Opinion ID: 166321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Accrual of Price's claims

Text: 16 When a claim accrues, and thus when the limitations period begins to run, is a question of federal law. Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir.1998) A civil rights action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Baker v. Bd. of Regents, 991 F.2d 628, 632 (10th Cir.1993). Indeed, it is not necessary that a claimant know all of the evidence ultimately relied on for the cause of action to accrue. Id.; see also Johnson v. Johnson County Comm'n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir.1991) (Claims arising out of police actions toward a criminal suspect, such as arrest, interrogation, or search and seizure, are presumed to have accrued when the actions actually occur.). 17
18 Price's complaint makes clear he is asserting separate claims arising from both the June 14, 2000, search of his home and from his September 14, 2000, arrest. Indeed, Price emphasizes this on appeal by noting that [t]he complaint outlines two different dates, one the date of the search (i.e., June 14, 2000) and two, the date of arrest (i.e., September 14, 2000). Thus, Price's pleadings argue that his excessive force upon arrest claims are separate from his search-related claims and accrued instead on the day of his arrest, September 14, 2000. Specifically, Price asserts that his physical beating claim survives the statutory bar where occurring moments after his September 14, 2000, arrest. 19 We agree. The initiation of the June 14 search did not put Price on notice that he would have an excessive force upon arrest claim arising three months later. It is clear that Price is making a separate constitutional claim of abuse, dealing with a specific subset of named Defendants, occurring at his September 14, 2000 arrest. The district court erroneously lumped all of Price's abuse claims into a single claim arising upon the initiation of the search on June 14, 2000. Therefore, we reverse and remand Price's arrest-related excessive force claims for further proceedings. 3 20
21 Next, Price argues before this court that even his search-related claims accrued after June 14, 2000, because (a) Price fled the scene and was unaware of the extent of the violations resulting from the unlawful search until after that date; and (b) the search itself was not completed for several days. 22 We disagree. The law requires only that the claimant knows or has reason to know of the injury before the limitations period begins to run. Baker, 991 F.2d at 632. Indeed, the claimant need not even know all of the evidence before the cause of action accrues. Id. 23 Price may not have known the full extent of his property-related injuries on June 14, 2000, when the search was initiated; however, in his complaint, he acknowledges that he was present when Defendants arrived and allegedly began shooting. Even if Price's own flight may have prevented him from immediately surveying the extent of his property loss, and even if we assume the search did occur over several days, Price certainly had reason to know that the events giving rise to this action were occurring as early as June 14, 2000. Therefore, we agree with the district court's conclusion that June 14, 2000, is the applicable accrual date for Price's search-related claims.