Opinion ID: 1945411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Affidavit

Text: After discovering the lumber in the partially completed cellar in Chelsea, Mr. Garside executed an affidavit which formed part of the basis for the issuance of the search warrant. It recited the quantities and dimensions of the lumber which he believed to have been stolen from him and it recited his telephone conversation with the unidentified person which led him to the Chelsea cellar. This affidavit was admitted into evidence by agreement and later, after arguments and charge and after the jury had retired to complete its deliberations (presumably with the affidavit), the defendant's counsel sought to limit the use of the affidavit by the jury to matters which would not include the substance of the phone call. The Justice denied the motion. As to this, the affidavit had recited: The person who called would not identify himself, but asked me if I was missing any lumber, I told him that I was and I asked him who he was, he would not tell me who he was but did tell me that he knew where my lumber was located. The caller informed me [here followed detailed directions to the defendant's site]. He told me that the lumber was located inside that cellar. . . . (Emphasis added.) The hearsay aspect of this telephone conversation was recognized by both counsel and Court early in Mr. Garside's direct testimony when, on being asked why he went to the Chelsea lot, he answered: Well, without relating conversation, the only reason I went there was because I had been previously  I had a phone call that told me where my lumber was. On the defendant's motion, the Justice ordered the jury to disregard what someone may have told him and to consider only that he went out there as a result of a phone call. It was apparent from the very beginning of trial that identification of the lumber found in Chelsea as that previously stolen in Augusta was critical to the State's charge against the defendant. During cross-examination of Mr. Garside by defendant's counsel, counsel sought to weaken the credibility of Mr. Garside's identification of the lumber as being the same lumber stolen from him. For obvious tactical reasons counsel had the affidavit marked as a defendant's exhibit and then questioned Mr. Garside concerning its recitation of quantities and dimensions. Later, for the same obvious purposes, he sought to establish that the telephone call  and not any actual recognition of the lumber  was the true basis of Mr. Garside's identification. Defendant's counsel asked: And your testimony, I think, was that the caller told you over the phone as to where your lumber was located, or something to that effect? And again, on re-cross of this witness, counsel for the defendant asked: Mr. Garside, isn't it fair to say that the reason that you concluded that the lumber you saw out there at the foundation was your lumber was because of what this person had told you . . . .? The witness responded: I would think that perhaps part of the reason I thought it was mine was that I had a tip on it . . . . At the conclusion of the State's case the State again offered the exhibit and defendant's counsel said that the defendant joined in the request that it be admitted. It was admitted. After the jury had retired to commence deliberations, the defendant moved that the Justice limit the jury's use of the affidavit to whatever bearing it had on the amount of lumber originally reported missing, to show an inconsistent statement bearing on identification. The Justice pointed out that the affidavit had been admitted, by agreement, without any restriction as to its use, and he denied the defendant's request. The issue is whether this denial was an abuse of judicial discretion. We hold that it was not. The affidavit had been admitted by agreement without any limitation on its use by the jury and presumably counsel's arguments had been structured with its significance in mind. It lay within the discretion of the Justice to balance the equities and decide whether there existed a possible prejudice to the defendant so great as to require a departure from the usual and orderly procedure of placing limitation upon the use of an exhibit at the time the exhibit is admitted. Defendant's counsel expressed concern that the affidavit's recital that the anonymous informer had told Mr. Garside where his lumber was might be taken by the jury to have probative value as to the identity of the lumber. It is true, of course, that the presiding Justice could have instructed the jury that the affidavit's recitation that the anonymous caller had referred to the lumber as being Mr. Garside's lumber should not be given weight bearing on the question of whether it was in fact Mr. Garside's lumber. However, the defense had already chosen twice, for strategic reasons, to bring out from Mr. Garside in cross-examination that the caller had spoken of it as Mr. Garside's lumber, accepting whatever advantages this disclosure had brought the defense. Furthermore, there was additional evidence, to be discussed later, which must have carried great probative value, to the effect that at least some of this lumber certainly was Mr. Garside's. With all this in mind, we are satisfied that there was no abuse of discretion.