Opinion ID: 8312407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery

Text: Both defendants have moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, to compel discovery of material related to the Title III wiretaps. See generally Agustin's Discovery Mot.; Panfilo's Discovery Mot.; Panfilo's Am. Discovery Mot. Specifically,  the defendants seek to compel the government's production of two groups of intercepted communications: (1) [m]inimized interceptions of Defendant Panfilo (Panfilo's minimized intercepts); and (2) [a]ll interceptions from the Title III investigation, from all target devices, including pertinent and minimized communications, and including intercepts between alleged co-conspirators (co-conspirator intercepts). Jt. Stm. Discovery ¶ 7; see also Panfilo's Reply Gov't's Opp'n Defs.' Mots. Compel (Panfilo's Reply Discovery Mot.) at 3, ECF No. 58. The government has already produced to the defendants the intercepts from the BlackBerry devices used by Panfilo and the underlying applications and orders for those intercepts, as well as the applications, affidavits, and orders related to the interception of target devices utilized by individuals other than Defendant Panfilo, Gov't's Opp'n Defs.' Discovery Mots. at 3-4, but not any minimized communications or pertinent intercepted communications of only co-conspirators, Panfilo's Reply Discovery Mot. at 2-3. 17 The defendants seek both Panfilo's minimized intercepts and co-conspirator intercepts in order to argue that the Government improperly minimized the communications ... and search for exculpatory information. Jt. Stm. Discovery ¶ 7. 18 Obviously, if the defendants succeeded in this request, they would be buried in massive discovery from the intercepted communications of almost sixty devices for almost two years, the vast majority of which discovery would not be used against them at trial, and the government would have the burdensome task of preparing all of these materials for production. The government declines to produce these materials because: 1) the Government does not intend to rely upon them in their case in chief; 2) the Defendants are not entitled to these materials; and 3) the Defendant's proposed use of the minimized communications to argue that the Government improperly minimized the communications is not the appropriate method, as established by the case law, to challenge the Government's minimization of the intercepts. Id. Moreover, the government contends, Defendants are not entitled to an 'open file' search of the Government's evidence. Id. 19 The government is correct.  1. Relevant Legal Standard  Rule 16 is a discovery rule designed to protect defendants by compelling the prosecution to turn over to the defense evidence material to the charges at issue. Yates v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1074 , 1083, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015). Specifically, five types of evidence must be turned over: (1) the defendant's oral, written, or recorded statements, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)-(B); (2) the defendant's prior criminal record, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D) ; (3) certain documents and objects, if the item is within the government's possession, custody, or control, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E) ; (4) the results or reports of any physical or mental examination, test, or experiment, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(F) ; and (5) a written summary of any expert testimony that the government intends to use during its case-in-chief at trial, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G). The defendants' instant motions to compel hinge on the third category of evidence. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E). 20 Under Rule 16(a)(1)(E), the government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions of any of these items, if the item is within the government's possession, custody, or control and, inter alia , the item is material to preparing the defense or the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i)-(ii) ; see United States v. Thompson , 562 F.3d 387 , 396 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Here, the government intends to use Panfilo's electronic communications in its case-in-chief as direct evidence against Defendant Panfilo and as  statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy against Defendant Agustin, Gov't's Opp'n Defs.' Discovery Mots. at 3-4, but the government does not plan to rely on any electronic communications not involving Panfilo in its case-in-chief, id. at 4-5; Jt. Stm. Discovery ¶ 7. Thus, to be entitled, under Rule 16(a)(1)(E), to Panfilo's minimized intercepts and/or co-conspirator intercepts, the defendants must show that these communications are material to preparing the defense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i). [I]n the context of Rule 16, 'the defendant's defense' means the defendant's response to the Government's case in chief. United States v. Armstrong , 517 U.S. 456 , 462, 116 S.Ct. 1480 , 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996). To qualify as material for preparing the defense, the D.C. Circuit has explained that the discovery sought must be related to refutation of the government's case in chief, and not to establishment of an independent ... bar to the prosecution. United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280 , 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ; see also United States v. Marshall , 132 F.3d 63 , 67 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (The Supreme Court recently clarified the meaning of the phrase 'material to the preparation of the defendant's defense.' The phrase 'authorizes defendants to examine government documents material to the preparation of their defense against the Government's case-in-chief ....' ) (quoting Armstrong , 517 U.S. at 463 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 ). In other word, the evidence must not simply bear some abstract relationship to the issues in the case, ... and the government must disclose Rule 16 evidence only if such evidence enables the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his favor. United States v. Libby , 429 F.Supp.2d 1 , 7 (D.D.C. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rule 16(a)(1)(E) applies equally to exculpatory and inculpatory evidence, since it is just as important to the preparation of a defense to know its potential pitfalls as it is to know its strengths. Marshall , 132 F.3d at 67 . As a general matter,  Rule 16 establishes 'the minimum amount of discovery to which the parties are entitled. It is not intended to limit the judge's discretion to order broader discovery in appropriate cases.'  United States v. Karake , 281 F.Supp.2d 302 , 306 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note to the 1974 amendments). That being said,  Rule 16 does not authorize a blanket request to see the prosecution's file. United States v. Maranzino , 860 F.2d 981 , 985-86 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Jencks v. United States , 353 U.S. 657 , 667, 77 S.Ct. 1007 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1103 (1957) ). 2. Analysis The defendants fail to demonstrate that the minimized Panfilo intercepts and co-conspirator intercepts are material to preparing their defenses in response to the Government's case in chief. Armstrong , 517 U.S. at 462 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 . To the contrary, the two reasons the defendants have put forward to compel this discovery-the possibility of finding some exculpatory information and to verify the government's minimization procedures-fall far short of justifying the massive discovery undertaking contemplated by this request. They are simply not entitled to the broad, time-consuming and burdensome fishing expedition encompassed by this discovery demand. Cf. United States v. George , 786 F.Supp. 11 , 14 (D.D.C. 1991) (At least one of the rationales behind the materiality requirement (and limiting discovery by criminal defendants generally) is to insure that the government not expend excessive time and effort securing documents for the defendant.).  First, the defendants' vague asserted need for potentially exculpatory evidence that might be contained in the minimized and co-conspirator intercepts does not pass muster. See United States v. Williams-Davis , 90 F.3d 490 , 514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting, in the Brady context, bare speculation [of] ... the existence of favorable materials); United States v. Sims , 508 Fed.Appx. 452 , 460-61 (6th Cir. 2012) (denying a Rule 16(a)(1)(E) motion to compel discovery because the defendant's motion was predicated on a series of generalities based upon an unsubstantiated possibility) (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to the alleged co-conspirators' intercepts, Panfilo suggests that if the Defendant is not the subject of nor any of his communications captured in any of the intercepts of his co-conspirators, these communications have apparent exculpatory value. Panfilo's Reply Discovery Mot. at 3. As noted, supra note 20, Panfilo's absence from certain pertinent intercepts of co-conspirators does little to rebut the inculpatory evidence contained in the approximately 12,500 Panfilo intercepts the government seeks to use at trial. See U.S. v. Scarpa , 913 F.2d 993 , 1011 (2d Cir. 1990) (A defendant may not seek to establish his innocence ... through proof of the absence of criminal acts on specific occasions.). Moreover, far easier methods to establish the fact that Panfilo is not a party to the requested co-conspirator intercepts are available than wholesale production of those intercepts. A straight-forward question to an appropriate law enforcement agent or a stipulation with the government regarding the fact that the government has identified intercepts as containing communications of co-conspirators, and not Panfilo, come to mind. Agustin has provided a similarly vague rationale for seeking the minimized and co-conspirator intercepts: The defense must have access to all the intercepts in order to analyze their contents and determine what evidence exists that both potentially inculpates or exculpates him of the charges in this case. Agustin's Discovery Mot. at 4. As a threshold matter, the government has stated that the undisclosed intercepts will not be introduced in the government's case-in-chief, and, accordingly, the inculpatory nature of any of these communications is not material. Moreover, Agustin has provided absolutely no information about why communications to which he was not a party because he was incarcerated would contain any exculpatory information about him. The defendants' mere desire to search the intercepts for exculpatory information, Jt. Stm. Discovery ¶ 7, reveals this request as the fishing expedition it is. In contrast to the defendants' speculative reasons proffered here, in other cases in which a defendant has made a Rule 16(a)(1)(E) motion to compel discovery based on its potential exculpatory value, the defendant clearly identified how the evidence would further the defense. See, e.g. , United States v. O'Keefe , Crim. No. 06-249 (PLF), 2007 WL 1239204 , , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31053 , , 11 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2007) (granting a motion to compel in a corruption case where the evidence sought would prove that there was no 'official act' as a matter of law and that the defendants did not have the requisite criminal intent as a matter of fact); Libby , 429 F.Supp.2d at 14-17 (granting in part the defendant's motion to compel and ordering disclosure of the topics covered during briefings to aid the defendant in his defense that he was preoccupied during the relevant time period); Karake , 281 F.Supp.2d at 308 (granting the defendants' motion to compel discovery where the information sought was crucial to their ability to file motions to suppress [their] statements ..., and may reveal mitigating  evidence arising from the circumstances of their extradition). In any event, the government represents that it is unaware of any exculpatory material regarding the Defendants in this case and affirms that it has and will continue to comply with its obligations under Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) ; Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) ; and Weatherford v. Bursey , 429 U.S. 545 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977). Gov't's Opp'n Defs.' Discovery Mots. at 9. The government reiterated this point during the August 2, 2017 hearing and added that the members of the Meza Flores DTO (the distribution cell of a larger Mexican drug trafficking organization at issue in this case) used many different modes of communication. See Status Conf. Hr'g ( rough ) Tr. (Aug. 2, 2017) at 38-39. Thus, even if Panfilo were not a participant in all of the intercepted Blackberry messages among DTO members, this would not necessarily be exculpatory. Based on the government's written and oral assurances, the Court is satisfied that the government has been and will remain vigilant in ensuring that it fulfills its discovery and Brady / Giglio obligations. Karake , 281 F.Supp.2d at 306 (accepting the government's assertion that it was aware of no Brady information of the type described). The next reason given by the defendants for compelling discovery of the minimized Panfilo and co-conspirator intercepts shows plainly that this discovery demand is not intended to prepare a defense in response to the government's case-in-chief. The defendants argue that receiving all intercepts, including those of alleged co-conspirators and minimized, will help show that the government improperly minimized the communications. See Jt. Stm. Discovery ¶ 7. Although the erroneous marking of seven AMR files as pertinent rightfully raises some concern, seven is a small number compared to the approximately 12,500 electronic communications marked pertinent and not minimized. Gov't's Third Opp'n T. III Intercepts at 18. In addition, given the detailed description provided by the government of the minimization procedures employed, and the fact that the seven AMR files were all received in the same session by the same monitor and have no accompanying transcript, Gov't's Second Opp'n T. III Intercepts at 5, the defendants' argument that additional minimization violations may be uncovered through the requested compelled discovery is purely speculative. This defense effort to find additional evidence to bolster arguments challenging the minimization procedures used during the wiretap phase of the investigation does not refute any of the government's direct evidence against the defendants. To the contrary, even if additional minimization violations were found, the wiretap statute does not provide a suppression remedy for Panfilo's intercepted electronic communications, which could still be used in the government's case-in-chief. Consequently, the defendants' wishful thinking of finding additional minimization violations does not justify the requested discovery under Rule 16. See, e.g ., United States v. Pray , 734 F.Supp.2d 158 , 159-60 (D.D.C. 2010) (denying defendants' motion to compel discovery of periodic wiretap reports for use in challenging, inter alia , minimization and propriety of government's procedures since such evidence do[es] not constitute material evidence); United States v. Trabelsi , Crim. No. 06-89 (RWR), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189343 , -7 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015) (finding that defendant's request for discovery to was not warranted under Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) since it is not to rebut the government's case in chief but to support an independent argument to dismiss the indictment).  Accordingly, the defendants' motions to compel discovery are DENIED .