Opinion ID: 1706522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Griffith Matter

Text: Petitioner charged, in specification number 2, That in your capacity as Attorney at Law, you did represent one Elvira Griffith in a matter entitled State of Louisiana v. Elvira Griffith, number 193216 on the docket of the First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish, Louisiana. That Ms. Griffith's case was set for trial on September 13, 1988. That you did meet and converse with Elvira Griffith in the hallway of the courtroom prior to the case being called for trial on September 13, 1988. That following your conferring with Elvira Griffith, you did go into the courtroom and did engage in a conversation with one Christina Chandler, an Assistant District Attorney. That Ms. Chandler had observed you talking with your client in the hallway and she did mention to you that she had seen you talking with your client. That you did falsely inform Ms. Chandler that the individual you were talking to was not your client. That when the case was called for trial you did mislead the court when you did state that you did not know the whereabouts of your client when in fact you had been talking to your client in the hallway shortly beforehand. That you were cited for contempt of court and were on November 10, 1988 found guilty of contempt of court in this matter. That on February 24, 1989, you were sentenced to pay a fine of $500.00 or spend fifty days in jail and were in addition sentenced to perform thirty days of community service for your contempt of court conviction. That you have committed a criminal act that adversely reflects on your honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer; have engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit of [sic] misrepresentation; have engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; that you have made a false statement of material fact to opposing counsel; that you have made a false statement of material fact to a tribunal, and/or have failed to disclose the material fact to both opposing counsel and the court when such disclosure would be necessary to avoid assisting the client in a criminal or fraudulent act, to wit. [sic] failure to appear at trial; that you have assisted a client in conduct that you know to be criminal or fraudulent, to wit. [sic] failure to appear at trial. All of the above are in violation of Rules 1.2(c), 3.3(a), 4.1 and 8.4(a)(b)(c)(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Louisiana State Bar Association. [2] The LSBA has introduced portions of the record in the criminal proceeding against Elvira Griffith. From that record, the following facts may be gleaned. Harrington represented Elvira Griffith, a defendant in a criminal case (DWI, second offense). The case was set for trial on September 13, 1988. Harrington met and spoke with his client in the hallway of the courthouse very shortly before the case was called for trial. Following that conversation, Harrington went into the courtroom and spoke with Christina Chandler, an assistant district attorney. Ms. Chandler mentioned she had seen respondent talking with Griffith. Harrington falsely told Chandler the individual to whom he spoke was not Griffith but was a witness in another case. When the case was called for trial Harrington informed the court he did not know the whereabouts of his client. He was cited for and, after a hearing before another judge, was convicted of criminal contempt of court. Harrington testified at the Committee hearing he had spoken to Griffith earlier in the morning on September 13, 1988, and when the case was called for trial he told the court her whereabouts were unknown to him. He also testified he was about to explain to the court he had seen her that morning but was cut off by the judge. The judge who heard testimony on the criminal contempt charge did not believe Harrington's testimony. He was in a better position to make this credibility determination than we are. In addition, both Chandler and Katherine Estopinal, another assistant district attorney, testified Harrington told them the person to whom he'd been speaking was not Griffith a mere five minutes after Chandler observed him speaking to her. They each noted Griffith was distinct both in physical appearance and in that she was born in Germany and retained a noticeable German accent when speaking English. Chandler further testified she had observed a videotape of Griffith made at the time of the arrest and had heard Griffith speaking to Harrington in the hallway. She harbored no doubt whatsoever that the woman she had observed was Griffith. In light of this testimony, we agree with the finding of the Commissioner that Harrington's position is untenable. The petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that Harrington's conduct violated Rule 1.2(c). The only substantial purpose which would have been served by Harrington's misrepresentations to the court and to the prosecutors was to assist Griffith in her failure to appear in court for the scheduled trial. [3] A lawyer has an affirmative duty to apprise the court of material facts if failure to do so would assist a crime or a fraud upon the court. Louisiana State Bar Association v. White, 539 So.2d 1216, 1220 (La. 1989). We find Harrington's actions were intended to assist his client to commit a criminal act. We also find petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence Harrington violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) by knowingly making a false statement of material fact to the trial court when he informed the court he did not know the whereabouts of his client. He had been observed speaking to Griffith a half hour prior to his telling the court he knew nothing of her whereabouts. Harrington poses the question, What disclosure must an attorney give as to the location of a client in a criminal proceeding? Under the circumstances of this case, he should at the very least have revealed to the court his client had been in the hallway of the courthouse minutes before and he was currently unable to locate her. See Rule 3.3(a)(2). Harrington's misrepresentation to the court facilitated Griffith's failure to appear for trial. His misconduct is contrary to the standards of candor which apply to members of the bar and is a serious violation of ethical rules. See White, 539 So.2d at 1221; Louisiana State Bar Association v. Brown, 291 So.2d 385, 388 (La.1974). By clear and convincing evidence, petitioner also has shown Harrington violated Rule 4.1(a) which prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person. After being observed by Chandler and Estopinal speaking to Griffith in the hallway, Harrington falsely told them he was not speaking to Griffith but was speaking to a female witness in another case. He told them he did not know where Griffith was nor did he offer to assist in locating her for her scheduled court appearance. Rather than telling the truth about the matter, respondent chose to lie. His conduct exceeded the bounds of professional propriety in representing his client. He has neither a right nor an obligation to facilitate a client's failure to appear. In fact, as an officer of the court, he had an obligation to be candid about Griffith's whereabouts. By the same clear and convincing evidence, petitioner has shown Harrington: violated the Rules of Professional Conduct herein specified; committed a criminal act, viz. contempt of court (which reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer); engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; [4] all in violation of Rule 8.4(a), (b), (c), & (d).