Opinion ID: 183279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: adequate basis for entry of guilty plea

Text: Generally, the adequacy of a guilty plea is reviewed in the Rule 11 context for harmless error. United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 1995). Conversely, where an error is not preserved before the district court by noting a specific Rule 11 6 error, such as one occurring during a plea colloquy, plain error review applies. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-27 (4th Cir. 2002); see United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2009). Edgerton filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, but the motion did not specifically contend that a specific Rule 11 error occurred during the plea colloquy and Edgerton did not argue before the district court that an insufficient factual basis existed to support his guilty plea. Accordingly, plain error review applies to his claim that no sufficient factual basis existed to support his plea of guilty to Count Five of the superseding indictment since the plea agreement referred to the use of firearms in furtherance of the criminal offense of possession with intent to distribute crack rather than marijuana, as set forth in Count 5 of the superseding indictment. To establish plain error, the defendant must show that there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (internal citations omitted). “Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) requires the district court to determine whether a factual basis exists 7 before entering judgment on a guilty plea.” United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 2008). “[T]he district court ‘possesses wide discretion,’ and it ‘need only be subjectively satisfied that there is a sufficient factual basis for a conclusion that the defendant committed all of the elements of the offense.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 1997)). A district court judge “taking a defendant’s plea . . . need not . . . explain the elements of each charge to the defendant on the record.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005).
Finding impermissible Rule 11 error, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently vacated a defendant’s conviction for firearm possession in furtherance of drug trafficking and discussed the factual basis necessary to uphold a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). United States v. Maye, 582 F.3d 622, 627-31 (6th Cir. 2009). The Sixth Circuit found that the district court judge, the defendant, and the defendant’s counsel each were confused as to what conduct sufficiently established a § 924(c) offense. Id. at 627. At his sentencing hearing, the defendant expressed concern and confusion about the § 924(c) offense. Id. at 627-28. The defendant’s counsel explained to the court that his client was 8 still concerned following the court’s provision of time for counsel to explain the nature of the charge and its elements. Id. at 628. The district court judge then read the indictment aloud, the defendant stated that he was guilty of the charged offense and that he understood why, the district court judge invited the defendant to explain it before the court, and the defendant stated that he was guilty because he “just had the gun period, point blank” in his apartment when the cocaine sale took place on his front porch. Id. at 628-29 (emphasis in original). The district court then proceeded to sentence the defendant. The defendant appealed his sentence to the Sixth Circuit, contending that the district court erred in finding that a factual basis existed to support his plea of guilty, asserting that his admission that he possessed a revolver in close proximity to his drug transaction was insufficient. Id. at 62728. The Sixth Circuit noted that “coincidental presence of a firearm in the vicinity of a crime is insufficient to support a section 924(c) conviction” since such a pronouncement falls short of the statutory requirement that the firearm be possessed “‘in furtherance’” of drug trafficking or “possessed to advance or promote the commission of the underlying [drug-trafficking] offense.” Id. at 630-31. The court noted that the firearm was not brandished during the crime, the gun may not have been 9 loaded or easily visible to the informant, and was not sufficiently established as a “tool of [the defendant’s] trade.” Id. at 631 n.3. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit found that it was unclear that the defendant understood the elements of the charged crime and that plain error had occurred, such that the court remanded the case to provide for a new plea hearing. Id. at 630. Edgerton contends that application of Maye compels this Court to conclude that Rule 11 error occurred such that the four firearms described in Count Five of the superseding indictment were not possessed by him “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking activity, that he never admitted to specifically possessing the four firearms described in Count Five of the superseding indictment, and that no sufficient basis existed for the district court to accept his plea of guilty to Count Five. The plea colloquy plainly demonstrates that notwithstanding a scrivener’s error in the plea agreement delineating crack cocaine rather than marijuana as charged in the superseding indictment, the district court judge twice accurately discussed the nature of Count Five during the plea colloquy and Edgerton affirmatively stated that he committed the offenses as stated by the court. J.A. 29-37. Maye is readily distinguishable from the instant case since, here, neither Edgerton nor his counsel expressed any confusion as to the nature of Count Five or 10 § 924(c) which necessitated a recitation of the elements of the offense. Further, there was no erroneous legal pronouncement of the elements of Count Five or any other allegation of the superseding indictment which could provide Edgerton sufficient basis to allege confusion as to the elements of § 924(c). Although it is the better practice to do so, the district court judge was not required to recite the elements of § 924(c). Thus, the district court had a proper basis upon which to find that Edgerton committed all of the elements of Count Five – Edgerton admitted guilt following the district court’s reading of the charges, explanation of potential punishment, and extensive colloquy. Simply stated, no error occurred.