Opinion ID: 490121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: THE Sec. 1983 CLAIMS FOR EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE

Text: 38 Via and Harrison also seek reversal of the district court's denial of their motions for summary dismissal of Robison's Sec. 1983 claims for the excessive use of force, contending that they have immunity from suit for the force used in taking custody of the children; Harrison argues also that, in any event, the amount of force he used was not excessive. We conclude that Robison has failed as a matter of law to show any factual basis for such a claim against Via and that Via was therefore entitled to summary judgment dismissing this claim. We conclude that Harrison's challenge to the Sec. 1983 claim against him involves factual issues that, in light of Robison's deposition testimony, were properly not resolved on summary judgment.
39 Via's motion for summary judgment sought dismissal of Robison's claim for assault on the basis of, inter alia, Via's affidavit statement that she had never touched Robison during the struggle for control of the children. The court denied this part of Via's motion because Robison had contradicted this assertion at her deposition by testifying that [Via] and Harrison were pushing and pulling, trying to separate Julia from me, prying at your [sic ] fingers or that kind of thing. This is the entire extent of the force ascribed by Robison to Via, however, and we conclude that Robison's assertions are insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a due process claim against Via for excessive use of force. 40 Not every push or shove by a state officer constitutes a violation of substantive due process. Whether the constitutional line has been crossed depends on such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973). None of Robison's allegations against Via comes close to describing force that was injurious, malicious, or excessive. Notably, while the first count of the amended complaint complained of both [d]efendants' taking of [the] children, it complained only of Harrison's assaultive behavior (emphasis added), alleging that Harrison shoved and struck [her] (emphasis added). The second count of that pleading alleged that Harrison's actions constituted a battery; neither that count nor any other alleged that Via had touched Robison. Consistent with the tenor of her pleading, at her deposition Robison did not testify that Via had participated in or authorized any of the assaultive acts attributed to Harrison. The meagre assertion that Via had pushed or pulled or pried at Robison's fingers, even if it did contradict Via's statement that she had not so much as touched Robison, created at most an issue that was not material since it was entirely insufficient to show excessive force. 41 We conclude that the force Robison attributed to Via was, as a matter of law, not excessive and that the court should have granted summary judgment dismissing this Sec. 1983 claim against Via.
42 Robison's assertions as to the use of force by Harrison were not so meagre. She testified that Harrison pushed her against the inside of the door of her car, yanked her out, threw [her] up against the fender, and twisted [her] arm behind [her] back. Robison testified that she suffered bruises lasting a couple weeks. We have held that assertions such as these are sufficient to prevent the summary dismissal of a Sec. 1983 claim for excessive force. See Bellows v. Dainack, 555 F.2d 1105, 1106 & n. 1 (2d Cir.1977). 43 In Bellows v. Dainack, the plaintiff contended that the defendants had used excessive force against him by twisting his arm, pushing him into the back seat of a police car, pulling him by the scruff of the neck, and striking him in the ribs. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor. On appeal, the defendants contended, inter alia, that these assertions were insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim under Sec. 1983. We explicitly rejected this contention. 555 F.2d at 1106 & n. 1. Accordingly, we declined to order that the action be dismissed as a matter of law, and, although we vacated the verdict because of a prejudicial summation and the improper admission of certain evidence, we remanded the case for a new trial. We disagree with the dissent's argument that Bellows v. Dainack is not applicable here because it merely affirmed a decision not to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). First, as noted above, the case came to this Court after a trial. Had the facts presented been insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief, we would have ordered dismissal of the claim. Instead, we remanded for a new trial. Further, even if Bellows v. Dainack had been merely a 12(b)(6) decision, it would govern here because where a complaint has pleaded specific facts such as those discussed in Bellows, a decision not to dismiss constitutes a ruling that those very facts if proven are a legally sufficient basis for relief. See F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure Sec. 3.11, at 153 & n. 10 (3d ed. 1985). In sum, Bellows stands for the proposition that assertions virtually identical to those made by Robison under oath at her deposition will, if accepted by the jury, suffice to sustain a claim of due process violation through the excessive use of force. 44 While Robison did not seek medical treatment for her injuries, and this fact may ultimately weigh against her in the minds of the jury in assessing whether the force used was excessive, this failure is not fatal to her claim. If the force used was unreasonable and excessive, the plaintiff may recover even if the injuries inflicted were not permanent or severe. See Norris v. District of Columbia, 737 F.2d 1148, 1150-52 (D.C.Cir.1984); Bowman v. Casler, 622 F.Supp. 836, 838 (N.D.N.Y.1985); see also Bellows v. Dainack, in which the description of the events did not suggest that plaintiff had been seriously or permanently injured. 45 As indicated in Part I above, the parties have provided conflicting accounts as to whether Robison or Harrison initiated the use of force, how much force was used by each, and whether Robison was reaching toward Harrison's gun. Resolution of credibility conflicts and the choice between these conflicting versions are matters for the jury and were properly not decided by the district court on summary judgment. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) 1963 advisory committee note; Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 756, 98 S.Ct. 2081, 2086, 56 L.Ed.2d 677 (1978); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 472-73, 82 S.Ct. 486, 490-91, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); Centronics Financial Corp. v. El Conquistador Hotel Corp., 573 F.2d 779, 782 (2d Cir.1978); 6 Moore's Federal Practice p 56.02, at 56-45 (2d ed. 1986). 46 Finally, we note that even though there is no suggestion that Harrison's alleged intentional use of excessive force was anything other than random and unauthorized conduct, dismissal of this claim was not required by the Supreme Court's decisions in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-34, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3202-04, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-43, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912-17, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), which held that the random and unauthorized deprivation of state-created property rights does not violate due process when the state provides adequate postdeprivation remedies. The intentional use of excessive force by a public official violates constitutionally created substantive due process rights, see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952); Bellows v. Dainack, 555 F.2d at 1106 n. 1; Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032, and we have held that Hudson and Parratt do not apply to alleged violations of substantive due process, see Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344, 347-48 (2d Cir.1987) (collecting cases); McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 86 n. 3 (2d Cir.1986). Accordingly, the victim of the intentional, albeit random and unauthorized, use of excessive force by a public official continues to have a claim under Sec. 1983. See McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d at 88; Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1970, 90 L.Ed.2d 654 (1986); see also Massop v. Coughlin, 770 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir.1985); Hodges v. Stanley, 712 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir.1983) (per curiam). 47