Opinion ID: 2164776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: and II. The court's continuing duty to furnish support.

Text: The first two issues, both concerning the court's continuing duty to assure adequate support for the McNamara children under the dissolution decree are very similar. The first raises appellant's claim that the court failed to perform its duties under § 598.21 and the second raises his claim that it erred in failing to apply proper criteria in determining support under chapter 675 (paternity). For purposes of expediency they will be treated together. Appellant's factual basis for these contentions is not clear. He contends that the trial court concluded that a portion of the McNamara children's support be taken away from them for the benefit of . . Jason. He further contends that no where in the judgment entry opinion does the district court even recognize the interests of the McNamara children. In this respect, it is true that the court order entitled Judgment Entry filed on December 22, 1977 did not mention the McNamara children nor the father's duty to support them. In the Supplemental Findings and Conclusions, however, dated October 28, 1977, the court did recognize these obligations. The findings include these: (c) Defendant, age 38, is single, having been married previously, and has custody of and supports four children ranging in age from 12 years to 15 years. . . . Defendant of course has substantial living expenses in maintaining a household and supporting four children, including high school tuition for three of the children. It apparently is defendant's position that all his income is used to support himself and his four children by his first marriage and that he has no means with which to contribute to the support of Jason. . . . It is the court's understanding that in a situation such as here existing, the law contemplates that defendant shall make such adjustments as are necessary to enable him to contribute reasonably to the support of Jason. If appellant's arguments under Divisions I and II of his brief are premised on the trial court's failure to consider his commitments to support his four legitimate children, they are clearly not borne out by the record. The above language shows the trial court was aware of these circumstances and made the award with full knowledge of them. As to his legal basis for objection to the allowance, the specific reasoning is unclear. The continuing duty of the court to assure adequate support for the McNamara children relied upon by him is a nebulous generalization of rights and responsibilities regarding children. If it refers to the authority of the court to modify a decree under § 598.21, The Code, cited by him, some observations should be made. That section provides: When a dissolution of marriage is decreed, the court may make such order in relation to the children, property, parties and the maintenance of the parties as shall be justified. . . . Subsequent changes may be made by the court in these respects when circumstances render them expedient. (Emphasis added.) Jason was not born as of the date of the dissolution decree here, and therefore the first sentence of that statute is inapplicable to him. Apparently the father's reliance upon § 598.21 is under the second sentence regarding the court's authority to modify it. It shall be noted that this is a paternity action under chapter 675, The Code. The prior action was for dissolution under chapter 598, The Code. The two cases are in no manner related unless, as appellant contends, § 598.21 imposes a continuing duty on the part of the court to monitor the needs of the children. The statute relied upon, § 598.21, mentions no ongoing duty and the only arguable basis for saying such duty is imposed by that section is that it provides that the court may enter future orders of modification. This section by its plain wording applies only as to the original dissolution proceeding, not a subsequent case involving different parties and different subject matter. The involvement of the trial court in proceedings subsequent to the decree turns on an application, notice and hearing. Appellant here apparently contends the trial court should sua sponte assert future jurisdiction even when, as here, no attempt is made to implement the court's authority to modify under § 598.21. Does appellant mean this section merely demonstrates a legal principle, and is not cited for the actual mechanics it provides for asserting modification jurisdiction? If this is so, and it merely announces a legal principle, i. e., state concern for continual well-being of children in dissolution cases, what happens if the original decree was from outside Iowa, but the children are now living here? What about other children of a paternity defendant who were not included in a prior dissolution decree? Certainly the courts have an interest in the well-being of all children under the doctrine of parens patriae. Section 598.21 does not alter or expand that principle in the manner now urged by the appellant; it gives the court the authority, but not the unrequested duty to correct a decree to reflect substantial change in circumstances. We reject appellant's contention that a trial court, in an entirely separate action involving different parties, often in a different district court, without notice to the non-custodial parent and involving entirely different children, should or even could, make any orders to implement or effectuate its duty under § 598.21 in a proceeding under chapter 675, The Code. It is, of course, the duty of the court to consider other child-related obligations, including the cost of raising other children in the custody of the party when setting amounts of child support. The general rule is stated as follows in the similar area of dissolutions: [I]n determining the ability of the father to pay child support the court should take into consideration his obligations with respect to alimony and child support payments under an existing decree, and his expenses in supporting children who remain in his custody or in supporting a child in a divided custody case. 24 Am. Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 840, p. 953. 10 Am.Jur.2d Bastards § 122, p. 931 states: [S]ome courts hold that the only pertinent fact [in setting paternity support] is the defendant's ability to earn, coupled with his property, and that it is error to admit evidence of his debts, while others permit the defendant to show his other financial burdens such as his dependents. . . . (Emphasis added.) See also, Annotation Child Support Award Adequacy, 1 A.L.R.3d § 10(e) p. 343. The trial court here considered the father's responsibilities toward the McNamara children. Its findings, as we have stated, have substantial evidence to support them. The court did not err in refusing to apply the concept of its continuing duty urged by appellant. A similar issue was raised in the case of In Matter of Sarah S. v. John K., 70 Misc.2d 803, 335 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Fam.Ct.1972). The mother there sued for support in a paternity action. The father had a wife and three children. In denying his claim that his primary responsibility was to his wife and legitimate children, the court said nor may the respondent shrug off the responsibility of this [illegitimate] child by urging his liabilities to his other children and wife. 335 N.Y.S.2d at 126. Defendant contends he cannot pay support as ordered and also pay his other living expenses. In his reply brief, he states if the district court judgment is upheld, the McNamara children will be forced to lower their standard of living. (The effect on Jason's standard of living, in the event it is reduced, is not mentioned.) When there is not enough money to go around, support payments must have priority. As stated in Kelley v. Iowa Dept. Social Serv., 197 N.W.2d 192, 201 (Iowa 1972), the obligation of [parents] is not to support after payment of debts, but to support. At p. 202, we said, an indebted stepparent living with the family is required to support the family ahead of paying creditors, just as a natural parent is required to do.