Opinion ID: 2570151
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Taggart's challenge to specific rulings

Text: Taggart also challenges specific rulings of the trial court, although he contends that he is only arguing that the superior court applied the wrong legal standard. Some of these rulings resolved fact disputes or were based on factual findings. Factual findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. [21] The others we review for abuse of discretion. [22] Taggart first argues that Sabra refused to return to work fulltime and that this created financial problems for the parties. He implies that her refusal was contrary to the parties' agreement. The superior court found that Sabra was a part-time Anchorage School District teaching assistant during the school year, that this employment was reasonable, that she would slowly re-enter the work force, and that she was not underemployed during the school year. Taggart testified only that he had expected Sabra to go back to work fulltime when the children were in school. He did not testify that Sabra had refused to return to work fulltime, that she had failed to abide by any agreement between them regarding her employment, or that her part-time schedule created any financial difficulties. Sabra testified that she was in the process of returning to work fulltime, and that the parties had agreed that she would not work at all between 1997 and 2001. The superior court therefore did not clearly err by finding that Sabra's employment was reasonable. Taggart next asserts that Sabra is voluntarily underemployed, because [t]he evidence presented clearly demonstrated that Sabra had the skills and ability to work full-time at a wage of at least $13.00 an hour. He implicitly argues that such jobs were actually available to Sabra. When asked by Taggart's attorney if she would take a full-time job that paid $13.15 per hour, Sabra testified that she would. She also testified that she thought she could earn $13 per hour. But Sabra did not testify expressly or implicitly that a full-time job paying $13 per hour was available to her. She explained that she no longer has the skills necessary to do the work she had previously done for Alaska Airlines, when she last earned about $13 per hour in full-time employment. Sabra also testified that she had applied for several full-time jobs with the school district and had not been hired. The record does not compel a finding that Sabra actually could have obtained full-time employment for $13 per hour, and it does not demonstrate that the court clearly erred in failing to find that she could have. The superior court did not clearly err by finding that Sabra's current level of employment was appropriate, given her skills. The court also did not clearly err in finding that she was not underemployed during the school year. And as to summer employment, the court reasoned that while the children were young, child care expenses of at least $750 monthly would be incurred; it seemed to assume that if she worked thirty hours a week at $13 per hour these expenses would consume about fifty percent of her summer earnings. We are unconvinced that this finding and this implicit assumption were clearly erroneous. Taggart next asserts that Sabra will earn more money in the future, when and if she obtains a teaching degree. But the statute requires the court to consider each party's earning capacity. [23] It does not require the court to consider the party's potential future earning capacity following significant additional education. There was no evidence Sabra would earn a teaching certificate in the near future. She testified she had about ten credit hours and needed about 112 more to obtain a teaching certificate. It was not an abuse of discretion to decline to attribute a teacher's earning capacity to Sabra. Taggart next asserts that the trial court also justified [awarding] 67% of the marital estate to Sabra based upon the fact that if she was unable to refinance the home then she would need to `pay for cost[s] of repairs in order to sell the house if she must.' We assume Taggart is not contending that the prospect of pre-sale repair expenses was the court's only justification for the disparate award; the findings also discussed a variety of other facts which the court thought rendered a sixty-seven/thirty-three division fair and equitable. It appears the court regarded pre-sale repair costs as a logical alternative to its finding that Sabra needed money to refinance the marital home to keep it for the children, if she can.... It also appears, as Taggart argues, that there was no evidence in the record that the house needed repairs, whether or not it had to be sold. But there is likewise no indication the superior court gave the possibility of repair costs significant weight. [24] Taggart also seems to argue that in determining whether Sabra was to receive more than half the marital estate, the court improperly considered the cost of child care and the amount of time Sabra spent raising the children. We have stated that the list of factors in AS 25.24.160(a)(4) is not exhaustive and that it is entirely appropriate for a court to consider factors not enumerated in that statute. [25] The statute did not prevent the court from considering these circumstances. To the extent these circumstances may have been relevant to Sabra's economic necessities not otherwise covered by child support payments, it was not inappropriate to consider them. Taggart also argues that the court should have considered his child-care costs. Because Taggart testified that he had no child-care costs, we are unpersuaded by this argument.