Opinion ID: 1737377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the boards and commissions

Text: We begin our analysis of the issue of legislative encroachment on the executive department by defining executive power as the power to administer and enforce the laws as enacted by the legislature and as interpreted by the courts. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161, 75 S.Ct. 668, 672, 99 L.Ed. 964, 971 (1954); Mabray v. School Board of Carroll County, 162 Miss. 632, 636, 137 So. 105, 106 (1931). Execution is at the core of executive power. We also find pertinent the following distinction: Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions. Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202, 48 S.Ct. 480, 482, 72 L.Ed. 845, 72 L.Ed. 845, 849 (1927). We next consider the agency which appears to be central to this controversy.

For 37 years, 1918 through 1955, the budget for the government of Mississippi was prepared by the Office of the Governor and submitted to the legislature for its consideration. See Laws of 1918, Ch. 225; Laws of 1932, Ch. 120; Laws of 1952, Ch. 320. In 1955 the composition of the Budget Commission was altered when, by statute, four members of the Mississippi Legislature assumed positions on the Budget Commission and began to participate in all of its functions. See Laws of 1955, Ch. 24. In 1968, five additional legislators joined the commission, bringing the total to nine. Laws of 1968, Ch. 513. The Commission of Budget and Accounting now consists of the following persons: William F. Winter Governor and Ex Officio Chairman Brad Dye Lieutenant Governor W.B. Alexander President Pro-Tempore Ellis Bodron Chairman of Senate Finance Committee Glen DeWeese Chairman of Senate Appropriations Committee Robert L. Crook Member of Senate named by the Lieutenant Governor C.B. (Buddie) Speaker of House of Newman Representatives H.L. Merideth, Jr. Chairman, House Ways & Means Committee F. Edwin Perry Chairman, House Appropriations Committee James C. Simpson Member of House of Representatives named by the Speaker Ted J. Millette Member of House of Representatives named by the Speaker Mississippi Code Annotated § 27-103-1(1) (Supp. 1982). Nine Commission members, Alexander, Bodron, DeWeese, Crook, Newman, Merideth, Perry, Simpson, and Millette, hold office in the legislative department of government and are appellants here. The Commission of Budget and Accounting has the authority to appoint a director to administer its affairs, including, subject to the Commission's approval, the right to appoint and employ support personnel necessary to perform the duties of the Commission. Miss. Code Ann. § 27-103-11 (1972). The activities in which the Commission has been engaged may be divided into five general areas:

The Attorney General contends each of these activities is an executive function belonging solely to the executive department of government and by virtue of Article I, Section 2, the above named appellants are constitutionally forbidden to perform such functions, either directly or indirectly. The Legislators contend otherwise. First, they argue the separation of powers article should be given a flexible construction to permit an overlap in the exercise of powers. Second, the Legislators vigorously contend the present system is efficient, that it works well. The legislators argue that the affairs of state have been well managed with our government structured so that legislators have substantial influence upon boards and commissions which exercise powers we regard as essentially executive in nature. If such boards and commissions are essentially executive, then, in that event, the legislators' degree of control is of practical benefit to the state in that efficiency is promoted, or so we are told. The second point, in our opinion, is legally irrelevant. [T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. INS v. Chadha, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2780-81, 77 L.Ed.2d 317, 340 (1983). If the system be found efficient and nevertheless in violation of the constitution, our duty is clear. See Runnels v. State, Walker (1 Miss.) 146 (1823). The first point is dispositive. Our ultimate inquiry is the correct meaning of Article I of the Constitution without regard to whether our interpretation be labeled flexible or rigid, liberal or conservative. We are engaged with what the people in convention assembled in 1890 intended and with what the document they made our supreme law means for us today. We hold that the whole of the legislative power has been vested in the legislature of this state. We further hold that the whole of the executive power has been vested in a separate and distinct department of our government, and that no person a member of the legislative branch may consistent with the constitution exercise any powers essentially executive in nature.
Constitutionally, budget-making is a legislative prerogative and responsibility in Mississippi. The legislature has the power and prerogative to provide for the collection of revenues through taxation and other means and to appropriate or direct the expenditure of monies so raised. Though subject to gubernatorial veto, the primary budget-making responsibility vests in the legislature. This premise has been unequivocally stated in Colbert v. State, 86 Miss. 769, 39 So. 65 (1905), as follows: Under all constitutional governments recognizing three distinct and independent magistracies, the control of the purse strings of government is a legislative function... . The right of the Legislature to control the public treasury, to determine the sources from which the public revenue shall be derived and the objects upon which they shall be expended, to dictate the time, the manner, and the means both of their collection and disbursement, is firmly and inexpugnably established in our political system... . The American commonwealths have fallen heirs to this great principle, and the prerogative in question passes to their Legislatures without restriction or diminution, except as provided by their Constitutions, by the simple grant of the legislative power. 86 Miss. at 775, 39 So. at 66. The Legislature of this State has the power and prerogative to create such committee as it may deem appropriate to assist it in its budget-making responsibilities. The only limitation on these powers is that no person a member of the executive department of government may serve as a voting member on any such legislative budget committee. The legislature has acknowledged the right of the Governor to submit to it his recommendations upon the budget prepared by the Commission of Budget and Accounting, not excluding a recommendation for changes thought desirable by the executive. Apparently this enactment is in recognition of the general powers vested in the Governor by virtue of Article V, Sections 116 and 122 of our Constitution. Mississippi Code Annotated, § 27-103-43 (1972), provides: On or before December 15 preceding each regular session of the legislature, the governor shall submit to the members of the legislature or the members-elect, as the case may be, and to the executive head of each state agency, his recommendations regarding the budget as prepared by the commission of budget and accounting, together with any recommendations for changes which he deems desirable. Although the statutory language seems to contemplate the governor will merely comment upon the recommendations of the Commission of Budget and Accounting, it does not preclude the governor from making an entire executive budget for the legislature's consideration. Indeed, the Governor did so for 37 years, 1918-1955, pursuant to the authority of Laws of 1918, Chapter 225; Laws of 1932, Chapter 120; and Laws of 1952, Chapter 320. In this regard we observe the Laws of 1918 were 28 years removed from the constitutional convention of 1890 and that the intention of the draftsmen was undoubtedly more firmly implanted in the memory of the legislators at that time than at present. Undoubtedly, the authorization for the executive budget came from Section 122 of Article V of the Constitution which provides, The Governor shall, from time to time, give the legislature information of the state of the government, and recommend for consideration such measures as may be deemed necessary and expedient. In sum, we are of the opinion the governor is constitutionally empowered each year to submit to the legislature an executive budget for its consideration in making appropriations for the government of this state. Implicit therewith the governor is entitled to establish within the executive department such committee as may be appropriate to assist him in this budget proposal/recommendation function. It necessarily follows that he has the prerogative to staff such commission or agency with persons whose loyalty is to the executive and not to the legislative department of government. Ultimately, of course, the legislature has the power and prerogative to accept or reject the budget recommendation of the governor, in whole or in part. Indeed, under our present arrangement, the legislature has unrestricted power to accept or reject the recommendation of the Commission of Budget and Accounting, in whole or in part. Under our Constitution the final budget-making power is vested in the legislature because it has the ultimate responsibility of appropriation by which it can honor the budget by appropriating, in whole or in part, or refusing a budget request by non-appropriation. Colbert v. State, 86 Miss. 769, 775, 39 So. 65, 66 (1905). The constitutional imperative that the powers of government be divided into separate and distinct departments, however, renders unconstitutional the organization of any commission or agency on which both legislators and members of the executive branch serve as voting members. We hold that the Commission of Budget and Accounting as presently structured violates the article on separation of powers in this state. Legislator Appellants Alexander, Bodron, DeWeese, Crook, Newman, Merideth, Perry, Simpson and Millette, in our opinion, may not consistent with the constitution serve on a budget preparation commission or agency which also has as one of its voting members the Governor or other member of the executive department. Similarly, so much of § 27-103-1(1), as creates a Commission of Budget and Accounting composed simultaneously of members of both the legislative and executive departments as voting members is hereby declared unconstitutional.
The budget control process presents a different issue in that it is an executive function. [4] Once taxes have been levied and appropriations made, the legislative prerogative ends, and executive responsibility begins to administer the appropriation and to accomplish its purpose, subject, of course, to any limitations constitutionally imposed by the legislature. See INS v. Chadha, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). We have held above that the constitution does not permit the legislature to directly or indirectly invade the powers and prerogatives of the executive branch of government. The legislature thus may not administer an appropriation once it has been lawfully made and is prohibited from imposing new limitations, restrictions or conditions on the expenditure of such funds, short of full legislative approval. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that Appellants Alexander, Bodron, DeWeese, Crook, Newman, Merideth, Perry, Simpson and Millette may not consistent with the constitution perform any budget control functions after appropriation. Similarly, so much of Section 27-103-1, et seq., as vests budgetary control powers and responsibilities in a commission on which persons who are members of the legislative department serve is hereby held unconstitutional.
The statutes enacted by the legislature, coupled with the record of the proceedings below, reflect that the Commission of Budget and Accounting has numerous additional powers and in fact, performs multi additional duties all of which are essentially executive. These adjunctive powers include the administration of public purchasing statutes (Section 31-7-1, et seq.), and the administration of state employees group insurance program (Section 25-15-1, et seq.). Additional and assorted miscellaneous duties are also spread throughout the code, including the authority to approve rules adopted by the State Auditor for establishing a merit system for his employees (Section 7-7-7). Other similar duties and responsibilities not essentially legislative, that is in accord with their constitutional function to provide the policy of the state through the enactment of laws, are noted below. To allow the authority for Educational Television to contract (Section 37-63-11); to give concurrence for the use of funds to travel outside the continental United States (Section 25-3-41); to advertise for and accept bids on equipment for the State Crime Laboratory (Section 63-11-47); to grant authority for the purchase of motor vehicles by state departments, institutions or agencies (Section 25-1-77); and to approve the disbursement of funds by the Mississippi Air and Water Pollution Commission (Section 49-17-13), are obviously duties or responsibilities that come within the Executive Department. None have functions essential to the legislative right of providing state policy through the enactment of laws. In our opinion, they are essentially, if not altogether, administrative functions within the prerogative of the executive department. Further, the statutes grant the Budget Commission concurrent authority to obtain loans for interim financing of state ports and harbors from Mississippi banking institutions (Section 59-5-41); to approve the issuance of bonds and lease and/or sales contracts for the financing and development of a state port, harbor or waterway (Section 59-5-51); to approve contracts entered into by state agencies for printing, binding, engraving and lithographing (Section 31-1-1); and to approve the disposal of state property held as surplus property by the Surplus Property Procurement Commission (Section 31-9-15). Undoubtedly these rights, attempted to be bestowed by statute, are an enlargement of legislative power beyond constitutional restraints and as such are prohibited. Consistent with what we have stated above, Appellants Alexander, Bodron, DeWeese, Crook, Newman, Merideth, Perry, Simpson and Millette may not constitutionally perform any of these functions because they properly belong to the executive department. Similarly, the statutes vesting in these appellants the powers and functions mentioned, or other functions which are in their essence executive, are hereby declared unconstitutional.
We turn now to the remaining eight boards and commissions in issue, first looking briefly at their functions and compositions.
(a) To formulate the policy of the department regarding the economic and tourist development of the state. (b) To use and expend any funds from state, federal or private sources coming into its hands for the purposes herein provided. State funds appropriated for the board shall be expended in accordance with the regulations governing the expenditures of other state funds. (c) To discharge such other duties, responsibilities and powers as are necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter. Appellants Newman, Powell and Hall serve on this board by authority of Section 57-1-3(1) (Supp. 1983). 2. The basic purpose of the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System is to administer the public employees' retirement law of 1952. Sections 25-11-3 and 25-11-15. Appellants Perry and Bodron are members of this board. Section 25-11-15(2). 3. The Central Data Processing Authority is composed of appellants Blount, Campbell, Walman, Gordon, Gresham and Smith, all legislators. Mississippi Code Annotated, § 25-53-7. The authority's duties, Sections 25-53-5 and 25-53-27 (Supp. 1983), include the following: To plan and implement acquisition and utilization of computer equipment by all agencies of state government; to contract with consulting firms; and to accept or reject bids for the acquisition of computer equipment and services. 4. The State Personnel Board consists of eight members, four of whom are appellants Waldrop, Overstreet, Brooks, and Huggins. Section 25-9-109 (Supp. 1983). The board's basic duty is to administer a state personnel system. Sections 25-9-101 and 25-9-115 (Supp. 1983). 5. The Medicaid Commission has the purpose of administering a statewide system of medical assistance. Section 43-13-103. Its specific duties include determining medical assistance eligibility as well as the scope, duration and amount of medical assistance to be provided by the state in accordance with the statute; to contract with other agencies; to sue in its own name; and to establish administrative methods. Sections 43-13-116 and 43-13-121 (Supp. 1983). Appellants DeWeese, Ellington, Richardson and Perry are members of this board. Section 43-13-107. 6. The Capitol Commission has the following primary duties: (a) To exercise general supervision and care over and keep in good condition the following state property located in the City of Jackson... . (b) To designate by order duly passed and spread upon its minutes suitable office space for the various state departments, officers and employees who are provided with an office in any of the buildings under the jurisdiction of the commission. .. . (c) To approve or disapprove any lease or rental agreements by any state agency or department ... Section 29-5-2 (Supp. 1983). Appellants Childre, Stringer, Beulow, Stubbs, Mulholland and Chambliss are six of the eight voting members of this commission. Section 29-5-1. 7. The Wildlife Heritage Committee has the statutory authority to acquire property interests; to administer and control the lands acquired; to employ engineers, lawyers, real estate counselors and appraisers; and to contract. Sections 49-5-71; -73; -75; -77; -87; and -88 (Supp. 1983). Appellants Gollott, Davis, Nix, Owens, Cates and Dubaz are members of this committee. Section 49-5-61 (Supp. 1983). 8. The Board of Corrections is composed of seven members who are appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. Section 47-5-12. The commission has the authority to approve proposals for the location of new facilities; to open bids; to hold hearings; to lease certain lands; and to enter into contracts and to sue. Sections 47-5-8; -20; -24; -31; -33; -37; -49; -56; -64; -66; -71; -75; -105; and -107. Appellant Young is a member of this board. Using the analysis we employed in our consideration of the Commission of Budget and Accounting, we are of the opinion the boards and commissions listed above exercise powers constitutionally vested in the executive department of government. Their primary functions, as revealed by their enacting legislation, are to carry out laws previously enacted. Once a law is enacted, the executive department has the duty to administer and enforce it. See INS v. Chadha, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). We find no constitutional authority for appellants' contention that their service as legislators on these boards is made constitutional by the delegation of the executive duties, if any, to the directors of the boards. The directors are, of course, employed by the board and are subject to its every order. The primary functions of the boards and commissions are clearly the responsibility of their members, and since these duties are in essence executive duties, they may not be delegated by statute which would be contrary to the constitution. Accordingly with what we have said above, appellants Newman, Powell, Hall, Perry, Bodron, Blount, Campbell, Walmon, Gordan, Gresham, Smith, Waldrop, Overstreet, Brooks, Huggins, DeWeese, Ellington, Richardson, Childre, Stringer, Beulow, Stubbs, Mulholland, Chambliss, Nix, Gollott, Davis, Owens, Cates, Dubaz and Young may not constitutionally perform any of these executive functions. Similarly, so much of the following statutes as create executive boards and commissions with legislative members are declared unconstitutional: Section 57-1-3 (Supp. 1983); Section 25-11-15 (Supp. 1983); Section 25-53-7 (Supp. 1983); Section 25-9-109; Section 43-13-107; Section 29-5-1; and Section 49-5-61 (Supp. 1983).