Opinion ID: 1464920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duties under the NRP

Text: We now determine the applicability of § 5148 of the Stafford Act to this case by turning to the well-established precedent defining discretionary conduct under § 2680(a) of the FTCA. The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test for determining whether the federal government's conduct qualifies as a discretionary function or duty under this exception. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 1954). First, the conduct must be a matter of choice for the acting employee. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954. The exception covers only acts that are discretionary in nature, acts that `involv[e] an element of judgment or choice.' Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954) (alteration in original). Thus, `it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor' that governs whether the exception applies. Id. (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813, 104 S.Ct. 2755). If a statute, regulation, or policy leaves it to a federal agency or employee to determine when and how to take action, the agency is not bound to act in a particular manner and the exercise of its authority is discretionary. See id. at 329, 111 S.Ct. 1267. On the other hand, [t]he requirement of judgment or choice is not satisfied and the discretionary function exception does not apply if a `federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow,' because `the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.' Id. at 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954). Second, even `assuming the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment,' we must still decide that the `judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.' Id. at 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954); see also Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813, 104 S.Ct. 2755. Because the purpose of the exception is to `prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort,' when properly construed, the exception `protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.' Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537, 108 S.Ct. 1954). With this understanding, however, if a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation of the regulations. Id. at 324, 111 S.Ct. 1267. The focus of the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis. Id. at 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267. In this case, plaintiffs argue that the government failed to perform or was negligent in its performance of the specific duties prescribed by the NRPnamely, the provision of food, water, shelter, medical assistance, and transport to the Convention Center and to the Cloverleaf. ( See Pls.' Br. 34 (The Convention Center and Cloverleaf certainly fall into the categories of places where the federal government had an express duty to provide the support that meant the difference between life and death for these three Plaintiffs.)); see also Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324, 111 S.Ct. 1267 ([A]n agency may rely on internal guidelines rather than on published regulations.). The NRP directives that plaintiffs cite permit agents to exercise judgment or choice that is subject to policy analysis. We therefore hold that the government's conduct under the NRPeven its failure to provide food, water, shelter, medical assistance, and transport to the Convention Center and to the Cloverleaf qualifies under the Stafford Act's discretionary function exception. Under the first prong of the Berkovitz test, plaintiffs fail to identify any specific, nondiscretionary function or duty that does not involve an element of judgment or choice. To the contrary, plaintiffs cite a large number of NRP provisions that contain generalized, precatory, or aspirational language that is too general to prescribe a specific course of action for an agency or employee to follow. Plaintiffs first allege that Secretary Chertoff failed to comply with the NRP Base Plan's requirement that within 120 days of the NRP's issuance he identify and establish procedures for the rapid deployment of appropriate assets. See Dep't of Homeland Sec., Nat'l Response Plan, at ix. According to plaintiffs, Secretary Chertoff completed this duty on September 6, 2005, beyond the 120-day window and after the events in this case. [11] We conclude that, despite the delay, this agency time line created no judicially enforceable duty on the part of Secretary Chertoff. Cf. Action on Smoking & Health (ASH) v. Dep't of Labor, 100 F.3d 991, 993-94 (D.C.Cir.1996) (treating more formalized statutory and regulatory deadlines as nonmandatory, aspirational goals that do not circumscribe the discretion of the agency to delay formation of policy in good faith). Plaintiffs next cite numerous provisions of the Annex as prescribing specific action. These provisions can be grouped into two categories: (1) plan context, and (2) agency responsibilities. Neither category gave rise to a nondiscretionary duty. With respect to the Annex's context, the Situation section noted that in devastating natural disasters, [m]edical support is required not only at medical facilities, but at casualty evacuation points, evacuee and refugee points and shelters, and at other locations to support field operations. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Nat'l Response Plan, at CAT-2. The ostensibly mandatory language is required, when read in light of the broad goals of the Annex which establishe[d] the context and overarching strategydid nothing more than explain the needs that arise in an emergency. Satisfaction of those needs was a broad, implied goal allowing for significant choice in its implementation by federal agencies. This broad goal, therefore, satisfies the first prong of the discretionary function test. See Shansky v. United States, 164 F.3d 688, 691 (1st Cir.1999) (A broadly worded expression of a general policy goal contained in the [agency's] operating manual ... suggests that the [agency] and its functionaries will have to make discretionary judgments about how to apply concretely the aspirational goal embedded in the statement.); Tippett v. United States, 108 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir.1997) ([T]he general goal of protecting human life in the nation's national parks is not the kind of specific mandatory directive that operated to divest [the federal agent] of discretion in the situation he faced.); Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir.1995) (While the said policy guidelines certainly outline general policy goals regarding visitor safety, the means by which [agency] employees meet these goals necessarily involves an exercise of discretion.); Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir.1993) (Such a general guideline is insufficient to deprive the federal government of the protection of the discretionary function exception. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). We reach the same conclusion for other contextual provisions that plaintiffs cite, such as those contained in the Annex's Planning Assumptions and Concept of Operations sections. [12] Plaintiffs also identify responsibilities that the Annex allocated to specific agencies. For example, once the NRP processes are implemented, the Annex tasks DHS with, e.g., activating and deploying resources in accordance with the NRP-CIS; identifying and operationalizing facilities to support the deployment of federal resources; and maintaining communications to ensure a common understanding of resource requirements. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Nat'l Response Plan, at CAT-5. We conclude that these (and similar) responsibilities were so general that they too fail to prescribe a nondiscretionary course of action. Almost by definition these responsibilities required the agency to exercise judgment and choice to define specific directives or functions. Statements made at this level of generality do not satisfy Gaubert 's and Berkovitz 's specific prescription requirement. Were the law otherwise, the discretionary function exception would be a dead letter. Shansky, 164 F.3d at 691; see also Rosebush v. United States, 119 F.3d 438, 442 (6th Cir. 1997) (The relevant inquiry is whether the controlling statutes, regulations and administrative policies mandated that the [agency engage in relevant conduct] in any specific manner. (internal citation omitted, emphasis in original)); Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d 495, 500-01 (11th Cir.1997) ([T]he use of the word `shall' in describing the responsibilities of the AUSA does not necessarily mean that the Guidelines left no room for the AUSA to exercise judgment or choice. ... [T]he provisions ... leave room for responsible officials to exercise choice or judgment in discharging their responsibilities. (internal citations omitted)). Simply put, these responsibilities required judgment and choice to make them applicable to specific situations. Aside from the provisions of the NRP, plaintiffs offer cursory argument that mission assignments gave rise to nondiscretionary directives satisfying the first prong of the Berkovitz test and that an aid blockade also gave rise to the federal government's liability. Plaintiffs' assertions are misplaced. We initially note that plaintiffs did not present argument related to the mission assignments to the district court. We typically will not entertain legal arguments or evidence presented for the first time on appeal; however, because mission assignments were mentioned in passing in the record, we will dispose of plaintiffs' argument here. The issuance of mission assignments is left to the discretion of FEMA. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.5. Mission assignments are often nonspecific, requiring an agency to exercise additional judgment or choice regarding, e.g., where and how to complete the requested mission. The evidence cited by plaintiffs does not support the existence of a specific mission assignment (let alone sub-tasks), for which an employee had no lawful option but to adhere, that ordered the provision of assistance to evacuees at the Convention Center or the Cloverleaf prior to decedents' deaths. [13] Regarding the aid blockade, plaintiffs allege in their amended complaint that the federal government prevented the American Red Cross from accessing the Convention Center and the Cloverleaf from August 30 to September 2, 2005. Assuming the truth of these allegations, as we must, plaintiffs fail to explain what nondiscretionary duty the federal government violated. Overall, the federal government's functions and duties under the NRP satisfy the first prong of the two-part test because they permit the exercise of judgment and choice. [14] Under the second prong of the Berkovitz test, we hold that the government's decisions about when, where, and how to allocate limited resources within the exigencies of an emergency are the types of decisions that the discretionary function exception was designed to shelter from suit. Although plaintiffs contend that complying with the NRP was not policy-related, [15] they formulate no legal argument or factual development to support their conclusion. In light of the strong presumption that, where permitted by the relevant statute or regulation, the exercise of choice or judgment implicates relevant policy, see Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324, 111 S.Ct. 1267, decisions regarding the feasibility, safety, and benefit of mobilizing federal resources in the aftermath of a national disaster are grounded in social, economic, and public policy, see, e.g., Dep't of Homeland Sec., Nat'l Response Plan, at 6 (documenting policy considerations in the deployment of federal resources). As such, these decisions are clearly susceptible to policy analysis, even if specific decisions were not the result of such a reasoned analysis. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267; Shansky, 164 F.3d at 688. Thus, we hold that the Stafford Act's discretionary function exception precludes subject matter jurisdiction in this case because the NRP and other authorities leave policy-related choices or judgments to the discretion of the involved federal agencies.