Opinion ID: 181375
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The FISA Challenge

Text: In securing Abu-Jihaad's conviction, the prosecution relied on certain recorded evidence intercepted pursuant to court orders issued under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. Abu-Jihaad submits that the district court erred in refusing to suppress this evidence because (1) on its face, FISA violates the Fourth Amendment; and (2) in any event, the statute's requirements were not satisfied in this case. We identify no merit in either argument.

Enacted in 1978, FISA permits the Chief Justice of the United States to designate eleven federal judges as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court), see id. § 1803(a)(1), with jurisdiction to entertain ex parte executive applications for electronic surveillance [18] for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information, Id. § 1802(b). [19] To issue a FISA warrant, a judge must find, inter alia, that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that the place or facilities to be surveilled are being used, or ... about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Id. § 1805(a)(2). [20] Rulings by the FISA Court are subject to review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISA Review Court), which consists of three judges also designated by the Chief Justice. See id. § 1803(b). The FISA Review Court has convened only twice since the statute's enactment: (1) when it heard and rejected a constitutional challenge to FISA not dissimilar to that pursued by Abu-Jihaad in this case, see In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev.2002); and (2) when it heard and rejected an as-applied constitutional challenge to certain provisions of the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA), Pub.L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552, that permitted the executive to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance on targets reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, see In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (In re FISA Section 105B Directives ), 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev.2008). [21]
As originally enacted, FISA required a high-ranking member of the executive branch to certify that the purpose for which a warrant was being sought was to obtain foreign intelligence information. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (Supp. V 1981). [22] Referencing this language in United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.1984), we observed that the requirement that foreign intelligence information be the primary objective of the surveillance is plain not only from the language of § 1802(b) but also from the requirements in § 1804 as to what the application must contain. Id. at 77 (emphasis added). Duggan rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to the procedures established by FISA for issuance of foreign intelligence surveillance warrants, see id. at 72-74, a decision we recently had occasion to reaffirm in United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009). In 2001, Congress amended FISA as part of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (PATRIOT Act), Pub.L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 271 (2001). Among other things, Congress indicated that it did not, in fact, require foreign intelligence gathering to be the primary purpose of the requested surveillance to obtain a FISA warrant. Rather, upon satisfaction of all other FISA requirements, Congress authorized FISA Court judges to issue warrants upon executive certification that acquisition of foreign intelligence information is a significant purpose of the requested surveillance. See id. § 218, 115 Stat. at 291 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B)) (emphasis added). Because neither Duggan nor Stewart considered FISA's constitutionality in light of the statute's amendment by the PATRIOT Act, Abu-Jihaad submits that we must address the question of constitutionality yet again. Specifically, Abu-Jihaad submits that the primary purpose requirement is, in fact, essential to the constitutionality of FISA, lest the government misuse the statute to procure warrants for criminal investigations without demonstrating the probable cause essential to that latter purpose, i.e., probable cause to believe that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense and that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through the surveillance. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)-(b) (stating probable cause required by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522)). In support of his challenge, Abu-Jihaad cites Mayfield v. United States, 504 F.Supp.2d 1023 (D.Or.2007) (holding FISA in violation of Fourth Amendment). That district court decision, however, has now been vacated by the Ninth Circuit on standing grounds. See Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir.2010). Meanwhile, all other courts that have considered the issue, both before and after enactment of the PATRIOT Act, have rejected constitutional challenges to FISA. See United States v. Ning Wen, 477 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir.2007); United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir.2005); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742-46; United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 573 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790-92 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Kashmiri, No. 09 Cr. 830-4, 2010 WL 4705159, at -5 (N.D.Ill. Nov.10, 2010); United States v. Warsame, 547 F.Supp.2d 982, 993 (D.Minn.2008); United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F.Supp.2d 125, 135-41 (D.Mass.2007); United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., No. 04 Cr. 240, 2007 WL 2011319, at -6 (N.D.Tex. July 11, 2007); United States v. Jayyousi, No. 04 Cr. 60001, 2007 WL 851278, at  (S.D.Fla. Mar.15, 2007); United States v. Benkahla, 437 F.Supp.2d 541, 554 (E.D.Va. 2006); United States v. Marzook, 435 F.Supp.2d 778, 786 (N.D.Ill.2006); United States v. Nicholson, 955 F.Supp. 588, 590-91 (E.D.Va.1997); In re Kevork, 634 F.Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D.Cal.1985); United States v. Falvey, 540 F.Supp. 1306, 1312 (E.D.N.Y.1982). We do the same here. As we discuss more fully in this opinion, the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement demands a showing of probable cause reasonable to the purpose being pursued. Thus, identification of purpose is necessary to assess the reasonableness of the probable cause standards at issue. Where multiple purposes are significant to an investigation, however, the Fourth Amendment does not require the government to identify a primary purpose or limit its ability to secure a warrant to satisfaction of the standards for that purpose. Rather, the government may secure a warrant under the probable cause standards applicable to any purpose that it pursues in good faith. [23] Thus, we identify no constitutional defects in FISA's certification requirement of a significant rather than a primary purpose ... to obtain foreign intelligence information. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B).