Opinion ID: 2617139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Other Invasion of the Right of Private Occupancy

Text: Kitsap County contends, additionally, that even if a trespass is not a wrongful entry it is an invasion of another's right of private occupancy. Since that phrase, like the phrase wrongful entry, is undefined in the policy, it must be given its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning which can be derived by reference to the dictionary. Significantly, an invasion is defined as an act of ... encroachment or trespassing. Opening Br. of Pl. at 39 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 740 (1976); WEBSTER'S DELUXE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 965 (1979); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 688 (1979)). Occupancy is defined as the period during which one owns, rents, or uses certain premises or land. See Opening Br. of Pl. at 39 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 908 (1979)); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1251 (3d ed.1992) (emphasis added). Something is private if it is [s]ecluded from the sight, presence or intrusion of others. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1442 (3d ed.1992) (emphasis added). It would seem apparent from the above definitions that the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning that an average purchaser of insurance would ascribe to the phrase other invasion of the right of private occupancy would include a trespass on or against a person's right to use premises or land that are secluded from the intrusion of others. Indeed, this view of the phrase would be consistent with a definition of trespass found in Black's Law Dictionary at 1509 (1990), [a]n unlawful interference with one's ... property. Again, the insurers do not contend that the words in the phrase do not have the meaning advanced by Kitsap County. Rather, they assert that fundamental principles of contract interpretation require that this phrase be limited to offenses, like wrongful entry and eviction, tat involve (1) physical actions taken by human beings resulting in (2) the wrongful dispossession of property. Br. of Certain Insurers at 41. The principle they refer to is the doctrine of ejusdem generis which provides that when a general term follows a series of specific terms, the general term should not be given its broadest possible meaning, but rather should extend only to matters of the same general class or nature as the terms specifically enumerated. See Lombardo v. Pierson, 121 Wash.2d 577, 583, 852 P.2d 308 (1993) (the term `other matters' is given a meaning similar to the specific items listed). We are not persuaded that the doctrine is applicable here for two reasons. First, as we have indicated above, we do not give the term wrongful entry the limited meaning that the insurers have urged us to do. In that respect, our thinking coincides with that of the Seventh Circuit in Pipefitters, which concluded that because intent is not a requisite of wrongful entry the principle of ejusdem generis does not limit the catchall phrase `other invasion of the right to private occupancy' to conduct undertaken with a motive to possess or deprive another of possession. Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1042. Our second reason for rejecting the insurers' argument is more fundamental. It is based on our recognition of the general principle that we set out above to the effect that we should strive to give effect to every clause in an insurance policy. If we were to apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis in the way suggested by the insurers, we would be rendering the general term meaningless contrary to the aforementioned rule of construction. See City of Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wash.2d 130, 136, 437 P.2d 171 (1968). We agree with Kitsap County, in this regard, that the phrase other invasion of the right of private occupancy is intended to encompass torts that are not encompassed by the terms wrongful entry and wrongful eviction. Under the insurers' narrow reading of the phrase we are hard pressed to conceive of any tort, other than the two specifically mentioned, that would fall within the scope of the more general term. We cannot believe that this was intended by the insurer or that an average purchaser of insurance would think that this was intended.
Kitsap County also contends that the nuisance claim that was maintained against it is equivalent to a claim for wrongful entry and other invasion of the right of private occupancy. We agree. We reach that conclusion for the same reasons that we concluded a trespass claim is a claim for personal injury. A nuisance is an unreasonable interference with another's use and enjoyment of property, whereas a trespass is an invasion of the interest in exclusive possession of property. Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 685, 709 P.2d 782 (1985), answer to certified question conformed to, 635 F.Supp. 1154 (W.D.Wash.1986). There is little substance to the historical distinction between trespass and nuisance where pollution is involved. Bradley, 104 Wash.2d at 684, 709 P.2d 782. The reason, as the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains is that an invasion of the possession of land normally involves some degree of interference with its use and enjoyment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. e (1979). In light of the similarity between a nuisance and a trespass, what we have indicated above in regard to trespass is equally applicable to nuisance.