Opinion ID: 2261485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Cohen Case

Text: Charged with various sexual offenses, Cohen did not make a written election as to the mode of trial, as required by Rule 735 b. At the time of Cohen's trial, his counsel told the court that he had advised Cohen of his right to have a jury or a court trial. The court then initiated a dialogue with Cohen concerning his age and education and whether he understood what a jury trial is. In response, Cohen told the court that a jury consisted of twelve of his peers. After the court had fully advised Cohen, in the language of Countess, as to the nature of a jury trial, Cohen said he did not want a jury but wanted to be tried by the court. On three separate occasions, Cohen told the trial judge that he did not want a jury trial. The trial judge said he was convinced that Cohen knew what a jury trial was and that he voluntarily and intelligently made a waiver thereof. The court did not specifically inquire of Cohen as to whether his decision to waive a jury trial was the result of any threats or promises which were made to him. Cohen was convicted and appealed, claiming that his waiver of a jury trial was not voluntary. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, held that there was no requirement under Rule 735 d or under Countess to catechize as to threats, promises, or inducements. It concluded that the trial court could have easily perceived a certain voluntariness ... [from the] interlocution between the court and Mr. Cohen. The court held that the record demonstrated that Cohen had voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. We granted certiorari. Each appellant argues that the trial court violated Rule 735 d in accepting his jury trial waiver because no inquiry was made on the record to determine the voluntariness of the waiver. The appellants claim that while an accused may be fully informed of the nature of a jury trial, as required by Rule 735 d and as explicated in Countess, nevertheless the waiver would not be voluntary if it was the product of coercion. Accordingly, they maintain that the trial judge must make a specific inquiry under Rule 735 d regarding voluntariness, since circumstances rendering a waiver involuntary may be subtle as well as blatant. They suggest, by way of example, that absent an on-the-record inquiry by the trial judge to elicit the existence of any threats, promises or inducements calculated to coerce the waiver, an Assistant State's Attorney could with impunity promise to go to bat for the accused if he waived his right to a jury trial. The appellants argue that Countess does not speak to the voluntariness prong of Rule 735 d and, consequently, the mere fact that they were fully informed as to the nature of a jury trial, in accordance with Countess, is not alone sufficient to meet the rule's voluntariness requirement. To satisfy constitutional due process standards, the waiver of the right to a jury trial must constitute an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969); State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 424 A.2d 349 (1981); Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 361 A.2d 113 (1976). We think it clear that the provisions of Rule 735 b and d that require a voluntary and knowing waiver of the right to a jury trial were intended simply to incorporate the due process standard within the rule itself. As the cited cases point out, whether there has been the requisite waiver can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the relevant circumstances in their totality as disclosed by the record. Nothing in the verbiage of Rule 735 b or d requires the trial court to inquire of an accused who elects a court rather than a jury trial whether his decision was induced by promises or by physical or mental coercion. We conclude therefore, as we did in Priet and Davis involving the voluntariness of a guilty plea, that no specific ritual or fixed litany need be followed by the trial judge in determining the voluntariness of the accused's election to waive his right to a jury trial. The record in the Dortch case indicates that the defendant made a written election witnessed by counsel, stating that his election for a court rather than a jury trial was knowingly and voluntarily made. The voluntary character of the election was fortified by the colloquy between the trial judge and Dortch at the commencement of the trial. We think the trial judge fairly determined that Dortch, having been fully advised with respect to the nature of a jury trial, voluntarily relinquished that right when he elected a court trial. While Cohen, unlike Dortch, did not make a written election under Rule 735 b acknowledging that his court trial election was voluntarily made, the trial judge specifically determined on the record from his dialogue with Cohen prior to trial that he voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. In the circumstances of the cases before us, therefore, the failure of the trial judge to specifically inquire as to whether the jury trial waivers were induced by promises or by physical or mental coercion did not constitute error. We nevertheless take note of the fact that many trial judges do direct such an inquiry to defendants who waive jury trials under Rule 735 d and we think this is the preferable practice. Indeed, paralleling the thought expressed by Judge Digges for the Court in Davis v. State, supra, 278 Md. at 118, we encourage trial judges to engage persons electing court trials in a dialogue as detailed as time, resources and circumstances permit so as to insulate jury trial waivers from successful direct or collateral attack. Judgments affirmed; one-half of the costs to be paid by each appellant.