Opinion ID: 784977
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Determination of Loss on Remand

Text: 19 Zakhary submits that this court should limit the district court's authority, on remand, to order restitution in the amount of $1,145 in favor of Providian National Bank because this is the only identifiable victim loss that was determined at the original sentence. In response to the government's assertion that it can now identify other victims and their specific losses, Zakhary argues that such a belated accounting is barred by 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), which requires victims' losses to be determined and an order of restitution entered no later than ninety days after sentencing. See United States v. Stevens, 211 F.3d at 4 (holding that § 3664(d)(5) contemplates the entry of the restitution order within the 90-day period). We reject Zakhary's argument. 20 As this court has now twice explained, the purpose behind the statutory ninety-day limit on the determination of victims' losses is not to protect defendants from drawn-out sentencing proceedings or to establish finality; rather, it is to protect crime victims from the willful dissipation of defendants' assets. See United States v. Catoggio, 326 F.3d at 330; United States v. Stevens, 211 F.3d at 4-5 & n. 2; see also United States v. Dando, 287 F.3d 1007, 1110 n. 4, 1111 n. 6 (10th Cir.) (citing approvingly to Stevens in concluding that ninety-day limitation period is to protect victims rather than defendants), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 917, 123 S.Ct. 301, 154 L.Ed.2d 202 (2002); United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d at 639 (emphasizing that beneficiaries of § 3664 procedures are the victims, not the victimizers). Similarly, the statutory requirement for individualized, rather than aggregate, loss calculation is aimed primarily at protecting victims, ensuring their receipt of the pro-rata share of the restitution funds to which they are entitled. United States v. Catoggio, 326 F.3d at 328. 4 Mindful of these goals, we have ruled that a district court's failure to determine identifiable victims' losses within ninety days after sentencing, as prescribed by § 3664(d)(5), will be deemed harmless error to the defendant unless he can show actual prejudice from the omission. See United States v. Stevens, 211 F.3d at 5; accord United States v. Catoggio, 326 F.3d at 329-30. 21 Our discussion of harmless error in Stevens and Catoggio arose in slightly different contexts. In Stevens, the defendant sought to vacate a restitution order that determined identifiable victims' losses 117 days after sentencing. Finding no prejudice from the § 3664(d)(5) delay, we affirmed the order. 211 F.3d at 4-6. In Catoggio, the challenged restitution order was not simply belated; it failed to identify victims or their specific losses. Thus, we addressed the question presented in this case: whether, in light of the time limit imposed by § 3665(d)(5), we can remand the case to the district court to identify the victims and their losses. 326 F.3d at 329. Drawing on Stevens 's discussion of harmless error, we concluded that such a remand was appropriate where a defendant failed to show prejudice. Id. at 329-30. The Seventh Circuit has similarly ruled. See United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d at 640 (To give the victims the benefit of the 90-day period, which runs from the date of sentencing, we direct the district judge to resentence the defendant.). 22 Zakhary does not quarrel with the harmless error presumption in Stevens and Catoggio. Neither does he assert that he would be prejudiced by a determination of identifiable victims' losses on remand. Instead, he urges us to limit the presumption of harmlessness to § 3664(d)(5) delays caused by a defendant, see United States v. Stevens, 211 F.3d at 4-6, or consented to by him, see United States v. Catoggio, 326 F.3d at 325-26, 330. Zakhary notes that he did neither; to the contrary, he repeatedly requested victim identification and an individualized loss accounting in the district court. But apart from drawing this factual distinction, Zakhary offers no legal rationale for why harmless error review should pertain only to cases of defendant misconduct or consent. 23 Zakhary's argument is legally unconvincing, largely because it conflates harmless error review with principles of equitable estoppel. In Stevens, we alluded to equitable estoppel in commenting on how defendant's misconduct in that case likely contributed to the delay in determining victims' losses: the 90-day clock in § 3664(d)(5) may be tolled by the defendant's own purposeful misconduct. 211 F.3d at 5; see United States v. Dando, 287 F.3d at 1011 (citing Stevens and holding that defendant's request for a continuance tolled the ninety-day period established by § 3664(d)(5)). But Stevens expressly did not rely on estoppel in affirming the challenged restitution order in that case because estoppel would have required a remand for further factfinding by the district court. 211 F.3d at 5. Instead, Stevens concluded that any § 3664(d)(5) error was harmless because defendant could not show that the delay caused prejudice to his ... defense, a holding made without reference to defendant's alleged misconduct. Id. 5 24 As Stevens observed, sentencing errors not affecting substantial rights are regularly deemed harmless. See id. (and cases cited therein). The principle pertains with special force to a sentencing statute such as § 3664(d)(5), the primary purpose of which is to protect victims' rights. Absent a defendant's clear showing that his substantial rights have been prejudiced by a § 3664(d)(5) delay, it would in fact, defeat the statutory purpose to allow a defendant to invoke this provision in order to avoid paying restitution to the victims of his crime. United States v. Catoggio, 326 F.3d at 330. 25 We note that two sister circuits, although not addressing Zakhary's particular argument, have applied harmless error review in cases of § 3664(d)(5) delays not caused or consented to by defendants. In United States v. Vandeberg, 201 F.3d 805 (6th Cir.2000), the Sixth Circuit ruled that a failure to afford a defendant an opportunity to be heard as to the proposed amount of restitution within the ninety days prescribed by § 3664(d)(5) constituted harmless error because the court provided him ample opportunity to object to the amount thereafter, id. at 814. On remand, we expect the district court will similarly afford Zakhary ample opportunity to object to any victim identifications or loss amounts with which he disagrees. In United States v. Grimes, the Seventh Circuit ruled that a defendant was not prejudiced by a district court's failure to identify, within ninety days of sentence, all crime victims entitled to share in the challenged $500,000 restitution order: the error wronged the victims, not [the defendant]. 173 F.3d at 639. So in this case, where Zakhary admitted that he caused losses in the tens of thousands of dollars, the failure timely to identify individual losses has wronged only the victims, not Zakhary. 26 Accordingly, we decline to limit harmless error review of § 3664(d)(5) delays to cases in which a defendant causes or consents to the delay. We direct the district court, on remand, to resentence defendant only with respect to restitution; because Zakhary has failed to show prejudice, 6 we place no other limits on the district court's determination of each identifiable victim's losses or on its award of full restitution.