Opinion ID: 440199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admission of evidence of second murder

Text: 54 At Smith's trial, the judge allowed Wesley Johnson to testify concerning the facts of a second murder for which Smith was not on trial. (The circumstances and content of this testimony are set forth in the portion of the Florida Supreme Court's opinion quoted in the introductory portion of this opinion.) The Florida court apparently admitted this testimony on the theory that it constituted part of the res gestae. See Smith v. State, 365 So.2d 704, 706 n. 2 (Fla.1978). Smith contends that the evidence was irrelevant, inflammatory, prejudicial, and inadmissible as a matter of constitutional law. 55 In reviewing the disposition of this claim by the district court, we note that [i]n order for an evidentiary ruling to be cognizable in habeas corpus, it must deprive the state court defendant of fundamental fairness. Jameson v. Wainwright, 719 F.2d 1125, 1126 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2355, 80 L.Ed.2d 827 (1984); see also Hills v. Henderson, 529 F.2d 397 (1976). A denial of fundamental fairness occurs when the evidence is material in the sense of a crucial, critical, highly significant factor. Id. at 1127. Under this test, the admission of the evidence did not violate the Constitution, although its admissibility under state law presents a close and difficult question. See 365 So.2d at 708 (three Justices dissenting).