Opinion ID: 150478
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: April Statements

Text: The June statements were preceded by two interrogations in April, on the 24th and the 27th, during which time Simpson was in jail for a separate offense. Acting on a tip that Simpson might have known something about the arson, Detective Kallay and Agent Ozbolt arranged to meet with Simpson in jail. In his April statements, Simpson denied any involvement at all in the arson. He claimed, however, to know that Pumpkin Kelly and Leah met the day before the incident. He also claimed that Kelly had called Simpson to request a ride around the time of the fire and that, when he picked Kelly up, Kelly was excited and smelled like gasoline. The officers did not administer Miranda warnings at the outset of either interview. Simpson later moved to suppress both April statements due to the officers' failure to give Miranda warnings. The state court overruled the motion on the basis that Simpson was not in custody under Miranda during the interrogations, so no warnings were required. At trial, the prosecutor introduced the two statements for the purpose of showing that Simpson had not been truthful with the police in April. The prosecutor sought to show that, because Simpson lied to the officers in April by denying involvement completely, he similarly lied in his June statements when he admitted to only limited involvement. In other words, the prosecutor asked the jury to credit Simpson's June statements up to the point that he implicated himself at all. However, the prosecutor urged the jury not to credit the June statements insofar as Simpson minimized his involvement in the arson, and pointed to the April statements as proof of why the jury should so conclude. The state appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling, and it further held that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless because the April statements were not inculpatory on their face. The state court held that, although Simpson was in prison at the time of the April statements, he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and, thus, no warnings were required. In so holding, the state court cited a string of cases from various circuits, primarily the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir.1978), [7] that have concluded that simply being incarcerated does not, by itself, constitute custody for Miranda purposes. Instead, the question under these cases is whether there has been a change in the surroundings of the prisoner which results in an added imposition on his freedom of movement. Id. at 428. The state court's reliance upon this line of circuit cases was contrary to factually indistinguishable Supreme Court case law, Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968). In Mathis, the Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of statements given without Miranda warnings in a case, like this one, in which the individual was in prison serving a sentence on an unrelated state crime. Id. at 2, 88 S.Ct. 1503. The government contended that the statements were admissible because the petitioner had not been put in jail by the officers questioning him, but was there for an entirely separate offense, id. at 4, 88 S.Ct. 1503, or, in other words, because the petitioner was not in Miranda custody during the interviews. The Supreme Court concluded that this argument was too minor and shadowy to justify a departure from the well-considered conclusions of Miranda with reference to warnings to be given to a person held in custody. Id. The Court went on to state that restricting Miranda protections to those that are in custody for the case under investigation would go against the whole purpose of the Miranda decision and that there was nothing in the Miranda opinion which calls for a curtailment of the warnings to be given persons under interrogation by officers based on the reason why the person is in custody. Id. at 4-5. And to punctuate the matter with clarity, the Court stated: In speaking of custody the language of the Miranda opinion is clear and unequivocal: To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Id. at 5, 88 S.Ct. 1503 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602). Indeed, in dissent, Justice White objected to the majority's cavalier extension of the definition of Miranda custody. Id. at 7, 88 S.Ct. 1503 (White, J., dissenting). There is no relevant factual distinction between Mathis and the circumstances of Simpson's April statements. Quite tellingly, the state court never cited Mathis. Here, as in Mathis, state agents unaffiliated with the prison isolated an inmate and questioned him about an unrelated incident without first giving Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court ruled that such action was improper and that any resulting statements must be suppressed. [8] As there is no material factual distinction, the April statements were admitted contrary to Supreme Court precedent.