Opinion ID: 2795225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: ¶1 Cody Reece was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, possession of a weapon by a restricted person, and obstruction of justice. He argues that we must vacate his STATE v. REECE Opinion of the Court convictions because the trial court erred by (1) denying his request for a variety of lesser-included-offense jury instructions, (2) preventing him from asking twelve questions during voir dire, (3) refusing to exclude evidence that he was arrested with a stolen rifle in his car one month after the murder, and (4) refusing to sever the weapons offense from the other charges. ¶2 We affirm Mr. Reece‘s convictions. First, although the court erred in denying Mr. Reece‘s request for lesser-included-offense instructions on several variants of unintentional homicide, the error was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence that Mr. Reece committed aggravated murder. Second, the court‘s limits on voir dire questioning were not improper—Mr. Reece was allowed to ask almost two hundred questions from his proposed juror questionnaire, and the court also permitted unlimited individual follow-up questioning with each prospective juror, so Mr. Reece had ample opportunity to evaluate each juror for potential biases. Third, the stolen-rifle evidence was properly admitted because it was relevant to the genuine noncharacter purpose of linking Mr. Reece to the murder weapon, and the evidence was unlikely to improperly affect the jurors‘ decision in light of the significant criminal conduct Mr. Reece admitted to in his trial testimony. Finally, the court‘s refusal to sever the weapons charge was not an abuse of discretion, because the jury never heard any evidence that Mr. Reece was a convicted felon. ¶3 Mr. Reece also challenges his sentence, arguing that the noncapital-aggravated-murder sentencing statute is unconstitutional. And even if it is not, he maintains that the court abused its discretion when it imposed a sentence of life without parole (LWOP) because it erroneously interpreted the sentencing statute as establishing a presumptive LWOP sentence. We conclude that the sentencing statute is constitutional for reasons we recently discussed in State v. Perea.1 But because the record is unclear as to how the court‘s incorrect reading of the statute influenced its decision to impose an LWOP sentence, we remand for the court to determine whether its erroneous interpretation of the statute affected its sentencing decision. If the court concludes that it did, Mr. Reece is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. 1 2013 UT 68, 322 P.3d 624. 2 Cite as: 2015 UT 45 Opinion of the Court