Opinion ID: 480341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Interpretation of Section 7116(b)(3)

Text: 15 Both parties insist that their conclusions are not only reasonable, but are compelled by the plain language of the Statute, which means exactly what it says. NTEU v. FLRA, 721 F.2d 1402, 1406 (D.C.Cir.1983) (NTEU ). However, the language of section 7116(b)(3) is far from clear. Indeed, we have trouble understanding the section's meaning simply as a matter of grammar. 12 In any event, several meanings of the plain language of the Statute are possible. 16 One possible meaning is that the Union's action must be intended to coerce, discipline or fine one of its members. This reading, implied by the inclusion of attempt to coerce in the list of prohibited actions, is certainly plausible. However, if the section is so viewed, there appears to be nothing in the record of this case to support a violation of the section 7116(b)(3). Thus, it is possible that the FLRA reads the provision as merely requiring a coercive effect. However, if an effects test is embodied in section 7116(b)(3), the inclusion of attempt to coerce would be anomalous, since failed attempts to coerce could not have coercive effects. This leaves a third possible reading, namely that the Statute is violated if the Union's action has a coercive, disciplinary or punitive effect or was intended to have a coercive effect. We do not know which of these three readings the FLRA has adopted. 17 The second portion of section 7116(b)(3) is no clearer. Again the issue is whether the Union's action had to have the purpose of punishment or reprisal or whether an effect is sufficient. Assuming an appropriate standard is then placed on punishment or reprisal, we need to know where to complete the clause. Specifically, can the action be punishment or reprisal impeding the member's work performance or productivity or is it limited to punishment or reprisal for the discharge of the member's duties as an employee? The latter meaning, suggested by the Executive Order's language, is difficult to infer from the grammatical structure of section 7116(b)(3) as written. 18 The FLRA, as the agency charged with administering the Statute, must carefully examine the meaning of section 7116(b)(3) and explain its application so that affected parties may understand its limits. The FLRA apparently reads this section of the Statute as if its meaning were self-evident. We do not find it to be so, nor would we expect the affected parties to comprehend its meaning without further explanation from the FLRA. While it is true that we will give some deference to the FLRA's interpretation of the Statute, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), we must first understand that interpretation. We do not know what meaning the FLRA places on section 7116(b)(3), and so a remand to the FLRA is essential to allow the Authority to clarify its interpretation.
19 Given that no reading of section 7116(b)(3) is unmistakably clear, it is important that the FLRA harmonize its reading of the section with congressional intent. In doing so, the FLRA should look not only to the legislative history and the structure of the Statute, but also to analogous provisions in private sector legislation. See Library of Congress v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280, 1286 (D.C.Cir.1983); Turgeon v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 937, 939 (D.C.Cir.1982). It is notable that this case presents an Agency challenge to the Union's decision to remove one of its officers. This type of interference by management in the internal affairs of unions is unprecedented in the private sector. We would expect any discussion by the FLRA on remand to tackle this issue head-on. 20 In Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982), the Supreme Court faced a similar issue under sections 101(a)(1) and (2) of the Labor-Management Reporting Disclosure Act (LMRDA). 13 Those sections guarantee equal voting rights, and rights of speech and assembly, to '[e]very member of a labor organization.'  456 U.S. at 436, 102 S.Ct. at 1870 (emphasis supplied by the Court) (footnote omitted). An action was brought by union employees who were discharged as employees of the union after supporting another candidate in a union election under section 609 of the LMRDA, 14 which renders it unlawful for a union or its representatives 'to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this Act.'  456 U.S. at 436, 102 S.Ct. at 1870 (emphasis supplied by the Court) (footnote omitted). The Court viewed the issue as hinging on the nature of the union action taken: 21 Petitioners held a dual status as both employees and members of the Union. As members of Local 20, petitioners undoubtedly had a protected right to campaign for Brown and support his candidacy. At issue here is whether they were thereby immunized from discharge at the pleasure of the president from their positions as appointed union employees. 22 Id. at 437, 102 S.Ct. at 1871. 23 The Court concluded that section 609 applied only to retaliatory actions that affect a union member's rights or status as a member of the union. Id. Because discharge from union employment does not impinge upon the incidents of union membership, and affects union members only to the extent that they happen also to be union employees, the LMRDA was not violated. Id. at 438, 102 S.Ct. at 1871. The Court rejected the idea that the firing was an indirect interference with membership rights, forcing a choice between free expression and jobs. Id. at 440, 102 S.Ct. at 1872. The Court found nothing in the language or legislative history of the LMRDA that restrict[ed] the freedom of an elected union leader to choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own. Id. at 441, 102 S.Ct. at 1873 (footnote omitted). On a related point, the Court found it virtually inconceivable that Congress would have prohibited the longstanding practice of union patronage without any discussion in the legislative history of the Act. Id. at 441 n. 12, 102 S.Ct. at 1873, n. 12. 24 Section 7116(b)(3) should also be viewed within the context of labor-management relations in general. In passing the Civil Service Reform Act, Congress unquestionably intended to strengthen the position of federal unions and to make the collective-bargaining process a more effective instrument of the public interest.... BATF v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 107, 104 S.Ct. 439, 449, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983). A union steward must have the support of the members and be an effective advocate for the members in order for the collective bargaining process to work effectively. It follows that the selection process of a union officer should be an internal matter for the union. In this case, it is undisputed that Poteat was ineffective as steward. To require the Union to keep him in office is thus in tension with the purposes of collective bargaining that underlie the Civil Service Reform Act. 25 Under the National Labor Relations Act, the selection and removal of officers has long been viewed as an internal union matter. See NLRB v. Wooster Division, Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 78 S.Ct. 718, 2 L.Ed.2d 823 (1958). In the duty to bargain context, the FLRA has already similarly held that it is within the discretion of ... labor organizations ... to designate their ... representatives when fulfilling their responsibilities under the Statute. AFGE (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base), 4 F.L.R.A. 272, 274 (1980). Although the Agency has a legitimate interest in ensuring that its employees execute their jobs free of Union coercion, this does not necessarily translate into an ability to challenge the removal of officers when no Union action is taken on a member as a member. Further, so long as the action does not affect the employee's performance of his job, there is no reason to delve into internal union affairs. Indeed, this is recognized in the Labor-Management Agreement between the Agency and the Union, where the parties have expressly provided: It is agreed that the designation of stewards and the area of assignment is internal business of the Union. 15 Absent some explicit findings of congressional intent, the FLRA should be hesitant to alter this result. 16 26