Opinion ID: 1704873
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: General Framework for Section 448.24(1)(b)

Text: Liner asserts that section 448.24(1)(b) has both a subjective standardi.e., the first clause which states that a labor hall shall not charge [m]ore than a reasonable amount to transport a worker to or from the designated worksiteand a separate objective standard i.e., the second clause which states but in no event shall the amount exceed the prevailing rate for public transportation in the geographic area. We disagree. Instead, we conclude that the Legislature intended for section 448.24(1)(b) to constitute a single standard for evaluating the transportation fee charged by a labor hall owner. The plain language of the legislation supports an interpretation that the term reasonable amount is the centerpiece of section 448.24(1)(b). The other language contained within this statute is designed to provide meaning and a parameter for this term. Specifically, the phrase to or from the designated worksite, which follows the term reasonable amount, in the first clause of section 448.24(1)(b), is intended to modify this term. Logically, the transportation charge of a labor hall owner should only be evaluated against the cost of site-to-site public transportation between the designated worksite and the labor hall. Additionally, the second clause i.e., but in no event shall the amount exceed the prevailing rate for public transportation in the geographic areawas included to provide further meaning or a ceiling on that which may constitute a reasonable amount. Finally, we conclude that the plain language of section 448.24(1)(b) establishes that the Legislature intended for the highly specific phrase to or from the designated worksite, which is contained within the first clause, to modify the entire second clause, which includes the more general term geographic area. See Eicoff v. Denson, 896 So.2d 795, 798 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ([W]here an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated. (quoting Jacobo v. Bd. of Trustees of Miami Police, 788 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001))). The legislative history of section 448.24(1)(b) also supports this interpretation. In 1995, the Legislature initially attempted to enact a provision (with regard to the transportation fee that day laborers could be charged) that consisted of a single clause, made no mention of reasonable amount, and capped the permissible transportation charge at $1.00. [8] However, the Legislature ultimately enacted section 448.24(1)(b), which included two clauses that surround the central concept and term reasonable amount. This history demonstrates that the Legislature intended to provide greater flexibility for transportation charges that could be assessed, while maintaining the framework of a single standard of reasonableness. Tellingly, a staff analysis summarized the effect of the proposed language, which was ultimately enacted in identical form as section 448.24(1)(b): s. 448.24, F.S. (Duties and rights): Prohibits a labor pool from charging laborers... more than a reasonable amount, not to exceed the local prevailing rate for public transportation, for transporting the worker to or from the worksite. ... Fla. H.R. Comm. on Commerce, CS/HB 595 (1995) Staff Analysis 3 (Apr. 19, 1995) (on file with the Florida State Archives) (emphasis supplied). This illustrates that the Legislature understood that the phrase to or from the designated worksite, which appears in the first clause of section 448.24(1)(b), modifies the additional language contained in both the first and second clauses. In sum, the relevant legislative history further supports our conclusion that section 448.24(1)(b) contains a single standard centered upon the concept and term reasonable amount.