Opinion ID: 1868744
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Immunity Provision is Procedural and Applies Retroactively to Rodgers's Prosecution.

Text: The one exception to the bar against retroactive application of the new law is KRS 503.085, the new provision granting immunity to those who justifiably use self-defense: (1) A person who uses force as permitted in KRS 503.050, 503.055, 503.070, and 503.080 is justified in using such force and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force, unless the person against whom the force was used is a peace officer, as defined in KRS 446.010, who was acting in the performance of his or her official duties and the officer identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law, or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a peace officer. As used in this subsection, the term criminal prosecution includes arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant. (2) A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the use of force as described in subsection (1) of this section, but the agency may not arrest the person for using force unless it determines that there is probable cause that the force that was used was unlawful.       At least in cases such as this one, that do not involve a peace officer, the immunity provision does not constitute substantive law; it has nothing to do with who is entitled to use self-defense or under what circumstances self-defense is justified. It is, rather, purely procedural, and by prohibiting prosecution of one who has justifiably defended himself, his property or others, it in effect creates a new exception to the general rule that trial courts may not dismiss indictments prior to trial. [5] By declaring that one who is justified in using force is immune from criminal prosecution, and by defining criminal prosecution to include arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant, the General Assembly has made unmistakably clear its intent to create a true immunity, not simply a defense to criminal charges. This aspect of the new law is meant to provide not merely a defense against liability, but protection against the burdens of prosecution and trial as well. With KRS 503.085, the General Assembly has created a new procedural bar to prosecution, and that bar, like other procedural statutes, is to be applied retroactively. Before turning to implementation of the immunity afforded by KRS 503.085, it bears noting that the statute grants immunity to a person who uses force as permitted in KRS 503.050, 503.055, 503.070, and 503.080. But KRS 503.055 is a wholly new substantive statute pertaining to Use of defensive force regarding dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicleExceptions. and, as previously discussed, is not to be applied retroactively. Similarly, the 2006 amendments to KRS 503.050 (self-protection); 503.070 (protection of others); and 503.080 (protection of property) were substantive law changes and are not retroactive. Thus persons whose conduct occurred prior to the July 12, 2006 effective date of these amendments but whose trials were not concluded are entitled to immunity only for actions in conformity with the version of the applicable statute, ( i.e. self-protection, protection of others, protection of property) in effect at the time they acted. Application of the pre-2006 selfdefense statute presents no real issue here, however, because as the trial court found, conflicting evidence of record precluded a pretrial finding that Rodgers was clearly acting in self-defense and thus entitled to immunity. Specifically, the trial court ruled that even if KRS 503.085 applied to Rodgers's case, Rodgers was not entitled to dismissal because the discovery record included conflicting evidence as to whether his use of deadly force was justified. Noting that the immunity statute does not specify who bears the burden of proof or what standard of proof applies, the trial court in effect imposed on the Commonwealth a directed verdict standard, which was met, the court held, because the discovery record, in particular Eubanks's and Palmore's statements accusing Rodgers of pulling a gun and firing several times at McAfee, was sufficient to raise a jury question concerning self-defense. Rodgers contends that the trial court's use of the discovery record and directed verdict standard failed to comport with KRS 503.085. Relying on People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1987), in which the Supreme Court of Colorado was called upon to fill in the procedural gaps of that state's self-defense immunity provision, Rodgers contends that he was entitled to a pre-trial evidentiary hearing at which he would bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his use of deadly force was justified. We disagree. The trial judge's uncertainty regarding how to implement the immunity provision is understandable because the statute offers little guidance. Indeed, the only express indication of legislative intent is in KRS 503.085(2) which provides that immunity must be granted pre-arrest by the law enforcement agency investigating the crime unless there is probable cause that the force used was unlawful. Because the statute defines the criminal prosecution from which a defendant justifiably acting in self-defense is immune to be arresting, detaining in custody and charging or prosecuting, we can infer that the immunity determination is not confined to law enforcement personnel. Instead, the statute contemplates that the prosecutor and the courts may also be called upon to determine whether a particular defendant is entitled to KRS 503.085 immunity. Regardless of who is addressing the immunity claim, we infer from the statute that the controlling standard of proof remains probable cause. Thus, in order for the prosecutor to bring charges or seek an indictment, there must be probable cause to conclude that the force used by the defendant was not fully justified under the controlling provision or provisions of KRS Chapter 503. Similarly, once the matter is before a judge, if the defendant claims immunity the court must dismiss the case unless there is probable cause to conclude that the force used was not legally justified. Probable cause is a standard with which prosecutors, defense counsel and judges in the Commonwealth are very familiar although it often eludes definition. Recently, in Commonwealth v. Jones, 217 S.W.3d 190 (Ky.2006), this Court noted the United States Supreme Court's definition in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983): [P]robable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Just as judges consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant, they must consider all of the circumstances then known to determine whether probable cause exists to conclude that a defendant's use of force was unlawful. If such cause does not exist, immunity must be granted and, conversely, if it does exist, the matter must proceed. Because immunity is designed to relieve a defendant from the burdens of litigation, it is obvious that a defendant should be able to invoke KRS 503.085(1) at the earliest stage of the proceeding. While the trial courts need not address the issue sua sponte, once the defendant raises the immunity bar by motion, the court must proceed expeditiously. Thus a defendant may invoke KRS 503.085 immunity and seek a determination at the preliminary hearing in district court or, alternatively, he may elect to await the outcome of the grand jury proceedings and, if indicted, present his motion to the circuit judge. A defendant may not, however, seek dismissal on immunity grounds in both courts. Once the district court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant's use of force was unlawful, the circuit court should not revisit the issue. In the case of a direct submission or where a defendant has elected to wait and invoke immunity in the circuit court, the issue should be raised promptly so that it can be addressed as a threshold motion. The sole remaining issue is how the trial courts should proceed in determining probable cause. The burden is on the Commonwealth to establish probable cause and it may do so by directing the court's attention to the evidence of record including witness statements, investigative letters prepared by law enforcement officers, photographs and other documents of record. Although Rodgers advocates an evidentiary hearing at which the defendant may counter probable cause with proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the force was justified, this concept finds no support in the statute. The legislature did not delineate an evidentiary hearing and the only standard of proof against which a defendant's conduct must be measured is the aforementioned probable cause. We decline to create a hearing right that the statute does not recognize and note that there are several compelling reasons for our conclusion. First, the pretrial evidentiary hearings that are currently conducted, such as suppression hearings, do not involve proof that is the essence of the crime charged but focus instead on issues such as protection of the defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, right to be represented by counsel and right to Miranda warnings prior to giving a statement. Similarly, a competency hearing addresses the state of the defendant's mental health and his ability to participate meaningfully in the trial. Neither of these hearings requires proof of the facts surrounding the alleged crime. An evidentiary hearing on immunity, by contrast, would involve the same witnesses and same proof to be adduced at the eventual trial, in essence a mini-trial and thus a process fraught with potential for abuse. Moreover, it would result in one of the elements of the alleged crime (no privilege to act in self-protection) being determined in a bench trial. In RCr 9.26 this Court has evinced its strong preference for jury trials on all elements of a criminal case by providing specifically that even if a defendant waives a jury trial in writing, the court and the Commonwealth must consent to a bench trial. Thus, where probable cause exists in criminal matters the longstanding practice and policy has been to submit those matters to a jury and we find no rational basis for abandoning that stance. As for the Colorado Supreme Court's adoption of an evidentiary hearing approach, there are several fundamental differences in the Colorado statute and KRS 503.085. The Colorado statute in essence, if not in express words, provides there shall be immunity in home invasion cases. People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d at 975. The statute contains no reference to an immunity determination by law enforcement or the prosecutor, no reference to a standard of proof and no reference to how the courts should proceed to determine immunity. Writing on a blank slate and crafting a judicial procedure to be used only in home invasion cases (as opposed to all assaults and homicides wherein self-defense is raised as here in Kentucky), the Colorado court opted for an evidentiary hearing. Given the large volume of Kentucky cases for which immunity may be an issue, the probable cause standard expressly stated in KRS 503.085, and Kentucky's strong preference for jury determinations in criminal matters, we do not find the Colorado court's approach appropriate. Finally, we note that the precise mechanism for judicial implementation of KRS 503.085 is purely academic as to Rodgers because he has been tried and convicted by a properly instructed jury in a trial with no reversible error. In short, his self-defense claim has been thoroughly examined by both the trial judge under the directed verdict standard and the jury under the court's instructions and his entitlement to self-defense has been rejected. While the trial court's approach to the immunity issue was not the one outlined by this Court, it was certainly sufficient and Rodgers suffered no discernible prejudice. Indeed if the trial court had divined the procedure outlined here, applying the probable cause standard would have produced the same conclusion, no entitlement to immunity and denial of Rodgers's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, there was no reversible error in the handling of the immunity determination.