Opinion ID: 184596
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The history of section 16-1901

Text: 38 The limited available evidence as to the history of section 16-1901 confirms--or at least fails to contradict--our view that sections 16-1901 and 2241 are properly conceived of as distinct, equally available avenues by which D.C. petitioners may seek habeas corpus. A version of section 16-1901 existed long before the DCCRCPA; indeed, a predecessor was enacted in the course of Congress's 1901 recodification of the D.C.Code. See 31 Stat. 1372 (1901). The earlier section largely tracked the language of what is now section 16-1901(a), but with a reference to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia where that section now refers to the appropriate court. Before the enactment of the DCCRCPA, section 2241 contained no territorial restriction that would have precluded its invocation by petitioners within the District of Columbia; it permitted (and still permits) the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge to grant writs of habeas corpus within their respective jurisdictions. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Nor did the former text of section 16-1901 say that it was the exclusive remedy for D.C. habeas corpus petitioners. Although the caselaw does not explain the relationship between the two sections in any detail, it suggests that petitioners could choose to proceed under either or under both. See, e.g., Stewart v. Overholser, 186 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C.Cir.1950) (as to a prisoner at St. Elizabeths, citing the general federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et [331 U.S.App.D.C. 371] seq., and saying that the court has considered also the statutes of the District of Columbia [citing what is now § 16-1901], and found, [a]ssuming them to be in effect, that they do not require a different result); Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 867 (D.C.Cir.1945) (describing the requirements of what are nows 16-1901 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq. as equivalent and synonymous). 39 Our conclusion that before the DCCRCPA was enacted petitioners could ordinarily choose to proceed under either or both of the two provisions is strengthened by section 16-1909 of the D.C.Code (enacted in 1963), which says: This chapter [§§ 16-1901--16-1909] does not affect any provision of chapter 153 [Habeas Corpus] of title 28, United States Code. The accompanying Revision Note states: 40 Section is new, and is inserted for the purpose of construction. 41 Chapter 153 of Title 28, United States Code, also relates to habeas corpus and applies to Federal courts generally, including the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Upon the reenactment of the provisions carried into this chapter, they will constitute a later enactment than Title 28, United States Code, which was enacted in 1948. Considering the local character of the provisions carried into this chapter, there should not arise, as a general rule, even without this section, any question of conflict. However, this section is inserted as a precautionary measure. 42 Chapter 153, of course, includes section 2241 and the other general federal habeas corpus provisions. Congress's express reference to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia indicates that Congress intended that section 2241 should continue to remain available in the federal courts in the District, despite the existence of section 16-1901. 7 See also McCall, 510 F.2d at 182 (saying that section 16-1909 specifies that the District habeas provisions are not to be construed to restrict the general federal habeas provisions). 43 But if sections 16-1901(b) and (c) only set forth the venue for those habeas corpus petitions filed under section 16-1901(a), why--one may ask--the reference to petitions directed to Federal officers and employees in section16-1901(b)? Here again, history is of some help. At the time the DCCRCPA was enacted, there were a large number of persons in the D.C. prisons who had been tried in federal district court. As we explained in McCall, subsection (b) ensured that any petitions that they filed under section 16-1901 would be heard in federal court. This is so because the local prison officials who were their custodians were deemed to be 'Federal officers or employees' within the meaning of 16 D.C.Code § 1901 because they had custody over a federal prisoner. McCall, 510 F.2d at 180. When a prisoner is convicted and sentenced by the Superior Court, this logic does not apply, and exclusive jurisdiction over actions under section 16-1901 is vested in the Superior Court. 8 Because sections 16-1901(b) and (c) serve this narrower function, there is no need to read them as broadly as the District proposes, to allocate jurisdiction under all habeas corpus statutes between the federal and D.C. courts. 44 Portions of the legislative history of the DCCRCPA do suggest that Congress thought that the federal courts would not be able to entertain any habeas corpus petitions [331 U.S.App.D.C. 372] brought by persons convicted in the newly-created D.C. courts. For example, the report of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia said that after the effective date of the DCCRCPA, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia shall no longer have jurisdiction over local civil actions in the nature of quo warrento, suits to acquire title, and actions regarding change of name, contractors' bonds, restitution of real property, replevin of personal property, habeas corpus, and commitment of narcotics users....S. REP. NO . 91-405, at 19 (1969); see also id. at 23; H.R. REP. NO . 91-901 at 136 (1970), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2966 (saying that as of the effective date of the Act the Superior Court will have jurisdiction over a range of matters, including writs of habeas corpus to persons other than Federal officers and employees); STAFF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 91ST CONG., STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE SENATE 5-6 (Comm. Print 1970) (saying that the Superior Court is to have exclusive, general jurisdiction over all local matters, civil and criminal, and listing habeas corpus as an example). The DCCRCPA's legislative history, however, almost universally refers to habeas corpus generally, without distinguishing those petitions that attack the petitioner's conviction or sentence and are given over exclusively to the local courts under section 23-110(g) from other habeas petitions which that section does not encompass. We confess that we can discern no obvious reason for Congress to deny the federal courts jurisdiction over one type of petition but permit jurisdiction over the other. Congress's description of habeas corpus petitions as local in character, S. REP. NO . 91-405, at 19 (1969), seems to fit both types of petition equally well (with one possible exception, discussed below). 45 But, because Congress did not explicitly remove our jurisdiction over those section 2241 actions that do not attack the petitioner's conviction or sentence, that jurisdiction necessarily continues in effect. This is plain from Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996), in which the Supreme Court found that although the AEDPA bars habeas corpus petitioners who are denied leave to file a second or successive petition from challenging this decision through certiorari, see AEDPA § 106(b)(3)(E), it does not withdraw the Court's authority to entertain original habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. This was so even though a petitioner may be able to use the latter route to circumvent Congress's apparent intent in enacting the AEDPA to bar all review of such decisions. The rule that [r]epeals by implication are not favored, Felker, 116 S.Ct. at 2338, and the principle that the withdrawal of habeas corpus jurisdiction is subject to especial scrutiny, dates back over a hundred years; in Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 19 L.Ed. 332 (1868), the Court similarly declined to conclude that Congress had implicitly stripped it of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus actions under the forerunner of section 2241. 46 Congress's intent in enacting the DCCRCPA is if anything less clear than it was in Felker. This is so because reading sections 16-1901(b) and (c) to bar us from exercising jurisdiction over all D.C. habeas petitions that are not directed at federal officials, as the District urges, might yield anomalous results in some cases. For example, Crowell, the petitioner in one of the companion cases, was convicted in the state courts of Virginia but is now being held in D.C.'s prison system. His habeas corpus petition must be directed to his custodian, who is either a D.C. official, or perhaps (under the principle of McCall ) constructively an official of Virginia. Either way, Crowell's custodian is not a federal official, so that, under the District of Columbia's proposed reading of section 16-1901, exclusive jurisdiction over Crowell's petition would be in D.C. Superior Court. See § 16-1901(c) (Petitions for writs directed to any other person shall be filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.). Yet, had Crowell been transferred to a prison anywhere else in the nation, he would have had a remedy in an Article III court. Cf. McCall, 510 F.2d at 182 (citing the anomaly of denying access to a federal habeas corpus remedy to only those federal prisoners convicted in the District of Columbia in concluding that section 16-1901 permits such prisoners to file their petitions [331 U.S.App.D.C. 373] in federal court). And Crowell's action, which involves the good time credit rules of the Commonwealth of Virginia, does not seem to be the type of local civil action that Congress had in mind when it enacted section 16-1901. See S. REP. NO . 91-405, at 19 (1969) (saying that the DCCRCPA would give the Superior Court exclusive jurisdiction over all local civil actions, including proceedings in habeas corpus). In short, not only does the text of section 16-1901 fail to divest the federal courts of jurisdiction under section 2241, but the underlying intent of Congress in enacting that provision is far from clear. Thus, we now find that Congress has not extinguished Blair-Bey's section 2241 remedy.