Opinion ID: 2817754
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Merit Promotion Plan

Text: Ms. Bandi additionally argues that Mr. Griffin failed to follow the Merit Promotion Plan during the selection process by not ranking the candidates or maintaining a record of how he made his decision. The SSA counters that the selection process did comply with the Merit Promotion Plan procedures, Mr. Griffin was not required to rank the candidates, and HR maintained a record sufficient to allow reconstruction of the promotion decision. Any factual dispute as to whether Mr. Griffin followed the merit procedures is not material.4 Even assuming Mr. Griffin did not follow the Merit Promotion Plan procedures, that does not demonstrate pretext. As we have explained: “The mere fact that an employer failed to follow its own internal procedures does not necessarily suggest that the employer was motivated by illegal or discriminatory intent or that the substantive reasons given by the employer for its employment decision were pretextual.” Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 454 (10th Cir. 1995). In Randle, we also noted that cases in which procedural irregularities suggested illegal discrimination involved disregarded procedures that “directly and uniquely disadvantaged a minority employee.” See id. at 454 n.20. That is not the case here. 4 Ms. Bandi attempted to introduce testimony that Mr. Griffin did not follow the procedures from Ralph De Juliis, another SSA employee and union steward. The district court noted that this evidence was not material to its conclusion and agreed with the SSA that it was inadmissible. We agree this evidence is not material and see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary ruling. See N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Britt Paulk Ins. Agency, Inc., 579 F.3d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 2009). - 13 - c. Statistical evidence and evidence about other complaints Ms. Bandi contends the district court erred by declining to consider statistical evidence of disparate hiring or promotion practices and other complaints against Mr. Griffin. i. Statistical evidence Ms. Bandi’s statistical evidence is a chart contained in her affidavit. She asserts the chart reflects the race of Mr. Griffin’s hires from March 29, 2010 to October 5, 2012. It shows that nine African-Americans were promoted or hired during that time period while two Caucasians were promoted or hired. Ms. Bandi offers no explanation in her affidavit as to how she obtained this information. The SSA asserts that Ms. Bandi’s list is incomplete and inaccurate, and provided its own evidence of seven Caucasian employees who were promoted or hired during that time period. The SSA further notes that the previous District Manager, not Mr. Griffin, hired one of the African-American women on Ms. Bandi’s list. Even if we consider Ms. Bandi’s evidence, it fails to eliminate nondiscriminatory explanations for the hiring statistics or to show that more-qualified white applicants applied for those positions and were not selected. As we have explained: “In order for statistical evidence to create an inference of discrimination, the statistics must . . . eliminate nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparity. In other words, a plaintiff’s statistical evidence must focus on eliminating nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparate treatment by showing disparate treatment between comparable individuals.” Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 - 14 - F.3d 1136, 1147 (10th Cir. 2009) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Ms. Bandi has not done that. The chart identifies each hired person’s name and race, whether each was promoted or newly hired, and the date of the employment action (sometimes only giving a year and sometimes giving a specific date). Ms. Bandi offers no information about who else applied for the positions and what their qualifications were as compared to the persons who were hired or promoted. Her “statistical evidence does not take into consideration nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparity—for example, differences in various individuals’ job performance, experience, and training.” Sanders v. SW Bell Tel. L.P., 544 F.3d 1101, 1110 (10th Cir. 2008). “Because the statistics fail to account for these variables, they do not constitute evidence of pretext.” Id.; see also Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Plaintiff’s statistical evidence compares only the ages of the employees retained with the ages of those laid off . . . . Plaintiff’s statistical evidence fails to eliminate nondiscriminatory explanations for disparate treatment—i.e., that those laid off had lower performance evaluations and rankings than those retained— and therefore does not permit an inference of pretext.”). ii. Other complaints Ms. Bandi also argues that she presented evidence of other employee complaints that were filed against Mr. Griffin and that “[e]vidence of an employer’s treatment of other employees is relevant to its discriminatory intent.” Aplt. Br. at 35. - 15 - The evidence shows eleven men and women claimed either sex or race discrimination arising from Mr. Griffin’s employment decisions. To be relevant, evidence regarding other employees’ discrimination claims must be reasonably tied to the plaintiff’s claim. The evidence must involve the same type of discrimination during the same time period under similar circumstances. See Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847, 856 (10th Cir. 2000). Ms. Bandi’s evidence must therefore show that the other complaints against Mr. Griffin alleged race discrimination by Caucasian applicants who were not selected for positions that were filled by African-Americans during the same time period under similar circumstances. From the evidence Ms. Bandi cites, only three of the complaints appear to be based on race. One involved a woman who identified herself as black or Jamaican, so she is not similarly situated to Ms. Bandi. The race of the remaining complainants or of the persons selected is not clear from the cited pages. See Aplt. App. at 17087.5 At his deposition, Mr. Griffin mentioned a man who filed a claim for race and sex discrimination, but his testimony does not disclose that person’s race or the race of the candidate who was selected for the position. See id. at 170-73. He mentioned another man who filed a complaint based on race regarding a reassignment request 5 Ms. Bandi also cites to three other pages in the appendix, but two of those pages do not provide any information about the discrimination complaints, see Aplt. App. at 200, 205, and the other page simply lists the names of the complainants and states that their complaints were based on gender or race, see id. at 358. - 16 - for the Oklahoma City office, but the record does not reflect that person’s race or the race of the person who was selected for reassignment instead of him. Id. at 176-77. Mr. Griffin’s testimony about the remaining complainants shows the claims were for sex or disability discrimination or does not disclose the nature of the claims. See id. at 178-87. In her reply brief, Ms. Bandi cites to her affidavit in which she identifies at least four of the complainants as Caucasian. See Aplt. Reply Br. 23 (citing Aplt. App. at 263-64). But other than the first person mentioned at Mr. Griffin’s deposition, no evidence shows whether these complainants filed claims based on sex or race. Ms. Bandi never explains the circumstances of any of the discrimination complaints or ties them to the circumstances in her case. Although Ms. Bandi argues generally that Mr. Griffin had “a pattern of discrimination,” see Aplt. Br. at 35, she has not shown there were other complaints involving circumstances that are reasonably related to her claim, see id. at 35-36. We therefore see no basis to infer that the SSA’s stated reason for its employment decision was pretextual.