Opinion ID: 1826657
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The plaintiffs access to channels of effective communication.

Text: In determining a plaintiffs involvement in the controversy, consideration must also be given to the extent to which the plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication to counteract any false statements. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45, 94 S.Ct. 2997. The NCAA and Culpepper argue that Cottrell and Williams had adequate access to the media to effectively rebut the alleged defamatory statements. The NCAA and Culpepper submitted over 200 newspaper and Internet articles published over several years containing comments by Cottrell and Williams throughout their careers at The University. Additionally, the NCAA points out that at the time it published the false statements in the penalty-summary report neither Cottrell nor Williams were prohibited from talking with the press. Cottrell and Williams argue that although they did enjoy limited access to the press as assistant coaches who were questioned about various prospective student-athletes and enrolled student-athletes, the NCAA rules prohibited them from discussing the NCAA investigation with the press and prevented them from being able to defend their reputations in the press. They maintain that this gag order prevented them from having access to the media and precluded a finding as a matter of law that they were limited-purpose public figures. In Price v. Chaffinch, (No. 04-956, May 12, 2006) (D.Del.2006) (not reported in F.Supp.2d), the United States District Court addressed whether a gag order imposed by the defendant, which prevented the plaintiff from responding in the media to the defamatory statements made by the defendant, precluded a finding that the plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure. In Price, the plaintiffs media access was nonexistent, in light of the defendant's imposition of a gag order. The federal district court held that although this fact cut against a finding that the plaintiff was a public figure, the plaintiff was aware that a public controversy existed, yet he voluntarily assumed a position in the controversy. The court balanced the gag order against the plaintiffs voluntary assumption of risk in the controversy and concluded that the plaintiff was a significant player in a controversy with high public interest. Consequently, the court held that the gag order imposed on the plaintiff was a factor to consider, but did not preclude a finding that the plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure. A similar circumstance was also addressed in Sculimbrene v. Reno, 158 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C.2001), in which a former FBI agent sued a media commentator, alleging that the commentator conspired with others to defame him. The commentator attacked the agent's credibility with regard to statements he had made to various congressional bodies. The agent was unable to respond in the media to the attack because the FBI refused to allow him access to the media. The court; when addressing whether the agent was a limited-purpose public figure who had been drawn into a public controversy, focused on the agent's role in the controversy. In conducting the analysis pursuant to the Waldbaum test, the court noted that the agent's access to the press, both prior to the relevant controversy and during the relevant controversy, was at all times, circumscribed by his employment by the FBI, and his employer prevented him from talking with the media. 158 F.Supp.2d at 23. Nevertheless, the court held that the agent was a limited-purpose public figure because his actions required the conclusion that the' agent had played a significant role in the outcome of the controversy. Therefore, although the gag order prevented the agent from having access to the media, this fact did not out-weigh the evidence indicating that the agent had played a prominent role in the controversy or preclude a finding that the agent was a limited-purpose public figure. We agree with the federal district courts that the imposition of a gag order does not necessitate a finding that an individual is not a limited-purpose public figure. It deserves weight in making the determination, but it does not prevent such a finding. Here, the gag order prevented Cottrell and Williams from discussing their role in the NCAA investigation with the press. However, the evidence that Cottrell and Williams played a prominent role in the public controversy significantly outweighs the effect of the gag order.