Opinion ID: 2060702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Reducing Plaintiff's Award to the Amount Paid by Medicaid and Medicare?

Text: Having hopefully answered any outstanding questions on the operation of the collateral source rule in cases in which a plaintiff's medical bills were settled for less than the billed amount, we now consider the application of the law to this case. As we noted above, the trial court denied defendant's motion in limine, which sought to limit plaintiff's evidence of medical expenses to the amount paid by Medicaid and Medicare at a reduced rate. This was correct under the law set forth above and in Arthur. The difference between this case and Arthur, however, is that this case involved a recipient of Medicaid and Medicare, and the amount of plaintiff's award was reduced after a trial. Under the reasonable-value approach that we have adopted, the fact that the collateral source was the government instead of a private insurance company is a distinction without a difference. All plaintiffs are entitled to seek to recover the full reasonable value of their medical expenses. Although Arthur involved only the evidentiary component of the collateral source rule, the language that the court used in that case was broad enough to encompass the damages component. For instance, this court stated that the collateral source rule protects collateral payments made to or benefits conferred on the plaintiff by denying the defendant any corresponding offset or credit. Such collateral benefits do not reduce the defendant's tort liability, even though they reduce the plaintiff's loss. (Emphasis added.) Arthur, 216 Ill.2d at 78, 295 Ill. Dec. 641, 833 N.E.2d 847. Moreover, this court stated that [p]laintiff, of course, is entitled to recover as compensatory damages the reasonable expense of necessary medical care and that the only relevant question was the reasonable value of those services. (Emphasis added.) Arthur, 216 Ill.2d at 81, 295 Ill.Dec. 641, 833 N.E.2d 847. This court further explained that, because the full amount of the bills had not been paid, the plaintiff would have to satisfy the requirements for admission of the bills into evidence through witness testimony. Arthur, 216 Ill.2d at 82, 295 Ill.Dec. 641, 833 N.E.2d 847. Once the bills were admitted into evidence, it was up to the jury to consider whether to award `none, part, or all of the bill as damages.' Arthur, 216 Ill.2d at 83, 295 Ill.Dec. 641, 833 N.E.2d 847, quoting Baker v. Hutson, 333 Ill.App.3d 486, 494, 266 Ill.Dec. 791, 775 N.E.2d 631 (2002). Here, we find that the trial court erred in reducing plaintiff's award of medical expenses to the amount paid by Medicaid and Medicare. Plaintiff did not produce a witness to testify that the billed amount was reasonable. However, that was not necessary here because defendant stipulated to the admission of the billed amounts and neither objected to nor offered any evidence on the question of their reasonableness. The position defendant took in this case was not that the amounts billed were not reasonable, but that the written-off amount was not recoverable as damages as a matter of law. The reasonableness requirement discussed in Arthur is part of the foundational requirement that a plaintiff must satisfy for admission of an unpaid bill into evidence. Arthur, 216 Ill.2d at 82, 295 Ill.Dec. 641, 833 N.E.2d 847; see also Arthur, 216 Ill.2d at 96, 295 Ill.Dec. 641, 833 N.E.2d 847 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting), quoting 11 Ill. Jur. Personal Injury & Torts § 5:26, at 315 (2002) ([i]f no evidence as to a bill's reasonableness is introduced, the bill is not admissible into evidence). Defense counsel explained at oral argument that the issue was set up in pretrial motions, and once the court had ruled, the defense elected not to take up the jury's time with a foundation objection. By stipulating to the admission of the billed amounts into evidence and failing to offer any objection, defendant relieved plaintiff of the burden of establishing reasonableness. Further, as Arthur clearly states, once the bill has been admitted it is for the jury to decide whether to award all, part, or none of the bill. See Arthur, 216 Ill.2d at 83, 295 Ill.Dec. 641, 833 N.E.2d 847. Here, the jury awarded the entire amount. There was no basis for the trial court to reduce plaintiff's award.