Opinion ID: 1194882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claim of Improper Use of Peremptory Challenges

Text: (1a) Defendant, who is African-American, contends that the prosecutor improperly exercised peremptory challenges to exclude all four Black prospective jurors. He claims that this procedure violated the state Constitution's implicit guaranty of a representative jury, as explained in People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277 [148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748], and, in the federal Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and Sixth Amendment jury trial provisions. (See generally, People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 192-193 [58 Cal. Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].) Three times defendant objected to the peremptory challenges and moved for a mistrial under Wheeler. The trial court specifically declared that it found no prima facie evidence of discrimination, and it denied the motions. But it invited the prosecutor to explain informally any reasons for his actions. The prosecutor explained that he challenged Emery H. because he gave conflicting and possibly untrue answers about whether he had followed the case in the newspapers. He could not recall the reason for his challenge to Doris C., except that it was based upon her answers in her questionnaire and her answers in [individual voir dire] and her attitudes with respect to the death penalty as she expressed [them then]. He challenged Edna A. because she opposed the death penalty on religious grounds. And he challenged Joseph S. because he had earlier stated that realistically he could not impose the death penalty and the prosecutor felt that these were his true feelings. I don't think he can vote for death. The prosecutor stated that he regretted having to challenge Joseph S., that he was very conscious of the image that this might be creating, and that he wished that I had Black jurors on this panel that I felt could impose the death penalty under any circumstances or any evidence presented in this case. (2) We review a trial court's ruling on a motion of this type for substantial evidence. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 196.) A party who suspects improper use of peremptory challenges must raise a timely objection and make a prima facie showing of strong likelihood that the opponent has excluded one or more jurors on the basis of group or racial identity. ( People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 909 [21 Cal. Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277].) The court found that there was no showing of such behavior at all, and we examine the record to determine whether evidence supported this finding. `Because Wheeler motions call upon trial judges' personal observations, we view their rulings with `considerable deference' on appeal.' ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 117 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) We also bear in mind that peremptory challenges are not challenges for cause  they are peremptory. We have said that such challenges may be made on an apparently trivial or highly speculative basis. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275.) Indeed, they may be made `without reason or for no reason, arbitrarily and capriciously' ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 663 [66 Cal. Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752]). (1b) The record reveals evidence to support the court's rulings. Emery H. did give conflicting and possibly untrue answers to questions whether he had followed the case in the media. We note that he volunteered the statement that he had read about the case. Still, it did contradict the response on his questionnaire. Moreover, Emery H. said that he knew a lot of Jones[es] in Pasadena and couldn't say whether I know any members of [defendant's] family; he wouldn't know unless he saw them. Prospective juror Doris C. showed hostility toward the death penalty in principle and to the prosecution's questioning. She acknowledged that she thought the penalty was implemented too often in the United States. When asked why, she replied, It's just how I feel. I mean, what are you trying to pull from me? She implied that the penalty is meted out to people later found to be innocent. Edna A. agreed with the prosecutor that California should not have a death penalty law because the Bible says we should not kill. During voir dire to ascertain Joseph S.'s willingness to impose the death penalty, the prosecutor had told him the parties were trying to determine your really true thoughts on this and whether you could ever do it. [¶] I'm not asking you if you could be fair. I'm asking you if you could really weigh the evidence and, under any set of facts, could you ever return a death verdict, realistically? Joseph S. answered No. Something in Joseph S.'s demeanor evidently was troubling the prosecutor even before this negative answer, for he hesitated or equivocated in answer to other questions and the prosecutor, to remind him of the gravity of his role, commented that you may not have faced what we're really talking about yet emotionally. That is, we're putting the defendant's life in your hands.... As stated, the trial court found no impermissible bias in the prosecutor's decisions. A fortiori, therefore, it found no strong likelihood of such bias. As alluded to, our review of the record satisfies us that there was evidence to support the rulings. There was no error. Defendant contends in substance that bias may be found in that other prospective jurors, evidently not Black, had expressed doubts about the death penalty but were impaneled anyway. The implication is that the Black prospective jurors were singled out for special scrutiny. On this record, however, we are constrained to disagree. There is evidence to support the court's rulings on the four Black prospective jurors in question, enough to reject defendant's claims of Wheeler error.