Opinion ID: 2764307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: C.M. was only four years old.

Text: ¶31 Considering the obviously and undisputedly contentious nature of the proceedings, the statements of Tonia and her husband indicating their strong and persistent belief that visitation with David is not in A.C.M.’s best interest, the steps taken by Tonia to facilitate A.C.M.’s personal involvement in the court proceedings, and the lengthy history of filings by Tonia intended to limit David’s visitation, the District Court’s finding that Tonia’s actions contributed to A.C.M.’s reluctance to visit David is supported by evidence in the record. The District Court concluded, and we agree, that Tonia’s claim that she is willing to help David repair his relationship with A.C.M. is not credible, particularly in light of her support of Silvester’s petition to terminate David’s parental rights. It is also clear that Tonia encouraged, if not solicited outright, A.C.M.’s active involvement in legal actions taken against her father. 15 ¶32 As noted by the District Court, whether a parent may be held in contempt when a child refuses to attend court-ordered visitation because the parent has either acquiesced in or encouraged the child’s refusal is an issue of first impression in Montana. A district court has the responsibility to enforce its own orders, In re Marriage of Baer, 1998 MT 29, ¶ 45, 287 Mont. 322, 954 P.2d 1125, and may exercise its discretionary contempt power as necessary to enforce the dignity and authority of the court, In re Marriage of Winters, 2004 MT 82, ¶ 41, 320 Mont. 459, 87 P.3d 1005. In family law cases, “the best remedy to [e]nsure respect for the law and the orderly progress of relations between family members split by dissolution is to give effect to the contempt powers of the District Court.” Milanovich v. Milanovich, 201 Mont. 332, 336, 655 P.2d 963, 965 (1982); see also Grounds, ¶ 3; Lee, ¶ 29. This is particularly true in high-conflict cases like the present one. Recognizing this, we agree with those courts concluding that where a parent fails to make reasonable efforts to require a recalcitrant child to attend visitation as provided for in a parenting plan, the parent has not made a good faith effort to comply with the parenting plan, and a contempt order may be appropriate. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rideout, 77 P.3d 1174, 1181-83 (Wash. 2003) (citing MacIntosh v. MacIntosh, 749 N.E.2d 626, 630-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Smith v. Smith, 434 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980); Commonwealth ex rel. Ermel v. Ermel, 469 A.2d 682, 685 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)). ¶33 We find additional support for this conclusion in our statutes. A parenting plan must be determined “in accordance with the best interest of the child.” Section 40-4-212(1), MCA. “[F]requent and continuing contact with both parents” is considered 16 to be in a child’s best interest, unless determined otherwise. Section 40-4-212(1)(l), MCA. Further, it is recognized that “continuous and vexatious parenting plan amendment actions” may have “adverse effects” on a child. Section 40-4-212(1)(m), MCA. A parent is also required to make a good faith effort to comply with the provisions of a parenting plan, or the dispute resolution provisions therein, before moving to amend the plan. Section 40-4-212(4)(b), MCA. The policies reflected in these statutory provisions support our conclusion that a parent must make a good faith effort to require an unwilling child to attend visitation with a noncustodial parent if visitation is provided for in a parenting plan. ¶34 A parent is not “a powerless bystander” in the decisions and actions of a child, and has “an obligation to attempt to overcome the child’s resistance” to visitation. Rideout, 77 P.3d at 1182. A parent has “a great deal of influence over [a child’s] ideas and feelings,” which carries with it an affirmative responsibility to nurture in the child a positive regard for his or her other parent. Ermel, 469 A.2d at 685. Although we recognize the difficulty, at times, of compelling a child’s compliance with parental—or judicial—directives, a parent must make a good faith effort to do so. Hancock v. Hancock, 471 S.E.2d 415, 419 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (contempt order not appropriate where mother “did everything possible short of using physical force or a threat of punishment to make the child go with his father.”). This obligation is in no way met where a parent allows a child to disregard a court-ordered parenting plan, passively submits to the child’s judgment about his or her own parenting arrangements, or actively 17 fosters animosity and distrust toward the other parent.2 The District Court was justified in exercising its contempt powers to “[e]nsure respect for the law and the orderly progress of relations between family members” in this case. Milanovich, 201 Mont. at 336, 655 P.2d at 965. We affirm. ¶35 2. Did the District Court err when it denied Tonia’s motion to hold David in contempt for failure to pay child support? ¶36 Tonia argues the District Court was required to grant her motion to hold David in contempt by default because David failed to file a timely response. Uniform District Court Rule 2(a) provides that within 14 days of service of a movant’s brief, the opposing party shall file an answer brief. Rule 2(b) states that failure to file briefs may subject a motion to summary ruling. Tonia’s motion to find David in contempt for failure to pay support was filed September 10, 2013. On September 27, 2013, she moved for entry of default. David did not file an answer brief until October 3, 2013. Rule 2(b), however, allows a trial court discretion to either grant or deny an unanswered motion. State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 466, 914 P.2d 592, 596 (1996). The District Court acted within its discretion when it decided to consider Tonia’s motion on the merits rather than issue a summary ruling. 2 Throughout these proceedings, the parties appear to have held the belief that upon reaching 14 years of age, a child is permitted to make his or her own parenting decisions. This is not the case. When considering a motion to amend a parenting plan, a court may consider, among other factors, whether “the child is 14 years of age or older and desires the amendment.” Section 40-4-219(1)(c), MCA. While the child’s wishes may be one appropriate consideration, they are not dispositive. Regardless of the child’s wishes, the parenting plan may not be amended unless the court finds the amendment necessary to serve the best interest of the child. Section 40-4-219(1), MCA. The best interest of the child must be determined by the court, and not by the child. 18 ¶37 The District Court reviewed the extensive record in this case and determined that although David had been ordered to pay Tonia those benefits designated for the support of Tonia and B.J.M., he was never ordered to pay Tonia benefits he received for the support of A.C.M. Moreover, the benefits designated for Tonia and B.J.M. were terminated in September 2003. David was ordered to pay $494.00 per month in child support for A.C.M., and the District Court found he had paid in excess of that amount. Accordingly, the District Court concluded David was not in violation of the support order. The record supports this conclusion. The District Court’s decision not to find David in contempt for failure to pay support was not a blatant abuse of discretion. Lutes, ¶ 7. We affirm. ¶38 3. Did the District Court err when it imposed sanctions against Tonia? ¶39 Tonia claims the District Court erred when it granted David’s motion to impose sanctions against her pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 11. The District Court ordered Tonia to pay David’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in pursuing certain actions. The District Court also required Tonia to obtain leave of court before filing any future pleadings relating to the parenting of A.C.M. The amount of attorney fees and costs has not yet been determined. ¶40 Pursuant to M. R. App. P. 6(1), a party may appeal from a final judgment or from specified final orders, including, as previously noted, certain contempt orders in family law proceedings under M. R. App. P. 6(3)(j). A final judgment is one that “conclusively determines the rights of the parties and settles all claims in controversy in an action or proceeding, including any necessary determination of the amount of costs and attorney 19 fees awarded or sanction imposed.” M. R. App. P. 4(1)(a) (emphasis added). While the contempt order is appealable under M. R. App. P. 6(3)(j), the award of sanctions is not yet a final judgment as defined by M. R. App. P. 4(1)(a), because it does not include a necessary determination of the amount of costs and attorney fees awarded. Tonia’s appeal from the award of sanctions is therefore premature, and we remand for entry of a final judgment, including a determination of the amount of costs and attorney fees awarded.