Opinion ID: 852089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Baum to the Current Case

Text: We now turn to the particular facts of this case. As a threshold matter, it is critical to recount only the relevant procedural history, as Hill's case has progressed through multiple post-conviction proceedings over a span of eight-plus years. At this stage, Hill asks this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his P-C.R. 1 petition. This P-C.R. 1 petition alleged that Attorney Reed denied Hill of a procedurally fair setting because Reed failed to timely appeal the trial court's denial of Hill's P-C.R. 2 petition, which asked for permission to file a belated notice of appeal. [5] Importantly, we note that Hill's P-C.R. 1 petition did not address Attorney Reed's performance in filing the P-C.R. 2 petition or her performance during the P-C.R. 2 hearingit alleged only that her performance following the denial of the P-C.R. 2 petition violated Baum. Essentially, granting Hill's P-C.R. 1 petition would allow Hill to appeal the denial of his petition to file a belated appeal. It would not automatically give Hill the ability to pursue a direct appeal of his sentence, but it would give Hill the opportunity to demonstrate why the trial court was wrong in denying him permission to pursue a belated direct appeal. We can thus narrow and frame the relevant issue as follows: does P-C.R. 2 counsel violate the Baum standard if she fails to timely appeal a denial of a P-C.R. 2 petition? The Court of Appeals answered this question in the affirmative. The court drew a parallel with Waters v. State, 574 N.E.2d 911, 912 (Ind.1991), in which this Court found that post-conviction counsel's representation, or lack thereof, amounted to abandon[ment] of the criminal defendant. The Court of Appeals found that Attorney Reed likewise abandoned Hill because Reed's failure to timely appeal the P-C.R. 2 denial `prevented [Hill] from being heard, either through counsel or pro se. ' Hill II, slip op. at 7 (alteration in original) (quoting Graves, 823 N.E.2d at 1197). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the post-conviction court's ruling so that Hill could appeal the denial of his P-C.R. 2 petition. Id. The Court of Appeals was correct in noting that Reed's failure to timely appeal the denial of Hill's P-C.R. 2 petition resulted in Reed's inability to appear and represent Hill. Id. The court was also correct in noting that due to Reed's failure, Hill was unable to receive any appellate review of the denial of his P-C.R. 2 petition. Id. At first blush, these facts seem to support the conclusion that Reed did, in fact, abandon Hill. But upon closer inspection, we find that conclusion to be analytically faulty for at least two distinct reasons. First, the failure to timely appeal a P-C.R. 2 denial, standing on its own, does not violate Baum. In other words, when analyzing whether P-C.R. 2 counsel violated the Baum standard, a court cannot treat the failure to timely appeal a P-C.R. 2 denial as its own separate entity. Instead, the appropriate inquiry is whether P-C.R. 2 counsel denied the criminal defendant of a procedurally fair setting during the entire course of the P-C.R. 2 proceeding, which includes the filing of the petition and representation during a P-C.R. 2 hearing, if any. To separate the appeal of a P-C.R. 2 petition denial from the rest of the P-C.R. 2 proceedings creates a significant logical problem: an automatic end run around the limitations of P-C.R. 2 and Indiana Appellate Rule 9. Indiana Appellate Rule 9 states that if a party does not file a notice of appeal within thirty days from the entry of a final judgment, the right to appeal is forfeited except as provided by P-C.R. 2. Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1), (5). P-C.R. 2, as explained above, applies to direct appeals of convictions or sentences. P-C.R. 2, on the other hand, does not apply to appeals of collateral or post-judgment rulings. This Court has recognized this on several occasions. See, e.g., Newton v. State, 894 N.E.2d 192, 193 (Ind.2008) (holding that the trial court lacked authority to grant a request for a belated appeal from a prior order denying permission for a belated appeal); Davis v. State, 771 N.E.2d 647, 649 (Ind.2002) (holding that P-C.R. 2 does not permit belated consideration of appeals of other post-judgment petitions). In fact, this is the exact reason why Hill was unable to belatedly appeal the trial court's order denying his request to pursue a belated appeal of his sentence. Hill I, slip op. at 5. Thus, in the collateral review context, the failure to timely file a notice of appeal permanently extinguishes the opportunity to appeal. But under the Court of Appeals' application of Baum, a represented collateral review petitioner, like Hill, can get around this and obtain a belated appeal of a collateral ruling. How? By simply filing a P-C.R. 1 petition alleging his attorney failed to timely appeal the collateral ruling. In essence, this would mean that there is no way for a represented collateral review petitioner to forfeit a direct appeal of a P-C.R. 2 denial, effectively circumventing the limits of P-C.R. 2 and Appellate Rule 9. We believe that this automatic end run is an example of the serial relitigation of which this Court disapproves. Graves, 823 N.E.2d at 1195. In Graves, another performance of post-conviction counsel case, this Court noted that as collateral review litigation progresses through successive stages, the likelihood of finding an injustice diminishes. Id. We continued, the value of finality begins to outweigh the benefits of mandating further review at the post-conviction stage, because `[a]ny other conclusion would suggest that each previous proceeding serves no valuable purpose and would degrade the entire [criminal] proceeding to nothing more than a random game of chance.' Id. at 1195-96 (alterations in original) (quoting Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655, 664 (Ind. 2005)). Most notably, the Graves post-conviction counsel failed to timely appeal the trial court's denial of a P-C.R. 1 petition. Id. at 1194. In Graves, the Court never discussed this failure or suggested that it was a relevant consideration in assessing whether the criminal defendant was denied a procedurally fair setting in which to adjudicate his post-conviction claim. [6] Id. at 1197. Second, the Court of Appeals' application of Baum contravenes the general principle that the Baum standard is less onerous than the Strickland standard. As stated earlier, the Baum standard is highly deferential, and a Baum claim is intended to be more difficult for defendants to prove than a Strickland claim. Daniels v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1177, 1190 (Ind.2001). In this case, the Court of Appeals found that Reed violated Baum after finding she did not timely appeal the P-C.R. 2 denial. Hill II, slip op. at 7. Thus, under that analysis, Hill needed to demonstrate only that Reed failed to timely appeal, and nothing more, to succeed on his Baum claim. On the other hand, in a pre- Baum decision, this Court addressed a failure to perfect an appeal of a P-C.R. 1 denial under Strickland, finding that the petitioner was unable to show any prejudice by his counsel's failure to file an appeal. Jordan v. State, 506 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ind.1987). Thus, the Jordan petitioner's burden under Strickland was significantly greater than Hill's burden under Baum, even though both of them were essentially presenting the same claim. This result is clearly at odds with the Baum case, which explicitly mandates a lesser standard than Strickland for the performance of post-conviction counsel. Baum, 533 N.E.2d at 1201. Thus, as pleaded, Hill's P-C.R. 1 petition does not present any cognizable claim, as he alleges a violation of Baum based solely on Attorney Reed's failure to timely appeal the P-C.R. 2 denial. The proper route for Hill would have been to challenge, in his P-C.R. 1 petition, Reed's performance during the P-C.R. 2 proceedings as a whole. We speculate this is what the Court of Appeals envisioned in its earlier opinion, which affirmed the denial of Hill's second P-C.R. 2 petition but also stated that Hill may seek post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(a)(1). Hill I, slip op. at 5 n.3. Regardless, even if Hill had challenged Reed's P-C.R. 2 performance as a whole, his claim would have failed. Reed far from abandoned Hill. Reed filed the petition seeking a belated appeal; appeared at the hearing; presented both testimonial and documentary evidence, including transcripts from the guilty plea and sentencing hearings; and made a thorough argument to the trial court, including citations to relevant caselaw. The present case is akin to Graves, where this Court found that post-conviction counsel did not abandon the defendant where he appeared at the post-conviction relief hearing, directly examined the defendant, and tendered relevant affidavits. 823 N.E.2d at 1197. Like Reed, the counsel in Graves did not file a timely appeal of the post-conviction court's denial of his client's petition, but as a whole his performance did not violate Baum. Id. Furthermore, Reed's performance can be easily contrasted with the post-conviction counsel's performance in Waters, 574 N.E.2d 911, where this Court did find a Baum violation. In Waters, post-conviction counsel deprived the defendant of a fair hearing where counsel failed to correct obviously inadequate affidavits filed by the defendant and also failed to present any additional evidence in support of the defendant's claim. 574 N.E.2d at 912. This Court concluded that this complete lack of representation amounted to abandonment of the client and thus violated Baum. Id. Taking it one step further, had Hill timely appealed the trial court's denial of his P-C.R. 2 petition, we conclude his appeal would have been unsuccessful. We give substantial deference to a trial court's decision whether to grant permission to file a belated notice of appeal because diligence and relative fault are fact sensitive. Moshenek v. State, 868 N.E.2d 419, 423 (Ind.2007). The P-C.R. 2 petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was without fault in the delay of filing and was diligent in pursuing permission to file a belated motion to appeal. Id. at 422-23. Hill attempted to meet this burden by testifying that he was unaware of his direct appeal right. But the trial court found Hill did not meet his burden for several reasons: Hill had testified under oath that he had read and understood the entire plea agreement, which stated that Hill retained the right to directly appeal his sentence; Hill had considerable prior experience with the criminal justice system; and Hill was, as described by the trial court, very articulate and pretty smart. These are all relevant factors for the trial court in determining whether to grant a P-C.R. 2 petition. Id. at 423. In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hill's P-C.R. 2 petition.