Opinion ID: 198097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Willful Blindness Instruction

Text: 42 Patrick's final assertion of error concerns the giving of a willful blindness instruction to the jury. Two claims are made. First, Patrick alleges that it was error for the court to instruct on willful blindness at all because there was insufficient evidence to support the instruction. Because a timely objection was lodged to the giving of the instruction, we review its propriety for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 809 (1st Cir.1996). Second, Patrick contends that the language of the instruction was incorrect because it failed to specifically instruct that mere recklessness or negligence is not enough to support a finding of willful blindness. Because this specific assertion of error was not raised below, we review for plain error. See United States v. O'Connor, 28 F.3d 218, 221 (1st Cir.1994). 43 With regard to Patrick's first contention, we detect no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to instruct on willful blindness. We stated in United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 452 (1st Cir.1994), that [t]he trial court may instruct the jury concerning willful blindness when a defendant claims a lack of knowledge, the facts support an inference of defendant's conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and the instruction, taken as a whole, cannot be misunderstood by a juror as mandating the inference of knowledge. Patrick argues that when there is an absence of evidence showing deliberate acts, on Defendant's part, aimed at avoidance of actual knowledge, then the willful blindness instruction should not be given. Patrick's Br. at 27. But this is not the law. All that is required is that the facts support an inference of defendant's conscious course of deliberate ignorance. Brandon, 17 F.3d at 452 (emphasis added). 44 We think the facts of this case sufficiently supported the inferences necessary to permit the district court to instruct on willful blindness. There was evidence which tended to show that the Cunans were closely involved with DeCato's extensive purchases, and were aware that he was purchasing goods and property under false names. There was also evidence that they knew that he was a fugitive from a drug trafficking charge, yet accepted large amounts of cash from DeCato, turning that cash into checks for his purchases. In the face of this, they adamantly maintain that they did not know DeCato's funds came from drug trafficking. This evidence supports an inference of conscious avoidance. See United States v. Gabriele, 63 F.3d 61, 66-67 (1st Cir.1995) (finding similar red flags of criminal activity sufficient to support instruction). 45 Turning to Patrick's second assertion, we detect no plain error. The district court's instruction was as follows: 8 46 [Y]ou may infer that a person had knowledge from circumstantial evidence or evidence showing willful blindness by that person. Willful blindness exists when a person, whose suspicion has been aroused deliberately fails to make further inquiries. If you find that a person had a strong suspicion and someone withheld important facts, yet shut his or her eyes for fear of what he or she would learn, you may conclude that the person acted knowingly. 47 Patrick asserts that this instruction should have included a statement that mere recklessness or negligence is not enough to support a finding of willful blindness. He is correct that our recent decisions on the issue have approved instructions that included such language. See, e.g., Brandon, 17 F.3d at 452 n. 72; United States v. Richardson, 14 F.3d 666, 671 (1st Cir.1994). We stated in Brandon that [t]he danger of an improper willful blindness instruction is the possibility that the jury will be led to employ a negligence standard and convict a defendant on the impermissible ground that he should have known an illegal act was taking place. 17 F.3d at 453 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also First Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal § 2.14 (West 1998). But we think the instruction at issue was adequately worded to avoid such a danger. The instruction speaks of conscious acts of avoidance--deliberately fails to make further inquiries, shut his or her eyes. This language conveys the proper standard to apply in assessing the Cunans' conduct, and fairly read, does not suggest that anything less will suffice. We therefore find no plain error. 48 As a final note, we do not understand Patrick's contention that the district court failed to instruct the jury that it must find willful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt. The record demonstrates that the court instructed the jury that the government must prove the knowledge element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, before outlining the ways in which the knowledge element could be satisfied, including willful blindness.