Opinion ID: 1398014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: bifurcated procedures

Text: 1. In Moore v. Thompson , [4] we held that evidence of the defendant's prior and subsequent guilty pleas to driving under the influence was admissible on the question of punitive damages. Our rationale was that the extent of the defendant's wilful misconduct, wantonness, and entire want of care in driving under the influence could not be gauged solely from the incident in issue, but that evidence of other DUI incidents was relevant to the question of punitive damages. [5] Recognizing the prejudicial effect of the guilty pleas on the defendant's liability in the underlying case, we further held that the trial judge should exercise his discretion under OCGA § 9-11-42(b) to try the issue of punitive damages separately in a bifurcated procedure or in a separate trial. [6] This decision is consistent with both the federal rule and the rule in most states. [7] Two years later, the Georgia General Assembly mandated a different bifurcation procedure under the Tort Reform Act of 1987. [8] The act provides that punitive damages may be awarded in tort actions when the plaintiff specifically prays in the complaint for an award and proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences. [9] OCGA § 51-12-5.1 expressly requires a bifurcation of the punitive damages issues: the trier of fact first decides whether to award punitive damages and then reconvenes to decide the amount to be awarded. [10] Because of this required bifurcation of the punitive damages claim, courts may no longer conduct the bifurcated proceeding recommended by this court in Moore determining liability in the underlying negligence action first and then determining all punitive damages issues together. [11] Instead, courts must conduct either bifurcated or trifurcated trials under the statute. Under the bifurcated trial, the jury would decide liability, the amount of compensatory damages, and liability for punitive damages in the first phase and the amount of punitive damages in the second phase. [12] Under the trifurcated trial, the jury would determine liability and the amount of compensatory damages in the first phase, liability for punitive damages in the second phase, and the amount of punitive damages in the third phase. In a bifurcated trial, the statute's mandatory separation of the punitive damages claim creates a problem when, as here, the plaintiff seeks to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior similar acts of DUI on the issue of liability for punitive damages. Although evidence of the prior acts is relevant to whether the defendant acted with willful misconduct, wantonness, or an entire want of care, the evidence of prior convictions is highly prejudicial to the issue of liability in the underlying negligence action. As the court of appeals has explained the problem: [E]vidence appropriately admitted to show the propriety of punitive damages may influence the jury in deciding the issue of liability for compensatory damages. Further, any reversible error in the admission of evidence pertaining to the entitlement to punitive damages makes it difficult, if not impossible, to affirm a judgment on the compensatory claim, when both claims are litigated in the same phase of the trial. [13] Thus, the defendant may be denied a fair trial on liability in the underlying negligence action if the jury is permitted to hear the prior similar act evidence during the first phase. On the other hand, the plaintiff may be denied a fair trial on liability for punitive damages if the evidence of prior similar acts is excluded during the liability phase of the bifurcated trial. Exercising their discretion, trial courts have attempted various solutions. Some courts permit evidence of prior similar acts on the issue of liability for punitive damages during the first phase of a bifurcated trial, but give a limiting instruction to the jury. [14] Others, like the trial court in this case, exclude evidence of prior similar acts during the liability phase, but permit it on the issue of the amount of punitive damages in the second phase. [15] A third approach is to separate both the liability issues and the punitive damages issues in a trifurcated proceeding. [16] Under this procedure, the jury decides the issue of liability for compensatory damages, the propriety of punitive damages, and the amount of punitive damages in three separate phases. [17]