Opinion ID: 2634394
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Washington's Application of Batson

Text: ¶ 31 The parties and the Court of Appeals focus on three cases that have addressed whether excusing the only remaining African-American in the jury venire is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Although the Court of Appeals relied on State v. Evans, 100 Wash.App. 757, 998 P.2d 373 (2000), [8] and State v. Wright, 78 Wash.App. 93, 896 P.2d 713 (1995) in its ruling, and specifically rejected State v. Rhodes, 82 Wash.App. 192, 917 P.2d 149 (1996), [9] a closer look at these three cases shows that they actually articulate the same standard: trial courts are not required to find a prima facie case based on the dismissal of the only venire person from a constitutionally cognizable group, but they may, in their discretion, recognize a prima facie case in such instances. ¶ 32 Hicks and Babbs cite decisions from other jurisdictions that have similarly found that striking the sole remaining African-American, Hispanic, or Native American juror may be sufficient for a prima facie case under Batson. [10] This seems consistent with the Supreme Court's concern in Batson. The Batson Court noted that `a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination' is not `a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause' and that `[a] single invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not `immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.' 476 U.S at 95, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)). The Court further declared that [f]or evidentiary requirements to dictate that `several must suffer discrimination' before one could object would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all. Id. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citation omitted). ¶ 33 The Batson Court also declared that [w]e have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. ¶ 34 Here, the trial judge was well within his discretion when he determined, [O]ut of an abundance of caution, I find a prima facie case [of discrimination]. 5 VRP (Jan. 30, 2004) at 496. Not only was juror nine the only remaining African-American venire member, but both Hicks and Babbs are African-American, and the prosecution failed to orally question juror nine about all reasons for which he dismissed her. Lack of questioning prior to dismissing a juror can be evidence that the removal is race-based. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 246, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (`[T]he State's failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire examination on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination.' ( Ex parte Travis, 776 So.2d 874, 881 (Ala. 2000))). The facts were sufficient for the trial court to find an inference of discrimination. ¶ 35 In a brief in support of the defendants, amicus American Civil Liberties Union emphasizes that this court has found that the Washington Constitution provides greater protection for jury trials than is provided in the federal constitution. See, e.g., City of Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wash.2d 87, 99, 653 P.2d 618 (1982). Article I, section 21 states, The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. . . . In interpreting inviolate, this court has relied on Webster's definition: `free from change or blemish: PURE, UNBROKEN . . . free from assault or trespass: UNTOUCHED, INTACT.' State v. Smith, 150 Wash.2d 135, 150, 75 P.3d 934 (2003) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1190 (1993)). ¶ 36 The increased protection of jury trials under the Washington Constitution further supports allowing the trial judge, in his discretion, to find a prima facie case of discrimination when the State removes the sole remaining venire person from a constitutionally cognizable group.
¶ 37 In Hernandez, the Court declared that [o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859. We have similarly held that if . . . the prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation and the trial court has ruled on the question of racial motivation, the preliminary prima facie case is unnecessary. Luvene, 127 Wash.2d at 699, 903 P.2d 960 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859). ¶ 38 In the instant case, where the trial court found a prima facie case out of an abundance of caution, the prosecutor offered a race-neutral explanation, and the trial court properly ruled, whether a prima facie case was established does not need to be determined. 5 VRP (Jan. 30, 2004) at 496. A reviewing court should focus its deferential review on the trial court's ultimate ruling on the Batson challenge. The discussion of a prima facie case, supra, is included only to clear up confusion among the lower courts.
¶ 39 Courts afford a high level of deference to the trial court's determination of discrimination. In Hernandez, the Supreme Court noted that [d]eference to trial court findings on the issue of discriminatory intent makes particular sense in this context because . . . the finding `largely will turn on evaluation of credibility.' 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712. . . . As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies `peculiarly within a trial judge's province.' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859. And in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003), the Court declared, [d]eference is necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations. ¶ 40 Although defendants contend that the trial judge's prompt ruling of Okay. The . . . challenge is denied illustrates a failure to perform the third step of the Batson process, the record does not support this contention. 5 VRP (Jan. 30, 2004) at 498. The Supreme Court stated in Hernandez, [t]he analysis set forth in Batson permits prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges without substantial disruption of the jury selection process. 500 U.S. at 358, 111 S.Ct. 1859. Although more articulation of a trial judge's findings is always helpful on appellate review, the court here carefully followed the Batson analysis as outlined in Evans and provided sufficient explanation for his denial of the Batson challenge. The record indicates that the trial judge found defense counsel's prima facie case weak and the prosecutor's explanation for juror nine's dismissal credible and in accordance with common jury selection considerations. Many lawyers maintain strong viewpoints that individuals in certain professions or occupations tend to be unfavorable jurors. The trial judge recognized the prevalence of such beliefs with his response to the prosecutor's explanation for juror nine's removal: [h]e must have read the same version of the jury selection book that's been on my shelf for years. 5 VRP (Jan. 30, 2004) at 497. While dismissing teachers or social workers from jury service may be based upon generalizations about the type of persons engaged in those professions, such challenges are not race- or gender-based and thus constitutionally permissible. Here, although the prosecutor did not pointedly question juror nine, the dismissal was based on the facts revealed in the extensive juror questionnaire. The trial court's denial of the Batson challenge was not clearly erroneous. [11]