Opinion ID: 2352091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: dr. pack's testimony

Text: Although Dr. Pack testified at trial regarding the nature of Appellant's mental retardation, the trial court prohibited Dr. Pack from testifying to her opinion that Appellant's limited mental capacity could have caused him to confess falsely to a crime that he did not commit. The trial court reasoned that this testimony was inadmissible because it addressed the ultimate issue of Appellant's guilt or innocence. Appellant preserved this allegation for our review by introducing Dr. Pack's testimony in an avowal outside the presence of the jury: Q: Dr. Pack, are there specific areas in theeither the videotaped statement or the transcript which you reviewed which reflect confusion on behalf of Mr. Rogers? A: Yes. There were times he responded he was very confident in a very strong voice he responded. There were other times when he responded, but in a much softer, much more hesitant voice. And then there were times when he was asked questions and he answered it, and then the officer questioned him again, so he changed what he said or how he said it or the language that he used. Didn't seem to understand the difference in a tire tool and a crowbar. Q: Did you think it was significant that he didn't know how to spell his middle name? A: Yes. Q: Are there specific references to the statement that you think demonstrate that John was either not using language that he was familiar with or that he is somehow being led to say what he is saying to the authorities? A: Specifically where I suppose it's Detective Kearney asked, Okay. Do you not want a lawyer at this time? John said softly, No. And then the detective's response was, You don't? Okay. You have to answer yes or no for me. John said, Yes, uh, no, you know yes, uh, no. He didn't know which way to answer. And so the detective said again, You don't want a lawyer at this time; correct, and he said No, but in the very next line of questioning, the officer said, You understand and know what you're doing; correct, and John answered, Yes. I'm not sure what the correct answer to that is, if it's no or yes, and apparently John didn't know either. He frequently was responding whatever his answer was, if he got an okay responseif he didn't get okay from the detective, then he seemed to try to modify what he said. He didn't offer a lot of testimony that he initiated that seemed to be his own word or fill in any details or descriptions or information that seemed to be volunteered. Q: Are there other references to the statement that indicate those things? A: He said things like, I don't know how we got in, and a lot of his responses were predicated with I think as opposed to I know or I did or I saw. It's I think, like he's trying tohe's hopinghe's guessing, he's hoping he's getting the right answers. Q: Is this type of interrogation, if you're give someone in John's situation who's got a 65 IQ and the adaptive skills you've described, are they capable of creating a story involving themselves in a crime that they didn't really commit in response to that sort of interrogation? A: Yes, I think he would be capable of that. I think a person of his ability would be capable of that or of tryingattempting to repeat back details or information that he had been given. Q: So if the police suggested that this is what he was going to say, he is an individual that would say what they told him to say? A: I think under some circumstances, he would do that if he thought thatperhaps that there was going to be a lesser punishment or that he was going to get home or even that he was going to get to have a cigarette. Q: And are there any case studies of instances where mentally retarded people in fact falselyhave falsely confessed to crimes they did not do? A: Yes, there are numerous case studies that document that. Q: And is that something that you rely upon in your field? A: Yes. Q: People that are mentally retarded in situations where they're being interrogated and told by their interrogator that they're lying andor perhaps confronted with statements that we know you did it, we have evidence that you did it or along that lines, what wouldhow would a mentally retarded individual react to that sort of interrogation? And we had earlier talked about stress. What other things would you expect to see? A: It might create doubt in his own mind as to what happened, and it might cause him to be furtherto rethink what he said to try to get out of the situation again, toparticularly, as I said, if he thinks that the consequences are going to be greater if he stays with the story he's told or the consequences are going to be greater if he changes his story to what he thinks that the authority figure wants him to say. Q: Is that irregardless of what the truth is? A: Yes. Appellant contends that Dr. Pack's expert opinion was admissible and argues that the trial court erred by excluding this portion of Dr. Pack's testimony. We agree with Appellant that the trial court's stated basis for excluding this testimonyi.e., that it involved the ultimate issue at trialis not relevant to the admissibility inquiry and therefore does not support the trial court's ruling. However, we cannot determine from the record before us whether some or all of Dr. Pack's testimony constituted an expert opinion admissible under the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. KRE 702 governs the admissibility of expert opinion testimony: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. [31] In Stringer v. Commonwealth, [32] we interpreted KRE 702 as abrogating the former common law, ultimate issue rule and held that: The real question should not be whether the expert has rendered an opinion as to the ultimate issue, but whether the opinion will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Generally, expert opinion testimony is admitted when the issue upon which the evidence is offered is one of science and skill, and when the subject matter is outside the common knowledge of jurors. [33] Thus, KRE 702 authorizes the introduction of expert opinion testimony where: (1) the witness is qualified to render an opinion on the subject matter, (2) the subject matter satisfies the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), (3) the subject matter satisfies the test of relevancy set forth in KRE 401, subject to the balancing of probativeness against prejudice required by KRE 403, and (4) the opinion will assist the trier of fact per KRE 702. [34] Although the trial court's ruling predated the Stringer opinion, Stringer merely interpreted KRE 702, which had been adopted at the time of Appellant's trial. Thus, while the trial court improperly framed the issue by focusing upon whether Dr. Pack's testimony embraced an ultimate issue, the question of whether Dr. Pack's testimony constituted specialized knowledge [that would] assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue [35] was part of the relevant inquiry. While we believe that at least portions of Dr. Pack's excluded testimony would have assisted the trier of fact by providing an explanation for Appellant's confession that would rebut the common assumption that people do not ordinarily make untruthful inculpatory statements, [36] the trial court's misconstruction of the relevant inquiry meant that it did not evaluate which portions of Dr. Pack's testimony would have assisted the jury. Nor did it address the other three-fourths of the Stringer analysis. Although no one appears to dispute Dr. Pack's qualifications (Stringer factor # 1), the trial court's ruling excluding this testimony on ultimate issue grounds left unanswered questions relating to the scientific reliability (Stringer factor # 2) of testimony linking mental retardation and false confessions [37] and whether, even if generally scientifically reliable, Dr. Pack's opinions as to the reliability of Appellant's individual confession satisfied the prejudice v. probativeness test of KRE 403 (Stringer factor # 3). Accordingly, upon remand, the trial court should conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the proffered testimony is admissible under KRE 702, as interpreted by Stringer and should focus upon whether Dr. Pack's proffered testimony is sufficiently reliable, [38] and, if so, whether the KRE 403 relevancy inquiry warrants limitations on the scope of Dr. Pack's testimony.