Opinion ID: 755341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Daubert Ruling

Text: 55 In its ruling on Rebel's expert witness testimony, a week before its summary judgment ruling, the district court held that Leffler's opinions were admissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Rebel contends that the later grant of summary judgment in ARCO's favor and the district court's rejection of Leffler's conclusions is irreconcilable with the admission of Leffler's testimony. 56 The test [for the admission of expert testimony] under Daubert is not the correctness of the expert's conclusions but the soundness of his methodology. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869, 116 S.Ct. 189, 133 L.Ed.2d 126 (1995) (on remand from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). As the district court's Daubert order explicitly stated, Whether Leffler's cost analysis is an economically valid method is [a] different question from whether it is legally sufficient to support a price discrimination claim. [ER p. 275] The district court's conclusion at summary judgment that Leffler's testimony was not legally sufficient evidence to create a question of material fact regarding whether ARCO priced its gasoline below its costs is not inconsistent with its conclusion following the Daubert hearing that Leffler's methodology was sound. An expert witness may be qualified to testify even though the expert's conclusions are legally incorrect. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, ----, 118 S.Ct. 512, 519, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (district courts may reject expert testimony that is based on sound methodology when there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered). 57 The Daubert ruling did not require the district court to deny ARCO's motion for summary judgment.