Opinion ID: 1969314
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Corporation Counsel's interpretation of the GTCA.

Text: Less than two weeks after the GTCA became effective, the Deputy Corporation Counsel prepared a memorandum for the DOC in which she responded to various questions relating to the meaning of the new legislation. In that memorandum, Ms. Hines wrote, inter alia, as follows: [Question]. Is § 5(a) of the act [11] inconsistent with D.C.Code § 24-206 (1981)? [Answer]. Yes. Section 5(a) of the act gives a recommitted parole violator a credit on the maximum term equal to the time served on parole. At the conclusion of her answer to this question, Ms. Hines explained that the Council was apparently unaware of the inconsistent provision in Section 24-206(a) when it enacted Section 24-431(a). See page 1109, supra. On September 16, 1987, Patrick S. Glynn, the General Counsel for the USPC, wrote a letter to Corporation Counsel Frederick D. Cooke, Jr., in which he expressed his disagreement with Ms. Hines' interpretation. Mr. Glynn argued that a specific statute must always take precedence over a statute of general applicability, regardless of priority of enactment. He also expressed the view that the Councilmembers could not have intended to benefit a category of offenders that includes many of our most dangerous recidivists. On October 30, 1987, Mr. Cooke responded to Mr. Glynn's submission with a comprehensive five-page letter in which he discussed the meaning of Section 24-431(a) in considerable detail. Mr. Cooke noted, inter alia, that one of the principal purposes of the GTCA was to relieve prison overcrowding, and that construing [Section 24-431(a)] to provide for credit against the maximum sentence for time served on parole, even when parole is later revoked, accords with this principal purpose. Addressing the legislative history of the GTCA, Mr. Cooke quoted the section-by-section analysis of the statute in the Report of the Judiciary Committee. In that Report, the language that ended up as Section 5(a) was described as follows: Requires that a person be given credit for time spent in custody and time spent on parole. COMMITTEE REPORT, at 3. Mr. Cooke pointed out that the Report specified no exceptions to the foregoing requirement, and he wrote that [i]f the last sentence of D.C.Code § 24-206(a) (1981) had been brought to the Committee's attention, and the Committee had intended that sentence to remain an exception, it would likely have so indicated in the section-by-section analysis.[ [12] ] Finally, the Corporation Counsel stated: [Y]our limiting construction of the phrase or on parole in § 5(a) of the act renders that phrase superfluous. For if that phrase means only what you have construed it to mean, its elimination would not change the state of the law in any way. This is so because pre-existing law makes quite clear the general rule, namely that time served on parole is time served in fulfillment of the maximum sentence.     Of course, ... a court must, if possible, give effect to every phrase of a statute so that no part is rendered superfluous. National Insulation Transp. Committee v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 221 U.S.App. D.C. 192, 196, 683 F.2d 533, 537 (1982).