Opinion ID: 4543042
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Press Release

Text: Hinkle also alleges that “Jay amped up the retaliation against Hinkle by overseeing the publication and dissemination of . . . false information through a Press Release detailing Hinkle’s arrest.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 35. As mentioned, Sheriff Jay has conceded that Hinkle established the first two Worrell elements for purposes of summary judgment; thus, the sole question before us is whether Sheriff Jay’s “adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to [Hinkle’s] exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.” Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1212 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court concluded that Hinkle had failed to demonstrate this was so. It noted that Hinkle had “not provided anything except suspicions and a 17 As an example, if officers have a practice of never arresting people for jaywalking but then do arrest a plaintiff for jaywalking after he or she has complained about the police, a possible retaliatory-arrest claim could survive, probable cause notwithstanding. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1727. 36 chronological connection (as opposed to a causal connection) between [Hinkle’s] support of [the opponent] and issuance of the news release regarding [Hinkle’s] arrest.” Appellant’s App. vol. 6 at 1413. It also credited Sheriff Jay’s testimony that “the news release [w]as ‘part and parcel of law enforcement activity’ and ‘common practice.’” Id. Finally, the court concluded that Hinkle had presented “no specific evidence of [Sheriff Jay]’s culpable state of mind.” Id. at 1415 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And even if he had, the court reasoned that Hinkle had not cited “support for the proposition that there exists a constitutional or statutory right to prevent one’s arrest information from being disclosed publicly.” Id. On appeal, Hinkle does little to contest the district court’s analysis. Hinkle claims that Sheriff Jay must have been targeting him because an “alleged theft of a trailer going back 10 years is hardly a ‘high profile’ crime spree deserving of being blasted out on the internet by the Sheriff via his website or to media at his direction.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 38. He also asserts that “the Press Release and its impact cannot be construed in a vacuum. An inference of retaliation via the release is certainly stronger in this case where a false Press Release follows immediately on the heels [of] an arrest without probable cause.” Id. Finally, he argues that this court has “opened the door for consideration” of evidence regarding past instances where Sheriff Jay may have retaliated against other political opponents. Id. at 39. We agree with Hinkle that we must consider surrounding circumstances in evaluating his retaliation claim. But doing so here shows an absence of retaliation: 37 the press release followed an arrest that was based on probable cause.18 Therefore, this case is not one in which “a false Press Release follows immediately on the heels [of] an arrest without probable cause.” Id. at 38. Second, Hinkle’s argument that this was not a high-profile matter fails to acknowledge his status as a former local police chief. Though the alleged crimes are not the most serious ones under Oklahoma law, an arrest of a former police chief is a high-profile arrest. Finally, Hinkle alleges that in Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1537 (10th Cir. 1995), implicitly overruled on other grounds by Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916 (10th Cir. 2001), this court “opened the door” for Hinkle to show that Sheriff Jay’s alleged retaliation against others supports his claim that Sheriff Jay retaliated against him as part of a larger pattern of harassing political adversaries. Appellant’s Opening Br. 38–39. Gehl Group does not support that assertion. In Gehl Group, the plaintiffs—two chapters of the Fraternal Order of Police, their solicitation agent, and their regional manager—argued that certain law-enforcement officials and other local officials “filed baseless criminal charges against them and selectively and vindictively prosecuted them” because they were “soliciting charitable contributions 18 As mentioned, Hinkle actually alleges that the press release was somehow posted on May 9, 2013—a day before his arrest. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Because the press release is written in the past tense, we believe that the press release must have been posted sometime after his arrest. If it had been written and posted after Sheriff Jay knew that Hinkle had been exonerated—and after probable cause had dissipated—we would consider this some evidence that Sheriff Jay intended to retaliate against Hinkle. But Hinkle has not presented such a theory. 38 in the Boulder area.” 63 F.3d at 1530. We rejected that contention because the plaintiffs had not “identif[ied] a pattern of harassment from which we might be able to infer [the] [d]efendants’ retaliatory motivations.” Id. at 1537 (citing W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of Am. v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 312–13 (1967) (per curiam)). That was because they had been “subject[ed] to only a single prosecution.” Id. And there, we concluded that the prosecution “was supported by probable cause.” Id. Likewise, here, Hinkle was arrested once, his arrest was supported by probable cause, and the press release merely reported the details of that lawful arrest. So Gehl Group does not support Hinkle’s argument—it undermines it. Nor does it support Hinkle’s argument that other instances of Sheriff Jay’s possible retaliation against others was evidence that he retaliated against Hinkle. See id. (considering whether the defendants had treated other groups “in a different manner” to determine if they had “singled [the plaintiffs] out for prosecution”).