Opinion ID: 783754
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

Text: 17 In 1996, Congress added 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to the immigration code as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208 Division C, § 306(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 (1996). This section, the effects of which we asked the parties to address in their supplemental briefs, replaces an affirmative grant of jurisdiction under former 8 U.S.C. § 1105a and strips the federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain INS decisions: 18 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review ... any other decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is specified under [8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1378] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title [relating to asylum]. 19 Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). In their supplemental briefs, which were very helpful to this Court, both the appellants and the Department of Justice argued that the decision to issue an immigrant investor visa is not specified under[8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1378] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General, see id., and therefore that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not preclude federal court review of such a decision. 20 At first glance, it is not immediately obvious what is meant by a decision the authority for which is specified under [8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1378] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General. Id. In the only Supreme Court decision to address § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), Zadvydas v. Davis 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001), the Court determined that the legal question of the extent of the Attorney General's authority under a statute was not a matter of discretion. Id. at 688, 121 S.Ct. 2491. Even if a statute gives the Attorney General discretion, therefore, the courts retain jurisdiction to review whether a particular decision is ultra vires the statute in question. But though this interpretation has narrowed the potential scope of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) slightly, it is insufficient to decide the question presented here. 21 In IIRIRA's transitional rules, which govern cases pending at the time IIRIRA was enacted, Congress withdrew jurisdiction over any discretionary decision made pursuant to several enumerated sections of the INA. IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(E), 110 Stat. at 3009-626. In Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir.1997), we interpreted the transitional rules to preclude review of several types of decisions: those that had previously been reviewed for an abuse of discretion, id. at 1151, those that were by the express terms of [a] statute... discretionary determination[s], id. at 1152 (internal quotation marks omitted), and those that were wholly discretionary, id. 3 22 The language of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), however, is sufficiently distinct from the language of the transitional rules to compel a different interpretation. This section refers not to discretionary decisions, as did the transitional rules, but to acts the authority for which is specified under the INA to be discretionary. See id. Following the well-established canon of statutory interpretation that the use of different words or terms within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different meaning for those words, SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003), we must assume that this difference in language is legally significant. If Congress had intended to withdraw jurisdiction over all discretionary decisions, it would have used the same language found in the transitional rules. 23 We find that the language of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) differs from the transitional rules in at least two ways. First, the language of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) requires that the discretionary authority be specified under the INA. Specify means [t]o mention specifically, Black's Law Dictionary 1399 (6th ed. 1990); that is, the language of the statute in question must provide the discretionary authority. This interpretation finds support in Matsuk v. INS, 247 F.3d 999 (9th Cir.2001), the one reported Ninth Circuit case construing the scope of this provision. There, we held that language giving the Attorney General the authority to determin[e] ... [that] an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious crime, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B), was sufficient to specify that the Attorney General's authority was discretionary. Matsuk, 247 F.3d at 1002. Notably, we stated that the Attorney General's discretion [was] pursuant to Section 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), id. (emphasis added). Thus, jurisdiction was precluded not simply because the decision at issue was discretionary, but because that discretion was specified in, or pursuant to, the statute in question. 24 The second significant difference is the requirement that the  authority ... be in the discretion of the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). Authority may be defined as the [r]ight to exercise powers; to implement and enforce laws ... to command; to judge. Black's Law Dictionary 133 (6th ed. 1990). Discretion means the power to act according to [one's] own understanding and conscience. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954); see also 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 63 (2002) (defining discretion as the power of officials to act according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience). If the authority for a particular act is in the discretion of the Attorney General, therefore, the right or power to act is entirely within his or her judgment or conscience. Such acts are matters of pure discretion, rather than discretion guided by legal standards. 25 Support for this interpretation is found in the fact that many of the other provisions of IIRIRA, the act that created § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), do in fact specify that particular decisions are within the sole or unreviewable discretion of the Attorney General. See, e.g., IIRIRA § 301(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-577 (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)) (stating that the Attorney General has sole discretion to waive a requirement); id. § 303(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-586 (8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)) (The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review.); id. § 304(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-594 (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(D)) (providing that the determination of credibility and weight of evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Attorney General). Our interpretation is also bolstered by the fact that the heading of paragraph § 1252(a)(2)(B) is entitled Denials of discretionary relief, indicating that it applies primarily to forms of relief that are within the Attorney General's sole discretion to grant. 26 Another example of the type of decisions whose authority is specified by statute to be entirely discretionary, and would therefore be covered by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), is the granting of asylum. The Attorney General  may grant asylum to aliens who qualify, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (emphasis added), but need not. Despite the fact that there may be many non-discretionary elements of asylum eligibility, the ultimate authority whether to grant asylum rests entirely in the discretion of the Attorney General. Congress specifically exempted asylum determinations from § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), but this exemption demonstrates its recognition that such decisions would otherwise be covered. Similarly, the decision at issue in Matsuk — whether to classify an alien's past offense as a particularly serious crime under § 1231(b)(3)(B) — is a decision that is entirely lacking in statutory guidelines. Under the language of the statute, this decision is left entirely to the discretion of the Attorney General, with no governing statutory standards. 27 This interpretation of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is, admittedly, quite similar to the interpretation of committed to agency discretion by law under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), raising the possibility that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) could be merely redundant to the APA's jurisdictional bar. Although the rule against redundancy is only one rule of construction among many, and does not necessarily have the strength to turn a tide of good cause to come out the other way, Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 258, 120 S.Ct. 740, 145 L.Ed.2d 747 (2000), it is nonetheless a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988). We find that the two provisions are not identical, however, because § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) withdraws jurisdiction wherever discretionary authority is specified by statute. As noted above, under the APA, even a decision that is wholly discretionary by statute may be reviewed if regulations or agency practice provide standards by which an agency's conduct may be judged. Under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), such standards must be found in the statutes; if the statute specifies that the decision is wholly discretionary, regulations or agency practice will not make the decision reviewable. 28 We recognize that our interpretation of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) may be in tension with that of one of our sister circuits. In Van Dinh v. Reno, 197 F.3d 427 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit determined that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) deprives jurisdiction to review any decision or action the Attorney General has discretion to make under §§ 1151-1378. 197 F.3d at 433. We do not find this statement persuasive, however, for several reasons. First, this interpretation was entirely unnecessary to the Tenth Circuit's holding because the court had already held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) withdrew jurisdiction over the action. See 197 F.3d at 433. Second, although Van Dinh states that it is giving effect to the literal meaning of the statute, id. at 434, it fails to observe that the plain language of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) requires that discretionary authority be specified by statute. Finally, Van Dinh does not mention the transitional rules or the differences in language between them and § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Thus, we see little real conflict between our holding and that of Van Dinh. 29 Applying § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) here, we find that the authority to issue a visa under the immigrant investor program is not specified by any statute to be discretionary. Instead, the authority comes directly from § 1153(b)(5), which both mandates issuance of such visas, see 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A) (Visas shall be made available ... to qualified immigrants seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in a new commercial enterprise.... (emphasis added)), and sets out a series of standards for eligibility that the visa petitioner must meet. Although, like the statute in Matsuk, § 1154(b) does allow the Attorney General to determine the petitioner's eligibility, the determination here is clearly guided by the eligibility requirements set out in § 1153(b)(5), whereas the discretionary determination in Matsuk is unguided. Moreover, as noted above, § 1154(b) directs that the Attorney General shall ... approve the petition of any visa petitioner who is determined to be eligible. This language is very distinct from the discretionary language in the asylum context, which allows the Attorney General to deny asylum even to those applicants who meet the statutory eligibility requirements. 4 We conclude that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not preclude judicial review of the decision whether to issue a visa pursuant to § 1153(b)(5). 30 The appellants also suggest an alternate basis for the inapplicability of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii): that this section only applies to decisions made in the context of removal proceedings. On this issue the government disagrees; it argues that the plain language of the statute extends its reach to all decisions taken under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1378. 31 There is a split in authority as to the applicability of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) outside the context of removal proceedings. Several district courts, after examining § 1252 as a whole, have determined that Congress only intended this section to apply to decisions made in the context of removal proceedings. See Talwar v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9248 at , 2001 WL 767018,  (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2001); Mart v. Beebe, 94 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1123-24 (D.Or.2000); Burger v. McElroy, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854 at , 1999 WL 203353,  (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1999); Shanti v. Reno, 36 F.Supp.2d 1151, 1157-60 (D.Minn.1999). These cases hold that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) should be read in the context of the entirety of § 1252, which generally concerns orders of removal or actions taken in the removal process; the title of § 1252 is Judicial review of orders of removal. See, e.g., Mart, 94 F.Supp.2d at 1123-24. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the former 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, which § 1252 replaced, was concerned solely with judicial review of orders of deportation and exclusion, and is consistent with our caselaw holding that, in interpreting IIRIRA, we should construe narrowly restrictions on jurisdiction. Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002). 5 32 Other courts have determined that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies to all decisions made under §§ 1151-1378; the leading case in this camp is the Sixth Circuit's decision in CDI Information Services, Inc. v. Reno, 278 F.3d 616, 618-20 (6th Cir. 2002). This position relies primarily on the plain language of the statute, and the principle that the title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 91 L.Ed. 1646 (1947). 33 Because we hold that the decision whether to issue an immigrant investor visa is not discretionary, we need not decide whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies outside the context of removal proceedings. Even if it does, it would not preclude jurisdiction in this case.