Opinion ID: 3013899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Circuit in Walker v. Crosby, 341 F.3d

Text: 1240 (11th Cir. 2003). 2 There, the Court Fielder argues that we should apply held that “[t]he statute of limitations in § these provisions to the present case in the 2244(d)(1) applies to the application as a following manner. He begins by noting whole; individual claims within an that “an application for a writ of habeas application cannot be reviewed separately corpus” by a person in state custody must for timeliness.” Id. at 1245. In reaching be filed within one year after “the latest this conclusion, the Court relied primarily of” the four dates set out in subsections on the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (A) through (D). 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) The Court wrote: (emphasis added). He then points to subsection (D), which refers to “the date The statute directs the court on which the factual predicate of the claim to look at whether the or claims presented could have been “application” is timely, not discovered through the exercise of due whether the individual diligence.” Fielder then argues that his “claims” w ithin the entire application was timely because (taking into account the tolling rule set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)) 1 his application proceeding tolled the statute until the PCRA litigation ended on July 10, 1999. Fielder argues that since the federal habeas petition was filed within one year 1 On the date of Brown’s affidavit, thereafter, in May 2000, it was timely. and, indeed, on the date when Brown 2 claims he first became aware of Fielder’s See also Shuckra v. Armstrong, predicament, Fielder’s PCRA petition was No. 3:02cv583(JBA), 2003 U.S. Dist. pending, and under 28 U.S.C. § LEXIS 4408, 2003 WL 1562097 (D. 2244(d)(2), the pendency of that Conn. M arch 2003). 5 application are timely. The interpretation advanced by Fielder and the statute provides a single Walker Court. Although Fielder and the statute of limitations, with a Walker Court claim that this interpretation single filing date, to be is dictated by the language of 28 U.S.C. § applied to the application as 2244(d)(1), their interpretation (which, for a whole. convenience, we will simply call the Walker interpretation) actually disregards Id. at 1243. the language used in the portion of § The Court added that its 2244(d)(1) that is most critical for present interpretation of § 2244(d)(1) was “guided purposes, i.e., subsection (D). Subsection by the distinction between an application (D), as noted, refers to “the date on which and claims within an application, and by the factual predicate of the claim or claims the presumption that Congress understood presented could have been discovered the difference when drafting AEDPA.” Id. through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 at 1243-44. The Court continued: U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (emphasis added). Applying this language in a case in which Section 2244(d)(1) states the multiple claims are presented poses a limitation period shall apply problem, as Fielder’s case illustrates. to “an application for a writ of habeas corpus.” Contrast Fielder’s application, as noted, the language in § 2244(d) presented two claims, a prosecutorial creating a statute of misconduct claim and an after-discovered limitations with the evidence claim. The factual predicate of language in § 2244(b) the prosecutorial misconduct claim was requiring dism issal o f presumably known to Fielder at the time of certain claims presented in a trial, but the factual predicate of the after- s e c o n d o r s u ccess iv e discovered evidence claim was not application. The former reasonably discoverable until years later. speaks only to the timeliness So which of these two dates should of the “application,” while control? the latter allows for the If § 2244(d)(1) is applied, as we dismissal of “claims” within believe it must be, on a claim-by-claim a second or successive basis, there is no problem, but if, as the application if they were or Walker interpretation prescribes, the could have been presented claim-by-claim approach is rejected, there in a prior application. is nothing in § 2244(d)(1) that provides a Id. ground for picking one date over the other. The Walker interpretation implicitly reads