Opinion ID: 2971674
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: KOSHA Preemption

Text: The next issue is whether KOSHA preempts Maiden’s action in the district court. On appeal, Maiden argues that his damages claims are not preempted by KOSHA because Kentucky Revised Statute § 446.070 allows a person injured by a statutory violation to recover damages. Thus, Maiden contends that he should be allowed to recover damages from NAS. Maiden also argues that KOSHA does not affirmatively require the Labor Cabinet to provide relief to an aggrieved employee, and that, as a result, the Labor Cabinet systematically denies such relief. In a diversity action, state law governs the parties’ claims and defenses. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Under Kentucky law, “[w]here the statute both declares the unlawful act and specifies the civil remedy available to the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party is limited to the remedy provided by the statute.” Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985). The Kentucky OSHA statute provides that “[n]o person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to [Kentucky OSHA].” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 338.121(3)(a). To enforce the KOSHA requirements, “[a]ny employee who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation of this subsection may . . . file a complaint with the commissioner alleging such discrimination.” § 338.121(3)(b). If the commissioner issues a citation and that citation is appealed, “the review commission may order all appropriate relief including rehiring and reinstatement of the employee to his former position with 5 back pay.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, KOSHA provides a statutory structure for employees to seek a remedy, thereby preempting any common-law wrongful discharge claims based on those statutes. Hines v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 550, 552 (W.D. Ky. 1993). Indeed, “employees seeking to enforce their rights under these laws must file their complaints with the Kentucky Labor Cabinet . . . not in court.” George J. Miller, Federal District Court Dismisses Worker’s OSHA Retaliation Claim, Ky. OSHA J., July 2001, at 1, 2 (citing Hines). In support of his contention, Maiden first cites the text of KOSHA that does not impose a duty to the Review Commission to provide relief, and State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1988), that permitted a direct action under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 446.070 for violations of the state unfair settlement law. In Grzyb, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that § 446.070 “is limited to where the statute is penal in nature, “or where by its terms the statute does not prescribe the remedy for its violation.” 700 S.W.2d at 401. Moreover, in Reeder, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed its prior holding in Gryzb that if a statute specifies a civil remedy, an aggrieved party is limited to the remedies provided for in the statute, and further affirmed that it had based its prior decision in Reeder on the fact that the statute at issue did not specify such a civil remedy. 763 S.W. 2d at 118 (analyzing Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.12-230); cf. Phoenix Healthcare of Ky., LLC v. Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 120 S.W.3d 726, 727-28 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003) (following Gryzb and distinguishing Reeder where applicable statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-220, provided a civil remedy). Maiden’s argument is incompatible with Kentucky precedent because KOSHA provides a civil remedy. As to his contention that KOSHA does not affirmatively require the Labor Cabinet to provide 6 any relief to an aggrieved employee, Maiden argues that he “would have been able to establish, though the simple expedient of Interrogatories to KOSHA, that the Labor Commissioner never has, nor ever intends to, provide any relief to aggrieved employees (including the Plaintiff in this case) beyond, ‘ . . . rehiring and reinstatement of the employee to his former position with back pay.’ ” (Appellant Brief at 10-11). Maiden seeks an injunction from the district court ordering the Review Commission to consider awarding him compensatory and punitive damages. As noted above, KOSHA explicitly provides that the Review Commission may provide “all appropriate relief,” which includes compensatory and punitive damages. Maiden’s argument that he will be denied such damages simply because the Review Commission allegedly has a de facto policy of denying such relief is not properly before the court for several reasons. First and foremost is that the Review Commission proceeding is pending and the Commission may award Maiden the damages he prospectively seeks. We consider this claim as more appropriate for any appeal of the Review Commission’s decision, if necessary.