Opinion ID: 3065246
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: On fences, boulders, planters, other

Text: signs, vehicles, utility facilities, or any structure. 6. Construction. Signs shall be: a. Constructed of durable and weather- resistant materials. 15410 REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT b. Anchored or weighted down to avoid being displaced in windy conditions, or otherwise to be a safety hazard to the public. [4] Section 4.402(P) regulates physical characteristics, such as size, number and construction of the signs; location of placement; and timing of display. None of these restrictions implicate the content of speech. The only possible contentbased aspect of § 4.402(P) is its limitation to signs related to “Qualifying Events.” In the Glossary of the amended Code, Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event are defined as temporary signs intended to direct passersby to a “Qualifying Event,” which, in turn, means: any assembly, gathering, activity, or meeting sponsored, arranged or promoted by a religious, charitable, community service, educational or other similar non-profit organization. A directional sign does not contain a message such that regulating directional signs would inherently “distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed.” Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). The definition of Qualifying Event Signs bears out this observation, as it does not mention any idea or viewpoint, let alone single one out for differential treatment. [5] The definition of a Qualifying Event sign merely encompasses the elements of “who” is speaking and “what event” is occurring. These two criteria invoke the speakerbased and event-based characteristics approved in G.K. Limited because “the City d[id] not limit the substance of [the] speech in any way.” 436 F.3d at 1078. In addition to the pole sign ban, the plaintiffs in G.K. Limited challenged exemptions in the Lake Oswego sign ordinance. Id. at 1070. We concluded the exemptions from the permitting and fee requireREED v. TOWN OF GILBERT 15411 ments for “public signs, signs for hospital or emergency services, legal notices, railroad signs and danger signs” were speaker-based exemptions that did not relate to the contents of the signs. Id. at 1076-77. We reached that conclusion because “officers decide whether an exemption applies by identifying the entity speaking through the sign without regard for the actual substance of the message.” Id at 1078. Here, an officer can likewise determine whether a “religious, charitable, community service, educational or other similar non-profit organization” is “speaking through the sign” without assessing the substance of the sign’s contents. The plaintiffs in G.K. Limited also contested the permit exemption for “temporary signs in residential zones.” Id at 1070. This exemption allowed homeowners to erect a temporary sign regarding any subject when a triggering event, such as a home sale or election, occurred. We characterized the provision as an event-based exemption that, again, did not relate to the content of the speech. Id. at 1078. “In the case of event-based exemptions to the permitting process, the officer must determine only whether a specific triggering event has occurred and if the temporary sign has been erected within the specified time frame.” Id. Similarly, for a Qualifying Event Sign, in addition to the content-neutral step of noting the speaker, the Gilbert officer need only check that an event is listed on the sign and the timing of the event. Identifying a triggering event under § 4.402(P) does not entail making a content-based determination. “We have never held, or suggested, that it is improper to look at the content of an oral or written statement in order to determine whether a rule of law applies to a course of conduct.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 721 (2000) (holding that need for officers to sometimes review the contents of oral statements made by “sidewalk counselors” to determine whether ordinance limiting speech near health care facilities was violated did not make ordinance content based). Good News contends that because a Gilbert enforcement officer must review elements of Good News’ signs in order to 15412 REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT apply § 4.402(P) the section is content based. Surely, however, this regulation is a good example that the “officer must read it” test is not always determinative of whether a regulation is content based or content neutral. The district court indeed recognized that we have “not applied the ‘officer must read it test’ so strictly that a law must be invalidated any time it forces an officer’s eyes to venture within the four corners of the sign.” See Berger, 569 F.3d 1052 n. 22 (“Whether an officer must read a message is persuasive evidence of an impermissible content-based purpose, but is not dispositive.”) (quoting Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 789 n. 5) (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ACLU of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 796 n.12 (9th Cir. 2006) (observing same). [6] This case also highlights the absurdity of construing the “officer must read it” test as a bellwether of content. If applied without common sense, this principle would mean that every sign, except a blank sign, would be content based. While a Gilbert officer needs to briefly take in what is written on the Qualifying Event Sign to note who is speaking and the timing of the listed event, this “kind of cursory examination” is not akin to an officer synthesizing the expressive content of the sign. Hill, 530 U.S. at 721. See G.K. Ltd., 436 F.3d at 1079 (observing that the pole sign grandfather clause “does not require Lake Oswego officials to evaluate the substantive message on the preexisting sign and the clause certainly does not favor speech ‘based on the idea expressed’ ”); see also, e.g., Covenant Media of South Carolina v. City of North Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 434 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that to the extent enforcement of a sign ordinance similar to Gilbert’s that “defined and distinguished between different types of signs,” including “directional or instructional signs,” required “looking generally at what type of message a sign carries to determine where it can be located, this ‘kind of cursory examination’ did not make the regulation content based”) (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 721); La Tour v. City of FayetteREED v. TOWN OF GILBERT 15413 ville, Arkansas, 442 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that an exception to a sign ordinance’s ban on electronic message signs for “time and temperature” signs was distinguishable from a provision in a prior case regulating political signs, as “[i]t takes some analysis to determine if a sign is ‘political,’ but one can tell at a glance whether a sign is displaying the time or temperature”). We conclude that § 4.402(P) is not a content-based regulation: It does not single out certain content for differential treatment, and in enforcing the provision an officer must merely note the content-neutral elements of who is speaking through the sign and whether and when an event is occurring.