Opinion ID: 2395751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct Allegation

Text: Amid the particular imperatives of a prosecutor enumerated in Article V, Rule 3.8(d) of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct, is that [t]he prosecutor in a criminal case shall    make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused   . Binns advances various arguments alleging misconduct by Prosecutor Nugent at several phases of the litigation, including Nugent's purported personal knowledge of Knight's conflicting sunrise testimony and the subsequent dismissal of the arson count against Tooher immediately before the trial. We find these allegations to be devoid of merit for the following reasons. In Binns' 1995 motion for a new trial, he contends that the prosecution denied him information to which he was entitled, thereby violating Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. We concur with the Superior Court justice's findings that Nugent had no pretrial knowledge of Knight's sunrise testimony nor was his opening statement at trial and his dismissal of Tooher's arson count a precursor to this wholly unanticipated testimony offered by Knight. We further defer to the findings of the trial justice that: [T]he defendants have failed to make the least minimal showing that any evidence favorable to them for their defense was suppressed or withheld by the state and that the defendant's proposition that exculpatory evidence in the nature of a purported conflict in Knight's ` around sunrise' testimony and Williams' car fire testimony should have been disclosed is without foundation. We agree with the trial justice's determination that [w]hat ever reason prompted Nugent to dismiss the arson charges, it was not bottomed on any knowledge or concern that there was an exculpatory conflict in the testimony of Knight and Williams. Moreover, Binns had the opportunity to inquire into the elements which comprised [Nugent's] judgment call [in dismissing the charge], and they exercised a judgment call of their own in declining to do so. We comport with the trial justice's conclusions that the defendant's unsupported and unjustified accusations exceed the bounds of proper advocacy and that the defendant's failed trial strategies may not be metamorphosed into a basis for a new trial. For the aforementioned reasons, we deny and dismiss the defendant's appeals. The orders of the Superior Court are affirmed, and the papers of the case are remanded to the Superior Court.