Opinion ID: 1269190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of Kenneth Korn.

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in his treatment of motions related to the testimony of Kenneth Korn, a witness for the State. Mr. Korn testified that he was incarcerated in the Guilford County Jail in early March of 1984, that he was in the same cell block as the defendant, and that the defendant told him that he should have made sure the bitch could never walk, see or hear again, and he should haveshould have made sure she was dead. He further testified that the defendant told him that snitches get their throats slit and that if Mr. Korn said anything he [the defendant] would know where it came from, and that I would be a dead snitch. The defendant contends that admission over defendant's objection of Mr. Korn's testimony regarding snitches and what happened to them violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2) which requires the State to divulge to the defendant by 12:00 Noon on Wednesday prior to the week of trial any oral statement made to a person other than a law-enforcement officer, the existence of which is known to the prosecutor. As amended effective 26 August 1983, the portions of N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a) relevant to this issue provide as follows: (a) Statement of defendant. Upon motion of a defendant, the court must order the prosecutor: .... (2) To divulge, in written or recorded form, the substance of any oral statement relevant to the subject matter of the case made by the defendant, regardless of to whom the statement was made, within the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of which is known to the prosecutor or becomes known to him prior to or during the course of trial;.... If the statement was made to a person other than a law-enforcement officer and if the statement is then known to the State, the State must divulge the substance of the statement no later than 12 o'clock noon, on Wednesday prior to the beginning of the week during which the case is calendared for trial. The record contains no discovery request or motion of the defendant. However, the record does reflect that on 25 April 1984 the State served upon the defendant a notice that the State intended to use an oral statement made by the defendant, the substance of which was, If I had made sure the bitch was dead, I wouldn't be in this mess now. The trial judge did not err by overruling the defendant's objection to the testimony of Mr. Korn on the ground of failure to comply with N.C.G.S. § 15A-903. Even if we were to assume that the legislature intended for the substance of a statement made by the defendant to a person other than a law enforcement officer to be divulged by the State without motion by the defendant, notice of the substance of the statement relevant to the subject matter of the case was timely given to the defendant. Those portions of Mr. Korn's testimony to which objection was made and as to which notice was not given related to an explanation of why the witness came forward with the evidence. He stated in essence that Mr. Kuplen accused him of being a snitch and threatened him by saying Remember, snitches always, you know, that talk, always get this, (indicating), across the throat, like this. After talking with his father, Mr. Korn decided that if he was going to be accused of being a snitch anyway, he might as well tell. Objections at trial to other references to snitches appeared to be made on the ground that they were hearsay, although no ground was stated. When the witness clarified that the defendant was the person who warned the witness about what would happen to snitches, the objections were overruled. We hold that there is no merit to the defendant's contention that the judge should have excluded the evidence because of a failure to comply with N.C. G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2). Further, even if a violation had occurred, sanctions for failure to comply with discovery procedures may be imposed in the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. King, 311 N.C. 603, 320 S.E.2d 1 (1984). Since no discovery sanction was requested by the defendant, he cannot now claim that the failure of the trial judge ex mero motu to exclude the evidence as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery procedures was an abuse of discretion. We further hold that objection to the witness' testimony on the ground that it was hearsay likewise is without merit, for the witness, after the defendant's objection was made at trial, clearly stated that the statements and threats were made by the defendant to the witness, not, as suggested in the defendant's brief, by the defendant to someone else who related the statements to the witness. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(d). The defendant further contends that the trial judge erred in allowing the witness Korn to testify and in not allowing the defendant's motion for a mistrial when the defense attorney learned that he had a conflict of interest and could not cross-examine Mr. Korn effectively because of the conflict. The record reflects that no objection to Mr. Korn's testimony on the ground of a conflict of interest was made when he was called to the stand or throughout direct examination. After defense counsel questioned the witness about charges pending against him and about whether or not he was to receive a benefit from the State because of his testimony, defense counsel requested a recess during which he conferred with other members of the staff of the Public Defender's Office. He then was allowed to approach the bench, but the conference was not recorded. Defense counsel continued his cross-examination of Mr. Korn regarding his expectation of benefit from his testimony. The witness was then excused. When the State rested its case, the following exchange between the trial judge and defense counsel occurred out of the presence of the jury: THE COURT: Now, Mr. White, during your cross examination of the [sic] Kenneth Korn, you approached the bench, after you had cross examined the defendant [sic] to some extent, and stated that Mr. Churchill in the Public Defender's Office represented Mr. Korn. MR. WHITE: That's correct. THE COURT: And you raised the question of a possibility of a conflict. You stated to me, here at the bench, that you knew nothing about his case. MR. WHITE: That's right THE COURT: Mr. Churchill representing him. MR. WHITE: That's correct. THE COURT: And, as I recall, Mr. Korn's testimony, I don't recall him saying that he talked to his lawyer about testifying here in this court. MR. WHITE: That's correct, Your Honor. I doI do have informationI have got information as to what he is charged with, that's all the information I have. THE COURT: Well, that's public record. I told you, when you approached the bench, I told you to go ahead and cross examine him to any extent that you wanted to. All right, sir. Defense counsel shortly thereafter made a motion for a mistrial on the basis that an inherent conflict existed because Mr. Churchill of the Public Defender's staff represented Mr. Korn. The defendant assigns denial of that motion as error. The claim that a possible conflict of interest limited defense counsel's ability to cross-examine the witness raises a question of whether the defendant's right to confront his accusers, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by Article I, § 23 of the North Carolina Constitution, has been violated and if so, whether the violation was harmless. The United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) applied the harmless constitutional error rule to a confrontation clause violation when a defendant was barred from conducting cross-examination designed to show a witness' bias. In that case the Court said: [A]s we observed earlier this Term, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. ___, ___ [106 S.Ct. 292, 295, 88 L.Ed.2d 15] (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). Id. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d at 683. The Court went on to say that if a defendant's opportunity for effective cross-examination is denied, the error may be harmless under the rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendant's conviction), and that whether an error is harmless depends on a variety of factors, including: the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Van Arsdall, ___ U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d at 686-87. In the instant case, we are not satisfied that the defendant's confrontation rights were violated, for the defendant has pointed to nothing which suggests that his counsel would have conducted the cross-examination of Mr. Korn differently if the perceived conflict had not been made known to him during the course of the cross-examination. Mr. White stated that because another member of his office represented Mr. Korn, he did not want to send his investigators out to do what they could.... I could not have a way to effectively dig up what I could on the guy. At the time of the witness' testimony, he had already entered a plea of guilty to the charges upon which the Public Defender's Office was representing him and was awaiting sentence. In State v. Thomas, 310 N.C. 369, 312 S.E.2d 458 (1984) the trial judge had refused to allow defense counsel to withdraw when he learned that a former client was a potential State's witness. The representation had been in regard to an unrelated matter, but defense counsel also had advised the potential witness' mother concerning the very incident about which the witness was to testify at trial. The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that the prior representation did not create a conflict of interest as a matter of law. This Court said: We do not reach the question of whether the denial of the motion to withdraw constituted an abuse of discretion, since defendant has failed to demonstrate that the ruling resulted in prejudice to him. Id. at 375, 312 S.E.2d at 461. Likewise, here the defendant has failed to establish prejudice. Defense counsel had conducted a substantial portion of his cross-examination before he became aware of the possible conflict. He denied having any information which his agency's representation of Mr. Korn had made available to him. Whether Mr. Korn was represented by another member of the Public Defender's staff or by an unrelated attorney, the attorney-client privilege would prevent the attorney from being called as a witness to testify, over Mr. Korn's objections, to conversations between the attorney and his client in refutation of Mr. Korn's denial that he had talked with his attorney about the effect of his testimony. Further, nothing in the attorney-client privilege prohibited Mr. White from obtaining non-privileged information concerning the witness and using it to this defendant's benefit. A concern in that case about creating an appearance of impropriety might suggest the necessity for Mr. Churchill to withdraw as counsel for Mr. Korn if Mr. Korn so desired, but no prejudice to the present defendant could be demonstrated. Mr. Korn at no time sought to invoke the attorney-client privilege. If, however, we were to conclude that the defendant's confrontation rights were violated, we further conclude that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony of the witness Korn was not essential to the State's case, although it supported the inference of an intent to kill that was raised by the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted upon the victim. The defense counsel in fact cross-examined the witness concerning the witness' reason for testifying, attempting to show that the witness had a motive of self-benefit which tended to impeach his credibility. No showing has been made that the perceived conflict actually influenced the scope of cross-examination. And, finally, the State's evidence was clear, strong, consistent and overwhelming. This assignment of error is overruled.