Opinion ID: 67086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: xtreme lashes

Text: Type of trademark. Type of trademark refers to the strength of the senior mark. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 201 (5th Cir.1998). Stronger marks are entitled to greater protection. Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 259 (5th Cir. 1980). Marks are normally assigned to categories of generally increasing distinctiveness: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, or (5) fanciful. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768, 112 S.Ct. 2753, 120 L.Ed.2d 615 (1992). The latter three categories of marks, because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product, are deemed inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection. Id. A generic term refers to the class of which a good is a member. Id. A descriptive term provides an attribute or quality of a good. Id. at 769, 112 S.Ct. 2753. Generic terms receive no trademark protection, while descriptive terms merit protection only if they have secondary meaning. Id. A suggestive term suggests, but does not describe, an attribute of the good; it requires the consumer to exercise his imagination to apply the trademark to the good. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir.1983). More distinctiveness and less natural or literal content correspond with increased mark strength. See Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir.1980). It is proper to give more weight to distinctive portions of a mark and less weight to unremarkable or generic portions. See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407 (Fed.Cir.1997). Any given term's correct classification is a factual issue. Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). The district court did not determine whether the mark XTREME LASHES is weak or strong. Xtreme does not contend that the mark has secondary meaning; thus, it is protectable only if it is suggestive, fanciful, or arbitrary. Plainly, the mark as a whole is not generic (e.g., eyelash extensions), despite the inclusion of the term lashes. See In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407. Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to Xtreme, we believe that XTREME LASHES arguably has many of the indicia of a suggestive mark and is therefore entitled to protection. See Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 191 n. 5 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept.1981). The consumer must exercise some imagination to associate xtreme lashes with artificially elongated eyelashes. See Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791. The mark uses a misspelling of the word extreme and a stylized eyelash forms part of the X. Cf. Soweco, 617 F.2d at 1186 n. 24 (noting that a misspelling alone does not make an otherwise generic term protectable). Xtended showed that the term xtreme appears frequently on cosmetics and grooming products. Cf. Amstar, 615 F.2d at 259-60 (holding that widespread use of DOMINO across many industries weighed against mark strength). However, this prevalence should be weighed by a jury. There is no evidence that other sellers of eyelash products use the term xtreme. We cannot say with certitude that XTREME LASHES is strong or weak. For summary judgment purposes, the mark is entitled to protection. Mark similarity. Mark similarity is determined by comparing the marks' appearance, sound, and meaning. Capece, 141 F.3d at 201. Similarity of appearance is determined on the basis of the total effect of the designation, rather than on a comparison of individual features. Amstar, 615 F.2d at 260-61 (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, courts should give more attention to the dominant features of a mark. See Capece, 141 F.3d at 202. Even if two marks are distinguishable, we ask whether, under the circumstances of use, the marks are similar enough that a reasonable person could believe the two products have a common origin or association. See id. at 201. To determine the meaning and connotation of the marks, we consider the context of use, such as labels, packaging, and advertising. Id. (quotation omitted). The two marks must bear some threshold resemblance in order to trigger inquiry into extrinsic factors, but this threshold is considerably lower than the degree of similarity required where the plaintiff presents little or no evidence on extrinsic factors supporting infringement. Sun-Fun, 656 F.2d at 189. XTREME LASHES and XTENDED BEAUTY have no common words and use different typefaces. Each mark has two words, but there is minor aural similarity when the marks are spoken aloud. Both marks suggest cosmetic enhancement. Two color schemes are used for each mark (white lettering/black background and black lettering/white background for XTREME LASHES, and white lettering/black background and white lettering/azure background for XTENDED BEAUTY). Thus, both marks have employed white lettering on a black background. Both marks also use a large stylized X as a prominent feature of the mark. Xtreme's letter X is formed in part by a golden eyelash, while Xtended's X uses regular typeface. Both marks use the X in an eye-catching misspelling. Moreover, the marks appear in similar contexts. Each appears upon a silver carrying case for the companies' kits, as well as on the products inside the kits. The companies use similar marketing channels to promote the marks. Focusing on the marks' distinct terms and typefaces, the district court concluded that no reasonable person could be confused. The court in essence held that there was too little threshold resemblance to engender any likelihood of confusion. See id. at 189. We disagree. A focus on the marks' distinguishable visual features, when viewed side by side in the judicial solemnity of the courtroom is by itself enough of a falsification of actual market conditions to defy realistic appraisal. Id. (quotation omitted). While a large X alone should not be protectable, it is a visually striking common feature integrated into both marks. See id. at 190 (holding that use of a sunburst in a similar format, despite dissimilar brand names and stylistic features, created question of fact); cf. Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 504 (5th Cir. 1979) (no likelihood of confusion where term WORLD was prominent feature of senior mark but diminutive feature in junior mark). Taking all inferences in favor of Xtreme, we believe that the marks are similar enough to suggest a common origin or associationespecially because several other digits weigh towards confusion. See Sun-Fun, 656 F.2d at 189. Even if a person recognized that the marks are not identical, she might believe that XTENDED BEAUTY is a product line offered by the makers of XTREME LASHES, such as a discount line. Confusion of origin, not the identity of marks, is the gravamen of trademark infringement. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117, 125 S.Ct. 542, 160 L.Ed.2d 440 (2004). The marks also appear in near-identical contexts on the companies' kits. For this reason, we find Xtended's assertion unpersuasive that reversing the district court would allow Xtreme to preclude anyone that uses a Big X to promote eyelash extension and related products. Ultimately, [a] jury might well conclude that the marks are too dissimilar to justify a finding of infringement. We merely hold that it was improper for the district judge to weigh these similarities and differences instead of the jury. See Sun-Fun, 656 F.2d at 190. Product similarity. The greater the similarity between the products and services, the greater the likelihood of confusion. Exxon, 628 F.2d at 505. Xtreme and Xtended peddle kits which include eyelash extensions, adhesive, special scissors, and other accouterments needed to affix, touch up, or remove fake eyelashes. Both kits come in a silver case bearing the respective mark. This factor weighs in favor of likelihood of confusion. Outlet and purchaser identity. Xtreme sells to health and beauty professionals who meet in-house training and certification requirements. Xtended sells to beauty distributors, which in turn sell to cosmetologists and other professionals. Buyers cannot compare the products side by side, which may increase the likelihood of confusion. See Sun-Fun, 656 F.2d at 192. Ultimately, both companies seek to land their kits in the hands of trained cosmetologists, and have their products affixed to customers' lashes. This supports an inference that Xtended and Xtreme compete directly for end-users in the eyelash extension market. This factor favors Xtreme. Advertising media identity. Both companies use print advertisements, direct mailings, and Internet promotion. The parties do not advertise in identical magazines, but they target the same class of buyers. This supports an inference that the parties use similar advertising and marketing channels. Defendant's intent. A junior user must avoid choosing a mark which may cause confusion with the senior user's mark. See in re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1209 (Fed.Cir.1993). However, with no evidence of Xtended's intent, this factor is neutral. See Capece, 141 F.3d at 203. Actual confusion. Actual confusion need not be proven, but if consumers have confused the junior mark for the senior mark, this is the best evidence of a likelihood of confusion. Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 483. Moreover, reason tells us that while very little proof of actual confusion would be necessary to prove the likelihood of confusion, an almost overwhelming amount of proof would be necessary to refute such proof. World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir.1971). Xtreme showed several incidences of confusion. For instance, Lisa Flowe, a cosmetologist licensed for 26 years, stated in an affidavit that in 2007 she tried to buy Xtreme's kit. Flowe knew of Xtreme but never purchased its products: When I saw a picture in the catalogue of an eyelash extension kit with a name that begins with `X,' I assumed it was the Xtreme Lashes product I was looking for. She ordered the kit and contacted a salon affiliated with Xtreme, seeking to obtain training. Later she realized that she bought the wrong kit. Before the entry of summary judgment, Xtreme presented evidence that two other customers were confused, one of whom, like Flowe, actually purchased Xtended's kit but thought she had purchased Xtreme's kit. [2] Despite this evidence, the district court reasoned: occasional confusion is not the same thing as market confusion. The court noted that some people might say Bloomingdale's when they mean Neiman Marcus, or Pepsi instead of Coke. Because the court considered the marks so distinct, it reasoned that any confusion was irrational. In this vein, Xtended argues that isolated anecdotes of purchaser confusion do not constitute actual confusion. The only case from this Court cited by Xtended is First Southern Federal Loan & Savings Association of Mobile, Alabama v. First Southern Savings & Loan Association of Jackson County, Mississippi ( First Southern ), 614 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980). Xtended misinterprets First Southern. There, we reviewed a bench trial in which the court denied the senior user relief, despite actual confusion. Id. at 72-73. We applied Mississippi law, not the Lanham Act, and found the senior mark unprotectable. Id. at 74. We held that it was not clear error to find that the marks were not so similar as to be reasonably calculated to deceive the public and injure the appellant. Id. (citations omitted). First Southern applied a different standard of review, body of law, and legal test. It contributes nothing to this dispute. The evidence of confusion in this case creates a genuine issue of material fact. While summary judgment may be appropriate in outlier cases, see, e.g., Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 483, courts may not ignore competent evidence of actual confusion, see Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 597 (5th Cir.1985) (In no case have we sanctioned total disregard of evidence of actual confusion; there is simply no precedent for such a view. ...). The evidence shows more than a fleeting mix-up of names. It shows actual confusion about the origin of the parties' products. The confusion was caused by the trademarks employed and it swayed consumer purchases. See Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 487 (5th Cir.2004) (To prove infringement, [plaintiff] must ultimately prove that a misleading representation by [defendant], as opposed to some other source, caused a likelihood of confusion.). This evidence is highly probative of infringement. See World Carpets, 438 F.2d at 489; Louisiana World Expo., Inc. v. Logue, 746 F.2d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that single known incidence of confusion by purchaser supported bench trial finding of likelihood of confusion). To ignore this evidence as anecdotal or irrational tramples upon the province of the trier of fact. Xtended does not persuade when it insinuates that confusion was due to inattentiveness or similarity of trade dress. Nothing proves that Flowe and other consumers haphazardly mixed up XTREME LASHES and XTENDED BEAUTY. To so presume, in favor of Xtended, is verboten. Furthermore, if the marks' appearance on similar silver kits confuses consumers, this shows that the marks appear in confusingly similar contextsweighing in Xtreme's favor. Xtended has it backwards to say otherwise. The evidence may not be overwhelming. A jury could find that Flowe and the other confused consumers were careless. However, it bears emphasizing that the evidence on record is only from those individuals who conveyed their confusion to Xtreme. We cannot assume that these known incidents of confusion prove a negative, namely, a paucity of confusion by all others. Discovery and a survey should illuminate actual or potential confusion. See Exxon, 628 F.2d at 506-07; Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 793 n. 4. We reiterate that Xtreme only needed to show a genuine issue as to likelihood of confusion. Xtreme has gone beyond this requirement, and shown true confusion in the marketplace. This factor weighs strongly in Xtreme's favor. Care exercised by potential purchasers. Where items are relatively inexpensive, a buyer may take less care in selecting the item, thereby increasing the risk of confusion. Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 483; see also Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 173-74 (5th Cir.1986) (reasoning that because purchasers were buying for professional and institutional purposes at a cost in the thousands of dollars, they are virtually certain to be informed, deliberative buyers) (citation omitted). However, a high price tag alone does not negate other indicia of likelihood of confusion, especially if the goods or marks are similar. See Fuji, 754 F.2d at 595-96. Xtreme presented an affidavit by Martin Dale, a co-owner and director of Xtreme, who stated that in his experience, the purchasers of eyelash kits, while experienced or licensed estheticians, are often young, very impressionable, and impetuous in their purchasing behavior. Xtreme also points to the affidavit of Lisa Flowe as evidence that buyers are not always informed or careful. Despite decades of experience as a cosmetologist and an intent to buy Xtreme's kit, Flowe did not bat an eyelash before spending over $300 on Xtended's kit. Flowe did not realize her mistake until after she had called an Xtreme affiliate for customer support and training. Xtended argues that the high price of Xtreme's kits ($529 for the gold kit, $949 for the platinum), and the requirement that purchasers be trained professionals, impel the conclusion that customers exercise great care when buying the kits. After an esthetician undergoes training on Xtreme's products, it is logical to say that confusion is less likely. However, this does not prevent confusion by untrained buyers, like Lisa Flowe, seeking to extend their repertoire to this up-and-coming product. Whether Flowe's case is aberrational or indicative of typical market reaction cannot be adjudicated at this stage. We therefore infer that this factor favors Xtreme. Conclusion/weighing of digits. For summary judgment purposes, all digits of confusion are either neutral or weigh in Xtreme's favor. Actual confusion weighs strongly in Xtreme's favor. No factor favors Xtended. Considering the record in the light most favorable to Xtreme, we cannot say that judgment for Xtended is preordained. See Soc'y of Fin. Examiners v. Nat'l Ass'n of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc., 41 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 1995). We therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment.