Opinion ID: 1124085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The sole issue in this appeal is whether Elizabeth submitted to in personam jurisdiction in Mississippi, for purposes of Steven's counterclaim for modification of custody under the UCCJA statute, by her initiation of a child support claim under URESA in the Colorado court. This Court will not hesitate to reverse a chancellor when his findings are manifestly wrong or when he has applied an erroneous legal standard. Tilley v. Tilley, 610 So.2d 348, 351 (Miss. 1992); Faries v. Faries, 607 So.2d 1204, 1208 (Miss. 1992). The record undisputedly shows that the custody question was addressed initially by the Colorado court at a time when the family lived in Colorado and that the Colorado court had personal jurisdiction of this family. The divorce decree reserved continuing jurisdiction over the marital issues in the Colorado court. The children have continually resided in Colorado with their mother since the divorce, but have visited their father in Mississippi. The mother's Mississippi attorney (DHS' attorney) had preserved the personal jurisdiction issue by pleadings timely filed. The home state of the children is Colorado, although the father asserts an emergency situation with regard to the children's best welfare. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the mother has submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the Mississippi courts except the initiation of her URESA action in Colorado. Our uniform acts were enacted to give authority to Mississippi courts to address custody and support suits. The UCCJA, § 93-23-1 et seq., [3] deals with custody and excludes support actions (§ 93-23-3(c)), while the URESA act, § 93-11-1 et seq., addresses the duty of support (§ 93-11-5(6)) and (§ 93-11-15). There is also the class of federal constitutional mandates that covers these uniform actions to insure rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Carpenter v. Allen, 540 So.2d 1334 (Miss. 1989) (the Mississippi court lacked personal jurisdiction over the non-resident father in a UCCJA suit). Miss. Code Ann. § 93-11-15 has enunciated what duties are enforceable in Mississippi under a URESA suit and clearly provides for an action for support. Effective July 2, 1993, Mississippi amended § 93-11-15 to clarify, if any clarification was needed, that URESA was intended to address support enforcement only. The amendment states that [a]wards of custody and orders regarding visitation rights are not contestable under the provisions of the law. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-11-15 (Supp. 1993). This Court has addressed the issue of retroactivity of statutory amendments on many occasions. In Estate of Stamper, 607 So.2d 1141, 1148-49 (Miss. 1992), this Court held that prohibitions on ex post facto laws do not preclude the Legislature (or this Court) giving retroactive effect to new enabling, power-conferring rules, or rules of procedure or practice ... [W]e have on occasion looked to post-event legislation to clarify the pre-enactment content of the law ... When we do this, of course, our questions ordinarily are whether we offend any vested right ... or disappoint reasonable reliance. In the instant case, Steven had no vested right nor reason to rely on URESA, as it read prior to the 1993 amendment, as conferring jurisdiction to entertain a suit for modification of custody. Additionally, in Bell v. Mitchell, 592 So.2d 528, 532 (Miss. 1991), this Court held [w]hen cases are in the bosom of this Court and there is involved a statute that is modified prior to a final decision of this Court, we take that modification into consideration. See also, Grant Center Hospital of Mississippi, Inc. v. Health Group of Jackson, Mississippi, Inc., 528 So.2d 804, 809 (Miss. 1988). In proper cases an amendment may be viewed as a clarification of the former statute. As such it aids us in assigning meaning to the prior law. See also 1 A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 22.36 (1985) (when the purpose of the amendment is to clarify the meaning of an earlier enactment ... provisions added by the amendment that affect procedural rights  legal remedies  are construed to apply to all cases pending at the time of its enactment ... whether the substantive rights sought to be enforced accrued prior or subsequent to the amendment, unless a vested right would be impaired by it.) It is true that in personam jurisdiction and constitutional amenability may be waived. Carpenter v. Allen, 540 So.2d at 1337. However, there is nothing in this record that suggests any waiver by Elizabeth; in fact, the record shows unequivocally the opposite. This Court holds that the custody issue cannot be contested within the filing of a URESA action. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-11-15 (Supp. 1993). The next question to be addressed is whether Elizabeth waived in personam jurisdiction to the UCCJA counterclaim. As noted earlier, in personam jurisdiction was timely raised by Elizabeth. No personal appearance by Elizabeth was made; no pleadings on the custody issues were filed, except to contest jurisdiction. The record shows a reservation by the Colorado Court of jurisdiction over all issues relating to the marital dissolution. Colorado's reservation of jurisdiction was acknowledged by Steven when he signed the Agreement by which he sought credit for the bank loan payments. The Colorado Court properly held that the home state of these children was Colorado, where they had lived continuously since 1987. The visitation of the children with their father in Mississippi does not change the home state to Mississippi. This Court holds that there was no in personam jurisdiction over Elizabeth in the child custody issue raised by Steven's counterclaim under the UCCJA, nor a waiver of the same by Elizabeth. Therefore, this Court reverses and renders the chancery court judgment, awarding custody of the Marquis' children to the mother.