Opinion ID: 2339708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The English Common Law and the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance

Text: Under settled American judicial construction the following conception of the English common law pertaining to the intertidal zone has prevailed in the United States: By the common law of England that was brought to this country by the earliest settlers, unless title to the intertidal zone was held by private landowners pursuant to grant or prescription or by the crown in its private capacity, the title was vested in the crown which held it in trust for the use of the public. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-13, 14 S.Ct. 548, 551-52, 38 L.Ed. 331 (1894); Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 20 (N.Y.1829); Pike v. Munroe, 36 Me. 309, 313 (1853). The crown could convey the title to the intertidal zone to private subjects, but the title so conveyed was held subject to the public rights of navigation and fishing. Shively, 152 U.S. at 13, 14 S.Ct. at 552; Lansing, 4 Wend. at 20-21; Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 472, 485-88 (1854). See also Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 605 (Me.1981). We note that this American judicial conception represents a reconstruction by nineteenth-century American judges of the English common law of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Legal scholarship has sharply challenged the accuracy of this judicial reconstruction of the English common law. [5] We need not resolve this controversy because the Maine common law of the intertidal zone has not developed directly from English common law, but from the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47. We turn then to the enactment and subsequent history of the Colonial Ordinance. In 1629 Charles I granted lawmaking power to the Governor and the Company of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The Charter of Massachusetts Bay (March 4, 1629), reprinted in R. Perry, Sources of our Liberties 82, 89 (1960). In 1641 the General Court of the Massachusetts colony enacted the Body of Liberties. Section 16 of this enactment provided for public fishing and fowling rights in the intertidal zone while leaving open the question of title: Every Inhabitant that is an howse holder shall have free fishing and fowling in any great ponds and Bayes, Coves and Rivers, so farre as the sea ebbes and flowes within the presincts of the towne where they dwell, unlesse the free men of the same Towne or the Generall Court have otherwise appropriated them, provided that this shall not be extended to give leave to any man to come upon others proprietie without there leave. Massachusetts Body of Liberties § 16 (December 10, 1641), reprinted in R. Perry, supra, at 148, 150. In response to a public demand for a more comprehensive codification, the General Court labored over a period of three years from 1645 to 1648 to compile, revise and supplement its statutes. In October 1648 the General Court concluded its work and ordered the codification to be printed. [6] Under the heading Liberties Common, the codification provides in pertinent part: Everie Inhabitant who is an hous-holder shall have free fishing and fowling, in any great Ponds, Bayes, Coves and Rivers so far as the Sea ebs and flows, within the precincts of the town where they dwell, unles the Free-men of the same town, or the General Court have otherwise appropriated them. Provided that no town shall appropriate to any particular person or persons, any great Pond conteining more then ten acres of land: and that no man shall come upon anothers proprietie without their leave otherwise then as heerafter expressed; the which clearly to determin, it is declared that in all creeks, coves and other places, about and upon salt water where the Sea ebs and flows, the Proprietor of the land adjoyning shall have proprietie to the low water mark where the Sea doth not ebb above a hundred rods, and not more wheresoever it ebs farther. Provided that such Proprietor shall not by this libertie have power to stop or hinder the passage of boats or other vessels in, or through any sea creeks, or coves to other mens houses or lands. And for great Ponds lying in common though within the bounds of some town, it shall be free for any man to fish and fowl there, and may passe and repasse on foot through any mans proprietie for that end, so they trespasse not upon any mans corn or meadow. [1641 1647] Liberties Common § 2, The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes Concerning the Inhabitants of Massachusetts 35 (Cambridge, Mass., 1648; facsimile reprint, T. Barnes ed. 1975) (years in brackets in the original). [7] Section 16 of the 1641 Body of Liberties as amended by the 1648 Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes came to be called the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47. See J. Whittlesey, Law of the Seashore, Tidewaters and Great Ponds in Massachusetts and Maine xxxv-xi (1932). The colonial Ordinance in its 1648 form was republished in the 1660 and the 1672 revisions of the Massachusetts Bay Colony Laws. Id. at xxxvii-xxxix. Although the ordinance as positive statutory law may have been annulled by the abrogation of the Colonial Charter, nevertheless, it continued as part of the common law of Massachusetts. Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 (1810). [8] Storer involved a claim of trespass on intertidal lands located in Cape Elizabeth in the then District of Maine. Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Parsons noted that under the Colonial Ordinance the proprietor of the upland holds title to the low water mark or to 100 rods seaward of the high water mark, whichever is less. The ordinance continues as a usage that now has force as our common law. Id. at 438. In Barker v. Bates, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 255 (1832) (Shaw, C.J.), the defendant in a trespass action raised the question whether the Colonial Ordinance applied to that part of the Commonwealth that had formerly been a part of the Plymouth Colony. The court agreed that the Colonial Ordinance did not extend to the Colony of Plymouth as a rule of positive law, but held that it applied to the entire Commonwealth as a rule of common law: [T]hough the rule in question cannot be traced to this source [i.e., the Ordinance], as a rule of positive law, we are of the opinion that it is still a settled rule of property in every part of the State and founded upon a basis quite as firm and immovable; that being a settled rule of property, it would be extremely injurious to the stability of titles, and to the peace and interests of the community, to have it seriously drawn in question. It is founded upon a usage and practice so ancient, immemorial and unvarying, that without tracing its precise origin, it must now be deemed a rule of common law proved by such usage. Id. at 258. Thus, the Colonial Ordinance was a rule of Massachusetts common law at the time of the separation of Maine from Massachusetts. By force of article X, § 3 of the Maine Constitution [9] and of section 6 of the Act of Separation between Maine and Massachusetts, [10] it must be regarded as incorporated into the common law of Maine. See Davis v. Scavone, 149 Me. 189, 192-95, 100 A.2d 425, 427-28 (1953) (English statute pertaining to the sale of estate property by executors, 21 Henry VIII, ch. 4, is part of the Maine common law by force of article X, § 3 and the Act of Separation). In Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85 (1831), the defendant in an action for a writ of entry contended that the Colonial Ordinance had never been in force in Maine. Id. at 91, 93. Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Mellen rejected this contention: Ever since [the decision in Storer v. Freeman ], as well as long before, the law on this point has been considered as perfectly at rest; and we do not feel ourselves at liberty to discuss it as an open question. Id. at 93. Similarly, in Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441 (1882), a landowner seeking to prevent access to a great pond contended that the Colonial Ordinance did not apply to that part of the State that falls within the limits of the former Acadia Colony. Id. at 447. Rejecting this contention, the court declared that public and judicial acceptance and recognition of long standing had given the Ordinance full power throughout the State: But [the Colonial Ordinance] has been so often and so fully recognized by the courts both in this State and in Massachusetts as a familiar part of the common law of both, throughout their entire extent, without regard to its source or its limited original force as a piece of legislation for the colony of Massachusetts Bay, that we could not but regard it as a piece of judicial legislation to do away with any part of it or to fail to give it its due force throughout the State until it shall have been changed by the proper law making power. When a statute or ordinance has thus become part of the common law of a State it must be regarded as adopted in its entirety and throughout the entire jurisdiction of the court declaring its adoption. It is not adopted solely at the discretion of the court declaring its adoption, but because the court find that it has been so largely accepted and acted on by the community as law that it would be fraught with mischief to set it aside. It is not here and now a question whether this ordinance shall be adopted with such modifications as might be deemed proper under the circumstances of the country. It has been long since adopted in all its parts, acted upon by the whole community and its adoption declared by the courts; and now the argument of the plaintiff's counsel aims to have us declare either that it has not the force of law in certain parts of the State, or that the court may change it if satisfied that it does not operate beneficially under present circumstances. We cannot so view it. That which has the force of common law in one county in this State has the same force in all. Id. at 448-49 (citations omitted). Accord Conant v. Jordan, 107 Me. 227, 230, 77 A. 938, 939 (1910). We turn then to an analysis of the text of the Colonial Ordinance as a vital part of our common law. The Ordinance initially provides that every inhabitant has a right of fishing and fowling in the intertidal zone. Liberties Common § 2, Book of the General Laws and Liberties at 35 (spelling and capitalization modernized). This right is qualified by a clause prohibiting trespass: [p]rovided ... that no man shall come upon another's propriety without their leave otherwise then as hereafter expressed. Id. The Ordinance then declares the title ownership of the intertidal zone to be in the proprietor of the adjoining upland. The title ownership extends to the low water mark where the sea does not ebb above a hundred rods, and not more wheresoever it ebbs farther, and is further qualified by the Ordinance's declaration of a public right of navigation. Id. Thus, under the Colonial Ordinance the owner of the upland holds title in fee simple to the adjoining intertidal zone [11] subject to the public rights expressed in the Ordinance. Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 536, 45 A. 497, 498 (1900); Snow v. Mt. Desert Island Real Estate Co., 84 Me. 16-17, 24 A. 429, 429-30 (1891); Pike, 36 Me. at 313. [12] Because the Colonial Ordinance is an integral part of the common law of Maine and Massachusetts, these two states do not recognize the general American rule that a coastal state presumptively holds title to the intertidal zone. [13] See Shively, 152 U.S. at 14-26, 52-58, 14 S.Ct. at 553-57, 567-69; 1 Waters and Water Rights §§ 36.3(B)-(C), 42.1 (R.Clark ed. 1967). We turn then to examine the effect of the Colonial Ordinance and our cases construing it on the instant quiet title actions.