Opinion ID: 1790021
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the trial court err in directing a verdict as to the appellant's claim on the alleged lack of informed consent?

Text: In an action based upon lack of informed consent, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a duty, a breach of that duty, proximate causation, and a resulting injury. Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1363 (Miss. 1990). We have adopted an objective test to determine what information a physician must disclose to the patient about the medical procedure which is to be performed. The test is based on the patient's need rather than on the standard in the medical profession. Using the objective test, a physician must disclose those known risks which would be material to a prudent patient in determining whether or not to undergo the suggested treatment. Phillips by and through Phillips v. Hull, 516 So.2d 488, 493 (Miss. 1987) [quoting Reikes v. Martin, 471 So.2d 385, 392 (Miss. 1985)]. An objective test is also used to determine if there is a causal connection between the breach of the duty and the resulting injury. Under this test the question becomes whether or not a reasonably prudent patient, fully advised of the material known risks, would have consented to the suggested treatment. Reikes v. Martin, 471 So.2d 385, 392 (Miss. 1985). In Phillips by and through Phillips, supra, the plaintiff had undergone a tubal ligation after which she became pregnant. Among the claims asserted by the plaintiff was a claim based upon the failure to obtain the proper informed consent. The plaintiff claimed that the doctor failed to inform her about the effectiveness of tubal ligation or the fact that contraceptives would be required to prevent future pregnancies. Phillips, 516 So.2d at 493. The lower court granted summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to offer any affidavits from medical experts to support her allegations. This Court reversed on the issue of informed consent. We said that expert testimony was not needed on informed consent in this particular instance because what transpired between a doctor and his or her patient are matters within the knowledge of laymen. Whether consent is informed may be a question of whether the information provided by the doctor was adequate. It may also be a question of whether the information was too complex for a patient to understand. Palmer, 564 So.2d at 1363. Lack of informed consent may be based on allegations of incompetency or involuntariness. Id. at 1364. Documents introduced into evidence containing the signature of the plaintiff and authorizing the medical action taken are a measure of support for the doctor's claim that the consent given was informed even though the documents do not reveal the specific information disclosed and whether the information was adequate. Palmer, 564 So.2d at 1364. In Phillips by and through Phillips, supra, we said that in the absence of any documentary evidence substantiating Hull's claim of having obtained Phillips `informed' consent for the operation, Hull was not entitled to summary judgment. 516 So.2d at 494. Since a directed verdict was granted on the issue of informed consent, we must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to Hudson and consider her testimony to be true. Hudson testified that Dr. Parvin did not warn her of the risks or complications which attend a tubal ligation. Hudson could not remember that he had explained the surgical procedures to her. Hudson's claim of lack of informed consent is based on her contention that Dr. Parvin told her she would never again become pregnant after the surgery and that she relied on his guarantee. In other words, Hudson's claim goes to what actually transpired between Dr. Parvin and her. At trial, two consent forms were introduced into evidence which contained Hudson's signature. Hudson testified that she signed both forms. The first form was a Request and Consent to Sterilization Form. Hudson said that she glanced through the form. She read the part of the form which stated that the possible consequences of the operation are that sometimes the tubes grow together resulting in pregnancy, but she said she did not think anything about it because Dr. Parvin had guaranteed the surgery. She also read the part which stated that she acknowledged that she had received no guarantees or assurances with respect to the surgery. She indicated that she understood what that meant. She said that Dr. Parvin told her that she would never again become pregnant. He did not tell her that the surgery does not always work. She would not have had the surgery without Dr. Parvin's guarantee. Dr. Parvin was required to disclose the known risks which would be material to a prudent patient in determining whether or not to undergo a tubal ligation. Clearly, a known risk which should be disclosed in tubal ligation surgery is the fact that the surgery does not necessarily preclude pregnancy. The fact that Hudson said that she read the statement on the consent form that sometimes the tubes grow together resulting in pregnancy and which contained the acknowledgment that she had received no guarantees negate her claim of lack of informed consent. Because of the documentary evidence which was produced at trial and Hudson's testimony about those documents, we uphold the directed verdict on this issue.