Opinion ID: 2639411
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: harrison's remaining claims

Text: ¶ 38 Because we remand this case for the trial court to complete its findings on the essential elements of fraud and to determine whether those findings support a conclusion that Harrison is liable for fraud, we need not reach the other issues Harrison raises on appeal. However, in the interest of judicial economy, a brief discussion of these issues is appropriate as guidance for the trial court on remand. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, ¶ 55, 37 P.3d 1130 (citing Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 949 (Utah 1996)). ¶ 39 First, Harrison claims that the trial court erred in its measure of fraud-based damages and in assessing against her the same amount of damages as was awarded against RSI. We note that AFIE waives recovery from Harrison for all but $57,607.85 of the trial court's award. See Appellee's Brief at 61 n. 15. Whether Harrison is liable for any of this amount can only be determined after the trial court completes its findings of fact on remand. Accordingly, we decline to address the issue. However, there was some dispute regarding the method used by the trial court to determine fraud-based damages. Therefore, if the trial court still concludes that Harrison is liable for fraud, we direct the trial court to explicitly state the method used to determine fraud-based damages when it revisits this issue. ¶ 40 Second, Harrison also claims that the trial court erred in awarding AFIE attorney fees and in failing to apportion attorney fees between causes of action. These two points of error are moot, however, because AFIE has waived its claim to recovery of its attorney fees in this case and is no longer seeking those amounts. See id. at 65. ¶ 41 Finally, Harrison argues that the trial court improperly assessed against her $35,959.00 for costs incurred by AFIE for accounting and construction experts and that even if it was appropriate to award these costs, the trial court failed to comply with the procedural requirements of rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure before assessing these costs. AFIE argues that the trial court properly awarded the expert fees as an element of fraud damages since Harrison, by committing fraud, made it necessary for AFIE to go to the extra expense of hiring the experts. [A] trial court's decision to award the prevailing party its costs will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, ¶ 4, 16 P.3d 549 (footnote and citations omitted). If the trial court completes its findings and concludes Harrison is liable for fraud, the trial court will also need to decide whether to award expert witness fees as an element of fraud-based damages. [T]o provide guidance to the trial court on remand[,] ... we simply set forth the applicable law. See Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 949. ¶ 42 A prevailing party's costs may be recovered under rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [6] The Utah Code also expressly provides for witness fees to be taxed as costs against the losing party in civil cases. Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-30 (2002). We have held, however, that only the statutory witness fee may be taxed as costs against the losing party. Young, 2000 UT 91 at ¶ 15, 16 P.3d 549 (citing Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980)). The statutory witness fee is limited to a stated daily rate plus reimbursement for mileage traveled in going only. Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-28 (2002). We have also held that [t]here is a distinction to be understood between the legitimate and taxable `costs' and other `expenses,' of litigation which may be ever so necessary, but are not properly taxable as costs. Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. In Young, we held that [a]ny amount paid [for a witness] over the statutory allowance is an expense of litigation, rather than a taxable cost, and not recoverable. 2000 UT 91 at ¶ 18, 16 P.3d 549. ¶ 43 Nevertheless, AFIE argues that the award of expert witness fees should stand because the trial court awarded them as an element of fraud-based damages. It relies on Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), in which we held that `the defrauded party may recover any additional damages which are a natural and proximate consequence of the defendant's misrepresentations.'  Id. at 1250 (citations omitted). AFIE argues that it would not have had to consult the forensic accountant and the construction expert but for Harrison's destruction of evidence. While the trial court may exercise reasonable discretion regarding the allowance of certain costs, see Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) (citation omitted), expert witnesses cannot be awarded extra compensation unless the statute expressly so provides, Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. No Utah statute provides for extra compensation to expert witnesses in fraud cases. In Young, we made it clear that even if necessary, fees paid over the amount allowed by statute are not properly taxable as costs, and are therefore not recoverable. 2000 UT 91 at ¶ 16, 16 P.3d 549 (emphasis added). If, on remand, the trial court needs to decide the appropriate amount to award for expert witness fees, the amount awarded should be limited to that allowed by statute.