Opinion ID: 399825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the right of ocaw to appeal

Text: 13 As an initial matter, American Cyanamid challenges the jurisdiction of this court, arguing that OCAW's petition for review fails to present a case or controversy because the statute precludes the union from being heard on matters other than the reasonableness of the abatement period. Our jurisdictional basis for reviewing any OSHRC proceeding is 29 U.S.C. § 660, which provides for appellate review of commission decisions. It states: 14 Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order of the Commission issued under subsection (c) of section 10 (29 U.S.C. § 659(c) ) may obtain a review of such order in ... the court of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit .... 15 Cyanamid argues in its motion that the broad language of § 660(a) must be limited by Section 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 659(c). Section 10(c) is the cornerstone of the right of employees, or their authorized representatives, to participate in hearings before the OSHRC. It provides, in its entirety: 16 If an employer notifies the Secretary that he intends to contest a citation issued under section 658(a) of this title or notification issued under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, or if, within fifteen working days of the issuance of a citation under section 658(a) of this title, any employee or representative of employees files a notice with the Secretary alleging that the period of time fixed in the citation for the abatement of the violation is unreasonable, the Secretary shall immediately advise the Commission of such notification, and the Commission shall afford an opportunity for a hearing (in accordance with Section 554 of Title 5 but without regard to subsection (a)(3) of such section). The Commission shall thereafter issue an order, based on findings of fact, affirming, modifying, or vacating the Secretary's citation or proposed penalty, or directing other appropriate relief, and such order shall become final thirty days after its issuance. Upon a showing by an employer of a good faith effort to comply with the abatement requirements of a citation, and that abatement has not been completed because of factors beyond his reasonable control, the Secretary, after an opportunity for a hearing as provided in this subsection, shall issue an order affirming or modifying the abatement requirements in such citation. The rules of procedure prescribed by the Commission shall provide affected employees or representatives of affected employees an opportunity to participate as parties to hearings under this subsection. 17 29 U.S.C. § 659(c). 18 The company contends that section 10(c) limits employee participation in enforcement proceedings to contesting the reasonableness of the abatement period. It reasons that this limit on the initiation of and participation in commission adjudications should be carried over to the instigation of judicial review because Congress intended that the provisions be read together as part of a detailed statutory scheme. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 10, 100 S.Ct. 883, 889, 63 L.Ed.2d 154 (1980). That scheme-says the company-may most consistently be interpreted to limit the rights of employees to initiate and participate in proceedings before the commission and to appeal commission decisions to issues challenging the reasonableness of the abatement period. 1 19 We reject the company's initial contention that employees have no right to be heard on matters other than the reasonableness of the abatement period. The starting point for our analysis is section 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 659(c). It is apparent that the first sentence of section 10(c) contemplates two types of hearings. The first is triggered by an employer who notifies the Secretary of an intention to contest a citation. In that hearing, employees are authorized to participate as parties by virtue of the last sentence of section 10(c). The second type of hearing is triggered by employees who notify the Secretary of their contention that the period of time fixed in the abatement citation is unreasonable. 20 This second type of hearing-that initiated by employees-is tied to the agenda set by statute: contesting the reasonableness of the abatement period. Marshall v. OSHRC and OCAW, 635 F.2d 544, 552 (6th Cir. 1980). Employees are prohibited from instituting a commission action on any matter other than the reasonableness of the abatement period. UAW v. OSHRC, 557 F.2d 607, 610 (7th Cir. 1977). Nothing in the text of the statute, however, so confines employee/union participation as parties in the first type of hearing-that initiated by the employer to contest a citation. 21 Indeed, the section 10(c) limitation suggested by the company would be an anomaly when viewed in the total context of the Act. Typically, as demonstrated by the instant case, an employee who believes a violation exists that threatens physical harm may request an inspection by giving the Secretary written notice. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1). If, upon receipt of such notification, the Secretary determines there are reasonable grounds to believe a violation exists, he must conduct a special inspection as soon as possible. 2 Id. A representative authorized by the employees shall be given the opportunity to accompany the Secretary or his representative during the physical inspection of the workplace. Id. § 657(e). If the Secretary believes that the employer has violated any portion of the Act, he shall with reasonable promptness issue a citation to the employer. Id. § 658. 3 The employer may then contest the citation if he disputes the Secretary's finding of a violation flowing from an investigation initiated by employees. At the hearing initiated by the employer, the employee may elect party status. Id. § 659(c). It is at this juncture that the company insists that the election of party status limits the employees to contesting the length of the abatement period. We find no support for this position in the statute. Moreover, we find the adoption of the company's premise inconsistent with the remainder of the statutory scheme. The company would have us hold that the employee's interest in and contribution to the enforcement process, protected by the statute throughout the enforcement process, abruptly ceases once the adjudicative process is initiated by the employer filing a notice of contest. By permitting employees to elect party status, and not qualifying this status with the same limits imposed on the employees' initiation of commission proceedings, it is apparent that Congress intended to continue the broad scope of employee participation in the enforcement of the Act through the adjudicative stages. 22 The anomalous limitation on employee participation argued by the company is not to be found in the text of section 10(c). The company, however, contends that it is supplied in the report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which discusses the right of an employee to challenge the reasonableness of the abatement period. Subcom. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 at 154-55 (Comm. Print 1971) (hereinafter cited as Legislative History). The company points to the following quotation in the second paragraph in that report to argue that the abatement period is the sole issue that can be raised by employees. We find, however, that when that paragraph is read along with the preceding one, it demonstrates that employee initiation of commission proceedings is but one of two means of employee participation in OSHRC proceedings. 23 If the employer decides to contest a citation or notification, or proposed assessment of penalty, the Secretary must afford an opportunity for a formal hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act. Based upon the hearing record the Secretary shall issue an order confirming, denying, or modifying the citation, notification, or proposed penalty assessment. The procedural rules prescribed by the Secretary for the conduct of such hearings must make provision for affected employees or other representatives to participate as parties. 24 Section 10(c) also gives an employee or representative of employees a right, whenever he believes that the period of time provided in a citation for abatement of a violation is unreasonably long, to challenge the citation on that ground. Such challenges must be filed within 15 days of the issuance of the citation and an opportunity for a hearing must be provided in similar fashion to hearings when an employer contests. The employer is to be given an opportunity to participate as a party. 25 Id. (Emphasis added). 26 In sum, the legislative history shows that Congress intended to allow employees to participate as parties in enforcement proceedings in two separate contexts-to initiate contests over the reasonableness of the abatement period and to participate as parties in an employer-initiated contest. We find that Congress did not intend to limit the interest assertable by the union in an employer-initiated proceeding to the length of the abatement period. The scheme of the Act enables employees to translate their concern for workplace safety into a demand for an inspection of the workplace, and, if a violation exists, into a citation. If the employer disputes the inspector's findings and files a notice of contest, the Act entitles employees to participate as parties in hearings before the OSHRC. The employees' request for party status confers jurisdiction on the commission to entertain the employees' objections on all matters relating to the citation in question. 4 27 We therefore hold that where a union or employee has elected party status in proceedings before the OSHRC, the union or employee has a right to appeal the decision of the OSHRC. As a party in an employer-initiated hearing before the OSHRC, the union will be adversely affected or aggrieved by an unfavorable OSHRC decision. Accordingly, the union can seek judicial review in a federal court of appeals under section 11(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(a). 28 The legislative history of section 11(a) provides further support for our decision. The House version of the Act, H.R. 19200, clearly limited the right to seek judicial review to employers and the Secretary. Legislative History, 1192. The Senate version, S. 2193, contained the identical language as Section 11(a) of the Act, and provided for judicial review of any commission order by any person adversely affected or aggrieved. Id. at 1192. Faced with the conflict between the two provisions for judicial review of commission decisions, the Conference Committee adopted the broader language of any person adversely affected or aggrieved. 5 Id. We therefore conclude that an employee can seek judicial review of OSHRC action in two situations: when the employee seeks to challenge a decision from an OSHRC proceeding which he initiated to contest the reasonableness of the abatement period, and when the employee seeks to challenge a decision from an OSHRC proceeding in which he elected party status pursuant to Commission Rule § 2200.20. 6 29 Our view does not impinge on the Secretary's unique role in administering the Act. As the Supreme Court has noted, the Act creates public rights that are to be vindicated by the Secretary through government management and enforcement of a complex administrative scheme. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 444-47, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 1264-65, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977). We recognize that the Secretary has been vested with considerable discretion in the promulgation of standards. Thus, employees may not compel the Secretary to adopt a standard. National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens v. Usery, 554 F.2d 1196 (D.C.Cir.1977). Similarly, we are persuaded that enforcement of the Act is the sole responsibility of the Secretary. He is the exclusive prosecutor of OSHA violations. Atlas Roofing Co., 430 U.S. at 445-47, 97 S.Ct. at 1264-65; Dale M. Madden Construction, Inc. v. Hodgson, 502 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1974). Necessarily included within the prosecutorial power is the discretion to withdraw or settle a citation issued to an employer, and to compromise, mitigate or settle any penalty assessed under the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(e). 7 Thus, employees may not contest the representation of a settlement agreement that abatement has occurred. Marshall v. OCAW and OSHRC, 647 F.2d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 1981). They may not prosecute a citation before the commission after the Secretary has moved to withdraw it. Marshall v. OSHRC and OCAW, supra, 635 F.2d at 552. They may not argue that a particular method of abatement would be inefficacious. Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Co., 622 F.2d 1176, 1184-86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061, 101 S.Ct. 784, 66 L.Ed.2d 604 (1980). They may not challenge the substantive provision of an abatement plan. UAW v. OSHRC, supra, 557 F.2d at 610-11. 30 We endorse so broad a reading of prosecutorial discretion under the statute because we believe that such discretion comports with the Congressional intent that the Secretary be charged with the basic responsibilities for administering the Act. We agree with other courts that have considered the issue that the union has no right to challenge the refusal of the Secretary to proceed with a citation or to file a complaint. See, e.g., Marshall v. OSHRC and OCAW, supra, 635 F.2d at 550. The company, however, contends that these decisions prohibit employees from challenging the Secretary's prosecutorial decisions before the commission proceedings, except where the length of an abatement period is concerned. It reasons that the decision to seek review of a commission decision is a similar exercise of prosecutorial discretion and concludes that allowing employees to petition for judicial review of a commission decision impermissibly usurps the Secretary's prosecutorial discretion as enforcer of the Act. 31 We reject this position. We agree with the company that a decision of the Secretary not to appeal the OSHRC ruling is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Accordingly, we find that the union has no right to challenge the determination of the Secretary not to appeal. In this instance, however, the OCAW is not seeking review of the Secretary's decision; instead, it is seeking judicial review of an order of the OSHRC, an independent adjudicatory body. 8 Under the Act, we hold that a union has the right to appeal the ruling of the OSHRC, whether or not the Secretary simultaneously seeks review, as a person adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of section 11(a) of the Act. 32 The union's right to appeal OSHRC decisions where it has participated as a party in the commission proceedings is, however, subject to two conditions, derived from the general statutory scheme and purpose of the Act. First, the union must give the Secretary notice of its intention to appeal and must serve him with copies of all of the pleadings. This notice requirement is ordered so that the Secretary is made aware of the litigation and so that he may act to intervene if he deems it appropriate. Second, the case may become moot in those instances when the Secretary, participating in the appeal as an amicus curiae or as an intervenor, provides this court with a clear and unconditional statement that he will not prosecute the claim regardless of the disposition of the appeal by this court. The prosecutorial discretion with which the Secretary is vested empowers him not to renew his prosecution effort even if this court were to find that the citation dismissed by the OSHRC asserted a violation under the Act. Marshall v. OSHRC and OCAW, supra, 635 F.2d at 549-52. While we will not require the Secretary to furnish us with a statement of his intent, we may dismiss the appeal as moot in instances where the Secretary has voluntarily proffered such a statement after the union has filed a petition for review. 9