Opinion ID: 425171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ciuzio's Motion

Text: 97 Ciuzio contends that he presented the district court with an unequivocal demand to represent himself at his second trial, relying solely on the following request contained in his motion filed pro se with the district court: 98 The defendant, CIUZIO, respectively requests that this Court enter its Order allowing the defendant, CIUZIO, to represent himself with assigned counsel, or in the alternative, Stand-by Counsel other than KARL PILGER. 73 99 The district court treated Ciuzio's motion as one requesting it to replace Karl Pilger with an alternative assigned counsel of Ciuzio's choosing, and denied the motion. 74 We believe the district court correctly interpreted Ciuzio's motion as one for substitution of counsel. 100 The clear thrust of Ciuzio's motion was to substitute an attorney of his own choice, Orlando attorney Dennis Salvagio, for the attorney appointed by the district court, Karl Pilger. The motion averred that Ciuzio lacked confidence in Pilger and recited in considerable detail the reasons for his lack of confidence. 75 The motion recommended appointment of Salvagio, indicating that he was qualified and willing to serve as Ciuzio's counsel, provided that the district court authorized payment of attorneys' fees in excess of the maximum allowed by statute. 76 Asserting that the Constitution mandates that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to counsel of his own choosing, Ciuzio, in his prayer for relief, requested only 101 that this Court enter its Order Allowing the defendant Assigned Counsel of his own Choice .... 77 102 Considering the motion as a whole, it was reasonable for the district court to interpret the language relied on by Ciuzio as indicating that Ciuzio wished to avail himself of the services of appointed counsel, but wished to substitute Salvagio for Pilger. Certainly Ciuzio's request to represent himself with assigned counsel ... other than KARL PILGER, 78 when made in the context of the described motion, fell far short of an unmistakable assertion that he wished to dispense with the services of counsel and proceed pro se. 103 We find additional support for the district court's view of Ciuzio's motion in the record of Ciuzio's exercise of his right of self-representation at his first trial. Prior to that trial, Ciuzio requested that the district court allow him to represent himself and submitted, pro se, a memorandum in support of his request. 79 In that memorandum, Ciuzio cited Faretta and stated correctly that 104 [t]he right to represent oneself in conducting his own defense in a criminal case is established ... by both the Sixth Amendment ... as well as statute. 80 105 Noting that he ha[d] made an unequivocal request to represent himself and was aware of the disadvantages of proceeding to trial without counsel, Ciuzio asserted that the district court must grant [his] motion to proceed pro se. 81 Concluding that, under the circumstances, it had no alternative, the district court granted Ciuzio's request to represent himself. 82 106 Without question, Ciuzio's memorandum in support of his request to proceed pro se at his first trial articulately and unmistakably asserted his right of self-representation. Thus, when considering the motion filed by Ciuzio prior to his second trial, the district court was necessarily aware that Ciuzio was capable of clearly asserting his right of self-representation if he wished to do so. That Ciuzio's motion made no reference to the constitutional right of self-representation, or to Faretta, was a telling indication that Ciuzio was not asserting his right to proceed pro se. 83 107 There are other compelling indications that Ciuzio's motion was not intended to assert his right of self-representation. For example, although the district court granted Ciuzio's request to represent himself at his first trial, Ciuzio permitted Pilger, who had been appointed standby counsel, to conduct his entire defense. 84 This fact suggests that at some point Ciuzio reconsidered his decision to proceed pro se and decided to avail himself of the assistance of counsel, perhaps when confronted with the realities of a complex conspiracy trial. 85 Whatever the reasons for Ciuzio's reliance on Pilger, the district court could properly consider his apparent abandonment of the right of self-representation at his first trial as an indication that Ciuzio's motion only requested to substitute appointed counsel. Likewise, the district court could look to the motion for substitution of counsel filed by Pilger on behalf of Ciuzio a mere three days prior to Ciuzio's motion 86 as a reliable statement of Ciuzio's wishes at the time. Brown v. Wainwright, supra, 665 F.2d at 611-12. Pilger's motion sought only to substitute Salvagio as Ciuzio's appointed counsel, and gave absolutely no indication that Ciuzio had any interest in representing himself. 87 108 We therefore conclude that the record in this case overwhelmingly supports the district court's reading of Ciuzio's motion as a request for substitution of counsel. That interpretation results from a natural and reasonable construction of Ciuzio's motion, and is consistent with the clear import of the motion for substitution of counsel filed by Pilger, as well as the record of Ciuzio's exercise of his right of self-representation at his first trial. The language relied on by Ciuzio, when viewed in the context of this record, cannot reasonably be characterized as an unequivocal assertion of the right of self-representation. 88 Since Ciuzio failed to articulately and unmistakably assert his right to represent himself at his second trial, thereby waiving that right, we reject his contention that he was denied the right of self-representation.