Opinion ID: 874070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Plaintiff Failed to Show Good Cause for Failing to Serve Defendants Within Six Months After Filing the Complaint.

Text: Dismissal is not required under Rule 4(a)(2) if there is good cause for the failure to serve a defendant within the six-month period. The district court found that Plaintiff had not met her burden of establishing good cause for the failure to serve Defendants within six months of filing the complaint. Plaintiff challenges that finding on appeal. A. Standard of review. Plaintiff contends that the standard for determining whether good cause has been shown is the same standard we apply to summary judgment. Plaintiff relies upon our statement in Sammis that [b]ecause [good cause] is a factual determination, the appropriate standard of review is the same as that used to review an order granting summary judgment. Id. at 346, 941 P.2d at 318. However, in this case the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding the disputed facts concerning good cause. Therefore, as stated above, the standard of review is whether the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. B. Irrelevant factors. This court has held that there are various facts that do not constitute good cause for failing to serve the summons and complaint within the six-month time period required by Rule 4(a)(2). They include the following. Pro se status. In this case, Plaintiff was pro se from the date she filed the complaint on October 5, 2009, until March 30, 2010, when Mssrs. Swartz and Kamitomo filed a notice of appearance on her behalf. The record does not reflect whether Mr. Maile, who drafted the pro se complaint for her, advised her that she must serve the summons and complaint within six months of filing the complaint. Likewise, the record does not reflect whether Mr. Swartz, who reviewed Plaintiff's case for about five months before agreeing to represent her on March 26, 2010, ever advised her that she must serve the summons and complaint within that six-month period. However, that does not matter. Pro se status does not excuse parties from adhering to procedural rules, even though they may be unaware of such requirements. Id. Time bar if dismissed. It appears that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants would be barred by the statute of limitations. In Sammis we held that the running of the statute of limitations and the subsequent time-bar to refiling the action is not a factor to be considered in determining whether good cause exists under Rule 4(a)(2). Id. at 347, 941 P.2d at 319. Lack of prejudice to defendant(s). In Sammis we held that [b]y its terms, however, Rule 4(a)(2) imposes the burden of preventing dismissal for violation of the rule upon the party who failed to effect timely service-here, the Sammises. In addition, the rule's language renders a consideration of prejudice to the defendants irrelevant to good cause determinations. Id. at 348, 941 P.2d at 320. Settlement negotiations. Ongoing settlement negotiations during the six-month period are not, by themselves, relevant to a finding of good cause. As we held in Martin v. Hoblit , [S]ettlement negotiations between the parties do not provide justification for delay of service and do not in and of themselves constitute good cause for non-compliance with Rule 4(a)(2). 133 Idaho 372, 377, 987 P.2d 284, 289 (1999). Defendant's knowledge of the pending litigation. In Campbell v. Reagan , the plaintiff mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant the day after filing the complaint, but did not serve the complaint within the six-month period required by Rule 4(a)(2). We held: That [the plaintiff] mailed [the defendant] a copy of the summons and complaint will not establish good cause for her delay in serving him with process. . . . Telford [ v. Mart Produce, Inc., 130 Idaho 932, 935, 950 P.2d 1271, 1274 (1998)] stands for the proposition that such notice will not excuse a plaintiff's failure to timely serve process. 144 Idaho at 257, 159 P.3d at 894. Pending proceedings before the prelitigation screening panel. A request for a prelitigation screening panel provided by the Idaho State Board of Medicine is a condition precedent to litigation against a physician or surgeon practicing in this state or against a licensed acute care hospital operating in the state if the claim is for damages based upon alleged malpractice. I.C. § 6-1001. The panel's decision is merely advisory. [W]hile filing with the screening panel is a condition precedent to proceeding with district court litigation, such as filing interrogatories or setting trial dates, it is not a condition precedent to filing an action in order to toll the statute of limitations. Moss v. Bjornson, 115 Idaho 165, 167, 765 P.2d 676, 678 (1988). It is not essential that the plaintiff file such medical malpractice action prior to the completion of proceedings before the screening panel in order to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations because the statute of limitations is tolled upon the filing of a request for a prelitigation screening panel, during the time the claim is pending before the panel, and for thirty days thereafter. Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 146, 106 P.3d 470, 472 (2005). In the instant case, Mr. Maile, as attorney for Plaintiff, filed a request for a prelitigation screening panel on April 28, 2009. He argued Plaintiff's case before the panel on October 23, 2009, and the panel issued its decision on October 27, 2009. Those proceedings are irrelevant to good cause. As we held in Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 533, 66 P.3d 230, 237 (2003), The Plaintiffs chose to file this lawsuit before the completion of the proceedings before the prelitigation screening panel. Having done so, they were required by Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to serve the summons and complaint upon the Defendants within six months. We have never held that service of process cannot be accomplished while a matter is pending before the prelitigation screening panel. Timing of the motion to dismiss under Rule 4(a)(2). Whether or not the defendant promptly moves for dismissal under Rule 4(a)(2) is irrelevant to the issue of good cause for the plaintiff's failure to comply with that rule. In Telford, the defendant waited four months after being served with the summons and complaint before moving to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 4(a)(2). We held that [w]hen a rule is mandatory, rather than discretionary, the time at which dismissal is sought is irrelevant. 130 Idaho at 935, 950 P.2d at 1274. Likewise, in Rudd, we held, The Defendants' participation in discovery or other proceedings after the expiration of the six-month period does not constitute a waiver of their right to seek dismissal based upon the Plaintiffs' failure to serve the summons and complaint before the six-month period expired. 138 Idaho at 533, 66 P.3d at 237. C. Good cause analysis. [T]he determination of whether good cause exists is a factual one. Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 346, 941 P.2d 314, 318 (1997). The burden is on the party who failed to effect timely service to demonstrate good cause. Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372, 375, 987 P.2d 284, 287 (1999). When deciding whether there was good cause, the court must, considering the totality of the circumstances, determine whether the plaintiff had a legitimate reason for not serving the defendant with a copy of the state complaint during the relevant time period. Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 132 Idaho 531, 534, 976 P.2d 457, 460 (1999). Courts look to factors outside of the plaintiff's control including sudden illness, natural catastrophe, or evasion of service of process. Harrison v. Bd. of Prof'l Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Med., 145 Idaho 179, 183, 177 P.3d 393, 397 (2008). In deciding whether there were circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control that justified the failure to serve the summons and complaint within the six-month period, the court must consider whether the plaintiff made diligent efforts to comply with the time restraints imposed by Rule 4(a)(2). Martin, 133 Idaho at 377, 987 P.2d at 289. In Martin, after filing their complaint the plaintiffs engaged in settlement negotiations with the adjuster for the defendant's liability insurer. Eleven days before the [six-month] deadline, the [plaintiffs'] counsel delivered the complaint and summons to the sheriff for personal service on [the defendant]; however, service was not effectuated because [the defendant] had removed himself from the state of Idaho. Id. The plaintiffs' counsel then learned that the defendant had moved to the State of Washington, but he was unable to have the defendant served before the six-month deadline. The defendant's relocation to the State of Washington was certainly something beyond the plaintiffs' control. However, it did not constitute good cause for failing to serve the defendant within the six-month period required by Rule 4(a)(2) because of the lack of diligence in attempting to serve the defendant within that time period. As we stated: Having earlier rejected consideration of settlement negotiations, the only question remaining is whether counsel's single timely act of forwarding the summons and complaint to the sheriff for service can reasonably be viewed as diligent efforts to comply with the time restraints imposed by Rule 4(a)(2). Under the totality of the circumstances, good cause was not demonstrated by the Martins who bore the burden to show good cause for sufficient to avoid dismissal upon defendant's Rule 4(a)(2) motion to dismiss. Id. Likewise, in Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 66 P.3d 230 (2003), we held that the plaintiffs had not shown that they made diligent efforts to serve the defendants prior to the expiration of the six-month period required by Rule 4(a)(2). We stated: The Plaintiffs waited until July 31, 2000, one week before the six-month period was due to expire, before making any attempt to effectuate service. Waiting five and three-fourths months before attempting to effect service does not show due diligence. Id. at 532, 66 P.3d at 236. Plaintiff did not attempt to serve Defendants until five days before the expiration of the six-month period. She asserts, But for the dispute over whether Ms. McLeod was or was not authorized to accept service, Ms. Elliott acted in a timely manner to effectuate service. The district court found that Plaintiff had failed to prove good cause for failing to serve Defendants timely, and considering her lack of due diligence in attempting to do so that finding is supported by substantial and competent evidence. On April 20, 2010, Defendants filed and served their motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service. The next day, Plaintiff's counsel retained a professional process serving entity. It served Dr. Verska the same day and served Mr. Russell, as registered agent for the Spine Institute, the following day. Obviously, Defendants could easily have been served within the six-month period had Plaintiff exercised due diligence. Plaintiff also argues that she was able to serve both Defendants within seventeen days after the expiration of the six-month period. As we said in Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 346, 941 P.2d 314, 318 (1997), The relevant period of time on which to focus is the six months following the filing of the amended complaint. . . .