Opinion ID: 2084834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Neglect Occurring in New York

Text: Since it is undisputed that the children are domiciled in New York, the sole question before this Court concerns the locus requirement that the neglect occur in New York to assert personal jurisdiction over the mother. [5] The majority erroneously divides this inquiry into a two-step process. First, the majority finds that the mother's efforts to gain custody of her children through the Florida court may constitute neglect due to her disregard for her children's special vulnerabilities. Second, rather than examine whether such neglect occurred in New York to satisfy the long-arm jurisdictional requirements of the Family Court Act, the majority finds that jurisdiction may be obtained over the mother based upon two separate events: (1) the mother's efforts to defend and enforce her court ordered rights of parental visitation in litigation brought against her in New York; and (2) the enlistment of a New York police officer to help enforce the same rights. Contrary to the reasoning of the majority, these events, taken individually or together, are insufficient evidence of neglect occurring in New York to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the mother. It should be noted that the instance where the mother was involved in litigation to defend her parental rights was not included in the petition  nor was it cited to Family Court during oral argument  as an allegation of neglect . In fact, the petition makes no reference at all to the mother's efforts to defend or enforce her parental rights through the courts of Florida or New York. The mother's defensive litigation efforts in New York do not justify long-arm jurisdiction. Although the majority states that the [u]se of the New York courts is a traditional justification for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident (majority opn, at 319) such reasoning has heretofore only been applicable to the initiation and prosecution of New York claims ( Kazlow & Kazlow v Goodman & Co. , 92 Misc 2d 1084, 1085) and not in the context of defensive litigation efforts based upon an absence of jurisdictional elements. Notably, we have unanimously affirmed the dismissal of the prior action for lack of jurisdiction ( Matter of Mott v Patricia Ann R. , 91 N.Y.2d 856, supra ). Most troubling is the majority's conclusion that the mother's efforts to defend her parental rights through the court system of New York qualifies as neglect occurring in this State. Apparently, the only option available to the mother was to sit back and do nothing in the prior proceeding. It is by defending her parental rights that she neglected her children which, in turn, provides the basis for a subsequent protective proceeding and sufficient minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction in that proceeding. Contrary to the majority's assertion, the record is barren of evidence that the mother ever threaten[ed] the children with the ultimate sanction of forced immediate relocation to Florida in her sole custody. (Majority opn, at 317.) Rather, it is the ruling of the Florida court requiring the children's relocation to Florida which has caused the alleged neglect of the children as manifested by their apprehension of relocating. Moreover, under no reasoning may the mother be said to have disregarded counseling recommendations to the detriment of her children by defending rights in a New York proceeding which occurred prior to the issuance of such recommendations. The majority opines that a responsible adult would have ignored her visitation rights, allowed her ex-husband to impede her efforts at building a relationship with her children and, instead, would have taken a gradual approach by initially seeking, short, supervised visits, coupled with family counseling for all of the principals (majority opn, at 317). The majority seemingly forgets that each time the Florida court cited the father for contempt, the court ordered just such counseling and visitation which the father repeatedly disregarded. Simply, there is no support for the majority's conclusion that the mother's defensive litigation may constitute an act of neglect occurring in this State. It is difficult to fathom how a mother's efforts to legally protect her parental rights by going to court could ever constitute neglect. Rather, the mother's legal and ordinarily permissible attempts to enforce court orders and defend her parental rights are the antithesis of neglect and clearly represent a minimum degree of care. The majority's ruling means that every action involving children (e.g., divorce) may provide a basis for a subsequent protective proceeding solely because the litigation itself was an example of neglect. The majority understandably seeks to limit its holding to cases involving children with special vulnerabilities which might restrict parental behavior which would otherwise be unquestionably lawful (majority opn, at 316, 317). In such cases, the majority holds that a parent does not have the legal right to exercise the legal rights he or she has. Such reasoning is unsupportable here where the mother had no other legal recourse in the face of her ex-husband's illegal actions. The sole allegation of neglect contained in the petition which actually occurred in New York concerns the mother's visit in December 1995. The mother was legally entitled to the visit and the fact that she was accompanied by a police officer due to her husband's threats to have her arrested if she attempted to see her children does not constitute purposeful activity directed at this State. Indeed, as advocated by the majority, such a familial visit in the children's primary home setting is precisely the type of gradual course that a responsible parent would have pursued to reestablish visitation  which had been extralegally impeded in the first instance. The record lacks any evidence that the mother disregarded her children's well-being by attempting the visit or that she had any notice that the visit would harm her children. This single allegation is certainly insufficient to sustain the majority's unprecedented ruling in derogation of constitutional due process.