Opinion ID: 1356584
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant Hudson's Conversations with Farm Bureau

Text: The primary allegation in Plaintiff's complaint is that Defendant Hudson's conversations with Plaintiff's employer amounted to threats to her economic livelihood, an injury that she alleges to be an adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her First Amendment rights. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Defendant Hudson's statements were designed to both pressure Ms. Fritz to discontinue attending Comstock meetings and express opinions on Comstock issues publicly and privately and discontinue petitioning Comstock for a redress of grievances, as well as pressure Farm Bureau to move out of Comstock or terminate its relationship with Ms. Fritz or both. (Dist.Ct.Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 29). This factual allegation may be better understood as an inference from what Defendant Hudson is alleged to have communicated to Plaintiff's employer rather than a fact that must be accepted as true for purposes of evaluating the motion to dismiss. Still, Plaintiff's factual allegations, construed in the most favorable light for her position, show that Defendant Hudson communicated his dislike and opposition to her speech and commented on his opinion of its effect on her reputation and on the reputation of Farm Bureau in Comstock. While Plaintiff may not have pled specific facts to support her claim that Defendant Hudson specifically threatened her business, nor that he attempted to persuade Farm Bureau to terminate its contract with Plaintiff, there is certainly a set of facts which, if accepted by the trier of fact, would entitle [Plaintiff] to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561-63, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (abrogating the no set of facts minimal standard often cited from Conley by requiring more than a mere possibility of such a set of facts). It remains a question of material fact, discoverable through depositions of the parties involved, as to what the exact contents of the conversations were. If Defendant Hudson in fact made statements that were designed to communicate to Farm Bureau that it would be in the business' interest in terms of its dealings in Comstock to reign in Plaintiff's exercise of her First Amendment rights, or that it would be better for Farm Bureau to cancel its contract with Plaintiff, that would be an adverse action sufficient to support a claim of retaliation. The complaint alleged that such threats were made, even if generally alleged, which is sufficient at this stage of the litigation both to put Defendants on notice of the claim and to raise a plausible claim of an adverse action. A person of ordinary firmness would be deterred from engaging in protected conduct, if as a result, a public official encouraged her employer to terminate the person's contract or to have her change her behavior. The fact that the public official did not have the power to actually terminate the employment, see Cohen v. Smith, 58 Fed.Appx. 139 (6th Cir. 2003) (police officers reporting threats by doctor to residency program not an adverse action because they lacked the power to terminate the doctor), makes this case close, but since Defendant Hudson and the other Comstock Defendants did have the power to substantially affect Farm Bureau's ability to do business in Comstock through their role in enacting township ordinances and making zoning decisions, the alleged threats are more tangible. Plaintiff further alleges that many of the statements made by Comstock officials to her employer were false, misleading or both. Defamatory statements motivated in part by a person's exercise of their First Amendment rights can be, but are not always, legally sufficient standing alone for a claim of adverse action under the framework of this Circuit. See Mezibov, 411 F.3d at 722-723 (defamatory comments made by prosecutor did not rise to the level of adverse action for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 retaliation claim). Examples of such statements from Defendant Hudson include statements that Plaintiff was in violation of an ordinance prohibiting solicitation of business clients, that Plaintiff had written a letter to the editor in which she bashed Comstock, and that [Plaintiff] had said things in planning commission meetings that she should not say, that there was a petition in her neighborhood against her, and that she was very antagonistic against Comstock. (Dist.Ct.Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 25-26, 28). Defendants allege that these statements may not suffice as defamation under Michigan tort law because they are either not defamatory or are protected speech: A communication is defamatory if it tends to lower an individual's reputation in the community or deters third persons from associating or dealing with that individual. However, not all defamatory statements are actionable. If a statement cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about the plaintiff, it is protected by the First Amendment. Ireland v. Edwards, 230 Mich.App. 607, 584 N.W.2d 632, 636 (1998) (citing New Franklin Enterprises v. Sabo, 192 Mich. App. 219, 480 N.W.2d 326, 328 (1991); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990)). But the inquiry on a motion to dismiss is not whether Plaintiff will be successful on the merits, but simply whether her pleadings are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Many of the statements could not reasonably be interpreted as expressing facts about Plaintiff, and instead are opinions about Plaintiff's feelings towards Comstock or about the propriety of her speech at public meetings, which, especially if they are considered to be about a matter of public concern, would constitute protected speech under the First Amendment unless they could be objectively proven to be false. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20, 110 S.Ct. 2695 (a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law and the First Amendment provides protection for statements that cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The other statementsthe petition against her and her violations of an ordinanceare potentially defamatory if they are not true since a third party, her employer, might be deterred from associating with her as a result of the statements from Defendant Hudson. Therefore, had the district court reached the state law claims, it most likely should have allowed Plaintiff's defamation claim to survive the motion to dismiss. However, the Court must inquire whether such potentially defamatory statements are sufficient as a matter of law to state a claim that the conduct amounts to an adverse action for purposes of the § 1983 claim. The kinds of statementsboth defamatory and notthat have been interpreted as adverse actions for the purposes of a retaliation claim are of a fundamentally different character than Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant Hudson falsely stated that she was violating ordinances and that there was a petition against in her in the neighborhood. For example, in Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 679-681 (6th Cir.1998), this Circuit found that a sheriff who used a press conference to publicize confidential and embarrassing details of the plaintiff's rape by an unknown assailant in retaliation for the victim's public criticism of the sheriff for failing to diligently investigate the crime did constitute adverse action against the plaintiff. On the other hand, in Mezibov, a prosecutor's statements to the press that a defense attorney was ineffective, looking for a show trial and that the client should ask for his money back were not found to amount to an adverse action despite the court assuming for the purposes of its analysis that the statements were defamatory. 411 F.3d at 722-723. Defendant Hudson's statements were more similar in kind to, and are probably less objectionable than, those in Mezibov rather than those in Bloch because they were not highly embarrassing nor did they impugn Plaintiff's character. While Defendant Hudson's allegedly false claim that there was a petition in the neighborhood against Plaintiff might be sufficient to state a claim of defamation under Michigan law, as might the allegedly false claim that she was violating township ordinances, these potentially defamatory statements were not of such a character that they amounted to an adverse action taken on their own. Some of the alleged content of Defendant Hudson's conversations with Plaintiff's employer expressed Hudson's opinion of her speech and his opinion of its effect on her reputation in Comstock. That kind of speech is probably most akin to protected speech under the First Amendment, falling under Defendant Hudson's right to respond to Plaintiff's criticisms that were made in the public sphere. Samad v. Jenkins, 845 F.2d 660, 663 (6th Cir.1988) (Ironically, plaintiff is accusing defendants of chilling his first amendment freedoms by reserving their own first amendment right to speak out.). Plaintiff argues that because Defendant Hudson's speech was not of a similar typepart of a public meeting or in the pressthat it should not qualify as responding to her exercise of her First Amendment rights. (Appellant's Br. at 18-19). This argument has some merit since a right to respond is usually in a similar forum and often is in direct response to the other party, but the fact that Defendant Hudson's speech was not in a public forum does not divorce it from First Amendment protection, especially if it remains focused on an issue of public concern. See Belk v. City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 879-880 (8th Cir.2000) (a private conversation with a public official may be afforded First Amendment protection, especially concerning a matter of public concern). However, regardless of whether Defendant Hudson's alleged defamatory speech is properly understood as falling within the constitutionally protected right to respond, Plaintiff has alleged more than a mere conclusory allegation that Defendant Hudson attempted to threaten her business relationship with Farm Bureau rather than simply express his opinion of her reputation in the community or to exercise his right of reply. Negative comments made by Defendant Hudson, especially about the possible damage to Farm Bureau's business, are sufficient to rise to the level of a threat to take action tangibly affecting employment status. Samad, 845 F.2d at 663. After the conversations, Plaintiff's employer requested that she change her behavior in the community, and ultimately Farm Bureau terminated its contract with Plaintiff. While these factual allegations are not directly relevant to whether Comstock officials took actions that are cognizable as an adverse action, these facts do support Plaintiff's theory that Defendant Hudson's statements were designed to threaten her economic livelihood. Since few aspects of one's life are more important than gainful employment, it is likely that a person of ordinary firmness would be deterred by this conduct.