Opinion ID: 200357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Chief May's Statements

Text: Yohe alleges that Chief May's statements defamed him and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. Specifically, Yohe challenged the following statements that May made to the press: (1) that Yohe was a retired member of the Army Special Forces of Green Berets and has been trained as a sniper; (2) that Yohe had threatened to kill himself and was reported to be armed with several large caliber weapons; and (3) it was [May's] belief that [Yohe] was suicidal. As the district court judge noted, Reading the newspaper articles in their entirety, it is clear that May was simply reporting information he received in his official capacity and which served as the basis for the arrest. He makes clear that the information was derived from witness statements, and qualifies his recitation of facts with phrases like according to witnesses, it was [my] belief, and it was reported. While plaintiff challenges the veracity of the underlying information May gathered from witnesses, he does not refute that those facts were reported to May, or that they were the premise of his conduct. Yohe v. May, No. CIV.A. 00-10802-RWZ, 2002 WL 924225 at  (D.Mass., March 14, 2002). May's statements referring to Yohe's military background, to the fact that he was heavily armed and that he was in a disturbed mental state on May 11, 1997 amount to nothing more than unrefuted statements of fact. Although Yohe now challenges these statements, the fact is that most of them are either true or have -7- never been shown to be false. Yohe carries the burden of showing that each allegedly defamatory statement is materially false. Dulgarian, 420 Mass. at 847; see also Phantom Touring Inc. v. Affiliated Publ'ns, 953 F.2d 724, 727 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that statements made by a media defendant must be provable as false before there can be defamation liability). Moreover, other statements referring to Yohe's background could not -- even if they were proven false -- amount to defamatory language. For instance, Yohe now claims that although he was a Green Beret, he did not receive sniper training. While this aspect of the articles may be inaccurate, inaccuracy by itself does not make a statement defamatory. It is inconceivable that this inaccurate account of Yohe's Special Forces training could hold Yohe up to contempt, hatred, scorn, or ridicule or tend to impair his standing in the community. See Tartaglia, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 696. The only other statement Yohe characterizes as defamatory is the statement May stated it was his belief that [Yohe] was suicidal. Unlike the other challenged statements which recited basic facts about Yohe's background and his conduct on May 11, this statement plainly constitutes Chief May's opinion about Yohe's mental state the night of the arrest. May's opinion was of obvious relevance to the reporters' stories because, as the Telegram article explained, Yohe was arrested under a state law that allows -8- police to take into custody anyone who is considered at risk of harming himself. To determine whether or not a statement is an opinion, a court must 'examine the statement in its totality and in the context in which it was uttered or published. The court must consider all the words used . . . [and] must give weight to cautionary terms used by the person publishing the statement.' Finally, the court must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the statement. Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co., 415 Mass. 258, 263 (1993), quoting Fleming v. Benzaquin, 390 Mass. 175, 180-81 (1983). Here, the qualified language of the statement (it was his belief) makes clear that May was expressing his own opinion about Yohe's mental state on May 11 and 12, 1997. Of course, the fact that a statement is an opinion does not automatically shield it from a defamation claim. After all, expressions of 'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990); Dulgarian, 420 Mass. at 849. Thus, a cause of action for defamation may still be sustained where an opinion implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion. Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Central Broad. Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 227-28 (1979). Chief May's opinion, however, was based on disclosed nondefamatory facts. As the district court correctly noted, May makes clear that the information was derived -9- from witness statements, and qualifies his recitation of facts with phrases like 'according to witnesses' . . . and 'it was reported.' Yohe v. May, 2002 WL 924225 at . Since the articles establish that May's opinion was based on witness statements and reports he received, the logical nexus between the facts and the opinion sufficiently apparent to render unreasonable any inference that the derogatory opinion was must have been based on undisclosed facts. Dulgarian, 420 Mass. at 850-51, quoting Lyons, 415 Mass. at 266. An expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed nondefamatory facts is not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no matter how unjustified or unreasonable the opinion may be or how derogatory it is. Id. Consequently, Chief May's opinion about Yohe's mental state is not actionable. In sum, the statements challenged by Yohe all fall into one of three categories: (1) unrefuted statements of fact; (2) statements which -- although likely false -- could not reasonably be considered offensive to the average person in the community; and (3) statements of opinion based upon disclosed facts. As none of these types of statements provides a basis for a defamation cause of action, Yohe's defamation claim against Chief May fails. Yohe also alleges that Chief May's statements are sufficient to find May liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This claim is premised on precisely the same facts as his defamation claim. To prevail, Yohe must show: (1) -10- that May intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, was beyond all possible bounds of decency and was utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) that May's actions were the cause of Yohe's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by Yohe was severe. Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144-45 (1976) (citations and quotations omitted). Two reporters asked Chief May why thirty police cruisers and a SWAT team descended on a residence in Townsend, Massachusetts. May explained, in the most professional manner possible, that the officers were dispatched to ensure a calm resolution in a domestic dispute involving a heavily armed and potentially suicidal ex-Green Beret. He provided the public with an accurate summary of the facts as they had been reported to him, and, without identifying Yohe by name, justified his decision to arrest him by explaining that he believed Yohe might be suicidal. May's conduct cannot in any way be described as extreme and outrageous. Consequently, Yohe's emotional distress claim fails. Finally, Yohe claims that Chief May made defamatory statements to other law enforcement officials about Yohe being suicidal and dangerous, and that these statements resulted in the false arrest, physical beating, invasion of privacy and warrantless search of Yohe's home. He claims that May's actions violated his -11- constitutional rights and seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These claims have been briefed by the parties and reviewed by this Court, and we find them to be without merit.