Opinion ID: 1953248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the trial court erred by sentencing wilcher based on the same conduct used to condemn him in the companion case?

Text: The conviction of murder of the second victim, Velma Odell Noblin, was offered as an aggravating circumstance. Specifically, the jury was instructed to consider whether the Defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Wilcher contends that the jury should not have been instructed to consider his conviction for Noblin's murder as an aggravating circumstance. Wilcher argues that, by having his conviction in the capital murder of Noblin considered as an aggravating circumstance, the jury was improperly required to weigh the same facts twice against the mitigating evidence, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Cause of the Fifth Amendment. Wilcher correctly states that a capital murder defendant cannot be convicted of both capital murder and the underlying felony; the reason being that the defendant cannot be twice prosecuted for the same actions. See Meeks v. State, 604 So.2d 748, 753 (Miss. 1992). By analogy, Wilcher argues that the same elements or  Blockburger  test precludes the introduction of his conviction of the capital murder conviction of the second victim as an aggravator at the sentencing hearing on the first murder victim. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Wilcher's analogy does not hold true. In this case, the court is not faced with one action for which Wilcher could be prosecuted on either the underlying crime or the capital murder. Rather, there are actually two murder victims  the product of two separate criminal actions by Wilcher. Even though the same facts surround the murder of each victim, there are undeniably two victims, and two counts of capital murder arising from Wilcher's actions. Therefore, the same elements test does not apply. Furthermore, as the Fifth Circuit has observed: [C]onsideration of other crimes at sentencing does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defendant is not actually being punished for the crimes so considered. Rather, the other crimes aggravate his guilt of, and justify heavier punishment for, the specific crime for which defendant has just been convicted. See United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1175 (5th Cir.1977) (rejecting virtually identical double jeopardy argument). Sekou v. Blackburn, 796 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir.1986). Wilcher's argument to the contrary is without merit. Wilcher next argues that, at the original (1982) sentencing trial in this case, his conviction for the capital murder of Moore was not yet final. The only reason his conviction was final at the time of the second (1994) sentencing hearing was because the original death sentence was reversed and the case was remanded for resentencing. He argues that [s]urely the State should not be granted the benefit of its own prior errors. Wilcher's conviction of guilt in both cases has been repeatedly upheld by every court that has considered the matter. Therefore, Wilcher's argument that his conviction for the murder of Katie Belle Moore was not final is specious. See Wilcher I, 448 So.2d 927 (Miss. 1984) (as to capital murder of Noblin), cert denied, Wilcher v. Mississippi, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 231, 83 L.Ed.2d 160 (1984); Wilcher II, 455 So.2d 727 (Miss. 1984) (as to capital murder of Moore); Wilcher III, 479 So.2d 710 (Miss. 1985) (as to consolidated motions for post-conviction relief); Wilcher IV, 978 F.2d 872 (5th Cir.1992) (as to federal habeas corpus action), cert. denied, Wilcher v. Hargett, 510 U.S. 829, 114 S.Ct. 96, 126 L.Ed.2d 63 (1993); Wilcher IV, 635 So.2d 789 (Miss. 1993) (as to remand for resentencing). Wilcher also argues that the trial judge should have granted instruction D-4, which provided as follows: You are allowed to consider, as an aggravating circumstance in this case, whether the defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. The state has offered the conviction of Bobby Wilcher for the capital murder of Velma Odell Noblin as its evidence to support this aggravating circumstance. The Court instructs the jury that the use of this aggravating circumstance does not allow you to punish Bobby Wilcher for any crime other that [sic] the killing of Katie Belle Moore. Indeed, the punishment you assess for the capital murder of Katie Belle Moore will be served in addition to his punishment for the capital murder of Velma Odell Noblin. The trial judge refused the instruction, but indicated that he would have given it if the last sentence were redacted. Defense counsel refused to amend the proposed instruction. Clearly, the instruction would have been granted, but for the last sentence: Indeed, the punishment you assess for the capital murder of Velma Odell Noblin will be served in addition to his punishment for the capital murder of Katie Moore. An analysis of this sentence indicates that it asserts as fact an entirely speculative matter. This Court has repeatedly condemned confusing and misleading instructions. Sudduth v. State, 562 So.2d 67, 72 (Miss. 1990). Therefore, the trial judge properly refused to give the proposed instruction. Wilcher's argument to the contrary is without merit.