Opinion ID: 1286710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-Arrest Right to Silence

Text: Easter's principal claim in this case is that his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment was violated by testimony and argument regarding his silence at the accident scene. Additionally, the testimony and emphasis in the State's closing argument on Easter as a smart drunk constituted a comment on Easter's silence; Officer Fitzgerald testified the term meant Easter was evasive, wouldn't talk and was hiding something, all judgmental assertions. The State initially urges us to avoid any constitutional question here by characterizing the testimony that Easter was a smart drunk as the lay opinion of a police officer based on his experience and observations. The State urges this testimony was admissible because Officer Fitzgerald, while only a layperson for purposes of ER 701, was also qualified by his practical experience of 13 years as a police officer ... under ER 702. Supp. Br. of Resp't at 26. [5] We agree an officer or lay person may opine that someone was intoxicated. State v. Forsyth, 131 Wash. 611, 230 P. 821 (1924); ( City of Seattle v. Heatley, 70 Wash.App. 573, 576-80, 854 P.2d 658 (1993)), review denied, 123 Wash.2d 1011, 869 P.2d 1085 (1994). But the testimony Easter was a smart drunk went beyond, and was more pejorative than, an opinion Easter was intoxicated. Officer Fitzgerald did not testify Easter was intoxicated. Rather, he testified Easter was a smart drunk, characterizing Easter's silence as evasive and evidence of his guilt. The use of pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt implicates the Fifth Amendment and is not merely an evidentiary issue. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in part, no person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This provision applies to states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). WASH. CONST., art. I, § 9 states: [n]o person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself. We interpret the two provisions equivalently. State v. Earls, 116 Wash.2d 364, 375-75, 805 P.2d 211 (1991); State v. Foster, 91 Wash.2d 466, 473, 589 P.2d 789 (1979); State v. Mecca Twin Theater & Film Exc., Inc., 82 Wash.2d 87, 507 P.2d 1165 (1973). The right against self-incrimination is liberally construed. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). It is intended to prohibit the inquisitorial method of investigation in which the accused is forced to disclose the contents of his mind, or speak his guilt. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210-12, 108 S.Ct. 2341, 2347-49, 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988). To enforce this principle, upon arrest, an accused must be advised he or she can remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483-85, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1633, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). At trial, the right against self-incrimination prohibits the State from forcing the defendant to testify. State v. Foster, 91 Wash.2d 466, 473, 589 P.2d 789 (1979); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461, 86 S.Ct. at 1620-21. Moreover, the State may not elicit comments from witnesses or make closing arguments relating to a defendant's silence to infer guilt from such silence. As the United States Supreme Court said in Miranda, [t]he prosecution may not ... use at trial the fact [the defendant] stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n. 37, 86 S.Ct. at 1624 n. 37. The purpose of this rule is plain. An accused's Fifth Amendment right to silence can be circumvented by the State just as effectively by questioning the arresting officer or commenting in closing argument as by questioning defendant himself. State v. Fricks, 91 Wash.2d 391, 396, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979). Courts have generally treated comments on post-arrest silence as a violation of a defendant's right to due process because the warnings under Miranda constitute an implicit assurance to the defendant that silence in the face of the State's accusations carries no penalty. The use of silence at the time of arrest and after the Miranda warnings is fundamentally unfair and violates due process. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 628, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1716-17, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2244-45, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Pre-arrest silence, which lacks such implicit assurance from the State about its punitive effect in future proceedings, does not implicate due process principles, although the constitutional inquiry does not end at that point. The cases that have permitted testimony about the defendant's silence have done so only for the limited purpose of impeachment after the defendant has taken the stand, and not as substantive evidence of guilt when the defendant has not testified. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 1311-12, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982) (post-arrest silence could be used for impeachment when no Miranda warnings given) [6] ; Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2129-30, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (pre-arrest silence can be used to impeach defendant's exculpatory testimony); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1926) (silence at first trial permissible to impeach defendant's testimony at second trial). See also State v. Watkins, 53 Wash. App. 264, 273, 766 P.2d 484 (1989); State v. Hamilton, 47 Wash.App. 15, 20-21, 733 P.2d 580 (1987). See generally, Barbara Rook Snyder, A Due Process Analysis of the Impeachment Use of Silence in Criminal Trials, 29 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 285 (1988). The Court of Appeals stated the admission of testimony and argument as to Easter's silence was not error because it went to Easter's credibility as to why he was acting the way he was. State v. Easter, No. 31561-7-I, slip op. at 11 (Wn.App. May 15, 1995). This is wrong. As the State correctly observed, because Easter did not testify at trial, his credibility was never an issue. The use of silence as impeachment is not an issue in this case. The State argues pre-arrest silence may be used to support the State's case in chief because the Fifth Amendment is designed to deal only with compelled testimony, and Easter was under no compulsion to speak at the accident scene prior to his arrest. Foster, 91 Wash.2d at 473, 589 P.2d 789. [7] The State also finds support for this argument in the rule that post-arrest silence, after Miranda warnings, may not be used for impeachment. Miranda warnings implicitly assure the defendant his or her silence will not be used for any purpose once the compulsion of an arrest has occurred. Such silence is insolubly ambiguous because the defendant may be exercising the right to silence. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2244, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Moreover, the State contends the defendant must specifically invoke the privilege to enjoy it prior to arrest or the Miranda warnings, citing State v. Warner, 125 Wash.2d 876, 884, 889 P.2d 479 (1995). We decline to read the Fifth Amendment so narrowly as the State urges. An accused's right to silence derives, not from Miranda, but from the Fifth Amendment itself. [8] The Fifth Amendment applies before the defendant is in custody or is the subject of suspicion or investigation. The right can be asserted in any investigatory or adjudicatory proceeding. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1656, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Indeed, the Miranda warning states the accused is entitled by the Fifth Amendment to remain silent; Miranda indicates the right to silence exists prior to the time the government must advise the person of such right when taking the person into custody for interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. When the State may later comment an accused did not speak up prior to an arrest, the accused effectively has lost the right to silence. A bell once rung cannot be unrung. State v. Trickel, 16 Wash.App. 18, 30, 553 P.2d 139 (1976). The State's theory would encourage delay in reading Miranda warnings so officers could preserve the opportunity to use the defendant's pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt. Davis, 38 Wash.App. at 605, 686 P.2d 1143. The State's belief that the Fifth Amendment applies only to compelled testimony also implies that an accused acquires the right to silence only when advised of such right at the time of arrest. This is not so. No special set of words is necessary to invoke the right. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162, 75 S.Ct. 668, 673, 99 L.Ed. 964 (1955) (no magic language or ritualistic formula). In fact, an accused's silence in the face of police questioning is quite expressive as to the person's intent to invoke the right regardless of whether it is pre-arrest or post-arrest. If silence after arrest is insolubly ambiguous according to the Doyle court, it is equally so before an arrest. The majority of federal courts considering the issue have ruled pre-arrest silence cannot be used in the state's case in chief. In United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997, 112 S.Ct. 1702, 118 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found it was error to admit testimony of pre-arrest silence, noting whether Mr. Burson was advised of his privilege against self-incrimination is immaterial. In Burson, the right extended to a noncustodial interrogation of the defendant by two criminal investigators. See also Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989); United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981). In United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (7th Cir.1987), the court explained the right to remain silent applies equally before arrest or trial, for one has a constitutional right to say nothing at all to police before the giving of any Miranda warnings. [9] Courts in Utah, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Wisconsin have also found the use of pre-arrest silence violates the Fifth Amendment. In State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 349 (Utah. Ct.App.), cert. denied, 868 P.2d 95 (1993), the court indicated a person may exercise the right to remain silent prior to custodial interrogation and such a rule is an incentive to law enforcement to provide early Miranda warnings. In State v. Rowland, 234 Neb. 846, 851-52, 452 N.W.2d 758, 762-63 (1990), an officer testified the defendant, who had beer with him in his truck and was asleep, gave evasive answers to questions about his driver's license and his driving. The Nebraska Supreme Court held the testimony to be a violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right. In Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo.1995), the court held the right to remain silent is self-executing, so an accused is presumed to be exercising that right by his silence, pre-arrest and pre- Miranda, when questioned by the State's agents for purposes of a criminal investigation. The logic of this position is well stated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Fencl, 109 Wis.2d 224, 237, 325 N.W.2d 703, 711 (1982): The Fifth Amendment protects a person from compelled self-incrimination at all times, not just upon arrest or during a custodial interrogation. Any time an individual is questioned by the police, that individual is compelled to do one of two thingseither speak or remain silent. If both a person's prearrest speech and silence may be used against that person, as the state suggests, that person has no choice that will prevent self-incrimination. This is a veritable Catch-22. The State offers United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir.1996), and United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991), in support of its position. However, the Zanabria court provided no analysis and cited no authority for its holding. The only authorities the Rivera court noted were two cases, Jenkins and Fletcher, which involved using pre- Miranda silence to impeach a defendant's trial testimony. The Rivera court seemed unaware of the difference between cases like the present case, in which the pre-arrest silence is offered as substantive evidence, and cases like Jenkins and Fletcher, in which the pre-arrest silence was offered to impeach the defendant who had taken the stand to testify. The State also relies on State v. Helgeson, 303 N.W.2d 342 (N.D.1981), but there the silence was in the face of an accusation by a citizen, rather than a law enforcement officer or other representative of the State. The purpose of the right against self-incrimination supports the conclusion a right to silence exists prior to arrest. The purpose of the right is to make the government obtain evidence on its own, and to spare the accused from having to reveal, directly or indirectly, his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the Government. Doe, 487 U.S. at 213, 108 S.Ct. at 2349. The right exists to put the entire load of producing incriminating evidence on the State by its own independent labors. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460, 86 S.Ct. at 1620. Applying the right more generally supports this policy. Accordingly, Easter's right to silence was violated by testimony he did not answer and looked away without speaking when Officer Fitzgerald first questioned him. It was also violated by testimony and argument he was evasive, or was communicative only when asking about papers or his friend. Moreover, since the officer defined the term smart drunk as meaning evasive behavior and silence when interrogated, the testimony Easter was a smart drunk also violated Easter's right to silence. [10]