Opinion ID: 12692
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: During Closing Argument

Text: 35 Fletcher insists that his conviction must be reversed because of the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument. Specifically, he contends that during closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the following inculpatory facts that were never introduced into evidence: that Fletcher was homeless around the time of the bank robbery; 9 that Fletcher lied by telling an FBI agent that he had never been to Webster, Texas; and that Denise Burse made an in-court identification of Fletcher. 36 We will reverse a conviction for improper prosecutorial remarks only where the defendant's right to a fair trial is substantially affected. See United States v. Andrews, 22 F.3d 1328, 1341 (5th Cir.1994). The critical question that we must resolve is whether the prosecutor's remarks cast serious doubt on the correctness of the jury verdict. Id. The relevant factors to consider are: (1) the magnitude of the prejudicial effect, (2) the efficacy of any cautionary instruction, and (3) the strength of the evidence supporting the defendant's guilt. See id. Because Fletcher objected to only one of the allegedly improper comments, he bears an even greater burden; we will reverse only upon a showing of plain error. See id. In such a situation, Fletcher must show that the plain error jeopardizes his substantial rights and seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Calverley, 37 F.3d at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted). This he has not done. 37 The prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's comments is slight. The first remark--that Fletcher was homeless--is inconsequential and was made only in passing. The prosecutor's second statement--that Fletcher lied by asserting that he had never been to Webster, Texas--is only slightly prejudicial. The important fact is not that Fletcher lied, but that witnesses placed him at the Bank of America in Webster, Texas. The prejudice resulting from this remark is far from enough to warrant reversal under the plain error standard. Finally, the prejudicial effect of the third remark--that Burse identified Fletcher in court--is slight because she did identify him in a photo array and because Penny Sondecker identified Fletcher in court. 38 The other two factors outlined in Andrews also support affirmance. The court never had the opportunity to caution the jury as to two of the statements because none of the defendants objected to the prosecutor's statements. Finally, as we outlined in Part III of this opinion, the evidence linking Fletcher to the crime is substantial. Thus, we decline to reverse Fletcher's conviction on this ground.