Opinion ID: 2657202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DoubleTap’s Intent

Text: “Evidence that the alleged infringer chose a mark with the intent to copy, rather than randomly or by accident, typically supports an inference of likelihood of confusion.” Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 527 F.3d at 1055. The district court held that the intent factor favored DoubleTap, based on a lack of similarity in the marks and Hornady’s failure to produce direct evidence of DoubleTap’s intent to copy. Aplee. Br. Att. 12. Hornady argues that it did produce evidence creating a factual issue regarding intent, namely, circumstantial evidence creating an inference of DoubleTap’s intent to copy. On summary judgment, however, a nonmovant is entitled to only those inferences that are “reasonable.” Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1143. In this case, the district court correctly held that Hornady’s inferences were not reasonable. First, Hornady argues that an intent to copy can be inferred from the fact that, at the time of its founding, DoubleTap was aware of “Hornady and its products.” Aplt. Br. 61. This inference fails: “When we have said that evidence - 11 - of intent to copy may justify an inference of likelihood of confusion, we have been referring to copying a particular mark, not copying a competitor’s product.” Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1157. Whether DoubleTap’s founder was aware of Hornady and its products is irrelevant to whether DoubleTap adopted its mark intending to copy the TAP mark: “The intent to compete by imitating the successful features of another’s product is vastly different from the intent to deceive purchasers as to the source of the product.” Id. at 1158 (quoting Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 745 (2d Cir. 1998)). Second, Hornady argues that an intent to copy can be inferred from the fact that, after Hornady sent DoubleTap a cease-and-desist letter in January 2010, DoubleTap accelerated its marketing efforts apparently to capitalize on the alleged confusion. Aplt. Br. 61-62. This inference also fails. Under the intent factor, the alleged infringer’s intent is measured at the time it “chose” or “adopted” its mark. See Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1157 (collecting cases). In analyzing intent, we look to evidence of “the process of choosing” a mark, not evidence of events subsequent to its adoption. See id. at 1159. Evidence of DoubleTap’s mindset in 2010, when it became aware of Hornady’s claim of infringement, is irrelevant to its mindset in 2002, when it adopted the “DoubleTap” mark. Because, as we mentioned, DoubleTap adopted a mark dissimilar to Hornady’s, and because no evidence demonstrates DoubleTap’s intent to copy Hornady’s mark in 2002, this factor weighs in DoubleTap’s favor. - 12 -