Opinion ID: 6346167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Saving Clause Application

Text: The government has conceded that Santiago meets the ﬁrst two criteria of the saving clause: he relies on a new statutory case (Rehaif) that applies retroactively. Our focus on appeal is the third element, whether Santiago has shown or could show that the government’s failure to prove knowledge of his felon status caused a miscarriage of justice because he was actually innocent of the felon-in-possession crimes. In deciding actual innocence for purposes of the § 2255(e) saving clause, we have borrowed the actual innocence standard that applies to a prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 or 2255 despite a procedural default of his claim. See, e.g., Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d 962, 964–65 (7th Cir. 2017) (prisoner seeking relief under § 2241 must show it is “more likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt” he was guilty of oﬀense), citing House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (§ 2254 petitioner showed actual innocence to excuse procedural default), and Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (adopting standard for actual innocence under § 2254). The Supreme Court applied that standard to a federal prisoner’s § 2241 petition in a similar context, a change in the courts’ understanding of the scope of a federal criminal statute. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998), quoting the Schlup “no reasonable juror” standard. 3 3 In Bousley, the petitioner filed his petition under § 2241, but the district court had treated it as a § 2255 motion. Under either characterization, the Supreme Court applied the demanding Schlup standard for actual innocence. We see no reason to apply a less demanding standard to Santiago’s petition under § 2241, where the key factual question was Santiago’s subjective knowledge of his own criminal record at the times he possessed the firearm in 2002. No. 20-2665 9 We apply that standard here, as well, as both parties’ briefs assume we should. Accordingly, to prove actual innocence, the petitioner must show “that more likely than not … no reasonable juror would ﬁnd him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” House, 547 U.S. at 538. This standard seeks to “ensure[] that petitioner’s case is truly extraordinary … while still providing petitioner a meaningful avenue by which to avoid a manifest injustice.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To meet that demanding standard, a petitioner must often oﬀer “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientiﬁc evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial” to prove actual innocence. Id. at 324; see also House, 547 U.S. at 553–54 (concluding that petitioner established actual innocence when he presented testimony that called into question forensic evidence connecting him to crime and substantial evidence pointed toward a diﬀerent suspect). We have also found that a petitioner was actually innocent when he established that he had been convicted of a non-existent crime, Davenport, 147 F.3d at 610–11 (allowing § 2241 petition to proceed where prisoner showed he had been convicted of “using” a ﬁrearm in committing a drug oﬀense when he had merely possessed the ﬁrearm, which the Supreme Court had later held was not suﬃcient to establish crime of “use”), or when he was categorically ineligible for the death sentence that had been imposed. Webster, 975 F.3d 667. Section § 922(g)(1) of Title 18 of the United States Code makes it “unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess “any ﬁrearm or ammunition.” 10 No. 20-2665 As noted, long after Santiago’s convictions became ﬁnal, the Supreme Court changed the governing law by holding in Rehaif that the government must also prove that the defendant “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a ﬁrearm.” 139 S. Ct. at 2200. Rehaif does not require the government to prove that the defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a ﬁrearm. Knowledge of the relevant status is enough. United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 949, 954–55 (7th Cir. 2020). To establish actual innocence here, Santiago must show that no reasonable juror would ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that either of his prior convictions was for a crime that carried a potential sentence of more than one year in prison. Santiago has not met that burden.
At trial, the government relied on two of Santiago’s state felony convictions to prove that his possession of a ﬁrearm violated § 922(g)(1): a 1999 conviction for criminal trespass and a 2001 conviction for retail theft. The jury in the robbery case did not designate in its verdict which felony it relied on to convict Santiago. It is possible that either felony would qualify as a predicate felony for the § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession convictions, but both parties focus on the criminal trespass oﬀense. We do so as well. After Santiago pled guilty to felony criminal trespass in 1999, the state court sentenced him to time served with up to 23 months imprisonment. Right after imposing the sentence, however, the court granted Santiago parole. At that time, Santiago had served four months and 20 days in jail, all as pretrial detention. In June 2000, Santiago was arrested for disorderly conduct and then found to have violated his No. 20-2665 11 parole. The court revoked his parole and ordered him to serve the balance of the maximum 23-month prison sentence. Again, however, the state court immediately paroled him. A few months later, in October 2000, the state court revoked Santiago’s parole a second time after he failed to pay his ﬁnes. The court again resentenced him to serve the remainder of his 23-month prison sentence. Yet again, however, the court immediately granted Santiago parole.

On appeal, Santiago asserts that, despite the 23-month sentence imposed three times, he did not know the oﬀense was actually punishable by more than one year in prison, particularly in light of his shorter actual custody and the relatively minor nature of the oﬀense. He contends he was thus actually innocent of unlawfully possessing a ﬁrearm as a felon. Santiago contrasts his case with those of defendants who were denied relief under Rehaif because they had served signiﬁcant time in prison or were convicted of particularly serious underlying felonies. E.g., United States v. Williams, 946 F.3d 968, 973–74 (7th Cir. 2020) (denying Rehaif claim on direct appeal; defendant had served twelve years in prison for murder, and “even the most legally ignorant would know [murder] is subject to substantial penalties well beyond a year of imprisonment”); United States v. Pulliam, 973 F.3d 775, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2020) (rejecting Rehaif claim on direct appeal; defendant had been sentenced to prison for several diﬀerent crimes, including theft and escaping from prison, and had served about ﬁve years in prison). 12 No. 20-2665 The argument is not persuasive. Santiago relies on cases asserting Rehaif claims argued on direct appeal with courts applying the plain-error standard of review. The ﬁnal step in the plain-error analysis is whether “the error seriously aﬀects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Maez, 960 F.3d at 962, quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993). Courts have compared that factor to the “miscarriage of justice” question that arises in collateral review cases such as those under § 2255 and § 2241. Maez, 960 F.3d at 962, citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982). However, “a collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 165. “[T]o obtain collateral relief [under § 2255] a prisoner must clear a signiﬁcantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal.” Id. at 166. A defendant’s ability to win relief under Rehaif in a direct appeal does not necessarily show that he could also succeed in a Rehaif-based action for collateral relief under § 2255, let alone under § 2241, with its substantially higher burden. In fact, very few petitioners have won relief under Rehaif in collateral challenges even under § 2255, let alone § 2241. See, e.g., Colen v. Ortiz, No. 19-15413, 2022 WL 488943 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2022) (assuming petitioner showed that § 2255 was inadequate or ineﬀective, but denying § 2241 relief on merits; petitioner could not prove that no reasonable juror would ﬁnd him guilty); United States v. McCreary, No. 1:19-cv-357-TLS, 2021 WL 510952, at  (N.D. Ind. Feb. 11, 2021) (denying § 2255 motion; defendant could not plausibly argue he lacked knowledge of his status when he had three prior state felony convictions for which he was sentenced to more than one year in prison and served time in prison); Farrell v. Warden FCI Fairton, No. 20-4414, 2021 WL 222684 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2021) (denying motion to dismiss § 2241 petition and deferring No. 20-2665 13 ruling on merits); Alexander v. Entzel, No. 1:19-cv-1301, 2020 WL 1068060, at ,  (C.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2020) (denying § 2241 petition; petitioner stipulated at trial that he had been convicted of a felony punishable by more than one year in prison and did not otherwise argue that he was unaware of his felon status). One rare exception was Moore v. United States, No. 20-cv476-bbc, 2020 WL 4785432, at –5 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2020), but even Moore did not turn on the Rehaif issue of knowledge, which is Santiago’s theory. Moore won relief under § 2255 by showing that, at the time he possessed the ﬁrearm, he had not yet actually been convicted of a felony. See also Delgado v. United States, No. 20-cv-00931-JPG, 2022 WL 1227353, at –6 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2022) (ﬁnding miscarriage of justice under § 2241 where petitioner oﬀered evidence that he would not have pled guilty under § 922(g)(1) if he had known of Rehaif standard); United States v. Abundis, No. 2:20-cv-00637-MMD, 2020 WL 7029892, at  (D. Nev. Nov. 30, 2020) (denying § 2255 motion on other grounds but ﬁnding that prisoner could likely show he lacked knowledge of his prohibited status where he was sentenced to only probation for a crime that could be charged as a misdemeanor or a felony). 4 4 Appellate authority on Rehaif issues on collateral review is scarce. United States v. Hisey, 12 F.4th 1231 (10th Cir. 2021), presents the closest example of a successful Rehaif claim. In Hisey, the Tenth Circuit held that the petitioner established actual innocence to overcome the procedural default barrier to § 2255 because he did not have a prohibited status. Id. at 1236. The court explained that because the state’s mandatory sentencing rules had prevented the sentencing court from imposing a prison sentence at all because the petitioner met certain criteria, he was not convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. Hisey does not guide us here because there were no legal barriers preventing the state court 14 No. 20-2665 We recognize that the facts presented here allow some room for debate about whether Santiago knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. He was sentenced to a maximum of 23 months in prison but immediately received parole and continued to do so even after violating parole twice. He was in custody for less than ﬁve months, and even that was pretrial detention. Santiago was also convicted of an arguably minor crime of criminal trespass, which he claims did not alert him to his felon status. This is not a case where the oﬀense of conviction alone would tell “even the most legally ignorant” that he had the required status. See Williams, 946 F.3d at 974. Nevertheless, Santiago has not oﬀered evidence that would require any reasonable juror to ﬁnd a reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court explained in Greer v. United States, a person who is a felon “ordinarily knows he is a felon,” and “That simple truth is not lost upon juries.” 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2097 (2021) (Rehaif error did not amount to plain error). In addition, we ﬁnd it diﬃcult to view Santiago’s felon-inpossession convictions in isolation, as his § 2241 petition seeks to do. Recall that these two felon-in-possession counts were based on his conduct in carrying out three armed robberies. Under the Rehaif standard, the question would be whether, at that time, Santiago knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. Santiago’s theory here is that he had an innocent state of mind at that time regarding possession of the ﬁrearm. In other words, Santiago is claiming that he had a non-criminal state of mind from sentencing Santiago to more than one year in prison. The court imposed such a sentence and then chose to grant parole on that 23-month sentence. No. 20-2665 15 regarding his possession of the ﬁrearm while he was planning and carrying out those three armed robberies. Given the common sense recognized in Greer and Santiago’s possession in the course of the armed robberies here, this is not such a compelling story of an innocent state of mind that any reasonable juror would have acquitted Santiago on the felon-in-possession counts. 5 5 This is not an issue of what our dissenting colleague calls “backward propensity,” post at 30, but a factual issue about Santiago’s state of mind to be determined in light of all the circumstantial evidence at the relevant time, which was when he was planning and carrying out the armed robberies. His other actions and intentions at the time are relevant to his state of mind for the felon-in-possession charges. A reasonable juror could be deeply skeptical about Santiago’s recent claims that he did not know that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison. We must also note that Santiago’s sentences for the three Hobbs Act robberies and the two felon-in-possession counts were all 42 months in prison, running concurrently with each other. One might wonder what the point would be of vacating the sentences on only the felon-in-possession counts. The answer may lie in the First Step Act of 2018, which eased the rules for “stacking” mandatory minimum and consecutive sentences for multiple counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See United States v. Sparkman, 973 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir. 2020). When Santiago was convicted, his second § 924(c) conviction required a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years on that count, to run consecutive to all other prison terms. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2002). Section 403 of the First Step Act now requires such a sentence only if the second violation occurs after a first § 924(c) conviction had become final before the violation. That change is not retroactive, however. Still, if Santiago could have any portion of his sentencing “package” set aside, he could at least seek to be re-sentenced under the new, less severe provisions for his § 924(c) convictions. 16 No. 20-2665 b. Limited Education and Mental Health Challenges For the ﬁrst time on appeal, Santiago tries to support his claimed lack of knowledge based on information about mental illness and limited education in his 2005 presentence report. He dropped out of school during the tenth grade, though he says he earned a GED degree a few years later. As an adult he was diagnosed with “depression, bipolar, and/or anxiety disorder” but had not been compliant with treatment. He also had a history of substance abuse and had threatened to harm himself in jails and prisons. See Dkt. No. 27, ¶¶ 104– 109. The government asserts the argument based on these factors is waived. An argument not raised in the habeas petition or in brieﬁng before the district court is waived on appeal. Bolton v. Akpore, 730 F.3d 685, 694 (7th Cir. 2013). Santiago counters that we construe pro se ﬁlings liberally and hold them “to less exacting standards.” Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). We do not need to decide the waiver issue. Even if these arguments were not waived, Santiago has not shown that no reasonable juror who heard evidence of his mental illness and limited education would ﬁnd him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In United States v. Payne, 964 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2020), the defendant challenged his felon-in-possession conviction on direct appeal. He made a similar argument that he did not understand his felon status because of his low educational attainment, heavy drug use, and childhood mental illness. Id. at 656. We acknowledged that “cognitive or psychological issues might impair a defendant’s understanding of his sentencing exposure,” but we applied plain-error review and concluded No. 20-2665 17 that the defendant did not make a plausible showing that he did not know he was a felon. Id. at 657. Like the defendant in Payne, Santiago argues in the abstract that his limited education and mental health challenges prevented him from understanding his felon status. He has not tethered those assertions to any speciﬁc evidence. We accept for purposes of argument that Santiago’s limited education and mental health issues are relevant to the question of his knowledge. They provide additional grounds for debate about whether Santiago in fact knew that his conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison. But room for debate falls well short of the actual-innocence standard, which would require that any reasonable juror ﬁnd a reasonable doubt. House illustrates the standard. The petitioner in House relied on conclusive DNA test results that disproved an important part of the prosecution case, and on “evidentiary disarray” that undermined the reliability of key prosecution blood evidence. 547 U.S. at 540–48. Additional evidence implicated another suspect. Id. at 548–53. The Supreme Court described House as “not a case of conclusive exoneration” but as one where new evidence necessarily raised reasonable doubt. Id. at 554–55. All Santiago can oﬀer here is his uncorroborated denial that he knew he was a felon, despite his having gone through three court proceedings imposing a 23-month sentence. That denial alone, without other external evidence to bolster his assertion, fails to satisfy Santiago’s burden. We agree with the district court that Santiago cannot satisfy the criteria for the § 2255(e) saving clause and win relief under § 2241. He has 18 No. 20-2665 not established that the government’s failure to prove that he knew he was a felon resulted in a miscarriage of justice.