Opinion ID: 2599891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Under the Majority's Reasoning the Statute is Ambiguous

Text: ¶ 35 Given former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii), read in conjunction with RCW 69.50.206(d)(2), explicitly includes salts of methamphetamine while former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) does notif the latter is arguably susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous. First among the canons of criminal statutory construction is the rule of lenity, which commands we strictly construe ambiguous statutes in favor of the defendant and against the State. See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 603, 115 P.3d 281 (2005); United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973) (criminal statutes must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity). ¶ 36 Construing the statute in Cromwell's favor the prosecution would be required to provide evidence that the substance delivered was methamphetamine. However, Dr. Suzuki testified unequivocally that the substances in this case were not methamphetamine but rather salts of methamphetamine. RP (vol.5) at 46, 50-52. ¶ 37 Because salts of methamphetamine and methamphetamine are not treated by the legislature in the same way, under the plain language of the statutes and the rule of lenity (if the language isn't so plain), the prosecution did notand could notprove by sufficient evidence the charged crime. Therefore the conviction should be reversed and the case dismissed. ¶ 38 I dissent.