Opinion ID: 1136054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Determining the Severity Level

Text: Whitaker also contends that the sentencing judge erred in computing the severity level of his conviction for aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer under the KSGA. K.S.A. 21-4724(f) requires that for persons who committed crimes prior to July 1, 1993, but who are sentenced after that date, the sentencing court shall impose a pre-KSGA sentence but shall also compute the appropriate KSGA sentence. Although Whitaker committed his crimes prior to the effective date of the KSGA, the resentencing occurred after the KSGA took effect. In compliance with K.S.A. 21-4724(f), the sentencing judge computed the appropriate KSGA sentence. The sentencing judge stated that the aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer conviction was a severity level 3 offense. Whitaker challenges this finding on appeal. At the time of Whitaker's offense, aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer was an aggravated battery committed against a uniformed or properly identified state, county, or city, law enforcement officer while such officer is engaged in the performance of his duty. K.S.A. 21-3415 (Ensley 1988). Aggravated battery was defined as the unlawful touching or application of force to the person of another with intent to injure that person or another and which either: (a) Inflicts great bodily harm upon him; or (b) Causes any disfigurement or dismemberment to or of his person; or (c) Is done with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement, dismemberment, or death can be inflicted. K.S.A. 21-3414 (Ensley 1988). Whitaker was charged with aggravated battery as described in subsection (c), aggravated battery with a deadly weapon or in a manner in which great bodily harm, disfigurement, dismemberment, or death could be inflicted. At the time of Whitaker's offense, the crime was a class B felony. K.S.A. 21-3415 (Ensley 1988). With the enactment of the KSGA, the definitions of aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer were modified and different severity levels were assigned to the various manners in which the crime could be committed. The crime is a severity level 3 crime if it is committed by [i]ntentionally causing great bodily harm to another person or disfigurement of another person. K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(A); K.S.A. 21-3415(a)(1), (b)(1). The crime is a severity level 6 crime if it is committed by intentionally causing bodily harm to another person with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted or by intentionally causing physical contact with another person when done in a rude, insulting, or angry manner with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted. K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(B), (C); K.S.A. 21-3415(a)(2), (b)(2). The question here is whether Whitaker's offense of aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer is properly classified as a severity level 3 or 6 crime. According to the parties, the crucial determination in classifying this crime as a severity level 3 crime is that there must have been an intent by the defendant to cause great bodily harm. Although the State could have originally charged Whitaker with aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer by the manner of inflicting great bodily harm as defined in K.S.A. 21-3414(a) (Ensley 1988), the State instead charged Whitaker with committing the crime by using a deadly weapon or in a manner in which great bodily harm could be inflicted as defined in K.S.A. 21-3414(c) (Ensley 1988). Whitaker states the element of intentionally causing great bodily harm or disfigurement was neither alleged in the complaint nor proven in his trial. Whitaker argues that it is error to assign a severity level based on an element of an offense which did not exist in the statute at the time the offense was committed. As authority, Whitaker relies on State v. Houdyshell, 20 Kan. App.2d 90, 884 P.2d 437 (1994). Houdyshell had been convicted of aggravated battery under K.S.A. 21-3414 committed prior to July 1, 1993. The Houdyshell court held it was error to assign a severity level to the convictions predicated upon an element that did not exist in the statute at the time of the offense. The defendant's reliance on Houdyshell is misplaced as the procedure to assign a severity level set out in Houdyshell was disapproved by this court in State v. Fierro, 257 Kan. 639, 651, 895 P.2d 186 (1995). In Fierro, 257 Kan. at 649, we noted that historically, the fundamental rule is that a person convicted of a crime is given the sentence in effect when the crime was committed. See State v. Reed, 248 Kan. 792, 795, 811 P.2d 1163 (1991). That rule is reflected in K.S.A. 21-4723 and K.S.A. 21-4724(f), which require the sentencing court to impose a sentence as provided pursuant to law as the law existed prior to July 1, 1993, for crimes committed prior to that date. Fierro, 257 Kan. at 649. Under Fierro, 257 Kan. 639, Syl. ¶ 5, and our later decision in Farris v. McKune, 259 Kan. 181, Syl. ¶ 2, 911 P.2d 177 (1996), we decided that in applying K.S.A. 21-4724, the Department of Corrections (DOC) or the sentencing judge must convert a pre-KSGA crime to an analogous post-KSGA crime. The sentencing judge is required to compute the guidelines classification by looking at actual conduct and by applying the actual acts committed to the comparable crime in effect after July 1, 1993. Fierro, 257 Kan. at 651. Any uncontested information may be considered to determine what the actual conduct of the offender was. Farris, 259 Kan. 181, Syl. ¶ 3. Here, even though it was unnecessary for the State to prove an intent to cause great bodily harm for Whitaker to be convicted of aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer, if the facts show such an intent Whitaker's crime may be assigned a severity level of 3 based on that intent. The same judge presided over Whitaker's trial, sentencing, and resentencing. The judge was familiar with the facts of the case. Whitaker's testimony at trial was that his codefendant, Neal, instructed one of the victims to drive slowly toward a dumpster and that Neal got out of the car and started shooting. Other testimony also showed that Neal directed the victim to drive next to the police officer and slow down. The official version of the incident contained in the presentence report states: Whitaker told Detective Mervosh that Neal shot at the officer, trying to kill him by firing a big .45 caliber automatic handgun. At the resentencing hearing, the judge noted: Mr. Neal should not have perceived that his own safety was in jeopardy. He just wanted to avoid detention or apprehension, feeling as though one of the victims getting away, that they were on the verge of being apprehended by a police officer, believing the only way to head that off was just to shoot the police officer. And it's nothing but luck that the officer wasn't killed. The bullets just didn't happen to end up in the right place. I don't think it was any magical shooting on the part of Mr. Neal, that he just happened to hit the officer in a non vital area. It was just a matter of luck that is what happened. Our criminal code does not define great bodily harm. In State v. Dubish, 234 Kan. 708, 715, 675 P.2d 877 (1984), this court stated: Bodily harm has been defined as `any touching of the victim against [the victim's] will, with physical force, in an intentional hostile and aggravated manner.' [Citation omitted.] The word `great' distinguishes the bodily harm necessary in [the offense of aggravated battery] from slight, trivial, minor or moderate harm, and as such it does not include mere bruises, which are likely to be sustained in simple battery. See People v. Lopez, 222 Cal. Rptr. 83, 176 Cal. App.3d 460 (1986) (through and through gunshot wound to thigh was great bodily injury for enhancement statute); cf. People v. Watkins, 243 Ill. App. 3d 271, 277-78, 611 N.E.2d 1121 (1993) (no great bodily harm for aggravated battery conviction where bullet only grazed victim and did not draw blood). Whether bodily harm is great is generally a question of fact for the jury, not the trial judge. See State v. Sanders, 223 Kan. 550, 552, 575 P,2d 533 (1978); State v. Ochoa, 20 Kan. App.2d 1014, 1020, 895 P.2d 198 (1995). Here, however, where the determination of great bodily harm is made in the context of classifying the severity level of a crime, the trial judge is required to explore that question and determine if great bodily harm occurred. Did great bodily harm occur? The facts indicate that Neal had an intent to cause great bodily harm. The police officer received a through and through wound to his right arm, although a more damaging injury could have occurred had the officer been hit in a more vital area of his body or if the bullet had struck a bone. The officer missed 3 days of work as a result of his injury. The officer here suffered more than a mere bruise or scratch. The sentencing judge properly classified Whitaker's offense as a severity level 3 crime based on the intent to cause great bodily harm. Affirmed.