Opinion ID: 1318869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A.R. 11(a)(1), which addresses appealable judgments, reads in pertinent part:

Text: Rule 11. Appealable judgments and orders.  An appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court from the following judgments and orders: (a) Civil Actions. From the following judgments and orders of a district court in a civil action: (1) Final judgments and decrees including decisions by the district court dismissing, affirming, or reversing or remanding an appeal. This Court construed Rule 11(a)(1) in Winn v. Winn, 101 Idaho 270, 611 P.2d 1055 (1980), and held that [d]ecisions by the district court dismissing, affirming, or reversing or remanding an appeal are appealable. Id. at 271, 611 P.2d at 1056. Therefore, because the district court was acting as an appellate court and reversing and remanding a magistrate court's decision, this case is distinguishable from that situation set out in Wilson, supra . Following Wilson, a denial of a summary judgment motion is not appealable when a district court is not acting as an appellate court. However, when a district court is acting as an appellate court, I.A.R. 11(a)(1) allows a party to appeal when the district court reverses a granting of the summary judgment motion. Next, the appellant, Bluestone, contends that the district court erred in finding that she had waived the right to raise the statute of frauds defense for the first time in a summary judgment motion. The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense that must be raised in a responsive pleading or it is waived. I.R.C.P. 8(c). [3] The appellant argues that she should have the right to raise the defense in a summary judgment motion because this Court held in Cook v. Soltman, 96 Idaho 187, 525 P.2d 969 (1974), that the statute of limitations defense was properly presented to the district court in a motion to dismiss. This motion to dismiss was treated by the Court as a motion for summary judgment. The respondent argues, however, that Cook does not apply because in Cook the record shows that there was no pleading filed prior to the summary judgment motion and in this case the appellant filed a reply to the counterclaim before the summary judgment motion. The respondent states that under the facts of this case Resource Engineering, Inc. v. Siler, 94 Idaho 935, 500 P.2d 836 (1972), applies and the affirmative defense must be raised in a mandatory pleading that has been filed or it is waived. The respondent argues that this Court held in Resource Engineering that a reply to the counterclaim is a mandatory pleading. Therefore, he claims that following Cook, supra, and Resource Engineering, an affirmative defense can be raised in a summary judgment motion only when a party has not yet responded to a mandatory pleading. The respondent's argument has some merit but we are not persuaded. It is true that several federal circuit courts have held that a party may raise an affirmative defense by way of a motion for summary judgment only when the motion is the initial pleading tendered by a party. Funding Systems Leasing Corp. v. Pugh, 530 F.2d 91 (5th Cir.1976); Roe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 132 F.2d 829 (7th Cir.1943). However, even though it would have been a better practice for the appellant to have raised the affirmative defense in the reply to the counterclaim or to have requested an amendment, See Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 99 Idaho 740, 588 P.2d 939 (1978), we decline to follow the federal circuit courts cited. The defendant knew of the affirmative defense and was given time to present argument in opposition to the defense. This case is unlike Paloukos where the affirmative defense was not raised until the appeal to this Court. Therefore, in light of I.R.C.P. 1(a), which mandates that the rules be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding, we hold that where the defense was raised before trial and the defendant was given time to present argument in opposition, the defense of statute of frauds can be raised for the first time in the summary judgment motion even though the reply to the counterclaim has been filed. McKinley v. Bendix Corp., 420 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D.Mo. 1976); Greenwald v. Cunard Steam-Ship Company, 162 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); See Baker v. Chicago, Fire & Burglary Detection, Inc., 489 F.2d 953 (7th Cir.1973). We reverse the district court's decision and reinstate the judgment of the magistrate court. [4] Costs to appellant. No attorney fees on appeal. BAKES, C.J., and McFADDEN and SHEPARD, JJ., concur. BISTLINE, J., concurs in result.