Opinion ID: 170070
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Civil Versus Criminal

Text: The OCCA was not required to apply Ashe 's collateral estoppel doctrine in this case. The deprived-child proceedings against Smith were civil in nature, and thus he has not suffered successive criminal punishments. We reach this conclusion by first interpreting the relevant portions of the Oklahoma Children's Code (Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 7001-1.1, et seq. ) and then applying the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors. To determine whether the state subjected Smith to a criminal punishment in the earlier proceeding, we look initially to the Oklahoma statutory scheme. A court must first ask whether the legislature, `in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.' Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636). Oklahoma has clearly chosen the civil label. The Oklahoma legislature devoted special provisions of the Oklahoma children's code to deprived-child/termination proceedings. These provisions are distinct from the criminal sexual abuse provisions. Compare Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 7006-1.1 (termination of parental rights) with Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 7115 (malicious child sexual abuse); see also Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1123(A) (sexual abuse of child under sixteen or believed to be under sixteen). The focus of neglect proceedings is to quickly resolve the placement of children, not to determine the ultimate guilt or responsibility of particular custodians. See In re H.J., 854 P.2d 381, 383 (1993) ([T]he entire philosophical rubric permeating the Juvenile Act relates to promoting the welfare of children  not the infliction of punishment.). The Oklahoma legislature has made clear, The paramount consideration in proceedings concerning termination of parental rights shall be the health, safety or welfare and best interests of the child. Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 7006-1.1(A). The state's burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence, and appeals from juvenile proceedings are heard by the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, not the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Thus, the Oklahoma legislature has expressed a plain preference for considering deprived-child/termination cases as civil. The seven Mendoza-Martinez factors further support a finding that the termination proceedings are civil in nature. Although the sanction of losing parental rights involves an affirmative disability or restraint, none of the other factors point in the direction of criminality. A child may be deemed deprived and parental rights may be terminated without a finding of scienter; the proceedings are not designed to promote the traditional aims of punishment; the behavior to which the proceedings apply is not necessarily already a crime; and the penalty does not appear[ ] excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100, 118 S.Ct. 488; Ives v. Boone, 101 Fed.Appx. 274, 290-91 (10th Cir.2004). Again, the focus of the deprived-child/termination hearing is whether custody should remain with a parent or guardian. While criminal behavior may be examined in making this determination, Oklahoma law establishes different standards and procedures in resolving parental rights than it does in creating criminal liability for child abuse. As Oklahoma courts have recognized, [t]ermination of parental rights cases, despite the high liberty interest at stake, are civil in nature. In re K.L.C., 12 P.3d 478, 480 (2000); see also In re K.W., 10 P.3d 244, 245-46 (2000) (treating a deprived child hearing as a civil case); Ives, 101 Fed.Appx. at 290 (finding Oklahoma courts consider deprivation hearings civil in nature). Based on the relevant statutory language and the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, we cannot conclude the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Simpson v. Bouker, 249 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488); see also Showery, 814 F.2d at 203-04 (holding that Ashe does not constitutionally compel application of collateral estoppel from parol revocation hearings resulting in imprisonment, which are civil in nature). Because Smith's first trial was not criminal in nature, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not triggered and his reliance on Ashe is without merit. Smith's reliance on Bowling v. State, 298 Md. 396, 470 A.2d 797 (1984), is similarly misplaced. On facts similar to those in this case, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevented the state from criminally prosecuting an individual on charges of sexual assault after the state had failed, in an earlier child-custody proceeding, to show sexual abuse had occurred. Bowling, 470 A.2d at 800-02. Our assessment of the relevant case law looks, of course, only to the United States Supreme Court. Early, 537 U.S. at 10, 123 S.Ct. 362. But in any event, Bowling provides Smith no more help than Ashe. While applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel from the earlier civil proceeding to the criminal proceeding as a matter of state law, the court ignored the constitutional nuance of the collateral estoppel doctrine. A state can certainly choose  as a matter of state law  to broadly apply collateral estoppel to criminal proceedings. But Supreme Court precedent does not require it to do so under federal law. The Supreme Court's cases apply collateral estoppel as an aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which is triggered only by successive criminal penalties. The OCCA's decision to uphold Smith's criminal sentence thus was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.