Opinion ID: 62855
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Judgment Motion

Text: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a “motion for reconsideration” in those words. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994). [A] motion [for reconsideration], provided that it challenges the prior judgment on the merits, will be treated as either a motion “to alter or amend” under Rule 59(e) or a motion for “relief from judgment” under Rule 60(b). Under which Rule the motion falls turns on the time at which the motion is served. If the motion is served within ten days of the rendition of judgment, the motion falls we construe his briefs liberally and address the issue raised in the motion to vacate. See Andrade, 459 F.3d at 543. 8 No. 08-20036 under Rule 59(e); if it is served after that time, it falls under Rule 60(b). Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 173 (footnotes omitted). Rogers’s motion for reconsideration was filed within ten days of the rendition of judgment. Thus, it falls under Rule 59(e). Motions under Rule 59(e) are not subject to the same stringent limitations as those under Rule 60(b). Id. at 173–74. [I]n order to reopen a case under Rule 59(e) on the basis of evidentiary materials that were not timely submitted, the mover need not first show that her default was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or that the evidence is such as to show that the judgment was manifestly wrong. Id. at 174. However, “a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence and cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued.” Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted).
This issue in Rogers’s post-judgment motion was simply a more explicitly worded restatement of the same argument made in Rogers’s motion to vacate, which is addressed above. There is no need to address it again. Rogers did not submit any newly discovered evidence in his post-judgment motion, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rogers’s post-judgment motion on this issue. (2) Manifest Disregard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 In his post-judgment motion, Rogers for the first time argued that KBR’s failure to submit a timely answer to his demand for arbitration was a violation of Rule 55. He claimed that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by not granting his motion for a default judgment. He could and should have made this 9 No. 08-20036 argument in his motion to vacate. Thus, it could not be made in a Rule 59(e) motion. Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 863. Even if he had made this argument in his motion to vacate, Rule 1 states “[t]hese rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.” Rule 55 does not apply to arbitration proceedings. HDRP rules require the application of the “state or federal substantive law which would be applied by a United States District Court” to arbitration proceedings. However, that rule refers to substantive law, not procedural law or rules. The arbitrator’s decision not to apply Rule 55 to the arbitration proceedings was rationally inferrable from the employment agreement and rules. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rogers’s post-judgment motion on this issue. (3) Rules Regarding Travel to Afghanistan Rogers reiterated his argument from his motion to vacate that KBR should have obtained an Afghan visa for him. There is no need to address that issue again. However, in his post-judgment motion, Rogers added a claim that KBR failed to register him with the U.S. Embassy or Consulate when he entered Afghanistan, citing that as a requirement under KBR’s contract with the U.S. Army. Rogers could and should have made this argument in his motion to vacate. It could not be made in a Rule 59(e) motion. See Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 863. Even if properly made, Rogers presented no evidence to show that he was not registered with the appropriate U.S. Embassy or Consulate when he was working at Camp Eggers. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rogers’s post-judgment motion on this issue. (4) Failure to Provide Written Reasons In his motion to vacate, Rogers claimed the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law when it did not provide written reasons its decision regarding each of his claims. In his post-judgment motion, he re-characterized 10 No. 08-20036 this claim as misconduct on the part of the arbitrator and cited items in the record which he claimed were requests for written reasons. This is an argument that Rogers could and should have made in his motion to vacate. Id. The evidence he cited to show that he made a request for written reasons was not newly discovered. Further, he cited a January 31, 2007 conference call which was neither a request to initiate proceedings nor an answering statement. Thus, it was insufficient under the HDRP rules to require the arbitrator to provide a written statement of reasons. Even if Rogers had raised this argument and cited this evidence in his motion to vacate, he failed to show that the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that resulted in prejudice to him. He also failed to show that the arbitrator’s decision was not rationally inferrable from the agreement and rules. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rogers’s post-judgment motion on this issue.