Opinion ID: 78201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Had Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.

Text: Drummond raises three objections about jurisdiction. First, Drummond argues that the Torture Act and the Alien Tort Statute do not permit suits against corporations. Second, Drummond argues that those Acts do not provide liability for aiding and abetting. Third, Drummond contends that the district court should have dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for extrajudicial killing under the Alien Tort Statute because the Torture Act provides the exclusive cause of action for that claim. We conclude that the issues under the Torture Act are not issues of jurisdiction and the arguments of Drummond about the Alien Tort Statute are foreclosed by our precedent. The two related statutes that pertain to this appeal perform complementary but distinct roles. The Alien Tort Statute is jurisdictional and does not create an independent cause of action. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2761, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004). In contrast, the Torture Act provides a cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing but does not grant jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1350, note, § 2(a). Federal courts are empowered to entertain complaints under the Torture Act when either the Alien Tort Statute or the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, provides jurisdiction. This distinction between the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Act gives rise to a general rule regarding claims under the latter Act: when either the Alien Tort Statute or federal question statute provides jurisdiction, defects in pleading claims under the Torture Act are not jurisdictional defects. These pleading issues involve stating claims on which relief can be granted and should be raised in motions filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Alien Tort Statute provides jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims for violations of the law of nations; the federal question statute provides jurisdiction over their claims under the Torture Act; and the supplemental jurisdiction statute provides jurisdiction over their claims under state law and Colombian law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Even if we agreed with Drummond that its argument about corporate liability under the Torture Act was jurisdictional, we would be bound to reject that argument. Under the law of this Circuit, the Torture Act allows suits against corporate defendants. We held that a complaint, under the Act, stated a claim against a corporate defendant in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir.2005), and we are bound by that precedent. Because the Alien Tort Statute is jurisdictional, we must address the argument of Drummond about corporate liability under that statute. The text of the Alien Tort Statute provides no express exception for corporations, see 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and the law of this Circuit is that this statute grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate defendants. Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1242. Again, we are bound by that precedent. As Drummond acknowledges, the law of this Circuit permits a plaintiff to plead a theory of aiding and abetting liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Act. Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (11th Cir.2005); see also Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1247-48. We based our decision in Cabello on the text of the statutes, the decisions of two sister circuits, Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776-77 (9th Cir.1996), and Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113-14 (5th Cir.1988), and the legislative history of the Torture Act. See Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1157-58. We are bound by our decision in Cabello. As Drummond also acknowledges, the law of this Circuit suggests that the Torture Act is not the exclusive cause of action for claims of extrajudicial killing. In Aldana, we held that a plaintiff may bring distinct claims for torture under each statute, 416 F.3d at 1250, and the analysis that supported that conclusion supports the same conclusion for claims of extrajudicial killing. In Aldana, we stated that the statutory texts permit plaintiffs to seek relief for claims of torture under both statutes because both define torture and each statute provides a means to recover for torture as that term separately draws its meaning from each statute. Id. The same is true for extrajudicial killing, which is actionable under the Alien Tort Statute if it is committed in violation of the law of nations, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and under the Torture Act as that Act expressly defines it, id.,, note § 3(a). For the same reason that we held in Aldana that the Torture Act does not provide the exclusive remedy for claims of torture, we decline to read the Torture Act as providing the exclusive remedy for claims of extrajudicial killing.