Opinion ID: 146368
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Griffin's state-law battery claim

Text: In addition to her § 1983 claim, Griffin alleged a state-law battery claim against Hardrick. Griffin brought this claim under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, which permits individuals to bring a cause of action against governmental employees who allegedly commit intentional torts. See Baines v. Wilson County, 86 S.W.3d 575, 583 n. 5 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002). Griffin's appellate brief, however, does not mention her battery claim. Indeed, her Statement of the Case references only an excessive-force violation against Hardrick pursuant to § 1983. Nor was her battery claim mentioned at oral argument. She has therefore likely abandoned this claim on appeal. See Marks v. Newcourt Credit Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 444, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (An appellant waives an issue when he fails to present it in his initial briefs before this court.). But see Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep't, 549 F.3d 666, 673 (6th Cir.2008) (holding that where the same analysis applies to a plaintiff's federal and state-law causes of action, a defendant does not waive its defense to the state-law claim by failing to present the state-law claim on appeal if it argued the federal claim). But even if Griffin has not abandoned this claim, it fails on the merits. Where a plaintiff asserts a battery claim under Tennessee law that arises out of the same use of force as her § 1983 excessive-force claim, the analysis is the same for both causes of action. That is, whether the analysis concerns whether an officer violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights by using excessive force or whether the analysis concerns whether an officer committed state-law battery by using force that was `clearly excessive,' the same principles... are applied. Lee v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 596 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1118 (M.D.Tenn.2009) (holding that officers entitled to summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim were automatically entitled to summary judgment on the Tennessee common-law battery claim); see also Harris v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, No. 3:06-0868, 2007 WL 4481176, at  (M.D.Tenn. Dec.18, 2007) ([T]he plaintiff has set forth adequate grounds for his [§ 1983] claim of excessive force against each of the officers. Because Tennessee courts apply the same `excessive force' principles to assault and battery claims against police officers, the plaintiff has additionally set forth adequate grounds against each of the officers for assault and battery under Tennessee law.). We thus find no error in the district court's conclusion that because Hardrick was entitled to summary judgment on Griffin's § 1983 claim, he was also entitled to summary judgment on her state-law battery claim.