Opinion ID: 2361099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Legal Discussion of the First Two Issues

Text: Price insists that the trial court excluded testimony regarding his state of mind, that this testimony was not hearsay and was relevant to his defense against the BRA charge because it was motive evidence which explained why he did not appear in court. Furthermore, he states that his testimony about Porky, if credited, could have vitiated the argument that [his] failure to come to court showed consciousness of guilt of distribution. The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant and should be admitted. United States v. Mosby, 495 A.2d 304, 305 (D.C.1985); United States v. Riley, 550 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir.1977) (citation omitted) (trial judge is traditionally accorded a wide range of discretion in the admission of evidence). However, such discretion does not extend to the exclusion of crucial relevant evidence establishing a valid defense. Riley, 550 F.2d at 236. In Martin v. United States, 606 A.2d 120 (D.C.1991), we said, [o]rdinarily, any evidence which is logically probative of some fact in issue is admissible, . . . unless it conflicts with some settled exclusionary rule. . . . `[I]f the evidence offered conduces in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in controversy, it should go to the jury.' Id. at 128 (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 438, 440, 20 L.Ed. 197 (1870)). Price was tried simultaneously on the BRA and the distribution charges. As a result of Price's failure to appear for the status hearing, reasonable jurors could have inferred that he was trying to flee because of his consciousness of guilt as to both charges. The government did not make the consciousness of guilt argument until closing and rebuttal, despite the fact that the trial court first recognized the potential connection between the failure to appear and possible guilt during its consideration of the second issue set forth above, that is, whether the prosecution should have been permitted to pose cross-examination questions to Price regarding his consideration of entering a guilty plea to the drug charge. After the government's hearsay and legal defense objections relative to the first issue (whether the trial court improperly precluded Price from explaining his failure to appear for the January 28, 1992, status hearing), the trial court ruled that Price could not explain his failure to appear by reference to Porky's alleged assault of him and his alleged fear of Porky. Defense counsel stressed that the questioned testimony was not hearsay because it was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Instead, it was designed to explain Price's state of mind as to why he failed to appear. He failed to appear, according to defense counsel, both because he was afraid of Porky and these other individuals involved in the drug sales on this particular block, the repeated continuances of his case, and because he had nothing to do with it . Nonetheless, the trial court struck Price's explanation on the ground that it was not a legal defense to the BRA. We agree that fear of coming to court is not a defense to the BRA violation. Patton v. United States, 326 A.2d 818, 820 (D.C. 1974). However, reasonable jurors could interpret Price's explanation more broadly to encompass fear in the context of both the BRA and the distribution charge. Price testified that Porky was the person who engaged in the drug transaction. Price's fear could be interpreted as a fear of the consequences of naming Porky as the perpetrator in the drug transaction. In that regard, his explanation constituted an exception to the hearsay rule because it showed his state of mind, and could be used to vitiate any notion of consciousness of guilt as to either the BRA or the distribution charge. With respect to the distribution charge, Price relied on a mistaken identification theory. He testified that while he was washing a friend's car, he saw Porky sell crack cocaine to Officer Marable. If jurors believed Price's testimony regarding Porky, reasonable doubt could be raised in their minds as to whether Officers Marable and Leach mistakenly identified Price as the perpetrator. Price's testimony clearly was probative regarding his defense, but not unfairly prejudicial to the government. To the extent that the trial judge intended to strike Price's objected to direct testimony as related both to the BRA and the distribution charge, she abused her discretion. [5] As we said in In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70 (D.C.1991), [j]udicial discretion must . . . be founded upon correct legal principles, . . . and a trial court abuses its discretion when it rests its conclusions on incorrect legal standards. Id. at 75 (citations omitted). Defense counsel posed no objection concerning the trial court's last instruction about Price's explanation of his fear of Porky due to Porky's alleged assault against him. For this reason, the government asserts that plain error is the proper standard of review. However, before determining our standard of review, we turn to a legal discussion of the second issue raised by Price. The trial court permitted the government, on cross-examination of Price, to pose questions regarding his plea bargain discussions. The trial court apparently justified this ruling on two grounds. First, Price opened the door by testifying on cross-examination that he had reasons to believe that [his case] would be dismissed. [6] Second, jurors could conclude that Price failed to appear at the January 28, 1992, status hearing because he contemplated flight due the possibility that he would enter a guilty plea to the distribution charge. Price's direct testimony made no reference to plea bargain discussions and his consideration of a guilty plea. All references to the consideration of a guilty plea came in response to questions posed by the prosecutor. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 11(e)(4) generally prohibits testimony against a defendant regarding his or her plea discussions with the government. [7] The pertinent part of the rule specifies that evidence of any statement made in the course of plea discussions with a prosecutor which do not result in a plea of guilty may not be admitted against the defendant who . . . was a participant in the plea discussions. With respect to Mr. Price's case, there is one relevant exception to the rule: such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it. . . . Here, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to pose extensive cross-examination questions to Mr. Price regarding his plea discussions. As the trial court put it, Price can be cross examined with respect to all the colloquy that goes on, all of which is on the record, about discussing possible plea options and what he could do. . . . When defense counsel objected, called the trial court's ruling highly prejudicial, and asked for a mistrial, the trial court remarked, Doesn't it go directly to his consciousness of guilt for fleeing? Despite defense counsel's emphatic [c]ertainly not, the trial court decided to allow [the prosecutor] limited room because it is very relevant to the issue of flight. . . . Thereafter, the prosecutor continued to pose questions to Price which clearly intimated that Price had considered entering a guilty plea to the distribution charge because he was guilty. Only one of the prosecutor's questions was struck after the trial judge inquired, after several more questions, isn't there a rule with respect to settlement discussions and plea negotiations not coming out? Clearly, the government sought to impeach Price with his plea bargain discussions. In Johnson v. United States, 420 A.2d 1214 (D.C.1980), we admonish[ed] the government to heed the provisions of Super. Ct. Cr. R. 11(e)(4) and avoid future transgressions of it. Id. at 1216. In addition, we rejected the government's argument that statements regarding a defendant's plea bargain discussions could be used for impeachment purposes. We recognized that [t]he legislative history of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6), the federal analogue to Super. Ct. Cr. R. 11(e)(4), precludes use of statements made in connection with withdrawn guilty pleas for impeachment purposes. Id. at 1216 n. 3 (citations omitted). Similarly, after its review of the legislative history of Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that Congress debated and rejected proposals that statements made in conjunction with an offer to plead guilty be available for impeachment purposes. United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir.1982). Further, said the Second Circuit, We regard this legislative history [relating to an identical rule, Fed.R.Evid. 410,] as demonstrating Congress' explicit intention to preclude use of statements made in plea negotiations for impeachment purposes. Id. at 693. The government seeks to sidestep the Rule 11(e)(4) and related impeachment issues by invoking the exception to the rule allowing use of plea bargain statements where another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it. . . . In the record before us, Price made no statement on direct examination regarding his plea bargain discussions. The government maintains, however, that because Price responded to a cross-examination question by saying, I had reasons to believe my case would be dismissed, the prosecutor could ask questions about Price's consideration of a guilty plea to the distribution charge. We know of no case, and the government cites none, which would allow the government to circumvent the prohibition on the use of plea bargain discussions against a defendant for impeachment purposes where the government itself elicits a plea bargain statement from the defendant on cross-examination. To allow such a tactic would defeat the purposes of Rule 11(e)(4). We see no merit to the government's curative admissibility argument. In Lampkins v. United States, 515 A.2d 428 (D.C. 1986), on which the government relies, we reiterated that the introduction of incompetent or irrelevant evidence by a party opens the door to admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence `only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence.' Id. at 430 (quoting Dyson v. United States, 450 A.2d 432, 442 (D.C.1982)). There, however, defense counsel's questions, not the prosecutor's, opened the door. Moreover, as we emphasized in Lampkins, curative admissibility is based upon, and is limited by, `the necessity of removing prejudice in the interest of fairness.' Id. (citations omitted). Even if Price's response, I had reasons to believe [my case] had been dismissed, constituted prejudice to the government, the government's extensive questioning regarding Price's plea bargain discussions was substantially more than that required to remove that prejudice in the interest of fairness. Price's statement made no reference to the plea bargain discussions. Indeed, he told the prosecutor, You don't want me to talk about it, so I cannot tell you. Undeterred, the prosecutor pressed on saying, You can tell me anything that responds to the question I just asked you. I want to know what the reasons are you thought this case was going to be dismissed.. . . By the time the prosecutor had completed his questioning of Price, the trial court thought it had struck all references to the plea bargain discussions after it recalled the existence of a rule concerning plea bargains. However, the record shows that critical and prejudicial questions in the form of prosecutorial declarative statements remained part of the record for the jury's consideration, including: Now isn't it true that the real reason you thought this case was going to be dismissed was because on December 10, 1991, you told the Court . . . that you were thinking about a disposition of the case, isn't that right? . . . You told [the court] that you were thinking about entering a plea before [the court] in the case? . . . The purpose of each of those status dates was for you to make a decision whether you were going to accept the plea offer that had been given you and enter a guilty plea, or were going to exercise your right to go to trial, isn't that right? These declarative questions clearly were prejudicial to Price. And, when they are considered in light of the trial court's striking of Price's testimony regarding Porky's alleged assault and Price's fear of Porky, as an explanation for his failure to appear for the January 28, 1992, status hearing, the prejudice to Price is compounded. Accordingly, although the testimony of Officers Marable and Leach was sufficient to permit reasonable jurors to find Price guilty of the distribution charge, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and erred with regard to the first and second issues, precluding Price from explaining his failure to appear in court to rebut consciousness of guilt and to show mistaken identity; and permitting the prosecutor to ask questions concerning his plea bargain discussions. Further, the cumulative impact of these errors, may have substantially influenced the jury's verdict, despite the testimony of Officers Marable and Leach. Warren, supra, 436 A.2d at 842-43. Consequently, we are constrained to agree with Price regarding the first and second issues. We address the third and fourth issues briefly, in the event that they may arise in a new trial.