Opinion ID: 4294091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The parties agree that we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 at least to consider this petition for review and to adjudicate the BIA’s denial of the Patels’ motion for reconsideration. Pet’rs’ Br. at 1–2; Resp’t’s Br. at 1–2, 8–10. The Government argues that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of the Patels’ latter motion to reopen, Resp’t’s Br. at 9, given our prior “hold[ing] that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of [a] petitioner’s motion to reopen sua sponte,” Gor v. Holder, 607 F.3d 180, 188 (6th Cir. 2010). But this interpretation of the present case’s posture puts the cart before the horse. Indeed, the BIA’s denial was only properly on a sua sponte basis if the BIA was correct in its immediately preceding conclusion that statutory and regulatory notice-based exceptions—which, if applicable, would have freed the Patels from the otherwise-operative time and number limits on motions to reopen—did not in fact apply. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)(B); 8 C.F.R §§ 1003.2(c)(3), 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2); A.R. I at 3 (Nov. 2017 BIA Decision); A.R. II at 3 (Nov. 2017 BIA Decision). In other words, if the Patels were in fact impermissibly denied notice, then the Patels were not subject to the time and number limits on motions to reopen. And if they were not in fact subject to those limits, then the BIA’s conclusion 5 Nos. 17-4277/4278, Patel et ux. v. Sessions that it was to consider the question only as a sua sponte matter was itself a legal error. We therefore have jurisdiction to consider, with reference to the BIA’s denials of both types of motions by the Patels, the crux of this case: whether the Patels were in fact impermissibly denied notice in light of the mistyped address and undelivered mailings.