Opinion ID: 1387773
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Submission of Issues to Jury

Text: Carver argues that: (1) it was error to find the agreement was ambiguous; (2) even if the agreement was ambiguous, it was error to submit Counts III and IV to the jury because the parties clearly intended that the ninety-day provision should not apply to lease extensions or expansions; and (3) the court's instructions erroneously allowed the jury to redetermine the issue of ambiguity. The agreement, when read as a whole, is ambiguous. Paragraph 2(d), which provides for commissions on extensions and expansions that occur during the term of the agreement, appears in a document entitled Schedule of Commissions. The Schedule of Commissions is expressly made subject to the Exclusive Leasing Agreement to which it is attached. The Exclusive Leasing Agreement provides for commissions on leases executed within ninety days after the agreement expires, if Leon negotiated with those tenants prior to expiration of the agreement, and if he had submitted a list of those tenants within 10 days following such expiration. Thus, the phrase during the term of the agreement found in Paragraph 2(d) can be read to mean either prior to the expiration date or prior to the end of the ninety-day period following the expiration date. Leon's understanding of the ambiguity was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide the intentions of the parties and to conclude further that the parties had intended the ninety-day provision to apply to extensions of term and expansions of space by existing tenants, and not simply to new tenants, as Carver contended. Contrary to Carver's assertions, the trial court's instructions on Counts III & IV did not allow or instruct the jury to redecide the issue of ambiguity. It explicitly charged the jury to determine the intent of the parties. The introductory explanation of the term ambiguous in the instruction was, at worst, harmless surplusage. An unnecessary instruction is not grounds for reversal if it does not mislead the jury. El Paso Electric Co. v. Pinkerton, 96 N.M. 473, 475, 632 P.2d 350, 352 (1981).