Opinion ID: 1924373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: [¶2] This proceeding began, as medical malpractice cases generally must begin, with a notice of claim and a prelitigation screening panel. See 24 M.R.S. §§ 2851-2859 (2006). The panel unanimously found that (1) Hawthorne deviated from the applicable standard of medical care in treating James Smith; (2) the deviation did not proximately cause Smith's injury; and (3) Smith's negligence was not greater than or equal to Hawthorne's. With regard to its first finding, the panel specifically found that Hawthorne had deviated from the standard of care regarding only one of four allegations in the notice of claim. The allegation on which the panel unanimously found that Hawthorne had deviated from the standard of care stated: The wound at the fracture site was leaking from a sore at three months. Dr. Hawthorne failed to have a culture taken, a sedimentation rate done, or antibiotics administered. This open wound continued through December of 1997 and, at that time, there was a high index of suspicion of infection reflected in the x-rays. Despite all of these indications, Dr. Hawthorne did not adequately treat this patient for suspected osteomyelitis at that time. [¶ 3] There have been three jury trials in this matter. The first ended in a mistrial. The second resulted in a verdict for Hawthorne and led to our opinion in Smith v. Hawthorne ( Smith I ), 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433. In Smith I, we vacated the judgment because the court had admitted into evidence only the second finding of the panel, that is, the finding that Hawthorne's acts or omissions complained of by the Smiths were not the legal cause of the injuries that [Smith] has alleged. Smith I, 2006 ME 19, ¶¶ 6, 25, 892 A.2d at 435, 439-40. In Smith I, a majority of the Court held that when a court admits the causation finding, it is required to admit the negligence finding as well. Id. ¶ 25, 892 A.2d at 439-40. That majority split on the rationale, with two justices determining that the constitutional right to a jury trial requires both findings to be admitted if any finding is admitted, id. ¶ 22, 892 A.2d at 439; and two justices concurring, but preferring to interpret 24 M.R.S. § 2857(1) to require all unanimous findings to be submitted to the jury, id. ¶ 34, 892 A.2d at 441 (Alexander, J., concurring). [¶4] On remand, Smith requested that both the negligence and causation findings be presented to the jury. Hawthorne objected and requested that no findings be given to the jury. The trial court granted Smith's request. [¶ 5] At the beginning of the trial, the court allowed Smith's counsel to make the following statement to the jury: The Pre-litigation Screening Panel unanimously found that the wound at the fracture site was leaking from a sore at three months. Dr. Hawthorne failed to have a culture taken, a sedimentation rate done or antibiotics administered. This open wound continued through December of 1997, and, at that time, there was a high index of suspicion of infection reflected in the x-rays. Despite all these indications, Dr. Hawthorne did not adequately treat this patient for suspected osteomyelitis at that time. The panel also found that the acts or omissions complained of did not proximately cause the injury complained of or as found by the panel or as agreed by the parties. [¶ 6] The court thereafter addressed the jury with a brief explanation of the prelitigation process, as we required in Irish v. Gimbel, 1997 ME 50, ¶ 12, 691 A.2d 664, 671, including naming the panel members, cautioning the jury that it was not bound by the panel's findings, and explaining that the evidence the panel heard may or may not be the same evidence that the jury would be hearing. [¶ 7] The jury eventually reached a verdict for the Smiths in the amount of $140,000 plus interest and costs.