Opinion ID: 786696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Feres Doctrine Applied to Lawsuits by Guard Technicians

Text: 31 The Feres doctrine's bar to lawsuits that are incident to military service has generally been applied to suits by Guard Technicians arising while they are being paid as civilian employees. Despite the fact that their employment may be denominated civilian, the duties that they are performing are typically military in nature. Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether the Feres doctrine applies to a Guard Technician's lawsuit arising from his or her dual-status employment and brought against another Guard Technician, the state, or the federal government, the Circuit Courts of Appeals have: They have nearly unanimously applied the Feres doctrine to bar such suits. See, e.g., Fisher v. Peters, 249 F.3d 433, 443 (6th Cir.2001) (applying the Feres doctrine to a Title VII action brought by a Guard Technician); Brown v. United States, 227 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir.2000) (same). And they have done so even in cases in which the injuries complained of were incurred while the plaintiff was allegedly performing the nominally civilian aspects of his or her employment. See, e.g., Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 589 (1st Cir.1993) (applying the Feres doctrine to a section 1983 action brought by a Guard Technician and allegedly related to his civilian duties); Stauber, 837 F.2d at 399 (applying the doctrine to a state tort law claim brought by a Guard Technician and allegedly related to his civilian duties); NeSmith v. Fulton, 615 F.2d 196, 201 (5th Cir.1980) (applying the doctrine to a section 1983 claim brought by a Guard Technician and allegedly related to his civilian duties). But see Mier, 57 F.3d at 748 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that the Feres doctrine bars a Title VII claim by a Guard Technician only if the suit involves personnel actions integrally related to the military's unique structure). 8 32 There are at least two persuasive reasons to conclude that the Feres doctrine may apply to a lawsuit based on alleged actions taken while the Guard Technician is being paid as a civilian employee. 33 First, a Guard Technician's employment as a civilian is ordinarily in support of a mission that is ultimately military in nature. The broad purpose of the National Guard Technicians Act of 1968, 32 U.S.C. § 709, which grants Guard Technicians their dual status, is to insure that the military mission of the National Guard ... be carried out effectively and efficiently. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 730 F.2d 1534, 1545 (D.C.Cir.1984) (describing the legislative history of the act). [M]ilitary preparedness is the sine [ qua non ] of the ... Act. Id. at 1546. Congress gave Guard Technicians dual status in order to make these positions more attractive, i.e., for the limited purpose of making fringe and retirement benefits of federal employees and coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act ... available to National Guard Technician employees of the various states. Id. at 1536-37; accord Wright, 5 F.3d at 588. 9 The military characteristics of [Guard Technicians'] duties are paramount. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 730 F.2d at 1544. As the First Circuit observed, under the Technician Act's composite regime, technicians are considerably more than nominal members of the military establishment. Wright, 5 F.3d at 588. 34 Thus, the civilian employment of Guard Technicians is often incident to military service. [A] suit based upon service-related activity necessarily implicates the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the military mission.... Civilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in military activities. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 682, 691 & n. 11, 107 S.Ct. 2063, 95 L.Ed.2d 648 (1987) (holding nonjusticiable a lawsuit against a civilian agency for allegedly negligent assistance of a military mission); accord Shearer, 473 U.S. at 55-56 (holding nonjusticiable a suit brought by the mother of a member of the military who was killed allegedly as a result of the Army's negligence while he was off duty); Stauber, 837 F.2d at 400 (relying on Johnson with reference to a suit by a Guard Technician). 35 Second, there are concerns about the intrusive nature of the inquiry that would be necessary for a federal court to disentangle a plaintiff's civilian and military duties if the Feres doctrine were applicable only to suits arising out of the latter. [T]he mere process of arriving at correct conclusions would disrupt the military regime. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683, 107 S.Ct. 3054; see also Lutz, 944 F.2d at 1487 ([W]here it is sufficiently ambiguous whether challenged actions were `incident to military service,' and the process of disentangling conduct not incident to service from that incident to service would itself work an impermissible intrusion upon military matters, Feres must be applied to the whole course of conduct.). 36 In a decision with a setting strikingly similar to the present one, Stauber v. Cline, 837 F.2d 395 (9th Cir.1988), the Ninth Circuit observed that the [harassing] conduct that occurred at the maintenance shop cannot give rise to actionable tort claims without impinging on military authority and calling into question matters which are exclusively the subject of military remedies. Id. at 399. The court continued, [The plaintiff] and the defendants were always under the direct command of active-duty military officers. The parties shared the same direct military relationships whether on civilian or military status. Their conduct was subject to military discipline, and indeed, plaintiff requested that his superiors step in to improve the situation. Id. at 400. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activities would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry into military judgments. Id. (quoting Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 107 S.Ct. 2063; internal quotation marks omitted). The court concluded that the Feres doctrine was applicable. 37 Overton has not argued that his claims are not incident to military service, as he might have. That issue is therefore not before us. See Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir.2004) (`On a motion invoking sovereign immunity to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that jurisdiction exists.' (quoting Garcia v. Akwesasne Hous. Auth., 268 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir.2001))); Wake v. United States, 89 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that the Feres doctrine concerns the waiver of sovereign immunity). We therefore need not address the question whether the Feres doctrine applies because Overton's claims arise out of or ... in the course of activity incident to [military] service. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. 153; cf. Brown, 739 F.2d at 368 (holding that Feres did not bar claims against national guardsmen who participated in a mock lynching). 10 38