Opinion ID: 665730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: 2 Petitioners are administrative law judges who serve as Indian probate judges (IPJs) with the Department of the Interior's (DOI) Office of Hearings and Appeals. They were originally appointed under 25 U.S.C. Sec. 372-1 (1967), which stated that hearing officers appointed for Indian probate work need not be appointed pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act [APA]. See 25 U.S.C. Sec. 372-1 (1967), repealed by Act of May 24, 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-301, 104 Stat. 206. Unlike judges appointed under the APA, IPJs were subject to performance evaluations. However, DOI did not evaluate the IPJs on their performance until 1983. 3 In 1984, four of the petitioners, Burrowes, Hammett, Taylor, and Willett, filed a grievance with DOI challenging its authority to subject them to performance evaluations. The grievance was later dismissed as moot because Congress had enacted legislation repealing 25 U.S.C. Sec. 372-1 and providing that all judges who had been appointed under 25 U.S.C. Sec. 372-1 shall be deemed to have been appointed pursuant to the APA. See Act of May 24, 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-301, Sec. 12, 104 Stat. 206, 211. This legislation exempted the IPJs from performance evaluations and rendered the grievance moot. 4 In accordance with the new legislation, DOI requested the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to determine the proper classification for the judges. DOI believed that classification at the GS-15 level was appropriate, whereas the judges believed that classification at the GS-16 level was more appropriate. In due course, OPM issued a final decision classifying the judges at the GS-15 level. 5 On June 20, 1991, petitioners filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 1214 (Supp. IV 1992). The OSC is responsible for investigating allegations of prohibited personnel practices within the government. Petitioners alleged that they had been subjected to adverse personnel actions in reprisal for making disclosures protected by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA), Pub.L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). In July 1991, the OSC notified them by letter that it would not seek corrective action on the matters raised in their complaint. 6 Thereafter, on September 27, 1991, petitioners filed Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeals with the Board pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 1221(a) (Supp. IV 1992), alleging that they had been subjected to adverse personnel actions in reprisal for making various disclosures protected by the WPA, including the 1984 grievance and a later petition to Congress. The AJ raised the issue of the Board's jurisdiction to hear their appeals and ordered petitioners to describe the [whistleblowing] activity, to whom the disclosure was made, and when the activity occurred. On October 17, 1991, the AJ granted the government's motion to stay discovery pending resolution of the jurisdictional issue after finding no evidence that [the stay] will prejudice [petitioners'] case. 7 The AJ issued an initial decision on December 9, 1991, dismissing petitioners' appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The AJ found that petitioners' grievance was not a disclosure protected by the WPA and that their petition to Congress and other disclosures did not constitute whistleblowing as defined by 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2302(b)(8) (Supp. IV 1992). In the AJ's view, the petition and the various disclosures did not allege a violation of law, rule, or regulation, or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. On review, the Board stated that the AJ had correctly determined that petitioners' petition to Congress did not constitute a disclosure protected by the WPA. However, the Board remanded the case for further findings because the AJ did not sufficiently discuss his reasons for concluding that the other disclosures alleged did not constitute whistleblowing. 8 On August 21, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to lift the stay of discovery. Petitioners also moved (i) for the disclosure of alleged ex parte communications on the part of Board Chairman Daniel R. Levinson and (ii) for the disqualification of the Board's Chief Administrative Law Judge, Edward J. Reidy. Petitioners alleged that Chairman Levinson, who had recused himself, had engaged in conversations regarding the case with a friend of a DOI official and that Judge Reidy would possibly seek to improperly influence the proceeding because of his position as Chief Judge. On September 10, 1992, the AJ denied all three motions. 9 In October 1992, petitioners filed another motion to lift the stay of discovery and a motion to disqualify the DOI's Solicitor's Office from representing the DOI. They alleged that one of the DOI attorneys had engaged in improper tactics before the filing of petitioners' appeals. On November 9, 1992, the AJ dismissed both motions as untimely. Regarding the discovery motion, the AJ found that petitioners had ample opportunity prior to and during their petition for review to explain why discovery was necessary to establish jurisdiction. Regarding the motion to disqualify, the AJ held that the motion was untimely and that petitioners had failed to show good cause for the late filing. See 5 C.F.R. Sec. 1201.31(b) (1993) (motion to disqualify opposing counsel must be filed with judge within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of designation). 10 Also on November 9, 1992, the AJ issued his second initial decision dismissing petitioners' appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The AJ addressed each of petitioners' alleged protected disclosures and determined that they did not constitute whistleblowing as defined by 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2302(b)(8) (Supp. IV 1992). In addition, the AJ found that petitioners had not been subjected to any personnel actions as defined by 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2302(a)(2) (1988). Finally, the AJ held that petitioners had failed to allege any facts which would establish that the protected disclosures were a contributing factor to the alleged prohibited personnel actions. The AJ's decision became the final decision of the Board when petitioners' petition for review was denied on March 24, 1993.