Opinion ID: 2442122
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Categorization of Contempt as a Crime

Text: [¶ 16] St. Onge also argues that the court did not have authority to charge a new Class D crime of criminal contempt out of thin air. [¶ 17] We review a court's interpretation of procedural rules de novo. Town of Poland v. T & M Mortg. Solutions, Inc., 2010 ME 2, ¶ 6, 987 A.2d 524, 526. By its plain language, Rule 66(c) provides that a plenary contempt proceeding for punitive sanctions shall proceed as provided by the criminal rules for the prosecution of a Class D crime. However, contempt with punitive sanctions is not defined as a Class D crime by rule or statute. Indeed, we have stated that we no longer categorize contempt as either `civil' or `criminal' but, rather, as `punitive' or `remedial.' Manter, 2001 ME 164, ¶ 5, 784 A.2d at 515. The classification of St. Onge's offense as Class D on the summons and on the judgment and commitment form, therefore, was error. [¶ 18] We find, however, that it is highly probable that the court's classification of St. Onge's contempt charge as a Class D crime did not adversely affect his substantial rights, and we disregard the error as harmless. See M.R.Crim. P. 52(a); In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶¶ 24-25, 775 A.2d 1144, 1152 (discussing that there is no significant distinction between the harmless error standards in civil and criminal matters). Nevertheless, we recognize that an adjudication of contempt with punitive sanctions is not a Class D crime, and we modify the judgment accordingly. See M.R.Crim. P. 50.