Opinion ID: 2045157
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defamation/Slander

Text: Wilson's second intentional tort claim alleges that Arndt's statements to Dr. Hamsa regarding Wilson's alleged failure to follow Dr. Hamsa's advice and the non-existent videotape were defamatory because they injured his reputation and character, particularly in the eyes of Dr. Hamsa. The jury found for Wilson and awarded damages. Defendants contend the district court erred by not ordering a JNOV on Wilson's claim of defamation. We disagree. As we have noted, [t]he gist of an action for libel or slander is the publication of written or oral statements which tend to injure a person's reputation and good name.... Slander generally consists of the oral publication of defamatory matter. Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 785 (Iowa 1994). Certain statements can be characterized as slander per se. Words are libelous per se if they are of such a nature, whether true or not, that the court can presume as a matter of law that their publication will have a libelous effect. Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 116 (Iowa 1984) (citing Haas v. Evening Democrat Co., 252 Iowa 517, 522, 107 N.W.2d 444, 447 (1961)). Thus, statements categorized as slander per se are actionable without proof of malice, falsity, or special harm. Spencer v. Spencer, 479 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1991); Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 115-16. In addition, we have recognized that [s]landerous imputations affecting a person in his or her business, trade, profession, or office are also actionable without proof of actual harm. Lara, 512 N.W.2d at 785. Here, the district court did not determine whether Arndt's statements were slander per se, but instead left it to the jury to consider the nature of Arndt's communication with Dr. Hamsa. In assessing whether the slander issue should have been submitted to the jury, we need only decide whether the statement could be understood as slanderous per se. See Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 116 (Because defendants assert the slander claim should not have been submitted at all, we need decide only whether the statement could reasonably be understood as slanderous per se.). We find that a reasonable juror could interpret Arndt's statements as constituting slander per se. Iowa law is clear that [a]n attack on the integrity and moral character of a party is libelous per se. Id.; see also Shaw Cleaners & Dyers v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 1137, 245 N.W. 231, 234 (1932). Arndt's statements to Dr. Hamsa regarding Wilson's alleged untruthfulness about his condition and the non-existent videotape could be reasonably understood as imputing dishonesty to Wilson and as an attack on his integrity and moral character. Thus, under the standards of review enunciated above, this issue was properly submitted to the jury to determine whether Arndt's statements constituted slander per se. Furthermore, sufficient evidence also exists to support the jury's finding that Arndt's statements were defamatory.
Defendants further argue that Wilson failed to present substantial evidence of damages from Arndt's alleged slanderous communication to Dr. Hamsa. Slander per se, however, is actionable without proof of damage. Lara, 512 N.W.2d at 786; Rees v. O'Malley, 461 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Iowa 1990); Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 115-16. Recovery is limited to those damages which were a natural and probable consequence of the original slander or its repetition or republication. Lawrence v. Grinde, 534 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Iowa 1995) (quoting Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 N.W.2d 547, 555 (Iowa 1972)); see also Rees, 461 N.W.2d at 839. There is no indication in the record that the jury awarded ordinary damages above and beyond that permitted by this standard. Wilson's testimony sufficiently met the requirement that the jury be presented with evidence upon which the consequences of the [slander] can be judged, evidence such as the nature of the plaintiff's reputation before the libel was published and the extent of the publication. Rees, 461 N.W.2d at 839 (citing Kelly v. Iowa State Educ. Ass'n, 372 N.W.2d 288, 300 (Iowa App.1985)). Wilson testified that as a result of this incident, he was unable to return to work because of lack of self-esteem and distrust of his employer, and that he suffered damage to his reputation as a result of Arndt's statements. He particularly emphasized the detrimental effect the communication had on his relationship with Dr. Hamsa, who accused Wilson of lying. Defendants' contention that Wilson's reputation before the slanderous communication was less than exemplary and that the scope of the publication was limited does not necessarily preclude a recovery. As we stated in Rees, [r]equiring evidence of reputation and extent of publication is necessary so that a jury can determine the extent of injury, but is not imposing a burden on the plaintiff of proving damages. Id. Thus, evidence of Wilson's prior reputation is only useful in determining the amount of damages awarded, not whether they should be awarded at all as a matter of law. After considering the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict in the amount of $4000 in compensatory damages for Wilson. The district court, in considering defendants' motion for JNOV, noted that at the very least Wilson's reputation and relationship with Dr. Hamsa were disrupted by Arndt's statements. We agree with the district court that, in viewing the record in the light most favorable to the verdict, sufficient evidence exists to support submission of the damage claim and the jury's verdict.
In further defense to the defamation claim, defendants contend that Arndt's statements to Dr. Hamsa were substantially true and thus establish a complete defense to the claim. Defendants suggest that because Wilson allegedly did not follow his prescribed bed rest and that he continued to run errands and work on his car against Dr. Hamsa's orders, then Arndt's statements that Wilson was not injured as severely as he claimed and that he was not following Dr. Hamsa's orders were substantially true. But whether Wilson actually followed the exact requirements prescribed by his doctor does not affect the underlying claim. In recognizing substantial truth as a defense to a defamation action, we emphasized: It is no longer necessary for a libel defendant to establish the literal truth of the publication in every detail as long as the sting or gist of the defamatory charge is substantially true. The gist or sting of the defamatory charge... is the heart of the matter in question-the hurtfulness of the utterance. Behr v. Meredith Corp., 414 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1987) (quoting Vachet v. Central Newspapers, Inc., 816 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1987)). Thus, the literal scope of Wilson's activity is not determinative of this issue. We agree with the trial court in that the essence of the alleged defamatory statement was that Wilson was faking the severity of his injury and was being untruthful to his doctor, i.e., that he was a liar. It was not, as defendants suggest, that he was working on his car or driving his children to school. When considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that there was sufficient evidence to both submit this question to the jury and to support the jury's verdict that substantial evidence of damages was present.