Opinion ID: 2193901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First Issue: Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury under KRS 510.035?

Text: Robinson's marriage to S.M.H. was voidable, not void. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury under KRS 510.035 for that time period when the parties were married. While the trial court's analysis under KRS 402.040 seems just under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that the legislature has declared that the marriage of a female under the age of 16 is against the public policy of Kentucky. We reach this conclusion after considering and harmonizing the language of five Kentucky statutes: KRS 402.040, KRS 402.010, KRS 402.020, KRS 402.030, and KRS 510.035. Because the parties married in Tennessee, the trial court properly considered KRS 402.040. KRS 402.040(1), as referenced above, announces the general rule that an out-of-state marriage shall be valid in Kentucky if valid in the state where solemnized unless the marriage is against Kentucky public policy. KRS 402.040(2) affirms that same-sex marriages are against Kentucky public policy. To determine if an underage marriage is against Kentucky public policy, we turn to KRS 402.010, KRS 402.020 and KRS 402.030. See Mangrum v. Mangrum, 310 Ky. 226, 220 S.W.2d 406, 407-408 (Ky. 1949) (construing KRS 402.010, KRS 402.020 and KRS 402.030 in connection with one another and with other statutes and holding that underage marriages are not void, but merely voidable); Holbert v. West, 730 F.Supp. 50, 53 (E.D.Ky.1990) (relying on the holding in Mangrum and concluding that under Kentucky law, minor's marriage without parents' consent is merely voidable rather than void). KRS 402.010 expressly declares void incestuous marriages. KRS 402.020 is as follows: (1) Marriage is prohibited and void: . . . (f) 1. Except as provided in subparagraph 3. of this paragraph, when at the time of the marriage, the person is under sixteen (16) years of age; . . . 3. In case of pregnancy the male and female, or either of them, specified in subparagraph 1. or 2. of this paragraph, may apply to a District Judge for permission to marry, which application may be granted, in the form of a written court order, in the discretion of the judge. There shall be a fee of five dollars ($5) for hearing each such application. Despite KRS 402.020's plain language that such a marriage is prohibited and void, KRS 402.030(3) states: At the instance of any next friend, courts having general jurisdiction may declare void any marriage where: (a) The person was under sixteen (16) years of age at the time of the marriage; (b) The marriage was not conducted with the permission of a District Judge, as required by KRS 402.020(1)(f)3., in the form of a written court order; and (c) The marriage has not been ratified by cohabitation after the person reached eighteen (18) years of age. If the legislature had intended to declare an underage marriage against the public policy of the state, it would have made it absolutely voidas it has done with incestuous marriages and same-sex marriagesand it would not have enacted KRS 402.030. Nor would it have allowed the defense under KRS 510.035 that is at issue in this case. KRS 510.035 is as follows: A person who engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with another person to whom the person is married, or subjects another person to whom the person is married to sexual contact, does not commit an offense under this chapter regardless of the person's age solely because the other person is less than sixteen (16) years old or mentally retarded. Interpreting these statutes in connection with one another, we conclude that a marriage of a person under the age of 16, which is in violation of KRS 402.020(1)(f), is voidable, not void. See Mangrum, 220 S.W.2d at 408. As such, the marriage is not against Kentucky public policy. Likewise, as to the validity of the Tennessee marriage, the marriage was voidable, not voida circumstance which the Commonwealth concedes in this appeal. See Brown v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 491, 495 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000), permission to appeal denied, (`A marriage is voidable from the beginning (1) when either party was insane; or (2) the complainant was under duress; or (3) was under the age of consent; or (4) when the consent was obtained by force, or fraud, and was given by mistake; or (5) when the defendant was impotent; or (6) when the woman was pregnant by another man without the knowledge of the complainant; or (7) when, for any other reason, the marriage was not binding on the complainant . . .'). And a voidable marriage is valid and binding upon the parties until such time as it is annulled by a competent court. See Brewer v. Miller, 673 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tenn.App.1984). Turning to the facts of this case, the evidence at trial established that Robinson and S.M.H. married in Knox County, Tennessee on March 18, 2000, when S.M.H. was 14. S.M.H. did not testify that the marriage had been annulled. Given the fact of the marriage, Robinson requested that the trial court give an instruction on marriage as a defense to the second and third-degree rape charges. This preserved the error for review. See RCr 9.54. Upon review, we conclude that there was evidence to support the instruction on the third-degree rape charges, but not on the second-degree rape charges because S.M.H. testified that she and Robinson did not marry until about one month after her 14th birthday. See KRS 510.050. Robinson was not entitled to an instruction under KRS 510.035 for the time period preceding the marriage. Upon review, this seems to be the case of a sophisticated child predator. In holding as we do today, we are not condoning this marriage. We are following the public policy as established by the legislature. It is beyond the power of a court to vitiate an act of the legislature on the grounds that public policy promulgated therein is contrary to what the court considers to be in the public interest. It is the prerogative of the legislature to declare that acts constitute a violation of public policy. Com. ex rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson, 828 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Ky.1992). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in regard to Robinson's convictions and sentence for three counts of second-degree rape. However, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion that part of his conviction and sentence for three counts of third-degree rape.