Opinion ID: 1512563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Weber's 1991 Sentence Standards After Successful Appeal

Text: In addition to credit for time served, Weber contends that he is entitled to receive credits for good time served from 1985 to 1989. To achieve that result, Weber argues that the 1988 and 1991 sentences must be aggregated. Properly framed, the question becomes whether the United States Constitution requires that Weber's 1988 and 1991 sentences be aggregated (run consecutively from 1985) to total 18½ years, or may, as the Superior Court did, be treated as one 1988 sentence for 6½ years and another, new 1991 sentence, for 12 years. Weber's related contention is that he was punished for taking a partially successful appeal. Two policies must be balanced: 1) a defendant must not be punished for taking an appeal, see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724, 89 S.Ct. at 2080; and 2) the imposition of a sentence is within the discretion of the trial court and effect is to be given to its intent. See Faircloth v. State, Del. Supr., 522 A.2d 1268, 1272-73 (1987); Howell v. State, Del.Supr., 421 A.2d 892, 899 (1980). There is no absolute constitutional bar to the imposition of a more severe sentence on reconviction after the defendant's successful appeal of the original judgment of conviction. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 135, 101 S.Ct. at 436. Nevertheless, whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081. This Court has indicated that increased penalties are valid so long as the trial judge meets articulated requirements. White v. State, Del.Supr., 576 A.2d 1322, 1328-29 (1990); Tramill v. State, Del.Supr., 425 A.2d 142 (1980). Tramill requires: 1) acknowledgement by the sentencing Judge that the new sentence is more severe, 2) objective details concerning one or more incidents which have occurred subsequent to the original sentencing, 3) a statement to the defendant that the increased sentence results from the identified conduct, and 4) an indication that the amount of the increase is justified on the basis of the identified conduct. Id. at 146.