Opinion ID: 2508270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Aggravated Battery and Shooting at or from a Motor Vehicle

Text: {17} As with the convictions related to the death of Solisz, Defendant argues that his convictions of both aggravated battery and shooting at or from a motor vehicle for the unitary conduct of shooting Martinez violates double jeopardy. For reasons similar to those expressed above, we reject this argument. {18} Our analysis of this claim again focuses on legislative intent. Applying the Blockburger same elements test, we agree with Defendant's concession that each of these crimes contains an element that the other does not. Aggravated battery requires an intent to injure, which is not an element of shooting at or from a motor vehicle. The crime of shooting at or from a motor vehicle requires the discharge of a firearm at or from a motor vehicle, which is not an element of aggravated battery. Thus, there is a presumption that the Legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses. {19} Other indicia of legislative intent support this presumption. These two statutes have different social aims. The aggravated battery statute is directed at preserving the integrity of a person's body against serious injury. State v. Vallejos, 2000-NMCA-075, ¶ 18, 129 N.M. 424, 9 P.3d 668. As noted above, the purpose of the shooting at or from a motor vehicle statute is not principally to protect bodily integrity, Highfield, 113 N.M. at 608, 830 P.2d at 160; it has a narrower goal of protecting the public from reckless shooting at or from a vehicle. Gonzales, 113 N.M. at 225, 824 P.2d at 1027. This crime reflects the Legislature's judgment that traditional homicide and assault and battery crimes are inadequate to respond to the particular dangers involved with motor vehicle shootings. For shootings from a motor vehicle, including drive-by shootings, the Legislature was concerned with the heightened risk of harm to a larger number of people from firing out of a moving object and the ease of escape from use of a vehicle during the commission of the crime. For shooting at a vehicle, the Legislature directed its attention at the substantial dangers associated with firing on an enclosed space that is likely to be occupied by people. Addressing an analogous question, we concluded in Sosa that the crimes of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and shooting into a vehicle proscribe different social evils. 1997-NMSC-032, ¶ 38, 123 N.M. 564, 943 P.2d 1017; accord People v. Rivera, 216 Mich.App. 648, 550 N.W.2d 593, 595 (1996) (allowing convictions for the crimes of assault with intent to commit murder and discharge of a firearm from a vehicle in part because [t]he social norms protected by the respective statutes differ markedly). Similarly, in Highfield, the Court of Appeals, relying on Gonzales, determined that assault with intent to commit a violent felony and shooting at a dwelling protect different social norms and achieve separate legislative policies. 113 N.M. at 608-09, 830 P.2d at 160-61. {20} As another indicator of legislative intent, it is possible to commit each of these crimes without committing the other. If an individual fires a gun out of a car with reckless disregard but without a specific intent to injure, such as by shooting randomly or in the air, and causes great bodily harm, the individual will have violated Section 30-3-8(B) but will not have committed aggravated battery. There are also, of course, a multitude of ways to commit aggravated battery without the involvement of a motor vehicle. {21} We conclude that the Legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses by enacting the aggravated battery statute and the shooting at or from a motor vehicle statute. We therefore reject Defendant's claim that these two convictions violate double jeopardy.