Opinion ID: 1933813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Theory B.

Text: The trial judge, as we have seen, expressed serious reservations regarding the applicability to the facts of record of the government's natural and probable consequences theory. Although the judge's initial leaning was to restrict the prosecution to Theory A, and although he recognized that the present case took him to the outer reaches of Theory B, the judge ultimately allowed the case to go to the jury on both theories, while expressly inviting this court to clarify the legal principles applicable to Theory B. We share the trial judge's initial reservations, and now conclude that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support Roy's conviction pursuant to Theory B. By invoking the natural and probable consequences theory, the government insists that we sustain Roy's convictions of armed robbery and PFCV without requiring a showing that Roy intended to participate in the robbery of Miller or in any other crime of violence. Armed robbery is a felony punishable by life imprisonment; selling a handgun, on the other hand, constitutes CPWOL, [11] a misdemeanor of which Roy has been independently convicted. [12] The government's application of the natural and probable consequences doctrine would thus dramatically expand Roy's exposure even where (as postulated here for purposes of Theory B) he did not intend that a crime of violence be committed. See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 6.8 at 158 (1986 & Supp.1994). This court has stated that an accessory is liable for any criminal act which in the ordinary course of things was the natural and probable consequence of the crime that he advised or commanded, although such consequence may not have been intended by him. Morriss v. United States, 554 A.2d 784, 789 (D.C.1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Hackney v. United States, 389 A.2d 1336, 1342 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132, 99 S.Ct. 1054, 59 L.Ed.2d 95 (1979)); see also Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 1001 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1017, 112 S.Ct. 667, 116 L.Ed.2d 757 (1991). The italicized words place a number of obvious restrictions on the reach of Theory B. The phrase in the ordinary course of things refers to what may reasonably ensue from the planned events, not to what might conceivably happen, and in particular suggests the absence of intervening factors. [13] Natural has many meanings, but the most apposite dictionary definition is in accordance with or determined by nature. [14] A natural consequence is thus one which is within the normal range of outcomes that may be expected to occur if nothing unusual has intervened. [15] We need not define probable, except to note that, even standing alone, this adjective sets a significantly more exacting standard than the word possible. Accordingly, if we accord to the words of our cases their ordinary everyday meaning, it is not enough for the prosecution to show that the accomplice knew or should have known that the principal might conceivably commit the offense which the accomplice is charged with aiding and abetting. Without inserting additional phrases or adjectives into the calculus, we think that our precedents require the government to prove a good deal more than that. A natural and probable consequence in the ordinary course of things presupposes an outcome within a reasonably predictable range. We turn to the facts at hand. We stated in Hordge v. United States, 545 A.2d 1249 (D.C.1988) that one who aids and abets a felony is legally responsible for all acts of the other persons which are in furtherance of the common purposes, design, or plan to commit the felony. Id. at 1256 (quoting Battle v. United States, 515 A.2d 1120, 1128 (D.C. 1986)). The government contends that the armed robbery of Miller was in furtherance of the common purpose because it resulted in the defendants' obtaining Miller's moneyan achievement which, according to the government, was the defendant's prime design and plan in the first place. In our view, however, an exchange of a handgun for $400 is qualitatively different from an armed robbery in which Ross stole $600 and retained for himself the object which, in Roy's contemplation, was supposed to be sold. Not the least of the differences is that violence directed to the intended buyer may ricochet against the seller-turned-assailant. To suggest that a sale and an armed robbery have a common purpose is to exaggerate their similarities and to understate their differences. The government argues that Peppi Miller was a logical target of a robbery because, given the illegal nature of the activity in which he was involved, [he] was unlikely to file a complaint with the police about the robbery. [16] This reasoning, however, recognizes no apparent limiting principle. If we were to accept the government's position, then the robbery of any buyer or seller in a drug or unlicensed pistol sale would be viewed as the natural and probable consequence of that transaction, for a participant in any illegal project may well be reluctant to invoke the aid of the constabulary. [17] Moreover, as Roy points out, the buyer may be as likely to rob the seller as the seller is to rob the buyer; the government's reasoning would arguably sustain prosecution of Roy as an aider and abettor of armed robbery even if Miller had robbed Ross, rather than the other way around. In this case, in our view, no impartial jury could rationally conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Roy cross[ed] a moral divide by setting out on a project involving either the certain or contingent commission of a robbery. Cf. United States v. Powell, 289 U.S.App.D.C. 131, 134, 929 F.2d 724, 727 (1991). Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence would perhaps support a finding that Roy should have known that it was conceivable that Ross might rob Miller. The evidence was insufficient, however, to show that a robbery would follow in the ordinary course of events, or that it was a natural and probable consequence of the activities in which Roy was shown to have engaged. We must therefore reverse for evidentiary insufficiency Roy's conviction for armed robbery. Armed robbery was the predicate crime of violence on which the government relies to sustain Roy's PFCV conviction. Indeed, according to the government, it was Roy's complicity in the armed robbery [which] established his complicity in possessing the weapon which was used to effectuate the robbery. Because the government has failed sufficiently to connect Roy to the predicate offense, his conviction for PFCV likewise cannot stand. See Whitaker v. United States, 617 A.2d 499, 501 (D.C.1992). [18]