Opinion ID: 1881163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Essential tools of defense

Text: ¶ 13. In addition to claiming that the circuit judge applied the wrong legal standard, the County also maintains that even under the Strickland analysis, it did show that the essential tools of defense were not provided. The County claims that, like this Court in the case at bar, other courts have concluded that prospective challenges to indigent defense systems were not subject to the requirements of Strickland, and that the proper inquiry is whether the system provides the tools of an adequate defense. The County further explains that there were distinct differences between the applicable standards to post-conviction proceedings and to systemic challenges. In a post-conviction challenges, the County avers that courts attempt to balance the individual defendant's interest in challenging his conviction against broader interests in judicial economy and finality. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052). The County argues that courts must look to whether the system provides the essential tools of an effective defense across the broad run of cases, and that the performance of a particular lawyer or the result in any one case is not decisive. ¶ 14. The County then claims that even under the post-conviction cases that use the Strickland analysis, it has demonstrated that the county-based system does not provide the tools of an adequate defense. The County cites numerous post-conviction cases that follow Strickland that have identified other tools that the county-based system does not provide as fundamental to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (investigation of mitigation evidence); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (failure to call witnesses and waiving of argument in sentencing phase); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (investigation of mitigation evidence); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (failure to file notice of appeal); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) (failure to file merits brief without consent); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (guilty plea challenges). The County also cites several cases decided by this Court such as State v. Tokman, 564 So.2d 1339, 1343 (Miss. 1990) (citing Gaines v. Hopper, 575 F.2d 1147, 1150 (5th Cir.1978)), which held that meaningful discussions regarding the realities of a case are the cornerstones of effective assistance of counsel. Tokman also held that counsel has, at a minimum, a duty to interview potential witnesses and to make an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case. State v. Tokman, 564 So.2d at 1342. ¶ 15. The County also references the Triplett case, in which this Court held that a defendant is entitled to a basic defense, and that a basic defense in Triplett required complete investigation to ascertain every material fact about this case, favorable and unfavorable. Triplett v. State, 666 So.2d 1356, 1361 (Miss.1995). The County concludes that if the circuit judge had assessed the tools of an adequate defense in light of this Court's prior decisions and standards, it would have been clear that the county-based system in Quitman and counties does not provide the essential tools of defense and therefore violates the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. ¶ 16. The circuit judge's opinion discussed in depth the claims raised by the County regarding the lack of essential tools of defense. In response to the County's allegation that lack of counsel and excessive caseloads promotes pretrial delay... accordingly, excessive pretrial delays have caused Quitman County to spend its own funds to hold defendants in county custody, the court stated that testimony during trial established that Quitman County has averaged thirty-four (34) indigent defendants per year in Circuit Court since 1999. Further, that each public defender is required to be in Justice Court one day each month, an average of seventeen (17) cases per public defender per year in Circuit Court. Certainly, this does not represent an excessive caseload for the two public defenders in Quitman County, as alleged. The circuit judge also held that: The two public defenders also take on indigent cases in two neighboring counties in this circuit court district and also represent private clients. The County contends that the public defenders average 165 cases a year in civil and private and indigent criminal cases, and that this is excessive. The Court is satisfied that those directly involved in the Quitman County criminal justice system, that is, the two public defenders and the three circuit judges, are in a better position than the Court to judge the weight of their caseload. Each of these testified that the caseload was not excessive and the defenders did not feel overburdened with their caseload. Mr. Shackleford testified that the public defenders were not allowed to schedule other cases during Circuit Court terms without permission of the Circuit Court Judge. The circuit judge also attributed the pretrial delay to the fact that Quitman County has two terms of court each year, with approximately six months between terms of court, which necessarily results in pretrial delays in processing felony cases. The circuit judge concluded that the delays cannot be attributable to the public defender program. ¶ 17. The County also contends that due to the chronic underfunding of indigent defense, the result was ineffective assistance of counsel which in turn, adversely affected the administration of justice in Mississippi. The County supports this allegation by stating that there have been an unusually high number of guilty pleas entered on the day of appointment of counsel, public defenders are not provided investigators, public defenders most often meet defendants in mass in the courtroom, public defenders are not provided office space, there is little motion practice in Quitman County and that the part-time flat fee public defender system is conducive to ineffective counsel. This argument was not persuasive to the circuit judge because in summary, none of the public defenders for this judicial district, circuit judges, or district attorneys testified to this effect. Further, none of the three witnesses tendered by the County as experts concluded in their testimony that either of the public defenders in Quitman County was incompetent. More specifically, Steven Farese, who was accepted as an expert, stated that he understood he was to testify as to the regularly accepted methods of defending a criminal defendant in an adequate manner and also testify as to what I have observed and read through the practices of Mr. Tisdell and ... Mr. Pearson and Mr. Shackleford and their representation of indigent defendants in Quitman County. Farese stated that his opinion was that there's not one single case that you can point to and say that this person or that person is ineffective because it doesn't work that way, but he concluded that the system as a whole was ineffective. ¶ 18. Similarly, Dr. Steven Bright, the director of the Southern Center for Human Rights, testified that, with regard to his observations on how indigent defense is provided in Quitman County, it is not so much about the lawyers ... I would say it's the system or more precisely the absence of a system that I find impressive. The County also complains about the public defenders' not having investigators, but the circuit judge, in her opinion, stated that [t]he Mississippi Supreme Court has confirmed that the right to counsel does not require an investigator or expert `absent a showing of substantial need' and has held that the Circuit Court should review such requests on a case-by-case basis. See Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 125 (Miss.1991). ¶ 19. Upon consideration of the briefs, the record, and the evidence contained therein, this Court finds that the circuit judge did not apply the wrong legal standard to the County's claims for relief.
¶ 20. The County also contends that the circuit judge misconstrued the applicable legal standard with respect to financial matters. According to the County's interpretation of this Court's previous decision regarding Quitman County, the County had to show the cost of an effective system of indigent criminal defense and the County's inability to fund such a system. Quitman I, 807 So.2d at 408. The County avers that it met its burden and established that it cannot afford to pay any more than it presently does for indigent defense. In response, the State claims that the County's evidence regarding its financial condition showed that the County had sufficient resources to fund a constitutionally adequate indigent defense system and that the County's obligation to pay for indigent defense in non-capital cases has neither caused the County's present economic troubles nor forced the County to substantially reduce other governmental services. ¶ 21. More specifically, the County alleged in its complaint that Mississippi's current indigent defense system has imposed enormous and unpredictable costs and that the financial resources available to fund schools, hospitals, local law enforcement and the traditional health, safety, and welfare obligations of county government have been substantially reduced. However, Butch Scipper, the Quitman County Chancery Clerk, admitted that the reason for the unpredictable spikes in budgetary outlays was the expense of defending capital casesa potentially ruinous cost that is no longer borne by the counties. This cost was alleviated by the creation of the Office of Post-Conviction Counsel and the Office of Capital Defense Counsel in 2000. [1] On March 21, 2005, Governor Barbour signed into law effective July 1, 2005, Senate Bill 2960, which creates the Office of Indigent Appeals. This newly created office will be responsible for handling appeals for the indigent defendants that have been convicted of noncapital crimes. ¶ 22. The circuit judge also found no evidentiary support for the County's assertion that the cost of providing indigent defense services had led to decreased funding for other essential services. As previously mentioned, the circuit judge found the County's deficit was mainly a result of spending in the area of solid waste, other unfunded mandates, natural disasters, and economic development bonds that were not being repaid. Again, the circuit judge found that there was no testimony that resources to fund schools, hospitals, and local law enforcement were reduced because of indigent defense costs as was alleged in the Complaint. The Court is convinced that indigent defense is neither the cause nor the solution to the county's financial difficulties. ¶ 23. The County claims that the circuit judge disregarded the evidence it presented through the expert testimony which unanimously concluded that a statewide, state-funded system is needed to provide the tools of an effective defense. The County further explains that even if one were to hypothesize a standalone county system that provided adequate defense tools, Mr. Farese's opinion was that it would cost $300,000 to $500,000, 10 to 15 times what Quitman can pay. The County asserts that the circuit judge, in addition to disregarding this evidence, never reached the issue framed by this Court and instead, addressed a different one. The County stated that [u]nder this newly devised test, the county could prevail only if it showed indigent defense was the sole cause of the county's financial problems and that these problems would disappear if the financial burden of indigent defense were lifted. The State rebuts this argument by stating: [o]f course, the County's expert did not explain why a full time public defenders' office in a county with a population of 10,000 would cost more than the full-time office in a county (Jackson County) with more than 130,000 people. But even assuming that the cost estimate is correct, the County's argument ignores a crucial point: The Circuit Court found that Quitman County's system of providing indigent defense services is not providing constitutionally inadequate legal representation, even at the current level of funding. Unless the County was able to show that it was providing inadequate services, the question of its ability to pay thousands of dollars more per year simply does not come into play. ¶ 24. The State correctly points out that the County seems to argue that it put on all the proof it needed when Chancery Clerk Scipper announced that the County cannot afford to pay any more for indigent defense than it already does. However, the County does not mention the testimony and documentary evidence that discussed the County's discretionary spending as well as its spending priorities. The State accurately concludes that [i]f the Quitman County Board of Supervisors made indigent defense a higher priority, the County could find the additional fundseven if that meant less discretionary spending on recreation and similar projects. ¶ 25. Similarly, it was not plausible for the County to maintain that the Legislature is prohibited from imposing financial burdens on counties because it is well established that each county is an agency or subdivision of the state, created for administration and other public purposes. See State v. Hinds Cty. Bd. of Sup'rs, 635 So.2d 839, 843 (Miss.1994). As this Court held, [t]he revenues of a county are subject to the control of the Legislature, and when the Legislature directs their application to a particular purpose or to the payment of the claims of particular parties, the obligation to so pay is thereby imposed on the county. Jackson Cty. v. Neville, 131 Miss. 599, 95 So. 626, 629 (1923). ¶ 26. The circuit judge found insufficient evidence that the County's public defenders are providing ineffective assistance on a regular basis, and the judge also determined that the County could afford to spend more if it chose to and the spending on indigent defense was not the cause of the deficit. The circuit judge's findings are not askew from the applicable standard with which this Court reviews this issue. Therefore, this issue is without merit. ¶ 27. For the aforementioned reasons, this Court finds that the circuit judge did not apply the wrong legal standard in concluding that the County did not prove financial injury.
¶ 28. The standard of review on appeal from evidentiary rulings is prescribed by Rule 103(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, which states [e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.... This Court articulated the standard of review of evidentiary rulings and stated that [o]ur standard of review for the admission of or refusal to admit evidence is well settled. `Admission or suppression of evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.' Church of God Pentecostal, Inc. v. Freewill Pentecostal Church of God, Inc., 716 So.2d 200, 210 (Miss.1998) (citing Broadhead v. Bonita Lakes Mall, Ltd. P'ship, 702 So.2d 92, 102 (Miss.1997) (quoting Sumrall v. Miss. Power Co., 693 So.2d 359, 365 (Miss. 1997))). ¶ 29. In applying that standard, the reviewing court may reverse a case only if the admission or exclusion of evidence,. . . result[s] in prejudice and harm or adversely affect[s] a substantial right of a party. K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 983 (Miss.1999) (citing Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 132 (Miss.1991)). Abuse of discretion is found when the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing of relevant factors. Caracci v. Int'l Paper Co., 699 So.2d 546, 556 (Miss.1997). Accordingly, the reviewing court must let stand a trial judge's findings of evidentiary or ultimate fact when substantial evidence in the record supports those findings, or when the findings are not `clearly erroneous.' Crowe v. Smith, 603 So.2d 301, 305 (Miss. 1992) (quoting Matter of Estate of Varvaris, 528 So.2d 800, 802 (Miss.1988)). ¶ 30. The County claims that the circuit judge committed prejudicial error in two evidentiary rulings, which in turn, affected a substantial right of Quitman County. The first purported error occurred when the circuit judge barred the County from introducing expert testimony that the indigent defense system has affected the independence and effectiveness of the courts, and the second purported error occurred when the judge allowed local circuit judges to offer their opinions on the competence of the public defenders.