Opinion ID: 2010443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statute of Limitations and Speedy Indictment

Text: Burgess argues the charge of theft by deception was barred by the statute of limitations and it violated her right to a speedy indictment. She also argues the charge of theft by deception violated her right to be free from double jeopardy. We first address the statute of limitations and speedy indictment issues as Burgess waived these challenges by the entry of her Alford plea. An Alford plea is a variation of a guilty plea. In effect, the pleas are the same as the defendant is agreeing to the imposition of a criminal sentence for the crime charged. [1] A guilty plea freely and voluntarily entered waives all defenses and objections, including constitutional guarantees. State v. Yodprasit, 564 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Iowa 1997). However, in certain circumstances, a defendant does not waive the right to challenge the plea itself, the right to challenge the indictment or information if it charges no offense, and the right to be free from double jeopardy. See id.; see also State v. White, 545 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa 1996). The rights to challenge a charge based on statute of limitations or speedy indictment grounds are not exceptions to the general rule of waiver. Consequently, we do not address either the statute of limitations or speedy indictment claims because Burgess waived them by entering an Alford plea. The central issue in this case is whether the charge of theft by deception violates Burgess' right to be free from double jeopardy. We now turn to this issue.