Opinion ID: 766768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Massey's sec. 1983 Eighth Amendment Claim

Text: 20 In Count I of the Fourth Amended Complaint, Massey alleged that the prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment by refusing to surgically repair his hernia. The district judge held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required Massey to first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing a sec. 1983 lawsuit. Because Massey's complaint failed to allege that he had sought any administrative relief before bringing his lawsuit, the court dismissed his claim. Massey contends that the district court misconstrued the PLRA's exhaustion requirement and asks us to vacate the dismissal of his claim. 21 Before we reach the exhaustion issue, we must first address a jurisdictional concern raised in Massey's brief. Massey observes that the district court noted . . . but did not resolve the issue of whether the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional or a threshold requirement such as a statute of limitations. We can make short work of this jurisdictional concern simply by citing our recent decision in Perez v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 1999). In Perez, we held that a prisoner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA does not deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 535. Rather, as we explained in Perez, so long as a prisoner has a federal claim and the failure to exhaust is not essential to the claim or the claim's ripeness, then 28 U.S.C. sec.sec. 1331 and 1343 give the court subject matter jurisdiction. Perez, 182 F.3d at 535-36. In this case, Massey asserts an Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 and his failure to exhaust administrative remedies is neither an essential element of his claim nor does it affect his claim's ripeness. Therefore, the district court had, and this court now has, proper federal subject matter jurisdiction over Massey's claim. 3 See Perez, 182 F.3d at 536. 22 Having satisfied ourselves of our jurisdiction, we turn to Massey's argument that the PLRA did not require him to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. The relevant section of the PLRA provides that: 23 [n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 24 42 U.S.C. sec. 1997e(a). Massey argues that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement does not apply to him because his lawsuit seeks money damages and there is no administrative procedure in which he can collect monetary compensation. Massey insists that money damages are the only appropriate damages because his hernia has been surgically repaired and any injunctive relief would therefore be meaningless. Thus, according to Massey, there is no administrative remedy available to him within the meaning of the PLRA because no administrative procedure can afford him any worthwhile relief. Massey theorizes that because there is no meaningful administrative remedy available to him, he is not required to exhaust any administrative procedures before filing a lawsuit. 25 Again, we need not spend much time on this argument. In Perez v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 1999), this court held that there is no futility exception to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. Id. at 537. The PLRA plainly requires prisoners to exhaust such administrative remedies as are available before bringing a lawsuit complaining of prison conditions under sec. 1983. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1997e(a). Contrary to Massey's suggestion, the PLRA does not condition the applicability of the exhaustion requirement on the effectiveness of the administrative remedy available in a given case. See Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998). Rather, as we noted in Perez, the statutory question is whether any 'remedies' are 'available'; sec. 1997e(a) does not require the prison to use the prisoner's preferred remedy. Perez, 182 F.3d at 537. Thus, if a prison has an internal administrative grievance system through which a prisoner can seek to correct a problem, then the prisoner must utilize that administrative system before filing a claim under sec. 1983. The potential effectiveness of an administrative response bears no relationship to the statutory requirement that prisoners first attempt to obtain relief through administrative procedures. 26 Employing a never say die strategy, Massey argues that even if he had sought administrative relief before filing suit, no administrative response could have corrected the cruel and unusual punishment that he endured. In other words, in addition to being unable to provide money damages, Massey claims that no administrative complaint could have prompted prison officials to authorize the surgery he sought for his hernia. Thus, Massey argues that because no remedy was available for his medical condition, he did not have to exhaust the BOP's available administrative procedures. 27 Massey constructs his argument on a somewhat hyper-technical reading of the federal regulations that govern administrative complaints within the BOP and the BOP's Health Services Manual. Massey first points out that the regulations which authorize administrative complaints, 28 C.F.R. sec.sec. 542.10 - 542.19, will only direct Massey's medical concerns to the FCI Pekin staff, the BOP Regional Director, and ultimately to the BOP's General Counsel. Massey emphasizes that these administrative regulations do not explicitly require the BOP Medical Director to review complaints about inmate medical care. Massey then notes that, under the Health Services Manual, only the BOP Medical Director can authorize an exception to the Health Services Manual's general prohibition of surgical repair for hernias. Thus, Massey argues that because the regulations do not expressly require the BOP Medical Director to review every administrative appeal concerning medical care, there is no way he could have had his hernia surgery authorized by the Medical Director. 28 Massey's argument, while creative, misses the mark; it once again confuses the effectiveness of an administrative procedure with the availability of one. As we have already concluded, whether the administrative process actually produces a result that satisfies the inmate is not the appropriate inquiry. Instead, courts merely need to ask whether the institution has an internal administrative grievance procedure by which prisoners can lodge complaints about prison conditions. If such an administrative process is in place, then sec. 1997e(a) requires inmates to exhaust those procedures before bringing a prison conditions claim. 29 On this issue, we once again agree with the reasoning in Alexander v. Hawk. In Alexander, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the term available in sec. 1997e(a) is used to acknowledge that not all prisons actually have administrative remedy programs. Some state penal institutions may not have an administrative remedy program to address prison conditions, and thus there are no 'available' administrative remedies to exhaust. Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1326-27. Here, as in Alexander and Perez, the BOP provides an administrative process through which inmates may seek formal review of an issue which relates to any aspect of their confinement. 28 C.F.R. sec. 542.10. The BOP's administrative remedy program applies to all inmates confined in institutions operated by the Bureau of Prisons. Id. The program provides for a first step of informal resolution, 28 C.F.R. sec. 542.13, then appeals to the BOP Regional Director and eventually the BOP General Counsel. 28 C.F.R. sec. 542.15. Because Massey had this administrative procedure at his finger tips, but failed to utilize it, the district court correctly found that Massey failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1997e(a) and properly dismissed Massey's Eighth Amendment claim. 30 Citing dicta from our decision in Perez, Massey also pressed a unique theory at oral argument to escape the exhaustion requirement. In Perez, Judge Easterbrook gave the following hypothetical: 31 [s]uppose [a] prisoner breaks his leg and claims delay in setting the bone is cruel and unusual punishment. If the injury has healed by the time suit begins, nothing other than damages could be a 'remedy,' and if the administrative process cannot provide compensation then there is no administrative remedy to exhaust. 32 Perez, 182 F.3d at 538. Massey argues that he exemplifies the imaginary prisoner in Judge Easterbrook's illustration because he has already received the surgical repair of his hernia. Massey therefore contends that, since his hernia has been repaired, only money can serve as a remedy and monetary compensation is unavailable through the BOP's administrative system. If he cannot get monetary damages from the BOP, then Massey insists that there is no administrative remedy to exhaust. 33 Close, but no cigar. Unlike the lame prisoner in Judge Easterbrook's hypothetical whose leg healed before he filed suit, Massey's injury did not heal by the time suit begins. Perez, 182 F.3d at 538 (emphasis added). Rather, Massey's hernia was still causing him problems when he filed his lawsuit on November 7, 1997. In fact, Massey did not receive surgery until January 28, 1998, several months after he filed his lawsuit. In contrast to the imaginary prisoner in Perez for whom only money would serve as a remedy, Massey could have availed himself of administrative remedies that may have resulted in the surgical repair of his hernia before he filed suit. Because Massey's physical ailment lingered long past the date he filed his lawsuit, the dicta in Perez does not relieve him of his obligation to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing his sec. 1983 claim. 34 Before we can leave Massey's appeal behind and move on to consider Dr. Otten's claims, one more of Massey's arguments deserves attention. Massey contends that defendants waived their right to raise exhaustion of administrative remedies as a basis for dismissal. 4 Massey premises this argument on the fact that defendants did not plead failure to exhaust administrative remedies as an affirmative defense to his Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint. 35 A prisoner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a sec. 1983 claim constitutes an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 29 (2d Cir. 1999); King v. Cooke, 26 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 1994). Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, defendants have the burden of pleading and proving the defense. See, e.g., Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997) (Title VII case noting that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense [and] the defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies.). However, when a plaintiff files an amended complaint, the new complaint supersedes all previous complaints and controls the case from that point forward. See Carver v. Condie, 169 F.3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 1999). Because a plaintiff's new complaint wipes away prior pleadings, the amended complaint opens the door for defendants to raise new and previously unmentioned affirmative defenses. See Harris v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 343 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Sidari v. Orleans County, 174 F.R.D. 275, 283 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (filing of an amended complaint gives defendants the opportunity to assert new affirmative defenses). 36 Here, defendants' Answers to Massey's Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint did not mention Massey's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Defendants did, however, raise Massey's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies in their Answers to his Third and Fourth Amended Complaints. According to Massey, this was not soon enough and by failing to assert the affirmative defense earlier, defendants waived their right to raise the exhaustion issue. 37 We disagree. By asserting failure to exhaust administrative remedies in their Answers to Massey's Third and Fourth Amended Complaints, defendants clearly complied with Rule 8(c). Defendants' actions also provided Massey with ample notice of their intent to use that affirmative defense. See Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (the purpose of Rule 8(c) is to give the opposing party notice of the affirmative defense and an opportunity to contest it). Accordingly, defendants' failure to raise exhaustion of administrative remedies in response to Massey's first few complaints did not constitute a waiver of that affirmative defense. To hold to the contrary would, in essence, enable plaintiffs to change their theory of the case while simultaneously locking defendants into their original pleading. This result would clearly contravene Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) which authorizes the amendment of answers as justice so requires. We therefore reject Massey's argument. 5