Opinion ID: 2081133
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Existing Lack of Capacity

Text: In Bendler, supra, this Court rejected a claim for compensation by a husband injured while working for his wife's embroidery business. Basing its determination on a three-part analysis, the Court concluded that the statutory right of recovery did not apply when employer and employee were married. In the first part of its analysis, the Court reviewed the general scheme of the Compensation Act and concluded that [t]he evident legislative design was the incorporation, in default of adverse action by the parties, of the compensatory system provided by Article II [elective compensation] into the common-law contract of hire   . [3 N.J. at 167] Thus, a contract of hire, either express or implied in fact, was a basic prerequisite to the right of compensation. Id. The Court next observed that such a contractual relationship could not exist between a husband and a wife. Id. at 168. [A] contract of hire between spouses is utterly void and unenforceable at law. Id. The Court noted two reasons for this common law rule: Contracts between husband and wife have been deemed objectionable, not only because they are inconsistent with the common-law doctrine of unity of person and interest, but because they introduce the disturbing influence of bargain and sale into the marriage relation, and induce a separation rather than a unity of interests. [ Id. at 172 (citation omitted)] In the final part of its analysis, the Bendler Court assessed the effect of the Married Women's Act, N.J.S.A. 37:2-1 et seq., on the common law contractual incapacity. While the provisions of the act granted married women numerous individual rights not enjoyed at common law, the Court reasoned the act [has] not so far severed the unity of person and interest of husband and wife in the law as that their contracts inter se are enforceable at law and are no longer the subject of jurisdiction in courts of equity alone. [3 N.J. at 168] The Court also interpreted the disclaimer of R.S. 37:2-5 (now N.J.S.A. 37:2-5) [4] as continu[ing] the common-law mutual disability of a husband and wife to contract inter se and to sue each other. 3 N.J. at 172. Thus, the Court determined that the legislation as well as the common law had declared contracts between spouses to be void at law. Petitioner does not challenge the conclusion of Bendler that a contractual employment relationship is a prerequisite for recovery under the Compensation Act. See generally Biger v. Erwin, 57 N.J. 95 (1970), aff'g 108 N.J. Super. 293 (Cty.Ct. 1970); Smith v. E.T.L. Enterprises, 155 N.J. Super. 343 (App.Div. 1978); N.J.S.A. 34:15-9, -36. The dispute here focuses on those portions of the opinion discussing the incapacity of spouses to contract with each other. Petitioner contends that later decisions of this Court abolishing interspousal tort immunity have undermined the bases of Bendler. Respondent answers that the rule in Bendler has not been legislatively altered in the 30 years since it was decided. According to respondent, this signifies legislative adoption of Bendler ; therefore, any modification must come from the Legislature and not this Court.