Opinion ID: 167729
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: W aiver of Appellate Rights

Text: In resolving appeals brought by defendants w ho have waived their appellate rights in a plea agreement, we consider: “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing -8- the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice . . . .” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325.
W e narrowly construe the scope of an appellate waiver and any ambiguities will be read against the government and in favor of the defendant’s appellate rights. Id. The plea agreement in this case contained the following waiver of appellate rights: [D]efendant in exchange for the promises and concessions made by the United States in this plea agreement, knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to: a. Appeal or collaterally challenge his guilty plea and any other aspect of his conviction, including but not limited to any rulings on pretrial suppression motions or any other pretrial dispositions of motions and issues; b. Appeal, collaterally challenge, or move to modify under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) or some other ground, his sentence as imposed by the Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined, provided the sentence is within or below the applicable guideline range determined by the Court to apply to this case. Defendant acknowledges that this w aiver remains in full effect and is enforceable, even if the Court rejects one or more of the positions of the United States or defendant set forth in paragraph 7 concerning the application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines[;] 6 c. It is provided that (i) defendant specifically does not waive the right to appeal an upward departure from the sentencing guideline range determined by the Court to apply to this case, and (ii) his waiver of rights to appeal and to bring collateral challenges shall not apply to appeals or challenges based on changes in the law reflected in Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court cases decided after the date of this 6 In Paragraph 7, the parties agreed Bailey should receive a downward adjustment under USSG §3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. -9- agreement that are held by the Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court to have retroactive effect. (R OA, Vol. 1, Doc. 16 at 10-11.) Based on this language, Bailey agreed to a broad w aiver of appellate rights, limiting his right to appeal his sentence to two specific circumstances: (1) the imposition of an upward departure, and (2) a change in law held to have retroactive effect. None of Bailey’s arguments on appeal concern an upward departure; in fact, the district court did not depart upward from the guideline range. M oreover, Bailey’s arguments alleging the district court misapplied the guidelines and there was insufficient evidence supporting the enhancements to his sentence are not based on a change in law held to have retroactive effect. Therefore, these arguments are within the scope of the appellate waiver. How ever, Bailey’s Blakely argument, which we analyze in light of the Supreme Court’s Booker decision, 7 concerns a “change[] in the law . . . decided after the date of th[e] agreement that [was] held by the . . . Supreme Court to have retroactive effect.” See United States v. Booker,543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005) (“[W ]e 7 In Booker, the Supreme Court extended its holding in Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines, holding that the Sixth Amendment requires “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict [to] be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” 543 U.S. at 244. To remedy the constitutional infirmity of the guidelines, Booker invalidated their mandatory nature, requiring the district court to consult them in an advisory fashion. Id. at 245-46 (severing and excising 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1), 3742(e)). -10- must apply today’s holdings--both the Sixth Amendment holding and our remedial interpretation of the Sentencing Act--to all cases on direct review.”); 8 see also United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2005) (construing similar language in plea agreement to allow appeal of sentence under Booker). Therefore, Bailey has not waived his right to challenge his sentence under Booker. W e now consider the remaining Hahn factors to determine whether we should enforce Bailey’s waiver of appellate rights as to his arguments concerning the district court’s application of the guidelines and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the enhancements to his sentence.
In determining whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights, we look to two factors: (1) whether the plea agreement states the defendant entered into the agreement knowingly and voluntarily, and (2) whether an adequate Rule 11 colloquy occurred betw een the defendant and the court. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. Both conditions are satisfied in this case. The waiver of appellate rights section of the plea agreement informs Bailey of his right to appeal the judgment and sentence imposed by the district court. It also states he 8 While “Booker does not apply retroactively to criminal cases that became final before its effective date of January 12, 2005,” this is not such a case. United States v. Bellamy, 411 F.3d 1182, 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that “like Blakely, Booker does not apply retroactively on collateral review”). -11- “knowingly and voluntarily” waives that right (unless the court imposes an upward departure or there is a change in law held to have retroactive effect). (ROA, Vol. 1, Doc. 16 at 10.) At his change of plea hearing, the court explained to Bailey the rights he was w aiving by pleading guilty, including the right to appeal his sentence. It also asked Bailey whether he understood the w aiver; Bailey stated he did. Therefore, we conclude Bailey’s w aiver of appellate rights was knowing and voluntary.
There are at least four situations in which a miscarriage of justice may occur: (1) the district court relied upon an impermissible factor such as race, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel in the negotiation of the waiver renders it invalid, (3) the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or (4) the waiver is otherw ise unlawful. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327. Clearly, the first three situations are not at issue here— the district court did not rely on an impermissible factor, there is no claim defense counsel was ineffective in negotiating the waiver, 9 and 9 Bailey was represented by Larry Speer during the negotiation of the plea agreement and at the change of plea hearing. Sentencing was set for April 29, 2004; Mr. Speer failed to appear. A bench warrant was issued for his arrest. On May 3, 2004, current counsel was appointed to represent Bailey. Subsequently, Mr. Speer was held in contempt. Despite Mr. Speer’s failure to appear for sentencing, there is no indication that his previous representation of Bailey, including the negotiation of the plea agreement, was ineffective. Indeed, at the change of plea hearing, in response to the court, Bailey stated he was satisfied with the services of his attorney and believed Speer had done all he could to counsel and assist him in the matter. -12- Bailey’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum. 10 Thus, the only issue under the miscarriage of justice prong is whether Bailey’s waiver was “otherwise unlawful.” “For a waiver to be otherwise unlawful, the error must seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings, as that test was employed in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).” United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180, 1194 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). Bailey argues that to enforce the w aiver and deny him his day in court would be a miscarriage of justice because a successful appeal would reduce his sentence by at least eighty-five percent. He contends that absent the district court’s sentencing errors, he would only have been exposed to a guideline range of twelve to eighteen months. The essence of Bailey’s complaint is that although he pled guilty to possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), he was punished for manufacturing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, both of which were initially alleged against him in the 10 “‘[S]tatutory maximum’ under the Hahn miscarriage of justice inquiry refers to the statute of conviction,” not as the term is defined by Blakely (see supra n.5). United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, the penalty provision to which Bailey pled was 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), which carries a ten year maximum term of imprisonment. Bailey’s sentence does not exceed that maximum. In fact, although Bailey’s guideline range was 135 to 168 months imprisonment, his statute of conviction limited his sentence to 120 months. -13- criminal complaint but later dismissed. However, by pleading guilty to violating § 922(g)(3), Bailey avoided the statutory maximum of twenty years imprisonment for the manufacturing of methamphetamine 11 and the consecutive mandatory minimum five-year term of imprisonment required for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. 12 He also received the benefit of a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Therefore, we cannot conclude that enforcement of the waiver in this case— where Bailey, the Government and society at large have all benefitted— would result in a miscarriage of justice. See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1318 (“[W]e generally enforce plea agreements and their concomitant waivers of appellate rights . . . because public policy strongly supports such waivers as they benefit defendants, the government, and society at large.”). Based on the above, we conclude Bailey’s w aiver of appellate rights is enforceable with respect to his arguments that the district court misapplied the guidelines and there was insufficient evidence supporting the enhancements to his 11 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) provides a maximum term of twenty years imprisonment for the manufacturing of an indeterminate amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. 12 The criminal complaint sought to penalize Bailey for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). This subsection requires a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years if the firearm was brandished. However, even if the firearm was not brandished, Bailey was facing a consecutive five-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment had he been convicted under the criminal complaint. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). -14- sentence. Therefore, we dismiss his appeal as to these arguments. However, because his waiver does not extend to his Blakely/Booker argument, we turn to it now .