Opinion ID: 2222251
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: uncompensated medical expenses

Text: As previously noted, the review panel directed the single judge, on remand, to dispose of two medical bills to which the single judge's award did not speak. Dawes argues that the review panel should have found as a matter of law that he should be compensated for those expenses. When an employee in a workers' compensation case presents evidence of medical expenses resulting from injury, he or she has made out a prima facie case of fairness and reasonableness, causing the burden to shift to the employer to adduce evidence that the expenses are not fair and reasonable. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Deyle, 234 Neb. 537, 451 N.W.2d 910 (1990). Dawes argues that he made a prima facie case with respect to the unawarded expenses that was not rebutted, thus entitling him to compensation for those expenses. Dawes argues that the record does not contain any evidence rebutting the fairness or reasonableness of the expenses, or the causal relationship between the expenses and his 1999 injury. Our review of the record supports this argument. The record contains the two medical bills omitted in the single judge's award: $440 for magnetic imaging performed by the Lincoln Radiology Group on November 19, 1999, and $3,024 from the Lincoln Surgical Group for Dawes' lumbar fusion. The record also contains the medical reports associated with these bills, establishing their relationship to Dawes' injury. Wittrock does not argue that the expenses were not fair and reasonable, nor does our review of the record provide any basis for such an argument. Nonetheless, we do not conclude that the review panel erred in remanding this issue to the single judge. The single judge listed all of the medical expenses she found to be compensable, but expressly denied compensation for other medical expenses, one of which lacked a supporting medical record, and the remainder of which were incurred prior to the 1999 injury. The single judge's award simply does not mention the expenses noted above. We agree with the review panel that it cannot be discerned, from the single judge's award, why those expenses were omitted. In that respect, the single judge's award does not meet the requirements of rule 11, because we are unable to conduct a meaningful appellate review. We note that this case must be remanded to the single judge in any event, because the parties agree, as did the review panel, that the single judge erred in her calculations of Dawes' average weekly wage. The review panel ordered that the case be remanded for a recalculation in that regard, and none of the parties to this appeal challenge that aspect of the review panel's order. Nor does either party dispute the review panel's calculation that based on the dates found by the single judge, Dawes is entitled to 342/7 weeks of temporary total disability, rather than the 334/7 weeks ordered by the single judge. Since the case must be remanded to the single judge in any event, we agree with the review panel that the single judge should be required, in the first instance, to explain and resolve her incomplete discussion of Dawes' claimed medical expenses. The single judge should either explain why the expenses were denied, or award the expenses if she finds that to be appropriate. Therefore, Dawes' fifth assignment of error shall be resolved in that manner.