Opinion ID: 4514181
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Christian II

Text: {¶ 5} On remand, the Second District held that in light of this court’s interpretation of the statutory definition of “enterprise” in Beverly, Christian’s conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity was supported by sufficient evidence. 2016-Ohio-516, 56 N.E.3d 391, ¶ 16, 22 (2d Dist.) (“Christian II”). The Second District accordingly reinstated Christian’s conviction for that offense, but it also reduced the degree level of the offense from a first-degree felony to a seconddegree felony because the degree level of the underlying predicate offense was reduced in Christian I in accordance with H.B. 86. Id. at ¶ 24. The court then remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing on Counts Two, Three, and Five. Id. at ¶ 37. {¶ 6} On remand from Christian II, the trial court resentenced Christian as follows: • Count Two: 12 months (24 months shorter than the original sentence); 3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO • Count Three: 180 days (12 months shorter than the original sentence); • Count Five: 8 years (1 year shorter than the original sentence). While the concurrent and consecutive nature of the majority of Christian’s sentences remained the same, the trial court did modify Count Two from being served concurrently to Count Five to being served consecutively to Count Five. Thus, with Counts Two and Five running consecutively to each other, Christian’s aggregate sentence after the remand was the same as her original aggregate sentence: nine years.