Opinion ID: 75978
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: McMahon Factor One: MMWA's Text

Text: 19 The MMWA's text does not expressly prohibit arbitration and, in fact, fails to directly mention either binding arbitration or the FAA. Nevertheless, the Davises argue that the MMWA reserves strictly a judicial forum for consumers by providing a private right of action for consumers. The Supreme Court, however, has held that a statute's provision for a private right of action alone is inadequate to show that Congress intended to prohibit arbitration. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29, 111 S.Ct. at 1653-54 (rejecting the argument that binding arbitration is improper because it deprives claimants of the judicial forum provided for by the ADEA). As the Fifth Circuit recently recognized, binding arbitration generally is understood to be a substitute for filing a lawsuit, not a prerequisite. Walton, 298 F.3d at 475 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S.Ct. at 3354) (By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum.). Furthermore, the fact that the MMWA grants a judicial forum with concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts for MMWA claims is insufficient evidence that Congress intended to preclude binding arbitration. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227, 107 S.Ct. at 2338 (rejecting the argument that compulsory arbitration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is improper because the statute provides that [t]he district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title....); see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29, 111 S.Ct. at 1654 (noting that Congress' grant of concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts for ADEA claims is consistent with binding arbitration because arbitration agreements, `like the provision for concurrent jurisdiction, serve to advance the objective of allowing [claimants] a broader right to select the forum for resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise') (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483, 109 S.Ct. at 1921). 20 The Davises also argue that because § 2310(d) lists only two exceptions to the private right of action, the internal dispute settlement procedure referenced in § 2310(a) and the class action exception referenced in § 2310(e), 3 Congress intended to preclude any other method of dispute resolution, including binding arbitration. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20, 100 S.Ct. 242, 247, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979) ([W]here a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it. When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode.) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The § 2310(a) exception to a consumer's private right of action states that, if a warrantor establishes an informal dispute settlement procedure, a consumer must resort to the procedure before pursuing any legal remedy under this section respecting such warranty. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(c). Section 2310(a) also states that the consumer may not commence a civil action ... unless he initially resorts to such procedure and that [i]n any civil action arising out of a warranty obligation and relating to a matter considered in such a procedure, any decision in such procedure shall be admissible in evidence. Id. Based on this language, the Davises assert that Congress intended to allow only non-binding alternative dispute resolution procedures. We disagree. 21 In Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Ga., Inc., we noted that the district court erred in concluding that, standing alone, the presence of the non-binding § 2310 mechanism in the statutory text requires the conclusion that Magnuson-Moss claims may not be the subject of binding arbitration agreements. 253 F.3d 611, 619 (11th Cir.2001). The fact that the MMWA regulates § 2310(a) informal dispute settlement procedures does not mean that the Act precludes a court from enforcing a valid binding arbitration agreement. See id. at 620 (noting that a statute's provision for one out-of-court settlement mechanism does not necessarily preclude the enforcement of all alternative mechanisms); see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29, 111 S.Ct. at 1654 (holding that the ADEA's provision for out-of-court dispute resolution is not inconsistent with permitting arbitration under the FAA and that it even suggests that out-of-court dispute resolution, such as arbitration, is consistent with the statutory scheme established by Congress). Thus, we are unpersuaded that Congress intended to bar binding arbitration agreements in the language of the MMWA. 22