Opinion ID: 1861263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sufficiency of evidence for verdict of murder in the first degree.

Text: Defendant contends that the evidence was, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt and cannot sustain a conviction of murder in the first degree. In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we are limited to ascertaining whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged. State v. Whelan, 291 Minn. 83, 85, 189 N.W.2d 170, 172 (1971); State v. Norgaard, 272 Minn. 48, 52, 136 N.W.2d 628, 631 (1965). We cannot retry the facts, but must take the view of the evidence most favorable to the state and must assume that the jury believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any contradictory evidence. State v. Darrow, 287 Minn. 230, 235, 177 N.W.2d 778, 781 (1970); State v. Ellingson, 283 Minn. 208, 211, 167 N.W.2d 55, 57 (1969); State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 36, 139 N.W.2d 490, 515, certiorari denied, 385 U.S. 817, 87 S.Ct. 39, 17 L.Ed.2d 56 (1966). If the jury, giving due regard to the presumption of innocence and to the state's burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have found the defendant guilty, that verdict will not be reversed. State v. Norgaard, supra, 272 Minn. at 52, 136 N.W.2d at 632. Minn.St. 609.185 defines murder in the first degree as  Caus[ing] the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of such person   . In the present case, defendant attempted to create reasonable doubt as to premeditation by arguing that he was intoxicated at the time of the crime. This court has stated that a defendant's state of intoxication at the time of a killing may properly be considered in determining whether he acted with premeditation, State v. Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Minn.1978), but in adopting that rule, it reaffirmed the rule that the fact that a defendant had been drinking alcoholic beverages prior to the killing does not raise a presumption that he was incapable of premeditation, id.; cf. State v. Lund, 277 Minn. 90, 92, 151 N.W.2d 769, 771 (1967) (The mere fact of a person's drinking does not create a presumption of intoxication, and the possibility of intoxication does not create the presumption that a person is rendered incapable of intending to do a certain act.). Whether the defendant's drinking did render him incapable of acting with premeditation is a question for the trier of fact. State v. Neumann, supra, 262 N.W.2d at 431. Here the defendant told police officers he had drunk 12 beers and three-quarters of a pint of brandy on the night of the killing. Two of the state's witnesses testified, however, that defendant did not appear to be intoxicated and did not act drunk. The owner of the tavern where defendant had been drinking also testified that he had served defendant only 5 or 6 beers. Although defense counsel attempted to attack the credibility of these witnesses, judging the credibility of witnesses is clearly a function of the jury, State v. Thompson, supra, 273 Minn. at 36, 139 N.W.2d at 515, and the jury here could reasonably have believed the testimony of these witnesses and rejected defendant's attempts to discredit them. The jury would thus have found that defendant's drinking did not render him incapable of acting with premeditation. The premeditation required for a finding of murder in the first degree has been statutorily defined to mean to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine to commit [the alleged act] prior to its commission. Minn.St. 609.18. Because, by definition, premeditation is a product of the mind and wholly subjective, its existence must be inferred from objective manifestations. State v. Gowdy, 262 Minn. 70, 74, 113 N.W.2d 578, 581 (1962). The jury need not be given direct proof of premeditation from other evidence. State v. Campbell, 281 Minn. 1, 12, 161 N.W.2d 47, 55 (1968). Defendant cites State v. Swain, 269 N.W.2d 707 (Minn.1978), in which this court reduced a conviction from first to second degree murder where a son murdered his mother but where there was nothing but circumstantial evidence and no direct evidence of premeditation at all. The Swain case differs from the case at bar because here the defendant admits first striking the decedent with a candy dish, then going into the kitchen to search for a knife, finding a knife, and then returning to the bedroom and stabbing the victim 17 times. Thus, the jury, by interpreting all the evidence favorably to the state, could reasonably have concluded that the defendant acted with premeditation in killing Mrs. Miesler. That he may not have been determined to kill her when he first returned to the house does not preclude the possibility that he determined to kill her during the course of the argument or after he had hit her with the candy dish. His actions in going into the kitchen, obtaining the knife, returning to the bedroom, and stabbing the victim numerous times reasonably imply that he had determined to kill Mrs. Miesler. Even if he only formed that determination when he found the knife, he acted with premeditation when he stabbed her. [11] Because the evidence, viewed in favor of the prosecution, could reasonably lead the jury to conclude that the defendant acted with premeditation, the jury's verdict will not be reversed for insufficiency of evidence. Affirmed.