Opinion ID: 1939904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brown's Decision to Waive His Presence at the Evidentiary Hearing

Text: Brown next challenges the adequacy of Brown's waiver of his right to appear during the evidentiary hearing. At the end of the evidentiary hearing's second day, the following discussion occurred: THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, may I just for a second, they're talking about another hearing. I would formally like to waive my presence at the next hearing. . . . I don't want to come back for the next hearing for medical reasons and stuff. So they can handle it. THE COURT: So you don't want to testify either? Is that what you're saying? THE DEFENDANT: Not if it's going to  no, no, I was going to do it today, but they decided to wait until the next hearing, and I don't want to come back for another hearing.... THE COURT: Wait. I have to get this straight now. That if you decline  first, you understand that you have the right to testify? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. THE COURT: And if you're declining to testify, that has to be your decision, not somebody else's. THE DEFENDANT: I understand that. THE COURT: Is it your decision? THE DEFENDANT: Well, let me  see . . . I don't want to come back for another hearing, and so I'm just going to decline to testify period, okay? So  Postconviction counsel then told the court that he wanted Brown to testify last and the court stated: THE COURT: But he doesn't want to be here. So you can't do that because he's not coming. MR. BRODY: Well, I don't  THE COURT: If he doesn't want to come, he doesn't have to. He has the right  MR. BRODY: I understand that . . . these decisions are made and unmade, and I think it would be better at that time to make that determination. . . . . . . . THE COURT: We'll let the record reflect that if that changes between now and then, then so be it, but I just want to make sure that for whatever reason, reasons of convenience or comfort or whatever, you're deciding not to testify, right? . . . . THE DEFENDANT: And so they tell me, well, you need to come down there and testify.... I extended myself trying to get along, trying to get this over with. Now I'm here and they said they want me to come back because these other witnesses can't show up, and it's always tomorrow, tomorrow with these people. So I'm not going to testify period. THE COURT: Okay. Let me tell you something. The reason you're here this time is because you have to be, okay? The law says you have to be, and if you're not here, it can only be if you make a waiver in front of a judge. . . . . . . . THE COURT: Now, you're here. Now you can talk to me. Now you can waive an appearance, okay, and that's fine, too, if you're telling me you don't want to be here at some subsequent hearing, we'll let that be on the record right now, and if you don't come at the next hearing, I and the Supreme Court will both understand why you didn't, okay. THE DEFENDANT: . . . [I]f they want me to testify, I would say they better get me up there today because if they don't, I'm leaving. THE COURT: Okay. When the prosecutor indicated that appellant could go ahead and testify that afternoon, Brown responded: THE DEFENDANT: I just said I was waiving. Can't you understand this, Ms. [sic] Aguero? THE COURT: You are not testifying? THE DEFENDANT: I am not coming back to testify. They say I can't testify because they got these other witnesses to put on, and they don't want me to testify until these other witnesses are put on, and I am saying I am not making this trip again. The appellant then stated: THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, between  let's put this in abeyance. I need to really discuss  they have these other witnesses they want to put on the record. At some point between now and whenever they have this other witness, let's decide  let me decide then, okay? THE COURT: Okay. THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Court's adjourned. On November 20, 2000, Brown filed the following waiver with the trial court: I, GEORGE WALLACE BROWN, having been fully advised of my right to appear at and testify in my evidentiary hearing, hereby waive appearance at the December 15, 2000 hearing. I understand that by not appearing and providing testimony, I may fail to present evidence on claims for which I have been granted a hearing but knowingly waive appearance and the possible presentation of my own testimony. At the subsequent December 15 hearing the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Mr. Brody, why don't you state for the record why your client isn't here. MR. AGUERO: He signed a waiver. We advised him of the ups and downs and pros and cons of that, and he did not want to come. THE COURT: Okay. And do you have anything else? MR. BRODY: No, Your Honor. We will have no further evidence other than the introduction of these depositions and reports substantively into evidence. In the end, it appears that the court discussed the waiver with Brown during the second day of the evidentiary hearing, but he did not actually waive at that hearing. Instead, he waived his presence when he filed the written waiver. Brown now argues that his presence was required. He cites to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(c)(3), which states that a prisoner's presence is required at the evidentiary hearing on the merits of any claim. However, rule 3.851(c)(3) does not apply to Brown because his amended postconviction motion was filed on December 2, 1999. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851 (stating that the rule shall apply to all postconviction motions filed on or after October 1, 2001). Rule 3.850(e), which does apply to Brown, states that [a] court may entertain and determine the motion without requiring the production of the movant at the hearing. Thus, Brown's argument has no merit. See Clark v. State, 491 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla.1986) (stating that whether a prisoner should be physically present at a 3.850 hearing is discretionary with the trial court except when evidence is to be presented and the prisoner is not represented by counsel); Neal v. State, 636 So.2d 197 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (rejecting an argument that the trial court erred when it failed to require the movant's presence at the hearing on his motion for postconviction relief, citing rule 3.850(e)). If the court can adjudicate the postconviction motion's claims without the defendant's presence, it follows that a waiver of appearance is not required. Finally, to the extent that Brown's argument involves the waiver of testimony, and not just appearance, his argument also fails. In the context of discussing the waiver of defendant's right to testify during his capital trial, this Court has repeatedly refused to require an on-the-record waiver. See Lawrence v. State, 831 So.2d 121, 132 (Fla.2002) (rejecting defendant's argument that counsel should have obtained a waiver of his right to testify on the record to ensure that the waiver was knowing and intelligent and stating that due process does not require that the defendant waive his right to testify on the record); Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So.2d 403, 410-11 (Fla.1988) (holding that although there is a constitutional right to testify under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, this right does not fall within the category of fundamental rights which must be waived on the record by the defendant himself). When viewed in this context, the court's discussion with Brown and his subsequent written waiver are more than sufficient. It would also be inconsistent to require an on-the-record waiver for a defendant's evidentiary hearing testimony and not his capital trial testimony. Such a requirement would create an odd jurisprudence where the defendant's right to testify at a postconviction evidentiary hearing is deemed a fundamental right, but his right to testify at the actual capital trial is viewed as something less.