Opinion ID: 2622136
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sealed Correspondence

Text: ś 26 Finally, Athan argues that, under RCW 9.73.020, his letter was protected. Athan relies on State v. Christensen, 153 Wash.2d 186, 198, 102 P.3d 789 (2004), to argue the state privacy act protects sealed messages, letters, and telegrams from being opened or read by someone other than the intended recipient. According to Athan, a law firm was his intended recipient, not the police. Because the police were not the intended recipients, he argues they violated the act by opening the letter and, at the same time, violated his privacy rights. ś 27 The State argues the letter was in fact opened by the intended recipient because it was opened by the detectives listed in the law firm's letterhead or by their agents. The State finds it immaterial that the persons designated in the letterhead were detectives and not attorneys. ś 28 RCW 9.73.020 reads, [e]very person who shall wilfully open or read, or cause to be opened or read, any sealed message, letter or telegram intended for another person, or publish the whole or any portion of such a message, letter or telegram, knowing it to have been opened or read without authority, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Nothing in the statute indicates the intended recipient must be who the recipient actually claims to be. The detective who actually received the letter was listed on the law firm letterhead and thus, under the state privacy act, had authority to open or cause to be opened, the letter. Since the letter was received by the intended addressee, though not an attorney as Athan believed, he has failed to establish a statutory violation. ś 29 We are again reminded of Townsend. Townsend argued the police detective's actions violated Townsend's privacy rights under a similar provision of the state privacy act. In upholding his conviction, we found the communications were private, but that Townsend impliedly consented to the recording of his private e-mail conversations because it was reasonable to infer Townsend was aware it was possible to record the messages. Notably, our holding did not turn on Townsend's subjective belief he was communicating with a child and not a police detective. Townsend, 147 Wash.2d at 674-79, 57 P.3d 255. Similarly, Athan's privacy act claim here does not turn on his subjective belief he was corresponding with a law firm. The detectives listed on the letterhead were the intended recipients of the letter; their actual occupation is immaterial for the purposes of RCW 9.73.020. ś 30 Having found there is no privacy interest in saliva after it has been voluntarily placed on an envelope and relinquished to a recipient; the act of placing saliva on an envelope to seal the envelope does not constitute a communication under the ordinary meaning of the word; and the police did not violate RCW 9.73.020 because the detective named on the letterhead was the intended recipient, we conclude Athan's private affairs were not disturbed under article I, section 7. We now examine if his rights were violated under the Fourth Amendment.