Opinion ID: 1630934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether certain evidence admitted and arguments presented by tuckier constitute reversible error.

Text: ¶ 20. Cooper presents this issue in terms of four sub-issues, which are A.) plaintiffs' witnesses were invited to make improper references to religious belief to enhance their credibility; B.) plaintiffs presented false, irrelevant, and prejudicial references to other claims against Cooper; C.) plaintiffs improperly criticized Cooper's objections to discovery; and D.) plaintiffs presented the opinion of an expert who was not called as a witness, thereby placing before the jury matters not in evidence. Cooper also made four motions for mistrial during the course of this trial, three of which were based upon the above mentioned sub-issues or combinations of these sub-issues.
¶ 21. The Tuckiers called two former Cooper employees to the stand and questioned each about their motives for testifying in this case. On direct examination of witness Jimmy Oats, counsel for the Tuckiers asked, point-blank what brings you all the way to Batesville, Mississippi, to testify in a case that involves people that you don't even know? Over defense counsel's objection, Oats answered, Well, I don'tI understand that I can't live with myself if I don't tell the truth and don't try to do what I think the Lord would have me do, and I think the Lord wants me to tell the truth and be honest about what I do and the way I live my life. And I don'tI'm sorry. I don't think He would like for me to let things go and not stand up for what I know is right and what I believe is right without being punished for it. ¶ 22. Another former employee, Richard Angell, was similarly questioned on redirect examination when counsel asked, And why are you here testifying? Angell's response was, it's just too few a people that are brave enough to do it, I guess. I just felt like it was a Christian responsibility. Cooper did not object to this exchange. ¶ 23. Cooper objects to these questions and answers stating that they were in violation of M.R.E. 610 on religious beliefs and opinions, which states, evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature his credibility is impaired or enhanced. However, the comment to Rule 610 states, this rule prohibits impeaching a witness by questioning him concerning his religious beliefs and opinions. It does not prohibit questioning him as to those beliefs and opinions when testing his bias or interest. ¶ 24. Cooper argues that these questions were asked in order to bolster the witnesses credibility, which would be in violation of the rules of evidence, i.e., M.R.E. 608(a). However, Cooper attempted to discredit these witnesses as early as its opening statement, when it described the witnesses as disgruntled employees who were motivated by animosity for Cooper. In Cooper's opening statement, it stated that Oats and Angell had filed many grievances with Cooper while employed because they became dissatisfied with the discipline or money they were receiving from the company. Cooper also stated that Oats and Angell did not file grievances concerning the tires made nor their components. Therefore, from the beginning, Cooper presented their two former employees to the jury as ones testifying because of animosity towards Cooper and therefore opened the door. ¶ 25. It is clear from the record that the Tuckiers questioned their witnesses for the purposes of establishing their motives for testifying in this matter and for rebutting the purported motives presented to the jury during Cooper's opening statement. Therefore, the Tuckiers were not acting in violation of Rule 610 on religious beliefs, and the trial court properly allowed these questions and the witness responses. The Tuckiers did not ask their witnesses specifically about their religious beliefs or opinions, but simply their motivations for testifying. The trial court is affirmed as to this sub-issue.
¶ 26. Cooper cross-examined the Tuckiers' expert witness, Max Nonnamaker, as to his prior testimony in other cases. On re-direct examination, the Tuckiers attempted to rehabilitate Nonnamaker by questioning him as to his familiarity and involvement in other cases. Cooper contends that the Tuckiers violated a pre-trial order that required the Tuckiers to approach the bench and lay a foundation showing substantial similarity of other accidents prior to introduction of these accidents before the jury. However, Cooper opened the door for these questions when it cross-examined Nonnamaker and questioned him as to his involvement in prior cases. Cooper argues that although it did question Nonnamaker as to his previous experiences in testifying the Tuckiers went beyond the scope of this cross-examination by questioning Nonnamaker about other cases where victims were injured as a result of a tire separation. ¶ 27. Cooper summarizes its position clearly, as it states in its brief, As is apparent from the questions and their context, the purpose of these questions was to impeach Mr. Nonnamaker by showing the following: he had an ongoing professional relationship with plaintiffs' counsel; he invariably found tires defective; a trial judge once characterized his testimony as completely increditable; his work is overwhelmingly for plaintiffs, rather than manufacturers; in one case plaintiffs' counsel authored his report; and two courts have excluded his testimony as not qualified. The Tuckiers' re-direct of Nonnamaker was as follows. Q....Do you recall whether one of those, the Cleghorn tire, involved people, in fact, there were two people killed, and it involved a tire made in the Texarkana plant of Cooper Tire? A. Yes, sir. Mr. Raulston: Objection, Your Honor. Object and move to strike and ask the jury be instructed to disregard it. He's trying a case within a case. Mr. Turner: He opened the door. The Court: Overruled. Mr. Turner: Thank you. Q. (By Mr. Turner) Do you recall a case called Swank v. Ford? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you recall that Cooper was likewise involved in that case? A. I don't recall who the manufacturer was. Q. Do you recall another case involving Cooper Tire from Texarkana that involved a tire that failed from this same time period involving a little boy that was 12 years old that ended up with severe brain damage because of one of the tires? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you recall that that tire was likewise manufactured defectively? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you recall whether or not Cooper settled that case? A. Yes, sir. Mr. Raulston: Your Honor, same objection. The Court: It will be noted for the record. It will be overruled. Q. (By Mr Turner) Now, do you recall a case called Walsh, versus a variety of defendants? A. No, I don't. Q. Do you recall whether the Walsh case involved a young college student paralyzed from the neck down because of a Cooper tire made in Texarkana. Mr. Raulston: Your Honor, he's already said he didn't recall. It's improper leading of a witness. He's trying to testify. The witness said he didn't recall the case. Mr. Turner: He opened the door to this. The Court: Okay. The witness can recall. If he doesn't, that's fine, but I overrule the objection. Q. (By Mr. Turner) Do you recall? A. Yes, I do. ¶ 28. Cooper contends that the Swank case, the twelve-year-old boy case, and the Walsh cases are irrelevant and beyond the scope of re-direct examination because the Swank case is absolute fiction, the twelve-year-old boy case was the Mariona case, in which the tire was not the same as the subject tire and was not manufactured in 1992, and that the Walsh case was apparently a Georgia case involving a tire not manufactured in Texarkana and not similar to the Tuckier tire. [2] However, the Swank case was first mentioned by Cooper in its direct examination of Nonnamaker, so Cooper contradicts itself by calling the case fiction. Cooper's basic argument is that if Cooper did in fact open the door to these cases when attacking the credibility of Nonnamaker, then the Tuckiers went beyond the scope of this door-opening by asking questions that implied Cooper's guilt in other prior cases. Cooper also asserts that regardless of the intent of this questioning, these questions are still subject to M.R.E. 403, the rule which allows the trial court to balance the undue prejudice versus probative value of the admitted evidence. ¶ 29. This line of questioning does not constitute reversible error. In Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 291 (Miss.1992), we have [C]learly held, however, that once the defense opens the door to otherwise improper testimony, the prosecution is permitted to enter and develop the matter in greater detail. When the defense presents evidence helpful to its case, the adverse side is presented with an opportunity to rebut the evidence and the defendant's theory. By undertaking such an effort, the defense has sufficiently opened the door to evidence that might otherwise have been inadmissible due to relevance and the lack of probative value. Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852, 868 (Miss.1995). ¶ 30. In Florence v. State, 755 So.2d 1065, 1070 (Miss.2000), the defendant was charged with sexual battery and aggravated assault and filed a motion in limine to exclude several magazines and videotapes, which the State intended to introduce as being illustrative of homosexual tendencies. We found that Florence had opened the door to this evidence during his opening statement and also during testimony which put the issue of his homosexuality in question. Although Florence argued that the evidence was inadmissible because they were not a part of the res gestae of the crime, we held that the trial court did not err by allowing the magazines and tapes into evidence. ¶ 31. Cooper opened the door to this testimony when it attacked the credibility of the Tuckiers' expert on cross-examination. In addition, the judge gave a cautionary instruction to the jury to disregard all evidence of prior cases in which Cooper was involved. Instruction C 12 stated that, you cannot and must not consider this evidence of other alleged claims as substantive evidence on the issue of whether Cooper is responsible for the accident involved in the case before you today. We presume that the jurors follow the instructions as given to them by the trial judge, as upon their oaths, they are required to do so. Fielder v. Magnolia Beverage Co., 757 So.2d 925, 937 (Miss. 1999). ¶ 32. In light of the fact that Cooper is also challenging the denial of its directed verdict, and in finding that the evidence presented was sufficient to uphold the jury verdict, the Tuckiers' re-direct examination of its witness does not constitute reversible error, and this issue is without merit.
¶ 33. The heart of this sub-issue is that the Tuckiers made reference to a quality assurance manual (manual), that had been entered into evidence with several pages that were blank. The Tuckiers allege nearly 90% of the pages were blank, meaning that the information on those pages had either been deleted or whited-out. Cooper asserts that these pages contained confidential product information and that pursuant to M.R.C.P. 26(d), it was allowed to protect this confidential information. Cooper further asserts that the Tuckiers should not have been allowed to make reference to the blank pages in this manual because they failed to object to the form of the manual or file a motion to compel this information during the discovery process. ¶ 34. However, this manual was offered into evidence by the Tuckiers without any objection from Cooper, during the Tuckiers' cross-examination of Cooper employee Larry Dowd (Dowd). Dowd identified the manual and stated on cross-examination that the manual had, lots of blank pages in here so it's different. I mean it's difficult to tell if this is the manual I use or not. Dowd further stated, from the pieces that are here, yes, it looks like pieces of mine. The Tuckiers had every right to question witnesses about this item of evidence. ¶ 35. The manual was admitted into evidence, and the Tuckiers should be allowed to question witnesses because the manual was relevant evidence. As the Tuckiers point out, the quality of the Cooper tire was at issue and one of the purposes for introducing the manual was to show the jury the quality requirements as set forth by Cooper, so that those requirements could be compared to the subject tire. The trial court did not err by allowing the Tuckiers to refer to the blank pages in this manual. ¶ 36. The manual was relevant evidence pursuant to M.R.E. 401, 402, & 403. M.R.E. 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. The quality of Cooper's tire was of consequence to the determination of the action. The standard of review for denial of a motion for mistrial is whether the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the Tuckiers to refer to the blank pages in this manual.
¶ 37. Cooper further asserts reversible error occurred when the Tuckiers made reference to an x-ray report that examined the remaining three tires on Laura's Bronco. This report was prepared by H.B. Baumgardner, an expert retained by the Tuckiers but not called as a witness. The trial court granted Cooper's pre-trial motion to exclude this evidence. Cooper questioned the Tuckiers' expert, Nonnamaker, on cross-examination, about his examination of these other three tires, and the Tuckiers questioned Nonnamaker in their re-direct about the x-rays of the tires that had been made. ¶ 38. Cooper cross-examined Nonnamaker whether he ever had the other three tires in his possession to inspect and whether he ever looked at the other tires. Nonnamaker answered negatively to both of these questions. Nonnamaker testified on re-direct, over Cooper's objections, that the x-rays had shown that two of the three remaining tires on Laura's Bronco had belted separations, that could have come to fruition and resulted in another one of Laura's tires separating within the next two weeks of when the accident occurred. ¶ 39. Cooper's objections to the mention of these x-rays was overruled by the trial court, and this was not an abuse of its discretion. Cooper's cross-examination was clearly aimed at destroying the credibility of the Tuckiers' expert witness, by showing that the other three tires had not been personally inspected by him. However, Nonnamaker testified that he had examined the x-rays of the remaining three tires and that two of them showed belted separations within the tire. This is relevant evidence for the jury to consider, and it was appropriate re-direct examination by the Tuckiers. The credibility of its witness had been lessened by Cooper, and the Tuckiers attempted to rehabilitate their witness by showing that he had in fact examined the other three tires through the use of x-rays, even though he had not physically seen the tires. The admission of the x-ray evidence was relevant and despite the pre-trial motions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing it. The trial court is affirmed.