Opinion ID: 1231921
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: front pay under idaho human rights act.

Text: In a case of first impression, we hold that front pay is a permissible element of damages under the Idaho Human Rights Act. In making this determination, we refer first to the language of the statute itself. Idaho Code § 67-5908(3), in listing the remedies available for violations of the Idaho Human Rights Act, provides that: [I]f the court finds that unlawful discrimination has occurred, its judgment shall specify an appropriate remedy or remedies therefor. Such remedies may include, but are not limited to:       (c) An order for actual damages including lost wages and benefits, provided that such back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two (2) years prior to the filing of the complaint... . Respondents claim that the phrase such back pay, which refers back to the lost wages recoverable under the statute, limits the term lost wages to back pay exclusively, and that if the legislature had intended to include front pay it would have been expressly mentioned as an available remedy. Both back pay and front pay are subsets of the global term, lost wages. The words lost wages do not differentiate between wages lost before or after trial. This is illustrated by the fact that lost wages are to be awarded as an element of actual damages, which are commonly understood as those actual losses caused by the conduct at issue. In other words, the purpose of the lost wages element of damages is to restore to the plaintiff all of the benefits lost as a result of the violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act. There is no distinction drawn in the statute between actual damages suffered before the case reaches a courtroom from those arising after trial. The words such back pay are included only as a limitation of the amount of back pay that may be awarded when compensating a plaintiff for lost wages. It does not limit the entire award of lost wages to back pay alone. We are guided in our interpretation of the Idaho statute by federal law. The first section of the Idaho Human Rights Act declares that its purpose is to provide for the execution within the state of the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, ... and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967... . I.C. § 67-5901. This Court has previously determined that the legislative intent reflected in I.C. § 67-5901 allows our state courts to look to federal law for guidance in the interpretation of the state provisions. Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 644 P.2d 355 (1982); Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808, 606 P.2d 458 (1979). Front pay is allowed in federal case law under the equal employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17. This result has been reached in most federal circuits despite the fact that the federal statute, like the Idaho statute, does not expressly refer to front pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); Walsdorf v. Board of Comrs., 857 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.1988); Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir.1985); Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area, 739 F.2d 344 (8th Cir.1984); Fadhl v. San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir.1984); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir.1980); Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929, 100 S.Ct. 271, 62 L.Ed.2d 186 (1979). Likewise, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), does not expressly refer to front pay, back pay, or lost wages, but front pay is nevertheless allowed. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); E.E.O.C. v. Prudential Federal Sav. & Loan Asso., 763 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946, 106 S.Ct. 312, 88 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985); Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S.Ct. 796, 88 L.Ed.2d 773 (1986); Davis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir.1984); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859, 103 S.Ct. 131, 74 L.Ed.2d 113 (1982). Respondents have cited certain United States District Court cases which hold that front pay is not available under Title VII and the ADEA. However, as discussed above, our determination is based primarily upon the language of the Idaho statute and guided by federal case law. We acknowledge that several circuits have arrived at a different holding, but even these jurisdictions do not preclude an independent determination by this Court. Our conclusion on the issue of front pay is bolstered by policy considerations. If damages were measured by the interval between the wrongful conduct and the date of trial, plaintiff's attorneys would have great incentive to procure trial delays in order to increase the amount of compensable damages. In addition, to cut off the measure of damages as of the date of trial would preclude full compensation to people injured by discriminatory practices. The alternative, to allow full compensation to injured plaintiffs for actual losses, is consistent with the terms of the statute and the policy to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). Although future damages are by their nature somewhat uncertain, any ambiguity in what the claimant would have received but for discrimination should be resolved against the discriminating employer. Rasimas v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950, 104 S.Ct. 2151, 80 L.Ed.2d 537 (1984). To clarify the scope of front pay as an element of damages, we first note that future lost wages or front pay is an alternative to reinstatement, Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d at 796, and may be granted only where reinstatement is made unreasonable by hostility between the parties, Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp., 511 F. Supp. 352 (D.N.H. 1981), or lack of vacancy in the position Wangsness v. Watertown School Dist., 541 F. Supp. 332 (D.S.D. 1982). The amount of future lost wages or front pay to be awarded is a matter to be determined by the trier of fact upon review of the evidence in the record. Relevant considerations include the plaintiff's salary history, scheduled or mandated pay raises, and a finding based on the evidence in the record of the time which it will take the plaintiff to find comparable employment with a commensurate salary, at which time the award of front pay should be discontinued. BISTLINE, JOHNSON and BOYLE, JJ., concur.