Opinion ID: 2814318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: RIPLA and the Fourth Amendment

Text: ¶16. Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003). The Fourth Amendment’s purpose “is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967). ¶17. In Camara, the United States Supreme Court examined whether administrative inspection provisions violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches. Id. at 525, 87 S. Ct. 1727. The case arose when a tenant was prosecuted for violating the San Francisco Housing Code after he refused to allow a housing inspector to enter his apartment without a warrant. Id. at 526, 87 S. Ct. 1727. The housing code gave inspectors the right to enter buildings at reasonable times. Id. The Supreme Court held “that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth 9 Amendment, that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual. . . .” Id. at 534, 87 S. Ct. 1727. ¶18. Camara emphasized that a warrant for an inspection may be obtained only upon probable cause. “In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained, ‘probable cause’ is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness.” Id. at 534, 87 S. Ct. 1727. But the test of probable cause required for a search in this context is different from what is required to establish probable cause to search in a criminal investigation. Id. at 538, 87 S. Ct. 1727. Specifically: Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of “probable cause” to make an inspection are clearly different from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken. Experience may show the need for periodic inspections of certain facilities without a further showing of cause to believe that substandard conditions dangerous to the public are being maintained. The passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify the issuance of warrant. The test of “probable cause” required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the search that is being sought. Id. The Supreme Court further stated that: it is obvious that “probable cause” to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multifamily apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. 10 In the companion case of See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967), the Supreme Court found that consent or a warrant also is required for administrative entry upon commercial premises not open to the public. ¶19. In subsequent cases, courts have addressed ordinances that forced owners to consent in advance to property inspections. Numerous cases have held these ordinances to be unconstitutional because they did not contain a warrant provision. See, e.g., Brower v. Village of Bolingbrook, 735 F. Supp. 768, 777 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Hometown Co-op. Apartments v. City of Hometown (Hometown I), 495 F. Supp. 55, 60 (N.D. Ill. 1980); State v. Finnell, 685 N.E.2d 1267, 1271 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Sokolov v. Village of Freeport, 420 N.E.2d 55, 58 (N.Y. 1981); Pashcow v. Town of Babylon, 410 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); Wilson v. Cincinnati, 346 N.E.2d 666, 671 (1976). For example, in Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, an ordinance required a property owner to consent to a warrantless inspection before entering into a purchase and sale agreement. If the seller attempted to sell the property without a certificate of inspection, the seller was subject to criminal penalties. Wilson, 346 N.E.2d at 670. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the consent was involuntary and unconstitutional because it was coerced by the threat of criminal penalties. Id. The court also held that “[a]s applicable to the instant facts, the import of Camara is that the Fourth Amendment prohibits placing appellant in a position where she must agree to a warrantless inspection of her property or face a criminal penalty.” Id. at 671. The court found that the ordinance violated the Fourth Amendment because it forced a property owner to choose 11 between obtaining the required certificate by allowing a warrantless inspection, or incurring criminal penalties upon the failure to tender the certificate. Id. ¶20. In Sokolov, the Court of Appeals of New York faced an ordinance, similar to RIPLA, that required a landlord to consent to a warrantless inspection in order to obtain a permit to rent the property. Sokolov, 420 N.E.2d at 56. Renting the property without a permit subjected the landlord to a fine of $250 per day. Id. The court found that, under these facts, “in substance, a landlord is subject to a fine of $250 per day for failure to consent to a warrantless administrative inspection.” Id. The Village argued that the ordinance did not punish the failure to consent to an inspection, but it only punished renting a property without a permit. Id. at 57. The Court of Appeals of New York rejected this argument, stating that: through an indirect method the property owner is being penalized for his failure to consent to a warrantless search. In this instance the property owner’s consent is not voluntarily given as it is clearly a product of coercion. A property owner cannot be regarded as having voluntarily given his consent to a search where the price he must pay to enjoy his rights under the Constitution is the effective deprivation of any economic benefit from his rental property. Id. (citation omitted). The court found that, because the ordinance coerced consent to a warrantless search under threat of criminal penalty, it was unconstitutional under Camara and its progeny. Id. at 58. ¶21. In other cases, ordinances requiring advance consent to search have been upheld because the ordinances required the government to obtain a warrant if the owner refused consent, and the ordinances did not exact criminal penalties for lack of consent. Mann v. Calumet City, Ill., 588 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2009); Tobin v. City of Peoria, 939 F. Supp. 628, 634 (C.D. Ill. 1996); Hometown Co-op. Apartments v. City of Hometown (Hometown 12 II), 515 F. Supp. 502, 504 (N.D. Ill. 1981); cf. Dearmore v. City of Garland, 400 F. Supp. 2d 894 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (although the rental-permit ordinance required the City to obtain a warrant if the owner did not consent to an inspection, it also imposed criminal penalties on the owner for failing to consent and was unconstitutional). In Mann v. Calumet City, 588 F.3d 949, 950 (2009), the Seventh Circuit reviewed an ordinance that forbade the sale of a house without an inspection to determine compliance with the building code. The ordinance had a requirement that the city’s inspectors obtain a warrant to conduct the inspection if the owner refused consent. Id. at 952. The Seventh Circuit held that the ordinance was constitutional, stating that “‘[p]oint of sale’ ordinances such as this one are common and have withstood constitutional attack in all cases that we know of in which the ordinance avoided invalidation under the Fourth Amendment by requiring that the city’s inspectors obtain a warrant to inspect a house over the owner’s objection.” Id. at 951. ¶22. In Hometown I, the district court found an ordinance unconstitutional under Camara because it required the owner to consent to an inspection before the property could be leased or sold; a fine ensued if the owner leased or sold the property without a certificate of inspection. Hometown I, 495 F. Supp. at 56, 60. In Hometown II, the district court revisited the ordinance after it had been amended to provide a warrant procedure for cases when the owner refused consent to an inspection. Hometown II, 515 F. Supp. at 503. The court held that the City of Hometown’s amendment “remedied the fatal flaw in its earlier point of sale inspection ordinance. The property owner is no longer forced to choose between consenting to a warrantless search or subjecting himself or herself to substantial fines for failure to 13 procure a certificate of inspection.” Id. at 504. Thus, the court found the ordinance constitutional. Id. ¶23. In Tobin, an ordinance required property owners to obtain a certificate of inspection for compliance with housing, environmental, and building codes before renting a property. Tobin, 939 F. Supp. at 630. Renting without the certificate subjected the owner to a criminal penalty. Id. Several property owners sued, arguing that the ordinance forced them to consent to warrantless searches to obtain the required certificate of compliance. Id. at 631. Like RIPLA, the City of Peoria’s ordinance stated that the City would give owners advance notice of inspections. Id. at 632. The ordinance also stated that, in the event the owner refused to allow an inspection, the City reserved the right to obtain a warrant. Id. The owners argued that the warrant provision was insufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment because it did not require the City to get a warrant. Id. But the court held that “the plain language of the Inspection Ordinance can be read as incorporating a warrant requirement into the inspection procedure, thereby successfully defeating a claim that it is unconstitutional on its face.” Id. at 633. ¶24. Crook argues that this case is analogous to Wilson, Sokolov, and the other cases in which the ordinance at issue lacked a warrant provision. While Crook recognizes that RIPLA contains a warrant provision, he argues that it does not apply to RIPLA’s advance-consent provision because a landlord must give advance consent to inspections in order to get a rental license. The Court of Appeals agreed with the City that, like the ordinance in Tobin, when RIPLA is read in its entirety, RIPLA’s warrant provision is sufficient to satisfy the Fourth 14 Amendment. Under this reasoning, the advance consent a landlord gives to get a rental license is illusory because, under the warrant provision, a licensed landlord can always refuse a scheduled inspection and force the City to obtain a warrant. According to the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, RIPLA never makes a landlord consent to a warrantless search. ¶25. The Court of Appeals’ reasoning is flawed because it fails to account for the language of RIPLA’s warrant provision, which on its face does not comport with the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause requirement. The warrant provision states: “[s]hould a Tenant or Owner refuse entry, the building official shall be authorized by virtue of the terms of the Rental License to secure a judicial warrant authorizing entry by the terms of the Rental License, lease, or rental agreement.” The emphasized language allows a judicial officer to issue a warrant “by the terms of the Rental License, lease, or rental agreement,” rather then upon probable cause. The portion of RIPLA’s warrant provision authorizing a judicial officer to issue a warrant “by the terms of the Rental License” is particularly troublesome. Because each rental license contains the owner’s advance consent to inspections, a significant danger exists that a building official could attempt to obtain a warrant by asserting the owner’s advance consent. Probable cause, however, must be the standard. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534, 87 S. Ct. 1727. Because RIPLA’s warrant provision authorizes the issuance of a warrant without probable cause, it is unconstitutional. And because RIPLA lacks a valid warrant provision, its inspection provisions are unconstitutional. ¶26. The separate opinion would find that RIPLA’s inspection provisions are not appropriate for a facial challenge because they do not prohibit the City from obtaining a 15 warrant based upon probable cause. We reject that reasoning. Camara held that administrative searches conducted without a warrant procedure violate the Fourth Amendment. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534, 87. S. Ct. 1727. And a warrant to inspect property must be based upon probable cause. Id. Thus, for an inspection provision to be constitutional, it must contain a warrant requirement that provides for the issuance of warrants upon probable cause. See Dearmore, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (stating that “Camara . . . holds that an administrative search of a private residence, including a private residence owned by one person and rented by another, must include a warrant procedure”). RIPLA contains a warrant procedure, but that procedure is constitutionally deficient because it expressly allows a warrant to issue without probable cause. Because RIPLA expressly allows inspection warrants to issue without probable cause, it effectively contains no warrant requirement. And an inspection provision with no warrant requirement is facially unconstitutional. State v. Finnell, 685 N.E. 2d 1267, 1272 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). ¶27. The separate opinion also would find that the advance-consent provision is facially unconstitutional because it requires a landlord to give advance consent to inspections. Rather than focusing on the absence of a constitutionally valid warrant requirement, the separate opinion simply would find the advance-consent provision unconstitutional because it requires a landlord to give advance consent to searches in order to obtain a rental license. Because we hold that RIPLA’s inspection provisions, which include the advance-consent requirement, are facially unconstitutional because they allow a warrant to issue without probable cause, we agree with the separate opinion that the advance-consent requirement is facially invalid. 16