Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Prosecutor's Remark Purportedly on Defendant's Failure to Testify

Text: (47) Defendant maintains that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct at closing argument when he purportedly commented on defendant's failure to testify. He contends that the misconduct violated the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Discussing Fowler's and Chavez's killings, the prosecutor dwelt on the alibi defense: defendant was elsewhere, read about the killings in the newspapers, and falsely confessed. He pointed out discrepancies in the newspaper accounts and the confession. For the most part, he emphasized that defendant could not have given his detailed description of the facts solely from having read newspaper accounts of the crimes. The prosecutor proceeded: Now, the theory  I assume the defense theory is that for some reason he wanted to falsely confess to this crime and he wanted to do it properly. He didn't want to be caught in any lies or anything for some reason, otherwise who would be prosecuting him for these murders which he apparently wanted? And if there's a reason for that, perhaps we'll hear it from the defense. I don't know what it is. Why doesn't he tell us about his friend that the police are looking for? Now, according to most of these articles, very prominent in the whole thing is that there were these two people at this park. Now why doesn't he tell us about his pal who presumably got away? How is it that 27 months later he could remember the sort of detail that he has if he didn't do it? Defendant complains that the remark, Why doesn't he tell us, was a comment on his failure to take the witness stand. To be sure, the federal Constitution has been deemed to prohibit a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's failure to testify. ( People v. Mayfield, supra, 5 Cal.4th 142, 178, citing Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 110, 85 S.Ct. 1229].) But defendant did not assign misconduct to the remark when the prosecutor made it, and there is no reason to believe any harm could not have been cured. Defendant's point must therefore be rejected on procedural grounds. (See People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 754, 794.) Moreover, counsel cannot be faulted for not interposing an assignment of misconduct. Such an action would have been without merit, for it is manifest that the prosecutor did not comment on the failure to testify. We examine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood the remark to be a comment on defendant's failure to testify. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th 629, 663.) There is no such likelihood. The remark's context shows that the prosecutor was ridiculing the possibility that defendant wanted to confess falsely to two homicides on the basis of newspaper stories. He first stated that such an idea was inherently implausible. He then added that it was unlikely in fact: if defendant were confessing solely on the basis of newspaper accounts, he would, in his confession, have mentioned an accomplice because the stories mentioned the presence of two men at John Anson Ford Park. So this was not a comment on defendant's failure to testify, but rather on discrepancies between newspaper accounts of the Bell Gardens killings and the confession. It was a fair comment on the state of the evidence that falls outside the purview of Griffin. ... ( People v. Mayfield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 178.) There was no misconduct, and no constitutional violation.
Defendant contends that various errors bearing on penalty occurred in this case. As will appear, none of his claims has merit.
(48) Defendant contends that California's 1977 death penalty statute (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, pp. 1256-1266) is facially unconstitutional, in essence because it is unconstitutionally vague and gives the trier of fact too much discretion to decide his fate. For those asserted reasons he urges that it violates the federal Constitution's Eighth Amendment. It does not. ( Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. ___ [129 L.Ed.2d 750] [considering the 1978 death penalty statute]; Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 51-54 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 40-43, 104 S.Ct. 871] [considering the 1977 statute]; People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d 264, 315-316 (plur. opn.); accord, id. at p. 318 (conc. opn. of Newman, J.).)
(49) After his motion to sever counts was denied, defendant asked the court to hear the penalty trial itself in lieu of the jury. The court refused, stating that the prosecution was entitled to a jury trial and wanted one. Citing Singer v. United States (1965) 380 U.S. 24 [13 L.Ed.2d 630, 85 S.Ct. 783], defendant maintains that the ruling violated the due process clause and a right he claims to a reliable sentence under the Eighth Amendment because there were compelling reasons to have the court, rather than the jury, decide his fate. We have held that there is no state law right to waive a penalty trial by jury over the prosecution's objection. ( People v. King (1970) 1 Cal.3d 791, 795 [83 Cal. Rptr. 401, 463 P.2d 753].) The court could not constitutionally have granted defendant's request over the prosecutor's opposition. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) Thus his claim that former section 190.4, subdivision (c), did not require prosecutorial approval for a jury waiver must fail. The state Constitution would have trumped any such implicit statutory rule. ( People v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th 271, 336, fn. 18.) The United States Constitution is not offended: it is proper to require the prosecution and the court to agree to a defendant's request for a court trial. ( Singer v. United States, supra, 380 U.S. at pp. 26, 36 [13 L.Ed.2d at pp. 630, 638-639].) Defendant does not dispute this, but urges us to conclude that his case falls under Singer 's dictum that there might be some circumstances where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial. ( Id. at p. 37 [13 L.Ed.2d at p. 639].) He asserts that there were such circumstances here because two noncapital murder charges were joined with a capital murder charge, and the evidence relating to the three killings would be highly inflammatory, and would reveal inconsistent defenses to the killings. We agree with the People that this argument does little more than restate defendant's unsuccessful contention that the court wrongly denied his motion to sever the counts for the 1976 murders from that for the 1978 murder. ( Ante, at pp. 847-851.) We disagree that there were any circumstances that might possibly have entitled him to a court trial under Singer.
As described ante, page 856, before the penalty phase began, defendant moved that counsel either be relieved or not present a penalty defense. He complained that they would not tell him the defense strategy. Counsel acknowledged that defendant would not be told the names of specific witnesses, but explained that defendant was trying to get witnesses not to cooperate when he learned of their identity. From the beginning of pretrial proceedings, the record reveals that defendant wanted no meaningful penalty defense. His refusal to mount a penalty defense continued throughout the trial. It culminated in his statement to the jury urging his execution. ( Ante, p. 817.) Just before the penalty phase began, his counsel told the court, Mr. Memro would rather we not proceed with presenting evidence at a penalty phase. He has informed us that if we were to call some of these people or tell him that we are going to call them that he would make sure that they wouldn't appear. Defendant replied, I believe I have a right to know what is going to be done at the penalty phase or what isn't going to be done. The court ruled, I am not going to tell [counsel] to do anything. The court also refused to appoint new counsel who might tell defendant what witnesses would be called at the penalty phase. (50) Defendant contends in effect that the court's refusal either to compel counsel to adequately confer with him regarding penalty phase strategy or to relieve them for refusing to do so denied him the assistance of counsel in violation of the state and federal Constitutions. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution conferred a right to the assistance of counsel on defendant. ( Maine v. Moulton, supra, 474 U.S. 159, 168 [88 L.Ed.2d 481, 490-491]; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 694 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217].) But we have concluded that the right is not infringed when `the opportunity [of the defense] to participate fully and fairly in the adversary factfinding process' [citation] is not significantly limited. (46 Cal.3d at p. 695, first bracketed material added in Bonin. ) No such limitation occurred here. Rather, it was defendant who was trying to thwart the ability of the defense to participate fully in the factfinding process, and counsel who were trying to present a defense as fully as possible. At the time of the retrial, counsel was obligated to present evidence in mitigation even over defendant's objection. ( People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d 705, 712, 716-717 [280 Cal. Rptr. 424, 808 P.2d 1181].) Neither the right to counsel nor any right to a reliable penalty determination was violated by the court's refusal to accede, in effect, to defendant's desire to prevent his counsel from presenting evidence in mitigation. Nor do we discern any other federal constitutional violation. Defendant also asserts that the state Constitution's guaranty of the right to be personally present with counsel (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15) would be illusory if counsel were allowed to keep secret from [their] client [their] plans for trial. We disagree with the premise, however. Counsel obviously told him that they would introduce evidence in mitigation. They did refuse to reveal who the witnesses might be after he told them he would try to stop them from testifying. We do not see how the right to be personally present with counsel was violated by counsel's refusal to aid him in that quest.
(51) Defendant contends that the prosecution erred in failing to give him proper notice of evidence introduced in aggravation. He asserts that this failure violated state law and a right he discerns to a fundamentally fair penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. As will appear, his claim is not preserved for review, for he failed to move to have the evidence excluded. The cause was called to trial April 1, 1987. Months before, on December 30, 1986, the prosecution filed a notice of intention to introduce evidence in aggravation. In court the prosecutor handed defense counsel a photocopy of essentially the entire district attorney's file of the Schroeder incident. On February 6, 1987, defendant moved to have evidence of his prior conviction barred from any penalty trial. The court agreed, ruling that no evidence of the prior conviction could be introduced. At trial the prosecution elicited other evidence that defendant assaulted Schroeder in 1972 when he was nine years old. His conviction of that crime was not introduced in evidence. Section 190.3 provided in relevant part, Except for evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time, as determined by the court, prior to trial. Evidence may be introduced without such notice in rebuttal to evidence introduced by the defendant in mitigation. The purpose of this provision `is to advise an accused of the evidence against him so that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense at the penalty trial. [Citation.]' ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1152 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].) We have construed the phrase `prior to trial' to mean before the cause is called to trial. ( People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1070 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277].) But defendant did not move, before or during trial, to exclude evidence of the attack itself. He has failed to preserve his claim on appeal. In any event, a motion to exclude the evidence would have been unavailing. The prosecution had given ample notice of its intention to rely on the incident involving Schroeder, and defendant could not reasonably have believed that by having caused proof of the prior conviction to be barred, he had thwarted the prosecution's ability to show the circumstances of the crime against the victim by other evidence.
(52) Defendant testified before the jury that he wanted a verdict of death. ( Ante, p. 817.) He contends that the effect of [his] testimony was to compel the death penalty, and that it likely relieved the jury of its full responsibility to fix the penalty based upon the proper statutory factors. He asserts that the evidence was irrelevant (Evid. Code, § 350), and that its introduction made the verdict unreliable and thereby violated rights he finds in the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant invited any error when he testified. Moreover, he offered no objection at trial on the grounds he now raises. He has failed to preserve his claims for review.
After defendant testified that he desired death, he was cross-examined. He was asked whether he planned to appeal his conviction  he denied that he did  and whether he felt he would get quicker and more direct access to the Supreme Court if you're given the death penalty.... Defendant did not object to these questions. (53) Defendant asserts that the cross-examination improperly focused the jury on the role of the appellate process, thereby relieving the jury of the need to be aware that it was responsible for determining his fate. He contends that this procedure violated the federal Constitution. To be sure, [a]rguably the mere mention of appeal is improper, since it rarely serves any constructive purpose and may lead the jury on its own to infer that [its] responsibility for penalty determination is diluted. But when the context does not suggest appellate correction of an erroneous death verdict, the danger that a jury will feel a lesser sense of responsibility for its verdict is minimal. ( People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1106 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) As was true in Bittaker, there was no suggestion of appellate correction of an erroneous verdict. (Cf. Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 325-326, 328-329 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 237-238, 238-239, 105 S.Ct. 2633] (plur. opn.); id. at p. 341 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 247] (opn. of O'Connor, J., conc. in part & in judg.).) Therefore defense counsel's failure to object is fatal to his contention. ( People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1106.)
(54) Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he argued to the jury that life imprisonment without possibility of parole was legally not worse than death, and again when he argued that if you think that by sentencing him to life without possibility of parole that you're going to cause him to sit around and contemplate this for the rest of your life, the rest of his life, I think you're going to make a big mistake. Defendant did not assign misconduct to either statement. He maintains here that the prosecutor's first comment misstated the law, and that the second hinted to the jury that defendant might not spend the rest of his life in prison if not sentenced to death. The result, in his view, was to deprive him of a right he asserts to a fair, reliable, and individualized sentence under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Because defendant did not assign misconduct to either statement, and there is no reason to believe that an admonition would not have cured any harm, his claims are not preserved on appeal. ( People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th 463, 537.) Defendant urges that if we so conclude, the failure to assign misconduct to the prosecutor's statements amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. First, the prosecutor's comment that life imprisonment without possibility of parole was legally not worse than death was accurate as a legal matter, whatever philosophical feelings individuals might have on the subject ( People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1223, fn. 7 [259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698]), for indeed death is the worse punishment. At the time the jury decides the penalty for a death-eligible individual that person will already have been convicted of first degree murder and one or more special circumstances will have been found true, meaning that a minimum penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole must be imposed, or the accused will have been convicted of another offense imposing a sentence either of death or of life imprisonment without possibility of parole (e.g., Mil. & Vet. Code, § 1672, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 128). Thus, the law's command to the trier of fact to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances at that time can only mean to consider the possibility of a worse punishment than what the individual was already automatically subject to. (§§ 190.2, subd. (a), 190.3.) The 1977 statute was no different. Moreover, section 190.4, subdivision (b), provides that if a jury twice cannot decide the penalty, the court may order a third jury impaneled or may sentence the defendant to prison. It is unlikely, in our view, that the Legislature would have allowed a court to prescribe the legally worse penalty if the community could not agree that the defendant should receive it. (The 1977 statute's different penalty retrial scheme (see post, p. 882) does not compel a different conclusion.) (55) And the prosecutor's reference to defendant's lack of future reflection was a comment that because he would not spend the rest of his life racked by regret over his murders of Fowler, Chavez, and Carter, imprisonment was an insufficient punishment. He was not arguing that defendant would spend less than the rest of his life in prison if sentenced to that fate.
Defendant requested that the court not instruct the jury with language derived from factors (e) and (j) of section 190.3 in the penalty instructions. It refused. The instructions directed the jury to consider whether or not the victims consented to the homicidal acts or were participant[s] in the defendant's homicidal conduct, and whether the defendant was an accomplice to the offense[s] and his participation ... relatively minor. Defendant contends that giving instructions he views as listing inapplicable mitigating factors violated the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We have rejected similar claims ( People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 718 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729] [construing 1978 death penalty statute]) and do so here as well.
At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence of prior violent criminal conduct. The court instructed the jury that the evidence was introduced to show that defendant violated section 273d, which the court defined as cruel or inhuman bodily injury on a child which involved the express use of force. As the parties were discussing the language of this instruction, defendant said he'd just as soon have the 245  i.e., have the jury instructed on assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). But the court found section 273d to be a better fit and did not instruct on assault. Defendant did not ask the court to instruct the jury on the elements of section 273d. He contends that the court erred  he does not specify under what statutory or constitutional regime  in failing to define the elements of section 273d sua sponte. As he concedes, we have rejected that claim ( People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1, 48-49), and we continue to do so. (56) He also contends that the court should have instructed the jury in the language of assault rather than cruel or inhuman bodily injury on a child.... He argues that the latter definition was inflammatory and violated the Eighth Amendment because it created a risk that the penalty would be arbitrarily decided. The parties point us to no case in which this question has previously been raised, and we have been unable to locate any. Assuming that defendant's comment registered an objection, there was no error, because there was substantial evidence that defendant violated section 273d and, as a matter of law, simply providing the definition of an offense supported by substantial evidence cannot unduly inflame a trier of fact.