Opinion ID: 69183
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Void Judgment

Text: Rule 60 allows a district court to provide relief from a judgment if “the judgment is void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). A judgment may be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) if the district court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or if it acted inconsistent with due process. Callon Petroleum Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see 11 C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT ET AL., F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 2862 (2d ed. 1995). “[B]ecause federal courts regulate the scope of their own jurisdiction, a Rule 60(b)(4) challenge to jurisdiction should be sustained only where there is a clear usurpation of power or total want of jurisdiction.” Callon Petroleum Co., 5 No. 09-70016 351 F.3d at 208 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Herbert, 341 F.3d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring “exceptional circumstances” to invoke Rule 60(b)). There is no question that Jackson’s habeas petition was filed in a district court authorized by statute to consider it. Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or more Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court for the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each of such district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). Jackson was convicted of capital murder and sentenced in Harris County, Texas. Harris County is within the Southern District of Texas, the same district in which his habeas petition was filed. Jackson argues, however, that he did not file, and did not approve the filing of, his habeas petition. He asserts that his complaints about his counsel should have prompted the judge to replace his counsel and should have indicated that his appointed counsel were not representing him when they filed the habeas petition. Jackson waited until this court affirmed the district court’s ruling and the Supreme Court denied his application for a writ of certiorari before filing his Rule 60 motion and directly informing the district court about his alleged problems with counsel. He did not tell the court that his lawyers had filed the petition without his consent while it was pending, and the record reveals no objections to his representation during the same period. Except for a letter produced nearly three years after the filing of his habeas petition indirectly indicating that Jackson thought he was being “railroaded,” Jackson has not come 6 No. 09-70016 forward with anything but his own unsworn allegations about his communications with counsel. Jackson’s failure to contest the district court’s jurisdiction over his habeas petition when he had the opportunity to do so bars him from collaterally attacking that jurisdiction after the fact. “Even if a court does not expressly rule on matters relating to its exercise of jurisdiction, if the parties could have challenged the court’s power to hear a case, then res judicata principles serve to bar them from later challenging it collaterally.” Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Chicot County Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 378 (1940)) (emphasis in original). The rule makes sense in this context. Habeas petitioners cannot employ a wait-and-see strategy by attacking jurisdiction only after losing on the merits and through the appeals process when they know about the putative jurisdictional defect from the start. Even assuming that Jackson had a valid jurisdictional objection, he could have raised it while his habeas petition was pending. He failed to do so. Moreover, Jackson’s unsworn, after-the-fact allegations are wholly insufficient to show the district court’s “clear usurpation of power or total want of jurisdiction.” Callon Petroleum Co., 351 F.3d at 208. Jackson can point to nothing in the record that shows he asked for different counsel, told the district court that he refused to be represented by Rosen and Crowley, or asked to represent himself. Indeed, Jackson acknowledges that he met with Crowley to discuss his case after his exchange of letters with Rosen. Jackson’s complaints about his lawyers’ filing of the petition and their failure to include certain arguments in it are complaints about their performance as his counsel; they do not undermine the court’s jurisdiction to consider the petition. The court’s alleged receipt, months prior, of a letter intimating that Jackson was dissatisfied with one of his two appointed counsel did not strip the district court of 7 No. 09-70016 jurisdiction over the petition.4 Even assuming that the judge did encounter a letter expressing Jackson’s belief that he was being “railroaded,” a decision to allow Rosen and Crowley to continue their representation would not have had jurisdictional consequences.5 Reasonable jurists could not disagree with the district court’s finding that it had jurisdiction over Jackson’s habeas petition. His application for a COA on the Rule 60(b)(4) motion is denied.