Opinion ID: 2634607
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ex parte Young 's Origins

Text: {16} In 1908, the United States Supreme Court held in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441 that the Eleventh Amendment generally does not preclude a suit brought against a state official in federal court for prospective equitable relief, even when the state is otherwise immune from suit. This doctrine, which the federal courts have applied for nearly a century, provides a powerful tool for ensuring state compliance with federal law, without undue encroachment on state sovereignty. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Dep't of Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 608 (10th Cir.1998). {17} Ex parte Young claims were originally conceived as an essential tool for ensuring that constitutional guarantees would be enforced. Alden emphasized the importance of this exception to preserving the balance between state autonomy and the enforcement of constitutional rights: In particular, the exception to our sovereign immunity doctrine recognized in Ex parte Young is based in part on the premise that sovereign immunity bars relief against States and their officers in both state and federal courts, and that certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers must therefore be permitted if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land. Alden, 527 U.S. at 747, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (citation omitted). {18} In 1997, the Supreme Court narrowed the Ex parte Young doctrine to exclude certain actions for prospective equitable relief against state officials that would impinge upon special sovereign interests. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 283, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (holding that the state had a unique sovereign interest in submerged land within its borders, and therefore state officials could not be sued even under Ex parte Young ). The previous year, in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74, 116 S.Ct. 1114, the Supreme Court also held that an Ex parte Young suit against state officers was impermissible because the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act contained its own comprehensive, and exclusive, enforcement mechanisms. {19} With these limited exceptions in mind, Ex parte Young retains its full vitality. Just last year, in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 535 U.S. 635, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002), the Supreme Court allowed an Ex parte Young action under the federal Telecommunications Act. Distinguishing the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Court noted that the Telecommunications Act does not contain a detailed and exclusive remedial scheme like the one in Seminole Tribe.  Verizon, 535 U.S. at 647, 122 S.Ct. 1753. The remedial scheme included in the ADEA, however, is comprehensive. See 29 U.S.C. § 626; Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir.1989). The ADEA requires that individuals seeking redress for age discrimination in the workplace must first file charges with the EEOC. Gill complied with these remedial procedures by first filing with the EEOC, and filing suit after receiving a Right to Sue notice from the EEOC. Therefore, any injunctive relief Gill might obtain would be consistent with the comprehensive remedial scheme contemplated in the ADEA. Also, as we shall discuss shortly, prospective relief in the case at bar would not impinge upon core sovereign interests, of the kind discussed in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 283, 117 S.Ct. 2028. The Ex parte Young Doctrine Endures as an Exception to State Sovereign Immunity {20} In Kimel, the Supreme Court did not expressly address the viability of injunctive relief to enforce the ADEA. But the Court subsequently spoke on the same subject, and clarified that the lack of a remedy for damages due to sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment did not invalidate the ADEA as applied to the states. In Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, state employees sued the university board of trustees under the ADA for failure to accommodate the disabled. Just as with the ADEA in Kimel, the Court found that the abrogation of sovereign immunity from suit under the ADA was not enacted pursuant to a valid exercise of the congressional power afforded in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court explicitly stated that despite the failure of the law to abrogate constitutional sovereign immunity, Ex parte Young still offers a viable route for relief against the state for injunctive relief to enforce the law. Congress is the final authority as to desirable public policy, but in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation. Those requirements are not met here, and to uphold the Act's application to the States would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cleburne [ v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)]. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374, 121 S.Ct. 955. In a footnote, the court then stated: Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young ... In addition, state laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other aspects of life provide independent avenues of redress. Id. at 374 n. 9, 121 S.Ct. 955 (emphasis added). {21} This passage clarifies what had been left open in Kimel : that Ex parte Young remains a viable action for injunctive relief when damages are not available because Congress has failed to abrogate States' immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also emphasizes that federal laws like the ADEA and ADA remain applicable to the states, even though states are not subject to suit for money damages under these laws. Thus, as we have previously stated, the Court of Appeals' conclusion in Gill's case that Congress lacked the power to make the ADEA applicable to the states is incorrect as a matter of constitutional law. See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 899, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004) (upholding Ex parte Young prospective relief against state officers to vindicate federal law even though state sovereign immunity would preclude retrospective relief for money damages). {22} The effect of Congress' failure to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the context of the ADEA was recently discussed in State Police for Automatic Retirement Association v. DiFava, 317 F.3d 6 (1st Cir.2003). In DiFava, a Massachusetts law substantially lowered the mandatory retirement age for certain police officers. Id. at 8. In an appeal from a preliminary injunction preventing the state from forcing police officers to retire, the court addressed whether the ADEA remains applicable to the states after Kimel, the very question our Court of Appeals answered in the negative in regard to Gill. DiFava, 317 F.3d at 8. The DiFava court expressly rejected the contention that Kimel rendered the ADEA inapplicable to states, and upheld an injunction under Ex parte Young for prospective relief under the ADEA. DiFava, 317 F.3d at 11-12. {23} DiFava also reinforced the understanding that the traditional exceptions to sovereign immunity continue in effect, even under federal legislation that fails to satisfy Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 317 F.3d at 12. The Eleventh Amendment... does not confer upon the states a total immunity against suit. Id. ; Alden, 527 U.S. at 755, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Therefore, legislation that does not satisfy Section 5 may nevertheless be enforceable against the states in other ways. In Cockrell this Court described several alternative forms of recourse available to plaintiffs despite the existence of constitutional sovereign immunity, including certain actions against state officers for injunctive or declaratory relief. 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 28, 132 N.M. 156, 45 P.3d 876 (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 757, 119 S.Ct. 2240). No heightened immunity is bestowed upon states by virtue of a finding that Congress cannot abrogate state immunity in a given statute. Instead, states maintain the same degree of immunity from suit by private individuals seeking money damages. This immunity is subject to certain exceptions and limitations, such as state consent to suit, or enforcement of the act through an action initiated by the United States, or an equitable action under Ex parte Young.