Opinion ID: 871589
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The ICA Majority Opinion

Text: The ICA majority examined Walker’s charge16 and explained that “[t]he minimum requirements for a criminal charge 14 Judges Fujise and Leonard comprised the ICA majority. 15 Pinpoint citations to State v. Walker, No. 29659, 2011 WL 4537771 (App. 2011) are based on the hard copy opinion attached to Walker’s Application. 16 Because Walker first objected to the sufficiency of the HOVUII charge prior to the circuit court finding him guilty, the ICA did not apply the Motta/Wells liberal construction rule in evaluating the sufficiency of his charge. State v. Walker, No. 29659, 2011 WL 4537771 at  (App. 2011). Under the Motta/Wells rule, there is a “presumption of validity,” [State v.] Sprattling, 99 Hawai#i [312,] 318, 55 P.3d [276,] 282 [(2002)], for charges challenged subsequent to a conviction. In those circumstances, this court will “not reverse a conviction based upon a defective indictment [or complaint] unless the defendant can show prejudice or that the indictment [or complaint] cannot within reason be construed to charge a crime.” [State v.] Merino, 81 Hawai#i [198,] 212, 915 P.2d [672,] 686 [(1996)] (citation omitted). State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i 383, 399-400, 219 P.3d 1170, 1186-87 (2009) (some brackets in original). The ICA’s analysis in Walker is consistent with this court’s principle that the “liberal construction standard is limited to construing indictments[] when the issue is only raised after trial.” State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 94, 657 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 15  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  are set by statute[]” in HRS § 806-34: In an indictment the offense may be charged either by name or by reference to the statute defining or making it punishable; and the transaction may be stated with so much detail of time, place, and circumstances and such particulars as to the person (if any) against whom, and the thing (if any) in respect to which the offense was committed, as are necessary to identify the transaction, to bring it within the statutory definition of the offense charged, to show that the court has jurisdiction, and to give the accused reasonable notice of the facts. Averments which so charge the offense and the transaction shall be held to be sufficient. Id. (quoting HRS § 806-34 (1993)). In State v. Stan’s Contracting, Inc., 111 Hawai#i 17, 31, 137 P.3d 331, 345 (2006), this court construed HRS § 806-34 as containing mandatory requirements for a charge. Id. The ICA majority’s analysis explained that “the factual description of the transaction has a jurisdictional component and is in addition to the requirement of giving the defendant ‘reasonable notice of the facts.’” Walker, No. 29659, 2011 WL 4537771 at  (citing HRS § 806-34 (1993)). Furthermore, the ICA majority also examined Hawai#i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 7(d) and noted that the rule “reflects a similar distinction between the requirements for the description of the offense charged and the facts giving rise to the charge.” Id. The majority explained: With respect to the identification of the charge, HRPP Rule 7(d) requires that “[t]he charge shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation[,] or other provision of law[.]” With respect to the description of the transaction, HRPP Rule 7(d) requires that “[t]he charge shall be a plain, concise[,] and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Id. 16  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Beyond HRS § 806-34 and HRPP Rule 7(d), the ICA majority acknowledged that in some circumstances, “compliance with the requirements for identification of the charge . . . does not necessarily satisfy the requirements for the allegation of the transaction.” Id. at . In such a situation, a mere “citation to the statute would not cure the failure to allege an element of an offense.” Id. For example, in Wheeler, “[t]he use of the phrase ‘operate’ [in the charge] did not provide adequate notice to [the defendant] that the State was required to prove that [the defendant’s] operation of the vehicle occurred on a public way, street, road, or highway.” Id. (quoting Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i at 395, 219 P.3d at 1182). The ICA analogized Walker to Wheeler: “[j]ust as the word ‘operate’ does not suggest operation on a public road, ‘habitual operator’ does not convey the narrow definition that the person charged had three prior convictions within the previous ten years[]” as required for a conviction under HRS §§ 291E-61.5(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A). Id. at . State v. Mita, 124 Hawai#i 385, 245 P.3d 458 (2010), a case involving an animal nuisance charge pursuant to the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (ROH), also provided guidance to the ICA majority’s opinion. Id. at -10. Two significant factors distinguished Mita from Wheeler. First, in Mita, the definition 17  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  of “animal nuisance” as used in the ROH did not create an additional element of the offense of animal nuisance as the definition of “operate” created an additional element of the offense of OVUII in Wheeler. See id. at  (citing Mita, 124 Hawai#i at 391, 245 P.3d at 464). Second, the definition of “animal nuisance” as used in the ROH is consistent with the commonly understood meaning of the term unlike the definition of “operate” in Wheeler that carried a narrow, statutory definition. See id. (citing Mita, 124 Hawai#i at 391, 245 P.3d at 464). Ultimately, Mita’s charge “sufficiently alleged all of the essential elements of the offense of animal nuisance[]” by tracking the language of the ROH. Id. (quoting Mita, 124 Hawai#i at 391, 245 P.3d at 464). Following Wheeler and Mita, the ICA majority concluded that “the charge of HOVUII is essentially a recidivist offense and virtually the only difference between it and the offense of [OVUII] under HRS § 291E-61 is the number of previous convictions required for an HOVUII conviction.” Id. Furthermore, “[t]he term ‘habitual,’ or even ‘habitual operator,’ does not convey the specificity of the term for HOVUII purposes.” Id. at -11. Therefore, the ICA majority determined that the terms “habitual” and “habitual operator” do not qualify as terms that may be used in a criminal charge under their commonly understood definitions 18  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  as allowed by HRS § 806-31 (1993).17 Id. at . Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Walker was a “habitual operator of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant” as that phrase might be understood given the words usual meaning (see HRS § 1–14 (2009)),[ 18] would not necessarily result in a conviction. A conviction would only lie upon proof that Walker “has been convicted three or more times within ten years of the instant offense, for offenses of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant” as prescribed in HRS § 291E–61.5(b). Thus, the three prior convictions are attendant circumstance elements of the offense. See Ruggiero, 114 Hawai#i at 239, 160 P.3d at 715. Id. at . For the ICA majority, “[s]ince proof of each element of the offense is required for a conviction (HRS § 701–114(1)(a)),[19] the proof of three or more convictions within the previous ten years is an element of the offense and therefore should have been included in the charge.” Id. Accordingly, based on this analysis alone, the ICA majority vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to the circuit court to dismiss Count I without prejudice. Id. The ICA majority’s opinion is silent as to Walker’s other points 17 HRS § 806-31 (1993) provides: No indictment or bill of particulars is invalid or insufficient for the reason merely that it alleges indirectly and by inference instead of directly any matters, facts, or circumstances connected with or constituting the offense, provided that the nature and cause of the accusation can be understood by a person of common understanding. 18 HRS § 1-14 (2009) provides that “[t]he words of a law are generally to be understood in their most known and usual signification, without attending so much to the literal and strictly grammatical construction of the words as to their general or popular use or meaning.” 19 HRS § 701–114(1)(a) provides: “(1) Except as otherwise provided in section 701-115, no person may be convicted of an offense unless the following are proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (a) Each element of the offense[.]” 19  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  of error presented in his opening brief. Id. at -12.