Opinion ID: 4764
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Marijuana Cigarette

Text: Williams also contends that the district court improperly admitted extrinsic offense evidence under F.R.E. 404(b). The district court overruled the defendant's objection to Officer Munday's testimony that he found a marijuana cigarette in Williams's wallet. Williams argues that the marijuana cigarette was not relevant to any issue other than his bad character, and that, even if relevant to an issue other than character, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. The admissibility of extrinsic evidence under Rule 404(b)1 is governed by the two-part test established by this court in United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244 (1979). First, the court must determine whether the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character. Second, the probative value of the evidence cannot be substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice. See United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 241 (5th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2057 (1991). We review 1 F.R.E. 404(b) provides that Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 11 the admission of the marijuana cigarette under the two-part Beechum test.
The district court found that Officer Munday's testimony regarding the marijuana cigarette found in Williams's wallet was relevant to his motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge and so on. (R., vol. 2 at 170). We find that the evidence that Williams was carrying a marijuana cigarette in his wallet bears on the issue of his knowledge, preparation, plan, or absence of mistake. Evidence is relevant if it makes the existence of any fact at issue more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 826 (5th Cir. 1990). Evidence that Williams was carrying a marijuana cigarette in his wallet makes it slightly more probable that he knew he was carrying cocaine in his suitcase, and that he, rather than someone else, placed the cocaine in the unlocked suitcase.
Although evidence of the marijuana cigarette is relevant, we find that its probative value was slight. The probative value of extrinsic evidence correlates positively with its likeness to the offense charged. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 915. As in United States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 566, (1990), there is a large leap from evidence that Williams was carrying a single marijuana cigarette in his wallet to an inference that he was knowingly carrying 2,004 grams of cocaine in his suitcase with intent to distribute it. 12 We need not determine, however, whether the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect because any error that the district court may have committed in admitting the evidence was harmless. In a harmless error examination, [w]e must view the error, not in isolation, but in relation to the entire proceedings. United States v. Brown, 692 F.2d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 1982). As discussed in the previous section, the evidence of Williams's guilt is overwhelming. Any error in admitting the evidence of the marijuana cigarette would not have substantially influenced the jury's verdict, and therefore, was harmless. United States v. Bernal, 814 F.2d 175, 184 (5th Cir. 1987) (issue in harmless error inquiry is whether the error itself had a substantial impact). Although we base our holding on harmless error analysis, we note that the district court never required the government to articulate a basis for which the testimony regarding the marijuana cigarette could be admitted. This court has stated that a trial judge faced with the problem of admissibility of other crimes evidence should exercise caution and require the government to explain why the evidence is relevant. United States v. Yeagin, 927 F.2d 798, 803 (5th Cir. 1991). Additionally, the court did not carefully weigh the probative and prejudicial value of the cigarette, but perfunctorily stated I think that the possession of the marijuana cigarette is some evidence bearing on motive, intent, 13 preparation, plan, knowledge, and so on.2 (R., vol. 2 at 170). This case represents a situation in which the district court should have carefully considered the probative and prejudicial weight of the evidence. 2 Although the defense filed a pre-trial motion in limine in an attempt to prevent the Government from introducing evidence of the marijuana cigarette during the trial, the district court refused to rule on the motion before trial. (R., vol. 2 at 92). The district court ruled on the admissibility of the marijuana cigarette during a bench conference: MR. ABLE (ATTORNEY FOR THE GOVERNMENT): The only thing I wanted to get into now was the fact he searched the defendant and found a marijuana cigarette inside the defendant's wallet, . . . . THE COURT: Okay. MR. FLEURY: And, of course, we had that motion in limine regarding that particular evidence. THE COURT: And we have already dealt with that on the motion in limine. MR. FLEURY: I thought you had said to wait until the context of the case. THE COURT: Come on back up here, Mr. Able. What rule were we talking with about, 404(b)? MR. FLEURY: Yes, sir. And I have a brief on it. THE COURT: Do you want to show me some authority real quick? MR. ABLE [sic]: It is in the brief that is filed with the court. THE COURT: I looked at that. I thought maybe you meant something else. MR. FLEURY: Nothing other than the brief in support of my motion. THE COURT: Okay. Well, I am going to overrule your objection because I think that the possession of the marijuana cigarette is some evidence bearing on motive, intent, preparation, plan knowledge and so on. And to whatever extent it has any, what might be viewed as, unfair prejudice, I think its probative value and probative weight outweighs that. MR. FLEURY: As to what? As to which of those is it being offered for? THE COURT: Pardon me. We've already made the ruling. Let's go on. As to all of them. 14