Opinion ID: 775740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equitable Tolling As Applied

Text: 50 Having concluded that the filing period for motions to reopen is subject to equitable tolling, we now consider whether the filing period should have been tolled in Socop's case. We will apply equitable tolling in situations where,  `despite all due diligence, [the party invoking equitable tolling] is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of the claim.'  Supermail, 68 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Stevens v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 31 Fed. Cl. 12, 23 (1994)). We have previously applied equitable tolling in situations where an alien was unaware, despite due diligence, that he missed the limitations period for filing a motion to reopen due to fraud by a third party, Varela, 204 F.3d at 1240, and due to ineffective assistance of counsel, Lopez, 184 F.3d at 1100. But the doctrine is by no means limited to these situations. 51 The inability to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of a claim need not be caused by the wrongful conduct of a third party. Rather, the party invoking tolling need only show that his or her ignorance of the limitations period was caused by circumstances beyond the party's control, see, e.g., Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff's mental incapacity warranted equitable tolling), and that these circumstances go beyond a garden variety claim of excusable neglect. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 458. 52 In this case, Socop seeks to toll the filing period during the time he was unaware that his final order of deportation had become effective-from May 5, 1997, when the BIA returned his case to the Immigration Court, until July 7, 1997, when he received the Bag and Baggage letter ordering him to report for deportation. The question is whether, despite due diligence, Socop was prevented during this period, by circumstances beyond his control and going beyond excusable neglect, from discovering that his order of deportation had become effective-the vital information he needed in order to determine that a motion to reopen was required in order to preserve his status. 53 We have no difficulty answering this question in the affirmative. Socop's deportation order was triggered precisely because he was diligently pursuing his rights. Socop sought advice from the INS in the first place because he was attempting to adjust his status on the basis of his marriage to an American citizen. He visited the INS office in Westminster on April 7, 1997 and, on that very same day, he followed the INS officer's advice and wrote a letter to the BIA withdrawing his asylum appeal. About two weeks later, on April 23, 1997, Socop filed an immediate relative visa petition, an application for adjustment of status, and an application for employment authorization. Socop was awaiting word from the INS regarding these applications when the BIA returned his case to the Immigration Court on May 5, 1997. 54 Between May 5, 1997 and July 7, 1997, Socop had no reason to believe that his deportation order had become effective. In fact, he had every reason to believe that he had followed the correct procedure for adjusting his status. We therefore hold that the period from May 5 until July 7 (a total of 63 days) should not have counted toward the ninety-day period during which Socop could have filed a motion to reopen. 55 We note that on July 7, when Socop was first put on notice that his deportation order had become effective, he still had twenty-seven days in which he could have filed a motion to reopen. A recent case in our circuit, Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2000), suggests that in order to extend tolling to Socop, we must further inquire whether he reasonably could have been expected to file his motion to reopen within the twenty-seven days remaining in the limitations period. In Santa Maria, the plaintiff asked that the court apply equitable tolling to the 300-day limitations period for filing a charge with the EEOC. Id. at 1178. The court declined to apply tolling because, even if the plaintiff did not have access to vital information bearing on the existence of his claim for part of the limitations period, he gained access to that information before the 300-day period expired. Id. at 1178-79. The panel held that regardless of when the plaintiff gained enough knowledge to enable him to file suit, equitable tolling may not be invoked by an ADA plaintiff who, within the limitations period, has sufficient information to know of the possible existence of a claim. Id. at 1179. 56 The implication of this holding is that courts should not apply equitable tolling in situations where a plaintiff discovers the existence of a claim before the end of a limitations period and the court believes that the plaintiff reasonably could have been expected to bring a claim within the remainder of the limitations period. This approach to tolling was also adopted by the Seventh Circuit in a case cited with approval in Santa Maria, Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that when a plaintiff gathers the necessary information . . . after the claim arose but before the statute of limitations has run . . . . [the] plaintiff who invokes equitable tolling . . . must bring suit within a reasonable time after he has obtained, or by due diligence could have obtained, the necessary information). 57 Were we to accept this approach to tolling, we would need to inquire whether Socop-who learned before the expiration of the ninety-day filing period that his deportation order had become effective-could reasonably have been expected to file his motion to reopen in the twenty-seven days remaining in the limitations period. 58 We believe, and the following discussion will demonstrate, that this approach to tolling is needlessly difficult to administer, runs counter to Supreme Court precedent, and undermines the policy objectives of the statutes of limitations. 59 In tolling statutes of limitations, courts have typically assumed that the event that tolls the statute simply stops the clock until the occurrence of a later event that permits the statute to resume running. See, e.g., Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 561 (1974) (The class suit brought by Utah was filed with 11 days yet to run in the period as tolled by &#167 5(b), and the intervenor thus had 11 days after the entry of the order denying them participation in the suit as class members in which to move for permission to intervene. Since their motions were filed only eight days after the entry of Judge Pence's order, it follows that the motions were timely.) (emphasis added); Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (stating that if tolling applied, the plaintiffs would have the full remainder of the filing period-six months-in which to file suit); Supermail, 68 F.3d at 1207 (holding that where the government provided inaccurate information to the plaintiff, causing the plaintiff to delay filing, dismissal was improper because plaintiff could establish tolling up to the date that it learned of the IRS's levy on its property) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court in Irwin phrased the issue in terms consistent with this understanding, noting that it granted certiorari to determine when the 30-day period under &#167 2000e-16(c) begins to run. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 92 (emphasis added). 60 These cases employ the conventional rule that when a statute of limitations is tolled, the days during a tolled period simply are not counted against the limitations period. The rule employed in Santa Maria, and also by the Seventh Circuit in Cada, imposes a more complicated scheme: in addition to determining whether the party invoking tolling was unable, despite due diligence, to discover the existence of a claim, a court must also determine whether the party discovered the need to file early enough in the limitations period that he or she could reasonably be expected to file before the period expired. Santa Maria, 202 F.3d at 1179; Cada, 920 F.2d at 453. 61 The Santa Maria rule does away with the major advantages of statutes of limitations: the relative certainty and uniformity with which a statutory period may be calculated and applied. See Burnett, 380 U.S. at 436 (stating that the policies served by statutes of limitations are uniformity and certainty). While under the conventional tolling rule there may be uncertainty in any given case whether equitable tolling will apply at all, the parties are able to calculate with some certainty the date on which the period would run if tolling is applied, and act accordingly. Moreover, litigants across the board are given the same amount of time in which to file a claim. The Santa Maria rule, in contrast, promotes inconsistency of application and uncertainty of calculation, thus undermining two of the purposes served by statutes of limitations. 62 The approach taken in Santa Maria was also explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Burnett. In Burnett, the Court decided to apply equitable tolling to a limitations period within which to bring suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). Burnett, 380 U.S. at 434-35. The plaintiff originally filed suit in the wrong venue, and brought suit in the proper venue only after the limitations period had run. Id. at 425. After deciding that equitable circumstances warranted the application of tolling, the Court had to determine for how long the filing period should be tolled. The Court explicitly rejected the suggestion that the filing period be tolled for a `reasonable time' after the state court orders the plaintiff's action dismissed because such a rule would create uncertainty as to exactly when the limitation period again begins to run. Id. at 435. Instead, in the name of greater uniformity and certainty, the Court adopted the rule that under familiar principles which have been applied to statutes of limitations . . . the limitation provision is tolled until the state court order dismissing the state action becomes final . . . . Id. This precedent appears to foreclose the approach to tolling taken in Santa Maria and Cada. 63 Finally, the approach to tolling taken in Santa Maria and Cada trumps what is arguably Congress' intended policy objectives in setting forth a statutory limitations period-to permit plaintiffs to take a specified amount of time (even if they don't need it, Cada, 920 F.2d at 452) to further investigate their claim and consider their options before deciding whether to file suit. A court may decide whether or not to use its equitable powers to toll a limitations period, but a court arguably usurps congressional authority when it tolls and then rewrites the statute of limitations by substituting its own subjective view of how much time a plaintiff reasonably needed to file suit. Moreover, the Santa Maria/Cada approach provides the plaintiff with an incentive to rush to court without fully considering his or her claim-a policy that serves none of the parties involved. 64 Accordingly, we reject the approach to tolling adopted in Santa Maria, and we need not inquire whether Socop reasonably could have filed his motion to reopen within the twenty-seven days remaining in the limitations period after he received the Bag and Baggage letter. Cf. Iavorski, 232 F.3d at 134 (asking only whether the alien acted with due diligence during the period [he] seeks to have to have tolled) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, we need only ask whether Socop filed within the limitations period after tolling is taken into account. Socop had until ninety days after July 7 to file a motion to reopen, or until October 5, 1997. Socop filed his motion to reopen on August 11, 1997, which is well before the October 5 cut-off. Therefore, Socop's motion to reopen was timely filed.