Opinion ID: 2074533
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Blockbusting

Text: D.C.Code § 2-1402.22, part of the Human Rights Act, makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person . . . directly or indirectly to engage in the practice[] of blockbusting[,]. . . including . . . the commission of any 1 or more of the following acts: (1) To . . . attempt to promote, induce, or influence a transaction in real property through any representation, means or device . . . calculated to induce a person to discriminate or to engage in such transaction . . . in response to discrimination, prejudice, fear or unrest adduced by such means. Evidently relying on the fact that the Act elsewhere prohibits an array of unlawful discriminatory practice[s] based on categories including matriculation, meaning (partially) the condition of being enrolled in a college, or university, id. §§ 2-1401.02(18), -1402.11(a), Dr. Kreuzer sued the University for blockbusting, alleging in essence that GWUthrough its president, Stephen Trachtenberghad threatened that if he did not sell his property to it at a below-market rate, the influx of dormitory-housed students into his block would greatly reduce the property's value. The Act also requires that private suits for discrimination in real estate transactions be brought within 2 years of the unlawful discriminatory act. Section 2-1403.16(a). As Dr. Kreuzer's complaint was filed on May 5, 2003, the act on which he relied had to have occurred after May 5, 2001. The trial judge, after reviewing all of the acts alleged, concluded (a) that the principal acts among them had occurred before May 5, 2001, and (b) that the acts occurring later were not blockbusting and so could not rescue the earlier acts on a theory of continuing violation. We agree with the trial judge. [4] Dr. Kreuzer offered evidence of a series of statements by GWU officials in 1999 and 2000 which he alleged were designed to intimidate him, including a statement by President Trachtenberg to him personally in which (he recalled) the president said we're going to build a dormitory right next to you and no person in his right mind would want to live next to a dormitory. (Further, according to Dr. Kreuzer, the president promised to put a fraternity across the street.) Dr. Kreuzer recognizes that these utterances themselves fell outside the statute of limitations. He contends, however, that he offered proof of a pattern of continuing violations extending well into the statutory period, relying on this court's decision in Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass'n, 830 A.2d 874 (D.C. 2003), which also construed the D.C. Human Rights Act. But the availability of Lively and the continuing tort theory to support Dr. Kreuzer's claim is questionable. The statute of limitations issue in Lively was shaped by the unique nature of the violation alleged there, i.e., creation of a sexually hostile work environment. In keeping with the recent Supreme Court decision of National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), we concluded that by its very nature a forbidden hostile work environment is one unlawful employment practice continuing over time, id. at 890, and thus that a single act evincing this environment and occurring within the limitations period is enough to make `the entire time period of the hostile environment' count `for the purposes of determining liability.' Id. (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061). By contrast, blockbusting as the Act defines it is not continuous in nature; the violation Dr. Kreuzer alleges can consist of as little as a single act of attempt[ing] to . . . induce. . . or influence a real property transaction in the forbidden manner. Section 2-1402.22. And Lively, by adopt[ing] the Supreme Court's analysis in Morgan,  id. at 890, implies that such `discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.' Id. at 889 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122, 122 S.Ct. 2061). The availability of the continuing tort theory to support claims of violation of § 2-1402.22 is, in any case, a moot point because, as the trial judge recognized, Dr. Kreuzer offered no evidence of blockbusting within the limitations period. See Boulton v. Institute of Int'l Educ., 808 A.2d 499, 503-04 (D.C.2002) (A continuing violation exists where there is a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period (emphasis added; citations and quotation marks omitted)). In essence, Dr. Kreuzer merely asserted that after May of 2001 GWU began and continued the design and construction of the residence hall. So, for example, in his list of Evidence of Blockbusting presented to the court he cited to the facts that GWU had entered into a Development Agreement with the Remington [Condominium], and had then proceeded with the construction without any permission from Dr. Kreuzer to trespass on, over or under this property. It is scarcely deniableand fully confirmed by the recordthat GWU had business reasons to proceed with the construction of the dormitory unrelated to any desire to intimidate Dr. Kreuzer into selling his property or to penalize him for not doing so. Dr. Kreuzer's contrary assertion that a reasonable juror could conclude that there was no purpose in GW's design and construction other than to spite him (Br. for App. at 17; emphasis added) cannot be taken seriously. [5] In late 2001 and early 2002, the Board of Zoning Adjustment had conditioned approval of GWU's Campus Plan for 2001-2010 on the school's promptly tak[ing] decisive action to provide housing for the bulk of its undergraduate students on campus. George Washington Univ. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 831 A.2d 921, 929 (D.C.2003) (quoting Board). In keeping with that directive, GWU sought and received the Zoning Commission's approval in April 2002 to build the ten-story residence hall on the site adjoining Dr. Kreuzer's property. [6] Thus there is a wide gulf, to say the least, between the University's actual motives for its post-May 2001 actions and the scheme alleged by Dr. Kreuzer to drive him out of the neighborhood by the threat of an influx of students and reduced property value. President Trachtenberg had few communications with Dr. Kreuzer after that date (the last apparently being a letter in August 2001), and none can reasonably be viewed as a renewed warning of consequences if he did not sellin short, an act of blockbusting under the statute. [7] The judge correctly dismissed the blockbusting claim as a matter of law. [8]