Opinion ID: 1161511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The Suits to Quiet Title : Effect of Actions 5362 and 5591

Text: The trial court found that: On August 13, 1952, certain of the defendants herein filed San Benito County Action No. 5362 to quiet title to the Syncline Ranch including Section 31, against the claims of all persons. A lis pendens was duly recorded in San Benito County and summons was posted on the ranch property. A decree quieting title was entered on June 9, 1953, and duly recorded in San Benito County. In 1954 certain defendants herein filed San Benito County Action No. 5591 to quiet title to an undivided one-half interest in the Syncline Ranch in fee, including Section 31, against named persons and the claims of all persons. A lis pendens was duly recorded in San Benito County and a decree quieting title to an undivided one-half interest in the ranch was entered in February 1955, and duly recorded in San Benito County.... None of the plaintiffs ... nor their predecessors had knowledge of or were named other than as unknown persons or served with process other than by publication in San Benito County Actions Nos. 5362 and 5591. That it is not known whether the interests of the present [plaintiffs'] predecessors were sold as ordered by the Court in the judgment in Action 1870, nor if such sales were made, to whom said interest passed by said sales; the holders of such title were properly determined to be `unknown persons' within the meaning of C.C.P. 749 and sued and served as such by publication in said actions. The judgments in Actions 5362 and 5591 are now final and quiet title to the property involved in the present actions in the present defendants. That by reason thereof plaintiffs have no right, title nor interest in nor claim to the real property described in the complaints.... Code of Civil Procedure section 749 et seq. set forth a procedure whereby one who has been in the actual, exclusive and adverse possession of such property continuously for 20 years prior to the filing of the complaint, claiming to own the same in fee against the whole world, and who ... has paid all taxes of every kind levied or assessed against the property and which were payable during the period of five years continuously next preceding the filing of the complaint may determine the adverse claims to and clouds upon title to real property.... The said complaint may include as defendants in such action, in addition to such persons as appear of record to have, all other persons who are known to the plaintiff to have some claim or cloud on the real property described in the complaint adverse to plaintiff's ownership, and other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, interest or lien in such real property, or cloud upon the title of plaintiff thereto.... (Code Civ. Proc., ง 749.) The court must issue a summons, a copy of which the plaintiff shall post on the property. All ... defendants residing in the State of California, whose place of residence is known to the plaintiff shall be served personally with said summons.... All defendants whose residence is unknown, all defendants residing outside of the State, and all unknown residents are to be served by publication. Nonresident defendants whose names and addresses are known must be mailed a copy of the summons. A copy addressed to defendants at the county seat of the county in which the action is brought must be sent to defendants whose names but not addresses are known. Service is deemed complete as to these latter classes of defendants, and as to unknown defendants upon publication of the summons pursuant to Government Code section 6064. (Code Civ. Proc., ง 750.) [T]he court shall proceed to hear the case as in other cases and shall have jurisdiction to examine into and determine the legality of plaintiff's title and of the title and claim of all the defendants and of all unknown persons, and to that end must not enter any judgment by default, but must in all cases require evidence of plaintiff's title and possession, and ... must thereafter direct judgment to be entered in accordance with the evidence and the law.... The judgment after it has become final is conclusive against all the persons named in the summons and complaint who have been served and against all unknown persons as stated in the complaint and summons who have been served by publication.... (Code Civ. Proc., ง 751.) [24] Plaintiffs attack the conclusive effect of the two judgments on several grounds, only one of which we need consider. We hold that plaintiffs' predecessors were known to have a claim to certain property rights in section 31; since defendants failed to name them in the complaints and serve them with process, the two judgments do not foreclose plaintiffs' claims to these rights. (Code Civ. Proc., ง 751.) [25] Our courts have clearly indicated that a judgment obtained under section 749 et seq. is not binding as to a person known to plaintiff to have an adverse claim, if that person is not named and served. ( Manuel v. Kiser (1949) 94 Cal. App.2d 540, 545 [210 P.2d 918]; see Smith v. McDaniel (1964) 228 Cal. App.2d 275 [39 Cal. Rptr. 544]; O'Connor v. Rumiano Bros. Co. (1958) 157 Cal. App.2d 483, 489-490 [321 P.2d 122].) In these cases the party seeking to avoid the conclusive effect of the decree claimed to have been in actual hostile possession of the property at the time the action was brought but had not been named in the complaint or served with process. The court in Manuel relied on the general rule that a party in the actual possession of real property cannot be regarded as an `unknown' person so as to be bound by a decree based upon published service. (94 Cal. App.2d 540 at p. 545.) Other than to describe a party openly in actual possession as known, the courts have not indicated what means of knowledge must be asserted against the plaintiff in a section 749 action in order to secure an in rem decree. In Title etc. Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan (1906) 150 Cal. 289 [88 P. 356, 119 Am.St.Rep. 199, 8 L.R.A.N.S. 682], the test case on the McEnerney Act, [47] the court held that known owners are those who could with reasonable diligence be ascertained and found. (P. 317.) We have no doubt that where the statute is thus careful to secure actual notice to known claimants, it should not be construed as intended to permit a plaintiff to willfully or negligently close his eyes to the means of knowledge and thus secure a decree by publication and posting alone, as against persons whose identity he might have learned by the use of due effort. (P. 318.) We hold that this standard of reasonable diligence applies in connection with known claimants in an action brought under section 749 et seq. Conceding, as they must, that they cannot show the reasonable diligence required under section 749 et seq. unless they undertake some examination of the title records, defendants argue that in view of the statutory requirement that a plaintiff under this section or his predecessors possess the property for 20 years and pay the assessed taxes for 5 years, such a plaintiff need only examine title records dated within 20 years of the commencement of the action and tax records within 5 years of that time. [48] [26] We cannot accept defendants' construction. Section 749 states that The said complaint may include as defendants in such action, in addition to such persons as appear of record to have, all other persons who are known to the plaintiff to have, some claim.... (Italics added.) This language indicates that persons who appear of record at any time to have some claim to the property are known persons who cannot be served merely by publication. [49] Needless to say, we do not hold that a section 749 plaintiff must pursue every missing link in the chains of title or trace every stray deed recorded since the first volume of deeds. Such a requirement would defeat the intent of the Legislature to permit a party occupying and using the property for a given period to obtain a marketable title. Thus, if we held that a plaintiff must trace all successors from a claimant appearing of record over such a period as, for example, 100 years, even though a further disposition of the claim did not appear of record, we would impose in some instances an intolerable burden. [27] Nevertheless, although the question of reasonable diligence is one for the trier of fact, we do not find sufficient evidence in the instant case to foreclose plaintiffs' rights under section 751. In bringing the 1952 and 1954 quiet title actions, defendants should have known of the 1910 deeds to the corporations and of the judgment in action 1870 listing the interests of the stockholders at the time of the charter forfeitures. To meet the standard of reasonable diligence they were obligated to undertake some effort to locate the stockholders or their heirs. Although, as pointed out by the trial court, it is not known whether the interest of the present [plaintiffs'] predecessors were sold as ordered by the Court in the judgment in Action 1870, nor if such sales were made, to whom said interest passed by said sales ..., the very absence of evidence of the sale should have alerted defendants to the shareholders' claim or cloud on the real property described in the complaint.