Opinion ID: 4533276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Medlin’s Remaining Claims

Text: Medlin argues that “the true motivation of his discipline and termination . . . was retaliation for the exercise of his right guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Medlin Br. at 25. First, he claims that the City violated his “right to maintain intimate associations.” Id. at 26. Second, he claims the City violated his “right to associate and speak to members of the Algood city council.” Id. at 28. Finally, Medlin argues that the City’s actions “shock the conscience.” Medlin Br. at 27– 28. -16- Nos. 19-5862/5866, Medlin, et al. v. City of Algood, et al.
Medlin argues that he had a “right to associate and speak to members of the Algood city council” and that Harris decided to “root him out of the force” for exercising his constitutional rights. Medlin Br. at 28. “For a retaliation claim to survive summary judgment,” the plaintiff must establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to three elements: “(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two,” that is, the defendants’ adverse action was “substantially motivated by the exercise of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.” Dade v. Baldwin, No. 19-3621, 2020 WL 534060, at  (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Sowards v. Loudon County, 203 F.3d 426, 431, 433–34 (6th Cir. 2000)). Here, Medlin cannot satisfy the first element. “The Supreme Court recognized the First Amendment right to freedom of association in intimate human relationships.” Gaspers v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 648 F.3d 400, 414 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)). The Sixth Circuit has determined that a “[p]ersonal friendship is protected as an intimate association.” Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1039–40 (6th Cir. 2003). This court has also noted, however, that “[w]hile there are relationships other than those between family members that may be afforded constitutional protection, it does not follow that any relationship that could be objectively qualified as ‘intimate’ should be protected.” Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 640 (6th Cir. 2002). The determination whether a particular relationship is protected by the Constitution depends on its characteristics: To determine the limits of state authority over an individual’s freedom to enter into a particular association, it is the task of the court to engage in “a careful assessment of where that relationship’s objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from -17- Nos. 19-5862/5866, Medlin, et al. v. City of Algood, et al. the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments,” taking into consideration factors that may include “size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics” that may be pertinent. Rotary added that while the exact boundaries of this type of constitutional protection were not marked, it is not restricted to relationships among family members. The Court emphasized that protection is afforded to those relationships that “presuppose deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.” Id. at 639–40 (citations omitted) (first quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984); then quoting Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)). In Marcum, this court considered Marcum’s argument that he was fired from his position as a deputy sheriff because of his relationship with Abbott, an informant Marcum met during his work. 308 F.3d at 638. “From the initial meeting until their cohabitation, Marcum and Abbott were just ‘good friends’ whose respective spouses and families were social acquaintances whose association was marked by family outings and get-togethers.” Id. at 637. After Marcum and Abbott separated from their respective spouses, they moved in together and began a sexual and romantic relationship. Id. at 638. “After learning of this living arrangement, Sheriff Catron told Marcum that either he or Abbott would have to move out. Marcum was discharged . . . upon his perceived failure to comply with Catron’s directive.” Id. This court found that Marcum failed to show “how his decision to enter into an intimate, sexual relationship and cohabitation with a married woman is a fundamental right deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. at 643. This court held that “[t]hough perhaps unfair, his dismissal did not infringe his right of association.” Id. The record indicates that Medlin had close relationships with two city councilwomen, Green and Norris. Medlin testified that he spoke to Green about “relationships,” engaged in sexual activity with Green, and spoke to her on the phone while on duty. L.R. 45-1, PID 289–92. Harris testified that Medlin and Green were “close.” L.R. 74-5, PID 862. Bilbrey testified that Medlin -18- Nos. 19-5862/5866, Medlin, et al. v. City of Algood, et al. and Green had an extramarital affair. There is no evidence that would suggest Medlin’s relationship with Green was as intimate or personal as the relationship considered in Marcum, which did not receive constitutional protection. Without more, Medlin cannot show that the relationship “involved an attachment to an individual with whom [he] shared the ‘distinctly [sic] personal aspects of [his] life.’” Anderson v. City of LaVergne, 371 F.3d 879, 882 (6th Cir. 2004) (third alteration in original) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620). The evidence regarding Medlin’s relationship with Norris is similarly sparse. Lindsay stated that Medlin spoke frequently with Norris. Harris testified that Medlin was particularly close to Norris and called her “mom.” L.R. 74-5, PID 862; L.R. 79, PID 1366; L.R. 81, PID 1525. Medlin and Norris knew each other for five to six years. The two spoke daily about both personal and city business, including meeting agendas, and frequently about Harris, his appointment as the chief of police, and the termination of Harris’s employment. In Bracken v. Collica, 94 F. App’x 265, 266 (6th Cir. 2004), the City of Streetsboro’s law director, Martin, appointed Bracken to be his assistant. The mayor later terminated Bracken’s employment. Id. Bracken filed suit, claiming “that she was fired because of her association with Martin.” Id. at 269. The court noted that “as Martin’s full time assistant, Bracken was in a close relationship with Martin. Also, it was Martin who originally nominated her for the job.” Id. at 270. The court concluded that although the relationship was “close,” Bracken did not allege “that she and Martin had the kind of highly intimate relationship which the First Amendment protects.” Id. Here, the evidence regarding the relationship between Medlin and Norris is similar to that considered in Bracken. Although the record indicates that Medlin and Norris were close, there is little indication that the relationship was “distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a -19- Nos. 19-5862/5866, Medlin, et al. v. City of Algood, et al. high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. Medlin has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that his relationship with Green or Norris was protected by the right to intimate association.
Medlin asserts that “[h]e had an absolute right to speak out on matters of public concern.” Medlin Br. at 28. Medlin argues that “Harris had grown paranoid and upset about the Appellant’s apparent growing influence with the city council” and that Harris believed Medlin should not be “communicating or fraternizing with the city council members.” Id. Medlin claims that “the true motivation of his discipline and termination . . . was retaliation for the exercise of his right guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Id. at 25. Again, this court considers three elements in a retaliation claim: A plaintiff seeking to establish a case of retaliation for speech protected under the First Amendment must point to evidence sufficient to establish three elements: 1) the plaintiff engaged in constitutionally protected speech; 2) the plaintiff was subjected to adverse action or was deprived of some benefit, and 3) the protected speech was a “substantial” or a “motivating factor” in the adverse action. Brandenburg, 253 F.3d at 897 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). Regarding the first element, this court employs a two-part test. Id. “The first part of the test requires the court to ask whether the speech at issue addressed a matter of public concern.” Id. “Next, the court must decide whether ‘the interest of the employee as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern, outweighs the employer’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’” Id. at 897–98 (quoting Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2000)). To determine whether speech addressed a matter of public concern, “we will consider (1) the point or focus of the speech in question and (2) whether the point ‘relat[es] to any matter -20- Nos. 19-5862/5866, Medlin, et al. v. City of Algood, et al. of political, social, or other concern to the community.’” Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 600 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). The Supreme Court has “instructed that ‘[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement.’” Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 589 (6th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48). Defendants argue that “Medlin does not identify any ‘speech’ that is a matter of public concern.” Algood Br. at 46. The evidence that Medlin spoke to city-council members regarding a matter of public concern is limited to Medlin’s testimony that he would speak to Norris about city business and frequently about Harris, his appointment as the chief of police, and the termination of that employment. “[T]he employee bears the burden of proving his or her actions were constitutionally protected in the particular circumstances.” Brandenburg, 253 F.3d at 897. Medlin has not provided enough evidence to begin the analysis. The record does not disclose, and Medlin does not explain, “the content, form, and context” of the allegedly protected statements. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. With only a vague description of the topics he discussed with Norris, we cannot conclude that Medlin’s speech addressed a matter of public concern. “When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.” Id. at 146.
Medlin asserts that the test for his “due process claim is whether the action ‘shocks the conscience’ of the court.” Medlin Br. at 27–28. However, Medlin does not state which action by the City “shocks the conscience.” Medlin Br. at 2–3. It also appears that Medlin did not present -21- Nos. 19-5862/5866, Medlin, et al. v. City of Algood, et al. this argument before the district court.2 “Generally, we will not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal.” Frazier v. Jenkins, 770 F.3d 485, 497 (6th Cir. 2014). In any event, there is no indication in the record that any of the actions of the City or its officials rose to the level of “conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 116 (1992). The conscience-shocking “characterization applies to only the most egregious official conduct, conduct that is so brutal and offensive that it [does] not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency.” Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 599 (6th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 547–48 (6th Cir. 2012)). Medlin has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that the City’s actions shocked the conscience.