Opinion ID: 2620316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Harrison Remains Clearly Established Law

Text: Subsequent to Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)
In December 1981, $150,000 worth of art and furnishings were stolen from an Oregon home. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300. A witness implicated an eighteen-year-old neighbor of the victims, Michael Elstad. Id. Responding to the neighbor’s tip, two officers went to Elstad’s home with a warrant for his arrest. Id. While Officer McAllister spoke with Elstad’s mother in another room, Officer Burke asked Elstad if he knew why the officers were there. Id. at 301. Elstad said he did not. The officer then asked Elstad if he knew a person by the name of Gross. Id. Elstad said he did, and also that, “he heard that there was a robbery at the Gross house.” Id. Officer Burke told Elstad he “felt he was involved in that[.]” Elstad looked at the officer and said, “Yes, I was there.” Id. Elstad was transported to the Sheriff’s headquarters. One hour later, Officer McAllister advised him of his Miranda rights, reading from a standard card. Id. Elstad stated he understood his rights, and, with them in mind, wished to speak with the officers. Id. Elstad gave a full confession. Id. The statement was typed, reviewed by Elstad, read back to him for correction, and initialed and signed by Elstad and both officers. Id. At trial for first-degree burglary, Elstad’s counsel moved to suppress his oral statement and signed confession, arguing that the statement at his house “let the cat out of the bag,” citing United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947), and tainted the subsequent confession as “fruit of the poisonous LUJAN V. GARCIA 23 tree,” citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Id. at 302. The trial judge excluded Elstad’s in-home statement because he had not been advised of his Miranda rights, but allowed the written confession. Id. The court concluded Elstad’s statement was “given freely, voluntarily and knowingly” after he had waived his properly administered rights. “[The written statement] was not tainted in any way by the previous brief statement between [Elstad] and the [officers] that had arrested him.” Id. Elstad was found guilty and received a five year sentence. Id. Elstad appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, concluding that the crucial constitutional inquiry was “whether there was a sufficient break in the stream of events between [the] inadmissible statement and the written confession to insulate the latter statement from the effect of what went before.” State v. Elstad, 658 P.2d 552, 554 (Or. Ct. App. 1983), rev’d, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). The Court of Appeals concluded that “the coercive impact of the unconstitutionally obtained statement remains, because in a defendant’s mind it has sealed his fate. It is this impact that must be dissipated in order to make a subsequent confession admissible.” Id. The Court of Appeals identified lapse of time and change of place from the original surroundings as the two most important considerations as to whether the impact had been sufficiently dissipated, and concluded that in Elstad’s case, exclusion of the subsequent written confession was required. Id. at 554–55. The Oregon Supreme Court declined review and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider 24 LUJAN V. GARCIA whether “the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the suppression of a confession, made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned admission from the defendant.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court held that “a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.” Id. at 318.
Respondent argues that Harrison does not set forth a clearly established rule because its entire rationale and reasoning has been undermined by the subsequent Supreme Court authority of Elstad. However, the Supreme Court in Elstad confronted and rejected this argument. The Supreme Court explained that it “has never embraced the theory” pursued by the defendant in Elstad – “that a defendant’s ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates their voluntariness.” Id. at 316–17. The Court then distinguished Harrison as precedent wherein the government’s illegal actions – as opposed to the defendant’s ignorance – vitiated the voluntariness of a confession: If the prosecution has actually violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by introducing an inadmissible confession at trial, compelling the defendant to testify in rebuttal, the rule announced in Harrison v. United States[,] 392 U.S. 219[](1968), precludes use of that testimony on retrial. LUJAN V. GARCIA 25 Id. Thus, in distinguishing Elstad from Harrison, the Supreme Court confirmed the Harrison exclusionary rule as good constitutional law. Elstad and Harrison are also distinguishable on their facts. In Elstad, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule in the context of multiple confessions obtained from a suspect during a criminal investigation. In Harrison, the Supreme Court outlined an exclusionary rule to apply in the context of unlawfully admitted confessions of the defendant in a criminal trial. Accordingly, Elstad concerns the investigative stage of a criminal proceeding whereas Harrison concerns the trial stage. Both cases developed rules that safeguard the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition of the use by the prosecution in its case-in-chief of compelled testimony. The opinions of Elstad and Harrison should not be conflated to create ambiguity where there is none. Harrison sets forth a clearly established rule that has not been undermined by Elstad. Under the Harrison exclusionary rule, when a criminal defendant’s trial testimony is induced by the erroneous admission of his out-of-court confession into evidence as part of the government’s case-in-chief, that trial testimony cannot be introduced in a subsequent prosecution, nor can it be used to support the initial conviction on harmless error review, because to do so would perpetuate the underlying constitutional error. In the case at bar, the California Court of Appeal’s harmless error analysis violated this rule and, 26 LUJAN V. GARCIA thus, was contrary to clearly established federal law.6 Therefore, we affirm the district court’s determination that federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is warranted. II. Petitioner’s Rights Under Miranda Were Violated Respondent argues that the discussion that Mr. Lujan had with the police regarding his right to counsel satisfied Miranda. “Miranda claims present mixed questions of law and fact which we review de novo.” Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 805 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, we apply a de novo standard in reviewing whether the district court and California Court of Appeal properly concluded that Petitioner’s rights under Miranda were violated. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that, because of the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation, a person must be advised of his or her constitutional rights, including being advised prior to any questioning of the right to an attorney and the right to remain silent. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. “If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” Id. at 474. In such an instance, “[i]f the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and 6 Again, the parties do not dispute that, if Harrison is clear federal law applicable to the States (which we so conclude), then the California Court of Appeal’s decision affirming the conviction was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as set forth in Harrison. LUJAN V. GARCIA 27 intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.” Id. at 475. Respondent argues that both the California Court of Appeal and the district court mistakenly held law enforcement to a standard higher than is required under Supreme Court precedent by requiring an affirmative warning that specifically states that the suspect has the right to counsel before and during questioning.7 Respondent reads the interrogation transcripts as communicating to Petitioner that it was his “choice” and “prerogative” whether to speak with or without an attorney present. Thus, according to Respondent, Miranda was satisfied since “[d]ifferent words” from those set forth in Miranda may be used by law enforcement so long as they “communicate[] the same essential message.” See Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 64 (2010). The problem here is that the words used by law enforcement did not reasonably convey to Petitioner that he had the right to speak with an attorney present at all times – before and during his custodial interrogations. In the end, we find that the “choice” communicated to Petitioner was that he could speak without an attorney or he could remain silent throughout his interrogations. Speaking with an attorney present was not an option presented to Petitioner. Thus, Miranda was never satisfied. Before his first interrogation, Petitioner was told the following regarding his Miranda rights: 7 Petitioner mistakenly asserts that Respondent did not challenge the Court of Appeal’s Miranda ruling in the district court. 28 LUJAN V. GARCIA Your rights are you have the right to remain silent, whatever we talk about or you say can be used in a court of law against you, and if you don’t have money to hire an attorney one’s appointed to represent you free of charge. So, those are your rights. If you have questions about the case, if you want to tell us about what happened tonight, we’ll take your statement, take your statement from beginning to end. We’ll give you an opportunity to explain your side of the story. That’s what we’re looking for and we’re looking for the truth. So you understand all that? Petitioner did not receive any further advisements about his right to counsel until his third interrogation. Respondent argues that, during Petitioner’s third interrogation, Detective Rodriguez provided an “enhanced Miranda warning” that advised Petitioner above what the Miranda warning itself provides by telling Petitioner that his legal counsel would likely advise against making any statements to the police. The detective advised Petitioner, “I doubt that if you hire an attorney they’ll let you make a statement, usually they don’t. That’s the way it goes. So, that’s your prerogative, that’s your choice.” This advice did not inform Mr. Lujan of his constitutional right to counsel. It was improper, unauthorized legal advice. See Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding officer’s advice, which included, “a lawyer, he’s gonna say forget it. You know, don’t talk to the police,” “demeaned the pre-trial role of counsel articulated by the Supreme Court in Miranda and its progeny. He did so by dispensing a onesided, unauthorized legal opinion regarding whether [the LUJAN V. GARCIA 29 suspect] should remain silent and exercise his right to counsel. This advice adds yet another unacceptable dimension to [the officer’s] methods.”). Further, read in context, this advice was given to counter Petitioner’s invocation of his right to counsel. The purportedly enhanced Miranda warning came after confronting Petitioner with letters written to Monica about their marital problems, photographs of Monica and their children, and purported blood evidence found at Petitioner’s house, and after the following dialogue took place: Sgt. Rodriguez: . . . . Everything comes back to you. Everything says it’s you. People say it’s you. The only person that’s still somewhat in denial is you. . . . maybe you’re going to need to look inside yourself. Like I told you before, it’s very important that if there’s some other side to this story, your side of the story that we hear, it’s very important. . . . there may be some other movements, other mechanisms, other things that cause other causal factors, other things that are involved that we don’t know. Only you know and only you can tell us. Only you can tell us, what you were feeling at the time. Only you can tell us how you really felt, if you felt provoked. If there was something that was done that, took you over the edge. All those kinds of issues – Defendant: Can I have an attorney present? Sgt. Rodriguez: You want, you want an attorney present? You feel you need one? 30 LUJAN V. GARCIA Defendant: Yes I do. The interrogation should have ended there as Petitioner invoked his right to counsel. Instead, the detective pushed forward as if Petitioner’s unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel was somehow unclear, making statements like, “So like I said it’s up to you. So want [sic] to make a statement without an attorney, that’s up to you. I doubt that if you hire an attorney they’ll let you make a statement,” and “Now, you’ve asked for an attorney, so if you want to talk about this, you’ll have to tell me without an attorney present.” Given a commonsense reading, the record shows that law enforcement’s advisements overall limited Petitioner’s right to counsel and did not directly or indirectly fully communicate to Petitioner his right to counsel at all times. Respondent contends that any argument that the detective’s “enhanced Miranda warning” did not clearly convey to Petitioner his right to have counsel present during any questioning runs afoul of Powell. Respondent argues that the California Court of Appeal and the district court interpreted the words of Detective Rodriguez in such a way so as to come to the counterintuitive conclusion that counsel would be whisked in and out of the interrogation between questions. We disagree that the advisements at issue here lead to such a conclusion. In Powell, the following advisement was given: You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in court. You LUJAN V. GARCIA 31 have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview. Powell, 559 U.S. at 54. The Supreme Court concluded that the “warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s right to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all times.” Id. at 62. The same cannot be said of the warnings provided to Petitioner. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s and state appellate court’s conclusion that law enforcement’s communications with Petitioner did not comply with the clearly established Supreme Court precedent of Miranda and its progeny. Petitioner was never advised of his right to counsel at all times. III. The District Court’s Remedy Petitioner argues that the district court erred in granting the state the option to modify Petitioner’s convictions to second-degree murder in lieu of releasing or retrying him. Petitioner argues that only the habeas remedies of release or retrial are appropriate in this case, as a trial judge may also 32 LUJAN V. GARCIA instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter in a retrial.8 For reasons other than those argued by Petitioner, we remand. We review the district court’s remedy for abuse of discretion. Chioino, 581 F.3d at 1184. In general, “a district court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law, when it rests its decision on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (internal quotations and alteration omitted). In habeas cases, federal courts have broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting relief. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987). “Federal courts are authorized, under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, to dispose of habeas corpus matters as law and justice require.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). More specifically, a court may issue a conditional writ that requires the state to release a petitioner unless it takes some other remedial action, such as retrial of the petitioner. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403 (1993); Braunskill, 481 U.S. at 775 (“[F]ederal courts may delay the release of a successful habeas petitioner in order to provide the State an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation found by the court.”). 8 In California, voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice, upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. Cal. Penal Code § 192(a). The provocation – never simply the passion for revenge – must suffice to cause an ordinary man of average disposition “to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.” People v. Berry, 18 Cal. 3d 509, 515 (1976). LUJAN V. GARCIA 33 The United States Supreme Court recently provided guidance on crafting a habeas remedy. In a case concerning a Sixth Amendment violation, the Court stated: [R]emedies should be ‘tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.’ Thus, a remedy must ‘neutralize the taint’ of a constitutional violation, while at the same time not grant a windfall to the defendant or needlessly squander the considerable resources the State properly invested in the criminal prosecution. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388–89 (2012) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364–65 (1981)). We find it sensible that the Court’s guidance apply equally to a Fifth Amendment remedy, as well. Here, the district court fashioned its remedy in reliance on Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2008), which it believed supported the proposition that it could direct the state to modify Petitioner’s convictions to second-degree murder if the state chose not to release or retry him. See id. at 740. Harvest was a rehearing of an unreported memorandum disposition. The panel in Harvest referenced without comment the previous panel’s remand order that directed “‘the district court to order the state to release the petitioner unless the state either modifies the conviction to one for second degree murder or retries the petitioner.’” Id. (quoting Harvest v. Castro, 121 F. App’x 216, 220 (9th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion)). Since the district court issued its opinion relying on Harvest, however, we decided Douglas 34 LUJAN V. GARCIA v. Jacquez, 626 F.3d 501 (9th Cir. 2010), which provides guidance. Douglas involved a habeas petitioner who had been convicted of arson of an inhabited structure under California Penal Code Section 451(b). The district court, on habeas review, found insufficient evidence of inhabitation and ordered the state to resentence the petitioner under California Penal Code Section 451(c), for arson of a structure. Id. at 503. This Court vacated the order and remanded, holding that “[t]he district court’s power under habeas corpus was either immediately to vacate the prisoner’s arson sentence, or to postpone such relief for a reasonable period to allow the state court properly to sentence the prisoner.” Id. at 504. “Under California law, a trial court can modify a jury verdict when the trial evidence establishes that the defendant is not guilty of the charged crime, but is guilty of a lesser included offense.” Id. at 505 (citing Cal. Penal Code § 1181(6)).9 This Court held that: 9 The California Penal Code provides: When the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence, but if the evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of the degree of the crime of which he was convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser crime included therein, the court may modify the verdict, finding or judgment accordingly without granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall extend to any court to which the cause may be appealed. Cal. Penal Code § 1181(6). California courts may also modify a conviction to a lesser included offense in habeas proceedings. See In re Bower, 700 P.2d 1269 (Cal. 1985). LUJAN V. GARCIA 35 [A] California state trial court can modify the judgment from a conviction under § 451(b) to a [lesser] conviction under § 451(c). . . . Instead of directing the trial court to enter a judgment under § 451(c), the district court should have granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus and ordered that [petitioner’s] conviction under § 451(b) be vacated only if the state court did not resentence him within a reasonable time, such as 90 days. The state court would thus have an opportunity to correct its own constitutional error. Id. (emphasis added). We now apply Douglas’s holding to this case. The district court determined that absent the improperly admitted confession and testimony, the record supported a modification of the convictions to second-degree murder convictions and such a modification would be an appropriate habeas remedy. We conclude that the district court correctly concluded that it may provide the state trial court with the general option of remedying the constitutional error through a modification of the petitioner’s convictions. Id.; see also Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388–91. However, the district court erred in specifically concluding that second-degree murder convictions are an appropriate remedy here. The state court made no such determination, and thus, that issue is not properly before us on habeas review. Applying Douglas, we leave to the state court the question of whether based on this record a modification of the convictions to second-degree murder is proper as a matter of law. 36 LUJAN V. GARCIA Accordingly, we vacate the portions of the district court’s order and judgment that conclude second-degree murder convictions are an appropriate remedy. We remand this habeas petition to the district court to modify its judgment and issue a conditional writ in accordance with this opinion. On remand, the district court’s judgment and writ may include the option that the state court make an independent determination as to whether the convictions can be modified under state law. IV. Voluntariness of Petitioner’s Confession Petitioner now asks us to decide, or remand to the district court to decide, whether his confession was involuntary in addition to having been procured in violation of Miranda. The district court declined to decide this issue, as the magistrate judge determined it need not address alternative grounds for the habeas relief already granted. We agree with the district court’s reasoning. Having provided Petitioner with federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 § U.S.C. 2254(d) that removes the taint of the improperly admitted confession and the testimony thereby impelled, an inquiry into the voluntariness of Petitioner’s confession is neither appropriate nor necessary at this point. See Blazak v. Ricketts, 971 F.2d 1408, 1413–14 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that courts may avoid resolution of all extraneous issues to preserve scarce judicial resources); see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 n.8 (2004) (“Because we find that the [Miranda] warnings were inadequate, there is no need to assess the actual voluntariness of the statement.”). Further, the purpose of habeas remedies is to “‘put the defendant back in the position he would have been in if the [constitutional] violation never occurred.’” Nunes v. Mueller, LUJAN V. GARCIA 37 350 F.3d 1045, 1057 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Johnson v. Uribe, 682 F.3d 1238, 1244, opinion amended and superceded on denial of reh’g, 700 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 2012); Chioino, 581 F.3d at 1184. Here, the remedy afforded to Petitioner does just that – his improperly considered confessions have been stripped from the record and cannot be used in the government’s case-in-chief should Petitioner be retried, nor can they be used as inculpatory evidence should proceedings be initiated to modify his convictions in state court. Nevertheless, Petitioner asks this Court to address the issue of voluntariness because while “statements taken in violation of only the prophylactic Miranda rules may not be used in the prosecution’s case in chief, they are admissible to impeach conflicting testimony by the defendant.” Harvey, 494 U.S. at 350. On the other hand, involuntary statements may not come in at all. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978). Petitioner’s request is inconsistent with the record. Here, Petitioner’s trial counsel declared under penalty of perjury that Petitioner would not have testified absent the improper admission of his custodial confession. As such, ruling now on whether Petitioner’s custodial confession was involuntary would not further the purpose of putting Petitioner back in the position of a non-testifying criminal defendant – the position he would have been in if the constitutional violation never occurred. Rather, it would serve only to provide Petitioner a potential advantage in the unlikely event this case is retried. Accordingly, because the voluntariness issue is extraneous to Petitioner’s request for federal habeas relief, we decline to address it. 38 LUJAN V. GARCIA