Opinion ID: 4328257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims VII and VIII

Text: Patricia argued that Lane was “estopped” from challenging the validity of the loan to Patricia. Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at A694. The district court concluded that Lane was estopped and that claims VII and VIII, in which he asserted the loan to Patricia was invalid, could be dismissed based solely on Lane’s position before the 1 In his notice of appeal, Lane identified the final judgment and four specific orders that (1) denied his motion for leave to amend his complaint; (2) granted defendants Matthew and Colleen Lane’s motion to dismiss them from the case and to dismiss claim VI; (3) granted a motion to dismiss claims VII and VIII against defendants Hathaway and Kunz PC, Scott Meier, and Lucas Buckley; and (4) granted summary judgment to Patricia on claims VII, VIII, and IX. But in his appellate brief, Lane challenges only the grant of summary judgment to Patricia. He has therefore waived our consideration of all the district court’s other rulings. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that issue not raised in opening brief is waived). 7 bankruptcy court that the loan was valid. In support, the court relied on a statement in a prior appeal Lane took from a bankruptcy court order that “‘[l]itigants are barred from adopting views that are inconsistent with their previous positions in the same or related litigation.’” Id. at A695 (quoting Lane v. Barney (In re Lane), No. 15-CV-114-J, 2015 WL 12915111, at  (D. Wyo. Aug. 13, 2015), citing United States v. 198.73 Acres of Land, More or Less, 800 F.2d 434, 436 (4th Cir. 1986)). Lane has not meaningfully challenged the district court’s estoppel ruling.2 Although he acknowledges it, he then argues that the district court erroneously excluded evidence that Patricia repudiated the loan in 2013. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 16–17. But he has not explained, nor do we see, how any alleged error in excluding evidence of repudiation affects the estoppel ruling. Lane has therefore waived our review of the estoppel ruling. See Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1031 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Where an appellant lists an issue, but does not support the issue with argument, the issue is waived on appeal.”). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment on claims VII and VIII. To the extent Lane contends there are disputed issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on those claims,3 or that the 2 Similarly, in the district court, Lane did not address Patricia’s estoppel argument. 3 The alleged disputes include (1) the date the loan agreement was signed; (2) whether Patricia was DFWU’s manager or a DFWU fiduciary when she signed the loan agreement on its behalf or when funds were transferred from DFWU to her own account; and (3) whether Patricia directed or had a role in the purchase and sale of shares of money within DFWU and Penobscot Pension. 8 district court prematurely determined that Wyoming’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act applied to claim VIII instead of Arizona’s version, his arguments pertain only to the district court’s alternative merits analysis of those claims. Because we affirm the district court’s unchallenged estoppel rationale, we need not reach those contentions. See Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389–90 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming on basis of unchallenged alternative disposition).