Opinion ID: 2975703
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other-act evidence

Text: Gonzalez further claims that the district court erred by admitting testimony concerning other acts allegedly committed by him because the government failed to give proper notice as required by Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In particular, Gonzalez objects to the admission of statements by Rodriguez concerning instances in which Gonzalez had driven him to prior drug deals not charged in Gonzalez’s indictment. Under Rule 404(b), when the defendant requests notification of the government’s intent to introduce other-act evidence, the government must provide such notice in a reasonable form and manner. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1147 (6th Cir. 1995) (setting forth the Rule 404(b) notice requirements). We ordinarily review the district court’s decision to admit evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d 945, 948 (6th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). But Gonzalez’s counsel, Joseph Dubyak, couched his objections to the other-act evidence at issue in terms of relevancy rather than notice. Although Dubyak argued on the day of trial that “now I get told ‘Oh, by the way, this is all of the other stuff that we’re going to introduce,’” he raised no objection to Assistant U.S. Attorney Becker’s assertion, and the district court’s agreement, that he had failed to properly seek discovery of any other-act evidence. The following exchange took place prior to trial: Dubyak: . . . . And I think, secondly, you know, under 404, if the government is trying to bring in some other—some other acts or some other information about, you know maybe my client had been somewhere with one of the other defendants and maybe there was some discussion about drugs or something, that I say that that’s totally improper, that’s irrelevant. The court: . . . . Did you move for discovery of 404(b) testimony? I wasn’t aware that you had. Becker: I don’t believe so, Your Honor. The court: Yes. Becker: I looked at the discovery requests, and I didn’t see that in there. Dubyak never contradicted the court or opposing counsel on this point. Gonzalez’s counsel thus not only failed to specifically object on Rule 404(b) notice grounds, but also left the district court with the impression that he had not even made a discovery request that would have triggered the government’s notice obligation. In Gonzalez’s appellate brief, in fact, he cites the above exchange as an example of Dubyak’s ineffectiveness. Due to Dubyak’s failure to raise a proper objection based on lack of notice, we will apply the plain-error standard of review to Gonzalez’s evidentiary claim. See United States v. Baker, 458 F.3d 513, 519 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The ‘plain error’ rule also applies to a case . . . in which a party objects to the submission of evidence on specific grounds in the trial court, but on appeal the party asserts new grounds challenging the evidence.”); United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 213 n.3 (4th Cir. 2005) (reviewing a Rule 404(b) notice claim under the plain-error standard where the defendant had objected to the testimony on other grounds, but not as to notice). Nos. 06-3303/3387 United States v. Gonzalez Page 7 An appellant seeking to demonstrate plain error must establish: “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (brackets and quotation marks omitted). If these three conditions are met, “an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (brackets omitted). Gonzalez points out that Dubyak did, in fact, submit a discovery request well before trial that sought, among other things, “[a]ll ‘other offense’ evidence which the Government intends to use in its case in chief or in rebuttal.” This obviously contradicts the assertions made by the district court and the government prior to trial that no such request was made. Furthermore, the government concedes that it did not provide its full trial brief to Dubyak until the morning of the first day of trial. The testimony at issue regarding Gonzalez’s involvement in prior uncharged drug activity with Rodriguez was clearly admissible under Rule 404(b), but for the notice violation, to show Gonzalez’s motive or knowledge. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (providing that evidence of other acts not admissible to demonstrate propensity “may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of . . . motive . . . [or] knowledge”). Yet the remedy for an unexcused violation of Rule 404(b)’s notice requirement is exclusion of the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) advisory committee’s note, 1991 amendment (“Because the notice requirement serves as condition precedent to admissibility of 404(b) evidence, the offered evidence is inadmissible if the court decides that the notice requirement has not been met.”). The government responds by arguing that, even though the district court admitted the testimony at issue under Rule 404(b), the testimony should not have been subject to that rule at all because it was, in reality, simply background evidence supporting a broader, uncharged drug conspiracy that was “inextricably intertwined” with the offense charged against Gonzalez. See United States v. Everett, 270 F.3d 986, 992 (6th Cir. 2001) (determining that evidence of the defendant’s receipt of certain checks was intrinsic to her alleged crime of bank fraud and therefore not subject to Rule 404(b)). If the government is correct, then any error resulting from the Rule 404(b) notice issue would be harmless. See id. Had the testimony in question been presented solely to establish an uncharged conspiracy for purposes of Rule 801, however, it should not have been put before the jury at all. Whether evidence of an uncharged conspiracy—or any uncharged crime—is subject to Rule 404(b) depends upon the extent to which it is “intertwined with” the charged offense. See Everett, 270 F.3d at 992. In United States v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144 (6th Cir. 1995), this court explained the distinction between acts that are intrinsic to the offense charged—and thus not subject to Rule 404—and extrinsic “other acts,” which are subject to the rule. Like Gonzalez, Barnes was charged only with drug possession rather than conspiracy. Barnes, 49 F.3d at 1146. Barnes also argued on appeal, like Gonzalez, that the government had failed to properly provide notice of the other-act evidence that he contended was governed by Rule 404(b). The government in Barnes had introduced testimony at trial regarding a prior, uncharged drug shipment that was “short” of the expected quantity of drugs and for which the charged drug shipment was expected to make up. Holding that evidence of the prior shipment was “intrinsic” to the charged offense, the court explained that [w]hen the other crimes or wrongs occurred at different times and under different circumstances from the offense charged, the deeds are termed “extrinsic.” “Intrinsic” acts, on the other hand, are those that are part of a single criminal episode. Rule 404(b) is not implicated when the other crimes or wrongs evidence is part of a continuing pattern of illegal activity. When that circumstance applies, the government has no duty to disclose the other crimes or wrongs evidence. Barnes, 49 F.3d at 1149. Nos. 06-3303/3387 United States v. Gonzalez Page 8 The Seventh Circuit case of United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2002), adopted an even broader definition of intrinsic evidence, explaining that evidence might be intrinsic simply where it fills a “chronological or conceptual void in the story of the crime [charged].” This court has also employed language approving of such a broad definition, stating that intrinsic evidence not subject to Rule 404(b) “[t]ypically . . . is a prelude to the charged offense, is directly probative of the charged offense, arises from the same events as the charged offense, forms an integral part of a witness’s testimony, or completes the story of the charged offense.” United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (rejecting the government’s argument that evidence of drug transactions that occurred six years before the charged conspiracy, and that did not involve an identity of parties, was intrinsic). That narrative-based definition, however, has been criticized as overly broad. See United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (commenting that “[t]he ‘complete the story’ definition of ‘inextricably intertwined’ threatens to override Rule 404(b)”). In this case, all of the other acts alluded to took place during the months leading up to the August 10, 2005 drug transaction, and they occurred under the similar circumstances of Gonzalez driving a car to facilitate Rodriguez’s drug dealing. Moreover, analogous to Barnes, Gonzalez’s prior rides with Rodriguez can be seen as a continuing pattern of criminal activity and even a necessary predicate for the charged offense. Only through these earlier drives, after all, did Gonzalez become acquainted with the basics of the drug trade and with one of the same conspirators who was involved in the August 10 drug deal. As the government asserts, “[i]t would be unthinkable that Rodriguez would choose to arrive for a $22,000 drug deal involving a kilogram of cocaine associated with persons he had never met or dealt with before.” Barnes, on the other hand, might arguably be distinguished from the present case because in Barnes “there was a direct connection between the earlier ‘short’ drug shipment and the receipt of the one for which defendants were charged.” 49 F.3d at 1149. But here too there was a connection—albeit perhaps not quite as “direct”—between Rodriguez’s tutoring of Gonzalez in the drug trade as Gonzalez drove him to the earlier transactions and Gonzalez’s role as the driver of the “drug car” in the offense charged against Gonzalez and Rodriguez. Though the issue here is a close one, we find that the circumstances before us are closer to Barnes than to Hardy. Without relying on a broad, narrative-based definition, we conclude that the evidence of an ongoing drug conspiracy between Gonzalez and Rodriguez—which led up to and encompassed their jointly charged substantive offense—establishes a continuing pattern of illegal activity that is intrinsic to the charged offense and thus not subject to Rule 404(b). See Barnes, 49 F.3d at 1149. Moreover, even if we were to consider the evidence in question extrinsic to the charged offense and thus subject to the Rule 404(b) requirements, any error arising from its admission did not affect Gonzalez’s substantial rights or seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding. Gonzalez does not clearly articulate how his substantial rights were prejudiced by the lack of advance notice from the government. Despite the fact that Gonzalez did not receive full Rule 404(b) notice in the form of the government’s trial brief until the day of the trial, Dubyak noted at argument before the district court prior to trial that he had considered filing a motion in limine because “I look[ed] at the plea bargains and I look[ed] at proffers and I s[aw] all of this hearsay upon hearsay about what other people have said and people who aren’t even in this case.” Even if these proffers and plea bargains did not embody explicit notice as contemplated by Rule 404(b), Dubyak’s statement demonstrates that he had sufficient notice of the other-act evidence at issue such that its admittance at trial did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Nos. 06-3303/3387 United States v. Gonzalez Page 9