Opinion ID: 1913355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues 1, 2 & 4

Text: Since issues 1, 2 and 4 deal with similar evidentiary rulings we will address these issues at the same time. The only issue before the jury in a condemnation action is the amount of compensation to be paid for the property taken or damaged. SDCL 21-35-15. City's claims of error in Issues 1, 2 & 4 are connected with both parties' valuation testimony. The theme of City's argument is that evidence dealing with property values prior to the time of taking (February 4, 1991) should not be admitted. However, neither party presented an expert opinion on the fair market value as of the date of taking. The fair market value of property is to be determined at the time of the taking. Basin Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. Cutler, 254 N.W.2d 143 (S.D. 1977). Kelleys were the only party who submitted an appraisal of the land as of the date of taking. Donald Kelley valued the land as it existed on February 4, 1991, at $746,000. City has not raised this as an error which would constitute grounds for a reversal of the jury verdict. In fact, no objection was made on the record to exclude the opinions for the reason that the opinions fail to state the value on the date of taking. It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that, in order to preserve an issue for appeal on admissibility of evidence, an objection or motion to strike has to appear in the record. Horton v. Horton, 503 N.W.2d 248 (S.D.1993) (citing SDCL 19-9-3(1); State v. Rufener, 392 N.W.2d 424, 427 (S.D.1986); Bright v. Ecker, 9 S.D. 192, 68 N.W. 326 (1896)). In view of the circumstances in this case, this defect in the evidence is not of such magnitude to warrant reversal even though the opinion testimony is not a model of clarity or precision. The main thrust of City's position is that the damage award in this case contains an element of severance. The transcript of the motion hearing denotes a suspicion on the part of City that Kelleys were making a claim for severance damages. This fear of severance was birthed in the instructions proposed by Kelleys prior to trial. The instruction given by the trial court did not advise the jury to consider diminution of value to Kelleys' remaining property as an element of damage. This court held in State Highway Commission v. Hayes Estate, 82 S.D. 27, 34, 140 N.W.2d 680, 684 (1966), as follows: The measure of damages in condemnation cases involving a partial taking is the difference between the fair market value of the unit before the taking and the fair market value of what remains after the taking. City of Bristol v. Horter, 73 S.D. 398, 43 N.W.2d 543; State Highway Commission v. Fortune, 77 S.D. 302, 91 N.W.2d 675. In the application of this rule severance damage to the remaining property is included in an award[.] (Emphasis supplied.) This case involves the taking of the total property owned by Kelleys. The witnesses gave their opinions as to the value of the total unit and did not discuss any diminution of value of a remainder, since there was no remainder to suffer any severance damage. [2] In fact, after hearing Kelleys' appraiser, the trial court held that his opinion was limited to the value of the land being condemned. Trial courts exercise discretion when deciding whether to admit opinion evidence in a condemnation case. This court has previously stated: Great latitude is allowed in the reception of evidence to prove the value of property in condemnation cases, and generally any relevant and material evidence, if competent under general rules of evidence, is admissible to prove market value. If the proffered evidence tends to aid the trier of fact in arriving at a conclusion on the issue of value and damage, it should be received. Basin Elec. Power Co-op. v. Poindexter, 305 N.W.2d 46, 48 (S.D.1981). Once a witness is qualified, as was the case here, he/she is entitled to give a value opinion. Basin Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Cutler, 88 S.D. 214, 218, 217 N.W.2d 798, 800. This opinion does not have to be beyond reproach. It is not required that an expert witness stand at the head of his class to make his evidence admissible. His preliminary examination must show such knowledge of the subject as will enable him to speak with intelligence. The jury will determine the value of his opinion from the knowledge which he shows himself to possess. Gleckler v. Slavens, 5 S.D. 364, 384, 59 N.W. 323, 329 (1894). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the expert opinion to be weighed by the jury in this case. The record reflects that the jury also heard value evidence from the landowners. The general rule is that the owner of the land being taken is competent to express an opinion on the value of his property being condemned. 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 23.03 (1993). In upholding a jury verdict in a condemnation decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court held: The general rule was recently stated in Wear v. State of Nebraska, 215 Neb. 69, 76, 337 N.W.2d 708, 714 (1983): `The amount of damages sustained in a condemnation action is peculiarly a question of a local nature and ordinarily is to be determined by a jury. Where the evidence is conflicting, this court will not ordinarily interfere with the verdict of the jury unless it is clearly wrong. In the instant case the jury's verdict was within the range of the testimony and is supported by sufficient competent evidence. City of Hastings v. Peter Ellis Farms, Inc., 216 Neb. 550, 344 N.W.2d 640, 642 (1984). Furthermore, City must establish that the evidence admitted was not only erroneous but prejudicial. Zens v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac., 479 N.W.2d 155, 159 (S.D.1991). Prejudicial error is error `without which the jury would have probably returned a different verdict.' Id. (quoting Shaull v. Hart, 327 N.W.2d 50, 53 (S.D. 1982)). Admitting the expert opinions on value was not prejudicial error, it could assist the jury in determining just compensation. A review of this record does not warrant an assumption that the jury bought the experts' opinion hook, line, and sinker. The determination of value in a condemnation proceeding is not a matter of formula or artificial rules, but of sound judgment and discretion based upon a consideration of all the relevant facts. Wishek Investment Co. v. MacIntosh County, 77 N.D. 685, 45 N.W.2d 417 (1950). A relevant fact considered by the jury in this case was the landowner's opinion. In this case, the opinions of the experts and landowners on value were conflicting; the opinions were subject to thorough cross-examination; and the jury was properly instructed and returned a verdict within the range of the testimony. This verdict was not clearly erroneous and should not be set aside. State Highway Comm. v. Madsen, 80 S.D. 120, 125, 119 N.W.2d 924, 927 (1963).