Opinion ID: 1749200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Neglect or Abandonment of a Dependent Person

Text: The elements of the crime of neglect of a dependent child are set forth in Iowa Code section 726.3. The relevant portion states: A person who is the father, mother, or some other person having custody of a child[ [2] ] . . . who knowingly or recklessly exposes such person to a hazard or danger against which such person cannot reasonably be expected to protect such person's self or who deserts or abandons such person, knowing or having reason to believe that the person will be exposed to such hazard or danger, commits a class C felony. Iowa Code § 726.3 (emphasis added). The term custody, as it pertains to neglect or abandonment of a dependent person, is not defined in the Iowa Code. Two cases guide our analysis of the term custody. In State v. Sparegrove, 134 Iowa 599, 600, 112 N.W. 83, 84 (1907), the State charged an individual with exposing and abandoning a child, a predecessor to section 726.3, when he abandoned a baby on a woman's doorstep at the direction of the baby's parents. The applicable code provision provided as follows: If the father or mother of any child under the age of 6 years, or any person to whom such child has been intrusted or confided, expose such child in any highway, street, field or outhouse, or in any other place with intent wholly to abandon it, he or she, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not exceeding 5 years. Iowa Code § 4766 (1897) (emphasis added). The defendant argued the language intrusted or confided only referred to situations in which an individual held legal custody of a child. Sparegrove, 134 Iowa at 601, 112 N.W. at 84. We held that the statute was not so limited and concluded that the State properly charged the defendant with the crime because he undertook. . . to take charge of [the baby] and care for it. Id. In State v. Johnson, 528 N.W.2d 638 (Iowa 1995), we analyzed the term custody within the current statute. In Johnson, the defendant, Paula, provided the daily care and maintenance for her husband, Wallace, who suffered from Parkinson's disease, hypertension, depression, and hyperuricemia. 528 N.W.2d at 639. One day, Wallace fell to the floor and was unable to get back up. He yelled to Paula for assistance and, after about an hour, Paula came and kicked and punched him in the face. After Paula left, Wallace called a friend and told him to call 911. Paramedics and police arrived at the scene after Paula had returned home. Paula told the paramedics she was the only person living at the address. However, Wallace made noises in the background and the paramedics entered to find Wallace lying on the floor with a broken nose and lacerations on his ears. The State charged Paula with, among other things, neglect or abandonment of a dependent person. Id. The district court dismissed the charge of neglect or abandonment of a dependent person on the ground that custody, an element of the crime, required the existence of legal custody. Id. at 640. We disagreed. We determined the legislature's use of the phrase custody in section 726.3 did not mean legal custody. Id. at 641. Citing Sparegrove, we concluded custody in the context of chapter 726 meant [t]o be in charge of an individual and to hold the responsibility to care for that individual. Id. We therefore reversed the trial court's dismissal of the charge of neglect or abandonment of a dependent person. Id. at 642. In the present case, Mark contends the State did not prove he had custody of Travis for the purposes of this crime. The State argues Mark had custody because he undertook the supervision of, and responsibility for, Travis. The State claims Mark had custody of Travis during at least three points in time. First, when Mark allowed Travis in the car; second, when he took Travis to the Leckington home and left him there with no other adults present; and finally, when he did not immediately call for help when he came back home. The first and third arguments are without merit. First, merely allowing a minor into a car does not establish a custodial relationship. The third argumentMark did not immediately call for helpis not supported by the record. All of the evidence indicates that Mark went to a different part of the home as soon as he and Sandra returned home from running errands. A child then approached Sandra and told her that Travis was dead in the bathtub. Mark remained unaware of the situation until Sandra came and told him about it. As soon as Mark found out, he instructed Sandra to call Travis's mother. There was no evidence to support a finding that Mark did anything to purposefully delay medical attention for Travis, and therefore no evidence to conclude he personally took charge of Travis's well being. The State's second argumentMark took charge of Travis and had the responsibility to care for him when he actively participated in the decision to leave Travis at the Leckington homerequires more analysis. The State contends Mark's testimony about what happened during the brief car ride illustrates Mark was actively involved in the decision to leave Travis at his unsupervised home. The State points to the following testimony by Mark: Well, I said, So what is going on, to Sandi, and she says, I don't know. I said, What are you guys planning on doing? And they wanted to go to our house to play PlayStation. Well, with the kids that were at home, and being Brandon was there, I said, Call Travis's mom and dad, see if they're home, because I really don't want Travis over at the house without us being there. Which I did not know that he had spent the night that night before anyway. And Sandi had tried calling Travis's parents, got no answer. I ain't going to abandon a child out on the street, you know, saying, no, you can't come over to our house. I just said, We got some things we got to do, me and Sandi got to go and do some things, will you guys promise me that you'll behave? After the boys promised they would behave, Mark told the boys to stay downstairs away from the other children in the home. Mark then testified Me and Sandi stayed until they got in the porch area. I made sure they were in the back door of the house. Once I saw the back kitchen door close, that's when we left. The State argues that once the Leckingtons left Travis at their own home, without adult supervision, Mark and Sandra both undertook charge of Travis. The State makes a persuasive argument that Sandra decided to take charge of the care and responsibility of Travis, but the record does not support such a finding for Mark. In fact, the evidence shows Mark had very little involvement in the decision to pick up Travis and the decision to leave Travis at the Leckington home. Dominic Major called Sandra and told her to pick up her son and Travis. On the way to Major's apartment, Sandra stopped and picked up Mark at the convenience store. Mark remained in the car while Sandra went inside to retrieve the boys. Neither Mark's inquiry about Travis's condition nor his further inquiry about what the boys planned to do next demonstrates Mark made the conscious choice to place the boys at the Leckington home. While there was at least some dispute as to who drove the vehicle, [3] the State presented insufficient evidence to conclude Mark decided what to do with Travis. At best, Mark acquiesced in Sandra's decision to move the children to their home. Without proof that Mark played a significant role in the decision to move Travis, there is not enough evidence to find Mark was in charge of Travis, and therefore insufficient evidence to support a finding that Mark had custody of Travis.