Opinion ID: 2775226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Issue Was Properly Preserved

Text: ¶ 19 The State first contends that Mr. Jones did not preserve his reliability challenge under rule 702 and that therefore this court should not reach the issue. Mr. Jones does not contest the underlying principles or techniques of the Y-STR DNA technology; rather, Mr. Jones frames his 702 challenge as pertaining to the reliability of Y-STR DNA “as identification evidence.” ¶ 20 “An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it].” 13 As noted above, Mr. Jones and the State adopted the pleadings, argument, and court order from the evidentiary hearing in the Johnson case, during which defense counsel challenged the admissibility of the Y-STR DNA evidence on the very grounds that it was unreliable for identification purposes. We determine that counsel’s challenge during the evidentiary hearing permitted the trial court to meaningfully rule on the issue. We therefore conclude that Mr. Jones’s challenge to until April 21, 2009, at which time LDA withdrew due to a conflict, and private counsel was appointed. Because the conflict no longer exists, LDA now represents Mr. Jones on appeal. 12 Third Judicial Dist., No. 071900184. 13 Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 12, 266 P.3d 828 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 Cite as: 2015 UT 19 Opinion of the Court the admission of the Y-STR DNA evidence for purposes of identification was preserved. C. Standard of Admissibility for Expert Testimony ¶ 21 The admission of the Y-STR DNA evidence is governed by Utah Rules of Evidence 702 and 403. 14 “Rule 702 assigns to trial judges a ‘gatekeeper’ responsibility to screen out unreliable expert testimony.” 15 To that end, the rule establishes a two-part analysis to determine admissibility of expert testimony.16 First, the testimony must “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” 17 Second, scientific knowledge that “serve[s] as the basis for the expert testimony” must meet “a threshold showing that the principles or methods 14 See State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 121, 299 P.3d 892. Rule 702 was amended in 2007 while the State’s motion to admit the Y-STR DNA evidence was pending before the district court. We interpreted the previous version of the rule to require that the scientific principles and techniques underlying the testimony be “inherently reliable” and properly applied to the facts by qualified experts. State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n.7, 403 (Utah 1989). We later explained that the 2007 amendment was not intended to make admission of expert testimony more difficult than under the Rimmasch test. Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59, ¶ 11, 242 P.3d 762. Rather, the Rimmasch test was “subsumed in the new rule.” State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶ 38, 223 P.3d 1103. Thus, as both parties agree, the analysis is the same under each version of rule 702. Additionally, rule 702 was amended again in 2011, but the changes were “stylistic only” and did not “change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” UTAH R. EVID. 702, 2011 advisory committee note. For clarity, we cite to the rule as currently written, but we note that the result would be the same regardless of the version used. 15State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶ 74, 322 P.3d 624 (quoting UTAH R. EVID. 702, advisory committee note) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2011 UT 28, ¶ 42, 254 P.3d 752. 17 UTAH R. EVID. 702(a). 9 STATE v. JONES Opinion of the Court that are underlying in the testimony (1) are reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts.” 18 This threshold showing may be satisfied if the underlying methods “are generally accepted by the relevant expert community.” 19 Finally, even if the testimony satisfies rule 702, the court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice” under rule 403. D. Evidentiary Hearing ¶ 22 At the Johnson evidentiary hearing, Timothy Kupferschmid, the lab director of Sorenson Forensics, 20 testified about the use of Y-STR DNA. 21 Y-STR DNA testing is a form of PCR STR testing, which stands for polymerase chain reaction using short tandem repeats. Traditional PCR STR testing, also called autosomal STR, analyzes repeating chemical patterns, called haplotypes, at specific loci on the twenty-three pairs of chromosomes that contain DNA. Mr. Kupferschmid testified that Y-STR PCR testing is similar to traditional PCR STR testing in that it looks to repeating patterns at certain loci; however, Y-STR PCR analyzes only the Y chromosome, which is carried only by males. As Mr. Kupferschmid explained, because it analyzes only the Y chromosome, Y-STR PCR has several significant limitations compared to traditional PCR STR testing. For example, because a male inherits the entire Y chromosome from his father (unlike other chromosomes which are a mix of paternal and maternal DNA), all men in the same paternal line have identical Y-chromosome DNA, and the test therefore cannot distinguish among them. 22 18 Id. 702(b). 19 Id. 702(c). 20At the time of the testing, the Utah State Crime Lab did not have the capability to carry out Y-STR DNA testing; therefore, Sorenson Forensics conducted the Y-STR tests. See also Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 9 n.3 (describing Y-STR 21 DNA). 22 The possibility of a random genetic mutation on the Y chromosome is the same as with other chromosomes— (con’t.) 10 Cite as: 2015 UT 19 Opinion of the Court ¶ 23 Mr. Kupferschmid also explained that Y-STR PCR testing is statistically much less powerful than traditional PCR STR testing. Traditional PCR STR compares patterns from twenty-three pairs of chromosomes that have undergone independent assortment of both paternal and maternal DNA. The possible DNA combinations are therefore quite numerous, and statistics for traditional PCR STR evidence can be calculated using the “product method,” which, as Mr. Kupferschmid testified, often results in frequencies of “one in a billion, one in a trillion type numbers.” In contrast, Mr. Kupferschmid explained that Y-STR DNA statistics “are much, much lower” because Y-STR testing looks only to the single Y chromosome that did not undergo random assortment. Calculation of occurrence must therefore use the less powerful “counting method.”23 Mr. Kupferschmid provided an example, explaining that if the sample was not observed in the database with a size of 3,561, the probability that a member of the population would have that sample is .08 percent. In turn, this means that 99.92 percent of the male population could be excluded as a possible donor.24 Mr. Kupferschmid explained that a “match” meant that the individual could not be excluded as the source of the sample. ¶ 24 In the Johnson case, the district court concluded that Sorenson Forensics, the lab that analyzed the DNA samples in both cases, had the proper certifications and protocols to reliably approximately three or four times every thousand generations, according to the State’s expert. 23 The probability equals the sum of occurrences of the haplotype in the database divided by the total number of samples in the database (P = X/N). The calculation is slightly different if the sample profile is not in the database (P = 1 – α1/N, where α is the confidence interval, usually 95 percent). See Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods, Y-chromosome Short Tandem Repeat (Y-STR) Interpretation Guidelines, FBI (Jan. 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/forensic-sciencecommunications/fsc/jan2009/index.htm/standards/2009_01_sta ndards01.htm. 24 Another Sorenson employee, Rebekah Kay, testified that finding zero matches in a database of 13,906 samples would yield a frequency of one out of 4,651 individuals. 11 STATE v. JONES Opinion of the Court conduct Y-STR DNA testing. The Johnson court further concluded that the scientific principles underlying Y-STR DNA testing are “correct” and are “generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.” Lastly, the court concluded that the probative value of the Y-STR DNA evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The trial court in Mr. Jones’s case therefore adopted the Johnson rulings and admitted the Y-STR DNA evidence against Mr. Jones. E. The Trial Court Did not Err When It Admitted the Expert Testimony Under Rule 702 ¶ 25 Mr. Jones first challenges admission of the Y-STR DNA evidence by arguing that the State did not carry its burden under rule 702 to show that the expert testimony was reliable in its use as identification evidence. Importantly, Mr. Jones does not challenge the underlying scientific methodology or claim that the test produced errant results in this case. Rather, he contends that the limitations inherent within the test, even a test performed correctly, render Y-STR DNA evidence unreliable for use in identification. ¶ 26 We first reiterate the role of courts in assessing the admissibility of expert testimony. Courts are to act as a “gatekeeper,” ensuring a minimal “threshold” of reliability for the knowledge that serves as the basis of an expert’s opinion. This is a crucial but limited function. We must be careful not to displace the province of the factfinder to weigh the evidence. As our court of appeals has astutely observed, under rule 702 “the line between assessing reliability and weighing evidence can be elusive.” 25 We must be mindful of this important distinction because “the factfinder bears the ultimate responsibility for evaluating the accuracy, reliability, and weight of the testimony.”26 Acknowledging that the rule limits our task to considering whether “the underlying principles or methods . . . are generally 25Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, 2012 UT App 20, ¶ 47, 269 P.3d 980. 26 Id. 12 Cite as: 2015 UT 19 Opinion of the Court accepted by the relevant expert community,” 27 we turn now to the substance of Mr. Jones’s challenge. ¶ 27 We have previously ruled on the admissibility of both traditional and Y-STR DNA evidence. In State v. Butterfield, we determined that traditional PCR STR testing is inherently reliable for identification, and we therefore allowed the admission of such evidence. 28 Then, in State v. Maestas, we upheld admission of Y-STR DNA evidence. 29 In that case, Mr. Maestas faced aggravated murder and aggravated burglary charges for a series of crimes committed with two accomplices. 30 To show that Mr. Maestas committed the murder alone, the State introduced Y-STR DNA evidence recovered from under the victim’s fingernails that excluded the accomplices but could not rule out Mr. Maestas as the DNA’s source. 31 We held that Y-STR DNA testing is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community and thus concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of its reliability. 32 In affirming, we noted that scientific and forensic journals as well as other courts have recognized Y-STR DNA testing as reliable for excluding individuals as the source of an unknown sample. 33 ¶ 28 Mr. Jones argues that we should reach a different conclusion in the present case because he alleges the DNA evidence was used to identify him, not to exclude him from a class of possible perpetrators. He claims that Y-STR DNA evidence is scientifically unreliable for identification purposes. We are not persuaded. Where, as here, the testing procedures and results are not in question, we agree with the State that the statistical conclusions from the Y-STR DNA go to the weight of the 27 UTAH R. EVID. 702(c). 28 2001 UT 59, ¶ 40, 27 P.3d 1133. 29 2012 UT 46, ¶ 140. 30 Id. ¶¶ 1, 4–6. 31 Id. ¶ 126. 32 Id. ¶ 136. 33 Id. ¶ 133 & nn.145–46. 13 STATE v. JONES Opinion of the Court testimony and not to the underlying scientific reliability. 34 We have previously upheld the reliability of the methodology for traditional PCR STR 35 and Y-STR DNA testing, 36 and Mr. Jones does not challenge those principles here. It is thus for the jury to determine whether the DNA evidence was sufficient to link Mr. Jones to the crime. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Y-STR DNA evidence. F. The Trial Court Properly Admitted the DNA Testimony Under Rule 403 ¶ 29 Mr. Jones next argues that the trial court should have ruled the Y-STR DNA evidence inadmissible under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 imposes on Mr. Jones the heavy burden not only to show that the risk of unfair prejudice is greater than the probative value, but that it “substantially outweigh[s]” the probative value. Mr. Jones argues that the limitations of Y- STR DNA testing diminish its probative value such that the value 34We also note that Mr. Jones does not challenge the statistics or mathematical calculations presented at trial. 35 Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ¶ 40. 36 Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 133 & nn.145–46. Other courts have also upheld the reliability of Y-STR testing. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Artus, No. 07 Civ. 4688, 2008 WL 2262606, at  (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2008) (explaining that a claim that Y-STR testing cannot determine the source to a statistical certainty “is an argument going to the weight of the evidence”); People v. Stevey, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 11 (Ct. App. 2012) (“The fact that Y–STR DNA testing cannot positively identify an individual does not mean . . . that it is unreliable, or that the results are not probative.”); People v. Zapata, 8 N.E.3d 1188, 1192–94 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (concluding that Y-STR testing has gained general acceptance in the relevant community); People v. Wood, No. 315379, 2014 WL 5470590 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2014) (admitting Y-STR DNA evidence under rule 702 and finding no rule 403 violation where the expert explained the test’s limitations to the jury); State v. Bander, 208 P.3d 1242, 1255 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing the general acceptance of the counting method for Y-STR statistical analysis). 14 Cite as: 2015 UT 19 Opinion of the Court is substantially outweighed by the danger that it unfairly prejudiced him. ¶ 30 The “critical question” in a rule 403 analysis for unfair prejudice “is whether certainty [sic] testimony is so prejudicial that the jury will be unable to fairly weigh the evidence.”37 Additionally, “[e]vidence is not unfairly prejudicial because it tends to prove guilt, but because it tends to encourage the jury to find guilt from improper reasoning.”38 However, where expert testimony is presented accurately and where the evidence’s scientific limitations are properly described to the jury, we cannot conclude that the testimony is unfairly prejudicial to the defendant or likely to confuse the jury. The fact that Y-STR DNA evidence is less powerful than other forms of DNA evidence does not automatically render it unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Jones or likely to mislead or confuse the jury. For example, in Maestas, we found that the Y-STR DNA evidence survived a rule 403 challenge because “it was likely that the jury was able to fairly weigh the evidence.” 39 This was so because the State’s expert carefully explained the testing process to the jury and spoke accurately about the test’s conclusions. 40 We found that there was no rule 403 violation even when the expert spoke of the Y-STR DNA test as yielding a “match” to the defendant, because the expert had 37 State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12, ¶ 27, 133 P.3d 363; see State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ¶ 53, 191 P.3d 17 (“Only when evidence poses a danger of rous[ing] the jury to overmastering hostility does it reach the level of unfair prejudice that rule 403 is designed to prevent.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 38 United States v. Condon, 720 F.3d 748, 755 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (explaining that “unfair prejudice . . . speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 39 2012 UT 46, ¶ 139. 40 Id. 15 STATE v. JONES Opinion of the Court explained that a “match” simply meant the individual could not be excluded as a possible donor. 41 ¶ 31 In reviewing the expert testimony presented in the current case, we likewise find no rule 403 violation. Rebekah Kay, one of the State’s experts, testified about Y-STR DNA technology and its use in the present case. She explained that Y-STR is a newer technology that allows for the analysis of male DNA when it is in the presence of large amounts of female DNA. Ms. Kay also described some of the limitations of the test, including the fact that all men in a paternal line will likely have an identical Y chromosome profile. On multiple occasions, Ms. Kay stated that the DNA profile from the belt and Ms. Brennan’s fingernails was a “match” to Mr. Jones. However, on cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Ms. Kay on whether Y-STR DNA evidence could reveal a “match” to a specific person. Ms. Kay clarified that “when you are used to hearing a DNA match with traditional STRs, you’re thinking that it’s individualized. If it matches that person, it only matches that person.” In contrast, she explained, with Y-STR, “it’s not the same kind of match. It is a match to the profile but not necessarily the person.” ¶ 32 Mr. Kupferschmid also appeared as an expert for the State and explained that, compared with traditional DNA testing, “[t]he statistics are much lower with Y-STR DNA profiles because . . . there is no cross-mingling of DNA.” He then testified to the result in the present case, asserting that “approximately 99.6 percent of . . . the male population can be excluded” as a contributor of the DNA sample but that Mr. Jones could not be excluded. 42 When defense counsel crossed Mr. Kupferschmid on his statistical conclusion, Mr. Kupferschmid explained that, read another way, the frequency of Mr. Jones’s DNA profile “is equivalent to one in 2681 individuals.” He explained this means 41 Id. 42 In the State’s motion to admit the Y-STR DNA evidence, the collected sample was compared to a database of 3,561 individuals. At trial, Mr. Kupferschmid based his statistical analysis on the database available at the time, which in 2010 included 8,028 samples. 16 Cite as: 2015 UT 19 Opinion of the Court that “every time you test . . . a male, the probability of that person having that particular DNA profile is approximately one in 2681.” ¶ 33 We acknowledge that Y-STR DNA may be most helpful to the trier of fact when used to exclude possible suspects, as in Maestas. 43 However, juries are routinely called upon to evaluate complex scientific evidence, including DNA evidence. And any risk of confusion or unfair prejudice are minimized where, as here, the jury hears testimony from the experts of the various limitations of Y-STR DNA. Additionally, Mr. Jones had the opportunity on cross-examination to elicit details about Y-STR testing, including its specific limitations. And counsel did just that. Given the accurate and thorough expert testimony on the Y-STR DNA evidence, we conclude that the DNA testimony was properly explained to the jury such that the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion or misleading the jury did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Y-STR DNA evidence against Mr. Jones. ¶ 34 We do, however, take this opportunity to note concerns regarding DNA evidence, even traditional PCR techniques. While we recognize the great potential benefit of DNA evidence as both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, we agree with the United States Supreme Court that, “[g]iven the persuasiveness of [DNA] evidence in the eyes of the jury, it is important that it be presented in a fair and reliable manner.” 44 For example, and as particularly relevant here, the Court recently warned that DNA evidence runs the risk of creating the so-called “prosecutor’s fallacy,” which occurs when a jury confuses random match probability with source probability. 45 Additionally, even at its best, DNA evidence 43 2012 UT 46, ¶ 9. 44 McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 136 (2010). 45 Id. at 129. For example, if there is a 1 in 10,000 chance that the DNA from a random member of the public would match (random match probability), that does not lead to the conclusion that there is a 1 in 10,000 chance that the DNA sample came from someone other than the defendant (source probability) or that there is a 1 in 10,000 chance the defendant is innocent. If the relevant population from which the defendant came was (con’t.) 17 STATE v. JONES Opinion of the Court is not infallible; there are still concerns of, for example, inherent subjectivity or bias 46 and unavoidable error. 47 ¶ 35 Furthermore, we recognize the inherent differences in traditional PCR and Y-STR DNA tests and caution against courts and parties treating them identically. While the common scientific principles may render both DNA tests reliable as expert testimony, the disparity between their statistical conclusions is great and warrants careful consideration. 48 For this reason, we reiterate the responsibility of the State to properly and accurately present Y-STR DNA evidence, including its limitations, and the duty of defense counsel to counter any errant or incomplete testimony.