Opinion ID: 200103
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: goya's affirmative defense

Text: 38 Goya argues, next, that it cannot be held liable for Cárdenas's behavior even if a hostile work environment existed. As a general rule, an employer is vicariously liable for an actionable hostile work environment created by a supervisor. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. However, the Supreme Court has recognized an affirmative defense to employer liability that look[s] to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of [the] plaintiff victim. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 781, 118 S.Ct. 2275; see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (describing the affirmative defense). Goya maintains that it established that affirmative defense here, and that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law on that ground. 39 The Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense has two necessary elements, and the employer bears the burden of proof as to both. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. First, the employer must show that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. That requirement typically is addressed by proof that the employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with [a] complaint procedure. Id. Second, the employer must establish that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Id. That prong is usually addressed by proof that the plaintiff unreasonably ignored an established complaint procedure. 3 40 Thus, the availability of the affirmative defense often will turn on whether the employer had established and disseminated an anti-discrimination policy, complete with a known complaint procedure. Such was the case here. As the district court observed in denying Goya's motion for judgment as a matter of law, [o]ne of the most hotly contested issues in [the] case, and which depended entirely on the credibility of the witnesses, was precisely whether ... Goya had in effect a policy against discrimination and whether it installed posters to that end. 41 On the one hand, Marrero and her co-worker Zelma Miranda-Rivera testified that they did not receive any orientation regarding sex discrimination; that they were not given any written policy on sexual harassment or available grievance procedures; that they were not aware of any complaint procedure; and that they never saw any anti-harassment literature posted anywhere in the workplace. Marrero also testified, without contradiction, that Goya ignored her request — first lodged on October 31, 1996 — for a copy of the company's anti-discrimination policy. 42 On the other hand, Nieves testified that Goya had asked an outside law firm to draft a written policy on sexual harassment, and that it received that policy in August or September of 1995. The policy was not dated, however, and on cross-examination Marrero established that Nieves had stated in his deposition that he used the same policy during Marrero's orientation in April of 1995 (several months before he later claimed to have received it). Moreover, although the policy had a signature line so that the employee could certify that she had received it, Goya could not produce a copy signed by Marrero. Nieves testified that Goya never asked its employees to sign the policy. 43 Nieves also testified that Goya began to use anti-sexual harassment posters in 1991, 1992, or 1993 — he was not sure when. Nieves stated that the posters were placed all around Goya's facilities, including the glass doors of the entrance to the lobby so that anyone who would go to Goya would be able to see the poster. However, in the film of Goya's facilities that was shown to the jury, there were no posters to be seen anywhere on the premises, including the glass doors of the lobby. 44 We need not decide which party presented the most persuasive testimony. [I]t is for jurors, not judges, to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Musa, 785 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir.1986). Thus, in reviewing the district court's denial of Goya's Rule 50 motion, we cannot evaluate the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, or evaluate the weight of evidence. Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 441 (1st Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). We can grant judgment as a matter of law only if the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, could lead a reasonable person to only one conclusion, namely, that the moving party was entitled to judgment. Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st Cir.1994). 45 That standard is especially exacting where, as here, the moving party bears the burden of proof on the issue in question. See Serv. Auto Supply Co. v. Harte & Co., Inc., 533 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir.1976). We have said that the party with the burden of proof is entitled to judgment as a matter of law only if it has established its case by testimony that the jury is not at liberty to disbelieve. Jordan v. United States Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 48, 49 (1st Cir.1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). In that situation, relief under Rule 50 is warranted only if the moving party's evidence is `uncontradicted and unimpeached.' Serv. Auto Supply Co., 533 F.2d at 25 (quoting Fed. Ins. Co. v. Summers, 403 F.2d 971, 975-76 (1st Cir.1968)). 46 Goya has not satisfied that strict standard here. Although Goya's witnesses testified that the company had an anti-discrimination policy in place during the relevant period and that it disseminated the policy to its employees, that testimony was contradicted by Marrero and her co-worker Miranda-Rivera and called into question by the video tape and Nieves's conflicting statements during his deposition. The jury was at liberty to disbelieve Goya's witnesses, Jordan, 738 F.2d at 49, and to credit the testimony by Marrero and Miranda-Rivera. 47 In order to qualify for judgment as a matter of law on its affirmative defense, Goya had to show that a reasonable jury was compelled to find in its favor on both elements of the defense. We have concluded that Goya has not satisfied that standard with respect to the first prong — the existence of an antiharassment policy with a known complaint procedure. Accordingly, we need not consider whether the evidence presented at trial compelled a finding in Goya's favor on the second prong. 4 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808, 118 S.Ct. 2275.