Opinion ID: 1646734
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the 1999 and 2005 registrations were timely.

Text: ¶ 27. Under the UIFSA, a child-support order is registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this state. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-25-85(1) (Rev.2004). MDHS first registered the Canadian order (issued June 1990) in January 1999, when Margaret-Anne was twelve. ¶ 28. In actions for arrears of child support, UIFSA's choice-of-law provision allows use of either Mississippi's statute of limitations or that of the issuing state, whichever is longer. See Miss.Code Ann. § 93-25-87(2) (Rev.2004). The chancellor used Mississippi law. ¶ 29. Mississippi's applicable statute of limitations requires actions to be commenced within three years against Mississippi residents, such as Shelnut. All actions founded on any judgment or decree rendered by any court of record without this state shall be brought within seven years after the rendition of such judgment or decree, and not after. However, if the person against whom such judgment or decree was or shall be rendered, was, or shall be at the time of the institution of the action, a resident of this state, such action, founded on such judgment or decree, shall be commenced within three years next after the rendition thereof, and not after. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-45 (Rev.2003). However, the statute is tolled while the child remains a minor: If any person entitled to bring any of the personal actions mentioned shall, at the time at which the cause of action accrued, be under the disability of infancy or unsoundness of mind, he may bring the actions within the times in this chapter respectively limited, after his disability shall be removed as provided by law. ... Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (Rev.2003). ¶ 30. In Wilson v. Wilson, 464 So.2d 496 (Miss.1985), a mother brought a contempt action twenty years after a divorce decree. Both children were emancipated, but the seven-year statute of limitations had not run. See id. at 497. This Court recognized that child support is a legal duty owed to the child. Even though the action must be brought by a guardian who is not under the disability, the statute of limitations is tolled until the disability of infancy is removed upon emancipation. See id. at 498 (citing Weir v. Monahan, 67 Miss. 434, 7 So. 291 (1890)). The Wilson court detailed the philosophy behind this rule as follows: To allow the statute of limitations to run during the disability of the minor, the very period through which the minor needs and is entitled to the support of his parents, would defy reason. To bar the child because of a parent's failure to timely assert the child's claim for support is to deprive the child of that support which belongs to him for reasons over which the child has no control. Wilson, 464 So.2d at 499. In Vice v. Dep't of Human Servs., 702 So.2d 397 (Miss. 1997), this Court followed Wilson, affirming a judgment in which a child-support order was enforced even though it was brought six years after the order. Vice, 702 So.2d at 398. ¶ 31. The three-year statute of limitations applicable to Shelnut under Mississippi law was tolled while Margaret-Anne remained a minor. The tolling applied to Kern and MDHS, though neither was under such a disability. Margaret-Anne was twelve years old in January, 1999. Therefore, we conclude that the 1999 registration was timely.
¶ 32. The Vice and Wilson cases allowed support orders to be enforced even though they were brought years after the children had become emancipated. In Vice, this court stated, That the child has been emancipated does not pretermit recovery of vested but unpaid child support. Id. at 401 (quoting Varner v. Varner, 588 So.2d 428 (Miss.1991)). We have plainly allowed parents to sue to obtain unpaid child support where the children have been emancipated at the time of the suit. Id. at 402 (citing Wilson, 464 So.2d at 496; Varner, 588 So.2d at 428). ¶ 33. The three-year statute of limitations applicable to Shelnut under Mississippi law was tolled while Margaret-Anne remained a minor. Tolling ceased when she became eighteen (the Saskatchewan age of majority) on July 31, 2004. Kern and MDHS then had three years to register the order. The order was registered by the submission of the Notice of Registration Amended in September 2005. Margaret-Anne was then nineteen years old. Thus, we conclude that the 2005 registration was timely, and would have been so, even if it were the first attempt to enforce the order. We find no error as to this issue.