Opinion ID: 1345660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF SANTOSKY v. KRAMER

Text: In Santosky v. Kramer , the United States Supreme Court addressed a challenge to a provision of the New York Family Court Act which permitted the State to terminate, over parental objections, the rights of parents in their natural child upon a finding that the child was `permanently neglected.' [1] The New York law required that only a `fair preponderance of the evidence' support the court's finding. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747. The petitioners, parents whose parental rights had been terminated pursuant to the statute, asserted that the standard of proof called for in the statute violated their Fourteenth Amendment right of due process. The Court agreed. Initially, the Court noted that natural parents possess a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and management of their child protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. Before the State may destroy the weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754. Determining what process was due petitioners, the Court balanced the `three distinct factors' set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976): the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754. Applying those factors to the New York statute, the Court held that the fair preponderance of the evidence standard violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758. Summarizing its analysis of the statute, the Court concluded In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight. Evaluation of the three Eldridge factors compels the conclusion that use of a fair preponderance of the evidence standard in such proceedings is inconsistent with due process. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758. Striking down the standard of proof set forth in the New York statute, the Court held that before a state could sever the parental rights of parents in their child, due process required that the State support its allegations by a minimum of clear and convincing evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769-70. In its analysis of the private interest affected by the statute, the Court noted that victory for the State under the statute entail[ed] a judicial determination that the parents are unfit to raise their own children. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760. Discussing the family court judge's express refusal to terminate the petitioners' parental rights on a `non-statutory, no-fault basis ...', the Court stated Nor is it clear that the State constitutionally could terminate a parent's rights without showing parental unfitness. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 [54 L.Ed.2d 511, 98 S.Ct. 549] (1978) (We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended `[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest,' quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 [53 L.Ed.2d 14, 97 S.Ct. 2094] (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)). Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 n. 10.