Opinion ID: 561304
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: multiplicity of indictment

Text: 16 Defendant Roberto Ramirez argues that the indictment was multiplicitous because the two possession with intent to distribute counts in the indictment charged the commission of merely one offense. In United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1522 (7th Cir.1990), we observed that: Essentially a claim of multiplicity alleges that separate counts in an indictment charge a single offense. 'As such the indictment exposes a defendant to the threat of receiving multiple punishment for the same offense.'  (Citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Podell, 869 F.2d 328, 330 (7th Cir.1989)). In United States v. Marquardt, 786 F.2d 771, 778 (7th Cir.1986), we set forth the standard utilized in evaluating whether counts are multiplicitous: 17 The traditional test of multiplicity 'determines whether each count requires proof of a fact which the other does not. ' United States v. Kennedy, 726 F.2d 546, 547-48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, [469 U.S. 965], 105 S.Ct. 365, 83 L.Ed.2d 301 (1984) (quoting United States v. Glanton, 707 F.2d 1238 (11th Cir.1983)). 'If one element is required to prove the offense in one count which is not required to prove the offense in the second count, there is no multiplicity.' United States v. Briscoe, 742 F.2d 842, 845 (5th Cir.1984). 18 Ramirez was convicted of the two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine based upon the vicarious liability theory of Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). In order for Ramirez to be liable for Chao or Ortega's possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under Pinkerton, the government was required to demonstrate that Chao or Ortega possessed cocaine with intent to distribute in furtherance of or as a natural consequence of the conspiracy and that Ramirez was a co-conspirator with either Chao or Ortega. Conviction on the second count of possession with intent to distribute required proof that Pena or Tobon (rather than Chao or Ortega) had possessed cocaine with intent to distribute in furtherance of or as a natural consequence of the conspiracy and that Ramirez was a co-conspirator with Pena or Tobon. The record establishes that these two separate crimes of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in conjunction with the conspiracy occurred and that Chao (the jury absolved Ortega) possessed the cocaine with the intent to distribute it at the time he and Ortega unloaded it at the Celi-Mar warehouse, and Ramirez is vicariously liable for Chao's crime under Pinkerton in Count II. Likewise, under Count III Ramirez is vicariously liable for Pena's and Tobon's possession of the cocaine with the intent to distribute it, which occurred when they conveyed the cocaine from the warehouse in a truck. Since the government was required to prove the element of Pena's and Tobon's possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute under Count III that was immaterial to Count II, it was proper that the two counts be individually charged and that Ramirez receive separate punishment for each count.