Opinion ID: 1919090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Statutory Structure

Text: We have recognized as axiomatic the principle that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole. Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992) (emphasis omitted). When possible, we must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another. Id. (emphasis omitted). According to the State, the only way to harmonize subsection (4)(f) with the rest of the statute would be to construe the word or conjunctively. The State makes four arguments to this effect. We disagree with all of them. As we explain below, a disjunctive reading would be equally harmonizing, and more faithful to the usual meaning of the word or. The State's first argument is that various provisions in the recidivist sentencing statute reveal the Legislature's obvious intent to punish career criminals with the most severe sanction possible. The State emphasizes two provisions: one expressly stating that the Legislature's intent in enacting these provisions was to incarcerate [recidivists] for extended terms, § 775.0841, Fla. Stat. (2002); and another demanding that [a]ll reasonable prosecutorial efforts shall be made to persuade the court to impose the most severe sanction authorized upon a person convicted after prosecution as a career criminal. § 775.0843(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002). We see nothing in these two provisions that clarifies whether multiple recidivist categories may be applied to a single criminal sentence. The provisions speak generally of extended terms and severe sanction[s], but do not direct the severity of the punishment when more than one recidivist category applies. The Legislature has ordered prosecutors to pursue the most severe sanction authorized  not the most severe sanction possible, as the State suggests. Whether a sentence imposed under multiple recidivist categories is, in fact, authorized by section 775.084 is unclear from these general statements of legislative intent. Moreover, designation of a defendant under more than one category would not necessarily increase the severity of a sentence. For example, a defendant who commits a third-degree felony and is designated as both a habitual felony offender and a habitual violent felony offender is subject to ten years' imprisonment as a habitual felony offender; but he is already subject to the same term as a habitual violent felony offender, with a minimum five-year term. Similarly, a defendant sentenced as both a habitual felony offender and a violent career criminal receives no greater punishment than if he were sentenced solely as a violent career criminal. Therefore, designation within more than one category does not always (or even often) result in greater punishment. The State's second argument is that subsection (4)(f) incorporates by reference three other provisions in the statute that require trial courts to consider all applicable recidivist categories. Therefore, the State reasons, the Legislature must have intended for defendants to be sentenced under all categories that apply. As we explained earlier, subsection (4)(f) directs that the court shall make that [recidivist sentencing] determination as provided in paragraph (3)(a), paragraph (3)(b), or paragraph (3)(c). Those cross-referenced paragraphs provide, respectively, that [i]n a separate proceeding, the court shall determine if the defendant is a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender, § 775.084(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002); that [i]n a separate proceeding, the court shall determine if the defendant is a three-time violent felony offender, § 775.084(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002); and that [i]n a separate proceeding, the court shall determine whether the defendant is a violent career criminal. § 775.084(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2002). The State quotes the First District's conclusion that [s]ubsection (4)(f). . . merely reiterates the requirements of subsections (3)(a), (b), and (c), each of which directs the court to conduct separate proceedings to determine if a given recidivist category applies. Clines, 881 So.2d at 724. This reading is certainly reasonable, but it renders subsection (4)(f) superfluous. We traditionally have sought to avoid a redundant interpretation unless the statute clearly demands it. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 789 So.2d 320, 324 (Fla.2001) (A court's function is to interpret statutes as they are written and give effect to each word in the statute.). We have no difficulty avoiding redundancy in this case. Subsection (4)(f) obtains meaning when interpreted not as a mere reiteration, but as an instruction that explains how to apply the three cited provisions. On this reading, subsection (4)(f) clarifies that, although the trial court may need to hold multiple separate proceedings under subsections (3)(a), (3)(b), and (3)(c) in order to determine which recidivist categories apply, it can only sentence a defendant under a single category. When a defendant qualifies for more than one category, the Legislature has expressed its desire for the court to impose the most severe sanction authorized, § 775.0843(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002), which in turn promotes the Legislature's goal of uniform punishment of similarly situated defendants. § 775.084(6), Fla. Stat. (2002). We note, however, that the statute does have a safety valve. A trial court may depart from the sentence required for a habitual felony offender, habitual violent felony offender, or violent career criminal, provided that it explains in writing why such sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public. § 775.084(3)(a)6., (3)(c)5., (4)(e), Fla. Stat. (2002). The State's third argument is that subsection (4)(f) must be interpreted to allow application of multiple categories because two of the categories  the three-time violent felony offender category and the violent career criminal category  are phrased in mandatory language. The statute provides that the court . . . must sentence the three-time violent felony offender to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, § 775.084(4)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis added); and that the court . . . shall sentence the violent career criminal to certain mandatory minimum terms. § 775.084(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis added). In contrast, the other two categories are permissive. § 775.084(4)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2002) (stating that the court may sentence habitual offenders more harshly). A comparison of the two mandatory categories reveals, however, that regardless of how one interprets subsection (4)(f), they cannot be simultaneously applied to the same sentence. The punishment required by the violent career criminal category always eclipses the punishment required by the three-time violent felony offender category. For example, for third-degree felonies, violent career criminals must be sentenced to a term of years not exceeding 15, with a mandatory minimum term of 10 years' imprisonment, § 775.084(4)(d)3., Fla. Stat. (2002), whereas three-time violent felony offenders need only be sentenced to a lesser mandatory minimum of five years in prison. § 775.084(4)(c)1.d., Fla. Stat. (2002). For second-degree felonies, violent career criminals must be sentenced to a term of years not exceeding 40, with a mandatory minimum term of 30 years' imprisonment, § 775.084(4)(d)2., Fla. Stat. (2002), whereas three-time violent felony offenders need only be sentenced to a lesser mandatory minimum of 15 years. § 775.084(4)(c)1.c., Fla. Stat. (2002). For first-degree felonies, violent career criminals must be sentenced for life without eligibility for discretionary early release, § 775.084(4)(d)1., 4(k), Fla. Stat. (2002), whereas three-time violent felony offenders need only be sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 30 years. § 775.084(4)(c)1.b., Fla. Stat. (2002). Finally, for life felonies, both violent career criminals and three-time violent felony offenders must be sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for early release. § 775.084(4)(d)1., (c)(1)a., (k)2., Fla. Stat. (2002). In each case, designating a defendant as a violent career criminal renders moot any designation as a three-time violent felony offender. [5] Thus, the mere existence of two mandatory categories does not evidence a legislative intent to allow multiple categories to be simultaneously applied. The State's final argument is cumulative: that even if none of the preceding arguments is independently persuasive, together they clearly indicate that the Legislature intended for the violent career criminal category and the habitual felony offender category to be applied in combination. The First District expressed this view as follows: [T]he entire statutory scheme of section 775.084 readily contemplates, in the case of a single criminal charge, a sentence under the habitual felony offender provision, with the mandatory minimum term provisions provided for by the violent career criminal designation.' Clines, 881 So.2d at 724. We disagree. We believe that the recidivist categories are designed to be hierarchical, not complementary. As we mentioned earlier, anyone whose pattern of recidivism meets the stringent requirements for designation as a violent career criminal will also qualify for designation as a habitual felony offender. Compare § 775.084(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002), with § 775.084(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). But designation as a violent career criminal renders superfluous any other designation. The punishments required for violent career criminals are always as harsh as, or harsher than, the punishments permitted under other categories. In fact, the mandatory minimum prison term for a violent career criminal in Clines's position is as long as the maximum prison term for a habitual felony offender. Compare § 775.084(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002), with § 775.084(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). We doubt the Legislature intended a trial court to apply both categories when one encompasses the other.