Opinion ID: 1196827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unconstitutional vagueness of the regulations applied to the F/V American Eagle.

Text: A statute or regulation is impermissibly vague when the language is so indefinite that the perimeters of the prohibited zone of conduct are unclear, violating rights to due process because the law fails to give adequate notice of what type of conduct is prohibited. Marks v. City of Anchorage, 500 P.2d 644, 646 (Alaska 1972). The owners of the American Eagle argue that the regulations which the vessel was accused of violating are unconstitutionally vague because they fail to identify with certainty the area subject to regulation by the state which was closed to king crab fishing at the time of the alleged violations. Some ambiguity did exist in the applicable regulations, as a result of conflict over the extent of the state's jurisdictional power. In 1968 the Alaska Board of Fish and Game had adopted 5 AAC 36.040, making it unlawful to transport, possess, buy or sell any king crab taken in violation of the rules and regulations promulgated by the board, if such crab was taken in any waters seaward of that officially designated as the territorial waters of Alaska... . Hjelle v. Brooks, 377 F. Supp. 430, 433 (D.C. Alaska 1974); State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 533 (Alaska 1976). In 1974, crab fishermen were successful in obtaining a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of this regulation from the federal district court in Alaska. The three-judge panel held that the evidence before the court at that time did not prove a sufficient basis for an extraterritorial regulation applicable only to crab taken beyond the three-mile limit, but confirmed that Alaska could regulate king crab fishing beyond the three-mile boundary if regulations related to a nexus between its legitimate state interests and its regulation of certain extraterritorial conduct, Hjelle v. Brooks, 377 F. Supp. at 441. [13] In conformity with this decision, the state amended its king crab regulations to the form in existence at the time of the American Eagle's alleged violations. These regulations established statistical areas, each consisting of a registration area where state conservation laws would be enforced to protect and maintain the king crab resources of the state, 5 AAC 34.005(c) and an adjacent seaward biological influence zone where the state would collect information for the development of protective regulations to govern king crab resources inhabiting waters subject to the jurisdiction of the state. 5 AAC 34.005(d). The registration area was defined as comprised of all waters within the statistical area which are waters subject to the jurisdiction of the state, while the seaward biological influence zone was described as all waters within the statistical area which are not part of the registration area. 5 AAC 34.005(b). The geographic boundaries of statistical area O, were defined exactly in 5 AAC 34.600. The seaward boundary was designated as the 800-fathom depth contour. [14] The Egg Island district of statistical area O, in which the alleged violations occurred, had its exact boundaries described in 5 AAC 34.605(c). [15] However, nowhere in the regulations was the boundary, if any was intended to exist, between the registration area of statistical area O and the seaward biological influence zone of the same area delineated. Thus, the seaward boundary of the area in which the state intended to enforce its regulations within each statistical area was left unspecified. The intent, according to the state, was for the boundary to extend within the statistical area as far beyond the three-mile limit as state jurisdiction could be justified in a trial on the merits under the Hjelle criteria. The vessel owners argue on the other hand that the only reasonable interpretation of the regulations is that the state intended to regulate only to the three-mile limit, in response to the Hjelle decision. If this was the intention, a phrase such as territorial waters of Alaska employed in the pre- Hjelle and post- Bundrant regulations or waters of Alaska, which defines the state's territorial waters in 5 AAC 39.975(3), would reasonably have been employed, rather than waters subject to the jurisdiction of the state utilized in describing the boundary of a registration area in the version of 5 AAC 34.005(b) adopted after Hjelle. While we disagree with this interpretation by the owners, [16] the ambiguity in the language employed in the regulations is evident. Regardless of the ambiguity in delineating the registration area, however, the Emergency Orders issued by the state prior to the American Eagle's activities in the Egg Island district left little question that the entire district was closed to king crab fishing as of November 7, 1975. Authorized by AS 16.05.060, Emergency Closure Orders have the force and effect of law. [17] Although 5 AAC 34.035 specifically authorizes the closure of registration areas, neither its terms nor those of AS 16.05.060 prohibit the closure of an entire statistical area or district thereof. [18] Westward Region 1975 Shellfish Emergency Orders Nos. 20 and 23 state unequivocally that the Egg Island district would close to king crab fishing at noon on November 7, 1975. [19] The boundaries of the Egg Island district, as already stated, are described without ambiguity in 5 AAC 34.605(c) as comprising all Pacific Ocean waters of statistical area O within specified geographic lines. [20] Emergency Order No. 28, dated November 18, 1975, in no way contradicted the earlier orders. Its text states that [t]hree districts remain open, of which none of those listed was the Egg Island district. Finally, Emergency Order No. 32, dated January 11, 1976, stated that several previously issued emergency orders, including Nos. 20, 23, and 28 are rescinded effective immediately because no longer needed. The order states that the rescission is effective only prospectively. [21] Thus the order cannot be interpreted to retroactively authorize crab fishing in the closed Egg Island district such as the American Eagle was alleged to have conducted, and which occurred prior to the effective date of the rescinding order. We therefore conclude that the closure of the Egg Island district by Emergency Order was not in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, in violation of the due process rights of the American Eagle's owners. Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1974). Since the other regulations in question have been amended to eliminate the ambiguities noted in this opinion, after Bundrant clarified the extra-territorial jurisdiction question in favor of the state, there is no need to further comment on any deficiencies existing in the past. [22]