Opinion ID: 807913
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: “Reasonable Detail”

Text: An order granting a preliminary injunction or re- straining order must “describe in reasonable detail — and not by referring to the complaint or other document — the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(C). DFS argues that the TRO violated this provision by improperly describing the enjoined acts “by reference to a definition of the capitalized term ‘Licensed [Trademarks]’ as it appeared in the [HarleyDavidson]/Elmec Agreement,” which was under seal at the time.5 But the injunction must also be broad enough to be effective. The appropriate scope of the injunction 5 DFS’s brief refers to the phrase “Licensed Products” instead of “Licensed Trademarks.” Because the court’s TRO did not use or define the phrase “Licensed Products,” we presume that DFS meant “Licensed Trademarks,” which is defined by the district court in the TRO. For our purposes the particular term is not important. 32 Nos. 11-3618, 11-3838 and 12-1280 is best left to the district court’s sound discretion, because the district court is in the best position to weigh these interests. See Russian Media Group, LLC v. Cable America, Inc., 598 F.3d 302, 307 (7th Cir. 2010) (injunction that potentially enjoined legal conduct upheld; defendant had demonstrated proclivity for unlawful conduct and for violating court’s orders, warranting a broadly-worded order) (collecting cases). Although the district court’s TRO did not explicitly define the term “Licensed Trademarks,” the term’s reference to HarleyDavidson trademarks is sufficiently plain from the document. DFS does not argue that it suffered from any confusion or uncertainty concerning the definition of “Licensed Trademarks” or any other aspect of the district court’s language. Nor has DFS asked the district court to modify or clarify the order. See, e.g., Russian Media Group, 598 F.3d at 308 (inviting defendants to seek modification of injunction from district court if they desired to engage in legal conduct that would otherwise violate the order). Accordingly, we find that the district court’s TRO satisfied Rule 65(d)(1)(C)’s requirement that it “describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained,” and that the broad scope of the order was not an abuse of the district court’s discretion.