Opinion ID: 1294715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Discretion to permit untimely briefs

Text: [¶ 26.] DSS asserts that the trial court erred in granting relief from DuBray's default in filing her opening brief. DSS argues that the briefing time limits in SDCL 1-26-33.2 are mandatory and leave no room for a trial courts discretionary relief from a default. We disagree. [¶ 27.] DuBray served her notice of appeal on January 17, 2003. On January 22, 2003, DuBray filed a request for transcript of the administrative hearing, and she was provided the transcript on February 13, 2003. Pursuant to SDCL 1-26-33.2, DuBray had thirty days after service of the transcript in which to serve her brief. [6] [¶ 28.] However, DuBray failed to meet this deadline. On April 22, 2003, DSS filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because of DuBray's failure to timely serve her brief. On April 23, 2003, DuBray filed a motion for relief from default. After a hearing on July 3, 2003, DuBray was granted relief from the default. She was also ordered to file her brief no later than July 31, 2003. [¶ 29.] Thus, DuBray timely filed her notice of appeal, but she failed to timely file her brief and that default was excused for good cause shown. This Court has previously stated that under our analogous rules of appellate procedure only failure to timely serve and file the notice of appeal is jurisdictionally fatal to an appeals validity, while lesser omissions may be subject to sanctions. Western States Land Cattle Co., Inc., v. Lexington Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 429, 432 (S.D.1990). DSS has advanced no reason or authority to adopt a different rule for administrative appeals. Therefore, we conclude that because the failure to timely file a brief is not jurisdictional, the circuit court had discretion to excuse the default. [¶ 30.] DSS finally complains that DuBray was given 135 days to file her brief, while DSS had only the statutory thirty days. We note however, that the hearing to consider DuBray's motion for relief from default was not held until July 3, 2003, almost four months after DuBray moved to excuse the default. Furthermore, following the hearing, DuBray's brief was not ordered to be filed until July 31, 2003. Thus, while 135 days may have expired from the original date that DuBray's brief was due, a prompt motion to excuse the default was filed, almost four months of the delay occurred in conducting a hearing on the motion, and DuBray's brief was ultimately filed as ordered by the court. Therefore, this is not a case of a 135 day unexplained failure of an appellant to file a brief. [¶ 31.] Affirmed. [¶ 32.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, KONENKAMP, and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.