Opinion ID: 2064125
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prejudicial trial publicity.

Text: During the continuance, the news media gave the absent witnesses what defendant refers to as widespread publicity. These news accounts contained various statements referring to Penny Frank as a key witness having key testimony that would be essential in implicating her sister. Stories reported that bench warrants had been issued, and that a nationwide search for the missing witnesses was under way. One news item quoted the prosecutor as stating that the state had sworn statements from the witnesses but that they are not admissible as evidence in the trial ... unfortunately. Another story reported the sheriff as stating that the witnesses were in contempt of court and would be jailed if apprehended. After the witnesses had been returned, another news account reported the sheriff as stating that the witnesses were being held and that contempt citations had been issued. Defendant contends that there is a substantial likelihood that the jury's verdict was influenced by exposure to this publicity, and that a new trial must be granted. Unquestionably, a person accused of committing a crime has a fundamental right to a fair trial by an impartial jury whose determination of guilt or innocence is based exclusively on evidence admitted at trial. The media, however, have a competing right to report factually accurate information. These rights must be accommodated in the best manner possible. State v. Sefcheck, 261 Iowa 1159, 1173, 157 N.W.2d 128, 136 (1968). In State v. Bigley, 202 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Iowa 1972), we adopted standard 3.5(f), A.B.A. Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, as the procedure to be applied when the issue of possible jury exposure to potentially prejudicial material is raised at trial. That standard provides: If it is determined that material disseminated during the trial goes beyond the record on which the case is to be submitted to the jury and raises serious questions of possible prejudice, the court may on its own motion or shall on motion of either party question each juror, out of the presence of the others, about his exposure to that material. The examination shall take place in the presence of counsel, and an accurate record of the examination shall be kept. The standard for excusing a juror who is challenged on the basis of such exposure shall be the same as the standard of acceptability recommended in section 3.4(b), above, except that a juror who has seen or heard reports of potentially prejudicial material shall be excused if reference to the material in question at the trial itself would have required a mistrial to be declared. (emphasis added). [1] Standard 3.5(f) therefore imposes a mandatory duty on the trial court to question jurors when a proper request has been made. Unless a specific request is made, however, the matter rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Defendant did bring the matter of the publicity concerning the missing witnesses to the attention of the trial court by moving for a mistrial. Defendant did not move to have the jurors questioned regarding their exposure to the publicity, however. Thus, under standard 3.5(f), there was no mandatory duty for the trial court to examine the jurors. Defendant nevertheless maintains that the issue was adequately raised and that the trial court chose to ignore it. Matters committed to the discretion of a lower court are not reviewable upon appeal; only the alleged abuse of that power is reviewable. Rath v. Sholty, 199 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Iowa 1972). We must, therefore, determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in not examining the jury. Generally, abuse of discretion will be found only when there is no support in the record for the trial court's action. Id. Defendant argues that the number and contents of the news accounts surrounding the missing witnesses are of sufficient magnitude to establish a substantial likelihood of probable jury prejudice. We find no merit in this contention. We will not presume prejudice from the mere publication or broadcast of news stories. State v. Sefcheck, 261 Iowa at 1173, 157 N.W.2d at 136. The trial court need not act on mere speculation. When a jury has been clearly admonished not to expose themselves to media publicity of the trial in which they are serving as jurors, a presumption arises that they will not violate that admonition. State v. Sallis, 262 N.W.2d 240, 246 (Iowa 1978) (quoting Rizzo v. United States, 304 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890, 83 S.Ct. 188, 9 L.Ed.2d 123 (1962)). Not only is the burden on the defendant to demonstrate jury exposure to trial publicity, but unless specific examples are presented of jurors being affected by such publicity, it weighs heavily against the defendant's position. Id. at 247. Throughout the trial, the court was careful to admonish the jury not to expose themselves to publicity concerning the case. We have thoroughly examined the record and cannot find anything which would overcome the presumption of nonviolation of these admonitions. In asserting that the trial court had an affirmative duty to examine the jury in this case, defendant relies on United States v. Titsworth, 422 F.Supp. 587 (D.Neb.1976), and State v. Williams, W.Va., 230 S.E.2d 742 (1976). In both of these cases, however, there was evidence of jury exposure to trial publicity. These cases are, therefore, inapposite. Defendant also cites United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919, 97 S.Ct. 313, 50 L.Ed.2d 285 (1976). Hall dealt with the examination of prospective jurors when there is a possibility of exposure to prejudicial pretrial publicity and is therefore also distinguishable. In the case before us, the jury had been impaneled and admonished not to expose themselves to media publicity about the case when the witnesses failed to respond to subpoenas. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in failing to examine the jurors sua sponte.