Opinion ID: 2067933
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Second Duren Element

Text: [¶ 25] The second Duren element requires Holland to show that the representation of African-Americans (Holland refers to all minorities in arguing the second Duren element, not just to African-Americans as he had in the first element) [6] in panels from which juries are selected in Androscoggin County is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community. Courts have discussed various forms of statistical analysis that may be used to establish the second Duren element. We have not previously addressed these methods of statistical analysis. See State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1259-61 (Me.1983) (holding that the defendant failed to satisfy the first element of the Duren test, obviating the need to consider the latter two elements). [¶ 26] Holland mentions three analytical methods courts have adopted, noting that most have applied the absolute disparity test. He urges us not to adopt that test, however, and appears to suggest that we instead apply the approach taken in United States v. Osorio, 801 F.Supp. 966, 977-78 (D.Conn.1992) (applying, then rejecting the results of, the absolute numbers test adopted in the Second Circuit). [7] [¶ 27] Although the United States Supreme Court has not mandated the use of any particular test, the Court considered only the absolute disparity test in Duren to determine whether the distinctive group at issue was underrepresented in venire panels. Duren, 439 U.S. at 365-66, 99 S.Ct. 664; see also Royal, 174 F.3d at 8. The First Circuit has consistently applied the absolute disparity test over the comparative disparity test in such cases. [8] See Royal, 174 F.3d at 7-8 (describing the comparative disparity test and its historical rejection thereof); Hafen, 726 F.2d at 23-24 (applying the absolute disparity test in the case before it, though acknowledging that the complete exclusion of a small distinctive group will result in only a small absolute disparity). [¶ 28] The absolute disparity test measures the difference between the percentage of members of the distinctive group in the community and the percentage of group members on the jury wheel, though the test has often been applied by measuring the difference between the percentage of members of the distinctive group in the community who are eligible for jury duty, at least with respect to age, and the percentage of group members on the jury wheel. See, e.g., Duren, 439 U.S. at 364-66, 99 S.Ct. 664 (comparing the percentage of the distinctive group in jury venires to the percentage of the group, women, in the community); Royal, 174 F.3d at 6-7, 10 (comparing the percentage of black persons eighteen years or older in the community to the percentage on the jury wheel); United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 23 n. 5 (1st Cir.1994) (defining the absolute disparity standard as the gross spread between the percentage of eligible Hispanics ... in the relevant population and the percentage of Hispanic representation on the Master Jury Wheel); Hafen, 726 F.2d at 23 (calculating the difference between the percentage of eligible blacks in the population [i.e., age eighteen or over] and the percentage of blacks on the master wheel). [¶ 29] Several Courts of Appeals, including the First Circuit, have held, often citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-09, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) (analyzing an equal protection claim), overruled in part on other grounds as explained in Rivera v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1446, 1455, 173 L.Ed.2d 320 (2009), that an absolute disparity of less than 10% is not sufficient to demonstrate underrepresentation pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Carmichael, 560 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir.2009) (stating that it is black-letter law in that circuit that an absolute disparity of 10% or less does not satisfy the second Duren element); United States v. Gault, 141 F.3d 1399, 1402-03 (10th Cir.1998) (absolute disparity of 7% permissible), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 910, 119 S.Ct. 253, 142 L.Ed.2d 208 (1998); United States v. Joost, 1996 U.S.App. Lexis 21959, at  (1st Cir. Aug. 7, 1996) (citing Hafen, 726 F.2d at 23) (approving an absolute disparity of 7.13% and noting that disparities up to 10% are widely considered not to constitute underrepresentation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 974, 117 S.Ct. 408, 136 L.Ed.2d 321 (1996); United States v. Ashley, 54 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that a disparity of less than 10% alone is insufficient to demonstrate underrepresentation), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 888, 116 S.Ct. 232, 133 L.Ed.2d 161 (1995); United States v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 1990) (absolute disparity of 8% permissible); United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir.1981) (absolute disparity of 5.45% permissible), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 2274, 73 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1982); United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir.1981) (absolute disparity of 7.2% permissible). [¶ 30] Though we recognize the inherent limitations of the test, as with each of the statistical tools discussed, the absolute disparity test utilized by the United States Supreme Court and the First Circuit appears to be the appropriate method for measuring representativeness in our jury pools. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. 692. [¶ 31] At jury selection, Holland offered evidence, in the form of census statistics from 2000, see Duren, 439 U.S. at 365 n. 24, 99 S.Ct. 664 (indicating that six-year-old census data may be used to show a Sixth Amendment cross-section violation), that African-Americans constituted 0.7% of the total population of Androscoggin County, but that none of the eighty-one potential jurors in his jury pool appeared to be African-American. It is unknown how many African-Americans in Androscoggin County were qualified on the basis of age for jury duty. It is also unknown how many of the 151 people originally called to jury duty and who were excused or deferred from jury duty, or who failed to appear at the venire, may have been African-American. See Pion, 25 F.3d at 23 n. 5 (observing that the absolute disparity test properly measures the difference between the percentage of eligible members of the distinctive group and percentage on the jury wheel, not the percentage who appear for jury orientation). Therefore, applying the absolute disparity test to the extent possible by comparing the percentage of African-Americans in the community (.7%) to the percentage who were, based on mere observation, in Holland's eighty-one person jury pool (0%), the disparity is 0.7%. [9] Though we need not necessarily adopt the 10% disparity threshold that many courts have adopted, the 0.7% disparity is not sufficient to show underrepresentation of African-Americans in Holland's jury pool. [10] See Ashley, 54 F.3d at 313-14 (holding that an absolute 3% discrepancy between the 3% of voting-age African-Americans in the population and the 0% of African-Americans on the jury venire was not shown to be more than statistical coincidence). [11]