Opinion ID: 2367192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nature of the Hearing

Text: Because § 1325(a) lacks § 1322's 60-day limit on pretrial detention, appellants claim they are entitled to greater procedural due process protections than this court found would be required for pretrial detention under § 1322. Specifically, appellants contend that they have a right to: (1) a hearing concerning the basis of the proposed detention; (2) notice reasonably in advance of the hearing setting forth the specific facts on which the government intends to rely to establish dangerousness; (3) confront in person all eyewitnesses upon whom the government would rely; (4) present evidence; (5) compulsory process; and (6) a written decision setting forth findings of fact based on clear and convincing evidence and setting forth with specificity the reasons for the detention. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) sets the minimum procedural process due under the Fourth Amendment for pretrial detention. While the process in Gerstein was aimed at a determination of offense probable cause, we see no meaningful difference between that and the decision here on the additional factors of likelihood of flight and danger to the community. In Gerstein, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. Id. at 115, 95 S.Ct. at 864. The Court also held that such adversary safeguards as right to counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process were not essential for the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment, since such procedures would exacerbate problems of pretrial delay. Id. at 120-23, 95 S.Ct. at 866-67. Surely, if a process is adequate for Fourth Amendment purposes, there is no reason why it should not be adequate for Fifth Amendment purposes. In Edwards, this court held that while the procedures required by § 1322 (right to a hearing, to representation by counsel, to present evidence, to testify, and to present witnesses) were constitutionally adequate, they were not constitutionally required because [a]n arrestee has no constitutional rights to cross-examination, confrontation, or compulsory process or to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a bail proceeding. United States v. Edwards, supra at 1336. In fact, the historic precedent for holding persons accused of first-degree murder without bail supports application of the minimum procedural protections required by the Court in Gerstein v. Pugh, supra . This view was expressed in Judge Ferren's concurring and dissenting opinion in Edwards. He distinguished pretrial detention without bail in capital cases, for which the Gerstein Fourth Amendment analysis would apply, from pretrial detention in noncapital cases for which he felt Fifth Amendment analysis would be more appropriate. Edwards, supra at 1353 n. 3. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Therefore, based on Edwards, this court rejects appellants' contention that § 1325(a) violates their rights to confrontation and compulsory process. The government correctly notes that § 1321(b), which is incorporated by reference in § 1325(a), provides a defendant with sufficient notice of the factors the court will consider in its determination concerning flight and danger to the community. Specifically, that provision mandates consideration of such matters as the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against such person, his family ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental conditions, past conduct, length of residence in the community, record of convictions, and any record of appearance at court proceedings, flight to avoid prosecution, or failure to appear at court proceedings. D.C. Code 1981, § 23-1321(b). Though § 1325(a), unlike § 1322, does not state that a hearing is required prior to detention without trial, these appellants were given hearings. Because a § 1325(a) determination could result in a significant pretrial restraint of liberty, some type of hearing is required to insure a fair and reliable determination. See Gerstein v. Pugh, supra at 125-26, 95 S.Ct. at 868-69. Though § 1325(a) does not expressly give a defendant the right to present evidence, counsel were permitted to present extensive argument and any information relevant to the bail determination. D.C.Code 1981, § 23-1321(b). This is consonant with the informal nature of the hearing, which allows counsel to make factual presentations concerning the factors under § 1321(b), without the need for a formal evidentiary hearing. See Blunt v. United States, D.C. App., 322 A.2d 579 (1974) (clear and convincing standard of proof under § 23-1322 is met by informal proceedings similar to those found in the instant case). Just as the court in Gerstein v. Pugh, supra at 121, found that adversary safeguards were not necessary at a probable cause hearing, this court concludes that there is no constitutional right to a formal evidentiary hearing in a § 1325(a) hearing. The hearing contemplated by the legislature is an informal one in which the presiding judge entertains representations from counsel and the bail agency. This is in accord with § 1321(b), which instructs that the judicial officer shall, on the basis of available information determine which conditions of release, if any, will reasonably assure against flight and danger. (Emphasis added.) By specifying available information, the legislature expressed its intent that the hearing would be an informal one in which counsel made representations concerning the available information.