Opinion ID: 1133414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Other contentions of prosecutorial misconduct

Text: Defendant contends that in arguing to the jury, there is no reasonable doubt in this case unless you believe [defendant] is telling the truth, the prosecutor suggested that a guilty verdict hinged on defendant's credibility and thus improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense. We discern no impropriety in the prosecutor's argument. Viewed in context, it merely invited the jury to compare defendant's explanation of the evidence with the prosecution's while stressing to the jury that the prosecution had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly without merit is defendant's claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct by expressing in argument to the jury his personal belief in defendant's guilt. The prosecutor started to say, And I am convinced, but realizing he had misspoken, he quickly added although my being convinced is irrelevant, [and defense counsel's] feeling about the evidence is irrelevant. The prosecutor then stressed the jury's duty to decide the case based upon the evidence. Thus, the jury was not left with the impression that the prosecutor was convinced of defendant's guilt based on information known to him but not presented at trial. (See People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 183, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862 [noting that when a prosecutor expresses personal belief in the defendant's guilt the jurors may assume there is other evidence at his command on which he bases this conclusion].) There was no misconduct. We also reject defendant's assertion that by arguing that defendant's testimony was not to be believed, the prosecutor was urging the jury to return a guilty verdict for special-circumstance murder because defendant had committed perjury. Here, the prosecutor did not argue that defendant's lies warranted conviction, but rather that defendant had not told the truth. In this respect, this case differs from People v. Ellis (1966) 65 Cal.2d 529, 541, footnote 17, 55 Cal.Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393, in which we described as misconduct a prosecutor's statement to the jury that it could do nothing else but find a perjurer guilty of the charged offense. Nor is there merit to defendant's claim that here the prosecutor had an obligation during defense counsel's direct examination of prosecution investigator Detective Edwin Milkey to prevent Milkey from mentioning that he had investigated possible subornation of perjury. These are the relevant facts: During Milkey's November 6, 1991, testimony, defense counsel Louis Bernstein inquired about an interview Milkey had conducted of Dennis Morgan on October 7, 1991, during a recess in this trial. Bernstein's questioning focused on what Morgan had told Milkey about a telephone conversation between defendant and Diane Ellison, baby Amanda's grandmother, around the time of baby Amanda's death. This exchange followed: Mr. Bernstein: Now, did you as an investigator, did you try to determine when this call from [defendant] or to [defendant] occurred in relationship to August 25, 1988 [the day Amanda lost consciousness]? Detective Milkey: Since October 7th? No, I have been chasing other things on some issues that have come up in this case concerning some people. Mr. Bernstein: So you haven't done that; is that right? Detective Milkey: No, I haven't. I have been looking at other issues. Mr. Bernstein: How come? Detective Milkey: If you want to know, I have been investigating subordination [sic] of perjury. A prosecutor has the duty to guard against statements by his witnesses containing inadmissible evidence, and if a prosecutor believes a witness may give an inadmissible answer during his examination, he must warn the witness to refrain from making such a statement. ( People v. Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d 471, 481-482, 247 Cal.Rptr. 172, 754 P.2d 218.) Here, Detective Milkey stated that he was investigating subornation of perjury in response to a question asked him not by the prosecutor but by defense counsel who had called Milkey as his own witness. Assuming for the sake of argument that under Warren the prosecutor here had a duty to see to it that during defense counsel's questioning of the prosecutor's investigator called as a defense witness, the investigator would not mention an ongoing investigation into subornation of perjury, nothing in the record suggests that the prosecutor had a basis for anticipating the response in question by Detective Milkey. Therefore, there was no prosecutorial misconduct.