Opinion ID: 2451581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CNHSOU Officers Richard Arell, Robert Cormier, Chris Tyler, and Rick Tyler

Text: Plaintiffs Jessica and Tina claim that they were subjected to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as assault and battery, by the CNHSOU officers who detained them in their bedrooms before bringing them down to the living room. The question here is whether the force used in detaining Jessica and Tina is consistent with the kind of judgment that a reasonable police officer under the same or similar circumstances might have made. For Jessica, the claim of excessive force is based on the fact that she was shoved to the floor by Officer Arell, severely damaging her kneecap, and that she was then handcuffed behind her back with metal handcuffs and detained with an assault rifle held to her head for seven to ten minutes, far beyond the time it took to locate, arrest, and remove Rothman. We do not separate these facts out but rather take them as a whole. [17] On plaintiffs' version of events, Jessica, a fifteen-year-old girl, was in no way a threat to the officers. She was not a suspect and made no efforts to resist, but rather complied with all commands. And the officers' actions are alleged to have caused her serious physical injury, which required two surgeries and extensive treatment, as well as psychological injury, including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. First, the facts are sufficient to support a finding that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred. Second, taking all facts and inferences in Jessica's favor, we conclude, as did the district court, that the CNHSOU officers involved are not on this state of the record entitled to immunity. The law was sufficiently well established to provide the officers with fair warning that the force they are alleged to have used on Jessica was excessive given the circumstances. While the calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments ... in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving, Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, the need to subdue Jessica and to keep a weapon trained at her head while she was in metal handcuffs was minimal at best, and certainly did not last for seven to ten minutes. Although not every push or shove will reach the level required for an actionable excessive force claim, Alexis v. McDonald's Rests. of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 352 (1st Cir.1995), no reasonably competent officer would have thought the totality of force used against Jessica was permissible given the facts of her situation, taking all inferences in plaintiffs' favor. Cf. Morelli, 552 F.3d at 24 (finding that no reasonable officer could have thought it reasonable to yank the arm of an unarmed and non-violent person, suspected only of the theft of $20, and pin her against a wall for three to four minutes with sufficient force to tear her rotator cuff). A reasonably competent officer also would not have thought that it was permissible to point an assault rifle at the head of an innocent, non-threatening, and handcuffed fifteen-year-old girl for seven to ten minutes, far beyond the time it took to secure the premises and arrest and remove the only suspect. See, e.g., Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1192-93 (10th Cir.2001) (denying qualified immunity to officers who detained children, including teenagers, at gunpoint after gaining complete control of the situation); McDonald ex rel. McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir.1992) (denying qualified immunity to officer who during search of residence held gun to head of nine-year-old and threatened to pull trigger); see also Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1192-94 (3rd Cir.1995) (reversing summary judgment on grounds that constitutional violation could be found if officers had, as alleged, pointed guns at fifteen- and seventeen-year-olds and handcuffed some of them for up to twenty-five minutes when they were merely visiting house that was being searched). Even without a First Circuit case presenting the same set of facts, defendants would have had fair warning that given the circumstances, the force they are alleged to have used was constitutionally excessive. Cf. Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 848 (9th Cir.2007) (Although there may not be a prior case specifically prohibiting the use of handcuffs and weapons by more than twenty officers to subdue an unarmed eleven-year-old boy who is not suspected of any wrongdoing and is cooperating with the officers, ` [a]ny reasonable officer should have known that such conduct constituted the use of excessive force.' (alteration in original) (quoting Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir.2003))). Defendants have not even come forward with a justification for pointing a gun at Jessica's head. [18] Their defense is that they did not use the force they are alleged to have used. Assuming Jessica's version of the relevant facts to be true, we cannot say that a reasonable officer would have used such force. On Jessica's account, defendants' actions are outside the universe of protected mistakes. Morelli, 552 F.3d at 24. As for Tina, her case turns on her claim that an assault rifle was pointed to her head for up to half an hour. In that period of time, her son was removed from the house, her husband was taken down-stairs, and she was handcuffed and lying partially nude in bed. While the CNHSOU officers did initially have to make split second decisions to assess Tina's threat level and the possible need for restraint, that does not characterize the entire period in the bedroom, which she says was half an hour. Rather, it quickly became clear, on plaintiffs' version of the facts, that Tina was not the suspect, that she was not trying to resist arrest or flee, that she was not dangerous, and that she was not trying to dispose of contraband or weapons. Further, she was completely compliant with all orders. These are all relevant factors under Graham that undercut any claim that defendants acted reasonably. The circumstances of Tina's detention in bed are unlike those in which a reasonable officer could have thought that keeping a gun pointed at her head was lawful. Cf. Los Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 610, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (finding qualified immunity on the grounds that there was no constitutional violation when police entered bedroom with guns drawn, ordered plaintiffs out of bed, forced them to stand naked at gunpoint for one to two minutes, and detained them for a few more minutes, before realizing that they had made a mistake and leaving the house). There was no reasonable danger that Tina, who was not a suspect and was nearly naked in bed and without a sheet, was concealing a weapon. Cf. id. at 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989. The officers were not carrying out a warrant for a group of individuals who might have been engaged in joint criminal activity with Rothman. Cf. id. at 610, 127 S.Ct. 1989. And the gun pointed at Tina was not, on her version, lowered as soon as it was clearly safe to do so. Cf. id. at 615, 127 S.Ct. 1989. Defendants had fair notice that under the circumstances alleged, the detention of Tina with an assault rifle at her head was objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340, 347 (7th Cir. 2009) (denying qualified immunity to officer who pointed gun at plaintiff when there was no hint of danger); Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 773-74 (7th Cir.2000) (denying qualified immunity to officer who pointed a gun at an elderly man's head for ten minutes after realizing that he was not the desired suspect and presented no resistance or threat); see also Harrington, 268 F.3d at 1193 (Where a person has submitted to the officers' show of force without resistance, and where an officer has no reasonable cause to believe that person poses a danger to the officer or to others, it may be excessive and unreasonable to continue to aim a loaded firearm directly at that person, in contrast to simply holding the weapon in a fashion ready for immediate use.). As with Jessica, defendants offer no justification for holding an assault rifle to Tina's head. The CNHSOU officers also argue that the doctrine of official immunity protects them from Jessica's and Tina's related state law assault and battery claims. We reject this argument for the same reasons identified by the district court. See Mlodzinski, 731 F.Supp.2d at 183. Under the doctrine of official immunity, municipal police officers are immune from personal liability for decisions, acts or omissions that are: (1) made within the scope of their official duties while in the course of their employment; (2) discretionary, rather than ministerial; and (3) not made in a wanton or reckless manner. Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 156 N.H. 202, 932 A.2d 831, 845 (2007). Given defendants' failure to establish that a reasonable officer in their position would have believed his conduct was consistent with Jessica's and Tina's Fourth Amendment rights, they have also failed to establish that they did not act in a wanton or reckless manner. Cf. Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 652-54 (6th Cir.2010) (denying official immunity from assault and battery claim arising out of excessive force during arrests for essentially the same reasons that it denied qualified immunity from overlapping Fourth Amendment claim). A more fleshed-out record on summary judgment than the bare-bones details with which we have been presented could well have affected the outcome of each of the immunity issues. For example, the situation would be very different if, given the execution of these warrants, Tina had been detained with a weapon pointed at her for only a very short period needed while she was being cuffed, her husband was being escorted out of the room, and her son was being apprehended. Our denial of immunity on plaintiffs' version of the events leaves these claims for trial, where defendants may try to persuade the jury that they did not do what they are accused of doing.