Opinion ID: 2604112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Infliction of Emotional Distress and Punitive Damages

Text: Mattingly's amended complaint asserted as its fourth count a cause of action for the infliction of emotional distress. The complaint alleged that as a result of the College's willful, reckless, and negligent conduct, Mattingly suffered severe and extreme emotional distress arising as an incident to the physical and emotional injury to his son and other employees, and that as a result of Mattingly's emotional distress, he has been prevented from transacting his business, lost earnings, lost employee services, had increases in business expenses, suffered great anguish of mind and pain of body and incurred expenses for treatment and hospitalization of his representatives and employees. The sixth count alleged that the College's conduct was willful, wanton, knowing and intentional, thereby making appropriate the imposition of punitive damages. The superior court held that [d]amages for emotional distress have required either (1) that the plaintiff have been present and to have observed the harm inflicted, e.g., Deboe v. Horn, [16 Cal. App.3d 221], 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. App. 1971), or (2) that the conduct of the defendant be extreme and outrageous, i.e. the harm was caused intentionally or recklessly, e.g., Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454 (Alaska 1985). The court cited Richardson for the proposition that to sustain emotional distress damages, the conduct of the defendant should be compared to that which would support a punitive damages award. The court then cited Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d 767 (Alaska 1982), explaining that punitive damages should be based upon conduct which is found to imply actual malice. The court concluded that because the College's conduct causing injury to Mattingly's employees did not occur in his presence, damages for emotional distress and punitive damages must be based on conduct of such a nature that a finding of malice must be made. Because the court found that, even drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, Mattingly had failed to plead anything which would support such a finding, it dismissed counts four and six. Regarding Mattingly's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages, the superior court correctly ruled that Mattingly did not allege anything which, construed liberally, would support a finding of intentional, reckless, extreme, outrageous, or malicious conduct which would give rise to damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Richardson, 705 P.2d at 456 (adopting elements of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)), or punitive damages, see, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d at 773-74. In addressing Mattingly's claim for damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court rejected Mattingly's argument that special geographical concerns justify extension of the rule requiring that the injury occur in the plaintiff's presence. The court held that geographical concerns were not consistent with the policy of law to limit the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress to an event causing injury within the plaintiff's presence. The court's decision was filed before we issued our opinion in Tommy's Elbow Room v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1986), which adopted a test for claims alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Kavorkian, we rejected the zone of danger test of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1965), and adopted instead an interpretation of the guidelines set forth in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (1968): (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship. Id. at 1041. We rejected the rigid requirement of sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, looking instead to the reasonable foreseeability that the plaintiff-witness would suffer emotional harm. Id. at 1043. In Kavorkian, an intoxicated driver struck the car in which the plaintiff's daughter was a passenger. On his way home the plaintiff observed the accident, but did not know his daughter was involved. Upon his arrival home the plaintiff found his daughter missing and went back to the scene of the accident, where he saw police and medical technicians attempting to remove his injured daughter from the car. The father brought an action against the tavern that had served drinks to the intoxicated driver, seeking damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. We noted that [u]pon arriving at the scene, ... he perceived and suffered shock from observing his child's injury... . We cannot say as a matter of law that it was not reasonably foreseeable that he would appear at the scene of the accident. Id. In rejecting a rigid interpretation of the second part of the Dillon guidelines, which requires that the plaintiff's shock result from a direct emotional impact from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, we did not address the first requirement that the plaintiff be near the accident scene. We observed that other states are increasingly permitting recovery for emotional distress in situations where the Dillon guidelines are not explicitly satisfied. Id. at 1042 n. 4. We cited as an example Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980), which permitted recovery by a mother and her children for emotional distress resulting from the sight of the husband-father in a hospital after he had sustained quadriplegic injuries in a work-related accident. We quoted from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's opinion that [a] plaintiff who rushes onto the accident scene and finds a loved one injured has no greater entitlement to compensation for that shock than a plaintiff who rushes instead to the hospital. So long as the shock follows closely on the heels of the accident, the two types of injury are equally foreseeable. 727 P.2d at 1042 n. 4 (quoting 413 N.E.2d at 697). In this case Mattingly cannot meet the Dillon guidelines even as interpreted in Kavorkian. Mattingly was located in Ketchikan when he learned of the accident in Sitka. Under the first part of the Dillon guidelines, it cannot be said that Mattingly was located near the scene of the accident but rather was a distance away from it. Id. at 1041. We agree with the superior court that Alaska's special geographical concerns play no role in the analysis. Moreover, it cannot be said that the shock of observing his injured son and employees followed closely on the heels of the accident. Although we have departed from a requirement that a plaintiff suffer direct emotional impact from sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, there remains a requirement that the shock result more or less contemporaneously with the plaintiff's learning of the nature of the victim's injury. [3] Here, Mattingly was more than 150 miles away from the accident scene and had time to steel himself during his flight to Sitka. There was no sudden sensory observation of his injured son. We therefore affirm the superior court's decision that Mattingly does not state a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress.