Opinion ID: 1648210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Reaffirming Statutes of Convenience

Text: To overrule Nickell I and II after nearly eight decades would frustrate legislative intent in two respects. First, the legislature's silence over the years is evidence of its tacit approval of our construction of the statutory framework. State v. Anderson, 517 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Iowa 1994); accord Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 318-19 (1986) (A statute owes its existence not only to the decision people made to enact it but also to the decision of other people later not to amend or repeal it.). Second, it must be remembered that venue statutes are statutes of convenience, and to hold otherwise would promote inconvenience. See Nickell I, 202 Iowa at 411, 210 N.W. at 564. On this latter point, some further explanation of the common carrier statute is necessary. As enacted, the common carrier statute both expanded and restricted venue for suits brought against common carriers. In each instance, however, the statute promoted convenience. The common carrier statute expanded the venue options for plaintiffs suing a resident common carrier by itself. At the time, of course, there was not a special venue statute such as Iowa Code section 616.18 permitting plaintiffs to bring suit in the county where the injury occurred. Instead of forcing the plaintiff to sue the resident common carrier at its principal place of business, the plaintiff could sue it wherever its lines ran. See Bruce Transfer, 227 Iowa at 52, 287 N.W. at 280 (The statute was apparently based upon the thought that the public interest and convenience would be promoted by permitting suits against common carriers in any county on their lines.). This was undoubtedly utilized by plaintiffs to file suit where the injury occurred, which, in turn, was likely to be where evidence, the witnesses, and possibly even the plaintiff resided. The common carrier statute restricted venue for plaintiffs suing a nonresident common carrier by itself. In its absence, the general venue statute permitted plaintiffs to sue the common carrier anywhere it could be found. Iowa Code § 11041 (1924) (now codified at Iowa Code § 616.18). Again, the common carrier statute promoted convenience because the common carrier can more easily procure its witnesses, and carry on the process of the trial [when sued where its lines run] than if it were forced to defend in some remote corner of the state where one of its officers may be served, but where it does not carry on its business of transportation. The Distinction Between Suability and Residence in Venue Statutes, 13 Iowa L. Rev. 212, 214 (1928); see, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Mershon, 181 Iowa 892, 894, 165 N.W. 86, 87 (1917) (sanctioning change of venue pursuant to common carrier statute from a county in which one of the railroad's agents was served to a county in which it ran its lines). The Richards would have us overrule our precedents and reinterpret chapter 616 to permit a plaintiff to sue any Iowa resident who happens to have a common carrier as a codefendant in the remotest parts of the state, even though the chosen venue had no connection with the case. This interpretation would clearly promote forum shopping and inconvenience, and thereby frustrate legislative intent. It would also foster injustice because it would encourage plaintiffs to sue defendants in inconvenient venues as leverage in the settlement process. We will not sanction an interpretation of chapter 616 that would permit a plaintiff to transform statutes of convenience into statutes of inconvenience. We are obligated to consider the common carrier statute in pari materia with other pertinent statutes. Niles v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 683 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Iowa 2004). That is precisely what we did in Nickell I and Nickell II, when we held the common carrier statute does not fall within the exception to the general venue statute, at least with respect to a non-common carrier defendant. We adhere to those holdings today.