Opinion ID: 398053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the Admission of the Confession Against Kathelyn Violate Bruton ?

Text: 24 Appellant Kathelyn Miller claims that the trial court erred in allowing Inspector Clemmons to testify at trial about the statement he obtained from Clifford because it violated her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1969). 6 Since appellant failed to object at trial to the admission of this testimony, her conviction may be reversed on this ground only if its admission into evidence constitutes plain error. Though plain error is an elusive concept, we have no difficulty in holding that the admission of Clemmons' testimony was not a mistake so prejudicial and substantial that it rendered justice an impossibility. See United States v. Johnson, 585 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1978). 25 The cases relied on by appellant do not support her position. In United States v. Morales, 477 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1973), the court found plain error, but noted that its decision would be different in a case where more evidence of guilt existed and where the incriminatory implication of the confession is weaker. Id. at 1316 n.19. Where the confession in Morales was the primary piece of evidence against the defendant, the evidence inculpating Kathelyn Miller in this case is strong even without referring to Clemmons' testimony. Representatives of Standard Insurance and Mutual of New York described how appellant submitted claims for insurance benefits. A Social Security claims representative documented appellant's submission of the false Mexican death certificate to support her claim for benefits. The officers who searched appellants' car testified that Kathelyn falsely identified her husband as Joseph Rosenfeld. She also stated that she had recently lost her husband and had known Rosenfeld for six to eight months. From this evidence a jury reasonably could infer Kathelyn's knowledge of the fraud and her participation in it. 26 More importantly, however, even if we assume that Clifford's statement was a critical part of the government's case, the jury nevertheless could have construed it favorably to the defense. Clifford stated that appellant was unaware that he had faked his death in Mexico and that she continued to believe he was dead for two or three months after she returned to the United States. Clifford also stated that he told his wife she could either file the insurance forms or he would appear sometime during the night and pick up the children and take them back to Mexico. Miller, supra, 608 F.2d at 1105 Appendix. This part of Clifford's statement aided appellant because it allowed the jury to imply that she was coerced into the fraudulent scheme by her husband's threats. Appellant, in fact, argued this inference before the jury. When we consider that the jury could interpret Clifford's statement as providing some excuse for appellant's behavior, the failure of her attorney to object looks like a tactical decision that backfired. We cannot say this decision was wrong in light of the other evidence against appellant, see United States v. Habel, 613 F.2d 1321, 1327-28 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925, 100 S.Ct. 3018, 65 L.Ed.2d 1117 (1980), and in view of the ease with which the trial court could have remedied the objection had it been presented below. We, therefore, hold that the admission of Inspector Clemmons' testimony was not plain error, if it was error at all. 7 V. Did the Trial Court Abuse Its Discretion in Refusing to Strike Two Jurors? 27 The final point of error raised in these consolidated appeals concerns the failure of the trial court to grant two challenges for cause made by Clifford Miller. Since appellant was tried after his wife, he was concerned that the publicity surrounding her trial would infect the partiality of jurors in his trial. Thus, he asked the court to question seventeen members of the jury panel individually. The court complied. After questioning, appellant sought to strike nine jurors for cause. The court granted four of these challenges. Of the remaining five jurors, appellant struck four by exercising his peremptory challenges. Thus, only one objectionable juror actually served on the jury, and appellant does not object to the refusal to strike that juror on this appeal. He objects to the trial court's refusal to strike for cause two jurors who did not serve on the jury. 28 A reviewing court cannot disturb the decision of the trial court on the impartiality of a juror absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Salinas, 654 F.2d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 1981). Appellant argues that Ms. Arrieta and Ms. Chavez could not put aside what they had learned about this case from the newspapers and their relatives after Kathelyn's trial. Appellant essentially doubts the ability of any human being to forget what has been learned-he seeks assurance against bias that is impossible to guarantee. See United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1081 (5th Cir. 1981). The record shows that both jurors understood the problem-that they had heard reports which could not be considered in evidence-and that they believed they could put their knowledge of the case aside and render an impartial decision. They reiterated this belief several times. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion. See United States v. Jimenez-Diaz, 659 F.2d 562, 568 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1230 (5th Cir. 1976). 29 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellants' convictions. 30 AFFIRMED.