Opinion ID: 2585937
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Superior Court's Remand of Future Disputes to the Arbitrator

Text: The final argument raised by Kinn and Singletary is that the superior court in its Revised Entry of Final Judgment erred by remanding future disputes regarding the interpretation of the award to the arbitrator. Kinn argues that such a remand is inconsistent with the language of our decision in International Brotherhood of Electric Workers, Local Union 1547 v. City of Ketchikan, [47] which emphasized the fundamental common law principle that once an arbitrator has made and published a final award, the arbitrator's authority is exhausted and he or she can proceed no further [48] and held that remand [of an arbitrator's award] is appropriate only where the award is patently ambiguous. [49] But many jurisdictions now permit arbitrators to exercise limited, continuing jurisdiction over the issues that they were initially responsible for adjudicating. [50] Indeed, the 2003 edition of the treatise Elkouri: How Arbitration Works, which we cited in IBEW, states that [t]he arbitration process does not automatically end in those cases where a grievance has been sustained and where a remedy has been ordered. Questions over the application of a remedy can arise after an arbitration award has been issued, which is why arbitrators may decide, at their discretion, to retain limited jurisdiction to resolve any such remedial issues. [51] Thus, our dicta in IBEW should not be interpreted to prohibit arbitrators from retaining limited jurisdiction to ensure that their awards are carried out properly. Here, the arbitration award provided that [a]ny further disputes between these parties as to: the terms of rescission, remediation and expenses of remediation on Lot 7 . . . calculation of pre-award or post-award interest, future attorney's fees and costs or interpretation of these awards may be submitted to the undersigned [(Davis)] for resolution. Far from reopening issues that had already been decided, the arbitrator was simply offering to resolve any ambiguities in the award and ensure the enforcement of the award. This is precisely the type of limited jurisdiction that other courts now permit arbitrators to retain. [52] For this reason, we hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Davis to retain limited continuing jurisdiction.