Opinion ID: 2637946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retrial is barred by Wilmer's right against double jeopardy.

Text: A defendant has a valued right to have his [or her] trial completed by a particular tribunal. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 142, 938 P.2d at 573 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978)). Generally, a defendant may not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. U.S. Const. amends. V & XIV; Hawai`i Const. art. I, § 10. Further bars to reprosecution are contained in HRS § 701-110 (1993). [7] Thus, an analysis of a defendant's double jeopardy claim must usually consist of constitutional as well as statutory analysis. State v. Miyazaki, 64 Haw. 611, 617, 645 P.2d 1340, 1345 (1982). As noted supra, retrial is not barred where the defendant consented to a mistrial or there was manifest necessity for the mistrial. However, when the mistrial is prompted by prosecutorial misconduct, even where the defendant consented to the mistrial, the consent can be negated by the egregiousness of the prosecutor's misconduct. In State v. Rogan , this court held that reprosecution after a mistrial or reversal on appeal as a result of prosecutorial misconduct is barred where the prosecutorial misconduct is so egregious that, from an objective standpoint, it clearly denied a defendant his or her right to a fair trial. 91 Hawai`i 405, 423, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 (1999).
A defendant can consent to a mistrial expressly, such as through a motion for a mistrial, or impliedly. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 142, 938 P.2d at 573. In the present case, Wilmer moved for a dismissal with prejudice. The trial court concluded that this constituted consent to the mistrial. Wilmer made it clear, however, that he did not contemplate further proceedings if dismissal were granted. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, De Lima further made it clear that the defense was not seeking a mistrial. He specifically stated, We're asking for dismissal with prejudice, and later acknowledged that if the defense moved for a mistrial, Wilmer could be retried. Wilmer's motion and defense counsel's arguments clearly indicate that Wilmer did not consent to a mistrial. The United States Supreme Court has stated: Even when judicial or prosecutorial error prejudices a defendant's prospects of securing an acquittal, he may nonetheless desire to go to the first jury and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an acquittal. United States v. Jorn, [400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971)]. Our prior decisions recognize the defendant's right to pursue this course in the absence of circumstances of manifest necessity requiring a sua sponte judicial declaration of mistrial.... ... In such circumstances, the defendant generally does face a Hobson's choice between giving up his first jury and continuing a trial tainted by prejudicial judicial or prosecutorial error. The important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608-09, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) (emphasis added). [8] Thus, by refusing to consent to a mistrial, Wilmer effectively chose to accept any prejudice caused by the prosecutor's misconduct and continue with the trial. Because we hold that Wilmer did not consent to the mistrial under the constitutional double jeopardy analysis, we do not reach the question whether he consented under HRS § 701-110(4)(a) (1993). Further, because Wilmer did not consent to the mistrial, we do not reach the Rogan analysis here. Absent circumstances constituting manifest necessity, the trial court should have honored Wilmer's decision to proceed with the trial.
Manifest necessity is defined as ... circumstances in which it becomes no longer possible to conduct the trial or to reach a fair result based upon the evidence. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 143, 938 P.2d at 574 (quoting Lam, 75 Haw. at 204-05, 857 P.2d at 590) (alterations omitted). We note that in Lam we defined manifest necessity as a `sudden and overwhelming emergency beyond control of court and unforeseeable.... [W]here, due to circumstances beyond control of parties and court, it becomes no longer possible to conduct trial or to reach a fair result based upon the evidence.' 75 Haw. at 204-05, 857 P.2d at 590 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 963 (6th ed.1990)) (alterations in original). However, the requirement that the circumstances be beyond the control of the parties is inconsistent with our double jeopardy case law. The requirement was adopted, but not relied upon, in Lam and has not appeared in any subsequent double jeopardy cases. The requirement also improperly implies that there are categorical rules concerning what can and cannot form the basis of manifest necessity. For example, prosecutorial misconduct is arguably always within the prosecutor's control and can, therefore, never constitute manifest necessity. This court has recognized that [i]t is impossible to define all the circumstances [that] would render it proper to interfere by declaring a mistrial. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 133, 938 P.2d at 574 (citation omitted). Further, [t]he United States Supreme Court has noted that there is no `standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge.' Lam, 75 Haw. at 205, 857 P.2d at 591 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978)). Therefore, insofar as Lam requires that the circumstances constituting manifest necessity must be beyond the control of the parties, and that it be a sudden and overwhelming emergency, it is overruled. Because manifest necessity is a high standard not to be declared lightly, a trial judge should record his or her reasons for declaring a mistrial and include the reasons for finding manifest necessity. Id. (citations omitted). However, where the trial court has found manifest necessity based on prosecutorial misconduct, retrial will be prohibited where the prosecutorial misconduct is so egregious that, from an objective standpoint, it clearly denied a defendant his or her right to a fair trial. Rogan, 91 Hawai`i at 423, 984 P.2d at 1249. In the order declaring a mistrial without prejudice, the trial court entered the following conclusions of law: 1) Iopa violated Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 16(b)(1)(vii) (1998) by failing to disclose the Mehau report and the reward payment to Kuheana; 2) Iopa and Bender violated the witness exclusion rule by telling Kuheana about the letter to the potential juror; and 3) Iopa committed misconduct by making misrepresentations to the court regarding the letter and by casting De Lima in a negative light to Rooney. The prosecution does not contest these conclusions. Although Iopa's many instances of misconduct in this case were inexcusable, they resulted in little actual prejudice to Wilmer. What little prejudice that did result could have been cured through means other than a mistrial. Therefore, it was not impossible for the court to proceed with the trial and reach a fair result on the merits. Iopa's failure to disclose the Mehau report resulted in minimal prejudice to Wilmer's defense. De Lima's files included a letter dated June 5, 1998 to Iopa from Oshiro, which notified the prosecution of Wilmer's intent to rely on an alibi defense. Mehau was listed as an intended alibi witness. The letter recounted the information Oshiro had about Wilmer's whereabouts on May 14 and 15, 1997. It stated that Wilmer went to Mehau's apartment on May 14, left briefly to go to Granger's residence, and discovered the body. The Sur report was, for the most part, consistent with the information contained in Oshiro's letter, but the report provided some additional details. According to Sur's report, when Wilmer first arrived at Mehau's apartment, it was between 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. Mehau said that Wilmer returned less than ten minutes later and did not have any blood on him. Mehau also told Sur about the following conversation he had with Wilmer when Wilmer returned: Defendant: Uncle Brah, if I tell you I saw one dead body, you would tell? Mehau: Why, you went kill somebody? Defendant: No, I nevah. Mehau: Why don't you call the cops? Defendant: (Said nothing) Mehau said that he did not take Wilmer seriously because he thought of Wilmer as a good liar. However, when he heard about Granger's death, he thought Wilmer must have been telling the truth. Because the report was, for the most part, consistent with information already known to the defense, Iopa's failure to disclose the Mehau report resulted in little actual prejudice to Wilmer. A brief continuance would have been sufficient to allow Wilmer to evaluate the additional information provided in the report and incorporate it into the defense case. Further, even though De Lima was not aware of the one thousand dollar reward payment, he elicited testimony from Kuheana that Officer Rodillas paid her the one thousand dollar reward and paid for her to stay in the Naniloa Hotel for [her] protection. This was sufficient to allow De Lima to attack her credibility by arguing that she was biased in favor of the prosecution. Wilmer's defense was not significantly prejudiced because his attorney did not learn about the payment until trial was in progress. Iopa and Bender violated the witness exclusion rule by disclosing Wilmer's letter to the former juror to Kuheana. [9] However, Wilmer does not allege, nor is there any indication in the record, that Kuheana changed her testimony as a result of learning about the letter. Her testimony after she learned about the letter was consistent with the testimony she gave prior to that point. Had the trial proceeded, any prejudice to Wilmer could have been cured by allowing De Lima the opportunity to further cross-examine Kuheana in order to question her about the letter. In addition, Iopa made repeated misrepresentations to the court about the disclosure of the letter. Although they clearly constituted misconduct, the misrepresentations themselves did not prejudice Wilmer's right to a fair trial except insofar as Iopa could have been more forthright about the circumstances of how Kuheana learned about the letter to the potential juror. Finally, Wilmer was not prejudiced by Iopa's attempt to cast De Lima in a negative light by telling Rooney that De Lima was responsible for making Rooney wait. Wilmer does not argue that Iopa's comment affected Rooney's testimony, nor did he establish that any of the jurors overheard the remark. Iopa's misconduct resulted in minimal prejudice to Wilmer, and the prejudice that did result could have been cured through means other than a mistrial. At the point that the trial court declared the mistrial, it was possible for the trial to proceed and for the court to reach a fair result based on the evidence. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that there was manifest necessity for the mistrial because the circumstances creating an apparent need for a mistrial did not make it impossible for the trial to proceed. Because we hold that manifest necessity did not exist under the constitutional analysis, we do not reach the analysis under HRS § 710-110, nor do we reach the Rogan analysis. In the absence of manifest necessity, Wilmer should have been allowed to choose between continuing with the trial or consenting to a mistrial. [10] Because Wilmer did not consent to a mistrial, retrial is barred by Wilmer's double jeopardy rights. Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that the mistrial would be without prejudice.