Opinion ID: 794154
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Thomas Penn's Extinguishment of Aboriginal Rights8

Text: 14 The doctrine of discovery, which governs the relationship between the European colonial powers and the Indians, holds that the discovering nation takes fee title to the land, subject to the aboriginals' right of occupancy and use. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 234, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 21 U.S. 543, 588, 5 L.Ed. 681 (1823) (All our institutions recognise the absolute title of the crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and recognise the absolute title of the crown to extinguish that right.). The Indians' right of occupancy and use (aboriginal title) could only be extinguished with the consent of the sovereign. County of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 234, 105 S.Ct. 1245. The Delaware Nation claims in its appeal that the King of England — not Thomas Penn — was the sovereign over the territory that included Tatamy's Place. Therefore, Thomas Penn could not extinguish aboriginal title via the Walking Purchase and, consequently, the Delaware Nation maintains a right of occupancy and use. 15 The Delaware Nation's argument fails because the issue of Thomas Penn's lack of sovereign authority was not raised before the District Court. The Delaware Nation, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 24178,  (Plaintiff does not contest that Thomas Penn and the other Proprietors of the time maintained sovereign authority to extinguish this aboriginal title.). The closest the Delaware Nation comes to raising the issue is ¶ 31 of its Complaint, in which it notes that the Penns were accountable directly to the King of England. However, this paragraph fails to put the District Court or the defendants on notice of the Delaware Nation's purported argument on appeal — that Thomas Penn lacked the sovereign authority or consent from the King of England to extinguish aboriginal title in Pennsylvania. 9 16 Absent exceptional circumstances, this Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994). Although the Delaware Nation now contends that it did not concede the argument that Thomas Penn had the sovereign authority to extinguish aboriginal title, it does not, and cannot, argue that it raised the issue before the District Court. See Houghton v. American Guaranty Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 289, 294-5 (3d Cir.1982) (noting that the issue must be brought to the attention of the district court to be heard on appeal). Therefore, the issue is waived. 17 The Delaware Nation next argues that, even if Thomas Penn was sovereign and had the power to extinguish its aboriginal title with the Walking Purchase, he did not do so because the circumstances surrounding the Walking Purchase were fraudulent, and fraud is not a valid means to extinguish aboriginal title. However, the manner, method, and time of the sovereign's extinguishment of aboriginal title raise political, not justiciable, issues. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347, 62 S.Ct. 248, 86 L.Ed. 260 (1941). [W]hether (extinguishment) be done by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the exercise of complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or otherwise, its justness is not open to inquiry in the courts. Id. (emphasis added); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 46, 67 S.Ct. 167, 91 L.Ed. 29 (1946) (noting that the sovereign possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will.). Accordingly, the District Court correctly held that [p]roof of fraud is not a material fact that would nullify Proprietory Thomas Penn's extinguishing act. The Delaware Nation, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 24178, . 10 18 For extinguishment to occur, the sovereign must intend to revoke the Indians' occupancy rights. United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1976). The intent to extinguish aboriginal title must be plain and unambiguous based on either the face of the instrument or surrounding circumstances. Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 382 F.3d 245, 260 (2d Cir.2004). Extinguishment cannot be lightly implied. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 354, 62 S.Ct. 248. 19 The District Court held that the Delaware Nation's Complaint made it clear that Thomas Penn executed the Walking Purchase intending to take from the Delaware Nation its claim to land in Pennsylvania, including Tatamy's Place. The Delaware Nation, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 24178, -9. The Complaint notes that Thomas Penn, in order to pay creditors, needed to sell tribal land. To acquire such land, in the first place Thomas Penn executed the Walking Purchase. Complaint at ¶ 38. To now argue that Thomas Penn did not intend to extinguish aboriginal title to Tatamy's Place, which is indisputably land covered by the Walking Purchase, contradicts the very allegations of the Complaint. Put another way, there are no facts or allegations in the public record or in the Complaint which could be used to question Thomas Penn's intention to extinguish aboriginal rights in Tatamy's Place. Moreover, if the Delaware Nation still retained aboriginal title to Tatamy's Place, there would have been no need to grant Tatamy the 1741 patent in fee.