Opinion ID: 169760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Religious Freedom Claims

Text: Kay makes both a First Amendment free exercise claim and a statutory claim under RLUIPA.
Kay first challenges the district court's dismissal of his religious freedom claim. After reviewing Kay's original complaint, we are satisfied that he alleges facts sufficient to plausibly support a legal claim for relief and reverse and remand this claim to the district court. It is well-settled that [i]nmates . . . retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). Yet such protections are not without reasonable limitations. The Supreme Court has cautioned that prison inmates are also subject to the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system. Id. Accordingly, the Court has held that a prison regulation imping[ing] on inmates' constitutional rights . . . is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Id. at 349, 107 S.Ct. 2400. Thus, in order to allege a constitutional violation based on a free exercise claim, a prisoner-plaintiff must survive a two-step inquiry. First, the prisoner-plaintiff must first show that a prison regulation substantially burdened . . . sincerely-held religious beliefs. Boles v. Neet, 486 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir.2007). Consequently, [t]he first questions in any free exercise claim are whether the plaintiff's beliefs are religious in nature, and whether those religious beliefs are sincerely held. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir.1997). Second, prison officials-defendants may identif[y] the legitimate penological interests that justif[ied] the impinging conduct. Boles, 486 F.3d at 1182. [2] At that point, courts balance the factors set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), to determine the reasonableness of the regulation: (1) whether a rational connection exists between the prison policy regulation and a legitimate governmental interest advanced as its justification; (2) whether alternative means of exercising the right are available notwithstanding the policy or regulation; (3) what effect accommodating the exercise of the right would have on guards, other prisoners, and prison resources generally; and (4) whether ready, easy-to-implement alternatives exist that would accommodate the prisoner's rights. Boles, 486 F.3d at 1181. [3] The district court prematurely dismissed Kay's claim at step one. The district court denied his claim because Kay failed to sufficiently plead: (1) what religion he practices, (2) whether his religious beliefs are sincerely held, and (3) how tarot cards, incense, and religious books are necessary to the practice of his religion. [4] This misconstrues the complaint. First, Kay's complaint clearly identifies his religion as Wicca. [5] Contrary to the district court's statement that his complaint only mentions Wicca once in reference to Wiccan books, the complaint references Wicca four times. See Kay Compl., R., Doc. 3, at 5, 7. In two of those instances, Kay refers to Wicca as his religion. Id. Second, the court's assessment of the sincerity of Kay's beliefs was premature at this stage of the claim. The inquiry into the sincerity of a free-exercise plaintiff's religious beliefs is almost exclusively a credibility assessment, . . . and therefore the issue of sincerity can rarely be determined on summary judgment, let alone a motion to dismiss. Snyder, 124 F.3d at 1352-53 (internal quotation omitted). We have said that summary dismissal on the sincerity prong is appropriate only in the very rare case[] in which the plaintiff's beliefs are so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation that they are not entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 1353 (internal quotation omitted). On this record, such a determination is unwarranted. See Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 933 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that Wicca is a religion subject to First Amendment protection); see also Pugh v. Caruso, No. 1:06-cv-138, 2006 WL 696497, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24709 (W.D.Mich. March 15, 2006) at  n. 2. (stating that Michigan state penal regulations recognize Wicca as a religion and permits inmates one deck of tarot cards). Reviewing his complaint, and taking the factual allegations as true, enough factual support exists to rationally and plausibly conclude that Kay is a sincere devotee of the Wiccan faith. Kay persistently asked prison administrators for permission to possess tarot cards in order to practice his religion. On two occasions, he surreptitiously brought tarot cards into the BCCF and was disciplined for it. Kay Compl., R., Doc. 3, at 7. If any thing, these facts evince some conviction on Kay's part to practice his faith with the use of tarot cards. Third, it is unnecessary for Kay to show that the use of tarot cards and the other items were necessary to the practice of his religion if his belief in their use was sincerely held. We acknowledge that other circuits require that a prison regulation must interfere with a tenet or belief that is central or mandated by religious doctrine before a prisoner may state a claim under § 1983. See, e.g., Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir.1997). The Tenth Circuit does not follow such a rule. In LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1119 (10th Cir.1991), we held that a prisoner's belief in religious dietary practices is constitutionally protected if the belief is genuine and sincere, even if such dietary practices are not doctrinally required by the prisoner's religion. `Sincerely held' is different from `central,' and courts have rightly shied away from attempting to gauge how central a sincerely held belief is to the believer's religion. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 05-13852, 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir.2007). We believe this rule more closely hews with Supreme Court precedent. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953) ([I]t is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment.); Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834, 109 S.Ct. 1514, 103 L.Ed.2d 914 (1989) (explaining that the fact some Christian denominations do not compel[] their adherents to refuse Sunday work does not diminish the constitutional protection the belief enjoys); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989) (It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds.); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.). Accordingly, the district court erred in requiring Kay's pleading to indicate that the use of tarot cards and other items were necessary to the practice of his religion. Religious sinceritynot necessityis the key component to satisfying the first step of a prisoner's free exercise claim at this stage of the litigation. As stated above, we believe that Kay's complaint sufficiently pleaded his belief in the use of tarot cards and the other requested items for religious purposes was sincerely held. We remand this claim to the district court. We take no view on whether Kay can meet the other requirements for a claim for relief or whether the prison's restrictions are justified (1) by reasonable penological interests, or (2) under step two of Turner. [6]
On appeal, Kay also asserts that the district court failed to address his RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, claim. We agree. Kay's initial complaint styles his claims under RLUIPA, yet the district court's order only construed his religious claim as a § 1983 action. RLUIPA provides that no [state or local] government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, unless the government shows that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and does so by the least restrictive means. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). The Act defines religious exercise to include any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). And we have held that RLUIPA applies in the prison context. See Ahmad v. Furlong, 435 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir.2006); Hammons v. Saffle, 348 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2003); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir.2001). Accordingly, the standards under RLUIPA are different than under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Kay was entitled to consideration of his claim under RLUIPA and we remand to the district court for further action on this matter.