Opinion ID: 1609410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of On-Premise Exception.

Text: The district court evidently believed that the booster signs were not intended to advertise the boosters' businesses but to celebrate the boosterism occurring within the ballfields themselves. In the court's words, this act of recognizing supporters and being recognized as a supporter of the athletic teams is an activity conducted on the property just as selling concessions, having a celebrity throw out the first pitch on opening day and the like. Following this reasoning, the court concluded the on-premise exception to section 306C.11 applied. The DOT assails this conclusion on appeal. Bypassing its credible objection to the way the issue was preserved for review, we agree that the defense fails on its merits. Under the on-premise exception, [a]dvertising devices concerning activities conducted on the property on which they are located are not prohibited. Iowa Code § 306C.11(2). To qualify for the exception, an on-premise sign must be located on the same property as the advertised activity and limited to identifying the activities located on or products or services available on the property. Iowa Admin. Code r. 761-117.1 (1999). Thus, for example, the exception would permit a fast-food establishment like McDonald's to erect signage on its own property notwithstanding its proximity to the highway. Cf. Brazelton Group v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 623 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Iowa 2001) (under similar language in predecessor statute, court affirmed order preventing company from locating sign for Ramada motel on property owned by Sirloin Stockade restaurant). Here, the district court attempted to shoehorn something into the exception that simply does not fit. The placards in question do not merely identify or celebrate boosters in the bleachers. They advertise goods and services available to the public well beyond the centerfield fence. If their sole purpose were to foster goodwill, there would be no need to include addresses and telephone numbers on the signs. Moreover, as the DOT rightly points out, the goodwill generated by the signs is the very essence of advertising. Because the signs do not advertise products or services available on the property, they do not qualify for protection under the plain meaning of section 306C.11(2). The district court erred in so ruling.