Opinion ID: 714052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion for New Trial and Presentation of Claims of Ineffective Assistance.

Text: 22 Wiman argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion for new trial as untimely pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. 3 The record indicates that on November 14, 1994, seven days after the jury verdict, the district court received a pro se letter from Wiman in which he complained about certain aspects of his trial, professed his innocence, related his version of the events at issue, and requested some type of closed hearing to verify what I've said so that I may have a chance to clear up some very serious loose ends. In response, on November 14, 1994, the district court issued a Notice of Receipt of Correspondence (the notice) which ordered counsel for Wiman to review the letter, consult with Wiman and determine whether [a]ny post-trial motions on behalf of the Defendant are appropriate.... On January 3, 1995 the district court received from Wiman a pro se Motion to Dismiss Public Defender dated December 23, 1994, in which Wiman, for the first time, requested a new trial. 23 After trial counsel withdrew and new counsel was appointed, a Verified Amended and Supplemental Motion for New Trial was filed on February 17, 1995. This motion coupled Wiman's motion for new trial with a request for an evidentiary hearing that would encompass his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. This motion was later supplemented when the district court granted Wiman's request that his earlier pro se motion for new trial be incorporated into the motion filed on February 17, 1995 and be shown to have been filed as of December 23, 1994. On April 5, 1995, the district court denied Wiman's motion for new trial on the ground that the court lacked authority to consider the motion because it had not been filed within the seven day period specified by Rule 33. 4 24 Because Wiman's motion for new trial did not allege newly discovered evidence, Rule 33's seven day time limit was applicable, and Wiman does not contend otherwise. Wiman concedes, as he must, that the December 23, 1994 motion for new trial was filed beyond the seven days contemplated by Rule 33. Moreover, any order extending the time to file a motion for new trial must be issued within the seven-day period. 5 United States v. Castillo, 965 F.2d 238, 242 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 874, 113 S.Ct. 212, 121 L.Ed.2d 152 (1992); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 608-09 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Hocking, 841 F.2d 735, 736 (7th Cir.1988). 25 This would seem to be the end of the inquiry, but Wiman argues that when the district court issued its notice on November 14, 1994, which directed Wiman's then defense counsel to determine whether any post-trial motions were appropriate, the district court thereby implicitly granted an extension of time within which to file Wiman's motion for new trial. 6 The problem with this argument is that it implies too much into the district court's notice. While the notice did direct Wiman's counsel to determine whether any post-trial motions would be appropriate, it did not specifically refer to a motion for new trial much less an extension of time within which to file one. Wiman concedes here that the district court did not impose any time limit on the purported extension he would have us recognize. Wiman attempts to explain away this anomaly by suggesting that the extension would have terminated automatically upon sentencing, but he fails to cite any authority for his interpretation of the notice. 26 If an extension had been intended, it is reasonable to presume that the district court would have so stated and the length of any extension would have been specified. The district court which issued the notice did not accept Wiman's interpretation and neither do we. Wiman's pro se motion for new trial filed on December 23, 1994 is therefore untimely. A district court does not commit error when it denies a motion for new trial that it lacks the authority to grant. Benson, 941 F.2d at 608. 27 Alternatively, Wiman contends that the district court should have held evidentiary hearings on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel prior to sentencing by treating his motion for new trial as, in effect, either a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 7 or a dispute requiring resolution prior to sentencing under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a). Wiman fails, however, to identify any relevant points or authorities in support of these novel arguments and we need not consider them. 28