Opinion ID: 1713689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Exemption Claim

Text: The Hartmanns also contend that Minn.Stat. § 31A.15, subd. 1(1), exempts them from the prohibition on the sale of custom-processed meat. Section 31A.15, subd. 1, provides: The provisions of sections 31A.01 to 31A.16 requiring inspection of the slaughter of animals and the preparation of the carcasses, parts of carcasses, meat,    and meat food products at establishments conducting slaughter and preparation do not apply: (1) to the processing by a person of the person's own animals and the owner's preparation and transportation in intrastate commerce of the    meat    of those animals exclusively for use by the owner and members of the owner's household, nonpaying guests, and employees; or (2) to the custom processing by a person of cattle, sheep, swine, poultry or goats delivered by the owner for processing, and the preparation or transportation in intrastate commerce of the    meat    exclusively for use in the household of the owner by the owner and members of the owner's household, nonpaying guests, and employees. The Hartmanns argue that the term use in the phrase exclusively for use by the owner in clause (1) is not defined and therefore can include the owner's sale of the processed meat. The Hartmanns' reliance on the statutory exemption fails for several reasons. First, clause (1) of subdivision 1 does not apply to the Hartmanns' circumstances because clause (1) by its terms applies only to the processing by a person of the person's own animals. Id. The Hartmanns did not process their own animals; they sent them to Lafayette City Meats for processing. In contrast, clause (2) by its terms applies to custom processing by a person of [animals] delivered by the owner for processing. Minn.Stat. § 31A.15, subd. 1(2). Custom processing is defined as slaughtering, [etc.] an animal or processing meat products    for the owner of the animal or of the meat products    if all meat products    derived from the custom operation are returned to the owner   . Minn.Stat. § 31A.02, subd. 5. Plainly, custom processing involves processing of the meat by someone other than the owner, with all of the product returned to the owner. Just as plainly, custom processing does not include processing of the meat by the owner himself. The exemption provided in clause (1) of section 31A.15, subdivision 1, applies to owner processing, whereas the exemption in clause (2) applies to custom processing. Because the Hartmanns' meat was custom-processed, they must look to clause (2) for any exemption. However, one of the conditions of the clause (2) exemption is that meat must be exclusively for use in the household of the owner by the owner and members of the owner's household, nonpaying guests, and employees. Minn.Stat. § 31A.15, subd. 1(2) (emphasis added). The precise language of this exemption for use in the household of the owner belies the Hartmanns' argument that the use allowed includes sale of the meat to others. [9] An additional reason that the statutory exemption does not render the Hartmanns' conviction for unlawful sales invalid is that the exemption is only from the inspection provisions of the designated statutes. There is no reference at all in the exemption language to the prohibition against sale of custom-processed meat, and therefore no reason to conclude the exemption covers that activity. For these reasons, the Hartmanns' constitutional and statutory challenges to their convictions of selling custom-processed meat in violation of Minn.Stat. § 31A.10(4) fail.
In their brief, the Hartmanns argued that the state's decision to prosecute them after failing to provide them with an administrative hearing is objective evidence of vindictiveness. The Hartmanns also cited as further evidence of prosecutorial vindictiveness the state's failure to resend the complaint against the Hartmanns when it was returned undeliverable, despite having notice that the Hartmanns obtained their mail by general delivery from the Glencoe post office. But, the Hartmanns explicitly abandoned their prosecutorial vindictiveness claim at oral argument. Therefore, we do not reach the merits of this issue. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.