Opinion ID: 827271
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: what constitutes “testimony”?

Text: “[M]edical reports created for treatment purposes . . . would not be testimonial under our decision today.” —Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts (2009)35 “Testimony” is “‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”36 The Court explained that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not,” and concluded that “[t]he constitutional text, like the history underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement.”37 Although it did not delineate the scope of testimonial statements, the Crawford Court acknowledged that “[v]arious formulations of this core class of ‘testimonial’ 34 Crawford, 541 US at 68. 35 Melendez-Diaz, 557 US at ___n 2; 129 S Ct at 2533 n 2. 36 Id. at 51, quoting 2 Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (alteration in Crawford) (emphasis added). 37 Crawford, 541 US at 51. 14 statements exist,”38 and instead of choosing one, it “[left] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”39 In reviewing Crawford and its progeny, it becomes clear that the Court considers two related factors above all others when deciding whether an extrajudicial statement is testimonial, and therefore within the parameters of the Confrontation Clause: the formality of the statement within a criminal investigation or prosecution and the purpose of the statement.40 Formal statements created as part of the investigative or judicial process—such as statements that are “quite plainly affidavits”—are testimonial.41 Similarly, statements that are made for the express purpose of investigating and prosecuting crimes—such as a statement “the sole purpose of [which] was to provide ‘prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net 38 Id. 39 Id. at 68. 40 Notwithstanding the majority’s characterization to the contrary, this articulation is less a strict “‘two-part test,’” ante at 38, than a summation of factors that the United States Supreme Court has considered most relevant in determining whether a statement is testimonial for confrontation purposes. The majority is correct that this summation is an “attempt to synthesize several very-difficult-to-synthesize Confrontation Clause decisions of the Supreme Court,” ante at 37-38, but as the analysis in this opinion indicates, I believe that those decisions contain a consistent pattern and that, as a result, some meaning can—and must—be given to those decisions. 41 Melendez-Diaz, 557 US at ___; 129 S Ct at 2532. And even if formality “is not the sole touchstone” in the inquiry into whether a statement is testimonial, Michigan v Bryant, 562 US ___, ___; 131 S Ct 1143, 1160; 179 L Ed 2d 93 (2011), “a statement’s formality or informality can shed light on whether a particular statement has a primary purpose of use at trial,” Bullcoming v New Mexico, 564 US ___, ___; 131 S Ct 2705, 2721; 180 L Ed 2d 610 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 15 weight’ of the analyzed substance”—are likewise testimonial.42 Contrarily, statements made for some other primary purpose—such as responses to interrogations in order “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”43 or “medical reports created for treatment purposes”44—are not testimonial. This last example, specifically referenced in Melendez-Diaz, is particularly relevant to the instant case. In deconstructing this reference in Melendez-Diaz, the majority claims that this dissent fails to account for the final phrase of footnote 2—“‘under our decision today’”45—and it argues that, instead, “the circumstances under which a medical report created for treatment purposes could be considered testimonial was simply left for another day.”46 In fact, the Melendez-Diaz majority was responding to Justice Kennedy’s concern that the core holding of Melendez-Diaz would create unintended consequences.47 Moreover, while the context of the Melendez-Diaz majority’s decision supports the 42 Melendez-Diaz, 557 US at ___; 129 S Ct at 2532, quoting Mass Gen Laws, ch 111, § 13; see also Bullcoming, 564 US at ___; 131 S Ct 2716 (stating that “[t]he same purpose [as the certificate in Melendez-Diaz] was served by the certificate in question here”); accord id. at ___; 131 S Ct 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]his is not a case in which the State suggested an alternate purpose, much less an alternate primary purpose, for the [blood alcohol concentration] report.”). 43 Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 822; 126 S Ct 2266; 165 L Ed 2d 224 (2006); see also Bryant, 562 US ___; 131 S Ct 1143. 44 Melendez-Diaz, 557 US at ___ n 2; 129 S Ct at 2533 n 2. 45 Ante at 33, quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 US at ___ n 2; 129 S Ct at 2533 n 2. 46 Ante at 33. 47 Melendez-Diaz, 557 US at ___; 129 S Ct at 2546 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“It is difficult to confine at this point the damage the Court’s holding will do in other contexts.”). 16 interpretation that this opinion attaches to footnote 2, all the caselaw applying Crawford and its progeny attaches great significance to the broader proposition that the footnote applies: a statement’s primary purpose is accorded great weight in the determination whether the statement is testimonial in nature.48 In the end, while the facts of this case were not squarely before the Court in Melendez-Diaz, the Melendez-Diaz majority’s statement that “medical reports created for treatment purposes . . . would not be testimonial under our decision today” is highly instructive regarding how to apply Confrontation Clause principles to the facts of the instant case. There are also a number of instructive state supreme court cases that illustrate the Melendez-Diaz Court’s recognition that “medical reports created for treatment purposes” are not testimonial.49 For instance, in People v Cage, the California Supreme Court held that a victim’s statement to his doctor at a hospital was not testimonial because it was made for the purpose of “immediate acute treatment”50 and not to bear testimony against the defendant. Alternatively, in Hartsfield v Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a statement made to a sexual assault nurse examiner was testimonial because the purpose of the questioning was to “elicit[] evidence of past offenses with an 48 The majority itself affirms this proposition in its discussion of the recent decision in Bullcoming, stating that the Bullcoming Court “clearly reconfirmed that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of a scientific report, prepared in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution . . . .” Ante at 38 (emphasis added). The majority, however, reads Bullcoming too broadly when it would apply Bullcoming’s analysis to statements prepared for purposes other than to aid a criminal investigation or prosecution. Bullcoming simply does not apply to cases like defendant’s. 49 Melendez-Diaz, 557 US at ___ n 2; 129 S Ct at 2533 n 2. 50 People v Cage, 40 Cal 4th 965, 986; 56 Cal Rptr 3d 789; 155 P3d 205 (2007). 17 eye toward future criminal prosecution,” making the nurse “an active participant in the formal criminal investigation.”51 The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v Stahl perhaps most fully explained a court’s inquiry into the purpose of a statement.52 It held that, although a forensic nurse working in an emergency room “serves a prosecutorial function by collecting evidence,” that function is “at best secondary to the . . . primary motivation, the care of [the unit’s] patients.”53 The court went on to explain: [The defendant] asserts that [the nurse’s] taking of evidence, which included swabbing for DNA with the help of ultraviolet light, taking pictures of [the victim’s] mouth, and taking a napkin that [the victim] used after the incident, demonstrates the . . . unit’s prosecutorial purpose and renders [the victim’s] statements testimonial. Emergency rooms routinely perform these procedures, and a witness in this situation could reasonably believe that the . . . unit’s medical examination, including the incident history statement, serves primarily a medical function.[54] In distinguishing an emergency room nurse’s “primary” and “secondary” functions, the Stahl court answered the majority’s concern that “[i]t is utterly unclear how a court would apply the ‘primary purpose’ test outside the Davis context to a case in which no emergency [requiring immediate police assistance] is alleged” and its questions regarding “what alternative ‘purposes’ would be considered, and how would the resolution of 51 Hartsfield v Commonwealth, 277 SW3d 239, 244 (Ky, 2009). 52 State v Stahl, 111 Ohio St 3d 186; 2006-Ohio-5482; 855 NE2d 834 (2006). 53 Id. at 196-197. 54 Id. at 198. 18 which of these is ‘primary’ bear in any meaningful way on the principles inherent in the Confrontation Clause[.]”55 These cases and others reiterate the United States Supreme Court’s acknowledgment in Melendez-Diaz that statements made for the purposes of diagnosing and treating medical emergencies are not testimonial, while recognizing statements that carry an investigative purpose and that turn medical professionals into “active participant[s] in the formal criminal investigation” can create testimonial statements, even if they are created by medical professionals.56 The majority has not followed this line of analysis. Instead, it substitutes an inquiry into the mere foreseeability of a statement’s use at trial for an inquiry into the primary purpose for which the statement was created. The majority’s analysis is simply contrary to the mandates of Davis, Melendez-Diaz, and most recently Michigan v Bryant.57 Thus, the majority of this Court 55 Ante at 42. 56 Hartsfield, 277 SW3d at 244. While these cases from other courts apply the purpose analysis to victims’ treatment for injuries, rather than to defendants’ treatment, this distinction is without a difference because courts are required to examine the declarant’s purpose when determining whether the statement was made for the purposes of medical treatment. Davis, 547 US at 823 n 1 (“[I]t is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”). A declarant-victim telling a doctor what occurred so the doctor can treat her is in no different a position than a declarant-doctor documenting a medical evaluation so he can treat a criminal defendant. 57 Bryant, 562 US ___; 131 S Ct 1143. 19 continues to misapply the Confrontation Clause caselaw of the United States Supreme Court.58