Opinion ID: 691309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violations of the Act

Text: 38
39 The Board determined that certain statements of Rodriguez, attributable to Horizons, violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(1). Horizons asserts that the finding is not supported by substantial evidence. 40 Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a), provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by the Act. An employer violates Sec. 8(a)(1) by coercively interrogating employees about their union activities or sentiments, or about the activities or sentiments of others, and by either directly or indirectly threatening employees. 3-E Co., Inc., 26 F.3d at 3 (citing Cumberland Farms, Inc., 984 F.2d at 559; NLRB v. Otis Hospital, 545 F.2d 252, 256 (1st Cir.1976)). When examining assertedly violative conduct, courts must be mindful that [i]t is the coercive tendency of employer statements, not their actual effect, that constitutes a violation of the Act. NLRB v. Marine Optical, Inc., 671 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir.1982) (citations omitted). The Board's inference of coercive tendency will not be disturbed if reasonable, even if susceptible of an alternative interpretation. Id. (citations omitted). 41 The Board's determination that Horizons violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(1), is supported by substantial evidence and stands without error. Rodriguez told a hotel employee, Rosado, that he (Rosado) had betrayed him by talking to the Union's president; he then questioned Rosado about his conversation. Thereafter, he told Rosado that all hotel employees would be fired if the Union continued to bother him. These statements are reasonably interpreted as coercive interrogation and direct threats. Considered in context, the statements could reasonably have interfered with or coerced hotel employees in the exercise of their organizational rights. See 3-E Co., Inc., 26 F.3d at 3; Cumberland Farms, Inc., 984 F.2d at 559. 42
43 The Board, in adopting the findings of the ALJ, found that Horizons's refusal to hire all but several of the hotel's former service-unit employees violated Secs. 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 158(a)(1), (3). Horizons argues that this determination is not supported by substantial evidence, and is therefore erroneous. 44 Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(3), declares that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment ... to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Where an employer violates Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 8(a)(3), by discriminating in its hiring practices to discourage a union presence, it necessarily violates Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(1), which disallows employers to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their organizational rights. See, e.g., American Press, Inc., 833 F.2d at 624; NLRB v. Horizon Air Services, Inc., 761 F.2d 22, 26-28 (1st Cir.1985); Kallmann v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir.1981). 45 Generally, a successor employer has the right to operate its business as it wishes. See Elastic Stop Nut Div. of Harvard Ind. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 1275, 1279 (D.C.Cir.1990) (citing NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88, 92 S.Ct. 1571, 1582, 32 L.Ed.2d 61 (1972)). Within this prerogative is the successor's freedom to hire its own work force:  'nothing in the federal labor laws requires that an employer ... who purchases the assets of a business be obligated to hire all of the employees of the predecessor.... '  Id. (quoting Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, 417 U.S. 249, 261, 94 S.Ct. 2236, 2243, 41 L.Ed.2d 46 (1974) (citation omitted)). The successor employer may not, however, discriminate against union employees in its hiring. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 40, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 2234, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (citations omitted). 46 Thus, where a successor employer refuses to hire its predecessor's employees because of their union affiliation, it may violate Sec. 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(3). The test is as follows: If it is proved that the former employees' protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the successor's refusal to hire, the refusal to hire violates Sec. 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3), unless the successor proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action for wholly permissible reasons. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2473, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983). See also Elastic Stop Nut Div. of Harvard Ind., 921 F.2d at 1280; Horizon Air Services, Inc., 761 F.2d at 27. [I]f the employer [refuses to hire] an employee for having engaged in union activities and has no other basis for the discharge, or if the reasons that [it] proffers are pretextual, the employer commits an unfair labor practice. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 398, 103 S.Ct. at 2472. 47 In the present case, the Board determined that the General Counsel sustained its burden of proving that the hotel's former service-unit employees' union affiliation was the substantial or motivating factor in Horizons's refusal to hire them. This determination is supported by substantial evidence: Rodriguez, Horizons's agent, indicated to Quinones that Horizons would utilize PEC's services only on the condition that there be no risk of a union at the hotel; Quinones responded with a letter confirming that [t]here is no possibility for a Union; Rodriguez told a Carib Inn union employee that all union employees would be fired if the Union continued to bother him; Rodriguez told union leaders that Horizons has nothing to do with the Union; not one union-affiliated former employee who submitted an application with Horizons was interviewed; with the exception of several individuals who were offered supervisory or managerial positions, no former service-unit employees were hired by Horizons. 48 The Board disqualified as a pretext Horizons's proffered lawful reason for refusing to hire the former employees. This determination also is supported by substantial evidence. Horizons asserted at the administrative proceedings that the former employees were not hired because many of them were not needed, and because they were not competent employees. Fernandez testified that the former employee's unfitness was determined after he personally observed them, and that their incompetence is evidenced by the fact that the hotel had gone into bankruptcy. The Board, adopting the ALJ's findings, discredited Fernandez' testimony and rejected Horizons's proffered justification, noting that Horizons submitted no evidence tending to prove that Fernandez personally observed each former employee, and that it failed to prove its contention that the service employees caused the hotel's bankruptcy. The Board concluded that Horizons's retention of PEC for recruiting services, and its solicitation of applications from former service-unit employees, was conduct intended as a smoke screen to conceal its scheme to keep the Union out of the Carib Inn. Again, this conclusion is well supported by substantial evidence. 49 The Board, in adopting the ALJ's findings, concluded that Horizons violated Secs. 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 158(a)(1), (3). This determination is supported by substantial evidence and stands without error. 50
51 The Board determined, in adopting the findings of the ALJ, that Horizons violated Secs. 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 158(a)(1), (5), by refusing to bargain collectively with the Union, which represented employees of the service and casino units. Horizons asserts that this finding is in error, unsupported by substantial evidence. 52 Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(5), provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. Where an employer violates Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(5), by refusing to bargain collectively, it necessarily violates Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(1), which disallows employers to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their organizational rights. See, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 482 U.S. at 34 & n. 2, 107 S.Ct. at 2231 & n. 2. Under Sec. 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(5), an employer is obligated to bargain with the union representing its predecessor's employees if: (1) the new employer is a 'successor' to the old ... and (2) a majority of the successor's employees previously were employed by the predecessor. Asseo v. Centro Medico Del Turabo, 900 F.2d 445, 450-51 (1st Cir.1990) (citing Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 482 U.S. at 43-52, 107 S.Ct. at 2236-41). If these two criteria are satisfied, a rebuttable presumption of majority status arises, leading to a consequent duty to bargain in good faith. Id. at 451. 53 Where a successor employer's unlawful hiring practices preclude the possibility of a majority status in its work force, however, the successor violates the Act by refusing to bargain collectively with the union that had represented the predecessor's employees. Elastic Stop Nut Div. of Harvard Ind., 921 F.2d at 1282. Thus, with regard to the former union employees of the hotel's service unit, our affirmance of the Board's determination that Horizons violated Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(3), by refusing to hire them because of their union affiliation compels affirmance of the determination that Horizons violated Sec. 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(5), as a duty to bargain with the employees' union representatives arose from the violation of Sec. 8(a)(3). See Elastic Stop Nut Div. of Harvard Ind., 921 F.2d at 1282. 54 With regard to the hotel's casino-unit employees, the Board's finding of a violation of Sec. 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(5), is supported by substantial evidence. The Board, in adopting the ALJ's findings, found that the casino continued operations after transfer of possession of the hotel to Horizons on June 1, and that Horizons operated the casino through June 23, 1986. The Board determined that, with respect to casino operations, Horizons was a successor employer. Fourteen of Horizons's twenty-four casino-unit employees were former union employees of the hotel's casino unit. 55 The fact that greater than one-half of the employees in Horizons's casino unit had been union employees of Horizons's predecessor raises a rebuttable presumption that there existed in the casino unit a majority status. See Asseo, 900 F.2d at 450-51. Horizons does not assert that it was able to overcome this presumption. Horizons therefore had a duty to bargain with representatives of the former casino-unit employees. Its failure to do so violated Secs. 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(1), (5).