Opinion ID: 766381
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Referendum Provision of the Ohio Constitution

Text: 26 Plaintiffs first allege that H.B. 269 violates the referendum proviso found in Article VI, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, which provides: 27 Provision shall be made by law for the organization, administration and control of the public school system of the state supported by public funds; provided, that each school district embraced wholly or in part within any city shall have the power by referendum vote to determine for itself the number of members and the organization of the district board of education, and provision shall be made by law for the exercise of this power by such school districts. 28 Plaintiffs claim that this provision subjects school boards to mandatory referenda and that H.B. 269 unconstitutionally delays such referenda for at least five years. 29 Although Plaintiffs' argument has some limited appeal, the relevant Ohio case law grants the state legislature discretion as to the timing of the referenda so long as the legislature acts reasonably. In State ex. rel. Ach v. Evans, 107 N.E. 537, 538 (Ohio 1914), the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Jung Small School Board Act (Jung Act) under the same referendum provision at issue here. The Jung Act classified and organized city school districts and their respective school board members by using three general categories based on population. Id. at 537. The central legal challenge in Evans was that the Jung Act impermissibly infringed on the referendum provision of the Ohio Constitution. The relevant provision of the Jung Act provided: 30 Said commission shall prepare and submit to the electors at the next general school election, if one occur not less than one hundred and twenty days after the passage of said resolution, otherwise, at the second general school election, two or more plans for the organization of the board of education in such district . . . . 31 Id. at 538. The 120 day limitation period, coupled with the enactment date of the Jung Act, delayed the earliest public referendum for more than two years after the implementation of the new classification scheme and allegedly rendered the Jung Act unconstitutional. 32 The Ohio Supreme Court, however, found the Jung Act constitutional under the state constitution and held that the referendum provision did not require that voters approve any legislative change to the organization of the boards of education in Ohio cities before the legislature can enact and implement such changes. Id. Instead, Evans held that the legislature may make such changes without voter pre-approval so long as it provides the voters with an opportunity at a later date to vote on the changes. Id. (It is obvious that this provision of the Constitution does not require that, before any change shall be made in the old board, a referendum shall be provided determining what change shall be made.); see also State ex rel. Core v. Green, 115 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ohio 1953) (holding that the legislature may change the organization and control of the public schools without holding an immediate public referendum). Absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the legislature, the court determined that the Jung Bill did not conflict with the referendum provision of the Ohio Constitution because the Jung Bill provided for a referendum within a reasonable time. See Evans, 107 N.E. at 538 (Statutes cannot be held unconstitutional upon the ground that somebody disagrees with the Legislature as to the time at which an act should take effect. The Legislature is presumed to have acted in good faith, and there is nothing in the record to overcome that presumption.). Evans thus implied that the legislature could wait two years before submitting the school district changes to a referendum. See id. 33 We read Evans as supporting Defendants' position. Despite Plaintiffs' argument that Evans established a two-year waiting period for a referendum as the maximum reasonable time period permissible, Evans never imposed or implied an exact limitation on the legislature with respect to the timing of referenda. Further, the four year period in H.B. 269 is reasonably related to the legitimate state purpose of improving the school board and providing the new appointees with some leeway to do their work. Without further guidance from the Ohio Supreme Court, we find Evans controlling and hold that H.B. 269 does not violate the referendum proviso of the Ohio Constitution. 34 As additional support for our holding, we note that the Ohio Legislature enacted on the same day both Article VI, Section 3 (the referendum provision) and Article XVIII, Section 5, which also contains a referendum provision that involves public utilities 10 . Unlike the constitutional provision at issue in this case, the utility referendum provision provides for voter approval before a challenged ordinance takes effect. Had the drafters of the Ohio Constitution wanted a similar express limitation in Article VI, Section 3, it is likely they would have included similar language in that provision. The fact that they did not evinces their intent that discretion regarding the timing of referenda under Article VI, Section 3 should rest with the legislature, which has determined that four years between referenda is acceptable. We do not believe Evans implies a contrary result. Moreover, despite Plaintiffs attempts to portray municipal school districts as special because they involve a four-year period before a referendum, Ohio statutes limit referenda to four yearsfor both city and municipal school districts. O.R.C. § 3313.04. Thus, Ohio legislators had a reasonable basis for choosing the four-year period as a reasonable time period for testing the new appointive school board system and we affirm the judgment of the district court on this issue.