Opinion ID: 70357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: frost's motion for severance.

Text: 38 Appellant Frost appeals the district court's denial of his motion for severance, which was made both prior to and during his trial. We may reverse a district court's denial of a motion for severance only if we find that the court abused its discretion. United States v. Adams, 1 F.3d 1566 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1310, 127 L.Ed.2d 660 (1994). 39 Appellant Frost argues that this case presented mutually exclusive defenses. Specifically, Frost asserts, handwriting exemplars introduced into evidence by co-defendant Martin in which Frost had misspelled the word councilman as counselman, the same as it had been spelled by the writer of the blackmail note, was highly prejudicial and damaging to Frost. We address the nature of this evidence in section F, the portion of this opinion discussing Frost's motion for a new trial. 40 Joinder of defendants is proper if they are alleged to have participated in the same ... series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. F.R.Crim.P. 8(b). The defendant attempting to establish that the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion for severance carries a heavy burden. This Court has held: 41 In conspiracy cases like this one, the general principle is well-settled that persons who are charged together should also be tried together. In evaluating a motion for severance, this court must determine whether the prejudice inherent in a joint trial outweighs the interests in judicial economy. To establish that the district court's balancing of interests was an abuse of discretion, [the defendant] must demonstrate that a joint trial resulted in specific and compelling prejudice to the conduct of his defense. 42 Adams, 1 F.3d at 1578 (quoting United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 707 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 396, 126 L.Ed.2d 344 (1993)). By proving that the defenses in the case were antagonistic to the point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive, a defendant can meet this burden. United States v. Farrell, 877 F.2d 870, 876 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922, 110 S.Ct. 289, 107 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (quoting United States v. Romanello, 726 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir.1984)). The essence or core of the defenses must be in conflict, such that the jury, in order to believe the core of one defense, must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other. Id. 43 As noted, we have discussed in section F of this opinion the exemplars that Frost asserts prejudiced his defense, and we find that the defenses offered at trial by Frost and Martin were not mutually exclusive and antagonistic. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever. 44