Opinion ID: 2016366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Before addressing the merits, this court must raise on its own motion the question of jurisdiction over this appeal. See Larsen v. Ralston Bank, 236 Neb. 880, 464 N.W.2d 329 (1991). The jurisdictional question in this case concerns whether the trial court's order barring the Hendersons' action regarding the roof, but not regarding the drainage system, constitutes an appealable, final order. In the absence of a judgment or order finally disposing of a case, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to act and therefore must dismiss the purported appeal. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1911 (Reissue 1989); Wicker v. Waldemath, 238 Neb. 515, 471 N.W.2d 731 (1991). Generally, an order is final if it disposes of the whole merits of the case and leaves nothing for further consideration by the court. Id. When substantial rights of the parties to an action remain undetermined and the cause is retained for further action, the order is not final. Lewis v. Craig, 236 Neb. 602, 463 N.W.2d 318 (1990). In P.R. Halligan Post 163 v. Schultz, 212 Neb. 329, 322 N.W.2d 657 (1982), this court held that an order dismissing one theory of recovery, while a second theory arising out of the same cause of action remains pending for trial, is not an appealable, final order. A single cause of action is presented in this case. The Hendersons seek to recover damages arising from a contract of sale on the grounds of fraud. Two separate instances of alleged fraud are pled, one involving Forman's statements concerning the condition of the roof and the other involving his representation as to the effectiveness of the underground drainage system. It is difficult to conceive of any theory that would allow separate or successive actions to recover based on each single act. Under any reasonable construction only one cause of action is pled. Therefore, the trial court's order barring the Hendersons' action as it relates to the roof only is not a final order, and this court must dismiss the appeal. However, because this case will have to be retried, we observe that the limitations period applicable to a tort action for fraud is 4 years. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-207(4) (Reissue 1989). The 4-year period is deemed to accrue upon discovery of the fraud. Id. As used in reference to a statute of limitations, discovery occurs when an individual acquires knowledge of a fact which existed but which was previously unknown to the discoverer. Broekemeier Ford v. Clatanoff, 240 Neb. 265, 481 N.W.2d 416 (1992). In the context of a fraud action, the limitations period begins to run upon discovery of the facts constituting the fraud, or facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on an inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to such discovery. If the fraud or mistake ought to have been discovered, the statute will run from the time such discovery ought to have been made.... Id. at 273, 481 N.W.2d at 421, quoting Lee v. Brodbeck, 196 Neb. 393, 243 N.W.2d 331 (1976). Here, the trial court held that the Hendersons should have discovered the facts supporting their claim regarding the roof prior to April 2, 1982. The court reasoned that [d]iscussions with roofers, [Henderson's] personal inspections of the roof, experience with leaks, and ready access to discover the structural support for the roof, (either from physical examinations, or from the plans for the building), all lead to that conclusion. The trial court obviously found that Henderson's conversation with Forrest Rose, Sr., in June 1980 should have put the Hendersons on inquiry notice of the roof's defects. This is the position taken by the Formans in their brief as well. Such an approach represents a misapplication of the discovery rule relating to fraud actions. To recover in an action for fraud based upon a misrepresentation of fact, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant made a representation of a material fact; (2) the representation was false; (3) the representation, when made, was known to be false or was made recklessly as a positive assertion without knowledge concerning the truth of the representation; (4) the representation was made with the intention that the plaintiff would rely on it; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; and (6) as the result of such reliance, the plaintiff suffered damage. Broekemeier Ford, 240 Neb. at 271, 481 N.W.2d at 420, quoting Edwin Bender & Sons v. Ericson Livestock Comm. Co., 228 Neb. 157, 421 N.W.2d 766 (1988). In this case, Henderson testified that he would not have entered into the contract as written had he known of the roof's defects. In other words, had they known the true nature of the roof, the Hendersons would have either not entered the contract at all or done so on terms reflecting the true condition of the premises. Thus, the act which the Hendersons performed in reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was entering into the contract, and the damage caused was payment of an inflated price. With this background in mind, it becomes apparent that the cause of action relating to the roof did not accrue at the time of Henderson's conversation with Rose. This conversation occurred approximately 2 weeks prior to the signing of the contract on June 29, 1980. A cause of action cannot accrue before occurrence of all the elements which constitute a defendant's violation of a plaintiff's judicially protected right. See Givens v. Anchor Packing, 237 Neb. 565, 466 N.W.2d 771 (1991) (Shanahan, J., dissenting). Reliance on the alleged misrepresentations and damage resulting therefrom are necessary elements of a cause of action for fraud. Broekemeier Ford, supra . At the time of Henderson's conversation with Rose, the Hendersons had not yet decided whether to enter into the contract and thus lacked any reason to sue the Formans. It cannot be said that their cause of action for fraud accrued at that point. As we noted in Henderson I, Henderson's conversation with Rose is relevant to the issue of whether the Hendersons reasonably relied on Forman's assurances in entering into the contract. Whether the Hendersons relied upon these assurances at all, and if they did whether such reliance was reasonable in the face of Rose's warning, are questions of fact. Resolution of these questions does not relate to the statute of limitations, but to whether the fraud occurred in the first place. APPEAL DISMISSED. BOSLAUGH, J., concurs in the result.