Opinion ID: 1530550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mistake of Law State Confesses Error

Text: Nevertheless, the State has confessed error in Kipp's case on appeal. Under the facts presented, the State concedes that Kipp presented a valid mistake of law defense. This Court has held that, in very narrow circumstances, mistake of law can be a defense to a criminal charge. Long v. State, Del.Supr., 65 A.2d 489, 497-98 (1949). That defense is cognizable when the defendant: (1) erroneously concludes in good faith that his particular conduct is not subject to the operation of the criminal law; (2) makes a bona fide, diligent effort, adopting a course and resorting to sources and means at least as appropriate as any afforded or under our legal system, to ascertain and abide by the law; (3) act[s] in good faith reliance upon the results of such effort; and (4) the conduct constituting the offense is neither immoral nor anti-social. Id. Kipp presented evidence that he was misled in connection with his plea to Assault in the Third Degree. His 1990 guilty plea form, which was introduced at trial, and his testimony indicated he was told that the prohibition against possession of a deadly weapon which would result from a guilty plea was not applicable to the plea which he was entering. Kipp testified that he was told that prohibition was not applicable to him because he was pleading to a misdemeanor. Kipp's plea agreement and truth-in-sentencing guilty plea form were submitted to the judge in 1990 at the plea colloquy before his guilty plea to Assault in the Third Degree was accepted. Apparently, the prosecutor and the judge who accepted his guilty plea failed to notice the not applicable notation on the guilty plea form. The judge referred to the plea agreement in the plea colloquy, but never informed Kipp that the not applicable notation was incorrect with respect to the prohibition against future possession of a deadly weapon which would result from the plea. Under 11 Del.C. § 1448, a person is guilty of possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited when he is: (a) a person prohibited; and (b) knowingly possesses a deadly weapon. Thus, to be guilty of the offense, the defendant need only know that he or she possessed the weapon. Section 1448 does not require the defendant to know that it was criminal to do so. See United States v. Smith, 1st Cir., 940 F.2d 710, 713 (1991) (federal firearms law). Ignorance of the law is not a defense to crime. State v. LeCompte, Del. Supr., 538 A.2d 1102, 1103 (1988); State v. Deedon, Del.Supr., 189 A.2d 660, 661 (1963). But [a] defendant is not charged with knowledge of a penal statute if he is misled concerning whether the statute is not being applied. Krewson v. State, 552 A.2d 840, 843 (1988). A mistake of law defense is appropriately recognized where the defendant demonstrates that he has been misled by information received from the State. See Miller v. Commonwealth, Va.App., 25 Va. App. 727, 492 S.E.2d 482, 486-88 (1997); United States v. Tallmadge, 9th Cir., 829 F.2d 767, 773-75 (1987). Under the unique circumstances of this case, the State concedes on appeal that Kipp presented a proper and complete mistake of law defense. See Krewson v. State, 552 A.2d at 842; Long v. State, 65 A.2d at 497-98. In relying on the advice of counsel, memorialized in an official guilty plea document presented to and not corrected by either the prosecutor or the judge, Kipp had made a bona fide, diligent effort, adopting a course and resorting to sources and means at least as appropriate as any afforded under our legal system, to ascertain and abide by the law .... Long v. State, 65 A.2d at 497. The State submits that Kipp's three convictions for possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited should be reversed. See generally Walls v. State, Del.Supr., 560 A.2d 1038, 1051-52 (1989) (confession of error by prosecution).