Opinion ID: 2085790
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Source of the Right

Text: The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to a jury trial was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) and the right to a speedy trial was incorporated by Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). No case similarly explicitly incorporates the public trial right. Nonetheless, in Duncan, the Court listed the public trial right as a right that had already been incorporated, citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). Oliver held that a public trial was a component of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process as such but did not explicitly decide or turn on a Sixth Amendment claim. Similarly, in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 39, 47, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2212, 2216, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) the Court referred to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a public trial and held that the Sixth Amendment public trial right applied to a state's motion to suppress hearing. We conclude that Waller established that the public trial right of the Sixth Amendment applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent that this Court in Marshall v. State, 254 Ind. 156, 158, 258 N.E.2d 628, 629 (1970) indicated that state courts are not bound by federal Sixth Amendment jurisprudence on the public trial right, Marshall is no longer valid. In addition to the Sixth Amendment, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution provides that In all prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial.... IND. CONST. art. I, § 13. In advancing his argument, Williams makes no contention based on the language or history of the State Constitution. To the extent he cites Indiana authority, he relies on no cases that effectively treat the public trial guarantee in § 13 as distinct from its federal counterpart. Rather, the Indiana cases he cites discuss both rights together as yielding the same result. See, e.g., Hackett v. State, 266 Ind. 103, 360 N.E.2d 1000 (1977); Kendrick v. State, 661 N.E.2d 1242 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). Accordingly, we resolve Williams' U.S. and Indiana constitutional claims on the basis of federal constitutional doctrine and express no opinion as to what, if any, differences there may be under Article I, § 13 of the Indiana Constitution. Cf. Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466 (Ind. 1997). The right to a public trial has long been recognized as a fundamental right of the accused. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266-67, 68 S.Ct. at 504; Hackett, 266 Ind. at 109, 360 N.E.2d at 1004. It helps ensure a fair trial because the presence of interested spectators may keep [the accused's] triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.... Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct. at 2215 (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2906, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979) (in turn quoting Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n. 25, 68 S.Ct. at 506 n. 25)). It protects the accused by allowing the public to assess the fairness of the proceedings. In addition, it encourages witnesses to come forward, and discourages perjury. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct. at 2215. In addition to the rights of the defendant, the public trial implicates the First Amendment right of the press and public to attend a criminal trial, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982), or other proceeding. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (extending First Amendment right of access to voir dire). However, neither right is absolute. Complete or partial exclusion of the public may be justified if a court finds that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45, 104 S.Ct. at 2215 (quoting Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. at 824). See also Hackett, 266 Ind. at 110, 360 N.E.2d at 1004 (exclusions may be justified by a legitimate purpose that furthers the integrity of the judicial process, so long as there is a sufficient record supporting the court's exercise of discretion). Examples of valid exclusions include forbidding the televising of a public trial, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965) and protecting a witness fearful of retaliation by those attending the trial, Hackett, 266 Ind. at 110, 360 N.E.2d at 1004; Kendrick, 661 N.E.2d at 1242. In addition to his constitutional right, Williams relies on Indiana's statutory protection of public access to criminal proceedings. The Indiana Code provides that Criminal proceedings are presumptively open to attendance by the general public. IND.CODE § 5-14-2-2 (1993), and defines open to attendance as meaning that individuals have the right freely to attend and observe criminal proceedings. [7] Id. at § 5-14-2-1. The general public may be excluded from a criminal proceeding, however, if the court first affords the parties and the general public a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue of any proposed exclusion. Id. at § 5-14-2-3. In addition, as Williams notes, the Code further provides: This chapter does not affect the inherent power of a court to make limited exclusions of witnesses, to relieve overcrowding, to protect the order and decorum of the courtroom, or to exclude those individuals whose presence constitutes a direct threat to the safety of the spectators, parties, or witnesses. Id. at § 5-14-2-7.