Opinion ID: 1269932
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Supervisor Harassment

Text: The district court also analyzed Jenkins's claim under the supervisor harassment standard. Because Jenkins does not claim she suffered a tangible employment action, the Navy may assert the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense. See Brenneman, 507 F.3d at 1145. The defense has two elements: (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior; and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm. Id. The first element has two prongs: prevention and correction. Id. As relevant here, the correction prong requires the employer to show it promptly corrected any sexual harassment that occurred. Id. [I]n applying the correction prong, the employer's notice of the harassment is of paramount importance. Weger, 500 F.3d at 720 (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed in section A, genuine issues of material fact exist as to when the Navy had actual or constructive notice of the harassment. This goes to the correction prong. Because the Navy fails to demonstrate as a matter of law that it acted promptly to correct any sexual harassment, and thus fails to prove the first element of the affirmative defense, summary judgment was inappropriate. See Anda, 517 F.3d at 531 (summary judgment appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law), citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The district court's grant of summary judgment is reversed, as to supervisor harassment.