Opinion ID: 4397423
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Matter of Cross

Text: The BIA has not opined on the meaning of the phrase “establish paternity by legitimation” under the older Section 309(a) at issue here, but it has interpreted identical and similar phrases in other provisions of the same statute, most recently in Matter of Cross. The petitioner in Cross was born to unwed parents in Jamaica and came to the United States with his father, who became a citizen by naturalization in 2001. Cross, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 486. Cross argued that he automatically derived citizenship from his father on that date. Under the version of the INA applicable to Cross, he had to show, among other things, that he was his father’s “child,” as defined in Section 101(c)(1) of the INA. Id. at 485. To qualify under that provision, Cross had to be “legitimated under the law of the child’s residence or domicile, or under the law of the father’s residence or domicile.” Id. at 487 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a). Jamaica, like Guyana, had passed a law according equal treatment to all children regardless of whether their parents were married, which Cross claimed “legitimated” him. Cross, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 486. But Jamaica, like Guyana, also retained a law providing that children born out of wedlock could only be “legitimated” by the parents’ subsequent marriage. Id. at 490. Cross held that a person born abroad to unmarried parents is “legitimated” under Section 101(c)(1) if that person has resided or been domiciled in a jurisdiction “that has eliminated all legal distinctions between children based on the marital status of their parents . . . , irrespective of whether the country or State has prescribed other legal means of legitimation.” Id. at 485-86. Because Jamaica had a general legitimation statute, Cross was “legitimated” despite the unfulfilled formal process, and so could derive citizenship from his father. Id. at 493. 5 Although it was not directly at issue, Cross also addressed former Section 321(a)(3) of the INA, which previously governed when children born abroad to unmarried, alien parents automatically derived citizenship from their naturalizing mother and continues to apply to children whose parents naturalized before its repeal. Id. at 489-91. Under former Section 321(a)(3), a child born out of wedlock derived citizenship upon “the naturalization of the mother if the . . . paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation.” 1952 INA § 321(a)(3) (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3)) (emphasis added). Section 321(a)(3) was designed to “prevent[] the naturalizing parent from usurping the parental rights of the alien parent,” who may not want the child to become a citizen of another country. Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) as amended (June 9, 2003); see Lewis v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795, 800 (7th Cir. 2000). The BIA held in Cross that, although a general legitimation statute “legitimated” under Section 101(c)(1) even if a formal legitimation process remained, “paternity” was only “established by legitimation” under former Section 321(a)(3) if the requirements of the formal legitimation process were met. Cross, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 489-90. Cross partially reversed two prior BIA cases: Matter of Hines, 24 I & N Dec. 544 (BIA 2008) and In re Rowe, 23 I & N Dec. 962 (BIA 2006). The BIA held in those cases that Jamaica’s and Guyana’s general legitimation statutes neither “legitimate” nor “establish paternity by legitimation” because both jurisdictions also retained formal legitimation processes. Hines, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 547-48; Rowe, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 967. Cross explained that the Hines and Rowe panels erroneously believed that they had to “interpret the term ‘legitimation’ identically throughout the Act, regardless of variations in statutory context,” when in fact “[m]ost words have different shades of meaning and consequently may be variously construed.” Cross, 26 I. & 6 N. Dec. at 490-91 (quoting Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007)). Because of this legal error, the Hines and Rowe panels wrongly concluded that their interpretation of “section 321(a)(3), which makes the establishment of ‘paternity . . . by legitimation’ a barrier to citizenship, was controlling in all other statutory contexts, including those that make proof of legitimation a prerequisite for eligibility for a benefit.” Id. at 490. The Cross panel justified its decision to adopt the broader definition of “legitimation” by pointing to “the growing consensus—both in the United States and abroad—against labeling children ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ by virtue of the marital status of their parents.” Id. at 492. “Any coherent understanding of legitimation as a stand-alone concept—rather than as a mechanism for establishing paternity as in former section 321(a)(3)—must take this reality into account.” Id.