Opinion ID: 2994621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Transportation Statutes

Text: Plaintiffs contend that the City has violated two federal transportation statutes, 23 U.S.C. sec. 301 and 23 U.S.C. sec. 129(a)(3)/2 which when read together, regulate the entities operating tollways and receiving federal funds. Section 301 generally prohibits state and local entities from charging tolls on highways that receive federal funding. Section 129 creates an exception to that rule, allowing operation of tollroads only under certain conditions. Endsley and Graham argue that the City’s failure to meet the conditions required under sec. 129 gives rise to a private right of action. It is clear that the City has not violated sec. 301. However, plaintiffs insist that the City has violated sec. 129 and they try to liken the language of sec. 301, which at least one court has found does create a private right of action,/3 to that of sec. 129(a)(3), which on its face does not. The district court distinguished sec. 301 from sec. 129(a)(3) and rejected this approach. If the City has violated sec. 129, any violation may be properly redressed by the Secretary of Transportation. . . . There is no compelling reason why private persons such as plaintiffs . . . should have the right to seek federal court action to aid in enforcement of this portion of the statute. The district judge’s analysis is right on point. No express or implied private right of action was created by sec. 129. Neither a review of the language nor a consideration of the statute’s intended beneficiaries, its legislative history, or the purpose of the statutory scheme suggest that it was. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Nothing in the express language of the statute suggests that sec. 129(a)(3) creates a private right of action. Section 129 simply requires the Transportation Secretary and the tollway operating entity (here, the City) to enter into an agreement which sets forth a list of priorities for the spending of toll revenues by entities receiving federal funding under the statute. Under such an agreement, the City would be required to use toll revenues first for debt service, then for reasonable return on private investment in the project, then for any maintenance and operation costs. Therefore, the City’s use of funds for non-Tollway expenses before fulfilling these other obligations would violate the agreement between the City and the Secretary of Transportation, not sec. 129. Furthermore, a close review of the language, structure, and history of sec. 129 suggests that no implied private right of action exists either. As we acknowledged in Mallett v. Wisconsin Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, 130 F.3d 1245, 1248-49 (7th Cir. 1997), the Supreme Court has retreated from the four-part test established in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), to determine whether an implied cause of action exists under a statute./4 See also, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) ([W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted.). Instead of applying the four-part test, we now focus primarily on legislative intent. Our inquiry is whether Congress intended an implied right of action . . . in light of the statute’s language, structure, and legislative history. If such inferences of intent are not present, we must conclude that the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy does not exist. Mallett, 130 F.3d at 1249 (internal citations omitted). As we noted above, neither the language nor the structure of sec. 129 indicate that Congress intended to create a private right of action. A look at the legislative history suggests the same. Section 129 was created to authorize federal participation in, and funding for, the creation and maintenance of highways that facilitate travel among various states and cities./5 It is by and large an appropriations provision designed to strengthen the highway and transit components of a national intermodal transportation by contributing $153.5 billion in federal funds. See H.R. Rep. 102-171, at 10 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1526. It is important to note that in enacting sec. 129, one of Congress’ goals was to give state and local authorities more flexibility in spending federal highway funds. The Committee feels that one of the most important things this legislation can do is give state and local officials the flexibility to make the crucial decisions on how their funds should be used. [Under sec. 129,] [t]hey will have the ability to choose the best transportation solution without the artificial constraints of funding categories. Id. The provision upon which plaintiffs rely, sec. 129(a)(3), regulates the manner in which the entities operating federally funded tollways spend the revenues raised by the tolls charged. However, it does not operate to control state and local government use of tollway revenues completely. In fact, the legislative history indicates that Congress sought to encourage private investment in the nation’s highways and public investment in privately operated toll roads such as the Skyway and give state and local entities more freedom to raise and use revenues as they see fit--just within certain limits./6 Although willing to permit these innovative partnerships to form through the use of federal funds on privately-owned toll roads, Congress enacted sec. 129(a)(3) to strike a balance among the private and public interests involved in the operation of tollways like the Skyway. The provision simply sets forth limitations on the use of revenues for those highways that receive funding from the U.S. Department of Transportation under the statute. The existence of these limitations do not lead us to the conclusion, however, that Congress intended to open the door to private enforcement of them. As in other cases where the Supreme Court has found no implied right of private action, sec. 129 contains no judicial, or even administrative, remedy through which aggrieved persons can seek redress. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 348 (1997) (holding that a Social Security Act provision contained no private remedy, either judicial or administrative, through which aggrieved persons could seek redress). Like many statutes appropriating federal funds and regulating the use of those funds, the only way sec. 129 assures that the City will abide by the statute’s rules is through oversight by an executive agency official, here the Secretary of Transportation. Any violation of the provision’s mandates will be handled by the Secretary of Transportation, not private citizens. It is as Congress intended it to be. A strong presumption exists against the creation of an implied private right of action and where, as here, there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that such a right was intended, we will not imply a private right of action where none appears in the statute. See Statland v. American Airlines, Inc., 998 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting West Allis Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251, 254 (7th Cir. 1988)). Seeking to salvage their transportation statute claims, plaintiffs also challenge the district court’s denial of their motion for leave to amend the complaint. The district court correctly denied this motion. For even if plaintiffs were to bring the sec. 129 claims by way of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, they would still lose. Section 1983 is not available to enforce a violation of a federal statute where Congress has foreclosed enforcement in the enactment itself and ’where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of sec. 1983.’ Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1991), (citing Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)). As such, the district judge did not err in denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend.