Opinion ID: 1202179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Should a New Hearing Before a Different Panel Have Been Ordered Following One Member's Recusal?

Text: Rule 211(a) states that formal disciplinary hearings shall be conducted by a panel of three attorneys. Carson argues that the intent of this rule is to ensure a just result in disciplinary cases by calling on the collective wisdom and experience of three panel members. Carson's premise is that the decision-making process among the panel is dialectical. He asserts: A single astute and articulate fact finder can show his [or her] fellow factfinders that their position is fallacious and cause them to change their vote. He views a factfinder who has not actually heard the testimony as being at a disadvantage. Additionally, Carson points out that our rules neither make any provision for a hearing by less than three panel members, nor provide for reading the transcript in lieu of a hearing. The Disciplinary Administrator emphasizes that no consensus or decision had been reached at the time Grady recused himself. The Chair of the KBDA required that there be a rehearing if the original panel members were in disagreement on the findings and recommendations. When the panel convened in January 1991, it made a unanimous finding that Carson had violated the disciplinary rules. The Disciplinary Administrator underscores our Rule 224(d) (1992 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 186), which states that if a procedural variation is to justify dismissal of a disciplinary action, a respondent must show actual prejudice by clear and convincing evidence. The Disciplinary Administrator argues that Carson did not prove that prejudice occurred. We agree. Babcock, who replaced Grady, had an opportunity to read the entire transcript and to review exhibits. This was not a case where the panel was required to assess the credibility of witnesses. The Phillips-Carson multi-faceted relationship detailed in Carson I was admitted to by Carson. No actual prejudice has been shown. The Bankruptcy Code and The Supremacy Clause Carson implies that the disciplinary action was brought about directly by reason of his seeking protection under the federal bankruptcy code. He suggests that the instant action violates both his rights under the Bankruptcy Code and under the Supremacy Clause (Art. 6, cl. 2) of the United States Constitution. Carson's argument as flawed. Carson appears to claim that he was singled out for prosecution in the disciplinary case because he had not paid a debt. Carson's ethical transgressions preceded his filing for bankruptcy. Carson's bankruptcy/Supremacy Clause argument is not persuasive. The Discipline Recommended by the Panel Carson observes that we have set out the mitigating factors to be considered in determining the nature and extent of discipline for a breach of professional responsibility: (1) Whether restitution has been made; (2) previous violations or the absence thereof; (3) previous good character and reputation in the community; (4) the present or past attitude of the attorney as shown by his cooperation during the hearing and acknowledgement of the transgression; (5) letters from clients, friends and lawyers in support of the character and general reputation of the attorney; and (6) any statement by the complainant expressing satisfaction with any restitution made and requesting no discipline. State v. Scott, 230 Kan. 564, 572, 639 P.2d 1131 (1982). Another factor, the personal misfortunes of the attorney if such misfortunes have contributed to violation of the code of professional responsibility, was added to the list in State v. Martin, 231 Kan. 481, 486, 646 P.2d 459 (1982). Carson asserts that disciplinary panels and courts look to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) in determining the appropriate discipline. Carson argues that his conduct should be covered by ABA Standard § 4.33 (Reprimand) or 4.34 (Admonition). Carson addresses aggravating or mitigating circumstances. He states that the panel mentioned prior discipline as an aggravation factor. According to Carson, [t]he `prior discipline' was imposed in July 1989 concerning conduct of an entirely different character that occurred long after the incidents involved in this case. According to Carson, [t]here was `prior discipline' in this case, but only because the case moved so slow. Carson points to a variety of mitigating factors: (1) personal, financial problems; (2) timely, good faith effort to make restitution in the form of the appeal of the bankruptcy court's order avoiding Phillips' mortgage; (3) full and free disclosure to discipline investigators and total cooperation; (4) good character and reputation attested to by many letters; (5) the proceedings have been a severe ordeal, hanging over his head since the time the initial complaint was filed in 1985; and (6) interim rehabilitation  he is not likely to do this again. In response to the panel's claim that it was deeply troubled by respondent's obvious lack of remorse and unwillingness to admit his own wrongdoing, Carson states: Any party who defends against a charge in the genuine belief that he is not guilty is subject to the criticism that he is unwilling to admit his wrongdoing. However, the willingness or unwillingness to admit wrongdoing is not dispositive on the question of remorse.... [H]e expressed his extreme regret about what happened. Carson asserts that he recognizes that taking the loan was a serious mistake. Consequently, Carson believes that the discipline in this case should not exceed a reprimand. The panel took into consideration the magnitude of the violations and was disturbed by the fact that the disciplinary rules were violated by a very experienced attorney who should have known better. The panel did not believe that either the payment Phillips received from Carson's malpractice carrier or the apparent reconciliation by Phillips with Carson prior to the time of the hearing rectified Carson's behavior. According to the Disciplinary Administrator, Carson's conduct is covered by ABA Standard 4.0, Violations of Duties Owed to Clients. Specifically, ABA Standard 4.3, Failure to Avoid Conflicts of Interest, and ABA Standard 4.4, Lack of Diligence apply to the instant case. The Disciplinary Administrator emphasizes that we held in Carson I that Carson breached his duties with respect to his client by failing to advise Mrs. Phillips of the legal ramifications of the loan transactions, in failing to advise her of the legal consequences of the changes in security, and in failing to recommend that she secure independent counsel. [ Carson I, 240 Kan.] at 478. According to the Disciplinary Administrator, Carson's conduct fits in the category described in ABA Standard 4.31: Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, without the informed consent of client(s): (a) engages in representation of a client knowing that the lawyer's interests are adverse to the client's with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to the client. Additionally, the Disciplinary Administrator indicates that Carson's failure to record the mortgage is covered by ABA Standard 4.4, Lack of Diligence. We agree with the characterization of Carson's conduct advanced by the Disciplinary Administrator. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that David W. Carson be and he is hereby suspended from the practice of law in the State of Kansas for a period of one year. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that David W. Carson shall forthwith comply with Supreme Court Rule 218 (1992 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 176). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order shall be published in the official Kansas Reports and that the costs of this action be assessed to the respondent. January 22, 1993. Effective this 22nd day of January, 1993.