Opinion ID: 2584939
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Refusal to Grant Penalty Phase Continuance

Text: Defendant contends he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his motion for a continuance during the penalty phase under somewhat unusual circumstances. His expert, Dr. LaCalle, was arrested during the trial on an unrelated mattercruelty to animals arising from certain practices he utilized (electrocution) to kill chinchillas that he raised on his ranch for their pelts, an endeavor presumably unconnected to his occupation as a psychologist. Defendant argues that the arrest and publicity surrounding his expert witness's practice of killing chinchillas by electrocution diminished the effectiveness of his expert witness, and hence the requested continuance should have been granted to afford him an opportunity to obtain a new untainted expert. When a newspaper article about Dr. LaCalle's troubles surfaced, defense counsel became concerned that it would destroy his credibility as an expert witness and prejudice the jury. Defense counsel therefore proposed three potential actions in response to the situation: (1) declare a mistrial, or give the defense a continuance to substitute a different psychologist, (2) grant a continuance until the effect of the article dissipates, or (3) bring the jurors in one at a time and determine how many people have read it, and if so, do they say that it's prejudicial, [that] they can't be fair. The trial court and parties opted for the third approach. All 12 jurors and two alternates were individually questioned about whether they had seen the article or any other press reports about the chinchilla affair, and whether they were aware of the name or identity of the person to whom the article referred. Eight of the 14 jurors had not seen the article or heard any media reports about the chinchilla story. Of the six who indicated some exposure to the story, only one, Juror No. 1633, reported that she had seen the article and had been exposed to radio and television reports about the incident. She indicated, however, that she had formed no opinion about the chinchilla rancher, and stated, upon further questioning, that [she] would take him as any other witness that's been on the stand, at face value and interpret what they have to say. I don't think what he does forwhat [he] does for a living would apparently has caused this ruckus wouldmake me believe or disbelieve anything he said. Following the initial voir dire of the jurors on the chinchilla story, the trial court made the following ruling: Okay. All right. The Court concludes based on the responses from the jurors that first, there were very few even aware of it. [¶] And second, the one who really seemed to have acquired the most in the way of information who was Number 1663 seemed to me very frankly and honestly to say that it's a subject matter inwhich would not concern her one way or the other. And that she would be quite capable of properly evaluating the evidence given by that person, same as anyone else. [¶] So the Court then makes the finding that there is not a basis on which either a mistrial should be declared, a new jury impaneled or other remedy taken concerning our chinchilla growing witness. Each of the jurors was then admonished not to have any conversations about the chinchilla case, and not to read any newspaper articles, watch television stories, or listen to radio reports concerning that matter. The day following the trial court's ruling, defense counsel renewed the defense request for a continuance based upon escalating publicity or media coverage of Dr. LaCalle's current criminal problems. The court forthrightly acknowledged that the publicity on this thing being a local issue is somewhat profound, but if that publicity is not something that is affecting our jury, if they are simply not aware of it, or to the extent they're aware of it as one indicated yesterday that she or others can nevertheless proceed in an objective fashion, it's ait's a problem that really isn't a problem. Thereafter, each juror was once again brought into the courtroom and individually voir dired as to whether he or she had seen any additional news or media stories about the chinchilla affair since the day before. Each juror reported that he or she had not come in contact with any further media stories about the matter. The trial court then denied the renewed motion for a continuance. (22) The determination whether to grant a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152].) We find no abuse of such discretion here, as it was demonstrated that there was no substantial likelihood that any of the jurors who became aware that publicity existed, were actually biased, that is, `unable to put aside [their] impressions or opinions based upon the extrajudicial information [they] received and render a verdict based solely upon the evidence received at trial.' ( Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1049, quoting People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 583 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87].)