Opinion ID: 2355508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tribal Authority

Text: ¶ 7 Jurisdictional disputes on Indian reservations involve overlapping federal, state, and tribal jurisdiction. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 380, 850 P.2d 1332. [3] Jurisdiction is a matter of law that we review de novo when the location of a crime is not in dispute. [4] State v. Waters, 93 Wash.App. 969, 976, 971 P.2d 538 (1999) (citing State v. L.J.M., 129 Wash.2d 386, 396, 918 P.2d 898 (1996)). ¶ 8 Whether a tribe has authority to stop and detain an individual necessarily involves an analysis of the limited sovereignty the tribe retains. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 380, 850 P.2d 1332. To determine whether tribes retain their sovereign powers, we must look[ ] to the character of the power that the tribe seeks to exercise, not merely the location of events. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 752 (Alaska 1999). Tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975). Intrinsic in this sovereignty is the power of a tribe to create and administer a criminal justice system. Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975). ¶ 9 However, Indian tribes have a unique dependent relationship with the United States. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990). Because of this dependent status, the sovereign authority possessed by Indian tribes is less than that of nondependent sovereigns. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 378-79, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring); Duro, 495 U.S. 676, 110 S.Ct. 2053; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that tribal sovereignty over nonmembers is not an inherent power retained by Indian tribes. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 695 n. 15, 113 S.Ct. 2309, 124 L.Ed.2d 606 (1993) (tribal sovereignty over nonmembers `cannot survive without express congressional delegation' (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245)). ¶ 10 The United States Supreme Court has held that the dependent nature of Indian tribes has implicitly divested some powers traditionally associated with sovereignty. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 378-79, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (Souter, J., concurring); Duro, 495 U.S. 676, 110 S.Ct. 2053; Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195, 98 S.Ct. 1011. This divestiture includes all criminal jurisdiction and nearly all civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. However, powers lost through dependent sovereign status can be restored through positive federal law, such as treaty provisions or acts of Congress. ¶ 11 The United States Supreme Court has limited tribal authority over non-Indians. In Oliphant, the Supreme Court stated, We granted [review of the present case] to decide whether Indian tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. We decide that they do not. 435 U.S. at 195, 98 S.Ct. 1011. In Montana, the Court held that the Crow Tribe could not prohibit on-reservation fishing and hunting by non-Indians. The Court endorsed the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810)). The Court noted two exceptions to this rule: (1) tribes may regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe and (2) tribes may exercise civil authority over non-Indians' conduct on land within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Id. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245. ¶ 12 The Court has since held that the Montana exceptions are to be narrowly construed. In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997), the Court made clear that the second Montana exception included a necessity requirement. In that case, the Court considered the Montana exceptions in the context of alleged tribal jurisdiction over a car accident on a state highway running through tribal lands. After deciding that the first exception was inapplicable, the Court turned to the question of maintaining tribal safety. The Court emphasized that this power did not extend `beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.' Strate, 520 U.S. at 459, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245). ¶ 13 Treaties, agreements, and statutes must be liberally construed in favor of the tribe, and all ambiguities are to be resolved in its favor. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32, 63 S.Ct. 672, 87 L.Ed. 877 (1943) ([T]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements.... Especially is this true in interpreting treaties and agreements with the Indians[, which are to be construed] `in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of [the Indians].' (quoting Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85, 62 S.Ct. 862, 86 L.Ed. 1115 (1942))). ¶ 14 The parties agree on appeal that the incident began on the Lummi Reservation; therefore the narrow issue before us is whether McSwain had authority to stop a non-Indian driver, who pulled over after she crossed the reservation boundary, and then detain her until a deputy with jurisdiction to arrest arrived. [5]