Opinion ID: 1877968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: limits of one policy on two vehicles

Text: The declarations pages of the Milbank policy separately listed six vehicles insured under the policy, including two of the trucks used to haul sugarbeets. Each vehicle's coverage was separately listed as BI-100/300. There is no disagreement that this is a shorthand reference for coverage of $100,000 for bodily injury damages sustained by any one person in any one automobile accident and for $300,000 maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury resulting from any one automobile accident. The policy included a Limits of Liability provision: The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for `each person' for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one auto accident. Subject to this limit for `each person', the limit of liability shown in the Declarations for `each accident' for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury resulting from any one auto accident. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for `each accident' for property damage liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages to all property resulting from any one auto accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of covered persons, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations, or vehicles involved in the auto accident. We will apply the limit of liability to provide any separate limits required by law for bodily injury and property damage liability. However, this provision will not change our total limit of liability. It is uncommon, where a single policy covers more than one vehicle, that two or more of the covered vehicles are involved in a single occurrence. The question of stacking coverages under a single multi-vehicle policy normally arises where only one of the insured vehicles is involved in an accident. In that context, this court has held that a policy limitation prohibiting the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage is enforceable and observed that other courts which have addressed various aspects of stacking have come up with widely divergent conclusions. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company v. Andrews, 321 N.W.2d 483, 489 (N.D.1982). Stacking has often been allowed for medical payment and uninsured motorist coverages. But, when considering liability coverage the courts, with near uniformity, have held the first party coverage cases [on medical payment and uninsured motorist coverages] to be inapplicable and have found the policy to be unambiguous and to preclude `stacking.' Oarr v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 39 Md.App. 122, 383 A.2d 1112, 1117 (1978). Preclusion of stacking is sensible where only one of the insured vehicles is involved. Pacific Indemnity Company v. Thompson, 56 Wash.2d 715, 355 P.2d 12 (1960). Generally, bodily injury coverage is automobile-based, rather than person-based, and is clearly insurance on the vehicle.... Oarr, 383 A.2d at 1117. But, decisions involving stacking of coverage under a single policy for several vehicles involved in the same occurrence have gone both ways, depending upon subtle policy differences. In Inman v. Hartford Insurance Group, 132 Mich.App. 29, 346 N.W.2d 885 (1984), two vehicles insured under the same policy were involved in a single accident. The Michigan intermediate appellate court held that a single limit applied, rejecting the reasoning of an earlier New York decision, Loerzel v. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Company, 204 Misc. 115, 120 N.Y.S.2d 159, aff'd, 281 App. Div. 735, 118 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1952). The accident in Loerzel involved two trucks insured under one fleet policy that contained not only a limits of liability clause similar to the one in the Milbank policy, but also a separability clause. Finding that the two clauses together created an ambiguity, the New York court construed the ambiguity against the insurer and held that each vehicle involved was insured for the policy limit as if it were insured under a separate policy. On the other hand, in Inman, the Michigan court concluded that since the policy before it contained no separability clause, no ambiguity existed, and the language in the limits of liability clause controlled, regardless of the number of insured vehicles involved in the occurrence. The trial court followed the Inman approach. We concur. The Limits of Liability provisions in this policy leave little room for doubt: This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of covered persons, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations, or vehicles involved in the auto accident. [Emphasis supplied.] It is hard to imagine how Milbank could have made more clear that whether one or more of the vehicles were involved in the accident, Milbank's liability would be limited to $100,000 for bodily injuries sustained by one person in any one automobile accident. See e.g., Link v. Federated Mutual Insurance Company, 386 N.W.2d 897 (N.D.1986) [In order to impose liability ... we would have to strain the clear language of the policy.] Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the limit of Milbank's liability for Houser's death is $100,000.