Opinion ID: 1433971
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Were Whitfield and Teel agents of the AOC?

Text: Section 666 broadly defines agent as a person authorized to act on behalf of another person or a government and, in the case of an organization or government, includes a servant or employee, and a partner, director, officer, manager, and representative. 18 U.S.C. § 666(d)(1). In United States v. Phillips, we held that for an individual to be an agent for the purposes of section 666, he must be authorized to act on behalf of [the agency] with respect to its funds. 219 F.3d 404, 411 (5th Cir.2000). At trial, the Government presented testimony that the AOC handled the finances for the entire Mississippi court system, including payroll, travel expenses, inventory, and budgeting. Each judge was allotted $40,000 annually from the AOC to pay the salaries of chambers staff, including secretaries, paralegals, and law clerks. Although these staff personnel were technically employees of the AOC, in reality the judges maintained independent control over their chambers staff and were responsible for all employment decisions. Additionally, the judges were provided with another $4,000 each year to cover operating expenses and could request reimbursement for travel expenses. Appellants contend that they should not be considered agents of the AOC under section 666, because the agency funds under their control were entirely unrelated to and separate from the federal funds received by the AOC. This court has held that [a]lthough the conduct prohibited by section 666 need not actually affect the federal funds received by the agency, there must be some nexus between the criminal conduct and the agency receiving federal assistance. United States v. Moeller, 987 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir.1993). In Phillips, we observed that the funds in question need not be purely federal, nor must the conduct in question have a direct effect on federal funds. The statute possibly can reach misuse of virtually all funds of an agency that administers the federal program in question. 219 F.3d at 411 (citing Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 118 S.Ct. 469, 473-74, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997)). In Sabri v. United States, the Supreme Court explained why courts have interpreted section 666 broadly in this regard: Money is fungible, bribed officials are untrustworthy stewards of federal funds, and corrupt contractors do not deliver dollar-for-dollar value. Liquidity is not a financial term for nothing; money can be drained off here because a federal grant is pouring in there. 541 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 1946, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004). Therefore, so long as there is a nexus between the criminal conduct and the agency, see Moeller, 987 F.2d at 1137, the lack of a direct connection between the AOC funds under the judges' control and the federal funds in question does not preclude them from being considered agents of the AOC for the purposes of section 666. In the sense that Whitfield and Teel hired chambers staff that were paid at the expense of the AOC, they were authorized as judges to act on behalf of [the AOC] with respect to its funds. See Phillips, 219 F.3d at 411. Therefore, we will assume, arguendo, that Whitfield and Teel were agents of the AOC, but only in so far as they performed functions that involved AOC funds. See Moeller, 987 F.2d at 1137 (focusing the section 666 agency inquiry on whether the defendants were acting on behalf of the state agency receiving federal funds when they accepted the alleged bribes).