Opinion ID: 682808
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Heading: issues

Text: 54 On appeal, the government does not argue for the admissibility of the statements McCurdy made prior to the time he received his Miranda warnings. Rather, the government contends that the court erred in granting McCurdy's motion to suppress the statements he made after receiving the Miranda warnings and the physical evidence the officers found in his pickup truck. 55 In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Girolamo, 23 F.3d 320, 326 (10th Cir.1994). However, we review de novo the ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir.1993)). 56 The fifth amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1579-80, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976) (emphasis in original). For example, the [d]isclosure of name and address is essentially a neutral act, and it would be the 'extravagant' extension of the privilege Justice Holmes warned against to hold that it is testimonial in the Fifth Amendment sense. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 431-32, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 1539-40, 29 L.Ed.2d 9 (1971). Moreover, one's identification would inevitably be discovered via fingerprints, dental records or other non-testimonial evidence. 57 a. 58 The government acknowledges that McCurdy was in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes when Dickerson and Morris initially detained him and that the officers' failure to Mirandize him at that time mandated the suppression of the statements he made prior to being Mirandized. It seems clear that the investigation was no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime after McCurdy was taken into custody; the focus was on him. See Escabedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1764-65, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). The government argues, however, that the officers' failure to Mirandize McCurdy at the time he was initially detained did not require the suppression of McCurdy's statements made after he was formally arrested and Mirandized. 59 McCurdy responds that his statements acknowledging ownership of the truck, indicating where the truck was, permitting Tafoya to search his truck and confessing responsibility for the marijuana plantation, were all obtained in violation of Miranda, (Appellee's Answer Brief at 20), and that the court properly suppressed both his pre- and post-Miranda statements. 60 Our analysis begins with Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). In that case, defendant Elstad was picked up at his home as a suspect in a burglary. He made an incriminating statement prior to the time the officers apprised him of his rights under Miranda. After Elstad was taken to the station house and after he was advised of and had waived his Miranda rights, he executed a written confession. Following Elstad's conviction, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the written confession should have been excluded. The Supreme Court reversed, holding: 61 Prior to Miranda, the admissibility of an accused's in custody statements was judged solely on whether they were voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.... The court in Miranda required suppression of many statements that would have been admissible under traditional due process analysis by presuming that statements made while in custody and without adequate warnings were protected by the Fifth Amendment.... 62       63 Respondent's contention that his confession was tainted by the earlier failure of the police to provide Miranda warnings and must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree assumes the existence of a constitutional violation.... 64       65 In Michigan v. Tucker [417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) ], the court was asked to extend the Wong Sun [v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ] fruits doctrine to suppress the testimony of a witness for the prosecution whose identity was discovered as the result of a statement taken from the accused without the benefit of full Miranda warnings.... The court concluded that the unwarned questioning did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege ... but departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege. ... 66 We believe that this reasoning applies with equal force when the alleged fruit of a noncoercive Miranda violation is neither a witness nor an article of evidence but the accused's own testimony.... Once warned, the suspect is free to exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the authorities.... 67       68 It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made. 69       70 We hold today that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings. 71 470 U.S. at 305-09 and 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1291-93 and 1298. 72 Elstad makes clear that a failure to administer Miranda warnings, without more, does not automatically require suppression of the 'fruits' of the uncounseled statement. United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1517 (6th Cir.1988). Where the uncounseled statement is voluntary, and thus not a product of 'inherently coercive police tactics or methods offensive to due process' ... there is no fifth amendment violation and the 'fruits' may be admissible in the Government's case in chief. Id. Similarly, under Elstad, [i]f the unwarned statement was voluntary, and the allegedly tainted second statement was also voluntary, the second, warned statement is admissible since [t]he Fifth Amendment ... prohibits only the use of compelled testimony. United States v. Wiley, 997 F.2d 378, 383 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 600, 126 L.Ed.2d 565 (1993). 73 We followed Elstad in United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1986), holding that [t]he record reflects that after Hall was fully advised of his rights, he chose to give a recorded statement to Detective Marquez, and under the ruling in Oregon v. Elstad ... there was no error in admitting that statement. The government, citing Hall, argues that [s]ince McCurdy's pre-Miranda statement was voluntary, and he voluntarily waived his rights before making his post-Miranda statement, under Elstad his post-Miranda statements are admissible. (Opening Brief for Appellant at 11). 74 McCurdy responds that the court properly found that suppression of his post-Miranda statements was warranted because the officers' violation of Miranda was so gross and were the product of ... behavior that demonstrates so much contempt for Miranda. (Appellee's Answer Brief at 25-6). McCurdy argues that United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir.1989), is virtually on all fours with this case and compels the suppression of his statements. 75 In Carter, the officers did not Mirandize defendant Carter until after they had induced him to turn over incriminating evidence and to make incriminating statements. Moreover, there was no break in time between Carter's unwarned confession, his receipt of Miranda warnings, and his second confession. In suppressing Carter's second confession, the court, following a review of Elstad, held [a]ssuming arguendo that the first, unwarned confession was voluntary, we find that the circumstances of this case do not warrant admission of the second, warned, confession ... [since] the second confession came almost directly on the heels of the first. Id. at 373. The court reasoned that there was no passage of time between the unwarned confession, the subsequent Miranda warning, and the second confession--they were part and parcel of a continuous process. Id. The court concluded that [e]ven assuming ... that Elstad permits the second confession's admission, we hold alternatively.... [a]s we affirm ... the district court's conclusion that Carter's consent to the search was not obtained voluntarily ... that his confession must be suppressed as the fruit of the fourth amendment violation. Id. In our view, Carter is distinguishable from the case at bar. 76 Unlike Carter, the district court in our case found that the officers did not coerce McCurdy into making any incriminating statements prior to his receipt of the Miranda warnings. Also, there was a delay of several hours between the time that the officers detained McCurdy in their custody and the time that he was formally arrested, Mirandized, and gave his statement. The district court granted McCurdy's motion to suppress based solely on its finding that the officers had violated Miranda. The district court did not rule on whether McCurdy's post-Miranda statements were voluntary, notwithstanding the court's specific finding that the actions of the officers did not give rise to a due process violation. 77 It can almost always be said that interrogation results in a confession or an incriminating statement. However, admissibility of a confession (or an incriminating statement) requires an independent examination of the entire record and a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991); United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1680, 118 L.Ed.2d 397 (1992). 78 We hold that the district court, having determined that the officers did not violate McCurdy's due process rights, erred, as a matter of law, in concluding that the actions of the officers constituted a gross violation of Miranda. 79 We reverse the order of the district court suppressing McCurdy's post-Miranda statements and remand for further proceedings, mindful that under Elstad, the court must determine both whether the officers complied with Miranda which protects defendants against governmental coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), and whether the defendant's post-Miranda statements were voluntary within the meaning of the due process clause. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. at 1293 ([t]hough Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made (emphasis added)). In conjunction therewith, title 18, Sec. 3501(a) unmistakenly mandates that '[b]efore [a] confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness.'  United States v. Caro, 965 F.2d 1548, 1552 (10th Cir.1992) (emphasis added). 80 b. 81 The government contends that the district court erred in suppressing the physical evidence found in McCurdy's truck, citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). In Tucker, the Court declined to suppress the testimony of a witness whose identity was discovered as the result of an alibi statement given by the defendant at a time when the defendant had not been give his full Miranda warnings. The government argues that this rationale should be applied here, and that since McCurdy's consent to search his truck and the unwarned statements were both voluntary, the photo of the headset found in the truck was also admissible under Elstad. 82 McCurdy responds that the district court correctly suppressed the physical evidence found in his truck since [t]hat evidence was discovered as a direct result of McCurdy's statements regarding the ownership and location of the truck and of his consent to search, statements obtained in blatant violation of Miranda. (Appellee's Answer Brief at 29). McCurdy states that the government's reliance on Michigan v. Tucker does not help its argument since the police in that case acted in good faith with the existing law and [h]ere, the officers deliberately violated Miranda in order to obtain additional evidence. Id. at 32. 83 McCurdy argues that [e]ven if the Miranda violation alone does not warrant suppression of every statement by [him] and of the evidence found in [his] truck, the district court was free to suppress the evidence on other grounds [s]ince the record would support a finding of involuntariness with respect to both the statements and the consent. (Appellee's Answer Brief at 33). McCurdy acknowledges that the District Court explicitly refused to determine whether his statements or consent to search were voluntary. Id. 84 An officer's request to search a defendant's automobile does not constitute interrogation invoking a defendant's Miranda rights. United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 379-80 (10th Cir.1985). See also United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 733, 126 L.Ed.2d 696 (1994); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 833, 106 S.Ct. 104, 88 L.Ed.2d 84 (1985). Thus, officers may, following a voluntary consent to search, search a vehicle or portion thereof without first apprising the owner of the vehicle of his rights under Miranda. 85 A consent to search, however, is valid only if voluntary. We determine the voluntariness of a consent to search under the totality of the circumstances, with the government bearing the burden of proof. United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751, 758 (10th Cir.1993). The government must show that there was no duress or coercion, express or implied, that the consent was unequivocal and specific, and that it was freely and intelligently given. Id. (quoting United State v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir.1993)). If a consensual search is preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation, the government must prove both the voluntariness of the consent under the totality of the circumstances and that there was a break in the casual connection between the illegality and the evidence obtained. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir.1994). See also United States v. Peters, 10 F.3d 1517, 1523 (10th Cir.1993) (incriminating statements and consents to search made following an illegal arrest must be considered inadmissible as tainted unless the government can establish that the statements were purged of the taint of the unlawful invasion). 86 Here, however, McCurdy was lawfully in police custody. There was no Fourth Amendment violation. Accordingly, the government was entitled to introduce into evidence the physical evidence found in McCurdy's vehicle if the government established that McCurdy voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle and if the search did not exceed the scope of his consent. See United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir.1991), followed in United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1557 (10th Cir.1993) and United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir.1993). The district court, despite the government's requests, refused to rule on the voluntariness of McCurdy's consent to search. 87 We hold that the district court erred in suppressing the physical evidence found in McCurdy's truck without first ruling on the voluntariness of McCurdy's consent to search his truck. Thus, we reverse the order of the district court suppressing the physical evidence found in McCurdy's truck. Upon remand, the district court must make specific findings as to whether McCurdy voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle for identification and whether McCurdy thereafter consented to the continued search of his vehicle after Tafoya discovered his shirt and identification. 88 The district court must make these determinations based on the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1452 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1409 (10th Cir.1990)). In determining whether a consent to search is voluntary, a court should consider, inter alia, physical mistreatment, use of violence, threats, threats of violence, promises or inducements, deception or trickery, and the physical and mental condition and capacity of the defendant within the totality of the circumstances. An officer's request for consent to search does not taint an otherwise consensual encounter as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their request is required. United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir.1993). See also United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777 (9th Cir.1989) (holding consent was voluntary absent any police threats or coercion). 89 REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent herewith.