Opinion ID: 2979938
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: White’s Statement

Text: Pittman claims the district court erred by allowing inadmissible hearsay during the direct examination of White. White testified that Sherrills told White it was Pittman’s idea to transport drugs in girdles. After describing how the cocaine was cut, placed in freezer bags, and carried using a woman’s girdle, the government’s attorney asked White: Q. Did [Sherrills] ever tell you whose idea that was? A. Yeah, basically he did. He said his wife had been - - MR. WATSON: Objection. THE COURT: It’s overruled. THE WITNESS: That’s what she had been doing while he was in prison. J.A. at 350. Pittman argues admission of White’s testimony was not proper under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence because the district court failed to make the requisite findings for admission of a coconspirator statement outlined in United States v. Young, 553 F.3d 1035, 1045 (6th Cir. 2009). Pittman also claims the admission of these statements violated her confrontation rights because it is undisputed Sherrills asserted his Fifth Amendment right and did not testify.3 A district court’s evidentiary rulings, including hearsay, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2003). Whether the government has 3 Sherrills adopts this argument on appeal. However, White’s statement regarding what Sherrills told him was not hearsay and was properly admitted against Sherrills as a statement by a party opponent, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A). - 16 - Nos. 08-4088, 08-4095 United States v. Sherrills, et al. met its burden of showing a conspiracy under Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is a preliminary determination of fact that will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 630, 635-36 (6th Cir. 2007). White’s statement above is admissible against Pittman as a statement by a coconspirator under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), subject to three foundational prerequisites. The government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a conspiracy, the defendant’s membership in the conspiracy, and that the declarant’s statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Payne, 437 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2006). Pittman cites as error the district court’s admission of White’s statement prior to the government satisfying its burden. This sequence is not necessarily improper. Prior to White’s testimony, the district court deferred ruling on anticipated coconspirator statements subject to a later determination of admissibility. This is a recognized practice and was not an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 867 (6th Cir. 2004)(quoting United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 153 (6th Cir. 1979))(“[W]e have long recognized the trial court's prerogative to conditionally admit co-conspirator statements ‘subject to later demonstration of their admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence’”). The more problematic issue is the district court’s failure to make specific findings that the requisites for admission had been satisfied at all. These findings were made for other statements, and perhaps the court concluded it was implicit based on the volume of evidence presented that Sherrills and Pittman were coconspirators and a specific determination was unnecessary. It is simply - 17 - Nos. 08-4088, 08-4095 United States v. Sherrills, et al. unclear from the record. The absence of specific findings has, in many cases, warranted a remand to make such findings. See e.g., United States v. Conrad, 507 F.3d 424, 431-32, 435 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Holloway, 731 F.2d 378, 382 (6th Cir. 1984). However, in this case, the district court’s failure to make a specific finding constitutes harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence proving the conspiracy and Pittman’s active involvement. Young, 553 F.3d at 1047-48; United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 478 (6th Cir. 1997). Evidence of Pittman’s coaching, purchase of, and instructions on couriers’ use of girdles was properly admitted during testimony of Brown and Johnson. Both White and Wade provided detailed testimony on how they were recruited by Sherrills into the conspiracy and were provided cocaine by Pittman. Wade described getting flight details and instructions from either Pittman or White. Numerous coconspirators testified that Sherrills and Pittman provided instructions, payments, and drugs to couriers and collected drugs and money that were transported. The government introduced incriminating recorded conversations, including: White and Sherrills discussing the recent apprehension of a courier, Pittman offering to switch vehicles with Sherrills because she was concerned he would be pulled over in the car with the drugs in it, and Pittman and Sherrills discussing the drug transactions and money arrangements. In addition, Pittman was observed picking up couriers from the airport in a vehicle rented by Sherrills on multiple occasions. This evidence provides fair assurance the verdict was not substantially swayed by the erroneous admission of the single statement during White’s testimony. See United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320, 340- - 18 - Nos. 08-4088, 08-4095 United States v. Sherrills, et al. 41 (6th Cir. 2009). Pittman’s argument that admission of the statement violated the Confrontation Clause is without merit as Sherrills’s statement was not testimonial. A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004), held the Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” By contrast, the Confrontation Clause has no bearing on out-of-court statements that are not testimonial. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 (2006); United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 2009). In deciding whether a statement is testimonial, the proper inquiry is whether the declarant “intends to bear testimony against the accused.” United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004). The test is “whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime.” Id. At the time Sherrills was describing the girdle method of drug transportation, he was not reasonably anticipating use of this statement against Pittman at a later date and its admission was not a violation of the Confrontation Clause. See Martinez, 430 F.3d at 329 (“We agree that a reasonable person in the position of a coconspirator making a statement in the course and in furtherance of a conspiracy would not anticipate his statements being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting - 19 - Nos. 08-4088, 08-4095 United States v. Sherrills, et al. the crime.”); accord Warman, 576 F.3d at 337 n.2. There was overwhelming evidence of the existence of a conspiracy involving both Sherrills and Pittman and the statement describing the method of transporting cocaine in girdles was made during Sherrills’s attempt to recruit White, in furtherance of the conspiracy. Although the district court erred in failing to make the necessary findings to admit this statement against Pittman as a coconspirator, here such error is harmless.