Opinion ID: 2087709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Life-Qualifying Voir Dire

Text: The defendant argues that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing due to the trial court's refusal to ask certain questions submitted by the defense during the court's voir dire of potential jurors. The defendant submitted a list of proposed voir dire questions which included, inter alia, 10 questions under the heading of Reverse Witherspooning or Life Qualifying. The trial court agreed to reverse- Witherspoon the potential jurors by asking them whether they would automatically vote for death if the defendant was found guilty of murder. However, the trial court refused the remainder of the defendant's proposed reverse- Witherspoon questions. The defendant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to give all of his proposed reverse- Witherspoon questions. The defendant focuses on the last two questions, both of which asked whether the potential juror would automatically vote to impose the death penalty if the jury should convict the defendant of murder and if they should be told that he was eligible for death because he had been convicted of another murder. The remainder of the rejected questions on the defendant's list were similar to those two, except that they added specific facts about the other (Doyle) murder conviction. The defendant argues that the trial court's refusal violated his right to an impartial jury at sentencing. The defendant cites Morgan v. Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, and argues that that decision entitled him to have all of his proposed life-qualifying questions asked of the potential jurors. The defendant, however, reads Morgan far too broadly. In Morgan, the Supreme Court held that the trial court in a capital case is constitutionally required, if requested by the defendant, to ask potential jurors during voir dire whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty if the defendant was convicted of murder. ( Morgan, 504 U.S. at 734-39, 112 S.Ct. at 2232-35, 119 L.Ed.2d at 506-09.) The Court in Morgan based its holding on the following reasoning: A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do.    Therefore, based on the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror who maintains such views. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2229, 119 L.Ed.2d at 502-03. The trial court in this case fully complied with Morgan. Morgan held only that the defendant is entitled to have potential jurors questioned as to whether they would automatically vote to impose the death penalty upon a finding of guilt, without regard to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances present in the case. The trial judge asked all the potential jurors whether they would automatically vote to impose death if they should convict the defendant of murder. The further questioning desired by the defendant, inquiring into how the venire members would act given a particular aggravating circumstance, i.e., the Doyle murder conviction, is clearly not required by Morgan. To the contrary, Morgan specifically directed its holding toward the end of discovering jurors for whom the presence or absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant. ( Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2229, 119 L.Ed.2d at 502-03.) Conducting inquiry into whether a potential juror would vote to impose the death penalty, given a particular set of circumstances, is thus not required by Morgan. We find that the trial court's refusal to ask all of the defendant's requested voir dire questions does not warrant reversal. The conduct and scope of jury voir dire is within the discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Cloutier (1993), 156 Ill.2d 483, 495, 190 Ill.Dec. 744, 622 N.E.2d 774; People v. Howard (1991), 147 Ill.2d 103, 136, 167 Ill. Dec. 914, 588 N.E.2d 1044.) The purpose of voir dire is to ascertain sufficient information about prospective jurors' beliefs and opinions so as to allow removal of those venirepersons whose minds are so closed by bias and prejudice that they cannot apply the law as instructed in accordance with their oath. ( Cloutier, 156 Ill.2d at 496, 190 Ill.Dec. 744, 622 N.E.2d 774.) Only when the trial court's actions have frustrated the purpose of voir dire will an abuse of discretion be found. ( Cloutier, 156 Ill.2d at 496, 190 Ill.Dec. 744, 622 N.E.2d 774.) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to ask all of the defendant's proposed reverse- Witherspoon questions. The trial judge's questioning was adequate to ensure that those jurors who would fail to consider all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were discovered. Reversal on this ground is not warranted.