Opinion ID: 1486394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Principle of Fairness

Text: To state the principle that one is not liable for the damage which he did not wrongfully cause is merely to begin the analysis. Whitehead and Kales applied this principle to discard a number of doctrines that were long a part of Missouri law. Among the doctrines discussed in Whitehead and Kales are the following: (1) Prior to Whitehead and Kales , one joint or concurrent tortfeasor was not entitled to indemnity from other joint or concurrent tortfeasors unless the negligence of the party seeking indemnity was passive and that of the party from whom he sought indemnity was active. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Payway Feed Mills, Inc., 338 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo.1960). Whitehead and Kales thoroughly discusses the active-passive distinction, 566 S.W.2d at 469-72, and concludes that its use had led to illogical results and that its use was not a sensible way to fix responsibility. Id. at 471. The active-passive distinction makes the outcome depend on ingenuity of phrasing, or characterization. Id. The use of the active-passive distinction has been criticized in cases from other jurisdictions. Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23, 28 (1956); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn.1977); Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1972); Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291-93 (1972); Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 56 Wis.2d 383, 202 N.W.2d 268, 271-72 (1972). (2) Prior to Whitehead and Kales , Missouri's contribution statute, § 537.060, RSMo 1978 (§ 3658, RSMo 1939), was interpreted to allow [] contribution between joint tortfeasors only after a joint judgment [was rendered] against them, and even if the plaintiff amended his petition to name an impleaded third-party defendant, the plaintiff could still by release . . . prevent a third-party defendant from becoming subject to contribution. State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 22, 213 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Mo. banc 1948). See also May v. Bradford, 369 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Mo. 1963); Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Mo. banc 1961); State ex rel. Merino v. Rose, 362 Mo. 181, 240 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Mo. banc 1951); Layman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 220, 225 (Mo.App.1977). This construction of § 537.060, RSMo 1978, was forcefully rejected in Whitehead and Kales in the following terms: To limit any apportionment of damages between tortfeasors to those whom the plaintiff has chosen to sue and against whom judgment is rendered is an inartful and capricious policy, relying in excess upon the whim and wrath of a plaintiff before concurrent wrongdoers can share liability. 566 S.W.2d at 473. And again: there is no sound reason why this issue should not be decided by the jury prior to judgment on the basis of relative fault. Id. at 474. Instead, the distribution of joint tort liability on the basis of relative fault would apply whether the tortfeasors were joined as defendants by the plaintiff or a third party defendant was added to a cause under our rule 52.11. Id. (3) Whitehead and Kales did not, however, extend the principle that one should pay only for the damages which he wrongfully caused to abolish the rule of joint and several liability among joint and concurrent tortfeasors. [3] The Court stated that, whether tortfeasors were joined as defendants by the plaintiff or joined as third-party defendants under rule 52.11, the ability of a plaintiff to sue and ultimately collect judgment against his or her choice of tortfeasor need not be impaired. Plaintiff continues free to sue one or more concurrent tortfeasors as he sees fit and nothing that transpires between them as to their relative responsibility can reduce or take away from plaintiff any part of his judgment. 566 S.W.2d at 474. Or again: The interests of plaintiffs are secure . . .. Id. The Court held that while it is inartful and capricious and gives unnecessary effect to the whim and wrath of the plaintiff to bar contribution among joint tortfeasors unless a joint judgment has been entered against them, the plaintiff may ultimately collect judgment against his or her choice of tortfeasor regardless of the proportion of damages caused by each tortfeasor. While it may appear difficult to reconcile a rule that permits a plaintiff to collect his or her entire judgment from one who is only partly at fault with the principle that one is not liable for damages one did not wrongfully cause, closer examination of the rule of joint and several liability discloses the extent to which it is supported by the principle of fairness. [4]