Opinion ID: 64039
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Due to Affirmative Misrepresentation

Text: As to Santos-Sanchez's first argument, ineffective assistance of counsel is an error that can warrant coram nobis relief. See United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir.1994). The standard for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel is the familiar test from the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington : the defendant must establish that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Castro, 26 F.3d at 559 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)); United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir.1993); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding that the Strickland test applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining). We determine whether counsel's performance was deficient by measuring it against an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Castro, 26 F.3d at 559 (quotation omitted). As to prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. (quotations and alteration omitted). Santos-Sanchez asserts that his counsel misled him into thinking that he had a chance of remaining in the country if he pleaded guilty. Montemayor stated in her affidavit that it is [her] practice to always advise resident alien defendants that there is a possibility that they may be deported as a result of their plea of guilty to the criminal charge against them, and that they may want to consult with an immigration lawyer. [2] Santos-Sanchez argues that this statement was an affirmative misrepresentation of the law; Montemayor indicated that deportation was possible, when in fact it was almost certain. Santos-Sanchez thus argues that Montemayor misled him into thinking that he could plead guilty but avoid deportation. Further, according to Santos-Sanchez's affidavit, Saenz gave Santos-Sanchez an immigration lawyer's business card and suggested that Santos-Sanchez call the lawyer if he had any problems with immigration. Santos-Sanchez argues that this only compounded Montemayor's misrepresentation. By leaving him with the impression that deportation was not certain, Santos-Sanchez argues, his counsel's performance was deficient. [3] In support of his argument, Santos-Sanchez relies on United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir.2005), and United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir.2002). In both Kwan and Couto, attorneys indicated to their clients that guilty pleas to aggravated felonies would not necessarily result in deportation when deportation was actually a near certainty. See Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1008-09; Couto, 311 F.3d at 187. In both cases, the court held that an attorney's misleading statements about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea constituted objectively unreasonable conduct that satisfies Strickland 's first prong. See Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1015-17; Couto, 311 F.3d at 188. The attorneys' actions in Kwan and Couto, however, were quite different from the public defenders' actions in the present case. In Couto, the attorney assured [his client] that they could deal with her immigration problem after the guilty plea. 311 F.3d at 183. The Second Circuit found fault in the attorney's representations that there were a lot of things that could be done to avoid deportation and that his client should not worry about it. Id. at 184. According to the court, these statements affirmatively misled [the defendant] into believing there were things that could be done to avoid deportation (when in fact there were none). Id. at 187. In Kwan, the attorney responded to the defendant's specific questions regarding the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, gave erroneous advice, and represented himself as having expertise on the immigration consequences of criminal convictions. 407 F.3d at 1015-16. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the attorney made an affirmative representation to [the defendant] that he had knowledge and experience regarding the immigration consequences of criminal convictions. Id. at 1016. Moreover, the court noted that [i]f counsel did not have the requisite competence in immigration law, or if counsel did not plan on maintaining the requisite competence, he should not have advised [the defendant] regarding the immigration consequences of his plea without referring [the defendant] to an immigration lawyer or consulting himself with an immigration lawyer in the first place. Id. In contrast, neither Montemayor nor Saenz represented that they had any expertise in immigration law, nor did they suggest that Santos-Sanchez could probably avoid deportation after pleading guilty. They also did not purport to answer any questions Santos-Sanchez had regarding deportation. Further, Montemayor's statement put Santos-Sanchez on notice that there were potential immigration consequences of his guilty plea and suggested that he should seek out an immigration attorney. Saenz even gave Santos-Sanchez the name of an immigration attorney that he could contact. While Montemayor's statement that deportation was possible might indicate that deportation was not a certainty, it is not so inherently misleading in this context that it constitutes an affirmative misrepresentation of the law. Cf. Zhang v. United States, 543 F.Supp.2d 175, 183 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (noting that an attorney's advice regarding the immigration consequences of a guilty plea was mistaken, but not an affirmative misrepresentation). Under these circumstances, we cannot hold that the behavior of Santos-Sanchez's public defenders was objectively unreasonable. Consequently, Santos-Sanchez has failed to establish deficient performance due to affirmative misrepresentation.