Opinion ID: 223533
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Susinka

Text: Susinka makes the same mistaken argument. The record is replete with evidence from which the jury could have found that Susinka was part of the conspiracy. Susinka was a Shorty. He was repeatedly arrested with other members of the gang. When gang leadership ordered the murder of Robert Perez, Susinka drove Crowder and Delatorre to carry out the order. Susinka and Delatorre picked up three Shorties after they attempted to murder Latin Kings on February 23, 2002, and less than a month later, Susinka was arrested in possession of a “nation gun.” Susinka himself was the victim of a shooting, and, in keeping with the gang’s code, he refused to give a statement to the police. He was photographed attending a meeting of the Insane Deuces on April 10, 2002, and then, less than a week later, was arrested with another firearm connected to the Insane Deuces. Susinka attempts to brush off this evidence as acts and events unrelated to the charged conspiracy, but the jury had ample evidence to find that he was a member of the charged RICO conspiracy. Susinka also contests the sufficiency of the evidence related to the two predicate acts required to uphold the charge of RICO conspiracy. He argues that the two acts charged against him as part of his RICO conspiracy (the murder of Robert Perez and dealing in narcotics) cannot support his guilt because the jury found the murder not proven and the government dropped the drug conspiracy allegation. As explained above, however, on the RICO conspiracy charge, the government needed to prove only that Susinka agreed that some member of the conspiracy would commit two predicate acts of racketeering. See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64-65. The record fully supports his agreement to the commission of at least two predicate acts of other members of the conspiracy. His conviction for RICO conspiracy was supported by sufficient evidence. IV. Sufficiency of the Indictment and Constitutionality of the RICO Statute Susinka, joined by Guzman and Juarez, argues that the second superseding indictment was defective because it failed to cite “the elements of the types of racketeering activity agreed to.” Susinka did not move to dismiss the indictment before trial on this ground, and thus has Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 21 waived this argument under Rules 12(b)(3)(B) and 12(e).5 Even on the merits, however, we would disagree with Susinka’s assessment of the indictment. The indictment charged the elements of a RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), tracking those elements in Count 1. We also would find that it provided Susinka with sufficient facts to inform him of the conduct at issue. In short, contrary to Susinka’s argument, the indictment was sufficient. See United States v. White, 610 F.3d 956, 958-59 (7th Cir. 2010). Joined again by Guzman and Juarez, Susinka argues that he was unconstitutionally convicted because the RICO enterprise proven at trial did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce “due to its exclusive intrastate, non-economic nature.” We review this argument for plain error; Susinka forfeited it by not raising it below. See Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848-49. The government introduced evidence that it had recovered from members of the gang eighteen firearms that had been manufactured outside of Illinois, and that the cocaine sold by the gang members – including Susinka – also came from outside of Illinois. The court instructed the jury that it was required to find that “the activities of the Insane Deuces street gang would affect interstate or foreign commerce” in order to find the defendants guilty of RICO conspiracy. When it found the defendants guilty of RICO conspiracy, therefore, it found that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants had participated in an illegal enterprise engaged in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce. We find no error.