Opinion ID: 2066513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Legislative Trend in Connecticut

Text: The first reason for my conclusion is that the trajectory of Connecticut legislation over the past decades clearly indicates the extraordinarily great and growing political power of the gay community generally and more specifically with respect to the right to marry. That extraordinary trajectory consistently has been in the direction of greater protection and recognition of the rights of gay persons, of their rightful claims to be free from intimidation and discrimination, and, finally and most important, of their claim to the right to marry. Since 1971, when our Penal Code came into effect, noncommercial, consensual sexual relations, whether homosexual or heterosexual, in private between adults has not been the business of the criminal law. Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes, Penal Code Comments, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. (West 2007) § 53a-65, comment, p. 277. Thus, the preexisting criminal prohibition against sodomy, for example, which targeted male homosexual conduct even when engaged in privately, was eliminated from our criminal laws. In addition, General Statutes §§ 53a-181j through 53a-181 l, which have been in effect since 1972, make intimidation based on sexual orientation criminal. [15] Furthermore, since 1991, General Statutes §§ 46a-81a through 46a-81n have prohibited discrimination by both private and state actors based on sexual orientation in a broad range of human endeavors in this state, have required state agencies to take positive steps, including training and education, to remedy any such discrimination and ensure that it does not occur in the future, and have placed these prohibitions and positive obligations within the enforcement authority of the state commission on human rights and opportunities. More specifically, these statutes govern: professional or occupational licensing; General Statutes § 46a-81b; employment; General Statutes § 46a-81c; public accommodations; General Statutes § 46a-81d; housing; General Statutes § 46a-81e; credit practices; General Statutes § 46a-81f; employment practices in state agencies; General Statutes § 46a-81h; services performed by state agencies; General Statutes § 46a-81i; employment referral and placement services by state agencies; General Statutes § 46a-81j; state licensing; General Statutes § 46a-81k; state educational, counseling and vocational guidance programs; General Statutes § 46a-81m; allocation of state benefits; General Statutes § 46a-81n; and mandatory annual reporting to the governor by all state agencies of their efforts to effectuate their obligations under these sections. General Statutes § 46a-81o. Moreover, since 1991, General Statutes § 4a-60a has required all state contracts to contain a clause that the contracting party will not discriminate or permit discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. [16] Then, in 2005, our state became the first state in the nation to establish by legislation the institution of civil union between persons of the same sex. We are one of only two states in the nation to establish civil unions purely by the political process, without being required to do so by a decision of the state's highest court. [17] Chapter 815f of our General Statutes, comprising General Statutes §§ 46b-38aa through 46b-38pp, entitled Civil Union, is our comprehensive civil union statutory scheme. Although retaining the traditional definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman; General Statutes § 46b-38nn; the statute provides that persons of the same sex may enter into a civil union. General Statutes § 46b-38bb (2). The core of that statutory scheme is § 46b-38nn, entitled Equality of benefits, protections and responsibilities, which provides as follows: Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether derived from the general statutes, administrative regulations or court rules, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage, which is defined as the union of one man and one woman. Thus, there is no doubt that, for all purposes under law; General Statutes § 46b-38nn; parties to a civil union are the same as parties to a marriage. This means that, in the eyes of the law, the two legal relationships marriage and civil unionare the same. There is no concrete, substantive or procedural legal right, privilege, immunity or obligationno benefit, protection or responsibility, in the language of the statutethat differs between the two. The statute goes further. Section 46b-38oo provides in relevant part: Whenever in the general statutes the terms `spouse', `family', `immediate family', `dependent', `next of kin' or any other term that denotes the spousal relationship are used or defined, a party to a civil union shall be included in such use or definition, and wherever in the general statutes ... the term `marriage' is used or defined, a civil union shall be included in such use or definition. Such a statute could not have been enacted without the very heavy political power of the gay community in 2005, just three years ago. Indeed, the civil union bill passed the House of Representatives by a vote of eighty-five to sixty-three, and passed the Senate by a vote of twenty-six to eight, with bipartisan support in both chambers. See 48 H.R. Proc., Pt. 7, 2005 Sess., p. 2181; 48 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 2005 Sess., p. 1345. Finally, on January 31, 2007, less than two years after the enactment of the civil union statute, the joint committee on the judiciary raised on its own Raised House Bill No. 7395 (2007), entitled An Act Concerning Marriage Equality. Raised House Bill No. 7395 defined marriage as the legal union of two persons, and specifically provided that a person is eligible to marry if such person is [o]f the same or opposite sex as the other party to the marriage.... It specifically would have eliminated the previous statutory declarations that the current public policy of the state of Connecticut is now limited to a marriage between a man and a woman; General Statutes § 45a-727a (4); and that marriage ... is defined as the union of one man and one woman. General Statutes § 46b-38nn. Raised House Bill 7395 would do everything that the majority does by constitutional adjudication in this lawsuit. Simultaneously with the introduction of this bill in the judiciary committee, the cochairs of the committee held a news briefing in the state capitol in support of the bill. The public access television network, CT-N Connecticut Network, video-recorded that news briefing. See Videotape: Capitol News Briefing with the Chairs of the Judiciary Committee on the Same Sex Marriage Bill (CT-N Connecticut Network January 31, 2007) (copy contained in the file of this case with the Supreme Court Clerk's Office). That news briefing is significant in showing the extraordinary political support for the proposed legislation. In addition to the cochairs of the committee, in attendance and supporting the bill were numerous other senators and representatives, as well as a deputy comptroller of the state. In addition, other legislators could not attend but asked that their support be publicly acknowledged, and it was. Senator Andrew J. McDonald, the Senate cochair of the committee, noted that, since the enactment of the civil union legislation, there had been no public outcry regarding, and nothing but public acceptance of, civil unions. Id. Some of the remarks at that news briefing by Representative Michael P. Lawlor, the House cochair of the committee, indicate his view that the chances of the gay marriage bill passing were very good. Id. He noted the significant shift in public opinion over the past eleven years, when apparently the issue of gay marriage had begun to be discussed. [18] Id. Representative Lawlor stated that he had never seen an issue where public opinion shifted so quickly as this one, and he referred to public opinion polls indicating that the evolution of the public acceptance of gay marriage has been extraordinary over the past few years. Id. He put forth his view that civil union is marriage by another name, and that those couples joined in such a union are married. Id. He stated that he believed that legislative enactment of gay marriage was inevitable, and that even legislators and other public officials who opposed gay marriage were of the same opinion. [19] Id. He remarked that he no longer sees public officials speaking out against gay marriage. Id. In his view, the enactment of the civil union legislation had been the big stuff. Id. Representative Lawlor said that times have changed this law will change with the times. Id. Referring specifically to Governor M. Jodi Rell's indication that she would veto the bill if it passed, he stated that governors change their minds as well as legislators, and that there is a political tide in the direction of gay marriage. Id. The public legislative hearings on the bill further show the extraordinary political support for gay marriage through legislation. Speaking in support of the bill were State Comptroller Nancy Wyman; Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary Committee, Pt. 17, 2007 Sess., p. 5312; State Treasurer Denise L. Nappier; id., at p. 5339; Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz; id., at p. 5395; Senator Edith Prague; id., at p. 4771; Teresa C. Younger, executive director of the Permanent Commission on the Status of Women; id., at p. 5258; and the mayors of three of our largest cities, namely, Dannel P. Malloy, the mayor of Stamford; id., at p. 5343; Eddie A. Perez, the mayor of Hartford; id., at p. 5331; and John DeStefano, Jr., the mayor of New Haven. Id., at p. 5390. In addition to these state and municipal public officials, the bill was supported by the Hartford Court of Common Council; id., at p. 5331; and by two major labor unions in the state, namely, the Connecticut State United Auto Workers CAP Council; id., at p. 5326; and the Connecticut AFL-CIO. Id., at p. 5333. In addition, support was registered from the American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut; id., at p. 5314; the Connecticut Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers; id., at p. 5351; the National Council of Jewish Women; id., at p. 5309; the Connecticut Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics; id., at p. 5310; and the Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund. Id., at p. 5328. Furthermore, nine religious leaders of both Christian and Jewish denominations registered their support of the bill. Not one state or local officialelected or appointedand not one labor or professional organization opposed the bill. [20] The judiciary committee reported the bill out favorably by a bipartisan vote of twenty-seven to fifteen. See Raised House Bill No. 7395, Judiciary Committee Vote Tally Sheet, April 12, 2007. Subsequently, the cochairs of the judiciary committee decided not to ask for a floor vote on the bill. Their reasons for doing so, however, are extremely significant, because they underscore the extraordinary growing political support for the bill. In a press release announcing their decision, Senator McDonald and Representative Lawlor stated that several vote counts of legislators show the results to be encouragingly close, but that many lawmakers have requested more time before voting for the bill. Press Release, Judiciary Chairman Will Not Seek Vote on Marriage Equality, but Are Encouraged by Increasing Public Support (May 11, 2007) (copy contained in the file of this case with the Supreme Court Clerk's Office). Senator McDonald stated that [t]he number of legislators backing this proposal has more than doubled in just the past two years since the bill was last introduced.... Support toward gay marriage equality is growing. We achieved an incredible benchmark this year by passing the bill out of committeea step that many believed we would not be able to accomplish. Id. Representative Lawlor stated: I thought passing the bill out of committee was a possibility. However, following the public hearing, at least five more committee members changed their minds and decided to vote for the bill.... Id. He stated that numerous colleagues on both sides of the aisle had approached him privately and said that while they were personally in favor of same sex marriage, they were hesitant at that time to announce publicly their support for the bill. In due time, they told him, they will be comfortable voting for it as public opinion continues to shift in that direction. Id. Representative Lawlor stated: A significant number of legislators have told us that they are currently in favor of same sex marriage personally, but feel that the state will be ready for it in another year or two. With time, these are the people that will create a majority.... This doesn't surprise me because we've been seeing the same trends happening in the general public, too, with more people gradually coming out in support for same-sex marriage. When [not if] it passes, I hope it is a strong bipartisan vote as was the case with civil unions in 2005. (Emphasis added.) Id. The press release reported that a poll conducted in April, 2007, for the Hartford Courant by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut showed that 49 percent of Connecticut residents favor same sex marriage, while 46 percent oppose it. Id. Senator McDonald stated that [l]ike most people in Connecticut, I think that the governor has demonstrated an increased willingness to be open-minded and she understands that peoples' views are changing rapidly on the topic.... Id. Noting the public testimony in favor of the bill by the state comptroller, treasurer and secretary of the state, as well as the three mayors, Senator McDonald stated: An increasing number of elected officials will support marriage equality as time progresses. The trend is undoubtedly moving in that direction. Id. Other legislators were quoted in the press release as being in favor of the bill, acknowledging the rapid shift in public opinion, and expressing their belief that the bill would soon pass. Senator Mary Ann Handley stated: I've long believed that gay and lesbian couples should have the same rights to marriage that heterosexual couples have and should not be treated differently by the government. I'm very encouraged that we have come closer this year to achieving this.... Full equality is definitely in reach.  (Emphasis added.) Id. Representative Beth Bye said that the great majority of feedback has been positive, stating: The support shown has been immense ... I've received numerous e-mails and phone calls of encouragement from my constituents, and even words of support from other legislators who actually oppose the legislation. It's clear to me that opinions are moving in this direction.  (Emphasis added.) Id. Representative Toni Walker said that throughout her time in the legislature, she has seen a growing number of legislators switch their positions into the direction of equal marriage rights for same sex couples. Id. Representative Walker stated: I've seen it for myself. Increasingly, as I sit down and talk with my colleagues, I've found that they are changing their views toward the direction of marriage equality.  (Emphasis added.) Id. It is to blink at political reality to ignore or to dismiss, as the majority does, this extraordinary and unprecedented public record. No other court that considers the political power factor as relevant has been presented with this unique demonstration of political power. Moreover, I note that it is influential elected politiciansnot appointed judgeswho think that gay marriage through legislation is inevitable in Connecticut; who have discussed the issue with their elected colleagues and their constituents; who have read the public opinion polls, and have concluded that gay marriage will be enacted legislatively in Connecticut sooner rather than later; and who determined, in April, 2007, more than one year ago, that within one or two years from then a strong, bipartisan majority likely would pass a gay marriage bill, and that such a majority, as well as the growing public support for gay marriage in the state, might well persuade the governor to sign the bill. The majority dismisses this extraordinary public record of political support for gay marriage through legislation, and substitutes its uninformed view of the political landscape for that of those who shape it and work in it day after day. [21] As a result, the majority joins only two other states, namely, California and Massachusetts, in mandating same sex marriage as a matter of state constitutional law. See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal.4th 757, 785, 183 P.3d 384, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 (2008); Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 344, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). [22] The other five state courts of final appeal that have considered the issue have concluded to the contrary. See Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 312, 932 A.2d 571 (2007); Lewis v. Harris, supra, 188 N.J. at 441, 908 A.2d 196; Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 362-63, 855 N.E.2d 1, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770 (2006); Baker v. State, supra, 170 Vt. at 224-25, 744 A.2d 864; Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash.2d 1, 53, 138 P.3d 963 (2006). California is the only one of these states that has what could be called a civil union statute, but in the California constitutional jurisprudence there is no political power factor analysis. See In re Marriage Cases, supra, at 843, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384 ([O]ur cases have not identified a group's current political powerlessness as a necessary prerequisite for treatment as a suspect class.... Instead, our decisions make clear that the most important factors in deciding whether a characteristic should be considered a constitutionally suspect basis for classification are whether the class of persons who exhibit a certain characteristic historically has been subjected to invidious and prejudicial treatment, and whether society now recognizes that the characteristic in question generally bears no relationship to the individual's ability to perform or contribute to society. [Emphasis in original.]). Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated, in a subsequent proceeding, that a civil union statute would not be sufficient; Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 440 Mass. 1201, 1207-1208, 802 N.E.2d 565 (2004); it did so by way of an advisory opinion in the absence of an operating civil union statutory scheme. Thus, the majority in the present case stands alone in mandating gay marriage as a matter of state constitutional law in the presence of both a fully functioning civil union statute and a highly relevant [23] and revealing public record of extraordinary political support for gay marriage through legislation. I disagree with the cramped notion of political power applied by the majority. The majority, relying on the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973), asserts that, because there has never been, in Connecticut, an openly gay person elected to statewide office or appointed to our higher courts, gay persons `remain apolitical underclass' in our state. I agree that election or appointment to high office is one aspect of a group's political power, and that the plurality opinion in Frontiero supports that view. I also believe, however, that the legislative record regarding a particular group is another measure of the group's political power, and that Cleburne supports that view. [24] Consequently, the political power of a group is not measured solely by whether one who is a member of the group has been elected or appointed to high office. It is also measured by whether the group has been and is able to secure the passage of important and beneficial legislation on its behalf. One does not measure the political power in this state of organized labor, for example, solely by examining the number of labor union officers or members elected or appointed to high public office; or the political power of the business community solely by examining the number of chief executive officers of major corporations, or the number of officers of the Connecticut Business and Industry Association, so elected or appointed; or the political power of the plaintiffs' trial bar solely by examining the number of plaintiffs' lawyers, or officers of the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association, so elected or appointed. On the contrary, one measures the political power of those powerful groups alsoindeed, often primarilyby examining the success they have achieved in enacting legislation that affects their interests. Thus, the legislative history in our state for the past thirty-seven years, beginning with the passage of the Penal Code in 1971, and the public record discussed previously, are proof of the political power of gay persons in this state. Simply put, one cannot read the record of legislation over the past thirty-seven years, including the passage of the civil union legislation in 2005, watch the video of the press briefing following the introduction of the gay marriage bill in early 2007, read the outpouring of political support for that bill and the vote of the judiciary committee in favorably reporting out the bill, and read the press release of the cochairs of the judiciary committee, including the comments of other influential legislators, regarding the bill, and reasonably conclude that gay persons are a political underclass in today's Connecticut. Rather, the only reasonable conclusion from this extraordinary public record is that gay persons as a class now have in Connecticut the political power to enact gay marriage legislation sooner rather than later. Consequently, I also disagree with the majority's characterization of our state's admirable record of legislation described previously as  supporting the conclusion that the subject group is in need of heightened constitutional protection. (Emphasis in original.) In the context of equal protection jurisprudence, this characterization renders a group's political power, as demonstrated by its ability to secure beneficial and protective legislation, essentially irrelevant. Under the majority's view, if the state has enacted a large body of legislation beneficial to or protective of a particular groupas this state has done with respect to gay personsthat means that the group lacks political power because the legislation is evidence of the group's need for protection. But if the state has not enacted such legislation, that also undoubtedly would mean that the group lacks political power because of that lack of legislation. Indeed, that lack of such legislation is precisely what Chief Judge Kaye cited, in her dissent in Hernandez v. Robles, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 388, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1, as evidence of a lack of political power of gay persons in New York: The simple fact is that New York has not enacted anything approaching comprehensive statewide domestic partnership protections for same sex couples, much less marriage or even civil unions. In this way, the political power of the group, as demonstrated by the state's record of legislation, is rendered irrelevant to the equal protection analysis, because either wayif there is or is not a body of beneficial legislationit supports the view that the group lacks political power. This simply cannot be. It is true that our long history, beginning in 1971, and running through 2005, of enacting legislation protective of the rights of gay persons demonstrates their need for protection. Of course the legislation was aimed at rectifying historic and ongoing wrongs. That is always what civil rights legislation aims to do. But it is a strangely narrow view of such legislation to say that it supports heightened scrutiny because it demonstrates the group's need for protection. This view ignores the fact that the body of legislation obviously has another, equally important aspect: it also clearly demonstrates the political power of the group to bring about beneficial and protective legislation for the precise purpose of rectifying those wrongs. In my view, it is untenable to dismiss, as the majority does, this other important aspect of such legislation. Moreover, were there no record of such legislation in this state, the majority would undoubtedlyand justifiablycite that as evidence of a lack of political power. It is also true, as the majority notes, that, despite the growing political power of both women and African-Americans, neither gender nor race has since been questioned as a class entitled to strict scrutiny. That does not compel the conclusion, however, that political power must be relegated to secondary status in our own state constitutional protection jurisprudence. As I indicate in part II of this opinion, our state constitution already specifically protects both gender and race, among other classes, as entitled to strict scrutiny. Thus, there is no need to consider even the possibility of a reclassification of those two classes under our constitution, and I would not attempt to answer the academic question asked by the majority, namely: why, if the political factor is important, do both gender and race still retain their heightened scrutiny status? No one has ever suggestednor do Ithat, once established, a class entitled to heightened scrutiny protection may subsequently lose that status if its political power grows substantially. [25] No court has ever been presented with such a question, and this court certainly never will be. But the answer to that academic question should not be that, when considering whether as a matter of first impression under our own state constitution a new, unspecified group is entitled to heightened scrutiny, we must, as the majority does, nevertheless ignore the root of the entire heightened scrutiny analysis, namely, the need of a burdened class for judicial intervention because of its likely inability to invoke the political process on its own, and blind ourselves to the powerful record of political support for gay marriage in the present case that clearly indicates that the legislature is about to do by legislation what the majority does by adjudication.