Opinion ID: 1503246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The 1947 Constitution Leaves the Statutes Requiring Property Assessments at True Value in Full Force and Effect.

Text: It is conceded by all parties that the statutes hereinbefore quoted remain in full force under the Constitution of 1947, yet the defendant county board of taxation would have us ignore their mandate, as I understand its position, on the basis of the new tax provision of the 1947 Constitution which supersedes the 1875 amendment and which reads as follows: Property shall be assessed for taxation under general laws and by uniform rules. All real property assessed and taxed locally or by the State for allotment and payment to taxing districts shall be assessed according to the same standard of value; and such real property shall be taxed at the general tax rate of the taxing district in which the property is situated, for the use of such taxing district. ( Art. VIII, Sec. I, par. 1) It is clear beyond the slightest doubt (1) that it is for the Legislature alone to enact the general laws and to prescribe or authorize the prescription of the uniform rules referred to in the quoted constitutional provision, and (2) that it has done so in retaining on the books the statutes requiring assessments of property at true value and in not substituting any other standard. That, indeed, is conceded by the majority (The cited enforcement statutes remain unaltered in terms ), but from the use of the phrase in terms and the majority's failure to give force to the standard of true value, I take it to mean that the full value statutes are to remain as unused and ineffective as heretofore. The defendant county tax board contends that the dominant principles of the new constitutional mandate as to taxation are equality of treatment and burden, but does not the legislative standard of assessment at true value  the only standard the Legislature has prescribed  provide equality of treatment and burden? Indeed, what standard could do so more effectively than assessments at true value? The defendants urge that the standard of value is but a means of achieving uniformity and equality, but is it not for the Legislature to decide how these objectives shall be achieved and by what standard of values? And has not the Legislature in an unbroken series of statutes prescribing the duties of local, county and state taxing officials fixed the standard of value at true value and true value alone? This whole question was resolved by this court only two years ago in requiring assessments at the statutory standard, i.e., true value, in Deleware, L. & W.R. Co. v. City of Hoboken, 10 N.J. 418, 433: The constitutional restraint is upon the Legislature when enacting statutes for the assessment of the two classes of property. The Legislature has enacted the same standard of value for both. Tax receipts derived from the assessment of Class II property in railroad use are allotted to and paid over to the local taxing districts in which such property is situated, each taxing district receiving the total amount of tax derived from the assessment of such property situated within the district. N.J.S.A. 54:29 A -24. The standard of assessment of such property prescribed by N.J.S.A. 54:29 A -17 to be employed by the Director is `true value.' This is the identical standard prescribed for the assessment of locally assessed lands by local assessors. R.S. 54:4-1. Neither the Director nor the local assessor has any authority but to make the respective assessments at true value in compliance with the statutory provision applicable to him.  The defendants ignore this holding and argue that the common assessment ratio was given recognition under the old constitutional and statutory standard of true value, but the cases they cite have nothing to do with the taxation of property in general which concerns every citizen. They relate to such special classes of property as bank stock, Stratton v. Collins, 43 N.J.L. 562 ( Sup. Ct. 1881); and railroads, State Board of Assessors v. Central R. Co., 48 N.J.L. 146 ( E. & A. 1886); Appleget v. Pownell, 49 N.J.L. 169 ( Sup. Ct. 1886), in contrast with which it is to be noted that Delaware, L. & W.R. Co. v. City of Hoboken, supra , is a clear holding of this court to the contrary only two years ago, merely deals with the taxpayer's right to a writ of certiorari and has nothing to do with standards. The defendants would limit the action of this court to the doctrine of the Hillsborough case, supra, as being consistent with its views of our past and present constitutional and statutory provisions. One cannot quarrel with the decision of the Hillsborough case under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Hillsborough case itself paid its respects in no uncertain terms to the earlier decisions of our courts in such fashion as to arouse us to their shortcomings.