Opinion ID: 3011274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court's Dismissal of

Text: the Amended Complaint
Appellants focus most of their attention on the district court's dismissal of their breach of contract claim pleaded in count I of the amended complaint. While recognizing that under New Jersey law, courts generally find that there is a reasonable time term implicit in contracts that do not set forth any time limitation for performance, the district court nevertheless held that [i]n this case, the Court finds no justification for implying a `reasonable time' for performance because such a term is not `necessary to give business efficacy to the contract as written.'  App. at 8a. The court explained that [a] main purpose of the Agreement, and the only purpose of Paragraph 16, was to require Essex to remediate the Property to the full satisfaction of the DEP and thereby make the land freely marketable. App. at 8a. The court found thata `reasonable time' limitation is not necessary because Essex's performance under the contract--obtainingfinal DEP approval--must be evaluated solely by reference to the DEP. App. at 9a. Accordingly, the court stated that such a contract simply does not lend itself to a reasonable time limitation. Id. 12 It also dismissed the breach of contract claim on the alternative ground that appellants presented insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Essex breached its obligation to perform remediation and obtain DEP approval pursuant to the Clean-Up Plan within a reasonable time. On this point, the district court held as follows: Plaintiffs allege that Essex has breached its contractual obligation to complete the detoxification and obtain final DEP approval `within a reasonable time.' Therefore, to prevail, plaintiffs must show that a `reasonable time' has already expired. The Agreement was executed in 1985. This Court cannot say that fourteen years is unreasonable as a matter of law. In the context of an ISRA clean-up, which plaintiff Berger understood to be a `cumbersome' and `long' process, plaintiffs must adduce evidence that a `reasonable time' for completion of the clean-up is less then fourteen years. . . . Such evidence might be in the form of reprimands or other statements from regulatory agencies like the DEP. Plaintiffs might also carry their evidentiary burden with expert testimony that, under the circumstances of this site and comparing it to other sites, fourteen years is an unreasonable length of time. In this case, however, plaintiffs have simply failed to adduce any evidence that fourteen years is unreasonable. The only evidence that even remotely addresses this issue is contained in plaintiffs' expert report. . . . Giving plaintiffs the best of Mr. Cohen's report, `the environmental program undertaken on this site has been slow and ineffective in treating the contaminants that were release by Essex Chemical.' But evidence of a slow and ineffective clean-up process, without more, cannot reasonably support an inference that fourteen years is unreasonable. App. at 11a-12a. Appellants contend that the court erred in dismissing their breach of contract claim because, notwithstanding the 13 absence in Paragraph 16 of the Agreement of an explicit date by which Essex was to complete its cleanup of the Property and obtain DEP approval, by implication the Agreement requires Essex to fulfill its contractual obligations within a reasonable time. Appellants rely on the well-established principle of New Jersey law, which is applicable here on the contractual issues, that `[w]here no time is fixed for the performance of a contract, by implication a reasonable time was intended.'  Br. at 41 (quoting, inter alia, Becker v. Sunrise at Elkridge, 543 A.2d 977, 983 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)). They claim that the district court erred in concluding that the nature of this particular contract, and Essex's obligation with respect to the remediation of the Property, rendered a reasonable time limitation unreasonable in the circumstances. Alternatively, they assert that at a minimum, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties intended that Essex complete its remediation obligations within a reasonable time, thus precluding summary judgment in appellees' favor. Second, appellants contend that contrary to the district court's finding, they presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Essex failed to remediate the Property within a reasonable time. Appellees respond that the district court correctly dismissed the breach of contract claim because appellants base their argument on the incorrect premise that Paragraph 16 omits a contractual provision which in turn requires the court to supply a reasonable time limitation. Br. at 36. They claim that contrary to appellants' construction of the contract, Paragraph 16 does contain a definite term for completion of the Property's remediation and therefore does not omit a contractual provision. In appellees' view the contract unambiguously provides the only term for completion that is reasonable in the circumstances--namely, that Essex's obligation is satisfied if the detoxification is undertaken in accordance with and to the approval of DEP. Br. at 35-36. They claim that the district court correctly determined that it would be unreasonable to find that the Agreement included an implied reasonable time limitation, given the commercial context of the sale and purchase. 14 Appellees further assert that, in any event, even if we agreed with appellants that the district court should have implied a reasonable time limitation on Essex's remediation obligations pursuant to Paragraph 16, summary judgment was appropriate because there is no evidence that Essex breached its contractual obligations in that connection. They claim that the district court correctly determined that appellants failed to meet their burden of producing evidence demonstrating that as of the date that appellants filed their complaint in the district court, Essex had failed to remediate and detoxify the Property in accordance with the Clean-Up Plan, and obtain DEP approval of its efforts, within a reasonable time. Appellees' protestations notwithstanding, we reject the district court's conclusion that a reasonable time provision was not implicit in Paragraph 16 of the Agreement. After all, New Jersey courts uniformly have applied the principle that where no time is fixed for the performance of a contract, by implication a reasonable time was intended. See Becker, 543 A.2d at 983 (contract for sale of real property); see also, e.g., River Dev. Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 148 A.2d 721, 722 (N.J. 1959) (license to reclaim land must be exercised within a reasonable time); Ridge ChevroletOldsmobile, Inc. v. Scarano, 569 A.2d 296, 300 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (performance under real estate contract); Mazzeo v. Kartman, 560 A.2d 733, 737 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (If the trial judge cannot determine the parties' actual intent [concerning the temporal limits of a right of first refusal], he should determine a `reasonable time' for the expiration of the right.); Ocean Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 164 A.2d 607, 614 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) (where plaintiff claimed that defendant was obligated to make certain repairs to property, if plaintiff 's claim had been based on breach of contract, the court would have implied a term that required completion of performance within a reasonable time and would not have permitted parol evidence that defendant promised repairs as of a certain fixed date); McGraw v. Johnson, 126 A.2d 203, 206 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (noting that performance under contract must be completed within reasonable time where claim was based on contractor's alleged failure to complete 15 building of home within a reasonable time); Curtis Elevator Co. v. Hampshire House, Inc., 362 A.2d 73, 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (performance under contract to install elevators; where no specific date for completion was provided in contract, court implied term requiring completion within a reasonable time). The district court predicated its analysis on statements in New Jersey cases to the effect that terms are implied to give business efficacy to the contract as written. See app. at 8a (citing McGarry v. Saint Anthony of Padua Roman Catholic Church, 704 A.2d 1353, 1357 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)). But appellants argue persuasively that it would be commercially unreasonable to construe the terms of Paragraph 16 so as to permit Essex to begin its cleanup at its leisure, and to continue its efforts in perpetuity without the threat or even the slightest possibility of adverse legal consequences flowing from inordinate delay. We also doubt that the parties could have intended such a bizarre result. See Onderdonk v. The Presbyterian Homes of N.J., 425 A.2d 1057, 1063 (N.J. 1981) (Central to this inquiry of ascertaining what, if any, terms are implied is the intent of the parties. Intent may be determined by examination of the contract and in particular the setting in which it was executed.). Nevertheless, notwithstanding our holding that a reasonable time term is implicit is Paragraph 16 of the Agreement, we agree with the district court's alternative basis for dismissing appellants' breach of contract claim, i.e., that a reasonable time period has not expired.8 We are mindful that [w]hat constitutes a reasonable time under New Jersey law `is usually an implication of fact, and not of law, derivable from the language used by the parties considered in the context of the subject matter and the _________________________________________________________________ 8. In view of our result appellees should understand that they do not have forever to complete the remediation and detoxification. To the contrary, they must diligently pursue their efforts to obtain the DEP approval within a reasonable time. Of course, it is not our intention by making this point to invite further litigation. We believe that if appellees are diligent in these efforts and keep appellants advised of the steps they are taking that the parties should be able to avoid additional judicial proceedings. 16 attendant circumstances, in aid of the apparent intention.'  Mazzeo, 560 A.2d at 737 (quoting Borough of West Caldwell v. Borough of Caldwell, 138 A.2d 402, 412 (N.J. 1958)). Nevertheless, appellants would bear the burden of proof on this issue at trial, to show that a reasonable time has expired, and to survive summary judgment, they must adduce evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Essex breached its contractual obligation to complete its remediation and detoxification efforts within a reasonable time. Here, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to appellants, we agree with the district court's assessment of the weakness of appellants' evidence as well as the court's conclusion that appellants failed to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether Essex had breached its obligation to remediate the Property and obtain DEP approval within a reasonable time. Simply put, the record does not support the conclusion that appellants posit, i.e., that Essex breached its contractual duties to complete the remediation and detoxification efforts within a reasonable time. For example, appellants first point to an EssexExpense Appropriation Request which indicated that the completion date of the entire project would be 1987.9 App. at 777a. But we do not share appellants' view that this evidence can support a conclusion that Essex breached Paragraph 16 of the Agreement. Obviously, the fact that Essex estimated its completion date incorrectly does not support the conclusion that it has failed to cleanup the Property within a reasonable time. While a party's advance estimate of the time to complete a project might be persuasive evidence of the reasonable time for that undertaking, it is not in the circumstances here in which the scope of the project was so uncertain. _________________________________________________________________ 9. According to the deposition testimony of Irwin Zonis, Essex's Chief Environmental Officer who was involved in the remediation and detoxification of the Property, the purpose of the Expense Appropriation Request was to notify Essex's financial department of the amount of funds deemed necessary for the completion of the project. He further explained that the document told the financial department that the $320,000 would be expended by the end of 1987. App. at 189a. 17 Appellants also rely on the fact that in March 1986, shortly after the DEP approved Essex's Clean-Up Plan, Dr. Calvin J. Benning (Benning), Director of Environmental Affairs for Essex, wrote to the DEP questioning whether certain of the standards set forth in the Clean-Up Plan with respect to the contemplated soil remediation and whether the Clean-Up Plan's requirements were reasonable in the circumstances. App. at 225a-26a. For convenience, we will refer to this correspondence as Essex's March 1986 letter. Appellants claim that the March 1986 letter was Essex's attempt[ ] to circumvent the parameters and conditions of its Clean-Up Plan, and that it demonstrates that Essex failed to proceed reasonably and diligently with the Property's detoxification. Br. at 46. We cannot agree. The March 1986 letter questions the cleanup levels relating to the soil remediation which Essex completed within two years of the sale of the Property. See generally app. at 235a; appellees' br. at 17. Certainly if Essex also had completed the groundwater remediation within that period appellants would not have instituted litigation alleging a breach of Paragraph 16. Thus, inasmuch as appellants' breach of contract claim essentially is predicated on Essex's failure to complete groundwater remediation, we fail to see how this letter supports appellants' argument. Similarly, appellants cite the fact that Essex did not begin groundwater remediation efforts until 1988 or remediation of the CVOCs until 1997. See br. at 47-48. However, appellants do not present evidence indicating that the delays were avoidable, and in any event, were unreasonable. Also they rely on the circumstance that groundwater pumping was frequently interrupted throughout the years, br. at 47, and that the DEP gave Essex a rating of unacceptable due to `failure to operate the groundwater remediation system in the capacity it was designed.'  App. at 298a (emphasis added). But a review of the evidence in the record confirms that the interruptions Essex experienced are not a basis for holding that it unreasonably delayed its performance under Paragraph 16. To the contrary, intermittent delays are to be expected on a remediation project which cannot be compared to an 18 ordinary construction project built in accordance with fixed plans which is thus far less likely to encounter problems than a remediation undertaking. Moreover, as appellees correctly point out, the DEP's unacceptable rating did not relate to the length of time that Essex had expended on the remediation and detoxification of the Property. Rather, the DEP comments related to the need for Essex to implement a sufficient maintenance program so that it could manage the problems it had been experiencing with the wells more efficiently in the future. See app. at 298a. Thus, we cannot view the DEP's comments as tantamount to a statement that Essex was taking too long to finish the Property cleanup. As the district court correctly observed, app. at 11a-12a, appellants' strongest evidence on this score is a statement by their environmental consultant, Irving Cohen of ESI. Cohen issued a report in which he opined that the environmental program undertaken on this site has been slow and ineffective in treating the contaminants that were released by Essex Chemical. App. at 418a. In our view, however, this statement does not create a factual issue for the jury on the issue of unreasonable delay. Importantly, Cohen stops short of stating definitively that, given the circumstances, Essex had taken too long to complete its remediation and detoxification efforts. Moreover, even if he had stated such a conclusion it would not have an adequate foundation as he does not analyze specifically the types of contaminants involved in this project and the circumstances surrounding the remediation of this site. Nor does he compare Essex's efforts to other sites plagued with similar environmental contaminants. Given the vague nature of Cohen's conclusion, we agree with the district court's observation that evidence of a slow and ineffective cleanup process, without more, cannot reasonably support an inference that fourteen years is unreasonable. App. at 12a. When boiled down to its essence, appellants' argument is that because the cleanup of the Property has taken longer to finish than the parties originally anticipated, Essex has breached Paragraph 16 of the Agreement as it has not completed the cleanup within a reasonable time. While it 19 may be unfortunate that it has taken Essex an extended period of time to complete the cleanup of this Property, the delay does not support a conclusion that the amount of time it already has spent is unreasonable given the nature of Essex's contractual obligation. By appellants' own admission, the remediation and detoxification of the Property is a large effort which, by its very nature, is a lengthy and time-consuming process. Given the realities of the situation, appellants simply have failed to point to any evidence in this record demonstrating that the length of time that Essex has taken to detoxify the Property and obtain DEP approval is unreasonable in the circumstances. Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's dismissal the breach of contract claim.
and Fair Dealing (Count II) The district court also dismissed appellants' claim based on Essex's alleged breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, reasoning: In this case, plaintiffs allege only that Essex has failed to complete the clean-up process and obtain final DEP approval within a reasonable time. They point to no acts or omissions done in bad faith. There is no allegation, and certainly no evidence, that Essex has committed any misconduct. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate. App. at 13a. Appellants claim that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this claim because it ignored evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Essex breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing during the course of its cleanup of the Property. Appellants point to the following evidence in support of their claim: (1) documents confirming that appellees attempted to renege upon the standards set forth in the Clean-Up Plan; (2) evidence showing that appellees inexplicably failed to even begin remediation for many years after delineating contamination on the Property; and (3) DEP documents reprimanding Essex for  `violations' and `unacceptable' progress. Br. at 49. 20 To be sure, every contract in New Jersey contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 587 (N.J. 1997); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 205 (1981) (Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.). The implied covenant is an independent duty and may be breached even where there is no breach of the contract's express terms. Emerson Radio Corp. v. Orion Sales, Inc., 80 F. Supp.2d 307, 311 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing, inter alia, Sons of Thunder, Inc., 690 A.2d at 575); see also Bak-a-Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc. , 351 A.2d 349, 352 (N.J. 1976). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract. Sons of Thunder, Inc., 690 A.2d at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted); Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti , 207 A.2d 522, 531 (N.J. 1965). A party to a contract breaches the covenant if it acts in bad faith or engages in some other form of inequitable conduct in the performance of a contractual obligation. See, e.g., Sons of Thunder, Inc., 690 A.2d at 589 (distinguishing prior decision in Karl's Sales & Service, Inc. v Gimbel Bros. Inc., 592 A.2d 647 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), in which there were no allegations of bad faith or dishonesty on the part of the terminating party to the contract); Association Group Life, Inc. v. Catholic War Veterans, 293 A.2d 382, 384 (N.J. 1972) (stating that a contracting party breaches duty of good faith and fair dealing by engaging in behavior that wasnot contemplated by the spirit of the contract and fell short of fair dealing); Emerson Radio Corp., 80 F. Supp.2d at 311 (The Restatement and the [New Jersey] cases note a state of mind or malice-like element to breach of good faith and fair dealing, holding that the duty excludes activity that is unfair, not decent or reasonable, nor dishonest.); Kapossy v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 234, 248 (D.N.J. 1996) (noting that courts imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in order to protect one party to a contract from the other party's bad faith misconduct or collusion with third parties where there is no breach of the express terms of the 21 contract); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 205 cmt. a (noting that [t]he phrase `good faith' is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat with the context and explaining that [g]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving `bad faith' because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.).10 Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides examples of the types of behavior that can give rise to a claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the context of one's performance under a contract: Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty. A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off , willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance. Id. S 205 cmt. d (emphasis added). Appellants' basic contention is that the circumstances of this case demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning Essex's lack of good faith in its _________________________________________________________________ 10. Quite coincidentally this very panel on the same day that it heard argument in this case also heard argument in a case under Pennsylvania law involving the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., No. 99-3873, 2000 WL 1273953, ___ F.3d. ___ (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2000). Plainly, New Jersey law imposes a broader obligation on a party to a contract than Pennsylvania law to act in good faith in its performance. The parties, however, do not dispute that New Jersey law applies in this case, and we will decide the case on that basis. 22 performance of its obligation to remediate the Property and obtain DEP in accordance with Paragraph 16 of the Agreement. They claim that since the DEP approved the Clean-Up Plan in 1985, Essex has not performed its cleanup in a diligent manner, and in fact, has engaged in bad faith conduct purposely to protract the process. According to appellants, Essex's conduct has precluded them from obtaining the fruits of their contract, i.e., a property that is not environmentally distressed. We cannot agree that the evidence in this case supports the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of Essex's good faith in its performance of its obligation to remediate and detoxify the Property. In reality, appellants' argument rests exclusively on their subjective interpretation of the March 1986 letter in which Benning set forth the following reservations as to whether certain aspects of the Clean-Up Plan were reasonable in the circumstances: The clean-up plan calls for the excavation and disposal of the contaminated soil to a level of 1 ppm, . . . based on the requirements of the case manager at BISE. I believe these levels are extremely low and not warranted. . . . We fully intend to remove the contaminated dirt from the former tank farm area. . . . However to satisfy BISE we are required to perform 15 separate sample analyses in the laboratory instead of using a portable field analyzer to determine the extent of pollution and excavation, and to excavate to 1 ppm residual total VOC in the soil. I believe these requirements are both unreasonable and unwarranted. The clean up plan had to be approved by the end of 1985 and time was not available to question the requirement or to rationally discuss these points. However, the IAG discussion [which Benning attended on March 18, 1986] indicate [sic] that the[DEP] has also been rethinking some of their procedures and actions. I believe hexane and heptane are classified as hydrocarbon and I believe that a higher level than 1 ppm is perfectly justified. App. at 225a-26a. Appellants claim that this letter exhibits Essex's lack of good faith and confirms that Essex 23 attempted to renege upon the standards set forth in the Cleanup Plan. Br. at 49; reply br. at 22-23. While the letter questions whether the cleanup level of 1 ppm is warranted and whether lab analysis of soil samples is necessary as opposed to Essex merely conductingfield measurements of the soil, the letter does not demonstrate a lack of good faith on Essex's part in performing its obligations pursuant to Paragraph 16 of the Agreement. First, as we previously mentioned, the letter discusses Essex's obligations under the Clean-Up Plan relating to soil remediation, but appellants do not dispute that Essex has completed its soil remediation and detoxification efforts. In fact, appellants confirmed that Essex began its cleanup of the soil shortly after the sale, and that it completed soil remediation sometime within two years. Thus, we fail to see how this letter can demonstrate Essex's lack of diligence in that regard, or how Essex's conduct in questioning certain aspects of the Clean-Up Plan compromised appellants' right to receive the fruits of the contract. See Sons of Thunder, Inc., 690 A.2d at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, Benning wrote the March 1986 letter after he met with DEP officials and discussed the topic of appropriate cleanup levels in soil. The letter specifically states that the IAG discussion on March 18 indicate [sic] that the department has also been rethinking some of their procedures and actions. App. at 225a. Thus, while the letter questioned the reasonableness of certain aspects of the Clean-Up Plan, Benning's comments indicate that he did so because of his previous discussions with DEP officials which apparently led him to believe that the DEP might no longer view some of its requirements as necessary or appropriate. Thus, when viewed in context, the letter does not indicate that Essex intended to renege on its obligation to cleanup the Property, and it does not indicate that Essex performed its contractual obligations with a lack of good faith. In any event, Benning's concern over certain aspects of the Clean-Up Plan is of no consequence when we consider that less than two months later, he wrote a memorandum to Essex officials in which he recognized and re-emphasized 24 Essex's obligation to adhere to the requirements set forth in Clean-Up Plan. The memorandum states: Lately we have received letters from NJDEP and have discussed our program and permit applications with both state and local officials. These discussions have led to some very specific program requirements and items we must `keep in mind.' For example: 1. The NJDEP's ECRA office and the department of solid waste management have made it very clear that we must adhere to the Clean Up Plan . App. at 227a. Simply put, the fact that Benning questioned certain aspects of the Clean-Up Plan is not evidence that Essex acted in bad faith, as the DEP obviously responded to Benning's concerns by indicating that Essex was obligated to remediate the Property in accordance with the Clean-Up Plan, and Benning expressly reaffirmed Essex's intent to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations in that regard. Moreover, appellants do not demonstrate that Essex ever failed to implement a substantive remediation measure that the DEP required in connection with Essex's cleanup of the Property, and do not dispute that Essex completed soil remediation on the Property within two years of the sale. In our view, Benning's May 1986 memorandum reaffirming Essex's commitment to remediate the Property in accordance with the Clean-Up Plan belies appellants' assertion that the March 1986 letter evidences Essex's intent from the outset to conduct its remediation and detoxification efforts in bad faith. Reply br. at 23. In the circumstances, we will affirm the district court's dismissal of appellants' claim that Essex breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
and Spill Act Claim (Count IV) Count III of the amended complaint asserts a claim for damages and injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to CERCLA, and count IV seeks the same relief pursuant to 25 the Spill Act. As previously mentioned, the district court dismissed the CERCLA claim, reasoning that appellants had not incurred any compensable necessary costs of response pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a)(4)(B). In particular, the court explained that the only costs that appellants claimed to have incurred were the fees they paid to their environmental consultant, ESI. The district court found that those fees were not recoverable under CERCLA because they had nothing to do with any effort by plaintiffs to detoxify the Property or to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances. App. at 14a (emphasis added). The district court explained that the fees were not recoverable because ESI merely reviewed the quarterly reports that Essex submitted to appellants and the DEP; ESI never visited the Property, monitored the contamination or the cleanup of the Property, or gathered data related to the investigation or remediation of the Property. The district court stated that ESI's fees are those of an ordinary expert witness: the fees represent litigation costs, not environmental monitoring costs. App. at 15a. Similarly, the court dismissed appellants' Spill Act claim seeking to recover ESI's fees because the fees are unrelated to any prevention, mitigation, or remediation of contamination on the Property. App. at 14a. The district court also denied appellants' request for a declaration that Essex is liable to appellants for any future costs pursuant to CERCLA or the Spill Act. The court stated that [p]laintiffs have utterly failed to make any showing that they are likely to incur any future costs that will be recoverable under CERCLA or the Spill Act. Indeed, it is undisputed that Essex is contractually obligated to remediate the Property at its own expense. App. at 15a. Inasmuch as there was no evidence--or even an allegation --that the plaintiffs intend to participate in future clean-up activities or incur any costs that might be recoverable under CERCLA, the court concluded that granting declaratory relief would be inappropriate. Finally, the court denied appellants' request for an injunction compelling Essex to commence and complete the cleanup on the basis that there was no present case or 26 controversy. The court reasoned that [t]here is no dispute that Essex is under both a contractual and statutory duty to detoxify the Property; nor is there any dispute that Essex has worked continuously to remediate the Property. The court further explained that [i]n the absence of evidence that Essex has breached the Agreement or violated CERCLA or IRSA, there is no basis for the injunction that plaintiffs seek. App. at 16a. On appeal from the CERCLA and Spill Act dispositions, appellants primarily claim that the district court erred in dismissing their CERCLA claim for monetary relief. 11 While _________________________________________________________________ 11. We will address only briefly the several other issues appellants raise in connection with their CERCLA and Spill Act claims pleaded in counts III and IV of the amended complaint. Specifically, appellants maintain that the district court erred in rejecting their request for injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to CERCLA, and in dismissing count IV of the amended complaint, their Spill Act claim. First, appellants contend that they are entitled to declaratory relief under CERCLA even if they have not incurred any compensable response costs as of yet, [p]articularly [because] in light of the inexplicable lack of progress by Defendants in detoxifying the Property to date, Plaintiffs may well be forced to incur future response costs to complete [the] detoxification. . . . Br. at 52 (citing Bowen Eng'g v. Estate of Reeve, 799 F. Supp. 467, 476 (D.N.J. 1992), aff 'd, 19 F.3d 642 (3d Cir. 1994) (table)). They also state generally that injunctive relief pursuant to CERCLA is appropriate in the circumstances, but fail to explain the reason for their position on that point. See id. We reject appellants' arguments in their entirety. First, appellants have not presented any evidence with respect to their request for a declaratory judgment as to future response costs under CERCLA demonstrating that such relief is appropriate. Given our discussion in the text that follows, it is clear that appellants have not incurred any response costs to date, and it is undisputed that Essex, rather than appellants, is bound contractually to complete the cleanup of the Property and obtain final DEP approval. Thus, there is nothing in the record suggesting that appellants ever will incur response costs, and there is no potential for injury that is sufficiently immediate and real so as to warrant declaratory relief pursuant to section 113(g)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 9613(g)(2). See Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 845 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 819 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting statement in Kelly, 17 F.3d at 844, that  `[i]n providing for the recovery of response 27 appellants have not set forth their CERCLA argument in any detail, we understand they predicate it on a belief that they are entitled to recover the amounts paid to appellants' environmental consultant, ESI, as necessary costs of response pursuant to section 107(a) of CERCLA, because those oversight costs fall within the scope of either _________________________________________________________________ costs, Congress included language [in section 113(g)(2)] to insure that a responsible party's liability [for response costs], once established, would not have to be relitigated. . . .' ) (emphasis added)); The Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 999 (D.N.J. 1988) (To be granted a declaratory judgment on the issue of liability, . . . plaintiff[ ] must establish four factors to satisfy the requirements of section 107(a), including that, as a result [of defendants' conduct], [plaintiff] has incurred response costs.); compare Bowen Eng'g, 799 F. Supp. at 476 (stating that [O]nce some expenditure [for response costs] has been made, the controversy is sufficiently real to permit the court to issue a declaratory judgment on defendant's liability.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, appellants' vague assertion that injunctive relief is appropriate in this case, without any further elaboration on that point, is unconvincing. Finally, we agree with the district court's disposition of the Spill Act claim seeking both monetary and equitable relief. While we have considered appellants' argument on this score, which essentially consists only of a citation to T&E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991), we fail to see how the case is germane here because it did not present claims under the Spill Act. In any event, after reviewing the applicable statutory provisions and case law on point, we are convinced that the district court did not err in dismissing count