Opinion ID: 2509294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Intimidation of a Defense Witness

Text: Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by intimidating a defense witness, Victoria Eckstone. His argues this misconduct violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, among other constitutional rights. `Governmental interference violative of a defendant's compulsory-process right includes, of course, the intimidation of defense witnesses by the prosecution. [Citations.] [ķ] The forms that such prosecutorial misconduct may take are many and varied. They include, for example, statements to defense witnesses to the effect that they would be prosecuted for any crimes they reveal or commit in the course of their testimony. [Citations.]' ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 835, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Ms. Eckstone testified that she believed defendant was the father of her child, had spent time with the child, and loved her. On recross-examination, she was confronted by the prosecutor with her statement to a detective that she would not allow defendant near her child. Therefore, on redirect, she testified that, during the investigation of this case, the prosecutor called her several times and, when she finally returned his call, threatened to arrest her unless she spoke to him. She testified further, I told them pretty much anything they wanted to hear as long as I wasn't going to get arrested. On further recross-examination, she acknowledged that what she was actually told by someone in the prosecutor's office was, `I guess we're going to have to come out and get you,' which she considered a threat for an arrest. She testified further that she had not intentionally lied to the prosecutor. In a bench conference after her testimony, the trial court disclosed it had received a note from the bailiff that said sheriff's deputies in the courtroom believed Eckstone might be under the influence of a controlled substance. The court said she could either be arrested or examined by a drug recognition expert or simply kept on call. The prosecutor asked she be examined because if she's under the influence of a substance, I think the jury needs to know that. The court agreed her demeanor and behavior was highly unusual, to say the least. Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court ordered the examination in another part of the courthouse and outside the presence of the jury. Subsequently, the trial court reported on the record that the examination had taken place, and there was some indication of substance usage but not enough to make an arrest. We find no supportable claim of prosecutorial intimidation. The record makes clear that the alleged threat of arrest was simply a matter of interpretation on Eckstone's part. Moreover, even if the prosecutor had overreached during the investigatory part of this case, he did not interfere with defendant's Sixth Amendment compulsory process rights because Eckstone appeared and testified on defendant's behalf, not only in the guilt phase, but in the penalty phase. Thus, this case is easily distinguishable from the cases defendant relies upon in support of his argument, in which prosecutorial threats to charge a defense witness with perjury ( People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 835, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673; People v. Bryant (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 582, 590, 203 Cal.Rptr. 733), or apprising a defense witness of his privilege against self-incrimination in an intimidating fashion ( People v. Warren (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 961, 973-974, 207 Cal.Rptr. 912), deprived the defendant of the testimony of that witness. Defendant suggests that the threat of arrest may have subtly influenced Eckstone's demeanor. This is mere speculation. We also reject his claim that prosecutorial misconduct was involved in Eckstone's detention for possible drug use. The request came not from the prosecutor or the court, but from police present in the court-room. The extent of the prosecutor's participation was his legitimate observation that whether a witness is testifying under the influence of drugs is relevant to credibility. ( People v. Viniegra (1982) 130 Cal. App.3d 577, 581, 181 Cal.Rptr. 848 [It is well established that a witness may be questioned as to whether he or she has recently used, or is under the influence of, drugs].) Additionally, the detention did not prevent Eckstone from returning to testify for defendant at the penalty phase. There was no misconduct and no constitutional violation.