Opinion ID: 2622125
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Absence of Recklessness

Text: ¶ 49 Next, Chenoweth contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Kaholokula did not act recklessly in omitting material facts related to Parker's veracity. [19] Chenoweth does not contend, however, that the prosecutor intentionally omitted information regarding Parker's criminal background or his history as a failed informant. Rather, he asserts that Kaholokula acted in reckless disregard for the truth during the second warrant application when she told the commissioner that she had confirmed her prior recollection of Parker's criminal history when, in fact, she had not thoroughly checked her own records. [20] ¶ 50 Recklessness may be shown by establishing that the affiant actually entertained serious doubts about the informant's veracity. State v. Clark, 143 Wash.2d 731, 751, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001) (citing State v. O'Connor, 39 Wash.App. 113, 117, 692 P.2d 208 (1984)). Serious doubts may be inferred from either (a) an affiant's actual deliberation or (b) the existence of obvious reasons to doubt the informant's veracity or the information provided. Clark, 143 Wash.2d at 751, 24 P.3d 1006 (quoting O'Connor, 39 Wash.App. at 117, 692 P.2d 208). Chenoweth argues that Kaholokula's knowledge that Parker's court file might contain additional derogatory information raises an obvious reason to doubt his veracity. He claims that if Kaholokula had thoroughly reviewed her files, she would have recalled that Parker's criminal history included crimes of dishonesty, that she once considered charging him with suborning perjury, and that he had been a paid police informant in the past. ¶ 51 Initially, Chenoweth provides no authority that police must routinely check an informant's criminal history before applying for a search warrant, let alone that a prosecutor must perform an exhaustive review of court files relating to an informant's past criminal conviction. [21] Moreover, at the time of the first warrant application, Kahalokula related what she knew based only on her personal recollection. During the fewer than 24 intervening hours between the first and second warrant applications, she checked her records to the extent necessary to verify the accuracy of what she had told the commissioner but she did not carry out a more extensive investigation; nor did she purport to do so during the second warrant application. The possibility that Parker had a more extensive criminal history was before the commissioner, and Kahalokula did nothing to dispel it. Had the commissioner deemed it material to her probable cause determination, she could have requested additional information on Parker's criminal background. The mere possibility that the court files could reveal additional adverse information does not raise an obvious reason to doubt Parker's veracity. ¶ 52 Chenoweth next argues that the court should infer that the prosecutor acted recklessly in not reviewing her own files based on the materiality of the information that she would have discovered had she done so. In support, he cites dicta from Martin, 615 F.2d at 329, suggesting that recklessness may be inferred from proof of the omission itself. Chenoweth argues that the outcome determinative materiality of the omissions raises an inference that Kahalokula recklessly portrayed Parker as a reliable citizen informant. Chenoweth overlooks this court's decision in State v. Garrison, 118 Wash.2d 870, 827 P.2d 1388 (1992), in which we expressly disapproved of the Martin dicta, holding that it is improper to infer recklessness from the materiality of an omission. As we noted, `[s]uch an inference collapses into a single inquiry the two elementsintentionality and materialitywhich Franks states are independently necessary.' Garrison, 118 Wash.2d at 873, 827 P.2d 1388 (quoting United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 301 (4th Cir.1990)). Garrison controls on this argument. ¶ 53 Finally, the factual findings made in this case support the trial court conclusion that Kaholokua did not act in reckless disregard for the truth by failing to disclose material facts to the commissioner. The trial court found that Kaholokula was not aware of Parker's history as a failed police informant when she applied for the search warrants. Further, the court found that Kaholokula, who prosecutes over 200 cases per year, did not intentionally hide any information from the magistrate and did not act in bad faith in failing to gather relevant information. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's conclusion that the prosecutor did not recklessly omit material facts in obtaining a search warrant was not clearly erroneous.