Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: constitutional due process: is same-sex marriage a fundamental right?

Text: Appellants contend that interpreting the marriage statute in a manner that denies same-sex couples the opportunity to marry violates their constitutional rights. Specifically, they argue, first, that even if marriage is traditionally understood and statutorily defined to include only opposite-sex couples, this limitation of the right to marry unconstitutionally burdens gays' and lesbians' fundamental right to marry as they choosea right protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. I speak now for the division majority; we conclude that same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right protected by the due process clause, because that kind of relationship is not deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1938, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977). A. Definition of Fundamental Right The Supreme Court initially characterized as fundamental rights, entitled to heightened judicial protection under the due process clause, those privileges and immunities that belong to someone as a citizen of the United Statesand thus cannot be denied by the statesbecause they are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Palco v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937) (Fifth Amendment double jeopardy clause did not bar state's appealing second degree murder conviction for alleged evidentiary and instructional errors and, upon obtaining reversal, retrying defendant for first degree murder) (emphasis added). In rejecting the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates and forbids whatever the Fifth Amendment forbids, Palko announced the so-called selective incorporation approach. The Court characterized the fundamental rights that are so incorporated, and thus binding on the states, as those having their source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. Id. at 326, 58 S.Ct. at 152. [26] Over thirty years later, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases whichwere they to be tried in a federal courtwould come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1447, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). The Court premised its ruling on a belief that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, id. (emphasis added)a fundamental-right formulation the Court expressly recognized as somewhat different from Palko 's. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n. 14, 88 S.Ct. at 1447-48 n. 14. [27] Finally, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland (plurality opinion), the Court overturned a conviction under a housing ordinance that denied certain family members the right to live together. The Court premised its decision on the due process clause, which protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. 431 U.S. at 503, 97 S.Ct. at 1938 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). [28] This brings us to Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986), which presented the question whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in [consensual] sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time. Id. at 190, 106 S.Ct. at 2843. The Court answered No, expressly reserving the question whether the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy is constitutional as applied to consensual heterosexual sodomy. See id. at 188 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. at 2842 n. 2 (We express no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to other acts of sodomy.). Writing for the majority, Justice White quoted both Palko and Moore (reflecting the range of fundamental right formulations under the due process clause) and concluded that neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy. Id. at 192, 106 S.Ct. at 2845. As in Hardwick, we need not resolve where, along the continuum between Palko and Moore, the correct formulation falls. As elaborated below, we conclude that even under Moore 's most inclusive definition of fundamental right, appellants' due process claim fails. B. Appellants' Due Process Claim The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and women]. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967). More specifically, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the right to marry is part of the fundamental `right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384, 98 S.Ct. 673, 680, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978). In addressing a Wisconsin law that prohibited a couple from marrying if one of them had an outstanding child support obligation, the Court in Zablocki explained: When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. Id. at 388, 98 S.Ct. at 682. The Court then concluded that an unpaid child support obligation did not give the state a sufficiently compelling reason to deny the couple the fundamental right to marry, and thus the Court declared the law invalid as an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws. See id. at 388-91, 98 S.Ct. at 682-84. An historical survey of Supreme Court cases concerning the fundamental right to marry, however, demonstrates that the Court has called this right fundamental because of its link to procreation. See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44, 55 (1993). The Court first discussed marriage as a fundamental right in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942), a case striking an Oklahoma statute that allowed the state to sterilize habitual criminals without their consent. In explicating the rationale for decision, the Court stressed that [m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, 62 S.Ct. at 1113. In Zablocki, moreover, the Court explained: It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. As the facts of this case illustrate, it would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.... [I]f appellee's right to procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place. 434 U.S. at 386, 98 S.Ct. at 681 (footnote omitted). See also Loving, 388 U.S. at 12, 87 S.Ct. at 1824 (Marriage is one of the `basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival.) (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, 62 S.Ct. at 1113). Although we recognize that gay and lesbian couples can and do have children through adoption, surrogacy, and artificial insemination, see Developments in the LawSexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV.L.REV. 1508, 1642-60 (1989) (hereafter Sexual Orientation and the Law ), and that not all heterosexual married couples are able, or choose, to procreate, we cannot overlook the fact that the Supreme Court has deemed marriage a fundamental right substantially because of its relationship to procreation. Thus, in recognizing a fundamental right to marry, the Court has only contemplated marriages between persons of opposite sexes persons who had the possibility of having children with each other. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56; see generally Note, Homosexuals' Right to Marry: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U.PA.L.REV. 193, 200-02 (1979) (hereafter Homosexuals' Right to Marry ). The question, then, is whether there is a constitutional basis under the due process clause for saying that this recognized, fundamental right of heterosexual couples to marry also extends to gay and lesbian couples. The answer, very simply, is No. Even without reference to Hardwick 's constitutional approval of statutes criminalizing consensual sodomy, we cannot say that same-sex marriage is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503, 97 S.Ct. at 1938. Indeed, the District of Columbia marriage statute reflects an altogether different tradition. Accordingly, same-sex marriage cannot be called a fundamental right protected by the due process clause.