Opinion ID: 1243361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: removal of juror during sentencing

Text: Stone next asserts the trial court abused its discretion in removing Juror Clydie Thompson during sentencing. We agree. At sentencing, the state called Stone's aunt, Bernice Perry, as a witness. When Perry was placed on the witness stand, Juror Thompson indicated to the court that she knew Ms. Perry. Although Perry had been announced as a witness at the start of voir dire, Thompson did not know her name. Thompson had lived down the street from Perry five or six years earlier, and they were casual acquaintances only. Thompson indicated her acquaintance would not affect her ability to be fair and impartial. The solicitor objected to Thompson's continued participation contending it would be difficult for her to impose a death sentence on a former acquaintance's nephew. The court removed Juror Thompson and replaced her with the second alternate juror. We find this was error. In State v. Woods, 345 S.C. 583, 587-88, 550 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2001), we recently stated: When a juror conceals information inquired into during voir dire, a new trial is required only when the court finds the juror intentionally concealed the information, and that the information concealed would have supported a challenge for cause or would have been a material factor in the use of the party's peremptory challenges. Thompson v. O'Rourke, 288 S.C. 13, 15, 339 S.E.2d 505, 506 (1986). Where a juror, without justification, fails to disclose a relationship, it may be inferred, nothing to the contrary appearing, that the juror is not impartial. On the other hand, where the failure to disclose is innocent, no such inference may be drawn. State v. Savage, 306 S.C. 5, 409 S.E.2d 809 (Ct.App.1991). Although the present case does not involve a new trial, Woods is instructive. It is patent here that Juror Thompson's failure to disclose her acquaintance with Perry was innocent. Moreover, we find her scant acquaintance would neither have supported a challenge for cause nor would it have been a material factor in the state's exercise of its peremptory challenges. Thompson clearly indicated her former acquaintance with a witness whose name she did not even know, would not have affected her in any way. Accordingly, we hold the trial court abused its discretion in removing her.