Opinion ID: 1748627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was it error to deny a continuance because of the unavailability of jamie humphries?

Text: Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-15-29 (1972) provides as follows: On all applications for a continuance the party shall set forth in his affidavit the facts which he expects to prove by his absent witness or documents that the court may judge of the materiality of such facts, the name and residence of the absent witness, that he has used due diligence to procure the absent documents, or presence of the absent witness, as the case may be, stating in what such diligence consists, and that the continuance is not sought for delay only, but that justice may be done. The court may grant or deny a continuance, in its discretion, and may of its own motion cross-examine the party making the affidavit. The attorneys for the other side may also cross-examine and may introduce evidence by affidavit or otherwise for the purpose of showing to the court that a continuance should be denied. No application for a continuance shall be considered in the absence of the party making the affidavit, unless his absence be accounted for to the satisfaction of the court. A denial of the continuance shall not be ground for reversal unless the supreme court shall be satisfied that injustice resulted therefrom. Of course, the granting or not granting of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. In King v. State, 251 Miss. 161, 168 So.2d 637 (1964), the Court said the following: The granting of a continuance is largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a judgment will not be reversed because the continuance is refused unless there has been an abuse of sound discretion... . ... Moreover, we are of the opinion that the rule set out in Lamar v. State, 63 Miss. 265, 271 (1885), applies here wherein this Court said: In view of the frequency of these applications we deem it advisable to repeat what has been before substantially said as to the correct course to be pursued by a defendant who applies for a continuance. To begin with, he should promptly issue summonses for all witnesses who may be material for his defense; for any witness who has been served with process and who had failed to appear as commanded he should ask for an attachment, which will never be refused by the court; in capital cases he should apply for a continuance before the venire is drawn, setting out in his affidavit the names and residences of the absent witnesses, the facts expected to be proved by them, and should also show to the court what steps have been taken to secure their attendance; he should negative the idea that they are absent with his consent or procurement, and if any reasons are known to him why they are not present, these should be stated. If the court declines to grant the continuance he should sue out the proper process for them, and when the case is called for trial should renew his application, make such changes in his affidavit as the conditions then existing require. If the continuance is still refused, he should with unremitting diligence seek to secure their attendance pending the trial by the continued use of the process of the court; if tried and convicted he should still persist in his efforts to enforce their attendance before the expiration of the term, and on his motion for a new trial present them to the court for examination; if, with all of his efforts, he is unable to have the witnesses personally present, he should, if practicable, secure their ex parte affidavits, which should be presented for the consideration of the court, which, on the motion for a new trial, will review the whole case and correct any error prejudicial to the defendant which may appear in any part of the proceeding.  (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 251 Miss. at 171-72, 168 So.2d at 641. See also, Denton v. State, 348 So.2d 1031, 1033 (Miss. 1977) (there must be an offer to show on appellant's motion for a new trial that prejudice to appellant resulted.) Both sides issued subpoenas for Humphries on October 13, 1983, and both subpoenas were served and returned. On the day of the trial, Gates filed for a continuance on the grounds that Humphries was in the hospital due to complications in a pregnancy. The motion set forth what Humphries would testify to and said further that it was not filed for the purpose of delay but for good cause. Attached to the motion was a letter from Dr. Leroy Howell stating that Humphries was in the hospital and could not testify on October 20. Also attached to the motion was the affidavit of Gates which set out, inter alia, what Humphries would testify to. At the motion hearing, the prosecution offered to stipulate that if called Humphries would testify as set out in the motion and part four of the affidavit, and as set out in a statement given to the police by Humphries on June 23, 1983. The prosecution of course did not stipulate as to the truth of that testimony. The trial court overruled the motion because there was no proof that Humphries was actually in the hospital, only the letter from the purported physician. He also gave as a supporting reason the stipulation. Defense counsel announced ready, subject to the motion for continuance. Gates had set forth what he expected to prove by Humphries in his affidavit. He arguably made an attempt to preserve the motion throughout the trial as required by King, supra ; however, he made no attempt to introduce more evidence about her absence, such as substituting an affidavit of the doctor for the letter, even though the judge told him that he was not satisfied with the proof about her absence. Also, when the evidence at trial indicated that Humphries was in the hospital, Gates failed to renew his motion. The motion was not renewed at trial's end, nor was any further action taken concerning the absent witness. More important, on both motions for a new trial, Gates made no attempt to present Humphries to the court for examination nor present her affidavit, so the court could consider it and review the whole case and correct any error prejudicial to the defendant which may appear in any part of the proceeding. King, supra . Gates never indicated at any time that the witness would have testified in any way other than what was contained in the affidavit and statement which was stipulated to. Gates cites several cases in support of this assignment, which are readily distinguishable. Ivy v. State, 229 Miss. 491, 91 So.2d 521 (1956), comes closest to being authority for reversal. In Ivy, the witness, defendant's wife, would have testified that the victim was the aggressor. She was the only witness who would verify the defendant's version. We held that the denial of a continuance under these circumstances was error. In so doing, it was noted that not only did the application for continuance conform with the statute but the motion for a new trial conformed with the procedure governing continuances as set out in Lamar v. State, 63 Miss. 265, 271 (1885). This procedure was followed in King, supra . Also, the Ivy motion was supported by the affidavit of the attending physician, and when this occurs a strong prima facie case for a continuance is made out. Gates never produced the affidavit of the attending physician. The comfort offered to Gates by Ivy is cold indeed. There was no abuse of sound judicial discretion in denying the continuance.