Opinion ID: 450588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sentence severity

Text: 36 The Government submitted a sentencing memorandum to the district court which included a letter from the Nigerian government. The letter regarded another Nigerian defendant who had been convicted of dealing in firearms without a license. The Nigerian Consul General detailed the crime problems created in Nigeria by the influx of weapons from other countries and urged the court to mete out the severest penalty and to order deportation after the sentence was served. Adi contends that the inclusion of this letter in the sentencing memorandum, and the court's consideration of it, denied him due process of law under Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). Adi's reliance upon Williams, however, appears to be misplaced. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the due process clause should not be treated as a uniform command that courts throughout the Nation abandon their age-old practice of seeking information from out-of-court sources to guide their judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence. 337 U.S. at 250-51, 69 S.Ct. at 1085. 37 Generally, this Court will not review the severity of a sentence imposed within statutory limits, United States v. Sparrow, 673 F.2d 862, 864 (5th Cir.1982), and the trial court's broad discretion in determining the appropriateness of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a finding of arbitrary or capricious action resulting in a gross abuse of discretion. United States v. Small, 636 F.2d 126, 127 (5th Cir.1981). 38 Adi acknowledges that [i]t is fundamental that a judge has a wide discretion in the kind of information he considers in determining punishment, citing United States v. Ochoa, 659 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 959, 102 S.Ct. 1472, 71 L.Ed.2d 678 (1982). Brief of Appellant at 14. Adi insists, however, that this Court will not allow the trial court to consider, even if true, the characteristics of offenders in a specific group, citing United States v. Cavazos, 530 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.1976). In Cavazos, the defendant pleaded guilty to narcotics violations and at the time of sentencing informed the court that he had no prior criminal record. The trial judge responded that most drug offenders who appeared before the court had no prior arrest record. The court, drawing from nonrecord FBI computer statistics, went on to state that some drug offenders got by with ten, fifteen, twenty, or as many as 200 narcotics sales before they were ever arrested. The trial court then imposed the maximum term of imprisonment. This Court held that the use of statistics was an invalid premise on which to impose sentence. 530 F.2d at 6. The panel further stated: This approach injects hypothetical extraneous considerations into the sentencing process and contradicts the judicially approved policy of individualizing sentences that are tailored to fit the offender. Id. Upon its facts, Cavazos is readily distinguishable from the instant case. 39 Clearly, as the Government maintains, the sentencing court may take into consideration the impact that a pattern of crime might have in foreign countries. See United States v. Tooker, 747 F.2d 975, 979 (5th Cir.1984). Further, the court apparently was not overly influenced by the Nigerian government's recommendation. The court sentenced Adi to three concurrent four-year terms of imprisonment. The maximum statutory penalty was five years' imprisonment on each count in addition to fines totalling $20,000. Adi has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the somewhat abbreviated and concurrent sentence here. 40 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 41 AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART.