Opinion ID: 146276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonableness and Disparity

Text: Kimbrough further contends that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 151 months’ imprisonment, which is more than two and one half times the mandatory minimum set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), especially since the Guidelines are now deemed advisory. He also asserts that the district court did not articulate its reason for choosing the 151-month sentence. We address the latter contention first. As noted, a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court fails to consider the applicable Guidelines range or neglects to consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Bolds, -9- 511 F.3d at 579-81. Here, the district court offered both specific reasons for rejecting Kimbrough’s guidelines objections in a written order, and considered the § 3553(a) factors on the record. At that sentencing hearing, the district court reviewed Kimbrough’s personal history, both his parents’ separation when he was young and the death of a friend when he was fourteen years of age, as well as the fact that Kimbrough owed $56,658 in child support. The court noted his “involvement with drugs and the selling of drugs for all of [his] adult life.” The district court also reviewed Kimbrough’s extensive criminal history and his record of probation violations. The district court stated that it considered the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to provide just punishment, to promote deterrence, and to protect the public. Lastly, the court requested that Kimbrough be placed in a comprehensive drug treatment program. The court also stated that it was imposing a sentence that was “sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a).” The record demonstrates the district court’s “awareness of the § 3553(a) factors and how those factors apply” in Kimbrough’s case. See United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 371 (6th Cir. 2008). The court’s explanation of the sentence imposed satisfies Rita’s requirement to “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for his own legal decision making authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Kimbrough also contends that the district court’s sentence was unreasonable because it did not depart below the crack guidelines, despite the crack-powder disparity recognized in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). This argument too must be rejected. The record reflects that the district court recognized that the Guidelines as a whole are advisory. Cf. United States v. Townsend, 286 F. App’x 285, 286 (6th Cir.) (holding that a district court’s refusal to sentence below the crack guidelines despite crack-powder disparity recognized in Kimbrough was not error where it was clear -10- from the record that the court recognized its authority and opted not to use lower offense level), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 478 (2008); see also United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 249 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the application of the crack guidelines is not ipso facto unreasonable); United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 243, 253 (6th Cir. 2007) (same; citing Caver).