Opinion ID: 2708543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Interpreter Arrangement

Text: A criminal defendant is denied due process when he is unable to understand the proceedings due to a language difficulty. See United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 1985). And a criminal defendant has a due process right to communicate with counsel. Johnson, 248 F.3d at 664. Therefore, a criminal defendant lacking a basic understanding of the English language has a due process right to an interpreter to enable him to understand what is said at trial and to communicate with counsel. Id. But a defendant does not have a due process right to have an interpreter continuously seated at the defense table. Id. (holding the defendants’ confocuses on the alleged violation of the right to contemporaneous communication with counsel. In any event, the district judge found that Mendoza could understand the questions put to Virruta, his common law wife, when they were translated into Spanish; he could understand Virruta’s testimony, which was given in Spanish; and both interpreters testified that they interpreted loudly enough so Mendoza could hear them; thus Mendoza had no need for translation of Virruta’s testimony. See United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1455–56 (6th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2002). 10 Nos. 13-3195 & 13-3196 stitutional right to communicate with counsel was not violated where the defendants were able to communicate with counsel through an interpreter during breaks in testimony). Under the Court Interpreters Act, which was enacted “to ensure that the defendant can comprehend the proceedings and communicate effectively with counsel,” Johnson, 248 F.3d at 661 (quotation marks and citation omitted), a defendant is entitled to the appointment of an interpreter “if the district court determines that the defendant: (1) speaks only or primarily a language other than the English language; and (2) this fact inhibits their comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel,” id. Like the Constitution, “the CIA does not mandate the appointment of an additional interpreter to sit at the defense table.” Id. at 663. As we have explained: “The CIA provides for simultaneous interpretation of the proceedings, not simultaneous interpretation of attorney-client communications.” Id. The district judge’s factual findings defeat Mendoza’s due process claim. The judge found that two interpreters were in the courtroom during Virruta’s testimony; one interpreted for Virruta and the other was at the defense table with Mendoza and available for communications with counsel. These findings are well-supported by Lenyo’s testimony and the interpreters’ testimony. The district judge had the opportuni- ty to hear and observe the witnesses’ manner and demeanor while testifying and he found Lenyo’s testimony “quite believable and persuasive”; by contrast, he found Mendoza “painfully unbelievable, perhaps the least credible witness the presiding judge has seen in thirty years.” In fact, the judge noted that, despite Mendoza’s claimed unfamiliarity with the English language, during his § 2255 hearing testiNos. 13-3195 & 13-3196 11 mony, he answered questions asked of him in English before they were translated into Spanish. Having heard the interpreters’ testimony, the judge described Mendoza’s claim that he complained to them about problems he was having with hearing but that they ignored his complaints as “poppycock.” And the judge characterized other parts of Mendoza’s testimony as “hogwash” and “balderdash.” As examples supporting these colorful characterizations, we note that when Mendoza was asked whether the questions put to Virruta were translated into Spanish, he said he didn’t remember, and when asked if her answers were in Spanish, he said, “Maybe they were” and then he claimed not to have heard them. The judge credited Lenyo’s testimony over Mendoza’s testimony “on any point on which they disagree,” specifically mentioning Lenyo’s testimony about what happened during Virruta’s testimony. Credibility determinations are “especially within the province of the district court and can virtually never be clear error.” United States v. Longstreet, 669 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and omitted). We have no reason to dispute the experienced trial judge’s credibility determinations. Given his findings that Lenyo was “quite believable” and Mendoza was “painfully unbelievable,” there is no basis to think the judge made a mistake in finding that an interpreter was at the defense table during Virruta’s testimony. Because an interpreter was available to interpret communications between Mendoza and Lenyo at all times during Virruta’s testimony, Mendoza’s due process claim fails. Mendoza suggests that the district court’s statement that “[w]e don’t have interpreters for witnesses” shows there was 12 Nos. 13-3195 & 13-3196 only one interpreter in the courtroom. But the district court found otherwise, and the quoted statement is consistent with the presence of two interpreters who were appointed to interpret for Mendoza. The district judge noted that in lengthy proceedings, including jury trials, interpreters usually work in pairs so one can rest while the other actively translates testimony. (This is a commendable practice.) There was only a slight deviation from this practice during Virruta’s testimony: by having one of the interpreters translate for Virruta, that interpreter was unable to rest as she otherwise would during the testimony. In addition, Mendoza suggests that the only plausible explanation for the bench conference before Virruta testified was the presence of only one interpreter. However, at the bench conference, the prosecutor explained that he had contacted the court, informed its staff that Virruta did not speak English, and asked to be notified if this was a problem; yet he was not notified. It is obvious that there had been some confusion about whether the court would provide an interpreter. The fact that government counsel addressed this confusion with the court outside of the presence of the jury says nothing about the number of interpreters present in the courtroom and does not call the trial judge’s finding into question. But even if Mendoza had shown that the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous, his claim would fail as a matter of law. As the court properly determined, neither the Constitution nor the CIA guarantees simultaneous interpretation of attorney-client communications. See Johnson, 248 F.3d at 663–64 (neither the Constitution nor CIA gives a criminal defendant a right to the appointment of an interNos. 13-3195 & 13-3196 13 preter to sit at the defense table). Even assuming that no interpreter had been sitting at the defense table to enable Mendoza to communicate with counsel during Virruta’s testimony, Bueno and Toro-Greiner were available for that purpose at all other times that second day of trial. Indeed, interpreters were available to interpret for Mendoza throughout the trial, including breaks. The court took a lunch break right after Virruta’s testimony; Mendoza could have communicated with counsel before or during that break. See id. (concluding that an arrangement which allowed the defendants to communicate with counsel “during breaks in testimony” satisfied the Constitution and CIA). Mendoza apparently did not mention to Lenyo during that break that he had wanted Lenyo to ask Virruta if the government agents had threatened her; when the parties and counsel reconvened after the break, and the judge asked if there was anything either side wanted to raise before the jury was brought into the courtroom, Lenyo said no. In fact, Mendoza never told Lenyo that Virruta had been threatened. Virruta was not a surprise witness; Mendoza was aware that she was going to testify at trial. If Virruta had been threatened by the agents, we would expect Mendoza to have mentioned that to trial counsel at some point along the way. And even if there was a due process violation in the interpreter arrangement, we would not vacate Mendoza’s conviction if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 705 F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir.) (“In assessing a claim of constitutional error, we are mindful that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a rea14 Nos. 13-3195 & 13-3196 sonable doubt.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 166 (2013). A constitutional error is harmless if it can be shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, “that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Mendoza argues that if he had had contemporaneous communication with counsel during Virruta’s testimony, the jury would have been exposed to information that the agents who testified for the government had threatened Virruta that if she failed to cooperate, her children would be taken away from her, which would have affected the agents’ credibility. Because Virruta did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, there is no evidence that she would have said that the agents had threatened her. Besides, she was not an important witness for the prosecution; she claimed to have no knowledge of Mendoza’s drug dealing. However, there was ample evidence of Mendoza’s guilt from police participation in Mendoza’s drug deals, two informants’ drug dealings with Mendoza, and evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at Mendoza’s residence. See Mendoza, 401 F. App’x at 129–30. Any error arising from the interpreter arrangement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.