Opinion ID: 1574793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Test For Arising Out Of.

Text: A. Governing Principles. In order for an injury to be compensable in Iowa, there must be a connection between the injury and the work. Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 221. That connection is established by showing the injury arose out of and in the course of the worker's employment. Iowa Code § 85.31(1) (2001); Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 220. In this case, the employer does not dispute that Blue's stumble on the stairs occurred in the course of her employment, but it does contest the Commissioner's determination that Blue's injury arose out of her employment. Not only do the parties disagree whether Blue has carried her burden to prove her injury arose out of her employment, the parties disagree on the proper test under which this element is to be determined. Consequently, we begin our analysis with a discussion of the legal standard that should be employed to determine whether an injury arises out of the worker's employment. As this court has noted in prior cases, [i]njuries that occur in the course of employment or on the employer's premises do not necessarily arise out of that employment. Miedema v. Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Iowa 1996). The two tests are separate and distinct and both must be satisfied in order for an injury to be deemed compensable. Id. It is important, therefore, to understand the in the course of test before we address the arising out of test. The element of in the course of refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. Id. To satisfy this requirement, the injury must take place `within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while the employee is fulfilling work duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto.' Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 222 (quoting 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law ch. 12, scope, at 12-1 (2005)). [1] The element of arising out of requires proof that a causal connection exists between the conditions of [the] employment and the injury. Miedema, 551 N.W.2d at 311. In other words, the injury must not have coincidentally occurred while at work, but must in some way be caused by or related to the working environment or the conditions of [the] employment. Id.; accord McIlravy v. N. River Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 323, 331 (Iowa 2002) (stating injury must be related to the working environment or the conditions of employment); Griffith v. Norwood White Coal Co., 229 Iowa 496, 502, 294 N.W. 741, 744 (1940) (stating injury arises out of the employment if it can reasonably be said to result from a hazard of the employment). In Hanson, this court adopted the actual-risk rule: If the nature of the employment exposes the employee to the risk of such an injury, the employee suffers an accidental injury arising out of and during the course of the employment. And it makes no difference that the risk was common to the general public on the day of the injury. 452 N.W.2d at 168. Consequently, with limited exceptions, [2] we have abandoned any requirement that the employment subject the employee to a risk or hazard that is greater than that faced by the general public. [3] Floyd v. Quaker Oats, 646 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Iowa 2002) (stating requirement of increased hazard or exertion only applies to claims of heart attack and mental illness). Applying these principles, this court has held the following injuries were not compensable or, in the penalty-benefits/bad-faith context, arguably not compensable, because they did not arise out of the employee's employment: (1) a knee injury that occurred as the employee was walking across a level floor, McIlravy, 653 N.W.2d at 331 [4] ; (2) a neck injury that happened when the employee straightened up after bending over to sign an invoice, Gilbert v. USF Holland, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 194, 200 (Iowa 2001) [5] ; (3) a back injury that occurred when an employee twisted to flush the toilet, Miedema, 551 N.W.2d at 312; and (4) a back injury that occurred when the employee was leaning against a wall for balance while putting on an overshoe, Musselman v. Cent. Tel. Co., 261 Iowa 352, 361, 154 N.W.2d 128, 133 (1967). We concluded or suggested there was nothing in the conditions of the work environment that caused or was related to the employees' injuries. See McIlravy, 653 N.W.2d at 331; Gilbert, 637 N.W.2d at 200; Miedema, 551 N.W.2d at 311; Musselman, 261 Iowa at 359-60, 154 N.W.2d at 132. In contrast to these decisions, we have held the following injuries did arise out of the employee's employment: (1) death of an employee caused by a deranged co-employee, Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. v. Cady, 278 N.W.2d 298, 302 (Iowa 1979); and (2) a head injury that occurred when a mining employee riding a man trip struck his head on a beam in the roof of the mine shaft, Griffith, 229 Iowa at 502, 294 N.W. at 744. In both cases, we concluded the injuries were causally connected to a hazard of the employment. Cady, 278 N.W.2d at 302-03; Griffith, 229 Iowa at 502, 294 N.W. at 744. In a third case, this court held an injury occurring when a teacher slipped on ice while checking on the condition of the highway prior to the students leaving school was compensable without any specific discussion of the arising out of requirement other than a statement of the basic definition. See Crowe v. De Soto Consol. Sch. Dist., 246 Iowa 402, 410, 68 N.W.2d 63, 67-68 (1955). B. Commissioner's Interpretation of the Governing Legal Principles. With this background, we now turn to the Commissioner's decision and his discussion of the applicable law. As noted above, the Commissioner adopted the deputy's proposed decision, but added some additional analysis of his own. We will separately consider both bases of the Commissioner's decision. The deputy concluded in his proposed decision that the claimant had to establish a causal connection between her injury and a condition, risk, or hazard of her employment in order to prove her injury arose out of her employment. We find no error in this interpretation of the workers' compensation statute. As noted above, this court adopted the actual-risk rule in Hanson, and the deputy's statement of the law is consistent with this rule. Although the Commissioner incorporated the deputy's actual-risk analysis into his final decision, the Commissioner also appeared to interpret Iowa law to allow compensation under the positional-risk doctrine. See generally 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 3.04, at 3-5 (2007) (stating under the actual-risk doctrine, the injury is compensable as long as the employment subjected [the] claimant to the actual risk that caused the injury); id. § 3.05, at 3-6 (stating under the positional-risk rule, [a]n injury arises out of the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where he would be injured). The Commissioner stated in his decision: When injured, [Blue] was on duty and on the employer's premises. Her employment compelled her to traverse those stairs. Accordingly, any injury she sustained as a result of traversing the stairs arose out of and in the course of her employment unless something in the evidence establishes otherwise. The Commissioner seems to be applying the rule that causal connection is sufficiently established whenever [the employment] brings claimant to the position where he or she is injured. Id. ch. 7, scope, at 7-1. Iowa has not adopted the positional-risk rule, and we decline to do so now under the circumstances presented by this case. Larson argues in his treatise that an unexplained fall should be compensated under the positional-risk rule. Id. § 7.04[1][a], at 7-28 to 7-29. Blue argues her injury arose from an unexplained fall, and Iowa should permit compensation under the positional-risk rule. We disagree that Blue's stumble is unexplained. The Commissioner found that Blue tripped when she lost her footing on the stairs. [6] Such an occurrence is easily explained by the process of going down stairs: one must necessarily lift one's foot to clear the current step, carefully position one's foot on the next step, and all the while maintain one's balance. Blue did not do so. Thus, Blue's stumble was readily explainable by the natural configuration of stairs and the care required to traverse them. To the extent the Commissioner interpreted Iowa law to permit an award of benefits under the positional-risk rule, the Commissioner erred. Notwithstanding this error, we do not believe the employer's substantial rights were prejudiced because the claimant met the arising out of requirement under the actual-risk analysis incorporated in the Commissioner's final decision. Focusing then on the actual-risk rule, we now examine whether the Commissioner's decision was [b]ased upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of law to fact. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)( m ).