Opinion ID: 1613753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Mr Brooks

Text: Both the jury and the court of appeal found that Mr. Brooks was negligent and his actions were a cause-in-fact of the damages incurred by the Fontenots and LCG. Unquestionably, Mr. Brooks, in his capacity as a motorist, owed a legal duty to use reasonable care in the operation and control of his vehicle. See La. R.S. 32:58. The flashing red light controlling his lane of travel required that he stop at the intersection in a position where he had a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway [i.e., Main Street] before entering the intersection. La. R.S. 32:123(B). See also La. R.S. 32:234. [7] Moreover, he was barred from proceeding through the intersection until he yielded the right of way to those vehicles that constituted an immediate hazard. La. R.S. 32:123(B). Based on our review, we agree with the lower courts that Mr. Brooks was negligent in the operation and control of his vehicle, and that his negligence was a substantial cause of the accident. The police report indicates Mr. Brooks advised Sergeant Elliot Thomas of the Brossard Police Department at the scene of the accident that he came to a complete stop at the intersection, and that he looked both ways not seeing any oncoming vehicles on Main Street before he began entering the intersection. This statement was corroborated by the trial testimony of Sergeant Thomas, who prepared the report. There is no evidence to contradict Mr. Brooks's assertions that he stopped and looked before entering the intersection. Rather, his negligent actions stem from his failure to see what he should have seen. In support, the undisputed testimony of Dr. Andrew McPhate, P.E., the DOTD's expert in the field of vehicle dynamics and accident reconstruction, indicates Mr. Brooks was traveling between nineteen and twenty-six miles per hour, and Mr. Fontenot was traveling at approximately fifty-six miles per hour. He concluded, utilizing these respective calculated speeds, Mr. Fontenot was clearly approaching the intersection when Mr. Brooks proceeded from his stop. Mr. Brooks should have seen the police cruiser, and should have not entered the intersection before yielding the right of way, and is at fault because he did neither. As for the reason why Mr. Brooks did not see the approaching vehicle, in the absence of his testimony at trial, we are only guided by the police report, which was admitted into evidence. While it provides there were no vision obscurements for either driver, the report indicates Mr. Brooks's condition at the time of impact was inattentive or distracted. The jurisprudence provides, [i]f a motorist fails to see what he should have seen, the law charges him with having seen what he should have seen, and the court examines his subsequent conduct on the premise that he did see what he should have seen. Fernandez v. General Motors Corp., 491 So.2d 633, 636-637 (La.1986). Mr. Brooks breached his duty to use reasonable care, which encompassed within it a risk that an approaching driver could be simultaneously present on the road traveling at an excessive rate of speed. Therefore, we determine the jury did not err in finding that Mr. Brooks was at fault in causing the accident.