Opinion ID: 1806129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor

Text: II. As a guest plaintiff must show damage caused by recklessness or by operation of the car while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. On the intoxicating liquor division the court directed a verdict for defendant. This was error. Throughout his testimony plaintiff stated defendant did not appear to be intoxicated, did not have any difficulty in driving. The trial court ruled: The plaintiff testified that he did not consider defendant was intoxicated; that nothing that he did in his driving worried him, and, `I thought it was all right.' There is nothing to show that if the defendant were under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the mishap that it was a proximate cause of the collision. Under the authority of the case of Reeves v. Beekman [256 Iowa 263]127 North Western 2nd, Page 95 at Page 99, it is said: `Defendant was either intoxicated or she was not. If not, there is no cause of action. Under the uncontroverted evidence if she was intoxicated it must have been obvious to plaintiff who was with defendant for at least four hours and who furnished part of the beverage. Therefore the doctrine of assumption of risk would apply, and as a matter of law, plaintiff assumed the risk of riding with a drunken driver. In either event there can be no recovery.' Reeves v. Beekman will be noted infra at Division V. Outward manifestation of the effects of alcohol is not the only way to show a person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Defendant had two vodka sours before plaintiff got to the pool hall, 3 more after plaintiff arrived and two ounces of brandy before leaving to take Gravemann home. He also had a large part of a whiskey and 7-Up mixed by plaintiff in Vinton. The bartender testified the vodka was 80 proof and the brandy was 70 proof. This evidence coupled with the testimony of Dr. Regis Weland, a qualified pathologist, was sufficient to create a jury question on the issue of whether the damage is caused as a result of the driver of said motor vehicle being under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Under the circumstances shown here the question of causation was also for the jury. Rule 344(f) (10), R.C.P. III. Certain rulings of the court during the course of direct examination of the pathologist are the subjects for assigned error. Full consideration of the various complaints and the issues thus raised would unduly lengthen this opinion. Suffice to say at least part of the complaints have merit. We have recently noted in Dougherty v. Boyken, Iowa, 155 N.W.2d 488, 491: The admission or exclusion of expert opinion testimony rests largely in the judgment of the trial court. Its ruling will be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. (Authorities cited). However, despite Professor Wigmore's argument that the trial court's ruling should not be subject to review, such discretion is not unlimited. (Authorities cited). The discretion exercised by the trial court must be a legal one based on sound judicial reasons. `Abuse of discretion' means simply no discretion to do what was done. (Authorities cited). During the course of the examination it appeared Dr. Weland, a qualified pathologist, who has read and followed the literature on the subject, stated: We are frequently asked to take samples of body fluids; the common ones are blood and urine; and determine the alcohol content, either to determine the patient's clinical condition, or in some instances, to determine the effects this might have on the person's actions, such as driving an automobile.   .    We conducted a series of experiments in our own county for the purpose of determining the accuracy of one of these breath analyzers. So, we gave jail prisoners known amount of alcohol, measure breath, blood, urine, and notice the effects on them as far as muscular coordination, their reactions. Q. That's as far as it went? A. Yes, I haven't had vast experience as far as I would want to write about it, but certainly we have done it before. Q. But, the bulk of your information has come from others? A. Yes, much of it. On this basis defendant objected to the doctor's testimony because there was no foundation to show the witness is any more competent than anybody else to testify as to the effects of alcohol on the operation of a motor vehicle. This objection was sustained insofar as the testimony may refer to the effect upon the operation of a motor vehicle. Later objections to questions directed to the same subject were sustained on the same grounds. The trial court exceeded its discretion when it barred the proffered evidence. Dr. Weland's qualifications based on study and experience qualified him not only in the general field of medicine but in the particular field of effect of consumption of alcohol on the human body and its effect on driving. The principles relating to qualification of witnesses to express opinions are carefully analyzed at II Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., §§ 555-562, 569; Dougherty v. Boyken, supra, and authorities cited therein. We find it unnecessary to pass on complaints centered on the exclusion of expert opinion testimony based on hypothetical questions. The record may well be different on retrial and the question of whether the proper foundation was laid will arise, if at all, in a different context. IV. Plaintiff argues that the court interpreted under the influence of intoxicating liquor to mean intoxication. This occurred in connection with direction of a verdict on plaintiff's intoxicating liquor division. In Division II of this opinion we hold there was a question of fact for the jury under the statute as written. The manner of submission of the issue to the jury is not before us. We note Iowa Uniform Instructions 2.12 and 5.11 use the terms of the statute. We need not explore the difference, if any, between the terms intoxication and under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Cf. State v. Stout, 247 Iowa 453, 457, 74 N.W.2d 208, 210, for consideration of the matter under Code section 321.281 as it existed before House File 207, Sixty-third General Assembly, effective July 1, 1969. The amendment is not applicable here.