Opinion ID: 1189218
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Regulation of Commercial Speech

Text: (4) The extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech announced in Va. Pharmacy Board v. Va. Consumer Council (1976) 425 U.S. 748 [48 L.Ed.2d 346, 96 S.Ct. 1817] applies to regulation of advertising by lawyers. ( Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio (1985) ___ U.S. ___ [85 L.Ed.2d 652, 105 S.Ct. 2265]; In re R.M.J. (1982) 455 U.S. 191 [71 L.Ed.2d 64, 102 S.Ct. 929]; Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977) 433 U.S. 350 [53 L.Ed.2d 810, 97 S.Ct. 2691].) Lawyers are permitted to advertise the availability and terms of routine legal services ( Bates, supra, at p. 384 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 836]), to advertise by general mailings of announcement cards and to include in their advertisements lists of jurisdictions where they are licensed to practice and areas of specialization. ( In re R.M.J., supra, at pp. 205-206 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 75-76].) (5) The State Bar does not argue that commercial speech is without First Amendment protection, but contends that the Slate & Leoni letters and pamphlets are misleading. Therefore the State Bar argues, it may invoke Rule 2-101(A)'s permissible content-based restriction. We agree and note that the First Amendment cases do not question the authority of the state to regulate misleading advertising. In Va. Pharmacy Board v. Va. Consumer Council (1976) 425 U.S. 748 [48 L.Ed.2d 346, 96 S.Ct. 1817], the Supreme Court held that a ban on advertisements of prices of prescription drugs violated the First Amendment. In rejecting the argument that commercial speech was without First Amendment protection the court stated that [i]f there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment protection, therefore, it must be distinguished by its content. ( Id., at p. 761 [48 L.Ed.2d at p. 358].) The court specifically recognized that misleading advertising could be regulated, noting that [o]bviously, much commercial speech is not probably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a state's dealing effectively with this problem. ( Id., at p. 771 [48 L.Ed.2d at p. 364].) The principle that [a]dvertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading ... is subject to restraint has been repeatedly affirmed in the commercial speech cases. ( Zauderer, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [85 L.Ed.2d at pp. 667-668, 105 S.Ct. at p. 2278]; Bates, supra, 433 U.S. at p. 383 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 835].) The United States Supreme Court has stated the principle in broad terms: The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it [citations] or commercial speech related to illegal activity. [Citation.] ( Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York (1980) 447 U.S. 557 at pp. 563-564 [65 L.Ed.2d 341 at p. 349, 100 S.Ct. 2343].) In analyzing restrictions on commercial speech the Supreme Court has stated At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. ( Id., at p. 566 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 351].) Limitations on an absolute ban, however, have been indicated. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely ... [but] the States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive. ( In re R.M.J., supra, 455 U.S. at p. 203 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 74].) Further, it has been noted that special considerations apply to advertising by lawyers because they do not dispense standardized products; they render professional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising. ( Va. Pharmacy Board v. Va. Consumer Council (1976) 425 U.S. 748, 773, fn. 25 [48 L.Ed.2d 346, 365, 96 S.Ct. 1817].) This court analyzed the above quoted language in Jacoby v. State Bar (1977) 19 Cal.3d 359 [138 Cal. Rptr. 77, 562 P.2d 1326, 4 A.L.R.4th 273]. Writing for the court, Justice Mosk explained that the footnote stands for the proposition that while the First Amendment values in commercial advertising remain constant regardless of the profession involved, the governmental regulatory interest may vary from profession to profession. ( Id., at p. 377.)