Opinion ID: 483528
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Younger v. Harris and Our Federalism

Text: 11 Younger v. Harris was one of six cases decided the same day in which the Supreme Court addressed the proper relationship between the federal courts and state criminal prosecutions. 7 In Younger, the Supreme Court identified [t]he precise reasons for [the] longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings. 8 In so doing, the Court began with basic principles of equity jurisprudence, but noted that an even more vital consideration, the notion of 'comity,'  is involved in situations in which federal courts are asked to enjoin proceedings in state court. 9 The principle, dubbed Our Federalism, that National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways, 10 led the Court to conclude that, absent special considerations, a federal court will not enjoin proceedings in a state court unless the threat to the plaintiff's federally protected rights [is] one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution. 11 12 Thus, Younger, at its core, is a case about the proper relationship between federal and state courts. Younger is not merely a principle of abstention; rather, the case sets forth a mandatory rule of equitable restraint, requiring the dismissal of a federal action that seeks to enjoin an ongoing prosecution in a state criminal proceeding. Because of its potentially drastic effects--i.e., denying a litigant a federal forum to pursue an otherwise legitimate constitutional claim--Younger has been specifically limited in its application. So far as we can tell--and the Government has been unable to cite any cases to the contrary--Younger never has been applied by the Supreme Court or this court in a situation involving civil and criminal proceedings in separate federal court actions. It is a case mostly about considerations of federalism. We do not intend to indulge a strained reading of Younger in order to apply it here in a context in which it was never intended to operate. 13 The only conceivable relevance that Younger may have to the case before us is its statement concerning general principles of equity jurisprudence: that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. 12 To the extent that this suggests that the District Court judge in the civil case had discretion to defer action in the proceeding before him pending resolution of the criminal case, the principle is unexceptional. It cannot be read, however, to have required the judge to dismiss the civil action merely because of the existence of the criminal proceeding. The absurdity of such a result is highlighted by the facts in these cases. 14 The only conceivable reason not to consider the claim for injunctive relief in the civil case was that it would have been inefficient to do so, because the same issues--the validity and applicability of the regulations--would be decided in the criminal action. That, however, merely restates the traditional test for denying the consideration of equitable relief--that there is an adequate remedy available at law. We find this reason pursuasive as to whether one court may enjoin an ongoing prosecution in another court. However, this is not the relief that the CCNV members sought. The appellants wished to continue their demonstration on the White House sidewalk, but faced almost certain prosecution in the future if they were to do so. Thus, they sought to enjoin future arrests for violations of the structures and parcels regulations. They never sought to enjoin the existing prosecutions. Nor could adjudication of the criminal cases afford them adequate relief. If they were to await the conclusion of trial, many days would be lost. The district judge acted properly in considering whether a temporary restraining order and, later, an injunction should issue. 15 Even taking a strained view of Younger, and attempting to apply its principles to this case, it is clear that the district judge did not err in hearing the case. In order for Younger to operate, the civil dispute must entail injunctive relief over an ongoing criminal prosecution. When the civil action does not seek to enjoin an ongoing prosecution and where the movants are not being prosecuted, an injunction may issue. These points were made most clearly by the Supreme Court in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. 13 Doran involved a challenge to a local ordinance prohibiting topless dancing in bars. The owners of three bars where topless dancing had been featured sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance. After the suit was filed, one of the bars resumed its showing of topless dancing and the bar owner was prosecuted; the other two did not. The District Court granted the preliminary injunction and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court held that an injunction could issue in favor of the two bar owners that had not been prosecuted. The fact that the three bar owners had common counsel, and that the federal action shared similar issues with the state court proceeding was not deemed relevant. 14 16 Applying Doran to this case, it is clear that, at least as to Juluke and Moss, consideration of the claims for injunctive relief was proper despite the ongoing prosecution of Snyder and Fennelly. Nor does Hicks v. Miranda 15 compel a different result. In Hicks, there was identity of parties in the criminal and civil actions. 16 Even as to Snyder and Fennelly, it is not clear that Younger principles should bar an injunction against future enforcement. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 279 (1981 Supp.); Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 SUP.CT.REV. 193, 238 (Even though they refuse to enjoin the first prosecution, federal courts should not deny relief with respect to contemplated future violations.); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); Ealy v. Littlejohn, 569 F.2d 219 (5th Cir.1978). 17 For all of the foregoing reasons, we flatly reject the Government's motion to dismiss on grounds of equitable restraint under Younger v. Harris. 18