Opinion ID: 183968
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Allen’s Batson challenge

Text: We review jury selection de novo under the three-part test articulated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986), and review the district court’s underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Allen-Brown, 243 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001). In Batson, the Supreme Court outlined the following test to assess challenges to peremptory strikes: (1) the party challenging the peremptory strike must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, (2) if the court finds that a prima facie case of discrimination has been established, the burden shifts to the party exercising the peremptory challenge to articulate a non-discriminatory explanation for the strike, and (3) if a nondiscriminatory reason is offered, the court must determine whether the party challenging the strike has met its burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Lowder Realty Co., Inc., 236 F.3d 629, 636 (11th Cir. 2000). “A district court’s finding as to why a juror is excused is an issue of fact, and as such, it will not be disturbed on appeal ‘unless it is clearly erroneous or appears to have been guided by improper principles of law.’” Allen-Brown, 243 F.3d at 1297. 15 Allen argues that the district court erred in denying his Batson challenge to the government’s peremptory strikes of two African-American jurors. The government responds that the two African-American jurors were struck for race neutral reasons: inattentiveness and close family members who had been arrested. Allen maintains that the government’s peremptory striking of these two prospective jurors was motivated by race because the government did not strike two white jurors who also had family members who had been arrested. Applying the Batson three-part test, it is clear that even if Allen can establish a prima facie case for discrimination, Allen cannot satisfy the second and third prongs of the test. The government has provided an acceptable race-neutral, nondiscriminatory explanation for its striking of the jurors. Specifically, juror 13 was inattentive and had a sister who had been arrested for an unspecified traffic violation. Juror 14 had an aunt who had been arrested for drug trafficking, the same crime for which Allen was being tried. Finally, applying the third Batson prong, Allen has not proved the government purposefully discriminated in using their using peremptory strikes to remove them. Accordingly, we find no error. D. Vindictive filing of government’s 21 U.S.C. § 851 information “[T]he dismissal of an indictment on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct is a discretionary call; we therefore review the court’s action for an abuse of 16 discretion.” United States v. Barner, 441 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion if, in making the decision at issue, it applies the incorrect legal standard or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quoting United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1249. (11th Cir. 2003)). Allen argues that the government’s filing of a 21 U.S.C. § 851 information, listing prior convictions which would possibly subject Allen to a sentence of life imprisonment, was filed in retaliation for his successful appeal to vacate his earlier guilty plea. However, we can find no vindictive conduct on the government’s behalf. In fact, the government went so far as to extend the same plea agreement to Allen on remand that Allen had initially agreed to, even offering to refrain from filing the 21 U.S.C. § 851 information. Defense counsel informed Allen of the risks involved in refusing the plea agreement and explained to him that once the information was filed, Allen would be subject to a life sentence should he be convicted. Under these circumstances, it does not appear that the government’s filing of a 21 U.S.C. § 851 information was vindictive; Allen simply chose not to accept the plea agreement and to take his chances at trial. The fact that the trial did not turn out favorably for him and that he is now facing a life sentence does not render the government’s actions vindictive in nature. Allen is merely facing the consequences of his actions. 17 Accordingly, we find that the district court committed no error in denying Allen’s motion to strike the government’s 21 U.S.C. § 851 information. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM. 18