Opinion ID: 774294
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII Race and Retaliation Claims

Text: 33 To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, plaintiff must show that he (1) was a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the position, (3) was discharged, and (4) was replaced by a person outside the protected group. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision. The ultimate burden of persuasion rests with plaintiff to prove that the proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994). 34 The district court found that plaintiff had not made a prima facie showing of race discrimination because he was not qualified to return to work as a meter tester apprentice. When plaintiff asked to return to work in December 1996, he had been on disability leave for about 20 months. Accepting the genuineness of plaintiff's request, KUB required that certain conditions be met before he could return to work. The first and foremost of these conditions was that plaintiff be evaluated by Dr. Carpenter, who concluded that plaintiff should not be returned to the ongoing stress of a work environment. Plaintiff makes much of the fact that a jury found against Dr. Carpenter in an unrelated malpractice action arising out of an evaluation performed on behalf of an employer. As the district court correctly observed, that fact has no bearing in this case. This is particularly true since Dr. Greenwood did not disagree with Dr. Carpenter's conclusions, and no contrary opinions were offered concerning plaintiff's ability to return to work. 35 Plaintiff argues that he was qualified to work in the meter tester program because KUB had placed him there in July 1994, and he had performed satisfactorily until going on leave in March 1995. The district court addressed this argument and distinguished between plaintiff's skill and his ability to function on the job. 36 Wade argues that KUB transferred Wade to the meter testing program so it cannot argue he is not qualified. Wade also points to the testimony of Don Blevins (Blevins) who was his supervisor in the meter testing apprentice program as support for his contention that he was qualified for the job. Blevins testified that he never had a problem with Wade and that Wade was able to perform the work testing the meters and was making good progress. However, Blevins' experience working with Wade was prior to Wade's involuntar[y] commitment to a psychiatric hospital and almost two years of disability leave for paranoid schizophrenia. It was also prior to the fitness for work examination by Dr. Carpenter. Blevins' experience with Wade and his evaluation of Wade's performance prior to these significant events has no bearing on the issue of Wade's status and ability to perform in December 1996. Under these circumstances, whether Wade is qualified for the meter testing apprentice position is not a question of skill but the ability to function on the job by performing the work and dealing with the stress, coworker interaction, and supervision attendant to the job. 37 It is clear that Dr. Greenwood's letter in December 1996 stating that plaintiff could return to work at some capacity represents a somewhat inconsistent position from the opinions he expressed while Wade was on disability leave. KUB was justified based on all the circumstances and its own policy to require Wade to undergo a fitness for work examination. 38 Plaintiff offered no evidence to contradict the opinion of Dr. Carpenter, nor did plaintiff offer other evidence to show that he would be able to handle the stress of returning to work, dealing with coworkers, and accepting supervision and constructive criticism. The district court concluded that, [c]onsidering all of the facts and circumstances, this evidence demonstrates that Wade could not perform the essential functions of the meter testing apprentice position and could not meet the reasonable expectations KUB would have for a person in that position. See Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 929 (6th Cir. 1999). Reviewing the question de novo, we agree that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that he was discharged or not returned to work because of race discrimination. 6 39 Next, to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must show that (1) he was engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) the activity was known to the defendant, (3) he was subjected to tangible employment action, and (4) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Johnson v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 30 F.3d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1994). The evidence must be sufficient to raise an inference that the protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action. See Walborn v. Erie County Care Facility, 150 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 1998). 40 With respect to the decision to terminate plaintiff's employment, the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff had not shown a causal connection between the termination and the prior EEOC charges. The district court explained: 41 There is no direct evidence in the record or evidence to raise an inference that Wade's termination in February 1997 was connected with the EEOC charges he filed in 1993 and 1995. Subsequent to filing the first charge, Wade was advanced to the third year lineman apprentice position and later was given an accommodation by being transferred to the meter testing program. The number of years between the first two EEOC charges and the discharge in February 1997 militate against a finding that the discharge was retaliatory in nature. See, e.g., Jackson v. Pepsi-Cola, Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., a Div. of RKO Bottlers of Toledo, Inc., 783 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1986) (a time span of more than one year from the filing suit to the firing militated against finding that discharge was retaliatory). Much of Wade's response to the motion is comprised of conclusory allegations and his perceptions which are not sufficient to stave off summary judgment. Pilgrim v. Trustees of Tufts College, 118 F.3d 864, 871 (1st Cir. 1997). Wade's subjective assessment is not evidence. Id. 42 The district court's decision is also supported by evidence that plaintiff was approved for long-term disability benefits shortly after he filed the second EEOC charge in June 1995. In addition, those benefits were not terminated after the second right-to-sue letter was issued in April 1997. 43 Plaintiff emphasizes that the letter accompanying KUB's formal notice of termination was written on the same date that the EEOC issued the second right-to-sue letter. It is undisputed, however, that KUB made the decision to terminate plaintiff's employment before the right-to-sue letter was issued. The other evidence of retaliatory intent that plaintiff points to is the statement from Upton on March 27, 1995, to the effect that plaintiff's refusal to apologize for the Uncle Tom comment would have consequences. Since Upton viewed the comment as insubordination, it is not surprising that he might threaten disciplinary action. Nonetheless, consequences were threatened in March 1995, before plaintiff filed the second EEOC charge in June 1995. While the question of possible disciplinary action for that statement was included as the last of the conditions required before plaintiff could return to work, that does not suggest a connection between the filing of EEOC charges and the decision not to permit plaintiff to return to work. 44 Finally, plaintiff alleges that his conditional offer of employment from Boeing was sabotaged by defendant in retaliation for having engaged in protected activity. We agree with the district court that there was no causal connection shown between the prior EEOC charges and Noe's response to the inquiry from Boeing. 7