Opinion ID: 901122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Koch Complaint

Text: [¶ 25.] When Eicher became a member of the State Bar of South Dakota he took an oath to abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged[.] SDCL 16-16-18. Note that this is a continual and on-going obligation. Each day of an attorney's life demands that these requirements be met anew. In re Ogilvie, 2001 SD 29, ¶ 56, 623 N.W.2d 55, 67 (Gilbertson, J., dissenting). This constitutes a lawyer's duty, SDCL 16-18-14, and a lawyer's responsibility to use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. Preamble, South Dakota Rules of Professional Responsibility. SDCL 16-18 Appx. [¶ 26.] [T]he legal profession has seen an increasing number of attorneys engaging in conduct that is personally and professionally offensive. State-bar disciplinary action results because of findings that an attorney has engaged in flagrant disrespect toward a court, opposing counsel, an adverse party, or the attorney's own client[.] Janelle A. McEachern, Annotation, Engaging in Offensive Personality as Ground for Disciplinary Action Against Attorney, 58 A.L.R.5th 429 (1998). [¶ 27.] The Nebraska Supreme Court has observed: We explained in In re Appeal of Lane, 249 Neb. at 511, 544 N.W.2d at 375, that the requisite restraint in dealing with others is obligatory conduct for attorneys because `[t]he efficient and orderly administration of justice cannot be successfully carried on if we allow attorneys to engage in unwarranted attacks on the court [or] opposing counsel.... Such tactics seriously lower the public respect for ... the Bar.' (emphasis supplied.) (Quoting Application of Feingold, 296 A.2d 492 (Me.1972)). Furthermore, `[a]n attorney who exhibits [a] lack of civility, good manners and common courtesy... tarnishes the ... image of ... the bar....' Id. (Quoting In re McAlevy, 69 N.J. 349, 354 A.2d 289 (1976)). In re Converse, 258 Neb. 159, 602 N.W.2d 500, 508 (1999). [¶ 28.] This Court quoted Converse in Dorothy, 2000 SD 23 at ¶ 48, 605 N.W.2d at 507-508 and expanded its analysis: The Nebraska Supreme Court has recently stated: Care with words and respect for courts and one's adversaries is a necessity, not because lawyers and judges are without fault, but because trial by combat long ago proved unsatisfactory. ... The profession's insistence that counsel show restraint, self-discipline and a sense of reality in dealing with courts, other counsel, witnesses and adversaries is more than insistence on good manners. It is based on the knowledge that civilized, rational behavior is essential if a judicial system is to perform its function. Absent this, any judicial proceeding is likely to degenerate into [a] verbal free-for-all.... [H]abitual unreasonable reaction to adverse rulings ... is conduct of a type not to be permitted of a lawyer when acting as a lawyer. In re Converse, 258 Neb. 159, 602 N.W.2d 500, 508 (1999) (citing Appeal of Lane, 249 Neb. 499, 544 N.W.2d 367, 376 (1996)). Distinguishing between reasoned comment protected by the First Amendment and unprotected, unprofessional statements goes back nearly to the establishment of an organized bar in this State. [T]here can be such an abuse of the freedom of speech and liberty of the press as to show that a party is not possessed of good moral character, as required for admission to the bar of this state ... and therefore to require that such person be excluded from the bar of this state; and to our mind the evidence submitted here shows such an instance ... Nor can the respondent be justified on the ground of guaranteed liberty of speech. When a man enters upon a campaign of villification [sic], he takes his fate into his own hands, and must expect to be held to answer for the abuse of the privilege extended to him by the Constitution.... In re Egan, 24 S.D. 301, 326-27, 123 N.W. 478, 488 (1909). See also In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644, 648-49 (1956); Converse, 602 N.W.2d at 509. [¶ 29.] Eicher's written comments to the trial court in the Thomas matter concerning Koch, Koch's client, and the trial court, went far beyond fair and reasoned comment protected by the First Amendment. Instead they constitute unprotected, unprofessional statements. As we said in Dorothy, 2000 SD 23 at ¶ 47, 605 N.W.2d at 507: This clearly was not an isolated incident where emotions of the moment in the heat of litigation overcame better judgment. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 647, 105 S.Ct. 2874, 2882, 86 L.Ed.2d 504, 514 (1985). The worst of it was prepared or written out in advance with sufficient time to reflect on the inflammatory contents of the statements before they were delivered. Moreover, these acts were not an isolated `foolish and negligent' incident, id., they were intentional and numerous in number. Mattson, 2002 SD 112 at ¶ 55, 651 N.W.2d at 289.
[¶ 30.] When Eicher received notice of the disciplinary complaint that Koch filed against him, he promptly faxed Koch a letter. In it, Eicher proposed that he would not appeal the Thomas decision if Koch would agree to withdraw the disciplinary complaint. [¶ 31.] By doing so, Eicher attempted to utilize Koch's client's interest in avoiding an appeal to compromise Koch's obligations to report professional misconduct. Rule 8.3(a) provides: A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate professional authority. (emphasis supplied). Rule 8.3(a) is a mandatory rule of discipline. 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. and W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 8.3:201 (2d ed. 1996). The duty to report disciplinary violations also embraces a responsibility not to frustrate the reporting by others or dissuading others from cooperating in disciplinary investigations. [4] See Sup.Ct. Bd. of Prof. Ethics v. Furlong, 625 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 2001). Attempting to bargain away a disciplinary complaint also constitutes conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.] Rule 8.4(d); The Florida Bar v. Frederick, 756 So.2d 79 (Fla.2000). See also SDCL 16-18-26(2) which states, [e]very attorney at law who: ... intentionally delays his client's suit with a view to his own gain; ... is guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor. [¶ 32.] Additionally, Eicher's deliberate conduct created a conflict with his own client which he did not report to the client. The attorney is in effect a special agent limited in duty to the vigilant prosecution and defense of the rights of the client and not to bargain or contract them away. Northwest Realty Co. v. Perez, 80 S.D. 62, 65, 119 N.W.2d 114, 116 (1963). The foundation of an attorney's relationship with clients and the legal system is trust. Tidball, 503 N.W.2d at 856 (citations omitted). [5] Eicher violated this duty.