Opinion ID: 3039101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kymsta Presented Evidence to Rebut the

Text: Presumption of Validity Afforded Quiksilver’s Marks, Foreclosing Judgment as a Matter of Law in Favor of Quiksilver. The presumption of validity may be rebutted “by showing that the registrant had not established valid ownership rights in the mark at the time of registration”; that is, “if [Kymsta] can show that [it] used the mark in commerce first, then the registration may be invalidated.” Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1996); Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 448 F.3d at 1124-26.
“ROXYWEAR” Before Quiksilver First Used “ROXY.” [5] Trademark rights are acquired by the party that first uses a mark in connection with the sale of goods. Sengoku Works Ltd., 96 F.3d at 1219; Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 448 F.3d at 1125-26. A mark is used in the sale of goods when “it is placed in any manner on the goods . . . or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. 2005); Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 448 F.3d at 1125-26.6 6 Relying on Hydro-Dynamics, Inc. v. George Putnam & Co., 811 F.2d 1470, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1987), Kymsta contends that Quiksilver, in attempting to prove that “QUIKSILVER ROXY” and “ROXY” have priority over “ROXYWEAR,” should have been held to the clear and convincing evidence standard, because Quiksilver attempted to prove first-use dates that preceded the dates averred in its federal registrations. However, because Kymsta conceded that “QUIKSILVER ROXY” has priority over “ROXYQUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP. 17379
Quiksilver First Used “ROXY” as a Standalone Mark Before Kymsta First Used “ROXY- WEAR.” [6] Quiksilver’s 1991 graffiti short displayed “QUIKSILVER” beginning on the left front side, wrapping around to the left back side.7 The short also displayed “ROXY” on the right back side. See Figures 3 and 4. Viewing the back of the short, “ROXY” is fully discernable, but only the last four letters of “QUIKSILVER” appear on the left side. See id. In view of the fact that both “QUIKSILVER” and “ROXY” were conspicuously displayed on the short in relatively close proximity, a reasonable jury could conclude that the short did not display “ROXY” as a standalone mark; an equally appropriate inference is that the short displayed the “QUIKSILVER ROXY” mark. The district court appeared to rule that Quiksilver used “ROXY” as a standalone mark on the first promotional poster, which featured the Bali-ohm logo. Assuming (without deciding) that this poster is relevant to proving that Quiksilver first used the “ROXY” mark in connection with the sale of WEAR,” Quiksilver had no need to prove first use of the “QUIKSILVER ROXY” mark at all, let alone by clear and convincing evidence. See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987). As to the “ROXY” mark, the registration lists the first-use date as “at least as early as January 1, 1992,” which precedes Kymsta’s first use of “ROXYWEAR” in mid-January, 1992. Quiksilver’s evidence supports the averment in its registration that it used “ROXY” at least as early as January 1, 1992. Quiksilver need not prove a first-use date that is earlier than that alleged in its registration application. Therefore, the clear and convincing evidence standard was never triggered. 7 At oral argument, Quiksilver suggested that the denim vest displayed “ROXY” as a standalone mark. However, because “ROXY” appears directly above “QUIKSILVER,” reasonable minds could infer that the vest displayed the “QUIKSILVER ROXY” mark. 17380 QUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP. apparel, reasonable minds could also differ on whether the Bali-ohm logo displayed the standalone “ROXY” mark or the “QUIKSILVER ROXY” mark.8 [7] In view of the evidence in the record,9 the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Quiksilver first used “ROXY” as a standalone mark before Kymsta first used “ROXYWEAR.”
Quiksilver Created Independent Trademark Significance for Its “ROXY” Mark Before Kymsta First Used “ROXYWEAR.” Quiksilver argues, in the alternative, that the evidence at trial established that the “ROXY” mark, used in conjunction with the “QUIKSILVER” house mark in 1990 and 1991, acquired independent trademark significance as Quiksilver’s mark for its juniors’ line. This contention provides an independent basis for concluding that Quiksilver is the senior user of “ROXY.” See Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1989). [8] A product mark like “ROXY,” even if always displayed with a house mark like “QUIKSILVER,” may acquire independent trademark significance. See Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Whether 8 Quiksilver also used the Bali-ohm logo on hangtags that it attached to all juniors’ apparel. For the same reason, these hangtags do not conclusively display “ROXY” as a standalone mark. 9 The record does reveal a poster displaying “ROXY” alone. At oral argument, however, Quiksilver disavowed reliance on this poster. In addition, Dodd testified that Quiksilver did not use the poster or the “ROXY” mark on the poster during her employment with Quiksilver, which ended in February, 1992. Her testimony serves as adequate evidence to support an inference that the “ROXY” mark as displayed on the poster was not used until sometime after she left in February, 1992, which is after Kymsta began using its “ROXYWEAR” mark. QUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP. 17381 “ROXY” acquired trademark significance independent of “QUIKSILVER” “depends on the manner of use and the commercial impression engendered by that use.” Id. (citation omitted). The question is whether “ROXY” is “recognized in and of itself as an indication of origin” for the product. Textron Inc. v. Cardinal Eng’g Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 397, 399 (T.T.A.B. 1969). In determining whether a mark has independent trademark significance, we consider whether the mark owner has engaged in “a constant pattern or effort . . . to use . . . [the product mark] in a manner separate and distinct from [the house mark].” See id. at 400 (holding that a product mark, “ZIP,” had a separate commercial impression from its house mark, “HOMELITE,” because, inter alia, “ ‘ZIP’ is always set off by three arcs or by different logo and print style or by different size lettering or by using it alone [and/or] in varying positions apart from ‘HOMELITE’.”). “[C]onsumer awareness of the product mark apart from the fame of the associated house mark,” the “strength of the public reputation of the product mark,” and the “nature and context of promotion” are also “reliable test[s] of the independence of the product mark from its parent house mark.” Bose Corp., 293 F.3d at 1374. [9] Quiksilver asserts that whenever it displayed “ROXY” with the “QUIKSILVER” house mark in 1990 and 1991, they were displayed in a separate and distinct manner. For example, Quiksilver’s second season hangtags displayed “QUIKSILVER” in corporate script and “ROXY” in a different size, font, and color. This evidence may suggest that “ROXY” acquired independent trademark significance, but it certainly does not establish it. In fact, evidence to the contrary exists, as McKnight and Danny Kwock, President of Quiksilver Entertainment, testified that when Quiksilver launched its juniors’ line, they were concerned because “no one would know who Roxy was at that time.” Consequently, Quiksilver decided to associate “ROXY” with “QUIKSILVER” to take advantage of Quiksilver’s reputation. 17382 QUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP. [10] The evidence also evinces a lack of promotion. Besides distributing free clothes and posters, Quiksilver did no consumer advertising for the “ROXY” brand at least through October 31, 1992, and did not advertise nationally in mainstream publications until 1995 or 1996. Cf. Kellogg Co. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 166 U.S.P.Q. 281, 282 (T.T.A.B. 1970) (recognizing the existence of independent trademark significance partially because “[e]xpenditures for media advertising ha[d] increased from a sum in excess of one hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars . . . to more than three million dollars . . .”). [11] The totality of the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that, by mid-January, 1992, consumers were not aware of “ROXY” apart from its association with “QUIKSILVER”; that the strength of the reputation of the “ROXY” mark was low; and that promotion for “ROXY” was weak, see Bose Corp., 293 F.3d at 1374; and, therefore, that “ROXY” was not “recognized in and of itself as an indication of origin” of Quiksilver’s juniors’ line. See Textron Inc., 164 U.S.P.Q. at 399.
Quiksilver May Tack the First-Use Date for Its “QUIKSILVER ROXY” Mark onto Its “ROXY” Mark. Kymsta conceded that Quiksilver used its “QUIKSILVER ROXY” mark in 1990 or 1991, and that “QUIKSILVER ROXY” has priority over “ROXYWEAR.” Ruling that tacking applies, the district court determined that “Quiksilver Roxy and Roxy are one and the same” and “ROXY” can benefit from “QUIKSILVER ROXY’s” 1990 or 1991 first-use date. [12] Under the tacking doctrine, a mark owner “essentially seeks to ‘tack’ his first use date in the earlier mark onto the subsequent mark.” Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at QUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP. 17383 1048 (citation omitted). Tacking permits a mark owner “to claim priority in a mark based on the first use date of a similar, but technically distinct, mark — but only in the exceptionally narrow instance where the previously used mark is the legal equivalent of the mark in question or indistinguishable therefrom such that consumers consider both as the same mark.” Id. at 1047-48 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “The standard for tacking . . . is exceedingly strict: The marks must create the same, continuing commercial impression, and the later mark should not materially differ from or alter the character of the mark attempted to be tacked.” Id. at 1048 (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). The later mark must be indistinguishable from the original mark at the time that the later mark is introduced. See id.; see also KeyCorp v. Key Bank & Trust, 99 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 (N.D. Ohio 2000).10 [13] Kymsta asserts that the district court erred by deciding tacking as a matter of law. Whether tacking is an issue of law or fact is a matter of first impression in this circuit. The only circuits that have addressed this issue are the Federal Circuit and the Sixth Circuit, and both consider tacking a legal question for the court. See Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 623 (6th Cir. 1998). The Federal Circuit arrived at its conclusion by citing to, 10 In deciding whether tacking applies, courts often compare the earlier mark with the subsequent mark to determine whether the two marks create “the same, continuing commercial impression.” Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1048-49 (emphasis omitted) (reviewing cases). The similarities or dissimilarities between two marks constitute evidence of whether consumers view them as indistinguishable. See id. at 1047-48. In this case, we are unable to compare the two marks because Quiksilver has not delineated the attributes of its “QUIKSILVER ROXY” mark; therefore, we are left without a referent against which to compare the “ROXY” mark. 17384 QUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP. and relying on, its cases that treat “likelihood of confusion” — an analogous consideration — as a question of law. See Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc., 926 F.2d at 1159 (citing Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1987), and In re Bed & Breakfast Registry, 791 F.2d 157, 158 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). In reaching the same conclusion, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. See Data Concepts, Inc., 150 F.3d at 623.11 [14] In contrast, we have analyzed likelihood of confusion as a question of fact. See Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002). Applying the approach of the Federal Circuit and the Sixth Circuit, we conclude that because we have analyzed the analogous consideration of likelihood of confusion as a factual question, whether tacking applies should also be analyzed as a question of fact. Although the outcome differs, the approach is consistent with that taken by our sister circuits. [15] A question of fact may be resolved as a matter of law if reasonable minds cannot differ and the evidence permits only one conclusion. See Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 194 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the evidence proffered by Quiksilver does not conclusively meet the “exceedingly strict” standard that, at the time the “ROXY” brand was introduced, consumers considered both “QUIKSILVER ROXY” and “ROXY” as the same mark. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1048; see also KeyCorp, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 820. McKnight testified that, when the “ROXY” brand was launched, he decided to associate the “ROXY” brand with “QUIKSILVER” because he was concerned that “no one would know who Roxy was.” Randy Hild, Quik- silver’s Senior Vice President of Marketing, confirmed that, without combining the “ROXY” brand with “QUIKSILVER,” 11 Subsequent Sixth Circuit cases have analyzed likelihood of confusion as a mixed question of fact and law. See Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 548 n.11 (6th Cir. 2005). QUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP. 17385 some people would not have recognized the “ROXY” brand as being from the Quiksilver company, and the presence of “QUIKSILVER” next to the “ROXY” brand could make a difference on how a consumer perceives the trademark. Finally, Dodd stated that the name of the brand given to the juniors’ line was “QUIKSILVER ROXY” because “no one would have known what ‘Roxy’ was.” [16] This is evidence from which a reasonable jury could easily conclude that “QUIKSILVER ROXY” and “ROXY” did not create the “same, continuing commercial impression” at the time the “ROXY” brand was introduced. Therefore, the decision to allow Quiksilver to tack its priority in “QUIKSILVER ROXY” onto “ROXY” was erroneous. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1049 (“[I]t would be clearly contrary to well-established principles of trademark law to sanction the tacking of a mark with a narrow commercial impression onto one with a broader commercial impression.” (quoting Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc., 926 F.2d at 1160)).
an Inherently Distinctive Mark. “There are five categories of trademarks: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; and (5) fanciful.” Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). At one end of the spectrum, generic marks “give the general name of the product; they embrace an entire class of products.” Id. (citation omitted). “Generic marks are not capable of receiving protection because they identify the product, rather than the product’s source.” Id. (citation omitted). At the other end of the spectrum, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are “deemed inherently distinctive and are automatically entitled to protection because they naturally serve to identify a particular source of a product.” Id. (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). 17386 QUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP. Descriptive marks “define a particular characteristic of the product in a way that does not require any exercise of the imagination.” Id. (citation omitted). “A descriptive mark can receive trademark protection if it has acquired distinctiveness by establishing ‘secondary meaning’ in the marketplace.” Id. (citation omitted); Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 448 F.3d at 1127-28. “Secondary meaning is used generally to indicate that a mark . . . ‘has come through use to be uniquely associated with a specific source.’ ‘To establish secondary meaning, [the relevant party] must show that, in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.’ ” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 766 n.4 (1992) (citations omitted). [17] Where, as here, the PTO issues a mark registration without requiring proof of secondary meaning, the registrant (Quiksilver) enjoys a “presumption that the purchasing public perceives the [“ROXY”] mark to be inherently distinctive.” Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento, 419 F.3d at 928. Kymsta seeks to rebut this presumption, contending that “ROXY” is not inherently distinctive because it is a female name. “[P]ersonal names — both surnames and first names — are generally regarded as descriptive terms,” 815 Tonawanda Street Corp. v. Fay’s Drug Co., 842 F.2d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted), which are not inherently distinctive. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992). To overcome the presumption in reliance on this theory, Kymsta must present evidence that “the primary significance of the mark to the purchasing public is that of [primarily only] a [name].” Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d at 345 (citation omitted). “[T]he relevant purchasing QUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP. 17387 public is not the population at large, but prospective purchasers of the product.” Id. (citation omitted). To establish that prospective purchasers perceived “ROXY” as primarily only a name, Kymsta presented evidence that “ROXY” is a female name; that “ROXY” is the name of McKnight’s daughter, as well as the daughter of the co-founder of Australian Quiksilver; and that Quiksilver employees and materials, including a promotional video, associated “ROXY” with McKnight’s daughter. In Lane Capital Management, Inc., appellant, like Kymsta in this case, argued that “Lane” in “Lane Capital Management” is not inherently distinctive because Lane is primarily only a surname. Id. at 341, 346. To support its argument, appellant presented evidence indicating that Lane is indeed a popular surname. Id. at 346. The Second Circuit held, however, that such evidence “is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial” because it “does not meet the burden of proving that it is primarily only a surname, especially since Lane — unlike, for example, Harris — does have a dictionary definition.” Id. (emphasis in the original). [18] In this case, although there is evidence that “ROXY” was the name of a theater and a night club and connoted “Rock ‘N’ Roll,” “ROXY,” unlike Lane, does not have a dictionary definition, suggesting that it is primarily only (if not only) a name. The absence of a dictionary definition for “ROXY,” together with Kymsta’s evidence — which included evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Quiksilver used advertising material that associated “ROXY” with the name of McKnight’s daughter — distinguish this case from Lane Capital Management, Inc. This evidence, construed in the light most favorable to Kymsta, reasonably supports an inference that prospective purchasers perceived “ROXY” as primarily only a name. Accordingly, judgment as a matter of law in favor of Quiksilver on the issue of inherent distinctiveness was not warranted. 17388 QUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP.