Opinion ID: 787694
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Substantive Elements

Text: 31 The substantive requirements of the statute are that the government prove (1) that Lentz unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away Doris; (2) that Lentz held her for ransom or reward or otherwise; and (3) that Doris's death resulted from those actions. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a). It is this involuntariness of seizure and detention which is the very essence of the crime of kidnaping. Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 464, 66 S.Ct. 233; see United States v. Young, 512 F.2d 321, 323 (4th Cir.1975) (noting that the true elements of the offense are an unlawful seizure and holding) (internal quotation marks omitted). 32 Here, the government presented sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Lentz inveigled Doris into traveling from her home to his, thereby satisfying the seizure element of the Act. Cf. United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 239 (4th Cir.1983) (holding that [b]y inducing his victim by misrepresentations to enter his vehicle and to accompany him, and knowing that the victim's belief as to their purpose and destination is different from his actual illicit purpose, the kidnapper has interfered with, and exercised control over, her actions). Lentz does not contend otherwise, and also concedes that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that Doris is deceased. Rather, Lentz's challenge to his kidnapping conviction is narrowly centered upon the claim that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that Doris was held or otherwise restrained by Lentz for ransom or reward or otherwise. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a). It is to that inquiry that we now turn.
33 The Supreme Court has held that [t]he act of holding a kidnaped person for a proscribed purpose, as required by the Act, necessarily implies an unlawful physical or mental restraint for an appreciable period against the person's will and with a willful intent so to confine the victim. Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 460, 66 S.Ct. 233 (emphasis added). It implies an intent to restrain [the victim's] movements contrary to her wishes. Id.; see United States v. Wills, 346 F.3d 476, 493 (4th Cir.2003) ( Wills II ) (To hold means to detain, seize, or confine a person in some manner against that person's will.) However, [i]t is not necessary that the government prove that the holding occurred prior to the transportation in interstate commerce. Wills II, 346 F.3d at 493. 34 In Chatwin, the Court decided that the victim had not been held for purposes of the Act because, even though the victim was mentally-challenged and had been persuaded to stay with the defendants in a plural marriage, the victim had remained free to move about at will. The victim was not deprived of her liberty, compelled to remain where she did not wish to remain, or compelled to go where she did not wish to go. Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 460, 66 S.Ct. 233. Nor was there evidence that the defendants willfully intended through force, fear or deception to confine the girl against her desires. Id. On the contrary, she was perfectly free to leave the [defendants] when and if she so desired. Id. 35 Lentz claims that the evidence in this case was similarly insufficient to prove that Lentz imposed an unlawful physical or mental restraint for an appreciable period against [Doris's] will. Id. Specifically, Lentz argues that, although his inveiglement of Doris and her unaccompanied travel from Virginia to Maryland caused by it satisfies the jurisdictional and seizure components of the statute, it cannot also serve to establish the holding element because there was no evidence that Lentz exerted any physical or mental force sufficient to effect a restraint upon her movements during the trip. In other words, Lentz argues that Doris was at all times perfectly free to return to her home or otherwise decide not to complete the journey to pick up Julia at his home. Lentz also argues that Doris's murder upon her arrival at his home (assuming the jury found that this to be supported by the evidence), cannot suffice because a holding under the kidnapping statute requires a restraint of the victim beyond that required to accomplish the murder and there is no evidence that Doris was subjected to any physical restraint beyond that necessary to simply kill her upon her arrival. 36 The government argues to the contrary, contending that Doris was held for purposes of the Act in two distinct ways: (1) by deception from the time she was inveigled or deceived into traveling from Virginia to Maryland through the time that she came into Lentz's presence; and, (2) thereafter through physical force or fear up to and during her murder. As explained below, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, we are satisfied that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to support the jury's determination that, upon Doris's arrival at Lentz's home, Lentz exerted an unlawful physical or mental restraint for an appreciable period against Doris's will.
37 At the conclusion of the evidence in this case, the district court instructed the jury that the government was required to prove (1) that Lentz knowingly and willfully inveigled or decoyed Doris, (2) that Doris was held for ransom, reward, or some other benefit that Lentz intended to derive by so holding Doris, (3) that Lentz willfully transported or caused the transportation of Doris in interstate commerce, and (4) that Lentz's actions resulted in Doris's death. The court instructed the jury that [t]o inveigle or decoy a person means to lure or entice or lead a person astray by false representations or promises or other deceitful means and that [t]o hold means to detain, seize or confine a person in some manner against that person's will. J.A.1922. In addition, the jury was instructed as follows: 38 [T]he government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant held his victim for some benefit and that the defendant willfully transported the victim in interstate commerce. 39 It is not necessary that the government prove that the holding occurred prior to the transportation in interstate commerce. 40 However, the holding must be separate from ... the transportation. 41 J.A.1924. Later, the jury was informed, in response to its question, that the defendant himself [would] have to do the actual detaining/holding of the victim. J.A.2059A. 42 With regard to the evidence of holding, the government produced testimony from the child's babysitter that Lentz admitted Doris had come to his house on the evening of April 23. Additionally, the government's evidence showed that Lentz stopped his mailman from coming to the house and that the realtor's lockbox was removed to keep unexpected and unwanted visitors from entering the house; that a blue tarp was present in the foyer of the home on the morning of April 23, but with a false pretense by Lentz as to its purpose; that both Doris's blood and Lentz's blood were found later in her car, which witnesses testified was clean and stain-free the evening before and which witnesses testified Doris would never voluntarily have allowed Lentz to enter; and that the sofa had been removed from the home and replaced with its matching chair, all of which taken together provides circumstantial evidence that Doris was brought into Lentz's home upon her arrival and murdered there. 43 The evidence also sufficiently supported the conclusion that, once Doris arrived at Lentz's home, Lentz was in the position of employing further means, be it deceit or force, necessary to bring Doris inside the home where he could physically confine her and kill her. From the moment Doris pulled up at Lentz's home, she was in his company and no longer perfectly free to leave. Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 460, 66 S.Ct. 233. Rather, Lentz was then in a position to confine her physically if necessary. See Higgs, 353 F.3d at 313 (rejecting challenge to the holding element where the evidence supported the conclusion that the kidnapper was prepared to confine [his inveigled victims] at gunpoint if necessary); cf. United States v. Boone, 959 F.2d 1550, 1555 n. 5 (11th Cir.1992) (noting that [i]nveiglement becomes an unlawful form of kidnapping under the statute when the alleged kidnapper interferes with his victim's actions, exercising control over his victim through the willingness to use forcible action should his deception fail). Beyond this, there was also sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that, once Lentz had lured or forced Doris into his home, he continued to hold her and kill her, wrapped her body in the blue tarp, drove her car into the carport, moved her bleeding body out to the carport and into the front passenger seat of the car, disposed of the body, and abandoned her car in a high-crime neighborhood in Washington, D.C., with keys and wallet in plain view, no doubt hoping that someone would steal the car and be caught in it along with Doris's wallet and credit cards. 44 It is against this backdrop of evidence that we must determine whether there was a logical and supporting evidentiary basis for the jury to conclude that Doris was held by Lentz after she arrived at his house but before the fatal wounds were inflicted. We believe there was. Given the evidence that Doris was extremely fearful of being alone with Lentz out of the public eye and given the evidence that Doris was inside the house when she was killed, the jury could reasonably conclude from circumstantial evidence that after her arrival at the house Lentz either physically forced or lured her inside or otherwise confined her against her will for an appreciable period of time in order to accomplish the purpose of the seizure — her murder and its accompanying benefit to him in the domestic litigation. The defense argues correctly that there is no direct evidence as to exactly what events occurred in the house preceding Doris's murder. However, the government's inability to produce direct evidence on this issue is not fatal to its case, because we believe the circumstantial evidence in the case supports the jury's finding that Lentz himself accomplished the actual detaining/holding of the victim against her will, separate and apart from her trip to the house. J.A.2059A. 45 To conclude, the evidence was sufficient for the properly instructed jury to convict Lentz of kidnapping resulting in murder. In applying the instructions given, a reasonable juror could readily have concluded from the evidence that Lentz, after inveigling Doris into traveling across state lines to his home, employed unlawful physical or mental restraint for an appreciable period against [Doris's] will and with a willful intent so to confine [her] inside his home. Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 460, 66 S.Ct. 233. Once Doris arrived at Lentz's home, Lentz had successfully transported Doris across state lines by his deception and was in the position to complete his plan to confine and kill Doris in private to eliminate any requirement that he split their marital assets, and eliminate any further liability on his part for child support payments. See United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 81, 84 S.Ct. 553, 11 L.Ed.2d 527 (1964) (holding a victim for ransom, reward or otherwise  under § 1201(a) encompasses holding a victim for any reason which is of benefit to the defendant); United States v. Childress, 26 F.3d 498, 503 (4th Cir.1994) (stating that the kidnapping need not be performed for pecuniary gain to satisfy the ransom or reward or otherwise element and that it is sufficient if the defendant acted for any reason which would in any way be of benefit). 46 Nor does this conclusion conflict with the purposes of the Act, as argued by Lentz, by federalizing a state murder case. Lentz's plan was to cause Doris, through his deceit, to travel beyond the borders of her home state into his home state and then to involve yet another jurisdiction in the investigation by dumping Doris's blood-stained vehicle and personal effects in the District of Columbia. Cf. Hughes, 716 F.2d at 239 (The policy justification for the original federal kidnapping statute was to provide federal officials the `power to disregard [state] barriers in pursuing' kidnappers who planned their activities to take the best possible advantage of the limited authority and coordination of state law enforcement agencies.) (quoting Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 463, 66 S.Ct. 233). According to representations made by the government, the federal investigation and prosecution proceeded precisely because jurisdictional boundaries stifling the state prosecutions had come into play and the circuit case law interpreting the Act, specifically the Wills I case, had opened up the prospect of the federal charge. See Lentz, 275 F.Supp.2d at 748, n. 29 (They couldn't charge a homicide in Prince George's County, where Lentz resided, and [t]hey couldn't charge anything in Arlington. All you ha[d] in Arlington [was] someone being told to come over and get the child. That's no charge.). According to the district court, [u]nlike the classic tragic kidnapping case, ... this case suggests a mysterious intrastate disappearance of Ms. Lentz under suspicious circumstances. Id. at 748 (emphasis added). On the contrary, the evidence in this case supports the jury's finding that Doris was held and killed after Lentz tricked her into traveling interstate for the purpose of avoiding further domestic litigation and liabilities on his part. 47 For similar reasons, we reject Lentz's suggestion that the evidence in this case cannot suffice to establish a holding of Doris under the Act because it demonstrates no more than a holding incident to her murder. Compare United States v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1529, 1537 (11th Cir.1991) (reversing conviction for conspiracy to kidnap and attempted kidnapping of a federal agent under § 1201(a)(5) where defendants, during an attempted drug buy, unsuccessfully tried to force the agent into their vehicle because the record was devoid of evidence to support an inference that [defendants] would have detained [the agent] after stealing his money, and the limited detention inherent in the crime of robbery does not rise to the level of a kidnapping in this case), with United States v. Etsitty, 130 F.3d 420, 427 (9th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (affirming kidnapping conviction under § 1201(a)(2) of horse-back rider who roped a 16-year-old girl on an Indian reservation and rejecting claim that the kidnapping charge was merged into an assault charge because the charges of kidnaping and assault involved different elements and because a reasonable trier of fact ... could find seizure, holding or detention and defendant prevented [the victim] from escaping, in effect seizing or holding her, for a substantial period of time, for the purpose of causing her considerable bodily and emotional harm). 48 In Chatwin, the Supreme Court instructed that the holding need only be for an appreciable period of time. The holding or detention element is separate and distinct from the kidnapping or seizure element, but they should not be viewed in a vacuum. In this case, there was evidence that Doris was seized by inveiglement, transported across state lines by virtue of that inveiglement, and held by Lentz for the purpose of killing her and eliminating the pending custody, support, and marital asset issues. Far from a routine state murder case, it is this type of seizure, interstate transportation, and holding that the Act, as amended, was intended to reach. Cf. Wills II, 346 F.3d at 493 (`Nothing in the policy [disregard of State borders in pursuit] justifies rewarding the kidnapper simply because he is ingenious enough to conceal his true motive, until he is able to transport... [his victim] into another jurisdiction.') (quoting Hughes, 716 F.2d at 239). 49 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court erred in granting Lentz's motion for acquittal. 3