Opinion ID: 1902113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the confidential status of the secretary to the business manager

Text: Aside from their jurisdictional arguments, petitioners contend that the Superior Court exceeded its authority by substituting its judgment for that of the labor board when it reversed the board and held that the business manager's secretary is a confidential employee. We disagree and conclude that the court did not exceed the bounds of its scope of review under the APA. As an initial matter it must be recognized that this court has not indicated previously whether employees who have unusual access to confidential labor relations materials or stand in confidential relationships to their employers may be precluded from membership in collective bargaining units. Such confidential employees are not excluded expressly from the ambit of the Labor Relations Act or of other legislation authorizing workers to bargain collectively if they so choose. [7] However, in the past we have followed the federal practice in holding that managerial and supervisory employees may not engage in collective bargaining. State v. Local No. 2883, AFSCME, 463 A.2d 186 (R.I. 1983). We are persuaded that many of the factors that caused us to arrive at our decision in Local No. 2883 are present in the instant case. The labor board's long-standing convention is to bar confidential employees from belonging to a bargaining unit, as it did with managerial and supervisory employees even before we ratified this practice in Local No. 2883. The labor board's administration of the state's labor laws clearly merits some consideration by this court. Additionally the same sorts of policy concerns that pointed toward our precluding managerial and supervisory employees from bargaining collectively in Local No. 2883 are manifest in the case at bar. As with managerial and supervisory employees, to allow confidential employees to be union members would be to undermine the equality of bargaining power that the provisions of the Labor Relations Act seek to foster. It would be unfair for an employee who is entrusted with advance knowledge of his or her employer's labor relations policies to be able to share this information with a union that serves as that employee's collective bargaining representative. If a union were able to obtain such one-sided access to management's sensitive labor relations data, it would have a substantial and unwarranted advantage in its dealings with management. In other less frequent instances, prohibiting confidential employees from taking part in collective bargaining benefits labor by protecting a union from having to accept an employee into its ranks who will be sympathetic to management in prospective struggles. See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 194-95, 102 S.Ct. 216, 231, 70 L.Ed.2d 323, 341 (1981) (Powell, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). We are convinced accordingly that to preserve the integrity of the collective bargaining process, confidential employees must be excluded from membership in a collective bargaining unit. We now turn our attention to which employees should be deemed confidential employees. Both the labor board and the Superior Court in its review of the board's decision embraced the test developed by the NLRB to assess the alleged confidential status of an employee, the labor-nexus test. The labor-nexus test is meant to be narrow in its application. Two categories of employees are recognized as confidential under the test and are therefore excluded from collective bargaining. The first category comprises those confidential employees `who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations.' Id. at 173, 102 S.Ct. at 220, 70 L.Ed.2d at 327-28 (quoting B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956)). The second category consists of those employees who, in the course of their duties,  `regularly have access to confidential information concerning anticipated changes which may result from collective bargaining negotiations.' 454 U.S. at 189, 102 S.Ct. at 228, 70 L.Ed.2d at 337 (quoting Pullman Standard Division of Pullman, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 762, 762-63 (1974)). For an employee to be considered a confidential employee, his or her job responsibilities must fall within at least one of the two categories. In regard to the first category, the supervisor of the employee whose status is under consideration must have ongoing responsibility for developing labor policy. This qualification is to prevent an employer from temporarily investing a supervisor with influence over labor matters so that his or her personal secretary or assistant might be precluded from belonging to a bargaining unit. In this vein, employees who assist persons who merely serve as consultants or advisors in the field of labor relations do not fall within the scope of the test. Holly Sugar Corp., 193 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1971). The relevant supervisor must also operate at a higher level than merely implementing routine, day-to-day administrative decisions needed to carry out a collective bargaining agreement or other labor policy without having any meaningful input into the contours of such an agreement or policy. See S. Mukamal & J. Grenig, Collective Bargaining: The Exclusion of Confidential and Managerial Employees, 22 Duq. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1983). Some tangible influence by the supervisor on the development of labor policy is required because many employees in an organizational hierarchy have an arguably confidential relationship with a superior who at least effectuates labor policy. A more expansive application of the exclusionary rule would deprive a great number of employees, in an unwarranted fashion, of the statutory right to bargain collectively. See Note, The Labor-Nexus Limitation on the Exclusion of Confidential Employees  NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 16 Ga. L. Rev. 745, 754 (1982) (citing Union Oil Co. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 852, 853 (9th Cir.1979)). In regard to the second category, the employee in question must be in a confidential work relationship with a specifically identifiable managerial employee responsible for labor policy. NLRB v. Lorimar Productions, Inc., 771 F.2d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir.1985) (citing Union Oil Co. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 852, 853 (9th Cir.1979)). Casual access to labor-related information is not enough to disqualify an employee from belonging to a bargaining unit. For example, the mere typing of or handling of confidential labor relations material does not, without more, imply confidential status. United States Postal Service, 232 N.L.R.B. 556 (1978); Ernst & Ernst National Warehouse, 228 N.L.R.B. 590 (1977). The employee at issue must have regular and considerable access to such confidential information as a result of his or her job duties. The scope of the exclusionary rule does not extend to employees who have such access on an occasional, substitute, or overflow basis. See 22 Duq. L. Rev. at 22-23. We are persuaded that the labor-nexus test strengthens the practice of collective bargaining in line with the objectives of the Rhode Island Labor Relations Act. In its usual application it is premised upon denying labor unfair access to management's confidential labor-relations strategies and data when management would not have similar access to labor's sensitive labor relations material. As a consequence it tends to encourage equitable collective bargaining between labor and management. We therefore adopt the labor-nexus test for purposes of this case as the proper method of ascertaining whether an employee performs confidential duties and should accordingly be precluded from membership in a bargaining unit. In utilizing the labor-nexus test in the case at bar, neither the labor board nor the Superior Court committed an error of law. However, we decline at this time to embrace the labor-nexus test as necessarily controlling in all future instances. It may be that a broader definition of those employees considered to be confidential would be desirable in other circumstances. [8] Because both tribunals below followed the dictates of the labor-nexus test in reaching their conclusions, we need not determine the appropriate scope of the test presently. We now turn our attention to whether the Superior Court substituted its judgment for that of the labor board outside the bounds of its statutory power of review. As we have indicated, the operations of the labor board are included within the ambit of the APA's coverage and subject to its procedural requirements. See § 42-35-18. We therefore look to the APA's procedures for judicial review to determine whether the Superior Court exceeded its authority in the case at bar. Under the terms of the APA, appellate jurisdiction in the Superior Court is conferred by § 42-35-15 to review final orders and certain interlocutory orders of state administrative agencies not exempted explicitly from the provisions of the act. The court is limited to an examination of the certified record to determine if there is any legally competent evidence therein to support the agency's decision. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Caldarone, 520 A.2d 969, 972 (R.I. 1987); Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg, 118 R.I. 596, 607, 376 A.2d 1, 6 (1977). The Superior Court is not to substitute its judgment on questions of fact for that of the agency whose actions are under review. Lemoine v. Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, 113 R.I. 285, 291, 320 A.2d 611, 614-15 (1974). This is so even in situations in which the court, after examining the certified record, might be inclined to view the evidence differently and draw different inferences from those of the agency below. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 506, 246 A.2d 213, 214-15 (1968). If competent evidence exists in the record considered as a whole, the court is required to uphold the agency's conclusions. However, it may reverse, modify, or remand the agency's decision if the decision is violative of constitutional or statutory provisions, is in excess of the statutory authority of the agency, is made upon unlawful procedure, is affected by other errors of law, is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record, or is arbitrary or capricious and is therefore characterized by an abuse of discretion. Section 42-35-15(g). In the instant case the Superior Court examined the certified record and determined that the board's finding that the secretary to the business manager is a nonconfidential employee under the labor-nexus test was clearly erroneous in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole. See § 42-35-15(g)(5). The court was persuaded that this evidence indicates that the position is one in which the secretary has regular access to confidential information concerning collective bargaining matters, anticipated contract changes, and disciplinary matters. It could find no competent evidence to the contrary. As a consequence the court reversed the decision of the labor board in regard to the confidential status of the business manager's secretary. Our consideration of the final judgment of the Superior Court rendered in proceedings brought under § 42-35-15 is confined to a review by writ of certiorari of any questions of law involved. Section 42-35-16. We have described this function previously as determining whether there is any legally competent evidence to support the actions of the reviewing court. Herald Press Inc. v. Norberg, 122 R.I. 264, 405 A.2d 1171 (1979); Correia v. Norberg, 120 R.I. 793, 391 A.2d 94 (1978). In the case at bar this determination means that we must examine the record of the Superior Court to see whether the court concluded properly that the labor board's ruling was unsupported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole and was therefore clearly erroneous. We do not weigh the evidence but merely ascertain whether the court was justified in its modification or reversal of the board's order. Prospecting Unlimited, Inc. v. Norberg, 119 R.I. 116, 123, 376 A.2d 702, 706 (1977). If there is in fact no reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record to sustain the board's findings, we are constrained to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. We now turn to our examination of the certified record. Extensive probative evidence is contained in the record concerning the duties of both the business manager and the secretary to the business manager and how those responsibilities have been carried out previously. It is undisputed that the school committee's business manager formulates, determines, and effectuates management policies for the school department in the field of labor relations. The business manager, Ralph Malafronte (Malafronte), is responsible for conducting labor relations with three certified unions, including the union involved in this litigation. In the past Malafronte has served as chief negotiator for the school committee in both the custodial and the clerical employee bargaining units. In this capacity, he arranged confidential financial information, generated and reviewed bargaining proposals, and made recommendations to the school committee about management strategy. Malafronte also served as the school committee's designee to hear pre-arbitration grievances concerning custodial and maintenance workers. He was frequently involved in sensitive discussions with legal counsel about all these matters. In addition Malafronte played a significant role in running the school committee's campaign during the union's representation election. It is uncontroverted that Malafronte performed all these duties in the past and is expected to do so for the foreseeable future. There is some conflict in the record regarding the job description and actual responsibilities of the secretary to the business manager. However, the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole indicates that the secretary to the business manager has complete access to any privileged labor relations material that passes through the business manager's office. The secretary, Sandra Whittaker (Whittaker), testified that she types and files most of, if not all, the confidential information used by the business manager for disciplinary matters and employee grievances. Consequently she has familiarity with the school committee's position on grievances before it is otherwise disclosed. Whittaker's duties have also included preparing salary schedules and contract proposals for negotiations with teachers and custodial and maintenance workers. Additionally she has handled all confidential correspondence between the business manager and legal counsel concerning labor negotiations. Because of her duties Whittaker has advance knowledge of the school committee's negotiating strategy including awareness of proposals that have been approved but not actually submitted to the unions. With reference to the representation election related to the case at bar, she prepared all correspondence pertaining to the election, including information concerning the school committee's election tactics. All these facts were supported by the credible and reliable evidence reviewed by the Superior Court. From our examination of the certified record, we are convinced that the Superior Court concluded properly that the labor board's decision was clearly erroneous. There is no competent evidence in the record in accordance with the dictates of the labor-nexus test to support the board's finding that the business manager's secretary should not be excluded from the bargaining unit. Under the labor-nexus test, for an employee to be deemed a confidential employee for collective bargaining purposes, he or she must either `assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations' or `regularly have access to confidential information concerning anticipated changes which may result from collective-bargaining negotiations.' Hendricks, 454 U.S. at 189, 102 S.Ct. at 228, 70 L.Ed.2d at 337. The facts of the case at bar fulfill without question the requirements of both aspects of the labor-nexus test. It is apparent from the record that the business manager to the school committee has significant responsibility for developing and carrying out management policies in the labor relations field. This responsibility is neither provisional nor minor but is ongoing and prominent. It is discharged at a high level in the school committee's operation. It goes beyond simply administering policies that one did not have a meaningful role in shaping. It is equally evident from the record that the secretary to the business manager acts in a confidential capacity to the business manager. She is his personal secretary and is primarily responsible for the preparation and handling of sensitive labor relations material in the business manager's office. As a consequence her position is plainly a confidential one under the labor-nexus test. The secretary to the business manager must also be considered a confidential employee in light of her substantial and steady access to privileged labor relations materials. It is uncontroverted in the record that she has access to sensitive data concerning contract proposals being formulated by the school committee. This access is regular and considerable. It is not occasional or the result of temporary assignment. She not only has been entrusted in the past with knowledge of management strategy under discussion but also has had advance familiarity with tactics that have actually been decided upon. If she were to be included in the bargaining unit, the union might become prematurely acquainted with this kind of information and would gain an unjust advantage in negotiations and in grievance matters. The nature of her actual contact with confidential labor relations information puts her clearly within the ambit of the labor-nexus test. After a searching review of the evidence presented, we conclude that there is no competent evidence in the record considered as a whole to support the labor board's decision to include the position of secretary to the business manager within the bargaining unit. For the reasons stated, the petition for certiorari is denied. The writ heretofore issued is quashed. The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, and the papers in this case may be remanded to the Superior Court with our decision endorsed thereon. FAY, C.J., did not participate.