Opinion ID: 166742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Wilson's Misconduct Conviction

Text: 27 Upon review of Mr. Wilson's Class X misconduct conviction, we now expressly adopt the conclusion that Gamble suggests and Sandin requires: the misconduct conviction infringed a liberty interest because it reduced his credit earning class in a manner that inevitably affect[ed] the duration of his sentence. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293. As we have noted, as a direct result of the Class X misconduct conviction, Mr. Wilson was automatically demoted from a level-four credit earning classification to level one. Moreover, Oklahoma DOC policy prohibited Mr. Wilson from being considered for promotion beyond level two for a period of two years. Prison officials exercised absolutely no discretion over the imposition of these two punishments and had no discretion to allow Mr. Wilson to avoid them. Okla. DOC Policies OP-060107(I)(C)(2)(a)(5); OP-060107(I)(C)(2)(c) & (d); OP-060103(a)(M). Thus, Mr. Wilson lost more than a mere opportunity to earn credits upon satisfactory completion of a job or program in the future. See Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d at 571-72; Higgason, 83 F.3d at 809-10; Bulger, 65 F.3d at 50. 28 That lack of discretion contrasts markedly with the discretionary effect on the prisoner's chances of parole in Sandin, where the disciplinary infraction was only one of a myriad of considerations, 515 U.S. at 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293, that could affect whether the prisoner received an early release. In Mr. Wilson's case, the only consideration in his demotion and prevention from promotion was the misconduct conviction. These effects were not the result of prison officials' discretion after they considered a number of factors; rather they occurred solely, automatically, and mandatorily because of the misconduct conviction. This but for causation is the kind of direct result that Sandin requires for a disciplinary action to have an inevitable effect on a sentence. See 515 U.S. at 487 n. 10, 115 S.Ct. 2293. 29 We find additional support for this conclusion in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641 (7th Cir.2001). There, the Seventh Circuit held that Indiana prisoners are deprived of liberty when demoted to a lower credit-earning status. The court cited Supreme Court decisions holding that prisoners may have a liberty interest in the expectation of parole where the parole boards' discretion is limited by mandatory language in a statute or a regulation. Writing for the panel, Judge Easterbrook analogized the opportunity to earn credits toward early release to those parole cases, noting that [a] hope to be released before the expiration of one's term on good-time credits is no different in principle from a hope to be released on parole. Id. at 645. Judge Easterbrook examined the statute at issue and noted that it required prisoners to be assigned to a credit-earning class unless certain events occurred, thus curtail[ing] administrators' discretion and ... giv[ing] prisoners more than a subjective hope of receiving day-for-day credit. Id. The impact of a demotion in class level on the prisoner's sentence was directly traceable and clearly evident: but for the demotion, the prisoner would have continued to earn credits. See id. Thus, the Indiana statute created a liberty interest.