Opinion ID: 2368151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Intervening Legislation & Remand

Text: Grasslands contends that the CSA erred by failing to remand this case to the Commission in light of the County's enactment of the Conformity Ordinance and the Emergency Service Ordinance. Indeed, it asserts, the CSA erred in failing to consider these ordinances altogether. Grasslands's focus is principally on the Conformity Ordinance, which now requires the Commission, when approving a site plan or a subdivision, to find[] that the development conforms to the visions, objectives, and policies of the Comprehensive Plan. QACC § 18-1-138.1. Citing Trail v. Terrapin Run, LLC, 403 Md. 523, 527 n. 5, 943 A.2d 1192, 1194-95 n. 5 (2008), Grasslands asserts that the County, by enacting this ordinance, intended to elevate its Comprehensive Plan `by mandates of compliance' to the level of an enforceable `regulatory device.' (Emphasis omitted.) In other words, Grasslands maintains that the County has now imposed on the Commission a stricter standard of compliance with the County's Comprehensive Plan when approving a subdivision than was in effect at the time it approved Frizz-King's proposed subdivision. Additionally, relying on Layton v. Howard County Board of Appeals, 399 Md. 36, 70, 922 A.2d 576, 596 (2007), Grasslands asserts that this is a `substantive change in relevant statutory law' that has taken `place during the course of the litigation of a land use or zoning issue [that] shall be retroactively applied by appellate courts.' Frizz-King responds that the Conformity Ordinance constitutes a change in procedure only, and that procedural changes are not applied retrospectively in land use or zoning cases. It maintains that, under this principle, the Commission need not apply the Conformity Ordinance on remand. In deciding this question, we first examine the law on retrospective application of legislative enactments. We reviewed this subject in Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 406, 754 A.2d 389, 394 (2000): The retroactive or retrospective application of a legislative enactment has been defined in 2 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, § 41.01, at 337 (5th ed. 1993): The terms `retroactive' and `retrospective' are synonymous in judicial usage and may be employed interchangeably. They describe acts which operate on transactions which have occurred or rights and obligations which existed before passage of the act. (Footnote omitted.) Concerning the retroactive application of a statute, we noted in Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 607, 471 A.2d 730, 733 (1984): There is no absolute prohibition against retroactive application of a statute. [ State Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecom Div., 278 Md. 120, 123, 360 A.2d 1, 4 (1976).] The question whether a statute operates retrospectively, or prospectively only, ordinarily is one of legislative intent. In determining such intent this Court has repeatedly stated, there is a general presumption in the law that an enactment is intended to have purely prospective effect. In the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, a statute is not given retrospective effect. Traore v. State, 290 Md. 585, 593, 431 A.2d 96, 100 (1981). Unlike the Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance addressed in footnote six, neither of the ordinances at issue contains an express statement of legislative intent about whether they are to operate retrospectively or prospectively. The Emergency Service Ordinance purpose clause states that in connection with the approval of new residential and commercial development, the ... Commission should consider the impact of such development ... and should be authorized to require ... that any negative effects of new development on the provision of emergency services be offset and mitigated[.] Frizz-King would have us draw from this an intent to apply this ordinance prospectively because of its reference to new residential and commercial development. This new ordinance, it argues, does not apply to The Highlands because the Commission approved it before the ordinance's adoption. We do not agree with Frizz-King. This reference to new residential development does not exclude a proposed development that has received the Commission's approval but is in litigation. Indeed, the ordinance's Fiscal Impact Note states that its purpose is to prevent or modify proposed development that may adversely affect the public welfare[.] (Emphasis added.) An approval is not finally valid until all litigation concerning the approval is final. See Powell v. Calvert County, 368 Md. 400, 410, 795 A.2d 96, 101 (2002)(stating that a special exception approval, whose validity is being litigated, is not finally valid until all litigation concerning the special exception is final). Without any clear expression of legislative intent to inform our analysis, we proceed by addressing the common law presumption against retroactive application set forth in Langston. Not surprisingly, there are exceptions to this presumption, one involving procedural changes: One such category of exceptions concerns legislative enactments that apply to procedural changes. See Roth v. Dimensions Health Corp., 332 Md. 627, 636, 632 A.2d 1170, 1174 (1993) (Notwithstanding this presumption [against retroactivity], if the statute `contains a clear expression of intent that it operate retrospectively, or the statute affects only procedures or remedies, it will be given retroactive application.'); Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 219-20, 522 A.2d 1344, 1346 (1987) (Despite the presumption of prospectivity, a statute effecting a change in procedure only, and not in substantive rights, ordinarily applies to all actions whether accrued, pending or future, unless a contrary intention is expressed....)[.] Langston, 359 Md. at 406-07, 754 A.2d at 394 (some internal citations omitted). Another exception is for remedial enactments that do not impair vested rights. Id. at 408, 754 A.2d at 395. `Generally, remedial statutes are those which provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries.' Id. (quoting 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, § 60.02, at 152). The exception most pertinent to this case is the general presumption in favor of retroactivity in zoning and land use cases. See Layton, 399 Md. at 70, 922 A.2d at 596; Armstrong v. Mayor & City Council, 409 Md. 648, 976 A.2d. 349 (2009). The petitioners in Layton sought a special exception to operate a primate sanctuary in Howard County, which was denied by the Board of Appeals. After the petitioners sought judicial review, the County amended its Code, changing the definition upon which the Board relied in making its zoning decision. [9] Both the Circuit Court and the CSA affirmed the Board's decision, but we reversed, concluding that under Yorkdale Corporation v. Powell, 237 Md. 121, 205 A.2d 269 (1964), [10] the petitioners were entitled to retroactive application of the legislated change of pertinent law, which occur[ed] during the ongoing litigation of a land use or zoning case[.] Layton, 399 Md. at 38, 922 A.2d at 577. We then directed the Board to apply the current law on remand. Id. at 70, 922 A.2d at 596. In applying the Yorkdale rule, we considered the Yorkdale Court's following explanation for retrospective application of new enactments in zoning cases: [A] change in the law after a decision below and before final decision by the appellate Court will be applied by that Court unless vested or accrued substantive rights would be disturbed or unless the legislature shows a contrary intent[.]    [A]n applicant for rezoning to a more intense use of his property, who has been successful before the zoning authorities and the circuit court does not acquire a vested or substantive right which may not be wiped out by legislation which takes effect during the pendency in this Court of the appeal from the actions below. Id. at 54-55, 922 A.2d at 586-87 (quoting Yorkdale, 237 Md. at 124, 126, 205 A.2d at 271, 272) (citations omitted). Noting that we have affirmed this principle in a number of subsequent land use and zoning cases, we concluded that  Yorkdale and its progeny have never been overruled and are determinative in evaluating whether, in a land use or zoning case, a change in statutory law taking place during the course of a litigated issue should have retrospective application. Id. at 58, 922 A.2d at 589. See also, Armstrong, 409 Md. at 673, 976 A.2d. at 364. In a footnote, however, we indicated that `[a] different rule is applicable to procedural changes' and that [t]he present case concerns changes in reference to the substance of the law. Id. at 58 n. 18, 922 A.2d at 588-89 n. 18. For this proposition, we cited Luxmanor Citizens Ass'n, Inc. v. Burkart, 266 Md. 631, 644-45, 296 A.2d 403 (1972). Id. Relying on this Layton footnote and Luxmanor, Frizz-King argues that the Conformity Ordinance's new requirement that the Commission find[ ] that the development conforms to the visions, objectives, and policies of the Comprehensive Plan is merely a procedural change. This is so, says Frizz-King, because an existing county code provision already required conformity. See QACC § 18:1-161(A)(stating that [a] subdivision layout shall conform the Comprehensive Plan and to the other provisions of this Chapter 18:1). Citing Luxmanor, 266 Md. at 645, 296 A.2d at 410, Frizz-King asserts that the Conformity Ordinance's requirement that the Commission make findings is a change in `procedural machinery' which is construed under Maryland law to operate prospectively on all proceedings instituted after its passage, rather than retrospectively. Upon careful examination of Luxmanor and its progeny, we do not agree with Frizz-King that procedural law changes are always construed to operate prospectively in a land use or zoning case. Rather, we think it depends on the type of procedural modification, and the point in the proceedings at which the legislative change is made. We explain. In Luxmanor, we considered whether the grant of a special exception by a three to two vote of the members of the Montgomery County Board of Appeals was made void by a zoning ordinance amendment that was enacted during the pendency of an appeal to the Circuit Court, and required four affirmative votes for the granting of a special exception. We held that the action of the Board was not made void by the subsequent amendmenta holding based largely on the appellants' failure to raise the impact of the amendatory ordinance in the Circuit Court proceedings. [11] Luxmanor, 266 Md. at 644, 646, 296 A.2d at 410, 411. Despite the non-preservation, we proceeded to discuss a group of cases upon which the appellants relied to support their claim that the Board's decision should be voided because of the new ordinance. Id. at 644-46, 296 A.2d at 410-11 (addressing Dal Maso v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Prince George's County, 264 Md. 691, 288 A.2d 119 (1972); Springloch Area Citizens Group v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 252 Md. 717, 251 A.2d 357 (1969); Janda v. General Motors Corp., 237 Md. 161, 205 A.2d 228 (1964); and Yorkdale, 237 Md. at 121, 205 A.2d at 269). Rejecting this argument, we offered the following problematic reasoning: This Court has decided that a legislative change in the law in regard to procedure, rather than in regard to substance, will be applied to matters and proceedings taking place after the effective date of the change in the law. Id. at 644-45, 296 A.2d at 410. For this proposition, the Court relied primarily on the following language from a 1958 workers' compensation case, Beechwood Coal Company v. Lucas : [W]here the effect of the new statute is not to impair existing substantive rights but only to alter the procedural machinery involved in the enforcement of those rights, such legislation is usually construed as operating on all proceedings instituted after its passage, whether the right accrued before or after that date.    The appellants do not contend that the amendment requiring four affirmative votes for granting a special exception must be applied to a decision made after its enactment, but rather that the ordinance must be applied to invalidate a decision of the Board made some six and one-half months prior to its enactment. Luxmanor, 266 Md. at 644-45, 296 A.2d at 410 (quoting Beechwood Coal Co. v. Lucas, 215 Md. 248, 254, 137 A.2d 680, 683 (1958))(emphasis in original). [12] Our decision in Luxmanor has been cited in dictum for the proposition that procedural changes receive prospective application in zoning cases. See Layton, 399 Md. at 58, 58 n. 18, 922 A.2d at 588-89 n. 18, 589 (discussing Anne Arundel County. v. Maragousis, 268 Md. 131, 299 A.2d 797 (1973) and its remand for reconsideration under the new substantive law while noting from Luxmanor that a different rule is applicable to procedural changes); Powell v. Calvert County, 368 Md. 400, 413-14, 795 A.2d 96, 103-04 (2002)(distinguishing Luxmanor's procedural change from the substantive change in law concerning a special exception); and Maragousis, 268 Md. at 139, 139 n. 3, 299 A.2d at 802, 802 n. 3 (indicating our consistent policy to consider zoning cases on the state of substantive law as it exists when the case is argued while citing Luxmanor for the proposition that [a] different rule is applicable to procedural changes). Frizz-King seeks to capitalize on Luxmanor and this dicta to support its arguments. But upon close examination of all the precedent, which admittedly contains some bothersome loose language, we construe the law as contrary to its position. Luxmanor's dictum quoted above was imprecise and did not accurately reflect the very cases it cited. That imprecision was then repeated as if by rote in the line of cases cited above, but simply in the course of applying substantive zoning or land use enactments, not procedural enactments. Luxmanor's imprecision lay in articulating the rule about legislative changes in procedural laws as if there were a wholesale distinction between modification of a procedural land use law and modification of a substantive land use law. Yet Beechwood Coal the workers' compensation case relied on by the Luxmanor Court does not establish a wholesale rule of prospective application for procedural statutes. Indeed, if anything, it stands for the opposite. [13] Beechwood Coal was a workers' compensation case in which the Legislature amended a statute defining the State Industrial Accident Commission's authority to review findings of the Medical Board. Under the amended statute, the Commission was no longer bound by the findings of the Medical Board which relate to medical matters. The issue was whether the law in effect at the time of the injury or disability is controlling or whether the law as it existed at the time of the hearing before the Medical Board and of the review of the record by the Commission should govern. Beechwood Coal, 215 Md. at 252, 137 A.2d at 682. The appellants sought application of the old statute, claiming a substantive right to the Medical Board's findings. The Beechwood Coal Court relied on, inter alia, Thomas v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 162 Md. 509, 160 A. 793 (1932), in holding that the appellants did not have a vested right to have the Medical Board's findings ... conclusively presumed to be correct under the old provision the Court regarded as procedural. Beechwood Coal, 215 Md. at 255, 257, 137 A.2d at 683-84. In other words, Beechwood Coal held that the amended statute should be applied retrospectively to the appellants' accrued action. The Court analyzed and followed Thomas, recognizing it as a case in which it was proper to give a procedural statute retrospective operation, though the appeal had been entered prior to the amendment's effective date: In Thomas, the Court held that an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Law requiring court review of the Commission's actions to be confined to and based upon the record made before the Commission (or upon a stipulation of facts made by the parties) was applicable, even though the appeal by the claimant from the Commission's action had been entered before the effective date of the amendment and was heard several months after the effective date.... The Court ... held that the provision was merely procedural, and affirmed the action of the lower court in refusing to admit any testimony at the trial from the witnesses whom the claimant had produced to testify in his behalf.... The majority ... held that it was not unconstitutional to give the statute a retrospective operation, stating that it deprives the appellant of no property or rights in an existing contract, and no right of action or ground of recovery. She is not denied the benefit of proof of the facts. The provision is merely procedural [.] Id. at 255-56, 137 A.2d at 683-84 (citations omitted, emphasis added). Thus, neither Beechwood Coal nor Thomas gave succor to the Luxmanor dictum suggesting that procedural enactments in the zoning/land use area must be applied prospectively. Nor is there any hint that Luxmanor actually intended to judicially modify the law as set forth in Beechwood Coal or Thomas. What we learn from our study of these cases is that not only does Frizz-King's theory lack a legal pedigree, but it makes no logical sense. The basic reason we presumptively apply new legislation prospectively is our concern that a retrospective application may interfere with substantive rights. Amecom Div., 278 Md. at 123-24, 360 A.2d at 4. Because procedural changes in most contexts do not affect substantive rights, such legislation is generally excluded from the presumption of prospectivity. See id. at 124, 360 A.2d at 4 (stating that if the statute affects only procedures or remedies, it will be given retroactive application) (citations omitted). We can fathom no sensible reason for drawing a wholesale distinction between new procedural zoning/land use legislation and new substantive zoning/land use legislation, and applying the former more restrictively than other procedural legislation, when we still apply the latter less restrictively than other substantive legislation. See Yorkdale, 237 Md. at 124-26, 205 A.2d at 271-72 (holding that new substantive zoning legislation, such as a change in permitted uses, is applied retrospectively). Accordingly, we do not accept Frizz-King's invitation to resolve this case by drawing a wholesale distinction between procedural and substantive changes in zoning/land use law, and then classifying the Conformity Ordinance as procedural, which would lead us to the inevitable conclusion that it must be applied prospectively only. We believe the analysis is slightly more complex, i.e., if the new law is procedural, the decision about retroactivity will turn on what aspect of the administrative/adjudication process is changed, [14] at what point in the administrative/adjudication process the change is made, and the question presented to the reviewing court. Because we see the procedural vs. substantive debate about the Conformity Law as uncomfortably close to call, we choose to resolve this case by assuming, without deciding, that it is procedural, and then performing the appropriate analysis. We are dealing with an administrative decision made before enactment of the new legislation, but one which we void for reasons other than the new legislation, i.e., error in applying the burden of proof. Thus, this case differs from Luxmanor, in which only the procedural change in law triggered the retroactivity analysis. This difference is significant because in Luxmanor, we were looking backwards to see if an earlier administrative proceeding should be re-done for the sole purpose of applying the new procedural law. Here, because we remand to the Board for a new hearing due to the burden of proof issue, we look forwardto decide what should occur in the future, as the proceedings recommence. This Luxmanor difference in vantage point merits a different rule because we should not duplicate expenditure of the parties' and administrative agency's resources for a new hearing simply to apply a new rule, that is arguably procedural, when the hearing was done correctly in the first place.