Opinion ID: 171226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Calculation of Sells's Sentencing Guidelines Range

Text: In a controlled substances case, a defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook. United States v. Lauder, 409 F.3d 1254, 1267 (10th Cir.2005) (quotation and alterations omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Sells asserts the district court miscalculated his advisory Guidelines range when it attributed to him all methamphetamine manufactured by the conspiracy. In particular, Sells asserts that because he did not personally participate in the manufacture of methamphetamine, he should only be held accountable for those quantities of methamphetamine he personally distributed. Sells's challenge to the district court's drug-quantity determination is a challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. [1] United States v. Ellis, 525 F.3d 960, 964 (10th Cir.2008) (holding a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the court . . . improperly calculated[ ] the Guidelines range (quotations and alterations omitted)). In determining whether the district court correctly calculated Sells's advisory Guidelines range, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error, giving due deference to the district court's application of the Guidelines to the facts. United States v. Wolfe, 435 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir.2006). A district court's determination of the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant, including the subsidiary questions of whether drugs were reasonably foreseeable to a defendant and within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, is a determination of fact reviewed only for clear error. Lauder, 409 F.3d at 1267. Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) makes clear that in calculating a defendant's offense level under the Guidelines, a defendant must be held accountable for the conduct of his co-conspirators, including conduct in which the defendant did not personally participate, as long as the conduct was within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity and was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n. 2 (describing responsibility of defendants for the conduct of others in cases of jointly undertaken criminal activity); United States v. Albarran, 233 F.3d 972, 980 (7th Cir.2000) (As a co-conspirator, a defendant can be held accountable for transactions in which he or she did not personally participate if such a deal was reasonably foreseeable to him or her.); United States v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir.1993) ([Defendant] is potentially liable for the foreseeable criminal acts of others in furtherance of that enterprise even though he did not personally participate in them.). The record here provides ample support for the district court's finding that Anthony's manufacturing activities were within the scope of the criminal activity Sells agreed to undertake and were foreseeable by Sells. George Hanna testified that he met Sells in prison and, after their release, began buying methamphetamine from him. Sells informed Hanna that if he was unavailable, Hanna could purchase methamphetamine from Anthony. Hanna further testified he purchased drugs from both Sells and Anthony from the property owned by Sells. As noted by the government, this evidence demonstrates Sells and Anthony jointly served clients from the pool of drugs manufactured by Anthony. Holly Brown, Anthony's former girlfriend, testified that almost every time Anthony manufactured drugs, Sells would collect an amount to distribute. Furthermore, the jury convicted Sells of jointly maintaining, with Anthony, a place for the use, manufacture, and distribution of methamphetamine. The testimony and jury findings set out above are more than sufficient to support the district court's factual finding that Anthony's manufacturing activities were within the scope of the criminal enterprise Sells agreed to undertake and were foreseeable to Sells. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n. 2 (In determining the scope of the criminal activity that the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake . . . the court may consider any . . . implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others.). For that reason, Sells's procedural sentencing claim based on the correctness of his advisory Guidelines range fails.