Opinion ID: 577753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retroactive Enforcement of the Void Injunction

Text: 14 The Forest Service argues that in issuing judgment for Hampton and Suntip, the district court was retroactively enforcing a void injunction. Hampton and Suntip argue that while the injunction was valid, they had acquired and exercised the right to file their MSEP plans late. In granting them summary judgment, they argue, the district court was merely enforcing these existing rights. 15 In Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Dile, 643 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.1981), the district court imposed civil contempt sanctions against a party who had disobeyed an injunction. At the time the court imposed the sanctions, the injunction was in full force. On appeal, this court overturned the injunction. In addition, we reversed the award of sanctions. 16 In reaching this conclusion, this court relied on United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947). Scott & Fetzer, 643 F.2d at 675. In United Mine Workers, the Supreme Court held that [t]he right to remedial relief falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued. 330 U.S. at 295, 67 S.Ct. at 696. 17 The lesson of these cases is that once an injunction in a civil case has been invalidated, rights granted under the injunction no longer exist and cannot be enforced. 1 See also Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 545 F.2d 1336, 1346 (3d Cir.1976) (The United Mine Workers doctrine ... recognizes that a private party should not profit as a result of an order to which a court determines, in retrospect, he was never entitled.); Sandler v. Tarr, 345 F.Supp. 612, 621-22 (D.Md.1971) (An order issued without jurisdiction is null and void--it never existed.... [R]elief may [not] be based on the fact that the order had existed at an earlier time.) aff'd, 463 F.2d 1096 (4th Cir.1972). 18 Hampton and Suntip argue that Littell v. Morton, 369 F.Supp. 411 (D.Md.1974) suggests a contrary rule. In Littell, the general counsel of the Navajo Tribe had previously obtained an injunction preventing the tribe from firing him. The fourth circuit overturned that injunction. While the injunction was still in force, however, the general counsel had performed legal services for the tribe. At trial, the district court awarded the general counsel fees for these services. Id. at 415. 19 The Littell court justified its award on a theory of restitution. As restitution, the court treated the award as a matter within the discretion of the court, and not as the enforcement of a right. Id. at 419. Littell does not support Hampton and Suntip. 20 Applying the United Mine Workers principles to this case, Hampton and Suntip cannot rely on the voided injunction to justify filing their MSEP plans after the February 15, 1984 deadline. Rather than seeking contract extensions in a timely fashion, they elected to take a chance on an invalid injunction. Hampton and Suntip now seek to improve their position by relying on an option that has long since been extinguished. The district court had no authority to rewrite the Forest Service MSEP to accommodate contractors who had rejected the MSEP deadline while waiting to see how the injunction fared on appeal.