Opinion ID: 71480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Number of Victims in Williams's Case

Text: Williams's second assignment of error is that the district court enhanced his sentence four levels based on its finding that his offense had involved fifty or more victims. Williams objected to this enhancement, because only eight of the sixty-three financial institutions identified as victims by the district court suffered an actual loss. The Government correctly concedes that it was error to apply this enhancement in its brief, explaining that: In the application notes to § 2B1.1, `victim' is defined to include `any person who sustained any part of the actual loss determined under subsection (b)(1).' USSG § 2B1.1, comment. (n.1) (emphasis added). `Actual loss' is `the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.' Id. (n.3(A)(I)). `Pecuniary harm' means `harm that is monetary or that otherwise is measurable in money.' Id. (n.3(A)(iii)). Here, only eight of the 63 financial institutions that had issued the credit cards improperly skimmed by Williams suffered an `actual loss' .... Thus, only those eight financial institutions would qualify as `victims' under the plain language of § 2B1.1, and it was error for all 63 banks to be counted in calculating the four-level enhancement for more than 50 `victims.' See, e.g., United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 489 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that, under language of § 2B1.1, `actual loss' must be suffered to qualify as a `victim' under § 2B1.1(b)(2)). However, the Government argues that this error does not require remand, because Williams's sentence fell within the correct range, and because it asserts that the record adequately demonstrates that the district court would have imposed the same sentence without the error. Williams argues that the record does not show that the district court would have selected the same sentence if it had calculated the correct range. Under the district court's erroneous interpretation of the Guidelines, Williams's recommended range would have been seventy-eight to ninety-seven months, had he not pleaded guilty only to conspiracy. Because Williams pleaded guilty only to conspiracy, the Guidelines recommended a sentence of sixty months under USSG § 5G1.1(a). [16] If the district court had correctly assessed the number of victims, Williams's recommended range normally would have been fifty-one to sixty-three months, which would have been reduced by the statutory maximum for conspiracy to a range of fifty-one to sixty months. See USSG § 5G1.1(c)(1). A procedural error made during sentencing is harmless if the error did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed. United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir.2009) (citing Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1120-21, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992)). The burden of establishing that an error is harmless rests on the party seeking to uphold the sentence. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d at 753. The proponent of the sentence must point to evidence in the record that will convince us that the district court had a particular sentence in mind and would have imposed it, notwithstanding the error made in arriving at the defendant's guideline range. Id. (quoting United States v. Huskey, 137 F.3d 283, 289 (5th Cir.1998)). We use this method of analysis even when the sentence selected under a district court's erroneous interpretation of the Guidelines would have fallen within the correct range. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d at 753. [T]he crux of the harmless-error inquiry is whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence, not whether the district court could have imposed the same sentence. Id. (emphasis in original). The fact that the actual sentence fell within the properly calculated Guidelines range may sometimes be relevant to the harmless-error inquiry, but it is not dispositive. Id. After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the district court would have imposed the same sentence if it had properly calculated Williams's Guidelines range. The Government points to several statements made by the district court at Williams's sentencing hearing as support for its argument that the district court would have imposed the same sentence if it had correctly calculated the guidelines range: [Y]ou are dealing with over 500 cards that were skimmed improperly, that is why the Guidelines are so high, and I think this qualifies as a serious offense.    So I think the Guideline range is appropriate in this case. It is reasonable for the conduct. It is a serious offense. And frankly, Mr. Williams, you received a break by the fact that your lawyer was able to work out a plea agreement to get you to plead guilty to a conspiracy. If you had pled guilty to the underlying statute, you would be looking at 78 to 97 months or six to eight years confinement. That is where your Guidelines are. By working a plea agreement for conspiracy, you limited your exposure to 60 months. ... So I think the Guideline range is reasonable in light of the conduct that is involved here, the type of crime, and the magnitude of the crime .... (emphasis added). We find that these statements are ambiguous, because it is unclear to us whether, in speaking of the Guideline range, the district court was referring to the seventy-eight to ninety-seven month range that would normally have been recommended or to the sixty month range that was technically recommended in Williams's case due to the fact that he pleaded guilty to conspiracy. While the sixty month range was the official Guidelines range for Williams's case, the district court also referred to the seventy-eight to ninety-seven month range as where your Guidelines are. Furthermore, that the district court found its miscalculated Guidelines range reasonable would not necessarily mean that it would have issued the same sixty month sentence if it had been apprised of the correct range. This is true whether the range to which the district court referred was the sixty month sentence or the seventy-eight to ninety-seven month sentence. We have nothing that indicates to us, with the confidence needed to satisfy the standard of harmless error review on this issue, that the district court would have sentenced Williams to sixty months' imprisonment if it had calculated his Guidelines range correctly. Therefore, we must vacate Williams's sentence and remand it to the district court, so that it may sentence him after considering the correct Guidelines range for his offense, fifty-one to sixty months. The district court may decide not to alter Williams's original sentence, but the sentence must be reconsidered.