Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: If he is able [to assist his attorney in conducting his defense] [to conduct his own defense] in a rational manner.

Text: The defendant is presumed to be mentally competent and he has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally incompetent as a result of mental disorder [or developmental disability]. (CALJIC No. 4.10 (1984 rev.).) The trial court instructed the jury in language that, according to the reporter's transcript, differed slightly from the standard jury instruction. [3] The reporter's transcript reflects that the court instructed the jury that [a]lthough on some subject his mind may be deranged or unsound, a person charged with a criminal offense is deemed mentally competent to be charged with the crime against him, if he is capable of understanding the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; second, if he comprehends his own status and condition in reference to such proceedings. [І] If he is able to assist his attorney in conducting his defense in a rational manner, the defendant is presumed to be mentally competent, and he has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally incompetent, as a result of mental defect, or disorder. The most significant differences between the court's instruction as reflected in the reporter's transcript and the standard instruction are that the word and does not appear between the three clauses that are identified by number in the standard instruction and that the period at the end of the third such clause is missing so that this clause becomes part of the next sentence. Defendant relies upon these differences to argue that the instruction was defective because [i]nstead of instructing the jury in accord with section 1367 and CALJIC No. 4.10 to deem [him] competent to stand trial only if he is capable of understanding the nature of the criminal proceedings and assisting counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner, the trial court permitted the jury to find [him] competent if it found either of these facts true . . . . Of course, when the court orally instructs the jury, the court reporter cannot always capture and report the court's intended punctuation. Speakers seldom indicate punctuation as they speak, leaving the court reporter with the always difficult, and sometimes impossible, task of supplying punctuation that reflects the speaker's cadence and inflection. Although we rely upon the court reporter to accurately record the words spoken in court, we are not bound by the court reporter's interpretation of the speaker's intended meaning as shown by the punctuation inserted by the reporter. In the present case, the trial court read the words of the standard instruction nearly verbatim. But the punctuation supplied by the court reporter suggests that the court misread the standard instruction by disregarding the period at the end of the third numbered clause and reading that clause as if it were an introductory clause in the next sentence, which would have altered the instruction's meaning. We are not convinced, however, that the court misread the standard instruction. As noted above, we are not bound by the punctuation supplied by the court reporter. Because the court clearly was reading a standard instruction, it is far more likely that the punctuation supplied by the court reporter failed to accurately reflect the meaning conveyed by the court's oral instructions than that the court misread the standard instruction. We can conclude with confidence, therefore, that the court read the standard instruction as it was written and did not merge the final two sentences of the standard instruction as reflected in the reporter's transcript. [4] Our conclusion is supported by the fact that the final, merged sentence of the court's oral instruction as reflected in the transcript does not make sense. According to the reporter's transcript, the court instructed the jury: If he is able to assist his attorney in conducting his defense in a rational manner, the defendant is presumed to be mentally competent, and he has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally incompetent. . . . It would strain credulity to imagine that the court instructed the jury that defendant is presumed to be competent only if he is able to assist his attorney in conducting his defense. As the record before us demonstrates, the court was well aware that a defendant always is presumed to be competent, not just if he or she is able to assist his counsel. Also, whether a defendant is able to assist his or her attorney in conducting the defense is part of the test for determining whether he or she is competent and does not affect the fact that the defendant is presumed to be competent. [5] To give credence to the erroneous punctuation in the reporter's transcript would produce an anomalous result. It would be illogical to find someone competent who either was incapable of understanding the nature and purpose of the proceeding or unable to assist his or her attorney in a rational manner. Having concluded that, despite the punctuation supplied by the court reporter, the trial court did not misread CALJIC No. 4.10 by omitting the period at the end of the third numbered clause, it remains that the reporter's transcript reflects that the court omitted the word and from between the three numbered clauses. This minor deviation from the text of the standard instruction, however, did not materially alter the instruction's meaning. Even with the word and omitted, the instruction the court read adequately conveyed that in order to be deemed mentally competent, defendant must be capable of understanding the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him, comprehend his own status and condition, and be able to assist his attorney. Moreover, even if the minor variation between the standard instruction and the trial court's instruction created ambiguity, it did not infringe on defendant's due process rights. With regard to criminal trials, not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation. The question is `whether the ailing instruction . . . so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.' [Citation.] `[A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.' [Citation.] If the charge as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a `reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.' ( Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437, 124 S.Ct. 1830, 158 L.Ed.2d 701.) Assuming for purposes of discussion that this standard applies in a competency trial or other competency proceeding (see People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 899-900, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494; People v. Johnwell (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1274, fn. 5, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 286), the question, then, is whether the difference between the standard version of CALJIC No. 4.10 and the version the trial court recited made it reasonably likely that the jury misunderstood the applicable law. We discern no such reasonable likelihood here. As stated, we believe that the trial court instructed the jury correctly in all material respects, even if it did omit the word and. The court did not expressly speak in the disjunctive. If the court's instruction, as read to the jury, reasonably suggested otherwise, we believe that the record would reflect expressions of concern by counsel, for it would be illogical for the court to tell the jury it could find defendant competent even if, in essence, he was not capable of understanding that he was on trial, as long as he yet could somehow assist his attorney in a rational manner. Counsel was aware of the proper instructional language: the prosecutor correctly read the CALJIC instruction in his argument to the jury, and in his responding argument defense counsel agreed with the prosecutor's definition. We cannot believe that counsel would have remained silent had the court delivered an instruction that was obviously illogical. In light of the United States Supreme Court's teaching that a commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial [is] likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting ( Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 381, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316) during the deliberation process, we consider the arguments of counsel in deciding whether the jury misunderstood the instructions ( People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 526-527, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385). There is no reasonable likelihood that the minor departure by the court from the language of the standard instruction in reciting the instruction to the jury caused the jury to misunderstand its duties in a manner that denied defendant his due process rights. Moreover, even if error had occurred, we would find it to be harmless under either the Chapman or Watson standards of prejudice. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) Accordingly, we need not resolve here which standard of prejudice applies. (Cf. People v. Johnwell, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1274-1278, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 [applying Chapman to a constitutionally based claim of error in giving instruction regarding competency]; cf. also People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 198, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 922, 274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282 (dis. opn. of Broussard, J.) [same]; but see People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 222, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222 [applying Watson to a claim of error for failing to give a proposed competency instruction that was not constitutionally based].) Turning to defendant's assertion: Although defendant insists that the competency trial itself was close, the record belies that view. True, defense expert witnesses testified that defendant suffered from impairments that would render him incompetent to be tried. But the weight of that evidence was diminished by their concessions, and the testimony of prosecution expert witnesses, that defendant was striving to feign mental illness. The defense experts conceded that defendant attempted to manipulate their examinations, but testified that despite those efforts they detected genuine mental difficulties in him. Expert witnesses for the prosecution opined that defendant was competent, and there was evidence that defendant acted normally in jail. When defendant testified on his own behalf at the guilt phase, he was lucid, articulate, and fully able to comprehend the proceedings and to reason in light of them. He ably provided a self-justifying account of himself through his testimony, which he tailored to minimize his culpability. It is plain from the record that defendant had the ability to consult with his counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and had a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings. For all of these reasons, if error had occurred, we would conclude that it was harmless.