Opinion ID: 1765297
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Multiple Indictment

Text: Brown urges that the multiple count indictment results in multiple punishments growing out of the same set of operative facts, which constitutes reversible error, citing Stinson v. State, 443 So.2d 869 (Miss. 1983); Bennett v. State, 451 So.2d 727 (Miss. 1984); Johnson v. State, 452 So.2d 850 (Miss. 1984); Friday v. State, 462 So.2d 336 (Miss. 1985); Thomas v. State, 474 So.2d 604, 605 (Miss. 1985). He further argues that certain evidence would have been inadmissible in separate trials, and that the cumulative effect of all of the evidence prejudiced his right to a fair trial. In support of this proposition, he cites Friday v. State, supra , in which this Court stated that consolidation where evidence of the crime would not be mutually admissible in separate trials destroyed the defendant's right to the presumption of innocence. No case in the Stinson line held that it was error in and of itself for the State to obtain a multiple count indictment. It was the combination of the indictment with a trial on all counts that created error. Stinson did not create a per se rule that the multi-count indictment was error. Dixon v. State, 465 So.2d 1092 (Miss. 1985) and Breckenridge v. State, 472 So.2d 373 (Miss. 1985). As stated in Justice Robertson's special concurrence to Thomas v. State, 474 So.2d at 607, there is a great potential for mischief in allowing a multi-count indictment where the charges arise out of separate transactions or occurrences in that the jury may believe that the defendant is charged with so much that he must be guilty of something. However, as this Court held in Dixon and Breckenridge, there is no error when the crimes have the same elements of proof and arise from the same transactions or occurrences. The holding in Friday v. State, supra , is based upon a recognition of the danger of prejudice to the defendant in allowing evidence inadmissible for one of the charged crimes but inadmissible for another. In Friday v. State, supra , we held: Because of the inherent prospect of destroying a defendant's right to the presumption of innocence, Mississippi does not allow trial on separate charges to be consolidated where evidence of the crime would not be mutually admissible in separate trials and where the defendant is subject to receiving more than one sentence. Examining the evidence introduced in Brown's trial, his actions toward the victims, M.B. and G.C., were clearly part of the same occurrences or schemes. The nude photographs, Playboy magazines, lesbian movies, and drugs and alcohol were methods by which Brown seduced the two victims. These events were part of the sexual battery. These same acts were relevant to the charges of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Under Miss.Rules of Evidence Rule 404(b), other crimes or acts are admissible: (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of notice, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of a mistake or accident. See also, Whitlock v. State, 419 So.2d 200, 203 (Miss. 1982); Carter v. State, 450 So.2d 67, 69 (Miss. 1984); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 759 (Miss. 1984). In Neal, this Court recognized that ... proof of another crime is admissible where the offense charged and that offered to be proved are so interrelated as to constitute a single transaction or occurrence or a closely related series of transactions or occurrences. 451 So.2d at 743. Because the multi-indictments arose from the same transactions or occurrences, and the evidence against Brown was admissible for each of the charged crimes, there was no error in allowing trial on the multi-count indictment.