Opinion ID: 201800
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misuse of the Country Condition Reports

Text: In El Moraghy, a case on direct appeal, we criticized the IJ for several errors. First, we noted that the IJ improperly imposed a requirement that the country condition reports refer specifically to the petitioner or his family members. Id. at 204. In other words, the IJ appear[ed] to have employed the country condition reports solely as a test of direct corroboration, rather than for the purposes of providing context and generalized credibility assessment. Id. We do not see a similarly improper use of the country condition reports here. The IJ did note in his evidence summary that the country condition reports submitted by Ishak did not refer to any members of his family. But he said nothing further on this subject. It appears that his summary of the evidence was designed solely for the purposes of providing context. He did not tie this item into a specific adverse finding. On this record, we cannot -17- say the BIA abused its discretion in not granting a rehearing based on misuse of the country condition reports. 2. Failure to Make Credibility Findings and to Exercise Independent Judgment We also noted in El Moraghy the IJ's and the BIA's failure to make findings as to credibility or past persecution. Id. at 198. We remanded the case for further consideration, because the absence of findings as to credibility or past persecution prevented us from resolving the case on either of those grounds. Id. Ishak argues that the IJ and the BIA similarly failed to make credibility findings and that the BIA failed to exercise independent judgment in its decision. Ishak, however, failed to raise these arguments before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2000). We lack jurisdiction over issues not raised before the BIA. Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 762 (1st Cir. 1992). Due process claims may be exempt from this procedural rule where resort to the BIA would be futile because of its lack of power to adjudicate constitutional issues. See, e.g., Sousa v. INS, 226 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2000); Ravindran, 976 F.2d at 762. See infra. In the petition for review of the denial of his motion to reconsider, however, Ishak does not challenge the constitutionality of the regulations or procedures that governed his hearing. Instead, he complains of irregularities which the BIA could have corrected if brought to -18- its attention. Ravindran, 976 F.2d at 763. As Ishak did not raise these issues before the BIA, we cannot hear them now. 3. Antagonistic Cross-Examination by the IJ Ishak also contends the IJ's antagonistic cross- examination is indicative of the unfair hearing [he] received and that the BIA abused its discretion by [doing] nothing to address or remedy that legal error. The IJ has broad discretion over the conduct of trial proceedings. Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 568 (1st Cir. 1999). During Ishak's testimony, the IJ asked Ishak questions, attempting to clarify portions of his testimony. One may infer from the record that the IJ's manner of questioning was brusque and impatient. But we cannot say the questioning was so obviously biased or unfair that the BIA abused its discretion in determining that the questioning did not make Ishak’s hearing unfair. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) (holding that charges of judicial bias and partiality cannot be established solely by expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger); Morales v. INS, 208 F.3d 323, 327 (1st Cir. 2000). We accordingly reject Ishak's petition for review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reconsider its decision denying asylum and ordering his removal. -19- B. Petition for Review Based Upon Ishak's Habeas Case A district court case transferred to a court of appeals under the Real ID Act is to be treated as if it had been filed pursuant to a petition for review . . . . Real ID Act § 106(c), Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. at 311. The court thus looks at the same issues raised in the district court case but as if presented to it in a timely petition for review. Ishak's claims in his converted district court case are essentially a reformulation of the arguments he raised in the petition for review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reconsider. He presents those, however, as violations of his constitutionally-protected right of due process, contending that the IJ and the BIA violated his constitutional right to a fair trial and informed decisions with specific and sound reasoning. He argues that his hearing was not fair and impartial because the IJ misused the country condition reports, the IJ and the BIA failed to make credibility findings, and the BIA failed to exercise its independent judgment, as required by El Moraghy. Ishak also argues that the IJ's questioning on cross-examination was indicative of the unfair hearing he received. It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). We review a claim that an -20- administrative law judge violated a party's right to due process de novo. Mekhoukh v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 118, 129 (1st Cir. 2004). 1. Misuse of the Country Condition Reports First, for essentially the same reasons we stated in affirming the BIA's denial of the motion to reconsider, we reject Ishak's claim that his right to due process was violated by the IJ's misuse of the country condition reports under El Moraghy. See supra p. 17. 2. Failure to Make Credibility Findings and to Exercise Independent Judgment Second, Ishak argues, based on El Moraghy, that his right to due process was violated because the IJ and the BIA improperly relied on the asylum officer's assessment memorandum instead of making their own credibility findings, and that the BIA failed to exercise its independent judgment. As stated earlier, Ishak failed to raise these arguments to the BIA, and we lack jurisdiction to review issues not raised before the BIA. Ravindran, 976 F.2d at 762. Due process claims may be exempt from this procedural rule where resort to the BIA would be futile because of its lack of power to adjudicate constitutional issues. See, e.g., Sousa, 226 F.3d at 32; Ravindran, 976 F.2d at 762. A petitioner cannot, however, obtain review of unraised procedural errors in the administrative process by simply alleging that such errors amount to due process violations. Reid v. Engen, 765 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir. 1985). Unless an alien shows that his unraised due process -21- claims go beyond mere 'procedural errors,' which the BIA plainly may address, [] this court lacks jurisdiction to hear them. Ravindran, 976 F.2d at 762. Even assuming arguendo that Ishak's arguments that the IJ and the BIA failed to make credibility findings and that the BIA failed to exercise independent judgment are claims that go beyond mere procedural errors, they lack merit. It is true, as Ishak points out, that the IJ recited the asylum officer's assessment memorandum verbatim as part of his oral decision. The IJ, however, held a hearing to allow Ishak to develop his claims, and, as the BIA noted, the IJ additionally made his own credibility finding based on his own observations at the merits hearing. In his oral decision, the IJ stated, as already recited: I have observed the demeanor of the respondent during the time he has testified in these proceedings and find his testimony to be less than candid, his answers to be rambling, his answers not responsive to the questions asked, and his testimony not credible concerning the reasons for his leaving Egypt and not wanting to return to Egypt. The IJ's exhaustive discussion of the record shows that he independently reviewed the record and came to his own conclusion that Ishak lacked credibility. The fact that he also recited the asylum officer's assessment memorandum and reached the same conclusion as the asylum officer does not render Ishak's hearing unfair. -22- On appeal, the BIA made its own credibility finding and exercised its independent judgment. The BIA agreed with the IJ's characterization of Ishak's testimony as not responsive, but gave independent reasons for its decision. The BIA said that Ishak's unresponsive testimony occurred when the IJ was trying to clarify implausibilities and inconsistencies in his testimony. The BIA also found that [Ishak’s] testimony regarding his arrest and false accusation [was] too implausible and [had] too many unresolved inconsistencies to establish his eligibility for asylum. In light of the findings by the IJ and the BIA, we are unconvinced that Ishak's right to due process was violated. 3. Antagonistic Cross-Examination by the IJ Finally, for essentially the same reasons stated earlier, see supra pp. 18-19, we reject Ishak's contention that his right to due process was violated by the IJ's questioning on crossexamination. V.