Opinion ID: 542890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impact of the Christmas Holiday on the Jury Deliberations

Text: 26 Jury deliberations in this case began at 2:50 p.m. on Friday, December 23, and lasted nearly four hours. Both Fozo and Thomas argue that the impending Christmas holiday caused the jury to rush its deliberations and improperly reach a guilty verdict. The defendants raised this claim in their motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) and now, on appeal, cite Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) 3 as a basis for claiming that the district judge erred in failing to conduct a post-trial hearing on the issue. The defendants argue that the district judge should have conducted a post-trial hearing which would have involved questioning members of the jury about the effect of the Christmas holiday on the pace of their deliberations. 27 Under narrow circumstances the procedure a court employs with regard to the management of the jury during its deliberations may raise an issue of coercion which, upon timely objection, would be subject to review. See e.g., United States v. Murvine, 743 F.2d 511, 515-16 (7th Cir.1984). However, any claim of coercion based on the upcoming holiday period was waived by the failure of the defendants to object to the submission of the case to the jury on December 23. 4 Moreover, as the district judge noted in his Order and Memorandum denying the Rule 29(c) motion, the duration and timing of the jury's deliberations cannot be challenged in a motion for judgment of acquittal. The sole ground for a post-trial motion under Rule 29(c) is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. See Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Crim.2d Sec. 466 (1982). 28 Concerning defendants' argument on appeal that Rule 606(b) required the district judge to conduct a post-trial hearing on their theory that the impending holiday constituted an outside influence which was improperly brought to bear upon the jury, they are simply wrong. The invalidating of a verdict may be pursued under Rule 606(b) on the limited basis that prejudicial extraneous influence or information was injected into or brought to bear upon the deliberation process. However, while a juror may testify describing the extraneous influence or information, a juror may not testify about its impact. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-16, 102 S.Ct. 940, 945, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). Thus, the only information which could be obtained from a juror in this situation would be whether or not the juror was aware the Christmas holiday was impending. This is obviously not the type of outside influence contemplated by Rule 606(b). Such factors as the timing or length of jury deliberations and other jury management techniques which are unrelated to allegations of improper contact are not cognizable under Rule 606(b).D. Propriety of Thomas' Sentence 5 29 Thomas was sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment. This term is two months greater than the maximum of the Guidelines range for his convictions. The district judge departed because he found Thomas unlawfully attempted to influence Fozo's testimony by preparing a script for him to use in his trial testimony. Thomas challenges the sentence on the ground that it was inconsistent for the court to depart from the range, based on the use of the script, for Thomas but not for Fozo. 30 The district judge, after consideration of the demeanor of the defendants, made a factual finding and determined that Thomas had taken advantage of Fozo's request for assistance--a request based on Fozo's spelling difficulties. The court found that Thomas attempted to influence Fozo's testimony through the use of the script. The court properly considered the actions of each defendant and found one culpable and the other not culpable under these circumstances. Thus, there was no anomalous treatment with regard to the sentences imposed. The district judge correctly utilized Application Note 1(d) to Sec. 3C1.1 of the Guidelines which refers to one defendant unlawfully attempt[ing] to influence a co-defendant. The departure was warranted under Application Note 4 to Sec. 3C1.1. Note 4, as applicable to Thomas, 6 reads in part: 31 In cases in which a significant further obstruction occurred during the investigation or prosecution of an obstruction offense itself [which includes unlawfully attempting to influence a co-defendant], an upward departure may be warranted (e.g., where a witness to an obstruction offense is threatened during the course of the prosecution for the obstruction offense). 32 Thus, we find the departure by the district court was reasonable under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e)(3). See United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 466, 471 (7th Cir.1989). 7