Opinion ID: 6321818
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Previous cases

Text: ¶18 This framework has been further refined by three of our previous cases: Law Enforcement Standards Board v. Village of Lyndon Station, 101 Wis. 2d 472, 305 N.W.2d 89 (1981); Gibson v. Transportation Commission, 106 Wis. 2d 22, 315 N.W.2d 346 (1982); and Milwaukee County v. LIRC, 139 Wis. 2d 805. Lyndon Station 10 See, e.g., State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 406, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999) (holding that substantially probable means much more likely than not rather than extreme likelihood); AllEnergy Corp. v. Trempealeau Cnty. Env't & Land Use Comm., 2017 WI 52, ¶76, 375 Wis. 2d 329, 895 N.W.2d 368 (reiterating that substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence but does not amount to preponderance of the evidence). 12 No. 2019AP1671 concerned whether the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB) unlawfully discriminated when it deemed a prospective police chief ineligible for that appointment because he had been convicted of 26 counts of misconduct in public office for falsifying uniform traffic citations while working as a chief deputy sheriff. 101 Wis. 2d at 475-77. We held that common sense dictated that the LESB recognize a substantial relationship between the convicted offenses and the job of police chief. Id. at 492. We pointed to the importance of [p]ublic trust in the integrity of our law enforcement officials and reasoned that someone who had been convicted of 26 felonies would have his effectiveness as a law enforcement officer greatly diminished. Id. at 492-93. ¶19 Gibson concerned whether the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) made a properly detailed inquiry into Gibson's conviction record when it refused to grant him a school bus driver's license. 106 Wis. 2d at 23-24. The DOT refused to license Gibson after considering only the elements of armed robbery——the crime for which Gibson was convicted——and not the surrounding circumstances, such as the fact that Gibson's coconspirator was the one who was armed. Id. We held that the DOT had a rational basis for limiting its inquiry to the elements of the convicted offense as that information alone sufficiently established a substantial relationship to the school bus driver 13 No. 2019AP1671 job.11 Id. at 27. We elaborated that the elements of armed robbery indicated a disregard for both the personal and property rights of other persons . . . [and] a propensity to use force or the threat of force to accomplish one's purposes. Id. at 28. We considered these traits to be contradictory to the traits required to be a bus driver, namely patience and level-headedness. Id. We cautioned that this case does not mean that the particular factual circumstances of the crime upon which a felony conviction was based may never be relevant in a substantial relationship evaluation because such a holding would impermissibly render the circumstances of which language superfluous. Id. ¶20 Milwaukee County contains the most recent and thorough discussion of the substantial relationship test. 139 Wis. 2d 805. That case concerned whether an individual's convictions for misdemeanor patient neglect arising from his employment as a nursing home administrator substantially related to being a crisis intervention specialist. Id. at 809. In defining the scope of the substantial relationship inquiry, we looked to the term circumstances. Id. at 818. To determine which circumstances were relevant, we focused on the underlying statutory purpose, highlighting the balance between the two sometimes competing This case, along with the other two cases concerning the 11 substantial relationship test, was decided before Tetra Tech EC., Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21, abrogated judicial deference to administrative agency interpretations of law. Under the old standard, we upheld an agency's decision if there was a rational basis for the agency to come to its conclusions. See Dairy Equip. Co. v. DILHR, 95 Wis. 2d 319, 327, 290 N.W.2d 330 (1980). 14 No. 2019AP1671 rehabilitation and public-protection interests. Id. at 821-23. We determined that although it is highly desirable to reintegrate convicted criminals into the workforce . . . the legislature has clearly chosen to not force such attempts at rehabilitation in employment settings where experience has demonstrated the likelihood of repetitive criminal behavior. Id. at 823. It declared that the purpose of the substantial relationship test is to [a]ssess[] whether the tendencies and inclinations to behave a certain way in a particular context are likely to reappear later in a related context, based on the traits revealed. Id. at 824. ¶21 Based on that understanding of the test, we interpreted circumstances to mean those circumstances material to foster[ing] criminal activity, for example, the opportunity for criminal behavior, the reaction to responsibility, or the character traits of the person. Id. But immaterial details such as the hour of the day the offense was committed, the clothes worn during the crime, whether a knife or gun was used, whether there was one victim or a dozen[,] or whether the robber wanted money to buy drugs or to raise bail money for a friend fall beyond the scope of relevant circumstances. Id. We emphasized that this line resulted in a practical test which employers can reliably apply without a full-blown factual hearing. Id. at 826. Finally, we addressed the Gibson court's supposed elements only test—— that the statutory test requires only a review of the elements of the crime——by saying that [i]t appears that the 'elements only' test is not a test distinct from the statutory test. Rather, 15 No. 2019AP1671 focusing on the elements simply helped to elucidate the circumstances of the offense. Id. ¶22 Applying our refined view of circumstances, we held that the circumstances of the convicted offenses did substantially relate to the circumstances of the crisis intervention specialist job. Id. at 828. We rejected a superficial distinction between the fact that the offenses were committed in an administrative capacity while the job at hand involved direct care, instead focusing on the fact that the prospective employee would again be responsible for the wellbeing of vulnerable individuals. Id. at 830.