Opinion ID: 2118255
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Phyllis Ham Garth

Text: Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call former Chicago police officer Phyllis Ham Garth as a witness during the eligibility phase of his second capital sentencing hearing. Defendant contends that Garth's testimony would have impeached the credibility of Theresa Woods, the State's chief witness, regarding whether defendant possessed the mental state required to render him death eligible. Section 9-1(b)(6)(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that a defendant may be sentenced to death if he killed the murdered individual intentionally or with the knowledge that the acts which caused the death created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. (Emphases added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(b). We begin with a review of portions of the testimony given at trial and at the second sentencing hearing, along with relevant argument of counsel and findings of the trial court in the sentencing hearing. At trial, Woods testified that on February 10, 1983, she and her employer, Jesse James, Sr., closed his tavern at about 2 a.m. and left the premises together between 3:30 and 4 o'clock that morning. As they walked to their cars, they were approached by defendant, who grabbed Woods and pointed a gun at her head. Following defendant's instructions, James got into the driver's seat of his car, and Woods sat in the back seat on the driver's side. Defendant, who sat in the front passenger's seat, then ordered James to drive a short distance and park in a nearby alley. Once they had parked, defendant demanded $300 from James and Woods, threatening to kill them if they did not comply. Defendant explained that if he was caught he was going back to jail for good, so it did not matter if he killed them. James told defendant that he had some money back at the tavern, so they returned to that area and parked in the mouth of an alley with the car facing outward toward the street. Defendant told Woods to go to the tavern and get the money, and he warned her that he would kill James if she did not return within three minutes. Woods then ran into the tavern, grabbed paper currency from the cash register, and went back outside. Emerging from the tavern, she noticed that the car had pulled out of the alley and was parked next to the curb. Woods walked to the driver's side of the car, and defendant, who was still in the front passenger seat next to James, told her to get into the vehicle. James objected, asking why Woods had to get back in the car. Defendant told James to shut up and that he was running this. According to Woods, defendant then pulled James toward him so they were facing each other, and defendant shot James. Woods attempted to run away from the car. As she was running she heard another gunshot and tripped and fell. She landed on her left side and rolled over onto her back. When she looked up, she saw defendant standing over her with the gun. Defendant said, You bitch. Woods raised her hand to protect herself, pleading with him not to shoot, and rolled over onto her stomach. Woods heard another shot and then lay motionless, pretending to be dead. A short time later she heard footsteps running from the scene. Woods got up, saw that James was still alive, and noticed that the car had crashed into the window of a nearby storefront. She then ran into the tavern and called the police. It was then that she noticed she had been shot. The wound was in her right shoulder. Also testifying at trial was Chicago police detective Geraldine Perry, who gave a somewhat different account of the incident. According to Perry, who spoke to Woods at Billings Hospital the day of the incident, Woods told Perry that when she emerged from the tavern with the money, she saw the car moving down the street and saw some movement in the front seat of the car. As Woods watched, she saw the car crash into the storefront. Woods did not tell Perry that she approached the driver's side of the car or that she heard any words spoken by James or defendant. At defendant's second sentencing hearing, Woods gave essentially the same testimony that she gave at trial. She stated that when she emerged from the tavern with the money, the car in which Jesse James, Sr., and defendant were seated had already moved out of the alley and was parked next to the curb. Woods did not see the car moving, nor did she see the two persons in the front seat struggling. Woods also did not see the car go up over the curb and crash into the storefront window. It was not until after she had been shot that she noticed the car had moved up into the building. In order to impeach this testimony by Woods, the defense called Detective Perry, who also gave essentially the same testimony that she gave at trial. According to Perry, Woods said that when she emerged from the tavern, she observed the car moving slowly along the street, and she saw movement of the two persons in the front seat. Woods also told Perry that she saw the car go up over the curb and crash into the storefront window. During argument in the first phase of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel referred to this testimony by Perry and stated: [It] suggests that there was a struggle going on in the car and that is certainly corroborated by the fact that the car rolled forward and crashed into a window. It contradicts any suggestion by the State's witness that this was in any way, shape, or form a cold-blooded killing. In rebuttal, the State offered a different explanation. According to the State, it was reasonable to infer that the car was in gear when James was shot and that [t]he car simply moved as cars will move when [an] automatic transmission is in gear[,] and [it] went up the curb and bumped in the window and cracked the window.    It does not mean that somebody was driving that car wildly after the shot was fired. At the conclusion of this phase of the sentencing hearing, the judge found defendant eligible for the death penalty. He stated: The Court's finding of eligibility will stand. Before this court, defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call former police officer Garth as a witness at the second sentencing hearing. Defendant contends that Garth's testimony would not only have impeached the credibility of Woods' testimony but it also could have provided substantive evidence (under the excited utterance-spontaneous declaration exception to the rule against hearsay) that the shooting was a negligent or accidental act rather than an intentional or knowing one. Attached to defendant's amended post-conviction petition are a February 10, 1983, police report prepared by Officer Phyllis Ham (now Garth) and a second affidavit of State Appellate Defender's office investigator Jonathan Lyon. According to these attachments, Garth and her partner were the first officers on the scene of the February 10, 1983, incident. Garth interviewed Woods, who Garth said was upset, and Garth was told by Woods that when she came out of the bar she observed a struggle inside the car after which the car crashed into a building. Defendant argues that if Garth's testimony had been presented, it is reasonably probable that the judge at the sentencing hearing would have found that the State had failed to prove the requisite mental state beyond a reasonable doubt. The State initially contends that defendant made [v]irtually the same claim on direct appeal in Harris II and that this court's decision as to this claim is res judicata as to this issue. In Harris II, defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present Detective Perry's testimony as substantive evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule ( Harris II, 164 Ill.2d at 348, 207 Ill.Dec. 400, 647 N.E.2d 893), rather than merely as impeachment of Woods' testimony. This court rejected defendant's ineffective assistance argument, concluding that defendant had failed to show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to offer Perry's testimony as substantive evidence at the sentencing hearing. Harris II, 164 Ill.2d at 349, 207 Ill.Dec. 400, 647 N.E.2d 893. The purpose of a post-conviction proceeding is to allow inquiry into constitutional issues that have not been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously on direct appeal. Accordingly, determinations of a reviewing court on the prior direct appeal are res judicata as to issues actually decided. Towns, 182 Ill.2d at 502, 231 Ill.Dec. 557, 696 N.E.2d 1128; Whitehead, 169 Ill.2d at 371, 215 Ill.Dec. 164, 662 N.E.2d 1304. While defendant's argument in the case at bar is similar to the argument he raised about the Perry testimony in Harris II, the two contentions are not the same. In Harris II, defendant argued that Perry's testimony, which had already been presented as impeachment, should have been offered as substantive evidence as well. In other words, Perry's testimony would have carried more weight had it been introduced as substantive evidence. In the case at bar, defendant argues, similarly to his previous contention, that Perry's testimony should have carried more weight, but here the device by which the weight is to be added is different. In this instance, unlike Harris II, defendant complains that Garth's testimony was not presented at all. If it had been, defendant contends, it would have corroborated Perry's testimony and would have thereby given it greater weight. Because of this distinction between these contentions, we conclude that defendant's argument in the case at bar was not actually decided in Harris II, and res judicata does not apply. We therefore consider the merits of defendant's claim. Under the Strickland standard, a defendant must establish not only that his counsel's performance was deficient, but also that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result. Morgan, 187 Ill.2d at 529-30, 241 Ill.Dec. 552, 719 N.E.2d 681. Prejudice is shown if the defendant establishes that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. We agree with defendant that Garth would have been a separate witness from Perry, and that Garth's testimony would have recounted a different interview with Woods. However, the gist of Garth's testimony would have been exactly the same as Perry's: that Woods, upon emerging from the tavern, observed a struggle inside the car and saw the car crash into the storefront. Even if Garth's testimony had been presented, it is not reasonably likely that the judge at the second sentencing hearing would have accepted defendant's theory that the shooting was accidental. In considering defendant's similar claim in Harris II, we stated: the prosecutor explained at the sentencing hearing [that] the more reasonable inference from the description of the offenses provided by Woods to police was that James was shot while the car was in gear, and that the vehicle rolled forward when the driver lost control. Harris II, 164 Ill.2d at 349, 207 Ill.Dec. 400, 647 N.E.2d 893. In addition, we stated: Other evidence established that the shooting was not accidental. The defendant initially threatened to kill James and Woods because, he said, he had `nothing to lose.' When Woods reentered the tavern to obtain money, the defendant said that he would kill James if she did not return shortly. When Woods came back to the car, the defendant rejected James' plea that Woods be allowed to go, saying that he was `running this.' After James was shot, the defendant straddled Woods, said to her, `You bitch,' and shot her at close range. Harris II, 164 Ill.2d at 349, 207 Ill.Dec. 400, 647 N.E.2d 893. At the conclusion of the second sentencing hearing, the circuit court judge stated that the murder of James was `totally unnecessary,' suggesting that he did not accept defendant's accident theory. Harris II, 164 Ill.2d at 347-48, 207 Ill.Dec. 400, 647 N.E.2d 893. The judge made this comment after hearing Perry's testimony in support of this theory during the first phase of the hearing. Garth's testimony, if presented, would have been to the same effect as Perry's. Given the other evidence establishing that the shooting was not accidental, it is not reasonably probable that Garth's testimony would have altered the result of the proceeding. Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant points to People v. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d 1, 191 Ill.Dec. 10, 623 N.E.2d 255 (1993). In Pugh, as in the case at bar, the defendant contended that his shooting of the victim was accidental and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that he lacked the culpable (intentional or knowing) mental state required to render him eligible for the death penalty. We held in Pugh that the defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's errors, and we vacated his death sentence. Pugh is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Pugh, the defendant entered a blind plea of guilty to felony murder, and he stipulated to his eligibility for the death penalty. This stipulation was entered based on defense counsel's incorrect belief that a finding of felony murder by itself rendered the defendant eligible for the death penalty. Defense counsel was unaware that the State also was required to prove that the defendant possessed the culpable mental state of intent or knowledge. Accordingly, [n]one of defendant's evidence was presented by defense counsel at the first phase of sentencing because counsel believed such evidence was irrelevant once felony murder was established. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d at 20, 191 Ill.Dec. 10, 623 N.E.2d 255. Here, by contrast, there was no misapprehension of the law on the part of defense counsel, nor was there any stipulation that defendant was eligible for the death penalty. Defendant in the instant case does not allege that counsel presented no evidence during the eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing. Rather, he complains that counsel did not augment the testimony that was presented by calling an additional witness who would have testified to precisely the same effect as did Perry. Given the other evidence establishing that the shooting was not accidental, we do not believe that defendant has shown that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to augment Perry's testimony with Garth's. Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed this post-conviction claim without an evidentiary hearing.