Opinion ID: 2967565
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act

Text: Bryant maintains that he has standing to seek judicial enforcement of the arbitration award pursuant to Section 3-227 of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, which specifically provides for a judicial proceeding to enforce an arbitration award. Section 3-227(b) provides that [t]he court shall confirm the [arbitration] award, unless the other party has filed an application to vacate, modify, or correct the award within the time provided in §§ 3-222 and 3-223. Thus, Bryant argues, because Bell Atlantic did not challenge the award, Section 3- 227 provides Bryant with an avenue with which to seek enforcement of his award. We disagree. 2 The district court also granted summary judgment to Bell Atlantic as to each of Bryant’s additional claims, which Bryant does not challenge on appeal. BRYANT v. BELL ATLANTIC MARYLAND 7 Section 3-206(b) of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act expressly excludes from its coverage arbitration agreement[s] between employers and employees or between their respective representatives unless it is expressly provided in the agreement that [the Act] shall apply. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-206(b) (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.); see also Wilson v. McGrow, Pridgeon & Co., P.A., 467 A.2d 1025, 1031 (Md. 1983) (primary purpose of Section 3-206(b) is to exclude arbitration agreements in collective bargaining contracts from the Act). Bryant does not contend that the collective bargaining agreement at issue here expressly provides that the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act should apply, nor do we find such a provision in the agreement. Therefore, Section 3-206(b) renders the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act inapplicable here. See Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s County v. Prince George’s County Educators’ Ass’n, Inc., 522 A.2d 931, 936 (Md. 1987) (finding that the absence of any reference to Maryland statute in collective bargaining agreement renders Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act inapplicable to suit seeking to vacate an arbitration award). We thus hold that Bryant is not entitled to seek enforcement of the arbitration award under the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act. B. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act On appeal, Bryant argues that Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides a jurisdictional basis for individual suits brought by employees. The district court disagreed, however, and granted Bell Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Bryant lacked standing to seek judicial enforcement of the arbitration award because he failed to exhaust the dispute resolution procedures specified in the collective bargaining agreement and did not attempt to demonstrate that the CWA breached its duty of fair representation. An individual employee represented by a union, such as Bryant is, generally does not have standing to challenge, modify, or confirm an arbitration award because he was not a party to the arbitration. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Porca Co., 38 F.3d 289, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1994) (employees represented by union generally lack standing to enforce arbitration award because they are not parties to either the collective bargaining agreement or union-company arbitration); Katir v. Columbia Univ., 15 F.3d 23, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (same); 8 BRYANT v. BELL ATLANTIC MARYLAND Bacashihua v. USPS, 859 F.2d 402, 405-06 (6th Cir. 1988) (same). The exception to this general rule is when the union has breached its duty of fair representation by failing to enforce the award on the employee’s behalf.3 See, e.g., Porca, 38 F.3d at 297; Katir, 15 F.3d at 24-25; Bacashihua, 859 F.2d at 406. Bryant was not a party to the arbitration between the CWA and Bell Atlantic. In addition, Bryant has not attempted to show that the CWA breached its duty of fair representation. Accordingly, Bryant lacks standing to enforce the award, and the district court properly granted Bell Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment.