Opinion ID: 1609293
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: conclusion

Text: Once adversary judicial criminal proceedings have commenced against a defendant, he is entitled, by virtue of the Sixth Amendment and La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13 to the assistance of counsel at all subsequent critical stages of the proceedings. Interrogation is a critical stage triggering this right. This means that the government is prohibited from deliberately eliciting statements from the defendant without an express knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver by him of the right to counsel. This prohibition exists automatically and does not hinge on any assertion of rights by the defendant. Under Michigan v. Jackson , however, the Court presumed that suspects who assert their right to counsel are unlikely to waive that right voluntarily in subsequent interrogations. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. at 350, 110 S.Ct. at 1180. This presumption led to the creation of a purely prophylactic, bright-line rule holding that waivers otherwise considered valid will be held invalid where they are made after defendant has asserted or invoked his right to counsel and makes a statement in response to police-initiated interrogation. Where defendant has not made an assertion or invocation of his previously attaching right to counsel, however, defendant is only entitled to the traditional right to counsel protection whereunder the state cannot deliberately elicit statements from him in the absence of counsel without an express waiver of the right to counsel. The State then has the burden of proving defendant's waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Under the facts of this case, even if defendant's Sixth Amendment and La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13 right to counsel attached at his initial appearance and the subsequent interrogation of defendant constituted a critical stage at which he was entitled to the assistance of counsel, the motion to suppress was properly denied. Because defendant did not assert or invoke his previously attached right to counsel in any way, he is not entitled to the enhanced protection afforded by the bright-line rule created in Michigan v. Jackson . The State met its burden of proving defendant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel by virtue of the fact his waiver was uncoerced and was made after defendant was given Miranda warnings. Defendant's statements to Detective Dickerson are therefore admissible at trial. Although the court of appeal properly applied Hattaway, our partial overruling of that opinion herein requires us to find the court of appeal erred in reversing the trial judge's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. The defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied by the trial judge. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED.