Opinion ID: 2494205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Standing to Bring Vagueness Challenge

Text: We last address a standing-related argument specific to NOM's vagueness claims. Defendants argue that NOM cannot bring a vagueness challenge to the non-major-purpose PAC definition, as well as to its corresponding definition of the term expenditure, [20] because NOM's advocacy efforts were clearly covered by the provisions' terms. In so arguing, defendants rely on the well-established proposition that a `plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.' Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, ___ U.S. ____, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2719, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)). [21] Defendants contend that certain postcards NOM sent in September 2010 targeting state legislative candidates were unambiguously covered by the non-major-purpose PAC statute and expenditure definition, i.e., that they were for the purpose of promoting, defeating or influencing in any way a candidate election, Me.Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, § 1052(5)(A)(5), and for the purpose of influencing the . . . election of any person to political office; or for the initiation, support or defeat of a campaign, id. § 1052(4)(A)(1). The defendants' argument is off-target for at least two reasons. First, the question of whether the non-major-purpose PAC provisions clearly applied to NOM's September mailings is irrelevant to NOM's standing to bring its vagueness claims. Because this is a preenforcement challenge based on conduct forgone due to an alleged chill, the appropriate focus for the defendants' arguments would be on whether the statutory terms are clear in their application to [NOM's] proposed conduct. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. at 2720 (emphasis added). Moreover, the judgment in this case was entered and NOM's appeal was filed in August 2010, and thus evidence of NOM's September 2010 advocacy efforts is not properly part of the record on appeal. [22] At the time of the hearing below, NOM had not yet engaged in any advocacy efforts in Maine in 2010. Second, NOM's claim is not simply a challenge to the vagueness of the provisions as they would be applied to its actual or intended advocacy efforts; NOM also brings a facial challenge to the provisions under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. The bar against vagueness challenges by those whose conduct the law clearly proscribes is relaxed . . . in the First Amendment context, permitting plaintiffs to argue that a statute is overbroad because it is unclear whether it regulates a substantial amount of protected speech. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008). [23] We thus see no bar to reaching the merits of NOM's vagueness challenge to the non-major-purpose PAC provisions.