Opinion ID: 852990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Seizure of Documents in Jail

Text: Malinski claims that the police violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by seizing from his jail cell documents he categorizes as confidential communications between him and his lawyer. On September 7, 1999, and again on November 2, 1999, personal property from Malinski's cell was gathered and placed in a cardboard container for safe keeping while Malinski was put in solitary confinement for disciplinary reasons. On both occasions, detectives photocopied papers from these belongings. The deputy prosecutor was made aware that this had occurred, but Malinski's lawyers did not learn about it until January 3, 2000, when counsel received a letter from the deputy prosecutor apprising him of the copying. Malinski moved to dismiss, alleging that the State interfered with his Sixth Amendment rights by surreptitiously copying his legal documents. The trial court observed that the detectives' actions were, to say the least, suspicious, but found it unnecessary to address Malinski's constitutional claims despite a dispute about how the documents were packaged when copied. Instead, the court found that the prosecution's actions amounted to a blatant violation of the court's discovery order. (R. at 626.) It treated the matter as a discovery violation and proceeded to determine what sanction was appropriate. After examining the documents, the court found that while those documents contain some details of Defendant's defense that may not have been previously known by the State, they do not contain any major revelations of defense strategy from which the State would gain a significant advantage by having advance knowledge. Id. Consequently, it concluded the proper sanction was to prohibit the State from using any of the copied documents for any purpose whatsoever during the course of the trial, including cross-examination of Malinski if he chose to testify. Id. While the trial court did not specifically address Malinski's Sixth Amendment claim, its factual conclusions support a similar outcome under the Sixth Amendment. There is no per se rule that every intrusion by the prosecution into the relationship between a criminal defendant and his attorney constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 550-51, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977). Rather, some showing of prejudice is a necessary element of a Sixth Amendment claim based on an invasion of the attorney-client relationship. United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 267 (4th Cir.1990), citing Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558, 97 S.Ct. 837. In cases of Sixth Amendment violations, absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981) (footnote omitted). Malinski contends that he was prejudiced by the detectives' actions in photocopying his legal documents because the information contained in the documents led to the discovery of a hidden room (also called the porn room) in the attic of his house and several Polaroid photos of Lori in bondage. He notes the prosecution used this evidence at trial and thus, gave them an advantage. We conclude that the trial court's sanction for discovery violation was adequate to shield Malinski from any prejudice. There is dispute about how the documents were packaged, one that may reflect on whether they could be considered legal or not. Nevertheless, in reviewing the documents in question, we agree with the trial court's assessment that they would not have revealed anything major that would have given the prosecution a significant advantage in the investigation. We also agree with the State's contention that based on the evidence, the hidden room and the photographs could have been discovered by means other than the copied documents. There is ample evidence suggesting the authorities would have discovered the hidden room without the information contained in the documents. For one thing, in his second statement to the police, Malinski told about the porn room. (R. at 2537.) The police had a map drawn by Malinski indicating the location of it. (R. at 1851-53.) Malinski's wife told the authorities there was such a room covered with photographs. (R. at 1850-51.) Prior to September 7th, the police recovered from Malinski's house a letter that described a room with electricity, dry wall, carpeting, and air conditioning, which led them to believe that they had not yet discovered the hidden room. (R. at 1853.) The police also had the transcript of a monitored telephone call Malinski made from jail to his brother on August 25th, in which the brother refers to the room. (R. at 1857.) They likewise had a September 3rd statement taken from an inmate who recited Malinski's description of a room with a floor and a dummy hallway with a hidden wall. (R. at 1866.) As to the Polaroid photos, the police recovered them on August 26th before either of the document removal events. (R. at 1829-30.) The police recovered these based on information received from an inmate. Malinski told an inmate that he discarded some photographs alongside a county road and that the pictures would incriminate him if found. (R. at 1819, 1822.) Malinski urges that there is evidence that the police rifled through and removed some of his documents prior to September 7th. He says this earlier intrusion came days before the prosecution's discovery of the photographs. Such evidence does not show, however, that this earlier intrusion led to the discovery of the photos. In fact, the testimony does not make any reference to the photographs: an inmate had seen jailers go into Malinski's cell after having been removed, and proceeded on looking through his house and removed his paperwork then. (R. at 1614.) Another inmate who testified said he never saw the jailers looking through Malinski's stuff. (R. at 1882.) We conclude that the State did not gain any significant advantage from copying Malinski's documents. The trial court made sure that the documents themselves were not used at trial for any purpose and Malinski appears not to have suffered any other demonstrable prejudice. The trial court's remedy seems to have innoculated Malinski from any governmental misconduct. Absent a demonstrable or substantial threat of prejudice on the criminal proceedings, there is no basis for imposing a new trial as a remedy.