Opinion ID: 1057817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Recharacterization of Dorr's Petition

Text: Dorr argues that the circuit court cannot recharacterize a pro se litigant's motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the court notifies the petitioner that the court intends to recharacterize the pleading or warned the petitioner that the recharacterization means that any subsequent writs of habeas corpus will be restricted under Virginia Code § 8.01-654(B)(2). Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) is plain and unambiguous, clearly limiting the right of a prisoner to file successive petitions for writs of habeas corpus. The key provisions of this statutory language focus on 'the time of filing' the first habeas petition. Dorsey v. Angelone, 261 Va. 601, 603, 544 S.E.2d 350, 352 (2001). Moreover, the provisions of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) require a prisoner to include all claims that he intends to bring before the court in his first habeas petition. Regardless of the manner in which that habeas petition is resolved, he may not thereafter file a subsequent habeas petition that seeks relief based upon any allegations of fact that were known to him at the time of the initial filing and not included therein. Daniels v. Warden of the Red Onion State Prison, 266 Va. 399, 403, 588 S.E.2d 382, 384 (2003). In Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003), the Supreme Court of the United States considered whether lower 12 courts may recharacterize a pro se litigant's motion as a request for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (§ 2255). It concluded that the recharacterization powers of lower courts are limited in the following way: The limitation applies when a court recharacterizes a pro se litigant's motion as a first § 2255 motion. In such circumstances the district court must notify the pro se litigant that it intends to recharacterize the pleading, warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent § 2255 motion will be subject to the restrictions on second or successive motions, and provide the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the § 2255 claims he believes he has. If the court fails to do so, the motion cannot be considered to have become a § 2255 motion for purposes of applying to later motions the law's second or successive restrictions. Castro, 540 U.S. at 383. We adopt this limitation on a trial court's power to recharacterize a pro se litigant's pleading in the present context. Virginia trial judges must notify pro se litigants of the potential consequences when recharacterizing their pleading. However, if thereafter the pro se litigant is given the opportunity to withdraw or amend the pleading to state all then-available claims and does not withdraw the pleading or agrees to the recharacterization after receiving notice and warning from the trial judge, then Code § 8.01-654 and its associated limitations apply. 13 Here, Dorr filed a motion for mandamus to compel VDOC to comply with the circuit court's sentencing order dated April 22, 2010. Clarke moved to dismiss Dorr's petition, recharacterizing his motion as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Dorr responded that he sought mandamus relief, not habeas corpus relief, and requested that the circuit court deny Clarke's motion. The circuit court then recharacterized Dorr's motion, without providing him notice or an opportunity to be heard, and ordered that his petition be dismissed. Accordingly, we hold that Dorr's petition cannot be considered his first habeas petition for purposes of limiting his right to file a subsequent habeas petition under Code § 8.01-654. Moreover, we conclude that a pro se litigant is not limited to challenging an unwarned recharacterization on appeal, but may do so when a later-filed habeas petition is challenged as being a second habeas application barred by the successive petitions provision of the statute. [T]he very point of the warning is to help the pro se litigant understand not only (1) whether he should withdraw or amend his motion, but also (2) whether he should contest the recharacterization, say, on appeal. Castro, 540 U.S. at 384 (emphasis in original). Therefore, [t]he 'lack of warning' prevents [the pro se litigant from] making an informed judgment in respect to the latter just as it does in respect to the former. Id. 14 Accordingly, we hold that an unwarned recharacterization cannot count as a [habeas petition] for purposes of the 'second or successive' provision [in Code § 8.01-654(B)(2)], whether the unwarned pro se litigant does, or does not, take an appeal. See Castro, 540 U.S. at 384. Despite this, [u]nder the doctrine of harmless error, we will affirm the circuit court's judgment when we can conclude that the error at issue could not have affected the court's result. Forbes v. Rapp, 269 Va. 374, 382, 611 S.E.2d 592, 597 (2005). Here, Dorr challenged the recharacterization of his petition on appeal; however, he is not required to do so until his first actual habeas petition is challenged as being a second or successive habeas petition barred by the successive petitions provision of Code § 8.01-654. Regardless of the characterization of his petition, Dorr was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence from August 20, 2009 until April 29, 2010, because during this time period he was serving time for his West Virginia sentence. Accordingly, we hold that the recharacterization could not have affected the circuit court's conclusion because, under the rule we announce here, Dorr would not be barred from filing a future petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a successive habeas petition, and the circuit court properly concluded that Dorr was not entitled to 15 credit toward his Virginia sentence for the time he spent in the Detention Center from August 20, 2009 until April 29, 2010.