Opinion ID: 6108018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Employer's Argument was Preserved for Appellate Review

Text: The majority opinion asserts Employer did not preserve on appeal its claim that the verdict director was unsupported by substantial evidence. This is not true. It has been long-established that an issue is preserved for appellate review if it is based on the same theory as presented at trial. Gateway Foam Insulators, Inc. v. Jokerst Paving & Contracting, Inc. , 279 S.W.3d 179 , 188-89 (Mo. banc 2009) ; Welch v. McNeely , 269 S.W.2d 871 , 875 (Mo. 1954) (enforcing the long-established and  salutary principle that this [C]ourt will review a case only upon the same theory upon which it was submitted in the trial court). In fact, the same theory was advanced in Employer's motion for new trial and its appellate brief: the verdict director was not supported by substantial evidence and should not have been submitted to the jury. The majority opinion attempts to manufacture a distinction that is without a difference. This parsing of words is inconsequential because Employer advanced the same theory on appeal to this Court as it did in its motion for new trial. Throughout the proceedings, Employer consistently asserted, whether due to its incorrect wording or the sheer lack of evidentiary support, that the verdict director was not supported by substantial evidence. Legal writing is not an exacting science, and this Court does not require a party to use identical argument language throughout the proceedings. Though the arguments in the motion for new trial and appellate briefs are admittedly worded differently, they advance the same substantive theory. In its appellate brief, Employer asserted the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to give Employee's verdict director, which submitted a recovery theory under the known-person exception. 1 As the majority opinion sets out, a duty arises under this exception after the known party has entered the business premises. Employer contends on appeal there was no evidence from which the jury could find that [Employer]: (1) actually knew; or (2) using ordinary care, could have known that Lovelace was in the parking lot in time to have called law enforcement authorities to prevent the shooting, as required by Employee's verdict director. App. Brief at 38. Employer clearly argued there was no substantial evidence supporting the verdict director and, by submitting this verdict director, the trial court erred. App. Brief at 44. Similarly, in its motion for a new trial, Employer also made a substantial evidence argument. First, it asserted that Employee's verdict director did not accurately state the law on either the known-person exception or the unknown-person exception. It raised instructional error as to both theories. Since it is not clear from the record on which theory of recovery [Employee's] claim was being submitted ... [Employer] asserts instructional error as to both. L.F. 110. Employer asserted in its motion that the verdict director was worded incorrectly and allowed the jury to consider Employer's actions before Lovelace entered the premises, which had the effect of allowing the jury to find a causal link ... based upon circumstances other than those that existed at the time Lovelace entered the parking lot.... L.F. 115-16 (emphasis added). Further, the verdict director allowed the jury to impermissibly speculate what [Employer] could have known had it taken security precautions [before Lovelace arrived]. L.F. 116 (emphasis added). Employer argued that the effect of the verdict director was to allow the jury to reach a verdict based upon speculation and conjecture. In other words, it argued the verdict director was unsupported by evidence , as was argued in Employer's appellate brief. This Court has a substantial interest in judicial efficiency and ensuring arguments are properly preserved, but it has an equally important interest in ensuring that verdicts are supported by substantial evidence  and that justice is served. Here, the verdict director was not supported by substantial evidence. This Court should prioritize substance over form and find the argument is preserved. Further, Employer made the requisite objection to Employee's proffered verdict director during the instructions conference as required by Rule 70.03. Under this rule, a party must state distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. Rule 70.03. Employer urged the trial court to submit an alternate verdict director expressly limiting the jury to consider only what steps Employer could have taken after it knew of Lovelace's presence on the parking lot. Employer argued: The plaintiff correctly [acknowledged] there has to be a paragraph in there about sufficient time to act on the part of the defendant, after they should have either known he was violent or that his conduct[,] after they became aware of him[,] indicated danger that there was sufficient time after that to have prevented the shooting by Alan Lovelace. So what we put in there [i.e., proffered to the court in its instruction] is [Paragraph] Third: that sufficient time existed thereafter. Meaning after they became aware of [Lovelace]. Tr. 1204-05 (emphasis added). Employer also sufficiently stated the grounds for its objection-that the verdict director failed to comport with the known-person exception by asking the jury to consider things that are outside the scope of the exception. Tr. 1192-93. Employer made clear that Employee's instruction, which failed to limit the evidence to be considered under the known-person exception, improperly allowed evidence of what Employer knew or could have known before Lovelace entered the property. Employer clearly objected by stating, we object to their proposed instruction. Tr. 1208. Because the issue is properly before this Court, its merits should be addressed. 2