Opinion ID: 567439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Paul Abrams

Text: 12 Abrams argues that there is insufficient evidence to convict him of possession with intent to distribute. Rather, he says, he was mere[ly] present at the location when the search occurred and that he did not have either constructive or actual possession. We disagree. 13 The standard of review for claims of insufficient evidence in a criminal case is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); accord United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 978 (1991). 14 In addition to the possession with intent to distribute charge, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), Abrams was also charged in the alternative with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2, the aiding and abetting statute. 2 It is well established that one who is indicted as a principal may be convicted on evidence that shows he only violated the aiding and abetting statute. All indictments must be read in effect ... as if the alternatives provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2 were embodied in each count thereof. United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 72 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); see also United States v. Young, 527 F.2d 1334, 1336 (5th Cir.1976) (18 U.S.C. § 2 is an alternative charge to be read into every count, and one indicted as a principal may be revisited as a showing of merely aiding and abetting.). 15 Aiding and abetting requires that a defendant  'in some sort associates himself with the venture, that he participates in it as something he wishes to bring about, and that he seeks by his action to make it succeed.'  United States v. Winston, 687 F.2d 832, 834 (6th Cir.1982) (citing Nye & Nisson v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)); accord United States v. Lawson, 872 F.2d 179, 181 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 110 (1989). Thus, it has been said that aiding and abetting involves (1) an act by a defendant which contributes to the execution of a crime; and (2) the intent to aid in its commission. Lawson, 872 F.2d at 181 (citation omitted). 16 Defendant is correct when he states that mere presence is not enough to convict under either charge. However, the evidence indicates that he not only was present in a drug-selling environment, but also that he was actively aware of the activities occurring around him, and that he himself was involved in those activities. 17 Abrams was found sitting in the living room next to a table on which there was a scale, calibrated in grams and typical of the type used by drug dealers. Within several feet were numerous loaded guns; on the table in front of him, a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver; across the room, a sawed-off shotgun; and, in his possession, a Derringer pistol. Abrams admits ownership and possession of the Derringer, and this possession under the circumstances presented here provides circumstantial evidence of his involvement in a drug crime. Weapons are tools of the trade, insofar as drug distribution is concerned, and are kept on the premises from which distribution occurs, just like other drug paraphernalia. 18 There were plastic bags near Abrams feet, of the same type that contained the drugs thrown on the kitchen floor. More than 20 pieces of crack cocaine and a razor blade were found in the drawer of the coffee table next to where Abrams was sitting. Unlike the crack in the drawer, the crack in the kitchen was in large chunks. At trial, an expert testified that the amount of cocaine in the apartment, more than 41 grams, was more than is usual for personal use. When Abrams arose from the couch, money, totalling $455 in small bills fell to the floor, further circumstantial evidence of involvement in drug transactions. Finally, Officer Castle testified that six days before the search warrant was executed he went to the front door of the residence in an undercover capacity and the following dialogue took place: 19 I knocked at the door. Mr. Abrams answered the door. I asked for June, which is a nickname for Mr. Greene. He stated he wasn't there. I asked for a half. He stated he did not have any. I asked him if he could help me out, that I used to cop from them over on Crown Avenue. He says, no, we're all out. 20 And he said--I said, are you sure you can't help me out? And he says June will be back in a little bit with--in about a half hour; come back in a half hour. 21 Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction and such evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 363 (6th Cir.1984); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 932 (6th Cir.1984) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985). Presence combined with other evidence of guilt can be an adequate basis for a conviction. United States v. Schwartz, 666 F.2d 461, 463-64 (11th Cir.1982). It reasonably can be inferred from the evidence presented that Abrams knew about the quantity of crack cocaine in the house, that it was used for distribution purposes, and that he aided defendant Greene by providing protection or by handling money from drug sales and by dealing with drug customers in Greene's absence.