Opinion ID: 621564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of the Frisk

Text: Having concluded that the basis for the Terry frisk was proper, we next examine “‘whether the degree of intrusion into the suspect’s personal security was reasonably related in scope to the situation at hand, which is judged by examining the reasonableness of the officials’ conduct given their suspicions and the surrounding circumstances.’” United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hardnett, 804 F.2d at 356). Because a Terry frisk is “for the limited purpose of ensuring the safety of the officer and others around him, the search must ‘be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover’” weapons that could be used to assault the officer. United States v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949, 955 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29). The frisk conducted here was unremarkable in scope or duration. Officer Roncska thoroughly, but not unreasonably, patted down Stennis’ waist and pants. The pat down of Stennis’ waist did not indicate contraband, so Officer Roncska proceeded to frisk Stennis’ groin and upper legs, which revealed hard bulges indicating contraband. After palpating these bulges, Officer Roncska reached within Stennis’ pants to retrieve the guns and drugs. Accordingly, the frisk remained within the proper scope laid out in Terry. Stennis nevertheless argues that this search exceeded the scope permitted under Terry because Officer Roncska briefly pulled up on Stennis’ shirt or jacket while performing the pat down of his waist. He contends that, in doing so, Officer Roncska went beyond a frisk of Stennis’ outer clothing. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7. The government responds by pointing to several cases from our sister circuits in which those courts upheld frisks in which the individual’s shirt was lifted. See United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hill, 545 F.2d 1191, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 10 No. 10-5835 1976) (per curiam). The government argues that these cases demonstrate that “the reasonableness of a protective search depends on the factual circumstances of each case” and that “a patdown frisk is but one example of how a reasonable protective search may be conducted.” Baker, 78 F.3d at 138. A police officer “making a reasonable investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others,” a limited protective search may be conducted for the purpose of discovering any concealed weapons. Id. Regardless of the specific mechanics, Officer Roncska’s actions did not go beyond this purpose. This Court has reviewed the videotape and agrees with the district court’s factual finding that any pulling up of Stennis’ shirt or jacket was a de minimus action attributable to patting down Stennis’ waist while he was in a seated position. Officer Roncska made no attempt to perform a search outside Terry’s boundaries while doing so. Officer Roncska did not reach up or grope beneath Stennis’ outside clothing; he made no attempt to place his hands under Stennis’ waistband; and he did not reach within Stennis’ inner clothing or pockets. Accordingly, the protective frisk was reasonably related in scope to the situation at hand.