Opinion ID: 149229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: mr. hasan's claims under the cia

Text: Mr. Hasan argues that his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted at trial because the government violated the CIA by failing to provide him with an interpreter before the grand jury. [3] We conclude that the district court failed to apply the proper legal standard when it rejected Mr. Hasan's CIA claim. Thus, we must remand for the district court to apply the correct law to the facts in the first instance.
`We review the trial court's determination with respect to the appointment. . . of an interpreter only for an abuse of discretion.' United States v. Black, 369 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir.2004) (ellipsis in original) (quoting United States v. Urena, 27 F.3d 1487, 1492 (10th Cir. 1994)). This rule is appropriate [b]ecause the trial judge is in the best position to assess a defendant's or witness' language usage, comfort level and intelligibility. United States v. Osuna (Osuna I), 189 F.3d 1289, 1296 (10th Cir.1999) (Brorby, J., dissenting). Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we review the district court's factual determinations for clear error, see, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (A court of appeals would be justified in concluding that a district court had abused its discretion in making a factual finding only if the finding were clearly erroneous.), and its underlying legal determinations de novo, see, e.g., Hamilton v. Boise Cascade Express, 519 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir.2008) (Where the exercise of that discretion [to award sanctions] depended on the resolution of a purely legal issue, however, we approach such a question de novo. ). `An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court bases its ruling on an erroneous conclusion of law,' Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir.1998)), or where the trial court fails to consider the applicable legal standard, Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir.1997); see also In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir.2009) (`When the district court errs in deciding a legal issue, it necessarily abuses its discretion.' (quoting In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir.2006))).
In Hasan I, we articulated a two-step framework for analyzing Mr. Hasan's claim under the CIA. First, the district court was to determine whether, at the time of the grand jury hearings, Mr. Hasan spoke `only or primarily a language other than the English language.' 526 F.3d at 666 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1)(A)). Second, if Mr. Hasan's primary language was other than English, then the district court was to determine whether the lack of an interpreter inhibited his comprehension or communication to such an extent as to have made the [grand jury hearings] fundamentally unfair. Id. (quoting Osuna I, 189 F.3d at 1293). Concerning the first stepwhether Mr. Hasan spoke primarily Englishwe stated: As the district court correctly perceived, this inquiry is not resolved simply by asking whether Mr. Hasan's native language is other than English. Neither do we think the statute concerns itself with primacy in the sense of which language the defendant speaks most frequently; instead, it seems to us that the term primarily in this statute seeks to measure the defendant's comparative ability to speak English. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word primarily as [i]n the first order in time or temporal sequence, or as [w]ith reference to other than temporal order: In the first place, first of all, preeminently, chiefly, principally; essentially. XII Oxford English Dictionary 472 (2d ed.1989). While the former definition could suggest native language, or the language first learned, we believe the structure of the statute makes clear that Congress intended the latter definition of the term focused on comparative ability. The CIA extends the right to an interpreter to two classes of people: those who speak only or primarily a language other than English, and the hearing impaired. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1)(B). The fact that the right is extended to the hearing impaired suggests that Congress was not concerned about the frequency with which one speaks English, or whether one is a native speaker; a hearing impaired person in the United States might well be a native English speaker and speak English on a daily basis, but might not be able easily to understand or communicate in English. Thus, it seems to us the question the statute poses concerns the ability to communicate. Confirming this conclusion, reading the word primarily to mean native would violate a cardinal rule of statutory construction by rendering surplusage the word only in the statutory phrase only or primarily a language other than English. Whether a witness's native language was the only language he spoke would be irrelevant, because a witness able to speak only a language other than English would always have as his native language a language other than English. Hasan I, 526 F.3d at 666 (brackets in original) (third citation omitted).
As noted above, after remand the district court concluded under this first step that Mr. Hasan's primary language was English. In explaining this conclusion, the court stated: There should be no doubt from all of the factual findings previously entered herein that the primary language utilized by the Defendant in the performance of his daily life functions was English. Specifically, the evidence was uncontroverted that the Defendant communicated with 1) his employers, 2) students on his bus routes and 3) his wife, in English. R., Vol. I, Doc. 180, at 2 n. 2. As further support for its finding, the district court pointed to the fact that the Defendant waived the services of an interpreter when he was interviewed by [a] probation officer shortly after the grand jury proceedings. Id. at 3. Mr. Hasan now argues that the district court failed to apply the law as we set it out in Hasan I. According to Mr. Hasan, the district court's focus on his communication with his employers, his students, and his wife ignores our instructions that the word primarily in the CIA is not to be treated as conterminous with most frequently. Aplt. Br. at 30. Indeed, his employers, students, and wife do not speak the Somali language, and Mr. Hasan contends that the necessity to speak with them in English or forego communication does not rationally point to primacy of English skills over Somalian. Id. Whether the district court properly applied the requisite standards under the CIA is a legal question which we review de novo. We will not give deference to the district court's opinion. Office of Thrift Supervision v. Overland Park Fin. Corp. (In re Overland Park Financial Corp.), 236 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir.2001). We agree with Mr. Hasan that the district court failed to apply the correct legal standard. As highlighted above, the district court considered several indicators suggesting that Mr. Hasan regularly spoke English. But it did not weigh these indicators against contrary indicators of his Somali-language ability. In other words, despite the blueprint we provided in Hasan I, the district court did not seek to measure Mr. Hasan's comparative ability to speak the language. This is a legal error amounting to an abuse of discretion. There is no doubt that Mr. Hasan used English in some circumstancesperhaps even most circumstances. But under the proper legal standard, such a fact does not necessarily entail a finding that his primary language was English, especially in light of the welter of conflicting evidence on Mr. Hasan's language abilities. Hasan I, 526 F.3d at 663. This is precisely why we insisted on a comparative standard in the first place, and why it is crucial for the district court to analyze Mr. Hasan's language abilities under this standard.
When the court of appeals notices a legal error, it is not ordinarily entitled to weigh the facts itself and reach a new conclusion; instead, it must remand to the district court for it to make a new determination under the correct law. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) ([W]here findings are infirm because of an erroneous view of the law, a remand is the proper course unless the record permits only one resolution of the factual issue.); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414-17 (10th Cir.1987) (applying Pullman-Standard ). We will follow just such a course here, for we cannot say that the record supports only one conclusion as to whether Mr. Hasan spoke primarily English. See Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 292, 102 S.Ct. 1781. To the contrary, as noted above and as discussed in Hasan I, the record is highly conflicted on this point. See Hasan I, 526 F.3d at 663. In Hasan I, we explained that the CIA contemplates a two-step, sequential inquiry. 526 F.3d at 666-67. In providing remand guidance to the district court, we described the inquiry as follows: First, it should consider whether, at the time of the grand jury hearings, Mr. Hasan spoke only or primarily a language other than the English language. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1)(A). . . . . . . . Second, if the district court finds that at the time of the grand jury proceedings Mr. Hasan's primary language was other than English, it must determine whether the lack of an interpreter during his testimony inhibited his comprehension of the proceedings or communication with . . . the presiding judicial officer, [or his] comprehension of questions and the presentation of . . . testimony, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1), `to such an extent as to have made the [hearing] fundamentally unfair,' Osuna, 189 F.3d at 1293. Id. (alterations in original). Thus, Hasan I leaves no room for doubt that the CIA contemplates a sequential, two-step inquiry. We do recognize, however, that just because a multi-step test is logically sequential does not necessarily mean that the test establishes a rigid order of battle that requires a court to decide the first step of the test before reaching the others. Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 817, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 818 (holding that it was not mandatory for courts to resolve the first step of the qualified immunity test (i.e., whether the facts alleged or shown by plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional right) before deciding the second step (i.e., whether any such constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation)); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (establishing the familiar two-step test for adjudicating ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, but noting that a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient [i.e., step one] before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies [i.e., step two]). We have not directly addressed whether it is mandatory to move sequentially through the CIA's two-step test or whether a court may assume arguendo an affirmative answer to the first step and then proceed to resolve the second step. In Hasan I, we did describe the district court's undertaking of the second step of the CIA's test in conditional terms, stating  if the district court finds that at the time of the grand jury proceedings Mr. Hasan's primary language was other than English, then it must resolve the second step of the CIA's test. 526 F.3d at 666 (emphasis added). In other words, we arguably suggested that a necessary condition for undertaking an inquiry under the second step is an affirmative finding under the first step (i.e., a finding that defendant speaks only or primarily a language other than English). However, we also noted there that either step of the CIA analysis may be dispositive if not resolved in Mr. Hasan's favor. Id. In Osuna I, we did not address in discrete, sequential fashion the CIA's two-part testleaving our view of the order-of-battle question nebulous at best. Thus, we have not had occasion to squarely address the order-of-battle issue under the CIA. It certainly would not be unreasonable, in light of its plain language and structure, to interpret the CIA as requiring the court to resolve the first step of the CIA's two-step test before, proceeding to the second step. For example, as relevant here, the CIA's plain language does not evince a congressional concern with providing interpreter protections for all conceivable circumstances that could inhibit the comprehension or communication of a party or witness, but rather with those circumstances related to mastery of the English language. See Hasan I, 526 F.3d at 666 (The CIA extends the right to an interpreter to two classes of people: those who speak only or primarily a language other than English, and the hearing impaired.); Osuna I, 189 F.3d at 1293 (While Osuna's rapidity in speaking was one apparent cause of the difficulties, the protection of the Court Interpreters Act to alleviate language problems may not be disregarded.); Osuna I, 189 F.3d at 1296 (Brorby, J., dissenting) (None of these communication pitfalls is related to primary use of a language other than English. Read as a whole, Mr. Osuna's testimony simply does not suggest the district court abused its discretion in failing to apply the Court Interpreters Act.). Thus, arguably a court could not meaningfully and intelligently engage in the second-step comprehension-and-communication inquiry that the CIA contemplates without first knowing whether there is a language problem to begin with viz., whether the party or witness speaks only or primarily a language other than English. Cf. Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818 (`It often may be difficult to decide whether a right is clearly established without deciding precisely what the constitutional right happens to be.' (brackets omitted) (quoting Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 581 (6th Cir.2005) (Sutton, J., concurring))). The parties do not advance any arguments concerning whether the CIA requires mandatory application of its sequential, two-step test. In particular, neither party has asked us to assume arguendo that Mr. Hasan has prevailed at the CIA's first-step inquiry (i.e., that he has established that his primary language is Somali), and then to proceed to the inquiry's second step. Without briefing and argument from the parties, we think it would be inappropriate for us to resolve here this order-of-battle question. Therefore, we do not address the matter further. Guided by Pullman-Standard, we simply conclude that findings under the proper legal standard by the district court at the first step of the CIA's test are a necessary condition for our review and, accordingly, a remand is required. Having established the necessity for it, we provide guidance to the district court upon remand: First the district court should follow the blueprint laid out in Hasan I and undertake a comparative analysis to identify Mr. Hasan's primary language at the time of the grand jury proceedings. If the court concludes that Mr. Hasan spoke primarily English, its analysis should come to an end, for he is not entitled to relief under the CIA. If the district court concludes that Mr. Hasan spoke primarily Somali, then it should proceed to the next step and determine whether, in light of this determination, Mr. Hasan was inhibited in his ability to comprehend and communicate at the grand jury proceedings to such an extent as to have been fundamentally unfair. In sum, we hold that the district court abused its discretion by failing to employ the proper legal standard in determining whether, at the time of the grand jury proceedings, Mr. Hasan spoke primarily a language other than the English language. We remand for the district court to apply the correct law in the first instance. [4]