Opinion ID: 1285642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Failure to disclose information regarding Bernard Johnson

Text: Bernard Johnson gave Columbia police a statement indicating that he was the owner of the .38, that he gave the gun to appellant, and that appellant said he used the gun in the barbershop shootings. At the time he was interviewed by police, Johnson was in jail on unrelated drug charges. At trial, the defense requested that the State be required to disclose the identity of the confidential informant who led police to arrest Johnson on these drug charges and the audio tapes of Johnson's drug transactions claiming, [W]e need to know all the relevant evidence about any testifying snitch in this case. Appellant contends the trial judge's refusal to require disclosure of this information violated his due process rights, especially in light of the fact that Johnson eventually pled guilty to the pending drug charges and received an eight-year sentence. Due process requires the prosecution to disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. Cain, 297 S.C. 497, 503, 377 S.E.2d 556, 559 (1988) ( quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375). In determining the materiality of nondisclosed evidence, the reviewing court's function is to determine whether the appellant's right to a fair trial has been impaired. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998). We find the nondisclosure of the requested information did not deprive appellant of a fair trial. Narcotics offenses are generally not considered probative of truthfulness. State v. Aleksey, supra . Accordingly, the requested drug-related information regarding Johnson would have little, if any, impeachment value. Further, appellant does not argue he was deprived of information regarding any deal Johnson may have had with prosecutors. [5] In any event, Johnson was thoroughly impeached with nine drug charges pending from August 1996 for which he was released on bond in exchange for his testimony in this case, five additional drug charges pending from October 1996, and prior convictions for possession of an unlawful weapon, assault and battery with intent to kill, and possession and distribution of crack cocaine. Where there is an abundance of evidence detailing the witness's unabashed disrespect for the law, the nondisclosure of other impeaching evidence does not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Gunn, 313 S.C. 124, 137, 437 S.E.2d 75, 82 (1993). This issue is without merit.