Opinion ID: 173058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The OPPRS as a Subterfuge

Text: Under the ADEA's law enforcement exception, a state can refuse to hire an individual as a firefighter or law enforcement officer if this refusal is pursuant to a bona fide hiring or retirement plan that is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623(j)(2). Mr. Kannady does not contend that the OPPRS is not a bona fide hiring or retirement plan. Instead, he argues that the district court erred in determining that the OPPRS is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA. Mr. Kannady contends that the OPPRS is a subterfuge because the Oklahoma legislature enacted the OPPRS not out of public safety concerns, but for the invidious financial purpose of enhancing the state's pension fund. Aplt. Opening Br. at 5. We conclude that Mr. Kannady cannot demonstrate subterfuge because he has failed to identify a non-hiring substantive provision of the ADEA that the OPPRS is a scheme to evade. Like our sister circuits, we construe the word subterfuge in accordance with its ordinary meaning to be a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion. Minch v. City of Chicago, 363 F.3d 615, 624 (7th Cir.2004); see also Feldman, 434 F.3d at 183; Minch, 363 F.3d at 623-28. A plaintiff challenging the law enforcement exception bears the burden of establishing that a hiring plan is a subterfuge. Feldman, 434 F.3d at 184; Minch, 363 F.3d at 627-28. Because the ADEA's law enforcement exception expressly allows a state or local government to create a hiring or retirement plan for law enforcement personnel that discriminates on the basis of age, a government employment plan that follows the statute's precepts can hardly be said to be a scheme of evasion. See Feldman, 434 F.3d at 184 (There is nothing deceptive about the state legislature doing exactly what Congress provided it the authority to donamely, benefitting from an exception to the general prohibition in the ADEA against discrimination on the basis of age.); Minch, 363 F.3d at 629 ([D]oing something that the statute expressly permits does not evade its prohibitions.). Thus, a plaintiff cannot prove that a hiring or retirement plan for law enforcement personnel is a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA simply by demonstrating that the plan discriminates in hiring and retirement on the basis of age. See Feldman, 434 F.3d at 184 (noting that the law enforcement exception would be a dead letter if subterfuge could be demonstrated simply by proving discriminat[ion] on the basis of age rather than ability); Minch, 363 F.3d at 628-29; see also Correa-Ruiz v. Fortuño, 573 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.2009) ([W]e thus join the Second and Seventh Circuits in rejecting an interpretation of `subterfuge' that would effectively nullify the exemption.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 640, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009). Instead, a plaintiff proves subterfuge by showing `that the employer is using the [law enforcement] exemption as a way to evade another substantive provision of the act.' Feldman, 434 F.3d at 184 (emphasis added) (quoting Minch, 363 F.3d at 629); see Correa-Ruiz, 573 F.3d at 14. For example, if a state or local government imposed age limits on hiring police officers in order to retaliate against employees for protesting practices made illegal by the ADEA, the hiring plan would clearly be a subterfuge to evade other provisions of the ADEA. See Minch, 363 F.3d at 630 (identifying hypothetical instances of subterfuge). In this case, Mr. Kannady must show that the OPPRS is a `means of discriminating in another aspect of the employment relationshipthat is, other than in the hiring decisionin a way that the ADEA forbids.' Feldman, 434 F.3d at 184 (brackets omitted) (quoting Minch, 363 F.3d at 629). In this regard, Mr. Kannady's main argumentthat the OPPRS was created for an invidious financial purpose, and not because of public safety concernsis unavailing. Aplt. Opening Br. at 5. In particular, Mr. Kannady argues that the OP[P]RS is hiding behind the veil of the law enforcement exemption to discriminate against law enforcement candidates over the age of forty-five (45) ... merely for financial reasons, since older officers do not pay as much into the pension plan created through the OPPRS. Id. Even if Mr. Kannady could prove that the Oklahoma legislature adopted the OPPRS for reasons unrelated to public safety, he could not establish subterfuge unless these motivations reveal a kind of discriminatory conduct that the ADEA by its very terms forbids. Minch, 363 F.3d at 629; see also id. (noting that state or local governments cannot be liable for their motives if their conduct has not evaded the ADEA's prohibitions (internal quotation marks omitted)). That the Oklahoma legislature allegedly took financial considerations into account when adopting the OPPRS's hiring-age ceiling cannot by itself demonstrate that the OPPRS is a subterfuge that frustrates provisions of the ADEA not directly subject to the law enforcement exception. Feldman, 434 F.3d at 185; see also id. at 184 (noting that it is difficult to imagine any legislation on social or labor concerns that is wholly divorced from budgetary or fiscal considerations). Ultimately, Mr. Kannady cannot demonstrate subterfuge because he has failed to identify a non-hiring substantive provision of the ADEA that the OPPRS is a scheme to evade. See id. (rejecting the plaintiff's claims of subterfuge where the plaintiff never points to any specific provision of the ADEA that is violated by [the New York statute]). Although Mr. Kannady has at various times throughout the appeal hinted at possible provisions or regulations that might satisfy his burden, for the reasons noted below, we decline to consider the merits of any of these arguments. First, Mr. Kannady argues that the OPPRS violates EEOC regulations; because he did not raise this argument before the district court, however, he has waived it on appeal. See Stewart v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 554 F.3d 1236, 1245 n. 1 (10th Cir.2009). Mr. Kannady's contrary contention that he submitted to the district court federal case law that cited the EEOC regulations, Aplt. Reply Br. at 16, is unavailing. See Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co., 497 F.3d 1135, 1141 (10th Cir.2007) ([T]he vague and ambiguous presentation of a theory before the trial court [does not] preserve that theory as an appellate issue. (internal quotation marks omitted)). We only deviate from the waiver rule in the most unusual circumstances, which may include issues regarding jurisdiction and sovereign immunity, instances where public interest is implicated, or where manifest injustice would result. Smith v. Rogers Galvanizing Co., 128 F.3d 1380, 1386 (10th Cir. 1997) (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted). Because we find no such unusual circumstances or manifest injustice here, we deem this argument to be waived and do not consider it. Second, at oral argument, Mr. Kannady suggested that the OPPRS was being used as a subterfuge to evade a provision of the ADEA that pertains to benefit plans and retirement. Although Mr. Kannady made a similar argument at the district court regarding 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2), he did not make this argument in his opening brief on appeal and, in fact, specifically indicated in his reply brief that we need not be burdened with this argument because it was essentially abandoned in the district court. Aplt. Reply Br. at 13. Therefore, Mr. Kannady has waived this argument and we will not consider it on appeal. See Anderson v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 422 F.3d 1155, 1174 (10th Cir.2005) (The failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that issue.). Finally, Mr. Kannady argues in his reply brief that he identified a substantive provision of the ADEA that the OPPRS was a scheme to evade by citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) in his opening brief, which provides that an employer may not fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age. While Mr. Kannady did cite § 623(a)(1) in his opening brief, he failed to provide any analysis or reasoning whatsoever for the assertion he now makes. Indeed, even in his reply brief, Mr. Kannady did little more than assert in conclusory fashion that the OPPRS is a subterfuge to evade § 623(a)(1). Because Mr. Kannady has failed to adequately present his § 623(a)(1) argument in his opening brief, we decline to address it. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) ([W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant's opening brief.). In order to carry his burden of proving subterfuge, Mr. Kannady needed to prove that Krebs was using the OPPRS to evade a non-hiring substantive provision of the ADEA. Since Mr. Kannady cannot identify this ADEA provision, he has failed to demonstrate that the OPPRS is a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA. [11]