Opinion ID: 782410
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The CPIA

Text: 74 Schultz contends that the adoption of the CPIA shows that Congress did not intend the NSPA to apply to objects such as the ones he conspired to bring to the United States. The CPIA implements a United Nations convention that was ratified by the United States in 1982, the purpose of which was to achieve greater international cooperation towards preserving cultural treasures that not only are of importance to the nations whence they originate, but also to greater international understanding of our common heritage. S.Rep. No. 97-564, at 21 (1982). 75 The CPIA provides a mechanism for the American government to establish import restrictions on cultural property at the request of another signatory nation and after a determination by the President that (1) the cultural patrimony of [the requesting nation] is in jeopardy from the pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials of [that nation], (2) the requesting nation has taken measures ... to protect its cultural patrimony, (3) the import restrictions are necessary and would be effective in dealing with the problem, and (4) the restrictions are in the general interest of the international community. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(A)-(D) (2003). 76 Schultz argues that the CPIA was intended to be the only mechanism by which the United States government would deal with antiquities and other cultural property imported into the United States. However, nothing in the language of the CPIA supports that interpretation, and the legislative history shows that exactly the converse is true. As the district court correctly noted, Schultz, 178 F.Supp.2d at 449, the Senate Report on the CPIA expressly states that the CPIA neither preempts state law in any way, nor modifies any Federal or State remedies that may pertain to articles to which [the CPIA's] provisions ... apply. S.Rep. No. 97-564, at 22 (1982). Furthermore, the Senate Report states that the CPIA affects neither existing remedies available in state or federal courts nor laws prohibiting the theft and the knowing receipt and transportation of stolen property in interstate and foreign commerce ( e.g., National Stolen Property Act, Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 2314-15). Id. at 33 (emphasis added). 77 The CPIA also bars the importation of items that have been stolen from a museum or other cultural institution in a foreign signatory nation. See 19 U.S.C. § 2607. Schultz argues that because only those items that are stolen from specified places are covered by the CPIA, Congress never intended in any way to limit the import of items stolen only in the sense that they were taken in violation of patrimony laws. This argument is unpersuasive. The CPIA does not state that importing objects stolen from somewhere other than a museum is legal. If, for instance, an artifact covered by the CPIA were stolen from a private home in a signatory nation and imported into the United States, the CPIA would not be violated, but surely the thief could be prosecuted for transporting stolen goods in violation of the NSPA. 78 The CPIA is an import law, not a criminal law; it is not codified in Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure), with the NSPA, but in Title 19 (Customs Duties). It may be true that there are cases in which a person will be violating both the CPIA and the NSPA when he imports an object into the United States. But it is not inappropriate for the same conduct to result in a person being subject to both civil penalties and criminal prosecution, and the potential overlap between the CPIA and the NSPA is no reason to limit the reach of the NSPA. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98-99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (holding that a person may be subjected to civil and criminal penalties for the same conduct without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause). 79 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the passage of the CPIA does not limit the NSPA's application to antiquities stolen in foreign nations. 9 80