Opinion ID: 1598841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Manslaughter Defense

Text: Under the heading II. REFUSAL OF THE MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION, the Court of Appeals stated the following: The defendant also claims that the court erred in refusing a manslaughter instruction. Specifically, the defendant claims in his brief that the lower court erred in refusing all defense instructions as well as all defenses. The lower court denied defense's request for instructions dealing with manslaughter, deliberate design, and insanity. The defendant testified in essence that he did not know what he was doing at the time of the shooting and that he had no intention of hurting his wife when he met her at the bank. The court ruled that all of the defendant's testimony of the incidences which led up to the shooting was not admissible. We disagree. The defendant's testimony should have been admitted on the issue of insanity and on the issue of manslaughter. The defendant sought to testify that he was disoriented and confused and that he was under the care of a doctor for a pituitary tumor. He also testified that he had no intention of hurting his wife when he went to the bank to meet her. The defendant further claimed that he did not know what he was doing at the time of the shooting. In light of this testimony, the jury could have found the defendant guilty of manslaughter or found the defendant insane. The testimony should have been admitted and the proper jury instructions should have been given. Slip opinion at 7. The Court of Appeals quoted from Giles v. State, 650 So.2d 846, 849 (Miss.1995), where this Court stated that [e]ven though based on meager evidence and highly unlikely, a defendant is entitled to have every legal defense he asserts to be submitted as a factual issue for determination by the jury under proper instruction. Much of the State's argument that the Court of Appeals reached a conclusion inconsistent with existing Mississippi law is based on a misreading of the opinion. The State contends that the Court of Appeals coupled the insanity issue with the manslaughter issue and held that evidence of insanity reduces murder to manslaughter. The language of the opinion shows that these are spoken of in the alternative: In light of this testimony, the jury could have found the defendant guilty of manslaughter or found the defendant insane. Some of the confusion is generated by the Court of Appeals' choice of discussing and resolving issues unrelated to the question of the manslaughter instruction under this heading and issue. The second issue, as discussed by the Court of Appeals, could more properly be labeled as whether the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theories of defense, not just manslaughter. As Russell notes in his response, the State is not really arguing a conflict with prior case law; the State is arguing whether the evidence rises to the threshold level required for a manslaughter instruction. Under Giles all that is required is a meager, highly unlikely showing, and the Court of Appeals concluded that the requirements had been met. The State, relying on Taylor v. State, 452 So.2d 441 (Miss.1984), argues that the defenses of insanity and manslaughter are distinct defenses and that an imperfect insanity defense does not warrant a manslaughter instruction. Though there is nothing wrong with that statement in the abstract, it does not control in this case. In Taylor, holding that manslaughter was not to be decided upon expert testimony, the Court distinguished the case then before itin which an insanity defense was not offeredfrom situations, as now before us, wherein both manslaughter and insanity defenses were presented. The Court here said: In Collins v. State, [361 So.2d 333 (Miss. 1978)] expert psychiatric testimony was admitted into evidence and the defendant was convicted of manslaughter and not murder. But that case is not authority for the admission of expert opinion evidence where the defense of insanity is not raised. In Collins both the defense of insanity and the alternative defense of manslaughter were raised at trial. Therefore, the expert opinion testimony was clearly admissible. Appellant here did not raise the complete defense of insanity. Therein lies the crucial difference between the two cases. Where insanity is not the defense, the determination of the ultimate fact of murder or manslaughter is left to the jury and is not subject to expert opinion. Taylor at 449 (citations omitted).