Opinion ID: 436288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: George Green.

Text: 15 The defendant-appellant, George Green, contends that the evidence at trial at best merely provided the basis for an inference that he was an outsider to the conspiracy who unknowingly furthered its objectives. He argues that he only acted as a broker for the sale of the jewelry between Richard Tisch and the sellers, Robert Tuohey and Jerry Waldo, in an effort to receive a commission from Tisch. 16 Green argues that the government failed to establish that he was working in the Baggage Facility with Tuohey and Waldo on April 27, 1981, the date the jewelry disappeared. He therefore contends that the government did not establish that he participated in or had any knowledge of the conspiracy on that date. Our review of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789, demonstrates that Green was in fact working in the same area with Tuohey and Waldo on April 27, 1981. 2 This was established at trial through the testimony of a United Airlines Supervisor based on his examination of United Airlines' employment records. 17 We disagree with Green's assertion that he was a mere broker trying to make a commission and note the overwhelming evidence of his active involvement and his continuous efforts in aid of the conspiracy to sell stolen jewelry. Green does not challenge the evidence that he normally worked on the same shift and in the same area as Waldo and Tuohey, and that he was personally acquainted with them. Nor does Green challenge the testimony that some six months after the disappearance of the jewelry, he introduced his two co-employees (Waldo and Tuohey) to Tisch as jewelers liquidating their business, in an effort to assist them (jewelers) to procure a buyer for jewelry. Green would have us believe that he was just a good guy trying to help out friends and unwittingly furthered the objectives of a conspiracy when, in fact, he: (1) arranged for the parties to meet in his house to consummate a $15,000 jewelry transaction, (2) was paid a $700 to $900 commission for that sale, and (3) made renewed efforts to aid in the sale of additional hot jewelry. 18 He argues that there was no reason for him to suspect anything other than that his co-workers were somehow in a sideline of selling jewelry and chose him to be their broker. Considering the totality of Green's involvement with the conspiracy--(1) he worked in the area where the jewelry disappeared; (2) he later introduced two co-employees as jewelers; (3) he made the arrangements for these alleged jewelers to sell approximately 100 high-quality rings for $15,000 cash in the kitchen of his home; and (4) he made further efforts to aid in the sale of an additional 200-400 rings--his argument of lack of knowledge of the conspiracy defies logic, common sense and reason. 19 Green points out that he entered into prior commission agreements with Tisch before he introduced him to Tuohey and Waldo, arguing that acting as a broker was usual and ordinary. This argument also fails as the record establishes that his prior jewelry transactions with Tisch were on a very limited scale involving private individuals (who were not jewelers) which did not approach the magnitude of the $15,000 transaction involving some 100 rings he arranged. Further, had Green been a legitimate broker it strains logic to believe that he would have instructed Tisch not to tell the sellers (Waldo and Tuohey) that he (Tisch) had paid Green a commission. Legitimate brokers need not and do not attempt to hide their commissions. 20 In an effort to isolate himself from the conspiracy, Green points to the evidence establishing that he did not handle the jewelry or the money used to purchase it, and that he was never entrusted with the jewelry even while Tisch obtained the necessary cash. According to Green, this evidence bolsters the inference that he was only a broker unaware of any criminal activity. Even if we accept Green's view of the evidence, the court's decision was proper since [a] party need not know all of the purposes and details of a conspiracy to be proved a co-conspirator.... It is sufficient that the government prove a connection between the defendant and the conspiracy. United States v. Frans, 697 F.2d 188, 190 n. 1 (7th Cir.1983). It is clear that the government proved far more than just a mere connection. Furthermore, while 'mere presence at the scene of the crime or mere association with conspirators will not themselves support a conspiracy conviction ... presence or a single act will suffice if the circumstances permit the inference that the presence or act was intended to advance the ends of the conspiracy.'  United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d at 989 (quoting United States v. Mancillas, 580 F.2d 1301, 1308 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 361, 58 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)). 21 We believe the record, when viewed in a light most favorable to the government, contains more than sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find that George Green did in fact knowingly, and actively participate in the conspiracy to receive, possess and sell the stolen jewelry through his provision of assistance to Waldo and Tuohey in arranging the sale of the stolen jewelry. Green does not challenge the government's theory of the existence of the conspiracy to sell stolen jewelry, but only that he was isolated from that conspiracy. However, the law is clear that [o]nce a conspiracy is shown to exist, evidence that establishes a particular defendant's participation beyond a reasonable doubt, although the connection between the defendant and the conspiracy is slight, is sufficient to convict. United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 988 (7th Cir.1983). Relying on United States v. Xheka, we view the evidence linking Green with the conspiracy as far more than slight. As our court recognized in Xheka, [t]his [case] is a far cry from the typical 'mere presence' case in which the alleged conspirator has no demonstrated stake in the conspiracy and contributes nothing to its success. 704 F.2d at 989. We hold that the record contains more than sufficient evidence to allow the trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Green was guilty of conspiring to receive, possess, and sell the stolen jewelry. 22