Opinion ID: 1801674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: exclusiveness of workers' compensation remedy

Text: In its first assigned error, Tri-State alleges that the district court erred in concluding that the exclusive remedy provision of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-111 (Reissue 1993), does not apply. That statute reads, in relevant part: Such agreement or the election provided for in section 48-112 [which provides, so far as is relevant here, that every employer and every employee is presumed to accept and come under the act] shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any other method, form, or amount of compensation or determination thereof than as provided in the ... [a]ct, and an acceptance of all the provisions of such act, and shall bind the employee himself or herself, and for compensation for his or her death shall bind his or her legal representatives, his or her surviving spouse and next of kin, as well as the employer, and the legal representatives of a deceased employer.... For the purpose of this section, if the employer carries a policy of workers' compensation insurance, the term employer shall also include the insurer. Tri-State argues that § 48-111, along with our decision in Pettigrew v. Home Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 312, 214 N.W.2d 920 (1974), prevents the widow from recovering under the underinsured motorist provisions of its automobile policy. The plaintiff in Pettigrew suffered injuries in the course of his employment, received workers' compensation benefits, and then sued his employer's workers' compensation carrier, alleging that the carrier negligently performed its agreement to provide safety engineering inspections. We held that the carrier was immune from liability by virtue of § 48-111, writing that [i]t is evident to us that the legislative intent in adopting the language quoted was to place the insurer in the same situation as the employer and to eliminate actions of this type. Id. at 315, 214 N.W.2d at 923. Tri-State also calls our attention to CNA Ins. Co. v. Colman, 222 Conn. 769, 610 A.2d 1257 (1992); Bouley v. Norwich, 222 Conn. 744, 610 A.2d 1245 (1992); Hackenberg v. Transp. Authority, 526 Pa. 358, 586 A.2d 879 (1991); and Lewis v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 517 Pa. 461, 538 A.2d 862 (1988), which in general held that workers' compensation is an employee's exclusive remedy against the employer and that an employee may thus not recover uninsured motorist benefits from the employer for a work-related automobile accident. However, other jurisdictions have held that recovery of workers' compensation benefits does not preclude recovery of uninsured motorist benefits. William v. City of Newport News, 240 Va. 425, 397 S.E.2d 813 (1990); Christy v. City of Newark, 102 N.J. 598, 510 A.2d 22 (1986). Instructive as the holdings of other states may be, we have observed that [c]olor-matching cases would serve no useful purpose herein where our problem is one of statutory construction and our [workers' compensation] statute is not identical to those involved in other jurisdictions. Pettigrew, 191 Neb. at 314, 214 N.W.2d at 922. It is true that under § 48-111, an employee's election of workers' compensation benefits shall be a surrender ... of [his or her] rights to any other method, form, or amount of compensation against the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier. The fact is, however, that as Richland Grain's underinsured motorist carrier, Tri-State is not Richland Grain's workers' compensation carrier. This factual difference makes the reasoning of Pettigrew, supra, inapplicable. It would be illogical to allow an employee whose employer contracted with two separate insurance carriers (one for workers' compensation coverage and another for underinsured motorist coverage) to collect under both policies, but disallow the employee whose employer contracted with only one insurer, as in the instant case, to recover under both. In short, § 48-111 protects Tri-State only in its role as the workers' compensation carrier, not in its role as Richland Grain's underinsured motorist carrier. That determination brings us to a consideration of Tri-State's claim that [t]he result of the [district court's] decision in this case is to permit those workers who happen to be injured while driving a company car to recover significantly more benefits from the employer and its insurers than those workers who are injured somewhere else while on the job. That is a distinction without a substantial difference, discrimination without a rational basis. Brief for appellant at 13. In support of that proposition, Tri-State quotes from State ex rel. Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 608-09, 300 N.W.2d 181, 187 (1980): It is competent for the Legislature to classify objects of legislation and if the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary, it is a legitimate exercise of legislative power.... Classifications for the purpose of legislation must be real and not illusive; they cannot be based on distinctions without a substantial difference . . . . (Emphasis in original.) Tri-State does not, however, tell us what legislation it is challenging. As Tri-State wants both classes to be treated equally, perhaps it is challenging the constitutionality of § 48-111. But even if the equal protection argument were to prove meritorious, Tri-State clearly lacks standing to argue the equal protection rights of an employee injured during the course of employment while driving a vehicle not owned by the employer. See State ex rel. Bouc v. School Dist. of City of Lincoln, 211 Neb. 731, 320 N.W.2d 472 (1982). Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that the exclusive remedy provisions of § 48-111 do not apply in the instant case.