Opinion ID: 3064963
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of Conspiracy

Text: [1] “To establish a drug conspiracy, the government must prove: 1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective; and 2) the intent to commit the underlying offense.” United States v. Barragan, 263 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The government “can prove the existence of a conspiracy through circumstantial evidence that defendants acted together in pursuit of a common illegal goal.” United States v. Bishop, 1 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). “Express agreement is not required; rather, agreement may be inferred from conduct.” United States v. Hegwood, 977 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find that Mincoff entered into a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, rather than merely making or attempting to make a purchase.
[2] Mincoff and Munoz agreed that Mincoff would take the cocaine to his source and return with the money. This type of arrangement is known as “fronting.” “Fronting is a sales technique in which some or all of the drugs being sold are provided before payment is required.” United States v. RamirezRobles 386 F.3d 1234, 1242 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). [3] Although we have not specifically commented on the relationship between fronting and conspiracy, other circuits have credited evidence of fronting to establish a distribution conspiracy. In United States v. Pruett, 501 F.3d 976, 985-86 (8th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 1473 (2008), the Eighth Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could have found Pruett to be a knowing member of a con9992 UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF spiracy to distribute methamphetamine when he both purchased and sold the drug, and fronted one-half ounce of it on at least one occasion. Similarly, the evidence in United States v. Beasley, 2 F.3d 1551, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1993), as amended, cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1240 (1994), was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conspiracy conviction where the defendant’s supplier testified that the defendant purchased crack cocaine from him on several occasions and that the supplier sometimes fronted cocaine to the defendant.
[4] Although the 2005 transaction was not completed because Munoz was unable to secure the cocaine for Mincoff’s buyer, the recorded telephone calls reflect that Mincoff and Munoz planned to incorporate fronting into their second transaction. In fact, Mincoff specifically asked Munoz to deliver the drugs directly to him to save time. In both the 2004 and 2005 transactions, the existence of a deferred payment arrangement supports the conclusion that Mincoff was engaged in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. See United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 665, 676 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that fronting demonstrated trust between the parties and was sufficient to establish that there was a “continuing and mutually profitable relationship to distribute drugs”) (citation omitted). We are persuaded by precedent from our sister circuits that evidence of fronting may support a conviction for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. See United States v. Bender, 539 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[S]elling drugs on credit is especially indicative of a conspiracy because it gives the seller a stake in the buyer’s successful resale of the drugs.”) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Pizano, 421 F.3d 707, 719-20 (8th Cir. 2005) (relying on evidence of fronting over five-year period to uphold conviction for conspiracy to distribute). UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF 9993
[5] The district court instructed the jury on Mincoff’s theory that “[u]nder the controlling buy-sell law, there was no conspiracy to distribute cocaine.” The jury was instructed that: The sale of narcotics, standing alone, does not establish a conspiracy to distribute narcotics; rather, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the buyer and seller in a narcotics transaction had an agreement to further distribute the narcotics in question. The sale of large quantities of narcotics, without more, is insufficient to establish an agreement between the buyer and seller to further distribute narcotics; however, the sale of large quantities of narcotics, in combination with other factors that indicate the buyer conspired with the seller to effect a further narcotics transaction, may be sufficient to establish a conspiracy to distribute narcotics. The jury obviously did not adopt Mincoff’s theory because it convicted him of one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. [6] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could have found the buyer-seller rule inapplicable to the facts of this case. In United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1994), the defendant sold marijuana to friends for their personal use. There was no evidence that the friends “further distributed the marijuana” or that “Lennick sold them marijuana in a sufficient quantity to support an inference that they were going to further distribute it.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, by contrast, Munoz sold Mincoff large quantities of cocaine that could support an inference of further distribution. Also, the recorded 9994 UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF calls and Munoz’s testimony revealed that both he and Mincoff were well aware that they were procuring the cocaine for Mincoff’s buyers. Mincoff’s conspiracy conviction was warranted because the evidence demonstrated an agreement to further distribute the cocaine, rather than the “mere purchase” of large quantities of drugs. [7] The facts of United States v. Thomas, 284 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2002), on which Mincoff relies, are distinguishable for the same reason. See Thomas, 284 F.3d at 752-53 (noting the lack of an agreement between the buyer and seller). Munoz knew at all times that Mincoff was purchasing the cocaine for his customers. Munoz had a shared stake in Mincoff’s illegal venture because he made $500 per kilogram of cocaine sold in 2004. Munoz was confident that he would make a similar profit on the 2005 deal. The fronting that occurred in 2004, and was to occur in 2005, demonstrated mutual trust between Munoz and Mincoff. Ultimately, if one looks at the “entire course of dealing” between Mincoff and Munoz, there is evidence that Munoz, unlike the defendant in Thomas, “shared with [Mincoff] a stake in the success of the retail sales to [Mincoff’s] customers . . . ” Thomas, 284 F.3d at 753. 4. Agreement on Essential Terms of the Planned 2005 Transaction “A formal agreement is not necessary [for a conspiracy]; an agreement may be inferred from the Appellants’ acts pursuant to the scheme, or other circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Mincoff and Munoz agreed to the essential terms of the planned 2005 transaction. Mincoff initially ordered “maybe seven but six [kilograms] for sure.” When the cocaine had not arrived by July 27, Mincoff’s buyers grew impatient, and Mincoff reduced the order to three kilograms. Mincoff further UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF 9995 reduced the cocaine order to one kilogram on July 28 because his buyers were leaving town. The changing quantities of cocaine do not necessarily indicate that there was no agreement on Mincoff’s part. In the 2004 transaction, Mincoff ordered eight kilograms of cocaine for his buyer, but Munoz was only able to procure five. Mincoff accepted the reduced order, and retrieved the drugs within the hour. Mincoff and Munoz also agreed on the price of the cocaine. Munoz sold Mincoff the cocaine for $15,500 per kilogram in 2004. The transcript of the recording indicates that Mincoff was expecting to pay about the same price per kilogram in 2005: “I just . . . assume [sic] do ‘em with you if the numbers are right, because we didn’t have any problem with ‘em last time.” Munoz also testified that he and Mincoff were set on the price of the cocaine, and that price was $15,500 per kilogram, the same price as in 2004. Munoz confirmed his belief that there was an agreement between Mincoff and him to obtain cocaine and redistribute it to other individuals. Circumstantial evidence bolstered Munoz’s belief. See United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendants “acted together with a common goal”) (citation omitted). [8] In sum, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Mincoff was involved in a drug distribution conspiracy with Munoz and others. Evidence of the fronting arrangement, the intent to further distribute the cocaine, the shared stake in the success, and the agreement on essential terms of the 2005 planned transaction support the conspiracy conviction. B. Sufficiency of Evidence of Attempt to Distribute a Controlled Substance [9] “[A]n attempt conviction requires evidence that a defendant intended to violate the statute and took a substantial step 9996 UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF toward completing the violation.” United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 720 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “To constitute a substantial step, a defendant’s actions must cross the line between preparation and attempt by unequivocally demonstrating that the crime will take place unless interrupted by independent circumstances.” United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [10] Mincoff crossed the line between preparation and attempt during the 2005 planned transaction. Mincoff and Munoz discussed the details of Mincoff’s order. Mincoff repeatedly asked Munoz whether they could “knock out” the deal “now.” Mincoff did everything within his power to consummate the cocaine deal. His buyer, who was from Northern California, arrived in person to pick up the drugs in San Diego, and was present during some of the calls to Munoz. Munoz testified that he had no reason to believe that Mincoff did not intend to fully go through with the transaction. The only thing missing was the drugs, and Munoz asserted that finding the cocaine was all that remained to be done to complete the deal. The evidence demonstrates that Mincoff would have gone through with the narcotics sale and redistribution but for the independent circumstance that Munoz, his supplier, could not secure the drugs. Therefore, because he did all he could to ensure the deal’s completion, a rational trier of fact could have found that Mincoff attempted to distribute cocaine. See United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 930-31 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that there was sufficient evidence of an attempt where the defendant “committed all the steps necessary on his part.”). Citing United States v. Yossunthorn, 167 F.3d 1267, 127173 (9th Cir. 1999), Mincoff proposes that there were too many uncertainties in the 2005 planned transaction to constitute an attempt. However, United States v. Hernandez-Franco, 189 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 1999), explains that: UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF 9997 Yossunthorn merely held that conducting countersurveillance activities to ensure the security of a meeting to make arrangements for some future drug purchase did not constitute a substantial step to sustain a conviction for attempted possession with intent to distribute heroin because too many steps remained for the crime to be completed. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, as in Hernandez-Franco, “there was much less uncertainty,” as the only task remaining was for Munoz to obtain the cocaine. Id. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mincoff’s conduct “was undertaken in accordance with a design to violate the statute.” Id. (citation omitted). C. Sufficiency of Evidence of Unlawful Use of a Communication Facility [11] “In order to show a violation of section 843(b), the government must establish knowing and intentional use of a communications facility, e.g., a telephone, to facilitate the commission of a narcotics offense.” United States v. Davis, 960 F.2d 820, 827 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). “The knowledge element of § 843(b) requires the government to prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally used the communication device in order to aid or facilitate the underlying criminal violation.” United States v. Whitmore, 24 F.3d 32, 35 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations and footnote reference omitted). “What is essential is that the defendant knows that he or she is using the communication device to facilitate the drug transaction.” Id. [12] There was sufficient evidence to support Mincoff’s convictions under § 843. The recorded calls between Mincoff and Munoz, where price, quantity, and delivery were discussed, establish that Mincoff knowingly used a telephone to 9998 UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF facilitate the distribution of cocaine. See Davis, 960 F.2d at 827 (concluding that direct and circumstantial evidence were sufficient to show that defendant used a telephone, or instructed another to use a telephone, to facilitate a drug deal). Mincoff’s reliance on United States v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1985), is unavailing because he went far beyond merely checking on the status of Munoz’s efforts. Cf. id. at 1562 (noting that defendant made calls “simply to find out whether any sales had been made,” not to facilitate the sales). In contrast, Mincoff urged Munoz to find a drug source for the willing buyers Mincoff had lined up. The only task remaining was to procure the cocaine. D. Mincoff’s Requested Multiple Conspiracies Instruction “A multiple conspiracies instruction is generally required where the indictment charges several defendants with one overall conspiracy . . . .” United States v. Anguiano, 873 F.2d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir. 1989). “Evidence sufficient to support a multiple conspiracies instruction is present where a jury could reasonably conclude that some of the defendants were only involved in separate conspiracies unrelated to the overall conspiracy charged in the indictment.” United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1247 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted). [13] The district court properly denied Mincoff’s request for a multiple conspiracies jury instruction. Mincoff’s theory that the presence of subagreements among himself and Munoz, Munoz and his suppliers, and himself and his buyers warranted a multiple conspiracies instruction, is unconvincing. It is irrelevant that Munoz’s suppliers and Mincoff’s buyers did not know each other or may not have been aware of every act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, because “[a] single conspiracy can include subgroups or subagreements . . .” United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1560 (9th UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF 9999 Cir. 1996), as amended. It is sufficient that the government proved that Mincoff “was involved in a broad project to distribute cocaine and that his benefit depended on the success of the operation.” United States v. Shabani, 48 F.3d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (citation omitted). E. Mincoff’s Requested Attempt Instruction Mincoff contends that the district court erred when it declined to give his requested instruction that there is no attempt to distribute simply from negotiations with a known drug dealer. He argues that the actual instruction given “opened a wider pathway to conviction to which the government was unentitled.” “In reviewing jury instructions, the relevant inquiry is whether the instructions as a whole are misleading or inadequate to guide the jury’s deliberation.” United States v. Cherer, 513 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “The trial court has substantial latitude so long as its instructions fairly and adequately cover the issues presented.” Id. (citation and alteration omitted). [14] The attempt instruction was not misleading or inadequate to guide the jury’s deliberation. It read: A substantial step towards the commission of the crime of distribution of cocaine requires more than mere preparation. Merely initiating a transaction with a known drug supplier, without more, is not sufficient. In evaluating whether a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of distribution of cocaine has been taken, you may consider the nature and scope of the negotiations between a buyer and seller, as well as all other circumstances relating to the commission of the alleged crime. This instruction tracks the language in Yossunthorn, which stated: 10000 UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF When key elements of the drug deal are incomplete, making an appointment with a known drug supplier, even one who has previously fronted drugs to the defendant at a fixed price, is . . . not of itself such a commitment to an intended crime as to constitute an attempt, even though it may make a later attempt possible. 167 F.3d at 1272-73 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court also provided an instruction that tracks Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction on attempt:2 The defendant is charged in Count 2 of the superseding indictment with attempted distribution of cocaine in violation of Sections 841(a)(1) and 846 of Title 21 of the United States Code. In order for the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the defendant intended to deliver cocaine to another person; Second, the defendant knew it was cocaine or some other prohibited drug; and Third, the defendant did something that was a substantial step toward committing the crime, with all of you agreeing as to what constituted the substantial step. Mere preparation is not a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of distribution of cocaine. 2 The text of Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Instruction 5.3 (2003) reads: “The defendant is charged in the indictment with attempting to commit [ crime charged]. In order for the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the defendant intended to commit [crime charged]; and Second, the defendant did something which was a substantial step toward committing the crime, with all of you agreeing as to what constituted the substantial step. It is a crime to commit [crime charged]. Mere preparation is not a substantial step toward the commission of the [crime charged].” UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF 10001 Because the instructions addressing attempt tracked the language of Yossunthorn and the Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Instruction, they adequately informed the jury of the requirements for conviction on the charge of attempt to distribute cocaine. F. Constructive Amendment of the Indictment Mincoff contends that the indictment was constructively amended because the government’s charge did not match the proof offered at trial. Essentially, he argues that a conspiracy to distribute cocaine requires proof that one possessed that cocaine. Mincoff theorizes that the indictment implicitly charged possession of cocaine by charging conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Because the government did not prove that he possessed cocaine, Mincoff accuses the government of charging one thing and proving another. “A constructive amendment involves a change, whether literal or in effect, in the terms of the indictment.” United States v. Adamson, 291 F.3d 606, 614 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A constructive amendment requires reversal and occurs where “(1) there is a complex of facts presented at trial distinctly different from those set forth in the charging instrument, or (2) the crime charged in the indictment was substantially altered at trial, so that it was impossible to know whether the grand jury would have indicted for the crime actually proved.” Id. at 615 (citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). The Superseding Indictment charged Mincoff with “knowingly and intentionally conspir[ing] . . . to distribute 5 kilograms and more of cocaine . . .” The proof at trial, including Munoz’s testimony and the recorded telephone calls, establish that Mincoff ordered large quantities of cocaine from Munoz with the intent to further distribute the cocaine to Mincoff’s buyers. Nevertheless, Mincoff contends that the government 10002 UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF did not prove the charges in the indictment, because there was no proof that he possessed cocaine. Although we have not yet ruled on this precise issue, other circuits have rejected the argument that possession is a necessary element of the crime of conspiracy to distribute narcotics. See, e.g., United States v. Osuna-Zepeda, 416 F.3d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Possession of the narcotic is not a necessary element of the crime of conspiracy to distribute.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Colon, 268 F.3d 367, 377 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is possible to commit the distribution element of the crime without possessing the drugs themselves.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1297 (10th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000) (“Although it may be unusual for a person to distribute a controlled substance without at least momentarily possessing the controlled substance, it is not impossible.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Sepulveda, 102 F.3d 1313, 1317 (1st Cir. 1996) (“While possession is certainly helpful in proving distribution, it is technically not a necessary element.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Barrientos, 758 F.2d 1152, 1158 (7th Cir. 1985) (same). [15] We adopt the rule articulated by our sister circuits that a narcotics distribution charge may be proven without proof of possession. This conclusion is consistent with the general law of conspiracy—that the conspiracy is complete once agreement is reached and an overt act is committed by either conspirator to further the agreement. See United States v. Bosch, 914 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The conspiracy was complete when the conspirators had agreed to commit the offense and one of them had done an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. The accomplishment of the conspiracy’s goal is immaterial . . .”) (citation omitted). To hold otherwise would create a loophole allowing drug conspirators to dodge conviction by avoiding possession of the drugs that formed the very basis of the conspiracy. Because the evidence proved UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF 10003 the conspiracy charge in the Superseding Indictment, Mincoff’s argument that the indictment was constructively amended fails. G. Speedy Trial Ruling “The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, sets forth those trial delays which shall be excluded in computing the time within which a defendant’s trial must commence.” United States v. Aviles-Alvarez, 868 F.2d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 1989). “A continuance will result in excludable delay only if the continuance is based on the district court’s findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id. at 1112 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court’s factual findings and conclusion that the ends of justice supported exclusion of time in this case were not clearly erroneous. Mincoff and three codefendants were indicted on June 6, 2006. On August 22, 2006, the district court made oral and written findings that this case was “unusually complex” and excluded time under the STA from August 16, 2006 to October 11, 2006. Pursuant to other factual findings, the district court also excluded time from October 11, 2006 to November 29, 2006; November 29, 2006 to March 14, 2007; March 14, 2007 to June 27, 2007; and June 27, 2007 to August 3, 2007. [16] Each of the factual findings described how this case was related to five other cases pending before the district court by way of common evidence and common defendants, with a total of thirty-four individuals before the district court. Two of the four individuals originally charged in this case were also charged with a RICO conspiracy that presented “novel questions of fact and law.” The findings related that as of June 29, 2007, the Government has produced in discovery approximately 48,000 pages of written material, 130 com- 10004 UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF pact disks, 4 digital video disks, 17 video tape recordings and 15 audio cassette tapes. The compact disks contain, among other things, approximately 30,000 intercepted telephone calls and approxi- mately 31,400 pages of line sheets which correspond to those calls. These findings complied with Aviles-Alvarez. The exclusions were specifically limited in time and justified with reference to the facts as of the time the delay was ordered. H. The Government’s Obligations Under Brady, Giglio, and the Jencks Act 1. Brady/Giglio Brady requires the government to disclose “any evidence favorable to Defendants material to their guilt or innocence.” United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2008). Giglio requires that the government disclose “any promises, inducements, or threats made to witnesses to gain cooperation in the investigation or prosecution.” Id. “The three elements of a Brady violation are: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued.” United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). “Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [17] The district court properly denied Mincoff’s motions for Brady/Giglio material. Mincoff requested any untruthful UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF 10005 or incomplete information or testimony in addition to the notes taken during FBI interviews of Munoz. However, Mincoff concedes that the government informed him of Munoz’s contradictory statement regarding the reduction of the 2004 cocaine order from eight to five kilograms. Aside from this contradiction, Mincoff has not identified any potentially exculpatory evidence that was not disclosed to him. Mincoff’s “mere speculation about materials in the government’s files” did not require the district court to make those materials available, or mandate an in camera inspection. United States v. Michaels, 796 F.2d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 1986). 2. Jencks Act “The Jencks Act3 mandates that after a witness called by the United States testifies on direct, the United States must, on motion by the defendant, produce any statement of the witness in the possession of the United States that relates to the subject matter testified to by the witness.” United States v. Riley, 189 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The term “statement” means “a written statement made by said [government] witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him,” or “a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement.” United States v. Ogbuehi, 18 F.3d 807, 810 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation and alteration omitted). [18] The district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the interview notes were not Jencks Act material. Although notes were taken by FBI agents during the interviews with Munoz, nothing in the record suggests that the notes amount to substantially verbatim recitals of Munoz’s oral statements. Further, the agents never read any of these notes back to Munoz and there is nothing to indicate that 3 18 U.S.C. § 3500. 10006 UNITED STATES v. MINCOFF Munoz “signed or otherwise adopted or approved” the notes as his own statements. Thus, the notes cannot be considered substantially verbatim recitals of Munoz’s oral statements that were adopted by him. “A government agent’s rough notes will not be Jencks Act statements when they are not complete, are truncated in nature, or have become an unsiftable mix of witness testimony, investigator’s selections, interpretations, and interpolations.” United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 809 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court correctly determined that the interview notes were not subject to production under the Jencks Act.