Opinion ID: 2224483
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: relevancy objection and sufficiency of objection

Text: Relevancy. At trial, Thomas objected to introduction of a police inventory sheet which listed items seized pursuant to the search warrant previously mentioned. The inventory sheet reflects 17 items, including Thomas' 2 firearms, over $1,400 in food stamps, jewelry, and various documents which tend to show Thomas' residence as 2515 Himebaugh Avenue. Thomas attacks admission of the inventory on the ground that it is irrelevant, i.e., [e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Neb.Evid.R. 402, Neb.Rev. Stat. § 27-402 (Reissue 1989). Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Neb.Evid.R. 401, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1989). There are two components to relevant evidence: materiality and probative value. Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case. If the evidence is offered to help prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue, the evidence is immaterial. What is `in issue,' that is, within the range of the litigated controversy, is determined mainly by the pleadings, read in the light of the rules of pleading and controlled by the substantive law.... The second aspect of relevance is probative value, the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.... State v. Baltimore, 236 Neb. 736, 740, 463 N.W.2d 808, 812 (1990) (quoting McCormick on Evidence § 185 (Edward W. Cleary 3d ed. 1984)). Accord State v. Messersmith, 238 Neb. 924, 473 N.W.2d 83 (1991). To be relevant, evidence must be rationally related to an issue by a likelihood, not a mere possibility, of proving or disproving an issue to be decided. State v. Lonnecker, 237 Neb. 207, 210, 465 N.W.2d 737, 740-41 (1991). Accord, State v. Coleman, 239 Neb. 800, 478 N.W.2d 349 (1992); State v. Baltimore, supra . The main issue in Thomas' case was whether he intended to distribute the cocaine found on his person. Documentary evidence containing information that Thomas' residence was 2515 Himebaugh Avenue tended to establish that Thomas lived at that address and, therefore, was afforded access to the Kent Cadillac used to transport individuals dealing in drugs, according to the information supplied by the reliable informant. Also, recently, in State v. Groves, 239 Neb. 660, 477 N.W.2d 789 (1991), this court concluded that a defendant's possession of a firearm is relevant to a prosecution on the charge that the defendant intended to distribute narcotics possessed by the defendant. Therefore, evidence of Thomas' two firearms, found at his residence, was relevant in the case against Thomas. However, we do not see how the presence of jewelry and food stamps relates to, or tends to prove, essential elements of the charge against Thomas. First, in view of the record presented, jewelry and food stamps were not contraband referable to or related with possession of cocaine, and, hence, evidence concerning those items was immaterial in prosecuting the possession charge against Thomas. Second, we find nothing in the mere presence of jewelry and food stamps that makes it more likely that Thomas intended to distribute cocaine, especially since Thomas was not the sole occupant of 2515 Himebaugh Avenue. Consequently, with the exception of reference to Thomas' firearms and documents which tended to show Thomas' residence, the inventory sheet was irrelevant and should have been excluded. [I]n a bench trial of a law action, including a criminal case tried without a jury, erroneous admission of evidence is not reversible error if other relevant evidence, admitted without objection or properly admitted over objection, sustains the trial court's factual findings necessary for the judgment or decision reviewed; therefore, an appellant must show that the trial court actually made a factual determination, or otherwise resolved a factual issue or question, through use of erroneously admitted evidence in a case tried without a jury. State v. Lomack, 239 Neb. 368, 370, 476 N.W.2d 237, 239 (1991). Thomas has failed to show that the district court actually made a factual determination, or otherwise resolved a factual issue or question, through use of those parts of the inventory sheet or list which were erroneously received in evidence. Most assuredly, the inadmissible parts of the inventory sheet were not the only evidence against Thomas. The other evidence against Thomas, admitted without objection or properly admitted over objection, is discussed in the next section. However, before proceeding, we note the proposition expressed in the State's brief: The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Brief for appellee at 31. We again direct attention to State v. Messersmith, 238 Neb. at 936, 473 N.W.2d at 92, wherein we expressly disapproved of the expression `The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.' Thomas' third assignment of error, based on his relevancy objection, has no merit. Sufficiency of Evidence. Finally, Thomas contends that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to show his intent to deliver crack cocaine. [C]ircumstantial evidence may support a finding that a defendant intended to distribute, deliver, or dispense a controlled substance in the defendant's possession. State v. Zitterkopf, 236 Neb. 743, 748, 463 N.W.2d 616, 620 (1990). Accord State v. Messersmith, supra . Circumstantial evidence to establish that possession of a controlled substance was with intent to distribute or deliver may consist of the quantity of the substance, the equipment and supplies found with it; the place it was found; the manner of packaging; and the testimony of witnesses experienced and knowledgeable in the field. State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. 433, 445, 461 N.W.2d 554, 562 (1990) (quoting from State v. Turner, 192 Neb. 397, 222 N.W.2d 105 (1974)). See, also, State v. Lonnecker, 237 Neb. 207, 465 N.W.2d 737 (1991); State v. Harney, 237 Neb. 512, 466 N.W.2d 540 (1991); State v. Messersmith, supra . Thomas admitted that he was in possession of crack cocaine, but denied that he was trafficking in the drug. Thomas' intent to sell the cocaine may be inferred from the circumstantial evidence, especially Sergeant Langan's stipulated testimony. Therefore, Thomas' fourth and last assignment of error lacks merit.