Opinion ID: 201350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Course of Proceedings Here

Text: 86 In this case, the course of proceedings gave Alexander fair notice that she was being sued in her individual capacity. First, Powell's complaint and amended complaint contained a prayer for punitive damages. The prayer for punitive damages could only be brought against defendant governmental officials who were sued in their individual capacities. Claims for punitive damages are not available against a municipality, such as the City of Pittsfield, under § 1983. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-60, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). Because bringing suit against a governmental official in his or her official capacity is tantamount to bringing suit against the official's office, Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), it follows that punitive damages are not available against governmental officials sued in their official capacities. See Biggs, 66 F.3d at 61. Recognizing these legal principles, Alexander filed a joint answer on behalf of all the defendants named in Powell's complaint, raising, among other affirmative defenses, a qualified immunity defense. [T]he assertion of that defense indicates that the defendant interpreted the plaintiff's action as being against [her] personally. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 61. 87 Alexander argues that both Powell's claim for punitive damages and her assertion of a qualified immunity defense were merely perfunctory pleadings and should not be taken as notice of the capacity in which she was sued. Yet the assertion of qualified immunity provides some indication that Alexander is not prejudiced by our treating [the] complaint as one brought against [her] in [her] personal capacit[y]. Id. (according less weight to raising of qualified immunity defense where defendants also raised sovereign immunity). 88 Alexander also argues that subsequent indications of the capacity in which she was sued came too late in the litigation to provide her with adequate notice. For example, the magistrate judge's conclusion that Alexander was being sued in her individual capacity emerged only in a report and recommendation regarding summary judgment, more than three years after the litigation's inception. See Powell v. City of Pittsfield, 143 F.Supp.2d 94, 115 (D.Mass.2001) (adopting magistrate judge's report and recommendation discussing availability of suit against defendants in their individual capacity under various statutes). However, the relevant time frame of the course of proceedings varies for each individual case and may include events occurring after the initial pleadings. See, e.g., Moore, 272 F.3d at 774 (Subsequent filings in a case, including responses to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or to motions for summary judgment, may rectify deficiencies in the initial pleadings.); Houston v. Reich, 932 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir.1991) (pleadings, pre-trial order, and [jury] instructions ma[d]e it clear that defendants were being sued in both official and individual capacities). Here, Alexander reiterated her early assertion of qualified immunity as an affirmative defense in her individual motion for summary judgment. 89 Alexander makes much of the fact that Powell's complaint identified her as a natural person who at all times pertinent ... was the City Solicitor for the defendant City of Pittsfield, that is, as a municipal governmental official. She asserts that this language strongly suggests Powell intended to sue her solely in her official capacity. However, under § 1983, a plaintiff may sue a [governmental] officer in [her] individual capacity for alleged wrongs committed by the officer in [her] official capacity. Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir.1990). It simply does not follow that every time a public official acts under color of state law, the suit must of necessity be one against the official in his or her official capacity. Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir.1990), aff'd, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). 90 Powell points out that he did not seek to establish that Alexander acted in accordance with a governmental policy or custom, Biggs, 66 F.3d at 61, as would be expected in an official-capacity suit. See Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 394 n. 8 (7th Cir.1988) (noting plaintiff's failure to assert that the defendants followed a policy or custom of the city as required in official-capacity suit). Powell thus argues that he gave no indication here that he was suing Alexander in her official capacity, much less solely in that capacity. Of course, Powell was free to sue Alexander in either or both of her official and personal capacities. Thus, the central inquiry remains whether the course of proceedings here gave Alexander fair notice of an individual-capacity suit, regardless of the presence or absence of allegations supporting an official-capacity suit. 91 Viewed as a whole, the course of proceedings in this case gave Alexander fair notice that she was being sued in her individual capacity and was subject to personal liability for punitive damages.