Opinion ID: 3013221
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: United States v. Martinez-Fuerte

Text: The District Court likewise relied primarily upon the Supreme Court’s opinion in Martinez-Fuerte. See Pollard, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 552-59. But, unlike the District Court, we view Martinez-Fuerte as supporting the constitutionality of the Checkpoint. In Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of procedures employed in connection with various (consolidated) criminal prosecutions for transporting illegal aliens from Mexico. Id. at 545. The defendants were apprehended at fixed checkpoints on the highway located 25 to 100 miles from the Mexican border whose purpose was to interdict aliens. The Court addressed the issue of whether, under the Fourth Amendment, “a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of its occupants even though there is no reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens.” Id. The Court held that it may. The Court reached this conclusion after applying the aforementioned balancing test, “weigh[ing] the public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual.” Id. at 554. In doing so, the Court made a number of observations. First, the Court examined the public interest and the practicality of requiring individualized suspicion. The Court noted “the 21 substantiality of the public interest in the practice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints [designed to control the flow of illegal aliens across the border].” Id. at 556. The Court also noted that requiring reasonable suspicion would be impractical given the “heavy” flow of traffic and the fact that such a requirement would “largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations.” Id. at 557. Thus, the Court found that “the need to make routine checkpoint stops is great.” Id. Next, the Court examined the resulting intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests. The Court noted that the checkpoint stops did intrude to some extent on “motorists’ right ‘to free passage without interruption’ and arguably on their right to personal security.” Id. at 557-58 (citation omitted) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)). Nonetheless, the Court dismissed this intrusion as “quite limited.” Id. at 557. The Court found that the stop did not involve a search, but, instead, involved “only a brief detention during which ‘(a)ll that is required of the vehicle’s occupants is a response to a brief question or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing the right to be in the United States.’ ” Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975)). The Court further emphasized that the intrusion did not occur in private dwellings, where the expectation of privacy is much greater. Id. at 561. The Court also referenced the distinction drawn in the case law between the permanent checkpoints at issue and the roving patrol stops found repugnant to the Fourth Amendment in Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882-83. The Court noted that “the subjective intrusion — the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers — is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop,” Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, because the traveler “can see visible signs of the officers’ authority.” Id. (quoting Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 894-95). See generally Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450 (discussing roving patrols). The Court also cited the following characteristics of the permanent checkpoint as distinguishing: “the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal,” Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-59; 22 “checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity” given that the checkpoint is operated in a “regularized manner” not chosen by field officers, but by “officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources,” id. at 559; “since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals,” id.; and “a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review.” Id. Ultimately, the Court found that the government’s interests outweighed those of the individual citizens, id. at 545, 561-62, and therefore held that the stops and questioning at issue were constitutional without individualized suspicion at “reasonably located checkpoints.” Id. at 562. Applying the analysis of Martinez-Fuerte to the facts before us, it seems clear that the checkpoint here does not offend the Fourth Amendment. We begin, as the Supreme Court did, by analyzing the public interest advanced by the Checkpoint. The Government’s interest at issue is in interdicting aliens illegally entering or present in the U.S. — essentially the same interest identified in Martinez-Fuerte. Id. at 556. As the Supreme Court noted: “It has been national policy for many years to limit immigration into the United States,” id. at 551, and “[m]any more aliens than can be accommodated under the quota [annually set for immigrants] want to live and work in the United States.” Id. The public interest is clearly compelling. Next, we identify the intrusion. As in Martinez-Fuerte, the Checkpoint stop “involves only a brief detention of travelers during which ‘all that is required . . . is a response to a brief question or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing the right to be in the United States.’ ” Id. (quoting Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880). The Checkpoint also minimizes “the physical and psychological intrusion,” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979), visited upon travelers because it serves as “visible evidence, reassuring to lawabiding [travelers], that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest.” 23 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559. It is not likely to result in the “generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers.” Id. at 558; see also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656 (finding that the minimal “subjective intrusion” felt by lawful travelers is “the crucial distinction” between impermissible roving-patrol stops and the Border Patrol checkpoint operations). Additionally, the Checkpoint in the Airport mimics the checkpoints at issue in Martinez-Fuerte in that it interferes minimally with traffic, and is conducted in a regularized manner at a fixed location “not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources,” Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559, thus minimizing the possible evils of absolute discretion. Id. at 559; see also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656 (discussing the “danger” of leaving officers in the field with discretion to make stops). These determinations, along with the fact that one’s expectation of privacy in immigration status and identification while traveling via airplane from the U.S. Virgin Islands to the other parts of the U.S. is extremely low, see Martinez-Fuerte 428 U.S. at 561, leads to the ineluctable conclusion that stops and questioning conducted at the Checkpoint are consistent with the principles of the Fourth Amendment articulated in Martinez-Fuerte, and, thus, may be made in the absence of any individualized suspicion.