Opinion ID: 6344850
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Transfer of Division

Text: Nyah next argues the district court erroneously transferred venue to the Eastern Division from the Central Division of the Southern District of Iowa. We disagree. The “district judge has broad discretion in determining where within a district a trial will be held, and to overturn the court’s decision the defendant must prove abuse of that discretion or prejudice.” United States v. Worthey, 716 F.3d 1107, 1112 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Stanko, 528 F.3d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 2008)). Nyah proves neither here. Nyah does not show the district court abused its discretion. First, the district court did not violate Nyah’s Sixth Amendment rights. The Sixth Amendment “requires that a trial be held in the state and district where the crime was committed.” Id. (quoting same). It does not, however, establish “a right to be tried in a particular division.” Id. (quoting same). Here, Nyah’s crime occurred in the Southern District of Iowa. Thus, the district court’s choice of division within the Southern District did not violate the Sixth Amendment. -5- Next, the district court appropriately weighed the relevant factors in setting trial in the Eastern Division. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18, the district “court must set the place of trial within the district with due regard for the convenience of the defendant, any victim, and the witnesses, and the prompt administration of justice.” Convenience of the defendant encompasses the ability of the defendant’s “family, friends, and other supporters to attend trial.” Stanko, 528 F.3d at 586. Here, the district court acknowledged the inconvenient distance for Nyah, his family, and other spectators but noted public transportation mitigated the inconvenience. It also considered the witnesses’ convenience, noting only the government identified witnesses besides Nyah yet expressed no concerns about transporting them. Finally, the district court considered the prompt administration of justice, specifying “this case needs to be tried” and observing the Eastern Division had a “significantly smaller degree” of COVID-19 infections and was open for incourt criminal trials. It noted the Central Division, in contrast, had a “very substantial backlog” of trials. We conclude the district court acted within its broad discretion when applying these factors.3 Nyah also shows no prejudice. While Nyah expressed concern about the racial composition of the jury pool, the district court found based on census data that the Southern District of Iowa’s Eastern Division had a higher proportion of black people in its population than its Central Division. His concerns about racial disparities thus lack merit. Nyah cites no other indicia of prejudice besides distance, but the district court already concluded this concern was mitigated by public transportation. We thus affirm the district court’s choice of venue because Nyah shows neither abuse of discretion nor prejudice. 3 Nyah also vaguely asserts the transfer violated his due process rights and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). We disagree. We find no authority suggesting Nyah’s due process rights or 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) were violated by the district court’s intra-district transfer that complied with the Sixth Amendment and governing law. -6-