Opinion ID: 60277
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Read-and-Heed Presumption

Text: Appellant also contends that, regardless of Dr. Sonn's testimony, Texas law creates a presumption of supporting a causal link between Wyeth's inadequate warning and her husband's death. [14] Texas law creates no such presumption. In general, when a manufacturer fails to give adequate warnings or instructions, a rebuttable presumption arises that the product user would have read and heeded such warnings or instructions (the `read and heed presumption'). Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F.Supp.2d 551, 556 (N.D.Tex.2006) (quoting Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., 721 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex.1987)); see also RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1977). The read-and-heed presumption's effect is to shift the burden of producing evidence to the party against whom it operates. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Saenz ex rel. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Tex.1993). [15] But neither Texas nor federal courts applying Texas law have applied the read-and-heed presumption to pharmaceutical cases involving learned intermediaries. In fact, Texas has explicitly rejected the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment j's read-and-heed presumption for policy reasons and because it has been superseded by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 336-37 (Tex.1998). Additionally, the relevant cases show the plaintiff bore the burden of showing that the inadequacy of the warning was a producing cause of injury. See Porterfield, 183 F.3d at 468; Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1992); Koenig, 435 F.Supp.2d at 556-57 (stating expressly that the read-and-heed presumption does not apply in cases involving learned intermediaries); Gerber v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 392 F.Supp.2d 907, 921-22 (S.D.Tex.2005); Dyer, 115 F.Supp.2d at 741; Medrano, 28 S.W.3d at 95; Stewart v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied). [16] Further, we doubt the Texas Supreme Court would apply such a presumption here, when it would not serve its intended purposes. The read-and-heed presumption has been justified because [i]t excuses plaintiff from the necessity of making self-serving assertions that he would have followed adequate instructions, simply to put the issue of causation in sufficient dispute to avoid summary judgment or directed verdict, and it assists plaintiffs in cases where the person injured has died and evidence of what he would have done is unavailable for that reason. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d at 359. In the learned-intermediary context, however, it is Dr. Sonn, not Ackermann or her husband, who had to testify about his decision to prescribe Effexor. One federal court speculated that the Texas Supreme Court would agree with other courts, including this court, that have held to `read and heed,' in the context of a learned intermediary, means only that the physician would have incorporated the additional risk into his decisional calculus. Koenig, 435 F.Supp.2d at 557. [17] Further, even if the presumption applied, it would not change the result here. No genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the inadequacy of the warning was a producing cause of her husband's death because Dr. Sonn's testimony rebuts the read-and-heed presumption. [18] Dr. Sonn has remained firm in stating that even if Ackermann's proposed black box warning had been given to him, he would have considered or heeded it just as [he] consider[s] or heed[s] any warning, but it would not have changed [his] decision to prescribe Effexor XR to Martin Ackermann to treat his depression. But as we note, the read-and-heed presumption does not apply to Texas cases involving learned intermediaries. For these reasons, we conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment to Wyeth on appellant's failure-to-warn and strict-liability claims because she failed to show that an inadequate warning was a producing cause of her husband's death. We pretermit discussion of Wyeth's Texas statutory and federal preemption arguments. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.