Opinion ID: 1662210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Specification 2: Advances to Selzer

Text: However, with regard to the remaining specification, which charges improper advances to Selzer, we do find improper conduct. Selzer, a seaman, was injured in February 1972. Being dissatisfied with an attorney he had earlier retained, he sent for Edwins in late February to visit him while still in the hospital. He there retained Edwins as his attorney. Edwins represented Selzer for approximately three months. During that time, Edwins filed a suit for him, made at least two motion appearances, and spent about fifty hours in his service. Edwins finally relinquished Selzer as a client, because of Selzer's repeated demands for money advances. Between February 27 and April 17, however, Edwins had advanced Selzer $756.95 in monied loans (in addition to $303.32 paid out for normal expenses of litigation). These cash advances violate the prohibition of Disciplinary Rule 5-103(B). Unlike the advances made to Thomas (Specification 1(c) above) for necessary living and medical expenses, no justification is shown for them. In the absence of such justification, we apply the literal wording of the rule and presume that the advances were improperly made with the intention of securing or keeping legal representation of Selzer. We therefore must hold that the cash advances by Edwins violated the disciplinary rule forbidding them. For this violation, we will order his suspension from the practice of law for a period of thirty days, this suspension to run concurrently with his suspension for soliciting his own employment by Thomas. Nevertheless, in fairness to the respondent Edwins, the implication from Selzer's testimony is that periodic advances not necessarily based on need are a common practice in maritime litigation. High-paid seamen, unable on maintenance and cure during disability to maintain their style of life, apparently demand and receive rather large advances pending final disposition of such high-award litigation. Selzer's testimony is open to the construction that, in the absence of such advances, he would not retain a lawyer. He testified, for instance, that the lawyer he retained to replace Edwins had advanced him $4,000 during the year prior to settlement. (We do not mean to imply that, under the guidelines above set forth, this latter necessarily was an advance prohibited by the rule, as not being a reasonable expense of litigation.) In a sense, the client's dissatisfaction with Edwins and the consequent disciplinary proceedings resulted from Edwins' refusal to make any more advances and the resultant termination of Edwins' representation of him. It might be said that the present complaint results, not from Edwins' violation of the disciplinary rule, but because he refused to continue to violate it. The troublesome query presented by Selzer's testimony is whether the rule prohibiting advances, even under the less restrictive interpretation we place upon it, is practicably enforceable (except selectively, as here). The long-customary practices of maritime law lead to expectations of such services to the clients whom the bar serves in this area of litigation. Selzer's testimony implies that, if Louisiana lawyers do not meet the need and expectation established by this ancient custom, lawyers from other areas will. But neither the moral desireability nor the practical difficulties of the rule are before us now. Nor is any issue of either modification or else less-selective enforcement of the rule as now adopted, which the respondent's conduct violated. For this deliberate and unexcused violation, we deem disciplinary action required, as set forth above.