Opinion ID: 2632213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Imposition of Sanction Costs; Refusal to Limit Sanction to One Co-Plaintiff; Refusal to Delay Imposition of Sanction Pending Retrial; Refusal to Permit Counsel to Pay Sanction Costs on Behalf of Clients

Text: Terry takes issue with the imposition of the sanction itself; the trial court's refusal to limit the sanction to her co-plaintiff, Sprague, who violated the order by his testimony; the trial court's refusal to delay imposition pending retrial; and the trial court's refusal to permit counsel to pay the sanction on his clients' behalf. Terry essentially argues the trial court lacked authority through either rule or statute to impose the costs sanction against her for causing the mistrial. We believe the authority for both the sanction and the method of assessment is founded in the inherent authority of all courts to take actions reasonably necessary to administer justice efficiently, fairly, and economically and [to ensure] the court's existence, dignity, and functions. [5] 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 43 at 363 (1995). As this Court noted in Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District Court of Ninth Judicial District of Fremont County, 735 P.2d 709, 714 (Wyo.1987) (emphasis added): It is unquestioned that courts have inherent powers beyond those specified in rules and statutes that are absolutely necessary to the courts' ability to perform the functions for which they were created.... ... [I]t is said that courts possess an inherent power described as an extremely narrow range of authority involving activity so fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms `court' and `judicial power.' Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562, 77 A.L.R.Fed. 751 (3rd Cir.1985). This power is essential to the separation of powers concept and allows a court to act notwithstanding contrary legislative direction. There is also an inherent power that is described as necessary to the efficient functioning and prompt and just disposition of litigation and business of the court . . . . Finally, there is an inherent power to take such action as is useful to the efficient functioning of the court. The record contains no transcripts of the trial, except the excerpt of Sprague's brief testimony previously referenced, and contains no transcripts for any of the subsequent related hearings. As this evidence is unavailable, we must assume the trial court conducted itself in a reasonable and rational manner. The trial court issued a detailed Order Granting Mistrial and subsequent Order Awarding Costs by which it clearly justified the declaration of mistrial and the sanction on the basis of the plaintiffs' violation of the pretrial order. The trial court's reduction of the attorney fees by more than $6,000 demonstrates its careful review. Based on the trial court's actions, there is a presumption that it determined the violation of its pretrial order to be deliberate. The court's reasons for refusing to limit the sanction to Sprague were clearly spelled out. The violation of the pretrial order occurred in the presentation of the case in chief being presented (a) on behalf of both Plaintiffs, and (b) in support of the Amended Complaint seeking damages on behalf of both Plaintiffs. (Emphasis added.) The court logically concluded that the plaintiffs, acting in concert to obtain damages, should be sanctioned in concert for misconduct. Terry also asserts error that the trial court did not delay imposition of the costs pending retrial. To this Court, the sanction appears aimed at bringing the parties into essentially the same financial position with regard to the litigation as they held prior to the mistrial. Further, it appears to be intended to deter the plaintiffs from again violating a trial court order with impunity. Neither of these purposes would be met if assessment were withheld pending retrial. Terry argues the trial court erred in refusing to permit her counsel to pay the costs on behalf of his clients. The trial court made it clear that the sanction was to be paid by the plaintiffs because the mistrial was a direct consequence of their violation of the pretrial order. The intended deterrent effect of the sanction on Terry would have been undermined by permitting her counsel to cover the payment. On the basis of these particular facts and circumstances, we find the trial court acted within its inherent authority to ensure its efficient functioning and the prompt and just disposition of litigation. An inherent power to impose the sanctions has been recognized because of the special circumstances, although support for those sanctions may not be found in particular rules and legislative enactments. Bi-Rite Package, Inc., 735 P.2d at 716. As the sanction was within the trial court's inherent authority, so too was the method and manner of assessment.