Opinion ID: 663465
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the conduct punished by each conviction

Text: 12 Taylor alternatively argues that the behavior which sustained his state conviction is linked to the behavior supporting his federal conviction, thus preventing the lower court's consideration of the state sentence when calculating his criminal history score for federal sentencing purposes. This argument is also without merit. 13 The Sentencing Guidelines instruct a trial court that prior sentences can be considered only if such sentences are imposed for conduct other than that being punished in the current federal case. Specifically, the Guidelines state: 14 A sentence imposed after the defendant's commencement of the instant offense, but prior to sentencing on the instant offense, is a prior sentence if it was for conduct other than conduct that was part of the instant offense. Conduct that is part of the instant offense means conduct that is relevant to the instant offense under the provisions of Sec. 1B1.3. 15 U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2, comment. (n. 1) (emphasis added). 16 In an attempt to facilitate application of this language to actual cases, in Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1338, we referred to a variety of factors that courts should consider when determining whether conduct underlying prior sentences is severable from conduct supporting a federal conviction. These factors include the temporal and geographical proximity of the two offenses, common victims, and a common criminal plan or intent. Id. 17 In the instant case, Taylor was convicted in state court for attempted rape and attempted sodomy of minor children. His federal conviction, on the other hand, was for the transmission of materials depicting children in a sexually explicit manner. The behavior underlying these two convictions was temporally and geographically distinct. Moreover, they did not exploit a common victim, or arise out of a common criminal scheme other than the very general strategy of abusing children. 1 The attempted rape and sodomy of the undercover agent's fictional children, therefore, was not a part of the instant offense. Consequently, the lower court's consideration of Taylor's state conviction for purposes of federal sentencing was not erroneous. 18