Opinion ID: 543660
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Posting of prices

Text: 51 The appellants also presented evidence indicating that several of the appellees publicly posted their dealer tankwagon prices and any applicable dealer discounts. Specifically, the appellants produced evidence indicating that Mobil, Standard Oil, and Exxon posted such information, for public inspection, at either their company headquarters, division offices, or bulk plants. The appellants also presented testimony from an ARCO executive to the effect that ARCO probably posted its tankwagon prices at its bulk plants. In addition, there is evidence in the record indicating that ARCO, among others, checked these postings. 52 For reasons comparable to those discussed above, we conclude that the practices of posting and checking this detailed information supports a reasonable and permissible inference of an agreement or understanding concerning prices. The appellees' assertedly independent explanation for such posting was that, as one Standard Oil official put it: 53 It was our desire to be open and straightforward in the matter of our product pricing and to make available for any customer the ability to look and see what our posted price was.... I guess one might say that it was for the logic of being open and above board on what our prices were to our customers. We had nothing to conceal and it was just a mechanism to accomodate that openness. 54 Another Standard official testified that the posting was done [f]or the customer's benefit, to inform the customer what the applicable prices were. A Mobil official testified that the purpose of the posting was to allow any individual dealer to come in and check that he wasn't being discriminated against. It is uncontested, however, that any changes in tankwagon prices or dealer discounts were directly reported to the dealers. 55 Other testimony indicates that the purpose and effect of the posting was to allow competitors to learn quickly of any withdrawal of dealer support. The following testimony from a Standard Oil official is illustrative: 56 Q. ... Was there any business reason why the temporary dealer assistance that was being granted in the trade zone ... should have been published or made available to anybody other than the dealers? 57 A. Yes, I think a practical business reason. If we had raised our prices to our dealers, and our dealers had raised it on the street generally, I think particularly our dealers ... may have been as much as one, two, three, four cents--they were all over the lot. If a competitor saw this, he might wonder, Is this a dealer movement, or has Standard Oil Company raised their prices to cause this reaction in the marketplace? ... 58 Q. ... The reason you are giving, then, is that you wanted the competition to know what the price move was. 59 A. Exactly. 60 Given that the evidence thus indicates that the purpose and effect of the public posting was the same as for the press releases, we similarly conclude that a reasonable inference of agreement may be drawn from this evidence. 61 We also perceive no Matsushita problem in permitting such an inference. To the extent that the appellees assert business motivations comparable to those discussed in Section III-B-1, our analysis is the same. Furthermore, given that the appellees' asserted purpose of assuring dealers that there was no discrimination could easily be achieved through other means, we have little difficulty concluding that permitting such an inference will not deter any significant or valuable independent conduct. 62 Lastly, we perceive an additional reason why the posting of this information may serve as the basis for an inference of conspiracy. The record indicates that the information posted was unusually detailed, listing tankwagons and dealer discounts for each individual price zone. Such detailed information would have the effect of revealing any gradual shading of wholesale prices that might occur in a particular zone. The record indicates that the spread of such shading was one factor that contributed to the gradual collapse of price restorations. By posting and checking such information, several of the appellees created a mechanism whereby shading might be discouraged or detected. In light of the fact that disclosure of this sort of sensitive price information might be considered contrary to a firm's self-interest, a jury may reasonably conclude that it was the intention and common understanding of these companies to discourage such shading, thus facilitating and possibly lengthening restoration periods.