Opinion ID: 199007
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Restrictions Will Alleviate the Cited Harms to a Material Degree

Text: 58 The second aspect of the third prong of the Central Hudson analysis is also hotly disputed by the parties. The tobacco companies argue that the Attorney General has failed entirely to demonstrate that advertising causes underage smoking or that advertising restrictions of the type at issue here will have any effect on underage tobacco use, much less result in a material reduction. The companies pointedly attack the studies submitted by the Attorney General and assert that several of those very studies decline to assert a cause-effect relationship between advertising and smoking. The Attorney General responds with a common sense argument on the causal relationship between advertising and product use, supported by a number of studies and anecdotal evidence demonstrating at least a correlation between advertising and tobacco use in general and among children in particular. We think that the Attorney General has carried his burden. 59 The common sense argument asserted by the Attorney General -- that advertising has some cause-effect relationship with consumption -- is not a novel one. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized in Central Hudson itself that [t]here is an immediate connection between advertising and demand. 447 U.S. at 569. More recently, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995), the Court found it assuredly a matter of 'common sense' that a restriction on advertising of a product characteristic will decrease the extent to which consumers select a product on the basis of that trait. But see Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, 527 U.S. at 189 (While it is no doubt fair to assume that more advertising would have some impact on overall demand for gambling, it is also reasonable to assume that much of that advertising would merely channel gamblers to one casino rather than another.). After all, the five leading cigarette manufacturers spent approximately $5.66 billion on advertising and promotion in 1997, and nearly $300 million on outdoor advertising alone. See Federal Trade Comm'n, Report to Congress for 1997, Joint Appendix at 2544. It would defy common sense to conclude that for-profit corporations which have demonstrated their ability to survive and flourish in the market would pour such tremendous resources into advertising without at least some calculation that their efforts would have a substantial effect on consumption of their product. As a general proposition, we think that common sense does support the Attorney General's position. 60 The Attorney General, however, does not rest on common sense arguments alone. He cites myriad sources to support his proposition that tobacco advertising and tobacco use are causally related, including notably a Surgeon's General's report concluding that cigarette advertising appears to increase young people's risk of smoking, see U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General (1994), Joint Appendix at 1203, and the FDA's extensive investigation and finding that advertising plays a material role in the decision by those under 18 to use tobacco products, see 60 Fed Reg. 44466 (1996), Joint Appendix at 1513. Nearly two thousand pages of the joint appendix in this case consist of reports and surveys by governmental, scientific, and academic entities submitted by the Attorney General in support of his dual proposition that tobacco use by minors poses a real risk and that tobacco advertising contributed materially to this problem. 10 Although we decline to summarize that material here, we have no difficulty concluding that it is sufficient to satisfy the Attorney General's burden of demonstrating that the restrictions will alleviate the harm caused by underage smoking to a material degree. 61 The smokeless tobacco and cigar manufacturers also repeat the argument that the majority of the materials submitted by the Attorney General concern primarily or exclusively cigarettes, and that such materials cannot justify restrictions on smokeless tobacco and cigar advertisements. We agree that the cigarette regulations are the supported most abundantly, in terms of the sheer size of record submitted by the Attorney General. That, however, is not determinative. The product-specific information submitted by the Attorney General, taken in conjunction with the other statistical and anecdotal information presented, is sufficient to carry his burden. See Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 626-28. 62 Finally, the cigar manufacturers argue that the Massachusetts regulations cannot reasonably be expected to reduce cigar consumption in Massachusetts, because the advertising of cigars is nearly nonexistent in comparison with the pervasive promotion of cigarettes. For instance, the cigar makers do not use any billboards in Massachusetts, and they spent only $50,500 on outdoor advertising in the entire United States during 1997, compared to the nearly $300 million spent by the leading cigarette manufacturers in that year. While this argument is a forceful one, it fails to persuade us that the regulations are unjustified. Although the regulations will necessarily have a small impact on the amount of existing advertising (because relatively little exists), they will remove any outdoor advertising that does currently fall within 1000 feet of a school or playground, thus protecting those particular children. As the Attorney General has demonstrated, children exposed to tobacco advertising near their schools and play areas are likely to be affected by its message. Although fewer children will be affected by cigar advertising, simply because there is much less of it, the relative lack of current cigar advertising also means that the burden imposed on cigar advertisers is correspondingly small. We cannot conclude that, under these particular circumstances, the First Amendment bars the Attorney General from regulating cigar advertising of the type targeted here, especially when we consider that he has done so as part of a rational and well-founded comprehensive tobacco regulatory scheme. 63 In sum, we conclude that the Attorney General has carried his burden of demonstrating that the regulations will directly advance his goals of reducing both underage tobacco use and tobacco sales to minors. 11 Less advertising may reasonably be expected to reduce the consumption of tobacco products by current users, insofar as there will be fewer reminders to stop at the store to pick up a pack of cigarettes, a can of smokeless tobacco, or a cigar (at least on the way to and from schools and playgrounds, where Massachusetts has focused its efforts). Moreover, the restrictions on advertising should reduce the number of new or future users by reducing the visibility of tobacco products to minors, by dispelling the advertising-encouraged notion that tobacco products are pervasive and form part of the good life, and by eliminating the psychological incentives to tobacco use presented by things as simple as attractive ad color and design (aspects of advertising which we agree may reasonably be assumed to have greater effect on young people). Because the Attorney General has submitted sufficient data to demonstrate the harms posed by underage tobacco use and to support his view that the regulations will diminish underage tobacco consumption in both of these ways, we conclude that he has satisfied his burden under prong three of the Central Hudson analysis. 64