Opinion ID: 811067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Multiplication Order.

Text: The district court submitted the case to the jury by means of a special verdict form, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a), and the jury accompanied its finding of retaliation with a special finding that HEI knew or had reason to know that its retaliatory actions -26- violated state law. Based on this special finding, the court doubled the damages award. See Trainor I, 2011 WL 1670234. HEI assigns error to this ruling. Massachusetts law provides for double damages in an age discrimination case (including a retaliation case) if the act or practice complained of was committed with knowledge, or [the defendant had] reason to know, that such act or practice violated [Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4]. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9. The special finding upon which the district court relied was tailored to this standard. The primary thrust of HEI's assignment of error is that this special finding is inconsistent with another special finding memorializing the jury's conclusion that HEI had not willfully violated federal law. HEI contends that the standards underlying the two questions — knowingly violating Massachusetts law and willfully violating federal law — are effectively the same and that, therefore, the special findings are inconsistent. HEI first raised this contention in a post-trial motion, and the district court rebuffed it on the ground that no inconsistency existed. Trainor II, 2012 WL 119597, at . We need not linger long over HEI's ipse dixit. HEI waived its right to challenge the alleged inconsistency because it failed to mount a timely objection. When the jury returned with an affirmative answer to the question about knowing violation of state -27- law and a negative answer to the question about willful violation of federal law, HEI had both an opportunity and an obligation to point out any inconsistency. Yet, HEI did nothing; its counsel sat silent and did not call the district court's attention to the matter. The first time that HEI saw fit to mention any alleged inconsistency was when it filed its post-trial motions (well after the court had awarded double damages and dismissed the jury). Courts, like the Deity, tend to help those who take steps to help themselves. So it is here: with respect to special verdicts, [t]he law is perfectly clear that [parties] . . . waive[] any claim of internal inconsistency by failing to object after the verdict [is] read and before the jury [is] discharged. Peckham v. Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 830, 836 (1st Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have described this rule as iron-clad. Wennik v. Polygram Grp. Distrib., Inc., 304 F.3d 123, 130 (1st Cir. 2002). The resultant waiver forecloses HEI from challenging the court's multiplication of damages based on any purported inconsistency between the two special findings. In an effort to escape from the consequences of its waiver, HEI suggests that because the verdict in this case was returned pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a), it had no duty to call the inconsistency to the district court's attention -28- prior to the jury's discharge.4 This suggestion flies in the teeth of settled precedent in this circuit. See, e.g., Andrade v. Jamestown Hous. Auth., 82 F.3d 1179, 1189 (1st Cir. 1996); Peckham, 895 F.2d at 836 (holding that party waived its right to object to inconsistency in context of Rule 49(a) special verdict).5 4 Rule 49(a)(1) provides that: The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding on each issue of fact. The court may do so by: (A) submitting written questions susceptible of a categorical or other brief answer; (B) submitting written forms of the special findings that might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or (C) using any other method that the court considers appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a). 5 We recognize that this Rule 49(a) waiver issue has split the circuits. See 9 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 49.11[6] (2012) (collecting cases). In creating this split, some courts have held that no waiver arises despite the failure to object to a putative inconsistency before the jury leaves the box. See, e.g., Pierce v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 823 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987); Ladnier v. Murray, 769 F.2d 195, 198 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1985). But we are firmly bound by past panel holdings in this circuit, United States v. Clark, 685 F.3d 72, 79 (1st Cir. 2012), and therefore must adhere to our own precedent. This body of precedent inarguably requires that parties object to verdict inconsistencies prior to the jury's discharge on penalty of waiver. See, e.g., Jamestown Hous. Auth., 82 F.3d at 1189; Coastal Fuels of P.R. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 201-02 (1st Cir. 1996); Peckham, 895 F.2d at 836. -29- HEI also argues that it cannot be charged with a waiver because, when the jury returned its verdict, the district court never inquired as to whether any party wished to comment. This argument is untenable. It is the obligation of a litigant to bring a question of verdict inconsistency to the court's attention, not the other way around. See, e.g., Austin v. Lincoln Equip. Assocs., Inc., 888 F.2d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1989). As we have said in a different context, [t]he law ministers to the vigilant not to those who sleep upon perceptible rights. Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1203 (1st Cir. 1987). That ends this aspect of the matter. Given HEI's waiver, it is not necessary for us to pursue the merits of HEI's inconsistency argument.6