Opinion ID: 337643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: fleury, wesaw, dodge and johns.

Text: 35 Mark Fleury, Colin Wesaw, Reginald Dodge, Jr., and Larry Johns appeal from their convictions of conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). 14 They contend that there is insufficient evidence to establish that they agreed to go to Wounded Knee, carrying weapons and ammunition to be used at Wounded Knee for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, or interfering with United States Marshals and Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who the defendants supposed were engaged in the lawful performance of their official duties incident to and during the commission of a civil disorder as found by Judge Urbom sitting without a jury. 36 There is no direct evidence that the appellants had an agreement to go to Wounded Knee for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, or interfering with United States Marshals, Special Agents of the FBI or other law enforcement officials. The conviction must be sustained on the basis of circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Overshon, 494 F.2d 894, 895-896 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 96, 42 L.Ed.2d 85 (1974). 37 The record shows that Fleury entered the Larabee home on the Pine Ridge Reservation with the intent to coerce, by the threat of a rifle he was carrying, a ride to the Village of Wounded Knee if a ride was not voluntarily given. Failing to receive a ride, Fleury left the Larabee home, was joined by Johns, and shortly thereafter by Wesaw and Dodge. It further shows that the four men walked across the Larabee ranch in the general direction of Wounded Knee. A number of armed ranchers, summoned by Mrs. Larabee on a two-way radio, surrounded the appellants in a depression in the middle of a field on the ranch. The ranchers were joined shortly thereafter by two Bureau of Indian Affairs Police Agents. As these officers were alighting from their patrol car, two of the appellants fired shots in the general direction of the officers and the ranchers. The BIA Agents responded with M-16 automatic fire. The officers then identified themselves and ordered the appellants to come out. After a brief delay and another short exchange of gunfire, the appellants surrendered and were arrested. The arrest occurred on April 27, 1973. 38 After the appellants had been arrested and searched, the BIA officers went to the depression where the appellants had been. They found a 22 caliber rifle with the name Reg Dodge printed on it, a 12 gauge shotgun, ammunition consisting of forty-three 9 millimeter rifle cartridges, eighteen 22 caliber long rifle cartridges and several 12 gauge shotgun cartridges, a bow with Wesaw's name written on it and twelve arrows. They also found several backpacks containing clothes and minor medical supplies. A search of Dodge one hour after his arrest disclosed that he had several shotgun shells taped to his arm. 39 Wesaw, who was released after this initial arrest, was arrested a second time on May 8, 1973, at a government roadblock outside of Wounded Knee. The arrest occurred when he voluntarily turned himself in seeking medical attention for a female companion. Dodge, who was also released after the initial arrest, was stopped and searched at a Wounded Knee roadblock on May 7th. He was found to be carrying ammunition on his person. 40 Other testimony shows that a civil disorder existed at Wounded Knee on April 27, 1973, that law enforcement officers were engaged in the performance of their duties at Wounded Knee on that day and that they were engaged in a federally-protected function. 41 On the basis of the above facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, we have no hesitancy in concluding that there is not substantial evidence to support the convictions of Wesaw and Johns. There is no evidence that they agreed with each other or with Fleury and Dodge to go to Wounded Knee for any purpose other than to join in the demonstrations then taking place. There is no evidence that either of them knew that a civil disorder existed at the reservation on April 27th, or that the United States Marshals or FBI Agents were on duty there. There is no evidence that Johns was armed, and the only evidence with respect to Wesaw in this regard is that he was carrying a bow and twelve arrows, hardly a weapon that one intending to interfere with a federal marshal or FBI Agent would carry. There is no evidence that either Wesaw or Johns was carrying ammunition, or that either was involved in Fleury's attempt to coerce Mrs. Larabee into transporting him to Wounded Knee, or that either fired shots at the BIA officers when they were surrounded by ranchers and BIA officials on the Larabee ranch. 15 Under these circumstances, the requisite intent to violate § 231(a)(3) has not been shown. 42 We reach the same conclusion with respect to Fleury and Dodge. There is no evidence that they knew that a civil disorder existed on April 27th at Wounded Knee or that United States Marshals or FBI Agents were on duty in that community on that date. Absent such evidence, we find it difficult to see how they can be convicted of a conspiracy to violate § 231(a)(3). 43 Moreover, there is no direct evidence that Fleury and Dodge had agreed with each other, or with Johns and Wesaw, to go to Wounded Knee with an intent to obstruct or interfere with law enforcement officers in the lawful performance of their duties at that community. The existence of such an agreement can only be inferred from evidence that Fleury and Dodge were armed on the Larabee ranch on April 27th, and that they used the arms against Mrs. Larabee, ranchers and BIA Agents on that date. In our view, this evidence does not establish that they had agreed to obstruct or interfere with United States Marshals or FBI Agents at Wounded Knee. 16 It is one thing to attempt to coerce a civilian or to open fire on armed ranchers and BIA Agents (no § 231(a)(3) charge was brought for this incident) when surrounded in a field and quite another to infer from these facts that Fleury and Dodge would interfere with United States Marshals and FBI Agents in the performance of their duties two weeks later at Wounded Knee. 44 No one can dispute the fact that Fleury and Dodge were anxious to get to Wounded Knee to associate themselves with other Indians in protesting governmental policies they considered to be unjust. But we cannot from that infer, that once at Wounded Knee, they would knowingly interfere with United States Marshals and FBI Agents in the lawful performance of their duties in that community. 45 Accordingly, we have no alternative but to reverse the convictions of Fleury and Dodge on this charge, as well as those of Johns and Wesaw. 46