Opinion ID: 25054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence from Search of Barnett’s Residence

Text: When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress involving a search warrant, we engage in a two-step process: We first determine whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, clarified in United States v. Leon, applies;1 then, if we conclude that the officers did not act in good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant, we determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding that probable cause existed.2 If, however, we are satisfied that the good-faith exception applies, we do not reach the question of probable cause.3 We review the underlying findings of fact for clear error, but we review the determination of good faith de novo.4 Accordingly, we review de novo the district court’s determination of the reasonableness of the executing officer’s reliance on the warrant.
After Barnett’s suppression hearing, the district court determined that (1) there was probable cause for the issuance of 1 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 2 United States v. Cherna, 184 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1999). 3 Id. (quoting United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Principles of judicial restraint and precedent dictate that, in most cases, we should not reach the probable cause issue if a decision on the admissibility of the evidence under Leon will resolve the matter.”). 4 Id. 4 the warrant, (2) the police acted in good faith, and (3) a sufficient nexus between the drug conspiracy and Barnett’s residence justified the search. Barnett contests the district court’s determination of good faith on two grounds: Agent Navarro omitted material facts from his affidavit in support of a search warrant; and the agent failed to establish a nexus between the items searched for and Barnett’s residence. The Fourth Amendment does not require suppression of evidence obtained from an objectively reasonable warrant even if the warrant is later found to be deficient.5 The Amendment requires only that the law enforcement officer’s reliance on the warrant be objectively reasonable. The good-faith exception does not apply, and suppression is an appropriate remedy, under any one or more of four situations: (1) The issuing magistrate was misled by an affiant who knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, provided the affidavit on which the magistrate relied; (2) the magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role and acted as part of the law enforcement team; (3) the law enforcement officer relied on a warrant based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; (4) the warrant itself was so facially deficient that the executing officers could not have reasonably relied on its validity.6 5 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. 6 Cherna, 184 F.3d at 407-08. 5 Satisfied that the district court’s findings are free of clear error, we conclude that none of these four situations is present in Barnett’s case. First, as found by the district court, Agent Navarro, on whose affidavit the magistrate relied, neither materially misstated any facts in his affidavit nor omitted any material facts from it. He was an experienced law enforcement officer who included the relevant aspects of his investigation in his statement to the magistrate. Second, the magistrate did not abandon his judicial role and act as part of the law enforcement team. The district court found that the magistrate was impartial and that he based his decision solely on the information within the four corners of the affidavit. Third, the affidavit and warrant were not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to make reliance on them entirely unreasonable. As we have held, when a warrant is supported by more than a “bare bones” affidavit, officers may assume in good faith that it is valid.7 Here, Agent Navarro’s affidavit detailed the results of the criminal investigation leading up to the seeking and granting of the warrant. It included specific information derived from the surveillance of Barnett and his co-conspirators. Finally, the 7 United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1214 (5th Cir. 1996) (“When a warrant is supported by more than a ‘bare bones’ affidavit officers may rely in good faith on the warrant’s validity. Bare bones affidavits contain wholly conclusory statements, which lack the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently determine probable cause.”) (citing United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.3d 317, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1992)). 6 warrant itself was not facially deficient. It specified the place to be searched and the evidence to be seized, if found. The district court found that Agent Navarro’s affidavit established an ongoing pattern of criminal activity and that it contained nothing to indicate that, after the activity had ceased to operate from B & W, Barnett had moved his drug distribution operation anywhere but to his home. As the actions of the magistrate and the executing officers do not fall into any of the four situations described above, the goodfaith exception applies. The district court correctly concluded that the evidence recovered from the search of Barnett’s residence need not be suppressed. Having decided on the admissibility of the seized evidence under the Leon guidelines, we follow the teachings of Cherna and Craig and decline to address whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause.