Opinion ID: 2708854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adams’s Appeal

Text: On appeal, Adams challenges only his sentence. Specifically, he argues that the district court erred in determining that he was responsible for between one and three kilograms of heroin. The district court found Adams responsible for this quantity of heroin based on the heroin he personally sold, as well as the heroin sold by other street-level sellers who were working alongside him during the 6:00 a.m. to noon shift.1 1 The amount of heroin Adams personally sold totaled less than one kilogram of heroin. The mandatory minimum sentence for less than one kilogram of heroin is five years; whereas, for quantities of one to three kilograms of heroin, the mandatory minimum sentence is ten years. The (continued...) Nos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 7 This court reviews a district court’s drug quantity finding for clear error. United States v. Barnes, 602 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 2010). We will reverse such a finding only if, “after reviewing the entire record, [we] are left with the firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Marty, 450 F.3d 687, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2006). Under the sentencing guidelines, the drug quantity attributable to a defendant includes “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). “A ‘jointly undertaken criminal activity’ is a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), Application Note 2. And “[i]n determining the scope of the criminal activity that the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant’s agreement), the court may consider any explicit agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others.” Id. Adams argues that the district court clearly erred in holding him responsible for quantities of heroin sold by other street-level sellers, claiming that those sales were not a “jointly undertaken criminal activity.” Adams bases his argument in large part on Application Note 2(c)(6) to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). That note illustrates the concept of “jointly 1 (...continued) higher quantity of heroin involved also translated into a total guideline offense level three levels higher. 8 Nos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 undertaken criminal activity” with this example and explanation: Defendant P is a street-level drug dealer who knows of other street-level drug dealers in the same geographic area who sell the same type of drug as he sells. Defendant P and the other dealers share a common source of supply, but otherwise operate independently. Defendant P is not accountable for the quantities of drugs sold by the other street-level drug dealers because he is not engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal activity with them. In contrast, Defendant Q, another street-level drug dealer, pools his resources and profits with four other street-level drug dealers. Defendant Q is engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal activity and, therefore, he is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(B) for the quantities of drugs sold by the four other dealers during the course of his joint undertaking with them because those sales were in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), Application Note 2(c)(6). Adams argues that he is like Defendant P, operating independently from the other street-level sellers. Or as he put it at oral argument—he was merely an independent contractor, running a separate franchise. Thus, according to Adams, he was not acting jointly with the other street-level sellers for purposes of 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). At first blush, Application Note 2(c)(6) seems to fit Adams’s scenario. But as the Application Notes also explain: Nos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 9 [I]n cases involving contraband (including con- trolled substances), the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (and thus the accountability of the defendant for the contraband that was the object of that jointly undertaken activity) may depend upon whether, in the particular circum- stances, the nature of the offense is more appropriately viewed as one jointly undertaken criminal activity or as a number of separate criminal activities. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), Application Note 2(c)(8). The “particular circumstances” involved here change the complexion of this case. In this case, Adams admitted at his change of plea hearing that he was one of three or four other street-level sellers who worked between 6:00 a.m. and noon, “selling heroin on behalf of Bagley and other New Breeds gang members.” See Adams’s Change of Plea Hearing at 22–23. Bagley was a street supervisor who distributed the heroin to Adams and the other street sellers and then collected the proceeds. While Adams stated that his knowledge of the other individuals in the distribution chain above Bagley was limited, he otherwise agreed with the government’s proffer of the factual basis for the change of plea, which included the statement that he and the other street sellers sold heroin “on behalf of Bagley and other New Breeds gang members.” He also agreed with the government’s characterization of Bagley as a “supervisor.” Thus, in this case, Adams and the other street sellers were working for the same organization, during the same shift (6:00 a.m. to noon), for the same supervisor, and selling heroin owned by that organization. Adams also was not merely working in “the same geographic area” as the other 10 Nos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 street-level sellers; he was “working as a street worker in Bostic’s organization,” selling drugs in the a territory controlled by the New Breeds gang.2 These facts speak not of several street-level sellers operating independently to run their own drug franchises, but rather of the Bostic organization running one drug store with several employees staffing the various shifts. In fact, that was the government’s theory before the district court—that the Bostic organization ran an open-air drug store which attracted customers by having so many sellers available with its product. The government explained that by having a ready access to drugs and several sellers on hand, the Bostic organization attracted customers to the market. And thus, while Adams and the other street-level sellers might be competing for their commission, the government argued that because of the number of sellers all working there for the Bostic organization, customers could come in, [take the “L”], and they knew they would find sellers there who were selling heroin openly on the street. These people were not competing with each other. The reality is that you needed the sheer critical mass of people to make this a successful 2 The government also represented at oral argument that the street sellers alerted each other to the presence of police. The government, though, did not rely on this fact at sentencing. Clearly, this fact would further show that the street sellers were working together to further the same endeavor. But there was apparently much about the New Breeds gang left unsaid at sentencing. See Mick Dumke, “Anatomy of a Heroin Ring,” Chicago Reader, Feb. 14, 2013, http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/gang-violence-heroin-new-breed s-vice-lords/Content?oid=8761736 (visited Feb. 8, 2014). Nos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 11 open-air drug market, and the defendant was a part of that. The people who were out there were not competing with him. They were part of the reason that they were able to draw customers in from all over the city. The district court found the government’s argument persuasive and, given the facts of this case, that conclusion was eminently reasonable. Similarly, in a case involving crack dealers operating out of the same house—but arguably with different suppliers—the Fifth Circuit found the “marketing symbiosis” supported a finding of jointly undertaken criminal activity. See United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 860, 864–65 (5th Cir. 1994). In Smith, Smith, Cheney and Adams were dealers operating out of the same crack house. Smith’s co-defendant, Phillips, had flagged down two undercover officers who indicated they wanted some “rocks.” Phillips directed them to the crack house and the trio showed the officers their wares. The officers purchased some crack from Smith and then gave the “bust” signal and a raid ensued. The four retreated into the house, where they were arrested. None had crack on his person, but officers recovered 3.9 grams of cocaine base from the floor of the house. That crack was of a different purity and color than the crack Smith had sold the undercover agents. Smith maintained that it was not her crack and that therefore the district court erred in sentencing her based the amount of crack she sold, plus the 3.9 grams recovered from the house. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that Smith was responsible for the crack recovered from the premises even if it was owned by a different dealer, because the facts support a finding that “Smith agreed to engage in jointly undertaken criminal activity 12 Nos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 with Cheney and Adams.”3 In reaching this conclusion, the Smith court reasoned, the house had become a very rudimentary shopping center or flea market for crack, replete with Phillips, its “barker,” and the friendly competitors who as a whole created a marketing site greater than the sum of its parts. The presence of multiple, part-time pushers and a larger supply for users produced a marketing symbiosis that far outweighed its minor competitive aspect. Id. The facts in this case are even more demonstrative of a jointly undertaken criminal activity than the facts in Smith. First, in this case, Adams and the other sellers working the morning shift in Bostic’s open-air drug market did not own the drugs. While that factor is not dispositive, it shows that Adams had much less independence than the dealers in Smith. Yet the Fifth Circuit found Smith had engaged in jointly undertaken criminal activity with the two other dealers. Second, in Smith, there was evidence the crack came from different sources, id. at 864, which also indicates more independence. Here, though, Adams and the other sellers were “selling heroin on behalf of Bagley and other New Breeds gang members.” See Adams’s Change of Plea Hearing at 22–23. Thus, the facts in this case are 3 Cheney and Adams were not charged federally. See Smith, 13 F.3d at 862 n.2. And while Phillips was also held responsible for the 3.9 grams of crack recovered from inside the house, the Fifth Circuit reversed his sentence and remanded for resentencing because the government had not presented any evidence, and the district court had not found, that Phillips had jointly undertaken criminal activity with Cheney and Adams. Nos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 13 even more supportive of a finding of jointly undertaken criminal activity than those at issue in Smith. Moreover, even if Adams’s independent contractor characterization was a reasonable view of the facts, there was no clear error because “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v. Bush, 79 F.3d 64, 66 (7th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in finding Adams acted jointly with the other street-level sellers who staffed the Bostic open-air market during the morning shift and sold drugs on behalf of Bagley and other New Breeds gang members. Adams does not claim that the sales of the other sellers were not foreseeable to him. Nor does he contest that, if he is held accountable for the drugs sold by the other street-level sellers during the shifts he worked, the quantity of drugs involved was between one and three kilograms of heroin. Accordingly, because the district court did not clearly err in finding those sales part of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, the district court did not err in holding Adams responsible for between one and three kilograms of heroin and sentencing him accordingly.