Opinion ID: 1981668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor Disqualification

Text: The defendant next contends that he is entitled to a new trial because of the failure of the LaGrange County Prosecutor to recuse himself or of the trial court to grant the request for appointment of a special prosecutor. The defendant asserts that an apparent conflict of interest arose because Denise Robinson, who had become a deputy prosecuting attorney on June 15, 1992, before the defendant's trial, formerly served as defense attorney for one of the original codefendants, Douglas Huey, and negotiated a plea agreement dated April 29, 1992, that required Huey's testimony against the defendant. The defendant also claims that his attorney provided Robinson with information about the case before she concluded her representation of Huey. This Court has held that [t]he precepts of professional ethics forbid the participation of a lawyer in the prosecution of a criminal case if by reason of his professional relation with the accused, he has acquired a knowledge of facts upon which the prosecution is predicated or which are closely interwoven therewith. State v. Tippecanoe County Court (1982), Ind., 432 N.E.2d 1377, 1378. See also Fadell v. State (1983), Ind., 450 N.E.2d 109, 120; Banton v. State (1985), Ind. App., 475 N.E.2d 1160, 1163-64; Walker v. State (1980), Ind. App., 401 N.E.2d 795, 796. The test to be applied is: [A] lawyer must be disqualified if it is shown that the controversy involved in the pending case is substantially related to a matter in which the lawyer previously represented another client. This test must be applied to the facts of each case to determine whether the issues in the prior and present cases are essentially the same or are closely interwoven therewith. Tippecanoe County Court, 432 N.E.2d at 1378 (citations omitted). The public trust in the integrity of the judicial process requires that any serious doubt be resolved in favor of disqualification. Id. at 1379. However, [i]t is not necessary to disqualify a prosecutor's entire staff or to dismiss an indictment because a deputy prosecutor has a conflict of interest, where it is not clear from the record that a deputy prosecutor received confidential information from a defendant or that such information has provided assistance to the prosecution. Daugherty v. State (1984), Ind. App., 466 N.E.2d 46, 50. Moreover, it is appellant's burden on appeal to show that prejudice actually has resulted from prosecution by an individual who previously represented him as a public defender. Flowers v. State (1985), Ind., 481 N.E.2d 100, 103, appeal on remand (1988), Ind., 518 N.E.2d 1096. This case is unlike Banton, 475 N.E.2d at 1163, in which attorney John Meyers as a public defender had represented one codefendant and later, after becoming the Tippecanoe County Prosecutor, entered his appearance for the State to prosecute the other codefendant in exactly the same matter. Id. at 1164 (emphasis in original). The cause number is the same, the court is the same, and most important, the same set of facts are necessary to convict Banton as were necessary to achieve prosecution of [codefendant] Chadwell... . Indeed, Chadwell testified he told Meyers everything concerning the crimes alleged, including material he would not reveal to the prosecutor, when Meyers represented him as public defender. The prejudicial effect on Banton's case is readily apparent. The prosecution, via a previous relationship with the same case, knew the details of Banton's case because Chadwell's case was, in effect, Banton's case. Id. Emphasizing the unique facts of the case, including the fact that a recusal or disqualification of Meyers as the county prosecutor would thereby disqualify his deputy prosecutors, the Banton court found trial court error in denying Banton's motion to disqualify Meyers as prosecutor. In the present case, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for appointment of a special prosecutor following a hearing at which several witnesses testified. The deputy prosecutor, Robinson, stated that she did not disclose to the prosecutor any written or verbal information gained from the defendant's counsel during her representation of Huey. She also indicated that she and the prosecutor had never discussed any details regarding the pending prosecution of the defendant, except during her representation of Huey. Robinson had not in any way participated in the prosecution of the defendant and did not participate at his trial. Reviewing the unique facts of this case, we find that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the deputy prosecutor participated in the prosecution of the defendant, or that she provided any information or assistance to the prosecutor in this case. While the cases of the defendant and Huey were closely interwoven, there is no prejudice shown to have resulted from the deputy prosecutor's prior representation of Huey. Such representation is not imputed to the prosecutor during the defendant's trial merely by reason of his employment of Robinson as a deputy. We decline to find error in the trial court's denial of the defendant's motions to recuse the prosecuting attorney and for appointment of special prosecutor.