Opinion ID: 195402
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Actions of the Army Corps of Engineers

Text: Under 404 of the CWA, the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) must prepare an EIS in compliance with NEPA if there is a substantial possibility that the proposed actions (in this case, the granting of a permit to fill wetlands) could significantly affect the environment. For the Jamestown Connector, the Corps prepared a preliminary Environmental Assessment (EA) and found no significant impact warranting a full EIS. While the record does contain evidence that the project will detrimentally affect some wetlands, this evidence does not overwhelmingly contradict the Corps' conclusion that the project will not significantly affect the environment. The district court upheld the Corps' determina- tion and we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court or the Corps. The district court also found that the Corps did not improperly segment their analysis in the EA or fail to consider cumulative effects. Plaintiffs claim error but the district court responded fully to their objections. Conservation Law Found., 827 F. Supp. at 881. We have nothing to add.3 3 The plaintiffs cite Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d at 1244, for the proposition that conclusory statements by the Corps that it has considered cumulative impacts are insufficient to show compliance with the cumulative impact requirements. We do not read this case as standing for such a proposition or in any -25- B. CLEAN WATER ACT & DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION ACT CLAIMS Under 404 of the Clean Water Act, the Corps cannot issue a permit to fill wetlands if there exists a practicable alternative4 to the proposed action that would have less adverse impact. Likewise, the FHWA may not approve a transportation project under 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act which encroaches on a National Historic Site unless no prudent and feasible alternative exists. Plaintiffs claim that the district court erred in crediting the determination of the Corps and the FHWA that there were no practicable alternative designs to the Jamestown Connector project. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the agencies failed to consider the so-called Todd design which is identical to the design actually chosen (the FHWA and the Corps chose Alternative B) except that a stoplight and an at-grade intersection would replace a proposed overpass at one of the major intersections on the island. Although the defendants did not explicitly consider the Todd design itself, the district court found that the Corps and the FHWA did consider the main feature of the Todd design -- the way casting serious doubt on the validity of the district court's holding. 4 40 C.F.R. 230.10(a)(2) provides that: An alternative is practicable if it is available and capable of being done, after taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall project purposes. -26- at-grade intersection in place of the overpass -- when they evaluated two other alternatives (Alternatives A and A1). Plaintiffs object to this because Alternatives A and A1 involve an unlimited access road and other features not present in the Todd design. Therefore, plaintiffs contend, the conclusion by the defendant agencies that Alternatives A and A1 are not practicable because they involve significant traffic congestion and safety hazards does not necessarily apply to an alternative that removes all the traffic hazards with the exception of one stoplight at a major intersection. This is a valid objection, but plaintiffs' contention does not justify a finding of an abuse of discretion or manifest error of law. Technical discrepancies may have existed between alternatives actually considered and an alternative which, if considered, may have been found to be more practicable. The two alternatives considered, however, were somewhat similar in that they both contained an element of major concern to the Corps -- an at-grade intersection which could lead to traffic congestion and safety problems. This similarity is sufficient to render the Corps' substantive analysis acceptable. Plaintiffs also argue that because two other agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), criticized the FHWA's conclusions in the 1987 FSEIS, the Corps could not blindly rely on the FHWA's conclusion that Alternative B was the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative. As the district court points -27- out, however, the Corps did not blindly rely on the 1987 FSEIS. Rather, the Corps supplemented the FHWA's evaluation with its own administrative record, studies, and responses to public comment. The district court's finding is not an abuse of discretion. Finally, 4(f) of the DOT requires that the FHWA must undertake all possible planning to minimize harm to historical sites. Plaintiffs argue that the Todd design alternative constitutes an example of required planning which would minimize such harm. Under 4(f), agency determinations that a particular plan minimizes harm to historical sites deserve even greater deference than agency determinations concerning practicable alternatives. Coalition on Sensible Transp. Inc. v. Dole, 642 F. Supp. 573, 599 (D.D.C. 1986); see also Druid Hills Civic Ass'n. v. Federal Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700, 716 (11th Cir. 1985). With this in mind, our review of the record convinces us that the district court's discussion of the planning to minimize harm issue, Conservation Law Found., 827 F. Supp. at 883-84, is beyond reproach on appellate review. -28- C. CLEAN AIR ACT CLAIMS 1. Jurisdiction We address, first of all, the defendants' argument that the federal court has no jurisdiction over plaintiffs' Clean Air Act (CAA) claims -- an issue not addressed by the district court but one that we nevertheless may notice on appeal. Sierra Club v. Larson, 2 F.3d 462, 465-66 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1993); Martel v. Stafford, 992 F.2d 1244, 1245 (1st Cir. 1993). The defendants claim that the language of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7604(a)(1), which authorizes suits to enforce violations of an emission standard or limitation, limits such suits to cases involving standards and limitations set in a state implementation plan or standards set by the EPA. Because the present suit does not involve the enforcement of standards set out in a state or EPA plan, defendants argue that the district court had no jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' claims in the first place. We disagree. Under CAA's citizen suit provision, any person may commence a civil action to enforce violations of an emission standard or limitation under this chapter. 42 U.S.C. 7604 (a)(1). The term emission standard or limitation is defined by 42 U.S.C. 7604(f) as a standard of performance . . . which is in effect under this chapter . . . or under an applicable implementation plan.5 (emphasis added). According to its plain 5 Defendants' use of the definition for emissions standard or limitation provided in 42 U.S.C. 7602(k) (a requirement established by the State or Administrator) is improper because -29- language, this section includes standards of performance set out in the Act itself. The specific statutory provisions enumerated in 7604(f)(3) are not the only statutory provisions that can be enforced under the citizen suit provision. Rather, as long as the claimed violation involves a standard of performance under the CAA, the court has jurisdiction pursuant to 7604(f)(1), even though the standard is not imposed by the statutory sections enumerated in 7604(f)(3). In this case, plaintiffs are challenging the defendants' violation of the CAA conformity requirements, 42 U.S.C. 7506 (c)(1) & (c)(3), which mandate that defendants demonstrate that their transportation projects would contribute to annual emissions reductions consistent with the levels set out in 7511a(b)(1) and 7512a(a)(7). These conformity requirements plainly constitute an emissions standard of performance as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. 7602(l) (a requirement of continuous emission reduction, including any requirement relating to the operation or maintenance of a source to assure continuous emission reduction). Therefore, because the citizen suit provision allows for suits to enforce standards of performance, 42 U.S.C. 7604(f)(1), this court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs' CAA claims. See Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687, 693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990) (enforcing 42 U.S.C. 7506(c) and EPA conformity guidelines in 7604(f) defines this term for all of 7604, trumping the definition in 7602(k). -30- citizen suit). We recognize that there are a number of cases holding that the citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. 7604, only applies to suits against individual polluters or government actors that fail to comply with the specific requirements of a state or EPA implementation plan, and that the provision does not encompass statutory directives requiring the creation of such implementation plans in the first place. Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605, 613-15 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053 (1989); League to Save Lake Tahoe, Inc. v. Trounday, 598 F.2d 1164, 1173 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979); Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown Committee of 100 v. Washington, 535 F.2d 1318, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 683 F.2d 663, 670-71 (2d Cir. 1982). We do not believe, however, that any of these cases have satisfactorily explained why the plain language of 7604(f)(1) would not apply to suits like the one before us in this case. Instead, these cases seem primarily concerned with declining to allow plaintiffs to use 7604 as a vehicle to force government agencies or instrumentalities to comply with their general obligations under the Clean Air Act. See, e.g., League to Save Tahoe, 598 F.2d at 1168-70, 1173; see also Coalition Against Columbus Ctr. v. New York, 967 F.2d 764, 769-71 (2d Cir. 1992) (distinguishing between general air quality standards, which are not enforceable under 7604, and specific emissions -31- controls which are enforceable). Thus, these cases restrict the use of 7604 to violations of objective evidentiary standards and avoid suits requiring a reanalysis of technological or other considerations at the enforcement stage. E.g., Wilder, 854 F.2d at 614. The present case is distinguishable in that plaintiffs substantive claims involve statutory provisions that are fairly specific and objective. See 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(3)(A)(iii) (requiring transportation plans -- which involve exclusively pollution from automobile emissions -- to be consistent with 7511 a(b)(1) which requires states to formulate an implementation plan that reduces certain pollutants by 15% from a 1990 baseline level). The provision is more similar to a specific emission control standard applicable to a specific source, than a general air quality standard which may be accomplished in any number of ways depending on the technological considerations of the state or agency developing the implementation plan designed to reach the proscribed level of air quality. Thus, even under the aforementioned caselaw, the federal court has jurisdiction over this case.6 2. The Merits Under 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1), an instrumentality of the 6 Our decision on the jurisdictional issue is a close one. The preliminary evaluation set out above provides ample basis for proceeding to the merits. However, because the outcome of this case does not depend upon our jurisdictional ruling, this Court remains free to revisit the issue in a future case where it may be decisive. -32- federal government may not authorize, fund or support any activity that does not conform to an approved State Implementation Plan (SIP). During the relevant period in this case (i.e., an interim period when no conforming SIP yet exists), conformity for transportation plans and programs in Rhode Island was demonstrated by showing that the plan and program contribute[d] to annual emissions reductions consistent with 7511a(b)(1) and 7512a(a)(7) of this title. 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(3)(A)(iii). In this case, the relevant plan and program are Rhode Island's Transportation Improvement Program of 1991 (TIP) and its Transportation Plan of 1992 (Plan). The challenged governmental actions include the FHWA's authorization of construction on the Jamestown Connector in July of 1992 and the Corps' issuance of a permit to fill wetlands in May of 1992. The defendants also adopted and approved the TIP and the Plan, actions which the plaintiffs also challenge. The district court found: (1) that Rhode Island's TIP and Plan conformed with the requirements of the CAA because they contributed to annual emissions reductions consistent with 7511a(b)(1); and (2) that, regardless, the Jamestown Connector project was not subject to further conformity review pursuant to regulations in effect at the time of approval. 23 C.F.R. 770.9 (d)(3) (w/drawn Dec. 22, 1992, 57 Fed. Reg. 60,725). For purposes of the present litigation, which involves construction on the Jamestown Connector, we need not consider the conformity of Rhode Island's TIP and Plan to the extent this -33- issue does not effect the status of the Jamestown Connector project itself. Because the district court's second finding is dispositive in this case, we do not reach the issues raised in the court's first finding. Plaintiffs claim that the regulation found by the district court to insulate the Jamestown Connector from further conformity review, 23 C.F.R. 770.9(d)(3), does nothing to stop the ban on federal support of nonconforming projects provided in 7506(c) as part of the 1990 CAA Amendments. (Again, the challenged actions include the FHWA's authorization of construction and the Corps' issuance of a permit to fill wetlands in 1992). According to the plaintiffs, the 1990 CAA Amendments either trump the effect of the regulation or simply provide new, independent conformity requirements that must be met before federal action can be taken on any project, regardless of that project's own conformity status. In other words, the Jamestown Connector may itself conform to the CAA, but the TIP and Plan do not, so the government is barred from taking any actions in the entire state, including actions for the Jamestown Connector. Specifically, plaintiffs read 7506(c)(3)(B)7 to 7 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(3)(B) provides, in relevant part, that conformity of transportation projects will be demonstrated if they:
plan and program as defined in subparagraph (A) or for 12 months after November 15, 1990, from a transportation program found to conform within 3 years prior to such date of enactment. -34- mandate that no transportation project may receive federal funding or support unless the project comes from a conforming Plan and TIP as defined in 7506(c)(3)(A) or, until November of 1991, from a plan or program found to conform within 3 years prior to November 15, 1990. The issue before us is whether 7506(c)(3) applies to all projects regardless of their status, or just to projects that have yet to receive a conformity determination as of November, 1990. Without delving into statutory minutiae -- and, as a consequence, declining the parties' invitation to engage the battle of dueling legislative histories -- we believe that it is certainly reasonable for the district court to (implicitly) interpret the grace period provision in 7506(c)(3)(B)(i) as applying only prospectively and not to past projects like the Jamestown Connector. First of all, 7506(c)(3)(B) does not say that no project can receive federal support unless it comes from a conforming transportation plan. Instead, the grace period sentence relied on by the plaintiffs, 7506(c)(3)(B)(i), is part of a provision explaining the manner in which the conformity of plans, TIPs and projects will be demonstrated for purposes of the restriction in 7506(c)(1). Plans whose conformity has already been demonstrated do not appear to fall under the auspices of this provision. The grace period in 7506(c)(3)(B)(i) talks about projects that come from . . . a transportation program found to conform within 3 years prior to November 1991. It says nothing about the project itself being found to conform during the prior -35- 3 years. Consequently, the provision seems specifically aimed at projects whose conformity had yet to be demonstrated by the time the 1990 Amendments took effect.8 The Jamestown Connector was found to conform in 1988 at the latest (by means of the approval of the Jamestown FSEIS) and we see no indication in 7506(c)(3) that Congress intended to abrogate this determination. Furthermore, the language of 7506(c)(3) -- Until such time as the implementation plan revision . . . is approved, conformity of such plans, programs and projects will be demonstrated if . . . -- sounds like it is referring to the interim period, that is, the time between the enactment of the Amendments and the adoption of the new SIPs. Thus, a prospective application of the provision seems particularly appropriate and, conversely, a retroactive application particularly inappropriate. This interpretation of 7506(c)(3) has apparently been adopted by the EPA and the Department of Transportation. See June 7, Environmental Protection Agency and Dept. of Transportation Guidance for Determining Conformity of Transportation Plans, Programs and Projects With Clean Air Act Implementation Plans During Phase I of the Interim Period, June 7, 1991 at 22-23, 24- 8 For this reason, the plaintiffs' argument that the defendants' interpretation of 7506(c)(3)(B)(i) would make that provision superfluous is specious. Presumably, there existed plenty of projects in 1990 that were not as far along as the Jamestown Connector and had not yet received a conformity determination, as did Jamestown, prior to the 1990 Amendments. Those projects may have come from conforming Plans and TIPs at the time of the Amendments, but the projects themselves had yet to receive a determination of conformity. As a result, the grace period in 7506(c)(3)(B)(i) was enacted to address these types of projects. -36- 25 (interpreting 7506(c)(3) to apply only to projects that have yet to receive conformity determinations); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 62190-91 (EPA and Department of Transportation regulations holding that its Interim Guidance governs conformity determinations made between 1990 and 1993). It is well established that we afford considerable deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute that it is primarily charged with enforcing, especially a complicated one like the CAA. Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. United States EPA, 889 F.2d 292 (1st Cir. 1989) (Courts give EPA's construction of the statute controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous); see also Chevron United States, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984); Larson, 2 F.3d at 466-69; Comit Pro Rescate De La Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 888 F.2d 180, 186 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990). We realize that a result of this interpretation of the CAA is that states may have conforming transportation projects without having any conforming transportation plans or programs. We see no problem with this outcome as long as federal government support is limited to projects that were basically already on their way to completion before the 1990 CAA Amendments.9 The 9 Although the FHWA did not authorize construction of the Jamestown Connector until 1992 and the Corps did not issue its permit to fill wetlands until 1992 as well, the final federal environmental go-ahead for the project was given in 1988, and Rhode Island had acquired much of the land for the project by 1990. See Conservation Law Found., 827 F. Supp. at 890. -37- plaintiffs' position, however, would result in a more absurd situation -- a complete halt of all ongoing projects regardless of how close to completion those projects have become. We see no indication in the CAA that Congress intended such a result. Affirmed. -38-