Opinion ID: 1701900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The elements necessary to support a cause of action for malicious prosecution are:

Text: 1) a previous prosecution. 2) instigation or procurement thereof by defendant. 3) termination of the prosecution by an acquittal or discharge of plaintiff. 4) want of probable cause. 5) malice in bringing the prosecution on the part of the defendant. Liberty Loan Corp. of Des Moines v. Williams, 201 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Iowa 1972); Lukecart v. Swift & Co., 256 Iowa 1268, 130 N.W.2d 716, 722; White v. International Textbook Co., 156 Iowa 210, 136 N.W. 121. The first issue presented for review in this appeal derives from defendant's contention plaintiff presented no evidence tending to establish the existence of malice on his part in causing the arrest and prosecution of which plaintiff complains and that trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict for defendant on grounds lack of actual malice existed as a matter of law. What showing must be made to establish malice in an action for malicious prosecution depends on the status of the defendant. We have held in reviewing appeals from actions for malicious prosecution involving defendants who were not public officials that there is no burden on plaintiff to show ill-will, hatred or express malice on the part of the defendant, and that malice may be inferred from a lack of probable cause. See Schnathorst v. Williams [240 Iowa 561, 36 N.W.2d 739], supra, at pp. 746-747 of 36 N.W.2d; Lukecart v. Swift & Co., supra . In Vander Linden I, we suggested a different standard of malice would apply when the defendant is a public official, holding that such a defendant would not be immune from suit where actual malice is alleged. Actual malice is synonymous with express malice, which has been defined as malice in fact, ill-will, or wrongful motive. . .  Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 1968, p. 1109. See Giltner v. Stark, 219 N.W.2d 700, 708 (Iowa 1974). The element of actual malice essential to an action for malicious prosecution involving a defendant who is a public official cannot simply be inferred from a lack of probable cause, but must be the subject of an affirmative showing defendant's instigation of criminal proceedings against plaintiff was primarily inspired by ill-will, hatred or other wrongful motives. If the defendant's purpose in instigating proceedings was otherwise proper, the fact he felt indignation or resentment toward the plaintiff will not subject him to liability. See Prosser on Torts, 4th Ed., § 119, pp. 847-848. In the instant case plaintiff first testified that there may have been animosity on defendant's part in carrying out his arrest and trial, but later testified he could not think of any reason why the defendant would have harbored animosity toward him at the time. Except for plaintiff's highly speculative statement to the effect there may have been animosity, a rather tepid allegation discounted by his own subsequent testimony, no other evidence was presented at trial concerning defendant's state of mind in initiating criminal proceedings against him. There was on the other hand evidence suggesting plaintiff and defendant maintained a competitive but cordial relationship while operating separate drugstores in Pella. We agree with defendant that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to raise a jury issue on the question of actual malice. Virtually no showing was made at trial tending to establish defendant acted with ill-will or out of any improper motive in causing plaintiff to be arrested and prosecuted. Trial court should have sustained defendant's motion for directed verdict on the ground plaintiff failed to prove actual malice as a matter of law and erred in failing to do so. II. While our holding trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion for directed verdict is dispositive of this appeal, we feel several of the remaining issues presented here are of sufficient importance to merit our attention. We touch on them briefly. In light of our holding in Vander Linden I, as amplified by the foregoing discussion, the challenged instruction on malice submitted in the instant case was clearly erroneous insofar as it failed to take into account the fact defendant was a public official, whose action in procuring the arrest and prosecution of plaintiff was to be measured by the standard of actual rather than legal malice. Trial court erred in instructing the jury that malice does not necessarily presuppose personal hatred, ill-will or revenge, and that malice can be inferred from a lack of probable cause where defendant is a public official. III. The final issue we consider in this appeal derives from defendant's contention trial court erred in permitting plaintiff's wife to testify concerning mental anguish she and her daughter suffered as a consequence of plaintiff's arrest. She testified extensively in this area over defendant's timely objections the questions concerning the effect of plaintiff's arrest on others was immaterial and irrelevant to any issues in the case, the wife or daughter not being parties to the action. We have noted that the principal basis of recovery in actions for malicious prosecution is mental anguish and suffering arising from the wrongful charge and arrest, and have said the fact an arrest was made in the presence of a plaintiff's family may properly be considered as a matter bearing on the shame and humiliation the plaintiff suffered. Hepker v. Schmickle [204 Iowa 744, 229 N.W. 177], supra, at 179 of 229 N.W.; Flam v. Lee, 116 Iowa 289, 90 N.W. 70. In both Hepker and Flam we refused to find error in the admission of evidence showing the identity and general reaction of family members present at the time of a plaintiff's arrest, holding that while plaintiff's recovery must be restricted to the injury he himself sustained, that evidence constituted circumstances bearing upon the suffering he underwent on account of his alleged wrongful arrest and prosecution. In the instant case plaintiff's wife was permitted to testify concerning the relatively long term effect her husband's arrest and prosecution had upon their 13-year old daughter. Her testimony was not restricted to the immediate impact of plaintiff's arrest on those present at the time and did not relate any suffering of other family members to his own injury. Because no attempt was made to relate the effect of plaintiff's arrest on other family members to the mental anguish he suffered himself, the testimony of his wife concerning impact of the arrest on their daughter was irrelevant to any pleaded issue in this case. Trial court erred in permitting such testimony and in overruling defendant's objections thereto. IV. In view of our disposition of this appeal, we need not consider several remaining issues presented for review. We reverse insofar as the judgment against defendant Crews is concerned, and remand for entry of order and judgment dismissing plaintiff's petition as to Crews. Plaintiff's judgment against the non-appealing defendant, Snyder, is not affected by this opinion. Reversed and remanded.