Opinion ID: 1860134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The testimony of Nurses DeBroy and Reed and Detective Jeffrey concerning conduct of Ten Broeck's employee, Gilbert, was admissible

Text: St. Matthews Police Detective Brad Jeffery, who at the time was investigating an alleged, unrelated rape of another Ten Broeck patient by a fellow patient, testified that in November or December of 2000 he told the attorney retained by Ten Broeck to represent it in the investigation, that he had information about some more problems at the hospital on the adolescent side. Detective Jeffrey then told the attorney that an employee named Gilbert, that worked on the adolescent wing, had perped some young female patients. Detective Jeffery defined perping as the act of a sexual predator to lure or prime a victim sexually before the sexual predator attacks. Jeffery received the information from a hospital employee. Detective Jeffery's information was reported by the attorney to Ten Broeck's risk manager, Sherrie Greenhill. Thereafter, Detective Jeffery was informed by the attorney that Ten Broeck had no employee by that name and was unaware of any such problem. Ten Broeck objected to Detective Jeffery's testimony on grounds of hearsay. Likewise, Ten Broeck objected on the same grounds to the following testimony of Anita DeBroy, Ten Broeck's charge nurse for the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift: 1. That Gilbert had rubbed a patient's leg and asked the patient if she was wild. DeBroy noted that it wasn't reported directly to her, it was reported to somebody on dayshift. She couldn't remember who it was reported to, but Nancy Reed, a nurse, may have been the person on dayshift that received the complaint from the patient. There was a report made about it and an investigation. Subsequent to the investigation, hospital procedures changed. After that, both a male and female were required to go into patient rooms together to take a patient's vital signs. 2. Gilbert told her that he had read a young lady's diary one night when he was working in the children's unit and then gone back later on and told her that he had read her diary. And that was reported also. 3. She had heard of an alleged patient on patient rape in the hospital. Supposedly, the man who committed the alleged rape, William Cole, was sent to KCPC, but she was there that night, and didn't actually believe it happened because she saw him all night long in his room. There was, however, a roommate that said she had observed it, but the roommate was preoccupied with people being raped, and the account she gave of the event, was the same identical account that she gave of another lady that had previously been her roommate, being raped by the same patient. So whether she was a good historian telling you a great story or not would be questionable because of her delusions. 4. That she was aware of two staff members that were terminated for sleeping on the unit during their work hours. 5. She had heard rumors that a former female staff member allegedly had sexual relations with a former patient after the patient's discharge. That staff member was reprimanded for her behavior and eventually was fired. This alleged sexual activity occurred after the alleged sexual assault on Brooks. In addition, DeBroy testified that Gilbert would regularly make sexual comments and engage in inappropriate sexual conduct. In fact, she discussed Gilbert's inappropriate behavior and sexual comments with her co-workers. On one occasion, Gilbert told her that he liked to watch a particular female walk down the hall  and to watch how her butt bounces. According to her, Gilbert engaged in a lot of sexual talk. She also noted that various incidents were reported before Brooks became a patient: Q: Is it fair to say that this type of sexual talk occurred on numerous occasions by him? A: That's fair to say, yes. Q: And is it fair to say that it would have occurred on numerous occasions before Artemecia Brooks was a patient in this facility? A: Yes. Q: And is it fair to say that those incidents were reported on each occasion to someone in administration? A: To my knowledge they were reported. DeBroy also testified that she was short-handed on the evening the rape allegedly occurred and so  informed her supervisor, Larry Koebel. Koebel told her to simply redistribute existing employees. DeBroy believed the Gilbert/Brooks incident occurred the same night she complained to Koebel that the staff was short-handed. Ten Broeck also objected to the following testimony of Nancy Reed, Ten Broeck's supervisor of mental health associates, to wit: 1. That another mental health associate told her that a patient, whose identity she did not know, allegedly claimed that Gilbert had rubbed her leg. 2. That another employee, Regina Kirkpatrick, had said she had reported the incident to nurse managers, John Bisig or Larry Koebel. In addition, Ms. Reed testified that the person who reported the leg rubbing incident was a patient. As a supervisor, she testified the information needed to be reported to the staffing nurse managers, Bisig and Koebel. She admitted the nursing staff needed to watch for such things and report them. She discussed it with the associate who made the report and was advised that Larry Koebel already knew. She was told that the incident was reported and that it would have been before the alleged assault on Brooks. She testified that she was so concerned about Gilbert's conduct that she told co-workers to watch out for him. Appellant's objections to the above testimony on the grounds of hearsay were overruled by the trial court. [4] Ten Broeck argues that the statements made by these witnesses are hearsay or double hearsay. It asserts that double hearsay is automatically precluded by the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. KRE 805, however, provides that double hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule. KRE 805, however, like other hearsay rules, has no application to non-hearsay. Thus, there would be no need for a second exception if [a] statement had one layer of hearsay and [one] layer of non-hearsay. Lawson, Supra § 8.90[3]. The majority of the testimony was offered by Brooks to show that Ten Broeck had, through its staff, received numerous complaints from patients and staff regarding Gilbert's conduct for purposes of the negligent hiring/retention claim. [5] Moreover, the staff testified the statements had been reported. When viewed in such context, the statements are not hearsay. See Jones v. Heady, 553 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Ky.App.1977) (Statement not inadmissible hearsay when offered to show knowledge); see also Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 351 (Ky.2006) ([T]he statements are not hearsay evidence because they are `not admitted for the purpose of proving the truth of what was said, but for the purpose of describing the relevant details of what took place.'); Marshall v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 513, 521 (Ky.2001) (statements which show knowledge are not hearsay because they are not offered to proof the truth of the matter asserted.). Here, knowledge of the complaints, whether ultimately true or not, was highly relevant to Ten Broeck's duty to investigate the conduct of Gilbert. However, even assuming the statements made by the employees required secondary hearsay exceptions, they fall within KRE 801A(b)(4). KRE 801A(b)(4) provides: Admissions of parties. A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the statement is offered against a party and is: .... (4) A statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship; or Here, the statements made by Ten Broeck's nurses were within the scope of their employment as they concerned the interaction of staff with patients at Ten Broeck's facility. They were received and were required to be reported due to their employment. Accordingly, KRE 801A(b)(4) would apply. [6] KRE 801A(b)(4) is the Kentucky counterpart to Fed. R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). See Fields v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Ky.App. 1995). The commentary to the Federal Rule notes Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D)  and thus, KRE 801A(b)(4) by analogy  literally takes certain types of hearsay statements out of hearsay consideration under the premise or theory that they should be admitted in a adversary system. Fed. R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) advisory committee's note. The commentary stresses that such evidence should enjoy freedom from the technical demands of searching for an assurance of trustworthiness in satisfaction of the hearsay rule and should be generously admitted. Id. Rather, the appropriate manner for testing the reliability of admissions by agents is to apply the usual test of agency, in determining if the admission was made in the scope of employment. Id. Moreover, communications by patients regarding their medical care, or complaints of staff misconduct, are an important and necessary aspect of a medical care provider's ability to monitor and upgrade its medical care. Thus, there is a social policy which both protects and encourages the free communication of such reports and/or complaints. When made, they are evaluated by the receiving staff, and if found to be of concern, the report is, or should be, passed on for appropriate investigation. Here, both Nurse DeBroy and Reed testified the patient complaints were reported. Several were acted upon. This action manifested an adoption or belief in the truth of the report/complaint of the patient. Thus, the patient complaints or statements which were acted upon by Ten Broeck, are not excluded by the hearsay rule, as it was offered against Ten Broeck and is [a] statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth. KRE 801A(b)(2); see also Pilgrim v. Trustees of Tufts College, 118 F.3d 864, 870 (1st Cir.1997) (Adoption or acquiesce may be manifested in any appropriate manner) ( abrogation recognized on other grounds in Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 406 (1st Cir.2002)); see also Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 1998) (A statement is adopted to the extent the adoptive party accepted and acted upon the evidence.). However, the burden of showing the manifestation is on the party offering the evidence. Cf. Ricciardi v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 811 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir.1987). In Pilgrim , the president of Tufts College, received and acted upon a committee's report of grievance and recommendations. Thus, its acceptance of the contents of the Report and [its] implementation of its recommendations, without disclaimer, served as an adoption of the Report for the purposes of [KRE 801A(b)(2) ]. Pilgrim, 118 F.3d at 870. There is no requirement that a `declarant have personal knowledge of the facts underlying [its] statement' for it to qualify as an adoptive admission. Powers v. Coccia, 861 A.2d 466, 470 (R.I.2004) ( quoting Brookover v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, 893 F.2d 411, 416 (1st Cir.1990); Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc., 588 F.2d 626, 630-31 (8th Cir.1978)). Here, the reports and complaints of Ten Broeck's patients were received, evaluated and reported by its staff. In one instance, hospital procedures were changed to require the presence of both a male and a female staff member to be in patient rooms when a patient's vital signs were taken, and in another, noted later, Gilbert was suspended, pending an investigation. This later event occurred just prior to his arrest. Thus, there is evidence establishing Ten Broeck's adoption by virtue of its acceptance and action upon these two complaints. As noted previously, the standard of review of a trial court's evidentiary rulings is an abuse of discretion. Tumey v. Richardson, 437 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Ky. 1969). Here, the statements and complaints were testified to by Ten Broeck's staff and their receipt and reporting of such statements or complaints was within the scope and purpose of their employment. As the purpose of the testimony was to primarily show that the statements were made, they were properly admitted in regards to whether Ten Broeck should have investigated the matter prior to Brooks' injury. Moreover, those acted upon are admissible under KRE 801A(b)(2). Nor can we find that the statements of the detective or staff were unduly prejudicial. KRE 403. Given the above, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its ruling on these matters.