Opinion ID: 1360636
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alaska Equal Protection Analysis

Text: This court has adopted a sliding-scale approach to equal protection analysis under article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 12 (Alaska 1978). Under this approach, we must first determine what weight to afford the interest impaired by the challenged enactment. Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269-70 (Alaska 1984). Appellees claim that the interest impaired by the classification created by Rule 39 is the right of indigent defendants to access to the courts. They rely on Patrick v. Lynden Transport, Inc., 765 P.2d 1375 (Alaska 1988), in which this court held that a statute requiring nonresident plaintiffs to post a bond in order to bring suit in the state's courts implicated a right of access to the courts and was an important right on Alaska's sliding scale. Id. at 1379. We therefore subjected the statute to close scrutiny. [16] The State responds that indigents are not denied access to the courts, but are only afforded different procedures, and that therefore Patrick is inapplicable. [17] The bond requirement at issue in Patrick imposed an obstacle to initial entry to the court system. 765 P.2d at 1377. Absent the resources to post bond, nonresident plaintiffs could not bring an action in an Alaska court. Id. In contrast, Criminal Rule 39 does not prevent entry to the courts for resolving disputes over the reasonableness of fees. It does, however, provide a different procedure for the determination of the amount owed and the entry of judgment than that available to those who retain an attorney privately. Therefore, the interest impaired by the classification is the criminal defendant's interest in these particular procedures. This interest is less important than Patrick's interest in access to the courts, so lesser scrutiny is appropriate. This is in accordance with prior decisions of this court which consider equal protection challenges to unique procedural matters under a low level of scrutiny. See Turner Constr. Co. v. Scales, 752 P.2d 467, 471 (Alaska 1988) (analyzing challenge to statute of repose under fair and substantial relationship test); Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 358 (Alaska 1988) (applying relatively low level of scrutiny to equal protection challenge to mandatory pre-trial review of medical malpractice claims). On review at the low end of our sliding scale, the challenged provisions of Criminal Rule 39 need only serve a legitimate purpose and be fairly and substantially related to the accomplishment of that purpose. State, Dep't of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 629 (Alaska 1993). It is clear that the procedures of Rule 39 meet these requirements. Although the purpose of requiring reimbursement by the procedures of Rule 39 is not stated in the rule, the State contends that the purpose is to obtain partial repayment for the cost of defending indigent criminal defendants. Appellees accept this statement of the general purpose of the rule for the purposes of discussion and concede that it is probably legitimate. The State further contends that the purpose of providing only the procedures of Rule 39 is to achieve that end [repayment] with administrative efficiency while protecting the rights of the criminal defendants. [18] We hold that both the general purpose of Rule 39 and the particular reason for providing only limited procedures are legitimate. Efficient collection is a legitimate reason for providing different procedures in different contexts generally, and especially for not providing indigent defendants with the same procedures afforded private clients involved in fee disputes. Fee disputes between a private attorney and client may involve many issues, including the reasonableness of the hourly fee, the actual hours expended, the reasonableness of expending these hours, and interpretation of the contract between the attorney and the client. In contrast, under Rule 39, the amount of the fee in most instances will be determined by the schedule, and the range of possible disputes is quite narrow. Equally detailed procedures therefore are unnecessary. Finally, the means employed by Rule 39 are substantially related to the purpose of fair but efficient collection. The procedures of Rule 39 apply only to individuals who receive appointed counsel and whose obligation to pay for that counsel is limited and subject only to a narrow range of possible disputes. This class is sufficiently differently situated from the class of individuals obligated to pay for private counsel that different procedures are appropriate. Moreover, Rule 39 does not prevent more detailed procedures from being utilized if more complex disputes emerge. For these reasons, Criminal Rule 39 does not violate the equal protection guarantee of the Alaska Constitution.