Opinion ID: 2641056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: According to Pritchett, the District Court committed three errors: (1) requiring him to prove the element of malice as distinct from the absence of probable cause; (2) refusing to permit the jury to infer malice from the absence of probable cause; and (3) disregarding the law of the case as established at summary judgment. None of these arguments persuades us to vacate the judgment of the District Court. First, the trial judge did not err by insisting that Pritchett come forward with evidence of both the absence of probable cause and the presence of malice. In this circuit, a plaintiff seeking to recover for malicious prosecution pursuant to § 1983 must show that a defendant initiated criminal proceedings against him without probable cause. See, e.g., 1 The District Court had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Third Circuit exercises plenary review of a district court’s decision to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268 (3d Cir. 2012). Accordingly, this Court applies the same standard as a district court: “A motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 3 Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). A plaintiff must also show that the defendant “acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice.” Id. The District Court properly separated these two elements. Pritchett rests his contrary view on Sykes v. Anderson, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that malice was not an element of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. See 625 F.3d 294, 309-10 (6th Cir. 2010). Sykes v. Anderson, however, is not the law in the Third Circuit, so the District Court did not err by requiring the element of malice. Second, Pritchett cannot obtain a new trial on the grounds that the District Court neglected to invoke the common law doctrine that a fact-finder may infer malice from the absence of probable cause. “[I]t is well established that failure to raise an issue in the district court constitutes a waiver of the argument.” Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 645 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Pritchett failed to invoke the inference of malice before the District Court and therefore did not preserve the issue for review. Third, the District Court’s denial of summary judgment did not create law of the case that ensured Pritchett’s claim would reach the jury. “[T]he law of the case doctrine limits relitigation of an issue once it has been decided in an earlier stage of the same litigation.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 786 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). When the record contains new material evidence, however, a court may revisit an earlier ruling. Id. at 787. That is the circumstance here, where the District Court entered judgment as a matter of law on a different and more complete record than the one on which it denied summary judgment. Indeed, the trial judge properly considered 4 Warrender’s motion for judgment as a matter of law only after Pritchett had been “fully heard on [the] issue during a jury trial.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).