Opinion ID: 2602179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Statutory Language Is Ambiguous

Text: Of his own accord, but with the undisputed consent of his parents, Grant decided to reveal his involvement in the murders outside his parents' earshot. In 1996 the legislature amended the Children's Code to provide for precisely this situation; it added a waiver provision. See ch. 283, sec. 1, § 19-2-511(5) 1996 Colo. Sess. Laws 1595, 1635-36. The new provision directs that [t]his express waiver shall be in writing. § 19-2-511(5). Resorting to the plain meaning of the statutory language does not answer whether the general assembly intended in writing to require a signature to be effective. On one hand, the general assembly frequently uses in writing in Colorado's statutes in a way that does not assume it encompasses signatures. For example, in the field of music copyrights, the legislature chose the following language: A contract for the payment of the royalties by a proprietor to a copyright owner or society shall: (a) Be in writing; (b) Be signed by the parties. § 6-13-103(4), 2 C.R.S. (2001) (emphasis added). A statute governing forcible entry and detainer directs, The demand ... shall be made in writing, specifying the grounds of the demandant's right to the possession of such premises, ... and shall be signed by the person claiming such possession. § 13-40-106, 5 C.R.S. (2001) (emphasis added). These are two of a multitude of examples whereby the legislature has treated in writing as separate and distinct from a signature requirement. Indeed, interpreting the phrase in writing to assume a signed document renders superfluous the separate signature language used in the above examples, an interpretation we are to avoid. See People v. Swain, 959 P.2d 426, 432 (Colo. 1998) ([I]nterpretations that render statutory provisions superfluous should be avoided.). On the other hand, Colorado statutes often contain the phrase in writing by itself, without accompanying signature language. In some of those instances, the legislature arguably intended the writings be signed. For example, section 4-2.5-309(5), 2 C.R.S. (2001), provides, The interest of a lessor of fixtures ... has priority ... if: ... (c) The encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the lease .... Surely, in this case, the written consent should bear the signature of the owner. Similarly, section 6-2-111(3), 2 C.R.S. (2001), directs, If any person,... in writing and under oath, submits to the attorney general a statement setting forth facts sufficient to constitute a prima facie case of violation of ... this article.... Again, it is difficult to conceive that the legislature would require a writing under oath, but be indifferent as to whether that writing was signed. At other times, however, a signature requirement is not necessarily implicit in instances when in writing appears alone. For example, in a statute governing unlawful telemarketing, the general assembly mandated, The availability and terms of the return and refund privilege shall be disclosed to the consumer orally by telephone and in writing with any advertising or promotional material.... § 6-1-304(2), 2 C.R.S. (2001) (emphasis added). Another example appears in the UCC, section 4-2-609(1), 2 C.R.S. (2001): When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party, the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance .... (Emphasis added.) See also § 8-4-105(4), 3 C.R.S. (2001) (Every employer shall at least monthly ... furnish to each employee an itemized pay statement in writing showing the following ....) (in this and following quotations, emphases have been added); § 8-4-120(1), 3 C.R.S. (2001) (Ascertain and disclose in writing to each migratory laborer, in a language in which the migratory laborer is fluent ....); § 17-22.5-403(6), 6 C.R.S. (2001) ([T]he state board of parole shall ... modify the conditions of parole if circumstances then shown to exist require such modifications, which circumstances shall be set forth in writing, or revoke the parole and order the return of the offender to a place of confinement ....); § 27-10.3-104(1)(b), 8 C.R.S. (2001) (At the time of the assessment by the mental health agency, if residential services are denied, the mental health agency shall advise the family, both orally and in writing, of the appeal process available to them.). None of these examples would lead one necessarily to conclude that the writing must be signed. The legislature's varied use of the phrase in writing does not unequivocally answer whether a signature must accompany such writing. Where multiple interpretations are reasonable, we may find a statute's language is ambiguous. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 502 (Colo.2000). Accordingly, we conclude that in writing as used in this statute is ambiguous.