Opinion ID: 165959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: January 2004 Order

Text: On January 2, 2004, the magistrate judge recommended granting Jefferson County’s motion to dismiss, which asserted that Jefferson County Department of Health and Environment was plaintiff’s employer and that the two entities were legally distinct. The recommendation was filed and served by mail three days later. On January 20, 2004, the district court issued an order noting that no objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation had been filed, reviewing the matter de novo nonetheless, and summarily adopting the recommendation to dismiss Jefferson County from the case. In this instance, the district court did act prematurely. Measured from the date of service and extended by the pertinent provisions of Rule 6, plaintiff had until January 23 to file objections. More importantly, plaintiff may have received the district court’s order granting Jefferson County’s motion to dismiss before the time for objection expired, in which event she would understandably have been deterred from filing objections in light of their evident futility. Under these circumstances, we deem it appropriate to resolve plaintiff’s appeal on the merits. Review of January 2004 Order on the Merits The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss Jefferson County from the case because it is an entity distinct from plaintiff’s employer and, thus, was not a proper defendant here. We agree. -6- Plaintiff’s claims relate to her employment with the Jefferson County Department of Health and Environment (JCDHE). The JCDHE is “a political subdivision of the state with its own statutory rights and mandate” and, as such, “is a legal entity, separate and distinct from the board of county commissioners [i.e., from Jefferson County 2 ].” Jefferson County Health Servs. Ass’n v. Feeney , 974 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Colo. 1998) (en banc). Under the governing statutory scheme, a county board of health appoints a public health administrator who, as executive and administrative head of the department, is responsible for hiring, compensating, and directing department personnel consistent with policies set by the board of health. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-1-505(1), (3). See generally id. §§ 25-1-501 to 516. In Feeney , the Colorado Supreme Court underscored the independent legal status of the county board of health by holding that when suit is brought on a claim against the county health department, the notice requirements of the state governmental immunity act are not satisfied by sending a notice to the board of county commissioners, but only by sending a notice to the county board of health, since “the county board of health, not the board of county commissioners, is the governing body of a county health department.” Feeney , 974 P.2d at 1002. 2 Under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-11-105, actions against the county are brought against the county board of commissioners. See Calahan v. Jefferson County , 429 P.2d 301, 302 (Colo. 1967) (applying predecessor statute). -7- Plaintiff points out that JCDHE follows personnel rules drafted by the Jefferson County commissioners. But that is only because the board of health overseeing JCDHE elected to adopt those rules, and such election did not, indeed could not, effect a relinquishment of its authority over personnel matters to the county commissioners. See Johnson v. Jefferson County Bd. of Health , 662 P.2d 463, 467, 471 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (noting JCDHE’s adoption of county personnel rules but holding this did not override health board’s statutory authority over employment of its administrator, because “[a] county board of health, as a political subdivision of the state, may not by rule or regulation abdicate the authority and responsibility delegated to it by the legislature”). Plaintiff also notes that her wages were paid by checks issued by the county treasurer, but this likewise does not undermine the district court’s analysis. By statute, the county treasurer also serves as treasurer of the county health department, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-1-505(2), and, in the latter role, the treasurer’s issuance of checks to the department’s employees is entirely consistent with the department’s statutory responsibility over its own personnel matters. This court has emphasized the importance of legislative delineations of administrative responsibility and rejected efforts to extend Title VII liability beyond the plaintiff’s direct governmental employer, “since such [an extension] effectively negates what we assume was a state’s conscious choice to create -8- distinct organizations.” Sandoval v. City of Boulder , 388 F.3d 1312, 1323 n.3 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Bristol v. Bd. of County Comm’rs , 312 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002). “Absent some indication that the state’s decision was motivated by a desire to circumvent the civil rights laws or other laws, principles of comity counsel federal courts not to be too quick to erase organizational dividing lines drawn up by state authorities.” Sandoval , 388 F.3d at 1323 n.3. The district court properly accorded due effect to the organizational scheme drawn up by the state legislature here. Motions to Dismiss Appeal Before briefing this appeal, defendants moved for summary dismissal on two grounds, neither of which is cognizable under our local rules. Motions for summary disposition are limited to: “(a) a motion to dismiss the entire case for lack of appellate jurisdiction; (b) a motion for summary disposition because of a supervening change of law or mootness; or (c) a motion to remand for additional trial court or administrative proceedings.” 10 th Cir. R. 27.2(A)(1). Defendants’ motions for dismissal, based on the waiver rule discussed above and on plaintiff’s delay in seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, do not fall into any of the designated categories. Such non-jurisdictional deficiencies relating to the merits or to matters of procedure are not proper grounds for summary disposition. See, e.g. , Joseph A. ex rel. Wolfe v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs. , 28 F.3d 1056, 1059 -9- (10 th Cir. 1994); Braley v. Campbell , 832 F.2d 1504, 1509 (10 th Cir. 1987). Defendants’ motions are, therefore, denied. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Defendants’ motions for summary dismissal are DENIED. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. Entered for the Court Mary Beck Briscoe