Opinion ID: 2364609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Classification of McDaris as a Class X Offender

Text: In the tenth claim of his pro se motion, McDaris alleges that two 1960 convictions should not increase his classification to Class X offender. § 558.019 RSMo Supp. 1989. Based on the pro se motion, McDaris makes two arguments on appeal: 1) § 558.019.6 limits enhancement offenses to those committed within 25 years of the current offense; and 2) the two 1960 convictions are not valid convictions, and counsel was ineffective for allowing them to enhance his sentence.
If 25 years have passed since a conviction (or any release from confinement, whichever is later), then the defendant shall not be classified as a prior offender for purposes of this section. § 558.019.6 RSMo Supp.1989. McDaris contends that this statement mentioning prior offender means persistent offender and Class X offender as well. McDaris cites State v. Lucas, 809 S.W.2d 54, 57-58 (Mo.App. 1991), which held that prior offender in § 558.019.6 included all three levels of enhancement under § 558.019. The State contends that prior offender merely means prior offender as defined in § 558.019.4(1), and not the other two enhancement classes. The State cites State v. Miller, 821 S.W.2d 553, 556-57 (Mo.App. 1991). As McDaris notes, Miller discusses only whether prior offender in § 558.019.6 refers to other enhancement statutes, in particular § 558.016 RSMo 1986. By the plain language of the statute, Lucas was wrongly decided. The terms prior offender, persistent offender, and class X offender are terms of art within § 558.019 and have only the meaning given them by that statute. When the General Assembly used prior offender for the purposes of this statute in § 558.019.6, the General Assembly meant prior offender as defined in § 558.019.4(1). The present case legitimates this distinction. The record clearly shows that McDaris committed offenses approximately once each decadein 1960, in 1969, in 1982, and the current offenses in 1990. Section 558.019.6 excuses an offender who committed one and only one offense previously, and then maintained a long period of rehabilitation. Though over 25 years old, the 1960 convictionsif validare one of the three offenses that make McDaris a Class X offender. § 558.019.4(3). To the extent inconsistent with this opinion, State v. Lucas, 809 S.W.2d 54 (Mo.App.1991), is overruled.
McDaris's pro se motion alleges that the 1960 convictions were invalid because he was not represented by an attorney, and includes allegations that his conviction (or that of a codefendant) were voided in a Rule 27.26 proceeding. The motion court held no hearing nor made any specific findings on this issue (possibly because the claim was detailed after the prayer for relief, but above the verification). The State contends that the pro se motion insufficiently raised this issue by omitting whether McDaris waived counsel at the time of the 1960 convictions. The only case cited by the State is State v. Brock, 778 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Mo.App.1989), which addresses plain error review of impeachment during trial, not the sufficiency of a post-conviction pleading. Examining the various papers filed by movant with the circuit court during the sixty-day filing period, the pleadings allege that 1960 convictions were invalid due to the absence of counsel, and that a prior post-conviction court so held in this or a related case. Generally, invalid convictions may not be used to enhance punishment. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448-49, 92 S.Ct. 589, 592-93, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15, 88 S.Ct. 258, 261-62, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967); State v. Van Horn, 625 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Mo.1981). The appropriate course at this point is to remand for an evidentiary hearing on this issue at which the movant and the State may introduce evidence on these issues. [2]