Opinion ID: 1059037
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: third party contact

Text: Riner asserts that juror Gibson's contact with his wife regarding the newspaper headlines about the case was unauthorized third party contact. Citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), Riner argues that such contact was presumptively prejudicial, thereby shifting the burden to the Commonwealth to establish that it was harmless to the defendant. We agree that the legal standard for evaluating a claim of extraneous jury contact requires that `any private communication, contact or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury ... [be] deemed presumptively prejudicial' unless the contact was pursuant to the directions and instructions of the trial court with complete knowledge by both parties. Lenz v. Warden, 267 Va. 318, 328, 593 S.E.2d 292, 298 (2004) (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. 450). This presumption, however, is not conclusive. Id. The prosecution has the burden to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. Id. We explained in Lenz that [t]he Remmer presumption of prejudice arises upon a showing of two elements: that an extraneous contact with or by a member of the jury took place and that such contact was `about the matter pending before the jury.' 267 Va. at 329, 593 S.E.2d at 298 (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. 450). Clearly, juror Gibson's communication with his wife about the headlines in the newspaper was an improper contact with a third party about the matter pending before the jury. However, it is debatable whether his communication, or attempted communication, of the content of the newspaper headlines to the other jurors constituted extraneous jury contact. Instead, it is analogous to jurors' reading or hearing news media reports about the criminal trial in which they are sitting. In Thompson v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 498, 502-03, 247 S.E.2d 707, 709 (1978), we addressed an incident in which two jurors in a criminal trial admitted that they had read a newspaper article concerning the evidence and the defendant. We enumerated the following principles for resolving whether that kind of jury conduct denied a defendant of a fair trial: First, the influence of newspaper articles or other publicity during a criminal trial may be of such a nature as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. Second, jurors serving in a criminal case may not, during the trial, properly read newspaper stories or listen to media reports discussing the proceedings. The basis for this elementary proposition is that a juror's information about the case should come only from the evidence presented at trial and not from any extraneous source. Third, upon a showing that such jurors have read or heard news accounts of the proceedings, the test to be used by the trial court in determining if a mistrial or a new trial should be ordered is whether under the circumstances there has been interference with a fair trial. Fourth, mere reading or hearing news accounts of the trial while it is in progress does not in every case amount to prejudicial misconduct by the jury as a matter of law. Some publicity to which jurors have been exposed may be inherently prejudicial while in other cases inquiry will be necessary to ascertain whether the information may have effectively prejudiced the jury in its deliberation. Fifth, the decision whether such media information brought to the jury's attention results in prejudice to the defendant rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. And, sixth, because there can be no fixed rule which defines what constitutes prejudicial interference with a fair trial, each case must be decided on its special facts. Id. at 500, 247 S.E.2d at 708 (internal citations omitted). Our holding in Thompson requires a trial court to determine whether a juror's exposure to media coverage of the proceedings interfered with a fair trial. Unlike extraneous juror contact, a juror's reading or hearing news accounts about a criminal trial is not presumptively prejudicial. For purposes of this case, we will, however, apply the test set out in Remmer and Lenz and assume, as did the Court of Appeals, that juror Gibson's contact with his wife about the newspaper article reporting that the defense had moved for a mistrial because the jurors were taking notes, as well as his communication, or attempted communication, of that information to other jurors, was sufficient to shift the burden to the Commonwealth to prove the contact was harmless to Riner. Riner, 40 Va.App. at 468, 579 S.E.2d at 685. We conclude that the Commonwealth carried its burden. First, juror Gibson was discharged from jury service; so he did not participate in the deliberations that resulted in the guilty verdict. See Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 339, 356 S.E.2d 157, 171 (1987) (finding no prejudice where an alternate juror who failed to respond to voir dire question about family members employed in law enforcement was released from the panel before the case was submitted to the jury and did not participate in the jury's deliberations). That is a significant fact distinguishing the present case from many other cases involving juror misconduct. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 197, 590 S.E.2d 520, 531 (2004) (after conclusion of trial, alternate juror stated that she had heard jurors discussing the case before the close of the evidence); Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 460, 423 S.E.2d 360, 370 (1992) (post-trial interview of jury foreman revealed that jurors had discussed defendant's parole eligibility if he received a life sentence); Haddad v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 325, 327, 329 S.E.2d 17, 18 (1985) (misconduct during lunch break by juror who later became foreman of the jury). Second, only one juror heard or remembered juror Gibson's comment about the specific newspaper article discussing a defense motion for a mistrial. Next, the questioning of the jurors revealed that they were not influenced by juror Gibson, actually attempted to avoid him so they would not hear his comments, and still had open minds about the case. Finally, after releasing juror Gibson, the trial court not only instructed the jurors to disregard anything that juror Gibson had said but also told them that some of his comments were not correct. Unless the record shows otherwise, and it does not in this case, we presume that a jury follows an explicit cautionary instruction given by the trial court. See LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589, 304 S.E.2d 644, 657 (1983). In summary, the extraneous juror contact was harmless to Riner. Thus the trial court did not err in denying Riner's motion for a mistrial based on unauthorized third party contact.