Opinion ID: 2804186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Title VI Discrimination, Count 1

Text: Pouyeh argues the district judge misconstrued his Title VI claim as one alleging employment discrimination, rather than education discrimination. He argues ophthalmology-resident positions are dual employment and education positions; consequently, they are open to a Title VI education-discrimination challenge. Because his claim was one of education discrimination, Pouyeh argues his allegation in his Third Amended Complaint that Bascom Palmer received federal financial assistance was sufficient to sue the Trust, because the two entities collaborated in running the ophthalmology-residency program. He also maintains his trespassing arrest was an act of retaliation for his having sued Bascom Palmer for discrimination, which allegedly supports a claim of Title VI retaliation. We review de novo a district judge’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Redland Co., Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 568 F.3d 1232, 1234 (11th Cir. 2009). “[W]e may affirm the dismissal of a complaint on any ground supported by the record even if that ground was not considered by the district court . . . .” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 750 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015). We will not consider an issue that was 12 Case: 14-13704 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Page: 13 of 23 not raised before the district judge and is raised on appeal for the first time. Access Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1331. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This pleading standard “does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to allow the district judge to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct. Id. “The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint but need not accept legal conclusions: “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 Case: 14-13704 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Page: 14 of 23 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Courts are “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the Rule 12(b) motion-to-dismiss context, a judge generally may not consider materials outside of the four corners of a complaint without first converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2005). A court may consider a document that has been attached to a motion to dismiss, however, if it is central to the plaintiff’s claims and its authenticity is not challenged. Id. at 1276. Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Pouyeh consistently has maintained his Title VI claim is one of education, not employment discrimination. Consequently, we do not consider the merits of the district judge’s dismissal of any Title VI employment claim. We also note we may consider the BAA, even though it was not attached to the complaint. See Day, 400 F.3d at 1275-76. Although attached to Bascom Palmer’s motion to dismiss, the operative BAA was central to Pouyeh’s claims against Bascom Palmer, and Pouyeh referenced the BAA specifically in his complaint. See id. Moreover, Pouyeh has 14 Case: 14-13704 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Page: 15 of 23 not disputed the authenticity of the BAA. See id. at 1276. Based on the denial of his residency application, Pouyeh’s claim of Title VI education discrimination is flawed, because the BAA makes clear medical residents are employees, not students. Therefore, Pouyeh has failed to show that, as a prospective medical resident, he was excluded from, denied participation in, or denied the benefits of an educational, rather than employment, program or activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Pouyeh’s allegation that he suffered education discrimination because he was barred from attending the weekly medical conference also falls short of stating a plausible claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. His Third Amended Complaint contained a claim he was barred access to a weekly morning-medical conference at Bascom Palmer at the time he was arrested for trespassing. His claim falls short, because Pouyeh’s allegation his exclusion was motivated by his national origin is wholly conclusory. See id. Pouyeh simply asserted he was arrested for trespassing because of his national origin, but that amounts to “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because he failed to allege sufficient facts to show plausibly his arrest for trespassing was improperly motivated by his national origin, his Title VI claim in Count 1 properly was dismissed. See id. Pouyeh did not include a Title VI retaliation claim argument in his Third Amended Complaint; consequently, he may not raise it on appeal. See Access 15 Case: 14-13704 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Page: 16 of 23 Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1331. Pouyeh states he included this claim in his proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, but that has no effect, because (1) he was not given leave to file his proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, and (2) he has abandoned any argument the district judge erred in denying him leave to file it. See id. at 1330. Therefore, Pouyeh’s attempt to raise a Title VI retaliation claim is unavailing. E. Alleged Employment Discrimination, Counts 2 and 3 Pouyeh argues he proved a prima facie case of discrimination based on his national origin, because (1) all seven slots during the three years he applied were filled by “Americans”; (2) Pouyeh had prior ophthalmology, clinical, and other valuable experiences the other applicants did not have; and (3) consequently, it reasonably could be assumed he was more qualified than those who were given residency positions. Pouyeh also states Bascom Palmer’s alleged policy of not hiring graduates of foreign medical schools disproportionately affects foreign-born-medical students. Title VII, the FCRA, and § 1981 all prohibit an employer from engaging in discrimination on the basis of an individual’s national origin. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e-2(a); Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). We have explained claims brought under § 1981 and the FCRA need not be analyzed separately from Title VII claims, based on the same conduct. See Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., 232 16 Case: 14-13704 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Page: 17 of 23 F.3d 836, 843 n.11 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The elements of a claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are also the same as a Title VII disparate treatment claim in the employment context.”); Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The Florida courts have held that decisions construing Title VII are applicable when considering claims under the [FCRA], because the Florida act was patterned after Title VII.”). Under Title VII, an employer may not “fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, an employer may not “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2). Title VII provides that “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Id. § 2000e-2(m). There are two types of actionable discrimination under Title VII: disparate treatment and disparate impact. Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999). “Although proof of discriminatory intent is necessary for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim of disparate 17 Case: 14-13704 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Page: 18 of 23 treatment, a claim of disparate impact does not require evidence of intentional discrimination.” Id. A potential employee may prove a prospective employer discriminated against him through direct or circumstantial evidence. E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002). “Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence, that, if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). With circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff may prove his case via the burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Id. Where a plaintiff seeks to prove his claims with circumstantial evidence, “[i]n a traditional failure-to-hire case,” he establishes a prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that: “(1) [he] was a member of a protected class; (2) [he] applied and was qualified for a position for which the employer was accepting applications; (3) despite [his] qualifications, [he] was not hired; and (4) the position remained open or was filled by another person outside of [his] protected class.” Id. at 1273. “Although a Title VII complaint need not allege facts sufficient to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, it must provide enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest intentional . . . discrimination.” Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Case: 14-13704 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Page: 19 of 23 A plaintiff may prove a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by the following two-step process: “First the plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice that allegedly has a disproportionate impact. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate causation by offering statistical evidence sufficient to show that the challenged practice has resulted in prohibited discrimination.” Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1314 (citation omitted). We do not analyze Pouyeh’s Title VII, FCRA, and § 1981 claims in Counts 2 and 3 separately, because the two counts allege the same intentional discrimination based on the same facts. See Rice-Lamar, 232 F.3d at 843 n.11; Harper, 139 F.3d at 1387. The district judge properly dismissed Pouyeh’s discrimination claims, since Pouyeh did not provide sufficient factual matter to suggest discrimination. See Davis, 516 F.3d at 974. First, Pouyeh failed to state a plausible claim of disparate treatment discrimination. He pled two of the four requirements to establish a prima facie case of discrimination: (1) he was a member of a protected class, based on his national origin, and (2) the residency position was filled by someone outside of his protected class. See Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d at 1273. Nevertheless, Pouyeh failed to provide sufficient factual matter to show he was qualified for the position. See id. He alleged in conclusory fashion he was qualified; he stated he had graduated from medical school in Iran and had clinical and research experience, but he did not allege the 19 Case: 14-13704 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Page: 20 of 23 specific qualifications necessary for resident physicians at Bascom Palmer or that he had fulfilled them. Pouyeh’s allegation he was qualified for the position amounts to a threadbare recital of an element of his Title VII claim, which the district judge was not obligated to accept as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Pouyeh alleges Bascom Palmer had a policy of not accepting graduates of foreign medical schools. This allegation cuts against Pouyeh’s allegations of discrimination, because it suggests one of the necessary qualifications to be a resident physician at Bascom Palmer is graduating from an American medical school. Moreover, the most plausible explanation for Pouyeh’s application being rejected is the foreign medical school from which he graduated was not among the recognized medical schools. On the facts alleged in Pouyeh’s complaint, his allegation of discrimination based on national origin amounted to no more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted). Construed liberally, Pouyeh’s complaint also sought to raise a disparate impact claim, based on Bascom Palmer’s alleged policy of not hiring graduates of foreign medical schools. 3 Nevertheless, Pouyeh did not allege any facts in his 3 Pouyeh states on appeal he did not raise a disparate impact claim, because the alleged discrimination was intentional. Nevertheless, we construe his Third Amended Complaint to raise 20 Case: 14-13704 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Page: 21 of 23 complaint, such as statistics, sufficient to show the practice of not hiring graduates of foreign medical schools has resulted in prohibited discrimination. See Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1314. Instead, he stated he knew of only one other immigrant Iranian doctor, who had applied and not obtained a residency position; however, he did not provide any information about that individual’s background. Even if accepted as true, that fact is insufficient to show the alleged practice of not hiring graduates of foreign medical institutions resulted in prohibited discrimination, since it gives no insight into statistical information. See Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1314. Pouyeh makes some conclusory assertions regarding statistical disparities in his reply brief, but those assertions are unavailing, because they are speculative and were not argued in his initial brief on appeal. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. Therefore, Pouyeh’s Third Amended Complaint did not state a plausible disparate impact claim. F. FCRA Discrimination in Obtaining a Medical License, Count 6 Pouyeh argues the district judge improperly reasoned the individual defendants could not be sued under the FCRA. Under the FCRA: Whenever, in order to engage in a profession, occupation, or trade, it is required that a person receive a license, certification, or other credential, become a member or an associate of any club, association, or other organization, such a claim, because (1) it referenced Bascom Palmer’s alleged policy of excluding graduates of foreign medical schools, and (2) on appeal, he argues that policy had a disproportionate effect on foreign-born, medical-school graduates. See Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1314 (explaining the requirements of disparate impact claims). 21 Case: 14-13704 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Page: 22 of 23 or pass any examination, it is an unlawful employment practice for any person to discriminate against any other person seeking such license, certification, or other credential, seeking to become a member or associate of such club, association, or other organization, or seeking to take or pass such examination, because of such other person’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. Fla. Stat. § 760.10(5). Even if Pouyeh is correct that he can raise a claim against the individual defendants under § 760.10(5), the record provides ample support for the dismissal. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 750 F.3d at 1242 (recognizing we may affirm for any reason supported by the record). Pouyeh’s claim in Count 6 was based on the same conduct as his discrimination claims in Counts 2 and 3, the denial of his application for a residency position. As we have explained, his discrimination allegations were too conclusory to survive dismissal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.