Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Robbing Semadar Barzel and Regena Mannello

Text: In the pretrial notice to defendant of the aggravating evidence it planned to introduce, the district attorney included [t]he incident ... in which the defendant robbed Semadar Barzel of her purse and contents . . . and the separate incident of an assaultive purse-snatching robbery that injured Regena Mannello. Rejecting a challenge that introducing evidence of the Barzel incident would violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because the evidence was obtained by means of an unlawful detention, the trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce the evidence. Defendant renews his Fourth Amendment claim on appeal. He maintains that the police lacked sufficient reason to justify an investigative stop and detention. Without the evidence obtained from that stop, he contends, there was insufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find true beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed any crimes against Barzel. In a pretrial proceeding in this case, a police officer testified that he and his partner detained defendant after they observed him loitering at night in a crime-ridden residential neighborhood for an extended period, perching on the trunk of a parked automobile, entering an automobile from the passenger side before attempting to drive it away (the police later learned that he was trying to steal it), and following both a woman and a police officer (who may have been dressed in plain clothes) in a suspicious manner, as if stalking them. Pursuant to the detention, the officer performed a patdown search on defendant and felt a hard object. At that point, defendant fled and was tackled by the police, who recovered a gun. Assuming for purposes of argument that the Fourth Amendment may be invoked in an attempt to exclude evidence the prosecution wishes to present solely at a capital sentencing proceeding (but see U.S. v. Ryan (10th Cir.2001) 236 F.3d 1268, 1271 [ordinarily the exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction of the fruits of illegal searches and seizures during sentencing proceedings]), it is plain that the police had sufficient cause to detain and question defendant. [A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. [Citation.] While `reasonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. [Citation.] The officer must be able to articulate more than an `inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch' of criminal activity. [Citation.] [І] ... An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. [Citation.] But officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a `high crime area' among the relevant contextual considerations.... ( Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 123-124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570.) In making such a stop, police may conduct a protective patdown search for weapons. ( Id. at p. 121, 120 S.Ct. 673.) The circumstances here justified an investigative detention of defendant. He was following a woman and a police officer in a suspicious manner; he was loitering in a high-crime residential area at night; and he entered a car in a peculiar manner and then tried to drive it away. Lurking in the dark by residences in the wee hours of the morning is unusual for law-abiding persons ( Battle v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2004) 868 So.2d 587, 589), and the officer[s] had reasonable suspicion that appellant was loitering and prowling ( ibid. ). In Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 6, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, the court noted the defendant's measured pacing and peering, similar to defendant's conduct before the officers detained him. The evidence of the Barzel robbery was properly admitted.