Opinion ID: 71475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory framework of Title VII and burden shifting

Text: In order to determine whether the district court gave a proper instruction on the law, we must review what the law is in a Title VII retaliation case. Our task is complicated by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc ., [3] to which we turn after examining the law up until now. Title VII prohibits both discrimination [4] and retaliation [5] because of protected factors. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , the Supreme Court established in the context of a Title VII discrimination case that a plaintiff could show that discrimination was because of an impermissible factor by showing that factor to be a motivating or substantial factor in the employer's decision. [6] Once the plaintiff made this showing, the Court said, the burden of persuasion would shift to the defendant, who could avoid liability by showing from a preponderance of evidence that it would have taken the same employment action even without consideration of the prohibited factor. [7] The Court's motivating factor approach differed from the usual burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, [8] which requires the plaintiff, after making a prima facie case followed by the employer's articulation of a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, to show that the employer's stated reason is a mere pretext. [9] Whereas pretext cases involve discernment of the true reason for the employer's action, which is either legal or illegal, motivating factor cases applying the Price Waterhouse test involve employment decisions based on multiple factors, or mixed motives, at least one of which was illegitimate and prohibited by statute and one of which may have been legitimate. [10] In 1991, Congress amended Title VII partially in response to Price Waterhouse. [11] It explicitly codified the holding that a Title VII discrimination plaintiff could show an unlawful employment practice by demonstrating that a prohibited factor was a motivating factor in the employment decision. [12] But it also limited the remedy if the employer shows that it would have taken the same action without the prohibited factor. [13] We have previously held that the allocation of the burden of proof in a Title VII retaliation case depends on the nature of the plaintiff's evidence. Fierros v. Tex. Dep't of Health. [14] We said that if the plaintiff attempts to establish causation by circumstantial evidence, the burden shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas applies and the plaintiff must prove but-for causation. [15] If the plaintiff presents direct evidence of retaliation, however, the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive approach applies, and the plaintiff may, by showing a motivating factor, shift to the employer the burden of establishing that it would have made the same decision without that factor. [16] The Supreme Court dispelled the notion that direct evidence was required to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction in a Title VII discrimination case when it decided Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. [17] In Desert Palace, the Court concluded that Congress's addition of § 2000e-2(m) allowing for a motivating factor test in a discrimination case, and its failure in that section to require a heightened burden of proof, left little doubt that there was no special evidentiary showing required in a Title VII discrimination case. [18] Xerox argued in the district court that Desert Palace is inapplicable to a Title VII retaliation case, and that the district court should not give a mixed-motive instruction because Smith did not present direct evidence in support of her claims. Xerox repeats this argument in its appellate brief. Before addressing Xerox's argument, however, we must first consider the Supreme Court's decision in Gross, which was decided after briefing but before oral argument in this case, and determine whether the mixed-motive framework is still applicable to Title VII retaliation cases.