Opinion ID: 2089711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: State v. Hittle

Text: Taylor also asserts that he should not have been found guilty under § 28-931 and sentenced as a habitual criminal under § 29-2221 because this results in improper double enhancement, which this court specifically disapproved of in State v. Hittle, 257 Neb. 344, 598 N.W.2d 20 (1999). See, also, State v. Chapman, 205 Neb. 368, 287 N.W.2d 697 (1980). Both Chapman and Hittle involved repeat offenses under Nebraska's driving under the influence of alcoholic liquor statutes, and in both cases, the holdings were based on state statutory interpretation rather than constitutional grounds. Chapman, 205 Neb. at 370, 287 N.W.2d at 699. Accord State v. Hittle, supra . In Hittle, the defendant had been previously convicted of driving under the influence on at least two occasions under Neb. Rev.Stat. § 60-6,196(2)(c) (Reissue 1993). As a result, his drivers' license was suspended. Afterward, the defendant was twice convicted of driving on a suspended license under § 60-6,196(6), which stated in part, `Any person operating a motor vehicle on the highways or streets of this state while his or her operator's license has been revoked pursuant to subdivision (2)(c) of this section shall be guilty of a Class IV felony.' Hittle, 257 Neb. at 355, 598 N.W.2d at 29. At the operative time in Hittle's case, driving on a suspended license was a misdemeanor offense unless § 60-6,196(6) applied, in which case the crime was a felony. Because of the enhancement provisions of § 60-6,196, both of Hittle's offenses for driving on a suspended license were felony crimes. After the second conviction for driving on a suspended license under § 60-6,196(6), Hittle was sentenced under the habitual criminal statute. The trial court found that Hittle qualified as a habitual criminal based on his two enhanced convictions under § 60-6,196(6). On appeal, Hittle argued that it was improper to sentence him under the habitual criminal statute found at § 29-2221 because § 60-6,196(6) contained its own specific penalty enhancement mechanism. This court agreed, concluding that it was improper to sentence Hittle under the habitual criminal statute. The court reasoned that [a] defendant should not be subjected to double penalty enhancement through application of both a specific subsequent offense statute and a habitual criminal statute. Hittle, 257 Neb. at 355, 598 N.W.2d at 29. See, also, State v. Burdette, 259 Neb. 679, 611 N.W.2d 615 (2000); State v. Lobato, 259 Neb. 579, 582, 611 N.W.2d 101, 104 (2000) (`special provisions of a statute in regard to a particular subject will prevail over general provisions in the same or other statutes so far as there is a conflict'). Taylor bases his double enhancement argument on the assumption that § 28-931 is an enhanced penalty statute, similar to the driving under the influence statutes at issue in State v. Hittle, supra . Taylor points out that general third degree assault under § 28-310 is a misdemeanor offense, while third degree assault under § 28-931 is a felony offense. Taylor also asserts that the only difference between §§ 28-310 and 28-931 is the status of the victim. Therefore, Taylor reasons, § 28-931 constitutes an enhanced penalty for third degree assault based on the status or employment of the alleged victim. Taylor's argument presents a question of statutory interpretation as to whether the Legislature enacted § 28-931 as a specific subsequent offense statute for general third degree assault, or as a separate crime. See State v. Hittle, 257 Neb. 344, 355, 598 N.W.2d 20, 29 (1999). In reading a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. State v. Hochstein and Anderson, ante 262 Neb. p. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (2001). Penal statutes are given a sensible construction in the context of the object sought to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, and the purpose sought to be served. Id. Also, penal statutes are to be strictly construed. See id. Nothing contained in the plain language of § 28-931 enhances the penalties for third degree assault upon a DCS employee based on subsequent offenses. A comparison of the plain language of §§ 28-310 and 28-931 indicates that the Legislature enacted these statutes to punish two separate and distinct crimes with separate and distinct elements. Under § 28-931, the status of the victim is an element of the crime and is not a subsequent offense penalty enhancement. The reasoning of Hittle is inapplicable to the facts of this case because § 28-931 is not a specific subsequent offense statute. See State v. Hittle, supra . This assignment of error is without merit.