Opinion ID: 6495733
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Broader Context of the INA

Text: Our interpretation is supported by the broader context of the statute as a whole. Kar Onn Lee, 701 F.3d at 936 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The INA and our precedent make clear that eligibility for refugee status is distinct from the determination of whether an applicant ultimately receives asylum. For example, the INA has mechanisms that come into play only after an asylum applicant qualifies as a refugee. An applicant with refugee status may nevertheless be ineligible for asylum due to the firm resettlement bar, which applies when the alien was firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). 4 Firm resettlement has long meant that a refugee who has an offer of permanent 4 There are also other bars to asylum that, if applicable, mean that an application for asylum must be denied. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A), (c)(2)(C) (safe third country provision); see also 8 U.S.C § 1158(c)(2)(E) (termination of asylum upon acquisition of a new nationality). 17 residence status or citizenship prior to entering or while in a third country is barred from asylum unless the refugee enters that third country as a necessary means to flee persecution and does not establish significant ties to the country before moving onward. See Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 489-98 (B.I.A. 2011). 5 The firm resettlement bar therefore weeds out asylum applicants who have a safe homeland to turn to by examining the manner and degree to which the applicant is associated with a third country. Accordingly, refugee status is necessary, but not sufficient by itself, for a person to receive asylum. We have also acknowledged this multi-step process in our precedent by distinguishing between those who are refugees and those who are eligible for asylum. For example, we have held that [t]he United States offers asylum to refugees not to provide them with a broader choice of safe homelands, but rather, to protect those arrivals with nowhere else to turn. Sall v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). This reflects the bigger picture of the statutory scheme, where an applicant's connection to third countries is 5 The newest regulation defining firm resettlement was promulgated in January 2021 but is the subject of a nationwide injunction. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(a)(3) (2021); see Pangea Legal Servs. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 20-CV-09253, 2021 WL 75756 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2021). On February 4, 2022, the case was administratively closed by stipulation, but the preliminary injunction remains in effect. 18 considered not at the eligibility-for-refugee-status step but rather thereafter, when the United States decides whether the applicant was firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi), or even later, when the agency decides as a matter of discretion whether it will offer asylum to such a refugee based on the totality of circumstances, Ojo, 25 F.4th at 162-64. Hence, the INA treats the determination of refugee status and the grant of asylum as distinct steps in the application process. Provisions such as the firm resettlement bar indicate that the grant-of-asylum step is when the asylum applicant's connections to third countries, including ties through dual nationality, are considered. Connections, if any, to third countries can also be considered when the agency decides whether, after refugee eligibility has been determined, to grant asylum as a matter of discretion. Thus, we conclude that, for purposes of initial qualification as a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), dual nationals need only show persecution in one of the countries of which they are a citizen. 19