Opinion ID: 1174404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The statutory claim must be filed in an inverse condemnation proceeding.

Text: As we have said, the Plaintiffs urge that, if the filing was not timely under § 9-2-332, W.S. 1977, this omission is not fatal because Article 1, Section 33, is self-executing. Article 16, Section 7, of the Wyoming Constitution commands the filing of claims with the officer or offices whose duty it may be to audit the same before money can be paid out of the State Treasury, and this section of our constitution is of equal dignity with Article 1, Section 33, which prohibits the taking or damaging of property without just compensation. In fact, the two provisions are not in conflict. The rights afforded by Article 1, Section 33, are protected even though the directive of Article 16, Section 7, are complied with, since Article 16, Section 7, is no more than a regulation of the procedure by which the rights guaranteed by Article 1, Section 33, will be exercised. It is not a substantive limitation imposed upon such rights. The Napolitanos rely upon the authority expressed by those courts which have found that state statutes requiring a timely filing of claims with a particular state official are not a condition precedent to suits against the state in inverse condemnation. This is an extension of the philosophy that such constitutional provisions as those found in Article 1, Section 33, are self-executing. Generally, the states which have come to this conclusion have done so upon the theory that the constitutional right to just compensation is beyond legislative destruction. The theory behind the argument is that constitutional provisions which assure citizens their right to recover from the state for property taken are limitations on the state government's power and, therefore, the state cannot restrict a limitation which has been placed upon it. Alexander v. State, 142 Mont. 93, 381 P.2d 780; State ex rel. Herman v. Mestas, 12 Ariz. App. 289, 469 P.2d 855; Armbruster v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage District, 165 Neb. 459, 86 N.W.2d 56; Boitano v. Snohomish, 11 Wash.2d 664, 120 P.2d 490; and Decker v. State, 188 Wash. 222, 62 P.2d 35. States which have held that claim-filing statutes are capable of limiting the time in which one must seek just compensation in inverse condemnation cases approach the problem from the standpoint of the reasonableness of the limitation. California, in City of San Jose v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 12 Cal.3d 447, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701, specifically has held that their claim statute applies to cases of inverse condemnation. In City of San Jose, supra, the California Supreme Court said: The claims statutes provisions apply to actions brought both for nuisance and for inverse condemnation. ( Bellman v. County of Contra Costa (1960), 54 Cal.2d 363, 369, 5 Cal. Rptr. 692, 353 P.2d 300; Dorow v. Santa Clara County Flood Control Dist. (1970), 4 Cal. App.3d 389, 391, 84 Cal. Rptr. 518; Mosesian v. County of Fresno (1972), 28 Cal. App.3d 493, 495, 104 Cal. Rptr. 655.) The fact that inverse condemnation is founded directly on the California Constitution (art. I, § 14) neither excuses plaintiffs from compliance with the claims statutes ( Powers Farms v. Consolidated Irr. Dist. (1941), 19 Cal.2d 123, 126, 119 P.2d 717; Dorow v. Santa Clara Flood Control Dist., supra, 4 Cal. App.3d 389, 391-392, 84 Cal. Rptr. 518), nor renders the claims statutes unconstitutional. ( Crescent Wharf, etc., Co. v. Los Angeles (1929), 207 Cal. 430, 278 P. 1028; Dorow v. Santa Clara County Flood Control Dist., supra, 4 Cal. App.3d 389, 391-392, 84 Cal. Rptr. 518.) 115 Cal. Rptr. at p. 802, 525 P.2d, at 706. We discussed the problem at hand in North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 30 Wyo. 238, 219 P. 561, 572, aff'd, 268 U.S. 276, 45 S.Ct. 491, 69 L.Ed. 953. In this case, a landowner-plaintiff sought a restraining order against the county's taking a part of his land for road purposes. The statute provided for objections or claims for damages to be filed within a time period to be established by a board. In compliance, a date was set and notice given that all objections or claims for damages had to be filed by June 7, 1917. Plaintiff, however, filed objections and his claim for damages on June 30, 1917. Several days later, the county commissioners executed and filed a document which purported to be an extension of the time for filing such objections. Since the statute providing for the filing of objections did not include the authority for the Board of County Commissioners to extend the time period after it was initially set, the objection was held to be untimely. Plaintiff argued that the statute could not impose upon an owner whose property is sought to be taken in eminent domain proceedings a condition that, in order to be entitled to compensation, he must file a claim therefor. Cited in support of this contention were cases from Washington and Nebraska, the Supreme Court of Nebraska having held that claim statutes do not affect inverse condemnation actions. We noted that the Nebraska case argued by the plaintiff dealt with a constitutional provision identical to that of Wyoming on eminent domain, but these cases did not persuade us that this should be the law of this state. We concluded that as long as the damages are payable absolutely in highway proceedings, ample provision exists under our laws for ultimate payment. We found this sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the constitution. The opinion contemplates that the entity in charge of the highway construction is entitled to know the claims made and objections entered at a time which would then enable that entity to determine whether or not to place the burden of the expense of construction upon the taxpayers. The court did not feel justified in holding a law requiring the presentment of a claim for damages within a given time as unconstitutional when, ... reasonable provision has been made and reasonable opportunity has been given, after notice, for the landowner to do so... . In so holding, we cited the following authority: Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Defiance, 52 Ohio St. 262, 305, 40 N.E. 89, and other Ohio cases cited; Brookville, etc., Co. v. Butler, 91 Ind. 134, 46 Am.St.Rep. 580; Kansas City v. Duncan, 135 Mo. 571, 37 S.W. 513; Petet v. McClanahan, 297 Mo. 677, 249 S.W. 917; Sala v. Pasadena, 162 Cal. 714, 124 P. 539; Potter v. Ames, 43 Cal. 75; Taylor v. Drainage District, 167 Iowa 42, 148 N.W. 1040, L.R.A. 1916B, 1193; State v. Messenger, 27 Minn. 119, 6 N.W. 457; Simms v. R.R. Co., 59 Tenn. 621; Bost v. Cabarrus County, 152 N.C. 531, 67 S.E. 1066; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U.S. 88, 17 S.Ct. 748, 754, 42 L.Ed. 87; 20 C.J. 871, 872, and Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 344. Having in mind the North Laramie Land Company case, and other authority which stands for the reasonableness of § 9-2-332, when tested against Article 1, Section 33, we are compelled to the conclusion that § 9-2-332 applies to inverse condemnation claims  and so hold.