Opinion ID: 583331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Appellant's Affidavit

Text: 23 As further district court proceedings will now occur, we offer briefly our view on appellant's other allegation of error--an issue likely to recur on remand. The district court treated appellees' evidence as being wholly uncontradicted by Neal, despite plainly contradictory allegations in Neal's verified complaint. The allegations in Neal's verified complaint should have been considered on the motion for summary judgment as if in a new affidavit. 24 Rule 56 contemplates that the summary judgment motion shall be accompanied and opposed by [s]upporting and opposing affidavits ... made on personal knowledge, [which] shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence.... Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Verification is defined as [c]onfirmation of correctness, truth, or authenticity, by affidavit, oath, or deposition. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1400 (5th ed. 1979). Neal verified the complaint under the statutory substitute for the taking of an oath, declaring under penalty of perjury ... that the foregoing is true and correct, and dating his signature. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746(1) (1991). Thus, the complaint was verified and constituted an affidavit. 25 Every circuit that has faced this issue has treated verified complaints as acceptable opposition to a motion under Rule 56 for summary judgment. As the First Circuit has stated: 26 There is some uncertainty as to whether, or when, a verified complaint can serve in lieu of an affidavit for purposes of opposing a summary judgment motion.... We think the better rule is that a verified complaint ought to be treated as the functional equivalent of an affidavit to the extent that it satisfies the standards explicated in Rule 56(e).... 27 Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1262 (1st Cir.1991) (citations omitted). Other circuits are in accord. 2 The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have all held as well that a verified pleading functions as an affidavit when it meets the standards of Rule 56(e). Lodge Hall Music, Inc. v. Waco Wrangler Club, Inc., 831 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir.1987); Fowler v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 343 F.2d 150, 154 (5th Cir.1965); Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 945 (6th Cir.1985); Khan v. Garanzini, 411 F.2d 210, 212-13 (6th Cir.1969); Carroll v. Sielaff, 514 F.2d 415, 417 (7th Cir.1975); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir.1987). 28 The Ninth Circuit decision, McElyea, closely parallels the present action. There a prisoner had also filed a § 1983 action against prison officials. In response to defendants' motion to dismiss and accompanying affidavits, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Ninth Circuit reversed because the district court had ignored the factual allegations made in the complaint: McElyea's complaint has been verified; because it is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence, [295 U.S.App.D.C. 355] it may be considered in opposition to summary judgment. McElyea, 833 F.2d at 197; accord Lew v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir.1985) ([a] verified complaint may be treated as an affidavit to the extent that the complaint is based on personal knowledge and sets forth facts admissible in evidence); see also Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733, 734 n. 1 (9th Cir.1974). Likewise here. 29 We have deliberately avoided reciting herein the specific allegations Neal makes. We take these pains, because, since the district court's decision, the Supreme Court has spoken in Hudson v. McMillian, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992), on the requisites for a § 1983 action alleging cruel and unusual punishment. We think the course of litigation will be best served if the district court has the first chance at applying that decision to the allegations before the court.