Opinion ID: 1443013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Manufacture of Marijuana

Text: Under I.C. § 37-2701(r), the term manufacture is broad, and includes not only production or propagation, but also packaging or repackaging a controlled substance. Under this definition, the manufacturing charge might have been based on the growing marijuana in the greenhouse, or the marijuana that was put into sandwich bags inside the residence. The jury instructions narrowed the definition of manufacture, however, to the production (manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting) or propagation of a controlled substance. Thus, the only question before us is whether the growing plants in the greenhouse were sufficient to sustain a conviction of manufacture against the defendants. We hold that they are not. This case involves premises which were shared by both defendants. Even if we assume that they are the only two people who had access to the greenhouse, there is no evidence in the record as to which of the two was guilty of the act of manufacture. It is a fundamental principal of our system of justice that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt against each individual defendant. Delgado v. United States, 327 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.1964); State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 718 P.2d 1270 (Ct.App. 1986). In this case, no evidence was produced at trial of fingerprints, footprints, or any other physical evidence which would have connected either defendant to the cultivation activity in the greenhouse. Without such evidence, we are unable to sustain the conviction of either defendant for manufacturing marijuana. The State argues that both defendants may be convicted of manufacture, since it is obvious that at least one overtly cultivated the plants, and that the other could not have been ignorant of this activity. The reasoning is that even if one defendant did not actually help to cultivate the plants, he or she is equally guilty of the substantive offense as an accomplice for aiding and abetting in the cultivation. It is true that one who aids and abets a crime is guilty as a principal. I.C. § 18-204. However, aiding and abetting requires some proof that the accused either participated in or assisted, encouraged, solicited, or counseled the crime. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.1938); Johnson v. United States, 195 F.2d 673 (8th Cir.1952); State v. Gladstone, 78 Wash.2d 306, 474 P.2d 274, 42 A.L.R.3d 1061 (1970). Mere knowledge of a crime and assent to or acquiescence in its commission does not give rise to accomplice liability. State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 892, 655 P.2d 99 (Ct.App. 1983); State v. Sensenig, 95 Idaho 218, 506 P.2d 115 (1973); State v. Schrag, 21 Or. App. 655, 536 P.2d 461 (1975); Morrison v. State, 518 P.2d 1279 (Okl.Cr. 1974). Failure to disclose the occurrence of a crime to authorities is not sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting. Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 118, 23 S.Ct. 42, 47 L.Ed. 100 (1902); State v. Grant, 26 Idaho 189, 140 P. 959 (1914). Rather, under the Idaho Criminal Code, failure to report a felony makes a person guilty only as an accessory, not as an accomplice. I.C. § 18-205. Neither defendant was charged with being an accessory in this case. There is sufficient evidence to infer that if only one party was cultivating the marijuana, the other must have at least known of the activity. Yet there is no evidence to show which defendant was actively cultivating the plants, or that the other did anything to incite, encourage, counsel or assist the commission of the crime. Therefore, we cannot say that there is sufficient evidence to hold either defendant criminally liable for the manufacture of marijuana.