Opinion ID: 1782622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court erred in admitting evidence of unrelated acts of adultery with adults by todd, and in refusing to permit impeachment of the state's corroborating witness trances ford concerning the alleged adultery.

Text: ¶ 20. At a hearing on pretrial motions, Todd presented a motion in limine to exclude testimony by Trances Ford regarding Todd's admission to intercourse with the aunt and Williams. The trial judge apparently granted that motion, subject to reconsideration on rebuttal, stating: As to number two about asking the witness Ford about extramarital sex with another adult, if I understand it correctly, this occurred on the night of the same time that one of the times that Mr. Todd is accused of that; and it's the State's position that this is part of the res gestae for the jury to get the whole picture, but I'm of the opinion that this would be far too prejudicial than in the case in chief. Now, if Mr. Todd opens the door, if he takes the stand and if he opens the door, then I'll revisit this on rebuttal; but as to the case in chief State will not present any evidence or testimony about any alleged statement by Mr. Todd about any extramarital affair or sex that he had with one Melissa Williams about the time that he's accused of having sex with [E.K.]. ¶ 21. Later, however, during Trances Ford's direct testimony, the following exchanges occurred: Q. What did he tell you when he told you to leave? A. He asked me to leave and said he would call me by the radio to come pick him up. Q. How was he going to call you? A. By the radio. . . . . Q. And did you leave the house? A. Yes, sir. Q. Where did you go? A. Nowhere in particular. Q. Did you drive around? A. Yes, sir. Q. How long was it before you had did the defendant call you? A. Yes, sir. Q. On the radio. A. Yes, sir. Q. And did you go back to the house? A. Pulled into the front of the residence. Q. How long was it when, how long was he in the house while you were out riding around? A. I guess around 30 minutes more or less. Q. So he stayed in the house for about 30 minutes. A. I estimate that to be how long it was. Q. Did he come out when you drove up? A. He was standing out front when I made it there. Q. Did he say anything about doing any investigation then? A. No, sir. Q. Where did y'all go from there? A. We drove around a while and ended back up at the police department. Q. Did Officer Todd tell you what he was doing in that house? BY MR. WAIDE: Your Honor, if the Court please, I object to this; and he's again violating the motion in limine that the Court ruled on. BY THE COURT: Overruled. If I did, I didn't understand the question. BY MR. WAIDE: Sir? BY THE COURT: I didn't understand the testimony if I did. He may answer. BY MR. WAIDE: Your Honor, if the Court please, your Honor unequivocally ruled on this; and he's violating the Court's ruling. BY THE COURT: You may proceed. BY MR. HOOD: Your Honor, may I develop it outside the jury? I don't want to get close to any of the Court's rulings. BY THE COURT: I said you may ask the question and he may answer. All right, sir. Q. Did Cameron Todd tell you what he was doing in that house while you left him there? A. Yes, sir. Q. What did he tell you? A. He, Officer Todd, stated to me he had a sexual encounter. I guess that's the way to put it. Q. Did he tell you with whom? A. Missy Williams and E.K.'s aunt. ¶ 21. Todd argues that this testimony is inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts and should have been excluded under M.R.E. 404(b). Todd further argues that the trial court compounded its error by denying Todd the opportunity to impeach Ford's testimony with what Todd alleges are prior inconsistent statements.
¶ 22. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b) states: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. M.R.E. 404(b). ¶ 23. In Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 759 (Miss.1984), we said that: Proof of another crime is admissible where the offense charged and that offered to be proved are so interrelated as to constitute a single transaction or occurrence or a closely related series of transactions or occurrences. Such proof of another crime is also admissible where it is necessary to identify the defendant, where it is material to prove motive, and there is an apparent relation or connection between the act proposed to be proved and that charged, where the accusation involves a series of criminal acts which must be proved to make out the offense, or where it is necessary to prove scienter or guilty knowledge. We went on to say that evidence of defendant's crimes against Bobby Neal and Melanie Sue Polk were admissible because they were integrally related in time, place and fact with the murder of Amanda Joy. Id. We have since limited Neal, however, by holding that repeated references to other crimes which were not necessary to prove the State's case may be overly prejudicial and result in reversible error. Flowers v. State, 773 So.2d 309, 321 (Miss.2000)(reversing where State tried defendant separately on each of four murder counts and then repeatedly used evidence of all four killings in same trial). Such prejudice and evidence of prosecutorial overreaching are absent here. The record makes clear that the liaison to which Ford alluded and the alleged fondling activities to which E.K. testified (without objection from Todd) were the exact same transaction. The facts therefore much more closely parallel Neal than Flowers, and we conclude that the State's legitimate interest in telling a rational and coherent story naturally required the revelation of the adultery with Williams and E.K.'s aunt which was integrally intertwined with the fondling of E.K.
¶ 24. Todd next argues that the trial court also erred in not allowing him to impeach Ford's testimony about adultery. According to Ford, Todd told him that he [Todd] had sex with both E.K.'s aunt and Williams. In an effort to impeach Ford, Todd attempted to offer into evidence part of the transcript of Todd's first trial in which the State made a proffer of what Ford's testimony was going to be. According to Todd's interpretation of this transcript, Ford's original testimony was going to be that Todd had sex with E.K.'s aunt and Williams, while Todd only admitted to having sex with one of the women. ¶ 25. As the lower court noted when Todd first raised this issue at trial, the prosecutor during the first trial clearly stated that he was describing what he believed the testimony would be. Todd cites a number of cases for the general proposition that a witness may be impeached with prior inconsistent statements offered either through witnesses who heard the statements or through testimony at prior trials. However, Todd cites absolutely no authority for the proposition that a prosecutor's brief description of what he expects a potential witness's testimony to be is the equivalent of a prior statement of that witness for impeachment purposes. This issue is without merit.
¶ 26. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 901(a) states that [t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. M.R.E. 901(a). Todd's interpretation of this rule, apparently, is that if a party can produce any evidence that a document is what it purports to be, then the trial court must consider it authenticated. We decline to adopt such an expansive view. ¶ 27. At a hearing on post-trial motions, Todd offered the following evidence in support of his claim that the letter purportedly written by E.K., recanting her charges against Todd, was authentic: (1) testimony by Jimmy Hester that he recognized E.K.'s handwriting from having seen it on five letters to him, written two years earlier, (2) testimony by handwriting analyst Lillian Hutchinson that E.K. wrote the letter, and (3) Todd's efforts to impeach prosecution witnesses who denied the letter's authenticity. [4] Balanced against this evidence are the following factual findings upon which the trial court relied in ruling against authentication: (1) E.K. denied having written the letter, (2) Tim Hester admitted to having forged the letter, (3) the person who provided the letter to Todd's counsel indicated that she received the letter from Tim rather than E.K., and (4) an analysis by an examiner with the Mississippi Crime Lab indicating that authorship of the letter could not be conclusively determined. The trial court also found that Lillian Hutchison and Jimmy Hester were not credible witnesses. ¶ 28. A trial court's application of Rule 901 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Ragin v. State, 724 So.2d 901, 903 (Miss.1998). A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hall v. State, 611 So.2d 915, 919 (Miss.1992). On the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disregarding the testimony of Lillian Hutchison, particularly in light of the trial court's stated concerns about her qualifications and her own admission that she only compared the letter to photocopies of E.K.'s handwriting rather than originals. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in disregarding the testimony of Jimmy Hester, who admitted that he had not seen E.K.'s handwriting in two years. Consequently, we have no basis for finding an abuse of discretion regarding the authentication of the letter itself, since the only other evidence supporting its authenticity consisted of vigorous cross-examination of witnesses who otherwise flatly denied the letter's authenticity. This assignment of error is without merit.