Opinion ID: 2303421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merger

Text: Boudreau's counsel has characterized the second phase of this appeal as involving the doctrine of merger. A merger, at common law, involved an act the commission of which constituted both a felony and a misdemeanor. In such instances it was said that the misdemeanor was merged into the felony and a defendant could be punished only for the felony. While there has been a tendency to describe the issue presented here as Identity of Offenses, or Divisibility and Merger of Offenses, we prefer to tell it as it is. We are dealing with Boudreau's constitutional right to be protected from double jeopardy. This right which in its classic sense bars a second prosecution following an acquittal or conviction is afforded by both the fifth amendment of our Federal Constitution and art. I, sec. 7 of our state's constitution. See State v. Trivisonno, 112 R.I. 1, 307 A.2d 539 (1973). Section 11-47-3 makes it a felony for a person to commit, or attempt to commit, a crime of violence when armed with or having available any firearm. A crime of violence is defined in § 11-47-2 as including    murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, robbery, burglary, breaking and entering, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault or battery involving grave bodily injury, and/or assault with intent to commit any offense punishable as a felony. Before trial the merger defense was invoked by a motion to dismiss either the assault indictments or the violent crime indictment. The whole thrust of the defense's argument was that since both offenses rise out of the same act and because proof of one offense is also proof of the other, the motion for dismissal should have been granted. In State ex rel. v. Berberian, 109 R.I. 309, 284 A.2d 590 (1971), this court adopted the test for determining whether an accused stands in danger of being tried twice for the same offense that is set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932), [3] wherein the Supreme Court held that: The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. When viewing the elements of the two alleged offenses on the facts of this case, we find the crimes in this particular instance to be essentially the same. In order to prove Boudreau guilty of the assault with a dangerous weapon, it is necessary to prove the same elements as are required to convict him on the charge of the commission of a felony with the use of a firearm. No proof of any additional facts is required. A loaded revolver is a dangerous weapon per se. Once the elements constituting the assault charge were established, those of the other offense necessarily had been established also. The relief sought by defendant is a remand to the Superior Court for a new trial. We do not believe such a remand is appropriate. After conviction Boudreau was placed on a probationary status on the indictments charging the assaults on the six sons. He received a 10-year suspended sentence on the assault indictment relating to Mrs. Patterson and he received a three-year prison sentence on the indictment charging an assault on Mr. Patterson. The trial justice imposed a three-year sentence on the violent crime indictment. It was to tun concurrently with the other three-year sentence. Execution of both sentences was stayed pending our determination of this appeal. When more than one sentence has been imposed where only a single sentence was proper, relief from the improper penalty has been provided in a variety of ways. See State v. Mills, 51 N.J. 277, 240 A.2d 1 (1968). In People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 324 P.2d 556 (1958), the California Supreme Court was faced with determining the correct procedure to be applied to an appellant who had been convicted on two counts of receiving stolen property and sentenced to concurrent terms for each crime. The court determined that only one sentence was proper and concluded: In a situation such as this, if any substantial objective of justice would be served thereby, this court could reverse [both judgments], order such counts consolidated, and remand the cause for rearraignment of the defendant for sentence and for sentence on the consolidated count. Inasmuch, however, as it does not appear that here either the state or the defendant will be prejudiced by a simple reversal as to one count and affirmance as to the other, and as finality of adjudication will thereby be expedited, we conclude that the latter procedure is the more desirable. Id. at 275-76, 324 P.2d at 573. It is obvious in the present case that the defendant has not been prejudiced by the imposition of the two concurrent sentences. We shall simply order reversal on the indictment based upon § 11-47-3 and affirm the conviction of Boudreau on the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon. [4] In any event, at this point in time he is to serve only three years. The defendant's appeal as it relates to the assault indictments is denied and insofar as it relates to the violent crime indictment it is sustained. The cases are remanded to the Superior Court with direction to dismiss the committing a violent crime indictment.