Opinion ID: 6346140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of One-Class Enhancement

Text: Having set forth the history and applicable provisions of the drug-free zone statute, we turn to the first issue raised by the Defendant. Consistent with his application for permission to appeal to this Court, the Defendant argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it ordered that the judgment for the Xanax conviction in count three be corrected to reflect the offense as a Class C felony rather than a Class D felony. Looking to section 39-17-432(b)(1), the Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that because the offense was committed in a drug-free zone—within 1,000 feet of the Savannah City Park— it should have been punished one classification higher than was otherwise provided for in section 39-17-417. State v. Linville, 2021 WL 4476681, at  (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(b)(1)). The Defendant argues—and the State agrees—that the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals misinterprets the language of section 39-17-432(b). We agree with the parties. Subsection (b) generally provides that a violation of section 39-17-417 that occurred in a drug-free zone “shall be punished one (1) classification higher than is provided in [section] 39-17-417(b)–(i) for such violation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17432(b)(1) (2014). However, section 39-17-432(b)(3) establishes an exemption, specifying that when the drug-free zone relates to “a preschool, childcare center, public library, recreational center or park,” the defendant “shall not be subject to additional incarceration as a result of this subsection (b) but shall be subject to the additional fines imposed by this section.” Id. § 39-17-432(b)(3) (2014). Various panels of the Court of Criminal Appeals have concluded that an offense that occurred in a drug-free zone related to the places enumerated in section 39-17-432(b)(3) is not subject to the one-class enhancement otherwise provided for in subsection (b). See, e.g., State v. Garrard, No. W2018-01026CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 3072104, at –8 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2019), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 9, 2019); State v. McNeal, No. E2013-00602-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6187962, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Apr. 8, 2014); State v. Shaw, No. M2012-01437-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 5310489, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2013), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 23, 2013). In this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded without significant discussion that the Defendant’s Xanax conviction in count three was subject to the one-class enhancement, citing only to section 39-17-432(b)(1). Although the court recognized that the drug-free zone related to a public park, it did not address section 39-17-432(b)(3). -8- The plain language of section 39-17-432(b)(3) is controlling as to this issue. We have determined that the General Assembly, through section 39-17-432(b)(3), chose not to impose the one-class enhancement set forth in subsection (b)(1) for violations of section 39-17-417 that occur in a drug-free zone when that zone relates to “a preschool, childcare center, public library, recreational center or park.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(b)(3) (2014). Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by ordering, based on the drug-free zone statute, that the judgment for the Defendant’s Xanax conviction in count three be corrected to reflect a Class C felony rather than a Class D felony. We therefore reverse that part of the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. C. Applicability of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing The Defendant next argues that because the drug-free zone was related to a public park, he was not subject to the requirement “to serve at least the minimum sentence for the defendant’s appropriate range of sentence” prior to release. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17432(c) (2014). The record reveals that for the Defendant’s convictions in counts one through three (possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, hydrocodone, and Xanax, respectively), the judgment for each conviction exhibited a check-marked box next to the section on “Release Eligibility for Felony Offense” reflecting that the offense was committed in a “Drug Free Zone.” In addition, below the space on the judgment for designating the sentence length, there was a section with a space to designate a “Mandatory Minimum Sentence Length” that contained a reference to various code sections, including “39-17-432 in Prohibited Zone.” For counts one and two (methamphetamine and hydrocodone, respectively), the space was filled out to reflect a mandatory minimum sentence length of ten years.8 For count three (Xanax), the space was filled out to reflect a mandatory minimum sentence length of eight years.9 Thus, the Defendant’s argument that he is not subject to mandatory minimum sentencing would apply to all three of his convictions that were designated as having occurred in a drug-free zone. In response, the State first argues that the Defendant has waived consideration of this issue. The State points out that the Defendant, in his application for permission to appeal to this Court, framed the issue as “[w]hether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in its statutory interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(b) when it found that a defendant is subject to sentencing at one classification higher than is provided for in section 39-17-417(b)–(i) when the drug-free school zone is created by a park.” Moreover, the substance of the Defendant’s application asserts that the drug-free zone 8 As previously mentioned, the appropriate range of punishment for these Class C felonies, given that the Defendant was a Range III Persistent Offender, was ten to fifteen years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(c)(3) (2014). 9 The appropriate range of punishment for this Class D felony, given that the Defendant was a Range III Persistent Offender, was eight to twelve years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(c)(4) (2014). -9- statute “does not enhance an offense by one classification if the drug-free zone is created by a park,” with no mention of any challenge to mandatory minimum sentencing. Clearly, although the application specifically challenges classification enhancement, it does not address mandatory minimum sentencing. The State further points out that the Defendant, in his brief before the Court of Criminal Appeals, specifically stated that he was “not raising an issue as to sentencing in this appeal” other than the clerical error with respect to the Xanax conviction in count three. However, the judgments for counts one through three reflected mandatory minimum sentencing, and thus the Defendant was free to challenge it before the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State makes a compelling point. We have stated that “issues are properly raised on appeal to this Court when they have been raised and preserved at trial and, when appropriate, in the intermediate appellate courts and when they have been presented in the manner prescribed by [Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure].” Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 334 (Tenn. 2012) (footnote omitted). Similarly, we have recognized that because our scope of review on appeal is typically limited to the issues raised in the application for permission to appeal, “[a] party who fails to adequately raise an issue in a Rule 11 application waives the issue.” TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879, 887 (Tenn. 2019). However, we note that the Defendant alternatively has requested that this Court address the issue as plain error. See, e.g., State v. Minor, 546 S.W.3d 59, 65 (Tenn. 2018) (recognizing that the plain error doctrine “affords appellate courts discretion to review unpreserved errors and grant relief when fairness and justice demand”); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b) (“When necessary to do substantial justice, an appellate court may consider an error that has affected the substantial rights of a party at any time, even though the error was not . . . assigned as error on appeal.”). Although we agree with the State that the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal does not raise mandatory minimum sentencing sufficiently as an issue, we exercise our discretion to address the substance of the Defendant’s argument under the plain error doctrine. Under the plain error doctrine, the court must consider whether: (1) the record clearly establishes what occurred in the trial court; (2) a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached; (3) a substantial right of the accused was adversely affected; (4) the issue was not waived for tactical reasons; and (5) consideration of the error is necessary to do substantial