Opinion ID: 796224
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fernandez's Right to Appeal

Text: 43 Because we have concluded that Fernandez pursued a pure discrimination claim cognizable in the EEOC, we reject the Department's argument that Fernandez failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not appealing to the MSPB. We also reject the Department's strained reading of § 7121(d) as barring an employee from seeking review of a final arbitration decision in the EEOC in all instances. Under § 7121(d), [s]election of the negotiated procedure in no manner prejudices the right of an aggrieved employee to request the Merit Systems Protection Board to review the final decision pursuant to [5 U.S.C. § 7702] of this title in the case of any personnel action that could have been appealed to the Board, or, where applicable, to request the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to review a final decision in any other matter involving a complaint of discrimination of the type prohibited by any law administered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 44 (emphasis added). 45 The Department contends, for the first time on appeal, that because Fernandez is pursuing the same matter — discrimination underlying the Department's refusal to reinstate him — that he previously pursued in his grievance, § 7121(d) does not authorize him to seek review before the EEOC. The Department argues that: 46 [I]f Congress had intended the EEOC to review grievances, it could have provided in § 7121(d) that an employee has the right to request the EEOC to review the final decision of the grievance process (like it did with respect to the MSPB) or the matter that was raised in the grievance process. Instead, Congress wrote that such an employee has the right to request the EEOC to review any other matter involving a complaint of unlawful employment discrimination. 47 The Department therefore interprets any other matter to mean any other act of discrimination not previously alleged in the negotiated grievance process. 48 The term any other matter in § 7121(d), however, refers to the nature of the employee's claim, not to whether the claim was raised previously. Where the employee raises a mixed claim, an appeal from an arbitrator's decision lies in the MSPB. See Johnson, 996 F.2d at 401 ([S]ection 7121(d)'s preservation of the mixed claim employee's right to appeal to the MSPB created the bridge by which the employee following the negotiated procedure could revert to the statutory path and seek judicial review.). Where, as here, the employee raises a pure discrimination claim, an appeal from an arbitrator's decision lies in the EEOC. The provision in § 7121(d) allowing an employee to request the EEOC to review a final decision in any other matter involving a complaint of discrimination therefore refers to cases of pure discrimination as opposed to the cases within the jurisdiction of the MSPB to review. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.401(d) (A grievant may appeal the final decision of the . . . arbitrator . . . on the grievance [to the EEOC] when an issue of employment discrimination was raised in a negotiated grievance procedure that permits such issues to be raised. A grievant may not appeal under this part, however, when the matter initially raised in the negotiated grievance procedure is still ongoing in that process, is in arbitration, [or] is appealable to the MSPB.  (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we read any other matter to refer to pure employment discrimination claims as distinguished from the other types of claims involving prohibited personnel practices cognizable by the MSPB. 49 Although Fernandez elected to proceed along the negotiated grievance route, the NTEU chose not to go forward with arbitration. We note that only parties to the collective bargaining agreement may pursue binding arbitration of a grievance not otherwise satisfactorily settled. See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(b)(1)(C)(iii). The NTEU both submitted Fernandez's grievance to arbitration and withdrew it, and the Record does not reveal that Fernandez was provided with an opportunity to represent himself or that he had the right to do so. Moreover, Fernandez could not be compelled to accede to a settlement agreement that was unacceptable to him. The failure by Fernandez to exhaust administrative remedies available under the CSRA was therefore attributable to the NTEU's actions in preventing a final decision from which he could have otherwise appealed. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d). Since the CSRA left Fernandez with no avenue of relief after the NTEU unilaterally withdrew from arbitration, the District Court should consider this fact on remand in determining whether the failure to exhaust EEOC remedies can be excused.