Opinion ID: 1235169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Starr's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Text: Starr next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him. [T]he [district] court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29. When a district court considers a motion for acquittal, it does so with `very limited latitude.' The court should not assess the credibility of the witnesses or weigh the evidence. United States v. Hernandez, 301 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir.2002). Starr's sufficiency arguments fail. Starr argues his version of the facts was reasonable; however, the pertinent inquiry is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction if the government's evidence is accepted. See United States v. Grover, 511 F.3d 779, 779 (8th Cir.2007) (stating that [o]nly if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty will we reverse). If believed, the government's evidence could have convinced a reasonable jury to convict him.
Starr alleges that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on counts 1, 3, and 7. Specifically, Starr contends that the government failed to show that he used, persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced his alleged victims to send him pictures. [9] Starr argues that this element cannot be met because V.M., K.E., and K.S. acted voluntarily. And with regard to count 3, Starr also argues that because there was no return address or note inside the package that was sent to K.E., the jury could not conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he sent the camera to K.E. We disagree on both claims. Starr's argument ignores his role in convincing the victims to send the sexually explicit photographs to him. In his dealings with V.M., K.E., and K.S., it was Starr who introduced the sexual dimension to their relationships and requested the photographs. Given the record proof of Starr's overt solicitation, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Starr used, persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced these individuals to send him sexually explicit pictures of themselves. Also, the jury's verdict is consistent with record evidence that Starr sent the camera used to produce pornographic images to K.E. At trial, the government presented evidence of Starr's Internet dealings with K.E., his repeated requests from Starr for pictures of K.E., and his knowledge that she did not have a camera to take and send these pictures. The absence of a note or return address did not render the evidence insufficient.
Starr argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain convictions on counts 2 and 8 because there was insufficient evidence presented that he personally received or attempted to receive the images of V.M. or K.S., respectively. Starr argues that because V.M. only talked with darklordmaster11 over the Internet and Mrs. Starr had access to Starr's email accounts, there is no way the government could have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Starr sought the images. Starr's version of events, however, is not supported by the record. Detective Miller testified that Starr admitted on multiple occasions owning the online profile darklordmaster11 and the explicit photos of V.M. These facts supply sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. With regard to count 8, Starr argues that other individuals had access to his office computer and that his door did not have a lock on it. We find this argument unavailing because the record clearly establishes Starr's dealings with K.S.K.S. testified, and telephone records confirmed, that Starr and K.S. engaged in telephone sex and that Starr requested the photos to use in these sessions. Given Starr's documented dealings with K.S., the jury reasonably could infer that Starr knowingly possessed the photos of K.S., and we decline to disturb its finding.
Starr's final evidentiary argument contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction on counts 4, 5, 6, and 9. On counts 4 and 5, Starr argues that the government failed to prove that he possessed the images prior to his wife's delivery of the items to police. Starr asserts that Mrs. Starr's failure to specifically testify that she found the photos among his personal items and knew them to be his is fatal to the government's case. However, given E.M.'s testimony that she sent the photos to Starr when she was 17 years old and Starr's admission that he possessed the photos, we reject his argument. With regard to count 6, Starr again argues that his wife may have planted the photos in his desk to frame him. However, as explained previously, this version of events is not borne out by the evidence. Starr also challenges the knowingly element of count 9, but this argument fails for the same as his challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to prove count 8the record clearly establishes his relationship with K.S. and provides a sound basis on which the jury could infer that he knowingly possessed the photos. Crediting the testimony of the witnesses, as we must under our standard of review, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support Starr's conviction on each count. Accordingly the district court did not err in denying Starr's motion for a judgment of acquittal.