Opinion ID: 1171916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: considerations of similar cases and punishments rendered.

Text: Keith's counsel contends that both sentences of death are excessive and disproportionate punishments compared to other Montana sentences for similar crimes and therefore violate § 46-18-310(3), MCA. Keith cites a statistical analysis to demonstrate that the average sentence for a conviction of deliberate homicide in Montana during 1982 and 1983 was 72 years. Despite these statistics, Keith fails to identify any similar cases where the death penalty was not imposed. Keith's citation to statistics fails because it does not establish that the death sentences are necessarily disproportionate under the facts and circumstances of the present situation. Keith states the death sentences are disproportionate or excessive because no individual or official connected with the case recommended or desired the death sentences. Defendant states the prosecution recommended a term of life and that the rejected plea bargain agreement did not include any death sentence. However, we note that the prosecution did indicate in the early stages of these proceedings that the death penalty might be appropriate. The State did not argue for the imposition of the death penalty at sentencing, but this does not prohibit the District Court from rendering such a sentence when it finds the necessary elements as set forth in §§ 46-18-301 to -310, MCA. Defendant Keith also states that the parole officer preparing the presentence investigation stated a life sentence would insure public safety. The authoring parole officer, however, specifically noted that the District Court might wish to consider the imposition of the death penalty, and avoided making any specific sentence recommendation. Keith also points out that none of the victims' relatives, nor the victims themselves, indicated that the death penalty would be appropriate. Although there were certain victim statements contained in the presentence investigation report, no other victim statement evidence was introduced at the sentencing hearing and defendant presented no additional evidence of this nature for the District Court's consideration. Even assuming all of the living victims and all of the victims' relatives did not favor the death penalty, this would not necessarily control the sentencing decision. We refuse to reverse the sentence based on these contentions. Keith contends that his sentence is disproportionate and excessive when compared to other Montana cases which have resulted in a penalty of death. Montana law requires this Court to conduct such a comparison, considering both the crime and the defendant, and to include in this decision a reference to those similar cases considered. Section 46-18-310(3), MCA. In regards to this consideration, [W]e need not examine every similar case whether appealed or not, rather we need only examine those cases where after conviction the death penalty could have been or was imposed that has reached our attention through the appellate process. State v. Smith (Mont. 1985), 705 P.2d 1087, 1108, 42 St.Rep. 463, 490. This Court has affirmed the death penalty for a total of four criminal defendants since the landmark case of Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859. In Smith, we engaged in an examination and comparison of the following three cases: State v. McKenzie (1976), 171 Mont. 278, 557 P.2d 1023, vac. (1977), 433 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 2968, 53 L.Ed.2d 1089, on remand (1978), 177 Mont. 280, 581 P.2d 1205, vac. (1979), 443 U.S. 903, 99 S.Ct. 3094, 61 L.Ed.2d 871, cert. denied (1979), 443 U.S. 912, 99 S.Ct. 3103, 61 L.Ed.2d 877, on remand (1980), 186 Mont. 481, 608 P.2d 428, cert. denied (1980), 449 U.S. 1050, 101 S.Ct. 626, 66 L.Ed.2d 507; State v. Coleman, (1979), 185 Mont. 299, 605 P.2d 1000, cert. denied (1980), 446 U.S. 970, 100 S.Ct. 2952, 64 L.Ed.2d 831; and State v. Fitzpatrick (1980), 186 Mont. 187, 606 P.2d 1343, cert. denied (1980), 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct. 252, 66 L.Ed.2d 118. At the time of the Smith case, these were the only three cases arising in Montana since 1973, the effective date that the death penalty could be imposed for the crime of aggravated kidnapping in which the victim [was] killed. Smith, 705 P.2d at 1108, 42 St.Rep. at 490. The Smith decision included the following descriptions of the circumstances involved in each of these three cases: The defendant in McKenzie, supra, was charged with deliberate homicide and aggravated kidnapping as a result of the bludgeoning death of Lana Harding. The District Court imposed the death penalty for both offenses and this Court affirmed following remand from the United States Supreme Court McKenzie, supra, 581 P.2d 1205. The victim was found draped over a grain drill; partially nude; with a rope tied around her neck; and severely beaten about the head and body. Death had been caused by severe blows inflicted by Duncan McKenzie, the defendant. In Coleman, supra, Dewey Coleman was sentenced to death following the jury's verdict of guilty of the crime of aggravated kidnapping. The defendant raped Peggy Harstad, beat her about the head with a motorcycle helmet, attempted to strangle her with a nylon rope and finally held her in the Yellowstone River until she drowned. The defendant in Fitzpatrick, supra, was convicted of deliberate homicide, aggravated kidnapping and robbery and was sentenced to death for the homicide and kidnapping of Monte Dyckman. The victim was found dead lying on the passenger seat of his car with his hands tied behind his back. Monte Dyckman had been shot twice with a gun held less than six-inches from his head. The homicide resulted from the perpetration of the robbery. Smith, 705 P.2d at 1108, 42 St.Rep. at 490. The defendant in Smith, supra, was convicted, pursuant to guilty pleas, of two counts of aggravated kidnapping and two counts of deliberate homicide. State v. Smith (Mont. 1985), 705 P.2d 1087, 42 St.Rep. 463, cert. denied (1986), 474 U.S. 1073, 106 S.Ct. 837, 88 L.Ed.2d 808. While in the process of stealing a car, defendant Smith abducted and shot two victims in the head at point blank range with a sawed-off, single-shot, bolt action .22 rifle. At his sentencing hearing, Smith indicated he committed the murders because he did not wish to leave any witnesses to his car theft and that he had had a morbid fascination to find out what it would be like to kill somebody. Smith, 705 P.2d at 1089, 1090, 42 St.Rep. at 465. Smith constitutes the fourth case in which this Court has affirmed the penalty of death since the Gregg case in 1976. Keith argues his crimes were not nearly as heinous or perverse as those cited above. However, we find it neither convincing nor controlling that some might say Keith's actions were not as heinous or perverse as those other Montana cases which have generated a death penalty. In comparison to these past cases, we find defendant Keith's crimes are of a sufficient magnitude to qualify for capital punishment. Keith alleges he had no malicious plan to take a life. He contends his only true original intent was to commit a robbery. Instead, his intentions were escalated out of control due to his desire to escape and that the death of Shryock was the result of an incompetent and negligent response by law enforcement officials. Therefore, he concludes that capital punishment is disproportionate and excessive under these facts. The record demonstrates that Keith abducted a young boy at gun point and clearly stated he would kill the youth if his demands were not met. Keith buttressed his claim by forcing the barrel of the gun against the youth's head. It is difficult to imagine how one would not classify this scenario as a malicious plan to take a life. The youth was released only after he was replaced with another hostage, Harry Shyrock, who thereupon became a kidnap victim, held at gunpoint by Keith. Keith classifies Shryock as a volunteer hostage. Although Shryock's actions were noble, they were not voluntary. A volunteer offers himself for a service free of compulsion. Shryock offered his presence in exchange for the youth's freedom and his actions were therefore not free from compulsion and cannot be classified as voluntary. As previously mentioned, Keith fired a shot at a clerk in the store which could have resulted in her death. The District Court concluded that the killing by Keith was in execution style, and that Keith took Shryock's life because he did not want to die alone. After a careful review of the entire record, we conclude that the circumstances of this crime are directly comparable to the four cases previously considered in Montana. While the circumstances of the killing by Keith are not identical to these four cases, clearly his crime is properly classified as both heinous and perverse and of sufficient magnitude to qualify for capital punishment in a comparable manner to the other four cases reviewed in Montana. We hold that capital punishment is not disproportionate or excessive under the facts of the present case.