Opinion ID: 626993
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Consecutive Sentence Mandate

Text: Berrios's principal argument is that § 924(j) lacks any indication that a sentence is to be stacked on top of his other offenses, and therefore the requisite congressional intent is not present. He also observes that the consecutive sentence mandate exclusively applies to a penalty imposed under subsection (c), see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), and contends that a sentence imposed pursuant to a subsection (j) conviction is not imposed under subsection (c) because, following the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Julian, 633 F.3d at 1252-57, subsection (j) constitutes a separate offense. Although the government concedes that § 924(j) establishes a discrete crime from § 924(c), this has no bearing on our decision: we are persuaded that under any reasonable interpretation, 18 U.S.C. 924(j) is subject to the consecutive sentence mandate provided in § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). First, in light of Congress's clear intent to stack punishments for all § 924(c) violations, we agree with the Tenth Circuit that [t]he failure to repeat the prohibition against concurrent sentences set forth in § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) does not demonstrate that Congress has determined that the penalty set forth in § 924(j) should not be imposed `in addition to' any other term of imprisonment. Battle, 289 F.3d at 668. After all, the consecutive sentence mandate is the heart of the statutory scheme set forth by subsection (c); its veritable raison d'etre. See Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 9-10, 117 S.Ct. 1032. It takes no special insight or leap of logic to conclude that the central reason for Congress's choice of language in writing subsection (j)during the course of a violation of subsection (c)was to ensure that separating out subsection (j) from subsection (c) did not deprive the law of a coherent sentencing scheme, the heart of which is the consecutive sentence mandate. [16] As we have said before, [o]nce Congress has clearly stated an intention to stack punishments as it did in section 924(c), `it need not reiterate that intent in any subsequent statutes that fall within the previously defined class.' Bishop, 66 F.3d at 575 (quoting United States v. Singleton, 16 F.3d 1419, 1428 (5th Cir. 1994)). To interpret the text any other way would give rise to an anomalous result: that a defendant convicted under § 924(c) is subject to an additional consecutive sentence only in situations that do not result in a death caused by use of a firearm. Allen, 247 F.3d at 769; Battle, 289 F.3d at 668 (quoting Allen, 247 F.3d at 769). We agree with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits that it is highly unlikely that Congress, which clearly intended to impose additional cumulative punishments for using firearms during violent crimes in cases where no murder occurs, would turn around and not intend to impose cumulative punishments in cases where there are actual murder victims. Battle, 289 F.3d at 668 (quoting Allen, 247 F.3d at 769). In light of the statutory scheme and purpose shared by subsection (c) and subsection (j), we simply cannot impute a contradictory intent to Congress without some underlying rationale. This reading is supported by our prior interpretation of § 924(c)'s prefatory clause, which instructs that the penalties enumerated in subsection (c) apply in addition to the punishment provided for the predicate crime of violence or drug trafficking offense, except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see Abbott, 574 F.3d at 206-08. As we discussed in Abbott, the prefatory clause's mandatory sentencing scheme is not limited to subsection (c), because [i]n referring to alternative minimum sentences, the prefatory clause mentions `any other provision of law' to allow for additional § 924(c) sentences that may be codified elsewhere in the future. ... 574 F.3d at 208 (emphasis added). The clause thereby provides a safety valve that would preserve the applicability of any other provisions that could impose an even greater mandatory minimum consecutive sentence for a violation of § 924(c). United States v. Studifin, 240 F.3d 415, 423 (4th Cir.2001). Although Abbott did not place subsection (j) squarely before us at that time, we think that subsection (j) was the unambiguous target of this safety valve. Accordingly, if Congress wanted to increase the mandatory minimum for a violation of subsection (c) resulting in the death of a person, it could do so in subsection (j) without rewriting the entire statute. Cf. Bishop, 66 F.3d at 575. Thus, Congress's intent in imposing cumulative punishment on a defendant for both a § 924(c) violation and a predicate offense was not constrained to those penalties provided solely by that subsection. Rather, the consecutive sentence scheme is intended to impose additional punishments for any violation of subsection (c), whether the penalties for such violations are provided in that subsection or elsewhere. Second, we think that Berrios's interpretation of sentences imposed under subsection (c) to exclude subsection (j) lacks a firm textual basis and is unduly restrictive in light of the statutory scheme. Of course, imposed under could refer to only those sentences literally listed in subsection (c), but that is by no means the only possible definition. For instance, Webster's defines under as, in part, subject to regulation by, see Webster's Third Int'l Dictionary (1989), and so it is equally plausible that a sentence imposed under subsection (c) means subject to regulation by subsection (c), a definition under which subsection (j) would clearly qualify. But in light of the statutory scheme as a whole, it is apparent that the phrase serves a functionalas opposed to literalpurpose, by identifying those sentences imposed as a consequence of a subsection (c) offense: in other words, those sentences handed down for a subsection (c) violation. Although we decline to follow the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in concluding that subsection (j) merely sets forth sentencing elements to be applied to a subsection (c) offense, see Battle, 289 F.3d at 666; Allen, 247 F.3d at 769, such a determination is not dispositive. [17] The sentencing scheme embodied by subsection (c) does not distinguish between an increased sentence provided as a function of a sentencing factor, as in § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), see Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 552-54, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), or an element of a separate offense, as in § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), see Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 125-26, 120 S.Ct. 2090, 147 L.Ed.2d 94 (2000). Nor do we think that, where an offense is defined jointly by two statutory provisions, a sentence can only be imposed under one of them. Rather, we are persuaded that a subsection (j) sentence qualifies as a sentence imposed under subsection (c), even though it is also imposed under subsection (j), because they are part and parcel of the same statutory scheme, and jointly provide the legal basis for the sentence. Simply put, because a § 924(j) sentence is imposed on a defendant for violating subsection (c), such a sentence is imposed under subsection (c). [18] We find the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning to the contrary unpersuasive. See Julian, 633 F.3d at 1253. In concluding that a subsection (j) penalty is not imposed under subsection (c) because subsection (j) provided [defendant's] sentence, the Eleventh Circuit looked to decisions of our sister circuits that have declined to read section 924(o), which punishes `conspir[acies] to commit an offense under subsection (c),' as requiring consecutive sentences. Id. But neither United States v. Clay, 579 F.3d 919, 933 (8th Cir.2009), nor United States v. Stubbs, 279 F.3d 402, 405-09 (6th Cir.2002), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Helton, 349 F.3d 295, 299 (6th Cir.2003), the two cases on which Julian relies, are analogous. In those cases, the defendant was charged and convicted of a § 924( o ) offense, but sentenced under § 924(c), thereby posing a severe problem under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). See Stubbs, 279 F.3d at 408-09. Here, on the other hand, as in Julian, the defendant was convicted and sentenced under the same provision, § 924(j), thereby implicating none of the concerns underlying those decisions. Moreover, § 924( o )'s relationship to § 924(c) is easily distinguishable from that of § 924(j): § 924( o ) creates a conspiracy offense, which is by nature inchoate, and therefore does not require that the defendant actually commit the underlying crime. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975). In that regard, a § 924( o ) sentence, unlike § 924(j), is in no way dependent on a § 924(c) violation, and therefore provides no guidance for our analysis here. Based on our reading of the statutory scheme, we conclude that Congress intended a defendant who violates subsection (c) to be subject to enhanced sentences by virtue of the consecutive sentence mandate. A defendant who violates subsection (j) by definition violates subsection (c), and therefore is subject to the mandate, regardless of whether § 924(j) constitutes a discrete criminal offense from § 924(c). And when Congress required proof of a § 924(c) violation before imposing the penalties listed under § 924(j), it intended to include a subsection (j) penalty within the scope of those sentences imposed under subsection (c). Finding that Congress clearly intended to impose cumulative punishment for a violation of subsection (j) and any other offense, see Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137, we reject Berrios's double jeopardy challenge accordingly.