Opinion ID: 1892335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exceptions to the Charge

Text: The respondent seasonably filed written requests to charge, which, in substance, would have instructed the jury to pass upon the issues of whether the oral confession had been voluntarily given, after proper Miranda warnings and knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. This the Court refused to do, and with respect to the confession gave only the standard charges relating to out-of-court statements of a party. The jury was simply told to determine whether the statement was made, and, if it was, the factors to be determined in assessing its credibility. Both parties discuss Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), and Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967), as determinative of the issue presented. These decisions are, of course, binding upon this Court, but we do not consider that they resolve the issue. As we read Jackson and Sims, two courses of procedure are constitutionally permissible. One is that followed by the trial court, sometimes called the orthodox rule. Under this rule, the court's preliminary determination that the confession was voluntary and admissible is a final determination, and nothing remains for jury determination. The second is the so-called Massachusetts rule, under which the court rules on admissibility, but submits to the jury for final determination the question of voluntariness. The State flatly asserts in its brief that Vermont's procedure is the orthodox rule. It cites no cases for this conclusion, and we know of none which support it. In State v. Rocheleau, supra , we held that the issue need not be presented to the jury where no factual question has been raised by the evidence. That is not, however, the point which is raised here. Although the respondent did not himself testify, a majority feel that cross-examination and the short testimony of one witness, did create a factual issue calling for determination. We judicially notice that, both before and after Jackson, the trial courts of the state, in general, have followed the Massachusetts rule and submitted the issue of voluntariness, where raised, to the jury under appropriate instruction. As far as we can determine, this issue has never been squarely presented to this Court. Now that it is, we feel that the so-called orthodox rule contains aspects of harshness inconsistent with the general administration of criminal law in this jurisdiction. It attaches to the preliminary determination of the court an aura of infallibility which, while it may be consistent with the requirements of the constitution, is not consistent with the general concepts of the right to jury trial. While some of the requests to charge were not fully justified, the general refusal to submit the issue of voluntariness to the jury, and charging them only with respect to credibility, are prejudicial error, requiring reversal.