Opinion ID: 2543191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Failure to Give Reasonable Doubt Instruction with Respect to Sodomy Evidence

Text: As discussed, defendant did not plead guilty to the sodomy special circumstance; although he initially told Detective Legg he had sodomized Breck, he recanted that confession. During the penalty phase, the prosecutor introduced evidence of defendant's confession of sodomy and argued to the jury that defendant had in fact sodomized Breck. The trial court instructed the jury with a modified CALJIC No. 2.01 instruction that before the jury could consider the Elliott burglary to be a criminal act involving an implied threat of force or violence, it must determine the defendant armed himself and was in the house at the same time as Mrs. Barnden. This proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt.... The trial court then instructed the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt with reference to the instruction just read. Defendant now claims that the reasonable doubt instruction should have also referred to defendant's alleged crime of sodomy, in other words, that the jury should have been instructed that it could only consider the alleged sodomy against defendant if it concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that such act occurred. He contends that this instructional error violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Generally speaking, neither California law nor the United States Constitution requires that aggravating factors be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) The one exception is unadjudicated criminal acts involving force or violence under section 190.3, factor (b), which requires that jurors be instructed that they can consider such acts in aggravation only if they find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had committed the acts. ( People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 793, 22 Cal. Rptr.3d 1,101 P.3d 956.) Defendant claims that the sodomy evidence was being introduced as an unadjudicated criminal act under section 190.3., factor (b) and that therefore a reasonable doubt instruction was required. The record does not support his contention. The trial court instructed the jury that evidence has been introduced that may show that the defendant engaged in criminal activity other than the instant offense and the Elliott burglary. You may not consider such evidence as a factor in aggravation. You may consider the Elliott burglary in deciding whether the defendant has engaged in criminal activity which involves the use of, or the express or implied threat of force or violence, if you conclude the defendant armed himself and was in the house at the time Ms. Barnden was present. Thus, the trial court made clear that the Elliott burglary was the only incident to be considered under factor (b), and that they could not consider sodomy as independent criminal activity but only as a circumstance of the murder of which defendant was being tried. Defendant asserts that the trial court's instruction defining the term sodomy indicated that sodomy was to be considered as a criminal act under section 190.3, factor (b). The trial court stated: Various types of crimes have been mentioned in this case, ladies and gentlemen, and I won't define them for you except for one. It has been my experience that sometimes people do not understand the meaning of the word sodomy and I will define that for you from a legal perspective. Sodomy is sexual conduct consisting of contact between the penis of one person and the anus of another person. Any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the act of sodomy. Proof of ejaculation is not required. Sodomy per se is not a crime and the trial court did not define the crime of sodomy, which is the commission of sodomy under specified circumstances, such as by means of force, or with minors. (§ 286.) Rather, the trial court defined the word sodomy because of the jury's possible unfamiliarity with it. Read in conjunction with the instruction in the previous paragraph, in which the trial court made clear that the Elliott burglary was the only crime other than the current offense to be considered in aggravation, the jury would not have understood the trial court's definition of sodomy to imply that sodomy could be considered under section 190.3, factor (b). Moreover, the prosecutor said nothing during closing argument to suggest that evidence of sodomy would be considered as unadjudicated criminal activity, and spoke of such evidence solely within the context of elaborating upon the circumstances of the crime. We therefore conclude that the failure to instruct on reasonable doubt in reference to defendant's alleged sodomy of Breck was not error.