Opinion ID: 1172230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motions to dismiss of gould, cadet, ipc, and pink's

Text: The Sammises named Gould and Cadet in their motion for enlargement of time. The court viewed Gould and Cadet's motions to dismiss as motions for reconsideration of the court's previous order granting the Sammises' motion for enlargement of time. The court ruled that the Sammises had failed to demonstrate good cause for an extension of time in which to serve Gould and Cadet and granted Gould and Cadet's motions to dismiss. Although the Sammises did not name IPC or Pink's in their motion for enlargement of time, the Sammises failed to timely serve these respondents. IPC and Pink's also based their motions to dismiss on I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) and 12(b). The court granted these motions, again finding that the Sammises had failed to demonstrate good cause.
Because the court initially granted the Sammises' ex parte motion for enlargement of time, the first issue to be decided is whether a district court can reconsider and vacate an interlocutory order, such as an order allowing late service of named defendants. This Court has held that I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) provides the authority for a district court to reconsider and vacate interlocutory orders so long as final judgment has not yet been entered. Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68, 878 P.2d 762, 767 (1994). See I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). In this case, then, the district court's reconsideration of its prior ruling was proper.
The version of I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) in effect at the time the amended complaint was filed provides: If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within six (6) months after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative without notice to such party or upon motion. I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added). Although we have not previously articulated the standard of review applicable to cases involving this rule, it is clear that the determination of whether good cause exists is a factual one. See Shaw v. Martin, 20 Idaho 168, 174-75, 117 P. 853, 855 (1911) (issue of whether plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in serving summons upon defendant is a factual one). Because this is a factual determination, the appropriate standard of review is the same as that used to review an order granting summary judgment. See Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 74-75, 803 P.2d 978, 980-81 (1990) (applying summary judgment standard to factual questions presented by conflicting affidavits in motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction). Thus, when reviewing the trial court's decision that the Sammises failed to establish good cause under the rule, we must liberally construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994) (citing Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994); Harris v. Department of Health and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992)).
Rule 4(a)(2) required the court to dismiss the action unless the Sammises demonstrated good cause for failure to timely serve the respondents. The relevant period of time on which to focus is the six months following the filing of the amended complaintMarch 18 through September 18, 1994. By its terms, Rule 4(a)(2) imposes the burden of demonstrating good cause on the party who failed to effect timely servicein this case, the Sammises.
The Sammises argue that greater leniency from the court is required due to the fact that they participated in this litigation pro se until March 3, 1995. This Court has held, however, that pro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration on that ground. Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990). Pro se status does not excuse parties from adhering to procedural rules, even though they may be unaware of such requirements. Id., 797 P.2d at 100; Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Idaho 1086, 1089 n. 5, 739 P.2d 385, 388 n. 5 (1987); Scafco Boise, Inc. v. Rigby, 98 Idaho 432, 434, 566 P.2d 381, 383 (1977). In Scafco, the pro se appellant, in filing a motion for a new trial, violated a mandatory procedural rule requiring that he set forth with particularity the factual grounds for his motion. The opposing party sought to strike appellant's motion on that basis. This Court ruled that the trial court erred in not striking appellant's motion, noting that the language of the rule was mandatory and that, the law provides that a man may try his own case if he wants to do so. [Appellant] has chosen to do so, and having so chosen, I suppose he should not complain if he finds himself in difficulty. Scafco, 98 Idaho at 434, 566 P.2d at 383 (quoting trial court's order). Likewise, in the instant case, the lower court considered the mandatory nature of the procedural rules, stating prior to granting the respondents' motions to dismiss, There are rules, and, particularly, `shall' rules I think have to be complied with, and courts themselves are places where rules are followed. Rule 4(a)(2) is couched in mandatory language, requiring dismissal where a party does not comply, absent a showing of good cause. We hold that the Sammises' pro se status cannot excuse their lack of compliance with this mandatory rule. In their briefing before this Court, the Sammises argue that we should consider good cause in Rule 4(a)(2) as synonymous with excusable neglect. Even if this were the applicable standard, we have held that ignorance of procedural requirements goes beyond excusable neglect: [A pro se litigant's f]ailure to be aware of the requirements of procedural rules does not constitute excusable neglect. Golay, 118 Idaho at 392, 797 P.2d at 100 (quoting lower court when discussing excusable neglect for purposes of I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1)). Thus, even under this more relaxed standard, the Sammises' pro se status does not excuse their failure to comply with the time limitations in Rule 4(a)(2).
The Sammises also argue that Rule 4(a)(2) provides for dismissal without prejudice where a plaintiff fails to timely serve defendants. They point out that if we affirm the district court's order dismissing these respondents, refiling of their claim will be time barred. This, they urge, should be considered in the assessment of good cause and should weigh in their favor. The Sammises, however, cite no authority for this proposition. Although Idaho courts have not addressed this issue, the federal courts have ruled that, under the analogous federal rule, the running of the statute of limitations and the consequent bar to refiling the action is not a factor to be taken into account when determining whether good cause exists. Petrucelli v. Bohringer and Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1306 & n. 7 (3d Cir.1995); Mendez v. Elliot, 45 F.3d 75, 78 (4th Cir.1995); Floyd v. United States, 900 F.2d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). We hold that the running of the statute of limitations and the subsequent time-bar to refiling the action is not a factor to be considered in determining whether good cause exists under Rule 4(a)(2).
The Sammises next assert that they diligently attempted to serve the respondents in this case. In Mr. Sammis' affidavit, he states, I have made a diligent and good faith effort in pursuing the claims in this case and the following demonstrates what I have done and what has occurred in this case. The majority of the affidavit, however, is irrelevant as to why the Sammises failed to timely serve the defendants, as the events which Mr. Sammis describes occurred outside the relevant time frame, either before the filing of the amended complaint or after the six-month period had expired. He also did not elaborate on what steps he took to locate the respondents and to ascertain how he could serve them. Although the Sammises are correct in asserting that a court may consider a party's diligent efforts to effect service, the Sammises did not meet their burden of establishing good cause given the dearth of specific information regarding attempts at service.
The Sammises also cite the difficulty in determining the proper defendants in complex products liability actions. This factor, however, is irrelevant to a good cause determination in the instant case. The relevant time period to consider is March 18 through September 18, 1994. The four respondents at issue (Gould, Cadet, IPC, and Pink's) were named in the Sammises' amended complaint. This is not a case, then, where the defendants' identities were not discovered until after the six-month period had expired. Their identities were known on March 18, 1994, at the start of the relevant time frame. The complexity of a products liability action thus cannot account for or excuse the Sammises' untimely service of these respondents.
The Sammises also argue that their ongoing attempts to settle the suit against Cadet should be considered in the good cause analysis. In his affidavit, Mr. Sammis asserts that, beginning in October 1994, he and Cadet discussed the possibility of settlement. Even if negotiations were a proper factor to consider in a determination of good cause, the attempts at settlement in this case occurred after the expiration of the six-month period (September 18, 1994). They are thus irrelevant as to whether the Sammises had good cause for failure to timely serve Cadet.
The Sammises appear to argue that Rule 4(a)(2) imposes a burden on defendants to show prejudice stemming from the late service and that a court cannot dismiss a case pursuant to this rule absent such a showing. The Sammises also assert that lack of prejudice to the defendants should be a consideration in the good cause analysis. By its terms, however, Rule 4(a)(2) imposes the burden of preventing dismissal for violation of the rule upon the party who failed to effect timely servicehere, the Sammises. In addition, the rule's language renders a consideration of prejudice to the defendants irrelevant to good cause determinations. The rule required the Sammises to show good cause why such service was not made within the stated time frame. I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added). As a federal court noted when interpreting identical language in the analogous federal rule, lack of prejudice to the defendant does not constitute a reason why service could not be made. Floyd, 900 F.2d at 1048. Federal courts have also held that a lack of prejudice to defendants, by itself, cannot constitute good cause. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 64, 136 L.Ed.2d 25 (1996); Floyd, 900 F.2d at 1048-49. Because the Sammises have not proffered a legitimate reason for the late service and thus have not demonstrated good cause (as discussed above), the respondents' lack of a showing of prejudice is irrelevant. The purported absence of prejudice does not support the Sammises' allegation of good cause.
We affirm the district court's dismissal of the Sammises' complaint as to respondents Gould, Cadet, IPC, and Pink's pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). We hold that the Sammises did not meet their burden of demonstrating good cause for failure to timely serve these respondents.