Opinion ID: 1462254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Felony Murder in the United States

Text: Two statesHawaii and Kentuckyhave specifically abolished the felony murder rule. Hawaii Rev.Stat. § 707.701 (1976); Ky.Rev.Stat. § 507.020 (Supp.1982). In addition, Ohio has effectively abolished the rule by defining as involuntary manslaughter a death caused by the commission or attempted commission of a felony. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. §§ 2903.01, 2903.04 (Page 1982). Manslaughter, by definition, does not require malice. Since the felony murder rule's main function is to supply malice, the rule is useless in Ohio. The majority of the other states, including Vermont, have attempted to ameliorate the harshness of the rule by limiting its applicability to violent felonies involving a risk that death will occur during the natural course of the felony. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra, at 547. Thus, Vermont has limited its felony murder rule to the crimes of robbery, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, arson and burglary. 13 V.S.A. § 2301. Some state legislatures have imposed additional restrictions. Several states have reduced the punishment for felony murder by downgrading the crime from first degree murder to second or third degree murder. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.41.110(a)(3) (1978); N.Y.Penal Law § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975); Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 18, § 2502(b) (Purdon 1983); Wis.Stat.Ann. § 940.02(2) (West 1982). Other statutes require that the defendant have some degree of culpable mental state beyond the intent to commit the underlying felony. See, e.g., Ark.Stat. Ann. § 41.1501(1)(a) (1977) (defendant must manifest extreme indifference to the value of human life in causing the death); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 636(a)(6) (Supp.1982) (requires criminal negligence); La.Rev. Stat.Ann. § 14:30 (West Supp.1983) (requires specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 630:1-a, 630:1-b (1974) (to constitute first degree murder, death must be caused knowingly, and to constitute second degree murder, death must be caused recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life). Some legislatures also have established affirmative defenses to the felony murder rule. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.41.115(b) (1978); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-3-102(2) (1978); Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 53a-54c (West Supp.1983); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 17-A, § 202 (West 1983); N.J.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3a (1982); N.Y.Penal Law § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975); N.D.Cent. Code § 12.1-16-01(3) (Supp.1981); Or.Rev. Stat. § 163.115 (1981); Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 9A.32.030(c) (1977) (affirmative defense that defendant did not commit or cause homicidal act; was not armed with deadly weapon; or had no reasonable grounds to believe co-felon was armed or intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious injury). In addition to legislative action, judicial decisions in many jurisdictions have limited the scope of the common law felony murder rule. Such limitations have included requirements that the felony be inherently dangerous, see, e.g., Wade v. State, 581 P.2d 914 (Okl.Ct.App.1978); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 456 Pa. 278, 309 A.2d 714 (1973); People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 (1966), that the killing be a proximate cause of the felonious act, see, e.g., Wade v. State, supra ; State v. Mauldin, 215 Kan. 956, 958, 529 P.2d 124, 126 (1974); People v. Scott, 29 Mich.App. 549, 185 N.W.2d 576 (1971), that the time period during which the felony is in the process of being committed be narrowly construed, see, e.g., State v. Montgomery, 191 Neb. 470, 215 N.W.2d 881 (1974); State v. Opher, 38 Del. 93, 188 A. 257 (1936); People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422 (1933), and that the underlying felony be independent of the homicide, see, e.g., People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 (1969); People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927). See also Aaron, supra, 409 Mich. at 699-701, 299 N.W.2d at 312-13; ALI Model Penal Code § 201.2, comment 4, at 37 (Tent.Draft No. 9, 1959). Many of these court-imposed limitations on the common law felony murder rule have subsequently been codified by statute. See, e.g., Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.1983); Iowa Code Ann. § 707.2 (West 1979); Minn.Stat.Ann. § 609.185 (West Supp.1983) (underlying felony must be forcible or violent); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2903.04 (Page 1982) (felon's act must be proximate cause of death); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 17-A, § 202 (1983) (death must be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of commission of felony); see generally Aaron, supra, 409 Mich. at 705, 299 N.W.2d at 315.