Opinion ID: 1985099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claim of Improper Rebuttal Argument

Text: Appellant argues that the government engaged in improper rebuttal argument. Specifically, appellant cites the prosecution's statements to the jury that you took an oath to decide this case without fear, without fear. If you make a mistake, if a mistake is made in this case[,] Mr. Edwards has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals and they can give him a brand new trial and start all over again if a mistake was made. Don't be afraid to go back and make the decision. Appellant contends that these statements misled the jury as to its function as the finder of fact. He asserts that the statements not only misinformed the jury but reduced the jury's conception of the importance of its role. In addition, appellant maintains that the government's prefatory remarks to the effect that the government had already taken the burden of proof standard into account at several prior pretrial stages  i.e., when entering charges, asking the grand jury to vote, and determining to proceed to trial  were further designed to diminish the jury's sense of importance of its responsibilities and, if the jury did have any doubts about Mr. Edwards' guilt, to cause the jury to put aside or counter such doubts with the knowledge that other groups of informed, government persons had concluded that Mr. Edwards was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant concedes that he did not object to the government's comments at trial. In evaluating appellant's claim of prosecutorial impropriety, this court must first determine whether the prosecutor's comments constituted misconduct. Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 32 (D.C.1989) (citations omitted); see also Bowman v. United States, 652 A.2d 64, 70 (D.C.1994). Once a determination has been made that the prosecutor's comments were improper, this court must then determin[e] whether prosecutorial [impropriety] infects a verdict [by] . . . balanc[ing] ... the gravity of the [impropriety], its direct relationship to the issue of innocence or guilt, and the effect of specific corrective instructions of the trial court, if any, against the weight of the evidence of appellant's guilt. Bowman, 652 A.2d at 70 (citations omitted). Finally, where a defendant has properly preserved his objection on the record, this court must make a determination as to whether we can say with fair assurance, after all that has happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. Irick, 565 A.2d at 32 (citations omitted). However, where as here, defendant has not properly preserved his objection, this court will reverse his conviction only if the misconduct so clearly prejudiced his substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of his trial. Id. (citations omitted); see also Bowman, 652 A.2d at 71. The question is `whether the judge abused his discretion by failing to intervene sua sponte in the prosecutor's argument.' Parker v. United States, 757 A.2d 1280, 1289 (D.C.2000) (quoting Mills v. United States, 599 A.2d 775, 787 (D.C. 1991)). [R]eversal for plain error in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct should be confined to `particularly egregious' situations. Id. (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)); see also Bowman, 652 A.2d at 71. This is not such a case. Assuming an impropriety in the prosecutor's comments, in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, it is not likely that this brief statement infected the verdict.