Opinion ID: 2622042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: amended pleadings

Text: Pabst's amended motion included some of the claims from his original motion, as well as 10 new claims that were not included in the original pleading. The State did not file a response until after the amended motion was filed. The district court found that the new claims did not relate back to the original motion and dismissed Pabst's new claims as time-barred by K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1). The specific new claims at issue were set forth in the amended motion as follows: (d) trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to adequately investigate and prepare for the testimony of Pabst's forensic expert, Dr. Jay Dix, which resulted in the jury hearing testimony that was damaging for Pabst; (e) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when Dr. Dix commented on the credibility of Pabst's former trial testimony; (f) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the State's forensic expert, Dr. Erik Mitchell, testified about the credibility of Pabst's testimony; (g) trial counsel was ineffective in having failed to object to Dr. Mitchell's testimony that this was a homicide and not an accident; (h) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when Dr. Mitchell commented on areas outside of his expertise; (i) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal that Dr. Mitchell gave improper opinion testimony that invaded the province of the jury; (j) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the improper opinion testimony of law enforcement officers concerning crime scene evidence and how the crime occurred; ( l ) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and/or test hairs and other debris taken from the victim that could have supported the defense theory that there was a struggle between Pabst and the victim for the gun; (m) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the issue that the jury witnessed Pabst being unshackled before he entered the courtroom; (p) Pabst was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel by the cumulative errors and omissions made by trial counsel. Resolution of this issue involves the interpretation of statutes, which is a question of law. This court has unlimited review over questions of law and is not bound by the trial court's interpretation. State v. Bryan, 281 Kan. 157, 159, 130 P.3d 85 (2006). K.S.A. 60-1507 was amended, effective July 1, 2003, to add a 1-year time limitation for bringing an action. L.2003, ch. 65, sec. 1. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals found that those individuals who had preexisting claims had 1 year from the effective date of the 2003 amendment to file a 60-1507 motion. Hayes v. State, 34 Kan.App.2d 157, 161-62, 115 P.3d 162 (2005). Therefore, Pabst had until June 30, 2004, to file his 60-1507 motion. Pabst's original motion was filed by counsel on October 15, 2003, well within the time limitation. His amended motion was filed by new counsel on July 15, 2005, well outside the limitation period. The district court found that Pabst's new claims did not relate back to the original motion and were therefore barred by the limitation in K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1) as applied in Hayes. Pabst argues that the district court's ruling fails to recognize that he had an absolute right under the Rules of Civil Procedure, K.S.A. 60-215(a), to amend his 60-1507 motion at any time prior to a responsive pleading being filed by the State. The relevant portions of K.S.A. 60-215 are as follows: (a) Amendments. A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.... .... (c) Relation back of amendments. An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when: (1) The claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. If we look solely at the statutes, the terms utilized would dictate against applying K.S.A. 60-215 in the context of a 60-1507 proceeding. K.S.A. 60-1507(a), entitled Motion attacking sentence, permits a prisoner in custody to move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. In other words, a 60-1507 proceeding is commenced with a motion, notwithstanding Pabst's use of the word, Petition, in the caption of his latest filing. K.S.A. 60-203 suggests that a petition is used to commence a new civil action. Further, K.S.A. 60-215 speaks to the amendment of pleadings. K.S.A. 60-207(a), entitled Pleadings, describes the pleadings which are permitted, and a motion is not described therein as a pleading. Therefore, an attempt to amend a motion is not governed by the provisions applicable to the amendment of a pleading. However, these technical distinctions are arguably obscured by our Supreme Court Rule 183, which governs the procedure under K.S.A. 60-1507. In relevant part, subsection (a), entitled Nature of Remedy, states: K.S.A. 60-1507 is intended to provide in a sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in district courts in whose jurisdiction the prisoner was confined. A motion challenging the validity of a sentence is an independent civil action which should be separately docketed, and the procedure before the trial court and on appeal to the Court of Appeals is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure insofar as applicable.  (Emphasis added.) 2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 243. The suggestion that a motion commences a new civil action is hard to reconcile with the aforementioned statutory definitions. Moreover, one could argue that a motion which serves the same purpose as a petition, i.e., which commences an independent, separately docketed civil matter, should be treated the same as a pleading within the meaning of K.S.A. 60-215, notwithstanding the assigned label. On the other hand, our directive is that the Rules of Civil Procedure will govern insofar as applicable. K.S.A. 60-215(a) speaks to two time frames where an amendment can be made as a matter of course, before the responsive pleading is served or within 20 days of service if a responsive pleading is not permitted. Neither circumstance describes the 60-1507 motion scenario. As the State points out, there is no statutory requirement that it file a responsive pleading under K.S.A. 60-1507. Cf. K.S.A. 60-1504 (the person to whom a K.S.A. 60-1501 writ of habeas corpus is directed shall file an answer within 72 hours after the writ is served or at another time as specified in the writ). Moreover, in Tipton v. State, 194 Kan. 705, 711, 402 P.2d 310 (1965), this court held that it was neither necessary nor required that the State answer or otherwise plead to the 60-1507 motion in order to refute the allegations of the motion or the evidence offered in support of those allegations. On the other hand, nothing in the statute or our rules makes it impermissible for the State to file a responsive pleading. Thus, neither circumstance described in K.S.A. 60-215(a) accurately describes the procedural posture of a 60-1507 proceeding and, therefore, that rule of civil procedure would not be applicable. Pabst urges us to follow the decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals in State v. Wilkins, 127 Ohio App.3d 306, 712 N.E.2d 1255 (1998). Wilkins found that a petitioner filing a postconviction petition had an absolute right to amend before a responsive pleading was filed. 127 Ohio App.3d at 310-12, 712 N.E.2d 1255. Although Pabst points out that the Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure governing amendments is identical to our K.S.A. 60-215(a), he fails to mention that the Ohio statute governing postconviction proceedings differs significantly from our K.S.A. 60-1507 procedure. In Ohio, a response is required. Specifically, the prosecuting attorney shall respond by answer or motion within 10 days of the docketing of a petition for relief or at some other time set by the court. Ohio Rev.Code Annot. § 2953.21(D) (Anderson 2003). That significant distinction renders Wilkins unpersuasive. Although Pabst neither sought nor obtained leave of court to amend his motion, the district court nevertheless considered whether the new issues in the purported amendment would be barred by the statute of limitations. In its memorandum decision, the district court relied on the body of law developed under the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). Specifically, the court cited to Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 125 S.Ct. 2562, 162 L.Ed.2d 582 (2005), and the parties extensively discuss that decision in their briefs. In Mayle, the United States Supreme Court held that an amended habeas petition does not relate back and escape the 1-year time limitation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), when the amended petition asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those set forth in the original pleading. 545 U.S. at 650, 125 S.Ct. 2562. Pabst argues that all of his new claims involve his trial attorney's conduct at the retrial, so they meet the time and type requirement. There is some merit in viewing an ineffectiveness claim as a unitary issue, notwithstanding the number of separate reasons advanced in support of the claim. See Galloway, 56 F.3d at 1241. However, our rule governing the sufficiency of a 60-1507 motion appears to require more specificity. Supreme Court Rule 183(e) dictates that [a] motion to vacate a sentence shall be deemed sufficient if in substantial compliance with the form set forth by the Judicial Council. 2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 244. In paragraph 10 of that form, movant is directed to [s]tate concisely all the grounds on which you base your allegation that you are being held in custody unlawfully. In the next paragraph, movant is directed to concisely state the facts which support each of the grounds. That language calls for specificity in the manner in which the movant claims ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, when a movant submits the form, he or she is presumed to have listed all of the grounds upon which he is relying. Smith v. State, 195 Kan. 745, 747, 408 P.2d 647 (1965). Accordingly, the district court was unquestionably correct in finding no relation-back for the claims set forth in paragraphs (d), (e), (i), (j), ( l ), (m), and (p) of the amended motion, because they are based on different grounds than asserted in the original motion. The claims set forth in paragraphs (f), (g), and (h) dealt with trial counsel's effectiveness concerning Dr. Mitchell's testimony, which could arguably be bootstrapped into an originally raised ground for relief. However, any error in that regard was ameliorated when the district court nevertheless ruled on the merits of those claims. Finally, Pabst argues in the alternative that the district court should have extended the time limitation of K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1) to prevent manifest injustice, as permitted in K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2). However, as the district court noted, Pabst failed to explain the delay between the filing of the initial motion on October 15, 2003, and the attempted amendment filed July 15, 2005. Originally, Pabst's attorney had asserted that additional time would be required to fully examine the trial and appellate records in order to identify supplemental grounds for relief. The district court found that those records were available through the office of the Clerk of the District Court of Thomas County during the entire period of the delay, suggesting that no good cause had been shown to extend the limitation period. Further, we find unavailing Pabst's argument that it was manifestly unjust for him not to have known that the district court would not find K.S.A. 60-215(a) applicable to give him an absolute right to amend his motion. Apparently, original counsel did not believe such an absolute right existed given that he advised the court that he would seek leave of court to supplement the motion, after reviewing the record. As noted, no leave of court was sought. The district court did not err in failing to apply K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2) to extend the limitation period.