Opinion ID: 2804061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The PPRA and its Legislative History

Text: To clarify, the present statutory language describing the Board‟s standard of review as “de novo” originated in the PPRA‟s predecessor, the District of Columbia Procurement Practices Act of 1985 (“1985 Act”), and was not new language added to the revised PPRA to support — what the majority characterizes 45 as — its inherently “pro-competition” bent. Specifically, the 1985 Act established the current Board and stated that, under Section 903 (Jurisdiction of the Board), “[t]he Board shall be the exclusive hearing tribunal for, and shall have jurisdiction to review and determine de novo . . . [a]ny protest of a solicitation or award[,]” and, under Section 908 (Protest of solicitations or awards to the Board), “the Board shall promptly decide whether the solicitation or award was in accordance with the applicable law, regulations, and terms and conditions of the solicitation. The proceeding shall be de novo.” D.C. Council, Report on Bill 6-191, “District of Columbia Procurement Practices Act of 1985” at 56, 60 (Oct. 10 1985). These two sections of the 1985 Act track almost verbatim with the current statutory language found in D.C. Code § 2-360.03 (a) and D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (d), respectively, and which forms the basis for the majority‟s holding.6 Rather than the “de novo” review language being inextricably linked to the statutory goal of promoting competition, as the majority contends, it is wholly unclear from reading the nearly thirty-year old statutory provisions just what extent of “de novo” review authority 6 See D.C. Code § 2-360.03 (a) (“The Board shall be the exclusive hearing tribunal for, and shall review and determine de novo . . . [a]ny protest of a solicitation . . . .”); D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (d) (“[T]he Board shall decide whether the solicitation . . . was in accordance with the applicable law, rules, and terms and conditions of the solicitation. The proceeding shall be de novo . . . .”); see also 27 DCMR § 101.7 (“The Board shall hear and decide, de novo, all cases under its jurisdiction.”). 46 the legislature actually intended the Board to have in reviewing bid protests.7 In fact, nowhere in the 1985 Act legislative report does the D.C. Council explain its “de novo” word choice. Rather, on the issue of establishing the Board, the Council observed that the Board‟s predecessor was “established by executive order, and the functions for the Board as provided in the bill are similar to the current functions and authority of the [predecessor] Board . . .” Id. at 5. The current PPRA was proposed in 2010 as a direct response to significant flaws identified in the District‟s procurement system. 8 See Report on Bill 18-610, supra, at 3. Although one of the systematic flaws recognized was the need for improved fairness and “accountability and oversight,” as indicated by the majority, the D.C. Council also identified a second, equally fundamental interest: the need 7 Nor am I persuaded by the majority‟s argument that the Council must have inherently understood the meaning of the “well-established” term “de novo,” apparently meaning nondeferential review, when it adopted the language in the 1985 Act. Ante at 27 n.46. This is because “de novo” has been interpreted differently by courts in the past, especially in the context of reviewing agency decisions. See infra at 60. 8 Areas requiring improvement that the PPRA intended to address included, among others: (1) developing a professional acquisition workforce; (2) enhancing transparency through an open and transparent process; (3) uniformity of procurement policies; and (4) source selection integrity. See Report on Bill 18610, supra, at 8-23. These specific areas of improvement were intended to support the twin fundamental goals of the PPRA: fairness and efficiency. Id. at 5. 47 to improve government efficiency in the procurement process. Id. at 4.9 The Council noted that “fairness and efficiency are not inherently opposing interests,” but conceded that “an ever-increasing number of procedural steps to ensure fairness imposes limits on the push towards greater efficiency . . .” Id. at 5. Accordingly, the Council sought to balance, in the PPRA, increased procedural steps to guarantee a “fair” procurement process with “flexible” procurement rules that “allow procurement officials to make the most strategic purchasing decisions — i.e., those that are in the best interest of the government as a purchaser[,]” recognizing that “[d]ifferent goods and services require different procurement structures, methods, and timeframes.” Id. (emphasis added). The Council further acknowledged and, in fact, endorsed the notion that “most procurement decisions involve a significant degree of subjective decision-making, either in the description of goods or services needed, the nature of a contract vehicle to be used, or the weight given to various ranking criteria.” Id. (emphasis added). The Council explained that “[t]he need for subjective decision-making should not be cause for concern [as] [i]ndependent decision making is part of all procurements and a 9 Specifically, the Council stated that: “The ability to procure goods and services in a timely and cost-efficient manner ensures that organizations have the resources they need to fulfill their institutional missions. Delays impede performance and often lead to increased costs, limiting the ability of an organization to achieve its mission.” Id. at 4. 48 fundamental tenet of the most successful procurement organizations[,]” referring to the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and the federal procurement system. Id. at 5 n.2 (emphasis added). In fact, in revising the District‟s procurement law, the D.C. Council looked to the findings of the GAO on the District‟s procurement system, see id. at 7, an agency whose expertise the majority perfunctorily discarded as irrelevant to construing the District‟s statute.10 The Council further endorsed the GAO‟s statement that “one of the fundamental challenges to the federal procurement system” is that “[g]overnment contracting officials [are] confronted with numerous mandates that left little room for the exercise of sound business judgment, initiative, and creativity in satisfying the needs of their agency customers.” Id. at 5 n.2 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Council concluded that “[a] good procurement system will rely on well-qualified decision-makers and empowers those individuals to make strategic buying decisions.” Id. (emphasis added). In this regard, the majority‟s rigidly literal interpretation of “de novo” review 10 Given that the Council looked to the GAO‟s findings on the shortcomings within the District‟s then-existing procurement statute, the majority perhaps too hastily brushed aside the District‟s attempt to argue for an alternative reading of “de novo,” based on the standard of review adopted by the GAO and the former General Services Agency Board of Contract Appeals (“GSBCA”), by asserting simply that the federal frameworks were inapplicable. 49 eliminates deferential consideration of the discretionary decisions that agency officials have the expertise and authority to make. Further, the majority decision ignores the reality that most procurement actions involve some discretionary and subjective decision-making, which is within the purview and responsibility of agency officials.11 Illustrating the D.C. Council‟s goal in seeking to improve procurement efficiency through recognition of agency discretion, the PPRA legislative report actually recommended that the D.C. Council, which then may have been the only “state-level legislature authorized to routinely disapprove contracts[,]” limit its own power to review and reject contracts, because, while such a review clearly increases oversight over the agencies, it “place[d] an increased burden on the [District agencies] by adding a potentially lengthy step to the procurement process.” Id. at 20. 11 The majority contends that the statutory language “[a]ny prior determinations by administrative officials shall not be final or conclusive,” D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (d), supports a rigid definition of “de novo” review by the Board. Ante at 23. However, this statutory language is not in conflict with according deference to the agency‟s determination of its minimum needs because the Board clearly retains the authority to reject an agency‟s “minimum needs” if there is no rational basis for their inclusion. See infra at 66-67. 50 Thus, in addition to the “central purposes” of the PPRA identified by the majority,12 there are also competing “central purposes” within the PPRA intended to “maximize efficiency.” For example: (1) “promot[ing] efficiency and eliminat[ing] duplication in the District government procurement organization and operation to reduce costs;”13 (2) “provid[ing] increased economy in procurement activities and maximiz[ing], to the fullest extent practicable, the purchasing power of the District government;”14 and (3) “provid[ing] for timely, effective, and efficient service to District agencies and individuals doing business with the District government[.]”15 12 Including: (1) “foster[ing] effective and equitably broad-based competition in the District[,]” D.C. Code § 2-351.01 (b)(2), (2) “obtain[ing] full and open competition by providing that contractors are given adequate opportunities to bid[,]” id. at (3), (3) “increase[ing] public confidence in the procedures followed in public procurement[,]” id. at (5), and (4) specifying procurement needs “in a manner designed to promote competition to the maximum extent possible[,]” 27 DCMR § 2500.3. 13 D.C. Code § 2-351.01 (b)(6). 14 Id. at (7). 15 Id. at (9). 51