Opinion ID: 2651088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prejudice to Scott

Text: For this factor, the plaintiff must show that setting aside the default judgment will result in “loss of evidence, increased difficulties in discovery, or greater opportunities for fraud and collusion.” Lacy, 227 F.3d at 293 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It is not enough that the plaintiff will be required to prove his case or that any potential recovery will be delayed. Id. As a result of our ruling in this case, Scott will still have a judgment against the parties he alleged caused him the harm—Mr. Carpanzano and Ms. Belcastro. We can find nothing about setting aside the judgment only as to Ms. Carpanzano that prejudices Scott beyond the normal issues of litigating a case. Scott argued before the district court that setting aside the default judgments against all three of the Defendants would produce increased difficulties in discovery and provide the Defendants with further opportunities to hide or dispose of the funds that were transferred out of the escrow account. The district court agreed when assessing the Defendants as a group. Scott’s brief does not address how he would be prejudiced if only the monetary default judgment against Ms. Carpanzano were set aside; he refers only to the harm that would ensue if the default judgment against Mr. Carpanzano was vacated. By the time the Defendants filed their motions to set aside the default judgments in this case, Scott had successfully seized the 2008 Land Rover 16 Case: 13-10096 Document: 00512512053 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/24/2014 No. 13-10096 Range Rover pursuant to a constructive trust in his favor. Since the vehicle is in Scott’s possession, setting aside the monetary default judgment against Ms. Carpanzano will not provide further opportunity for Ms. Carpanzano to hide or dispose of the vehicle. 6 Because Ms. Carpanzano has made no effort to set up a meritorious defense to or otherwise dispute the seizure of the Land Rover, we leave that portion of the district court’s order intact. We recognize that Ms. Carpanzano has failed to participate in postjudgment discovery and do not condone her behavior in this regard. We conclude that such conduct is best addressed by a sanctions or contempt order. It is unlikely that her punishment for failing to respond to discovery would equal the size of the monetary default judgment currently in place. 7