Opinion ID: 556603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the court's comments

Text: 81 Last and least is appellant's assertion that the district court used prejudicial language when instructing the jury. In particular, appellant castigates the court for characterizing the issue of causation as complex and difficult. We find this caterwauling to comprise much ado about very little. 82 The charge must, of course, be considered as a whole, not in isolated bits and pieces. United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 1003 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913, 108 S.Ct. 259, 98 L.Ed.2d 216 (1987). After reviewing the entirety, we have difficulty fathoming how Kotler can seriously contend that the challenged snippets were prejudicial. 21 On any fair reading of the remarks, taken in context, the trial judge was merely offering words of obligation, telling the jurors that the causation inquiry, though labyrinthine, must nonetheless be confronted conscientiously. Appellant's version--that the jury would probably infer from such comments that the causation inquiry was difficult because her proof was scanty--strikes us as chimerical. 83 Where, as here, the judge adhered to appropriate standards of fairness and impartiality, he was not required to function as some bloodless automaton. United States v. Polito, 856 F.2d 414, 418 (1st Cir.1988). Having been scrupulous throughout the trial and the charge in respecting the jury's independence and domain, it was permissible for the presider to express empathy for the jurors' plight and concern for their steadfastness of purpose. Rather than seeming a sarcastic put-down of plaintiff's case, we think it likely that the court's comments comprised a useful motivational device. At any rate, we think it certain that these comments were not outside the bounds of proper judicial conduct. Aggarwal v. Ponce School of Medicine, 837 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir.1988).