Opinion ID: 2709205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Postconviction proceedings in the trial court

Text: At the initial stage of his state postconviction proceed‐ ings—before the same judge who presided over his trial— Kidd renewed his argument that the court should have or‐ dered a formal competency hearing because Kidd was tak‐ ing psychotropic drugs under medical direction. Kidd also argued that his waiver of counsel was not voluntary. In arguing that he should have received a competency hearing, Kidd produced medical records showing that he was indeed taking Sinequan at the time of his August 1994 waiver and throughout his second trial. In addition, Kidd included a report by Nancy Cowardlin, who concluded that Kidd had severely subaverage intelligence and lagged func‐ tionally. Kidd also submitted the affidavit of Dr. Deborah Mash. After reviewing the trial record, Kidd’s medical rec‐ ords, and his psychiatric and psychological reports, Dr. Mash diagnosed Kidd with Organic Brain Dysfunction and mental retardation. She found that Kidd had been prescribed Sinequan throughout August and September of 1994, and No. 12‐2614 11 that the Sinequan would have significantly slowed Kidd’s cognition and thought processes. Sinequan’s effect on Mr. Kidd “required that a fitness evaluation be conducted before trial to determine Mr. Kidd’s competence to waive counsel, his ability to understand the nature of the charges against him, and his ability to assist in his own defense.” Dr. Mash also found that the medical records showed that Kidd had taken Dilantin throughout his trial, which constituted an ad‐ ditional reason that a competency hearing should have been conducted before Kidd’s waiver and trial. The trial court was not persuaded by this new evidence. It found nothing that called into question its conclusion— and the Illinois Supreme Court’s conclusion—that Kidd was at all times competent to waive counsel and stand trial. Kidd also argued, for the first time, that his waiver of counsel was involuntary. He said that he had no choice but to represent himself because of Strunck’s ineffective assis‐ tance and the trial court’s refusal to appoint other counsel. Kidd claimed that Strunck had abandoned his duty of loyal‐ ty to Kidd and was unwilling to prepare adequately for Kidd’s second trial. Kidd submitted several affidavits in support of his claim. His new public defender, Richard Cunningham, said that in June 1988—before Kidd’s first trial—Cunningham observed a handwritten sign in Strunck’s office that read “Leonard Kidd 14, Society 0.”3 Cunningham added that when he first contacted Strunck to discuss Kidd’s case, Strunck became 3 In the instant case, Kidd was charged with killing ten people in 1980. He was also charged with killing four other people in a later, unrelated incident. 12 No. 12‐2614 angry, used profanity to describe Kidd, and said that Kidd’s going pro se was “his little scam.” Kidd also submitted an affidavit from another detainee at the same jail, Ronald Kliner, who said that he had observed hostile interactions between Strunck and Kidd. After one conversation in which Strunck refused to interview or call at trial certain witnesses whom Kidd suggested, Strunck allegedly told Kidd, “If you don’t like me being your lawyer—do it yourself. I’ll ride with you on the helicopter to your execution!” Kidd also submitted his own affidavit. He said that Strunck tried to convince him to plead guilty; that Strunck became angry when Kidd refused to do so; that Strunck said the jury would find Kidd guilty again; that Strunck rejected Kidd’s trial advice; and that Strunck said he would just “go through the motions” at trial. Under these circumstances, Kidd said, he felt that he had no choice but to represent himself. The trial court rejected Kidd’s claim that his waiver of counsel was involuntary. The court said it had observed no antagonism between Kidd and Strunck at any time after the remand. In fact, the court stated that Strunck had “fought” for Kidd in both trials. The court noted that Kidd had invited Strunck to return as his counsel during the sentencing phase and for post‐trial motions. Even if Strunck did hold personal animosity toward Kidd, the court reasoned, that did not mean he had given such ineffective assistance that Kidd had no choice but to represent himself. E. Postconviction proceedings in the Illinois Appellate Court Kidd appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, raising two arguments. First, he argued that the trial court should have ordered a competency hearing because there was suffi‐ No. 12‐2614 13 cient evidence at the time of his waiver to support a “bona fide doubt” of his competency. See Ill. Code Crim. Pro. § 104‐ 11(a). The Illinois Appellate Court held that Kidd procedur‐ ally defaulted this claim by not raising it on direct appeal. In any event, the court found, the additional proof of Kidd’s use of medication and mental impairment was insufficient to establish a bona fide doubt of his fitness at the time of the waiver. The court noted that there was no evidence that Kidd displayed any erratic behavior. It emphasized that “af‐ ter over two years of observation, the trial court concluded that defendant was competent, totally mentally fit and his efforts as pro se counsel supported that finding.” Second, Kidd renewed his argument that he had no choice but to proceed pro se because Strunck was unpre‐ pared and had “abandoned” him. The Illinois Appellate Court also rejected this theory. It found that the record did not support Kidd’s claims about Strunck’s ineffectiveness. It reasoned that Strunck had already gone through one trial, so he could not be considered unprepared. And it dismissed Kidd’s contentions about Strunck not calling certain wit‐ nesses as mere disagreements over trial strategy. It further found that Kidd’s allegations of Strunck’s hostility toward Kidd were contradicted by the trial court’s observations of Strunck when he acted as counsel and standby counsel. In sum, the Appellate Court found no reason to doubt the trial court’s assessment that Kidd’s waiver was knowing and voluntary: “The record indicates that defendant was properly questioned and admonished by the trial court and simply decided that he would be best suited to represent himself against the witnesses he believed were lying.” The Illinois Supreme Court declined to hear Kidd’s appeal. 14 No. 12‐2614 F. Habeas review Kidd then filed a habeas petition in federal district court. First, he raised his competency claim again. Second, he ar‐ gued that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary. The district court denied the petition. It agreed with the Illinois Appellate Court that Kidd’s competency claim was procedurally defaulted. Nonetheless, it found the claim mer‐ itless: “the record does not reflect a basis for the trial court to have found a bona fide doubt as to Kidd’s fitness to proceed pro se.” The district court agreed with the Illinois Appellate Court’s assessment of Kidd’s lack of erratic behavior, the conflicting expert testimony about his mental capabilities, and the fact that he had changed his story about drug use. In rejecting Kidd’s argument that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary, the district court found that the Illi‐ nois Appellate Court’s conclusion was neither an unreason‐ able application of Supreme Court precedent, nor based up‐ on any unreasonable finding of fact. The district court re‐ viewed the trial court’s discussions with Kidd before his waiver and concluded that the record “clearly indicate[s] that Kidd was cognizant of what he was doing.” We limited Kidd’s current appeal to the issue of whether his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary.