Opinion ID: 771682
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Can the Definitions be Saved by a Narrowing Construction?

Text: 85 In order to save the definitions, they must be construed to apply only to expenditures for communications that contain explicit words advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. It is well-settled that a federal court must uphold a statute if it is 'readily susceptible' to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional . . . . The key to application of this principle is that the statute must be 'readily susceptible' to the limitation; we will not rewrite a state law to conform it to constitutional requirements. Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 397 (citations omitted, emphasis added). Even the Supreme Court is without power to adopt a narrowing construction of a state statute unless such a construction is reasonable and readily apparent. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2616 (2000) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998) (statute must be genuinely susceptible to narrowing construction); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987) (fairly or obviously susceptible); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (easily susceptible). 86 In order to narrow 103(7) and (11) so that they are consistent with Buckley, we would not only have to add qualifying language (indicated with an underline), but would also have to disregard entire phrases (indicated by 87 103(7) Independent expenditure means payment of money by any person for the purpose of expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, which expenditure is not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. 'Independent expenditure' includes expenditures for political messages . . . . 88 103(11) Political message means a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which expressly advocates the election or defeat of any candidate. 8 89 To rewrite the statutes in this manner would exceed the power and function of the court, and would fail to bind state prosecutors, leaving the citizens of Colorado vulnerable to prosecutions under the actual language of the statute. See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2616; Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 397. Accordingly, we decline [Colorado's] invitation to give the statute[s] a construction more restrictive than that provided by [their] plain language. Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 948 (10th Cir. 1987). As written, 103(7), (10), and (11) are not susceptible of a narrowing construction. As explained below, however, we can sever the problematic language from the definitions and then narrowly construe the remaining text. 90