Opinion ID: 4513018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Zheng’s reporting requirements

Text: In finding Zheng not credible, the IJ relied on what it perceived to be inconsistent descriptions of Zheng’s reporting requirements after her release from detention. In both her declaration and testimony before the IJ, Zheng stated that she was required to report weekly to the village committee. Yi wrote in his onepage declaration that after Zheng’s release “the police wanted her to report whenever they like.” AR at 232. And Lin stated that “[g]overnment officials . . . asked her to report” without elaborating on the nature of these reporting requirements. Id. at 238. This evidence does not support an adverse credibility finding. First, we note that the descriptions of Zheng’s release conditions were not inconsistent. As Zheng clarified in her testimony before the IJ, she was required both to report weekly to the village committee and to appear whenever summoned by police. Specifically, Zheng testified that, in addition to imposing a weekly village committee reporting requirement, police also told her that “whenever they call [her], summon [her], [she] ha[s] to appear.” Id. at 146-47. These are readily understandable and facially plausible conditions. They are also consistent with the declarations of her husband and neighbor. That Zheng’s husband described only 10 Case: 18-14730 Date Filed: 03/05/2020 Page: 11 of 17 one component of Zheng’s reporting requirements in a one-page declaration, which did not purport to be exhaustive, also does not weigh against her credibility. Indeed, the IJ did not identify any inconsistencies in these statements, finding only that Zheng’s testimony was not corroborated by other evidence.2 But unlike inconsistency, the absence of corroborating evidence alone is not a proper basis for an adverse credibility finding. Since the passage of the REAL ID Act, this Court has repeatedly recognized that DHS regulations permit noncitizens to establish eligibility for asylum based on their credible testimony alone. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (stating that, for the purpose of establishing eligibility for asylum, “[t]he testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration”); Niftaliev v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11th Cir. 2007) (approving of the proposition that, in the absence of corroborating evidence, an applicant’s testimony alone may be sufficient to establish eligibility for asylum so long as it is “believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mohammed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 547 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2008) (“An applicant may be able to meet his 2 The IJ and BIA both considered the fact that the village committee notices do not mention Zheng’s reporting requirements. But neither the IJ nor the BIA explained why these notices would be expected to contain information about the conditions of Zheng’s release. Nothing in the form or content of these one-paragraph notices suggests that they would normally contain such information. And nothing else in the record supports such a conclusion. To the extent that the IJ and BIA held otherwise, it was based “solely on speculation and conjecture” and does not merit consideration. See Tang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 578 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009). 11 Case: 18-14730 Date Filed: 03/05/2020 Page: 12 of 17 statutory burden by providing uncorroborated but credible testimony . . . .”). That an applicant can establish eligibility for asylum based solely on credible, but uncorroborated, testimony cannot be squared with the IJ’s decision that Zheng was not credible for failing to corroborate her testimony. When this Court has affirmed adverse credibility findings based on lack of corroboration, it has been based on the omission of facts in asylum applicants’ own prior statements, and only when those omissions were material to their applications. See Carrizo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 652 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Although [respondent] might reasonably decline to list every detention, his failure to mention any of them supports the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.”); Shkambi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 584 F.3d 1041, 1049–50 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming adverse credibility determination where applicant made “material omissions” central to his persecution claim in his airport interview and credible-fear interview); Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287–88 (holding that substantial evidence supported adverse credibility finding where asylum applicant had failed to mention prior political activities and severe physical assaults prior to testimony). And we have required “reasonable explanations” for adverse credibility findings based on omissions in prior statements. Shkambi, 584 F.3d at 1048. Unlike omissions in supporting evidence, there are good reasons to consider material omissions from an applicant’s own statements in evaluating her credibility. The failure to mention 12 Case: 18-14730 Date Filed: 03/05/2020 Page: 13 of 17 significant events relevant to an asylum claim at early stages of the process suggests that the applicant may have later invented or embellished elements of her claim, especially when she is unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for the omission. But friends and family members preparing corroborating declarations often will have no reason to think that their statements need mention every detail, particularly when that detail is not central to the applicant’s claim. Even if we were to consider omissions in Yi and Lin’s statements, our precedent still would not support the IJ’s credibility determination. First, the omissions here were not material to Zheng’s claim, as they related only to a peripheral question, her conditions of release. Second, Zheng provided a plausible explanation for the omission: that she was in fact subject to both conditions of release. And third, the IJ provided no reasoned explanation of why this omission undermined Zheng’s credibility or why her explanation of the omission was unsatisfactory. This factor thus was not a proper basis for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.