Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Proposed Disposition: Reversal and Remand for Trial

Text: Despite familiarity with a substantial body of scientific literature, from which comes the range of possibilities I have identified, I am not comfortable opining about a subject so elusive, and so controversial, as the nature, causes, preventability, and immutability of homosexuality without benefit of a trial record with the right kind of expert testimony, subject to cross-examination. Such expert testimony would have to includeand this is importantexamination and cross-examination about the most probative, up-to-date literature. This court was leery about relying at all, let alone exclusively, on scientific literature to determine whether the EMIT drug testing system met with general acceptance in the scientific community. See Jones, 548 A.2d at 39-47; supra note 22. I am even more leery about relying exclusively on scientific and other literature in this case of constitutional magnitude without benefit of questions germane to the issue of immutability, including the causes of homosexuality, asked of leading experts subject to cross-examination. I have explained earlier, see supra Part IV.C., my doubts about the efficacy of trial court proceedings to ascertain legislative facts, given the likelihood that the parties will use too few truly qualified experts who are familiar with all relevant sources of information and who themselves do not have discernible biases. Thus, I cannot be sanguine about the merits of a remand for legislative fact-finding, as part of the trial, unless the parties arrange for the ideal kind of hearing I have called for. See supra Part IV.C. On the assumption that there would be close to the ideal hearing necessary to address the complex issues presented, I see at least five potential benefits from reversing summary judgment and remanding the case for trial, rather than disposing of the case ourselves at this time on the basis of this court's own legislative fact-finding. First, the court can gain whatever benefit there can be from testimony by truly knowledgeable experts, subject to examination and cross-examination on the most revealing, up-to-date sources of information available about the causes of homosexuality and their effect on the issue of immutability. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, supra ; Evans II, supra. The non-record sources I already have reviewed, of course, will be available not only for examination at trial but also for this court's scrutiny once again (assuming appeal) in the event the trial record itself proves unsatisfactory. Second, there is always the possibility that the fact-finding process at a trial will reveal reasons why the rational basis test, not scrutiny of a higher order, should apply. Based on the sources I have reviewed, however, most of which are cited in this opinion, I cannot say (as the trial court has) that the rational basis test applies as a matter of law, and I am skeptical, to say the least, about the likelihood of that test's surviving further inquiry. See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 36 (lead opinion) (sexual orientation appears to possess most or all of the characteristics that have persuaded the Supreme Court to apply strict or heightened constitutional scrutiny to legislative classifications under the Equal Protection Clause). At the same time, I am not yet comfortable sayingwithout more detailed, hopefully helpful examination corroborating or challenging my understanding of relevant social and scientific factsthat the traditional test assuredly does not apply. At least a trial will give the government its best opportunity to advocate the rational basis testan opportunity the government deserves in this complex constitutional case, just as the plaintiffs-appellants deserve the opportunity to demonstrate the contrary. Third, on the assumption that my present, tentative rejection of the rational basis test holds after trial, the anticipated cross-examined expert testimony, when added to existing, non-record sources, may be important to deciding whether homosexuals are a suspect, or instead a quasi-suspect, class entitled to strict or only intermediate (or heightened) scrutiny. The Supreme Court to date has recognized only three suspect classes: race, alienage, and national origin; see supra notes 35, 36, 37, and a plurality of the Court once placed gender in that category, see Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 682, 93 S.Ct. at 1768 (plurality opinion), although gender today, like illegitimacy, receives intermediate scrutiny as a quasi-suspect classification. See supra note 38, 39. Women, of course, do not comprise a minority, and illegitimacy does not reflect the kind of discriminatory stereotyping historically experienced by racial minoritiesand by homosexuals. see Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506, 96 S.Ct. at 2762-63. If a trial were to confirm that homosexuality, once in place, is no less immutable than race, or is virtually no less so, then there may be reason, when considering all factors, to consider homosexuals a suspect class. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 724-28 (Norris, J., concurring) (concluding homosexuals comprise a suspect class); TRIBE, supra, at 1616 (homosexuals in particular seem to satisfy all of the Court's implicit criteria of suspectness); ELY, supra, at 162-64 (Homosexuals for years have been the victims of both `first-degree prejudice' and subtler forms of exaggerated we-they stereotyping). At this point, however, I am not prepared to make that judgment. Fourth, given the predictable negative public response to a decision that ultimately could require the District to recognize same-sex marriagesabsent a compelling, or at least substantial, governmental interest in continuing to ban themit is important to be sure that the contending parties have every opportunity to make the strongest possible cases, pro and con, observed by all interested persons, so that procedurally there appears to be the maximum legitimacy to court decisions ultimately made. There is the danger, of course, as I have discussed, that the parties will not call truly knowledgeable experts, such as persons who have conducted critical studies, see supra notes 49 through 53, or who are truly informed about all probative studies and are unquestionably qualified to testify about them. But I believe it is important to give the parties the opportunity to do so, to everyone's benefit. Ultimately, of course, the reviewing courtbeginning with this court (assuming eventual appeal)would have responsibility for determining whether the trial record added anything useful to what we already know. Finally, even if this court were to conclude at this time that appellants comprise a suspect or quasi-suspect class, we would still have to remand for trial on whether the District can show a compelling, or at least a substantial (or important), governmental interest in denying same-sex marriages. Cf. Evans I, supra (sustaining grant of preliminary injunction and remanding for determination whether voter-enacted constitutional amendment that precluded anti-discrimination legislation protecting homosexual[s], lesbian[s], or bisexual[s]held to infringe on fundamental right under Equal Protection Clause to participate equally in political processwas supported by compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that interest in least restrictive manner possible). Interestingly, as we have seen, much of the immutability evidence germane to determining whether homosexuals comprise a suspect or quasi-suspect class is likely to be relevant to resolving whether the government has a compelling or at least a substantial interest in preventing same-sex marriages. See Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1347 (in holding that constitutional amendment precluding antidiscrimination legislation to protect homosexuals did not serve compelling state interest, court concluded that state's assertion gay rights laws would undermine marriages by enforcing heterosexuals into gay lifestyles flies in the face of the empirical evidence presented at trial). Consequently, as long as there has to be a trial that deals with evidence about the nature and causes of homosexuality, there is every reason to benefit from the trial court's initial application of that evidence (in addition to applying the legislative fact data I have compiled) to the threshold question whether homosexuals are entitled to suspect or quasi-suspect class status. As far as I am aware, in virtually all other cases concerning suspect or quasi-suspect classifications, the immutability factor has not been contestedindeed, it has been self-evident. Accordingly, appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, typically have resolved the classification issue with judicial analysis of the relevant factors based exclusively on their own legislative fact-finding. See supra notes 43, 54. I have found one exception in this jurisdiction, however. Twenty years ago in Waldie v. Schlesinger, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 175, 509 F.2d 508, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, confronted by a constitutional challenge to the men only admissions policies of the service academies, reversed the District Court's grant of summary judgment for the government and remanded the cases for a full trial on the merits, including the question whether the rational basis test applied to discrimination against women. [W]e are not nearly as certain as the District Court that the Supreme Court has settled on the rationality standard for testing sex-based equal protection claims. Rather, we think this area of constitutional law is still evolving and is often highly dependent on the facts of each case. Accordingly, a full development of the facts of these cases is essential to any meaningful assessment of appellants' claim against the rapidly changing, and variously interpreted, case law. Id. at 177, 509 F.2d at 510. As in Waldie, in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, and in the Evans litigation in Colorado, a trial court record developing the legislative facts relevant to this case would be helpful here. [63] Furthermore, although the immutability issue would be the reason for the remand, I would not limit the parties or the trial court to that issue. All legislative facts applicable to all factors relevant to equal protection analysis would be fit subjects for trial. Accordingly, I would reverse summary judgment for the District and remand the case for trial, at which the court would decide (1) the level of scrutiny constitutionally required and, if strict or intermediate scrutiny were called for, (2) whether the District has demonstrated a compelling or substantial enough governmental interest to justify refusing appellants a marriage license.