Opinion ID: 2320764
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Reference to Bankruptcy

Text: Scire first argues that the trial justice abused her discretion by excluding references to Botelho's bankruptcy because of its relevance to witness credibility. Scire argues that plaintiffs had a motive to lie about the fact that she allegedly cut off Anderson because they were unable to recover damages from Botelho. [T]he admission of evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Votolato v. Merandi, 747 A.2d 455, 462 (R.I.2000) (quoting New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Rouselle, 732 A.2d 111, 113 (R.I.1999)). Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence allows relevant evidence to be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, ormisleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. By making her decision off the record, the trial justice makes review of her determination difficult. However, when the trial justice later granted plaintiffs' motion for new trial, she indicated that [t]he [c]ourt made clear that [Botelho's] bankruptcy was not relevant to the case and reference to [the] same would be inflammatory and unduly prejudicial. This makes clear the basis for, and scope of, her earlier ruling. The trial justice did not abuse her discretion in deciding that Botelho's bankruptcy was inadmissible because prejudice resulting from its disclosure would disturb the jury's ability to assess the comparative negligence of each of the parties. The trial justice appropriately sought to ensure that each person's negligence could be properly assessed based only on the facts and not hindered by the fact of Botelho's bankruptcy. At the same time, the trial justice appropriately prevented the jury from construing the fact of bankruptcy as an admission of liability. In sustaining the trial justice's decision, we note Scire maintains that immunity from suit does not inform the jury that Botelho was bankrupt. By saying immune from suit Scire's counsel communicated to the jury the information the trial justice sought to prohibit. The terminology makes no difference.