Opinion ID: 1755027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: motion for mistrial based on improper impeachment

Text: Dessaure argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to impeach William Birchard and Rodney Stafford, two defense witnesses, by cross-examining them about their mandatory life sentences for unrelated crimes and by denying Dessaure's motion for mistrial. Dessaure asserts that information about Birchard and Stafford's sentences was improper impeachment not relevant to their bias or credibility. The State responds that the questions were proper because the same State Attorney's office had prosecuted them and was responsible for their sentences, and the State had no recourse against the witnesses if they committed perjury.
Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2001), states that a party may attack the credibility of a witness by showing that the witness is biased. Additionally, section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that [a] party may attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused, by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted.... Importantly, section 90.610(3) explicitly provides that the admissibility of evidence under section 90.608 is not affected by the limitations contained in section 90.610(1). In Fulton v. State, 335 So.2d 280, 284 (Fla.1976), a case concerning section 90.610(1), the Court stated: When there has been a prior conviction, only the fact of the conviction can be brought out, unless the witness denies the conviction. If the witness denies ever having been convicted, or misstates the number of previous convictions, counsel may impeach the witness by producing a record of past convictions. Even if a witness denies a prior conviction, the specific offense is identified only incidentally when the record of the conviction is entered into evidence. If the witness admits the conviction, the inquiry by his adversary may not be pursued to the point of naming the crime for which he was convicted. Fulton, 335 So.2d at 284 (citations and footnote omitted). In Howard v. State, 397 So.2d 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), a case concerning section 90.608(2), the Fourth District Court of Appeal allowed the State to introduce evidence of a defense witness's prior conviction of obstructing justice. The court stated: To show bias it is obviously necessary to show the nature of acts by the witness which evidence such bias. To do this it is necessary to show and explain the nature of the crime of which the witness was convicted. Thus we agree with the trial court's conclusion that conviction of a specified crime may be introduced to show bias of a witness. Howard, 397 So.2d at 998. The Fourth District considered a similar scenario in Roper v. State, 763 So.2d 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). The State introduced evidence that a defense witness resided in a jail and argued that [m]aybe he has a bias against the state or officers. Id. at 489. The court differentiated Howard and held that in Roper there was no attempt by the state to show that being incarcerated resulted in any bias against law enforcement as the conviction for obstructing justice tended to show bias in Howard. Roper, 763 So.2d at 490. In Reeves v. State, 711 So.2d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), the State introduced evidence that a defense witness, the defendant's brother, was incarcerated for a traffic offense. The court held that [a]llowing the prosecutor to inform the jury about the brother's incarceration on a traffic offense served only to embarrass the only defense witness and discredit him. The brother's incarceration after an arrest for a traffic offense was merely a collateral matter which did not tend to affect his credibility. Id. at 562.
Dessaure argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to impeach defense witnesses, William Birchard and Rodney Stafford, with evidence that they were serving mandatory life sentences. The defense presented the testimony of Birchard and Stafford to undermine the credibility of State witness Valdez Hardy. During the State's cross-examination of Birchard, the following exchange occurred: Q. Sir, you have been convicted of five different felonies? A. Yes. Q. And all five of those occurred here in Pinellas County; right? A. Yes. Q. And, in fact, my office, my coworkers, prosecuted you for each and every one of those felonies, didn't we? A. Yes. Q. And we are currently responsible for you serving a life sentence right now? The defense objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that under section 90.610(1), the State could only introduce as impeachment evidence the number of felony convictions  not the length of a sentence served. The State argued that the mandatory life sentence was relevant because it showed that there was nothing the State could do if Birchard committed perjury. The State's line of questioning and argument to the court demonstrates that the State believed the question to be proper under section 90.608(2). The court denied the motion for mistrial and allowed the State to ask the question again. The following exchange occurred: Q. You are currently serving a mandatory life sentence for those felonies; correct? A. Yes, ma'am. Q. And my office is responsible for the imposition of that sentence; correct? A. Yes, sir. Defense counsel also presented the testimony of Rodney Stafford. As with Birchard, the State asked Stafford whether he was currently serving a mandatory life sentence courtesy of the prosecutor's office. He responded that he was. In most cases, witnesses with prior convictions may only be asked if they have ever been convicted of a felony and, if so, how many times. Fulton, 335 So.2d at 284. In this case, the jury was told by the defense that both Birchard and Stafford were incarcerated at the Pinellas County Jail. The prosecution then introduced evidence that Birchard and Stafford had been tried by members of the prosecutor's own office and that Birchard had been convicted of five felonies and Stafford had been convicted of four. On appeal, the State argues that Birchard and Stafford were biased because they had been prosecuted by coworkers in the prosecutor's office. Given the clear potential for bias against the State, Birchard and Stafford arguably had a motive to commit perjury at trial. The State's questions as to whether they were serving mandatory life sentences also were relevant to the fact that Birchard and Stafford could not be sanctioned for committing perjury. Essentially, they could lie with impunity. Because Birchard and Stafford had a potential motive to lie at trial, the State's questions concerning their life sentences and immunity from perjury sanctions were relevant and admissible under section 90.608(2). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to question Birchard and Stafford about the length of their sentences and denied the motion for mistrial.