Opinion ID: 175302
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Our perspective is consistent with the recent decisions relied upon by Pool

Text: The case by case balancing of the government's asserted legitimate interests and the intrusion into the individual's privacy may be seen in our opinions in Friedman, 580 F.3d 847, and Scott, 450 F.3d 863. Friedman concerned the forcible extraction of a DNA sample by a state official from a person who was being held pending trial. [12] We held that Nevada had failed to present sufficient legitimate interests or needs to overcome the intrusion of personal privacy. The panel's conclusion of its discussion of the totality of the circumstances approach, or what it refers to as the reasonable argument (580 F.3d at 856), states: The Nevada authorities extracted the DNA from Friedman not because they suspected he had committed a crime, nor to aid in his reintegration into society, nor as a matter of his continuing supervision. Their purpose was simply to gather human tissue for a law enforcement databank, an objective that does not cleanse an otherwise unconstitutional search. 580 F.3d at 858. Pool's case, however, presents very different factors. First, unlike the situation in Friedman, there has been a judicial determination of probable cause to believe that Pool committed a federal felony. Second, the arguments that the opinion in Friedman noted were not made by the state in that case are made by the government in this case. Here, the government has probable cause to believe that Pool committed the crime and in determining conditions that would allow the release of Pool to the public pending trial. Third, in Friedman, Nevada proffered no statutory authority for collecting a DNA sample, but here, the Attorney General seeks to enforce the Bail Reform Act passed by Congress. [13] In sum, this case presents very different concerns both as to the individual's legitimate expectation of privacy and the government's legitimate interests. By definition, the totality of the circumstances standard requires that the court consider the individual facts presented in each case. The determination that the circumstances in Friedman favored the individual does not control our determination that under the totality of the circumstances standard the balance of the distinct facts in this case permits the mandatory collection of DNA as a condition for pre-trial release. The facts before us in Scott were also very different from this case and raised distinct issues under the totality of the circumstances standard. The central issue in Scott was whether police may conduct a search based on less than probable cause of an individual released while awaiting trial. 450 F.3d at 864. We were troubled by the assertion that the drug test and the search of Scott's house were valid because he had consented to them as a condition of pre-trial release, and determined that Scott's consent to any search is only valid if the search in question (taking the fact of consent into account) was reasonable. 450 F.3d at 868. We concluded that Nevada had failed to show that the searches were permissible under the special needs approach, noting in passing that Scott's privacy interest in his home was at its zenith. Id. at 871-72. We also held that the search in Scott was not reasonable under the totality of the circumstances approach. Id. at 872-73. However, both the government's legitimate interests, as well as Scott's privacy rights were different from the interests and rights presently at bar. First, the government's interest in Scott was not in identifying Scott. Instead, it sought to condition his pre-trial release on his consent to random drug testing and to having his home searched any time of the day or night. 450 F.3d at 865. While the government's legitimate interest in definitively identifying a defendant is well established, Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 949, we have questioned the government's authority to otherwise intrude on a defendant's privacy rights. [14] In Scott, we recognized that a person's privacy interest in his home is at a zenith and is not usually reduced by a person's arrest or even a determination of probable cause. Id. at 871-72. Moreover, we found the government's alleged purposes for imposing the waiver to be questionable. Id. at 870 (We assume for purposes of our analysis that the non-lawenforcement purposethe interest in judicial efficiencyis `primary' in this case. But the connection between the object of the test (drug use) and the harm to be avoided (non-appearance in court) is tenuous.). In addition, we noted that the government has no concern with integrating people like Scott, who has never left the community, back into the community. Id. at 874. In Pool's case, the government seeks only his definitive identification which it relates to its ability to check on his activities while on pre-trial release. Thus, while we are mindful of our holding in Scott, we remain convinced that in this case the government's legitimate interests outweigh Pool's legitimate expectations of privacy. We recognize that there is language in Friedman and Scott which may appear to be inconsistent with our decision and our application of Kincade and Kriesel. [15] We have plotted a course based on the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 533, 99 S.Ct. 1861, and Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749, 107 S.Ct. 2095, that respects the concerns asserted in each of our cases. This led us first to conclude that the probable cause determination by the district court allows for the application of the totality of the circumstances standard. We then compared the specific government interests and expectations of privacy in this case to those asserted in the prior cases. We conclude that where a court has determined that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a felony, the government's interest in definitively determining the defendant's identity outweighs the defendant's privacy interest in giving a DNA sample as a condition of pre-trial release where the government's use of the DNA is limited to 13 loci purposely selected because they are not associated with any known physical or medical characteristics, at least where, as here, there is no evidence that the government may legally extract any other information from the sample or that the government has any intention of attempting to do so.