Opinion ID: 775760
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Riddick's Murder

Text: 103
104 We review de novo the district court's interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Studley, 47 F.3d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1995). However, we will reverse a factual finding relevant to a sentencing determination only if it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Ruggiero, 100 F.3d 284, 291 (2d Cir. 1996). And, we must give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v. Molina, 106 F.3d 1118, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3742(e)). 105 Preliminarily, defendants argue that due process required the government to prove the facts underlying the attribution of Riddick's murder to them beyond a reasonable doubt or, at a minimum, by clear and convincing evidence. In United States v. Watts, the Supreme Court held that a preponderance standard for proving relevant conduct generally satisfies due process but left open the possibility that the Due Process Clause might require a higher standard of clear and convincing evidence in cases where the tail of relevant conduct wagged the dog of the substantive offense. 519 U.S. 148, 156-57 & n. 2 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 106 In our most recent case on the burden of proof necessary to establish a sentencing factor, we reconciled dicta in earlier cases by holding that the preponderance standard applied to fact finding at sentencing even when the proposed enhancement would result in a life sentence but that the district court could consider a departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5K2.0 where there is a combination of circumstances . . . including (i) an enormous upward adjustment (ii) for uncharged conduct (iii) not proved at trial and (iv) found by only a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704, 708-09 (2d Cir. 2000). Although the district court's sentencing remarks are not completely free from ambiguity, it appears that it appropriately considered defendants' requests for departure on this basis. The court indicated that it would not depart further downward even if it used a clear and convincing or a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Therefore, we discern no error in the district court's analysis of the applicable burden of proof.
107 The applicable guideline, U.S.S.G. 2 B3.2, provides that if a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. 1111, the court should apply 2 A1.1 (First Degree Murder).  U.S.S.G. 2 B3.2(c)(1). The referenced statute provides that 108 Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing . . . is murder in the first degree. 109 18 U.S.C. 1111(a). 110 Defendants contend that Mulder acted in the passion of the moment and that his act thus was not murder. 6 Although we have located no precedent from this circuit that defines premeditated or first degree murder, cases from other circuits give some guidance. In United States v. Brown, the court held that the fact that cruelty or brutality is manifested in a killing will raise an inference of malice and the length of time of premeditation is not material. 518 F.2d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1975). In addition, threats made before the killing are relevant to a finding of premeditation. See id. (finding that defendant's statement made before the stabbing about a 'snitch' had probative value in establishing premeditation). In United States v. Shaw, the court noted that the distinction between first degree and second degree murder was less than clear but that the best that can be said of deliberation is that it requires a 'cool mind' that is capable of reflection, and of premeditation that it requires that the one with the 'cool mind' did, in fact, reflect at least for a short period of time before his act of killing. 701 F.2d 367, 393 (5th Cir. 1983). Ample evidence supports the district court's finding that Mulder committed premeditated murder. For example, Mulder previously had threatened to kill one or more of Callie Harris' men; Riddick was restrained by another man when Mulder shot him; Mulder fired many bullets; and he admitted that he was motivated by a desire not to have Riddick return to the job site. Therefore, the district court properly found Mulder's crime to have been first degree murder. 111
112 Defendants next argue that Section 2B3.2(c)(1) does not apply because Riddick, as a rival coalition member, was not a victim within the purview of the Hobbs Act. This is a legal issue subject to de novo review. Relying on United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1162, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1084, 120 S. Ct. 1176 (2000), defendants first argue that the victim referred to in Section 2B3.2(c)(1) must be a direct and not an indirect victim of the extortionate scheme. Napoli is inapposite because it construed U.S.S.G. 3D1.2, which refers to the same victim while the Hobbs Act guideline refers to a victim. Id. 179 F.3d at 7. Alternatively, defendants argue that even though a victim may not deserve the narrow construction accorded to the victim by Napoli, it is less inclusive than any victim, as that phrase was construed in United States v. Muhammad, 948 F.2d 1449, 1455-56 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying enhancement for bodily injury to any victim to robber who assaulted police officer attempting to restrain him during his get-away). In appellants' view, a victim's place on the continuum between any victim and the victim may support application of 2B3.2(c)(1) if a direct target of extortion or an innocent bystander is killed but not if a rival coalition member is killed. We disagree. If it were not for BFB's extortionate purpose and need to control the Queens site, Mulder would not have come to the site to confront Callie Harris' gang and therefore would not have shot Riddick. In Muhammad, the court said, one must understand the term 'victim' in the context of the crime committed. Id. at 1456 n.1. In extortion, the term a victim is most reasonably construed to include all persons killed to carry out the extortionate scheme, a reading that includes Riddick, who was killed to maintain BFB's control over the HHM sites in Queens. Therefore, we agree with the district court that Riddick was a victim of that portion of the conspiracy that related to the Union Street site. 113
114 Under the relevant conduct principles of subsection 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), all reasonably foreseeable acts . . . of others in furtherance of [a] conspiracy may be taken into account to determine a defendant's sentence. Molina, 106 F.3d at 1121 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the district court must make two particularized findings. First, it must determine the scope of the criminal activity agreed upon by the defendant. Studley, 47 F.3d at 574. Second - and only if it finds that the scope of the activity to which the defendant agreed was sufficiently broad to include the conduct in question -- the court must make a particularized finding as to whether the activity was foreseeable to the defendant. Id. In Studley, we identified several principles and factors relevant to determining the scope of jointly undertaken criminal activity. Mere knowledge of another participant's criminal acts or of the scope of the overall operation will not make a defendant criminally responsible for his co-defendants' acts. Id. at 575. Also, it is more likely that an activity has been jointly undertaken if the participants pool their profits and resources and do not work independently. Id. Another sign of a joint undertaking is the defendant['s] assistance in designing and executing the illegal scheme. Id. 115 The government agrees that the district court may not have made sufficiently particularized findings on the scope of the individual defendants' agreements and consents to a remand for this purpose but argues that the scope of each defendant's agreement was broad enough to cover Riddick's murder. To support its argument, the government relies principally on the assistance that coalition members rendered each other and Johnson and McCall's roles as supervisors of Mulder. 116 There is evidence in the record that both McCall and Johnson entered into a joint agreement with Mulder to eliminate Callie Harris' gang as a threat at HHM's Queens work site. A recording demonstrates that Mulder informed Johnson of his intent to kill someone at that site. And, the court could choose to believe Mulder's testimony that Johnson's later attempt to disassociate himself from any such plan was a sham. Mulder also testified that he viewed McCall as his supervisor, that McCall frequently visited the site, that McCall introduced him to Harvey Lyons as the new coordinator of the Queens site, and that Mulder told McCall about his problem with Callie Harris' coalition. From Johnson's and McCall's conversations with Mulder, the district court reasonably could find that they jointly planned methods to take control of the Queens site, albeit not specifically the murder of Riddick. Because a reasonable fact finder could find, but would not be required to find, that McCall and Johnson entered into a joint agreement with Mulder to maintain control of the Queens work site, we vacate their sentences and remand to allow the district court to make particularized findings with respect to each on the scope of their agreement. 117 We find no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that Hunter's agreement with other BFB members extended to the Queens work site. Therefore, we vacate Hunter's sentence and remand for resentencing at an offense level that does not take into account Riddick's murder. 118 The only evidence that associates Carnes with the Queens site is his promise to Mulder to check with members of BFB to see whether Mulder would be acceptable as the site's coordinator and his attendance at meetings with Mulder that members of Harris' coalition also attended. As a matter of law, this conduct is not sufficient to indicate that Carnes agreed to help control the Queens work site. See Studley, 47 F.3d at 576. Therefore, we vacate Carnes' sentence and remand for resentencing without consideration of Riddick's murder. 119 If the district court finds on remand that the scope of Johnson's or McCall's agreement was broad enough to encompass Riddick's killing, that defendant or those defendants will have the burden of demonstrating Mulder's conduct was not foreseeable to them. United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 677 (2d Cir. 1998). Because we are remanding, we add that the district court's original basis for finding foreseeability - the use of violence by coalition members in other circumstances - was inadequate. Our cases contemplate a closer link. See United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's conclusion that co-defendant's possession of a machine gun was foreseeable to sentenced defendant where he carried the ammunition for the gun in question); Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d at 674-78 (upholding scheme's mastermind's responsibility for a substantial portion of his co-conspirators' tax losses where he had direct personal involvement in the evasion of taxes by [his co-defendants] and also upholding less culpable defendants' offense level reflecting co-defendants' losses because they shared specific tax evasion mechanisms and pooled resources) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Medina, 74 F.3d 413, 417 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding relevant conduct adjustment for use of firearms where defendant knew co-conspirator intended to carry a gun and defendant masterminded the robbery); United States v. Tapia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 743 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant's involvement in cocaine transaction was not sufficient to hold him liable for proposed heroin transaction where only evidence was co-conspirator's alleged ambiguous statement to government agent indicating that defendant also would be the buyer in the heroin transaction and even this statement was contradicted by other portions of agent's testimony). On remand, the district court may not find that Riddick's murder was foreseeable to McCall or Johnson solely because BFB members committed other violent acts.