Opinion ID: 780462
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Treatment of certain breaks in presence

Text: 16 An alien shall be considered to have failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the United States under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section if the alien has departed from the United States for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days. 17 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)-(2). 18 Petitioner points out that this subsection deletes the portion of the prior statute excusing absences that are brief, casual, and innocent and [do] not meaningfully interrupt the continuous physical presence. He views subsection (d)(2) as having been substituted for this deleted material. He concludes that Congress has established a new bright-line, across-the-board rule that all absences are to be ignored if they last less than 90 days and do not exceed 180 days in the aggregate. 19 As we have indicated, the BIA concludes that the continuous physical presence requirement continues to mean the same thing in the context of voluntary departures that it meant before the 1996 amendments. A voluntary departure under the statute is something that occurs with the permission of the Attorney General in lieu of removal proceedings. 3 Under subsection (d)(1) of the removal statute as amended, any period of continuous physical presence ends as soon as removal proceedings are instituted. Thus, under this stop time provision, those in removal proceedings immediately cease to accrue presence that might entitle them to discretionary relief. See Pondoc Hernaez v. INS, 244 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir.2001). While the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing presence so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief. 20 It well may be, as petitioner suggests, that the 90/180 day rule of § 1229b(d)(2) is intended as a substitute for the more indefinite brief, casual, and innocent standard. We may make that assumption arguendo because it does not resolve the issue before us. Section 1229b(d)(2) does not create an exception from the continuous presence requirement. It declares only that when an alien exceeds the 90/180 day standard, he has failed the continuous presence test. It does not mandate that only lengthy physical absence can affect continuous physical presence. At most, this provision can be read to recognize implicitly that some absences may be too insignificant to occasion a break in an alien's continuous physical presence. An implication that some absences may be too insignificant to break the continuum, however, falls far short of a legislative mandate that all departures not exceeding the 90/180 standard are to be excused including even those that occur pursuant to an agreement not to return. 21 Petitioner was not physically present in the United States while he was in Mexico. That absence was not inadvertent, casual, or otherwise lacking in significance. Rather, it occurred pursuant to an agreement between Petitioner and the Attorney General under which Petitioner agreed to depart and not to return other than in accordance with the entry process applicable to all aliens. It was not unreasonable for the BIA to regard Petitioner's departure under these circumstances as a break in the continuum of his physical presence in the United States. Indeed, to regard him as having maintained his physical presence would be inconsistent with the statutory concept of voluntary departure in general and with the stop time provisions of § 1229b(d)(1) in particular. 22 We will defer to the BIA's reasonable interpretation of the statute. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439; Yang, 79 F.3d at 935. 23 The petition for review is DENIED.