Opinion ID: 1033488
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wyoming Machinery agrees to file a motion for

Text: summary judgment on its claims against Jerry Herling in the Natrona Lawsuit on or before February 1, 2011. . . . [¶51] Herling claims that the settlement agreement released both JHCI’s liability and his personal guaranties as a matter of law. He acknowledges that neither he nor JHCI were parties to the settlement agreement. However, he relies upon paragraph 11 of the agreement, which states that the settlement amount reflects full and final payment of all funds due Wyoming Machinery, and the fact that the agreement requires an assignment of part of Wyoming Machinery’s claim against JHCI and Herling to Tetra Tech. He contends that the district court therefore erred when it found that he was not released from his guaranties. 7 [¶52] Like the assignment discussed above, we review the settlement agreement according to our usual principles of contract interpretation. A “cardinal principle” in our review of contracts is that “a document should be read to give effect to all its provisions and to render them consistent with each other.” Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63, 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219, 131 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1995) (citation omitted). We presume that “each particular provision is placed in a contract for a purpose,” and “therefore avoid constructions which would render a provision meaningless.” Treemont, Inc. v. Hawley, 886 P.2d 589, 594 (Wyo. 1994) (citation omitted). Herling urges us to read the assignment provision of the settlement agreement as a complete release of his obligations, contending that “[t]he debt and the guarantee [sic] no longer belonged to Wyoming Machinery. Finding any other way would make a number of the provisions in the settlement agreement meaningless.” [¶53] Wyoming Machinery only agreed to a dismissal of all claims against Tetra Tech and Safeco. It did not agree to release its claims against Jerry Herling and JHCI. In fact, the settlement agreement specifically required Wyoming Machinery to pursue its claims against Herling and not to settle them without advance notice to Tetra Tech. Read in context, the phrase “full and final payment of all funds due Wyoming Machinery for its equipment, services, parts or transportation costs relating to the Projects” clearly refers to 7 Herling does not challenge the district court’s finding that he was not a third-party beneficiary of the agreement, and we therefore decline to consider that aspect of the court’s ruling. See Ferrell v. Knighten, 2013 WY 37, ¶ 12, 298 P.3d 161, 163 (Wyo. 2013) (“Since Ultra failed in its opening brief to designate or argue the issue of the propriety of the holding by the district court that it contractually waived its right to seek judicial review of the arbitration award, the holding is uncontested.” (quoting Ultra Resources, Inc. v. McMurry Energy Co., 2004 WY 121, ¶ 13, 99 P.3d 959, 964 (Wyo. 2004))). 17 all funds due Wyoming Machinery from Tetra Tech, not all funds due Wyoming Machinery from JHCI or Herling. [¶54] In addition, Wyoming Machinery only agreed to assign $500,000 of its claim to Tetra Tech, making the assignment partial. Whether the assignor of part of a claim may pursue the entire claim is a question discussed below. The clear language of the settlement agreement left Wyoming Machinery with a claim of at least $884,019.59. [¶55] The construction urged by Herling would render portions of the agreement meaningless and nonsensical. Herling argues, in effect, that Wyoming Machinery intended to settle its claim of approximately $1.38 million for only $500,000, and to give up its right to recover from him when he was not even a party to that agreement. There were no genuine issues of material fact, and the clear language of the agreement did not release Herling from his obligations under the guaranties as a matter of law, as the district court concluded.