Opinion ID: 1700831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does SDCL 7-8-32 provide the exclusive remedy available to Weger?

Text: SDCL 7-8-32 provides: Appeal to the circuit court from decisions of the board of county commissioners, as provided in this chapter, is an exclusive remedy. Judicial review of county commission action shall be allowed only as provided in §§ 7-8-27, 7-8-28, 7-8-29, 7-8-30, and 7-8-31. SDCL 7-8-27 provides for appeal by persons who have suffered individual and personal grievances by the county's actions. We have previously stated in reference to SDCL 7-8-27 that this statute provides for an appeal from decisions of the board of county commissioners only to such persons who suffer personal or individual grievances, as distinguished from those grievances suffered by taxpayers or the public generally. Simpson v. Tobin, 367 N.W.2d 757, 760 (S.D.1985) (citing Houser v. Olmstead, 57 S.D. 41, 230 N.W. 224 (1930)). Weger claims because he has not suffered an individual or personal grievance, he is not a person aggrieved, so that SDCL Ch. 7-8 does not apply as his exclusive remedy. He concludes, therefore, that a declaratory judgment action under SDCL Ch. 21-24 is available to him. However, SDCL 7-8-27 is not the only avenue provided for appealing a decision by the county commission. In Houser, we noted the statutes authorize: two separate and distinct classes of appeal from decisions of the board of county commissioners, one by `any person aggrieved,' and the other by the state's attorney in the name of the county ... and that these two classes of appeal are distinct, originated in our law at different times, and are for the protection of entirely different interests. Houser, 230 N.W. at 225 (referring to § 5886 R.C. 1919, the predecessor statute to SDCL 7-8-27 and 7-8-28). [1] SDCL 7-8-28 sets forth procedures for general taxpayers' challenges to county commission decisions and provides, in relevant part: Upon written demand of at least fifteen taxpayers of the county, the state's attorney shall take an appeal from any action of such board if such action relates to the interests or affairs of the county at large or any portion thereof, in the name of the county, if he deems it to the interest of the county so to do.... This statute gives the state's attorney discretion in determining the merits of any action. State ex rel. Cook v. Richards, 61 S.D. 28, 245 N.W. 901 (1932); Barnum, 220 N.W. 135 (providing extensive discussion on the operation of the predecessor statute to SDCL 7-8-27 and 7-8-28). Upon filing the petition with the required signatures, SDCL 7-16-2 provides for the appointment of a state's attorney pro tem where the state's attorney abuses his discretion by an unjustifiable refusal to act or has a conflict of interest. [2] Simpson, 367 N.W.2d at 761. In Barnum, we declared the method for providing an appeal by general taxpayers, under the predecessor statute to SDCL 7-8-28, is exclusive. Barnum, 220 N.W. at 138. We have, on numerous occasions, noted that the strict limitations on the availability of taxpayer challenges to county commission actions were enacted to help reduce the number of lawsuits brought by taxpayers in order to prevent continued and unnecessary interference with the conduct of public affairs. Simpson, 367 N.W.2d at 761 (citing Holmes v. Miller, 71 S.D. 258, 23 N.W.2d 794 (1946); Richards, 245 N.W. at 906). This goal does not deny a taxpayer the ability to bring a grievance involving the public interest before the circuit court for review. The legislature has, however, limited the taking of such appeals by three conditions precedent: 1) the commission's action must relate to the interests or affairs of the county; 2) there must be written demand of at least fifteen taxpayers; and 3) the state's attorney must deem it in the county's interest to appeal. Richards, 245 N.W. at 906. In Wold v. Lawrence County Commission, 465 N.W.2d 622 (S.D.1991), we held the statutes under SDCL Ch. 7-8 provided the exclusive remedy for taxpayers who failed to comply with service of process requirements under SDCL 7-8-29 and, subsequently, attempted a collateral attack on the trial court's order of dismissal by seeking a declaratory judgment. The taxpayers in Wold were aggrieved persons who initially brought an action under SDCL 7-8-27. We noted the plain language of SDCL 7-8-32 provided that an action under SDCL Ch. 7-8 was the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy: The plain language of the statute clearly establishes that individuals dissatisfied with county commission decisions can only seek relief by direct appeal of that decision to the circuit court. The legislature has clearly and unequivocally spoken to this point. It is unnecessary for this court to engage in the often complex task of statutory interpretation when the statute under consideration is clear and unambiguous. The word exclusive is defined in its ordinary sense to mean sole and not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others. Black's Law Dictionary 506 (5th ed. 1979). Clearly, Wolds' sole remedy to seek review of Commission's decision was only by direct appeal. Wolds had no right to proceed with a declaratory judgment action to attack collaterally a decision which they failed to properly appeal. ... It is a firmly established rule of law that a party cannot have an equitable remedy if an adequate legal remedy is available. Wold, 465 N.W.2d at 624. See also Thies v. Renner, 78 S.D. 617, 106 N.W.2d 253 (1960) (direct appeal pursuant to statute was the exclusive remedy to persons seeking appeal of school board decision; review of the board's decision could not be accomplished by seeking injunctive relief). Weger relies on Simpson, 367 N.W.2d 757, to support his contention that he may maintain his claim by a declaratory judgment action. Simpson is clearly distinguishable in that it held the appeal statutes of SDCL 7-8 were not applicable to the facts of that case. Therein, the county had already made the disputed payment to an attorney hired by the county commission, and thus, in reality, the case was an action against the attorney to return the payment and not against the county. It is only in cases where the appeal statutes of SDCL 7-8 could not give the requested remedy, that they are not considered to be an exclusive remedy. Simpson, 367 N.W.2d at 761; cf. Lick v. Dahl, 285 N.W.2d 594 (S.D.1979). Weger argues that, in reality, he has no remedy pursuant to SDCL 7-8-28 in that the Pennington County States Attorney, who provided legal advice to the AQB, would refuse to proceed with an appeal should Weger obtain the fifteen signatures to invoke the provisions of that statute. Given the fact that Weger made no attempt to procure this petition and the minimal number of needed signatures, his theoretical argument has no basis in fact. Had he properly filed his petition, he could have availed himself of SDCL 7-16-2 which allows for the appointment of a state's attorney pro tem by the circuit court where the state's attorney has a conflict of interest or unjustifiably refuses to act. These appeal statutes clearly attempt to strike a proper balance between the necessity of county government to operate in an efficient and orderly fashion and the right of its citizens to pursue injustices in the courts of this state through an appeal process. We agree with the observation of the trial court in this case that the appeal statutes protect the public and individual citizens from the unfettered whims of a county commission. However, the overall effect of [Weger's] action, if it were permitted to exist, would be to place a Circuit Court Judge in the position of being a one person county commission. That was never meant to be. Our prior holdings on taxpayer actions stand for the proposition that where there is a remedy by appeal, that remedy must be followed, rather than actions in equity or at common law. Simpson, 367 N.W.2d at 761. SDCL 7-8-28 offers Weger a remedy by appeal and in Barnum we declared it the exclusive remedy; therefore, an action in equity for declaratory judgment is not available to Weger. This result is consistent with prior case law and with SDCL 7-8-32's exclusivity provision. Weger's declaratory judgment action was properly dismissed by the trial court against the county and we, therefore, affirm.