Opinion ID: 1275746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Immunity From Liability

Text: Even had plaintiffs' complaint stated a cause of action against defendant for breach of a mandatory statutory duty to formulate accurate testing and reporting standards for hypothyroidism, plaintiffs could not prevail if defendant was immune from suit. If a specific immunity statute applies, it cannot be abrogated by a statute which simply imposes a general legal duty or liability.... ( Caldwell v. Montoya, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 986, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 897 P.2d 1320.) Defendant contends that Government Code section 855.6 provides specific immunity in this case. We agree. Our analysis makes it unnecessary to consider defendant's alternate theories of immunity under Government Code sections 820.2 (general discretionary act immunity), 818.2 (immunity for adopting or failing to adopt enactment or law), or 818.4 (immunity for issuing or failing to issue permit, license, ... or similar authorization). Government Code section 855.6 provides:  Except for an examination or diagnosis for the purpose of treatment neither a public entity nor a public employee acting within the scope of his employment is liable for injury caused by the failure to make a physical or mental examination, or to make an adequate physical or mental examination, of any person for the purpose of determining whether such person has a disease or physical or mental condition that would constitute a hazard to the health or safety of himself or others. (Italics added.) Defendant contends the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the development of testing or reporting standards for mass neonatal screening is an examination or diagnosis for the purpose of treatment within the meaning of Government Code section 855.6, and therefore constitutes an exception to the general rule of immunity for making an inadequate physical or mental examination. In plaintiffs' view, developing standards for testing and reporting possible hypothyroidism indeed involved an examination or diagnosis for the purpose of treatment because the state's testing and reporting standards were developed for ultimate use in examining and diagnosing children for the purpose of treating them for hereditary disorders. Defendant, on the other hand, points to language in the California Law Revision Commission Comment to Government Code section 855.6 indicating that the purpose of treatment exception was intended to be narrowly applied to cases involving negligent treatment of particular individuals in doctors' offices or hospitals, rather than to the initial development of testing and reporting standards governing laboratory tests given to help detect congenital diseases. According to this comment, Government Code section 855.6 grants an immunity for failure to perform adequately public health examinations, such as public tuberculosis examinations, physical examinations to determine the qualifications of boxers and other athletes, and eye examinations for vehicle operator applicants. It does not apply to examinations for the purpose of treatment such as are made in doctors' offices and public hospitals. In those situations, the ordinary rules of liability would apply. [¶] The immunity provided by this section relates only to failure to make any examination or, if an examination is made, to the `adequacy of the examination; the section does not provide immunity, for example, where a public employee negligently injures a person while making an examination. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32 West's Annot. Gov. Code (1995 ed.) foil. § 855.6, p. 487, italics added; see also Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice 3d, supra, Liabilities and Immunities, § 4.83, at pp. 547, 548 [§ 855.6 is not a blanket immunity from medical malpractice liability]; Colome v. State Athletic Com. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1458-1459, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 300 [upholding immunity claim because purpose of physical examination of professiona boxer was to determine fitness for license, not treatment]; Smith v. County of Kern (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1833-1835, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 716 ( Smith ) [denying immunity claim because purpose of blood test of third person was to diagnose and treat plaintiffs' exposure to acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)].) The preceding explanatory comment was itself based on a 1963 Law Revision Commission report that further explained the policy reasons underlying the immunity in favor of public entities charged with giving physical or mental examinations: To provide the utmost public protection, public entities should not be dissuaded from engaging in such activities by the fear that liability may be imposed if an employee performs his duties inadequately. Far more persons would suffer if government did not perform these functions at all than would be benefited by permitting recovery in those cases where the government is shown to have performed inadequately. (Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, No. 1, Tort Liability of Public Entities and Public Employees (Jan. 1963) 4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1963) p. 831.) Plaintiffs rely heavily on Smith, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 1826, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, but that case is readily distinguishable. In Smith, plaintiff, a police officer, had come into contact with blood from a third person possibly suffering from AIDS, and plaintiff feared exposure to the disease. County employees then negligently tested the person for hepatitis rather than AIDS, resulting in six months' delay, and plaintiffs consequent mental anguish, before another test could be made. Unlike the present case, the negligent test occurred in a public medical facility, and was conducted for the purpose of treating the plaintiff for infection with the AIDS virus. The test therefore clearly fell within the purpose of treatment exception to immunity under Government Code section 855.6. As previously stated ( ante, at p. 492 of 76 Cal.Rptr.2d, at p. 1326 of 957 P.2d), in the present case, any negligence on defendant's part occurred not while testing Sierra but earlier, during the formulation of the standards designed for interpreting and reporting the results of the tests ultimately given. The formulation of test standards could not reasonably be deemed an examination or diagnosis within the meaning of Government Code section 855.6. Based on the available legislative history and case law, defendant argues that Government Code section 855.6 was intended to immunize public entities from liability in connection with development of testing and reporting standards for mass public screening efforts such as the public tuberculosis examinations referred to in the noted Law Revision Commission Comment or the neonatal screening program involved here, programs that do not focus on the in hospital diagnosis and treatment of a specific patient. Although the Hereditary Disorders Act expressly requires that testing and counseling services be made available, the act does not include provisions calling for treatment of any genetic diseases detected by newborn screening. (See Health & Saf.Code, former § 151, subds. (g), (h) [now § 124980, subds. (g), (h)]; former § 309, subds. (e), (f) [now § 125000, subds. (e)(1), (g)].) The Court of Appeal's contrary holding could deprive all medical screening programs from testing immunity, as all these programs are ultimately aimed at treating persons diagnosed as suffering from various ailments or conditions. As the 1963 Law Revision Commission Report suggests, such a broad holding could discourage further testing, to the ultimate detriment of all these salutary programs.