Opinion ID: 764769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Conspiracy and Travel Act Counts

Text: 101 We conclude that defendants' convictions of conspiracy and Travel Act violations must also be set aside. In its instructions on the conspiracy count, the district court made clear that a defendant could not be found guilty on that count unless he or she was aware of the unlawful nature of the agreement. Thus, it informed the jury, inter alia, that in order to convict a given defendant on that count, it must find that that defendant entered into the alleged conspiracy with criminal intent, i.e., with aware[ness] of the generally unlawful nature of his or her acts (Tr. 1769), i.e., that the defendants acted with an understanding of the unlawful character of the conspiracy, intentionally engaged, advised, or assisted in it for the purpose of furthering one or both of its unlawful objects (Tr. 1771). However, in elaborating on the allegedly unlawful acts and objects of the conspiracy, the court stated: 102 The indictment charges two distinct unlawful objects or goals. The first charges that it was an object of the conspiracy that the defendants, with the intent to extort money and things of value from Bill Cosby, would and did transmit in interstate commerce communications containing threats to injure the reputation of Bill Cosby, in violation of Section 875(d) and, as I have told you, in addition the indictment alleges a second object of this conspiracy, to violate Section 1952(a)(3) of Title 18 of the United States Code, which makes it unlawful to cross state lines or use interstate facilities to facilitate extortion. 103 ... [I]t is not necessary for the government to prove the success of the conspiracy. It is also not necessary for you to find that the conspiracy embodied both of these unlawful objectives. It is sufficient if you find beyond a reasonable doubt the conspirators agreed, implicitly or impliedly [sic ], on either of these two objectives. When a conspiracy has more than one objective, the government need prove only that the defendant you are considering agreed to accomplish at least one of the criminal objectives. 104 (Tr. 1767-68.) Thus, the instruction on conspiracy incorporated the error in the court's instruction on § 875(d), thereby erroneously allowing the jury to find defendants guilty of a conspiracy to engage in conduct that, under the court's definition, could have been lawful. Defendants are entitled to a new trial on the conspiracy count with the jury properly instructed as to the nature of the conduct prohibited by § 875(d). 105 The court's instructions on the Travel Act count likewise incorporated the erroneous instruction on the § 875(d) count. As to the objectives of the interstate travel, the court stated as follows: 106 The indictment alleges that the defendant traveled or caused someone else to travel interstate and used or caused someone else to use interstate facilities to facilitate two forms of unlawful activity, extortion in violation of 875(d), and extortion in violation of Section 155 of the New York Penal Law. The government must prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the activities the defendant intended to facilitate were in fact unlawful under either federal law or New York State law. 107 It is sufficient if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct was unlawful under either of these statutes. Of course, to conclude that the government has met its burden of proof in this case, you must unanimously agree on whichever statute you may find that the conduct violated. 108 .... 109 I have already instructed you on elements of extortion under the federal law under 875(d) in connection with my charge to you on Count 2. Those instructions apply here as well. 110 (Tr. 1785-86.) Accordingly, defendants are entitled to a new trial on the Travel Act count as well.