Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant evans additional peremptory challenges.

Text: ś 144. Evans next argues that he was denied a trial by a fair and impartial jury when the trial court erred in refusing to grant additional peremptory challenges when 124 of 127 potential jurors had knowledge of the facts of the case. Evans repeatedly requested additional peremptory challenges. However, prior to the exhaustion of Evans' twelve challenges, the trial court ruled that the motion was premature. Evans exhausted his twelfth peremptory challenge on Juror Cavin and the State struck the next juror. Juror Stevens was accepted by the State becoming the twelfth juror and Evans again reurged his motion for additional peremptory challenges. The trial judge questioned Evans about the basis for the motion: The basis, Your Honor, that we stated previously in all of our motions. We've been forced to exhaust all 12 of ours and accept people that we might not have otherwise accepted, strike people that would have otherwise been acceptable had not it been for the publicity regarding the matters I stated. ś 145. Jurors Harris, Jones, and Merideth indicated that they had knowledge of the case including Evans' escape. Jones was excused by the trial court for personal reasons. Harris and Merideth were challenged for cause by Evans on the basis that they had extensive knowledge about the facts of the case. However, each of these jurors indicated they could set aside matters they had seen or heard and consider only the evidence produced at trial. Evans did not peremptorily strike Harris or Merideth from the jury. ś 146. In the preceding assignment of error, Evans complained about the presence of Juror Stevens, the jury foreman. Steven was the twelfth juror chosen after the exhaustion of Evans' peremptory challenges. Evans did not challenge Stevens for cause. However, it is precisely at this point, when faced with a juror with knowledge of the facts of the case and without further peremptory challenges, that Evans should have challenged Stevens for cause. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 845 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 (1995); Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 635, 639 (Miss.1988); Johnson v. State, 512 So.2d 1246, 1255 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 968, 108 S.Ct. 462, 98 L.Ed.2d 402 (1987). Having not made such a challenge, Evans cannot now assign Stevens' presence on the jury as error. Notwithstanding the lack of a challenge, Stevens indicated that he could be impartial and fair and would restrict his consideration to the evidence presented at trial. ś 147. In Mettetal v. State, 615 So.2d 600, 603 (Miss.1993), this Court held that the loss of a peremptory challenge does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. There, this Court held that [s]o long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean that the defendant was denied his constitutional rights. Id. (quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988)). ś 148. Evans, however, argues that this case is similar to that before this Court in Mhoon v. State, 464 So.2d 77 (Miss.1985), where twelve of the thirty-nine veniremen who were not excused for cause were either police officers or related by blood or marriage to current or former police officers. Of the twelve jurors selected, a uniformed police officer served as foreman and five other jurors were related to law enforcement officers. There, we held that the sheer number of law enforcement-connected persons in the jury pool, as well as persons selected as jurors, has worked a great hardship on Mhoon. Id. at 81. This Court stated: Given the statistical aberration in the jury pool, the judge could have done several things to ameliorate its prejudicial effect: (1) he could have afforded counsel additional peremptory challenges; (2) he could have increased the size of the available venire as well as affording additional challenges, or (3) he could have sustained at least some of the challenges for cause. A.B.A. Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management (1983); Standard 9(b) & (g) at 83, 85-86.... Id. Noting the opportunity for undue influence over the opinions of other jurors, we held that under this novel situation the coercive inference on the jury precludes this Court from saying that this appellant was afforded his constitutional right of a trial by an impartial jury secured by Art. 3, § 26 of our Constitution. Id. at 82. ś 149. Evans now argues that the extensive number of persons in the jury pool with knowledge about the case warranted additional peremptory challenges. One hundred and sixteen veniremen were present during voir dire. Of the 101 veniremen actually considered, six indicated that they had no knowledge about the case. Those jurors who indicated that they knew about the facts of the case were extensively questioned during individual sequestered voir dire. ś 150. Of those jurors actually impaneled, eleven jurors and one alternate possessed some knowledge about the case. However, each of these jurors indicated that they could consider only the evidence presented in court. ś 151. In Mhoon, supra, this Court noted that because of the novel situation Mhoon's counsel would have had to use every single one of his peremptory challenges just to exclude persons connected with the police force. Evans' counsel was faced with a similar dilemma. However, the issue before this Court, and the primary concern of the Mhoon Court, is whether the sheer presence of a majority of veniremen who had some knowledge of this highly publicized case warrants the conclusion that Evans was not tried by a fair and impartial jury. ś 152. In Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887 (Miss.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), on remand, 595 So.2d 1323 (Miss.1992), this Court was again confronted by the statistical aberration argument. There, this Court distinguished Mhoon on several bases. First, this Court noted that unlike Mhoon, defense counsel in Shell had two remaining peremptory challenges at the conclusion of voir dire and could have challenged two jurors who served on the jury who had relatives that had been murdered. Moreover, this Court held: In the case sub judice, the trial court questioned each member of the venire about their ability to be impartial, and defense counsel asked each member of the venire if those relationships would prevent them from being fair and impartial toward the defendant, Robert Shell. Neither juror Sherrod, whose uncle had been killed, nor juror Goss, whose brother had been killed, indicated they would find it difficult to fulfill their obligations in a fair and impartial manner. Neither juror was peremptorily challenged or challenged for cause. Id. at 890. As in Shell, each juror indicated they could be fair and impartial. From the record before us, we cannot now conclude that Evans did not receive a fair and impartial trial.