Opinion ID: 6491398
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether HMA sufficiently alleged injury to itself

Text: In its May 23, 2003 order in the HMA Appeal case, the circuit court concluded, inter alia, that: [E]ven if HMA’s claims could otherwise be construed as claims [of] “unfair methods of competition,” they are still barred because HMA has failed to show, and cannot show, antitrust injury and antitrust standing as required by HRS chapter 480. To establish “antitrust injury,” HMA must show injury of the type the antitrust law were intended to prevent and that flows from HMSA’s alleged unlawful activities. Only a plaintiff who can show a significant threat of injury to his or her “business or property” from impending violations can obtain injunctive relief. HRS. § 480-13(a)(2); McCormack v. Nat[’l] Collegiate Athletic Found[.], 845 F.2d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir.1988)[.] [[Image here]] To establish “antitrust standing,” HMA must allege a direct injury. HMA cannot meet this burden. Each and every allegation of harm suffered by HMA pertains either to a harm allegedly suffered directly by a physician member ... or a harm HMA suffered as a result of such a physician’s alleged suffering. HMA’s repeated assertion that these injuries are “direct” does not make it so. Its injuries are derivative and remote by definition, and do not give rise to an antitrust standing. First, we note that we have already concluded, in section III.B., that HMA has standing to bring suit on behalf of its physician members and on its own behalf and, in section III.C., that HMA’s post-June 28, 2002 claims of unfair methods of competition are not barred. Second, we note that HRS § 480-13(a) authorizes a plaintiff to seek damages and injunctive relief, providing that: “any person who is injured in the person’s business or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this chapter: (1) May sue for damages ...; and (2) May bring proceedings to enjoin the unlawful practieesf.]” In Ai v. Frank Huff Agency, Ltd., 61 Haw. 607, 607 P.2d 1304 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Robert’s Hawai’i, 91 Hawai'i at 250 n. 26, 982 P.2d at 879 n. 26, this court established three elements essential to recovery under HRS § 480—13:(1) a violation of HRS chapter 480; (2) injury to the plaintiffs business or property resulting from such violation; 30 and (3) proof of the amount of damages. 31 Id. at 617, 607 P.2d at 1311; see also Robert’s Hawai'i, 91 Hawai'i at 254, 982 P.2d at 883; Beclar Corp. v. Young, 7 Haw.App. 183, 194, 750 P.2d 934, 941 (1988). “[Wjhile proof of a violation of chapter 480 is an essential element of an action under HRS § 480-13, the mere existence of a violation is not sufficient ipso facto to support the action; forbidden acts cannot be relevant unless they cause [some] private damage.” Robert’s Hawai‘i, 91 Hawai'i at 254 n. 30, 982 P.2d at 883 n. 30 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (some brackets in original). In the HMA Appeal, HMA maintains that, by alleging the “diminishment of financial resources,” it had established “antitrust injury” to its business and property. In Ai, this court held that “it is unnecessary for plaintiffs[, in that case, the consumers] to allege commercial or competitive injury[;]” it is sufficient that plaintiffs allege that injury occurred to personal property through a payment of money wrongfully induced.” 61 Haw. at 614, 607 P.2d at 1310. Therefore, HMA need only allege that, by reason of an antitrust violation, it has been injured in its “business or property.” HMA did so when it alleged that, as a result of HMSA’s unfair or deceptive practices, HMA was required to divert substantial resources and time to deal with its members' problems created by HMSA’s conduct—“resources that otherwise would go to support its principal mission in service of its members.” Clearly, HMA has sufficiently alleged “injury to business property.” Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in concluding that HMA failed to allege sufficient injury to its business or property. 32 We emphasize, however, that this case comes before us not after a trial on the merits, but after a grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. As such, we are bound to construe the allegations in the complaint in favor of the pleader. Ruf v. Honolulu Police Dep’t, 89 Hawai'i 315, 319, 972 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1999). It would, therefore, be inappropriate for this court to delve into HMA’s ability or inability to prove damages as a result of its involuntary diversion of resources caused by HMSA’s alleged unfair methods of competition.