Opinion ID: 1351576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion to Suppress Confessions to Police

Text: After the jury was sworn and before the People made their opening statement, defendant moved to suppress his two confessions to the police. He had given those statements during interviews conducted on January 9 and 13, 1986, by officers including Detective Steven A. Bolts of the San Luis Obispo Sheriff's Department and Investigator Larry Wayne Hobson of the San Luis Obispo District Attorney's Office. As relevant here, the ground of the motion was that the confessions were involuntary under the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 15, of the California Constitution (hereafter sometimes article I, sections 7 and 15). (1a) The argument in support was that the statements were assertedly obtained by what was claimed to be a promise of benefit, viz., a comment by Detective Bolts, There's no death penalty here. Imposing on the People the burden of proving that defendant's confessions were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt in conformity with the decision in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 602-609 [147 Cal. Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672], [1] the court held a hearing on the motion outside the presence of the jury. The People presented evidence of the interviews: they introduced fourteen 60-minute audiotape cassette recordings as well as a 227-page transcript of their contents; they also called Detective Bolts to the witness stand. Defendant too presented evidence of the interviews: he himself took the stand. After presenting argument, the parties submitted the matter. The next day, the court made its ruling. Determining, in substance, that there was no coercive police activity and that Detective Bolt's comment did not constitute a promise of benefit and in any event did not operate as an inducement, it concluded that the confessions were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. [2] It accordingly denied the motion to suppress the statements and, as noted, subsequently admitted portions at the guilt phase and virtually all at the penalty phase. As relevant here, its findings in support of the ruling were as follows. Now, let me just touch briefly on the factual setting that the Court is dealing with. [Defendant was advised of, and waived, his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], prior to each of the interviews.] By way of background, I think it is appropriate to note for the record that in my opinion we are dealing with Mr. Benson a defendant who is very articulate, very wellspoken, seems to the Court having read this transcript, that he's an intelligent young man. Secondly, by Mr. Benson's own account, he was experienced in the criminal justice system.... It was also brought to the Court's attention yesterday that Mr. Benson was aware that he was a suspect in this, in the Nipomo homicide[s] very early on.... So he knew that going into the interview setting that we are focusing on. Now, let's talk about the interview itself. If I understand correctly, there were some one and a half to two hours of interview between Mr. Benson, Detective Bolts, and Detective Hobson in which there were no recordings made. And then the tape recorder was started, activated. And there was another time frame, I guess, of an hour or perhaps even more on that tape before the sequence came up that we are focusing on. Sequence being this, quote, `There's no death penalty here,' close quote. The record should reflect that at least on the portion of the record, the transcript that I have of the discussion between Mr. Benson and the police officers up to that point of the statement by Detective Bolts, there was  oh, I guess for want of a better word  there was a lack of candor in Mr. Benson's responses and some evasiveness to the detectives  responses to the detectives' questions about the kidnapping. And then the questioning shifts from the kidnapping area to the investigation of the Nipomo murders.... .... .... .... .... .... Yes. The focus of the questions now has shifted, and the detectives by way of their questions to Mr. Benson have pointed out perhaps the obvious; that is, that his responses are not coinciding with responses made by other people who have given statements already.... .... .... .... .... .... Then there is this colloquy between the detectives and Mr. Benson about, `Your friends, and they are kind of sucked into this situation now. And what's going to happen to them, they're stuck in the middle here.' Mr. Benson says, quote, `Yeah, they don't deserve it.' Close quote. There is a statement by Detective Bolts where he's talking about things are different than they were in State Prison where people might lie for you. Then Detective Hobson says this, `Richard, tell us what happened. We want to hear your side of the story.' And Mr. Benson says, `I don't know, man. It's horrible, and I don't even think I'm capable to do something like that.' Close quote. Okay. Now, to me, having heard these tapes of this portion of the interview and having reread my transcript, to me, it seems fairly clear that Mr. Benson was focusing on the horror of the situation. I think he said yesterday, and I think it shows up later in the transcript here that he had feelings of real, real strong mental feelings here of why this all happened. And I see  I think reviewing this, that those were motivating his thinking, those feelings of horror and shame and guilt, motivating his thinking at this time. Okay. Now, we go on and there's some further questioning, and then Detective Hobson says, `What's going through your head right now, Richard?' Mr. Benson says, `I don't think you'd believe it.' `DETECTIVE HOBSON: I'd like to believe it. Try me. We sat here with you all this time. That's why we're still here with you, because we care also. `DETECTIVE BOLTS: We're caring, feeling human beings. We have compassion for a lot of things. We've seen a lot worse, believe me. This is not the end of the line by any means. `DETECTIVE HOBSON: Richard, if we didn't care, we wouldn't be sitting here. `MR. BENSON: I don't see  I don't see how you can say it's not the end of the line. `DETECTIVE BOLTS: It's not. `MR. BENSON: It is for me. `DETECTIVE BOLTS: Why? There is no death penalty here.' Okay. Now, immediately thereafter, immediately after Detective Bolts says, `Why? There's no death penalty here,' Mr. Benson's comment is, `That doesn't matter.' And then Detective Hobson right away says, `Wait a minute. Before we talk about that ' and another version of the transcript said, `Before we talk about death penalty, we don't know what happened in that house.' Okay. Now, those are three important statements. Detective Bolts, `Why? There's no death penalty here.' Mr. Benson, `That doesn't matter.' Detective Hobson, `Wait a minute. If  before we talk about that, we don't know what happened in that house.' Okay. Now, what happens then, did Mr. Benson immediately rely upon the statement of Detective Bolts? Did he totally discount what Detective Hobson said thereafter? `Wait a minute. Before we talk about that,' or, `Before we talk about death penalty, we don't know what happened in that house.' Did he discount that and open up immediately and start sharing his  [baring] his [soul] about this? No way. Go on for a little bit. He says, `DETECTIVE HOBSON: Laura had a temper, we know that. Maybe you were put into a position where you had to make a choice. `MR. BENSON: It doesn't matter what choices I had. `DETECTIVE HOBSON: Sure, it does. `MR. BENSON: No, because nothing justifies the outcome.' Okay. This is tied in exactly with what we were talking about before that statement was even made. `What's in your mind?' `RICHARD: I don't think you'd even believe it. I don't know, man. It's horrible. I don't even think I'm capable of doing something like that.' That's in his mind now. He's thinking about the horror of it, and he says to the officer, `It doesn't matter what choices I had because nothing justifies the outcome.' Okay. Then Detective Hobson says, `Well, why don't you tell us and let us decide that.' And Mr. Benson says, `The thing of it is I can't.' Detective Benson  or Detective Hobson, `Why?' Mr. Benson, `I don't know.' Detective Hobson, `You don't know what?' Mr. Benson, `I don't know what happened.'[ [3] ] Okay. So then we go into several minutes of, again, less than candid responses. And then finally and slowly in the interview, they get around to the point where some candor is shown and those statements are made. Okay. Then  trying to look at this entire scenario here  then later on, perhaps as long as two hours later, Detective Hobson and Detective Bolts leave the room and a lieutenant that I cannot remember his name comes into the room with Mr. Benson and visits for a period of time. And Mr. Benson says something to [the] lieutenant of a nature that these two detectives, Hobson and Bolts, have done a very good job. And there are laudatory comments about they should be complimented for the good job that they've done in this interview session. Okay. Then a couple of days later in a subsequent interview, and this goes back to what I said early on about Mr. Benson's knowledge of the system, and why he was there in that room, and what it was all about. This is a subsequent interview, and Detective Bolts and Detective Hobson are explaining to Mr. Benson what might happen now when he goes to court. They're talking about the arraignment process, `And you'll enter your plea and you'll be given an opportunity.' And Detective Bolts says ... [.] `Not necessarily. You might not even be asked for a plea. They'll decide the counsel issue first. So that you've had time to discuss your plea or the situation with counsel and enter a plea. It's not uncommon for them to continue an arraignment for days or weeks in order for you to carefully consider your legal options. You know that  you know that all too well. `MR. BENSON: I have enough knowledge of the legal system and the information that I have given you that nothing is going to change the fact that I did it and I admitted it. Now, this is going to be the end result. I did do it, and I did admit it. I don't understand how, I mean, I'm sure they can, now that you mention it, but I don't understand how they can ask me in a court of law how I plead and not accept my ... [.]' And then it goes on there, and then I think the next to last page of the transcript there is this colloquy. `DETECTIVE BOLTS: Okay. `We'll make sure that you get commissary, any other items that you need besides cigarettes?' Detective Bolts continues, `For a few hours today, we'll probably be talking to you again if you so desire. Just so that I'm clear, is there something that we've said, as far as you know, threats that we have made to you, or promises, or any promises of leniency, anything that has caused you to tell us what you've told us? `MR. BENSON: No. I'm surprised that that came up. `DETECTIVE BOLTS: Well, I  you know, it's something that, you know, I've thought of that maybe something we said that you interpreted as some kind of threat or promise or some  `MR. BENSON: You know what, if you guys started whipping me with billy clubs right now, you'd see me smile. So you know that's not a  a  now, no. You guys are good at your job. I complimented you to your lieutenant about it, as a matter of fact. I'm glad you are, because it served in getting me off the street, you know. I feel that in some sick, twisted way I helped a little bit, but you guys still  you did your job.' Now, I mean, when I was thinking about this, I was asked to focus my attention on those six words: `Why? There is  Why? There's no death penalty here.' And I did some rough calculation on this transcript of the final hours of the interrogation, and there were in the area of 152,000, 153,000 words in this transcript. And I guess the suggestion is  I mean, I don't  I'm not sounding critical. I don't mean it to sound that way, but I guess when I was focusing on those six words: `Why? There's no death penalty here.' The argument would have  would go that I should discount and not consider the other 152,600 [ sic ] words. And I think the case law suggests that that is inappropriate. I think the case law points out that it is necessary for me to consider the entire gamut of questions, the attitude of the participants, the factual setting. I ask myself some questions, some obvious questions: What is the nature of the benefit allegedly offered to Mr. Benson by this, `Well, there's no death penalty? Why? There's no death penalty here,' statement. That, `This is not the end of the line by any means. There's no death penalty here.' And then again the response, `Well, it doesn't matter, nothing justifies the outcome.' .... .... .... .... .... ... [T]here is no suggestion that would be any worse or different if Mr. Benson confessed or if he didn't confess.... .... .... .... .... .... ... Everything totally aboveboard with the officers. No coercion, no harassment. No heavy-handedness, at least in the hundreds of pages that I've read. To the contrary, it was strangely cordial and somewhat light, and not at all heavy-handed in the approach that was taken. There was open discussion in our  in the interview that I'm dealing with. The obvious question, did Mr. Benson rely on  was he induced by Detective Bolts' statement? I asked the obvious question, was there anything to rely on? ... ... [T]here's no suggestion of different treatment if Mr. Benson chose to make any confessions or admissions.... .... .... .... .... .... ... We don't have any tough guy cop approach. As I've commented, we had to the contrary, officers who were patient and even-handed and fair in the way they approached their  this discussion. .... .... .... .... .... ... [T]here was no breaking down or loss of composure. Listening to the tape, it was clear that he was thinking clearly and appropriately. It was clear to the Court in listening to it that, in fact, he hedged on the truth, understandably, for much of the interview until things started unraveling. Okay. When I compare ... `The totality of the circumstances in viewing the interview in its entirety in light of all of the attendant circumstances,' I'm persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Benson's statements were not coerced by promise of leniency, but rather were made freely and voluntarily. Defendant now contends that the court erred by denying his motion to suppress his confessions to the police as involuntary. (2) An involuntary confession, of course, is inadmissible under the due process clauses of both the Fourteenth Amendment (e.g., Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 385-386 [12 L.Ed.2d 908, 920-921, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205]) and article I, sections 7 and 15 (e.g., People v. Ditson (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 438-439 [20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714] [decided under the predecessor of Cal. Const., art. I, § 15]). (See, e.g., People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 238 [250 Cal. Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25], affd. sub nom. Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 110 S.Ct. 1190].) A confession is involuntary under the federal (e.g., Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1, 7 [12 L.Ed.2d 653, 658-659, 84 S.Ct. 1489]) and state (e.g., People v. Trout (1960) 54 Cal.2d 576, 583 [6 Cal. Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231, 80 A.L.R.2d 1418]) guaranties of due process when it was `extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence[ ]' ( Hutto v. Ross (1976) 429 U.S. 28, 30 [50 L.Ed.2d 194, 197, 97 S.Ct. 202] ( per curiam )). (See People v. Berve (1958) 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [332 P.2d 97].) [C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary'.... ( Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 167 [93 L.Ed.2d 473, 484, 107 S.Ct. 515].) That is the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Ibid. ) It is also the law under article I, sections 7 and 15. ( People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 973 [275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 800 P.2d 516] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) (3) A confession is obtained by a promise within the proscription of both the federal and state due process guaranties if and only if inducement and statement are linked, as it were, by proximate causation. This is certainly true for the federal right. The requisite causal connection between promise and confession must be more than but for: causation-in-fact is insufficient. ( Hutto v. Ross, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 30 ( per curiam ).) If the test was whether a statement would have been made but for the law enforcement conduct, virtually no statement would be deemed voluntary because few people give incriminating statements in the absence of some kind of official action. ( U.S. v. Leon Guerrero (9th Cir.1988) 847 F.2d 1363, 1366, fn. 1.) The foregoing is also true for the state right. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 973 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) (4) When a challenge is mounted, the prosecution must prove that a confession is voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence under the Constitutions of the United States (e.g., Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 489 [30 L.Ed.2d 618, 627-628, 92 S.Ct. 619]) and California ( People v. Markham, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 71). [4] (5) On appeal, the determination of a trial court as to the ultimate issue of the voluntariness of a confession is reviewed independently in light of the record in its entirety, including all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation ( Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 226 [36 L.Ed.2d 854, 862, 93 S.Ct. 2041]). (E.g., Davis v. North Carolina (1966) 384 U.S. 737, 741-742 [16 L.Ed.2d 895, 898-899, 86 S.Ct. 1761] [reviewing federal constitutional claim]; People v. Sanchez (1969) 70 Cal.2d 562, 571-572 [75 Cal. Rptr. 642, 451 P.2d 74] [apparently speaking of review of both federal and state constitutional claims].) The trial court's determinations concerning whether coercive police activity was present, whether certain conduct constituted a promise and, if so, whether it operated as an inducement, are apparently subject to independent review as well. The underlying questions are mixed; such questions are generally scrutinized de novo; that is especially true when  as here  constitutional rights are implicated ( People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 984-987 [232 Cal. Rptr. 110, 725 P.2d 180] [articulating principles underlying both federal and state standard-of-review jurisprudence]). Lastly, the trial court's findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession  including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation ( Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at p. 226 [36 L.Ed.2d at p. 862])  are clearly subject to review for substantial evidence. The underlying questions are factual; such questions are examined under the deferential substantial-evidence standard ( People v. Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 984-987 [articulating principles underlying both federal and state standard-of-review jurisprudence]). (1b) Having considered the matter closely, we are of the opinion that the court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress his confessions to the police as involuntary. After independently reviewing the record in its entirety, we believe that the court properly concluded that the confessions were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. Examined de novo, each of the court's crucial determinations is sound. First, the police activity here was clearly not coercive. Having weighed the evidence, including the audiotapes and the transcript, we agree with the court's assessment: Everything totally aboveboard with the officers. No coercion, no harassment. No heavy-handedness.... To the contrary, it was strangely cordial and somewhat light, and not at all heavy-handed in the approach that was taken. We don't have any tough guy cop approach.... [W]e had to the contrary, officers who were patient and even-handed and fair in the way they approached their  this discussion. [T]here was no breaking down or loss of composure. Defendant finds fault with the interrogation in several particulars. His complaints, however, simply fail to establish coercion on the part of the officers. He claims, for example, that the interrogation was calculated to secure a confession. But calculation does not necessarily imply compulsion. Second, Detective Bolts's comment about the death penalty did not constitute a promise of benefit. What the appropriate standard is for determining whether certain conduct amounts to a promise is apparently an open question: is it purely objective (i.e., from the perspective of a reasonable person); purely subjective (i.e., in accordance with the suspect's actual understanding); or purely neither and partly both? (See generally People v. Conte (1984) 421 Mich. 704, 739-740 [365 N.W.2d 648] [choosing what is evidently a hybrid standard, viz., whether the defendant is likely to have reasonably understood the statements in question to be promises of leniency], and cases cited therein.) But as will appear, the question need not be resolved here. The conclusion that Detective Bolts's comment did not constitute a promise follows if the remark is construed objectively. Interpreted thus, it amounts to no more than an observation that ultimately proved to be incorrect  to the effect that the death penalty was not available here. Nothing in the surrounding circumstances transforms the comment's meaning or its force. Defendant claims in substance that Investigator Hobson's interjection, Wait a minute, before we talk about that, we don't know what happened in that house, supported the promise he discerns in Bolts's words and conditioned that promise on his confession. We disagree. Hobson's words effectively withdrew the remark. And as defendant himself conceded at the hearing, the remark was not renewed: the officers [n]ever again discuss[ed] the matter of the death penalty with him. The conclusion that Detective Bolts's comment did not constitute a promise follows even if the remark is construed subjectively. Several times at the hearing, defendant made admissions bearing on the matter. At one point, he stated that his interpretation was as follows: That at that time there was no  that the death penalty was dormant in California, and that they weren't seeking the death penalty as far as what the interview, what the case was going to. At another point, he said: I felt that they were confirming what I already believed, that they weren't seeking the death penalty, and the reason they weren't seeking it is because at that time it wasn't being used in California. At yet another point, he stated: You know, I can't honestly say that anyone straightforward came out and said, `What  if you talk to us, I'm not going to give you the death penalty.' I interpreted it to mean that the death penalty was  I mean, an officer, I mean, you know, handling the investigation is telling me, `There is no death penalty here.' I assumed to be it wasn't being sought, or that because of legal things in the court, the death penalty was either out, or going to continue being dormant. It is true that defendant also testified that he did indeed interpret Detective Bolts's comment as a promise. But the court clearly, albeit impliedly, found his testimony unworthy of credit. On this record, we must agree. Third, Detective Bolts's comment about the death penalty did not operate as an inducement. On this record, it is difficult to conclude that the remark was even a cause-in-fact of the confessions. To Bolts's observation, There's no death penalty here, defendant immediately responded, That doesn't matter. The evidence practically compels the inference that insofar as the confessions were concerned, the comment in fact didn't matter. We recognize that the remark preceded defendant's confessions. The intervening period of time, however, was not insubstantial. Moreover, temporal priority does not establish causal force: it is a logical fallacy to reason post hoc ergo propter hoc. In any event, the evidence simply does not support an inference that the causal connection between Bolts's comment and defendant's confessions was more than but for. As explained above, however, causation-in-fact is insufficient. Again, it is true that defendant testified that he was indeed induced to confess by the comment. But again, the court clearly, albeit impliedly, found his testimony lacking in credibility. Again, on this record we must agree. In conclusion, we are of the opinion that defendant's confessions were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. The court effectively determined that defendant spoke not because of coercion applied by the police but as a result of compunction arising from his own conscience. After independent review, we agree. Accordingly, the court did not err by denying the suppression motion. [5]