Opinion ID: 381865
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bivens-Type Actions

Text: 27 The appellant also alleged that his first, fifth, and eighth amendment rights 2 were violated by the actions of Wayne and O'Brien, and he sought direct recovery under those constitutional provisions. The district court did not address these Bivens -type claims in its order of dismissal. We thus assume that the court believed that Bivens -type actions could not be maintained under those Amendments, or that if such claims could be made, the appellant had failed to state his causes of action. 28 The United States Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to consider a Bivens-type action in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). In Carlson, the Supreme Court established that a violation of the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment could be the basis for a Bivens-type action. More importantly, the Supreme Court also set forth a more specific framework in which to determine whether claims to damages against federal officials may be maintained directly under constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court stated that victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right unless the defendant (1) demonstrates  'special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress'  (citations omitted), or (2) shows that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective. (citations omitted) Id., 446 U.S. at 18, 100 S.Ct. at 1472, 64 L.Ed.2d at 23. 29 The Supreme Court's application of the guidelines to the circumstances in Carlson appears to be equally appropriate in the present case. First, as in Carlson, there do not appear to be any special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. United States Marshals do not enjoy such independent status in our constitutional scheme as to suggest that judicially created remedies against them might be appropriate. (citations omitted) Moreover, even if requiring them to defend (appellant's) suit might inhibit their efforts to perform their official duties, qualified immunity accorded them . . . provides adequate protection. (citations omitted) Id., 446 U.S. at 19, 100 S.Ct. at 1472, 64 L.Ed.2d at 24. Second, as in Carlson, there does not appear to be any Congressional declaration that would preempt a Bivens -type action or create an equally effective remedy for constitutional violations of the first, fifth or eighth amendments. 30 Appellant's complaint alleges that the defendants (1) deliberately denied him health and medical needs during the entire two and a half month period; (2) failed to provide him adequate protection from beatings and sexual attacks in the Jackson County City Jail in Kansas City, Missouri; (3) allowed him to be placed in an isolation cell in Lexington, Kentucky, in which temperatures reached near freezing during the night; and (4) denied him access to a phone during the entire two and a half month period, and thus denied him a means to obtain assistance from the courts or an attorney. We believe these allegations, if proven, could provide bases for relief on at least some of the alleged constitutional violations. 3 Therefore, we reverse and remand as to appellant's Bivens -type claims.