Opinion ID: 1371342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Version of Lane and appellant

Text: Lane and Lester got out of their cars, and after verbal exchanges, walked toward each other. Lester hit him (Lane) with a beer can, and then with his pistol. Lester then started firing his pistol into the car in which appellant was sitting. Appellant returned the fire. Albert was hit and Lester started hollering. The firing stopped and the appellant, at Lester's direction, threw his pistol (now empty) out of the car. Lane then assisted Lester in placing Albert into the Cox car. Appellant and Lane drove off. In the trial the judge permitted the State to show by witnesses McDowell, Britt and Lester, that appellant made threats against Lester about a week prior to the killing. The threat apparently was the result of a dispute between appellant and Lester. One week before the fatal shooting appellant, Lester, and McDowell were riding together in Lester's truck. Appellant was driving recklessly and Lester warned him to be more careful. Appellant persisted in his haphazard driving so Lester cut the ignition off and took the keys. Appellant refused to move from behind the wheel, and Lester hit him in the face. Appellant told Lester that he was going to get him. A few minutes later the three stopped to get some coffee. Inside the coffee shop and in the presence of the owner, appellant pulled a knife. As appellant was leaving he said, Take me to Gene Ray's [the owner of the pistol used by appellant in the shooting] and it will all be over with tonight. While it is true that threats against a third party are normally not admitted to show malice against the deceased, the rule is not an inflexible one. It is discussed in C.J.S.: Evidence is inadmissible to show a difficulty between accused and a third person in no way connected with the victim or offense .... However, where there connection with the offense sufficiently appears, evidence of prior difficulties between accused and a third person is admissible to show malice, premeditation, or general state of mind, as is evidence of accused's ill will toward a member of the family of deceased, or that accused had a grudge against the companion of the victim at the time of the assault. ... 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 209. The trial judge also admitted in evidence, over the objection of appellant's counsel, testimony of two witnesses who quoted the appellant as having stated at Hathcock's approximately two hours prior to the killing that he would get Lester with a knife or with a .357 pistol. We are of the opinion that the series of events recited hereinabove sufficiently connects the threats with the offense so as to evidence malice on the part of the appellant. Malice being an element of the offense of which the appellant was charged, both the threats of the previous week and the threats of the same night were admissible in evidence. Error is also alleged on the part of the trial judge in allowing evidence of details incident to the threats. Such details as were admitted did not violate the rule set forth in State v. Clinkscales , 231 S.C. 650, 654, 99 S.E. (2d) 663, which prohibits testimony as to the general details of a previous difficulty. Appellant alleges error on the part of the trial judge in excluding testimony relative to a conversation which took place between Lane and Albert just prior to the fist fight at the park. The testimony would indicate that Albert talked in a derogatory manner about Lane's girl friend. The testimony was submitted by counsel for Lane for the purpose of showing Albert's frame of mind, and showing that he (Albert) was the aggressor. After the judge refused to admit the testimony, counsel for the appellant stated, Your Honor, the defendant Albert would like to join in with the motion made by Mr. Kilgo. The judge again declined to admit the testimony. Whether the excluded testimony prejudiced Lane's rights is a matter with which we are not concerned since he was acquitted. So far as the appellant's rights are concerned, we find no prejudice because the appellant testified that he never saw Albert. We quote from his testimony: Q. Did you ever see Albert Cox? A. No, sir. Q. Did you ever fire at Albert Cox? A. No, sir. Q. Who did you fire at? A. Lester Cox. Q. Why did you fire at Lester Cox? A. Because I was scared. Albert's attitude was amply described by other testimony. It cannot be soundly argued that appellant was induced to begin shooting by the aggression of Albert, whom he admits he did not see. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in excluding the testimony. Appellant contends that the lower court erred in charging the jury as follows: And malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly weapon; and I tell you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that a pistol such as has been introduced in evidence in this case is a deadly weapon. The State could just prove that the act was done with a deadly weapon and stop right there and malice would have been proven; but after all the facts and all of the case is in, it is up to you to determine whether or not the State has proven that the homicide was committed with malice. It is argued that such a charge is incorrect in a case wherein a defendant asserts self-defense as justification for the killing. A similar issue was before us in the case of State v. Maxey , 262 S.C. 504, 205 S.E. (2d) 841, wherein we held the charge to be proper. We do not think that the fact that the appellant asserted self-defense warrants a different ruling and accordingly, we hold the exception to be without merit. After the judge gave the usual charge in a case of this type, including a charge on the law of self-defense, counsel for the appellant asked him to charge the law of coming to the aid of another. It was the contention of counsel that appellant was coming to the aid of Lane when he fired the fatal bullet. The judge declined the request. We find no error. A review of the evidence simply does not reveal testimony warranting the conclusion that the appellant shot Albert or shot at Lester for the purpose of protecting Lane from death or serious bodily harm. The appellant himself testified as follows: Q. When these bullets came into the car where you were, what did you do then? A. I got scared and started shooting. Q. And why were you scared? A. Because Lester said he was going to kill me. Q. And you say you were scared of him? A. Yes, sir. Q. Tell the jury how you fired the pistol that you had. A. When Lester started firing on me, he fired about three times; and I just raised my gun up and started shooting back. At no time did the appellant testify that he was shooting for any purpose other than to protect himself. It is obvious that the jury did not believe his testimony. Appellant's contention that he was entitled to a directed verdict is clearly without merit. Reference to the evidence cited hereinabove points out that there was abundant testimony from which the jury could find the appellant guilty of manslaughter. Affirmed. MOSS, C.J., LEWIS, J., and NESS, Acting Associate Justice, concur. BUSSEY, J., dissents.