Opinion ID: 2397328
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conscious Disregard Instruction

Text: Appellant argues that, in responding to the jury's note, the trial court erred in defining conscious disregard as meaning that the defendant knowingly engaged in acts that ignored the danger of such acts that a reasonable person would know could cause death or serious bodily harm. He contends that this definition confused the alternative intent levels for second-degree murder and manslaughter with the less stringent intent requirement for involuntary manslaughter. He argues that the instruction, therefore, detracted from the seriousness of voluntary manslaughter, which might have led the jury to compromise for conviction instead of acquitting him of this offense. The government responds that the instruction could be read reasonably as informing the jury of the subjective requirement that appellant knowingly engaged in acts that ignored the danger of such acts. It contends that any ambiguity in the re-instruction is not plain error because the original instruction for the term was correct, and there is no evidentiary support for any claim by appellant that he did not know that firing gunshots at a person created an extreme risk of his death or serious bodily injury. Appellant concedes that, having interposed no objection, this challenge is subject to review for plain error. See Wilson, supra, 785 A.2d at 326 (citation omitted). (To establish plain error, the error must be plain, affect substantial rights resulting in a miscarriage of justice or affecting the fairness, integrity of the proceeding). Against the plain error standard, appellant's challenge fails. As appellant points out, the trial court's definition of conscious disregard appears to set forth an objective standard for intent for voluntary manslaughter, by injecting the familiar reasonable man standard. For second-degree murder and manslaughter, where the element of malice is based on a wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human risk, the accused's knowledge of the risk is to be judged under a subjective standard. See Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 39 & n. 12 (D.C.1990). [S]uch depraved heart malice [19] exists only where the perpetrator was subjectively aware that his or her conduct created an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury, but engaged in that conduct nonetheless. Id. at 39 & n. 12. We observed in Comber that, [i]n terms of the actor's awareness of the risk to life, if he is aware of the risk, the crime is murder and not involuntary manslaughter. If he is not aware ... and he should have been aware, the crime is involuntary manslaughter. Id. (quoting United States v. Bradford, 344 A.2d 208, 215 n. 22 (D.C.1975)). Thus, Comber and Bradford indicate that for second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must be subjectively aware of the risk that would create a danger of death or serious bodily injury. Therefore, insofar as the court's re-instruction employed an objective standard in defining conscious disregard for voluntary manslaughter, it was erroneous. That does not end our inquiry, however, under the plain error standard. This standard is extremely high. Under the plain error standard... [a defendant] not only must establish `error,' but also that the error is `plain' and `affects substantial rights.' Wilson, supra, 785 A.2d at 326 (citing Olano, supra, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770). If he satisfies these three hurdles, he must then show either a `miscarriage of justice,' that is, actual innocence; or that the trial court's error `seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Id. (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770). Applying that standard, we consider appellant's claim. The element of malice required to prove second-degree murder and manslaughter may be established by showing that the accused had: (1) a specific intent to kill, (2) a specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury, or (3) acted in conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to the decedent. See Comber, supra, 584 A.2d at 38-39 (citations omitted); CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Nos. 4.18 B & C (4th ed. 2002). The trial court so instructed the jury in this case in its original charge. However, the jury sent a note requesting a definition for conscious disregard. When a jury expresses confusion or a lack of understanding of the terms used to explain the elements of an offense, the court should respond with concrete accuracy to clear up any confusion or lack of understanding. See Alcindore v. United States, 818 A.2d 152, 155 (D.C.2003) (quoting Whitaker v. United States, 617 A.2d 499, 501 (D.C.1992)) (other citations omitted). An erroneous response does not satisfy this requirement. Therefore, an erroneous response may affect the accused's substantial rights. See Wilson, supra, 785 A.2d at 328. However, assuming that appellant's substantial rights were affected by the court's erroneous instruction, in this case, he can not show, as he must, either a miscarriage of justice ( i.e., actual innocence) or that the trial court's error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceedings. Wilson, supra, 785 A.2d at 328 (quoting Olano, supra, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770). It is inconceivable that a jury voting to convict appellant of voluntary manslaughter would have voted to acquit him of that offense if informed of a more stringent intent requirement than the one given in response to the jury's note. [20] Moreover, even if properly instructed, it is highly unlikely that the jury would have found on the evidence presented that appellant was not subjectively aware that shooting Crowe in the chest created a high risk that Crowe would die or sustain serious bodily injury. Id. There was no evidence to that effect, and indeed, the evidence was to the contrary. According to appellant's own testimony, he shot at Crowe five times with a .357 revolver. Even if appellant had asserted that he did not intend to kill or injure Crowe or that he was not aware of the extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to the victim, his conduct was of such a nature as to reflect a subjective awareness of the extreme risk of death or serious injury. See Johnson v. United States, 631 A.2d 871, 876 (D.C.1993). [21] Under these circumstances, declining to reverse based on the court's conscious disregard re-instruction would not constitute a miscarriage of justice nor seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano, supra, 507 U.S. at 732, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770.