Opinion ID: 1736768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Bare statistics

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to find he established a prima facie case based on bare statistics alone. Racial discrimination, defendant contends, can be inferred from the record, which reflects that when he lodged his objection, the state had accepted twenty-two of twenty-five Caucasian-Americans prospective jurors tendered to it (88%), yet only one of six African-Americans (16%), and had exercised five of its eight peremptory challenges to strike African-American women (over 62%) Gender discrimination, defendant contends, likewise can be inferred from the record, which reflects that when he lodged his objection, the state had accepted fourteen of the fourteen males tendered to it (100%), yet only nine of the seventeen females (53%), and had exercised eight of its eight peremptory challenges to strike female prospective jurors (100%). Based on the application of Hyper-Geometric Distribution, defendant contends that the statistical improbability that the state would exclude such a high percentage of African-Americans and females relative to their representation in the jury pool establishes the trial court erred in failing to find the prima facie requirement was met. [15] Defendant adds that simply because the prosecutor left one African-American male on the jury despite the prosecution having four challenges left is insufficient to preclude a finding of prima facie case. [16] Although we agree with defendant that the mere presence of some African-Americans on the jury is no bar to finding a prima facie case, we also recognize, as the state contends, that it is appropriate to consider the fact that the state did not eliminate all African-Americans when deciding whether or not there exists a prima facie case of discrimination. 5 Wayne R. LaFave, et al, Criminal Procedure § 22.3(d)(2nd ed. 1999)(collecting cases including State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815 (La. 1989), for the former proposition, and State v. Thompson, 516 So.2d 349, 354 (La.1987), for the latter). [17] Neither the total exclusion of a cognizable group from the jury nor the mere presence of one or two perhaps token members of the group on the jury is dispositive of whether the prima facie requirement is satisfied. The mere inclusion of some blacks on the jury is no bar to a finding of a prima facie case, and there is not a per se rule that a certain number or percentage of the challenged jurors must be black in order for the court to conclude a prima facie case has been made out. LaFave, supra (collecting cases). Such number games, stemming from the reference in Batson to a pattern of strikes, are inconsistent with the inherently factintense nature of determining whether the prima facie requirement has been satisfied. Indeed, such attempts to fashion absolute, per se rules are inconsistent with Batson in which the court instructed trial courts to consider all relevant circumstances. 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Consequently, it is important that the defendant come forward with facts, not just numbers alone, when asking the district court to find a prima facie case. United States v. Moore, 895 F.2d 484, 485 (8th Cir.1990). Applying these principles to this case, we hold that defendant's reliance on bare statistics to support a prima facie case of both gender and race discrimination is misplaced. For completeness' sake, we separately address each of defendant's challenges.