Opinion ID: 583934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: breach of statutory duty

Text: 6 In support of her theory that the Railroad breached a statutory duty when it allegedly failed to blow its whistle for one-quarter of a mile as it approached the crossing, the plaintiff requested the trial judge to present the following instruction to the jury: 7 There was in force in the State of Illinois at the time of the occurrence in question a statute which provided: 8 Every railroad corporation shall cause a bell and a whistle or horn to be placed and kept on each locomotive to be rung or sounded by the engineer or fireman at a distance of at least one quarter mile from the place where the railroad crosses or intersects any public highway and shall be kept ringing or sounding until the highway is reached. 9 If you find that the Burlington Northern Railroad violated the statute on the occasion in question, then you may consider that fact together with all of the other facts and circumstances in evidence in determining whether or not the Burlington Northern Railroad was negligent immediately before and at the time of the occurrence. 10 Plaintiff's instruction 18. Harrison submitted an alternative instruction which was similar except for the last paragraph. It stated: If you find that the Burlington Northern Railroad violated the statute on the occasion in question, then you must find that the Burlington Northern was negligent immediately before and at the time of the occurrence. Plaintiff's instruction 18-A. The trial court ruled as follows: 11 I rejected ... Plaintiffs' 18 and 18-A on the basis of case authority which indicated that despite the statutory language, that it is sufficient under the statute that either a whistle or a bell be sounded. The evidence was that the bell was being sounded all the way through. 12 The plaintiff's attorney failed to object to the trial court's refusal to give the proposed instructions; nor did he argue that the court erred in its determination that the bell was sounding all the way through the intersection. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 states: No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. Thus, the plaintiff's failure to object to the trial judge's rejection of her instructions at trial prevents her from arguing on appeal that the refusal to give the instructions was reversible error. Furthermore, Harrison's argument that there was evidence presented at trial that the bell was not sounded for the statutory distance is likewise raised for the first time on appeal. We require parties to raise timely, precise objections to the trial court rulings in order that the judge might have an opportunity to remedy inadvertent errors if there be any. We will not reverse a trial court's judgment on a ground that was not presented to it. [T]his court has repeatedly stated that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are waived. United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660 (7th Cir.1990)). Since the plaintiff failed to raise a timely objection to the district court's rejection of her instructions, she has waived that objection on appeal. 7