Opinion ID: 2633519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Easterling's constitutional right to a public trial violated?

Text: ¶ 16 The State argues that though Jackson's and Easterling's cases were joined, the proceedings in question related to Jackson's requests to sever and dismiss and, thus, were not a part of Easterling's trial. It reasons that Easterling's public trial right was not violated, even in the face of an improper courtroom closure, because it was Jackson's public trial right that was then at issue, and Jackson's attorney waived that right by requesting the closed proceeding. In response, Easterling asserts that the trial court's decision to close the courtroom and to entertain a codefendant's motions to sever and dismiss during a closed, sealed proceeding were necessarily a part of his trial. Easterling asserts that this is because Jackson's motions were made prior to severance and directly impacted the posture, if not the substance, of the State's case against him. ¶ 17 We agree with both parties that this case does present a unique situation. In Bone-Club, the party requesting closure was the State. In Orange and State v. Brightman, 155 Wash.2d 506, 122 P.3d 150 (2005), we were confronted with cases where the trial court had ordered closure sua sponte. In all three cases, a single defendant was being tried. Those cases presented clear cut facts which compelled us to hold that the improper closure violated the affected defendant's right to a public trial. In this case, a codefendant requested the courtroom closure, and there was no objection from the State or the complaining defendant, Easterling. Neither the State nor Easterling cite to any precedent from this State or other jurisdictions indicating whether or not a co-defendant's pretrial motions implicate the other codefendant's public trial right. The State briefly argues that the joinder rules under CrR 4.3 [9] do not compel that result, but a review of these rules does not lend support to the State's position. ¶ 18 Due to the lack of precedent on this narrow issue, we rely heavily upon our prior decisions relating to article I, section 22 of our state constitution, which require trial courts to strictly adhere to the well-established guidelines for closing a courtroom and upon public policy as made manifest by the federal and state constitutions which favors keeping criminal judicial proceedings open to the public unless there is a compelling interest warranting closure. Accord Brightman, 155 Wash.2d 506, 122 P.3d 150; Orange, 152 Wash.2d 795, 100 P.3d 291; Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d 254, 906 P.2d 325. In light of these precedents, we conclude that Jackson's motion to sever his trial from Easterling's pertained to Easterling's trial and thereby implicated his right to a public trial under the Washington Constitution. We hold, additionally, that the trial court committed reversible error by fully closing the courtroom to Easterling and the public. ¶ 19 Our holdings are compelled by the record, which demonstrates that Easterling and Jackson were charged together pursuant to the same information and were being jointly tried at the time of the courtroom closure. The record shows also that the request to close the courtroom and the closed proceeding itself were necessarily a part of Easterling's trial because they involved a motion to sever Easterling's case from Jackson's and a motion to dismiss one party from the joint criminal proceeding. The joint proceedings terminated only when Jackson reached a plea agreement with the State and agreed to testify against Easterlinga point in time after the trial court closed the courtroom to the public and to Easterling and after the closed proceeding was held. ¶ 20 Our holding is further dictated by our interest in protecting the transparency and fairness of criminal trials by ensuring that all stages of courtroom proceedings remain open unless the trial court identifies a compelling interest to be served by closure. The record here demonstrates that the trial court closed the courtroom to consider Jackson's pretrial motions without identifying any interest justifying closure of the courtroom. [10] This action undermined the fairness of the process by precluding Easterling from arguing for or against the motion to sever during the subsequent closed proceeding. We conclude that this impact upon the posture of Easterling's case warrants our holding that Jackson's motions and the proceedings relating to them were a part of Easterling's trial, thereby implicating his public trial rights. B. Was the public's constitutional right to an open public trial violated? ¶ 21 Were we to conclude that the closure did not violate Easterling's constitutional right to a public trial, the trial court's failure to comply with Bone-Club still constitutes a violation of the public's right under article I, section 10 to an open public trial, which exists separately from Easterling's right. Accord Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 7, 106 S.Ct. 2735 (the right to an open public trial is a shared right of the accused under the Sixth Amendment and the public under the First Amendment, the common concern being the issue of fairness). We come to this conclusion because the record plainly shows the trial court specifically excluded the public from the closed courtroom hearing. This decision to close a part of a criminal trial to the public runs afoul of the article I, section 10 guaranty of providing open access to criminal proceedings. It also runs contrary to this court's consistent position of strictly protecting the public's and the press's right to view the administration of justice. Accord Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash.2d 205, 848 P.2d 1258 (1993); Ishikawa, 97 Wash.2d 30, 640 P.2d 716. ¶ 22 The State correctly points out that the public's exclusion from a criminal proceeding does not always amount to finding constitutional error. However, contrary to what case law and constitutional protections required, the trial court erred when it neither identified a compelling interest warranting the public's exclusion from the pretrial process nor made specific findings that showed it weighed the competing interest of Jackson as the proponent of closure against the public's interest in maintaining unhindered access to judicial proceedings. Accord Orange, 152 Wash.2d at 800, 100 P.3d 291 (absent a closure order narrowly drawn to protect a clearly identified interest, a trial court may not exclude the public or press from any stage of a criminal trial). ¶ 23 In sum, we conclude that the closed proceeding did pertain to, and was a part of, Easterling's trial. The record shows the trial court closed the courtroom to Easterling and to the public prior to severance of the joint proceeding, necessarily impacting the posture and fairness of Easterling's trial. Further, contrary to what the State would have us hold, we do not believe that either a criminal defendant's or the public's right to a public trial is waived simply because a codefendant in a joint criminal trial requested the courtroom closure. It was the request to close itself, and not the party who made the request, that triggered the trial court's duty to apply the five-part Bone-Club requirements. The trial court's failure to apply that test constitutes reversible error.