Opinion ID: 2823794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Acts Evidence Offered by a Defendant

Text: Â¶35Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Sometimes, the âmoreâ offered to establish the non-speculative connection between the alternate suspect and the charged crime is evidence that the alternate suspect committed other similar acts or crimes. Under CRE 404(b), â[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.â Such evidence may be admissible, however, for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. This rule has roots in the common law principle that a defendant should be tried only for the offense for which he stands charged. See Stull v. People, 344 P.2d 455, 458 (Colo. 1959) (âBasic to our criminal law concepts is the commandment that: âThou shalt not convict a person of an offense by proof that he is guilty of another.ââ). Evidence of criminal activity other than that for which the defendant is being tried has an inherent tendency to prejudice the jury against the defendant and induce it to find him guilty on the basis of his past activities rather than on the basis of the crime charged. See Bueno, 626 P.2d at 1169; see also State v. Machado, 246 P.3d 632, 634â35 (Ariz. 2011) (observing that the common law rule restricting the use of other acts evidence was designed to prevent the defendant from being convicted simply because the jury might conclude from the other similar acts that the defendant was a âbad manâ). It also âtends to inject collateral issues into a criminal case which are not unlikely to confuse and lead astray the jury.â People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 369 (Colo. 1991) (quoting Stull, 344 P.2d at 458). Â¶36Â Â Â Â Â Â Â CRE 404(b) is not, on its face, limited to evidence offered by the prosecution regarding similar acts committed by the defendant. However, the concern for prejudice to the defendant that gave rise to the common law rule that underpins CRE 404(b) does not exist when the defendant offers other acts evidence of an alternate suspect. Salazar, Â¶ 18, 272 P.3d at 1072; People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916, 919 (Colo. 1982). Â¶37Â Â Â Â Â Â Â When discussing the admissibility of other acts evidence offered by a defendant to link an alternate suspect to the charged crime, this court has not expressly referred to CRE 404(b) but has described the analysis as one to be decided on a case-by-case basis, according to âgeneral relevancy considerations.â Salazar, Â¶ 18, 272 P.3d at 1072 (citing Flowers, 644 P.2d at 919). Â¶38Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In Flowers, this court adopted the court of appealsâ formulation of the test in Bueno, 626 P.2d at 1170, for admissibility of other acts evidence introduced by the defendant. Flowers, 644 P.2d at 919. Although Flowers was decided after the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence, our analysis in that case did not mention CRE 404(b). Rather, the discussion centered on section 16-10-301, C.R.S., a statute that applies in cases involving unlawful sexual behavior and permits the prosecution to introduce other similar acts by a defendant âfor any purpose other than propensity,â including to show common plan, scheme, design, modus operandi, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, identity, or absence of mistake, Â§ 16-10-301(3), C.R.S. (2014). See Flowers, 644 P.2d at 919â20. Adopting the court of appealsâ approach in Bueno, we held that, rather than being limited to the specific purposes enumerated in the statute, a trial court must decide the admissibility of similar acts evidence offered by a defendant on aÂ case-by-case basis, looking to whether all the similar acts and circumstances, taken together, support a finding that the same person probably was involved in both the other act and the charged crime. See id. Â¶39Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Despite the âmore lenient standard of admissibilityâ for defense-proffered other acts evidence that we adopted in Flowers, id. at 919 (quoting Bueno, 626 P.2d at 1169), CRE 404(b) principles have guided this case-by-case analysisâif not expressly, then at least implicitly. First, nothing in our discussion in that case suggests that evidence of an alternate suspectâs other acts is admissible purely for the inference that the alternate suspect acted in conformity with his bad character. Second, the articulation of the test for admissibility in Flowers reflects that other acts of an alternate suspect generally are offered to show identity (a permissible purpose under CRE 404(b)). In this context, the evidence is offered to show that the same person (here, the alternate suspect) committed both the other similar acts and the charged act. As discussed in Flowers, an inference that the alternate suspect committed the other acts and the charged crime is permissible only where the prior acts and the charged crime share sufficient similar characteristics or details. Indeed, in Flowers, we upheld the trial courtâs exclusion of the other acts evidence because the âdetails of the other crimes were not distinctive or unusual enough to represent the âsignatureâ of a single individualâ and thus did ânot support a finding that the same person probably was involved in all the cases.â Id. at 920. Likewise, in Salazar, this court concluded that the other acts evidence was ânot distinctive or unusual enoughâ to support a finding that the same person was probablyÂ involved in both cases. Â¶ 26, 272 P.3d at 1074. These analyses echo the analyses this court has made under CRE 404(b). Â¶40Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In the alternate suspect context, however, the overarching relevance inquiry remains whether the evidence, taken collectively, establishes a non-speculative connection between the alternate suspect and the charged crime. Contrary to the court of appealsâ analysis in Muniz, we have not established separate tests for the admissibility of other acts evidence based on whether the evidence pertains to an alternate suspectâs motive or opportunity or, instead, to identity.