Opinion ID: 624672
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stites & Harbison's Liability for Martin's Actions

Text: Savoie argues that the district court erred in dismissing his section 1983 claim against Stites & Harbison. A section 1983 claimant must show 1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and 2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Street v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the Second Amended Complaint, Savoie acknowledges that there is no federal law supporting liability in this situation. Nonetheless, Savoie argues that Stites & Harbison, as the private employer of an employee providing court-mandated mediation, is analogous to a private prisonwhich this Circuit treats as a state actorand can therefore be held liable for the acts of its agents as a state actor. Stites & Harbison points out that Savoie has failed to advance any support for the argument that Stites & Harbison should be considered a state actor. Moreover, a defendant such as Stites & Harbison cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior or vicarious liability basis. See Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir.2005); Street, 102 F.3d at 818. Savoie argues that this rule applies only to municipalities and that private entities can be held liable based on a respondeat superior theory. This argument, too, has no basis in law or fact. This Court has previously found that respondeat superior is not a valid theory of liability for private contractors employed by a state, Street, 102 F.3d at 818. Indeed, every circuit to consider the issue has extended to private corporations as well the rule that a defendant cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior or vicarious liability basis. Id. That Stites & Harbison is a professional limited liability company makes no difference with respect to respondeat superior liability under section 1983. See, e.g., Craig v. Floyd Cnty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir.2011) (finding that section 1983 claims against limited liability company cannot be based on respondeat superior). Thus, the district court did not err in finding that Savoie cannot pursue a claim of liability based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability against Stites & Harbison pursuant to section 1983. Stites & Harbison's liability to Savoie under section 1983 thus depends upon a demonstration that Savoie's constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom of Stites & Harbison was the moving force behind the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A systematic failure to train police officers adequately is a custom or policy which can lead to municipal liability. Id. The district court found that Savoie failed to state an allegation regarding a policy or custom of Stites & Harbison. Savoie himself does not argue either that Stites & Harbison had in place a policy or custom that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation, or that he properly pled the existence of such a policy or practice. Instead, Savoie argues that he did not have to allege that any such policy or custom was in place because Stites & Harbison could be held directly liable. As we have already explained here and over the years, a defendant cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior or vicarious liability basis. In the Second Amended Complaint, Savoie alleges that Stites & Harbison failed to properly select, supervise, and educate Martin. Savoie does not allege that a policy or practice at Stites & Harbison was the moving force behind his claim and his only potentially valid claim about Stites & Harbison is based on the law firm's alleged failure to train Martin. However, a systematic failure to train employees amounts to a custom or policy for which the employer may be subject to § 1983 liability only if such failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the employees come into contact. Miller, 606 F.3d at 255. To establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff `must show prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [employer] has ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.' Id. (quoting Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir.2005)). Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31, section 17 prescribes the training required for mediators and states that all mediators must be approved by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission, a commission established by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Savoie has not alleged that Martin did not obtain this training and approval from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission. Nor has he alleged that Stites & Harbison had any independent duty to provide training over and above that required by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission. Nor has he alleged that other Stites & Harbison employees who served as mediators have engaged in prior instances of unconstitutional conduct such that Stites & Harbison could be deemed to have demonstrated deliberate indifference to the inadequacy of its employees' training. Thus, even assuming Savoie had intended to plead that Stites & Harbison had a policy or practice of failing to train mediators and that Stites & Harbison was therefore the moving force behind Martin's alleged violation of Savoie's constitutional rights, no policy or practice of Stites & Harbison could have caused the violation. We agree with the district court that Savoie did not state a valid claim of relief against Stites & Harbison pursuant to section 1983. The district court also did not err when it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Savoie's state law claims against Stites. See Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 226, 233 (6th Cir.1997).