Opinion ID: 755357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismiss, at sentencing, the [i]ndictment ...;

Text: 10 B. File no further charges against [defendant] based upon what [was known at that time] of his criminal misconduct ...; 11 C. Stipulate, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(c), to a sentence of no more than sixty (60) months; 12 D. Agree that defense counsel may argue for an extraordinary departure under Section 5K2.0 et seq., and the government will defer to the Court's determination of this point. 13 E. Consider providing defendant an opportunity to debrief regarding his knowledge of drug trafficking activities, ... and agree to file at sentencing a motion under Section 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, recommending a downward departure from defendant's resulting guideline range, if, in the government's sole and good faith discretion, defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation of others. 14 Record I, Doc. 18, at 1-2. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to a one-count information which charged him with being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 15 Defendant argues the government violated part D of the agreement. The parties disagree on the meaning of the word defer and what departure determination the government agreed to defer to the court. The government argues this provision referred only to defendant's request for downward departure based on coercion or duress, while defendant argues the government agreed to defer on all possible bases for downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2. 16 The word defer means to refer or submit for determination or decision or to submit or yield through authority, respect, force, awe, [or] propriety. Websters Third New International Dictionary 591 (1993). The government adopts this definition and claims it agreed to submit the question of whether defendant was eligible for downward departure to the court for determination. Although this argument seems to comport with the dictionary definition of defer, it is nonsensical when viewed in the context of sentencing proceedings. The sentencing court already possessed the authority to determine whether defendant was eligible for downward departure. Therefore, interpreting the plea agreement as the government urges renders part D superfluous, which is obviously not in accord with general principles of contract law. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(a) (1979) (an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms [of an agreement] is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect); New Valley Corp. v. United States, 119 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1997) (An interpretation that gives a reasonable meaning to all of [the contract's] parts is preferred to one which leaves a portion of the [contract] inoperative, void, meaningless, or superfluous.); see also United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1006 n. 5 (10th Cir.) (We will not construe a statute in a way that renders words or phrases meaningless, redundant, or superfluous.), petition for cert. filed --- U.S.L.W. ---- (U.S. April 24, 1998) (No. 97-8828). 17 Therefore, defer must have some additional meaning in the present context. This additional meaning can, ironically, be gleaned from the government's description of its obligations at the sentencing hearing: 18 I indicated in the plea agreement that the government would defer to the court's finding on [whether defendant is entitled to a downward departure for coercion or duress]. Essentially, we are not going to take any particular position. You know, I am not calling any witnesses or putting on any exhibits today. I may point out a few things. But essentially, it's [defendant's] motion. Something [he] wanted to do, and we agreed to it as part of the plea agreement.... The Court will make the ultimate finding. 19 Record VII at 7. Later, the government stated: I don't think [the plea agreement] precludes me from making comments. I think it precludes me from taking any particular position. Id. at 50. 20 As the government correctly noted during sentencing, a plea agreement requiring the government to defer to the court's determination of an issue does not require the government to stand mute under all circumstances. Certainly the government is entitled, perhaps even obligated as an officer of the court, to correct factual and legal inaccuracies for the court. See United States v. Svacina, 137 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir.1998) (The government cannot be penalized for correctly stating the legal issue to be addressed by th[e] court.); United States v. Jimenez, 928 F.2d 356, 363 (10th Cir.1991) (government obligated to inform sentencing court of relevant, derogatory information about defendant that prosecutor learned after plea agreement); Hand, 913 F.2d at 856 (government not obliged to stand mute in the face of incorrect or misleading testimony offered before the trial court); United States v. Stemm, 847 F.2d 636, 639 (10th Cir.1988) (Disclosure of information as to the nature of the offense and each defendant's role is proper and within the Government's duty to provide, despite a promise that the Government would make no recommendation as to sentence.). However, if the government has agreed to defer to the court's determination of an issue, its authority to comment during a defendant's sentencing stops there. The government cannot oppose the defendant's motion, in any fashion, after agreeing to defer to the court's determination on the issue. This means the government may not call witnesses, present exhibits, or make any legal arguments in opposition to defendant's motion. As we explained in Hawley, the government breaches an agreement not to oppose a motion when it makes statements that do more than merely state facts or simply validate [ ] facts found in the Presentence Report and provide[s] a legal 'characterization' of those facts [or] 'argue[s] the effect' of those facts to the sentencing judge. 93 F.3d at 693. 21 Although we have determined the government agreed not to oppose defendant's motion for downward departure, it is also necessary to determine whether the government agreed not to challenge downward departure on all possible grounds or merely with respect to coercion or duress. The government argues it only agreed to defer to the court's determination with respect to coercion or duress and, therefore, even if it opposed the motion based on pre-indictment delay and the totality of the circumstances, it did not violate the plea agreement. Again, we must examine the precise language of the agreement to resolve the dispute. 22 The government agreed not to challenge defendant's motion for downward departure pursuant to Section 5K2.0 et. seq. This language seems plain; however, § 5K2.0 does not set forth a specific basis for departing from the guidelines. Rather, § 5K2.0 is a policy statement that generally outlines considerations the sentencer should contemplate when determining whether to grant a defendant a downward departure under any of the specific rationales listed in other sections of the subchapter that follow § 5K2.0. Each of the remaining sections in the subchapter, §§ 5K2.1-5K2.18, discusses a specific rationale for departure. Coercion and duress are addressed in § 5K2.12. 23 Not only does § 5K2.0 fail to specifically address a particular justification for departure, the agreement specifies 5K2.0 et. seq. Record I, Doc. 18, at 2. Et Seq. is an abbreviation for et sequentes or et sequentia, which means and the following. Black's Law Dictionary 553 (6th ed.1990). Here, 5K2.0 et. seq. can be reasonably interpreted to include §§ 5K2.0 through 5K2.18. Therefore, based on the language in the agreement, we conclude the government agreed to defer to the court's determination as to whether defendant deserved an extraordinary downward departure under any of § 5K2.'s subsections. See United States v. Williams, 102 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir.1996) (We review the language of the plea agreement objectively and hold the government to the literal terms of the plea agreement.). 24 Such an interpretation appears to comport with the parties' reasonable understanding of the agreement at the time the guilty plea was entered. At the change of plea hearing, the government stated it understood the plea agreement as obligating it to: 25 [allow] defense counsel [to] argue for an extraordinary departure downward under Section 5K2.0. The burden being on the defense counsel, of course, to convince the Court that [it] would apply, and the government will simply defer to the Court's determination of this point. 26 Record V at 9. This was also defendant's understanding of the agreement. Id. at 10. Therefore, based on the plain language of the agreement and the parties' apparent understanding of the agreement at the change of plea hearing, the government agreed not to oppose defendant's argument that he was entitled to a downward departure under any of the subsections listed after § 5K2.0. 27 Next, we consider whether the government kept its promise. At the sentencing hearing when defendant argued he should receive a downward departure based on the government's pre-indictment delay, the government argued federal prosecution was delayed because Garner had become a confidential informant and defendant's prosecution would require disclosure of Garner's status. See Record VI at 50-52 (arguing government did not delay prosecution for tactical reasons); Record VI at 58-59 (arguing defendant not prejudiced by government's delay); VII at 10 (announcing plan to present testimony to oppose motion). The government also called an F.B.I. agent to testify about Garner's role in the investigation to support its position. By arguing the government did not delay prosecution for tactical reasons and presenting testimony to support its position, the government clearly breached its plea agreement with defendant to defer to the court's determination on a downward departure for pre-indictment delay. See Hawley, 93 F.3d at 693 (government's comments that characterize the facts and argue a conclusion breach plea agreement to not take position on issue); c.f. Hand, 913 F.2d at 856 (The prosecutor here did not characterize the evidence elicited on cross examination, nor did he argue the effect of such evidence to the sentencing judge.). 28 The government also breached the plea agreement with respect to defendant's motion to depart for coercion and duress. The following statements, made in the government's sentencing statement, clearly demonstrate the government crossed the proverbial line: 29 Section 5K2.12 speaks of serious duress. The guideline drafters further provided that the extent of departure, if any, should be based upon the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct and whether it would have [been] less harmful. 30 One of the best methods for the court to determine this issue is to review the defendant's own words, captured in a wiretap, as he spoke those words just prior to, and after, the car chase. They reflect defendant's decisions in dealing with what had, undisputably, been a long-standing family matter, potentially involving inter-family violence. The real issue seems to be whether the duress was so extreme that defendant acted reasonably by breaking the law to protect himself and others, or whether this was a case of mutual combatants. 31 Record I, Doc. 26, at 4-5. While this statement does not explicitly state defendant should not receive a downward departure based on coercion and duress, its implication is clear. See Hawley, 93 F.3d at 693 (prosecutor's purported factual information provided to court was a thinly disguised, if disguised at all, effort to persuade the court in a way that the government had promised it would not do). By pointing out the real issue and highlighting the defendant's own words as one of the best methods for the court to determine this issue, the government was obviously, albeit subtly, taking a position on whether defendant should receive a downward departure for coercion and duress. Perhaps the best indication of the fact that the government's statements were meant to persuade is that the court ultimately resolved defendant's motion by reviewing defendant's own words in the tape-recorded conversations and concluding the brothers had a mutual disagreement. See Record VII at 59-65. 32 When the government has breached a plea agreement, it is generally preferable to remand the case to the district court for its determination as to whether defendant should be resentenced by a different judge or should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Hawley, 93 F.3d at 694 (Providing this type of latitude for the district court on remand is preferable in light of the district court's position with respect to the case.). When the government's breach is particularly egregious or intentional, we will allow defendant to withdraw the guilty plea. See id.; see, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563, 567 (10th Cir.1995). Since it does not appear the government's breach was egregious or intentional, but rather, was based on misinterpretation of the plea agreement, we remand only for resentencing by a different judge.