Opinion ID: 2519004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Plaintiffs' Complaint Was Untimely.

Text: Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs did not file their complaint within six months of Kevin's injuries, it was categorically untimely and, accordingly, we need not address the questions of the effectiveness of the Plaintiffs' letters as notices of claim or whether the County essentially notified itself of the Plaintiffs' claims as circumstantially reflected in the HPD investigation. As we observed in Salavea and reiterated in Kahale, while the notice requirement set forth in HRS § 46-72 may appear to be a mere condition precedent to liability, it operates, in reality, as a statute of limitations. Salavea, 55 Haw. at 218, 517 P.2d at 53; see also Kahale, 104 Hawai`i at 343, 345, 347 & n. 7, 90 P.3d at 235, 237, 239 & n. 7. Furthermore, the legislature recently affirmed HRS § 46-72's character as a statute of limitations by enacting Act 152, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2007), the preambles of which describe HRS § 46-72 as the statute of limitations for claims for damage and injury against the counties. See Act 152 §§ 1, 7, 8, and 14 (emphasis added). That being the case, the Plaintiffs did not comply with HRS § 46-72 (holding aside their equal protection argument, see infra section III.D), inasmuch as they filed their initial complaint on February 22, 2005, more than seven months after Kevin's alleged July 4, 2004 injuries. Cf. Kahale, 104 Hawai`i at 349, 90 P.3d at 241 (Rachael, as Brandzie's next friend, having filed claims for relief on Brandzie's behalf while she was still a minor, ensured that HRS § 46-72 would not act as a bar to those claims against the [County].). D. Inasmuch As The Prior Version Of HRS § 46-72 Distinguished Counties' Tort Victims From The State's Tort Victims Without A Rational Basis, It Contravened Article I, Section 5 Of The Hawai`i Constitution. Finally, given our disposition of the Plaintiffs' first three points of error, it becomes necessary to reach their equal protection [9] argument, on which basis we vacate and remand.
The Plaintiffs contend that HRS § 46-72 creates a class of tort claimants, to wit, those injured by the conduct of a county, who are subject to disparate treatment vis-à-vis victims of injuries caused by the state [10] without a rational basis to support such a distinction. [11] (Quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 145-46, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879, 882-83 (1973); Jenkins v. State, 85 Wash.2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363, 1367-68 (1975).) (Citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); Crandall v. City of Birmingham, 442 So.2d 77, 78-79 (Ala.1983); Gleason v. Davenport, 275 N.W.2d 431, 436 (Iowa 1979); Reich v. State, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1972); Glassman v. Miller, 356 N.W.2d 655, 656 (Minn.1984).) In substance, the Plaintiffs argue that, whereas tort claimants against private parties or the state derive the benefit of a two-year limitation period, they and other plaintiffs allegedly injured by a county are subject to a more restrictive six-month limitation for which no rational basis exists. [12] We agree. [13]
Our case law construing Hawaii's equal protection clause is heretofore silent as to the particular nuance before us. Justice Bernard H. Levinson postulated that the purpose of protecting the public fisc from fraudulent claims justifies the imposition on victims of governmental torts a more onerous requirement of prompt notice of claims than on victims of private torts, Salavea, 55 Haw. at 223 n. 3, 517 P.2d at 56 n. 3 (Levinson, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphases added), but we are not willing simply to transform this explanation of the separate classification of government and private tortfeasors' victims into a rational basis for the distinction between county and state defendants; we have no reason to believe that the counties endure greater budgetary strain or more fraudulent claims than the state. Among the few authorities on point, Farnum v. G.D. Searle & Co., 339 N.W.2d 392 (Iowa 1983), advances the most detailed justification of a county/state distinction, but we believe it to be distinguishable. In Farnum, the plaintiffs contend[ed] there is no rational basis for having a more stringent limitations period for actions against county doctors than for actions against state doctors. Id. at 396. The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed: Despite home rule, counties operate under greater fiscal constraints than the state does. Their main source of revenue is the property tax. The property tax levy is subject to a statutory ceiling. Strict time lines are established in the Local Budget Law. . . . In contrast, the [Iowa] General Assembly is free to raise revenue from a number of sources, and its procedure . . . enables it to appropriate funds as necessary, after the fact, to pay claims. This court has previously noted the special problems encountered by Iowa municipalities in formulating and implementing budgets. Budgetary considerations were noted in Lunday [ v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1973), overruled by Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 781 (1986),] as supporting the notice requirement. . . . See [ id. ] at 907-08. Other courts have also given weight to this factor in upholding similar notice requirements. The same reasoning led the New Mexico Supreme Court to uphold differential treatment of victims and tortfeasors in analogous facts in Espanola Hous[.] Auth[.] v. Atencio, . . . [90 N.M.787,] 568 P.2d 1233 ([N.M.] 1977). The court said: In this state, cities are clearly limited in their expenditures. The ability of cities to raise money to meet such extraordinary expense is also restricted. Therefore, it appears that some rational basis does exist for limiting the time period in which a suit may be brought against a city. . . . Id. . . . at 1236. Other courts have reached the same conclusion. We find these cases persuasive authority for upholding the differential treatment in the present case. Farnum, 339 N.W.2d at 397 (some citations omitted); see also Segarra v. Chi. Transit Auth., 265 Ill.App.3d 480, 202 Ill.Dec. 33, 637 N.E.2d 572, 575 (1994) (where plaintiff challenged notice requirement for suits against the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) that did not apply to suits against municipalities, upholding statute as consistent with equal protection, noting that the CTA, having as its only purpose the operation of one of the largest mass transit systems in the United States[,] performs a . . . governmental function with its own peculiar problems having no parallel in the usual functions of . . . governmental entities, such as a large number of personal injury claims) (internal quotation signals omitted). Unlike Segarra, Farnum, and Atencio, the record before us is silent with respect to any difference between the levels of government in this state that would constitute a rational basis for a more stringent limitation period when the County is the defendant as compared to when the state is the defendant. [14] In fact, the legislature has expressly recognized that the disparity is at least unnecessary and at most unfair. Effective June 7, 2007, the legislature enacted Act 152, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 8, which amended HRS § 46-72 so as to expand the limitation period to two years after the injuries accrued. See supra note 2. Act 152's preamble states that it is necessary to conform the statute of limitations . . . against the counties with the limitations period applicable to the State and private individuals generally to ensure fair and consistent application of the law. See Act 152 § 1; accord id. § 7 (articulating [t]he purpose of the amendment); Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 276 at 2 (Feb. 14, 2007) (This [amendment] will bring county claims in conformity with all other government and private sector claims and the reasonable expectations of the public.). Furthermore, while the County and the state's Department of the Attorney General opposed the amendment from its inception, when testifying against it, they failed to demonstrate how, if at all, the County's exposure to or procedure for handling tort claims is different from the state's so as to justify a disparate limitation period: The six-month requirement is a policy matter. . . . Because the Counties rely on public funds to operate, it is critical that the Counties have all possible avenues to protect their scarce resources. . . . . . . The majority of the claims received by the Counties are not the sensational matters about which the media reports; rather the majority of the claims are the more mundane types of matters that affect municipalities and counties and their citizens, [ e.g. ], pothole claims, damage to mailboxes from refuse trucks, sidewalk trip and falls, money lost in parking meters, tree branches dinging cars, vehicle damage from debris in the roadway, [and] injuries from divots in parks. . . . See Hearing on S.B. 1641, [15] Sen. Intergov'tal & Mil. Affairs Comm., 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 12, 2007) (statement of Corp. Counsel Carrie K.S. Okinaga) (on file with committee clerk); id. (statement of the Dep't of the Att'y Gen.). It just as easily could be said of the state that its resources are scarce and that it is regularly sued over debris in the roadway, damage . . . from refuse trucks, and similar workaday perils. Finally, the cases offered by the County in its answering brief concern only the government-versus-private tortfeasor distinction that we have already rejected as dissimilar to the classification scheme at work in HRS § 46-72 (Supp.1998). See Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 872 A.2d 1, 18-19 (2005); Johnson v. Maryland State Police, 331 Md. 285, 628 A.2d 162, 167 (1993); Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 227 Wis.2d 100, 595 N.W.2d 392, 401 (1999). [16]
We hold that there is no rational basis for the classification scheme effectuated by HRS § 46-72 as it read in 2004. The County offers no rationale for the distinction between the classes, nor can we deduce one. The record on appeal and the legislative history are silent with respect to any budgetary, logistical, or other difference between the County and the state that might justify the unequal treatment of victims of their torts. We cure this constitutional error by severing HRS § 46-72's (since repealed) six-month provision, thereby relegating the Plaintiffs' claims to the same two-year limitation applicable to claims against private tortfeasors under HRS §§ 657-7, see supra note 6, and 663-3(b), see supra note 1. See Kahale, 104 Hawai`i at 348 n. 8, 90 P.3d at 240 n. 8 ([T]he legislature is perfectly free to amend [HRS § 46-72] to provide, say, for a two-year limitations period or to repeal it altogether, in which case tort claims against the counties would be governed by HRS § 657-7.). Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs filed their complaint well within two years of Kevin's initial contact with HPD on July 4, 2004, a fortiori within two years after the cause of action accrued, HRS § 657-7, they are entitled to pursue their claims.