Opinion ID: 74678
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Florida Long Arm Statute

Text: Plaintiff contends that the requirements of the Florida long-arm statute are met by virtue of defendant, (1) doing business in Florida; (2) breaching a contract in Florida by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in Florida, see Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a), (g); and (3) committing the tort of conversion in Florida. See Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b).
Florida statute 48.193(1)(a) states in relevant part, Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself...to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: (a) Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. In order to establish that a defendant is carrying on business for the purposes of the long-arm statute, the activities of the defendant must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the state for pecuniary benefit. Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir.1996), citing, Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc., 314 So.2d 561, 564 (Fla.1975). The Court cannot find support for plaintiff's allegation that defendant falls within Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute under the provision dealing with the operation of a business in Florida. Defendant's business is running healthcare facilities in the Midwest, not contracting with computer companies in order to obtain remediation services for its computer information systems. The contract with plaintiff was not for defendant's pecuniary benefit in any direct sense. The work product may have saved defendant's entire business from potential failure due to millennium bug problems, but the immediate pecuniary interest to the defendant was the expenditure in excess of $800,000 paying for plaintiff's services. Plaintiff's attempt to satisfy the long arm statute under a continuing business in Florida theory is rejected.2
Florida statute § 48.193(1)(g) permits Florida courts to have jurisdiction over a non-resident when that party, breach[es] a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. Defendant stopped making scheduled payments under the contract once it declared the plaintiff to be in default on the contract. Plaintiff argues that the payments were required to be made in Florida and therefore, any non-payment constitutes a breach of an essential term of the contract.3 The events, as recounted by both parties, appear to be that it was FTT who was first declared to be in breach, therefore any subsequent breach by OSF may be irrelevant except to the determination of damages. However, plaintiff has alleged that defendant breached the contract by refusing to continue payments to plaintiff. Without deciding the case on the merits, the Court will assume arguendo, that the non-payment of the amount due under the contract constituted a breach of the agreement and that plaintiff has satisfied that portion of the long-arm statute under 48.193(1)(g).
Florida statute § 48.193(1)(b) subjects any person who commit[s] a tortious act within [the state of Florida] to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts. Plaintiff alleges that the defendant committed the tort of conversion by possessing the property of the plaintiff, without permission, for a period of several hours. Defendant contends that the property could not have been the property of the plaintiff by virtue of that provision of the contract defining any work performed by the plaintiff and reduced to a tangible medium of expression being the property of the client, i.e., OSF. In order to determine whether a tort was not committed by the defendant, this Court would have to conduct a full-scale inquiry into the nature of the document taken, an interpretation of the contract, and a determination on the merits. A motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction does not require such an inquiry. The plaintiff has alleged the conversion, and the record is in 2 Notably, counsel for plaintiff stated at the evidentiary hearing, We are not arguing that they [defendant] are doing business in Florida. Hearing Trans. at 119. 3 Although the complaint alleges that all payments to FTT were to be made in Florida, the contract itself does not specify any location for payment. The parties agree that the law in Florida is that in absence of a location for payment as designated by the contract, payments should be made to the seller's place of business. dispute as to the truth of the accusation, therefore the Court will construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and hold that the alleged conversion satisfies Florida's statute on long-arm jurisdiction.