Opinion ID: 1177756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction of probate court to determine contest over guns

Text: The controlling rule is stated in 1 Bancroft's Probate Practice 2d ed., § 27, pp. 70-71 (1950):    It is thoroughly established that in probate proceedings title to property as between the estate, the heirs or devisees, and a third person[ [2] ] may not be tried. Thus a superior court, sitting in probate, has no jurisdiction or authority to determine disputed titles to the property of the estate of a deceased person. The rule extends to disputes as to the ownership of personalty as well as to title to realty.    Part of the rationale for the concept of separate courts under the same judicial hat was set forth in Church v. Quiner, 31 Wyo. 222, 227, 224 P. 1073, 1074 (1924):    Where, as in Wyoming, the same court that has jurisdiction in probate has also general jurisdiction, the separation of its powers exercised in probate from those exercised in actions at law or in equity might at first seem the result of a merely technical rule of no practical importance; but when it is borne in mind that the court in probate having jurisdiction of the estate can for many purposes acquire jurisdiction of the persons interested in the estate without any actual notice to them, the substantial nature of the distinction, as well as the importance of maintaining it in practice, becomes clear. We deem it unnecessary to refer to other reasons for confining the probate jurisdiction to `matters of probate,' as defined by law. See In re Stringer's Estate, 80 Wyo. 426, 345 P.2d 786 (1959). We recently quoted from Church v. Quiner, supra, in the Matter of Estate of Frederick, Wyo., 599 P.2d 550, 555 (1979), to indicate that decisions and proceedings made by, or conducted in, probate courts on matters wherein there is an absence of jurisdiction are legally void and of no effect: `While in this state the district court is the court of general jurisdiction, and the same court has by the Constitution (section 10, art. 5) jurisdiction of all matters of probate, yet, in the exercise of its probate powers, its jurisdiction is limited and special, and when its acts in probate are without the limits of the special jurisdiction conferred, they have no binding effect even upon those who have invoked its authority. In re Black's Estate, 30 Wyo. 55, 216 P. 1059, 1063.   ' Accordingly, the orders of the probate court for appellant to show cause and to deliver the guns to appellee were beyond its jurisdiction and were void and of no effect. A void judgment is not res judicata. Stroock v. Kirby Royalties, Inc., Wyo., 494 P.2d 197 (1972); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 617 (1947). To obtain proper possession of the guns, appellee, as administrator, could have brought his replevin action in the district court.    Since, by statute[ [3] ] in most of the states, and likewise under the common-law rule, the executor or administrator has complete control of the personalty and is charged with the duty of reducing it to possession for purposes of administration, no extensive citation of authority is needed to demonstrate the existence of a right in him to maintain such actions as replevin or claim and delivery.    2 Bancroft's Probate Practice 2d ed. § 484, p. 612 (1950). See Windle v. Flinn, 196 Or. 654, 251 P.2d 136 (1952). If appellee had instituted such replevin action, appellant could have availed himself of the bonding procedure which is customary in replevin actions. Such was not possible under the orders here issued by the probate court. Further, appellant would have had the benefit of allegations in a complaint from which he could delineate specific issues through an answer containing admissions, denials and special defenses. For example, he could contend therein that a completed gift of the guns had been made to him; that any gift would be conditional until after probate of donor's will if the donor could void the gift by a simple statement in his will that the donee had a bill of sale (which the donee could not produce); or that the wording of the will, Walt and Mary Ferriter have a bill of sale for what I have given them  (emphasis supplied), confirms (1) the fact that it was a gift, and (2) the fact that they have a bill of sale, whether or not they produce it. [4] These specific issues would then be formulated and presented to the trial court in a manner not possible under the orders made by the probate court in this case. Inasmuch as the guns were taken by appellee under a void order of the probate court, an action of replevin was available for appellant to secure a determination of his right to possess them. The situation is similar to that involving other seizures of property under court direction. Replevin will not ordinarily lie for goods in the custody of the law, unless the process by virtue of which the property was seized is void.  (Emphasis supplied.) 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 25, p. 22 (1952).