Opinion ID: 1973500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: use of statements for impeachment purposes.

Text: The state appeals from the suppression order on the ground that the retrial court erred in prohibiting the state from using the defendant's statements as impeachment evidence. The state's arguments are premised on its conclusion that the order suppressing the use of the two statements at trial precludes the state from using the statements not only in its case-in-chief but also for impeachment purposes. The record does not support such a construction of the order. At the first trial, Judge O'CONNELL issued twenty-one findings of fact on the issue of the admissibility of the statements of the defendant, and made the following conclusions: Upon the foregoing findings of fact and considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes, based upon the law applicable to the admissibility of statements, that: 1. With regard to the Miranda requirements, the defendant having been appropriately advised of his rights not once but twice, and having on each occasion indicated understanding of them and having thereafter made responses to questions put to him, the State has met its burden of proof on the admissibility of such responses. 2. With regard to voluntariness, the Court concludes from the totality of the circumstances, including the age of the defendant, evidence of prior contact with law enforcement, absence of duress or coercion, physical or psychological, threats or promises, physical surroundings, brevity of time of interrogation, the statements made by the defendant as a result of such interrogation were voluntarily made by him and admissible in evidence. On retrial, Judge LANDRY first adopted the findings of Judge O'CONNELL and denied the defendant's motion to suppress the statements. The prosecutor then informed the court that he was concerned about the fact that the defendant had not been advised of his right to have an attorney present during interrogation or his right to stop questioning at any time. A discussion followed during which the retrial court stated: It is my view that the Miranda case speaks fluently and well to the subject. The Miranda warning is conceded by the State to be inadequate and insufficient and on the basis of that changed factual basis at least as I construe it to be inadequate and insufficient, the proposition simply being that this particular case raises that very fundamental question as to whether or not the defendant then and there fully appreciated that he had a right to an attorney present at the interrogation. The State has pointed out in the record where that aspect of the warning was omitted not on one occasion but on two occasions. The prosecutor then informed the court that the state was not conceding anything. The retrial court then spoke further about the Miranda decision and granted the motion of the defendant:  The Court: It is precisely that question that the Supreme Court expressed itself to on Miranda citing example after example after example where the attorney was ready, willing and able to participate, but the defendant was unable to use the services of an attorney, and it is obvious that the intention, when the Court used the words, understandingly gives up his rights that he understands that he has an opportunity to have an attorney present with him at the time of interrogation and not merely at the time of questioning. The Supreme Court specifically pointed out in that concurring opinion that the most important aspects of representation frequently occurs prior to the trial itself; and to give an individual the right to an attorney in court merely for the purposes of the appearance of protecting his constitutional rights, reduces the proposition to a mere sham. On the basis of what has been agreed to as the record in this case, the Court will indicate that those statements made by the defendant during the period of interrogation in the police administration building, the subject of this motion, are suppressed. Motion by the defendant is granted. The written order of the court states that the statements would be suppressed at trial. From this sequence of events, the state apparently concludes that the retrial court suppressed all use of the statements at trial, including use for impeachment purposes. We conclude and here determine that the retrial court suppressed the statements because they were not obtained in compliance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A finding that statements were obtained in violation of Miranda does not inexorably lead to a finding of involuntariness with the attendant prohibition against impeachment use of the statements. State v. Hernandez, 61 Wis.2d 253, 258, 259, 212 N.W.2d 118 (1973). The retrial court initially refused to suppress the statements on the grounds of involuntariness and non-compliance with Miranda. The court later ordered the statements suppressed after the prosecutor informed the court that the defendant had not been advised of his right to have an attorney present during interrogation or his right to stop the questioning at any time. It is our opinion that an examination of the record leads to only one conclusion. The statements were suppressed because of non-compliance with the Miranda requirements. At no time did the retrial court find the defendant's statements to be involuntary, nor did the court prohibit the state from using the statements for impeachment purposes. [2-4] A statement of the defendant made without the appropriate Miranda warnings, although inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility if the defendant testifies to matters contrary to what is in the excluded statement. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); State v. Oliver, 84 Wis.2d 316, 320, 321, 267 N.W.2d 333 (1978); Upchurch v. State, 64 Wis.2d 553, 562, 563, 219 N.W.2d 363 (1974); Wold v. State, 57 Wis.2d 344, 353-356, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973). It is only if the statements are also found to be involuntary that their use for impeachment purposes is precluded. Upchurch v. State, supra, at 562, 563; Wold v. State, supra, at 353-356. Because the statements of the defendant in the instant case were held to be in violation of the Miranda requirements but were not found to be involuntary, the state may use the statements to impeach the defendant's credibility if they contradict the defendant's testimony at trial. Since the state expressly asserts that it intends to use the statements only for impeachment purposes and does not challenge the ruling of the retrial court regarding non-compliance with Miranda, it is unnecessary to now review that ruling of the retrial court.