Opinion ID: 6321839
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Photospreads

Text: Sheppard argues that the Sheriff’s Office did not follow its own procedures in administering the photospread to Barrett. Namely, the officer failed to show the photos to Barrett one at a time and failed to document her witness statement verbatim. Sheppard argues that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to challenge Barrett’s identification during the photo lineup. - 21 - Because nothing in the record shows that the Sheriff’s Office breached its own procedure, the circuit court correctly concluded that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient when he decided to refrain from questioning Barrett on this point. Postconviction counsel argued below and on appeal that trial counsel was deficient for not challenging the failure of the Sheriff’s Office to document Barrett’s statement verbatim, but counsel does not explain how that failure would have affected the credibility of Barrett’s identification. Therefore, this claim is speculative and cannot succeed. See Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 672. Even if this claim was not speculative, trial counsel’s performance was not deficient. Sheppard argues that trial counsel was deficient when he failed to challenge Barrett’s identification during the photo lineup. This argument ignores the fact trial counsel actually did challenge the validity of Barrett’s identification when he suggested that she may have remembered Sheppard’s face from the “mugbook” that she was shown earlier. Trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to challenge Barrett’s identification because he actually did so during trial. See Bates v. - 22 - State, 3 So. 3d 1091, 1106 n.20 (Fla. 2009) (“[C]ounsel cannot be held ineffective for what counsel actually did . . . .”). Therefore, this claim was properly denied. (2) Failure to Effectively Cross-Examine Barrett Sheppard next challenges the circuit court’s denial of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Barrett on four alleged inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her previous statements, namely (a) her evolving description of the shooter; (b) her evolving description of the vehicle used during the shooting; (c) whether she had seen the shooter and the vehicle in the apartment complex prior to the shooting; and (d) whether she knew the victim. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief with respect to each of these claims. (a) Evolving Description of the Shooter Sheppard argues that Barrett’s description of him was inconsistent with his appearance at the time of the shooting and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Barrett regarding discrepancies in her description of the shooter’s hairstyle. When Barrett initially spoke to the police, shortly after the shooting, she described the shooter as having a short haircut. - 23 - Later, at her deposition, she described the shooter as having long plaits, although she stated that she could not really tell how long his hair was. Then finally at trial, Barrett testified that the shooter had dreads that did not go past his shoulders. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he would bring to the jury’s attention changes in a witness’s description of the shooter if the changes were significant. Trial counsel further testified that he was concerned that pressing Barrett as to certain aspects of her identification of Sheppard as the shooter would only provide her with an opportunity to reiterate her certainty that Sheppard was the shooter. The circuit court found that “Barrett’s description to the police of the shooter as having short hair is consistent with the picture of [Sheppard] with a short haircut and tight dreadlocks” that Barrett picked out of the photospread in identifying Sheppard as the shooter, and further ruled that trial counsel’s “strategy was reasonable in light of the insignificance of the different descriptions of [Sheppard’s] hairstyle.” Even if Barrett’s prior descriptions of the shooter’s hairstyle had been admissible as prior inconsistent statements, see Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 383 (Fla. 2014) - 24 - (holding that a prior statement is inconsistent only if it directly contradicts or materially differs from the trial testimony) (citing State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306, 313 (Fla. 1990)), we agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s decision to refrain from challenging Barrett on her prior descriptions of the shooter’s hairstyle was reasonable. The record shows that trial counsel’s strategy was not to challenge insignificant changes to Barrett’s description of the shooter that would give Barrett the opportunity to reiterate to the jury her identification of Sheppard as the shooter. Because reasonable strategy decisions do not constitute deficient performance, we affirm the denial of relief. (b) Evolving Description of the Vehicle Sheppard next argues that trial counsel was ineffective in cross-examining Barrett regarding her inconsistent descriptions of the vehicle used in the shooting, which he contends would have shown that the vehicle Barrett described did not match the vehicle stolen by Sheppard. Barrett testified at trial that she could not provide specific details relating to the vehicle’s tag, but that she could describe what the back of the vehicle looked like. Barrett also - 25 - stated that a white decal appeared on the back rearview window of the vehicle used in the shooting. The circuit court concluded that Barrett’s inability to provide specific details relating to the vehicle’s tag did not amount to an inconsistent statement, and that it was simply a gap in knowledge. As for the differing statements regarding the decal, the circuit court concluded that the decal was a minor detail and that it did not undermine Barrett’s trial testimony; therefore, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to question her on this point. The record shows that trial counsel made reasonable strategic decisions not to challenge Barrett’s descriptions because he did not want to potentially introduce more damaging evidence against Sheppard, who had confessed to the shooting, or highlight the consistencies between the descriptions of the car provided by Barrett and other witnesses. Accordingly, because Sheppard failed to establish deficient performance, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. - 26 - (c) Previous Sightings of Shooter at Hollybrook Apartments At the evidentiary hearing, Sheppard argued that trial counsel was deficient for failing to impeach Barrett with her prior inconsistent statements regarding her having previously seen Sheppard at Hollybrook Apartments. Barrett had initially told police that she knew the shooter and had seen his car around the complex before the shooting. She suggested that they check the security logs to try to identify the car. However, she later recanted and told police that she had fabricated that statement because she was afraid of retribution. Sheppard contends that his trial counsel should have used Barrett’s initial statement to impeach her. We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s strategic decision not to impeach Barrett with her prior statement was reasonable and therefore not deficient. Crossexamining Barrett regarding these statements would have provided her an opportunity to reiterate her certainty that Sheppard was the shooter and potentially to articulate before the jury facts supporting a reasonable fear of retribution from him. Trial counsel made a - 27 - permissible determination that the risk of allowing Barrett to bolster or supplement her testimony outweighed any potential benefit to Sheppard’s defense. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief.