Opinion ID: 2499529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Consideration of extraneous information

Text: Maestas asserts that the jury foreperson tainted the jury deliberations with extraneous information by telling the jury that she had special knowledge about matters related to sentencing. There are two problems with Maestas' argument. First, the district court considered the conflicting testimony and found that the foreperson did not suggest that she had special knowledge about sentencing in general or about Maestas in particular based on her employment but instead made comments that were based on general knowledge and life experience. The record does not reveal any clear error in those findings (even the juror whose affidavit provided the basis for the motion below testified consistent with those findings). Second, we have indicated that a juror's opinion based on life experience, general knowledge, and specialized knowledge or expertise is not extrinsic information and does not constitute juror misconduct. [11] Meyer, 119 Nev. at 570-71 & n. 54, 80 P.3d at 459 & n. 54 (The opinion, even if based upon information not admitted into evidence, is not extrinsic evidence and does not constitute juror misconduct.). The juror may not, however, relate specific information from an outside source, such as quoting from a treatise, textbook, research results, etc. Id. at 571, 80 P.3d at 459. Again, the district court found that the foreperson's comments involved her personal opinions and were based on her life experience and general knowledge rather than specific information from an outside source. [12] The district court's determination that Maestas had not demonstrated that the jury considered extraneous information is supported by the record and consistent with our prior decisions in this area. Maestas spends little time on the possibility of intrinsic misconduct, which on its face may be the more troubling aspect of the allegations: that the foreperson told jurors that she was aware of people who had been sentenced to life without parole but were later released with ankle bracelets. Such comments could suggest that the jury did not follow the court's instructions regarding the meaning of a life-without-parole sentence. This could constitute an improper discussion among jurors that would fall into the realm of intrinsic misconduct. [13] See Meyer, 119 Nev. at 562, 80 P.3d at 454 ([I]ntra-jury or intrinsic influences involve improper discussions among jurors (such as considering a defendant's failure to testify), intimidation or harassment of one juror by another, or other similar situations. . . .). The district court, however, found that the foreperson testified credibly that she made a comment about a person who had been released with an ankle bracelet while awaiting trial, but that she did not make any statements about people who had been sentenced to life without parole and then been released with an ankle bracelet. How other jurors interpreted her comments and the impact that the comments or the jurors' interpretation of those comments had on the jurors' thought processes are not admissible. NRS 50.065(2). Given the conflicting testimony, the district court's credibility determinations, and the evidentiary limitations imposed by NRS 50.065(2), there was no proof of intrinsic misconduct.