Opinion ID: 1926520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Wrongful Death Act

Text: Sindelar next asserts that the hearing justice erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Leguia because the justice incorrectly interpreted and applied the Act. She asserts that the Legislature, by using the term pecuniary damages in § 10-7-1.1 of the Act, intended to provide recovery solely to those persons who had a legitimate expectation of benefits from the continued life of the decedent. She contends therefore that Leguia, as an allegedly absentee father, had no such expectation from the life of Gregor and thus should be precluded from garnering any benefit from his untimely death. It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings. Union Village Development Associates v. Town of North Smithfield Zoning Board of Review, 738 A.2d 1084, 1086 (R.I.1999) (quoting Providence & Worcester Railroad Co. v. Pine, 729 A.2d 202, 208 (R.I.1999)). Once having done that, our `work of judicial interpretation is at an end.' Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 877 (R.I.1996) (quoting DeAngelis v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 656 A.2d 967, 969 (R.I.1995)). Finally, we note that where, as here, a statute operates in the derogation of the common law, we are charged with a strict interpretation of the General Assembly's language. [1] Kelly, 678 A.2d at 876. We have held that [t]he wrongful death act, G.L.1956 chapter 7 of title 10, confers a right ofaction on certain enumerated individuals to recover damages for the death of a family member. Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 680 (R.I.1999) (citing Presley v. Newport Hospital, 117 R.I. 177, 180, 365 A.2d 748, 749-50 (1976)). Section 10-7-2 sets out those entitled to recover under the Act: Every action under this chapter, other than one brought under § 10-7-1.2, shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the deceased person, whether appointed or qualified within or without the state, and of the amount recovered in every action under this chapter one-half (½) shall go to the husband or widow, and one-half (½) shall go to the children of the deceased, and if there are no children, the whole shall go to the husband or widow, and, if there is no husband or widow, to the next of kin, in the proportion provided by law in relation to the distribution of personal property left by persons dying intestate   . The plain language of the statute indicates that if the decedent dies childless, then all of the amount recovered shall go to the decedent's spouse, and if there exists no spouse nor children, then the entire amount recovered shall be distributed to the next of kin as if the decedent died intestate. In the instant case, Gregor died leaving no wife and no children, and therefore under Rhode Island intestacy law, the amount recovered in the wrongful death action is to be shared equally by his parents, as his heirs at law. While § 10-7-2 of the Act recognizes an exception to recovery for those parents who have failed to pay child support, [2] and we have recognized the so-called cause of death exception torecovery, see Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Curley, 585 A.2d 640 (R.I.1991), we conclude there simply is no reason to promulgate and thus to carve, by naked judicial fiat, a further exception into the Act that purports to test the strength of parental bonds between a parent and a decedent child before awarding recovery to a parent under the Act. In reaching this conclusion, we find controlling the plain language of the statute itself. We, as did the hearing justice, glean no language whatsoever indicating the need for a judicial inquiry to determine the worthiness of the relationship between a decedent and an enumerated taker under § 10-7-2. Sindelar, however, would have us turn the plain language of § 10-7-2 and § 10-7-1.1 on its head by accepting her argument that the General Assembly intended pecuniary damages to encompass only those takers under the Act who reasonably expected a benefit from the continuing life of the decedent. [3] We observe that the term pecuniary damage is statutorily determined in the Act in § 10-7-1.1: Pecuniary damages to the beneficiaries described under § 10-7-2 and recoverable by the beneficiaries shall be ascertained as follows: (1) Determine the gross amount of the decedent's prospective income or earnings over the remainder of his or her life expectancy, including all estimated income he or she would probably have earned by his or her own exertions, both physical and mental. That statutory definition is in complete harmony with the commonly accepted definition of pecuniary damages used throughout Rhode Island case law and used by persuasive authorities and creates no ambiguity in its interpretation. See e.g. Black's Law Dictionary 396 (7th ed.1999)(pecuniary damages defined as [d]amages that can be estimated and monetarily compensated). We simply perceive nothing in the plain and ordinary definition of pecuniary damages or in the § 10-7-1.1 determination of pecuniary damages establishing any requirement that a putative taker under the Act have some expectation, reasonable or otherwise, of a benefit from the life of the decedent. Rather, we stress that § 10-7-1.1, by its plain meaning, encompasses purely economic damages to the decedent, directed to the beneficiaries in § 10-7-2. By marked contrast, we note that § 10-7-1.2, by its plain language, allows for the bringing of a claim for loss of consortium, where a preexisting relationship between decedent and survivor is indeed relevant to recovery. Although inapplicable to the case at bar because Gregor was an adult at the time of his death, the existence of such a provision clearly indicates that if the Legislature intended damage computation under § 10-7-1.1 to encompass more than a determination of pure economic damages to the decedent, it would have so provided within that section. Sindelar next cites our holding in Curley, the so-called cause of death exception case, for the proposition that this Court is willing and able to carve out exceptions to the mechanical distribution rules under the Act under certain circumstances. We disagree. In Curley, we applied this jurisdiction's well settled public policy in concluding that a tortfeasor should not benefit from his or her own wrongdoing and was thus precluded from recovery under the Act, where that tortfeasor's negligence was adjudged the proximate cause of the decedent's death. Curley, 585 A.2d at 643. In reaching that result, we gleaned ample support from Rhode Island precedent and were particularly mindful of the liberal preamble language in the so-called Slayer's Act, G.L.1956 chapter 1.1 of title 33, providing: [t]his chapter shall not be considered penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this state that no person shall be allowed to profit by his or her own wrong. Section33-1.1-15. In light of such a clear statement of statutory intent from the General Assembly, we concluded in Curley that any contrary interpretation and holding would have been repugnant to the stated public policy of the state and would have been in disharmony with the legislative statutory schemes relating to intestacy and distribution. We find no such analogous circumstances in the case before us. Although we certainly recognize and appreciate the desirability and importance of ongoing parental contact and support for their children, we simply ascertain no legislative intent or stated public policy, as found in Curley, requiring Rhode Island courts to test those familial bonds to decide their worthiness for recovery under the Act. Mindful that our assigned task is simply to interpret the Act, not to redraft it, any attempt to create an absentee-parent exception must take place within a legislative rather than a judicial setting. Cardi Corp. v. City of Warwick, 122 R.I. 478, 479, 409 A.2d 136, 137 (1979). Sindelar finally claims that other jurisdictions have grappled with the absentee-parent exception, and these courts have concluded that such a parent cannot enjoy recovery under applicable wrongful death law, most notably in Guy v. Johnson, 448 N.E.2d 1142 (Mass.1983). There, in the context of an absentee father seeking to recover damages for the wrongful death of his son, the Massachusetts court found that a parent disassociated from the decedent    cannot justly claim that the decedent had any monetary value for him. Id. at 1145. It simply suffices to say that Guy is clearly distinguishable and inapposite to the issue before us because the Massachusetts court was interpreting a statutory section recognizing damages akin to loss of consortium, including compensation for loss of protection, care, assistance, society, companionship [and] comfort. Id. at 1144 (quoting Mass. General Laws ch. 229, § 2). Those damages clearly go beyond the pecuniary damage determinations prescribed in § 10-7-1.1. Accordingly, we cannot draw any meaningful comparison between ourRhode Island Wrongful Death Act provisions and the Massachusetts court's Wrongful Death Act interpretative caselaw, and conclude the holding in Guy is not relevant to the case before us. For the reasons stated above, the plaintiff's appeal is denied and the grant of summary judgment by the Superior Court is affirmed. The papers in this case are remanded to the Superior Court.