Opinion ID: 1919806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the state failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty of murder, or in the alternative, whether the jury's verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence?

Text: Upon reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, all of the evidence consistent with the defendant's guilt is accepted as true together with any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 838 (Miss. 1991); Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 703 (Miss. 1988); Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203, 212 (Miss. 1985). This Court may reverse only where the evidence such that reasonable and fair minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 808 (Miss. 1987). If there is in the record substantial evidence of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, the verdict of guilty is thus placed beyond our authority to disturb. McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 133-34 (Miss. 1987). Gossett argues that there was no evidence of malice aforethought to support a conviction of murder. He argues that the victim was shot spontaneously during a scuffle proving manslaughter at best. Malice aforethought is defined as the equivalent of deliberate design. [D]eliberate always indicates full awareness of what one is doing, and generally implies careful and unhurried consideration of the consequences. `Design' means to calculate, plan, contemplate ... deliberate design to kill a person may be formed very quickly, and perhaps only moments before the act of consummating the intent. Windham v. State, 520 So.2d 123, 127 (Miss. 1988). Given this definition of malice aforethought, the evidence was sufficient to show that Gossett had the requisite intent necessary for the charge of murder. In fact, the evidence indicated that before Gossett fired the first shots, it was the victim and May who were involved in the physical altercation while Gossett stood nearby. The evidence sufficiently demonstrated that Gossett had ample time to form the requisite intent for the crime of murder. While there certainly was an evidentiary basis for the crime of manslaughter, the trial court properly granted a manslaughter instruction and the jury nevertheless unanimously agreed that Gossett was guilty of murder. We find that the evidence produced by the prosecution was sufficient to establish the remaining elements required to uphold the jury's verdict of murder against Gossett. The prosecution introduced eyewitnesses and physical evidence which directly implicated his guilt. Gossett produced evidence in his defense implying that the jury was mistaken as to the identity of the true killer. That evidence only went towards the weight to be afforded the testimony of each individual witness. The jury must be left to resolve matters regarding the weight and credibility of the evidence. McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993). The evidence of May's involvement in the crime was also sufficient for the jury to find the requisite intent and the remaining elements necessary to convict him of murder. In support of his argument on appeal, May merely offers the version of the events which he alleged at trial. It was the jury's duty, however, to resolve any factual discrepancies which may have been elicited from the evidence produced at trial. Each defendant additionally argues that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence requiring a new trial. A new trial will be not granted by this Court unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Johnson v. State, 642 So.2d 924, 928 (Miss. 1994); McNeal v. State, 617 So.2d 999, 1009 (Miss. 1993); Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1983). This Court must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict, and a reversal is warranted only where the trial court abused its discretion by denying the movant a new trial. Johnson, 642 So.2d at 928. As this Court stated in Gandy v. State, 373 So.2d 1042 (Miss. 1979), Jurors are permitted, indeed have the duty, to resolve the conflicts in the testimony they hear. They may believe or disbelieve, accept or reject, the utterances of any witness. No formula dictates the manner in which jurors resolve conflicting testimony into findings of fact sufficient to support their verdict. That resolution results from the jurors hearing and observing the witnesses as they testify, augmented by the composite reasoning of twelve individuals sworn to return a true verdict. A reviewing court cannot and need not determine with exactitude which witness or what testimony the jury believed or disbelieved in arriving at its verdict. It is enough that the conflicting evidence presented a factual dispute for jury resolution. Shannon v. State, 321 So.2d 1, 2 (Miss. 1975). Gandy, 373 So.2d at 1045. We find that the overwhelming weight of the evidence summarized supra proved that the defendants were guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury returned a verdict consistent with this conclusion. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' request for a new trial.
The lower court denied Mars request for the following self-defense jury instruction: INSTRUCTION D-M-4 The Court instructs the jury that the Defendant, Eric Owayne May, was entitled to act upon appearances, and if the conduct of the deceased was such as to induce in the mind of a reasonable person, situated as he was, under the circumstances then existing, and viewed from the standpoint of the Defendant, Eric Owayne May, a fear that death or great bodily harm was about to be inflicted by the deceased on him, it does not matter if there was no such danger provided that the jury believes that the Defendant, Eric Owayne May, acted in self-defense from real and honest convictions; then the jury should find the Defendant, Eric Owayne May, not guilty, even though they may believe that at the time he was mistaken and that he was not in any great danger. The trial judge refused to grant this instruction stating that it was an incorrect statement of the law not supported by the evidence. The court instead granted the following self-defense jury instruction: INSTRUCTION NO. S-4 The Court instructs the jury that to make a killing justifiable on the grounds of self-defense, the danger to the defendant must be either actual, present and urgent, or the defendant must have had reasonable grounds to apprehend a design on the part of the victim to kill him or to do him some great bodily harm, and in addition to this he must have reasonable grounds to apprehend that there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. It is for the jury to determine the reasonableness of the defendant's acts. The evidence produced at trial indicated that Gossett fired at the victim first ending the scuffle between the victim and May. May contends in his brief that he shot the victim believing that it was the victim firing shots at him. He claims that this fact required the trial court to grant his requested self-defense instruction D-M regarding a mistaken belief as to imminent danger. The trial court did not deny a self-defense instruction altogether, but instead granted the self-defense instruction presented by the State. Where one jury instruction adequately covers the defendant's theory of self-defense, the trial court may properly refuse to grant a second instruction on the grounds that it is redundant or cumulative. Cook v. State, 467 So.2d 203, 210 (Miss. 1986); Evans v. State, 467 So.2d 957, 959 (Miss. 1984). The State's self-defense instruction S-4, like instruction D-M-4, instructed the jury that May was entitled to the defense of self-defense if he had a reasonable apprehension of imminent danger. While the State's granted instruction did not explicitly explain that May could have mistakenly believed to be in imminent danger and still have been entitled to have acted in self-defense, the instruction did make self-defense applicable in the situation where May possessed a reasonable apprehension of imminent danger and the victim had the apparent ability to inflict harm. May argues that the granted instruction was not cumulative in that it did not properly instruct the jury to consider the circumstances existing at the time of the incident from his viewpoint as the defendant. See Windham v. State, 91 Miss. 845, 852, 45 So. 861, 862 (1908) (stating that defendant was erroneously denied instruction stating that jury should not expect from the defendant the same cool and calm judgment they would presently possess, but instead they should judge the defendant's acts by the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the incident); Johnson v. State, 42 So. 166 (Miss. 1906) (same). While instruction S-4 may not have specifically addressed this point, the instruction was nevertheless a correct statement of the law on self-defense. This Court has expressly approved the instruction submitted to the jury in the case sub judice, and additionally, we have urged prosecutors to employ this same self-defense jury instruction in the future. Robinson v. State, 434 So.2d 206, 207 (Miss. 1983); see Flowers v. State, 473 So.2d 164, 166 (Miss. 1985) (overruling Robinson to extent that it merely criticized instead of condemned instruction which it replaced). Thus, instruction S-4, as a whole, accurately guided the jury on the law of self-defense.
The State's murder instruction S-2 [1] was submitted to the jury over May's objection. May does not contend that the jury instruction was an erroneous statement of the law regarding murder. He instead maintains that the evidence was not sufficient for the trial court to have submitted a murder instruction to the jury in the first place. As indicated above, we find that the evidence was sufficient to convict May of murder. Consequently, there was an evidentiary basis for the granting of the State's murder instruction S-2. This assignment of error is without merit.