Opinion ID: 1888436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was appellate counsel ineffective for failing to adequately raise the issue of whether the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct?

Text: Appellant contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising on appeal a claim that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during the trial. First, Appellant asserts that the prosecutor misled the trial court when he advised the court that the medical examiner Dr. Park was not available to testify because he was out of the country and would not return for two weeks. N.T. 1/26/93, 3-4. [45] According to Appellant, to the extent that the remark implied that Dr. Park was completely unavailable to testify at Appellant's trial, it was misleading because Dr. Park did not depart the United States until several days after trial began and conceivably could have testified before he left. Appellant's Brief, 48-49. Appellant claims he was prejudiced by the misrepresentation because Dr. Hood, who testified in Dr. Park's stead, destroyed [Appellant's] defense and left the jury with a biased and factually incorrect understanding of the forensic evidence. Appellant's Brief, 49. Appellant also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing on appeal that several comments made by the prosecutor during his closing speech to the jury disparaged trial counsel, misstated the law, and were beyond the evidence, and thus deprived Appellant of a fair trial. Appellant's Brief, 49-52. Appellant's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing on appeal that the prosecutor misled the trial court by stating that Dr. Park was out of the country and not available to testify entitles him to no relief because the claim was not raised in his PCRA petition. Thus, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), Appellant is not entitled to review of this claim because it was raised for the first time in this appeal. Appellant's assertion that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct in his closing speech to the jury during the guilt-phase of the trial involves three separate subclaims. First, Appellant alleges that direct appeal counsel should have complained that the prosecutor deprived Appellant of a fair trial by making comments that disparaged and demeaned Appellant's trial counsel personally and his defense strategy. [46] Appellant's Brief, 50-51. Second, Appellant contends that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the parties' respective burdens of proof. According to Appellant, the prosecutor placed the burden of proof upon Appellant by arguing that in order to accept Appellant's defense, the jury had to believe everything the defense presented at trial. [47] Appellant's Brief, 51. Third, Appellant alleges that direct appeal counsel should have raised issues asserting that the prosecutor presented arguments that went well beyond the evidence presented, encouraging the jury to consider inflammatory and irrelevant matters. Id. at 52. Specifically, he complains that direct appeal counsel should have claimed that the prosecutor's extensive remarks on Appellant's drug use and the effect illicit drugs have on society turned the trial into a plebiscite on drugs and drug dealers and their destructive effect on society. Id. [48] Appellant also argues that the prosecutor implied that Appellant was associated with the Junior Black Mafia (JBM), a notorious drug gang, in the absence of evidence Appellant had an association with the JBM or that the JBM had any connection to the case. Appellant further asserts that the prosecutor engaged in rank speculation when he argued that Ronald Williams denied having given police a statement inculpating Appellant because he disliked the prosecution and hoped to curry favor with fellow inmates. Finally, Appellant asserts that the prosecutor misstated the evidence by contending that Ms. Grant was scared to death to testify and by making reference to a witness who did not testify. Id. [49] The Commonwealth submits that these claims do not entitle Appellant to relief for various reasons. First, the Commonwealth contends that the claims were not preserved and were waived. Even if not waived, the Commonwealth argues that these claims have either been litigated previously or are meritless and thus direct appeal counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them on direct appeal. Commonwealth's Brief, 69-70. Specifically, with respect to Appellant's claim that the prosecutor deprived him of a fair trial by disparaging trial counsel and his defense strategy, the Commonwealth asserts that no relief is due because appellate counsel raised this claim on direct appeal and it was denied. See Fletcher I, 750 A.2d at 272-73. Thus, the Commonwealth argues that this claim is not cognizable because it was litigated previously and cannot be litigated anew in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. งง 9543(a)(3) and 9544(a). Commonwealth's Brief, 71. The Commonwealth also contends that direct appeal counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert on appeal that the prosecutor misstated the law or shifted the burden of proof in his comments on the defense presented by Appellant because the remarks merely discussed the relevant evidence of guilt, properly responded to defense attacks on the Commonwealth's evidence, and were well within the scope of acceptable oratorical flair. Id. at 72. The Commonwealth further argues that even if the remarks could be inferred to have shifted the burden of proof to Appellant, the trial court instructed the jury that Appellant was presumed innocent and that the burden of proof rested solely on the Commonwealth. Id. The Commonwealth next argues that direct appeal counsel was not ineffective for not complaining on appeal about the prosecutor's references to drugs in general and his assertion that Appellant used drugs because such comments were relevant to motive and were made in response to closing comments made by trial counsel, who argued to the jury that the Commonwealth's witnesses were unworthy of belief because they were drug addicts. Id. at 72-73. In addition, the Commonwealth notes that direct appeal counsel unsuccessfully argued on appeal that the prosecutor prejudiced Appellant by arguing that the evidence that Appellant was a drug dealer was overwhelming and that the Commonwealth's witnesses were not throw away people because they used drugs. See Fletcher I, 750 A.2d at 273. The Commonwealth further asserts that there is no merit to Appellant's claim that direct appeal counsel should have challenged the propriety of the prosecutor's reference to the JBM because the record shows that the reference was fleeting, did not associate Appellant with the JBM, and was intended to explain why Robert Skeet Williams may have disavowed his statement to police while testifying. Commonwealth's Brief, 73. The Commonwealth also argues that direct appeal counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue on appeal that the prosecutor's argument that Ms. Grant was scared to testify was improper because there was testimony presented at trial that she was afraid and scared to testify. Id. In addition, the Commonwealth contends that direct appeal counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by not raising a claim asserting that the prosecutor impermissibly referred to witnesses who did not testify; the witnesses did testify during the trial. Id. Finally, the Commonwealth asserts that even if the prosecutor did step outside the record, the remarks were not so unduly prejudicial as to deprive Appellant of a fair trial and that they constituted fair inferences from the evidence. Moreover, the Commonwealth submits that any prejudice was cured by instructions the trial court gave to the jury advising that counsels' arguments were not evidence and that its own recollection of the evidence controlled. Id. at 74. Appellant is not entitled to relief on these claims for myriad reasons. First, direct appeal counsel cannot be deemed ineffective with respect to comments he did indeed challenge on direct appeal, specifically: the comments denigrating trial counsel personally; those criticizing trial counsel's defense strategy; and those commenting on Appellant's personal involvement with drugs and those about drugs in general. Appellant's allegations of ineffectiveness are facially meritless in light of the fact that direct appeal counsel raised these claims on direct appeal and in the absence of any argument regarding appellate counsel's performance related to his advocacy of these raised claims. Fletcher I, 750 A.2d at 273. Next, Appellant is entitled to no relief on those comments concerning: the JBM; Ronald Williams's reasons for not cooperating with the Commonwealth; the purported improper shifting of the burden of proof; the fact that Ms. Grant was scared to testify; and a witness who allegedly did not testify, because these claims were not raised and preserved in a post-verdict motion either directly or in the context of an ineffectiveness claim. Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise claims that were defaulted below. We therefore deny Appellant relief with respect to this claim.