Opinion ID: 1460047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: JA Apparel's Proposed Meaning

Text: 1. Application of the Rules of Interpretation. The plaintiff argues that the term names in ¶ 1.1(a)(A) denotes Joseph Abboud's personal name itself, not a mark related to his name. As the district court concluded, application of the rule against surplusage makes this interpretation reasonable. Pursuant to that rule, the term names must be given a meaning different from the meaning of the other properties listed by ¶ 1.1(a)(A); otherwise the term would be superfluous. S. Road Assocs., 4 N.Y.3d at 278, 826 N.E.2d at 809, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 838. So the term must refer to intellectual property other than that which is subsequently referred to in the paragraph, i.e., other than a trademark [ ], for example, or a trade name[ ] or service mark[ ]. Sale Agreement ¶ 1.1(a)(A). [3] From the ordinary usage of the term name, it is reasonable to conclude that the other intellectual property in question is Abboud's personal name. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1167 (4th ed.2000) (defining name principally as [a] word or words by which an entity is designated and distinguished from others). [4] Reading the Sale Agreement as a whole supports this result. Paragraph 1.1(a)(C), quoted in full at the outset of this opinion, contains a list of intellectual property strikingly similar to that in ¶ 1.1(a)(A) but omits the term names with which the list in ¶ 1.1(a)(A) begins. See Sale Agreement ¶ 1.1(a)(C) (conveying [a]ll rights to use and apply for the registration of new trade names, trademarks, service marks, logos, insignias and designations containing [`Joseph Abboud' and similar words]). That names appears in one list but not the other suggests that the parties and their counsel took deliberate care to include the term in ¶ 1.1(a)(A) so as to convey an interest in something other than trademarks, trade names, and the like. 2. The Panel Majority's Analysis. The panel majority concludes that the term names is reasonably susceptible to JA Apparel's proposed interpretation because the term is unadorned and . . . the name `Joseph Abboud' is used many times in Schedule 1.1(a)(A). Supra at 398. I find both reasons problematic. To be sure, the term names in ¶ 1.1(a)(A) is unadorned in the sense that it has no modifiers. But that does not alone render either party's proposed meaning a reasonable one. Schedule 1.1(a)(A), attached to the Sale Agreement and referred to in ¶ 1.1(a)(A), does not support JA Apparel's reading, because the name Joseph Abboud, as a personal name, appears nowhere in the schedule. The schedule is a list of marks. The heading of each page reads: Trademark Report by Mark. The schedule lists categories of marks by name in bold-face capital letters, with each mark in the category set forth along with its registration information. So, while the schedule contains, among many other things, the words Joseph Abboud, those words are mentioned only as a mark or a part of a mark, reflecting a trademark property related to Joseph Abboud, not Joseph Abboud's personal name or whatever property right he may have in it.