Opinion ID: 1852594
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Joint Participant Exception

Text: We next turn to the determination of the trial court that the couple's joint criminal activity constituted an additional basis to preclude application of the marital privilege. The joint participant exception, also borrowed from federal jurisprudence, bars the application of the marital privilege to a defendant who engaged in joint criminal activity with his or her spouse. See United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th Cir.1974). This exception is based on reasoning that the policy of preserving family harmony is not sufficiently important to justify assuring a criminal that he can enlist his or her spouse as an accomplice without fear of creating an adverse witness. Id. Appellant again argues that it was improper for the trial court to recognize an exception to the testimonial privilege that was not identified in the statute, and that the legislature is in a better position to address public policy issues than the court. We have not directly ruled on denial of the spousal privilege based on the joint participation of the spouses in criminal activity, although we have indirectly supported its rationale, see, e.g., Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d at 676 ('A loyal spouse should not, in our view, become a partner in crime with the blessing of the law bestowed through a strained construction of the statute which is said to be supported by a policy of promoting marital bliss' quoting People v. Simpson, 39 Ill.App.3d 661, 350 N.E.2d 517, 524 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 68 III.2d 276, 12 Ill.Dec. 234, 369 N.E.2d 1248 (1977)), and we have expressly recognized the strict application of a privilege where it stands as a barrier to testimonial disclosure, Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of Minneapolis, 310 Minn. 313, 320, 251 N.W.2d 620, 624 (1976) (citation and quotation omitted). Nonetheless, as noted above, our appellate courts have a history of recognizing the important social policy objective of preserving the marital relationship and deferring to the legislature to determine public policy with regard to family and marital issues. [16] For example, we refer again to Hannuksela where we addressed as a first impression what acts or gestures are included in the term communication in Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(a): the spouse cannot be examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage. 452 N.W.2d at 675. Even though the defendant and his spouse were divorced at the time of trial, we stated: [W]e feel free to adopt a construction which seems to best reflect the law's social policy of protecting the marital relationship without erecting artificial `barriers to the ascertainment of truth.' Id. at 676 (quoting Larson, 275 Minn. at 402, 147 N.W.2d at 586) (citation omitted). Later we again emphasized the importance of protecting marital confidences as the public policy served by section 595.02, subd. 1(a) and cited Wigmore on Evidence: `The privilege has for its object the security from apprehension of disclosurea security of consequence of which confidences will be freely given and not withheld.' 452 N.W.2d at 676 (quoting VIII J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2337 at 657 (McNaughton rev.1961)). Thus, while we recognize the concern for establishing artificial barriers to the truth, our jurisprudence clearly weighs the balance in favor of the social policy of protecting the sanctity of the marriage. It is simply too great a departure from over 100 years of this court's jurisprudence [17] to adopt an exception to the marital privilege of this nature. The dissent argues that in this 100 years of case law nothing has been said about a joint participant exception to the privilege against adverse spousal testimony. This is precisely the point. We have not adopted such an exception and we decline to do so, preferring instead to defer a policy determination of this nature to the legislature, the branch of government historically responsible for addressing issues of public policy relating to the sanctity of the family. While we do not condone the ringing silence of the prime witness to the crime, given the strong policy supporting the privilege embodied in the common law and statute, we choose not to graft such an exception on to the privilege at this time. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law in its ruling that the alleged joint criminal activity of appellant and Jamie justified an exception to the marital privilege.