Opinion ID: 2584043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Awarded by Court of Appeals

Text: Sara contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it awarded attorney fees to Christopher pursuant to RCW 26.09.140, based on its determination that he was entitled to such fees as the prevailing party on appeal. Rideout, 110 Wash.App. at 382, 40 P.3d 1192. In support of her contention, Sara argues that RCW 26.09.140 permits awards of appellate fees based on need and ability to pay and that RCW 26.09.140 has nothing to do with prevailing parties. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 16. RCW 26.09.140 provides in relevant part that: The court from time to time after considering the financial resources of both parties may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter and for reasonable attorney's fees or other professional fees in connection therewith.... Upon any appeal, the appellate court may, in its discretion, order a party to pay for the cost to the other party of maintaining the appeal and attorney's fees in addition to statutory costs. (Emphasis added.) We agree with Sara. The aforementioned statute does not support an award of attorney fees to a party simply on the basis that they are prevailing. Although the statute does invest appellate courts with discretion to order a party to pay fees and costs to the opposing party, that provision must be read in light of the fact that the statute ties the award of fees to a consideration of financial circumstances. Here, there is no indication that the relative financial circumstances of the parties were a consideration in the award of fees to Christopher. It was, therefore, error for the court to award attorney fees to Christopher pursuant to RCW 26.09.140. However, Christopher also sought fees at the Court of Appeals under RCW 26.09.160. Concluding that an award of fees was appropriate under RCW 26.09.140, the Court of Appeals made no mention of Christopher's request under RCW 26.09.160. Rideout, 110 Wash.App. at 382, 40 P.3d 1192. On appeal, [w]e may affirm the [lower] court on any grounds established by the pleadings and supported by the record. Truck Ins. Exch. v. VanPort Homes, Inc., 147 Wash.2d 751, 766, 58 P.3d 276 (2002). Indeed, a reviewing court can sustain a grant of attorney fees under a different statute than the one relied upon by the lower court. State ex rel. A.N.C. v. Grenley, 91 Wash.App. 919, 927-28, 959 P.2d 1130, review denied, 136 Wash.2d 1031, 972 P.2d 467 (1998). RCW 26.09.160(1) provides as follows: An attempt by a parent ... to refuse to perform the duties provided in the parenting plan, ... shall be deemed bad faith and shall be punished by the court by holding the party in contempt of court and by awarding to the aggrieved party reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incidental in bringing a motion for contempt of court. (Emphasis added.) In addition, RCW 26.09.160(2)(b)(ii) provides: (b) If, based on all the facts and circumstances, the court finds after hearing that the parent, in bad faith, has not complied with the order establishing residential provisions for the child, the court shall find the parent in contempt of court. Upon a finding of contempt, the court shall order: .... (ii) The parent to pay, to the moving party, all court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred as a result of the noncompliance, and any reasonable expenses incurred in locating or returning a child.... (Emphasis added.) These statutes have application to these circumstances. We say that because all of the proceedings before the Court of Appeals focused on Sara's noncompliance with the residential provisions of the parenting plan relating to the Rideouts' children. Although the statutes do not speak directly to attorney fees on appeal, we agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in In re Parentage of Schroeder, 106 Wash.App. 343, 353-54, 22 P.3d 1280 (2001), that a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal to the extent the fees relate to the issue of contempt. As we have observed above, Sara acted in bad faith in not complying with the court order establishing residential provisions for Caroline. She must, therefore, pay Christopher's attorney fees and costs for his appeal to the Court of Appeals, in accordance with RCW 26.09.160(1), (2)(b)(ii).