Opinion ID: 2621432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: I. Jury Instruction Improperly Shifts Burden to Defendant to Prove Consent

Text: ś 194 Although the jury in a first degree rape case must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual intercourse occurred as the result of forcible compulsion, RCW 9A.44.050(1)(a), i.e., physical force which overcomes resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of death or physical injury to herself or himself or another person, or in fear that she or he or another will be kidnapped, RCW 9A.44.010(6), the trial court instructed the jury that it was the burden of the defendant to prove consent: Instruction 15. A person is not guilty if the sexual intercourse is consensual. Consent means that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse, there are actual words or conduct indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse. The burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sexual intercourse was consensual. Preponderance of the evidence means that you must be persuaded considering all the evidence in the case that it is more probably true than not true. 18 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (18 RP) (Sept. 28, 2000) at 2889. The prosecutor was able to effectively shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show consent based upon this instruction by arguing in closing argument: And the defendant doesn't typically bear a burden in a criminal case. It's the State's burden to prove a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, absolutely, beyond a reasonable doubt. It's a fair burden, and it's a burden the State accepts. But when he says this is consensual, that's his burden. And the Court's instruction to you is that that's his burden to prove that. Now that he says this is a consensual act, it's his burden to prove it. 18 RP at 2971. ś 195 Consent is the reciprocal opposite of forcible compulsion. The majority, however, affirms this instruction based upon State v. Camara, 113 Wash.2d 631, 640, 781 P.2d 483 (1989), which in turn relied upon Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987). Allen Gregory now asks us to overrule Camara, arguing that Camara misconstrued Martin. I agree with Gregory and would overrule Camara. ś 196 Martin was not a rape case but an aggravated murder case. A self-defense instruction allowed acquittal if the jury found, by a preponderance of the evidence, Martin had not precipitated the confrontation, that she had an honest belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that she had satisfied any duty to retreat or avoid danger. Martin, 480 U.S. at 233, 107 S.Ct. 1098. Thus self-defense did not negate any element the State was required to prove to obtain an aggravated murder conviction but rather provided an affirmative defense which the defendant had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence if, and only if, the State proved each and every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [1] ś 197 However, in the context of first degree rape, forcible compulsion (an element of the offense) is absolutely incompatible with consent. The two cannot coexist. Nevertheless the jury was instructed that it was the defendant's burden to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence, notwithstanding the State's burden to prove forcible compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt. This makes no sense. It is a contradiction. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits shifting the burden to the defendant to prove or disprove an element of the crime. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). Camara was wrongfully decided and harmfully so because it allows an unconstitutional shifting of the burden of proof. It should be overruled.