Opinion ID: 4510923
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct or Indirect Evidence

Text: The parties dispute which test applies to Fisher’s failure to accommodate claim. ADA discrimination claims are analyzed under two different rubrics, depending on whether the plaintiff relies on “direct” or “indirect” evidence of discrimination. See Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 826 F.3d 885, 891–92 (6th Cir. 2016). Direct evidence of disability discrimination “does not require the fact finder to draw any inferences [to conclude] that the disability was at least a motivating factor.” Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 853 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We have explained why the distinction between direct and indirect is “vital”: When an employer acknowledges that it relied upon the plaintiff’s handicap in making its employment decision[,] the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting approach is unnecessary because the issue of the employer’s intent, the issue for which McDonnell Douglas was designed, has been admitted by the defendant and the plaintiff has direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of his or her disability. Ferrari, 862 F.3d at 892 (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Because failure to accommodate is listed in the Act’s definition of disability discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), “claims premised upon an employer’s failure to offer a reasonable accommodation necessarily involve direct evidence (the failure to accommodate) of discrimination. . . . [I]f the fact-finder accepts the employee’s version of the facts, no inference is necessary to conclude that the employee has proven this form of discrimination.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 868 (citation omitted). A substantial body of our caselaw confirms this distinction. See, e.g., Brumley v. UPS, 909 F.3d 834, 839 (6th Cir. 2018); EEOC v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 899 F.3d 428, 435 (6th Cir. 2018); Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 853; Meade v. AT&T Corp., 657 F. App’x 391, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2016); Belasco v. Warrensville Heights City Sch. Dist., 634 F. App’x 507, 514 (6th Cir. 2015); Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp., 610 F. App’x 519, 526 (6th Cir. 2015); Horn v. Knight Facilities Mgmt.-GM, 556 F. App’x 452, 454–55 (6th Cir. 2014); Cash v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 548 F. App’x 330, 334 (6th Cir. 2013). Despite this robust precedent, Nissan argues that “a per se rule applying the direct evidence test to all accommodation cases would conflict with the numerous published and unpublished decisions of the Sixth Circuit.” As Nissan points out, we have occasionally— No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 7 though generally in unpublished cases—analyzed a failure-to-accommodate claim under the indirect test. See, e.g., Keogh v. Concentra Health Servs., 752 F. App’x 316, 326 (6th Cir. 2018); Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 883 F.3d 595, 603 (6th Cir. 2018); Aldini v. Kroger Co. of Mich., 628 F. App’x 347, 350 (6th Cir. 2015); Johnson v. Cleveland City Sch. Dist., 443 F. App’x 974, 982–83 (6th Cir. 2011). These cases do not explain why they apply the indirect test rather than the direct, nor do they distinguish Kleiber and its progeny. And each can be traced back to a single case, DiCarlo v. Potter, that applied the indirect test when analyzing a failure to accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation Act, not the ADA. 358 F.3d 408, 419 (6th Cir. 2004).1 Our court, sitting en banc, has explained that though the two statutes have many similarities, they are not identical. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 314–17 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Kleiber, our foundational case establishing that ADA failure to accommodate claims are analyzed pursuant to the direct test, controls. Fisher also provides additional direct evidence of discrimination, in the form of an alleged policy against accommodating “personal” disabilities. According to both Fisher’s testimony and notes from a nurse at his doctor’s office, Nissan refused to allow him to return to work with restrictions. When Fisher requested transfers to easier positions, one supervisor insisted that easier positions “ain’t for this kind of stuff” and another said his “hands [were] tied.” Yet Fisher claimed to have heard of at least two coworkers who were permitted restrictions and reassignments to easier positions after suffering on-the-job injuries. One of his supervisors explained the difference in a memo, writing that “Nissan does not accommodate personal restrictions.” In records from Fisher’s visits to Nissan’s medical department, the diagnosis reads only “[p]ersonal.” Factual disputes as to Nissan’s policies regarding assignment to easier positions remain. Because the record reflects that Fisher’s claim was based on Nissan’s failure to offer a reasonable accommodation, it involves direct evidence of discrimination under the ADA. See Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 853. Under the direct-evidence framework, Fisher bears the burden of 1Tracing the citation chain back further, DiCarlo relies on another Rehabilitation Act case, Gaines v. Runyon, 107 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (6th Cir. 1997), for the indirect test. No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 8 establishing (1) that he is disabled, and (2) that he is “‘otherwise qualified’ for the position despite his or her disability: (a) without accommodation from the employer; (b) with an alleged ‘essential’ job requirement eliminated; or (c) with a proposed reasonable accommodation.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 869 (quoting Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2004)). Nissan bears the burden of “proving that a challenged job criterion is essential, and therefore a business necessity, or that a proposed accommodation will impose an undue hardship upon” Nissan. Id. (citation omitted). Notably, although “[a] defendant may use a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale as a shield against indirect or circumstantial evidence of discrimination,” such a “neutral policy is of no moment” under the direct test. Dolgencorp, 899 F.3d at 435 (emphasis omitted). In other words, an employer “may not illegitimately deny an employee a reasonable accommodation” pursuant to “a general policy and use that same policy as a” so-called “neutral basis for firing him.” Id. Because Nissan does not dispute that Fisher is disabled, we proceed to the second element of Fisher’s proof.