Opinion ID: 1226006
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Trial Court Correctly Interpret the Custody Agreement?

Text: Preliminarily, we note that the superior court correctly applied a contractual analysis in interpreting the custody agreement between Samuel and Susan. Settlement agreements should be interpreted as contracts provided that they meet minimal contractual requirements. See, e.g., Davis v. Dykman, 938 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Alaska 1997); see also Singh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1193, 1199 (Alaska 1993). Samuel argues that he should now be able to invoke the dispute resolution clause of Section 2 because his failure to do so in October 1995 stemmed from his reliance on Susan's agreement to the Sunday overnights. We agree. The language of Section 2 suggests that the custody agreement was provisional and could be revised by the parents if either parent was dissatisfied with it at the end of one year. In addition, Section 2 provided that if the parents could not revise the agreement themselves, mediation or court modification would be available. In this case, Samuel and Susan agreed to try a new visitation schedule in July, thus making it unnecessary for either parent to seek mediation or court involvement in October. [3] Relying on Susan's agreement to the Sunday overnights, Samuel did not exercise his option to seek mediation or court modification in October 1995. Because Samuel reasonably relied on Susan's representation to his detriment, Susan is now estopped as a matter of law from relying on the one-year time limit as a basis for refusing to abide by the dispute resolution provision. [4] See K.E. v. J.W., 899 P.2d 133, 134 (Alaska 1995) (setting out the elements of equitable estoppel as (1) representation of a position by conduct or word, (2) reasonable reliance thereon by another party, and (3) resulting prejudice). We therefore conclude that the superior court erred in denying Samuel's motion in its entirety. Samuel requested mediation of his dispute with Susan or modification of the custody arrangement in his motion to the superior court. However, in the body of his motion and in his affidavit, Samuel expressed a preference for mediation. [5] Under the parties' agreement, if one party sought mediation the other was bound to mediate. Given the parties' agreement, the superior court should have ordered mediation. [6] Further, we take this occasion to endorse broader use of mediation in child custody and visitation matters. Mediation offers parents multiple benefits. In general, [i]nstead of pitting one parent against the other in the adversarial atmosphere of the courtroom, mediation encourages parents to solve their mutual problem, which is how to optimize the time their children share with each of them. Donald T. Saposnek, Mediating Child Custody Disputes 19 (1983). In particular, mediation expands the variety of possible resolutions to custody disputes because the parents are free to agree to more creative arrangements than those that might be adopted by a trial court. See id. Additionally, one commentator has pointed out that parents' satisfaction with the mediation process leads to what he terms a low rate of recidivism: in one program fewer than 10% of mediated cases were officially reopened within the first year after mediation. See Jeff Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice § 2.03, at 50 (1986) (footnote omitted). Most importantly, resolving custody and visitation disputes through mediation rather than through an adversarial process benefits the children who are the subject of disputes between their parents. [These] benefits include [fostering] increased chances for continued cooperation and communication between the parents, reduction of ongoing conflict as a result of both parents perceiving themselves to be on the same side, and an attitude of mutual flexibility in problem solving. Saposnek, supra, at 19. By increasing the potential for cooperation between parents, mediation decreases the potential for continuing parental strife in a child's life.