Opinion ID: 3016222
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subjective Symptoms and Credibility

Text: When addressing the issue of subjective symptoms, the ALJ noted that he considered “all symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence.” The ALJ went on to determine that Donatelli’s statements concerning his subjective symptoms were not credible. This finding was based on the inconsistency between Donatelli’s testimony and various medical reports. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 130-31 (3d 5 Donatelli asserts that the ALJ’s failure to cite explicitly to Dr. Arshad Chughtai’s report, in which it is noted that Donatelli cannot resume his job as a liquor clerk, that he should not perform any lifting while bending, and that walking aggravates his condition, merits reversal of the denial of benefits. We first note that the ALJ did find that Donatelli cannot return to his past work, in accordance with the first point from Dr. Chughtai’s report. As to the lifting and walking limitations, we note that the ALJ provided a reasoned explanation for his RFC determination as discussed above, rejecting such absolute restrictions. To the extent that the ALJ erred in not actually mentioning Dr. Chughtai’s report by name, we conclude that it was of little consequence, given the thorough consideration of Donatelli’s impairment. See Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535-36 (6th Cir. 2001). 8 Cir. 2002) (stating that an ALJ may reject testimony of subjective complaints where the testimony is not consistent with medical evidence). Specifically, Donatelli testified that he goes to the grocery store but requires his wife and son to bring the groceries into the house. This testimony contrasts with Dr. Ravishankar’s March 14, 2002 report. Dr. Ravishankar reported that Donatelli told him that he goes shopping and brings the groceries in his house without assistance. In fact, Dr. Ravishankar’s March 14, 2002 report implies that Donatelli was specifically capable of performing light work. Donatelli argues that the ALJ unduly relied on and misconstrued Dr. Ravishankar’s statements. However, the ALJ followed the dictate of current case law by weighing the conflicting evidence that was presented and explaining his rejection of Donatelli’s subjective allegations with reference to the reports by multiple doctors. See Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 266 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000). Additionally, under the substantial evidence standard, the question is not whether we would have arrived at the same decision; it is whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s decision. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). Consequently, the ALJ’s determination as to the credibility of Donatelli’s testimony is supported by substantial evidence. 3. Performing Jobs that Exist in the National Economy A vocational expert also testified at the hearing before the ALJ. The ALJ asked the expert whether jobs exist in the national economy for an individual of Donatelli’s age and education with his past relevant work experience and his residual functional capacity. 9 The expert responded that Donatelli could work as a packer, assembler or inspector. The expert estimated that in the aggregate there are approximately three million jobs that fit within these categories. Based on this testimony, the ALJ concluded that Donatelli retains the capacity for work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. The ALJ’s decision in this regard is supported by substantial evidence. See Jones, 364 F.3d at 503.