Opinion ID: 777353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Relevance and Burdensomeness

Text: 51 UAL next argues that the subpoena as written requests information that is not relevant to determining whether UAL could have contributed to the French social security system on behalf of Ms. Droge. Alternatively, even if the information were relevant, UAL submits that complying with the subpoena would place an undue burden on UAL. The EEOC, on the other hand, believes that it only has to establish that the information requested is minimally relevant. It further claims that, because the information sought meets this requirement, it is entitled to have the subpoena enforced absent evidence that compliance would disrupt UAL's normal business operations. We do not believe that either of these views accurately reflects the relationship between relevance and burdensomeness in the context of agency subpoenas.
52 The EEOC's investigative authority is not plenary; the EEOC is entitled to access only to evidence relevant to the charge under investigation. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 64, 104 S.Ct. 1621 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As discussed previously, see supra page 650, one aspect of this statutory requirement is a valid charge to form the basis of the EEOC's investigation. The charge requirement evidences Congress' desire to prevent the Commission from exercising unconstrained investigative authority. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 65, 104 S.Ct. 1621. 53 Furthermore, the Commission is entitled to access only to evidence `relevant' to the charge under investigation. Id. at 68, 104 S.Ct. 1621 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8) (emphasis added). The EEOC's burden is not particularly onerous. See id. at 68, 104 S.Ct. 1621; see also EEOC v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 271 F.3d 209, 211 (5th Cir.2001) (stating that the district court will enforce a subpoena when the EEOC carries its burden of demonstrating that the information requested is relevant to the charge filed against the employer). Courts traditionally have allowed the EEOC access to information that might cast light on the allegations against the employer. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 68-69, 104 S.Ct. 1621. 5 54 A closer look at some of the cases supporting the Court's rationale in Shell Oil sheds significant light on the meaning of relevance in the subpoena context. For example, in Shell Oil the Court referenced its decision in United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 104 S.Ct. 1495, 79 L.Ed.2d 826 (1984), in which it had adopted an expansive definition of `relevance' in the analogous context of an IRS subpoena, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602, of workpapers pertaining to an investigation of the correctness of a tax return. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 69 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 1621. In Arthur Young, the Supreme Court distinguished the relevance standard employed in the subpoena context from the relevance standard employed in deciding whether to admit evidence in federal court. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 814, 104 S.Ct. 1495. The Court remarked that the courts of appeals had accepted widely the broader concept of relevance in the formulation that subpoenaed documents might throw light upon the correctness of the return. Id. n. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). It further noted that the Second Circuit, in elaborating upon this standard, had required that the might in the articulated standard be indicative of `a realistic expectation rather than an idle hope that something may be discovered.' Id. (quoting United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (1968)). 55 In further refining the concept of relevance in Shell Oil, the Supreme Court also approved the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir.1969). In that case, the Sixth Circuit stated that racial discrimination is by definition class discrimination and held that, in determining whether an employer practiced racial discrimination, the existence of discrimination in job classifications or hiring situations other than those of the complainants may well justify an inference that the practices complained of here were motivated by racial factors. Blue Bell Boots, 418 F.2d at 358; see also EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc., 750 F.2d 40, 43 (6th Cir.1984) (citing Blue Bell Boots for the proposition that evidence concerning employment practices other than those specifically charged by complainants may be sought by an EEOC administrative subpoena). As another example of the permissible scope of a subpoena, the Court in Shell Oil cited Local No. 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 243 (9th Cir.1971), for the proposition that information from conduct prior to the effective date of the legislation can also be relevant to establish the purpose and effect of current policies. See Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 69 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 1621. 56 However, the Supreme Court also has cautioned that the charge and relevance requirements should not be interpreted so broadly as to render the statutory language a nullity. Id. at 69, 104 S.Ct. 1621. The requirement of relevance, like the charge requirement itself, is designed to cabin the EEOC's authority and prevent fishing expedition[s]. K-Mart Corp., 694 F.2d at 1066. Indeed, as we have noted previously, although the legitimate scope of the subpoena power includes information that might throw light upon the inquiry raised by the complaint, the might is an indication of a realistic expectation rather than an idle hope that something may be discovered. Harrington, 388 F.2d at 524. Absent a finding that the material sought is relevant, a court may not enforce an EEOC subpoena. See S. Farm Bureau Ins., 271 F.3d at 211; EEOC v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 26 F.3d 44, 47 (6th Cir.1994).
57 In determining whether a subpoena ought to be enforced, modified or quashed, the district court also must consider the burdensomeness of compliance. [T]he presumption is that compliance should be enforced to further the agency's legitimate inquiry into matters of public interest. FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 38 (7th Cir.1980). Consequently, a court may modify or exclude portions of a subpoena only if the employer carries the difficult burden of showing that the demands are unduly burdensome or unreasonably broad. Id. Often we have phrased this difficult burden as requiring a showing that compliance would threaten the normal operation of a respondent's business. EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 313 (7th Cir.1981). However, as Shaffner emphasizes, that scenario is more illustrative than categorical. What is unduly burdensome depends on the particular facts of each case and no hard and fast rule can be applied to resolve the question. Shaffner, 626 F.2d at 38. Conclusory allegations of burdensomeness are insufficient. Id. 58 We often have considered the cost of compliance when evaluating burdensomeness. If the personnel or financial burden on the employer is great compared to the resources the employer has at its disposal, the district court should attempt to alleviate this burden. See, e.g., Quad/Graphics, 63 F.3d at 649 (rejecting burdensomeness argument in part because EEOC's offer of random sampling would reduce by ninety percent the time involved in complying with the subpoena). Essentially, it is the court's task... to weigh the likely relevance of the requested material to the investigation against the burden to [the respondent] of producing the material. Ford Motor Credit, 26 F.3d at 47.
59 When considerations of relevance and undue burden are applied to the present case, we do not believe that the subpoena, as issued, can be enforced. 6 In assessing the relevance of the information requested by the subpoena, we examine first the nature of the charge. In her charge of discrimination, Ms. Droge alleges that she has suffered discrimination on the basis of her national origin and sex because of UAL's failure to make contributions to the French social security system on her behalf. The information sought, however, goes far beyond an inquiry into whether and for whom UAL makes French social security payments. It is not limited to individuals who may be considered similarly situated to Ms. Droge either by position (flight attendant) or by location (France); the subpoena requires extensive information with respect to all United employees residing abroad. As the Fifth Circuit wrote in EEOC v. Packard Electric Division, General Motors Corporation, 569 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir.1978), [i]n the context of an investigation of an individual complaint, it might well be most natural to focus on that employing unit or work unit from which came the decision of which the individual complainant complains; within such a unit the EEOC might well need a wide spectrum of statistical data in order to illuminate the general policies bearing on the complainant's situation. 60 In spite of this caution, the EEOC maintains that all the requested information will tend to cast light on Ms. Droge's allegations. See Appellee's Br. at 24. Although the relevance requirement is not onerous, we believe that accepting the EEOC's interpretation of relevance in this case would render that requirement a nullity. In the face of UAL's demonstration of the breadth of the subpoena in relation to the charge, the EEOC has made a feeble, and unconvincing, effort to explain how a wholesale review of each and every benefit provided to all UAL's French employees will shed light on the propriety of UAL's failure to pay into the French social security system. See R.2, Att. 2 ¶ 1. The district court and this court are left without any realistic explanation of the possible relevance of how providing the EEOC with information on each United Airlines employee residing abroad who has taken ... a medical leave of absence, id. ¶ 10, might assist it in resolving Ms. Droge's charge. Cf. Packard Elec., 569 F.2d at 318 (acknowledging that statistical information may be used to establish that the treatment of a particular employee follows a general pattern of employer discrimination, but stating that it does not help us in determining precisely what statistical and comparative data are to be deemed `relevant'; the court must look to the particular purpose of the investigation in question). 61 The EEOC argues alternatively that it must have access to employment information concerning a broad range of employees to be able to determine whether United's policies have a disparate impact on men and women and whether United's policies discriminate based on national origin. Appellee's Br. at 26. However, the policy at issue in the charge is UAL's failure to pay into the French social security system. Nothing in the charge suggests systemic discrimination on the basis of national origin or sex with respect to life, health, disability and leave benefits. 7 Allowing the EEOC to conduct such a broad investigation would require us to disregard the Congressional requirement that the investigation be based on the charge. 62 Even if we were to find that all the information required by the subpoena was relevant to the charge in some tangential way, we would have to conclude that the voluminous request of the EEOC is overly burdensome. The financial and administrative demand placed on UAL is significant and, in light of the tangential need for the information, an undue burden on UAL. 63 The EEOC has the right, of course, to investigate the charge now before it. On remand, the district court must undertake, consistent with our opinion today, the fact-bound inquiries necessary to determine the relevance of each of the requests that pertains to the charge currently before the EEOC. However, before undertaking this task, we believe it is incumbent on the district court first to resolve whether there is any possibility that Ms. Droge might prevail on her complaint. We note that counsel for the EEOC conceded at oral argument that UAL is correct in its submission that a treaty between the United States and France precludes UAL's making the contributions to the French social security system that Ms. Droge claims have been denied her. If the existence of that treaty obligation resolves the matter, we see no reason for the district court to undertake any additional scrutiny of the subpoena because the EEOC would have no ground upon which to justify its issuance. The EEOC cannot justify further investigating a charge for which it has conceded there is a valid affirmative defense.