Opinion ID: 2973508
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Convert the Motion to Dismiss

Text: -6- No. 05-1254 Gumble v. Waterford Township Gumble first suggests that the district court erred by failing to consider the Waterford Defendants’ motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. He argues that “Defendants’ brief contained numerous statements of claimed facts . . . that were outside the pleadings and were unsupported by affidavit, and also attached exhibits that were outside the pleadings.” But the attachments to which Gumble refers were referenced in the complaint and were public records—specifically, Michigan state court opinions. See Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that a court may consider exhibits to a motion to dismiss where the exhibits are “referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint” or are public records), overruled on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 n.2, 515 (2002). The additional “facts” to which Gumble points are extracted from these exhibits or from the complaint, and in any event were not necessary for the Waterford Defendants’ dismissal. Thus the district court did not err in declining to convert the motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion. b. False Arrest/False Imprisonment/Malicious Prosecution Claims Gumble also argues that the district court erred in dismissing his false imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan law. In dismissing, the court relied on the Waterford Defendants’ probable cause to arrest Gumble, concluding that the existence of probable cause precluded these claims. See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 871-72 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that the existence of probable cause for arrest forecloses false arrest and malicious prosecution claims); Mark v. Furay, 769 F.2d 1266, 1269 -7- No. 05-1254 Gumble v. Waterford Township (7th Cir.1985) (“[T]he existence of probable cause for an arrest totally precludes any section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, regardless of whether the defendants had malicious motives for arresting the plaintiff.”); Hansel v. Bisard, 30 F. Supp. 2d 981, 985-86, 990 (E.D. Mich. 1998). Gumble alleged in his complaint that he told the officers that he mistakenly shot and killed Garretson. The district court concluded that these statements to the officers created probable cause to arrest him under Michigan law for voluntary manslaughter. Gumble seems to argue that his assertion that armed robbers were in his house (presumably a claim of self-defense) eliminated any probable cause to arrest him. The Second Circuit has held that “[d]efenses which negate the existence of a crime should similarly negate probable cause.” Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2003). But Gumble’s protestations of self-defense did not suffice to eliminate probable cause in this case because, as the Second Circuit put it, “[o]nce a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.” Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted) (alteration original). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gumble’s motion for relief from judgment based on this claimed “mistake.” c. Conspiracy/Failure to Train -8- No. 05-1254 Gumble v. Waterford Township The district court did not err in dismissing Gumble’s remaining claims. Because, as discussed above, Gumble alleged no viable constitutional injury, he cannot maintain a conspiracy claim. See Jewell v. Leroux, 20 Fed. Appx. 375, 378 (6th Cir. 2001); Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1999). Likewise, Gumble’s failure-to-train claims against alleged policymakers Police Chief Reynolds and Waterford Township fail in the absence of a showing that his constitutional rights were violated. See May v. Franklin County Comm’rs, 437 F.3d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that there can be no § 1983 liability for failure to train where the individual defendants did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights).