Opinion ID: 1096122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: did the trial court err by refusing to grant abram a directed verdict on the charge of capital murder?

Text: Without citation to authority, Abram argues that a directed verdict should have been granted on the charge of capital murder. His motion to this effect at trial was overruled. Abram was tried and convicted for the capital murder of Percy Quin, the store customer killed during the armed robbery. Abram argues that the evidence (his confession) is insufficient to sustain a verdict of capital murder because it does not show that Percy Quin was the victim of the underlying felony, and because it does not show that Quin was killed during the commission of the robbery. Each of these claims is easily disputed. First, the statute under which Abram was convicted defines capital murder as [t]he killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner ... [w]hen done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of certain felonies, of which robbery is one. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Supp. 1991). Abram is clearly incorrect in suggesting that it is the intended victim of the underlying felony who must be killed in order for the murder to be capital. To the contrary, the killing of any human being during the commission of one of the enumerated felonies, whether it be the intended victim of the underlying felony or any intervenor, will substantiate a capital murder conviction. Cf. Layne v. State, 542 So.2d 237, 243-44 (Miss. 1989). Abram also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of capital murder because it does not show that Percy Quin was killed during the commission of the armed robbery. This argument is easily dispelled by language in Culberson v. State, 379 So.2d 499, 504 (Miss. 1979). There the Court stated: In our opinion, the statutory language, engaged in the commission of, includes the attempt to commit the constituent felony, the completed constituent felony, as well as the immediate post-felony acts of the accused so connected to the cardinal charge as to become a part of it, the res gestae. [citations omitted]. Abram's attempt to portray Quin's killing as an act wholly separable from the underlying robbery defies any reasoned application of the statutory language. There is no basis for concluding that the robbery had become a past fact such that [Abram] was not still engaged in its commission [citation omitted], i.e. [Abram] had not yet made good his escape when Quin was killed. Layne v. State, 542 So.2d at 244. In short, the evidence as reflected in Abram's confession is more than sufficient to support a valid conviction under § 97-3-19(2)(e) which requires only that the proof show that a killing took place while the accused was engaged in the commission of one or more of the enumerated felonies. Layne v. State, 542 So.2d at 243; White v. State, 532 So.2d 1207, 1221 n. 2 (Miss. 1988). We note that on remand, unless new evidence is offered on this point, the State cannot carry its burden because the confession will be inadmissible.