Opinion ID: 895412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellate Jurisdiction of this Court

Text: Defendants argue that this appeal falls outside the constitutional and statutory scope of our appellate jurisdiction. Because these issues may be dispositive, we consider them first.
Ordinarily, this Court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal from an interlocutory order.8 Here, however, we have jurisdiction over this case because the court of appeals’ decision conflicts with 6 __ S.W .3d __, __. 7 54 T EX . S U P . C T . J. 1012 (May 27, 2011). 8 See T EX . G O V ’T C O D E § 22.225(b). 4 prior decisions of this Court.9 The court of appeals held that, because no named plaintiff had standing on all of the class’s claims, no named plaintiff had standing at all.10 Previously, we have held that a plaintiff’s lack of standing to bring some, but not all, of his claims just deprives the court of jurisdiction over those discrete claims.11 Given this conflict, we conclude that this case does not fall outside the statutory scope of our appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals.
We next consider whether this case falls outside the scope of our appellate jurisdiction as delineated by the Texas Constitution. Defendants assert that it does, arguing that Heckman’s case amounts to a “criminal law matter.” We disagree.
The jurisdiction of this Court—like that of all Texas courts—derives from Texas’s Constitution and statutes.12 Under our Constitution, this Court’s appellate jurisdiction “extend[s] 9 See id. § 22.225(c). 10 __ S.W .3d at __. 11 E.g., Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W .3d 171, 184–85 (Tex. 2001); see Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W .3d 334, 338 (Tex. 2006). 12 In re Allcat Claims Serv., L.P., 356 S.W .3d 455, 459–60 (Tex. 2011). 5 to all cases except in criminal law matters.”13 Thus, if defendants are correct and this appeal constitutes a criminal law matter, then we lack the authority to decide it.14 No one rule clearly defines the content or contours of “criminal law matters.” We do not write on an entirely blank slate, however. To determine whether a case is a criminal law matter, we look to the essence of the case to determine whether the issues it entails are more substantively criminal or civil.15 Criminal law matters include disputes where “criminal law is the subject of the litigation;” such cases include those “which arise over the enforcement of statutes governed by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.”16 Criminal law matters also include disputes “which arise as a result of or incident to a criminal prosecution.”17 In addition to the principles announced in our own caselaw, we find guidance in the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals.18 The Texas Constitution gives that court the authority to issue a variety of writs, including the writ of mandamus, “in criminal law matters.”19 Thus, the Constitution uses the same term to demarcate the end of our appellate jurisdiction and the beginning 13 T EX . C O N ST . art. V, § 3(a) (“[The Court’s] jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with the limits of the State and its determinations shall be final except in criminal law matters. Its appellate jurisdiction shall be final and shall extend to all cases except in criminal law matters.” (emphasis added)). 14 Harrell v. State, 286 S.W .3d 315, 317 (Tex. 2009). However, we necessarily have jurisdiction to decide whether this appeal falls within the category of “criminal law matters,” because “[c]ourts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.” Id.; see Campbell v. State, 85 S.W .3d 176, 180 (Tex. 2002). 15 See Harrell, 286 S.W .3d at 318–19. 16 Id. at 318. 17 Id. 18 See, e.g., id. (citing opinions from the Court of Criminal Appeals for the definition of “criminal law matters”). 19 T EX . C ON ST . art. V, § 5(c). 6 of our sister court’s mandamus jurisdiction. When interpreting “criminal law matters” for purposes of our own jurisdiction, “we should be mindful of the potential effect of our construction” upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals.20 By declaring that our appellate jurisdiction reaches a certain matter, we thereby define, and potentially limit, the jurisdiction of our constitutional sibling.21
In this case, we are asked to consider the issues first raised by defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction: C Did the named plaintiffs lack standing to sue? C Were their claims not yet ripe? C Did the mooting of their individual claims render this suit moot? These are questions of justiciability—a doctrine rooted in the Separation of Powers provision22 and the Open Courts provision23 of the Texas Constitution.24 These constitutional provisions—or, more specifically, the justiciability doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness that derive from 20 See In re Johnson, 280 S.W .3d 866, 872–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 21 See id.; State ex rel. Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals, 885 S.W .2d 386, 410–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (Clinton, J., dissenting) (arguing that “criminal law matters,” as that term is used in Article V, Section 3(a), and Article V, Section 5(c), should be interpreted in the same way to avoid jurisdictional conflicts); see also Dearing v. Wright, 653 S.W .2d 288, 289–90 (Tex. 1983) (noting that “[u]nder our dual appellate system, we must concede to those courts the exclusive jurisdictional prerogative in criminal law matters our constitution requires that they exercise”). 22 See T EX . C O N ST . art. II, § 1. 23 See id. art. I, § 13. 24 Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W .2d 440, 443–45 (Tex. 1993) (explaining basis for standing under Texas Constitution); see Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W .2d 439, 442–43 (Tex. 1998) (same). 7 them—are the subject of this appeal, “not any provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure nor any other criminal statute.”25 Nor must we provide any “construction of a criminal statute” to answer the justiciability questions here.26 In other words, no “criminal law is the subject of the litigation.”27 Arguably for this reason alone, this case does not present a “criminal law matter.” But beyond this technical analysis, a more fundamental reason supports our conclusion. The Texas Constitution—the source of the requirements of justiciability in Texas—bars our courts from rendering advisory opinions and limits access to the courts to those individuals who have suffered an actual, concrete injury.28 By raising the issue of justiciability, defendants ask for a determination of whether the named plaintiffs have suffered an actual injury, and whether there exists a live, nonabstract question of law that, if decided, would have a binding effect on the parties. In short, they ask this Court to determine whether this suit is appropriate for judicial review, or whether the courts should refrain from deciding it.29 Thus, the question raised by defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction—and the constitutional and pragmatic concerns it engenders—goes to the heart of civil practice. Justiciability is a matter of 25 See Harrell, 286 S.W .3d at 318 (holding that a case involving the interpretation of section 501.014 of the Texas Government Code was not a “criminal law matter” because it presented the issue of how to interpret and enforce a civil statute); In re Johnson, 280 S.W .3d at 869–74 (same); see also Smith v. Flack, 728 S.W .2d 784, 788–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (holding a case, involving interpretation of article 26.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was a “criminal law matter”); Curry v. Wilson, 853 S.W .2d 40, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (same). 26 See Harrell, 286 S.W .3d at 319. 27 See id. at 318. 28 Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 825 S.W .2d at 444. 29 See Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W .3d 297, 305 (Tex. 2001). 8 concern in every civil case,30 and remains a live concern from the first filing through the final judgment.31 Accordingly, the body of Texas jurisprudence on justiciability has developed primarily in this and other courts exercising civil jurisdiction.32 This is not to say that justiciability concerns never arise in “criminal law matters” or in cases decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals.33 However, such concerns would seem to arise rarely, if ever, in classic “criminal proceedings” where a defendant’s guilt, innocence, or punishment are at issue,34 and the relationship between the State and the defendant is “solidly adversarial.”35 The question here is not simply the justiciability of an individual plaintiff’s claim, but whether multiple individual named plaintiffs have a justiciable interest in obtaining the use of a procedural device unique to civil law: the class action.36 Questions about the justiciability of a party’s motion for class certification do not fit neatly into any of the categories of “criminal law 30 See, e.g., Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W .3d 171, 178 (Tex. 2001) (noting that the justiciability doctrine of standing “is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining suit”). 31 See, e.g., Bd. of Adjustment v. Wende, 92 S.W .3d 424, 427 (Tex. 2002) (“It is well settled that a controversy must exist between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal.”). 32 The Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized as much: “In Texas, the law of standing has been developed mainly in the courts of civil jurisdiction.” Fuller v. State, 829 S.W .2d 191, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Riley v. State, 889 S.W .2d 290, 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 33 See, e.g., State ex rel. Watkins v. Creuzot, 352 S.W .3d 493, 504–06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (considering ripeness of criminal defendant’s pretrial declaratory judgment claim that the State could not execute him); Ex parte Bohannan, 350 S.W .3d 116, 119–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (analyzing justiciability of parolee’s habeas claims); Gallo v. State, 239 S.W .3d 757, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (assessing justiciability of habeas challenge to the manner of an