Opinion ID: 1224879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant Hewitt's arguments

Text: Appellant Hewitt argues that the district court erred by ordering him to make restitution to an insurance company as part of his sentence. [2] The statutory basis for ordering restitution as part of a sentence is found in NRS 176.033, which provides, in relevant part: 1. If a sentence of imprisonment is required or permitted by statute, the court shall: .... (c) If restitution is appropriate, set an amount of restitution for each victim of the offense and for expenses related to extradition.... Appellant Hewitt argues that an insurance company is not a victim within the meaning of the statute. We addressed a similar question in Igbinovia v. State, 111 Nev. 699, 895 P.2d 1304 (1995), and concluded that a police department that expends buy money to secure evidence against an offender is not a victim entitled to restitution under NRS 176.033. After examining the policy and legislative intent of the sentencing statute, we were persuaded that the word `victim' has commonly-understood notions of passivity, where the harm or loss suffered is generally unexpected and occurs without the voluntary participation of the person suffering the harm or loss. 111 Nev. at 707, 895 P.2d at 1308. We hold that insurance companies are not victims within the meaning of NRS 176.033. When an insurance company pays for a victim's medical expenses, it does so pursuant to a contractual obligation to its insured and cannot therefore be said to have suffered an unexpected harm or financial loss. We therefore conclude that the district court's order directing appellant Hewitt to pay restitution to an insurance company is improper and remand with instructions to enter an order instructing appellant to pay restitution to the true victim in this case, Officer McCracken. [3] Appellant Hewitt argues that the district court erred by awarding an uncertain amount of future expenses. We have recognized that NRS 176.033 contemplates that the district court will set a specific dollar amount of restitution. The statute does not allow the district court to award restitution in uncertain terms. Botts v. State, 109 Nev. 567, 569, 854 P.2d 856, 857 (1993). Although the trial court stated during the sentencing proceeding that it would provide the State leave to seek additional restitution as the victim incurred further expenses, the judgment of conviction ordered Hewitt to pay $16,386.00. We conclude that the judgment entered by the district court, on its face, orders a specific dollar amount, and that this amount represents the entire amount of restitution owed. Thus, we conclude that the State is not entitled to seek future expenses. Appellant Hewitt also argues that the district court erred by convicting him of a lesser included offense. We agree. The district court entered judgments of convictions against appellant Hewitt for battery by a prisoner (Count I) and battery on an officer with substantial bodily harm (Count III). At sentencing, the State conceded that the offenses merge and requested the district court to enter a judgment of conviction only as to Count III. The record reveals, however, that while the district court sentenced Hewitt only as to Count III, the court entered judgments of conviction for both Counts I and III. Where one offense is necessarily included in another, a defendant can be convicted of only one. Keefe v. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 109, 560 P.2d 913 (1977). We conclude that battery by a prisoner is necessarily a lesser included offense of battery on an officer with substantial bodily harm. Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred by convicting Hewitt for battery by a prisoner and reverse the conviction. [4] Having considered all other arguments raised by appellant Hewitt, we conclude that they are meritless.