Opinion ID: 6325455
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The reasonable-time filing requirement

Text: {¶ 51} Another preliminary issue is whether Bethel waited too long to file his motion for leave. As noted above, Bethel’s counsel acknowledges that Bethel may have obtained Summary 86 in 2008. At the latest, Bethel discovered the document in May 2017, when Withers provided him with an affidavit reiterating the statement Withers had made to investigators. This means that there was a delay of at least 16 months—and perhaps much longer—between the discovery of Summary 86 and the filing of the motion for leave. {¶ 52} The court of appeals held that it was within the trial court’s discretion to deny Bethel’s motion for leave because this delay was unreasonable. 2020-Ohio1343 at ¶ 24. In so holding, the court of appeals followed a rule adopted by most other courts of appeals—that under Crim.R. 33(B), a defendant seeking leave to file a motion for a new trial must do so within a reasonable period of time after discovering the new evidence on which he relies. Id. at ¶ 19. See also State v. Thomas, 2017-Ohio-4403, 93 N.E.3d 227, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.) (collecting cases). {¶ 53} Crim.R. 33(B) does not give a deadline by which a defendant must seek leave to file a motion for a new trial based on the discovery of new evidence. The rule states only that a defendant must show that he was “unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence upon which he must rely.” Courts nevertheless have concluded that a convicted defendant must file a motion for leave within a reasonable period of time after discovering the new evidence, to prevent defendants from deliberately delaying filing the motion “in the hope that witnesses would be unavailable or no longer remember the events clearly, if at all, or that evidence might disappear.” State v. Stansberry, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 71004, 1997 WL 626063,  (Oct. 9, 1997). Bethel offers several reasons why we should reject this rule. He argues that the rule discourages defendants from conducting full investigations before seeking a new trial, ignores the fact that defendants often lack the resources necessary to seek relief promptly after discovering new evidence, and wrongly 19 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO assumes that defendants will delay filing a motion simply to gain an evidentiary advantage at a potential new trial. {¶ 54} We need not weigh the pros and cons of requiring defendants to seek leave to file a delayed motion for a new trial within a reasonable time after discovering new evidence. We instead must examine whether the Rules of Criminal Procedure permit trial courts to impose this additional hurdle on criminal defendants. In doing so, we apply general principles of statutory construction. See State ex rel. Office of Montgomery Cty. Pub. Defender v. Rosencrans, 111 Ohio St.3d 338, 2006Ohio-5793, 856 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 23. Those principles instruct that our role is to apply the language in Crim.R. 33(B) as written “without adding criteria not supported by the text.” State v. Taylor, 161 Ohio St. 3d 319, 2020-Ohio-3514, 163 N.E.3d 486, ¶ 9. {¶ 55} Crim.R. 33(B), again, does not establish a timeframe in which a defendant must seek leave to file a motion for a new trial based on the discovery of new evidence. Courts have justified imposing a reasonable-time filing requirement by relying on Crim.R. 1(B) and 57(B). See, e.g., Thomas at ¶ 8; State v. York, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2000 CA 70, 2001 WL 332019, -4 (Apr. 6, 2001). Neither of those rules supports the imposition of a reasonable-time filing requirement. {¶ 56} Crim.R. 1(B) provides that the Rules of Criminal Procedure “shall be construed and applied to secure the fair, impartial, speedy, and sure administration of justice, simplicity in procedure, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” Requiring a defendant to seek leave to file a motion for new trial within a reasonable period of time after discovering the new evidence could help to further some of these objectives, most notably the elimination of delay. But that does not mean that Crim.R. 1(B) authorizes a court to narrow a defendant’s opportunity to seek a new trial. Crim.R. 1(B) instructs courts to construe Crim.R. 33(B)—that is, to explain its meaning. In requiring defendants to seek leave within a reasonable time after discovering new evidence, courts have not construed Crim.R. 33(B); they have 20 January Term, 2022 simply added a requirement that makes sense to them. Crim.R. 1(B) does not authorize the creation of a new requirement that has no foundation within Crim.R. 33(B) itself. {¶ 57} Crim.R. 57(B) also does not support the creation of a reasonable-time filing requirement. Crim.R. 57(B) provides that “[i]f no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules of criminal procedure, and shall look to the rules of civil procedure and to the applicable law if no rule of criminal procedure exists.” Crim.R. 33(B), of course, already prescribes the circumstances under which a defendant may seek leave to file a motion for a new trial. Crim.R. 57(B) does not authorize a court to establish a new procedure when a rule of criminal procedure already governs. {¶ 58} We hold that the court of appeals erred when it held that it was within the trial court’s discretion to deny Bethel’s motion for leave based on Bethel’s failure to file the motion within a reasonable time after discovering Summary 86.