Opinion ID: 551133
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendants Brennan's and Vocke's Renewed Motions to Dismiss.

Text: 37 The plaintiffs allege that defendants Brennan and Vocke, both Wisconsin State Circuit Court judges, along with the other defendants, conspired to destroy the Life Science Church and deprive the plaintiffs of their above-mentioned constitutional rights. Paragraph 4(h) of Count I of the amended complaint specifically mentions Brennan as conspiring with the other defendants by signing a search warrant based on two allegedly false affidavits. Plaintiffs allege that this search warrant permitted various defendants to illegally trespass and confiscate property and to commit an assault and battery on plaintiff Stockheimer. 38 Paragraph 4(n) of Count I of the amended complaint alleges that Vocke ordered the removal of the mobile homes, septic systems, and sanitary systems from the Life Science Church property. In Count III, the plaintiffs allege that Vocke issued an opinion and judgment denying plaintiffs' request to intervene in a state court action identified only as Cause No. 80-CV-172, and also ordered that the Life Science Church be disbanded. As to defendants Brennan and Vocke, the plaintiffs seek monetary damages; an order enjoining Vocke's order to remove various structures; a return of the confiscated property; and a declaration that the above-mentioned affidavits, search warrant and orders are void. 39 Defendants Brennan and Vocke move to dismiss based upon the principles of absolute judicial immunity, absention, and res judicata. As more fully detailed below, the Court finds that the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity cloaks defendants Brennan and Vocke from civil liability for damages pursuant to the allegations contained in plaintiffs' amended complaint. 40 On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the allegations thereof being taken as true, and, if it appears reasonably conceivable that at trial the plaintiff can establish a set of facts entitling him to some relief, the complaint should not be dismissed. Mathers Fund, Inc. v. Colwell Co., 564 F.2d 780, 783 (7th Cir.1977). 41 The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity was first announced by the United States Supreme Court in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) 335 (1871), which held that a judge was not to be held liable in civil damages for judicial acts committed while exercising his jurisdiction, even if accused of acting maliciously and corruptly. See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Eades v. Sterlinske, 810 F.2d 723 (7th Cir.1987) (Wisconsin judge who altered trial transcript and docket sheet was immune from Sec. 1983 action). Moreover, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is not limited by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. 42 The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences. Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868) quoted in Bradley, 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 349. The Supreme Court in Bradley identified five policy reasons supporting the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity: 43 1) A judge must exercise his duty to make decisions free of worries about personal liability for making those decisions. 44 2) Losing parties may be quick to accuse a judge of improper motives in his decisions. 45 3) It is too easy to allege bad faith if judges had only a qualified good faith immunity. 46 4) Faced with the possibility of defending civil actions, judges may not be free to exercise their judgment and may be forced to keep unnecessary voluminous records. 47 5) Other procedural safeguards reduce the need for civil actions against judges. 48 Eades v. Sterlinske, 810 F.2d at 725, paraphrasing Bradley, 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 347. 49 A judge will be liable for his actions only when they were taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or taken in excess of jurisdiction. Bradley, 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 351. Therefore, the crucial question is whether the judge's acts were judicial acts. Stump, 435 U.S. at 348. In Stump, the Supreme Court stated that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. 435 U.S. at 362. 50 The specific act that plaintiffs attribute to Brennan is the signing of a search warrant. The specific acts attributed to Vocke are issuing and entering various orders, an opinion, and a judgment. Further, plaintiffs attribute other general acts of conspiracy to these two defendants. 51 Wisconsin law vests in these two defendants as judges, the jurisdictional authority to perform the specific acts which plaintiffs attribute to them in their amended complaint. Therefore, the first part of the Stump test is satisfied. Further, plaintiffs were dealing with Brennan and Vocke in their judicial capacities and, thus, the second part of the Stump test is satisfied. The Court finds that defendants Vocke and Brennan are immune from liability for civil damages in this action and, accordingly, their motions to dismiss will be granted. 52