Opinion ID: 76840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mandatory Nature of the Guidelines Error

Text: 21 In this case, Shelton was sentenced under the pre- Booker mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. Thus, we must determine whether under Booker there is error in Shelton's sentence because the district court considered and applied the Guidelines as binding.
22 In Booker, the Supreme Court excised the two parts of the Sentencing Reform Act that rendered the mandatory Guidelines system unconstitutional: the part in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) making the Guidelines result binding on the sentencing court; and the part in § 3742(e) requiring de novo review of sentences on appeal. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 764. In doing so, the Supreme Court stated that [w]ith these two sections excised (and statutory cross-references to the two sections consequently invalidated), the remainder of the Act satisfies the Court's constitutional requirements. Id. The Supreme Court in Booker further instructed that its remedial holding applies to cases on direct review. Id. at 769 ([W]e must apply today's holdings — both the Sixth Amendment holding and our remedial interpretation of the Sentencing Act — to all cases on direct review.). 5 23 Although the district court followed the correct sentencing procedure when it sentenced Shelton, the Supreme Court has now excised the mandatory nature of the Guidelines in Booker. Thus, we conclude that it was Booker error for the district court to sentence Shelton under a mandatory Guidelines scheme, even in the absence of a Sixth Amendment enhancement violation. 6 24 In reaching this conclusion, we note that Booker error, as succinctly stated in Rodriguez, is as follows: 25 The constitutional error is the use of extra-verdict enhancements to reach a guidelines result that is binding on the sentencing judge; the error is the mandatory nature of the guidelines once the guidelines range has been determined. 26 Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300, 2005 WL 272952, at . As a result of Booker 's remedial holding, Booker error exists when the district court misapplies the Guidelines by considering them as binding as opposed to advisory.
27 The next issue is whether the error was plain. In this case, [a]lthough the error was not `plain' at the time of sentencing, `where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal — it is enough that the error be plain at the time of appellate consideration.' Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1298, 2005 WL 272952, at  (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). Booker made plain the district court's error in sentencing Shelton under a mandatory Guidelines scheme that is now advisory. See Barnett, 398 F.3d at 524, 2005 WL 357015, at . Thus, we move on to the third prong of plain error, which is exceedingly difficult for defendants to overcome. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1297, 2005 WL 272952, at . 7
28 Under the third prong of plain-error review, Shelton is required to demonstrate that the plain error affects [his] substantial rights. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1785, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). In this third prong, [i]t is the defendant rather than the [g]overnment who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). The Supreme Court has instructed us that plain error review should be exercised `sparingly.' Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1297, 2005 WL 272952, at  (citation omitted). Further, the plain error test is difficult to meet, and in particular, the burden of showing prejudice to meet the third-prong requirement is anything but easy. Id. at 1297-98, -7 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 29 Further, the defendant's burden with respect to prejudice is to show that the error actually did make a difference. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1299, 2005 WL 272952, at . In other words, in post- Booker sentencing cases, in applying the third prong, we ask whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result if the guidelines had been applied in an advisory instead of binding fashion by the sentencing judge in this case. Id. at 1300, . 8 A reasonable probability of a different result means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 1298,  (quotation marks and citations omitted). 30 A defendant sentenced pre- Booker faces difficulty in establishing that a mandatory, as opposed to an advisory, Guidelines scheme actually affected the outcome of the proceedings. To establish the third prong takes something more than showing the district court sentenced within the Guidelines range and felt bound to do so, especially given that the Guidelines range remains an important factor in sentencing. 9 But Shelton has carried that heavy burden in the instant case. 31 Here, the district court during sentencing expressed several times its view that the sentence required by the Guidelines was too severe, and noted that unfortunately Shelton's criminal history category under the Guidelines was based on his past charges rather than on the actual nature of the crimes as reflected in the sentences imposed in those cases. The district court not only sentenced Shelton to the lowest possible sentence it could under the Guidelines, 130 months, but also stated that sentence was more than appropriate in this case. All of these comments taken together convince us that there is a reasonable probability the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence in Shelton's case if it had not felt bound by the Guidelines. 10 In addition, and importantly too, Shelton has established a reasonable probability that some sentence below the Guidelines range would be permissible and reasonable in light of Booker and the § 3553(a) factors. 11 Thus, we proceed to the fourth prong. 32
33 Finally, under the fourth prong of plain-error review, we consider whether the plain error at sentencing seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1300-01 (11th Cir.2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v. Chisholm, 73 F.3d 304, 307 (11th Cir.1996). A plain error affecting substantial rights does not, without more, satisfy the plain-error test, for otherwise the fourth prong and the discretion afforded by the fourth prong would be illusory. We conclude that the fourth prong is established here and that an exercise of our discretion is warranted in this particular case. 12 34 The district court in this case indicated an express desire to impose a sentence lesser than the low end of the Guidelines range of 130 months' imprisonment, and the Supreme Court in Booker plainly indicated that the district court now has the discretion to do so, provided the resulting sentence is reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors. Under these circumstances, defendant Shelton has carried his burden to establish the fourth prong and has shown that the plain error that affected his substantial rights also seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings in his particular case. Accordingly, we vacate Shelton's sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with Booker. 35 VACATED AND REMANDED.