Opinion ID: 2557538
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: May a Statutory Damages Cap Apply to an Award for Successful Constitutional Tort Claims?

Text: Because the Legislature is permitted to cap damages recovery retrospectively and because the LGTCA cap is not so unduly low as to equate with cutting off all remedy, the damages cap should apply to the jury award in the present case. The fact that Longtin brought and proved constitutional tort violations does not dictate a different result under the Maryland Constitution or the legislative history of the LGTCA. At common law (that is, before the LGTCA), a plaintiff could bring a constitutional tort claim directly against local government officers and employees, as well as their employersthe local governments. After the passage of the LGTCA, a plaintiff lost, however, his/her/its ability to recover from the officers and employees, provided those tortfeasors acted within the scope of employment. The LGTCA restriction on liability ultimately applies to constitutional and non-constitutional tort claims alike, such that a plaintiff bringing a constitutional claim may recover only from the employing-local government. See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 52, 729 A.2d 354, 371 (1999) ([L]ocal governmental entities do, indeed, have respondeat superior liability for civil damages resulting from State Constitutional violations committed by their agents and employees within the scope of the employment.); Ashton, 339 Md. at 108 n. 19, 660 A.2d at 465 n. 19 ([T]here is no exception in the [LGTCA] for constitutional torts.... [T]he local government is required to pay the judgment against the employee....); see also Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 256, 863 A.2d 297, 304 (2004) (holding that the Maryland Tort Claims Act applies to constitutional and non-constitutional torts, such that the State steps into the shoes of public officials for purposes of liability). Moreover, we recognize, at least implicitly, that the LGTCA procedural requirements ( e.g., notice) apply also to constitutional tort claims. Ashton, 339 Md. at 108 n. 19, 660 A.2d at 465 n. 19 ([Although] there is no exception in the [LGTCA] for constitutional torts[,] .... [t]he parties in this case[, who raised constitutional and non-constitutional claims,] would appear to have waived [its] procedural requirements.); see also Gonzalez v. Cecil County, 221 F.Supp.2d 611, 615-16 (D.Md.2002) (dismissing state constitutional tort claims because plaintiffs did not comply with the LGTCA notice requirement). The Court of Special Appeals has applied the notice requirement to constitutional tort claims in at least three cases. See Wilbon v. Hunsicker, 172 Md.App. 181, 913 A.2d 678 (2006) cert. denied 398 Md. 316, 920 A.2d 1060 (2007); White v. Prince George's County, 163 Md.App. 129, 877 A.2d 1129 (2005), cert. denied, 389 Md. 401, 885 A.2d 825 (2005); Chappelle v. McCarter, 162 Md.App. 163, 873 A.2d 458 (2005). We implied that the LGTCA damages cap should apply to constitutional claims. In Ashton, 339 Md. at 108 n. 19, 660 A.2d at 465 n. 19, we observed that there is no exception in the [LGTCA] for constitutional torts. Therefore, [a]s long as the local government employee is acting in the scope of his employment and without malice, the local government is required to pay the judgment against the employee to the extent it represents compensatory damages, up to certain statutory limits. Id. (emphasis added); see also Ashton, 339 Md. at 108, 660 A.2d at 466 (holding that plaintiffs are entitled to a trial for their constitutional tort claims and that [a]ny judgment rendered should, under the [ LGTCA ], be paid by the City) (emphasis added). We also held relevantly that the cap on noneconomic damages in § 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article applies to constitutional claims. Specifically, in Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528, 544, 976 A.2d 279, 288 (2009), we agreed with the Court of Special Appeals that: [N]othing in the legislative history [of § 11-108] suggests that the General Assembly even thought of the difference between actions claiming personal injury due to common law torts as opposed to causes of action claiming personal injury arising out of statutory or constitutional torts. And, when interpreting a statute, a court must presume that the legislature did not intend to make any alteration other than what is specified and plainly pronounced. Also, in light of the reasons for the original cap statute, and its amendment, it is impossible to believe that the legislature intended to narrow the statute in the way appellant suggests so that insurers would now have to cover non-economic damages awards that exceeded the cap so long as the personal injury action arose out of the violation of a statute or a constitutional provision. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Regarding the damages cap provided by the Maryland Tort Claims Act, we observed in Benson v. State, 389 Md. 615, 628, 887 A.2d 525, 532 (2005), that not all constitutional tort claims must [necessarily] comply with the ... MTCA. We reasoned thus, however, because the constitutional provision at issueArticle 14 of the Maryland Declaration of Rightswas not compensable in monetary damages. Id. Presumably, therefore, constitutional violations that are compensable in monetary damages are governed by the MTCA. [15] In sum, I would hold that good cause existed to waive Longtin's failure to comply strictly with the LGTCA notice requirement. I would conclude also that the LGTCA damages cap limits Longtin's overall recovery. In all other respects, I agree with the Majority opinion. Judge BARBERA authorizes me to state that she joins the views expressed in this concurring and dissenting opinion.