Opinion ID: 6105748
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kerr's reference to herself as Lisa Brooks

Text: During cross-examination of Mark Harvey, defense counsel confirmed with the witness that during his conversation with Kerr at his home on the night of her death, she had referred to defendant as Squirrel Boy. In response to further questioning, Harvey indicated that Kerr did not use that name in defendant's presence. When counsel then asked Harvey whether he knew that Kerr had been calling herself Lisa Brooks as opposed to Lisa Kerr, the prosecutor objected on relevance and hearsay grounds. The court sustained the objection without comment, at which point defense counsel indicated he had no further questions and concluded his cross-examination. Defendant argues that the court's ruling was in error because the fact Kerr referred to herself using defendant's last name, rather than her married name, was not being admitted for its truth, but rather to show her state of mind and thereby to rebut the prosecutor's evidence that Kerr feared defendant.  Counsel made no offer of proof and advanced no argument to counter the prosecutor's relevance and hearsay objections to his cross-examination, and  the trial court did not explain the basis of its ruling sustaining the objection. We conclude therefore that defendant has forfeited his claim of error. Even were we to assume that the court abused its discretion in preventing counsel from pursuing the challenged line of questioning, however, any error was harmless because Kerr's use of the name Brooks was independently established. The parties stipulated at trial that defendant signed a rental agreement with the names Donald Brooks and Lisa Brooks for an apartment in which Kerr lived. And defendant's acquaintance, Kari, testified that defendant showed him a piece of paper with Lisa Brooks written on it. The defense also called a number of witnesses who testified to the effect that Kerr did not fear defendant. For example, Sheila Peet told the jury that Kerr seemed happy and excited when she was around defendant. On this record, even if the court erred in precluding defense counsel from asking Harvey whether he was aware Kerr had been referring to herself as Lisa Brooks, the ruling did not prejudice defendant.  c. Defendant's receipt of a package containing women's panties As previously mentioned, the defense called several witnesses in an attempt to show that Kerr was not fearful of defendant, but rather that she was happily involved with him. Over the prosecutor's objection, Yreno Lujano testified that defendant played for him several telephone messages that Kerr had left on defendant's answering machine telling defendant that she loved him and missed him, and thanking him for helping her with her lawyer. However, the court did not permit defense counsel to elicit from Lujano that he had seen defendant open a package he had received in the mail that contained a pair of women's panties. In the court's view, this evidence could not support a reasonable inference regarding Kerr's state of mind because it lacked sufficient foundation that Kerr was the person who had sent the package to defendant. In so ruling, the court rejected defense counsel's argument that Lujano's statement that he saw defendant open a package that had panties inside, standing alone, would support an inference that the panties had come from Kerr. Defendant claims that the court erred in excluding this evidence. The relevance, and thus the admissibility, of the evidence in question depends on the existence of the preliminary fact that Kerr was the person who mailed a pair of panties to defendant. Defendant, as the proponent of the evidence, bore the burden of producing evidence in support of that preliminary fact. (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a).) When, like here, the evidence at issue concerns the conduct of a particular person and the preliminary fact is whether that person ... so conducted [herself], the evidence is inadmissible unless the court finds that there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of  the existence of the preliminary fact. (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)(4).) We have explained that the trial court's role with regard to preliminary fact questions under Evidence Code section 403, subdivision (a),  'is merely to determine whether there is evidence sufficient to permit a jury to decide the question.'  ( People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415 , 467, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 .) The determination regarding the sufficiency of the foundational evidence is a matter left to the court's discretion. ( Id . at p. 466, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 .) Such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown. (  People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147 , 165, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 163 , 164 P.3d 590 ; People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50 , 83-84, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 117 P.3d 622 .) The defense was entitled to rebut the prosecution's evidence that Kerr feared defendant, which supported the stalking charge, with evidence that Kerr did not fear him. Evidence that Kerr had sent defendant a pair of panties in the mail might tend to show she was not afraid of him. The preliminary fact necessary to permit Lujano's testimony that he saw defendant open a package that contained women's panties was that Kerr was the person who sent them. This fact may be established by circumstantial evidence. (See People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529 , 591, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528 , 2 P.3d 1081 ; see also Evid. Code, §§ 1415 -1421 [specifying some of the types of circumstantial evidence that may authenticate a document].) Defendant argues that the court erred in excluding Lujano's testimony regarding defendant's receipt of the package because the undisputed fact that defendant and Kerr were involved in a sexual relationship, when coupled with evidence defendant had received a package of panties in the mail, was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that the package had come from Kerr. The People counter that the defense produced no evidence that would adequately support such an inference. Here, the court ruled it would permit Lujano to testify that on several occasions during the period of defendant's relationship with Kerr, defendant played for him tape-recordings of answering machine messages left by Kerr telling defendant that she loved him. The court also allowed Lujano to testify that during this same period, defendant showed him love letters from Kerr. Defendant's receipt of the package presumably occurred close in time to the messages and love letters. From this evidence the jury  arguably might have been able to decide that it was Kerr who had sent the package that Lujano saw defendant open. We need not decide, however, whether the court erred in excluding Lujano's testimony regarding the package of panties because even if the evidence in question should have been allowed, there is no reasonable  probability defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had it been admitted. ( People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082 , 1104, fn. 4, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 , 240 P.3d 204 [applying prejudice standard for state law error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836, 299 P.2d 243 , to assess effect of error in excluding evidence for lack of foundation].) As discussed above, the purpose of the proffered evidence was to show that Kerr did not fear defendant. The record shows, however, that the defense elicited strong evidence both during cross-examination and the defense case itself to make that point. For example, as noted earlier, prosecution witness Dwayne Kari testified that defendant played for him a tape-recorded message that Kerr had left on defendant's answering machine that said, All I can say about last night was 'yummy.'  Kari also testified that defendant showed him a piece of paper on which Kerr had written Lisa Brooks. Other evidence suggested that Kerr had willingly accepted defendant's offer of financial assistance, including his signing an apartment rental agreement for her that named Donald Brooks and Lisa Brooks as the tenants. And defense witness Jody Wheeler, a bartender at the bar where defendant often joined his father for lunch, testified that Kerr would often call the bar asking for defendant, sometimes 10 times a day. On this record, it is not reasonably probable that the addition of evidence from which it could be inferred that Kerr had mailed a  pair of her panties to defendant would have led the jury to agree with the defense that Kerr did not fear defendant. Any error in the exclusion of this evidence does not warrant reversal of the judgment. d. Domestic violence against Kerr Among the defense witnesses who testified that Kerr was not fearful of defendant was Sheila Peet, who owned a plumbing business where defendant purchased his plumbing supplies. According to Peet, defendant brought Kerr into the shop on two or three occasions in early 1999, and Kerr talked with Peet about her relationship with defendant. When defense counsel asked the witness what Kerr had said in this regard, the court held a sidebar conference with the parties to discuss the anticipated out-of-court statements. At the sidebar, defense counsel confirmed that the expected testimony was intended to show Kerr's state of mind, specifically, that she did not fear defendant. The prosecutor objected, however, to counsel's plan to elicit Kerr's statement to Peet to the effect that she had left her husband because he was violent and was trying to kill her. The court found that the proffered testimony regarding why Kerr left her husband was not relevant to the issue whether she feared defendant, and would not be admitted. The court also took defense counsel to task for attempting to dirty up the victim. Counsel pushed for admission of Kerr's statements regarding her husband nonetheless, arguing the proffered evidence would explain that, rather than  fearing defendant, Kerr had a motivation to be with him. The court was not persuaded and reiterated that it would not allow that point to come in under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule. When Peet's testimony resumed, she told the jury that when Kerr came into the plumbing shop with defendant she appeared to be very happy and talked about defendant getting her a place to live and retaining an attorney for her. According to Peet, Kerr did not appear to be afraid of defendant. Defendant contends the court erred in excluding evidence that Kerr said her husband was physically abusing her, which would have shown that she had a reason for being with defendant and did not fear him. According to defendant, the court's exclusion of the evidence on the ground that it dirt [ied] up the victim was erroneous because the proffered evidence portrayed Kerr's husband , not Kerr, in a negative light.  This was not the basis of the court's ruling, however. Rather, the court excluded the evidence because it found Kerr's statements regarding her husband to have no bearing on the issue whether she feared defendant . We conclude that the court acted well within its discretion in determining that Kerr's statements concerning her husband's violence toward her had no tendency to show her state of mind with respect to defendant. Defendant observes that the trial court admitted into evidence numerous out-of-court statements by Kerr offered by the prosecution to show that Kerr feared defendant. From this he argues for the first time that evidence of Kerr's statements regarding physical abuse by her husband should have been admitted under authority of Evidence Code section 356. 5 We previously  have referred to that provision as the [r]ule of completeness ( People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96 , 130, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 , 113 P.3d 1125 , italics omitted), and have described its purpose as  'prevent[ing] the use of selected aspects of a conversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to create a misleading impression on the subjects addressed.'  ( People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393 , 460, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541 , 297 P.3d 793 ; accord, People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287 , 319, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 268 , 148 P.3d 47 .) Thus,  '  '[i]n the event a statement admitted in evidence constitutes part of a conversation or correspondence, the opponent is entitled to have placed in evidence all that was said or written by or to the declarant in the course of such conversation or correspondence, provided the other statements have some bearing upon, or connection with , the admission or  declaration in evidence.'  '  ( People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310 , 334-335, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509 , 118 P.3d 545 .) According to defendant, Kerr's statements regarding her husband's physical abuse were admissible under Evidence Code section 356 because it was misleading to allow the prosecution to present Kerr's statements that she feared defendant without also allowing statements suggesting she had a reason to be with him. As a threshold matter, we conclude defendant forfeited his claim that the proffered evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 356 because counsel did not raise that basis for admissibility below. ( People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 460, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541 , 297 P.3d 793 .) In any event, Evidence Code section 356 has no application here. Defendant acknowledges that Kerr's statement to Peet regarding her husband's physical abuse of her did not occur in any of the conversations, presented by the prosecutor, in which Kerr said she feared defendant. By its terms, Evidence Code section 356 applies [w]here part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party .... (Evid. Code, § 356, italics added.) Nor does defendant persuade that the proffered statement was necessary to the jury's understanding of the prosecution's evidence regarding Kerr's fear of defendant. (See People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053 , 1103, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191 , 210 P.3d 361 [trial court was not required under Evid. Code, § 356 to grant the defendant's request to admit numerous additional letters from the defendant to the victim when several such letters that had been placed into evidence were  'independently comprehensible'  on the relevant topics of intent to kill and premeditation].) The defense was permitted to introduce evidence to the effect that Kerr did not fear defendant. This evidence was admitted, not as a matter of completeness under Evidence Code section 356, but rather because it tended to rebut the prosecution's evidence that Kerr feared defendant. The court determined that Kerr's statement regarding physical abuse by her husband was not relevant to whether she feared defendant. We conclude that the court did not err in excluding the proffered evidence on that ground.  e. Kerr's prior conviction for welfare fraud At the end of the defense case, defense counsel sought admission of evidence that in March 1998, about one year before her death, Kerr had been convicted of welfare fraud. Counsel argued that the felony conviction was admissible to impeach Kerr's out-of-court statements regarding  her fear of defendant, which had been admitted for their truth under the state-of-mind hearsay exception.  The court excluded the prior conviction evidence, finding it both irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. As the court explained, the evidence was not relevant to the case because the court had admitted the fear evidence under the state-of-mind hearsay exception for only a limited purpose, that is, the stalking charge. Invoking Evidence Code section 352, the court also explained that the prejudicial impact of the proffered evidence far outweighed its probative value. In the court's view, the welfare fraud conviction lacked any probative value whatsoever because it was being offered against a dead victim who never testified at trial. Defendant argues that the court prejudicially erred by refusing to allow the defense to use Kerr's welfare fraud conviction to impeach her out-of-court statements that she feared defendant and that he was stalking her, because preventing the defense from demonstrating Kerr was willing to lie cloaked her hearsay statements with a false air of truthfulness. Defendant's claim does not succeed: As explained below, even were defendant to show that the court abused its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence, the error did not prejudice him. The court's stated reason for concluding that the prior conviction evidence lacked probative value suggests that the court was unaware of Evidence Code section 1202, which allows impeachment of hearsay statements with evidence that would have been admissible had the declarant testified at trial. 6 (See generally People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769 , 806-808, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 191 , 259 P.3d 370 .) Although this court has not addressed the issue whether a prior felony conviction may be used as impeachment evidence under Evidence Code section 1202, the Courts of Appeal have held that such evidence falls within the purview of that provision. ( People v. Little (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1364 , 1373-1377, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 ; People v. Jacobs (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1444 , 1449-1452, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 783 .) The appellate courts also have concluded that, like the use of prior felony convictions for purposes of impeachment generally ( People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301 , 312, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 696 P.2d 111 ), the admission of a prior felony conviction pursuant to Evidence Code section 1202 to impeach the credibility of a declarant who does not testify at trial is subject to the trial court's discretion under Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Little, at pp. 1377-1379, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 ; People v. Jacobs, at pp. 1452-1453, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 783 ; see People v. Baldwin (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 991 , 1005, 118 Cal.Rptr.3d 68 [trial court has discretion under Evid. Code, § 352 to exclude as more  prejudicial than probative evidence of a declarant's prior inconsistent statements proffered for purposes of impeachment under Evid. Code, § 1202 ].) Because the court excluded, rather than allowed, the evidence of Kerr's felony welfare fraud conviction, we need not decide in this case whether prior felony convictions may be admitted pursuant to Evidence Code section 1202 to impeach the hearsay statements of a declarant who  does not testify at trial. Assuming without deciding that evidence of a prior felony conviction may be admitted under section 1202, we reject defendant's assertion that the court prejudicially erred under Evidence Code section 352 when it prohibited the defense from presenting the welfare fraud conviction to impeach Kerr's statements admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.  In considering whether to admit evidence of a prior felony conviction of a witness subject to impeachment concerning his or her credibility, the prominent factors in determining the probative value of the prior conviction include whether the conviction (1) reflects on honesty and (2) is near in time. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629 , 654, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564 , 828 P.2d 705 ; People v. Woodard (1979) 23 Cal.3d 329 , 335-337, 152 Cal.Rptr. 536 , 590 P.2d 391 .) As defendant points out, Kerr's felony welfare fraud conviction involved a crime of moral turpitude reflecting on her honesty. (See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044 , 1128, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121 , 954 P.2d 384 .) Moreover, because the prior conviction occurred in March 1998, during Kerr's relationship with defendant, it clearly was not remote in time. Finally, and as previously related, the court found that the prior conviction lacked probative value because it was being offered against a dead victim who never testified at trial. At the time of the court's ruling, however, People v. Jacobs, supra , 78 Cal.App.4th 1444 , 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 783 established that a prior conviction could be admitted pursuant to Evidence Code section 1202 to impeach the out-of-court statement of a declarant who did not testify at trial. ( Jacobs, at pp. 1449-1452, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 783 .) We need not determine whether the court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of Kerr's prior felony conviction for lack of probative value, however. Even if the court's ruling was an abuse of discretion, reversal is not warranted because there is no reasonable probability that a more favorable result would have occurred had the prior conviction evidence been admitted. ( People v. Watson, supra , 46 Cal.2d at p. 836, 299 P.2d 243 .) The defense attempted to cast doubt on the veracity of Kerr's statements regarding her fear of defendant and his stalking activities with testimonial evidence from which it could be inferred that Kerr was not afraid of defendant. For example, as recounted earlier, a fellow plumber and friend of defendant's, Yreno Lujano, testified that he heard a telephone answering machine message from Kerr telling defendant that she loved him and missed him. The owner of a plumbing  supply store, Sheila Peet, told the jury that when defendant brought Kerr into the shop with him, Kerr seemed happy and did not appear to be afraid. In addition, the bartender at the bar where defendant often dined testified that Kerr sometimes called the bar numerous times a day asking for defendant. Given the defense evidence that was before the jury, the admission of documentary proof that Kerr had committed welfare fraud, for the limited purpose of impeaching her out-of-court statements, would not have led the jury to disbelieve the prosecution's evidence that Kerr feared defendant. Even if the court erred by preventing the defense from presenting evidence of Kerr's prior conviction for welfare fraud, that error could not have prejudiced defendant. Defendant contends that the cumulative prejudicial impact of all of the evidentiary rulings that he challenges in this claim of error rendered his trial unfair. Whether viewing the asserted evidentiary errors individually or cumulatively, we conclude that the rulings in question did not deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial.  6. Admission of photographs Defendant claims that the trial court's admission of inflammatory crime scene and autopsy photographs showing Kerr's charred remains and her soot-filled respiratory tract, and a photograph of Kerr while alive, violated Evidence Code section 352 and defendant's state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a reliable death verdict. We conclude that the photographs were properly admitted, as explained below. a. Crime scene and autopsy photographs During the prosecution's case-in-chief, the prosecutor referred several of its witnesses to exhibit No. 5, a large board containing six crime scene photographs of Kerr's face, head, and body that were labeled A through F. The last of the witnesses to be asked about the exhibit No. 5 photographs was Dr. Raffi Djabourian, who performed the autopsy on Kerr and testified regarding his findings. When Dr. Djabourian explained that the extensive charring of Kerr's body showed she had suffered a thermal injury  from the fire, the prosecutor referred him to exhibit No. 5C, which depicted Kerr's badly charred body after it had been removed from the car. Dr. Djabourian confirmed that his finding was consistent with that photograph. Next referring to the entire board of photographs, the prosecutor asked Dr. Djabourian his opinion as to why a certain area of Kerr's hair and face appeared not to have burned. According to the witness, it may have been caused by the positioning of the body and the use of accelerant to cause the fire.  The prosecutor then questioned Dr. Djabourian regarding his findings following an internal examination of Kerr's body during the autopsy. According to Dr. Djabourian, one of the most significant findings was the presence of soot in the respiratory system, including inside the mouth and within the larynx, trachea, and bronchi. The court interrupted the witness's testimony to conduct a sidebar conference regarding defense counsel's objection to the admission of exhibit No. 27, which consisted of two autopsy photographs depicting these portions of Kerr's upper respiratory system. Counsel argued that this evidence, and the exhibit No. 5 photographs of Kerr's body at the crime scene, were too gory for the jury and therefore inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. The court overruled the objection, presumably agreeing with the prosecutor that the photographs were highly relevant to significant issues in the case, including whether Kerr was alive at the time of the fire. When Dr. Djabourian's testimony resumed and the prosecutor referred him to exhibit No. 27, the witness indicated that the black discoloration in the larynx and trachea was soot. Dr. Djabourian told the jury that, based on the distribution of the soot in the respiratory tract, he had no doubt that Kerr was alive, at least at the beginning of the fire. Defendant argues that the photographs in exhibits Nos. 5 and 27 were unnecessary to prove any fact in dispute, and that they were inflammatory. As defendant points out, for example, the defense did not contest that there was soot in Kerr's respiratory tract, which rendered photographs depicting that condition unnecessary. The admission of allegedly gruesome photographs is basically a question of relevance over which the trial court has broad discretion. [Citation.] 'A trial court's decision to admit photographs under Evidence Code section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the prejudicial effect of such photographs clearly outweighs  their probative value.'  ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646 , 713, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360 , 110 P.3d 289 ; accord, People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256 , 283, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 724 , 362 P.3d 376 .) Even if the defense did not contest that Kerr had soot in her respiratory tract, or that her charred body was found on the floorboard in the car, and was willing to so stipulate,  '[t]he prosecution was not obligated to accept antiseptic stipulations in lieu of photographic evidence. '  ( People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 734 , 767, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 536 , 353 P.3d 266 .) The autopsy and crime scene photographs were relevant to several issues, including whether the fire was started with accelerant and whether Kerr was alive at the time. These issues in turn were relevant to the prosecution's  theories that defendant premeditated the murder and committed torture. (See People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599 , 617, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 66 , 267 P.3d 1135 [photograph of the victim's burned body lying in the trunk of the car, combined with autopsy evidence indicating she was alive when set on fire, was probative of premeditation and torture].) [T]he jury is entitled to see details of the [victim's body] to determine if the evidence supports the prosecution's theory of the case. ( People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557 , 624, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345 , 51 P.3d 224 .) We have examined the objected-to photographs and find they are not unduly gruesome. Indeed, any revulsion they induce is attributable to the acts done, not to the photographs. ( People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037 , 1054, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675 , 175 P.3d 632 .) The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these photographs. b. Photograph of Kerr while alive Before opening argument, and outside the jury's presence, the prosecutor informed  the court that during opening argument he would be referring to a number of photographs mounted on display boards. Defense counsel indicated he had no objection to the prosecution's photographs, one of which depicted Kerr while alive. Nor did defense counsel object when the court allowed the jury to individually examine the photograph of Kerr after one of the jurors indicated during the prosecutor's opening statement that he had not seen it clearly. The photograph of Kerr while alive was marked as People's exhibit No. 13 and first shown during the redirect examination of Detective Gligorijevic, who identified the exhibit as a picture of Kerr. The prosecutor elicited from the detective that she had obtained the photograph during the course of her investigation. When asked from where she had obtained the photograph, the detective indicated it had come from a friend of Kerr's, at which point defense counsel objected on the grounds of relevance, hearsay, and lack of personal knowledge. The court immediately overruled the first two grounds for objection but eventually sustained the objection based on personal knowledge. Later during trial, Kerr's friend Cheryl Zornes confirmed that she had given Kerr's picture to Detective Gonzales, and that the photograph comprising exhibit No. 13 depicted Kerr. The prosecutor also showed exhibit No. 13 to prosecution witnesses Mark Harvey, Lynda Farnand, and Dwayne Kari, who likewise identified Kerr as the person shown in the photograph. At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the court admitted into evidence all of the prosecution's marked exhibits. Counsel raised no new objections to the  exhibits at that time, submitting the issue of their admissibility on the objections he had raised during trial.  Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the photograph of Kerr while alive because it created an undue risk of sympathy for the victim and prejudice against him. He argues that the court's ruling also deprived him of his state and federal constitutional right to due process and protection against cruel and unusual punishment. We agree with the People that defendant has forfeited his claim of error on appeal because defense counsel did not object on these grounds when the prosecutor used the photograph during opening remarks and while questioning witnesses. Defendant insists that counsel's relevance objection to exhibit No. 13 at the time it was offered into evidence during Detective Gligorijevic's testimony was sufficient to preserve his claim on appeal. We reject his reading of the record. As summarized above, the record shows that defense counsel did raise a relevancy objection to Gligorijevic's testimony, but never challenged the photograph itself. Accordingly, he may not challenge its admission here. (See People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381 , 423-424, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 58 P.3d 391 .) In any event, defendant does not persuade that the court abused its discretion in admitting the photograph of Kerr while alive. We have long advised trial courts to exercise care when deciding whether to admit during the guilt phase of trial photographs of a capital murder victim while alive, because of the risk such evidence will merely generate sympathy for the victim [ ]. ( People v. Harris, supra , 37 Cal.4th at p. 331, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509 , 118 P.3d 545 ; accord, People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622 , 677, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26 , 919 P.2d 640 .) But the possibility that a photograph of the victim while alive will elicit sympathy from the jury does not require exclusion if it is otherwise relevant. ( Harris , at p. 331, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509 , 118 P.3d 545 ; People v. Osband, at p. 677, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26 , 919 P.2d 640 ; People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198 , 1230, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628 , 831 P.2d 1210 .) Here, the photograph was relevant because it permitted the witnesses to identify Kerr as the person about whom they were testifying. ( DeSantis , at p. 1230, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628 , 831 P.2d 1210 [upholding on similar grounds the admission of a photograph of the capital murder victim and his wife while on vacation].) Moreover, our examination of the photograph suggests no basis on which to conclude that its admission was unduly prejudicial. Exhibit No. 13 was a two-feet by three-feet poster board, but the photocopy of the color photograph of Kerr that is mounted on the board measures eight and one-half by 11 and one-  half inches, and the actual image measures four by 11 inches. The picture shows Kerr in a pair of shorts and a sleeveless shirt, smiling and standing in what appears to be a park or garden. Although the photograph arguably posed some risk it would elicit sympathy from the jury, nothing about the manner in which Kerr's likeness was  displayed or the photograph's background suggests it was  'particularly calculated'  to do so. ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936 , 975, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) There was no error in admission of the photograph. Nor did its admission violate defendant's federal and state constitutional rights. (Cf. People v. DeSantis, at p. 1231, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628 , 831 P.2d 1210 [in light of the strong evidence of guilt, there was little possibility that any sympathy toward the victims that was generated by the photograph lessened the reliability of the guilt verdict in violation of the 8th Amend.].) 7. Sufficiency of the evidence The prosecution presented five theories of defendant's guilt of first degree murder:  (1) premeditated, deliberate murder, (2) murder during the commission of kidnapping, (3) murder during the commission of arson, (4) murder by means of torture, and (5) murder by means of lying in wait. Three of these theories, kidnap-murder, torture, and lying in wait, were the underpinnings of the three special circumstances alleged in the case. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder but did not specify the theory or theories on which it rested its verdict. The jury also found the kidnapping-murder and torture-murder special-circumstance allegations to be true, but found the lying-in-wait special-circumstance allegation to be not true. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lying-in-wait theory of first degree murder. But he argues that the first degree murder conviction and death judgment must be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to prove any of the other four theories of first degree murder presented by the prosecution. He asserts furthermore that there was insufficient evidence supporting the kidnapping-murder and torture-murder special-circumstance findings, which likewise would require reversal of the death judgment. The principles governing our assessment of defendant's various challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are well settled. We  ' must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. '  ( People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856 , 942, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 225 , 261 P.3d 243 .) The same standard applies when examining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a special circumstance finding. ( Id . at p. 943, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 225 , 261 P.3d 243 .) Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. ( In re Michael D . (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115 , 126, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 .)  Defendant's sufficiency challenge to the four theories of first degree murder liability and the special circumstance findings is premised on the same factual argument. According to defendant, the evidence showed that he confronted Kerr at her apartment in a fit of jealousy and rage and fatally strangled her, then placed the body in the back of her car and drove to the freeway off-ramp where he set the car on fire to hide the killing. As explained below, however, there was evidence in the record from which a reasonable trier of fact could have rejected that scenario and found instead that defendant had incapacitated Kerr, that he was aware she was still alive when he placed her in the back of the car, and that, after deciding her fate, ultimately drove to the off-ramp to set Kerr and her car on fire. Although the scenario defendant describes appears plausible, this court's role on review does not involve a reevaluation of the evidence. Rather, we presume the existence of every fact in support of the verdict that could reasonably be inferred from the evidence. ( People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141 , 173, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 722 , 245 P.3d 366 .)  Under the applicable standard of review, we conclude that the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant committed premeditated and deliberate murder, murder in the commission of kidnapping and arson, and murder by means of torture, and that substantial evidence likewise supports the true findings on the  kidnapping-murder and torture-murder special-circumstance allegations. a. First degree murder based on a theory of premeditation and deliberation A willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing is murder in the first degree. (§ 189.)  'Deliberation' refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of action; 'premeditation' means thought over in advance. ( People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041 , 1080, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859 , 46 P.3d 335 .) The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly, but the express requirement for a concurrence of premeditation and deliberation excludes from murder of the first degree those homicides ... which are the result of mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed. ( People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880 , 900-901, 156 P.2d 7 .) People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 , 26-27, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 447 P.2d 942 identified three categories of evidence relevant to deciding whether to sustain a verdict of first degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation: (1) evidence of planning activity prior to the killing, (2) evidence of the defendant's prior relationship with the victim from which the  jury could reasonably infer a motive to kill, and (3) evidence that the manner in which the defendant carried out the killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a 'preconceived design' to take his victim's life in a particular way for a 'reason' which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2). (Italics omitted.) The identified categories of evidence are those we  'typically' find sufficient to uphold first degree murder convictions. ( People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489 , 517, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199 , 828 P.2d 101 .) But we have also observed that the Anderson factors are simply an aid [for] reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence is supportive of an inference that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse. ( People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117 , 1125, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577 , 831 P.2d 1159 ; accord, People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205 , 242, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 481 , 278 P.3d 754 .) The record in this case discloses ample evidence from which it could be inferred that defendant acted deliberately and according to a preconceived design rather than from a rash impulse. Circumstantial evidence of planning included evidence regarding the location of Kerr's burning car, which defendant had driven to a secluded freeway off-ramp in the early morning hours when there was likely to be little traffic, and either had maneuvered or pushed the car down the embankment, hidden from view, to fake an accident and avoid detection. Planning also could be inferred from evidence regarding the various materials defendant used to set Kerr's car on fire. Specifically, defendant poured accelerant over Kerr and the inside of her car, stuffed a burning rag into the gas tank and, when that failed to ignite the accelerant, lit a rolled-up piece of paper on fire and threw it inside the car to set it ablaze. With regard to motive, the record discloses evidence that in the months preceding the killing, defendant had become obsessed and angry with Kerr. An acquaintance of defendant testified that defendant told him Kerr was screwing him around, and that defendant threatened to disclose evidence of the affair to Kerr's husband if she doesn't leave him. Other  witnesses testified that defendant was suspicious and highly possessive of Kerr, that he routinely monitored her whereabouts and activities, and that he had placed a listening device inside her home. Defendant's plumbing assistant Heiserman testified, for example, that he and defendant were  on a job when defendant parked the van near Kerr's home and was gone for 25 minutes to see what was going on. Heiserman testified, moreover, that in the weeks before Kerr's death, defendant appeared even more consumed by his thoughts of Kerr, telling Heiserman that he wanted Kerr to leave her husband and son and start a family with him. According to defendant's Colorado roommate, defendant told him that he suspected Kerr was cheating on him and that, on the night of  the killing, he was in the crawl space underneath the man's house when he overheard them having sex. Defendant also told his roommate that he overheard them belittling his father, which made him angry. And, according to Mark Harvey, while he and Kerr stood outside the front of his house saying goodnight, Kerr referred to defendant as Squirrel Boy. There was also evidence of a deliberate manner of killing. The crime scene and arson investigation evidence suggested that defendant poured accelerant around the car's interior and directly onto Kerr as she lay on her side, unconscious, on the backseat floorboard. The evidence also indicated that defendant first attempted to set the car afire by stuffing a lighted cloth into the gas tank. And, when that plan did not succeed, he chose a different strategy, lighting a rolled-up piece of paper on fire and tossing it into the front seat from a safe distance away, which caused an intense and quick-burning fire. As described earlier, the record shows additional evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find a premeditated, deliberate murder. On one or two occasions several months before Kerr's death, defendant told his plumbing assistant Heiserman that he wanted to get Kerr off his mind by blowing up her car or setting it on fire. And, close in time to the killing, defendant told Heiserman that were Kerr to refuse to leave her family for him, he wouldn't be able to live with it or be able to see her, and again mentioned blowing up her car. Defendant acknowledges the testimony by the medical examiner that Kerr was alive but unconscious when the car was set on fire, and that she died of thermal injuries. But he argues there was no evidence suggesting that he knew Kerr was alive at that time, thereby precluding a finding that he set out to kill her in a deliberate and intentional manner by lighting her car on fire. Defendant asserts that the evidence showed he confronted Kerr at her apartment in a fit of jealous rage and fatally strangled her, then placed the body in her car and drove to the freeway off-ramp where he set the car on fire to hide the killing. Notwithstanding defendant's argument, the record discloses substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have rejected defendant's reading of the record and found instead that defendant had incapacitated Kerr before driving her to the off-ramp, and that he knew she was alive, albeit unconscious, at the time he set her and her car on fire. The evidence showed that defendant had positioned Kerr's body so she was not visible, and he poured accelerant not only on the interior of Kerr's car but also on Kerr herself. From this evidence the jury could reasonably infer that defendant did so to cause her death, not simply to cover up his crimes. The evidence showed furthermore that when defendant called Heiserman  some seven hours  after firefighters responded to the scene of Kerr's burning car, he ignored Heiserman's question about his whereabouts and asked, Is she okay? When Heiserman responded, Is who okay?, defendant said, C'mon Smiley. Is she okay? Heiserman asked what was going on, and defendant rephrased his question, this time asking, Is she dead? When Heiserman said, Yes, defendant started to cry. A reasonable trier of fact could have inferred from these questions that defendant was asking whether Kerr had survived the fire. Heiserman further testified about the substance of his conversation with defendant after defendant had been returned to California following his arrest in Colorado. As noted earlier, during that conversation defendant explained that after hiding in the crawl space below Harvey's house and overhearing Harvey and Kerr bad-mouthing him, he confronted Kerr at her car, strangled her and, when she was out, put her in the backseat of her car. This evidence is more than sufficient to raise an inference that defendant knew Kerr  was alive at the time he drove to the off-ramp and set her and her car on fire. We therefore conclude there is substantial evidence in the record from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed a premeditated and deliberate murder. b. First degree felony murder based on a kidnapping-murder theory and kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding We likewise conclude the evidence was sufficient to support both the first degree murder verdict on a felony-murder theory based on kidnapping, and the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding. All murder ... which is committed in the perpetration of ... kidnapping ... is murder of the first degree. (§ 189.) At the time of defendant's crimes, section 207, subdivision (a), as now, provided that [e]very person who forcibly ... steals or takes, ... or arrests any person in this state, and carries the person into another ... part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping. (§ 207, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 1990, ch. 55, § 1, p. 393.) The mental state required for felony murder is the specific intent to commit the underlying felony ( People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083 , 1140, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 52 P.3d 572 ), and  'the evidence must establish that the defendant harbored the felonious intent either prior to or during the commission of the acts which resulted in the victim's death.'  ( People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984 , 1016, 248 Cal.Rptr. 568 , 755 P.2d 1017 .) First degree felony murder does not require proof of a strict causal or temporal relationship between the felony and the killing. ( Ibid . ) Rather, a  killing has been committed in the perpetration of the underlying felony within the meaning of section 189 if the killing and the felony are parts of one continuous transaction. ( Ainsworth , at p. 1016, 248 Cal.Rptr. 568 , 755 P.2d 1017 ; accord, People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 175, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 722 , 245 P.3d 366 .) The evidence showed that defendant formed an intent to kidnap Kerr prior to committing the acts that caused her death. Kerr was last seen alive at 1:15 a.m. when she left Mark Harvey's house to drive home to her apartment. Defendant had told his plumbing assistant Heiserman that he confronted and strangled Kerr when she got to her car and that when she was out, he put her in the backseat. But Kerr's burning vehicle and charred body  were not discovered until three hours later, at the bottom of an embankment near a freeway off-ramp that was a 15 to 20-minute drive from Harvey's residence. From this evidence, a jury could reasonably have inferred that defendant formed the intent to kidnap Kerr after rendering her unconscious, and that he set her and her car on fire only after having formed that intent. We conclude there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant formed the intent to commit kidnapping before killing Kerr, and that he committed both crimes as part of a continuous transaction. 7 Defendant argues that his belief he had killed Kerr at her apartment precludes a finding that moving her from the apartment to the location where her charred body was discovered constituted a kidnapping. (See People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469 , 498, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45 , 40 P.3d 754 [kidnapping requires a living victim].) As previously discussed, however (see ante , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 385-386, 396 P.3d at pp. 525-526), the record discloses substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have rejected that scenario and found instead that defendant incapacitated Kerr after confronting her at her car as she was leaving Harvey's house, and that he knew Kerr was still alive, albeit unconscious, when he placed her in the back of her car and eventually drove to the off-ramp embankment where he set her and her car on fire.  We likewise reject defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding. The prosecution alleged that Kerr's murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of kidnapping. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B).) To prove that special circumstance allegation at the time the present crimes occurred, the prosecutor had to show that the defendant had an independent purpose for the commission of the felony, that is, the commission of the  felony was not merely incidental to an intended murder. 8 ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130 , 182, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 , 6 P.3d 150 ; see also People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870 , 902, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 , 830 P.2d 712 [inquiring whether the defendant had a purpose for the kidnapping apart from murder].) Defendant argues that, even were the jury to have rejected the defense theory and found instead that he drove to the embankment of the freeway off-ramp to murder Kerr, the only logical conclusion would be that the kidnapping was merely incidental to the murder. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the contrary conclusion.  Here, the record discloses substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that defendant had not yet decided Kerr's fate after incapacitating her and moving her into the back of her own car. First, the evidence established an hours-long gap between the time Kerr said goodbye to Harvey at around 1:15 a.m. to return to her apartment and the firefighters' discovery of her burning car and charred body. Heiserman testified that defendant told him he had confronted Kerr and strangled her into unconsciousness when she got to her car after leaving Harvey's house. But it was not until three hours later that firefighters arrived at the scene of Kerr's intensely burning car. In addition to evidence of the three-hour time gap, there was substantial evidence regarding the complicated relationship between defendant and Kerr from which a reasonable jury could infer that defendant was conflicted regarding what to do with Kerr after he had strangled her. By all accounts, their year-long affair was tumultuous and consuming. Defendant conveyed to others that he was in love with Kerr and wanted to marry her, and described their relationship as perfect. The evidence showed that defendant was upset and frustrated by Kerr's decision to try to reconcile with her husband. But even shortly before the murder, defendant continued to profess his love for Kerr and his desire for her to leave her husband and start a family with him. Moreover, although he suspected that Kerr was screwing him around, defendant nonetheless rented an apartment for her after she left her husband, signing the rental agreement as Donald Brooks and Lisa Brooks. The record further showed that defendant had grown increasingly obsessed with Kerr and tormented by thoughts of her. It is during this period that  defendant made remarks to the effect that he wanted to burn or blow up Kerr's car. Although the prosecutor used such statements to support his theory of premeditated murder, a reasonable jury could also have inferred from this evidence that defendant's mental and emotional state was highly unstable close in time to the crimes. Evidence of defendant's complicated relationship with Kerr, when coupled with evidence of his fragile mental and emotional state, raised a reasonable inference that defendant was conflicted, confused, and possibly in a state of panic after rendering Kerr unconscious, and that he decided her fate only after having placed her on the floorboard of her car and driven off. Indeed, the arson investigator testified during cross-examination that defendant's initial attempt to light the car on fire-by stuffing a burning  cloth into the gas tank's filler neck-is a method that is rarely successful, and suggested that defendant may not have been thinking clearly. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's true finding on the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation as we must, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the kidnapping was not merely incidental to the murder.