Opinion ID: 2117678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Recent Montana and Michigan Cases

Text: Courts from Montana and Michigan have been the most recent to have considered at least some of the aspects of an agricultural exclusion from workmen's compensation statutes. Both courts expressed some general principles with which we agree. In State ex rel. Hammond v. Hager, 160 Mont. 391, 503 P.2d 52 (1972), the Montana Supreme Court was urged to ignore New York Central R. Co. v. White, supra , because there the issues were not considered head on, but only obliquely. The United States Supreme Court had used the terms patent, simple and familiar in describing agricultural employment, leaving the inference that that was the basis for justifying the agricultural exclusion. The majority of the Montana court did not indicate any disagreement with Hammond's criticism of White, nor with its contention that farming in Montana is not, in these days, patent, simple and familiar. The Montana court held that Hammond failed to overcome the strong presumption of constitutional validity and that it failed to negative every conceivable basis which might support it. Two of the Montana justices concurred specially, contending that there was no constitutional issue properly before the court. Because no state constitutional violation was asserted, there apparently was no reason for the court to discuss whether or not an intermediate standard of scrutiny is available in Montana. When the United States Supreme Court on appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, without explanation, it missed an opportunity to clarify a confused legal problem. See Hammond v. Hager, 411 U.S. 912, 93 S.Ct. 1548, 36 L.Ed.2d 303 (1973). Holding that an agricultural exclusion in the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act was discriminatory to persons thereby excluded, the Michigan Supreme Court in Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Company, 388 Mich. 654, 202 N.W.2d 786 (1972), reversed a Michigan Court of Appeals' holding in Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Company, 34 Mich.App. 489, 192 N.W.2d 52 (1971). The Michigan Supreme Court made no comments upon its previous, contrary holding in Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8, 153 N.W. 49 (1915), which, in upholding the exclusions from workmen's compensation coverage, stated: The law is unquestionable that it is within the power of the Legislature to classify both employers and employes, if the classification is not fanciful or arbitrary and for reasons of public policy, is based upon substantial distinctions, is germane to the object sought to be accomplished by the act, not limited to existing conditions only, and applies impartially and equally to each member of the class. Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., supra, 153 N.W. at 55. In Gutierrez, out of the seven Michigan justices, four (Adams, T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., Black and Swainson) concluded that: There is no basis for distinguishing the work of a laborer who drives a truck at a factory from a laborer who drives one on the farm or for any one of numerous other labor activities `on the farm' as distinguished from the same activity in industry, wholesaling, retailing, or building.. . . . . . . . If the argument is that this creates special benefits for a class of agricultural workers . . . then it is clearly discriminatory as to all other employees. . . If the argument is that the benefits are illusory since the class created is next to non-existent, then the exclusions. . . are all the more to be condemned. Finally, the argument that Section 115(e) is especially tailored to meet the problems of the small farmer and his occasional employees fails to account for the need for similar treatment as to the small businessman  grocer, clothier, butcher  or as to the small contractor  plumber, carpenter, roofer  or as to numerous other categories of small employers and their employees who are not accorded this treatment. Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Company, supra, 202 N.W.2d at 791. These four justices were not only concerned about a subclassification of agricultural employees but found that the special benefit to agricultural employers was impermissible, clearly discriminatory, and unsupported by any rational basis. Justice T. G. Kavanagh, when applying the rational-basis standard, concluded that there is a rational basis for distinguishing between agricultural and nonagricultural employees but, by applying a modified, substantive, due-process type of test, found the exclusion of a subclassification of agricultural workers invalid on the basis that the existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect. See Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Company, supra, 202 N.W.2d at 793, and Wright v. Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 92 S.Ct. 2196, 33 L.Ed.2d 51 (1972). Justice Williams agreed with Justice T. G. Kavanagh that the subclassification violated equal protection and found it altogether unreasonable and lacking in rational basis. He further agreed with the principle that the effect of a statute in combination with other factors may be the basis for applying the same standard of close scrutiny ordinarily associated with suspect classification. Justice Williams asserted that there were not sufficient facts to establish a suspect classification. Justice Brennan dissented, finding no discrimination. None of the justices concluded that there was an inherently suspect class even though the plaintiffs were Hispanic. None of the justices labeled it a fundamental right violated. In the light of these circumstances, Justice T. G. Kavanagh's statement appears significant: A court is not confined to a sterile examination of the statute itself but must look to its effect. [Footnote omitted.] Such effect alone may dictate a finding that equal protection has been denied. This is true because when a classification is made by a statute we must look first to its reasonableness and then to its effect  direct and indirect. If the effect is direct we have little trouble in determining discrimination. If the direct effect is not constitutionally offensive however, we must look for any indirect effect. An indirect effect is no more legitimate than a direct effect, and we must assay the effect apart from the purpose. `The existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect.' [Footnote omitted.] Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Company, supra, 202 N.W.2d at 793. We can only conclude that the Michigan Supreme Court has applied an intermediate standard of review which involves the rational basis to the extent applicable, and the strict-scrutiny standard where applicable. Although this court desires to portray an image of intellectual vitality and to display its capacity to identify and evaluate each analytically distinct ingredient of the contending interests, we have a legacy of judicial restraint which we should not cavalierly abandon. Use of judicial restraint, however, does not permit a court to ignore its responsibility. If taken too literally, the rule that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature could result in the abdication by the court of any authority to review the constitutionality of legislation. The ultimate result would be a destruction of the constitution as a limitation on legislative action. The pendulum could likewise swing too far the other way and the court could become so aggressively creative that the judge's notions as to what is good or bad or necessary or unnecessary could improperly restrict policy-making functions of the legislative branch.