Opinion ID: 1795126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Operative Facts after Shelton I

Text: Following our denial of her petition for a writ of mandamus, Clark filed in the Etowah County Circuit Court, among other additional things, a memorandum against arbitration; a motion to strike the supplemental affidavit of Melissa Brisendine, an employee of Blue Cross; a memorandum regarding the McCarran-Ferguson Act; and an affidavit from Billy Shelton. In her memorandum against arbitration, Clark asserted that the 1992 and 1993 documents purporting to add arbitration provisions to the 1991 contract of insurance were ineffective because they were not signed by an officer of Blue Cross as required by the 1991 contract of insurance. Blue Cross moved to strike an affidavit by Billy Shelton and submitted a second brief in support of the motion to compel arbitration. Blue Cross did not dispute Clark's assertion that the 1992 amended contract and the 1993 revised contract were not signed by an officer of Blue Cross. Likewise, Blue Cross did not dispute Clark's claim that the 1992 amended contract and the 1993 revised contract were invalid because of the absence of a Blue Cross officer's signature. Rather, Blue Cross argued that the effectiveness of the policy amendment had already been decided and that there is no reason to reopen the issue. Following oral arguments by counsel, the trial court entered an order stating, in pertinent part: Based upon the briefs and supporting materials submitted by the parties and the arguments made at the September 24, 1999 hearing, the Court hereby reaffirms its previous order sending all of [Clark's] claims to arbitration. [Clark's] arguments regarding the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq., have been rejected by the Alabama Supreme Court in American Bankers Insurance Co. v. Crawford, [757 So.2d 1125 (Ala.1999)]. Moreover, the decision in Crawford effectively moots Blue Cross's contentions regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss.... In her present petition, Clark asserts, among other theories, that no valid agreement to arbitrate exists inasmuch as: Blue Cross did not comply with its own contract provisions for amending the policy. The written contract provides a provision for changing any provision of the policy with 30 days notice with the written signed amendment being sent to the insured: `Contract Revisions. By giving 30 days written notice to you, or your group, we may change the fees you pay for coverage under this Contract or any provision of this Contract. If you pay any fees after the notice, your accept the new fees or changes in the Contract. ` The Contract can only be changed by written amendments, endorsements, revisions signed by one of our officers and sent by us to you or your group. None of our officers, employees, or agents can make any oral changes, such as by telephone. Nor may anyone waive or vary any provisions of this Contract except in writing, signed by one of our officers.' (Emphasis added.) (Ex. 2, p. 10.) The contract does not provide for changing the terms of the contract by mailing an amended policy which has not been `signed.' The policy itself requires a written amendment signed by an officer. (Ex. 2, p. 10.) There is no provision in the policy for a presumption of receipt by mail or a provision for changing the contract by newsletter or an unsigned amended policy. [Blue Cross] did not follow its own procedure. [Blue Cross] has never produced a signed amended policy. The process utilized to amend the contract was not in accord with the contract of insurance and not in accord with Alabama law. Petition, pp. 11-12. In its brief to this Court, Blue Cross does not dispute that the 1992 amended contract and the 1993 revised contract were not signed by an officer of Blue Cross. In fact, Blue Cross never addresses Clark's claim that the 1992 and 1993 documents were ineffective to add arbitration provisions to the 1991 insurance contract because they lacked a Blue Cross officer's signature. Instead, Blue Cross asserts that Clark's argument to the effectiveness of the policy amendment was not ripe for reconsideration by Judge Stewart. This issue was decided initially by Judge Stewart in January, 1998, and Judge Stewart's holding that the policy amendment was effective was affirmed by this Court in its June 11, 1999 opinion. See Shelton, 738 So.2d at 870-872. Therefore, this aspect of Clark's second mandamus petition is without merit. Brief, p. 17. Blue Cross argues that this Court in Shelton I, supra, affirmed Judge Stewart's holding that the policy amendment was effective.