Opinion ID: 722594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. App. II1

Text: 27 Collins argues that the district court should have dismissed his indictment because he was not brought to trial within the 180-day period specified by the IADA, 18 U.S.C. App. II, art. III. The government and Collins agree that his federal trial started 229 days after the U.S. Marshal's office received his demand for a speedy trial. However, the parties disagree on: (1) when the 180-day clock was started; (2) whether the 180-day clock was tolled during the 17-day period Collins was away from his California prison to attend his state trial; (3) whether the trial court's tolling of the 180-day clock in the interests of justice stopped the clock for 30 or 34 days; and (4) whether Collins' motions in limine tolled the clock for 5 days. 28 As we will explain below: (1) the clock was started when Collins filed his demand with the court; (2) the clock stopped for 14 days while Collins traveled to and from his California state trial; (3) the clock was stopped in the interest of justice for only thirty days; and (4) Collins' motions in limine tolled the clock for five days. Under these determinations, only 176 days of the 180-day clock were used, and therefore the district court did not err by refusing to dismiss the indictment. 29
30 On May 6, 1994, the U.S. Marshal in San Francisco received a copy of Collins' demand for a speedy trial. The Marshal filed a copy of the demand with the district court clerk on May 10, 1994. The precise question we address is whether the IADA clock began to run: (1) when the Marshal received the demand; or (2) the day Marshal filed the demand with the district court. This issue raises a question of law which we review de novo. United States v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir.1992). 31 Article III(a) of the IADA provides that a prisoner: 32 shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint. 33 18 U.S.C. App. II, art. III(a). In Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993), the Supreme Court interpreted this provision to mean that the 180-day clock does not start until the defendant's demand has actually been delivered to the district court and prosecuting officer that lodged the detainer against him. Id. at 52, 113 S.Ct. at 1091. 34 Here, Collins and the government agree that delivery to the U.S. Marshal fulfilled the requirement of delivery to the prosecuting officer. Collins goes further and argues that delivery to the Marshal also constituted delivery to the district court. 35 An argument similar to the one Collins raises here was rejected by the Supreme Court in Fex. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner could not start the clock by giving his demand to the prison authorities. Instead, the clock would start when the court and prosecuting officer received the notice. Id. at 46-51, 113 S.Ct. at 1088-90. The Court stated that this result would occur even if the warden maliciously delayed forwarding the prisoner's request or didn't send the demand at all. Id. at 49-50, 113 S.Ct. at 1089-90. 36 In other words, Fex instructs us that the IADA means what it says. And when it says that the prisoner must have his demand delivered to the ... appropriate court, that is what it means. See 18 U.S.C. App. II, art. III(a). Delivery to the Marshal on May 6, 1994 did not constitute delivery to the court because the Marshals are not agents for the court for purposes of accepting every request they find thrust upon them. Delivery to the court did not occur until May 10, 1994 when Collins' demand was filed. Therefore, we hold that the IADA's 180-day clock began to run on May 10, 1994. 37
38 On June 20, 1994, the government obtained a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum ordering that Collins be brought from the California State Prison at Ione for an initial appearance before a U.S. Magistrate in San Francisco on July 8, 1994. However, from June 24, 1994 until July 11, 1994, Collins was not at Ione. On June 24th, he was transferred to Sacramento County for state criminal proceedings pursuant to a June 9, 1994 order signed by Sacramento Superior Court Judge Gary S. Muller. On June 28, 1994, Collins appeared in state court in Sacramento County, pled guilty, and was sentenced. On July 5, he was moved to the Deuel Vocational Institution. Finally, on July 11th, he was transferred back to Ione. Collins was not released from Judge Muller's order until July 11, pursuant to California Penal Code § 2620. 39 The government argues that the entire 17-day period between June 24 and July 11 is tolled under Article VI(a) of the IADA. This article states: 40 In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction over the matter. 41 18 U.S.C. App. II, art. VI(a). The district court found the government's argument persuasive and tolled the entire 17-day period because the record shows Mr. Collins was not available for federal custody during the period June 24th through July the 11th because of these other state proceedings. The district court, however, never specified what test, if any, it used to determine Collins' unavailability. 42 This court has never addressed what standard a district court should use to determine whether a defendant is unable to stand trial for the purposes of tolling the IADA's 180-day clock. Therefore, a question of law is presented which we review de novo. United States v. Hall, 974 F.2d at 1204. 43 At least three different standards are used by other circuits to determine whether a prisoner is unable to stand trial under the IADA. The Fifth Circuit considers only the defendant's physical and mental incapacity. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits will toll the clock if the defendant is either legally or administratively unavailable. Finally, the Second and Fourth Circuits apply the Speedy Trial Act's, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, provisions for tolling. We will examine each in turn. 44 Collins argues that we should follow the Fifth Circuit and examine only whether he was physically or mentally incapacitated. We disagree because this standard is too narrow. The Fifth Circuit adopted its standard on the ground that before the IADA was enacted, the phrase unable to stand trial referred only to a prisoner's physical or mental ability to stand trial, and the court refused to infer that the drafters of the IADA wanted a broader definition. Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 F.2d at 1340-41. 45 Our concern with the Fifth Circuit's analysis is that IADA specifically addresses mental incapacity-half of the Fifth Circuit's definition of unable to stand trial. Under the terms of the IADA, the IADA does not apply to persons who are mentally ill. See 18 U.S.C. App. II, art. VI(b) (No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this agreement shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.). Had the drafters of the IADA wanted to exclude only the physically incapacitated, in addition to the mentally ill, they would have done so explicitly. 46 We also decline to adopt the second possible test, legally or administratively unavailable, see Young v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 339, 343 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S.Ct. 107, 62 L.Ed.2d 69 (1979); United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 635 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988), because this test is too broad. It provides little guidance to the district courts and its meaning could only be developed slowly on a case-by-case basis. 47 The third possible test, applying the tolling provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(9), is the most sensible. We join the Second and Fourth Circuits in justifying this approach on the ground that the Speedy Trial Act and the IADA serve the same purposes. United States v. Cephas, 937 F.2d 816, 819 (2nd Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1037, 112 S.Ct. 884, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. Odom, 674 F.2d 228, 231 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1125, 102 S.Ct. 2946, 73 L.Ed.2d 1341 (1982). 2 In addition, the case law on the Speedy Trial Act's tolling provisions is fairly well developed, thus giving district courts guidance in interpreting the IADA. 48 In this case, the most analogous tolling provisions of the Speedy Trial Act are contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(A) and 3161(h)(1)(H). Section 3161(h)(1)(A) tolls the clock for any delay resulting from any proceeding including other trials. Section 3161(h)(1)(H) provides for tolling for any reasonable 49 delay resulting from transportation of any defendant from another district, or to and from places of examination or hospitalization, except that any time consumed in excess of ten days from the date an order of removal or an order directing such transportation shall be presumed to be unreasonable. 50 In United States v. Nash, 946 F.2d 679, 680 (9th Cir.1991), we further clarified section 3161(h)(1)(H) to create a presumption of reasonableness for all transportation times of ten days or less. 51 Applying §§ 3161(h)(1)(H) and 3161(h)(1)(A) to the facts of this case results in fourteen days tolled. It took three days for Collins to be transported to trial; these three days are excluded under § 3161(h)(1)(H). The state trial took one day; this day is excluded under § 3161(h)(1)(A). Finally, it took twelve days to transfer Collins back to Ione; the first ten of these days are presumed reasonable and therefore tolled under § 3161(h)(1)(H). 3 3. Tolling for the continuance Collins requested 52 Originally, Collins' trial was set to begin on November 16, 1994. However, on the morning of the trial, Collins requested a continuance. The district court granted the motion and declared that in the interests of justice, the Speedy Trial clock-and therefore the IADA clock-would be tolled from November 16 through December 16. However, the Court later issued a written order extending the tolling period until December 20, 1994. 53 The district court was allowed to grant the 30-day continuance and toll the IADA clock under 18 U.S.C. App. II, art. III(a) which states, in pertinent part: That for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. (emphasis added). However, there is no provision for the district court to unilaterally and without a hearing extend the continuance-and its attendant tolling-an additional four days. See Snyder v. Sumner, 960 F.2d 1448, 1454-56 (9th Cir.1992) (good cause for continuance must be shown in open court). Therefore, we permit only 30 days to be subtracted for purposes of the 180-day IADA clock calculation. 54 4. Tolling of period due to Collins' in limine motions 55 Collins filed a motion in limine on November 10, 1994. The court tolled the IADA clock when it granted an ends of justice continuance on November 16, 1994. We must decide whether Collins' motion in limine tolled the IADA clock for the period between these two dates. 56 Collins argues that motions in limine do not toll the Speedy Trial Act and, therefore, the IADA was not tolled. 4 We rejected this argument in United States v. Springer, 51 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir.1995). Hence the district court properly tolled the five days between November 10 and November 16. 57 After subtracting all of the days that were tolled, we calculate that 176 days of the IADA's 180-day clock were used before Collins' trial began. Therefore, the district court did not err by refusing to dismiss Collins' indictment. 58 II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting prejudicial evidence regarding Collins' involvement in the burglary and the post-arrest cover-up story? 59 Collins argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the California Check Cashing burglary and his post-arrest attempt to have others lie on his behalf to the police. He claims that both types of evidence should have been excluded because their probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. This argument is without merit. 60 The evidence of the Collins' attempts to induce witnesses to lie is indicative of consciousness of guilt and may be placed before the jury. See United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1325 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111, 97 S.Ct. 1149, 51 L.Ed.2d 565 (1977). The district court did not abuse its discretion by holding that the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 61 The evidence that Collins and Winn were at the California Check Cashing building to commit a burglary was also properly admitted. In general, evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant-such as the attempted burglary here-is inadmissible. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). However, an exception to this general rule is that evidence of other criminal activity may be used for the purpose of providing the context in which the charged crime occurred. United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir.1995). This exception is most often applied in felon-in-possession cases because of the difficulty that the prosecution would encounter in proving that the defendant possessed a gun and in rebutting his proffered defense without relating the facts surrounding the commission of the crime. Id. The jury cannot be expected to make its decision in a void-without knowledge of the time, place, and circumstances of the acts which form the basis of the charge. United States v. Daly, 974 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Moore, 735 F.2d 289, 292 (8th Cir.1984)). 62 Here, Collins introduced evidence purporting to show that he was in the neighborhood for dancing, not burglary. Had the government not introduced the rebuttal testimony, the jury would have been left wondering why Collins would have wanted a gun. The government's evidence provided an answer: he was acting as the lookout for a burglary. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the burglary. 63 III. Did the district court violate Collins' Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by limiting the scope of his cross-examination of a government witness? 64 Collins asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to allow him to attack Calisterio's credibility by asking him whether he was a drug dealer and whether he lied when he told friends that the police broke down his door and arrested him for a traffic ticket. The district court prohibited these questions under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) which states, in part: 65 Specific instances of conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than for conviction of a crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness ... concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.... 66 Collins contends that our decision in United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir.1984), compels us to hold that the district court abused its discretion by not permitting him to ask Calisterio if he was a drug dealer. Collins reads Ray too broadly. In Ray we held that a district court abuses its discretion by not allowing cross-examination about a witness' continuing drug dealing where the drug dealing might bias the testimony of the witness. However, we cautioned that our holding was limited to cases where the defendant offers a threshold level of evidence that the witness's drug dealing might cause bias. Id. Collins completely failed to make this showing: when asked by the court how Calisterio's drug dealing might cause bias, Collins' lawyer's only response was: 67 Well, the bias is that-I think, you know, that his dealings with drugs had something to do with his changing history. I know that maybe that's speculative. Maybe I won't get it into evidence. But I believe that it's not irrelevant. 68 Given this weak response, the district court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Collins from inquiring into Calisterio's alleged drug dealing. 69 Nor did the court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Collins to ask Calisterio if he told others that the police broke down his door and arrested him for a traffic ticket. Despite the district judge's questioning, Collins could not explain how this alleged incident was connected with his case. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by invoking Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) and prohibiting the disputed questions. 70 IV. Did the district court err in adjusting Collins' offense level upward for obstruction of justice pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1? 71 Section 3C1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines requires a two-level enhancement [i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense.... Collins argues that this section should not apply to him because the police never believed the lies he instructed others to tell: i.e., they did not significantly obstruct or impede the investigation. This argument is not persuasive. 72 Collins argues that his conduct falls under § 3C1.1 app. note 3(g), which states that an enhancement for obstructing or impeding justice is proper when the defendant provid[ed] a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense. However, this application note only applies to the defendant's lies to the police; here, Collins instructed others to do the lying. 73 The correct application note of § 3C1.1 is 3(a). This note explains that obstruction of justice includes threatening, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully influencing a ... witness ... directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so. (emphasis added). It is unlawful to instruct others to lie to the police and perjure themselves. 18 U.S.C. § 1512; see United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1481-82 (5th Cir.) (defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) by writing letter to husband imploring him not to provide the authorities with incriminating information), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 898, 114 S.Ct. 266, 126 L.Ed.2d 218 (1993). Therefore, it does not matter that, in the end, Collins' unlawful influence scheme fooled no one, he still obstructed justice organizing the cover-up story. We affirm the two-level enhancement. 74 V. Did the district court err in assessing a four-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense? 75 Collins argues that the pistol played no role in the attempted burglary and therefore enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(5) was improper. 5 We disagree. Enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(5) is proper whenever a firearm facilitated or potentially facilitated-i.e. had some emboldening role in-a defendant's felonious conduct. United States v. Routon, 25 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir.1994). Here, Collins carried a loaded pistol during a nighttime burglary. It was not clearly erroneous to infer that the pistol had some emboldening role in Collins' felonious conduct. 76 VI. Did the prosecutor's use of two preemptory challenges on Hispanic jurors constitute purposeful discrimination in violation of Batson v. Kentucky? 77 During voir dire, the government exercised its first two preemptory challenges against Hispanic males, Mr. Castaneda and Mr. Padilla. Defense counsel objected and made a Batson challenge. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The prosecutor immediately offered a race-neutral explanation for the challenges: 78 I struck Mr. Padilla because he seems to be a loner type from Concord, expressionless, in essence. Mr. Castaneda was different. He answered too quickly. I just didn't get a good reaction from him. 79 The district court judge found that the prosecutor's explanations for the challenges were satisfactory and also noted that he thought Mr. Castaneda behaved strangely. 80 The trial court's factual findings regarding purposeful discrimination in jury selection are entitled to great deference and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 901 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891, 115 S.Ct. 239, 130 L.Ed.2d 162 (1994). Here, there is no indication that the district court's finding of no purposeful discrimination was clearly erroneous. 81 AFFIRMED.