Opinion ID: 1608431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Evaluation of Instructions Taken as Whole

Text: Despite what we find to be valid criticism of the language of the reasonable doubt instruction given in this case, we conclude that Putz' rights, including his due process rights, were not violated by the giving of the instruction. The Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he or she is charged. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), disapproved on other grounds, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). However, as long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the U.S. Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the prosecution's burden of proof. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). The U.S. Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. Id. We have held that the due process requirements of Nebraska's Constitution are similar to those of the federal Constitution. State v. Davlin, 263 Neb. 283, 639 N.W.2d 631 (2002). In addition to the foregoing, we note that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that in construing an individual jury instruction, the instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge to the jury considered as a whole. See, e.g., Victor, supra ; Cage, supra; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). See, also, e.g., State v. Pruett, 263 Neb. 99, 638 N.W.2d 809 (2002) (all jury instructions must be read together, and if, taken as whole, they correctly state law, are not misleading, and adequately cover issues supported by pleadings and evidence, there is no prejudicial error necessitating reversal). Evaluating the instructions given in this case as a whole, we note that in instruction No. 2, the jury was instructed that Putz is presumed to be innocent and that you must find him not guilty unless you decide that the state has proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Instruction No. 3, which set forth the elements of each of the two crimes with which Putz was charged, listed, for each crime, the material elements which the State must prove by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Instruction No. 3 also instructed the jury that [t]he State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the material elements of a crime charged before the Defendant may be found guilty of that crime. If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the material elements of a charge is true, it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of that charge. On the other hand, if you find the State has failed to prove one or more of the foregoing material elements beyond a reasonable doubt, on this count, you should find the Defendant not guilty of that charge. Instruction No. 5 further provided that [t]he burden of proof is always on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the material elements of a crime charged and this burden never shifts. (Emphasis supplied.) Finally, even within the instruction challenged in this appeal, the jury was reminded that [t]he State has the burden of proving the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewed in the context of the overall charge to the jury considered as a whole, the jury could not have interpreted the real possibility language as shifting the burden of proof to Putz. The jury was instructed several times that the burden of proof rested on the State, and the jury was explicitly told that this burden never shifts. The challenged instruction does not shift the burden of showing a real possibility of innocence; indeed, it does not allocate a burden and does nothing to contradict the other instructions and repeated emphasis that the burden of proof is on the State and never shifts. See, U.S. v. Litchfield, 959 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir.1992); U.S. v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869 (1st Cir.1984); Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind.2000); Smith v. U.S., 687 A.2d 1356 (D.C.1996), adhered to on rehearing 709 A.2d 78 (D.C.1998); State v. Castle, 86 Wash.App. 48, 935 P.2d 656 (1997). Putz argues that the phrase firmly convinced connotes something less than the very high level of proof required by the Constitution in criminal cases. Putz' argument asks this court to judge the instruction in isolation. However, we are required to view the instructions as a whole to determine whether they adequately convey the concept of reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Harris v. Bowersox, 184 F.3d 744 (8th Cir.1999). The instructions given in this case do not rely solely on the words firmly convinced to convey the meaning of reasonable doubt. See id. Viewed in the context of the entire charge, the firmly convinced language does not lessen the State's burden of proof in violation of due process. The instructions as a whole repeatedly emphasized the State's heavy burden of proof and explained how the State's proof must be more powerful than the burden of proof in civil cases. Taken as a whole, the instructions given in this case sufficiently set forth the State's burden of proving the material elements of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit which stated: Whether or not the firmly convinced definition alone would be constitutionally sufficient to convey the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the court's further exposition here left no doubt that the jury's duty was to convict only upon reaching consensus as to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing further is required. U.S. v. Brand, 80 F.3d 560, 566 (1st Cir. 1996). Accord, e.g., U.S. v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125 (5th Cir.1994); State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 796 A.2d 1118 (2002); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51 (Mo.1987) (en banc). In analyzing Putz' argument, the proper inquiry is not whether the instruction `could have' been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it. (Emphasis in original.) Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). The constitutional question, therefore, is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the standard of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (holding, inter alia, that due process requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of each fact necessary to constitute crime). See Victor, supra . Considering the instructions as a whole, there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to permit conviction of Putz based on proof insufficient to satisfy In re Winship, supra . As we noted earlier, it would have been better had the trial court in this case given the reasonable doubt instruction set forth in the Nebraska Jury Instructions and previously approved by this court. See, NJI2d Crim. 2.0; State v. Garza, 241 Neb. 934, 492 N.W.2d 32 (1992). Adherence to a standard reasonable doubt instruction promotes uniformity and avoids the pitfalls of ad hoc interpretations and repetitive constitutional challenges. See Smith v. U.S., 709 A.2d 78 (D.C.1998). See, generally, Robert G. Nieland, Pattern Jury Instructions: A Critical Look at a Modern Movement to Improve the Jury System (1979). Furthermore, varying definitions `[detract] from the goal of a uniform and equal system of justice.' See Smith, 709 A.2d at 81, quoting State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 898 P.2d 970 (1995) (en banc). In a matter central to the determination of guilt or innocence, as this is, the appearance of evenhandedness, like the actuality, is important. `Use of a standard definition thus will eliminate confusion and foster fairness for defendants, the [government], and jurors alike.' Id. For these reasons, we have indicated that whenever an applicable instruction may be taken from the Nebraska Jury Instructions, that instruction is the one which should usually be given to the jury in a criminal case. See State v. Dush, 214 Neb. 51, 332 N.W.2d 679 (1983). Notwithstanding the district court's deviation from the Nebraska Jury Instructions in this case, such deviation did not result in a constitutionally deficient instruction. The instructions given in this case, when considered as a whole, do not present a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the reasonable doubt instruction given in this case did not give rise to reversible error.