Opinion ID: 1195135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: conflict in defense role

Text: Taylor claims that Levine's philosophy about the role of a defense attorney conflicted with his duty to represent Taylor, resulting in an involuntary guilty plea and prejudicing the outcome of the penalty phase. The right to counsel encompasses `the right to counsel free from conflicts of interest.' State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah.Ct.App. 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064), denial of habeas aff'd. sub nom. by Webb v. Van Der Veur, 853 P.2d 898 (Utah.Ct.App.1993) and by Webb v. Van Der Veur, 67 F.3d 312 (10th Cir.1995). Defendants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from a conflict of interest must show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). In order to establish an actual conflict, [the defendant] must demonstrate `as a threshold matter ... that the defense attorney was required to make a choice advancing his own interests to the detriment of his client's interests.' United States v. Acevedo, 891 F.2d 607, 610 (7th Cir.1989) (ellipsis in original) (quoting United States v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414, 1419 (7th Cir.1988)). Once a defendant demonstrates an actual conflict, there is no need to show prejudice. Cuyler at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1718-19. The trial court found that Levine did not actually believe a defense attorney should help his client admit to his wrongdoing, but merely asserted that position in an effort to acquire credibility with the jury. Levine's testimony at the rule 23B hearing provided adequate evidence to support that finding. Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that Levine behaved in any way that was in conflict with Taylor's interests. Levine never told Taylor to plead guilty and in fact tried to discourage him from doing so. Moreover, Taylor himself testified that he pled guilty for personal reasons, not because of his attorney's advice. Thus, the alleged conflict does not undermine our confidence in the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Likewise, Levine's theory that the views expressed in his jury argument constituted a reasonable strategy under the circumstances is plausible; Levine wanted the jury to see him as a defense lawyer committed to truth and justice, with a client who was honest and repentant and thus not deserving of the death penalty. The only area where a significant question arises concerning Levine's motives in representing Taylor has to do with his failure to pursue mitigation evidence. At the sentencing phase of a capital crime in Utah, the fact finder must weigh the mitigating factors against the aggravating factors, imposing the death penalty only if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating beyond a reasonable doubt and the death penalty is appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207; State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981). Possible mitigating circumstances include an accused's minimal history of prior criminal activity, extreme mental or emotional disturbance, extreme duress, mental disease, intoxication, drug influence, youth, minimal participation in the offense, or any other factor that might mitigate the penalty. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(3). Where a defendant has pled guilty to a capital crime, as here, his attorney has the sole duty of trying to prevent the imposition of the death penalty. Thus defense attorneys, to provide effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase, must adequately investigate all potentially mitigating factors. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 104 S.Ct. at 2066 (stating that counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations). Nevertheless, where the attorney can reasonably rule out a mitigating factor, further investigation is not required. See id. For example, one theoretically available mitigating circumstance would be the substantial domination of the defendant by another person. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(3)(c). In this case, Taylor makes no such claim, and the evidence does not suggest it in any way. Therefore, no investigation of this factor was warranted. However, where the defendant claims to have suffered from mental illness at the time of the crime or to have suffered serious mental illness previously, the attorney must investigate potential mitigation by mental disease or extreme mental disturbance. Nonetheless, the attorney does not have an obligation to introduce such evidence if she believes after a thorough investigation that it will harm the case or if other strategic reasons for its omission exist. Strickland at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Taylor argues that Levine failed to conduct an adequate investigation of his psychological history and condition. However, Levine knew about Taylor's childhood psychological problems resulting from a facial scar, a learning disorder, and substance abuse in his family. Moreover, Levine had access to both of the psychological reports from the examinations that had been performed to determine sanity and competence. The trial court found that Levine made the reasonable decision that introducing evidence regarding mental health would hurt Taylor rather than help because of the negative information it would disclose to the jury, specifically Taylor's prior drug abuse and involvement with Satanism and witchcraft, including the drinking of animal blood. Levine quite plausibly decided that Satanic worship and blood drinking did not comport with the boy next door image he hoped to portray. The trial court's finding that this decision was reasonable was not clearly erroneous. Moreover, Taylor fails to identify any mitigating information that might have been uncovered by additional investigation or another psychological exam. In other cases where failure to conduct a psychological exam has been held to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendants had a history of serious mental illness and could show how an investigation would have furthered their defenses. See, e.g., Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1990) (subsequent history on other grounds omitted) (discussing various cases of ineffective assistance when attorney knew defendant had previously been hospitalized for mental illness). A defendant must show not only that counsel failed to seek mitigating evidence, but also that some actually existed to be found. Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 534 (11th Cir.1985) ([Defendant] has adequately demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have received a lesser sentence but for [attorney's] complete failure to search out mitigating character evidence. As the district court found, `Petitioner has demonstrated that no favorable evidence was sought and that some was in fact available.' (quoting Blake v. Zant, 513 F.Supp. 772 (S.D.Ga.1981))). Taylor has not suggested a helpful strategy that would have been supported by evidence not known to Levine. Failure to investigate mitigating factors can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel only where such factors actually exist and may be productively used in the penalty phase. One of the problematic aspects of this case is the evolving nature of standards for adequate defense of a capital prosecution. The State appears to suggest in its brief that an extensive mitigation workup or investigation may not always be necessary (apparently such investigations were not universally undertaken in Utah at the time this case was tried). We are troubled by that proposition if it is intended to suggest that a less-than-adequate investigation will suffice. We hold here that Levine's mitigation investigation, although very limited, appears to have been adequate; there are no indications that he overlooked anything useful in Taylor's background. We emphasize that the failure to perform an adequate mitigation workup represents ineffective assistance of counsel. To demonstrate that counsel made an unreasonable judgment in not pursuing an investigation further, a defendant must identify potentially mitigating circumstances that the investigation would have uncovered. See, e.g., Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 286 n. 6 (Utah 1995) (holding that where defendant did not introduce psychological report containing potentially mitigating evidence at effectiveness hearing, court cannot make judgments about its contents). Defense attorneys need not present all evidence uncovered by a mitigation workup, but they absolutely must perform one.