Opinion ID: 1323067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: trialpenalty phase

Text: During the penalty phase of the trial, Pope objected to evidence offered to show that he was, on the date of the offense, free on parole from a penitentiary sentence imposed for a prior crime. Pope concedes that his prior criminal record was admissible, and that prior unadjudicated criminal conduct might be used at the penalty phase to prove future dangerousness. He argues, however, that the parole system is not part of a criminal prosecution, but is part of a separate administrative system, and that his parole status was therefore irrelevant. The objection was without merit. Code § 19.2-264.4 requires the jury, as a prerequisite to imposition of the death penalty based on the future dangerousness predicate, to consider the prior history of the defendant. We upheld the constitutionality of that section in LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 593-94, 304 S.E.2d at 660, and in Smith, 219 Va. at 477-78, 248 S.E.2d at 148-49. We relied on the reasoning of Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976): What is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine. Id. at 276, 96 S.Ct. at 2958 (emphasis added). In Bassett, 222 Va. at 852, 284 S.E.2d at 849, we held that future dangerousness could reasonably be inferred from the fact that a defendant had committed additional crimes within six months of his release on parole from a 99-year sentence for armed robbery. That fact, we noted, tended to show a predisposition to commit other crimes upon release from custody. The evidence here is equally relevant and probative on the issue of future dangerousness. In addition to showing a predisposition to commit acts of increasing violence after punishment for earlier crimes, it demonstrates that Pope was undeterred by the constraints of parole supervision. The court correctly overruled Pope's objection.
On appeal, Pope contends that the cumulative effect of the trial court's erroneous rulings and the overzealousness of the Commonwealth's Attorney so inflamed the passion and prejudice of the jury to cause them to award the death penalty. Because we have found no error in the trial court's rulings, we reject Pope's cumulative-effect argument. See Wise, 230 Va. at 335, 337 S.E.2d at 723. Pope does not specify, nor does our independent review of the record disclose, any showing of prosecutorial overzealousness.
Pope argues, finally, that the death penalty, as applied here, is excessive and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in other capital murder cases. At the penalty phase of the trial, Pope's mother testified that he had had attendance and discipline problems in school as an adolescent, and that he dropped out of school and began having problems with the law. His parole officer testified that Pope had been convicted of four misdemeanors when he was 18 years old: unlawful concealment of property, two petit larceny convictions, and carrying a concealed weapon. At the age of 19, Pope was convicted of felonious assault and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to eight years for the shooting and two years for the firearm offense. He served 29 months of those 10 years, was released on parole in October 1985, and committed the present crimes three months later while still on parole. Pope's criminal record demonstrated an escalating tendency toward violence. The jury heard the testimony of Pope's parents, who testified that he could become a good citizen; a corrections officer, who testified that Pope had been a good prisoner; and a psychiatrist, who opined that although Pope acted on impulse and did not know how to handle circumstances he could nevertheless function adequately in a structured environment. The jury also properly took into account the unprovoked and sudden nature of the violence Pope employed on the two victims in this case, who were unarmed and constituted no threat to him, as well as the unnecessary degree of deadly force he chose to employ to accomplish his purpose of robbery and to quell resistance. There was sufficient evidence before the jury to support its conclusion that there was a probability ... that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society. Code § 19.2-264.4(C). Pursuant to the requirements of Code § 17-110.1(C), we have reviewed the record and have determined that the sentence of death was neither imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, nor is it excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. In making the latter determination, we have accumulated and reviewed the records in all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court since the present statutes became effective, giving particular attention to those cases in which the death penalty was based solely upon the future dangerousness predicate, i.e., Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 302 S.E.2d 520, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 202, 78 L.Ed.2d 176 (1983); Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 284 S.E.2d 844 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct. 1996, 72 L.Ed.2d 458 (1982); Evans v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 766, 284 S.E.2d 816 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038, 102 S.Ct. 1741, 72 L.Ed.2d 155 (1982); Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 266 S.E.2d 94 (1980); and Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972, 100 S.Ct. 1666, 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980). From that review, we are satisfied that juries in Virginia generally impose the death penalty in similar cases. Finding no error in the record, we decline to commute the death sentence and will affirm the several convictions and the judgments appealed from. Affirmed.