Opinion ID: 746480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tracy T. Fitzgerald

Text: 11 Fitzgerald appeals his conviction and sentence on the grounds that he pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine base and the government proffered proof of cocaine base, but the district court sentenced him as if he had pleaded guilty to crack. All cocaine base is not crack and Fitzgerald may be arguing that he would not have pleaded guilty to possession of crack (although this is not clear). Fitzgerald makes a number of arguments including that his sentence was improper, his attorney ineffective and that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. 1 All of his arguments turn on one issue: whether the government must prove crack specifically or merely cocaine base. 12 At his change of plea hearing, Fitzgerald objected to the government's characterization of cocaine base as crack. During the government's presentation of what it would prove if it had to go to trial, the following exchange took place: 13 [Government attorney]: ... Mr. Fitzgerald was found with nine ounces of crack cocaine on his possession on May 25th, 1995. That converts to almost over 25 kilograms of powder cocaine under the conversion. That's the first thing. 14 Second thing is that Mr. Fitzgerald has been involved in the distribution of cocaine since at least March 1990 when we caught him in a reverse transaction with Greg Hayes at a McDonald's parking lot. We have a substantial amount of evidence naming Tracy Fitzgerald as a cocaine and crack trafficker. 15 .... 16 If you want to look at just this offense, the nine ounces of crack convert to over 900 ounces of powder cocaine because of the 100-to-1 ratio here. 17 [Fitzgerald]: But that wasn't crack, it was base you know. 18 [Government attorney]: Crack is base. 19 [Fitzgerald]: Oh yeah? 20 [Government attorney]: Yeah.... 21 Fitzgerald Change of Plea Transcript at 17. Later, Fitzgerald requested both a change of plea and to discharge his attorney. Fitzgerald argued to the district court that he had not understood some portions of his plea agreement, that his attorney had not adequately explained the plea agreement and that his attorney had never been willing to go to trial. The district court denied both motions. Fitzgerald appeals both decisions and his sentence. Fitzgerald's appeal is based on his argument that all cocaine base is not crack and that before the crack enhancement can be applied to his sentence, the government must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he possessed crack. 22 The sentencing enhancement for crack in relation to that for powder cocaine, in terms of the drug weights corresponding to specified guideline levels, is on the order of 100:1. Thus, possession of one ounce of crack receives the same sentence as possession of 100 ounces of powder cocaine. The merits and politics of this differential have been extensively debated, 2 but at least for now the enhancement differential seems to be secure. But such a severe difference in punishment deserves great care in application. Until 1993, the Sentencing Guidelines did not define cocaine base. In 1993 a definition of cocaine base was added, apparently in response to the interpretation that all cocaine base was to be treated as crack under the guidelines and that only powder cocaine could be addressed under the more lenient sentencing schedule. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 980 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158 (2d Cir.1992). At least part of the definitional difficulties arose from the fact that cocaine base, in its various forms, retains exactly the same chemical structure. The definition now found in the guidelines reads thus: 23 Cocaine base, for the purposes of this guideline, means crack. Crack is the street name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form. 24 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(D). Fitzgerald argues that the definition of cocaine base in the guidelines makes it clear that only cocaine base which is crack should receive the 100:1 sentence enhancement for crack. This result follows because cocaine base is a more generic and inclusive term, also applied to other forms of cocaine. Further, Fitzgerald argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to note, even when the defendant himself did, that the government had not met its burden of proof. Finally, Fitzgerald believes that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. 25 The government argues in response that crack and cocaine base are identical for sentencing guideline purposes. 3 Apparently confident of its position, the government further indicates that it considers all of Fitzgerald's arguments to rest on this contention and declines to respond otherwise to his arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel or withdrawal of his guilty plea. However, we agree with Fitzgerald that the 1993 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines limits the sentence enhancement to cases in which the crack form of cocaine base is proved. Therefore, the government must prove that Fitzgerald possessed crack if the sentence enhancement is to be applied. 26 The Eleventh Circuit first considered the new definition of cocaine base in United States v. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375 (11th Cir.1994). Munoz-Realpe pleaded guilty to importation of cocaine after he was arrested at Miami International Airport with six bottles of liquid containing cocaine base. Id. at 376. He argued that the liquid cocaine base should be treated as cocaine hydrochloride (cocaine powder) under the recently adopted sentencing guideline and the court agreed: forms of cocaine base other than crack are treated as cocaine hydrochloride. 4 Id. at 377. 27 The Third Circuit has also addressed the new definition of cocaine base, in United States v. James, 78 F.3d 851, 858 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 128, 136 L.Ed.2d 77 (1996), and adopted the Munoz-Realpe reasoning. Because the government in James had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the form of cocaine base James sold was crack, the court found that it was error for the district court to enhance James' sentence. Id. We further agree with the Third Circuit that 28 [g]iven the highly severe sentencing ratio of 100:1 for crack versus cocaine, James' sentence may vary dramatically depending on whether he sold crack or cocaine. We do not believe that, without more, the casual reference to crack by the Government in the colloquy with the court over [ ]the relevant quantity of cocaine base in determining James' offense level[ ] unmistakably amounted to a knowing and voluntary admission that the cocaine base constituted crack. 29 Id. at 856. This conclusion is even more applicable in the present case since Fitzgerald objected during the change of plea proceeding to the government's use of the term crack. See Fitzgerald Change of Plea Transcript at 17. In contrast, the defendants in United States v. Sloan, 97 F.3d 1378, 1380 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2459, 138 L.Ed.2d 216 (1997), argued not that they did not sell crack, but that there was no scientific definition of crack cocaine and that the sentencing scheme was too ambiguous to warrant enforcement of the heightened, cocaine base penalties. The Sloan argument is directly countered by the cocaine base definition, which distinguishes one form of cocaine base from others, regardless of their similar chemical structures. 30 We find the reasoning of the Munoz-Realpe opinion persuasive and agree with the Eleventh Circuit that under the new definition of cocaine base found in the guidelines only the form of cocaine base which is crack is eligible for the enhanced sentence. Thus the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant possessed crack. The government did not attempt to do so in this case and therefore Fitzgerald's sentence cannot stand. Fitzgerald's case must be remanded for resentencing. 31 The government's reliance on two of our previous cases, United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488 (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1111, 116 S.Ct. 1334, 134 L.Ed.2d 484 (1996), and United States v. Reddrick, 90 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir.1996), is misplaced. In Booker we did state that the amendment defines 'cocaine base' as 'crack'  but we actually applied the 1990 version of the guidelines. Booker, 70 F.3d at 489. All of our analysis in Booker is directed to the meaning of cocaine base under the guidelines pre-1993 amendment, which contained no definition. Thus that analysis is inapplicable here. Similarly in Reddrick the defendant was arguing that  'cocaine' and 'cocaine base' are indistinguishable, as a matter of chemistry and that consequently the guidelines are ambiguous. Reddrick, 90 F.3d at 1282. We explained in Reddrick that [t]he term 'cocaine base' was intended to refer to 'crack'--a solid form of pure cocaine which is easily smoked but we were not addressing the definition now found in the guidelines. Id. Neither case addressed the issue before us now and therefore neither case supports the government's position. Since there was no proof that the crack subcategory of cocaine base was involved here, application of the crack enhancement was erroneous. 32 However, Fitzgerald's right to withdraw his plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel is far less clear. The purported ineffective assistance consists of failure to argue that involvement with crack as opposed to cocaine base had not been shown. The government contends that the ineffective assistance and withdrawal of plea issues turn on the validity of a cocaine base-crack distinction. Since we have held that distinction to be valid, the government may have waived the other issues, and there is thus an argument that the guilty plea should be permitted to be withdrawn. 33 At the time Fitzgerald pleaded guilty the government responded tersely to his objection that he possessed cocaine base and not crack: [c]rack is base. Fitzgerald Change of Plea Transcript at 17. When the district court later heard Fitzgerald's request to withdraw his plea, Fitzgerald's second attempt to distinguish between cocaine base and crack was again rebuffed: 34 The Court: Sir, didn't you tell me you were guilty of the charge? 35 [Fitzgerald]: I was guilty of--my understanding of what I was guilty of is being caught with nine ounces of base crack cocaine in my house. 36 The Court: Being what? 37 [Fitzgerald]: Being caught with nine ounces of base cocaine found in the house where I was living at. That was my understanding of the controlled substance. At the time I didn't even know that I was still being charged with in excess of 500 grams of powder cocaine. 38 The Court: We went through that, did we not? As I recall it Mr. Wall [government attorney] corrected you when you started to dispute the difference between crack cocaine and-- 39 Fitzgerald Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Hearing Transcript at 6-7. This exchange further indicates that Fitzgerald's objections to the interchangeable use of the terms crack and cocaine base were disregarded or misunderstood, and perhaps that the court and government attorney were able even to convince Fitzgerald of the correctness of their misunderstanding. Still, whether Fitzgerald is criminally liable for possession of some form of cocaine (and specifically cocaine base) does not depend on whether the stuff was proven to be crack. At his original change of plea hearing Fitzgerald admitted that he possessed nine grams of cocaine base. That admission is unaffected by the recognition that the term cocaine base is broader than the term crack. Unfortunately, the government did not make this argument, choosing to stake its case entirely on its belief that cocaine base and crack are synonymous: 40 Fitzgerald's third issue is that since the substance used to calculate his guidelines, was cocaine base, and not crack, he had a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea. Since this was the sole basis of Fitzgerald's motion to withdraw his plea, and is the sole basis for his appeal of the district court's denial of that motion, Fitzgerald's appeal must fail. 41 Government Br. at 15. The government could have given Fitzgerald the correct and complete answer to his objection, that, for sentencing purposes, cocaine base is not always crack, but that, for purposes of the indictment and plea, this distinction does not directly apply. Instead, the effect, if any, on the guilty plea was not addressed. The government's assertion, [c]rack is base, is generally correct in contexts other than sentencing. But sentencing can become important to the taking of a guilty plea if a defendant is misled to his prejudice. 42 In light of the general misunderstanding of the problem in the district court and of the confusing exchange between Fitzgerald and the government, and in light of the government's apparent waiver of the issue on appeal, there might be grounds to allow the withdrawal of Fitzgerald's guilty plea. But this seems an impermissible outcome when the only error was in interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines. Essentially, there is no reason why counsel's failure to object to the crack enhancement in connection with sentencing, even if it amounted to ineffective assistance, should have any effect on the validity of the guilty plea. Fitzgerald was charged with possession of cocaine base and he pleaded guilty to that charge. Counsel's deficiency affected only the sentence, not the validity of the conviction. 43 Fitzgerald at the plea stage protested that cocaine base was not equivalent to crack. But his guilt or innocence did not turn on whether the substance in question was described as crack or as cocaine base. Even if his counsel (or the court) had advised him that all cocaine base was not crack, it is difficult to see how this information would have directly affected his decision to enter a guilty plea. Of course, sentencing information may be relevant to entry of a guilty plea if the defendant was misled to his prejudice. Here, however, the argument would have to be that Fitzgerald was not told that he might get a lighter sentence than he could have otherwise expected (because cocaine base was not proven to be crack). He has not shown how this could be prejudicial. 44 Possibly, a more alert lawyer would have counseled Fitzgerald to refuse to plead guilty unless the government would concede that the substance involved was not crack. Of course, we have no way of knowing whether the facts would support such a concession. It is true that Fitzgerald's attorney apparently was not aware of the distinction between cocaine base and crack. 5 But Fitzgerald does not argue that, had he been correctly counseled, he would have insisted on going to trial if the government would not concede that the cocaine base involved was not crack. That omission lowers the significance of the government's apparent waiver. While the issue is confusing and may therefore be close (because of the insistence on accuracy in change of plea proceedings), we believe that withdrawal of the plea is not warranted and that the conviction must be affirmed.