Opinion ID: 2211646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff Has Established the Elements for a Prima Facie Claim of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment

Text: The majority determines that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict on plaintiff's claim. According to the majority, in order to establish such a claim, plaintiff must show the existence of a tangible employment action. Op., p. 918. Neither M.C.L. § 37.2103(i)(ii); MSA 3.548(103)(i)(ii) nor Champion requires plaintiff to prove a tangible employment action [2] in order to proceed with a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment. They require only a showing that the plaintiff's submission or rejection was a factor in decisions affecting [her] employment. MCL 37.2103(i)(ii); MSA 3.548(103)(i)(ii). Champion, supra at 708-709, 545 N.W.2d 596. In Champion, we recognized that a supervisor has authority to make decisions affecting an individual's employment: It is this Court's opinion that Mr. Fountain's [Ms. Champion's supervisor] decision to rape Ms. Champion constituted the requisite decision affecting... employment. In addition, this was a decision taken in response to Ms. Champion's refusal to voluntarily submit to Mr. Fountain's sexual requests. [ Id. at 709-710, 545 N.W.2d 596.] Thus, pursuant to Champion, the proper point of focus is the supervisor's conduct, not plaintiff's or defendant's actions after the incident: The decision to use force, in other words, was the equivalent of a decision to discharge because Mr. Fountain should have expected that it would lead to Ms. Champion's resignation. This decision affecting ... employment is actionable under M.C.L. § 37.2103(i)(ii); MSA 3.548(103)(i)(ii) because Ms. Champion's refusal to comply with Mr. Fountain's requests for sexual favors led to his decision to use force. [ Id. at 711, 545 N.W.2d 596.] Because the majority determines that there was no constructive discharge in this case, it concludes that plaintiff did not suffer a tangible employment action. [3] But, a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment under the facts of this case is not precluded: As previously noted, even without the discharge, the decision to rape was, in all respects, a decision affecting [Ms. Champion's] employment taken in response to her refusal to submit to Mr. Fountain's sexual requests. It can hardly be disputed that, even if Ms. Champion had returned to work, the rape would have affected her employment in some way. [ Champion, supra at 711, n. 5, 545 N.W.2d 596 (emphasis added).] Thus, Champion recognizes that the decision to rape a subordinate is the decision affecting employment. A victim's response to the decision affecting employment is irrelevant. Champion's holding would not have been different if Ms. Champion continued to work for defendant after her supervisor raped her. The majority insists that an employee who quits is in a different position than one who continues to work after her supervisor makes a decision affecting her employment. In so doing, the majority draws an arbitrary distinction between rape and a week of sexual intimidation and humiliation. It appears to be straining to avoid applying the rule we enunciated in Champion to the facts of this case. A correct application of Champion requires the conclusion that Mr. Wolshon's decision to make sexual contact with Mrs. Chambers without her consent was, in and of itself, a decision affecting her employment. By focusing on Mrs. Chambers' actions after her employment had been adversely affected, the majority misapplies Champion. In Champion, the defendant tried to argue that it had not given its supervisor authority to rape a subordinate. We rejected the argument, noting that [t]his construction of agency principles is far too narrow. It fails to recognize that when an employer gives its supervisors certain authority over other employees, it must also accept responsibility to remedy the harm caused by the supervisors' unlawful exercise of that authority. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (C.A.11, 1982). From his scheduling decisions that allowed him to work alone with Ms. Champion to his ordering of her into a remote part of the building, Mr. Fountain used his supervisory power to put Ms. Champion in the vulnerable position that led to her rape. In fact, there is little doubt that Mr. Fountain would have been unable to rape Ms. Champion but for his exercise of supervisory authority. [ Id. at 712, 545 N.W.2d 596.] Similarly, in this case, Mr. Wolshon used his authority as a supervisor to linger in Mrs. Chambers' work area. [4] Because Mr. Wolshon was their supervisor, Mrs. Chambers and her co-worker felt that they could not speak freely about his abusive behavior. I agree with the majority when it characterizes an employer's liability as hinging on whether it can be fairly said that the employer committed the violationeither directly or through an agent. Op., p. 916. By giving Mr. Wolshon the authority he used to assault Mrs. Chambers, defendant committed the violation through its agent. This is consistent with our holding in Champion: Our ruling today does not extend unlimited liability to employers whose supervisors rape subordinates. However, we hold an employer strictly liable where the supervisor accomplishes the rape through the exercise of his supervisory power over the victim. The rule we fashion is fully consistent with the results reached by other courts addressing this issue and with the legislative intent that employers, not the victims of sexual harassment, bear the costs of remedying and eradicating discrimination. [ Champion, supra at 713-714, 545 N.W.2d 596.] The flaw in the majority's overall treatment of this case is that, in analyzing whether Mr. Wolshon's conduct was quid pro quo sexual harassment, it focuses on plaintiff's reaction. As we pointed out in Champion, this is incorrect, because it blames the victim. Id. at 711, 545 N.W.2d 596. Instead, the analysis should concentrate on what defendant and its agent did. This focus would comport with the legislative intent that employers, not the victims of sexual harassment, bear the costs of remedying and eradicating discrimination. Id. at 714, 545 N.W.2d 596. Here, defendant gave Mr. Wolshon supervisory authority over plaintiff. Mr. Wolshon, acting as defendant's agent, then used that authority to lewdly proposition and sexually assault Mrs. Chambers for four days. Had Mr. Wolshon not been the supervisor, he would not have been able to continue this pattern of behavior. Someone having authority over him would have stopped it after the first instance. [5] Instead, matters escalated to the point where, on the third and fourth day that Mr. Wolshon harassed her, Mrs. Chambers actually slapped him. In response, Mr. Wolshon merely laughed. Because of his position with defendant, Mr. Wolshon was able to sexually intimidate and humiliate Mrs. Chambers repeatedly. Her attempts to alert the regional manager were unavailing. She did not realize this until her week of abuse was over. [6] In inflicting this sexual humiliation, Mr. Wolshon made a decision affecting her employment. He decided to treat her in such a way that her only choice was to submit to the assault or not come to work at all. [7] Mr. Wolshon could force Mrs. Chambers into this dilemma only because he was the supervisor. [8] Had it been only a co-worker treating her this way, Mrs. Chambers could have simply brought the problem to the supervisor on site. When she tried to complain to Mr. Wolshon's supervisor, Mr. McLaughlin, Mr. Wolshon could and did effectively prevent it. There is a critical difference between quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims. In quid pro quo claims, the victim's employment must be adversely affected in some manner. In hostile work environment claims, it need not be affected. I disagree with the majority's assertion that the effect on employment must be tangible. It can be, as it was here, tacit. Because he was the supervisor, and she the subordinate, Mr. Wolshon could sexually threaten and humiliate Mrs. Chambers; all she reasonably could have done to avoid the degrading behavior was to quit. In deciding to treat her in this manner, Mr. Wolshon made submitting to his sexual misconduct a term of Mrs. Chambers' employment. He could do this only because defendant gave him supervisory authority over her. Thus, quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when the employer's agent misuses his supervisory authority in a way that affects a subordinate's employment. In hostile work environment claims, the harasser does not affect the victim's employment. Either, he does not have the authority to do so, or he does not accomplish the harassment through the use of supervisory authority over the victim. To require plaintiffs to prove that they suffered a tangible employment action is to introduce an element that cannot be derived from the statutory language of M.C.L. § 37.2103(i)(ii); MSA 3.548(103)(i)(ii). It is also an element that may foreclose relief in situations where, as here, there clearly has been sexual discrimination. Another instance would arise if a woman's supervisor threatened to jeopardize her job unless she submitted to his sexual advances. If she submitted, she would be further sexually harassed, although suffering no tangible employment action. Under the majority's analysis, the employer would not be held vicariously liable, because its agent did not make a decision affecting her employment. The majority creates a loophole in the sexual harassment provisions of the MCRA. It will allow an employer to sexually harass an employee without adverse legal consequences if the employee chooses to submit, rather than risk potential job injury. It also places the burden on employees to complain about their supervisor's sexually harassing conduct, rather than encouraging employers to take the initiative to prevent such occurrences.