Opinion ID: 800561
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Daniel's, Jones's, and Mynatt's conduct

Text: The district court (over the plaintiff's objection) admitted testimony concerning events that took place before Whitehead's arrival on the scene, but agreed with plaintiff that charges or guilty pleas as to Daniel, Jones, and Mynatt should be excluded. Whitehead alleges that evidence relating to Daniel's, Jones's, and Mynatt's conduct was irrelevant and highly prejudicial because it created a mini-trial-within-a-trial and was used to elicit sympathy for the police and to impute Daniel's bad behavior to her. In allowing the evidence, the district court explained that the information was relevant to provide context, assess Officer Bond's testimony, and evaluate testimony about the mood of the crowd. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Fed.R.Evid. 401. In making this determination, [w]e will not substitute [our] opinion for that of the trial judge merely because we may be inclined to rule differently on the question of relevancy. United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir.2012) (quotations omitted). Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice.... Fed.R.Evid. 403. Recognizing that most relevant evidence is, by its very nature, prejudicial, we have emphasized that evidence must be unfairly prejudicial to require exclusion. Boros, 668 F.3d at 909 (quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). We employ a sliding scale approach: as the probative value increases, so does our tolerance of the risk of prejudice. Id. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial in the context of Rule 403 if it will induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather than on the evidence presented. Common v. City of Chicago, 661 F.3d 940, 947 (7th Cir.2011) (quotations omitted). [A] district court, in exercising its discretion under Rule 403, must carefully analyze and assess the prejudicial effect of challenged evidence. United States v. Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 971 (7th Cir.2011). Evidence of Daniel's, Jones's, and Mynatt's conduct immediately before Whitehead's arrival was relevant. [O]ne measure of relevance is whether its exclusion would leave a chronological and conceptual void in the story. Boros, 668 F.3d at 908 (quotations omitted). Even where evidence is not directly related to a disputed fact, it may be relevant when it provides background information. Id. The testimony explained why Whitehead's neighbor said, They're killing your son, why Whitehead hurried to the scene and inquired about her son, why approximately eighteen police officers were there, and why a sizeable crowd had gathered. This background information allowed the jury to put Whitehead's, the officers', and the crowd's conduct in context. That made it relevant. The challenged evidence was also relevant because it tended to make the defendants' testimony that the crowd was hostile more believable. See Common, 661 F.3d at 945-46. If the jurors hadn't heard evidence about the traffic stop, Jones fleeing, Daniel's attempt to flee and Officer Bond's physical altercation with him, or Mynatt's refusal to obey police orders and subsequent flight giving rise to a police chase, they would have had little basis to understand why people were gathered around yelling and why the officers had reasonable grounds to promptly maintain control of the crowd. The evidence also made Officer Bond's testimony that he was preoccupied with Daniel even after Daniel was secured in the squad car more believable. Accordingly, we find that evidence of Daniels', Jones's, and Mynatt's conduct (save testimony concerning the crack cocaine which we will discuss shortly) relevant in providing the jurors necessary background information and probative in their assessment of the officers' credibility. Although the district court only addressed Whitehead's concerns of undue prejudice briefly, we find no reversible error. We give special deference to the district court's evidentiary findings pursuant to Rule 403, see Common, 661 F.3d at 946, and we have no basis to second-guess the district court's judgment here. Evidence that crack cocaine was found in Daniel's car is more problematic. The defendants argue that this evidence was relevant to Daniel's and Jones's incentive to flee. The district court did not address this evidence separately and we are troubled by the evidence's minimal probative value in relation to the danger of unfair prejudice. But even if the district court erred in admitting this evidence, we conclude that it was harmless. See Cerabio, 410 F.3d at 994. The district court could have given a limiting instruction to help alleviate any unfair prejudice, but Whitehead didn't request such an instruction and so none was given. See United States v. Suggs, 374 F.3d 508, 517-18 (7th Cir.2004) (no error where the district court failed to give limiting instruction sua sponte). Even without the instruction, however, the parties told the jury that the case was not about Daniel or what he did, it was about Whitehead and her conduct. Whitehead's counsel explained in closing that it was important for the jury to know why Whitehead and the officers were at the scene, but Daniel is an adult and his conduct cannot be attributed to his mother. The jury also heard evidence that Whitehead was a professional with a steady job and no criminal record. Nothing in the record indicates that the jury would have attributed Daniel's bad acts, including his possession of crack cocaine, to Whitehead. In light of Lt. Stevens' and Sgt. Stack's testimony of Whitehead's conduct providing probable cause for her arrest, and the background information of Daniel's, Jones's, and Mynatt's conduct that was properly admitted, Whitehead hasn't shown that there was a significant chance that the crack cocaine evidence affected the outcome of the trial.