Opinion ID: 791124
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lerner's Legal Malpractice Claim Against the Attorneys

Text: 59 Lerner contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Attorneys, thereby dismissing her legal malpractice claim. Specifically, she argues that: (1) the Attorneys failed to support their motion properly with admissible evidence; and (2) on the merits, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the element of proximate cause. We disagree. 60
61 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 62 In granting summary judgment to the Attorneys, the district court relied heavily on the affidavit of Alfredo Alvarado, the attorney who represented MBCC in the underlying State Court Action. On appeal, Lerner mischaracterizes Alvarado's affidavit as an affirmation and urges this Court to find Alvarado's statement insufficient to support the Attorneys' motion. 63 Lerner's argument is wholly without merit. In support of her claim, she cites Wester v. Sussman, 304 A.D.2d 656, 757 N.Y.S.2d 500 (2d Dep't 2003), and Lauer v. Rapp, 190 A.D.2d 778, 593 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1993). These cases hold that a party attorney moving to dismiss a legal malpractice claim must submit an affidavit based on personal knowledge, not an affirmation. See Wester, 757 N.Y.S.2d at 501; Lauer, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 843. Initially, we observe that these New York state procedural rules do not apply here to a federal court sitting in diversity. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) (Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.). 64 In any event, these cases are inapposite because the record shows clearly that Alvarado submitted an affidavit based upon his personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the settlement of the State Court Action. Moreover, Alvarado was the attorney for MBCC in the underlying State Court Action and is not a party to this action. Thus, the Attorneys properly supported their motion for summary judgment.
65 A legal malpractice claim under New York law contains three elements: (1) the negligence of the attorney; (2) proximate cause; and (3) damages. Reibman v. Senie, 302 A.D.2d 290, 756 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1st Dep't 2003). To establish the elements of proximate cause and damages, a plaintiff must show that but for the defendant's negligence, he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action or would not have sustained any damages. Aversa v. Safran, 303 A.D.2d 700, 757 N.Y.S.2d 573, 574 (2d Dep't 2003). For defendants in a legal malpractice action to succeed on a motion for summary judgment, evidence must be presented establishing that the plaintiff is unable to prove at least one of these essential elements of a malpractice cause of action. Wester, 757 N.Y.S.2d at 501. 66 Applying this standard, the district court held that Lerner could not prove negligence or proximate cause. This decision is sound. On appeal, Lerner does not dispute that she failed to submit any admissible evidence in opposition to the Attorneys' motion. Indeed, Lerner's contention—that the Attorneys' settlement of the State Court Action for the policy limit of $100,000 was purely in Allstate's interest and prevented a more favorable apportionment of liability between herself and Robert Baron—is pure speculation. It is insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to negligence. Even if the Attorneys were negligent in settling the State Court Action, this negligence was not the proximate cause of Lerner's damages. Rather, Lerner's contractual liability to MBCC, and now Allianz, was the direct consequence of her executing the Lease with MBCC prior to the Attorneys' retention. 67 Lerner's only potentially persuasive allegation is that the Attorneys were negligent in settling the State Court Action without obtaining a release from MBCC as to its indemnification cross-claims against her. But even assuming that this failure to seek a release from MBCC was negligent, Lerner has not shown how this alleged negligence proximately caused her damages. As the district court properly noted, the affidavit of MBCC's attorney Alvarado conclusively proves that even if the Attorneys had acted non-negligently ( i.e., sought a release from MBCC), MBCC would not have granted a release. In Alvarado's own words, he states that [a]t no time did we nor would we ever have agreed to drop the cross claims. Thus, no act or omission by the Attorneys subjected Lerner to liability in favor of MBCC (and now Allianz). In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Attorneys were properly entitled to summary judgment. See Aversa, 757 N.Y.S.2d at 574 (summary judgment granted to attorney who demonstrated that plaintiff would be unable to prove proximate cause and plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact). 68 Finally, Lerner asks this Court to grant a fairness hearing to review the settlement of the State Court Action. We reject this belated request because Lerner failed to move for such relief below. Cohen v. Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Local 1199, 68 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir.1995) (Under the law of this circuit, a party may not seek on appeal relief that he failed to seek below.).