Opinion ID: 1811971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Discovery of Vulcan's E-mails

Text: Vulcan contends that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying its motion for an order protecting against the production of [a]ny and all ... e-mail or correspondence circulated within Vulcan regarding this case and/or the verdict in this case. Request no. 2. It insists that the burden of gathering whatever e-mails exist will subject it to extraordinary expense. Petition, at 21. Vulcan also insists that [a]ny known e-mails pertaining to the issues in the case that were created before the case was filed have already been produced during the merits stage, and it argues that, [b]y definition, every one of the e-mails now sought by Blizardas they were created after the case was filedwill have been prepared in anticipation of litigation and almost certainly will be protected by the work-product doctrine.  Petition, at 20 (emphasis added). It further contends that the e-mails will have no relevance to the assessment of punitive damages because they all were created after the time of the conduct upon which the punitive damages were assessed. Petition, at 21 (emphasis added). While this petition was pending, we decided Ex parte Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 987 So.2d 1090 (Ala.2007), which involved arguments by Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (Cooper), similar to those made here by Vulcan, that its burden of production with respect to e-mails [would] entail thousands of hours and [would] cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. 987 So.2d at 1104. We said: With respect to Cooper's contentions that the quantity of materials to be produced for discovery ... is simply too vast to be managed without undue time and expense, we believe that the trial court's exercise of its discretion over the discovery process requires some reference to standards designed to address the technology of information that is available, or that can be made available, on electronic media. ... .... ... In light of [the] showing by Cooper, we believe that it is appropriate for the trial court to consider in more detail Cooper's arguments as to its cost of producing e-mails.  987 So.2d at 1104-1105 (emphasis added). We then acknowledged that, although neither the courts of this state nor the legislature has developed standards for discovery of electronically stored information, the federal court system has addressed such standards. We directed the trial court to consider Cooper's motion for a protective order in light of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(B) (Specific Limitations in Electronically Stored Information), and the factors set forth in Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568 (N.D.Ill.2004). As we did in Cooper Tire & Rubber, we deny the petition as to the e-mails sought in request no. 2, but with directions for the trial court to reconsider Vulcan's motion for a protective order as to the e-mails sought in request no. 2 in light of the authorities cited and discussed in that case and in light of Vulcan's argument that the e-mails sought in request no. 2 will likely be work product and its contention that the e-mails would not likely lead to relevant information.