Opinion ID: 887107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Religion Clauses: A Multi-faceted Inquiry

Text: ¶ 70 From these analyses, we can discern a proper application of the Religion Clauses. First, the Jones-Chase rule, a product of the separation principle, forbids civil courts from interpreting church doctrine or teachings to resolve intra-church property disputes. Chase requires that courts examine church documents to determine whether purely secular language can be found to resolve those disputes. Chase, ¶ 15. In doing so, Chase admonishes that courts must exercise great care to avoid resolving such disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. Chase, ¶ 13. This precedent strongly suggests that a careful review of the Colony's documents is necessary to resolve the matters herein. That is undertaken below. ¶ 71 Second, the Sherbert cases demonstrate that the government cannot force an individual to choose between receipt of government benefits and religious convictions absent a compelling state interest. However, DPHHS, and this Court, have concluded, notwithstanding the Claimants' complete divestiture of property in accordance with their religious beliefs, that, actually, the Claimants retained a beneficial interest in such property. Further, the Court concludes that the Colony does not actually own and control the property in accordance with its religious principles, but, rather, holds the property in trust to meet the individual needs of the Claimants, and thus, the property is available for Medicaid purposes. ¶ 72 By such conclusions, as will be demonstrated more fully by the following discussion of the Colony's documents, this Court has waded so far into religious doctrine that it purports to proclaim whether the Claimants have complied with their own religious beliefs and whether the Colony is organized in accordance with its own theology. Like an advancing Panzer division, the Court overrides the Claimants' beliefs and announces,  We will tell you the real meaning of your religious beliefs. This Court thus declares that the Claimants did not successfully fulfill their religious obligation to completely give up their property interests, but, rather, retained an interest as beneficiaries. An examination of the Colony's documents will only further demonstrate that this is an improper and substantial burden upon the Claimants' exercise of religion for which DPHHS has established no compelling governmental interest or justification. [3] This Court's decision requires that the Claimants choose between their adherence to their beliefs in the KCR community and their eligibility for Medicaid benefits  precisely the choice forbidden under Sherbert. ¶ 73 Third, the separation and neutrality analyses first given life in Everson must ultimately be resolved, in this context, through a careful analysis of the relationship between the Claimants and KCR, without resort to an interpretation of KCR's religious doctrine. The separation mandate does not allow government to advance religion; however, even under the application of neutral principles, the separation mandate prohibits the government from taking a position on questions of religious belief, Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594, 109 S.Ct. at 3101, 106 L.Ed.2d at 495, in order to determine benefit eligibility. Therefore, the government cannot interpret religious doctrine. ¶ 74 The sum of these principles offers an appropriate approach to the present case. This Court should examine, with great care, KCR's organizational documents to see if they contain severable secular language that allows, on a purely secular basis, a determination whether an individual member has a claim to any church property or to church support. Chase, ¶¶ 13, 15. Such an analysis cannot require that members make choices that burden their religious beliefs, or which require the government to interpret religious doctrine. If a purely secular resolution can be found, then that language can determine whether the resources are available for Medicaid purposes. If an examination of the issue requires the interpretation of religious tenet, then this Court must decline jurisdiction, see Chase, ¶ 15, end its inquiry and assume that the Claimants' have no property interest that is legally enforceable.