Opinion ID: 815973
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Yilmaz’s Primary and Secondary Inspections

Text: “An interaction between law enforcement officials and an individual generally triggers Miranda’s prophylactic warnings when the interaction becomes a ‘custodial interrogation.’” United States v. FNU LNU, 653 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2011). The “overarching ‘custody’ question is whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood herself to be subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest.” Id. at 153 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). In determining whether a suspect is “in custody” for Miranda purposes, we consider, among other factors, the duration and location of the interrogation, the nature of the questions asked, whether the defendant volunteered for the interrogation, whether the officers used restraints, whether weapons were present or drawn, and whether the officers told the suspect he was free to leave or under suspicion. Id. “Practically speaking, the most important factor in determining whether Miranda applies at our borders will often be the objective function of an inspector’s questions . . . .” Id. at 156 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring). We agree with the District Court that Yilmaz was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes during the primary inspection. That inspection was brief and took place while Yilmaz remained in his vehicle at a highway border crossing – a 4 location where a reasonable person “will expect some constraints as well as questions.” Id. at 153 (majority opinion). In addition, the questions then asked of Yilmaz were routine and relevant to his admissibility and the admissibility of his effects. For example, Yilmaz was asked where he lived, where he was coming from, how long he had spent in Canada, the purpose of his trip, his occupation, whether he had any goods to declare, and for the name of the owner of his vehicle. A reasonable person in Yilmaz’s position would not have understood himself subject to the equivalent of a formal arrest during this inspection. We also agree with the District Court that Yilmaz was not “in custody” during the secondary inspection. Although the secondary inspection lasted for approximately ninety minutes and Yilmaz was not free to leave, during that time Yilmaz remained unrestrained in an area of the Port of Entry described as a “waiting room.” As before, the questions asked of Yilmaz during the secondary inspection were routine and relevant to his admissibility and the admissibility of his effects. Yilmaz was asked to (and did) fill out a standard customs declaration form. He was also asked about the purpose of his trip, how he had entered Canada, his plans for the vehicle once he entered the United States, and the reason for his possession of several thousand dollars in United States currency. Thereafter, a CBP officer inspected Yilmaz’s vehicle while Yilmaz remained in the waiting room. While the secondary inspection was undoubtedly more thorough than the primary inspection, the objective function of the officers’ inquiries concerned admissibility, and a reasonable person in Yilmaz’s position “would not have considered what 5 occurred to be the equivalent of a formal arrest.” FNU LNU, 653 F.3d at 155. Rather, a reasonable person would consider the secondary inspection “par for the course of entering the country from abroad.” Id. Because Yilmaz was not “in custody” during either his primary or his secondary inspections, Miranda warnings were not required before or during either of those inspections, and their absence does not provide a basis for suppression. Id.