Opinion ID: 1850321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State's Burden of Proving Independence of In-Court Identifications is Incorrect.

Text: ¶ 61. The opinion incorrectly concludes that a totality of the circumstances test should be applied to in-court identifications which follow an improper pretrial lineup. This is neither the law of Mississippi nor the United States of America. Rather, A participant in a lineup has a right to have a lawyer present only if criminal proceedings have been instituted against him. If the right is violated, the prosecution will be permitted an in-court identification by the eyewitnesses who viewed the proscribed lineup only upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications are based upon observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification. York v. State, 413 So.2d 1372, 1383 (Miss. 1982) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967)). See also Frisco v. Blackburn, 782 F.2d 1353, 1355 (5th Cir.1986) (reiterating that the burden is on the prosecution to establish basis of in-court identification by clear and convincing evidence); Green v. State, 377 So.2d 618, 620 (Miss.1979) (holding that the State must meet a heavy burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the independence of [the witness's] proposed in-court identification). ¶ 62. For its position, the majority relies upon Nicholson v. State, 523 So.2d 68, 71 (Miss.1988), a case which deals with the question of whether the pretrial identification was impermissibly suggestive. That is not the claim made by Lattimore in this case. The majority also claims that Outerbridge v. State, 947 So.2d 279 (Miss.2006), stands for the proposition that we will support a trial court's finding that an in-court identification was not tainted unless there is no substantial credible evidence supporting such a conclusion. Yet both Outerbridge and the case it cites, Roche v. State, 913 So.2d 306, 310 (Miss.2005), concern pretrial identifications. Accordingly, the substantial credible evidence standard is not applicable to the in-court identification issue. ¶ 63. When a criminal defendant is completely denied counsel at a pretrial lineup, the state must meet a higher burden of proof than when the lineup is simply alleged to be suggestive. Compare Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (holding that denial of counsel at lineup requires state to prove independence of in-court identification with clear and convincing evidence) with Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977) (holding that a totality of the circumstances test must be applied to in-court identifications following suggestive pretrial lineups). The reason for this distinction is because, without counsel, there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial and . . . presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial. Brooks, 903 So.2d at 695 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 236, 87 S.Ct. at 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1162). ¶ 64. As discussed supra, the trial record does not reflect that the prosecution was able to establish the basis of Mrs. Dycus's questionable in-court identification by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the identification.