Opinion ID: 1262445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Section 1252(b)(1) Violates the Suspension Clause

Text: The date of the final order to be reviewed is the date of the decision of the BIA dismissing the appeal from the order of removal issued by an IJ. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(I). Prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act, we had determined that compliance with the [30-day] time limit for filing a petition to review the BIA's final order is a strict jurisdictional prerequisite. Malvoisin v. INS, 268 F.3d 74, 75 (2d Cir.2001). In the cases at bar, Petitioners claim that the REAL ID Act requires this Court to alter its interpretation of the 30-day filing deadline as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Specifically; Petitioners' argument is that because the REAL ID Act repeals habeas corpus jurisdiction over removal orders issued by the BIA, petitions for review are now the only mechanism for judicial review over the administrative action in these cases. Since that is so, Petitioners allege that bars to this Court's jurisdiction over petitions for review would raise constitutional concerns under the Suspension Clause, at least in certain circumstances, such as those present in these cases. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (A construction of [the INA] that would entirely preclude review of a pure question of law by any court would give rise to substantial constitutional questions.). The Suspension Clause of the Federal Constitution provides that the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Because of that Clause, some judicial intervention in deportation cases is unquestionably required by the Constitution. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is well established, however, that the substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's detention does not constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977); see Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2001) (We do not doubt Congress' power to mandate adequate and effective substitutes for habeas review.). Accordingly, if the review available in the Courts of Appeals under the REAL ID Act is an adequate and effective substitute for the writ, the Act does not violate the Suspension Clause. Although this Court has not yet addressed the question, other Circuits, with which we now join, have determined that the provision of the REAL ID Act at issue here is not unconstitutional because it provides, through review by a federal court of appeals, an adequate and effective remedy to test the legality of an alien's detention. Alexandre v. US. Att'y Gen., 452 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir.2006); see also Mohammed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that, because the REAL ID Act created [a] remedy as broad in scope as a habeas petition, the Act is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus); Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2006) (determining that the REAL ID Act provided an adequate substitute for habeas proceedings); see also Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 888-90 (9th Cir.2007) (same). In De Ping Wang v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 484 F.3d 615 (2d Cir.2006), we wrote that [i]t is possible that in some future case, the particular circumstances that prevented a petitioner from seeking review within the 30-day time limit of § 1252(b)(1) would require us to reexamine whether that limit ought to be treated as jurisdictional now that the petition for review is the exclusive means of obtaining `judicial intervention in deportation cases.' 484 F.3d at 618-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). We now consider the future case[s] we presaged in De Ping Wang. This Court faced a similar situation when, in 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which created a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of petitions for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255. See AEDPA, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (effective April 24, 1996). In resolving the issue of suspension of the writ; we are faced with the question of whether the 30-day limitations period provided by the REAL ID Act is comparable to the one-year statute of limitations included in the AEDPA. In Lucidore v. New York State Div. of Parole, 209 F.3d 107 (2d Cir.2000), this Court rejected a petitioner's argument that the one-year period was per se unconstitutional, finding that, because AEDPA's period of limitation provided the petitioner with some reasonable opportunity to have [his] claims heard on the merits, the limitations period d[id] not render the habeas remedy `inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.' 209 F.3d at 113; see also Rodriguez v. Artuz, 161 F.3d 763, 764 (2d Cir.1998) (affirming the dismissal of an untimely petition for a writ of habeas corpus as the one-year statute of limitations period did not constitute an unconstitutional suspension of the writ). However, we have not addressed what constitutes a reasonable opportunity in connection with the length of a limitations period that is sufficient for the habeas substitute to be considered both adequate and effective. The 30-day time period applicable to an alien seeking judicial review of an administrative decision in his immigration proceeding is decidedly shorter than the one-year period available to inmates seeking review of their convictions under AEDPA. Petitioners argue here that, given the reality of the circumstances of many aliens subject to final orders of removal  language barriers, immigration detention, and the attendant difficulties that might affect a detained alien's opportunity to compose and file a petition for review  this 30-day period renders the judicial review available under the REAL ID Act inadequate to substitute for habeas corpus, and, thus, that the REAL ID Act is unconstitutional. In Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 102-03 (2d Cir.1998), we examined AEDPA's one-year period, and concluded that petitioners should have been accorded a period of one year after the effective date of AEDPA in which to file a first § 2254 petition or a first § 2255 motion. In determining that such a grace period was appropriate, we stated that where it is clear that Congress intended to foreclose suits on certain claims, `[t]he constitution . . . requires that statutes of limitations must allow a reasonable time after they take effect for the commencement of suits upon existing causes of action. Ross, 150 F.3d at 100 (quoting Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286 n. 23, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 632-33, 24 L.Ed. 365 (1877) ([S]tatutes of limitation affecting existing rights are not unconstitutional, if a reasonable time is given for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect.). Further, we explained that when adopting a new limitations period the legislature may specify the grace period during which the pertinent claims may be asserted following the statute's enactment, and if it does so, the grace period specified will generally provide the measure of the required reasonable time. If, however, the statute is silent as to the grace period to be allowed, the courts must fashion a grace period that is appropriate in view of the subject-matter. Ross, 150 F.3d at 100 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In reaching our determination in Ross, we considered the previously unlimited time within which petitioners could seek § 2241 habeas corpus relief and the important due process implications of extinguishing existing habeas petitions and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions immediately upon the enactment of a statute. See id. at 102-03. We concluded that, in light of Congress' selection of one year as the limitations period, the applicable grace period should also be one year. Id. at 103. The question of a grace period in relation to the REAL ID Act was examined recently in Kolkevich v. Att'y Gen., 501 F.3d 323 (3d Cir.2007). In Kolkevich, the petitioner was an aggravated felon and subject to the BIA's final order of removal on March 21, 2005. At the time that the REAL ID Act became law, on May 11, 2005, the 30-day time period for filing a petition for review had expired for the petitioner, and the petitioner had failed to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus prior to passage of the REAL ID Act. The court noted that prior to the REAL ID Act, criminal aliens could not file petitions for review and could only raise questions of law through the filing of a habeas petition. However, after the Act was passed, the writ was no longer available, and a criminal alien who had not filed a writ of habeas corpus prior to the passage of the Act would be denied judicial review: To say that [a petitioner] could have filed before [the REAL ID Act] was passed simply does not address whether, after [the REAL ID Act] became law, [petitioner's] right to habeas had been replaced with an `adequate and effective substitute.' Kolkevich, 501 F.3d at 334. The Kolkevich court found that the legislative history of the Act clearly demonstrated that Congress's intent was to provide every alien  criminal or otherwise  with some form of judicial review: Additionally, the [REAL ID Act's] legislative history makes clear that, rather than intending it to deprive aliens of judicial review, Congress saw the Act as a vehicle by which it could ensure that all aliens received an equal opportunity to have their challenges heard. . . . Not only does the House Report demonstrate that Congress had no desire to deprive any alien of his or her right to judicial review of a removal order, it clearly indicates that Congress acted to preserve review for every alien. Moreover, the House Report explicitly demonstrates Congress's, intention to craft legislation that comported with the Suspension Clause as well as the holding in St. Cyr. In light of these exceedingly clear statements, and the ambiguity in the statutory scheme, we simply cannot say that Congress intended to risk running afoul of the Suspension Clause by suspending the writ of habeas corpus with respect to the small class of aliens who received final orders of removal more than 30 days prior to the enactment of [the REAL ID Act]. Id. at 335. In the House Report accompanying the REAL ID Act, Congress made clear that [u]nder section 106, all aliens who are ordered removed by an immigration judge will be able to appeal to the BIA and then raise constitutional and legal challenges in the courts of appeals. No alien, not even criminal aliens, will be deprived of judicial review of such claims. Unlike AEDPA and IIRIRA, which attempted to eliminate judicial review of criminal aliens' removal orders, section 106 would give every alien one day in the court of appeals, satisfying constitutional concerns. The Supreme Court has held that in supplanting the writ of habeas corpus with an alternative scheme, Congress need only provide a scheme which is an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus. Indeed, in St. Cyr . . ., the Supreme Court recognized that Congress could, without raising any constitutional questions, provide an adequate substitute through the court of appeals. By placing all review in the courts of appeals, [the REAL ID Act] would provide an adequate and effective alternative to habeas corpus. H.R.Rep. No. 109-72, at 174-75, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 2005, pp. 240, 299-300 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Third Circuit thus determined in Kolkevich that the at-issue, provision of the REAL ID Act, § 106(c), should be read to permit the transfer from a district court to a Court of Appeals not only of those habeas petitions that were pending in the district court at the time the Act became law but also those that could have been brought in a district court prior to Act's enactment but were not. Kolkevich, 501 F.3d at 335. The Third Circuit further held that the 30-day time limit in. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) should not be interpreted as applying only to those aliens who received final orders of removal prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act but who did not file a petition for review directly in a court of appeals until after the enactment of the REAL ID Act. See Kolkevich, 501 F.3d at 336. As to the creation of a grace period, the Third Circuit in Kolkevich adopted a 30-day period: [W]e will provide pre-[REAL ID Act] claimants with the lesser of either the pre- or the post-[REAL ID Act] filing period. In this case, the pre-[REAL ID Act] filing period is the one applicable to § 2241 habeas petitions, which, as discussed, was infinite. The post-[REAL ID Act] filing period is the one applicable to petitions for review and is 30 days. Therefore, following Morton and Duarte, those in Kolkevich's situation shall be afforded 30 days from the date of [the REAL ID Act]'s enactment to bring their claims-that is, until June 1[0], 2005. Of course, this date has long passed. Only those who filed their petitions for review by that date will be allowed to proceed in this Court. We believe that this 30-day period is reasonable. As is made clear by the House Report, one of Congress's primary concerns in passing [the REAL ID Act] was to ensure that criminal aliens received the same type and amount of judicial review as other aliens. Were we to allow a grace period of longer than 30 days  for instance, six months or one year  a criminal alien who received his final order of removal on May 10, 2005 would receive more time to file his petition than a criminal alien, or even a noncriminal alien, ordered removed on May 12, 2005. This is exactly the sort of disparity that Congress sought to avoid by passing [the REAL ID Act]. Kolkevich, 501 F.3d at 337. For substantially the same reasons given by the Third Circuit in Kolkevich, we adopt a 30-day grace period to avoid any contravention of the Suspension Clause following the enactment of the REAL ID Act. As in Ross, we are adopting a grace period appropriate to the subject matter in light of Congress's selection of a limitations period and the constitutional requirement that statutes of limitation must allow a reasonable time after they take effect in which to commence law suits based on existing causes of action. We conclude that the REAL ID Act must be interpreted as having permitted an appropriate means for appeal and judicial review. Specifically, we hold that under the REAL ID Act, the 30-day time limit in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) should be extended to afford a period of thirty days from the effective date of the REAL ID Act as a grace period for the filing of a petition for review by those who received final orders of removal prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act but who did not file a petition for review until after the effective date of the Act.