Opinion ID: 1185731
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plaintiff alleged and proved facts which, if believed by a jury, could properly be found by it to constitute the tort of outrageous conduct.

Text: On April 23, 1969, more than one year after the trial of this case, this court, in Pakos v. Clark, 253 Or. 113, 453 P.2d 682, first recognized the tort of outrageous conduct. In that case this court quoted with approval at p. 122, 453 P.2d at p. 686, the following rule as previously stated in Restatement (Second) Torts 71, § 46: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress   . The court then also quoted from comment d under § 46 as follows:  Extreme and outrageous conduct. The cases thus far decided have found liability only where the defendant's conduct has been extreme and outrageous. It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by `malice,' or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, `Outrageous!'   . In my opinion, plaintiff's pleadings and evidence were sufficient to provide a proper basis upon which the jury, if it believed such evidence, could have properly found that defendant's conduct was outrageous conduct within the test approved by this court in Pakos v. Clark. It may be, of course, that a jury would choose to believe defendant's witnesses and to find that defendant's conduct was no more than negligent. On the other hand, if the jury believed the evidence offered on behalf of plaintiff and proceeded to draw reasonable inferences from such evidence, the jury could have properly found the following facts: (1) That after plaintiff found that he was unable to pay the balance of $3,911.50 on the truck purchased by him from defendant he surrendered it to defendant for resale under the terms of a chattel mortgage which imposed upon defendant the duty to account for and pay any surplus to plaintiff; (2) That defendant then removed the van body from the truck and sold the truck, without the van body, for $4,000; (3) That defendant then prepared a repossession report showing not only a charge of $220 for a sales commission, but also a charge of $400 for repairs which were never made, and resulting in an incorrect deficiency of $531.34; (4) That defendant then turned over this false deficiency to a collection agency which, as its agent, demanded payment from plaintiff; (5) That although plaintiff then called defendant and asked for an explanation he was given no satisfaction and no effort was made by defendant to correct the matter; (6) That defendant, through the collection agency, then again demanded payment, stating falsely that our previous notices have been ignored and threatening to sue plaintiff; (7) That when plaintiff's attorney then asked for an explanation he was told by defendant that $531 was the balance remaining after these charges for sales commission and repairs, but that defendant then refused to produce copies of the repair documents; (8) That meanwhile defendant had sold the van body separately for $865, resulting in a substantial surplus payable to plaintiff, but that defendant failed to discharge its duty to either account for or pay that surplus to him; (9) That even when plaintiff learned from another source that the van body had been sold separately (but not the price at which it was sold) and demanded an explanation from defendant, it continued to give him false information to the effect that the box (van body) was sold for only $400 and that there had been $400 in reconditioning costs (which were never incurred) on sale of the truck; (10) That when plaintiff questioned that item, defendant contended that the $400 charges were for selling and overhead expenses which were not supported by convincing evidence and were not claimed in the original repossession report; (11) That such conduct caused severe emotional distress to plaintiff. In my opinion, if the jury found the foregoing facts to be true it also could have properly found from the evidence that defendant deliberately embarked upon a course of conduct intended to defraud plaintiff of money which belonged to him and which defendant was under a duty as a fiduciary to account for and pay to him and that defendant then embarked upon a further course of conduct intended to conceal its fraud from plaintiff and was outrageous within the meaning of the rule as approved by this court in Pakos v. Clark. An examination of the facts of recent cases confirms this conclusion, in my opinion. See George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. April 12, 1971); Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 10 Cal. App.3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Rugg v. McCarty, Colo., 476 P.2d 753, 756 (1970); Turner v. ABC Jalousie Company, 251 S.C. 92, 160 S.E.2d 528 (1968); Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So.2d 154 (1963); Delta Finance Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956); Duty v. General Finance Company, 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954); LaSalle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934); and Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932). [9] With all due respect to the concurring opinion in this case, the views expressed in that opinion, without citing recent case authority, are not in accord with the clear trend of the law as demonstrated by these recent decisions, in my opinion. I fail to distinguish between outrageous and reprehensible, as defendant's conduct is described in that opinion. I also do not agree with the view, as at least implicit in that opinion, that in order for conduct to be outrageous it must consist of prolonged harassment or other misconduct. In any event, if the jury believed plaintiff's evidence it could have properly found that defendant was guilty of a long continued course of outrageous conduct, including threats to sue for a nonexistent debt, followed by deliberate and repeated lies in an effort to conceal the truth and retain surplus moneys which it was under obligation to pay to plaintiff. Also, in my opinion, the jury could properly have found from the facts of this case that defendant's conduct was not only fraudulent, but involved unusual, bizarre and particularly abusive methods of execution, as apparently conceded by the concurring opinion to be sufficient to constitute outrageous conduct. It may be that the developing tort of outrageous conduct should be more clearly defined and subject to more definite standards, but no such definitions or standards are proposed by the concurring opinion. The ordinary layman, when informed of the facts of this case, and when also informed that the plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed, without even payment of the surplus admittedly owing to him, for the reason that his lawyer did not tell the trial judge that he was relying on a theory of outrageous conduct and because lawyers and judges cannot agree upon any proper theory for recovery, would indeed regard this as an outrageous result! For all of these reasons, I most respectfully dissent.