Opinion ID: 2323063
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: First Degree Robbery

Text: Washington's argument that his conduct constituted a single, continuous act fails because he made distinct threats, separated in both time and space, against Miller, each intended to compel Miller to surrender different items of property. In addition, the record indicates that Washington formed the intent to take Miller's car keys separately from forming the intent to take Miller's silver chain. [6] The separation in time and space were small, but when considered along with the evidence indicating Washington's formation of a distinct intent, they are sufficient to support multiple convictions without implicating the multiplicity doctrine. In State v. Roderick, [7] the defendant challenged his conviction for two counts of robbery in connection with a robbery of a Radio Shack store. The State had charged the defendant with robbery of the store and robbery of the store's salesclerk. The defendant contended that the charges were multiplicitous because the robbery constituted a single, continuous criminal act. [8] The Superior Court held that the two charges were for separate offenses because the robber separately threatened the clerk to compel him to deliver the store's property and the clerk's own property. Similarly, Washington ordered Miller to turn over his keys after Miller had already relinquished his silver chain. In Wyant v. State, [9] this Court upheld a defendant's conviction for two counts of rape and one count of attempted rape where the sexual acts were committed against a single victim within a single residence and a relatively short time period. While on the first floor of the residence, the defendant attempted to rape the victim by anal intercourse and then raped her vaginally. [10] The defendant then forced the victim upstairs, where he forced her to have sexual intercourse with him again. [11] The Court rejected the defendant's argument that his actions constituted one continuous criminal act. [12] Considering the timing and physical movement of the victim between the sexual acts, the Court held that the defendant properly could be convicted of both attempted rape and rape. [13] As in the present case, the facts in Wyant do not indicate any significant passage of time between the separate acts other than the time required to move from one area of the home to another. In addition, the spatial distance in Wyant was only that space separating the second floor from the first floor of the same residence. Here, Washington and Miller had moved approximately fifty or sixty feet from where Washington took Miller's chain to where he took the car keys. In addition to Washington's making distinct, spatially and temporally separated threats to Miller, the evidence indicates that he formed the intent to take Miller's keys after he had already taken the chain and the leather jacket. After Washington took Miller's jacket, he told Miller to leave. As Miller started to run toward his car, Washington said No. F   that. Give me your keys. This statement, immediately following an order for Miller to leave, indicates that Washington changed his mind and then formed, for the first time, an intent to take Miller's keys. In Williams v. State, [14] this Court held that the multiplicity doctrine barred a defendant's conviction for two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver drugs that were found in his car near his apartment and drugs that were found in his apartment. The Court based its decision on several factors: (1) all the drugs were discovered during the same police confrontation, (2) all the drugs were found in the same general location, and (3) Williams `displayed only a single intent and goal  distribution.' [15] One scheme to distribute drugs may be complex and may occur over an extended period of time but still involve only one intent to distribute. In the present case, however, the evidence indicates that Washington had completed one robbery  the taking of the silver chain  before he formed a separate intent to take the car keys. [16] The separate convictions for two counts of robbery are therefore proper. Robbery is a violent crime against the person of the victim. Therefore, the multiplicity doctrine implications applicable to robbery are more akin to those arising in sexual assault cases than in cases involving property-oriented crimes. In a recent arson case, this Court held that multiple convictions relating to the same course of conduct violated the multiplicity doctrine because arson, as defined by the General Assembly, is primarily a crime against property. [17] The State charged the defendant with two counts of arson because the defendant had known when he set a single fire in a mobile home that two other people were inside. [18] The Court analyzed the legislative purpose underlying the arson statute and decided that the General Assembly had intended that arson would be a single crime regardless of how many human victims it threatens or claims. [19] Thus, arson is primarily a property crime, with first degree arson increasing the severity of the charges and punishment because of the arsonist's creating a general risk to human life. [20] In contrast to arson, the language of the robbery statute demonstrates that robbery is primarily a crime of physical violence against a person. Although robbery involves the taking of property, the legislature's concern in enacting the robbery statute was with violence and intimidation. Even second degree robbery is defined by the use or threat of force against a victim. [21] The severity of the crime increases to first degree robbery when that threat or use of force carries a greater risk of actual harm to a victim because of the display of what appears to be a deadly weapon. [22] In Le Compte v. State, [23] this Court held that imposition of consecutive sentences for a defendant's convictions for first degree robbery and for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, where both charges related to the same conduct by the defendant, did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court decided that the legislative purposes behind the two statutes differed and that the statutes addressed separate crimes for which the State was required to prove different elements. In the Court's view, the General Assembly enacted the weapons statute to attempt to deter the availability of a weapon during the commission of a serious crime, in order to decrease the danger to victims. That is, the statute attempts to address the increase in the actual risk to victims. [24] The first degree robbery statute, on the other hand, targets the victims' experience of intimidation and violence: The first degree robbery statute covers the interaction between the aggravating circumstances created by the defendant's conduct and the perceptions of the victim.  [25] Thus, the robbery statute seeks to address the personal well-being of the victim, rather than simply the protection of property. Cases involving violent crimes have held that a defendant may be convicted of more than one count of a crime if the defendant's acts are sufficiently separated in time and space. Courts also consider whether a defendant formed separate intents to commit the acts for which he was convicted. Washington's actions were separated by at least fifty or sixty feet, similar to the distance between the defendant's acts in Wyant, where the Court upheld a defendant's separate convictions for raping his victim on the first and second floors of a residence. Less than one minute elapsed between Washington's actions, so the timing factor does not give great weight to the conclusion that the acts were distinct. [26] The evidence indicates, however, that Washington formed separate intents to take Miller's car keys and Miller's silver chain. Even if we discount the temporal factor, the spatial and intent factors together support the separate convictions. Washington's conviction for two counts of first degree robbery was therefore proper and did not infringe his double jeopardy protection. Washington contended that his convictions were multiplicitous because they related to a single course of criminal conduct. Washington raised this issue in a post-trial motion that asserted his double jeopardy rights. In deciding that issue, this Court and the trial judge had to consider whether there are facts in the record that would support independent convictions by a rational jury. The inquiry is similar to the analysis used by this Court and trial judges in considering whether to allow a jury to consider multiple counts of unlawful sexual conduct or multiple counts of crimes that involve restraint. [27] The better practice is for defense counsel to raise such contentions in a motion before the case is submitted to the jury. If the trial judge makes an independent determination that sufficient evidence has been submitted to support separate convictions, defense counsel can ask for a jury instruction on those factual issues or the trial judge may sua sponte decide to give such an instruction. [28]