Opinion ID: 2335487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: April 9, 2001 Compensation Order

Text: Petitioner argues that she should have been reimbursed for her vocational rehabilitation expenses under the settlement agreement's provision entitling her to Chronic Fatigue Syndrome related medical treatment and services. ALJ Govan disagreed and denied petitioner's request for reimbursement, stating: The settlement agreement . . . represents the entire resolution of this claim, and is not subject to expansion through the use of extrinsic evidence. No specific intention that employer provide vocational rehabilitation is set forth in the parties' agreement, and claimant's condition was, at the time the settlement was drafted, considered permanent. Finally, the agreement, on its face, refers to continued reimbursement for medical treatment and services, where no vocational rehabilitation had been implemented (or requested) prior to the settlement's effective date. By excluding consideration of extrinsic evidence, we understand that the ALJ impliedly concluded that the contract was clear on its face in favor of employer's interpretation that vocational rehabilitation was not covered by the agreement. In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, we examine the document on its face, giving the language used its plain meaning. Tillery, 912 A.2d at 1176 (citation omitted). [A] contract is ambiguous when, and only when, it is, or the provisions in controversy are, reasonably or fairly susceptible of different constructions or interpretations, or of two or more different meanings, and it is not ambiguous where the court can determine its meaning without any other guide than a knowledge of the simple facts on which, from the nature of language in general, its meaning depends. Id. (citations omitted). As has often been stated, the first step in contract interpretation is determining what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the disputed language meant. Sagalyn v. Found. for Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107, 111 (D.C.1997). We disagree with ALJ Govan that the agreement unambiguously excludes vocational rehabilitation from the term Chronic Fatigue Syndrome related medical treatment and services. The employer's interpretation, that the term does not include vocational rehabilitation, is a reasonable construction of the contract; but so is petitioner's interpretation that it is included within its scope. Vocational rehabilitation is unquestionably a service, and petitioner's need for vocational rehabilitation could certainly be related  as the contract requires  to her chronic fatigue syndrome. Even if we assume that vocational rehabilitation is not a  medical service  itself an ambiguous proposition that might depend on the type of rehabilitation, as vocational rehabilitation could be an important component of petitioner's health and recovery  the term medical does not necessarily modify both treatment and services. See 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:26 (7th ed. 2007) (Where a sentence contains . . . antecedents and several consequents they are to be read distributively. The words are to be applied to the subjects that seem most properly related by context and applicability. . . . (citing Perkins v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 813 A.2d 206, 209 n. 5 (D.C.2002) (The Rule of Last Antecedent states that ` ordinarily, qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding them'. . . . (emphasis added)))). If the term medical modifies only treatment, the settlement agreement would read Chronic Fatigue Syndrome related . . . services. Under such reading, petitioner's claim for reimbursement of costs she incurred for vocational rehabilitation would be covered so long as the vocational rehabilitation was related to petitioner's illness. We also reject the ALJ's reasoning that since the agreement refers to petitioner's right to continue to receive reimbursement, it unambiguously means that vocational rehabilitation is not included, because at the time the settlement agreement was signed, petitioner was not receiving vocational rehabilitation. A contract that was without prejudice to reimbursement for five additional years would not necessarily be read as limiting petitioner to the precise medical treatments and services she was receiving at the time of the settlement, rather than as setting a time limitation on the period during which she would be entitled to reimbursement. [10] Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ erred in ruling that the contract was plain on its face and excluded vocational rehabilitation. Having determined that the agreement in this case is ambiguous, we remand to the Compensation Review Board  which has replaced the Director  and through it, to the ALJ, for an interpretation of the meaning of the agreement. Once a contract is deemed ambiguous, it is examined to determine what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the words of a contract meant. Sagalyn, 691 A.2d at 112 n. 8. In doing so, the ALJ must consider that the reasonable person is: (1) presumed to know the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract; and (2) bound by the usages of the term which either party knows or has reason to know and the course of conduct of the parties. Id. The D.C. Workers' Compensation Act, which provides the legal basis for petitioner's claims as well as for their resolution by a settlement approved by DOES, see note 3, supra, was the backdrop against which the parties negotiated their agreement. The act provides that the employer shall furnish . . . vocational rehabilitation. D.C.Code § 36-307(a) (emphasis added). [11] Moreover, the municipal regulations promulgated by DOES define Medical Services and Supplies as including medical, surgical, vocational rehabilitation services. [12] 7 DCMR § 2099. After the parties signed the contract, it was submitted to DOES for approval. Given the statutory and regulatory context of this claim, the ALJ must consider whether a reasonable person in the position of these parties would have understood the term related medical treatment and services to include vocational rehabilitation, consistent with the usage of that term in the workers' compensation context. In attempting to make that determination, the ALJ should also consider that the term and services was included in the agreement by hand notation  and whether it was intended to have a meaning separate and independent from medical treatment. ALJ Govan relied on an alternative ground to deny the claim for vocational rehabilitation services based on her finding that Claimant now demonstrates the ability to perform part-time work; she meets the physical requirements for Occupational Therapist (medical services) and Masseuse. Further occupational and physical treatment is not indicated; no additional course work is required for claimant to return to work part-time as an occupational therapist. . . . Consequently, ALJ Govan concluded, there is no merit to claimant's assertion that she needs a course of vocational rehabilitation to return to work. The Director did not rely upon this alternative ground, however, and we may not do so unless the result is clearly ordained by law. See Howard Univ. Hosp. v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 881 A.2d 567, 574 (D.C. 2005). We cannot say that high standard has been met on this record, so we remand on this issue as well. [13]