Opinion ID: 2449902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: ADCO is a proper claimant and can recover under NRS 482.345

Text: ADCO contends that pursuant to the plain language of NRS 482.345, it is a proper claimant and can recover compensation from the bond. We agree. [2] NRS 482.345(1) states that: [b]efore any dealer's license . . . is furnished. . . the Department [of Motor Vehicles] shall require that the applicant . . . procure and file with the Department a good and sufficient bond with a corporate surety thereon, duly licensed to do business within the State of Nevada, approved as to form by the Attorney General, and conditioned that the applicant or any employee who acts on behalf of the applicant within the scope of his or her employment shall conduct business as a dealer . . . without breaching a consumer contract or engaging in a deceptive trade practice, fraud or fraudulent representation, and without violation of the provisions of this chapter. NRS 482.345(5) adds that [t]he undertaking on the bond includes any breach of a consumer contract, deceptive trade practice, fraud, fraudulent representation or violation of any of the provisions of this chapter. NRS 482.345(6) states that [t]he bond must provide that any person injured by the action of the dealer . . . may apply . . . for compensation from the bond. Under NRS 482.345(7), [i]f a person is injured by the actions of a dealer, the person may bring an action on the bond. NRS Chapter 482 provides no definition for the term person, see NRS 482.010-.137, nor is the scope of NRS 482.345 constrained by limiting language. However, Webster's dictionary defines person as a human being (natural person) or a group of human beings, a corporation, a partnership, an estate, or legal entity . . . recognized by law as having rights and duties. Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1445 (1996). Therefore, based on the plain language of the phrase any person as used in NRS 482.345(6), we conclude that its meaning is clear and unambiguous, and includes corporate entities such as ADCO. Based on the plain language of NRS 482.345, the statute is intended to extend protection to a class larger than simply consumers, and the bond's protections are not limited to consumers, as it states that the bond must provide that any person injured by the action of the dealer may apply for compensation from the bond. Thus, we further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition for judicial review and finding that ADCO could recover from the bond pursuant to NRS 482.345(6). Although not discussing the exact same issue, this court's opinion in State, Department of Motor Vehicles v. Garcia-Mendoza, 114 Nev. 1187, 971 P.2d 377 (1998), tends to support our conclusion here. In Garcia-Mendoza, this court addressed whether the DMV could recover under NRS 482.345. Id. There, this court invalidated the district court's order granting Eva Garcia-Mendoza's petition for a writ of garnishment and attachment of bond, which directed the DMV to pay fines levied against the auto dealer from the bond. Id. at 1191, 971 P.2d at 379. This court concluded that the DMV had not properly executed its claims against the bond, which as a creditor it must do, and that the DMV cannot simply help itself to the money it controls for the benefit of others. Id. at 1191-92, 971 P.2d at 379-80. The court added that the bond requirement of NRS 482.345 was clearly intended to ensure compensation for defrauded consumers, not the DMV. [3] Id. The court did not, however, eliminate the possibility of nonconsumers recovering funds from the bond. In fact, the court left open the possibility that the DMV may have been eligible to recover from the bond had it complied with the proper procedures for executing on its claim. Id. at 1192, 971 P.2d at 380. Further, although this court does not resort to a review of legislative history when a statute's meaning is plain, we offer as illumination the statute's legislative history. NRS 482.345 was amended in 2001 and 2005. The 2001 amendment to NRS 482.345(4), which is now subsection 5, added breach of consumer contract and deceptive trade practices to the list of injuries for which the bond could be used to compensate. [4] 2001 Nev. Stat., ch. 391, § 3, at 1889-90. During discussion of the 2005 amendment, [5] Assemblywoman Barbara Buckley discussed the statute in terms of the rights of the consumer, stating that the bill clarifies that an aggrieved consumer has the option of going to court or bringing an administrative action held by [the] DMV. Hearing on A.B. 249 Before the Assembly Comm. of Commerce and Labor, 73d Leg. (Nev. April 6, 2005). Western uses this language to assert that the bond is limited to consumer claims and is solely for consumer protection. ADCO conversely claims that Assemblywoman Buckley's language indicates that NRS 482.345 is a consumer protection measure aimed at protecting any injured person rather than just those with consumer contracts. [6] However, the inclusion of any breach of a consumer contract in NRS 482.345(5) as a basis for claiming against the bond does not decrease the scope of those intended to be eligible to recover from the bond. The adjective consumer modifies only the term contract and not the other violations listed in NRS 482.345(5), i.e., deceptive trade practices, fraud, or fraudulent representations. The fact that contract breaches are limited to consumer contracts does not imply that claims based on deceptive trade practices or fraud are limited to those committed against consumers. Thus, the legislative history supports our conclusion that, based on the plain language of NRS 482.345, ADCO is eligible to apply for compensation from the bond. [7] We therefore affirm the district court's order granting the petition for judicial review. We concur: HARDESTY and PICKERING, JJ.