Opinion ID: 700909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retaliation for Title VII Claim

Text: 19 To sustain a claim of retaliation for filing a Title VII complaint, an employee must establish the following by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that she engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) that this exercise of her protected civil rights was known to the defendant; (3) that the defendant thereafter took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Canitia v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990). 20 If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, based on these four factors, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Assuming the employer meets this burden of production, the plaintiff, who bears the burden of persuasion throughout the entire process, then must demonstrate  'that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.'  Id. (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). 21 Regarding the Title VII retaliatory discharge claim, the magistrate judge held that Cuevas met her burden of presenting a prima facie case of retaliation. J.A. at 16-17. This is not an onerous burden. Kolb v. Department of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 721 F.Supp. 885 (N.D.Ohio 1989). Once Cuevas established her prima facie case, the burden of production shifted to LMHA to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Canitia, 903 F.2d at 1066, 1067. 22 In its Motion for Summary Judgment, LMHA stated that Cuevas was dismissed because LMHA eliminated her position upon the recommendation of Belz, an outside consulting firm, which determined that Cuevas' position was unnecessary because it combined clerical and managerial duties at a managerial rate of pay. As to the possibility of being rehired, LMHA stated and supported by affidavit that Cuevas was not hired for the positions of operations manager or clerk/typist because other candidates were more qualified or candidates, who possessed qualifications equivalent to Cuevas, were already employed by LMHA. In the latter instance, LMHA's hiring policy was to hire from within the organization when possible because it promoted the morale of the work force. 23 Based on these facts, the magistrate judge determined that LMHA had articulated a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for terminating Cuevas' employment and for not rehiring her. J.A. at 18. Cuevas concedes that LMHA met its burden of production. Cuevas' Br. at 21. At this point, the burden shifted back to Cuevas to meet her ultimate burden of persuasion that the proffered legitimate reason for the adverse employment action was merely a pretext for discrimination. See Canitia, 903 F.2d at 1066. 24 Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to Cuevas, the magistrate judge determined that Cuevas did not demonstrate that LMHA's reason for her dismissal and for not rehiring her was actually a pretext for retaliation for filing the previous discrimination claims. Thus, the court, finding no genuine issue of material fact, granted summary judgment to LMHA. 25 After reviewing de novo the record and the arguments of the parties on appeal, we agree with the magistrate judge that no material issue of fact remains for trial regarding Cuevas' Title VII retaliation claim.