Opinion ID: 2747286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: a Best Interests of

Text: Anal is Today, the majority opinion summa ly approves of the Court of Appeals' explanation of what a court should consider in the good cause analysis, as set forth in on v. Fairfax rtment of Famil Services, 62 Va. . 350, 747 S.E.2d 838 (20 3). I sagree th one si ificant aspect of son decision. The Court of als incorporated a modified best interests of the ild consi ration o the ly juri ctional good cause analysis. Id. at 373-77, 747 S.E.2d at 850-52. In particular, the majority opinion oves of a court's consideration of whether clear and convincing evidence [establishes] that transferring the case to a tribal court would cause, or would present a s tantial risk of causing, immediate serious emotional or physical damage to child. Id. at 376, 747 S.E.2d at 85 . I rating this consideration into the Section 191 (b) good cause anal is is error for t following reasons.
ted States Supreme Court Precedent The Supreme Court of United States has noted that 25 U.S.C. 1 § 1911 is a jurisdict 1 statute. HoI field, 490 U.S. at 36. As such, Section 1911(b) only allows a state court to determine who should make the [ ter care or parental rights] determination 1 HoI ield res d legal issues pertaining to Section 1911(a). See 490 U.S. at 42 54. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's ral scussion of 25 U.S.C. § 1911 lies w equal rce to Section 1911 (b) . 6 concerning [Indian] children. Id. at 53. Notably, a state court cannot use Section 1911(b) to decide substantive issues, such as what the outcome of [the foster care or rental rights] termination shou be.  Id. Instead, a state court must r to experience, wi and compassion of the tribal court, because it is the tr 1 court that must rule on the substant issues once juris ction is transfer Id. at 53-54 ernal ion marks omitted); see also Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1994) (Absent any indication of bias, we will not sume the Tribal Court to be anything other than competent and ial.). The best interests consideration contravenes this recti on by allowing a state court to second guess a tribal court's termination of substantive issues. This is because the actual act of transferring juris ction is not, in and of itself, something that can cause serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 62 Va. . at 376, 747 S.E.2d at 851. Juris ction, be a court's r to decide a case or issue a decree, is an stract concept, real world consequences of trans rring jurisdiction require only that parties a in front of, papers be filed with, a f rent tribunal. Black's Law Dicti 980 (10th ed. 2014); see Kern Oil & Refini Co. v. Tenneco 1 Co., 840 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing the effects of urisdiction be transferred between ral district llate courts) The act of transferring juris ct ,then, cannot harm a ld. Instead, only substantive isions subs to 7 transfer of juris ct - such as a tribal court's determination that the Indian child should be moved to a new adoptive family before ultimate resolution of the proceedings fall within the scope of a best interests consideration. The Court of Appeals recognized is ct when it held that the focus must remain on imrnediate serious emotional or physical damage flowing from the transfer self. 62 Va. App. at 376, 747 S.E.2d at 851. However, the Court of Appeals then compounded its error when it cons ide as relevant to this determination whether Tr is willing to allow the child to stay her current environment, pending adjudication of the case on merits of termination and/or placement. Id. These post-transfer, substant decisions are the very tribal court determinations that a state court cannot second guess. See 201 ield 490 U.S. at 53-54.
Best Interests in Jurisdictional Scheme To extent a best interests consideration is relevant, it has already been decided by Congress enacting the ICWA. Congress made clear its reasons for enacting the ICWA in its Congressional findings, stating specifically: the States, [when] exercising their recogni jurisdiction over Indian chi custody proceedings through administrat and judi al bodies, have often failed to recognize essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian com~unities and families. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5). The ICWA thus protect[s] the rights of [an] Indian child as an Indian . . by making sure that Indian child welfare determinations are not based on a white, middle-class standard which, in many cases, forecloses acement 8 th an Indian ly.n HoI ield, 490 u.s. at 37 rnal quotation marks and alterations omitted). To protect Indian children from these dangers, Congress found it to be in the best interests of Indian children for ster care and parental right proceedings to be  sumptive[ly] under the jurisdiction of a tribal, rat r than state, court. HoI 490 u.s. at 36; see 25 U.S.C. § 1902. is, the presumption of triba juri ction is in and of itself in the best interests of Indian Idren because tribal courts have the rience, sdom, and compassion . . to shion an appropriate remedy in these cases. HoI ield, 490 U.s. at 54; see 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(3)-(5); 1902; 1911 (B). There is no best interests consideration to be made. Whether post-transfer actions have a negat impact on Indian children was a risk Congress beli appropriate because it is tr 1 courts that are most familiar with, and respons to, the needs of their Indian community and Indian children. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (4), (5). Additionally, because the ICWA precludes the imposition of 10 standards by creating a broad presumption of jurisdiction in t 1 courts, allowing a best interests consideration under Section 1911(b) defeats the very purpose for which the ICWA was enacted [by allowingj Anglo cultural ases into the analysis. 906 S.W.2d 152, 169-70 (Tex. App. 1995 )
Indistinguishable From a Position It Recognizes As Incorrect Most states that have confronted the issue we face today have held that a best interests consideration is inappropriate under 9 the good cause analysis Section 1911(b). Eight states conclusively adopt this ition, including Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Texas. 870 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1065-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); In re Id of: R.L.Z. and R.G.L, 2009 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1015, at  16 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished); C.E.H. v. R.H., 837 Additionally, three other states have not expressly held that  cause analysis of Section 1911(b) precludes a best interests considerat ,but their opinions imply such a position. rst, Iowa has adopted its own, state version of the ICWA. See Iowa Code §§ 232B.1 Because that state law provides more than the minimum standards of federal ICWA, the state ICWA governs transfer of jurisdiction for cases involving Indian children within Iowa. See In the Interest of N.V., 744 N.W.2d 634, 637 38 (Iowa 2008). Relevant to our purposes, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that Iowa courts never approved of a best interests consideration under the f ral ICWA when it was the governing law. Id. Second, the Utah Supreme Court held that Utah's state abandonment law cannot allow a r's parent to that minor's domicile to frustrate the exclus jurisdiction provision of Section 1911(a). In re ion of Hall 732 P.2d 962, 968­ 70 (Utah 1986). In ruling on the ICWA's juri ctional provis ing state law, the Utah Supreme Court refused to weigh typical best interests considerations, ludi the bonding that [took] place between [the adoptive parents] [the minor] . Id. at 971-72. Third, the Wisconsin Court of als held that a trial court did not err when considering a minor's best erests as it re ed to a Section 1911(b) good cause analysis, because that best interests cons ration was tied solel to the timel ss of the tribe's attempt to take juri ction of [the] case. State v. Debra F., 695 N.W.2d 905, 2005 Wisc. App. 254, at  (Wis. Ct . . 2005). Timeliness is an appropriate consideration under the good cause analysis, and is not synonymous with a typical best interests consideration. 10 S.W.2d 947, 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); In re Interest of Z ena R. v. Elise M., 825 N.W.2d 173, 184-86 (Neb. 2012) (overruling its decision to allow a best interests consideration in In re Interest of C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1992)); In re Guardiansh of Ashle Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d 451, 456 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) i In re Interest of A.B. v. K.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 633-34 (N.D. 2003); Tr:lpe, 906 S.W.2d at 169-71. Only a minority of six states allow a best interests consideration in the Section 1911(b) good cause analysis, uding Arizona, California, Indiana, Montana, Oklahoma, and South 3 Dakota. In re Mari Juvenile Action No. JS 8287, 828 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); In re Alexandria P., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1355 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); In re ----------~---------------- 525 N.E.2d 298, 308 (Ind. 1988); In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 79-80 (Mont. 1990); 754 P.2d 863, 869 (Okla. 1988) i In re Guardiansh of J.C.D., 686 N.W.2d 647, 650 (S.D. 2004) . Four other state courts have acknowledged the issue, but avoided resolving it because the issue was not properly before the court. Ex e C.L.J. --~--~~~~~- 946 So.2d 880, 893-94 (Ala. Civ. App. 3 The South Carolina Court of Appeals sanctioned a best interests consideration for Section 1911(b) purposes. Chester Cnt. 't of Social Servs. v. Coleman, 372 S.E.2d 912, 915 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988). However, when the South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed that cision, it remained notably silent on the best interests issue and held that the good cause analysis of Section 1911(b) is, essentially, a modified forum non conveniens analysis. See Chester of Social Servs. v. Coleman 399 S.E.2d 773, 775 77 (S.C. 1990). It is therefore unclear whether the South Carolina Court of Appeals' approval of the best interests consideration remains good law. 11 2006); In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849,854 n.24 (Alaska 2001); Inre ~~, 2007 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1154, at -6 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (unpublished); In re Guardians of J.O., 743 A.2d 341, 348 49 (N. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). The Court of Appeals rejected the pos ion of all these other courts, and instead fashioned a wholly novel, and supposedly narrow, best interests cons ration. ~~~_o_n_ 62 Va. App. at 373 76, 747 S.E.2d at 850-51. Today, by approving the Court of Appeals' ~--=--- on decision, the majority opinion embraces a position that is a minority of one. Moreover, upon closer scrutiny, it is clear that this supposedly limited best interests consideration is actually indistinguishable from the neral best interests standard. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the traditional best interest of the child analysis is too broad a consideration in deci ng whether good cause exists to retain jurisdiction under Section 1911(b). Thompso~, 62 Va. App. at 374, 747 S.E.2d at 850. But the majority opinion's limited best interests consideration is identical to the general best interest st rd's scope and type of ew of post­ transfer tribal court rulings. First, the limited best interests cons ration affords the same scope of review of post-transfer tribal court rulings as the general best interests standard. The Court of Appeals created an immediate serious emotional or physical damage flowing from the transfer itself standard as the basis to determine what tribal court determinations are subject to a state court's best interests review. Id. at 376, 747 S.E.2d at 851. Putting to the side the fact that all post-transfer determinations are immune from a state 12 court's second guessing, see Hol 490 U.S. at 53-54, this standard does not actually operate to segregate reviewable from unreviewable tribal court rUlings. The transfer of jurisdiction itself is, essentially, the proximate cause of the tribal court's ability to make any ruling in the proceeding. Thus, all tribal court rulings occurring after a Section 1911(b) trans r of jurisdiction flow[] from the trans r, 62 Va. App. at 376, 747 S.E.2d at 851, and are subject to a state court's review under the majority opinion's best interests consideration. Second, the limited best interests consi ration affords the same type of review of post-transfer tribal court rulings as the general best interests standard. That is, both allow a circuit court to focus on the same legal factors, including the emotional and physical impact that a ruling would have on a child. re Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96, 101, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827-28 (1986) (hoI ng that a ruling which has a substantial likelihood of flicting se ous harm to the child is repugnant to the child's best interest), with Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 376, 747 S.E.2d at 851. Further, the factual context which informs the weighing of such factors is likely to be the same for all tribal court rulings. For example, questions of a child's mental and physical well being in light of the child's attachments to his current home, and the potential r danger in a new home, are equally present in a non­ nal ruling of whether a child should be moved to a new foster home before final disposition, and a ruling on the ultimate issue of whether the child should be placed in foster care or the parent's rights should be terminated. Simply put, the majority opinion's 13 limited best interests consideration and the general best interests standard apply the same law to the same types of facts.