Opinion ID: 694049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: substantial evidence supports the secretary's denial of disability of benefits to jones

Text: 8 In order to receive disability benefits, Jones must show that he was disabled prior to the termination of his insured status. See Morgan v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir.1991 (per curiam). The ALJ in this case concluded that Jones made a prima facie case of disability by demonstrating that his impairments prevented him from performing his previous job. See Gamer v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 815 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir.1987). Therefore, the Secretary had to show that Jones could do other substantial gainful activities considering his age, education, and work experience. See id.; 28 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(2) (Supp.1994). Under the Secretary's Medical Vocational Guidelines (Guidelines), 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 (1994), Jones remained capable of performing medium work. The ALJ therefore concluded that Jones was not disabled. 9 The ALJ may rely exclusively on the Guidelines if [Jones'] non-exertional impairments do not significantly affect [his] residual functional capacity. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir.1987)). Jones claims that the ALJ ignored a non-exertional impairment alcoholism, which he claims affected his residual functional capacity. This argument is belied by the record. The ALJ listened to Jones' testimony and questioned him about his alcohol use; questioned the vocational expert about Jones' ability to work if he could not remain sober; noted the absence of any contemporaneous medical evidence of an alcohol-related disability; and noted evidence that Jones was able to do some work as a backhoe operator during the relevant period. Indeed, Jones' treating physician at that time believed Jones was able to perform medium work, and that opinion is entitled to special weight. See Ghokassian v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.1994). The ALJ permissibly discounted Jones' allegations of an alcohol disability as self-serving and not credible. See Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir.1995) (ALJ ... may disregard unsupported, self-serving statements); Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir.1989) (claimant's testimony about pain may be discounted as self-serving in absence of contemporaneous medical confirmation). 10 In light of the foregoing, we hold that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Jones' alleged alcoholism did not significantly affect [his] residual functional capacity during the relevant period. Therefore, it was not error for the ALJ to rely on the Guidelines to conclude that Jones was not disabled. See Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 577. 11 We decline to remand the case to the agency for further development of the record, as Jones requests. First, we conclude that the three new medical reports Jones presented to the Appeals Council are not material and therefore do not justify remand. 1 Even assuming Jones had good cause for submitting the reports after his hearing, he has not shown that  'there is a reasonable possibility that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the Secretary's determination had it been before [her].'  Booz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 734 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (9th Cir.1984) (quoting Dorsey v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 597, 604-05 (5th Cir.1983)). 12 Jones' three new reports almost exclusively describe his post-1982 condition. The information that purports to describe Jones' condition during the relevant period is speculative and inconclusive. As described by Jones, for example, Dr. Veraldi's report stated that it was not possible to specify JONES' psychological capacity in 1982. Although Dr. Veraldi does state that Jones' alcohol-related psychological problems occurred before 1984, she could not be specific about their severity. 2 The ALJ considered and rejected similar recently formed and inconclusive opinions as insufficient to establish a disability during the relevant period. 13 Second, we conclude that the Secretary (via the ALJ) was not required to further develop the record by providing psychiatric and other medical examinations for Jones. The ALJ in this case conducted a hearing, extensively reviewed the available medical evidence, and asked both Jones and the vocational expert about the effects of Jones' alleged alcohol impairment. Jones concedes that the Secretary did obtain medical records from many sources such as Dr. Smith, Dr. Teal, et al. This satisfies the Secretary's responsibility to develop the record. See Duenas v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 719, 722 (9th Cir.1994) (burden satisfied where Secretary pursued information provided by claimant, but did not further investigate areas where claimant provided only sketchy information), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3672 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1995) (No. 94-1459). Moreover, as Jones' three new medical reports demonstrate, it is highly unlikely that further medical opinions could establish his condition during the relevant period.