Opinion ID: 2168236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attenuation and Ceccolini

Text: Though we dispose of this appeal on the procedural grounds just discussed, we deem noteworthy one element in the State's substantive arguments regarding attenuation. As one basis for finding that defendant's confession was attenuated from the taint of his unlawful arrest, the State contends that, even though Erving's name first came to police attention because of statements by defendant, and even though Davis was implicated by both Erving and defendant, the police would eventually have discovered Erving and Davis independently in any investigation of defendant, since they were known associates of his. The State cites United States v. Ceccolini (1978), 435 U.S. 268, 55 L.Ed.2d 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, for its discussion of why a willing witness should be allowed to testify at trial even if the witness was first found as a result of a defendant's statements following an unlawful arrest, as long as the witness' testimony is not compelled by exploiting the defendant's tainted statements. ( Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 274-79, 55 L.Ed.2d at 276-79, 98 S.Ct. at 1059-62.) Ceccolini also said that even putative defendants should be permitted to testify if there is no exploitation of their statements to compel the testimony. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276-77, 55 L.Ed.2d at 277, 98 S.Ct. at 1060-61. The flaw in the State's Ceccolini analysis is that Ceccolini dealt with the jurisprudential policy reasons for permitting live testimony at trial by a willing witness, not with whether the witness' supposed willingness or the inevitability of the witness' discovery can constitute an intervening circumstance as far as admissibility of the defendant's own confession is concerned. Ceccolini drew specific attention to this distinction. ( Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277-79, 55 L.Ed.2d at 277-78, 98 S.Ct. at 1061.) Conceivably, Ceccolini would permit the elicitation of trial testimony by Erving or Davis despite their having been initially named by defendant in an arguably tainted statement, but Ceccolini is inadequate to support an attenuation argument as to defendant's confession itself. See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 278, 55 L.Ed.2d at 278, 98 S.Ct. at 1061, quoting Michigan v. Tucker (1974), 417 U.S. 433, 450-51, 41 L.Ed.2d 182, 196-97, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2367. We need not actually decide whether the trial judge was substantively correct in finding attenuation. Today we simply hold that the trial judge improperly heard evidence and argument on the attenuation issue after the original judge's suppression order had already effectively decided it. Thus, we reverse defendant's convictions, vacate his sentences and the trial judge's attenuation order, and remand this cause to the circuit court of Cook County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. However, the Taylor rule and our holding in this cause, as involving appellate procedure, do not act as limitations on our supervisory power. Given the likelihood of a new trial, and pursuant to our supervisory power, we vacate the original judge's suppression order insofar as it may have prohibited the introduction into evidence of testimony of witnesses to events other than defendant's detention, his custodial interrogation, and the recovery of evidence procured as a result of that interrogation. We direct that, at any retrial of defendant, the circuit court shall conduct a hearing in accordance with the principles of Ceccolini to determine whether any proposed testimony by such witnesses was sufficiently attenuated from defendant's unlawful arrest so as to be admissible. In all other respects, the original judge's suppression order shall govern any such retrial. In view of our disposition of this cause, we need not address defendant's other allegations of error. Suppression order vacated in part; attenuation order and sentences vacated; judgment reversed; cause remanded with directions.