Opinion ID: 1676965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: What is a Stage of the Proceedings?

Text: At the time of the adoption of Article I, § 13's right to counsel provision, the basic test was well-settled for determining whether a confrontation was a stage of the adverse judicial criminal proceedings requiring the assistance of counsel. The United States Supreme Court never completely rejected the functional critical stages analysis articulated in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). Instead, the Court merely limited the temporal application of that test to the period of time following the initiation of adverse judicial criminal proceedings. Under the two part test that began to evolve in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972) (plurality opinion) a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel turns not only on the initiation of adverse judicial criminal proceedings but also on whether the uncounselled confrontation to which the defendant was subjected was of a critical nature. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 2003, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970). Therefore, even after the attachment of the right to counsel, not all activity involving the defendant constitutes a critical stage. For instance, the Court made clear in Wade itself that various preparatory steps, such as systematized or scientific analyzing of the accused's fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like are not critical stages because there is minimal risk that the absence of defense counsel at such stages might derogate from the defendant's right to a fair trial. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-228, 87 S.Ct. at 1932. Accordingly, while limiting its temporal scope, the Court adhered to the same functional critical stages test that required it to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice. Id. at 227, 87 S.Ct. at 1932. Because there is no evidence in the text or drafting history of Article I, § 13 to indicate that the drafters and ratifiers intended to deviate from the established test for when the assistance of counsel is necessary during adverse judicial criminal proceedings, we conclude that a functional approach similar to that set forth in Wade should be used to decide whether a confrontation is a stage of the proceedings at which a person is entitled to assistance of counsel under our state constitution. There is no indication that the drafters and ratifiers intended to disrupt the balance that the functional analysis test had struck between the two basic societal objectives of protecting the individual's rights and providing an effective system of law enforcement.