Opinion ID: 185178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Likelihood of an acquittal

Text: 18 Schaffer has failed to establish that Espy's testimony would be likely to result in an acquittal because his testimony is not relevant to the crime for which Schaffer was convicted. Schaffer was found guilty of violating the MIA, which provides in relevant part: 19 Any ... agent or employee of any person, firm, or corporation, who shall give, pay, or offer, directly orin directly, to any ... officer or employee of the United States authorized to perform any of the duties prescribed by this chapter ... any money or other thing of value, with intent to influence said ... officer or employee of the United States in the discharge of any duty provided for in this chapter, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.... 20 21 U.S.C. 622. The prior appeal of Schaffer's MIA conviction centered on whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Schaffer acted with the requisite intent to influence any of the Secretary's duties under the Meat Inspection Act. Schaffer, 183 F.3d at 845 (emphasis added). As the prosecuting attorney emphasized in his closing argument to the jury, this case is not ... about whether ... Secretary Espy was bought or could be bought. This is about the giver and what was in the giver's mind when the things given were given. Trial Tr. at 1702, reprinted in J.A. at 500. 21 As is evident from Espy's testimony during the evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new trial, his testimony at a new trial would do little to undermine the independent counsel's case. Espy testified that he believed that the APF function was a legitimate event, that his primary reason for traveling to Arkansas the weekend of the Tyson birthday party was to attend the APF function, and that he was aware of no attempt to influence his exercise of his official duties during the course of the weekend. Nothing in that testimony bears on Schaffer's intent in helping to arrange for Espy's attendance at these functions. The jury, for example, could fully accept Espy's statement that he believed the meeting was a legitimate event and still reasonably infer that the [APF] meeting, while legitimate, had nevertheless been set up to provide Espy with official cover. Schaffer, 183 F.3d at 847. 22 Because we conclude that the district court erred in finding that Schaffer had satisfied Thompson's second and fifth requirements, we do not reach the question of whether Espy's newly available testimony may be considered to be newly discovered within the meaning of Rule 33. Although we have previously noted this circuit's strong[ ] suggest[ion] that a non-party witness' post-trial offer to testify would fail to qualify as newly discovered evidence where the substance of the testimony was known to defendant at the time of trial, Gloster, 185 F.3d at 915, we leave for another day the question of the vitality of this court's earlier opinions in Di Giovanni v. Di Giovannantonio, 233 F.2d 26, 28-29 (D.C. Cir. 1956), and Amos v. United States, 218 F.2d 44, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1954), in which we granted new trials on the basis of newly discovered evidence that was known to exist but was unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial.