Opinion ID: 1983550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: guishard's other contention

Text: Guishard claims that certain statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument mischaracterized him as a man with an attitude towards women. He argues that these comments were prejudicial and inflammatory and that the court committed reversible error in overruling his objection to them. In his summation the prosecutor argued that the gun was in the dresser drawer, not on the person of either appellant, because both men were shirtless [20] and believed they had nothing to fear in making a sale to two women. Elaborating on this theory, the prosecutor reminded the jury of Guishard's own testimony, in which he said several times that he had just awakened from a nap and felt uncomfortable being without a shirt in the women's presence. Guishard further stated that the arresting officer (also female) was watching him use the bathroom before she announced her presence. The prosecutor suggested that Guishard's comments were not logical but merely reflected his attitude towards women. In reviewing claims of improper comment by a prosecutor during closing argument, we must first consider whether the comment was improper. McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991) (citing cases). If we conclude that it was, we must then decide whether it resulted in substantial prejudice. Scott v. United States, supra, 619 A.2d at 924; McGrier, supra, 597 A.2d at 41. The test for determining substantial prejudice is: whether we can say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (citation and footnotes omitted). We find no impropriety in the prosecutor's remarks in this case. A prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence, Jones v. United States, 512 A.2d 253, 257 (D.C.1986) (citing cases), and we need not assume that the jury drew the most damaging inference from what the prosecutor said. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1872-1873, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). Moreover, even if we were to find that the prosecutor's remarks were improper, they do not meet the substantial prejudice test articulated in Gaither, supra, and consistently applied by this court in such cases as Scott and McGrier. The prosecutor's remark about Guishard's attitude, even if we assume it was improper, was only a fleeting comment in a lengthy eight-day trial. Viewing it in the context of the whole record and in light of the government's strong evidence of guilt, we deem it too trivial to worry about. Scott, supra, 619 A.2d at 929.