Opinion ID: 1192553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Text of the Act and a Preliminary Construction

Text: In interpreting statutes, we seek to give effect to the Legislature's intent, and in determining intent we look to the language used and consider the statute's history and background. State ex rel. Klineline v. Blackhurst, 106 N.M. 732, 735, 749 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1988). Rules of statutory construction dictate that when a statute's language is clear and unambiguous and it conveys a clear and definite meaning, the statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Draper v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 116 N.M. 775, 777, 867 P.2d 1157, 1159 (1994). However, all parts of a statute must be read together to ascertain legislative intent. Quintana v. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 100 N.M. 224, 225, 668 P.2d 1101, 1102 (1983). We are to read the statute in its entirety and construe each part in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya, 103 N.M. 72, 76, 703 P.2d 169, 173 (1985). [C]ourts must exercise caution in applying the plain meaning rule. Its beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute's meaning. State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994); see also Miller v. New Mexico Dep't of Transp., 106 N.M. 253, 255, 741 P.2d 1374, 1376 (1987) (Statutes are to be read in a way that facilitates their operation and the achievement of their goals.). In this case, taken as a whole and against the background of its federal and state counterparts, the Act give[s] rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute's meaning. Helman, 117 N.M. at 353, 871 P.2d at 1359. There are a number of provisions relevant to the standing issues raised on appeal. They include: It is unlawful for any manufacturer, distributor or representative to: . . . . . L. prevent or attempt to prevent by contract or otherwise any motor vehicle dealer or any officer, partner or stockholder of any motor vehicle dealer from selling or transferring any part of the interest of any of them to any other person or party; provided, however, that no dealer, officer, partner or stockholder shall have the right to sell, transfer or assign the franchise or power of management or control thereunder without the consent of the manufacturer, distributor or representative except that consent shall not be unreasonably withheld [.] (Emphasis added.) Section 57-16-5. The provisions of this act shall apply to all persons, manufacturers . . . and dealers and to all written or oral agreements between a manufacturer, distributor or representative with a motor vehicle dealer including, but not limited to, the franchise offering, the franchise agreement . . . and all other such agreements in which the manufacturer, distributor or representative has any direct or indirect interest. (Emphasis added.) Section 57-16-2. In addition to any other judicial relief, any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in this act may sue therefor in the district court and shall recover actual damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. . . . (Emphasis added.) Section 57-16-13. Key is indeed a person as described in the Act. Section 57-16-3(C) (`person' means every natural person, partnership, corporation, association, trust, estate or any other legal entity). He sought to acquire an existing Chrysler automobile dealership franchise offered for sale by Borman. Due to the business nature of franchising, a franchise transfer is contingent upon approval by the franchisor, in this case, Chrysler. Therefore, the transaction was clearly a franchise offering as used in the Act. Section 57-16-2. However, the Act does not govern manufacturers' dealings with prospective franchisees, nor does it provide in explicit terms protection for that class. New Mexico's Act provides for standing in broad terms, but it links standing to forbidden conduct and articulates forbidden conduct in specific terms. Compare § 57-16-13 (any person . . . injured . . . by reason of anything forbidden ... may sue) with § 57-16-5 (unlawful for any manufacturer... to ...) and § 57-16-4 (unlawful for any dealer to . . .). The Act does not provide any standard against which specific conduct by a manufacturer might be challenged by a prospective franchisee or measured by a court. Read as a whole, the Act regulates the relations between manufacturers and their dealers, and also dealer conduct toward their customers. Proscribed acts on the manufacturers' part include refusing to deliver vehicles within a reasonable time after receipt of the dealer's order; using false or deceptive advertising; discriminating in price between dealers with respect to vehicles and parts; establishing an additional franchise for the same line or make in the area already served; preventing any dealer from changing the capital structure of his dealership; imposing unreasonable restrictions on the dealer in the franchise agreement; terminating a franchise or refusing to renew it without due cause; and preventing the dealer from transferring the franchise without consent, which may not be unreasonably withheld. See §§ 57-16-5, -8, -9. Similarly, dealers are prohibited from compelling a new car buyer to purchase extras; using false or deceptive advertising; failing to perform warranty service; and selling as new a used car or showroom model. See § 57-16-4. None of the Act's provisions proscribe conduct relating to procuring a dealership. Any cause of action by a prospective purchaser under the Act would need to be derived by implication. The basis for such an implication is tenuous.