Opinion ID: 562686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insufficient Evidence Claims

Text: 19 Farkas challenges both of his convictions on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support them. In reviewing sufficiency claims, we must affirm convictions if there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Meirovitz, 918 F.2d 1376, 1380 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)).1. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029(a)(2) Conviction 20 Farkas first argues that, at most, the evidence at trial showed only that his telemarketing employees obtained and illegally used access devices. As Farkas was the owner of the telemarketing companies and the only person with control over the account at Riverside Community Bank, it is incredible that his attorney even attempted to argue that he was not responsible for his employees' actions. Viewing Farkas' position in the telemarketing schemes in the light most favorable to the government, it is without question that there was sufficient evidence to support Farkas' role in the crimes. 21 Farkas next argues that the evidence at trial did not establish that any access device was used to obtain a value of $1,000 or more. This argument is without merit. The indictment charged Farkas with knowingly and with intent to defraud traffic[king] in or us[ing] one or more unauthorized access devices during any one-year period, and by such conduct obtain[ing] anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more during that period. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029(a)(2) (emphasis added). In making his argument, Farkas ignores the statutory provisions that allow the aggregation of amounts obtained with multiple unauthorized access devices. Farkas also argues that United States v. Russell, 908 F.2d 405 (8th Cir.1990), supports the proposition that this court refuses to rewrite the statute to permit aggregation. Id. As Farkas acknowledges, the Russell court made this statement with reference to Sec. 1029(a)(3), not Sec. 1029(a)(2). What Farkas does not acknowledge is that Sec. 1029(a)(3) does not mention aggregation, while Sec. 1029(a)(2) specifically does. Furthermore, the Russell court, in arriving at its conclusion not to rewrite Sec. 1029(a)(3), noted that Sec. 1029(a)(2) does include aggregation, indicating that Congress specifically excluded aggregation from Sec. 1029(a)(3). Id. at 407. Consequently, we reject Farkas' claim of insufficient evidence on the Sec. 1029(a)(2) conviction. 2. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029(a)(3) Conviction 22 Farkas also claims that, as a matter of law, the government failed to produce enough evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict on his 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029(a)(3) charge. Farkas challenges this conviction on two grounds. First he argues that the government failed to prove that he possessed fifteen unauthorized access devices. Second, he argues that the government failed to prove that he possessed fifteen unauthorized access devices at one time. 23 The government argues that the evidence established that Farkas possessed twenty-eight unauthorized access devices, thereby surpassing the statutory requirement of fifteen unauthorized access devices. In addition to seventeen live witnesses, the government introduced evidence of credit card debits from expired or invalid credit cards, Ex. 27; and an abnormally high number of chargebacks in Farkas' Riverside account, Tr. V-65. 24 The district court ordered the jury to disregard four of the seventeen live witnesses because their interaction with Farkas fell outside the scope of the indictment. In addition, Farkas contends that because six of the witnesses testified that they gave their credit card numbers to his employees, he cannot be charged with unauthorized possession of their access devices. Once again Farkas' argument contradicts the plain language of the statute. Section 1029(e)(3) defines the term unauthorized access device as any access device that is lost, stolen, expired, revoked, cancelled, or obtained with intent to defraud, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029(e)(3) (emphasis added). All the witnesses testified that their credit cards had been used without their authorization. Thus, the evidence, viewed most favorably to the government, clearly permits the inference that these credit card numbers were obtained with intent to defraud. 25 In sum, while we reject the government's argument that multiple uses of one credit card constitute possession of multiple unauthorized devices, and while we doubt the government's assertion that the evidence established Farkas' possession of twenty-eight unauthorized devices, we are convinced that viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the jury was justified in concluding that Farkas possessed at least fifteen unauthorized access devices. 26 Farkas' second argument, that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury finding that he possessed at least fifteen unauthorized access devices at one time, is also without merit. Farkas argues that this court's decision in Russell requires reversal. Russell, however, is clearly distinguishable. In Russell, the defendant provided a government agent with stolen credit cards on four separate occasions. The defendant never provided more than twelve credit cards at one time. This court refused to use the total of all the credit cards obtained for satisfying the Sec. 1029(a)(3) minimum of fifteen. We noted that 27 appellant's alleged possession of 41 credit cards is the sum of four distinct transactions which occurred on four separate occasions.... Each period of possession ended on the date of the sale of the access devices to the government agent. None of the four possessions involved 15 or more devices and each possession ended prior to the beginning of the next one. 28 Russell, 908 F.2d at 407 (footnote omitted). Unlike the defendant in Russell, Farkas did not sell the unauthorized access devices. Instead, he used them to make unauthorized charges; in some cases, he used the same credit card number several times. Therefore, his possession of the access devices was continuous. Farkas argues that we should limit our definition of possession to the time of the unauthorized use. This interpretation would lead to the ridiculous conclusion that in order to violate the statute, a defendant must use at least fifteen credit cards at the same moment in time. Such a reading of the statute cannot be accepted. Furthermore, since Farkas did not show that he disposed of any of the credit card numbers after his unauthorized use, he can hardly claim that his possession ended at any specific point. 29 Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Farkas' claim of insufficient evidence on the Sec. 1029(a)(3) conviction fails.