Opinion ID: 64501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Because Ollison moved for a judgment of acquittal prior to the submission of the case to the jury, her sufficiency claim is reviewed de novo. United States v. Alarcon, 261 F.3d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 2001). In assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found that the evidence established the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Villarreal, 324 F.3d 319, 322 (5th Cir.2003). All reasonable inferences must be drawn, and all credibility determinations made, in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. If, however, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, the conviction should be reversed. United States v. Mackay, 33 F.3d 489, 493 (5th Cir.1994) (citation omitted).
Section 666 prohibits theft or bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds. [1] United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572, 574 (5th Cir.1988). The Supreme Court has described the coverage of § 666 as `expansive, both as to the [conduct] forbidden and the entities covered.' United States v. Hildenbrand, 527 F.3d 466, 477-78 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 678, 120 S.Ct. 1780, 146 L.Ed.2d 707 (2000)). The legislative history indicates that § 666 was designed to protect the integrity of federal funds by punishing theft and bribery involving Federal programs for which there is a specific statutory scheme authorizing the Federal assistance in order to promote or achieve certain policy objectives. [2] United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). Although the district court found that Ollison made $64,633 in personal purchases on her P-Card for sentencing and restitution purposes, the jury instructions made clear that the jury could convict if the value of the property stolen, embezzled, knowingly converted, or intentionally misapplied was at least $5,000 in any one-year period as set forth in the Indictment. Because Ollison admitted to using the P-Card for routine grocery shopping, clothing, and home accessory purchases, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that all purchases falling within those general categories were personal because that inference was bolstered by the other factors identified by Sepeda and was not rebutted by evidence to the contrary. During the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2004, Ollison made grocery purchases and clothing purchases that exceeded the $5,000 threshold. [3] The same is true for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2005, [4] and for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2006. [5] Given Ollison's admissions, Sepeda's testimony, and the documentary evidence introduced at trial, the evidence certainly does not lend equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence. See Mackay, 33 F.3d at 493. Albeit de novo, sufficiency-of-the-evidence review is highly deferential to the verdict, United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 869 (5th Cir.2002), and does not depend on whether the evidence presented at trial is direct or circumstantial. United States v. Bryant, 770 F.2d 1283, 1288 (5th Cir.1985). Furthermore, our inquiry is limited to whether the jury's verdict was reasonable, not whether we believe it to be correct. United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 576 (5th Cir.2001). Although Ollison's witness, Sullivan, testified that various purchases could have been official, the jury was entitled to discount or ignore that testimony. See United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 904 (5th Cir.2006). We find that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to conclude that Ollison made personal purchases on her P-Card exceeding $5,000 in each fiscal year alleged in the indictment. See Villarreal, 324 F.3d at 322.