Opinion ID: 2974967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: county defendants’ summary judgment

Text: Loggins alleged Defendants-Appellees Arlene Shoemaker, Dewey Stokes, Mary Jo Kilroy, Mark Barrett and Sheriff Jim Karnes (collectively “County Defendants”) violated his civil rights by failing to segregate and protect him, failing to provide sufficient medical care and failing to train and supervise the jail employees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of these defendants.
The Court reviews de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment. Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 863 (6th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c). Initially, the burden is on the moving party to conclusively show no genuine issues of material fact exist, Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2003), and the Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio -4- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). However, the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations, but must come forward with some significant probative evidence to support its claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 323. The Court determines whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question; but does not weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir. 2003). The standard for summary judgment mirrors the standard for directed verdict. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The Court must decide whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Id. at 251-52. There must be some probative evidence from which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. If the Court concludes a fair-minded jury could not return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented, it may enter a summary judgment. Id.; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994). C. Federal claims against Mark Barrett in his individual capacity Mark Barrett (“Barrett”) was named in Loggins’ third amended complaint “in his official capacity as Chief Deputy, Corrections Division with the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department.” Loggins alleged Barrett was acting in this capacity “at all times relevant to this Complaint.” Despite this language, the district court construed the language in the complaint as sufficient to put Barrett -5- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al on notice in his individual capacity. Loggins’ federal claims against Barrett arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail Loggins must prove Barrett “caused a deprivation of Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights,” Hafer v. Milo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991), or that he “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995). Loggins alleges Barrett failed to act on his behalf by failing to properly train personnel and by failing to segregate Loggins from Russell. “[S]upervisory liability under § 1983 cannot attach where the allegation of liability is based upon a mere failure to act. Instead the liability must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior.” Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “Liability under this theory must be based on more than a mere right to control employees and cannot be based upon simple negligence.” Id. at 206-07. Barrett was not present at FCCCII the day the altercation occurred and Loggins does not argue Barrett took any action toward him. As there is no dispute of material fact that Barrett did not commit active unconstitutional behavior, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Barrett in his individual capacity with regard to Loggins’ federal claim. D. Federal claims against Sheriff Karnes and Barrett in their official capacities Loggins alleges Sheriff Jim Karnes (“Karnes”) and Barrett violated his rights when they failed to segregate and protect him, failed to provide sufficient medical care and failed to train and supervise their employees. To prevail on this section 1983 claim, Loggins must demonstrate a “violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” W. v. Atkins, -6- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “State employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor. It is firmly established that a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the position given to him by the state.” Id. at 49-50 (citations omitted). Moreover, because a suit against a government official in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the government entity, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985), Karnes and Barrett are liable in their official capacities only if an official policy or custom caused a constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). We will address these allegations individually.
To prove a claim for failure to segregate and protect “an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). “A prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure ‘reasonable safety.’” Id. at 844 (citation omitted). There is no evidence Karnes or Barrett had any knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to Loggins. Russell was incarcerated for a misdemeanor traffic violation. Russell had not exhibited a history of violence in a prior incarceration and the guards quickly responded to this 30 second altercation. There was no prior history between Loggins and Russell and there is no evidence any jail personnel had knowledge of any reason the two should be separated. Although Russell’s criminal history included felonies, there was no indication from his previous incarcerations or his specific criminal history that he had a propensity towards violence. There is no evidence Karnes or Barrett had any knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm, and therefore Loggins’ claim for failure to segregate -7- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al fails.
Loggins’ claim for failure to provide sufficient medical care fails for similar reasons. The government has an obligation to provide medical care for individuals it incarcerates and a “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 897 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Without a showing of deliberate indifference, claims of negligence or malpractice cannot sustain an Eighth Amendment claim. Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir. 2006). A claim for deliberate indifference has both a subjective and an objective component. Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). To satisfy the objective component the plaintiff must allege a “sufficiently serious” medical need. Id. at 703 (citation omitted). “To satisfy the subjective component, the plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, would show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” Id. (citation omitted). If an official should have perceived a significant risk but did not, there is no Eighth Amendment claim. Id. “The subjective component requires that an official who actually knew of the serious medical need possessed ‘a sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying the medical care.’” Perez, 466 F.3d at 424 (citation omitted). The plaintiff must show more than medical malpractice and negligence -8- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al because the subjective requirement acts to prevent the constitutionalization of medical malpractice claims. Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703. Liability only attaches when the plaintiff “demonstrate[s] deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish.” Horn v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994)(citation omitted); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (“To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety. . . . It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”). Loggins’ claims relate to treatment received immediately after the altercation and after he returned to the jail from the Hospital. We will address each in turn.
Loggins claims he was forced to waive his right to press charges against Russell before he was taken to the Hospital.1 However, Loggins stated in his deposition that the jail statement was given freely and voluntarily before he went to the Hospital. Even if Loggins was detained prior to being taken to the Hospital, his claim fails because he suffered no harm. A claim for failure to provide medical care for the time lapse between the incident and being taken to the hospital is not supported. Loggins fails to establish the objective component of the 1 The form Loggins signed was a “Division of Corrections Statement of Witness” form. The only right Loggins waived was his Miranda rights regarding any criminal conduct he discussed in the statement. The statement written by Loggins merely states “I am not pressing charges at this time.” Loggins stated in his deposition the only charges he was choosing not to press were internal jail violations. Moreover, Loggins went to the City Prosecutor after he was released from jail and filed a criminal complaint against Russell. -9- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al deliberate indifference test because he cannot show the alleged deprivation is sufficiently serious. This Court examines the seriousness of the deprivation by looking at the effects of the delay in treatment. See Napier v. Madison County, 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001)(indicating an inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment to succeed (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994))). The evidence shows the thirty to forty-five minute delay before Loggins was taken to the Hospital had no detrimental effect on Loggins’ health. Loggins’ treating physician stated the treatment and outcome would have been the same if the injury would have occurred at the Hospital. Therefore, because Loggins cannot establish an essential element for his claim, summary judgment on Loggins’ claim for the events prior to his hospitalization was proper.
Loggins states he did not receive his prescribed medications, proper medical care or a liquid diet upon his return to the jail. Loggins establishes the objective component of the deliberate indifference test because the deprivation of prescriptions was a sufficiently serious medical need. Loggins has produced some evidence tending to demonstrate the detrimental effect of the delay in treatment as his treating physician stated missing two doses of antibiotics would be detrimental to recovery. The prescribed plan of treatment was interrupted when Loggins was denied his medicine. Loggins cannot establish the subjective component of the deliberate indifference test because he cannot show Karnes or Barrett subjectively perceived a risk of harm and then disregarded it. The burden to prove subjective knowledge is “onerous.” Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703. “The state of mind -10- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al requires that the official ‘consciously disregard’ a substantial risk of serious harm. Thus, a showing of deliberate indifference requires a showing of the official’s actual awareness of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1994). The “inflicting official [must] act or fail to act with subjective awareness of the deprivation.” Id. at 129. There is no evidence Karnes or Barrett had any knowledge of Loggins’ medical care while he was incarcerated. Loggins was at FCCCII for less than twenty-four hours after returning from the surgery, during which he was processed into the jail and later processed for release. The medical request form he completed was not received and processed until after Loggins was released. There is no evidence to suggest Karnes or Barrett had any knowledge of Loggins’ medical treatment and therefore Loggins’ claim fails because Karnes and Barrett lacked actual awareness of a substantial risk of serious harm to Loggins.
When a plaintiff alleges supervisory liability based on failure to train and supervise employees, the plaintiff must show the failure to train and supervise amounts to deliberate indifference on the part of the supervisor. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). In City of Canton the United States Supreme Court stated: The inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. . . . Only where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city policy or custom that is actionable under § 1983. .... -11- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al [I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. In that event, the failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury. Id. at 388-90. Loggins has not put forth any evidence suggesting Karnes or Barrett encouraged or directly participated in any alleged deliberate indifference to Loggins’ medical needs. Moreover, Loggins has not identified a specific written policy or memorialized custom indicating officers are to ignore the medical needs of jailed inmates. Loggins has not produced an official declaration that such a policy or custom exists. Loggins argued that similar allegations raised in other pending cases demonstrated a custom of deliberate indifference, but the mere fact that allegations have been raised, without any effort to prove those allegations, is insufficient to establish a custom. See Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803, 815 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that for a custom to give rise to liability, it must be “so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Karnes and Barrett put forth evidence that indicates the training jail personnel received relating to inmate supervision, inmate protection and procedures for handling medical situations. The evidence shows there is a policy to provide adequate medical care to inmates. Furthermore, Loggins himself acknowledges jail deputies did pass along his request for medical attention evidencing a policy of ensuring inmates received proper medical attention. As there is no evidence Karnes or Barrett encouraged, implicitly authorized or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of any officers, his claim for failure to train and supervise fails. -12- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al E. Federal claims against Franklin County Board of Commissioners members Arlene Shoemaker, Dewey Stokes, and Mary Jo Kilroy (the “Board”) The district court correctly characterized Loggins’ claims against the Board as a four-pronged 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Loggins claims the Board: (1) promulgated a policy of improper medical care; (2) promulgated a policy of denying inmates their constitutional rights; (3) failed to train, supervise and direct the other defendants; and (4) failed to take action to remedy flawed systemic practices resulting in false imprisonment. Loggins’ claims fail because as discussed above there is no constitutional injury. Assuming a constitutional injury did occur, there is no evidence the Board promulgated any policies leading to Loggins’ injuries. The Board possesses a limited set of powers and duties dictated by statute. OHIO REV . CODE ANN . §§ 305, 307. By statute, the Sheriff is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the jail and as part of that responsibility the Sheriff promulgates rules for the jail. OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 341.01. The Board is responsible for providing a jail that meets the minimum design standards of the Ohio Code. OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 307.01. There is no evidence the Board made any policies that would support Loggins’ first three claims. Loggins puts forth no evidence the Board enacted or even had the authority to enact such policies. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate on the first three theories. Loggins also asserts the Board failed to prevent or remedy systematic injustices resulting in false imprisonment. As discussed above, absent a statutory grant of power, the Board is without power to act. There is no support in the record or in the Ohio Code to suggest the Board had any responsibility for the issuance of the warrant that led to Loggins’ arrest. The Board’s role in the -13- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al judicial system is limited to a duty to provide a courthouse. OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 307.01. Loggins simply asserts because certain actions occurred, the Board must be responsible for them. As unsupported claims will not prevent summary judgment, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Board. F. State law claims against Karnes and Barrett The district court correctly granted summary judgment for Karnes and Barrett with respect to the state law claims against them.2 The district court determined Karnes and Barrett enjoyed immunity under state law for these claims. OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 2744.03(A)(6) controls the issue of state immunity in this case. Under this section, immunity is provided for employees in Barrett’s position with the following exceptions: (a) The employee's acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee's employment or official responsibilities; (b) The employee's acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; (c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code. Civil liability shall not be construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code merely because that section imposes a responsibility or mandatory duty upon an employee, because that section provides for a criminal penalty, because of a general authorization in that section that an employee may sue and be sued, or because the section uses the term shall in a provision pertaining to an employee. OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 2744.03(A)(6)(a)-(c). As the district court pointed out, Loggins does not 2 The district court did not address any state law claims against Karnes because Loggins did not address claims against Karnes in his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment. Loggins did not raise this issue before this Court and therefore the Court will only address claims as they relate to Barrett. -14- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al argue any of the statutory exceptions apply. Instead he asserts the statute cannot provide immunity for a violation of federal law or the United States Constitution. While the statute cannot shield Barrett from section 1983 claims, it does provide immunity from state law claims. Therefore, because the acts were within the scope of employment, there is no evidence he acted with a malicious purpose, in bad faith or in a wanton and reckless manner, and there is no other state statute that expressly imposes liability on Barrett, summary judgment on the state law claims is appropriate.