Opinion ID: 2594735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Competence of Defense Counsel

Text: Defendant accuses his counsel of rendering incompetent representation at the guilt phase. The legal principles governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have been set forth above. ( Ante, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d at pp. 502-503, 6 P.3d at pp. 165-166.) Briefly, to establish such a claim a defendant must show that trial counsel's performance was deficient and resulted in prejudice. If a defendant fails to show prejudice, a reviewing court may reject the claim without determining the adequacy of counsel's performance. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 366, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.)
Defendant faults trial counsel for not objecting to the admission into evidence of photographs of victim Mary Frances Litovich's charred body and of her when she was alive. Defendant argues the photographs were irrelevant to any issue in the case. Established rules of evidence govern the admissibility of photographs. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 132, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid.Code, § 351.) Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the action, including the credibility of witnesses. ( Id., § 210.) The photograph of Litovich's body was relevant because it corroborated and clarified not only arson investigator Jakubowski's testimony as to where and how the fire started and spread, but also the coroner's testimony regarding the cause of death and condition of the body. ( People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 18, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 132, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 243, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) The photograph was also relevant to the prosecution's proof of the charges of forcible rape, residential robbery, and arson with great bodily injury. Contrary to defendant's assertion, photographs of a murder victim may be relevant in murder cases tried on any theory, including the theory of felony murder. ( People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 17-18, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748.) The photograph of Litovich when she was alive was relevant to Officer Hinds's identification of her as the person to whom he spoke shortly before discovery of the fire, thereby assisting the prosecution in establishing the chronological order of events. (See People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1230, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210.) We reject defendant's argument that trial counsel could have prevented the admission into evidence of the photographs by stipulating to the truth of matters to which they were relevant. (See People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 243, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) We also reject defendant's assertion that trial counsel was incompetent in not objecting, on the ground of lack of foundation, to the admission of the photograph of the victim when she was alive. For the reasons given above, such an objection would not have been well taken and would therefore have been futile. Finally, an objection by the defense counsel to the introduction into evidence of the photograph of Litovich's body on the ground that it was more prejudicial than probative would not have succeeded. (Evid.Code, § 352.) We have independently reviewed the photographs, and we conclude that they are not unduly gruesome or inflammatory. ( People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 19, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 243, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.)
Defendant complains about his counsel's failure to object to allegedly improper statements in the prosecutor's guilt phase closing argument to the jury. We reject defendant's claim. A prosecutor's argument may properly be based on evidence, including reasonable inferences or deductions drawn from the evidence, and on matters that are common knowledge. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 221, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) A defense attorney's failure to object at trial rarely establishes ineffectiveness. ( Ibid.; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 540, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385.) Here, defendant faults trial counsel for not objecting on the ground that in closing argument the prosecutor improperly testified to facts not in evidence. Defendant initially cites the prosecutor's comment to the jury that robbery victim Jung Wang had described defendant's hair as combed back like Cholo style, gang style. As defendant notes, Wang never testified that defendant wore his hair gang style, only that he wore it Cholo style. The prosecutor's gang style remark, however, was fleeting and was made in the context of noting the identification of defendant by several witnesses. Nor can trial counsel be faulted for not objecting to the prosecutor's comments that defendant was not intoxicated on the day of the murder, as shown by his ability to concoct a lie, and that defendant could not have found Litovich's jewelry or received it from someone else because [w]e know the defendant is a loner. These comments by the prosecutor were within the scope of the evidence presented. Equally without merit is defendant's assertion that his counsel should have objected when the prosecutor used the word we in her remark, [w]e know the defendant is a loner. The word we obviously included the jury, and the comment referred to the evidence presented to the jury. Defendant also contends his trial counsel should have objected to what defendant describes as prosecutorial misrepresentations of the law. He accuses the prosecutor of improperly arguing to the jury that defendant failed to present expert testimony showing that defendant could not have formed the requisite specific intent to commit the felonies involved in his case. Defendant argues that because the defense of diminished capacity was abolished before his trial, evidence that he could not have formed the requisite intent was inadmissible and the prosecutor therefore misrepresented the law to the jury. The prosecutor, however, made the statement in question while discussing the instruction about intoxication as negating specific intent. Evidence of intoxication is admissible to show that a defendant lacked the requisite specific intent. (§ 22, subd. (b).) In context, the prosecutor's comment referred to the possible effect of intoxication on defendant's actual formation of the requisite specific intent, not on his capacity to form such intent. We also reject defendant's contention that his counsel was incompetent for not objecting to the prosecutor's argument on the definition of reasonable doubt. After describing reasonable doubt as like being in love, the prosecutor told the jury: You can't really describe it but you know it when you see it. It's that feeling that you have, that you feel comfortable with and it's not something mystical, magical at all. The trial court gave the jury the standard instruction on reasonable doubt. (CALJIC No. 2.90 (1979 rev.).) We have previously held that the court's instructions, not the prosecution's argument, are determinative, for `[w]e presume that jurors treat the court's instructions as a statement of the law by a judge, and the prosecutor's comments as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade.' ( People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 179, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331, quoting People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, fn. 8, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) Defendant here has failed to demonstrate that counsel's failure to object was prejudicial. (See People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 366, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) Defendant asserts trial counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's description of Ann DiPrima's testimony on the ground it misstated the evidence. The prosecutor mentioned to the jury DiPrima's testimony that defendant had brought to her house cartons of cigarettes, firecrackers, speakers with Chinese lettering on them, and a coffee can with coins in it, telling her that he had obtained them from Chinatown. Defendant correctly notes DiPrima did not testify that defendant told her the speakers or the can of coins were from Chinatown. DiPrima, however, did testify that when she saw defendant the morning after the commercial burglaries he had a coffee can with change in it and that several days later she discovered speakers with Chinese lettering on them in her backyard. Defendant fails to show that trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's slight mischaracterization of DiPrima's testimony was prejudicial.
Defendant contends trial counsel should have requested jury instructions on lesser offenses necessarily included in the crimes of robbery, rape, and arson, the offenses on which his felony-murder conviction and the special circumstance findings were based. An instruction on a lesser included offense must be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction. ( People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 424, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.) To warrant such an instruction, there must be substantial evidence of the lesser included offense, that is, evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the lesser offense. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) Speculation is insufficient to require the giving of an instruction on a lesser included offense. ( Ibid.; People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 941, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212.) In addition, a lesser included instruction need not be given when there is no evidence that the offense is less than that charged. ( People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Defendant argues counsel should have requested an instruction on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery. He asserts the jury could have concluded that the force or fear element of robbery was not proven because the jury might have found that defendant did not form the intent to steal until after his attack on victim Litovich. Defendant's argument is based on speculation, not evidence, and we therefore reject it. ( People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 941-942, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 276-277, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) Defendant faults counsel for not asking the trial court to instruct on assault, battery, and assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury as lesser offenses included in the crime of rape. He argues that the jury might have concluded there was someone else in Litovich's house who raped her after defendant assaulted her. Defendant relies on the absence of evidence matching the semen found in the victim to him, the absence of his fingerprints at the scene, the lack of any physical evidence from the victim (such as her hair or blood) on defendant's body at the time of his arrest, and the short period of time in which the crimes were committed. Even if we were to assume that the crimes of assault, battery, and assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury are necessarily included in the offense of rape and that the evidence was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude there was more than one perpetrator inside Litovich's home, we cannot accept defendant's argument. There is no evidence that the assault on Litovich and the rape of Litovich were committed by different people. Defendant's argument to the contrary is pure speculation. In addition, there is no evidence that the offense committed is less than the rape charged. Finally, defendant contends counsel should have requested an instruction on unlawfully setting fire to an inhabited structure (§ 452) as a lesser included offense of arson. He argues the record is more consistent with a conclusion that the Litovich home burned as a result of reckless conduct in setting fire to the victim's bed, than a conclusion that there was an intentional burning of the house itself. Defendant relies on evidence that the fire was started at the foot of the bed to which the victim was tied and it spread from there. Assuming for the sake of argument that unlawfully setting fire to an inhabited structure is a lesser included offense of arson, the evidence here was insufficient to require the trial court to instruct on that offense. The evidence of the cause and nature of the fire, as presented by arson investigator Anthony Jakubowski, established that the flammable liquid used to start the fire was poured on the bed and distributed throughout the room. The evidence here is not substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury of the possibility that defendant recklessly set fire to a bed on which he had tied the victim without intending also to burn the house. (See People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 195, fn. 4, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) For the reasons given, we conclude that defense counsel was not incompetent for failing to request instructions on theft, assault, battery, assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury, and unlawfully causing a fire to an inhabited structure.