Opinion ID: 1388611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 27

Heading: Substitution of penalty counsel.

Text: (33) Defendant maintains he was entitled to a mistrial, or to a new penalty jury, when illness forced Attorney O'Brien to withdraw as his appointed counsel at the conclusion of the guilt phase. Defendant asserts that because substitute penalty counsel, William Owen, was not present at the guilt trial, Owen could not effectively reargue the credibility of guilt phase witnesses in order to establish lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation. The only solution, defendant suggests, was to empanel a new penalty jury which would rehear the guilt phase evidence in Owen's presence. In defendant's view, the court had a sua sponte duty to order such remedies here. Alternatively, he suggests, counsel was ineffective for failing to request them. Courts of Appeal have held that a fundamental deprivation of the right to effective representation may occur when circumstances force replacement of defense counsel for closing arguments only. The cases reason that substitute counsel has no means of raising credibility issues in counsel's summation, because counsel was not present to observe the witnesses' demeanor. A retrial may therefore be necessary, in which the evidence is presented to a new jury with substitute counsel present. ( People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal. App.3d 102, 197-203 [132 Cal. Rptr. 265]; see also People v. Gibbs (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 763, 766 [223 Cal. Rptr. 194].) A different situation arises, however, when substitution becomes necessary between the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial. The jury has already heard the credibility arguments of guilt phase counsel who was present for testimony, and has nonetheless convicted the defendant of capital murder. The separate penalty phase assumes the validity of the capital conviction, then addresses a different issue  which available punishment is appropriate under all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Lingering doubt arguments are often unwise, for they risk antagonizing a jury that has already found the defendant guilty. [25] The theoretical possibility of a lingering-doubt argument does not automatically require the heroic and cumbersome procedure defendant suggests. The trial court in this case had no sua sponte duty to empanel a new penalty jury simply because guilt counsel was forced to withdraw before the penalty phase commenced. Nor does counsel's failure to press the issue warrant reversal on a theory of ineffective assistance. Though Attorney O'Brien and his guilt phase colleagues argued credibility issues with vigor, the jury had clearly rejected them and had accepted every prosecution theory of defendant's role and guilt. [26] The eyewitness and circumstantial evidence supporting their verdicts was very strong indeed. Moreover, a contemporaneous example of defendant's violent criminal leadership was presented at the penalty phase. Under these circumstances, the penalty jury was unlikely to give lingering doubt substantial weight on the issue of penalty. Any hindrance of penalty counsel's ability to present a lingering-doubt argument does not undermine confidence in the outcome.