Opinion ID: 2518434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Judge Nakamura's Dissent

Text: Judge Nakamura set forth the following analysis in his dissent: ... [The jury] instruction [on Eberly's mistake-of-fact defense] tracked the language of the statute defining the defense, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 702-218 (1993).[ [4] ] The trial court did not additionally instruct the jury that the prosecution had the burden of disproving Eberly's ignorance-of-fact defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority concludes that the Hawai`i Supreme Court's decision in State v. Locquiao, 100 Hawai`i 195, 58 P.3d 1242 (2002), dictates that Eberly's firearm convictions be reversed. I respectfully disagree. Locquiao is distinguishable because, unlike in Locquiao, the jury in this case was given an instruction on Eberly's ignorance-of-fact defense. .... In my view, Locquiao is not dispositive. In Locquiao, the trial court refused to give any instruction on the defendant's ignorance-or-mistake-of-fact defense. Id. at 201, 58 P.3d at 1248. Here, the trial court gave the jury an instruction on Eberly's ignorance-of-fact defense in the language of the statutory defense.[ [5] ] Thus, Eberly's case turns on an issue not presented in Locquiao whether the trial court's instruction on an ignorance-of-fact defense, but not on the prosecution's burden to disprove that defense, requires that Eberly's convictions be vacated. The standard of review for determining the adequacy of jury instructions is whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. State v. Valentine, 93 Hawai`i 199, 204, 998 P.2d 479, 484 (2000). Unlike in Locquiao, the instruction on Eberly's ignorance-of-fact defense gave the jury the opportunity to expressly and separately consider his defense. The primary concern expressed in Locquiao was therefore substantially addressed in Eberly's case. The instructions on Eberly's ignorance-of-fact defense and the mens rea required for each firearm offense, when read and considered as a whole, were not prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. Valentine, 93 Hawai`i at 204, 998 P.2d at 484. The jury was instructed that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Eberly knowingly or intentionally possessed or controlled a firearm. The jury was also instructed that Eberly had a defense if his ignorance negated the state of mind required to establish the offense. Based on these instructions, the jury could not have found Eberly guilty unless it determined that the prosecution had disproved Eberly's ignorance-of-fact defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Any error in failing to instruct on the prosecution's burden to disprove this defense was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Had the jury received the instruction Eberly claims was erroneously omitted, there is no reasonable possibility that the outcome of Eberly's case would have been different. The other claims Eberly raises on appeal are without merit. Eberly has failed to show that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance or that the court erred in allowing the jury to ask questions of witnesses. I would affirm Eberly's fire-arm convictions and therefore respectfully dissent. Dissenting opinion, at ___ - ___, 116 P.3d at 710-11, 2005 WL 605551 (emphasis in original). On April 12, 2005, the prosecution timely filed an application for writ of certiorari. On April 18, 2005, we granted certiorari.