Opinion ID: 1982659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusion of Proffered Evidence.

Text: The assignment of errors includes a series of rulings in which the trial judge refused to allow appellant to offer evidence consisting of (a) a copy of Giant Food's rules and regulations on the conduct of employees concerning the apprehension of shoplifters, (b) testimony intended to show that the training and supervision by Giant of its security personnel was negligent, and (c) prior reprimands to three of the employee-defendants in this case. Appellant argues that evidence of such reprimands would have provided additional proof of its contention that the guards at the Giant store lacked adequate training and supervision. It is difficult to perceive in the context of the pleadings in this case why such evidence, even if admitted, would have had any relevance whatsoever on the questions upon which the parties had joined issue and thus called upon the jury to decide. Obviously, the purpose of such proffers was to demonstrate that the defendant-employer Giant was liable for the acts of its employees. The authorities cited, including sections of the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY upon which appellant relies, all deal with litigation in which the defense of the employer (or owner of the premises) is that the acts of the offending employees were outside the scope of their employment, and therefore, the rule of respondeat superior was inapplicable. Where this defense is advanced, manuals of instructions to employees are frequently introduced, sometimes to show that the challenged employee actions were forbidden by employer rules, or by a plaintiff, to show the converse. Both Brown v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 275 App.Div. 304, 89 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1949), and Peak v. W.T. Grant Co., 409 S.W.2d 58 (Mo.1966) (en banc), which appellant cites, turned upon principles of agency law. But in the instant case, Giant Food never disclaimed responsibility for the acts of its employees, the individual defendants. In its answer to the complaint, it joined all of them in a common defense, viz., a denial that any defendant had committed unlawful acts, and in the alternative that they had reasonable and proper cause to do and say what they did. At no stage in the trial did Giant attempt to distance itself from the measures undertaken by its personnel in the arrest and forcible detention of appellant. Equally irrelevant to the issues in this case was the effort of appellant to show that Giant's security personnel were negligently trained or supervised. In cases where the offending employees have clearly acted beyond the scope of their authority, e.g., an armed gardener shooting and wounding a trespasser, [8] or watchmen stealing merchandise from the storeroom of their employer's client, [9] it is of course proper to show in actions where recovery is sought against the employers of the tortfeasors, that when such employers failed to give precautionary instructions or were lax in supervision, they should not be allowed to escape responsibility for the acts of their servants. But where the liability of the principal for the conduct of its agents is not disputed, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to admit evidence ultimately to establish a matter conceded. [10] Appellant has also taken exception to another exclusionary ruling of the court which sustained objection to the elicitation of testimony concerning Giant's liability insurance policy, contending that such policy might have contained a provision protecting employees of the company from liability for punitive damages. Appellant concedes that in this jurisdiction it is well established that in actions for personal injury, plaintiffs are not permitted to present evidence to show that a defendant is protected by insurance. Brooke v. Croson, 61 App.D.C. 159, 160, 58 F.2d 885, 886 (1932). He argues, however, that in this case he sought the admission of such evidence solely on the question of punitive damages, and consequently, the court should have distinguished the matter from the ordinary rule preventing the disclosure of insurance protection against compensatory damages. It is true that in cases where punitive damages are sought, testimony with respect to the financial assets of a particular defendant may be received. King v. Nixon, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 98, 207 F.2d 41 (1953). The rationale for such holdings is that since the objective of punitive damages is punishment and deterrence, an amount that might inflict substantial financial harm on a person of limited assets would have only a negligible effect upon a person of great wealth. 22 AM.JUR.2d Damages § 322 (1964). In the case now before us, the individual defendants were allowed to testify on direct examination that they possessed little or no net worth, and that the debts of one of them (Belton) actually exceeded his assets. Appellant's position is that the admission of such testimony entitled him to show the jury that the financial condition of the witness was not limited to his personal assets but included insurance coverage for substantial punitive damages. This is something of a non sequitur. If the purpose of punitive damages is to impose real punishment upon the tortfeasor, such purpose would plainly not be accomplished if the wrongdoer was relieved of any financial loss by an insurance policy paid for by somebody else. [11] Even when the defendant himself has subscribed to the policy, it has been held in some jurisdictions, that it would defeat public policy to permit such person to shift the burden of punitive damages to an insurance company. See Northwestern Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.1962). [12]