Opinion ID: 2002109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Occupancy Preference: Title VIII and the Law Against Discrimination.

Text: Earlier in this opinion, supra at 19-20, 622 A. 2d at 1266, we took note of the Public Advocate's reliance on the data indicating that Bloomingdale's minority population, as a percentage of its total population, was 1.5%, whereas its region's minority population was 20.9%. Similarly compelling statistical data are before us comparing the minority population percentage in each of the other five municipalities with that of its region: Denville 1.1%/Region 52%; Hillsborough 2.8%/Region 8.9%; Holmdel 1.7%/Region 8.6%; Roseland 1%/Region 52%; Warren 1.3%/Region 8.9%. The Public Advocate contends that because the minority resident and-worker population in those municipalities is disproportionately low, compared to their respective regions, the occupancy preference has a discriminatory impact on minorities, in that it favors occupancy of affordable-housing units by eligible white households and perpetuates the pattern of minority exclusion that exists in those municipalities. The Appellate Division expressed the view that Title VIII does not deal with a preference for government sponsored housing    extended on the basis of present residence or place of employment. 247 N.J. Super. at 176, 588 A. 2d 1227. Accordingly, that court concluded that unless the occupancy preference was adopted as a subterfuge for discrimination on the basis of race, ibid., the Act is not violated. In addition, the Appellate Division adverted to the governmental justifications advanced to support the occupancy preference: (1) the interest of municipalities in providing affordable housing for existing residents who encounter financial downturns; (2) the desire to preserve a municipality's social fabric by providing affordable housing for residents with roots in the community; (3) the desirability of encouraging adoption of fair-share plans likely to meet with approval by community residents, thereby promoting voluntary compliance with the Act. [ Warren Township, supra, 247 N.J. Super. at 172-173, 588 A. 2d 1227.] Based on those justifications, the Appellate Division held that the occupancy preference furthered a `legitimate, bona fide governmental interest,' noting that the Public Advocate had failed to suggest any alternative provision that `would serve that interest with less discriminatory effect.' Id. at 177, 588 A. 2d 1227 (quoting Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, supra, 844 F. 2d at 936). We conclude that the Appellate Division erred in its summary disposition both of the Public Advocate's Title VIII claims and the related claims under the LAD. Its holding that Title VIII does not deal with residential preferences for government-sponsored housing fails to take into account cases such as United States v. Housing Authority of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.Ala. 1980). There, the district court invalidated defendant's imposition of a residency requirement for its governmentally-sponsored housing units, noting that the City of Chickasaw had virtually no minority residents whereas the adjacent cities of Pritchard and Mobile had African-American populations of 50.5% and 32.3% respectively. Id. at 718. The court concluded that the residency requirement perpetuates segregation, and that because of its discriminatory impact it violated Title VIII even in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent. Id. at 732. Moreover, the Appellate Division's conclusion that the occupancy preference does not violate Title VIII unless adopted as a subterfuge for discrimination, 247 N.J. Super. at 176, 588 A. 2d 1227, suggests that a discriminatory motive is an essential element of a Title VIII violation. As the federal cases have demonstrated, see supra at 22-25, 622 A. 2d at 1267-1269, proof of discriminatory impact is sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VIII. On the sparse record presented, the disparity between the percentage of minority population in the six municipalities as compared with that of their respective regions would be sufficient to present a significant possibility that the occupancy preference could cause a discriminatory impact on minorities. Because COAH did not hold an evidentiary hearing, the issue is not before us on an adequate record, no evidence whatsoever having been presented with respect to the percentage of minority workers in each of the municipalities. The inference is compelling that unless the percentage of minority workers proved to be sufficient to compensate at least in part for the significant disparity in the local and regional percentages of minority residents, the occupancy preference would exert a discriminatory effect on minority residents in the region eligible for affordable housing. Nor can we readily accept the Appellate Division's summary assessment of the validity of the asserted governmental justifications for the occupancy preference, or its conclusion that no alternative provision would adequately serve those interests. In our view, the conclusion that a prima facie violation of Title VIII has been rebutted adequately by governmental justifications cannot be reached without the benefit of a full evidentiary record that includes evidence establishing and contesting the legitimacy of the governmental interests and the existence of reasonable and non-discriminatory alternatives. Assessed at face value, however, the governmental justifications proffered to support the occupancy preference do not appear to have sufficient weight to counterbalance proof that the occupancy preference may have a discriminatory impact on minorities eligible to occupy low- and moderate-income housing.