Opinion ID: 1185583
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kidnaping

Text: (2a) The court instructed the jury that An essential element of the crime of Kidnapping for the Purpose of Robbery is that the defendant had the specific intent to commit said robbery at any time during the course of the kidnapping. This intent must be a motivating purpose of the action, although it need not be the only such purpose. [Par.] To constitute the crime of Kidnapping for the Purpose of Robbery, it is not necessary that the perpetrator shall have intended to commit robbery at the time of first contacting the complaining witness. It is sufficient even if the intent to commit robbery was formed later but during the progress of the kidnapping. These instructions are in accord with the holding in People v. Brown (1947) 29 Cal.2d 555, 558 [176 P.2d 929]. That holding, however, was based on the language of section 209 as it read before its amendment in 1951. [2] At that time section 209 included any person who holds or detains [the victim] ... to commit extortion or robbery. Accordingly, the court stated that the section makes it unnecessary to determine whether the kidnaper intended to commit extortion or robbery at the time of the original seizure or carrying away. It is sufficient if the extortion or robbery was committed during the course of the abduction. Thus, whatever may have been the original motive of the kidnaping, if the kidnaper commits extortion or robbery during the kidnaping, he `holds or detains' his victim `to commit extortion or robbery' within the meaning of section 209. (29 Cal.2d at p. 558.) Subsequently, in People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 180-181 [217 P.2d 1], the court extended the holding in Brown and concluded that section 209 did not require any asportation of the victim and that therefore even a standstill robbery could be punished under its terms. (See People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225].) Thereafter, in 1951, the Legislature amended section 209 and abrogated the rule of the Knowles case. [3] The section no longer covers a person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts [or] conceals ... any individual ... with intent to hold or detain, or who holds or detains, such individual ... to commit... robbery. (3, 4) Insofar as robbery is concerned, the section now applies only to any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery. The 1951 amendment did more than make asportation an element of the crime of kidnaping to commit robbery. It also abrogated the rule of the Brown case. A person could not kidnap and carry away his victim to commit robbery if the intent to rob was not formed until after the kidnaping had occurred. As the court stated in People v. Smith (1963) 223 Cal. App.2d 225, 234 [35 Cal. Rptr. 719], in condemning instructions essentially the same as those given in this case, both the Brown case and the Knowles case preceded the 1951 amendment when detention alone was sufficient to constitute kidnapping for purpose of robbery and no asportation was required. [Par.] ... [A]n additional effect of the change in the statute is to make it necessary for the trier of fact to determine whether the kidnaper intended to commit robbery at the time of the original seizing. In this respect the crime is similar to burglary where it is necessary to show that the entry was with the intent to commit larceny or any felony. An illegal entry but without such an intent is not a burglary ( People v. Jenkins, 16 Cal. 431); similarly since the 1951 amendment to section 209, kidnapping without intent to rob constitutes kidnapping but not kidnapping for purpose of robbery; and a robbery during a kidnapping where the intent was formed after the asportation is a robbery and not a kidnapping for purpose of robbery. (Per Burke, P.J.; accord: People v. Lindsay (1964) 227 Cal. App.2d 482, 508-510 [38 Cal. Rptr. 755].) In re Ward (1966) 64 Cal.2d 672, 676 [51 Cal. Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400], is not to the contrary, for the court was there considering crimes that were committed before the 1951 amendment to section 209. People v. Paxton (1967) 255 Cal. App.2d 62, 72 [62 Cal. Rptr. 770], and People v. Gomez (1967) 252 Cal. App.2d 844, 859 [60 Cal. Rptr. 881], are not persuasive, for neither case considered the impact of the 1951 amendment. To the extent that they are inconsistent with our decision herein they are disapproved. (2b) In the present case defendant was entitled to have the jury determine whether he intended to commit robbery at the time the kidnaping commenced or whether the intent to commit robbery was an afterthought to a kidnaping that was sexually motivated. The instructions took this issue from the jury, and the error was therefore prejudicial. ( People v. Smith, supra ; People v. Lindsay, supra . )