Opinion ID: 1726966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: conflict of interest of trial attorneys

Text: Harris also claims that trial counsel's imputed conflict of interest warrants postconviction relief. After our remand of the cause in Harris II, the county attorney requested leave to withdraw as counsel for the State and requested the appointment of a special prosecutor. The basis for the request was that Thompson, the associate at the same law firm as the attorney representing Harris at trial, had been hired by the Douglas County Attorney's office. This was the first time that Harris' postconviction counsel was aware of this, and counsel was granted leave to amend the motion for postconviction relief to include claims based on this conflict of interest. The evidence at the postconviction hearing regarding the conflict of interest was that Thompson was an associate at the firm where Harris' trial attorney worked. Thompson's relationship with the firm was somewhat akin to an office-sharing arrangement. The firm did not actually pay Thompson. Thompson was responsible for bringing his own cases to the firm, and he set his own fee schedule and generated his own income. At the end of the month, Thompson would pay half of his earnings to the firm and he would keep the other half. Thompson testified that although he knew that Fabian had been appointed to represent Harris, Thompson never met with Harris, never did any legal work on Harris' case, and did not recall having any confidential information relating to Harris' case. The only connection Thompson had with the case was voluntarily attending a preliminary hearing, in the courtroom gallery, to learn how such matters were handled. Although both Thompson and Fabian stated that it was possible they had informal conversations about Harris' case, neither specifically recalled any such conversation. In December 1998, Thompson left Fabian & Thielen to accept employment with the juvenile division of the county attorney's office. Thompson primarily worked on termination of parental rights cases. Thompson had no direct contact with the criminal division of the county attorney's office, which was located in a different building from where Thompson worked. Thompson testified that he never discussed the Harris case with anyone in the county attorney's office. The postconviction court ultimately found that Thompson did not have any confidential information regarding Harris' case. In addition, the postconviction court found that during the entire period in question, Thompson was effectively screened off' from the entirely separate criminal division of the county attorney's office, located in a different building. The court thus concluded that no actual conflict of interest of the attorneys involved in Harris' trial existed and that there was no basis for postconviction relief. [6-8] Harris correctly notes that under Strickland v. Washington, [14] there is a limited presumption of prejudice if a criminal defendant can show (1) that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests and (2) that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. [15] But Harris' reliance on principles of imputed conflict of interests is misguided. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Cuyler v. Sullivan , has held that the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction. [16] In order to obtain relief in a postconviction action based upon the alleged conflict of interest of trial counsel, the defendant must show an actual, as opposed to an imputed, conflict of interest. [17] We determine that the postconviction court did not clearly err in concluding that no actual conflict of interest was present in this case. As such, Harris has no conflict of interest claim which warrants postconviction relief. The State's cross-appeal asserts that the postconviction court lacked the power to allow Harris' motion to amend the postconviction petition with the conflict of interest allegations. The State argues that issue was not within the purview of our mandate in Harris II remanding the cause for an evidentiary hearing. Having affirmed the denial of postconviction relief on other grounds, we need not reach this issue.