Opinion ID: 2102034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inter Vivos Gift

Text: The requisites of a valid gift inter vivos are delivery, intention on the part of the donor to make a gift, and absolute disposition of the subject of the gift. Murray v. Gadsden, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 38, 49, 197 F.2d 194, 205 (1952) (citations omitted). The evidence must show that the gift took effect immediately; a gift intended to take effect in the future is not an inter vivos gift. Lust v. Miller, 55 App.D.C. 217, 219, 4 F.2d 293, 295 (1925); 38 A.M. JUR.2D Gifts §§ 18, 81 (1968). If the donor retains the right to receive income for life, the inter vivos gift is not necessarily invalidated. But such a retention may become a decisive factor if there are other factors which tend to negate a finding of absolute disposition. Id. § 26. The burden of proving that a transfer was an inter vivos gift falls upon the person asserting the gift, in this instance James Lemp. Because his allegation of an inter vivos gift followed the death of the alleged donor, James must prove the gift by clear and convincing evidence. Estate of Presgrave v. Stephens, 529 A.2d 274, 280 (D.C.1987); Davis v. Altmann, 492 A.2d 884, 885 (D.C.1985). We agree that James Lemp at least raised a factual issue as to whether his stepmother intended to make an inter vivos gift or a future gift. The letter of February 25, 1976, quoted at 1130, supra, is ambiguous on this question. It does not refer specifically to the bearer bonds, most of which did not even exist at the time Mary wrote the letter, nor does it explain what Mary meant by safe keeping. It does appear that James was not to remove the papers from the box until Mary's death was imminent (when it looks as if my time here is ending). On the other hand, Mary placed the bonds in a safe deposit box that she leased jointly with James, and James testified that Mary opened the box and showed him a bundle containing some municipal bonds, telling him that they were his. Mary may very well have intended to make an inter vivos gift at that moment, retaining only a right to the interest payments during her lifetime. We need not rule on the issue of intent, however, for it is clear from the undisputed evidence that there was neither delivery nor absolute disposition, and for that reason the estate was entitled to summary judgment on its counterclaim. Mary kept a key to the safe deposit box and continued to have access to the bonds throughout her lifetime, clipping the coupons from them for her own benefit. Hence she never made an absolute disposition of the bonds. Likewise, James did not produce sufficient evidence of delivery to raise a triable issue of fact. An inter vivos gift can be made by either actual delivery (physically handing over the chattel) or constructive delivery (handling over some type of formal instrument purporting to pass title to the donee). See 38 AM.JUR.2D Gifts §§ 20, 32 (1968). The evidence here shows neither. James argues that Mary made actual delivery by placing the bonds in the safe deposit box which she leased jointly with him. Case law in this and other jurisdictions, however, requires that donor part with all dominion and control of the property to effect actual delivery. Casey v. Topliffe, 65 App.D.C. 100, 101, 80 F.2d 543, 544 (1935) (no inter vivos gift of bonds because alleged donor, although an invalid, retained key to safe deposit box containing the bonds); Lee v. Lee, 55 App.D.C. 344, 345, 5 F.2d 767, 768 (1925) (no gift of property in trunk because alleged donor retained right to remove trunk's contents); see also Murray v. Gadsden, supra, 91 U.S.App.D.C. at 49, 197 F.2d at 205 (no gift because alleged donor retained control over joint savings account); Annotation, Joint Lease of Safe-Deposit Box as Evidence in Support or Denial of Gift Inter Vivos of Contents Thereof, 40 A.L.R.3D 462, 465 (1971); Annotation, Necessity of Delivery of Stock Certificate to Complete Valid Gift of Stock, 23 A.L.R.2D 1171, 1184 (1952). Because she had continued access to the bonds and clipped coupons for her own benefit, Mary did not part with dominion and control of the property; hence there was no actual delivery. Casey v. Topliffe, supra , is dispositive on this point. The record also fails to support James' theory that Mary constructively delivered the bonds by sending him the February 25 letter. A written instrument may be used to effect delivery of personal property in some cases. E.g., Smith v. Acorn, 32 A.2d 252, 254 (D.C.1943) (automobile effectively delivered when donee received certificate of title even though donor retained possession); see 38 AM.JUR.2D Gifts § 32 (1968). But the letter written by Mary does not contain the necessary formalities, such as those found in a certificate of title or a bill of sale, to effect constructive delivery of the bonds. Unless physical delivery is impossible or impracticable, an informal writing is generally deemed insufficient to prove a valid gift. See id. § 33. James relies on Conlon v. Turley, 56 App.D.C. 95, 10 F.2d 890 (1926), in which the court found constructive delivery of some bonds even though the donor had retained access to them and continued to collect the interest. The donor in Conlon told a bank official to place the bonds in safe-keeping for my daughter, and I want a receipt made out in her name. The official prepared and signed such a receipt on bank stationery, which the father then handed to the daughter. Thereafter she placed the receipt in her father's safe, and the father continued to collect the interest on the bonds, which the bank held as bailee, until his death. The court held that the written receipt, coupled with the repeated declarations of the donor that he had given the bonds to the donee, were sufficient to prove a gift. Id. at 97, 10 F.2d at 892. Mary Lemp's letter of February 25 has none of the formal attributes of the bank receipt, nor is there anything in this case comparable to the repeated declarations of the donor in Conlon. Moreover, Mary's letter was, at best, ambiguous as to what property she intended for safe keeping when her death became imminent. Finding Conlon readily distinguishable, we hold that the February 25 letter is insufficient on its face even to raise a factual issue of constructive delivery. [10] Thus we conclude that the evidence before the trial court failed to raise a material issue of fact as to absolute disposition and delivery, two of the three elements necessary to prove an inter vivos gift. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the estate on its counterclaim.