Opinion ID: 741980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Test for excusable neglect

Text: 7
8 This court has held that [i]gnorance of court rules does not constitute excusable neglect, even if the litigant appears pro se. Swimmer v. IRS, 811 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir.1987); cf. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.1987) (Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.). Recent United States Supreme Court authority requires that we reexamine Swimmer. 9 The Supreme Court analyzed the circumstances under which missing a filing deadline counts as excusable or inexcusable neglect in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). In that case, creditors of a Chapter 11 debtor sought to extend the bar date for filing proofs of claim under a bankruptcy rule (Rule 9006(b)) which gave discretion to the court to allow late filings where lateness was the result of excusable neglect. 10 Respondents received a notice from the bankruptcy court informing them that they must file proofs of claim by a certain bar date. Respondents then hired a bankruptcy attorney to represent them and gave the attorney their file containing that notice. Respondents later asked the attorney whether there was a bar date for claims, to which the attorney incorrectly responded that no such date had been set, and therefore there was no urgency in filing proofs of claim. As a result, respondents failed to file before the bar date. Upon discovering their error, respondents moved for an extension on grounds of excusable neglect. The bankruptcy court denied the motion and held that excusable neglect could only be the result of something beyond a party's reasonable control. 11 The Supreme Court analyzed a variety of statutory uses of the term excusable neglect in order to analogize to the bankruptcy context. It explained that neglect has its normal, expected meaning, i.e., negligence, carelessness, inadvertent mistake: 12 Although inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute excusable neglect, it is clear that excusable neglect under Rule 6(b) is a somewhat elastic concept and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of the movant. 13 Id. at 391, 113 S.Ct. at 1496 (footnotes omitted). It then examined cases arising under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) and went on to explain that, at least for purposes of Rule 60(b), 'excusable neglect' is understood to encompass situations in which the failure to comply with a filing deadline is attributable to negligence. Id. at 394, 113 S.Ct. at 1497. 14 In light of its interpretation of neglect as negligence, the Court said that the excusable portion of the term would provide the limitations necessary to prevent abuse by the parties (at least in the bankruptcy context, but presumably wherever there is an exception for excusable neglect). It therefore suggested the following analysis of excusable: 15 Because Congress has provided no other guideposts for determining what sorts of neglect will be considered excusable, we conclude that the determination is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission. These include, as the Court of Appeals found, the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith. 16 Id. at 395, 113 S.Ct. at 1498. These four enumerated factors, while not an exclusive list, provide a framework with which to determine whether missing a filing deadline constitutes excusable neglect. 17 In Committee for Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814 (9th Cir.1996), this court held that the Supreme Court's analysis of excusable neglect in Pioneer is applicable to Rule 6(b) and also noted our prior holding that the analysis is applicable to Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5). Id. at 825 n. 4. We now hold that the equitable test set out in Pioneer applies to Rule 60(b) as well. In addition to its similarity to the language in Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), Rule 60(b) was discussed at some length in the Pioneer decision. There appears to be no reason why the term excusable neglect in Rule 60(b) should not generally be given the same effect as it was given in Rule 9006(b). 1
18 test on plaintiff's motion to set aside judgment. 19 At the time the district court entered its order denying plaintiff's motion to set aside judgment, Swimmer seemed to require that a Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief following a failure to comply with court rules be rejected. Such a per se rule cannot exist after Pioneer. There the Court noted that inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute 'excusable neglect.'  507 U.S. at 392, 113 S.Ct. at 1496 (emphasis added). Thus, although a late filing will ordinarily not be excused by negligence, 2 that possibility is by no means foreclosed. 20 While pro se litigants are not excused from following court rules, it is not apparent that Briones' failure to respond to the motion to dismiss resulted only from a failure to read and attempt to follow court rules. It may have been a communication problem within his group of assistants. In light of Pioneer and the holding in this case, it is appropriate for the district court to reconsider its decision to deny plaintiff's motion to set aside judgment.