Opinion ID: 37721
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim 9(d)

Text: Shields insists that his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to (1) object to Dr. Gripon’s testimony based on the inadmissible reports on which Dr. Gripon based it,60 and (2) challenge Dr. Gripon under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702. Specifically, Shields emphasizes that trial counsel failed to voir dire Dr. Gripon under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 705(b) to determine the foundations of his opinion. Shields also contends that trial counsel failed to challenge Dr. Gripon’s qualification as an expert under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702. We reject Shields’s arguments and decline to issue a COA on this claim. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 705(b) “allows counsel to voir dire expert witnesses outside the presence of the jury to admissibility under Rule 404(b).”) (citations and quotations omitted). 60 Contrary to the state’s argument and the district court’s finding, Shields explicitly argued in his state habeas petition that Dr. Gripon testified on the basis of reports that were never admitted at trial. 40 learn what facts the expert is basing his or her opinion on.”61 “[N]either the rule nor the case law creates a presumption of error if counsel fails to request voir dire.”62 Texas courts have often held that the rule is not violated when nothing in the record indicates that counsel did not know on what facts the expert witness based his opinion.63 In other words, when defense counsel knows the basis of the expert’s opinion, there is no need to invoke this rule.64 Here, the record confirms beyond cavil that defense counsel was cognizant of the reports on which Dr. Gripon based his opinion. Although Shields points to no specific reports in his federal petition, in his state habeas petition, he challenged Dr. Gripon’s reliance on the reports of Drs. Felthous, Barrett, Hungerford, Franke, and Freedman. If Shields knew of the basis of Dr. Gripon’s opinion, his counsel must have. Further, Dr. Gripon explicitly testified at trial that he based his opinion on these reports. It is thus clear that because defense counsel knew of the basis of Dr. Gripon’s opinion, it would have been 61 Saenz v. State, 103 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); see Brown v. State, 974 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). 62 Saenz, 103 S.W.3d at 546; Brown, 974 S.W.2d at 292. 63 Saenz, 103 S.W.3d at 546; Brown, 974 S.W.2d at 292. 64 Saenz, 103 S.W.3d at 546; Brown, 974 S.W.2d at 292. 41 futile to invoke Rule 705(b). In addition, we note that Shields provides no explanation as to why any of the reports on which Dr. Gripon based his testimony would have been inadmissible. In any event, under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 703, an expert “can . . . base his opinion partially on facts or data which is inadmissible, if such information is commonly relied upon by experts within his field.”65 We perceive no ineffective assistance in counsel’s failure to challenge Dr. Gripon’s reliance on, inter alia, the autopsy report of Dr. Hungerford and psychiatric reports on Shields from 1993. In addition, our review of the trial transcript convinces us that defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Gripon, including questioning him at the opening of his testimony with regard to the validity of his expert opinion. There is no merit to this claim. Shields also insists that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to Dr. Gripon on the basis of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.66 Specifically, Shields argues that “the methodology used by Dr. Gripon was inadequate and unreliable under the Daubert test because he based his 65 Joiner v. State, 825 S.W.2d 701, 707-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (citing Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). 66 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 42 assessment of future dangerousness entirely on his judgment, not on any empirical data concerning base rates of violence of lifesentenced prisoners convicted of capital murder, nor on any other data that the science of violence risk assessment recognizes.” As noted, though, Dr. Gripon based his psychiatric opinion on future dangerousness on the records that related to Shields and Paula Stiner’s murder. Even though we are somewhat troubled by the absence of a personal interview of Shields by Dr. Gripon,67 we cannot say that counsel was ineffective in failing to make a Daubert objection to Dr. Gripon’s testimony. Our review of the record demonstrates that Dr. Gripon adequately established his expert credentials, which included prior testimony as to the future dangerousness of a perpetrator on between twelve to eighteen occasions. We have also noted our awareness of no clearly established law that prevents a psychiatrist from basing his opinion on the records of the case and the psychiatric records of the perpetrator. Shields has established no prejudice here. Although trial counsel did not object to the testimony of Dr. Gripon, the defense did put on its own expert witnesses during the punishment phase to rebut Dr. Gripon’s testimony. Dr. 67 See Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., specially concurring). 43 Fason testified as to the possible unreliability of future dangerousness testimony, and Dr. Marquart testified that studies reveal that capital inmates are no more likely to commit future violent acts than any other inmates. Trial counsel was not ineffective when he elected to rely on rebuttal witnesses to discredit Dr. Gripon’s testimony instead of futilely filing a Daubert objection. We reject Shields’s arguments and deny a COA on this claim.