Opinion ID: 1863183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discretion of the Court

Text: The trial Court, of course, must of necessity have wide discretion in the general conduct of a trial, but to use discretion as a substitute for definitive, substantive rules of evidence distorts the concept and effectively eliminates appellate review of error. If the rule of evidence above enunciated by Chief Justice Stone is the law of this State and we allow its misapplication to be affirmed under the guise of lack of abuse of discretion, of what value is the rule? Surely this question answers itself and precludes the use of the doctrine of discretion as a legal basis for the affirmance of the trial Court. Indeed, the right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, Sec. 6, Const, of Alabama, 1901, includes the right of cross-examination. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965); Wray v. State, 154 Ala. 36, 45 So. 697 (1908); and reversal is mandated where the defendant's substantive rights to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of an important witness have been invaded. Tit. 7, § 443, Code of Alabama 1940 (Recomp.1958), provides in express language: The right of cross-examination thorough and sifting, belongs to every party as to the witnesses called against him. See also Green v. State, 258 Ala. 471, 64 So.2d 84 (1953). The trial Court's discretion was here abused, in my opinion, particularly since the Court cut off defense counsel's effort to develop the line of questions designed to refresh the witness's recollection not merely by sustaining the district attorney's objections, but by affirmatively asserting to defense counsel: . . . I'll just take the bull by the horns right now and say that you can't ask her any more questions from that statement . . .. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. HEFLIN, C. J., concurs.