Opinion ID: 2304836
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Emotional Distress Stalking

Text: One of the trial court's concerns regarding the stalking statute was that someone might be prosecuted for merely engaging in conduct with the intent to cause emotional distress to another person. We recognize that there are potential vagueness problems with this interpretation. However, by examining the mens rea and actus reus components of the statute, it becomes clear that the elements of willfully, maliciously and repeatedly following or harassing must be present under each theory. This interpretation is also supported by the legislative history of the statute, in which the bill was described as follows: The [bill] would prohibit any person, male or female, from willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following or harassing another person, on more than one occasion: 1) with the intent to cause emotional distress; 2) with the effect of placing a person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury; or 3) without a legal purpose. The Committee on the Judiciary, Council of the District of Columbia, Report on Bill 10-42, Anti-Stalking Amendment Act of 1993, at 4 (April 28, 1993) (hereinafter Committee Report); see Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753-55 (D.C.1983)(en banc)(allowing for review of legislative history when meaning of statute is ambiguous). Since the appropriate interpretation of the emotional distress theory of stalking requires proof of the additional elements of malice and willfulness, along with the actus reus of repeatedly following or harassing, the trial court's concerns that this theory was unconstitutionally vague are unfounded.