Opinion ID: 1523828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for first-degree burglary for the reason that it failed to prove that he entered or unlawfully remained in the room with intent to commit a crime. He relies upon his testimony that his sole purpose in entering the room was to talk to his wife and to attempt to persuade her to return home with him. He repeatedly testified that he had no thought of harming his wife or the victim or of committing any crime whatsoever when he entered the room. Criminal intent, of course, can be inferred from the circumstances. There was evidence in this case that appellant had purchased the fatal weapon shortly before the homicide; evidence to indicate that he sat up waiting for the victims to return to the apartment; that when denied entrance to the apartment, he shot the lock off the door and forced his way into the apartment; and within a very brief time shot and killed Stutzenberger. After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant entered the room with an intent to commit a crime. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Even though the evidence was sufficient to justify a first-degree burglary verdict, the jury could have believed appellant's testimony that he had no intent to commit a crime when he entered the room. In that case, he would have been guilty of criminal trespass only, and he was entitled to his requested instruction setting out his theory of the case. K.R.S. 511.020(1) pertains to burglary in the first degree. It provides: A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when, with the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building, and when effecting entry or while in the building or in the immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: (a) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or (b) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (c) Uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument against any person who is not a participant in the crime. K.R.S. 511.060(1), pertaining to first-degree criminal trespass, provides: A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling. There is no question in this case but that appellant knowingly entered and unlawfully remained in the victim's apartment. There is also no question but that while therein he was armed with a deadly weapon, used a dangerous instrument against a person not a participant in the crime, and caused physical injury and death of that person. The question of whether appellant intended to commit a crime when he entered the apartment was a question to be determined by the jury. Unfortunately, there was no instruction to the jury which would permit it to find that appellant entered the apartment unlawfully, but without an intent at that time, to commit a crime. This omission from the instructions was erroneous, and it is crucial in this case because the imposition of the death penalty was predicated upon the aggravating factor that the homicide was committed during the course of a first-degree burglary. Had the jury found appellant guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree rather than burglary in the first degree, the death penalty could not have been imposed.