Opinion ID: 2423913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Existence of a Duty

Text: [¶ 17] The existence of a duty and the scope of that duty are questions of law. Alexander v. Mitchell, 2007 ME 108, ¶ 14, 930 A.2d 1016, 1020. Duty refers to whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff. Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 11, 738 A.2d 839, 844 (quotation marks omitted); see also Alexander, 2007 ME 108, ¶ 16, 930 A.2d at 1020 (identifying the considerations relevant to determining the existence of a duty). Ordinarily, individuals have no duty to protect others from the criminal conduct of a third party. See Bryan R., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 12, 738 A.2d at 844. There are, however, exceptions to this general proposition. An actor has a duty to protect those with whom he stands in a special relationship and those facing harm created by the actor. See id. ¶ 14, 738 A.2d at 845; Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 25 n. 5, 871 A.2d 1208, 1217-18. [¶ 18] Gniadek asserts that both exceptions apply here. She contends that the Camp had a special relationship with her, in the form of a fiduciary relationship and a custodial relationship, which gave rise to a duty under the tort of negligent supervision. See Dragomir v. Spring Harbor Hosp., 2009 ME 51, ¶¶ 16, 18-19, 970 A.2d 310, 315-16 (providing the elements of a negligent supervision claim and recognizing five types of special relationships). Gniadek points to her age, chronic illness, use of anti-depressants, and involvement in the Camp to argue that the Camp had a fiduciary relationship with her, and relies on the time she spent at Camp to argue that the Camp also had a custodial relationship with her. She also contends that the Camp affirmatively created the risk to her from Newton by compiling and distributing contact lists when industry standards discourage out-of-session contact between counselors and campers due to the risk of sexual assault. [6] We first address whether a special relationship exists and then turn to whether the Camp's affirmative acts gave rise to a duty.

[¶ 19] A fiduciary relationship exists where the law will recognize both the disparate positions of the parties and a reasonable basis for the placement of trust and confidence in the superior party in the context of specific events at issue. DeCambra v. Carson, 2008 ME 127, ¶ 13, 953 A.2d 1163, 1166 (quotation marks omitted). But not all fiduciary relationships are special relationships; only those where there is a great disparity of position and influence between the parties will suffice. Dragomir, 2009 ME 51, ¶ 19, 970 A.2d at 316 (quotation marks omitted). We make this determination on a case-by-case basis, unless the nature of a given relationship is such that there is always certain to be a great disparity of position and influence. Id. [¶ 20] In two instances we have found that, in light of the circumstances, a plaintiff's relationship to the defendant was marked by a great disparity of position and influence between the parties. See id. ¶ 21, 970 A.2d at 316; Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 34, 871 A.2d at 1220. In Fortin, the plaintiff, who had been sexually assaulted by his childhood priest, alleged that the Diocese was liable for negligent supervision. 2005 ME 57, ¶¶ 3, 16, 31, 871 A.2d at 1212, 1215, 1219. When the abuse began, Fortin was a parochial school student and altar boy under the daily supervision, control, and authority of the Diocese. Id. ¶ 34, 871 A.2d at 1220. We distinguished Fortin's relationship with the Diocese from that of an individual who could assert only a general membership in an organization and concluded that the established and close connection between Fortin and the organization signaled a special relationship. Id. ¶¶ 32, 34, 37, 871 A.2d at 1219-20, 1222. [¶ 21] Similarly, a patient with a serious mental condition and the hospital providing him with treatment may have a fiduciary relationship marked by a great disparity of position and influence. Dragomir, 2009 ME 51, ¶ 21, 970 A.2d at 316 (quotation marks omitted). In Dragomir, while the plaintiff was receiving treatment from a hospital for schizophrenia and substance abuse, he and his social worker began a sexual relationship. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3, 21, 970 A.2d at 312, 316. As a vulnerable and impaired patient receiving intensive treatment from the hospital, Dragomir was able to allege facts sufficient to establish a special relationship. Id. ¶ 21, 970 A.2d at 316. [¶ 22] In the instant case, the Camp did not have a fiduciary relationship with Gniadek that amounts to a special relationship as we have defined it. Dating back to 2001, Gniadek spent one week each year at Camp Sunshine. Outside of this contact, she elected to participate in, at most, three fundraising events to benefit the Camp. Gniadek also maintained a social relationship with some campers, volunteers, and staff. Ultimately, her relationship with the Camp was indistinguishable from that of other campers. [¶ 23] Further, although the Camp provided Gniadek with a distinct and beneficial service, it did not exercise influence over her as the Diocese did in Fortin or as the hospital did in Dragomir. Gniadek's chronic illness and use of anti-depressants, and Cooper-Moon's head injury establish that Gniadek was vulnerable. But the Camp had a limited presence in Gniadek's life, one that was not marked by a great disparity of position and influence between the parties. Dragomir, 2009 ME 51, ¶ 19, 970 A.2d at 316 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 24] A custodial relationship exists between those who are required by law to take physical custody of another or who voluntarily do so, `such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection.' Id. ¶ 18, 970 A.2d at 316 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965)). Ordinarily a child who is in school or at camp is deprived of the protection of his parents or guardian. Therefore, the actor who takes custody ... of a child is properly required to give him the protection which the custody or manner in which it is taken has deprived him. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 320 cmt. b (1965). [¶ 25] The scope of the duty arising from a custodial relationship is circumscribed by temporal and geographic limitations. See id. § 314A cmt. c. A duty exists only where the special relationship is intact and the risk of harm, or further harm, arises in the course of that relation. Id. Thus, [a] carrier is under no duty to one who has left the vehicle and ceased to be a passenger, nor is an innkeeper under a duty to a guest who is injured or endangered while he is away from the premises. Nor is a possessor of land under any such duty to one who has ceased to be an invitee. Id.; see also Mastriano v. Blyer, 2001 ME 134, ¶ 17, 779 A.2d 951, 955 (explaining that a cab driver had no duty to a passenger after the passenger made a safe exit in a safe place); Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 662 A.2d 272, 281 (1995) (stating that school officials' duties based on special relationships with students will not ordinarily extend beyond graduation); Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 52 P.3d 1230, 1231, 1233-35 (Utah 2002) (holding that a school owed no duty to an elementary school student hit by a car while riding his bicycle to a mandatory school conference). [¶ 26] Gniadek attended Camp Sunshine with her mother and was not deprived of her mother's protection while at Camp. Even overlooking this fact, there was no custodial relationship at the time of the assault. Gniadek and Cooper-Morin left Camp Sunshine over two months before Newton sexually assaulted Gniadek. [¶ 27] Because Gniadek has failed to establish that she had a special relationship with the Camp, we do not go on to consider the other requirements for negligent supervision liability. See Dragomir, 2009 ME 51, ¶ 16, 970 A.2d at 315.
[¶ 28] Gniadek relies on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B (1965) comment e(D) to support her claim that the Camp affirmatively created a risk to her by compiling and distributing contact lists. Although the law may impose a duty to protect someone from the danger created by the defendant, see Bryan R., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 14, 738 A.2d at 845, we have not expressly adopted section 302B. That section defines what constitutes a negligent act where a third party inflicts the harm. It states: An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B. [¶ 29] An actor is required to guard against the intentional misconduct of others where the actor's own affirmative act has created or exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such misconduct, which a reasonable man would take into account. Id. § 302B cmt. e. For example, [w]here the actor has brought into contact or association with the other a person whom the actor knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to commit intentional misconduct, under circumstances which afford a peculiar opportunity or temptation for such misconduct, the actor may be negligent. Id. § 302B cmt. e(D). In assessing the applicability of this principle, factors to be considered are the known character, past conduct, and tendencies of the person whose intentional conduct causes the harm, the temptation or opportunity which the situation may afford him for such misconduct, the gravity of the harm which may result, and the possibility that some other person will assume the responsibility for preventing the conduct or the harm, together with the burden of the precautions which the actor would be required to take. Id. § 302B cmt. f. [¶ 30] Other courts have found the peculiar[ ] likel[ihood] and the peculiar opportunity described in section 302B comment e(D) when a wife encouraged children to use her swimming pool while her husband supervised, knowing her husband had molested children in the past, and her husband molested some of these children, Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App.3d 206, 169 Cal.Rptr. 282, 283-84 (1980), and when the police disclosed an assault victim's name and address to the newspaper without her consent and before the assailant was arrested, and the victim was terrorized by the assailant on seven occasions after publication of the information, Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 253, 257-58 (Mo.Ct.App.1982); see also Golden Spread Council, Inc. No. 562 of the Boy Scouts of America v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 289, 290-92 (Tex. 1996) (holding that a duty may exist where a boy scout troop recommended a scout master to another organization after learning he had been messing with some boys, and the scout master went on to commit further sexual abuse). [¶ 31] Newton's known character, past conduct, and tendencies did not include conduct demonstrating a particularly high risk that he would sexually assault a camper. His interaction with the female volunteer counselor was insufficient to establish that he posed a peculiar risk of committing a sexual assault, and the Camp was unaware of the allegation that he patted young females on the buttocks and rubbed their shoulders. Moreover, making available a contact list that included Cooper-Morin's contact information did not create a peculiar opportunity for misconduct. It is nowhere alleged that Newton could not have obtained Cooper-Morin's phone number even without the contact list had he wanted to reach Gniadek after they met at Camp. Further, Cooper-Morin consented to inclusion on the contact list.