Opinion ID: 152605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Disability claim based on Spees's transfer to the tool room

Text: Spees next appeals the entry of summary judgment for JMI on her claim that the company prohibited her from welding and transferred her to a tool-room position because it wrongfully perceived her pregnancy to be a disability. The ADA prohibits discrimination by a covered entity against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show (1) that she or he is an individual with a disability, (2) who was otherwise qualified to perform a job's requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) who was discriminated against solely because of the disability. Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1105 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The third element requires that the plaintiff suffer an adverse employment action. Id. In this case, the central dispute over Spees's ADA claim revolves around whether she meets the definition of a disabled person. A disability is defined as (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). This section of the Act was amended in 2009, subsequent to the events giving rise to Spees's lawsuit. But we must analyze Spees's claims pursuant to the earlier version (provided above) because the amendments to the ADA do not apply retroactively. See Milholland v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 567 (6th Cir.2009) (holding that the ADA Amendments Act does not apply to pre-amendment conduct). Spees does not argue that her pregnancy qualified as a disability under subsections (A) or (B); rather, she brings her claim pursuant to the regarded-as provision in subsection (C). Moreover, Spees acknowledges that pregnancy, by itself, does not constitute a disability under the ADA and thus cannot form the basis of a regarded-as claim. This concession comports with the unanimous holdings of the federal courts that have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Richards v. City of Topeka, 173 F.3d 1247, 1250 n. 2 (10th Cir.1999) ([W]e do note that numerous district courts have concluded that a normal pregnancy without complications is not a disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).) (listing cases); Navarro-Pomares v. Pfizer Corp., 97 F.Supp.2d 208, 212 n. 5 (D.P.R. 2000) (observing that the only district judge to have held that pregnancy, by itself, was a disability under the ADA reversed himself in a subsequent case), rev'd on other grounds, Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir.2001). Likewise, the interpretive guideline for the term disability issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in its Compliance Manual excludes pregnancy from its definition of disability. EEOCCM § 902.2(c)(3), 2009 WL 4782107 (Nov. 21, 2009) (Because pregnancy is not the result of a physiological disorder, it is not an impairment.). Spees's ADA claim instead hinges on her contention that JMI erroneously perceived her to be disabled based on her history of conditions with a previous pregnancy. This type of claim exists where (1) an employer mistakenly believes that an employee has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) an employer mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more of an employee's major life activities. Gruener v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 510 F.3d 661, 664 (6th Cir.2008) (brackets and citation omitted). Either application requires that the employer entertain misperceptions about the employee. Id. (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Spees has not alleged that she suffered an actual impairment, so she therefore must show that JMI mistakenly regarded her as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limit[ed] one or more of [her] major life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). Our first step in evaluating Spees's ADA claim is to determine whether her prior miscarriage, or a potentially higher risk of having a future miscarriage, could constitute an impairment. Whereas no court has held that pregnancy by itself is an impairment under the ADA, many district courts have held that pregnancy-related conditions can qualify as such. See, e.g., Navarro, 261 F.3d at 97 (While pregnancy itself may not be an impairment, the decided ADA cases tend to classify complications resulting from pregnancy as impairments.). The EEOC interpretive guidelines also recognize that pregnancy-related conditions can constitute impairments under the ADA. EEOCCM § 902.2(c)(3), 2009 WL 4782107 (Nov. 21, 2009) (Complications resulting from pregnancy... are impairments.). Pregnancy-related conditions have typically been found to be impairments where they are not part of a normal pregnancy. See Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare LLC, No. 2:08-CV-4 RM, 2010 WL 1568606, at  14 (N.D.Ind. Apr.16, 2010) (surveying cases and noting that only abnormal complications might qualify as impairments under the ADA). Susceptibility to a miscarriage, moreover, has been deemed by some courts to be such a condition. See Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F.Supp. 388, 393 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (adopting the American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs' conclusion that a threatened ... miscarriage is a substantial complication not part of an entirely normal, healthy pregnancy); Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95 C 3834, 1997 WL 106257, at  (N.D.Ill. Feb.10, 1997) (holding that the inability or significantly impaired ability to carry a viable fetus to term is ... a `substantial impairment' under the ADA). Although other courts have held that pregnancy complications related to miscarriages are not disabilities, the analysis in those cases did not hinge on the question of whether there was an impairment, but rather on whether the condition was sufficiently severe to substantially limit a major life activity. See, e.g., LaCoparra v. Pergament Home Ctrs., 982 F.Supp. 213, 228 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (concluding that the plaintiff's history of infertility and prior miscarriage were not disabilities where the evidence suggests that, if anything, the existence and impact of the complications were temporary), overruled on other grounds by Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 724 (2d Cir.2001). There thus appears to be a general consensus that an increased risk of having a miscarriage at a minimum constitutes an impairment falling outside the range of a normal pregnancy. In the present case, there is evidence that JMI regarded Spees as having an impairment. Milam testified that because Spees had experienced complications with other pregnancies before, he thought that she should not be working, and he had concerns about her being around the chemicals, the welding smoke, [and] climbing around on some of the jobs. This statement suggests that Milam believed Spees to be especially sensitive to miscarriages in light of the fact that she had experienced one in the past. Milam's testimony therefore constitutes evidence that JMI perceived Spees as having an impairment. Spees must next show that JMI viewed her impairment as substantially limiting a major life activity. The only major life activity Spees points to is that of working. A claim that an employer perceived an employee as being unable to work requires proof that the employer regarded the employee as significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Id. (citation omitted). In evaluating this issue, the regulations accompanying the ADA direct us to consider certain factors. These factors include those used to determine whether an impairment substantially limits any major life activity, namely: (i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(J)(2). The regulations further provide three additional factors where, as here, the major life activity is working: (A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access; (B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or (C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes). 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). In the present case, the evidence supports the conclusion that the tool-room transfer precluded Spees from working in a class of jobs for two reasons. First, JMI viewed Spees as being unable to weld in any capacity, thereby precluding her from employing the skills that she had acquired during the one-month training program for welding. The tool-room position, unlike a welding position, did not require any special training, meaning that Spees was effectively removed to an unskilled position and precluded from utilizing any of the welding training that she had received. JMI's belief that Spees could not perform any type of welding work thus weighs in favor of concluding that she was precluded from working in a class of jobs. Cf. Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir.1995) (holding that a plaintiff was not precluded from working in a class of jobs where an arm injury restricted her from performing any climbing while welding, but did not prevent her from welding in general). The second reason supporting the conclusion that JMI prevented Spees from working in a class of jobs is the fact that it restricted her to light-duty work. In this regard, we are persuaded by the EEOC Compliance Manual, which states, as an example of an employee being unable to work in a class of jobs, that a charging party is substantially limited in working if (s)he has a back impairment that precludes him/her from heavy lifting and, therefore, from the class of heavy labor jobs. EEOCCM § 902.4(c)(3)(ii), 2009 WL 4782109 (Nov. 21, 2009). This dividing line between light-duty and medium- or heavy-duty work for purposes of determining what constitutes a class of jobs has also been previously recognized by this court. See Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 652 (6th Cir.2001) (denying summary judgment on an ADA claim where the employer perceived an employee as unable to perform anything but `light duty' work, and [] perceived that medium to heavy manual labor constituted a majority of the jobs available to her). Here, JMI put Spees on light-duty work immediately upon learning that she was pregnant. Milam was instrumental in transferring Spees to the tool room, going so far as to instruct Spees to obtain a note from Dr. Cardenas restricting her to light-duty work even though Dr. Cardenas had already cleared her to return to welding. And although Spees testified that she found the tool-room work to be as physically demanding as welding, both parties clearly considered it to be light-duty work. The light-duty nature of the tool-room work, viewed in conjunction with the fact that the tool-room position did not utilize any of the skills that Spees had acquired as a result of her welder training, supports the determination that JMI precluded Spees from working in a class of jobs. We therefore conclude that the first element of Spees's prima facie ADA claim based on the tool-room transfer has been met. Moreover, Spees has satisfied the remaining two elements of this claim. One of these elements hinges on whether she was qualified to weld, with or without reasonable accommodation. Spees fulfilled this element by presenting considerable evidence, none of which is disputed by JMI, that she successfully completed the training course for welding and performed competently as a welder prior to being transferred to the tool room. And the final element has likewise been met because, as discussed in Part III. C.1. above, the tool-room transfer constituted an adverse employment action. The district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment in favor of JMI on Spees's ADA claim to the extent it is based on the tool-room transfer.