Opinion ID: 184453
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rogenkamp's Autopsy

Text: 58 The United States presented extensive evidence at trial relating to Rogenkamp's autopsy. This included the testimony of a pathologist, who described the autopsy in considerable clinical detail, and testified that Rezaq's bullet had caused Rogenkamp's death; the pathologist also discussed the cause of Mendelson's death on the basis of autopsy records that he had reviewed. The United States also introduced an autopsy report, and a number of enlarged photographs from the autopsy, which were placed on an easel near the jury box; the United States displayed the photographs again during closing arguments. 59 Rezaq had filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude this evidence as overly prejudicial. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 permits the district court to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. FED.R.EVID. 403. The district court accordingly weighed the probative value of this evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. As to probative value, the district court found the evidence relevant to both the force or intimidation element of the statute and the death results element. The district court found that the autopsy reports were highly probative as to the fact of Rogenkamp's death, as to its cause, and as to the fact that the killings were intentional. It found that the autopsy photographs were likewise highly probative as to the first two of these factors, the fact and cause of death. 60 In weighing the prejudicial effect of this evidence, the district court found that the autopsy reports had no prejudicial effect, as they were straightforward and factual, and nothing in them was likely to inflame the jury. It observed that some of the autopsy photographs similarly presented no danger of prejudice; others it found were more graphic in nature, but it concluded that, [i]n light of the highly probative value of these particular photographs, the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value. 9 Rezaq asserts that the district court erred in admitting this evidence. 61 We review Rule 403 determinations most deferentially and will reverse only for 'grave abuse' of the trial court's discretion. United States v. Johnson, 46 F.3d 1166, 1171 (D.C.Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 322 (D.C.Cir.1989)). Here, although we might not have admitted at least one of the most grisly photographs into evidence, we cannot say that the district court's decision to do so amounted to grave abuse.We begin with the evidence's probative value. The fact that death resulted from the hijacking was an element of the offense with which Rezaq was charged. The autopsy report, the testimony of the pathologist, and the photographs all demonstrated that it was Rezaq's bullets that killed Rogenkamp and Mendelson. The fact that Rezaq's victims died is also relevant to the force and intimidation element of the statute. See Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d at 996 (1st Cir.1995) (It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the death of a victim would not be relevant to the use of force and violence during the commission of an attempted carjacking.). The autopsy evidence corroborated the government's account of the way in which Rezaq used systematic executions to maintain control of passengers and airport personnel. 62 Based on this analysis, we can dismiss the autopsy report and the pathologist's testimony from consideration immediately. Both had some small prejudicial effect, as they presented unsettling details of the way in which Rezaq's victims died; but this effect does not substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value. All but one of the autopsy photographs that were introduced into evidence fell into the same category. These photographs were fairly antiseptic; they included three photographs of the entry wound in Rogenkamp's head, an x-ray image of her skull with the bullet embedded in it, and a photograph of the bullet itself. The harder case is a close-up photograph showing the removal of the bullet from Rogenkamp's skull. This photograph was notably graphic: in it, a large triangular portion of the skin on Rogenkamp's skull has been removed, revealing bone, tissue, and a large quantity of blood (as well as the bullet). 63 Blood will have blood, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act 3, sc. 4; accordingly, photographs of gore may inappropriately dispose a jury to exact retribution. A number of courts have recognized this principle. For instance, in Ferrier v. Duckworth, 902 F.2d 545, 548 (7th Cir.1990), the court found it improper to admit photographs, in color and enlarged to twelve square feet, of the victim's blood on the floor of a bar, as the blood was not relevant to any issue in the case, and [t]he only conceivable reason for placing [the photographs] in evidence was to inflame the jury against the defendant. Id. at 548. See also Gomez v. Ahitow, 29 F.3d 1128, 1139 (7th Cir.1994) (similar). The fact that the photograph in this case was taken in a clinical setting somewhat reduced its prejudicial effect, but the photograph nevertheless created some risk of prejudice. Nor was its probative value great. Autopsy photographs can have immense probative value, if for example they confirm the prosecution's theory about the manner in which the crime was committed. See United States v. Cruz-Kuilan, 75 F.3d 59, 61 (1st Cir.1996) (autopsy photographs confirmed witness's account of the crime, establishing that bullets fired by defendant had indeed passed through the body of the victim and injured the witness). Here, however, the photograph only provided further corroboration that Rogenkamp was shot in the head; because the bullet was visible in the other photographs, this point did not especially need elucidation. 10 64 Although some might have doubts about the prudence of admitting this photograph into evidence, we cannot say that the district court's decision to do so amounted to grave abuse. The photograph did have some probative value, and its prejudicial effect, although significant, was not extreme. The trial judge's exercise of discretion in balancing the prejudicial effect and probative value of photographic evidence of this type is rarely disturbed. United States v. Goseyun, 789 F.2d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir.1986).