Opinion ID: 2814288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Parker

Text: We turn next to Mr. Parker, a nurse practitioner who twice examined Mr. Kuhne, once in late 2008 and again in early 2009. The first examination occurred on December 13, 2008. There, Mr. Parker indicated in his notes that Mr. Kuhne had “recent blurry vision,” and wrote that “[patient] refused consult due to short EOS [stay in prison] time.” 43 In a deposition, Mr. Parker testified that he had spoken with Mr. Kuhne about the need for an eye consult, but that Mr. Kuhne had told him that “[h]e was going home really soon and would take care of it when he got out.” 44 Mr. Kuhne tells a different story. His is that a defendant, who he believed was Mr. Parker, told him “that [he] could not see a doctor because [he] had less than six months to go on [his] sentence.”45 In short, as our first decision held, whether Mr. Kuhne waived or was refused medical treatment in December 2008 remains disputed. 46 43 ECF No. 53-7, at . 44 ECF No. 63-7, at . 45 ECF No. 63-11, at . Mr. Kuhne also includes an affidavit by his expert, Dr. Joseph Paris, which states that “[t]here is no question that Mr. Kuhne wanted to be treated for the problem as of December 13, 2008.” ECF No. 62-9, at . 46 See Kuhne, 745 F.3d at 1097. The defendants rely heavily on our unpublished decision in Whitehead v. Burnside, 403 F. App’x 401 (11th Cir. 2010), which concluded that “[s]elf-serving statements do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory, contemporaneously created medical records.” Id. at 403. Setting aside the fact that Whitehead is not controlling precedent, in this case, the records – Mr. Parker’s notes – state only that Mr. Kuhne “refused consult due to short EOS time.” ECF No. 53-7, at . 14 Case: 14-13845 Date Filed: 07/02/2015 Page: 15 of 22 This does not entirely end the issue, because Mr. Kuhne must demonstrate that had medical care been provided in mid-December, it would have made a difference in his eyesight. There is undisputed record evidence that had Mr. Kuhne been treated in November 2008 the outcome would have been different, 47 and there is equally undisputed evidence indicating that by early February, any treatment would not have made “any difference in outcome from that which he received subsequently.” 48 December 13, 2008, fits comfortably within the range where medical treatment could have mattered. The Defendants do not suggest otherwise, and fail to discharge their burden of showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 49 Mr. Parker also saw Mr. Kuhne on February 21, 2009, and “did nothing to obtain eye care for [him].” 50 However, at this point, the only evidence in the summary judgment record is that any late-arriving treatment provided by this date In this context, the word “refused” is ambiguous – it could either indicate that Mr. Kuhne decided to refuse medical care or that Mr. Parker refused him such care. The latter reading would be consistent with Mr. Kuhne’s affidavit, and as such, we are not faced with a situation where there are necessarily contradictory records. 47 See Kuhne, 745 F.3d at 1096. 48 ECF No. 53-26, at . 49 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); see also Appellees’ Br. 35. 50 Kuhne, 745 F.3d at 1095-96. 15 Case: 14-13845 Date Filed: 07/02/2015 Page: 16 of 22 would have made no difference in terms of outcome. 51 Causation is a necessary element of a deliberate indifference claim, and with such evidence unavailing, summary judgment as to conduct stemming from this medical visit is appropriate.