Opinion ID: 794672
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Plaintiffs' Correspondence is Protected by the Statute

Text: 67 Riverboat contends that the plaintiffs' correspondence with the Coast Guard is not entitled to statutory protection under § 2114 because it did not constitute a report. In support of this contention, Riverboat relies upon Garrie v. James L. Gray, Inc., 912 F.2d 808 (5th Cir.1990). In its view, Garrie stands for the proposition that § 2114 requires a formal complaint be made to the Coast Guard. The district court did not accept this argument. First, it noted that, although the plaintiffs' October 10th letter did not use[] the catch-word `report,' it is hard to imagine that Congress would have intended for such specificity, given that the statute itself does not prescribe the manner in which such a report must be made. R.191 at 21. The district court concluded that the October 10th letter to the Coast Guard satisfied this requirement. In that letter, the plaintiffs did not merely seek information. Rather, they made a specific complaint about the limited endorsement on the COI and sought its removal: they reported what they believed was a violation of a safety law. Id. 68 Whether a particular form of communication qualifies as a report under § 2114 is a question of law that we review de novo. See Olson v. Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 366 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir.2004) (holding that we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo). As always, when approaching a question of statutory interpretation, we begin with the plain wording of the relevant statutory provision[]. United States v. Vitrano, 405 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir.2005). 69 When read in isolation, the term report arguably could have more than one meaning. 20 However, we do not read a word or words of a statute in isolation; rather, we read them in the context in which they appear in the provision. When read in its entirety, the purpose of § 2114 is quite clear. Its import is to ensure that the United States Coast Guard receives accurate and timely information about the violation of safety regulations so that it in turn may fulfill its statutory obligations to keep vessels and those who voyage in them safe and to keep the lanes of maritime transportation free from hazards and impediments. From the Coast Guard's perspective, being always prepared 21 requires timely and accurate information. In this context, we cannot attribute to Congress the intent to give the term report a narrow or formal meaning. Seamen are not professional report writers; they staff ships and have the skills necessary to their appointed role on the crew and to ensure the vessel's safe and efficient passage. The obvious point of the term report in § 2114, plainly and fairly read, is to require that the crew member's message to the Coast Guard addresses a safety violation and contains sufficient detail to apprise the Coast Guard of the nature of the alleged violation. To require any further formality would narrow the statute in a manner that Congress clearly avoided, and, in the process, would frustrate the clear purpose of the provision. 70 We note that our interpretation of the statutory language comports with the legislative history of the provision. Section 2114 was intended as a response to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Donovan v. Texaco, Inc., 720 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.1983). See S.Rep. No. 98-454, at 12 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4831, 4842. Donovan, which was decided before seamen were covered by a specific retaliatory discharge provision, involved an engineering officer who corresponded with the Coast Guard in a manner similar to the plaintiffs in this case. He placed a phone call to the Coast Guard to complain about the condition of certain generating equipment on the vessel; after he was demoted, and later terminated, he filed suit under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), claiming that his discharge was motivated by retaliatory animus. The Fifth Circuit held that OSHA's prohibition against retaliatory discharge of a complaining employee does not apply to seamen. Donovan, 720 F.2d at 828-29. Congress signaled its disagreement with the result in Donovan by enacting § 2114. It made clear that, although OSHA does not forbid retaliation against seamen, termination for corresponding with the Coast Guard also should be protected by statute. Notably, Congress took this action even though the Donovan plaintiff never memorialized his complaint in a formal written statement. This history — coupled with Congress' decision not to define report in the statute or in the course of discussing Donovan in the relevant legislative history — supports the conclusion that § 2114 does not require a formal complaint, or even a written statement, as a prerequisite to statutory whistleblower protection. 22 71 This conclusion is bolstered by the holding of the only other federal appellate case to address the requirements of § 2114. In Garrie, 912 F.2d 808, the plaintiff had placed a phone call to the Coast Guard to discuss his employer's violation of a regulation setting maximum working hours for officers on the vessel. The plaintiff identified himself, but not his employer; he never indicated to the Coast Guard that he wished to file a complaint; and he testified that his main purpose in calling was to get information about running times and to verify his understanding of the applicable rules, rather than to request that the Coast Guard take any particular action. Id. at 812 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit concluded that, because the plaintiff did [not] reveal the name of his employer or the vessel upon which he was employed — information without which the Coast Guard could not investigate or prosecute a violation — the communication could not be considered a report. Id. Although Riverboat relies on this case as establishing that § 2114 requires a formal complaint be made by the seaman, we instead believe that Garrie held simply that, had sufficient information been conveyed to the Coast Guard, such as the name of the seaman's vessel, his employer and the nature of the safety violation, the communication would have been within the ambit of the statute's protection despite the absence of a formal complaint. So long as the correspondence makes clear that the seaman is reporting a specific regulatory violation with respect to a vessel, the statute protects the reporting crew member. 72 Therefore, the plaintiffs' October 10th letter clearly qualifies as a report: It identified the company responsible for the alleged regulatory violation, the vessel in question, the plaintiffs' employer, as well as the Coast Guard department that had granted the amended COI. In sum, the letter put the Coast Guard on notice that, in the view of the crew members, the ship was being operated in derogation of applicable regulations. This communication was, in both purpose and effect, just the sort of communication protected by the statute. 23