Opinion ID: 1795931
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: GM's Motion for a JML

Text: Our standard of review on a motion for a JML is well settled. When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court uses the same standard the trial court used initially in deciding whether to grant or deny the motion for a JML. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So.2d 3 (Ala.1997). Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to allow the case to be submitted to the jury for a factual resolution. Carter v. Henderson, 598 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1992). The nonmovant must have presented substantial evidence in order to withstand a motion for a JML. See § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975; West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). A reviewing court must determine whether the party who bears the burden of proof has produced substantial evidence creating a factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury. Carter, 598 So.2d at 1353. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury would have been free to draw. Id. Regarding a question of law, however, this Court indulges no presumption of correctness as to the trial court's ruling. Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So.2d 1126 (Ala.1992). Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875 So.2d 1143, 1152 (Ala. 2003).
GM argues that we should change the law in Alabama to embrace the standard for admitting expert testimony set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), instead of retaining the standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), which we have followed for many years. See Courtaulds Fibers, Inc. v. Long, 779 So.2d 198 (2000), and Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So.2d 505 (2000). We decline to change the standard in this case. As we discuss in Part II.C. of this opinion, regardless of whether we abandon Frye and embrace Daubert, Mundo's expert testimony was admissible and offered substantial evidence of alternative designs. In fact, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 702, Fed.R.Evid., when it was amended to reflect the issuance of Daubert and related cases, [15] contain a statement that particularly applies to Mundo's expertise in this case. The Comments state: Nothing in this amendment is intended to suggest that experience aloneor experience in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or educationmay not provide a sufficient foundation for expert testimony. To the contrary, the text of Rule 702 expressly contemplates that an expert may be qualified on the basis of experience. In certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, basis for a great deal of reliable expert testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony of a handwriting examiner who had years of practical experience and extensive training, and who explained his methodology in detail); Tassin v. Sears Roebuck, 946 F.Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D.La.1996) ( design engineer's testimony can be admissible when the expert's opinions `are based on facts, a reasonable investigation, and traditional technical/mechanical expertise, and he provides a reasonable link between the information and procedures he uses and the conclusions he reaches' ). See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, [526 U.S. 137, 156] 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1178 [, 143 L.Ed.2d 238] (1999) (stating that ` no one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized experience. '). (Emphasis added.) Clearly, Mundo's experience and expertise were factors the jury could properly consider in this case, regardless of whether we reviewed his testimony under the standard enunciated in Daubert or the standard enunciated in Frye. Courtaulds, 779 So.2d at 202.
In an AEMLD case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving a design defect. In order to prove that a product is defective for purposes of the AEMLD, a plaintiff must prove that `a safer, practical, alternative design was available to the manufacturer at the time it manufactured the [product]. The existence of a safer, practical, alternative design must be proved by showing that: `(a) The plaintiff's injuries would have been eliminated or in some way reduced by use of the alternative design; and that `(b) taking into consideration such factors as the intended use of the [product], its styling, cost, and desirability, its safety aspects, the foreseeability of the particular accident, the likelihood of injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury if that accident occurred, the obviousness of the defect, and the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the defect, the utility of the alternative design outweighed the utility of the design actually used.'  Beech v. Outboard Marine Corp., 584 So.2d 447, 450 (Ala.1991) ..., (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1191 (Ala.1985), overruled on other grounds, Schwartz v. Volvo North America Corp., 554 So.2d 927 (Ala. 1989)). Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So.2d 839, 858 (Ala.2002) (emphasis omitted). GM first argues that the trial court should have excluded Mundo's testimony in its entirety because he did not test, build, model, or draw his proffered alternative designs, and it insists that Mundo's untested and subjective opinion was inadmissible. GM also criticizes Mundo's testimony because, it argues, Mundo did not offer the opinion that his untested alternative designs would have provided the six to eight extra inches of space that Dr. Burton testified would have been required to prevent Jeffrey's brain injury and because Mundo did not know how much more space Dr. Burton said was needed. In its brief to this Court, GM points to Mundo's testimony, based on his experience as an automotive-design engineer, that he `believe[d] that these alternative designs would have made a difference' and `preserved the occupant space' by preventing any intrusion of the A-pillar. In support of its argument that Mundo's testimony was inadmissible, GM relies on Slay v. Keller Industries, Inc., 823 So.2d 623, 626 (Ala.2001), in which this Court held: Mere assertions of belief, without any supporting research, testing, or experiments, cannot qualify as proper expert scientific testimony under either the `general-acceptance' standard enunciated in Frye or the `scientifically reliable' standard of Daubert.  GM characterizes as deficient Mundo's failure to personally perform any tests, and then concludes that Mundo's opinions are not supported. GM also denounces Mundo's opinions as nothing more than mere assertions of belief. After reviewing all of Mundo's testimony, we conclude that GM has mischaracterized Mundo's opinions. The allegedly defective product in Slay was a ladder, and this Court disallowed an expert's opinion. There, the expert admitted that he had performed no tests on the ladder in question or on exemplar ladders. However, he went further and admitted that he had not determined that the ladder on which Slay was injured was in any way defective in its design, manufacture, or distribution, or that the manufacturer had failed to provide adequate warnings. Consequently, the only evidence available to Slay was his expert's bald assertion that the ladder was possibly underdesigned. 823 So.2d at 626. Mundo's testimony cannot be fairly compared to that of the expert in Slay. Although Mundo did not personally conduct any tests, unlike the Slay expert he had access to significant test data from GM, as well as to the two automobiles from the accident itself, all of which he claimed he had relied upon. He also had considerable personal expertise, a factor GM conceded. Mundo relied upon GM's test results concerning both the first- and second-generation H-cars, actual evidence from the collision, and his design expertise. We cannot agree with GM's contention that Mundo had no basis upon which to render an expert opinion. GM also contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a JML because, it says, Jernigan did not introduce sufficient evidence of the availability of a safer, practical, alternative design. GM's appellate counsel [16] have parsed the record and seized upon what they depict as a fatal gap in the proof of the availability of a safer, practical, alternative design. GM states that Dr. Burton testified that to avoid Jeffrey's injuries, the intrusion of the right front structures had to be reduced by six to eight inches. GM then states in its brief to this Court that Dr. Burton could not and did not say whether Jeffrey impacted the A-pillar or another of the car's right front structures. GM then argues that Mundo's testimony regarding an alternative design dealt only with the A-pillar, thus leaving a gap in proof because, it argues, Mundo did not testify concerning what GM refers to as an alternative design that would have reduced the intrusion of all of those structures that Jeffrey may have impacted by Burton's necessary 6-8 inches. GM also points to the following exchange between GM's trial counsel and Dr. Burton on cross-examination: Q.... And I believe you told us in terms of the exact place that Jeffrey's head hit in the accident, you weren't sure if it was the A-pillar or the dash? A. I don't have a marker like I have that says I'm going to put my finger on the exact spot, but I can put my hand in the general area. That's all. Q. Either the dash or the A-pillar? A. Yes. In order to accept GM's argument, we would have to overlook other testimony the jury could have properly considered. First, with respect to GM's attempt to confine Dr. Burton's testimony regarding the areas of the passenger compartment that could have caused Jeffrey's head injury to [e]ither the dash or the A-pillar, Dr. Burton also testified on direct examination: It's my opinion that [Jeffrey] has a very severe brain injury as a consequence of his head striking some part of the right front side of the dash where the pillar that supports the windshield comes down on the right side and where the door panel comes in that corner, right up in there.  (Emphasis added.) Obviously Dr. Burton was gesturing at this point, and the record does not include a description of where the witness was pointing. Neither the California attorney who signed the appellate brief, the Birmingham attorney who presented oral argument on behalf of GM, nor this Court had the opportunity to hear the evidence and to view the gestures of the witness as did the jury and the trial court. Dr. Burton continued: It's my opinion that if the space in which Jeffrey had been seated, the occupant space, if the dash had been kept further away from him, if the support pillar for the window had not straightened up and came [sic] in toward him, because he was wearing a restraint and because it looked like the restraint worked as it should have, that he would not have this severe injury which was a life-threatening injury, and the severity of it was such that in some people it could have caused him to be dead. But in order to protect, it is my opinion, you need to have more space in the area where Jeffrey was sitting. Dr. Burton identified the right front side of the dash where the pillar that supports the windshield comes down on the right side and where the door panel comes in that corner, right up in there. He then identified what he called the support pillar for the window, an obvious reference to the A-pillar, and said had the support pillar not straightened up and [come] in toward him, Jeffrey would not have been so severely injured. Dr. Burton further testified, describing a photograph he took of the Oldsmobile: I took [the photograph] to show the profileprimary profile of damage to the front. This is the A-pillar I was talking about which should be sloped down like this. And instead, the bottom of it has been pushed back, and not only back, it has been pushed somewhat inboard into where the occupants are. Dr. Burton continued, comparing photographs he took of the Pontiac with photographs of the Oldsmobile: You can see very easily from looking at photos of the Pontiac that this pillar is not nearly as vertical. The roof line is not kinked up. The right front door is not deformed like this. There is more space inside that Pontiac, for whatever reason, than there is in this Oldsmobile. Although GM attempts to attribute to Dr. Burton the mere identification of structures as the site where Jeffrey struck his head, Dr. Burton's testimony quoted above contradicts this theory. Moreover, Dr. Burton's testimony about structures follows his specific testimony previously noted as to the site of the impact. Dr. Burton testified: It's my opinion that if Jeffrey had 6 or 8 inches of space that he didn't have, that the [seat] belt would have been allowed to give him that extra distance.... And that even if he did make contact with some of the structures, it would be a softer contact. May not have made any contact at all. If he made contact, it would be much softer. He wouldn't have the severe brain injury that he has. And he has no other severe injury.... So if we can keep his head from having a severe impact with the structures in front of him, Jeffrey's okay. Contrary to GM's argument, Dr. Burton's reference to structures related to areas in the vehicle that could not have caused serious injury and that reference, therefore, cannot serve as the basis for a gap in proof as to the availability of a safer, practical, alternative design. This Court has held in a products-liability case that we do not permit the losing party to cherry-pick a single answer to a question. We must look at the evidence as a whole. Although certain portions of [the plaintiff's expert's] testimony were somewhat self-contradictory (to the extent that he later admitted that he was of the opinion that the design defects alone would not have caused this tipover), viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we hold that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to support a verdict of liability against [the defendant] based on design defects. Mallory v. Hobbs Trailers, 554 So.2d 966, 969 (Ala.1989). Based upon Dr. Burton's testimony, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cause of Jeffrey's injuries was a collision between Jeffrey's head and the structure of the car where the dashboard meets the A-pillar. The jury also could have concluded that the dashboard came in toward the passenger compartment when the A-pillar, which is ordinarily at an angle commensurate with the angle of the windshield, straightened out because it was unable to maintain that angle. Had it maintained the angle, the dashboard would not have intruded into the passenger compartment. In this context, the reference to impact at either the dash or the A-pillar does not mean, as GM argues, that there is a fatal gap in the proof. Moreover, GM has not shown that Dr. Burton was unable to identify the appropriate structural components involved in causing Jeffrey's injury. The dissent states that Jernigan presented evidence indicating only that certain design changes, among others, were made in the second-generation H-car that, considered in isolation from the other aspects of the overall design of the vehicle, contributed to Jeffrey's injury. 883 So.2d at 676. Jernigan's experts, however, did not consider the design changes in isolation. Testifying at a service station about the two automobiles involved in this accident, where both vehicles were on display for the benefit of the jury, Mundo stated: These vehicles [the Oldsmobile and the Pontiac] were in the same accident. According to Newtonian physics, the same forces applied to these cars. If you will, starting with this car [the Oldsmobile] up front, notice how this upper shotgun beam [the upper rail] is bent but it's not necessarily crushed. It just kind of wimped out of the way. This is the beam that used to be high-strength steel that they put low-strength steel in for the fenders. Notice how it's just bent, not crushed. Remember the soda straw where we talked about how it would crush or the accordion and that [GM] in that document put things like holes in here and so forthlike triggersto allow this thing to crush. It didn't. It just bent. When that failed and in combination with the backup structure, secondly notice how this rocker [beam]look how it's bent, turned all the way inboard. That part of the rocker [beam] would have been tied to that part of the torque box. That could not happen as we saw over here in the Pontiac. But over here because they're not tied together, notice how that collapsed. When that rocker [beam] collapsed like that, that allowed this hinge pillar to move into the space where Jeffrey Jernigan was sitting. That's one. .... Now we're looking at the door-guard beam itself. That's this pipe that we looked at earlier. You see where it's shaved from here? It's shaved back to almost nothing as it welds here. And you can see where it was shaved here. See where it's bent there? And then it goes around the corner all the way over to here. That bend there is sympathetic with the bend here. The two of them bent together around the corner. When that happened, again it was up to this and it was up to this to keep that and that from closing on one another. But they bent. They bent because they shaved it back. Those permitted pillars, the floorYou take all that combination together and you can see that it went into the people zone. So now when you ride the seat belt down in the crash, well, there's hardly enough room in there as you can imagine for a human being to sit, much less ride the belt down. The defects again, this beam, notches, not enough welds, door-guard beam shaved it back, rocker [beam] not tied to the primary beams underneath. That swings on into the toe pan area where there's not enough reinforcements inside the rail to do the job. All of those added together along with weakening the shotgun [beam], the whole thing just caved right on him.  (Emphasis added.) Mundo clearly based his opinion on the effect of the combination of the criticized design changes that he identified in the second-generation H-car, not on the effect of each design change in isolation. Finally, GM argues that Mundo's alternative designs changed throughout the course of the litigation. GM contends that Mundo first testified in his deposition that the Ford Taurus embodied his alternative designs, [17] changed his theory at trial to point to the 2000 Pontiac as a better design, and then at oral argument changed again to rely upon the design of the first-generation H-car. We do not find that to be true. Throughout Mundo's testimony, he consistently pointed to the same defects he identified in the upper rails, the door-guard beams, the front lower rails, and the lack of torque boxes. He used different examples to illustrate his alternative designs, but the fact that he used more than one example does not change his underlying theory that safer, practical, alternative designs were available. The dissent attempts to eliminate the safer design associated with the Ford Taurus. As we discuss in detail in footnote 17, the record reflects that Mundo considered the Taurus as one of three examples that illustrated his alternate designs but that the parties disputed whether he had ever relied solely upon the Taurus and then abandoned that theory. The dissent then attempts to eliminate the safer design associated with the Pontiac. The dissent concludes that the 2000 Pontiac Grand Prix cannot qualify as an alternative design because there was no evidence indicating that its design was available to GM when it manufactured the Oldsmobile. To the contrary, Jernigan established that the torque boxes in the Pontiac were comparable to the torque boxes used in automobiles Mundo designed in the 1980s. The Pontiac also had the longer front lower rails Mundo had identified in the first-generation H-car and in the rear of the Oldsmobile. After attempting to eliminate the Taurus and the 2000 Grand Prix as examples of a safer, practical, alternative design, the dissent focuses its attention exclusively on the proof relating to the first-generation H-car. Assuming only for the sake of argument that the elimination of the Taurus and the 2000 Grand Prix stands on solid ground, the conclusion in the dissent that Jernigan failed to prove that the changes made in the first-generation H-car to produce the second-generation H-car made the second-generation H-car defective disregards the evidence in the record. Likewise, the conclusion in the dissent that [t]here is no meaningful discussion of the utility of the first-generation H-car in comparison to the Oldsmobile is also unsupported by the record. 883 So.2d at 676. Proof that the first-generation H-car was less likely to cause serious head injury on collision would be evidence of greater utility of the first-generation H-car. See footnote 12. A showing that the redesign of the second-generation H-car made it more likely to expose an occupant to a devastating head injury is evidence of the greater utility of the first-generation H-car. Jernigan presented evidence from which the jury could have drawn such a conclusion. Jernigan's proof cannot be criticized, as the dissent contends, for failure to prove overall utility because of what the dissent perceives to be an absence of evidence concerning factors such as `styling, cost, and desirability [of the product], its safety aspects, the foreseeability of the particular accident, the likelihood of injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury if that accident occurred, the obviousness of the defect, and the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the defect.' 883 So.2d at 675 (quoting Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So.2d 839, 858 (Ala.2002)). With respect to styling and desirability, Jernigan offered evidence indicating that GM made structural changes in its second-generation H-car to make it look less like GM's luxury line of vehicles because of concerns that GM was losing sales of its luxury vehicles to the first-generation H-car. Those structural changes permitted changes in styling. The jury had before it evidence that, if it so chose, could justify the structural and concomitant styling changes as a legitimate business concern for which GM should not be faulted. Of course, the jury did not find that the utility in the styling change justified the increased danger to passengers. Moreover, evidence that the styling of the first-generation H-car was so popular that it was taking sales away from GM's luxury line effectively eliminates any basis for a conclusion that incorporation of Jernigan's safer, practical, alternative design would produce an ugly duckling with the aesthetic appeal of an army tank. Further, the addition of a beam or a torque box to support the floor pan under the feet of the passenger, a design found in cars manufactured before 1992 and involving an area not visible to the style-conscious buyer, does not implicate the component of design related to styling. With respect to cost, Jernigan offered evidence that the redesign resulted in cost savings of $2,500 per second-generation H-car. GM contended that only $100 of this amount was allocable to the structural changes in the second-generation H-car. The jury had before it evidence that, if it so chose, could justify the structural changes to the second-generation H-car as a legitimate business concern for which GM should not be faulted. Of course, the jury did not find that the cost savings in the structural changes justified the decrease in the safety of passengers. Further, the fact that GM successfully marketed thousands of units of the first-generation H-car with the structural design advocated by Jernigan was evidence that the jury could consider in evaluating whether the alternative design was practical from a cost standpoint. With respect to the foreseeability of this particular accident, Jernigan established that a front-end collision is so foreseeable that GM actually performs tests involving such collisions. No rationally functioning jury could conclude that GM was taken by surprise when this almost head-on collision was reported to it. With respect to the likelihood of injury and the probable seriousness of the injury if such an accident occurred, Jernigan offered the test results performed by GM on the first-generation H-car and the second-generation H-car dealing with risk of head injury. The jury had before it evidence that, if it so chose, could justify the conclusion that one of the consequences of GM's structural changes that could not have been foreseen was serious injury to the occupants. The jury, however, did not find that the injury and its seriousness was unlikely. The conclusions in the dissent that the main opinion contains no meaningful discussion of the utility of the first-generation H-car in comparison to the Oldsmobile, 883 So.2d at 676, and that Jernigan, through his expert, Mundo, failed to prove that those designs were in fact safer and practical when more than just the performance of the A-pillar was considered, namely, the overall design, styling, and cost of the vehicle were considered, 883 So.2d at 677, cannot stand scrutiny on this record. Jernigan offered credible evidence of various safer, practical, alternative designs that would have prevented the compression of the occupant compartment that resulted in the impact to Jeffrey's skull. [18] The requirement for proving that a safer, practical, alternative design was available is evidence indicating (1) that the plaintiff's injuries would not have occurred or would have been less severe, and (2) that the usefulness of the alternative design outweighed the usefulness of the design used. Hannah, 840 So.2d at 858. [19] Jernigan produced such evidence. While GM offered rebuttal evidence, the jury had before it evidence from which it could have found in favor of either GM or Jernigan. The jury made its decision, and it is not this Court's function to reweigh the evidence the jury found to be adverse to GM at trial. Viewing all of the evidence, not merely isolated portions of the transcript, in favor of Jernigan, the nonmovant, as settled precedent requires, we conclude that Jernigan introduced sufficient evidence to allow him to present to the jury the question whether a safer, practical, alternative design was available to GM when it manufactured the Oldsmobile. Therefore, the trial court properly denied GM's motions for a JML, and we affirm that portion of the postjudgment order.