Opinion ID: 2092304
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prior similar action

Text: Defendant next claims that the failure of the trial court, in the absence of request, to give the jury a limiting instruction on the admission of two exhibits, a pill bottle containing lye pills and wrapper, that tended to indicate defendant made a prior attempt on the life of deceased, was reversible error. Defendant's argument has two separate parts. First defendant argues that as motive and intent were not in issue, it was error to introduce evidence of prior acts under MCLA 768.27; MSA 28.1050 [1] to show defendant's motive or intent. The second branch of the argument is that even if the evidence was admissible, the trial judge erred, even in the absence of request, in not instructing the jury as to the limited purpose for which such evidence was admissible.
At the time of trial, the prosecutor offered as evidence Exhibits 14 and 15, being respectively a pill bottle labeled as tranquilizers though containing a caustic substance [2] which had been transmitted through the mail to the deceased, and a piece of wrapping paper found on the shelf with the bottle which was on the bottle at the time it was received. [3] The defendant raised objection to the admission of this evidence. The prosecution claimed that the evidence was to show intent, plan, and design. The trial judge ruled that it was admissible under the statute having to do with defendant's mode of intent in the absence of mistake or accident. Over further objection of defendant, the expert witnesses for the prosecution testified that in their opinion the handwriting on the pill wrapper and the package wrapper that the bomb was delivered in was the defendant's. [4] The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. They stated: It would seem to be reasonable under the statute to show, by previous acts, that defendant intended or planned to kill the deceased by sending some form of harmful article to her through the mail. 32 Mich App 610, 625-626. The crux of defendant's argument was that since, admittedly, whoever sent the pills through the mail intended to do so, that no evidence to prove intention or motive was admissible. The trial court reasoned that to allow a defendant to admit intent on the part of some party (not defendant) and thus be able to bar the evidence would make the statute rather nonsensical. The trial judge's conclusion has support in Michigan case law. In People v Neaton, 294 Mich 134, 142; 292 NW 589 (1940) this Court held: By the great weight of authority, the prosecuting attorney was not precluded from introducing evidence in the regular way to establish all the material facts and circumstances set forth in the information, and he is not precluded from so doing by any admissions made by defendant or his attorney. Defendant by making bald admissions that someone intended to do the act could not shut out evidence by the prosecution that tended to show that defendant was the one who intended to do the act. Intent was in issue. Murder involves intent. People v Giacalone, 242 Mich 16; 217 NW 758 (1928). It was a material and relevant element in the instant case. Thus the cases cited by defendant are inapposite. The general proposition that the motive or intent of the defendant may be shown by prior acts, even though these acts would constitute commission of another crime is supported by numerous cases. [5] The testimony of the handwriting experts linked defendant with the poison pills. That is, it was defendant's act in sending the pills. This act was then admissible to show the intent to murder. We hold that the trial judge did not err in allowing the pill bottle and wrapper into evidence for the purposes of establishing defendant's intention of doing away with the deceased.
Defendant claims that even if this evidence was admissible, it was reversible error for the trial judge not to limit its purpose and use, in the minds of the jury, to the question of intent. However, defendant never requested a cautionary instruction, nor did he object to the instructions as given. He claims, nevertheless, that it was the duty of the trial judge to give a limiting instruction even in the absence of a request. He cites the dicta of Judge O'HARA in People v Kelly, 26 Mich App 148; 182 NW2d 8 (1970). [6] Our Court of Appeals has split on this issue even after the definitive Supreme Court ruling in People v Nawrocki, 376 Mich 252; 136 NW2d 922 (1965). See People v Harper, 39 Mich App 134, 137; 197 NW2d 338 (1972). [7] Kelly held that while it may be preferable for the trial judge to give an instruction at the time of the introduction of the evidence there is no reversible error if the judge includes such an instruction in the final charge. [8] But Nawrocki goes even further and holds that the trial judge is not required to give any limiting instruction sua sponte. Here no instruction was ever requested by defendant nor did he offer objection to the final charge to the jury. As a result, no cautionary instruction was ever given. We hold that in the absence of request or proper objection under present Michigan case law, there is no absolute requirement that the trial judge give limiting instructions, even though such an instruction should have been given. Therefore failure to instruct in this case where there was no request for such instruction and no objection to the failure to instruct was not reversible error.