Opinion ID: 2177003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nero's Severance Claim

Text: Appellant Nero argues that the trial court erred in denying severance because he was unfairly prejudiced by the admission into evidence of his co-defendant's statements which he contends would have been inadmissible against him in a separate trial. He contends that the numerous statements introduced, some admissible against both defendants, and some admissible only against his codefendant, made it difficult for the jury to separate this evidence as to each defendant, thereby causing him prejudice. Nero also argues that the trial court's instructions were inadequate to prevent the prejudice. Finding no clear showing that the trial court abused its considerable discretion in denying severance, we reject this argument for reversal. See Taylor v. United States, 601 A.2d 1060, 1063 (D.C.1991). A strong presumption arises that persons charged with committing the same offense will be tried jointly. Id.; Tillman v. United States, 519 A.2d 166, 169 (D.C.1986). However, severance will be granted where a defendant makes a sufficient showing of prejudice under Super.Ct.Crim.R. 14. [12] Taylor, supra, 601 A.2d at 106. Whether to grant severance under Rule 14 is within the trial court's discretion, and in exercising that discretion, the court must weigh the potential prejudice to the defendant against the considerations of judicial economy and expeditious proceedings. Carpenter v. United States, 430 A.2d 496, 502 (D.C.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 852, 102 S.Ct. 295, 70 L.Ed.2d 143 (1981). In balancing these interests, some prejudice is permitted. Id.; see also Payne v. United States, 516 A.2d 484, 489 (D.C. 1986). Thus, in order to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance, a defendant must show not merely prejudice, but manifest prejudice. Payne, 516 A.2d at at 490; ( James A.) Johnson v. United States, 596 A.2d 980, 987 (D.C.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1987, 118 L.Ed.2d 585 (1992). In light of these principles, we consider the statements which appellant Nero contends prejudiced him during the joint trial. The statements which form the predicate for appellant's severance argument include the following: (1) Terry Howard's testimony that appellant Elliott told her prior to the murder that she, her sister, and Kearney had better stop robbing people in the alley or he would f[___] them up; (2) testimony by Howard that a couple of weeks after the shooting Elliott denied shooting Kearney, but said that Kearney had stolen five thousand dollars and Elliott's gun and that he was looking for Brenda Thomas for testifying against him on killing [Kearney]; (3) Keisha Cooper's and Brenda Thomas' testimony that Elliott pointed a gun at them two days before the murder and accused them of setting him up with Kearney; [13] and (4) Tameshia Fowler's testimony that Elliott told her that if he learned that she snitched on him, somebody [was] going to blow up [her] house. Appellant argues that these statements attributed to Elliott had a prejudicial spill-over effect upon the jury's consideration of his case. He also contends that the sheer number of statements created a source of jury confusion. We disagree. None of the statements mention or even refer inferentially to appellant Nero. Appellant argues that the jury might have concluded that Nero was the somebody referred to in the statement recounted by Fowler. However, in context with Fowler's other testimony and the remaining evidence at trial, we discern no such danger. While the statements substantially incriminate Elliott, they do not inculpate Nero. The trial court gave a prompt limiting instruction, charging the jury to consider this evidence solely against appellant Elliott. Under these circumstances, there is no substantial risk that the jury improperly considered the statement in determining the guilt of appellant Nero. See Foster v. United States, 548 A.2d 1370, 1378 (D.C.1988). With the exception of the testimony of Cooper and Thomas recounting Elliott's words when he talked to them at gunpoint, the trial court gave appropriate cautionary instructions following the admission of each of the other statements. [14] Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the spillover effect of this evidence, if any, was minimal and that appellant failed to show manifest prejudice on that basis as a result of joinder. See Payne, supra, 516 A.2d at 491.