Opinion ID: 769408
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Imposing All Rulings from the Original Action on the Refiled Action

Text: 29 The Duffys also argue that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to impose on the refiled action the law of the case from the original action. They claim that this ruling rendered them unable to prevail in the refiled case, since the ineptness of the Duffys' original counsel had left significant gaps in their proof 6 . Furthermore, they point out that the district court's ruling undermines the policy behind Rule 41, which is to leave the parties as if the suit had never been brought. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 915 F.2d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 1990). Ford, in response, points out that Rule 41 is also intended to protect the defendant from unfairness; in addition, Ford disputes the Duffys' contention that the district court's rulings left them unable to prevail in their case. Therefore, Ford urges that the district court's ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 30 Under appropriate circumstances, we believe that it would not be an abuse of discretion for the district court to grant a voluntary dismissal on the condition that all rulings from the original action carry over to the refiled action. District courts have broad discretion to attach conditions to voluntary dismissals under Rule 41(a)(2). See id. Furthermore, several courts of appeals have upheld conditions on voluntary dismissals similar to the one at issue here. See, e.g., Parker, 940 F.2d at 1025 (upholding the district court's order that expert testimony excluded in the original action could not be reintroduced in the refiled action); Templeton v. Nedlloyd Lines, 901 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting with approval the district court's decision to condition a voluntary dismissal on the plaintiffs agreeing that they would not oppose the use of existing discovery in a subsequent suit). Thus, if necessary for the protection of Ford's legitimate interests, see, e.g., LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 603-05; 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2366, at 304, the district court could validly impose the evidentiary rulings from the Duffys' original action on their refiled action. 31 We are again troubled, however, by the district court's failure to give notice to the Duffys that it intended to condition the voluntary dismissal on retaining the law of the case in the refiled action. The record reveals no discussion of that condition on January 15, 1997, when the Duffys requested and the district court orally granted a voluntary dismissal. The first mention of the law-of-the-case conditionappeared in the district court's written order granting the voluntary dismissal, on January 24, 1997. In addition, the court did not specify the matters to be governed by the law of the case until an order entered on June 11, 1998, after the Duffys attempted to refile their suit. 7 This lack of notice meant that the Duffys did not have a sufficient opportunity to contest the district court's decision or to withdraw their motion for voluntary dismissal if they did not wish to accept that condition. 8 As we stated with respect to the cost condition, we hold that the district court should have given the Duffys notice and an opportunity to withdraw their motion before imposing the law-of-the-case condition. See Marlow, 19 F.3d at 305; Lau, 792 F.2d at 930; GAF Corp., 665 F.2d at 368. 32 We also note that the district court did not explain its reasons for deciding to apply its rulings from the original action to the refiled action. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to determine whether the district court appropriately exercised its discretion in attaching this condition to the Duffys' voluntary dismissal. See, e.g., DWG Corp., 962 F.2d at 1202 (citing Taragan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 838 F.2d 1337, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 605. Ford contends that no additional discovery is necessary for the Duffys to prevail and that there is no legal or factual reason why the district court would be inclined to rule differently on the evidentiary issues if the Duffys were given an opportunity to re-visit them. At the same time, the Duffys contend that the district court's condition prevents them from prevailing in their suit and is not necessary for the protection of the defendant. We believe that the district court is in the better position to determine initially whether there is a basis for reconsidering its evidentiary rulings, whether the Duffys are still capable of prevailing in light of those rulings, and whether retaining the law of the case in the refiled action is necessary for the protection of Ford's interests. 33 We therefore find it necessary to vacate the district court's order applying the law of the original case to the refiled case and direct the district court on remand to reconsider its decision in light of any objections that the Duffys may wish to make. We note, however, that if the district court's rulings from the original action no longer apply in the refiled action, Ford may be entitled to reimbursement for any additional costs and fees that it will have to expend in the refiled litigation as a result of having to relitigate those rulings, consistent with our discussion in Part II.B.1.