Opinion ID: 852353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Family and Medical Leave Act

Text: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2008), entitles certain employees to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for the employee's serious health condition, the birth or adoption of a child, or the employee's need to care for a seriously ill family member. Id. § 2612. Following a qualified leave, an eligible employee is entitled to be restored to the former position or one with equivalent benefits, pay, and conditions of employment. Id. § 2614(a)(1). The employee may sue in federal or state court for damages, equitable relief, and fees if an employer interferes with the employee's FMLA rights or retaliates for the exercise of those rights. Id. §§ 2615, 2617. GCSC contends that (1) Powell was not an eligible employee with respect to his head football coaching position and (2) insufficient evidence supported the jury's determination that GCSC retaliated against Powell.
Under the FMLA, an eligible employee is entitled to be restored to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced or an equivalent position. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). One of the requirements of an eligible employee is employment by the employer for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous twelve month period. Id. § 2611(2)(A). In the twelve months before his leave, Powell served more than 1,250 hours in his capacity as a math teacher, but fewer than 1,250 hours as head football coach. Powell asserts that his total hours of service to GCSC required his reinstatement in all capacities. GCSC argues that Powell's service as teacher and coach are to be viewed separately for purposes of the FMLA, so Powell was entitled to reinstatement as a teacher, but not as a coach. Whether an employee's FMLA eligibility is determined by the employee's entire service to the employer or separately for each position is an issue of first impression. The trial court concluded that Powell was an eligible employee for purposes of both his teaching and coaching positions. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the issue is controlled by the parties' treatment of the jobs as unified or separate. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Powell, 881 N.E.2d 57, 58 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). The Court of Appeals concluded that because the parties treated the jobs as entirely separate and independent of one another, they are separate for the purposes of FMLA coverage. Id. Because this issue is a question of law, we review it de novo. For the reasons explained below, we hold that an employee filling multiple positions with the same employer is eligible for FMLA leave as to all positions if that employee has completed 1,250 total hours of service to that employer in the twelve months preceding the request for leave. Because this issue is purely an issue of statutory interpretation, we look first to the language of the FMLA. The parties are the Gary Community School Corporationan employer subject to the FMLAand Powell as an employee. An employee is defined in the FMLA simply as any individual employed by an employer. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(1), 203(d), 2611(3). Employers are defined as any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year. Id. § 2611(4)(A)(i). Only an eligible employee may assert claims under the FMLA. The definition of eligible employee in § 2611(2) requires: (1) employment for at least 12 months by the employer from whom leave was requested, id. § 2611(2)(A)(i), and (2) employment for at least 1,250 hours of service by that employer during the previous 12-month period, id. § 2611(2)(A)(ii). None of these definitions suggests that separate positions held by the employee are relevant. Importantly, the test for eligibility is phrased in terms of hours of service to an employer, not service in any particular position. In short, the definitions are entity specific, not job specific, and the service requirements for an eligible employee are in terms of overall service, not service in any specific position. Our conclusion that the 1,250-hour requirement applies to the employee's overall service to the employer is supported by the legislative history of the FMLA and applicable federal regulations. Committee reports accompanying passage of the FMLA instruct that the minimum ours of service requirement is meant to be construed broadly. H.R.Rep. No. 103-8(I), at 35 (1993); S.Rep. No. 103-3, at 25 (1993), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1993, pp. 3, 25. The FMLA directs that regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2008), apply under the FMLA for determining hours of service. § 2611(2)(C). Under the FLSA, to determine hours worked for purposes of overtime compensation the employer must total all the hours worked by the employee for him in that workweek (even though two or more unrelated job assignments may have been performed) ... 29 C.F.R. § 778.103 (2008). Similarly, FMLA regulations provide that the determination of hours worked is not limited by methods of recordkeeping, or by compensation agreements that do not accurately reflect all the hours an employee has worked for or been in service to the employer. Any accurate accounting of actual hours worked under FLSA's principles may be used. Id. § 825.110(c)(1); see also H.R. Rep. 103-8(I), at 35 (same); S.Rep. No. 103-3, at 25 (same). Finally, the regulations provide that [n]ormally the legal entity which employs the employee is the employer under FMLA. Applying this principle, a corporation is a single employer rather than its separate establishments or divisions. 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(c); see also id. § 825.600 (describing the school board as the employer for purposes of the 50-employee test in its example). Thus, GCSCthe legal entity employing Powellis the employer under the FMLA, even though Powell had separate academic and athletic supervisors. GCSC points to § 207 of the FLSA, incorporated by reference in the FMLA. The only portion of § 207 arguably relevant to Powell's relationship with GCSC is subsection (p)(2), which provides If an employee of a public agency which is a ... political subdivision of a State... undertakes, on an occasional or sporadic basis and solely at the employee's option, part-time employment for the public agency which is in a different capacity from any capacity in which the employee is regularly employed with the public agency, the hours such employee was employed in performing the different employment shall be excluded by the public agency in the calculation of the hours for which the employee is entitled to overtime compensation under this section. Gary argues that Powell's coaching position was such a position and should therefore be excluded from the FMLA hours of service calculation. It seems a stretch to characterize a head football coaching position as occasional or sporadic or solely at the employee's option. Moreover, the regulation under section 207 specifically explains that any activity traditionally associated with teaching (e.g., coaching, career counseling, etc.) will not be considered as employment in a different capacity.  29 C.F.R. § 553.30(c)(5) (2008). We do not find subsection (p)(2) applicable to Powell's employment. Finally, GCSC notes that it employed Powell under separate contracts and may have issued separate paychecks for coach and teacher. In view of the statute and regulations already described, we do not find these relevant.
Powell's claim for retaliation seeks damages resulting from GCSC's actions against Powell for opposing any practice made unlawful by the FMLA. Powell claims that his opposition to GCSC's initial FMLA violation during the 2001 football season resulted in his being denied employment as head football and assistant basketball coach for the seasons from 2002 to his anticipated retirement in 2014. At trial, the jury found that GCSC had retaliated against Powell and awarded the full amount of damages sought by Powell. On appeal, GCSC argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that GCSC had retaliated against Powell, particularly in light of GCSC's asserted proper reasons for not rehiring Powell. The Court of Appeals, finding the eligibility issue dispositive, did not address the retaliation claim. When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we do not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. We affirm a verdict when, considering the probative evidence and reasonable inferences, a reasonable jury could have arrived at the same determination. Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515, 521 (Ind.1993). We conclude that Powell has presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that GCSC retaliated against him for complaining about not being reinstated. FMLA retaliation claims have been evaluated in federal circuit courts reviewing summary judgments by applying the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Phillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905, 912 (8th Cir.2008); Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 707 (6th Cir. 2008); Martin v. Brevard County Pub. Sch., 543 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir.2008); Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 551 (4th Cir.2006); Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 175 (2d Cir.2006). On appeal from a jury verdict, however, the McDonnell Douglas presumptions fade away, and the appellate court reviews whether the evidence is sufficient to support whatever finding was made at trial. E.g., Hite v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 446 F.3d 858, 865 (8th Cir.2008). Although juries do not rigidly apply the McDonnell Douglas framework, it is a useful tool for evaluating the sufficiency of Powell's evidence. Under this framework, the employee must first show that he engaged in activity protected by the FMLA, that the employer took adverse action against him, and that the adverse action was causally connected to the plaintiff's protected activity. The burden then shifts to the employer to present evidence of a proper reason for the adverse employment action. Finally, the burden returns to the employee to establish that the employer's proffered explanation is a pretext. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817. 1. Protected activity. Here, Powell argues that he engaged in protected activitytaking FMLA leave and opposing GCSC's FMLA violation by complaining to the newspaper. A newspaper article published October 13, 2001, shortly after Powell's termination as head football coach, stated: Imagine you have a job, one you like very much. But one day, on the job, you get hurt. After going through proper channels to inform your employer of your work status, you expect to return to that job when healthy. Instead, when you return, you learn you have been terminated. Any human resources director knows you can't fire a productive employee because he or she is sick. But it happened to Thomas Powell II, Wallace's coach.... The newspaper reporter and Powell testified that Powell was the source of information for the article. Similarly, a May 22, 2002 article, published when Powell had applied as head football coach for the 2002 season, stated: Powell missed most of the first six weeks of the [2001] season after he developed a blood clot in his leg. When he tried to return to the sidelines on October 1, Hoover told him that he had been replaced. GCSC disputes that Powell complained to the newspaper about an FMLA violation, stressing that no article quoted him as saying he was fired for taking FMLA leave. Although none of the newspaper articles explicitly refers to the FMLA, the jury could have reasonably concluded from the articles that Powell complained to the newspaper about GCSC's failure to reinstate him after taking medical leave. We agree with Powell that his complaints to the newspaper were acts opposing actions prohibited by the FMLA, and therefore were not a permissible ground for retaliation. 2. Adverse employment action and causal connection. Powell experienced an adverse employment action when he was subsequently not hired as head football and assistant basketball coach. The timing of this action in relation to Powell's complaints suggests a causal connection. On May 22, 2002, a three-person committee consisting of Lew Wallace's principal and athletic director and a parent recommended Powell for head football coach for the 2002 season. The same day, a newspaper article referring to Powell's medical leave was published. On May 29, the GCSC athletic director, who was not a member of the recommending committee, sent a memorandum to the superintendent explaining why he would not recommend Powell. The memorandum's reasons included Thomas Powell created a number of problems for the players and the coaching staff after he failed in his attempt to get his job back, and He was in contact with the news media and several articles were perpetrated with unfounded statements through Thomas Powell. 3. Employer's legitimate reasons. GCSC responds that it did not rehire Powell for legitimate reasons unrelated to his FMLA leave or complaints to the press. First, GCSC alleges that Powell failed to obtain a proper medical examination form from a football player who was later injured and sued the school. Second, GCSC points to an incident in which Powell allegedly gambled with a student over a one-on-one basketball game. Third, GCSC asserts that the coach selected for the 2002 season, who had played in the Rose Bowl and was an All Big Ten football player, was superior to Powell. Finally, GCSC argues that Powell had no expectation that he would be hired as football coach for the 2002 season because all coaches in the school system are terminated at the end of each season per school policy. 4. Pretext. Powell argues that GCSC's proffered proper reasons are pretextual. Powell notes that the medical form and gambling incidents occurred during 2000, before both the Lew Wallace and GCSC athletic directors recommended Powell for the 2001 season. Powell also points out that the GCSC athletic director omitted these incidents from his list of reasons for not recommending Powell in 2002. Powell also argues that the coach hired for the 2002 season was not more qualified because he was not a certified teacher, and certified teachers were to receive priority for coaching positions pursuant to GCSC's Collective Bargaining Agreement. Finally, regarding the school's automatic termination policy, Powell presented evidence that the head basketball coach did not reapply or interview for his position from 1995 until 2006, when he was replaced. Given the statements of GCSC's athletic director, the temporal proximity of the statements to the newspaper articles, and Powell's rebuttal of GCSC's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons, the jury had sufficient evidence to find that Powell's protected actions were causally related to his not being rehired as head football coach.