Opinion ID: 625075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Indirect Method of Proof

Text: We turn now to Good's argument that she presented a prima facie case of discrimination under the indirect, burden-shifting method initially set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under the indirect method, to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in a reverse discrimination suit involving disparate discipline such as this one, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing: (1) `background circumstances' that demonstrate that a particular employer has `reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously against whites' or evidence that `there is something fishy about the facts at hand'; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals who are not members of the protected class. Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 684-85 (7th Cir.2003) (altering first prong of the indirect case to account for reverse nature of race discrimination claim), quoting Mills v. Health Care Service Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 455 (7th Cir.1999); Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 329 (7th Cir.2002) (When a plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to raise an inference that an employer applied its legitimate expectations in a disparate manner . . . the second and fourth prongs of McDonnell Douglas mergeallowing the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, stave off summary judgment for the time being, and proceed to the pretext inquiry.). Summary judgment in the defendant's favor is proper if a plaintiff fails to set forth a prima facie case. See Burks v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transportation, 464 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir.2006). Otherwise, if the plaintiff satisfies her initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Id. If the defendant does so, the burden returns to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's explanation was pretextual. Id. We find, like the district court before us, that Good has failed to present sufficient evidence of the first prong for this reverse race discrimination case: evidence of background circumstances demonstrating that UCMC has reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously against whites, or evidence that there is something fishy about her termination. See Phelan, 347 F.3d at 684-85. In Phelan, the plaintiff was a white man who argued that he had been unfairly treated because of his race. His reverse discrimination case failed because he was unable to present any facts from which a jury could infer that his white superiors were inclined to discriminate against their fellow whites; indeed, the plaintiff had been replaced by a white person. Id. Good, too, is white and was replaced by another white person. Also like the plaintiff in Phelan, Good has offered no facts in the summary judgment record that could suggest to a reasonable jury that UCMC had any reason or inclination to discriminate against white persons. See, e.g., Hague v. Thompson Distribution Co., 436 F.3d 816, 822-23 (7th Cir.2006) (five white plaintiffs satisfied the background circumstances prong by presenting evidence that after their African-American boss fired them, they were replaced by three African-American employees, an African-American employee was assigned duties of the fourth, and the fifth was not replaced); Ballance v. City of Springfield, 424 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.2005) (background circumstances shown by law firm's report confirming that police chief took minority race and female gender into account when hiring, assigning, promoting, and disciplining officers). Good argues that this prong is satisfied by her evidence that UCMC departed from its demotion policy in an unprecedented fashion. Good Br. 28. She relies on Mills v. Health Care Service Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir.1999). In that case, we found that Mills, a male, made a sufficient showing of suspicious background circumstances by showing that over a seven-year span, nearly all promotions in his office went to women instead of men and that women dominated the supervisory positions in the relevant office. See id. at 457. As explained above, Good's evidence does not rise to this level. Good has evidence that in three instances, UCMC gave a minority employee with deficient performance the opportunity to take a demotion rather than suffer more onerous discipline. But again, nothing in the record demonstrates that UCMC has an anti-white bias or a history of discrimination against white people. Good has no evidence that a formal or informal affirmative action policy was in force in her workplace. After Good's termination, her position was filled by another white person. We agree with the district court that Good has not offered evidence of any fishy background circumstances from which a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that UCMC was motivated by improper, racially-based motives when it terminated her employment rather than demoting her. Accordingly, we find that Good has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the indirect method. Finally, we recognize that the direct and indirect methods for proving and analyzing employment discrimination cases are subject to criticism. They have become too complex, too rigid, and too far removed from the statutory question of discriminatory causation. See Coleman, 667 F.3d at 862-63 (Wood, J., concurring). If we look away from the intricacies of the direct and indirect methods here and focus on the summary judgment evidence as a whole, we still do not see evidence that would allow a reasonable finding of reverse race discrimination in favor of Good. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.