Opinion ID: 1973414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Current Status of the Law of Fresh Complaint

Text: We must first consider the continued viability of the fresh-complaint rule. The present rule in New Jersey is that to qualify as fresh complaint, the victim's statements to someone she would ordinarily turn to for support must have been made within a reasonable time after the alleged assault and must have been spontaneous and voluntary. State v. Tirone, 64 N.J. 222, 226-27, 314 A. 2d 601 (1974); State v. Balles, 47 N.J. 331, 338-39, 221 A. 2d 1 (1966), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 388 U.S. 461, 87 S.Ct. 2120, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1321 (1967). At trial, fresh-complaint evidence serves a narrow purpose. It allows the State to negate the inference that the victim was not sexually assaulted because of her silence. 4 J. Wigmore, supra, § 1135 at 297-301. Only the fact of the complaint, not the details, is admissible. Id. § 1136, at 306-11. In addition, the victim must be a witness in order for the State to introduce fresh-complaint evidence. Ibid. The entire area concerning sexual offenses committed against women only recently has been examined from the perspective of the rights of the woman-victim. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 190-97, 478 A. 2d 364 (1984) (expert evidence on battered-woman syndrome admitted). The parties in this case did not challenge the viability of the fresh-complaint rule. Indeed, the State relied heavily on the fresh-complaint rule to support M.K.'s version of the incident. It is true that the fresh-complaint rule does not necessarily contradict sexist notions of how a woman should act after she has been raped, but merely serves to establish that a woman acted in the correct or natural manner expected by society. Still, our judicial process cannot remove from every juror all subtle biases or illogical views of the world. The fresh-complaint rule responds to those jurors on their own terms. In cases in which a woman does, in fact, confide in someone that she has been raped, the fresh-complaint rule serves to neutralize the sexist expectations of some jurors that the woman should have complained after having been raped. That is particularly true in cases, like this, where there is little evidence presented aside from the conflicting testimony of M.K. and Hill. Thus, the fresh-complaint rule certainly did not harm M.K., undoubtedly helped her, but at the very least made the proceedings fairer for her, a woman who did complain. Although the fresh-complaint rule does not hurt those and indeed may help women who do complain, the issue then becomes whether the fresh-complaint rule so hurts those women who do not complain that it must be abolished. Balanced against that concern for the silent victims, of course, is the concern that defendants receive fair trials. Society's perception and understanding of rape is changing. Yet, no one contends that subtle and overt bias against women victims of rape has been eradicated. Hence, we hesitate to discard the benefit of this rule to a woman who does complain without a clearer understanding of the burdens the rule may impose on the woman who does not complain. We are mindful that in some cases efforts to rid the judicial process of sexism by unreasoned reform have proven in practice to be worse medicine than the illness itself. See S. Estrich, Real Rape, supra, at 81-83 (discussing legislative reforms that meant to eradicate sexism from the language of rape statutes but that in practice created new problems); Findlater, Reexamining the Law of Rape, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1356, 1356-57 (1988) (discussing some of the reforms to the law of rape and the rules governing proof of the crime, and asserting, however, that until our understanding of the experience of rape changes, women will continue to be victimized by sexist assumptions that control the interpretation and application of the law of rape). If we were to eliminate the fresh-complaint rule, rape victims would suffer whenever members of the jury held prejudices that women who do not complain have not really been raped. If we limit the fresh-complaint rule to the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, allowing the admission of spontaneous or excited utterances, then women who had not complained very shortly after the crime would not be able to have their complaints admitted into evidence. N.J.Evid.R. 63(4). We could also allow third-hand testimony of a rape complaint only in response to defense counsel's impeachment of the woman complainant on the grounds that she recently fabricated the charges. Evid.R. 20. That alternative would allow the defense, and not the State, to control the circumstances under which the subject of a prior complaint is raised. As a result, the issue of a prior complaint would arise in a context prejudicial to the victim. Hence, until there is a clearer understanding of the perception of rape and its women victims, we think that the better solution is to allow fresh-complaint testimony to be admitted. This case does not present the issue of the rights of a defendant to comment on a rape victim's silence. Resolution of that issue must incorporate procedures that protect both the accused and the victim. Given the complexity of the problem and society's slowly evolving understanding of sex offenses, its victims, and its offenders, we believe that the problem will benefit from more deliberate study that will allow both advocates of women's rights and representatives of defendants to present their views in a nonadversarial proceeding. This lessformal proceeding will allow a more expansive and complete examination of the many ramifications involved in this serious and complex issue. We therefore refer to the Court's standing Committee on the Rules of Evidence and the Court's Criminal Practice Committee the task of recommending proposed procedures relating to the admissibility in the State's case of fresh-complaint evidence, defendant's right to elicit and rely on the absence of fresh-complaint, and the desirability of special instructions dealing with the issue. Until such procedures are developed, however, if a defendant introduces or elicits evidence of a victim's silence to prove that a rape did not occur, as additional protection, the trial court, if requested by the State, may instruct the jury that a woman may respond to rape in a variety of ways, including silence. In all other respects the trial court shall review the admissibility of a victim's silence under existing rules of evidence. The other side of the equation is that the defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial. Under the present rule the details of fresh complaint are excluded and the jury is instructed to consider the fresh-complaint evidence narrowly and not as substantive evidence of the crime. Under the res gestae rule, the complaint would be an exception to the hearsay rule, and would carry substantive weight. Thus, a defendant's rights, balanced against the interest in a fair proceeding that does not unduly humiliate or punish the victim of the crime, lead us to consider the fresh-complaint rule as a reasonable compromise. We thus turn to the application of the fresh-complaint rule to this case.
At issue here is whether the trial court properly admitted into evidence under the fresh-complaint rule the statements M.K. made to Valerie McCabe and to Detective Hoffman. Defendant argues that those statements are not spontaneous and voluntary but the result of vigorous coercive questioning by Ms. McCabe and the detective. Courts have allowed fresh complaints made in response to general non-coercive questioning. (In cases dealing with young children, the courts have shown more latitude in the type and extent of questioning they have allowed to precede fresh complaint. We do not deal with the issue of a young child complainant in the present case but do so in State v. Bethune, 121 N.J. 137, 578 A. 2d 364 (1990), also decided today.) In People v. Harris, 134 Ill. App. 3d 705, 89 Ill.Dec. 446, 480 N.E. 2d 1189, appeal denied, (1985), the Illinois court ruled that the fact that a statement is made in response to questions will not necessarily deprive an utterance of the spontaneity necessary for it to qualify as fresh complaint. In People v. Hood, 59 Ill. 2d 315, 319 N.E. 2d 802 (1974), the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled admissible as fresh-complaint evidence statements made by a victim in response to general questions. The victim in that case ran to the house of friends after having been raped, and when asked what was wrong, began to cry and told them she had been raped. In People v. Damen, 28 Ill. 2d 464, 193 N.E. 2d 25 (Illinois 1963), the victim was bleeding after having been raped. The victim told of the rape after the police asked her what had happened. The court held her statements admissible as fresh complaint. Similarly, in People v. Evans, 173 Ill. App. 3d 186, 201-02, 122 Ill.Dec. 950, 960, 527 N.E. 2d 448, 458 (Ill. App. 1988), and State v. Stevens, 289 N.W. 2d 592, 594-96 (Iowa 1980), the courts held admissible statements made in response to general, or non-coercive, questioning. We agree with those courts that statements made after non-coercive questions have the necessary spontaneity and voluntariness to qualify as fresh complaint. On the other hand, statements that are procured by pointed, inquisitive, coercive interrogation lack the degree of voluntariness necessary to qualify under the fresh-complaint rule. The line, however, between non-coercive questioning and coercive questioning depends on the circumstances of the interrogation. We leave it to the trial court to determine in each case when that line is crossed. State v. Bethune, supra, 121 N.J. at 145, 578 A. 2d at 368. Among the factors a court should consider in making that determination are the age of the victim; the circumstances under which the interrogation takes place; the victim's relationship with the interrogator, i.e., relative, friend, professional counselor, or authoritarian figure; who initiated the discussion; the type of questions asked  whether they are leading and their specificity regarding the alleged abuser and the acts alleged. Ibid. D.R., Ms. McCabe, and Detective Hoffman gave fresh-complaint testimony. M.K.'s statement to D.R. that she had been raped is indisputably covered under the fresh-complaint rule because it was not preceded by questioning and met all the criteria for admissibility. It is, however, a close call whether M.K.'s statements to Ms. McCabe and Detective Hoffman have the necessary voluntariness to qualify as fresh complaint. M.K. was not a young child. She was questioned several times by Detective Hoffman and Ms. McCabe before she stated she had been raped. Although it is clear that Ms. McCabe occupied a position of power in the Home, it is unclear whether she was a friendly house mother in whom the girls normally would confide or a stern disciplinary figure. Likewise, Detective Hoffman, a police officer, was an authoritarian figure, but it is unclear whether M.K. perceived him as a threatening cop or a helpful police officer. In this case, the State presented little evidence other than fresh complaint testimony, so the evidence may have had a great impact. McCabe and Detective Hoffman were persons in authority whom jurors would respect and to whom they would listen. Instead of merely negating the inference that M.K. had not complained (achieved by D.R.'s fresh complaint testimony), the evidence could easily have served as the lynchpin of the prosecution's case. Accordingly, to be fair to the defendant and the victim, on remand the trial court at the new trial must consider whether Ms. McCabe's and Detective Hoffman's testimony is properly admissible as fresh-complaint evidence or whether M.K.'s complaint to them was inadmissible under the fresh-complaint rule because it was elicited by coercive questioning.
The Appellate Division decided that the trial court had erred by admitting duplicative fresh-complaint evidence. We agree to the extent that the trial court should not have admitted evidence of a complaint extracted through coercive questioning. Yet this raises the issue of when otherwise admissible testimony regarding fresh-complaint evidence should be excluded because it is duplicative or prejudicial. We have traditionally left it in the hands of the trial court to decide whether to limit or exclude witnesses. See State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 433, 136 A. 2d 761 (1957) (The question of limiting witnesses calls for the exercise of sound discretion in the context of the circumstances of the particular case. There can be no doubt as to the power of the trial judge to restrict the number of witnesses). It would usurp the trial court's discretion to establish a blanket policy restricting testimony that fully qualifies for admissibility under the fresh-complaint rule but is duplicative or prejudicial. In such cases, the trial court must first determine whether the testimony fulfills the requirements of the fresh-complaint rule. If so, then the trial court should assess, in light of the rule's narrow purpose of negating inferences that the victim had failed to complain, whether repeated testimony of the victim's complaint is irrelevant or prejudicial to the defendant. There may be instances in which the trial court may find no prejudice from duplicative fresh-complaint testimony. That may occur when the victim complained at various times to different people, or when so much other evidence exists that duplicative testimony is unlikely to tip the scales. Yet, in close cases in which the victim's complaint has already been once established and it appears that repeated fresh-complaint testimony would leave the jury with the impression that the State has gathered a greater number of witnesses than the defense, the trial court may properly exercise its discretion and exclude the testimony. If the trial court determines that Ms. McCabe's and Detective Hoffman's testimony is admissible, then it will have to decide whether D.R.'s testimony had already established the fact of a complaint, whether the jury would find evidence of further complaints of any relevance, and whether in a close case like this one the testimony could prejudice defendant. In short, the court would need to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its potential prejudicial effects. We cannot establish a blanket rule because in each case the weight of each of those variables will be different.