Opinion ID: 483526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the employment relationship

Text: 15 ERISA defines employee merely as any individual employed by an employer. 41 The statutory definition thus provides little or no guidance when the question is whether a party performing services pursuant to a particular work arrangement is an employee. However, both parties agree 42 and the District Court held 43 that one must look to common-law rules of agency to determine employee status. In this approach we fully concur. 44 16 The District Court embarked upon its analysis by announcing that it must look to common law principles and the intent of the parties. 45 Yet the court never enunciated the common-law test but instead focused exclusively upon intent, concluding that 17 all involved in establishing plaintiff's relationship with the IAM, including plaintiff, intended that she be retained on a contract basis, not as an employee earning pension credit. Customarily, an office manager receiving on-the-job supervision while working somewhat regular hours does not serve as an independent contractor. Here, however, custom was deliberately defied. In this case, all parties involved, and particularly plaintiff, stood to gain from a relationship in which plaintiff served on a contract basis. 46 18 Intent of the parties is a factor, but merely one of a number of factors, that the common law weighs in distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor. 47 7] The simple fact that IAM characterized appellant as a contractor did not make her one in the eyes of the law. 48 Rather, the right of one party to control not only the result to be achieved by the other, but also the means and manner of performing the task assigned, is the most critical factor in ascertaining whether an employment relationship exists. 49 Consequently, while all relevant circumstances are to be examined and evaluated, the degree to which English, appellant's supervisor, controlled her daily work activities is the primary consideration in determining her employment status. 19 Although the District Court made no findings in this regard, the uncontradicted record evidence shows that English exercised well-nigh unbridled control over appellant's work and the details of its performance. Eugene D. Glover, IAM's General Secretary-Treasurer and one of the pension plan's Administrators, testified that Mr. English supervised her work, he trained her, he told her what to do, and he could have fired her if she disregarded his directions. 50 Both English and appellant testified that he set out her daily routine, told her what tasks needed to be done, trained her to use office equipment, and taught her to perform many clerical tasks such as bookkeeping, typing up leases and updating the building directory. 51 English likewise admitted that he could have discharged appellant at any time had he been displeased with her work. 52 This testimony amply demonstrates that English possessed and exercised the right to control not only the final products of appellant's labor, but also the manner in which she achieved the results expected. Even the District Court felt constrained to observe that [c]ustomarily, an office manager receiving on-the-job supervision while working somewhat regular hours does not serve as an independent contractor. 53 20 Although, in the circumstances here, the right-to-control test alone might be dispositive of the issue, other common-law factors 54 support our conclusion that appellant was an employee, not an independent contractor, during her first year of service to IAM. From aught that appears, she did not render that service as a self-employed individual or affiliate of a business distinct from IAM. 55 Her work was integrally related to the branch of IAM's business concerned with management of the DuPont Circle Building. 56 So far as we know, the job she held during this era--clerical assistant--is rarely an unsupervised position; indeed, we know that in this case English provided constant direction and oversight. 57 Performance of appellant's duties did not call for the sort of specialized skill for which employers would normally hire independent contractors. 58 She did not supply her own equipment; rather, she worked in English's office and used IAM's typewriters, calculators, and various other machines and office supplies. 59 Although she was paid by the hour, and received neither the level salary nor employee benefits enjoyed by other IAM workers, her compensation did not depend on completion of a specific job, a method by which independent contractors are often compensated. 60 While this financial arrangement does suggest that, for purposes of compensation, IAM handled appellant's situation in a manner different from those of other workers, this singular treatment did not extend to other aspects of the employment relationship, the most important of which for present purposes was control over the details of her performance. 61 We hold that, as a matter of law, appellant worked as an employee during the first year of her service to IAM.