Opinion ID: 2974809
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: failure to object to inadmissible evidence

Text: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a “mixed question[] of law and fact.” Mapes v. Tate, 388 F.3d 187, 190 (6th Cir. 2004). Therefore, this court “review[s] the district court’s ruling on such a claim de novo,” while “‘[a]ny findings of fact pertinent to the ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 181 F.3d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 1999)). Ineffective assistance claims are analyzed under the test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires -4- No. 03-6250 James v. United States showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 687. Meeting the second, “prejudice” prong requires showing “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. The harmless error standard is applicable to claims of ineffective assistance, Maurino v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 2000), on collateral review as well as on direct appeal. See Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 906 (6th Cir. 2000); Myers v. United States, 198 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 1999). However, reviewing courts need not undertake an independent harmless error analysis. State court convictions are examined on collateral review to determine whether an error “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 464 (6th Cir. 2006). This standard does not apply to collateral review of federal-court convictions, as state-court convictions are entitled to special deference. Clemmons v. Sowders, 34 F.3d 352, 354 (6th Cir. 1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The Supreme Court has explained that the more stringent habeas standard for state-court convictions is subsumed in a prejudice standard identical to that in Strickland: “‘a reasonable probability that, . . . [but for the error], the result of the proceeding would have been different’ . . . necessarily entails the conclusion that” there was a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict . . . .’” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623). This court has -5- No. 03-6250 James v. United States similarly held that “[n]o harmless error analysis is necessary for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,” because the less-stringent harmless error analysis is likewise subsumed in the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 291 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435-36). Petitioner’s counsel failed to object to the introduction of three pieces of evidence at trial: the fact that Petitioner was convicted in 1977 for stealing fifty to eighty firearms, introduced by the Government on cross-examination of Petitioner; a statement in the Medical Data form prepared upon Petitioner’s arrest that Petitioner’s “behavior suggest[ed] the risk of assault,” introduced through the testimony of a jail records custodian; and a letter purportedly written by “most of” Petitioner’s cell block, indicating that Petitioner “has been causing problems in the cell, and is using intimidation to take from people,” introduced through the same witness. 7/3/1997 Tr. Excerpt at 50; Government Exhibit 14; 7/3/1997 Tr. Excerpt at 19.
Petitioner contends that counsel’s failure to object to this evidence entailed ineffective assistance of counsel. The questions regarding Petitioner’s 1977 gun conviction violated a pretrial order that “the United States will not be allowed to use stale [more than ten-year-old] convictions for impeachment purposes” pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609. Order at 3. This court on direct review held that the Government’s elicitation of this evidence constituted plain error because it “was in direct contravention of the district court’s pretrial order and Rule 609.” 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2024, at . However, this court held that reversal was not appropriate because “James fails the prejudice prong of the plain error test.” Id. -6- No. 03-6250 James v. United States Similarly, the district court ruled regarding Petitioner’s § 2255 motion that counsel’s failure to object “does not fall within the wide range of reasonably competent assistance demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Memorandum Opinion at 16. The Government contends on appeal that counsel’s failure to object could have been trial strategy, as counsel could have decided that “rather than object, and perhaps give the jury the impression petitioner was hiding prior convictions,” he would “permit[] the impeaching inquiry about the stale conviction in order” that Petitioner might “testify unequivocally that he had no convictions involving the use of guns or involving violence.” Appellee’s Brief at 33. The Government’s argument is unpersuasive. The failure to object to clearly inadmissible evidence of prior convictions is not shielded as “strategy” even where it is part of a carefully considered defense plan. See Coleman v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 118 F. App’x 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The state’s argument that counsel’s failure to object to the remarks as part of a conscious strategy to use the prior conviction in [the defendant’s] favor does little to rebut the district court’s finding of ineffective assistance, and is supported by no case.”); Lovett v. Foltz, No. 88-1682, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 13295, at -12 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 1989) (in case table at 884 F.2d 579) (“[W]hile ‘baring the soul’ may have been a reasonable defense theory, its use . . . does not excuse counsel’s failure to object to what might otherwise have been inadmissible evidence. ‘Strategy,’ whether labeled ‘baring the soul’ or with some other name, is not the equivalent of ‘opening the floodgates.’”). The district court was correct in ruling that “[t]his Court can conceive of no reason, other than inattentiveness, for an attorney to sit silent while a client is subjected to questioning that transgresses a court order as well as an evidentiary rule.” Memorandum Opinion at 16. -7- No. 03-6250 James v. United States However, counsel’s failure to object does not entitle Petitioner to habeas relief. The Government presented significant evidence against Petitioner, including the testimony of two eyewitnesses regarding threats and the firing of a shot at the Nashville Sound, and of a police officer regarding Petitioner’s furtive actions during the traffic stop. As this court held in United States v. Scisney, 885 F.2d 325, 327 (6th Cir. 1989), “Although ‘overwhelming’ might be too strong a word to describe the Government’s case, it was solid enough overall, and convinces us that any error involved in the brief reference to the prior . . . conviction was harmless as a matter of law.” Moreover, although the Government improperly elicited evidence of Petitioner’s 1977 conviction, evidence that Petitioner had been convicted of two counts of cocaine trafficking, had violated parole and been returned to prison, and had been convicted of introducing contraband into a jail, was properly admitted. This court held in Charles v. Foltz, 741 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir. 1984), in which two convictions were improperly elicited on cross-examination, but “at least six additional convictions” were properly before the jury, that “[i]t is . . . beyond a reasonable doubt that the two convictions elicited during cross-examination were harmless error.”
Similarly, counsel’s failure to object to the admission of two hearsay documents from Petitioner’s jail file, the Medical Data form and the letter from Petitioner’s cellmates, does not entitle Petitioner to habeas relief. The district court made no express ruling as to whether counsel’s failure to object to this evidence met the first requirement of the Strickland test, and it is unnecessary for this court to do so in the first instance, since the prejudice requirement is not met. -8- No. 03-6250 James v. United States The Medical Data form recorded a police officer’s belief that Petitioner’s “behavior” at the time of his arrest “suggest[ed] the risk of assault.” Though, as this court ruled on direct appeal, the Medical Data form was inadmissible hearsay, the evidence was essentially cumulative with the testimony of the arresting officer. That officer had already testified that when Petitioner was stopped, “It was kind of a tense moment. I’d already received a [be-on-the-lookout] of an altercation in Johnson City involving a weapon. I stopped a vehicle with the tag number that was given to me, and I felt a threat of a – of a gun.” 7/3/1997 Tr. Excerpt at 8-9. Although the hearsay evidence “was improperly before the jury,” it “was cumulative of other evidence and did not pose a reasonable possibility of prejudice to the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Lartigue, Nos. 93-5356, 93-5359, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9342, at  (6th Cir. Apr. 26, 1994); see also United States v. Sollars, 979 F.2d 1294, 1298 (8th Cir. 1992). The letter purportedly from Petitioner’s cellmates alleged that he was “using intimidation to take from people.” The letter does not specify what “intimidation” means, and Petitioner’s explanation that his cellmates may have been resentful because he had won several poker games was uncontroverted. 7/3/1997 Tr. Excerpt at 36. Thus, it is not clear that the hearsay statement in the letter was even unflattering to Petitioner. Even assuming that it was, in the context of the officer’s testimony mentioned above and the testimony of Nashville Sound security guards that Petitioner was “cursing us out pretty good,” that Petitioner or his companion stated that “they’d shoot every one of” the security guards, that Petitioner made two passes by the guards in his car, and that he fired a shot as he drove away, any evidence of Petitioner’s disagreements with cellmates was harmless. -9- No. 03-6250 James v. United States Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance fail because he cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.