Opinion ID: 2508633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: American's Vicarious Liability on the Common-Law Claims

Text: {29} Ocana asserts that the district court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of American on this claim because there was evidence supporting American's vicarious liability for Kaminski's intentional torts of assault, battery, and IIED. Under basic respondeat superior principles, an employer is liable for an employee's torts committed within the scope of his or her employment. Los Ranchitos v. Tierra Grande, Inc., 116 N.M. 222, 226, 861 P.2d 263, 267 (Ct.App.1993). Thus, under these principles, an employer is not generally liable for an employee's intentional torts because an employee who intentionally injures another individual is generally considered to be acting outside the scope of his or her employment. See Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, ¶ 13, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182 (In most instances, the intentional conduct of an employee injuring another employee is not the intentional conduct of the employer.). Intentional torts arising from sexual harassment are generally considered to be outside the scope of employment. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757 118 S.Ct. 2257 (The general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment.); cf. Coates, 1999-NMSC-013, ¶ 25, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999 (Injuries caused by sexual harassment do not arise out of employment.). Conceding that Kaminski's alleged torts were committed outside the scope of his employment, Ocana asserts that American may be vicariously liable under the aided-in-agency theory because there was evidence showing that the torts were facilitated by his supervisory status. {30} Under the aided-in-agency theory, an employer may be held liable for the intentional torts of an employee acting outside the scope of his or her employment if the employee was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) (1958). As the parties acknowledge, no New Mexico court has yet adopted the aided-in-agency theory in addressing respondeat superior issues. Ocana asserts that we should adopt this theory because our courts have relied upon other sections of the Restatement in determining the scope of an employer's liability. She also asserts that it would be consistent with New Mexico's public policy favoring compensation to a victim injured by another's tortious actions. American, on the other hand, asserts that this theory should not be adopted because our courts have already developed a comprehensive and extensive body of law which defines scope of employment. Consequently, American argues that these cases more aptly apply to the case at hand because they address scope of employment in the context of sexual harassment and assault. As a result of the parties' arguments, we discuss whether we should adopt the aided-in-agency theory in the context of sexual harassment. {31} We do not believe that it would be a radical departure for this Court to adopt the aided-in-agency theory of vicarious liability. New Mexico courts have routinely relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Agency in discussing issues of respondeat superior. See Nabors v. Harwood Homes, Inc., 77 N.M. 406, 407-08, 423 P.2d 602, 602-03 (1967) (applying the Restatement (Second) of Agency to determine if the employer was liable for the negligence of its employee). Additionally, adopting the aided-in-agency theory would further the policies that underlie tort law. See Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 624, 798 P.2d 571, 574 (1990) (Our fault system of recovery, while by no means indispensable to our society in an abstract sense, today serves the important social functions of redistributing the economic burden of loss from the injured individuals on whom it originally fell, deterring conduct that society regards as unreasonable or immoral, and providing a vehicle by which injured victims may obtain some degree of compensation and satisfaction for wrongs committed against them and by which society may give voice and form to its condemnation of the wrongdoer. (Footnote omitted).), rev'd on other grounds, 1998-NMSC-031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305. {32} Consequently, the question that we must decide is whether Ocana presented sufficient evidence showing that Kaminski was aided by his status as her supervisor in committing his alleged torts. We conclude that she did not. In order to prevail under the aided-in-agency theory, Ocana had to present sufficient evidence showing that Kaminski's supervisory authority aided him in the commission of his torts. Employees with such authority have been empowered by the employer to make decisions affecting subordinate employees. It is this authority, bestowed by the employer, that gives the supervising employee the ability to injure the subordinate employee. In this sense, the supervising employee is aided-in-agency. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) cmt. e. (explaining that the basis for the aided-in-agency theory is that the employee may be able to cause harm because of his [or her] position as agent  of the employer) (emphasis added). Here, Ocana failed to present any evidence showing that Kaminski's conduct occurred as a result of an abuse of his supervisory status. Since there is no evidence showing that Kaminski was able to commit his alleged acts by virtue of his supervisor status, summary judgment on this claim was proper. [1]