Opinion ID: 1365997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Invasion of Privacy Complaint

Text: Even if the First Amendment did not bar the plaintiffs' invasion of privacy claims on the facts of this case, which it does, the complaint also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Invasion of privacy as a common law tort has evolved over the years into four separate torts. [7] The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) defines four different types of invasion of privacy. Section 652A of the Restatement states: (1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other. (2) The right of privacy is invaded by (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or (b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in § 652D; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 652E. Since the photograph here was taken in an open place and in a common workplace where there were a number of other people, neither the taking of the photograph nor its publication constituted an unreasonable intrusion into the plaintiffs' seclusion. Not only did the plaintiffs agree to have their photographs taken, but they also were in a place where they had no reasonable expectation of privacy, at least as to the fact of their being there in the company of others. In short, the facts alleged do not state a claim for relief, either for intrusion into their seclusion, see Restatement, supra, § 652B, comment c, or for publicity concerning private aspects of their lives, see Restatement, supra, § 652D, comment b. Nor do the facts state a claim for placing the plaintiffs in a false light under § 652E. Under that section, the false light must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Restatement, supra, § 652D. For essentially the same reasons that the photograph was not susceptible to a defamatory meaning, it was not highly offensive to a reasonable person. See McCabe v. Village Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525, 529 (E.D.Pa. 1982). Therefore, the photograph is not actionable under § 652E. [8] Finally, we also hold that the facts alleged fail, as a matter of law, for two reasons, to assert a valid claim for the appropriation of another's name or likeness under the Restatement § 652C, or one's personal identity under Utah Code Ann. § 45-3-3 (1981). [9] In the first instance, the complaint fails because it must allege that the plaintiffs' names or likenesses have some intrinsic value that was used or appropriated for the defendants' benefit. Jackson v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D.Ohio 1983); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's Brooks Brothers, 492 A.2d 580, 592 (D.C.Ct.App. 1985); Lawrence v. A.S. Abell Co., 299 Md. 697, 475 A.2d 448, 453 (1984); Restatement supra, § 652C, comment a; see also Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (E.D.Pa. 1980). The plaintiffs do not allege that their appearances have any intrinsic value or that they enjoy any particular fame or notoriety. A political endorsement by an unknown member of the general public has no intrinsic value. Nor can intrinsic value be shown just because the defendants may have obtained some benefit by using the plaintiffs' likenesses when the benefit is the same as defendants would have had from using the likeness of a number of other workers. The plaintiffs' photograph, viewed in the context of the entire flier, was not used for the purpose of appropriating any value that the plaintiffs' names or likenesses may have had. The flier contained eight pages of partisan political material emphasizing Senator Hatch's views on labor issues. The pictures highlight the articles; they were not captioned; the individuals were not identified or their names otherwise used in any way; and the pictures were used only for general illustrative purposes. For all that appears, it was wholly unimportant which workers' pictures were used. See Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 86 (W. Va. 1984). There is nothing whatsoever in the complaint that indicates that the use of the plaintiffs' pictures took advantage of any value associated with the plaintiffs' names or likenesses. The second reason the complaint fails to state a claim for relief is that the use of the plaintiffs' photograph falls within the incidental use doctrine. The incidental use of a person's name or likeness is not, as a matter of law, actionable as an appropriation of a person's name or likeness under either the Restatement or the Utah statute. The Restatement, supra, § 652C, comment d, states the incidental use doctrine as follows: The value of the plaintiff's name is not appropriated by mere mention of it, or by reference to it in connection with legitimate mention of his public activities; nor is the value of his likeness appropriated when it is published for purposes other than taking advantage of his reputation, prestige, or other value associated with him, for purposes of publicity. No one has the right to object merely because his name or appearance is brought before the public, since neither is in any way a private matter and both are open to public observation. It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant's benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or the likeness that the right of privacy is invaded. A number of courts have held that even if an unauthorized use is made of one's name or likeness which does not take advantage of commercial or other values associated with the name or likeness, the use is, as a matter of law, incidental and not actionable. See, e.g., Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341, 1360 (N.D.Tex. 1985) aff'd, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088, 107 S.Ct. 1295, 94 L.Ed.2d 151 (1987); Fogel, 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1089; Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977); Lawrence, 299 Md. 697, 475 A.2d 448; Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 749-51, 400 N.E.2d 847, 850-51 (1980); Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 86. The case here is similar to Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 400 N.E.2d 847. In Tropeano, the Atlantic Monthly had published an article in November, 1976, entitled After the Sexual Revolution which dealt with modern sexual and social mores. The plaintiff was not personally mentioned in the article, but she was one of several people shown in a photograph which was published in the magazine to illustrate the article. The court held that the publication of the plaintiff's photograph in the magazine did not appropriate any value of the plaintiff's identity and that the use of the plaintiff's picture was incidental and not actionable. 379 Mass. at 749-51, 400 N.E.2d at 850-51. Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, is also similar. The plaintiffs were photographed while standing at an airline counter in the Miami International Airport. Forbes Magazine published a photograph to illustrate an article dealing with investments and purchases by Latin Americans in the Miami area. The article reported the purchase of large quantities of goods in Miami and their transportation to Latin America for resale at a much higher price. The photograph of the plaintiffs was captioned,  The Load: Some Latins buy so much in Miami they've been known to rent an extra hotel room just to store their purchases. 500 F. Supp. at 1084. That use of the photograph was also held to be an incidental use and not an appropriation of the value of the plaintiffs' names. [10] Clearly the use of the plaintiffs' names or likenesses was incidental to the purpose of showing Senator Hatch in the company of workers. Other workers' pictures would have sufficed as well. For all practical purposes, the plaintiffs' pictures were wholly fungible with those of any other persons working at the post office. We hold that a photograph of a person in a public or semi-public place with a candidate for office or a public official is not an endorsement within the meaning of that term as used by the Restatement, or by § 45-3-3, and that the use of the photograph was incidental and therefore not actionable. Affirmed. HALL, C.J., and PAGE and CHRISTENSEN, District Judges, concur. HOWE, A.C.J., concurs in the result. DURHAM, and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., having disqualified themselves, do not participate herein; PAGE and CHRISTENSEN, District Judges, sat.