Opinion ID: 2746007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mitigating-Role Adjustment

Text: Section 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides: Based on the defendant’s role in the offense, decrease the offense level as follows: (a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels. (b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 3B1.2 (2013). The comments accompanying this section state that a minimal participant “is intended to cover defendants who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group.” Id. at cmt. n.4. Minor participants are “less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.” Id. at cmt. n.5. “The determination whether to apply subsection (a) or 5 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. subsection (b) . . . is based on the totality of the circumstances,” making the district judge’s final conclusion heavily fact-dependent. Id. at cmt. n.3(c). The defendant “bears the burden of proving a mitigating role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Roberts, 223 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2000). We have traditionally reviewed a district court’s denial of a mitigating-role adjustment for clear error. Id. at 379–80. In United States v. Gort-DiDonato, 109 F.3d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 1997), however, we announced a two-part standard of review for examining aggravating-role adjustments. Under this standard, a district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id. Our decision in United States v. Owusu, 199 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2000), appeared to extend this two-part framework to cover mitigatingrole adjustments as well. Id. at 337 n.2. Yet we need not resolve this legal question today, as our result would be the same under either standard. Verburg argues “that he qualified for at least a minor role reduction, if not a minimal role reduction.” Appellant Br. at 23. Verburg’s request for a minimal-role adjustment fails on its face. As we explained in United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, “[u]nder the sentencing guidelines, a minimal participant is someone who played a single, limited role in the conspiracy.” 148 F.3d 577, 595 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Verburg’s involvement, from the beginning of the conspiracy (purchasing the Trinity Center property and building living quarters on it) to its end (collecting money and physically transporting funds to California), clearly falls outside the scope of this minimal-participant umbrella. 6 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. On his request for a minor-role adjustment, Verburg bases his claim on two different grounds. First, he notes that he was found accountable for 106.34 kilograms of marijuana for guideline computation purposes. Appellant’s Br. at 18. The only co-defendant held accountable for less was Catherine Weitz (accountable for 10.63 kilograms). Verburg PSR at ¶ 116. By contrast, several co-defendants were held accountable for nearly 900 kilograms of marijuana. See id. at ¶¶ 106–29. Second, he argues that he played a non-essential role in the conspiracy, “act[ing] as a courier essentially transporting money back to his kids.” R. 427 (Verburg Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 8) (Page ID #2129). Both of Verburg’s arguments are unavailing. With respect to Verburg’s first contention—the amount of marijuana—we have held previously that “[d]efendants may be minimal or minor participants in relation to the scope of the conspiracy as a whole, but they are not entitled to a mitigating role reduction if they are held accountable only for the quantities of drugs attributable to them.” United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1303 (6th Cir. 1990)). In Campbell, we went on to deny the defendant’s claim for a mitigating-role adjustment, noting that the defendant had been held “accountable for at least 100, but less than 200 grams of cocaine, which was the amount of drugs that [defendant] actually purchased and distributed or used.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “the district court held [defendant] accountable only for the quantity of drugs attributable to him,” rather than the full amount involved in the conspiracy. Id. Like the defendant in Campbell, Verburg was, for purposes of sentencing guideline computations, found accountable only for the quantity of drugs attributable to him: 106.34 7 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. kilograms of marijuana.1 Section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that drug offenses involving at least 100 but not more than 400 kilograms of marijuana have a base offense level of 26. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (2013). By comparison, the Guidelines provide a base offense level of 30 for members of the conspiracy found accountable for 700 to 1000 kilograms of marijuana. Id. In other words, by prescribing Verburg a lower base offense level, the Guidelines have already taken into account his reduced role within the conspiracy. See, e.g., Roberts, 223 F.3d at 380 (“The thrust of Roberts’s argument is that his minimal role in the overall conspiracy warrants a § 3B1.2 adjustment, even though the larger conspiracy was not taken into account in establishing Roberts’s base offense level. As we have in the past, we reject this argument.”). Our decision to reject Verburg’s argument is consistent with a majority of circuit courts that have considered the same issue. Id. (collecting cases). Verburg’s second argument—that he played a non-essential role in the conspiracy—is likewise unconvincing. To be clear, “[a] defendant does not qualify for a mitigating role reduction merely because someone else planned the scheme and made all the arrangements.” United States v. Sheafe, 69 F. App’x 268, 270 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Miller, 56 F.3d 719, 720 (6th Cir. 1995)). Rather, “[a] defendant who plays a lesser role in a criminal scheme may nonetheless fail to qualify as a minor participant if his role was indispensable or critical to the success of the scheme, or if his importance in the overall scheme was such as to 1 This number was obtained by dividing the total value of the marijuana sales attributable to Verburg ($750,000) by the cost per pound of marijuana ($3200), and then converting this number to kilograms for Guideline purposes. See Verburg PSR at ¶ 104. Verburg did not object to being held accountable for this amount. R. 427 (Verburg Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 10) (Page ID #2131). 8 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. justify his sentence.” United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 458 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); cf. United States v Samuels, 308 F.3d 662, 672 (6th Cir. 2002) (“As Samuels played a key role in brokering the drug transaction, he did not play a limited role in the conspiracy. Instead, he was indispensable to the completion of the operation.”) (emphasis added). Here, a number of facts illustrate the critical role Verburg played within this conspiracy. Purchasing the Trinity Center property, building structures on the property, and delivering collection proceeds from Michigan to California—each of these actions evidence the key part Verburg played in this conspiracy. While Verburg might not have planned or directed operations, he certainly “was a fully integrated member of a substantial drug conspiracy.” United States v. Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 924–25 (6th Cir. 2002) (upholding district judge’s denial of a minor- and minimal-role adjustment for member of conspiracy who offered his property “as a base of operations” and “personally received at least one large shipment of marijuana.”) The district court did not err in refusing to grant Verburg a minor-role reduction for his participation.