Opinion ID: 3204805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Appeal Waiver

Text: We first address the effect of the appeal-waiver provision in Wilkozek’s plea agreement. It reads: “[T]he defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal any sentence imposed in accordance with paragraph 19 below [(relating to the prison term)] or the manner in which that sentence was determined.” The government argues that this waiver strips the court of jurisdiction to consider Wilkozek’s challenge. We disagree. Two components make up this appeal, neither of which implicates the appeal waiver. First and foremost is Wilkozek’s petition for a writ of coram nobis. This writ, like habeas corpus, is a collateral attack on a criminal judgment. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1106 n.1 (2013) (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507, 510–11 (1954)). To be sure, the right to collaterally attack a judgment can be waived. See Keller v. United States, 657 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir. 2011). But such a waiver must be stated expressly. See id. (“To bar collateral review, the plea agreement must No. 15-1537 5 clearly state that the defendant waives his right to collaterally attack … in addition to waiving his right to a direct appeal.”). That plainly wasn’t done here. Wilkozek’s petition for coram nobis is not barred by his appeal waiver. The second component of Wilkozek’s appeal is a challenge to the government’s calculation of the outstanding restitution balance. This is merely a defense to the government’s motion to collect on the judgment. That is, Wilkozek is partially defending against the attempt to enforce the restitution judgment by arguing that the government is seeking to collect more than the amount authorized by the judgment. That plainly is not barred by the appeal waiver either.