Opinion ID: 1886051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: temporary total benefits

Text: Regarding Davis' temporary total benefits, however, we hold that the Administrative Judge was in error in ending Davis' temporary total benefits on January 7, 1983. When analyzing medical proof, Dunn tells us that the ultimate issue to be determined should be kept in mind when evaluating the medical evidence. The cases fall into three categories, involving issues of: 1. causal connection of a death or conceded disability; 2. the continuance of a disability found to be compensable in its inception; and 3. the degree of wage capacity lost from a disability found to be present and permanent. Dunn, § 282 at p. 358. Accordingly, we focus on the second category. When the issue is continuance of a disability, conflicting medical testimony may be reconciled by relating the testimony to the time of medical examination: ... In such cases, lay testimony is usually emphasized, and the testimony is to the effect that the claimant is unable to perform his usual work and suffers disabling pain. Id. Dunn explains further: Thus, if a claimant sustains a compensable injury and receives medical treatment until discharged as cured, the testimony of the doctor who discharged the claimant may not be sufficient to furnish an effective conflict with that of another doctor who examined the claimant at a later date and who gives it as his opinion that the patient remains in a disability status, especially if the claimant so testifies that he continues to be disabled from the injury. The basic reasoning is that the last examination and treatment begins where the former ends and a mere prognosis by the first doctor that claimant will have no future trouble does not conflict with credible evidence of actual subsequent developments. The witnesses simply speak as of different periods of time. [Emphasis added] Id., § 279, at p. 350-351; see Masonite Corp. v. Fields, 229 Miss. 524, 91 So.2d 282 (1956). The principle above has been established in the following cases where conflicting medical testimony was reconciled so as to find no conflict because the examinations were done at different times: Reyer v. Pearl River Tung Co., 219 Miss. 211, 68 So.2d 442 (1953); Int'l Paper Co. v. Handford, 223 Miss. 747, 78 So.2d 895 (1955); O'Neal v. Multi-Purpose Mfg. Co., 243 Miss. 775, 140 So.2d 860 (1962). We find that Masonite Corp. v. Fields, supra , is dispositive of the issue before us. In Masonite, the attorney referee disallowed temporary total disability benefits after June 5, the date of estimated maximum medical recovery according to the employer's doctor. On June 14, the claimant still complained of pain and was examined by a Dr. Granberry. After twelve visits to Dr. Granberry from June 14 to October 6, Dr. Granberry testified the claimant was suffering from severe lumbosacral strain and maximum medical recovery had not been reached. Regarding the continuance of temporary total benefits, we held: Hence [Dr. Granberry's] testimony, and that of [claimant] stand uncontradicted to the effect that through October 6, 1955, Fields was suffering a temporary total disability resulting from the injury received in his employment. This testimony was not in conflict with the other medical testimony, and was not inherently improbable, incredible, or unreasonable, nor was it discredited. Under these circumstances it should be taken as binding upon the trier of facts. It should not be arbitrarily and capriciously rejected. 229 Miss. at 529, 91 So.2d at 283-84. Applying the same analysis to the case before this Court, from January 18, 1983, until September 1, 1983, (date of Dr. Cook's deposition), the testimony of Davis and Dr. Cook is uncontradicted to the effect that Davis was suffering from a temporary total disability. [1] The facts of the case at bar make a stronger argument for such a finding, since Dr. Cook's medical findings showed an annulus bulge on the CT scan that had not been there before. The employer should have thereafter re-examined Davis to refute Dr. Cook's opinion. See A. DeWeese Lumber Co. v. Poole, 231 Miss. 83, 94 So.2d 791 (1957). Since the testimony of Davis and Dr. Cook is not in conflict with the other medical testimony, nor was it discredited, it should not have been rejected by the Administrative Judge when he cut off temporary total disability payments as of January 7, 1983. We hold that since the evidence was supported by the January 23, 1983, findings of Dr. Cook that Davis did not reach maximum medical recovery; therefore, he was entitled to compensation for each week after January 7, 1983, to the date of the hearing and each week thereafter during the continuance of his disability as provided by law. See Reyer v. Pearl River Tung Co., supra, 219 Miss. at 218, 68 So.2d 442, for authority supporting this remedy.