Opinion ID: 3003336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The amount of force the defendants used to

Text: restrain Catlin Again, the reasonableness of a particular use of force depends on the circumstances of the case. Graham, 490 5 The district court disregarded Catlin’s allegation that at least one defendant drew his gun in the course of the arrest, finding that this allegation was contradicted by Catlin’s deposition testimony. Catlin has not challenged this finding on appeal. 10 No. 07-3903 U.S. at 396. Catlin’s principal argument is that when officers use more than a de minimis amount of force in carrying out an arrest, the question of whether the use of force was reasonable is for the jury. Catlin relies heavily on our decision in Abdullahi, where we said “since the Graham reasonableness inquiry nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom, we have held on many occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” 423 F.3d at 773 (quoting Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Catlin focuses on the conclusion of this remark—namely, that summary judgment should be granted sparingly in excessive force cases—while disregarding the premise on which it was based. The reason that summary judgment is often inappropriate in excessive force cases is that the parties typically tell different stories about what happened. Here, by contrast, there are no material factual disputes. According to both parties, Catlin was tackled, at which point Uhlir held him in place by forcibly placing his knee on Catlin’s back while Hale handcuffed him. In the light of the fact that Catlin admitted that he “struggled really, really hard” and managed temporarily to break free, these actions were reasonable as a matter of law. Further, while there are superficial similarities between the facts of the this case and those of Abdullahi, the facts and the issues presented by the two cases are different. No. 07-3903 11 In Abdullahi, three officers took the arrestee to the ground, at which point one of the officers testified that he placed his right knee on the arrestee’s back and increased the pressure until he stopped struggling. 423 F.3d at 765. When the arrestee was fully subdued, the officers realized that he had stopped breathing. Paramedics were unable to resuscitate him, and he was later declared dead. Id. at 766. Four doctors testified that the arrestee suffered from injuries consistent with strangulation, and that his chest had been crushed. Id. Based on this record, we reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants, holding that, [t]he reasonableness of kneeling on a prone individual’s back during the arrest turns, at least in part, on how much force is applied. Kneeling with just enough force to prevent an individual from “squirming” or escaping might be eminently reasonable, while dropping down on an individual or applying one’s full weight (particularly if one is heavy) could actually cause death. Id. at 771. Viewed at a high level of generality, Abdullahi stands for the rather unsurprising proposition that a knee-to-theback restraint may or may not be reasonable depending on the circumstances. While this may seem to lend some support to Catlin’s excessive force claim, Abdullahi is distinguishable from the present case for two reasons. First, in Abdullahi, the officers used deadly force. Cases involving deadly force will often present more difficult questions concerning the reasonableness of the force 12 No. 07-3903 that was used than cases like this one, where the arrestee was able to leave the scene without assistance and apparently required no immediate medical attention. Second, and most significantly, Abdullahi presented disputed factual issues concerning the type of force that the defendants used: although the defendants testified that they merely placed a knee on the arrestee’s back, the plaintiff introduced medical evidence that the arrestee had been strangled and his chest crushed. Here, by contrast, there is no evidence—direct or circumstantial—that contradicts the defendants’ version of events.6 In short, in the present case, unlike Abdullahi, there are no factual disputes the resolution of which could make it reasonable to conclude that the defendants’ use of force was disproportionate given the threat they reasonably believed they faced. 2. The defendants’ failure to identify themselves as officers Catlin also argues, somewhat more plausibly, that it was unreasonable for the defendants to fail to identify themselves as police officers at some point during the arrest. Here, it is helpful to distinguish between the defendants’ 6 Catlin argues that medical records show that he suffered serious injuries as a result of this incident. But these medical records post-date the incident by two years. Whatever Catlin’s 2005 MRI results show, they do not show that the defendants used excessive force when they arrested him in 2003. No. 07-3903 13 failure to identify themselves initially, and their failure to identify themselves after they had forced Catlin from his motorcycle but before they had fully restrained him. It seems to us that there was nothing unreasonable about the defendants’ initial failure to identify themselves. The defendants believed that Catlin was armed and that there was a high probability that he would fight if he were given the opportunity. Having concluded that they needed to act quickly in order to minimize the risk to themselves and to bystanders, the defendants could have reasonably concluded that they needed to use the element of surprise to their advantage. The defendants’ continuing failure to identify themselves after they forced Catlin from his motorcycle seems to us more problematic. On Catlin’s version of events, the defendants told him to “quit resisting” when they had him face-down on the grass, but they did not identify themselves as police officers until after he was handcuffed. Assuming, as we must, the truth of these allegations, the risk the defendants ran in failing to identify themselves is that Catlin would think that he was being attacked by common criminals and that this would make him more likely to resist. Indeed, this may have been what actually happened. Catlin admitted that after he was forced from his motorcycle, he struggled and managed to break free. Had the defendants identified themselves as police officers, it is conceivable that Catlin might haven given up without a fight, thus obviating the need for the defendants’ final show of force. At any rate, a reasonable jury might so conclude. 14 No. 07-3903 It seems to us a close question whether the defendants’ failure to identify themselves was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.7 However, even if we assume that the defendants’ failure to identify themselves as officers after wrestling Catlin from his motorcycle was objectively unreasonable, they would still be entitled to qualified immunity unless the putative unlawfulness of their conduct was apparent in the light of pre-existing law. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Public employees are not required, at their financial peril, to anticipate developments in constitutional law.”). Even where a plaintiff can show that an officer’s use of force was objectively unreasonable, qualified immunity 7 While we decline to decide whether the defendants’ failure to identify themselves as police officers violated Catlin’s Fourth Amendment rights, we note that “[p]olice officers who unreasonably create a physically threatening situation in the midst of a Fourth Amendment seizure cannot be immunized for the use of deadly force.” Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993). Presumably this is equally true when police officers unreasonably contribute to a situation in which they are forced to use non-deadly force. On the other hand, we must make allowances for the defendants’ split-second judgments. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. Accordingly, our sister circuits have been reluctant to hold that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment where his or her split-second judgments exacerbate the need for force. See Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2003); Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 780 (4th Cir. 1993); Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1992). No. 07-3903 15 affords the officer an additional layer of protection. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. Specifically, while the substantive constitutional standard protects officers’ reasonable factual mistakes, qualified immunity protects them from liability where they reasonably misjudge the legal stan- dard. See Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 583, 650-51 (1998); Teressa E. Ravenell, Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should Look Beyond Summary Judgment When Resolving § 1983 Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 Vill. L. Rev. 135, 156 (2007). In the present case, it is far from clearly established that the Fourth Amendment requires police officers to identify themselves in the course of carrying out an arrest in a public place. To the contrary, while the Supreme Court has held that police officers usually must announce their identity before carrying out an arrest in a private dwelling, Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995), we are aware of no court of appeals decision that has recognized a constitutional obligation on the part of the police to announce their identity when they carry out an arrest in a public place.8 Further, the district courts that have considered this issue are, if anything, divided. Compare Johnson v. Grob, 928 F. Supp. 889, 905 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (“a seizure outside the home may be unreasonable because the officers involved were not identified or 8 Without reaching the question of whether such a constitutional obligation exists, the First Circuit held that this putative obligation would not have been clearly established in 1990. See St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1995). 16 No. 07-3903 identifiable as such, and the seized person suffers injuries because of the officers’ lack of identification.”) and Newell v. City of Salina, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1155 (D. Kan. 2003) (holding that a seizure “without having identified themselves as law enforcement officers, may not be objectively reasonable.”) with Sanchez v. City of New York, No. 96-C-7254, 2000 WL 987288, at  (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000) (rejecting the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim because it “assumes the uncertain proposition that the reasonableness of a seizure outside the home depends on whether the police officer made an announcement or identification”). If there is a legitimate question as to the existence of the right at issue, then qualified immunity attaches. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 n.12 (1985). In the present case, even if the defendants had consulted a casebook prior to formulating their plan, they still would not have had fair notice that they had a constitutional obligation to announce their identity prior to completing the arrest. Thus, they are entitled to qualified immunity.