Opinion ID: 186823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eligibility and Entitlement to Attorney Fees Under FOIA

Text: 16 Subject to specified statutory exclusions and exemptions, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), (c), the Freedom of Information Act requires federal agencies to make agency records available to the public upon reasonable request, United We Stand Am., Inc. v. IRS, 359 F.3d 595, 597 (D.C.Cir.2004). FOIA also provides that a court may award reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case ... in which the complainant has substantially prevailed. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). 17 A FOIA plaintiff is eligible for fees if it has substantially prevailed on the merits of its claim. Edmonds v. FBI, 417 F.3d 1319, 1322 (D.C.Cir.2005); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Harris, 653 F.2d 584, 587 (D.C.Cir.1981). And in order to substantially prevail, a party must obtain court-ordered relief on the merits of its FOIA claim. See Edmonds, 417 F.3d at 1325 (holding that the plaintiff was eligible for fees because she received not just a declaration of her right to expedited processing [of her FOIA claim], but an order that `changed the legal relationship between the parties' (quoting Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 946 (D.C.Cir.2005))). 18 Eligibility for fees does not necessarily mean that a party is entitled to attorney fees under FOIA. See Edmonds, 417 F.3d at 1327. In determining whether a `prevailing' FOIA plaintiff is entitled to fees, the district court [must] assess[] four factors: `(1) the public benefit derived from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to the plaintiff; (3) the nature of the plaintiff's interest in the records; and (4) the reasonableness of the agency's withholding.' Davy v. CIA, 456 F.3d 162, 166-67 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting Tax Analysts v. Dep't of Justice, 965 F.2d 1092, 1093 (D.C.Cir.1992)). 19 A plaintiff's overall success on the merits also must be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee award. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (citing Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989)). Thus, when a plaintiff presents distinctly different claims for relief that are based on different facts and legal theories, the limit on awards to prevailing parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-35, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). In some cases, however, 20 claims for relief will involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories. Much of counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. Instead the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation. 21 Id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Finally, [t]he plaintiff who has proven both eligibility for and entitlement to fees must submit his fee bill to the court for its scrutiny of the reasonableness of (a) the number of hours expended and (b) the hourly fee claimed. Long v. IRS, 932 F.2d 1309, 1313-14 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam). 22