Opinion ID: 2315948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Change Venue Sua Sponte

Text: Defendant did not move for a change of venue at the time of the resentencing proceeding. Nevertheless, he now contends that the trial court's failure to change venue on its own motion violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. Defendant claims that the publicity surrounding this case was so prejudicial that a fair trial before an impartial jury was impossible. He further contends that the failure to change venue resulted in the jury considering his guilty pleas to two murders in violation of his plea-bargain agreement in another case. In Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 30-37, 524 A. 2d 130, we rejected a similar contention with respect to denial of defendant's motion for change of venue for the initial trial. As we indicated in Biegenwald II, It is axiomatic that a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial requires that he be tried before a jury panel not tainted by prejudice. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, [81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642], 6 L.Ed. 2d 751, 755 (1961). We have emphasized the importance, particularly in capital cases, of the trial court's responsibility to preserve the integrity of the jury and minimize the danger that prejudice will infiltrate the adjudicatory process   . [106 N.J. at 32, 524 A. 2d 130 (quoting State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 63, 459 A. 2d 641 (1983) ( Williams I)).] In capital cases the trial court may in its discretion change venue when it is `necessary to overcome the realistic likelihood of prejudice from pretrial publicity.' State v. Williams, supra, 93 N.J. at 67-68 n. 13, 459 A. 2d 641; see State v. Bey, 96 N.J. 625, 630 [477 A. 2d 315], clarified, 97 N.J. 666 [483 A. 2d 185] (1984). 106 N.J. at 33, 524 A. 2d 130. Because we have adopted the distinction recognized by the federal courts between cases in which the trial atmosphere is so corrupted by publicity that prejudice may be presumed, ibid. (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1517, 16 L.Ed. 2d 600, 614 (1966)), and those in which the publicity is less saturating, see, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032-35, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2889-91, 81 L.Ed. 2d 847, 854-56 (1984), we must first identify the applicable standard for determining prejudice. Without question this case does not warrant application of the presumed-prejudice standard. In State v. Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. 225, 548 A. 2d 939, we identified a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining whether prejudice should be presumed: (1) evidence of extreme community hostility against defendant; (2) prominence of either the victim or the defendant within the community; (3) the nature and extent of the news coverage; (4) the size of the community; (5) the nature and gravity of the offense; and (6) the temporal proximity of the news coverage to the trial. Id. at 271-73, 548 A. 2d 939. Consideration of those factors (save, of course, the nature and gravity of the offense) leads overwhelmingly to the conclusion that this case does not involve the extreme circumstances that cause a trial atmosphere to be so corrupted by publicity as to produce a presumption of prejudice. Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 33, 524 A. 2d 130. Consequently, we review the trial court's failure to change venue under the actual prejudice standard, i.e., whether under the totality of the circumstances the voir dire and the trial court's handling of the jurors resulted in a fair and impartial jury. In light of an appellate court's distance from the jury-selection process, we have indicated that deference to the trial court is appropriate. E.g., Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 274-76, 548 A. 2d 939. The nature of jury selection inherently requires evaluation of the demeanor of venirepersons, an assessment narrowly circumscribed on appellate review of an unanimated transcript. Voir dire spanned three days. The trial court admonished the panel both before and after it administered the oath to the jurors that the members should avoid any media coverage of the proceeding. Before individual voir dire the venirepersons were required to fill out a questionnaire that included the following questions: 6. The defendant, Richard Biegenwald, was a resident of Staten Island. Do you know him? YES ____ NO ____ 7. Do you know any member of his family? YES ____ NO ____ 8. Have you ever heard of him? YES ____ NO ____ 19. Before coming here today had you ever heard of a murder case involving Richard Biegenwald from any source whatsoever either today or at any time previously? YES ____ NO ____ 20. Had you ever read of a case involving Richard Biegenwald? YES ____ NO ____ 21. Have you ever discussed him with anyone? YES ____ NO ____ Affirmative responses to any of those questions triggered additional probing by the trial court. On individual voir dire sixty of sixty-four prospective jurors questioned indicated that they were in some way familiar with defendant's name. The court excused for cause eight venirepersons because it appeared their familiarity with other proceedings involving defendant would impair their ability to comply with their oath. Ten of the twelve deliberating jurors had indicated familiarity with defendant's name. One deliberating juror indicated awareness that defendant had been implicated with respect to more than one murder. Jurors who have formed an opinion on the guilt or innocence of a defendant must be excused. State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 77, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991). However, we have long recognized that impanelled jurors need not be ignorant of the facts of the case. Ibid. (citing Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 268, 548 A. 2d 939; State v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 23, 417 A. 2d 474 (1980)). Those venirepersons who indicated that they had formed an opinion concerning the appropriate sentence were properly excused. Although ten of the deliberating jurors indicated some recognition of defendant's name, their recollections were almost uniformly vague associations of defendant with the Olesiewicz murder and prosecution. The voir dire of the one deliberating juror who indicated awareness of more than one murder does not reflect awareness of any facts not to be presented and considered during the sentencing proceeding: [Q.] You indicate you have heard the name Richard Biegenwald before? A. Yes. Q. Do you recall how it was? A. Well, I ride to work every day and I had the radio on and it comes on the radio in the past. Q. How much in the past are we talking about? A. I have no idea, but I know I heard it on the radio. Q. Talking about last week or way beyond  back beyond that? A. I really don't know. Q. All right. Do you recall whether it was used in any particular context, like Richard Biegenwald, criminal, or Richard Biegenwald mason, or  A. No, accused of murder. Q. Okay, So you associate Richard Biegenwald accused of murder kind of thing? A. Right. Q. Anything about the details of the murder you may have recalled? A. I recall that one of the murders took place I think in Asbury Park, something about Asbury Park. Q. Okay. Do you recall also there was more than one murder? A. Yes. Q. You said one of the murders? A. Yes. Q. Now you are thinking about that, was that your recollection of that? A. I don't know. Q. So we have Richard Biegenwald, murder associated with Asbury Park and another murder? A. Yes. Q. Okay. A. You know, if there's anything more in your head, let me know? A. That's about it. Q. Well, is there anything that you may have heard even though your memory is indistinct which you think might work on you or affect you somehow or other if you sit as a juror here? A. I don't think so.         Q. In other words, you'd stick with what I say and put aside any pre-conceived notions you may have had? A. Yes. Q. That's my job, that's your oath? A. Okay. Q. Then as you sit there and evaluate yourself, knowing what we're asking all these questions about, do you believe that if you are selected to sit as a juror on this case, that you could be open minded to the proofs that are put to you, that you could weigh the proofs, the good and the bad, weigh both sides, listen to the law as I explain it and then come to a conscientious decision as to whether the penalty should be death or life imprisonment with no parole for at least 30 years? A. Yes. THE COURT: Any additional questions? MR. DIAMOND: Yes, your Honor, if you could inquire, having had the knowledge that he says he does that there were additional murders, does that have an additional effect upon him weighing the mitigating factors than if he didn't hear about that previously? THE COURT: All right. With that in mind, you may have heard something about at least another murder floating around, where does that leave you in so far as your ability to decide this case on what's presented in the courtroom? THE JUROR: I'd have to take only in consideration what I'm here for. THE COURT: Well, that's true, but we want to make sure you are not just saying that to please us but it really is true, that you would put aside whatever it was that you heard? THE JUROR: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. The other thing that's important if you stay here is you do not idly discuss whatever it was that you heard a long time ago on the car radio with any of the other jurors here. Because that's getting, you understand, outside information some how or other and that's completely improper? THE JUROR: Yes, I understand that. The voir dire of that juror on the issue of pretrial publicity was thorough and extensive. The court offered defense counsel the opportunity to probe further. No challenge or objection was made. We will not second-guess the trial judge's evaluation of the effect of pretrial publicity on that juror. We conclude that the jury impanelled was free of any taint from pretrial publicity. The voir dire adequately disclosed exposure to publicity. There was no need to change venue sua sponte or otherwise. Nor do we find that there was any breach of defendant's plea agreements in other cases because there is no indication that evidence relating to defendant's other murder convictions entered into the deliberation process. We pause briefly to consider and reject defendant's related contentions that two specific circumstances caused him to be denied a trial free of taint from publicity. The first is an article, containing inadmissible and assertedly erroneous information, that appeared in the Asbury Park Press the morning of the second day of voir dire. Defense counsel brought the article to the court's attention before that day's proceedings commenced, and each prospective juror was asked whether he or she had complied with the court's frequent admonitions to avoid media coverage. There is no indication that the substance of the article came to the attention of any member of the jury, much less that it infected the jury's deliberations. The court's diligence in instructing the jury to avoid media coverage and discussions concerning the case was exemplary, and the presumption that the jury adhered to the court's direction has not been overcome. Second, defendant objected to the court's failure to excuse for cause a juror who had knowledge of facts relating to other murder investigations of defendant. The juror was qualified on the third and final day of voir dire and defense counsel excused her peremptorily during that same morning session. Defense counsel also moved for a mistrial based on the juror's presence in the jury room, colorfully characterizing her as a hand grenade that might trigger mass recall of inadmissible evidence by the other jurors. Although the argument that the juror should have been excused for cause is persuasive, we find the failure to have excused her unproblematic for several reasons. Foremost the juror did not deliberate; she was excused peremptorily shortly after she had been qualified. Consequently, the juror's presence in the jury room was brief and ended before the jury was exposed to the evidentiary phase, which, particularly in a murder case such as this one, can understandably pique the urge to discuss the case. Of equal importance is the judge's scrupulous reminder to each qualified venireperson that any discussion about the case was strictly forbidden, particularly his admonition to that juror: MR. DIAMOND: Judge, I have no more questions. Could we instruct the proposed juror on the items we discussed here, they were not to be discussed with any of the other jurors at any time. THE COURT: Oh, I tell each juror and I will tell [this juror] when you go into the jury room you are not supposed to discuss this with anybody there. The only time to do any discussing about this case at all with your fellow jurors if you sit is when you are deliberating at the end of the case. A. Yes, I understand that. MR. DIAMOND: I'm sorry, would that also include any prior knowledge? THE COURT: Anything relating to this case, I think that's pretty clear and this lady seems to understand that and I'm not going to fine tune it because you don't understand it. Okay? You understand what I'm saying? The juror indicated that she had not had discussions relating to defendant with any person other than her husband; we are unpersuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood that she infected the jury during her brief stay in the jury room.