Opinion ID: 1974893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mitchell Q. Owens' Remaining Claims

Text: Prior to trial, appellant Owens issued a subpoena seeking to obtain the medical and psychiatric records of a witness for the government, a former co-defendant, Christopher Sampson. The trial court (J. Scott) quashed the subpoena. Sampson testified that he had used phencyclidine (PCP) for several years on a regular basis, that less than two years before the offenses he had been hospitalized for psychiatric problems associated in part with PCP use, and that he hallucinated during that period. Appellant argues that he needed the records in order to test Sampson's competency to testify and to assist with his cross-examination. Appellant does not challenge the applicability of D.C.Code § 6-2002 (1989) which restricts disclosure of mental health records to any person with certain exceptions not pertinent here. Disclosures by the court are permitted in cases where the court has ordered the mental health examination, see D.C.Code § 6-2031, but then only to the extent necessary to initiate or seek civil commitment. D.C.Code § 6-2032. Where a party places in issue his own mental or emotional condition, then such records may be disclosed. D.C.Code § 6-2033. While a defendant in a criminal case may establish bias of a witness through the introduction of extrinsic evidence, the accused, like the state, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence to assure fairness and reliability. Gibson v. United States, 536 A.2d 78, 82 (D.C. 1987). The individual's interest under D.C.Code § 6-2002 is not absolute, and may have to yield where the right of the defense to cross-examine a witness in a criminal case must be accorded protection. United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1167 (11th Cir.1983). Appellant proffered that he wished to cross-examine Sampson on matters related to an alleged remark he made to his psychologist that Owens was a devil in order to demonstrate bias. The court inquired of Owens' counsel about the basis for his belief regarding the statement, and the attorney represented that Sampson told Owens and his sister about the remark. The court concluded that there were other witnesses who could testify about their firsthand knowledge concerning the alleged remark and denied the motion. In spite of the availability of these witnesses at trial, Owens did not inquire into the matter either of Sampson or the witnesses who allegedly knew about the statement. Appellant did not challenge Sampson's competency to testify. Further, Sampson testified about his hospitalization for psychiatric problems, his use of PCP, and prior hallucinations. Although the combination of circumstances Sampson's use of PCP, his past hallucinations, his psychiatric hospitalization and his alleged devil remark may have justified an in camera inspection of the records by the judge, we find no reversible error. The jury heard a good deal of evidence about Sampson's infirmities, and even assuming, arguendo, that there was error, we are satisfied that it was harmless.
Appellant Owens claims that he was denied a fair trial because his common-law wife, Miss Sheryl Sampson, was compelled to testify against him before the grand jury and at trial without being apprised of her statutory spousal privilege. In civil or criminal proceedings, a husband or wife is competent to testify, but neither may be compelled to do so. D.C.Code § 14-306. [8] Miss Sampson testified on direct examination for the government and characterized herself as Owens' former common-law wife. She stated that she had a six and one half year relationship with Owens and that he was the father of her six and one half year old child. Miss Sampson acknowledged that her relationship with Owens had concluded. Other evidence showed that Owens married someone named Barbara Moore in June 1984. Common-law marriages are covered by the marital privilege. Bowler v. United States, 480 A.2d 678, 685 (D.C. 1984). Moreover, confidential communications made during the marriage survive the dissolution of the marriage. United States v. Lewis, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 40, 43 n. 10, 433 F.2d 1146, 1149 n. 10 (1970). Therefore, Miss Sampson's status at the time of trial makes no difference with respect to the availability of the privilege for confidential communications. Miss Sampson denied at trial that Owens had admitted his involvement in the Kovak's robbery, and the prosecutor impeached her with her grand jury testimony to the contrary given on January 18, 1985. An appropriate limiting instruction on the use of the prior testimony for impeachment purposes only was given by the trial court. The court repeated the instruction during its final charge to the jury. The court also instructed the jury, consistent with Miss Sampson's trial testimony, that Mr. Owens had not told her that he participated in the robbery and that they should accept that testimony as fact. No one alerted the court or objected that Miss Sampson's testimony fell within the spousal privilege. Had the potential for privilege been clear, it would have been incumbent upon the court to address the witness and to inform her that she could not be compelled to testify. See Bowler, supra, 480 A.2d at 685. Here, the availability of the privilege was less than clear because of the uncertainty about Miss Sampson's status, and any claim to that effect went unnoticed because of the failure of Miss Sampson or appellant Owens to call the matter to the attention of the court. Even assuming error in the failure of the trial court to inquire, we find that appellant suffered no prejudice in view of the limited use of Miss Sampson's testimony for impeachment purposes, the limiting instruction, as well as the further instruction given by the court that the jury should consider as fact that appellant never made the remark which the prosecutor sought to elicit. [9]