Opinion ID: 794242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Forcible Intimidation Count

Text: 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) penalizes anyone who 47 forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates or interferes with any [officer or employee of the United States] while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties. 48 We have said that this provision must be read as prohibiting any acts or threats of bodily harm that might reasonably deter a federal official from the performance of his or her duties. United States v. Walker, 835 F.2d 983, 987 (2d Cir.1987). Although a touching is not required within the meaning of § 111 and a threat of physical injury is sufficient, the threat must be accompanied by an apparent present ability to inflict the injury and a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. United States v. Chestaro, 197 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir.1999) (emphasis supplied). 49 Where the evidence permits an inference that a reasonable person standing in the place of the threatened official would have feared  imminent bodily harm, the official's state of mind need not be established by explicit testimony. United States v. Walker, 835 F.2d at 987 (emphasis supplied). An implied threat to use force sometime in the indefinite future does not fill the bill. Id. at 988. 50 In Walker, with respect to the requirement of immediacy, we approved an instruction, given in the following terms, that the threat must be of present harm: 51 [T]he threat of bodily harm in the future — there was some testimony about I will get you after work, etc., that is not the kind of thing that would be sufficient under the law. You have to find that there was a present threat, immediate threat for you to find the forcible requirement to be met. 52 Id. 53 In denying the motion for a judgment of acquittal on the Section 111 count, the District Court found sufficient evidence of immediacy in Temple's threat to Petherbridge: I'm gonna fuck you up, you faggot bitch. Temple, 342 F.Supp.2d at 242. This finding was informed by the tone of the message and the sense of immediacy conveyed by it as well as by Temple's knowledge of the location of Petherbridge's office, Temple's ability to gain access to that office, and the timing of the telephone call. Id. From these factors, the District Court concluded: Indeed, a reasonable jury could have found that Temple might very well have been in the building or across the street or somewhere else nearby, waiting for Petherbridge to leave work at the close of the business day, when she placed the telephone call. Id. The District Court's finding was further informed by its observations that the evidence showed that Petherbridge was actually intimidated by the voicemail, id., and that Temple's actions were clearly the type of conduct § 111 seeks to prevent, id. at 243. 54 We think that the voicemail message did not pose the sort of immediate or imminent threat required by the statute. We see little difference between Temple's message and the I will get you after work message considered insufficient as an immediate threat in Walker. A sense of immediacy in a tone of voice cannot substitute for evidence of actual immediacy and mere knowledge of someone's location cannot give rise to an inference of the physical proximity necessary to fulfill the immediacy requirement. In any event, there was no evidence whatsoever as to Temple's location when she left the voicemail message. The requisite apparent present ability to carry out a threat is absent here. The District Court's contrary conclusion is founded largely in speculation. 55 The cases affirming § 111 convictions generally involve face-to-face encounters. See, e.g., United States v. Street, 66 F.3d 969, 977-78 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Shedlock, 62 F.3d 214, 217 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Schrader, 10 F.3d 1345, 1348 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Fernandez, 837 F.2d 1031, 1033 (11th Cir.1988); cf. United States v. Fallen, 256 F.3d 1082, 1087-89 (11th Cir.2001) (affirming a conviction where the defendant was located on one side of door with police officers on the other side). Here, the threat was not presented to Petherbridge until he listened to his voicemail some nineteen hours after the message was placed there and, although the subjective fear described by Petherbridge is relevant, it is not controlling. The test is an objective one, viz: whether  imminent bodily harm would have been feared by a reasonable person standing in [Petherbridge's] shoes. Walker, 835 F.2d at 987 (emphasis supplied). That test was not met in this case, for, although Petherbridge may reasonably have feared harm, he had no objective basis to fear imminent harm. We therefore cannot agree with the District Court that Temple's conduct was of the type that § 111 was designed to prevent and conclude accordingly that the District Court erred in failing to grant a judgment of acquittal on Count Two of the Indictment. Since we dispose of this Count on the basis of evidentiary insufficiency, we see no need to pass on Temple's evidentiary challenges made in relation to this Count. 56 We have considered Temple's claim of retroactive misjoinder resulting in prejudicial spillover and find it meritless. See United States v. Hamilton, 334 F.3d 170, 181 (2d Cir.2003).