Opinion ID: 1681413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right of Confrontation and the Videotaped Victim Interviews

Text: On appeal, the defendant raises several assignments of error related to his right of confrontation arising from the admission of the victim's videotaped interview conducted by Amalee Gordon, in which the victim accuses the defendant. First, the defendant argues that the statute which authorized the use of the videotape, La. R.S. 15:440, et seq., is unconstitutional. Further, the defendant argues that the admission of the videotape constituted a statutory violation of La. R.S. 15:440, et seq., because the victim was unavailable for cross-examination. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment safeguards the defendant's rights to confront his accusers and to subject their testimony to rigorous testing in an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). Although face-to-face confrontation forms the core of the Clause's values, it is not an absolute right of the defendant. Id.; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). Through exceptions to the hearsay doctrine, testimony may be introduced against the defendant without a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial under certain circumstances, provided the denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy interest and further provided that the testimony's reliability is otherwise assured. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988). One recognized important public policy interest is the protection of abused children. Id.; Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). Louisiana is one of many states which have developed special procedures to protect child witnesses testifying about abuse from unnecessary additional trauma, allowing videotaped statements of abused children to be admitted in court, provided certain conditions are met, La. R.S. 15:440 et seq., and allowing abused children to testify out of court via closed circuit television systems, La. C. Cr.P. art. 283. However, Louisiana's provisions creating special arrangements for abused children contain strict requirements designed to ensure that these accommodations do not compromise the rights of defendants to confront adverse witnesses and test the reliability of their testimony. The legislature first authorized the videotaping of victim statements in cases of child abuse in which the victim was under the age of 14 years at the time of the offense. 1984 La. Acts 563; La. R.S. 15:440.1-440.6. The purpose of the legislation was to facilitate prosecution of offenders who have committed crimes of violence against children with a minimum of additional intrusion into the lives of such children. The statute authorizes videotaping the statements of such victims and introducing the statements at trial as an exception to the hearsay rule. La. R.S. 15:440.3. It sets out conditions for taking the statement in the absence of the child's parents or relatives and with a minimum of questioning calculated to lead the child to make any particular statement. La. R.S. 15:440.4. [18] In order to be admissible, the videotape must meet the requirements of La. R.S. 15:440.5, which provides as follows: 440.5. Admissibility of videotaped statements; discovery by defendant A. The videotape of an oral statement of the protected person made before the proceeding begins may be admissible into evidence if: (1) No attorney for either party was present when the statement was made; (2) The recording is both visual and oral and is recorded on film or videotape or by other electronic means; (3) The recording is accurate, has not been altered, and reflects what the witness or victim said; (4) The statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the protected person to make a particular statement; (5) Every voice on the recording is identified; (6) The person conducting or supervising the interview of the protected person in the recording is present at the proceeding and available to testify or be cross-examined by either party; (7) The defendant or the attorney for the defendant is afforded an opportunity to view the recording before it is offered into evidence; and (8) The protected person is available to testify. B. The admission into evidence of the videotape of a protected person as authorized herein shall not preclude the prosecution from calling the protected person as a witness or from taking the protected person's testimony outside of the courtroom as authorized in R.S. 15:283. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to prohibit the defendant's right of confrontation. C. In a criminal prosecution, when the state intends to offer as evidence a copy of a videotaped oral statement of a protected person made pursuant to the provisions of this Subpart, the defendant may be provided a copy of the videotape if the court determines it necessary to prepare a proper defense. If the court orders the defendant be provided a copy of the videotaped statement, only the attorney and the defendant shall be permitted to view the tape and no copies shall be made by any person. The copy shall be returned to the court immediately upon conclusion of the case. Any violation of this Subsection shall be punished as contempt of court. At trial, after the victim took the stand, the State offered the videotape into evidence and defense counsel stipulated that the videotape was in compliance with the requirements of La. R.S. 15:440.5. In addition, defense counsel expressly stated that it had no objection to the admissibility of the tape. Furthermore, as early as the opening statement, the defense calculated the December 16, 1999, videotape would be played for the jury, as it instructed the jury to watch both this videotape and the March, 1998, videotape closely because the March, 1998, videotape would provide more detail and thus be more truthful. However, now, the defendant characterizes the impact of the admission of this tape as devastating to his case. The defendant concedes that these issues were not presented to the court below, as defense counsel expressly stipulated to the admission of the tape and stated he had no objection to the tape. However, he contends that La. R.S. 15:440.5 is unconstitutional on its face, which can be addressed by this Court in the absence of contemporaneous objection in the court below. He argues that under existing jurisprudence this Court may consider its validity despite the failure of the defense to move to quash the statutory provisions or otherwise object on confrontation grounds to the admission of the videotaped statement. [19] See State v. Green, 493 So.2d 588, 590 (La.1986) (The facial unconstitutionality of a statute on which a conviction is based is an error discoverable by the mere inspection of pleadings and proceedings, without inspection of the evidence, which an appellate court is entitled to review, even though the defendant did not comply with the assignment of error procedure.) However, this Court has applied this rule only in the context of challenges to the facial validity of substantive criminal statutes. In this case, the statutes at issue concern only the nature of the evidence admitted at trial. As with any other ruling by a trial court admitting or excluding evidence, defendant must object to the ruling to preserve the issue for review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 841 ([a]n irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.); State v. Thomas, 427 So.2d 428, 433 (La. 1982) (on rehearing) (the contemporaneous objection rule prevents a defendant from gambling for a favorable verdict and then resorting to appeal on errors that might easily have been corrected by objection.). In the present case, defense counsel not only failed to object to the admission of the videotape but he also stipulated to its admissibility. However, assuming the facial unconstitutionality of this statute can properly be considered in the absence of an objection at trial, we reject defendant's argument that this statute is unconstitutional on its face. [20] The defendant argues that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), makes clear that the admission of testimonial statements, such as the victim's in this case, violates the Sixth Amendment. Traditionally, for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, all hearsay statements were admissible if: (1) the declarant was unavailable to testify; and (2) the statement fell under a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). However, in Crawford, the United States Supreme Court overruled Roberts insofar as it applies to out-of-court statements that are testimonial in nature. The Court held that the adequate indicia of reliability standard set forth in Roberts is too amorphous to adequately prevent admission of core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63, 124 S.Ct. at 1371. The Crawford Court drew a distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay and noted that non-testimonial hearsay is admissible when both prongs of Roberts are satisfied, regardless of whether the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63, 124 S.Ct. at 1371. On the other hand, the Court held that testimonial hearsay statements may be admitted as evidence at a criminal trial only when the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Id. The Court also declined to provide a comprehensive definition of testimonial, observing that, whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. Id., 541 U.S. at 68. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed. Id. [21] While Crawford did establish as an important requirement for Sixth Amendment purposes that the defendant have a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, and that requirement was clearly not met in this case, Crawford also expressly stated: Finally, we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). It is therefore irrelevant that the reliability of some out-of-court statements cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in court. Post, [124 S.Ct.] at 1377 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986)). The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it. (Emphasis added.) 541 U.S. 59, n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Therefore, according to Crawford, a testimonial videotaped statement is not inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment if the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it. Id. Thus, it is clear that La. R.S. 15:440.5 is not facially unconstitutional as it specifically requires as a condition of admissibility that the protected person is available to testify. La. R.S. 15:440.5(8). Whether the victim was actually available to testify or present at trial to defend or explain her statement is thus the only remaining issue related to the admissibility of the videotape. This raises the related questions of whether the statute is constitutional as applied in this case, and/or whether the admission of the tape was a statutory violation of La. R.S. 15:440.5(8), because, as urged by the defendant, although she took the stand at trial, her lack of memory rendered her unavailable. Once again, we note that the defendant stipulated to the admissibility of the tape before it was played and expressly stated that he had no objection to the tape. Even after the cross-examination, he still did not object on the grounds that the victim's alleged lack of memory rendered her unavailable. Thus, this objection is clearly waived. La.C.Cr.P. 841. However, in an abundance of caution, we find that even had defendant objected, we would still find that the victim was available to testify for purposes of La. R.S. 15:440.5(8) and the Confrontation Clause. The defendant argues that although the victim was physically present to testify, she was unable to respond to questioning in a meaningful way and simply adopted her videotaped statement, which was obtained without the presence of defense counsel or any opportunity to effectively cross-examine the witness either pre-trial or at trial. Defendant contends that the victim's poor memory rendered her unavailable for cross-examination despite her physical presence on the stand. We disagree. A witness may be physically present in a courtroom and still be unavailable. See, e.g., State v. Nall, 439 So.2d 420 (La.1983); State v. Pearson, 336 So.2d 833 (La.1976); State v. Ghoram, 328 So.2d 91 (La.1976). However, since the Supreme Court's decision in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), the Court has made clear that [t]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only `an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.' United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561, 108 S.Ct. 838, 842, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2664, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985)) (emphasis in original). In Owens, the trial court allowed the admission of the testimony of a witness with amnesia that although he remembered identifying defendant as his attacker, he no longer had an independent memory of the attack. Id. at 840-41. The Supreme Court found that this was not in violation of defendant's Confrontation Clause rights because, even though amnesia rendered effective cross-examination difficult, it did not deprive defendant of an opportunity for effective cross examination. Id. at 842. In this case, the victim was able to answer the vast majority of the questions asked of her. See, supra pp. 767-71. In court, she identified defendant as the person who raped her, and testified that she remembered making the videotape, that everything happened as she reported on the videotape, that she earlier had told police and others that a boy had raped her but that was a lie, and she testified about circumstances surrounding the rape. The fact that she could not remember meeting with specific people during the investigation and that she did not remember making the first videotape with Dr. McDermott does not render her unavailable for purposes of the statute or the constitution. She was clearly able to defend or explain the videotaped statement at trial. These assignments of error lack merit. The defendant next claims that the admission of C.H.'s testimony that L.H. told her the defendant raped her violates the hearsay rule. As stated above, C.H. followed the victim to the stand and told jurors that after her daughter returned to her custody in 1998, L.H. came to her one night and confided that she couldn't hold it [in] anymore that Patrick Kennedy had raped her. The state offered C.H.'s testimony over defense hearsay objections as the first reporting to her mother, for purposes of La.C.E. art. 801(D)(1)(d) (defining as non-hearsay the prior consistent statement of a declarant who testifies in court subject to cross-examination referring to an initial complaint of sexually assaultive behavior.) The statutory provision reflects a longstanding jurisprudential rule exempting the initial report of a child rape victim from the hearsay rule. See, e.g., State v. Prestridge, 399 So.2d 564, 572 (La.1981)([I]n the prosecution of sex offenses the better rule is that the original complaint of a young child is admissible when the particular facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the complaint was the product of a shocking episode and not a fabrication.); State v. Adams, 394 So.2d 1204, 1212 (La.1981) (same); State v. Noble, 342 So.2d 170, 173 (La.1977) (same). We find this statement clearly was not made under emergency circumstances shortly after the offense, and the press of the shocking episode most likely dissipated over the course of nearly two years to a point where it no longer assured the reliability of the assertion even for purposes of Louisiana's hearsay rules. Moreover, the statement constituted L.H.'s initial report of the sexual assault only from the state's perspective. It remained for jurors to determine whether her first report to the police, that two black boys had been involved, or to her mother, told the truth of the matter. However, even assuming that the trial erred in admitting C.H.'s testimony, the ruling was clearly harmless. This Court has long held that the admission of hearsay testimony is harmless error when the effect is merely cumulative or corroborative of other testimony adduced at trial. State v. Johnson, 389 So.2d 1302 (La.1980); State v. McIntyre, 381 So.2d 408, 411 (La. 1980). As this evidence was merely cumulative of the evidence provided in the videotaped statement of L.H. previously viewed by the jury, and L.H.'s testimony at trial, the admission of this evidence constitutes harmless error. Finding no other errors in defendant's conviction and sentence, we now reach the seminal issue in this case. [22]