Opinion ID: 183831
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Amendment Framework Post-Alameda Books

Text: Following Alameda Books, the test for the constitutionality under the First Amendment of a dispersal ordinance relating to adult businesses remains that prescribed in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). [7] We have encapsulated that test recently as follows: First, we must determine whether the regulation is a complete ban on protected expression. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46 [106 S.Ct. 925]. Second, we must determine whether the county's purpose in enacting the provision is the amelioration of secondary effects. Id. at 47 [106 S.Ct. 925]. If so, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and we must ask whether the provision is designed to serve a substantial government interest, and whether reasonable alternative avenues of communication remain available. Id. Dream Palace, 384 F.3d at 1013. The Supreme Court's Alameda Books plurality clarified the substantial government interest standard of the third step of Renton, by prescribing the burden-shifting test we have noted: If plaintiffs fail to cast direct doubt on this rationale, either by demonstrating that the municipality's evidence does not support its rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality's factual findings, the municipality meets the standard set forth in Renton. If plaintiffs succeed in casting doubt on a municipality's rationale in either manner, the burden shifts back to the municipality to supplement the record with evidence renewing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438-39, 122 S.Ct. 1728. Justice Kennedy's concurrence slightly modifies this burden-shifting framework by narrowing the universe of allowable municipal rationales to support an ordinance. In particular, [a] city may not assert that it will reduce secondary effects by reducing speech in the same proportion. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 449, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy went on to elucidate what this means for the present dispersal statute: The claim ... must be that [the] ordinance will cause two businesses to split rather than one to close, that the quantity of speech will be substantially undiminished, and that total secondary effects will be significantly reduced. Id. at 451, 122 S.Ct. 1728. In addition, the City raises a statute of limitations argument. The statute of limitations applicable to an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the cause of action arose. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007); DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636, 644 (9th Cir.2000). The California limitations period applicable in this case is one year. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954-55 (9th Cir.2004). [8]