Opinion ID: 2632550
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Menzies Meets the Meritorious Defense Requirement

Text: ¶ 108 The final inquiry in our rule 60(b) analysis is whether Menzies has alleged a meritorious defense. The purpose of the meritorious defense requirement is to prevent the necessity of judicial review of questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are frivolous. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 28, 11 P.3d 277 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a litigant seeking rule 60(b) relief must proffer some defense of at least sufficient ostensible merit as would justify a trial on the issue thus raised. Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1976). This requirement does not set an overly burdensome threshold: A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried. Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994). Thus, where a party presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would [warrant relief] by the claimant . . . it has adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense. Lund, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 29, 11 P.3d 277. Even general denials that would allow a litigant to prevail if proven are sufficient. Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149. ¶ 109 Menzies easily meets the meritorious defense requirement. In his amended petition, Menzies alleged multiple trial errors that, if proven, would allow Menzies to prevail in his post-conviction proceeding. While the record is far from fully developed with regard to Menzies' claims as a direct result of the ineffective assistance of his counsel, Menzies is not required to prove any of his claims or meet an evidentiary threshold in order to demonstrate that his claims have merit. Lund, 2000 UT 75, ¶¶ 29, 32, 11 P.3d 277. Because this final requirement of our 60(b) analysis is met, Menzies is entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(6). ¶ 110 Having concluded that Menzies is entitled to rule 60(b) relief, it is necessary also to consider what relief is warranted. Merely setting aside the default judgment would be insufficient, for the sanctions that were imposed by the district court would still preclude Menzies from investigating his claims. Moreover, Brass' ineffective representation extended well beyond the entry of the discovery sanctions because Brass was willfully neglecting Menzies' case long before the sanctions were imposed. Brass' actions pervade the entire course of his representation, for he took no actions to develop Menzies' case even when he was first appointed. Even the second amended petition filed by Brass, the first pleading he filed, did little more than repeat the allegations of the amended petition that had been filed three years previously. In addition, Brass took no action to oppose the State's motion to dismiss, which disposed of many of Menzies' claims. Thus, in order to fully correct the harm of Brass' ineffective assistance, it is necessary to set aside the entire course of his representation and give Menzies an opportunity to properly develop his case. We do not undertake this decision lightly. The post-conviction proceedings in this case have now extended for eleven years, with no resolution apparent in the immediate future. However, as we have noted repeatedly, while finality in judicial proceedings is an important policy, the constitutional guarantees of life and liberty must prevail in this instance. See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989). We simply cannot allow Menzies' sentence to be carried out without allowing him to exercise his right to post-conviction review. In order to ensure that this right is adequately protected, it is necessary that Menzies have the opportunity to investigate his claims and present them to the district court for proper adjudication. ¶ 111 Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court with instructions to set aside the proceedings that took place during the time that Brass was representing Menzies. Menzies should be allowed to investigate his claims in accordance with the pertinent Utah rules and should be given the opportunity to amend his post-conviction petition in the event that it is warranted. We now address Menzies' final claim, relating to the district court's evidentiary rulings during the rule 60(b) proceedings.