Opinion ID: 2979457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: second or successive habeas application

Text: We cannot authorize the filing of a second or successive habeas corpus application unless we determine that Chambers has made a prima facie showing that his claims meet the requirements 5 No. 09-6483 In re: Danny Chambers of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Chambers did not raise the claims in the instant motion in his first § 2254 petition. A claim not presented in a prior application must be dismissed unless: (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Although Chambers’s allegations of juror misconduct and grand-jury bias are troubling, we must deny Chambers’s § 2244 motion because his claims do not meet the stringent § 2244(b)(2) requirements. First, none of Chambers’s claims “rel[y] on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Second, Chambers does not allege facts that were not previously discoverable through due diligence, and that “establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [Chambers] guilty.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B). With respect to his claims of juror misconduct and grand-jury bias, Chambers does not rely on any newly applicable rule of constitutional law, and he fails to meet the § 2244(b)(2)(B) criteria for new evidence. Although Chambers asserts that he did not have personal knowledge of the 6 No. 09-6483 In re: Danny Chambers alleged juror misconduct, Chambers does not explain why he could not have discovered the misconduct earlier through due diligence. Moreover, even if Chambers could make such a showing, he fails to demonstrate that, but for the misconduct, no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of murder. In spite of their impropriety, the alleged juror conversations do not bear upon Chambers’s guilt or innocence. Chambers’s allegations of grand-jury bias suffer from the same defects. In light of Elizabeth Hollon’s signature on the indictment, it is unclear why Chambers could not have discovered previously the names and relationship of the grand-jury foreperson and the prosecutor. Nor does Chambers show how the involvement of Elizabeth Hollon in the grand-jury proceedings casts doubt on his guilt as proven at trial. A marital relationship between a member of the grand jury and a prosecutor does raise concerns about the fairness of the grand-jury proceedings against Chambers. However, in the instant motion, Chambers does not present evidence that would prevent any rational factfinder from finding him guilty, as required by § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).1 With respect to his claim of sentencing error, Chambers does not present any new evidence. Nor does he rely on a previously unavailable rule of constitutional law, made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court.2 Under Kentucky law, if a jury 1 We also note that, according to the trial-court docket, Tom Hollon was appointed as a special prosecutor on or around March 26, 1993 for a pre-trial hearing held in May 1993. These are the only listings on the docket sheet submitted by Chambers noting Hollon’s involvement in Chambers’s case. 2 Chambers claims that the Kentucky Supreme Court held unconstitutional Ky. Rev. Stat. § 532.055, the provision under which the trial court had authority to impose sentence in the event 7 No. 09-6483 In re: Danny Chambers in a felony case is unable to agree on a sentence, “the judge shall impose the sentence within the range provided elsewhere by law.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 532.055(4) (1990). Five years after Chambers’s conviction became final, and two years after Chambers filed his first habeas petition, the United States Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). We first note that the Supreme Court has not held that Apprendi applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. See In re Nailor, 487 F.3d 1018, 1023 (6th Cir. 2007).3 But, in any event, Chambers objects to the imposition of life imprisonment, which did not require additional factfinding to be imposed by the trial court. Kentucky Revised Statute § 532.025(3) provides that “the death penalty, or imprisonment for life without benefit of probation or parole until the defendant has served a minimum of twenty-five (25) years of his sentence” may not be imposed unless a “statutory aggravating circumstance[] . . . is so found.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 532.025(3) (1990) (emphasis added). Chambers objects to his sentence of life imprisonment, which was not for life without benefit of of jury deadlock. However, only one provision, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 532.055(2)(a)(6), which permits impeachment by use of a juvenile adjudication, was held unconstitutional, and, moreover, it was held by the Kentucky Supreme Court to violate the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, not by the United States Supreme Court to violate the United States Constitution. Manns v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 439, 445-46 (Ky. 2002). 3 In the death-penalty context, the Supreme Court applied Apprendi to hold that a jury must find the aggravating factors necessary for the imposition of the death penalty. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). But Chambers did not receive a capital sentence, and Ring “does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004). 8 No. 09-6483 In re: Danny Chambers probation or parole for twenty-five years, and which, accordingly, requires no finding of an additional aggravating circumstance. Thus, Chambers’s sentence was within the power of the trial court to impose without a jury.