Opinion ID: 1173446
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: statutory disqualification

Text: A judge who has been or is acting as a special inquiry judge is statutorily disqualified from acting in any other capacity than in the case under inquiry. RCW 10.27.180 provides: The judge serving as a special inquiry judge shall be disqualified from acting as a magistrate or a judge in any subsequent court proceeding arising from such inquiry[,] except for specified contempt situations. The majority's efforts to provide dictionary definitions to certain words in the statute fail to answer the only relevant question about the meaning of the disqualification provision: Upon what event is the special inquiry judge disqualified to act in subsequent proceedings? To the extent that the statute does not explicitly provide the answer, it is ambiguous. Our enunciated rules of statutory construction compel our resolution of the Legislature's intent that the appointment of the special inquiry judge, not the termination of the special inquiry proceedings, disqualifies that judge in regard to subsequent proceedings. Subsequent is defined as following in time: coming or being later than something else. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2278 (1971). The question for us is not the meaning of subsequent, but rather what is the something else after which the special inquiry judge is disqualified. There is no support for the majority's assumption that the something else is the conclusion of the special inquiry proceedings. When the words in a statute, given their plain, ordinary meaning, are unambiguous, the court may not construe the words otherwise. People's Org. for Wash. Energy Resources v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 101 Wn.2d 425, 679 P.2d 922 (1984). But, when a statute is ambiguous, it must be interpreted in a reasonable manner and in accordance with the apparent intent of the Legislature. Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. 30, 97 Wn.2d 118, 641 P.2d 163 (1982). The court should look primarily to the language of the statute itself to determine legislative intent. Department of Transp. v. State Employees' Ins. Bd., 97 Wn.2d 454, 645 P.2d 1076 (1982). The court must construe the act as a whole giving effect to all the language used. Burlington N., Inc. v. Johnston, 89 Wn.2d 321, 572 P.2d 1085 (1977). RCW 10.27.180 disqualifies the judge serving as a special inquiry judge. (Italics mine.) By qualifying the special inquiry judge thusly, rather than in a form indicating a judge whose services as a special inquiry judge have terminated, the Legislature has indicated it meant a presently serving judge. Had the Legislature intended to disqualify a judge who had previously served as a special inquiry judge, it would have said so. See Jepson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 89 Wn.2d 394, 573 P.2d 10 (1977). The language of the statute indicates the Legislature's intent. Examining RCW 10.27 as a whole, it is apparent that the Legislature did not intend the special inquiry judge to issue warrants. The actions that the special inquiry judge may take are limited by the statute. On petition of the public attorney, the special inquiry judge shall command persons to appear and answer questions as the special inquiry judge may approve, and shall direct production of evidence. RCW 10.27.170. On a belief that persons may have knowledge concerning the subject under investigation, the special inquiry judge may cause those persons to be called. RCW 10.27.140(3). The statute provides no explicit authority for the special inquiry judge to issue search warrants. There is significance in the Legislature's failure to provide the special inquiry judge with the authority to issue search warrants. The purpose of the Criminal Investigatory Act of 1971 is to serve law enforcement in combating crime and corruption. RCW 10.27.010. The majority apparently believes that the issuance of search warrants by the special inquiry judge would further this purpose. Nevertheless, the court is not permitted to add words to a statute. See Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. State, 91 Wn.2d 132, 134, 587 P.2d 535 (1978). The Legislature withheld from the special inquiry judge the authority to issue search warrants, and this court cannot supply that authority. In addition to examining the words of a statute, we must construe the statute in a reasonable manner. Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. 30, supra . We must avoid meaningless, arbitrary distinctions. Bellevue Fire Fighters Local 1604 v. Bellevue, 100 Wn.2d 748, 675 P.2d 592 (1984). Whatever the Legislature's motive for disqualifying a special inquiry judge from acting in any other capacity on the case under inquiry, it is unreasonable to suggest the disqualifying factors arise at the termination of the inquiry and not at its inception. The facts of this case illustrate the absurdity of such a conclusion. Judge Pitt was appointed special inquiry judge in July 1981. In March 1983, the State filed the information which terminated the special inquiry proceedings. See State v. Manning, 86 Wn.2d 272, 543 P.2d 632 (1975). In the nearly 2 years in which the special inquiry was ongoing, the majority's construction would permit Judge Pitt to issue warrants up to March 6, 1983, but would disqualify him as of March 7. If the nature of the special inquiry proceeding disqualifies the special inquiry judge from acting in any subsequent proceeding, that disqualification arises upon the judge's appointment.