Opinion ID: 2116227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: PERA Challenge

Text: Plaintiffs also contend that Act 374 violates the PERA. In light of my conclusion that Act 374 does not, on its face, violate the Separation of Powers Clause, I am compelled to address this issue. Initially, I agree with the following observation of the Court of Appeals: Of course, if 1996 PA 374 is inconsistent with [the PERA] or any previously enacted statute, then Act 374 is not, on that account alone, invalid. Rather, Act 374 would effect a repeal of such other statute by implication. Washtenaw Co Rd Comm'rs v. Public Service Comm, 349 Mich 663, 680, 85 NW2d 134 (1957); Antrim Co Social Welfare Bd v. Lapeer Co Social Welfare Bd, 332 Mich 224, 228; 50 NW2d 769 (1952). This notion is a corollary to the principle that one Legislature cannot enact irrepealable legislation or restrict its own power or that of its successors concerning the repeal or amendment of statutes. Atlas v. Wayne Co Bd of Auditors, 281 Mich 596, 599, 275 NW 507 (1937). [228 Mich.App. at 393, n. 4, 579 N.W.2d 378.] In his dissent, Judge Markman accurately summarized the parameters of the PERA: The PERA is the principal state law regulating public employment relations; it generally prevails over conflicting laws that do not specifically address collective bargaining. Local 1383, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Warren, 411 Mich 642, 655; 311 NW2d 702 (1981). A primary goal of the [PERA] is to resolve labor-management strife through collective bargaining. Port Huron Ed Ass'n v. Port Huron Area School Dist, 452 Mich 309, 311; 550 NW2d 228 (1996). Under the PERA, a public employer must bargain collectively with representatives of its employees regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. MCL 423.215(1); MSA 17.455(15)(1); Port Huron, supra at 317 [550 N.W.2d 228]. [228 Mich.App. at 457, 579 N.W.2d 378.] In St. Clair Prosecutor v. AFSCME, Local 1518, 425 Mich. 204, 233, 388 N.W.2d 231 (1986), we recognized the coemployer status in collective bargaining. We noted that this concept is especially useful in the historically fragmented power structure of county government. Id. We held that the use of the coemployer status, which may require public employees' representatives to bargain with more than one person, does not appear to impose an undue burden on the collective bargaining process. Id. In his dissent, Judge Markman aptly stated: Contrary to plaintiff JAA's assertion, members of different branches of government may be considered coemployers for purposes of the PERA. St Clair Prosecutor involved a coemployer relationship between a county prosecutor, who is a member of the executive branch, People v. Trinity, supra at 22 [471 N.W.2d 626]; People v. Potts, 45 MichApp 584, 589; 207 NW2d 170 (1973) (partial concurrence by Holbrook, P.J.), and a county, which in those circumstances was operating within the legislative sphere, Alan v. Wayne Co, 388 Mich 210, 245, 200 NW2d 628 (1972). [228 Mich.App. at 459, 579 N.W.2d 378.] Here, § 593a makes Wayne County and the chief judge coemployers for purposes of the PERA. Section 593a provides roles for both the local funding unit and the chief in collective bargaining, requires both to participate in collective bargaining, [3] and binds both to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Because Act 374 does not limit plaintiffs' ability to collectively bargain over all the terms and conditions of employment and ensures that both Wayne County and the chief judge will be bound by any collective bargaining agreement, I conclude that it is not inconsistent with the PERA.