Opinion ID: 1057791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reference to Death Row

Text: The term death row was used three times during the testimony of Thomas Mach, a mitigation witness for the defense: [Counsel for Defendant]: And how is it that you know Mr. Michael Rimmer? [Witness]: I visited him in prison. I'm involved in prison ministry at Riverbend. . . . . [Counsel for Defendant]: Now, you stated you met Michael while he was on death row? [Witness]: Yes, sir. [Counsel for Defendant]: And how would you describe his interest in the services and the worship services? [Witness]: Michael's done amazing things in unit four. When he was taken off of death row and went to unit four, . . . he got eighteen men interested in the [B]ible. . . . The following colloquy occurred on cross-examination of the witness: [State]: How long have you known the defendant in prison? [Witness]: Since I met him on death row. No objections were made during any of these instances. During final argument, the subject was not addressed. The State argues that because the Defendant did not raise this issue in his motion for new trial, it has been waived. We disagree. Because this is a capital case, the Defendant may raise this on review at this stage because of the exception to the waiver doctrine in capital cases. See State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 880-81 (Tenn.1998). This exception arises from the legislative mandate that this Court review all capital cases. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-206 (2006). This is consistent with our prior practice. In other cases of mandatory review, we have noted that [i]n light of this clear statutory directive, it would be anomalous, in our view, to hold that review is precluded because the motion for new trial was not timely filed. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 880-81. While the issue is reviewable, we nevertheless hold that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. The United States Supreme Court has held that introduction of prior evidence of a death sentence was not constitutional error when the evidence did not affirmatively [mislead] the jury regarding its role in the sentencing process so as to diminish its sense of responsibility. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 10, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994). We have previously stated that it is clearly improper, as a general rule, to inform a jury at a resentencing hearing that at a prior trial Defendant was sentenced to death. State v. Miller, 771 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tenn.1989). However, this general bar against the sentencing jury hearing evidence of a prior sentence of death is subject to qualification. In Miller , for example, this Court recognized that a defendant could open the door to questions about death row. Id. The defense wanted to present evidence that Miller had become a born again Christian. The prosecution did not object to this evidence but wanted to cross examine the witness to show that at the time Miller had been baptized, he was under a sentence of death from a previous trial. In a pretrial hearing, the trial judge ordered that the defense could offer evidence that Miller had found religion, but also permitted the State to cross examine the witness about the fact that he had been under a sentence of death at the time. The defense decided not to admit the evidence and appealed the ruling. This Court refused to find error, holding that when a defendant claims a change of heart, the circumstances of the conversion are relevant, including that he was on death row at the time. Id. We observed that the propriety of the admission of the prior death sentence would depend upon the manner in which the State . . . introduced evidence of the prior sentence. . . . Id. This case is factually distinguishable from Miller . The jury never actually heard evidence that Miller had been on death row because he chose not to testify after the pretrial ruling. Id. Here, the reference to death row during the sentencing hearing was first made by a defense witness in response to a question by defense counsel. Generally, proof that a defendant in a resentencing hearing has previously been sentenced to die is improper; whether it is reversible error depends on the specific manner in which the evidence was presented. Id. [5] The first reference to death row by the witness Mach appears to have been inadvertent. During the line of questioning by defense counsel, Mach mentioned death row in the context of their first meeting. The third reference came from the same witness in response to a question by the State, asking how long he had been acquainted with the Defendant. He responded, Since I met him on death row. The nature and context of the prosecutor's question does not suggest that it was calculated to solicit the specific response about death row. The witness could have just as likely have said he had known the Defendant for a specific period of time or since he met him in prison, and the jury was already aware that the Defendant had spent time there. There is no evidence that it was the intention of the prosecutor to use the fact that the Defendant had been on death row to prejudice the Defendant. To the contrary, the State neither drew attention to the mention of death row at the time it occurred nor did the prosecutor bring it up during closing arguments. Given the circumstances and the manner in which the allusion to death row came out, the Defendant is not entitled to relief. See Miller, 771 S.W.2d at 404. As the United States Supreme Court noted, it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every . . . influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). Because the references to death row were by a defense witness in response to questions by defense counsel and because the State neither solicited nor actively used that fact in the prosecution, the general rule prohibiting such references is inapplicable.