Opinion ID: 1809010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Origin of Alabama Discrimination Procedure

Text: The first point on which I disagree with Justice Maddox is his premise that Batson forms the peremptory challenge framework for Alabamaif not for every state in the country. According to this premise, Alabama's framework is based on federal law. Thus, Justice Maddox states that in Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676 (Ala.1991), and Millette v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 613 So.2d 1225 (Ala. 1992), we were merely attempting to follow the Batson standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court. 681 So.2d at 185. Justice Maddox's premise is consistent with the rationale of the Court of Civil Appeals, which refused to analyze the Bruners' claims of discrimination in the selection of their jury under the procedure this Court outlined in Millette. In particular, the Court of Civil Appeals stated: Legally, the analysis used in Millette has been superseded. Since Millette was decided three years ago, the United States Supreme Court has [in Purkett v. Elem, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995)] substantially altered what the proponent of a peremptory strike must do in order to survive a Batson challenge. Bruner v. Cawthon, 681 So.2d 161 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). However, the rationale of the Court of Civil Appeals, like Justice Maddox's premise, incorrectly assumed that Alabama's peremptory challenge framework is a matter of federal law. Ignored is the fact that the movement to reform the rules relating to discrimination in jury selection was initially a state court movement. This fact was made clear in Batson itself, which was decided only after a number of state courts had already taken the initiative in ameliorating the harsh rule of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). [1] More specifically, Batson explained that two United States Circuit Courts of Appeals had recently  [f]ollow[ed] the lead of a number of state courts construing their State's Constitution to challenge as discriminatory peremptory strikes based on evidence supplied in the particular case, rather than requiring, as did the federal standard, proof of  systematic exclusion of blacks. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. at 1715 n. 1 (emphasis added). As examples, the Court cited People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978); State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984); and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979). Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. at 1715 n. 1. Significantly, when this Court in Ex parte Jackson, 516 So.2d 768 (Ala.1986), first discussed the operation of Batson, it relied on the same state cases cited in Batson as cases on which to establish the principle under consideration. The extent of this reliance is illustrated by the following excerpt from Jackson: In the face of the harsh burden of Swain, several state courts have found that their state constitutions required a lesser burden on a defendant. See State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct.App.1980); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979), People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978). The Second Circuit in McCray v. Abrams, [750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir.1984),] gave an excellent summary of the state court cases cited above and their analyses of their state constitutions. The California Supreme Court found that `the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.' Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d at 276-77, 148 Cal.Rptr. at 903, 583 P.2d at 761-62. In Soares, supra, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts wrote: `What we view art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights as proscribing is the use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely by virtue of their membership in, or affiliation with, particular, defined groupings in the community. Were we to decline to so hold, we would leave the right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community wholly susceptible to nullification through the intentional use of peremptory challenges to exclude identifiable segments of that community.' 377 Mass. at 486, 387 N.E.2d at 515.  We particularly note the holding of the Florida Supreme Court in Neil, supra: `Article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution guarantees the right to an impartial jury. The right to peremptory challenges is not of constitutional dimension. The primary purpose of peremptory challenges is to aid and assist in the selection of an impartial jury. It was not intended that such challenges be used solely as a scalpel to excise a distinct racial group from a representative cross-section of society. It was not intended that such challenges be used to encroach upon the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury. As did the New York, California, and Massachusetts courts, we find that adhering to the Swain test of evaluating the peremptory challenges impedes, rather than furthers, article I, section 16's guarantee. We therefore hold that the test set out in Swain is no longer to be used by this state's courts when confronted with the allegedly discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.' 457 So.2d at 486. Although we know that the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether Batson v. Kentucky is to be applied retroactively, this Court does not need to await revelation from the federal judiciary when our own state constitution also guarantees to a criminal defendant the equal protection of the laws. Sections 1, 6, and 22, Ala. Const.1901, combine to guarantee equal protection of the laws. City of Hueytown v. Jiffy Chek Co., 342 So.2d 761 (Ala.1977).... The doctrine of equal protection of the laws requires that the guarantee of trial by an impartial jury not be illusory. The defendant Jackson was under the Swain burden when he attempted to show the prosecution's alleged discriminatory use of its peremptory strikes. This was too great a burden. Our state constitution requires that Jackson be entitled to test the prosecution's use of its peremptory strikes under a rule similar to the one set forth in Batson v. Kentucky: `[A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group [citation omitted], and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits `those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' [Citation omitted.] Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empanelling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. `In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a `pattern' of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. These examples are merely illustrative. We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor s use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors.' 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23. Once the defendant has made a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, then the prosecution must come forward with valid non-racial reasons for its strikes. The Florida Supreme Court has given an illustration of the prosecution's burden: `The reasons given in response to the court's inquiry need not be equivalent to those for a challenge for cause. If the party shows that the challenges were based on the particular case on trial, the parties or witnesses, or characteristics of the challenged persons other than race, then the inquiry should end and jury selection should continue. On the other hand, if the party has actually been challenging prospective jurors solely on the basis of race, then the court should dismiss that jury `pool' and start voir dire over with a new pool.'  Neil, 457 So.2d at 487.  No merely whimsical or fanciful reason will suffice as an adequate explanation. In light of the circumstances of the case, the trial court must use its discretion in determining whether the prosecutor's reasons are adequate.  516 So.2d at 772-73 (emphasis added). Undoubtedly, Jackson contains three of the most significant statements ever made by this Court on the subject of discrimination in jury selection. First, we said: Although we know that the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether Batson v. Kentucky is to be applied retroactively, this Court does not need to await revelation from the federal judiciary when our own state constitution also guarantees ... the equal protection of the laws.  516 So.2d at 772 (emphasis added). Second, we said: Our state constitution requires that Jackson be entitled to test the prosecution's use of its peremptory strikes under a rule similar to the one set forth in Batson v. Kentucky.  516 So.2d at 772 (emphasis added). By these two statements, this Court clearly demonstrated that it was not adopting the federal analysis set forth in Batson per se, but, rather, was adopting a quasi- Batson analysis based on Alabama state law. Third, we said: Once the defendant has made a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, then the prosecution must come forward with valid non-racial reasons for its strikes. The Florida Supreme Court has given an illustration of the prosecution's burden. 516 So.2d at 772 (emphasis added). We quoted the portion of State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984), as establishing the standard of proof needed to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. Then we added:  No merely whimsical or fanciful reason will suffice as an adequate explanation.  516 So.2d at 772 (emphasis added). These cogent statements contained in our first discussion of the  Batson  issue established the framework of the analysis that was to be used in the courts of Alabama to this day. That they established the framework on adequate and independent state law grounds is clear from a fair reading of Jackson. If further proof of this fact was needed, it came quickly in Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.1987). In Branch, this Court reiterated the basis for resolving jury discrimination issues. The Court discussed at length the statutory HISTORY OF THE DRAWING, SUMMONING, SELECTION AND EMPANELING OF JURIES IN ALABAMA. At the conclusion of this historical analysis, it stated: We believe that the Legislature intended, in adopting this public policy, that our trial juries should be selected from a list which contains a fair cross section of the area served by the court, and that any form of discrimination against a particular juror on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status is prohibited, and if liberally interpreted to apply to the ... use of peremptories, the state policy is not inconsistent with Batson or Jackson requirements. 526 So.2d at 618-19 (emphasis added). [2] The Court then proceeded to flesh out the framework established in Jackson. In doing so, it drew extensively from rules set forth in state cases, such as People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 (1978); People v. Hall, 35 Cal.3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal.Rptr. 71 (1983), People v. Turner, 42 Cal.3d 711, 726 P.2d 102, 230 Cal.Rptr. 656 (1986), and Slappy v. State, 503 So.2d 350 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987), aff'd, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S.Ct. 2873, 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), of those cases, Wheeler and Hall had preceded Batson. 526 So.2d at 622-24. We then emphasized: The trial court, in exercising the duties imposed upon it, must give effect to the state policy expressed in Sections 1, 6, and 22 of the Alabama Constitution and Code 1975, § 12-16-55 and § 12-16-56. 526 So.2d at 624 (emphasis in original). Four years later, in Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676 (Ala.1991), we reversed the convictions of Terry Bird and Jacob Warner on the ground that the prosecution had exercised its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 678. More specifically, our review of the reasons offered by the prosecution convinced us that the State's explanations for its peremptory strikes [fell] considerably short of the standard ... announced in Jackson and Branch. 594 So.2d at 682 (emphasis added). The absence of a reference in this statement to Batson or any other federal authority was conspicuous and intentional, for the Court sought to reinforce the ideaif it needed any reinforcement that peremptory strikes in Alabama were to be subject to review based on adequate and independent state law. Bird should have dispelled any lingering confusion as to the source of authority for reviewing allegations of jury discrimination. By now, therefore, it should be clear to all that in making a  Batson  motion before the jury is empaneled and sworn, Alabama litigants are simply using shorthand terminology to invoke the analysis this Court bases on the Constitution and laws of Alabama. In other words, litigants should understand that in dealing with discrimination in jury selection, Alabama has followed the lead of her sister states in guaranteeing equal protection on the basis of adequate and independent state law. The willingnessas well as the power and the dutyof the states to afford their citizens equal protection and due process on state-law grounds has been advocated by cases and commentators, including former United States Supreme Court Associate Justice William Brennan, Jr. Lecturing at the New York University School of Law on November 18, 1986, Justice Brennan identified what he perceived as the Supreme Court's involv[ment] in a new curtailment of the Fourteenth Amendment's scope of protection of individual civil and political rights. W. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 535, 546 (1986). After noting several specific examples of this phenomenon, he stated: For a decade now, I have felt certain that the Court's contraction of federal rights and remedies ... should be interpreted as a plain invitation to state courts to step into the breach. ... Now, the diminution of federal scrutiny and protection out of purported deference to the states mandates the assumption of a more responsible state court role. And state courts have taken seriously their obligation as coequal guardians of civil rights and liberties.  Id. at 548 (emphasis added). See also Brooks v. Hobbie, 631 So.2d 883, 889 (Ala. 1993) (the state court system may be a more appropriate forum for protecting [constitutional] rights [than the federal court system], because, in many instances, the individual rights provisions under the state constitution are ... broader than[ ] those in the federal Bill of Rights); Vogel v. State, 426 So.2d 882, 885 (Ala.1982) (the United States Constitution provides only the floor for protection of liberty and property interests; state constitutions and statutes provide the ceiling ) (Faulkner, J., concurring specially), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107, 103 S.Ct. 2456, 77 L.Ed.2d 1335 (1983); Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 Ala. 267, 271, 292 So.2d 651, 654-55 (1974) (Alabama may, when adjudicating claims based on state law, provide greater safeguards than would be available under the United States Constitution). In developing a state-law framework for eliminating discrimination in jury selection, Alabama has laudably risen to the challenge to serve as a coequal guardian[ ] of civil rights and liberties. W. Brennan, supra, at 548. Evidently, however, considerable confusion remains as to the source of Alabama's peremptory challenge framework, which confusion is evidenced by the reasoning contained in Justice Maddox's special concurrence and in the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion in this case. The mischief that this confusion, if not dispelled, will inject into this area of the law will be incalculable. For example, in properly applying state law, the bench and bar operate within a relatively small universe of case-law authority. Justice Maddox's universe, however, would include the entire federal court system. Because only the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are binding on our courts, litigants would be forced to scour every federal circuit for cases supporting their positions, thus inundating the bench and bar with often conflicting case law. Just as the admiralty courts have created a system comprised of general and often relatively ill-defined principles, Batson litigation has created a sea of federal common law one that is continually evolving. Justice Maddox's approach would cast litigants adrift upon this sea of federal common law. Alabama would be ill served, indeed, by such an approach. For this reason, I have taken this opportunity to say clearly that Alabama's peremptory challenge procedure is based not on federal law, but squarely on adequate and independent state law.