Opinion ID: 853332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Discriminatory Juror Strikes

Text: There were no African-Americans on Dickens' jury. During jury selection, the State used two peremptory strikes against African-Americans. Another African-American was dismissed for cause at the defense's request. A fourth African-American served as the first alternate juror. Dickens challenges the State's two peremptory strikes as being racially motivated. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Peremptory strikes are improper when used to exclude potential jurors from serving solely because of race. Williams v. State, 700 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ind.1998). Such claims are analyzed like this: To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges, a defendant must first show the trial court: (1) that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove members of a cognizable racial group from the jury pool; and (2) that the facts and circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used those strikes to exclude potential jury members from the jury because of their race. Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the State to tender a race-neutral explanation. Id. (citations omitted). During jury selection, Dickens first challenged the prosecutor's peremptory strike of Ms. Dixon. The prosecutor disagreed that he needed to state racially-neutral reasons for the strike before Dickens established a prima facie case. Nonetheless, he explained that he was concerned about Dixon's ability to follow the law concerning the death penalty [7] and her ability to understand technical evidence. [8] The second challenged strike was of Mr. Warburton-Brown. The prosecutor explained that Warburton-Brown knew a police officer who was a witness; that his license had been suspended because of a false driver's application; that he had a record of charges for unlawful use of a weapon and deceptive practices; and that he did volunteer work by giving legal, economic, and social advice to youth. [9] The prosecutor also stated a vague concern regarding Warburton-Brown's involvement with international studies and Amnesty International's position against the death penalty. The prosecutor later also said the State was concerned that Warburton-Brown had expressed that he felt the judicial system was unfair towards economically disadvantaged individuals. Dickens challenges the validity of these reasons at some length. (Appellant's Br. at 26-31.) [10] Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 786 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995)). The trial court found the reasons to be sufficiently race neutral. We will uphold the trial court's decision on the matter of discriminatory intent unless the decision is clearly erroneous. Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 786 (citing Kent v. State, 675 N.E.2d 332, 340 (Ind.1996); Lee v. State, 689 N.E.2d 435, 441 (Ind. 1997)). We find no clear error.