Opinion ID: 901494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Credit for Time on Supervised Release

Text: [¶ 11.] At the hearing where the Board revoked Krukow's suspended sentence, it also decided to deny him credit for the entire time he was on supervised release. Krukow claims, first, that the Board was not vested with the power to deny him credit for his street time and, second, that if the statute is construed to give the Board such power, then denying him credit for this time violated his right against double jeopardy. [¶ 12.] Resolution of this issue depends on our interpretation of the statutes governing revocation of parole and suspended sentences. The primary purpose of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the law. See Moss v. Guttormson, 1996 SD 76, ¶ 10, 551 N.W.2d 14, 17. [S]tatutes must be construed according to their intent, the intent must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject. See id. (quoting U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 505 N.W.2d 115, 122-23 (S.D.1993)). But, in construing statutes together it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. Id. State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 8, 625 N.W.2d 275, 278; see also Brim v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 1997 SD 48, ¶ 4, 563 N.W.2d 812, 813. From the language of the statutes, Krukow argues that when the Board revoked his suspended sentence under SDCL 23A-27-19, it did not have the power under SDCL 24-15A-28 to deny him credit for time spent on release. That statute provides: If the board is satisfied that any provision of § 24-15A-27 has been violated, it may revoke the parole and reinstate the terms of the original sentence and conviction or it may modify conditions of parole and restore parole status. In addition, the board may order the denial of credit for time served on parole. If the board does not find that the provisions of § 24-15A-27 have been violated, the board may restore the parolee to the original or modified terms and conditions of the parolee's parole. SDCL 24-15A-28 (emphasis added). [¶ 13.] By the plain language of this statute, it only governs denial of credit for time served on parole, not time served on a suspended sentence. Krukow argues that only SDCL ch. 23A-27 vests the Board with certain powers over those released under a suspended sentence. He claims that nothing in SDCL ch. 23A-27 can be interpreted to grant the Board the power to deny him credit for his release time. Because the Board's jurisdiction over Krukow exists only in SDCL 23A-27-19, he contends that the word parole in SDCL 24-15A-28 cannot be interpreted to include persons released under a suspended sentence. [1] [¶ 14.] In its appellate brief, the Board dedicates most of its argument to this Court's past cases, where we discussed the relationship between a suspended sentence and parole. See Turo v. Solem, 427 N.W.2d 843 (S.D.1988); State v. Oban, 372 N.W.2d 125 (S.D.1985); State v. Huftile, 367 N.W.2d 193 (S.D.1985). In those cases, we concluded that [s]uspended sentences and paroles are alike in practice because [b]oth involve the release of an offender from the penitentiary prior to expiration of the full term of the offender's sentence. Turo, 427 N.W.2d at 845-46 (citing Oban, 372 N.W.2d at 127-28); see also Huftile, 367 N.W.2d at 195-96. Like persons released on parole, those who leave the penitentiary under a suspended sentence, are under the supervision of the executive branch of government. Turo, 427 N.W.2d at 845 (citing Oban, 372 N.W.2d at 130); see also Grajczyk v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 1999 S.D. 149, ¶ 7, 603 N.W.2d 508, 510. [¶ 15.] Contrary to the Board's argument, the cases it cites interpret statutes no longer in effect. After July 1, 1996, the Legislature enacted SDCL ch. 24-15A, which replaced the majority of the statutes in SDCL ch. 24-15. Language declaring similarities between a suspended sentence and parole derived from this Court's interpretation of SDCL 24-15-14 in conjunction with SDCL 23A-27-19. Huftile, 367 N.W.2d at 195-96. The support for the comparison was that SDCL 24-15-14, like SDCL 23A-27-19, placed persons released under a suspended sentence under the supervision of the Board. Id. The cases that followed Huftile similarly held that the Board's power over those released on a suspended sentence stemmed both from SDCL ch. 24-15 and SDCL 23A-27-19. See Turo, 427 N.W.2d at 845; Oban, 372 N.W.2d at 127-28. [¶ 16.] Because Krukow was sentenced after July 1, 1996, SDCL ch. 24-15 does not apply to him, and our earlier cases are inapplicable here. See SDCL 24-15A-1. Nonetheless, based on the entirety of the statutes governing release on parole and suspended sentence, we conclude that the Board has discretion to deny credit for time spent on release to persons who violate their supervision conditions during the term of their suspended sentences. First, under SDCL 23A-27-19, the Board is charged with the responsibility for enforcing the conditions imposed by the sentencing judge, and the [B]oard retains jurisdiction to revoke the suspended portion of the sentence for violation of the terms of the suspension. Second, under SDCL 24-15A-8, the Board is empowered to grant persons serving a suspended sentence an early release from supervision. [2] [¶ 17.] By including those released under a suspended sentence within the purview of SDCL 24-15A-8, found in the chapter governing adult parole, we conclude that the Legislature intended to grant the Board discretion in deciding who receives credit for time spent on release. The power to grant early release includes the power to deny such release. To read these statutes as Krukow would have us do could result in allowing those released on a suspended sentence to evade supervision and defy their release terms, and yet still receive credit for time served while they were in violation of their conditions. We do not believe that the Legislature intended such an interpretation of its enactments. See Moeller v. Weber, 2004 SD 110, ¶ 46, 689 N.W.2d 1, 16. [¶ 18.] Krukow next claims that if this Court interprets our statutes to allow the Board to deny him credit for his time while free on his suspended sentence, then applying that statutory interpretation to him would violate his double jeopardy rights. Specifically, he contends that because this statutory interpretation did not exist before, applying the decision to him violates his legitimate expectation that the laws meant what they said when he was sentenced. Because the laws governing sentences applicable to Krukow came into effect in 1996, and he was not sentenced until 1998, his argument is without merit. [¶ 19.] Affirmed. [¶ 20.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, ZINTER, and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.