Opinion ID: 3009555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prior Identification

Text: At trial, bank teller Annette Miller testified she was unable to recall the bank robber's eye color. FBI Agent McEachern testified that the day after the robbery, Miller told him the bank robber had dark colored eyes. Brink, whose eyes are light hazel, sought to use Miller's prior statement as substantive evidence of his innocence, but the court refused and instead gave the following instruction: You will recall that certain witnesses who testified during the trial had made statements before this trial about matters at issue in this case. These earlier statements (..continued) 2081 (1993). Because the erroneous admission of a coerced confession does not automatically warrant a new trial, see Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1972); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 311 (1991) (Opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court), the district court judgment would stand if admitting Brink's confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 295-96. We find, however, that the admission of Brink's confession, if error, was not harmless. When reviewing constitutional violations for harmless error our inquiry is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2081. On this record we hold the guilty verdict was not surely unattributable to the introduction of Brink's confession, and therefore was not harmless. Cf. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296-302 (admission of coerced confession was not harmless despite admission of a second, lawfully-obtained confession and other circumstantial evidence). were brought to your attention to help you decide if you believe that witness' testimony. You cannot use these earlier statements as evidence in this case. Brink contends the district court erred because Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) allows statements of prior identification to be admitted as substantive evidence. a. At the outset we must determine the proper scope of review. The government contends our review should be for plain error. Generally, we review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, see, e.g., In re Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1990), but when no objection is made at trial we review for plain error only. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677, 681 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1128 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1029 (1986).10 This rule gives the court an opportunity to correct any mistakes before charging the jury, Santos, 932 F.2d at 251; United States v. Chicarelli, 445 F.2d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 1971)(quoting United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 690 (3d 10 . The plain error doctrine is intended to correct errors that are `obvious' or that otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Government of Virgin Islands v. Charleswell, 24 F.3d 571, 576 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). The doctrine provides for correction of a mistake so `plain' the trial judge [was] derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely objection. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982); see also Government of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 631-32 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 556 (1993); United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 592 (1991). Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964)), and prevents the appellant from purposely failing to object in the hopes of later asserting the court's error as the basis for a new trial, Chicarelli, 445 F.2d at 1116 (quoting United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 62 (1968)). Brink challenged the instruction, stating, With regard to identification, we believe that under the federal rules it is not hearsay. The government maintains Brink's statement was not specific enough to constitute an objection. We disagree. Although Brink did not mention Rule 801(d)(1)(C) expressly, his objection was sufficiently specific to inform the district court. Cf. Santos, 932 F.2d at 250-51 (finding appellant's statement I object to the refusal to charge points 1 through 6 of defendant's proposed points of charge too general to alert district court to the specific objection raised on appeal); see also United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1129 (3d Cir. 1985). Because Brink's challenge put the district court on notice of the issue now raised on appeal, we review the district court ruling for abuse of discretion. b. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide A statement is not hearsay if . . . one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C) (West 1994). Statements of prior identification are admitted as substantive evidence because of the generally unsatisfactory and inconclusive nature of courtroom identifications as compared with those made at an earlier time under less suggestive conditions. Fed. R. Evid. 801, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1972 Proposed Rules; see S. Rep. No. 199, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975) (Both experience and psychological studies suggest that identifications consisting of nonsuggestive lineups, photographic spreads, or similar identifications, made reasonably soon after the offense, are [more] reliable than in-court identifications.). Admitting these prior identifications therefore provides greater fairness to both the prosecution and the defense in a criminal trial. Id. Generally, evidence is admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) when a witness has identified the defendant in a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial. See, e.g., United States v. O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 898-99 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985). Although less common, Miller's exculpatory prior identification falls within the rule. The rule's plain language does not exclude exculpatory statements, nor can we find any reason to distrust the reliability of this kind of identification. Moreover, the fact that FBI agent McEachern, rather than Miller, recited Miller's statement at trial does not preclude introducing her statement as substantive evidence. Debate on the 1975 amendment to the Rule demonstrates Congress was aware that third parties would testify to the witness's prior statements. See 121 Cong. Rec. 31,867 (1975) (statement of Rep. Hungate) (The bill . . . applies to situations where an eyewitness has previously identified a person out of court. It would admit into evidence testimony of that identification. For example, testimony by a police officer that at a lineup John Doe identified the defendant as the man who robbed his store.). See generally, Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 801(d)(1)(C)[01], at 801-222 (1993) (If at trial the eyewitness fails to remember or denies that he made the identification, the previous statements of the eyewitness can be proved by the testimony of a person to whom the statement was made, and the statement can be given substantive effect.). Thus, Miller's statement should have been admitted as substantive evidence. c. The government maintains that Brink is not entitled to a new trial because the district court's error, if any, was harmless. Like resolution of Brink's Sixth Amendment claim, resolving this issue depends on whether Scott was acting as a government agent while collecting information on Brink. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) any error, defect or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)(West 1994). An error that does not implicate a constitutional right is harmless where it is `unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question as revealed in the record.' United States v. Palmieri, 21 F.3d 1265, 1273 (3d Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed Aug. 1, 1994 (No. 94-5463) (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991)). Upon reviewing the entire record, we believe that, provided Scott's testimony was properly admitted at trial, the district court's error was harmless. Scott testified that, when they were cellmates, Brink confessed to the robbery. The bank tellers, Miller and Simpson, made positive in-court identifications11 and Brink's friend, 11 . Simpson testified: Q: How do you know that Billy Brink robbed you on December 16, 1992? A: I could tell who he was. I could see through the ski mask. The holes around the eyes and the mouth were big enough to see. I could recognize his features, his voice, the way he walked, his mannerisms. Q: Now you have identified several characteristics. Did you know Billy Brink prior to December 16, 1992. A: Yes, I did. Q: And how was it that you knew him or knew of him? A: I knew of him all his life. My son coached him in midget football, I think junior high, and probably varsity football also. But, I just know that he - - you know, I have known of him. Q: Now, was he a customer of the Farmers National Bank? A: Yes, he was. Q: When was the last time you had seen him in the bank prior to December 16th. A: Probably around the first week in December he was in the bank.