Opinion ID: 1179984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disproportionality: California Provisions

Text: Applying the second prong of the analysis described in In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d 410, 426-427, it also appears that the provision in question for second offenders provided by section 11501 is unusual in its severity when compared with punishments imposed in California upon perpetrators of more serious crimes, including second offenders. According to the compilation of penalties submitted in this case by the Attorney General, there are very few situations in which an offender is denied the possibility of parole for a period as long as 10 years. Apart from the limited offenses for which a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is prescribed, [9] and excluding the penalties for drug-related offenses discussed below, the only instances in which an offender is subject to a mandatory minimum term of 10 years or more involve the 12-year mandatory minimum terms imposed upon habitual criminals who have been convicted of specifically enumerated violent or morally reprehensible felonies with three separately tried prior convictions of similar serious felonies (Pen. Code, §§ 644, subd. (b), and 3048.5), [10] and the 10-year mandatory minimum term imposed upon those offenders convicted at one trial of 2 or more felonies the minimum sentences of which aggregate more than 10 years (Pen. Code, § 3024, subd. (d)). Each of these situations clearly present more serious violations of the penal laws than does the sale of a small quantity of heroin by an addict to support his habit. In addition, persons convicted for the second time of first or second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 190), robbery with great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 213), burglary with great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 461), burglary with explosives (Pen. Code, § 464), rape with great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 264), arson on a dwelling (Pen. Code, § 447a), assault with intent to commit murder (Pen. Code, § 217), assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245), kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 208), escape from jail or prison with force (Pen. Code, §§ 4530, subd. (a), 4532, subd. (a)), or lewd or lascivious acts upon a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288) are all eligible for parole consideration before one convicted of a violation of section 11501 with a prior drug-related offense. More significantly, before a person convicted of any of the above listed felonies will incur a mandatory minimum term of nine years, he must have been previously twice convicted in separate trials of similar serious felonies. (Pen. Code, §§ 644, subd. (a), 3047.5.) [11] Thus, not only is the provision under attack here more severe than the sentences inflicted for several far more dangerous felonies, the recidivist provision of section 11501 is more severe than that provided for the third conviction of such felonies. The Attorney General argues that the recidivist provision of section 11501 is not unusually severe when compared with similar sentences imposed for repeated violations of other provisions of the Health and Safety Code relating to drug abuse. (See In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d 410, 434-436.) The provisions precluding parole consideration for the mandatory minimum terms contained in the statutes to which the Attorney General refers, however, were all enacted in 1961 as part of the same legislation [12] (Stats. 1961, ch. 274, §§ 1-10, pp. 1301-1307), and thus appear to be a part of an overall legislative reaction to the increasing problems of drug abuse. [13] As noted above, the comparison between punishments imposed for more serious crimes with the punishment in question is based upon the assumption that although isolated excessive penalties may occasionally be enacted through `honest zeal' ... generated in response to transitory public emotion, the vast majority of punishments may be deemed to have been enacted with due regard for constitutional restraints. ( In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d 410, 426.) Similar penalties for related offenses enacted by the same legislation are subject to the same zeal as the punishment in question. Such penalties cannot, therefore, be taken as illustrative of the permissible degrees of severity under article I, section 6, of our Constitution. In addition, even if similar penalties for drug offenses could be used as a standard against which to compare the penalty of section 11501, such a comparison does not negate the fact that the penalty is considerably more harsh than penalties imposed for far more serious crimes in California.