Opinion ID: 1304136
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Effect of Introduction of Evidence Before the Grand Jury of Gilreath's Refusal to Take a Polygraph

Text: John David Gilreath, Sr., a former District Engineering Administrator with the Highway Department, testified before the State Grand Jury without any grant of immunity. During Gilreath's testimony, the Chief Deputy Attorney General asked him a question which could only be answered by referencing a previously attempted polygraph examination. Gilreath stated that he had refused to take the polygraph. Rather than attempting to stop Gilreath and give a curative instruction as legal advisor to the State Grand Jury, the Chief Deputy continued to question Gilreath about his refusal to take the polygraph. The Chief Deputy then called the polygraph operator to testify before the State Grand Jury. The polygraph operator testified that he advises people to not take the polygraph if they are going to have to lie about something, and that Gilreath had repeatedly refused to take the test. [13] The trial judge found these actions constituted prosecutorial misconduct and were so prejudicial to Gilreath that both charges against him must be dismissed. It is well settled that any evidence flowing from an experience with a polygraph is inadmissible at trial in South Carolina. State v. Pressley, 290 S.C. 251, 349 S.E.2d 403 (1986). Whether this type of evidence is admissible before a grand jury is, however, a novel issue. Other courts are divided on this question. Compare In re Grand Jury Investigation, 791 F.Supp. 192 (S.D.Ohio 1992) (polygraph results are generally admissible before federal grand juries) with State v. Woodson, 551 A.2d 1187 (R.I.1988) (erroneous admission not so prejudicial as to warrant dismissal of indictment). We hold today that polygraph evidence, including evidence that an individual refused to take a test, is inadmissible before South Carolina grand juries. Ordinarily, we do not inquire into the nature or sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury. State v. Williams, 301 S.C. 369, 392 S.E.2d 181 (1990); State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974). An exception to this general rule exists where, as here, a defendant makes a colorable claim of prosecutorial misconduct. It is usually difficult for a defendant to make such a claim. The Court of Appeals in State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 409 S.E.2d 420 (Ct.App.1991), held that, [s]peculation about `potential' abuse of grand jury proceedings cannot substitute for evidence of actual abuse as grounds for quashing an otherwise lawful indictment. Thompson, 305 S.C. at 502, 409 S.E.2d at 424. [Emphasis in the original]. Fortunately, given the nature of State Grand Jury proceedings, there is a complete record available for analysis. As noted above, the court will only entertain this type of challenge to an indictment where there is a colorable claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Where as here, there is a colorable claim of prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury proceeding, the next inquiry is whether the defendant was sufficiently prejudiced by the admission of the evidence so as to warrant dismissal of the indictment. Here, the trial court found prosecutorial misconduct and prejudice. We reverse the finding of misconduct under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Chief Deputy Attorney General faced a novel issue of law in deciding whether to present the polygraph evidence. The fact that we now hold this type of evidence inadmissible does not detract from the fact the record discloses absolutely no evidence of any improper motive or improper conduct on the part of the Chief Deputy Attorney General or any of the other Deputy or Assistant Attorneys General who worked on the Thrift case. Quite to the contrary, the record demonstrates that the Attorney General and the Attorney General's staff handled the Thrift matter in complete good faith and in accord with the highest of ethical and professional standards. This is a new and complex area of criminal law for South Carolina prosecutors. It is understandable that mistakes will be made as the State Grand Jury system is implemented. Although we find no prosecutorial misconduct here, we nonetheless address the prejudice prong because of the colorable claim of prosecutorial misconduct and the unique procedural posture of this case. We find that the presentation of this evidence was severely prejudicial to Respondent Gilreath. The inference that Gilreath was afraid the polygraph exam would expose him as a liar, and that he was guilty, was inescapable. We affirm the trial court's finding of prejudice. Amerson, supra . A difficult issue is what remedy should be applied. In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the dismissal of an indictment for nonconstitutional error was only appropriate if it was established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict, or there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from substantial influence of such violations. Id. [14] The present facts are well within the parameters established in Bank of Nova Scotia. Under the Amerson standard, the extensive testimony elicited about the polygraph refusal, especially without any instruction to the State Grand Jury, coupled with the State's acknowledgment of the weakness in its case against Gilreath, support the trial judge's finding of prejudice sufficient to warrant dismissal of the indictment. [15]