Opinion ID: 1972466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The DCYRA, the FYCA, and Dorszynski revisited.

Text: The DCYRA provides that if the court shall find the defendant eligible by age and offense [5] for sentencing as a youth offender, it may sentence [him] for treatment and supervision pursuant to the Act. D.C.Code § 24-803(b) (1989). If the court finds that the youth offender will derive benefit from the provisions of this chapter, the court shall make a statement on the record of the reasons for its determination. Id. § 24-803(c). The Act goes on to state that [i]f the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) of this section, then the court may sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision. Id. § 24-803(d). A statement of reasons is thus explicitly required when a DCYRA sentence is imposed, but there is no comparable requirement that the judge explain his reasons for imposing an adult sentence. Finally, § 24-803(f) provides that the sentencing alternatives provided by sub-sections (a) through (e) are in addition to the options already available to the court. At first blush, there appears to be some tension between the various sub-sections of § 24-803. Section 24-803(b) states that the court may sentence an eligible offender pursuant to the Act, not that the court shall do so. Section 24-803(d), on the other hand, authorizes imposition of an adult sentence ifand thus arguably only if the court finds no benefit. But Section 24-803(f) provides in effect that the sentences available to the judge prior to the passage of the Act remain availablea provision which makes sense only if the judge retains the option to impose an adult sentence on any offender. Veney's argument proceeds from the assumption that if an age-and offense-eligible defendant's prospects of rehabilitation would be enhanced by DCYRA sentencing, then the judge must sentence the offender pursuant to that statute and may not impose an adult sentence, regardless of the potential competing interest of the community. Agreeing with Veney, Judge FERREN characterizes amenability to treatment leading to rehabilitation as the controlling factor. Even if we were writing on a clean slate, this interpretation would be difficult to reconcile with the language of the statute as a whole, and especially with § 24-803(f). Moreover, it runs counter to the trial judge's traditionally broad discretion in the imposition of sentence. See, e.g., In re L.J., 546 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.1988). [6] In any event, Veney's approach and Judge FERREN'S dissenting opinion cannot, in my view, be reconciled with the Supreme Court's decision in Dorszynski. [7] The Supreme Court held unequivocally in Dorszynski that [t]he authority to sentence a youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision is expressly reserved to federal trial courts by [18 U.S.C.] § 5010(d), and thus is within the permissible range of sentences which may be imposed under the Act. The no benefit finding required by the Act is not to be read as a substantive standard which must be satisfied to support a sentence outside the Act, for such a reading would subject the sentence to appellate review even though the sentence was permitted by the Act's terms, thereby limiting the sentencing court's discretion. We will not assume Congress to have intended such a departure from well-established doctrine without a clear expression to disavow it. As our review has shown, the exclusive sentencing power of district judges was acknowledged, and Congress' intention to affirm that power was clearly indicated. 418 U.S. at 441, 94 S.Ct. at 3051 (emphasis added). Indeed, the [FYCA] was intended to increase the sentencing options of federal trial judges, rather than to limit the exercise of their discretion whether to employ the newly created options. Id. at 440, 94 S.Ct. at 3051 (emphasis added); see also Tribble, supra note 7, 447 A.2d at 774. Accordingly, [o]nce it is made clear that the sentencing judge has considered the option of treatment under the Act and rejected it, however, no appellate review is warranted. Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at 443, 94 S.Ct. at 3052; Tribble, 447 A.2d at 774. It is undisputed that, in this case, the trial judge consideredand rejectedthe option of sentencing Veney pursuant to the DCYRA. Later in the Dorszynski opinion, the Court stated that [l]iteral compliance with the Act can be satisfied by any expression that makes clear the sentencing judge considered the alternative of sentencing under the Act and decided that the youth offender would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act. 418 U.S. at 444, 94 S.Ct. at 3053 (emphasis added). Given Chief Justice Burger's repeated allusions to the optional character of FYCA sentencing, however, the Court obviously did not contemplate in the italicized language that statements by the trial judge to the effect that he or she elected not to exercise that option were to be rigorously parsed, as Veney now seeks to parse them, in order to assure that sufficient or even exclusive weight was being accorded to the defendant's personal benefit. Appellate courts should not be subject to the burden of case-by-case examination of the record to make sure that the sentencing judge considered the treatment option made available by the Act. Id. Moreover, in the present case, the judge made an explicit defendant-oriented finding. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated that she had explored the availability of psychiatric counselling at Lorton and at the Youth Center, and that I have not seen anything that would indicate that he will receive better treatment at the Youth Center... than at Lorton. Veney's attorney took the position that [t]he Youth Center is not ideal. It does not have everything that will help and treat Mr. Veney, but it's certainly better and it certainly has more than what regular Lorton, adult Lorton, has. The judge expressly addressed the issue whether the Youth Center would provide Veney with rehabilitative treatment superior to that at Lorton: A Youth Act sentence is inappropriate. I'm satisfied that your treatment as an adult will be just as good as it would be as a youth. Given the context of the lawyers' arguments, the judge's reference to your treatment plainly referred to rehabilitative opportunities. If adult facilities were just as good as those at the Youth Center, then Veney failed to show that DCYRA sentencing would provide him with any benefit from a rehabilitational perspective. The judge was also obviously of the opinion that the safety of the community, as well as the nature of Veney's crime, called for severe punishment. He noted that if he sentenced Veney pursuant to the DCYRA, he would have absolutely no control over the ultimate decision those folks would make when to release you. His concerns were among those which have traditionally been invoked in the sentencing process. See, e.g., Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563-64, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 3220, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1082-83, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949); Butler v. United States, 379 A.2d 948, 950 (D.C.1977). Judge FERREN insists, however, that these authorities are not decisive here because, in his view, the decision whether to impose a DCYRA sentence turns exclusively on the question of rehabilitative benefit to the defendant. It is to that theory I now turn.