Opinion ID: 1368892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining the mount of the attorney fees award?

Text: The defendants assert the trial court erred in calculating the attorney fee award of $500,000. The record gives no indication how the trial court reached the figure, except for one letter from the trial judge to the parties stating an appropriate segregation of his attorney's fees ... would be one-third of the trebled amount. Counsel for the plaintiff had argued to the trial court a contingency fee arrangement of one-third to 50 percent of the judgment was standard in a case of this nature. [8] The attorney fee was awarded pursuant to the federal civil RICO statute allowing recovery of a reasonable attorney's fee. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). We therefore turn to federal decisions for interpretation of this provision. Federal courts have widely accepted the lodestar method of calculating a reasonable attorney fee, first developed in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.1973). The United States Supreme Court recently approved this method in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Vly. Citizens' Coun. for Clean Air, ___ U.S. ___, 92 L.Ed.2d 439, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3097 (1986), describing the procedure as follows: First, the court was to calculate the lodestar, determined by multiplying the hours spent on a case by a reasonable hourly rate of compensation for each attorney involved.... Second, using the lodestar figure as a starting point, the court could then make adjustments to this figure, in light of (1) the contingent nature of the case, reflecting the likelihood that hours were invested and expenses incurred without assurance of compensation; and (2) the quality of the work performed as evidenced by the work observed, the complexity of the issues and the recovery obtained. ... This formulation emphasized the amount of time expended by the attorneys ... The court then discussed the use of the adjustment factors, indicating they should only modify the lodestar figure in `rare' and `exceptional' cases, supported by both `specific evidence' on the record and detailed findings by the lower courts. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Vly. Citizens' Coun. for Clean Air, 106 S.Ct. at 3098 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-901, 79 L.Ed.2d 891, 104 S. Ct 1541 (1984)). The record in the present case makes obvious the trial court performed none of the steps in calculating the attorney fee award here. No consideration was given to the amount of time expended by the counsel for the plaintiff, thus making it impossible to consider whether the adjustment factors should be applied, or to what extent, if any. The trial court's method of calculation of the attorney fee award here was an abuse of discretion and is in error.