Opinion ID: 1882186
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Intent to Defraud Is an Element of Section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes (1997).

Text: This Court has repeatedly held that the plain meaning of statutory language is the first consideration of statutory construction. Capers v. State, 678 So.2d 330, 332 (Fla.1996). Section 817.234(8) states in pertinent part: It is unlawful for any person ... to solicit any business ... for the purpose of making motor vehicle tort claims or claims for personal injury protection benefits required by s. 627.736. Any person who violates the provisions of this subsection commits a felony of the third degree.... Obviously, there is no mention of fraud as an element of the offense. In fact, as noted by Judge Stone in Hansbrough: The statute in question, distilled to its most essential terms, provides that it is unlawful for any person ... to solicit any business ... for the purpose of making ... claims for personal injury protection benefits.... § 817.234(8), Fla.Stat. Subsection (8) does not include the words with the intent to defraud. As it is not ambiguous, we should assume the omission was intentional. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). 757 So.2d at 1283 (Stone, J., concurring specially). The same reasoning was echoed by the First District Court of Appeal in its recent decision in Cronin where the court noted that section 817.234(8) clearly and unambiguously does not include the requirement that the solicitation occur with the intent to defraud. See 774 So.2d at 874. In our view, the plain language of the statute clearly and unambiguously indicates that intent to defraud is simply not an element of the offense as established by the Legislature. To this end, we have held that [w]here the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial interpretation. T.R. v. State, 677 So.2d 270, 271 (Fla.1996); see also State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 540 (Fla.1997); Pardo v. State, 596 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1992). Because we conclude that the language of this statute is facially clear and unambiguous, our analysis need not proceed any further. However, our conclusion here that intent to defraud is not an element of the offense is similarly fully substantiated by this statute's legislative history and by canons of statutory construction.
In an apparent response to concerns that unscrupulous doctors and lawyers were inflating or outright falsifying personal injury claims in an effort to meet and exceed the statutory monetary threshold amount, [4] the Legislature enacted section 627.7375, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976). See ch. 76-266, § 7, Laws of Fla. [5] Section 627.7375, when enacted, contained essentially that which is now found in subsections (1) through (4) of section 817.234, all of which then included, and still include, fraud as an element of the crime. The following year, through the adoption of chapter 77-468, section 36, Laws of Florida, subsections (8) and (9) [6] were added. [7] Neither subsection (8) nor (9) contained any language pertaining to fraudulent intent. Moreover, the staff analysis for section 36, as it specifically related to subsection (8), simply indicated that the statute was amended to [p]rovide[] that acting as a runner is a third degree felony. Fla.S. Comm. on Com., CS for SB 1181 (1977) Staff Analysis (June 7, 1977)(on file at Florida Archives). The staff analysis, albeit brief, clearly supports the conclusion that intent to defraud has never been an element of subsection (8). Instead, it is evident to us that subsection (8) solely seeks to curtail what has come to be known as chasing business, irrespective of any intent to defraud. In 1978, subsections (8) and (9), both of which, at the time of enactment, prohibited solicitation for the purpose of making motor vehicle tort claims, were amended to prohibit solicitation for the purpose of making motor vehicle tort claims or claims for personal injury protection benefits. See ch. 78-258, § 3, Laws of Fla. The Legislature, again having the opportunity to include intent to defraud as an element, did not do so. The following year, the entire section (then-section 627.7375) was renumbered as section 817.234. See ch. 79-81, § 1, Laws of Fla. Worthy of notice, however, is that during the same year, the Legislature passed a reviser's bill to remove inconsistencies and redundancies and otherwise clarify statutes and facilitate their correct interpretation. See ch. 79-400, Laws of Fla. While revising then-section 627.7375, the Legislature permitted subsections (8) and (9) to remain untouched. See ch. 79-400, § 240, Laws of Fla. Subsections (8) and (9) have remained, essentially, unchanged since 1979. In our view, it is clear from the preceding analysis that the legislative history accompanying section 817.234(8) also supports the conclusion that the Legislature, having had ample opportunity to do so, did not include fraudulent intent as an element of the offense of unlawful insurance solicitation.
Respondent Bradford initially asserts that section 817.234 is codified within a chapter entitled Fraudulent Practices and is itself entitled False and Fraudulent Insurance Claims. Thus, Bradford presents the position that the title of section 817.234 evinces a strong indication that the Legislature intended fraud to be an element of subsection (8). In this respect, we have held: The arrangement and classification of laws for purposes of codification in the Florida Statutes is an administrative function of the Joint Legislative Management Committee of the Florida Legislature. The classification of a law or a part of a law in a particular title or chapter of Florida Statutes is not determinative on the issue of legislative intent, though it may be persuasive in certain circumstances. Where there is a question, established principles of statutory construction must be utilized. State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 1985) (citation omitted). Turning to well-settled principles of statutory construction, this Court has held that [t]he legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended. See Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d at 541; see also Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So.2d 146, 152 (Fla.1997) (quoting Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995) ([W]hen the legislature has used a term ... in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.)). In the present case, while intent to defraud is not mentioned in subsection (8), it is specifically included as an element in subsections (1), (2), (3), (4), and (7) of section 817.234. Thus, this principle of statutory construction lends further support to our determination that the Legislature intentionally excluded fraud as an element of subsection (8). It is evident that the Legislature knew how to include intent to defraud as an element, and it could have easily done so with respect to subsection (8) if it so wished. Respondent Bradford further urges us to consider another principle of statutory construction which dictates that statutes dealing with the same subject matter should be considered in pari materia in an effort to give effect to legislative intent. See, e.g., McGhee v. Volusia County, 679 So.2d 729, 730 n. 1 (Fla.1996) (The doctrine of in pari materia requires the courts to construe related statutes together so that they illuminate each other....); Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992) ([A]ll parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole.). In this respect, the district court below reasoned that [w]hen reading subsection (8) [which does not include fraud as an element] in pari materia with subsection (1)(a) [which does include fraud as an element], it becomes obvious that the Legislature in enacting subsection (8) intended to punish only solicitations made for the sole purpose of defrauding that patient's PIP insurer. Bradford, 740 So.2d at 571. We conclude that the district court's reasoning that the concept of reading statutes in pari materia necessarily incorporates the fraud requirement contained in subsection (1) into subsection (8) is premised on a misguided interpretation of that particular canon of statutory construction. Simply, the concept of reading statutes in pari materia does not require that elements from one subsection be carried over and inserted into another subsection even if the statutes are related. See Hansbrough, 757 So.2d at 1283-84 (The fact that subsection (1)(a) of the statute prohibits certain acts in connection with insurance claims if committed with intent to defraud, as observed in Bradford, does not automatically lead to the conclusion that all portions of the same statute require proof of specific intent to defraud.) (Stone, J., concurring specially). Thus, we conclude that the plain meaning of the statute does not indicate that fraud is an element; the legislative history does indicate that there was ample opportunity to include intent to defraud in subsection (8), yet the Legislature did not do so; and lastly, but of no less importance, principles of statutory construction lead to the conclusion that the Legislature was well aware of how to incorporate the element of fraud into these subsections (as evidenced by subsections (1), (2), (3), (4) and (7)), yet it declined to do so as related to subsection (8). As a result, we conclude that the Legislature has not included fraudulent intent as an element of the offense of unlawful insurance solicitation.