Opinion ID: 1113494
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Heading: Elaboration of Principles and Interpretation of Constitutional Provision

Text: It is a fundamental principle of constitutional construction that when a provision is clear and unambiguous it should be applied as written. Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So.2d 704 (La.1983); Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Seavey, 383 So.2d 354 (La.1980); City of Baton Rouge v. Short, 345 So.2d 37 (La. 1977); State v. Bradford, 242 La. 1095, 1119, 141 So.2d 378, 386 (1961) (On rehearing, McCaleb, J.). Accordingly, effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used, and that construction which effectuates, rather than that which destroys a plain intent or purpose of a constitutional provision, is not only favored but will be adopted. Board of Comm'rs v. Department of Natural Resources, 496 So.2d 281 (La.1986); Barnett v. Develle, 289 So.2d 129 (La.1974); Stokes v. Harrison, 238 La. 343, 115 So.2d 373 (1959); In re Bankston, 306 So.2d 863 (La.App. 1st Cir.1974). In ascertaining both the intent and general purpose, as well as the meaning, of a constitution, or a part thereof, it should be construed as a whole. Antoine v. Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corp., 217 La. 251, 46 So.2d 260 (1950). As far as possible, all provisions should be construed together so as to harmonize in their application, if possible, with a view to giving effect to each and every provision insofar as it shall be consistent with a construction of the instrument as a whole. Barnett v. Develle, 289 So.2d 129 (La.1974); Meyers v. Flournoy, 209 La. 812, 25 So.2d 601 (1946); Central Louisiana Elec. Co. v. Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n., 251 La. 532, 205 So.2d 389 (1967); In re Bankston, 306 So.2d 863 (La.App. 1st Cir.1974). Insofar as the general purpose of Article XII, § 5 is concerned, its text and meaning are clear according to a fair and reasonable interpretation of the provision as a whole. The general purpose of Article XII, § 5 is to afford constitutional protection to the legal institution of forced heirship in order to recognize and protect the interests of individuals and to further important state interests. Consequently, in our opinion, the first sentence of Article XII, § 5 (No law shall abolish forced heirship.) clearly and explicitly indicates the purpose of the constitutional provision. The second sentence (The determination of forced heirs, the amount of the forced portion, and the grounds for disinherison shall be provided by law.) must be construed as having a meaning that best conforms to this purpose. Otherwise, the express limitation upon the power of the legislature, prohibiting the abolishment of forced heirship, would have no purpose or effect and would not be given equal dignity with the other parts of the provision. This would be contrary to our decisions holding that every clause in a written constitution is presumed to have been inserted for some useful purpose, and courts should avoid a construction which would render any portion of the constitution meaningless. Barnett v. Develle, 289 So.2d 129 (La.1974); Meyers v. Flournoy, 209 La. 812, 25 So.2d 601 (1946). Furthermore, our customary rules of constitutional and statutory interpretation require that different provisions relating to the same subject matter must be interpreted in the light of each other. Hoppe v. City of Shreveport, 340 So.2d 1314 (La.1976); Antoine v. Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corp., 217 La. 251, 46 So.2d 260 (1950); La.Civ.Code art. 13. Accordingly, it is our duty to give to Article XII, § 5 that construction which effectuates, rather than that which destroys its purpose as an express limitation upon the otherwise plenary power of the legislature. Therefore, the power reserved to the legislature to pass laws relating to forced heirs, the forced portion, and disinherison is subordinate, ancillary, or supplementary to the purpose of preventing the abolishment of forced heirship. Otherwise, the legislature under the guise of enacting such laws could render the legal institution of forced heirship wholly ineffective or inactive; thus, the purpose of Article XII, § 5 would be destroyed rather than effectuated by a construction permitting such legislation.
This court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the state constitution and laws. La. Const. art. V, § 1; State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 751 (La.1992); Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. State, 213 La. 1, 34 So.2d 331 (1948); State through the Dept. of Highways v. Constant, 359 So.2d 666 (La.App. 1st Cir.1978), affirmed, 369 So.2d 699 (La.1979). See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3476, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); Friesen, State Constitutional Law, §§ 1.03[2], 1.07 (1992); Linde, E. Pluribus Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 Ga.L.Rev. 165; Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324, 1331-67 (1982); Devlin, supra, 51 La.L.Rev. at 7. Therefore, the second sentence of Article XII, § 5 recognizing the power of the legislature to pass certain forced heirship laws within the boundaries set by the constitution does not by any means authorize the legislature to set the limits upon its own power. It is the exclusive prerogative of this court to interpret and trace out the bounds or limits of the residual legislative power under Article XII, § 5.
It also is a well established rule of constitutional construction that where a constitutional provision similar or identical to that used in a prior constitution is adopted, it is presumed such provision was adopted with the construction previously placed on it by the jurisprudence. See State v. Schneller, 199 La. 811, 7 So.2d 66 (1942); Kuhn v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 174 La. 990, 142 So. 149 (1932); State v. Glenn, 153 La. 147, 95 So. 534 (1922); State ex rel. L.B. Da Ponte v. Board of Assessors, 35 La.Ann. 651 (1883); Dickie's Sportsman's Centers, Inc. v. Department of Transp. & Dev., 477 So.2d 744 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 478 So.2d 530 (1985); State ex rel. Cox, 461 So.2d 658 (La. App. 1st Cir.1984), writ denied, 464 So.2d 1375 (1985); Brasseaux v. Vermillion Parish Police Jury, 361 So.2d 35 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 363 So.2d 535 (1978). After comparing the provisions of Article XII, § 5 with that of its source, Article IV, § 16 of the 1921 Constitution, we conclude that they are so similar that the essential elements of the source provisions were adopted with the construction previously placed on them by the jurisprudence. Article XII, § 5 is entitled Forced Heirship and Trusts. The first sentence of Article XII, § 5 (No law shall abolish forced heirship.) is virtually identical to that pertinent part of the 1921 constitutional provision: No law shall be passed abolishing forced heirship   . The second sentence of Article XII, § 5 (The determination of forced heirs, the amount of the forced portion, and the grounds for disinherison shall be provided by law.) is similar to the jurisprudential gloss on the 1921 provision to the effect that the legislature may implement and regulate forced heirship subject to and not inconsistent with the core principle and right of equality of heirship for children. This further confirms that Article XII, § 5 adopted the correspondingly similar elements of its source provision along with the prior jurisprudential interpretations of them. The third sentence of Article XII, § 5 is simply a continuation of the exception to the prohibition on the abolishment of forced heirship reserving legislative power to authorize trust estates. Consequently, we conclude that Article XII, § 5 essentially continues the meaning of the provisions of Article IV, § 16 of the 1921 Constitution as they had been interpreted by the courts, commentators, and the legislature. We are not persuaded by the argument that, because the second sentence of Article XII, § 5 was not expressly included in the source provision, its appearance in the 1974 Constitution signalled a change in the law. The wording of the second sentence and its placement make it so similar to the idea that the legislature may implement and regulate laws without changing the basic principle, right, and purpose of forced heirship that it is difficult to read into it an intention to make any major change in the law. If there had been any intention to empower the legislature to abrogate the fundamental principle and right of every child to equality of heirship in a forced portion of his or her decedent's estate, the document would have either explicitly so stated or would have omitted any mention of a forced heirship guarantee altogether. Furthermore, as we observed earlier, the second sentence's provision occupies a subordinate position following the first sentence's clear, explicit statement of Article XII, § 5's constitutional purpose an express limitation on legislative power without which there would have been no point in including any of its three sentences in the constitution. Therefore, the second sentence may be construed reasonably only as a provision that makes explicit the jurisprudential interpretation that had been placed on the source provision, viz., that the legislative function is to mould and implement the legal institution of forced heirship without thwarting or destroying the fundamental and enduring rights, principle, or purposes that it encompasses. As five of the leading forced heirship commentators have observed, the constitutional provision allowing the legislature to determine forced heirs, the amount of the forced portion, and the grounds of disinheritance is not an invitation to destroy the concept, but a grant of flexibility within the confines of the institution of forced heirship. Spaht, Lorio, Picou, Samuel & Swaim, supra, 50 La.L.Rev. at 414.
Appellants argue that this court should turn to the constitutional convention debates in interpreting Article XII, § 5; and that in doing so we should conclude that the constitutional provision was intended to empower the legislature to define forced heirship in any manner that it deems appropriate. We disagree with both arguments. When a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, it should be applied as written and no further interpretation made in search of the constitutional intent. Cajun Elec. Power v. Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n, 544 So.2d 362 (La.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991, 110 S.Ct. 538 (1989); City of New Orleans v. Scramuzza, 507 So.2d 215 (La.1987); Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Seavey, 383 So.2d 354 (La.1980); See also La.Civ.Code art. 9. Because the question in interpreting a constitution is how it was understood by the people adopting it, not merely how it was viewed by the drafters, the debates of a convention as a general rule should not be resorted to for the purpose of overruling a plain provision. Devlin, supra, 51 La.L.Rev. at 689-90; See City of New Orleans v. Scramuzza, 507 So.2d 215 (La.1987); Board of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. Department of Natural Resources, 496 So.2d 281 (La.1986); Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Seavey, 383 So.2d 354 (La.1980); Chehardy v. Democratic Executive Comm., 259 La. 45, 249 So.2d 196 (1971). See also Household Finance Corp. v. Shaffner, 356 Mo. 808, 203 S.W.2d 734 (1947); State ex rel. Russell v. State Highway Comm., 328 Mo. 942, 42 S.W.2d 196 (1931); McCulley v. State, 53 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn.1899); Scribner v. State, 9 Okl.Cr. 465, 132 P. 933 (1913); Cooley, Constitutional Limitation 143 (8th ed. 1927). We have concluded that the constitutional intent of Article XII, § 5 is clear, in view of the history, purpose, and jurisprudential interpretation of its source provision, and that the legislature is powerless to pass a law that abolishes or renders wholly ineffective the essential principle and purposes for which the legal institution of forced heirship was elevated to constitutional status. Consequently, the proceedings and debates of the constitutional convention may not be referred to for the purpose of varying this clear constitutional aim. Cajun Elec. Power, 544 So.2d 362; City of New Orleans, 507 So.2d 215; Bank of New Orleans, 383 So.2d 354. Furthermore, aside from the fact that the convention debates can not be used to vary the clear intent of a constitutional provision, convention and legislative debates often furnish an uncertain and unreliable guide in the interpretation of constitutions and laws and may be of little value as expressions of the view of the convention as a whole. Frequently no one expresses the views of those by whose votes a measure of importance is passed. Many delegates who vote for a provision may be satisfied to vote without discussion, but if one or more does join in the debate, it does not follow that their interpretation or opinion expresses the view of the convention as a whole. See West v. Allen, 375 So.2d 758 (La.App. 4th Cir.1979), rev'd on other grounds, 382 So.2d 924 (La.1980). See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1683, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 17 S.Ct. 540, 41 L.Ed. 1007 (1897); Funkhouser v. Spahr, 102 Va. 306, 46 S.E. 378 (1904); McCulley v. State, 53 S.W. 134 (Tenn.1899); People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432 (1868); Scribner v. State, 9 Okl.Cr. 465, 132 P. 933, 934 (Okla.Ct. Cr.App.1913); Cooley, Constitutional Limitation 143 (8th ed. 1927). Moreover, the debates confirm the clear meaning of Article XII, § 5 that we have derived from the provision itself and the history, purpose, and jurisprudential interpretation of the corresponding provision of the former constitution. If it had been the drafters' object to subject the legal institution of forced heirship to the plenary power of the legislature, as the Appellants contend, the convention could have done so simply by omitting any provision regarding forced heirship from the constitution. When such an opportunity was presented by a delegate's proposed amendment, however, the convention soundly rejected it by a vote of 93 to 11. The delegates' remarks during the brief debate on the forced heirship provision do not support the Appellants' argument. Of the fourteen delegates who spoke on this subject, only four expressed opposition to retaining a constitutional limitation of the legislature's power to enact laws with respect to forced heirship. No delegate stated or even suggested that the proposed provision would allow the legislature to destroy or impair the core principle of equality of heirship among children in the legitime or to defeat the purposes of promoting family unity, deterrence of litigation and dispersion of excessive accumulation of wealth. On the contrary, the prevailing sense of the remarks of the delegates was that the provision which ultimately became Article XII, § 5 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution would continue the same express limitation upon legislative power that had been provided for by Article IV, § 16 of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution. State of Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 Verbatim Transcripts, Vol. IX, 107th Day ProceedingsJanuary 3, 1974 (see e.g., statements of delegates Burson at 3076, Dennery at 3077-78, Stinson at 3073, 3076 & Smith at 3076). See appendix for transcript of convention debates regarding Article XII, § 5.