Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rushing the Jurors to a Verdict

Text: At the defense's request, defendant's trial was conducted on a four-day-per-week schedule, with Fridays off. But when closing arguments finished on a Thursday, the trial court inquired whether it would be inconvenient to begin deliberations the next day. The court explained it would instruct the jury at 9:00 a.m., and then the jury would retire to deliberate. The court further explained that the jury would break for the weekend around 4:30 p.m., unless it indicated it was close to concluding its deliberations. Defendant did not object to this procedure. The jury was instructed the next day as indicated and reached a verdict at 2:45 p.m. Defendant contends the trial court improperly rushed the jury to a verdict because, by asking the jurors to come in on their scheduled day off, the court was subtly implying that deliberations would not take very long. Defendant failed to preserve the claim for appeal by objecting at trial. ( People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 55, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.) Were we to reach the issue, we would find no error. In People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 534, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081, we explained that A trial judge should refrain from placing specific time pressure on a deliberating jury and should never imply that the case warrants only desultory deliberation. Such comments risk persuading legitimate dissidents, whatever their views, that the court considers their position unreasonable. The record here fails to support defendant's claim that the trial court pressured the jury or implied that it believed the deliberations would not take long. (See People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 469, 276 Cal.Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107.)

At the time of his interrogation by police in connection with the Dolinka murder, defendant was already in prison serving a 15-year-to-life term for the second degree murder of Amelda Neff in 1984 (see discussion post, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 414, 51 P.3d at p. 282). Accordingly, defendant was charged with the special circumstance of having suffered a prior murder conviction. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2).) He raises three separate challenges to this special circumstance finding; as we explain, none has merit. Defendant first contends the prior-murder special-circumstance finding must be set aside because there was no evidence he intended to kill Neff. The claim fails because section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) does not require the People to prove the prior murder was committed with an intent to kill. ( People v. Neely, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 899, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 189, 864 P.2d 460; People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 596, 238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350 ( Hendricks ).) Defendant argues that after we held an intent to kill was a necessary prerequisite for felony-murder special-circumstance allegations in Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, we thereafter held intent to kill was required to sustain the prior-murder special-circumstance allegation. Defendant cites People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d 302, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669, and People v. Malone (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 31, 211 Cal. Rptr. 210 in support, and argues the Neff murder fell within the window period between Turner and Hendricks, in which an intent to kill was required. He is mistaken. Neither People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d 302, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669, which involved the multiple-murder special circumstance set forth in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3), nor People v. Malone, supra, 165 Cal. App.3d 31, 211 Cal.Rptr. 210, holds that a prior murder, charged as a special circumstance under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2), must involve the intent to kill. To the extent there was any confusion in the holding of Malone (see, e.g., People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 587, fn. 17, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290), that case was expressly disapproved on this point in Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 596, footnote 3, 238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350. Accordingly, the prior-murder special circumstance has never required an intent to kill. [21] Second, defendant contends the prior-murder special-circumstance finding must be reversed because he was not informed, before pleading no contest to the second degree murder of Neff in 1986, that the conviction would make him eligible for the death penalty. The trial court denied his motion to strike the special circumstance on this ground. Defendant argues strenuously that the trial court's ruling was incorrect. We disagree. When a criminal defendant chooses to plead guilty (or, as here, no contest), both the United States Supreme Court and this court have required that the defendant be advised on the record that, by pleading, the defendant forfeits the constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine the People's witnesses, and to be free from compelled self-incrimination. ( Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449.) In addition, this court has required, as a judicially declared rule of state criminal procedure, that a pleading defendant also be advised of the direct consequences of his plea. ( People v. Barella (1999) 20 Cal.4th 261, 266, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 975 P.2d 37; Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 605, 119 Cal. Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086.) If the consequence is only collateral, no advisement is required. Defendant cites no authority holding that the future possibility of the death penalty in the event of a second murder prosecution constitutes a direct consequence of a guilty plea. [22] The situation is directly analogous to a claim that a prior serious felony conviction enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a) cannot be imposed because the defendant had not been advised, prior to pleading in an earlier case, that his conviction could be used to enhance a future sentence should he reoffend. In such cases, the appellate courts have held that the possible future use of a current conviction is not a direct consequence of the conviction. ( People v. Bernal (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1457, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 839; accord, People v. Crosby (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1355, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 159.) Although the death penalty is the ultimate punishment in our criminal scheme, in 1986 when defendant pleaded no contest to murdering Amelda Neff his future eligibility for that penalty was only a possible collateral consequence of his plea. Accordingly, failing to advise him of that possibility when he pleaded was not error. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying his motion to strike the prior-murder special-circumstance finding for the failure to advise him of the possible future use of the conviction to render him eligible for the death penalty. [23] The third and final reason defendant contends the prior-murder special-circumstance finding must be reversed is because the Neff murder occurred after the Dolinka murder and thus was not a prior murder. Although the Neff murder, which occurred in 1984, indeed postdated the Dolinka homicide, which was committed in 1982, that fact does not undermine the correctness of the special circumstance finding because, for purposes of the prior-murder special circumstance, [t]he order of the commission of the homicides is immaterial. ( Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 5%, 238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350.) Defendant argues that Hendricks is inconsistent with federal constitutional principles and with our Legislature's intent as gleaned through legislative history. Taking the latter point first, defendant argues our interpretation of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) renders the word previously surplusage in violation of the canons of statutory construction. We addressed and rejected this exact argument in Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 595, 238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350, and defendant does not convince us we should revisit the issue. Regarding the federal constitutional claim, defendant seemingly contends that considering the 1984 Neff murder as a prior murder failed to afford him the fair notice required by the federal due process clause because, at the time he killed Dolinka, he had no way to know he was subjecting himself to prosecution for a `prior' murder special circumstance. He cites in support cases suggesting that, in the context of habitual offender statutes, conviction of the first crime gave fair notice that heightened punishment would follow upon reoffense. [24] We rejected this argument as well in Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d 584, 238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350. We there explained that, in contrast to habitual criminal statutes that seek to punish recidivism, the function of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) is to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. (See also Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 878, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235.) Unlike recidivism statutes, ... section 190.2[, subdivision] (a)(2) is directed neither to deterring misconduct nor to fostering rehabilitation. ( Hendricks, supra, at p. 595, 238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350.) Because the prior-murder special-circumstance statute is directed to a different purpose than recidivism laws, defendant's attempted analogy is inapt. Defendant further argues that Hendricks is inconsistent with our interpretation of section 190.3, factor (c), which permits a penalty jury to consideras a capital sentencing factorprior felony convictions. We held in People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201-203, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480, that section 190.3, factor (c) is limited to crimes occurring before the charged capital crime. Defendant contends the Hendricks court's decision not to impose a similar limit on section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2), the prior-murder special-circumstance statute, was an abrupt departure from both prior state law and established principles of stare decisis and statutory construction. The break from the past was so great, defendant argues, as to deprive him of federal due process and equal protection. He cites Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175 in support. We have previously rejected the substance of this contention. As noted, the purpose of the prior-murder special circumstance is to narrow the class of persons who may be given the death penalty, as required by the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, all murders committed by a defendant, not just those occurring temporally before the present crime, are relevant. By contrast, the purpose of [section 190.3,] factor (c) is to show the capital offense was the culmination of the defendant's habitual criminalitythat it was undeterred by the community's previous criminal sanctions. ( People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 46, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249.) In light of this purpose, section 190.3, factor (c) is properly limited to crimes occurring before the present one. Because Hendricks thus did not effect an arbitrary denial of a state-created liberty interest, its holding involved no denial of rights that could implicate the holding of Hicks v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. 343, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175. Defendant further argues that if the prior-murder special circumstance is not limited to murders actually antedating the charged capital crime, then the law is vague and overbroad because it does not sufficiently guide sentencing juries and channel their discretion in particular cases. Defendant is correct that our statutory special circumstances cannot be overly vague: Although [United States Supreme Court] precedents do not require the use of aggravating factors, they have not permitted a State in which aggravating factors are decisive to use factors of vague or imprecise content. A vague aggravating factor employed for the purpose of determining whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty fails to channel the sentencer's discretion. ( Stringer v. Black (1992) 503 U.S. 222, 235, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367.) It is not, however, unconstitutionally vague for the state to determine that one charged with committing first degree murder, who has committed another murder at some other time in his or her life, falls into that narrow category of persons who are more deserving of the death penalty than other murderers. We thus reject the vagueness challenge to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2). As defendant makes no independent argument as to overbreadth, we reject that claim as well. ( People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 884, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15.) To the extent defendant contends that applying the rule laid down in Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d 584, 238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350, violated his rights under the ex post facto clause of the federal Constitution because Hendricks was decided after he committed the Dolinka murder, we reject that claim. ( People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 430-431, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071 [ex post facto clause does not apply to judicial decisions].) We also reject the claim that Hendricks constituted an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of the special circumstance statute and that its application to defendant's case violates his right to due process. (See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964) 378 U.S. 347, 353, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 [an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids].) There was no enlargement of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2); indeed, the issue was left open explicitly in People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103, 111, footnote 2, 151 Cal.Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773, [25] and finally decided in Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d 584, 238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350.
Defendant demurred to the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation because the three-year statute of limitations had run on the underlying robbery. (§ 801.) He cited People v. Superior Court ( Jennings ) (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 636, 641-644, 228 Cal.Rptr. 357 ( Jennings ), in support of his motion, but admitted that this court had expressly disapproved Jennings in People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 18, footnote 7, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843 ( Morris ). [26] Nevertheless, he argued that Jennings had established a judicially created statute of limitations, that Morris repealed that rule, and that applying that repeal retroactively to his case violates his right to due process. ( Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra, 378 U.S. at p. 353, 84 S.Ct. 1697.) The trial court denied the motion. Defendant renews the argument here, claiming our decision in Morris effected an unforeseeable enlargement of a criminal statute and that applying it to his case violated his right to due process. He is mistaken, because the premise of his argument is faulty. Jennings did not create a judicially created rule akin to a statute of limitations that was enforceable until overruled by this court. Jennings merely was wrong on the law. As we explained in Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at page 17, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843, [t]he courts have long permitted felony-murder prosecutions notwithstanding the expiration of the felony statute of limitations for the simple reason that the prosecution is for murder, not for the underlying felony. (Italics omitted.) Jennings, then, did not establish a general rule, and Morris did not effect an enlargement of a criminal statute, unforeseen or otherwise. We thus reject defendant's due process argument.