Opinion ID: 4519774
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to protect speedy trial rights

Text: In its order denying Mr. Waldron’s ineffective assistance claim regarding protection of speedy trial rights (Claim 6), the district court addressed the issue under the Speedy Trial Act (“STA”) and under the Sixth Amendment. In his request for a COA, Mr. Waldron addresses only the former. See Aplt. Br. at 20-21. He first argues that the superseding indictment was untimely filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), which provides that “[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.” See id. at 20. He makes this argument for the first time here. “We generally do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.” United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2002). This argument otherwise lacks merit because “[t]here is nothing in either the statute or the cases 9 construing it to suggest that a superseding indictment must be filed within the [30-day] period allowed for the original indictment.” United States v. Wilks, 629 F.2d 669, 673 (10th Cir. 1980); see United States v. Peterson, 945 F.3d 144, 156 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e join every federal court to address the question and hold that a superseding indictment filed more than thirty days after an arrest does not violate Section 3161(b) so long as the original indictment was filed within the STA’s thirty-day window.”). Mr. Waldron further complains about the “‘ends of justice’ continuances.” Aplt. Br. at 20-21. The district court examined the three ends of justice continuances for prejudice, found none, and concluded that counsel was not ineffective. ROA, Vol. II at 367-68. Mr. Waldron fails to show to the contrary or that the district court’s denial of his claim would be debatable among reasonable jurists. No COA is warranted.