Opinion ID: 2831057
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 3d 753, 760(Pa. 2014)(citation omitted).

Text: 48. To the extent that this case presents a question of law, such as the requirement of a hearing, the Courts standard ofreview is de novo and the scope ofreview is plenary. ld. 49. The Supervising•Judge abused his discretion because the protective order violates the state and federal due process rights of the Penrisylvania Attorney General, hundreds of OAG employees, and innumerable people not affiliated with OAG. 50. In the words ofthis Honorable Court: The due process clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions embodÿ the principle offundamental fairness, entitling everÿ individual to be free from arbitrarÿ or oppressive government conduct. This Court has found that the guarantees associated with the due process clause of the federal constitution are generally coextensive with those under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. Wallace, 97 A.3d 310, 320(Pa. 2014)(citations omitted)(emphasis added). 5 1. The essential elements of due process of law are notice and opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause. Fiore v. Com., Bd. ofFinance and Revenue, 633 A.2d 111 1, 1114(Pa. 1993). 52. As a matter of fundamental procedural due process, an individual may not be deprived of a constitutionally protected interest without a hearing, and a hearing requires notice and an opportunity to be heard; it follows that the opportunity to be heard must be at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 838 A.2d 710, 714(Pa. 2003). 11 53. OAG was not provided with prior notice that there had been an allegation of misconduct and/or request for issuance of a protective order in connection with the Special Prosecutor s investigation. 54. Although the protective order purports to apply to any person who has been swom to grand jury secrecy, has or had access to any grand jury information, and/or is associated with the J. Whyatt Mondesire proceedings and investigation, notice of this protective order was provided afier thefact and only to the governmental agency OAG. 55. The order proscribes behavior and threatens criminal sanctions upon countless unidentified individuals both within and without OAG, yet not a single one of them has been served with notice of the order.1° 56. The protective order was conceived and initially filed in a remarkably partisan fashion, the product of a one-sided in camera, ex parle proceeding that deprived those who were targeted and eventually subjected to the order of any opportunity to address the allegations that provoked the Supervising Judge to enter the order. 57. Rather than fully develop a factual record in a disinterested and even-handed fashion, the Supervising Judge inexplicably accepted the covert allegations of OAGs accusers at face value. 10 There is no reasonable basis for concluding that every person encompassed by the protective order is likely to engage in intimidating activity or retaliatory conduct based on testimony before the Grand Jury, especially since (a) the vast majority of OAG employees have no contact with the Grand Jury and would be completely unaware of the Special Prosecutors investigation,(b) eveh among those employees who have contact with the Grand Jury, most would be completely unaware of the Special Prosecutors investigation (as just one example, it is difficult to imagine that a Medicaid Fraud investigator in Pittsburgh would have any knowledge of, or interest in, a leak investigation involving the Norristown Grand Jury), and (c) there have been no reports of any contact with witnesses apart from the two incidents involving OAG agents discussed infra. 12 58. Although the Supervising Judge subsequently acquiesced to OAGs request for a hearing after the fact, the process eventually afforded to OAG was hollow and meaningless. 59. As recounted supra, OAG was prohibited from accessing the transcript of the initial ex parte proceeding and was denied knowledge of the specific factual allegations which formed the basis for the protective order. 60. The deprivation of this information by the Supervising Judge prevented OAG from proceeding in any meaningful way: it had no way of determining precisely what allegations had been leveled, whether rebuttal was necessary, and if so what witnesses to call and what questions to ask. 61. In addition, the Supervising Judge: (a) precluded OAG from calling the purported victims/accusers as witnesses and probing the nature, veracity, and credibility of their claims; and (b) rejected OAGs attempt to subpoena and question a journalist with first-hand personal knowledge directly relevant and probative to an apparent allegation of witness intimidation. 62. The Supervising Judge denied OAG, its employees, and the others affected a constitutionally adequate hearing on the subject ofthe protective order. 63. To date, OAG is still unaware of the precise nature of any allegation of misconduct giving rise to the issuance of the protective order, and has been left to speculate in that regard. OAG is aware generally of: (a) an allegation that two agents behaved in an inappropriate manner towards Fina and Costanzo at the OAGs grandjury suite on August 26, 2014; and (b)an allegation that recent Right to Know Act submissions by the press to OAG are linked to the Special Prosecutors investigation. The former appears to be a basis for the protective order because the order was issued the day after Fina and Costanzo appeared, i.e. August 27, 2014. The latter appears to be a basis for the protective order because the Supervising Judge alludes to it in his October 30, 2014 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See Exhibit A. Any such contact between the witnesses and the agents cannot reasonably constitute intimidation given that OAG agents work on the premises where the grand suite is located and because both jury 13 64. The foregoing constitutes the kind of arbitrary or oppressive government conduct that is prohibited by the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. See Wallace, 97 A.3d at 320. 65. The order itself is intolerably vague: OAG employees and others are prohibited from engaging in obstruction, intimidation, and retaliation in connection with the Special Prosecutors investigation, but because the nature of that investigation is entirely secret, the terms obstruction, intimidation, and retaliation exist in a vacuum that renders them utterly cryptic. 66. The order supplies no discernable context for its prohibition; without such context, a person subject to the order cannot know what action might constitute an infraction. 67. Such an order violates the notion of fundamental faimess in which our system of justice is deeply rooted. See Commonwealth v. Burno, 94 A.3d 956, 966(Pa. 2014). 68. The order also infringes on the First Amendment rights of all affected. 69. An order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate...the order must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case. Carroll v. President and Com rs ofPrincess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968). Attorney Fina and Attorney Costanzo are career prosecutors who have worked with, directed, and supervised OAG agents on many occasions. The protective order constitutes an abuse of discretion because any conduct of the agents cannot reasonably be construed as an act of intimidation, obstruction, or retaliation. Moreover, the conduct of the agents cannot reasonably be attributed to every employee of OAG. The Protective Order also constitutes an abuse of discretion because there is no evidence that the agents supervisors were aware that they would engage in intimidation, obstruction, or retaliation, or that they had engaged in such conduct in the past, and so the conduct ofthe agents cannot reasonably be attributed to OAG as a whole. 14 70. The Supervising Judges protective order sweeps broadly and appears to encompass speech relating to any person, subject, or event associated with the Special Prosecutor s investigation. 71. The Supervising Judge has apparently banned communication both within and without OAG regarding Fina, Costanzo, the J. Whyatt Mondesire proceedings, and other unknown and unknowable matters relating to the investigation. 72. Because only the Supervising Judge and Special Prosecutor know the nature of the investigation, the persons subject to the protective order must curtail virta11y all speech out of fear that they will unwittingly commit a violation. 73. The protective order constitutes an abuse of discretion because the scope of the order, in terms of both the persons subject to the order and the conduct covered by the order, is far broader than necessary to protect any witness before the Grand Jury. 74. Finally, the protective order violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine of our federal and state constitutions because it improperly infringes on OAGs ability to fulfill its constitutional law enforcement mandate. 75. By way of illustration only, to the extent that perjury or obstruction of the administration of law has been committed by witnesses or others in connection with the Special Prosecutors investigation, the order purports to render OAG powerless to investigate and prosecute those responsible. 76. To the extent that grand jury material has been leaked to the public from the Special Prosecutors investigation in violation of grand jury secrecy rules, the order purports to constrain OAG from investigating and prosecuting those responsible. 15 77. To the extent that witnesses in the Special Investigation may have committed crimes or other misconduct unrelated 10 Notice 123, the order purports to eliminate OAG s power to investigate andprosecute. 78. Finally, the Protective Order constitutes an abuse of discretion because persons who violate the Order are subjected to the jurisdiction of the Court for purposes of a prosecution under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4955, which permits, inter alia, prosecution for other, substantive offenses and for contempt of court, and allows for a warrantless arrest, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4955(a)(1), (a)(2), (b), and there is no substantial evidence supporting the exercise of such jurisdiction. STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 79. OAG requests this Court to enter an Order granting this Petition for Review and vacating the Orders entered by the Supervising Judge of the Thirty-Fifth Statewide Investigating Grand •Jury on August 27, 2014, September 17, 2014, and October 30, 2014. 16