Opinion ID: 495033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standing Requirement: Governing Principles

Text: 26 Our evaluation of the appellants' submission with respect to standing will be significantly advanced if we remember, as Chief Justice Warren stated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), that standing is an aspect of justiciability. Id. at 98, 88 S.Ct. at 1952. Justiciability, the Chief Justice pointed out, is the term of art employed to give expression to [the] dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine. Id. at 95, 88 S.Ct. at 1950. This doctrine, at the heart of our constitutional concept of judicial power, embodies two complementary but somewhat different limitations: 27 In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. 28 Id. These policy concerns must guide our application of the analytical formula that the Supreme Court has developed with respect to standing. 29 The basic criteria for standing have been set forth by the Supreme Court in many cases. Perhaps the most comprehensive is Justice O'Connor's statement in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984), that sets forth the three elements of the standing analysis: A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Id. at 751, 104 S.Ct. at 3324; see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). See generally Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261, 97 S.Ct. 555, 561, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1925-26, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). 8 30 The second criteria--that the injury be fairly traceable to the challenged action--is an important one if the values underlying the case-and-controversy requirement of article III are to be respected. The party who invokes [judicial] power must be able to show ... that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the action that forms the basis of the complaint. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S.Ct. 597, 601, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 35 L.Ed.2d 536, 95 L.Ed.2d 415 (1973); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634, 58 S.Ct. 1, 82 L.Ed. 493 (1937). The asserted injury must be shown to be the consequence of the defendants' actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2208, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). See generally Meese v. Keene, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1862, 95 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987); South E. Lake View Neighbors v. Department of Housing and Urban Dev., 685 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir.1982). [U]nadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal judicial power. Simon, 426 U.S. at 44, 96 S.Ct. at 1927; see also Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618, 93 S.Ct. at 1149 (The prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative.). [T]he remote possibility, unsubstantiated by allegations of fact, that [the plaintiffs'] situation might have been better had [the defendants] acted otherwise, and might improve were the court to afford relief, Warth, 422 U.S. at 507, 95 S.Ct. at 2209, is simply insufficient. 31