Opinion ID: 171900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Court Orders' Facial Validity

Text: A key requirement that we have found necessary to the application of quasi-judicial immunity where government officials are executing court orders is the requirement that the order be facially valid. See Turney, 898 F.2d at 1472 (holding that officials charged with the duty of executing a facially valid court order enjoy absolute immunity). However, we have acknowledged that even assuming that an order is infirm as a matter of state law, it may be facially valid, as facially valid does not mean lawful, and erroneous orders can be valid. Id. at 1473. We explained: State officials `must not be required to act as pseudo-appellate courts scrutinizing the orders of judges,' but subjecting them to liability for executing an order because the order did not measure up to statutory standards would have just that effect. Id. (quoting Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1289). Further, [t]o allow plaintiffs to bring suit any time a state agent executes a judicial order which does not fulfill every legal requirement would make the agent `a lightning rod for harassing litigation aimed at judicial orders.' Id. (quoting Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1289). Simple fairness requires that state officers `not be called upon to answer for the legality of decisions which they are powerless to control.' Id. (quoting Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1289). We have also noted that a narrow conception of facial validity would deprive the court of most of the benefit it derives from the existence of quasi-judicial immunity for officers carrying out its orders because the unhesitating execution of court orders is essential to the court's authority and ability to function, and state officers subject to litigation might neglect to execute these orders. Turney, 898 F.2d at 1473. Even worse, `a fear of bringing down litigation on the [officer executing the order] might color a court's judgment in some cases.' Id. (quoting Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1976)). In short, `[t]he public interest demands strict adherence to judicial decrees.' Id. at 1473-74 (quoting Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1289). Turning to the particulars of the case before us, a Utah sheriff's deputy is required to obey [a court's] lawful orders and directions and serve all process and notices as prescribed by law. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-22-2(1)(c), (k) (2008). Process is defined to include all writs, warrants, summonses and orders of the courts of justice or judicial officers. Id. § 17-22-1. Further, Kopp and Herlin may have faced contempt if they had refused to execute the orders at issue in this case. See id. § 78B-6-301(3), (5) (The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or its proceedings are contempts of the authority of the court: ... (3) misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by [a] sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to perform a judicial or ministerial service; ... (5) disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court. ...). A court order may be unlawful or erroneous and yet still facially valid, and holding that the orders in this case are facially valid, even if they were unlawful or erroneous, furthers the goals this court sought to achieve by extending quasi-judicial immunity to officials charged with executing court orders. If we were to hold these orders to be facially invalid, state officials would be required to `act as pseudo-appellate courts scrutinizing the orders of judges,' which state officials such as these must not be required to do. See Turney, 898 F.2d at 1473 (quoting Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1289). Or worse, the officials may have to secure legal counsel to help them fulfil that functiona result this court sought to avoid by extending quasi-judicial immunity to this situation in the first place. See Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1288 (observing that absolute immunity for officials assigned to carry out a judge's orders is necessary to ensure that such officials can perform their function without the need to secure permanent legal counsel). Having to act as pseudo-appellate courts, and requiring legal counsel to help them do so, is especially likely here, where there is a statute directing the nonlawyer state official to execute judicial orders lest he or she be held in contempt, and where nonlawyer sheriff's deputies may already be accustomed to receiving ex parte noncriminal orders to seize property. See Utah R. Civ. P. 64, 64B (providing that a writ of replevin is available to compel delivery of property, that the writ may direct the officer to seize the property, and describing procedures when the writ is issued ex parte ). Further, we have deplored a narrow conception of facial validity, as it would deprive the courts of most of the benefit they derive from the existence of quasi-judicial immunity. Turney, 898 F.2d at 1473. This is especially likely here: if the orders here were held facially invalid even though statutory law directs the officials to execute such orders, thereby subjecting the deputies to potential liability, these deputies and others like them may be much more reluctant to execute future orders of the judiciary. See id. (explaining that state officers without quasi-judicial immunity and subject to litigation might neglect to execute judicial orders). That is unacceptable. `The public interest demands strict adherence to judicial decrees.' Id. (quoting Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1289). Finally, as previously noted, a court order can be unlawful and yet still be facially valid for purposes of quasi-judicial immunity. Turney, 898 F.2d at 1473. Even if the court orders here are unlawful, several considerations demonstrate that the orders did not reach the level of illegality necessary to render them facially invalid for purposes of quasi-judicial immunity and to justify imposing liability on the deputies: (1) Utah sheriff's deputieswho do not have the benefit of a formal legal educationare otherwise subject to being authorized to seize property in noncriminal actions through writs of replevin; (2) we are pointed to no law totally forbidding entry into a dwelling when executing a writ of replevin; [11] and (3) an order in a civil case that authorizes entry into a residence but does not meet warrant requirements is not as clearly unlawful as a similar order in a criminal case, where law enforcement officers are familiar with the requirements for legally obtaining evidence. Therefore, we conclude that the court orders in this case meet the facial validity requirement. [12]