Opinion ID: 1461778
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: B. The Fences

Text: As a prelude to considering this issue, it is useful to revisit some well-settled principles of real property law and particularly those governing easements. An easement is broadly defined as a nonpossessory interest in the real property of another, and arises through express grant or implication. Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688, 484 A.2d 630, 635 (1984) (citations omitted). In general, the terms easement and right-of-way are regarded as synonymous. Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110, 126, 733 A.2d 1055,1063 (1999). An express easement by reservation arises when a property owner conveys part of his property to another, but includes language in the conveyance reserving the right to use some part of the transferred land as a right-of-way. Knotts v. Summit Park Co., 146 Md. 234, 239, 126 A. 280, 281-82 (1924). In every instance of a private easementthat is, an easement not enjoyed by the publicthere exists the characteristic feature of two distinct tenementsone dominant and the other servient. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Garrett County v. Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc., 346 Md. 160, 175, 695 A.2d 171, 179 (1997). Where a right of way is established by reservation, the land remains the property of the owner of the servient estate, and he is entitled to use it for any purpose that does not interfere with the easement. Greenwalt v. McCardell, 178 Md. 132, 136, 12 A.2d 522, 524 (1940) (citation omitted). The generally accepted rule for an express easement is that [because] an easement is a restriction upon the rights of the servient property owner, no alteration can be made by the owner of the dominant estate which would increase such restriction except by mutual consent of both parties. Reid v. Washington Gas Light Co., 232 Md. 545, 548-49, 194 A.2d 636, 638 (1963) (citation omitted). Our cases establish that the Millers' right-of-way entitles them to traverse it and that the Kirkpatricks, as owners of the fee, are also entitled to use the property. The owner of the dominant tenement is entitled to use the easement only in such manner as is fairly contemplated by his grant, whether expressly or implied, and the owner of the servient tenement is entitled to use and enjoy his property to the fullest extent consistent with the reasonably necessary use thereof by his neighbor in accordance with the terms and conditions of the grant. Millson v. Laughlin, 217 Md. 576, 585, 142 A.2d 810, 814 (1958). The subservient tenement may not obstruct the use of the easement. We said in Maddran v. Mullendore, 206 Md. 291, 297, 111 A.2d 608, 610 (1955), that it is axiomatic that the owner of a servient tenement cannot close or obstruct the easement against those who are entitled to its use in such manner as to prevent or interfere with their reasonable enjoyment. See also Klein v. Dove, 205 Md. 285, 107 A.2d 82 (1954) (affirming decision of trial judge to grant an injunction requiring the defendants to remove obstructions from the right-of-way and restraining them from interfering with the plaintiff's right-of-way) Respondents' brief in this Court adopted the Court of Special Appeals's unreported opinion as their argument. The Court of Special Appeals held that the Kirkpatricks, as owners of the fee, are entitled to use the road, so long as they do not unreasonably interfere with the Millers' use. The court reasoned that there was no interference with the right-of-way by erection of the fences because the jury's determination not to award damages for interference meant there was no interference that deprived the Millers of their use of the road. We conclude that, although the Kirkpatricks also may use the access road as such, they may not unilaterally modify or reduce the right-of-way in a manner or extent that is inconsistent with the intention of the parties as gleaned from the language of the deed granting the right-of-way. Chevy Chase Land Co., 355 Md. at 123, 733 A.2d at 1062. In construing the language of a deed, the basic principles of contract interpretation apply. The grant of an easement by deed is strictly construed. Buckler v. Davis Sand and Gravel Corp., 221 Md. 532, 538, 158 A.2d 319, 323 (1960). The extent of an easement created by an express grant depends upon a proper construction of the conveyance by which the easement was created. Id. The primary rule for the construction of contracts generallyand the rule is applicable to the construction of a grant of an easementis that a court should ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties at the time the contract was made, if that be possible. Id. Here the subject deed(s) and referenced surveyas determined by the Circuit Courtgranted the dominant tenement a right-of-way for ingress and egress that was twenty feet in width. The grant of the right-of-way to the Millersas set forth in the deed, dated 27 October 1977 does not contain any reservation of rights to the grantors. Similarly, there is no written instrument of record reserving to the owners of the servient tenement the power to modify the contractually fixed grant of the express easement. As we said as long ago as 1880, the grant of an express easement is founded upon the maxim that a grantor shall not derogate from his grant. [1] Mitchell v. Seipel, 53 Md. 251 (1880)(emphasis in original). This principle is deeply embedded in the common law, and if the grantor intends to reserve any right over the tenement granted it is his duty to reserve it expressly in the grant, and to this the only exception is of ways or easements of necessity. Id. The cases of Bump v. Sanner, 37 Md. 621 (1873) and Brooks v. Voigt, 224 Md. 47, 166 A.2d 737 (1961) are pertinent examples of grantors being prevented from derogating from their grants. In Bump, the plaintiffs had an express easement in an alley designated on a filed plat and, thus, had by grant the right to use the alley. There, as here, the defendant had chosen to deny the plaintiffs the use of a portion of the express easement. We said that a grant of a right to use a piece of property includes `the last inch as well as the first inch,' and therefore it is clear that the fence or obstruction placed upon it by defendant is an invasion of the plaintiff's legal rights, for which an action may be maintained. Bump, 37 Md. at 627-28. The defendant in Bump had grown tired of the waste water and offal that found its way down the alley to his house, and he supposed that he had the right to place across the alley an obstruction to prevent this nuisance. We pointed out that this injury cannot give him the right to close the alley; and deprive the plaintiffs of the use of it or any part of it. Id. We acknowledged that the question of damages is of course exclusively for the jury. Id. Thus, implicitly an unlawful obstruction of the right-of-way could be found without necessarily being joined with the award of monetary damages merely on the basis that an obstruction was found to be inconsistent with the grant. In Brooks the Court also was dealing with an alley over which the plaintiffs had an express easement. The fee simple owner of the alley denied the easement holders the use of parts of the alley arguing that the plaintiffs only needed enough of the alley that was needed to give them access from the rear of their property to the public street. We held that the express easement was coextensive with the entire length of the alley and the express grant of the right to the use of an alley carried the right to use the whole of the alley. 224 Md. at 50, 166 A.2d at 739. The grant of the easement in the original conveyance could not be narrowed unilaterally by the servient tenement and, thus, the dominant tenement was entitled to the use of the whole of the fifteen foot alley. Id. In the present case, the Court of Special Appeals reiterated in its opinion our explanation in Bishields v. Campbell, 200 Md. 622, 624, 91 A.2d 922, 923 (1952), involving a prescriptive easement, that a right of way is merely a right of passage and the owner of the land is entitled to use it for any purpose that does not unreasonably interfere with the use of the easement. The intermediate appellate court then found that the jury's determination that no damages should be awarded meant there was no unreasonable interference with the express easement. We do not agree that the jury's decision as to damages was determinative of the proper declaration and enforcement of the foundational property rights found by the court to exist in this case. The respective roles of the trial judge and jury in the application of Maryland easement jurisprudence was discussed by this Court in Greenbaum v. Harrison, 132 Md. 34, 35, 103 A. 84, 85 (1918), and Leekley v. Dewing, 217 Md. 54, 58, 141 A.2d 696, 697-98 (1958). In Greenbaum and Leekley, the questions for the jury were limited to: (1) determining whether an easement existed; and (2) determining the amount of monetary damages the defendant may be liable for as a result of the defendant's interference with a plaintiff's enjoyment of an easement. In Greenbaum, we indicated that the existence of a disputed easement could be a question of fact to be resolved by the jury as the finder of fact: We will first consider the objection of the defendants to the bill upon the question of jurisdiction, and that is, whether the proceedings in this case involves a real, disputed question of title to the easement in question, because if that be true it is too clear for argument that a court of equity would be without jurisdiction to determine it and could not grant the relief sought by the bill until the title had been established at law. 132 Md. at 34, 103 A. at 85. We said in Leekley, however, that where there is no reasonable doubt as to the title or the propriety of equitable action is evident, an equity court may act in cases involving title and enjoin continuing trespasses or declare rights as to ways. 217 Md. at 58, 141 A.2d at 697-98. In the present case, there was no dispute of fact to be resolved by the jury regarding the existence of the express grant of the right-of-way. The Circuit Court properly concluded, as a matter of law, that the width of the Millers' right-of-way was twenty feet. Similarly, there was no dispute of fact that the Kirkpatricks' fences were erected within the right-of-way and impeded access to approximately forty percent of the right-of-way. The Circuit Court refused to order the removal of the fences on the basis of: (1) the Circuit Court's own conclusion that the fences did not interfere unreasonably with the Millers' use of the right-of-way; and (2) the jury's finding of no liability for damages for the Kirkpatricks' interference with the Millers' use of the right-of-way. The trial judge's conclusion of no unreasonable interference with the express easement was premised on an incorrect legal analysis. He should not have considered the reasonableness of the established interference and physical obstruction. Rather, any interference of a permanent nature within a right-of-way that obstructs an express easement, created by reservation, for ingress and egress is unlawful as a matter of law and should be ordered removed. Bump v. Sanner, 37 Md. 621, 627-28 (1873) (the grant of a right to use a piece of property includes the last inch as well as the first inch and a fence or obstruction placed upon it by the servient tenement is an invasion of the dominant tenement's rights); Brooks, 224 Md. 47, 166 A.2d 737 (1961) (the grant of the fifteen foot easement in the original conveyance can not be narrowed unilaterally by the servient tenement). The verdict sheet in the trial essentially tasked the jury with determining liability, if any, for monetary damages. The use of the term liability on the verdict sheet meant the jury was to consider only whether to make an award of monetary damages. Blacks Law Dictionary defines the terms liability, civil liability, and liable in terms of an obligation to pay monetary damages: liability, n. 1. The quality or state of being legally obligated or accountable; legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by civil remedy or criminal punishment .Also termed legal liability. 2. ( often pl. ) BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 925 (7th ed.1999). civil liability. 1. Liability imposed under the civil, as opposed to the criminal law. 2. The state of being legally obligated for civil damages. Id. at 926. liable, adj. 1. Responsible or answerable in law; legally obligated. 2. (Of a person) subject to or likely to incur (a fine, penalty, etc.)Also termed legally liable. Id. at 927. This Court in Megonnell v. United States Automobile Assn., 368 Md. 633, 796 A.2d 758 (2002), examined the term legally liable as used in an insurance policy. We explained that the nature of the legal process itself means that the term legally liable to pay damages depends not upon when, and if, a judicial determination is made, but, generally, upon the creation of circumstances by and/or between parties, whereby the parties, or one or other of them, can enforce rights through legal process. Parties often become legally obligated (liable) to pay by way of contract, i.e., construction contracts, leases, insurance contracts, etc., or by committing tortious acts. The verdict of a jury and the judgment of a court are merely a determination that a legal obligation existed, and continues to exist. 368 Md. at 645, 796 A.2d at 765-66. Our elucidation of the term legally liable in Megonnell is consistent with the definitions for liable and liability found in Black's Law Dictionary. As such, use of the term liable on the verdict sheet in the present case asked the jury to consider whether to make an award of monetary damages, but not whether the fences should be removed. With respect to the jury's finding of no liability for damages, the jury correctly was not requested to and it did not make any findings regarding the scope of the express easement or removal of the fences. The jury's finding of no monetary liability had no bearing on the trial judge's obligation to order removal of the fences in the right-of-way. In Simon Distributing Corp. v. Bay Ridge Civic Ass'n, Inc., 207 Md. 472, 114 A.2d 829 (1955), we affirmed a circuit court's decree ordering a chain suspended between postsrestricting access to the right-of-waybe removed because the chain was a physical obstruction. The offending chain had been placed in position by the servient tenement. We concluded that the grantor retained title to the bed of the roads or paths over which rights of way were granted by sales made on the basis of the plats. The grantor-developer obviously had no use for the property otherwise than as roads or paths, and hence had no apparent purpose to serve by putting up gates or chains at any point. The main purposes of the rights-of-way in this waterfront were evidently to enable lot owners and their families to get about in the development and to get to the water. Gates, chains or like obstructions across any roads or paths could only defeat this purpose or make its attainment more difficult. The fair inference from the showing of these ways on the plats was, we think, that they should be unobstructed.... 207 Md. at 480-81,114 A.2d at 833. When an easement has been located by mutual agreement of the parties and granted by deed, the express easement cannot thereafter be obstructed physically by one party acting unilaterally. Waldschmidt v. Vito, 228 Md. 328, 330,179 A.2d 884, 885 (1962) (ordering removal of a fence barring access to an express easement by grant that gave waterfront owners the rights of ingress and egress across the right-of-way to the water). Just as we have found fences and gates restricting access to rights-of-way to be impermissible obstructions, so also we conclude that a permanent physical obstruction placed in an express easement created by grantin the absence of an agreement or surrounding circumstances to the contraryinterferes as a matter of law with the dominant tenement's right to the use of all the express easement. It is axiomatic that an express easement for ingress and egress includes the right to unfettered physical access up to the boundaries of the easement.