Opinion ID: 1441328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Merits of the District's Appeal Regarding its Cross Claim

Text: In essence, the District argues that it has never had its day in court on its cross claim against Ebone for contribution and indemnity. It maintains that it preserved its right to trial on its cross claim as evidenced by the parties' joint pretrial statement, the court's pretrial order, and the trial judge's statement during trial. Ebone asserts that the District should not be permitted a second bite at the apple to litigate its cross claim because Ebone is not a joint tortfeasor and the District is barred by the doctrines of res judicata, waiver and estoppel. The District's silence during trial on the issue of its cross claim against Ebone is puzzling. Ebone's liability clearly was at issue during the trial, as indicated by Ebone's obvious presence and participation in the trial as a defendant. Hence, the issue of Ebone's liability was conclusively resolved at trial. See Lowery v. Muse, 151 A.2d 263, 265 (D.C.1959). [5] The District's reliance on Hecht Co. v. District of Columbia, 139 A.2d 857 (D.C.1958) is misplaced. There, the trial court severed the cross claim from the main action at the request of the defendant and the cross claim was, thus, not in issue at trial on the main claim. We reiterated that: The general rule is that where an indemnitor has been given notice of and an opportunity to defend a suit brought against the indemnitee, a judgment rendered in such an action, as well as the resolution of all issues material to such judgment, is conclusive on both parties in a subsequent suit for indemnity. Id. at 859 (footnote omitted). By remaining silent, the District allowed the issue of Ebone's negligence and its status as a joint tortfeasor to be litigated during the trial and is now bound by the trial court's judgment. [6] We turn now to the effect of the directed verdict in Ebone's favor on the District's cross claim for contribution and indemnification. Questions of contribution and indemnity pose legal issues that must be resolved by the court rather than the jury. In this jurisdiction, the law pertaining to the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors has been established by case precedent rather than by statute. District of Columbia v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 722 A.2d 332, 336 (D.C.1998) (en banc) (citing Lamphier v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 524 A.2d 729, 733 (D.C.1987)).