Opinion ID: 2015832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Involving the Motion for Mistrial.

Text: Jackson asserts that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct in questioning a witness concerning whether defendant had made any statement to law enforcement officers after the court had ruled that any such statements would be inadmissible. Jackson's trial counsel objected immediately upon the propounding of the question, and no answer was given by the witness. The trial court admonished the jury to disregard the question. Jackson's motion for mistrial made at this point was overruled. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. As we observed in State v. Peterson, 189 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 1971), when improper evidence has been promptly stricken and the jury admonished to disregard it, there has been no erroneous ruling by the district court. Consequently, a reversal may only be predicated on the proposition that the matter forbidden by the ruling was so prejudicial that its effect upon the jury could not be erased by the trial court's admonition. As we stated in Peterson: Ordinarily the striking of improper testimony [here only an improper question] cures any error. Only in extreme instances where it is manifest that the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the jury remained, despite its exclusion, and influenced the jury is the defendant denied a fair trial and entitled to a [mistrial]. Peterson, 189 N.W.2d at 896 (citations omitted). This principle has been reaffirmed in State v. McGonigle, 401 N.W.2d 39, 43 (Iowa 1987), and State v. Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa 1986). We find no error in denying defendant's motion for mistrial.