Opinion ID: 1241212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: burden of proof in section 232 proceedings

Text: (1a) Appellants, contending that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in section 232 proceedings, thereby raise the central issue in the case. They stress that parenting is a fundamental right, that a section 232 proceeding involves a significant deprivation of liberty invoking the due process clause, and that, because of the liberty interest involved and the stigma attached to both parent and child when the parent-child relationship is severed, due process requires the state to meet the highest burden of proof before parental rights may be terminated. Appellants describe the adversarial interest in a section 232 proceeding as not those of parent versus child, but rather those of the family unit as opposed to the state which is interfering with a natural and fundamental relationship. It is undeniable that grave consequences flow from the permanent severance of the parent-child relationship. These include important financial results attending the extinction of the parent's duty to support and the mutual right to inherit. Additionally, the very essence of the proceeding is the complete and final legal termination of a relationship which is biological in nature and most personal in form. (Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy (Summer 1975) 39 Law & Contemp. Prob. 226, 245; In re Jacqueline H. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 170, 175-177 [145 Cal. Rptr. 548, 577 P.2d 683].) We have recently acknowledged that Parenting is a fundamental right, and accordingly, is disturbed only in extreme cases of persons acting in a fashion incompatible with parenthood. ( In re Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 [146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 579 P.2d 514]; In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688-689 [114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 523 P.2d 244].) Nonetheless, parental rights are not absolute and we must seek a consistent and reasonable approach to the varying rights involved when the state, by intervention, disturbs natural familial relationships. To that end we examine the nature of the affected rights. Historically, the parental right or preference doctrine originated with the concept that a parent's right in his child was akin to that of a property owner in his chattel ( In re B.G., supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 694), from which it followed that the parent's interests in custody were of primary consideration. (See Comment, Alternatives to Parental Right in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties (1963) 73 Yale L.J. 151, 155, hereinafter Yale Comment.) This principle survives, albeit in modified form, based on the assumption that a natural parent will most adequately fulfill his child's needs. (Yale Comment, at p. 155.) More recently the primacy of another consideration has evolved in the reasoning of courts, legislatures and commentators which have focused on the child's well-being, seeking to ascertain the best interest of and the least detrimental alternative to the child. Our Legislature's concern is manifest in its direction that the statutes concerning the termination of parental rights shall be liberally construed to serve and protect the interests and welfare of the child. (§ 232.5; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 302, 319.5, 328.5, 360-370; Sen. Bill No. 1726 (Presley 1980) [statutes establishing and regulating demonstration counties involved in innovative approaches to dealing with removal, termination, and foster care for children].) In theory, the evolving parental preference and child's best interests standards do not necessarily conflict. As one commentator has noted, In general, children's needs are best met by helping parents achieve their interests. In some situations, however, there may be a conflict of interests.... In these situations, the legal system should protect the child's interests. Not only is the child a helpless party but the parents should suffer the consequences of their inadequacy rather than the child. (Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights (1976) 28 Stan.L.Rev. 625, 638, fn. omitted [hereinafter Wald]; Yale Comment, at pp. 155-156; see Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973) pp. 53-54 [hereinafter Goldstein et al.] [recommending `the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child's growth and development' as a standard on the ground that the best interest test too often subordinates the child's interests to those of various adult claimants].) The foregoing doctrinal expressions underscore the fundamental nature of the parents' custodial rights, but also qualify these rights recognizing that they do not exist in a vacuum wholly devoid of legitimate competing interests. In rejecting the argument that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required when the state terminates a natural family relationship, one federal court has concisely identified these interests as follows: the liberty and privacy interest afforded to the parents, the interest of the state, as parens patriae, in protecting children from harm, and finally, the often silent interest of the child. ( Sims v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, etc. (S.D.Tex. 1977) 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1191 [three-judge court].) In In re Carmaleta B., we recently noted that subdivision (a)(7) of section 232 functionally balances the interests of the child in secure and sufficient parenting with the conjoined interests of both parent and child in preserving the familial bond. (21 Cal.3d at p. 491.) Acknowledging the fundamental nature of the respective rights involved and that due process protection must surround their assertion and termination, what evidentiary burden will meet constitutional requirements? Section 232, subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(6) are silent on the requisite burden of proof, but subdivision (a)(7) referring to children who have been at least two years in foster homes specifies a clear and convincing evidence standard. Evidence Code section 115 states, as a generality, that unless otherwise provided the applicable standard is the preponderance of the evidence. Justice Harlan, in his useful concurring opinion in In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 371-372 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 379-380, 90 S.Ct. 1068] (fns. omitted) described the nature and general utility of this standard: In a civil suit between two private parties for money damages, for example, we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's favor. A preponderance of the evidence standard therefore seems peculiarly appropriate for, as explained most sensibly, it simply requires the trier of fact `to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the [judge] of the fact's existence.' In our view, the more serious potential consequences of a section 232 proceeding require a higher evidentiary standard than civil actions in which money damages are awarded. The conflicting interests are weightier when the result may be termination of natural parental rights. Appellants, in turn, urge adoption of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement which traditionally has been reserved for those cases where the unsuccessful litigant is subject to confinement or custody. The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence  that bedrock `axiomatic and elementary' principle whose `enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.' Coffin v. United States [56 U.S. 432 (1895)] at 453. ( In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 363 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 375].) In criminal proceedings, where the conflicting interests involve an individual's freedom and the state's enforcement of its criminal laws, courts have traditionally been particularly sensitive to the citizen's liberty. Again in Justice Harlan's words, we do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty ... [¶] [I]t is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free. ( In re Winship, supra, at p. 372 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 380], Harlan, J. conc.) Moreover, we have not refused to extend the beyond reasonable doubt test to those noncriminal situations in which a personal freedom similarly collides with the state's interest in confinement for the protection of both the public and the individual. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219 [152 Cal. Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1].) Such a liberty interest is not herein presented. Rather, as recently expressed, the goal of [§ 232] is to promote the welfare of the child; and the state as a parens patriae has not only a `compelling interest' but also has a `duty' to sever parental bonds once a situation contemplated by the statute arises. ( In re Terry D. (1978) 83 Cal. App.3d 890, 896 [148 Cal. Rptr. 221]; In re Eugene W. (1972) 29 Cal. App.3d 623 [105 Cal. Rptr. 736].) The protection which is required is for a complex group of interrelated, but perhaps conflicting, interests among which are those of (1) the parent and child in a continuing familial relationship; (2) the parent in preserving the integrity and privacy of the family unit, free of state intervention and social stigma attached to either parent or child; (3) the child in a permanent, secure, stable, and loving environment; and (4) the state in protecting the child. Weighing these competing interests, we conclude that use of a beyond reasonable doubt standard is not required. The proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard is inappropriate in a section 232 proceeding where the state may be an adversary to the parents but also may be a necessary champion for the child. We conclude that findings under any subdivision of section 232 must be made on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. Such a test is fully consistent with the goal of section 232 to provide the fullest opportunity to the parents for exercise of their rights not inconsistent with the ultimate best interests of the child ( In re Carmaleta B., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 492), and in harmony with the purposes delineated by the United States Supreme Court's statement in Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423 [60 L.Ed.2d 323, 329, 99 S.Ct. 1804] that: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding is to `instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring.). The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision. Clear and convincing evidence requires a finding of high probability. This standard is not new. (2) We described such a test, 80 years ago, as requiring that the evidence be `so clear as to leave no substantial doubt'; `sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.' ( Sheehan v. Sullivan (1899) 126 Cal. 189, 193 [58 P. 543].) It retains validity today. ( In re Terry D., supra, 83 Cal. App.3d at p. 899.) Our conclusion is further supported by a review of the decisions of other courts, as well as some of the model codes and literature which have examined this issue. California appellate decisions addressing the question have almost unanimously held that clear and convincing evidence is required before parental rights may be terminated under any subdivision of section 232. (See, e.g., In re Sarah H. (1980) 106 Cal. App.3d 326, 329, fn. 4 [165 Cal. Rptr. 61]; In re David B. (1979) 91 Cal. App.3d 184, 196 [154 Cal. Rptr. 63]; In re Heidi T. (1978) 87 Cal. App.3d 864, 870 [151 Cal. Rptr. 263]; In re Cynthia K. (1977) 75 Cal. App.3d 81, 84-85 [141 Cal. Rptr. 875].) The Alaska Supreme Court, in Matter of C.L.T. (Alaska 1979) 597 P.2d 518, rejected a constitutional challenge to the analogous Alaskan statutory scheme in a persuasive example of the decisions of sister states. Concluding that clear and convincing proof was the appropriate standard, the Alaskan court noted that This evidentiary standard balances the competing interests involved in a proceeding brought to terminate parental rights, one of which is the right of a child to an adequate home. Appellant all but ignores this interest. When a petition is brought to terminate an individual's parental rights based upon alleged child abuse, the child's interests do not necessarily coincide with the parent's interest in continuation of the family unit. While appellant's standard would give the parent even greater due process protection, it would simultaneously decrease the ability of the state to protect the rights of the child. (P. 526, fns. omitted; see also, In Interest of Atwood (1978) 2 Kan. App.2d 680 [587 P.2d 1, 2]; In Interest of Massey (1976) 35 Ill. App.3d 518 [341 N.E.2d 405, 407]; In re Sego (1973) 82 Wn.2d 736 [513 P.2d 831, 833]; Alsager v. District Court of Polk City, Iowa (S.D.Iowa 1975) 406 F. Supp. 10, 25; Sims v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, etc., supra, 438 F. Supp. at p. 1194, and the cases cited in 59 Am.Jur.2d, Parent and Child, § 27, pp. 112-113, and 67A C.J.S., § 37, p. 274; cf., Matter of Five Minor Children (Del. 1979) 407 A.2d 198 [preponderance of the evidence standard applies in termination proceedings].) Similarly, Stanford N. Katz, author of a Model Act to Free Children for Permanent Placement under a grant from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, proposed a clear and convincing standard, noting that Since the overriding consideration in termination proceedings is the welfare of the child, the fault or guilt of the parents is not a central focus. Thus, the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt used in the criminal process was deemed inappropriate for these proceedings. The preponderance of the evidence standard, used in some civil proceedings, was rejected because this lesser test would make it too easy for the state to separate a child from its parents. (Katz, Freeing Children for Permanent Placement Through a Model Act (1978) 12 Fam.L.Q. 203, at p. 240; see also Institute of Judicial Administration, ABA Project on Standards for Juvenile Justice, Stds. Relating to Abuse and Neglect (Tent. Draft 1977) stds. 8.3, 8.4, pp. 154-161 [for children maintained in placement out of the home for the specified period the court shall order termination unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that an exception as provided in the proposed scheme exists].) In candor, we must acknowledge the existence of at least one model statute developed by the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges (Fam. L. Rep., Reference File, p. 201:0070) as cited in Matter of Five Minor Children, supra, 407 A.2d at page 200, which recommended the more lenient preponderance of the evidence test. In only one instance have we found the application of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a parental rights setting. In the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Congress required the establishment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt before parental rights could be terminated. It has been suggested that the legislative establishment of the higher standard of proof was a response to a particular problem. In passing the Act, Congress recognized that current state standards and procedures were leading to the wholesale destruction of Indian families and the unwarranted removal of Indian children from their homes. (Miles, Custody Provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: The Effect on California Dependency Law (1979) 12 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 647, 655, fns. omitted.) Initially, our own Legislature provided that the standard of proof in proceedings brought under section 232, subdivision (a)(7), should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but as noted in In re Lynna B. (1979) 92 Cal. App.3d 682 [155 Cal. Rptr. 256], Civil Code section 232, subdivision (a)(7) was amended in 1976 to substitute `by clear and convincing evidence' for `beyond a reasonable doubt.' It was amended again in 1977, to become operative July 1, 1978, to change the burden of proof back to `beyond a reasonable doubt.' However, an urgency measure was enacted in 1978 again amending the statute, operative July 1, 1978, to provide for the `clear and convincing evidence' standard [which remains the present test]. (Stats. 1978, ch. 429, § 23; ch. 1269 §§ 1-3.) (P. 694, fn. 2.) The several statutory changes in the standard represent a clear legislative assertion of a right to establish such a test. There is authority for the Legislature's exercise thereof because Here we are in the arena of policy, but not properly judicial policy.... [T]hese are social problems which the Legislature has attempted to deal with over the years as it deems best, attempting to balance the interest of the children with that of the parents. ( In re Terry D., supra, 83 Cal. App.3d at p. 897.) (1b) Use of the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof fairly protects the interests represented in proceedings brought under any subdivision of section 232, and we turn to appellants' remaining contentions.