Opinion ID: 2828903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Revised Airports Act, RCW 14.08.330

Text: A. RCW 14.08.330 Provides That Proposition 1 Cannot Be Applied at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport As we emphasize in every case of statutory interpretation, [i]f the statute's meaning is plain, we give effect to that meaning as the expression of the legislature's intent. Majority at 10 (citing State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005) ). Only if the statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we may 'resort to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history,' to resolve the ambiguity. !d. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 423, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005)). In my view, there is no ambiguity in RCW 14.08.330. The statute simply provides, in relevant part, that [e]very airport ... controlled and operated by any municipality ... shall, subject to federal and state laws, rules, and regulations, be -2- Fila Foods, LLC, et al. v. City ofSeaTac, et al., 89723-9 (Stephens, J. Dissent) under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the municipality ... controlling an~ operating it. RCW 14.08.330. Here, it is undisputed that the Port of Seattle is the municipality that controls and operates the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. Therefore, the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport is under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Port of Seattle. 1 RCW 14.08.330 also provides that [n]o other municipality in which the airport . .. is located shall have any police jurisdiction of the [airport] or any authority to charge or exact any license fees or occupation taxes for the operations. (Emphasis added.) Here, it is undisputed that the municipality in which the airport ... is located is the city of SeaTac. Id. Therefore, the city of SeaTac has no police jurisdiction over the Seattle-Tacoma Internal Airport and cannot charge or exact any license fees or occupation taxes for the airport operations. 2 1 Of course, both federal law and state law apply at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, as RCW 14.08.330 recognizes. I will discuss below the majority's point about another state law, the Minimum Wage Act, RCW 49.46.120. Based on my resolution under RCW 14.08.330, there is no need to consider whether applicable federal law prohibits applying Proposition 1 at the airport. 2 The majority contends that my reading renders superfluous RCW 14.08.330's provision concerning police jurisdiction, license fees, and occupation taxes. Not so. The city of SeaTac and the Port of Seattle agree that the term 'police jurisdiction' in the statute is not synonymous with the police power. Rather, 'police jurisdiction' refers to a municipality's authority to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. Br. of Appellants City of SeaTac and Kirstina Gregg, City of SeaTac Clerk at 10 & n.16; accord Br. ofResp't Port of Seattle at 11. The purpose of the statute's provision that SeaTac shall [not] have any police jurisdiction of the airport is to foreclose the city's otherwise colorable argument that, although it does not have traditional police powers at the airport under RCW 14.08.330's first sentence, it has extraterritorial police jurisdiction there. RCW 14.08.330. The fact that the legislature went out of its way to expressly reject this argument reinforces the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction articulated in RCW 14.08.330's first sentence. -3- Fila Foods, LLC, et al. v. City of SeaTac, et al., 89723-9 (Stephens, J. Dissent) The statute contemplates that an airport will be owned and operated by one municipality, though physically located in another municipality's territory. And the statute's delineation of those two municipalities' respective jurisdiction is clear. The municipality ... controlling and operating the airport has exclusive jurisdiction and control. Id. The municipality in which the airport ... is located has [no] police jurisdiction. I d. The statute thus evidences the legislative desire to avoid uncertainty between jurisdictional lines. Its plain language compels the result that the Port of Seattle is the only local jurisdiction whose laws apply at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. Our analysis of RCW 14.08.330 should end there. 3 B. The Majority's New Test for RCW 14.08.330 Belies the Statute's Text, Renders Other Provisions Meaningless, and Will Prove Unworkable The majority creatively seeks to avoid the statute's plain language by dividing the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport into two parts. The first part is a Nor is the statute's provision that denies SeaTac authority to charge or exact any license fees or occupation taxes at the airport superfluous. As is common in legislation, RCW 14.08.330 includes a general provision followed by specific examples that are included out of an abundance of caution. The specific prohibition on license fees and occupation taxes clarifies the general language on exclusive jurisdiction; it is not superfluous. E.g., HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 431 (2d ed. 1911) ([A] proviso ... may be introduced from excessive caution, and designed to prevent a possible misinterpretation of the statute .... ). 3 The majority relies on dicta from King County v. Port of Seattle, 37 Wn.2d 338, 348, 223 P.2d 834 (1950), stated in the context of our conclusion that RCW 14.08.330 does not violate the constitutional provision that '[t]here shall be no territory stricken from any county.' (Quoting WASH. CONST. art. XI,§ 3.) Separate from determining the statute's constitutionality, when we applied RCW 14.08.330, we held RCW 14.08.330 precludes King County from enforcing taxi licensing fees at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. !d. at 346-47. The case's holding provides no support to authorize a local regulation at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. -4- Fifo Foods, LLC, et al. v. City of SeaTac, et al., 89723-9 (Stephens, J. Dissent) place-the geographic area in which the Port of Seattle owns title to the land and has the power to regulate. The second part is a set of activities-airport operations and the subject of aeronautics. Majority at 14 (emphasis omitted). As the majority sees things, it is only as to the second part that the Port of Seattle has exclusive jurisdiction and control. !d. at 14-15. After announcing this new interpretation, the majority concludes, Proposition 1 has nothing to do with airport operations or the subject of aeronautics, so the city of SeaTac has not invaded the Port of Seattle's exclusive jurisdiction and control. !d. at 16. I disagree with the majority's interpretation and application. The majority's distinction, between the airport as a geographic area and as a set of functional activities (airport operations or the subject of aeronautics, id.), is nowhere to be found in the statute. The subject of the statute is simply [e]very airport. RCW 14.08.330. The statute does not slice and dice an airport to reveal some sort of core airport function judicial test. Instead the statute concerns, as its language says it does, the airport. The statute's structure confirms this. The statute follows a general rule/exception structure. Its general rule is that the municipality controlling and operating the airport (the Port of Seattle) shall have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the airport, and that no other municipality in which the airport is located (the city of SeaTac) shall have any police jurisdiction of the airport. RCW 14.08.330. The statute then has one exception to that rule. The exception provides However, ... a municipality in which an airport ... is located (the city of -5- Filo Foods, LLC, et al. v. City of SeaTac, et al., 89723-9 (Stephens, J. Dissent) SeaTac) may be responsible for the administration and enforcement of the uniform fire code ... on that portion of any airport ... located with its jurisdictional boundaries, so long as it does this by agreement with the municipality operating and controlling the airport, (the Port of Seattle). !d. Thus, a fire code is the single circumstance in which the city of SeaTac can enforce its laws within the airport. This exception disproves the majority's conclusion that airport in RCW 14.08.330 means only airport operations or the subject of aeronautics, majority at 16. If the legislature intended the operating municipality's exclusive jurisdiction to be over only that narrow functional concept, why would the legislature specify an exception from the operating municipality's exclusive jurisdiction to allow the municipality in which the airport sits to enforce a fire code at the airport? Under the majority's view of the statute, the fire-code exception is simply unneeded because the city of SeaTac can already enforce a fire code at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport because that does not concern airport operations or the subjection of aeronautics, id. The fire-code exception creates a second puzzle under the majority's test. The exception provides that the city in which the airport is located (the city of SeaTac) may enforce a fire code within the airport only if the city does so by agreement with the municipality operating and controlling the airport (the Port of Seattle). RCW 14.08.330. As the majority notes, this exception was crafted by legislative amendment in response to concerns raised by the Seattle city attorney. -6- Fila Foods, LLC, et al. v. City ofSeaTac, et al., 89723-9 (Stephens, J. Dissent) Under the majority's holding, the fire code exception seems misplaced. If the city of SeaTac can unilaterally impose other measures at the airport, such as Proposition 1's sweeping wage and employee right protections, what is the point of requiring the Port of Seattle's consent to enforce a minimally intrusive fire code?. Unless the majority is willing to say that enforcing a fire code interfere[s] with airport operations or the subject of aeronautics, majority at 16, the majority leaves unanswered what role the fire code exception plays under its interpretation of the statute. The majority's flawed interpretation of RCW 14.08.330 foreshadows the statute's troubled future. Under the majority opinion, whether a business operating on airport property is bound by a city's local law will now turn on case-by-case adjudication in court about whether the city's particular ordinance interfere[s] with airport operations or the subject of aeronautics, id. at 16, however that concept may be construed. Even the SeaTac Committee for Good Jobs concedes that some minimum wage ordinances will affect airport operations under certain circumstances-though it maintains that Proposition 1 does not do so. See Wash. Supreme Court Oral Argument, Fila Foods LLC v. City of SeaTac, No. 89723-9 (June 26, 2014), at 17 min., 26 sec. through 19 min. 35 sec., audio recording by TVW, Washington State's Public Affairs Network. To see the confusion the majority's holding will create, consider the majority's application of its new test to this case. The majority simply asserts and concludes, Proposition 1 has nothing to do with airport operations or the subject of aeronautics. Majority at 16. Yet, -7- Fifo Foods, LLC, et al. v. City of SeaTac, et al., 89723-9 (Stephens, J. Dissent) Proposition 1's text specifically regulates the performance of quintessential airport activities that the Port of Seattle contracts for, regulates, and licenses, including aircraft interior cleaning; aircraft carpet cleaning; aircraft washing and cleaning; aviation ground support equipment washing and cleaning; aircraft water or lavatory services; [and] aircraft fueling. SEATAC MUNICIPAL CODE 7.45.010(M)(1)(a); see also Br. of Resp't Port of Seattle at 27-32 (describing the Port of Seattle's regulation of these and other activities that Proposition 1 attempts to regulate). The majority's summary conclusion that Proposition 1 has nothing to do with airport operations or the subject of aeronautics, majority at 16, makes the majority's new test all the more troubling. The legislature did not intend to foster a cottage industry of litigation over airport operations, where the courts arrive at case-by-case conclusory determinations under an imprecise test. It chose to draw a clear line. It enacted a statute that gives exclusive jurisdiction and control to the operating municipality. RCW 14.08.330. And it specifically said that [n]o other municipality in which the airport ... is located shall have any police jurisdiction of the [airport]. Jd. The legislature understood that because airports are unique, complex operations, they should be governed by one and only one local government-the one that specializes in controlling and operating them. This desire to have legal clarity at airports is especially understandable considering that airports can straddle multiple municipal, county, or state lines. See RCW 14.08.200 (multiple municipalities -8- Fila Foods, LLC, eta!. v. City ofSeaTac, et al., 89723-9 (Stephens, J. Dissent) may jointly operate an airport), .030 (municipalities may establish airports outside this state).