Opinion ID: 1058396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Persons Insured under the State Auto Insurance Policy

Text: The State Auto policy contains two separate definitions of an insured one in the liability portion and another in the uninsured motorist provisions. As previously noted, an insured for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage is defined, in part, as (1) you; (2) any family member; and (3) anyone else occupying a covered auto or temporary substitute for a covered auto, provided the covered auto is out of service due to breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction. The term you, as used throughout the policy, refers to the named insured. The only named insureds in the policy are Clayton Christenberry and Christenberry Trucking and Farm, Inc. Further, it is undisputed that the plaintiff was not a family member of Clayton Christenberry at any time pertinent to this case. Neither was the plaintiff occupying any vehicle covered by the State Auto policy at the time of the accident. It is also undisputed that the plaintiff's vehicle was fully operational at the time of the trip and that she and Tipton had simply elected to use his vehicle instead. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff would not have fallen within any of the definitions of insured set forth above. Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that she is covered under the liability provisions of the policy because she is specifically listed as a driver. She further asserts that Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1201(a) requires that all persons covered for liability purposes must also be provided uninsured motorist coverage. However, as we construe the scope of section 56-7-1201, the plaintiff's argument still necessarily rests upon the premise that she was insured under the liability portion of the policy at the time of the accident. [4] The liability provisions of the policy define insured as follows: 1. WHO IS AN INSURED The following are insureds: a. You for any covered auto. b. Anyone else while using with your permission a covered auto you own, hire or borrow ... c. Anyone liable for the conduct of an insured described above but only to the extent of that liability. By these express terms, the policy provided liability coverage to the named insured for any covered auto and to any other permissive driver of a covered auto. However, the plaintiff was neither the named insured, nor, at the time of the accident, was she using an auto covered by the State Auto policy. In light of the facts presented, the plaintiff was not an insured, as the policy defines that term under either the uninsured motorist or liability provisions. As we view it, the policy clearly and unambiguously defines insured both for liability and uninsured motorist coverage, and the plaintiff does not meet either definition. Our inquiry does not end here, however, because the plaintiff's name appears on the list of drivers in the policy declarations, and no language can be found anywhere in the policy explaining the purpose of this list. The plaintiff seizes upon this fact to assert that listing these drivers by name reveals the intent of the parties to include these individuals as additional insureds and thereby to extend full liability and uninsured motorist coverage to them. She points out that the policy, by its express terms, provides coverage for any permissive driver while operating a covered vehicle. Therefore, the plaintiff contends that there was no logical reason to list specific drivers unless the parties intended these individuals to be entitled to the same coverage and benefits as the named insureds and additional insureds. She further points to the fact that when the insurance policy was being negotiated, the State Auto agent was informed of the necessity of including her under its coverage. In addition, the plaintiff notes the affidavit of Clayton Christenberry, the named insured in the State Auto policy, in which he states that he understood the policy to provide full uninsured motorist coverage to the plaintiff. As a general rule, when ambiguous language in an insurance contract limits coverage, it should be construed in favor of providing coverage to the insured. See Am. Justice Ins. Reciprocal, 15 S.W.3d at 815; Tata v. Nichols, 848 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tenn.1993). However, when interpreting an insurance policy, just as in any other type of contract, a cardinal rule is that a court must attempt to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties. See Tata, 848 S.W.2d at 650. A court cannot under the guise of construction make a new and different contract for the parties. Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Am. Cas. Co., 480 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tenn.1972). In light of the facts currently in the record, there are two logical and reasonable explanations for this list of drivers. First, as the plaintiff argues, the parties could have intended to supersede the definitions of insured contained elsewhere in the policy and include this list of drivers as an additional class of insureds. Second, as the Court of Appeals speculated, the list may have been intended only to provide information regarding the most likely drivers of the covered vehicles, perhaps as a means for State Auto's underwriting department to assess risk and set premiums. In any event, no facts currently in the record, including the language of the policy itself, clearly compel either conclusion. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Webber, 49 S.W.3d at 269; see also Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tenn.2000). Further, as we stated in Webber, summary judgment is appropriately granted when the facts as developed can lead a reasonable jury to reach only one conclusion. 49 S.W.3d at 274 (citing Seavers v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Oak Ridge, 9 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Tenn.1999)). Such is not the case here. Assessing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the parties intended the individually listed drivers, including the plaintiff, to be considered an additional class of insureds and therefore entitled to uninsured motorist coverage equivalent to the other parties named in the policy. Based upon the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for State Auto. [5]