Opinion ID: 1057719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: For purposes of this section: Blighted

Text: property means any property that endangers the public health or safety in its condition at the time of the filing of the petition for condemnation and is (i) a public nuisance or (ii) an individual commercial, industrial, or residential structure or improvement that is beyond repair or unfit for human occupancy or use. Code § 1-219.1(A), (B) (emphasis added). Paragraph 3 of Chapter 882 provides: until July 1, 2010, the provisions of this act shall not affect the ability of a redevelopment and housing authority organized pursuant to Title 36 of the Code of Virginia to acquire property pursuant to any redevelopment or conservation plan adopted prior to January 1, 2007. However, the provisions of this act shall be applicable to all redevelopment and conservation plans adopted after January 1, 2007. (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 4 of Chapter 882, as amended by Acts 2010, ch. 203, provides: [n]othing contained in this act shall prohibit the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority or the City of Norfolk to acquire property located at . . . , both located in the City of Norfolk, through the use of eminent domain for the location of a recreational facility open to the public to be owned or operated by a not-for-profit entity, provided such acquisitions are instituted prior to January 1, 2011. 7 (Emphasis added). 2. Statutory Interpretation of Code § 1-219.1 and Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Chapter 882 PKO, in its first assignment of error, contends that the circuit court erred in allowing the NRHA to acquire the Property after July 1, 2010 by a condemnation action that the NRHA filed before July 1, 2010. PKO argues that the circuit court erred because: (1) the Property was not blighted at the time the petition was filed, as required by Code § 1-219.1, and (2) the acquisition of unblighted property was prohibited beginning on July 1, 2010, as indicated in Paragraph 3 of Chapter 882. PKO's assignment of error presents an issue of statutory interpretation of both Code § 1-219.1 and Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Chapter 882. This presents a pure question of law which we will review de novo. Laws v. McIlroy, 283 Va. 594, 598, 724 S.E.2d 699, 702 (2012). When evaluating statutory language, the Court applies the plain language of a statute unless the terms are ambiguous. Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 926 (2006). When an enactment is clear and unequivocal, general rules for construction of statutes of doubtful meaning do not apply. Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). We have held that in the construction of statutes conferring the power of eminent domain, every reasonable doubt 8 is to be [resolved] adversely to th[at] right. School Board v. Alexander, 126 Va. 407, 413, 101 S.E. 349, 351 (1919). [U]nless both the spirit and letter of the statute clearly confer the power, it cannot be exercised. Id. Statutes authorizing the power of eminent domain must, therefore, be strictly construed, and a locality must comply fully with the statutory requirements when attempting to exercise this right. 3232 Page Ave. Condo. Unit Owners Ass'n v. City of Va. Beach, 284 Va. 639, 645, 735 S.E.2d 672, 675 (2012). The plain meaning of Code § 1-219.1 makes it clear that redevelopment and housing authorities no longer have the authority to condemn individual properties within a redevelopment area determined to be a blighted area when the properties are not themselves blighted. The central issue in this appeal, however, is whether the NRHA, in its acquisition of the Property, is bound by the enactment of Code § 1-219.1. 3. Effective Date of Code § 1-219.1 Code § 1-219.1 became effective on July 1, 2007. It applied to all governmental entities, including the NRHA. The ability. . . to acquire property as specified in Paragraph 3 refers to the completion of an effective taking, and does not permit a redevelopment and housing authority acting pursuant to a valid redevelopment plan to acquire properties that are not 9 themselves blighted after July 1, 2010 merely by filing a petition for condemnation. We have held that we have a duty, whenever possible, to interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal. Generally, the Court will look to the whole body of [a statute] to determine the true intention of each part. Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon, 281 Va. 543, 549, 708 S.E.2d 846, 850 (2011) (quoting Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488, 498, 621 S.E.2d 48, 52-53 (2005)). This includes the entirety of a single legislative enactment as it appears in the Acts of Assembly as a whole. Eberhardt v. Fairfax Cnty. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 283 Va. 190, 194, 721 S.E.2d 524, 536 (2012). Accordingly, we must read the text of Chapter 882 as a whole to determine the intended meaning of the words ability . . . to acquire as used in Paragraph 3. We also assume [w]hen interpreting and applying a statute, . . . that the General Assembly chose, with care, the words it used in enacting the statute, and we are bound by those words. Kiser v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 285 Va. 12, 19 n.2, 736 S.E.2d 910, 915 n.2 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because we assume that the General Assembly chose the statutory language with care, when the General Assembly has used specific language in one instance, but omits that language or uses different language when addressing a similar subject elsewhere in the 10 Code, we must presume that the difference in the choice of language was intentional. Newberry Station Homeowners Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 285 Va. 604, 616, 740 S.E.2d 548, 554 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). We presume that the General Assembly's use of specific language in Paragraph 4 of Chapter 882 was intentional and consequential. Paragraph 4 establishes an exception to the application of the provisions of Code § 1-219.1 specifically for the NRHA for one specific recreational project, which is not the project at issue here, so long as the petition for acquisition by eminent domain was instituted prior to January 1, 2011. Thus, Paragraph 4 clearly sets a deadline for the filing of the petition for condemnation and demonstrates that when the General Assembly wanted to make an exception to the application of Code § 1-219.1 based on the date a petition for condemnation was filed, it did so with clear and unambiguous language. In contrast, Paragraph 3 applies to all redevelopment and housing authorities operating pursuant to redevelopment plans adopted prior to January 1, 2007. It does not refer to either the filing of a petition for condemnation or the institution of the acquisition of property, but instead places a limitation on the ability of a redevelopment and housing authority . . . to acquire property. This language is not comparable to the language contained in Paragraph 4 of Chapter 882 and cannot be 11 construed to provide an exception to the application of Code § 1-219.1 based on the date the petition for condemnation was filed. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred when it allowed the NRHA to acquire the Property subsequent to the statutory deadline. The parties stipulated that the Property was not blighted. Further, the NRHA did not acquire the Property by obtaining title by certificate of take or certificate of deposit, or an award pursuant to a petition for condemnation prior to the July 1, 2010 deadline established by Paragraph 3. The NRHA therefore retained its ability to acquire the unblighted property only until July 1, 2010 when the limitations of Code § 1-219.1 became applicable. On July 1, 2010, the terms of Code § 1-219.1 governed the NRHA's attempted acquisition and barred its authority to condemn PKO's unblighted Property. 4. Whether the NRHA Had a Substantive Right to Acquire PKO's Property under Title 36 of the Code The NRHA contends that even if the Court determines that Paragraph 3 of Chapter 882 does require it to have completed litigation prior to the July 1, 2010 deadline, the circuit court did not err. The NRHA argues that Title 36 of the Code conferred the NRHA with a substantive right to acquire PKO's Property that cannot be impaired by the enactment of a later 12 statute. According to the NRHA, the law in effect when its right to acquire the Property accrued governs the proceeding.  The NRHA contends that its right to obtain PKO's Property arose in 1998 with the adoption of the Redevelopment Project, and that the language of Code § 1-219.1 cannot limit that right. We disagree. We have previously held that there are no vested rights in a potential result in pending litigation. Marriott v. Harris, 235 Va. 199, 212, 368 S.E.2d 225, 231 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The NRHA filed a petition for condemnation in April 2010 but did not acquire title to the Property until after