Opinion ID: 215941
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Termination as Trainer

Text: When C.R. England removed Mr. Watson from his trainer position, the stated reasons for the removal were: (1) he sat up with [his] student and burned up [his] h[ou]rs; (2) he refused a load; and (3) he deadheaded ... over 1000 miles home. EEOC App. at 432. The supervisor further conveyed to Mr. Watson that she would remove any trainer[,] especially a brand new trainer for any one of th[o]se reasons, and that he did not use good judgment[,] especially knowing that [he] w[as] on an automatic 90 day probation. Id. These stated reasonswhich on their face are legitimate and non-discriminatorysatisfy C.R. England's exceedingly light burden. Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1013 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1363 (10th Cir.1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The burden, therefore, shifts to Mr. Watson. In attempting to demonstrate that C.R. England's proffered reasons for the removal are pretextual, Mr. Watson asserts that the company's justifications are not supported by the record. Specifically, he argues that (1) there is no evidence that Plaintiff Watson improperly allocated hours for his student; (2) he refused the load because he was extremely frustrated with at least three load cancellations in a row; and (3) although [he] deadheaded home, Defendant England cites no rule or company policy which would require the termination of a trainer for deadheading home. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 44-45. [15] In determining whether the proffered reason for a decision was pretextual, we examine the facts as they appear to the person making the decision,  Zamora, 478 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Watts v. City of Norman, 270 F.3d 1288, 1295 (10th Cir. 2001)); we do not look to the plaintiff's subjective evaluation of the situation, see McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1130 (10th Cir.1998). Regarding the supervisor's belief that he had inappropriately burned up his hours, Mr. Watson had told the driver manager that he had run out of hours. When asked why this was the case, Mr. Watson did not explain and instead simply refused the load. Moreover, regardless of whether Mr. Watson actually misallocated his hours, we are only concerned with whether the employer held a good-faith belief that he had done so; the evidence before us demonstrates that it did. See Sorbo v. United Parcel Serv., 432 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir.2005) (indicating that the relevant inquiry concerns the belief of the employer that the employee engaged in misconduct, not whether the actual facts, as shown by evidence extrinsic to the employer's assessment, may have been otherwise.). In the end, Mr. Watson has not put forth any evidence that undermines the sincerity of C.R. England's stated justificationthat is, he has not demonstrated it is unworthy of belief. Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1071 (10th Cir. 2004). In regard to Mr. Watson's load refusal, he does not dispute that he refused the load, and the evidence confirms that he did. Instead, Mr. Watson attempts to demonstrate pretext by giving a justification for his refusal, stating that he was extremely frustrated with at least three load cancellations in a row. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 45. However, we fail to see how this excuse demonstrates pretext. [A]n employer's exercise of erroneous or even illogical business judgment does not constitute pretext. Reynolds v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1535 (10th Cir.1995). And Mr. Watson's [m]ere conjecture that the employer's explanation is pretext is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir.1999). As to C.R. England's final justification that he deadheaded home while training a new driverMr. Watson asserts that this is pretextual because the company cites no rule or company policy which would require the termination of a trainer for deadheading home. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 45 (emphasis added). However, Mr. Watson cites no controlling precedent that in any way supports the proposition that an employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification must be based upon an official company rule or policymuch less be required by such a rule or policyand we are not aware of any such precedent. See Medlock v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 608 F.3d 1185, 1192-93 (10th Cir.2010) (rejecting the argument, asserted by the plaintiff in an age discrimination case, that an otherwise reasonable justification for a business decision somehow loses its legitimacy simply because it reflects an exercise of managerial judgment rather than a ministerial execution of written policyas if a manager could not legitimately fire an employee for vandalizing property, stealing from co-workers, or assaulting a customer absent a formal company policy specifically addressing such misconduct). It is true that a failure to follow company policy can support a finding of pretext in some circumstances. See Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1119 (10th Cir.2007) (It is well-established that pretext can be shown by `evidence that the defendant acted contrary to a written company policy prescribing the action to be taken by the defendant under the circumstances.' (quoting Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir.2000))). However, we discern no basis for concluding that an otherwise reasonable justification by an employer should be deemed pretextual merely because it is not directly reinforced by an official rule or policy. This facially untenable idea... is belied by countless employment discrimination cases decided on the basis of legitimate business justifications without any reference to formal policies necessarily legitimizing those justifications. Medlock, 608 F.3d at 1193. Accordingly, Mr. Watson's argument does nothing to cast doubt on C.R. England's otherwise legitimate and non-discriminatory justification. In sum, Mr. Watson has not met his burden to demonstrate that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Zamora, 478 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Stinnett, 337 F.3d at 1218) (internal quotation marks omitted).