Opinion ID: 607688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges to Milwaukee Ordinance 275-32

Text: 10 Milwaukee Ordinance 275-32-1 provides in part that [t]he general welfare of the residents of the city requires that the exterior of structures ... shall be kept in a good state of repair ... to prevent the blighting of city neighborhoods. To accomplish this purpose, the ordinance specifies that [a]ll exterior wood surfaces shall be reasonably protected from the elements and against decay, by paint or other approved protective coating applied in a workmanlike manner. 275-32-3a. Heldstab claims that this ordinance violates his rights in several of ways.
11 Heldstab argues that his choice not to paint the wood trim on his building is a form of speech and that 275-32-3a violates his rights under the First Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The magistrate assumed for the sake of argument that Heldstab's decision not to paint his exterior wood surfaces was a form of speech but concluded that under the analysis of symbolic speech set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the ordinance did not violate his First Amendment rights. We agree. 12 Heldstab insists that O'Brien does not apply here, claiming that this was a case of pure speech, i.e., there were no nonspeech elements involved in his refusal to paint his building. He claims that the very deliberate nature of his expression renders it pure [speech]. Br. 11. We do not agree. Actions can be just as deliberate as speech. Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. In our view, painting (or not painting) a building is within the realm of action, though, for the sake of argument, we assume in this case that it also can be communicative. Regardless, the ordinance passes constitutional muster. 13 In O'Brien, the Supreme Court considered whether, consistent with the First Amendment, a protestor could be prosecuted for the symbolic act of destroying his draft card. Under the Court's analysis, when both speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, an infringement on the speech element is justified if there is a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element. Id. In cases of symbolic speech, a restriction is valid if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id. at 377. 14 Applying this analysis here, we note that the City has the constitutional power to promulgate regulations to enhance the appearance of the City. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). We believe that Ordinance 275-32-3a, by requiring that exterior wood surfaces be painted, furthers the substantial governmental interest in maintaining the appearance of the City. All the Justices in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), agreed that a city has a substantial interest in its appearance. See id. at 507-08 (plurality); id. at 530 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 551 n. 23 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 560-61 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Heldstab maintains that there is no evidence that his decorative choice is unsightly. There is evidence, however, that his building had peeling paint. R. 9, exh. H, p. 9. Heldstab also argues that the ordinance is underinclusive because it fails to prohibit aesthetically displeasing paint colors or combinations of colors. However, a city need not address all aesthetic problems at the same time. See id. at 531 (Brennan, J., concurring). Third, the governmental interest in avoiding blight is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. No Milwaukee ordinance prohibits Heldstab from expressing his belief that he has a right to decorate or not to decorate his building, nor is he prevented from advocating the scientific concept of Natural Weathering. He simply may not practice natural weathering on his buildings in Milwaukee. And finally, the restriction on the expression of different aesthetics is narrowly tailored to ensuring the appearance of the City. Thus, we conclude that 275-32-3a does not infringe upon Heldstab's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
15 According to Heldstab, the City enforces 275-32-3a in a discriminatory manner. First, he argues that 275-32-3a is applied to non-owner-occupied buildings such as his, but not to owner-occupied buildings. The magistrate reasoned that Heldstab had not presented any facts in support of his argument that the ordinance is applied unequally. In his motion for summary judgment, Heldstab supported this claim by reference to the defendants' answer to an interrogatory. R. 14, exh. I. There, the defendants admitted that single-family residences and owner-occupied duplexes are not routinely inspected by the DBI. This does not support Heldstab's assertion that the painting requirement is enforced discriminatorily. 16 Heldstab also argues that Ordinance 275-32-3a is applied unequally because houses with cedar shingles or rough hewn pine or fir on the outside are not required to paint these surfaces. The magistrate did not discuss this claim. Heldstab's affidavit accompanying his motion for summary judgment supports this argument. R. 14, para. 15. The defendants did not rebut this evidence in their opposition. See R. 16-19. Therefore, we must accept as true for the purposes of this appeal that the ordinance is enforced in the fashion claimed by Heldstab. We are unable to conclude that this unequal application of the ordinance passes even the rational basis test because the defendants have offered absolutely no justification for this unequal treatment. They did not even address Heldstab's equal protection argument. We will not construct an argument for them. 3 United States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 702 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1564 (1992). We cannot say that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and therefore the summary judgment, to the extent it dismissed this equal protection claim, is reversed. 4
17 Heldstab claims that 275-32-3a is unconstitutional because it was not applied pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria as required by Marshall v. Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978). As noted previously, the passage from Barlow's upon which Heldstab focuses concerns the criteria for issuing an administrative search warrant. See supra, part A. No search warrant was issued in this case. To the extent that Heldstab's challenge is to the very fact that no search warrant was issued, we address this issue in part D, infra.
18 Heldstab argues that two state cases, City of Columbus v. Stubbs, 162 S.E.2d 370 (Ga.1968), and Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis.2d 318 (1959), compel this court to conclude that Ordinance 275-32-3a bears no rational relation to the promotion of public health, safety, or welfare. Although this argument is highly dubious on its face, we need not even consider it because the ordinance clearly bears a rational relation to the legitimate governmental interest of preserving the appearance of the City, which is one of its avowed purposes.