Opinion ID: 4543349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impoundment and Validity of Search Warrant

Text: Finally, Shelton argues the first search warrant of the car was not supported by probable cause and the initial impoundment of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. We reject these arguments. Where a warrant is obtained, a reviewing court determines the sufficiency of the warrant by examining the affidavit supporting it. See United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1124 (10th Cir. 2011). The court determines the sufficiency of the affidavit “by looking at the totality of the circumstances and simply ensuring that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. Probable cause exists when “there is a fair probability that the contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983). The “affidavit supporting the search warrant need not contain direct evidence or personal knowledge that the items sought are located at the place to be searched.” United States v. Nolan, 199 F.3d 1180, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999). Instead, the magistrate judge may draw reasonable inferences from the information in the affidavit supporting the warrant. Id. (...continued) give rise to reasonable suspicion. Here, however, Officer Estrada already had reasonable suspicion before Shelton fled. -10- Officer Estrada’s affidavit demonstrates the magistrate judge had a “substantial basis” for concluding probable cause existed. Officer Estrada had reasonable suspicion to believe a car burglary was in progress, which ripened into probable cause when the suspects walked away and then broke into a run. Given that the suspects were inside the car when Officer Estrada pulled up to the driveway, he reasonably suspected that evidence of a burglary or attempted burglary (e.g., gloves, flashlights, or entry tools) might be found in the car. In addition, a passenger in the car attempted to flee and when apprehended by another officer was found to have an uncapped syringe in his possession. While the simple act of carrying a syringe may be completely legal, neither the officer nor the court need “rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. These facts, as set forth in Officer Estrada’s affidavit, sufficiently demonstrate there was a fair probability the vehicle would contain evidence of a crime. Finally, Shelton argues that Officer Estrada’s impoundment of the car violated the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2015). When, however, the police have probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity, the police may seize it without a warrant and hold it for “whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant for the search.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51–52 (1970). The -11- Chambers court explained: “[W]e see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. It is true that Shelton was a permissive user of the impounded car. Significantly, however, Shelton never told Officer Estrada on the night of the encounter that he had the right to use the car. Officer Estrada only learned that fact after he tracked down the owner of the car several days later. In sum, we reject Shelton’s arguments regarding the search of the vehicle. Officer Estrada had probable cause for the impoundment, which in turn supported the subsequent warrant and search.