Opinion ID: 1536896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Diligence and Promptness Related Violations

Text: Rule 1.3(b) provides that a lawyer shall not intentionally [f]ail to seek the lawful objectives of a client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the disciplinary rules or [p]rejudice or damage a client during the course of the professional relationship. Respondent in this matter failed to seek the lawful objectives of Ms. Fisher-Hammond by failing to pay the medical providers and then later by failing to resolve the outstanding invoices of her medical providers as he had promised to do. He also damaged his client by harming her credit and subjecting her to demands for payment, with interest, from her creditors. Not only did he fail to pay in the first instance with the settlement proceeds, but when the issue was raised by Bar Counsel and the client in 2001, he failed to obtain his bank statements for the relevant period to determine whether he had actually paid the medical providers. Other steps, such as more diligent efforts to inquire of the providers, were also possible. Neglect ripens into an intentional violation when the lawyer is aware of his neglect of the client matter, or the neglect is so pervasive that the lawyer must be aware of it. In re Lewis, 689 A.2d 561, 564 (D.C.1997). The Board agrees with the Hearing Committee that this is an apt description of the view most favorable to Respondent of what transpired in this case. The Rules also provide that [a] lawyer shall act with reasonable promptness in representing a client, (R. 1.3(c)) and that a lawyer shall promptly deliver to [a] client or third person any funds . . . that the client or third person is entitled to receive. . . . R. 1.15(b). There can be no question on this record that Respondent failed to pay his client's medical providers promptly. On a charitable view of Respondent's conduct, he became aware in 2001 of a serious risk of nonpayment of at least two and possibly four medical providers whom he had withheld funds to pay in 1996 and Respondent paid one of them, Maryland Orthopedics, only in 2006, on the eve of his disciplinary hearing. As of the date of the hearing in this matter, Respondent had not paid at least one of the other providers at all and had not returned any of the funds to his client. See In re Ross, 658 A.2d 209, 211 (D.C.1995) (eleven-month delay in paying third-party medical provider not prompt). This conduct violated these rules.