Opinion ID: 1377787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: penalty-phase error

Text: Defendant challenges the penalty-phase proceedings that led to the imposition of the judgment of death on several grounds. We conclude that although the jury erroneously considered the three murders as six special circumstances, and counsel inexcusably pursued the insanity plea, thereby again putting before the jury defendant's threat to kill again if released from prison, neither requires reversal of the judgment of death. We also conclude that none of defendant's other arguments has merit. The jury was instructed under standard penalty-phase instructions, [35] that it should consider any special circumstances it had found true as factors relevant to the appropriate penalty. The jury found the six charged multiple-murder special circumstances true. (33) Presumably, these special circumstances were considered as factors relevant to the penalty determination. No purpose of the state is served in the consideration of more than one multiple-murder special circumstance inasmuch as the culpability factor which this special circumstance finding reflects is that the defendant has committed more than one murder. This factor is present regardless of the number of murders in excess of the one of which the defendant is convicted. Although the jury may properly consider that number as an aggravating factor, when multiple murder is identified as a special circumstance the potential impact may be greater. First, as a special circumstance, multiple murder is singled out as a factor which the state identifies as having particular relevance to the penalty decision. In addition, and of potentially greater significance, the multiple-murder special-circumstance findings could have an unwarranted impact on the jury's selection of the appropriate penalty if the jury is influenced by the sheer number of special circumstances which in some cases increase in geometric proportion to the number of victims. Thus, consideration of more than one multiple-murder special circumstance serves neither the legislative purpose of identifying those murderers whose crimes make them eligible for the death penalty, nor the overriding constitutionally mandated purpose of channelling or focusing the discretion of the jury so as to avoid arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. (See Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 53 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 42, 104 S.Ct. 871]; California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992, 999 [77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1179, 103 S.Ct. 3446].) Therefore, failure to instruct the jury at the penalty phase to consider only one multiple-murder special circumstance was also error. We see no possibility that this error affected the verdict. ( People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1281.) The impact, if any, of the error was inconsequential and cannot reasonably be characterized as a constitutional defect in the sentencing process. ( Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 888-889 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 257, 103 S.Ct. 2733]; see also Barclay v. Florida (1983) 463 U.S. 939, 957 [77 L.Ed.2d 1134, 1148-1149, 103 S.Ct. 3418].) The error here resulted from the instruction to the jury that it should consider each of the special circumstances it had found true as an aggravating factor. Because the jury had found six multiple-murder special-circumstance allegations true, when there should have been only a single special circumstance, the instruction could, theoretically, have led the jury to base its assessment of defendant's culpability on the sheer number of special circumstances rather than on the underlying conduct. After consideration of the entire record in this case, we conclude that the possibility that the jury may have based its penalty decision, even in part, on the sheer number of special circumstances it had found true, rather than on defendant's conduct, is far too remote and speculative to suggest that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it considered the murders as a single special circumstance. Review of the record here reveals no reference by the prosecutor to the multiple-murder special circumstances during his penalty-phase argument. The jurors were well aware of the actual number of victims and their consideration of multiple murder as an aggravating factor which the state identifies as being particularly relevant to the penalty decision was permissible. Only were we to assume that the jury for some reason believed that the murders were more heinous because they generated six multiple-murder special-circumstance allegations through the cross-charging would the failure to limit the multiple-murder factor to a single special circumstance result in prejudice. Nothing in the manner in which this case was tried, or in the penalty phase argument and instructions, affords a basis on which to speculate that the jury may have been influenced by the number of multiple-murder special circumstances. We conclude, as we did in People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1281-1283, that the error was harmless. We must also consider whether this error in combination with the impact of defense counsel's conduct of the sanity and penalty phases of the trial affected the penalty decision. (34) Counsel presented no evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase of the trial. [36] At the trial on defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, which immediately preceded the penalty trial, however, counsel introduced the evaluation of one appointed psychiatrist even though both experts had concluded that defendant was sane. His decision to do so rather than withdraw the plea put before the jury evidence of a potentially prejudicial nature. The only explanation for this decision offered by counsel was that he wanted to preserve for appeal his claim of error in the denial of a separate jury to hear the sanity phase testimony, and that he decided to let the jurors make what they would of the opinion. In the circumstances of this case, this decision was not one that competent counsel would make for tactical reasons. There is no present authority for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to a separate jury at the sanity-phase of a trial. Even accepting that an attorney might make a motion for a separate jury in order to lay a foundation for an appellate argument seeking to have such a right recognized, in this case there was no evidence that defendant was insane. Counsel's explanation that he wanted to preserve the claim of error for appeal, and therefore proceeded with the sanity phase rather than withdrawing the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, ignores the impact this lack of evidence would have on whether an appellate court would consider the merits of the separate jury argument. Nor is this explanation adequate to justify the decision to read the psychiatrist's report into the record, rather than calling the expert as a witness if counsel believed it possible that the expert would offer any evidence on which a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity might be returned. [37] In electing to read the report to the jury, counsel placed before the jury evidence that counsel should have recognized could be prejudicial to his client at the penalty phase. Not only was the jury reminded of the expert's guilt-phase testimony that defendant had stated that he was very prejudiced against Mexicans, but at the sanity phase defendant's scorn for rehabilitation and prediction that he would kill again if released were made known to the jury. [38] No limitations were placed on the purposes for which the jury was permitted to consider the evidence presented at the sanity phase of the trial. At the penalty phase the jury was instructed that they should consider all of the evidence presented at the earlier phases in making their penalty decision. Defendant's counsel was aware that this evidence would be considered by the jury, and the evidence was certainly not overlooked by the prosecutor in his closing argument. Referring to another part of the psychiatrist's report he reminded the jurors that they had heard defendant talk about his prior violent conduct when he talked to the psychiatrist. That is he told him that he had almost previously killed the people in a robbery. [¶] He told them that he had previously cut up a junkie. And in his closing argument, advising the jury that it must choose between life without possibility of parole and death, the prosecutor reminded the jury that the psychiatrist believed defendant had no conscience, and that he had told the doctor that [i]f I'm out in 20 years, I'd do it all over again. Counsel read this report to the jury shortly before noon on April 10, 1979. The penalty trial was conducted the following morning. At 2:33 p.m. on April 11, 1979, the jury returned its verdicts of death. Counsel's tactical decision, leading to the introduction of highly prejudicial evidence at the sanity phase, evidence which was considered by the jury in determining the penalty, was not within the range of acceptable performance by attorneys representing criminal defendants. (35) Nonetheless, as we have noted earlier, even an inexcusable omission or lapse by counsel does not warrant reversal on grounds that a defendant received constitutionally inadequate representation unless the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's conduct. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 690 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 695]; People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 60 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423].) Strickland was a capital case. In that decision the United States Supreme Court, for the first time, considered the meaning of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel in cases in which actual ineffectiveness was claimed. The court reasoned that because the purpose of the requirement is to ensure a fair trial, [t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. (466 U.S. at p. 686 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 692-693].) The same standard applies to the penalty phase of a capital case since a sentencing proceeding is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision ... that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial  to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the standards governing decision. ( Id. at pp. 686-687 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 693].) Reversal of a conviction is not required, therefore, unless the defendant first demonstrates that counsel's performance was actually deficient, and then demonstrates that his defense was prejudiced. This requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. ( Id. at p. 687 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 693].) An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. ( Id. at p. 691 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 696].) We have concluded above, and the People do not dispute, that in some respects counsel's performance in his defense of appellant fell below the standard to be expected of competent, experienced criminal defense counsel. Only the second question need be addressed here. Did counsel's failures deny appellant a fair penalty trial, or stated otherwise, can it be said that the verdicts of death in this case are the result of a breakdown of the adversarial process at the penalty phase which renders these verdicts unreliable? When a defendant challenges a death sentence ... the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer  including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence  would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 695 [80 L.Ed.2d at 674, 698].) [A] court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors. ( Id. at p. 696 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 698].) Applying the standards and the techniques suggested by the United States Supreme Court for making the prejudice analysis to the facts of this case, we conclude that defendant has not carried this burden. Given the overwhelming number of aggravating factors, and the quality of the representation that counsel did offer at the penalty trial, that trial was not fundamentally unfair. There was no breakdown in the adversarial process, and it is not reasonably likely that the result would have been different but for counsel's failings.