Opinion ID: 1396148
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is the BIA's interpretation of the INA at issue in this case entitled to deference under Chevron ?

Text: The BIA determined that Saleh was removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), which makes removable any alien who (I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status . . .) after the date of admission, and (II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. The BIA properly concluded that Saleh's original conviction for receiving stolen property, in violation of Cal. Pen.Code § 496(a), satisfies these requirements. See Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir.2000). Although Saleh thus stood convicted of a removable offense under state law at one time, he subsequently secured an amendment of the State's judgment in an effort to avoid adverse immigration consequences and not because of any procedural or substantive defect in the original conviction. Therefore, the issue before us is whether, under these circumstances, Saleh remains convicted of a removable offense for federal immigration purposes, viz. within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and the INA's definition of conviction, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). [6] This is a question of federal statutory interpretation. We have previously observed that [w]hether one has been `convicted' within the language of [federal] statutes is necessarily . . . a question of federal, not state, law, despite the fact that the predicate offense and its punishment are defined by the law of the State. United States v. Campbell, 167 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir.1999) (alterations in original, citation omitted); cf. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119-20, 103 S.Ct. 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983) (holding that in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, . . . it is to be assumed when Congress enacts a statute that it does not intend to make its application dependent on state law (alterations in original, citation omitted)). We review the BIA's interpretation of the INA under the familiar two-step analysis set forth in Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999). First, we determine whether the provision in question is ambiguous; [i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute, and thus entitled to deference. Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Turning to the first step of this analysis, we conclude that Congress' intent on the treatment of vacated or amended convictions under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) is ambiguous. Saleh was deemed removable because, inter alia, he is an alien who is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), and conviction is defined, in pertinent part, as a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). This language permits a spectrum of possible interpretations. On one end of the spectrum, Congress may have intended that where an alien receives any type of post-conviction relief  either through an amendment nunc pro tunc, an expungement, or some other remedy  the immigration law should treat the conviction as if it never occurred, regardless of the reason for the relief. Under this view, the expungement means that the defendant no longer is convicted of [the original] crime and there is no longer any formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court. On the other end of the spectrum, Congress may have intended that no post-conviction relief whatsoever should have any effect on whether an alien stands convicted of a removable offense, again, regardless of the reason for the relief. Or, Congress may have intended some middle position: that certain types of post-conviction relief would affect an alien's conviction status under the INA, but others would not, depending upon the reason for the relief. Neither the relevant statutory language nor legislative history allows us to conclude that any of these interpretations represents Congress' unambiguous intent. See, e.g., Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 206 (3d Cir.2005); Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir.2001). Accordingly, we turn to Chevron 's second step, which directs us to consider whether the BIA adopted a permissible construction of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In making this assessment, [i]t is not necessary that we conclude that the agency's interpretation of the statute is the only permissible interpretation, nor that we believe it to be the best interpretation of the statute. Skubel v. Fuoroli, 113 F.3d 330, 336 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2778). Rather, to affirm the BIA's determination, we need only conclude that the agency's interpretation is `rational and consistent with the statute.' Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 448 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 89, 110 S.Ct. 960, 108 L.Ed.2d 72 (1990)). The BIA has adopted an interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) that distinguishes between convictions vacated on the merits, which the BIA does not treat as convictions within the meaning of the provision, and convictions vacated for other reasons, including to avoid immigration hardships, which the BIA continues to treat as convictions. Because Saleh's conviction fell into the latter category, the BIA concluded that the nunc pro tunc amendment did not affect his conviction status for removability purposes. For reasons to be discussed, we reject Saleh's contention that the interpretation is unreasonable. [7] Over the last 20 years, there has been a consistent broadening of the meaning of conviction in the INA. Until 1996, the INA did not contain a statutory definition of conviction, and for most of that time, the BIA generally took the position that an alien whose conviction is vacated or expunged under state law no longer stood convicted of a removable offense for federal immigration purposes. See Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 550-52 (BIA 1988). In 1988, the BIA acknowledged, albeit in a somewhat different context from the instant case, that its own prior approach was unduly deferential to state definitions of conviction and had thus frustrated congressional intent: [F]orm has been placed over substance, and aliens who are clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered `convicted' have been permitted to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction. Id. at 551. Accordingly, the BIA attempted in Ozkok to remedy the problem, adopting a broader test for determining whether a conviction existed for federal immigration purposes. But Congress was of the opinion that the BIA had not gone far enough. See Francis v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that Congress subsequently indicated its dissatisfaction with the Ozkok test when it amended the INA to change the definition of conviction in 1996). Congress therefore codified, for the first time, a definition of the term conviction in the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (1996); see also Francis, 442 F.3d at 140. This definition was specifically intended to broaden the definition of conviction under the INA that had been previously used by the BIA. See Francis, 442 F.3d at 139 (noting that [t]he applicable definition of `conviction' was narrower [prior to Congress' intervention] than it is today). In particular, Congress expanded the Ozkok definition by including convictions where the adjudication of guilt was deferred. As the Conference Report on the amendments explained, there exist[s] in the various states a myriad of provisions for ameliorating the effects of a conviction. As a result, aliens who have clearly been guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended to be considered `convicted' have escaped the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 at 224. Interpreting the new definition, the BIA identified two primary aims that it believed Congress sought to accomplish: to focus the conviction inquiry on the original determination of guilt and to implement a uniform federal approach. Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 521-22 (BIA 1999). Relying on these rationales, the BIA, in a series of cases culminating in Matter of Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), reversed on other grounds, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir.2006), further expanded the definition of conviction beyond the particular procedural mechanism considered by Congress in its 1996 amendments to the INA. In Pickering, the BIA concluded that Congress objected generally to many state actions allowing aliens to escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a conviction, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 at 224, and that Congress did not intend to allow an alien to escape those consequences by means of a state vacatur that was not on the merits. Pickering gave effect to this objective by holding that the federal immigration consequences of all post-conviction relief will be determined by considering the State court's motivation in granting the relief, e.g., avoiding immigration hardships, recognizing the defendant's rehabilitation, or a substantive or procedural defect in the predicate conviction. Specifically, the BIA held that [T]here is a significant distinction between convictions vacated on the basis of a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying proceedings and those vacated because of post-conviction events, such as rehabilitation or immigration hardships. Thus, if a court with jurisdiction vacates a conviction based on a defect in the underlying criminal proceedings, the respondent no longer has a conviction within the meaning of section 101(a)(48)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)]. If, however, a court vacates a conviction for reasons unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal proceedings, the respondent remains convicted for immigration purposes. Id. at 624. Relying in part on this reasoning, the BIA in the appeal now before us concluded that Saleh remained convicted of the original removable offense because the amendment to Saleh's judgment of conviction was obtained solely to avoid immigration hardships and not to remedy a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying proceedings. The BIA's interpretation in both Pickering and the instant case is reasonable. For one thing, the interpretation is entirely consistent with Congress' intent in enacting the 1996 amendments to broaden the definition of conviction and advances the two purposes earlier identified by the BIA: it focuses on the original attachment of guilt (which only a vacatur based on some procedural or substantive defect would call into question) and imposes uniformity on the enforcement of immigration laws. Second, from a practical perspective, while state convictions are a useful way for the federal government to identify individuals who, because of their criminal history, may be appropriate for removal, there will still remain individuals who are guilty of morally turpitudinous conduct, see Michel, 206 F.3d at 263, and therefore suitable for removal even though they do not have a still-standing conviction for a removable offense under state law. Cf. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 120, 103 S.Ct. 986 (noting that state convictions provide a convenient, although somewhat inexact, way of identifying `especially risky people' and that [t]here is no inconsistency in the refusal of Congress to be bound by post-conviction state actions . . . that vary widely from State to State and that provide less than positive assurance that the person in question no longer poses an unacceptable risk of dangerousness. (internal citations omitted)). Under Pickering, these individuals will remain removable, as Congress intended. Particularly as applied to post-conviction relief granted to aid the defendant in avoiding immigration hardship, we think the BIA's position eminently reasonable: When a conviction is amended nunc pro tunc solely to enable a defendant to avoid immigration consequences, in contrast to an amendment or vacatur on the merits, there is no reason to conclude that the alien is any less suitable for removal. [8] For this reason, we find particularly instructive the settled law of our sister circuits, which holds that the BIA has reasonably concluded that an alien remains convicted of a removable offense for federal immigration purposes when a state vacates the predicate a conviction pursuant to a rehabilitative statute. See, e.g., Pickering, 465 F.3d at 266; Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1249-50 (11th Cir.2006); Pinho, 432 F.3d at 195; Ramos v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 800, 805-06 (7th Cir.2005); Cruz-Garza, 396 F.3d at 1129; Resendiz-Alcaraz v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1262, 1268-71 (11th Cir.2004); Murillo-Espinoza, 261 F.3d at 774; Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 305 (1st Cir.2000). Saleh attempts to distinguish away this body of law by arguing that his vacatur, by contrast, had absolutely nothing to do with rehabilitation. We agree, of course, but his argument proves too much. It would make little sense for federal law to ignore vacaturs for rehabilitation, which, at least in some cases, reflect a measured judgment that the defendant is rehabilitated, but recognize vacaturs that solely aim to help the defendant avoid adverse immigration consequences. In light of the foregoing, we join those of our sister circuits that have considered the question in holding that the BIA's conclusion  that an alien remains convicted of a removable offense for federal immigration purposes when the predicate conviction is vacated simply to aid the alien in avoiding adverse immigration consequences and not because of any procedural or substantive defect in the original conviction  is a permissible construction of the statute and is therefore entitled to deference. See, e.g., Sanusi v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 341, 342-43 (6th Cir.2007) (We deny the petitions for review on the ground that the state court's vacation of Sanusi's conviction was ineffective for immigration purposes because it was done solely for the purpose of ameliorating the immigration consequences to petitioner.) (citing Zaitona v. INS, 9 F.3d 432 (6th Cir.1993); Ali v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 722, 728-29 (7th Cir.2005)). [9]