Opinion ID: 76252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ordinance 1204 As a Regulation of Expressive Conduct

Text: 12 Fly Fish claims that Ordinance 1204's prohibition on nudity in adult entertainment establishments must be strictly scrutinized because it is a content-based regulation of expressive conduct. If so, the district court erred in not doing so.
13 The Supreme Court has identified three categories of laws that regulate conduct with an expressive component. In order to determine what level of scrutiny is due Ordinance 1204, we must first decide into which category it fits. a) Content-neutral Regulations 14 First, there are laws of general application that serve purposes unrelated to the content of expression. These content-neutral laws prohibit an entire class of conduct, and do not define the regulated conduct with reference to any expressive content it may have. Such a law is entitled to a deferential, or intermediate, level of constitutional scrutiny. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). 15 A general prohibition of public nudity is a law of general application. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (plurality opinion). It prohibits an entire class of conduct, and does not define the regulated conduct with reference to any expressive component. Id. at 570-571, 111 S.Ct. 2456. Therefore, it is content-neutral on its face. Id. 16 Nor does the application of the statute to expressive conduct — nude dancing — render the statute content-based. Id. 7 So long as the purpose of the statute is unrelated to the suppression of the expressive conduct, the statute is content-neutral. Id. (The perceived end that [the statute] seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but public nudity); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) ([I]n determining content neutrality, ... [t]he government's purpose is the controlling consideration) (emphasis added). A general prohibition of public nudity, even as applied to nude dancing, therefore, is content-neutral and reviewed under intermediate level of scrutiny. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568, 111 S.Ct. 2456. 8 17 Recently, the Court reaffirmed that a ban on public nudity is a content-neutral law of general application due intermediate scrutiny. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289-290, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000). In Erie, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting public nudity as applied to nude dancing because the ordinance was a law of general application, prohibiting the entire class of nude conduct. Id. The Court rejected the charge that the ordinance was content-based, observing that it was a general prohibition on public nudity, which: 18 [b]y its terms, ... regulates conduct alone. It does not target nudity that contains an erotic message; rather, it bans all public nudity, regardless of whether that nudity is accompanied by expressive activity. Id. at 290, 120 S.Ct. 1382. 9 b) Content-based Regulations 19 On the other hand, a law that proscribes or limits conduct precisely because of its expressive component is content-based. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). These regulations draw strict scrutiny because they are aimed at the suppression of free expression. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403, 109 S.Ct. 2533. Under this test, such an ordinance is presumptively invalid, and, if it suppresses protected speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys, it violates the First Amendment, absent some compelling state interest in its enforcement. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746. A law that prohibits nude dancing because of disapproval of its expressive content is unconstitutional. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570-571, 111 S.Ct. 2456. c) Content-Based Regulations Treated as Content-Neutral 20 The Supreme Court has identified a third category of regulation of expressive conduct. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). These regulations define the regulated conduct by its expressive content, and, to this extent, they are content-based. Id. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 925. Their purpose, however, is not to ban the expressive conduct, but merely to establish restrictions on the time, place, and manner of its presentation. Id. at 46, 106 S.Ct. 925. Although content-based, such a regulation will be treated as if it were content-neutral if it serves a substantial government purpose that is unrelated to the suppression of the expressive conduct. Id. at 47-49, 106 S.Ct. 925. 21 In the context of adult entertainment, the Court held that this purpose can be located in combating the harmful secondary effects of that conduct on the surrounding community. Id. at 49, 106 S.Ct. 925. In Renton, the Court upheld an ordinance that targeted adult theaters. Id. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 925. The Court rejected the argument that such an ordinance is necessarily aimed at the content of the films shown there, holding that [t]he ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally `protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life,' not to suppress the expression of unpopular views. Id. at 48, 106 S.Ct. 925 (quoting unpublished district court's opinion in Renton ). Thus, although discriminatory, the ordinance was entitled to be treated as a content-neutral regulation because it was justified without reference to the content of the regulated conduct. Id. 22 Under Renton, such a content-based, but treated as content-neutral, regulation of expressive conduct is entitled to an intermediate level of scrutiny. Id. at 49, 106 S.Ct. 925. It survives this scrutiny so long as it is designed to serve a substantial government interest and leaves available ample alternative avenues of communication. Id. at 50, 106 S.Ct. 925. 23
24 Ordinance 1204 does not fit neatly into any of these three categories. Unlike the laws upheld in Barnes and Erie, Ordinance 1204 is not a law of general application. It prohibits nudity only in adult entertainment establishments. It does not prohibit public nudity anywhere else in Cocoa Beach. 10 Although no worker in an adult entertainment establishment in Cocoa Beach may appear totally nude, apparently one may do so at the local Jiffy Mart or in the public library. As a result, the ordinance bans nudity with reference to the expressive content of that nudity, and is content-based. See Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 843 (7th Cir.2000) (holding a similar ordinance content-based because the Ordinance by its plain terms specifically targets erotic expression). 11 25 Nor does 1204 appear to be a Renton -type of regulation of adult entertainment. Although it purports to be a mere regulation on the time, place, or manner of adult entertainment aimed at reducing its secondary effects, as permitted by Renton, it does not place restrictions on nude dancing in adult entertainment establishments. It bans it. 12 26 Ordinance 1204 appears to be a discriminatory regulation that expressly targets and prohibits nude dancing. Neither Barnes nor Erie applied a secondary-effects rationale to permit a statute to target expressive conduct. In each, a content-neutral law of general application was upheld because it was justified without reference to nude dancing. 27 Nor does Renton permit a statute that targets nude dancing to completely ban it. 475 U.S. at 46, 106 S.Ct. 925 (The Renton ordinance, like the one in American Mini Theatres, does not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely provides that such theaters may not be located within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. The ordinance is therefore properly analyzed as a form of time, place and manner regulation); see also City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 443, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002) (ordinance warrants intermediate scrutiny only it if it is time, place, and manner regulation and not a ban). 28 Thus, Ordinance 1204 appears to be without constitutional underpinnings. 13 At least two courts have invalidated similar ordinances on the grounds that, by targeting and banning nude dancing, they unconstitutionally suppress protected speech. Nakatomi Investments, Inc. v. City of Schenectady, 949 F.Supp. 988, 998-999 (N.D.N.Y.1997); Books, Inc. v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 978 F.Supp. 1247, 1257 (S.D.Iowa 1997); see also Schultz, 228 F.3d at 847-48 (invalidating portion of city ordinance targeting adult entertainment that banned certain movements and gestures). Fly Fish argues that 1204 is similarly unconstitutional. 29 We disagree. Although not directly controlling, 14 we believe that the Court's analysis in Erie effectively forecloses this argument. In rejecting the dissent's claim that, as applied to nude dancing, the public nudity ordinance amounted to an unconstitutional complete ban on expression, the Court reiterated the distinction it made in Barnes between the means of expression — nudity — and the message — eroticism. 529 U.S. at 292-293, 120 S.Ct. 1382. See also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571, 111 S.Ct. 2456 (The appearance of people of all shapes, sizes and ages in the nude at a beach, for example, would convey little if any erotic message). Rejecting the dissent's characterization of the ordinance as a complete ban on the message of nude dancing, the Court said: 30 The public nudity ban certainly has the effect of limiting one particular means of expressing the kind of erotic message being disseminated at Kandyland. But simply to define what is being banned as the message is to assume the conclusion. 31 Id. at 293, 120 S.Ct. 1382. 32 Although conceding that there may be cases in which banning the means of expression so interferes with the message that it essentially bans the message, 529 U.S. at 293, 120 S.Ct. 1382, the Court rejected the contention that Erie was such a case: 33 [E]ven if Erie's public nudity ban has some minimal effect on the erotic message by muting that portion of the expression that occurs when the last stitch is dropped, the dancers at Kandyland and other such establishments are free to perform wearing pasties and G-strings. Any effect on the overall expression is de minimis. 34 Id. at 294, 120 S.Ct. 1382. 35 If the message of nude dancing is eroticism, then Ordinance 1204 may properly be characterized as a Renton -type of time, place, or manner regulation. It does not ban erotic dancing, but rather totally nude dancing in an adult entertainment establishment. Therefore, it merely regulates the manner of presentation of the erotic message. It does not ban the message; it only requires more clothing on the messenger. Therefore, 1204 may be properly characterized as a time, place, and manner regulation. 36 This is so even though 1204's prohibition of nudity regulates conduct and is not a traditional zoning regulation of the type approved by Renton. Erie extends the secondary effects rationale of Renton beyond its zoning context to the regulation of expressive conduct. 15 Under Renton, an ordinance may target adult entertainment establishments, and the nude dancing that occurs there, if it is aimed at reducing the negative secondary effects associated with these establishments. 16 After Erie, an ordinance may do so by banning totally nude dancing in these establishments. Thus, Erie makes clear that: 37 Even if the city thought that nude dancing at clubs like Kandyland constituted a particularly problematic instance of public nudity, the regulation is still properly evaluated as a content-neutral restriction because the interest in combating the secondary effects associated with those clubs is unrelated to the suppression of the erotic message conveyed by nude dancing. 38 Id. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382. 39 The City has determined that totally nude dancing in adult entertainment establishments generates undesirable secondary effects. Under Erie and Renton, it is entitled to combat these effects, so long as it does not ban, but merely regulates the erotic message. Ordinance 1204 is such an ordinance, and the district court did not err by not applying a heightened level of scrutiny. 17