Opinion ID: 2242593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Dismissal of Venireperson Cox

Text: Defendant argues that a prospective juror, Stanley Cox, was improperly dismissed for cause because of his views regarding the death penalty. Defendant maintains that, while Cox expressed some qualms about imposing a death sentence, his views on capital punishment would not have substantially impaired his performance as a juror. Thus, according to defendant, Cox's dismissal for cause was unwarranted and defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. The initial questioning of venireperson Cox was done by the court. During this questioning, Cox stated that he would not automatically impose a death sentence, that he would listen to the evidence presented and instructions from the trial court, and that he could sign a death verdict. Cox was then questioned by the State along with other prospective jurors. One of the other potential jurors, Jackie Heap, indicated that she could never impose the death penalty. The following colloquy between the State and Cox then ensued: [State's Attorney]: [Would you] be able to vote for the death penalty    Mr. Cox? JUROR [Cox]: I don't know if I could. [State's Attorney]: Are you having some kinds of second thoughts here? JUROR: Yeah, about the death penalty thing. [State's Attorney]: You were persuaded by Mrs. Heap over here? JUROR: Well, it's been on my mind since we [State's Attorney]: Well, just kind of found out about it, I suppose? JUROR: You know, everybody talks about it until when it comes up to it. This is it. I mean [State's attorney]: Right. I guess I needed to ask you then, you think you probably could not impose the [d]eath [p]enalty? JUROR: I don't know. [State's Attorney]: And I know that you know [defense counsel] from the school board? JUROR: I only saw his name. I have never met him personally. I just saw his name on something. [State's Attorney]: So that certainly doesn't have anything to do with it? JUROR: No. [State's Attorney]: You certainly think you may not be able to? JUROR: It's kinds [ sic ] of a religious thing. [State's Attorney]: Okay. That's fine. You have some religious or moral beliefs against it? JUROR: Yeah. Cox was subsequently questioned by defense counsel. Counsel asked Cox if you don't know whether you could sign that verdict or not? Cox responded, [m]ore or less, yeah, that would be about the same. Counsel then asked Cox if there could be a circumstance where you could go through and deliberate on the case and you may find that you could sign a verdict of death? Cox replied, Yes. The State later moved to dismiss Cox for cause. Over the objection of defense counsel, the court allowed the challenge for cause. A prospective juror in a capital case can be excused for cause when the juror's views on capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52 (1985), quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589 (1980). It is not necessary that a prospective juror express his views regarding the death penalty with meticulous preciseness before the trial court may rule on a motion to exclude for cause. People v. Tenner, 157 Ill.2d 341, 362, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138 (1993). In addition, the remarks of a prospective juror during the voir dire examination must be considered not in isolation but as a whole. Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 363, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138. Because of the unique nature of each voir dire, the standards for dismissing a juror for cause must be applied on a case-by-case basis. People v. Williams, 161 Ill.2d 1, 54, 204 Ill.Dec. 72, 641 N.E.2d 296 (1994). Defendant's argument regarding the dismissal of venireperson Cox centers upon the contention that the trial judge applied an improper standard in dismissing Cox for cause. Defendant notes that a venireperson may not be excused for cause simply because he voices general religious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty. According to defendant, in the case at bar, the trial judge focused solely on the existence of Cox's religious concerns in allowing the State's motion for dismissal. Thus, in defendant's view, Cox's dismissal was improper. We disagree. When the State moved to dismiss Cox for cause, it also moved to dismiss another juror, Helen Stram. After listening to arguments, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss Cox, but denied the State's motion with respect to Stram. The court explained that Stram's responses to questioning indicated that she had more of a skeptical sort of view of the thing. She would require herself to be convinced in order to sign ain order to sign a [d]eath penalty. I would hope all jurors would have such a belief. That it would [not] be something done lightly. Cox's position, however, which was based upon religious perception, was different from Stram's. That difference, in the court's view, justified dismissing Cox for cause. The clear import of the trial judge's statements is that, after observing Cox's demeanor, and gauging his responses to questioning, the judge concluded that Cox would have been more than simply hesitant to impose the death penalty. Instead, the judge determined that, unlike Stram, Cox would not be able to fully put aside his concerns regarding capital punishment and follow the law and his oath in deciding what sentence to impose. We note, moreover, that other portions of the voir dire indicate that the judge understood the proper standard for dismissing prospective jurors for cause. For example, after moving to dismiss Cox, the State moved to dismiss for cause another potential juror, Christine Cirrincione, based upon what the State characterized as an extreme reluctance to impose the death penalty. Defense counsel objected to the motion, and expressly noted that a venireperson might have moral and religious questions in their mind about the death penalty, but that the inquiry must be on whether the juror could follow the law. The trial judge, after hearing these arguments, denied the motion to dismiss Cirrincione for cause. Considering the record as a whole, it is clear that the judge understood the law and applied the proper standard in dismissing venireperson Cox. We have frequently noted that the trial judge is in a superior position to determine from a prospective juror's responses as a whole and the juror's demeanor whether that individual's views toward capital punishment would substantially prevent or impair the performance of his duties as a juror at the sentencing phase of the trial in accordance with the oath he is required to take. Williams, 161 Ill.2d at 54, 204 Ill.Dec. 72, 641 N.E.2d 296. Because the trial court is in a `superior position to gauge the meaning of the prospective juror's responses,' its determination of the propriety of removal for cause of a prospective juror is entitled to great deference on review. Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 363, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138, quoting People v. Emerson, 122 Ill.2d 411, 439, 119 Ill.Dec. 250, 522 N.E.2d 1109 (1987). In the instant case, at times, Cox indicated that he could follow the law and perform his duty as a juror. On other occasions, however, his responses indicated that he could not clearly set aside his own beliefs in deference to the rule of law. Williams, 161 Ill.2d at 54, 204 Ill.Dec. 72, 641 N.E.2d 296, citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1766, 90 L.Ed.2d 137, 149-50 (1986). [I]t is precisely in situations such as this, where the cold record suggests an apparent contradiction, that we defer to the circuit court's discretion. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill.2d 301, 317, 239 Ill.Dec. 311, 713 N.E.2d 1161 (1998), citing People v. Holman, 132 Ill.2d 128, 148-49, 138 Ill.Dec. 155, 547 N.E.2d 124 (1989). The trial judge in the case at bar clearly determined that Cox would have problems performing his duties as a juror. Based upon the record before us, we cannot substitute our speculations about [Cox's] demeanor in place of the lower court's personal observations. Shaw, 186 Ill.2d at 318, 239 Ill.Dec. 311, 713 N.E.2d 1161. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err when it dismissed venireperson Cox for cause. See, e.g., Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 359-63, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138 (upholding the dismissal for cause of a prospective juror who stated that she had a problem with the death penalty).