Opinion ID: 4562740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cordero’s Sentence

Text: The district court properly applied § 2E1.4 of the Guidelines in calculating the offense level for Cordero’s murder-for-hire conviction. Section 2E1.4 is the Guideline specifically indexed to the murder-for-hire statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1958. That Guideline instructs courts to apply a base offense level of 32 or “the offense level applicable to the underlying unlawful conduct,” whichever is greater. U.S.S.G. § 2E1.4(a). The district court determined that Cordero’s underlying conduct was conspiracy to commit murder, and thus rightly referred to the Guideline governing “Conspiracy or Solicitation to Commit Murder,” U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5. [R. 116, PageID #2925.] See United States v. Temkin, 797 F.3d 682, 693-94 (9th Cir. 2015). That Guideline calls for a base offense level of 33, with a four-level increase for when “the offense involved the offer or the receipt of anything of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder.” U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5(a), (b)(1). The district court found the four-level increase appropriate and accordingly assigned Cordero an offense level of 37. In arguing that the district court wrongly applied the Guidelines, Cordero does not challenge the district court’s specific determinations that Cordero’s underlying conduct was conspiracy to commit murder or that his conduct involved the offer or the receipt of anything of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder. Rather, Cordero asserts that Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 26 [b]ecause a conviction of murder for hire already involves the provision or offer of something of pecuniary value, applying a 4 level offense enhancement for that exact same conduct pursuant to USSG §2A1.5 is redundant and improper. It is purporting to “enhance” the base level offense by using the identical conduct that is necessarily contemplated in applying the base offense level of 32 found in USSG §2E1.4. As Cordero acknowledges, he is swimming upstream with this argument. Although we have not yet weighed in on the question of which Guideline applies in these circumstances, other circuits have unanimously approved the use of U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5(a) for assessing the base offense level of convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1958. See United States v. Lisyansky, 806 F.3d 706, 709-10 (2d Cir. 2015); Temkin, 797 F.3d at 694; United States v. Dotson, 570 F.3d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Vasco, 564 F.3d 12, 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2009). Moreover, at least two of these circuits have directly rejected the superfluity argument Cordero raises here. See Lisyansky, 806 F.3d at 710; United States v. Smith, 755 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 2014). The reasoning in these opinions is persuasive and aligns with that of our earlier decision in Ransbottom. Section 1958 “does not require that the offer have been made or accepted before the statute is violated,” Smith, 755 F.3d at 647; accord Ransbottom, 914 F.2d at 746, nor does it require the formation of a conspiracy, Lisyansky, 806 F.3d at 710; Ransbottom, 914 F.2d at 746. Accordingly, there will be occasions when the unlawful conduct under § 1958 does not involve conspiracy, solicitation, or the offer or receipt of anything of pecuniary value, in which case the base offense level of 32 in § 2E1.4 would apply. Lisyansky, 806 F.3d at 710; Smith, 755 F.3d at 647. Applying the plain language in § 2E1.4 thus does not render that Guideline a nullity, as Cordero contends.