Opinion ID: 555040
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial Review of the Recordkeeping Guidelines

Text: 40 Like the PRA, the FRA contains no express preclusion of judicial review. Appellants here repeat their argument that the statute impliedly precludes judicial review. They point out that the FRA expressly provides for judicial review only in an action, initiated by the Attorney General at the request of the Archivist or an agency head, to prevent the unlawful removal or destruction of documents. 44 U.S.C. Secs. 2905(a), 3106. All other review, they argue, is precluded because Congress chose to ensure compliance with the FRA through administrative enforcement and congressional oversight rather than judicial review. We do not find, however, in the FRA the clear and convincing evidence necessary to overcome the presumption in favor of judicial review. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). We thus reject appellants' argument for implied preclusion and hold that the district court on remand may entertain plaintiffs' claim that appellants' recordkeeping guidelines and directives to the NSC staff are inadequate because they permit the destruction of records that must be preserved under the FRA. 41 First, the fact the FRA expressly provides for judicial review in an action brought by the Attorney General to prevent the destruction or removal of records does not of itself mean that all other judicial review is precluded. It is well-established law that  '[t]he mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should not suffice to support an implication of exclusion as to others. The right to review is too important to be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of legislative intent.'  Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 141, 87 S.Ct. at 1511 (quoting Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 357 (1965)). 42 Similarly, the fact that Congress retains some direct oversight over agencies' compliance with the FRA does not necessarily indicate an intent to preclude judicial review. Indeed, in American Friends we rejected this argument as overbroad because it would create an enormous exception to judicial review: Congress exercises oversight over all agencies, gets reports from many, and is often consulted by the executive branch before specific actions are taken. 720 F.2d at 44. Accordingly, the fact that the Archivist must submit to Congress annual reports evaluating the agencies' records management practices, 44 U.S.C. Secs. 2106, 2904(c)(8), and notify Congress of violations of the FRA, id. Secs. 2115(b), 2905(a), is insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of judicial review. 7 43 Appellants additionally argue that Congress, by amending the FRA in 1984 to enhance the enforcement authority and responsibilities of the Archivist, reinforced its intent to supplant all judicial review. We view the 1984 amendments, however, as not intended to bar judicial review, but instead as a direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 100 S.Ct. 960, 63 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980). In Kissinger, the Supreme Court held that the FRA does not contain an implied cause of action allowing private parties to bring suit to recover records that have been unlawfully removed from an agency. Recognizing that this created the anomalous situation ... whereby an agency head has a duty to initiate action to recover records which he himself has removed, Congress amended the FRA to require the Archivist to ask the Attorney General to sue and to notify Congress if the agency head failed to make a similar request of the Attorney General. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-1124, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 28 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 3865, 3894, 3903; see also 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2905(a) (Archivist's enforcement authority), Sec. 3106 (agency head's enforcement authority). Nothing in the Conference Report or the 1984 amendments indicates a congressional intent to preclude ordinary judicial review of the adequacy of an agency's recordkeeping guidelines and directives. The more natural reading is that Congress intended only to eliminate the Kissinger loophole and establish a more effective administrative enforcement process to prevent the unlawful destruction or removal of records by agency officials. 44 In sum, neither the statutory scheme nor the legislative history evinces a congressional intent to preclude judicial review of the adequacy of the NSC's recordkeeping guidelines and directives. In this respect, we note that the legislative history and statutory scheme of the FRA differ significantly from the PRA. In drafting the FRA, Congress did not have to worry about the stark separation of powers questions implicated by legislation regulating the conduct of the President's daily operations. The congressional intent, evident in the PRA, to minimize outside interference with the President's recordkeeping practices is lacking in the FRA, with its more detailed and comprehensive agency recordkeeping provisions. Instead, the FRA reflects a congressional intent to ensure that agencies adequately document their policies and decisions, S.Rep. No. 2140, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950), and that their records management programs strike a balance between developing efficient and effective records management, and the substantive need for Federal records. S.Rep. No. 94-1326, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 6150, 6150-51; see also 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2902. Allowing judicial review of the adequacy of an agency's recordkeeping guidelines will frustrate neither the intent of Congress nor the FRA statutory scheme designed to implement that intent. Accordingly, we hold that the district court was authorized to hear plaintiffs' APA claim that the NSC's recordkeeping guidelines and directives do not adequately describe the material that must be retained as records under the FRA.
45 Appellants claim that even if the FRA does not preclude judicial review, the establishment of guidelines and directives defining records under the FRA is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 701(a)(2). Because we find that there is law to apply and the factors that courts point to as weighing against judicial review are not present in this instance, we reject appellants' argument. 46 Under the classic formulation, agency action is committed to agency discretion by law if the statute authorizing the agency action is drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 820, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (internal quotations omitted). The FRA clearly provides sufficiently detailed standards regarding what material the agencies must retain. For example, the FRA contains a detailed definition of the records that agencies must preserve. 44 U.S.C. Secs. 2901(1), 3301. It also mandates that the head of each agency shall establish and maintain a records management program, 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3102, and shall establish safeguards against the removal or loss of records, 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3105. Although the FRA understandably leaves the details of records management to the discretion of individual agency heads, it does contain several specific requirements, including the requirement that each agency head shall cooperate with the Archivist and develop a program that is consistent with the Archivist's regulations. 8 See 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3102. We thus have no difficulty in concluding that the FRA provides sufficient law to apply in evaluating the adequacy of appellants' guidelines and directives. 47 In determining whether agency decisions are committed to agency discretion by law, courts have also considered several pragmatic considerations that may militate for or against judicial review of appellants' guidelines and directives. These factors include: (1) the need for judicial supervision to safeguard the interests of the plaintiffs; (2) the impact of review on the effectiveness of the agency in carrying out its congressionally assigned role; and (3) the appropriateness of the issues raised for judicial review. American Friends, 720 F.2d at 41 (internal quotations omitted). 48 In this case, none of these considerations suggests that preclusion of review is appropriate. First, judicial review of the appellants' recordkeeping guidelines and directives is necessary to protect plaintiffs' interests because, if the guidelines are both inadequate and unreviewed, documents that plaintiffs would otherwise be able to study will be destroyed. Second, judicial review of the guidelines and directives will not impede the effectiveness of the agency in carrying out its congressionally assigned role. See id. at 44. Appellants' concerns that allowing judicial review of their guidelines will unduly interfere with agency functioning by requiring agency staff to save every scrap of paper pending a judicial determination of whether it is a record are unfounded. As we recognized in American Friends, even if a court may review the adequacy of an agency's guidelines, agency personnel will implement the guidelines on a daily basis. 720 F.2d at 41. Thus agency personnel, not the court, will actually decide whether specific documents--whether they be scraps of paper or PROFS notes--constitute records under the guidelines. Third, and most importantly, the only issue a court would be asked to consider, i.e., the adequacy of appellants' recordkeeping guidelines and directives, is clearly appropriate for judicial review. Courts review the adequacy and conformity of agency regulations and guidelines with statutory directives every day. 49 In sum, none of the practical factors prompting against review applies in this case. The FRA provides sufficient law to apply, and we find no reason to conclude that Congress intended to commit the development of recordkeeping guidelines and directives to the agencies' complete discretion. 50