Opinion ID: 1451220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the standard for reversal

Text: The majority misrepresents the standard for determining when a judge's improper remarks require reversal. Citing Levy, the majority implies that reversal is not required because the judge's remarks were not `reasonably calculated to influence the judgment of the jury'. Majority, at 522. Whether the judge intended prejudice is not the standard articulated by this court in Levy. Rather, the court held that [t]o warrant reversal, it must ... appear that prejudice resulted, or could reasonably be presumed to have resulted, from such error. Levy, at 644. The court's decision in Levy is instructional. In that case the trial judge warned counsel regarding certain lines of inquiry. After counsel disregarded the court's admonitions the judge fined counsel $25 in the presence of the jury. When counsel offered to write a check the judge refused to accept it. The following day the judge admonished the jury, emphatically and at length, to draw no inference from the previous day's occurrence. Trial counsel did not request a mistrial. The court recognized that where the contempt of counsel provokes the court's rebuke, as occurred in that case, a judge may properly take action in front of the jury. Levy, at 642. Nevertheless, the court reversed, finding that the judge's refusal to accept counsel's check required a new trial: The most obvious, if not the only, inference to be drawn from the trial court's refusal to take counsel's check being that the court distrusted counsel, the incident in question clearly belongs within the class of incidents the natural tendency of which would be to result in prejudice. In such a situation, this court should not speculate as to the actual effect of the trial court's actions and remarks, and we are therefore constrained to hold that the matter constituted reversible error. Levy, at 648. Application of Levy in the instant case demands reversal. As in Levy, the conduct of counsel provoked the remarks made by the judge in front of the jury. Even though the judge's improper remarks were provoked by counsel, Levy requires that we consider whether the judge's remarks actually prejudiced the Defendant. If the remarks are in the class of incidents the natural tendency of which would be to result in prejudice then reversal is required. Levy, at 648. As in Levy, the incidents which occurred before the jury in this case are susceptible of only one inference  that the judge is hostile to the Defendant's cause. The Levy court recognized the tremendous influence of the judge over the jury's attitude toward the parties. The court's cite to language explaining the significant role of the judge in forming juror attitudes bears the attention of this court in the instant case. Persons accused of crime have the right to be represented by counsel whose usefulness shall not be impaired by any unfavorable remark or critical attitude on the part of the trial judge in the presence of the jurors, who are quick to observe, and apt to receive, hostile impressions which deprive them of that fair and unbiased mental attitude which every juror should at all times possess in order to do justice between the state and the defendant at the bar.... As was said in State v. Phillips, 59 Wash. 252, 109 Pac. 1047 [(1910)]: `The aid of counsel is guaranteed by the constitution to every person accused of crime, and this is universally recognized as one of the surest safeguards against injustice and oppression. Any conduct or statement on the part of the court that tends to impair the influence or destroy the usefulness of counsel is palpable and manifest error.' Levy, at 643. Instead, the majority erroneously denies the Defendant here these protections by twisting United States v. Altamirano.