Opinion ID: 1058690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Statements of Fact or Opinion

Text: We now turn to RTSC's remaining assignment of error in which they assert that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the five statements contained in Hyland's 2002 performance evaluation that were submitted to the jury could form the basis of a defamation action. Although RTSC argued on brief and in oral argument that the statements were not actionable as defamation because the evidence showed that the statements were true, their assignment of error does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. [7] Furthermore, RTSC did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that the statements were false or otherwise not defamatory at trial or in its post-trial motions. Compare American Commc'ns Network, Inc. v. Williams, 264 Va. 336, 339-41, 568 S.E.2d 683, 685-86 (2002) (statements held not actionable because true where defendants assigned error to sufficiency of evidence that statements were false). Therefore, in reviewing this assignment of error we consider only the legal question whether the statements are statements of fact or statements of opinion, not whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the statements were true or false or otherwise defamatory. In support of their argument that the statements were not actionable opinions, RTSC first asserts that a performance review, by its nature, sets forth the opinions of the evaluators, implying that such reviews cannot be the subject of a defamation action. We agree that performance reviews normally will contain the evaluators' opinions, but we disagree with RTSC's suggestion that performance reviews should therefore be immune from claims of defamation. False statements of fact made maliciously in a performance review remain subject to claims of defamation. As we stated in Larimore v. Blaylock, 259 Va. 568, 575, 528 S.E.2d 119, 123 (2000), The rule of qualified privilege that we adopted years ago continues to encourage open communications on matters of employment while not shielding the use of such communications for an individual's personal malicious purposes. Turning to the merits of this assignment of error, we first review the principles applied when determining whether statements are opinions or potentially actionable facts. Statements that are relative in nature and depend largely upon the speaker's viewpoint are expressions of opinion. Fuste v. Riverside Healthcare Ass'n, 265 Va. 127, 132, 575 S.E.2d 858, 861 (2003). Additionally, [s]peech that does not contain a provably false factual connotation is sometimes referred to as `pure expressions of opinion.' WJLA-TV v. Levin, 264 Va. 140, 156, 564 S.E.2d 383, 392 (2002). It is firmly established that pure expressions of opinion are protected by both the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Virginia and, therefore, cannot form the basis of a defamation action. Williams v. Garraghty, 249 Va. 224, 233, 455 S.E.2d 209, 215 (1995). While pure expressions of opinion are not actionable, [f]actual statements made to support or justify an opinion . . . can form the basis of an action for defamation. Id.; WJLA-TV, 264 Va. at 156, 564 S.E.2d at 393; American Commc'ns Network, 264 Va. at 340, 568 S.E.2d at 686 (quoting Williams, 249 Va. at 233, 455 S.E.2d at 215); see also, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 298 n. 8, 362 S.E.2d 32, 43 n. 8 (1987) (finding the trial court was correct to submit opinions laden with factual content to the jury in a defamation action); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 cmt. a (1977) (false statement of fact expressly stated or implied from an expression of opinion subject to defamation under common law). As the United States Supreme Court noted in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), expressions of `opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact. Id. at 18, 110 S.Ct. 2695. The Supreme Court went on to state, [s]imply couching . . . statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications. Id. at 19, 110 S.Ct. 2695. Accordingly, the Supreme Court refused to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled `opinion,' id. at 18, 110 S.Ct. 2695, instead holding that opinions may be actionable where they imply an assertion of objective fact. See id. at 21, 110 S.Ct. 2695. Whether an alleged defamatory statement is one of fact or of opinion is a question of law to be resolved by the trial court. WJLA-TV, 264 Va. at 156-57, 564 S.E.2d at 392. In making this determination we do not isolate one portion of the statement at issue from another portion of that statement. See American Commc'ns Network, 264 Va. at 341-42, 568 S.E.2d at 686 (alleged defamatory statements considered in relationship to the opinions and facts contained in the paragraphs at issue). Because determination of whether a statement is a statement of fact or opinion is an issue of law, we conduct a de novo review of the five statements in question. Government Micro Res., Inc., 271 Va. at 40, 624 S.E.2d at 69. We reiterate that, in our review of this case, we are not considering whether the statements at issue are true or false; only whether they are capable of being proved true or false. We will address each of the allegedly defamatory statements sequentially. The first statement is: Cynthia and her team met their cash goals, but were significantly off plan on all other financial targets including Bookings by 25%, Sales by 11.5%, and profit by 24%. Whether the business unit missed its goals by the stated percentages is a fact that may be proved true or false. [8] The word significantly in the first phrase, in this context, is defined by the identified percentages and is not merely the view of the writer. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that this statement could form the basis of a defamation claim. The second statement submitted to the jury is also a statement which contains provably false factual connotations and is laden with factual content. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 234 Va. at 298 n. 8, 362 S.E.2d at 43 n. 8. That statement is: Cynthia lead [sic] RTSC in the protest of the FAA's evaluation selection process for the TSSC contract and through a difficult procurement for the TSA, both of which demanded her constant attention. These visible losses created significant gaps in our strategic plans and in her business unit financial performance. The negative import of this statement is that Hyland was responsible for certain losses that adversely affected the company. Whether Hyland led the protest of the TSSC contract award and the TSA procurement and was responsible for [t]hese visible losses is susceptible to empirical proof. Similarly, whether losses from those projects created gaps in the company's plans and the financial performance of business units which she oversaw can be established through the production of evidence. The adjective significant may be a matter of opinion, but the operative part of the statement involves Hyland's responsibility for the losses, not their size. Therefore, the trial court did not err in holding that this statement was not a statement of opinion and could be the basis for a claim of defamation. The third statement, however, should not have been submitted to the jury as a basis for Hyland's defamation claim: Cynthia is frequently verbose and vocal in her opinions, to a degree that others stop participating in open dialogue. The allegedly defamatory aspect of this statement is that certain conduct by Hyland, her frequent verbosity and vocal opinions, was negative and led to a specific result, lack of participation by others in open dialogue. Whether the result in fact occurred is only relevant if Hyland's negative conduct was its cause. However, the negative conduct, and whether and how often it occurred, is a matter of the speaker's perspective and, as such, constitutes opinion, not fact. Because the negative conduct cited as the reason for others not participating in open dialogue is a matter of opinion which is not subject to proof, this statement should not have been submitted to the jury. Similarly, the fourth statement is also one of opinion: She has received specific feedback from her customers, the Beacon group study, her employees, and her leader on her need to listen and learn from others, yet she has appeared to be unwilling to accept and work with this feedback. While evidence could be introduced to establish whether Hyland received certain feedback from the identified entities, the negative impact of this statement is the description of Hyland as unwilling to respond to feedback. Such unwillingness is not stated as a fact, but instead is conveyed from the perspective of the writer, stating that Hyland appeared to be unresponsive. As such, the statement is opinion not susceptible to proof as a matter of fact. The final allegedly defamatory statement is: Cynthia has also been inappropriately and openly critical of her leader, her peers, and other leaders in the company. This behavior is not only destructive to the team, it negatively impacts her image in the eyes of others, including customers. This statement contains a significant combination of fact and opinion. The negative connotation in the statement is the allegation that Hyland engaged in open and inappropriate criticism of others. The second sentence in the statement could not be true if the alleged conduct did not occur. Whether Hyland's statements are critical of others and made openly are facts that are subject to evidentiary proof; however, whether such statements were inappropriate is clearly a matter of opinion. In considering the statement as a whole, we conclude that this statement falls into the category of opinion and should not have been submitted to the jury. In order for Hyland's criticism to have the alleged effect, it must be both open and inappropriate. Neither element alone is sufficient. Whether the criticism was inappropriate is a matter of opinion, and accordingly the statement as a whole cannot be subject to evidentiary proof of its truth or falsity. Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that this statement was a statement of fact and submitting it to the jury.