Opinion ID: 1898591
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Request to File Additional Assignment of Errors

Text: The rule of this court in effect at the time this appeal was submitted read: Rule 2. Additional assignments may be made before submission, only with permission of the court, after five days' written notice to adversary parties. Usually the court acts on such a request prior to submission, but no such action was taken in this case. We do not think that appellant's request to file additional assignments of error should be stricken because the request was not acted on prior to submission under the circumstances of this case. So we deny appellee's motion to strike the request. We call attention to the fact that Supreme Court Rule 2 was amended March 21, 1966, so as to read: Additional assignments may be made before submission, only with permission of the court, after five days' written notice to adversary parties. No additional assignments may be made after the filing of the appellee's brief without the written consent of the appellee and leave of this court. See 279 Ala. XXIII. However, the additional assignments of error are not in proper form and will not be considered. They do not allege error on the part of the trial court in any respect. King v. Jackson, 264 Ala. 339, 87 So.2d 623, and cases cited; Randolph v. Kessler, 275 Ala. 73, 152 So.2d 138; Doughty v. City of Fayette, 278 Ala. 121, 176 So.2d 481; Accident Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Feely, 279 Ala. 74, 181 So.2d 889; Thompson v. State, 267 Ala. 22, 99 So.2d 198; State v. Barnhill, 280 Ala. 574, 196 So.2d 691. We understand appellant to take the position that, although he did not contend in the court below that the service upon him was insufficient, that he can raise that point for the first time in this court because the return of the sheriff as shown by the record was insufficient to support the judgment by default rendered against him. In dealing with that contention we lay aside consideration of the proceedings on plaintiff's motion for permission to amend the sheriff's return of service of process nunc pro tunc, which was marked filed in the Court of Appeals on July 2, 1965, because it is our view that such proceedings are unnecessary to a decision. Conceding, without deciding, that the sheriff's return endorsed on the complaint was not sufficient to show a valid service on the defendant, appellant, we are of the opinion that the defect was waived by the defendant when he appeared generally and filed his motion to dismiss and quash the garnishment, which motion contained no grounds challenging the sufficiency of the service upon the defendant. In Aetna Ins. Co. v. Earnest, 215 Ala. 557, 112 So. 145, we quoted approvingly from 4 Corpus Juris, Appearances, § 64, p. 1364. as follows: Where a judgment has been rendered by the court without jurisdiction of the person, a general appearance after such judgment waives all objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. Thus a general appearance by defendant after final judgment waives any and all defects and irregularities in the service of process and return, just as fully as it does where such appearance is entered before final judgment. In the Aetna Ins. Co. case, supra, we pointed out that in the same text (§ 65, p. 1365) many cases were cited to the proposition that: As to the immediate parties to the action, a general appearance validates a judgment that was theretofore absolutely void for want of jurisdiction. In Vaughan v. Vaughan, 267 Ala. 117, 121, 100 So.2d 1, we observed: We hold that the respondent below, the appellant here, by not limiting her appearance and by including nonjurisdictional as well as jurisdictional grounds in her motion to vacate which, as shown above, was filed long after the expiration of thirty days from the date the original decree was entered, has made a general appearance and has thereby waived any defect or insufficiency of service.    However, in the Vaughan case, supra, we pointed out that a motion for vacation of a decree solely on the ground of want of jurisdiction of the person does not operate as a general appearance by movant. See Sachs v. Sachs, 278 Ala. 464, 179 So.2d 46; Hawkins v. Hawkins, 208 Miss. 686, 45 So.2d 271; Balfe v. Rumsey etc. Co., 55 Colo. 97, 133 P. 417; Stubbs v. McGillis, 44 Colo. 138, 96 P. 1005, 18 L.R. A.,N.S., 405. We hold that the defendant's general appearance by filing the motion to dismiss and quash the garnishment cured any defects in service upon him prior to that time.