Opinion ID: 1479756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Review of Sua Sponte Declaration of a Mistrial

Text: We next turn to the standards which a reviewing court must apply when confronted by a claim of double jeopardy. [9] In attempting to bring a second prosecution after a mistrial granted over defense objection, the government bears a heavy burden to justify the mistrial decision. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 505, 98 S.Ct. at 830. The words `manifest necessity' appropriately characterize the magnitude of [this] burden. Id. Thus, in determining whether a retrial is barred, a reviewing court must resolve any doubt `in favor of the liberty of the citizen.' Downum, 372 U.S. at 738, 83 S.Ct. at 1035 (quoting United States v. Watson, 28 Fed.Cas. 499 (S.D. N.Y.1868) (No. 16651)). Reviewing courts are obligated to scrutiniz[e] mistrial decisions, Somerville, 410 U.S. at 462-63, 93 S.Ct. at 1069-70, and satisfy themselves that ... the trial judge exercised `sound discretion' in declaring a mistrial. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 514, 98 S.Ct. at 835 (quoting Perez, 22 U.S. at 580). This is not to say a reviewing court is to engage in de novo consideration of the manifest necessity issue. A reviewing court ordinarily will accept a trial judge's determination that there is a high degree of necessity for a mistrial, without a less drastic alternative, as long as that determination is reasonable. See Somerville, 410 U.S. at 459, 93 S.Ct. at 1068; United States v. Sedgwick, 345 A.2d 465, 472 (D.C.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 966, 96 S.Ct. 1751, 48 L.Ed.2d 210 (1976); Coleman, 449 A.2d at 329. This is true even when the reviewing court is aware that, if presented with the question in the first instance, other trial judges  or the reviewing court itself  might well be persuaded to continue with the trial. See Arizona, 434 U.S. at 509-10, 98 S.Ct. at 832-33; Sedgwick, 345 A.2d at 472. In evaluating the reasonableness of a mistrial decision, the level of deference accorded the trial court's determination will depend on the particular problem confronting the trial judge. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct. at 830 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a spectrum of trial problems which may warrant a mistrial, and that these problems vary in their amenability to appellate scrutiny. Id. at 510, 98 S.Ct. at 833. For instance, when a mistrial is declared because the jury is deadlocked in deliberations and unable to reach a verdict, or because of a courtroom error that the trial judge believes may result in irreparable jury bias, a reviewing court generally should accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge's determination of manifest necessity. Id. at 511, 98 S.Ct. at 833; see id. at 509-11, 98 S.Ct. at 832-33. [10] The reason for this heightened deference is that the trial court is in the best position to assess all the factors which must be considered in making a necessarily discretionary determination regarding the jury's ability to render an impartial verdict. Id. at 510 n. 28, 98 S.Ct. at 832-33 n. 28. When, however, a mistrial decision is based on factors that are not uniquely within the purview of the trial court, the reviewing court need not defer to the trial judge's reasoning and conclusions. [11] In order to satisfy itself that sound discretion was exercised in declaring a mistrial, a reviewing court should not focus exclusively on the trial judge's reasons or on a lack of expressed reasons. The double jeopardy clause does not mandate that a trial judge make findings of fact or set forth specific reasoning. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 516-17, 98 S.Ct. at 835-36. Thus, the absence of specific findings or reasoning in the record regarding manifest necessity, or the lack of less drastic alternatives, does not necessarily mean that the trial judge failed to exercise sound discretion. Id. [12] Alternatively, when a trial judge's reasons for declaring a mistrial are placed on the record, a reviewing court is not prohibited from looking behind these reasons to see if they accurately reflect the record and support a determination of manifest necessity. Braxton, 395 A.2d at 769. [13] Accordingly, the reviewing court should look at the record as a whole in determining whether the mistrial was justified by manifest necessity. Id. In sum, the reviewing court should require that `the basis for the trial judge's mistrial order [be] adequately disclosed by the record.' Id. (quoting Arizona, 434 U.S. at 517, 98 S.Ct. at 836). While the trial judge need not set forth reasoning, unless the reviewing court is able to discern from the record [p]recise and justified reasons for the mistrial, a second prosecution should not be permitted. Bristol, 325 A.2d at 187. This means that the record must support both (1) a reasonable conclusion that the events at trial were sufficiently serious to override the interests of the defendant in completing the trial, and (2) a determination that there were no measures short of mistrial that might have sufficed to mitigate or cure any perceived undue trial prejudice. Braxton, 395 A.2d at 773; See Brady v. Samaha, 667 F.2d 224, 229-31 (1st Cir. 1981); Dunkerley v. Hogan, 579 F.2d 141, 146-48 (2d Cir.1978); cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090, 99 S.Ct. 872, 59 L.Ed.2d 56 (1979).