Opinion ID: 1783612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Constitutionality of LSA-R.S. 18:1462(A)(2)

Text: Our decision to strike LSA-R.S. 18:1462(A)(3) and (4) as unconstitutionally overbroad does not complete our consideration of this case. Schirmer was also charged with a violation of LSA-R.S. 18:1462(A)(2), which makes it a crime to remain within 600 feet of a polling place after being given written instructions to leave by a poll commissioner or law enforcement officer. Since the constitutionality of this subsection of the statute was also implicated by the district court's quashing of the information, it is necessary to consider the constitutionality of this subsection of the statute as well. LSA-R.S. 18:1462(A)(2) presents something of a different problem than subsections (3) and (4) of the statute since it does not on its face strike at protected speech. Rather, it affects only certain conduct, namely the act of remaining at a polling place after having received written instructions to depart. This Court earlier visited this subsection of the statute in State v. Stilley, 416 So.2d 928 (La.1982), which also involved the prosecution of a defendant for refusing to leave the premises of a polling place after being instructed to do so. At the time of the Stilley decision, LSA-R.S. 18:1462(A)(2) made it a criminal offense [t]o loiter within (600 feet) of any polling place. After considering the inherent vagueness of the term loiter, the Court noted that [a]lmost any citizen within a six hundred foot radius of a polling place... could be charged with loitering. Stilley, supra, at 929. In addition, the Court observed that [a] criminal statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if its enforcement must necessarily be arbitrary. Id. Based upon these observations, the Court concluded that the statute in question is both vague and overbroad, and accordingly declared it an unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority. Id. The Legislature promptly acted to amend the statute. See La.Acts 1982, No. 778, § 1. The amended version of LSA-R.S. 18:1462(A)(2), the one now before the Court, makes it a crime for any person to remain within 600 feet of a polling place after having been directed, in writing, by an election commissioner or law enforcement officer to leave the premises or area of a polling place. [23] The current subsection (2) of the statute, while criminalizing the refusal to leave a polling site after being instructed to do so by designated authorities, offers no guidelines to election commissioners or law enforcement officers regarding when it is proper to instruct a person to leave the vicinity of a polling site. Thus, the criminality of such conduct is a matter solely within the discretion of the official on the scene. LSA-R.S. 18:1462(A)(2) no longer suffers from the vagueness that plagued its earlier incarnation, i.e., it now gives adequate notice to the general public of what conduct is criminal. See State v. David, 468 So.2d 1126, 1128-1129 (La.1984), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1130, 106 S.Ct. 1998, 90 L.Ed.2d 678 (1986). However, the updated version still suffers from the infirmities which concerned the Stilley Court, i.e., any citizen within 600 feet of a polling place may still be charged with a crime, and enforcement must necessarily be arbitrary. While the Legislature may of course act to define criminal conduct, [i]t cannot constitutionally do so through the enactment and enforcement of [a statute] whose violation may entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). The United States Supreme Court has recognized ... that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine `is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrinethe requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1859, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983), quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). We have recognized the compelling interest which the State has in maintaining the orderliness and integrity of the election process, but [a]s weighty as this concern is, ... it cannot justify legislation that would otherwise fail to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity. Kolender, supra, 461 U.S. at 361, 103 S.Ct. at 1863 ( citation omitted ). [24] We do not say that the Legislature cannot place limitations upon persons remaining in and around the environs of a polling place; in fact, we have already stated that such limitations are often necessary to the efficient functioning of the electoral process. We merely hold that the existence of such limitations cannot depend solely upon the whim and caprice of the official on-the-spot. See State v. Broom, 439 So.2d 357, 369 (La.1983) ( plurality opinion ). While we recognize that the State's Executive branch and district attorneys are accorded some discretion in the manner in which they enforce and prosecute criminal statutes, it is solely the province of the Legislature to designate the boundary between criminal and non-criminal conduct. See La. Const. Art. II, § 2; State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758 (1947). Accordingly, we find LSA-R.S. 18:1462(A)(2), as currently written, unconstitutionally vague insofar as it fails to set forth adequate guidelines governing when and under what circumstances the provision is to be enforced.