Opinion ID: 2453513
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Core Meaning

Text: We recognize that [w]here a[n ordinance] provides insufficient general guidance, an as-applied vagueness challenge may nonetheless fail if the [ordinance's] meaning has a clear core. Farrell, 449 F.3d at 493; Brache v. Cnty. of Westchester, 658 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1981) ([I]f a statute has a core meaning that can reasonably be understood, then it may validly be applied to conduct within the core meaning.); Goguen, 415 U.S. at 577-78, 94 S.Ct. 1242 (noting that there are statutes that by their terms ... apply without question to certain activities, but whose application to other behavior is uncertain, and that such a statute may not be vague as applied to hard-core violator[s]... whatever its implications for those engaged in different conduct). Where the ordinance has a clear core, the inquiry will involve determining whether the conduct at issue falls so squarely in the core of what is prohibited by the [ordinance] that there is no substantial concern about arbitrary enforcement because no reasonable enforcing officer could doubt the [ordinance's] application in the circumstances. Farrell, 449 F.3d at 494. Applying these standards, we hold that the ordinance as applied to the design and construction of Cunney's house is not saved by resort to a clear core. That is, the height of Cunney's house does not fall within the core of section E's prohibition because, under a reasonable interpretation of the ordinance, Cunney's house, as built, does comply with section E. The district court dismissed Cunney's void-for-vagueness claim because, in its view, the application of section E to Cunney's property fell within the ordinance's core goal. The court interpreted section E's core goalto preserve as nearly as practicable the remaining views o[f] the Hudson River from River Road, Grand View, N.Y. Zoning Law, ch. IX, § E (1999)to require: the shortest distance from any point on River Road to the Hudson River [to] be free of any view-obstructing structures that exceed the height requirements. For example, if a home has both a 100-yard frontage on River Road and an identical 100-yard frontage on the Hudson, an infinite amount of points can be used to measure the height. The measurement, in order to achieve its goal, must evaluate whether any structure between that arbitrary point and the Hudson violates the regulation. This can only be achieved if the line from point A on the road, and point B on the Hudson, is a straight line and the angle at measurement corresponds with the shortest distance between the two points. Cunney, 675 F.Supp.2d at 400. Because Collazuol's final compliance determination revealed that Cunney's house fell squarely within section E's proscribed heightparticularly at station 0 + 62 which contained the point on River Road closest to the house in questionthe district court concluded that the house's height markedly destroy[ed] the views of the Hudson River from River Road. Id. at 401. We disagree with this conclusion because we do not see how section E's imprecise core meaningthe preservation of river viewstranslates into the precise construct laid out by the district court. While there is no question that the ordinance could have been drafted to do exactly what the district court suggests, or could have been interpreted by the ZBA to call for this result, the ZBA refused to provide such guidance, and the ordinance's statement of core purpose is not so explicitly demanding. To begin with, we agree that section E's core is clear to the extent that its purpose is to preserve Village views of the Hudson River. The question then becomes whether the height of Cunney's house falls so squarely within section E's core prohibitionthe building of houses the height of which is more than four and one-half feet above River Road and destroying the views of the Hudson River that no substantial concern about arbitrary enforcement exists because no reasonable enforcing officer could doubt the ordinance's application in these circumstances. See Farrell, 449 F.3d at 494. Based on the record before us, because a reasonable enforcement officer could find that Cunney's house does comply with the ordinance, we conclude that the height of Cunney's house does not constitute a hard-core violation of section E, and thus does not fit squarely within the ordinance's core prohibition. See Goguen, 415 U.S. at 577-78, 94 S.Ct. 1242. Our review of the record gives us substantial concern that the ordinance was arbitrarily applied to Cunney's property. We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of this claim. First, as discussed above, Collazuol, Knizeski, and three members of the ZBA each offered permissible interpretations of section E's vague guidance defining the point on River Road adjacent to the property from which the height of the house should be measured, and two of them opined on how the measurement should be taken. Second, because River Road's elevation above the river fluctuates by some six feet along the boundary of the Cunney propertyfrom approximately 30 feet in the south to 24 feet in the norththe application of these interpretations to Cunney's property would undoubtedly lead to divergent results. Third, it is undisputed that, as ZBA member Kaliff stated, even if 5 feet were taken off the top of the house there would not be a better view of the River. Taken together, the undisputed facts of this case also demonstrate that a reasonable enforcement officer could interpret section E as permitting the height of the house to be measured from River Road's high point of pavement along the shared boundary with the Cunney property. [4] We find such a case in point specifically presented in the record. The Village engineer, Collazuol, following the discovery of the site plan data errors, apparently resolved in his third and final compliance determination that the road's high point of pavement was at least 29.25 feet above the Hudson River. Measuring from this elevation point on River Road to the high point of the roof line, he found that Cunney's house exceeded section E's height restriction by a maximum of three inches. There is no questionespecially given Collazuol's earlier determination of typical building tolerances and de minimis violationsthat a reasonable enforcement officer, even one zealously preserving river views, would nonetheless find a three inch overage to be de minimis. Nor is there anything in the ordinance that precludes the use of a high point on River Road adjacent to the property as the elevation point from which to determine the relative height of the house. In fact, in July 2007 Collazuol himself relied solely on the high point of pavement on the easterly side of River Road in determining the height of Cunney's house to be what he later articulated as effectively in compliance with section E. Applying this perfectly reasonable methodology, it is without question, on the record before us, that Cunney's house could be considered to be in compliance with section E. Given our determination, it cannot be said that the height of Cunney's house falls so squarely within the core of section E's prohibition as to allay our substantial concerns regarding the risk of arbitrary enforcement. We therefore hold that because section E's terms provided the Village enforcement officers with unfettered latitude in making compliance determinations regarding Cunney's property, see Farrell, 449 F.3d at 494, section E, as applied here, is unconstitutionally vague.