Opinion ID: 6108627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The TCPA's Applicability

Text: We begin our inquiry with the threshold question of whether the Act applies to the case before us. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22 , 25 (Tex. 2003). In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Id. ; see also TEX. GOV'T CODE § 312.005. The surest guide to what lawmakers intended is the enacted language of a statute, Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers , 282 S.W.3d 433 , 463 (Tex. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), which necessarily includes any enacted statements of policy or purpose, see, e.g. , Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n , 518 S.W.3d 318 , 329 (Tex. 2017) ; Greater Hous. P'ship v. Paxton , 468 S.W.3d 51 , 62 (Tex. 2015). Moreover, legislative intent derives from an act as a whole rather than from isolated portions of it. City of San Antonio , 111 S.W.3d at 25 . [W]e construe [a] statute's words according to their plain and common meaning, unless a contrary intention is apparent from the context, or unless such a construction leads to absurd results. City of Rockwall v. Hughes , 246 S.W.3d 621 , 625-26 (Tex. 2008) (citations omitted). A party may invoke the TCPA dismissal procedure if that party shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the legal action against it is based on, relates to, or is in response to the party's exercise of the right to speak, petition, or associate. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(a). The statute defines what it means to exercise those rights. Pertinent here, the exercise of the right to petition includes a communication in or pertaining to ... a judicial proceeding. Id. § 27.001(4)(A). A communication is broadly defined as the making or submitting of a statement or document in any form or medium. Id. § 27.001(1). Relying on the expansive statutory definition of the exercise of the right to petition, Youngkin argues that the TCPA applies here because Hines's claims stem from Youngkin's reciting the Rule 11 agreement in open court. Entering the agreement in the record, he continues, was a communication or statement made in a judicial proceeding, which constitutes the exercise of the right to petition as expressly defined in the statute. Hines responds that an attorney speaking for a client in a courtroom is not exercising any personal First Amendment rights at all. For that reason, Hines argues, his suit against Youngkin is outside the TCPA's purview. Courts must adhere to legislative definitions of terms when they are supplied. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.011(b) ; see also TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs , 340 S.W.3d 432 , 439 (Tex. 2011) (If a statute ... assigns a particular meaning to a term, we are bound by the statutory usage.). Substituting the statutory definitions for the defined terms, we see that the TCPA applies to a legal action against a party that is based on, related to, or in response to the party's making or submitting of a statement or document in or pertaining to a judicial proceeding. Youngkin's alleged liability stems from his dictation of the Rule 11 agreement into the court record during trial. By any common understanding of the words, he made a statement in a judicial proceeding. While those isolated provisions appear to resolve whether Youngkin may avail himself of the Act, it would be contrary to our rules of interpretation to end our inquiry here. It is by now axiomatic that we must construe individual words  and provisions in the context of the statute as a whole. See, e.g. , El Paso Healthcare Sys. v. Murphy , 518 S.W.3d 412 , 418 (Tex. 2017) ; Black v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. , 478 S.W.2d 434 , 437 (Tex. 1972) ; Lufkin v. City of Galveston , 63 Tex. 437 , 439 (Tex. 1885). The text of the TCPA itself explicitly acknowledges that the Act is intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of speech, petition, and association (without foreclosing the ability to bring meritorious lawsuits). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002. We see no conflict between the plain meaning of the definition of the exercise of the right to petition and the statute's express purpose. Therefore, the TCPA's protections properly apply to Hines's claims against Youngkin. Hines's argument that Youngkin cannot invoke the TCPA because the First Amendment right to petition does not encompass Youngkin's in-court statements attempts to add a requirement to the statute that does not exist in its text. It does not follow from the fact that the TCPA professes to safeguard the exercise of certain First Amendment rights that it should only apply to constitutionally guaranteed activities. Because the Legislature explicitly defined the term exercise of the right to petition, injecting such a requirement into the TCPA would be disloyal to its enacted text. Whether that definition maps perfectly onto the external constitutional rights it aims to protect is irrelevant; we are bound by the statutory definition for the purposes of the TCPA. Importantly, we do not opine on whether an attorney has a constitutional right to petition that encompasses speaking on behalf of a client. Accordingly, we hold that the TCPA applies to Hines's claims against Youngkin. We next turn to whether Youngkin is entitled to dismissal.