Opinion ID: 837289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Plurality Interpretation

Text: The plurality's interpretation, in my judgment, fails to give testator's language full effect. In particular, it interprets the class in the first clause to consist of the same individuals who make up the class in the second clause. That is, the siblings who outlive testator are both brother[s] and sisters that survive [testator] and the ... survivors thereof. This interpretation forces the strained reading that testator intended to give her estate to the siblings who survived her or to the siblings still alive when she died. I respectfully disagree with this interpretation because rather than giving meaning to testator's use of the word or to indicate alternative classes in the first and second clauses of paragraph A, the plurality essentially construes two distinct phrases (my brother[s] and sisters that survive me and the survivor or survivors thereof) to designate the exact same class. The only individuals who qualify to be included in the first class are siblings who were still living at the time of testator's death. If a sibling was still living at the time of testator's death, the sibling will always be a survivor, because the only way by which a sibling cannot be a survivor is if he or she predeceased testator. The sibling's death would also mean that the sibling did not survive [testator]. Thus, under this interpretation, a sibling alive after testator's death will always be in the first and second groups, and a predeceased sibling will never be in either of the groups. This interpretation, therefore, creates the same class with the different language in each clause, even though testator clearly intended for the second clause to provide alternative beneficiaries for the first clause through her use of the word or. I further disagree with the method of analysis by which the plurality reaches its conclusion. In particular, it relies on the results from In re Burruss Estate, 152 Mich.App. 660, 394 N.W.2d 466 (1986), and In re Holtforth's Estate, 298 Mich. 708, 299 N.W. 776 (1941), ante at 4, even though, as the Court of Appeals acknowledged, the wills in those cases are not exact match[es] to the instant will. In re Raymond Estate, 276 Mich.App. at 32, 739 N.W.2d 889. The variances among the wills, however, are highly significant, and because Burruss and Holtforth can be easily distinguished on these grounds, I believe reliance on those cases is an inappropriate substitute for giving full effect to the instant will's language. [13] Under the plurality's interpretation, the distribution under paragraph A would be subject to the antilapse statute, which would create a distribution through paragraph A different from the distribution through paragraph B, contrary to testator's manifest intent that the distribution through each paragraph be the same. [14] On the other hand, the interpretation set forth in this dissent results in an identical distribution under paragraphs A and B, which is not altered by the antilapse statute, thereby enforcing testator's use of the same language in each of those paragraphs. [15] Finally, the plurality's interpretation does not establish alternative beneficiaries who would retain the 50 percent portion of the residuary estate under paragraph B with Claude's family if all of Claude's siblings had predeceased testator. [16] See In re Raymond Estate, 276 Mich.App. at 40-41, 739 N.W.2d 889 (Murphy, J., dissenting). If no sibling could recover under paragraph B, the 50 percent portion set aside for Claude's family would be distributed under the state's intestacy statutes, which only distribute a testator's estate to the testator's heirs at law, who do not include any of Claude's family. [17] In re Martz's Estate, 318 Mich. 293, 301, 28 N.W.2d 108 (1947). In such a situation, Claude's family would receive no distribution, in contravention of testator's intent that each family receive an equal 50 percent portion of the residuary estate under all circumstances, and all of the estate would not be distributed through paragraphs A and B, in direct opposition to testator's intent. [18] The different distributions provided by the plurality and by this dissent illustrate the importance of giving meaning to all of a testator's words. The interpretation of the plurality, in my judgment, will leave uncertainty and doubt in its wake. By contrast, the interpretation of this dissent would leave testators confident that the precise words by which they choose to pass on their estate will be given full effect by the state.