Opinion ID: 2000103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plea Arrangement

Text: Ferebee contends that the plea bargain arrived at between the government and Briscoe was so favorable to the latter that it was unfair to Ferebee. The argument goes as follows: The government's agreement to dismiss the charges of first degree murder (premeditated) while armed, first degree felony murder while armed, attempted robbery while armed and carrying a pistol without a license merely in exchange for Briscoe's truthful testimony at trial and a plea of guilty to attempted robbery created a plea bargain so overwhelmingly in Briscoe's advantage as to unfairly induce him to give incriminating testimony against appellant. Ferebee asserts that the unfairness was exacerbated by the fact that Briscoe was aware that if he failed to testify the government could revoke the plea agreement and proceed to prosecute him on the original charges. Ferebee characterizes the government's plea bargain with Briscoe as being coercive because it resulted in Briscoe being unconstitutionally coerced into delivering testimony which incriminated Ferebee. Moreover, appellant contends, not only was the plea bargain an unfair inducement in and of itself, but the nature of the inducement serves to make the elicited testimony inherently unreliable. Ferebee asks us to rule as a matter of law that the terms of a plea agreement may be so favorable to a criminal offender that the use of his testimony, under the agreement, to incriminate a co-defendant violates the co-defendant's due process rights. We think appellant has misconstrued the nature of the plea bargain and the leverage exerted by the government. [3] No doubt that Briscoe had much to gain by accepting the government's offer. The prison sentences which could have been imposed for conviction of the various charges that were dismissed far exceeded the sentence which Briscoe faced for the one crime to which he pleaded guilty. Given the terms of the plea arrangement in the instant case, scrutiny of the agreement should take place while keeping in mind that the government has wide discretion in the plea bargain process. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has said, Where vigorous prosecution of one case threatens to undermine successful prosecution of another, it has traditionally been the prosecutor who determines which case will be pressed to conclusion, and his decision has been given great deference by the courts. United States v. Ammidown, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 34, 497 F.2d 615, 621 (1973). The circuit court noted that there is a presumption that the United States Attorney's determination will be followed because [h]e alone is in a position to evaluate the government's prosecution resources and the number of cases it is able to prosecute. Id. Along with the government having broad discretion in striking the plea bargain, the trial court retains the discretion whether to accept or reject a guilty plea. Hockaday v. United States, 359 A.2d 146, 148 (D.C.1976) (citations omitted). We have defined the trial court's role in the plea bargaining process as not one of primary responsibility, but rather [one] of guarding against abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Hockaday, supra, 359 A.2d at 148 (citing United States v. Ammidown, supra, 162 U.S.App.D.C. at 33, 497 F.2d at 621). As indicated, appellant Ferebee's contention goes, in part, toward asserting that there has been an abuse of discretion by either the government in reaching the plea agreement or the trial court in accepting the plea. Our review of the record on appeal leads us to conclude that there has been no action by the government or the trial court about which Ferebee may complain. Ferebee's attack on the plea agreement has another side which is that the agreement was so beneficial to Briscoe that it unfairly induced him to give testimony incriminating Ferebee. It would be impossible for this court to determine whether one plea agreement was more susceptible than another in fostering untruthful incriminating testimony. [4] Instead, we charge the factfinder with the task of assessing credibility. Clearly within the province of the jury lay its assessment of the credibility of each of the witnesses as well as of the weight, if any, to be accorded to the testimony of [the accomplice]. Turner v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 60, 416 F.2d 815, 816 (1969). During trial in the present case, not only was there testimony by Briscoe about the nature of his plea bargain with the government, he was also cross-examined concerning the contradictions between his initial statements to police and his testimony during the government's case-in-chief. We remain convinced that the factfinder must determine the credibility of witnesses and, in the process, be allowed information as to any plea agreements between those witnesses and the government. [5] The jury, not a reviewing court, is the one to decide whether a particular plea arrangement has caused a witness to give falsely incriminating testimony. Another point made by Ferebee is that the terms of the plea agreement were so attractive to Briscoe that the agreement was overwhelming and thus an unfair (as against Ferebee) inducement for Briscoe to testify. Anytime the opportunity is presented to a defendant to plead guilty to a lesser charge in return for a promise to testify against his co-defendants, there is put forth an inducement for the testimony of that witness. We cannot distinguish the inducement in this case and say it is unfair simply because it differs or has terms perceived as being more beneficial to the defendant. As a matter of law, we conclude that the plea agreement in the instant case, as provided for by Super.Ct. Crim.R. 11, was not violative of Ferebee's due process rights. Ferebee's final challenge to the plea agreement is that it exerted a coercive influence on Briscoe and forced him to give testimony which incriminated appellant. Having reviewed the transcript of the plea proceeding, we do not perceive the agreement to have been coercive. At the proceeding the information provided to Briscoe fully apprised him of the nature of his agreement with the government. The judge's colloquy with Briscoe included: The Court: Now Mr. Briscoe, in this matter, I understand you have entered into agreement with the government whereby the government has promised you not to prosecute this matter against you if the court accepts your plea of guilty in this matter to attempted robbery and if you waive all other rights that you might have under the Constitution of the United States and voluntarily appear as a witness in this matter and testify as to the truth if you are called as a witness in this matter by the government. As can be seen, Briscoe agreed voluntarily to appear as a witness and provide truthful testimony. Once the court accepted the plea, both the judge and the prosecutor were bound by its terms [6] assuming that Briscoe did not breach the agreement by failing to make himself available as a prosecution witness. It was then a failure to appear which caused the government, a week after the original plea proceeding, to move to have the plea agreement vacated. The agreement remained in force, however, when Briscoe eventually agreed to testify. We do not see merit in Ferebee's contention that the plea agreement worked an unfair testimonial advantage in favor of the government and against him. The terms of the agreement did not extract incriminating testimony from Briscoe in any way that violated the due process rights of Ferebee nor was the agreement revocable by the government contingent upon the nature of Briscoe's testimony. The plea agreement did not make his testimony inherently unreliable so that the court was required to exclude it from trial.