Opinion ID: 1707925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impeachment Evidence of Witness

Text: During cross-examination of State witness Heath Brittingham, defense counsel asked Brittingham if he had previously told the investigating detective that Pearce expressed surprise after Smith shot Tuttle. When Brittingham responded that he did not remember saying that, defense counsel requested that a videotape of a previous statement by Brittingham be shown to the jury. The judge responded that the defense would have to present the tape in its own case, not during the State's case. After the State rested its case, Pearce moved for judgment of acquittal, which was denied by the judge. When the judge asked if the defendant intended to present testimony or evidence, defense counsel stated his intent to present the videotape of Brittingham's statement as impeachment evidence. Defense counsel then proffered the testimony of the technician who had videotaped the interview. The technician stated that although she operated the video camera, she did not pay attention to the various interviews conducted by the detective, had not viewed the videotape in question, and could not authenticate its contents. Defense counsel also proffered the testimony of the investigating detective who conducted the interview. After viewing the videotape, the detective testified that it fairly and accurately depicted his interview with Brittingham. Defense counsel specified that he wanted admitted into evidence a part of the videotaped interview in which Brittingham stated that Pearce had expressed surprise after Smith shot Tuttle by stating, What the hell? What are you doing? and that Smith directed Pearce either to go, go or drive, drive after Smith shot Tuttle. Defense counsel argued that this was impeachment evidence that should be admitted. The State objected, arguing that the defense could not impeach Brittingham's response of I don't recall or I don't remember. The trial court did not permit Pearce to introduce Brittingham's previous videotaped statement into evidence, even for impeachment purposes, but allowed defense counsel to proffer the videotape for the record after the State rested its case. The trial court ruled that the tape did not meet the requirements of the Florida Evidence Code for impeachment purposes. In order to resolve this claim, we must examine the law relating to the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements. Prior inconsistent statements are not hearsay and can be admitted as substantive evidence  if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is ... [i]nconsistent with the declarant's testimony and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition. § 90.801(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added). However, in State v. Delgado-Santos, 497 So.2d 1199 (Fla.1986), this Court held that a statement given under oath during a police investigation is not a statement given at an other proceeding and consequently is not admissible as substantive evidence under section 90.801(2)(a). See also Ellis v. State, 622 So.2d 991, 997-98 (Fla.1993) (concluding that pretrial statement by witness during interview with prosecutor could not be admitted as substantive evidence under section 90.801(2)(a) because the interview was not an other proceeding within the meaning of the rule). Thus, the videotaped statement that Brittingham gave to the investigating detective did not meet the last requirement of section 90.801(2)(a) and could not be admitted as substantive evidence here. However, introduction of a prior statement that is inconsistent with a witness's present testimony is also one of the main ways to attack the credibility of a witness. See § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2001); see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 608.4 (2002 ed.). The Florida Evidence Code does not require the witness's prior inconsistent statement to be reduced to writing in order to impeach the witness under section 90.608(1)(a). Kimble v. State, 537 So.2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The theory of admissibility is not that the prior statement is true and the in-court testimony is false, but that because the witness has not told the truth in one of the statements, the jury should disbelieve both statements. See Florida Evidence § 614.1. To be inconsistent, a prior statement must either directly contradict or be materially different from the expected testimony at trial. The inconsistency must involve a material, significant fact rather than mere details. See State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 313 (Fla.1990). Nit-picking is not permitted under the guise of prior inconsistent statements. See Morton v. State, 689 So.2d 259, 264 (Fla.1997) ([C]aution should be exercised in permitting impeachment of a witness who has given favorable testimony but simply fails to recall every detail unless the witness appears to be fabricating.), receded from on other grounds Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29 (Fla.2000) (receding from Morton to extent it holds that a prior inconsistent statement cannot be used as substantive evidence in a penalty phase proceeding); see also Florida Evidence § 608.4. If a witness has made a prior inconsistent statement concerning a collateral matter, cross-examining counsel may question the witness about the statement, but must take the answer and cannot present extrinsic evidence to prove the prior inconsistent statement. Florida Evidence § 608.4. Before a witness can be impeached with a prior inconsistent statement, the proper foundation must be laid. Prior to questioning a witness about the contents of a previous inconsistent statement, counsel must call to the witness's attention the time, place, and person to whom the statement was allegedly made. Rowe v. State, 128 Fla. 394, 174 So. 820, 821 (1937); see also Florida Evidence § 614.1. As provided in section 90.614(2), Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is inadmissible unless the witness is first afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the prior statement and the opposing party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness on it.... If the witness denies making or does not distinctly admit making the prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic evidence of such statement is admissible. Thus, if the witness admits making the prior statement, examining counsel may not offer any evidence to prove the statement was made. See Jennings v. State, 512 So.2d 169, 172 (Fla.1987) (explaining that sworn pretrial motions, containing statement of a state witness which was inconsistent with his trial testimony, were not admissible for impeachment, where witness admitted making the prior inconsistent statement). Further, even if the witness admits making a prior statement, the witness should be given an opportunity to explain it, show that he or she was mistaken when it was made, or explain that the prior statement is not inconsistent. Under section 90.614(2), extrinsic evidence is admissible when a witness does not distinctly admit making the prior statement. See Pugh v. State, 637 So.2d 313, 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (finding error in not admitting prior inconsistent portions of witness's deposition into evidence when witness stated that he did not remember the questions he was asked nor the answers he gave during his deposition). If the witness does not distinctly admit making a prior statement, then when it is counsel's turn to offer evidence, he or she may introduce extrinsic evidence that the statement was made. See Florida Evidence, § 614.1. This evidence can include a properly authenticated written statement and the testimony of individuals who were present when the statement was made. See id. § 608.4. The record in this case shows that defense counsel laid the proper foundation under section 90.614(2): counsel called to Brittingham's attention the time, place, and person to whom he made the prior inconsistent statements, quoted from the prior statements, and gave Brittingham an opportunity to explain his prior statements. See Brumbley v. State, 453 So.2d 381, 385 (Fla.1984) (finding it proper for State to impeach witness by quoting the precise language of his prior statements as such references were a correct method of laying a predicate for the introduction of the prior statements). Further, the prior statements and Brittingham's in-court testimony were relevant to the issue of Pearce's level of involvement in the shootings. When Brittingham did not distinctly admit making the prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic evidence of such statement [was] admissible. § 90.614(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). Thus, the trial court erred by not permitting defense counsel to admit extrinsic evidence of Brittingham's prior statement. However, we conclude that the error in excluding this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986). The evidence was only admissible for purposes of impeaching Brittingham's credibility, not as substantive evidence of Pearce's level of involvement in the killings or his prior knowledge of Smith's intentions when he shot the victims. While the videotape itself was not admitted into evidence, defense counsel did call Brittingham's credibility into question before the jury when he quoted directly from Brittingham's previous statements. Further, even if Brittingham's credibility had been called into question by the admission of his prior inconsistent statements, Brittingham's account of the evening (i.e., that Pearce played the primary role in the kidnappings) was corroborated in every significant detail by the testimony of Butterfield, Tuttle, Loucks, Shook, and Havner. Cf. Garcia v. State, 816 So.2d 554, 563 (Fla.2002) (finding that exclusion of relevant impeachment evidence of key state witness was harmful where no physical evidence linked the defendant to the murder scene or murders and witness's credibility was critical to strength of State's case). Butterfield's testimony recounted the same conversation between Pearce and Smith after Tuttle was shot as Brittingham did during his in-court testimony, i.e., Pearce sought assurance from Smith that Tuttle was dead but there was no other conversation. More importantly, Brittingham's prior statement to the detective, Brittingham's in-court testimony, and Butterfield's in-court testimony were consistent as to the events and conversation that preceded Crawford's shooting, which is the basis for Pearce's first-degree murder conviction and death sentence. There was no evidence of any discussion between Pearce and Smith when Pearce stopped the car the second time and ordered Crawford out of the car. Pearce never distanced himself from Smith's previous actions of shooting Tuttle and leaving him for dead. Notably, Pearce never told Smith not to kill or shoot Crawford when he stopped the car the second time, even though he thought that Smith had already killed Tuttle. There was also direct testimony and physical evidence that tied Pearce to the kidnappings, the shootings, and the murder of Crawford. Thus, the cases relied upon by Pearce are distinguishable as Pearce's conviction did not rest solely or even primarily on the testimony of Brittingham. Cf. Pugh v. State, 637 So.2d 313, 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (finding that error in not admitting portion of pretrial deposition as prior inconsistent statement to impeach key prosecution witness was not harmless as this was only witness to claim defendant was directly involved in robbery and holding gun); Kimble v. State, 537 So.2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (same as to prior inconsistent statement of witness-victim). Thus, we conclude that any error in excluding extrinsic evidence of Brittingham's prior inconsistent statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the facts of this case. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1135.