Opinion ID: 591401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evidentiary error issues

Text: 77 (1) ADMISSION OF THE SHOTGUN TESTIMONY 78 The defendant objected at trial to the introduction of testimony about a shotgun found by the agent in a closet in a bedroom which he shared with Cheryl Hill. We turn to that issues. 79 Agent Malloy and Agent Craven went to the home which Cheryl Hill apparently shared with defendant. Their purpose was to arrest the defendant on the charges for which he had been indicted. Cheryl Hill invited Agent Malloy into the house after telling him that defendant was in the kitchen. Upon finding no one there, Agents Malloy and Craven conducted a protective sweep of the premises and found the shotgun in the closet of the bedroom they shared. 10 The shotgun was registered in Cheryl Hill's name. 80 The indictment does not mention the shotgun. However, at trial, the government sought to elicit testimony from Agent Malloy about the gun. The defense objected to the evidence as irrelevant and highly prejudicial, but the district court allowed the testimony. 81 On appeal, defendant asserts that the shotgun testimony was not relevant under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because it was not offered to prove any element of the crime. He argues further that the weapon should not have been admitted because there was no evidence showing a nexus between the gun and any aspect of the narcotics conspiracy. He also claims that the evidence was stale since Cheryl Hill purchased the shotgun after the alleged conspiracy ended. Finally, he contends that, even if the shotgun had some relevance in establishing a conspiracy, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the possibility of prejudice. We need not decide whether all these grounds were proffered to the district court. 82 Assuming that it was error to admit the shotgun testimony into evidence, the government says it was harmless because Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Evidence instructs that [a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3771. Therefore, in order to justify a new trial, defendant was required to show a reasonable probability that the assumed error contributed to his conviction by having a substantial influence on the minds of the jury. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 2374, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1987) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 758-59, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1244-45, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). 83 We find that any error resulting from the admission of the shotgun testimony was not likely to have had a substantial influence on the jury, given the other evidence of defendant's involvement in the conspiracy. In a similar case, where the government introduced into evidence cash that had been found at the defendant's apartment on the day of his arrest, this court found the error in admitting irrelevant evidence to be harmless. United States v. Zarintash, 736 F.2d 66, 72 (3d Cir.1984). Furthermore, as in Zarintash, the prosecutor here made no mention of the shotgun in his closing argument. Id. Thus, we conclude that the district court's assumed error in admitting the shotgun evidence was harmless. 84 (2) ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE OF CHERYL HILL'S FINANCIAL AFFAIRS 85 The defendant's final assignment of trial error is that the court's acts of striking the testimony and giving a curative instruction regarding Cheryl Hill's financial affairs were insufficient to remedy the prejudice incurred by the defendant. 86 At trial, the government offered three theories to justify the introduction of Cheryl Hill's finances to help prove that defendant committed the crimes for which he was charged. Apparently not wanting to interfere unduly with the government's presentation of its case, the court admitted the testimony in issue, over objection, subject to a showing by the government of a nexus between the testimony and the crimes with which defendant was charged. 87 The testimony may be summarized in abbreviated form as follows: Seventeen witnesses testified at trial that 62 money orders in amounts of $500 and $1000 were obtained from various banks in New York City and made payable to Cheryl Hill over a more than two year period in amounts that (in total) exceeded two hundred thousand dollars. The money orders came from unknown males but were sequentially numbered in amounts of less than $10,000. Federal disclosure forms--Currency Transaction Reports (CTR's)--were filed for only one of these money orders. Agent Monaghan testified that the use of money orders in this fashion is a typical method used by money launderers. He explained how this form of structured transactions evades the federal requirement of filing a CTR. 88 Further, Agent Monaghan testified on the basis of charts and summaries of financial documents introduced at trial that Cheryl Hill had unexplained income of almost $400,000 between January 1, 1987, and February 28, 1990; that she purchased $250,307 on her American Express credit card during that period using the money orders she received; that her annual income was $60,000 per year; that defendant deposited in Cheryl's checking account the $20,000 he received from work at the Car Lounge, Inc., during this same period; and that defendant had a credit card issued on Cheryl Hill's American Express account for which she guaranteed payment. 89 At the close of the evidence, the district court announced that in its view the government had not introduced evidence showing the necessary nexus. Thereupon, the defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion. Instead, at the court's invitation, the defendant moved that the testimony regarding the money orders and Cheryl Hill's finances be stricken. Over the government's objections, the court granted the motion and said it would give a curative instruction. 90 The court subsequently gave the jury the following curative instruction: 91 The government has presented exhibits in the form of charts and summaries. Now you should consider these charts and summaries as you would any other evidence.... [A]s to summary charts, you're entitled to disregard in part or in whole those charts if you conclude that there has been errors in the calculations, or in the analysis of attributions done therein. Most importantly, if you conclude that information was contained in the Government's charts which was not part of the trial record, then you should disregard the charts entirely. 92 In this case, I excluded and instructed the jury concerning certain evidence dealing with transactions by the defendant's friend, Cheryl Hill. You're not to consider this evidence during the course of your deliberations, or any chart or summaries prepared in conjunction with that testimony during their presentation. Now, this exclusion includes most, if not all of the testimony provided by the bankers, and the testimony that you have heard given to us concerning the furniture purposes [purchases] by the individual appearing from that furniture company. 93 App. at 1019-20. 94 The government argues that we need not entertain defendant's argument that only a mistrial order would have sufficed. It asserts that the testimony about Cheryl Hill's finances showed a nexus between the evidence and the charges against defendant. In consequence, it contends that such evidence was admissible and that it was error for the district court to strike it, thus rendering it unnecessary to reach the curative instruction issue. Defendant argues that the district court, in the exercise of its discretion, correctly struck the evidence of Cheryl Hill's financial affairs. 95 We shall assume, contrary to the government's position, that the district court, in the exercise of its discretion, did not err in striking the financial materials. On that assumption, we proceed to the defendant's contention that the striking of the evidence and the curative instruction did not remove the prejudice arising from the jury's exposure to the testimony about Cheryl Hill's financial affairs. 96 The general law appropriate to the resolution of the argument made by defendant is set forth in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987), where the Court said: 97 We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instruction, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 [107 S.Ct. 1702, 1708, 95 L.Ed.2d 176] (1987), and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 [88 S.Ct. 1620, 1628, 20 L.Ed.2d 476] (1968). 98 Id. 483 U.S. at 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. at 3109 n. 8. 99 Defendant's argument goes this way: the only evidence of substantial weight connecting defendant with the conspiracy came from the testimony of the government's principal witness, Albert Castagnola; that Castagnola's credibility was seriously impugned, as the district court noted; and thus, as we translate defendant' argument, it may not have been relied on by the jury in the absence of the testimony about Cheryl Hill's financial affairs. Defendant apparently also argues that, even if it was not relied upon, the excluded evidence colored any other evidentiary basis for the verdict. Defendant therefore maintains that the extensive testimony about Hill's finances created an overwhelming probability that the jury was unable to follow the court's curative instruction as well as a strong likelihood that the evidence had a devastating effect on defendant's case. 100 First, can we say on this record that there was an overwhelming probability that the jury was unable to follow the curative instruction? That instruction was given shortly after a most severe attack on Castagnola's testimony by defense counsel in his closing argument. Assuredly, the weight to be given to Castagnola's testimony, apart from the stricken testimony of Cheryl Hill's financial affairs, was sharply presented for the jury's consideration at that point. This is not to say that the testimony about Cheryl Hill's financial affairs was not potent. Rather, it is to say that Castagnola's credibility and the testimony of the Hill financial affairs were fairly differentiated for the jury before it retired. Thus, it was possible for the jury to evaluate Castagnola's credibility apart from the impact of Cheryl Hill's financial affairs. As we read Greer, the jury was therefore in a position to follow the curative instructions in arriving at its verdict. Thus, we find no overwhelming probability that the court's curative instruction was not observed by the jury. 101 We also conclude that the Cheryl Hill financial material was not devastating to defendant's case. Substantial support for this view is found in the fact that the jury acquitted defendant on the substantive money laundering count. Yet, the Hill financial material was devoted in large measure to such a scheme. 102 We therefore conclude that the curative instruction negated the assumed error in admitting the testimony about Cheryl Hill's financial affairs. 103 But defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the errors asserted had a devastating effect on the defense. We do not find that these errors, when combined, so infected the jury's deliberations that they had a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial. Thus, the district court properly denied the motion for a mistrial.