Opinion ID: 1742046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Implied PreemptionHas the State Completely Occupied the Field of Livestock Feeding Operations?

Text: The plaintiffs assert the legislature has so fully and extensively regulated livestock feeding operations that any local regulation would be inconsistent with the state regulatory framework. They also argue regulation of animal feeding operations is a matter of statewide concern and should be uniform across the state. Based on the nature of the subject to be regulated, the plaintiffs claim local laws are preempted. In evaluating these arguments, we begin with a review of the guiding legal principles in Iowa on implied preemption. A. Applicable analytical framework. Since the adoption of home rule in Iowa, we have continued to recognize that preemption may occur when the legislature has cover[ed] a subject by statutes in such a manner as to demonstrate a legislative intention that the field is preempted by state law. Cain, 342 N.W.2d at 812; accord Gruen, 457 N.W.2d at 342 (A municipal ordinance also is preempted by state law when the ordinance invades an area of law reserved by the legislature to itself.) (citing Cain, 342 N.W.2d at 812). Although this principle is simple to state, its application is less obvious. Both parties counsel a broad approach toward ascertaining implied preemption. They suggest that the court consider not only the statutory and regulatory treatment of livestock feeding operations, but also the nature of the issues to be addressed by state and local laws in this area. In essence, they ask the court to make a policy decision as to whether this area should be regulated on a statewide basis, rather than to simply decide whether this area has been regulated in such a way as to evidence the legislature's intent to reserve the area for uniform regulation. The plaintiffs cite several cases from other jurisdictions in which the courts have, in varying degrees, considered the nature of the subject matter being regulated and the need for statewide uniformity as one factor in determining whether there has been an implied preemption of the field. E.g., Envirosafe Servs. of Idaho, Inc. v. County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987); Gora v. City of Ferndale, 210 Mich.App. 622, 533 N.W.2d 840, 842 (1995), vacated, 451 Mich. 875, 549 N.W.2d 567 (1996); Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 274 Minn. 347, 143 N.W.2d 813, 819-20 (1966); Halpern v. Sullivan County, 171 A.D.2d 157, 574 N.Y.S.2d 837, 838 (1991). The analytical framework employed in these states cannot, however, be transferred to our state because the home rule statutes in these states do not include provisions similar to those found in Iowa law setting forth the breadth of home rule authority. Although some of these provisions have been quoted earlier in this opinion, they bear repeating: 1. A county may, except as expressly limited by the Constitution, and if not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly, exercise any power and perform any function it deems appropriate to protect and preserve the rights, privileges, and property of the county or of its residents, and to preserve and improve the peace, safety, health, welfare, comfort, and convenience of its residents.... .... 3.... A county may exercise its general powers subject only to limitations expressly imposed by a state law. 4. An exercise of a county power is not inconsistent with a state law unless it is irreconcilable with the state law. .... 6. A county shall not set standards and requirements which are lower or less stringent than those imposed by state law, but may set standards and requirements which are higher or more stringent than those imposed by state law, unless a state law provides otherwise. Iowa Code § 331.301; accord id. §§ 364.1,.2(2)-(3), .3(3) (governing city home rule). We have consistently endorsed and applied these principles in interpreting Iowa's home rule amendments. E.g., Decatur County, 564 N.W.2d at 397-98; Sheridan, 530 N.W.2d at 691; Sioux City Police Officers' Ass'n, 495 N.W.2d at 693-94; Gruen, 457 N.W.2d at 341-42; Cain, 342 N.W.2d at 812; Bryan v. City of Des Moines, 261 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa 1978). It would be inconsistent with Iowa's county home rule amendment, our home rule statutes and this court's prior cases to imply preemption based on an argument that statewide regulation of an area is preferable to local regulation, in the absence of an expression of legislative intent to completely regulate the area in question. Therefore, we decline the parties' invitation to engage in a wide-ranging analysis of whether statewide regulation of livestock feeding operations is desirable; our role is merely to ascertain whether the legislature has demonstrated its intention to handle livestock feeding operations exclusively on a statewide basis, or has demonstrated its desire that such operations be subjected to uniform regulation across the state. A brief review of the few cases in which we have considered the theory of subject-wide preemption provides guidance in our analysis of the issue before us in this case. As we noted above, the post-home-rule genesis of this branch of preemption was the Cain decision. 342 N.W.2d at 812 (stating legislature may preempt local regulation by covering a subject by statutes in such a manner as to demonstrate a legislative intention that the field is preempted by state law). The local action challenged in Cain was a city ordinance requiring anyone who keeps farm animals in the city limits to obtain a permit and pay a licensing fee. Id. The defendant, who had been charged with violating this ordinance, claimed the ordinance was preempted by state laws. Id. Although we recognized the existence of extensive state regulations and licensing provisions for farmers who keep or breed livestock, we found no preemption. Id. We reached the same result in Bryan v. City of Des Moines . In that case, we upheld local educational requirements for promotion of police officers despite the extensive statutory regulation of civil service employees. Bryan, 261 N.W.2d at 686. The court observed that Iowa's civil service law did not expressly purport to divest local authorities from imposing additional qualifications on civil service employees seeking promotion. Id. at 687. The holding and rationale of the Bryan decision was most recently applied and followed in the Sioux City Police Officers' Ass'n case. See Sioux City Police Officers' Ass'n, 495 N.W.2d at 694-95 (considering local anti-nepotism policy). These cases can be helpfully contrasted with an earlier case in which this court held a local ordinance was preempted. This case, City of Vinton v. Engledow, 258 Iowa 861, 140 N.W.2d 857 (1966), was the source for the Cain court's statement that preemption can be based on the legislature's action in covering a subject ... in such a manner as to demonstrate [its] intention [to preempt]. Cain, 342 N.W.2d at 812. In City of Vinton, the court considered whether a local traffic ordinance was preempted by state traffic laws. 258 Iowa at 864-66, 140 N.W.2d at 859-60. The court concluded the local law was preempted because the legislature had indicated its desire for uniformity in this area by stating the following in chapter 321, which deals with rules of the road: `The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein and no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this chapter unless expressly authorized herein.' Id. at 865, 140 N.W.2d at 860 (quoting Iowa Code § 321.235 (1962)). We held this expression of legislative intent preempted local action. Id. at 867-68, 140 N.W.2d at 861-62. [12] A comparison of the City of Vinton case with Cain and Bryan illustrates the high degree of expression required of the legislature before this court will find subject-wide preemption. These cases show that extensive regulation of an area is not sufficient in the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent to preempt regulation of a field by local authorities, or a clear expression of the legislature's desire to have uniform regulations statewide. Consequently, in this case we look to the statutes and regulations controlling the construction and operation of livestock feeding facilities to determine whether they contain the necessary expression of legislative intent to preclude local regulation. B. Application of law to facts. The plaintiffs rely generally on the extensiveness of the regulations governing animal feeding operations to support their argument that this area has been fully occupied by the legislature. As we have discussed, however, the expansive scope of state regulation is not enough under Iowa law to support a finding of intent to preempt. More specifically, the plaintiffs cite to three provisions of House File 519, a bill regulating animal feeding operations and recently enacted into law by the general assembly, see 1995 Iowa Acts ch. 195, to support their theory of preemption. These three provisions have been codified as (1) Iowa Code section 657.11, limiting nuisance suits against animal feeding operations, (2) Iowa Code section 455B.201, prohibiting groundwater contamination from manure disposal, and (3) Iowa Code section 455B.173(13), authorizing the Environmental Protection Commission to adopt rules relating to the construction or operation of animal feeding operations. None of these statutes, or the regulations promulgated pursuant to them, however, contain an expression of legislative intent to eliminate local home rule authority in the area of livestock feeding operations. Nor do we find any statement that uniformity or statewide regulation is the goal of the general assembly. Absent such expressions from the legislature that it has made the policy judgment that local regulation should be precluded, we must apply the home rule principles of our constitution and chapter 331. These principles authorize local regulation unless local action conflicts with state law or otherwise is contrary to the principles of home rule power set forth in chapter 331 and the Iowa Constitution. We turn now to an examination of each ordinance to determine whether it conflicts with state statutes or regulations.