Opinion ID: 2058054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of the Substantially Limits Language

Text: [¶ 17] Wal-Mart and the Maine Chamber of Commerce argue that the Legislature's 1991 amendment signified, sub silentio, that the 1985 Maine Human Rights Commission regulation was a proper construction of the definition of disability that the Legislature had enacted in 1975. Nothing in the legislative history, or anywhere else, supports that view. If the stated legislative intent of the 1991 amendment was to continue and not change the substance of the Maine Human Rights Act, then this amendment was surely neither an endorsement nor an acceptance of the restrictive language included in the Maine Human Rights Commission regulation. [¶ 18] The reason that the Human Rights Commission's 1985 regulation cannot be viewed as receiving approval by the Legislature is quickly apparent. A year after the regulation was adopted, we held in Rozanski v. A-P-A Transport, Inc., 512 A.2d 335, 340 (Me.1986) that a definition of disability, without the substantially limits language, should govern interpretation of the term disability or handicap under the MHRA. [¶ 19] In Rozanski, plaintiffs were two truck drivers who were discharged because they failed A-P-A Transport's pre-employment x-ray screening. Although neither plaintiff had ever experienced back problems, x-rays revealed that one had a small osteophyte or spur on his spine and the other had spondylolysis. Id. at 338. The Maine Human Rights Commission determined that these latent back conditions were a physical handicap pursuant to section 4553(7-A). Id. [2] After trial, the Superior Court determined that A-P-A Transport had discharged the plaintiffs because of a mistaken belief that their latent back conditions created a greater likelihood of disability if they engaged in the heavy work of truck driving. Id. [¶ 20] A-P-A Transport argued that these latent back conditions were not a protected physical or mental handicap under the MHRA. We rejected this argument: The [Maine Human Rights] Act defines physical or mental handicap as any disability, infirmity, malformation, disfigurement, congenital defect or mental condition caused by bodily injury, accident, disease, birth defect, environmental conditions or illness. . . . 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(7-A) (1979). Both [plaintiffs] fit within the express terms of that definition since the asymptomatic condition of each of the men constitutes a malformation of the spine. Their conditions are indistinguishable from that of the railway employee involved in Maine Human Rights Commission v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 458 A.2d 1225 (Me.1983), who because of his asymptomatic heart murmur was deemed to be handicapped within the meaning of the Act. Similarly, [plaintiffs'] latent back conditions, which were the sole ground for their termination, are physical handicaps that entitle them to the protection of the Maine Human Rights Act. Id. at 340. [¶ 21] The Rozanski opinion holding that latent conditions are protected under the section 4553(7-A) definition, necessarily rejects the substantially limits qualification to the definition of disability. It was this interpretation of section 4553(7-A), by both the Maine Human Rights Commission and this Court, that governed in 1991 when the Legislature amended section 4553(7-A), without substantive change, and it is this interpretation of the law that governs today. Not surprisingly, the Chief Judge of the United States District Court has interpreted section 4553(7-A) in just this way, as having a broader definition of `physical or mental disability' than the Rehabilitation Act. Norton v. Lakeside Family Practice, P.A., 382 F.Supp.2d 202, 205 n. 2 (D.Me.2005). [¶ 22] Wal-Mart asserts that, despite this history of section 4553(7-A), we should defer to the Commission's interpretation of a statute it administers. Our standards of review require that we afford significant deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers: When the dispute involves an agency's interpretation of a statute administered by it, the agency's interpretation, although not conclusive, is entitled to great deference. . . . Maritime Energy v. Fund Ins. Review Bd., 2001 ME 45, ¶ 7, 767 A.2d 812, 814. However, we must directly interpret an unambiguous statute according to its plain meaning. City of Bangor v. Penobscot County, 2005 ME 35, ¶ 9, 868 A.2d 177, 180. If, and only if, a statute is ambiguous do we look to extrinsic sources like agency interpretation or legislative history to assist in interpreting ambiguous terms. Competitive Energy Servs., LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2003 ME 12, ¶ 15, 818 A.2d 1039, 1046. An agency interpretation of a statute is invalid if it is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. See Gulf Island Pond Oxygenation Project P'ship v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 644 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Me.1994). [¶ 23] An agency cannot, by regulation, create an ambiguity in interpretation of a statute that does not otherwise exist. Such an approach is particularly difficult when the agency's construction seeks to add words of limitation to a statute that are inconsistent with the plain meaning of the law, legislative choice in enacting the law, and subsequent judicial interpretation. [¶ 24] Wal-Mart argues, contrary to our holding in Rozanski, that the substantially limits language of the federal law is incorporated into section 4553(7-A) by its reference to substantial disability. This is a misreading of the statute. The definition of physical or mental disability in section 4553(7-A) includes three categories of covered conditions. Under the first category, a person is covered if he or she has any disability, infirmity, malformation, disfigurement, congenital defect or mental condition caused by bodily injury, accident, disease, birth defect, environmental conditions or illness. Rozanski, 512 A.2d at 340 (quoting 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(7-A) (1979)). The second category is the physical or mental condition of a person that constitutes a substantial disability as determined by a physician or, in the case of mental disability, by a psychiatrist or psychologist. . . . 5 M.R.S. § 4553(7-A). The third category is any other health or sensory impairment that requires special education, vocational rehabilitation or related services. Id. [¶ 25] Although it is possible for an individual to have a condition that meets all three categories, Rozanski establishes that meeting all of them is not a prerequisite for coverage. In Rozanski, an asymptomatic back condition was covered because it was a malformation of the spine, 512 A.2d at 340, regardless of the substantial disability language in section 4553(7-A). [¶ 26] Section 4553(7-A) in defining disability is not ambiguous. It does not include the substantially limits . . . a major life activity qualification that the Legislature has chosen not to include in Maine's definition of disability. [¶ 27] Wal-Mart and the Chamber of Commerce assert, as a matter of policy, that Maine's definition of disability, without the restriction in the federal law, may promote litigation unduly burdensome to businesses. Therefore, they urge us to, in effect, amend the MHRA to include the limitation present in federal law but not in the Maine Legislature's enacted definition of disability. We have cautioned litigants that legislative policy arguments are more appropriately left to the executive and the Legislature to resolve. In Bertl v. Public Utilities Commission, 2005 ME 115, ¶ 11, 885 A.2d 776, 778, we rejected an appellant's argument as: more of a policy argument than it is a legal argument, and as such, is more appropriately left for the Commission, not this Court, to consider. See, e.g., Harding v. Sheridan D. Smith, Inc., 647 A.2d 1193, 1194 (Me.1994) (noting that [w]hile the employer makes an interesting policy argument, such policy issues are more appropriately addressed to the Legislature). If a legislative policy concern is valid, the appropriate body to address that concern is the Maine Legislature, it is not to seek amendment of the law by judicial action. [¶ 28] The entire history of the adoption and judicial interpretation of the definition of disability in the MHRA leaves no ambiguity for interpretation and supports a definition of disability without a substantially limits one or more of the major life activities qualification.