Opinion ID: 158634
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tainted In-Court Identification

Text: Petitioner also argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by admitting an in-court identification tainted by a pretrial confrontation. Petitioner was brought to the victim’s hospital room shortly after his apprehension. The admission of in-court identification testimony offends the Due Process Clause -4- only when, under the totality of the circumstances, it was tainted by suggestive pre-trial identification procedures in such a manner as to create a “very substantial likelihood of misidentification.” United States v. Smith , 156 F.3d 1046, 1051 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 844 (1999). In Neil v. Biggers , 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972), the Supreme Court set forth five factors to consider in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification. Those factors include: the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Id. at 199-200. The Neil factors “must be weighed against the corruptive effect of a suggestive pre-trial identification procedure to determine whether the identification testimony should have been suppressed.” Grubbs v. Hannigan , 982 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993). Applying the Neil factors to the facts of this case, we agree with the magistrate that the victim’s identification of the petitioner as her assailant was not rendered unreliable by the pretrial confrontation. Although the victim was not able to view her assailant while she was attacked, as she fled from the scene, she got a good look at him while he attempted to unlock her car. The victim testified that her attention was focused on the attacker because she wanted to make sure he -5- left the scene. The victim gave police relatively accurate, detailed, and consistent descriptions of her attacker. Finally, the witness testified that at the time of her confrontation, which occurred less than two hours after the attack, she was certain that the petitioner was her assailant. We therefore conclude that the admission of the victim’s in-court identification of petitioner as her assailant did not violate his due process rights.