Opinion ID: 212695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mrs. Jamison’s Testimony

Text: Jamison appeals the district court’s decision to permit the government to cross-examine Mrs. Jamison about why she thought Jamison was aggressive. We conclude that the district court did not err. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,” and that “[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” FED. R. E VID. 402. They define “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED. R. E VID. 401. Evidence revealing a witness’s bias or motive to lie is relevant and generally admissible under Rule 402. See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) (“Bias may be induced by a witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’ selfinterest. Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony.”); United States v. Thompson, 359 F.3d 470, 475480 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Manske, 186 F.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999). We review a district court’s decision to 6 No. 10-1515 admit evidence for abuse of discretion.1 United States v. Anifowoshe, 307 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2002). The question at issue—regarding why Mrs. Jamison thought Jamison was aggressive—was probative of Mrs. Jamison’s bias. The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting it. See Thompson, 359 F.3d at 479 (“Questioning a witness’ motives for testifying is precisely the type of inquiry permissible on cross-examination. The district court did not abuse its broad discretion in concluding that the evidence of threats and recent violence were probative of Shinnamon’s credibility and bias. When admitted on cross-examination, this evidence of recent threats and violence was relevant and probative to demonstrate that Shinnamon, a witness who changed her pretrial testimony, was biased and therefore likely to slant or even fabricate her testimony in the defendant’s favor.”). Jamison appeals under Rule 403, arguing that merely asking the question at issue prejudiced him. His argument lacks merit. Mrs. Jamison’s testimony about whether she or Jamison owned the shotgun contra- dicted her pre-trial statements. The threat evidence was relevant to her credibility and offered a potential explanation for her inconsistent statements. See id. at 477- 1 The government argues that we should review Jamison’s Rule 403 argument for plain error because he failed to object on Rule 403 grounds at trial. Jamison claims that he did object on Rule 403 grounds at trial. Since Jamison’s arguments fail under either standard, we decline to resolve the disagreement. No. 10-1515 7 79. It may have prejudiced Jamison to some extent, but not unfairly so. See F ED. R. E VID. 403; Thompson, 359 F.3d at 479 (“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it appeals to the jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case.” (quoting United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1294 (7th Cir. 1986), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Guerrero, 894 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1990)). Jamison also argues that we should vacate his conviction based on our opinion in Dudley v. Duckworth, 854 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1988). In Dudley, we held that the government’s elicitation of threat evidence from a witness on direct examination was so prejudicial that its admission violated the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. Id. at 972. We suggested that the government elicited the threat evidence as pretext, intending “more to prejudice the defendants . . . than to explain away any nervousness of the witness.” Id. Jamison’s argument is unpersuasive. We find more similarities between this case and Thompson, in which we distinguished Dudley. 359 F.3d at 476 n.7, 477. In Thompson, the defendant’s romantic partner made inconsistent statements—one in an initial meeting with police before trial, the other at trial—about the defendant’s ownership of ammunition. Id. at 473-74. On crossexamination, the district court permitted the government to elicit testimony that the defendant threatened and physically abused the witness. Id. at 474. Moving for 8 No. 10-1515 a new trial, the defendant argued that the district court erred by permitting the threat evidence. Id. The district court denied the motion, finding the evidence probative of the witness’s bias and credibility and that it potentially explained the witness’s inconsistent statements. Id. at 474-75. We affirmed and held that the evidence was relevant to prove bias and a motive to lie, and that it was not unduly prejudicial. Id. at 477-80. In reaching our holding, we distinguished eliciting threat evidence on direct examination, as was done in Dudley, from eliciting it on cross-examination, which occurred in Jamison’s trial: Evidence of threats on direct examination, admitted even though the witness shows no indication of intimidation, is not only of extremely weak probative value, but it also could constitute a prejudicial attack on the opposing party. Such evidence can be highly prejudicial. The situation is very different when the purpose of introducing evidence of a threat is to demonstrate bias on the cross-examination of a witness. In such a context, the probative value of such evidence is far more evident. For instance, evidence of bias, in- cluding evidence of a threat, to challenge the credibility of a witness who has made an inconsistent statement simply does not raise the same concerns as evidence of a threat offered, in the absence of a testimonial inconsistency, simply to “boost” a witness’ testimony. Id. at 476-77. No. 10-1515 9 Similar to the witness in Thompson, Mrs. Jamison made contradictory statements—one before trial, the other during trial—regarding whether she or Jamison owned the gun. In light of Thompson, the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the government to ask Mrs. Jamison why she thought Jamison was aggressive. See id. at 475-80. Next, Jamison argues that the threat evidence was unduly cumulative because the government previously established Mrs. Jamison’s bias and motive to lie when it elicited testimony that she and Jamison were married and living together at the time of the trial. Jamison cites no relevant legal authority to support his argument. To the extent that he is relying on Rule 403, his argument is unpersuasive. As discussed above, the evidence was probative; it demonstrated that Mrs. Jamison may have been motivated to lie. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 52; Thompson, 359 F.3d at 478 n.13, 479. Jamison simply fails to demonstrate that the probative value of the evidence at issue was “substantially outweighed by the . . . needless presentation of cumulative evidence” and that the district court abused its discretion in permitting it. F ED. R. E VID. 403. Finally, Jamison argues that the government did not lay adequate foundation to ask Mrs. Jamison about her opinion that Jamison was aggressive because there was no evidence that he physically abused her during the week of February 23, 2009. We disagree. There was undoubtedly sufficient foundation: She voluntarily admitted that Jamison was “an aggressive person” in re10 No. 10-1515 sponse to an earlier question by the government, she acknowledged that she made a sworn statement to police that Jamison had raised his hand to her to intimidate her,2 and she explained that she and Jamison had been married for fifteen years at the time of the trial and that they dated for over three years before marrying. See F ED. R. E VID. 602, 701. Further, we have “explained that there is no special foundational requirement for bias evidence and the party attempting to demonstrate bias should be able to prove any fact logically relevant to bias.” Thompson, 359 F.3d at 478 n.12 (construing Manske, 186 F.3d at 779). A party eliciting bias evidence based on fear need not “ask explicitly whether the witness was ‘presently afraid’ or whether the witness felt ‘pressured to testify a certain way.’ ” Id. (quoting Manske, 186 F.3d at 779). We have mentioned that defendants seeking to elicit such evidence must inquire into the “who, what, why, where, and when of the specific incidents he claims give rise to bias.” Id. (quoting Manske, 186 F.3d at 779). But such questions were unnecessary in this situation. Here, the government asked merely why Mrs. Jamison thought Jamison was aggressive. It did not seek testimony about specific incidents and Mrs. Jamison did not 2 She also testified that her statement to police was a lie and attempted to explain the discrepancy by claiming that she was off her medication for depression and anxiety when she spoke with police. But neither she nor Jamison established that failing to take her medicine indicated that her statement to police was false and her testimony true. No. 10-1515 11 discuss any. In response, Mrs. Jamison explained that her belief was “based on a knowledge of a person’s character” and that Jamison had not physically harmed her in any way. The district court did not err in permitting the government to elicit testimony regarding why Mrs. Jamison thought Jamison was aggressive.