Opinion ID: 2374258
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Petition for Condemnation

Text: This appeal arises in the context of the trial court's denial of Condemnees' motion to dismiss Condemnor's petition for private condemnation. The parties dispute whether the motion should be treated as a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Given that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure apply to eminent domain proceedings, Aldrich v. Dist. Ct., 714 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Colo.1986), and that Colorado's eminent domain statutes do not provide an alternative procedure for challenging a petition for condemnation, we treat this appeal as review of a ruling on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion. We view with disfavor a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 908 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Colo.1995). We review a ruling on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion de novo, applying the same standards as the trial court. Id.; Negron v. Golder, 111 P.3d 538, 542 (Colo.App.2004). Accepting all allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the trial court properly grants a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion only where the plaintiff's factual allegations cannot, as a matter of law, support a claim for relief. Rosenthal, 908 P.2d at 1099. Statutory construction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Specialty Rests. Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393, 397 (Colo.2010). Our primary objective is to effectuate the intent of the General Assembly by looking to the plain meaning of the language used, considered within the context of the statute as a whole. Romanoff v. State Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 126 P.3d 182, 188 (Colo.2006); see also §§ 2-4-101, -201(1)(b), C.R.S. (2010). Our review in this case requires us to construe applicable eminent domain statutes. We construe such statutes narrowly and resolve ambiguities in favor of the condemnee landowner. Coquina Oil Corp. v. Harry Kourlis Ranch, 643 P.2d 519, 522 (Colo.1982).
Article II, section 14 of the Colorado Constitution prohibits the taking of private property for private use unless by consent of the owner or except for private ways of necessity, among other exceptions. Condemnation proceedings are conducted strictly according to statutory procedures. Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 184 Colo. 360, 366, 520 P.2d 738, 742 (1974). Section 38-1-102(3) provides that private property may be taken for private use, for private ways of necessity, and for reservoirs, drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic, or sanitary purposes. (Emphasis added.) A private condemnation proceeding is commenced by filing a petition with the district court where the property is situated. § 38-1-102(1). The petition must include the following information: [the condemnor's] authority in the premises, the purpose for which said property is sought to be taken or damaged, a description of the property, the names of all persons interested as owners or otherwise. . ., and praying such judge to cause the compensation to be paid to the owner to be assessed. Id. (emphasis added). The General Assembly has not specified what a statement of the purpose or a description of the property requires. We have not previously construed section 38-1-102(1). In Platte River Power Authority v. Nelson, the court of appeals determined that the description in the petition must be sufficient to enable the trial court to enter its order conveying the condemned property. 775 P.2d 82, 83 (Colo.App.1989) (where the petition in Platte River lacked any description of the easement sought). With respect to the purpose, the court of appeals interpreted the provision to require that the petition describe in detail the nature of the use to be made of the land so that the burden on the landowner can be accurately evaluated. Bear Creek Dev. Corp. v. Genesee Found., 919 P.2d 948, 954 (Colo.App. 1996). However, as support, the court of appeals cited an earlier opinion in which it found adequate a petition describing the use as simply a slope easement and providing no additional detail. State Dep't of Highways v. Woolley, 696 P.2d 828, 830 (Colo. App.1984). In Woolley, subsequent testimony further described the slope easement sought, the landowner was not deceived by the lack of detail in the petition, and the landowner's appraiser was able to value the easement. Id.
The language of section 38-1-102(1) requires that a petition for condemnation include a description of the property to be condemned. Condemnees ask us to read into this language a requirement that the petition include a metes and bounds legal description. If the General Assembly had so intended, it could have included the word legal in the statutory language. Instead, the plain meaning of the statutory language is that the petition must include a general description of the property to be condemned. In this case, the petition included such a description. It requested a twenty-foot-wide access easement over the existing driveway and attached a map depicting the location of the driveway in relation to the affected properties. Condemnees were not confused as to the location of the driveway, given that it is the only driveway that crosses their eighty-acre parcelwhich the petition did legally defineand that it is the only existing means of access to Condemnor's otherwise landlocked parcel. Even assuming, arguendo, that there was uncertainty as to the location of the easement, Condemnor's subsequent production of a metes and bounds legal description cured any uncertainty. Ultimately, the description of the location of the easement was sufficient for the trial court to enter its order of condemnation, which included the legal description of the easement. See Platte River, 775 P.2d at 83. Section 38-1-102(1) also requires a description of the purpose for which said property is sought to be taken. The plain meaning of this language does not require any particular level of detail with respect to the statement of purpose. Considered within the context of section 38-1-102 as a whole, the General Assembly likely intended that the statement of purpose refer to the various purposes, listed in subsection (3), for which private property may be condemned: private use; private ways of necessity; or reservoirs, drains, flumes, or ditches for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic, or sanitary purposes. See § 38-1-102(3); see also Colo. Const. art. II, § 14 (listing the same purposes). The petition in this case specified one of the purposes listed in section 38-1-102(3): a private way of necessity. The petition elaborated that Condemnor sought the easement to provide physical access to her landlocked parcel in order to permit the use and enjoyment of her property. The plain meaning of the statute requires nothing more than this general statement of purpose. Nonetheless, Condemnor further clarified the purpose of the easement at her deposition and through testimony at the motion hearing that she intends to build one single-family home on her property and to use the driveway for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and accessing that home. In its order condemning the easement, the trial court specified that the easement shall be used for building, construction, residence in, and maintenance of one single-family home. Having so specified, the trial court order ensures that Condemnees' concerns that Condemnor might rely on her easement to subdivide or commercially develop her property, thereby significantly increasing traffic over the driveway, will not be realized without triggering the law applicable to overburdening an easement by change of use. See, e.g., Wright v. Horse Creek Ranches, 697 P.2d 384 (Colo. 1985). We find that Condemnor's petitionwhich contained an adequate description of the location and the purpose of the easement soughtalleged facts that, taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, supported her claim for a private way of necessity. Accordingly, the court of appeals properly determined that the trial court did not err in denying Condemnees' motion to dismiss.