Opinion ID: 2319241
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Exclusion of Other Mitigation Evidence

Text: Appellant additionally asserts the trial court erred in prohibiting him from introducing the following mitigation evidence related to his good character: 1. Evidence from Reverend Kathy Kay Higgins, Prison Chaplain, concerning her professional opinion as to the sincerity of [Appellant's] Christian faith; 2. Evidence from [the] Department of Corrections counselor, Rocky Farmartino, concerning his opinion about the sincerity of [Appellant's] beliefs and remorse for the crimes he committed; and 3. [Testimony from Appellant's] prior attorney, Joseph Luciano [sic], . . . concerning the positive attributes of [Appellant's] attitude and his ability to cooperate with his counsel as compared to those of other inmates that the attorney had represented. See Appellant's Brief at 32-33 (Argument IV). Appellant claims the testimony of these three individuals was crucial because they are part of the small group who know him, and their testimony regarding the sincerity of his beliefs was important to Appellant's rebuttal of the arguments made by the Commonwealth in its closing argument. Appellant's Brief at 34. While, as we recognized in Commonwealth v. Lesko , a defendant is to be accorded wide latitude in demonstrating mitigating circumstances, 553 Pa. at 246, 719 A.2d at 223 (1998), [5] the record belies Appellant's claim that the trial court denied him the opportunity to present crucial evidence relating to mitigating circumstances. As the trial court explained: Joseph Lucciano the Defendant's former attorney testified as to his interaction with the Defendant. Lucciano provided testimony that the Defendant was appreciative of the work he had done for him on the case and was cooperative when asked for information. Lucciano also served as the best man at the Defendant's wedding and spoke to his observations of the Defendant prior to and after the wedding. He explained that he had been informed that the Defendant had become a Christian. He observed after the Defendant's wedding that the Defendant no longer used rough language. The Defendant explained that his wife had indicated that the use of rough language was not consistent with genuine faith. Lucciano also testified that the Defendant expressed that he was sorry for the crimes he had committed and that he was very sorry for the pain that he had caused to the families, he was genuinely sorry for all the things that he had been involved with . . . Lucciano was precluded from testifying to how seriously he had contemplated being the best man in the Defendant's wedding. He was further precluded from comparing his relationship with the Defendant to his relationship with other prisoners. The testimony was precluded for lack of relevance. Evidence which tends to establish some fact material to the case, or which tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, is relevant. The precluded testimony does not make the Defendant's contention that he had conformed and become a Christian more or less likely. Thus the testimony was properly excluded. Rocky Farmartino was a Corrections Counselor II who was assigned to work with the Defendant. Mr. Farmartino was permitted to read from his report about discussions he had with the Defendant in which the Defendant claimed he had converted to Christianity. Farmartino testified that as a result of his meetings with the Defendant he recommended in a commutation summary that the Governor show mercy. Farmartino was prohibited from testifying as to his opinion of the sincerity of the Defendant's beliefs. This Court ruled that Farmartino's personal opinion as to whether or not the Defendant was sincere in his religious beliefs was irrelevant. Farmartino's opinion in that regard does not make the Defendant's contention that he had become a Christian more or less likely. While the specific opinion of the witness was not allowed in testimony, the witness' opinion was admitted by way of Defense Exhibit R, in which Farmartino stated that In the opinion of this counselor, Mr. Travaglia seems quite sincere with regards to his expressed beliefs. He seems to be remorseful with regards to his crimes . . . There is no evidence that the Court precluded this witness from providing relevant mitigating evidence. Reverend Kathy Higgins is a Chaplain at the state correctional facility where the Defendant is housed. The Defendant's specific objection is that Reverend Higgins was not permitted to provide her professional opinion as to the sincerity of the Defendant's Christian faith. However, Reverend Higgins was permitted to read from a letter she wrote, on the Defendant's behalf, for admission into an external Christian congregation. She described her interactions with the Defendant and stated that she believed what she wrote in the letter to be true. In the letter she stated I do believe that Michael is genuinely seeking after Jesus Christ. This statement is an opinion of her belief that the Defendant was sincere about his faith and the Court notes that the letter was admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibit Z. The defense witnesses were permitted to provide mitigating evidence as to the Defendant's character. The Jury, after instructions on how to determine what was mitigating evidence and how to use that evidence in their decision as to sentencing, found two mitigating factors. The first being that the Defendant had lived as a well adjusted inmate in prison and the second being that the Defendant had changed his life and adopted a Christian lifestyle. There is no evidence that the court precluded these witnesses from providing relevant mitigating evidence thus the Defendant's argument lacks merit. Trial Court Opinion, 10/11/07, at 13-15 (case citations and citations to transcript omitted, emphasis added). Although Appellant contends the three witnesses could have added so much more to the evidence of mitigation had they been permitted to testify, Appellant's Brief at 35, it is clear that the evidence of mitigating circumstances Appellant sought to have admitted was, in fact, admitted by the trial court, albeit through different means than Appellant desired. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.