Opinion ID: 1161299
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Williams's Negligence.

Text: Williams's negligence was not the sole proximate cause of the accident as a matter of law. There was evidence to sustain the jury's finding that Hill's negligence was a concurrent proximate cause. The defendant's negligence must be established as a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. We have previously defined proximate cause as any cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury complained of and without which the result would not have occurred. Mahan v. Hafen, 76 Nev. 220, 225, 351 P.2d 617, 620 (1960). An efficient intervening cause is not a concurrent and contributing cause but a superseding cause which is itself the natural and logical cause of the harm. Thomas v. Bokelman, 86 Nev. 10, 13, 462 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1970). Not every intervening cause, or even every negligent intervening cause, acts as a superseding cause absolving the prior negligence. Konig v. Nevada-California-Oregon Ry., 36 Nev. 181, 135 P. 141 (1913); Alex Novack & Sons v. Hoppin, 77 Nev. 33, 359 P.2d 390 (1961). Hill and Mid-West claim that the negligence of Williams caused the accident and, because it was an efficient intervening force, they are relieved of liability. In support of their position, they cite City of Reno v. Van Ermen, 79 Nev. 369, 385 P.2d 345 (1963), in which the defendant-appellant's possible negligence was held, as a matter of law, not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Van Ermen was similarly an action by a third party injured when a speeding motorist crashed into an obstruction created by the alleged negligence of another. As in the present case, the action was brought not against the motorist but against the party responsible for the obstruction. A significant difference between Van Ermen and the instant case, however, is that the plaintiff, Van Ermen, was a passenger in the speeding car, brought into the harm by the motorist, while Drummond became imperiled as he tried to remove the obstruction on the highway. As we acknowledged in Konig v. Nevada-California-Oregon Ry., supra : Each case presents its own particular set of circumstances, and a definition of proximate cause which might apply to one might be entirely inapplicable to another. 36 Nev. at 215, 135 P. at 153. In Konig, we also said that the test for proximate cause could be found in the probable injurious consequences which were to be anticipated... . 36 Nev. at 214, 135 P. at 153. Taking the evidence as it favors Drummond, the emergency situation produced by Hill's negligence prompted efforts at rescue. Assessing the circumstances, a jury could reasonably decide that a foreseeable risk of harm to the rescuers from a negligent or nonnegligent motorist had been created. As part of the prior risk, foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the prior negligence and do not negate liability.