Opinion ID: 1147525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Testimony of Daniel Crothers

Text: During jury selection, the trial court conducted a hearing on the prosecution's motion in limine to determine the admissibility of testimony by proposed prosecution witness Daniel Crothers. (5a) After the hearing, at which Crothers testified, the trial court sustained defense objections to some of Crothers's proposed testimony, but overruled objections to testimony that Crothers had observed defendant carrying a handgun on five or six occasions during the summer of 1983 and that when he asked why defendant carried the gun, defendant pointed the weapon at him and replied, I'll waste any mother fucker that screws with me. Relying on Evidence Code sections 1101, [6] 350, [7] and 352, defendant contends it was error to admit this testimony. In People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113], we rejected a similar contention regarding admissibility of the defendant's statements that he would kill any police officer who tried to arrest him. Noting that a defendant's threat against the victim is relevant to prove intent in a prosecution for murder, and that a generic threat is admissible to show the defendant's homicidal intent where other evidence brings the actual victim within the scope of the threat, we concluded that the statements were relevant and not excludable under Evidence Code section 1101. ( Rodriguez, supra, at pp. 756-757.) We also rejected an argument under Evidence Code section 352, observing that the evidence was probative of an essential element of the prosecution's case and not cumulative. (42 Cal.3d at pp. 757-758.) A defendant's statements that he would kill anyone who got in the way of his plan were likewise found to have been properly received in evidence in a prosecution for capital murder. ( People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 109-110 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37].) Although the prosecution presented no direct evidence that the victim had attempted to thwart defendant's plan, and thus was within the scope of the threat, the evidence was admissible to provide a possible motive in a case where no other motive for the killing was apparent. ( Ibid. ) In a third decision, we held admissible, under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1250), [8] a defendant's statement that he would not hesitate to eliminate witnesses if he committed a crime. ( People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 634-638 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) Although we rejected an argument that the statement was barred by Evidence Code section 1101, we cautioned that the content of and circumstances in which such statements are made must be carefully examined both in determining whether the statements fall within the state-of-mind exception, as circumstantial evidence that defendant acted in accordance with his stated intent, and in assessing whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs that potential prejudicial effect. (46 Cal.3d at p. 636.) We concluded that evidence of a generic threat is admissible to prove the declarant's state of mind unless the circumstances in which the statements were made, the lapse of time, or other evidence suggests that the state of mind was transitory and no longer existed at the time of the charged offense. ( Id. at p. 637.) Here the statement was made approximately one month before the charged offenses to explain why defendant carried a handgun. Defendant continued to carry the same gun throughout this one-month period and there were no circumstances indicating that the state of mind demonstrated by the statement had ceased to exist by the time of the charged offenses, which were committed with the same gun. In ruling on the motion in limine, the court was necessarily forced to rely on the representations of the parties regarding what issues would be disputed during the trial. Both parties recognized that defendant was charged with first degree murder on both felony-murder and premeditation theories, that defendant's identity as the killer would not be disputed, and that self-defense would be in issue. In accordance with this understanding, the jury was preinstructed, before any evidence was presented, on self-defense, both first degree murder theories (i.e., premeditation and felony-murder), and on various lesser included offenses. Although the prosecutor in closing argument conceded there was insufficient evidence to support the premeditation theory, that theory remained in issue throughout the trial and was again covered in the instructions given at the close of the guilt phase. In addition, the robbery-murder special circumstance, because the trial was held after our decision in Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], but before our decision in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], placed intent to kill at issue, and the jury was so instructed. The jury could reasonably interpret defendant's statement (I'll waste any mother fucker that screws with me.) to mean he had a preexisting intent to kill anyone who interfered with him or thwarted his desires or plans or, in other words, to kill on slight provocation under circumstances where he had no right of self-defense. Crothers's testimony thus provided circumstantial evidence that the killing of Anderson was intentional and was not required for self-defense. Under defendant's version of the killing, which the trial judge considered in ruling on the motion, Anderson was interfering with defendant by making a sexual advance and by making gestures with a rifle which defendant knew to be unloaded. Crothers's testimony supported an inference that defendant responded to Anderson's conduct with deadly force even though defendant realized he was not in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. If the jury determined from other evidence presented, as it eventually did, that defendant killed in the course of a robbery, Crothers's testimony provided evidence that the killing was intentional rather than accidental or in response to a threat of deadly force by the robbery victim. Crothers's testimony supported an inference that defendant had a preexisting intent to use deadly force to overcome any perceived resistance (like a gesture with an unloaded rifle) by a robbery victim or to prevent the victim from interfering with defendant by reporting the robbery and becoming a prosecution witness. Because the evidence was relevant to prove intent to kill, and to defeat the claim of self-defense, it was not made inadmissible by Evidence Code section 350, nor, for the reasons noted, was it barred by Evidence Code section 1101. [9] Before completing the weighing process required by Evidence Code section 352, the court inquired what other evidence the prosecution would be presenting to counter the claim of self-defense. In reply the prosecutor mentioned the position of the gunshot wounds (particularly the three behind Anderson's ear), the stronger-than-normal trigger pull of defendant's handgun, and defendant's possession of Anderson's belongings, as indicating that defendant did not kill Anderson in self-defense. In ruling Crothers's testimony admissible under Evidence Code section 352, the court noted that it would be not merely cumulative, that the undue prejudice would be quite slight, and that the probative value was considerable. Because the prosecution intended to offer other evidence which would tend to prove the same facts, Crothers's testimony was cumulative. (6) But trial courts are not required to exclude all cumulative evidence and if evidence has substantial relevance to prove material facts which are hotly contested and central to the case, it is not merely cumulative. (See People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d 86, 115-116; People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1137.) (5b) And while Crothers's testimony portrayed defendant as a dangerous person inclined to violence, the trial court was not obliged for this reason to exclude it. (See Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d 612, 637-638.) The record indicates the trial court carefully weighed the risk of undue prejudice against the probative value of the evidence on the issues of intent to kill and self-defense. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352.