Opinion ID: 2438904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Withdrawal from plea bargain

Text: Toward the end of his term of office, the prosecutor offered to recommend a sentence to five years probation in exchange for Caldwell's plea of guilty to first degree battery and aggravated assault. Caldwell signed the agreement. A new prosecutor took office before Caldwell entered a plea, and the new prosecutor refused to honor the agreement. Caldwell moved to require that the agreement be enforced. The motion was denied. The aggravated assault charge was dismissed, and, upon a plea of not guilty, Caldwell was convicted of second degree battery, a lesser offense included in first degree battery. As authority for his contention that he was entitled to specific performance of the agreement, Caldwell cites our opinion in Hall v. State, 285 Ark. 38, 684 S.W.2d 261 (1985), in which we said that if the state does not keep a plea bargain, an accused may withdraw his guilty plea, citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), and Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984). These cases involved alleged breaches of plea bargains which allegedly occurred after a guilty plea had been entered. To be distinguished are cases like this one where no plea has been entered at the time of the withdrawal. We have no case squarely in point. The cases from other jurisdictions are discussed in Annot., Right of Prosecutor to Withdraw from Plea Bargain Prior to Entry of Plea, 16 A.L.R. 4th 1089 (1982). The majority of jurisdictions which have considered the issue hold that, if the defendant has not pleaded or detrimentally relied upon the agreement, the state is free to withdraw. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1979), and Wynn v. State, 22 Md.App. 165, 322 A.2d 564 (1974), in both of which withdrawal was allowed, before prejudicial reliance had occurred, where a second prosecutor refused to honor an agreement entered by a predecessor. Caldwell argues that he relied to his detriment on the agreement, but the closest he comes to saying he was prejudiced is the general statement that upon entry of the agreement he stopped preparing his defense. He makes no specific statement that any preparations were foregone or how his defense may have suffered. We find no facts showing detrimental reliance. Caldwell also argues that it is fundamentally unfair to allow the state to renege, whether or not he has relied. Some courts might agree. See Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir.1979); Ex parte Yarber, 437 So.2d 1330 (Ala.1983). We disagree for two reasons. First, if the trial court chooses not to accept the plea bargain, it is of no effect. Ark.R.Crim.P. 25.3; Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984). The parties have no power to bind the court, and thus it is illusory to say the state is bound by such an agreement before it is consummated by the acceptance of a guilty plea by the court. Second, this court places substance over form, Stone v. State, 290 Ark. 204, 718 S.W.2d 102 (1986), and if there is no demonstrable prejudice resulting from the withdrawal we fail to see how it is unfair to allow it. We do not mean to suggest by this discussion that if an accused has detrimentally relied to any degree or in any manner upon a plea bargain he may have specific performance of it prior to entering a plea based upon it. We will cross that bridge when we come to it. Withdrawal under those circumstances may affect only the evidence available to the prosecution. Here we hold only that absent a showing of acceptance of a plea of guilty based upon agreement and absent a showing of other detrimental reliance upon the agreement, Caldwell was not entitled to enforcement of it.