Opinion ID: 1698190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sherrill smith

Text: Rita argues that Smith failed to exercise reasonable care to protect children from the dangerous artificial condition he had created in his chicken house. She contends that Smith could have prevented this accident by posting signs warning of the dangers of the chicken house and the feeder, by warning his employees that the chicken house was dangerous and that they should not bring their children into the chicken house, and/or by putting around the holes wire cages similar to those around the pre-drilled holes. Terry Williamson testified that Smith had told him that a person could lose a finger by sticking it into one of the drilled holes when the automatic feeder was running. Terry also testified that he knew the machine was running at the time of the accident and that he was aware that mechanical equipment inside the pipe was turning at the time the auger was on. Based upon this testimony, and assuming that Smith had a duty to warn his employees of the dangers of the automatic feeder, one must conclude that Smith had warned Terry, his employee, of the dangers of sticking a finger into the drilled holes while the feeder was running. The issue then becomes whether Smith is liable to Rita Williamsoneither to her individually or to her as mother and next friend of Nicholasfor the injuries Nicholas suffered, while with his father at work, when Nicholas stuck his finger into one of the drilled holes while the feeder was running. Although this Court has stated that the contributory negligence of a parent will not be imputed to his child so as to bar the child's recovery, a consideration of negligence on the part of Nicholas's father is useful in determining whether the injury to Nicholas was foreseeable to Smith. A case from the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, Laser v. Wilson, 58 Md.App. 434, 473 A.2d 523 (1984), illustrates the difference between analyzing a parent's lack of supervision and/or failure to take steps to protect his child of tender years as a factor in determining the foreseeability of the injury to the child, and analyzing it as the parent's own contributory negligence. In Laser, a 2½-year-old child, Adam Laser, had broken his leg when he fell from an unguarded stairwell and landing. Adam and his family had been invited to the Wilsons' house for a holiday party. Adam's parents sued the Wilsons, alleging a negligent breach of the Wilsons' duty owed to Adam to prevent his injury. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the Wilsons. Adam's parents had been specifically warned about the unguarded landing; however, on appeal, they argued that, assuming they were negligent in their supervision of Adam after being warned of the dangerous condition, their negligence could not be imputed to the child under Maryland law. Id. (citing Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 10910). In affirming the judgment based on the directed verdict, the Maryland court held: [The] appellants transpose the significance of their custodial responsibilities as well as the significance of that section. The statute was not intended to relieve parents from all supervision of a child. By Md.Ann.Code, Art. 72A, § 1, the parents of a minor child are charged with, among other things, the `care and welfare' of that child. The obligation is not a perfunctory one to be performed only at the voluntary pleasure or whimsical desire of the parent. The responsibility for supervision of such child may be relinquished or obtained only upon the mutual consent, expressed or implied, by the one legally charged with the care of the child and by the one assuming the responsibility.... The parental duty of supervision looking to the care and welfare of a child includes protecting it from known or obvious dangers. That duty may not be imposed upon, or assumed by, another without mutual consent. It follows that if a condition is open and obvious rather than latent or obscure, no greater duty is imposed upon a host of a child under parental supervision than would be owed to the parent. If the parent has either been warned, or if the condition is or should be obvious to the parent, the [parent's] failure properly to supervise its child is the proximate cause of a subsequent injury. The host is not negligent because he has performed his duty of having the premises as safe for his guest as for his family and himself. Id. at 528-29 (emphasis added; citations omitted). In O'Clair v. Dumelle, 735 F.Supp. 1344 (N.D.Ill.), affirmed 919 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1990), the federal district court, applying Illinois law, held that a homeowner was not liable for the death of a three-year-old child that had drowned in the owner's swimming pool. In so holding, the district court stated that its decision was not based on the failure or negligence of the child's mother to supervise the child, but the unforeseeability of her failure to do so. Id. at 1351 (emphasis added). The court went on to state: Under the circumstances of this case, the most important of which was that [the child] was in the custody and supervision of her mother, it was not reasonably foreseeable that [the child] would have access to the pool because it was not reasonably foreseeable that [the mother] would fail to take the basic precaution of ensuring that [the child] did not have access to the pool by locking the sliding door or by taking other protective measures.... . . . . ... [T]he other conditions of the pool... merely made [the child's] drowning possible. Illustrative is Dunaway [ v. Ashland Oil Co., 172 Ill.App.3d 712, 122 Ill. Dec. 557, 526 N.E.2d 950 (1988)], which was an action against an owner of an oil well and the owner of the land upon which the well was located to recover for the injuries sustained by [a] child who was injured, while trespassing on the land, when one of his companions dropped a firecracker into an oil storage tank causing it to explode. 122 Ill.Dec. at 559, 526 N.E.2d at 952. Affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, the Dunaway court concluded that the defendant's failure to enclose and lock the storage tanks merely created a condition which made plaintiff's injuries possible. There, the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was the objectively unforeseeable actions of a third-partythe misconduct of his companion. 122 Ill.Dec. at 559-60, 526 N.E.2d at 952-53. Here, [the child's] drowning was not due to the condition of the pool, but the objectively unforeseeable failure of [the mother] to lock the sliding door leading to the pool or to take other protective measures. . . . . Under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, the contributory negligence of a next of kin does not bar recovery. Yet, no recovery can occur until it is found that the defendant owed a duty to the deceased. Nothing in the Illinois Wrongful Death Act prevents the conduct of the next of kin from being considered in the foreseeability analysis and resulting in a finding that no duty was owing from the defendant to the decedent. This is not the functional equivalent of allowing next of kin `negligence' to bar recovery since there will be many times where a parent's failure to supervise the child to such an extent as to eliminate or minimize the risk from which the injury resulted will be foreseeable.... Under the circumstances of this case, where the young child was under the sole custody and supervision of a parent, it was not foreseeable that the parent would fail to undertake basic precautions to safeguard the child from an obvious risk [that] was well known to the parent.  Id. at 1351-53 (emphasis added). In the present case, we hold that Rita failed to produce substantial evidence that Terry's failure to protect Nicholas from a risk that was well known to Terry, after bringing Nicholas to work with him, was foreseeable to Smith. Nicholas was at his father's place of work at his father's invitation, not Smith's. Terry had been warned of the danger associated with the operation of the modified automatic feeder. Also, Smith used the modified feeder only to dispense feed for a one-week period following the arrival of new chicks in the chicken house; at all other times the holes Smith had drilled in the pipe were covered with PVC slides. On the day of the accident, Terry, preparing for the arrival of new chicks, had started the automatic feeder and was alone in the chicken house with Nicholas. Rita presented no evidence that Smith knew that Nicholas would be brought to the chicken house while his father was preparing the automatic feeder for the new chicks and, more importantly, she presented no evidence that Smith had any reason to believe that Terry would not properly protect Nicholas from the known danger presented by the operation of the modified automatic feeder. Therefore, we hold that the injury to Nicholas was unforeseeable to Smith and that Terry's failure to protect Nicholas was the proximate cause of Nicholas's injury. This decision is based on the specific facts in the record on appeal and it does not abrogate any other decision defining the scope of liability of a landowner; specifically, this decision does not affect that line of cases interpreting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 (1977). See Fletcher v. Hale, 548 So.2d 135 (Ala.1989); Motes v. Matthews, 497 So.2d 1121 (Ala.1986); Tolbert v. Gulsby, 333 So.2d 129 (Ala.1976). Based upon the foregoing, the summary judgment in favor of the defendants is affirmed. AFFIRMED. HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.