Opinion ID: 662461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Defenses to Venue Provision Violation

Text: 31 Citicorp and Kaplan make three additional arguments in support of the entry of summary judgment on claim one. The defendants raise each of these arguments for the first time on appeal. Nonetheless, because each contention raises a pure issue of law, we consider them in deciding whether to affirm summary judgment. See Jovanovich v. United States, 813 F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir.1987) (exceptions to general rule against considering issues for first time on appeal). 32
33 First, Citicorp contends that the application for a writ of garnishment, as an action in enforcement of a previously-obtained judgment, does not fall within the venue provision. By its terms, section 1692i reaches any legal action on a debt. The FDCPA defines debt as any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction ... primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692a(5). Thus, the June 1989 stipulated judgment was entered in a legal action based upon a debt as defined in the FDCPA. Furthermore, the definition of debt specifically states that it applies whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment. Id. Nonetheless, Citicorp contends that the application for a writ of garnishment is not a legal action on a debt for purposes of section 1692i. 34 The plain meaning of the term legal action encompasses all judicial proceedings, including those in enforcement of a previously-adjudicated right. Cf. S & M Investment Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Authority, 911 F.2d 324, 326-27 (9th Cir.1990) (construing term legal action as used in interstate compact), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1087, 111 S.Ct. 963, 112 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1991). Because debt includes obligations reduced to judgment, any judicial proceeding relating to such a judgment constitutes a legal action on a debt. 35 Moreover, the purpose of the venue provision supports our rejection of an enforcement-action exception. In enacting the provision, Congress was concerned about consumers having to defend against suits in distant or inconvenient courts. S.Rep. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699. Consumers face similar burdens in defending against enforcement actions. Here, for example, had the writ not been quashed, the Foxes would have had to move for its quashing or defend against the amount of garnishment in a distant court. We find no indication that Congress intended to exclude enforcement actions, entailing the same concerns as initial adjudications, from the venue provision. Accordingly, we conclude that such actions are subject to section 1692i. 8
36 Second, the defendants argue that Maricopa County and Pima County are not separate judicial districts; therefore, filing the application in the former rather than in the latter establishes no venue violation. Section 1692i specifies judicial district or similar legal entity. We have no difficulty in concluding that the two counties are different venues under the FDCPA where the state has provided a formal transfer mechanism (as utilized in Citicorp's two 1986 actions against the Foxes) between courts in the two counties. The fact that, as the defendants argue, the state of Arizona constitutes a single federal judicial district and has a unitary state superior court has no effect on our conclusion. See Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 F.Supp. 1130, 1139 (D.Del.1992) (rejecting similar contention).
37 Third, Citicorp contends that it may not be held vicariously liable under section 1692i for a venue decision made solely by Kaplan. We reject this contention as inconsistent with the structure of the FDCPA. As noted above, the FDCPA initially contained an all-purpose attorney exemption. If we were to conclude, as Citicorp urges, that debt collectors are shielded from liability for venue violations whenever a legal action is filed by an attorney, we would have to decide that section 1692i was superfluous as originally enacted. Under Citicorp's theory, for the first nine years after the FDCPA became law, no attorney could ever have been liable and no collector could have been vicariously liable for the actions of his attorney; therefore, liability could rarely if ever have rested on a venue violation. 9 In order to give reasonable effect to section 1692i, we must conclude that Congress intended the actions of an attorney to be imputed to the client on whose behalf they are taken. 38 Having concluded that none of the defendants' general or specific arguments in favor of affirming summary judgment are valid, we reverse the entry of summary judgment on claim one and direct the district court to reinstate the Foxes' claim that Citicorp and Kaplan violated the FDCPA venue provision.