Opinion ID: 65023
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant Hammond

Text: Hammond contends that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him outside of room 923. He further argues that the officers did not have consent or valid exigent circumstances to enter room 923, or, alternatively, that the officers themselves created the exigent circumstances. Finally, he contends that his prior Texas conviction which resulted in the imposition of deferred adjudication probation does not support enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). Hammond concedes that this final issue is foreclosed by our precedent, see United States v. Washington, 480 F.3d 309, 318 (5th Cir.2007), and thus we do not address it further. Hammond's remaining issues are considered in turn below.
The record facts provided the officers with reason to believe that Hammond had purchased methamphetamine from the occupants of room 940. They therefore support the district court's probable cause determination. The officers observed Hammond enter a room registered to an individual they suspected of distributing methamphetamine. He stayed in the room for just a few minutes, then left. The limited duration of Hammond's visit is consistent with a drug transaction. Shortly after he left, the officers overheard one of the females state, you are a real drug dealer now (implying that someone had just sold Hammond drugs) and another female state that she was like the ice cream man (meaning she distributed methamphetamine). The officers also overheard the females counting money, activity consistent with their belief that the females had sold Hammond drugs. Later, the officers heard the females using a butane lighter, a device commonly used by those who smoke methamphetamine. Given these facts, it was reasonable for the officers to conclude that Hammond was the individual that the females in room 940 had sold drugs to. Indeed, that is the most reasonable conclusion given these facts.
As mentioned, the testimony concerning whether Mrs. Hammond consented to the officers' initial entry into room 923 is conflicting and the district court did not make a fact finding on this issue. We need not delve into this conflict, however, because the district court correctly held that Mrs. Hammond's decision to open the door to room 923 created exigent circumstances justifying the officers' warrantless entry. A district court's finding of exigent circumstances constitutes a factual finding reviewed only for clear error. United States v. Howard, 106 F.3d 70, 74 (5th Cir.1997). Exigent circumstances are generally found where there is a risk to the safety of law enforcement or innocent bystanders, or that evidence might be destroyed. United States v. Blount, 123 F.3d 831, 837 (5th Cir.1997). In United States v. Rico, this Court identified a non-exhaustive list of factors that bear on the exigency analysis: (1) the degree of urgency involved and amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant; (2) [the] reasonable belief that contraband is about to be removed; (3) the possibility of danger to the police officers guarding the site of contraband while a search warrant is sought; (4) information indicating the possessors of the contraband are aware that the police are on their trail; and (5) the ready destructibility of the contraband and the knowledge that efforts to dispose of narcotics and to escape are characteristic behavior of persons engaged in the narcotics traffic. 51 F.3d 495, 501 (1995) (citation omitted). When evaluating the existence of exigency, this Court considers the appearance of the scene of the search in the circumstances presented as it would appear to reasonable and prudent men standing in the shoes of the officers. United States v. Rodea, 102 F.3d 1401, 1405 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Our focus is on the totality of the circumstances leading up to the challenged entry or search rather than on the isolated actions of law enforcement. Howard, 106 F.3d at 74. If reasonable minds could differ, we will not second-guess the judgment of experienced law enforcement officers concerning the risks of a particular situation. Blount, 123 F.3d at 838. The district court found that, when the officers arrested Hammond and Nichols in the hallway outside of room 923, Mrs. Hammond opened the door to room 923 to see what the commotion was. At this point, the officers already had evidence linking Hammond and Nichols to Lora (an individual that Blanton had identified as his methamphetamine source), and to the drug activities that had transpired in room 940. Because Hammond was attempting to enter room 923, it was reasonable for the officers to assume that it was Hammond's room or one of his accomplice's. Although the officers had no particular knowledge that weapons were located in room 923, fear for officer safety may be reasonable during drug arrests, even in the absence of any particularized knowledge of the presence of weapons, because in drug deals it is not uncommon for traffickers to carry weapons. United States v. Maldonado, 472 F.3d 388, 394 (5th Cir.2006) (citation and internal quotation omitted). Finally, the officers had no idea who the individual opening the door to room 923 was, or whether that individual intended the officers harm. Under these circumstances, exigency justifying the officers' protective sweep of room 923 existed on two grounds: (1) that the individual opening the door to room 923 might be armed; and (2) that the individual, upon seeing the officers, might attempt to dispose of any drugs contained in room 923.
The validity of the district court's exigency finding, however, does not end this Court's inquiry. The government cannot rely on exigent circumstances to excuse a warrantless entry if it created the exigent circumstances through its own actions. Rodea, 102 F.3d at 1410. We distinguish between cases where the exigent circumstances arise naturally during a delay in obtaining a warrant and those where officers have deliberately created the exigent circumstances. Id. at 1409 (citation omitted). When determining whether the government created the exigent circumstances, this Court considers not just the motivation of the officers, but also the reasonableness and propriety of the investigative tactics that created the exigency. Id. Hammond contends that the officers created any exigency that may have existed by knocking on the door to room 923, causing Mrs. Hammond to open it. But, as mentioned, the district court concluded that Mrs. Hammond opened the door to room 923 to investigate the commotion created by Hammond's arrest as he attempted to enter room 923 with his card key. Testimony from the suppression hearing supports this fact finding. Thus, Mrs. Hammond's initial appearance in the hallway, and the perceived risk to the officers created by that appearance, resulted from the actions of Hammond, not those of the officers. See United States v. Newman, 472 F.3d 233, 239 (5th Cir.2006) (When the occupants of the house create the circumstances amounting to the exigency in response to a reasonable law enforcement tactic, the agents cannot have manufactured it themselves.). The reasonableness of the officers' actions are further supported by Hammond's unanticipated decision to attempt to enter room 923 (as opposed to room 940), a room that the officers did not have under surveillance and knew nothing about. Thus, when the officers approached Hammond, they had probable cause for his arrest, he was attempting to enter an unidentified room, and the officers did not know whether the room was occupied. Under these circumstances, we do not conclude that the officers manufactured the exigency created by Mrs. Hammond's sudden appearance in the hallway. The officers were therefore justified in making warrantless entry into room 923.