Opinion ID: 2180320
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment

Text: [¶ 41] The First Amendment guarantees religious freedom by providing: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.  U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). The Diocese, relying principally on Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993), asserts that the imposition of a fiduciary-based duty of due care in this case will violate the Free Exercise Clause because it will necessarily encroach upon the Diocese's authority to decide such things in accordance with their own theological premises and governance traditions. We consider both decisions in some detail because they are central to our resolution of the Diocese's claim of immunity from suit based on its free exercise rights. [¶ 42] Smith involved the denial of workers compensation benefits for two employees of a private drug rehabilitation organization. 494 U.S. at 874, 110 S.Ct. 1595. The organization fired the workers because they ingested peyote, in violation of Oregon law, for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church, to which they belonged. Id. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, a five-member majority of the Supreme Court concluded that there was no violation of the Free Exercise Clause because if prohibiting the exercise of religion is not the object of a law, but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. 494 U.S. at 873, 878, 110 S.Ct. 1595. The Court noted that it has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. [11] Id. at 878-79, 110 S.Ct. 1595. [¶ 43] Justice O'Connor, writing for four members of the Court, concurred in the result, but criticized the majority for disregard[ing] [the Court's] consistent application of free exercise doctrine to cases involving generally applicable regulations that burden religious conduct. Id. at 891-92, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Instead, she wrote, the Court should adhere to its established Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence: To say that a person's right to free exercise has been burdened, of course, does not mean that he has an absolute right to engage in the conduct. Under our established First Amendment jurisprudence, we have recognized that the freedom to act, unlike the freedom to believe, cannot be absolute. Instead, we have respected both the First Amendment's express textual mandate and the governmental interest in regulation of conduct by requiring the government to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Id. at 894, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (citations omitted). Applying this standard, she concluded that although Oregon's criminal prohibition places a severe burden on the ability of respondents to freely exercise their religion, id. at 903, 110 S.Ct. 1595, the uniform application of [the] prohibition is essential to accomplish its overriding interest in preventing the physical harm caused by the use of a Schedule I controlled substance, id. at 905, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (quotation marks and citations omitted). [12] [¶ 44] The test established by the majority in Smith was subsequently applied in Lukumi, in which a church challenged the constitutionality of Hialeah city ordinances that, among other things, outlawed the sacrificial killing of animals. 508 U.S. at 524, 526, 113 S.Ct. 2217. At the time, the church had announced plans to construct a house of worship in Hialeah for the purpose of practicing the Santeria faith, which includes animal sacrifice as a part of its rituals. Id. at 525-26, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the ordinances unconstitutionally infringed upon the church's free exercise of religion, but divided as to the reasons why. See id. at 522, 557, 559, 577, 113 S.Ct. 2217. [¶ 45] Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority of the Court, [13] analyzed the ordinances in a manner that built on the approach adopted in Smith: In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and, as becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. These ordinances fail to satisfy the Smith requirements. Id. at 531-32, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (emphasis added) (citations omitted.) [¶ 46] Justice Kennedy concluded that the ordinances failed the test of neutrality because, although the ordinances were facially neutral, the Free Exercise Clause extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality and covert suppression of particular religious beliefs. Id. at 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The record established that the Santerian belief in ritualistic animal sacrifice was the ordinances' target, and that [a]part from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object. Id. at 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The Court also concluded that the ordinances failed the test of general applicability: Despite the city's proffered interest in preventing cruelty to animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice. Id. at 542-43, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Because the ordinances were substantially underinclusive in achieving their stated purpose of preventing cruelty to animals and protecting public health  they did not, for example, prohibit sport fishing or the euthanasia of stray animals  they failed the test of general applicability. Id. at 537, 543-44, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Not only did the ordinances fail the tests of neutrality and general applicability, they also could not survive the second level of scrutiny recognized in Smith, requiring a law that fails those tests to be narrowly tailored and to advance a compelling government interest. Id. at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217. [¶ 47] The Diocese urges us to consider, in particular, Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Lukumi, in which he advanced the view of the four concurring justices in Smith and wrote critically of the Court's adherence to the Smith rule that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated so long as a law satisfies the criteria of neutrality and general applicability. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 559, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Justice Souter specifically took issue with the Court's treatment of the concept of neutrality as only demanding formal neutrality, that is, neutrality, which as a free-exercise requirement would only bar laws with an object to discriminate against religion. Id. at 561-62, 113 S.Ct. 2217. He viewed neutrality as also requiring substantive neutrality, that is, in addition to demanding a secular object, [it also] generally require[s] government to accommodate religious differences by exempting religious practices from formally neutral laws. Id. at 562, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The defect with the Smith standard under this view is that it excludes from the protection of the Free Exercise Clause laws of general applicability that satisfy formal neutrality, but, when applied, unduly burden the free exercise of religion: [W]e have said, [o]ur cases have established that [t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden. Id. at 565, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 48] Justice Souter's broader view of neutrality is consistent with the formulation of neutrality applied in earlier decisions such as Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). In that case, the Court affirmed the invalidation of the convictions of Amish parents who were prosecuted for violating Wisconsin's mandatory school attendance law for children under the age of sixteen. Id. at 207, 92 S.Ct. 1526. The Court stated, A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. Id. at 220, 92 S.Ct. 1526. [¶ 49] In evaluating Fortin's claim, the result is the same whether we apply the Smith standard or the more rigorous standard advanced by Justice Souter's Lukumi concurrence. Judicial imposition of a civil duty based on the existence of a special relationship, as postulated in section 315(b) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, satisfies the Smith standard because it is a legal requirement that (1) is facially neutral and does not overtly or covertly target religious beliefs or practices, and (2) satisfies the requirement of general applicability because it applies to all individuals and organizations, not just religious organizations. As we recognized in Swanson, courts do not inhibit the free exercise of religion by applying neutral principles of law to a civil dispute involving members of the clergy. 1997 ME 63, ¶ 8, 692 A.2d at 443. [¶ 50] The Diocese asserts that such a civil duty cannot meet the test of neutrality because applying uniform standards of management to churches and secular corporations alike is not neutral because it ignores their fundamental differences and fails to recognize that churches are constitutionally protected in their beliefs and practices. This assertion implicates the more rigorous standard of constitutional review advanced by Justice Souter in his Lukumi concurrence. The Free Exercise Clause does not, however, immunize the Diocese from any interference in its internal hierarchical relationships so long as the application of neutral principles of law defers `to the resolution of [any] doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.' Swanson, 1997 ME 63, ¶ 8, 692 A.2d at 443 (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979)). As Justice O'Connor stated in Smith, religious conduct is not automatically immune from all governmental regulation simply because it is motivated by ... sincere religious beliefs. 494 U.S. at 897, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (O'Connor, J., concurring). [¶ 51] What most clearly distinguishes the Diocese's free exercise claim in this case from Smith, Lukumi, and the other free exercise decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court cited by the Diocese is the Diocese's failure to identify a specific religious doctrine or practice that will be burdened if Fortin's claim is not dismissed. In each of the decisions cited, the Court applied the Free Exercise Clause in connection with a specific doctrine or practice that its adherents claimed would be infringed upon by state action. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 523-24, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (addressing the Free Exercise Clause as applied to the animal sacrifice practices of the Santeria religion); Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (addressing the Free Exercise Clause as applied to the use of peyote as a sacramental ritual prescribed by a Native American church); Jones, 443 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (addressing the Free Exercise Clause as applied to a civil court's reliance on specific religious doctrines to resolve a church's internal property dispute); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) (addressing the Free Exercise Clause as applied to the allocation of hierarchical authority within a church as directed by the church's governing documents); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399-401, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (addressing the Free Exercise Clause as applied to Seventh-Day Adventist doctrine prohibiting work on its Sabbath); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210, 92 S.Ct. 1526 (addressing the Free Exercise Clause as applied to Amish doctrines concerning their objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade [which] is firmly grounded in Amish religious beliefs). [¶ 52] In none of these cases was the Court asked, as we are here, to find that the imposition of a neutral civil duty violates the Free Exercise Clause based solely on a generalized claim that it will interfere with a religion's doctrines or practices. For example, the Diocese contends that Fortin's claim will result in the court assessing, and approving or disapproving, fundamental theological doctrines concerning sin, penance, forgiveness and redemption. Theological beliefs only become relevant to the First Amendment analysis, however, if the Diocese demonstrates that its ability to practice specific beliefs will be interfered with in some real and substantial way. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 565, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that the free exercise of religion is violated only when a law or regulation place[s] a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). The Diocese has not asserted that it actually holds to ecclesiastical doctrines concerning sin, penance, forgiveness and redemption that would have prevented or restricted the Bishop from intervening after learning that Melville might be sexually abusing boys, or from otherwise reporting this information to the police or the members of the parish. [¶ 53] The Free Exercise Clause is violated only when laws actually conflict with a religion's specific doctrines and therefore impose penalties either for engaging in religiously motivated conduct or for refusing to engage in religiously prohibited conduct. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (1990). We cannot infer from the Diocese's generalized assertions that there is, in fact, an actual doctrine or practice that will be substantially burdened by the resolution of Fortin's claim. [¶ 54] Accordingly, whether we apply the Smith standard or the more rigorous standard advanced by Justice Souter in Lukumi, the result in this case is the same. For the reasons previously discussed, the Smith standard is not violated if Fortin's claim is permitted to proceed because the imposition of a duty pursuant to section 315(b) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS meets the tests of neutrality and general applicability. In addition, the more rigorous standard advanced by Justice Souter is not violated because we cannot conclude, at least at this early stage of this proceeding, that the imposition of a duty of due care will place[ ] a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice of the Diocese. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 565, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (Souter, J., concurring) (quotation marks omitted). On the limited record before us, there is simply no basis to conclude that any resulting burden on religious observance will be substantial.