Opinion ID: 854064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Criminal Gang Activity Statute Is Constitutional

Text: Klein concedes that Indiana courts have previously held that the criminal gang activity statute [3] is constitutional. Jackson v. State, 634 N.E.2d 532 (Ind.Ct.App.1994); Helton v. State, 624 N.E.2d 499 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993). Klein argues, however, that these holdings were rendered invalid when the statute defining a criminal gang was amended. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-45-9-1 (West 1998). Originally, the statute, which was enacted in 1991, stated: As used in this chapter, criminal gang means a group with at least five (5) members that specifically: (1) either (A) promotes, sponsors, or assists in; or (B) participates in; and (2) requires as a condition of membership or continued membership; the commission of a felony or an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult or the offense of battery.... Ind.Code Ann. § 35-45-9-1 (West Supp. 1991), amended by P.L. 140-1994, Sec. 5. In 1994, the legislature amended this statute by replacing the word and at the end of clause (1) with or. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-45-9-1 (West 1998). Klein argues that, as a result of the 1994 amendment, the statute is (1) unconstitutionally void for vagueness, (2) overbroad, and (3) allows the criminalization of a person's status. A. The Statute Is Not Vague. Klein argues that the criminal gang activity statute is unconstitutionally vague under the United States Constitution and the Indiana Constitution. Klein has not presented any separate argument based in the Indiana Constitution, citing instead various federal cases in support of this contention. Accordingly, he waives his state claim. We will address his federal claim. Under basic principles of due process, a law is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). A statute is also void for vagueness if its terms invite arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). Klein contends that the 1994 amendment to the statute defining the term criminal gang removed the requirement that the commission of a felony be a direct condition for membership in the group. As a result, Klein argues that the law fails to provide fair warning of what conduct is prohibited. Simplified and summarized, the statute now defines a criminal gang as a group that either: (1) promotes, sponsors, assists in, or participates in a felony, or (2) requires the commission of a felony as a condition of membership. According to Indiana Code section 35-45-9-3, a person who knowingly or intentionally participates in such groups commits criminal gang activity. A statute is not void for vagueness if individuals of ordinary intelligence could comprehend it to the extent that it would fairly inform them of the generally proscribed conduct. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); see Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972). In the matter at bar, the law puts individuals on active notice of what the legislature considers to be a criminal gang and that participation in these groups is prohibited. Klein also contends that the statute invites discriminatory enforcement. The idea is plausible, but Klein provides neither any citation to authority nor any other particularly cogent argument about it. The present case does not appear to constitute such an instance. B. The Statute Is Not Overly Broad. Klein contends the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because there is no longer any direct connection between particular proscribed conduct and membership in a group. He claims such a restriction violates his freedom of association guaranteed under article 1, § 9 and § 31 of the Indiana Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Overbreadth analysis under the U.S. Constitution is not applicable to the Indiana Constitution. Jackson, 634 N.E.2d at 536 (citing Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind.1993)). Unless the statute in question is incapable of constitutional application, an Indiana court should limit itself to vindicating the rights of the party before it. Price, 622 N.E.2d at 958. Once an Indiana constitutional challenge is properly raised, the court should first determine whether the statute is capable of constitutional application and then determine whether it was constitutional as applied in this case. Helton, 624 N.E.2d at 507 (citing Price, 622 N.E.2d at 958). Since Indiana's gang statute is capable of constitutional application, Helton, 624 N.E.2d at 507, we must determine whether or not it was constitutionally applied. Klein's argument that application of the gang statute to his case violates his freedom of association was rejected in Helton because neither the U.S. nor the Indiana Constitution protects associations made in furtherance of crimes or criminal conspiracies. 624 N.E.2d at 508; see United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.1978). As indicated by his boast that he was now a true five, Klein's actions were intended to improve his status within the gang. (R. at 1339.) As such, application of the gang statute to Klein's conduct was constitutional under Indiana law. Turning to federal overbreadth analysis, we must determine whether the statute substantially prohibits activities protected by the First Amendment. Jackson, 634 N.E.2d at 536 (citing Price, 622 N.E.2d at 966). The court in Helton determined that the gang statute does not prohibit the mere association of five or more persons and it does not criminalize the mere status of gang membership. 624 N.E.2d at 508. Further, undesirable groups, the wrong type of crowd, or annoying conduct alone is not punishable under the Gang Statute. Id. at 507. Therefore, the statute only applies to criminal associations that are not protected by the First Amendment. Jackson, 634 N.E.2d at 536. The Indiana Gang Activity Statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad. C. Statute Does Not Criminalize Status. Klein argues that the gang activity statute unconstitutionally criminalizes a person's status. An individual may not be prosecuted for mere status, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962), but the statute does not punish for status alone. Membership in a gang, by itself, does not provide the basis for prosecution for criminal gang activity. The State must prove that the individual was aware of the gang's criminal purpose. See Helton, 624 N.E.2d at 508 n. 12 ([T]he Gang Statute does not unconstitutionally criminalize the mere status of gang membership.).