Opinion ID: 2109821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ruling in Regard to Addition C

Text: As we have indicated, Judge Travers, although by no means sure that the question was properly before him, declined to grant the appellants the relief sought by them in their Second petition seeking injunctive relief against the erection of bulkheads and filling of Addition C. He was of the opinion, however, that in view of the importance of the case to the parties and to the contract purchasers of the land created, as well as the expense and duplication that a hearing de novo in regard to Addition C would entail, he should decide those issues in the present case. He ruled against the three contentions of the petitioners in the Second petition and, as we have already stated, dismissed the Second petition with prejudice. The appellants first contended before Judge Travers that no one had the right to fill in state waters. We have already disposed of this contention under part (1) of this opinion by indicating that Skyline when it did so did have a right to fill under the Act of 1862 and various conveyances. The second contention before the lower court was that the filling by the appellees was in violation of the covenants and rights granted to the appellants under the Skyline-Boinis Deed. Here again, we have decided this issue against the appellants under part (2) of this opinion. In addition to what we said there, the petitioners in their Second petition did not allege and made no attempt to prove that the lands to which Addition C attach are owned by Skyline and would be subject to the provisions of the Skyline-Boinis Deed, in any event. Indeed, the record indicated the contrary, i.e., that Skyline owned the fast land no farther north than North 28th Street and that Bay Shore owned all of the waterfront land between North 28th and North 32nd Streets. Nor did the petitioners in the Second petition show that the Skyline-Boinis Deed was in the chain of title to the Addition C property so that even if the Skyline-Boinis Deed had the effect contended for by the petitioners, it could not affect or bind land owned by another corporation through an independent chain of title. The third contention before Judge Travers in regard to the Second petition was that no permit had been issued by the Worcester County Shoreline Commission as allegedly required by §§ 15A and 15B of the Public Local Laws of Worcester County. The testimony, however, indicated that when either Bay Shore or Skyline applied to that Commission for a permit, the Commission ruled that no such permit was required, apparently because the permits from the Army Engineer predated the establishment of the Commission and the Commission had adopted the bulkhead limit line, which it administers, to coincide precisely with the work authorized by the permit from the Army Engineers. In addition to this, the Commission was advised by its counsel that the plat requirements of § 15A were illegal and hence the apparent requirement of recording a plat in advance of actual construction was excused. This was the general policy of the Commission. Judge Travers did not pass upon the correctness of the procedures of the Commission, but confined his ruling on this point, to a ruling that the petitioners could not divest either Skyline or Bay Shore of valuable property rights by mounting a collateral attack on the procedures of the Commission and when no fraud or bad faith is suggested on the part of the Commission when the Commission was not even a party to the suit. In our opinion, this ruling by the trial court was correct. See Taylor v. Ramsay Co., 139 Md. 113, 114 A. 830 (1921); 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, § 146, pp. 479-80. For all of these reasons, we affirm the order of August 16, 1971, dismissing with prejudice the First and Second petitions. Order of August 16, 1971, affirmed, the appellants to pay the costs.