Opinion ID: 1497216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leonard Goldstein

Text: Appellant Goldstein is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia. His primary business office is in Maryland, and the events recited herein occurred in Maryland except as otherwise noted. The events leading to his three convictions occurred in late 1975 and early 1976, and involved the placement of three infants, referred to at trial as Baby Doe, Baby Roe and Baby Poe, with three married couples, referred to, respectively, as the Norths, the Wests, and the Souths. The natural mothers, as well as the Norths and the Wests, were all residents of Maryland. The Souths resided in Virginia. Each of the natural mothers was a patient of Dr. Stave or Dr. Rose, [9] associates in the practice of obstetrics and gynecology in Maryland and private attending physicians at the Washington Hospital Center in the District of Columbia. Goldstein and Dr. Stave, although once acquainted, had had no contact for several years when Dr. Stave called Goldstein in late 1975. Dr. Stave advised Goldstein that one of his patients, Miss Doe, was expecting a child and wished to privately place the child for adoption. Goldstein responded to Dr. Stave's inquiries that private placements were legal in Maryland and that he, Goldstein, would be willing to assist in such a placement. Subsequently, Dr. Stave contacted Mr. and Mrs. North, who had been his patients for infertility. In response to his inquiry, they indicated that they would like to adopt Baby Doe. After unsuccessful attempts to obtain a satisfactory recommendation of an attorney to assist them in the adoption, the Norths obtained Dr. Stave's recommendation of Goldstein. The Norths thereafter retained Goldstein to assist in the proposed adoption. Upon the recommendation of Dr. Stave, Miss Doe went to the Washington Hospital Center for delivery of her baby. Goldstein arranged with the staff neonatologist to assure confidentiality of the identity of Baby Doe's mother by covering the baby's crib identification with the name Goldstein. Similarly, all hospital billing accounts were maintained in Goldstein's name and paid out of an escrow fund established through him by the Norths. On the day of Baby Doe's birth, Goldstein secured from a Maryland court a temporary custody decree authorizing the Norths to take custody of the child. (Goldstein had visited Miss Doe and her parents at the hospital for the purpose of obtaining their signatures on various documents related to the Maryland adoption proceedings.) When the child was able to be released from the hospital, the staff instructed the Norths on the care of the child and released the child to them. Thereafter the Norths adopted the child in accordance with Maryland procedures. The second placement also was initiated through Dr. Stave, who advised Goldstein that his patient, Miss Roe, wished to place her expected child for adoption. Miss Roe had indicated to Dr. Stave that each of the adoption agencies she had spoken with wanted her to be sent away from home during her pregnancy but that she wanted to remain at home. Dr. Stave asked Goldstein whether he knew of anyone interested in adopting the expected child. Goldstein advised a rabbi of the situation and the rabbi, in turn, advised the Wests, who retained Goldstein to assist in the placement. When Goldstein was advised by Dr. Stave that Baby Roe had been born at Washington Hospital Center, he arranged to meet Miss Roe and her mother at the hospital to obtain their signatures on various legal documents. He then obtained an order of temporary custody for the Wests. When Baby Roe was able to be released from the hospital, Goldstein was unavailable and therefore sent an associate to the hospital. The hospital bills were paid from an escrow fund established by Goldstein for the Wests. A hospital nurse released the baby to Miss Roe's mother who, in turn, gave the baby to Mrs. West. [10] Thereafter the Wests adopted the child in accordance with Maryland procedures. The third placement was initiated by Dr. Rose, whose patient, Miss Poe, desired to privately place her expected child. When Miss Poe began with unanticipated suddenness to deliver her child at home, Dr. Rose directed that she be taken to the Washington Hospital Center, where Baby Poe was born. The next day Dr. Rose contacted the Souths, whom he knew to be interested in adopting a child. They asked Dr. Rose to recommend an attorney; he recommended Goldstein but indicated that they need not use his services. Contacted by the Souths, Goldstein advised them to retain a Virginia attorney (since their proposed adoption would have to be processed in Virginia) but finally agreed to assist them. (This was the first time Goldstein had heard of Miss Poe or Baby Poe.) Goldstein arranged for the hospital bill to be transferred to his name and paid the bill from an escrow account established by him for the Souths. He met the Souths at the hospital, where they were instructed in the care of the child by the hospital staff. The child was released to its maternal grandfather, Mr. Poe, [11] who gave the child to Goldstein. Goldstein, in turn, gave the child to the Souths. The Souths returned to Virginia with the child and petitioned a Virginia court for adoption. At the time of trial, the Virginia court had entered an interlocutory decree of adoption. At the outset it is acknowledged that the facts of this case appear, at least in their broadest outlines, to have some similarity to those of Galison's case. Both Goldstein and Galison attempted to place the children of unmarried expectant mothers, domiciled outside the District, who gave birth to their children in the District. In each case, a non-resident attorney participated in dealings between the natural and the adopting families and the hospital. Additionally, both cases present evidence of some child-placement activity being conducted by the defendants within the District. The dissimilarities distinguishing the two cases, however, are stark. With reference to Goldstein's placements, the mothers' presence in the District was due to medical reasons  to enter the hospital for delivery. In Galison's case, the mother did not come to the District solely for medical reasons nor, in fact, when she changed her mind about giving away her child, did she desire to remain in the District. Far from having made up her mind to give away her child, the mother in Galison's case consistently expressed to Galison her desire not to go through with the adoption plan. Furthermore, there exists no indication that Goldstein, like Galison, negotiated with the mothers in an attempt to persuade them to relinquish their parental rights over the children. On the contrary, Goldstein's contacts with the natural mothers and with the hospital personnel in the District were limited to carrying into effect the unchanged decisions arrived at by the natural mothers previous to entering the District and subsequent to consulting with their physicians in Maryland. In short, these cases involve lawful Virginia or Maryland adoptions of children born to Maryland residents while in a District of Columbia hospital solely for medical reasons. The decision to place the child was made by each of the natural mothers before entering the District. The mothers evidenced no reluctance to follow their predetermined course after entering the District. Since the mothers were not residing in the District and no coercive activity was employed in an attempt to persuade them to relinquish their children, the District interests which were offended by Galison are not threatened here. Finding no other District interest threatened by Goldstein's conduct, we hold that the Baby Broker Act is inapplicable in his case. The government argues, however, that the District has an interest in regulating Goldstein's conduct in order to protect children (and their mothers) whose presence in the District is merely for medical care. In the circumstances proved in this case, we disagree. The government's asserted nexus, mere presence within the geographical bounds of the District, arose solely by reason of the mothers' or the doctors' decisions to utilize the medical facilities of the Washington Hospital Center. Such presence, without more, is a fortuity in which the District's interests under the Act are not affected. We think that whatever the District's interest may be in these mothers giving birth to children in D.C. hospitals, it could not have been intended by Congress to override the interests of expectant mothers and their physicians in assuring that both the mothers and their children receive the best medical care available to them in this multi-jurisdictional metropolitan area. [12] Cf. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974) (one year of residence requirement for free medical care at county hospital violated constitutional rights of equal protection and interstate travel). To hold otherwise on these facts would be antithetical not only to the medical judgment of the doctors in these cases but also to uniform public policy respecting anonymity in adoptions and prompt transfer of custody after birth. Congress cannot fairly be taken to have intended to introduce such serious questions of comity in these cross-jurisdictional births and adoptions. Goldstein persuasively argues, without refutation by the government, that in two adoptions the appellant came into the District with Maryland court orders granting temporary custody to the adopting parents. Pursuant to Maryland practice, such court orders are ordinarily issued on the date of the infant's birth so that the infant can be physically transferred to the adopting parents as soon as practicable after birth. This is sound medical (pediatric) practice and avoids traumatizing the natural mother by making contact between the natural mother and infant unnecessary. [13] The attorney's role, under Maryland practice, in executing the order granting temporary custody to the adopting parents and at the same time in preserving the anonymity of the parties would be substantially restricted were we to hold that the statute in question reached the conduct charged. We hold, therefore, that Goldstein's conduct did not violate § 32-785. [14] No district interest sought to be protected by the Act was threatened by Goldstein's placement activities. No. 12196 is affirmed. No. 12439 is reversed and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal.