Opinion ID: 865384
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether delashmit’s statements to law

Text: ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED. ¶9. The standard of review for admission of evidence is abuse of discretion. Debrow v. State, 972 So. 2d 550, 552 (Miss. 2007). However, when a question of law is raised, we apply a de novo standard of review. Id. “This Court will reverse a trial court's finding that a confession is admissible only when an incorrect legal standard was applied, manifest error was committed, or the decision is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Martin v. State, 871 So. 2d 693, 701 (Miss. 2004) (citing Duplantis v. State, 644 So. 2d 1235, 1243 (Miss. 1994); Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660, 665 (Miss. 1991)). ¶10. Delashmit argues that his separate confessions to Sheriff Johnson and to Investigator Franks were improperly admitted. With regard to the confession to Sheriff Johnson, Delashmit argues that while he was under arrest, the arrest was without probable cause, so the statement to the sheriff was inadmissible as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” He argues that the second statement also should not have been admitted, because it was made after he had invoked his right to counsel. ¶11. Delashmit was not under arrest at the time of his confession to Sheriff Johnson. “An arrest within the meaning of the criminal law is the taking into custody of another person by an officer or a private person for the purpose of holding him to answer for an alleged or 5 suspected crime. One who voluntarily accompanies an officer to a place where he may be interviewed is not under arrest.” Dancer v. State, 721 So. 2d 583, 586 (Miss. 1998); Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1202 (Miss. 1996) (quoting Smith v. State, 229 So. 2d 551, 556 (Miss. 1969)). Delashmit voluntarily got into the patrol car to speak with Sheriff Johnson. The sheriff testified at the suppression hearing that Delashmit was detained “based upon gathering information.” Sheriff Johnson likewise testified that due to the weather conditions, “I asked [Delashmit] to sit in the back seat of the patrol car on the driver’s side, and I got in the back seat of the patrol car next to him on the passenger side.” (Emphasis added). Also, Sergeant Gwin testified that Delashmit was not under arrest at this time and was simply a suspect. Police officers have authority to detain a person for investigatory purposes without actually arresting the person. Williamson v. State, 876 So. 2d 353, 355 (Miss. 2004) (citing Shannon v. State, 739 So. 2d 468, 471 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). ¶12. Further, this Court likewise has stated that “[i]f [the defendant] wanted to claim his confession was a product of an illegal arrest, ‘it [was] incumbent upon him to assert this defense at the hearing and to offer some evidence in support of it.’” Sills v. State, 634 So. 2d 124, 125 (Miss.1994) (quoting Bevill v. State 556 So. 2d 699, 709 (Miss. 1990) (emphasis added)). This Court held that in failing to do this, the defendant, Sills, had abandoned this claim and had forfeited his right to argue at some subsequent time that the trial judge had erroneously admitted his statement into evidence because it was induced by an illegal arrest. Id. at 126. In the case sub judice, Delashmit also failed to argue that his confession was the result of an illegal arrest and argued only that it was involuntary; therefore, this argument is 6 barred. Procedural bar notwithstanding, Delashmit’s argument fails on its merits for the reasons stated; therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing into evidence Delashmit’s first statement to Sheriff Johnson. ¶13. Before Delashmit made his second confession, Investigator Franks read him his rights at the Lee County jail, and he signed a waiver-of-rights form. The following exchange took place between Delashmit and Investigator Franks: Franks: This is a statement of your rights and you understand what your rights are? Delashmit: Yes, mam. Franks: You’re willing to make a statement and answer questions without a lawyer present at this time? Delashmit: I prefer a lawyer. Franks: You prefer to have an attorney? Delashmit: Well . . . but I will . . . you know . . . I will go ahead. Franks: No. You have to tell me you’re willing to talk to me. Delashmit: I’m willing to talk to you. Franks: Without an attorney at this time? Delashmit: Without an attorney. Franks: Okay. Do you understand and know what you’re doing? Delashmit: Yes, mam. Franks: Are you on any kind of medication? Delashmit: Uh . . . not presently. Franks: Has there been any promises or threats made to you? Delashmit: No, mam, it hasn’t. Franks: Again, I’m going to ask you . . . do you want an attorney at this time or do you want to talk to me? Delashmit: I want to talk to you. Franks: Okay. So, you’ve had your rights read to you and I need you to sign it right there. And you said you prefer to have an attorney, again, I want to emphasize . . . are you willing to talk to me without an attorney? Delashmit: Yes, mam. Franks: You changed your mind and said . . . you’re willing to talk. Delashmit: I was . . . yeah, I will talk to you. 7 Delashmit argues that the confession he made subsequent to this exchange was inadmissible because he had requested or invoked his right to counsel. ¶14. When a suspect invokes his right to counsel, all interrogation must cease until the lawyer is present. Grayson v. State, 806 So. 2d 241, 247 (Miss. 2001) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981)). However, such an invocation must be unambiguous. “[A]n ambiguous mention of possibly speaking with one’s attorney is insufficient to trigger the right to counsel.” Id. (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994)). In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that the statement, “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer,” was insufficient to trigger the right to counsel. Davis, 512 U.S. at 462. A suspect must articulate his or her desire to have counsel present with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer under the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Id. at 459. ¶15. This Court likewise recently dealt with the issue of a similar ambiguous statement made by the suspect during a custodial investigation. In Chamberlin v. State, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 352 (July 17, 2008); rehearing denied, Chamberlin v. State, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 470 (Sept. 11, 2008), this Court set out the following facts from the record: Lyon [law enforcement officer] began by asking preliminary identification questions. Chamberlin [defendant] claims that about one minute into the interview she stated, I won't tell you anything until I talk to a lawyer. The State contends that Chamberlin asked, Is this where I'm supposed to ask for a lawyer, and later Don't you think I need a lawyer? The videotape of the interrogation shows that Chamberlin made an unintelligible statement, and Lyon immediately asked questions to clarify whether Chamberlin had invoked her right to counsel. Subsequently, Chamberlin clearly said, I'll talk. 8 This first interview lasted about six minutes. Lyon testified that after he read Chamberlin her Miranda rights, she checked [on a Miranda form] that she did not want to speak with [him]. The interview concluded at approximately 5:20 p.m. Chamberlin, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 352, -13, ¶¶ 25-26. (footnote omitted). In analyzing this issue, we stated: P39. A review of the video recording of the first interrogation shows that Lyon was in the midst of asking identification questions when Chamberlin, after spelling her last name, blurted out the unintelligible statement regarding an attorney. Lyon then ceased his series of identifying questions and asked Chamberlin a number of questions, pertaining only to whether she wanted an attorney. Eventually, Chamberlin said, I'll talk. The trial court found that her questions concerning an attorney were ambiguous as a matter of law and that investigators took all appropriate precautions to determine the nature and extent of the ambiguity, and that the defendant voluntarily and without coercion agreed to proceed and further answer questions. This Court agrees. P40. After the clarifying questions and Chamberlin's response that she would talk, Lyon advised Chamberlin of her Miranda rights, and she acknowledged that she understood. When Lyon asked Chamberlin are you willing to answer questions now, Chamberlin shook her head no, and Lyon ceased asking questions. Chamberlin's indication that she did not want to answer questions did not constitute an unambiguous request for counsel. Thus, at the end of the first interrogation, she successfully invoked her right to silence but not her right to counsel. This Court fnds, as the trial court did, that Chamberlin's Miranda rights were fully respected during the first interview. Chamberlin, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 352, -22, ¶¶ 39-40 (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. at 458-61). ¶16. In today’s case, Delashmit’s statement of “I prefer a lawyer” was only an ambiguous mention of possibly speaking with an attorney. Consistent with Chamberlin, we find that this statement was insufficient to invoke the right to counsel. Clearly, a reasonable police officer would not understand this statement alone to be an unequivocal assertion of the right 9 to counsel. Investigator Franks asked Delashmit numerous follow-up questions to ensure that his rights were protected. Delashmit answered, “I’m willing to talk to you” and “without an attorney.” Investigator Franks thus was not required to cease her interrogation of Delashmit, and the trial court, therefore, did not err in allowing into evidence Delashmit’s statement to Investigator Franks. ¶17. For the reasons stated, this first issue is without merit.