Opinion ID: 551508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probable Cause Showing

Text: 7 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955 is a federal anti-gambling statute. Subsection (d) of that statute pertains to forfeiture and authorizes the seizure of any property, including money, used in violation of the provisions of this section.... 2 Subsection (b)(1) defines an illegal gambling business as: 8 a gambling business which-- 9 (i) is a violation of that law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted; 10 (ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and 11 (iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day. 12 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(b)(1). 13 Claimant argues that forfeiture is improper because the government failed to prove one of the elements of an illegal gambling business, namely the underlying state law violation. On Leong does not challenge the government's proof of elements (ii) and (iii) of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(b)(1). 14 The government's burden in a civil forfeiture case is merely to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant property is subject to forfeiture. In this case, the government needed to show probable cause to believe that the Building housed an illegal gambling business. Probable cause is defined as reasonable ground for the belief of guilt supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion. United States v. Three Hundred Sixty Four Thousand, Nine Hundred Sixty Dollars etc., 661 F.2d 319, 322-323 (5th Cir.1981). Of course, probable cause must be demonstrated with respect to every essential element of the alleged violation. United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d 253, 254 (9th Cir.1978), certiorari denied, 439 U.S. 868, 99 S.Ct. 196, 58 L.Ed.2d 179. Once the government demonstrates probable cause in a forfeiture case, the ultimate burden shifts to the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1615; United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377 (7th Cir.1989). Summary judgment ordering forfeiture is appropriate when the government establishes probable cause and the claimant fails to show that the facts constituting probable cause did not exist. United States v. Little Al, 712 F.2d 133 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Premises Known as 3639-2nd St., N.E., 869 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir.1989). 15 Claimant challenges the method by which the government established probable cause on the state law violation element of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(b)(1). Claimant interprets the statute to require the government to implicate the claimant in running an illegal business and to charge participants, at a minimum, with violations of state gambling laws. Under claimant's theory, the government failed to establish probable cause to believe that an illegal gambling business existed on the F.B.I. raid of April 20, 1988, because though On Leong members were present on those days and managed aspects of the gambling, no arrests were made. Similarly, the earlier Chicago police raids supposedly failed to uncover an illegal gambling business because no On Leong member was present at any of the first three searches, though gamblers were arrested at those searches for violating state laws. 16 On Leong's argument is overly formalistic. First the presence or involvement of the claimant is simply immaterial under the statute. The language of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(d) does not condition forfeiture on any suggestion that the claimant itself directed or managed the illegal gambling operation. It authorizes the forfeiture of any property ... used in violation of the provisions of this section. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(d) (emphasis added). Though one of the preceding subsections does make it illegal to conduct, finance, supervise, direct, or own all or part of an illegal gambling business, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(a), the forfeiture subsection is not limited in application to property owned by those who themselves conduct or oversee illegal gambling businesses. 17 By arguing that it must be linked to the state law crime, On Leong in essence claims that innocent ownership precludes forfeiture. This argument has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense in the context of civil in rem forfeiture actions. 3 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 2091, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974) (seizure of yacht justified after one marijuana cigarette discovered on board though owner/lessor was wholly innocent). Traditionally, forfeiture actions have proceeded upon the fiction that inanimate objects themselves can be guilty of wrongdoing. United States v. U.S. Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 1044, 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971). This is reflected in the fact that the object itself is the formal defendant. Because the object is the wrongdoer, forfeiture can be ordered even in the absence of any wrongdoing on claimant's part. Though the result for the innocent claimant is harsh, the hope is that the spectre of forfeiture will provide owners of property with an incentive to monitor the uses of their property. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 687-688, 94 S.Ct. at 2094. 18 On Leong also cannot assume that arrests, at a minimum, are necessary to prove that violations of state law occurred. The relevant burden of proof requires merely that the government establish probable cause to believe that state gambling laws were being violated. The means by which the government can do this are not limited to evidence of arrests. In this case, records of arrests were clearly relevant since the arrests were made pursuant to search warrants necessarily issued on a finding of probable cause. However, this does not mean that the government could only have shown probable cause to believe that the Building housed an illegal gambling business by introducing evidence of arrests. Any facts or evidence which might tend to establish reasonable grounds for belief of illegal activity are pertinent to the probable cause showing and can be presented to the district court. 4 19 It is pointless to try to distinguish the first three instances of gambling from the last on the basis of whether arrests were made. On Leong argues that since no arrests were made during the F.B.I. raid, no state laws were violated then. Yet the same gambling game was being played on all occasions. Claimant cannot successfully argue that Fan-Tan is illegal if someone happens to get arrested but legal if undetected. If gamblers were arrested for violations of Illinois law on three occasions, it is reasonable to conclude that a violation of state law occurred later when the same conduct was observed. 20 The affidavits presented to the district court contained ample evidence of gambling activity to support a probable cause finding. Claimant's quibbles over the proper means of establishing a state law violation are meritless. They do not amount to a refutation of the facts constituting probable cause. Claimant never denies the observations made by Agents Ng and Whitmer, nor does it try to argue that the gambling which occurred on the premises was legal under Illinois law. The government sustained its burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 296 (7th Cir.1983), certiorari denied, 464 U.S. 918, 104 S.Ct. 284, 78 L.Ed.2d 262 (1983). The district court properly found that probable cause existed to believe that the Building was being used in violation of state gambling laws, 5 and thus in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955. 21