Opinion ID: 2505697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Equitable Relief and Estoppel

Text: Equity jurisdiction is involved in every aspect of trust law. See OCGA § 53-12-6(a) (Trusts are peculiarly subjects of equity jurisdiction. . . .). Generally, [e]quity jurisdiction is established and allowed for the protection and relief of parties where, from any peculiar circumstances, the operation of the general rules of law would be deficient in protecting from anticipated wrong or relieving for injuries done. OCGA § 23-1-3. In addition, equity follows the law. OCGA § 23-1-6. Parties seeking equitable relief must themselves strive to do equity. OCGA § 23-1-10. Not only did the National Church fail to strive to do equity in this case, but the National Church also ignored its positive legal duty to fully communicate with its confidential relation CCS and to treat CCS with the utmost of good faith. See OCGA § 23-2-58 (Any relationship shall be deemed confidential, whether arising from nature, created by law, or resulting from contracts, where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, such as the relationship between partners, principal and agent, etc.); see also OCGA § 23-2-53 (Suppression of a material fact which a party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case.). The National Church's failure to comply with these important statutory duties toward its confidential relation CCS is a constructive fraud. See OCGA § 23-2-51((a) Fraud may be actual or constructive. (b) Actual fraud consists of any kind of artifice by which another is deceived. Constructive fraud consists of any act of omission or commission, contrary to legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, which is contrary to good conscience and operates to the injury of another. (c) Actual fraud implies moral guilt; constructive fraud may be consistent with innocence.). Indeed, if this Court gives effect to all of the applicable state statutes, it seems clear that the National Church committed a constructive fraud on CCS by its failure to treat CCS in the utmost good faith and to fully communicate with CCS. This constructive fraud of the National Church should prohibit this Court from allowing the National Church to prevail in this case. Indeed, I would hold that the National Church's failure to communicate with CCS in bad faith since its formation that the National Church claimed a trust on CCS's property provides for an implied trust in favor of CCS on any interest that the National Church arguably acquired in CCS's property. At the very least, that would be an issue for a jury. Furthermore, the National Church should be estopped from claiming any transfer of title of CCS's property into an implied trust for the benefit of the National Church for at least five reasons: (1) One equitable basis for estoppel is the National Church's allegedly deceptive action of referring to an alleged trust in favor of the National Church as a canon on the National Church's administrative forms. Both parties should present evidence on the issue of whether the National Church intended to deceive CCS, and a jury should be permitted to resolve this issue. As I discuss elsewhere, the notion of a trust is not included in the meaning of the term canon as that term is defined in various dictionaries. The dictionary definition of the term canon is church dogma, and not a trust. (2) No agent of CCS signing the National Church's administrative forms is shown to have been clothed with sufficient corporate authority to transfer title to all or substantially all of CCS's property without the prior approval of CCS's board of directors. See OCGA § 10-6-2. In Georgia, an agent must be clothed with authority by a corporate board of directors to transfer corporate assets, including real estate. Yet, no proper corporate approval is shown here. Any transfer by a corporate agent also must comply with the equal dignity rule. See OCGA § 10-6-2; see also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.02. Further, none of these administrative forms would survive scrutiny under various state statutes because there was no adequate description of the property to be transferred, no statement from CCS's vestry regarding its intention to transfer its title to the National Church, no witnesses, and no signature of the party to be charged. (3) The administrative forms relied on as evidence of ratification of the Dennis Canon fail to evidence CCS's intention to transfer title as mandated by the statutory laws governing trust instruments and deeds transferring title described at greater length in the preceding sections. (4) Ratification is the method of transferring title that the National Church is relying on to claim that the Dennis Canon formed an express trust on CCS's property, but any alleged conveyance by signing an administrative form is woefully inadequate to transfer CCS's title under Georgia law. More specifically, the administrative form does not show that the signatory had any intention to or authority to transfer property and does not contain attestation by two witnesses as required by Georgia statutory law. See OCGA § 44-5-30; see also Curry, 267 Ga. at 68, 473 S.E.2d 760 (describing the essential elements of a deed). CCS was entitled to the protections afforded by Georgia law against the fraudulent or negligent transfer of title in property. (5) There is no recitation of any evidence in support of a motion for summary judgment that the documents alleged to have been a ratification of the Dennis Canon were properly authorized by CCS's (vestry) board of directors. Absent such a showing, the Court is precluded from holding that an unauthorized corporate agent's signing such an administrative form operated to transfer title to all of CCS's real estate and other property. See OCGA § 14-5-7; see also Village Creations, Ltd. v. Crawfordville Enterprises, Inc., 232 Ga. 131, 133, 206 S.E.2d 3 (1974).