Opinion ID: 221481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: SJCA's NEPA Claims

Text: SJCA contends that the Federal Defendants' analysis of the Project led to multiple NEPA violations. We hold that SJCA has not established any ground for reversal under NEPA of the district court's decision.
As we understand SJCA's riparian-area NEPA claim, it is arguing that the EIS did not satisfy the requirements of NEPA because it acknowledged that some of the Project's proposed development may not comply or may conflict with various Area 9A standards, id., Vol. I at 273-275, yet it offered only perfunctory references to mitigation measures without analyzing how those measures could correct the anticipated violations of the Forest Plan. According to SJCA, the EIS's discussion of mitigation measures fell short of NEPA's mandated hard look, and left the public unable to assess the Project's conformity with Forest Plan mandates. We disagree. To be sure, an EIS must assess whether there are [p]ossible conflicts between the proposed action and the objectives of Federal ... use plans, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(c), and then discuss steps that can be taken to mitigate [a project's] adverse environmental consequences. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989). This requirement is [i]mplicit in NEPA's demand that an agency prepare a detailed statement on `any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented.' Id. at 351-52, 109 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(ii)). Accordingly, the EIS must discuss mitigation... in sufficient detail to ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated. Id. at 352, 109 S.Ct. 1835. An agency is required to discuss possible mitigation measures in defining the scope of the EIS, 40 CFR § 1508.25(b) (1987), in discussing alternatives to the proposed action, § 1502.14(f), and consequences of that action, § 1502.16(h), and in explaining its ultimate decision, § 1505.2(c). Id. It is not enough to merely list possible mitigation measures. Colorado Envtl. Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1173 (10th Cir.1999). But NEPA does not contain a substantive requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually formulated and adopted. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352, 109 S.Ct. 1835. An EIS's discussion of mitigation measures need be only reasonably complete. Id. It need not present a mitigation plan that is legally enforceable, funded or even in final form to comply with NEPA's procedural requirements. Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 222 F.3d 677, 681 n. 4 (9th Cir.2000). [T]he line between an EIS that contains an adequate discussion of mitigation measures and one that contains a `mere listing' is not well defined. Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 476 (9th Cir.2000). The essential test is reasonableness. See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352, 109 S.Ct. 1835 (discussion need be only reasonably complete). And the detail that reasonableness requires can depend on the stage of the approval process at which the EIS is prepared. Detailed quantitative assessments of possible mitigation measures are generally necessary when a federal agency prepares an EIS to assess the impacts of a relatively contained, site-specific proposal. See Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Service, 137 F.3d 1372, 1380-81 (9th Cir.1998); The Wilderness Soc'y v. Bosworth, 118 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1106-07 (D.Mont.2000). But requiring such detail would often not be appropriate when the EIS concerns a large-scale, multi-step project and the risks to be mitigated cannot be accurately assessed until final site-specific proposals are presented. For the EIS to analyze in detail every possible site proposal could take enormous time and resources, much of which would be wasted on potential proposals that would never materialize. Thus, NEPA regulations allow for tiering of environmental reviews: Tiering refers to the coverage of general matters in broader environmental impact statements (such as national program or policy statements) with subsequent narrower statements or environmental analyses (such as regional or basinwide program statements or ultimately site-specific statements) incorporating by reference the general discussions and concentrating solely on the issues specific to the statement subsequently prepared. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28. Tiering can eliminate repetitive discussions of the same issues and [allows the agency] to focus on the actual issues ripe for decision at each level of environmental review, id. § 1502.20, while exlud[ing] from consideration issues already decided or not yet ripe, id. § 1508.28(b); see Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1215 (11th Cir.2002). N. Alaska Environmental Center v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969 (9th Cir.2006), is instructive. Environmentalists alleged that an EIS analyzing the environmental consequences of a BLM plan to offer long-term oil and gas leases in northern Alaska violated NEPA because it only listed general mitigation measures and did not analyze the effectiveness of each measure. Id. at 979. The Ninth Circuit, however, upheld the EIS's discussion of mitigation measures. Similar to the project at issue here, the BLM's approval of the leasing plan did not approve any construction projects. Actual on-the-ground disturbances would not occur until the project's exploration and development stages, see id. at 977, and permits for those actions would not issue until the agency had performed extensive analysis of site-specific environmental effects and appropriate mitigation measures, see id. at 973. Although the EIS included lease stipulations and required operating procedures to avoid or minimize the environmental impact of the leasing program, it left further details regarding possible additional mitigation measures to site-specific environmental assessments when lessees submitted exploration and development plans. See id. at 979. Given the uncertainty regarding which sites would eventually be developed at such an early stage of a multi-step process, the court determined that the development of more specific mitigating measures was not required at that time. Id; see Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P'ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 515-17 (D.C.Cir.2010) (programmatic EIS's discussion of mitigation measures satisfied NEPA even though many of the mitigation measures were described in general terms and their exact application ... [would] be determined on a site-specific basis); N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Lujan, 961 F.2d 886, 890-91 (9th Cir.1992) (detailed analysis of mitigation measures is unwarranted in a programmatic EIS; it can be deferred until a concrete development proposal crystalizes the dimensions of a project's probable environmental consequences (internal quotation marks omitted)). We think that the EIS's discussion of the Project's impact on Area 9A standards was reasonably complete. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352, 109 S.Ct. 1835. The EIS and the ROD indicate that further review will take place when the Lessees submit site-specific permit applications. That review will be tiered to the [EIS] and will be limited in scope ... to the site-specific aspects of the environmental analysis that were not covered by the [EIS]. Aplts. App. at 413. Because of the uncertainty regarding the siting of wells and ancillary facilities, much of the EIS analysis had to rely on conceptual approximations of the best facility location based upon field knowledge, topographic map aids, and the application of well spacing rules. Aplees.-Fed. Defs. Supp.App., Vol. I at 110-11. Even so, the EIS included more than seven pages of siting and engineering techniques and best management practices to reduce CBM development effects to surface water quality, quantity, and use. Id. For example, the EIS recommends 11 mitigation measures if a pipeline, road, or power line has to cross a stream, wetland, or riparian area. As the EIS points out, the Forest Service Region 2 Watershed Conservation Practices Handbook describes the general effectiveness of many of these measures, often referencing empirical studies. The EIS also recommends the development of site-specific mitigation plans during the approval process of individual wells that would disturb wetlands or riparian areas, and notes that the Forest Plan requires the Lessees to implement monitoring plans to assess surface-water quality. SJCA has utterly failed to explain why it was unreasonable for the EIS to leave further detail to environmental analyses tied to specific site approvals. If SJCA believes that such analyses are nonexistent or inadequate, it can challenge the associated site approvals.
A footnote in SJCA's opening brief contends that the [Federal Defendants] violated NEPA when [they] failed to demonstrate compliance with the Forest Plan's wildlife standards. Aplt. Br. at 47 n.15. We decline to consider this issue. SJCA's opening brief mentions this NEPA argument only that one time, and the footnote is in a section of its brief whose title  The Forest Service Violated NEPA By Failing To Demonstrate Compliance With The Forest Plan's Stream Protection Standards  does not encompass this issue. Id. at 45. Moreover, the footnote fails to develop SJCA's argument. It states: For the same reasons [apparently referring to SJCA's reasons for believing that the EIS's discussion of riparian-area mitigation measures was inadequate], the agency also violated NEPA when it failed to demonstrate compliance with the Forest Plan's wildlife standards. For example, the Forest Service offered no analysis of whether seasonal traffic restrictions could achieve compliance with the Area 5B standards. Id. at 47 n. 15. SJCA advances the argument no further, leaving to this Court the burden of constructing a persuasive case for its position. This we will not do. Having raised the issue insufficiently in its opening brief, SJCA has waived it on appeal. See Therrien v. Target Corp., 617 F.3d 1242, 1252-53 (10th Cir.2010) (appellant waived argument on appeal when it mentioned the issue only once in a footnote in its opening brief and footnote did not contain argument); Norris, a Dover Res. Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir.2005) (issue mentioned but not argued in footnote was not adequately briefed); Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1169 (10th Cir. 2002) (one-sentence NEPA argument waived because not briefed adequately); United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1131 (10th Cir.2002) (Arguments raised in a perfunctory manner, such as in a footnote, are waived.).
NEPA required the EIS to analyze the Project's cumulative environmental impact on the San Juan Basin and surrounding area. See Richmond, 483 F.3d at 1133; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25. Cumulative impact is the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency ... or person undertakes such other actions. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. It can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time. Id. In evaluating a proposal's cumulative impact, an agency must consider the project's proximity to historical or cultural resources, park lands, ... or ecologically critical areas. Id. § 1508.27(b)(3). As summarized by a fellow circuit: [A] meaningful cumulative impact analysis must identify five things: (1) the area in which the effects of the proposed project will be felt; (2) the impacts that are expected in that area from the proposed project; (3) other actions  past, present, and proposed, and reasonably foreseeable  that have had or are expected to have impacts in the same area; (4) the impacts or expected impacts from these other actions; and (5) the overall impact that can be expected if the individual impacts are allowed to accumulate. TOMAC, Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 864 (D.C.Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because CBM drilling and various activities associated with the construction of CBM wells and their ancillary facilities can affect the surrounding region's air quality, the Federal Defendants used air-pollutant-dispersion modeling to assess the Project's cumulative impact on air quality and visibility. Their modeling sought to quantify potential [carbon monoxide] and [nitrogen dioxide] impacts during [well] operation, based on the period of maximum potential emissions and other emission sources located within the Analysis Area. Lessee' Supp.App., Vol. I at 315. The analysis covered 12,600 square miles of southwestern Colorado and northwestern New Mexico, and assessed the Project's air-quality impacts at Mesa Verde National Park and Weminuche Wilderness Area in Colorado. SJCA contends that the Federal Defendants' analysis nevertheless violated NEPA because they failed to assess the Project's effects on air quality and visibility in certain Class I areas within New Mexico. The Clean Air Act defines Class I areas to include national wilderness areas exceeding 5,000 acres and national parks exceeding 6,000 acres. See 42 U.S.C. § 7472(a). The Act declares as a national goal the prevention of any future... [manmade] impairment of visibility in Class I areas. Id. § 7491(a). SJCA argues that the absence of an assessment of the New Mexico areas violated NEPA's requirement to take a hard look at the impacts of the Project to these areas, which Congress has identified as being ecologically critical, and that [t]he stunted scope of [the cumulative-impact] analysis cannot be excused as a necessary line-drawing decision by the government. Aplt. Br. at 50. We disagree. Setting the boundaries of the region to be analyzed involved technical and scientific judgments within the Federal Defendants' area of expertise, and their conclusion regarding which Class I sites to include in the analysis is one to which we defer. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 414, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976) (the determination of the extent and effect of [cumulative environmental impacts], and particularly identification of the geographic area within which they may occur, is a task assigned to the special competency of the appropriate agencies); Morris, 598 F.3d at 691 ([O]ur deference to [an] agency is especially strong where [its] challenged decisions involve technical or scientific matters within the agency's area of expertise. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Both the Mesa Verde and Weminuche Class I areas are closer to the Project Area than the New Mexico Class I areas. SJCA has not demonstrated that it was unreasonable for the Federal Defendants to conclude that any visibility impacts in Class I areas would be greatest in those two areas, and impacts at other, more distant areas would be less significant. Fed. Defs. Br. at 57. We recognize that the New Mexico Environment Department disagreed with this conclusion. According to the state agency, dispersion modeling analyses demonstrated that emissions from the Four Corners region degrade New Mexico's Class I areas visibility equally or more than Colorado's Class I areas, a fact which necessitated analysis at northern New Mexico Class I areas. Aplts. Appx., Vol. II at 434-35. But the Four Corners region encompasses a far larger area (and much of it significantly closer to New Mexico Class I areas) than the Project Area. And in any event, [w]hen specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851; see Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1272 n. 14 (10th Cir.2004) ([An agency] is entitled to rely on its own experts even when their opinions conflict with those of other federal agencies, as long as its decisions are not arbitrary and capricious.). The Federal Defendants' decision to limit the study to Colorado Class I areas was not arbitrary or capricious.