Opinion ID: 682753
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brandished or Otherwise Used?

Text: 15 The guidelines establish the base offense level for robbery. 10 Additional offense levels are added to the base level according to any specific characteristics that apply to the particular robbery. The base level for a robbery that involves the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon is increased as follows: 16 (2)(A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7 levels; (B) if a firearm was otherwise used, increase by 6 levels; (C) if a firearm was brandished, displayed, or possessed, increase by 5 levels; (D) if a dangerous weapon was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; (E) if a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or possessed, increase by 3 levels; or (F) if an express threat of death was made, increase by 2 levels. 11 17 The guidelines define (and distinguish) otherwise used and brandishing as follows: 18 (c) Brandished with reference to a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) means that the weapon was pointed or waved about, or displayed in a threatening manner. 19 . . . . . 20 (g) Otherwise used with reference to a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) means that the conduct did not amount to the discharge of a firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon. 12 21 Gonzales asserts that the district court erred in determining that his conduct--merely pointing a gun at a store clerk during one robbery, even if done in a threatening manner--fits the guidelines' definition of otherwise used rather than its definition of brandished. Gonzales argues that, as the court made a factual finding that he did nothing more than point the gun at the robbery victim and instruct her to open her cash register--and did not find that he expressly threatened the clerk or used the gun in any other manner--the only correct application of those facts to the guidelines yields the conclusion that he brandished the gun. Thus, Gonzales reasons that his base offense level should have been increased by five levels rather than six. 22 No one disputes that Gonzales pointed a firearm at the store clerk while asking her to open the cash register so that he could get the money. But neither does anyone suggest that Gonzales did anything more than point and demand. The government argues, however, that Gonzales' conduct generated an implicit threat sufficient to compel the clerk to give him the money, thereby elevating the level of specific conduct from brandishing a firearm to otherwise using a firearm. The government relies on United States v. De La Rosa, 13 in which we affirmed a district court's finding that a firearm was otherwise used when the defendant waved a handgun, expressly threatened those near her, and so intimidated them that she was able to commit the crime. 14 In like manner, the government argues that aiming a weapon in a threatening manner toward a specific victim distinguishes it from mere brandishing. 15 We find the government's position untenable in light of the plain language of the guidelines' definition quoted above. 23 The government concedes that Gonzales did not verbalize a threat toward the store clerk or anyone else. The government argues nonetheless that when a threat is implicit, and equally coercive, from the conduct of the perpetrator, the threat need not be expressed to elevate the use of a gun from brandish to otherwise used. The government thus admits to no difference between (1) pointing a gun at a clerk and ordering her to open a cash register, and (2) pointing a gun at a clerk and verbalizing I'll put a bullet in you, or I'll blow your head off. Thus the government would have us hold that, as there was a possibility that Gonzales would shoot the clerk, the threat was evident and there was no need for Gonzales to verbalize it. The government is therefore contending that Gonzales' conduct is appropriately classified as otherwise used a firearm during the robbery. 24 We find the government's arguments illogical and wholly unpersuasive. We note that the cases cited by the government to support its position interpret otherwise used as including situations in which the defendants not only pointed firearms at victims but also explicitly--expressly--threatened them. Certainly that distinction is present in De La Rosa. We are convinced that were we to broaden otherwise used to include incidents in which implicit threats may exist, but in which no explicit threats have been made, we would unjustifiably expand the outer limits of prior law as well as the guidelines' definition of otherwise used. 16 In essence, brandishing would be totally subsumed into otherwise using a firearm in every case. After all, brandished is defined in the above quoted guidelines provision as pointed ... in a threatening manner. Thus, we conclude that Gonzales' conduct of pointing a firearm and instructing that the cash register be opened--but doing nothing more--fits precisely the guidelines' definition of brandished. As such, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the district court erred in increasing Gonzales' base sentence level by the six-level increase for otherwise using a firearm. 25