Opinion ID: 1974418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the hearing before the administrative law judge

Text: Eleven witnesses testified at the hearing conducted by the ALJ and 24 exhibits were presented; the transcript of the proceeding consumes 551 pages. The proposed recommendation of the ALJ listed 31 facts which he found by a preponderance of the evidence [b]ased on the testimony of witnesses, exhibits submitted at the hearing and documents entered into the record after the hearing. We set them out verbatim: 1. On January 15, 1991, Sgt. William Anderson was the shift Officer in Charge (OIC) on the South Wing of the Maryland Penitentiary. 2. Sgt. Anderson was required to make two security check rounds of the South Wing during his shift. 3. During the course of the morning round, Sgt. Anderson saw an inmate being handcuffed outside of his cell which he believed was a violation of Post Order 12 and a possible breach of security. 4. Sgt. Anderson approached the cell at a rapid pace and saw Correctional Officers Brenda Dorsey and Henry Brandon with inmate Glen Wooden. 5. Officers Dorsey and Brandon had been employed by the Division of Correction for two years and ten months respectively compared with Sgt. Anderson's ten years. 6. Upon reaching the cell, Sgt. Anderson noticed that Officer Dorsey was attempting to complete handcuffing the inmate in the front by placing one cuff on the wrist and the other on a crutch. 7. Sgt. Anderson ordered the inmate to return to his cell immediately in an effort to restore compliance with Post Order 12. 8. Inmate Wooden initiated an argument with Sgt. Anderson and verbally and physically resisted the order to return into his cell. 9. The inmate told Sgt. Anderson that he was a short timer and would get him when he got uptown. This statement was clearly a threat. 10. The inmate had a history of verbal and physical assaultive behavior. 11. With minor physical pressure, the inmate backed partially into his cell, faced outward and held the crutch by the lower shaft. 12. Officer Dorsey was between Sgt. Anderson and the inmate and facing the inmate. 13. Officer Dorsey was trying to correct the handcuffing of the inmate when he (the inmate) raised the crutch as if to swing it and hit her. 14. Sgt. Anderson responded to this threat by raising his forearm to divert the blow and grabbed the crutch. 15. Sgt. Anderson interposed himself between the inmate and Officer Dorsey to prevent her injury. 16. The inmate refused to respond to Sgt. Anderson's orders to cease struggling and let go of the crutch. They grappled for the crutch and with each other. 17. During the course of this struggle, Sgt. Anderson and the inmate hit the wall of the cell several times, then the bed and finally rolled onto the floor. 18. Sgt. Anderson lay on top of the inmate pinning his arms to prevent being hit; the inmate intertwined his legs with Sgt. Anderson's and both were unable to break the hold of the other. 19. When the scuffle began, Officer Dorsey took the keys from Officer Brandon, closed the cell door and went to call in a Signal 13 indicating an officer was in confrontation with an inmate. 20. Officer Brandon remained on the scene but did not assist Sgt. Anderson in subduing and containing the inmate. 21. A response team, including Lt. Wouldridge, came to the cell pursuant to the Signal 13 call. 22. Lt. Wouldridge unlocked the cell door, entered and observed Sgt. Anderson and the inmate in the position described in Finding 19 above. 23. Lt. Wouldridge directed Sgt. Anderson to stand up who then stated he could not because of the intertwinement of his and the inmate's legs. 24. Sgt. Anderson did stand up after a response team member untangled their legs. 25. Lt. Wouldridge escorted the inmate to the inmate inhouse medical facility for treatment of his abrasions and other internal injuries. 26. The inmate's abrasions and dermal injuries could have been easily caused by the use of minimal force. 27. On January 16, 1991, Sgt. Anderson reported to work with a swollen arm, abrasions, bruises and lacerations, which caused him to seek medical treatment.... He did not report back to work until January 18, 1991. 28. All required incidents and use of force reports were properly filed by participants and observers who were on site at the time of the incident. 29. The variations in these reports resulted from the difference in recollections of the writers rather than any intent to falsify an official report. 30. Sgt. Anderson was rated overall satisfactory in his annual efficiency rating reports for 1989 and 1990 and superior in the 1988 report. 31. On January 16, 1991, Sgt. Anderson was suspended pending charges for removal. The ALJ did not address the alleged COMAR violation but he discussed each of the DCRs charged. As to DCR 50-2 IV.A.4, he said: The facts educed at the hearing do not show that Sgt. Anderson acted in a manner bringing disrepute or discredit upon the Division or himself. They do show his action reduced greatly the actual and/or probable risk of a breach of security when he came upon Officers Dorsey and Brandon attempting to handcuff the inmate outside his cell while holding a dangerous instrument (crutch). Sgt. Anderson reacted instantly to [a] dangerous situation. He intended to restore conditions to those required by DCRs and Post Orders. His response reflected favorably on the Division without discredit or disrepute. As to paragraph 19a., he observed: The facts show that Sgt. Anderson acted immediately to restore proper security with the least possible harm to himself, fellow officers and the inmate as warranted by the situation. Sgt. Anderson did not act in violation of Paragraph 19a. As to paragraph 25, he stated: The facts in this case do not reveal any intentional falsity, omission or misstatement in the required reports. They do show that the variations in the reports arose from natural differences in the recollection of witnesses and participants involved in a traumatic incident. I conclude that Sgt. Anderson did not act in violation of Paragraph 25. On the charge under DCR 50-6 IV.A, he said: In this case, Sgt. Anderson came upon a situation that was dangerous and a breach of security. The facts show he acted immediately to restore safety, security and order. Such steps cannot be characterized as negligent, careless or inattentive. Thus, I conclude he did not violate this regulation. He discussed DCR 50-54 V and VI: Sgt. Anderson repeatedly ordered the inmate to return to his cell and only resorted to force after the inmate verbally and physically refused to comply with those orders. Reasonable force was also used by Sgt. Anderson when he saw the inmate raise a weapon (crutch) to strike Officer Dorsey who stood between them. Sgt. Anderson's attempt to wrest the crutch from the inmate resulted in their scuffling, hitting the wall, bed and floor. In a matter of seconds they came to rest in a position where neither party could hit the other and the inmate had Sgt. Anderson's legs entangled so that he could not stand up. Sgt. Anderson acted immediately to protect Officer Dorsey from a blow from the crutch; his swollen forearm attests to his taking the blow himself. The standoff existing when Sgt. Anderson and the inmate immobilized each other was not a display of excessive or unnecessary force. It was an example of the use of minimum force to contain/control a dangerous situation. Sgt. Anderson's actions in this situation do not constitute the use of excessive or unnecessary force. It might be argued that since the inmate was inside the cell, Sgt. Anderson could have retreated from the cell, locked the door and waited for the inmate to surrender the crutch; that was not possible here. The inmate initiated a course of verbal and physical threats, Officer Dorsey was inside the cell and preoccupied with resolving the handcuffing of the inmate. Finally, the use of no force was precluded when the inmate raised the crutch in an apparent attempt to strike Officer Dorsey. The ALJ correctly noted that DCR 110-23 IV.A. does not prescribe a violation; it merely defines certain terms. Therefore, the ALJ dismissed that charge. But, he said: If it is assumed for the sake of argument that the agency intended to refer to Section V, then the same discussion and conclusion set forth under DCR No. 50-54 above is also applicable here; i.e., Sgt. Anderson did not use excessive force. As far as we can ascertain from the record that was submitted to us, the charge was not amended to show that a violation of § V.A was the intended charge. Regarding Post Order 12, the ALJ declared: The facts in this case show that Officers Dorsey and Brandon were not following proper procedures in handcuffing the inmate for his shower. Sgt. Anderson recognized this fact and immediately attempted to restore the proper conditions of security with the minimum force necessary. He noted: The regulation does not speak to any accommodations for the inmate's use of a crutch. He pointed out: The evidence shows that medical authority to use a crutch does not alter basic security procedures if interpreted with a touch of common sense. The Acting Assistant Warden Sanders testified to the above and that if the inmate made a gesture with the crutch, it was completely proper for the Officer to take it from him. We think that the ALJ covered the COMAR violation even though he did not expressly discuss it. Based on his findings of fact as applied to the charges, the ALJ concluded as a matter of law that the DOC did not meet its burden of proving any of the charges by a preponderance of the evidence. The ALJ declared: [Anderson] did not act so as to bring disrepute/discredit upon himself, the Division or other parties. He used only that force necessary to comply with security regulations. In no sense was this excessive or unnecessary force. The ALJ issued the following proposed order: The decision of the Division of Correction to suspend Sgt. Anderson pending charges for removal from State service and their action to remove him from State service is REVERSED. Sgt. Anderson is to be reinstated as of the date his suspension without pay began with all rights, benefits and pay he would have been entitled to from that date to reinstatement.