Opinion ID: 197805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Gender-Discrimination and Mental-Anguish Claims

Text: 12 Plaintiffs challenge the summary judgment ruling which dismissed their gender-discrimination and mental-anguish claims as merely incidental to their Dealer Act claim. Plaintiffs insist that they consistently maintained throughout the proceedings below that all of Canon's adverse actions--not merely its Systronics designation--evidenced gender discrimination and contributed to their mental anguish. See supra note 1. As plaintiffs view it, even though Canon retained the contractual right to designate Systronics as a second distributor, it could not exercise that or any other right purely for gender-based reasons without violating P.R. Constitution art. II, § 1, and tortiously inflicting mental anguish upon plaintiffs. 13 The magistrate judge and the district judge converted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment without objection by plaintiffs. See Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1473 (4th Cir.1991) (conversion challenges waivable); Jones v. Automobile Ins. Co. Of Hartford, 917 F.2d 1528, 1533 n. 4 (11th Cir.1990) (same); Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 764 F.2d 381, 390 n. 9 (5th Cir.1985) (same). 5 Nor do plaintiffs challenge the conversion on appeal, see Brief for Appellants at 25, 30 (referring to summary judgment); Nieves v. University of P.R., 7 F.3d 270, 279 (1st Cir.1993) (conversion waivable on appeal); Wright v. Holbrook, 794 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir.1986) (same). 14 The summary judgment rulings on the gender-discrimination and mental-anguish claims are therefore reviewed de novo, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn favorably to plaintiffs, the nonmoving parties. EEOC v. Green, 76 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir.1996). Summary judgment was in order unless plaintiffs adduced evidence sufficient to establish each element essential to their claim as to which they would have borne the burden at trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Nieves, 7 F.3d at 279. 15 Although Canon acknowledges that the district court relied in error upon an inadequate ground in dismissing the constitutional claim, see supra Section I, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Levy v. FDIC, 7 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1st Cir.1993). Even assuming their constitutional claim for gender discrimination were cognizable under Puerto Rico law, 6 plaintiffs' Rule 56 proffer generated no trialworthy issue as to whether a gender-based animus motivated Canon's so-called pattern of conduct. 16 Summary judgment may be warranted even as to such elusive elements as a defendant's motive or intent where  'the non-moving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.'  DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997) (citations omitted); see Pilgrim v. Trustees of Tufts College, 118 F.3d 864, 870-71 (1st Cir.1997); Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir.1994); Velazquez v. Chardon, 736 F.2d 831, 833-34 (1st Cir.1984). A plaintiff [claiming discrimination] 'may not prevail simply by asserting an inequity and tacking on the self-serving conclusion that the defendant was motivated by a discriminatory animus.'  Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 444 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 53 (1st Cir.1990)). 17 The only smoking gun allegation in the complaint is that unidentified Canon representatives uttered unspecified derogatory epithets denigrating [Santiago's] dignity as a woman and as a human being. That bare allegation, parroted without elaboration in a Rule 56 proffer, see supra note 5, disclosed neither the substance and context of the epithets, 7 nor the identity and capacity of the person(s) employing them. 8 See Jones v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Indianapolis, 42 F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir.1994) ( 'The object of [Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) ] is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.' ) (citation omitted). 18 At summary judgment, the district court cannot accept on faith conclusory assessments by claimants that unspecified and unattributed epithets were derogatory and denigrating, let alone demonstrated discriminatory intent. See Pilgrim, 118 F.3d at 871 (noting that plaintiff's [subjective] perception is not evidence of discriminatory intent, hence not enough to withstand summary judgment); Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 53 (noting that, even at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, plaintiff may not rest on 'subjective characterizations' ) (citation omitted); see also Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc) (It is ... well settled that an employee's subjective belief that he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination, without more, is not enough to survive a summary judgment motion, in the face of proof showing an adequate nondiscriminatory reason.). 9 19 The counterproffer from Canon makes the uncontroverted representation that Professional remains its sole authorized micrographic products distributor in Puerto Rico. Thus, before the alleged pattern of conduct by Canon could be attributed to gender discrimination, one rationally would need to question not only why Canon retained Professional as its sole Puerto Rico dealer in micrographic products, and one of two Puerto Rico dealers in Canon optical disk filing products, but also why it entered into the October 1990 Canofile 250 dealership agreement with Santiago in the first place. In our judgment, based on these conflicting proffers the trier of fact could not find that the facially nondiscriminatory conduct engaged in by Canon actually was motivated by gender discrimination except by resorting to rank speculation. 10 20 Finally, the Rule 56 proffer on the mental-anguish tort claim under P.R. Civil Code Article 1802 fares no better. Plaintiffs were required to establish that in  'some appreciable measure the[ir] health, welfare and happiness ... were really affected,'  Ruiz-Rodriguez v. Colberg-Comas, 882 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1989) (quoting Moa v. Commonwealth, 100 P.R.R. 572, 585-86 (1972)), and they experienced  'deep moral suffering and anguish, and [not merely] a passing affliction,'  de Jesus v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 470, 472 (D.P.R.1989) (citing Hernandez v. Fournier, 80 D.P.R. 94, 104 (1957)). These showings turn upon an evaluation of: (1) the severity of the pain suffered; (2) its duration; and (3) its mental consequences. Lopez Nieves v. Marrero Vergel, 939 F.Supp. 124, 126 (D.P.R.1996). 11 21 Plaintiffs offered only their conclusory assertion that Santiago and her husband have been exposed to mental suffering, anxiety, anguish and humiliation, with no independent corroboration, cf. Cruz v. Molina, 788 F.Supp. 122, 129 (D.P.R.1992) (court sitting as trier of fact rejected plaintiff's uncorroborated testimony of mental anguish, where he was not a physician, nor had he consulted a physician); supra note 11. Moreover, since any emotional injury to plaintiffs presumably resulted primarily from the alleged use of sex-based epithets by Canon representatives, and plaintiffs offered no competent evidence as to the substance of the epithets, a rational factfinder would have no evidentiary basis for determining whether the alleged remarks were likely to have caused Santiago or her husband the type of deep moral suffering and anguish required under Article 1802. See DeNovellis, 124 F.3d at 306 (nonmovant cannot  'rest[ ] merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.' ) (citation omitted). 22 Affirmed.