Opinion ID: 2827659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Animated Video

Text: We now turn to the admission and use of the animated video at trial. Hentzen objected to the admission of the video as “other acts” evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), so we review that issue for abuse of discretion, using the three-part analysis discussed in further detail below.3 He also points to several other purported trial errors to which he did not object at trial, including the 2 The government also argues on appeal that Hentzen “frequented websites with a child-pornography connection.” None of its citations support this statement, and our review of the record reveals no other evidence that Hentzen did so. 3 Before the district court, the government also argued that the animated video should be admitted as “res gestae” evidence that was “inextricably intertwined with evidence of the crimes charged.” On appeal, the government no longer presents this rationale for admitting the video, waiving the argument. -8- No. 14-6153 United States v. Hentzen testimony elicited in the course of introducing the video and the limiting instruction. Because Hentzen did not preserve these issues, we review them for plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134–35 (2009). Rule 404(b) bars evidence of “a crime, wrong, or other act . . . to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Such evidence is admissible, however, if offered for a permissible purpose. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). “In deciding whether to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), the district court applies a three-step analysis.” United States v. Mack, 729 F.3d 594, 601 (6th Cir. 2013). The district court must first find, based on sufficient evidence, that the other act actually occurred. United States v. Jenkins, 345 F.3d 928, 937 (6th Cir. 2003). Next, the court determines if the acts could be admitted in support of one of the purposes allowed by Rule 404(b), in other words, “whether the evidence is probative of a material issue other than character.” Id. Finally, the court decides whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, and, in the case of Rule 404(b) determinations, such review requires a three-part analysis, mirroring the district court’s three-part analysis. United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 2012). “First, we review for clear error the factual determination that other acts occurred. Second, we review de novo the legal determination that the acts were admissible for a permissible 404(b) purpose.” Id. To answer this question, we independently determine whether the evidence is probative of a material issue other than character. Third, “we review for abuse of discretion the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudicial impact.” Id.; see also United States v. Geisen, 612 F.3d 471, 495 (6th Cir. 2010) (“it is an abuse -9- No. 14-6153 United States v. Hentzen of discretion to make errors of law or clear errors of factual determination in evidentiary rulings”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hentzen does not challenge the first step of the analysis. There was “sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury” that Hentzen was in possession of the animated video. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). The video was found in three locations on Hentzen’s hard drives. The animated video fails to satisfy the second step of our review because it is not probative of a material issue other than character. Our cases refer to three considerations that address this step, whether performed by the district court or our court: “Evidence of other acts is probative of a material issue other than character if (1) the evidence is offered for an admissible purpose, (2) the purpose for which the evidence is offered is material or ‘in issue,’ and (3) the evidence is probative with regard to the purpose for which it is offered.” United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2002). The district court determined that the animated video was “relevant to prove the defendant’s knowledge that the materials he possessed were child pornography.” Knowledge is an admissible purpose under Rule 404(b), and, as an element of the crime, it is material. United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1994). The government fails, however, to show that the animated video is probative of the material issue for which it was offered—whether Hentzen was aware of the contents of the files. The government relies on our earlier unpublished decision in United States v. Caldwell, 181 F.3d 104 (6th Cir. 1999) (Table). Caldwell, like this case, was a prosecution for possession of child pornography for which the sole defense was lack of knowledge—that Caldwell was unaware of the presence in his house of the child pornography. In that case, the pornography was in physical form. Caldwell’s wife directed investigators to a small room in their house and described it as -10- No. 14-6153 United States v. Hentzen containing his “stuff.” Caldwell, 1999 WL 238655 at . The room contained a large quantity of child pornography, child erotica, and adult pornography in boxes. There were also “very well kept stacks” of sexual material on the floor, including a stack on the floor containing erotic collages of children. Id. On the wall of the room, there was a teddy bear, a doll, and a sign saying “No Parents Admitted Unless Accompanied By A Child.” Id. One box that contained a child pornography magazine also contained “a photocopy of Caldwell’s Social Security card and birth certificate.” Id. at . Another box contained “a folder obtained by Caldwell from a previous employer.” Id. Finally, “Caldwell’s fingerprint appeared on a photograph of a clothed child” that was found in a tackle box “intermingled with pictures of naked children.” Id. There, we held that the child erotica—neatly stacked and on display in the room—was admitted as part of the “setting of the case” and also under Rule 404(b). Id. at . Specifically, we identified two ways that the child erotica was probative of Caldwell’s knowledge—(1) the child erotica was evidence of a sexual interest in children and (2) the total quantity of child erotica and child pornography made it less likely that Caldwell was unaware of its presence. Id. The government now argues that these same inferential links apply in Hentzen’s case. A core problem with the government’s proposed inferential chains is that there is no independent evidence that Hentzen knew he had the animated video on his computer. As the government notes, the copies of the animated video were “literally intermingled with the child pornography.” Hentzen’s possession of the animated video can only have been evidence of his knowledge of the contents of the child pornography if he knew that he had the animated video. But knowledge of the content of the folders is exactly what the government had to prove. To illustrate the problem with this circular logic, consider its analogue in the Caldwell case. If Caldwell had been found with a closed box containing both child erotica and child pornography, -11- No. 14-6153 United States v. Hentzen it would make no sense for the government to point to the child erotica in the same box as evidence that Caldwell knew of the contents in the box. In fact, in Caldwell’s case, there was significant independent evidence that he had seen the child erotica, including the display of some materials on the wall; the fact that child erotica was in a neatly-stacked open pile that Caldwell had moved into the room about two years prior; and the presence of his work and personal materials intermingled with the erotica and child pornography. In contrast, there is no independent evidence that Hentzen ever viewed the animated video or even saw its (profoundly disturbing) title, aside from the evidence that he knew of the child pornography. Nor does the addition of three copies of the animated video to the several thousand child pornography video files among Hentzen’s 100,000 videos make it more likely that Hentzen was aware of the contents of his computer. In the context of Hentzen’s nearly unlimited hard drive capacity, three copies of a file in an unopened folder would be virtually unnoticeable. This analysis does not imply that child erotica or virtual child pornography is never probative of a child pornography defendant’s knowledge. If there is independent evidence that the defendant had seen or knew of the child erotica, the erotica could support an inference of a sexual interest in children. For example, in United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512 (3d Cir. 2010), investigators had found traces of child pornography files on the defendant’s computer, along with a sizeable collection of child erotica of which the defendant admitted knowledge. Because the defendant admitted to knowledge of the pictures, “[p]ossession of those pictures suggested that Vosburgh harbored a sexual interest in children,” and the admission of the child erotica over a Rule 403 objection was affirmed. Id. at 538. Similarly, child erotica contained in a well-visited or visibly marked part of a defendant’s computer may provide sufficient independent evidence of knowledge of the erotica to support its relevance. -12- No. 14-6153 United States v. Hentzen Because the animated video is not probative of any material issue, it was error for the district court to admit it. There is then no need to address at length the third step of the Rule 404(b) analysis because the video’s non-existent probative value is substantially outweighed by the clear prejudicial effect of the video in light of its title and content—the insinuation that Hentzen was preparing to molest a child. Hentzen is not entitled to a new trial, however, if the error was harmless. “An error in the admission of evidence does not require granting a criminal defendant a new trial unless the error affects ‘substantial rights.’” United States v. DeSantis, 134 F.3d 760, 769 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)). “Where an error is not of constitutional dimension, it is harmless unless it is more probable than not that the error materially affected the verdict.” United States v. Martin, 897 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1990). Whether improperly admitted 404(b) evidence “substantially swayed” a jury “generally depends on whether the properly admissible evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming.” United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 447 (6th Cir. 2008). “When the government presents other convincing or overwhelming evidence, we may deem the admission of 404(b) evidence mere harmless error.” United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 573 (6th Cir. 1999). The burden is on the government to prove that the error was harmless. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734–35 (1993). In light of the entire record, the government sufficiently established that the error was harmless. The jury saw the animated video after seeing nine properly admitted videos—videos that showed actual children being abused by adult men in horrifying ways—and a catalogue of child pornography. The government reminded the jury of the videos and catalogue in closing. The government also relied on evidence that Hentzen knew of the child pornography, including the evidence from his browser history and his search terms. As for the animated video, it was -13- No. 14-6153 United States v. Hentzen never referenced after its introduction into evidence nor was there any further insinuation that Hentzen was preparing or had the inclination to molest a child. The limited use of the animated video illustrates its lack of legitimate evidentiary value, but it also weighs against any conclusion that the jury would have decided the case differently absent the introduction of the animated video. We ultimately conclude that the erroneous admission of the video did not materially affect the jury’s verdict. Nor do the various unpreserved errors regarding the investigator’s testimony about the video and purported flaws in the limiting instruction warrant reversal. Because Hentzen did not object, we can review the issues only for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). One of the requirements for an error to be plain is that it affected the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 307 (6th Cir. 2002). “[T]he substantial rights prong of the plain error analysis is akin to the harmless error analysis employed in preserved error cases. The difference, however, is that under plain error review the burden is on the defendant to show that the error was prejudicial, i.e., that his substantial rights were affected.” Id. at 322 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The alleged errors in testimony and limiting instruction prejudiced Hentzen only incrementally more than admission of the video itself. In light of the full record, Hentzen is unable to prove that the errors were sufficiently prejudicial to merit a new trial. C. Application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3) for Distribution “Post-Booker, we review a district court’s sentencing determination ‘under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard’ for reasonableness.” United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). We “must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or -14- No. 14-6153 United States v. Hentzen improperly calculating) the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “If the sentence is procedurally sound, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.” United States v. Presley, 547 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). District courts determine the factual bases for sentencing factors by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 884 (6th Cir. 2012). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal interpretations of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 2010). Because Hentzen limited the extent to which files were uploaded from his computer, he argues that the district court erred by applying the two-level increase for distribution, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F). Hentzen emphasizes that he limited his upload speed to an extremely low level and moved files out of his shared folder soon after they finished downloading. He describes these actions as preventing his computer from sharing anything with others on eMule. But that is not the test. The Guidelines manual defines distribution as “any act, including possession with intent to distribute, production, transmission, advertisement, and transportation, related to the transfer of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, comment. (n. 1). The investigators found Hentzen because his computer made several child-pornography files appear available for upload. This advertisement from his computers to other computers was sufficient for application of the distribution enhancement.4 D. Substantive Reasonableness of the Sentence Finally, Hentzen contends that his below-guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable. “Sentences are substantively unreasonable where ‘the district court chooses the 4 Because Hentzen is extremely knowledgeable about computers and peer-to-peer file sharing, we do not need to resolve whether the distribution enhancement applies where a user proves his ignorance of the nature of peer-to-peer file sharing programs. See United States v. Bolton, 669 F.3d 780, 783 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing United States v. Durham, 618 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2010), which recognizes such an exception for ignorant users). -15- No. 14-6153 United States v. Hentzen sentence arbitrarily, grounds the sentence on impermissible factors, or unreasonably weighs a pertinent factor.’” United States v. Lumbard, 706 F.3d 716, 727 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 796 (6th Cir. 2011)). “A sentence that falls within a properly calculated guideline range is afforded a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, and it is incumbent upon the defendant to demonstrate that his sentence is unreasonable.” United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 661 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Brogdon, 503 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2007)). It is even more difficult to demonstrate that a below-guidelines sentence is unreasonably long. United States v. Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573–74 (6th Cir. 2008). Hentzen argues that the district court failed to properly weigh several of his mitigating circumstances, including his lack of prior criminal history, his psychiatric issues leading to hoarding digital material, and his many character references from friends and family. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the sentencing court must consider, among other factors, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” The record reflects that the court reviewed all of the materials relating to Hentzen’s character and history, including the psychiatric material. (R. 60, PageID 904–05, 915) That the court gave some factors less weight than Hentzen deemed appropriate is not grounds for reversal. “The fact that [we] might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Hentzen also points to recent statements by the United States Sentencing Commission and other district courts calling into question the validity of the child-pornography guidelines as a measure of the culpability of defendants. District courts are permitted to exercise their discretion and vary from § 2G2.2 “on reasonable policy grounds as long as the basis for doing so is adequately explained.” United States v. Ziska, 602 F. App’x 284, 290 (6th Cir. 2015). But -16- No. 14-6153 United States v. Hentzen “the fact that a district court may disagree with a Guideline for policy reasons and may reject the Guidelines range because of that disagreement does not mean that the court must disagree with that Guideline or that it must reject the Guidelines range if it disagrees.” United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 800 (6th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). The court acted within its discretion in declining to reject the Guidelines range for policy reasons.