Opinion ID: 1113445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Procedural Issues

Text: (17) Respondent argues relief in this case is procedurally barred because petitioner has not explained the delay in raising the issue of his age in this collateral attack. The rule requiring a habeas corpus petitioner to justify any substantial delay in raising a claim, however, is inapplicable to a claim, as here, of sentencing error amounting to an excess of jurisdiction. An appellate court may correct a sentence that is not authorized by law whenever the error comes to the attention of the court. ( In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 191 [178 Cal. Rptr. 324, 636 P.2d 13].) We thus reject respondent's argument.
(18) Respondent next contends petitioner's failure to seek pretrial writ relief following the fitness hearing certifying him to adult court requires that we find he waived the issue. In support, respondent relies on People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698 [135 Cal. Rptr. 392, 557 P.2d 976] (hereafter Chi Ko Wong ). As we explain, although that case set forth the general rule, it does not control this case. On the question of the proper challenge to a juvenile certification order, Chi Ko Wong, supra, 18 Cal.3d 698, sets forth the general rule that a minor must challenge a fitness determination by pretrial writ or be deemed to have waived any challenge to the propriety of the certification. ( Id. at p. 714.) By establishing this general rule, however, we did not create an inevitable obstacle to judicial review. Instead, we merely announced that a certification order may normally be challenged only by extraordinary writ. ( Id. at p. 714, italics added.) Thus, for example, we went on to explain that in creating the rule that a minor must challenge a fitness determination by way of pretrial writ on pain of waiver, we did not purport to foreclose the right of an accused ... to assert in a proper case by petition for the writ of habeas corpus a challenge to his detention on the ground of a fundamental jurisdictional defect [citation] or, as here, a challenge to a defect which may have been waived but which, unlike the present case, the accused nevertheless preserved by timely if unsuccessful action. ( Chi Ko Wong, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 716.) A comparison between the present case and Chi Ko Wong compels the conclusion that petitioner did not waive the issue. The juvenile there did not raise an age-based challenge to his certification order. Instead, he claimed (1) inflammatory hearsay information was introduced against him at the fitness hearing, and (2) the referee failed to state his reasons for finding him unfit. ( Chi Ko Wong, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 716.) These are ordinary challenges to the certification order; the first is a garden-variety evidentiary complaint, the second a familiar procedural lament. Neither challenge rises to the fundamental level of the age-based claim asserted by petitioner Harris. In short, the petitioner in Chi Ko Wong challenged the correctness of the fitness determination, but did not dispute his eligibility to be tried as an adult. Petitioner Harris, by contrast, challenges his eligibility for the entire fitness determination process. For the aforementioned reasons, we find Chi Ko Wong, supra, 18 Cal.3d 698, is not controlling on the facts presented in this case. Accordingly, on the particular facts of this case, we reject respondent's contention that petitioner waived the issue of his age by failing to seek a pretrial writ.
(19) Respondent further argues that petitioner is procedurally barred from raising the issue of his age because the previous Court of Appeal decision rejecting his lack of jurisdiction claim is law of the case. (See generally, People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835 [120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 533 P.2d 211].) The rule discussed above that one may renew on habeas corpus certain challenges to a final judgment even after unsuccessfully raising the issue on direct appeal, however, presupposes that no law of the case barrier exists. (See In re Reed (1983) 33 Cal.3d 914, 918, fn. 2 [191 Cal. Rptr. 658, 663 P.2d 216].) None of the cases respondent cites contradicts this basic proposition nor applies the law of the case doctrine to prohibit an excess of jurisdiction challenge on habeas corpus. Accordingly, we reject the argument. There being no procedural bar to considering the merits of the petition, we next turn to whether petitioner was 16 years old at the time of the homicide-related offenses and thus properly subject to a finding of unfitness and trial as an adult.