Opinion ID: 2517841
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Loss of Victim's Car

Text: Defendant claims here, much as he did below, that the prosecution's failure to preserve and disclose evidence (i.e., Nguyen's car), and the trial court's refusal to specially instruct on the issue, violated due process under the federal and state Constitutions. No error occurred. In response to defense questions at trial, Detective Shave testified that Criminalist MacWillie met Shave in Missouri to examine Nguyen's Toyota MR2. The examination occurred on January 9, 1990, about two weeks after defendant's arrest, and three weeks before the criminal complaint was filed. The car was photographed inside and out. In addition, police searched for fingerprints and other forensic evidence by examining the car's exterior, interior, engine, and trunk. The car was released from police custody on January 12, 1990, before being examined by anyone acting on defendant's behalf. The circumstances surrounding this development are unclear. Shave testified that he did not authorize the car's release. Counsel suggested during this line of questioning that an insurance company claimed Nguyen's car. As noted earlier, MacWillie's examination of the Toyota MR2 led to the admission of fingerprint evidence against defendant. His expert witness, Hensgen, agreed with MacWillie in all major respects. In doing so, Hensgen used the fingerprint specimens that MacWillie had lifted from the car and saved for examination. Hensgen indicated that while it would have been ideal for him to have lifted the prints himself, such circumstance never happens when working for the defense. Nothing in Hensgen's testimony suggested that his assessment of the fingerprint evidence had been adversely affected as a result. During discussions between the court and counsel, the defense offered three special instructions in the alternative to address the state's failure to preserve certain items of evidence not relevant here. Almost as an afterthought, the defense team also complained about Nguyen's missing car, and the inability to examine it themselves. The prosecutor indicated that the car was released only after extensive testing, and that the results were timely disclosed to the defense. Defense counsel did not disagree. He argued, however, that, without access to the car, he did not know whether the prosecution's testing was as complete as it seemed. [13] The instructional request was denied. The trial court found no basis on which to conclude that material exculpatory evidence had been lost or suppressed in violation of due process principles, as discussed further below. The court also found no bad faith in police handling of the car. On appeal, defendant again faults the prosecution for not retaining Nguyen's car, because it contained three unidentified fingerprints that could have been made by Dennythe person who supposedly killed Nguyen and stole her car. Defendant argues that further testing might have revealed fingerprints inculpating such third party, or confirmed that the car contained no blood, hair, or other trace evidence linking defendant to the capital crime. According to defendant, the judgment must be reversed because the court failed to find a constitutional violation and, [a]t a minimum, to give the curative instructions he sought. The relevant due process principles have been discussed many times before. (See, e.g., People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1246, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544; Famam, supra, 28 Cal.4th 107, 166, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988; Roybal, supra, 19 Cal.4th 481, 509-510, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521; Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th 494, 519, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779.) Law enforcement agencies must preserve evidence only if it possesses exculpatory value apparent before [it] was destroyed, and not obtainable by other reasonably available means. ( California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413; cf. Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 [prosecutorial duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable and material to the defense].) The state's responsibility is further limited when the defendant challenges the failure to preserve evidence of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests that might have helped the defense. ( Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 ( Youngblood ).) In such a ease, unless the defendant can show bad faith by the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not violate his due process rights. ( Id. at p. 58, 109 S.Ct. 333.) We see no constitutional violation. Defendant stipulated to being in the possession of the murder victim's car in Missouri. The evidence also disclosed that he tried to disguise and hide the vehicle after attracting the attention of Missouri police. Consistent with the suspicions of Garden Grove police, most of the fingerprints that MacWillie found inside the car, and that the killer presumably left there, belonged to defendant. Contrary to what defendant argues, neither MacWillie nor her defense counterpart, Hensgen, could say that the three unidentified fingerprints found in the driver's compartment necessarily belonged to anyone other than defendant or the victim. Thus, the trial court properly concluded that the car had no discernible value favoring the defense before it disappeared. The three disputed fingerprints may or may not have been defendant's and may or may not have been the perpetrator's. ( Roybal, supra, 19 Cal.4th 481, 510, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521 [police lost crime scene evidence bearing unidentified fingerprint].) For similar reasons, defendant cannot show bad faith, i.e., that the police knew [the car] would have exculpated him when it was released. ( Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. 51, 56, fn. , 109 S.Ct. 333.) The record discloses that the prosecution scoured Nguyen's car for trace evidence, and provided the results of that examination to the defense. Defendant has not argued at trial or on appeal that the prosecution failed to conduct necessary tests or performed any testing in a deficient manner. Rather, he claims only that the prosecution should have preserved the car from which forensic test results were obtained. Even assuming negligence on the prosecution's part, no more can be said than that the car could have been subjected to further testing by the defense. Accordingly, no due process violation occurred, and no basis for giving defense instructions on the issue arose at trial.