Opinion ID: 2814839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Structure of the Constitution

Text: Finally, Pollack argues the AO’s geographical limitation is inconsistent with the structure of the Constitution, particularly as it is described in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867). There, the Court declared unconstitutional a law enacted by Nevada that imposed a tax of one dollar upon every person leaving the state. Instead of relying upon a specific provision of the Constitution, the Court declared the tax incompatible with the principles underlying the Constitution generally. Id. at 43–44. The Court recognized both the right of the federal government to call upon its citizens to travel from one state to another and the correlative right of a citizen to travel interstate of her own accord. Pollack contends the Court expressly recognized the right she seeks to vindicate here in stating that a citizen “has the right to come to the seat of government … to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions.” Id. at 44. Pollack’s reliance upon Crandall is misplaced. The Court there was concerned with a law that “actually deterred” interstate travel by taxing it. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903; see Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d at 441 (describing Crandall as a case where a law “directly burden[s] interstate travel”). As we have discussed, the AO’s geographical limitation did not “actually deter” Pollack from traveling interstate; it provided an incentive to do so. In any event, Crandall does not hold every law that indirectly burdens interstate travel or 21 makes it marginally less likely a person will travel interstate implicates the Constitution. Indeed not even every tax on interstate travel violates the Constitution. See EvansvilleVanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 712 (holding Crandall does not prevent a state from imposing upon commercial airline passengers a fee to fund airport construction and maintenance). Nor is there any support for Pollack’s broader contention that the AO’s geographical limitation is incompatible with the right to travel embedded in the structure of the Constitution. A law that “directly impair[s] the exercise of the right to free interstate movement” — such as the tax at issue in Crandall — may be deemed incompatible with the framework of the Constitution. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501 (“The right of free ingress and regress to and from neighboring States, which was expressly mentioned in the text of the Articles of Confederation, may simply have been conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created” (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)). In Saenz the Court invalidated a durational residence requirement enacted by California that discouraged people from relocating to that state in order to receive welfare benefits. The Court nevertheless agreed with the state that its law did not impinge upon the component of the right to travel protected by the structure of the Constitution because it “imposed no obstacle to … entry into California” and therefore did “not directly impair the exercise of the right to free interstate movement.” Id. Just so here: The AO’s geographical limitation does not “directly impair” Pollack’s “right to go from one place to another” or “to cross state borders while en route.” Id. at 500. We therefore conclude the AO’s policy of limiting its applicant pool to residents of a particular area is not inconsistent with the structure of the Constitution. 22