Opinion ID: 2809776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: scope of any duty of care

Text: [¶62] Finally, the extent of the duty defined by the Court today is distinct from the duties determined to exist in Stanton and Schultz. In Stanton, the University was determined to have “a duty to reasonably warn and advise students of steps they could take to improve their personal safety” in college dormitories—not a duty to prevent any individuals’ commission of torts against other individuals. 2001 ME 96, ¶ 10, 773 A.2d 1045. In Schultz, the duty at issue was a duty of care to prevent an assault “reasonably to be foreseen” based on a school security agent’s observation of specific evidence of an intrusion into the girls’ dormitory—not a generalized duty to prevent a sexual assault from occurring against a social invitee of an adult resident in a building that was not posted with a security guard. 332 A.2d at 371; see also Johnson, 712 N.E.2d at 975 (holding that a national fraternity that does not undertake to provide security services does not assume a duty of care). [¶63] If the Court is correct that the duty imposed is “no more onerous or unexpected than the duty society imposes upon a university to exercise care in the administration of its dormitories,” Court’s Opinion ¶ 27, then the duty imposed must be similar to the duty to warn of steps that could improve personal safety, see Stanton, 2001 ME 96, ¶ 10, 773 A.2d 1045, or the duty to prevent an assault if the national fraternity provides security services in the local chapter’s house and 36 observes evidence of misconduct, see Schultz, 332 A.2d at 371. No facts demonstrating a breach of such a limited duty have been presented on summary judgment. [¶64] The duty that the Court adopts today is, instead, a more expansive duty “to exercise reasonable care and take reasonable steps to provide premises that are reasonably safe and reasonably free from the potential of sexual misconduct by [the fraternity’s] members, for all social invitees to chapter-sponsored events.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 29. This broad and vaguely defined duty is fundamentally at odds with basic principles of tort law. The duty of reasonable care in providing a reasonably safe premises “is not one of absolute care or of an insurer.” Simmons, Zillman & Gregory, Maine Tort Law § 8.02 at 8-3 (2004 ed.). On the summary judgment record presented, the Court can only be understood to suggest that a national fraternity is such a general insurer, given that the Court has not identified which facts presented on summary judgment would, if believed, demonstrate any breach of the amorphous duty announced. See Estate of Cabatit, 2014 ME 133, ¶ 8, 105 A.3d 439 (requiring a plaintiff to present facts demonstrating a prima facie case for a claim to survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment). It is unclear what measures DTD was duty-bound to undertake, and it is even less clear how the evidence presented on summary judgment could demonstrate that DTD failed to undertake any such measures. 37 [¶65] Thus, even if any duty did exist, I would conclude that the scope of that duty could not be so broad as to require DTD, which was not present at the social gathering, to generally insure against the risk of sexual misconduct being committed on the premises by a member against a social invitee during the event. The evidence presented by Brown to establish a prima facie case is inadequate to demonstrate a breach of any appropriately limited duty that could be imposed on DTD for purposes of premises liability.