Opinion ID: 619293
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Testimony Regarding Wiretapped Calls

Text: In the final challenge to his convictions, defendant argues that the district court erred in allowing witnesses to interpret wiretapped conversations to which they were not a party. The district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). Even when the district court has abused its discretion in admitting evidence, we do not reverse a conviction if the error is harmless, meaning that `it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 741 (6th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). Wiretapped calls were published to the jury during the testimony of a number of witnesses, many of whom were participants in the calls. Without much development, defendant challenges testimony from Keith Herdman, Mitchell Wood, Mandell Cantrell, and Agent Bakr concerning calls to which they each were not a party. The government described the testimony as falling into two categories: (1) testimony regarding the identity of the callers; and (2) testimony about what the witness understood certain statements to mean. With respect to voice identification, the government maintains that in each instance the challenged witness had a proper basis for making a reliable identification of the speaker. See FED.R.EVID. 901(b)(5) (voices may be identified by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker); United States v. Cooper, 868 F.2d 1505, 1519 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Simms, 351 Fed.Appx. 64, 68-69 (6th Cir.2009). Defendant has not shown otherwise. Defendant relies on this court's statement in an unpublished decision that the agent's testimony interpreting the meaning of recorded calls was likely improper as he was not a party to the conversation and the conversation, though vague and cryptic, did not include many words or terms with which a juror would have been unfamiliar. United States v. Blakely, 375 Fed.Appx. 565, 570 (6th Cir.2010). However, the court did not hold that only participants may testify concerning the meaning of a recorded telephone call but, rather, rejected the claim because defense counsel had opened the door to questioning about whether drugs were actually mentioned in the calls, no contemporaneous objection to the testimony had been made, and any error in failing to give a curative instruction was harmless. Defendant's primary argument is that the witnesses could not have testified with personal knowledge about recorded calls to which they were not a party. A witness is required to have personal knowledge of the matters about which he testifies, except in the case of expert opinions, but the threshold for admitting testimony under Rule 602 is low. United States v. Hickey, 917 F.2d 901, 904 (6th Cir.1990); see FED.R.EVID. 602. Many calls were presented during the testimony of one of the participants and are not challenged on appeal. For example, Bankston testified about three calls in which she participated, and McReynolds testified concerning seven calls between himself and the defendant. Among the challenged witnesses, Keith Herdman testified about two calls between himself and defendant and one call between his wife Andrea and defendant. After identifying the voices of his wife and defendant, Herdman was asked what he understood his wife to mean when she asked for two bundles, and he responded that it referred to twenty individual bags of heroin. The government emphasizes that Herdman provided a foundation showing he had personal knowledge of the matter by testifying that he and his wife obtained heroin from defendant together, that she would place the call to defendant, and that he and his wife would meet defendant later to make the purchase. Defendant has not demonstrated that it was an abuse of discretion to admit this testimony. Eight recorded calls were published to the jury during Mitchell Wood's testimony, including five calls in which Wood was a participant. Defendant objected to testimony regarding the three calls between Wood's girlfriend Kristine Dixon and defendant. At issue is Wood's testimony that Dixon was referring to bundles of heroin when she is heard saying that she wanted six, or that she wanted twenty-two. Wood had already testified how he was familiar with Dixon's purchasing practices. When Wood was asked what defendant meant when he said it was too hot, defense counsel's objection was sustained. It was not an abuse of discretion to find the challenged testimonythat the numbers Dixon referred to in calls to defendant referred to bundles of heroin was based on personal knowledge. Further, any error was harmless since Wood explained that he knew the numbers referred to bundles rather than individual bags because they never bought bags, any of us, would not travel 60 miles to Columbus for individual bags, and always purchased bundles. Cantrell was a participant in only one of the eight calls published during his testimony, and testified that the other calls were between Plunk and the defendant. Cantrell testified that he was a runner making deliveries for Plunk, including to the defendant. Cantrell testified that references to he or him and checking to see if he had enough on him were references to himself and heroin. He also explained that references to numbers, as in 50 or the 21 that he had, were understood to refer to grams of heroin. No objection was made to this testimony. Nor has defendant attempted to show that Cantrell did not have personal knowledge concerning these matters. Finally, defendant complains only generally that Agent Bakr identified voices on a number of calls. The district court required a foundation for Bakr's voice identifications, and sustained defense counsel's objection with respect to several individuals because the foundation was not sufficient. As with the other witnesses' voice identifications, defendant has not demonstrated either an abuse of discretion or plain error. When the government began asking Bakr, a DEA agent, about the meaning of terms such as fronting, dime, and stack in the context of narcotics trafficking, defendant objected and counsel was permitted to conduct voir dire outside the presence of the jury. The district court made further inquiry before allowing the witness to offer her opinion based on her experience as a drug enforcement agent and police officer. Although the district court did not identify Bakr as an expert witness, in keeping with the defendant's pretrial request that the term be avoided in front of the jury, this is the sort of specialized knowledge that courts have permitted law enforcement officers to testify about as long as the testimony is relevant and reliable. See United States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 690, 697-98 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 2004). Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by permitting Agent Bakr to offer opinion testimony based on her specialized knowledge and experience. See Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 743.