Opinion ID: 2010717
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unreasonably Interfere

Text: [¶ 21] To interfere means to come between so as to be a hindrance. Id. at 669. Reasonableness is a well defined concept under the common law. Town of Baldwin, 2002 ME 52, ¶ 13, 794 A.2d at 68 (quotation marks omitted). As such, statutes prohibiting activities that have unreasonable effects are generally not unconstitutionally vague. See id. Indeed, in In re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d 736, 739, 749-53 (Me.1973), a case quite similar to this, we upheld the constitutionality of the Site Location of Development Law, currently codified at 38 M.R.S. §§ 481-490 (2008), in the face of a void for vagueness and unlawful delegation challenge. Our analysis centered on the law's regulation of unreasonable effect[s] upon existing uses: The requirement that the Commission must be satisfied that there will be no adverse effect upon the natural environment is the very substance of the Legislature's efforts to reduce despoilation of the environment to a minimum. While most such developments may be expected to affect the environment adversely to the extent that they add to the demands already made upon it, it is the unreasonable effect upon existing uses, scenic character and natural resources which the Legislature seeks to avoid by empowering the Commission to measure the nature and extent of the proposed use against the environment's capacity to tolerate the use. In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d at 751 (emphasis in original). [¶ 22] In re Spring Valley Development underscores that a reasonableness determination is a fact-specific inquiry. See also United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36, 124 S.Ct. 521, 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2003) ([W]e have treated reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case. ...). We recognized the same with respect to section 480-D(1) in Uliano I when we concluded that it was improper for the Board to treat its practicable alternative analysis as determinative, and that it must instead consider the practicable alternatives as part of determining reasonableness: Whether a proposed project's interference with existing uses is reasonable depends on a multiplicity of factors, one of which is the existence of a practicable alternative. A balancing analysis inheres in any reasonableness inquiry. 2005 ME 88, ¶ 13, 876 A.2d at 19. [¶ 23] Consequently, whether a proposed activity will unreasonably interfere with an existing scenic or aesthetic use will necessarily depend on the specific circumstances of a given case. In Kroeger, for instance, we affirmed the Department's finding that a proposed dock would unreasonably interfere with the scenic and aesthetic uses based on the specific scenic uses made of Somes Sound by the boaters and hikers who flock to Acadia for the scenic beauty of the area. 2005 ME 50, ¶ 16, 870 A.2d at 571. Given the factual nature of the reasonableness inquiry, it is the applicant's burden to establish facts that demonstrate[] that the proposed activity meets the standard[] set forth in [section 480-D(1)]. 38 M.R.S. § 480-D. As illustrated by Kroeger, an applicant may be aided by expert testimony in meeting this burden. See 2005 ME 50, ¶¶ 11-13, 870 A.2d at 570 (evidence on unreasonable interference included the experts' reports on existing scenic uses and the visual impact of the proposed dock). There was no expert testimony offered by the Ulianos on this issue in this case.