Opinion ID: 2789666
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the district court err in denying the

Text: INSURANCE COMPANY’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW The Insurance Company makes three primary arguments on appeal challenging the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. 1 In light of this holding, we need not address the Hilsons’ argument that the insurance company waived its right to challenge the district court’s relation back holding. 4 Case: 13-14329 Date Filed: 03/27/2015 Page: 5 of 7 First, the Company argues that there was insufficient evidence that Bloom was negligent. The Company points to the fact that the Company’s adjusters had assiduously, but unsuccessfully, sought the medical records from counsel for Johnson for approximately two years before Johnson filed suit. Then, immediately upon the filing of that underlying suit, when attorney Bloom took over the defense, Bloom immediately posed interrogatories seeking the medicals. And, notwithstanding the Florida rules requiring timely production, counsel for Johnson stonewalled for over a year. However, the jury also heard evidence that there were alternative means available to Bloom to obtain the records. Indeed, Bloom in fact utilized one such alternative. He directly subpoenaed several medical records. However, notwithstanding the fact that the name of the treating doctor was in his file, Bloom failed to subpoena the medical records of Johnson’s treating physician, obviously a crucial omission. The jury also heard the testimony of Bloom, in which he acknowledged the importance of prompt production of the medical records in order to assess the value of the claim, acknowledged that he intended to subpoena the treating physician, and explained that his failure to do so must have been an oversight, either on his part or that of his staff. A reasonable jury could find, and this jury did find, that Bloom’s actions constituted negligence. Second, the Insurance Company argues that, even if Bloom were negligent, his negligence was not the proximate cause of the Hilsons’ damages because 5 Case: 13-14329 Date Filed: 03/27/2015 Page: 6 of 7 Johnson would not have settled for the policy limits in any event. The Insurance Company relies on the fact that the January 24, 2006, demand letter offering to settle for the policy limits had a thirty-day deadline and stated that there would be no extensions. Although that fact does tend to support the Company’s argument, there was other evidence – other evidence of considerable force from several sources – before the jury which tended to show that Johnson would have accepted a settlement for the policy limits for an extended time until Christmas 2007, by which time Johnson’s continuing pain had persuaded her to follow the earlier recommendation of her surgeon to undergo an operation. It was this consultation with the surgeon and his recommendation of surgery that was the crucial piece of information which Bloom did not learn promptly. A reasonable jury could find that Bloom not only was negligent in not learning earlier, but also could find that had he learned, the Insurance Company would have offered to settle for the policy limits and Johnson would have accepted. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that a reasonable jury could have found negligence that was a proximate cause of the Hilsons’ damages. The Insurance Company’s final argument relies on the Florida law that a legal malpractice plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish the appropriate standard of care, and the breach thereof, unless the lawyer’s lack of care and skill is so obvious that the trier of fact can resolve the issue as a matter of 6 Case: 13-14329 Date Filed: 03/27/2015 Page: 7 of 7 common knowledge. The Hilsons do not dispute this aspect of the Florida law, nor did the district court. However, we agree with the Hilsons that Bloom’s failure to subpoena Johnson’s treating physician (despite the fact that he was identified in the Insurance Company’s file) constituted a lack of care that was sufficiently obvious that a jury could resolve the negligence issue without the benefit of expert testimony. Had Johnson’s treating physician been subpoenaed when Bloom subpoenaed other medical records, there was sufficient evidence on the basis of which the jury could have found that Bloom would have learned of the consultation with the surgeon and his recommendation of surgery, and the jury could have found that the Company would have offered to settle within the policy limits and that Johnson would have accepted. For the foregoing reasons, 2 the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 3 2 Other arguments raised by the Insurance Company on appeal are rejected without the need for further discussion. 3 We reject the Insurance Company’s challenges to the district court’s denial of costs to the Company. We agree with the district court that the Insurance Company is not a prevailing party. While the Company did prevail on the Hilsons’ bad faith claim and their breach of fiduciary duty claim, those claims sought precisely the same damages that the Hilsons received on the basis of their professional negligence claim. Thus, the Hilsons received all of the relief that they sought in this case. Moreover, all of the claims involved the common core of facts and were based on related legal theories. Neither the case law nor common sense suggests that the Insurance Company is a prevailing party in this case. 7