Opinion ID: 364238
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: congressional appropriations and authorization.

Text: 23 Congress has on a number of occasions appropriated funds specifically for the construction of the reregulating dam. 4 The Corps contends that such appropriations are equivalent to authorization of the second dam. The Rod and Gun Club conversely argues, and the district court agreed, that the recent Supreme Court ruling in T. V. A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978), holds directly that the appropriation of funds should not be construed to represent authorization of a project. 24 The Rod and Gun Club further buttresses this argument by referring this court to a number of cases where congressional funding of a project has not been viewed as representing implicit authorization of that project. See e. g. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 505, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959); D. C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Airis, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 125, 128-29, 391 F.2d 478, 481-82 (1968). 25 We are not convinced that these cases address issues that are necessarily analogous to those presented by this appeal, nor that they mandate the conclusion that courts can never construe appropriations as congressional authorization. However, we do conclude that T. V. A. v. Hill, although clearly distinguishable on the facts, nonetheless creates serious questions as to the Corps' claim that the appropriation of funds for a project should generally be regarded as project authorization. Id. 437 U.S. at 190-92, 98 S.Ct. 2279. 5 26 Reviewing the facts of this case, we find no evidence in the record that Congress intended the appropriations for the reregulating dam to be regarded as the authorization required by § 401, or that Congress as a whole believed that the reregulating dam had been authorized. 27 Admittedly, there is some evidence that when the Corps approached Congress for funds for the reregulating dam it asserted without challenge by congressional committee members that the dam had been authorized. Moreover, at least one report of the Senate Committee on Public Works refers to the reregulating dam as if it had been authorized. S.Rep.No.93-615, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1973). 28 We are hesitant, as was the Supreme Court in T. V. A. v. Hill, to interpret isolated remarks in committee hearings or reports as expressions of the intent or knowledge of Congress. T. V. A. v. Hill, supra, 437 U.S. at 191-92, 98 S.Ct. 2279; See S. E. C. v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121, 98 S.Ct. 1702, 56 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978). 29 We are confronted in this case with a specific statute that requires congressional authorization of dam projects. We find no evidence that the remarks contained in the committee reports, which asserted that such authorization had been obtained, were the product of a considered review of the issue. 30 We similarly find no indication that the appropriations for the reregulating dam were intended to satisfy the mandate of § 401, 6 and in fact there is some indication that Congress might have mistakenly relied upon assertions by the Corps that the LAURD project had been specifically authorized when it appropriated funds for the project. See, e. g., Public Works for Water, Pollution Control, and Power Development and Atomic Energy Commission Appropriations, Hearings on H.R.No.18127 Before the Senate Appropriations Committee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1779 (1971). 31 Without expressly reaching the general question whether appropriations as a rule constitute authorization, we find in this case that the congressional authorization required under § 401 was not conferred by appropriations alone. See Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Callaway, supra, at 620. 32