Opinion ID: 460976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Onset of the Disability

Text: 10 In applying the RRA disability standard to the facts of this case, we note that its interpretation is before us for the first time. Language identical to the RRA standard, however, appears in the disability provisions of the Social Security Act (SSA). 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(d)(1)(B) (applicant must be under a disability ... which began before he attained the age of 22). Similarly, the SSA standard for disability is whether the applicant can engage in any substantial gainful activity.... 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d). Accordingly, the RRB itself uses the Social Security Administration's regulations in determining disability under the RRA, and SSA cases are persuasive precedent in RRA disability cases. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Railroad Retirement Board, 546 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.1977); Parker v. Railroad Retirement Board, 441 F.2d 460, 463 n. 6 (7th Cir.1971); Duncan v. Railroad Retirement Board, 375 F.2d 915, 917-18 (4th Cir.1967). In particular, we find the Sixth Circuit's well-reasoned application of the SSA standard to a multiple sclerosis victim in Parish v. Califano, 642 F.2d 188 (6th Cir.1981), directly applicable to the facts in this case. 11 There is no dispute that Estes is now disabled by multiple sclerosis and that the condition existed before she was twenty-two. The RRB contends, however, that the condition did not become disabling until after Estes reached twenty-two; that is, she was able to engage in substantial gainful employment up to March 22, 1977. 12 The record indicates that before Estes was twenty-two she had experienced foot-drop, sensory problems in both lower extremities, visual problems in her left eye, and abnormal fatigue. While she worked at a car dealership for several months prior to her twenty-second birthday, her illness rendered her job performance inadequate. The appeals referee, while noting that healthy activity occurred [i]n the periods of remission of her disease, nevertheless found that the condition had not become disabling until 1980. 13 This conclusion is untenable in light of Parish, which is the only case under the RRA or SSA applying an age requirement to a progressively disabling disease like multiple sclerosis. The question before the Parish court was whether normal activity in a period of remission established substantial gainful activity under the SSA disability standard. Like Estes, the petitioner in Parish suffered from multiple sclerosis before reaching twenty-two but was able to work and attend school in periods of remission. Parish, 642 F.2d at 190-92. The Social Security Administration argued that such activity after reaching the age of twenty-two indicated that the petitioner in Parish was not disabled until after she reached her twenty-second birthday. The administrative judge in Parish, like the referee in this case, relied on the petitioner's employment in finding that the disease had not prevented substantial gainful activity by the petitioner. Id. at 192-93. 14 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that [t]he fact that plaintiff worked ... is not necessarily substantial evidence of substantial gainful activity. Id. at 192. The Sixth Circuit properly observed that multiple sclerosis can be disabling notwithstanding normal activity in periods of remission. The court said: 15 Multiple sclerosis is an incurable progressive disease subject to such periods of remission and exacerbation.... Because [the period when petitioner worked and attended school] was unquestionably a period of remission, we believe the ALJ erred in placing undue reliance on this brief and temporary interruption of plaintiff's progressively disabling condition. Rather, he should have considered that time-span as merely a period of remission in a continuing disability.... 16 Parish, at 193 (emphasis added). 17 We find the instant case essentially indistinguishable from Parish. Estes' employment during 1976 and early 1977 most likely occurred in a remission period. She had previously suffered severe symptoms, and in July of 1977 was again hospitalized as a result of even more serious disabilities. Under the logic of Parish, it appears that Estes was suffering from a progressive disability by 1976, her twenty-first year. That the next year was a period of remission, rather than exacerbation, does not alter the fact that she was indeed suffering from a disability. The fact that a disabled multiple sclerosis victim was employed during a remission period, especially where the victim's performance was inadequate, does not establish substantial gainful employment. Parish, at 191-92; see also Goodwin v. Railroad Retirement Board, 546 F.2d 1169, 1171 (5th Cir.1977) (applicant disabled despite employment where job performance was inadequate and environment was sheltered and sympathetic).