Opinion ID: 1690710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the robbery-murder aggravating circumstance in violation of the united states constitution and state law.

Text: ś 92. Doss argues under this assignment of error that the Mississippi capital murder statute is defective in that it does not genuinely narrow the class of defendants and is, therefore, constitutionally infirm. Doss additionally argues that the robbery aggravating factor duplicates the element of capital murder and is, therefore, constitutionally infirm on this basis as well. The State addresses the merits of the first ground, but asserts that the duplicative ground is procedurally barred. Doss objected to the second aggravator [28] of C-1 on the basis that it was unconstitutionally vague and lacked reliability. ś 93. The State contends that the use of the robbery aggravator is not constitutionally infirm as it does genuinely narrow the class of defendants, and cites Minnick v. State, 551 So.2d 77, 96-97 (Miss. 1988), reversed on other grounds, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) interpreting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 245-47, 108 S.Ct. 546, 555, 98 L.Ed.2d 568, 583 (1988). The Minnick Court found that Lowenfield held that the fact that the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury in its penalty decision was identical to an element of the underlying offense did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. Notably, the jury in this case unanimously found other aggravating factors in addition to the robbery aggravating factor. ś 94. Doss relies primarily upon Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1542, 123 L.Ed.2d 188, 200 (1993), for the proposition that the Mississippi statute permitting the use of robbery as a mitigating circumstance is over broad and does not genuinely narrow the class of persons on whom the death penalty is imposed. Arave noted that, [i]f the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm. Id. Therefore, Doss asserts that the robbery aggravating circumstance does not genuinely narrow because robbery-murder standing alone, is not a crime for which the death penalty is proportionate punishment, and so it thereby violates the Eight Amendment and Article 3, Section 28 of the Mississippi Constitution. ś 95. Doss's argument under this alleged error has been held without merit in several cases. Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 762 (Miss. 1991) [29] ; Minnick v. State, 551 So.2d 77, 96-97 (Miss. 1989), reversed on other grounds, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990); Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 358-59 (Miss. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1075, 110 S.Ct. 1800, 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990); Jones v. State, 517 So.2d 1295, 1300 (Miss. 1987), vacated on other grounds. [30] Ladner explicitly rejected this stacking argument by once again referring to Lowenfield wherein the United States Supreme Court found that it was permissible. 484 U.S. at 239-47, 108 S.Ct. at 552-55, 98 L.Ed.2d at 579-83. Accordingly, the trial court will not be held in error on this issue.