Opinion ID: 392819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: payment bond

Text: 25 The summary judgment against Muscarelle and American was based upon a payment bond issued by American binding itself and Muscarelle, jointly and severally, for payment of any and all claims arising from material or labor provided to the Hollis project. 8 Appellants concede that Dravo is a claimant within the bond's definition of that term. They assert, however, that the district court held improperly that Dravo complied with the notice requirement for payment under that bond. 26 The Bond provides that before any suit may be commenced thereon, a claimant must serve: 27 Written notice to any two of the following: The Principal, the Owner, or the Surety ..., within ninety (90) days after such claimant did or performed the last of the work or labor, or furnished the last of the materials for which said claim is made, stating with substantial accuracy the amount claimed and the name of the party to whom the materials were furnished, or for whom the work or labor was done or performed. 28 Paragraph 3(a) of Labor & Material Payment Bond Exhibit E, reprinted in Appendix at 170a. The district court held that Dravo's letter of February 19, 1973, addressed to Ideal, was sufficient to comply with this notice provision. 29 The appellants contend that the letter did not serve as sufficient notice because: (1) it was not timely; (2) it was only given to one of the three designated parties; and (3) it did not indicate that a claim was being made under the payment bond. If the notice was defective in any one of these three ways, this court must reverse the lower court's summary judgment. Untimely Notice 30 Paragraph 3 of the payment bond requires that notice be given within ninety (90) days after such claimant did or performed the last of the work or labor, or furnished the last of the materials for which such claim is made. Appellants claim that Dravo's letter of February 19, 1973 failed to constitute timely notice because it was delivered more than ninety days after September 26, 1972, the date on which the last of the materials ordered by Kerris was delivered. It also argues that the trial court erred in selecting the date of Dravo's start-up services as the measuring date; appellants contend that even if the start-up services were services within the meaning of the bond, 9 they took place after, not before, the February 19 letter. Consequently, the February 19 letter could not be within ninety (90) days after the date of the last service. 31 We agree with the district court (i)f September 26, 1972 is the date of last performance, then plaintiff's February 19, 1973 notice would be untimely. We disagree, however, with its holding that if we consider Dravo's completion of the start-up services as the time from which the ninety days was to be measured, then the February 19 letter was timely notice. 10 32 The district court reasoned that the notice given by Dravo before it began its start-up services was timely because the bond's reference to within permitted the notice to be either ninety days before or ninety days after commencement of the last labor or work. The district court believed: 33 It was eminently reasonable for plaintiff to notify the general contractor of this deficiency prior to engaging in its last labor or work, or last furnished materials at the job site. The word within itself, as a measurement of time, is variously defined. However, the concept of within clearly does not suggest a commencing point in time. Rather, the term is used as a terminus in time for the happening of an event. Construed strictly against the drafter, notice prior to commencing the last work, is certainly within 90 days after completion. 34