Opinion ID: 775873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Restrictions on Access to Computers and the Internet

Text: 43 Paul argues that the condition of his supervised release prohibiting him from having, possessing, or having access to computers, the Internet, photographic equipment, audio/video equipment, or any item capable of producing a visual image is unreasonably broad. 14 We will address the restriction on Paul's access to computers and the Internet in this section. We will discuss the ban on access to photographic equipment and audio/video equipment in the following section. 44 Paul contends that a blanket prohibition on computer or Internet use is excessively broad and cannot be justified based solely on the fact that his offense involved a computer and the Internet. He points out that computers and Internet access have become indispensable communication tools in the modern world and that the restriction imposed by the district court would prohibit him from accessing computers and the Internet for legitimate purposes, such as word processing and research. 45 The government responds that the order prohibiting Paul from using a computer or the Internet is rationally related to his offense and that such an order is an appropriate public protection measure. The government points out that Paul's computer contained over 1200 images of child pornography and contained evidence that Paul had used the Internet to access child pornography chat rooms, bulletin boards, and newsgroups. According to the government, Paul also used his e-mail to advise fellow consumers of child pornography how to scout single, dysfunctional parents and gain access to their children and to solicit the participation of like-minded individuals in trips to visit children in Mexico. Under these circumstances, the government argues, restricting Paul's access to computers and the Internet is reasonably tailored to his offense and conviction and serves the dual purpose of deterrence and public protection. 46 The government correctly points out that a number of courts have upheld Internet and computer-use prohibitions as conditions of supervised release. See, e.g., United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127-28 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding an Internet restriction as a condition of supervised release for a child pornography offender); United States v. Mitnick, 145 F.3d 1342 (unpublished table decision), available at 1998 WL 255343 (9th Cir. 1998) (determining that the district court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting a defendant convicted of offenses related to computer hacking from accessing computers, computer-related equipment, and certain telecommunications devices during his probationary period without prior approval of his probation officer). 15 47 Most factually analogous to the instant case is Crandon, wherein a defendant convicted of receiving child pornography challenged the district court's imposition of a supervised release condition dictating that he could not possess, procure, purchase, or otherwise obtain access to any form of computer network, bulletin board, Internet or exchange format involving computers unless specifically approved by the U.S. Probation Office. 173 F.3d at 125. The district court found that this restriction on the defendant's Internet access was reasonably related to [his] . . . criminal activities, to the goal of deterring him from engaging in further criminal conduct, and to protecting the public, in light of the fact that the defendant had once used the Internet as a means to develop an illegal sexual relationship with a young girl. Id. at 127. The court was unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that the Internet prohibition was overly broad and would unnecessarily restrict his career opportunities and his freedoms of speech and expression. Noting that supervised release conditions restricting employment and First Amendment freedoms are permissible if the statutory tailoring requirements are satisfied, the court ultimately concluded that the restriction on the defendant was not overly broad despite its effects on his business opportunities and expressive activities. 48 As in Crandon, the supervised release condition at issue in the instant case is reasonably related to Paul's offense and to the need to prevent recidivism and protect the public. The record reveals that Paul has in the past used the Internet to encourage exploitation of children by seeking out fellow boy lovers and providing them with advice on how to find and obtain access to young friends. Restricting his access to this communication medium clearly serves the dual statutory goals of protecting the public and preventing future criminal activity. While the condition at issue in the instant case is broader than the restriction at issue in Crandon because it prohibits access to both computers and the Internet and it contains no proviso permitting Paul to use these resources with the approval of his probation office, we cannot say that that the district court abused its discretion in determining that an absolute ban on computer and Internet use was reasonably necessary to protect the public and to prevent recidivism. 49 In arguing that the district court's computer and Internet prohibition was an abuse of discretion, Paul points to the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001). In White, the court of appeals remanded to the sentencing court a special condition of supervised release that was substantially similar to Paul's condition. 16 While the Tenth Circuit was unclear about the scope of the restriction at issue in that case, it indicated that if the condition were read to absolutely ban all Internet and computer use, it would be greater than necessary to serve the goals of supervised release outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Id. at 1206. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that Crandon did not dictate a different result. While acknowledging that Third Circuit did uphold an Internet restriction in Crandon, the White court noted that the Crandon court did not impose an absolute ban on computer or Internet access, despite the fact that the defendant in Crandon (unlike the defendant in White) had clearly used the Internet to initiate and facilitate a pattern of criminal conduct and victimization that produced an immediate consequence and directly injured the victim in that case. Id. at 1205. 50 We find the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in White unpersuasive. Initially, we note that there is some evidence that Paul did in fact use the Internet to initiate and facilitate a pattern of criminal conduct and victimization, and thus that White can be distinguished on these grounds. More importantly, we reject the White court's implication that an absolute prohibition on accessing computers or the Internet is per se an unacceptable condition of supervised release, simply because such a prohibition might prevent a defendant from using a computer at the library to get a weather forecast or to read a newspaper online during the supervised release term. Id. We find that such a supervised release condition can be acceptable if it is reasonably necessary to serve the statutory goals outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). In the instant case, the district court had strong evidentiary support for its determination that a strict ban on computer and Internet use was reasonably necessary. Moreover, Paul has articulated no specific objections to the computer and Internet ban suggesting how his occupational affairs or his expressive activities will be adversely impacted by the fact that he will be unable to use a computer or the Internet at a library, cybercafe or . . . an airport during the term of his supervised release. 17 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this condition of supervised release. 51 C. The Restrictions on photographic equipment, audio/video equipment, or any item capable of producing a visual image 52 Paul also challenges the restrictions on his ability to use photographic equipment and audio/video equipment. He argues that this prohibition is not reasonably related to his offense because there is no indication that he used cameras to further the crime for which he was convicted. He also maintains that this restriction, like the computer restriction, is unreasonably broad because it involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate goals of his supervised release. The government responds that this restriction is necessary to serve public safety goals and to deter Paul from committing future criminal conduct. 53 We reject Paul's contention that this condition should be vacated because it is not reasonably related to his offense. As detailed above, special conditions of supervised release are evaluated to determine if they are reasonably related to four different factors: (1) the nature and circumstance of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, (2) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, (3) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and (4) the need to provide the defendant with needed [training], medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2) (1994). Paul appears to be arguing that the ban on photographic equipment and audio/video equipment is invalid because it is not reasonably related to the first of these criteria, but he evaluates the condition only with respect to the conduct underlying his offense, neglecting to consider whether the condition is reasonably related to his history and characteristics. 54 Information in the record about Paul's history and characteristics supports the district court's determination that it was both reasonable and necessary to prohibit Paul from accessing photographic equipment and audio/video equipment during his term of supervised release. The search of Paul's apartment revealed photographs of naked children, including some children that were identified as being local neighborhood children. Moreover, the materials found in Paul's apartment advertising his medical examinations and lice removal services provide further evidence that he likely engaged in production (not mere possession) of child pornography in the past. In light of this information, a supervised release condition limiting Paul's ability to create images of children is unquestionably related to his history and characteristics. 55 The district court sufficiently demonstrated why this prohibition is also reasonably related to a legitimate need to protect the public and prevent recidivism. As the district judge noted at the sentencing hearing, to the extent that . . . I'm concerned about exploitation of children, especially if they are children who are being approached under the auspices of medical care, I'm concerned about having any kind of photographic equipment that would allow you to exploit that situation. The restriction on Paul's ability to access photographic and audio-video equipment is thus based on the district court's valid concern that Paul could use such equipment to exploit children in the future, and the condition is reasonably related to those concerns. 56 Paul contends that even if this condition is related to the appropriate statutory factors, it is broader than necessary to serve these goals. While the district court made no explicit finding in support of its implicit determination that this condition was necessary to promote public safety and to prevent Paul from repeating his crimes, there is ample evidence in the record supporting this determination. Moreover, the only specific objection to this condition that Paul raises is that the prohibition will prevent him from pursuing his interests in photography and repairing cameras. As these interests are mere hobbies, the detrimental impact of this restriction appears slight. 18 We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the condition of supervised release restricting Paul's access to photographic and audio/video equipment was necessary to protect the public and to prevent Paul from committing future criminal conduct. Thus, we affirm this condition of supervised release. 57 D. The Sex Offender Registration Requirement 58 Finally, Paul argues that the district court erred in not affording him pre-sentence notice before imposing the sex offender registration requirement as one of the conditions of his supervised release. Paul maintains that under this court's decision in Coenen, 135 F.3d at 943, a defendant is entitled to pre-sentencing notice that the court is considering requiring sex offender registration as a condition of supervised release. Paul did not raise this objection at the sentencing proceeding, and thus plain error review is appropriate. See United States v. Lopez, 923 F.2d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1991). 59 The government argues that pre-sentence notice was provided because the registration condition was set out in the probation officer's sentencing recommendation attached to the PSR. The record supports this assertion. Moreover, the government correctly points out that even if this information had not been attached to the PSR, Paul nevertheless would have had notice of this condition. The Sentencing Guidelines state that such a provision is a mandatory condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) for anyone convicted of a sexual offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3 n.1 (1998). Coenen is distinguishable on this basis. Coenen was decided prior to the effective date of the amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3583 making this condition mandatory. 19 The registration requirements at issue in Coenen were imposed pursuant to a catch all provision in the Sentencing Guidelines that did not necessarily provide the defendant with notice of the specific registration requirements that the sentencing court imposed. Coenen, 135 F.3d at 943. In the instant case, the language in the Sentencing Guidelines indicating that registration is a mandatory condition of supervised release for sex offenders provided adequate notice of the particular conditions that were ultimately imposed. 60 In light of these considerations, it is apparent that the district court did not plainly err in imposing the sex offender registration requirement at the sentencing proceeding. We affirm this special condition of supervised release.