Opinion ID: 1231473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the position of the dissenting opinion

Text: The gravamen of the dissent is that the enormous sentencing discretion which the Legislature left to the judiciary is, in sharp contrast to every other discretionary sphere of judicial activity, to be exercised at will in the trial court to the extent that appellate courts may do nothing more than assure themselves that the trial court has not exceeded the statutory maximum. Seven years ago in Coles, however, we unanimously rejected the very position now advocated in the dissenting opinion. Coles, supra, p 535. To adopt the position of the dissenting opinion  that the scope of sentence review should be so narrowly circumscribed that any sentence up to the statutory maximum must be upheld on appeal  would be to turn back the clock not just seven years to the pre- Coles era, but a full eighteen years to undercut the validity of our landmark decision in People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683; 199 NW2d 202 (1972), in which we held that the minimum term of incarceration in sentences imposed under the indeterminate sentence act could not be greater than two-thirds of the maximum term. In Coles, supra, p 547, this Court canvassed the ABA standards and the practices in other states, concluding: [O]ur research indicates that there are at most only ten states in this country which do not allow any form of appellate review of sentences. The remaining states, either by statute, court rule, or case law, allow some form of appellate review of sentences, although the scope of review varies widely from state to state. And since Coles, the national trend has pushed forward. Our sister states have continued to adopt a variety of measures to diminish the recognized evils of disparate sentencing. [30] Professor Nagel, in her comprehensive article on sentencing in the federal system, relates the following: With utmost candor, Judge Frankel pierced the veiled myth of prisons as rehabilitative, and unfettered judicial discretion as right minded, when he concluded from his experience that unlike medical diagnoses, with criminals it is impossible to determine when, if ever, the patient will be cured. Many echoed the systematic failure of coercive rehabilitation.... If there were any who clung to indeterminate sentencing for reasons other than its alleged tie to rehabilitation, now shown to be devoid of any empirical support, the outpouring of research on the other theme  disparity  paved the way for the emergent commitment to restructuring discretion. Justice Potter Stewart, writing as early as 1958, noted: It is an anomaly that a judicial system which has developed so scrupulous a concern for the protection of a criminal defendant throughout every other stage of the proceedings against him should have so neglected this most important dimension of fundamental justice. This dimension was equal justice under the law. [ Shepard v United States, 257 F2d 293, 294 (CA 6, 1958).] Disparity studies multiplied; consistently, the results revealed gross variations that could neither be explained by rational categorization of criminals, nor justified by referring to treatment goals....    On reflection, it appears that Congress chose to heed the calls of Judge Marvin Frankel and the cadre of other distinguished legal scholars joining him to combat head on the unacceptable consequences of unfettered discretion. [Nagel, pp 896-899.][ [31] ]
We do not share the dissent's belief that the effect of today's decision will be to drastically curtail the discretion and flexibility of our sentencing judges. We thus reject the dissent's suggestions that the result of our opinion is to circumscribe a trial court's statutory authority to tailor minimum sentences to the particular offender and the particular offense ( post, p 670); that a trial judge may no longer apply personal experience, education, intuition, or judgment to draw inferences from evidence to determine the appropriate sentence for a given offender ( post, pp 671-672); that to hold a given penalty unlawful ... is simply to say there is no discretion ( post, p 687); and that our decision will irrationally compel a trial judge who hopes to impose a just sentence to treat the individual convicted of one hundred prior felonies the same as the defendant who committed two such felonies ( post, p 685). The unspoken assumption underlying these claims appears to be that appellate review of discretionary decisions is equivalent to the wholesale destruction of discretion itself. Discretion, however, is a matter of degree, not an all or nothing proposition. The dissent's assumption and the conclusions that follow from it are untenable. They are refuted by the fact that trial judges throughout this state are ably exercising their full discretionary responsibilities over a wide range of matters that come before them, knowing that they are subject to review on an abuse of discretion basis according to law, developed in cases such as this, which sets parameters and standards for the exercise of that discretion. It is unquestionably the trial court, and the trial court only, which is empowered to hand down a sentence. It is just as unquestionable that the trial court alone is empowered to conduct a trial, fashion equitable remedies, grant divorces, award alimony and child support, terminate parental rights, and fulfill all of the innumerable other judicial responsibilities that are vested in the trial bench. And, of course, it is the responsibility of the appellate courts, and the appellate courts only, to carry out their function, which is to review the performance of judicial functions in the trial court. If and when it is determined that a trial court has pursued the wrong legal standard or abused its judicial discretion according to standards articulated by the appellate courts, it falls to the trial court, on remand, to exercise the discretion according to the appropriate standards. Thus, while it is true that the trial courts will continue to impose sentences on pain of reversal ( post, pp 670, 692), the same can be said of every discretionary trial court decision. [32] We likewise disagree with the accusations that we seek to impose our philosophy on the trial judges ( post, pp 670-671), and that we are guilty of assuming our sentencing philosophy is somehow superior to the trial court's judgment ( post, p 684). We certainly do not for a moment suggest that our philosophy is superior to that of anyone. We do work on the assumption that it is the appellate courts, in reviewing thousands of cases, that must and do get a sense of that disparity and that ultimately must interpret the legislative will. And it is the guidelines, which reflect the sentencing practices of the trial bench, that can help the appellate courts assess disparity. We do not suggest that in the day-in-day-out review of sentencing issues appellate courts should simply substitute their judgment for that of the trial court. Indeed, such de novo review of sentences would be unprecedented in the realm of criminal appeals and at odds with any reasonable construction of the term abuse of discretion.
The dissenting opinion contains no authority for the policy view that, unlike all other areas of the law where judges are given discretion, sentencing discretion ought not to be reviewable. The dissent not only disregards Coles, but, in arguing that its position carries the blessing of the Legislature, fails to cite any statutory authority for the proposition that the result of that case  that sentencing decisions are subject to appellate review  has been overruled by statutory enactment. Indeed, the only provision which the dissent cites addresses not appellate review, but merely the authority to impose sentences, post, p 680, n 19, a task which, like innumerable other reviewable judicial duties, belongs in the province of the trial court. This unremarkable statutory provision does not support the conclusion that appellate review of sentencing decisions is foreclosed. Despite the accusation of the dissent, while an increase or decrease in the prison population may result from a decision of this Court, [33] it is not, nor should it be, a legitimate goal or purpose of an appellate court to consider such effects. It is our duty and purpose to find meaning in the discretionary range provided in the criminal code and to see to it that it is carried out.