Opinion ID: 2829377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court’s Reasons for Disregarding our Nuisance Jurisprudence Fall Short

Text: The Court circumvents our due process nuisance jurisprudence discussed above in favor of a takings inquiry. Its justifications for doing so are (1) a misreading of the extent of our holding in Steele v. City of Houston , and (2) an entirely novel application of the constitutional fact doctrine. Both of these justifications fail.
The Court argues that the Stockwell – Lurie line of cases described above is no longer valid in light of Steele v. City of Houston , 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980) . This exaggerates the scope of Steele . The Court cogently describes Steele ’s actual effect, which was to make clear that the Takings Clause is self-executing, thereby reversing the prior assumption that the State enjoyed sovereign immunity from takings claims. But the Court then extrapolates that Steele also precluded the Legislature from summarily abating nuisances in fact. The problem with that assumption is that Steele in no way modified or curtailed the State’s police power; instead, it merely removed the shield of sovereign immunity from the exercise of that power. See id. at 791 (“The Constitution itself is the authorization for compensation for the destruction of property and is a waiver of governmental immunity for the taking . . . of property for public use.”) ( emphasis added). In fact, Steele says very little about the question in this case—in Steele , there was no due process at all, because the Houston police summarily set fire to the plaintiff’s home in an attempt to flush out fugitives, id. at 789, nor was the city claiming to abate a nuisance, see generally id. Steele simply stands for the proposition that the Takings Clause is self-executing, and that sovereign immunity is waived for takings claims. See id. at 789. An important point, to be sure, but one that is not relevant where, as here, the Takings Clause is inapplicable because there was a proper nuisance abatement, rather than a taking. See Samuels , 267 U.S. at 196.
The Court further reaches its conclusion by a novel adoption and application of the constitutional fact doctrine. But there are two important reasons that I would decline to import that doctrine from its proper, federal context. First, the doctrine is generally applied in the context of the First and Fourth Amendments, not to nuisance or takings questions, as the Court itself admits. __ S.W.3d __; see, e.g. , Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. , 466 U.S. 485 (1984). The common thread in those cases is that the “fact” in question is of highly subjective intent—such as whether an alleged defamer acted with actual malice, or whether the police had probable cause. See Bose Corp. , 466 U.S. at 515 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the constitutional fact issue in a First Amendment case is “no more than findings about the mens rea of an author”). Also, such cases involve the development and application of complicated, constitutional legal standards. See Ornelas , 517 U.S. at 697 (explaining that “the legal rules for probable cause and reasonable suspicion acquire content only through application,” thus requiring independent review “if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles”). By contrast, whether a building is so dilapidated as to constitute a danger to health and safety is not a legal rule that “acquires content” only through independent judicial review. Rather, it is a rule that derives its content from the specific statute in question. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.001(a )( 1)–(3). Indeed, a major concern of our nuisance precedents, such as Stockwell , was to ensure that cities and agencies only act under a specific statutory definition, limited to nuisances in fact, thus rendering inapplicable here the concerns that motivated the Supreme Court to “reinvigorate” the constitutional fact doctrine. Second, the Court’s reason for applying the doctrine is disquieting, both for its unsound basis, and for the breadth of its potential application in future cases. The Court applies the doctrine merely because “[t] akings claims also typically involve mixed questions of fact and law.” __ S.W.3d __. But mixed questions of fact and law abound in our legal system. See, e.g. , Intercont’l Grp . P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P. , 295 S.W.3d 650, 666 (Tex. 2009) (Brister, J., dissenting) (“Whether a party prevailed in litigation is a mixed question of law and fact.”); Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co. , 952 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1997) (explaining that probable cause is “a mixed question of law and fact” in malicious prosecution cases when the parties dispute the underlying facts). Under the Court’s reasoning, it appears that every mixed question of fact and law that is even alleged to touch on a constitutional right is now a “question of constitutional fact.” Further, it is unclear how the Court’s decision can be squared with our rule that “[w]e review a trial court’s decision on a mixed question of law and fact for an abuse of discretion.” 9 State v. $217,590.00 in U.S. Currency , 18 S.W.3d 631, 633 (Tex. 2000). What is particularly worrisome is that, while the Supreme Court takes pains to cabin both its reasons for applying the doctrine and the doctrine’s scope, this Court today provides no such limiting guidance. 1 0 See, e.g. , Bose Corp. , 466 U.S. at 510–11; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review , 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 272–73 (1985). 1 1 Because of the differences between regulatory and conventional takings cases, it is generally inappropriate to treat regulatory takings cases as controlling precedent for conventional takings. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency , 535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002); Lowenberg v. City of Dallas , 168 S.W.3d 800, 801–02 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam ). The Court errs when it relies on such cases here.