Opinion ID: 1728361
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Majority Opinion Paragraph 32 and the Traditional Approach

Text: ¶ 105 Until it was altered today by the holding in the instant case (although retained in paragraph 32), the traditional pre-1978 rule was that a circuit court must comply with the appellate court's decision but has the authority to take further action in a case as long as the action is not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate court. [13] The permissible further actions included reopening a case and amending the pleadings, so long as the amendments did not conflict with the decision of the appellate court. Recognizing that this court is fallible and that not all circumstances are foreseen or foreseeable, this court adopted a rule that gave some flexibility to the circuit court after an appeal was decided. ¶ 106 Citing Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 274 Wis. 478, 80 N.W.2d 461 (1957), this court has endorsed the pre-1978 view of a circuit court's powers in post-1978 cases, stating, Where a mandate directs the entry of a particular judgment, it is the duty of the trial court to proceed as directed. The trial court may, however, determine any matters left open, and in the absence of specific directions, is generally vested with a legal discretion to take such action, not inconsistent with the order of the upper court, as seems wise and proper under the circumstances. State ex rel. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 2000 WI 30, ¶ 25, 233 Wis.2d 428, 608 N.W.2d 679. [14] The court of appeals has similarly followed Fullerton, declaring that a circuit court is bound to follow the mandate of the court of appeals (which covered only some issues in that case) but also has the authority to address any remaining unresolved issues, so long as it acts in a manner consistent with [the appellate court's] mandate. Harvest Sav. Bank v. ROI Invs., 228 Wis.2d 733, 738, 598 N.W.2d 571 (Ct.App.1999). ¶ 107 The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Findorff and Fullerton from Tietsworth II, stating that in the prior cases, in contrast with Tietsworth II, the mandate line remanded the cause to the circuit court. See majority op., ¶ 55. The Findorff court did not give weight to any difference in the Findorff and Fullerton mandates in vesting discretion with the circuit court. See Findorff, 233 Wis.2d at 428, ¶ 25 n. 16, 608 N.W.2d 679. ¶ 108 In Sutter v. State, 69 Wis.2d 709, 717, 233 N.W.2d 391 (1975), a pre-1978 case, the mandate line stated, Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions to enter judgment not inconsistent with this opinion. On remand the plaintiffs in that case sought relief from the judgment and leave to amend their complaint. The Sutter court held against the plaintiffs, declaring, The trial court has no authority to amend the pleadings after remittitur with the mandate of this court providing specific directions for the entry of a particular judgment. [15] Nevertheless Sutter recognized this rule was not ironclad, stating: Generally, amendments are not permissible on remand where the case was determined on the merits. After final judgment has been rendered or directed on appeal, ordinarily the trial court has no power to allow the amendment of the pleadings. . . . [16] ¶ 109 The key words in Sutter for purposes of the present case are generally and ordinarily. The Sutter court deliberately used these appellate-court-wiggleroom-words twice to signal the reader that exceptions exist to the rule that amendments are not permissible when the appeal was determined on the merits. [17] ¶ 110 Tietsworth II falls within the traditional rule and paragraph 32 of the majority opinion. The decision left open the opportunity for the plaintiffs to pursue contract and warranty remedies. The plaintiffs' pursuit of these contract claims is consistent with our reversal of the decision of the court of appeals and the circuit court's dismissal of the tort claims in the complaint. ¶ 111 Furthermore, although I conclude that Tietsworth II specifically left open the plaintiffs' contract and warranty claims, other members of the court disagree with me and with each other about what Tietsworth II means. If we who write the opinions and the mandates cannot agree about the meaning of Tietsworth II, it is perfectly understandable that the parties disagree and that the three members of the court of appeals disagree with the circuit court judge about the import of our decision. ¶ 112 Inasmuch as this substantial difference of opinion exists about Tietsworth II, should not this court err on the side of giving the plaintiffs their day in court? ¶ 113 I turn now to Wis. Stat. § 808.08(3).