Opinion ID: 1192795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The College Tuition Supplement Program

Text: The challenged legislation in Weiss v. O'Brien is chapter 56, Laws of 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., now codified as RCW 28B.10.830-.836, which directed the Council on Higher Education to develop and administer a state plan to provide a tuition supplement program to undergraduate resident students attending an accredited independent or private institution of higher education within the state of Washington. RCW 28B.10.832. In accordance with that enactment the legislature appropriated $1,700,000 to fund the college tuition supplement program. Section 1 of chapter 56 (RCW 28B.10.830) declares a legislative intent and purpose, in specific exercise of the police power, to recognize the contributions made to the educational level of this state by the independent and private institutions of higher education and to acknowledge that these general educational programs and services are in the public's interest. This declaration further bases the act upon the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders. The council adopted a plan for the administration of the tuition supplement grant program. Under it, any resident student pursuing a minimum of 12 credit hours of instruction at any independent or private institution of higher education is eligible to receive aid. An independent or private institution of higher education is defined as one accredited by the Northwest Association of Secondary and Higher Schools. Chapter 56 and the plan provide that no single grant may exceed $100, and no aid may be given to a student pursuing a degree in theology. The council also prepared application cards and sent a supply of the cards to each private college or university. In applying for a grant, a student must obtain an application card from his school. No application was received directly by the state from a student, and if a student inquired of the council concerning the program he was referred to the private college or university. The application card, which must be signed by the student, contains the following provision: I assign to the institution in which I am enrolled, the receipt of the tuition supplement grant with the amount of that grant being credited to my student tuition account. Under the plan, on or before August 1st each eligible school submits to the council an estimate of the number of students who will participate in the program in the following academic year. Based upon these estimates the council then determines the amount of each grant and notifies the schools thereof. By November 1st, the schools submit to the council the application cards they have received from the students and lists of those students who are eligible. The council then sends to each school a single state warrant representing all funds payable to the school with respect to its students eligible for aid. This single state warrant, payable to the school, is sent directly to the school, with a covering statement identifying the students at that institution for whom applications have been approved. The individual student never receives the money. For the academic year 1971-72 the council disbursed $845,455 to 8,514 students at 10 colleges and universities under the plan. For the academic year 1972-73 the council received from these private schools estimates that 8,819 students in the state would qualify for the tuition supplement grant. In contrast to the grades 1-12 program, aid is not limited in the college program to needy or disadvantaged students; also, the act in the college program is expressly limited to nonpublic students. Petitioners in this suit are the same as in Weiss v. Bruno, No. 42570, and seek relief similar to that sought in the grades 1-12 case. Respondents here are the State Treasurer and the Council on Higher Education, a state agency. Intervenors include the Washington Friends of Higher Education, an association composed of or representing all of the private colleges and universities in the state of Washington, and certain students who attend those schools. Focusing first on the question of whether the college program violates Const. art. 9, § 4, it is manifest from our discussion in Weiss v. Bruno that the ultimate result of both the act and the plan here is to support, in part, the schools in question with public funds. We thus proceed to the second relevant inquiry under Const. art. 9, § 4: are the recipient schools free from sectarian control and influence? Most of the 255 pages of findings of fact are devoted to an analysis of the structure and operation of the 10 institutions. Typically, the following elements as to each institution are set forth: (1) history and current facts; (2) stated purposes; (3) governance; (4) faculty; (5) student body; (6) academic freedom; (7) property ownership, financial assistance and use of campus; (8) place of religion in the college, including physical surroundings, character and extent of religious activities; (9) college affiliation; (10) place of religion in curriculum; and (11) denominational control. While we have reviewed all of these elements with regard to each institution, it would unnecessarily extend this opinion to set each forth. Instead, a representative cataloging will demonstrate adequately the nature of the 10 schools. The stated purposes of these institutions are set forth in their articles of incorporation, their bylaws or their college bulletins. Among these stated purposes we find the following: (1) ... To instruct and educate in harmony with the Christian faith as set forth in the Holy Scriptures....; (2) ... A Christian place, self-consciously Christian and Catholic because the teachings of our Lord are the inspiration for its being; (3) ... We hope to instill a devotion to God which expresses itself in worship, in Christian conduct and in a sense of responsibility for extending the Kingdom of God.; (4) ... [The institution] expressly accepts the Catholic faith as the unique normative principal [ sic ] of authentic theology ...; (5) It [the college] encourages academic excellence, in keeping with the great traditions of Christian scholarship, Christian ideals in teaching and administration, and an atmosphere conducive to the understanding of all beliefs.; (6) To give a thorough knowledge of Bible truths and to develop evangelistic workers. As for the manner of governance, the following elements are typical: (1) Management and control of the college shall rest exclusively with the board of trustees, provided that at no time shall action be taken by such board contrary to the regulations, doctrines and standards of the Free Methodist Church of North America. (2) A majority of the trustees shall belong to the Society of Jesus.... (3) A majority of the board of trustees shall be members of Christian churches. One institution requires at least two-thirds of the trustees to be members of a particular church with a minimum and maximum number who are to be ordained ministers of that church. With regard to the choice of faculty, the findings range from no preference being given to members of a particular faith to the giving of such preference. One institution sets forth its philosophy of the fundamentals of the Christian faith and then states: The implementation of such a philosophy requires a Christian faculty who understands the nature and purpose of God as revealed in Jesus Christ and the nature and end of man as declared by the Scripture and attested by human experience. The faculty must possess a thorough academic preparation combined with Christian devotion and commitment. The bylaws of another provide: Having been informed, prior to appointment, of the character of the university and its Christian mission, members of the faculty shall be expected to share the sacred trust of safeguarding the defined objectives of the university, upholding its honor and enforcing its rules and regulations. They shall set a worthy example of Christian life and seek to inculcate in the students the highest ideals of Christian man. A review of the findings relating to the makeup of the student bodies indicates that generally a designation of the student applicant's religious preference is optional. One institution does specifically ask the applicant what church do you attend and whether or not he is a member. It also asks the student to describe briefly in what ways the Christian faith has been of importance to you. Another requires a commitment for attendance at a Friday evening devotional service, as well as Sabbath school and church service on Sabbath morning. All institutions appear to grant a high degree of academic freedom although one does provide, after recognition of respect for the religious beliefs and practices of all persons who cooperate in the operation of the university that: The university requires only that all faculty members maintain a standard of life and conduct consistent with the philosophy and objectives of the institution. Intelligent analysis and discussion of Catholic dogma and official pronouncements of the Holy See on issues of faith and morals is encouraged. However, continued open espousal in the classroom or in assigned University activities of viewpoints which contradict explicit principles of Catholic faith or morals is opposed to the specified aims of this University. It appears that uniformly the campus and buildings comprising the institutions are owned by separate corporate structures. Direct financial assistance from religious organizations or churches is minimal, although one institution receives approximately 12 percent of its operating budget from its sponsoring church, but contributed services of the members of religious orders are substantially valuable in the Catholic oriented institutions. There is a wide diversity in regard to the place of religion in the college. Some campuses exhibit religious symbols. Some classes begin with a prayer as a matter of practice, not policy. School holidays may include those of a nature peculiar to a particular faith. At one institution church attendance is mandatory. In another case students are expected to observe a day of worship, but there is no attempt to enforce attendance. The bylaws of one institution require all meetings of the trustees to be opened with a prayer. Catholic students at one university are required to make an annual retreat, some of which retreats have very little religious orientation. One university retains Jesuit priests and laymen specifically to foster and coordinate spiritual and religious life on campus. While the findings disclose institutional affiliation with organizations ranging from the Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities to the Association of Seventh Day Adventists Colleges and Secondary Schools, there is no finding of the significance of such affiliation in any instance. Regarding religion in the curriculum, the findings are broad and nondefinitive. While many of the institutions require one or more courses in religion for a bachelor's degree, the findings conclude, in one instance, that such course is not distinctly Catholic. What it distinctly is, we are not told. In another instance the findings are that the institution offers undergraduate and graduate majors in three areas of religious concern: pre-ministerial, pre-mission, and pre-Christian education. One of those courses is set forth as seeking to equip a student to teach God's word effectively to all age groups. Regarding the criterion of denominational control the findings provide little help. For example, these findings, prepared by the parties, advise this court that as to one institution the visibility of a church on campus is very low and the majority of the community view the college as a viable educational institution providing a high quality education. The meaning and significance of that conclusion is not apparent. In another instance, we have the conclusional statement of the president that the denominational requirements for the Board of Regents (including the requirements that a member of the board either be a member in good standing of a particular faith or a member in good standing of a church that acknowledges and confesses the ecumenical creeds of Christendom) have not led to attempts by the church to control the board. There is a finding that while a particular university is conducted under the auspices of a particular church, the relationship is spiritual and fraternal, but not legal or physical. (Whatever that means is not explained.) In summary, varying degrees of religious orientation characterize each of the institutions before us. None exhibits all of the possible constitutionally fatal criteria, but none is free of all prohibited elements. Const. art. 9, § 4 does not provide that a minimal amount of sectarian control or influence is permissible. We cannot say that any of these schools is completely free from such influence. [10] The findings of fact demonstrate that, in differing degrees, all of these institutions were founded upon and continue to be dedicated to some element of sectarian purpose and influence. For this, their foresighted founders, their devoted supporters and their dedicated personnel are to be commended. Their efforts and principles should not be diluted by the temporary gain of money diverted from the public treasury, since an inevitable byproduct of this effort would be a weakening of such devotion and dedication. This is one of the very results sought to be avoided by the clear prohibition of article 9, section 4. We conclude that chapter 56, Laws of 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., and the administrative plan adopted pursuant thereto violate article 9, section 4 of the Washington State Constitution, both on the face of the act and as applied to each of the recipient institutions herein. In light of this determinative holding, we need not decide whether each of the 10 schools here has such a substantial religious purpose and character that state aid to each particular school would fall within the broader language of the establishment clause. However, as applied to those institutions whose religiosity is sufficient to place them within the ambit of the First Amendment, the act and plan would be unconstitutional under the federal constitution. In those situations, this transfer of public funds to the narrow class of nonpublic schools (through the conduit of student grants) would violate the second Lemon requirement that the principal or primary effect [of the statute] must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 29 L.Ed.2d 745, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (1971). We note that here, as in the grades 1-12 program discussed above, there are no restrictions in either the enabling legislation or the administrative plan upon the use of the grant funds by the schools. Such a holding would be consistent with Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 29 L.Ed. 790, 91 S.Ct. 2091 (1971), decided by the Supreme Court on the same date as Lemon. In Tilton, the Supreme Court reviewed the Higher Education Facilities Act, which authorizes federal grants and loans to institutions of higher learning for the construction of academic facilities, but excludes `any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, or ... any facility which ... is used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity....' As long as these restrictions are obeyed, church-related schools are eligible for grants under the act. The United States Commissioner of Education requires such applicants to provide assurances that these restrictions will be respected. Prior to the Tilton decision, the United States retained a 20-year interest in any facility constructed with these funds. If, during the period, the recipient violated the statutory conditions, the United States was entitled to recover an amount equal to the proportion of the facility's present value that the federal grant bore to its original cost. During the 20-year period, the statutory restrictions were enforced by the Office of Education by way of on-site inspections. Upon a record which the court found to provide no basis for assuming that religiosity necessarily permeates the secular education of the four recipient colleges, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the act does not foster excessive entanglement between church and state. However, the court noted that under the act, a recipient institution's obligation not to use the facility for sectarian instruction or religious worship expired at the end of 20 years: Limiting the prohibition for religious use of the structure to 20 years obviously opens the facility to use for any purpose at the end of that period. It cannot be assumed that a substantial structure has no value after that period and hence the unrestricted use of a valuable property is in effect a contribution of some value to a religious body. Tilton v. Richardson, supra at 683. The court held the limitation of the restrictive use obligations to a period of 20 years to be in violation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment. It necessarily follows that the totally unrestricted money grants to the colleges herein constitute an advancement of religion in violation of the First Amendment. As for the potential of excessive entanglement in the college tuition supplement program, administrative entanglement is unlikely. The application process is the only contact the council has with the individual institutions or students. The council makes no audit to insure that the funds will be used for nonreligious purposes, nor to see that the disbursement is actually applied to students' tuition. However, political entanglement is intrinsic in this program. Unlike the 1-time, single purpose construction grants permitted in Tilton, the unrestricted monetary grants in the instant case are likely to result in a continuing financial dependency by the recipient schools upon the state. Greater and greater appropriations are likely to be demanded as costs increase each year, thus splitting the candidates and the electorate along religious lines. As emphasized in Weiss v. Bruno, these grants can only serve to aggravate and expand  not to abate  this controversy. In light of our holdings under Const. art. 9, § 4 in both of these cases, and under the first amendment to the United States Constitution as to the grades 1-12 program, it is unnecessary to reach the additional challenges made by petitioners to these statutes and administrative acts. One further matter deserves discussion, however. [11] Respondents contend that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and the privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution (article 1, section 12) require this court to preserve and uphold the college tuition supplement program. Under respondents' reasoning, whenever the state has a duty to provide a particular service to the public and does so, the state must also reimburse any individual who voluntarily chooses not to take advantage of the service provided, but instead pays a private party to perform the same service. Respondents support this novel theory with no citation of authority. It should be remembered that state action did not prevent the students at private schools from attending public schools because of their religious beliefs. Rather, the essence of respondents' argument is that the voluntary choice of a different education than that provided for all children by the state must be financed with public funds. We disagree. No violation of the equal protection provisions of the constitutions has been shown. In summary, in the grades 1-12 case (Weiss v. Bruno), we hold that the challenged portion of Laws of 1972, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 155, § 10, p. 494, quoted at page 202, and the administrative plan adopted pursuant thereto violate both article 9, section 4 of the Washington State Constitution and the establishment clause of the first amendment to the United States Constitution. In the case of the college tuition supplement program (Weiss v. O'Brien), we hold that Laws of 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 56, now codified as RCW 28B.10.830.836, and the administrative plan adopted pursuant thereto violate article 9, section 4 of the Washington State Constitution, both on the face of the act and as applied to the individual recipient institutions in question. In both of these cases, the respective state officers who are parties to these actions are prohibited from disbursing funds under these programs. HALE, C.J., FINLEY, ROSELLINI, HUNTER, HAMILTON, STAFFORD, WRIGHT, and UTTER, JJ., concur. Petition for rehearing denied July 17, 1973.