Opinion ID: 3011740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Firm Resettlement Inquiry

Text: The BIA denied Abdille asylum from Somalia based on a finding of firm resettlement in South Africa. As mentioned _________________________________________________________________ the firm resettlement bar). Prior to 1990, INS regulations prohibited district directors from granting asylum to aliens who had firmly resettled in a third country, see 8 C.F.R.S 208.8(f)(1)(ii) (1988), but the BIA interpreted that regulation as not applying either to immigration judges or to the Board itself. See Matter of Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99, 104 (BIA 1989). Accordingly, for immigration judges and the BIA, firm resettlement was a factor used to guide their discretion in determining whether to grant asylum. See 3 Charles Gor don et al., Immigration Law & Procedure S 33.04[1][e][iii], at 33-52.9 (2000). The BIA did, however, also rule that firm resettlement would ordinarily preclude an asylum grant unless the alien could demonstrate compelling countervailing equities in his or her favor. See Soleimani, 20 I. & N. at 105. Effective October 1, 1990, the INS amended its regulations concerning firm resettlement, providing for a mandatory denial of asylum upon a finding of firm resettlement. See 8 C.F.R. S 208.14(c)(2) (1991);see also 8 C.F.R. S 202.13(c)(2)(i)(B) (2000) (stating that for asylum applications filed before April 1, 1997, an immigration or asylum officer shall not grant asylum to any alien who [h]as beenfirmly resettled.). As noted above, Congress in 1996 codified this mandatory bar in the federal asylum statute at 8 U.S.C. S 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). 9 above, the firm resettlement bar applicable in Abdille's case is codified in the INA at 8 U.S.C. S 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi), and referenced in the INS's regulations at 8 C.F.R. S 208.13(c)(1).5 The INA does not furnish a definition offirm resettlement, but federal regulations do, and that definition becomes vital to our analysis in the instant matter. Specifically, 8 C.F.R. S 208.15, captioned Definition of `firm resettlement,'  provides the following: An alien is considered to be firmly resettled if, prior to arrival in the United States, he or she enter ed into another nation with, or while in that nation r eceived, an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement unless he or she establishes: (a) That his or her entry into that nation was a necessary consequence of his or her flight fr om persecution, that he or she remained in that nation only as long as was necessary to arrange onwar d travel, and that he or she did not establish significant ties in that nation; or (b) That the conditions of his or her residence in that nation were so substantially and consciously r estricted by the authority of the country of refuge that he or she was not in fact resettled. In making his or her determination, the Asylum Officer or Immigration Judge shall consider the conditions under which other residents of the country live, the type of housing made available to the refugee, whether permanent or temporary, the types and extent of employment available to the refugee, and the extent to which the refugee received permission to hold property and to enjoy other rights and privileges, such as travel documentation including a right of entry or r eentry, _________________________________________________________________ 5. In their briefs, both Abdille and the INS err oneously assume that 8 C.F.R. S 208.13(c)(2) contains the relevant firm resettlement bar. However, by its terms, this provision applies only to an alien who filed his or her application before April 1, 1997. 8 C.F.R. S 208.13(c)(2)(i) (2000) (emphasis added). Abdille did not arrive in the United States until April 8, 1999, and his asylum application is dated July 23, 1999. 10 education, public relief, or naturalization, or dinarily available to others resident in the country. 8 C.F.R. S 208.15 (2000) (emphasis added). It is the BIA's application of this provision that is at issue. The BIA's reliance on the firm r esettlement bar as its basis for denying Abdille asylum from Somalia r equires us to consider the factors that inform a finding of firm resettlement. Our analysis, of course, is constrained by the great deference we owe to the INS in immigration matters, particularly when the agency interprets and applies its own regulations. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirr e-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999) (holding that Chevron deference, typically triggered when an agency construes a statute it is charged with administering, is appropriate in the immigration context because of the INA's express delegation of authority to the Attorney General); Applebaum v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 226 F.3d 214, 218 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that when an agency is interpreting its own regulation, rather than a statute it administers, review is under the Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), standard, which renders the agency's interpretation controlling unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, id. at 414). Our principal guide in this endeavor is the language and structure of 8 C.F.R. S 208.15, the INS's own definition of firm resettlement. It is readily evident from the plain language of S 208.15 that the prime element in the firm resettlement inquiry is the existence vel non of an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement. 8 C.F .R. S 208.15 (2000). Thus, on its face, S 208.15 explicitly centers thefirm resettlement analysis on the question whether a third country issued to the alien an offer of some type of official status permitting the alien to reside in that country on a per manent basis. The alternative approach would have us consider the existence of a government-issued offer as simply one component of a broader firm resettlement inquiry according equal weight to such non-offer-based factors as the alien's length of stay in a third country, the economic and social ties that the alien develops in that country, and the alien's 11 intent to make that country his permanent home. Under such an approach, the IJ and BIA would consider both the formal issuance of an offer and the existence of various non-offer-based factors together , as part of the total mix of information bearing on the firm r esettlement question, and, after weighing these elements as a whole, would arrive at a conclusion regarding the applicant's fir m resettlement in the third country. Such a totality of the alien's circumstances-type of calculus is suggested by Chinese American Civil Council v. Attorney General, 566 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1977), in which the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that Chinese aliens who had lived in Hong Kong for at least fifteen years following their flight from mainland China had firmly resettled in Hong Kong. See id. at 326. In reaching this conclusion and in elaborating on the fir m resettlement inquiry, the D.C. Circuit relied principally on non-offerbased elements, noting that the time elapsed between an alien's flight from a country of persecution and his application for asylum in the U.S. is an important factor in determining whether an alien had fir mly resettled in a third country, see id. at 328 & n.18, and further stating that [a]n applicant's family ties, intent, business or property connections and other matters may be relevant to resettlement determinations. Id. at 328 n.18. The court made no mention of whether the government of Hong Kong had extended to the aliens an offer of per manent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of per manent resettlement. Although not expressly labeling it as such, other courts of appeals also appear to have employed a totality of the alien's circumstances approach in thefirm resettlement context. For example, in Farbakhsh v. INS, 20 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a BIA decision denying an Iranian national eligibility for asylum in the United States based on the applicant's resettlement in Spain. In concluding that the BIA's finding of firm resettlement was supported by the record, the court relied on several non-offer-based elements, such as the fact that the applicant had lived more than four years in Spain without fear of being returned to Iran; that he initially 12 intended to remain in Spain; and that his younger brother and younger sister were living in Spain. Id. at 882. As in Chinese American, no explicit mention of the for mal issuance of an offer of permanent r esettlement was made. In a similar vein, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit appeared to follow a totality approach in Mussie v. INS, 172 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 1999), deciding that an Ethiopian citizen had firmly resettled in Germany because she received asylum status and travel documentation from the German government, and [i]n addition, she lived in Germany for six years, during which time she r eceived government assistance for language schooling, transportation, rent, and food; held a job; paid taxes; and rented her own apartment. Id. at 331-32. We believe, however, that the plain language of the INS's own definition of firm resettlement counsels against such a broad, totality of the alien's circumstances analytical framework. Section 208.15 clearly states that a prima facie case of firm resettlement is established once the evidence shows that the asylum applicant received an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement in a thir d country. 8 C.F.R. S 208.15 (2000). Although S 208.15 expr essly enumerates certain non-offer-based elements, such as the type of housing made available to the refugee, . . . the types and extent of employment available to the refugee, and the extent to which the refugee received per mission to hold property, id. S 208.15(b), it prompts the IJ to consider such factors only in determining whether one of the two exceptions to the firm resettlement bar provided for in S 208.15 applies; it does not list these elements in connection with the prima facie showing of fir m resettlement.6 _________________________________________________________________ 6. For example, S 208.15(a), which per mits an alien to rebut the prima facie showing of firm resettlement by demonstrating that he or she remained in that nation only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel, authorizes the alien to set forth evidence that he or she did not establish significant ties in that nation. 8 C.F.R. S 208.15(a) (2000) (emphasis added). Similarly, S 208.15(b), which allows an alien to make this rebuttal showing by establishing[t]hat the conditions of his or her residence in that nation were . . . substantially and consciously restricted by the authority of the country of r efuge, expressly mandates 13 Thus, by its terms, this regulatory pr ovision focuses the firm resettlement analysis on the existence vel non of a formal government-issued offer . We are not the first court to r ecognize the prime relevance for firm resettlement purposes of a government's offer of some type of permanent r esettlement: the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit followed a complementary analysis in Abdalla v. INS, 43 F.3d 1397 (10th Cir. 1994). In Abdalla, the court considered the case of a Sudanese native who was found by the BIA to have fir mly resettled in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) prior to his arrival in the United States. See id. at 1398. The court upheld the BIA's conclusion, focusing principally on the fact that the alien had lived for twenty years in the UAE under a r esidence permit issued by the UAE government. See id. at 1399. In effect, the Abdalla court treated the residence permit, which had apparently conferred on the alien a legal right to live and work in the UAE for two decades, as dir ect evidence of a government-issued offer of permanent resettlement. Importantly, the court went on to note that this permit, viewed in light of the applicant's twenty-year stay in the UAE, was sufficient to suggest per manent resident status, citizenship or some other per manent resettlement. Id. at 1399 (inter nal quotation marks and citations omitted). The court ended its fir m resettlement analysis by shifting the burden to the aliento prove that his extended, officially sanctioned stay in [the UAE] did not constitute a firm resettlement in the UAE. Id. at 1399 (emphasis added). It ultimately concluded that the alien did not meet this burden in part because other , non-offerbased factors, such as the alien's significant family ties to the UAE, militated in favor of a firm r esettlement finding. See id. at 1400. _________________________________________________________________ that an immigration judge, in evaluating the alien's evidentiary presentation, consider factors such as the type of housing made available to the refugee, . . . the types and extent of employment available to the refugee, and the extent to which the refugee received permission to hold property and to enjoy other rights and privileges . . . ordinarily available to others resident in the country. 8 C.F.R. S 208.15(b) (2000). 14 We acknowledge that circumstances may arise in which the INS may not be able to secure direct evidence of a formal government offer of some type of permanent resettlement, and thus may be not be able to make the prima facie showing of firm resettlement under S 208.15 in that manner. In such a situation, the IJ or BIA may find it necessary to rely on non-offer-based factors, such as the length of an alien's stay in a third country, the alien's intent to remain in the country, and the extent of the social and economic ties developed by the alien, as cir cumstantial evidence of the existence of a government-issued offer. As we see it, if direct evidence of an offer is unobtainable, such non-offer-based elements can serve as a surrogate for direct evidence of a formal offer of some type of permanent resettlement, if they rise to a sufficient level of clarity and force, which we need not here delineate. 7 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced such a situation in Cheo v. INS, 162 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1998), as described in the margin.8 See also Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1043 _________________________________________________________________ 7. In the instant matter, the INS has adduced some direct evidence that Abdille received an offer of some type of resettlement from the South African government. See infra Section IV.A. The INS also points to certain non-offer-based factors, especially Abdille's employment as a street vendor and his opportunity to work as an electrician in South Africa, to bolster its contention that Abdille hadfirmly resettled in that country. See infra note 9. However, because we reject a totality of the alien's circumstances approach to thefirm resettlement inquiry, and because the INS has presented direct evidence of a South African government-issued offer (on which it primarily relied in arguing that Abdille had received an offer of some type of permanent resettlement within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. S 208.15), we need not address whether such factors can serve as circumstantial evidence of a governmentissued offer. 8. In Cheo, two Cambodian nationals, Meng Ly Cheo and Meng Heng Cheo, sought refuge from their native land, but had lived for three years in Malaysia prior to their entry into the United States. See 162 F.3d at 1228. In conducting its firm resettlement inquiry, the Ninth Circuit first noted that there is no direct evidence one way or the other as to whether the Cheos have or had the right to r eturn to Malaysia, id. at 1229, and therefore no evidence as to whether they had received an offer of permanent resettlement from the government of that country. In such a circumstance, the court contemplated the use of non-offer-based factors as a substitute for the existence of an of fer as prima facie 15 (9th Cir. 1999) (In the absence of dir ect evidence of an offer, a lengthy, undisturbed r esidence in a third country may establish a rebuttable presumption that an individual has the right to return to that country and remain there permanently.); Mussie v. INS, 172 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing with approval Cheo's pr esumption based on the length of the alien's stay). Finally, we note that the emphasis that S 208.15's firm resettlement calculus places on the existence of a formal government offer of some type of per manent resettlement is in keeping with a principal facet of immigration law: A nation has broad authority to regulate the terms and conditions under which an individual can be admitted within its borders, and under which he can seek to establish a residence therein. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 453 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1971). Absent some government dispensation, an immigrant who surr eptitiously enters a nation without its authorization cannot obtain official resident status no matter his length of stay, his intent, or the extent of the familial and economic connections he develops. Citizenship or permanent residency cannot be gained through adverse possession. With this understanding of the factors under girding the firm resettlement inquiry in mind, we turn to the BIA's decision in the instant matter. _________________________________________________________________ evidence of firm resettlement. Specifically, the court fashioned a rebuttable presumption of firm r esettlement based on the aliens' length of stay: Three years of peaceful residence established that the ground of `firm resettlement' in Malaysia might apply . . . . That was enough time so that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it would be a reasonable inference from the duration that Malaysia allowed the Cheos to stay indefinitely. Id. 16