Opinion ID: 3177408
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Village’s Respondeat Superior Liability

Text: Because we conclude that a new trial is required, we need not consider the parties’ remaining arguments.100 Nonetheless, we offer some guidance regarding one more issue that is likely to recur at trial: whether the District Court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a municipality may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior. The Village’s argument that Judge Spatt erred in this respect is meritless. As the Village rightly points out, a municipality may not be held liable under §§ 1981 or 1983 for an injury inflicted by its agents unless “the challenged acts were performed pursuant to a municipal 99 See Hester, 225 F.3d at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted). Namely, defendants’ arguments that the District Court erred in denying 100 defendants’ Rule 59 motion for a new trial, because the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence; that the District Court improperly coerced the jury to render a verdict; that the District Court erred in denying remittitur; and that the District Court awarded unreasonably high attorneys’ fees to Barrella. Similarly, we need not consider Barrella’s argument that the District Court erred in declining to award additional compensation to offset the negative tax consequences of his receiving his damages for front and back pay as a lump sum. 42 policy or custom.”101 But for two reasons, that argument carries no weight in the present case. First, Barrella sued under both § 1981 and Title VII, the latter of which does indeed permit respondeat superior liability.102 Since the same substantive standards govern claims under both statutes,103 a verdict that Hardwick intentionally discriminated against Barrella within the meaning of § 1981 would, absent any other defenses, entail a violation of Title VII—and, thus, respondeat superior liability for the municipality. Second, even under § 1981, a municipality may be held liable for the actions of high‐ranking officials with final policymaking authority.104 In particular, even a single adverse employment action, “if ordered by a person whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, can, by itself, support a claim against a municipality.”105 Here, Freeport concedes that Hardwick exercised “the sole authority to appoint a Chief of Police.”106 The Village may 101 Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (2013) (discussing 102 vicarious liability under Title VII in the context of workplace harassment). See Wiercinski, 787 F.3d at 113. 103 See Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 315. 104 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 105 Village Br. 11. 106 43 therefore be held liable in the event that the jury finds that Hardwick intentionally discriminated against Barrella on the basis of race. 107