Opinion ID: 1299913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bogue and Syfrett.

Text: The motions of Bogue and Syfrett to suspend the balance of their sentences are still pending in the trial court while these defendants remain incarcerated in the penitentiary system. It is a fair inference that the trial court, unless prohibited from doing so, sooner or later will act on these motions and will enter orders similar to those which accomplished the release of Sherman, Crowley and Taylor. Therefore, we must determine whether, as the Department contends, the trial court has lost jurisdiction over Bogue and Syfrett and should be prohibited from entering any further orders relating to these defendants. Bogue filed a motion to dismiss and grounds of defense, with supporting memorandum of law. The basis for the motion to dismiss was that the petition shows on its face that the trial judge was authorized to suspend Bogue's sentence and that he acted within 21 days to indicate a desire to further consider Bogue's sentencing orders. In his grounds of defense, Bogue cited the two 1975 opinions of the Attorney General as approving the procedure under which the trial court could release Bogue despite his transfer to the penitentiary where a motion to suspend had been taken under advisement by order entered within 21 days after the sentencing order. Bogue also asserted that the orders taking the motions under advisement were sufficient on their face to toll the 21-day limitation of Rule 1:1; that the orders were interlocutory, that Code § 53-272 applied only where sentence had been imposed by final order and that he had not been sentenced by a final order; that the Department exceeded its authority in transferring Bogue to the penitentiary system; that the endorsement of the orders by the Commonwealth's Attorney is binding upon the Commonwealth; and that since the Department has approved and consented to the practice of releasing prisoners from the penal system under similar circumstances in the past the doctrines of laches and estoppel should apply. Syfrett filed a motion to dismiss and grounds of defense asserting that the petition fails to allege facts sufficient to establish that the Department has standing to maintain this proceeding. In his supporting memorandum of law, the principal arguments advanced by Syfrett were that he had not been sentenced because the sentencing order was not final and that Code § 53-272 is a remedial statute and should be construed liberally to permit the trial court to retain control of the defendant's case after his transfer to the penal system. He challenged the Department's standing on the grounds that the Department had not alleged facts to show that it has suffered any injury or that it is the proper party to seek relief in this proceeding. The provisions of Rule 1:1 and Code § 53-272 are determinative of the issue before us. Prior to amendment, effective September 1, 1976, Rule 1:1 permitted trial courts to modify or vacate final judgments, orders or decrees within 21 days. The 1976 amendment gave trial courts the additional authority to suspend such final judgments, orders or decrees within 21 days after entry. Moreover, the explanatory comment stated that the purpose of the amendment was to add authority for the trial court to suspend, by order entered within twenty-one days, a final judgment pending disposition of a motion for a new trial ... or a like pleading. The meaning of Rule 1:1 is clear. Expression of a mere desire to consider a sentencing order further is not sufficient to comply with the Rule. Code § 53-272 authorizes the trial court, where a defendant convicted of a felony has been sentenced but not actually committed and delivered to the penitentiary, to suspend or modify the unserved portion of his sentence, or place the defendant on probation. Thus, reading Rule 1:1 and Code § 53-272 together, we conclude that after the expiration of 21 days from the sentencing order if the prisoner has been committed and delivered to the penitentiary and no order has been entered within 21 days after final judgment suspending the sentence, the trial court has no further authority to suspend the sentence. Opinions of the Attorney General are no more than guidelines for the benefit of public officials where our Court has made no definitive interpretation of the law. The 1975 opinions of the Attorney General were issued prior to the 1976 amendment to Rule 1:1. A more recent opinion of the present Attorney General, a letter dated March 23, 1981, addressed to the Honorable Frederick T. Gray, Jr., Secretary of the Commonwealth, advises that a trial court has no authority to reduce or terminate the suspension of imposition of sentence after a defendant has been committed to the penitentiary and 21 days have elapsed since entry of the final judgment order. This opinion, copies of which were filed with us after oral argument, reaches a conclusion different from that of the 1975 opinions. It was not available, of course, to guide the trial court when the orders were entered releasing Sherman, Crowley and Taylor from custody. In Godfrey v. Williams, 217 Va. 845, 234 S.E.2d 301 (1977), we held that under Rule 1:1 the trial court had no authority within the 21-day period after entry of final judgment to extend that limitation beyond the 21 days. We have also held that unless an order vacating or modifying a final judgment is entered before the expiration of 21 days, the final judgment is no longer under the control of the trial court. Lyle and Allen v. Ekleberry, 209 Va. 349, 350-51, 164 S.E.2d 586, 587 (1968). Moreover, we have held that the mere filing of a motion to set aside a judgment is not sufficient to extend certain time limits prescribed for perfecting appeals. Harvey v. Telephone Company, 198 Va. 213, 218, 93 S.E.2d 309, 313 (1956). Bridges v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 691, 58 S.E.2d 8 (1950), and Cobb v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 941, 146 S.E. 270 (1929), upon which the respondents rely, are inapposite. In Cobb, we held that the filing of a motion to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial would toll the running of time within which to tender a bill of exceptions as a prerequisite to filing a petition for appeal. In Bridges, we held that the trial court loses jurisdiction over a case unless within the prescribed time it enters an order or decree that shows the intent of the court to consider the matter further. These cases, however, were decided before the adoption of Rule 1:1 and turned upon the construction of certain statutes then applicable. Here, in view of the relevant Rule and statute, we hold that by taking the motions to set aside under advisement the trial court did not modify, vacate, or suspend the judgments. Therefore, the motions and the orders entered thereon did not affect the finality of the sentencing orders. We do not question the good faith of the trial judge. There may be, and often are, sound reasons why the trial judge is better qualified than probation and parole personnel to determine whether leniency should be accorded a convicted felon. If the trial judge wished to retain control of these defendants, however, it was necessary for him to comply with Rule 1:1 by entering orders within 21 days vacating, modifying or suspending the sentencing orders. He did not do so. Nor did he suspend such orders before the defendants were removed, pursuant to his orders, to the penitentiary. Under these circumstances, it is the policy of the Commonwealth, as shown by § 53-272, that control of the destiny of the prisoners passes from the trial court to the Department of Corrections. The trial court no longer has jurisdiction to act on the motions to suspend. It is apparent that the Commonwealth has assumed inconsistent positions. The Commonwealth's Attorney, the only official legal representative of the Commonwealth in the trial court, acquiesced in the procedure that the Attorney General now attacks. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth may not be estopped from repudiating the earlier position erroneously taken by the Commonwealth's Attorney, nor may the Department be estopped from changing its position. See Segaloff v. City of Newport News, 209 Va. 259, 261, 163 S.E.2d 135, 137 (1968), quoted with approval in WANV v. Houff, 219 Va. 57, 62-63, 244 S.E.2d 760, 763-64 (1978). Likewise, laches may not be set up as a defense against the Commonwealth acting in its governmental capacity. Supervisors v. N. & W. R. Co., 119 Va. 763, 790, 91 S.E. 124, 133 (1916); Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Supervisors, 110 Va. 95, 103, 65 S.E. 531, 534 (1909). See United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416, 60 S.Ct. 1019, 1020, 84 L.Ed. 1283 (1940). Furthermore, once the trial court actually lost jurisdiction over the cases by the passage of time, such jurisdiction could not be reconferred by the Commonwealth's acquiescence in any attempted exercise of jurisdiction. We reject the respondents' argument that the sentencing orders were merely interlocutory, and that the Department improperly removed the defendants to the penitentiary. The orders specifically directed that the defendants be delivered promptly to the penitentiary, and these instructions were never countermanded. In the orders entered by the trial court taking under advisement the motions to suspend filed on behalf of Bogue and Syfrett, the court noted that these defendants had not yet been committed to the penitentiary, but no provision was made for retaining them in jail pending disposition of their motions. Under Code § 19.2-310 the Department is required to remove a convicted felon to an appropriate receiving unit of the penitentiary system after receiving certain trial records from the clerk of the trial court within 30 days from the date of judgment. If the clerk fails to forward the records he will forfeit $100. While there is nothing in the record before us to show why Bogue and Syfrett were removed to the penitentiary, the mandates of the sentencing orders and the provisions of Code § 19.2-310 leave us in no doubt as to the propriety of the transfer. If the sentencing orders were interlocutory, then there are no appealable orders in the Bogue and Syfrett cases, and the appealable orders in the other three cases were the orders suspending the balance of the sentences and releasing the men from prison. Under this theory, a trial court conceivably could keep a motion under advisement for a considerable period of time during which the incarcerated defendant would have no appealable order to challenge. We regard this position as unsound. Syfrett's argument that the Department lacks standing to seek a writ of prohibition in this case is without merit. If the Department, and not the trial judge, is vested with jurisdiction over the prisoner, certainly the Department is a proper party to raise the question without being required to show actual injury or threat of injury. The petition alleges that the Virginia Parole Board has been vested by the General Assembly with the authority to determine when and if inmates of the penitentiary system should be released. Under Code § 53-230 the Virginia Parole Board functions as a part of the Department of Corrections. Therefore, the Department has standing to maintain this litigation to establish its exclusive authority. We will award a writ prohibiting the trial judge or any other judge of the trial court from entering any orders on the motions to suspend the balance of the sentences of Bogue and Syfrett. Writ denied as to Sherman, Crowley, and Taylor; writ awarded as to Bogue and Syfrett.