Opinion ID: 1705926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of General Principles in the Present Case, Particularly as to Liquidated Damages and Retainage

Text: At first glance, it would appear that Harbert's recovery in this case of liquidated damages and retainage would directly affect a contract ... right of the State, Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801, 806 (Ala.1992), `would result in the plaintiff's recovery of money from the [S]tate,' Jones, 895 So.2d at 873, and would directly affect the financial status of the State treasury, Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So.2d 257, 261 (Ala.2003). The main opinion overcomes this apparent obstacle, however, with the following reasoning: Generally, mandamus relief is available in certain situations to compel a State officer to perform the ministerial act of tendering payment of liquidated or certain sums the State is legally obligated to pay under a contract. State Highway Dep't v. Milton Constr. Co., 586 So.2d 872, 875 (Ala.1991) [ ( `Milton II' ) ]; see also [ Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. ] Jones , 895 So.2d [867] at 877-79 [ (Ala.2004) ] (describing as `well-established [the] rule that a writ of mandamus will issue to compel payment of only such claims as are liquidated ' and noting that prior caselaw had held `that payment for goods or services, for which the State had contracted and accepted, could be compelled by mandamus'); and State Bd. of Admin. v. Roquemore, 218 Ala. 120, 124, 117 So. 757, 760 (1928) ('the claim asserted [against the State was] for an amount fixed or determinable by the terms of the contract of sale,' and was `definite and certain, ... and not an unliquidated claim, in the sense that would render mandamus unavailable'). 990 So.2d at 842 (emphasis in first sentence added). As a threshold matter, I do not read the foregoing passage, and particularly its reference to the availability of mandamus relief, as in any way altering the above-quoted principles regarding § 14 immunity. Those principles apply regardless of whether the vehicle used by a plaintiff is an action at law (e.g., an action alleging breach of contract or negligence) or an action in equity, including, for example, a petition for a writ of mandamus. This Court has never held that there is one set of exceptions to § 14 immunity in actions generally and some other, special, set of exceptions uniquely applicable to petitions for the writ of mandamus. Such cases as Jones and McDowell-Purcell, Inc. v. Bass, 370 So.2d 942, 944 (Ala.1979), both of which sought writs of mandamus, bear this out. Further, the reference to ministerial acts in the first sentence reflects the third of the numbered exceptions to State immunity, as quoted above. [12] Having said that, it becomes critical, I think, to recognize that the reference in the cases cited in the above-quoted passage from the main opinion to claims that are liquidated, when considered in context, are references not merely to claims for amounts that have been reduced to sums certain, but claims as to which there is no room for dispute as to liability, i.e., whether the amounts at issue are owed. [13] In this regard, Part III.B. of the Jones opinion, titled Mandamus, is particularly instructive. The Jones Court parses the holdings in State Board of Administration v. Roquemore, 218 Ala. 120, 117 So. 757 (1928); Dampier v. Pegues, 362 So.2d 224 (Ala.1978); Hardin v. Fullilove Excavating Co., 353 So.2d 779 (Ala.1977); and State of Alabama Highway Department v. Milton Construction Co., 586 So.2d 872 (Ala.1991) ( Milton II ), most of which are relied upon by the main opinion in the present case. As to Dampier, the Jones Court noted that that case arose out of an action seeking a writ of mandamus to require [certain State officials] to pay [Dampier] $14,325.66 allegedly due under a contract. 895 So.2d at 878. The Jones Court explained that, taking the allegations of the complaint as true in the context of a motion to dismiss, the case before it was one in which the services at issue [had been] accepted, approved and used by the [State]. 895 So.2d at 878. Similarly, according to the Jones Court, the issue in Hardin was whether, ` [a]fter approval of final payment, including the sum of $15,413.76, [the State officials could] interpret, or reinterpret, the contract and specifications and rescind prior approval of payment' under a construction contract. 895 So.2d at 879. Without discussing § 14 expressly, the [ Hardin ] Court explained: `In this case the discretion of [the State officials] was exhausted, at the very latest, when approval was given Fullilove's final payment request....' 895 So.2d at 879 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hardin, 353 So.2d at 784). [14] The Jones Court then turned its attention to a case that, like the present case, involved an action by a contractor against the director of the Alabama Highway Department seeking to recover moneys allegedly owed under a construction contract. Quoting from this Court's opinion in McDowell-Purcell, 370 So.2d at 944, the Jones Court reiterated: `In limited circumstances the writ of mandamus will lie to require action of state officials. This is true where discretion is exhausted and that which remains to be done is a ministerial act. See Hardin v. Fullilove Excavating Co., Inc., 353 So.2d 779 (Ala.1977).... The writ will not lie to direct the manner of exercising discretion and neither will it lie to compel the performance of a duty in a certain manner where the performance of that duty rests upon an ascertainment of facts, or the existence of conditions, to be determined by an officer in his judgment or discretion.... `.... `[Purcell] contends that because the required rock bolting has been completed and accepted [emphasis in original] by ... Bass, all that remains is for Bass to perform a ministerial act: paying [Purcell] for all rock bolting at four dollars per linear foot. Were one other circumstance present we would be compelled to agree. The payment request for the rock bolting ... has never been approved [emphasis in original] by the Highway Department. Had it been, mandamus would lie because all that would remain would be for Bass to make payment. See Dampier v. Pegues, 362 So.2d 224 (Ala.1978); Hardin v. Fullilove Excavating Co., Inc., 353 So.2d 779 (Ala.1977).' 895 So.2d at 880 (emphasis in first two sentences added). The Jones Court noted that the contractor in McDowell-Purcell `had constructive notice that it could not sue the State over a contract dispute. Section 14, Const. 1901....' 895 So.2d at 880 (quoting McDowell-Purcell, 370 So.2d at 944). `In this case [the director of ALDOT] had a duty to either approve or disapprove payment according to one of two different interpretations of the contract. Performance of that duty rested upon his judgmental or discretionary ascertainment of facts or existence of conditions to be applied under the terms of the contract. The writ of mandamus will not lie to compel him to exercise his discretion and apply the ascertained facts or existing conditions under the contract so as to approve payment to [Purcell] according to its interpretation of the contract rather than his. ' Jones, 895 at 880-81 (quoting McDowell-Purcell, 370 So.2d at 944) (emphasis added in Jones ). The Jones Court then concluded its analysis as follows: Thus, in Roquemore, Hardin, and Dampier, the writ of mandamus issued, as McDowell-Purcell explains, only after the discretion of state officials had been exhausted. Consequently, mandamus was, in those cases, an available remedy to compel state agents to perform the essentially ministerial act of rendering payment for goods or services accepted. Cf. State of Alabama Highway Dep't v. Milton Constr. Co., 586 So.2d 872 (Ala.1991) (State Highway Department had no right to withhold payment from a construction company under a contractual clause held in an earlier opinion by this Court to be a void penalty provision ). [15] Jones, 895 So.2d at 881 (emphasis added). Although the State defendants' brief to this Court agrees with the foregoing analysis as to the meaning of liquidated claims in the above-discussed cases, it does so in the context of arguments relating to the dispute over the extra work for which the jury returned a $2,350,000 verdict in Harbert's favor. The State defendants make essentially no argument in their briefs to this Court specifically contesting that portion of the trial court's judgment requiring the State defendants to pay to Harbert amounts equal to the liquidated damages withheld after August 15, 1991, and the retainage. As to the liquidated damages, the State defendants' brief provides this Court with no argument (although a portion of the State defendants' Statement of Facts suggests one) as to whether, how, or to what extent the State defendants took the position in the trial court that the State's alleged obligations were disputed, i.e., that the State's discretion as to those obligations was not exhausted (in the same manner the State's discretion was not exhausted in Jones, supra, and McDowell-Purcell, supra), rather than obligations of an essentially ministerial nature like those in Milton II (see n. 15, supra) and Roquemore, Hardin, and Dampier. Further, it may well be that Milton II is distinguishable on the ground set out in note 15, supra; the State defendants do not make this argument, however. [16] Similarly, the brief of the State defendants does not offer an explanation as to whether, how, or to what extent the State defendants challenged at trial their alleged obligation to pay the retainage to Harbert as distinguishable from the ministerial obligation of the State to pay for those goods or services contracted for, accepted, and approved in Roquemore, Hardin, and Dampier. Nor do they ask us to overrule those decisions. Because under the arguments and circumstances presented in this case I do not read the main opinion as inconsistent with the general principles discussed herein, I concur in that opinion.