Opinion ID: 2291534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intent as distinguishable from predisposition.

Text: Intent is an element of virtually every crime. If the intent exception warranted admission of evidence of a similar crime simply to prove the intent element of the offense on trial, the exception would swallow the rule. In reversing a conviction for possession of heroin with intent to distribute because evidence of prior sales over a lengthy period had been erroneously admitted into evidence, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated: ... [T]he introduction of evidence which shows other offenses by the accused should be subject to rigid scrutiny ... To come within the exception to the rule that evidence of previous offenses is irrelevant, there must appear between the previous offense and that with which the defendant is charged some real connection other than the allegation that the offenses have sprung from the same disposition. The exception does not go to the extent of sanctioning the admission of evidence of the propensity of the accused to commit crimes similar to that for which he has been indicted. Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 671, 350 A.2d 680, 685 (1976). (Emphasis in original.) In Ross, prior sales could only become relevant to the intent with which the defendant possessed heroin on the occasion then under consideration if the court first inferred from the defendant's past conduct the predisposition to repeat it  an inference which the court found impermissible. Where evidence of prior crimes can become probative with respect to intent only after an inference of predisposition has been drawn, the argument for admission is at its weakest, for the distinction between intent and predisposition then becomes ephemeral. A comparison of Ross with United States v. Payne, 256 U.S.App.D.C. 358, 805 F.2d 1062 (1986), cited by the government, is instructive. In Payne, the court upheld the admission into evidence of guns found in defendant's apartment to show that the drugs also located there were intended for distribution, upon the theory that dealers in narcotics are more likely to use such weapons than are persons possessing unlawful drugs for their personal use. [12] The challenged evidence was thus relevant to the issue of intent to distribute without the court first having to resort to any inference of predisposition. The argument in favor of admission in that type of case is far stronger than in Ross or in the present context. But cf. the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1978) ( en banc ), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979).