Opinion ID: 214086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: In immigration cases, we review a denial of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion, regardless of the underlying basis of the alien's request for relief. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992); Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir.2003). We give the BIA's decision broad deference and generally do not disturb it unless it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir.2006) (citation and quotation omitted). However, motions that ask the BIA to sua sponte reopen a case [5] are of a different character. Because such motions are committed to the unfettered discretion of the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review a decision on whether and how to exercise that discretion. [6] Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir.2003). Nevertheless, in Mahmood v. Holder the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit suggested that there is jurisdiction to remand to the BIA for reconsideration when the BIA's decision to decline to exercise its sua sponte authority is based on a misperception of the relevant law. 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir.2009). In Mahmood, the petitioner, a native of Pakistan, filed for an adjustment of status after his marriage to a U.S. citizen. Id. at 467-68. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) found that the marriage had been entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws and, as a result, declined to adjust Mahmood's status. Id. at 468. Mahmood was then granted a 120-day voluntary departure period with an alternative order of removal to Pakistan. Id. During that period, Mahmood divorced his first wife and, shortly thereafter, married another U.S. citizen and filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Id. He also sought to stay his voluntary departure, saying, he would not have agreed to [it] had he understood the terms. Id. The IJ held that Mahmood's motion was untimely and that sua sponte reopening would be futile because Mahmood was barred from adjustment of status for a period of ten years because of his prior failure to depart. Id. Mahmood then filed an appeal, which the BIA dismissed for essentially the same reasons. Id. at 469. Later, the Supreme Court in Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 128 S.Ct. 2307, 171 L.Ed.2d 178 (2008), held that an alien could unilaterally withdraw from voluntary departure so as to pursue a motion to reopen. Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 470. That meant that Mahmood's stated desire to retract his decision to voluntarily depart would not have resulted in a ten-year bar to an adjustment of his status, as the BIA and IJ had thought when denying the motion to reopen. In light of Dada, the Second Circuit determined that it was error for the IJ and BIA to assume that Mahmood's failure to timely depart from the United States conclusively barred an adjustment of his status and thus sua sponte reopening was not necessarily futile. Id. at 467. Recognizing that it generally lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision to deny sua sponte reopening, the Second Circuit nevertheless remanded the case so that the BIA could reconsider it in light of Dada. Id. at 467, 471. The Court decided it could exercise jurisdiction where the Agency may have declined to exercise its sua sponte authority because it misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily fail. Id. at 469. We have not previously had occasion to consider whether a question of law arising in the context of a request for sua sponte reopening, as was implicated in Mahmood, gives rise to our jurisdiction. As noted earlier, we typically cannot review a BIA decision to deny sua sponte reopening. That jurisdictional limitation is a product of precedent noting that there is simply no meaningful standard against which such a decision can be judged, because the BIA can make the decision for practically any reason at all; [7] its discretion is essentially complete. [8] Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d at 474-75; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, the discretionary character of a decision to reopen sua sponte does not mean that we are powerless to point out when a decision is based on a false legal premise. Mahmood demonstrates that, and we adopt the Second Circuit's reasoning in that regard. If the reasoning given for a decision not to reopen sua sponte reflects an error of law, we have the power and responsibility to point out the problem, even though ultimately it is up to the BIA to decide whether it will exercise its discretion to reopen. We therefore conclude that, when presented with a BIA decision rejecting a motion for sua sponte reopening, we may exercise jurisdiction to the limited extent of recognizing when the BIA has relied on an incorrect legal premise. In such cases we can remand to the BIA so it may exercise its authority against the correct legal background. Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 469. On remand, the BIA would then be free to deny or grant reopening sua sponte, and we would have no jurisdiction to review that decision. Here, it appears that the BIA may indeed have misperceived the relevant law. We will therefore exercise jurisdiction to review the reasoning behind the BIA's refusal to sua sponte reopen Pllumi's proceedings.