Opinion ID: 1248260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Skurtu's Complaint Challenges an Order of Removal

Text: To properly determine whether we have subject matter jurisdiction over Skurtu's Complaint, we must first determine whether Skurtu's Complaint effectively challenges the IJ's ultimate order of removal and falls within the purview of the REAL ID Act. If so, then the district court properly transferred Skurtu's case to this court, as this court is the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal. REAL ID Act, Pub.L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 231, 310 (2005) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)). The REAL ID Act place[s] exclusive review of orders of removal with circuit courts. Haider v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir.2006). The Act amended 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to provide that a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal.... REAL ID Act § 106(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)). As of the effective date of the Act, any pending habeas petitions challenging such removal orders before a district court, or on appeal to a court of appeals, were converted to petitions for review. Kumarasamy v. Att'y Gen., 453 F.3d 169, 171 (3d Cir.2006) (citing the REAL ID Act § 106(c); Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir.2005)); see also Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 346 (4th Cir.2007) (finding that the REAL ID Act expressly eliminated district courts' habeas jurisdiction over removal orders); Jahed v. Acri, 468 F.3d 230, 233 (4th Cir.2006) (The REAL ID Act eliminated access to habeas corpus for purposes of challenging a removal order.). Pursuant to the Act, district courts must transfer to the appropriate courts of appeals all § 2241 petitions challenging final orders of removal, deportation, or exclusion `pending in a district court on the date of the enactment of [the Act].' Toledo-Hernandez v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 332, 333 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting the REAL ID Act § 106(c)) (alteration in Toledo-Hernandez ). We have previously addressed a district court's decision to transfer an alien's habeas corpus case to this court. Haider, 438 F.3d at 910. In Haider, the INS initiated removal proceedings against the alien by personally serving him with an NTA, which ordered the alien to appear before an IJ `on a date to be set at a time to be set to show why [the alien] should not be removed from the United States.' Id. at 904 (quoting Certified Admin. Rec. at 551). The NTA specifically instructed the alien that failure to keep his address current could result in his removal in absentia, and the agent who served the alien with the NTA informed the alien of the consequences of failing to appear. Id. Thereafter, the alien moved but neglected to notify the INS of his change of address. Id. A Notice of Hearing in Removal Proceedings was mailed to the alien at the address listed on the NTA. Id. When the alien failed to appear at his removal hearing, the IJ held an in absentia hearing and ultimately entered a removal order against the alien. Id. When the alien learned of the order of removal, he filed a motion to reopen, arguing that he did not receive notice of the removal hearing. Id. The IJ denied the motion. Id. at 905. The alien appealed to the BIA, arguing that he had not received the required notice of the date and time of the removal hearing, in violation of his due process rights, but the BIA rejected his argument. Id. Subsequently, the alien filed a petition for review with this court. Id. The alien also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, asserting that the INS had failed to provide him with a valid NTA. Id. But the district court transferred the matter to this court because it was `left with the inescapable conclusion that [the alien's] challenge to the constitutionality of the notice provided to him, is, in effect, a challenge to the ultimate Order of Removal.' Id. at 910 (quoting Report & Recommendation at 8). On appeal, the alien challenged, inter alia, the district court's decision to transfer his habeas case to this court. Id. We first noted that the petition for review that the alien had filed with this court vested in us the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of the removal order. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). We agreed with the district court that the alien was essentially making the same argument in his petition for writ of habeas corpus that he made in his petition for reviewthat the in absentia removal order was invalid due to lack of notice. Id. As a result, we held that because the alien's habeas petition did nothing more than attack the IJ's removal order, our Court `shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review.' Id. Thus, the district court properly complied with the REAL ID Act by transferring the alien's habeas case to this court. Id.; see also Codina v. Chertoff, 283 Fed.Appx. 432, 433 (8th Cir.2008) (unpublished per curiam) (affirming the district court's dismissal of the alien's § 2241 petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that [t]o the extent [the alien's] petition challenged her detention based on alleged procedural and clerical flaws in her removal proceedings, it essentially challenged her removal order, which the district court lacked jurisdiction to review in a habeas proceeding). We find Haider controlling, as Skurtu's Complaint attacks the IJ's order of removal, therefore vesting this court with the sole and exclusive means for judicial review. Skurtu concedes in his brief that his Complaint asserted claims that he was denied Fifth Amendment due process in connection with the removal proceedings, as well as an attack on the removal order itself. For example, in his Complaint, Skurtu alleged that the IJ failed to inquire about or take into consideration the persecution, abuse, discrimination, torture, and any life threatening situations of Petitioner's parents, grandparents, and Petitioners' aunts and uncles [or] what they faced while they were in Moldova. In addition, Skurtu asserted that the IJ failed to note any other reasons for this Petitioner's family members becoming refugees from Moldova and failed to ask his mother or father about any abuses while the[y] were on the stand and under oath. He also asserted that the IJ made erroneous findings and failed to take into consideration his age at the time that he entered the United States. Such allegations unmistakably implicate the order of removal. Nevertheless, Skurtu argues that, to the extent that he asserted in his Complaint a denial of the right to appointed counsel and denial of a fair hearing due to the IJ's failure to fully and fairly develop the record, he was not asking for a review of the removal order itself. He relies on the Ninth Circuit's holding in Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir.2007), that a narrow claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a post-administrative filing of an appeal with the court of appeals does not require review of an order of removal. Thus [such a] claim falls outside the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the REAL ID Act. In Singh, the alien brought ineffective assistance of counsel claims through a habeas petition filed with the district court. Id. at 971. The district court dismissed the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the REAL ID Act foreclosed the alien's habeas claims. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the REAL ID Act precluded its habeas review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising from an attorney's failure to file a timely petition for review of the BIA's decision. Id. at 975. The court concluded that both §§ 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9) of 8 U.S.C., by their plain language, apply to only those claims seeking judicial review of orders of removal. Id. at 978. (Section 1252(a)(5) is prominently directed to `judicial review of an order of removal.' Section 1252(b)(9) explicitly covers `any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien.'). The court also cited legislative history, demonstrating that § 106 of the REAL ID Act `would not preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders. ' Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 109-72, at 175, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 299) (emphasis added in Singh ). The court then inquired into the definition of order of removal, finding the phrase to mean `the order of the special inquiry officer, or other such administrative officer to whom the Attorney General has delegated the responsibility for determining whether the alien is deportable, concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.' Id. at 979 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(47)(A)). Such an order becomes final upon the earlier of `(i) a determination by the [BIA] affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the [BIA].' Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)). In its analysis, the Singh court noted that, at the time that the alien's counsel filed the late petition for review, the removal order against the alien had already become final. The alleged ineffective assistance of [counsel] occurred after the issuance of the final order of removal, and the claimed injury that [the alien] suffered as a result was the deprivation of an opportunity for direct review of the order of removal in the court of appeals. Id. (emphasis in original). Therefore, even if the district court permitted the alien's habeas petition to proceed and determined that counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to file a timely appeal, the alien's only remedy would be the restarting of the 30-day period for the filing of a petition for review with the court of appeals. Id. Put another way, a successful habeas petition in this case will lead to nothing more than `a day in court' for [the alien], which is consistent with Congressional intent underlying the REAL ID Act. Id. Thus, the court would not construe the ineffective assistance of counsel claim as seeking judicial review of [the alien's] final order of removal, notwithstanding his ultimate goal or desire to overturn that final order of removal. Id. Skurtu's reliance on Singh for support of his position is misplaced. In Singh, the Ninth Circuit specifically held that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a post-administrative filing of an appeal was not an order of removal. Id. at 972. Unlike in Singh where the alien's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel arose after the issuance of the removal order, Skurtu's claims that he was denied his right to counsel and a fair hearing are a direct result of the removal proceedings before the IJ. Specifically, Skurtu is attacking the IJ's decisions not to appoint Skurtu counsel and develop the record more fully. Accordingly, we hold that because Skurtu's Complaint seeks review of the IJ's removal order, sole and exclusive means for judicial review is vested in this court.