Opinion ID: 894541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Taking

Text: First, we determine whether the plaintiffs' property has been taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made in contravention of Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. [2] On this point, the parties agree that only an intentional act can give rise to such a taking. They disagree, however, as to what type of intent is needed. The Jenningses argue that it is only the act causing the damage that must be intentional, citing City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 504-05 (Tex.1997) (A person's property may be `taken, damaged or destroyed' ... if an injury results from either the construction of public works or their subsequent maintenance and operation.). Therefore, they assert that because the City intended to unclog a backup, and because this action resulted in the sewage flood, the City should be liable for the damage caused by the flood. In contrast, the City contends that the relevant question is whether the government intended to damage the property, not whether it merely intended to take an action that accidentally resulted in such damage. The City also finds support for its position in Likes. Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 505 ([M]ere negligence which eventually contributes to the destruction of property is not a taking.). The City argues that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment because there was no evidence that the City intended to flood the Jenningses' home. We do not believe that either position presents the correct standard. We do not agree with the plaintiffs' contention that any intentional act can give rise to liability for an intentional taking. Such a standard would hold the government entity to a higher liability than a private person engaging in the same acts. Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex.1968). Such a requirement would also ignore the predicate of Article I, Section 17: that the damage be for or applied to public use. When damage is merely the accidental result of the government's act, there is no public benefit and the property cannot be said to be taken or damaged for public use. Texas Highway Dep't v. Weber, 147 Tex. 628, 219 S.W.2d 70, 71 (1949) (emphasis added); Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791-92 (Tex.1980). Nor do we believe, however, that the City must necessarily intend to cause the damage; if the government knows that specific damage is substantially certain to result from its conduct, then takings liability may arise even when the government did not particularly desire the property to be damaged. Our earlier jurisprudence has left open the possibility that liability may be predicated on damage that is necessarily an incident to, or necessarily a consequential result of, the act of the governmental entity. Weber, 219 S.W.2d at 71; Dallas County Flood Control Dist. v. Benson, 157 Tex. 617, 306 S.W.2d 350, 351 (1957); see also Kerr v. Texas Dept. of Transp., 45 S.W.3d 248, 250 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). There may well be times when a governmental entity is aware that its action will necessarily cause physical damage to certain private property, and yet determines that the benefit to the public outweighs the harm caused to that property. In such a situation, the property may be damaged for public use. Weber, 219 S.W.2d at 71. We therefore hold that when a governmental entity physically damages private property in order to confer a public benefit, that entity may be liable under Article I, Section 17 if it (1) knows that a specific act is causing identifiable harm; or (2) knows that the specific property damage is substantially certain to result from an authorized government action  that is, that the damage is `necessarily an incident to, or necessarily a consequential result of' the government's action. Weber, 219 S.W.2d at 71; Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 43 S.W.3d 609 (Tex.2004). This definition comports with the definition of intent in the Restatement of Torts, which we have applied in other contexts. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965) (Intent means that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Tex.1993); Rodriguez v. Naylor Indus., Inc., 763 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex.1989). This standard also comports with the takings jurisprudence of states with similar constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court of New Mexico, for example, has adopted a nearly identical standard: [N]egligence in assessing a constitutional claim under the just compensation clause for property damage is irrelevant, but from this we think it does not follow that something less than negligence will suffice ... For an act to give rise to a [takings claim], we think that the act must at least be one in which the risk of damage ... is so obvious that its incurrence amounts to the deliberate infliction of harm for the purpose of carrying out the governmental projects. Intentionally causing the damage would clearly fall within this standard; so also would acting with knowledge that the damage was substantially certain to result from the conduct. Electro-Jet Tool Mfg. Co. v. City of Albuquerque, 114 N.M. 676, 845 P.2d 770, 777 (1992). Other states have adopted similar tests. See Robinson v. City of Ashdown, 301 Ark. 226, 783 S.W.2d 53, 56 (1990) (holding that repeated sewage flooding could give rise to a takings claim and noting that when one knows that an invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is substantially certain to result from one's conduct, the invasion is intentional.... Here the invasion continued long after the city was put on notice of it). In this case, there is no evidence that the City knew, when it unclogged the sewer line, that any flooding damage would occur. Nor is there evidence that the act of unclogging was substantially certain to lead to such damage; the record reflects that unclogging backups does not ordinarily cause residential flooding, and the plaintiffs themselves allege only that unclogging sometimes results in such damage. Because there was no evidence that the City possessed the knowledge required to establish an intentional taking, the trial court correctly granted the City's summary judgment motion, and the court of appeals therefore erred in reversing the trial court.