Opinion ID: 2799240
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Time Limit and Jackson's Character Witnesses

Text: Jackson asserts the district court erred by entering a pretrial order that excluded her character witnesses and by limiting her time to present evidence at trial. With respect to the district court's exclusion of her witnesses, Jackson concedes that, as a general matter, character evidence in civil cases, including evidence of religious beliefs or opinions, is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 403, 404(a)(1) & 610. Jackson contends, however, that Allstate attacked her credibility as a witness, and that Rule 608(a) therefore entitled her to rebut this attack via her own character witnesses. Rule 608(a) provides that a witness's credibility may be attacked or supported by opinion or reputation testimony about the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness; however, evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness's character for truthfulness has been attacked. Fed. R. Evid. 608(a). We 4 We also note the requests for admission may have been untimely, as they were filed months after the discovery deadline expired. See Freeman v. City of Detroit, 274 F.R.D. 610, 612-13 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (citing several federal district court cases holding requests for admission are subject to discovery deadlines). -12- review the district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 608(a) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jewell, 614 F.3d 911, 926 (8th Cir. 2010). Jackson first argues that Allstate attacked her character for truthfulness as a witness by asserting its material misrepresentations defense. Jackson cites no case law in support of her contention, and we decline to hold that Allstate's assertion of this defense entitled Jackson to offer character evidence under Rule 608(a). Jackson alternatively argues that Allstate attacked her credibility when Baker testified that she was dishonest with him during his investigation. However, Jackson never objected to Baker's testimony under Rule 608(a). In addition, despite the district court's assurances that it would consider revising its evidentiary rulings depending on how the trial progressed, Jackson never offered a rebuttal witness to counter Baker's purported attack on her character for truthfulness. Thus, with respect to Baker's testimony, Jackson has failed to preserve any challenge based on Rule 608(a), and we find no plain error in the district court's decision to enter a pretrial order excluding Jackson's character witnesses. Chism v. CNH Am. LLC, 638 F.3d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding plain error review is appropriate when a party fails to make a timely objection to an evidentiary ruling). We also hold the district court did not err by limiting Jackson's time to present evidence at trial. Trial courts are permitted to impose reasonable time limits on the presentation of evidence to prevent undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Harris v. Chand, 506 F.3d 1135, 1141 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). Trial management decisions are within the court's discretion and are reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Id. Abuse may occur when a court excludes probative, noncumulative evidence simply because its introduction will cause delay. Id. (internal quotation omitted). Having closely reviewed the trial record, we conclude that the time limit did not prevent Jackson -13- from presenting any probative, noncumulative evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Jackson's time.