Opinion ID: 1971691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Doctrine of Continuing Jurisdiction

Text: The District of Columbia long ago accepted the general doctrine of the courts of the United States . . . that jurisdiction over the custody and support of children in divorce cases is a continuing one. . . . Demonet v. Burkart, 23 App.D.C. 308, 315 (1904); see also Clark v. Clark, 485 A.2d 621, 622-23 (D.C.1984) (citing prior cases for the proposition that D.C.Code § 16-914 gives [the] trial court continuing jurisdiction over issues of custody and child support even where the decree is silent as to custody or child support); Alves v. Alves, 262 A.2d 111, 117 (D.C.1970) (The jurisdiction acquired by the trial court in a proceeding for divorce is one of continuing jurisdiction over the issues of custody and child support. This is true even though the decree is silent as to custody or child support. (footnotes omitted)); Trotter v. Trotter, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 213, 213, 183 F.2d 997, 997 (1950) (The continuing jurisdiction of a court of equity in such circumstances [where the divorce decree is silent as to custody and support] to deal with the custody and maintenance of a minor child is well established.); Elkins v. Elkins, 55 App.D.C. 9, 11, 299 F. 690, 693 (1924) ([I]t has become the established practice in divorce cases for courts, after a final decree for divorce and alimony, to make suitable orders in the same case for the maintenance of the minor children of the parties.). Mr. DeGroot argues that because the original divorce decree contained no express provision for child support the Superior Court cannot now add one. This is not correct. Continuing jurisdiction includes the power to issue a child support order even though the initial divorce decree is silent on the matter. See Alves v. Alves, 346 A.2d 736, 738 (D.C.1975) (We do not view the absence of a prior court order as a bar to trial court consideration on the merits of a motion to increase support for the son.); see also Elkins, 55 App.D.C. at 11, 299 F. at 693 (in cases wherein the decree is simply for divorce, alimony, and custody in the mother, the court may afterwards add an order for the father to furnish maintenance). Clark dealt with a plaintiff who returned to Superior Court, seeking to reduce arrearages to judgment several years after the court had entered a final judgment for absolute divorce. 485 A.2d at 622. The arrearages had accrued under a separation agreement that had not been incorporated and merged into the judgment for absolute divorce, or ratified by the court in the initial judgment. Id. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to modify the decree, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the original divorce action did not adjudicate any issue as to support or maintenance and the Final Order was silent as to support and maintenance. . . . Id. Reversing, this court dealt with the jurisdictional issue by simply reaffirming the power of the court to make orders for support when the judgment for divorce is silent on support and does not incorporate the separation agreement. Id. No case of this court suggests that subject matter jurisdiction to issue a support order expires if all the parties have left the jurisdiction. Addressing the issue of continuing jurisdiction to enforce a support order, we have rejected the view that a court with initial jurisdiction over a question of child support should, without more, lose authority to enforce the decree if both parents move to other jurisdictions. Desai v. Fore, 711 A.2d 822, 825 (D.C.1998). In Desai, the plaintiff asked the Superior Court to enforce a child support order after all the parties had moved away from the District. Id. at 823. The Superior Court concluded that its jurisdiction was not dependent on continued residence of the parties. Id. at 824. This court affirmed, holding that [t]o conclude otherwise would deprive a court of meaningful ability to enforce its orders when nothing has changed except the residence of one or both parents. Id. at 825. In Elkins, the mother sought to increase an allowance for maintenance of their child after the father had moved to New Jersey. Although the court granted an increase, the father failed to comply, and he later challenged the jurisdiction of the court. Discussing both personal and subject matter jurisdiction, the court of appeals concluded that the defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of the court. . . . 55 App. D.C. at 10-11, 299 F. at 692-94. The trial court had acquired jurisdiction when the suit was begun, and [t]hat jurisdiction continued so long as was necessary to make effective the court's orders and decrees in the determination of the [custody, care, and maintenance of the child.] Id. at 10, 299 F. at 693. Mr. DeGroot acknowledges that he has not challenged the personal jurisdiction of the court regarding modifying the divorce decree. Instead, he asserts that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to modify that judgment by adding an order for child support. He suggests that Elkins addressed only an issue of personal jurisdiction. As we have indicated, however, the court discussed principles of continuing subject matter jurisdiction, not simply personal jurisdiction. Elkins, 55 App.D.C. at 11, 299 F. at 693. Even if Desai is properly understood as dealing only with enforcement, not amplification, of a court order, Mr. DeGroot offers no reason why its underlying principles should not guide us here. To the contrary, we find the court's reasoning enlightening: [W]e can find no viable public interest to support [the] view that a court with initial jurisdiction over a question of child support should, without more, lose authority to enforce [or modify] the decree if both parents move to other jurisdictions. Desai, 711 A.2d at 825. Ultimately, however, this case turns on whether the legislature has limited the reach of continuing jurisdiction.