Opinion ID: 150007
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Emphasis on OEM Transactions

Text: Moss further argues that even if experience or lack thereof as to one particular type of transaction may in some situations be dispositive of a hiring decision, such is not the case here. He asserts that BMC's emphasis on OEM transactions smacks of pretext because BMC overlooked Moss's superior experience as to the other responsibilities covered by the job. An employer's reliance on a previously unmentioned job requirement to justify a challenged hiring decision would raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. See Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the fact-finder could regard an employer's explanation as pretextual when the person promoted became qualified for the position only after a change in the job requirements); Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1132-33 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that the fact-finder might view the employer's explanation as pretextual when the employer's proffered reason for hiring another candidate was not a listed job requirement). Here, for example, BMC also cites Moss's lack of experience with open source licensing and Lim's experience as in-house counsel as influencing their conclusion that Lim was better qualified for the Staff Legal Counsel position. Neither experience with open source licensing nor experience as in-house counsel, however, were listed in the job announcement or BMC's internal job requisition form as responsibilities or desired qualifications; although these qualifications are likely relevant to the position, we do not consider them for purposes of summary judgment. Our review demonstrates that BMC's emphasis on hands-on experience with OEM, Development Outsourcing, and Alliance transactions is supported by the record. Not only were these responsibilities listed in the job announcement and BMC's internal job requisition form, but the affidavits and deposition testimony of Stallworth, Clolery, Lim, and other members of the legal department confirm that experience with these specific agreements was a central and legitimate hiring consideration. Clolery stated that the key responsibility of this position was to handle the very important OEM transactions, both inbound and outbound, that BMC was involved in. Stallworth said that the Staff Legal Counsel was expected to spend approximately 70% of his or her time on managing transactions involving the creation or acquisition of technology for resell to customers through OEM, Alliance, Development Outsourcing, and Resell agreements. The BMC legal department therefore commonly referred to the Staff Legal Counsel position as the OEM Attorney position. Clolery further explained that BMC needed the new hire to get up to speed quickly and Stallworth similarly stated that BMC needed an individual in the Staff Legal Counsel position who could hit the ground running and operate immediately with little supervision. They therefore believed that someone who had previously worked on these specialized types of transactions in the software context would be optimal. Lim confirms that the focus on OEM transactions was genuine: she stated that during her interview Stallworth asked about her software licensing experience and her reseller OEM experience. She explained in her deposition that the primary responsibilities of the job were [n]egotiating OEM agreements and responsibility in general for the legal portions of OEM agreements. . . . oversee[ing] the open source program, the reseller contracts which were the market zone contracts, alliance agreements and general questions from R and D. When she started with BMC she worked mainly on OEM agreements, alliance agreements, market zone agreements. . . . Moss argues that the evidence offered by BMC and relied on by the district court was not proper summary judgment evidence because it consisted of [BMC's] own self-serving statements. But [s]worn affidavits . . . are certainly appropriate for review on a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment and Moss has proffered no evidence suggesting this testimony to be less than truthful. EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 398 (5th Cir.2007). Moreover, Moss has not asserted in the district court or on appeal that additional discovery would produce a quality or quantity of evidence different from the current summary judgment record. Therefore, as the district court concluded, Moss lacks evidence of pretext, and as a matter of law would not be able to prove that age was the `but-for' cause of the challenged adverse employment action. Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2352.