Opinion ID: 2043164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: Jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding is governed exclusively by the UCCJEA. [3] Jurisdiction over custody matters having interstate dimension must be determined independently by application of the UCCJEA. [4] The UCCJEA was enacted to serve the following purposes: (1) to avoid interstate jurisdictional competition and conflict in child custody matters, (2) to promote cooperation between courts of other states so that a custody determination can be rendered in a state best suited to decide the case in the interest of the child, (3) to discourage the use of the interstate system for continuing custody controversies, (4) to deter child abductions, (5) to avoid relitigation of custody issues, and (6) to facilitate enforcement of custody orders. [5] The UCCJEA treats a foreign country, such as Japan, as a state of the United States, unless the laws of the foreign country violate fundamental principles of human rights. [6] In this case, there is no allegation that Japan violates fundamental principles of human rights. In order for a state to exercise jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, that state must be the home state as defined by the UCCJEA or fall under limited exceptions to the home state requirement specified by the act. [7] Under the facts of this case, for Nebraska to exercise initial jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, Nebraska must be the home state as defined by the UCCJEA. [8] The UCCJEA provides that a state has jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination only if (1) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state. [9] Stuart does not allege that any of the exceptions to the home state requirement are applicable here. Instead, he asserts that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Alex because, at the time of the filing, Nebraska was Alex's home state. Home state of the child is defined in the UCCJEA as the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period. [10] Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. [11] We first note that although Stuart emphasizes that portion of § 43-1227 which refers to children under 6 months of age, the statement that [i]n the case of a child less than six months of age, [home state] means the state in which the child lived from birth clearly refers back to the sentence preceding it and applies only to a child custody case involving a child under the age of 6 months of age at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. [12] In other words, this clause was meant to provide a home state for a child when a custody proceeding is commenced at a time when a child has not lived in a state for the requisite 6-month periodbecause the child has not been alive for that period of time. [13] It is not meant to say that a child's state of birth is that child's home state. [14] Under the UCCJEA, regardless of where the child was born, if the child and his or her parents have been living in another state for the 6 months immediately preceding the commencement of a custody proceeding, then the state in which the child was born is not the child's home state under § 43-1227. [15] As the Nebraska Court of Appeals emphasized in Lamb v. Lamb, [16] the plain and ordinary meaning of home state is the state where the child has lived with a parent or person acting as a parent for the 6 months immediately preceding the action. [17] But Stuart argues that the 2 years spent in Japan was only a temporary absence from Nebraska and that thus, under § 43-1227, Alex continued to live in Nebraska for well over the requisite 6-month period. Section 43-1227 states that [a] period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period. Thus, under the UCCJEA, a temporary absence should be counted as part of the 6 months during which the child must live in a state for it to be the home state. [18] Stuart argues that the absence was temporary because it was due to a military assignment. We disagree. In the present case, the fact that Alex was in Japan because of Stuart's military obligations is of no consequence. The UCCJEA does not specifically address the meaning of temporary absence as used in § 43-1227. But it is clear that time spent living in another state or country due to a permanent military duty assignment is not considered a temporary absence simply because it was motivated by such assignment. [19] In Consford v. Consford, [20] the child was born while her parents were on military assignment in Germany. When that assignment was completed several months later, the family moved to Texas to await the father's next military assignment. Less than 8 weeks later, the family moved to Arizona upon the father's military assignment there. Shortly after moving to Arizona, the parents separated and the mother and child went to Florida to stay with the child's maternal grandmother. The father continued living in Arizona. Five months after moving there, he filed for divorce in Texas, and the Texas court eventually entered a custody decree. In the meantime, the mother and child had moved to New York, where the parties eventually disputed whether the Texas custody decree was enforceable for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, ultimately held that Texas lacked jurisdiction as the child's home state despite the fact that the parents had chosen Texas as their legal domicile, had registered a vehicle there, and had filed their tax returns there before being moved to Arizona on military assignment. Although the move from Texas was compelled by a military assignment, the court held that time spent in Arizona could not be considered simply a temporary absence from Texas. The court explained: Although an adult does not gain or lose a domicile or residence by serving in the military ..., the determination of a child's home state ... is separate and distinct from the determination of either the parents' or the child's legal residence.... [21] The court found simply that the family had functioned as a family unit in Arizona in a manner such that they lived there. In the present case, we note that before moving to Japan for Stuart's last military assignment, Stuart and Nahoko had significant ties to Japan. Nahoko is a Japanese citizen and has family in Japan. Stuart and Nahoko were married in Japan, and they lived in Japan previously to living in Nebraska. When they moved back, they stayed for over 2 years, most of Alex's life at that time. Alex attended daycare in Japan, he established close family relationships with his Japanese grandparents, and his first language was Japanese. Under these facts, Alex's absence from Nebraska could not be considered simply temporary. While their move to Japan was required by Stuart's military assignment, this is no different from any of the previous places the family had lived during their married life. In fact, the family lived in Nebraska only briefly prior to leaving for Japanbecause of Stuart's military assignment there. While Alex may have been under 6 months of age at the time they left, that fact does not change our analysis in this case. The time spent in Japan is not considered a temporary absence, and, therefore, it is clear that Alex was not living in Nebraska for the 6 months prior to the commencement of these proceedings. Thus, the district court did not have jurisdiction, and it should have granted Nahoko's motion to dismiss the child custody dispute. Nahoko also assigns error to the district court's failure to award her attorney fees. The district court's decision on a request for attorney fees is reviewed de novo on the record and will be affirmed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [22] Although the district court did not have jurisdiction to decide the child custody case because Nebraska is not Alex's home state, we have the power to determine jurisdictional issues and to allow attorney fees and costs regarding litigation of such jurisdictional issues. [23] Based on our de novo review of the record, the district court abused its discretion in not awarding Nahoko attorney fees. Nahoko was forced to leave her home in Japan to defend this lengthy and meritless jurisdiction dispute. As such, we award $10,000 to Nahoko in attorney fees.