Opinion ID: 1227864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Use of Circumstantial Evidence.

Text: The court explained direct and circumstantial evidence (CALJIC No. 2.00) and it gave the general sufficiency of circumstantial evidence instruction (CALJIC No. 2.01) [3] which is required to be given by the court on its own motion where the case rests substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence, as it does here. ( People v. Yrigoyen (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1]; People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 174 [163 P.2d 8].) In an abundance of caution, in the prosecutor's view, or as required, in the defendant's view, the court also instructed as to circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent. Its instruction was based on CALJIC No. 2.02, [4] but in its reading, the trial court deleted the phrase (or) (mental state). (13) Defendant points out that malice is a separate and distinct mental state which can be established independent of the specific intent to kill, and he argues that eliminating the words or mental state precluded the jury from applying the principles of CALJIC No. 2.02 to the existence of the mental states of malice and premeditation and deliberation. We do not agree. First, the court was not obligated to give CALJIC No. 2.02. The use note states that the instruction is designed for use instead of CALJIC 2.01 in a specific intent or mental state case in which the only element of the offense which rests substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence is the element of specific intent or the mental state. In this case, the specific question that would have been posed by adding or mental state was presented by the general circumstantial evidence instruction that was given. More importantly, defendant suffered no prejudice from the trial court's omission of the words or mental state. The jury was twice cautioned on the inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence susceptible of two interpretations; it was instructed on the mental states required as elements of the charges and included offenses; it was instructed to consider all instructions as a whole and to regard each in light of others. Under the circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that the omission of the phrase in question confused or misled the jury. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [299 P.2d 243].)