Opinion ID: 2229953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Managerial Exclusion

Text: Section 3(j) of the Act defines a managerial employee as an individual who is engaged predominantly in executive and management functions and is charged with the responsibility of directing the effectuation of management policies and practices. 5 ILCS 315/3(j) (West 1994). The Act excludes these managerial employees from the class of employees who are entitled to engage in collective bargaining. See 5 ILCS 315/3(n), 6(a) (West 1994). The exclusion is intended to maintain the distinction between management and labor and to provide the employer with undivided loyalty from its representatives in management. See National Labor Relations Board v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 682, 100 S.Ct. 856, 862, 63 L.Ed.2d 115, 125 (1980); National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Aerospace Co. Division of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 281-82, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1765, 40 L.Ed.2d 134, 146-47 (1974). The managerial exclusion in the Act was adopted from decisions of the National Labor Relations Board and the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672, 100 S.Ct. 856, 63 L.Ed.2d 115; Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134. The statutory definition of managerial employee under the Act is very similar to the definition contained in the two foregoing United States Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court's application of the managerial exclusion provides guidance to our analysis. In Yeshiva, the Supreme Court applied the managerial exclusion to preclude the unionization of certain professional employees. Specifically, the Court held that members of the Yeshiva University faculty were managerial employees and therefore excluded from collective bargaining. In explaining the managerial exclusion, the Court stated: Managerial employees must exercise discretion within, or even independently of, established employer policy and must be aligned with management.    [A]n employee may be excluded as managerial only if he represents management interests by taking or recommending discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 683, 100 S.Ct. at 862, 63 L.Ed.2d at 126. The Court further stated that, given the concern for divided loyalty between employer and union, the relevant consideration is effective recommendation or control rather than final authority over employer policy. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 683 n. 17, 100 S.Ct. at 863 n. 17, 63 L.Ed.2d at 126 n. 17. See also Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 288, 94 S.Ct. at 1768, 40 L.Ed.2d at 150 (definition of managerial employee includes generally all employees who `formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer' and is not limited to those employees who have some involvement in labor relations matters); Board of Regents of the Regency Universities System v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 166 Ill.App.3d 730, 740-41, 117 Ill.Dec. 799, 520 N.E.2d 1150 (1988) (managerial exclusion is not limited to employees who have some potential to affect labor relations matters, such as wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment). In Yeshiva, the National Labor Relations Board argued that faculty decisionmaking was exercised in the faculty's own professional interest rather than in the employer's interest. The Court found no justification for such a distinction. Instead, it concluded that the interests of the faculty and the employer were indistinguishable, and any attempt to separate these interests would divide faculty loyalty between employer and union. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686-87, 100 S.Ct. at 864-65, 63 L.Ed.2d at 128-29. In applying the managerial exclusion to the Yeshiva faculty, the Court stated that the Yeshiva faculty was intimately involved in policy decisions in a number of areas, including course offerings, course scheduling, teaching methods, grading policies, admissions standards, graduation standards, size of the student body, tuition, and location of a school. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686, 100 S.Ct. at 864, 63 L.Ed.2d at 128. The Court conceded that there was some tension between the managerial exclusion and the inclusion of professionals in collective bargaining. By its ruling, the Court did not intend to prevent all professionals from engaging in collective bargaining. The Court stated that employees who only engage in the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they have been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage even if union membership arguably may involve some divided loyalty. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690, 100 S.Ct. at 866, 63 L.Ed.2d at 130. The Court, however, determined that the Yeshiva faculty exercised authority which in any other context unquestionably would be managerial. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686, 100 S.Ct. at 864, 63 L.Ed.2d at 128. Illinois courts have also considered the application of the managerial exclusion to professionals. Most significantly, in Office of the Cook County State's Attorney v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 166 Ill.2d 296, 209 Ill.Dec. 761, 652 N.E.2d 301 (1995), this court held that assistant Cook County State's Attorneys were managerial employees and excluded from collective bargaining under the Act. This court discussed the statutory powers and duties of the State's Attorney and assistants. These powers and duties include representing the county and the state in the prosecution of civil and criminal actions, prosecuting and defending actions involving a county officer acting in an official capacity, and giving legal advice to county officers. See Cook County State's Attorney, 166 Ill.2d at 302-03, 209 Ill.Dec. 761, 652 N.E.2d 301. Given the procedural posture of Cook County State's Attorney, the Board had not conducted any fact finding at the time of the appeal. This court found that such fact finding was unnecessary because the pertinent inquiry focused on the statutory duties of the assistants, rather than the specific tasks performed by particular individuals. Cook County State's Attorney, 166 Ill.2d at 305, 209 Ill.Dec. 761, 652 N.E.2d 301. The court therefore decided the issue as a matter of law, based on statute and case law detailing the role of the assistant State's Attorneys. In determining whether the assistant State's Attorneys were managerial employees, this court stated that [t]he authority to make independent decisions and the consequent alignment of the employee's interests with management's are hallmarks of managerial status for purposes of labor law. Cook County State's Attorney, 166 Ill.2d at 301, 209 Ill.Dec. 761, 652 N.E.2d 301. This court determined that the assistants were vested with the authority to exercise the power of the State's Attorney and played a substantial part in discharging the statutory mission of the State's Attorney's office. This court stated that the assistants act as surrogates for the State's Attorney in performing the statutory duties of the State's Attorney. Cook County State's Attorney, 166 Ill.2d at 303, 209 Ill.Dec. 761, 652 N.E.2d 301. Because of this close affiliation with the State's Attorney, the assistant State's Attorneys were found to be managerial employees. The managerial exclusion has been addressed by the appellate court in other cases. In Salaried Employees of North America (SENA) v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 202 Ill.App.3d 1013, 148 Ill.Dec. 329, 560 N.E.2d 926 (1990), the appellate court held that, based on the facts presented to the Board, law department attorneys employed by the City of Chicago were managerial employees. The court stated that [m]anagerial employees are those involved in the direction of the governmental enterprise or a major unit thereof who possesses authority to broadly affect its mission or fundamental methods. Salaried Employees, 202 Ill. App.3d at 1020, 148 Ill.Dec. 329, 560 N.E.2d 926. The court relied on three factors in finding the employees to be managerial: (1) the informal setup of the office, allowing an employee to work in different divisions of the law department; (2) the authority of all the attorneys to recommend changes in the city's operation and policy; and (3) the large amount of discretion exercised by the attorneys on behalf of the city. The court concluded that the interests of the law department employees were identical to those of the city. In Chief Judge of the Circuit Court v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 229 Ill. App.3d 180, 171 Ill.Dec. 102, 593 N.E.2d 922 (1992), the appellate court held that, based on the facts presented to the Board, guardians ad litem employed in the office of the Cook County public guardian were managerial employees. Pursuant to statute, the public guardian, Patrick Murphy, had been appointed to represent individuals who were found to be incompetent due to age or disability. Because of the case load, the individual cases were assigned to guardians ad litem, who made almost all of the decisions in their respective cases. The Board argued that the guardians ad litem did not represent the interests of their employer but, instead, represented the many individual wards of the court. The court rejected this argument. The court concluded that the guardians ad litem, through their exercise of extensive discretionary decisionmaking, effectively directed the policies of the Cook County public guardian's office.