Opinion ID: 194593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Foreseeability of the Quantity

Text: The district court applies the law under the guidelines applicable on the date of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(4) (1985 & Supp. 1992); Isabel v. United States, 980 F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 1992). On December 28, 1989, the original sentencing date, U.S.S.G. 2D1.4(a), 1B1.3,3 (Nov 1, 1989) and their Application Notes4 directed the sentencing judge to consider conduct and quantities that were in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to defendants to determine the quantity of cocaine for the base offense level. United States v. Garc a, 954 F.2d 12, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. 3 Section 1B1.3 Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range) provides in relevant part: (a) (ii) cross references in Chapter Two, . . . shall be determined on the basis on the following: (1) all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense, or that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense . . . . U.S.S.G. 1B1.3 (Nov. 1, 1989). 4 The Application Note stated, [i]n the case of criminal activity undertaken in concert with other, whether or not charged as a conspiracy, the conduct for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable also includes conduct of others in furtherance of the execution of the jointly undertaken criminal activity that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. U.S.S.G. 1B1.3, comment. (n.1) (Nov. 1, 1989)(emphasis added). Section 1B1.3 has been amended and clarified with respect to its various provisions on several occasions, most significantly effective November 1, 1992. The appendix states that the 1992 amendments clarify and more fully illustrate the operation of this guideline and that material was moved from the commentary to the guideline and rephrased for greater clarity. U.S.S.G App. C 439 (1992). -14- Bianco, 922 F.2d 910, 913 (1st Cir. 1991).5 The government relies on United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1590 (1992), for the proposition that in cases in which defendants are charged with one isolated set of facts that comprise the entire conspiracy, the district court need not make individual findings with respect to each defendant. It argues that once an amount is determined for a temporally limited, small, and simple conspiracy, all defendants associated with the conspiracy should be held to foresee that amount. Edwards involved a complex and sophisticated heroin retailing business that had a chain of suppliers, mid-level managers, street vendors and wholesalers. The Seventh Circuit required specific findings as to each defendant since they had joined at different times and may have intended to enter a more limited agreement. Id. at 1397. The government contends that the foreseeability inquiry has always focused upon whether the disputed conduct fell outside the scope of the conspiracy in factually complicated cases. We do not read Edwards to limit the foreseeability inquiry to complex conspiracies. Nor do we find a principle that would sustain such 5 We garner further support from later clarification and expansion of the application notes to U.S.S.G. 1B1.3. Application Note 2 currently states that [w]ith respect to offenses involving contraband (including controlled substances), the defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook. U.S.S.G. 3B1.3, comment. (n.2). We may consider this clarifying language at the appeal stage. Isabel, 980 F.2d at 62. -15- a limitation. The criminal conspiracy net is often cast widely. Individuals may be involved who know that the agreement they have entered is illegal but have no way to foresee the magnitude or ambition of the enterprise, as in the case of an individual hired to remedy an unexpected complication in the main conspirators' plot. The Guidelines require that the government prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such individual could reasonably foresee the amount contemplated by the conspiracy. U.S.S.G. 2D1.4(a), 1B1.3. Appellants Carpio-V lez, Basti n-Cortijo, and LaboyDelgado contend that 18 U.S.C. 3553(c) (Supp. 1992)6 requires that the district court make a specific finding of foreseeability supported by reasoning and facts in the record. They argue that the district court's cursory rejection of their objection that the government failed to prove foreseeability runs afoul of this provision. The government contends that the district court made a specific finding on foreseeability, and that it was not required to provide specific, fact intensive reasons as the record amply showed that appellants knew that in excess of fifty 6 18 U.S.C. 3553(c) requires that [t]he court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence . . . . Appellants also argue that Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D) imposes that burden as well. We think that the appellants fare better under 3553(c) as Rule 32(c)(3)(D) only requires that the court make a finding. The commentary to the Rule notes that this does not impose an onerous burden. It does not even require the preparation of a transcript. Just a finding is required; thus, appellants' reliance on Rule 32 is misplaced. See United States v. Webster, 960 F.2d 1301, 1310 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 355 (1992); United States v. McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004, 1013 (1st Cir. 1990) (argument made academic by holding under 3553(c)). -16- (50) kilograms were involved.7 We have stated in related contexts that 3553(c) requires that when sentencing under the guidelines, a district court must make reasonably specific findings to allow for meaningful appellate review. United States v. Schultz, 970 F.2d 960, 963 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3479 (1993); United States v. McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004, 1012 (1st Cir. 1990). Other circuits similarly require the district court to supply sufficient reasoning for its sentencing determinations. See, e.g., United States v. Negr n, 967 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1992) (vacating and remanding for finding on foreseeable quantity when defendant contests); United States v. Puma, 937 F.2d 151, 160 (5th Cir. 1991)(The reasonable foreseeability required of 2D1.4 requires a finding separate from a finding that the defendant was a conspirator.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1165 (1992); United States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255, 1263 (7th Cir. 1991) (a district court should explicitly state and support, either at the sentencing hearing or (preferably) in a written statement of reasons, its findings that the unconvicted activities bore the necessary relation to the convicted offense), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 174 (1992); United States v. Guti rrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1492 (11th Cir.) (requiring specific findings), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 321 (1991); see also United States v. Turner, 898 F.2d 705, 709-710 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 7 The guidelines established a base offense level of 36 for in excess of 50 kilograms at the date of sentencing, U.S.S.G. 1D1.4, 1D1.1(a)(3) (Drug Quantity Table). -17- 495 U.S. 962 (1990).8