Opinion ID: 14718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sir?

Text: 9 Q. You went with the two nephews to Houston didn't you? 10 A. Yes, sir. 11 Q. You were also going over there to get some drugs weren't you? 12 A. No, sir. 13 Pratt's counsel did not object. 14 In closing argument, Pratt's counsel stated: 15 Quite candidly perhaps Leo [Washington] deserved it. Leo Washington, I believe it is clear, was a drug dealer. My client was an informant, informed on Leo's money, Leo's two cousins who are in jail in Texas. Leo didn't like that. Leo frightened my client. 16 .... 17 [Leo][g]ot in an argument, over dope money that he lost, his $10,000. Drug dealers ... get killed when they're trying to pressure informants, when they're trying to pressure people, and that's what happened here. 18 During rebuttal closing argument for the State, the prosecutor stated: 19 [Pratt's] on trial for murder. He's not going to get up on that stand and tell you that he's not a drug dealer. What's not clear from the testimony that his attorney brought out at trial is why was Leo Washington asking him for $10,000.00 if he just went to Houston to visit some of Leo's relatives. If he wasn't involved in something himself why would he even give Leo some money. Why? It doesn't make sense. It's a smoke screen. You still can't kill somebody regardless of what you may think about Leo [Washington]. The defense has put Leo Washington on trial. He is not on trial, he was a living, breathing human being. He's no longer a living, breathing human being, he's dead. He can't come into this courtroom and he can't talk to you and tell you what he was thinking or he can't tell you that George Pratt was the one involved with drugs. 20 (Emphasis added.) Pratt's counsel did not object to the references to drugs. 21 Pratt was sentenced to life in prison without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. After obtaining new counsel, he moved for a new trial, on the ground that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object: to the State's cross-examination of Pratt about accompanying Washington's nephews to obtain drugs; and to the State's rebuttal closing argument, in which Pratt was referred to as a drug-dealer. Pratt maintained that a mistrial would have been granted had counsel objected. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. 22 Pratt appealed, claiming error in the denial of his new trial motion. Noting that an ineffective assistance claim is usually properly raised in seeking collateral relief, the state court of appeal found the record sufficient to instead consider the claim on direct appeal. Pratt, 653 So.2d at 176. The court affirmed, holding that, even assuming the prosecutor's response to Pratt's evidence and argument was improper and Pratt's counsel rendered deficient performance by not objecting, Pratt had not demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for the State's references to other crimes, the outcome would have been different. Id. at 177-78. The court stated: [E]ven if counsel had moved for a mistrial and it had been granted, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of a new trial would have been different. Id. at 178. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Pratt's application for a writ of certiorari. State v. Pratt, 662 So.2d 9 (La.1995). 23 In March 1996, Pratt filed for federal habeas relief, raising the same ineffective assistance claim: that his trial counsel's performance was deficient, because he failed to object when the prosecutor referred to uncharged drug-dealing, both during cross-examination and in closing argument; and that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance, because, under state law, an objection would have resulted in a mandatory mistrial. 24 Concluding both that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary and that the state court records provided a sufficient basis for resolving the sole issue presented, the magistrate judge recommended habeas relief, on the basis that Pratt's trial attorney's performance was deficient when he failed to object to the prosecutor's remarks and ask for a mistrial; and that Pratt had shown prejudice, because an objection would have resulted in a mandatory mistrial. The district court overruled the State's objections to the recommendation, and ordered that Pratt be discharged from custody unless the State rearraigned him within 60 days after the date of the judgment. 1