Opinion ID: 62562
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stroud’s Prima Facie Case

Text: We first consider whether Stroud’s summary judgment evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation. Stroud argues that the district court ignored her allegations that Rodriguez exhibited “a pattern of animosity towards women who took medical/maternity leave.” Stroud cites a statement Rodriguez purportedly made that “he thought [Stroud] would not want to return [to work] after having the baby.”4 Stroud also claims that two 4 Stroud recounted this conversation in an affidavit attached to her response to BMC’s summary judgment motion: During one of my quarterly talks with Ricardo Rodriguez while I was pregnant, he asked me if I thought I would come back to work after having the baby. I told him that yes, I though [sic] I would want to work. He then talked about how his wife was a stay at home mom to their son and how he once had the opportunity to work from home when he worked for IBM and it was less than ideal for him because both he and his wife were at home all day. He then told me he thought I would not want to return after having the baby. 7 No. 07-20779 other BMC employees working under Rodriguez suffered adverse employment actions after taking maternity leave. We find no evidence here to suggest a causal link between Stroud’s FMLA leave and her termination. Rodriguez’s statement that he did not expect Stroud to return to work after giving birth does not support an inference of retaliation. Rodriguez made that statement in the context of a larger discussion with Stroud about her future plans after giving birth. He asked about Stroud’s plans and told her about his own past work experience. Even when viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to Stroud, it simply does not support her retaliation claim. Similarly, Stroud’s reference to the cases of two other pregnant BMC employees does not create a fact issue with respect to whether Stroud met her burden on the causal link element. Stroud relies on a deposition of Rodriguez in which he discussed the cases of those two women. One woman, who was demoted after her FMLA leave, had consistently underperformed in her job. According to Rodriguez’s undisputed deposition, “she wasn’t performing to her satisfaction nor to mine.” Rodriguez held coaching sessions with the woman prior to her maternity leave, discussing how “her performance wasn’t up to par”—an assessment with which the woman agreed. She was demoted after the next regularly scheduled annual evaluation. A second woman who took maternity leave subsequently was terminated in a reduction in force, although in his deposition, Rodriguez was unsure whether she was terminated or demoted following her maternity leave. It is unclear why she was terminated; Rodriguez was not even asked that question. Nor does the deposition tell us whether her FMLA leave and termination occurred close in time. This sparse evidence does not suggest any connection between either woman’s FMLA leave and adverse employment action. Stroud offers no evidence 8 No. 07-20779 to counter Rodriguez’s version of both cases, which in no way establishes that he has a bias against pregnant women. With respect to Stroud’s temporal proximity argument, it is a closer call as to whether the timing of her termination supports an inference of a causal link. The district court concluded that temporal proximity alone was insufficient to establish a causal link, in part because over 800 other employees were contemporaneously terminated as part of the reduction in force. However, that reasoning discards this court’s prior holdings that temporal proximity alone can support an inference of a causal link. The standard for establishing the causal link element in a retaliation claim is less stringent than a “but for” standard. Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 305 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996). “Close timing between an employee’s protected activity and an adverse action against [her] may provide the ‘causal connection’ required to make out a prima facie case of retaliation.” Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis omitted); see also Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding the causal link prong established where “[t]he only evidence available to support an inference of discrimination . . . is the temporal proximity” of the protected activity and the adverse employment action). The Supreme Court has noted that “cases that accept mere temporal proximity . . . as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be ‘very close.’” Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001). Although the Court did not define “very close,” it cited cases holding three and four-month periods insufficient to infer a causal link. Id. (citing Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997) (three months), and Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (four months)). In noting lower courts’ “very close” standard, the Supreme Court cited approvingly to a Tenth Circuit case, O’Neal v. Ferguson Construction Co., 237 9 No. 07-20779 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2001). The Tenth Circuit has a somewhat more specific definition: “‘[W]e have held that a one and one-half month period between protected activity and adverse action may, by itself, establish causation. By contrast, we have held that a three-month period, standing alone, is insufficient to establish causation.’” Id. at 1253 (quoting Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999)). In Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 355 (5th Cir. 2001) (issued prior to Breeden), this court found that a five-day lapse between an employee’s protected activity and an adverse employment action was sufficient to satisfy the “causal link” prong of a prima facie retaliation claim, without any other evidence of a causal link. At the time of Evans, courts in this circuit had found temporal proximity of up to four months to be sufficient to show a causal link. See, e.g., Garrett v. Constar, Inc., No. Civ.A. 397-CV-2575, 1999 WL 354239, at  (N.D. Tex. May 25, 1999).5 More recently, we have further clarified the meaning of “very close.” We have held that a five-month lapse, by itself, does not support an inference of a causal link. Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2002). In unpublished decisions, we have narrowed the range. For example, we concluded that two and a half months is a short enough period to support an inference of a causal link. Richard v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 233 F. App’x 334, 338 (5th Cir. 2007). Similarly, we found a fifteen-day lapse sufficiently close to support an inference of causation. Ware v. CLECO Power LLC, 90 F. App’x 705, 708 (5th Cir. 2004). 5 We have noted that “the mere fact that some adverse action is taken after an employee engages in some protected activity will not always be enough for a prima facie case.” Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 n.3. However, Stroud does not allege merely that her termination occurred after her FMLA leave. She notes that it occurred closely after her return to work from FMLA leave. 10 No. 07-20779 We have found no cases holding a three-week period, or shorter, to be insufficient to support an inference of a causal link. Therefore, following Evans, we believe the district court should have found that Stroud made a prima facie retaliation claim sufficient to shift the burden to BMC. Therefore, we hold that the district court should have found Stroud’s prima facie claim satisfied. Ultimately, however, this does not affect this case’s outcome because, as discussed below, Stroud fails to refute BMC’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination.