Opinion ID: 31548
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: As Free filed a motion under § 2241, he need not obtain a certificate of appealability to proceed on appeal.2 In an appeal from a district court’s denial of habeas relief, we review the findings of fact for clear error and rulings of law de novo.3 B. Free’s claim for credit against his federal sentence for time served in state custody on his state sentence. Interestingly, Free’s claim for time-served credit only makes sense in light of his successful petition on the issue of the proper starting date of his federal sentence. In considering his § 2241 petition, the magistrate judge determined that Free’s federal sentence began on June 27, 1997, because 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) states that “a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody . . . .” Although Free was returned to the TDC on December 29, 1997, to complete his state sentence, he had by then served approximately six months in federal 2 Ojo v. INS, 106 F.3d 680, 681-82 (5th Cir. 1997). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). 3 Moody v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1998). 4 custody, between June 27 and December 29, 1997. Thus, the magistrate judge concluded, Free’s federal sentence “commenced” on June 27, 1997, and his period of approximately six months’ incarceration at the Colorado FCI must be counted by the BOP as time served on his federal sentence. On appeal, Free insists that the magistrate judge’s rejection of his second habeas claim —— credit towards his federal sentence for time served in state confinement —— was improper given the recognition that he had begun to serve his federal sentence on June 27, 1997.4 He contends that logic mandates that acknowledgment of his federal sentence’s commencing on June 27, 1997 requires that he receive time-served credit for the approximately two-year “interruption” —— between December 1997 and April 2000 —— of his serving the federal sentence after the BOP returned him to the TDC to finish serving the state sentence. Free bases this conclusion on two propositions: (1) As the district court’s sentencing order did not indicate that his federal and state sentences were to be served consecutively, those sentences must run concurrently, and (2) a common law rule requires that a prisoner be credited with 4 Free offers two additional arguments in his appellate briefs: The district court failed to (1) comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b), which requires the court to apply 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5G1.3, and (2) award him credit against his federal sentence for his pre-sentence custody. As Free failed to raise either of these contentions before the magistrate judge or district court, we will not consider them on appeal. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). 5 time served when an interruption in a prison sentence is not caused by, or is not the fault of, the prisoner himself. Free’s first contention is without merit. Well-settled federal law presumes that when multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed at different times, they will run consecutively unless the district court specifically orders that they run concurrently.5 Thus, Free’s contention has the sentencing presumption reversed: A district court must specify in its sentencing order that sentences run concurrently; otherwise, they run consecutively. Accordingly, Free’s state and federal sentences ran consecutively, because the district court did not specify otherwise. The proper resolution of Free’s second contention is less obvious. We have not found a federal statute or a prior case in this circuit that specifically addresses the instant circumstances: (1) A state prisoner on “loan”6 to federal authorities is convicted and sentenced for a federal crime; (2) the prisoner begins to serve his federal sentence through a mistake of the federal authorities and no fault of his own; (3) after serving less than his full federal sentence in federal custody, the prisoner is returned to state custody to complete his state sentence; and (4) after completion of his state sentence, the prisoner is returned to federal custody to complete his federal sentence. There is some 5 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). 6 Causey v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1980). 6 precedent that supports the rule that a sentence may be interrupted and re-started only if the interruption is the fault of the prisoner. In such cases, the period of interruption is not credited against the sentence as time served.7 There is also precedent in other circuits suggesting that a federal sentence may be interrupted and re-started without time-served credit, regardless of whether the prisoner is at fault for the interruption.8 In urging that he should be granted time-served credit, Free 7 See Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359 (1938) (holding that paroled prisoners’ commissions of other crimes interrupted original sentences); Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting common law rule “that unless interrupted by fault of the prisoner . . . a prison sentence runs continuously from the date on which the defendant surrenders to begin serving it”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 541 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining that civil contempt confinement interrupts existing sentence for the term of the grand jury proceeding); Lipscomb v. Clark, 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that issuance of “violator’s warrant” interrupted another non-concurrent sentence); Moultrie v. Georgia, 464 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1972 (holding that violation of parole interrupts sentence). 8 See Dunne, 14 F.3d at 337 (noting that back-and-forth returns of prisoner to and from state and federal custody “with no release into the free community” did not violate rule that government may not delay expiration of sentence through piecemeal incarceration); Cox v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 643 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that prisoner not entitled to timeserved credit against federal sentence for interruption of this sentence to complete state sentence); Comulada v. Willingham, 351 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1965) (holding that prisoner would not receive time-served credit against his federal sentence for the time he spent completing his state sentence after he was returned to local authorities, although his erroneous transfer to federal custody commenced his sentence). 7 relies heavily on the aforementioned Luther case.9 There, the defendant was convicted and sentenced on federal charges, but he absconded before his federal sentence commenced. While on the lam, he was arrested and convicted on unrelated state charges.10 He was then erroneously transferred to federal custody, and served more than three years of his federal sentence before being returned to state custody. On completion of his state sentence, that defendant was paroled and taken back into federal custody to complete his federal sentence. The BOP did not give him credit against his federal sentence for the time he served in state custody, so he filed a § 2241 petition, challenging the BOP’s decision. The Luther court analogized the transfers to inadvertent prisoner releases, which present circumstances that courts have repeatedly held to be deserving of credit for time served.11 That court concluded: “Surely if a prisoner can be credited with time spent at liberty due to custodial mistake, a prisoner can be credited for time spent in custody due to custodial mistake.”12 We conclude that the district court in Luther overbroadly applied the common law rule that a prisoner is entitled to credit 9 Luther v. Vanyur, 14 F. Supp. 2d 773 (E.D.N.C. 1997). 10 Id. at 774. 11 Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984); White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930); United States v. Mazzoni, 677 F. Supp. 339, 341-42 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 12 Luther, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (emphasis added). 8 for time served when he is incarcerated discontinuously through no fault of his own.13 The limited function of this rule is clear: Its sole purpose is to prevent the government from abusing its coercive power to imprison a person by artificially extending the duration of his sentence through releases and re-incarcerations. As the Seventh Circuit recently explained: [This] common law rule has not been successfully invoked for many years, but we are not disposed to question its continued vitality in the core area of its application, when the government is trying to delay the expiration of the defendant’s sentence.14 The Seventh Circuit refused to apply this common law rule in circumstances similar to Free’s: An inmate was “reclassified” from being a federal prisoner to being a state prisoner for the purpose of having him finish serving his state sentence before serving his consecutive federal sentence.15 The Seventh Circuit recognized that, as there was “no release into the free community, . . . there was no postponement” of the federal sentence.16 Ergo, reasoned that court, there was no violation of the rule against piecemeal incarceration that results in the elongation of a prison sentence. On similar reasoning, the Eighth Circuit refused to grant time- 13 Pearlman, 42 F.2d at 789 (“A sentence . . . means a continuous sentence, unless interrupted by escape, violation of parole, or some fault of the prisoner, and he cannot be required to serve it in installments.”). 14 Dunne, 14 F.3d at 336-37. 15 Id. at 335-36. 16 Id. at 337. 9 served credit to a prisoner who was returned to state custody to complete a state sentence, and, on parole from state prison, was returned to federal custody to complete a consecutive federal sentence.17 It is apparent from the record that Free’s total time of incarceration in both federal and state prisons has not been —— and will not be —— increased by even a single day as a result of his mistakenly serving the first six months of his federal sentence prior to completing the service of his state sentence. Although the BOP originally did not give Free credit for these six months, he rightly and successfully challenged that decision in the instant habeas petition; a result that the government has not appealed. Thus, Free is serving the correct total time of his consecutive state and federal sentences. That he will have done so in two shifts between sovereigns rather than one is of no moment.