Opinion ID: 687340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Denial of a Kastigar Hearing

Text: 59 The Montoyas argue alternatively that if their indictments are not dismissed on the basis of improper use of immunized testimony, or because of vindictive prosecution or outrageous government conduct (discussed below), their case should be remanded for a full Kastigar hearing. They contend that the district court's refusal to grant a Kastigar hearing involving cross-examination of the Government's declarants deprived them of their right to procedural due process and their right to confront the witnesses against them. After considering the additional discovery material provided by the Montoyas, the district court stated: 60 Nowhere in the voluminous documents submitted to the court are there implications that the declarants, which swore they had no knowledge of Montoya's statement or testimony, knew the content of Montoya's statements or testimony. Importantly, absent such a contradiction, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing. 61 While ordinarily the district court should hold a Kastigar evidentiary hearing, see Trimiew v. United States, 9 F.3d 1388, 1390 (9th Cir.1993), the Government may meet its Kastigar burden of proof as to the existence of independent, prior sources through affidavits. Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1429 (citing United States v. Rogers, 722 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir.1983) (exhaustive sworn declarations), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835, 105 S.Ct. 129, 83 L.Ed.2d 70 (1984)). 62 In United States v. Zielezinski, 740 F.2d 727, 734 (9th Cir.1984), we held that when the same grand jury that hears a person's immunized testimony then indicts the person, a Kastigar -style hearing is necessary to determine the independent grounds for the indictment. Even if proper, such an indictment appears tainted. Lipkis, 770 F.2d at 1451 (citing Zielezinski, 740 F.2d at 733). On the other hand, in Lipkis, we held that a Kastigar hearing was not compelled once the defendant stipulated that there were only minimal differences between his nonimmunized and immunized statements. We held that a subsequent hearing would have served no purpose and was unnecessary because no issues were left to resolve. Id. 63 Although the Montoyas cite Zielezinski for the proposition that a Kastigar hearing is mandated, their case differs factually because Filiberto Montoya was not indicted by the same grand jury that heard his immunized testimony. 10 Furthermore, while Montoya did not make the kind of stipulation the defendant did in Lipkis, in this case we agree with the district court that a hearing was unnecessary because no issues were left to resolve. The declarations filed by the Government were exhaustive, detailed, nonconclusory in form, and uncontradicted. They did not simply ask the court to rely on the Government's good faith. See Block, 535 F.2d at 1169. 64 The Montoyas argue that the declarations served only to put issues in dispute and did not avoid, but rather required, an evidentiary hearing. The Montoyas contend that a hearing is necessary to resolve various alleged inconsistencies and misleading and inaccurate statements in the declarations. However, their attempt to create inconsistencies misses the mark. 65 First, they contend AUSA Meza states in her declaration that she had not been exposed to any of Montoya's statements or immunized testimony, while also admitting that she saw a copy of the request for authority to prosecute Montoya. Meza in fact stated in her declaration that [a]lthough I saw a copy of the U.S. Attorney's request for authority to prosecute Montoya, I have never seen transcripts of Montoya's testimony or reports of his interviews. As we have described, Meza's exposure to the request for authority to prosecute would not require her to withdraw from the case, did not constitute non-evidentiary use, and likewise does not necessitate a Kastigar hearing. The Montoyas' contentions with regard to the Meza declaration do not raise an issue of fact warranting a Kastigar hearing. 66 Second, the Montoyas contend that AUSA Weiner was in possession of at least one report which referenced and discussed Montoya's testimony, in conflict with Weiner's statement in his declaration that he had carefully reviewed the materials that Ms. Meza had assembled in connection with the investigation and determined that none of these materials included any reference to prior testimony or prior interviews with Filiberto E. Montoya. However, the one example of such a report that the Montoyas point to on appeal, entitled Filberto Montoya-Esparaza Real Estate Investigation, does not discuss Montoya's immunized testimony. The closest it comes to the immunized testimony is the reference to the fact that in the Contreras-Subias investigation, Reese was convinced that Montoya was not being truthful. 67 The Government conceded in its brief that the Reese report (the application for permission to prosecute) was in the Weiner team materials. While Meza's declaration states that she read the application, Weiner's declaration does not specifically address whether or not he read the application. 11 Even if Weiner, or members of his investigation team, were exposed to the application, as we have explained, given the content of the application, it would not constitute significant exposure such that it constituted non-evidentiary use. 68 Finally, the Montoyas contend that had the district court granted an evidentiary hearing and cross-examination, it would have learned that Reese assisted the other eight declarants in preparing their declarations. Reese explained at an earlier hearing before a magistrate judge that he managed the collection of the declarations and did make some suggestions as to form and content. To the extent that the Montoyas suggest that the Government's declarations were therefore contrived, false, or even tainted, we reject the argument. Reese's involvement in the preparation and collection of the declarations did not necessitate the cross-examination of the other eight declarants. 69 In this case, the district court's careful review of all of the declarations and discovery documents complied with due process, and the refusal to allow cross-examination was an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. The alleged internal inconsistencies in the declarations do not call into question the Government's proof by a preponderance of the evidence that all evidence utilized in the indictment of the Montoyas was obtained from independent sources and that the Weiner prosecution team had no access to the immunized testimony. 70