Opinion ID: 1968992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issue of substantial change in the character of the neighborhood

Text: In respect to the question of substantial changes in the character of the neighborhood, the appellee's case is seriously flawed in that it fails to meet the burden of proof which it has to delineate the neighborhood. Malmar Associates v. Board, 260 Md. 292, 305, 272 A.2d 6 (1971). This is true, unless we take as the definition of the neighborhood the description given by the witness Ben Dyer, which includes the entire South Potomac area. This would embrace a triangular area with a base of some 3 1/2 miles and side boundaries of approximately 6 1/2 miles. Although this Court has frequently stated that the concept of the neighborhood is a flexible one, and will vary according to the geographical location involved and that in a rural area the neighborhood tends to be larger and more fluid than in a city or suburban area ( Montgomery v. Commissioners, 263 Md. 1), nonetheless, in the absence of supporting evidence it appears to this Court to be unreasonable to argue that the neighborhood could be as general or as extensive as here contended by the appellee. See Board of County Commissioners v. Kines, 239 Md. 119, 123, 210 A.2d 367 (1965). Certainly, this Court has viewed a change in the neighborhood as applying to a more restricted area than is argued for by the appellee. Goucher College v. DeWolfe, 251 Md. 638, 645, 248 A.2d 379 (1968); Woodlawn Ass'n v. Board, 241 Md. 187, 199, 216 A.2d 149 (1966); Bishop v. Board of County Com'rs, 230 Md. 494, 503, 187 A.2d 851 (1963); Levitt and Sons v. Board, 233 Md. 186, 191, 195 A.2d 723 (1963), and cases cited in Woodlawn on pgs. 199 and 200. In Goucher at p. 644, Chief Judge Hammond writing for the Court stated: The matter of the reaches of the neighborhood in a given case and how near a change must be to affect its character are primarily for the Board to determine. A reading of the record in the instant case persuades us that the District Council considered the neighborhood to be the abutting property in the immediate vicinity of the 26 plus acre tract comprising the subject property. Certainly, Commissioners Baggett, Francois, Spellman and Brooke referred to the neighborhood area as that which had been the subject of adjudication in the MacDonald case in 1965, and that they were of the opinion that there had been no substantial change in the character of the neighborhood since that time. In MacDonald, while apparently no dispute was raised as to the definition of the neighborhood, it would appear that this Court directed its attention to the immediate neighborhood surrounding the subject property. See MacDonald at p. 555. In the case at bar, the lower court in its opinion expressly stated that because of the mass of testimony and exhibits it would not attempt to review in detail the testimony of the witnesses, much of which dealt with change. We will briefly comment on the nature of this testimony, but for the moment, we would call attention to the fact that the language employed by the lower court contains the reason as to why it was in error in not sustaining the action of the District Council which denied rezoning. The court's initial comment regarding change, stated: Admittedly those changes which have occurred in the immediate area do not require the change in zoning applied for : however, I do not see how anyone with an open mind could say that they were not such as to justify the change applied for. (Emphasis supplied.) By contrast, as recently as Wright v. McCubbin, 260 Md. 11, 271 A.2d 365 (1970), this Court stated:    Even if there had been some significant evidence of substantial change in the character of the neighborhood it is established that change which would support a rezoning does not compel it absent probative evidence that no reasonable use can be made of the property in its current zoning classification. Furnace Branch Land Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of Anne Arundel County, 232 Md. 536; Skipjack Cove Marina v. County Commissioners, 252 Md. 440, 453; Cabin John Limited Partnership v. Montgomery County Council, supra. [259 Md. 661, 271 A.2d 174]. Certainly, in the instant case, there was no effort made to show that reasonable use of the subject property could not be made in its current zoning classification. We are of the opinion that the changes in the neighborhood which were advanced by the appellee to further its cause were primarily development of residential uses in the Tantallon Subdivision, which were recognized as a futile bootstrap exercise in MacDonald, (238 Md. at 556). This Court has frequently recognized that the development of an area along the lines contemplated in the original comprehensive zoning is not such a change as would support the finding of a substantial change in the character of the neighborhood. Chatham Corp. v. Beltram, 252 Md. 578, 585, 251 A.2d 1 (1969); Smith v. Board of County Commissioners, 252 Md. 280, 284, 285, 249 A.2d 708 (1969); Helfrich v. Mongelli, 248 Md. 498, 505, 237 A.2d 454 (1968). Nor do we think that the construction of highway improvements, installation of sewage facilities, new schools and population growth constitute such substantial changes in this case as to prevent the issue of change in the character of the neighborhood from being fairly debatable. See MacDonald, supra, at 556 and Helfrich v. Mongelli, supra, at 504, as to effect of highway improvement; Smith, supra, at 285; Chatham, supra, at 585, as to installation of water and sewers and Baker v. Montgomery County, 241 Md. 178, 185, 215 A.2d 831 (1966) as to schools. Additionally, we have frequently held that a substantial growth of population in the neighborhood does not, per se, prove a substantial change in the character of the neighborhood, Hardesty v. Dunphy, 259 Md. 718, 721, 271 A.2d 152 (1970); Chapman v. Montgomery, supra, 643; Miller v. Abrahams, 257 Md. 126, 129, 262 A.2d 524 (1970); Board of County Commissioners v. Kines, supra, at 123; Pierpont v. Wells, supra, at 559; Cabin John Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery Council, supra, at 670; County Com'rs v. Fair Winds, 230 Md. 569, 587, 187 A.2d 845 (1963); Didlake v. Pottee, 228 Md. 588, 591, 180 A.2d 828 (1962).