Opinion ID: 154142
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expert Testimony Apportioning Injury

Text: Sauer contends there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could apportion his injuries between his preexisting condition and aggravation of that condition as a result of BN's negligence. Specifically, Sauer argues there must be expert testimony presented which apportions his injuries on a percentage basis between his preexisting condition and the workplace accidents before the jury can be asked to apportion his injuries. We disagree. The district court gave the following instruction on aggravation of a preexisting condition: If you find for the Plaintiff, you should compensate him for any aggravation of an existing disease or physical defect resulting from such injury. If you find that there was an aggravation, you should determine, if you can, what portion of the Plaintiff's condition resulted from the aggravation and make allowance in your verdict only for the aggravation. However, if you cannot make that determination or if it cannot be said that the condition would have existed apart from the injury, you should consider and make allowance in your verdict for the entire condition. Appellant's append. 69. The special verdict forms submitted to the jury asked for the percentage of damages from each of the two accidents attributable to preexisting conditions or prior accidents. The jury found BN was negligent only in the second accident and found 75 percent of Sauer's damages were attributable to preexisting conditions or prior accidents. -5- We conclude there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to apportion Sauer's injuries between his preexisting conditions and BN's negligence. We reject Sauer's argument that there must be expert testimony precisely apportioning the injury on a percentage basis between preexisting conditions and prior accidents. The extent to which an injury is attributable to a preexisting condition or prior accident need not be proved with mathematical precision or great exactitude. The evidence need only be sufficient to permit a rough practical apportionment. Kegel v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 790, 794-97 (D. Mont. 1968); LaMoureaux v. Totem Ocean Trailer Exp., 632 P.2d 539, 544-45 (Alaska 1981); Glassman v. St. Joseph Hosp., 631 N.E.2d 1186, 1213 (Ill. App. 1994); Dafler v. Raymark Industries, 611 A.2d 136, 140-46 (N.J. Super. 1992), aff'd 622 A.2d 1305 (N.J. 1993); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A, comment b (1965); W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 52, pp. 345, 348-52 (5th ed. 1984). See Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1170 (2d Cir. 1970); Henderson v. United States, 328 F.2d 502, 503-04 (5th Cir. 1964). Although apportionment may be difficult, like comparative negligence it is a question for which juries are well suited. See Steinhauser, 421 F.2d at 1174; Kegel, 289 F. Supp. at 797; Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 408 (N.J. 1990). Apportionment can be proved without expert testimony stating the percentage of injury attributable to the different causes. Morris v. Rogers, 456 P.2d 863, 865 (N.M. 1969). See McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498, 506-07 (1st Cir. 1996); Glassman, 631 N.E.2d at 1212-13; see also Smith v. Beaty, 639 N.E.2d 1029, 1033-35 (Ind. App. 1994) (expert testimony not required to prove which impact caused injury). When there is evidence that defendant's negligence aggravated a preexisting condition but expert testimony does not precisely apportion the injury, apportionment is an issue for the jury. Newbury v. Vogel, 379 -6- P.2d 811, 812-13 (Colo. 1963); Wise v. Carter, 119 So.2d 40, 42 (Fla. App. 1960); Becker v. D & E Distributing Co., 247 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 1976); Dafler, 611 A.2d at 140-46; Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892, 893-98 (Wyo. 1989). But see Borman v. Raymark Industries, 960 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1992); Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 528 A.2d 947 (Pa. 1987) (insufficient evidence presented to permit jury to apportion plaintiff's condition between asbestos exposure and smoking). We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the apportionment instruction. A chiropractor, Dr. Wills, and two neurosurgeons, Dr. Wirt and Dr. Beehler, agreed Sauer had preexisting degenerative changes in his upper and lower back that made him more susceptible to injury. Sauer sustained two distinct serious injuries, a ruptured disk in his lower back and a ruptured disk in his upper back. In Dr. Wills' opinion, Sauer ruptured the lower back disk in the January 6 accident, in which the jury found BN not at fault, and the upper back disk in the January 23 accident, in which the jury found BN 50 percent at fault. Thus, there was evidence that a substantial, identifiable portion of Sauer's injuries was not attributable to BN's negligence. Because there was evidence that the injuries were distinct, they could be apportioned by the jury. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A(1)(a) and comment b. Moreover, the evidence provided a basis for apportioning the injuries between the preexisting condition and the January 23 accident, in which the jury found BN 50 percent at fault. Sauer's preexisting condition made him more susceptible to injury. He had few symptoms and no significant disability from his preexisting back condition prior to the accidents in January 1992. It is true that a defendant cannot escape liability because a preexisting condition made plaintiff more susceptible to injury. See, e.g. Lancaster v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 773 -7- F.2d 807, 822 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 480 U.S. 945 (1987); Maurer v. United States, 668 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1981); Gorman v. Prudential Lines, 637 F. Supp. 879, 881 (S.D. N.Y. 1986); Kegel, 289 F. Supp. at 795; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 461 (1965). However, one of the preexisting condition instructions told the jury to reduce the damages by the likelihood that Sauer would eventually have suffered the injury even if the accident had not occurred. Sauer does not challenge that instruction on appeal, and in any case, it was a correct statement of the law. See, e.g., Lancaster, 773 F.2d at 822-23 (FELA case); Maurer, 668 F.2d at 100 (2d Cir. 1981); Steinhauser, 421 F.2d at 1173-74; Sweet Milk Co. v. Stanfield, 353 F.2d 811, 813 (9th Cir. 1965); Henderson, 328 F.2d at 504; Evans v. United Arab Shipping Co., 790 F. Supp. 516, 519 (N.J. 1992), aff'd 4 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1116 (1994) (Jones Act case applying FELA). But see Gorman, 637 F. Supp. at 881. Sauer's only objection to the instruction at trial was that it was not supported by the evidence. There was evidence to support the instruction. Dr. Beehler testified it was possible that Sauer's degenerative condition would eventually have worsened if the accidents had not occurred, although there was no way to tell whether it would eventually cause symptoms. Dr. Wills testified the degenerative process would lead to problems over time or because of some exciting cause or trauma. There was expert testimony that while healthy disks are hard to rupture, degenerated disks rupture very easily. Although Dr. Wirt could not predict how the degenerative condition would have progressed, he testified that little insignificant events, such as getting in and out of a compact car, bending down to pick up a newspaper, stepping off a curb or a locomotive, or riding in a bumpy pickup truck could rupture a degenerated disk. Dr. Beehler agreed such actions could cause a degenerated disk to rupture. -8- Given Sauer's high level of strenuous physical activity, this evidence could reasonably support a finding that Sauer would probably have ruptured the disk in his upper back in the future if the accident had not occurred. See Kegel, 289 F.Supp. at 792-97. The evidence provided a basis for apportioning some of Sauer's injuries to the preexisting condition.