Opinion ID: 21476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: An order of restitution is governed by the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA).1 The VWPA required that the district court consider a defendant’s financial circumstances and ability to pay before ordering restitution. In 1996 Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), which amended the VWPA to provide that “the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.”2 The sole consideration to be given a defendant’s ability to pay is factored into the court’s determination of “the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the defendant will satisfy the restitution order.”3 The MVRA applies to convictions occurring on or after April 24, 1996. 1 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664. 2 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). 3 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). 3 Howard complains that in imposing the restitution order in connection with the revocation of her supervised release, the district court applied the MVRA and, thus, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the restitution was based on conduct that occurred prior to enactment of the statute. Constitutional challenges to a federal statute are reviewed de novo.4 There being no objection to the order of restitution at sentencing, we review for plain error.5 We recently have held that retroactive application of the MVRA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.6 We conclude, however, that no Ex Post Facto violation occurred in the case at bar. The restitution order resulting from the first bank fraud conviction was not imposed as a condition of Howard’s supervised release.7 Rather, it was ordered as a separate sentencing component of the first judgment of conviction. 8 “Were restitution simply a term of supervised release or probation, it could not be due 4 United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997). 5 United States v. Rodriguez, 15 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1994). 6 United States v. Richards, 204 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2000), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 211 F.3d 595, petition for cert. filed (June 20) (No. 99-2049). 7 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 8 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3556. 4 prior to the commencement of such a term.”9 That is not, however, the factual situation at bar. Howard was not ordered to pay any additional amounts under the 1994 conviction but, rather, was directed to pay the amount still due and owing. For purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the district court did not impose a second restitution order, but merely recognized the prior imposition of restitution which had not been paid when the supervised release was revoked. 10 The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED. 9 United States v. Webb, 30 F.3d 687, 690 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Angelica, 859 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1988)). 10 Webb, 30 F.3d at 690 (“[A] district court’s decision to revoke supervised release does not affect the obligation to pay restitution if such obligation was [not imposed as a condition of the supervised release].”). 5