Opinion ID: 2049990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: motion to separate trials

Text: The first issue raised on appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in denying Boushee's motion to separate the trials. Boushee concedes that the decision of the trial court to consolidate Informations for trial would be reversible error only if there was a clear abuse of discretion by the trial judge. However, Boushee contends that there was an abuse of discretion shown by the prejudice that resulted to Boushee by consolidation of the Informations. The trial judge consolidated the actions in accordance with Rules 8 and 13 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 8(a), N.D.R.Crim.P., provides:  (a) Joinder of offenses. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment, information, or complaint in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Rule 13, N.D.R.Crim.P., provides: The court may order two or more indictments, informations, or complaints to be tried together if the offenses and the defendants, if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment, information, or complaint. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a single indictment, information, or complaint. As this court said in State v. Gann, 244 N.W.2d 746, 750-751 (N.D.1976): Consolidation is proper under Rule 13 in any cases where the offenses charged in the separate indictments or informations could have been joined in a single charge under Rule 8(a). However, under Rule 13 the court has discretion to deny consolidation, even though joinder would have been proper under Rule 8 if there is any doubt about the fairness of the trial. Although the scope of Rules 8(a) and 13 is the same and is determined by Rule 8(a), the grounds for their exercise are different. ..... Consolidation of indictments for trial is reversible error only where there is a clear abuse of discretion. See United States v. Harris, 211 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 822, 75 S.Ct. 34, 99 L.Ed. 648; State v. Berger, 234 N.W.2d 6 (N.D.1975); State v. Erickson, 231 N.W.2d 758 (N.D.1975). Boushee contends that there has been an abuse of discretion because consolidation has resulted in prejudice to him. Rule 14, N.D.R.Crim.P., provides for relief from prejudicial joinder as follows, in pertinent part: If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment, information, or complaint, or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever relief justice requires. . . . The trial judge determined not to grant a severance because all of the cases were of the same or similar character, the same witnesses would be testifying, all of the charges were drug-related and connected together by the sole identity of the defendant, and the closeness in time and place in which they were committed. He also found that the offenses indicated a common scheme or plan to distribute marijuana. The essence of Boushee's argument is that consolidation of the three Informations would tend to confuse the jury. However, the jury in this case indicated its ability to keep the evidence separate by the fact that it was able to acquit Boushee on two of the three consolidated charges. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals said in United States v. Borelli, 435 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 963, 28 L.Ed.2d 229 (1971) he [the defendant] must demonstrate substantial prejudice from a joint trial, not just a better chance of acquittal at a separate one, and . . . a trial court's refusal to grant severance will rarely be disturbed on review. A similar position has been adopted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 137 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 269, 34 L.Ed.2d 220. The defendant bears the difficult burden of demonstrating that he has been prejudiced by joinder. He must show something more than the mere fact that a separate trial would have afforded a better chance of acquittal. Joinder must be shown to have rendered the trial unfair. We determine that consolidation in the instant case has not caused a result unfair to Boushee. This is in accordance with our decision in State v. Gann, supra, 244 N.W.2d 746. In Gann, defendant was arrested for a robbery at a Taco John's store in Grand Forks. The investigating officer noticed similarities between the Taco John's robbery and a robbery at the Sweet Clover Dairy three weeks earlier. Because of similarities in the modus operandi the two trials were consolidated. Defendant took the stand and admitted he had committed the robbery at Taco John's, but denied having anything to do with the Sweet Clover Dairy holdup. The jury found him guilty of the Taco John's robbery but could not agree on a verdict on the Sweet Clover Dairy charge. On appeal, defendant contended that consolidation of the two cases was prejudicial error. This Court stated, in Gann, supra 244 N.W.2d at 751: If the defendant claims that a joinder, permissible under Rule 8 [N.D.R.Crim.P.], is nevertheless prejudicial and that relief should be granted under Rule 14 [N.D.R.Crim.P.], the matter is addressed to the discretion of the trial court and a conviction will be reversed only if the refusal of the trial court to grant relief was a clear abuse of discretion. The purpose for the Rule permitting consolidation is to promote judicial convenience and economy. A court must weigh the prejudice to the defendant caused by joinder against the obviously important considerations of economy and expedition in judicial administration. Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C.Cir. 1964). The defendant in the instant case contends that he was prejudiced by the consolidation because evidence admissible to prove the prosecution's case in Information 7316 would have been inadmissible to prove Information 7317 if the charges were tried separately. The contention is that the jury was shocked by the presence of the nine pounds of marijuana [Information 7316] into convicting on the sale in Information 7317. This argument is unpersuasive in light of the fact that the jury was able to sort through the evidence and acquit on two of the three charges. The jury had ample evidence to support the conviction, based on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and the defendant himself, independent of evidence presented on the other two charges. Boushee also contends that consolidation confounded the presentation of his defenses because it affected his choice of whether or not to take the stand. His defense to Information 7317 was entrapment and this defense is what motivated him to take the stand. It is difficult to see how his decision to take the stand was prejudiced by the consolidation when he was convicted of the very charge for which he decided to take the stand. His argument is that his defense of entrapment was frustrated by the fact that the jury would think he was predisposed to commit the offense charged in Information 7317 by the presence of the evidence admitted in connection with the other two charges. This is merely another way of stating the earlier argument regarding jury confusion which has been previously discussed in this opinion. All three of Boushee's arguments: (1) that the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence; (2) that the defendant may be confounded in presenting his defenses; and (3) that proof of defendant's guilt of one offense may be used to convict him of another offense even though proof of that guilt would have been inadmissible at a separate trial, are rarely, if ever, grounds for reversal where the consolidated charges arise out of the same transaction. See 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal Law § 222; Johnson v. United States, 356 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 857, 87 S.Ct. 105, 17 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966); Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C.Cir. 1964); and United States v. Jardan, 552 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 433 U.S. 912, 97 S.Ct. 2982, 53 L.Ed.2d 1097. Because all of the charges against Boushee stemmed from the same transaction, no prejudice resulted to Boushee by the consolidation of the three Informations for trial. We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the motion for severance.