Opinion ID: 2075762
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: district of columbia statutory and common law

Text: In cases contesting child custody, the courts of this jurisdiction have issued two lines of decisions which we occasionally have said may be difficult to reconcile: (1) those awarding custody to the natural parent absent a showing of unfitness (a fitness test), and (2) others permitting termination of parental rights in the best interests of the child without a required showing of parental unfitness (a best interests test). [12] Analysis of these cases shows they do not clearly reveal an answer to the claim to custody by an unwed, noncustodial father when the mother surrenders their child at birth for adoption by strangers.
In this jurisdiction, the awarding of custody in the best interest of the child as the paramount consideration originated in Wells v. Wells, 11 App.D.C. 392, 395 (1897), a case in which each divorcing spouse, as a natural parent, had an equal claim to custody. See also Seeley v. Seeley, 30 App.D.C. 191, 193 (1907) (same), cert. denied, 209 U.S. 544, 28 S.Ct. 570, 52 L.Ed. 919 (1908). Five years after Wells, in a case where the father of eleven-year-old twins died and their mother remarriedand the children's maternal grandmother and aunt sought custodythe court, citing Wells, acknowledged once again that the paramount consideration was the permanent advantage and welfare of the children. Beall v. Bibb, 19 App.D.C. 311, 313 (1902). But, to that end, the court recognized the mother's preferential claim over any nonparent, absent a finding of unfitness based, for example, on abandonment or misconduct. Id. at 313-14 (citing cases from other state courts). In light of Beall, the guardianship statute has been construed over the years to give natural parents, including a surviving parent, priorityabsent a showing of unfitnessover a variety of nonparents who have contested the custody of minor children. See D.C.Code § 21-101 (1989); Shelton v. Bradley, 526 A.2d 579 (D.C.1987) (unwed father prevails over maternal grandmother); Davis v. Jurney, 145 A.2d 846 (D.C.1958) (mother prevails over husband's sister); Bell v. Leonard, 102 U.S. App.D.C. 179, 251 F.2d 890 (1958) (mother prevails over sister of child's alleged father); see also Johnson v. Lloyd, 211 A.2d 764 (D.C.1965) (mother prevails over married couple with whom four-year-old child had resided for over three years); Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 185 A.2d 724 (D.C.1962) (father prevails over maternal grandmother). [13] In another relatively old case, In re Stuart, 72 App.D.C. 389, 394, 114 F.2d 825, 832 (1940), the court similarly applied a parental preference in reversing a trial court ruling on a petition filed by the Probation Department of the Juvenile Court. The trial court found that a fifteen-year-old child living with her mother did not have adequate parental care, within the meaning of the Juvenile Court Act. 52 Stat. 596, ch. 309 (June 1, 1938). In contrast with the decisions discussed in the preceding paragraph, the trial court awarded custody to an unrelated person with whom the child, apparently, had never resided. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the trial court's finding of inadequate parental care was without warrant in the evidence and thus violated the 1938 Act's incorporation of the natural parents' inherent constitutional right and liberty to direct the upbringing and education of their children, absent cruelty or neglect or unfit[ness] in character or mode of life. Stuart, 72 App.D.C. at 394, 396, 114 F.2d at 830, 832 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925)). In contrast with the cases in which parental preference was considered a rebutable presumption ( i.e., Beall, Seeley, Shelton, Davis, Bell, Johnson, Jackson, and Stuart ), later courts shifted to a best interests test, without regard to parental preference, in cases where a natural parent had earlier surrendered custody of her child to the welfare authorities (voluntarily or otherwise) or to an adoptive family and later sought to regain custody. See In re N.M.S., 347 A.2d 924 (D.C.1975) (foster parents, not mother, awarded custody in best interests of nine-year-old girl whom mother had voluntarily surrendered to Social Rehabilitation Administration when child was four days old); In re LEM, 164 A.2d 345 (D.C.1960) (mother permanently deprived of parental right to minor child, committed for two-and-one-half years to Child Welfare Division for lack of adequate parental care, whose best interests lay in Division's being in position to consent to adoption); Cooley v. Washington, 136 A.2d 583 (D.C. 1957) (custody determination reversed for application of best interests criteria to contest over thirteen-year-old boy between natural motherwho had surrendered child for adoption by her sister and brother-in-law, both now deceasedand child's stepmother, the brother-in-law's second wife); Holtsclaw v. Mercer, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 252, 145 F.2d 388 (1944) (foster parents of three-and-a-half year-old child retained custody in child's best interest when mother, who had relinquished child at birth, sought to regain custody on ground she had consented to arrangement under duress). [14] Three of these four cases reflect the court's view that in seeking to regain not retaincustody, N.M.S., 347 A.2d at 927, the natural parent by her earlier actions has put herself on an equal footing with the state, or with another nonparent, and thus, as a result, what is best for the child, rather than the natural right of the parent, is the controlling factor. Holtsclaw, 79 U.S.App.D.C. at 252, 145 F.2d at 388. Put another way, the probable welfare of the child is the controlling consideration[,] and all questions of superior rights are entirely subordinated. Cooley, 136 A.2d at 585 (footnote omitted). In sum, in a situation where there previously had been an acknowledgement or finding of unfitness resulting in a temporary withdrawal of custody from the natural parent, in a subsequent custody proceeding the fitness test yielded to a best interests test. Implicit in these rulings, with their language subordinating parental rights to a child's welfare, is the following understanding: although a child's interests ordinarily may be best served by granting custody to a fit parent, it is possible in some circumstances that the child's interests may be better served by someone other than a concededly fit parent. The fourth best interests case, LEM, added another dimension. It recognized that the prospect for adoption is an especially significant concern in evaluating the child's best interests. 164 A.2d at 347. As a consequence, the court authorized termination of parental rights with a view to facilitating adoption, although not in connection with an adoption proceeding itself. The opinion noted that [n]o attack is made on the court's statutory power to act as it did, and indeed none could be sustained in view of the court's plenary power in this area. Id., 164 A.2d at 349. Whatever the merits of this last observation at the time, it no longer applied to the statutory scheme adopted in 1970. See D.C.Code §§ 16-2301 to -2337 (1973) (incorporating Pub.L. 91-358, title I, § 121(a), 84 Stat. 535 (July 29, 1970)). In In re C.A.P., 356 A.2d 335 (D.C.1976), we stated that D.C.Code § 16-2320(a) (1973), while permitting the termination of parental rights, did so only in the context of an adoption proceeding.... [T]he sine qua non is that the adoptive parents petition the court for the child pursuant to D.C.Code §§ 16-301 to -315 (1973). C.A.P., 356 A.2d at 338; see White v. N.E.M., 358 A.2d 328 (D.C. 1976) (same). We held that Super.Ct. Neg.R. 18(c), which,in apparent implementation of a catchall provision, § 16-2320(a)(5) [15] expressly permitted termination of parental rights in the best interest of the child without regard to a pending adoption proceeding was, in essence, a nullity. See C.A.P., 356 A.2d at 336 & n. 1, 339 & n. 13, 344. As a result of C.A.P., parents enjoyed greater protection of their parental rights; a court could consider terminating parental rights only if an adoption petition was pending. Within the realm of adoption, however, the courts virtually ignored the parental rights of fathers of children born out-of-wedlock. In 1976, when C.A.P. was decided, the adoption statute did not require the consent of the father of a child born out-of-wedlock. See D.C.Code § 16-304(b)(2)(A), (C) (1973). Aside from constitutional considerations, any question of parental rights in an adoption proceeding as to a child born out-of-wedlock focused exclusively on the rights of the mother. But, even the rights of unwed mothers, as well as those of married parents, were statutorily limited. It is true that adoption was typically premised on consent, see id. § 16-304(b), or on an earlier relinquishment of parental rights, see id. § 16-304(a), coupled with a finding (among others) that the adoption will be for the best interests of the prospective adoptee, id. § 16-309(b)(3). The court, however, could grant the petition for adoption without a particular consent under certain circumstances: if the parent could not be located or had abandoned the child, id. § 16-304(d), or if the court found, after a hearing, that the consent was withheld contrary to the best interests of the child, id. § 16-304(e). Cf. D.C.Code § 16-202 (1951) (consent may be dispensed with when investigation has shown extraordinary cause). In this respect, the adoption statute reflected the same best interest test which had been applied for dispositions of neglected children whose natural parents had voluntarily or involuntarily surrendered custody. The caselaw development through 1976, therefore, reflects the following: 1. In a contest over custody of a minor child between a parent and a foster parent, or between a parent and the District of Columbia child welfare authorities, the natural parent would prevail absent a showing of unfitness (including neglect)with the following significant exception. 2. When there had been a surrender of custody to the child welfare authorities at the instance of the natural parent, or pursuant to court order upon a petition by the welfare authorities and a showing of neglect, any subsequent custody decision would be made exclusively with reference to the best interests of the child, and the parent would stand on no better footing than other participants (such as foster parents) seeking custody. Theoretically, therefore, a non-parent could obtain legal custody of the child in this situation without showing (current) parental unfitness. 3. After the C.A.P. decision in 1976, the courts could continue with a variety of dispositions for neglected children, such as foster care, in the best interests of the child, but they had no authority to terminate parental rights for neglect or otherwise, except in connection with an adoption proceeding. 4. As to children born out-of-wedlock, the court could approve an adoption in the child's best interests after the mother had relinquished her parental rights, or with the consent of the mother (or, when appropriate, by overriding her refusal to consent), without notice to, or consent of, the fathereven if he were known.
Effective September 23, 1977, the Council of the District of Columbia in effect overruled C.A.P. by amending the law to permit termination of parent and child relationships in the best interests of the child, D.C.Code § 16-2353 (Supp. V 1978), wholly apart from an adoption proceeding (as then codified at D.C.Code § 16-301 to § 16-315 (1973 & Supp. IV 1977)). This statutory best interests test for termination proceedings, codified in the same section of the current D.C.Code, reflected the language of a considerable body of caselaw and paralleled the long-standing approach under not only the statutes governing dispositions of neglected children, see, e.g., D.C.Code § 16-2320(a) (1973), but also our local adoption statutes, see, e.g., D.C.Code § 16-203(c) (1951) (the change will be for the best interests of adoptee); id. § 16-309(b)(3) (1989) (the adoption will be for the best interests of the prospective adoptee). In contrast with the adoption statute, however, and even as amended, the termination statute continues to focus on the capabilities of the natural parent, thereby allowing that parent to defend against attacks on his or her capabilities wholly apart from, and not in comparison with, other custodians or potential adoptive parents.
Could there be, however, any reason to believe that, in contrast with the termination statute, D.C.Code § 16-2353 (1989), the adoption statute, with its traditional best interests language, see D.C.Code §§ 16-304(e), -309(b)(3) (1989), nonetheless incorporated a parental preference with a corresponding fitness test under some circumstances? Of the seven custody cases applying a fitness test discussed earlier Beall, Shelton, Davis, Bell, Johnson, Jackson, and Stuart only one, Bell, concerned a petition for adoption. That aspect of the case was not material to the analysis, which was the same in all these cases without regard to the type of custody sought. As elaborated below, I perceive no basis for saying that termination of parental rights of a non-consenting parent under the adoption statute can be divorced from analysis under the termination statute. More specifically, absent a parent's consent to adoption (or earlier relinquishment of parental rights), a court cannot enter an interlocutory decree of adoption under D.C. Code § 16-309(b) (1989) [16] and override a parent's refusal to consent as contrary to the best interests of the child, id. § 16-304(e) (1989), [17] unless the parent's custodial rights are terminable under criteria such as those identified in the termination statute, id. § 16-2353 (1989) (grounds for termination of parent and child relationship). [18] Cf. In re D.R.M., 570 A.2d 796, 804-05 (D.C.1990). [19] Thus, even if the birth mother were to consent to an adoption, the court could not terminate the parental rights of the nonconsenting father through an adoption proceedingassuming his consent were requiredunless, as to him, § 16-2353-type criteria were met. As indicated earlier, however, consent to adoption of a child born out-of-wedlock traditionally has been limited to the mother; the unwed father, at least as a matter of statutory law, has had no standing to object. See D.C.Code § 16-304(b)(2)(A), (C) (1973). But in 1976, perhaps in anticipation of constitutional requirements, [20] the adoption statute was amended to require the consent of a father of a child born out-of-wedlock. See D.C.Code § 16-304(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1977) (incorporating D.C. Law 1-87 (Oct. 1, 1976) which struck paragraphs C and D, and modified paragraph A). [21] Accordingly, given the fact that an unwed father was now entitled to notice and to consentor to objectto an adoption proceeding when the mother elected, for example, to surrender the child for adoption at birth, we must ask whether the Beall-Davis-Bell-Jackson-Johnson-Shelton line of cases grants the fatherwho has never been formally charged with neglect or other elements of unfitnessa custodial preference in such circumstances. In Shelton, a 1987 case, we applied the guardianship statute, D.C.Code § 21-101 (1989), see supra note 13, in granting custody to the child's unwed fatherwith whom the child had lived on some occasions, 526 A.2d at 580over the maternal grandmother upon the death of the child's mother. There was no issue of unfitness or neglect. We recognized that the custodial presumption in the father's favor is rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence of abandonment, unfitness, or other circumstances which render the parent's custody detrimental to the best interests of the child. Id. (citations omitted). At first blush, therefore, it would appear this statute should apply on behalf of the father when a mother puts a child up for adoption, for the statute is not limited to cases of a surviving parent. See Davis; Bell. On the other hand, it is not clear that the guardianship statute, with its parental preference, is intended in all cases to prevail over the adoption statute, with its best interests test. It is difficult to conclude, purely as a matter of statutory construction, that an unwed, noncustodial father who has not helped attend to the child before or after birth belongs exclusively in the guardianship arena, not in the adoption-termination arena. This is especially true because the guardianship statute is almost ninety years old, see supra, note 13, whereas the fathers of children born out-of-wedlock were not even party to the adoption process until 1976. It is one thing to say that, as between a natural parent and another relative or family friendboth of whom have had a relationship with the minor childthe parent presumptively should have custody, which is what the Beall to Shelton line of cases under the guardianship statute stands for. It is not as easy to find statutory support for the proposition that, when an unwed mother surrenders her child for adoption and the father is nowhere to be found at the time the adoption agency takes physical custody, the guardianship statute nonetheless accords that fatherif ever foundpresumptive custody. It is just as persuasive to say that, in such circumstances, any such presumptive custody has been rebutted by the father's ostensible abandonment of the child, putting the statutory burden on him and on the would-be adoptive parents to assert their respective claims on an equal footing under the best interests test, as in Holtsclaw, Cooley, LEM, and N.M.S. To make matters even more complicated, one can imagine an unwed father whose claim to custody, as in Shelton, appears so deserving relative to any other solution that he should be accorded presumptive custody. One can also imagine unwed fathers whose indifference to the child has been so obvious that his refusal to consent to adoption after the mother has surrendered the child should not be enough to trigger a presumption favoring his right to custody over an adoptive family, even if he is not demonstrably unfit. The District of Columbia adoption and termination statutes, however, as well as our local caselaw, provide no basis for concluding that some unwed fathers are entitled to a custodial preference while others are not. Accordingly, it would appear that selecting one statutory approach or the other in a particular case, in the absence of any relevant legislative history whatsoever, would be a decision for the court to make in a relatively new context based either on an arbitrary selection among canons of statutory construction or on policy-oriented criteria selected by the court. We could take either approach and purport to make a sound statutory construction, but either has obvious limitations in the absence of an easily assessible statutory answer. There is a better approach. Given recent caselaw development in the Supreme Court, in this court, and in other courts around the country, it is clear that the judiciary has employed the Constitution to provide substantive content to unwed fathers' custodial claims. Fifty years ago in Stuart, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit construed the Juvenile Court Act of 1938 to conform to the court's understanding of constitutional requirements: a custodial preference for the custodial parent, absent a showing of unfitness in a neglect case. [22] If the Constitution were so to require in the context of an unwed, noncustodial father, then the question of statutory construction would be resolved, as in Stuart, by constitutional imperative. Having read ahead, so to speak, I am satisfied that constitutional analysis provides a more useful approach to the questionfitness test or best interest test?than a rendezvous with canons of statutory construction or with our own reasoned (or instinctive) policy views. I therefore turn to recent constitutional developments, in order to learn where a noncustodial, unwed father stands in a proceeding for adoption of his child by strangers. How prophetic for this context, if at all, was Stuart's ruling that the Constitution protects a natural parent's inherent right to custody absent unfitness? See id., 72 App.D.C. at 394, 396, 114 F.2d at 830, 832.