Opinion ID: 1826904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying proposed jury instructions.

Text: Collins argues that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the mistake of age defense. Specifically, Collins assigns as error the trial court's failure to give the following instructions to the jury: Instruction D-4 The Court instructs the jury that if you find from the evidence that James Collins engaged in sexual intercourse with Laquita Sesson (sic) who advised him that she was greater than eighteen (18) years of age, then you shall find James Collins not guilty of seduction of a child under age eighteen. Instruction D-5 The Court instructs the jury that if you find from the evidence presented in court that James Collins engaged in or committed capital rape upon Laquita Sesson (sic) who advised him that she was greater than eighteen (18) years of age, then you shall find James Collins not guilty of capital rape of Laquita Sesson (sic). This Court's standard of review in reviewing jury instructions is as follows: In determining whether error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. (citations omitted). Hickombottom v. State, 409 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Miss. 1982). In the case at bar, the jury was substantively instructed as to the offenses of capital rape, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-65(1) and seduction of a child under age eighteen, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-21. Collins was convicted of capital rape. Our task is therefore to determine whether the instructions, when read as a whole, accurately set forth the applicable law. While Collins does not object to the instructions actually given by the court, his complaint lies with the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the mistake of age defense. Collins argues that this defense is a modern trend recognized by at least seventeen states as well as a view adopted by the Model Penal Code, §§ 213.1, 213.6(1). Collins admits that those states which recognize this defense do so pursuant to the crime of statutory rape. However, Collins argues that this Court should recognize mistake of age as a defense to both statutory and capital rape. This is an issue of first impression before this Court. Further complicating the issue is the sparse legislative intent to supplement the relevant statutory provisions, §§ 97-3-65, 97-3-67, 97-5-21. However, prior decisions by this Court, case law from sister states and legal commentary aid in our analysis. A review of both the capital and statutory rape statutes reveals that age is a critical element of each crime. Crimes such as statutory rape and sexual assault, in the instant case are defined by the ages of the persons involved. Washington v. State, 645 So.2d 915, 919 (Miss. 1994). The age of the victim makes or breaks the conviction. Id. This Court recently held that the age of the accused was a sine qua non of the crime of capital rape requiring proof by the state at trial. Fisher v. State, 690 So.2d 268 (Miss. 1996). The difference between statutory and capital rape in Mississippi is first one of age. Capital rape requires rape of a child under age fourteen. If the perpetrator is over the age of eighteen, a sentence of death or life imprisonment may be imposed. However, if the perpetrator is between the ages of thirteen and eighteen years, the court in its discretion may determine an appropriate sentence. However, statutory rape requires carnal knowledge of an unmarried person of previously chaste character younger than himself or herself and over fourteen and under eighteen years of age. Thus, while age serves as a line of demarcation for purposes of the potential penalty for capital rape, age is the defining characteristic of statutory rape, be it forcible or not. See Lewis v. State, 184 So. 53, 183 Miss. 192 (1938). The legislative intent of § 97-3-67 is contained in General Laws of Mississippi, 1914, ch. 171, House Bill No. 76 wherein the legislature stated An Act to fix the age of consent at eighteen years. The clear intent underlying the crime of statutory rape is that females under age eighteen are legally unable to consent to sexual relations with another. Intent or mistake as to the age of the child are irrelevant. Historically, there have been two basic rationales for statutory rape laws. The first rationale is the need for strict accountability to protect young girls. The second rationale is the premise that the defendant's intent to commit statutory rape can be derived from his intent to commit the morally or legally wrongful act of fornication. 6 Am.Jur.2d Proof of Facts § 2 (1975). Further, the history of the offense of statutory rape indicates that from ancient times the law has afforded special protection to those deemed too young to understand their actions. United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir.1991). The weight of authority in this country indicates that statutory rape has traditionally been viewed as a strict liability offense. Id. (citing 8 A.L.R.3d 1100 and 1 Wharton's Crim. Law & Proc. § 321.) Despite the fact that statutory rape is historically a strict liability offense, mistake of age has been asserted successfully as a defense in several states [1] and is recognized by the Model Penal Code when the child is over the age of ten years. The basic premise of this defense is that a reasonable or good faith mistake as to the age of the victim is a valid defense to statutory rape. However, this defense remains the minority view. Far more states have rejected the defense. See Nelson v. Moriarty, 484 F.2d 1034 (1st Cir.1973); U.S. v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 1042, 112 S.Ct. 897, 116 L.Ed.2d 799; People v. Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973); State v. Plude, 30 Conn. App. 527, 621 A.2d 1342 (1993); State v. Sorakrai, 543 So.2d 294 (Fla.App. 1989); Tant v. State, 158 Ga. App. 624, 281 S.E.2d 357 (1981); State v. Silva, 53 Haw. 232, 491 P.2d 1216 (1971); State v. Stiffler, 117 Idaho 405, 788 P.2d 220 (1990); Toliver v. State, 267 Ind. 575, 372 N.E.2d 452 (1978); State v. Tague, 310 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa 1981); Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 (1993); Commonwealth v. Moore, 359 Mass. 509, 269 N.E.2d 636 (1971); State v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1992); State v. Campbell, 239 Neb. 14, 473 N.W.2d 420 (1991); Jenkins v. State, 110 Nev. 865, 877 P.2d 1063 (1994); State v. Davis, 108 N.H. 158, 229 A.2d 842 (1967) rev'd on other grounds, 136 N.H. 191, 612 A.2d 923 (1992); State v. Moore, 105 N.J. Super. 567, 253 A.2d 579 (1969); Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 195 S.E.2d 392 (1973); State v. Fulks, 83 S.D. 433, 160 N.W.2d 418 (1968); State v. Randolph, 12 Wash. App. 138, 528 P.2d 1008 (1974); Kelley v. State, 51 Wis.2d 641, 187 N.W.2d 810 (1971). The mistake of age defense could hardly co-exist with our statutory rape statute which is intended to set forth the age of consent. As a result, children below this age are legally incapable of consenting to sexual relations. There is simply no indication by our legislature or by this Court that the defendant's knowledge the child's age is a factor to be considered. Rather, the knowledge or ignorance of the age of the child is irrelevant. If reasonable mistake were recognized as a defense, the very purpose of the statute would be frustrated and the deterrent effect considerably diminished. However, Collins asks that this Court recognize mistake of age as a defense to capital rape [2] as well. This Court has held that capital rape does not require that the act be forcefully done against the will of the child. McBride v. State, 492 So.2d 581, 584 (Miss. 1986). Rather, we stated, [t]he child was under the age of consent, and it was not material whether the rape was accomplished by force or violence and against the will of the child. Id. Consent is no defense to the charge. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the capital rape statute appears to have the same purpose as does statutory rape; the protection of children of a specified age. In capital rape that age is under fourteen years whereas statutory rape applies to those children who are between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. At the heart of these statutes is the core concern that children should not be exploited for sexual purposes regardless of their consent. They simply cannot appreciate the significance or the consequences of their actions. Moreover, the capital rape statute is available for those cases which involve forcible rape of children under age fourteen. In a forcible rape case involving a child under the age of fourteen the mistake of age defense is even less appropriate. In the case at bar, LaQuita's testimony was unequivocal: Collins forcibly raped her. If we take the victim's story as true, as the jury did, then this is not merely a case of consensual sex with one partner falling below a prohibited age, but rather the forcible rape of a child. Recognizing the defense of mistake of age would at best frustrate the purpose of both legislative enactments. However, Collins argues that we imply such a defense because it is not expressly excluded by the legislature. Although not expressly excluded by the legislature, the intent underlying these statutes is clear. Those states which recognize the defendant's mistake as a defense do so in large part because criminal offenses require the critical element of mens rea or criminal intent. The defendant's mistake is allowed as a defense to negate this element of the crime. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of criminal intent and has recognized that the legislature's authority to define an offense includes the power to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228, 78 S.Ct. 240, 242, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957). The Court expressly recognized that sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's actual age was determinative despite the defendant's reasonable belief that the girl had reached the age of consent are exceptions to the general rule that criminal statutes require the State to establish intent. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n. 8, 72 S.Ct. 240, 244 n. 8, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). Moreover, overlooked by Collins is that those states which do recognize this defense require the defendant to prove that his belief was reasonable or in good faith. Collins' proposed instructions do not require that he reasonably believed or that he possessed a good faith belief that LaQuita was over the age of fourteen years. Rather, the instructions proposed by Collins focus on LaQuita's actions rather than Collins' state of mind. For example, Instruction D-4 states if you find from the evidence ... with Laquita Sesson (sic) who advised him ... then you shall find James Collins not guilty of seduction of a child under age eighteen. (emphasis added). Instruction D-5 likewise contains the language who advised him. Thus, the jury would have been instructed that they could find Collins not guilty of either seduction or capital rape if they merely found that LaQuita advised Collins that she was greater than (18) years of age. The jury would not have been required to find that Collins reasonably or in good faith believed LaQuita's statements. The State correctly suggests that if such instructions were allowed, an adult could have sex with a child of any age and could not be found guilty of capital rape if the child lied about her age, no matter how unbelievable that may be. Therefore, the proposed instructions, were an inaccurate statement of this defense. A trial court cannot be put in error for refusing to give an instruction that misstates the law. Allman v. State, 571 So.2d 244, 251 (Miss. 1990). Moreover, [o]ur law is well-settled that jury instructions are not given unless there is an evidentiary basis in the record for such. Fairchild v. State, 459 So.2d 793, 800 (Miss. 1984). The evidentiary basis for such an instruction in the case at bar is at best tenuous. Collins repeatedly claims that LaQuita told him and that he believed she was nineteen years of age. Despite Collins' testimony there is no other confirmation that LaQuita represented herself as such. Moreover, additional evidence presented at trial undermines the reasonableness of his belief. For example, numerous witnesses testified that Collins had known LaQuita and her mother or had at least seen them at Linda Lewis' home since LaQuita was a baby. Moreover, it was further shown that Collins lived less than a mile from LaQuita and her mother for the last four or five years. LaQuita was thirteen years old at the time of the rape and would have been between the ages of eight and nine when she first began living in Tate county and when she first met Collins. To now believe that Collins reasonably believed LaQuita was nineteen years of age is at best doubtful. Collins also argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of statutory rape. Collins argues that in light of his mistake of age defense, a statutory rape instruction was warranted. Collins' analysis suggests that while a hypothetical, reasonable jury might not believe that Collins thought LaQuita was nineteen, a reasonable jury could believe Collins thought LaQuita Sessom was older than thirteen years of age. The criteria for determining whether an offense is a lesser-included offense of a greater offense is as follows: ... the more serious offense must include all the elements of the lesser offense, that is, it is impossible to commit the greater offense without at the same time committing the lesser included offense. Hailey v. State, 537 So.2d 411, 415 (Miss. 1988) (citations omitted). Applying this test to capital and statutory rape does not lead to the conclusion that statutory rape is a lesser included offense of capital rape. Capital rape requires carnal knowledge by one eighteen (18) years of age or older of a child under the age of fourteen (14) years. § 97-3-65, Miss. Code Ann. (1972 as amended). Thus, a necessary element of capital rape is that the victim be under the age of fourteen years. However, the crime of statutory rape requires that the child be over fourteen but under eighteen years of age. Therefore, when one commits capital rape one does not necessarily commit the crime of statutory rape due to the requisite age of the victim. The cases are legion in this Court holding that lesser-included offense instructions must be warranted by the evidence. Monroe v. State, 515 So.2d 860, 863 (Miss. 1987). (citations omitted). In the case sub judice, the evidence was uncontradicted and clear: LaQuita Sessom was thirteen years of age at the time of the crime. LaQuita and her mother, testified that LaQuita was born on March 21, 1980. On or about August 7, 1993, LaQuita would have been thirteen years of age. The evidence presented at trial simply did not warrant a statutory rape instruction. [O]nly where the evidence could only justify a conviction of the principal charge should a lesser included offense instruction be refused. Fairchild v. State, 459 So.2d 793, 800 (Miss. 1984) ( quoting Ruffin v. State, 444 So.2d 839, 840 (Miss. 1984)). Here, the evidence could only justify a conviction of capital rape or possibly seduction of a child under the age of eighteen. The trial court properly refused the statutory rape instruction. Collins' argument that the statutory rape instruction should have been given was conditioned upon this Court upholding the mistake of age defense. At the time of trial, the lower court had before it the law as it existed at that time. We have repeatedly held that lesser-included instructions should not be granted indiscriminately, nor on the basis of pure speculation. Doss v. State, 1996 WL 272348, ___ So.2d ___ (Miss. 1996); McGowan v. State, 541 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Miss. 1989); Mease v. State, 539 So.2d 1324, 1329 (Miss. 1989). To have granted such an instruction based upon the assumption that this Court may recognize this defense would have been pure speculation.