Opinion ID: 671866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counts One and Ten of the Doucette Indictment

Text: 8 The district court did not err in trying counts one and ten of the Doucette indictment with the other counts against Doucette. The charges were related to each other. That Doucette lied to obtain a promotion is evidence of her desperation to be transferred. The false information in the credit application is evidence of Doucette's attempt to hide the proceeds of her illicit activity. Moreover, Doucette has failed to show any prejudice resulting from joinder. She admitted to the offenses charged in counts one and ten, and the evidence against her on the other counts was strong. Doucette's acquittal on one of the fraud charges convinces us that there was no undue spillover effect in this case. See Baker, 10 F.3d at 1387. 9 The district court did err, however, in joining counts one and ten of the Doucette indictment with the charges against Hubbard. Although defendants may be joined even if each defendant has not participated in all charged offenses, there must be some logical relationship before joinder is permitted under Rule 8(b). E.g., United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 550-51 (9th Cir.1989). Doucette's misuse of a social security number and her false statement are entirely unrelated to the fraud charged against Hubbard, and Kelli Bagley, the crucial link supporting joinder of the other offenses, was not involved in counts one and ten. 10 Because we have concluded that there was misjoinder, we must determine whether that error was harmless. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1985). We conclude that it was for the same reasons that joinder of the other offenses was not prejudicial. The evidence against Hubbard was strong, the jury was carefully instructed, and the acquittal of Hubbard on one count indicates that the jury properly performed its function.