Opinion ID: 381346
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The substance of the regulation.

Text: 41 The challenged regulations were issued amidst acknowledged uncertainty. Indeed, assuring safety in exposure to pesticides may be beyond the range of scientific certainty at present. 57 At the same time, analytic tools are only beginning to take shape for comparing costs and benefits of safety regulations. 58 The task for a court asked to review an administrative safety standard is to determine whether the basis for the standard satisfies the requirements of authorizing statute. 59 42 Here, the district court concluded that the Secretary could not delay the issuance of waivers until he received assurances that certain pesticides were absolutely safe or presented zero risk because the state of scientific knowledge could not in the near future, if ever, provide such assurances. 60 The court's reasoning is flawed in at least three respects. 43 First, its concern with the problem of proving absolute safety obscures the simpler question posed by this case: did the Department meet the statutory requirement for issuing waivers in announcing a list of approved pesticides solely on the basis of the Clement reports? The statute requires a finding by the Secretary based on objective data submitted by the applicant, that . . . the level and type of pesticides and other chemicals used would not have an adverse effect on the health or well-being of the individuals to whom the waiver would apply. 61 The Secretary here chose to simplify the process by announcing a list of approved pesticides. This approach is compatible with the statute, but by law the Secretary still had to find that the pesticides and chemicals used would not adversely affect the child hand harvesters. Yet here the Secretary had no data even tending to point in that direction. The Secretary relied completely on the solicited Clement reports which, as we have discussed, expressly disclaimed any assurances of safety. 62 None of the reports provides any data to show that even with the recommended entry times, pesticide exposure would not be adverse to children's health. Indeed, each Clement report recommended supervision and medical surveillance of children exposed. 63 44 This is not a case in which there are data supporting the Secretary's view, but subject to criticism. 64 The Secretary issued lists of approved pesticides solely on the basis of secondary reviews of the research literature which revealed that most critical information required for evaluating potential hazards to children is lacking. 65 The problem of proving absolute safety can in no way excuse the Secretary's failure to abide by the governing statute. 45 The reasoning of the district court is further flawed because of a factual error. The court concluded that the state of scientific knowledge could not in the near future, if ever provide requisite assurances of safety. 66 In fact, the Clement reports acknowledged that their findings were limited in no small part by the time constraints imposed by its contracts with the Department. 67 At the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, the witness from Clement testified that because of the time restrictions imposed by the contracts, Clement had never evaluated the basis for EPA pesticide standards, 68 even though EPA notified the Secretary that its data did not cover the special case of pubescent children. 69 The Clement witness also testified at the hearing that existing methodologies, applied to this special case, would be helpful, and feasible, time permitting. 70 Moreover, the EPA said the Department could and should examine retrospectively the effects of past harvest practices (to determine) whether any adverse effects are observed. 71 Nonetheless, the Department did not seek any new studies before issuing its lists of approved pesticides; it merely asked Clement to review existing literature, none of which dealt with children's exposure to pesticides. 46 Bolstered by the unsupported belief that no better evidence could be obtained, the district court concluded that the Secretary was justified in relying on the best available evidence. 72 This standard, while approved in other Department of Labor statutes, does not appear anywhere in the waiver provision. 73 This provision instead specifies the need for objective data of no adverse health effects. 74 47 Finally, the district court wrongly reasoned that the regulations had sufficient basis because absolute safety would be impossible to assure. Proof of an absolute the absence of danger is indeed beyond reach. 75 Yet such a proposition must not permit a court to substitute its view for the statute's explicit requirements. Apparently, the district court believed the requirements set by statute are impossible to fulfill. But if there ever were an instance in which Congress did not delegate discretion to an agency to establish less than absolute safety standards, this might be that case. Congress permitted a limited exception to the prohibition against child labor by imposing most stringent conditions to assure safety. The proposed bill passed by the House required merely objective proof that the employment permitted through waivers would not be deleterious to (the children's) health or well-being. 76 The Senate, however, refused to pass the bill without adding the further condition to guard specifically against adverse health effects from pesticide exposure. 77 The Senate sponsor of the initial language said new language was added just to make sure that there is no danger whatsoever from any toxic material encountered by children employed through waivers. 78 Thus, neither the legislative history nor the language of the waiver provision provides any leeway. The directive is clear. Exceptions to the prohibition against child labor can be made only upon findings, based on objective data, that the employment will not have adverse effects on the children's health or well-being. 48 The district court similarly erred in concluding that a requirement of absolute safety would in effect nullify the congressionally authorized waiver provision. 79 In fact, a situation of zero risk 80 from pesticides exists and is provided for in the regulations: fields where no pesticides are used. 81 They explicitly provide that employers may support waiver applications by submitting a statement that no pesticides or other chemicals were used on the crop to be harvested. 82 49 Apparently unaware of this possibility, the district court reasoned that stringent safety requirements would result in no waivers, and thus violate Congress' intention to permit waivers. 83 This reasoning turns the waiver provision on its head. Congress provided that the Secretary may not grant such a waiver unless  the conditions of the statute are met. 84 Congress authorized the waivers only after underscoring its commitment to protect children, especially from risks due to pesticide exposure. By conditioning waivers on the showing of proof that the work would not be deleterious or adverse to the children's health and well-being, Congress imposed tough barriers. Absent the requisite proof, Congress' intent would be violated if waivers are granted. Rather than turning the waiver provision into a nullity, plaintiffs' claim of statutory violation reflects exactly what Congress intended. Thus, plaintiffs' likelihood of prevailing on the merits is assured. 85