Opinion ID: 1779363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wallace and the Standard

Text: The standard by which this Court reviews a summary judgment is well settled: Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. Once the movant shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. In determining the propriety of a summary judgment, this Court reviews the evidence that was before the trial court when it entered the judgment and views that evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Childersburg Bancorporation, Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 893 So.2d 1142, 1145 (Ala.2004). In order to defeat a properly supported motion for a summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present substantial evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. George v. Raine, 895 So.2d 258, 261 (Ala.2004). Statements made subject to a qualified privilege are not actionable unless the plaintiff can prove that the defendant acted with [actual] malice. Atkins Ford Sales, Inc. v. Royster, 560 So.2d 197, 200 (Ala.1990). If the plaintiff in a defamation action is a private person and the publication is not privileged, then the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent in making the statement. Mead Corp. v. Hicks, 448 So.2d 308, 313 (Ala. 1983); cf. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14-17, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (discussing the constitutional evolution of the plaintiff's burden of proof in a defamation action). In Wilson, this Court construed for the first time Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-11-161, which provides: The publication of a fair and impartial report of . . . the arrest of any person for any cause . . . or of any investigation . . . shall be privileged, unless it be proved that the same was published with actual malice. . . . Wilson was a defamation action by a private person, based on publication in the media of statements made by two Cuban refugees to the Birmingham Police Department in the course of an official investigation and summarized in the official police incident report. 482 So.2d at 1213. It was undisputed that the report was a fair and accurate account of the statements. Id. Consequently, this Court held that the publication was privileged. In doing so, the Court explained that § 13A-11-161 is an explicit statutory privilege protecting fair and accurate reports of criminal charges and official investigations. 482 So.2d at 1211. The Court stated: [Section 13A-11-161] is a codification of the common law as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 611 (1977): `The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment of the occurrence reported.' . . . . In short, the news report at issue is [qualifiedly] privileged because it accurately reports statements made by the Cuban refugees during an official police investigation, as reflected in the official police incident report. 482 So.2d at 1211-12 (emphasis added). Thus, the application of the privilege turns on whether the alleged defamatory statement was an accurate, or substantially accurate, 482 So.2d at 1213, publication of the report of the arrest. Ordinarily, [t]he determination of whether a statement is privileged is a question of law for the trial judge. Atkins Ford Sales, Inc., 560 So.2d at 200. However, the application of the privilege in this case turns specifically on the credibility of Wallace and of Chief Mallard, whose versions of their August 8, 2000, telephone conversation are in direct conflict. It is axiomatic that the credibility of witnesses is a matter within the exclusive province of the jury. Floyd v. Broughton, 664 So.2d 897, 900 (Ala.1995); Mayben v. Travelers Indem. Co., 273 Ala. 643, 645, 144 So.2d 52, 54 (1962); Dixon v. Davis, 823 So.2d 1275, 1281 (Ala.Civ.App.2001). If a jury were to believe Chief Mallard, it must necessarily dis believe Wallace. Specifically, the jury must conclude that, in fact, Chief Mallard told Wallace that the arrestee was Clinton Keith Wiggins, not Raymond Wiggins. In that event, it must conclude that the publication made by Wallace and the Standard was not accurate and, therefore, was not privileged. Under these facts, we cannot say that Wallace and the Standard are entitled to a qualified privilege as a matter of law. The trial court erred, therefore, in entering a summary judgment for Wallace and the Standard. We next consider whether the Wigginses have presented substantial evidence of actual malice as to Chief Mallard.