Opinion ID: 22968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidentiary Rulings During The Second Trial

Text: 6 Reddin next challenges various evidentiary rulings during his second trial. We review admission and exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. 2 An error in the exclusion of evidence is not grounds for reversal unless substantial rights are affected or unless the affirmance is inconsistent with substantial justice. 3 The burden of presenting an adequate record on appeal is on the appellant. 4 7 Initially, Reddin challenges the district court's decision to refuse an adverse inference instruction for Horseshoe's alleged bad faith destruction of a video tape depicting the scene of the fall. The record excerpts do not include any reference to the evidentiary hearing on this issue, leaving us with little guidance as to the reasoning behind the district court's decision. Notwithstanding, we find our decision in Caparotta v. Entergy Corp. 5 instructive. In Caparotta the district court allowed evidence of missing documents to be admitted because it was relevant to Entergy's credibility and reliability. We reversed, finding it was an abuse of discretion to permit evidence of the destruction of documents, stating: Assuming that some probative value did exist as to the issues in this case, such value was minuscule. Contrastingly, the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues was substantial. 6 The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Reddin's request for an adverse inference instruction. 8 Reddin also disputes the district court's refusal to allow testimony regarding subsequent remedial measures. The Federal Rules of Evidence dictate that evidence of ... subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. 7 The Rules also provide an exception when a party offers such evidence for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 8 Reddin attempted to introduce evidence that Horseshoe employees taped off the area where his accident occurred, claiming that such evidence impeached testimony elicited by Horseshoe that guards walked and crawled the entire floor and found no defect. Specifically, Reddin asserts that no scanning of the area could have occurred if the area were taped off. Evidence of the placement of warning signs or tape around an area with an alleged defect constitutes exactly the type of evidence contemplated by Rule 407. While its introduction may have touched tangentially on the credibility of testimony that security guards traversed the area, such does not establish that its exclusion by the trial judge constituted an abuse of discretion. 9 9 Third, Reddin asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion seeking to exclude evidence of injuries he sustained after the May 1995 incident. Specifically, Reddin challenges the introduction of evidence regarding a 1997 bus accident which he asserts occurred after his six knee surgeries and total knee replacement. The record before us does not reflect that he timely objected. As we have noted, an overruled motion in limine does not preserve error on appeal. 10 We therefore review the court's evidentiary ruling for plain error, 11 reversing only for obvious and substantial errors that 'seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' 12 10 Reddin has failed to meet his burden on this issue. Our review of the record discloses no plain error in the admission of evidence relating to the subsequent injuries. 11 Reddin also urges error in the court's granting of Horseshoe's motion to exclude evidence of a subsequent fall, by a different patron, in the area where the incident occurred. In order for such evidence to be admissible the party offering same bears the burden of demonstrating that the accidents involved substantially similar circumstances. 13 We find no record evidence revealing an attempt to establish the similarity between the two incidents, or even a proffer regarding a subsequent fall. The trial court was acting within its discretion in excluding such evidence as unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. 12 Finally, Reddin disputes the trial court's refusal to allow him to call a rebuttal witness for the purpose of impeaching an EMT who treated him. He maintains that the EMT denied making statements indicating that the carpet on the gang plank was pulled up and that Horseshoe should settle because they knew they were liable. Reddin claims his witness was prepared to impeach the EMT. Determining the proper scope of rebuttal is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. 14 There is nothing in the record to support the proposition that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow this hearsay on rebuttal, or that such refusal affected Reddin's substantial rights. The impeachment value of such hearsay evidence was slight because the statement could not be used to prove the truth of its substance, but only to destroy the credibility of the witness. 15 Therefore, even if evidence impeaching the credibility of the EMT was wrongly excluded, such exclusion was harmless, particularly when viewed in the context of all the other evidence. 16 13 Reddin has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial or in its evidentiary rulings during the second trial. 14 AFFIRMED.