Opinion ID: 2390579
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Incidental Guilt-Phase Issues

Text: Defendant's other claims of error regarding the guilt phase merit little discussion.
Defendant objects for the first time on appeal to the trial court instructing the jury to consider the various charges in a sequential manner. The trial court, when it charged the jury on knowing murder, aggravated manslaughter, and reckless manslaughter, instructed it to begin by deliberating on the first charge, knowing murder, and to move on to subsequent charges only if the jury acquitted defendant of murder. We reject defendant's contention because there is nothing inherently wrong with a sequential charge. State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 223, 574 A. 2d 951 (1990); see also State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 405-06, 548 A. 2d 1022 (1988) (same). In Coyle, we rejected the use of a strictly sequential charge where passion/provocation manslaughter provided a viable alternative for the jury. In such a case, the sequential charge has the potential to foreclose whether passion/provocation should reduce an otherwise purposeful killing from murder to manslaughter. State v. Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 222, 574 A. 2d 951. However, here, where no evidence supporting passion/provocation exists, and where passion/provocation was not argued, the concerns present in Coyle disappear. We reaffirm the position that [a]bsent evidence of passion/provocation, sequential charges usually provide a framework for orderly deliberations. State v. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 405, 548 A. 2d 1022. [ State v. Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 223, 574 A. 2d 951]. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not commit plain error by instructing the jury to consider the charges in a sequential order.
Perry was acquitted of robbery, yet convicted of felony murder. Noting the inconsistency of those verdicts, the trial court molded the verdict on each count to not guilty. Therefore, it is apparent that no direct harm to defendant occurred as a result of the trial court's failure to dismiss the robbery and felony murder charges. However, there remains the question of whether indirect harm occurred as a result of the failure to dismiss those charges. That indirect harm revolves around the elusive idea of taint and whether the jurors' obvious confusion (as to what they must find to support a felony murder conviction) spilled over into their consideration of the charge of knowing murder. We conclude that neither the jury's deliberations nor the verdict of knowing murder was tainted by the misunderstanding of the trial court's instructions on those two charges. The conceded correctness of the court's definition of knowing murder (apart from the already-disposed-of Gerald issue) coupled with the court's instruction to deliberate sequentially suggests that the jury reached its conclusion regarding knowing murder before any possible taint. That conclusion rests on bi-polar support. The first strut is our necessary presumption that juries follow the instructions that they are given. State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 270, 255 A. 2d 193 (1969). The process of death qualification, the juror's oath, and the trial court's instructions are all designed to assure that the jury will make a conscientious attempt to follow the law in reaching its verdict. The entire system of capital punishment depends on the belief that the jury exercising the conscience of the community will responsibly exercise its guided discretion in deciding who shall live and who shall die. [ State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 310, 524 A. 2d 188 (emphasis added).] The second is the belief that where appropriate, sequential charges assure that a jury renders `a just verdict by applying the facts to the law as it is charged.' State v. Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 223, 574 A. 2d 951 (quoting People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y. 2d 174, 183, 513 N.Y.S. 2d 83, 87, 505 N.E. 2d 594, 597 (1987)). Together, they support the conclusion that no taint stained the jury's decision on knowing murder, because the verdict on knowing murder would have preceded any decision based on a misunderstanding of the instructions on felony murder or robbery. Even if the jury decided the robbery issue first, its not guilty on that count would not have prejudiced its consideration of the other charges against defendant.
Finally, defendant raises numerous issues with regard to the prosecutorial practices and procedures used to indict, try, convict, and sentence him. All of those claims fit under the general rubric of prosecutorial misconduct. As he earlier asserted with regard to his counsel's performance, defendant alleges that the prosecutor's behavior was constitutionally unacceptable in the specific instances and in the entirety. We do not agree. Perry claims five instances of prosecutorial misconduct, all of which can essentially be classified as a claim that the prosecutor abused his discretion in determining whom to prosecute and whom not to prosecute. To elaborate, he claims that (1) the State abused its discretion in failing to properly investigate Miller's complicity and prosecuting him; (2) defendant was selectively prosecuted; (3) the State purposely misled the Grand Jury by failing to disclose the extent of Miller's involvement and otherwise compromised their function; (4) A Brady violation occurred because the State failed to turn over to the defense the crucial portion of the report on Miller's polygraph wherein he makes inculpatory admissions; (5) the State's entire case was grounded on the fundamental misrepresentation that defendant alone committed these crimes. All of those claims are essentially a contention that Perry was prosecuted and Miller was not, and that no reason exists for that distinction. Prosecutors have very broad discretion in determining whom to prosecute and whom not to prosecute, but also have an obligation to exercise that discretion in good faith. State v. McCrary, 97 N.J. 132, 142, 478 A. 2d 339 (1984); State v. Hermann, 80 N.J. 122, 127, 402 A. 2d 236 (1979); State v. Laws, 51 N.J. 494, 510, 242 A. 2d 333, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 971, 89 S.Ct. 408, 21 L.Ed. 2d 384 (1968); State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 171, 96 A. 2d 63 (1953). The effect of this broad grant of power has been to accord a presumption of validity to the conduct of the prosecutor. State v. McCrary, supra, 97 N.J. at 142, 478 A. 2d 339 (citing In re Investigation Regarding Ringwood Fact Finding Comm'n., 65 N.J. 512, 516, 324 A. 2d 1 (1974) and State v. Laws, supra, 51 N.J. 494, 242 A. 2d 333). Courts will review the exercise of prosecutorial power by the executive branch for arbitrariness or abuse. In re Investigation Regarding Ringwood Fact Finding Comm'n, supra, 65 N.J. at 516, 324 A. 2d 1. Recently, in State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 571 A. 2d 914 (1990), the defendant argued that the prosecution had abused its discretion in failing to investigate and prosecute a putative accomplice. DiFrisco confessed that he had done the killing at the behest of one Franciotti. Only DiFrisco was prosecuted for the crime. The Court noted that in discriminatory enforcement cases, the general rule is: [S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion. Bordenkircher v. Haye, 434 U.S. 357, 364 [98 S.Ct. 663, 668] 54 L.Ed. 2d 604, [611] (1978). This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. [ Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530, 84 L.Ed. 2d 547, 566 (1986).] [ State v. Di Frisco, supra, 118 N.J. at 265-66, 571 A. 2d 914]. The Court explained that a defendant's burden in discriminatory or selective prosecution cases is to plead and prove intentional selectivity as well as an unjustifiable basis for the discrimination. `[The] standards require petitioner to show both that the    enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.' Id. at 266, 571 A. 2d 914 (quoting Wayte, supra, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. at 1531, 84 L.Ed. 2d at 556). The State's abandonment of prosecution against Miller was a legitimate exercise of discretion. Contrary to defendant's implication, Miller was not ignored during the investigation. Both men were subjected to polygraph examinations on Tuesday, March 4th. Any intensified efforts directed toward Perry were a product of his drug use as it interferred with the polygraph. In gathering evidence and questioning witnesses, the officials repeatedly probed for information involving Miller. For example, based on information that Miller had been present when 762 Division Street was secured, the police repeatedly questioned witnesses about Miller's role. All of those facts provide a rational reason for the State's decision to concentrate their efforts on the prosecution of Arthur Perry. An indictment should be disturbed only on the clearest and plainest ground. State v. New Jersey Trade Waste Ass'n, 96 N.J. 8, 18-19, 472 A. 2d 1050 (1984). Such a ground would be an indication that the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of defendant's trial. State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 320, 524 A. 2d 188; State v. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 426, 548 A. 2d 1022. No evidence presented to the grand jury relating to Clark Miller's involvement in the crime would have exculpated the defendant. Clear grounds for probable cause existed based on Perry's taped confession. Evidence regarding Miller would have been only incidental to the grand jury's decision regarding defendant. Finally, there is no factual basis for defendant's claims of a Brady violation, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed. 2d 215 (1963) (prosecution has ongoing duty to reveal all potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense), or a fundamental misrepresentation by the prosecution. There is no evidence that trial counsel did not receive a one-page section of the report on Miller's polygraph test, despite his certification that he did not recall receiving it. The sheets of the six-page report were numbered consecutively, and page five contained the results without which the report would have made little sense. The prosecutor sent the report to trial counsel well before trial with a letter saying If you have any questions please do not hesitate to call. Although prosecutors may not transfer the burden of Brady compliance by beseeching defense attorneys to be inquisitive, State v. DiFrisco, supra, 118 N.J. at 260, 571 A. 2d 914 ( Brady creates a non-delegable responsibility), that letter and the lack of any response lead us to conclude that defense counsel received page five, even if he cannot recall having done so. Similarly, the record contradicts the assertion that the prosecutor attempted to deceive the jury into believing that defendant was the sole actor involved in the crime. Such a claim ignores the testimony of Inspector Milbury surrounding the investigation of the crime. In that testimony he told the jury that Miller and Perry had reported the body and that he had interviewed both Miller and Perry. More importantly, defendant's entire taped confession was played for the jury, wherein he begins by implicating Miller. The prosecution did nothing to inhibit the defense from exploring alternative defenses, including the implication of Miller.
Defendant alleges that three gaps in the trial transcript plus the closed recording of the peremptory-challenge process resulted in an incomplete, defective record of the trial and prejudiced his chance for appellate review. We disagree. The three gaps, when read in the context of the entire transcript and of those discussions immediately preceding each gap, all involved inconsequential administrative matters or were related simply to waiting for the jury to re-enter the courtroom and settle into the jury box. Concerning the transcription of peremptory challenges, the jury-selection list on file with the court clerk renders any error harmless.