Opinion ID: 2378775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: motion to extend time to answer

Text: Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in granting appellees' motion to extend time to answer because appellees failed to meet their burden of proving excusable neglect or other just cause. Appellant claims the trial court's ruling was based on conjecture and speculation and that even if they had presented evidence to support their allegations, such evidence would not have risen to the level of excusable neglect or other just cause for extending the time within which to answer. Appellant further claims that if we are persuaded by its argument and conclude the trial court erred in extending the time within which appellees could answer, we must reverse the judgment awarded on appellees' counterclaim because the timeliness of their counterclaim is linked with the untimeliness of their answer. We do not address the merits of this argument as appellant waived it when it voluntarily dismissed its complaint with prejudice. Immediately prior to trial, appellant voluntarily moved to dismiss its complaint with prejudice. We observe that appellant specifically requested the dismissal to be with prejudice. Appellees agreed to the dismissal with prejudice and stated the counterclaim was still pending. The trial court then granted the dismissal with prejudice. The judgment states that appellant's complaint was dismissed with prejudice. It is a well-settled rule of law that a dismissal with prejudice is as conclusive of the rights of the parties as if there were an adverse judgment as to the plaintiff after a trial. Hicks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 304 Ark. 101, 799 S.W.2d 809 (1990). It is also a well-settled rule of law that a voluntary dismissal does not affect, but leaves for adjudication other claims such as counterclaims and cross-claims. Lemon v. Laws, 305 Ark. 143, 806 S.W.2d 1 (1991); Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Smith, 209 Ark. 135, 189 S.W.2d 718 (1945). Thus, it is of no consequence whether the answer and counterclaim were filed timely as it is clear that appellant's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice constituted a final adjudication on the merits at its own request. Any errors occurring prior to the dismissal with prejudice were therefore resolved against appellant at its own request. It is fundamental that, pursuant to the doctrine of invited error, an appellant cannot request a ruling by a trial court and then complain of that ruling on appeal. See Schmidt v. McIlroy Bank & Trust, 306 Ark. 28, 811 S.W.2d 281 (1991). By requesting and receiving a dismissal of its claim with prejudice, appellant waived any rights to assert errors relating to that claim. To allow appellant first to voluntarily dismiss its complaint with prejudice and then to appeal asserting points of error relating to issues involved in the complaint (other than any issues concerning the dismissal itself, such as whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice) would be to allow an antinomy. It would give absolutely no effect to the words dismissal with prejudice.