Opinion ID: 173891
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Colliding Presumptions

Text: If the two parties to a collision or allision suit each have a presumption of fault against them, then it is likely that the presumptions would merely cancel each other out. In Rodi Yachts, Judge Posner examined this question. In that case, a moored barge slipped its moorings and allided with a dock and two other vessels. Rodi Yachts, 984 F.2d at 881. The barge owner impleaded the dock owner, claiming that the dock had improperly moored the barge. Id. The plaintiffsthe owners of the damaged propertyhad the rule of THE LOUISIANA working in their favor. Id. at 886. While the barge owner also had a presumption against the dock. Id. at 887. [I]f a vessel that has been docked for a substantial period of time breaks loose from its moorings and an accident results, the operator of the dock shall have the burden of proving that the breaking loose was not the result of his negligence. Id. The Court examined two main questions in resolving the issue: (1) against whom do the presumptions operate; and (2) what happens when the presumptions clash. First, the Court examined the presumption against the drifting vesselhere, the barge. It found that the drifting vessel presumption did not operate between co-defendants. The issue [on appeal] is not the allocation of responsibility for the accident between the owner of the drifting vessel and the owners of the stationary objects that were damaged by it. The issue is the allocation of responsibility between the owner and the third party that let the vessel slip its mooring and drift into collision with the plaintiffs' property. The drifting-vessel presumption is not designed for the allocation of liability between the injurers, as distinct from the allocation of the loss between them and their victims, and although occasionally mentioned in the former context as well it does not control decision there, as well shown by Pasco Marketing, Inc. v. Taylor Towing Service, Inc., 554 F.2d 808 (8th Cir.1977), and Lancaster v. Ohio River Co., 446 F.Supp. 199, 202 and n. 1 (N.D.Ill.1978). For while as between drifting vessel and stationary object struck by it common sense suggests that the former is more likely to have been at fault in the collision than the latter, there is no similar presumption when the issue is whether the drifting vessel itself or the dock that, as it were, let it drift was at fault in the subsequent collision of the vessel with a stationary object. Id. at 886. Therefore, the Court found that the presumption against the drifting vessel did not apply to the issue of comparative fault. This Court, although presented with this argument in Mid-South Towing, did not reach the issue of the directionality of presumptions. Mid-South Towing, 418 F.3d at 531. We found instead that the district court had determined fault based on the facts in the case without resort to the presumptions. Id. Citing Rodi Yachts with favor, we explained that with the presence of evidence of fault in the record, the need for presumptions evaporates. Id. (citing Rodi Yachts, 984 F.2d at 887). In Rodi Yachts, the Seventh Circuit went on to determine that if the two presumptions had clashed, they would have disappeared, leaving the burdens of production and persuasion in their original pre-presumption state. Id. at 887. There, however, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence in the record to dispense with the presumptions altogether. Id.