Opinion ID: 1823228
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Precipitating Act

Text: The gist of the referee's ruling is that a worker can be disqualified from benefits based on a prior record of misconduct, even if the conduct that precipitated the discharge was authorized. This rule violates the plain language and broad purpose of chapter 443. Section 443.101(1) expressly states that disqualification is justified if the worker is discharged ... for misconduct, and section 443.036(26) defines misconduct as willful or wanton conduct that deliberately disregards the employer's standards. When (as in the present case) an employer opts to counsel rather than fire a worker based on a prior record of misconduct, the employer at that point elects not to discharge the worker for the prior record standing alone. If the employer later fires the worker based on a subsequent precipitating act, the employer at that point discharges the worker for the precipitating act -either standing alone or in conjunction with the prior record-not for the prior record. To say otherwise is to play word games with chapter 443. To ignore the plain language of these statutes and hold (as the present majority opinion does) that disqualification may be based on a precipitating act that is authorized is to create a workplace governed not by the objective criteria set forth in chapter 443 but by each employer's subjective criteria for disqualification. A counseled worker will be at the mercy of his or her employer and can be blindsided at any timeand denied benefitsbased on an authorized or otherwise innocent act, even if the worker has scrupulously honored any bargain struck at counseling. This is precisely the evil that chapter 443 was intended to dispeli.e., social insecurity. [10] Under the plain language of the above statutes and the rule of liberal construction contained in section 443.031, the precipitating act itself -either standing alone or in conjunction with the prior record-must constitute misconduct. In the present case, the referee found that the two incidents precipitating Mason's firing were authorized or otherwise comported with chapter 443. [11] Mason was counseled on January 29, 1997, concerning his absenteeism. He subsequently left work early due to illness on February 8 with the approval of his supervisor, [12] and he arrived late at work on February 13 after his ride failed to show and Mason was forced to walk. [13] Neither act constituted the same type of conduct for which he had been counseled a few days earlier. The printed counseling form, entitled EMPLOYEE WARNING NOTICE, that was used to counsel Mason on January 29 contained a box labeled Lateness/Early Quit, and this box was not checked off; only the box stating Excessive Absences was checked off. Mason explained: Okay. They said that I was terminated for absenteeism.... Okay. After I got my two day suspension, I missed no more days, and the day I came to work 30 minutes24 min30 minutes late, they terminate me. Well, I had never had no problem being late `cause I [had gotten that] straightened out.... Under the plain language of chapter 443, the referee should not have disregarded the fact that the two precipitating acts did not constitute misconduct.