Opinion ID: 1995829
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Waiver of Jury Trial.

Text: The state argues that the trial justice erred as a matter of law in allowing the waiver by defendants of their right to jury trial without exercising his discretion in determining the advantages and disadvantages of trying this case without a jury. The state cites a number of federal cases including Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965), which holds that a defendant does not have a federal constitutional right to waive a trial by jury and United States v. Panteleakis, 422 F. Supp. 247 (D.R.I. 1976), which construed Singer as allowing a judge to permit waiver of a jury trial even over the objection of the government when it determined that the refusal to consent under the circumstances was unreasonable or arbitrary. As interesting as these cases may be in the abstract, they deal with a procedural rule which is fundamentally different from the Rhode Island Rule. Rule 23(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows: Trial by jury. Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant in open court waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court. The reporter's notes following this rule set forth that it conforms to existing Rhode Island practice as prescribed in G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment), § 12-17-3. [2] The notes go on to say that it differs from the federal rule by expressly requiring that waiver of jury be `in open court' and by not requiring consent of the prosecution. The sole purpose in requiring the approval of the court and mandating that the waiver be made in open court is to assure that the defendant who waives a jury trial does so intelligently and with full knowledge of the consequences of his waiver. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). The specific deletion of the requirement of consent by the prosecution was to preclude the necessity of an adversarial proceeding on this issue. The framers of this Rule as well as the Legislature enacting § 12-17-3 were not fearful of the ability of justices of the Superior Court to render reliable determinations on the facts. The constitutional right to a trial by jury is given for the protection of the defendant, not for the protection of the prosecutor. Indeed, in a complex case involving contracts and corporate records, findings of fact by a jury made up of lay persons will probably not be as reliable and certainly not as articulate as those made by a judge who is trained and experienced in the determination of complicated factual issues. The state quotes a sentence from Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 2742, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (BNA) (1986), in which the Supreme Court describes the jury system as an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or over zealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased or eccentric judge   . Press Enterprise Co. had nothing to do with trial by jury and was concerned with the right of the press to be present or have a prompt disclosure of proceedings in a preliminary hearing as such hearings are conducted in the state of California. The quoted sentence came from Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), in which Justice White was commenting upon the right of a defendant to trial by jury. It did not purport to deal constitutionally or otherwise with the right of the government to a jury trial. Moreover, Justice White's lyrical description of the virtues of trial by jury was largely based upon the refusal of juries in the 17th and 18th centuries to apply the often ferocious law of England upon such sterling individuals as William Penn. See Bushell's Case 124 Eng.Rep. 1006 (1670). At no time did he suggest that juries were superior factfinders or that they had greater skill in applying the law to the facts of the case in such fashion as to vindicate the public interest more effectively than would a professional judge. In any event, both the Legislature and the framers of Rule 23(a) decided to depart from the federal model by not requiring the consent of the state to a waiver of jury trial. Consequently, the judge's sole task in deciding a waiver of jury trial is to determine that the defendants knowingly and intelligently waive their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury as well as the parallel right guaranteed by Art. I sec. 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution. The trial justice carried out his responsibilities in this respect by requiring that waivers be made by each and every defendant in open court after he had admonished defendants of the nature and consequence of such waiver. In following this procedure, the trial justice was correct in his application of the mandate of Rule 23(a) and of § 12-17-3.