Opinion ID: 693930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Washpun Appeal

Text: 4 Pursuant to his written Rule 11 plea agreement, Washpun pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute various controlled substances, including marijuana, heroin, and cocaine. The Rule 11 plea agreement specifically provided that the parties agree that any sentence of incarceration shall not exceed 160 months. (App. 42.) Attached to, and made a part of, the Rule 11 plea agreement were sentence computation worksheets in which the parties had set forth in detail Washpun's sentence computation, subject to final approval by the trial judge. Since the conspiracy count to which Washpun pled made no reference to drug quantities, the Rule 11 plea agreement worksheets provided Washpun's offense level would be computed on the basis of the equivalent of between 400-500 gr of cocaine. (App. 50.) This gave Washpun an offense level of 24, which was set forth on the worksheet. The government agreed to a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in an offense level of 21. Washpun's criminal history category was computed as IV. 5 This did not end the computation, however, because Washpun's past criminal record put him under the career offender provisions of the sentencing guidelines. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.1. This resulted in the offense level being recomputed as 32, less the three levels for acceptance of responsibility, giving a final offense level total of 29. The career offender provisions also dictated that the criminal history category be level VI. An offense level total of 29 and a criminal history category of VI gave a guideline range of 151-188 months, which was set forth in the worksheets. This sentencing range was consistent with the earlier language in the plea agreement providing that any custody sentence imposed would not exceed 160 months. 6 The Rule 11 plea agreement also provided that, if the defendant furnished substantial assistance to the government, the government would move for a section 5K1.1 downward departure to 96 months. Notwithstanding Washpun's effort to withdraw his plea, the government did live up to its promise and moved for a downward departure. Washpun was sentenced by the trial judge to 96 months imprisonment. 7 In Washpun's motion to withdraw his plea, he admits complicity in the trafficking of marijuana, but goes on to state that he was not involved in the trafficking of cocaine, and that his offense level was improperly computed based upon cocaine trafficking. The presentence report did contain the statement that [d]uring the conspiracy, WASHBURN [sic] was involved with the distribution of the equivalent of 400 to 500 grams of cocaine. (App. 161.) Upon reading this language, Washpun apparently concluded that he was being sentenced on the basis of having distributed cocaine, which he steadfastly denied doing. In this regard, Washpun is mistaken. 8 To make the plea agreement as precise as possible, the agreement provided that the base offense level would be computed using 400-500 grams of cocaine as the agreed upon reference point. The agreement did not state, nor did the presentence report state, that Washpun had personally distributed this much cocaine, or any cocaine at all for that matter. It was the government's contention that the conspiracy of which Washpun was a part had distributed at least this much cocaine, or as the guidelines provide, an equivalent amount of other Schedule I or II Stimulants. U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(10). 9 At the hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district judge clearly understood the nature of Washpun's dissatisfaction with the presentence report. The trial judge stated: He pled guilty to being involved with the equivalent of 400 to 500 grams of Cocaine. That doesn't mean that he actually handled Cocaine. (App. 124.) The court also stated: He [Washpun] said that [marijuana] was his involvement. However, the charge is a conspiracy, and there certainly is evidence that these other controlled substances existed and were distributed during the course of the conspiracy, to which he was part. (App. 124.) The assistant United States attorney then added: Your Honor, I should clarify to--for the Court, the 400 to 500 grams of Cocaine was a limited relevant conduct that included both Marijuana and the foreseeable Cocaine and Heroin that was being distributed and sought by members of this conspiracy, including agreements by this defendant to obtain Crack Cocaine and other controlled substances on behalf of Marlon Holland and the conspiracy. (App. 125.) Washpun is simply wrong when he asserts that the reference to cocaine somehow affected the computation of his sentence in an inappropriate manner. 10 Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant may be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea if he demonstrates any fair and just reason for doing so. Whether to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is a matter within the broad discretion of the district court. United States v. Spencer, 836 F.2d 236, 238 (6th Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Kirkland, 578 F.2d 170, 172 (6th Cir.1978)). It is clear that the burden rests on the defendant to establish that a motion to withdraw a plea should be granted. United States v. Triplett, 828 F.2d 1195, 1197 (6th Cir.1987). In Triplett and Spencer and their progeny, we have developed a five-factor test to be used in analyzing whether a court properly exercised its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a plea. Although the parties spend considerable time in their briefs discussing the application of these factors, we find it unnecessary to do so for two reasons. 11 First, Washpun is mistaken when he alleges that he is being held responsible for personally distributing cocaine. It is clear that he misunderstands the manner in which the sentencing guidelines deal with drug equivalencies in establishing offense levels. The fact that he may have been under a misunderstanding, however, in no way vitiates his plea, because drug quantities did not drive his ultimate sentence computation. With his criminal record, Washpun qualified as a career offender, and, accordingly, it was mandatory that his offense level be computed at 32, with a criminal history classification of VI. This was clearly set forth in the worksheets attached to the Rule 11 plea agreement. The only way that drug quantities or drug equivalencies could have impacted his sentence is if the drug computation yielded an offense level higher than 32. Here, the offense level resulting from the drug quantity computation was 24, and so the higher career criminal offense level of 32 had to be applied. Since drug quantities did not impact on his sentence, regardless of what drugs were involved, this becomes our second reason for finding it unnecessary to parse our holdings as they relate to the granting or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 12 Washpun's argument that the court failed to ascertain a factual basis for his guilty plea is really a spin-off of the argument he makes in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In essence, he claims that the guilty plea proceeding did not establish his involvement with cocaine. The guilty plea hearing was very complete, and the trial judge asked all of the questions of the defendant that were required. The defendant indicated that he fully understood the conspiracy charge to which he was pleading, and he also specifically indicated he had agreed with another co-conspirator to distribute, and did distribute, marijuana while he was in prison. The assistant United States attorney then stated that the Government would be prepared to prove that this Defendant had other conversations and agreed to provide other controlled substances or look for other controlled substances on behalf of the conspiracy. (App. 121.) Defendant is correct when he asserts that there was no factual basis for concluding he personally dealt with cocaine; it was not necessary to establish that the defendant had any direct involvement with cocaine, however. 13 Defendant does not seriously contend that his admissions and the government's representations at the time of the plea hearing did not provide an adequate factual basis for his plea. What he does contend is that 79 days later, when he attempted to withdraw his plea, he then denied that he had any conversations or other involvement relative to cocaine. This denial, without more, however, is of little consequence. In reviewing the adequacy of the factual basis for a plea, we review the record made at the time the plea was taken. See United States v. Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101, 105 (6th Cir.1988). Defendant does not contend that he was under any disability at the time of the plea hearing or that he failed to understand the proceedings. If he were allowed to withdraw his plea based on the fact that a considerable time after the plea was given he decides to give a different version of what occurred, there would be no finality to the plea process whatsoever. In sum, the defendant has shown no inadequacies in the factual basis established by the trial judge at the time the plea was taken. 14 We now turn to defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We note initially that a defendant must raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the trial level or, failing to do so, in a habeas corpus proceeding. See United States v. Hill, 688 F.2d 18, 21 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). When the record is adequate to assess the merits of the claim, however, an appellate court may make an exception to this rule and consider the ineffective assistance claim. United States v. Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223, 1234 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1505 (1992). We believe that the record here is adequate for us to dispose of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 15 Before discussing the claim, however, an overall observation is relevant. Although the sentencing guidelines were intended to eliminate at least some of the discretion that was formerly available to the parties to a plea bargain, the plea bargain here was as close to a negotiated sentence as one can get. Regardless of the plea computations that were mandated by the guidelines, the government agreed to recommend a sentence of 96 months. It did make such a recommendation, and the court imposed a sentence of 96 months. Under these circumstances, we find little equity in any of defendant's arguments. Insofar as defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument is concerned, he makes the bald assertion that his counsel did not understand the equivalency aspect of his plea bargain. We do not find that the record supports this assertion. At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, counsel made it clear that defendant was contending that he was involved with only marijuana, not cocaine. The court painstakingly explained that it understood that, and any reference to equivalency did not mean the defendant had possessed or distributed cocaine. To the degree defense counsel's argument was somewhat thin, this was not the result of any ineffective performance on his part but, rather, the complete lack of any merit to the argument that he was making at his client's request. 16 Since we find no errors committed by the trial court with regard to Washpun's plea or sentence, the conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.