Opinion ID: 66418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Uncharged Criminal Activity

Text: “We review the district court’s admission of prior crimes or bad acts under [Rule 404(b)] for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005). “An abuse of discretion arises when the district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.” United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir. 2005). To be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior bad acts generally must withstand a three-part test: (1) the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than defendant’s 7 character; (2) the probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice; (3) the government must offer sufficient proof so that the jury could find that defendant committed the act. United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (discussing these three prerequisites as part of a two-step test).3 We also have held that evidence of uncharged criminal activity is intrinsic, and thus not subject to Rule 404(b), if it arose from the same transaction as the indicted crime, is necessary to complete the story of the crime, or is inextricably intertwined with the evidence required to prove the charged offense. United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000). Even if the evidence meets one of these exceptions, it may still be excluded if “its probative value ‘is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.’ ” United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 721 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 403). On appeal, Goodwin does not dispute that the evidence was necessary to complete the story of the crime and was inextricably intertwined with the evidence 3 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981. 8 regarding the charged offense. Rather, he contends that the evidence was wrongly admitted because its prejudicial impact substantially outweighed its probative value. We disagree. The evidence was highly probative to explain how Russaw had Goodwin’s cell phone number and knew that Goodwin was selling crack cocaine. Moreover, the district court offered a limiting instruction as to the proper purpose of the admitted evidence. See United States v. Padron, 527 F.3d 1156, 1160 (11th Cir. 2008). We therefore cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this portion of Russaw’s testimony.