Opinion ID: 2521161
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Circuit Court Correctly Awarded Out-of-Pocket Expenses To The Trustees Based On The City's Failure To Institute Eminent Domain Proceedings Within Twelve Months Of The Department's Designation Of The Property For Acquisition Pursuant To ROH Ch. 38.

Text: In its cross-appeal, the City argues that the circuit court erred in awarding out-of-pocket expenses to the Trustees pursuant to ROH § 38-5.2, based on the City's failure to initiate eminent domain proceedings within twelve months of designating Kuapa Isle for condemnation, because the Trustees consented to, and indeed requested, the delay of the City's condemnation proceeding. Indeed, the City goes so far as to claim that ROH § 38-5.2 does not allow for the compensation of a landowner where the condemnation proceedings were delayed at the request of the landowner. (Emphases omitted.) The Trustees maintain that any potential waiver of their right to out-of-pocket expenses under the ordinance was expressly conditioned by the City itself upon the City's refraining from passing any resolution authorizing condemnation of any leased fee interest at Kuapa Isle until the claims for relief in [the Richardson appeals] [were] dismissed by a final non-appealable and non-reviewable judicial determination. . . and all claims and motions therein and all appeals and writs therein or therefrom [were] finally decided, resolved, and dismissed with respect to the facial constitutionality or validity of Ordinance 91-95. In an attempt to circumvent its own acknowledgment of an expressly conditioned waiver, the City recharacterizes the Trustee's argument to be a complaint that the City acted too soon, rather than too late, because the City did not wait until the final resolution of the Richardson appeals before proceeding under ROH ch. 38. The City then argues that ROH § 38-5.2 does not allow for the compensation of a landowner under circumstances in which the City proceeds with condemnation prematurely, rather than belatedly, and, in any event, that the record contains no evidence that the Trustees incurred any damage whatsoever as a result of the condemnation being filed seven months early. In fact, the City posits that it saved the Trustees money, insofar as they would have incurred even greater out-of-pocket expenses during this seven month period. Notwithstanding the City's logic, the plain language of ROH § 38-5.2 is clear that if the City fails to proceed with acquisition of a property within twelve months of having designated it for lease-to-fee conversion, the City shall reimburse the fee owner, the lessor, and the legal and equitable owners of land so designated for certain specified out-of-pocket expenses. See supra note 5. [48] Thus, the only real question in dispute is whether the Trustees waived their right to compensation. The circuit court found that, viewing all the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the City, there was no waiver as a matter of law. We agree with the circuit court. A waiver `may be expressed or implied[,]' and `[i]t may be established by express statement or agreement, or by acts and conduct from which an intention to waive may be reasonably inferred.' Wilart Assocs. v. Kapiolani Plaza, Ltd., 7 Haw.App. 354, 359-60, 766 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (1988) (citations omitted) (brackets in original). Generally, waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment of a known right, a voluntary relinquishment of rights, and the relinquishment or refusal to use a right. Association of Owners of Kukui Plaza v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 68 Haw. 98, 108, 705 P.2d 28, 36 (1985). To constitute a waiver, there must have existed a right claimed to have been waived and the waiving party must have had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right at the time of the purported waiver. Honolulu Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pao, 4 Haw.App. 478, 484, 668 P.2d 50, 54 (1983). In re Estate of Searl, 72 Haw. 222, 226-27, 811 P.2d 828, 831 (1991) (citations omitted). While the question whether a valid waiver exists is generally a question of fact, when the facts are undisputed it may become a question of law. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n v. Bush, 43 Haw. 281, 286 (1959) (citations omitted); see also Stewart v. Spalding, 23 Haw. 502, 517 (1916) (The question of waiver is usually a mixed one of law and fact ..., but where the facts are undisputed and are susceptible of but one reasonable inference it becomes one of law for the court. (Citations omitted.)). In the present matter, the parties do not dispute that the Trustees were aware of their rights under the ordinance and intended to waive them. Nor do they dispute that, in fact, the Trustees' waiver was on condition that the City stay authorization of condemnation of any leased fee interest in Kuapa Isle until the Richardson appeals were resolved by a final non-appealable and non-reviewable judicial determination[,] as acknowledged by the City in a letter written by Jon Yoshimura, Chair of the Committee on Policy of the City Council, dated July 11, 1996. The City does not dispute the letter, Yoshimura's authority, or the meaning that the Trustees ascribed to the letter. Moreover, the City does not deny that the City Council passed a resolution authorizing the condemnation of the Trustees' leased fee interests in Kuapa Isle on March 11, 1998, prior to the United States Supreme Court's denial of the Trustees' petition for a writ of certiorari i.e., prior to a final non-appealable and non-reviewable judicial determination in the Richardson appeals. The City's only argument is that, as a governmental entity, the City could not contract away its sovereign authority to take property by eminent domain. But the City cannot have it both ways: either there was a conditional waiver, which was not fulfilled, or there was no conditional waiver at all. As the circuit court ruled, under either scenario, the 12-month period had been exceeded and there was a conditional waiver in the agreement which could not be satisfied. Consequently, the City must pay the Trustees' out-of-pocket expenses pursuant to ROH § 38-5.2. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in granting the Trustees' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Count VIII of their complaint. We therefore affirm the circuit court's judgment in favor of the Trustees as to Counts VI, VII, and VIII of the Trustees' complaint.