Opinion ID: 1450785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the prostitution evidence

Text: The plaintiffs' first argument on appeal is that the trial judge committed prejudicial error by permitting the jury to hear evidence that Patricia had engaged in acts of prostitution in the months prior to her daughter's accident. The trial judge initially excluded the evidence on the ground that its potential relevance was outweighed by its prejudicial impact. After extensive argument by defense counsel, he withdrew his ruling and permitted cross-examination of Patricia about the circumstances of her prostitution. The judge admonished the jury to consider the evidence solely as it related to Patricia's care of the child and not as it bore on her character or credibility. [2] In addition to cross and re-direct examination of Patricia on the subject, the jury also heard a tape recording of Harold Wilson's deposition in which extensive reference was made to the prostitution issue. Although the trial court gave the jury no further instruction on how they were to consider this evidence, [3] all three attorneys mentioned prostitution in their closing arguments. The evidence presented to the jury concerning prostitution, although not entirely consistent, disclosed that Patricia had engaged in five to ten acts of prostitution during the months of December 1973 and January 1974. According to Patricia the prostitution did not take place in February (the accident occurred on the 20th), and did not continue after the accident. She testified that she had been encouraged to engage in prostitution by Harold Wilson, who, by his own admission, benefitted from the proceeds. She also stated that when she indicated reluctance to continue, Wilson would threaten and beat her. [4] According to Patricia, the prostitution occasionally took place in the apartment, but never when her daughter was present. The child was left at the Kiddie Drop or with a babysitter, and was never left overnight. In determining whether to admit relevant evidence, the trial court must balance its probative value against, 1) the danger that it will cause unfair prejudice and, 2) other factors, called by Wigmore auxiliary principals of policy, such as confusion of issues, distraction of the jury, and undue delay. [5] However, no balancing is needed if the evidence is not relevant, or if it is relevant but is subject to a rule calling for its exclusion. The prostitution evidence obviously carried with it a substantial danger of unfair prejudice. In our system of justice cases must be decided on the basis of what the parties have done, not who they are. The business of the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may have a very righteous cause. [6] Because prostitutes are held in such low regard by most people in our society there is a considerable risk that a case such as this might be decided on a status or emotional basis, rather than on the facts. The trial judge, we think accurately, characterized the potential prejudice of the evidence, referring to the extremely massive prejudice of talking prostitution before the jury. The danger was, in other words, that the jury would react with overmastering hostility. [7] The trial court ruled that the evidence of prostitution could be considered only in the overall context of whether [Patricia] exercised due care for the safety of the child. Comparative negligence was an issue pertaining solely to the personal claim of Patricia, and the court evidently believed that because Patricia had acted as a prostitute in the past one could logically infer that she was acting as a prostitute at the time of the accident, and was therefore either absent or inattentive to the well-being of Kristie. [8] Before allowing the questioned evidence to be admitted as evidence of how Patricia customarily or habitually spent her evenings, the court should have required a preliminary showing, out of the presence of the jury, to satisfy itself that the evidence did show that Patricia was working as a prostitute on most evenings during the period in which her child was injured. [9] As it developed during the trial there was no evidence that Patricia habitually engaged in acts of prostitution. Thus the evidence that she had engaged in prostitution on several occasions in the past should not have been admitted for the purpose of showing that she was so engaged when the accident took place. Merely because she had engaged in acts of prostitution does not give rise to an inference that she was away when her child was injured, any more than it would follow that because she had gone shopping or to the movies in the past she was away at the time in question. Likewise, it cannot be inferred from the fact that Patricia had occasionally engaged in prostitution at home that she was having sexual intercourse with a client at home when the child was burned. The appellees argue that the trial court could have received the evidence in order to contradict what they regard as Patricia's efforts to prove that she was a person of good character. They claim that she did this by testifying that she had expected to marry Wilson, that she had spent her time in Alaska before the accident taking care of her child and Wilson, [10] and after the accident had worked as a cashier in a grocery store and as a babysitter. [11] In making this argument the appellees acknowledge that evidence of specific instances of bad conduct, such as acts of prostitution, may not be used to impeach the credibility of a witness. At the time of the trial this rule was codified as Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 43(g)(11): A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called by contradictory evidence, or by evidence that his general reputation for truth is bad, or that his moral character is such as to render him unworthy of belief. He may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness or the record of a judgment that he has been convicted of a crime. [Emphasis added]. [12] Appellees, however, urge that this rule does not apply here, because Patricia placed her character in issue, even though it was not properly an issue. In this circumstance they contend they were required to fight fire with fire. While there are circumstances in which the introduction of inadmissible evidence requires responding evidence, they do not exist in this case. [13] We see no instance in which Patricia can be said to have put her character in issue. [14] Furthermore, none of her testimony that has been brought to our attention would have been contradicted by the fact that she had engaged in acts of prostitution. [15] Therefore we reject the appellees' arguments on this point. Raywall offers another justification for the admission of the evidence. It argues that it is always proper to establish a witness' background and to place him in his setting by asking him what he is doing and what he has done for a living... . We agree that a preliminary line of questioning of that sort has some probative value and should generally be permitted. However, the relevance of such an inquiry is ordinarily slight, and when there is a danger of prejudice resulting from such an inquiry, the questioning should not be permitted. As we stated in Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 262-63 (Alaska 1975), where the same justification was offered and rejected: But while such preliminary questioning is generally permitted, `[t]here is a duty to protect [a witness] from questions which go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate'... . Background or preliminary questions which are designed to discredit the witness as a person, and not as a witness are improper cross-examination. [citations and footnotes omitted]. Moreover, where the inquiry is designed to elicit testimony of prior wrongful acts, the prohibition against the use of wrongful acts for impeachment purposes must govern. We believe, therefore, that the evidence of Patricia's acts of prostitution could not have been received merely as background evidence. The appellees assert that any error which might have been committed in admitting the evidence of prostitution was harmless. Our harmless error standard requires reversal only for errors which affect the substantial rights of the parties. [16] Substantial rights are affected unless one can say with fair assurance that the result was not substantially swayed by the error. Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 631 (Alaska 1969), quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1567 (1946). We cannot declare such a belief in this case. The fact of Patricia's prior acts of prostitution may well have affected the jury's consideration. It is such an inflammatory subject that any mention of it might color the jury's judgment, especially where the right of the person involved to recover money is at issue. But here there was more than a mere mention of prostitution. Patricia was fully cross examined concerning the subject and there were many references to it in the deposition testimony of Wilson. Further, counsel argued it at final argument. In so doing, counsel for Raywall went beyond the limited purpose for which the trial judge allowed the evidence, arguing that: [T]he very principal issue in this case, as we see it, is one of the credibility of Patricia R... The significance is not whether or not her conduct, the conduct that she describes, should be condoned or condemned, but rather whether Patricia has been truthful with you during the course of her testimony here at trial. For those reasons, we believe that there is a substantial possibility that the jury's judgment of this case was affected by the admission of the evidence of prostitution. [17] The error committed in admitting the evidence was therefore not harmless.