Opinion ID: 163848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 21 We first consider Ms. Doubinin's jurisdictional challenge. She asserts that the district court did not have jurisdiction to dismiss her complaint because, in doing so, it violated Rules 12 and 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A judgment is not void merely because it is or may be erroneous. V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir.1979). Ms. Doubinin's argument, based on her claim that the district court erroneously applied the rules, does not implicate the court's jurisdiction, which is the power to adjudicate the case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). Post-Judgment Relief 22 We turn to Ms. Doubinin's claim that she is entitled to relief from the judgment striking her amended complaint and dismissing the action. We review the district court's decision to deny a Rule 60(b)(6) post-judgment motion for an abuse of discretion, keeping in mind that such relief `is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.' Amoco Oil Co. v. U.S. EPA, 231 F.3d 694, 697 (10th Cir.2000) (quoting Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co., 909 F.2d 1437, 1440 (10th Cir.1990)). A plaintiff must overcome a higher hurdle to obtain relief from a post-judgment motion than on direct appeal from a judgment. Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc., 909 F.2d at 1439-40. 23 Ms. Doubinin's opening brief lists seven grounds for reversal, but the brief provides argument and authority for only three of them, in addition to the jurisdictional challenge addressed above. The claims not supported by argument will not be considered. This court will not craft a party's arguments for [her]. Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n. 13 (10th Cir.1999). 24 In the first of her appellate arguments, Ms. Doubinin points to errors in the district court's order dismissing her original complaint, a different order than the one under review. Our review of the district court's decision on the post-judgment motion does not include the underlying judgment or prejudgment orders. See Amoco Oil Co., 231 F.3d at 697. Consequently, we do not consider this claim. 25 Next, Ms. Doubinin claims the district court improperly overruled the magistrate judge's previous finding that the amended complaint was filed timely, when, in fact, the magistrate judge ruled only that leave of court was not required. This argument is therefore without foundation. 26 Her final argument is that the first amended complaint was filed timely, so she is entitled to relief. We need not address the timeliness issue because Ms. Doubinin does not challenge the district court's determination that allowing the case to proceed under the first amended complaint would have been futile. The court found that the first amended complaint was in material aspects the same as the original complaint. Because the first amended complaint did not cure the deficiencies of the original complaint, the district court appropriately held that, even if it had been filed before the case was dismissed, allowing it to be filed would have been futile. See Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 906 (10th Cir.2000) (If the proffered amendments fail to cure the deficiencies of the original complaint or if the newly asserted claims would be futile, denial of a motion to amend is appropriate.). 27 In sum, Ms. Doubinin has not presented the requisite extraordinary circumstances to entitle her to relief. Accordingly, the district court's judgment is affirmed. Reminder to Counsel 28 Mr. Burton is reminded of his obligations under 10th Cir. R. 46.5(B)(2) and (3), which provide that presenting a brief to the court constitutes an attorney's certification that the issues presented are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or establishing new law and that the factual contentions or denials are supported in the record.