Opinion ID: 874801
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The statements of Mary Abitz and Robin Eckmann were properly admitted.

Text: Shackelford next asserts that the court erred in admitting Mary Abitz's statements to law enforcement officers because the statements were clearly testimonial and thus Shackelford's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was violated by their admission. Shackelford also contends that the admission of the statements of Robin Eckmann violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The statements at issue were introduced through the testimony of Sergeant Earl Aston, and revolved around a phone conversation Sergeant Aston had with Mary Abitz while he was at Shackelford's place of business in Missouri. [7] We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony regarding statements made by Mary and Eckmann because the statements were non-testimonial in nature and the district court instructed the jury that the statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. When a violation of a constitutional right is asserted, this Court will give deference to the trial court's factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 142, 176 P.3d 911, 914 (2007). However, we exercise free review over the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. Id. Whether the admission of Mary's and Eckmann's statements violated Shackelford's right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment is a question of law over which the Court exercises free review. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, 236 (2006). Only testimonial statements cause the declarant to be a witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. Id. The determination of whether evidence is testimonial requires the court to consider the purpose behind the Confrontation Clause. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 143, 176 P.3d 911, 915 (2007). The Supreme Court based its holding in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), on the historical underpinnings of the Confrontation Clause, and noted that the Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with this history in mind: First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. Hooper, 145 Idaho at 143, 176 P.3d at 915 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 124 S.Ct. at 1363, 158 L.Ed.2d at 192). In Hooper, this Court analyzed the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Crawford in determining what constitutes testimonial statements: First, the Court looked to Webster's dictionary definition of testimony from 1828. Testimony is [a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 [124 S.Ct. at 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d at 192], (quoting 1 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). The Court then listed three formulations of core testimonial statements: (1)  ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; (2) extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; and (3) statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 [124 S.Ct. at 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d at 192-193], (internal citations omitted). This is not an exclusive list of testimonial evidence. Rather, these formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around it. Id. Id. at 142-43, 176 P.3d at 914-15. This Court in Hooper then analyzed the factual situations of both Crawford and Davis, and determined that, under those cases, a statement is testimonial when: [T]he circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, unless made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. Id. at 143-44, 176 P.3d at 915-16. This Court also discussed the Supreme Court's focus on the formality of questioning and the extent to which the interview was similar to live testimony. Id. at 144-45, 176 P.3d at 916-17. In Davis, the Supreme Court stated: Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are inherently testimonial. 547 U.S. 813, 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2278, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, 242 (2006). Taking such factors into account, this Court employs a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine whether statements are testimonial in nature. Hooper, 145 Idaho at 145, 176 P.3d at 917. Looking at the totality of the circumstances here, it is apparent that the statements were non-testimonial in nature. Shackelford told Sergeant Aston that Martha Millar had taped an argument between Shackelford and Bernadette Lasater and mailed the tape to Mary Abitz. Mary then called Shackelford, and he put her on speaker phone in the room he was sitting in with Sergeant Aston. Mary's statements themselves were not offered for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. Nor was the primary purpose of the questioning to establish or prove past events. Instead, Sergeant Aston's testimony focused on Shackelford's demeanor during the conversation. Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in admitting the out-of-court statements of Mary Abitz. The district court also overruled defense counsel's objection to the introduction of Robin Eckmann's out-of-court statements during Sergeant Aston's testimony regarding the conversation with Mary about the tape. We agree with the State that the statements were offered merely to provide context to Mary's answer.