Opinion ID: 1627673
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sherley v. Commonwealth.[32]

Text: Under the Blockburger test, first-degree assault is not a lesser-included offense of first-degree rape, which means that Dixon's double jeopardy argument fails as a matter of law. But application of Blockburger does not end our inquiry on this topic because Dixon also argues that our holding in Sherley v. Commonwealth mandates that his assault conviction merges with his rape conviction. Sherley is very similar to the case at hand. In Sherley , an elderly woman was assaulted while visiting her husband's grave. The assailant struck the victim with a stick, took her purse, and forced her into an automobile. The victim then lost consciousness and could not remember further details. [33] The victim was found the next day in a muddy ditch with some of her clothing pulled down to her ankles and some above her hips. [34] The victim had suffered a stroke. The authorities identified Sherley as the perpetrator of the horrible attack, so Sherley was charged and ultimately convicted of first-degree assault and first-degree robbery. [35] Sherley was also charged with first-degree rape but was convicted of attempt to commit first-degree rape. [36] On appeal, Sherley contended that his simultaneous convictions for first-degree assault, first-degree robbery, and attempted rape violated double jeopardy because the same essential element  serious physical injury to the victim  was used in each offense. We held that the assault and attempted rape convictions merged, stating that the force causing serious physical injury which elevated the charge of attempted rape to attempt to commit first-degree rape, a Class A felony, being the same serious physical injury, the basis for the first-degree assault conviction also merged the offense of first-degree assault and attempt to commit first-degree rape, a Class A felony. Thus the conviction for first-degree assault merged with the charge of attempt to commit first-degree rape, a Class A felony. [37] We concluded that the force used for conviction of first-degree assault merged with the force used to elevate the punishment for the other offenses and Sherley was convicted of one offense included in others as proscribed in KRS 505.020. [38] Although the double jeopardy argument in Sherley was also made in the case now before us, under the facts of today's case, reasonable jurors could have concluded that Dixon was guilty of both first-degree assault and first-degree rape simply because Doe suffered two serious physical injuries to her head from a blow of the hammer delivered at different times during her ordeal at the store. In other words, since Doe was struck on the head with a hammer when the assailants first entered the store and was struck again after she was raped, a jury could have found that either blow to the head alone constituted the basis for the assault conviction. But the jury instructions actually given did not ask the jury to differentiate which blow to Doe's head formed the basis for finding Dixon guilty of assault. In analogous circumstances, we have held that a jury should be required in the instructions to identify which act underlies each specific criminal offense. [39] And Sherley itself involved multiple injuries to the victim. [40] Because the jury instructions in this case did not require the jury to determine which hammer strike and which resulting head injury supported the rape and assault convictions and because Sherley 's continued viability is a matter of importance to the bench and bar of the Commonwealth, we must explore the merits of Dixon's argument concerning the application of the rule in Sherley to the facts of this case. Our conclusion about the need to address Sherley is unchanged by the Commonwealth's fall-back position that the prosecutor's closing argument at trial sufficiently informed the jury which separate hammer blow supported each offense. Perhaps the prosecutor's differentiation in its closing argument could mean that the failure of the trial court's instructions to require the jury to identify specifically which hammer strike caused Doe to suffer which serious physical injury was a harmless error. [41] But the issue here is not whether the instructions were erroneous. Rather, the precise issue is whether Dixon's convictions for both assault and rape violate the double jeopardy clause, as interpreted in Sherley . In other words, if Sherley is followed, then the assault charge against Dixon should have been dismissed; and no jury instructions regarding that offense should have been given. [42] It is a longstanding principle that a jury is presumed to follow a trial court's instructions, [43] and those instructions must be based upon the evidence presented. [44] But an attorney's arguments do not constitute evidence. [45] So the arguments of counsel are not sufficient to rehabilitate otherwise erroneous or imprecise jury instructions. Turning to Sherley , the case itself does not contain any reference to Blockburger , despite the fact that Blockburger was rendered over forty years before this Court decided Sherley . In fact, Sherley 's failure to use the Blockburger test is curious because of the fact that we had expressly relied upon Blockburger in at least one previous opinion. [46] Additionally, although the opinions did not explicitly cite Blockburger , our predecessor-court had long ago espoused and utilized a test that is the de facto equivalent of the Blockburger test. Specifically, in 1923, our predecessor-court opined that a conviction for sale of liquor to a minor would not bar a prosecution for sale of liquor without a license because each offense contains elements that must be proven, which are wholly immaterial in proof of the others. [47] Thus, as the Court of Appeals noted, [t]he prohibition against double jeopardy found in Kentucky's constitution had traditionally been interpreted in the same way as was done in Blockburger .  [48] Our failure in Sherley to use Blockburger means that Sherley is an aberration in our double jeopardy decisional law. As we made plain ten years ago in Burge , we are firmly committed to the Blockburger test to resolve double jeopardy claims. [49] As previously explained, Dixon's double jeopardy argument clearly fails the Blockburger test. And Sherley is out of step with double jeopardy cases which came both before and after it. Accordingly, we now overrule Sherley [50] and hold that the prohibition against double jeopardy is not violated when a defendant is convicted of first-degree assault and first-degree rape (involving a serious physical injury to the victim), even if the same serious physical injury to the victim is used to support each conviction.