Opinion ID: 2102385
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Heading: Residential Expenses.

Text: Plaintiff also contends that he was entitled to residential relocation benefits in excess of the amount of $7464 allowed by the DOT and the district court$1464 for actual residential moving expenses and $6000 as a housing replacement benefit. A. Actual Moving Expenses. Iowa Code chapter 316 governs the award of residential relocation expenses. Section 316.4(1)(a), quoted above, permits a displaced person to recover the actual reasonable expenses of moving the entire family. As with the business assistance provisions, a person may elect to receive a residential in lieu of relocation payment rather than reimbursement of the actual expenses incurred, but the in lieu award is subject to a $500 ceiling. Iowa Code § 316.4(2). The DOT awarded plaintiff $1464 in actual residential moving expenses, pursuant to section 316.4(1)(a). Plaintiff contends he was also entitled to reimbursement of $1631 for the expenses he incurred in his second move, a relocation from his replacement rental property to the property he undertook to buy about a year later. Neither section 316.4 nor the regulations promulgated by the DOT address the question whether expenses of a second move are to be reimbursed. Those regulations do explain in considerable detail what expenditures constitute reasonable moving costs and related expenses. 820 Iowa Admin.Code § 8.4(1). The regulations also list several moving cost exclusions which include a catch-all provision providing: No payment shall be made for such other items as the agency determines should be excluded on the basis that they are not reasonable, or proper. 820 Iowa Admin.Code § 8.4(2)(e). The expenses of a second move are not specifically identified as compensable. Moreover, the regulations give the DOT considerable discretion to disallow claimed items of residential moving expense. The DOT could reasonably have decided that there was not a sufficient causal relationship between the initial need to relocate and the expenses incurred as a result of the second move. The evidence showed that plaintiff voluntarily chose the first relocation site and had reason to know when he moved into that rental property that it was not zoned for commercial use and would not be a suitable place from which to operate his business. We conclude that the DOT did not abuse its discretion in disallowing the expenses incurred by plaintiff in his second move. Plaintiff suggests that federal law governing moving expenses of dislocated persons should be applied, but he has not pointed to any provision in the federal statute or regulations which would provide him greater residential relocation benefits than do the Iowa statute and regulations. The pertinent provisions of Iowa Code section 316.4 and the regulations promulgated thereunder are virtually identical to the comparable pertinent federal statute and regulations. Plaintiff established no basis in either federal or Iowa law for challenging the agency's determinate of his actual moving expenses. See 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a), (b); 24 CFR 42 §§ 303 et seq. B. Replacement Housing Supplemental Benefit. When the DOT bought the property he was renting, plaintiff also became eligible for the replacement housing benefit described in Iowa Code sections 316.6 and 316.8 (1981). Section 316.6 provides that plaintiff was eligible for a maximum of $4000 for housing assistance, either as a rent supplement or down payment, if comparable housing was available and could be obtained with that amount of assistance. Because comparable housing, as there defined, could not be procured for plaintiff without breaking through that section's $4000 ceiling, the DOT determined that plaintiff was eligible for a replacement housing payment of $6000 under section 316.8(1) which provides in pertinent part: If a highway project cannot proceed to actual construction because comparable replacement sale or rental housing is not available, and the department determines that such housing cannot otherwise be made available, the department may take such action as is necessary or appropriate to provide such housing by use of funds authorized for such project. The department may let contracts for the construction of said housing to approve plans and specifications for the building thereof, and to supervise, inspect and approve the housing once constructed in order that the housing so constructed complies with the terms and conditions of this chapter. The DOT utilized two replacement housing studies, a technique permitted by its regulations, to arrive at its $6000 figure. See 820 Iowa Admin.Code §§ 8.6(2), (3). These reports showed that comparable residential housing was available for plaintiff at a rental rate of $350 to $375 per month compared to the $250 plaintiff had paid under his former lease. As plaintiff would have to pay approximately $125 more per month after relocating than before, the DOT granted him $125 per month for four years, or a total of $6000. Because it was awarding the benefit under section 316.8, rather than under section 316.6, it properly disregarded the $4000 ceiling of section 316.6. We conclude that the DOT did not abuse the discretion conferred upon it by section 316.8 in calculating the amount of the replacement housing payment in that manner which, except for the $4000 ceiling, was precisely the method suggested in section 316.6. Exercising appropriate discretion, the DOT reasonably determined that comparable housing would otherwise be made available to plaintiff, within the meaning of section 316.8, by awarding him a total supplemental payment in excess of the $4000 he would have received under section 316.6. See 820 Iowa Admin.Code § 8.10 (equating unavailability of comparable housing to unavailability within the payment limitations of § 316.6(2)). Plaintiff generally agrees with the DOT interpretation and application of sections 316.6 and 316.8, but he contends the benefit paid to him should be measured not by the higher cost of comparable rental property but by his $30,000 down payment on property he is now purchasing. Plaintiff argues that when the DOT turned to section 316.8 to calculate his replacement housing supplement in order to bypass the $4000 ceiling of section 316.6, it was bound to reimburse fully his cost of replacement housing. For two reasons, we find plaintiff's position untenable. First, we agree with the district court's finding, based on the DOT's replacement housing studies, that plaintiff could have obtained comparable housing for the additional $6000 awarded by the DOT. The $6000 offered to plaintiff thus satisfied the legislative purpose of section 316.3; nothing in either section 316.6 or section 316.8 required the DOT to base its replacement housing supplement on properties available for purchase rather than rent. Secondly, we agree with the DOT's contention that payment to plaintiff of a substantial portion of his $30,000 down payment would be totally disproportionate to the economic harm he sustained in having to seek higher-priced replacement housing. Plaintiff had no equity in the property he formerly was renting. He would receive an unfair windfall if a substantial portion of his equity investment in replacement property were reimbursed under the guise of a replacement housing benefit. The DOT did not abuse its discretion in finding plaintiff entitled to benefits of $6000 for replacement housing and $1464 for actual residential relocation costs. The district court properly approved the agency's determination that plaintiff was entitled to those specific amounts. Because plaintiff had already been paid $3764, the district court correctly entered judgment for $3700 for plaintiff's residential relocation benefit.