Opinion ID: 1057402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The scope of the new trial

Text: ¶ 13. We have not closely considered the question of what the scope of a new trial should be under circumstances like these. [3] In Nourse, the plaintiffsa husband and wife who were injured in a car accidentmoved for a new trial on damages alone after a jury verdict awarded no more than $110 for their general damages despite finding liability and awarding special damages. In a brief opinion, we remanded for a new trial on all issues: Since it appears that the verdict itself was the result of compromise . . justice and fairness require that the cause be remanded for a new trial on all issues, including liability. 140 Vt. at 186, 436 A.2d at 739. We take this opportunity to elaborate on the Nourse rationale. ¶ 14. Two California cases, Leipert v. Honold, 39 Cal.2d 462, 247 P.2d 324 (1952), and Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 Cal.2d 602, 248 P.2d 910 (1952), suggest the same result, but offer a more substantial analysis than Nourse. In Leipert, a personal-injury plaintiff moved for a partial new trial;(on damages only) after a jury verdict of $2,200 for severe head injuries, a broken pelvis, ruptured bladder, and abdominal operation. The motion was granted, and the defendant appealed. The California Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting the motion for partial new trial because: (1) the damages were inadequate, (2) the issue of liability was close, and (3) the circumstances indicated that the verdict was probably the result of prejudice, sympathy, or compromise. 247 P.2d at 327. Both the defendant and the plaintiff in Leipert stated that, if the order granting the new trial were reversed, they wished the underlying judgment to stand rather than conduct a new trial on all issues. Therefore, the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, but did not foreclose the possibility of a complete new trial under similar circumstances if a party requested one. Id. at 329. ¶ 15. In Hamasaki, 248 P.2d at 911, a little boy darted into the street and sustained serious injuries when he was hit by a car. The jury returned a verdict for the boy for $1,000, including a stipulated $817 for medical expenses. That left $183 to cover his general damages (pain and suffering) for a brain concussion, broken clavicle, skull fractures, and other injuries. The defendants moved for a new trial on all issues, and the motion was denied. The plaintiffs moved for a partial new trial on damages only, and the motion was granted after defendants refused an additur of $7,500. The defendants appealed, and the California Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 915. Citing Leipert, the court concluded that a new trial on damages only was inappropriate because: (1) the damages were inadequate, (2) the issue of liability was close, and (3) the inadequacy of the damages suggested compromise. Id. at 914. The controlling question on appeal in Hamasaki therefore was whether or not the trial court, on plaintiffs' motion for a new trial on the issue of damages only, had power to grant a new trial on all issues. Id. at 913. The California statute governing new trials, similar to V.R.C.P. 59, provided that a verdict may be vacated . . . in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on all or part of the issues, on the application of the party aggrieved. Id. at 915. The court held that [i]f the limited new trial sought would be prejudicial to the opposing party, the granting of a complete new trial is the most reasonable response to the motion. Id. ¶ 16. The Connecticut Supreme Court similarly concluded, in Malmberg v. Lopez, 208 Conn. 675, 546 A.2d 264 (1988), that a verdict finding a defendant liable for wrongful death but awarding no damages required a new trial on all issues. In Malmberg, as here, the issue of liability was strongly contested at trial. Id. at 267. The court noted that `where . . . liability is contested and an appellate court is unable to infer whether upon a new trial a jury would find in favor of the defendant or in favor of the plaintiff an appellate court must remand the case for a trial on all issues.' Id. (quoting Freshwater v. Booth, 160 W.Va. 156, 233 S.E.2d 312, 316 (1977)); accord McNall v. Farmers Ins. Group, 181 Ind.App. 501, 392 N.E.2d 520, 525 (1979). ¶ 17. We conclude that the standards announced in these cases are consistent with our prior cases and our rules, and so adopt the following standards today. As noted above, a new trial on damages alone will not generally be proper unless the issue to be retried is clearly distinct from the others and may be tried alone without injustice. See Gasoline Prods., 283 U.S. at 500, 51 S.Ct. 513. In particular, a new trial on damages alone is not appropriate when: first, the issue of liability is close; second, the damages awarded are grossly inadequate; and third, the circumstances indicate that the verdict was the result of prejudice or an improper compromise. See Leipert, 247 P.2d at 327. Here, all three of these circumstances were present, and it is not at all clear that the damages issue is distinct and separable from the hotly contested issue of liability. ¶ 18. First, the issue of liability was very close. Under Vermont law, defendants are not liable for harms caused when the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the defendant's. 12 V.S.A. § 1036. Here, the evidence introduced by both sides focused principally on liability, and the jury concluded that plaintiff and defendant were each 50% negligent. As reflected by the 50-50 verdict, the liability issue could not have been closer. ¶ 19. Second, the damages awarded $0 for past and future pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of lifewere grossly inadequate given the evidence adduced at trial. See supra, ¶ ¶ 10-12. This is not a case where plaintiffs injuries are de minimis or speculative, or where medical expenses were incurred only to rule out the possibility of injury. Cf. Hunter v. Sorensen, 201 Neb. 153, 266 N.W.2d 529, 533 (1978) (affirming $0 pain-and-suffering verdict because jury could have reasonably concluded that plaintiff suffered only a bruise to his knee as a result of the accident); Whitney v. Akers, 247 F.Supp. 763, 765 (W.D.Okla.1965) (upholding $0 pain-and-suffering verdict because physical injuries were minor and only medical expenses incurred were for examination to verify that no serious injuries were caused). Rather, plaintiff underwent invasive surgery involving cutting [her] throat open to reach the cervical discs that were herniated when she slipped in the hallway. ¶ 20. There was no dispute at trial over whether the surgery was reasonable and necessary, nor does the record suggest that the surgery was meant to remedy a preexisting condition or anything other than injuries sustained in the hallway slip and fall. According to plaintiffs doctor's uncontradicted testimony, she attempted various nonsurgical methods to manage the pain and avoid surgery, but without success. She was offered the choice to attend a three-week semi-residential intensive treatment program, but declined on the recommendation of her doctor, who testified I did not feel that she would be able to tolerate [the] intensive program. She could barely tolerate simple sitting and standing, let alone go through a heavy exercise program for three weeks, [so I] heavily suggested that she reconsider her position on the surgery. Under these facts, a $0 pain-and-suffering award was grossly inadequate. ¶ 21. Finally, although there is no evidence of compromise apart from the verdict itself, we conclude that the inconsistencies in the verdict itself strongly suggest that it was a compromise. See Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 577 (3d Cir.1983) (Inconsistent answers to the other special [interrogatories] further suggest that the verdict was a compromise.); Hatfield v. Seaboard Air Line R., 396 F.2d 721, 724 (5th Cir.1968) (jury responses to special interrogatories finding defendant liable for plaintiffs serious injuries but awarding nominal damages can be seen only as the result of either a compromise on one of the liability issues or as an attempt to render a verdict for [defendant] with [defendant] paying the costs.); Hamasaki, 248 P.2d at 913. Because we cannot say on this record that the jury finally determined liability, the new trial must be on all issues.