Opinion ID: 6317019
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of V.T.’s mother

Text: [39] Morales argues the testimony of V.T.’s mother recounting statements made by V.T. on the day V.T. returned home from her great-grandmother’s house following the incident is inadmissible hearsay. Appellant’s Br. at 29-30. Because Morales did not object to V.T.’s mother’s testimony, we review for plain error. We begin our plain error analysis by determining whether V.T.’s mother’s hearsay testimony was erroneously admitted. [40] During trial, V.T.’s mother recounted statements V.T. made to her during a conversation after V.T. returned home from her great-grandmother’s house. V.T.’s mother recalled V.T.’s reluctant demeanor during the conversation and stated that V.T. did not want to talk and kept wanting to leave. V.T.’s mother then testified that V.T. stated that “Papa Don”2 had touched her “putt putt,” “butt butt,” and “soo soo” and those terms referred to the vaginal area, buttocks, and breast area, respectively. Tr. at 21 (Jury Trial, Nov. 7, 2018). Such statements were permissible as an exception to hearsay under Guam Rule of Evidence 803(2). [41] The excited utterance hearsay exception permits a hearsay statement if the statement relates “to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Guam R. Evid. 803(2). This exception “stems from a belief that a statement made during a moment of excitement and without the opportunity to reflect on the consequences of one’s statement has greater indicia of truth and reliability than a similar statement offered in the relative calm of the courtroom.” People v. Jesus, 2009 Guam 2 ¶ 35. [42] To admit a hearsay statement under the excited utterance exception there must be: “1) an event or condition startling enough to cause nervous excitement; 2) the statement relates to the startling event; and 3) the statement must be made while the declarant is under the stress of the 2 V.T.’s mother testified that the term “Papa Don” is how V.T. referred to Morales. People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 17 of 29 excitement caused by the event before there is time to contrive or misrepresent.” Id. ¶ 36. Further, “there is no precise amount of time between the event and the statement beyond which the statement cannot qualify as an excited utterance.” United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1221 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 711 (10th Cir. 2005), abrograted on other grounds by Henderson v. United States, 575 U.S. 622 (2015)); see also United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1017 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding declarant’s statements admissible after five to six hours under excited utterance exception). For child sexual assault, “courts must also be cognizant of the child’s first real opportunity to report the incident” when considering any time lapse between the abuse and the declaration. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1988). Other relevant circumstances include a child’s age, the characteristics of the event, and the subject matter of the statements. United States v. Rivera, 43 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1995). [43] Based on the record, the first two requirements that the event or condition was startling enough to cause nervous excitement and that the statements relate to the startling event are satisfied; V.T.’s mother’s testimony about V.T.’s statements directly relate to a traumatic and startling incident of child sexual assault. The third requirement is met; the statements were made while V.T. was under the stress of the excitement caused by the event before there was time to contrive or misrepresent. The statements were made within hours of the event, although the exact time is unknown. Because of other considerations such as V.T.’s young age, her emotional state during her conversation with her mother, and that it was V.T.’s first real opportunity to report the incident, V.T.’s statements to her mother upon returning home qualified as excited utterances under Rule 803(2). There was therefore no error in admitting this specific testimony. [44] V.T.’s mother also testified as to a separate conversation with V.T. on some day following V.T.’s initial disclosure. V.T.’s mother testified that during this conversation, she asked V.T. if People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 18 of 29 Morales touched her with any instrument and that V.T. stated Morales used his “pinkie.” Tr. at 29 (Jury Trial, Nov. 7, 2018). As Morales did not object to V.T.’s mother’s testimony as to V.T.’s statement, we review for plain error and first determine whether the testimony was erroneously admitted. [45] Our review of the record shows the statement attributed to V.T. was made on some other day after V.T. had initially reported the events to her mother. Nor could we discern from the mother’s testimony whether V.T., at the time of making the specific statement to her about the “pinkie,” was under any stress of the excitement caused by the event. Considering the time lapse and the lack of other details about the context in which the statement was made, we find it difficult to conclude the statement admissible under Rule 803(2). As the testimony is not admissible under Rule 803(2), and the People do not argue that the statement was admissible under any other hearsay exception, we find the admission of the specific statement and related references to be error that is clear and obvious under current law.3 [46] The third prong of the plain error analysis is whether the defendant’s substantial rights were affected by the error. “To establish that an error affected substantial rights, a defendant must establish by ‘“a reasonable probability” that but for the claimed error the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” People v. Reyes, 2020 Guam 33 ¶ 25 (quoting People v. Lessard, 2019 Guam 10 ¶ 16). We find that Morales’s substantial rights were affected by the error because: (1) his conviction for First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct rested solely on the admission of V.T.’s mother’s testimony as to a “pinkie”; and (2) no other substantive and admissible evidence 3 Morales claims two other sets of statements were inadmissible hearsay as it relates to V.T.’s mother’s testimony: (1) statements made on a Monday following V.T.’s initial disclosure, as to which her mother testified that “[V.T.] repeated the same exact thing she told me the day before,” Tr. at 26 (Jury Trial, Nov. 7, 2018); and (2) V.T.’s mother’s testimony that V.T. informed her that the touching happened in V.T.’s great-grandmother’s apartment, id. at 33. The court declines to review these alleged hearsay issues because while Morales raised them in his brief, see Appellant’s Br. at 7-8, 29-30 (Sept. 16, 2019), neither party engaged in a substantive analysis of these statements. See, e.g., People v. Quinata, 1999 Guam 6 ¶¶ 22-27. People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 19 of 29 was elicited evidencing penetration. Given the effect on Morales’s substantial rights, we find that reversal of his conviction for First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (as a 1st Degree Felony) is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice and to maintain the integrity of the judicial process. See Gargarita, 2015 Guam 28 ¶ 11.