Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: postscript: response to majority on equal protection

Text: My colleagues in the majority very simply reject appellants' equal protection claim either (1) because marriage, as traditionally and statutorily defined, does not discriminate against homosexuals in fact since marriage, conceptually understood, cannot include same-sex couples (Judge TERRY); or (2) because the marriage statute, even if it discriminates against homosexuals in fact, does not discriminate against them as a matter of constitutional law, since the statute does not reflect a discriminatory purpose (Judge STEADMAN). Judge TERRY's response begs the question. Given appellants' undisputed proffer that many if not most homosexuals have the same emotional, spiritual, physical, and public-benefit needs that lead heterosexuals to marry, see supra note 33, there is no convincing basis for saying either that these needs do not exist or that, if they do, marriage could not satisfy themthe only reasons I can think of for saying that marriage and homosexuality, by definition, cannot fit together. This analysis is akin to the premise of the trial court opinion the Supreme Court rejected in Loving: that a divine natural order forbids racial intermarriage to the point of making it conceptually unthinkable. [64] If homosexuals comprise a suspect or quasi-suspect class, which Judge TERRY does not question, then they cannot lawfully be denied the right to marry on the constitutionally unprecedented ground that this claimed right, by definition, is impossible to confer. See supra note 20. Judge STEADMAN's principal argument is also unsound. He essentially rests his position on the incontestable fact that the legislature, when enacting the marriage statute for heterosexual couples, would not have dreamed that anyone might consider it discriminatory legislation against homosexuals. From that premise Judge STEADMAN concludes that the marriage statute cannot be held to reflect the discriminatory purpose essential to denial of equal protection of the laws. Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (upholding District of Columbia qualifying test for metropolitan police officers, neutral on its face but with discriminatory impact on black applicants, since test, having valid objective, did not reflect discriminatory purpose) and Personnel Administrator v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (sustaining Massachusetts veterans preference for state civil service employment against equal protection challenge based on discriminatory impact on female civil service applicants, because there was no purposeful discrimination against women, some of whom were eligible veterans) with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (striking down San Francisco ordinance, neutral on its face, limiting commercial laundries to brick or stone buildings, absent Board of Supervisors' permission to use other materials, since ordinance was intended to discriminate against Chinese laundries typically housed in wooden buildings). There are fundamental defects in this analysis. The line of cases that begins with Davis, sustaining statutes and other governmental actions, neutral on their face, for lack of a perceived discriminatory purpose, is inapplicable here for two reasons. First, the governmental actions at issue in those cases did not purport to exclude the affected classes altogether from the benefits sought. In Davis, racial minorities who passed the qualifying test were eligible for appointment as police officers; in Feeny, female war veterans were entitled to the civil service employment preference. In short, the impacts were disproportionate but not exclusionary. In contrast, in the case of homosexuals, marriage is altogether forbidden to same-sex couples. Second, the fact that the legislature, in adopting the marriage statute, did not have homosexuals in mind does not mean the statute lacks a discriminatory purpose; an absolute prohibition, whether explicit or implied, resulting in discrimination in fact, has an inherent discriminatory purpose, even if the legislature did not recognize it. As already indicated, when the Virginia legislature enacted an antimiscegenation statute, it was premised on the belief that couples of different races were inherently incapable of marriage, because the very idea of interracial marriage was an oxymorona perceived abomination that violated divine natural law. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3-7, 87 S.Ct. at 1819-21. Similarly, when railway passenger cars were racially segregated by law, there was no perceived discriminatory purpose; though separate, they were equal. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896). [65] The Supreme Court came to recognize, however, that as the idea of equality changed, the purposes inherent in once-benign, supposedly nondiscriminatory statutes were seen to change. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 489-95, 74 S.Ct. at 688-92 (concluding that [s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12, 87 S.Ct. at 1823 (restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause). Accordingly, if, as I believe is ineluctably true, the marriage statute discriminates against homosexuals in fact because they claim the same emotional, spiritual, and physical needs for marriage that heterosexuals have, see supra notes 20 and 33, then a court, in my opinion, cannot legitimately say that the statutewhich leaves no room for qualifying homosexual couplesdoes not reflect a discriminatory purpose. Judge STEADMAN's statute of inclusion of opposite-sex couples, post at 122, has become a statute of exclusion of same-sex couples. Judge STEADMAN advances another argument against appellants' equal protection claim: because heterosexual couples, but not homosexual couples, have a fundamental right to marry, the state may give separate recognition solely to that institution through a marriage act as here. Post at 125 (footnote omitted). I have pointed out at length, see supra Part VI. H., that fundamental right analysis under the due process clause does not dictate analysis applicable to a suspect or quasi-suspect class under the equal protection clause. Furthermore, I cannot accept my colleague's proposition (necessarily premised on at least a quasi-suspect class assumption) that the relationship between marriage and procreation, childbirth, and child rearing creates an important (if not compelling) governmental interest that justifiesas a matter of lawthe statutory limitation of marriage to heterosexual couples, even if the statute were held to be discriminatory. As I have stressed earlier in Part VI. K. of this opinion, any governmental interest that might trump appellants' discrimination claim must be a matter for trial, not a matter for summary judgment. That claimed governmental interest has never been elaborated in the trial court or on appeal. Taken together, my colleagues in the majority seem to be saying that, although the equal protection clause may not permit the state to discriminate against homosexuals in some areas, such as employment, any constitutional concern evaporates when marriage becomes the issue simply because marriage is different: it is conceptually limited by its traditional definition to opposite-sex couplesa limitation that inherently, therefore, cannot reflect discrimination against homosexual couples in fact or purpose. This definitional defense against an equal protection claim has failed before when substantial human rights, asserted in connection with a claimed right to marriage, have been at issue. See Loving. It should fail here. See generally James Trosino, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U.L.REV. 93 (1993). In concluding its opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1682, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), in another context, the Supreme Court stressed: We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rightsolder than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. I see no basis on this record, or in law, for concluding summarily that plaintiffs-appellants, a homosexual couple, cannot lay equal claim to such a noble relationship, sustained by law. TERRY, Associate Judge: I join in parts I-III of Judge Ferren's opinion. I also join in Judge Steadman's opinion. Accordingly, I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects, although not precisely for the reasons stated by the trial court. The outcome of this case, in my view, turns on the definition of marriage. Shakespeare in his 116th Sonnet wrote of the marriage of true minds. In the game of pinochle, the king and queen of the same suit are referred to as a marriage when those cards are held by the same player; if that suit is trump, the combination of king and queen is a royal marriage. But these and similar expressions are only metaphors, figures of speech derived from the literal meaning of the word that serves as the fulcrum of this case. Judge Ferren, in parts II and III of his opinion, cogently demonstrates that the word marriage, when used to denote a legal status, refers only to the mutual relationship between a man and a woman as husband and wife, and therefore that same-sex marriages are legally and factually i.e., definitionallyimpossible. This conclusion necessarily disposes of the equal protection issue that Judge Ferren goes on to discuss in part VI of his opinion. That is, if it is impossible for two persons of the same sex to marry, then surely no court can say that a refusal to allow a same-sex couple to marry could ever be a denial of equal protection. I am willing to assume, for the purposes of this discussion, that homosexuality is an immutable trait; indeed, recent scientific literature strongly suggests that this is so, as Judge Ferren tells us, ante at 346-347 & nn. 49-52. But if two people are incapable of being married because they are members of the same sex and marriage requires two persons of opposite sexes, as Judge Ferren has shown, then I do not see how it makes any difference that the District of Columbia, or any agency of its government, discriminates against these two appellants by refusing to allow them to enter into a legal status which the sameness of their gender prevents them from entering in the first place. Thus Judge Ferren's discussion of adjudicative versus legislative facts in part IV, while fascinating, is ultimately irrelevant to the outcome of this case, [1] and the equal protection issue is moot. It seems obvious that the remedy for the dilemma facing these appellants lies exclusively with the legislature. The Council of the District of Columbia can enact some sort of domestic partners law, bestowing on same-sex couples the same rights already enjoyed by married couples, whenever it wants to. But no court can order a legislature to enact a particular statute so as to achieve a result that the court might consider desirable, or to appropriate money for a purpose that the court might deem worthy of being funded. See Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328, 47 S.Ct. 594, 594-95, 71 L.Ed. 1074 (1927); Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62, 67, 6 S.Ct. 961, 963, 30 L.Ed. 96 (1886); cf. Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 289-290, 13 L.Ed. 693 (1851) (mandamus will not lie against the Secretary of the Treasury to pay a claim when Congress has not appropriated money to pay it). The separation of powers doctrine prohibits such action by a court. Nor can a court alter or expand the definition of marriage, as that term has been understood and accepted for hundreds of years. Thus the Council, and only the Council, can provide Messrs. Dean and Gill with the relief they seek. Having concluded unanimously that it is impossible for two persons of the same sex to marry, this court cannot also conclude that it isor even may bea denial of equal protection to refuse to allow such persons to marry. The two conclusions are inherently inconsistent. [2] If these appellants cannot enter into a marriage because the very nature of marriage makes it impossible for them to do so, then their quest for a marriage license is a futile act, and the District's refusal to issue a license to them is legally and constitutionally meaningless. They are, of course, free to refer to their relationship by whatever name they wish. But it is not a marriage, and calling it a marriage will not make it one. STEADMAN, Associate Judge, concurring: I join Judge FERREN'S compelling analysis of appellants' several arguments in Parts I., II., III., and V. of his comprehensive opinion. However, in my judgment, the marriage statute must be sustained as well against the challenge under constitutional equal protection, applicable within the District of Columbia through the due process cause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500, 74 S.Ct. 693, 694-95, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954). My initial difficulty with a postulate of appellants' analysis, reflected in Judge FERREN'S discussion of equal protection, is its treatment of the marriage statute as the equivalent of a statute expressly addressed to an assertedly suspect class. The marriage statute is simply not the same as, say, a statute prohibiting the employment of homosexuals. Cf. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo.1994) (holding that Amendment 2, which prohibited the state and municipalities from passing legislation to protect homosexuals, infringed on plaintiffs' right to vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). Rather, it is a statute of inclusion of opposite-sex couples who may wish to enter a particular legal status recognized by the state. To the extent it is exclusive, it is exclusive evenly of all same-sex couples, who may, for whatever reason, wish to enter that legal status. [1] I think it would take a considerable stretch to find, in such circumstances, the requisite purposeful or invidious legislative discrimination addressed to homosexuals. See Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2293-94, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (when a neutral law is challenged as having a disparate impact on women, plaintiffs must show purposeful discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-48, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (plaintiffs who alleged a racially disproportionate impact from governmental action must show invidious discrimination on the part of governmental actors). [2] But even assuming that the marriage statute should be analyzed as one of unequal application to homosexuals and assuming further that homosexuals are a quasi-suspect class, as Judge FERREN suggests may be the case, [3] I fail to see an unconstitutional transgression of equal protection. As Judge FERREN demonstrates, the right to marry is a fundamental right only in application to opposite-sex couples. While plainly the marriage state involves far more, [4] the Supreme Court teaches that at bottom the institution reflects considerations fundamental to the very existence and survival of the [human] race, Skinner, supra, 316 U.S. at 541, 62 S.Ct. at 1113, and bound up with sexual relations, procreation, childbirth and child rearing. Zablocki, supra, 434 U.S. at 386, 98 S.Ct. at 681. [5] It seems to me apparent that much the same considerations that elevate opposite-sex marriage to the status of a fundamental right constitute the requisite substantial relationship to an important governmental interest [6] of a statute designed to recognize and promote that fundamental right. Surely, if only opposite-sex marriage is a fundamental right, the state may give separate recognition solely to that institution through a marriage act as here. [7] These and like considerations have led, so far as I am aware, every appellate court in the land presented with the issue to reject federal constitutional challenges to opposite-sex marriage statutes. [8] I am led to the same conclusion.