Opinion ID: 2720490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Judd Street House

Text: The trial court found Bryant had established a legitimate expectation of privacy in his home on Judd Street. Bryant contends the affidavit supporting the warrant did not establish probable cause. Moreover, any likelihood that evidence would have been found there had grown stale by the time the warrant was served a month after the murders. The court properly rejected these challenges. The search warrant affiant was the initial murder scene detective. The affidavit encompasses 35 typed pages. It incorporates by reference nine multipage exhibits. Inter alia, the affidavit chronicles observations made at the murder scene, witness statements, and discovery of the victims‘ bodies. The blood, human tissue, remains, and evidence of gunshots at both Wheeler Avenue and the body recovery scenes are described in detail. The affidavit sets out the relationship between victim Andre Armstrong and the Bryants. It relates the drug interdiction incidents at Wheeler Avenue and the subsequent repairs made there. Jeff Bryant is the listed owner of Wheeler Avenue. His leadership of the Family and its operations and multiple criminal activities is extensively recounted. The affidavit states that while Jeff was in prison defendant ran the drug business, implementing Jeff‘s directions. Information from multiple sources recounting people and activity at Wheeler Avenue is provided along with background information about Bryant, the victims, and others identified during the investigation. Largely paralleling the facts adduced at trial, the affidavit recounts details about the shootings of Gentry and Goldman, Armstrong‘s intention to ―squeeze‖ the Family, the trip from Monterey to Los Angeles, the dispute 23 over the dirty apartment, Armstrong‘s affair with Tannis, the operations at Wheeler Avenue, and Bryant‘s activities there. Particularly with regard to the staleness question, the affidavit recites that guns are valuable and difficult to obtain, particularly by ex-convicts and parolees. Suspects often retain guns along with ammunition, documents, and gun-related equipment after a crime is committed. Blood is difficult to remove from clothing and other fabrics. Forensic analysis of such items is frequently successful in linking suspects to a victim or scene. The affiant relates his belief that these kinds of items, along with documents, address books, photographs, and clothing could be found at the locations or in the automobiles described. Accordingly, as the request pertained to Bryant, the application was made for authorization to search his home, a car, and the pool hall for a variety of items specifically listed. ―Probable cause sufficient for issuance of a warrant requires a showing that makes it ‗ ―substantially probable that there is specific property lawfully subject to seizure presently located in the particular place for which the warrant is sought.‖ ‘ [Citations.] That showing must appear in the affidavit offered in support of the warrant. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 161 (Carrington).) ―The showing required in order to establish probable cause is less than a preponderance of the evidence or even a prima facie case.‖ (Id. at p. 163.) The question of staleness concerns whether facts supporting the warrant application establish it is substantially probable the evidence sought will still be at the location at the time of the search. ―No bright-line rule defines the point at which information is considered stale. [Citation.] Rather, ‗the question of staleness depends on the facts of each case.‘ [Citation.] ‗If circumstances would justify a person of ordinary prudence to conclude that an activity had continued to the present time, then the passage of time will not render the information stale.‘ ‖ (Id. at pp. 163164.) 24 The affidavit clearly established probable cause to believe Bryant was involved in the murders, and he does not argue otherwise. Contrary to his claim, there is ample support for a finding of probable cause to search the Judd Street house. The affidavit is extensive and detailed. It demonstrates a substantial basis to believe that firearms, blood evidence, and other items of evidentiary value would be found at Bryant‘s home. Moreover, based on ― ‗ ―the nature of the crimes and the items sought, a magistrate [could] reasonably conclude that a suspect‘s residence is a logical place to look for specific incriminating items.‖ ‘ ‖ (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 163.) The trial court properly found the affidavit provided timely and sufficient probable cause. Bryant also contends the warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad because it authorized the police officers to seize ―[a]ny articles or personal property tending to establish the identity of persons who have dominion and control over the premises.‖ ―Whether a warrant‘s description of property to be seized is sufficiently particular is a question of law subject to independent review by an appellate court. [Citation.] In considering whether a warrant is sufficiently particular, courts consider the purpose of the warrant, the nature of the items sought, and ‗the total circumstances surrounding the case.‘ [Citation.] A warrant that permits a search broad in scope may be appropriate under some circumstances, and the warrant‘s language must be read in context and with common sense.‖ (People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 133-134.) We recently rejected a similar claim in Eubanks. As in that case, the warrant here was sufficiently particularized under the circumstances. At the time the warrant was requested, police could not have realistically described the personal property with any greater particularity, and it was necessary to establish Bryant‘s control over any evidence seized. (See id. at pp. 134-135; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 575.) 25 B. Denial of Bryant’s Motion for Pretrial Hearing Concerning Admission of Other Crimes Evidence The trial in this case began in late January 1995. In September 1992 Bryant had made a great many pretrial motions, including a request for a hearing on the admissibility of any uncharged crimes evidence to be offered under section 1101, subdivision (b), of the Evidence Code. The trial court held no such hearing. Bryant contends the court‘s failure to do so violated his statutory rights under Evidence Code sections 402 and 403,4 and his constitutional right to due process. The argument fails. To the extent Smith and Wheeler intended to join this claim, it is forfeited because they did not join the motion below, and, in any event, it is equally meritless as to them. Bryant acknowledges the record does not disclose whether the court ever ruled on the request, either when it was initially made, or shortly before the trial actually began. Bryant‘s failure to secure a ruling on his motion forfeits any appellate claim of error. Here, there is simply no ruling for this court to review. Even if Bryant could demonstrate the motion was denied, there was no error. Bryant points to no authority establishing that the court must conduct a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of anticipated evidence, much less do so years before the trial starts. A trial court is not required in all cases to conduct a ― ‗preliminary inquiry‘ ‖ regarding the sufficiency of proffered other crimes 4 Evidence Code section 402, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part that ―[t]he court may hear and determine the question of the admissibility of evidence out of the presence or hearing of the jury . . . .‖ (Italics added.) Evidence Code section 403, subdivision (a)(1), provides in relevant part that when the ―relevance of proffered evidence depends on the existence‖ of foundational facts, ―[t]he proponent of the proffered evidence has the burden of producing evidence as to the existence of the preliminary fact, and the proffered evidence is inadmissible unless the court finds that there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the existence of the preliminary fact.‖ (See also Evid. Code, § 405 [addressing the trial court‘s duty to evaluate preliminary facts related to evidentiary rules of exclusion]; People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 282-287 [discussing the distinction between Evid. Code §§ 403 and 405].) 26 evidence. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 677-678.) During trial the court ruled on Bryant‘s numerous objections to specific evidence. We reject the notion that asserted errors in those rulings somehow give rise to a retroactive violation of Bryant‘s rights based on the absence of an earlier pretrial hearing.5 C. Denial of Defendants’ Motions to Recuse the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office During pretrial proceedings before severance of the capital offenses and defendants, the court granted a motion to recuse the entire Los Angeles County District Attorney‘s Office (LADA). The Attorney General sought review and the Court of Appeal reversed for abuse of discretion. Bryant contends that permitting the LADA to prosecute him violated his statutory rights under section 1424 and his rights under the state and federal Constitutions. We assume Smith and Wheeler have properly joined in this claim. Defendants establish no statutory or constitutional error. 1. Background Recusal was sought based on two separate pretrial events. First, during a pretrial writ proceeding, the lead prosecutor asserted that Bryant Family employees had ―infiltrated‖ the district attorney‘s office. The defense had not been provided with discovery on that subject. Second, the prosecution delayed disclosing unredacted interview notes of a deputy district attorney. The notes expressed the deputy‘s belief that a police investigator and the lead prosecutor had questioned a witness in a way that affected her recollections and her testimony at a preliminary hearing. This witness ultimately did not testify at trial. 5 We discuss, post, defendants‘ separate challenges to the court‘s rulings admitting various items of evidence. 27 In addressing the infiltration issue, the trial court conducted a series of in camera ex parte meetings with LADA personnel and later took testimony in open court. The court found no infiltration by the Family and denied the motion to recuse. As to the interview notes, the prosecution had provided redacted copies of the notes that omitted the prosecutor‘s concerns. The fact that the notes had been redacted was not apparent from these copies. The prosecution later requested in camera review of the complete notes. It sought a ruling on whether the previously redacted portions constituted privileged work product. The court declined to undertake that review and the prosecution produced the unredacted copies. In light of this delayed disclosure, defendants renewed their recusal motion. The trial court heard testimony from a number of LADA supervisors and line deputies. There was a dispute among the prosecutors whether the witness questioning had been improper. The court ultimately granted the recusal motion, finding that there had been ―an intentional, deliberate holding back of evidence,‖ and that essentially all the high-level supervisors in the office had been involved. Part of the trial court‘s concern was that during its review of the infiltration issue the court had asked the prosecutors whether there was any other information that it should know. No one had mentioned the notes or the internal conflict. The Attorney General appealed. (See § 1424, subd. (a)(1).) The Court of Appeal concluded that the failure to disclose the complete notes did not support recusal of the entire office. We denied defendants‘ petitions for review. The LADA removed from the case the lead prosecutor who had made the infiltration assertion. The prosecutor who wrote the notes about the interview had previously been removed and the witness was not called at trial. 28 2. Applicable Law Section 1424 provides, in relevant part, that a motion to recuse a prosecutor ―may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.‖ (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1).) The statute provides a two-part test: (1) whether there is a conflict of interest, and (2) whether the conflict is so severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting. (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711.) Recusal under section 1424 requires ―a showing of a real, not merely apparent, potential for unfair treatment, and further requires that that potential ‗rise to the level of a likelihood of unfairness.‘ [Citation.] Although the statute refers to a ‗fair trial,‘ we have recognized that many of the prosecutor‘s critical discretionary choices are made before or after trial and have hence interpreted section 1424 as requiring recusal on a showing of a conflict of interest ‗ ―so grave as to render it unlikely that defendant will receive fair treatment during all portions of the criminal proceedings.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Vasquez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 47, 56 (Vasquez).) If a defendant seeks to recuse an entire office, the record must demonstrate ―that the conduct of any deputy district attorney assigned to the case, or of the office as a whole, would likely be influenced by the personal interest of the district attorney or an employee.‖ (Id. at p. 57.) As a constitutional matter, we acknowledged in Vasquez that ―[n]either this court nor the United States Supreme Court has delineated the limitations due process places on prosecutorial conflicts of interest.‖ (Vasquez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 60.) Indeed, ―[a]s . . . prosecutors [cannot] completely avoid personal influences on their decisions, to constitutionalize the myriad distinctions and judgments involved in identifying those personal connections that require a . . . prosecutor‘s recusal might be unwise, if not impossible. The high court‘s approach to judicial conflicts generally leaves that linedrawing process to state disqualification and disciplinary law, with ‗only the most extreme of cases‘ being recognized as constitutional violations. [Citation.] [¶] To show 29 a due process violation arising from a prosecutor’s conflicting interest should be more difficult than from a judge‘s, for the ‗rigid requirements‘ of adjudicative neutrality . . . do not apply to prosecutors.‖ (Id. at p. 64, italics added.) In Vasquez, we concluded the defendants had failed to establish a violation of due process when the prosecutors‘ conflicts did not arise from ―a direct, substantial interest in the outcome or conduct of the case separate from their proper interest in seeing justice done,‖ and any prosecutorial conflict that existed was not ― ‗so severe as to deprive [defendants] of fundamental fairness in a manner ―shocking to the universal sense of justice.‖ ‘ ‖ (Id. at pp. 64-65.)