Opinion ID: 2982687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compensability of meal breaks

Text: Our court applies the “predominant benefit” test from Hill v. United States, 751 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1984), to determine whether a meal period is compensable under the FLSA. In Hill, we concluded that a meal period was not compensable where a United States Postal Service worker remained responsible for the undelivered mail and other items in his truck during his break, but was not subject to interruptions from customers during his meal period nor required to eat in or within sight of his truck. Id. at 812, 815. We explained that a meal period is not compensable “[a]s long as the employee can pursue his or her mealtime adequately and comfortably, is not engaged in the performance of any substantial duties, and does not spend time predominantly for the employer’s benefit.” Id. at 814. The employee bears the burden of establishing that she performs substantial duties and spends her meal time predominantly for the employer’s benefit. See id. at 813–15. In Myracle v. General Electric Co., 33 F.3d 55, at  (6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished), we addressed whether a lunch break was compensable when maintenance mechanics were required to maintain responsibility for their machines and to remain on call during their lunch break in case the machine malfunctioned. We held that, given that the -6- Case No. 14-5497 Jones-Turner, et al. v. Yellow Enterprise Systems, LLC, et al mechanics were free to leave the plant if they wished to do so and were only rarely interrupted for emergencies or power outages, these occasional interruptions were de minimis and did not render a meal period compensable. Id. Yellow required its employees to radio the dispatcher to request a lunch break. EMTs had to eat within one mile of an assigned stand-by location. If the crews were “out of unit,” they had to maintain radio contact and were subject to any available run. They were expected to answer the radio after the first call. However, there was no policy that employees remain in the truck for lunch, and plaintiffs introduced no evidence that they were ever told they had to eat in the truck. Nor do the plaintiffs cite any evidence that while on a lunch break they were required to perform duties beyond responding to a call, or that once approved for a lunch break they were frequently interrupted by radio contact. As in Hill and Myracle, Yellow’s policies do not indicate that the plaintiffs were engaged in substantial duties during their lunch break. Other circuits have found that meal breaks were not compensable under the FLSA when employees were subject to emergency calls but could otherwise use their time for their own purposes. See Henson v. Pulaski Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531, 536 (8th Cir. 1993). The outcome here might be different if the plaintiffs had introduced evidence that they were required to stay in their trucks or to drive or perform other duties while eating. See Reich v. S. New England Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that meal breaks were compensable because the employees were required to remain on-site and perform duties such as providing security or ensuring safety at the sites, even if those activities were “passive” and the employees were permitted to eat their lunch). Because there is no such evidence here, we affirm the district court’s judgment that the meal breaks were not compensable under the FLSA. -7- Case No. 14-5497 Jones-Turner, et al. v. Yellow Enterprise Systems, LLC, et al