Opinion ID: 179140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hindsight

Text: Over Zebley's objection, the district court gave the jury a hindsight instruction. Final Jury Instruction No. 9 provided: In considering past conduct, you are not to use hindsight. Negligence, as applicable here, is based upon what a reasonable person, while exercising ordinary care, would have foreseen and would have done in the light of reasonable foresight under the circumstances then existing. The foreseeability contemplated by this instruction is not that the exact harm was foreseeable, it is sufficient that the risk of harm be generally foreseeable. The hallmark of ordinary care in this circumstance is what a reasonable and prudent person, while exercising ordinary care, would have done under the same or similar circumstances. Zebley renewed her objection to the district court's hindsight instruction in her post-trial motion. Zebley argues the district court's hindsight instruction is unprecedented and unjustifiedunprecedented because [t]here is no North Dakota law supporting this type of instruction in a negligence case and unjustified because Heartland did not adduce any after acquired [sic] facts tending to show Fallon's death was unforeseeable. Zebley maintains [t]he instruction required the jury to ignore the foreseeability of the dangers associated with Fallon being on the fire escape, to ignore expert testimony, and to unduly focus on Rock's and Fallon's actions immediately before Fallon fell when she was already on the fire escape. Zebley points out Heartland referred to the hindsight instruction during closing argument to discredit Zebley's expert witness, Dr. Kevin Schumacher. [6] The district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the hindsight instruction. The district court's hindsight instruction correctly stated North Dakota law. See Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 874 (N.D.1985) (remarking in a negligence action that [c]riticism in hindsight of one of many courses of action is not probative of negligence) (quotation omitted); Bjerke v. Heartso, 183 N.W.2d 496, 502 (N.D. 1971) (stating negligence must be determined without the aid of hindsight). The instruction embodies the familiar principle that foresight, not hindsight, is the measure of negligence. Cf. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Aitken, 196 U.S. 589, 595-96, 25 S.Ct. 317, 49 L.Ed. 610 (1905) (Holmes, J.) ([N]egligence must be determined upon the facts as they appeared at the time, and not by a judgment from actual consequences which then were not to be apprehended by a prudent and competent man.); Klisch v. Meritcare Med. Group, 134 F.3d 1356, 1359 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying Minnesota law and affirming the use of a similar hindsight instruction which charged the jury that [f]oresight, not hindsight, is the standard of negligence). Far from directing the jury to ignore relevant evidence, the hindsight instruction echoed Instruction No. 5, the district court's general negligence instruction, by stressing that [t]he hallmark of ordinary care in this circumstance is what a reasonable and prudent person, while exercising ordinary care, would have done under the same or similar circumstances. Zebley's allegation of prejudice concerning Heartland's reference to the hindsight instruction during closing argument is speculative. Dr. Schumacher testified he backtracked from the fact Fallon died while in Heartland's care to see what happened that day, ... whether there were parts of the ... [BPP] that might have led to her death, whether there were decisions made that may reflect poor training ... and whether there might have been judgments made that were not appropriate. In context, Heartland's reference to the hindsight instruction in closing merely reminded the jury that the jury should not use hindsight to backtrack, but should instead focus on what was reasonably foreseeable on or before February 6, 2006. Cf. Diesel Mach., Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 838-39 (8th Cir.2005) (examining propriety of statement during closing argument in context to evaluate potential prejudice). Heartland's closing argument did not, as Fallon seems to suggest, encourage the jury to disregard Dr. Schumacher's testimony simply because he formed his opinion after the events in question. Indeed, if this were Heartland's closing argument, it would have undercut the testimony of Heartland's own expert witnesses.