Opinion ID: 51149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: trina) as Yount’s lawsuit, so removal was ap-

Text: We review the denial of a request for attor- propriate. In her request for attorney’s fees ney’s fees for abuse of discretion. Avitts v. Yount pointed to the time limit provision of Amoco Prod. Co., 111 F.3d 30, 32 (5th Cir. § 1441(e)(1), which states that 1997). “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under [28 U.S.C.] a notice of removal may also be filed before § 1447(c) only where the removing party trial of the action in State court within 30 lacked an objectivelyreasonable basis for seek- days after the date on which the defendant ing removal. Conversely, when an objectively first becomes a party to an action under reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” section 1369 in a United States district Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. court that arises from the same accident as 132, 141 (2005) (citing Hornbuckle v. State the action in State court, or at a later time Farm Lloyds, 385 F.3d 538, 541 (5th Cir. with leave of the district court. 2004); Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2000)). We do not It is not disputed that Lafayette’s removal consider Lafayette’s motive in removing; we claim was within this time frame in reference look only to whether it had an objectively to Abadie. Yount alleges, however, that apreasonable basis for the removal. Valdes, 199 proximately three months earlier Lafayette had F.3d at 292. been named as a defendant in another suit arising out of Hurricane Katrina that could have Yount claims there is no objectively rea- been brought under § 1369, Berthelot v. Boh sonable basis on which Lafayette’s motion to Bros. Constr. Co., L.L.C. Yount’s suit was remove could be considered timely. Lafayette pending at the time that Lafayette was a defenalleged in its notice of removal that it was also dant in Berthelot, and thus she claims that the a defendant in another case pending in the thirty-day time period during which Lafayette Eastern District of Louisiana, Abadie v. Aegis could remove her suit pursuant to § 1441Sec. Ins. Co., that arose out of Hurricane Ka- (e)(1) had expired at the time that Lafayette trina and that could have been brought pursu- removed and that there was no objectively ant to § 1369. Lafayette based its motion to reasonable basis for asserting that the removal remove on 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B), which was timely. 2 Our review turns entirely on an objective consideration of the merits of Lafayette’s case at the time of removal. Valdes, 199 F.3d at 292. The question is the interpretation of the limitations period of § 1441(e)(1) if the defen- dant has been named in multiple § 1369 suits. Both parties concede that no court has ad- dressed this issue. Lafayette correctly points out that under the language of the statute, viewed in isolation, its removal was timelySSit removed within thirty days of first becoming a defendant in Abadie, which could have been brought under § 1369. Yount points to the word “first,” arguing that the thirty-day limitation period was tied to Berthelot, the first of the two § 1369 cases at issue, and that it would make no sense to permit the limitations period to start anew if a second § 1369 suit is brought against a defendant after the initial limitations period has expired. We need not, and do not, express an opinion about which of these inter- pretations is correct except to say that Lafay- ette could conclude from the language of the statute that its position was reasonable, espe- cially in light of the lack of any judicial prece- dent. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion. AFFIRMED. 3