Opinion ID: 550874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: other equitable relief

Text: 172 Finally, we generally find no error in the terms of the injunctive relief granted by the district court. A five year term is well within the bounds of the discretion of the district judge, and we will not extend the time as requested by plaintiffs. With regard to the question of divestiture, we find no basis for invocation of that doctrine with respect to acquisitions by defendants of quarrying and limestone operations or leases, a bridge contractor, or sand pit operations. Nor do we find generally a basis for divestiture of quarries or sand pits that may have been operated by asphalt plant operators or asphalt paving competitors. As to possible divestiture of Ohio Engineering, Creager, Northwest Materials, Union Quarries (as to paving operations only) and Dailey Asphalt, we construe California v. American Stores Co., --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1853, 109 L.Ed.2d 240 (1990) to indicate, even though it was an action brought by a state, not a private party such as Langenderfer, that this potential Sec. 16 Clayton Act remedy may apply contrary to our decision in Langenderfer I. 34 American Stores, 110 S.Ct. at 1866 & n. 28, citing 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law Sec. 328b (1978), and Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 418-427 (1st Cir.1985). Cia. Caribe found fault with I.T.T. Corp. v. G.T.E. Corp., 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.1975), a case we cited with approval in Langenderfer I for concluding that divestiture was not an available remedy in a suit instituted by a private plaintiff. 729 F.2d at 1060. American Stores also suggested that equitable defenses such as laches ... may protect consummated transactions.... 110 S.Ct. at 1867. In any event, we remand for further consideration the possibility of divestiture in the limited situations in which it may be available in this case subject to equitable defenses by defendants. 173 We find no error in the refusal of the district court to restrict competition as urged by Langenderfer--to limit defendants from bidding every other (50 percent) contract invitation on ODOT, turnpike, and local government asphalt jobs in northwestern Ohio. Other competitors, not parties in this case, have emerged as bidders on these jobs during the relevant years, and some of them have grown in their particular markets. We find no error in the refusal to preclude defendants from future acquisitions of bridge contractors. We also find no error in the district court's decision not to enjoin defendants to charge the same prices for limestone and sand in the Toledo area as they charge for these materials in other areas of the relevant market. 174 Finally, we find no basis to disturb the district court's decision not to mandate that defendants charge themselves the same prices for sand, stone, and asphalt produced by their own facilities as they charge others for these materials. While defendants may not unfairly nor invidiously discriminate between customers in the same class or status, we find no error in the court's refusal to direct and control internal pricing policies among the several different entities comprising the defendants' group. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984), and Russ' Kwik Car Wash v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.1985). We note that plaintiffs and other competing parties have employed their own quarries, sandpits, and asphalt plants as a basis for bidding competitively against others who may not have such resources, and there has been no proof one way or the other as to whether they have charged the same prices among subsidiary entities as they do with others. That NOAP has taken steps to reenter the business would indicate further such activity among plaintiff entities.