Opinion ID: 2583639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statutes of Repose and Statutes of Limitations

Text: ¶ 10 Before allowing Jean to invoke here the provisions of 12 O.S.2001 §§ 95 and 109, we must first determine how a statute of limitations differs in its impact from one of repose. Early treatise writers and judges considered time bars created by statutes of limitations, escheat and adverse possession as creating periods of repose. [20] As the courts began to modify statutory limitations by superimposing the discovery rule, [21] legislatures responded by enacting absolute (not tollable) time bars through statutes of repose. Modern statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are somewhat similar because they both provide repose for the defendant. They are nonetheless significantly different since a statute of limitation merely extinguishes the plaintiff's remedy while a statute of repose may defeat the accrual of a cause of action before one ever arises. [22] In practical terms, a statute of repose marks the outer time boundary for judicial enforcement of a substantive right whereas a statute of limitation interposes itself only procedurally to bar solely the remedy after a substantive right has vested and a claim accrued. [23] Moreover, remedial time bars are tollable, whereas substantive-law time limits must be allowed to run and expire uninterrupted by any arrest or suspension. [24] ¶ 11 The time prescribed by a statute of repose runs from a specific act or event regardless of when the harm or damage may occur. A statutory limitation period, on the other hand, runs from the time all the requisite elements of a cause of action occur. It may or may not allow for the plaintiff's discovery of the injurious event to extend the period of limitation. [25] Section 109 stands defined as a statute of repose. As we stated before: [s]ection 109 is not a statute of limitations; it is a statute of repose. Rather than disturbing a vested substantive right, `a statute of repose marks [the right's] boundary.' It sets an outer boundary in time beyond which no cause of action may arise for conduct that would have otherwise been actionable (citations omitted). [26] B.