Opinion ID: 2519241
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Commission failed to adequately scrutinize KMI's request to divert water.

Text: DHHL's second point of error contends that the Commission failed to apply even minimal scrutiny to KMI's request to divert water from the Kualapu`u Aquifer for private commercial use. This is an apparent reference to this court's previous admonition in Waiahole I, that [u]nder no circumstances . . . do the constitution or the Code allow the Commission to grant permit applications with minimal scrutiny. 94 Hawai`i at 160, 9 P.3d at 472. For the following reasons, we agree with DHHL that the Commission's decision lacked the requisite degree of scrutiny.
Specifically, DHHL argues that the Commission failed to apply the requisite level of scrutiny insofar as it relied on the 5.0 mgd sustainable yield determination in spite of evidence that the Kualapu`u Aquifer may be overdrawn and that the sustainable yield may actually be as low as 3.2 mgd. The Commission counters that the 5.0 mgd sustainable yield is statutorily deemed to be the appropriate planning guideline when balancing such competing interests. Utilization of the sustainable yield, the Commission claims, is neither rigid nor inflexible to the extent that any uncertainty as to the accuracy of the sustainable yield is adequately addressed by the fact that any party may petition for, or the Commission may on its own order, a hearing to show cause as to why the permitted amounts of water should not be reduced. KMI also argues that the sustainable yield is the appropriate guidepost when allocating water from the Kualapu`u Aquifer. KMI points out that the sustainable yield was set by rulemaking procedure, and that any challenge to the accuracy of the sustainable yield must be made via a petition to amend or modify the sustainable yield pursuant to HRS § 174C-31(p). We agree with the Commission and KMI that the Commission did not err by relying on the sustainable yield determination. The Commission is mandated by the Code to determine a sustainable yield for each hydrological unit within the state. See HRS § 174C-31(f)(2) (1993). The term, sustainable yield, is defined by the Code as the maximum rate at which water may be withdrawn from a water source without impairing the utility or quality of the water source as determined by the commission. HRS § 174C-4 (1993). The Commission is instructed to calculate the sustainable yield using the best information available. HRS § 174C-31(f)(2). At the time of KMI's application, the sustainable yield for the Kualapu`u Aquifer was determined to be 5.0 mgd. As the Commission and KMI suggest, the Code precludes the ad hoc revision of the sustainable yield. The sustainable yield figures are critical components of the state water plan, see generally HRS § 174C-31, and may not be modified absent notice and a public hearing. See HRS § 174C-31(m) (1993) (The commission shall not adopt, approve, or modify any portion of the Hawaii water plan which affects a county or any portion thereof without first holding a public hearing on the matter on the island on which the water resources are located. At least ninety days in advance of such hearing, the commission shall notify the affected county and shall give notice of such hearing by publication within the affected region and statewide.). Moreover, in Waiahole I, this court has impliedly endorsed reference to sustainable yield determinations in the context of ground water permit applications: Early designation of instream flow standards furthers several important objectives. First, it fulfills the Commission's duty of protection under constitution and statute, ensuring that instream uses do not suffer inadvertent and needless impairment. It also preserves the integrity of the Commission's comprehensive planning function. If the Commission decides instream flow standards and permit applications at the same time, private interests in offstream use will have already become highly particularized, risking an ad hoc planning process driven by immediate demands. See [Douglas W. MacDougal, Private Hopes and Public Values in the Reasonable Beneficial Use of Hawai`i's Water: Is Balance Possible?, 18 U. Haw. L.Rev. 1, 66 & n. 302 (1996)] (citing United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal.App.3d 82, 227 Cal.Rptr. 161, 180 (1986)). Finally, initial designation of instream flow standards relieves the Commission, as well as existing and potential offstream users, of the complexity and uncertainty presented by the unsettled question of instream flow requirements. See id. [at] 58-59, 66. Once the Commission translates the public interest in instream flows into a certain and manageable quantity [, t]he reference to consistency with the public interest in the definition of reasonable beneficial use likewise becomes a reference to that quantity. Id. at 62. 94 Hawai`i at 148-49, 9 P.3d at 460-61 (emphasis added) (some brackets added and some in original). Although the foregoing excerpt expressly refers to surface water instream flow standards, this court has analogized ground water sustainable yield determinations to instream flow standards. See id. at 148, 9 P.3d at 460 (These provisions confirm what the Commission recognized in its decision, that the Code contemplates the instream flow standard as the surface water corollary to the ground water sustainable yield. (Quotation marks omitted.)). Hence, contrary to DHHL's assertions, it would be inappropriate for the Commission to reevaluate the sustainable yield figure in a permit application proceeding.
DHHL additionally asserts that the Commission's approval of KMI's request to divert water cannot be reconciled with the Commission's refusal to grant DHHL's request for water on the grounds that there were very real concerns over sustaining the potable quality of the wells located in the Kualapu`u Aquifer. Although the Commission does not address this point, KMI asserts that the Commission staff's recommendation to reject DHHL's application for additional pumpage was based upon the fact that increased pumpage in the two existing DHHL wells would increase chloride content in not only DHHL's wells, but also the County Department of Water Supply's (DWS) wells. The Commission's staff recommended that increased withdrawals come from new wells located elsewhere in the aquifer. KMI now accuses DHHL of seeking to have KMI's preexisting uses reduced so that DHHL can obtain permits for new uses of water without incurring the expenses of creating new wells in the Kualapu`u Aquifer. For the following reasons, DHHL's argument is without merit. The Commission explained its treatment of DHHL's application in its findings of fact, summarized as follows. DHHL controls 25,383 acres of land on Molokai reserved for Hawaiian homesteaders and services these areas with water drawn from two wells located at a single site overlying the Kualapu`u Aquifer. DHHL previously obtained a permit to withdraw .367 mgd to serve its Hoolehua and Kalamaula homestead areas. On September 13, 1996, DHHL filed an application to increase its pumpage to 1.247 mgd. The Commission staff recommended the denial of DHHL's application on the grounds that the geographic concentration of the DHHL, DWS, and KMI wells militated against granting a permit for the requested new withdrawals of .879 mgd from the existing DHHL wells. . . . The staff suggested that such new withdrawals from the Kualapuu aquifer should be from new wells strategically located elsewhere within the aquifer so as not to interfere with the water quality in the existing wells. Specifically, the staff submittal cautioned that [the] two DHHL wells (Well nos. 0801-01 & 02), the County Department of Water Supply (DWS) well (Well no. 0801-03), and the Kukui Molokai Well 17 (Well no. 0901-01) all reside within one-half mile of each other. In terms of a regional scale, these wells are concentrating pumpage in one spot in the aquifer system. . . . Chloride levels in the two DHHL wells and the DWS well are sensitive to pumping rates. . . . Early low chloride readings from these wells were around 60 mg/1 during the 1980's but have risen above 100 mg/1 during more recent years of the 1990's. On occasion, chloride levels have reached 180 mg/l. The EPA potability guideline for chloride is to 250 mg/l. Therefore, the increases in chloride levels in response to relatively small increases in pumpage from this well field is an indication that localized upconing and interference between these wells is occurring. At a January 28, 1998 public hearing, DHHL proposed reducing its request to .21 mgd, to be taken from its 2.905 mgd reservation. The Commission requested that DHHL arrange for the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to determine whether an approximate .2 mgd increase in pumpage would cause chloride levels in the well field to rise to unacceptable levels. DHHL thereafter informed the Commission that the USGS was not able to answer that question, inasmuch as the USGS hydrological model was designed to simulate regional drawdowns and could not predict local scale upconing and drawdowns in the immediate vicinity of a particular well. The Commission also found that chloride increases in one of the DHHL wells was in large part attributable to the commencement of pumping in the [DWS well] in 1991, which raised the level of withdrawal from 0.367 to 0.867 mgd in the immediate area. DHHL asserts that its application now languishes unapproved due to the Commission staff's recommended denial of its application. [8] Obviously, the Commission was concerned with the effect of increased pumpage on the chloride content in the well field. Hence, inasmuch as KMI's application to continue an existing use did not threaten to increase pumpage, the Commission could reasonably have granted KMI's request for existing uses and denied DHHL's request for new uses. Moreover, the Commission correctly recognized that the Code contemplates a preference for existing uses. [9] See HRS § 174C-49(a)(3) (1993) (To obtain a permit pursuant to this part, the applicant shall establish that the proposed use of water . . . [w]ill not interfere with any existing legal use of water . . . . (Emphasis added.)); Waiahole I, 94 Hawai`i at 165 n. 67, 9 P.3d at 478 n. 67 ([T]he Code gives `existing' legal uses priority over `new' uses in the permitting process.); Ko`olau Agric. Co., Ltd. v. Comm'n of Water Res. Mgmt., 83 Hawai`i 484, 492, 927 P.2d 1367, 1375 (1996) (Existing uses are given preferences under the Code. . . .). In accordance with that preference, the Commission declined to uproot a preexisting use in favor of a new use. Therefore, the Commission's decision in that regard does not appear unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. The same cannot be said, however, for the Commission's decision to permit KMI to withdraw 82,000 gd from the aquifer for new uses. As mentioned, the Commission's staff recommended that the Commission deny DHHL's request for new, public uses on the grounds that (1) the DHHL, DWS, and KMI wells all reside within one-half mile of each other[,] (2) the wells are concentrating pumpage in one spot in the aquifer system[,] and (3) increases in chloride levels in response to relatively small increases in pumpage from this well field is an indication that localized upconing and interference between these wells is occurring. Inasmuch as KMI's well is, per the Commission's staff's own recommendation, contributing to the concentrated pumpage, we are compelled to wonder why the Commission did not similarly toll KMI's request for new uses. We do not suggest that the Commission did not have a valid reason for its conclusion or that the Commission was absolutely barred from reaching its result. Rather, the Commission has simply failed to explain the rationale behind the disparate treatment. Due to the apparent contradiction, we remand the issue for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. Clarity, we have said, is all the more essential `in a case such as this where the agency performs as a public trustee and is duty bound to demonstrate that it has properly exercised the discretion vested in it by the constitution and the statute.' Waiahole II, 105 Hawai`i at 11, 93 P.3d at 653 (citing Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So.2d 1152, 1159-60 (La.1984)). See also Waiahole I, 94 Hawaii at 163, 9 P.3d at 475 (A reviewing court must judge the propriety of agency action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency, and that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable. (Quoting Louisiana-Pac. Corp., W. Div. v. NLRB, 52 F.3d 255, 259 (9th Cir. 1995).) (Quotation marks omitted.)).
DHHL further points out that the Commission failed to provide any indication that it considered the feasibility or practicability of alternative sources of water for KMI's requested uses. [10] The record confirms DHHL's allegation, and that omission requires us to vacate KMI's permits. This court has, on multiple occasions, expounded on the necessity of considering alternative sources of water in balancing the distribution of a scarce public trust resource. In Waiahole I, the Estate of James Campbell (Campbell Estate) was among various applicants before the Commission requesting diversion of water from the Waiahole Ditch. 94 Hawai`i at 164, 9 P.3d at 476. The record indicated that Campbell Estate already possessed permits to pump 35 mgd of ground water from beneath its lands to support its agricultural purposes, but lacked proper pumping mechanisms. Id. The record also contained testimony that it would require millions of dollars to put infrastructure in place to pump water from the Pearl Harbor aquifer wells to the Campbell Estate fields which currently use Waiahole Ditch water. Id. at 164-65, 9 P.3d at 476-77. The Commission expressed findings recognizing Campbell Estate's permits. Id. at 165, 9 P.3d at 477. The Commission also made various general findings on the effects of irrigation on leeward aquifers, the costs of developing other alternative sources, and future growth in water demand. Id. The Commission ultimately decided to conditionally approve the leeward agricultural uses [i]f and until treated effluent or ground water is available[.] Id. This court found the Commission's decision to be unacceptable insofar as the Commission's findings failed to answer, with any reasonable degree of clarity, why it is not practicable for Campbell Estate to use ground water permitted to it and not otherwise in use as an alternative to diverting the sole source of water for windward streams, especially given the still unsettled state of instream flow standards. Id. Accordingly, we vacated Campbell Estate's permit and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id. On remand, the Commission determined that Campbell Estate had no practicable alternatives and issued Campbell Estate a water use permit for 4.74 mgd. Waiahole II, 105 Hawaii at 16, 93 P.3d at 658. On appeal before this court in Waiahole II, appellants argued that Campbell Estate failed to meet its burden of establishing that no practicable alternative sources of water existed. Id. This court again found the Commission's analysis deficient: In the instant case, the Water Commission entered no FOFs or COLs as to whether Campbell Estate met its burden. Instead, the Water Commission found, based on the testimony of Bert Hatton (Hatton), a Campbell Estate witness, that until the Supreme Court issued its decision in August 2000, Campbell Estate was assured of Waiahole Ditch water, so they did not conduct a systematic study of alternative water sources. During the past 6 months, there have been some informal and very general discussions about possible scenarios if Ditch water were no longer available. D & O II at 93. Informal and very general discussions are insufficient to satisfy Campbell Estate's burden. Id. We subsequently opined that [t]he Water Commission's analysis should have ceased when Campbell Estate failed to meet its burden of establishing that no practicable alternative water sources existed. Id. We thus concluded that, inasmuch as the Water Commission entered no FOFs or COLs as to whether Campbell Estate satisfied its burden of establishing that no practicable alternatives existed, we remand the matter for further proceedings relating thereto. Id. at 17, 93 P.3d at 659. Here, the Commission entered no FOFs or COLs as to the existence or feasibility of any alternative sources of water whatsoever. The Commission has thus failed to hold KMI to its burden of demonstrating the absence of feasible alternative sources of water. See Waiahole I, 94 Hawai`i at 161-62, 9 P.3d at 473-74 (Furthermore, besides advocating the social and economic utility of their proposed uses, permit applicants must also demonstrate the absence of practicable mitigating measures, including the use of alternative water sources.). Such a requirement is intrinsic to the public trust, the statutory instream use protection scheme, and the definition of `reasonable-beneficial' use, . . . and is an essential part of any balancing between competing interests. . . . Id. (footnote and citations omitted). Indeed, the Commission appears to have reserved consideration of feasible alternative sources of water until after the permit has been granted. In its decision and order, the Commission included, as a condition to the granting of KMI's permits, the following contingency: Within twenty-four months of the date of issuance of the aforementioned permits, KMI will prepare and present to the Commission a feasibility study on the development of a new source of nonpotable water near Mahana which can be blended to irrigate the golf course. Such a practice is fundamentally at odds with the Commission's public trust duties. The feasibility of a new source of nonpotable water ( i.e., an alternative source of water) should have been considered prior to the granting of KMI's permit, not after the fact. The Commission cannot fairly balance competing interests in a scarce public trust resource if it renders its decision prior to evaluating the availability of alternative sources of water. Thus, KMI's failure to demonstrate the absence of practicable alternatives should have terminated the inquiry. See, e.g., Waiahole II, 105 Hawai`i at 16, 93 P.3d at 658 (The Water Commission's analysis should have ceased when [the applicant] failed to meet its burden of establishing that no practicable alternative water sources existed.). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Commission has failed in its public trust duty to hold KMI to its burden of demonstrating the absence of other practicable alternatives. The Commission has thereby failed to establish an adequate basis for the amount of water allocated to KMI.
DHHL avers that the Commission rejected, without explanation, uncontroverted evidence that KMI was in violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), codified as HRS chapter 340E. KMI initially responded that DHHL waived the argument inasmuch as the SDWA was not raised when the Commission and the parties determined the issues for the proceedings below. However, KMI only refers this court to a minute order in the record stating that the parties were limited to the following matters: 1. Do the existing and proposed uses of water meet the criteria for the issuance of a water use permit as provided in Haw. Rev.Stat. §§ 174C-49(a) and 174C-50(b)? 2. Are the existing and proposed uses reasonable-beneficial uses as defined in Haw.Rev.Stat. § 174C-3, and allowable under the common law of the State? . . . . 3. Are the existing and proposed uses consistent with the public interest, including but not limited to, the statement of policy objectives declared to be in the public interest as set forth in Haw.Rev.Stat. § 174C-2(c). Without limiting any other factual public interest issues that the parties deem relevant at the time, the parties shall address the quantified effect, if any, of the well pumping of ground water on stream flow and nearshore ocean resources. 4. Are the existing and proposed uses allowable under the common law of the State. Without limiting any other relevant factual issues that could be present hereunder, the parties shall address whether any party has any appurtenant or riparian right under Haw.Rev.Stat. § 174C-101, or any other right to water that is equal to or has priority over the existing and proposed uses of water by Applicants. The parties shall quantify the amount of water they are claiming. 5. In the event the above-referenced water use application is not denied, the conditions, if any, that should be imposed on the Applicants' water permit for the existing and proposed water uses. To the extent that DHHL argues that violations of the SDWA are relevant to the question whether the requested existing and proposed uses are reasonable-beneficial, see discussion infra, the SDWA violations are fairly subsumed within the second issue expressed by the Commission above, and the argument has not been waived. KMI additionally asserts that any violations of the SDWA were irrelevant insofar as (1) full compliance with the SDWA is not a prerequisite to obtaining a water use permit under the Code, (2) the specific violation referred to by DHHL is with respect to the treatment facility and does not compromise the quality of water produced by that treatment facility, and (3) factual evidence of compliance with state and federal regulations was presented before the Commission. The record indicates that the Department of Health (DOH) filed a Notice and Finding of Violation against KMI, dated August 18, 1993. The DOH found, in relevant part, that [KMI] ha[d] been using the Kaluakoi water system to supply water to the public, after June 29, 1993, without filtration that meets the criteria of HAR § 11-20-46(c) or the Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR) Administrative Manual, as required by HAR § 11-20-46(a)(4). DHHL submitted proposed findings of fact describing the foregoing violation, but the Commission, in its Decision and Order, rejected them without explanation. Despite evidence in the record that KMI failed to comply with the SDWA, we hold that neither the Code nor the public trust preclude the Commission from allocating water to KMI for the purpose of supplying water to domestic end users from a delivery system that may not comply with the provisions of the SDWA. It is clear that this jurisdiction separately regulates water allocation, see HRS chapter 174C, and drinking water standards, see HRS chapter 340E. The Code and the SDWA do not reference each other, and we can discern no legislative intent to make water use permit applications subject to compliance with the SDWA. See Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 F.3d 955, 964 (9th Cir.2006) (rejecting the argument that granting a permit to mine gold violated the water quality provisions of Nevada's Clean Water Act, in pertinent part, because Nevada does not regulate water withdrawal in the same [statutory] regime as water quality. . . .). Although DHHL asserts that the distribution of potentially unsafe water to domestic users is neither reasonable, beneficial, nor in the public interest, the public interest is adequately protected by the enforcement provisions of HRS chapter 340E. See HRS § 340E-8 (Supp.1995) (authorizing civil and criminal penalties). Violations of the SDWA are simply not germane to a review of the propriety of water allocations under the Code and the public trust. 3. The Commission appears to have placed the burden of proof on DHHL to demonstrate that pumpage at KMI's well would increase the chloride concentration at the DHHL well site. DHHL also asserts that the Commission erred by placing the burden of proof on DHHL to produce conclusive evidence of harm to public trust resources. DHHL specifically challenges the Commission's COL # 51, which states as follows: Finally, DHHL asserts that continuing the existing and permitting the proposed uses would make it impossible for DHHL to utilize its full allocation in Kualapuu by increasing the chloride concentration levels. There was no conclusive evidence presented that the proposed pumpage in Well 17 alone would increase the chloride concentration to unacceptable levels at the DHHL wells. (Emphasis added.) DHHL also continues to assert that the Commission has, by granting KMI existing and proposed uses, precluded DHHL from making full use of its reservation. DHHL claims that the Commission allowed powerful private interests to complete their rush-to-monopolize Kualapu`u water before DHHL could utilize its own reservation. And, with cruel irony, at the same time it was allowing KMI to export water for its distant golf course in the desert, the Commission staff recommended denial of DHHL's request to use its reserved water within the boundaries of the aquifer on concerns over the vitality of Kualapu`u. (Emphases omitted.) The Commission, on the other hand, argues that it correctly required KMI to justify its existing and proposed uses. With respect to KMI's existing uses, the Commission refers this court to its COL # 15, which states as follows: Based on the evidence presented, the Commission concludes that accountable existing uses of water from Well 17 remain the same and the allocation herein is reasonable and beneficial and allowable under the common law. As to KMI's proposed uses, the Commission refers to its COLs Nos. 16, 17 and 18: 16. Section 174C-49(a), HRS, places the burden on an applicant to establish that the proposed water uses meet all the following seven criteria: a. Can be accommodated with the available water source; b. Is a reasonable-beneficial use as defined in section 174C-3; c. Will not interfere with any existing legal use of water; d. Is consistent with the public interest; e. Is consistent with state and county general plans and land use designations; f. Is consistent with county land use plans and policies; and g. Will not interfere with the rights of the department of Hawaiian home lands as provided in section 221 of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. 17. The applicant's burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 91-10(5), HRS. 18. Based on the evidence presented, the Commission concludes, for the reasons set forth below, that the water use permit application for proposed uses, as amended by this decision and order, meets all the conditions in sections 14C-49(a), HRS, by a preponderance of the evidence. KMI additionally contends that the evidence in the record suggests that increased chloride concentration in the DHHL wells was caused by pumpage in the nearby DWS well, and that the impact of pumpage in KMI's well on the DHHL wells was unknown: In this case, the two existing DHHL wells, the DWS well, and Applicant's well are all within one-half mile of each other. . . . . Based thereon, it was found that an upconing effect resulted as well pumpage was concentrated around the two DHHL wells and the DWS well and that chloride levels in these wells were sensitive to pumpage rates. No finding was made that Well 17 was similarly affected by increased well pumpage. We agree with DHHL that the Commission's COL # 51 is cause for concern. Although the Commission found that the increase in chloride concentration at the DHHL well site is, in large part, caused by pumpage in the nearby DWS well, it is undisputed that KMI's well is also in close proximity to the DHHL and DWS wells and its impact on the DHHL wells is unknown. Under these circumstances, rejecting DHHL's argument by simply stating that [t]here was no conclusive evidence presented that the proposed pumpage in Well 17 alone would increase the chloride concentration to unacceptable levels at the DHHL wells, gives the impression that the Commission improperly placed the burden of proof on DHHL. We do, however, recognize the Commission's predicament when inconclusive allegations raise a specter of harm that cannot be dispatched by readily available evidence. We note that in such situations, the public trust doctrine does not handcuff the Commission. Under the Code and the public trust, it is the applicant's burden to demonstrate that the use requested is reasonable-beneficial, meaning the use of water in such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization, for a purpose, and in a manner which is both reasonable and consistent with the state and county land use plans and the public interest. HRS § 174C-3. Hence, to the extent that harm to a public trust purpose ( i.e., the DHHL's reservation) is alleged, the permit applicant must demonstrate that there is, in fact, no harm, or that any potential harm does not rise to a level that would preclude a finding that the requested use is nevertheless reasonable-beneficial. To that end, although the present matter involves an allegation of harm that is not readily ascertainable, the Commission may nevertheless permit existing and proposed diversions of water if KMI can demonstrate that such diversions are reasonable-beneficial notwithstanding the potential increase in chloride concentration at the DHHL well site. It may well be that the Commission believed that KMI's existing and proposed uses were reasonable-beneficial in spite of the potential increase in chloride concentration at the DHHL wells, but the Commission did not say as much and merely responded to DHHL's concerns by pointing to a lack of conclusive evidence. Therefore, we hold that the Commission should be given the opportunity to clarify COL # 51 on remand. 4. The Commission's decision did not violate the precautionary principle. DHHL next asserts that the Commission violated the precautionary principle described by this court in Waiahole I. DHHL argues that the Commission's decision to grant KMI's permit and reserve jurisdiction to amend it in the event of unexpected and significant adverse impacts on DHHL's wells flies in the face of the foregoing principle. DHHL highlights the following special condition imposed by the Commission's Decision and Order: C. Because the sustainable yield of the Kualapu`u Aquifer system is close to full allocation, the issuance of both permits is subject to the following special conditions: 1. If there are significant or unexpected increases in chlorides or drawdowns in the two DHHL wells, the DWS well, or KMI's Well 17, substantially in excess of what they were on the effective date of designation, any party may petition the Commission, or the Commission may on its own motion, order a show cause hearing as to why the permitted amounts of withdrawal of water should no be reduced along with lawful and equitable reductions in pumpage from other wells in the Kualapu`u Aquifer. In Waiahole I, this court endorsed the Commission's application of precautionary principles in recognition of the lack of scientific certainty in the allocation of instream flows. The Commission stated that, where there are present or potential threats of serious damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be a basis for postponing effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 94 Hawaii at 154, 9 P.3d at 466. We agreed with the Commission, confirming that, at minimum, the absence of firm scientific proof should not tie the Commission's hands in adopting reasonable measures designed to further the public interest. Id. at 155, 9 P.3d at 467. Here, the scientific uncertainty raised by DHHL is whether the 5.0 mgd sustainable yield calculation for the Kualapu`u Aquifer is accurate. However, as previously mentioned, a permit application proceeding is an inappropriate forum for reevaluating the sustainable yield calculation. [11] Hence, it would be inappropriate for this court, in an appeal of a permit application proceeding, to nullify a sustainable yield calculation. Waiahole I, as applied to the case at bar, instructs the Commission to faithfully apply the sustainable yield determination. 94 Hawai`i at 148-49, 9 P.3d at 460-61. Having done so, the Commission did not simply ignore DHHL's concerns that the sustainable yield figure does not account for localized upconing and drawdown effects. Rather, the Commission further reserved jurisdiction to modify KMI's permits in the event of significant or unexpected increases in chlorides or drawdowns in the two DHHL wells, the DWS well, or KMI's Well 17, substantially in excess of what they were on the effective date of designation. Under the circumstances presented, the Commission's methodology constitutes a faithful application of the sustainable yield figure and includes reasonable precautionary measures. We have said that the Commission may make reasonable precautionary presumptions or allowances in the public interest. The Commission may still act when public benefits and risks are not capable of exact quantification. At all times, however, the Commission should not hide behind scientific uncertainty, but should confront it as systematically and judiciously as possibleconsidering every offstream use in view of the cumulative potential harm to instream uses and values and the need for meaningful studies of stream flow requirements. . . . . As a practical matter, the Commission may decide that the foregoing balance supports postponing certain uses, or holding them to a higher standard of proof, pending more conclusive evidence of instream flow requirements. . . . . Even if it tentatively decides to allow certain offstream uses to proceed, the Commission may still subject the uses to permit conditions designed to protect the public interest. See HRS § 174C-31(j). At the very least, the Commission should, as it did in this case, condition permits so as to confirm its constitutional and statutory authority to modify or revoke the permits should it later determine that present instream flows are inadequate. Id. at 159-60, 9 P.3d at 471-72 (emphasis added); cf. Wai`ola, 103 Hawai`i at 444, 83 P.3d at 707 ([T]he Commission did not abuse its discretion in imposing a well monitoring system as a condition to granting MR-Wai`ola a water use permit in the present matter and utilizing the K&amacr;kalahale well for such purpose.). 5. The Commission erred by considering an untimely application. DHHL next argues that the Commission violated HRS § 174C-50(c) by considering an untimely existing use application. HRS § 174C-50(c) provides as follows: An application for a permit to continue an existing use must be made within a period of one year from the effective date of designation [of the water management area]. Except for appurtenant rights, failure to apply within this period creates a presumption of abandonment of the use, and the user, if the user desires to revive the use, must apply for a permit under section 174C-51. If the Commission determines that there is just cause for the failure to file, it may allow a late filing. However, the Commission may not allow a late filing more than five years after the effective date of rules implementing this chapter. DHHL contends that the Water Commission designated the island of Moloka`i as a water management area effective July 15, 1992, and that existing use permit applications were due by July 15, 1993. DHHL concludes that KMI's application, filed on December 15, 1993, could not be considered as an existing use application inasmuch as (1) the application was not a legitimate amendment to an earlier timely application, and (2) the untimely application could not be excused for just cause because the just cause exception ceased to be available on May 27, 1993. [12] KMI and the Commission do not contest DHHL's assertion that late filing was statutorily precluded after May 27, 1993. Rather, they contend that the December 15, 1993 application was an amendment to an earlier application filed by Moloka`i Ranch, Kaluakoi Moloka`i, and Molokai Irrigation System on June 8, 1993. A similar situation was presented in Waiahole I. Therein, the Commission granted Pu`u Makakilo, Inc. (PMI) a .75 mgd water use permit. Id. at 165, 9 P.3d at 477. In doing so, the Commission treated PMI's requested uses as new, rather than existing, apparently because PMI's application to continue existing uses was not timely filed. Id. The Commission designated the windward aquifers as ground water management areas effective July 15, 1992. Id. at 166, 9 P.3d at 478. On June 3, 1993, Waiahole Irrigation Company (WIC), the former operator of the Waiahole ditch, filed a joint use permit application that did not mention PMI. Id. On June 14, 1994, WIC filed an amended joint use permit application that referred to PMI in attached exhibits but did not designate PMI as an applicant. Id. PMI was not named as an applicant until a subsequent amendment was filed on October 24, 1994. Id. None of the applications characterized PMI's requested uses as existing. Id. Although PMI asserted that it did not acquire title to the property in question until November 21, 1994, and that the initial failure to identify PMI as an applicant was an oversight, this court stated that [those] exigencies [did] not compel the Commission to ignore the express statutory deadline for existing use permit applications. Id. In the case at bar, the Commission should have strictly applied the statutory deadline for existing use permit applications as it did in Waiahole I. Here, Moloka`i was designated a water management area effective July 15, 1992. Pursuant to HRS § 174C-50(c), existing use applications were due by July 15, 1993. On June 8, 1993, a timely application was filed requesting permission to withdraw ten percent of the total pumpage from Well # 17. The application identified Moloka`i Ranch as the landowner, and Kaluakoi Moloka`i and Moloka`i Irrigation System were identified as the applicants. KMI was not mentioned. KMI obtained title to the land overlying Well # 17 on October 19, 1993. KMI then submitted its own application on December 15, 1993. The application identified KMI as the landowner and sole applicant. We hold that these circumstances are sufficiently analogous to the facts presented in Waiahole I, such that Waiahole I's strict application of the statutory deadline controls. In Waiahole I, despite the fact that the timely filed application was eventually amended to incorporate PMI's requested uses, this court approved the Commission's conclusion that PMI's application for existing uses was untimely. Consequently, even assuming, arguendo, that KMI's application constituted a legitimate amendment of the timely application filed by Moloka`i Ranch, Kaluakoi Moloka`i, and Moloka`i Irrigation System, Waiahole I demonstrates that such an amendment will not preserve a party's existing uses if that party is not identified as an applicant for existing uses in the application filed within the statutory one-year deadline. In light of the foregoing, DHHL is correct that the Commission erred by considering KMI's untimely request for existing uses. Therefore, we vacate the Commission's Decision and Order to the extent that it grants KMI a permit for existing uses. If, on remand, KMI wishes to revive these expired uses, it must apply for a permit under HRS § 174C-51 as the uses are now presumed abandoned. See HRS § 174C-50(c). 6. KMI requested both existing and new uses. DHHL also argues that despite checking the box for existing & new uses in its application, KMI represented at the contested case hearing that it was requesting only existing uses. Based upon KMI's repeated representations at the hearing, DHHL asserts that KMI waived any request for new uses. DHHL further contends that the Commission expressly recognized in its Decision and Order that KMI's application was for existing uses, but went ahead and granted a permit for proposed uses. DHHL avers that the Commission thereby abused its discretion and violated established practice, its own administrative rules, and principles of procedural due process. KMI and the Commission, on the other hand, claim that KMI's application clearly indicated that the application was for existing and new uses, inasmuch as the box labeled existing & new uses was checked. Preliminarily, we note that the parties do not dispute that the Commission has the authority to consider requests for existing and new uses in the same contested case hearing. Indeed, HRS § 174C-51 (Supp. 1992) states that [t]he Commission in its discretion may allow a person to apply for several related withdrawals in the same application for a water permit. Rather, DHHL focuses on (1) the allegedly inconsistent representation of KMI's vice president, Ben Neeley (Neeley), and (2) the Commission's statement, in COL # 7, that KMI's request was for existing uses. With respect to its first subargument, DHHL refers this court to a transcript of proceedings held on November 24, 1998, wherein Neeley stated that KMI's application was only for existing uses in the amount of 1.244 mgd. However, Neeley's statement, fairly viewed, did not waive KMI's request for new uses. The transcript adequately reveals KMI's position: A The application says 2 million gallons and we've changed it. Q So you've changed the application? A Well, what we're applying for is 1.25. That's the way it's stated in the briefs and everything else. . . . . Q . . . So I understand your testimony your application is for 1.244 for uses identified on the exhibit in the amounts identified on the exhibit, is that correct? A Yes. . . . . Q. . . . Now, if your application is limited to uses and amounts on the exhibit, then as you said, any representation for an application in excess of 1.244 is in error, is that correct? A Yes, we're applying for the 1.244. Q So when KMI applied for 2 million in its initial application of 2 million gallons per day, in its amended application that was an error? [COUNSEL FOR KMI]: I object. Objection. It's argumentative. Reasons are stated in the opening brief. I stand by my objection. We have stated in our opening brief quite simply that, you know, we don't agree that we don't have the right to 2 million as an existing use. However, for purposes of this contested case hearing in large part because we understand that pumping out more than what our historical pumpage would be is a problem given the proximity of the wells, we can't pump more from that well. We understand that's a concern for the Water Commission. That for our opening brief and for purposes of this contested case hearing we have limited ourselves to requesting as an existing use the range of 1.259 to 1.244. How often do I have to say that? HEARINGS OFFICER ADLER: I understand what your application is for, I believe. And we know there have been many different moving averages in the life of this application. You've identified what is the water that you are seeking. You ask that it be under an existing use. And I presume that in the alternative if we don't make it as an existing use you're seeking it as a new use, is that correct? [COUNSEL FOR KMI]: If that's the only way we're going to get it, sure. We obviously haven't been denied simply because we are going to say it's a new use. (Emphases added.) Clearly, it was KMI's position that it was entitled to an allocation of 2.0 mgd of water for existing uses. However, it acknowledged the Commission's concern regarding the effects of pumpage from Well # 17 on other wells in close proximity, and voluntarily limited its request to 1.259 to 1.244 mgd of water. KMI consistently asserted that its request was for existing uses, but it asked, in the alternative, that the Commission award the requested uses as new uses if it could not satisfactorily establish them as existing at the time of designation. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Mr. Neeley's statements advocating KMI's primary position constituted a voluntary or intentional abandonment of KMI's alternative position. See generally Enoka v. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., Inc., 109 Hawai`i 537, 555 n. 18, 128 P.3d 850, 868 n. 18 (2006); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. AIG Hawai`i Ins. Co., Inc., 109 Hawai`i 343, 354, 126 P.3d 386, 397 (2006). As mentioned, DHHL also contends that the Commission expressly recognized that KMI's application was for existing uses. DHHL specifically refers to the Commission's COL # 7, which states that [t]he application is for an Existing Use Permit issued under section 174C-50(b), HRS. DHHL argues that the Commission nevertheless included a section entitled, Application for Proposed Water Use Permit, in which it evaluated KMI's request for new uses under HRS § 174C-49(a). Contrary to DHHL's assertions, however, the Commission's approach was consistent with the views it expressed in the aforequoted portion of the transcript of proceedings. To wit, the Commission understood KMI's argument to be that (1) it was entitled to 1.244 to 1.259 mgd of water for uses existing at the time of the designation of Moloka`i as a water management area, and (2) if it failed to establish that all of the water requested was for existing uses, then it desired an award of whatever remained as new uses. Hence, it was not inconsistent for the Commission to recognize that KMI requested existing uses in COL # 7 and subsequently grant new uses in accordance with KMI's alternative argument. For these reasons, the arguments presented by DHHL are without merit. 7. Whether the Commission lacked authority to allocate water to KMI for existing uses not claimed in its application need not be considered. DHHL's final point of error asserts that the Commission lacked authority to allocate water to KMI for existing uses not claimed in its application. DHHL essentially claims that KMI's failure to include certain other existing uses in its application constituted an abandonment of those uses, and as such, the Commission violated HRS § 174C-50(c) when it allocated water to these excess uses. As discussed, supra, because we vacate the Commission's Decision and Order to the extent that it grants KMI a permit for existing uses, and, upon remand, hold that KMI must apply for a permit under HRS § 174C-51 to revive its expired uses pursuant to HRS § 174C-50(c), resolution of this point of error is unnecessary.