Opinion ID: 1992848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of limiting instruction concerning defendant's arrest for use of Marsh's credit cards

Text: At both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, a videotape and testimonial evidence of defendant's arrest for the attempted purchase, four days after the Marsh murder, of $3000 worth of computer equipment with Marsh's Sears credit card was presented to the jury. There was no objection to the introduction of the evidence at the guilt phase of the trial. At the penalty phase, the defense counsel objected, seeking to preclude the introduction of the videotape. Defendant now contends that the introduction of this evidence at the guilt phase without a limiting instruction and its introduction at the penalty phase with an inadequate legal instruction constituted plain error.
N.J.R.E. 404(b) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute. In Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 302, 558 A. 2d 833, we recognized the widespread agreement that other-crime evidence has a unique tendency to turn a jury against the defendant. We therefore required a limiting instruction ... to explain precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence, informing the jury that it could not infer from that evidence that a defendant acted in accordance with his bad character. Id. at 304, 558 A. 2d 833. But see Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 241, 619 A. 2d 1208 (holding that the Rule does not apply to uncharged acts of misconduct that are components of the crime that is the subject of the trial). As defendant concedes, evidence of the credit card use was relevant and admissible in the guilt phase. It proved defendant's motive (greed) and identity (because he could not have known about the victim's employment with Exxon unless he had been at the murder scene). However, defendant contends that the trial court should have sua sponte issued a limiting instruction pursuant to Stevens, supra, warning the jury not to infer guilt of murder from his attempted credit-card use. Defendant claims that the court's failure to issue an instruction constituted plain error. We need not consider whether, like the evidence in Martini I, supra, the evidence here was res gestae and part of the same crime, because [i]t seems unlikely to us that a juror would have been so affected by the sight of defendant engaging in the act of credit card fraud that she or he would have been moved to convict defendant of the violent crime of murder. Loftin, supra, 287 N.J. Super. at 97, 670 A. 2d 557 (affirming Loftin's conviction of the Atlantic County murder); see also DiFrisco II, supra, 137 N.J. at 497, 645 A. 2d 734 (finding introduction of evidence about prior car theft to be harmless. Considering that the defendant had confessed to the execution-style killing of [the victim], the fact that he stole a car, committed a few traffic violations and yelled at his mother had very little tendency to divert the jurors' attention from their duties.) Because the other crime evidence (credit card fraud) was nonviolent and not at all similar to the murder of Marsh, the fact that a limiting instruction was not given does not require a reversal of defendant's murder conviction.
At the penalty phase the other crime evidence was introduced again. The defense counsel insisted that no limiting instruction be provided because of a concern that any instruction would serve to highlight defendant's other crimes. Despite defense counsel's objection, the trial court instructed the penalty-phase jury: Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, I would just like to at this time give you a limiting instruction. You've heard the testimony from this witness that subsequent to the events at Sears, that the defendant was arrested in connection with the credit card fraud and theft. To the extent that the testimony was disclosed to you, those additional charges are not  that the testimony was not elicited for the purpose of establishing the three aggravating factors which the State seeks to establish with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The only aggravating factors that the State is seeking to prove are those which have been specifically set forth to you by the State in its opening, and you're not to consider these arrests on these additional charges as evidence in support of the aggravating factors. The trial court reiterated those instructions in its final charge to the jury. Defendant does not challenge the admission into evidence of those crimes, recognizing that the evidence was relevant to aggravating factor c(4)(g) (murder was committed in the course of a robbery). However, defense counsel contends that despite its insistence that no limiting instruction be given, the instruction provided at the penalty phase concerning those crimes was insufficient under Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. 289, 558 A. 2d 833. In Stevens, supra, we observed that trial courts should take pains to instruct juries carefully and comprehensively, with ample reference to the specific evidence and issues in a case, on the limited relevance of other-crimes evidence. 115 N.J. at 309, 558 A. 2d 833. Similarly, in Rose, supra, we noted that a penalty phase jury is not permitted, in its weighing process, to add other evidence of defendant's past conduct to the weight it assigns to the aggravating factors, nor to consider other evidence of defendant's past conduct, except to the extent offered to rebut mitigating factors, as detracting from the weight it assigns to the mitigating factors. 112 N.J. at 507-08, 548 A. 2d 1058. In this case, the limiting instruction was sufficient. In its instruction, the court explained to the jury the limited relevance of the evidence, advising them you're not to consider these arrests on these additional charges as evidence in support of the aggravating factors. Furthermore, the trial court again instructed the jury in its final charge: You are not permitted in your weighing process to add evidence of defendant's past conduct, except to the extent offered to rebut mitigating factors and as detracting from the weight you assign to mitigating factors. That instruction was in full conformance with Rose, supra . Finally, because it was defense counsel who insisted that no instruction of any kind be given, he cannot now attack the adequacy of the charge issued. Supra at 364-65, 680 A. 2d at 710-11. Even if the limiting instruction provided in this case was imperfect, the fact that the other-crimes evidence at issue consisted of a non-violent crime and was not at all similar to the crime charged supports the conclusion that an imperfect limiting instruction, under these circumstances, is not reversible error.