Opinion ID: 788575
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reference To Threatening Of Witnesses

Text: 47 Burton asserts that the following exchange between the prosecutor and Markita Robinson on redirect examination was in error because the prosecutor elicited testimony suggesting that Robinson had been threatened: 48 Q. What was the reason that you didn't contact the police before October 27th? 49 A. `Cause I was scared. 50 Q. Scared of what. 51 A. Something happening to me. 52 Q. For what reason. 53 A. Threats. Through threats. I was just scared that something might happen to me and fear of my life. 54 J.A. at 31 (Br. in Support of Pet. for Habeas Corpus at 8) (quoting Trial Tr. Vol. III at 509-10). However, the prosecutor's line of questioning was in response to cross-examination by defense counsel suggesting that the witness had not contacted the police at the time of the events in question: 55 Q. Now, prior to October 27th, you did not contact the police, is that correct? 56 A. No. 57 Q. And neither you nor your sister, as far as you know, contacted the police. 58 A. No. 59 Trial Tr. Vol. III at 509. It does not appear that the prosecutor violated Michigan Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), much less constitutional due process, because the prosecutor elicited the challenged testimony, not to prove Burton's character in order to show action in conformity therewith, but rather to explore more fully the issue, first raised by defense counsel, as to why the witness did not report Burton's conduct to the police. Mich. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); see Pennington v. Lazaroff, No. 98-4373, 2001 WL 406420,  (6th Cir. Apr.3, 2001) (stating that if properly before the court, we could only conclude that the introduction of the prior misconduct did not violate `fundamental fairness.' ... The prior misconduct..., coupled with the evidence of [the defendant's] threats and the victims' fear and guilt, helped explain the victims' reasons for not exposing [the defendant's] transgressions. Hence, the evidence of other misconduct was more probative than prejudicial, and its admission did not violate the due process clause.). 60 Given the difficulties in establishing that the admission of evidence regarding possible threats against witnesses was fundamentally unfair in this case, an objectively reasonable lawyer could have chosen not to raise this issue on appeal. Because the substance of Burton's other-acts-evidence claim lacks merit, Burton has failed to show a reasonable probability that his conviction would have been reversed on direct appeal even if appellate counsel had raised the issue. Thus, Burton has not demonstrated that his counsel on direct appeal was constitutionally ineffective, and in turn has failed to establish the requisite cause for excusing his procedural default of this claim. 61