Opinion ID: 2560231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Other Issues

Text: We dispose of Mr. Lee's other contentions summarily. He asserts that [t]he charging document alleges that [he] committed criminal acts on February 21, 2008[,] but [t]he prosecution submitted evidence of occurrences happening on September 15, 2007 and then asked for a conviction for actions that took place on February 21, 2008. Consequently, he argues that he had no chance to defend himself and faces charges again for the same incident. In essence, he claims a prejudicial variance between the charges and the proof. A variance of proof . . . will not require reversal and dismissal unless there is prejudice. Wooley v. United States, 697 A.2d 777, 779 (D.C.1997) (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. United States, 613 A.2d 1381, 1385 (D.C.1992) (A variance . . . implicates notice and double jeopardy guarantees and requires reversal only upon a showing of prejudice) (citations omitted). In the absence of a timely objection to the variance, the burden is on the appellant to show actual prejudice. Scutchings v. United States, 509 A.2d 634, 637 (D.C.1986) (citation omitted). When [an information] charges that the offense occurred `on or about' a certain date, as it did here, a defendant is on notice that a particular date is not critical. The evidence will conform to the [information] in such circumstances if it establishes that the offense was committed on a date reasonably close to the one alleged. Williams v. United States, 859 A.2d 130, 141 (D.C.2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). If it is clear from the record that the accused was not misled by the evidence and could not be retried for the same events, the `notice' and `double jeopardy' concerns underlying the variance between the charge and the evidence will have been satisfied. Wooley, supra, 697 A.2d at 779 (citations omitted). Here, the charging document dated February 1, 2008 accused Mr. Lee of LAC-PD on or about September 15, 2007. The amended information, dated April 4, 2008, charged Mr. Lee with LAC-PD, No Permit, and LAC-PI on or about February 21, 2008. Nevertheless, the transcripts of the proceedings against Mr. Lee establish that he was well aware that the date of the accident was September 15, 2007, and he never raised any concern or objection with respect to the amended information and the date of February 21, 2008. Prior to the voir dire of prospective members of the jury, the judge and the counsel met and in response to a question from the trial judge, government counsel stated: The accident occurred at the 2800 Block of New York Avenue, Northeast, Washington, D.C., September 15th, 2007. . . . Government counsel's opening statement reiterated that the accident occurred on September 15, 2007. The government's first witness, Mr. Killens, also identified the date of the accident as September 15, 2007. Government counsel referenced the September 15, 2007 date, not the February 21, 2008 date, during the testimony of Mr. Armour and Ms. Killens, and again during her closing argument. At no time did Mr. Lee voice any concern about the dates in the information. Clearly, the February 21, 2008 date in the amended information was an error that was corrected orally more than once. In addition, both the information and amended information used the phrase on or about and the February 21, 2008 date was reasonably close to the September 15, 2007 date; both the information and the amended information informed Mr. Lee of the precise charges against him; he had an opportunity to defend himself against the charges; and all of the evidence presented by the government proved that his criminal conduct took place on September 15, 2007. Under these circumstances there is no danger that Mr. Lee will be tried again for the same conduct on September 15, 2007, and we discern no prejudice. See Peay v. United States, 924 A.2d 1023, 1028 (D.C.2007) (there was no material discrepancy between the facts introduced at trial and those contained in the [information] and appellant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice that would warrant reversal); Roberts v. United States, 752 A.2d 583, 593 (D.C.2000) (failure to object to [information], request continuance, or claim surprise demonstrated lack of prejudice). Finally, Lee claims that [t]here was no testimony that the acts in question occurred in the District of Columbia and hence the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction. There is a presumption that an offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the court in which the charge is filed unless the evidence affirmatively shows otherwise. Joiner-Die v. United States, 899 A.2d 762, 766 (D.C.2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence clearly established that the acts at issue in this case took place in the Northeast quadrant of the District. Moreover, Mr. Lee has made no affirmative showing that the offense[s] occurred outside of the District of Columbia. Id. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Lee's convictions, but we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to vacate either the LAC-PD or the LAC-PI conviction. So ordered.