Opinion ID: 704006
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Separating the Existence of a Conflict from the Effect of

Text: 226 a Conflict 227 The majority also contends that there was no actual conflict in the context of the media rights contract because ... [t]he record does not demonstrate that the contract induced Andrews to compromise his zealous representation of Beets in favor of his own pecuniary interest. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1277. Similarly, in the lawyer as witness context, the majority contends that there was no actual conflict [b]ecause Andrews's potential testimony for Beets was cumulative, [and] he was not a necessary witness for her defense. Id. at 1277. As I have pointed out above, this conclusion has no factual support in the record. As a legal conclusion, it has no support in the case law surrounding Cuyler; determining whether there was an actual conflict (as distinguished from determining whether the Sixth Amendment has been violated) does not require a showing of an adverse effect. 228 As the majority concedes, Cuyler incorporates a standard less rigorous than Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067 (noting that unlike general ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the criminal justice system maintain[s] a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice in the conflict of interest context). The reason for this lighter burden in conflict cases is clear. As the Supreme Court has noted, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, and accordingly, the Court has refused to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice attributable to the conflict. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349, 100 S.Ct. at 1719 (internal quotation omitted). The majority, however, engages in such a calculation to determine whether a conflict even existed. 229 The question of whether there actually was a conflict plays an important role in separating cases where interests diverge--i.e., where the attorney places his own or another's interest above the client's interest--from those situations where the conflict remains potential. Whether the conflict actually affected the representation is a separate inquiry from the question of whether there was an actual conflict. Even when addressing whether a conflict had an adverse effect, the degree of prejudice caused by the conflict is not material once any real effect is shown. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349, 100 S.Ct. at 1719 ([A] defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice.). 12 230 The rule that the majority espouses goes even further than that prohibited in evaluating actual effect. The majority collapses the question of effect into the question of actual conflict. Just as it is improper to evaluate a foregone strategy's potential for success when determining whether there is an adverse effect, it is also improper to evaluate that strategy's potential for success when determining whether there is an actual conflict of interest. 13 231