Opinion ID: 821279
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fukushima and the NRC Response

Text: On March 11, 2011, before the ASLB had issued a decision on the remanded issue, an earthquake and tsunami occurred off the coast of Japan. The tsunami hit the Fukushima nuclear power plant causing a blackout at five of the six units and resulting in core damage at three of the units. Notably, however, virtually no damage occurred to any of the spent fuel pools on site and there were no spent fuel pool fires. The NRC took action within days to respond to the grave events at Fukushima, establishing a Task Force by a March 23, 2011 memorandum, and requiring the Task Force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of [the NRC's] processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to [its] regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction. The NRC also directed its staff to complete a review and implement lessons learned by 2016. On July 12, 2011, the Task Force issued its report, making twelve overarching recommendations, including on emergency preparedness and mitigation measures. The Task Force also made clear that a sequence of events like that at Fukushima is unlikely to occur in the United States and that continued operation and -13- continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued three orders implementing certain Task Force recommendations. First, the NRC ordered license holders to develop, implement and maintain guidance and strategies to restore or maintain core cooling, containment, and [spent fuel pool] cooling capabilities in the event of a beyond-design-basis external event. Second, the NRC ordered all boiling water reactors with Mark I and Mark II containments (including Pilgrim) to install hardened vents to ensure proper venting of the structure. Third, the NRC required provisions for reliable spent fuel pool indications, because during the Fukushima event [t]he lack of information on the condition of the spent fuel pools contributed to a poor understanding of possible radiation releases and adversely impacted effective prioritization of emergency response actions by decision makers. Each applies to Pilgrim. C. Massachusetts's Post-Fukushima Motion to the NRC to Admit Contention On June 2, 2011, slightly less than three months after Fukushima, Massachusetts moved to admit a contention and to reopen the Pilgrim record, arguing that Fukushima revealed new and significant information that the environmental impact analysis and SAMA analysis needed to address. The Commonwealth contended that Fukushima showed: (1) the likelihood of spent fuel pool accidents -14- was higher than estimated in the existing EIS;10 and (2) the frequency of core-melt accidents was also higher than estimated in the existing EIS, and relatedly, in light of new information on a variety of matters concerning core damage events,11 certain mitigation measures that the SAMA analysis ignored or rejected might be cost-effective.12 Massachusetts also included a petition for waiver, seeking to litigate the spent fuel pool accident issues in the individual adjudication, 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b), as opposed to challenging it through rulemaking. In the alternative, if a waiver was denied, Massachusetts requested that the NRC rescind the spent fuel pool determinations through rulemaking, and that the relicensing proceedings be suspended until that rulemaking request was resolved. 10 Massachusetts's expert stated in his report that the loss of water in an event could lead to a pool fire and that the Fukushima incident provide[d] direct experience of events that could be precursors of pool fires. 11 These included operators' ability to mitigate an accident, the effects of secrecy about mitigation measures, the risk of hydrogen explosions during core damage events, and the use of filtered venting. 12 Earlier in the relicensing proceeding, the agency had considered some similar issues raised in a contention by a different group, including the accuracy of the probabilistic risk assessment's (PRA) estimation of core damage frequency in the SAMA analysis and the use of filtered vents, which were rejected by the agency in an October 16, 2006 order. -15- The contention was accompanied by an expert report by Dr. Gordon Thompson, a senior research scientist at Clark University. Massachusetts moved, on August 11, 2011, to supplement its filing with the released Task Force Report, which Massachusetts stated provide[d] further support for its contention. Massachusetts filed a supplemental declaration from Dr. Thompson, which discussed the reasons he felt the report supported his views in support of the contention. On November 28, 2011, the ASLB denied Massachusetts's motion for a hearing, as well as the waiver motion, and the request for a stay. The ASLB determined that: (1) the spent fuel concerns were not unique to Pilgrim and so denied the waiver petition; and (2) each portion of the contention concerning core damage events failed to meet the agency's record reopening standards and/or its general admissibility standards.13 The NRC affirmed14 the ASLB's decision on March 8, 2012. On the spent fuel pool issues, the NRC denied the waiver petition, referred the rulemaking petition to its staff, and denied the request to suspend the proceedings pending resolution of that 13 One member of the Board concurred, agreeing that the contention should be denied, but concluding that the contention was premature, and Fukushima-related contentions should be allowed when relevant information becomes ripe for consideration. 14 The Chairman concurred in the majority's decision to deny the waiver petition and suspension request, but dissented in the majority's decision to apply the usual record reopening standards. -16- petition. The NRC rejected the contention on all other issues. It noted that Massachusetts had not provided sufficient information to make a significant difference in the environmental review. The NRC considered the core damage frequency claim and each of the related claims that new information on core damage events might affect the SAMA analysis, finding for many reasons that each aspect of the contention either failed to meet the agency's reopening standards or its admissibility standards. In particular, the NRC explained that the failure to sufficiently link the Fukushima events to the Pilgrim environmental analysis was the basic problem with the contention. On May 25, 2012, the majority of the NRC approved the renewal of Pilgrim's operating license. The Chairman was the sole dissenter, preferring to wait on making the licensing decision until all issues before the agency were resolved. The other Commissioners made no direct response, but two noted that if the renewed license were set aside on judicial review, the previous license would be reinstated pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 54.31(c). Massachusetts petitioned this court for review. Massachusetts's primary arguments are that the NRC violated NEPA and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to take a hard look at the lessons from Fukushima and by failing to require supplementation of the EIS as to both the spent fuel pool and core damage concerns before granting a renewed license. It also argues -17- that, under NEPA, the NRC should have heard its rulemaking petition and completed all the post-Fukushima review before granting the license. The record shows that the NRC gave a hard look to the information Massachusetts presented to it, and it engaged in reasoned decisionmaking in explaining why it refused to reopen the record and why it denied the contention. The NRC did not need to wait to grant the relicensing based on conjecture that additional information might arise in the future. Indeed, the NRC gave assurances that if such information did arise, and resulted in new requirements, those requirements would, under its normal procedures, be applied to Pilgrim.