Opinion ID: 2453310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Physical Liberty

Text: ¶ 36 The majority is correct that in criminal cases, there is generally a presumption that indigent defendants have a right to appointed counsel only when, if they lose, they may be deprived of physical liberty. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (holding that due process does not require appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding). However, this presumption may be overcome where other fundamental liberty interests are at stake. In re Dependency of Grove, 127 Wash.2d 221, 237, 897 P.2d 1252 (1995); accord In re Marriage of King, 162 Wash.2d 378, 394, 174 P.3d 659 (2007). ¶ 37 The majority points out that E.S. was not at risk of immediate incarceration at the initial hearing. Majority at 575-76. Had she complied with the court order and returned to school, contempt charges would never have been filed. Id. at 575-76. When contempt charges were eventually brought, E.S. was appointed counsel. Id. A party who disregards any court order stemming from any proceeding may later face contempt sanctions. RCW 2.28.020. The majority cites Tetro for the proposition that the mere possibility that an order in a hearing may later serve as the predicate for a contempt adjudication is not enough to entitle an indigent party therein to free legal assistance. Tetro v. Tetro, 86 Wash.2d 252, 255 n. 1, 544 P.2d 17 (1975). The majority is correct that the possibility of future contempt sanctions alone does not necessarily create a right to appointed counsel. See id. But the inquiry should not end there. ¶ 38 We have previously held that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 3 of our state constitution, parents have a right to counsel in permanent child deprivation hearings. In re Welfare of Luscier, 84 Wash.2d 135, 138, 524 P.2d 906 (1974). In Luscier, we discussed the importance of the familial relationship and the rights of parents to raise their children. Id. at 137, 524 P.2d 906. We noted that the right to counsel in the civil context does not turn on whether the proceeding may result in imprisonment but whether the individual may be deprived of liberty. Id. A year later we extended Luscier and held parents have a right to counsel at dependency and child neglect proceedings even where the parent is not at risk for permanent deprivation of his child. In re Welfare of Myricks, 85 Wash.2d 252, 253, 533 P.2d 841 (1975). We concluded that the right to one's child is too basic to expose to the State's forces without the benefit of an advocate. Id. at 254, 533 P.2d 841. As our decisions in Luscier and Myricks indicate, other significant interests coupled with the other Mathews factors may still tip the scales in favor of litigants seeking appointed counsel.