Opinion ID: 3164462
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We must first determine the basis for our jurisdiction. The Commonwealth begins by positing that to avoid deleterious effects that may result from delays attendant to the ordinary process of law, this Court may exercise King’s Bench authority to review issues of public importance that require timely intervention by the court of last resort. Brief of the Commonwealth at 21 (citing In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 670 (Pa. 2014)). It requests that we invoke King’s Bench power here to entertain the important question of whether Governor Wolf may issue a reprieve that is unlimited in time and is not based on Williams’ individual circumstances, but rather is imposed to further the Governor’s policy of declaring a moratorium on the death penalty. As developed in the merits analysis, the Commonwealth asserts that the Governor’s action in this regard intrudes upon judicial authority by effectively reversing final sanctions imposed in all capital cases in Pennsylvania, and raises fundamental constitutional questions regarding the scope of executive and judicial power, all of which will recur as the Governor’s moratorium continues. It further alleges that time is of the essence because Governor Wolf should not be afforded the opportunity to delay execution when all avenues of review have been exhausted in Williams’ case, including a petition for clemency rejected by the Board of Pardons. The Commonwealth also points out that this Court has invoked its King’s Bench jurisdiction previously to review the constitutional validity of a Governor’s exercise of power. See Creamer v. Twelve Common Pleas Judges, 281 A.2d 57, 58 (Pa. 1971) (per curiam) (exercising King’s Bench authority to determine whether the Governor’s appointments to the judiciary fell [J-52-2015] - 7 within his constitutional authority under Article V, Section 13(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution).7 Emphasizing the discretionary nature of King’s Bench jurisdiction, Williams responds that the doctrine should not be invoked here because the Commonwealth has failed to establish a clear right to relief on the merits as Governor Wolf’s issuance of the reprieve derived from explicit constitutional authority. While acknowledging that this Court has invoked King’s Bench jurisdiction to address allegations that another branch of government has encroached upon its judicial power, Williams nevertheless advocates for a more narrow interpretation of the doctrine. He urges us to limit the exercise of our King’s Bench authority to cases involving the supervision of lower tribunals and judges, and to decline to invoke the doctrine to review the propriety of a clemency action taken by the chief executive. Governor Wolf reiterates this sentiment, advocating that we decline to exercise King’s Bench authority, contending that this power encompasses only the superintendency of inferior judicial tribunals and officers, and not executive actions. Notably, however, the Governor does not oppose this Court’s review of the instant controversy, and requests that we resolve this important legal issue pursuant to our 7 The Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association (PDAA), which represents the Offices of the District Attorney for all 67 counties, has filed an amicus brief in support of the Commonwealth and joins the argument that King’s Bench jurisdiction should be invoked here. It asserts that as a result of the Governor’s declaration of a moratorium on the death penalty, capital defendants are requesting trial courts to strike aggravating circumstances set forth in notices of intent to seek the death penalty and to compel the Commonwealth to forego death penalty prosecutions. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Newell, No. 2642 of 2013 (Pa. Ct. Com. PL. Monroe Ctny. Mar. 12, 2015). The PDAA asserts that these defense tactics demonstrate that, absent a ruling in the Commonwealth’s favor, the Governor’s actions will have additional negative effects on the criminal justice system, including impacting plea discussions and negotiations. [J-52-2015] - 8 extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 726 of the Judicial Code, which permits this Court to assume plenary jurisdiction in a matter of immediate public importance that is pending in a lower tribunal.8 Recognizing the absence of a pending case in a lower tribunal over which this Court could assume extraordinary jurisdiction, Governor Wolf posits that the instant case could have been brought (or could technically be transferred to) the Commonwealth Court in its original jurisdiction, after which we could invoke our extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 726. Rather than engaging in such technical maneuvering, the Governor suggests that we decide the case before us by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 726. See Brief of Governor Wolf at 4-5 (citing Pa. Gaming Control Board v. City Council of Philadelphia, 928 A.2d 1255, 1272 (Pa. 2007) (J. Baer, concurring) (opining that because this Court could transfer the particular matter to the proper lower tribunal and then invoke our extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 726, we should avoid technical maneuvering, and simply decide the case under Section 726)). It is well-established that “[a]ll Pennsylvania courts derive power or authority, and the attendant jurisdiction over the subject matter, from the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth.” In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 659 (citing PA. CONST. art. V, § 2; 42 Pa.C.S. § 502). Article V, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in 8 Section 726, entitled “Extraordinary jurisdiction,” states: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Supreme Court may, on its own motion or upon petition of any party, in any matter pending before any court or magisterial district judge of this Commonwealth involving an issue of immediate public importance, assume plenary jurisdiction of such matter at any stage thereof and enter a final order or otherwise cause right