Opinion ID: 1817285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial on the grounds of the prejudicial testimony of gloria carter from west memphis, arkansas.

Text: During the trial Gloria Carter, an employee of the First National Bank of West Memphis, Arkansas was called to testify concerning a similar incident in the bank in which she was employed involving appellant and Marion Anderson, which took place on October 31, 1986, the day after the alleged robbery of Peoples Bank in Senatobia, Mississippi. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that under Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, no provision is stated for the admissibility of subsequent offenses. The objection was overruled. Ms. Carter was allowed to testify. Rule 404(b) reads as follows: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. (Emphasis added). Appellant claims there are no cases decided by this Court holding that subsequent offenses are admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. He emphasizes that the various cases decided by the Mississippi Supreme Court have referred strictly to prior offenses, one of the most prominent of which is Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 759 (Miss. 1984). Alternatively, assuming arguendo, this Court holds that subsequent offenses are admitted under the other crimes exception set forth in 404(b), appellant contends there is a further crucial consideration to which the trial court did not adhere in this case. In short, appellant properly states that even if an exception as delineated in 404(b) is clearly present in a case there still remains the precautionary test of Rule 403. That is, Rule 403 provides some protection from allowing any and all relevant evidence to be placed before the jury. Jenkins v. State, 507 So.2d 89 (Miss. 1987). To be sure, evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) is also subject to the prejudice test of Rule 403; that is, even though the Circuit Court considered the evidence at issue admissible under Rule 404(b), it was still required by Rule 403 to consider whether its probative value on the issues of motive, opportunity and intent was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In this sense Rule 403 is an ultimate filter through which all otherwise admissible evidence must pass. Id., at 93. We note that appellant does not attempt in his brief to expound on the reasons why the testimony of a witness to a subsequent crime fails the Rule 403 probative value test. He simply states in the conclusion of his brief that the testimony was highly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Appellee's (The State) position is clear: Where Rule 404(b) is silent as to the admissibility of prior or subsequent offenses  the Rule itself speaks to no more than the issue of [e]vidence of other crimes ...  the admission of the evidence was proper where it falls within the ambit of recognized exceptions thereunder, and where it is not impermissibly prejudicial. Appellee directs this Court to four (4) cases for the proposition that the admission of subsequently charged crimes is not without precedent in Mississippi. See, e.g., Reddix v. State, 381 So.2d 999 (Miss. 1980), where the issue was presented to this Court in the context of a death penalty prosecution. See also, Strickland v. State, 209 So.2d 840 (Miss. 1968); West v. State, 218 Miss. 397, 67 So.2d 366 (Miss. 1953); Walker v. State, 201 Miss. 780, 30 So.2d 239 (Miss. 1947). We further note that while somewhat helpful, Reddix, Strickland, West and Walker do not dispose of this issue in the case sub judice. Appellee argues that the facts adduced at trial show that appellant with another was charged with grand larceny of a sum of money from Peoples Bank in Senatobia, Mississippi. Both parties contrived to obtain the absence of the teller from her bank window by asking for coin wrappers. When she went to fetch them, one party (Marion Anderson) reached over into her open cash drawer and allegedly scooped out Seven Hundred Fifty ($750.00) dollars; in the process he unknowingly removed bait money, the removal of which triggered the bank's silent alarm system and activated the automatic surveillance camera. One party (Marion Anderson) was photographed in the act of extending himself horizontally through the teller's window and then stuffing something in his right pocket while the other party (appellant herein) stood by. Proof at trial was augmented with additional testimony and other automatic surveillance camera photographs of the parties made the following day, in which the same two parties  both wearing the same distinctive head wear  pulled the identical scam at the First National Bank in West Memphis, Arkansas, one day later. Significantly, the teller in the case sub judice did not observe any untoward activity on the part of appellant and his accomplice. She testified that money came up missing from her cash drawer after an internal audit, the audit in turn having been occasioned by the removal of the bait money and the triggering of the bank's alarm system. Her identification of the parties was limited to the fact that they were at her window immediately prior to the time she discovered the missing bait money, and that she could recognize them from the automatic camera photographs. Testimony from another teller revealed that she remembered seeing the individuals in the photographs immediately prior to the time the silent alarm alerted internal bank officials that something was amiss. She could not testify that she had seen them take anything from the complaining teller's cash drawer. The testimony complained of  that of a bank teller supervisor from West Memphis, Arkansas  proved (1) that two men came to her teller window and asked for coin wrappers; (2) that one party was seen ... bending way over into my window ... while talking to her about the denominations of wrappers needed. Immediately after the wrappers were requested, that bank's automatic camera system was activated by the removal of bait money from her cash drawer. She identified the two parties in photographs taken by the bank camera in Senatobia the day before, and from photographs taken by her bank's security camera in West Memphis, Arkansas. Appellant is one of the two men in each set. The modus operandi is identical. Taylor v. State, 398 So.2d 1341 (Miss. 1981). In Taylor, supra, there was a forged instrument presented to a bank teller. The teller testified as to circumstances of the cashing of that instrument, but was unable to identify the defendant as the person who presented the forgery for cashing. Over objections, a teller from another bank was permitted to testify to the identity of the defendant, where he presented to her that same day a similar instrument and identification the same as that presented to the first witness who could not identify him. In formulating its holding, the Taylor Court noted the general prohibition against introduction of evidence of other crimes, and noted as well the exceptions thereunder, citing Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342 (Miss. 1977). Thereafter this Court concluded, [t]he testimony of [the second teller] was competent to show the identity and guilty knowledge of the appellant, together with motive and intent.       The modus operandi was identical [citations omitted; emphasis added] Taylor, at 1342. Appellee asserts that in at least the case of forgery, this Court has recognized that ... evidence of similar transactions committed at or about the same time as a forgery offense, is admissible for the purpose of proving identity, intent, knowledge or a common scheme to defraud. Harrington v. State, 336 So.2d 721, 722 (Miss. 1976). Accord, Thompson v. State, 309 So.2d 533 (Miss. 1975). It seems clear that the significant phrase in Harrington, supra, in which this Court's intent is plain is ... at or about the same time... . Id., at 722. Appellee concludes its analysis on this point by stating that in this case, the testimony of the West Memphis bank teller was derived from an event which occurred the following day, in which an essential element was the photographic evidence of appellant's identity, and one in which the modus operandi was shown to be identical in every respect. Certainly, the teller in the instant case could only identify appellant as one who had been at her window, and who had asked for coin wrappers. Proof of the second crime was pointedly to the fact that in the second, subsequent larceny, appellant was the same, and the method of achieving the crime was the same. The latent factor underlying both was his motive and criminal intent. Finally, appellee addresses appellant's contention that Rule 403 is the ... ultimate filter through which all otherwise admissible evidence must pass. Jenkins, supra, at 92. The Court in Jenkins concluded its analysis by noting that ... we, as a matter of institutional necessity, accord the Circuit Court a certain leeway. The weighing and balancing task assigned by Rule 403 is not one susceptible of mechanical performance. It requires judgment and because such the law gives the Circuit Court discretion. Id., at 93. Therefore, appellee argues that where it is clear that the Court exhaustively considered the effect of the testimony sought to be offered in advance of the fact, and where it is abundantly clear that the Court perceived the exceptions as qualifying under Rule 404(b), this Court should accord that finding the deference it is due and not find an abuse of discretion such as to occasion reversal.