Opinion ID: 161014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Coupon as Part of the Purchase Contract

Text: 25 Dillard's appeals the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, first contending that the coupon was not a contract. We review the district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court. See Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000). But the legal standard that we and the district court must use is, as noted earlier, difficult for the movant: a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the party opposing the motion. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the record, we will not weigh evidence, judge witness credibility, or challenge the factual conclusions of the jury. Id. Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a claim under the controlling law. See id. We consider the evidence, and any inferences drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party. See id. 26 Dillard's challenges whether the fragrance coupon was a benefit of Ms. Hampton's contractual relationship for the purchase of children's wear. According to Dillard's, the coupons were promotional invitations, handed out indiscriminately and not exclusively in connection with a purchase. See Aplt's App. vol. 3, at 622, 648, 650, 655, 657. Dillard's maintains that the coupon was a gift and that it was never intended to confer a right upon its recipient. In addition, Dillard's points to Ms. Cooper's receipt of a coupon as evidence that a purchase was not required to receive the gift. 27 In rebuttal, Ms. Hampton argues that we must be mindful of the jury's appraisal of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the jury's resolution of factual issues. See United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting [t]he jury has the exclusive function of appraising credibility, determining the weight to be given to the testimony, drawing inferences from the facts established, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and reaching ultimate conclusions of fact) (internal quotation marks omitted). She and Ms. Cooper testified that, during the time they shopped at the Dillard's store (over an hour), they never saw anyone receive a coupon and saw no one distributing the coupons. The first they saw of the coupons was after Ms. Hampton had purchased merchandise. Furthermore, the sales representative from the fragrance company, Ms. Chouteau, testified that the purpose of the promotional coupon, handed out after a customer of Dillard's had made a purchase, was to entice the shoppers to come to the fragrance [counter] so that we could talk to them about our product. Aplt's App. vol. 3, at 622 (testimony of Ms. Chouteau). All such promotions were supported and agreed to by Dillard's. See id. at 663 (testimony of Ms. Dirks, Dillard's operations manager). Finally, Ms. Cooper testified that, upon receipt of the coupons, the children's wear salesperson directed her shopping party toward the appropriate fragrance counter. 28 Ms. Hampton contends that she performed the steps necessary to act in compliance with the terms and conditions of the offer from Dillard's: she completed a purchase and presented the coupon to the fragrance counter. The performance of these acts, she argues, either constitutes an acceptance or entitles her to the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship, as the statute says. 29 Clearly, the purpose of the statute is to make it clear that the right to `make and enforce contracts' free from race discrimination [is] protected by section 1981. S. Rep. No. 101-315 (1990). Furthermore, the list set forth in subsection (b) of the statute, which gives examples of what might constitute the making or enforcing of a contract under the Act, is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. Id. We have clarified that a § 1981 claim for interference with the right to make and enforce a contract must involve the actual loss of a contract interest, not merely the possible loss of future contract opportunities. See Wesley, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 (citing Phelps, 886 F.2d at 1267). 30 In the context of a retail transaction, this court has not had the opportunity to address or apply subsection (b). See id. at 1200 & n.8 (citing Morris, 89 F.3d at 413). There is even less guidance as to what constitutes a contract for the purposes of a § 1981 claim involving a retail transaction, and as such, we are authorized to look to common law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). 31 Section 45 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides illumination on the common law of contracts regarding an invitation to accept an offer by performance: 32 (1) Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, an option contract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance or tenders a beginning of it. 33 (2) The offeror's duty of performance under any option contract so created is conditional on completion or tender of the invited performance in accordance with the terms of the offer. 34 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 45 (1981). The Comment to § 45 further provides that 35 [t]his Section is limited to cases where the offer does not invite a promissory acceptance. Such an offer has often been referred to as an offer for a unilateral contract. Typical illustrations are found in offers of rewards or prizes.... 36 Id. § 45 cmt. a; see also Brown v. State, 602 N.W.2d 79, 88 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that performance by the entrant of the act requested by the sponsor--there, returning an eligibility card--constitutes an acceptance of an offer and forms a binding contract; also noting that nearly all jurisdictions have adopted the rule that contract law governs the sponsor-contestant relationship) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Dillard's offered a variance of an option or unilateral contract to Ms. Hampton, and she completed the invited performance in accordance with the terms of the offer. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 45; cf. Perry v, Burger King Corp., 924 F. Supp. 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying motion to dismiss where customer finished meal and sought to use restaurant's restroom facilities; noting that plaintiff may be considered to have contracted for food and use of the bathroom as benefit of contractual relationship). 37 Dillard's also contends that Ms. Cooper's receipt of a coupon undermines the jury's finding that the coupon was a benefit of Ms. Hampton's purchase contract. We disagree. Ms. Cooper, whose child received the clothing, was a part of the shopping party, and perhaps the store clerk thought Ms. Cooper too should receive the coupon. The jury weighed testimony regarding the receipt of such coupons by non-purchasing customers and determined that the evidence weighed in favor of Ms. Hampton, i.e., the coupon was a benefit of Ms. Hampton's contractual relationship with Dillard's. 38 With regard to the purpose of the coupon, Ms. Chouteau testified that it served to entice the shoppers to sample her company's products. Aplt's App. vol. 3, at 622 (testimony of Ms. Chouteau). She also stated that coupon holders were `entitled to' a fragrance sample. Id. at 625. In addition, we note that the benefit ran to Dillard's as well: to sample those products, the customer would traverse the store, perhaps eyeing other merchandise for purchase from Dillard's. The jury's credibility determinations and conclusion that the coupon conferred a right to a fragrance sample as a benefit of a contractual relationship are not against the weight of the evidence as a matter of law. Whether or not this providing of the sample in hopes that a customer would walk back through the store and purchase cologne or another item was itself an option or unilateral contract, we cannot say that the jury's conclusion that the coupon was a benefit of Ms. Hampton's contract with Dillard's was unreasonable. 39