Opinion ID: 1348457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Disparate Treatment Theory

Text: Plaintiffs first contend that AT & T Technologies' promotion practice treated them disparately because of their age. Generally, the disparate treatment theory of discrimination is applicable when the employer has treated some people less favorably than others because of an unlawful criterion such as age, sex, race, or disability. In such a case proof of a discriminatory motive is essential, although in some instances such a motive can be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. Akins v. South Cent. Bell Telephone Co., 744 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir.1984). Choosing to follow the lead of the federal courts, we hold that a plaintiff may thus establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by virtue of disparate treatment by showing that (1) she or he was in the protected age category, (2) she or he met the applicable qualifications, (3) despite those qualifications she or he was not promoted, and (4) other employees of similar qualifications, who were not members of a protected group, were promoted at the time plaintiff's request for a promotion was denied. Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 574 F.2d 958 (8th Cir.1978), applied to a claim of age discrimination the elements required by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to prove a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1982). Accord, Bell v. Bolger, 708 F.2d 1312 (8th Cir.1983). The Cova court also observed the federal age discrimination act does not require that advanced age and substantial length of service entitle employees to special favorable consideration; it requires merely that an employee within the protected age group not be the subject of discrimination because of his or her age. 574 F.2d at 960. We conclude the same is true under the subject act. As to the plaintiffs seeking promotion, our de novo review of the record convinces us that plaintiffs succeeded in establishing a prima facie disparate treatment case. Accordingly, we must also conclude that the district court's like finding is not clearly wrong as applied to those plaintiffs seeking monetary damages. Our de novo review of the record also convinces us that AT & T Technologies articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting those plaintiffs seeking elevation to their former positions; AT & T Technologies, absent contractual or other constraints, may certainly upgrade its personnel in an effort to remain competitive. That determination again compels the conclusion that the district court's like finding is not clearly wrong as applied to those plaintiffs seeking monetary damages. We thus reach the question of whether plaintiffs successfully rebutted AT & T Technologies' reason by showing that it is pretextual. Again, we follow the lead of the federal courts and hold that to show pretext in an age discrimination by virtue of disparate treatment case, a task which merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the finder of fact that age was a factor, a plaintiff may show either that the employment decision more likely than not was motivated by a discriminatory reason or by showing that the employer's proffered reason is unworthy of credence. Bell v. Bolger, supra at 1318. See Harris v. Misty Lounge, Inc., 220 Neb. 678, 371 N.W.2d 688 (1985), for application of the same analysis in a sex discrimination case under the provisions of the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act. The evidence establishes that AT & T Technologies' promotion process is a sound business practice, that factors considered in evaluating candidates are reasonably related to legitimate business concerns, and that the process is so designed as to attenuate the personal biases of the decisionmakers. While plaintiffs question the need for higher education, the fact remains the evidence establishes that better educated managers are better able to deal with the current business environment. More is written about the education aspect of these cases in the Disparate Impact Theory analysis which follows. To the extent plaintiffs urge that AT & T Technologies' affirmative action program may have unjustly kept them from being promoted, we must observe that plaintiffs made no reverse discrimination claim. Moreover, a temporary, voluntary affirmative action plan designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories is valid. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979). The evidence further establishes that AT & T Technologies has not reached its target for placing women in section chief positions; when the target percentage of minorities was exceeded, it was by less than 2 percent of its 8 percent goal. AT & T Technologies' promotion practices are not illegitimate or arbitrary. The discrimination laws are not intended to diminish traditional management prerogatives. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Nor should discrimination laws ensure the best selection of individuals for promotion; rather, they should ensure that the selection be free from discrimination. See Casillas v. United States Navy, 735 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.1984). We conclude from our de novo review of the record that the plaintiffs seeking promotion failed to discharge their ultimate burden of proof by failing to establish that AT & T Technologies' reason for not promoting them was pretextual. That again necessarily means that the district court's like finding is not clearly wrong with respect to those plaintiffs seeking monetary damages.