Opinion ID: 148908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Beyond-a-Reasonable-Doubt Standard Upheld for Insanity Defense

Text: Second, in the absence of any Supreme Court burden-of-proof holding in mental retardation execution cases, the Georgia Supreme Court looked to the Supreme Court's insanity decisions in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952) (rejecting due process challenge to reasonable doubt standard for establishing insanity plea), and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (recognizing Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of insane persons and allowing states to decide ways to enforce that constitutional restriction). The Georgia Supreme Court determined, inter alia, that a mental retardation claim is comparable to a claim of insanity in that both relieve a guilty person of at least some of the statutory penalty to which he would otherwise be subject. Hill III, 587 S.E.2d at 621. Both Leland and Ford support the Georgia Supreme Court's decision. [14] At the time of Leland, Oregon was the only state that required a defendant to establish a plea of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Nonetheless, in Leland the Supreme Court determined that that fact was not dispositive and that Oregon's reasonable-doubt standard for insanity pleas was constitutional, stating: Today, Oregon is the only state that requires the accused, on a plea of insanity, to establish that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Some twenty states, however, place the burden on the accused to establish his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence or some similar measure of persuasion. While there is an evident distinction between these two rules as to the quantum of proof required, we see no practical difference of such magnitude as to be significant in determining the constitutional question we face here. Oregon merely requires a heavier burden of proof. ... The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the practice offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Leland, 343 U.S. at 798, 72 S.Ct. at 1007 (footnote, quotation marks, and citation omitted) (emphasis added). [15] The Leland Court noted that a defense of insanity lessened one's culpability, which is the same basis used for Eighth Amendment protection in Atkins. [16] Id. at 796-97, 72 S.Ct. at 1006-07. And further, in Ford, as in Atkins, the Supreme Court refused to impose any particular burden of proof on the right of the insane not to be executed and left to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences. 477 U.S. at 416-17, 106 S.Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion). In Ford, a majority of the Supreme Court first held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited execution of insane persons. Then, in a portion of the lead opinion garnering plurality support, the Supreme Court stated that [i]t may be that some high threshold showing on behalf of the prisoner will be found a necessary means to control the number of non-meritorious or repetitive claims of insanity. Id. at 417, 106 S.Ct. at 2605 (emphasis added). [17]