Opinion ID: 1562759
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression and Manipulation of Evidence

Text: Appellant first claims that the prosecution suppressed material, exculpatory evidence in violation of due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Reloading his accusatorial shotgun, appellant alleges that the prosecution failed to disclose: (1) results of the striation analysis; (2) audiotapes of interviews with witnesses James Revak and Liz Manuel; (3) an interview of alibi witness Dr. Timothy McCormick; (4) reports of the further investigation referred to in affidavits of probable cause which placed appellant in his place of employment, from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.; (5) UPS logs showing a delivery to The Finishing Touch on the morning of January 10th, the day of the rape and murder; (6) photographs and drawings of the crime scene; (7) laboratory drawings; (8) a police report regarding the victim's car; and (9) evidence of the plea agreements made with prosecution witnesses Ferry and Christopher White. Appellant states that [b]ecause none of these items were ever provided to the defense, [a]ppellant cannot demonstrate precisely how they will undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial when produced. Appellant's Brief at 52. Appellant never states the basis for his belief that these particular items that he has never seen even exist. Notwithstanding this confession that he cannot make out his claims, appellant maintains that the potentially exculpatory value of the undisclosed evidence is readily apparent. Focusing on the alleged deals between the Commonwealth and White and Ferry, appellant also argues that evidence of such agreements would implicate the witnesses' credibility and should have been made available to trial counsel for impeachment purposes. Appellant also states that he has affidavits supporting the claims that Ferry and White testified falsely. [17] The Commonwealth responds that none of the items appellant complains of not receiving is exculpatory, and states that these issues, as well as their presentation as ineffectiveness claims, were previously litigated and held by this Court to be meritless in Tedford I. [18] Regarding evidence of alleged agreements with prosecution witnesses, the Commonwealth asserts that this claim is only cognizable as a layered ineffectiveness claim, but lacks arguable merit because the record demonstrates that Ferry and White had no established deals with the Commonwealth, but were only hoping for some positive consideration in exchange for their testimony. Prior to issuing its opinion, the PCRA court denied appellant's request for discovery on these claims, finding that appellant had failed to show that good cause existed to allow discovery. In its discovery opinion, the PCRA court found appellant's many discovery requests to be broad and improper. Far from showing any specific basis or necessity for the requested evidence, review of the PCRA court's discovery opinion demonstrates that appellant's only basis for requesting PCRA discovery often was that the evidence may be exculpatory depending on its content. In its PCRA opinion, the court incorporated its discovery denial and dismissed this claim because appellant did not demonstrate that the evidence was exculpatory or that the failure to disclose was prejudicial. A Brady violation consists of three elements: (1) suppression by the prosecution (2) of evidence, whether exculpatory or impeaching, favorable to the defendant, (3) to the prejudice of the defendant. Commonwealth v. Paddy, 569 Pa. 47, 800 A.2d 294, 305 (2002). No violation occurs if the evidence at issue is available to the defense from non-governmental sources. More importantly, a Brady violation only exists when the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, i.e., when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. [19] Similar to appellant's original discovery request, which was overbroad, improper, and lacking in good cause, his current prosecutorial misconduct claim fails to set forth any basis that the allegedly suppressed evidence is exculpatory or favorable to the defense, and that he was prejudiced by its alleged suppression. Appellant merely states that: [t]he potentially exculpatory value of these items ... is readily apparent. For example, any favorable evidence that was not disclosed with respect to [the striation analysis] would tend to discredit the prosecution theory that twine from [T]he Finishing Touch was the murder weapon. Moreover, any favorable evidence with respect to [reports of further investigation referred to in the affidavit of probable cause and the UPS log] would rebut the prosecution theory as to how the crime took place and create doubts about [a]ppellant's guilt. Appellant's Brief at 52. Appellant's claim is comprised entirely of conjecture. Appellant must affirmatively demonstrate exculpability; asserting the potential exculpatory value of any favorable evidence is insufficient. Moreover, appellant has not even proven the existence of some of the evidence, such as alleged undisclosed crime scene drawings, striation analysis, and the UPS log. As for the alleged agreements between the Commonwealth and prosecution witnesses Ferry and White, the record indicates that no such agreements existed. Ferry testified that he only hoped that the prosecution would mention his assistance to the Parole Board, and when questioned by trial counsel, White testified that he had never heard of inmates at his prison making deals with the authorities to help themselves. Because appellant has not satisfied any of the Paddy elements with regard to any of his Brady claims, the underlying claims fail. Respecting appellant's alternative couching of his Brady claims in boilerplate terms of ineffective assistance of counsel, we note that because the underlying Brady claims fail, any derivative ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacks arguable merit.