Opinion ID: 4533977
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Clickwrap Agreement

Text: The defendants contend that Mason agreed to arbitrate by assenting to a clickwrap agreement that was a part of his online application. In support of this argument, the defendants cite a single source of evidence: the declaration of Richard 8 Case: 18-14019 Date Filed: 05/13/2020 Page: 9 of 21 Winship, the Senior Vice President, Credit Operations and Collections Management for Bluestem Brands, Inc. Winship attached to his declaration a “true and correct copy of a template application for a Fingerhut Credit Account issued by WebBank, in a substantially similar form to the application that existed on August 11, 2013, on the Fingerhut website.” (emphasis added). According to Winship, “[t]he entire terms and conditions were contained on the same page as the application form,” and “Mason could not have opened a credit account on the Fingerhut website unless he clicked ‘Yes! I accept these terms.’” But a close review of Winship’s declaration and its attachment reveals that they don’t establish that Mason agreed to arbitrate when he completed Fingerhut’s online application. First, we do not know what terms Mason actually saw on August 11, 2013, when he viewed the website. The exhibit attached to the declaration, as Winship admits, shows the application in only a “substantially similar form.” In Bazemore, we faced a materially indistinguishable situation and concluded that an attachment that was “a form of the Cardholder Agreement that would have been sent to [the] Plaintiff” was not sufficient to show what terms the plaintiff had actually seen and agreed to. See 827 F.3d at 1331 (alteration and emphasis adopted). Though here a “substantially similar” online application is at issue—rather than a substantially similar cardholder agreement—that makes little difference because the defendants 9 Case: 18-14019 Date Filed: 05/13/2020 Page: 10 of 21 contend that that online application and its terms and conditions somewhere contained the arbitration provision. But we can’t know that without evidence about exactly what application Mason was actually looking at when he signed up for his credit account. Second, and more important, even if we were to assume that the “substantially similar” online application was materially identical to the application Mason actually filled out, we still lack any evidence showing that the online application or its terms and conditions contained an arbitration provision. As we have noted, Winship stated that “[t]he entire terms and conditions were contained on the same page as the application form.” But the attached application displays just two paragraphs of terms and conditions. Even assuming that those made up the “entire” terms and conditions, they still say nothing about arbitration. Instead, they detail “two types of financing provided by WebBank to pay for [ ] Fingerhut purchases.” If additional terms existed, we have no way to know what they were. Finally, though “Terms & Conditions” appears to be a hyperlink, we have no information about the contents of the linked page, and those terms are certainly not “on the same page as the application form.” So that, too, fails to move the needle. Of course, the Mason Card Agreement, also attached to the Winship declaration, contains an arbitration provision. But Winship never stated that the website ever displayed that agreement—as opposed to the application and its terms 10 Case: 18-14019 Date Filed: 05/13/2020 Page: 11 of 21 and conditions—to Mason during his online application. Nor did Winship state that the Mason Card Agreement was the “terms and conditions.” And Winship never explained the relationship, if any, between the Mason Card Agreement and the online application’s terms and conditions. Nor can we infer a relationship from anything in Winship’s declaration. In fact, Winship’s declaration renders the inference implausible because, according to Winship, “[t]he entire terms and conditions were contained on the same page as the [substantially similar] application form.” But, as we have discussed, the Mason Card Agreement, with its included arbitration provision, is not one of those terms. In short, the record evidence neither shows the actual application form that Mason filled out and agreed to online nor demonstrates that that online application contained an arbitration provision. Those evidentiary gaps mean the defendants failed to prove that it’s more probable than not that Mason was provided with a copy of the terms of the arbitration agreement via the online application. See Bazemore, 827 F.3d at 1331 (“[Defendant] did not meet its burden of proving that plaintiff assented to the ‘essential terms of the contract’ for the simple reason that the terms of exactly what, if anything, [plaintiff] agreed to when she applied for the credit card are unknown.”).4 4 Because we conclude that defendants have not shown Mason ever agreed to arbitrate, we need not reach the question of whether Utah law condones the use of clickwrap agreements. 11 Case: 18-14019 Date Filed: 05/13/2020 Page: 12 of 21 2. The Purported Mailing of the Mason Card Agreement Next, the defendants argue that they mailed Mason the Mason Card Agreement, so by way of the mailbox rule, they have established that Mason received the agreement and therefore agreed to arbitrate. But this argument also lacks the necessary evidentiary support. “The common law has long recognized a rebuttable presumption that an item properly mailed was received by the addressee.” Bazemore, 827 F.3d at 1331 n.2 (alteration adopted). A party may take advantage of the mailbox rule’s presumption by showing that “(1) the document was properly addressed; (2) the document was stamped; and (3) the document was mailed.” In re E. Coast Brokers & Packers, Inc., 961 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1992). A party may establish these requisites in two different ways. First, it may present evidence, based on personal knowledge, that the document was in fact placed in the mail. Bazemore, 827 F.3d at 1331. Second and alternatively, a party may invoke the mailbox rule based on “[t]estimony concerning specific office procedures for preparing and mailing notices in addition to evidence of mail received from the purported sender at the same address (and by other designated recipients in the normal course)[.]” Kerr v. McDonald's Corp., 427 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir. 2005); see also E. Coast Brokers & Packers, 961 F.2d at 1545-46. But that too requires more than “unsupported conclusory assertions of an individual based on his 12 Case: 18-14019 Date Filed: 05/13/2020 Page: 13 of 21 assumption of how mail was handled in the normal course of business[.]” E. Coast Brokers & Packers, 961 F.2d at 1545. 5 Once again, the facts here are materially indistinguishable from our recent decision in Bazemore. There, like here, the defendants relied on a single declarant to provide evidence that they hoped would trigger the mailbox rule’s presumption of receipt. We explained that the submitted evidence was insufficient because testimony that “a Cardholder agreement with an arbitration clause ‘would have been sent to [p]laintiff’” did not trigger the mailbox rule since it did not reflect “personal knowledge that [the agreement] in fact was sent” to the plaintiff. Bazemore, 827 F.3d at 1331. We also noted that the declarant had failed to claim that he reviewed records showing the agreement had been mailed. Id. For that reason, we held that the defendant could not compel the Bazemore plaintiff to arbitrate. Id. at 1330-32. So too here. The Winship declaration fails to show that Winship has personal knowledge that the Mason Card Agreement was in fact placed in the mail. True, Winship stated, “Bluestem, as part of its regular and routine business practice, transmitted information from Mason’s application to its print vendor, Impact, in connection with Bluestem’s order for printing and mailing of the Welcome 5 The parties dispute whether we should apply Utah’s mailbox rule, which purportedly imposes a stricter evidentiary standard than the federal mailbox rule. See McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah, 20 P.3d 901, 903-905 (Utah 2001) (setting forth a “direct and specific” evidence rule). Because we would reach the same conclusion under either standard, we decline to opine on whether Utah’s mailbox rule applies. 13 Case: 18-14019 Date Filed: 05/13/2020 Page: 14 of 21 Packet[,]” which supposedly contained the Mason Card Agreement. Winship also attached true and correct copies “of an excerpt of the data file, sent to Impact on August 12, 2013,” and a “template that Bluestem used for Welcome Packets . . . in August 2013[.]”6 No problems there. Winship, who works for Bluestem, set forth foundation supporting his claim to personal knowledge about those facts and events. But Winship didn’t complete the purported mailing to Mason. The mailing was, as Winship explains, completed by two third-parties, Impact and Pitney Bowes: “Impact, in turn, used Pitney Bowes to commingle and sort Welcome Packets with other bulk mail to optimize postal discounts and then to deposit with the United States Postal Service for delivery to Mason[.]” Like in Bazemore, nothing in the record suggests that Winship has personal knowledge about whether Impact and Pitney Bowes actually mailed the Welcome Packet intended for Mason. How could he? He didn’t work for either of the third parties that supposedly completed the mailing. And like in Bazemore, Winship never attested that he reviewed any of Impact’s or Pitney Bowes’s records showing that the Welcome Packet was in fact sent to Mason. 6 Winship stated that Exhibit D, the excerpt of the data file, was “sent to Impact, on August 12, 2013. It reflects that Bluestem sent the Welcome [sic] mailed Mason a Welcome Packet to Mason at . . . the address Mason provided when he applied for the Account.” That of course can’t be true. That a data file was sent to Impact does not “reflect” that the Welcome Packet was mailed to Mason. It “reflects” Bluestem’s request for Impact to do so. 14 Case: 18-14019 Date Filed: 05/13/2020 Page: 15 of 21 Nor did Winship attest about the “specific office procedures” that supposedly resulted in a mailing, so the defendants cannot take advantage of the Kerr rule. That’s unsurprising. Winship was twice removed from the Pitney Bowes office where the preparation and mailing actually occurred. Thus, Winship’s conclusory assertion about the result of those companies’ purported process is insufficient to show that Mason was mailed the Mason Card Agreement and its arbitration provision. At the end of the day, the defendants, who rely solely on the Winship declaration to show that the Mason Card Agreement was placed in the mail, fail to present any “competent evidence” establishing that occurred. For that reason, the mailbox presumption does not apply. Because nothing else indicates that Mason received the Mason Card Agreement, or otherwise agreed to arbitrate, the defendants have not met their burden to show Mason is subject to an arbitration agreement. So we conclude that the district court correctly denied the defendants’ motion to compel as it related to Mason. 3. Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act Finally, as this appeal regards Mason, the defendants argue in the alternative that should we determine that they failed to prove the existence of an agreement to arbitrate with Mason, we should order the district court to hold a trial on the issue. That argument relies on Section 4 of the FAA, which provides that “[i]f the making 15 Case: 18-14019 Date Filed: 05/13/2020 Page: 16 of 21 of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. As an initial matter, we note that the defendants did not request a trial under § 4 of the FAA in the district court. So we can decline to address the issue in the first instance. See San Francisco Residence Club, Inc. v. 7027 Old Madison Pike, LLC, 583 F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 2009) (declining to address request for relief made for the first time on appeal because the district court did not “have the opportunity to pass upon the issue”). But even if we chose to consider the merits of the defendants’ § 4-argument, we would conclude that the defendants are not entitled to a trial on the issue of whether Mason agreed to arbitrate. Section 4 does not require the district court to hold a trial on the issue of whether an arbitration agreement exists any time a party asks for it. Instead, “a summary judgment-like standard is appropriate[.]” Bazemore, 827 F.3d at 1333. So “a district court may conclude as a matter of law that parties did or did not enter into an arbitration agreement only if there is no ‘genuine dispute as to any material fact’ concerning the formation of such an agreement.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Neither conclusory allegations nor merely colorable and not significantly probative evidence satisfies that standard. Id. 16 Case: 18-14019 Date Filed: 05/13/2020 Page: 17 of 21 And of course, we do not require a trial based on supposed “disputes” of material fact unsupported by any evidence at all. See id. Bazemore again guides our analysis. Like in Bazemore, the “competent evidence offered by [the defendants here] is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to the existence of an arbitration agreement[.]” Id. As we have explained, the defendants “provide[ ] no competent evidence that an arbitration agreement ever was sent to plaintiff.” Id. As a result, there cannot be a genuine dispute about whether an arbitration agreement existed that would require a trial to resolve. See id. Bazemore also found no material dispute of fact because the defendant there had provided only “‘a form’ of the arbitration agreement”—as opposed to the actual arbitration agreement—that was supposedly sent to the plaintiff. Id. at 1333-34. That is also the case here with respect to the online application Mason completed. As we have explained, though the defendants may have presented competent evidence that Mason agreed to certain terms and conditions when completing the online application, they submitted no evidence that those terms and conditions (or anything else available through the online application) contained an arbitration agreement. Only competent evidence about Mason’s agreement to arbitrate—and not his agreement as to anything else—can create a genuine dispute of material fact entitling the defendants to a trial under § 4 of the FAA. The defendants have offered 17 Case: 18-14019 Date Filed: 05/13/2020 Page: 18 of 21 no such evidence here, so their motion to compel arbitration must be denied as a matter of law without the need for a trial.