Opinion ID: 2248921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Order of Argument at Sentencing Hearing

Text: Defendant's final alleged error at sentencing is whether the trial judge erred by allowing the State to argue first and last at the sentencing hearing, a right which the defendant claims as his own. He claims this right by virtue of having the burden of coming forward with evidence of mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty after the State established the existence of a statutory aggravating factor. This court has consistently rejected defendant's argument. ( People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 47-48, 79 Ill.Dec. 625, 464 N.E.2d 223; People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 302-03, 73 Ill.Dec. 360, 454 N.E.2d 220; People v. Ramirez (1983), 98 Ill.2d 439, 469, 75 Ill.Dec. 241, 457 N.E.2d 31.) Mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty can be addressed at trial, even if no further evidence at all is introduced at the sentencing hearing. ( People v. Gacy (1984), 103 Ill.2d 1, 100, 82 Ill.Dec. 391, 468 N.E.2d 1171; People v. Johnson (1986), 114 Ill.2d 170, 207, 102 Ill.Dec. 342, 499 N.E.2d 1355.) The very nature of sentencing in Illinois is one of balancing. ( People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181.) Yet the factors required to be balanced have different procedural characteristics which provide the State with the right to argue first and last. The State is required to establish sufficient aggravating factors to meet the standards set out for the death penalty. ( Ramirez, 98 Ill.2d at 469, 75 Ill.Dec. 241, 457 N.E.2d 31.) Since the burden of coming forward with this determinative evidence is on the State, the State is allowed to argue first and last at the sentencing hearing. The State argues first in order to establish the existence of these aggravating factors. Should this burden not be met, then no mitigating factors heed be presented. Thus, the true burden sits with the State. Although it is the defendant's responsibility to bring forth whatever mitigating factors may exist, it is not a duty, for there is no requirement that mitigating factors be before the sentencer. (Ill.Rev. Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(c).) Thus, defendant's reliance on People v. Olinger (1986), 112 Ill.2d 324, 351, 97 Ill.Dec. 772, 493 N.E.2d 579, is misplaced. That case merely set out the fact that it is up to the defendant to set out his mitigation, rather than the State, for which it would be illogical to establish mitigation when alternatively trying to establish sufficient aggravation to support the death penalty. There was no shift in the burdens, but rather simply the establishment of where the respective responsibilities fell. Defendant, however, cites Liptak v. Security Benefit Association (1932), 350 Ill. 614, 183 N.E. 564, in support of his contention that he was entitled to open and close at the sentencing hearing. Liptak is easily distinguishable from the case at bar. In Liptak, this court held that a defendant asserting an affirmative special plea and admitting the establishment of plaintiff's case is entitled to open and close in presenting evidence and argument since the defendant had the burden of proof. The burden here was on the State, and not defendant, thus the State properly argued first and last.