Opinion ID: 848723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Michigan's CRA, at MCL 37.2202(1), provides that [a]n employer shall not ... (a) discriminate against an individual with respect to employment ... because of ... race.... This language mirrors Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, which reads in pertinent part: It shall be unlawful employment practices for an employer ... (1) ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race.... [42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a).] In some discrimination cases, there is direct evidence of racial bias. But in most discrimination cases, there is no direct evidence. Recognizing this, the United States Supreme Court developed the McDonnell Douglas framework for examining discrimination claims where direct evidence of racial bias is lacking. McDonnell Douglas, supra . Under the McDonnell Douglas test, a plaintiff must first offer a prima facie case of discrimination. To create a presumption of discrimination a plaintiff must present evidence (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Once the plaintiff has created a presumption of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut that presumption by showing that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. In Hazle, this Court applied the above framework to a racial discrimination claim filed pursuant to the CRA. The plaintiff in Hazle was required to present evidence that (1) she belong[ed] to a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) the job was given to another person under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. [ Hazle, supra at 463, 628 N.W.2d 515.] In applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, this Court recognized that varying facts in discrimination cases require courts to tailor the McDonnell Douglas framework to fit the factual situation at hand. Hazle, supra at 463 n. 6, 628 N.W.2d 515. Strict application of the McDonnell Douglas framework would preclude all reverse discrimination claims without direct evidence of discriminatory bias. Because a majority plaintiff cannot prove that he belongs to a protected minority and because the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the federal civil rights act is not limited to minorities, [10] courts have adapted the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test for reverse discrimination claims. However, the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the test to be used for reverse discrimination claims and there is no consensus among the federal circuit courts of appeals regarding how the McDonnell Douglas test should be adapted for reverse discrimination claims. There are three general approaches followed by the federal circuits. The approach followed by a majority of the circuits is the background circumstances test, which requires a majority plaintiff to show background circumstances that support the suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. This approach is followed by the United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth circuits. Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 209 U.S.App.D.C. 215, 652 F.2d 1012 (1981); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 66-68 (C.A.6, 1985); Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 (C.A.6, 1994); Mills v. Health Care Service Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (C.A.7, 1999); Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1036-1037 (C.A.8, 1997). The second approach only requires a majority plaintiff to prove that he is a member of a class. This approach is followed by the Third and Eleventh circuits. Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 163 (C.A.3, 1999); Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301, 304 (C.A.11, 1991). The third approach allows a majority plaintiff to state a prima facie case in one of two ways, by using the background circumstances test or by showing indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable probability, that but for the plaintiff's status [as a member of the majority] the challenged action would have favored the plaintiff.... Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 589 (C.A.10, 1992). This test was developed by the Fourth Circuit in a traditional discrimination case and applied by the Tenth Circuit in the reverse discrimination context. Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 794 F.2d 142, 146 (C.A.4, 1986); Notari, supra .
The background circumstances test was created by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit because the United States Supreme Court noted that the McDonnell Douglas factors have to be adjusted to fit varying factual scenarios and because strict application of the framework would eliminate all reverse discrimination claims. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017. Under the background circumstances test a majority plaintiff claiming reverse discrimination can meet the first prong of establishing a prima facie case when background circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. Id. at 220, 652 F.2d 1012. Generally, background circumstances can be shown by evidence indicating that the employer has some reason or inclination to discriminate against the majority or by evidence indicating that there is something suspect about the particular case, which raises an inference of discrimination. See Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150 (D.C.Cir., 1993).
Some courts have criticized the background circumstances test and have applied their own adaptations of the McDonnell Douglas framework. The adaptation followed by the Third Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit essentially eliminates the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework. This adaptation was first applied by the Eleventh Circuit in Wilson, in which the court altered the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test by requiring the plaintiff to prove that he belonged to a class, not a protected class or a minority class, simply a class. The same standard was applied by the Third Circuit in Iadimarco. The Third Circuit, held that a plaintiff who brings a reverse discrimination suit under Title VII should be able to establish a prima facie case in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination by presenting sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude ... that the defendant treated plaintiff less favorably than others because of [his] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Furnco [Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978)]. [ Iadimarco, supra at 163.]
The Fourth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit apply yet another variation of the McDonnell Douglas framework to reverse discrimination claims. See Holmes, supra at 146; Notari, supra at 589. This test acknowledges the presumption of discrimination implicit in McDonnell Douglas, but allows a reverse discrimination plaintiff to prove either background circumstances or specific facts that support a reasonable inference that, but for plaintiff's status as a member of the majority, the challenged decision would not have been made.