Opinion ID: 676492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: District Court's Allen Charge and Partial-Verdict Instruction

Text: 26 Throughout the course of deliberations in the initial trial, the jury struggled to reach a complete verdict, and it expressed its difficulty through a series of notes to the District Court. Freddy contends that the District Court's responses to the jury's notes were improper and had a coercive effect upon deliberations. His claim is without merit. 27 On the second day of deliberations, the jury sent out two notes: the first came from the foreperson and asked the Court to tell one juror that he just can't walk out of deliberations; the second came from a juror who stated his belief that his decision will become a deadlock issue. In response, the District Court decided to re-read to the jury that part of its main charge explaining each juror's obligation to listen to the opposing views of others without surrendering conscientiously held opinions. 28 During the morning of the fourth day of deliberations, the jury sent a note stating that it was deadlocked on one of the counts of the indictment. As the District Court contemplated an appropriate response, the jury sent out other notes that suggested it was still deliberating. The District Court refrained from giving an Allen charge, see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02, 17 S.Ct. 154, 157, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896) (approving instruction to encourage a verdict from a deadlocked jury), and simply informed the jury to continue to deliberate in accordance with prior instructions. 29 During the morning of the fifth day of deliberations, the jury sent out a note stating: 30 [T]he jury is deadlocked in two places. We have gone around this for the last two days. We don't see the situation changing. What should we do? 31 After discussion with counsel, the District Court decided to give a modified Allen charge and also decided to advise the jury that it was permitted to return a partial verdict. Freddy's counsel explicitly objected to the partial verdict reference. 32 Three and one-half hours after receiving the Allen charge and partial-verdict instruction, the jury reported that it was deadlocked ten-to-one on two matters but had reached agreement on the other counts (one juror had been excused after deliberations had begun). Over the defendants' objections, the District Court decided to receive the jury's partial-verdict. The jury returned to report guilty verdicts on most counts, though one defendant was acquitted. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to two other defendants. 33 The District Court's responses to the jury and the procedure concerning the Allen charge and partial-verdict instruction were in full accord with this Circuit's precedents. We have consistently approved the use of an Allen charge in the face of an apparent deadlock as long as such a charge is carefully crafted to avoid coercing jurors. See United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 372, 116 L.Ed.2d 324 (1991). We have also approved the receipt of a partial verdict in multi-defendant criminal trials and have suggested that a jury should understand that it has the option to return such a verdict. See United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 146-47 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct. 1427, 71 L.Ed.2d 648 (1982). 34 The District Court did not give the Allen charge or the partial-verdict instruction hastily. Only after the jury had indicated repeatedly that it was deadlocked and had explicitly sought the Court's guidance did the Court proceed with these instructions. Furthermore, the Court's language was not improperly coercive and specifically stressed that the jurors should not surrender any conscientiously held views. See United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 76-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109, 109 S.Ct. 3164, 104 L.Ed.2d 1026 (1989); United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 517-19 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905, 98 S.Ct. 1451, 55 L.Ed.2d 496 (1978). As for the partial-verdict instruction, it is clear that the District Court conformed to our admonition that juries should be neither encouraged nor discouraged to return a partial verdict, but should understand their options, especially when they have reached a stage in their deliberations at which they may well wish to report a partial verdict as to some counts or some defendants. DiLapi, 651 F.2d at 147. 2 35 Significantly, the jury returned different verdicts as to different defendants, was unable to reach a verdict on certain counts, and reached a result consistent with its reports prior to the additional instructions. The verdict itself thus strongly indicates that individual attention was given to each defendant as to each count and that the Allen charge and partial-verdict instruction did not cause jurors to surrender their opinions merely to reach a result. See United States v. Black, 843 F.2d 1456, 1463 (D.C.Cir.1988) (noting that mixed verdicts demonstrate lack of coercion); DiLapi, 651 F.2d at 147 (noting that mixed verdict indicated each defendant received individual consideration).V. Sentencing Issues 36 A. Juan's drug-quantity calculation. Among other narcotics-related evidence, a set of drug records apparently reflecting drug transactions from 1983 to 1985 were discovered in a search of Juan's residences. 3 After calculating that the aggregate dollar amount in these records reflected cocaine sales of 58 kilograms, the District Court concluded that the similarity, regularity and temporalness of the activity reflected in the 1983 and 1985 records is relevant conduct ... to the conduct charged against [Juan] in this case. The District Court thus added this 58 kilogram quantity to the 33.2 kilograms that the District Court determined as the amount related to the charged conspiracy to arrive at a base offense level of 36 (for 50-150 kilograms of cocaine, see U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(c)). Juan claims that the Court erred by including the quantity of drugs reflected in the 1983-85 records as relevant conduct to his 1990-91 drug conspiracy offense. Specifically, Juan notes the lack of temporal proximity between the transactions at issue, as well as the limited evidence to indicate that the drug records reflected similar narcotics activity. 37 There is no question that relevant conduct--which encompasses acts that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction, U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2)--can include drug amounts not charged in the indictment, see, e.g., United States v. Cousineau, 929 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.1991). Moreover, this Circuit does not rely on temporal proximity alone when deciding whether certain transactions are part of the same course of conduct, see United States v. Santiago, 906 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir.1990). Yet, the Government cannot cite a single case in which transactions that occurred five or more years apart were considered part of the same course of conduct. In Cousineau, we approved the determination that drug quantities from uncharged conduct two years prior to the dates of the charged conspiracy were part of the same course of conduct. See 929 F.2d at 68. We stressed, however, the continuous nature of the conduct as well as the high degree of similarity between the uncharged conduct and the conduct of conviction. Id. 38 In Juan's case, there is no clear evidence that the type of conduct reflected in the drug records for the 1983-85 period is even related to the conduct for which he has been convicted, let alone part of a pattern of continuous or similar behavior. Though the records memorialize what appear to be narcotics transactions, they do not include details to suggest that the conduct they reflect was similar to the illegal activity of the brothers' narcotics conspiracy. Even the Government's own expert could not conclusively state what type of drugs were involved in the records. Moreover, the drug records do not clearly indicate the nature of the transactions involved, the participants, or any discernible connection to the conduct constituting Juan's offense. 39 It is possible that the drug records concern conduct comparable to that for which Juan was convicted. However, the records, which relate to conduct more than five years prior to the conduct of the offense of conviction, do not demonstrate conduct with a high degree of similarity sufficiently to consider the drug amounts reflected in the records as relevant conduct. See United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903, 910 (9th Cir.1992) (noting where the conduct alleged to be relevant is relatively remote to the offense of conviction, a stronger showing of similarity or regularity is necessary); see also United States v. Darmand, 3 F.3d 1578, 1582 (2d Cir.1993) (discussing in dicta that drug sales three years apart might not be part of same course of conduct); United States v. Barton, 949 F.2d 968, 969-70 (8th Cir.1991) (suggesting that 1983 drug conduct was too distant and dissimilar to comparable 1989 conduct of conviction to be used in calculating sentence). We therefore remand Juan's case for the recalculation of his sentence. 40 B. Freddy's three-level increase as manager or supervisor. Freddy contends that the District Court's conclusory statements at sentencing concerning his role in the offense do not support the three-level increase he received under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(b). Stressing our holding in United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1184-85 (2d Cir.1993), that a sentencing court must make specific factual findings to support an upward adjustment based on the defendant's role in the offense, Freddy claims his sentence must at least be remanded for specific findings to support his manager or supervisor enhancement. 41 The Government responds that the District Court mentioned certain conversations between Freddy and Juan in support of its finding that Freddy acted in a supervisory role. Yet Freddy correctly notes that the statements cited by the Government involve merely conclusory references to various transcripts and establish only that Freddy was an active member in the brothers' drug conspiracy, not that Freddy was a manager or supervisor as required for a section 3B1.1(b) enhancement. Because the required specific factual findings, see Stevens, 985 F.2d at 1184; United States v. Lanese, 890 F.2d 1284, 1294 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2207, 109 L.Ed.2d 533 (1990), are lacking, we also remand this part of Freddy's sentence for reconsideration. 4