Opinion ID: 2333788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finality of Will Construction:

Text: In a trustee's action for construction of a testamentary trust and for instruction, all persons interested in the subject matter are required to be parties. Hawes v. Bragdon, 66 Me. 534 (1877); McGilvery v. McGilvery, 152 Me. 93, 123 A.2d 777 (1956); Hitch v. Hitch, Me., 261 A.2d 858 (1970). Plaintiff here was a party to Murray and obligated to litigate all issues. When a court acts within its assigned capacity in the construction of a trust (under a will), that matter cannot be legitimately relitigated between the parties. A decree construing the will and determining the rights of the parties, if rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all parties to the suit unless attacked directly by appeal or error. . . . 4 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 31.12. See also 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1094c. . . . Public policy and the interest of litigants alike require that there be an end to litigation which, without the doctrine of res judicata, would be endless. The doctrine of res judicata rests upon the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate, the same matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his opponent. The doctrine of res judicata not only puts an end to strife, but produces certainty as to individual rights and gives dignity and respect to judicial proceedings. Willette v. Umhoeffer, Me., 268 A.2d 617 (1970). On remand the decree of the Superior Court acting within its competent jurisdiction in construing the Cassidy estate trust and determining the interest of the parties therein, being all the trust beneficiaries, is binding upon all parties unless successfully attacked directly on appeal. The issue cannot be relitigated to the harassment and vexation of an opponent. Conclusiveness in the construction of wills is a necessary element in the courts' supervision of estate administration. In North v. Harris, 126 Me. 371, 138 A. 564 (1927), plaintiffs asked for construction of a will claiming that the testamentary trust did not terminate upon the death of the testator's last son, but rather still continued for their benefit. The Law Court determined that the trust had, in fact, ended and the corpus was divested of the trust and therefore the plaintiffs had no interest to ask the equity court to construe the will. Equity will not assume jurisdiction of a bill for the construction of a will where any doubt as to the meaning of the language of the will should have been removed by previous decisions. It should be said, however, that the court will not feel itself bound to answer all questions which can possibly be asked by a devisee. It must appear that the language of the will is such that the parties may reasonably have doubts concerning its true construction. Other parties should not be subjected to the trouble and expense of appearing in court, or the possible hazard of not appearing, in cases where there is no doubt. Haseltine v. Shepherd, 99 Me. 495, 504, 59 A. 1025, 1029 (1905). By this proceeding and successive post judgment attacks on Murray, the plaintiff makes quite clear her intention to ignore the substance and validity of that decision. Dissatisfaction with her share of the trust estate is evident where she argues that The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine should overrule its interpretation made in Murray v. Sullivan, supra (1962)of what John Cassidy `should' have intended when he executed his will in 1906. (sic.) This Court in Murray examined, discussed, and determined the legal effect of what John Cassidy said. It could give no heed to what he might or should have said. It is a rare testator who will dispose of his worldly goods to the full satisfaction of anticipating relatives. The competing and conflicting interests make full satisfaction well nigh impossible leading one to realize that The man who wants to make an entirely reasonable will dies intestate. [2] While the defendants beseech this Court to deny plaintiff's appeal, they seek further a remand of this action to the Superior Court for a determination of reasonable counsel fees as . . . there is only one way that the appellant will desist from her persistent course of conduct, which seemingly ignores judicial fiat of both the highest court of the State and the United States. In denying the appellees' request for counsel fees, we recognize a statutory limitation allowing counsel fees in litigation involving trust matters. We admonish the plaintiff, however, of the inherent authority of this Court to impose pecuniary sanctions upon a litigant who contumaciously ignores orders having judicial finality, and who, as here, persistently and vexatiously pursues a litigious course of conduct to the harassment of the defendants and needless usurpation of judicial process. The entry shall be, Appeal denied.