Opinion ID: 1127164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: was the prescriptive period of the wrongful death action interrupted or suspended?

Text: Since the one year period applicable to wrongful death actions is prescriptive, the childrens' wrongful death action has prescribed unless it was interrupted. The circumstance relied upon for interruption is the continued existence of the survival action. Having concluded the actions are entirely separate and distinct rather than one cause of action, the issue thus posed is whether filing of suit on one cause of action interrupts prescription on an entirely separate and distinct cause of action. On October 8, 1979, we rendered Allstate Insurance Company v. Theriot, et al., 376 So.2d 950, Number 63,466, the benefit of which the Court of Appeal could not have had at the time it rendered the opinion presently under review. Allstate, above, requires discussion in view of the conclusions reached herein. In Allstate, above, an employer's insurer (Allstate) filed suit against a third party tort feasor (within a year of the accident) for tortious injury of an employee allegedly caused while the employee was returning from medical treatment for an earlier work-related injury. Allstate sought recovery on the ground that Theriot's negligence aggravated the employee's injury requiring Allstate to pay additional medical expense and compensation for the tort aggravation of the initial work-related injury. After the year expired, the employee intervened in Allstate's action, seeking damages for the same injury and same alleged negligence. The Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal of Allstate's suit, as stating no cause of action and also dismissed the intervention (which did state a cause of action), on the ground that the intervention fell with the dismissal of the principal demand. Allstate Insurance Company v. Theriot, 362 So.2d 1117 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1978). Allstate's request for certiorari was denied but certiorari was granted the employee to review dismissal of his intervention. The question in Allstate, above, was whether Allstate's timely petition interrupted prescription as to the employee's claim, notwithstanding Allstate's demand was held not to have stated a cause of action. Allstate, above, held that for purposes of prescription, La.R.S. 23:1101-03, pursuant to which plaintiff therein sued and the employee intervened, provides that either insurer or employee are expressly given a right of action against the tortfeasor, consequently only one principal demand is involved. Allstate went further and held that where a defendant knows or should know, prior to expiration of a prescriptive period, that legal demands are made on him from the occurrence described in the petition, prescription is interrupted, citing Nini v. Sanford Brothers, Inc., 276 So.2d 262 (La. 1973). Next Allstate recognized that where the subsequent claimant is a different person than the original plaintiff, to interrupt prescription, the first suit must not only be based on the same factual occurrence as the initial action, but must also be connected in close relationship and identity of interest with the original plaintiff. The rationale of the decision is that prescription is interrupted on the subsequently filed claim because the initial action affords defendant adequate and timely notice on behalf of the indicated interests that liability arising out of the factual occurrence pleaded is sought to be enforced against him. Assuming, arguendo, Allstate were applicable herein, it can be of no comfort to the children beneficiaries in this instance. As regards their wrongful death action, the beneficiaries must sue in their own right on a cause of action that accrued to them upon their mother's death, separate and distinct from their survival action. While they may be substituted as parties to the survival action, they must have instituted their wrongful death action within the one year period provided by L.C.C. Article 3536. Assuming prescription was interrupted by the filing of the initial action by the tort victim and the father of these beneficiaries, it was incumbent upon them to bring their wrongful death action within one year of the interruption which they did not do. We expressly hold that regardless of whether an action is brought for damages sustained by the tort victim, before or after the victim expires, the prescriptive period of bringing the wrongful death action is one year after date of the demise or within one year of interruption of the prescriptive period if an interruption is shown. We have expressly held that the survival and wrongful death actions are separate and distinct causes of action, entirely independent of each other. We also expressly hold that regardless of whether or not suit is instituted by a tort victim during his life, his named beneficiaries must bring their wrongful death action within one year of the victim's death pursuant to the provisions of La.C.C. Article 3536. This is so because they do not bring the wrongful death action as substituted parties, in which capacity they may bring the survival action to recover the victim's damages. They must bring their wrongful death action as original plaintiffs suing on a different cause of action which arose upon the victim's death. We have also held that the one year period involved is prescriptive, not peremptive. Assuming, arguendo, the principles of Allstate v. Theriot, above, are applicable herein, it would make no difference in the determination of this matter. Allstate v. Theriot, above, is factually distinguishable in one crucial aspect. In Allstate, prescription was found to have been interrupted and the intervention was filed within a year of the interruption. In this instance, assuming, prescription was interrupted by the suit filed on February 20, 1974, the present beneficiaries did not bring their action until March, 1978, long after the interrupted period had expired.