Opinion ID: 2020324
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Von's Videotaped Statement to Weber

Text: At the outset, the State presents a brief, one-paragraph argument contending that respondent forfeited the right to raise a confrontation clause claim by his failure to object at trial, on confrontation clause grounds, to the admission of hearsay testimony. We rejected an identical argument in Stechly and for the reasons expressed therein reject the State's claim here as well. As we explained in Stechly, Crawford announced a fundamentally new rule regarding the effect of the confrontation clause on the admission of hearsay statements and, thus, the rule should be applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final when Crawford was decided. Stechly, 225 Ill.2d at 268, 312 Ill.Dec. 268, 870 N.E.2d 333, quoting People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1400, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 753, 756 (2004). Moreover, as we recognized in Stechly, it would be manifestly unfair to hold defendant to have waived claims by not raising them at trial when those claims are based on a rule which was only announced during the pendency of his appeal. Stechly, 225 Ill.2d at 268, 312 Ill.Dec. 268, 870 N.E.2d 333. This reasoning is equally applicable to the case at bar. Here, too, fairness requires a finding that respondent did not forfeit the right to raise a confrontation clause claim by his failure to make a more specific objection at trial to the admission of hearsay testimony.
The State agrees that, pursuant to Stechly, Von's statement to his mother was nontestimonial and his statement to Officer Cure was testimonial. The State's only challenge is to the appellate court's determination that Von's videotaped statement to Weber was testimonial. The State asks that we reverse this determination, maintaining that the videotaped statement is nontestimonial because neither Von nor Weber was acting to a substantial degree to produce a statement for future trial. In support of this contention, the State maintains that: (1) there is no evidence to show Weber's intent because Weber did not testify at trial, (2) in general, the primary concern of child advocates and child advocacy centers, such as the Carrie Lynn Children's Center here, is the physical, mental and emotional welfare of child victims; (3) Weber's interview occurred prior to the time that Rolandis was arrested and the juvenile petition was filed, indicating that the purpose of the interview was to assess whether abuse occurred, rather than prepare for trial; and (4) Weber was not acting as an agent of law enforcement because, as a child advocate, her primary focus was the best interests of the child. The State admits that a majority of courts in other jurisdictions have held statements made to child advocates, under circumstances similar to those here, to be testimonial. However, the State argues that these cases are distinguishable or wrongly decided. Further, the State insists that the fact that Weber conducted her videotaped interview with Von under the observation of a police officer does not mean that Weber was acting as an agent of law enforcement. The State asks that we take into consideration the fact that Weber's interview was conducted as part of a statutorily encouraged, multidisciplinary response to child sexual abuse, the purpose of which is to reduce trauma to child victims. The State contends that a failure to recognize these multidisciplinary interviews as nontestimonial will discourage collaboration and video-taping, which is important in limiting the trauma to which children are subjected when they are involved in such investigations. Finally, the State contends that, because Weber's interview was not police interrogation, we may consider the viewpoint of the declarant, six-year-old Von J., in determining whether the statement is testimonial. The State urges us to find that, in the case at bar, Von's videotaped statement is nontestimonial because a reasonable six-year-old would not have anticipated that his statement to Weber would be used for a future prosecution. In response, Rolandis argues that the circumstances of this case objectively indicate that Weber was acting as an agent of the police and that the primary purpose of her interview was to establish or prove past events that would be relevant in a future criminal prosecution. Thus, respondent contends that the appellate court correctly ruled that the videotaped statement to Weber was testimonial and should not have been admitted. We agree. In Stechly, the plurality devised a framework for determining whether an out-of-court statement is testimonial. It held that a testimonial statement is one which is (1) made in a solemn fashion, and (2) intended to establish a particular fact. In general, a statement is testimonial if the declarant is acting in a manner analogous to a witness at trial, describing or giving information regarding events that have already occurred. Stechly, 225 Ill.2d at 281-82, 312 Ill.Dec. 268, 870 N.E.2d 333. Of course, this framework begs the question, Whose intent is determinativethe questioner or the declarant? After reviewing Crawford and Davis, the Stechly plurality concluded that, when the statement under consideration is the product of questioning, either by the police or someone acting on the behalf of law enforcement, it is the objective intent of the questioner that is determinative. Stechly, 225 Ill.2d at 284-85, 312 Ill.Dec. 268, 870 N.E.2d 333. However, where statements are not the product of law enforcement interrogation, the proper focus is on the intent of the declarant and the inquiry should be whether the objective circumstances would lead a reasonable person to conclude that his statement could be used against the defendant. Stechly, 225 Ill.2d at 288-89, 312 Ill.Dec. 268, 870 N.E.2d 333. Moreover, the plurality held that, when the declarant is a child, the child's age may be one of the objective circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether a reasonable person in his or her circumstances would have understood that his or her statement would be available for use at a later trial. Stechly, 225 Ill.2d at 295-96, 312 Ill.Dec. 268, 870 N.E.2d 333. Applying this framework to the case at bar, we first must determine whether Von's tape-recorded interview with Weber resulted in a testimonial statement, i.e., whether it was solemn statement made with the intent of establishing facts regarding past events. Pursuant to Stechly, the first step in this inquiry is to determine whether Weber was acting as a representative of the police when she obtained Von's recorded statement. As the State points out, the Carrie Lynn Children's Center, where Von's interview took place, is one of several accredited child advocacy centers in this state established to coordinate the activities of the various agencies involved in the investigation, prosecution and treatment referral of child sexual abuse. 55 ILCS 80/4(a) (West 2002). Weber, a child advocate and employee of the Center, interviewed Von in furtherance of the interdisciplinary, coordinated systems approach to the investigation of child sexual abuse. See 55 ILCS 80/4(c)(1) (West 2002). Although Weber did not testify and the record is silent as to the actual purpose of her interview with Von, the record, from an objective viewpoint, indicates that the interview took place at the behest of the police so that a more detailed account of the alleged sexual abuse could be obtained by a trained interviewer and memorialized on videotape. Moreover, because the interview was witnessed by Detective Swanberg and a copy of the videotaped interview immediately turned over to him as evidence upon completion of the interview, the objective circumstances indicate that Von's statement was the product of an interrogation, conducted on behalf of the police, intended to gather information and establish past acts for future prosecution. Clearly, then, it must be concluded that Weber was acting as a representative of the police, assisting in their investigation of an alleged child sexual abuse, when she interviewed Von. It is true that the purpose of this type of interdisciplinary, collaborative protocol is to minimize the stress created for the child and his or her family by the investigatory and judicial process, and to ensure that more effective treatment is provided for the child and his or her family. See 55 ILCS 80/3(d) (West 2002). However, there is absolutely no indication that, in the case at bar, Weber's interview of Von was conducted, to a substantial degree, for treatment rather than investigative purposes. Accordingly, we are compelled to conclude that Von's videotaped statement was testimonial in nature and, because Von did not testify at trial and there was no prior opportunity for cross-examination, it was improperly admitted in violation of respondent's confrontation rights. The appellate court's judgment in this regard must be affirmed. We note, additionally, that our conclusion here is supported by decisions rendered in other jurisdictions. As the State concedes, the majority of courts to consider the question have found statements to child abuse advocates such as social workers to be testimonial. One such case is State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). In Snowden, a social worker for Montgomery County Child Protective Services in Maryland interviewed three minors (two 10-year-olds and an 8-year-old) who were victims of sexual abuse. The interview took place at the Child Assessment Center in Rockville and was part of a joint investigation with the Montgomery County police department. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the statements made to the social worker (Wakeel) were testimonial, stating: [W]e find that the structure, location, and style of the interviews actually support the notion that the children's interviews were a formal and structured interrogation where the responses reasonably would be expected to be used at a later trial. The fact that the interviews were conducted by a licensed sexual abuse investigator, rather than a police officer, is of little persuasive weight in our analysis.    Wakeel's role as interviewer was little different from the role of a police officer in a routine police interrogation. Wakeel became involved only after being contacted by the Montgomery County Police Department, which informed her of the substance of the children's accusations. Because Wakeel was performing her responsibilities in response and at the behest of law enforcement, she became, for Confrontation Clause analysis, an agent of the police department. Snowden, 385 Md. at 85-86, 867 A.2d at 326-27. Similarly, in People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App.4th 1396, 1402, 1400, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 753, 757, 756 (2004), the videotaped statement of a four-year-old sex abuse victim was held to be testimonial. In that case, the child was interviewed by a forensic interview specialist at the Fresno County Multi-Disciplinary Interview Center, a facility specially designed and staffed for interviewing children suspected of being victims of abuse. The interview was observed by a district attorney and a police officer. The court held that the videotaped statement obtained at this interview was testimonial, stating: Under these circumstances, it does not matter what the government's actual intent was in setting up the interview, where the interview took place, or who employed the interviewer. It was eminently reasonable to expect that the interview would be available for use at trial. Sisavath, 118 Cal.App.4th at 1403, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at 758. More recently, a Florida appellate court reached the same conclusion in Hernandez v. Florida, 946 So.2d 1270 (Fla.App.2007). [2] In Hernandez, an officer investigating the alleged sexual abuse of a child took the child and her parents to the local hospital. At the hospital, a nurse, who was a member of the Child Protection Team (CPT), physically examined the child and questioned her and her parents about the alleged abuse. Because a week had passed since the alleged abuse had occurred, no specimens were taken and no treatment was provided. Also, no referral was made to a physician for follow-up treatment or examination. The nurse's testimony regarding the child's responses to questioning was admitted at trial pursuant to state statute. However, on review, the court held that the child's statement to the nurse was testimonial and the nurse's testimony was inadmissible because her interview with the child and the child's parents was the functional equivalent of a police interrogation. Hernandez, 946 So.2d at 1280. The court noted four factors that contributed to its determination: (1) the nurse, as a member of the CPT, was an arm of law enforcement, statutorily bound to work with the police to provide various services directed to the detection, investigation, and prosecution of child abuse; (2) the nurse was working in concert with the police, as evinced by the fact that after her examination and questioning of the child, the investigating officer, who had remained at the hospital during the interview, made the decision to charge the defendant; (3) the primary purpose of the examination and questioning was to gather facts for a potential prosecution; and (4) when the interview took place the child was in a place of safety and there was no indication of an ongoing emergency. Hernandez, 946 So.2d at 1280-82. These same factors are present in the case at bar. The child advocate who interviewed Von was employed by a licensed advocacy center and, pursuant to the Children's Advocacy Center Act, this Center not only worked in concert with other agencies involved in the investigation and prosecution of child sexual abuse, it was obligated to share information it obtained with the police. See 55 ILCS 80/4(c)(2) (West 2002). Respondent was not charged until after Weber's interview took place and Detective Swanberg had retained a copy of the videotaped interview as evidence. Furthermore, since there is no indication that the primary purpose of the interview was for treatment and because Von was no longer in any danger from the respondent, it must be concluded that the main purpose of the interview was to gather information about past events for potential future prosecution. Thus, here, as in Hernandez, the only conclusion we can reach is that the child's statement to the child advocate was testimonial. We are not unsympathetic to the State's concern that child abuse victims are often unavailable to testify because of their tender years and, for that reason,  Crawford is incompatible with the realities of child abuse prosecutions. However, the Court in Davis, when faced with a similar argument in regard to victims of domestic violence, stated, We may not, however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing the guilty to go free. Davis, 547 U.S. at 832-33, 126 S.Ct. at 2279-80, 165 L.Ed.2d at 243-44. Thus here, too, we may not abridge constitutional guarantees simply because they are a hindrance to the prosecution of child sexual abuse crimes.