Opinion ID: 792809
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Government expert's perjury

Text: 75 Defendants each seek a new trial or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing, based on alleged prejudice arising from the introduction of false testimony given by the Government's expert witness. 76 During its case in chief, the Government called Lawrence F. Stewart, 6 a civilian employee of the United States Secret Service and its Laboratory Director and Chief Forensic Scientist, to give an expert opinion regarding the worksheet that Bacanovic described in his testimony before the SEC as having been prepared on December 20th when he and Stewart reviewed her portfolio. The worksheet is a one-page document that listed each stock in Stewart's personal Merrill Lynch account and identified the market price as well as its unrealized gain or loss in position. Various handwritten notations, including circles, checks, and stock symbols appear on the page. In addition, to the right of the entry describing ImClone was the notation @60. Bacanovic testified on February 13, 2002, that the document demonstrated that Stewart sold her stock on December 27th pursuant to an earlier decision to liquidate if the per share price dropped to $60. 77 The original worksheet was sent to the Secret Service Forensic Services Division (FSD) where the ink that produced the handwritten notations was analyzed. At trial, Lawrence described himself as the only national expert for ink. He testified that laboratory tests were performed — first in July and August 2002, and again in January 2004 — to determine whether the ink used in the @60 notation was consistent with the ink in other notations on the page. Lawrence testified that the test results led him to conclude that the ink used to make the @60 notation, which appeared next to the ImClone entry, differed from the ink used to make the other notations that he was able to test, all of which had been made with a type of Paper Mate pen. The Government offered Lawrence's testimony to demonstrate that the @60 notation was not contemporaneous with the other notations on the page and therefore tended to prove that Bacanovic altered the document and that he and Stewart concocted the @60 stop-loss order story after the fact when the flaws in the tax loss story came to light. 78 The defense offered the testimony of Dr. Albert Lyter, a forensic chemist specializing in the analysis of inks and papers. There was little disagreement in the two experts' conclusions. Both testified that it was likely that the marks other than the @60 and a small dash at the end of the Apple Computer entry had been produced by a Paper Mate pen, that the ink used to make the @60 mark was unusual and from an unidentifiable source, and that the timing of the various marks could not be determined reliably through testing. Lyter's conclusion, however, departed from Lawrence's in two respects. First, Lyter concluded that the @60 notation and the Apple Computer dash had been made by the same pen, whereas Lawrence concluded that the @60 ink differed from the ink used for other notations on the page but, because he had not tested the dash, he had made no conclusion regarding its source. Second, Lyter testified that use of a device known as a densitometer revealed batch variations, which indicated that at least two different ball point pens had been used to make the remaining notations on the page. The Government recalled Lawrence to answer questions about the use of densitometry. He testified that the densitometer was not sufficiently accurate to ascertain variations among different batches of the same ink recipe with reasonable reliability. 79 Several months after the jury returned its verdict, the Government announced that an investigation had revealed that Lawrence had made false material statements in the testimony he gave in Stewart's and Bacanovic's trial. He was indicted on June 9, 2004 on two counts of perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 relating to his testimony that he had personally participated in the forensic tests about which he testified and that he was familiar with a book proposal drafted by his colleagues, and knew that it included a chapter on densitometry. 80 Defendants contend that, in light of the perjury charges, reversal of their convictions should be virtually automatic because the Government knew or should have known at the time of trial that Lawrence's testimony was false. They argue alternatively that the District Court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the Government's knowledge. We disagree.
81 We have frequently acknowledged that, even where newly discovered evidence indicates perjury, motions for new trials should be granted only with great caution and in the most extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1414 (2d Cir.1992); accord United States v. Spencer, 4 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. DiPaolo, 835 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir.1975); United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir.1958). So cautioned, the trial court's discretion to decide whether newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial is broad because its vantage point as to the determinative factor — whether newly discovered evidence would have influenced the jury — has been informed by the trial over which it presided. See United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 364 (2d Cir.1995) (recognizing that the trial court's Rule 33 ruling is deferred to on appeal because, having presided over the trial, it is in a better position to decide what effect the newly discovered materials might have had on the jury).

82 [W]hen the newly discovered evidence focuses on the perjury of a witness, a threshold inquiry is whether the evidence demonstrates that the witness in fact committed perjury. United States v. White, 972 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir.1992). When the District Court denied Defendants' requests for a new trial, it assumed that Lawrence perjured himself. Stewart, 323 F.Supp.2d at 615. At the time, Lawrence had been indicted on perjury charges arising from his testimony in this matter, but had not been convicted. Id. We will make the same assumption for purposes of this appeal, noting that the propriety of that approach is not altered by Lawrence's subsequent acquittal, which does not establish that Lawrence's trial testimony was true, but only that the Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his testimony was false.
83 Perjury in and of itself is insufficient to justify relief under Rule 33. White, 972 F.2d at 22 (the mere fact that [the witness] lied on the witness stand does not automatically entitle [defendant] to a new trial). Rather, when a trial has been tainted by false testimony, this Court is called upon to strike a fair balance between the need for both integrity and finality in criminal prosecutions by determining whether false testimony was prejudicial in the sense that it affected the outcome of the trial. Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 239. To do so, we assess the materiality of the perjury to the verdict and are guided by two standards which are based on the extent of the government's awareness of the false testimony prior to the conclusion of the trial. United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir.1991). 84 If the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury prior to the conclusion of the trial, the conviction must be set aside where there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The knowing introduction of false testimony will lead to virtually automatic reversal. Id. The standard applicable to the knowing introduction of false testimony serves the dual purposes of discouraging prosecutorial misconduct and providing relief from an unfair conviction. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). On the other hand, if the prosecution was not aware of the perjury, a defendant can obtain a new trial only where the false testimony leads to a firm belief that but for the perjured testimony, the defendant would most likely not have been convicted. Wallach, 935 F.2d at 456 (internal quotation marks omitted). 85 Defendants advance two theories for virtually automatic reversal of their convictions, arguing that the Government knew or should have known that Lawrence's testimony was false. First, Defendants contend that, as part of the prosecution team, Lawrence's own knowledge or that of his FSD colleagues should be imputed to the Government. They do not assert that evidence in the record demonstrates that the prosecutors actually knew that Lawrence was lying. Alternatively, Defendants contend that red flags should have alerted the prosecutors to Lawrence's lies.
86 As the Government points out, this Court has not expressly recognized or rejected the imputation principle in the context of a new trial motion based on evidence of perjured testimony. Nor do we have occasion to do so now. Without dismissing the possibility that there are circumstances in which it may be fair to impute the knowledge of certain persons to prosecutors as if it were their own, we find that the District Court did not err in concluding that those circumstances are not present here. 87 Drawing on Supreme Court authority holding that Brady obligations extend to all persons acting on the government's behalf, Defendants urge that the scope of the prosecution team should be similarly construed to impute government agents' false testimony to the prosecutors themselves. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); see also Wedra v. Thomas, 671 F.2d 713, 717 n. 1 (2d Cir.1982) (noting that the knowledge of a police officer may be attributable to the prosecutor if the officer acted as an arm of the prosecution). According to Defendants, because Lawrence was a government official working in conjunction with the prosecution, it is fair to attribute his knowledge of the perjured testimony, or that of other FSD employees, to the Government. But our determination of whether to deem an individual to be an arm of the prosecution for Brady purposes does not follow the broad, categorical approach urged by Defendants. Instead, the propriety of imputing knowledge to the prosecution is determined by examining the specific circumstances of the person alleged to be an arm of the prosecutor. United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 555 (2d Cir.1975). It does not turn on the status of the person with actual knowledge, such as a law enforcement officer, prosecutor or other government official. In other words, the relevant inquiry is what the person did, not who the person is. See id. (imputing law enforcement agent's knowledge of confidential file to prosecutors where agent supervised the witness, participated actively in the investigation and frequently sat at counsel table throughout the trial); see also United States v. Sanchez, 813 F.Supp. 241, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (imputing to prosecutor knowledge of perjury of local police officers who were deputized as federal agents and worked as part of investigative task force), aff'd on other grounds, 35 F.3d 673 (2d Cir.1994); Pina v. Henderson, 752 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.1985) (refusing to apply the descriptive term of arm of the prosecutor to parole officer who did not work in conjunction with the police or the prosecutor). 88 We do not agree with Defendants that the District Court dismissed the imputation argument as applicable only to law enforcement officials who were involved with the investigation. Rather, in finding that Lawrence acted as an ordinary expert witness and not as part of the prosecution team, the District Court properly analyzed what Lawrence actually did and did not do in connection with the investigation and subsequent judicial proceedings. Stewart, 323 F.Supp.2d at 616-18. The District Court's factual findings, which are not clearly erroneous, demonstrate that Lawrence's role was limited to matters concerning his area of expertise — ink. In that regard, Lawrence analyzed a single document, explained the forensic ink tests that had been performed, discussed potential testimony by the defense ink expert, assisted prosecutors to develop cross-examination questions addressing certain technical aspects of ink testing, and participated in a mock examination on ink issues to prepare for trial. His testimony at trial related only to his credentials, the tests that were performed and the conclusions he drew from them. None of this suggests that Lawrence was in any way involved with the investigation or presentation of the case to the grand jury. He did not interview witnesses or gather facts, nor, with the exception of the @60 worksheet, did he review documents or develop prosecutorial strategy. 89 Lawrence acted only in the capacity of an expert witness, as the District Court found, and not as a fully functioning member of the prosecution team, as Defendants suggest. The fact that Lawrence was a government employee does not alter that conclusion, which applies with even more force to the other laboratory employees whose participation was similarly limited in scope and less extensive than Lawrence's. These circumstances, therefore, do not justify attributing to the prosecutors, as if it was their own, knowledge that Lawrence or other FSD personnel possessed.
90 Alternatively, Defendants urge that even if the prosecutors did not in fact know that Lawrence lied, they should have been alerted to the possibility that he made misrepresentations as a result of certain matters that arose prior to and during the trial. We are not left with any inclination, much less a `definite and firm conviction,' that the District Court made a mistake, United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 222 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)), when it found that the record does not indicate that prosecutors negligently ignored indications that Lawrence overstated his participation in initial ink tests. See Stewart, 323 F.Supp.2d at 618-19 (noting that Defendants do not contend that there were red flags that should have caused the Government to suspect that Lawrence would lie about being aware of his colleagues' book proposal). The record fully supports the District Court's finding that the Government did not fail to properly utilize the available information where (i) the absence of Lawrence's name on the 2002 forensic report was not necessarily suspicious, nor was it inconsistent with his representation that he worked with another FSD employee, Susan Fortunato; (ii) Lawrence's and Fortunato's explanations of their initial failure to test the ink content of the Apple Computer dash did nothing to put prosecutors on notice that Lawrence would later misrepresent the extent of his participation in the 2002 testing; and (iii) Fortunato's description of an initial meeting with prosecutors does not establish that she informed them that she alone conducted the ink testing. Id. (quoting Wallach, 935 F.2d at 457). 91 The District Court did not err in finding that the facts did not demonstrate that the Government knew or should have known that Lawrence's testimony was false. There is no indication that the false testimony was introduced as a result of prosecutorial misconduct.
92 Ultimately, whether the prosecution was aware of the alleged perjury is of no moment, because we conclude that the testimony in question was not material under either standard. That is to say, whether we ask if the verdict might have been different or if it probably would have been different had the jurors known (i) the truth about Lawrence's involvement in the ink testing and his awareness of his colleagues' book proposal discussing densitometry and (ii) that Lawrence had lied under oath about those matters, the answer is no. Therefore, we conclude that the District Court did not err in finding that Lawrence's false statements were not material either as to the factual elements of the Government's case or for impeachment value, had the misrepresentations been exposed at trial. See Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 246. 93 Lawrence's testimony did not influence the verdict on the counts of conviction. It pertained exclusively to Bacanovic's @60 worksheet and was used by the Government to support its position that the $60 stop-loss agreement was an after-the-fact fabrication. The jury acquitted Defendants of all of the counts and specifications relating to the existence of the agreement. Because the Government failed to persuade the jury to convict on the only counts to which Lawrence's testimony related, that testimony cannot be considered capable of materially affecting the verdict on the counts to which it had no relevance. See White, 972 F.2d at 22 (determining that perjury was not material where defendant was acquitted of all charges that depended solely on perjurer's testimony). Furthermore, the perjury was collateral to the substance of Lawrence's own testimony — it did not concern the validity of the tests that were conducted or his conclusions, which were largely corroborated by the defense expert. 94 Where, as here, independent evidence supports a defendant's conviction, the subsequent discovery that a witness's testimony at trial was perjured will not warrant a new trial. Wong, 78 F.3d at 82 (citing United States v. Reyes, 49 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir.1995)). The District Court found that the jury convicted defendants of lies that had nothing to do with the $60 agreement. Stewart, 323 F.Supp.2d at 619. We see no reason to disturb the District Court's finding that ample evidence unrelated to Lawrence's testimony or to the $60 stop-loss agreement supported the verdict on the counts of conviction. See, e.g., Wong, 78 F.3d at 78-79 (factual findings in connection with denial of motion for new trial upheld unless clearly erroneous). As to Martha Stewart, the verdict of conviction was based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart lied to investigators (i) when she told them that she spoke to Bacanovic on December 27th and instructed him to sell her ImClone shares, (ii) she could not remember whether she was told about Waksal's efforts to sell his shares, (iii) she sold the stock when she did so because she did not want to be bothered during her vacation, (iv) she discussed MSLO and K-Mart with Bacanovic on December 27th, and (v) she did not discuss the investigations with Bacanovic. See Stewart, 323 F.Supp.2d at 619. As to Bacanovic, the jury found that he lied when he told investigators that he spoke to Stewart on December 27th and when he described a message he left with Armstrong for Stewart that only gave the price of ImClone shares. See id. at 619-20. 95 Like the District Court, we find that it is not possible, much less probable, that the jurors would have acquitted Stewart and Bacanovic of these charges and specifications had they known about Lawrence's limited participation in the ink testing, his awareness of his colleagues' book proposal or even his alleged attempt to cover up the real reason that the Apple Computer dash was not tested by FSD in July 2002. These simply cannot be matters that would `create[ ] a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist' concerning the factual elements of the counts of conviction. United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 365 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392). Nevertheless, Defendants advance a number of theories for concluding that revelation of the perjury would have resulted in a full acquittal, none of which is persuasive. 96 Exposure of the false testimony would not have added impeachment value sufficient to change the outcome of the trial. Gambino, 59 F.3d at 364 (Rule 33 relief justified only if newly discovered evidence is of a type that could change the verdict). Significantly, the District Court observed that the importance of the @60 agreement and Lawrence's testimony took on inflated importance as the centerpiece and core theory of the prosecution only after his false testimony came to light. Stewart, 323 F.Supp.2d at 620; cf. Wallach, 935 F.2d at 457-58 (determining that a new trial was necessary because lies of key witness who tied all the pieces together, even as to matters affecting only his credibility, could have caused the jury to reject his entire testimony and eliminate the foundation for conviction). Judge Cedarbaum obviously was in the best position to appraise the possible effect of the challenged testimony on the outcome of the trial because [a]fter all, Judge [Cedarbaum] was at the trial. We were not. United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 49 (2d Cir.1980). 97 In a further effort to bridge the great gulf between Lawrence's testimony and the counts of conviction, Defendants suggest that revelation of the perjury could have affected the verdict either by bolstering the jury's confidence in Defendants' position, exposing a lack of confidence by the Government in its own case or impeaching other Government witnesses by extension. These arguments are speculative and unpersuasive. Defendants offer nothing more than wishful conjecture that disclosure of Lawrence's lies would have endowed the @60 agreement with some amorphous plus factor capable of translating the jury's implicit recognition of the existence of the @60 agreement into a conclusion that it was the sole motivating factor for Stewart's ImClone sale. In addition, without endorsing Defendants' theory that Government fact witnesses could have been impugned by association with Lawrence, we note that newly discovered evidence of perjury that serves only to impeach credibility is generally insufficient to justify a new trial. See Reyes, 49 F.3d at 68. In any event, Defendants do not explain how Lawrence's false testimony would have diminished the credibility of Glotzer, Farmer, or any of the other witnesses called by the Government. 98 As a final point, we do not agree that the Government's indictment of Lawrence for perjury constitutes a concession that his perjury was material. Defendants argue that having charged Lawrence with making false material statements at Defendants' trial, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623, the Government should be precluded from denying the materiality of the false statements to resist a Rule 33 motion. There is no authority for that proposition, and the consequence of Defendants' reasoning would be that any prosecution of an individual for giving perjured testimony in a criminal proceeding would lead to a new trial regardless of whether the perjury had any effect on the jury's verdict. That result is inconsistent with our rejection of a Rule 33 standard that would require reversal when the perjury went only to an immaterial aspect of the proof. Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218, 226 (2d Cir.1988) (reflecting upon Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 245, in which the Court discussed its discomfort with a test that require[s] reversal in cases of perjury with respect to even minor matters). The need for a new trial depends on the effect of the perjury on the verdict, see Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 243-47, whereas materiality for purposes of a section 1623 prosecution is whether the false testimony was capable of influencing the fact finder in deciding the issues before [it], United States v. Guariglia, 962 F.2d 160, 164 (2d Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original). 99 The standards for assessing materiality in the two contexts reflect the different purposes effectuated by the rule and the statute. The materiality inquiry in a Rule 33 motion focuses on the ultimate outcome of the trial because the objective of the rule is to relieve a defendant of the unfairness that results when false testimony contributes to a verdict of conviction. See Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 239 (affirming conviction where alleged perjury was not sufficiently significant to have unfairly tainted verdict). Section 1623, on the other hand, serves to deter and punish false testimony and may be based more broadly on any matter before the jury. See United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 483 (2d Cir.1985) (observing that section 1623 facilitates intent to deter perjury and enhance reliability of testimony); United States v. Gugliaro, 501 F.2d 68, 71-72 (2d Cir.1974) (misstatement of fact need not be `dispositive' of the inquiry in question to be material in perjury prosecution (quoting United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n. 1 (2d Cir.1972))). 100 In sum, we find that the interests of justice do not require a new trial because Lawrence's false testimony did not result in unfairness to Defendants. The District Court did not err in finding that there is no reasonable possibility, much less a probability, that the jury's decision to convict Defendants for lying about their various communications on and after December 27th would have been different if the jurors had known the facts that Lawrence concealed or had known that Lawrence lied under oath. Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Rule 33 relief without convening an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the extent of the Government's awareness of the perjury. Where, as here, the additional evidence of perjury is not sufficiently material to undermine confidence in the verdict, there is no need to probe the extent of the Government's awareness of the perjury because the argument fails under either standard. See White, 972 F.2d at 22 (holding that where it is not necessary to resolve the issues that might be the focus of an evidentiary hearing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing). The District Court's denial of Defendants' Rule 33 motions based on Lawrence's testimony is affirmed in all respects.