Opinion ID: 2570739
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Superior Court Properly Awarded UAF Attorney's Fees.

Text: The trial court awarded UAF $5,301.60 in attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 82 for defending Sengupta's state law independent action claim. Sengupta argues that attorney's fees should not be awarded because: (1) the independent action claim was so closely related to his federal civil rights claims that attorney's fees should be awarded according to the federal standard  when the losing plaintiff's claims are frivolous, unreasonable or without merit; and (2) UAF failed to identify the basis for segregating fees among the various matters. We reject these arguments and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to UAF.
A defendant prevailing on claims brought under federal civil rights statutes may recover attorney's fees only if the plaintiff's claims are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. [104] Alaska courts apply this same standard to federal civil rights claims brought in state court. [105] Sengupta argues that this Christiansburg/DeNardo standard should be extended to apply to state law claims brought in state court that are integrally related to the federal civil rights claims. We reject this argument because it is directly contrary to our case law. Sengupta's argument ignores our holding in Lyman v. State. [106] In Lyman, the trial court had awarded attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant under both federal and state law claims based upon a finding that the plaintiff's lawsuit bordered on the frivolous. [107] On appeal, this court ruled that, under DeNardo, attorney's fees could only be awarded under federal civil rights statutes upon an absolute determination that the lawsuit was frivolous, vexatious or brought in bad faith. [108] This court then reversed the award of attorney's fees for the federal law claims. However, based upon the same lower court finding, the court permitted the award of attorney's fees for the state law claims under Rules 79 and 82. This court did not indicate that the defendant needed to make a heightened showing above that required by Rules 79 and 82  that the defendant be a prevailing party. Having been awarded summary judgment, UAF is clearly a prevailing party with respect to the state law independent action claim. UAF is not additionally required to show that Sengupta's independent action to set aside prior judgments was frivolous, unreasonable, or without merit in order to win attorney's fees.
Sengupta next argues that the award of attorney's fees is improper because UAF failed to identify the basis for segregating its fees. But UAF attorneys adequately identified the basis of the fee segregation. UAF submitted a motion for attorney's fees under Rule 82 based on all work performed on the case. The superior court then issued an order directing UAF to submit a pleading segregating all work done on State claims. UAF attorneys responded with an itemization of segregated fees. According to the attached affidavit of UAF attorney Mark Ashburn, the itemized fees were charges that relate to the State claims brought by Sengupta in this case. Specifically, the charges relate to the independent action in equity brought by Sengupta to set aside the earlier final judgments entered against him. Ashburn's description sufficiently identifies the manner in which UAF segregated its fees. Because we reject Sengupta's argument that attorney's fees should be denied for failure to identify the basis for segregation, we affirm the attorney's fees award. [109]