Opinion ID: 495272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Privacy Right

Text: 40 Pesce argues that the school board's decision to discipline him for failing to disclose information he received in a confidential discussion with his patient J.D. violated Pesce's federal constitutional right of confidentiality, which purportedly derives from J.D.'s right to privacy. The district court rejected this argument summarily: 41 Aside from the fact that it is by no means clear that plaintiff has standing to assert any such [privacy] right derivatively, plaintiff has not shown how the alleged privacy violation gives rise to a cause of action under Sec. 1983. 42 651 F.Supp. 152, 156 n. 4 (N.D.Ill.1986). We think the district court reached the correct result. 43 As a first step, Pesce's claim here does not even implicate the law of Illinois with respect to privacy. As noted, issues of state law certainly could arise in a federal substantive due process analysis, but Pesce cannot claim any section 1983 violation based solely on an alleged violation of state privacy rights. It may well be that Pesce can claim protection under the aegis of Illinois privacy law, but not in a Sec. 1983 claim. Cf. Ill. Const. art. I Sec. 6 (The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable ... invasions of privacy....); Oden v. Cahill, 398 N.E.2d 1061, 1062-63, 35 Ill.Dec. 111, 112-13, 79 Ill.App.3d 768, 770 (1979) (suggesting that Illinois Constitution protects right to confidentiality). The question raised by Pesce's claim is whether Illinois has so invaded the relationship between psychologist and patient as to deprive Pesce and J.D. of federal rights. 44 The Federal Constitution does, of course, protect certain rights of privacy including a right of confidentiality in certain types of information. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600, 97 S.Ct. 869, 876-77, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977); see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3355 n. 10, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 435, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 1184-85, 67 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-58, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2797-98, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977). In Whalen a unanimous Court upheld the validity of a New York statute that established a centralized repository of the names and addresses of all persons who received prescriptions for certain drugs for which both a legal and illegal market existed. The plaintiffs had argued that the mandatory collection of their names and addresses violated their federally protected constitutional rights of privacy. In describing the constitutional right of privacy the Court noted that the right of privacy actually comprised two separate interests: One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600, 97 S.Ct. at 876-77 (footnotes omitted). The Court concluded that, on its face, the New York law did not so threaten either sort of privacy interest in such a way as to violate the Constitution. This result followed in part because any threat of widespread disclosure of the information in question was too hypothetical, and in part because there was so little to suggest that the law in fact restricted the independence of patients to obtain certain prescriptions. Id. at 600-04, 97 S.Ct. at 877-78. 4 45 In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (which, incidentally, involved uniquely federal interests), the Court reaffirmed its holding in Whalen, see Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457, 97 S.Ct. at 2797, and suggested that a balancing was required between the former President's privacy interest in his personal papers and the public interest in subjecting all papers to archival screening. Id. at 458, 97 S.Ct. at 2797-98. Several courts have subsequently adopted this sort of balancing approach in evaluating claims of the right to confidentiality as derived from the privacy right. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir.1987); Taylor v. Best, 746 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 982, 106 S.Ct. 388, 88 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1558-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017, 104 S.Ct. 548, 78 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981), United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 576-79 (3d Cir.1980). But see Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir.1986) (public disclosure of certain information held by state is permissible only for compelling state interest served in least intrusive manner); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 469 (9th Cir.1983) (the more fundamental the privacy right threatened, the more weighty must the state's interest be), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979, 105 S.Ct. 380, 83 L.Ed.2d 315 (1984); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067-69 (9th Cir.1976) (right of confidentiality between psychotherapist and patient is defeated by compelling state interest in ascertaining truth in legal proceedings), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1598, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); cf. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 608, 97 S.Ct. at 881 (Brennan, J., concurring) (a statute that effected a deprivation of protected privacy interest would only be consistent with the Constitution if it was necessary to promote a compelling state interest). 46 In Fraternal Order of Police, the Third Circuit considered constitutional challenges to questionnaires used by the Philadelphia Police Department seeking detailed information from applicants to the new Special Investigation Unit of the department. The court acknowledged that the federal constitutional right of confidentiality was implicated by the questionnaires, because they demanded detailed, intimate facts concerning physical and mental health, personal financial information and personal behavior habits such as gambling and liquor consumption. (When use of the questionnaires was first proposed, applicants were to be subject to a polygraph examination after completing the questionnaire, but the department agreed not to pursue that avenue pending arbitration on the issue.) The court undertook a careful analysis of the applicants' interests in confidentiality and the state's interest in discovering information that might render an applicant unfit for the duties of the special unit, which included investigating corruption and narcotics. The court concluded that the state's powerful interests in creating an effective force against vice and narcotics justified the specific questionnaire involved, but the court ordered that the department be enjoined from conducting its questionnaires until adequate safeguards against unnecessary public disclosure of the information were instituted. See Fraternal Order of Police, 812 F.2d at 110-18. 47 In Fadjo v. Coon, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and found that the plaintiff had indeed stated a claim that his federal constitutional right of confidentiality was violated by the state when it unnecessarily released private information to insurance investigators. Fadjo, 633 F.2d at 1174. The court concluded that intimate details of the plaintiff's personal life, given to the state upon a promise of confidentiality, may not be disclosed to third parties without implicating the federal right of confidentiality. The court remanded the case for determination of the balance of interests between the state and the plaintiff. 48 We recognize that the federal right of confidentiality might in some circumstances be implicated when a state conditions continued employment on the disclosure of private information. But we cannot agree that Pesce has alleged such circumstances in the present case. Instead we conclude, like the Supreme Court in Whalen, that the state statutory scheme does not pose a sufficiently grievous threat to any right of confidentiality as to rise to a constitutional violation. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600, 97 S.Ct. at 877. 49 We do not necessarily agree with the district court that, as a matter of pleading, Pesce failed adequately to allege standing to assert a federal right of confidentiality. It is far from clear that the right of confidentiality protects one party to a psychologist-patient relationship more than the other party. Indeed, significant authority suggests that the constitutional right of privacy as relevant to doctor-patient relationships applies equally to doctor and to patient. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89, 93 S.Ct. 739, 745-46, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1679-80, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); see also Whalen, 429 U.S. at 595 n. 14, 604 n. 33, 97 S.Ct. at 874 n. 14, 879 n. 33 (suggesting patients' and physicians' rights are generally coextensive). As a school psychologist, Pesce may well be able to claim a right to confidentiality in his professional relationships with his patients. Cf. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1 (1980). 50 However, a constitutional right to confidentiality does not protect against any and every compelled disclosure nor does it federalize every state professional privilege. E.g., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602, 97 S.Ct. at 878; Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, 812 F.2d at 110. And while it may not be settled what standard of review governs a claim of abridgment of a right to confidentiality, 5 we conclude in the circumstances of this case that Pesce has not adequately alleged a violation of any federal right to confidentiality. 51 Even if there is here a federal right to confidentiality that can be infringed only to further a compelling state interest, we conclude that such an interest is present in the present circumstances. Of critical importance here is the fact that the state is acting to protect one of the most pitiable and helpless classes in society--abused children. The Supreme Court has recognized the substantial interest of a state in protecting all children, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3354-55, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2620, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168, 64 S.Ct. 438, 443, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), and the Court has acknowledged special concerns arising in public schools, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3164-65, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986). But cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (school cannot be treated simply as surrogate for parents). A state serves a compelling interest in protecting abused children. Illinois, like other states, has adopted measures seeking to uncover instances of child abuse in order to protect children from subsequent abuse. 6 The compelling interest of the state reflects several characteristics special to abused children: they often may be unaware of their own abuse or injury; they may often be unable to report abuse; the effects of abuse may be invisible to third parties; abused children can carry physical and emotional scars for a lifetime; and of course the state bears a special responsibility to protect children who are considered unable voluntarily to choose their own course of action. See generally Comment, Duties in Conflict: Must Psychotherapists Report Child Abuse Inflicted by Clients and Confided in Therapy?, 22 San Diego L.Rev. 645 (1985). In light of the unique problems of child abuse, we find that the Illinois requirement that Pesce and others in similar positions of responsibility promptly report child abuse to a state agency does not unconstitutionally infringe any federal right of confidentiality. Pesce may have some sort of privilege under Illinois law, but that is not a matter we need address. 52 We of course do not purport to define the contours of any federal right to confidentiality in matters other than the one before us. In the unique circumstances of child abuse, Illinois may constitutionally require that psychologists report to an agency of the state suspected instances of present abuse. In addition, Pesce has not contended that psychologists' reports would be too widely disseminated by the state, so we need not evaluate the adequacy of the recordkeeping procedures employed by the state. Cf. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601, 97 S.Ct. at 877.