Opinion ID: 602804
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ruling on Motion for Additional Damages

Text: 48 The FDCPA provides that any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The statute further provides that upon a finding of liability a court may award an individual plaintiff actual damages in compensation for the harm suffered as a result of the violation, additional damages not to exceed $1,000, and reasonable costs and attorney's fees. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)-(3). In this case, Clomon requested no actual damages and the district court awarded none. The court did, however, grant Clomon's motion for $1,000 in additional damages. The court also awarded Clomon $2,975 for attorney's fees and $120 for costs. On appeal, Jackson objects only to the award of additional damages. 49 The decision on whether to award additional damages and on the size of any such award is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See Pipiles, 886 F.2d at 27 (FDCPA gives district courts ample discretion in assessing damages); see also Emanuel v. American Credit Exchange, 870 F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir.1989) (decision to award additional damages is discretionary). The district court must, however, consider the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional, and other relevant factors in deciding the amount of any additional damages awarded. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b). 50 In arguing that the district court's award of additional damages was an abuse of discretion, Jackson contends that his noncompliance with § 1692e was unintentional and in good faith. Jackson asserts that he approved the collection letters at issue here in reliance upon authoritative interpretations of the law by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and by the district court in Howe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 686 F.Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y.1988). This argument is not persuasive. First, the language of § 1692e is, by itself, sufficient to make it clear that these collection letters violated the FDCPA. Section 1692e establishes a broad ban on all false and misleading means of debt collection, and it is clear that these letters misrepresented the nature of Jackson's involvement in the debt collection process. Second, the fact that the FTC received copies of these letters and expressed no disapproval of them is not evidence that the FTC authoritatively interpreted the letters as lawful or even that the FTC gave the letters its tacit approval. 2 On the contrary, as the defendant himself acknowledged in a deposition in this matter, the FTC routinely receives copies of letters such as these without issuing statements evaluating the letters' lawfulness. As an attorney responsible for ensuring compliance with laws enforced by the FTC, Jackson should have been familiar with this well-established practice and therefore cannot contend that he believed the FTC's silence indicated approval of these letters. Finally, the decision in Howe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., supra, does not state or imply that the practices at issue here would be permitted by the FDCPA. The Howe decision does hold that a debt collector can rely on the records of a creditor in determining whether to send collection letters. See id. at 467. But nothing in that decision releases or purports to release an attorney from the obligation to make some determination about a debtor's account prior to the issuance of a collection letter bearing the attorney's signature. More to the point, nothing in that decision releases or purports to release any debt collector from the obligation under § 1692e not to use false or misleading communications as a debt-collecting device. 51 In sum, we find sufficient grounds for the district court's conclusion that Jackson knew or should have known that these collection letters violated § 1692e. For that reason, the court's decision to award statutory damages of $1,000 was amply justified. 52