Opinion ID: 2829923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidentiary and Trial Issues

Text: A. Collins’ Impeachment with Evidence of Past Conviction We review a district court’s decision to allow impeachment evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Meyers, 952 F.2d 914, 916 (6th Cir. 1992). “An abuse of discretion exists when the district court applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 78990 (6th Cir. 2004). A district court that has conducted the necessary probative value versus prejudicial effect inquiry “has broad discretion to admit evidence of prior convictions” under Rule 609(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 181 (6th Cir. 1990). Even where the reviewing court “concludes that the district court’s ruling was erroneous, the defendant must demonstrate substantial prejudice to be entitled to a reversal.” Id. A defendant who chooses to testify at his criminal trial is subject to impeachment on cross-examination. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609, the district court must admit evidence of a past criminal conviction for any crime that has as an element a dishonest act or false Nos. 12-6263/6512/6617 United States v. Collins, et al. Page 9 statement. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). More stringent limitations apply to the admission of evidence of a past criminal conviction if more than ten years have passed since the witness’ conviction or release from confinement. In such circumstances, the evidence of conviction is only admissible if: (1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use. Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). Convictions that are more than ten years old “should be admitted very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.” Sloman, 909 F.2d at 181 (quoting United States v. Sims, 588 F.2d 1145, 1147 (6th Cir. 1978)). In order to admit such evidence, “a court must make an on-therecord finding based on the facts that the conviction’s probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial impact.” Meyers, 952 F.2d at 917. This hearing on the record, which “need not be extensive,” should include a consideration of the following factors: (1) The impeachment value of the prior crime. (2) The point in time of the conviction and the witness’ subsequent history. (3) The similarity between the past crime and the charged crime. (4) The importance of the defendant’s testimony. (5) The centrality of the credibility issue. Sloman, 909 F.2d at 181. The district court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard in admitting Collins’ past conviction as impeachment evidence. However, this error was harmless in light of the substantial evidence against Collins and the limited prejudicial potential of this past conviction. After Collins announced his intention to testify, the government stated its intention to impeach him with a 15-year-old Class B Misdemeanor for giving a false name to a police officer under Kentucky Revised Statutes § 523.110. Collins’ counsel objected to the introduction of this evidence absent prior written notice. The following day, the district court concluded that it would consider the admissibility of Collins’ prior conviction despite the lack of written notice, finding that the lack of notice was harmless because Collins’ counsel knew about Collins’ criminal history. Nos. 12-6263/6512/6617 United States v. Collins, et al. Page 10 Rather than applying the Rule 609(b) analysis whereby the court determines whether a stale conviction’s probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial impact, the district court erroneously applied Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under Rule 403, a court will exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Upon undertaking this analysis, the district court concluded that it could not find that the evidence of Collins’ prior crime was “so prejudicial that it ought not be allowed,” because it is the type of conviction that goes “directly to the witness’s v[e]racity and his truthfulness.” (R. 703, Transcript of Day 6 of Jury Trial, Page ID # 8353-4.)2 By applying the more permissive Rule 403 standard, the district court failed to undertake the requisite probative value versus prejudicial effect balancing, and in fact turned the Rule 609(b) analysis on its head. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by allowing the government to introduce evidence of Collins’ prior conviction for the purposes of impeachment. Nonetheless, the district court’s error in applying an incorrect evidentiary rule was harmless. In cases where evidence of the defendant’s participation in the crime is overwhelming, we have found that the erroneous admission of a stale conviction is harmless error. See Sloman, 909 F.2d at 181. Collins must show “substantial prejudice to be entitled to a reversal.” Id. There was overwhelming evidence in this case of Collins’ involvement in the conspiracy. Moreover, the potential prejudice of admitting this evidence is limited for the same reason that its probative value is limited—it had been 15 years since his conviction and he had had no subsequent similar convictions. In sum, while Collins’ prior conviction may have been inadmissible under a Rule 609(b) analysis, in light of the overwhelming testimony against Collins and the limited prejudicial impact of the conviction, the district court’s error in applying a Rule 403 analysis and admitting the conviction into evidence was harmless. 2 The court subsequently gave a limiting instruction to the jury, instructing them that the “earlier conviction was brought to your attention only as a way of helping you decide how believable [Collins’] testimony was. You cannot use it for any other purpose.” (R. 703, Transcript of Day 6 of Jury Trial, Page ID # 8582.) Nos. 12-6263/6512/6617 United States v. Collins, et al. Page 11 B. Expert Witness Disclosures We review a district court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ganier, 468 F.3d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 2006). Defendants argue that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the government’s proposed expert witnesses to testify despite the government’s deficient expert witness disclosures. We disagree. Pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the government must, at a defendant’s request, “give to the defendant a written summary of any testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial.” The summary required by this rule “must describe the witness’s opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness’s qualifications.” Id. Where the government has failed to comply with this disclosure requirement, the district court may: (A) order that party to permit the discovery or inspection; specify its time, place, and manner; and prescribe other just terms and conditions; (B) grant a continuance; (C) prohibit that party from introducing the undisclosed evidence; or (D) enter any other order that is just under the circumstances. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2). We have previously identified three factors for a reviewing court to consider in determining whether “suppression of evidence is an appropriate remedy to be imposed” for a disclosure violation: (1) the reasons for the government’s delay in producing the materials, including whether it acted intentionally or in bad faith; (2) the degree of prejudice, if any, to the defendant; and (3) whether the prejudice to the defendant can be cured with a less severe course of action, such as granting a continuance or a recess. United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 611 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Suppression of evidence must be viewed as an undesirable remedy for a discovery violation reserved for cases of incurable prejudice or bad faith conduct demanding punishment by the court.” Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). Courts should impose “the least severe Nos. 12-6263/6512/6617 United States v. Collins, et al. Page 12 remedy available to cure prejudice” where a potential Rule 16 violation has occurred. United States v. Maples, 60 F.3d 244, 247 (6th Cir. 1995). The government in this case filed its initial disclosure of expert witnesses for three potential witnesses on Friday, May 25, 2012—five days before the trial was scheduled to begin. Defendants had requested the government’s expert disclosures fourteen months earlier but had not received them. In discussing the timing of the government’s disclosure, the district judge commented, “I don’t know if there’s a phrase that captures something later than the 11th hour, but it appears that it would be appropriate to apply that phrase to this case.” (R. 680, Partial Transcript of Day 1 of Jury Trial, Page ID # 3231.) The prosecutor admitted that he had simply forgotten to file the disclosures. In addition to the government’s significant delay in filing its disclosures, the district court found that the disclosures themselves were substantively deficient because they lacked specificity and included fairly boilerplate language to describe the experts’ qualifications. Based on these deficiencies, Defendants orally moved the court to prohibit the government from introducing the testimony of the three witnesses. Finding the remedy of excluding the testimony to be unnecessarily extreme, the district court sought to “fashion a remedy that addresses the concerns that are raised by the defense in terms of the late and cursory notice that’s been given in this case, but something short of disallowing the testimony to occur.” (R. 713, Partial Transcript of Day 1 of Jury Trial, Page ID # 8803.) The district court determined that the defense would not be significantly prejudiced by the government’s error, noting that the experts’ potential testimony related to drug quantities and that “this case is largely about drug quantity . . . so it’s not surprising that there would be expert testimony as it relates to drug quantity in this case.” (Id. at 8804.) Determining that a less drastic course of action was possible, the district court denied Defendants’ motion to exclude the witnesses and instead required the government to produce complete expert disclosures the following day and to introduce the witnesses later in the week. The district court further explained that, following defense counsel’s receipt of the government’s complete disclosures, it would entertain motions regarding the adequacy of the district court’s proposed schedule. Specifically, the court suggested that it could “recess early one day to give counsel a little bit of [] extra time” and Nos. 12-6263/6512/6617 United States v. Collins, et al. Page 13 would consider making determinations regarding the order in which the government presented its evidence. (Id. at 8817). The district court weighed the appropriate considerations regarding the nature of the Rule 16 violation and the potential prejudice facing Defendants. In so doing, the district court sought a less extreme solution than excluding the government’s expert witnesses altogether and invited Defendants to file additional motions regarding the feasibility of the court’s proposed solution. Defendants chose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to seek further remedies, including a continuance that might have allowed them to prepare rebuttal testimony. Having given Defendants additional time to review the disclosures as well as inviting Defendants to request additional time and/or other accommodations, the district court acted within its discretion in denying Defendants’ motion to exclude the government’s witnesses on the basis of the government’s Rule 16 violation. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to apply a less severe remedy to address the government’s inadequate expert disclosures. C. Qualification of Agent O’Neil as an Expert Witness Preservation of the Issue Collins failed to preserve his objection to Agent O’Neil’s expert witness qualifications for appeal. Collins contends that the objection was preserved by a co-defendant’s objection, which he joined, on the first day of jury selection. In a lengthy exchange, Defendants raised concerns regarding the qualifications of Agent O’Neil and one other witness to testify regarding scientific issues, stating: “They want to testify to how much meth could be made from different things, and neither, I believe, none of them are qualified for that.” (R. 680, Partial Transcript of Day 1 of the Jury Trial, Page ID # 3206.) The district court determined that Defendants would have an opportunity to question Agent O’Neil about his background and expertise before the court qualified him as an expert witness. After questioning Agent O’Neil, Defendants failed to assert an objection and actively chose not to object to Agent O’Neil’s qualifications when explicitly invited to do so by the district court. Rather, Brosky’s attorney stated, “I’d certainly like to make an objection, but I think he’s going to be in the ballpark as far as that, [] I think we’re going to probably at some Nos. 12-6263/6512/6617 United States v. Collins, et al. Page 14 point in time ask for a more specific jury instruction [regarding his testimony].” (R. 702, Trial Tr., Page ID # 8108.) Collins’ attorney then clarified that defense might ask for a jury instruction regarding the pseudoephedrine conversion ratio to which Agent O’Neil was testifying, “because if - - he’s qualified as an expert, I think for the purposes of trial, he’s pretty close to it.” (Id.) When the district court then sought confirmation that “there’s no objection to moving forward with regard to [Agent O’Neil’s qualification],” Collins’ attorney failed to object, and Brosky’s attorney replied, “I don’t think I can. I mean, I’ve looked at all the case law.” (Id. at 8108-9.) Following this exchange, the government moved to qualify O’Neil as an expert witness in open court and none of the defense attorneys objected. Therefore, despite the earlier objections raised by defense counsel prior to the initial questioning of Agent O’Neil, Collins did not preserve this issue for appeal.