Opinion ID: 1315925
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: .The Enforceability of the Waiver

Text: As a threshold matter, we consider whether the waiver clause in Murray's proffer agreement was enforceable before determining whether it was properly invoked. Ordinarily, the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the use of statements made by a defendant during plea negotiations. Specifically, Federal Rule of Evidence 410 provides: Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: ... (4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn. See also Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(f) (providing that the admissibility of any plea, plea discussion, or related statement is governed by Rule 410). In United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210, 115 S.Ct. 797, 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a defendant could waive his rights under Rule 410 and Rule 11 as long as there is no affirmative indication that the agreement [to waive] was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily. But the Mezzanatto Court only considered the enforceability of proffer waivers for impeachment purposes, and five justices expressed doubt as to whether a waiver could be used to admit the defendant's statement in the Government's case-in-chief. Id. at 211, 115 S.Ct. 797 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (warning that a waiver to use such statements in the case in chief would more severely undermine a defendant's incentive to negotiate, and thereby inhibit plea bargaining); id. at 218, 115 S.Ct. 797 (Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that a defendant who gives such a waiver will be unable even to acknowledge his desire to negotiate a guilty plea without furnishing admissible evidence against himself then and there). Nevertheless, circuit courts that subsequently have considered the question have upheld the use of proffer waivers at trial. See United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (7th Cir.1998); see also United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402, 407 (9th Cir.2002) (upholding admission of proffer statements in rebuttal); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1321-22 (D.C.Cir.1998) (extending the majority opinion in Mezzanatto to allow the admission of plea statements in the case-in-chief). We are persuaded by the reasoning of these courts and find that the waiver agreement at issue in this case was enforceable.