Opinion ID: 175671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Secretary's MCA Jurisdiction over Southern Shuttle

Text: Abel argues that Southern Shuttle failed to show the first requirement of the MCA exemption. Abel argues that Southern Shuttle is not subject to the Secretary of Transportation's jurisdiction because (1) Southern Shuttle's airport shuttle service does not make or derive revenue from interstate trips, such that the Secretary could exercise such jurisdiction and (2) the Secretary of Transportation has not in fact exercised jurisdiction over Southern Shuttle. However, even if the Secretary has not in fact exercised jurisdiction, the MCA exemption still applies so long as the Secretary has the authority to do so. See Baez, 938 F.2d at 181 n. 2. Therefore, this appeal turns on whether the Secretary has jurisdictional power over Southern Shuttle. Here, the parties agree the Secretary's jurisdictional power depends upon whether the employer's transportation service engages in more than de minimus interstate commerce. [4] Therefore we examine the interstate commerce question.
Our recent decision in Walters sheds some light on this question. The Walters employer was a bus company that had a contract with Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines to transport passengers to and from the ship ports and the Miami and Fort Lauderdale airports. Walters, 575 F.3d at 1224. The shuttle trip was included as part of the passengers' vacation packages booked through either Royal Caribbean or a travel agent. Id. The passengers used vouchers to board the shuttle buses, and the bus company invoiced Royal Caribbean for the trips. Id. The bus company had informal agreements with two other cruise lines to provide similar shuttle transportation. Id. The bus company also provided motor coach transportation, which included a small number of trips outside Florida, that generated about four percent of the revenue. Id. at 1225, 1227. Moreover, the bus company was licensed by the DOT and authorized to operate an interstate motor carrier. Id. at 1227. The Walters Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that interstate trips comprising 4% of revenue were de minimus. Id. at 1227-28. This Court noted that Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422, 68 S.Ct. 131, 92 L.Ed. 44 (1947), as well as other cases, suggest that a company's interstate business is de minimus if it is less than one percent of its trips. Walters, 575 F.3d at 1228. The Walters Court expressed doubt that a de minimus requirement applied when the employer was licensed by the DOT and undisputedly engaged in some transportation that crosses state lines. Id. Because in Walters the employer's trips across state lines satisfied the interstate commerce aspect of the first requirement of being subject to the Secretary's jurisdiction, the Court did not consider whether the purely intrastate trips between the cruise ships and airports satisfied that requirement. However, in addressing the second requirement (whether the Secretary's jurisdiction extends to the employee's specific work-related activities), the Walters Court considered whether driving intrastate airport-to-seaport routes constituted interstate commerce. Id. This Court concluded that purely intrastate transportation can constitute part of interstate commerce if it is part of a `continuous stream of interstate travel.' For this to be the case, there must be a `practical continuity of movement' between the intrastate segment and the overall interstate flow. Id. at 1229 (citations omitted) (quoting, inter alia, Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 568, 63 S.Ct. 332, 335, 87 L.Ed. 460 (1943)). Noting that the fee for the airport shuttle would be bundled as part of [passengers'] cruise vacation package, the Court concluded that [f]or cruise ship passengers arriving at the airport or seaport, [the bus company's] shuttle rides would be part of the continuous stream of interstate travel that is their cruise vacation. Id. at 1230. The Walters Court determined that the bus company's common arrangements with cruise lines, even where it had no formal contract, satisfied any through-ticketing requirement. Id. at 1234. [5] Citing agency interpretation that the employer need only show a common arrangement with an out-of-state carrier the Court concluded that this requirement is met even when there is no through-ticketing agreement so long as there is evidence of a contractual connection between the motor carrier and the interstate carrier. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Although Walters discusses the import of purely intrastate trips under the second requirement, its general conclusion that such trips are part of interstate commerce if they are part of a continuous stream of interstate travel informs our analysis under the first requirement. Under either requirement, the Secretary of Transportation's jurisdiction (over either the employer's transportation business or the employee's activities) turns on the scope of the MCA's interstate commerce requirement.
While Walters did not need to address intrastate trips under the MCA's first requirement, other cases have. For example, the Supreme Court's Morris decision involved a general cartage business that primarily transported steel around the Detroit area either within local steel plants or to and from local steel plants. 332 U.S. at 427, 68 S.Ct. at 133. A small percentage of the employer's trips, roughly four percent, involved transporting miscellaneous freight to and from Detroit boat docks, railroad depots and freight terminals. Id. at 427 & n. 7, 68 S.Ct. at 133 & n. 7. Although these trips did not cross state lines, they nonetheless met the de minimus interstate commerce requirement because they transported freight in interstate commerce, either as part of continuous interstate movements or of interstate movements begun or terminated in metropolitan Detroit. Id. at 427, 432-33, 68 S.Ct. at 133, 136. Other cases make clear that trips within a single state are made in interstate commerce when they are part of a practical continuity of movement of the goods in interstate commerce. Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company's transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia). The Third Circuit distinguished the transportation of passengers from goods. See Packard v. Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 418 F.3d 246 (3d Cir.2005). The employer in Packard provided transportation to the elderly and disabled in Allegheny County, which included trips to train and bus stations and to the airport. Id. at 248-49. The Third Circuit concluded that this transportation service did not fall within the Secretary's jurisdiction because it was not in practical continuity with a larger interstate journey. Id. at 258. Because Morris involved transportation of goods not passengers, the Third Circuit looked at cases arising in other contexts that defined interstate transportation of passengers, including United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1560, 91 L.Ed. 2010 (1947), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984), a Sherman Act case. In Yellow Cab, the Supreme Court described interstate commerce as an intensely practical concept drawn from the normal and accepted course of business. Id. at 231, 67 S.Ct. at 1567. Because the limits of an interstate shipment of goods may be different than the commonly accepted limits of an individual's interstate journey, courts must mark the beginning and end of a particular kind of interstate commerce by its own practical considerations. Id. In light of these practical considerations, the Supreme Court concluded that, in the absence of some special arrangement, a taxi ride to or from a railroad station at the beginning or end of an interstate journey ordinarily is a local trip that is not within interstate commerce. Id. at 231-32, 67 S.Ct. at 1567. However, where the railroad contract[s] with the passengers to supply between-station transportation in Chicago, the taxi ride is clearly a part of the stream of interstate commerce. Id. at 228, 67 S.Ct. at 1565-66. The Supreme Court explained that [w]hen persons or goods move from a point of origin in one state to a point of destination in another, the fact that a part of that journey consists of transportation by an independent agency solely within the boundaries of one state does not make that portion of the trip any less interstate in character. Id. at 228, 67 S.Ct. at 1566. Relying on the distinctions drawn in Yellow Cab, the Third Circuit noted that the transportation of the elderly and disabled in Packard involves no joint fare or ticketing arrangement, and no prior arrangement of any kind, contractual or otherwise, with the railroads, airlines, or other companies. Packard, 418 F.3d at 258. The Third Circuit cited through ticketing as one example of a common arrangement involving both intra and interstate portions of passenger transport but concluded that it was not the only means of establishing that passenger transport operating intrastate is in practical continuity with a larger interstate journey. Id. (emphasis omitted). Highlighting the lack of coordination with other transportation, such as through a prepackaged tour, the Third Circuit concluded that the transportation service in Packard was purely intrastate. Id.