Opinion ID: 1953592
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Michigan Disqualification Law

Text: A. The Court Rule In Michigan, a motion to disqualify a judge is made pursuant to court rule, MCR 2.003. Defendant moved to disqualify Judge Giddings under what is now MCR 2.003(B)(1), which states: Grounds. A judge is disqualified when the judge cannot impartially hear a case, including but not limited to instances in which (1) The judge is personally biased or prejudiced for or against a party or attorney. Further, MCR 2.003(C)(1) requires that a motion to disqualify be filed within 14 days after the moving party discovers the ground for disqualification. The moving party must submit an affidavit including all grounds for disqualification that are known at the time the motion is filed. MCR 2.003(C)(2). A judge is disqualified when he cannot hear a case impartially pursuant to MCR 2.003(B). The court rule sets forth a list of situations that are deemed to be the equivalent of an inability to hear a case impartially. One such instance is when the judge is personally biased or prejudiced for or against a party. MCR 2.003(B)(1). [29] MCR 2.003(B)(1) requires a showing of actual bias. Absent actual bias or prejudice, a judge will not be disqualified pursuant to this section. In re Forfeiture of $1,159, 420, 194 Mich.App. 134, 151, 486 N.W.2d 326 (1992); Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 186 Mich.App. 715, 731, 465 N.W.2d 395 (1991); Band v. Livonia Associates, 176 Mich.App. 95, 118, 439 N.W.2d 285 (1989). Coupled with the requirement of actual bias, § (B)(1) also requires that the judge be personally biased or prejudiced in order to warrant disqualification pursuant to this section. The federal disqualification statutes similarly contain the requirement that the bias or prejudice be personal in nature. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (the judge ... has a personal bias or prejudice either against [a party] or in favor of any adverse party), and 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (Where [the judge] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party). As a result of this statutory language, the federal courts have developed what is commonly known as the extrajudicial source rule. Simply stated, a showing of personal bias must usually be met before disqualification is proper. This requirement has been interpreted to mean that disqualification is not warranted unless the bias or prejudice is both personal and extrajudicial. Thus, the challenged bias must have its origin in events or sources of information gleaned outside the judicial proceeding. The United States Supreme Court addressed the personal bias requirement in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,___, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1155, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994), and stated that the words bias and prejudice connote a favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess ..., or because it is excessive in degree.... [Emphasis in original.] Further, the Court stated: First, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.... In and of themselves ( i.e., apart from surrounding comments or accompanying opinion), they cannot possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required ... when no extrajudicial source is involved.... Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. [510 U.S. at___, 114 S.Ct. at 1157.] Thus, Liteky indicates that a favorable or unfavorable predisposition that springs from facts or events occurring in the current proceeding may deserve to be characterized as bias or prejudice. However, these opinions will not constitute a basis for disqualification unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Id. (emphasis added). See also United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1415 (C.A.10, 1995), interpreting Liteky, supra, [30] Furthermore, the party who challenges a judge on the basis of bias or prejudice must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality. In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420, supra at 151, 486 N.W.2d 326. [31] B. The Crampton v. Dep't of State Standard The Due Process Clause requires an unbiased and impartial decisionmaker. Thus, where the requirement of showing actual bias or prejudice under MCR 2.003(B)(1) has not been met, or where the court rule is otherwise inapplicable, parties have pursued disqualification on the basis of the due process impartiality requirement. Crampton v. Dep't of State, 395 Mich. 347, 235 N.W.2d 352 (1975), is the leading Michigan case addressing the constitutional basis for disqualification. [32] The Crampton Court stated: The United States Supreme Court has disqualified judges and decisionmakers without a showing of actual bias in situations where  experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.  Among the situations identified by the Court as presenting that risk are where the judge or decisionmaker (1) has a pecuniary interest in the outcome; (2) has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him; (3) is enmeshed in [other] matters involving petitioner ...; or (4) might have prejudged the case because of prior participation as an accuser, investigator, fact finder or initial decisionmaker. [Id. at 351, 235 N.W.2d 352 (citations omitted; emphasis added).] [6] This Court has examined the issue of judicial disqualification pursuant to the Due Process Clause and has found that disqualification for bias or prejudice is only constitutionally required in the most extreme cases. [33] The test articulated in Crampton was extracted from the United States Supreme Court decision Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). [34] The Withrow Court stated: Concededly, a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts. Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. In pursuit of this end, various situations have been identified in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. [ Id. at 46-47, 95 S.Ct. at 1464 (citations omitted; emphasis added).[ [35] ] Crampton sets forth specific examples of United States Supreme Court decisions that fall into the four listed categories. [36] Two of the four Crampton scenarios are implicated in the present case. Situation 2 allows disqualification of a judge or decisionmaker who has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him. Id. at 351, 235 N.W.2d 352 (emphasis added). The example cited in Crampton involved a situation in which a trial judge had been insulted, slandered, and vilified during trial by a defendant representing himself. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge should not adjudicate postjudgment contempt proceedings against the defendant. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465-466, 91 S.Ct. 499, 505, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971). However, the Court stated: It is, of course, not every attack on a judge that disqualifies him from sitting.... Many of the words leveled at the judge in the instant case were highly personal aspersions, even fighting words___dirty sonofabitch, dirty tyrannical old dog, stumbling dog, and fool. He was charged with running a Spanish Inquisition and told to Go to hell and Keep your mouth shut. Insults of that kind are apt to strike at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament. [Citations omitted.] In Mayberry, the nature of the defendant's remarks necessarily required the judge to become embroiled in a running, bitter controversy with the defendant. Id. at 465, 91 S.Ct. at 505. Thus, it would have been improper for the judge to adjudicate the defendant's contempt proceedings. Id. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 505. The facts of the present case do not rise to the level of those presented in Mayberry. See part VIII(B). Situation 3 listed in Crampton calls for the disqualification of the judge or decisionmaker in an instance where that individual is `enmeshed in [other] matters involving petitioner. ' 395 Mich. at 351, 235 N.W.2d 352, citing Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215, 91 S.Ct. 1778, 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 423 (1971) (emphasis added). In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court found that a trial judge should be disqualified from adjudicating a defendant's contempt proceedings where the judge had revealed deep prejudice against the defendant's profession and, further, was recently a losing party in a civil rights suit brought by that individual. The United States Supreme Court stated: In concluding that Judge Perry should have recused himself, we do not rely solely on the affidavits filed by the lawyers reciting intemperate remarks of Judge Perry concerning civil rights litigants. Beyond all that was the fact that Judge Perry immediately prior to the adjudication of contempt was a defendant in one of petitioner's civil rights suits and a losing party at that. From that it is plain that he was so enmeshed in matters involving petitioner as to make it most appropriate for another judge to sit. Trial before an unbiased judge is essential to due process. [403 U.S. at 215-216, 91 S.Ct. at 1780 (emphasis added).] Accordingly, this situation involved an actual previous lawsuit between the judge and the defendant before him. Again, the situation in Johnson differs from that presented by the facts of this case. See part VII(B). C. The Clemens v. Bruce Decision In the present case, the department has placed heavy reliance on the Court of Appeals decision in Clemens v. Bruce, 122 Mich.App. 35, 329 N.W.2d 522 (1982). Clemens ineffectively interprets the disqualification standard articulated in Crampton. The plaintiffs in Clemens moved to disqualify the judge on the basis of personal bias against their attorney, who had filed a complaint against the judge with the Judicial Tenure Commission as a result of a dispute over the appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants. [37] Thus, it appears that the plaintiffs were alleging actual bias pursuant to the court rule. However, without an examination of disqualification law under the court rule, the Court of Appeals held that [t]he circumstances presented ... fall within factors (2) and (3) of the test stated in Crampton. The circumstances suggested such a risk of actual prejudice on the part of the judge that due process required his disqualification even absent a showing of actual prejudice.... Our decision is not to be construed as suggesting that the trial judge was guilty of any actual impropriety. [122 Mich.App. at 38, 329 N.W.2d 522.] Aside from a repetition of the Crampton language, the Court of Appeals in the Clemens opinion gives little, if any, guidance regarding an interpretation of the listed situations calling for disqualification. The decision incorrectly refers to the Crampton scenarios as factors, as if it is applying some sort of balancing test. We disagree with this characterization, because the Crampton scenarios are examples, not factors to be balanced. Moreover, the lack of insightful analysis in Clemens fails to aid this Court in its attempt to understand and apply the Crampton standard for disqualification. Accordingly, we find the department's emphasis and reliance on Clemens to be misplaced and find that decision to be without precedential value.