Opinion ID: 2457797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Questioning the dissenting juror

Text: Saletta contends that the district court erred by allowing the dissenting juror to be questioned during an evidentiary hearing because the questions constituted an undue intrusion into the exclusive deliberative province of the jury. We agree. NRS 175.531 only provides two options for addressing a non-unanimous jury poll: the jury may be directed to retire for further deliberation or may be discharged. Nothing in this statute permits the district court to ask dissenting jurors why they disagree with the published verdict. We agree with the Ninth Circuit and other courts that such questioning constitutes an undue intrusion into the exclusive province of the jury to reach a verdict and exerts pressure on [the dissenting] juror to abandon his own view and conform his vote to the verdict as announced. United States v. Nelson, 692 F.2d 83, 85 (9th Cir.1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Edwards, 469 F.2d 1362, 1367 (5th Cir.1972) ([W]here a poll indicates a lack of unanimity the trial court must refrain from attempting to extract unanimity by questioning from the bench and must either order the jury to retire for further deliberations or dismiss them.); United States v. Sexton, 456 F.2d 961, 966-67 (5th Cir.1972) (It is both unwise and undesirable that the Court should enter into an argument with the juror or require an explanation of his change of position. To an even greater degree is it improper to allow counsel to interpose and question the reasons or motives of the juror in changing his mind. (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1181 (D.C.Cir.1971) (stating that a trial court invades the province of the jury and dilutes the requirement for a unanimous verdict when its efforts to obtain a jury verdict reach a point where a single juror may have been coerced into surrendering conscientiously entertained views). Accordingly, we hold that NRS 175.531 prohibits the district court from questioning jurors regarding their reasons for dissenting from the published verdict. [4] Saletta's motion for a mistrial did not preserve this issue for review because the basis for his motion was the seventh juror's testimony and not the fact that she was questioned regarding her reasons for dissenting. See Pantano v. State, 122 Nev. 782, 795 & n. 28, 138 P.3d 477, 485 & n. 28 (2006). Nonetheless, we conclude that the district court erred by conducting the evidentiary hearing; the error was plain under existing law because an evidentiary hearing is not a permissible option under NRS 175.531; and the error affected Saletta's substantial rights by culminating in a coercive intrusion into the exclusive province of the jury, which had the effect of depriving Saletta of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Bishop v. State, 92 Nev. 510, 515 n. 2, 554 P.2d 266, 270 n. 2 (1976). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction.