Opinion ID: 369379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: We state the issues as follows: 15 I. Was appellant guilty of negligence as that word is employed in 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)? 16 II. Is appellant relieved of liability on account of the concurring negligence of the stevedore AAA? 17 III. Is appellant relieved of liability by reason of the fact that the condition which caused the appellee's injury was open and obvious? 18 IV. Did the district court err in considering AAA's non-compliance with the safety and health regulations for ship repairing, 29 C.F.R. § 1915.43(3), Et seq. in passing on the negligence of the appellant?
19 Our review of a finding of negligence is governed by the clearly erroneous standard. Mattschei v. United States, 600 F.2d 205, 208 (CA9 1979); Miller v. United States, 587 F.2d 991, 994 (CA9 1978). 20 In an exhaustive opinion by Judge Duniway, the Ninth Circuit adopted the following standard of negligence for the purposes of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) 1 actions, to wit: 21 A vessel is subject to liability for injuries to longshoremen working on or near the vessel caused by conditions on the vessel if, but only if, the shipowner 22 (a) knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover, the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such longshoremen, and 23 (b) the shipowner fails to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to protect the longshoremen against the danger. 24 Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d 480 at 485 (CA9 1979). 25 Manifestly, the findings of the district court, fully supported by the evidence in the case, fall within the standards fixed in Santos. It is clear that appellant's officers and employees actually knew of appellee's working conditions. Moreover, it is obvious that they knew that the conditions clearly violated the regulations and created an unreasonable risk of harm to appellee. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that appellant, as the ship owner, failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to protect the appellee against the danger involved under these circumstances. 26 Applying the negligence standard set by Santos, we hold that the findings of the district court that the ship owner was guilty of negligence are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.II. 27 The appellant urges that the conceded negligence of the stevedore bars recovery by the appellee. This issue was thoroughly analyzed and decided against appellant's contention in the recent case of Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 61 L.Ed.2d 521 (1979), in which the Supreme Court held that the 1972 amendments were not intended to change the judicially created admiralty rule that the shipowner could be made to pay all damages not due to the worker's Own negligence and that the Congress had no intention of imposing a proportionate fault rule. It is there held that the court would not change the traditional rule so as to make the vessel liable only for the damages in proportion to its own negligence.
28 Appellant's contention that it should be relieved of liability by reason of the fact that the condition which caused appellee's injuries was open and obvious are resolved against it in Santos, supra, where it is said: 29 Finally, Congress 'intend(ed) that the admiralty rule which precludes the defense of assumption of risk in an action by an injured employee shall also be applicable.' House Report at 4705, Senate Report at 12. 598 F.2d at 485. 30 Judge Duniway's standard follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343(a) and (c), but specifically eliminates § 343(b) and § 343A which involve contributory negligence and the open and obvious assumption of risk standards. We conclude that Santos controls our facts and properly denies the open and obvious assumption of risk defense.
31 Finally, appellant charges that the district court erred in holding that the United States as the vessel owner was liable for the ship repair contractor's non-compliance with the safety and health regulations for ship repairing, 29 C.F.R. § 1915.43(e), 1915.47, 1915.51(a), (c), and 1915.54. These sections encompass the failure to provide planked walkways, work platforms, safety ropes, guard rails, or safety passages free of slippery fuel oil where workmen have to work. As recently as Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, 605 F.2d 438 (CA9 1979), we held that it was proper to consider violations of the safety regulations in determining whether a shipowner was guilty of negligence under the provisions of § 905(b) and under the standard of negligence in Santos, supra. The district court properly considered these regulations. See, Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347, 353 (CA4 1968); Boleski v. American Export Lines, Inc., 385 F.2d 69, 74 (CA4 1967); and Provenza v. American Export Lines, Inc., 324 F.2d 660, 665 (CA4 1963).