Opinion ID: 1670498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: applicable tennessee case law

Text: Where there is a statute of limitations that bars prosecution of the offense charged, there should be a sufficiently definite averment of time in the indictment to show that the offense was committed within the statutory limit. State v. Shaw, 113 Tenn. 536, 82 S.W. 480 (1904). Shaw was specifically followed in State v. Comstock, 205 Tenn. 389, 326 S.W.2d 669 (1959), wherein the rule is stated to be that where the indictment is brought after the period of limitations has expired, it must be pleaded and proved that certain specific facts toll the statute of limitations. See also State v. House, 2 Shannon's Tennessee Cases 610 (1877). The Court of Criminal Appeals dealt with a statute of limitations question in the case of State v. Thorpe, 614 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) in an opinion drafted by Judge, now Justice, Daughtrey. We quote from that opinion: The trial court ruled, correctly we think, that because no allegation had been made by the State that any affirmative act by Thorpe had taken place within the limitations period, the first two counts of the presentment should be dismissed. [2, 3] While it is true that the statute of limitations may be tolled when an offense is of a continuing nature, Nashville & Decatur R.R. v. State, 60 Tenn. 55, 56-60 (1873), the specific facts which toll the limitation period must be pleaded and proved. State v. House, 2 Shannon's Cases 610, 611 (1877); State v. Comstock, 205 Tenn. 389, 393, 326 S.W.2d 669 (1959); 2 Wharton's Criminal Procedure Section 274, at 86 (12th ed. 1974). Facts sufficient to toll the statute of limitations were not pleaded or proved here   . The same rule of law was stated and followed in the case of State v. Hix, 696 S.W.2d 22 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). We quote: [5-8] When an indictment is brought after the period of limitations has expired, the specific facts which toll the statute of limitations must be pleaded and proved. State v. Comstock, 205 Tenn. 389, 326 S.W.2d 669 (1959); State v. Thorpe, 614 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1980). In the instant case, both indictment 1874 and indictment 1875 are completely devoid of any allegation which might be interpreted as tolling the statute. In the absence of specific pleadings or proof as to why the statute was tolled, the child abuse convictions were barred by the statute of limitations and are therefore void.   . A case closely akin to the case at bar is State v. Tidwell, 775 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). Tidwell was charged with thirty-four counts of criminal sexual conduct with minor victims. He filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss certain counts of the presentment on the ground the offenses charged in those counts were barred by the statute of limitations. The State contended that the statute of limitations had been tolled as to each offense due to the defendant's concealment of the respective offenses. The trial court permitted the State to amend all counts of the presentment by adding this language: Said crime having been concealed by the aforesaid defendant, Marshall Tidwell, from date of the commission of the offense until August 16, 1986. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the allegations of this amendment constituted sufficient facts which, if proved, would toll the statute of limitations. In that case the amendment flatly claimed concealment for a specific time period. The appellate court wrote:    T.C.A. Section 40-2-103 provides that [n]o period, during which the party charged conceals the fact of the crime ... is included in the period of limitation. However, the State failed to establish during the trial that the defendant concealed the offense. State v. Bentley, 239 Kan. 334, 721 P.2d 227 (1986). See Sears v. State, 356 S.E.2d 72 (Ga. App. 1987). The victims were aware of the acts which constitute the offenses of which the defendant stands convicted. While the defendant asked the victims not to tell anyone about the sexual contact, the victims had ample opportunity to tell their parents, siblings, relatives and friends about the acts which constituted the offenses. One victim apparently told his fellow students about what had occurred, and the information traveled rapidly throughout the school. The defendant talked to a group of victims together on one occasion. He also told some of the victims about his sexual contact with other victims. However, no one alerted the authorities. It is clear the victims were aware of the acts which constituted the offenses of which the defendant stands convicted. However, the defendant never threatened any of the victims. In State v. Bentley, supra , an uncle had sexual contact with his nine-year-old niece. When the child's father arrived home, the uncle threatened the child in a mean voice. He told the child not to tell anybody, and if she did, he would try to do it again. He also told the child that if she told her father, he would tell her father that her brother had come into the bathroom while she was in there, a violation of the father's privacy rule. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the statements of the uncle did not constitute concealment of the offense. Bentley, 721 P.2d at 230. In Sears v. State, supra , the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that a victim's infancy, lack of awareness of the criminal nature of the accused's conduct, and/or the victim's fear of the accused does not toll the statute of limitations in a child abuse case. Sears, 356 S.E.2d at 74.