Opinion ID: 1848429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compliance with Statutory Provisions.

Text: It is not disputed that the city attorney is a public official whose appointment or selection is within the homerule authority of a municipality. Thompson v. Whitefish Bay (1950), 257 Wis. 151, 42 N. W. 2d 462. However, the appellant does contend that the exercise of this authority must comply with the provisions of sec. 66.01, Stats. Sub. (2) (b) thereof requires that: Every charter ordinance which amends or repeals the whole or any part of a city or village charter shall designate specifically the portion of the charter so amended or repealed, and every charter ordinance which makes the election mentioned in subsection (4) of this section shall designate specifically each enactment of the legislature or portion thereof, made inapplicable to such city or village by the election mentioned in subsection (4) of this section. Sec. 66.01 (4) to which sec. 66.01 (2) (b) refers provides: Any city or village may elect in the manner prescribed in this section that the whole or any part of any laws relating to the local affairs and government of such city or village other than such enactments of the legislature of state-wide concern as shall with uniformity affect every city or every village shall not apply to such city or village, and thereupon such laws or parts thereof shall cease to be in effect in such city or village, but is inapplicable to the instant case. The charter ordinance amended by the respondent and approved by referendum referred only to sec. 20.07 (2) of the Wauwatosa city code and in pertinent part specifically stated that Section 20.07 (2) of the Code is hereby amended by the deletion therefrom of the words `City Attorney.' It is apparent that it did not refer to ch. 62 of the Wisconsin statutes which, as previously noted, constitutes the general charter for all cities of the second, third and fourth classes. The appellant thus contends that to be effective as a change of charter, it would have had to refer specifically to sec. 62.09 (3) (b), Stats., and declare either that the city was electing that such section of the charter was inapplicable to the city or declare that in selecting its city attorney by appointment of the mayor, subject to the confirmation of the city council, it was amending the charter to provide for the use of the advisory panel. In support of this contention he cites State ex rel. Coyle v. Richter (1931), 203 Wis. 595, 234 N. W. 909, wherein this court invalidated a charter ordinance which made the election mentioned in sec. 66.01 (4), Stats., but failed to specifically designate the statute thus made inapplicable to the city. From this case the appellant correctly concludes that any charter ordinance which failed to designate the portion of the city charter being amended or repealed would likewise be declared invalid. However, the appellant's argument is fallacious in that it assumes that the word charter as used in sec. 66.01 (2) (b), Stats., refers exclusively to ch. 62 of the statutes. Since by definition a charter ordinance includes ordinances which amend the city's charter, it naturally follows that upon enactment such ordinances become part of the city's charter. The charter ordinance being attacked on this appeal was enacted to amend a previous charter ordinance which upon enactment had become part of the city's charter. Such charter ordinance had been numbered sec. 20.07 (2), and reference thereto by the instant charter ordinance fulfilled the requirement of sec. 66.01 (2) (b), Stats. We conclude that the amended charter ordinance is valid and in full force and effect. It is controlling and prevails over the election of a city attorney. By the Court. Judgment affirmed. BEILFUSS, J., took no part.