Opinion ID: 1923817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to three indeterminate ten-year terms and in ordering two of the terms to be served consecutively?

Text: Defendant was convicted on each count of the crime of delivering a Schedule II narcotic drug for profit. This is a class C felony. § 204.401(1)(a), The Code. A class C felon, not an habitual offender, shall be confined for no more than ten years and in addition may be fined not more than five thousand dollars. Id. § 902.9. A person sentenced pursuant to section 204.401(1)(a) or (b) shall not be eligible for parole until he or she has served a minimum period of confinement of one-third of the maximum indeterminate sentence. Id. § 204.413. Defendant was sentenced to be confined for a period not to exceed ten years, and to pay a fine of $1000, on each count. The court further provided the sentences imposed on counts I and II were to be served consecutively. Count I was based on the third, $9000 cocaine transaction. Count II was grounded on the first, $500 sale. Count III charged the second, $1185 transaction. Defendant argues trial court abused its discretion in failing to treat the three convictions as one offense for the purpose of sentencing, as permitted by section 204.408, The Code, and in imposing consecutive sentences. He asserts the whole record discloses a judicial preoccupation with deterrence, which resulted in a harsh, impassioned and biased sentence. We have held when a sentence is imposed within statutory limits, it will be set aside only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nelson, 279 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1979). Ordinarily an abuse of discretion will be found only where there is no support for the decision in the record. State v. Noonan, 246 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Iowa 1976). The trial court, within the limits of applicable statutes, had the discretion to select a sentencing combination that would provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant and others. § 901.5, The Code. We carefully have examined the record and the statements made by trial court at the sentencing hearing. We find the court did not abuse its discretion in the manner charged by the defendant. However, a sentencing question arises from our reversal of the conviction and judgment on count II. The sentence on count II was to be served consecutively, not concurrently. The colloquy of trial court from the bench at sentencing discloses the court considered the fact of three convictions in imposing all three sentences. See State v. Thompson, 275 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1979). We remand this case for resentencing of the defendant on counts I and III without consideration of a conviction on count II. We do not suggest what the sentence should be as that determination lies in the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Matlock, 289 N.W.2d at 630. State v. Swartz, 278 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 1979), describes the conditions under which a sentencing court can consider evidence bearing on another offense. We affirm defendant's convictions on counts I and III but remand for resentencing as to those counts. We reverse the conviction and judgment on count II and remand for new trial. Costs are taxed two-thirds to the defendant, one-third to the State. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.