Opinion ID: 792179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Inadequacy of the Record as to the Goals of the Sentencing Condition

Text: 26 Our analysis in this case is complicated by the fact that the record does not clearly reveal the intended purpose of the challenged condition. There is some reason to believe the court designed the condition to protect Myers's child; it discussed the need for probation officers to be able to speak with the child afterwards if necessary so that the visitation and the activities can still be in some fashion monitored for the best interest of that child. But there is also reason to believe the condition was intended to protect other children with whom Myers might come into contact during visits; the court also cited the need for specific approval for him to be allowed to pick [his child] up at the school ... or to be in the presence [of] other children. Without a clear indication of the condition's purpose, we cannot evaluate whether the condition involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). 27 If the condition was designed to protect other children, it is clearly related to a legitimate sentencing goal: the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1)(C). Concern for the safety of other children is entirely reasonable given the defendant's criminal history. Indeed, the defense appears to have conceded as much in the district court, at least with respect to prior authorization for school pick-ups: I'm not objecting to the idea if his son is at school and he wants to go pick up his son at school, that has to be precleared. School is hardly the only locale, however, at which defendant's unsupervised contact with his own son would likely put him in contact with other children. While picking up or dropping off his son at the residence of his foster family, Myers might encounter other children in that family. 11 And many of the activities that a father might wish to share with a son — visits to parks and playgrounds, ball games, movies, trips to the library — would bring him into contact with other children. 28 We note that another special condition bars Myers from sites where children are likely to congregate, except on prior approval of his probation officer. Because he does not challenge this condition, we assume that Myers concedes that such a general prohibition reasonably relates to his criminal history and the risk he presents to children. This risk would hardly disappear simply because Myers was accompanied by his young son when their visits took them to sites frequented by other children; indeed, in some circumstances it might increase, by giving Myers a respectable reason for being at the location. 29 Protection of other children would therefore be a reasonable and well-supported goal of the sentencing condition. As discussed below, however, once a reasonable goal is established, the district court will need to make findings as to whether Myers has any constitutionally protected liberty interest in his relationship with his son, and if so, what deprivation of liberty is necessary to achieve the sentencing goal or goals. 30 If the goal of the condition, however, was to protect Myers's own son, the district court will need to develop a record demonstrating the danger to that child, because we cannot say on the basis of the record before us that such a danger has been demonstrated. According to the record, neither the offense of conviction nor the prior offense as reflected in the PSR involved Myers's own child. Both of Myers's offenses involved girls; the PSR stated that the focus of Myers's pedophilia was an attraction to females. The government offered no evidence to show that Myers's child, a male, was in any danger from his father. The evidence in the record does not show, nor has the district court made adequate findings that explain, how the condition will deter misconduct toward that child if that is indeed its goal. See Abrar, 58 F.3d at 46-47 (discussing examples of conditions reasonably related to sentencing goals). 12 Once such a danger is established, it must then be decided whether, in light of the danger to Myers's child, the condition represents a greater deprivation of any cognizable liberty than is reasonably necessary. Whether the purpose of the condition was to protect other children or to protect Myers's son, the district court will need to create a full record to determine whether Myers has any parental rights that trigger due process concerns. 31