Opinion ID: 557785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The intent requirement in section 1030(a)(5)(A)

Text: Section 1030(a)(5)(A), covers anyone who 16 (5) intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without authorization, and by means of one or more instances of such conduct alters, damages, or destroys information in any such Federal interest computer, or prevents authorized use of any such computer or information, and thereby 17 (A) causes loss to one or more others of a value aggregating $1,000 or more during any one year period; ... [emphasis added]. 18 The District Court concluded that the intent requirement applied only to the accessing and not to the resulting damage. Judge Munson found recourse to legislative history unnecessary because he considered the statute clear and unambiguous. However, the Court observed that the legislative history supported its reading of section 1030(a)(5)(A). 19 Morris argues that the Government had to prove not only that he intended the unauthorized access of a federal interest computer, but also that he intended to prevent others from using it, and thus cause a loss. The adverb intentionally, he contends, modifies both verb phrases of the section. The Government urges that since punctuation sets the accesses phrase off from the subsequent damages phrase, the provision unambiguously shows that intentionally modifies only accesses. Absent textual ambiguity, the Government asserts that recourse to legislative history is not appropriate. See Burlington N.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 1859, 95 L.Ed.2d 404 (1987); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); United States v. Holroyd, 732 F.2d 1122, 1125 (2d Cir.1984). 20 With some statutes, punctuation has been relied upon to indicate that a phrase set off by commas is independent of the language that followed. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (interpreting the Bankruptcy Code). However, we have been advised that punctuation is not necessarily decisive in construing statutes, see Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 344, 53 S.Ct. 152, 153, 77 L.Ed. 350 (1932), and with many statutes, a mental state adverb adjacent to initial words has been applied to phrases or clauses appearing later in the statute without regard to the punctuation or structure of the statute. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-29, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 2088-90, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting food stamps provision); United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 446-50 (D.C.Cir.) (interpreting government revolving door statute), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 564, 107 L.Ed.2d 559 (1989); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 667-69 (3d Cir.1984) (interpreting the conservation act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208, 105 S.Ct. 1171, 84 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985). In the present case, we do not believe the comma after authorization renders the text so clear as to preclude review of the legislative history. 21 The first federal statute dealing with computer crimes was passed in 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030 (Supp. II 1984)). The specific provision under which Morris was convicted was added in 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-474, along with some other changes. The 1986 amendments made several changes relevant to our analysis. 22 First, the 1986 amendments changed the scienter requirement in section 1030(a)(2) from knowingly to intentionally. See Pub.L. No. 99-474, section 2(a)(1). The subsection now covers anyone who 23 (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer as defined in section 1602(n) of title 15, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.). 24 According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Congress changed the mental state requirement in section 1030(a)(2) for two reasons. Congress sought only to proscribe intentional acts of unauthorized access, not mistaken, inadvertent, or careless acts of unauthorized access. S.Rep. No. 99-432, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2479, 2483 [hereinafter Senate Report]. 25 Also, Congress expressed concern that the knowingly standard might be inappropriate for cases involving computer technology. Id. The concern was that a scienter requirement of knowingly might encompass the acts of an individual who inadvertently 'stumble[d] into' someone else's computer file or computer data, especially where such individual was authorized to use a particular computer. Id. at 6, 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2483. The Senate Report concluded that [t]he substitution of an 'intentional' standard is designed to focus Federal criminal prosecutions on those whose conduct evinces a clear intent to enter, without proper authorization, computer files or data belonging to another. Id., U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2484. Congress retained the knowingly standard in other subsections of section 1030. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a)(1), (a)(4). 26 This use of a mens rea standard to make sure that inadvertent accessing was not covered is also emphasized in the Senate Report's discussion of section 1030(a)(3) and section 1030(a)(5), under which Morris was convicted. Both subsections were designed to target outsiders, individuals without authorization to access any federal interest computer. Senate Report at 10, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2488. The rationale for the mens rea requirement suggests that it modifies only the accesses phrase, which was the focus of Congress's concern in strengthening the scienter requirement. 27 The other relevant change in the 1986 amendments was the introduction of subsection (a)(5) to replace its earlier version, subsection (a)(3) of the 1984 act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a)(3) (Supp. II 1984). The predecessor subsection covered anyone who 28 knowingly accesses a computer without authorization, or having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend, and by means of such conduct knowingly uses, modifies, destroys, or discloses information in, or prevents authorized use of, such computer, if such computer is operated for or on behalf of the Government of United States and such conduct affects such operation. 29 The 1986 version changed the mental state requirement from knowingly to intentionally, and did not repeat it after the accesses phrase, as had the 1984 version. By contrast, other subsections of section 1030 have retained dual intent language, placing the scienter requirement at the beginning of both the accesses phrase and the damages phrase. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a)(1). 30 Morris notes the careful attention that Congress gave to selecting the scienter requirement for current subsections (a)(2) and (a)(5). Then, relying primarily on comments in the Senate and House reports, Morris argues that the intentionally requirement of section 1030(a)(5)(A) describes both the conduct of accessing and damaging. As he notes, the Senate Report said that [t]he new subsection 1030(a)(5) to be created by the bill is designed to penalize those who intentionally alter, damage, or destroy certain computerized data belonging to another. Senate Report at 10, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2488. The House Judiciary Committee stated that the bill proposes a new section (18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5)) which can be characterized as a 'malicious damage' felony violation involving a Federal interest computer. We have included an 'intentional' standard for this felony and coverage is extended only to outside trespassers with a $1,000 threshold damage level. H.R.Rep. No. 99-612, 99th Cong.2d Sess. at 7 (1986). A member of the Judiciary Committee also referred to the section 1030(a)(5) offense as a malicious damage felony during the floor debate. 132 Cong.Rec. H3275, 3276 (daily ed. June 3, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Hughes). 31 The Government's argument that the scienter requirement in section 1030(a)(5)(A) applies only to the accesses phrase is premised primarily upon the difference between subsection (a)(5)(A) and its predecessor in the 1984 statute. The decision to state the scienter requirement only once in subsection (a)(5)(A), along with the decision to change it from knowingly to intentionally, are claimed to evince a clear intent upon the part of Congress to apply the scienter requirement only to the accesses phrase, though making that requirement more difficult to satisfy. This reading would carry out the Congressional objective of protecting the individual who inadvertently 'stumble[s] into' someone else's computer file. Senate Report at 6, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2483. 32 The Government also suggests that the fact that other subsections of section 1030 continue to repeat the scienter requirement before both phrases of a subsection is evidence that Congress selectively decided within the various subsections of section 1030 where the scienter requirement was and was not intended to apply. Morris responds with a plausible explanation as to why certain other provisions of section 1030 retain dual intent language. Those subsections use two different mens rea standards; therefore it is necessary to refer to the scienter requirement twice in the subsection. For example, section 1030(a)(1) covers anyone who 33 (1) knowingly accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct obtains information that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted data ... with the intent or reason to believe that such information so obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation. 34 Since Congress sought in subsection (a)(1) to have the knowingly standard govern the accesses phrase and the with intent standard govern the results phrase, it was necessary to state the scienter requirement at the beginning of both phrases. By contrast, Morris argues, where Congress stated the scienter requirement only once, at the beginning of the accesses phrase, it was intended to cover both the accesses phrase and the phrase that followed it. 35 There is a problem, however, with applying Morris's explanation to section 1030(a)(5)(A). As noted earlier, the predecessor of subsection (a)(5)(A) explicitly placed the same mental state requirement before both the accesses phrase and the damages phrase. In relevant part, that predecessor in the 1984 statute covered anyone who knowingly accesses a computer without authorization, ... and by means of such conduct knowingly uses, modifies, destroys, or discloses information in, or prevents authorized use of, such computer.... 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030(a)(3) (Supp. II 1984) (emphasis added). This earlier provision demonstrates that Congress has on occasion chosen to repeat the same scienter standard in the accesses phrase and the subsequent phrase of a subsection of the Computer Fraud Statute. More pertinently, it shows that the 1986 amendments adding subsection (a)(5)(A) placed the scienter requirement adjacent only to the accesses phrase in contrast to a predecessor provision that had placed the same standard before both that phrase and the subsequent phrase. 36 Despite some isolated language in the legislative history that arguably suggests a scienter component for the damages phrase of section 1030(a)(5)(A), the wording, structure, and purpose of the subsection, examined in comparison with its departure from the format of its predecessor provision persuade us that the intentionally standard applies only to the accesses phrase of section 1030(a)(5)(A), and not to its damages phrase. 37