Opinion ID: 2612145
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's convictions of furnishing and selling marijuana

Text: At the trial of the instant case David Fuentes, an undercover agent, testified that on November 14, 1967, defendant gave him a marijuana cigarette. Although defendant admitted that he was riding in an automobile with Fuentes on that day, he denied giving Fuentes anything. The verdict of the jury as to the matter of credibility of the witnesses (see Evid. Code, § 312) is, of course, decisive; defendant presents no arguments to challenge his conviction for the November 14 transaction. Fuentes further testified that on November 29 he met defendant at a pool hall and defendant agreed to sell him a kilo of marijuana for $80. Defendant told Fuentes to meet him near the Mi Ranchito Restaurant; when Fuentes arrived, defendant showed him a marijuana brick hidden in the grass. Fuentes picked it up and gave defendant the $80. Defendant admits the November 29 transaction. He asserts two defenses: (1) immunity from prosecution under Health and Safety Code section 11710 as a person working under the direction of a police officer, and (2) duress. Defendant testified that he was serving as a police informer, working with Agent Ruben Landa. Landa had requested information as to someone named Copeland. Although defendant stated that on November 29 he visited the pool hall, a place where he might acquire information, he did not testify explicitly whether he went there to get information for Landa. When Fuentes sought to buy marijuana, defendant refused, but Junior, a lieutenant for a syndicate operating in the area, ordered defendant to deal. Fearing that defiance of Junior's order would lead to defendant's murder by the syndicate, defendant agreed to the transaction. He expected Fuentes to pay Junior directly, but instead Fuentes thrust the money on defendant. [2] Defendant claims the court erred in failing to instruct, on its own motion, as to Health and Safety Code section 11710, which provides: All duly authorized peace officers, while investigating violations of this division in performance of their official duties, and any person working under their immediate direction, supervision or instruction, are immune from prosecution under this division. Defendant also objects to various evidentiary rulings which restricted inquiry into defendant's relationship with Agent Landa to events occurring in the few months preceding November 1967. [2] The problem with defendant's argument is that he has neither presented nor offered to present evidence that defendant, when engaging in the transactions of November 14 or 29, was acting under the immediate direction, supervision, or instruction of Landa. (Cf. People v. Benford (1959) 53 Cal.2d 1, 14 [345 P.2d 928].) Nor did defendant present or offer any evidence that he was ever requested to engage innarcotics transactions to gain information for Landa. [3] [3] In support of his claim of duress, defendant testified that on November 29, when he refused to sell to Fuentes, Junior approached him and said, Why don't you sell to that cat, man, he wants a brick, two bricks or three. Defendant replied, Man, I don't deal. Junior said, You're going to this time, I got 'em. On motion of the assistant district attorney, the court struck this testimony as hearsay. Subsequently, defendant testified that he had been taken out for a ride and didn't expect to get back, and that he had been threatened. The court also struck this testimony, ruling that it was immaterial. The court erroneously ruled that the hearsay rule applied. Evidence Code section 1200, subdivision (a), states that `Hearsay' evidence is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. Junior's statements did not constitute hearsay since they obviously were not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated  that Fuentes wanted bricks and Junior had them  but instead to prove the words spoken by Junior to defendant. [4, 5] The error, however, caused no prejudice to defendant. Defendant did not claim duress as a defense to the November 14 charge; hence the verdict must reflect the jury's decision to believe Fuentes and disbelieve defendant as to that matter. As to the November 29 sale, a sizable portion of defendant's testimony respecting duress came in without objection; [4] we doubt that the excluded portion would have affected the jury's resolution of this issue. In addition, neither the evidence admitted nor that excluded tended to establish a threat of imminent violence; yet such a showing is essential to a defense of duress. At the time of the sale near the Mi Ranchito Restaurant, as distinguished from the discussion earlier in the pool hall, no member of the syndicate was present. Other than defendant, Fuentes was the only person present, and defendant was positive that Fuentes was a police officer. Defendant, however, did not attempt to avoid the transaction or seek police protection; he sought, rather, to limit his participation by not touching the brick and by having Fuentes pay Junior directly. As to duress, the court pointed out in People v. Otis (1959) 174 Cal. App.2d 119 [344 P.2d 342], The common characteristic of all the decisions upholding the excuse lies in the immediacy and imminency of the threatened action: each represents the situation of a present and active aggressor threatening immediate danger; none depict a phantasmagoria of future harm. (P. 125.) People v. Sanders (1927) 82 Cal. App. 778 [256 P. 251], upheld an instruction that the danger must not be one of future violence, but of present and immediate violence at the time of the commission of the forbidden act. Subsequent causes have reaffirmed this instruction. ( People v. Otis, supra, 174 Cal. App.2d 119; People v. Simpson (1944) 66 Cal. App.2d 319, 327-328 [152 P.2d 339]; People v. Sing Chan (1944) 66 Cal. App.2d 167, 171 [148 P.2d 81]; People v. Villegas (1938) 29 Cal. App.2d 658, 661 [85 P.2d 480].) [5]