Opinion ID: 2994313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness Of Title VII Claim For Wage

Text: Discrimination Snider sought to prove her Title VII claim, in part, by relying on the higher salary of another male deputy assessor, Jerome Witek. Mr. Witek made $12.00/hour to Snider’s $11.07/hour. The District Court, however, held that Snider’s Title VII claim based on Witek’s wages was time-barred. Section 2000e-5(e) of Title VII provides that a charge of discrimination must be filed within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment prac- tice occurred. 42 U.S.C. sec.2000e-5(e). Failure to timely file the charge with the EEOC bars any subsequent civil rights suit in the courts. Terry v. Bridgeport Brass Company, 519 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1975). In this case, the District Court found that the 300 day time began to run on June 30, 1996, the day Mr. Witek left the employ of the Assessor’s office. Snider filed her charge with the EEOC on June 5, 1997, 340 days later. Snider, however, argues that her claim did not accrue when Witek’s employment ceased, but, rather, accrued anew each time she received her diminished paycheck. She characterizes her argument this way in an attempt to place herself within the continuing violation doctrine, an exception which allows a complainant to obtain relief for a time-barred act of discrimination by linking it with acts that fall within the statu- tory limitations period. See Filipovic v. K & R Express Systems, Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 395-97 (7th Cir. 1999); Koelsch v. Beltone Electronics Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 707-08 (7th Cir. 1995). Her attempt, however, ignores the precedent we established in Dasgupta v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 121 F.3d 1138 (7th Cir. 1997), that the continued receipt of lower paychecks does not revive past allegedly discriminatory conduct. Id. at 1139-40. We continue to believe that in situations such as this, where a plaintiff is complaining that she is paid less than similarly situated members of the opposite sex because of her gender, the claim of discrimination accrues when the male leaves his employment. This is because the male’s departure ends the allegedly discriminatory wage differential (assuming there are no other men being paid more than the plaintiff for a job requiring equal skill, effort and responsibili- ty). Our brethren in the Second and Sixth Cir- cuits join us in so holding. See Pollis v. New School for Social Research, 132 F.3d 115, 118-19 (2nd Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Penton Industrial Pub- lishing Co., 851 F.2d 835, 837-39 (6th Cir. 1988). As the Sixth Circuit said, to find other- wise, would redu[ce] the statutes of limitations in employment discrimination cases to a nullity. Penton, 851 F.2d at 839. Under this reasoning, Snider’s Title VII wage discrimination claim had to be filed within 300 days of Witek’s departure. It was not. It was filed more than forty days after the time limit and is therefore barred. The order of the Dis- trict Court finding that plaintiff’s Title VII claim was time-barred is affirmed.