Opinion ID: 4242298
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Johnson on Taylor’s

Text: “Crime of Violence” Holding We held in Taylor that Arizona attempted armed robbery was a crime of violence for Guidelines purposes. Id. at 1237–38. Based solely on the text of Arizona’s armed robbery statute, we concluded that “[a]rmed robbery under Arizona law involves the threat or use of force; therefore, that offense is a crime of violence pursuant to” the force clause of Section 4B1.2(a)(1). Id. at 1237. Molinar contends that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), is clearly irreconcilable with our crime of violence holding in Taylor and urges us to 8 UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR treat Taylor as “effectively overruled.” See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). We thus evaluate whether Taylor’s determination that Arizona attempted armed robbery is a crime of violence under Section 4B1.2’s force clause survived Johnson. We hold that it did not. The Supreme Court in Johnson analyzed the ACCA’s “violent felony” definition. The Court evaluated whether the term “physical force” in that definition was synonymous with the understanding of “force” under the common law and held that it was not. For common-law battery, the force element is “satisfied by even the slightest offensive touching.” See Johnson, 559 U.S. at 138–41. By contrast, the Court “th[ought] it clear that in the context of a statutory definition of ‘violent felony,’ the phrase ‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Id. at 140; see also id. (discussing similar conclusion reached in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), about the statutory definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16). We have applied Johnson’s definition of force in analyzing whether an offense constitutes a crime of violence under the force clause of Section 4B1.2 of the Guidelines.3 3 Recent Supreme Court decisions striking down the ACCA’s residual clause, see Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015), but upholding the Guidelines’ residual clause, see Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017), together with an amendment to the Guidelines’ enumerated felonies clause, see infra section II.B.1, have resulted in material differences between the two definitions that will likely limit our ability to treat the two as interchangeable in future cases. Those differences are not relevant to Molinar’s arguments about whether Taylor remains good law after Johnson, however, because the force clauses in the ACCA and the Guidelines remain identical. UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR 9 United States v. Tucker, 641 F.3d 1110, 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011); accord Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140 (discussing “crime of violence” and “violent felony” as equivalent terms). Thus, to qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause, an offense under state law—as interpreted by that state’s courts—must punish only conduct involving violent force as defined in Johnson. In light of Johnson, we must assess whether Arizona courts apply the armed robbery statute to punish conduct that does not involve violent force. Arizona’s armed robbery statute provides: A person commits armed robbery if, in the course of committing robbery as defined in § 13-1902, such person or an accomplice:
simulated deadly weapon; or
weapon or dangerous instrument or a simulated deadly weapon. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1904(A). On its face, this statute does not require that the robber actually use or even threaten to use a weapon. Arizona courts have not imposed further requirements. See State v. Snider, 311 P.3d 656, 659 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (“[Section] 13-1904(A)(1) does not require the use or threatened use of the weapon, only that a defendant is ‘armed with a deadly weapon’ during the commission of the crime.”). Thus, merely possessing a fake gun during the commission of a robbery, even without mentioning it or brandishing it, would constitute armed robbery in Arizona. 10 UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR Under the categorical approach, “we must presume that [Molinar’s] conviction rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts criminalized.” Strickland, 860 F.3d at 1226-27 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684). Because merely possessing a fake gun during a robbery is no more violent within the meaning of Johnson than robbery itself, armed robbery is indistinguishable from robbery for the purposes of the categorical analysis under the force clause. See United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974, 978–80 (9th Cir. 2016). Our analysis therefore turns on whether Arizona robbery involves sufficient force under Johnson. Arizona’s robbery statute provides that “[a] person commits robbery if in the course of taking any property of another from his person or immediate presence and against his will, such person threatens or uses force against any person with intent either to coerce surrender of property or to prevent resistance to such person taking or retaining property.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1902(A). The statute defines “force” as “any physical act directed against a person as a means of gaining control of property.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1901(1). This broad statutory definition of “force” has not been narrowed by Arizona courts, other than by clarifying that the force must be “intended to overpower the party robbed.” State v. Bishop, 698 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Ariz. 1985); see also State v. Garza Rodriguez, 791 P.2d 633, 637 (Ariz. 1990). Arizona courts have not required this “overpowering” force to be violent in the sense discussed by the Supreme Court in Johnson. In Lear v. State, 6 P.2d 426 (Ariz. 1931), a foundational robbery case, the Arizona Supreme Court held that simply snatching an article from a person’s hand or “surreptitiously tak[ing] from another’s pocket” is not UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR 11 robbery. 4 Id. at 427 (quoting State v. Parsons, 87 P. 349, 350 (Wash. 1906)). But the court observed that “if the article is so attached to the person or clothes as to create resistance however slight,” the offense becomes robbery. Id. (quoting JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 2 BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW 864 § 1167 (John M. Zane & Carl Zollmann, eds., 9th ed. 1923)); see also id. (“The snatching [of] a thing is not considered a taking by force, but if there be a struggle to keep it, . . . the taking is robbery . . . .” (quoting FRANCIS WHARTON, 2 A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 1297 § 1089 (11th ed. 1912)). Consistent with Lear’s analysis of force, in State v. Moore, No. 1 CA-CR 13-0649, 2014 WL 4103951 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2014) (unpublished), the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed a robbery conviction that involved only a minor struggle. In that case, the defendant reached through a car window to grab the wallet of the driver, who was an undercover police officer. Id. at . “The officer resisted and tightened his grip on the wallet, but [the defendant] wrested control of it away from him. As a result of what the officer called a ‘struggle,’ the officer’s arm ‘flew back.’” Id. The officer testified that the defendant had to “yank” and “pull” to take the wallet from his hand. Id. at . Citing Lear, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that “although the force [the defendant] used was not extreme or particularly violent, it was sufficient to constitute a ‘physical act directed against [the officer] as a means of gaining control of [the wallet].’” Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1901(1) and citing Bauer v. 4 Although Lear interpreted an earlier version of Arizona’s robbery statute, Arizona courts continue to rely on Lear’s analysis of the force required for robbery when interpreting the current statute. See, e.g., Bishop, 698 P.2d at 1243; State v. Rodriguez, 609 P.2d 589, 590 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). 12 UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR State, 43 P.2d 203, 205 (1935) (“[E]ven though the snatching of a thing is not looked upon as a taking by force, it is otherwise where there is a struggle to keep it.”)). It is clear from these cases that Arizona punishes as robbery conduct that does not involve violent force. The level of force involved in grabbing the wallet in Moore, where the victim was not harmed, is similar to the level of force we have considered insufficiently violent to qualify as force under Johnson. In United States v. DominguezMaroyoqui, 748 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2014), for example, we explained that bumping into or jolting someone, grabbing a jacket, or spitting in a victim’s face did not rise to the Johnson level of violent force. Id. at 921. Similarly, in United States v. Flores-Cordero, 723 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2013), we held that a “minor scuffle” during which a defendant jerked her arms, kicked, and struggled to keep officers from placing her arms behind her back during an arrest was not Johnson-level violent force. Id. at 1087–88 (citing State v. Lee, 176 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008)). Under these precedents, a conviction for robbery—or armed robbery—in Arizona does not require the threat or use of Johnson-level force. As a result, our conclusion in Taylor that Arizona armed robbery is a crime of violence under Section 4B1.2’s force clause, see 529 F.3d at 1237, is clearly irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson. We therefore treat this part of Taylor “as having been effectively overruled.” See Miller, 335 F.3d at 900. And we hold that Arizona armed robbery can no longer be considered a categorical crime of violence under Section 4B1.2’s force clause. UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR 13