Opinion ID: 4509912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: conclusion

Text: Given the foregoing, the decision of the district court is affirmed. Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices BRODY and MOELLER, CONCUR. STEGNER, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I think that the issue regarding whether the award of restitution was unfounded was preserved on appeal. Not only do I think it was preserved, I think it was meritorious. Villa-Guzman’s counsel objected to the State’s request for restitution, arguing that restitution was inappropriate. Defense counsel stated, I think almost all of [the restitution] is attributable to the State going forward on the felony [sic], and to lose on the felony counts and dismiss the felony counts and then turn around and ask to be reimbursed for the entire cost of law 7 enforcement, including the State going to trial, I don’t think it’s the purpose of the statute for restitution in this matter, and I think given the overall facts around it that there should be no restitution in this case. Following the State’s arguments concerning restitution, the district court stated, “I have not looked at [the request for restitution] yet, so what I will do is look at it and issue an order, and then if you want to object it to [sic], then, certainly, object to it.” The majority relies on State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 700, 760 P.2d 27, 39 (1988), for the proposition that if a district court reserves a ruling on an issue, a litigant must continue to object in order for the issue to be preserved on appeal. However, Hester concerned a motion in limine regarding the admissibility of evidence during trial. Id. In that case, this Court stated, [t]he trial judge . . . may decide that it is inappropriate to rule in advance on the admissibility of evidence based on a motion in limine, but may defer his ruling until the case unfolds and there is a better record upon which to make his decision. In such an event, a litigant who has made a motion in limine requesting advance rulings on the admissibility of evidence must continue to assert his objections as the evidence is offered or his objections are not preserved. Id. The rule announced in Hester does not apply in this case for two reasons. First, there was no need for the record to be developed further. This was the end of the proceedings. There had been a trial, Villa-Guzman had been sentenced, and restitution was the only matter left unresolved. Defense counsel objected to restitution because the vast majority of the restitution sought resulted from the prosecution of Villa-Guzman’s felony offenses. However, VillaGuzman was not convicted of any felonies. The only charge that resulted in a conviction was misdemeanor frequenting. As a result, the district court should have taken the objection into consideration in its decision whether to award restitution. Second, an order on a motion in limine is not immediately appealable as a matter of right, while an order awarding restitution is. Such an order is an appealable judgment under I.A.R. 11(c)(9). Once the judgment was entered, the forty-two day time clock to file a notice of appeal began to tick. I.A.R. 14(a). Requiring a defendant to file an objection to an appealable judgment, puts the defendant between a rock and a hard place: she must file the objection or run the very real risk of running out of time to file an appeal. For these reasons, I think the preservation rule articulated by the majority today places an unnecessary procedural hurdle on a defendant who wishes to appeal an order granting restitution. Accordingly, I would find the issue has been preserved and also address the issue on its merits. 8 Upon reaching the merits, I would vacate the order of restitution and remand the case to the district court because Villa-Guzman’s argument is meritorious. The cost sheet used to calculate the award of restitution does not differentiate between costs incurred on the felony charges and the costs incurred on the lone successful misdemeanor charge. Idaho Code section 37-2732(k) only allows restitution to be awarded for expenses actually incurred in prosecuting charges that result in a conviction. Considering Villa-Guzman was only convicted of one misdemeanor charge, any award of costs incurred based on the felonies (or the misdemeanor which resulted in an acquittal) is not supported by law. Accordingly, I would hold that the district court abused its discretion in awarding the entirety of the restitution sought. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 9