Opinion ID: 2975567
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: “class of one”

Text: The Supreme Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause can give rise to a “class of one.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). To present a class of one claim a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has been intentionally treated differently from others who are similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Id. Where a plaintiff succeeds in identifying similarly-situated individuals, plaintiff 38 must also (1) refute every conceivable basis that might support the government action, or (2) demonstrate that the challenged action was motivated by animus or ill-will. Klimik v. Kent County Sheriff ’s Dep’t, 91 F. App’x 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff argues that he has established a cognizable class of one claim because he was evaluated under an academic or tertiary standard of care, which is higher than the community standard of care used in negligence cases, and higher than the standard of care used to evaluate other physicians at The Ohio State University. Plaintiff supports his claim by pointing to the deposition statements of Drs. Ungerleider and Hodgson that they were not aware of the application of a standard of care higher than that used in the general community. The defendants respond that the James Institute has used an academic or tertiary standard of care to conduct peer reviews and also when making credentialing decisions and during peer reviews since 2000. The defendants point out that a peer review form from the James Institute asks the reviewer whether the “care provided was according to the acceptable medical/nursing practice at a tertiary care center?” Likewise, a tertiary standard of care was used to evaluate Physicians Nos. 128 and 144. The defendants alternatively argue that Plaintiff’s class of one claim should not be reviewed at all. They note that many courts have rejected class of one claims in the employment context. See Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 633–634 (7th Cir. 2005) (class of one claims are available in public employee cases only in rare situations); see also, Campagna v. Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 206 F. Supp. 2d 120, 126–27 (D. Mass. 2002) (applicability of class of one to employment claims is “dubious”), aff’d, 334 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2003). The defendants 39 urge the Court to reject class of one suits in hospital privileges cases because the analysis is difficult to apply in situations where governmental decision-making necessarily and legitimately involves the exercise of professional judgment and discretion. Instead, class of one claims should be limited to situations in which there is an egregious departure from an objective, generally applicable law or policy.
We need not review the merits of Plaintiff’s claim because a class of one claim is not appropriate under these circumstances. In the seminal case Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, the plaintiffs sought to connect their property to a municipal water supply. 528 U.S. at 563. The Village typically required a fifteen-foot easement from property owners seeking access to the supply. The Village however conditioned the plaintiffs’ connection to the supply upon their granting it a thirty-three-foot easement. Id. The Supreme Court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the Village’s request for the additional eighteen-feet of land was arbitrary because it was motivated by ill-will resulting from the plaintiffs’ previous filing of an unrelated, successful lawsuit against the Village. Id. Thus in Olech, the Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff’s class of one claim to proceed because the municipality allegedly deviated without justification from its clear procedure of always requiring the same width for an easement. This Court has also allowed a class of one claim to go forward in an employment case. In Bower v. Village of Mt. Sterling, 44 F. App’x 670, 672 (6th Cir. 2002), the plaintiff claimed that his equal protection rights were violated after he was denied the opportunity to become a police officer. The Village’s officers were normally selected through the following process: the police chief nominated candidates for officer positions and the mayor approved them without 40 question. Id. at 673. However, in Bower, while the police chief nominated the plaintiff, the mayor struck down the nomination in retaliation to the plaintiff’s parents’ opposition to him. Id. We found that this deviation from a routine hiring process was sufficient to state a class of one claim. Id. Unlike in Olech and Bower, there is no clear and neutral applicable procedure or standard for determining whether the Plaintiff here should retain his medical privileges. Here, the procedure set forth in the James Bylaws called for multiple physicians to review Plaintiff’s patient care and come to a determination as to whether his care was acceptable for an academic or tertiary hospital. Here, the MSAC’s decision to revoke Plaintiff’s medical privileges was the result of the recommendations and conclusions of several committees and independent reviewers, as well as the testimony and evidence presented at a lengthy hearing. Each reviewer was able to give his or her individual opinion as to the quality of Plaintiff’s care, and each member of the MSAC voted individually. This type of review is inherently discretionary, and distinct from the simple decision-making procedures and routines reviewed in Olech and Bower. Accordingly, we find that Plaintiff’s case is not reviewable as a class of one claim. Finally, we note that although we are not reviewing the merits of Plaintiff’s class of one claim, we are certain that neither ill-will nor animus prompted the MSAC’s decision. As already determined in Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, there is no evidence of bias due to the alleged tensions between Plaintiff and his colleagues. Likewise, there is no evidence that Plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of his national origin.