Opinion ID: 1796427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: compliance with the statute

Text: The appellant also argues that his due process rights were violated by allowing the deposition to be taken in the first place. We disagree. It is true that the trial judge failed to conduct a hearing before granting the district attorney's motion for a videotaped deposition. It is also true that the appellant was not given formal notice of the deposition. These omissions, procedural in nature, do not amount to a denial of procedural due process. The process that was due the appellant was the opportunity to dispute the use of the videotape and the right to cross-examine the child. The trial court provided the appellant an opportunity to do both. Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1745, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983). The substantive interest to which the appellant was entitled was the cross-examination of his accuser. This was provided. In addition, the trial court entertained a motion to exclude the videotape from evidence. As a result, the appellant's due process rights were protected. It would have been proper procedure to give notice of the motion to videotape the deposition when that motion was filed. However, the failure to give notice was a technical violation and did not deny the appellant any substantive rights. The requirements of due process are not technical. The Fifth Amendment guarantees no particular form of procedure; it protects substantive rights. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351, 58 S.Ct. 904, 913, 82 L.Ed. 1381 (1938). The procedures adopted by the trial judge, though not technically perfect, were not constitutionally defective. The judgment is affirmed. AFFIRMED. HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.