Opinion ID: 2635992
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Development of the Sophisticated User Defense

Text: Generally speaking, manufacturers have a duty to warn consumers about the hazards inherent in their products. ( Anderson, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1003, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528, 810 P.2d 549.) The requirement's purpose is to inform consumers about a product's hazards and faults of which they are unaware, so that they can refrain from using the product altogether or evade the danger by careful use. (Ibid.) Typically, under California law, we hold manufacturers strictly liable for injuries caused by their failure to warn of dangers that were known to the scientific community at the time they manufactured and distributed their product. ( Ibid.; see also Carlin v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1104, 1108, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 162, 920 P.2d 1347 (Carlin) .) Anderson made it clear that [w]hatever may be reasonable from the point of view of the manufacturer, the user of the product must be given the option either to refrain from using the product at all or to use it in such a way as to minimize the degree of danger. ( Anderson, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1003, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528, 810 P.2d 549.) Anderson explained that the rule of strict liability imposed on all manufacturers for their failure to warn of known or reasonably scientifically knowable risks was one that we had previously required of drug manufacturers. ( Id. at p. 1000, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528, 810 P.2d 549; Carlin, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1109, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 162, 920 P.2d 1347.) Conversely, when a sufficient warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. (Rest.2d Torts, § 402A, com. j, p. 353.) The sophisticated user defense exempts manufacturers from their typical obligation to provide product users with warnings about the products' potential hazards. ( In re Asbestos, supra, 543 F.Supp. at p. 1151.) The defense is considered an exception to the manufacturer's general duty to warn consumers, and therefore, in most jurisdictions, if successfully argued, acts as an affirmative defense to negate the manufacturer's duty to warn. (Ibid.) Under the sophisticated user defense, sophisticated users need not be warned about dangers of which they are already aware or should be aware. (See 4 Shearman & Redfield, Negligence (rev. ed. 1041) Manufacturers and Vendors, § 656, p. 1576.) Because these sophisticated users are charged with knowing the particular product's dangers, the failure to warn about those dangers is not the legal cause of any harm that product may cause. (Owen, Products Liability Law (2005) § 9.5, p. 599.) The rationale supporting the defense is that the failure to provide warnings about risks already known to a sophisticated purchaser usually is not a proximate cause of harm resulting from those risks suffered by the buyer's employees or downstream purchasers. (Ibid.) This is because the user's knowledge of the dangers is the equivalent of prior notice. ( Billiar v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. (2nd Cir.1980) 623 F.2d 240, 243 [[N]o one needs notice of that which he already knows].) As we explain further below, the sophisticated user defense evolved out of the Restatement Second of Torts, section 388 (section 388) and the obvious danger rule, an accepted principle and defense in California. ( Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 64, 107 Cal.Rptr. 45, 507 P.2d 653; Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 930, 933-934,133 Cal.Rptr. 483 ( Bojorquez ).) In addition, as we explain, the defense applies equally to strict liability and negligent failure to warn cases. The duty to warn is measured by what is generally known or should have been known to the class of sophisticated users, rather than by the individual plaintiffs subjective knowledge. (See, e.g., Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez (Tex.2004) 146 S.W.3d 170,183.)
Section 388 provides that a supplier of goods is liable for physical harm the goods cause if the supplier knows, or should know, the items are likely to be dangerous, fails to reasonably warn of the danger, and has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition. Comment k to section 388, subdivision (b), is entitled When warning of defects unnecessary, and it emphasizes this point. It declares that although the condition may be one that only specialists would perceive, the supplier is only required to inform the users of the risk if the manufacturer has no reason to believe that those who use it will have such special experience as will enable them to perceive the danger[.] (§ 388, subd. (b), com. k, p. 307.) Courts have interpreted section 388, subdivision (b), to mean that if the manufacturer reasonably believes the user will know or should know about a given product's risk, the manufacturer need not warn that user of that risk. ( Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc. (5th Cir.1976) 529 F.2d 457, 464-465; Lockett v. General Electric Company (E.D.Pa.1974) 376 F.Supp. 1201, 1208-1209, affd. (3d Cir. 1975) 511 F.2d 1394; Bryant v. Hercules Incorporated W.D.Ky.1970) 325 F.Supp. 241, 247.) This is especially [true] when the user is a professional who should be aware of the characteristics of the product. ( Strong v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., Inc. (8th Cir.1981) 667 F.2d 682, 687.) Other jurisdictions that have adopted the sophisticated user defense have cited section 388 and the obvious danger rule as a basis for doing so. (E.g., Akin v. Ashland Chemical (10th Cir.1998) 156 F.3d 1030, 1037 [no need to warn a knowledgeable purchaser like the United States Air Force about the dangers of low-level chemical exposure]; Strong v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., Inc., supra, 667 F.2d at pp. 686-687 [natural gas pipe manufacturer had no duty to warn a natural gas utility, or the utility's employee, of well known gas line dangers].) Other courts have employed the same principle to justify the sophisticated user defense without specifically citing the Restatement Second of Torts. (E.g., Antcliff v. State Employees Credit Union (1982) 414 Mich. 624, 327 N.W.2d 814, 818-819, 821 [scaffolding manufacturer had no duty to give information and instruction about safe rigging procedure to a professional painter experienced in rigging procedure].) While this court has not expressly adopted a sophisticated user defense, it has adopted section 388 as law in California. (See Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 64, 107 Cal.Rptr. 45, 507 P.2d 653.) California law also recognizes the obvious danger rule, which provides that there is no need to warn of known risks under either a negligence or strict liability theory. ( Bojorquez, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at pp. 933-934, 133 Cal.Rptr. 483; Holmes v. J.C. Penney Co. (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 216, 220, 183 Cal.Rptr. 777.) In Bojorquez, a child bought a slingshot from a 7-Eleven store and used it to shoot a projectile at the plaintiff, injuring one of her eyes. ( Bojorquez, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 932, 133 Cal.Rptr. 483.) The plaintiff sued the slingshot's retailer and wholesaler, claiming several causes of action, including strict liability for failing to warn about a slingshot's dangers. (Ibid.) The trial court dismissed her claim, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, observing that the seller does not need to add a warning when `the danger, or potentiality of danger[,] is generally known and recognized.' ... There is no need to include a warning; the product is not defective because it lacked a warning; there is no cause of action in strict liability. ( Id. at pp. 933-934, 133 Cal.Rptr. 483, quoting Restatement 2d Torts, § 402A, com. j.) Similarly, Holmes v. J.C. Penney Co., supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at page 220, 183 Cal. Rptr. 777, relying on Bojorquez, held that the dangers and potential harms associated with firing a pellet gun were obvious and did not require the seller to warn about them. (See also Plenger v. Alza Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 349, 362, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 811 [manufacturer of intrauterine device not strictly liable to patient who died after doctors implanted manufacturer's product: We are aware of no authority which requires a manufacturer to warn of a risk which is readily known and apparent to the consumer, in this case the physician. Further, if the risk ... is universally known in the medical profession, the failure to warn the physician of that risk cannot be the legal cause of the decedent's death].) Although the Court of Appeal was aware that no California court has squarely adopted the [sophisticated user] doctrine, the court observed that it is a natural outgrowth of the rule that there is no duty to warn of known risks or obvious dangers. As the Court of Appeal reasoned, the sophisticated user defense simply recognizes the exception to the principle that consumers generally lack knowledge about certain products, for example heavy industrial equipment, and hence the dangers associated with them are not obvious. For those individuals or numbers of professions who do know or should know about the product's potential dangers, that is, sophisticated users, the dangers should be obvious, and the defense should apply. Just as a manufacturer need not warn ordinary consumers about generally known dangers, a manufacturer need not warn members of a trade or profession (sophisticated users) about dangers generally known to that trade or profession.
One California court has, in dictum, addressed the sophisticated user defense in the strict liability context, and the court's decision has been the focus of federal jurisprudence discussed further below. ( Fierro v. International Harvester Co. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 862, 179 Cal.Rptr. 923 ( Fierro) . ) The plaintiff, Fierro, sued International Harvester Company (International), because it manufactured the truck her husband was driving when he crashed and died. ( Id. at p. 865, 179 Cal.Rptr. 923.) International manufactured skeleton trucks that came with only an engine, cab and chassis, which allowed purchasers to complete or add to the truck as they saw fit. (Ibid.) Luer Packaging Company (Luer) purchased one of these trucks from International and installed a refrigeration unit on the chassis. (Ibid.) Five years later, the plaintiffs husband was driving the truck in the course and scope of his job with Luer. The truck overturned after blowing a tire, crashed, skidded for a distance, spilled fuel, and caught fire. (Ibid.) The plaintiff and Luer's worker's compensation insurance carrier brought a wrongful death action seeking to impose liability on International for negligence and manufacturer's strict liability. ( Fierro, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d at p. 865, 179 Cal.Rptr. 923.) The evidence at trial focused on the location of the fuel tank and filler necks and their exposure to damage when the truck struck the guard rail and turned over. (Ibid.) During trial, the plaintiff alleged that International had to warn Luer that attaching power cables from the refrigerator unit to the truck's battery could create a fire hazard. ( Id. at p. 866, 179 Cal.Rptr. 923.) Even though these were not dangers an average consumer would perceive, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the issue of failure to warn. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment after concluding that the court was justified in not instructing the jury on the failure to warn because the plaintiff had not properly raised that issue at trial. (Ibid.) In dictum, the Court of Appeal explained that International, as the defendant manufacturer, need not warn the purchaser Luer because [a] sophisticated organization like Luer does not have to be told that gasoline is volatile and that sparks from an electrical connection or friction can cause ignition. ( Fierro, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d at p. 866, 179 Cal. Rptr. 923.) The court observed that [t]here was no evidence that any feature of the skeleton unit was unique or contained any component or capability which was known to International and which was not known to or readily observable by Luer. The fuel tanks and the filler spouts were patently exposed, and they were obviously designed to hold gasoline. The properties and propensities of that volatile liquid are a matter of common knowledge. Nor did Luer need to be advised of the necessity to cover and protect the exposed fuel tanks before operating the unit under circumstances which could subject them to damage. (Ibid.) In other words, the lack of a warning to Luer did not substantially or unreasonably increase any danger that may have existed in using the [truck]. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal impliedly adopted the sophisticated user defense in rationalizing its affirmance of the trial court's judgment.
The federal courts took notice of Fierro and predicted that this court would eventually adopt the sophisticated user defense. In an important products liability action filed in the Northern District of California, the plaintiffs were insulators and shipyard workers employed by the United States Navy during varying periods. In the course of their employment with the Navy, plaintiffs were allegedly exposed to asbestos products manufactured by defendants. Plaintiffs claim[ed] that defendants' asbestos products caused injury to them. ( In re Asbestos, supra, 543 F.Supp. at p. 1150.) The defendants claimed that the Navy was negligent in failing to provide plaintiffs with a safe work place and that this negligence constituted a superseding cause sufficient to relieve defendants of liability. (Ibid.) The court agreed that the sophisticated user defense applied to strict liability claims and refused to grant the plaintiffs' motion to strike the defense. (Ibid.) The court believed the highest California court would permit the defense. The federal court recognized, however, that under California law the plaintiffs could undercut the application of the sophisticated user defense by demonstrating that the defendants might have foreseen the Navy's alleged negligence, and so, it should not absolve them of liability. ( Id. at pp. 1150-1151.) [5] In re Asbestos, supra, 543 F.Supp. at page 1151 pointed, out that the defendants also asserted that the Navy was a `sophisticated user's asbestos products that is, that the Navy as an employer, was as aware of the dangers of asbestos as were defendants and that the Navy nonetheless misused of the products, thereby absolving the defendants of liability for failure to warn the Navy's employees of the products' dangers. Various federal courts that have applied state law under diversity jurisdiction have allowed the sophisticated user defense. (See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, supra, 86 F.3d at pp. 521-522 [applying sophisticated user defense in finding no negligence for manufacturer's failure to warn of danger in aircraft warning system]; Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. (5th Cir. 1976) 532 F.2d 501, cert. den. (1977) 429 U.S. 1095, 97 S.Ct. 1111, 51 L.Ed. 542 [sophisticated user defense applied in a strict liability case]; In re Asbestos, supra, 543 F.Supp. at p. 1151.) Although federal circuit and district court decisions interpreting state law are not binding on our court, we find their reasoning persuasive in adopting the sophisticated user defense in our jurisdiction. (See People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86, 81 Cal.Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d 129.)
Plaintiff asserts that we should adopt the reasoning of Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1601, 271 Cal.Rptr. 596, which rejected the sophisticated user defense. But a close reading of Selma indicates that the court did not reject the defense at all. The issue in Selma was whether a manufacturer had to warn the general public of the risks of damage its chemicals caused that the ordinary user could not reasonably be expected to know. Selma acknowledged the sophisticated user defense through its pronouncement that the existence of unknown dangers gives rise to the duty to warn. ( Id. at p. 1623, 271 Cal.Rptr. 596.) Selma recognizes that a defendant may introduce evidence demonstrating that a user has sufficient expertise to be charged with the knowledge of risks associated with a particular product. (Ibid.) Selma's holding, therefore, is consistent with the sophisticated user defense and the other case law discussed thus far. Nothing in Selma's reasoning persuades us not to adopt the sophisticated user defense, and to the extent that it might cause confusion, we would disapprove of its reasoning.