Opinion ID: 810883
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Haywood Borders’ Emails

Text: The Government introduced a number of emails at trial to rebut Roy III’s defense that a mortgage transaction was a personal undertaking that did not involve MTE or the Housing Program. The group of emails at issue includes five separate emails sent to, and received by, Melvin and Jean Norwood—A-Buyers for a Housing Program transaction—at their personal email account. The emails were sent by a “Hayward Borders” at “mte_123@hotmail.com,” and dated August 22, 2007; August 28, 2007; September 6, 2007; September 7, 2007; and September 10, 2007. The first email says that MTE’s bank accounts will be unfrozen on January 1, 2008, and, acknowledging the Norwood’s $108,000 equity payment, gives the Norwoods four options they can pursue regarding their participation in the Housing Program. The second email says the Norwoods’ “account and options” in the A-Buyer program are being reviewed, while the third email discusses the Norwoods’ current status and rights under the A-Buyer program. The fourth email asks for the Norwoods’ full participation regarding how to deal with the “renter” of the property (collect rent from her or tell her she faces eviction), and the fifth email explains how the “renter” will be evicted. Roy III attacks the emails’ admissibility on two grounds: (1) the emails were not properly authenticated, and (2) the emails contained inadmissible hearsay. 18 Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 Rule 901(a) provides that email evidence is admissible if authenticated by “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). “Authentication can be established in a variety of ways, including by ‘testimony of [a] witness with knowledge . . . that a matter is what it claimed to be[,]’ Rule 901(b)(1), and by distinctive characteristics such as ‘appearance, contents, substance, [or] internal patterns . . . taken in conjunction with circumstances[,]’ Rule 901(b)(4).” United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 574 (7th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original). Only a prima facie showing of genuineness is required; the task of deciding the evidence’s true authenticity and probative value is left to the jury. United States v. Harvey, 117 F.3d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir. 1997). Borders purportedly authored the emails. At trial, neither Borders nor anyone who saw Borders author the emails testified that the emails were actually sent by Borders. Authentication under Rule 901(b)(1) was, therefore, impossible. See Mark D. Robins, Evidence at the Electronic Frontier: Introducing E-Mail at Trial in Commercial Litigation, 29 R UTGERS C OMPUTER & T ECH. L.J. 219, 226 (2003) (“Where a written communication such as an e-mail message is transmitted, only the author of the e-mail message or anyone who saw the author compose and transmit the message will truly ‘know’ the message’s authorship, and be able to authenticate it.” (citing 2 JOHN W. S TRONG, ET AL., M C C ORMICK ON E VIDENCE § 219(a), 687-88 (5th ed. 1989))). Accordingly, the Government attempted to authenticate the emails using circumstantial evidence, which we think was sufficient. Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 19 Our conclusion is supported by a number of factors present in the record. The emails sent to the Norwoods had the email address “mte_123@hotmail.com,” with the author identified as “Hayward Borders.” Even though Melvin Norwood testified that he had never met Borders before receiving the emails, the uncontroverted testimony established that Borders was an MTE Board Member. It would be reasonable for one to assume that an MTE Board Member would possess an email address bearing the MTE acronym and have the capacity to send correspondence from such an address. Moreover, the Norwoods’ email address, the address Borders’ emails were sent to, was the same address to which Roy III had previously sent his email correspondence regarding the Housing Program. It would also be reasonable to assume that another MTE Board Member, in this case Borders, would have the ability to discover and send emails to the email addresses of Housing Program participants. The context of the emails further demonstrates the emails’ author had significant knowledge of the Norwoods’ involvement with the Housing Program and MTE. The emails discuss MTE’s frozen bank accounts, the purchased property being part of the A- Buyer program, and the $108,900 of equity from the Norwoods’ home that MTE received from the transaction. This is all information Borders would be in a position to know and discuss with the Norwoods. The Eleventh Circuit has found these types of factors to be sufficient to satisfy Rule 901(a)’s authentication requirements for email evidence, see United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 20 Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 1318, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2000), and we agree. Roy III’s challenge to the authentication of the emails fails. Directing our focus to Roy III’s contention that the emails constituted inadmissible hearsay, this argument is equally unavailing. He contends the emails were “offered to show that Borders made [certain] assertions,” but the touchstone of hearsay is that the evidence is being used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2); Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 902 (7th Cir. 2012). These emails actually contained a number of false assertions, so they were not offered for their truth. 6 We concur with the Government that these emails were offered to provide context and rebut Roy III’s argument at trial that the Norwood transaction was a personal undertaking; one that was separate and apart from MTE. Therefore, the emails were properly admitted.