Opinion ID: 1235798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jurisdiction to Review the Administrative Action

Text: In the district court, the government argued successfully that Plaintiffs-Appellants' suit should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in Whitman v. Department of Transportation, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2014, 164 L.Ed.2d 771 (2006) (per curiam), another case involving the right of a federal employee to obtain judicial review of constitutional claims. In its briefing in Whitman, the government adopted a position that was contrary to the position it had taken before the district court in the present case. Specifically, the government accepted that the language of the CSRA did not provide the clarity necessary to foreclose judicial review of an employee's constitutional claims. Brief for the Respondents at 45-49, Whitman, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2014 (No. 04-1131). The Supreme Court in Whitman did not decide the reviewability question. However, consistent with its arguments in Whitman, the government now concede[s] that total preclusion of [an employee's] equitable constitutional claims could not be sustained and agrees with Plaintiffs-Appellants that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was inappropriate. Despite the government's turnaround, we have an independent duty to determine our jurisdiction. See, e.g., Latman v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774, 781 n. 5 (9th Cir.2004). We review the question of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.  Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 455 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir.2006). [W]hether the CSRA precludes colorable constitutional claims sounding in equity where the plaintiff has no other remedy is a question of first impression in this circuit. Stanley v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 653, 657 (9th Cir.2007) (leaving the question unresolved because the plaintiff had failed to raise colorable constitutional claims). We agree with the parties that Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988), provides the relevant legal framework. At issue in Webster was whether the CIA Director's decision to terminate an employee, allegedly because of the employee's sexual orientation, was subject to judicial review on statutory and constitutional grounds. Id. at 595-99, 108 S.Ct. 2047. The government maintained that the Director's decision was unreviewable because it was made pursuant to § 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, which stated that, [n]otwithstanding. . . the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States. National Security Act of 1947 (NSA), ch. 343, § 102(c), 61 Stat. 495, 498; see Webster, 486 U.S. at 597, 108 S.Ct. 2047. The Supreme Court agreed with the government that the employee could not seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act because the language and structure of § 102(c) indicate that Congress meant to commit individual employee discharges to the Director's discretion. Webster, 486 U.S. at 601, 108 S.Ct. 2047. However, the Court concluded that § 102(c) did not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing his constitutional claims. The Court explained that where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear. . . . We require this heightened showing in part to avoid the `serious constitutional question' that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim. Id. at 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047 (citations omitted); see also Stanley, 476 F.3d at 656 (In Webster, the Supreme Court held that a party must demonstrate a `heightened showing' that Congress intended to eliminate judicial review when a federal statute is construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.); cf. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991) (applying the well-settled presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) ([L]itigants who allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights.); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that a statute restricting review of decisions made by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs did not provide[ ] the `clear and convincing' evidence of congressional intent required by this Court before a statute will be construed to restrict access to judicial review of constitutional claims). Thus, as in Webster, our task here is to decide whether the statutory scheme that covers TSA screeners such as Gavello expresses a clear intention on the part of Congress to prohibit judicial review of employees' colorable constitutional claims. We conclude that it does not. Indeed, the language Congress used when it enacted ATSA is quite similar to the statutory language at issue in Webster, which the Supreme Court held was not sufficiently clear to bar review of constitutional claims. ATSA permits the TSA Administrator, [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, to terminate screeners as the [Administrator] determines to be necessary to carry out . . . screening functions. ATSA § 111(d), 115 Stat. at 620 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44935 (note)). Meanwhile, the provision at issue in Webster permitted the Director of CIA, [n]otwithstanding . . . the provisions of any other law, to terminate employees whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States. NSA § 102(c), 61 Stat. at 498. Although both provisions authorize officials to exercise substantial discretion when making termination decisions, neither provision expressly precludes employees from challenging their termination on constitutional grounds. Indeed, the government states in its briefing that the United States has concluded that Section 111(d) of the ATSA cannot be reasonably read as satisfying the `heightened showing' of congressional intent necessary to construe a federal statute completely' to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims.' (quoting Webster, 486 U.S. at 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047). In deciding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the district court did not discuss Webster. Instead, the court relied on United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988), which the Supreme Court decided just a few months before it decided Webster. Unlike Webster, Fausto did not involve any constitutional claims. The question in Fausto was whether an Interior Department employee who alleged that he had been suspended from his job in violation of departmental regulations could bring suit in the United States Claims Court for back pay. Id. at 440-41, 108 S.Ct. 668. Because the employee was classified as a nonpreference eligible [employee] in the excepted service, the CSRA did not permit him to pursue an administrative appeal before the MSPB. Id. at 442, 108 S.Ct. 668. The Court explained in Fausto that Congress intended the CSRA to provide an integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review of personnel actions taken against civil servants. Id. at 445, 108 S.Ct. 668. The Court held that permitting the employee to bring suit in the Claims Court asserting a violation of departmental regulations would improperly circumvent the CSRA: [The CSRA's] deliberate exclusion of employees in respondent's service category from the provisions establishing administrative and judicial review for personnel action of the sort at issue here prevents respondent from seeking review in the Claims Court under the Back Pay Act. Id. at 455, 108 S.Ct. 668. Fausto and Webster thus address distinct issues. When Congress decides to exclude an employee from the protections of the CSRA or an analogous scheme, such as the FAA's personnel management system, Fausto precludes the employee from obtaining judicial review of statutory or regulatory claims. However, under Webster, the employee may still obtain judicial review of constitutional claims unless Congress, in addition to excluding the employee from the protections of the CSRA or an analogous scheme, has also expressly declared its intention to preclude review of constitutional claims. Because Plaintiffs-Appellants in this case raise constitutional claims, it is Webster, not Fausto, that controls. The district court also relied on cases from this circuit holding that the CSRA precludes federal employees from bringing Bivens actions even when the employee has no alternative remedy. See, e.g., Russell v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.1999); Blankenship v. McDonald, 176 F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 1999); Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 840 (9th Cir.1991). However, the rationale for these decisions does not extend to cases, such as this one, in which an employee seeks equitable relief. Instead, these decisions merely reflect the courts' general reluctance to allow damages as a judicially created remedy for constitutional torts. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, any free-standing damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation has to represent a judgment about the best way to implement a constitutional guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest, and in most instances we have found a Bivens remedy unjustified. Wilkie v. Robbins, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 2597, 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) (stating that the Court has responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts and that [t]he absence of statutory relief for a constitutional violation . . . does not by any means necessarily imply that courts should award money damages); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388, 390, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (holding that the comprehensive nature of the remedies currently available under the CSRA precluded a federal employee from pursuing a Bivens action to remedy a claimed First Amendment violation). We recognize that one of our cases, Saul v. United States , suggests that employees might be precluded from seeking equitable relief as well as damages for constitutional violations. 928 F.2d at 843. Saul brought a Bivens action against his supervisors at the Social Security Administration, alleging that they had violated his First Amendment rights by seizing and opening his personal mail. Id. at 831. After concluding that Saul could not maintain his Bivens action, see id. at 838-39, we briefly addressed Saul's request to amend his complaint to request injunctive relief. We wrote that amendment would be futile because [t]he CSRA's elaborate remedies show that judicial interference in federal employment is disfavored, whether the employee requests damages or injunctive relief. Id. at 843. Thus, [t]he CSRA precludes Saul from seeking injunctive relief for his asserted constitutional injury just as it precludes him from bringing a Bivens action for damages. Id. We conclude that Saul is distinguishable from this case because Saul could have availed himself of alternative mechanisms to pursue his constitutional claim. Specifically, Saul could have challenged his supervisors' actions under at least two CSRA appeal procedures rather than proceeding directly to federal court, and injunctive relief would have been available as a remedy. Id. at 833-35, 843. By contrast, the parties in this case agree that Gavello has no remedies available under the CSRA or ATSA and that judicial review is the only means by which he can attempt to vindicate his constitutional rights. Extending Saul to cases in which no alternative remedy is available seems particularly ill advised given that our opinion in Saul failed to make any mention of Webster, in which the Supreme Court declared that a `serious constitutional question' . . . would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim. Webster, 486 U.S. at 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047. Indeed, we recently observed that none of our precedents, including Saul, directly addresse[s] the issue whether the CSRA demonstrates the kind of heightened showing required [under Webster ] to preclude judicial review of colorable constitutional claims where the sole remedy sought is equitable relief. Stanley, 476 F.3d at 657. We also recognize that three of our sister circuits have held since Webster that the CSRA precludes federal employees from pursuing constitutional claims for equitable relief as well as for damages. See Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 181 (2d Cir.2005) (The integration of equitable relief, including reinstatement, into the CSRA's comprehensive statutory scheme evinces Congress's intent to determine for itself the scope of that relief and to preclude its applicability to federal employment disputes except where provided by statute.); Lombardi v. Small Bus. Admin., 889 F.2d 959, 962 (10th Cir.1989) ([J]udicial intervention [in federal personnel matters] is disfavored whether it is accomplished by the creation of a damages remedy or injunctive relief.); Berrios v. Dep't of Army, 884 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1989) (Given that plaintiff's constitutional claims amount to a federal law challenge to an adverse personnel action, they are preempted by the CSRA consistent with the reasoning of Bush and Fausto. ). But cf. Hardison v. Cohen, 375 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir.2004) (stating that whether the unavailability of a Bivens action for damages for a federal employee means that he is also barred from obtaining equitable relief for an alleged violation of the Constitution remains an open question in the Eleventh Circuit). Two of these cases, Dotson and Berrios, are distinguishable because, as in Saul, the employee had other remedial mechanisms available. See Dotson, 398 F.3d at 181 (noting that the court's interpretation of the statute did not leave judicial branch employees without any relief for employment grievances); Berrios, 884 F.2d at 33 (noting that plaintiff could still obtain review of his claim in the Federal Circuit). The third case, Lombardi, provided little support for its conclusion and, in our view, gave short shift both to Webster 's clear statement rule and to the differences between Bivens actions and our traditional power to fashion equitable remedies. We find more persuasive the reasoning of the Third Circuit and the D.C. Circuit. See Mitchum v. Hurt, 73 F.3d 30 (3d Cir.1995) (Alito, J.); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223 (D.C.Cir.1988) (en banc) (per curiam). As in this case, the plaintiffs in Mitchum alleged that they were disciplined by their superiors in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Mitchum, 73 F.3d at 31. Unlike the plaintiffs in this case, the plaintiffs in Mitchum had alternative statutory remedies. See id. at 31-32. Writing for the court, then-Judge Alito discussed the Supreme Court's decisions in Bush and Chilicky, which restricted the ability of federal employees to bring Bivens actions. He stated that, [b]ased on these decisions[,]. . . a good argument can be made that a federal employee who has meaningful administrative remedies and a right to judicial review under the CSRA or another comparable statutory scheme should not be permitted to bypass that scheme by bringing an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. Id. at 34. He then observed, however, that the Supreme Court has developed a special jurisprudence for Bivens claims, and we are hesitant to extend this jurisprudence into other spheres. Id. at 35. He explained: The power of the federal courts to grant equitable relief for constitutional violations has long been established. Thus,. . . there is a presumed availability of federal equitable relief against threatened invasions of constitutional interests. It is reasonable to assume that Congress legislates with the understanding that this form of judicial relief is generally available to protect constitutional rights. While Congress may restrict the availability of injunctive relief, we believe that we should be very hesitant before concluding that Congress has impliedly imposed such a restriction on the authority to award injunctive relief to vindicate constitutional rights. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d 1, 11 (D.C.Cir.1986)). Mitchum relied in part on the D.C. Circuit's en banc decision in Spagnola. At issue in Spagnola was whether two federal employees who claimed violations of their constitutional rights could pursue Bivens actions. The court held that they could not. Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 229. Citing Bush and Chilicky, the court declared that courts must withhold their power to fashion damages remedies when Congress has put in place a comprehensive system to administer public rights, has `not inadvertently' omitted damages remedies for certain claimants, and has not plainly expressed an intention that the courts preserve Bivens remedies. Id. at 228. The court found nothing in the legislative history suggesting that Congress' omission of a damages remedy in the CSRA was anything but advertent, nor . . . any clear expression of congressional intent that the courts preserve Bivens remedies. Id. at 229. However, the court continued: While we decline to extend Bivens remedies to [the plaintiffs], we do not suggest that the CSRA precludes the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the constitutional claims of federal employees and job applicants altogether. On the contrary, time and again this court has affirmed the right of civil servants to seek equitable relief against their supervisors, and the agency itself, in vindication of their constitutional rights. Id. at 229-30 (citations omitted). The court cited with approval its earlier decision in Hubbard, which stated that, as a general matter, federal courts have jurisdiction to grant equitable relief to remedy agency violations of constitutional rights. Hubbard, 809 F.2d at 11. Consistent with Mitchum and Spagnola, and with the position of both sides in this case, we conclude that the district court erred when it dismissed Plaintiffs-Appellants' suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that the statutory scheme governing Gavello's employment does not clearly state an intention on the part of Congress to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims. Plaintiffs-Appellants are therefore entitled to seek equitable relief based on the alleged violation of their First Amendment rights.