Opinion ID: 1355273
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant Thomas asserts that the trial court erred by failing to grant a motion for a directed verdict and judgment of acquittal following the conclusion of the State's proof and at the end of the trial. The duty of the trial judge and the reviewing court on the determination of a motion for a judgment of acquittal is the same as on a motion for a directed verdict. See State v. Torrey, 880 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993). This Court has observed that [t]he standard by which the trial court determines a motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of all the proof is, in essence, the same standard which applies on appeal in determining the sufficiency of the evidence after a conviction. State v. Thompson, 88 S.W.3d 611, 614-15 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000). Moreover, [a] motion for a judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the proof by the state is waived when the defendant elects to present evidence on his own behalf. State v. Ball, 973 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tenn.Crim.App.1998). Accordingly, we will address the Defendant's complaints as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In its review of the evidence, an appellate court must afford the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn.1982). Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact, not this court. See State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 795 (Tenn.2000). Moreover, we note that a guilty verdict can be based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. See State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999). Furthermore, while a guilty verdict may result from purely circumstantial evidence, in order to sustain the conviction the facts and circumstances of the offense must be so strong and cogent as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant, and that beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Crawford, 225 Tenn. 478, 470 S.W.2d 610, 612 (1971). To obtain a conviction for first degree felony murder, the State must prove the killing of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect or aircraft piracy [.] Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a) (1997). In this case, the proof at trial established that the victim, James Day, was shot in the back of the head during the commission of a robbery. The proof further established that the injuries sustained by the victim as a direct result of the gunshot wound ultimately led to the victim's death. Therefore, the crime of first degree felony murder was established. Defendant Thomas' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is three-fold. He asserts that (1) Angela Jackson's testimony establishing the identity of Defendant Thomas as the perpetrator is not reliable; (2) the discrepancy in the testimony of the State's medical experts as to the source of bacteria which eventually caused the death of the victim creates a reasonable doubt as to the causation of the victim's death; and (3) witness Richard Fisher identified Bond and then Thomas as the passenger in the getaway vehicle. We will address the first and third of these assertions together, and then turn to Defendant Thomas' contention regarding causation.
Identification of a defendant as the person who committed the offense for which he or she is on trial is a question of fact for the jury's determination upon consideration of all competent proof. See State v. Strickland, 885 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993). This Court must afford the State of Tennessee the strongest legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record, as well as all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. See State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn.1992). Because a verdict of guilt against a defendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. See id. Defendant Bond admitted that he and another person took part in the robbery of the Loomis Fargo truck and that James Day was shot during the robbery. It is undisputed that a car, matching the description of a vehicle belonging to Defendant Thomas' ex-wife, Angela Jackson, was seen parked a short distance from the crime scene and that Defendant Thomas and another person were observed getting into the vehicle and driving away. It is undisputed that Defendant Thomas, who was unemployed at the time, purchased a vehicle, jewelry, a shotgun, clothing, and opened a savings account within forty-eight hours of the robbery of the Loomis Fargo carrier. Angela Jackson identified her ex-husband in stills taken from the surveillance tape of the shooting. Ms. Jackson related that, while watching a news report on the robbery, Defendant Thomas remarked that he grabbed the nigger by the throat and shot him. Defendant Thomas points to Ms. Jackson's testimony that he and Defendant Bond returned to her residence between noon and 12:30 p.m. on the day of the robbery. However, the State proved that Mr. Day was robbed and shot between 12:30 and 1:00 p.m. Thus, he argues, the same testimony identifying him as the perpetrator also makes it factually impossible for him to have committed the crime. We are not convinced. Any discrepancy in Ms. Jackson's testimony relating to her report of the time that Defendant Thomas and Defendant Bond arrived at her apartment with the proceeds from the robbery and the actual time of the robbery is not fatal to the identification of Defendant Thomas as the perpetrator. The choice of which witnesses to believe and which to disbelieve is a matter entrusted to the jury. See Bolin v. State, 219 Tenn. 4, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1966). Furthermore, the jury is free to believe portions of a witness' testimony and to disbelieve other portions. See Wilson v. State, 574 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978). Additionally, Ms. Jackson's testimony as to the events immediately following the robbery were corroborated by other witnesses. Moreover, while it is true that Mr. Fisher initially identified Defendant Bond as the person he observed in the passenger side of the white getaway car, Mr. Fisher, upon request, reexamined both defendants and changed his identification to Defendant Thomas. Defendant Thomas challenged the identification on cross-examination. The jury was present during the identification and then the re-identification. The jury was in the best position to determine the credibility of this witness. Moreover, the identity of the shooter versus the driver is irrelevant, considering the theory of criminal responsibility, for purposes of determining guilt of the offense of felony murder. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-402. Irregardless of this identification, there was ample evidence from which any rational trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant Thomas was guilty of first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of a robbery. This issue has no merit.
Defendant Thomas claims that discrepancies between the testimony of Drs. Smith and Gardner mandate a reversal of his conviction for felony murder. Both Drs. Smith and Gardner concluded that the victim died from sepsis due to a rupture of the bladder resulting from a gunshot wound to the head. The alleged discrepancy in their testimony arises in their disparate opinions as to how the bacteria that resulted in sepsis was introduced to the victim's body. Dr. O.C. Smith testified that he had no opinion as to where the bacteria came from and that there were several potential sources for the bacteria. Dr. Smith surmised that the bacteria leading to the infection could have existed prior to the rupture of the bladder, could have been a result of the catheterization, or could have been the result of an infection of the urinary tract near the skin opening. However, Dr. Smith concluded that the neurogenic bladder and ... the fact that he has problems with bladder control ... combined with the requirement for catheterization ... predispose[d] [the victim] ... to have a high risk of colonization and an increased risk of infection. Dr. Cynthia Gardner, Dr. Smith's assistant, testified that [i]t probably was  I would say with ninety-nine percent certainty, the bacteria was introduced into the bladder through catheterization. Defendant Thomas contends that this discrepancy raises sufficient doubt as to the cause of death of the victim. We disagree. Both doctors testified as to the injuries sustained by the victim when he was shot and the impact of the injuries upon the victim during the intervening period until his death. Any alleged conflict as to the source of the bacteria is insignificant. From the testimony of both medical examiners, it appears to this Court that the infection would not have occurred but for the victim's medical condition directly caused by the shooting of the victim on April 21, 1997. That is, the uncontradicted medical testimony established that the victim eventually died as a result of the gunshot wound inflicted during the robbery. Accordingly, the evidence of causation is sufficient to support the verdict of guilt and this issue is without merit.