Opinion ID: 867372
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State prevented jury from considering mitigation evidence

Text: ¶ 30 Pandeli claims that the State improperly limited the type of mitigation the jury could consider by arguing in closing that (1) there was no causal nexus between the mitigating evidence and the crime, and (2) Pandeli knew right from wrong. When an objection was made, we review a trial court's ruling on the scope of closing argument for abuse of discretion. See State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 223, ¶ 123, 141 P.3d 368, 398 (2006).
¶ 31 Pandeli claims that the State improperly suggested in closing argument that the jurors could not find mitigation in the absence of a causal nexus between the mitigating evidence and the crime, in violation of Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004) (holding that jurors cannot be prevented from giving effect to mitigating evidence solely because the evidence is not causally connected to the crime). He specifically complains about the following statements: [W]e're not here to focus on defendant's childhood. . . . [Y]ou look at the last few years of his life, that's what we judge it on, and The natural rain and facts of this case wash[ ] mitigation away. ¶ 32 We addressed, and rejected, this precise claim in Anderson II, stating: Once the jury has heard all of the defendant's mitigation evidence, there is no constitutional prohibition against the State arguing that the evidence is not particularly relevant or that it is entitled to little weight. The prosecutor's various comments and questions here simply went to the weight of Anderson's mitigation evidence and were not improper. 210 Ariz. at 350, ¶ 97, 111 P.3d at 392. Similarly, in this case the State never told jurors that they could not consider mitigation unrelated to the crime; it merely suggested that such mitigation was entitled to minimal weight. ¶ 33 Furthermore, any potential error was cured by the jury instructions, which informed the jurors that they should consider and give effect to all of Pandeli's mitigation evidence. The court specifically instructed the jurors that [t]he defendant need not prove that the mitigating circumstances were the direct cause of the offense. The court also told the jurors to consider and give effect to all mitigating circumstances that have been raised by any aspect of the evidence. These instructions remedied any potential error. See Roque, 213 Ariz. at 223-24, ¶ 126, 141 P.3d at 398-99 (holding that jury instructions that required jurors to consider anything as mitigation and enumerated specific mitigating factors, including those that lacked a causal nexus to the crime, cured any potential error).
¶ 34 In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court of the United States held that [j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. 455 U.S. 104, 113-14, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). Thus, the State may not tell jurors that they cannot consider relevant mitigating evidence. ¶ 35 Pandeli asserts that the State did just that when it argued in its closing that Pandeli knew the difference between right and wrong and that the jurors should put Pandeli's background and actions in perspective. The State, however, did not direct the jurors to disregard the mitigation evidence; it simply suggested that jurors should assign less weight to the mental health mitigation presented by Pandeli's expert witnesses. Such argument is proper. See Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 350, ¶ 97, 111 P.3d at 392; cf. State v. Johnson, 212 Ariz. 425, 440, ¶ 65, 133 P.3d 735, 750 (affording evidence of defendant's mental impairment minimal value because defendant knew right from wrong), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 559, 166 L.Ed.2d 415 (2006). ¶ 36 Moreover, any potential error was remedied by the jury instructions. See Roque, 213 Ariz. at 223-24, ¶ 126, 141 P.3d at 398-99. The penalty phase jury instructions stated that [i]n order to prove the existence of a mitigating circumstance, the defendant does not need to prove that he did not understand the nature of his actions, was unable to control his actions, or did not know his actions were wrong. The court also instructed the jury that [m]itigating circumstances are not a defense, excuse or justification for the offense. Consequently, the trial court did not err when it allowed the State to argue that Pandeli knew the difference between right and wrong. ¶ 37 Pandeli also claims that the State's argument that Pandeli knew right from wrong was irrelevant. We have previously held, however, that a defendant's knowledge of right and wrong decreases the weight given to mental health mitigation. Johnson, 212 Ariz. at 440, ¶ 65, 133 P.3d at 750. Thus, the State's argument was relevant to the jury's assessment of the value of Pandeli's mental health mitigation.