Opinion ID: 1328164
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Out of Home Placement

Text: The Appellant's first assignment of error is three-fold: he maintains that the lower court erred in placing him out of the home without adequate findings of fact; erred in finding that no less restrictive disposition would be appropriate; and erred in failing to have an adjudicatory order in place at the time of disposition. As emphasized by the Appellant, this Court has consistently accentuated the necessity for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law justifying out of home placement of juveniles. In the recent pronouncements of this Court in State v. Damian R., 214 W.Va. 610, 591 S.E.2d 168 (2003), [8] we specified as follows in pertinent part of syllabus point two: [S]uch a petition [for out-of-home placement] may only be granted upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that such a custody or placement order is actually necessary; that the effective provision of services cannot occur absent such an order; and that all reasonable efforts have been made to provide appropriate services without an out-of-home placement or custody transfer; and orders granting such placement and/or transfer must be based on specific findings and conclusions by the court with respect to the grounds for and necessity of the order. In the case sub judice, the lower court made specific findings of fact, as outlined in the final order and quoted above. In addition to those written findings, the lower court expressed the following findings orally at the conclusion of the March 2003 hearing: There really hasn't been any denial on the part of [the Appellant] or his mother concerning his failure to regularly attend school this year. The Court's not been presented with any documentation that would justify the number of absences that have been alleged and he pretty much acknowledged that he has continued to be absent from school. So here we have three (3) school years now. We're into the third year that he has missed a substantial number of school days. The truancy continues, the services haven't been much good  there may have been some improvement, but they really haven't done much good.... Now the Court finds that Ms. W. [Appellant's mother] cannot provide the necessary supervision [the Appellant] needs at the present time to insure that he gets his education as required by law. As I indicated, he's now had three (3) school years that have been substantially missed because of his failure to regularly attend school. The Court finds that continuation in the home is contrary to [the Appellant's] best interests. Again, because he's not receiving his education. The Court believes that reasonable efforts have been made to prevent placement out of home by both the Court and the Department [DHHR] and that placement out of the home at this time is in his best interest. Our review of the lower court's action in this matter reveals that the lower court provided sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to justify its conclusion that the Appellant's placement order was, in the language of Damian, actually necessary; that the effective provision of services cannot occur absent such an order; and that all reasonable efforts have been made to provide appropriate services without an out-of-home placement and/or custody transfer. 214 W.Va. at 617, 591 S.E.2d at 175. This Court has noted that the court must set forth on the record findings of fact which support the conclusion required by the statute.... State ex rel. B.S. v. Hill, 170 W.Va. 323, 327, 294 S.E.2d 126, 129 (1982). We further find that the Damian requirements have been met since the order in the case sub judice granting such placement or transfer ... [was] based on specific findings and conclusions by the court with respect to the grounds for and necessity of the order. 214 W.Va. at 617, 591 S.E.2d at 175. The Appellant's contention that the lower court failed to choose the least restrictive appropriate alternative is equally without merit. Indeed, West Virginia Code § 49-5-11a(c) does require the court to make every effort to place juveniles in community-based facilities which are the least restrictive alternatives appropriate to the needs of the juvenile and the community. This Court recognized this directive in Damian, explaining that we must emphasize that the entire statutory scheme for status offenders contemplates that removal from the home and/or transfer of custody from a parent be undertaken only when necessary and upon clear and convincing proof that no less restrictive alternative is feasible. 214 W.Va. at 616, 591 S.E.2d at 174. The Damian Court also emphasized that [t]he removal of a juvenile status offender or delinquent from his parent's custody is authorized `only when the child's welfare or the safety and protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal....' W.Va.Code, 49-1-1(a)(12)(b) [49-1-1(b)1999]. Id. at 616, 591 S.E.2d at 174. Applying such principles to the case at bar, the procedural history of this matter reveals the extensive efforts undertaken by the lower court and the DHHR to comply with the statutory mandates. An improvement period, with specified conditions designed to accomplish appropriate results, was first implemented. The Appellant did not comply with the conditions of the improvement period, and it was revoked. Additional measures, such as in-home services and personal counseling were also implemented, to no avail. Thus, less restrictive alternatives were attempted and were unsuccessful. Based upon our review of the record, it appears that the evidence adduced at the hearing legally established the necessity of transferring legal custody of the Appellant to the DHHR and removing him from his home. Under the circumstances presented to the lower court, its action did constitute the least restrictive alternative. The Appellant further contends that the dispositional order is invalid because an adjudicatory order had not been entered in this case. The lower court did rule from the bench that the Appellant was being adjudicated as a status offender based upon poor school attendance. [9] No order was entered at that time, apparently due to the difficulty encountered in obtaining medical records. Although the Appellant contends that the court's failure to enter a written order memorializing its decision rendered subsequent action void, this Court has previously indicated that orders which have not been reduced to writing still have the full force and effect of written orders. In syllabus point one of Moats v. Preston County Commission, 206 W.Va. 8, 521 S.E.2d 180 (1999), for instance, this Court explained that [g]enerally, an order is effective when a court announces it. Syllabus point two of Moats continued: An oral order has the same force, effect, and validity in the law as a written order. In other words, the actual physical possession of a written order is not required to effectuate said order. The lower court clearly had adjudicated the Appellant as a status offender prior to entering the dispositional order. In view of the lower court's findings on the record, we conclude that no reversible error was committed in this case. [10]