Opinion ID: 6499595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Meaning of Encourage and Induce

Text: The government begins by noting that encourage and induce may sometimes refer to criminal facilitation or solicitation. For example, the government highlights 9 Appellees contend that the government did not present this interpretation in the district court and has therefore waived it on appeal. Because we conclude the government’s argument “fails on the merits,” “[w]e need not opine on the waiver issue.” United States v. Wells, 873 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 2017). 9 Appellate Case: 19-3210 Document: 010110710106 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 Page: 10 that Black’s Law Dictionary’s criminal-law definition of encourage refers readers to the entry for aid and abet, a term that is itself synonymous with the term criminal facilitation. Encourage, Aid and Abet, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The government also points to a federal statute that uses induce as one of several verbs to describe the crime of “[s]olicitation to commit a crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) (making it a crime to “solicit[], command[], induce[], or otherwise endeavor[] to persuade [another] person” to commit violent felony (emphasis added)). Yet the government’s position puts the cart before the horse: Our construction of subsection (A)(iv)’s terms begins with their ordinary meaning, not their specialized meaning in criminal law. See United States v. Thomas, 939 F.3d 1121, 1123 (10th Cir. 2019) (“As a general rule, we interpret a word or phrase in a statute . . . in accordance with its ordinary, everyday meaning.”).10 And the ordinary meanings of encourage and induce encompass both conduct and speech. Indeed, dictionary definitions from around the time Congress enacted subsection (A)(iv) use broad language that could refer either to actions or verbal expression. See Brune, 767 10 To be sure, not every case is “a plain[-]meaning case,” particularly if the relevant language involves a term of art with a long “legal lineage.” Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1125 (2018). But as we explain in more detail above, the ordinary meaning controls in this context because the government’s term-of-art definition “plainly do[es] not fit.” Thomas, 939 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 139–40 (2010)). Notably, our adherence to this interpretive principle tracks the government’s position below, where the government urged the district court not to define encourage because the jury could “give the word its ordinary meaning.” App. vol. 2, 303. 10 Appellate Case: 19-3210 Document: 010110710106 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 Page: 11 F.3d at 1022 (“An inquiry into a statutory term’s meaning must consider the ordinary, contemporary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute.”). For example, encourage simply means “[t]o give courage to: inspire with courage, spirit, or hope: hearten,” “to spur on: stimulate, incite,” or “to give help or patronage to: foster.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 747 (Philip Babcock Gove ed. 1961). The definition of induce is similarly broad: “to move and lead (as by persuasion or influence),” “to inspire, call forth, or bring about by influence or stimulation.” Id. at 1154. Based on these expansive definitions, then, subsection (A)(iv) covers not only conduct, but also speech—“one can encourage or induce with words, or deeds, or both.”11 Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 473; see also Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1107 (finding Sineneng-Smith “persuasive on the overbreadth issue” and merely “add[ing] . . . thoughts reinforcing that conclusion of overbreadth”); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 11 The government does not meaningfully dispute that encourage and induce ordinarily encompass both conduct and speech. Tellingly, the government avoids citing definitions of encourage from nonlegal dictionaries, instead noting that such dictionaries use encourage when defining abet (a word found nowhere in subsection (A)(iv)). But as Appellees note, “the mere fact that ‘abet’ can be defined as ‘encourage’ does not mean that ‘encourage’ only means ‘abet.’” Aplees. Br. 22. What’s more, the dictionaries the government cites to define abet—including Webster’s Third, cited above—support Appellees’ position that encourage encompasses speech. See, e.g., Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language 843 (2d ed. 1950) (encourage means “1. [t]o give courage to; to inspire with courage, spirit, or hope; to raise the confidence of; to animate; hearten,” and “2. [t]o embolden, incite, or induce as by inspiration, recommendation, etc.; hence, to advise”). The same is true of the government’s sole nonlegal definition of induce. See Webster’s New World College Dictionary 742 (5th ed. 2014) (defining induce to mean “to lead on to some action” or “to bring on; bring about”). 11 Appellate Case: 19-3210 Document: 010110710106 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 Page: 12 Loc. 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 701–02 (1951) (“The words ‘induce or encourage’ are broad enough to include in them every form of influence and persuasion.”). Other language in § 1324 confirms that Congress used encourage and induce in their ordinary sense, not in their more limited and specialized criminal-law sense. For one thing, if Congress intended this specialized meaning, there would be a potential overlap between subsections (A)(iii) (“conceals, harbors, or shields from detection” a noncitizen) and (A)(iv) (“encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States”). See United States v. Smith, 756 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting “our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause . . . of a statute” and “reluctan[ce] to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 167 (2001))). And crucially, the very next subsection makes it a crime to “aid[] or abet[]” any of the offenses proscribed in the preceding subsections, including subsection (A)(iv). § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II). This explicit reference to aiding and abetting shows that Congress knows how to draft a facilitation provision. Yet it used entirely different language in subsection (A)(iv), and we generally presume that “different meanings [are] intended” when Congress uses “certain language in one part of [a] statute and different language in another.”12 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 12 This presumption is especially strong here given the historical progression of the two provisions. Congress added the aiding-and-abetting provision decades after adding the encourage-or-induce language in subsection (A)(iv). Compare Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 274(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 228–229, with Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C., Tit. II, Subtit. A., § 203(b)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–565. The government’s interpretation would require us to accept that Congress inexplicably used two different phrases in two neighboring subsections to refer to the same 12 Appellate Case: 19-3210 Document: 010110710106 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 Page: 13 (2004) (quoting 21 Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06 (6th rev. ed. 2000)). Disregarding this presumption would render the aiding-and-abetting provision redundant in subsection (A)(iv) cases because that provision (according to the government) already covers aiding and abetting. See Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1108–09 (noting that “§ 1324(a)(1)(A) already includes an aiding[-]and[-]abetting provision,” which “strongly suggests that subsection [A](iv) should not also be read as an aiding[- and[- abetting provision”). Though not dispositive, this redundancy provides yet another “clue as to the better interpretation of [the] statute.” Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873, 881 (2019). Further, subsection (A)(iv) bears no resemblance to other facilitation-orsolicitation statutes. In each of the government’s examples of such statutes, the drafters included the terms encourage or induce among various other verbs that convey facilitation or solicitation. Consider the federal accomplice-liability statute cited by the government: It applies to anyone who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces[,] or procures” the commission of a federal crime. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (emphasis added). Likewise, the dozens of state statutes the government cites similarly include encourage or induce among a string of other facilitation-or- concept and added the second even though the first already did all or much of the work of the second. Or, as Appellees put it, this interpretation would require us to accept that “Congress intended to criminalize aiding and abetting aiding and abetting.” Aplee. Br. 22. This absurd result further undermines the government’s interpretation. Cf. Sunshine Haven Nursing Operations, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 742 F.3d 1239, 1250 (10th Cir. 2014) (discussing preference for avoiding interpretations that produce absurd results). 13 Appellate Case: 19-3210 Document: 010110710106 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 Page: 14 solicitation verbs. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-1-603 (treating anyone who “aids, abets, advises, or encourages” another person to commit offense as principal (emphasis added)), 18-2-301(1) (providing that solicitation occurs when someone “commands, induces, entreats, or otherwise attempts to persuade another person . . . to commit a felony” (emphasis added)). In each sample statute, the verbs accompanying encourage or induce narrow their “multiple and wide-ranging meanings” under the noscitur a sociis canon, “which counsels that a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 294; see also id. at 294–95 (construing verb string “advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits” as “hav[ing] a transactional connotation,” even though promotes and presents are susceptible to broader definitions “[w]hen taken in isolation,” because accompanying verbs ruled out those broader, nontransactional definitions). But that canon doesn’t apply here because there are no neighboring verbs in subsection (A)(iv) that narrow the meaning of encourage and induce. See Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1108 (concluding that “noscitur a sociis does not apply” to subsection (A)(iv) because “[e]ncourage and induce are not part of a series of words that shed additional light on their meaning”); United States v. Franklin, 785 F.3d 1365, 1369 (10th Cir. 2015) (concluding that “a list of two words” is “too short for application of the canon of noscitur a sociis”). The government cites no statute— and our own research reveals none—in which the words encourage or induce appear 14 Appellate Case: 19-3210 Document: 010110710106 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 Page: 15 by themselves (or together) as substitutes for facilitation or solicitation, casting further doubt on the government’s interpretation.13 Moreover, subsection (A)(iv)’s substantive coverage exceeds what one would expect to find in a statute proscribing facilitation or solicitation. Both facilitation and solicitation generally require some underlying criminal conduct; facilitating or soliciting civilly unlawful activity is not enough. See 2 LaFave, Subst. Crim. L. § 11.1 (3d ed.) (stating that offender must solicit another person “to commit a crime”); id. § 13.3(c) (explaining that accomplice liability does not attach “[i]f the acts of the principal . . . are found not to be criminal”). Yet some of the activity that subsection (A)(iv) prohibits a person from encouraging or inducing—namely, “resid[ing] in the United States,” § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)—is not a crime. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012) (“As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable [noncitizen] to remain present in the United States.”). Facilitation and solicitation also typically require a specific intent that the other party commit the underlying offense. See 2 LaFave, Subst. Crim. L. § 11.1 (noting requirement that 13 On the other hand, as Appellees point out, a different immigration statute expressly conveys facilitation or solicitation by including encourage and induce among a string of other verbs that includes aid and abet. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) (“Any alien who at any time knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law is inadmissible.”); Marquez-Reyes v. Garland, No. 17-71367, 2022 WL 2127237, at  (9th Cir. June 14, 2022) (construing encourage in § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) to cover solicitation and facilitation in part because, unlike in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), term appears among verb string that triggers noscitur a sociis canon). This strengthens our conclusion that Congress knows how to draft a facilitation-or-solicitation statute and did not do so in subsection (A)(iv). 15 Appellate Case: 19-3210 Document: 010110710106 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 Page: 16 solicitor “inten[d] that another person commit [the] crime”); id. § 13.2 (explaining that accomplice must not only assist principal but must do so “with the intent thereby to promote or facilitate commission of the crime”). Not so with subsection (A)(iv): Its sole state-of-mind element relates to the defendant’s knowledge that a noncitizen’s “coming to, entry, or residence” violates the law.14 § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). That Congress omitted these hallmarks of facilitation and solicitation—specific intent and resulting criminal conduct—bolsters our conclusion that subsection (A)(iv) uses encourage and induce in their ordinary, speech-encompassing sense. See Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1109 (rejecting government’s interpretation of subsection (A)(iv) as aiding-and-abetting statute in part because “the elements necessary for an aiding[-]and[-]abetting conviction . . . require that the government prove elements not contained in subsection[A](iv)”). Ultimately, subsection (A)(iv) cannot bear the government’s limiting construction.15 The ordinary meanings of encourage and induce encompass both 14 In fact, a 1986 amendment to subsection (A)(iv) eliminated a requirement that the offender “willfully and knowingly” encourage or induce the unlawful conduct. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 112(a), 100 Stat. 3359, 3381–82. 15 We decline to address the government’s alternative limiting construction, borrowed from DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties Inc., 672 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2012), that the defendant’s encouragement or inducement must be “substantial.” Rep. Br. 13. The government waived this limiting construction by raising it for the first time in its reply brief. See United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2019). And even if we exercised our discretion to consider the government’s waived argument, we would reject it because the Third Circuit’s approach adds a “substantiality” requirement found nowhere in the statutory text. See Exby-Stolley v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 979 F.3d 784, 971, 810 (10th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (rejecting interpretation that “added language to the [statute’s] plain text” because 16 Appellate Case: 19-3210 Document: 010110710106 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 Page: 17 conduct and speech, and nothing in the statutory language or surrounding context suggests that Congress gave those terms a narrower meaning akin to the criminal-law concepts of facilitation and solicitation. The novel limiting construction devised by the dissent fares no better. Unlike the government, the dissent reads subsection (A)(iv) as targeting only the solicitation, but not the facilitation, of criminal violations of immigration law.16 To arrive at this interpretation, the dissent essentially concludes that Congress must have used encourage and induce to convey the criminal-law concept of solicitation (and all its associated requirements) because subsection (A)(iv) is a criminal statute. But all the textual clues discussed above—especially the absence of any accompanying verbs suggesting a narrower meaning of encourage and induce—make clear that Congress used the broader, ordinary meaning of those terms. Accepting the dissent’s reading, such interpretations are “generally impermissible”), cert. denied 141 S. Ct. 2858 (2021). 16 The dissent’s attempt to distance itself from the government’s view—that subsection (A)(iv) also reaches facilitation—is understandable, albeit unsuccessful. If the words “encourages or induces” cover facilitation, then the dissent’s argument (like the government’s) runs into the roadblock created by Congress’s prohibition of facilitation (aiding and abetting) in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II). See discussion supra pp. 12–13. The dissent tries to avoid this tension by broadly declaring the facilitation component of the government’s interpretation “unpersuasive given the language’s clear support for solicitation.” Dissent 10. But the natural extension of the dissent’s suggestion that Congress used encourage and induce only in their criminal-law sense would require that subsection (A)(iv) also cover facilitation. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining encourage as synonymous with aid and abet, and aid and abet as synonymous with criminal facilitation). The dissent cannot have it both ways: Either the verbs in subsection (A)(iv) are limited to their criminal-law definitions and thus encompass both solicitation and facilitation, or they are not so limited and thus encompass far more conduct than solicitation and facilitation. 17 Appellate Case: 19-3210 Document: 010110710106 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 Page: 18 then, would require replacing the phrase “encourages or induces” with the term “solicits.” Because both the dissent and the government “rewrite” the statute’s plain language, we reject those approaches and conclude that subsection (A)(iv) is not “readily susceptible” to a limiting construction. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 481 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 884).