Opinion ID: 2532479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether tapper's indictment should have been quashed.

Text: ¶ 17. The question of whether an indictment is defective is an issue of law and therefore deserves a relatively broad standard of review, or de novo review, by this Court. Montgomery v. State, 891 So.2d 179, 185 (Miss.2004) (citing Nguyen v. State, 761 So.2d 873, 874 (Miss.2000); Peterson v. State, 671 So.2d 647 (Miss. 1996)). ¶ 18. Before turning to our discussion of Counts IV, V, VI, and VII of the indictment, which counts are the focus of Tapper's argument on this issue, we briefly mention the first three counts. Count I charged Tapper with sexual battery related to C.C. on or between August 19, 2006 and August 21, 2006 by placing his finger in her vagina. Count II charged Tapper with child-fondling related to C.C. on or between August 19, 2006 and August 21, 2006 by handling, touching, or rubbing with his hand or any part of his body the vagina of C.C. Count III charged Tapper with sexual battery related to L.P. on or between August 19, 2006 and August 21, 2006 ... [by] placing his finger in her vagina. ¶ 19. In Morris v. State, 595 So.2d 840 (Miss.1991), although there was evidence that the defendant had sexually molested his stepdaughter over a period of time several years earlier, the defendant was indicted on one count of touching a child for lustful purposes and two counts of sexual battery, occurring with the same stepdaughter, by then fifteen years of age, between March and May, 1986. Id. at 841. The victim testified that she had endured six years of continual sexual molestation at the hands of her stepfather, the defendant. Id. The defendant claimed that his fifteen-year-old, honor-roll stepdaughter should have been capable of recalling specific dates on which the acts occurred so that he could prepare an alibi defense. Id. at 841-42. We are not informed in Morris of the specific language of the indictment charging the defendant with two counts of sexual battery. We know only that, in the end, after a discussion of Wilson v. State, 515 So.2d 1181 (Miss.1987), and McCullum v. State, 487 So.2d 1335 (Miss.1986), the Court in Morris concluded that the victim's testimony amply illustrates the fact that the State could not narrow the time frame any more than it did, and that the defendant was fully and fairly advised of the charge against him. Id. at 842. ¶ 20. In Price v. State, 898 So.2d 641 (Miss.2005), the defendant was convicted of three counts of statutory rape. Each count involved the same victim and involved identical allegations that the defendant had committed the crime of statutory rape by the insertion of his penis into the vagina of [the victim]. Id. at 654-55. The main difference in each of the three counts was the alleged dates that these acts occurred, with one count alleging that the act occurred [d]uring the month of September, 1992, one count alleging that the act occurred [b]etween the 15th day of December, A.D., 1992 and the 25th day of December, A.D., 1992, and one count alleging that the act occurred [d]uring the month of August, 1995. Id. Citing Morris and Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Procedure 7.06(5), this Court found that the statutory rape charges contained in each of the three counts were sufficiently specific as to apprise the defendant of the charges against [the defendant]. Id. at 655. ¶ 21. Without question, consistent with Morris and Price, and Uniform Rule 7.06, the language of Counts I, II, and III sufficiently apprised Tapper of the charges against him so as to allow him to prepare a defense. ¶ 22. Now we address Tapper's main argument. Tapper argues that the indictment, as it relates to counts IV, V, VI, and VII, failed adequately to notify him of the nature and cause of the accusation, rendering the indictment defective. These counts of the indictment all stated the following: in Jackson County, Mississippi, on or between June 1, 2006 and August 19, [5] 2006, being at the time in question over the age of eighteen (18) years, for the purpose of gratifying his lust, or indulging his depraved licentious sexual desires, did unlawfully, willfully and feloniously handle, touch or rub with this hand, or any party of his body, or any member thereof, the vagina of [L.P.], a child who was at the time in question under the age of sixteen (16) years, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi. [6] Tapper also asserts that the failure of the indictment to allege more specific dates denied him the opportunity to present any defense other than denial. The State, however, argues that the counts of the indictment clearly and sufficiently informed Tapper of the felonies with which he was charged. The indictment upon which the defendant is to be tried shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged and shall fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.... Nguyen, 761 So.2d at 874-75 (citations omitted). In a child sexual-abuse case, a specific date is not required so long as the defendant is fully and fairly informed of the charges against him. Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852, 860 (Miss.1995) (citing Morris v. State, 595 So.2d 840, 842 (Miss.1991)). ¶ 23. As noted by the dissent, this Court has not been confronted with the issue of whether multi-count indictments which allege identical acts of conduct are sufficient to put the defendant on notice as to the essential facts constituting the offense charged and ... the nature and cause of the accusation. URCCC 7.06. ¶ 24. We first state that, consistent with our discussion above concerning Counts I, II, and III, the time frame of the acts committed by Tapper as alleged in Counts IV, V, VI, and VII (on or between June 1, 2006 and August 17, 2006) was sufficient to apprise Tapper concerning the date-and-time requirement of Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 7.06(5). The issue is as to the four acts allegedly committed by Tapper upon L.P. as set out in these latter four counts. ¶ 25. We first note that the dissent relies in part on Moses v. State, 795 So.2d 569 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). In Moses, the Court of Appeals stated: No formal amendment of the indictment was ever undertaken to narrow the dates of the alleged offenses or to attempt to differentiate the facts of the separate alleged incidents by providing even the sketchiest facts of what was alleged to have occurred. ... In the case before us, it is patently clear that the State, in drafting the repetitively identical and essentially uninformative counts of this indictment, made no effort to narrow the dates of the separate offenses in any meaningful way. We do not, therefore, face the situation where the State, after its best investigative effort, could only narrow the span of time for an offense to a period in excess of three years. The problems with requiring a defendant to present a defense to such an accusation seem self-evident but we may leave for another day the question of whether the problems are of sufficient gravity to bar the State from proceeding with a prosecution in that circumstance. In this case, there is no question but that the State was aware of information that would have easily permitted it to provide substantially shortened ranges of dates for each offense, together with other relevant facts that would have more specifically identified the alleged incident upon which that count was based. For reasons not apparent in this record, and for which we can find no reasonable excuse, the State declined to do so, proceeding instead to subject Moses to prosecution on multiple criminal counts relying solely on an indictment that was fundamentally ineffective to properly inform him of even the most basic circumstances giving rise to the charges against him. Moses, 795 So.2d at 572. This is not the situation in today's case. In our case today, there is no evidence that the State was aware of information that would have easily permitted it to provide substantially shortened ranges of dates for each offense, together with other relevant facts that would have more specifically identified the alleged incident upon which the count was based. Further, the State in today's case narrowed the time frame to less than three months, not a three-year time span as in Moses, and undertook properly to seek amendment of the indictment as necessary. In our case today, it appears from the record and testimony, that the State could not narrow the time frame or provide more specific details than it did. ¶ 26. Laying aside the testimony of the two emergency-room nurses and the program coordinator for the South Mississippi Child Advocacy Center, we focus on the testimony of L.P. as to these four child-fondling counts. L.P. called Tapper Uncle Randy. L.P. testified that during the summer of 2006, every time L.P. and C.C. spent the night at Tapper's house, they slept in the bed with Tapper, except for one occasion. L.P. testified that Tapper would touch her wrong spot (vagina) with his wrong spot (penis). L.P. could not remember the dates when this occurred. The prosecutor also asked L.P. if Tapper ever tried to put his wrong spot in your wrong spot, and L.P. answered [y]es, sir. L.P. reacted to Tapper's actions by screaming. The prosecutor asked L.P. how many times during the summer of 2006 Tapper touched her, and L.P. responded [a]bout five. L.P. again reiterated that the touching involved Tapper's wrong spot touching her wrong spot. ¶ 27. Tapper's defense was that he did not sexually abuse or inappropriately touch L.P. or C.C. Tapper testified that the mother of L.P. and C.C. coached the girls into making these false charges because the mother knew that I knew there was inappropriate things going on inside her home, and I'm afraid she knew that I was going to turn her in for them. The cold, hard facts are that, even if these young, immature girls had the ability to describe to the prosecutor in adult terms and in the most graphic detail the acts which they said Tapper committed upon them, Tapper would not have been in any better position to prepare his defense that he didn't do it, and that the false charges against him were a result of the girls' mother coaching them because the mother feared being reported by Tapper, for all the inappropriate things going on inside [the mother's] home. ¶ 28. While we implore our prosecutors to be as specific as possible in drafting indictments, consistent with the provisions of Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 7.06, in all cases, but specifically in cases involving allegations of sex offenses committed upon minor children, we find that the facts and circumstances of today's case lead us to the conclusion that the trial court committed no error in refusing to quash this multi-count indictment, as amended, handed down against Tapper by the Jackson County grand jury. For the reasons stated, this issue is without merit.