Opinion ID: 2521277
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Give Accomplice Instruction Sua Sponte

Text: Defendant contends that because Littleton assertedly was an accomplice, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that it should view Littleton's testimony with caution. (CALJIC No. 3.18.) The trial court instructed the jury that [t]he testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust and that [a]n accomplice is a person who was subject to prosecution for the identical offenses charged in Counts I, II, III and IV against the defendant on trial by reason of aiding and abetting or being a member of a criminal conspiracy. The trial court further instructed the jury that it must determine whether the witness Roland Rocky Mourning was an accomplice, but the court did not instruct the jury that it also should determine whether Littleton was an accomplice. The trial court did not err. When an accomplice is called to testify on behalf of the prosecution, the court must instruct the jurors that accomplice testimony should be viewed with distrust. ( People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 565, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928.) [3] Section 1111 defines an accomplice as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given. It is clear that Littleton was not an accomplice within the meaning of section 1111. Although he would have been an accomplice if defendant were being prosecuted for the planned cocaine transaction, he was not an accomplice in the present case, because he was not liable to prosecution for the offenses chargednamely, his own attempted murder, the robbery of himself and his companions, and the murder of his companions. (§ 1111.) Defendant argues that Littleton was liable to prosecution for the murder of his companions under the provocative act theory. ( People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 867-872, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225; People v. Mai (1994) 22 Cal. App.4th 117, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 141.) We disagree. The provocative act murder doctrine has traditionally been invoked in cases in which the perpetrator of the underlying crime instigates a gun battle, either by firing first or by otherwise engaging in severe, life-threatening, and usually gun-wielding conduct, and the police, or a victim of the underlying crime, responds with privileged lethal force by shooting back and killing the perpetrator's accomplice or an innocent bystander. [Citations.] ( People v. Cervantes, supra, 26 Cal.4th 860, 867, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225; People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690, 704, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365, revd. on other grounds in Gilbert California (1967) 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178.) In the present case, defendant's testimony that Littleton pointed a gun at him and demanded the cocaine is not sufficient to establish that Littleton instigated a gun battle within the meaning of the provocative act murder doctrine. [M]ere participation in an armed robbery is not sufficient to invoke murder liability, direct or vicarious, when the victim resists and kills. ( In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 504, 165 Cal.Rptr. 837, 612 P.2d 927, fn. omitted; People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130.) Because the evidence in this case is insufficient to support a murder charge against Littleton on a provocative act theory, we have no occasion to determine whether a trial court would have a sua sponte obligation to instruct the jury on this theory in the absence of a claim by the defendant at trial that a witness who ostensibly was a victim of defendant's criminal conduct actually was liable to prosecution for murder on a provocative act theory and should be considered an accomplice for purposes of section 1111.