Opinion ID: 489887
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chiefs Jefferson and Cullinane

Text: 30 Haynesworth averred that former Chiefs of Police Jefferson and Cullinane were directly responsible for the alleged retaliatory prosecution because they did not adequately instruct their subordinates on the impropriety of such prosecutions, 104 and vicariously liable under a theory of respondeat superior. 105 The District Court dismissed Jefferson and Cullinane from the suit on the grounds that the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply and that there was an insufficient showing of personal involvement by them in the purported constitutional violation. 106 While we concur in the District Court's rejection of the respondeat superior claims and in the determination of insufficient participation by Jefferson, we find that the court's exoneration of Cullinane did not take adequate account of Haynesworth's allegation of improper supervision. 31 We can easily dispose of the assertion of respondeat-superior liability. Haynesworth contends that the two former chiefs are responsible for the actions of the police officers by virtue of their dominant roles in the employment relationship. 107 This argument collides with the firmly entrenched principle that public officials are not vicariously responsible for the acts of their subordinates. 108 Analytically, high-level public officials, are not employers of their subordinates but rather are fellow governmental servants, and it thus is inappropriate to hold them liable on the basis of respondeat superior. 32 We also concur in the District Court's dismissal of the claims against Jefferson. He took office as Chief of Police as the events in question drew to a close, and was properly dismissed from the litigation because the complaint does not adequately allege any failing on his part. 109 However remiss he may have been in failing to remedy the District's alleged policy of retaliatory prosecution--a matter on which we intimate no view--no corrective action on his part could have aided Haynesworth since the harm he asserts had already taken place. 33 Haynesworth's claim that Cullinane is liable for failure to supervise the officers under his command is not so easily discarded. It requires us to consider the parameters of supervisory liability for constitutional violations and to view the allegations of the complaint against that template. This analysis leads us to disagree with the District Court's conclusion that Cullinane's role in the constitutional infringement charge could not under any circumstances support a finding of liability. 34
35 It is well established that a governmental officer may be held liable in damages for constitutional wrongs engendered by his failure to supervise or train subordinates adequately. 110 This responsibility is not premised on the notion of vicarious liability; rather, it is bottomed on the principle that in some contexts failure of an official to safeguard against constitutional transgressions by those under his control constitutes an actionable wrong under Bivens and Section 1983. The party seeking to impose liability must demonstrate that the official had an obligation to supervise or train the wrongdoer in the manner alleged, that the duty was breached, and that this breach was a proximate cause of the injury. 111 But while there is consensus on the existence of an actionable duty in this regard, the contours of that duty are unclear. 112 36 This court held in Carter v. Carlson 113 that a police chief would be liable for negligent failure to prevent constitutional impingements by his subordinates, thereby implying that such officials have a duty to supervise and train to foreclose all reasonably foreseeable constitutional harms. 114 While this decision arguably carries weight, 115 we have reason to question its continuing vitality in light of subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court 116 and other circuits 117 suggesting that the standard of culpability is higher. 118 Accordingly, we consider the question anew. 37 In Rizzo v. Goode, 119 the Supreme Court vacated an order providing equitable relief against city officials for failure to supervise municipal police officers. The Court noted that supervisory liability under Section 1983 had important limitations: it required an affirmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by petitioners--express or otherwise--showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct. 120 Rejecting the amorphous proposition[ ] that the officials implicated shared a constitutional 'duty' ... to 'eliminate' future police misconduct, 121 the Court saw no foundation for the asserted liability absent a showing of direct responsibility by the supervising official for the infringement. 122 38 Applying the tenets of Rizzo, numerous courts have concluded that something more than mere negligence on the part of the supervisor is necessary to state a claim under Bivens or Section 1983. 123 These courts have asserted that, in order to construct a basis for liability, the injured party must establish that the supervising official was either grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent in failing to take precautions against the constitutional violation that did in fact occur. 124 This standard of culpability for supervisory officials has been justified by a recognition that imposition of a duty of care to prevent all foreseeable misconduct by subordinates would thrust an excessive burden on supervisors and hamper performance of official duties. 125 Despite differences in articulations of the applicable standard 126 and the underlying rationale, 127 the overwhelming majority of courts faced with claims of supervisory liability after Rizzo have determined that, where responsibility is predicated on inattentiveness rather than affirmative misconduct, the plaintiff must establish a high degree of fault in order to implicate the supervisor in the constitutional infractions of his subordinates. 39 We agree that Rizzo mandates a retreat from the standard proclaimed in Carter v. Carlson, and join the majority of courts calling for something more than mere negligence to forge the affirmative link between the constitutional infringement and the supervisor's conduct. Consideration of the exigencies of criminal law enforcement also suggests that a higher standard is appropriate, given the wide range of constitutional breaches arguably foreseeable in the daily operations of a law enforcement agency, and the difficulty of providing meaningful guidance to ward off all possible wrongs. 128 The duty to supervise is triggered by proof that, absent effective supervision, harm was not merely foreseeable, but was highly likely, given the circumstances of the case. When inaction in the face of a substantial threat of harm is shown, it can be said that the supervisor acquiesced in the resulting constitutional violation, thereby linking the non-feasance with the injury in the manner required by Rizzo. 40 It remains to delineate those situations that trigger the duty to supervise under Bivens and Section 1983. Courts requiring gross negligence or deliberate indifference have held that standard satisfied where a supervisor remains passive in the face of past constitutional violations about which he knew or should have known. 129 Some of these courts have also concluded that a duty to supervise may arise, even absent a pattern of past transgressions, where training has been so clearly deficient that some deprivation of rights will inevitably result absent additional instruction. 130 In general, the existence of a duty to supervise to prevent a particular harm is a question of fact rather than law, and depends on the particulars of each dispute. 131 41 We hold today that the close analogy to Rizzo requires us to constrict the ambit of supervisory liability for constitutional wrongs. Our decision does not shift the level of culpability required to establish the underlying violation; that must turn on the nature of the constitutional provision allegedly infringed. 132 Nor does it affect the showing essential to municipal liability for inadequate supervision, since the problem of determining whether a governmental entity should be charged with responsibility for the acts of its employees is conceptually distinct from the question whether the wrongs of one municipal worker should be imputed to another. 133 Our holding is that, in order to find a supervisory official personally liable in damages for the unconstitutional acts of his subordinate, it must be shown that he was responsible for supervising the wrongdoer; that a duty to instruct the subordinate to prevent constitutional harm arose from the surrounding circumstances; and that, as a result of the official's failure to instruct, the plaintiff was harmed in the manner threatened. We turn now to Haynesworth's complaint against Cullinane to ascertain whether it states a colorable claim for relief under this standard. 42
Cullinane 43 As we have stated, a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) should be denied if it appears from the complaint that the plaintiff might be able to prove some set of facts which would provide a basis for liability. 134 Evaluated according to this liberal standard, we think the District Court's dismissal of Cullinane from the lawsuit was premature. Haynesworth's complaint alleged that Cullinane was charged with the responsibility of supervising the wrongdoing officers; 135 that a practice of retaliatory prosecution had unfolded in the District of Columbia; 136 that Cullinane failed to supervise or instruct his officers in order to guard against further outbreaks of retaliation; 137 and that Haynesworth's injuries resulted from that failure. 138 Additionally, we may infer 139 that the police participated in the prior acts of retaliatory prosecution, and that the police chief was or should have been aware thereof. Cast in the light most favorable to Haynesworth, these facts, if proven, could sustain a finding of liability on the part of Cullinane. 44 It will be for Haynesworth to substantiate his claim that there was a past practice of retaliatory prosecutions, and that the police participated therein with the knowledge--or at least the indifference--of Cullinane. Haynesworth should be afforded some opportunity to verify these claims through discovery since the operative information is largely in the hands of adverse parties. 140 Correspondingly, Cullinane should be given a chance to counter Haynesworth's allegations with factual information, and to develop the affirmative defense of good faith immunity. 141 We do not, of course, assess Haynesworth's chance of prevailing at trial, but believe that his complaint sets forth enough to withstand a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and to enable him to proceed with discovery. 142