Opinion ID: 1678139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: circumstances of identification

Text: Finally, we determine that the record supports the conclusion of the trial court that the in-court identification of Escamilla by a witness was not unduly suggestive. On the day of the homicide, Officer David Goehring interviewed a neighbor, Wilmer Davidson, who lived across the street from the victim. Davidson stated that he saw a man leaving the victim's residence that morning between 7 and 7:30, going northwest toward 30th Street at a good, fast trot. He described the man as standing 5 feet 10 inches or 5 feet 11 inches tall, weighing about 160 pounds, and being clean-shaven with dark hair down over his ears. He described the man's complexion as kind of a real heavy tan, kind of a yellowish color, like a [sic] I can see it in my mind, kind of like a [sic] oriental. Like I said before, I kind of hate to say this, kind of like a half-breed color, black and white or yellow and white, what I'm trying to say. He also stated that the man was wearing blue pants, a white butcher's-type apron that covered the front of his pants, and no shirt. When Escamilla was first contacted the day of the homicide, he was wearing tan pants and a red sweatshirt around his shoulders. He weighed approximately 130 pounds and was about 5 feet 4 inches tall. Escamilla's counsel recalled that Escamilla had a beard at the time of his arrest. Prior to the preliminary hearing, Escamilla agreed to appear in a lineup. However, no lineup took place, and no photo array was shown to Davidson. At the preliminary hearing, Escamilla sat at the defense table with his counsel. Davidson testified at the hearing that the person he saw leaving the victim's residence was a member of the Hispanic race, and identified Escamilla as that person. One of Escamilla's counsel could recall only two members of any minority race, other than his client, who were present in the courtroom during the preliminary hearing; these were two females who were seated in the audience. That same attorney agreed that it would have been difficult for Davidson to fail to identify Escamilla under those circumstances. Counsel could not recall discussing with his client the possibility of a motion to suppress. On this point, we could do no better than to quote from the trial judge's order: While it is quite clear that the courtroom identification was suggestive, it is well-established that suggestiveness alone does not violate due process so long as the identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliability. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); State v. Richard, 228 Neb. 872, 424 N.W.2d 859 (1988).... ... The court [in State v. Holtan, 205 Neb. 314, 287 N.W.2d 671 (1980)] held, however, that in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it must be shown that counsel's inaction resulted in an actual prejudice to the defendant. Consequently, since the evidence was so overwhelming that the imposition of the death penalty would be a certainty if the defendant went to trial, the court concluded that if competent counsel, after investigation[,] considers a point worthless, the fact that he is court-appointed does not require him to pursue it.... [T]he right to counsel ... does not include the right to ... advance a totally frivolous claim.... Id., 205 Neb. at 320, 287 N.W.2d at 675. ... Here, even if Escamilla's counsel had pursued and succeeded in suppressing the identification as unduly suggestive, the defendant's post- Miranda confession would have, in all likelihood, been sufficient to prove his guilt. Consequently, as in Holtan, counsel's failure to suppress the identification would not have prejudiced the defendant in any material way. This allegation is without merit.