Opinion ID: 1991039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Double-Jeopardy Claim

Text: Appellant claims that the correction of his sentence, which increased the maximum amount of time appellant could potentially serve, subjected him to double jeopardy. On March 20, 2002, pursuant to D.C.Code § 24-403.01 (2001), which provides for determinate sentencing, Judge Motley sentenced appellant to eight years imprisonment for arson, five years imprisonment for destroying property; and six years imprisonment for second-degree cruelty to children. The sentences for malicious destruction of property and cruelty to children were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the sentence of eight years for arson. [23] These sentences would incarcerate appellant for fourteen years. The determinate sentencing scheme under which this initial sentence was imposed is only applicable to crimes committed on or after August 5, 2000. See D.C.Code § 24-403.01 (2001). Consequently, two days later, Judge Motley, who had recognized his error in applying the determinate sentencing statute to appellant's offenses (committed on June 27, 2000), recalled the parties to a hearing and allowed each to argue how the court should resentence appellant under the proper, indeterminate sentencing scheme applicable to crimes committed before August 5, 2000, see D.C.Code § 24-403 (2001), [24] in order to effectuate what the [c]ourt's thinking was. The government argued for three consecutive three to nine year sentences; appellant argued that the sentences be made concurrent. The trial court then resentenced appellant, in accordance with D.C.Code § 24-403, and to achieve the Court's purpose, to three to nine years' incarceration for each count, with those terms to run consecutively. Therefore, appellant's new sentence provided that he would be imprisoned at least nine years, and up to twenty-seven years. The Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedural provide that the trial court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 35. This court has held that a sentence may be corrected, even if the defendant receives a stiffer sentence as a result. Smith v. United States, 687 A.2d 581, 583 (D.C. 1996) (citing Gray v. United States, 585 A.2d 164, 166 (D.C.1991)) (affirming trial court's correction of defendant's illegal five-to-fifteen month sentence to a proper five-to-fifteen year sentence) (citing Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67, 67 S.Ct. 645, 91 L.Ed. 818 (1947)). Sentences inconsistent with the controlling sentencing statute are illegal  a nullity  and do not constrain imposition of a legal sentence. Kerns v. United States, 551 A.2d 1336, 1337 (D.C.1989); see Prince v. United States, 432 A.2d 720, 720-22 (D.C.1981) (affirming where trial court modified an unlawful six-year sentence by imposing an indeterminate term not to exceed ten years as required by prevailing law, and noting [i]t has long been established that a sentence is a nullity if it is illegal for being at variance with the controlling sentencing statute, and it may be corrected at any time under Rule 35, . . . even if it increases the punishment). Because appellant's initial sentence was inconsistent with the controlling sentencing scheme, the trial court was authorized to correct its sentence to bring it in conformity with the law. We note that the corrected sentence does not necessarily prejudice appellant and may, in fact, prove to be shorter. It is possible that, in the end, appellant could serve less time under the corrected sentence, with the opportunity  depending on assessment of his parole eligibility  of being incarcerated nine years, less than the fourteen-year determinate sentence originally (and erroneously) imposed. That there is a possibility of a maximum of twenty-seven years is largely within the power of appellant to thwart.