Opinion ID: 1277356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court's Exclusion of Evidence of Amy's Civil Suit

Text: Amy filed a civil suit alleging that the Riverside County Sheriffs Department mistreated her and lied to her at the time she reported the murder of her friend, Diane. Prior to commencement of the parties' opening statements (at a hearing conducted outside the jury's presence pursuant to Evidence Code section 402), the trial court ruled that the allegations set forth in the civil suit would be inadmissible as character evidence against sheriffs department officials, but might be admissible as impeachment evidence if discrepancies appeared in the testimony offered at trial by Amy and the officials. During trial, defendant's counsel requested a second hearing on this issue outside the jury's presence. At that hearing, counsel contended that evidence pertaining to Amy's civil suit was relevant in that it might be motivation for Amy to make a stronger statement for herself, and for the officers to make a protective statement for themselves. The prosecutor contended that evidence of Amy's civil suit was irrelevant and, even if it were relevant, should be excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. [14] In support of his argument, the prosecutor observed that 90 percent of the investigative reports prepared by the detectives in this case or  who are the subjects of the civil lawsuit, were prepared at sometime prior to the lawsuit even being filed. The trial court found: Th[is] court's confident that within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352, whatever probative value that evidence would have, and I can't think of very much, is substantially outweighed by the probability that it ... will first of all necessitate undue consumption of time and will create a substantial danger, undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, and of misleading the jurors. [¶] I think that what goes into filing a lawsuit [] that motivation is really impossible for us to know, and what [e]ffect that lawsuit has on people testifying, especially when there are written police reports, especially when there are statements made before a lawsuit was even conceived as a possible way to go. [¶] It strikes me that there's just not probative value to that. So, for those reasons, the court will exclude that evidence. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in excluding evidence of Amy's civil suit. In defendant's view, evidence of that lawsuit provided a relevant basis upon which to attack [Amy's] credibility. (Evid Code, § 780.) [15] Defendant contends that he was entitled to expose the biases or motives to lie that may have been held by the witnesses who testified against him, and that the trial court's ruling infringed upon his rights to a fair trial, to counsel, to confront the witnesses against him, to due process of law, and to a reliable verdict under the United States and California Constitutions. Defendant's position regarding the probative value of evidence concerning Amy's civil suit has evolved during this litigation. At trial, defendant sought to introduce the evidence to highlight the Character of sheriffs department officers and, subsequently, to impeach their testimony and that of Amy. On appeal, however, defendant contends, among other things, that the evidence would have informed the jury that the Sheriffs Department itself suspected [Amy] of. involvement in the murder of Diane Harper. To the extent that defendant's assertion of evidentiary error rests upon a theory of admissibility not presented to the trial court, we conclude that defendant has waived this claim. In any event, defendant's contentions do not withstand scrutiny. Assuming, without deciding, that evidence of Amy's civil suit satisfied the definition of relevancy set forth in Evidence Code section 210, [16] we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. In basing its ruling upon the principles set forth in the latter statute, the trial court accepted defendant's contention  at least, for purposes of argument  that the proffered evidence had some relevance. As noted, the trial court thereafter concluded that Amy's civil suit had only minimal probative value, and that such value was substantially outweighed by the probability that presentation of the evidence would require the undue consumption of time and would create a substantial risk of confusing the issues and misleading the jurors. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. When an objection to evidence is raised under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court is required to weigh the evidence's probative value against the dangers of prejudice, confusion, and undue time consumption. Unless these dangers `substantially outweigh' probative value, the objection must be overruled. (See People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 688, 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253.) On appeal, the ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 973, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.) ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) Here, the trial court properly could conclude the circumstance that Amy filed a civil suit against the Riverside County Sheriffs Department was of attenuated significance to the issues contested at trial, particularly inasmuch as the observations of sheriffs deputies that were material to the present case were set forth to a great extent in reports prepared well before Amy filed her civil suit, and because the deputies' observations and recollections could be tested on cross-examination on the basis of those reports. Further, the trial court properly could determine that the admission of evidence of Amy's civil suit would have permitted the focus of the testimony to shift away from the events leading to and involving the charged offenses, to the conduct of law enforcement officers after those offenses had been committed. The trial court acted within its discretion in determining that such a shift presented a substantial risk of confusing or misleading the jury. Nor do we find any constitutional infirmity in the trial court's ruling. The court merely exercised its discretionary power to preclude examination on collateral matters. (See Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674.) Finally, even if we were to assume that the trial court erred in excluding this evidence, reversal would not be warranted. Defendant's involvement in the murder of Diane Harper and the sexual assault of Amy was firmly established. His defense focused upon the nature of the sexual misconduct committed at the crime scene. Hence, under any prejudicial error standard, the asserted error was harmless. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1125, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.)