Opinion ID: 3156789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Strike Appearance

Text: At the outset, there is some confusion as to what rule and standards govern a motion by counsel to withdraw from representation of a petitioner in a proceeding under CP §8-201. Like other post-conviction proceedings, it has a hybrid nature. On the one hand, courts frequently refer to post-conviction proceedings as “separate and distinct civil procedure[s]).” E.g., Ruby v. State, 353 Md. 100, 107, 724 A.2d 673 (1999). Yet some of the rules governing such proceedings, including the rules governing proceedings under the post-conviction DNA testing statute, are codified in a title of the Maryland Rules called “Criminal Causes.” See Maryland Rules, Title 4, Chapters 400, 700.13 Cf. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969) (although habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as “civil,” the label is “gross and inexact” as such a proceeding is essentially “unique.”) The Motion to Strike Appearance filed by the Innocence Project counsel was purported to be made under Rule 4-214(d),14 a rule governing withdrawal of a defense 13 Rules concerning habeas corpus and coram nobis – the post-conviction remedies with Latin names – appear in the Special Proceedings title. See Maryland Rules, Title 15, Chapters 300, 1200. 14 The rule provides: (d) Striking appearance. A motion to withdraw the appearance of counsel shall be made in writing or in the presence of the defendant in open court. If the motion is in writing, moving counsel shall certify that a written notice of intention to withdraw appearance was sent to the defendant at least ten days before the filing of the motion…. If no other counsel has entered an appearance for the defendant, leave to withdraw may be granted only by order of court. The court may refuse to leave to withdraw an appearance if it would unduly delay the trial of the action, would be prejudicial to any of the parties, 17 counsel in a criminal case. That rule requires an oral motion in the presence of “the defendant,” or a written motion served on “the defendant” at least 10 days before the filing of the motion. If no other attorney is entering an appearance to replace the departing defense attorney, the motion to withdraw the attorney’s appearance may be accomplished only by court order and the court must then conduct proceedings under Rule 4-215 governing unrepresented criminal defendants. The court may refuse to permit withdrawal if it would unduly delay trial, would be prejudicial to a party, or otherwise would not be in the interest of justice. The safeguards in this rule are obviously designed to vindicate a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to counsel – a right not implicated in a post-conviction proceeding. A better fit is Maryland Rule 2-132, which governs a motion to strike an attorney’s appearance in a civil case. That rule allows for withdrawal by a simple notice if the client has another attorney of record. Rule 2-132(a). In a situation like the instant case, where a substitute attorney is not entering an appearance, the departing attorney must file a motion. Rule 2-132(b).15 If the motion is not or otherwise would not be in the interest of justice. If leave is granted and the defendant is not represented, a subpoena or other writ shall be issued and served on the defendant for an appearance before the court for proceedings pursuant to Rule 4-215. 15At the time, the Innocence Project counsel asked to withdraw their appearance, Rule 2-132(b) provided: (b) By motion. When the client has no other attorney of record, an attorney wishing to withdraw an appearance shall file a motion to withdraw. Except when the motion is made in open court, the motion shall be accompanied by the client’s written consent to the withdrawal or the moving attorney’s certificate that notice has been mailed to the 18 accompanied by the client’s written consent, the withdrawing attorney must provide the client with notice at least five days advance notice of the filing of the motion and advise the client to have another attorney enter an appearance or to notify the clerk that the client intends to proceed pro se. After the attorney submits the motion, the court may deny the motion if the withdrawal would cause undue delay, prejudice, or injustice. The rule also provides for the automatic withdrawal of an attorney’s appearance in a case when no appeal is taken from a final judgment in the case. Rule 2-132(d). Although the attorneys from the Innocence Project formally filed their motion under Rule 4-214(d), we assess the disposition of that motion under Rule 2-132. A circuit court’s decision to grant a motion to withdraw is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Serio v. Baystate Properties, LLC, 209 Md. App. 545, 554, 60 A.3d 475 (2013). “An abuse of discretion occurs ‘where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court’ or if the court acts ‘without reference to any guiding rules or principles.’” Id. (quoting North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 13, 648 A.2d 1025 (1994). client at least five days prior to the filing of the motion, informing the client of the attorney’s intention to move for withdrawal and advising the client to have another attorney enter an appearance or to notify the clerk in writing of the client’s intention to proceed in proper person. Unless the motion is granted in open court, the court may not order the appearance stricken before the expiration of the time prescribed by in Rule 2-311 for responding. The court may deny the motion if withdrawal of the appearance would cause undue delay, prejudice, or injustice. The rule was amended slightly in 2015 to take account of a simultaneous amendment to Rule 2-131(b) that allows for an attorney to enter a limited appearance under certain conditions. 19 In our view, the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the motion of the Innocence Project counsel to withdraw their appearance. Everyone, including Mr. Simms, appears to have treated the determination, in early 2011, that the socks and other items recovered from the trash bag had been destroyed as the conclusion of the proceeding under CP §8-201. Had that conclusion been embodied in a court order at the time, the appearance of the Innocence Project attorneys would have automatically terminated under Rule 2-132(d). Indeed, in his “Motion for Appropriate Relief” to reopen the proceedings under CP §8-201 filed two and a half years later, Mr. Simms appeared to believe he was unrepresented as he requested appointment of counsel. When it became apparent that the court was under the impression that the Innocence Project attorneys still represented Mr. Simms, counsel sought to withdraw their appearance in a way that complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 2- 132(b). They filed a motion to withdraw their appearance. They advised Mr. Simms in writing a month in advance of filing the motion of their intentions. That motion recounted the history of their representation of Mr. Simms, including the fact that they had advised Mr. Simms more than two and a half years earlier that they would not pursue further relief under the post-conviction DNA testing statute on his behalf. The main proposition that Mr. Simms sought to pursue in his “Motion for Appropriate Relief” – whether the State had destroyed the evidence in violation of the later-enacted post-conviction DNA testing statute – was not the issue for which counsel had originally been appointed and was at odds with their representation to 20 the court that they would not be seeking further relief under the post-conviction DNA testing statute. At the hearing, the Circuit Court noted the representation by the Innocence Project counsel that the issue for which they had been appointed had been resolved. It was well within the discretion of the Circuit Court to conclude that the granting of the motion would not cause undue delay, prejudice, or injustice. Mr. Simms does not identify any particular prejudice that he suffered as a result of the withdrawal of the Innocence Project attorneys. As noted above, they had not filed the motion he was seeking to litigate. At most, he suggests that either Ms. Nethercott or Mr. Esworthy may have known the location of other items available for testing. That speculation, again, is contradicted by their representations to the Circuit Court and Mr. Simms that further efforts under the CP §8-201 would not be fruitful. In sum, the hearing judge did not abuse his discretion when he granted the motion of pro bono counsel to withdraw.