Opinion ID: 2365726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Relief for Corporate Plaintiffs

Text: The corporate plaintiffs contend that the 1973 ordinance is invalid not only generally, as exclusionary of lower income housing, but specifically as to their own tract of land because of zoning restrictions which are confiscatory. They therefore ask that the court specifically order the township to place their property in an appropriate multi-family or PUD zone to be created  in effect, to grant them a permit to build the kind of moderate-to-middle income housing they have in mind. [48] Plaintiffs' expert witnesses testified that the restrictions upon their land (originally encompassing about 400 acres, but later reduced by a Green Acres taking to about 200 acres in the R-40 zone) were such that even using the clustering device the residences to be produced would have to sell for about $63,000, for which there was no feasible market in the number producible on the property. Plaintiffs' witness Chester conceded that if only 30 or 40 units were involved they might be marketable, but not the hundreds contemplated by plaintiffs' project. We cannot render an assured determination that the zoning is confiscatory against corporate plaintiffs on such proofs. Plaintiffs are not necessarily entitled to zoning feasible for their holdings as an entirety if they are reasonably utilizable as divided in separate ownerships. Nor as they entitled to zoning permitting the most profitable development of the property. Cobble Close Farm v. Bd. of Adjustment, Middletown Tp., 10 N.J. 442, 452 (1952). Yet it appears that even if divided into smaller ownerships it would be difficult to market the property for residential uses under the zoning restrictions as they stand, having in mind the historical absence of any large lot development in the area. Cf. Schere v. Township of Freehold, supra (119 N.J. Super. 433). A consideration pertinent to the interests of justice in this situation, however, is the fact that corporate plaintiffs have borne the stress and expense of this public-interest litigation, albeit for private purposes, for six years and have prevailed in two trials and on this extended appeal, yet stand in danger of having won but a pyrrhic victory. A mere invalidation of the ordinance, if followed only by more zoning for multi-family or lower income housing elsewhere in the township, could well leave corporate plaintiffs unable to execute their project. There is a respectable point of view that in such circumstances a successful litigant like the corporate plaintiffs should be awarded specific relief. Mytelka and Mytelka, Exclusionary Zoning: A Consideration of Remedies. 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1, 26-29 (1975); Rubinowitz, Exclusionary Zoning: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 6 Mich. J.L. Ref. 625, 668 (1973); Hartman, Beyond Invalidation  The Judicial Power to Zone, 9 Urban L. An. 159, 162-168 (1975); cf. Mallach, Do Lawsuits Build Housing?: The Implications of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation. 6 Rutgers-Camden L.J. 653, 675, 677 (1975). There is also judicial precedent for such action. In Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 263 A. 2d 395 (Sup. Ct. 1970), a builder succeeded in obtaining an adjudication of the invalidity of an ordinance precluding apartment development. The municipality rezoned to create an apartment district but did not include plaintiff's land. The plaintiff then sought to compel issuance of a permit, but the town announced the property would be condemned for a park. When plaintiff sued to enjoin condemnation, the Supreme Court ordered issuance of a permit. Order No. MP-12, 271 (August 29, 1972). Hartman, op. cit supra, 9 Urban L. An. at 161-162. The same court took similar action in Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A. 2d 466 (Sup. Ct. 1975). See also Franklin v. Village of Franklin Park, 19 Ill, 2d 381, 167 N.E. 2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Such judicial action, moreover, creates an incentive for the institution of socially beneficial but costly litigation such as this and Mount Laurel, and serves the utilitarian purpose of getting on with the provision of needed housing for at least some portion of the moderate income elements of the population. We have hereinabove referred to the indirect housing benefits to low income families from the ample provision of new moderate and middle income housing. Point V. The foregoing considerations have persuaded us of the appropriateness in this case of directing the issuance to the corporate plaintiffs, subject to the conditions stated infra, of a permit for the development on their property of the housing project they proposed to the township prior to or during the pendency of the action, pursuant to plans which, as they originally represented, will guarantee the allocation of at least 20% of the units of low or moderate income families. [49] This direction will be executed under the enforcement and supervision of the trial judge in such manner as to assure compliance with reasonable building code, site-plan, water, sewerage and other requirements and considerations of health and safety. Cf. Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., supra (341 A. 2d at 468-469). An express condition of this holding, moreover, is that the trial court, after consideration of the ecological and environmental proofs referred to in IX, supra, determine that the plaintiff's land is environmentally suited to the degree of density and type of development plaintiffs purpose. Subject to these conditions it is our purpose to assure the issuance of a building permit to corporate plaintiffs within the very early future. [50]