Opinion ID: 47133
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Williams II

Text: In Williams II, Williams argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for specific performance of the plea agreement in Williams I. He contends that the “No Further Charges” provision prevented the government from indicting him in Williams II. He argues that Williams II and Williams I were “related” because he used a counterfeit JSO check, which was the same conduct he was indicted for in Williams I, to make a payment on the fraudulently obtained credit card. He contends that the government was aware of the investigation that lead to the charges in Williams II at least six months before he entered into the plea agreement in Williams I, and the conduct in the instant case occurred during the same time period as that in Williams I. He questions what other charges the “No Further Charges” provision of the plea agreement could have referred to and asserts that the district court’s line of reasoning in denying his motion was flawed. He asserts that cases involving fraud do not occur in a vacuum and that his conduct in Williams I helped to perpetuate the cover-up of his conduct in the instant case. When the government fails to honor a plea agreement, the court has the discretion of determining the appropriate remedy. United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1527 (11th Cir. 1990). A knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives all 12 nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings against a defendant. United States v. Fairchild, 803 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th Cir. 1986). After reviewing the record, we conclude that Williams waived his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion for specific performance. Williams ultimately entered an unconditional plea of guilty. Additionally, prior to entering his guilty plea, the district court informed Williams, among other things, that his plea was unconditional and that he would be giving up the right to appeal the denial of his motion. Williams does not contend that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary. Accordingly, because Williams’s claim is nonjurisdictional, he waived his right to appeal the denial of his motion for specific performance when he entered his unconditional guilty plea. Next, Williams argues that the 92-month sentence imposed by the district court was unreasonable, despite his criminal history, because it resulted from an unrequested upward departure. He contends that his sentence is three-times longer than the high-end of the applicable guideline range, which was 24 to 30 months imprisonment. “A district court’s decision to depart from the guidelines is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Jones, 289 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding 13 that pre-Booker standards for reviewing application of the Sentencing Guidelines still apply post-Booker because the “reasonableness” standard applies to the ultimate sentence imposed, not application of individual guidelines). “The district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines is subject to de novo review on appeal, while its factual findings must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Ellis, 419 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). After the court correctly calculates the guidelines, the court may impose a more severe or more lenient sentence, which we review for reasonableness in light of the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Jordi, 418 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 812 (2005). Section 4A1.3 of the guidelines provides for an upward departure if a defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or likelihood for recidivism. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). In determining the basis for an upward departure, a court may consider, among other things, “prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(2)(E). The statutory maximum for violating § 1028 was 15 years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1028. The statutory maximum for violating § 1029 was 10 years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1029. 14 The district court’s sua sponte application of an upward departure does not render Williams’s sentence unreasonable. As an initial matter, the district court did not abuse its discretion by sua sponte imposing an upward departure. The guidelines expressly authorize a court to depart upward from a defendant’s guideline range if the court determines that the defendant’s criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or likelihood of recidivism. Unlike a provision such as U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, there is no requirement that the government make a motion for an upward departure under § 4A1.3. Williams’s claim only concerned the process by which the court came up with his sentence, and does not assert how the sentence itself is unreasonable. Nevertheless, the sentence imposed by the court is reasonable. The court correctly applied the guidelines after finding that Williams’s criminal history category under-represented the seriousness of his criminal history. The record reflects that the court considered the factors set out in § 3553(a), specifically emphasizing the need for Williams’s sentence to afford adequate deterrence and protect the public from further crimes. In light of Williams’s extensive criminal history, which included convictions in 32 cases, 27 of which involved conduct similar to the offenses involved in the cases before the court, and his repeated commission of the 15 same or similar crimes, the 92-month sentence imposed by the court achieves the sentencing purposes set forth in § 3553(a), including the specific factors emphasized by the district court. For the above stated reasons, we affirm Williams’s convictions and sentences. AFFIRMED. 16