Opinion ID: 1707195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Are the Advertisements Misleading.

Text: It is interesting to note that the Committee's own expert, Dr. Haynes, testified the ads were not in fact misleading, and that his survey group, which had actually viewed the ads, agreed. The Committee's argument that they are deceitful is, in fact, an argument that they might mislead the viewer with respect to possible responsibility for court costs and with respect to the extent of the experience of Humphrey and Haas, which the Committee argues is minimal. The majority specifically concludes that the chance of deceit is sufficient to deny first amendment protection [w]ithout suggesting that the advertisements here were deceitful because in the medium defendants chose [television] the public could well be misled by them. It improvises on the four-prong test of Central Hudson by saying that because television is the medium, a mere chance of deceit is sufficient. That theory, however, is not suggested in Central Hudson nor in any other case. The majority draws support for this theory solely from language taken from Bates which, the majority says seems to clearly have recognized the electronic use of [sound, visual displays, and dramatization] as potentially misleading. Bates, however, did not say there was more potential for abuse in electronic advertising, only that the special problems of advertising on the electronic media will warrant special consideration. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384, 97 S.Ct. at 2709, 53 L.Ed.2d at 836. Neither Bates nor the case it cited on this issue even mentioned any increased potential of the electronic media for misleading the public. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F.Supp. 582 (D.C.1971), aff'd sub nom, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindiest, 405 U.S. 1000, 92 S.Ct. 1289, 31 L.Ed.2d 472 (1972). Capital Broadcasting illustrates the sort of special problems referred to in Bates in connection with television advertising. Capital Broadcasting justified a different rule for television advertising, not because it was likely to be misleading, but because it was nonselective. In effect, television was thought to be reaching too large an audience; children, who were being exposed to intensive cigarette advertising, were considered likely to be adversely affected by it. Television advertising by lawyers, on the other hand, cannot be considered objectionable merely because television is nonselective, and the rationale of Capital Broadcasting is inapposite. Yet, the majority seizes on Bates' special problems language used in connection with the Court's reference to Capital Broadcasting as authority for its broad assertion of power in restricting television advertising. I do not think this language of Bates was intended to grant such a broad exercise of state power. I believe the Supreme Court has actually made it clear that regardless of the medium used, advertising must be more than possibly misleading in order to be denied first amendment protection. In In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982), the Court addressed the matter of untruthful advertising: [T]he Court has made clear in Bates and subsequent cases that regulationand imposition of disciplineare permissible where the particular advertising is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates that a particular form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive. Id. at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at 73-74 (Emphasis added.) A further indication that more than a possibility of deceit would be required is found in R.M.J. 's discussion of two prior cases in which first amendment protection was denied for professional advertising or solicitation. In discussing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978), the R.M.J. Court said the possibility of `fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of vexatious conduct' was so likely in the context of in-person solicitation that such solicitation could be prohibited. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at 74. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in discussing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 887, 59 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979), the Court noted that first amendment protection on the use of trade names by Texas optometrists could be prohibited in view of the considerable history in Texas of deception and abuse worked upon the consuming public through the use of trade names. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at 74. (Emphasis added.) The Court in R.M.J., after discussing Ohralik and Friedman, summarized the rule: [W]hen the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proven that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the states may impose appropriate restrictions. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203, 102 S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at 74. R.M.J. involved printed advertising. There is no indication that a different rule would apply to television advertising, yet the Committee does not even attempt to meet the test. Even if I were to accept the plaintiff's possibility-of-deceit argument, which I do not, I believe the record here still falls short of establishing any reasonable likelihood that this would happen. The majority points to two aspects of the advertisements which it claims might well be misleading: (1) the statement that certain cases will be handled on a percentage basis without mention of court costs might be construed as an offer of cost-free services according to the majority; and (2) the advertisements could be construed as a claim of expertise by Humphrey and Haas which in fact is belied by their lack of actual experience. As to the cost issue, it is true the advertisements state that fees will be assessed on a percentage basis (without stating a percentage rate) but do not mention court costs. To require a statement concerning costs, however, would go beyond our own advertising rules, which merely require it in the event the ad specifies a contingent fee rate. Even then the advertisement is merely required to disclose whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs. See DR2-101(C). Here, the defendants represent no contingency rate at all, only that the fee would be a percentage. Significantly, also, DR2-101(C) allows a lawyer to advertise [f]ixed fees or range of fees for specific legal services without a caveat about costs, despite the fact that many of the specific legal services listed, such as dissolutions, bankruptcies, and several real estate services, would necessarily involve either court costs or recording fees. The Supreme Court, moreover, has apparently not considered a cost caveat to be necessary for a full disclosure on fees. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 194, n. 3, 102 S.Ct. at 933, n. 3, 71 L.Ed.2d at 68, n. 3 (fees for routine legal services may be advertised; no mention of court costs). As a practical matter, the subject of court costs, affected by the extent of discovery and a myriad of other factors, is so complex as to make it impractical to explain in a thirty-second advertisement. (Testimony showed a thirty-second ad to consist of only about sixty words). Furthermore, any lack of understanding about this matter, or any other matter relevant to the terms of a lawyer's employment, would logically be resolved at the initial conference, which, in this case, was advertised as being free of cost. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 373, n. 28, 97 S.Ct. at 2704, n. 28, 53 L.Ed.2d at 829, n. 28 (1977). I believe the majority's conclusion that the advertisements overstated the lawyers' qualifications is also without support in the evidence. While the record revealed that these were young lawyers just developing a law practice, there is no evidence, nor even a claim, that they were in fact not qualified. While they lacked the experience of many older lawyers, they did have some experience in each of the areas listed, and the evidence showed they possessed above average academic qualifications. The Committee and the majority seem to equate qualification with experience, and there is simply no direct correlation. I believe the claim that this could well be false and misleading is plainly without support.