Opinion ID: 2558115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Maine Uniform Arbitration Act

Text: [¶ 16] Forsley contends that the court erred by interpreting the Maine Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA) to preclude judicial review of arbitration awards on questions of law when an arbitration agreement expressly provides for such review. He argues that allowing parties to structure arbitration agreements flexibly would support the policy of encouraging arbitration. [¶ 17] We review the interpretation of statutes de novo. Garrison City Broad., Inc. v. York Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.A., 2009 ME 124, ¶ 9, 985 A.2d 465, 468. Only when we determine that a statute is ambiguous do we look beyond the plain language of the statute and the context of the whole statutory scheme to indicia of legislative intent such as the statute's history and its underlying policy. Id.; Pennings v. Pennings, 2002 ME 3, ¶ 13, 786 A.2d 622, 627; Smith v. Hawthorne, 2006 ME 19, ¶ 30, 892 A.2d 433, 440 (Alexander, J., concurring). [¶ 18] As provided in section 11.05 of the OGG Operating Agreement, the agreement, including the parties' retained right to appeal any questions of law in section 11.01, is governed by the laws of Maine. The MUAA provides, Upon application of a party, the court shall confirm an award, unless ... grounds are urged for vacating... the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in section[ ] 5938.... 14 M.R.S. § 5937 (2010). Section 5938 enumerates a number of grounds for vacating an arbitration award, but errors of law are not among them. See 14 M.R.S. § 5938(1). [4] [¶ 19] We have previously held that an arbitrator's decision is final and binding and non-reviewable save as specifically provided by [section] 5938. A reviewing court is not empowered to overturn an arbitration award merely because it believes that sound legal principles were not applied. Bd. of Dirs. of Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 33 v. Teachers' Ass'n of Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 33, 395 A.2d 461, 463 (Me.1978). Although this holding suggests that the grounds for vacatur listed in section 5938 are exclusive, in that case we did not address the circumstance where, as here, the parties agreed to expand judicial review of an arbitration award to include errors of law. [¶ 20] The pertinent facts of this case, however, are similar to those of Hall Street, where the United States Supreme Court interpreted the correlative provision of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). See 552 U.S. at 579-80, 128 S.Ct. 1396. Similar to the MUAA, the FAA provides grounds for vacating an arbitration award that do not include claimed errors of law. See 9 U.S.C.S. § 10(a). [5] In Hall Street, a party sought to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award after the parties arbitrated a dispute pursuant to an arbitration agreement that provided, The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award ... where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous. See 552 U.S. at 579, 128 S.Ct. 1396 (quotation marks omitted). The Court held that the FAA provided exclusive grounds for vacating arbitration awards and that those grounds may not by supplemented by contract. See id. at 578, 584, 128 S.Ct. 1396. Resolving a split in the federal circuit courts of appeals on this question, the Court applied a textual statutory analysis and concluded that there was no textual hook to include just any legal error among enumerated statutory grounds for vacatur that were, by their terms, restricted to egregious and extreme conduct by arbitrators. Id. at 586, 128 S.Ct. 1396; see 9 U.S.C.S. § 10(a)(1)-(4). The Court further reasoned that there was no hint of flexibility in the FAA's compulsory language: the court must grant [an order confirming the award] unless the award is vacated ... as prescribed in section[ ] 10 ... of this title. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 587, 128 S.Ct. 1396 (quotation marks omitted) (citing 9 U.S.C.S. § 9 (LexisNexis 2008)). [6] The Hall Street Court noted that expanded review of arbitration awards may be available pursuant to state common law or statutes, where judicial review of different scope is arguable. Id. at 590, 128 S.Ct. 1396. [¶ 21] With Hall Street's textual analysis in mind, we consider section 5938(1) in the context of the entire statutory scheme of the MUAA. See Garrison City Broad., 2009 ME 124, ¶ 9, 985 A.2d at 468. [¶ 22] Both the FAA and MUAA share origins in New York's 1920 arbitration statute. See Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 589 n. 7, 128 S.Ct. 1396; Unif. Arbitration Act (1956) Prefatory Note, 7 (Part 1A) U.L.A. 100 (2009). Consequently, the language of the FAA and the MUAA are substantially similar. Like the must grant language of section 9 of the FAA, there is no hint of flexibility in the language of section 5937: the court shall confirm an award, unless ... grounds are urged for vacating... the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in section[ ] 5938.... See 14 M.R.S. § 5937 (emphasis added). As the Hall Street Court concluded with section 9 of the FAA, the mandatory language of section 5937 implies a limited role for the court. See 552 U.S. at 587, 128 S.Ct. 1396. [¶ 23] Section 5938(1) of the MUAA, however, provides two additional grounds for vacating awards that are not included in the FAA: E. There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under section 5928 [7] and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; or F. The award was not made within the time fixed therefor by the agreement or, if not so fixed, within such time as the court has ordered, and the party has not waived the objection. 14 M.R.S. § 5938(1)(E), (F) (footnote added). These subsections do not address egregious conduct by the arbitrator; rather, they provide grounds for vacatur based on disputes about the existence of an agreement to arbitrate and issues of timeliness. [8] Following Hall Street's textual analysis, the MUAA's inclusion of these technical or procedural grounds for vacatur does not provide a textual hook for expanding the scope of the statute beyond its express terms. See Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 586, 128 S.Ct. 1396. [¶ 24] Significantly, unlike the FAA, the MUAA contains language at the end of section 5938(1) that further limits the court's authority: But the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award. [9] 14 M.R.S. § 5938(1). [¶ 25] Additionally, in contrast with section 5938(1), other sections of the MUAA expressly contemplate that parties may control certain aspects of arbitration by agreement. These sections provide default rules for arbitration that apply unless otherwise provided by the agreement. See 14 M.R.S. §§ 5929, 5930, 5931, 5934 (2010) (addressing appointment of arbitrators, procedure for arbitration, and time for making an award). We also note that, in the context of public employees labor relations law, the Legislature expressly provided for judicial review of an arbitration decision for errors of law. See 26 M.R.S. §§ 972, 979-M (2010). [10] It is apparent that the Legislature knew how to create statutory language that allows parties to structure arbitration agreements flexibly. Consequently, the absence of such language in section 5938(1) demonstrates the Legislature's intent to occupy the field and limit the grounds for vacatur to those enumerated in the statute. See Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 15 v. Raynolds, 413 A.2d 523, 527 (Me.1980). [¶ 26] Furthermore, the MUAA expressly directs that it shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 14 M.R.S. § 5947 (2010). Other states that have adopted the 1956 Uniform Arbitration Act interpret their statutes consistent with Hall Street. [11] [¶ 27] Finally, the parties urge competing policy arguments to support their positions. Forsley contends that prohibiting parties from tailoring judicial review provisions of arbitration agreements will discourage private dispute resolution and increase the burden on trial courts. The Riverwalk Defendants contend that strict adherence to the limited judicial review provided by the MUAA will foster the efficiency and finality of private dispute resolution. These policy arguments, however, are largely speculative. See Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 588-89, 128 S.Ct. 1396. The text of the statute reflects only one policy: when parties have agreed to arbitration that results in an award, the role of the court is to promptly confirm the award subject to narrow review upon application of a party. See 14 M.R.S. §§ 5937-5939 (2010). It would be contrary to that policy to permit parties, by contract, to craft a different role for the courts and thereby create new matters of disagreement for litigation. [¶ 28] Consideration of the text, purpose, and policy associated with section 5938(1) inevitably lead us to conclude that section 5938(1) provides the exclusive grounds for a court to vacate an arbitration award and that the statute is not sufficiently elastic so as to allow parties to expand the court's role by agreement.