Opinion ID: 38
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Disputed Provisions Regulate Commercial Speech Protected by the First Amendment

Text: Defendants' appeal challenges the District Court's threshold conclusion as to the first prong of this inquiry  that the First Amendment protects advertising that is irrelevant, unverifiable, and non-informational. Although they do not dispute that New York's thirty-day moratorium provisions regulate protected commercial speech, Defendants argue strenuously to us that New York's content-based restrictions regulate speech that is not entitled to First Amendment protection at all. The Supreme Court first recognized attorney advertising as within the scope of protected speech in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), in which the Court invalidated a ban on price advertising for what the Court deemed routine legal services. In so doing, the Court reserved the question of whether similar protection would extend to advertising claims as to the quality of services [that] are not susceptible of measurement or verification. Id. at 383, 97 S.Ct. 2691. In the years since Bates, the Supreme Court has offered differing, and not always fully consistent, descriptions as to what constitutes protected commercial speech, particularly with respect to attorney advertising. Speaking generally, the Supreme Court has said that states may impose regulations to ensure that the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). But this Court has nonetheless observed that there are doctrinal uncertainties left in the wake of Supreme Court decisions from which the modern commercial speech doctrine has evolved. In particular, these decisions have created some uncertainty as to the degree of protection for commercial advertising that lacks precise informational content. Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.1998) In the end, we agree with the District Court that, with one exception discussed below, the content-based restrictions in the disputed provisions of § 1200.50(c) regulate commercial speech protected by the First Amendment. In almost every instance, descriptions of the first prong of the Central Hudson test are phrased in the negative, and the only categories that Central Hudson, and its sequellae, clearly excludes from protection are speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading, and speech that concerns unlawful activities. See, e.g., Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371 ([T]he government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies [ Central Hudson 's remaining three prongs]. (citation omitted)); Ibanez v. Fl. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 142, 114 S.Ct. 2084, 129 L.Ed.2d 118 (1994) ([O]nly false, deceptive, or misleading commercial speech may be banned.). The Supreme Court has also emphasized that States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information ... if the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982); see also, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 100-01, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 110 L.Ed.2d 83 (1990); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479, 108 S.Ct. 1916, 100 L.Ed.2d 475 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 644, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985). We conclude from these precedents that the Central Hudson analysis applies to regulations of commercial speech that is only potentially misleading. [6] The speech that Defendants' content-based restrictions seeks to regulate  that which is irrelevant, unverifiable, and noninformational  is not inherently false, deceptive, or misleading. Defendants' own press release described its proposed rules as protecting consumers against  potentially misleading ads. This is insufficient to place these restrictions beyond the scope of First Amendment scrutiny. [7] There is one exception to this conclusion. Subsection 1200.50(c)(3) prohibits the portrayal of a fictitious law firm, the use of a fictitious name to refer to lawyers not associated together in a law firm, or otherwise imply that lawyers are associated in a law firm if that is not the case. N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs., tit. 22, § 1200.50(c)(3). The District Court invalidated § 1200.50(c)(3) in its entirety. Alexander, 634 F.Supp.2d at 249. Plaintiffs acknowledge, however, that they intended to challenge only the first clause of this subsection  prohibiting portrayals of judges  and they do not oppose Defendants' appeal seeking reinstatement of the prohibition on fictitious firms. The provision prohibiting advertisements including fictitious firms is susceptible to more than one interpretation. But we need not decide whether it would be constitutional to prohibit dramatizations in which an advertising law firm portrays itself arguing against a fictitious opposing counsel. At oral argument, the Attorney General, representing the Defendants, suggested a narrower interpretation of this regulation. He asked that we construe this language as applying only to situations in which lawyers from different firms give the misleading impression that they are from the same firm (i.e., The Dream Team). (Oral Arg. ~ 12:38:25) We accept this interpretation. So read, this portion of § 1200.50(c)(3) addresses only attorney advertising techniques that are actually misleading (as to the existence or membership of a firm), and such advertising is not entitled to First Amendment protection. See Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371. Accordingly, and subject to the above-mentioned construction, we reverse the District Court's invalidation of that portion of § 1200.50(c)(3) that prohibits advertisements that include fictitious firms. Having concluded that the remainder of the disputed regulations falls within the zone of protected commercial speech, we turn to the rest of the Central Hudson test. The Supreme Court has explained that [c]ommercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful activities may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through means that directly advance that interest. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472, 108 S.Ct. 1916 (quotation marks and alteration omitted). The party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). We apply the three remaining prongs of Central Hudson, in turn, to each of the two categories of regulations set forth above.