Opinion ID: 200345
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Inflaming the Passions of the Jury

Text: 66 We cannot agree with Henderson that the district court erred when it did not, on its own initiative, strike the prosecutor's description of Henderson as a successful businessman in the business of crack cocaine, who wanted a windfall verdict in his favor. When the evidence of a defendant's guilt is strong, a court should be very reluctant to find plain error in misguided rhetoric. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1188 (1st Cir.1993). Under plain error review, improper remarks are grounds for reversal only if they so poisoned the well that the trial's outcome was likely affected. Id. (internal quotations omitted). We place a prosecutor's remarks in context when determining whether they were inappropriate. See id. at 1187. 67 Henderson posits that the prosecutor's comments improperly appealed to the passions of the jury. To the contrary, we fail to see how these remarks would distract the jury from focusing on whether the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 574 (1st Cir.1994). Defense counsel suggested in his opening that Henderson was a legitimate businessman; the prosecutor countered that suggestion by arguing that Henderson was in the business of selling drugs. Here, defense counsel invited a response by suggesting that Henderson worked hard in the music promotion business, and was successful. The prosecutor, in turn, offered a reply that was not only supported by the evidence but was properly limited and addressed only the defense counsel's own comments. See Nickens, 955 F.2d at 123. There was nothing improper in this suggestion. 68 Nor did the district court err when it permitted, as Henderson claims, the prosecutor to tell the jury that it could convict him even if they found that the defendant was not the distributor of the cocaine. This is somewhat misleading. In his closing, Henderson's counsel suggested that someone other than Henderson was the crack cocaine supplier. The prosecutor responded: 69 What are the odds that there was a different supplier in this case in light of the following facts: First, a person that you might well find at a minimum bears a striking resemblance to this individual, even if you don't find that it's him, walks into 6 Denny Street at the exact time of a crack distribution on October 19th. Coincidence? 70 When read in its proper context, it is apparent that this comment, while unartfully expressed, is innocuous. It certainly would not suggest to the jury that it could convict the defendant even if it found that the person alleged to be the supplier of the cocaine was not the defendant. Furthermore, the court's instructions to the jury clearly explained that the ultimate question for the jury was whether Henderson was the supplier of crack cocaine on the dates in question. We conclude that Henderson's conviction should not be disturbed on the basis of these statements. 71 We also disagree with Henderson that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the passions of the jury during rebuttal by commenting, with regard to Henderson's defense theory, [w]hat is this, the Jerry Springer show? Given the strong evidence against Henderson, the prosecutor's misguided rhetoric, Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1188, if it was even that, does not rise to the level of plain error. See Joyner, 191 F.3d at 55. We conclude that Henderson's conviction should not be disturbed on account of the prosecutor's reference to the Jerry Springer show.