Opinion ID: 2048090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Refusal to Admit Evidence of Victim's Subsequent Violent Act.

Text: Throughout the trial, the district court refused to permit evidence that shortly after Dunson struck O'Neal and left the house, she followed him and ran over him with her automobile. The district court repeatedly expressed an inability to understand the relevance of the incident to the charge against Dunson. Dunson claimed the act was admissible to show O'Neal's aggressive and violent character at the time of his assault upon her. Because our disposition of the case calls for a retrial, the district court is certain to face the issue again. We therefore consider Dunson's second assignment of error. Whether evidence of a victim's subsequent acts is admissible in a criminal case to prove the victim's aggressive and violent character at the time of the earlier crime is a case of first impression for this court. Two evidentiary rules bear directly on this issue. Iowa Rule of Evidence 404(a) pertinently provides: (a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: .... (2) Character of Victim. (A) In Criminal Cases. Subject to Iowa R.Evid. 412 [Sexual Abuse Cases; Relevance of Victim's Past Behavior], evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused.... Iowa Rule of Evidence 405(b) pertinently provides: (b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of his conduct. All relevant evidence is admissible unless statutes, rules of procedure, or constitutional or policy considerations require its exclusion. Iowa R.Evid. 402. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Iowa R.Evid. 403. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Iowa R.Evid. 401. The concept of materiality is implicit in the phrase that is of consequence to the determination of the action. See id.; see also Iowa R.Evid. 401 committee comment. We have previously defined materiality as that which ordinarily relates to the pertinency of offered evidence to the issues in dispute or to the issue of credibility. State v. Clay, 213 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Iowa 1973); Iowa R.Evid. 401 committee comment. We think rules 404(a) and 405(b) permit the admission of the evidence in question. The evidence relates to a character trait of the victim: her aggressiveness and propensity for violence. See Iowa R.Evid. 404(a)(2). The evidence was offered by the defendant. See id. Next, rule 405(b) does not limit admissibility to past instances of conduct. Recently, one court ruled that evidence of a victim's subsequent acts is admissible in a criminal case to prove the victim's aggressive and violent character at the time of the earlier crime. People v. Shoemaker, 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 448, 185 Cal.Rptr. 370, 373 (1982) (similar to the Iowa rule, California evidence code permits admission of evidence of subsequent conduct of the victim in a criminal case to prove victim's character on a specified earlier occasion). In so ruling, the Shoemaker court, 135 Cal.App. 3d at 447, 185 Cal.Rptr. at 373, quoted with approval the following two passages from Wigmore: Character at an earlier or later time than that of the deed in question is relevant only on the assumption that it was substantially unchanged in the meantime, i.e. the offer is really of character at one period to prove character at another, and the real question is of relevancy of this evidence to prove character, not of the character to prove the act. 1 J.H. Wigmore, Evidence § 60, at 463 (3d ed. 1940). [T]here is no difficulty from the point of view of the relevancy of character; a man's trait or disposition a month or a year after a certain date is as evidential of his trait on that date as his nature a month or a year before that date; because character is a more or less permanent quality ... we may make inferences from it either forward or backward. 5 J.H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1618, at 595 (Chadbourn ed. 1974). Like the California Court of Appeals, we find Wigmore's views compelling. We therefore approve the rule adopted in Shoemaker. Applying this rule in Dunson's case, we think that the evidence in question was material to several elements of his defense. See Iowa R.Evid. 405(b). Because the evidence of O'Neal's subsequent act was consistent with her earlier violent behavior, the evidence might, to the jury, have shown that Dunson reasonably believed he needed to defend himself at the earlier time, that he had indeed withdrawn from physical contact during the fight with the vase, or that O'Neal's responsive acts were grossly disproportionate to the provocation. See Iowa Code §§ 704.3, 704.6. For example, the evidence gave credence to Dunson's belief that he was, at the earlier time, in imminent danger of serious injury. O'Neal's act with the automobile was consistent with her violent behavior toward Dunson at other times. While they were living together, she admitted, they were always fighting. We think the jury could have seen the evidence in question as part of the pattern of aggressive, even violent, behavior that apparently was a way of life to Dunson and O'Neal. In addition, had the jury heard the evidence, it might have found that Dunson, knowing O'Neal's violent nature, terminated his assault upon O'Neal before she left the room to get the vase. The jury might also have found that her attack upon him with the vase was grossly disproportionate to his initial provocation, just as the grossly violent act with the automobile was. We do not, however, intend by what we say to decide the issue in advance. Depending on the facts before it at the time the evidence is offered, the district court will still need to exercise its discretion as to the evidence's admissibility under rule 403.