Opinion ID: 172342
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cody Bledsoe's Hearsay Statements

Text: During the trial, hearsay statements made by Floyd's two-year-old son, Cody, were admitted into evidence during the examination of witnesses Rosa Bolinger and Heidi Bledsoe. Kurth introduced Cody's hearsay statements that Tom killed C.A. in his cross-examination of Rosa Bolinger, a government witness. Specifically, Bolinger testified that she spoke with the sheriff's department to report that Cody had been telling things that [Bolinger] didn't think a two-year-old should know. ROA, Vol. II, at 410. The testimony continued as follows: [Kurth]: Says Captain Turner spoke with you and you said that Cody would be three in March and he's saying things that concerned you and that he may have witnessed something or at least Tom, Tom Bledsoe may have told him something about the homicide. Is that correct? [Bolinger]: That he had got his information somewhere. [Kurth]: (Reading) Rose said Cody told her that Tom shot her, boom, boom, boom, boom, and dumped her in the water. Tom put his, Cody's, blanket around [C.A.] and also put [C.A.'s] blanket around her. Tom put her in a dump truck that goes beep, beep, beep. Tom closed [C.A.'s] eyes and he kissed her cheeks. There was red stuff on her legs. Shoes were wet and her shirt was wet. [Bolinger]: Yes. And later when I talked to Cody, because I talked to him sometime after that, and it was not a dump truck, it was a dump, and that was before I knew, you know, anything. Id. at 410-11. Cody's statements that Tom committed the murder were inadmissible hearsay, offered for their truth. They also opened the door for the prosecutor to later admit additional hearsay statements made by Cody. Bolinger testified on re-direct that she believed Cody had seen the murder and was not just repeating what he had been told. [Prosecutor]: [B]ased on your perceptions did it appear to you that somebody had told [Cody] about [C.A's murder] or that he had seen it? [Bolinger]: No. He had seen it. It was real to him. Id. at 413. Heidi, also a government witness, testified on direct examination as follows: Rose had told me that Cody had been talking and she thought I needed to hear it so we took Cody downstairs, it was Rose and I and Cody. She said, Cody what happened to [C.A]? And he said, Uncle Tom shot [C.A], bang, bang, bang.... I, I believe he said we, or he wrapped her in a blanket. At the time we thought he was saying dump truck but we, we figured out that, I think it was the following day or something, that he was saying dump, he put her in a dump. I think he said when, when she got shot she fell down and she shook. Id. at 433. When asked by the prosecutor if Cody's story ever changed, Heidi testified that after about a week after the murder, he says Daddy shot [C.A]. Id. at 434. Heidi testified that when she took Cody to C.A.'s grave, Cody said, [C.A.], I didn't shoot you, it wasn't me. Id. Heidi was asked by the prosecutor without objection: But [Cody's] original story was graphic enough and his actions were graphic enough to indicate to you that he observed what he was saying? Heidi answered, Yes. Id. at 435. The Kansas Supreme Court stated: According to Kurth, Cody's initial statement that Tom did it was an integral element of proof that Tom, rather than Floyd, committed the crime. Kurth testified at the [Kansas district court § 1507] hearing that the decision not to object to Cody's later statement that Daddy did it was a risk he weighed, and that he concluded the risk was worth taking. Considering, as we must, all of the circumstances at the time and granting Kurth all the deference he is due, we nevertheless conclude that his strategy regarding Cody's statements was objectively unreasonable. Cody was only 2 years old when he implicated first his uncle, then his father. In addition, even without Cody's statements, there was considerable evidence pointing to Tom as the perpetrator: His gun was the murder weapon; he had purchased the bullets; he initially confessed to having killed C.A.; and he led police to the body, which was buried behind the house where he lived. Kurth could have relied on this evidence to support the defense theory. Instead, he doggedly pursued a strategy that he knew would reveal that Floyd's own son eventually pointed his small finger at Floyd. We agree with [Jean] Phillips[, a legal expert called by Floyd at the habeas hearing,] that this strategy was a huge mistake, particularly when it included no plan to mitigate Cody's damaging Daddy did it statement. Such mitigation might have taken the form of expert testimony on the likelihood that Cody's original statement implicating Tom was more accurate than his later statement implicating Floyd, perhaps because the latter was a product of hearing others discuss his father's arrest. Had such testimony been introduced, Kurth could have argued this implication in closing, particularly after the State made its closing argument suggesting that Cody was an eyewitness who originally said Tom did it because his father told him to. But Kurth did none of these things. He put the exculpatory statement in front of the jury, knowing that the inculpatory statement would follow, and did nothing to explain the difference or its significance. Under these circumstances, the mere invocation of the word strategy does not insulate Kurth's performance from constitutional criticism. 283 Kan. at 94-95, 150 P.3d 868. To determine if Kurth's performance was deficient, the relevant inquiry is whether trial counsel's decision was an informed tactical decision that was reasonable under the circumstances of the case. Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1369 (10th Cir.1994). Further, the mere incantation of `strategy' does not insulate attorney behavior from review. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Kurth articulated a strategic reason for introducing Cody's hearsay statements Cody said that Tom shot C.A., which directly supports the defense's theory of the case that Tom, not Floyd, was guilty. However, even though Kurth thought the risk [that Cody's statements implicating Floyd would be admitted] was worth taking, 283 Kan. at 94, 150 P.3d 868, this strategy was unreasonable under the circumstances of the case. Kurth opened the door for additional statements made by Cody that Floyd committed the murder, and Kurth had no strategy to mitigate the negative impact of Cody's additional statements implicating his client. The prosecutor, at the state district court § 1507 hearing, testified that he offered these statements not for their truth, but merely to establish that Cody was present when C.A. was shot, no matter who the shooter may have been. Indeed, the federal district court summarized the importance of Cody's statements to the prosecution: If Cody saw the crime occur, as the prosecutor argued, Tom could not have committed the crime, since he was not with Cody on November 5 or 6, 1999. Mem. and Order at 36. Even if Cody's statements were not offered for their truth, they are still objectionable. The Kansas Supreme Court was not objectively unreasonable for concluding that the admission of Cody's statements, while demonstrative of counsel's deficient performance, was not prejudicial to Floyd. As the Kansas Supreme Court stated: Although Cody's statement was damaging, given the jury's knowledge of his age, and inconsistency, we are not prepared to say that it prejudiced Floyd's case. The State introduced other, far more damaging evidence, principally Tom's recitation of Floyd's admissions the day after C.A.'s disappearance.... Tom's credibility was critical; and the jury chose to believe him. 283 Kan. at 106, 150 P.3d 868. Because of the obvious reliability issues with Cody's statements and the other evidence against Floyd, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that the admission of Cody's statements was not prejudicial. We agree that, considering all of the evidence and noting that the jury had the opportunity to hear Tom's testimony and judge his credibility, there is not a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors the result of the proceeding would have been different. The Kansas Supreme Court's determination that the admission of this evidence did not prejudice Floyd is not an unreasonable application of Strickland.