Opinion ID: 2832760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Bankruptcy Court Judgment

Text: The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secured Creditors and issued a memorandum explaining the bases for its decision. In re Sheedy, 480 B.R. 204 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012). As to the TILA claim, the bankruptcy court held that it was time-barred since Sheedy first brought this claim within the bankruptcy case in 2010. The statute of limitations for claims for rescission under TILA varies depending on the circumstances, but is -- at most -- three years after the extension of credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). The 2004 Transaction occurred in April 2004. Thus, any attempt to rescind was initiated well after the right was extinguished by the statute of limitations. Regarding the Chapter 93A claim, the bankruptcy court found that Sheedy failed to send a written demand prior to commencing suit and that she failed to even specify under which section of Chapter 93A her claim arose.3 It concluded that the Chapter 13 plan by itself did not constitute a demand as required by Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A, § 9, and the applicable 3 We note that Sheedy's verified complaint in the adversary proceedings perfunctorily alleges that her claim under Chapter 93A is based upon the facts that: (1) there was a TILA violation; (2) she had demanded rescission in her Chapter 13 plan; (3) Deutsche Bank obtained the loan at the time when it was in default; (4) Chase is a servicing agent of Deutsche Bank, and thus the latter is liable for the actions of the former on agency grounds; and (5) the acts of Deutsche Bank through Chase were unfair and deceptive within the meaning of Chapter 93A. There is no further discussion as to why this constituted a violation of Chapter 93A. -7- statute of limitations had run because actions arising under Chapter 93A shall commence only within four years next after the cause of action accrues. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 5A. Since the 2004 Transaction in which the alleged unfair and deceptive practices occurred closed in April 2004, the statute of limitations for Sheedy's Chapter 93A claims ran out in April 2008. With respect to Sheedy's claim that the 2004 Transaction was also the result of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, as WAMU provided her with inaccurate or false information concerning the terms of the loan, the bankruptcy court held that Sheedy failed to plead the fraud allegations with particularity. The bankruptcy court added that it would have reached that conclusion even if it had taken into consideration the allegations contained in the report prepared by MFI-Miami.4 Besides the insufficiency of the 4 Sheedy introduced the report and incorporated it by reference into the allegations in her complaint. The bankruptcy court struck the report from the record on the grounds that Sheedy failed to state the preparer's qualifications as an expert pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 359 (1st Cir. 2004) (Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert must be qualified to testify based on the expert's knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. It is the responsibility of the trial judge to act as gatekeeper and ensure that the expert is qualified before admitting expert testimony. (citing Correa v. Cruisers, a Div. of KCS Int'l, Inc., 298 F.3d 13, 24 (1st Cir. 2002))). Sheedy included the bankruptcy court's refusal to admit this evidence as an issue in her summary of the facts on appeal, but failed to develop any arguments, which is sufficient ground for us not to consider the issue. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ([I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.). Furthermore, we would give deference to the bankruptcy court's decision, because -8- pleadings, the bankruptcy court held that Deutsche Bank and Chase established that the FDIC retained liability relating to borrowers' claims pursuant to the Purchase and Assumption Agreement between the FDIC, as receiver of WAMU, and Chase. That is, Chase never assumed any lender liability of WAMU.5 With regard to Sheedy's objection to the Secured Claim on the basis that the Secured Creditors failed to explain how the costs and fees included in the amount claimed were reasonable and necessary, the bankruptcy court concluded that Sheedy's claim was imprecise and that Sheedy had been provided sufficient information in the form of invoices, bills, checks, and receipts to enable her to specify which costs and fees were unreasonable and unnecessary. Sheedy did not set forth the specific grounds for her objection and failed to meet her burden. Finally, the bankruptcy court held that Deutsche Bank had standing to initiate foreclosure proceedings against Sheedy because [t]he trial court has broad discretionary powers in qualification of experts, and that court's decision will be affirmed unless there is clear error. Poulis-Minott, 388 F.3d at 360 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In any event, even if we were to consider the report, we would still affirm the dismissal of all claims, for the reasons explained below. 5 See Yeomalakis v. F.D.I.C., 562 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2009) (When Washington Mutual failed, Chase Bank acquired many assets but its agreement with the FDIC retains for the FDIC any liability associated with borrower claims for payment of or any liability to any borrower for monetary relief, or that provide for any other form of relief to any borrower. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). -9- it submitted evidence that it holds the Note, which was endorsed in blank and without recourse by WAMU, and thus is payable to the bearer. In reaching this conclusion, the bankruptcy court dismissed Sheedy's claims that the Mortgage was not validly assigned to the Securitized Trust under the terms of the Pooling and Service Agreement (PSA) because the Mortgage was assigned in 2010 but the Securitized Trust had been formed in 2004. Sheedy challenged this decision before the district court, which then affirmed the bankruptcy court.6 This appeal followed.