Opinion ID: 2515111
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural bars to relief

Text: Defendant contends he is eligible for a writ of error coram nobis as a result of two distinct mistakes of fact that, he claims, undermine the validity of his guilty plea to felony petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction. First, he claims he was not aware, prior to entering his plea, of the fact that his plea to a petty theft with a prior would qualify as a `crime of moral turpitude' and subject him to deportation to South Korea. Second, he contends he did not know at the time of his plea that if deported, he would almost certainly face religious persecution, including beatings and imprisonment by the authorities because of his religious objections to serving in the South Korean army. In his nonstatutory motion to vacate his plea, he also contends he is entitled to relief because Worthington, his trial counsel, was constitutionally ineffective in failing to adequately investigate the true immigration consequences of defendant's plea, and in failing to arrange for defendant to plead to a nondeportable offense. (6) As a nonstatutory motion to vacate has long been held to be the legal equivalent of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis ( People v. Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 229, fn. 2; People v. Adamson, supra, 34 Cal.2d at p. 325), we consider these claims together. (7) Before we turn to the merits of these claims, however, we find defendant's entitlement to the writ fails at the threshold for three distinct procedural reasons. First, he has not satisfied the requirement that he show due diligence when seeking such extraordinary relief. It is well settled that a showing of diligence is prerequisite to the availability of relief by motion for coram nobis  ( People v. Shorts (1948) 32 Cal.2d 502, 512 [197 P.2d 330]; see People v. Carty (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1528 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 851]), and the burden falls to defendant to explain and justify the delay ( People v. Castaneda (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1618 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 666]). [W]here a defendant seeks to vacate a solemn judgment of conviction ... the showing of diligence essential to the granting of relief by way of coram nobis should be no less than the similar showing required in civil cases where relief is sought against lately discovered fraud. In such cases it is necessary to aver not only the probative facts upon which the basic claim rests, but also the time and circumstances under which the facts were discovered, in order that the court can determine as a matter of law whether the litigant proceeded with due diligence; a mere allegation of the ultimate facts, or of the legal conclusion of diligence, is insufficient. ( Shorts, at p. 513, italics added; see also People v. Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 230 [defendant `must show that the facts upon which he relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ'].) This diligence requirement is analogous to that which we apply to petitions for writs of habeas corpus, where we require a petitioner to set forth with specificity when the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim. ( In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311].) Indeed, we previously have recognized that petitions for writs of habeas corpus and error coram nobis are essentially identical in this regard. ( In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 779 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729] [a habeas corpus petitioner, like a petitioner who mounts a collateral attack by petition for writ of [error] coram nobis,  must allege facts showing due diligence].) (8) The diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle placed randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead reflects the balance between the state's interest in the finality of decided cases and its interest in providing a reasonable avenue of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated. [I]t is the trial that is the main arena for determining the guilt or innocence of an accused defendant.... At trial, a defendant is afforded counsel and a panoply of procedural protections, including state-funded investigation expenses, in order to ensure that the trial proceedings provide a fair and full opportunity to assess the truth of the charges against the defendant and the appropriate punishment. Further, ... [i]t is the appeal that provides the basic and primary means for raising challenges to the fairness of the trial. ( In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 777.) Thus, although coram nobis exists as a possible remedy in cases where this system breaks down, the availability of that extraordinary remedy, like habeas corpus, properly must be tempered by the necessity of giving due consideration to the interest of the public in the orderly and reasonably prompt implementation of its laws and to the important public interest in the finality of judgments. ( Id. at p. 778.) Nor is the diligence requirement for coram nobis unique, for in addition to habeas corpus petitions, we require diligence for other types of collateral attacks on the validity of a plea. (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court ( Zamudio ), supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 203-207 [diligence requirement for a motion to vacate a plea under § 1016.5]; People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1023 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 902, 819 P.2d 861] [defendant's complaint that he was not advised of the collateral consequences of his plea requires a timely objection].) In this case, defendantwho presumably knew he was not a citizen entered his plea in April 1997 and initialed the statement stating he understood his plea could result in deportation, exclusion from admission to this country, and/or denial of naturalization. The INS first moved to deport him in December 1998, filing a notice to appear. Upon his parole from state prison in February 1999, he was immediately detained by federal immigration authorities. Although he was involved in the state and federal judicial systems and was represented by counsel throughout this time, he did not file his petition for a writ of error coram nobis or move to vacate his plea until July 2005, almost seven years after the INS first attempted to deport him. (See People v. Trantow (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 842, 847 [224 Cal.Rptr. 70] [filing a petition for a writ of error coram nobis eight years after filing a habeas corpus petition and 14 years after conviction constitutes inexcusable delay].) Further undermining his claims, defendant fails to allege with specificity when he learned the facts forming the basis of his petition. He declared in an affidavit accompanying his petition that (1) he is concerned he would be forced to serve in the South Korean military if deported; (2) that he may be punished for refusing on religious grounds; (3) that he was not aware at the time he entered his plea that he was admitting a deportable offense; and (4) that had he known he had the option of pleading to a different, nondeportable offense, I would have worked with my attorney to bring it to the attention of the court in negotiating an equivalent plea and sentence that [would have] avoided my deportation. But nowhere does he allege when he learned these facts. Counsel himself declared that at the time of the plea he was unaware the plea would render defendant deportable, although he does not speak to whether he failed to investigate. He further declares that had he been aware an alternative plea to burglary in the language of the statute would have avoided deportation, I believe there is a reasonable probability the prosecution and court would have been willing to agree to this plea. Although counsel mentions he subsequently became aware of the immigration consequences defendant faces, he does not declare when he learned of these facts. In sum, with regard to the allegedly new facts on which defendant relies for his petition for the writ of error coram nobis, he fails to allege with specificity the time and circumstances under which the facts were discovered so as to permit this court to determine as a matter of law whether [defendant] proceeded with due diligence. ( People v. Shorts, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 513.) (9) Defendant's claim fails for a second procedural reason: he failed to avail himself of other remedies when he had the chance. The maxim, `for every wrong there is a remedy' (Civ. Code, sec. 3523) is not to be regarded as affording a second remedy to a party who has lost the remedy provided by law through failing to invoke it in timeeven though such failure accrued without fault or negligence on his part. ( People v. Reid, supra, 195 Cal. at p. 260; see also Mendez v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 791, 798 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 839] [quoting Reid with approval].) [12] This procedural requirement is analogous to the general rule applicable to writs of habeas corpus that habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal, and, in the absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse for failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction. ( In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 [264 P.2d 513].) In the instant case, defendant could have petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus while he was still in actual or constructive state custody, that is, in prison or on parole. Defendant argues that neither of these procedural bars (delay and other remedies) precludes his entitlement to relief, but his arguments are unpersuasive. The INS first moved to deport defendant by filing a notice to appear in December 1998 while he was still in prison and thus in actual custody. At this time defendant could have sought to vacate his plea or otherwise invalidate his conviction by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Although defendant asserts the basis of the 1998 notice to appear was merely the length of his sentence and not his plea, so that he could not have sought to vacate the plea, he is mistaken. The 1998 INS filing against him was based on his status as an aggravated felon, i.e., that he was an alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission. (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).) Thus, the 1998 notice to appear informed him he was deportable because (1) he had been convicted (2) of a theft offense for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year, i.e., an aggravated felony. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).) That defendant's conviction was achieved by a guilty plea rather than a jury trial is irrelevant; the critical fact was his conviction of the type of offense authorizing deportation. Thus, it cannot be said he was not fairly on notice in 1998 that the INS intended to deport him based on his conviction for the Costco crimes. (Compare People v. Gontiz (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1312-1313 & fn. 2 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 786] [defendant placed on notice of adverse immigration consequences when, four years after his plea, the INS brought permanent deportation charges against him] [13] with People v. Totari (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 613] [defendant had no notice INS would deport him based on his criminal convictions when the initial deportation proceedings were based on his alleged violation of his student visa, not his convictions].) Although he asserts [h]e was never sleeping on his rights, his assertion is belied by the record, for nearly seven years passed after the INS's first action against himbased on his conviction for an aggravated felonybefore he filed his petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the trial court and sought to vacate his plea in the Costco crimes. Defendant next claims he was not placed on notice he could actually be deported until 2004, when the BIA reversed the immigration judge's grant of his motion for cancellation of removal. (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).) Although the BIA's action made his removal more likely, to conclude this ruling constituted the very first time defendant learned he could actually be deported is unreasonable. The INS's December 1998 notice to appear notified defendant not merely of the potential adverse immigration consequences of his guilty plea to felony petty theft with a prior, but of the actual consequences. (Cf. People v. Superior Court ( Zamudio ), supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 204 [addressing § 1016.5].) (10) Even were we to assume defendant first learned the facts underlying his coram nobis petition sometime around 2003 (when he first began challenging his state convictions), the petition is procedurally defective for a third reason: defendant has engaged in the piecemeal presentation of claims. Defendant maintains he has at all times taken a []holistic view of his immigration predicament, following a strategy that prioritized his legal challenges to attack first the most serious of the various bases for his removal from the country, and that he should not be penalized for proceed[ing] in a logical progression to deal with the worst threat first. However prudent or efficacious defendant and his legal representatives may have believed this strategy to be, a litigant seeking extraordinary relief from a final judgment is not entitled to bring his legal claims to court seriatim. The analogy to habeas corpus is again apt; for relief on habeas corpus, it has long been the rule that piecemeal presentation of known claims is prohibited. ( In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 777; see also In re Horowitz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 534, 547 [203 P.2d 513] [a habeas corpus petitioner `cannot be allowed to present his reasons against the validity of the judgment against him piecemeal by successive proceedings for the same general purpose']; In re Connor (1940) 16 Cal.2d 701, 705 [108 P.2d 10] [a defendant is not permitted to try out his contentions piecemeal by successive proceedings attacking the validity of the judgment against him].) As with petitions for writs of habeas corpus, one seeking relief via coram nobis may not attack a final judgment in piecemeal fashion, in proceedings filed seriatim, in the hopes of finally convincing a court to issue the writ. Although defendant contends he has not violated this rule, his 2005 motion in the trial court to vacate his guilty plea (and hence his conviction) for the Costco crimes frankly concedes the motion was based on the same grounds that all parties acknowledged in 2003 in support of his successful motion for resentencing in the same case. If defendant knew of these grounds in 2003, he was not entitled to reraise them in 2005. (11) Defendant claims the People's failure, in 2003, to contest his request for resentencing to an aggregate 364 days for the Costco crimes and the toolshed burglary necessarily conceded for all purposes that he has proceeded with diligence. But the prosecutor's equivocal statements at that 2003 hearing (No. I just want to say we're not opposing it. That's as far into it as I want to get) cannot fairly be read as a concession that defendant's subsequent petition for a writ of error coram nobis, filed two years later, was timely. Nor, as defendant claims, did the People forfeit the timeliness objection by failing to raise the issue below. As the party moving the court to issue the writ, defendant, not the People, had the burden of producing evidence. ( People v. Totari, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1206.) Moreover, in opposing both the habeas corpus and the coram nobis writ petitions below, the People specifically argued that defendant has failed to prove diligence. In sum, defendant's petition for a writ of error coram nobis is procedurally defective. The petition was not diligently filed, defendant failed to avail himself of the adequate legal remedy of habeas corpus, and the petition is successive and improperly raises claims piecemeal.