Opinion ID: 2234677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: prior bad acts involving trotter and his ex-spouses

Text: Trotter assigns that the district court erred in refusing to suppress before trial, and in admitting into evidence at trial, the testimony of his ex-spouses that they had been physically abused by Trotter while married to him. Before Trotter's trial, the State indicated its intent to offer prior bad acts evidence involving Trotter and his ex-spouses. A hearing was held pursuant to rule 404 (404 hearing) to determine whether the alleged acts had occurred. After the 404 hearing, the district court determined that evidence of Trotter's physical abuse of his two ex-spouses would be admissible at trial. Trotter's ex-wives both testified at the 404 hearing. At the 404 hearing, Lynette Molczyk testified that she married Trotter in 1981 and that the couple was divorced in 1985. Molczyk testified that Trotter was physically violent with her during their marriage, starting the first month they were married and continuing almost on a monthly basis. In one incident, Trotter hit Molczyk in the face, breaking her glasses. In another, he pushed her down the steps as she was attempting to leave their house, causing scrapes and bruises. Molczyk testified that there were approximately five instances when Trotter grabbed Molczyk by the neck, which caused bruising. Additionally, Molczyk stated that in the summer of 1985, Trotter found Molczyk in a Wal-Mart store and pushed a shopping cart into Molczyk's back. Molczyk also testified that the son she had with Trotter has never complained about Trotter's striking, hitting, or abusing him. Trotter's second wife, Sharena Gayman, testified at the 404 hearing that she was married to Trotter from December 1987 until December 1993. Gayman stated that in the spring of 1992, she returned home from a work-related trip late one night and that Trotter started to argue with her. Gayman tried to leave the house, but before she could get to her company van, Trotter grabbed her and threw her up against the side of the van, hurting Gayman's shoulder. Gayman also testified that on a couple of other occasions, Trotter shoved her but never hit her. Additionally, Gayman said that she and Trotter were arguing on one occasion and that when she tried to leave, he prevented her from getting in her car and, while in his pickup truck, chased her around their yard and the neighbor's yard for approximately 20 minutes. Gayman also testified that Trotter never, in any way, hit, struck, or threatened her children, who were living with her and Trotter during their marriage. During the 404 hearing, the prosecutor urged that Trotter's history of domestic violence should be admissible at trial to show this man's violent tendencies towards the people living in his household. The district court determined that the evidence would be admissible at trial. In the district court's order on the admissibility of the evidence of other bad acts involving Trotter and his ex-spouses, the court found that the acts described and the injuries sustained by Trotter's ex-wives were sufficiently similar to the acts committed against Christopher to allow them at trial. The court found that the acts against Trotter's ex-wives would be similar to those committed against Christopher because, in both cases, the acts were against someone living with Trotter, Trotter had superior strength and size, there were injuries to the facial area in both cases, both parties were grabbed by the neck, and the individuals injured should have been considered loved ones by Trotter. Further, the court noted that Trotter's bad acts against his ex-wives would appear to be relevant to a jury for consideration of such things as enumerated by § 27-404(2), such as motive, opportunity, intent, identity and lack of accident or mistake. Initially we address the State's argument that Trotter is precluded from arguing that the admission of such testimony was error. During opening statements at trial, Trotter's attorney mentioned that there would be testimony during trial regarding physical contact by Trotter on his two ex-wives. The State argues that because Trotter mentioned the possible testimony during opening statements, Trotter is precluded from arguing on appeal that it was error for the district court to allow such evidence at trial. While we have not addressed the issue whether opening statements constitute evidence in the criminal context, we have stated, in the civil context, that declarations made in opening statements cannot be used as evidence in deciding a case. King v. Crowell Memorial Home, 261 Neb. 177, 622 N.W.2d 588 (2001). Other jurisdictions have held that assertions made by the defendant's counsel during opening statements in a criminal action are not evidence. See, McIntyre v. State, 717 N.E.2d 114 (Ind.1999); State v. Tevay, 707 A.2d 700 (R.I.1998); State v. Donovan, 698 A.2d 1045 (Me.1997); State v. Faison, 330 N.C. 347, 411 S.E.2d 143 (1991); Cooper v. Com., 31 Va.App. 643, 525 S.E.2d 72 (2000); Bynum v. Com., 28 Va.App. 451, 506 S.E.2d 30 (1998). See, also, State v. McCorkendale, 267 Kan. 263, 979 P.2d 1239 (1999) (opening statements by prosecutor in criminal prosecution are not evidence). Compare Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L.Ed.2d 826 (2000) (defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of prior conviction on direct examination, after in limine ruling allowing such evidence at trial for impeachment purposes, may not challenge admission of such evidence on appeal). In State v. Donovan, 698 A.2d at 1048, the court held that the defendant's opening statements did not `open the door' for rebuttal by the prosecution to evidence never brought out by the defendant at trial. The court stated that `[a] distinction exists between assertions made by counsel in an opening statement and the testimony of witnesses during trial. The latter is evidence; the former is not.' Id. In Bynum v. Com., 28 Va.App. at 458-59, 506 S.E.2d at 34, the court stated that statements made during an opening statement are not evidence; therefore, opening statements may not `open the door' to otherwise inadmissible evidence. We agree and determine that comments made by counsel during opening statements in a criminal prosecution are not evidence. Therefore, comments made by Trotter's counsel during opening statements regarding the testimony of Trotter's former spouses were not evidence. As a result, Trotter did not waive his objection to the admission of evidence at trial of other bad acts involving Trotter and his former spouses, nor is Trotter precluded from arguing on appeal that such evidence was improperly admitted at trial. Next, we address Trotter's first assignment of error on appeal: The district court erred by not informing the jury as to the specific purpose for which the prior bad acts evidence was admitted in this case pursuant to our ruling in State v. Sanchez, 257 Neb. 291, 597 N.W.2d 361 (1999). At trial, after Trotter objected to the introduction of Molczyk's testimony, the district court instructed the jury in the following manner: The jury is instructed that the witness will be allowed to testify regarding prior acts allegedly committed by the defendant on the witness. You're instructed that this testimony is not admitted to prove the character of the defendant to show that he acted in conformity therewith, but rather is being admitted for the limited purpose of evidence as to proof of motive, intent, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident regarding the offenses for which the defendant stands charged in this case. The court also gave an almost identical instruction to the jury after Trotter objected to the introduction of Gayman's testimony. In State v. Sanchez, supra , we held that a trial court is to state the specific purposes for admission of evidence under rule 404(2). The trial court in this case clearly did not state the specific purpose for which the rule 404(2) evidence was being admitted. Indeed, the district court merely cited the list of possible purposes for admitting such testimony as found in rule 404(2). See State v. Sanchez, supra . However, Trotter's trial occurred in October 1997 and, as we held in State v. Dreimanis, 258 Neb. 239, 603 N.W.2d 17 (1999), the rule set forth in State v. Sanchez, supra , is to be applied prospectively from the date of our decision in Sanchez, which was July 16, 1999. Therefore, the trial court's failure to state the specific purpose for which the prior bad acts evidence was admitted did not constitute reversible error because Trotter's trial occurred prior to our ruling in Sanchez. We next turn to the substantive rule 404 issue presented in the instant appeal. Before the prosecution may offer evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to rule 404(2), it must first prove to the trial court, out of the presence of the jury and by clear and convincing evidence, that the accused committed the crime, wrong, or act. State v. Sanchez, supra . Trotter does not specifically argue on appeal that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he physically abused his ex-wives. Therefore, we do not address this issue. The admissibility of what has been described as other crimes or similar acts evidence is governed by rule 404(2), which provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he or she acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. See State v. Sanchez, supra . It is axiomatic that only relevant evidence is admissible. State v. Sanchez, 257 Neb. 291, 597 N.W.2d 361 (1999). Evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Id.; State v. McManus, 257 Neb. 1, 594 N.W.2d 623 (1999). However, rule 404(2) prohibits the admissibility of relevant evidence for the purpose of proving the character of a person in order to show that he or she acted in conformity therewith. State v. Sanchez, supra . Stated another way, rule 404(2) prohibits the admission of other bad acts evidence for the purpose of demonstrating a person's propensity to act in a certain manner. The reason for the rule is that such evidence, despite its relevance, creates the risk of a decision by the trier of fact on an improper basis. State v. Sanchez, supra . The exclusion of other bad acts evidence offered to show a defendant's propensity protects the presumption of innocence and is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence. Id. An appellate court's analysis under rule 404(2) considers whether the (1) evidence was relevant for some purpose other than to prove the character of a person to show that he or she acted in conformity therewith, (2) probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, and (3) trial court, if requested, instructed the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which it was admitted. State v. Sanchez, supra . Therefore, we first consider whether the evidence of prior bad acts was relevant for some purpose other than to show Trotter's propensity to commit the crimes charged in the instant case. See State v. McManus, supra . The purpose for which the district court allowed evidence of Trotter's acts against his ex-wives is not clear from the record. During the pretrial 404 hearing, the prosecutor argued that Trotter's history of domestic violence is admissible to show this man's violent tendencies towards the people living in his household. In the district court's pretrial order allowing such evidence to be used at trial, the district court found that the evidence would be admissible to show motive, opportunity, intent, identity, and lack of accident or mistake. Because the district court did not state a specific purpose for which the bad acts evidence was admitted, we will consider only those purposes for the bad acts evidence which are urged in the State's brief. See State v. Sanchez, supra . The State's arguments in its brief relate mostly to identity. However, the State also appears to assert that the evidence was properly admitted to show intent, motive, and absence of mistake or accident. Thus, we will consider intent, motive, identity, and absence of mistake or accident as possible purposes for admitting the evidence.