Opinion ID: 1291295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor's Use of False and Inconsistent Argument to Obtain Death Penalty

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecutor, who also prosecuted Waidla, argued inconsistent factual theories in the two trials and, in one respect, knowingly made a false argument in defendant's trial. This conduct, defendant contends, violated his constitutional rights to due process of law. Asking us to take judicial notice of the appellate record of Waidla's trial, which preceded his own, defendant relies on the prosecutor's guilt and penalty phase arguments in the two trials to establish the asserted deprivation of due process, which he contends was prejudicial as to the special circumstances and penalty verdicts. The asserted inconsistencies in prosecutorial theories are as follows. (1) In Waidla's trial, the prosecutor argued Waidla inflicted the three chopping wounds to the victim's upper head with the blade edge of the hatchet during the initial attack in the living room (as well as inflicting the blunt force wounds with the back of the hatchet); in defendant's trial, he presented evidence (defendant's statements), and argued, that defendant inflicted these three wounds in the bedroom, after the initial attack ended and the victim was dragged to the bedroom. (2) In Waidla's trial, the prosecutor presented evidence (the medical examiner's expert opinion), and argued, that the victim was dead when she was dragged into the bedroom; in defendant's trial, he presented no such evidence and argued the victim may still have been alive when, in the bedroom, defendant struck her with the blade edge of the hatchet. (3) In Waidla's trial, the prosecutor argued Waidla was the dominant figure of the two, and planned the burglary and robbery; in defendant's trial, he argued there was no evidence of domination and that defendant was in all respects an equal partner in the crimes. As to the second-listed inconsistency, defendant also contends the prosecutor's argument, to the effect the victim may still have been alive when defendant struck her additional blows in the bedroom, was knowingly false. That a prosecutor's knowing use of false evidence or argument to obtain a criminal conviction or sentence deprives the defendant of due process is well established. (See, e.g., Miller v. Pate (1967) 386 U.S. 1, 7, 87 S.Ct. 785, 17 L.Ed.2d 690; Napue v. Illinois (1959) 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217; Brown v. Borg (9th Cir.1991) 951 F.2d 1011, 1015; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 595-596, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 835 P.2d 371.) Less clear is whether, knowing falsity aside, a prosecutor oversteps constitutional limits by asserting, in separate trials of different defendants, factually inconsistent or contradictory theories of the criminal events. The question has most recently been discussed at length by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, in Thompson v. Calderon (9th Cir.1997) 120 F.3d 1045, reversed on other grounds sub nom. Calderon v. Thompson (1998) 523 U.S. 538, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728. In her opinion for the court, Judge Fletcher, writing on this point only for a plurality, [9] concluded the death sentence and rape-murder special-circumstance finding returned against Thompson by a California jury required vacation because, inter alia, the prosecutor had subsequently argued, in the trial of coperpetrator David Leitch, that the victim was killed to further Leitch's personal interests, rather than, as charged and urged against Thompson, in order to prevent her from reporting her rape by Thompson. ( Thompson, supra, at pp. 1055-1059 (plur. opn. of Fletcher, J.).) Judge Fletcher, reasoning from the principle that the public prosecutor's legitimate goal is not to obtain convictions as such, but to seek justice, using only tactics that are fundamentally fair and calculated to bring forward the truth, concluded that, under the due process clause, when no new significant evidence comes to light a prosecutor cannot, in order to convict two defendants at separate trials, offer inconsistent theories and facts regarding the same crime. ( Id. at p. 1058.) Thompson was prejudiced because the position taken in his trialthat he was alone with the victim and killed her to cover up a rape was inconsistent with that taken in earlier proceedings and at Leitch's subsequent trial. ( Id. at p. 1059.) In a concurring opinion, Judge Tashima declined to order vacation on this ground because, in his view, a prejudicial due process violation could be established only by finding which of the two inconsistent theories pursued by the prosecutor represents the true facts and which is false. ( Thompson v. Calderon, supra, 120 F.3d at p. 1064 (cone. opn. of Tashima, J.).) Judge Tashima would have remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. ( Ibid. ) Dissenting on other grounds, Judge Kozinski agreed with the plurality that prosecutorial inconsistency is troubling, primarily, in his view, because it raises the suspicion that the prosecutor may have presented testimony he knows, or has reason to believe, is false. ( Thompson v. Calderon, supra, 120 F.3d at p. 1070 (dis. opn. of Kozinski, J.).) But, he observed, it is impossible to make judgments about what the prosecutor knew or should have known at our level.... Thus, if the petitioner makes a prima facie case that the prosecutor knowingly presented false evidence, the matter must be resolved at an evidentiary hearing. ( Id. at p. 1071.) [10] Finally, Judge Kleinfeld, also dissenting, agreed that [a] prosecutor cannot present evidence or a case he knows to be false, but found no reason to think the Thompson prosecutor, who, Judge Kleinfeld emphasized, had no independent means of discovering why Thompson and Leitch killed the victim, knew either theory he presented was false, when he presented it or at any time. ( Thompson v. Calderon, supra, 120 F.3d at p. 1074 (dis. opn. of Kleinfeld, J.).) The Thompson opinions are useful because they appear to outline a full range of positions one might take on prosecutorial inconsistency. Judge Fletcher finds a prejudicial due process violation in the inconsistency itself, although even she would apparently permit a change in theory when new significant evidence comes to light. ( Thompson v. Calderon, supra, 120 F.3d at p. 1058 (plur. opn. of Fletcher, J.).) Judge Tashima finds a due process violation in inconsistency, but would rest the prejudice analysis on a determination of which theory is actually true and which false. ( Id. at p. 1064 (cone. opn. of Tashima, J.).) Judge Kozinski would find a due process violation only when it is shown the prosecutor presented testimony he knows, or has reason to believe, is false ( id. at p. 1070 (dis. opn. of Kozinski, J.)), [11] Judge Kleinfeld only if the prosecutor knows the evidence is false ( Thompson, supra, 120 F.3d at p. 1074 (dis. opn. of Kleinfeld, J.)). We need not decide what position on this spectrum we would take, because we conclude that, under any view of the proper constitutional limits, the issue is better decided on a petition for writ of habeas corpus than on direct appeal, at least under the circumstances here presented. Where, as here, the asserted inconsistencies in prosecutorial theory were not the subject of any proceeding in the trial court and, hence, neither the inconsistencies nor any explanations the prosecutor may have been able to offer appear in the appellate record, any due process claim defendant can state should be presented by petition for writ of habeas corpus rather than by appeal. ( People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 59, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129, fn. omitted.) The transcripts of Waidla's trial are, of course, physically available to us, and notice of their contents would be permissible under Evidence Code sections 452 and 459. (See People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 134, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) But we would be unable to take notice of any factual explanations the trial prosecutor may have for any material inconsistencies we might find by comparing the transcripts of the two trials. Nor could we take notice of other extra-record evidence of the prosecutor's state of mind. For example, defendant claims the prosecutor made a knowingly false argument when he told the jury, in this case, that the victim may have still been alive when she was dragged into the bedroom. Defendant's claim is based on the existence of contrary testimony and argument in the earlier Waidla trial, of which we could take notice. If we did so, however, we would still be unable to determine whether, in the period between the two trials, significant new evidence surfaced on this point (satisfying due process even under Judge Fletcher's view in Thompson), the medical examiner reevaluated his opinion, or other events occurred such that the prosecutor, at the time of defendant's trial, neither knew nor had reason to know his argument was false. As Judges Tashima and Kozinski observed in their Thompson opinions, the questions of which of two conflicting factual theories is true, or which the prosecutor believed or should have believed was true, might, in a habeas corpus proceeding, require reference to an evidentiary hearing. No such evidentiary proceeding would be available to the court and parties in this direct appeal. In short, this is an instance of the general rule that an appellate court should not take notice of matters not first presented to and considered by the trial court, where to do so would unfairly permit one side to press an issue or theory on appeal that was not raised below. ( People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 134, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) We therefore deny the request for judicial notice of the Waidla record; to take notice under these circumstances and for the purpose requested would be to augment improperly the appellate record. (See People v. Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 59, fn. 5, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) Absent notice of the Waidla transcripts, defendant's due process claim is without support. Defendant also contends his trial attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to introduce, in the penalty phase, evidence of the medical examiner's prior (Waidla trial) testimony that the victim was already dead when dragged to the bedroom and of the prosecutor's prior argument to that effect and to the effect that Waidla was the dominant partner and had inflicted the three blows with the hatchet blade. For reasons similar to those above, we do not reach the merits of this claim on direct appeal. (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 268, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) The evidence defendant insists should have been introduced does not, of course, appear in the appellate record before us. Although we could take notice of the testimony and argument in Waidla's trial, we would still be without any procedure for further supplementing the record with any tactical considerations trial counsel might offer to explain his decision or with any explanatory testimony Dr. Ribe, the medical examiner, might have given. For example, had defense counsel recalled Dr. Ribe at the penalty trial, as defendant suggests he should have done, and examined him regarding his prior opinion that the victim's abrasions, caused by being dragged along the carpet, were postmortem, we do not know whether Dr. Ribe would have simply repeated that opinion, contradicted it, or explained or qualified it. Similarly, had trial counsel successfully sought to introduce into evidence portions of the prosecutor's Waidla trial argument, we have no way of determining in this appeal what additional explanations or qualifications, from within or without the Waidla record, the prosecutor might have introduced in rebuttal. Rather than attempt to glean inferences from a record where the critical questions were ... unasked, we leave the merits of this issue for consideration, if therein presented, on petition for writ of habeas corpus. ( Ibid.; see also People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1012, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.)