Opinion ID: 1886897
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Testimony of Latanio Fraticeli

Text: At one point during the trial, the Commonwealth considered calling as a witness an eight-year-old girl, Latanio Fraticeli (Fraticeli). Before she testified, however, the trial judge, without revealing the identity of the witness, called for a recess, explaining in the presence of the jury that he wanted to talk to the little girl a little bit first, see if I can put her at ease a little bit. She is very shy. N.T., 11/2/1994, p. 1794. Thereafter, a separate proceeding was held, where the prospective witness gave specific identification testimony that would have implicated Appellant as the person who entered the Fortney home the night of the homicide. Ultimately, the Commonwealth decided not to call Fraticeli as its witness, see N.T., 11/2/1994, pp. 1810-1811, the parties agreed that the best course of action would be not to offer the jury any explanation for Fraticeli not having been called, and the jurors were dismissed for the day. The next day, an article appeared in the newspaper about Fraticeli and her statements during the hearing. Defense counsel requested that jurors be examined as to whether any of them had read the article. The trial court refused, but, before the start of the proceedings, cautioned the jurors about staying away from the media coverage of the case. [55] Presently, Appellant asserts that the explanation for the recess, given by the trial court, was unnecessary and unfair, because it invite[d] ... speculation as to what the witness may have said ... drawing the focus away from what was ... being said from the witness stand. Brief for Appellant, p. 89 (emphasis in original). Thus, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in this regard. Further, Appellant contends that a new trial is warranted, because the trial court erred in refusing to inquire whether the jurors read the newspaper article concerning Fraticeli. Although the trial court's statement may have been unnecessary, we cannot conclude that Appellant was prejudiced  the remark did not reveal the substance of the witness' testimony, such as her identification of Appellant, and provided an acceptable explanation for the brief intermission in the proceedings. We are also not persuaded that this passing statement drew the jury's focus away from considering the evidence and testimony actually presented by the parties. Appellant is also not entitled to relief with regard to the trial court's refusal to question jurors about their knowledge of the newspaper article. In Commonwealth v. Bruno, 466 Pa. 245, 352 A.2d 40 (1976), this Court stated: The preferred procedure when highly prejudicial material is publicized during the trial and the jury is not sequestered is to question the jurors individually, out of the presence of the other jurors. However, questioning jurors as a group or giving special precautionary instructions may be sufficient precaution depending on the facts of the particular case. Id. at 52 (internal citations omitted). The jurors were individually instructed during voir dire to avoid media coverage of the case. On the first day of the trial, the trial court again reminded the jurors to keep away from the media coverage of the trial and invited them to reveal if any such exposure already occurred. See N.T., 10/24/1994, p. 24. [56] The trial judge repeated its warning during his initial jury address. See N.T., 10/24/1994, pp. 32-33. Moreover, the trial court gave a cautionary instruction the morning after the article about Fraticeli was published, reiterating its earlier statements and instructing the jurors that they were required to determine the facts of the case based upon the evidence and testimony that they heard during the course of the trial. See N.T., 11/3/1994, p. 1828. Accordingly, we find that the trial court acted entirely within its discretion in refusing to voir dire the jurors, thus avoiding inadvertently notifying the jury of the contents of the article, and giving a sufficient precautionary instruction to secure the integrity of the trial. Also see Commonwealth v. Crispell, 530 Pa. 234, 608 A.2d 18, 22-23 (1992).