Opinion ID: 354319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Jury Bias or Misconduct

Text: 8 All three appellants assert that the jury was infected with prejudice before the deliberations even began. On the fifth day of an eight-week trial, Juror Number Three reported to the judge that several other jurors had remarked that the defendants were guilty. She noted, however, that the jurors were not speaking about the case per se, whatever that meant. The district judge proceeded to interview each juror individually in camera. Several said that they had heard nothing of the kind, although six reported that someone had made a passing reference, in jest, to the subject of the defendants' guilt. Each averred that he or she would not form any opinion of guilt or innocence until all the evidence was presented. Each further recognized the necessity of not talking about the case. 9 In treating charges of jury misconduct, the trial judge is accorded broad discretion. United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 457 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103, 97 S.Ct. 1129, 51 L.Ed.2d 553 (1977); United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354, 372 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909, 75 S.Ct. 295, 99 L.Ed. 713 (1955); see Note, The United States Courts of Appeals: 1975-1976 Term Criminal Law and Procedure,65 Geo.L.J. 203, 370-71 (1976). A criminal trial is of course no place for bias or prejudice, even in jest. And faced with the threat of bias, Judge Bonsal acted properly in conducting the in camera interviews. If one juror had been contaminated, the district judge's prompt action could have contained any spread of the taint. United States v. Torres, 519 F.2d 723, 727-28 (2d Cir.) (expeditious voir dire after defendants seen in handcuffs minimized harm where all jurors but one assured judge of continuing impartiality; unsure juror excused), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 457, 46 L.Ed.2d 392 (1975); cf. United States v. Lord, 565 F.2d 831, 837-39 (2d Cir. 1977) (in camera individual interrogation of juror exposed to prejudicial publicity during trial required); United States v. Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177, 186 (2d Cir.) (individual jurors examined on exposure to prejudicial publicity), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941, 93 S.Ct. 2779, 37 L.Ed.2d 400 (1973); but cf. United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1359-60 (2d Cir.) (omission to conduct individual voir dire where jury may have seen defendants in manacles not plain error), cert. denied sub nom. Salley v. United States, 432 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 2958, 53 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1977). 10 Likewise, on the basis of the jurors' interview statements, it was not an abuse of discretion to continue the trial upon concluding that the jurors were not prejudiced, a determination which the district judge was in the best position to make. See United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833, 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 844, 78 S.Ct. 67, 2 L.Ed.2d 53 (1957); cf. United States v. Chiarizio, 525 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1975) (factual findings at pretrial suppression hearing are reversible on appeal only if clearly erroneous); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 678, at 143 (1969) (same).