Opinion ID: 1037978
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: (3)(B) of this section [defining “terrorist

Text: activities”] shall not apply with respect to an alien within the scope of that subsection or that subsection (a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) of this section [defining Tier III terrorist organization] shall not apply to a group within the scope of that subsection, except that no such waiver may be extended to an alien who 7 Annachamy points out that the totalitarian bar was enacted several years before the material support bar, as the BIA acknowledged, but we must “assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.” See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990). Presuming congressional awareness of existing legislation is particularly appropriate here because Congress updated the totalitarian party membership provision in the same legislation in which it created the material support bar. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-955, 1990 WL 201613, at § 601. 16 ANNACHAMY V. HOLDER is within the scope of subsection (a)(3)(B)(i)(II) [i.e. an alien who the executive knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or likely to engage in terrorist activity after entry], no such waiver may be extended to an alien who is a member or representative of, has voluntarily and knowingly engaged in or endorsed or espoused or persuaded others to endorse or espouse or support terrorist activity on behalf of, or has voluntarily and knowingly received military-type training from a terrorist organization that is [designated as a Tier I or II terrorist organization], and no such waiver may be extended to a group that has engaged terrorist activity against the United States or another democratic country or that has purposefully engaged in a pattern or practice of terrorist activity that is directed at civilians. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i).8 As we recognized in Khan, this delegation of authority to the specified Secretaries reflects 8 The waiver provision was originally passed as part of the Real ID Act of 2005. See Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 104, 119 Stat. 231, 309 (2005). It was amended to its current form by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. See Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 691(a), 121 Stat 1844 (2007). Although the waiver provision was not enacted until 15 years after the creation of the material support bar, the waiver provision is still relevant in determining the earlier congressional intent. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1969) (“Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction.”); see also Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2012) (considering the waiver provision in its analysis of the material support bar). ANNACHAMY V. HOLDER 17 Congress’ determination that executive branch officials are in a position to judge the characteristics of particular groups engaging in terrorist activities, see 584 F.3d at 782, perhaps taking into account whether the groups have a practice of forcing innocent civilians to support their causes under threat of force. Indeed, the relevant officials here have exercised their authority to create a mechanism by which aliens who have provided material support under duress may be exempted from the material support bar. In March 2007, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, after appropriate consultations, exercised his discretion under the waiver provision to exempt from the material support bar aliens who provided support to several specific organizations. See Exercise of Authority Under Sec. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 9954-01 to 9957-02 (Mar. 6, 2007) (exempting aliens who provide material support to the Alzados, Kayan New Land Party, Karenni National Progressive Party, Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army, Mustangs, Arakan Liberation Party, Chin National Front/Chin National Army and Chin National League for Democracy). He also exercised his discretion by creating a mechanism by which certain aliens who provided material support to a Tier III terrorist organization under duress could be exempted from the material support bar. See Exercise of Authority Under Sec. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 9958-01 (Mar. 6, 2007). He set forth specific criteria an alien must meet to qualify for a duress exception and delegated to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, in consultation with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the authority to make individual determinations. See id. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary 18 ANNACHAMY V. HOLDER extended the mechanism for duress waivers to aliens who provided support to Tier I and Tier II organizations. See Exercise of Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 26138-02 (May 8, 2007).9 Subsequent legislative action helps clarify Congress’ intent. Only months after Secretary Chertoff issued his directive exempting specified groups from the material support bar and creating a mechanism for processing duress waivers, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. See Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat 1844 (Dec. 26, 2007). That Act created a statutory exemption from the material support bar for the eight groups the Secretary had previously excepted from the bar. See id. In response to the mechanism for duress waivers, the Act also required the Secretary to report to Congress on an annual basis: 9 We acknowledge that several commentators have questioned the adequacy of the Secretary’s waiver mechanism. See, e.g., Steven H. Schulman, Victimized Twice: Asylum Seekers and the Material-Support Bar, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 949, 953-54 (2010) (describing “pronounced” delays associated with the waiver process); Human Rights First, Denial and Delay: The Impact of the Immigration Law’s “Terrorism Bars” on Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the United States, 7–8 (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/ RPP-DenialandDelay-FULL-111009-web.pdf (last visited May 28, 2012). We express no opinion as to the efficacy of the waiver mechanism. That determination has been delegated solely to the Secretaries of State and of Homeland Security and, as we discuss below, Congress appears to be monitoring the mechanism in an effort to strike the appropriate balance between the United States’ humanitarian obligations and national security. We rely on the waiver provision only insofar as it informs our understanding of the statutory structure. ANNACHAMY V. HOLDER 19
removal from the United States for having provided material support to a terrorist group who allege that such support was provided under duress;
organizations to which the individuals described in paragraph (1) have provided material support;
Department of Homeland Security considers when evaluating duress waivers; and
believes that the Congress should consider while overseeing the Department’s application of duress waivers. Id. These legislative reactions indicate that Congress was deliberate in delegating to the Secretary the sole authority to waive the applicability of terrorist-related bars, and has paid specific attention to duress waivers. Moreover, the Act amended the waiver provision itself, significantly expanding the Secretaries’ authority to grant waivers.10 Among the amendments was an express 10 Prior to the Act, the Secretary was given authority to issue waivers with respect to only three specific terrorism bars. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i) (2006) (permitting waivers for aliens who were members of a political group that endorsed terrorist activity, themselves endorsed terrorist activities or provided material support to a terrorist 20 ANNACHAMY V. HOLDER prohibition on waivers to aliens who “voluntarily and knowingly” support or receive training from Tier I and II organizations, again indicating that Congress has appreciated the distinction between voluntary and involuntary conduct when amending the INA and has been express when it seeks to distinguish between the two. In light of all this legislative activity, we should defer to Congress’ chosen method to try to strike the correct balance between the United States’ humanitarian obligations and national security.11 activity). The Act amended the waiver provision to permit the Secretary to waive almost all of the terrorism-related bars. See id. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i) (2008) (permitting waiver for any part of subsection (a)(3)(B), except where executive official has reasonable grounds to believe the alien is engaged in or is likely to engage after entry in terrorist activity or the alien has voluntary and knowingly espoused support for, received military training from or engaged in terrorist activity on behalf of a Tier I or II terrorist organization). This amendment made eligible for waivers several classes of aliens who were previously ineligible, including members and representatives of Tier III organizations, persons who themselves have “engaged in terrorist activity,” provided that it was not on behalf of a Tier I or II organization, and persons who “engaged in terrorist activity” on behalf of a Tier I or II group, provided that they did not do so voluntarily and knowingly. 11 At oral argument, Annachamy urged us not to rely on the executive waiver provision when interpreting the material support bar in this instance because the Secretary lacks the authority to grant him a waiver. Specifically, he points to an exception to the waiver provision that says “no . . . waiver may be extended to a group that has engaged terrorist activity against the United States or another democratic country,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i), and Sri Lanka is a democratic country. Annachamy misreads the statute. By its own terms, the exception limits only the Secretaries’ authority to extend waivers to groups. See id. (delegating the authority to “determine . . . that subsection (a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) of this section [defining Tier III terrorist organizations] shall not apply to a group within the scope of that subsection” (emphasis added)). The exception does not apply to the Secretaries’ authority to ANNACHAMY V. HOLDER 21 Annachamy argues that interpreting the material support bar to include aliens who provided support under duress is inconsistent with Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), and Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009). We disagree. In Fedorenko, the Court interpreted the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA), which Congress enacted “to enable European refugees driven from their homelands by [World War II] to emigrate to the United States without regard to traditional immigration quotas.” 449 U.S. at 495. “The DPA incorporated the definition of ‘refugees or displaced persons’ contained in Annex I to the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization of the United Nations” (IRO Constitution). Id. at 495 n.3. Section 2 of the IRO Constitution, as codified by Congress, excluded any individual “who can be shown: (a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, Members of the United Nations; or (b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the second world war in their operations against the United Nations.” Id. at 495 n.4 (quoting Annex I, Part II, 62 Stat. 3037, 3051–52 (1946)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fedorenko Court held that “an individual’s service as a concentration camp armed guard — whether voluntary or involuntary — made him ineligible for a visa” under § 2(a) of the IRO Constitution. Id. at 512. The Court observed, “[t]hat Congress was perfectly capable of adopting a ‘voluntariness’ limitation where it felt that one was necessary is plain from comparing § 2(a) with § 2(b), which excludes only those individuals who ‘voluntarily assisted the enemy forces . . . in their operations.’” Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis in “determine . . . that subsection (a)(3)(B) of this section [which includes the material support bar] shall not apply with respect to an alien within the scope of that subsection.” Id. (emphasis added). 22 ANNACHAMY V. HOLDER original). “Under traditional principles of statutory construction, the deliberate omission of the word ‘voluntary’ from § 2(a) compels the conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas.” Id. (emphasis in original). In Negusie, the BIA held that it was constrained by Fedorenko to read an implied involuntariness exception into the INA’s persecutor bar. See 555 U.S. at 518.12 The Supreme Court held that the BIA erred by assuming that Fedorenko controlled without considering the differences between the statutory frameworks at issue in Fedorenko and Negusie. In particular, “[t]he textual structure of the statute in Fedorenko (‘voluntary’ is in one subsection but not the other) [was] not part of the statutory framework considered” in Negusie. Id. at 519. The Court remanded to allow the BIA to exercise its interpretive authority to construe the persecutor bar. See id. at 522–23. Fedorenko and Negusie are consistent with our conclusion here. As with the IRO Constitution in Fedorenko, Congress’ express distinction between voluntary and involuntary conduct in § 1182 compels the conclusion that it deliberately omitted a voluntariness requirement from the material support bar. Furthermore, we are not faced with a situation in which the BIA mistakenly based its decision on precedent that was not controlling. Rather, the BIA engaged in an independent interpretation of the statute, employing 12 The persecutor bar states: “The term ‘refugee’ does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). ANNACHAMY V. HOLDER 23 some of the same canons of statutory interpretation that we have applied above, and concluded that the material support bar contains no exception for duress.13 We also reject Annachamy’s suggestion that construing the material support bar to include involuntary support conflicts with the United States’ obligations under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”) and the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Convention”). Although Annachamy does not identify the provisions of the Convention or Protocol that support his argument, he apparently relies on the Convention’s limited exceptions to refugee status and its nonrefoulement provision. The Convention excepts from the definition of refugee: 13 Annachamy also argues that the criminal law presumption of a duress exception should be imported into immigration law. In Negusie, the Supreme Court did not decide whether the INA’s persecutor bar imports this principle of criminal culpability. See 555 U.S. at 517–18 (declining to address the issue). Some Justices were divided on the issue. Compare id. at 526 (Scalia, J., joined by Alito, J., concurring) (providing several reasons a duress defense based on principles of criminal culpability should not necessarily be read into the INA’s persecutor bar) and id. at 549 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]here is no warrant to read criminal-law requirements into” the INA) with id. at 536–37 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that principles of criminal culpability should apply to the persecutor bar). Unlike Negusie, however, where the statutory structure surrounding the persecutor bar did not inform the provision’s silence as to duress, the statutory structure surrounding the material support bar would be strong enough to defeat the criminal law presumption that there is a duress exception. Thus, we need not reach the more general question of whether Congress should be presumed to have legislated with a duress exception in mind. 24 ANNACHAMY V. HOLDER any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;