Opinion ID: 419956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Law Negligence and Indemnification

Text: 35 After Mobil had been sued by Helaire for his injuries sustained during the vessel unloading procedure, it made a third party demand against Cheramie and its underwriters claiming contractual indemnity under the charter agreement and under the protections and indemnity (P & I) policy in which Mobil was named as an additional insured. The district court entered judgment for Cheramie on this third party claim, but granted Mobil recovery over against the Cheramie P & I underwriters. The underwriters now appeal, claiming that the trial court erred in instructing the jury only as to Mobil's potential liability as vessel owner under 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905(b). They argue that Mobil's fault, if any, was in its capacity as platform owner not in its capacity as vessel owner. The claim that Mobil is liable as the platform owner is a claim under state law. In this case La.Civ. art. 2315 would apply. The underwriters' argument is in furtherance of their theory that the P & I contract under which they are liable only indemnified Mobil in its role as vessel owner and not in its role as platform owner. We reject this argument and affirm the district court's dismissal of the state law negligence claim and its indemnification order. 36 It is undisputed that Mobil, as time charterer of the vessel, would normally be covered under the broad definition of vessel owner under 33 U.S.C. Sec. 902(21) 15 and thus subject to potential liability under Sec. 905(b). Mobil claims against the underwriters for indemnity because it is vessel owner under Sec. 905(b). Then, 905(b) states that 905(b) remedies are exclusive of all other remedies available, except those otherwise provided in LSHWCA. This provision negates a claim under state law which the underwriters would not need to indemnify. The underwriters, however, argue that 905(b) does not control at all because the activities of Mobil which related to Helaire's claim had nothing to do with Mobil's role as time charterer, i.e. vessel owner, but instead were a direct consequence of Mobil's platform activity. According to the underwriters, there was no evidence that Mobil was at fault with respect to any of the acts associated with its responsibilities as time charterer in assigning cargo or assigning the platform as the vessel's destination. Rather, they charge Mobil as having negligently permitted the unloading in spite of the inclement storm and sea conditions, acts related directly to Mobil's capacity as a platform owner. 37 In support of this argument the underwriters cite Lanasse v. Travelers Insurance Co., 450 F.2d 580 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied sub nom. Chevron Oil Co. v. Royal Insurance Co., 406 U.S. 921, 92 S.Ct. 1779, 32 L.Ed.2d 120 (1972), in which the plaintiff was injured when a crane operator on the platform negligently lifted a heavy welding machine from the deck of a time-chartered vessel during the unloading of cargo. There, as in the instant case, the defendant possessed the dual identity of platform owner/time charterer. Upholding a jury verdict that the vessel was liable as a platform operator, not as vessel owner or time charterer, the court said that the unloading procedure was not even remotely related to the operation, navigation or management of the vessel, 450 F.2d at 583. The underwriters argue that here, too, the vessel was no more than the inert locale of the injury which is not enough to create the required causal operational relation between the vessel and the resulting injury. Id. at 584. 38 We disagree. In Lanasse, the jury's finding of negligence was predicated upon the negligent manner in which a platform-based crane was operated. The operation of the crane on the platform was in no way related to the navigation or management of the vessel. In the instant case, nothing happened on the platform to cause the accident. 16 The negligence with which Mobil was charged was based on its actions or omissions in permitting the unloading of cargo on the vessel to continue despite the obvious danger created by the poor weather conditions. As pointed out correctly by the district court, this kind of boat-unloading decision was traditionally and historically vessel-related. In fact, but for the exclusivity provision of the LSHWCA, Helaire would have been entitled to coverage under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. Sec. 688. See International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 47 S.Ct. 19, 71 L.Ed. 157 (1926) (stevedore employee in stowing freight in hold of ship was seaman for purposes of statute giving seamen cause of action for personal injury suffered during the course of their employment). Clearly maritime, rather than state law, applies where the situs of the injury was on navigable waters and the negligence bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249, 268, 93 S.Ct. 493, 504, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972). The state law claim was properly dismissed under the LSHWCA's exclusivity provisions. 39 Moreover, even assuming that Mobil's liability may have arisen from its status as platform operator, indemnification was still properly awarded. The indemnity policy which named Mobil as assured was a standard fleet insurance policy providing assured's coverage against liabilities ... in respect of the vessel, with one significant deletion. The words as owner of the vessel named herein were deleted from the policy. 17 The district court found that this deletion was intended to provide coverage for Mobil regardless of the capacity in which Mobil was sued. Certainly this finding was not clearly erroneous. The policy in contention here makes no distinction between coverage for unloading activities on the one hand and platform activities on the other. Consequently, the court's indemnification order is proper regardless of whether Mobil incurred liability as a vessel owner or as a platform operator.