Opinion ID: 738528
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutionality of La. R.S. 40:1299.35.5(B)(4) & (6)

Text: 46 Act 1254 changes Louisiana's judicial bypass procedure so that a minor who demonstrates that she is mature, well-informed, or that an abortion would be in her best interest, may receive judicial authorization for the abortion. La. R.S. 40:1299.35.5(B)(4), (6). In addition, Act 1254 sets up a state-sponsored evaluation and counseling scheme to which a minor may be referred within forty-eight hours of a hearing before the juvenile court. La. R.S. 40:1299.35.5(B)(4). The plaintiffs challenge (B)(4) and (6) on two grounds. First, the plaintiffs claim that (B)(4) and (6) violate the Bellotti II principle that mature and well-informed minors and those for whom an abortion is in their best interest must receive judicial authorization to have an abortion. Second, the plaintiffs claim that (B)(4)'s requirement that minors receive counseling from state health and social services agencies violates the Bellotti II principle that bypass proceedings are to proceed expeditiously. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs on both issues. We discuss each of these holdings in turn. 47
48 The 1981 version of § 1299.35.5(B) provided that if a minor demonstrates that she is either mature and well-informed or that the abortion would be in her best interest, the juvenile court shall order an abortion. La. R.S. 40:1299.35.5(B)(4), (5) (West 1992). As we noted above, this language appeared in Louisiana's judicial bypass statute because of the Supreme Court's decision in Bellotti II, which rendered the 1978 version of § 1299.35.5(B) unconstitutional. See Margaret S. (I), 488 F.Supp. at 203. And with, among other things, the addition of the mandatory shall language, the 1981 version of § 1299.35.5(B) survived a constitutional challenge. Margaret S. (II), 597 F.Supp. at 650-52. 49 Against this legislative backdrop, the district court declared § 1299.35.5(B)(4) and (6) unconstitutional. The court looked to the common meaning of the terms shall and may and concluded that the Louisiana Legislature intended a change in the statutory framework governing the judicial bypass procedure. [T]he clear intent of the statutory amendment, reasoned the district court, was to grant the substantive power of discretion to the judges of this state that is directly contrary to the rulings of the Supreme Court in Casey, Akron II and Bellotti II. 905 F.Supp. at 364. 50 The State in its briefs and at oral argument strenuously asserts that § 1299.35.5(B)(4) and (6) is constitutional because (1) the change from shall to may does not confer discretion on juvenile court judges to deny a minor an abortion if the minor is mature and well-informed or if the abortion is in the minor's best interest; and (2) subsections (B)(4) and (6) are procedural in nature and therefore do not contradict the substantive federal law in this area. Neither of these arguments is persuasive. 51 We reject the State's contention that the change from shall to may does not confer discretion on juvenile court judges. We note by way of illustration that with one partial exception, 9 Louisiana stands alone on this front: As far as we are aware, every state with a parental consent or notification statute has used the mandatory shall language in their bypass schemes. 10 The State's argument that subsections (4) and (6) pass constitutional muster takes one of two forms. First, the word change does not on its face give juvenile courts the discretion to deny a minor an abortion if the minor shows that she is mature, well-informed, or that the abortion would be in her best interest; or, alternatively, even though the statute on its face states that a juvenile court judge may order an abortion if the Bellotti II requirements are met, we should not assume that juvenile court judges will not order an abortion in violation of Bellotti II. 52 The State itself sows the seeds for rejecting the claim that shall ostensibly carries the same meaning as may. In its briefs and at oral argument, the State claims that in determining the constitutionality of § 1299.35.5(B), we should follow Louisiana's rules of statutory construction. When we consider the constitutionality of state statutes, we look to the rules of statutory construction of the state, see, e.g., Leavitt v. Jane, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. 2068, 2069-72, 135 L.Ed.2d 443 (1996) (per curiam); Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d at 1341-42, mindful of the principle that we should avoid federal-court nullification of state law, Leavitt, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2072, and [w]here fairly possible, ... construe a statute to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality, Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 493, 103 S.Ct. at 2526; Akron II, 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. at 2980-81. 53 Under Louisiana law, the paramount consideration for statutory interpretation is the ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or reasons which prompted the legislature to enact the law. Fontenot v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 676 So.2d 557, 562 (La.1996). In searching for the legislative intent behind subsections (4) and (6), we begin with Article 9 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides: 54 When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. 55 La. C.C. art. 9 (West 1996); Tucker v. Fowler, 668 So.2d 718, 719 (La.1996); Marine Marketing Servs., Inc. v. Louisiana Dep't of Ins., 673 So.2d 335, 338 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.1996) (holding that it was reversible error for trial court to look to statutory intent when the language of the statute was neither ambiguous nor produced absurd consequences). When the wording of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. La. R.S. 1:4 (West 1996); Sumrall v. Luhr Bros., 665 So.2d 796, 800 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.1995), writ denied, 669 So.2d 425 (La.1996). 56 Thus, when determining the Louisiana Legislature's intent behind subsections (4) and (6), we may only go beyond the plain terms of § 1299.35.5(B)(4) and (6) if the statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous or if application of the terms of subsections (4) and (6) produces absurd consequences. We have found no decisions from the Louisiana courts interpreting the meaning of subsections (B)(4) and (6), no decisions interpreting the pertinent provisions of the 1981 version of § 1299.35.5(B), and no legislative history explaining the 1995 change from shall to may. We therefore apply Louisiana's principles of statutory construction to § 1299.35.5(B)(4) and (6). 57 We hold that § 1299.35.5(B)(4) and (6) plainly violates Bellotti II. As such, the statute is neither unclear nor ambiguous, nor does application of its plain terms produce absurd results. La. R.S. 1:3 (West 1996) provides: 58 § 3. Words and phrases; how construed 59 Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning. 60 The word shall is mandatory and the word may is permissive. 61 (emphasis added); see also La. C.C. art. 11 (West 1996) (The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning.); Backhus v. Transit Cas. Co., 549 So.2d 283, 289 (La.1989) (same). We can imagine no more clear indication that § 1299.35.5(B)(4) and (6) on its face provides juvenile court judges discretion to deny an abortion to a minor who has met the Bellotti II requirements. The basic guide for interpreting Louisiana statutes states in unmistakably clear terms that shall means mandatory and that may means permissive. Moreover, the common usage of the term permissive is [a]llowed; allowable; that which may be done[;][l]enient; tolerant. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 1140 (6th ed.1990); Sumrall, 665 So.2d at 800 (looking to Black's Law Dictionary for common and approved usage). Thus, the plain language of § 1299.35.5(B)(4) and (6) states that juvenile court judges within Louisiana have the discretion to deny an abortion to a minor even though the minor demonstrates that she is mature, well-informed, or that the abortion would be in her best interest. This flies in the face of Bellotti II and its progeny. 62 Our reading of the statute does not produce absurd consequences. We have done nothing more than apply the meaning of may and shall that exists in La. R.S. 1:3 to a statute that is neither unclear nor ambiguous on its face. Louisiana courts have not declared that this sort of bread-and-butter interpretation of statutes produces absurd consequences. Compare Breaux v. Hoffpauir, 674 So.2d 234, 236 (La.1996) (holding that interpretation of Louisiana statute would lead to absurd consequence because state definition of actual wages would be illegal under federal statute); Washington-St. Tammany Electrical Coop., Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 671 So.2d 908, 914 (La.1996) (absurd consequence results when interpretation contravenes the purposes of the statute). 63 The State would have us read § 1299.35.5(B) differently. They claim that § 1299.35.5(B) provides only the procedural means needed for Louisiana state judges to apply the federal substantive principles in this area of law to individual cases in order to issue judgments in accordance with such substantive principles. Because, argues the State, § 1299.35.5(B) is a procedural statute, we must liberally construe the statute to effectuate its overall purposes. Second, the State points to the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Rathborne Lumber & Supply Co. v. Falgout, 218 La. 629, 50 So.2d 295 (1950), in which the court stated in dictum: [A]lthough words of a statute are permissive, ... sometimes they may require an interpretation giving them mandatory effect ... where the context or subject matter compels such construction or where it is necessary to carry out the clear policy and intention of the Legislature. Id. at 635, 50 So.2d 295; accord Romero v. Stephens, 359 So.2d 1061, 1065 (La.Ct.App.3d Cir.1978); Gurtler, Hebert & Co. v. Marquette Casualty Co., 145 So.2d 145, 147-48 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir.1962). But see Hornsby v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank of Baton Rouge, 243 So.2d 96, 98 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.1971) (declining to follow Falgout, adhering to La. R.S. 1:3, and interpreting may and shall to mean permissive and mandatory, respectively). Thus, concludes the State, we should follow Falgout in this case and effectuate the intent of the Louisiana Legislature as expressed in § 1299.35.0--It is the intention of the Legislature of the State of Louisiana to regulate abortion to the extent permitted by decisions of the United States Supreme Court. We reject both arguments. 64 For us to accept the State's claim that Act 1254 is a procedural statute that merely effectuates the substantive federal law in this area, we would have to conclude that the legislature did not in 1995 intend to change § 1299.35.5(B). In other words, we would have to hold that the change from shall to may has no bearing on the constitutionality of Act 1254 because Act 1254 does not materially change the 1981 version of § 1299.35.5(B). We cannot accept the State's proposition that Act 1254 does not change the law. First, we would in effect be interpreting the statute so that may means shall, an interpretation that would be flatly inconsistent with the definition of those terms in La. R.S. 1:3. Second, we would be ignoring the Louisiana Supreme Court's understanding of statutory changes. The court has said: The legislature is presumed to have enacted a statute in light of the preceding statutes involving the same subject matter and court decisions construing those statutes, and where the new statute is worded differently from the preceding statute, the legislature is presumed to have intended to change the law. New Orleans Rosenbush Claims Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 653 So.2d 538, 544 (La.1995) (emphasis added). Nothing the State has said in their briefs or at oral argument persuades us that Act 1254 does not materially change the judicial bypass procedure in Louisiana. 65 Perhaps the most basic flaw in the State's arguments is the assumption that we must go beyond the plain meaning of § 1299.35.5(B)(4) and (6). We decline to do so because, as we have said, the language of subsections (4) and (6) is clear, unambiguous, and does not produce absurd consequences. The State points us to no authority, and we perceive none, suggesting that procedural statutes are immune from Article 9's clear mandate. In addition, the State fails to provide any authority, and again we perceive none, for the proposition that Falgout is an exception to Article 9's statutory construction principle. 66 Finally, the State argues that if we interpret § 1299.5.5(B)(4) and (6) to mean that juvenile court judges have the discretion to deny an abortion to a minor that meets the Bellotti II requirements, we would be indulging the inappropriate assumption that Louisiana judges will decline to follow the federal Constitution. We agree with the State that we should refrain from assuming that state actors will violate the law. [T]he Fifth Circuit is not, as we have recognized, a 'roving commission[ ] assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's laws.'  Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d at 1342 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). 67 However, we make no such assumption here. We have held that § 1299.35.5(B)(4) and (6) on its face is inconsistent with Bellotti II and its progeny because it invests juvenile court judges with the discretion to deny a minor an abortion even though she satisfies the Bellotti II requirements. As such, this case is plainly distinguishable from our decision in Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335. There, the plaintiffs brought a facial challenge against a rule promulgated by the Mississippi Supreme Court pursuant to a bypass statute that did not on its face conflict with Bellotti II. Id. at 1337-41. The Mississippi statute notably provided that if a minor demonstrates that she is mature and well-informed or that the abortion would be in her best interest, the court must order the abortion. Id. at 1342 n. 4. The procedural rule challenged by the plaintiffs, although it was worded differently than the language in Bellotti II, did not on its face conflict with the statute. Id. at 1341 ([T]he rule requires a minor to plead that notifying her parents of the abortion is not in her best interest.). Accordingly, we rejected the challenge to the Mississippi Supreme Court's procedural rule on the ground that [i]f a Mississippi court does follow [the procedural rule] so as to conflict with Bellotti, a plaintiff will be free to launch an as-applied challenge to the bypass procedure. Id. at 1342. 68 Here, we face an entirely different situation. Juvenile court judges within Louisiana have a legislatively prescribed choice whether to order an abortion for a minor who is mature, well-informed, or for whom an abortion would be in her best interest. It is this discretion itself, and not the exercise of it, that we find inconsistent with Bellotti II. 69 In short, § 1299.35.5(B)(4) and (6) is unconstitutional. We affirm the district court's decision to permanently enjoin these provisions of Act 1254. 70
71 Section 1299.35.5(B)(3) provides that [e]ach application shall be heard in chambers, anonymously, in a summary manner, and within forty-eight hours of the filing thereof. Except for the admonition that the hearing proceed in a summary manner, subsection (B)(3) on its face does not provide a specific time frame for deciding the merits of a minor's application. Section 1299.35.5(B)(4) provides that a juvenile court may require a minor to attend various state-sponsored evaluation and counseling sessions within forty-eight hours of the ex parte hearing with the juvenile court judge. Subsection (B)(4), like subsection (3), does not on its face provide a time frame within which that evaluation is to be completed and the results forwarded to the court. Nor does subsection (4) contain the summary manner language found in subsection (3). 72 The plaintiffs claim that § 1299.35.5(B)(3) and (4) violates the Bellotti II requirement that bypass procedures proceed expeditiously because both subsections provide an indefinite time period for the juvenile court judge to decide the merits of the minor's application. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs that subsections (B)(3) and (4) did not meet the Bellotti II requirement for expeditious resolution of bypass applications. 905 F.Supp. at 365. 11 On appeal, the State argues that the district court erred in reaching this conclusion because the statute requires juvenile court judges to conduct the proceedings in a summary manner, and to hold that this provision violates Bellotti II, we would have to assume that a state district judge would intentionally ignore the requirements of state law and the dictates of the United States Supreme Court. 73 We agree with the district court that subsections (B)(3) and (4) are inconsistent with Bellotti II because they do not provide for an expeditious resolution of the minor's bypass application. We again frame our analysis in accord with Louisiana's rules of statutory construction and determine whether proceeding in a summary manner satisfies Bellotti II 's expedition requirement. Louisiana Civil Code article 2595 (West 1996) provides that in a summary proceeding, [t]he court shall render its decision as soon as practicable after the conclusion of the trial of a summary proceeding and, whenever practicable, without taking the matter under advisement. (Emphasis added). 74 Such an open-ended bypass procedure has never been approved. We should not, as the Supreme Court has suggested, invalidate[ ] [a bypass] statute on a facial challenge based upon a worst-case analysis that may never occur. Akron II, 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. at 2981. The Supreme Court has held that a seventeen- and twenty-two-day delay satisfies Bellotti II. Akron II, 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. at 2980-81 (22 days); Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 479 n. 4, 491 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 2519 n. 4, 2525 n. 16 (17 days). An indefinite period, however, has been rejected. In Glick v. McKay, 937 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.1991), 12 the Ninth Circuit determined the constitutionality of the bypass procedure in Nevada's parental notification statute. Like Louisiana's bypass procedure, Nevada's statute did not on its face provide a time frame within which a minor's bypass application was to be decided. Id. at 438. The Ninth Circuit struck down the statute as inconsistent with Bellotti II. Under the statute, reasoned the court, the district court could ... delay the bypass procedure indefinitely. The district court review procedure does not meet the Bellotti expediency criterion. Id. at 440-41; see also id. at 441 n. 4 (stating that an indefinite period does not satisfy Bellotti II ). 75 Subsections (B)(3) and (4) plainly conflict with Bellotti II because the juvenile court is not required to rule on the minor's application within any specified time nor are state counselors required to report back to the juvenile court within any specified time. We hold that whenever practicable does not satisfy constitutional standards of expediency. There is no fall-back (or constructive authorization) provision within subsection (3) that deems a minor's application granted in the event the juvenile court does not act within a particular time frame. Thus, not only do subsections (3) and (4) fail to provide any specific time within which a minor's application will be decided, but they give no assurances (assurances required by Bellotti II ) that the proceedings will conclude expeditiously. 76 The State attempts to rescue subsection (3) by pointing to Article 2591 (West 1961) of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides: Summary proceedings are those which are conducted with rapidity, within the delays allowed by the court, and without citation and the observance of all the formalities required in ordinary proceedings. (Emphasis added). Plainly, the rapidity language refers to the expeditiousness of the summary proceeding itself, not to the time a judge has to decide the merits of a case. We inevitably return to article 2595 which does, as we have said, prescribe the time frame within which a decision in a summary proceeding is to be rendered--as soon as practicable. This is insufficient under Bellotti II. 77 Finally, contrary to the State's contention, we do not portray Louisiana juvenile court judges or state-employed counselors as individuals who would intentionally violate Bellotti II, nor are we analyzing the constitutionality of subsections (B)(3) and (4) under a worst-case scenario. We have simply looked to the plain terms of § 1299.35.5(B)(3) and (4) to determine the rules juvenile court judges are required to follow when presented with a bypass application from a minor. The Louisiana Legislature has told them that they must rule on the application as soon as or whenever practicable. This violates Bellotti II 's expedition requirement on its face. We therefore affirm the district court's decision to permanently enjoin subsections (3) and (4). 78