Opinion ID: 2306077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Surety Bond

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in ordering that appellant secure a surety bond in the amount of $500,000 [17] for his future child support obligation because appellee only requested this relief in her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. According to appellant, [appellee] provided no legal authority for a court to impose a surety bond obligation against future child support obligations pursuant to a contract which did not require the posting of such a bond. Appellee responds that the Agreement provided sufficient notice to appellant of the possibility that the trial court would order a surety bond for his future child support obligation and that counsel mentioned the issue of a surety bond at trial. Appellant is incorrect that there is no authority for a court to order a surety bond as a guarantee of future child support obligations pursuant to a contract that did not expressly require the posting of such a bond. Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 54(c) gives the trial court broad discretion to fashion appropriate relief, requiring that every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party's pleadings. [18] Furthermore, we have held that because trial courts are given broad discretion in resolving custody cases ..., and ought to fashion relief to foster and safeguard a child's best interests, a trial court may impose a bond upon a parent whose history reflected a capacity for absconding with the child. Moore v. Moore, 391 A.2d 762, 769-70 (D.C.1978) (internal citations omitted) (action not unlike appellant's derelictions under the Agreement). See generally Bowie v. Nicholson, 705 A.2d 290, 292 (D.C.1998) (As for child support, a parent has a legal duty to provide support to his or her children if able to do so, and a court may enforce that duty by an appropriate order.); McGehee v. Maxfield, 256 A.2d 576, 578 n. 5 (D.C.1969) (awarding child support arrearages although not specifically requested). Although Moore involved imposing a bond as related to a father's violation of visitation duties, similar logic applies here. Given appellant's past consistent failures to pay child support in accordance with the Agreement, it was within the court's discretion to order such a surety bond as relief to which appellee was entitled, regardless of whether she asked for that relief. Appellant also contends that because of his minimal income he is not able to purchase security against hypothetical future arrearages. An appellant's income, however, is only one factor the court need consider. The court must also consider the child's best interest. Sollars v. Cully, 904 A.2d 373, 375 (D.C.2006) (When assessing child support obligations, we `look to the children's best interest [which] guarantees that they will be protected.') (quoting Nowak v. Trezevant, 685 A.2d 753, 757-58 (D.C.1996)). [19] Furthermore, the cost to secure a surety bond, typically referred to as a bond premium, is only a percentage of the bond amount, which varies based on individualized factors. See generally The Surety & Fidelity Ass'n of America, Surety, http://www.surety.org/ content.cfm?lid=70&catid=2 (last visited Aug. 28, 2009). Therefore, appellant's claim that such a bond would be unconscionable because he lacks the resources to purchase security against hypothetical future arrearages lacks merit. [20]