Opinion ID: 844212
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Allying itself with the prosecutor and preventing the defense from presenting its case

Text: Defendant asserts the court improperly and prejudicially allied itself with the prosecutor by commiserating openly about defense counsel, taking an active role in the examination of witnesses to bring out evidence favorable to the prosecution, and interfering with the defense. Defendant's claim that the court commiserated with the prosecutor is based on the court's comments after the prosecutor complained that defense counsel was testifying rather than soliciting evidence from a witness. The court responded, I don't know how to stop him; do you have a hint for me . . .? The prosecutor replied, All I can do is object. The court then sustained the objection. The court's response did not suggest an alliance with the prosecutor. To the contrary, the court implicitly chided the prosecutor while making the point it would not rule in the absence of an objection. (5) As to the claim the court improperly interjected itself into the proceedings to bring out or clarify the evidence, `a judge should be careful not to throw the weight of his judicial position into a case, either for or against the defendant.' ( People v. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1237.) But [t]he object of a trial is to ascertain the facts and apply thereto the appropriate rules of law, in order that justice within the law shall be truly administered. ( People v. Mendez (1924) 193 Cal. 39, 46 [223 P. 65].) To this end, the court has a duty to see that justice is done and to bring out facts relevant to the jury's determination. ( People v. Santana (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1206 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 158].) [I]t is not merely the right but the duty of a trial judge to see that the evidence is fully developed before the trier of fact. . . . ( People v. Carlucci (1979) 23 Cal.3d 249, 255 [152 Cal.Rptr. 439, 590 P.2d 15]; see Pen. Code, § 1044 [It shall be the duty of the judge to control all proceedings during the trial, and to limit the introduction of evidence and the argument of counsel to relevant and material matters, with a view to the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding the matters involved.].) Defendant complains that the court directed defendant to take off his glasses so Bettina Redondo could see his face. The direction was consistent with the court's duty to see that justice is done and to bring out facts relevant to the jury's determination. (See People v. Santana, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197.) That the court later denied the prosecutor's request that defendant be directed to put on a hat to allow Redondo to see defendant's facial features in the same manner as she had observed the features of the gunman demonstrates the court was not favoring the prosecution. Defendant also complains that after Colleen Heuvelman testified she told the police the man she had seen had been wearing a long military-style trench coat, the court remarked that a coat or jacket then shown to the witness, apparently a trench coat, was not a military-style coat. The court should not have interjected its own knowledge of military-style coats into the proceedings, but its comment, if anything, undermined the prosecution's attempt to show defendant was the man Heuvelman had seen. Defendant next complains that the court improperly interfered with defense counsel's cross-examination of Heuvelman. Counsel, armed with a transcript of Detective Tarpley's interview of Heuvelman, observed that Heuvelman had told Tarpley that, as she was chatting with Miller just before leaving the bank to take care of her son, her son was behaving like a wild man. Counsel asked Heuvelman if her son had been with her. After she said yes, he asked if the son had been acting like a wild man. Heuvelman said yes. Counsel asked if the son had been running around. Heuvelman said she had needed to restrain her son earlier, but her son was standing next to her, holding her hand, when she was speaking with Miller. The court then called the attorneys to the bench and said to defense counsel: Mr. Freeman, if you've got some prior inconsistent statements or something that you want to impeach her with, get to it, don't be reading the entire transcript into the record. I don't care about the kid and how he was running around the place or any of that kind of silliness. Counsel explained he was trying to impeach the witness's earlier statement that she could not recollect if her son had been with her at the bank. The court replied: I don't care about the kid, it's superfluous and it's not improper [ sic ] impeaching. [¶] The court's objection is sustained. The court then allowed counsel to examine the witness about matters, including her son's conduct, that might have distracted her when she was watching the man in the bank's parking lot. Contrary to defendant's argument, the court did not prevent defense counsel from testing the witness's powers of observation or her memory of events. It forestalled an irrelevant discussion of the son's presence and conduct in the bank. That the son was with Heuvelman and was presenting distractions had never been in dispute. The court's silliness remark, made at the bench, could not have influenced the jury. Defendant complains the court improperly curtailed his cross-examination of Detective Solis. Solis testified about a field showup during which witnesses were asked if a man found in the area shortly after Miller was shot was the man they had seen in the bank's parking lot. None of the witnesses identified the man, who was then released. Defense counsel later asked if Solis recalled a witness had said the man fit the gunman's profile. The court summoned the attorneys to the bench and remarked that Solis's report of a witness's statement would be hearsay. Defense counsel asserted the evidence was being offered to test the detective's credibility or recollection, not for the truth of the matter stated. But because Solis's ability or inability to recall the details of the field showup could not have aided the defense, it is likely the defense was soliciting hearsay evidence. In any event, the field showup took place because the man resembled the descriptions of the gunman; that a witness agreed he resembled the gunman added nothing to the defense case. Finally, Solis had little reason to recall if a witness confirmed the resemblance; the important point to him would have been that the witnesses said the man was not the man they had seen. Counsel's line of questioning thus was not directed at any admissible evidence that could have aided defendant. The court's refusal to allow further questioning on the matter therefore was well within its discretion to manage the trial. Moreover, defendant could not have been prejudiced by the court's ruling. The proceedings relating to defense investigator Douglas Portratz are somewhat more disturbing, although for reasons having nothing to do with judicial misconduct. Portratz spoke with witness Bettina Redondo in January 1997, a few months before trial commenced. Redondo testified Portratz showed her photographs of defendant and of James Gano's brother-in-law, Craig Elz, compared them to the composite drawing Redondo had helped prepare, told her Elz's photograph more closely resembled the drawing than defendant's photograph, and told her Elz had been involved in another robbery. Redondo felt Portratz was trying to convince her Elz had murdered Miller. The court called the attorneys to the bench and asked the prosecutor if he had caused Portratz to be arrested for attempting to dissuade a witness. When the prosecutor said no, the court said: Why not? I mean, I haven't seen a better case for it than this. [¶] . . . [¶] Is it in the scheme of things, I hope? The court's remarks, made out of the jury's hearing, could not have caused the jury to think the court believed the defense team had acted dishonestly. Defendant, however, asserts the comments must have had a chilling effect on the defense. But that the court was legitimately concerned a defense investigator may have attempted to influence a witness should not have caused the defense to shy away from presenting legitimate evidence to support its case. Further, nothing in the record hints that the court's words chilled defense efforts. To the contrary, after the bench conference defense counsel cross-examined Redondo at length, exploring Redondo's reasons for believing Portratz was trying to convince her Elz was the murderer; making the point that other persons, including Elz, generally met the description of the man Redondo had seen; and eliciting Redondo's statement she could not be certain defendant, as he appeared at trial, was that man. The jury also heard a tape of Portratz's interview with Redondo and was provided with a transcript of the interview. The defense therefore was able to, and did, use material from the interview to suggest Redondo may have been mistaken, and the jury was fully informed about the statements both Redondo and Portratz made during the interview. Defendant next complains the court repeatedly denied defense requests for a sidebar conference, while granting the prosecution's requests. He provides two examples. In the first, defense counsel, after objecting to the form of the prosecutor's question, asked if the court wished the attorneys to approach the bench. The court overruled the objection and denied the request to approach. In the second, defense counsel, during the prosecution's redirect examination of a witness, objected that the prosecutor seemed to be misrepresenting that the defense had pursued a particular line of questioning. The court agreed it could not recall if defense counsel had asked the disputed questions. Defense counsel then asked to approach the bench. The court denied the request. After asking a question on another subject, the prosecutor asked to approach the bench, explaining he wished to cover two additional areas but thought he had better approach before going forward. The court granted the request. Nothing in either exchange suggests the court favored the prosecution. Having heard the defense objections, the court could assess whether a sidebar conference was necessary. But it did not know what areas the prosecutor intended to pursue. By granting the prosecutor's request, the court thus protected defendant from the possibility the prosecutor would elicit testimony that might unfairly damage defendant's case. Defendant has no cause to complain. Defendant asserts the court unfairly and improperly suggested defendant's wife had been in jail. He mischaracterizes the court's words. Defense counsel had asked Lorraine Ripple if she recalled when defendant got married. The court stated: That's hearsay, counsel. Sustained. She's probably in custody now. In context, it appears the court was referring to Ripple's time in custody, observing that because Ripple was in custody at the time of the wedding, anything she said about it would be based on hearsay. Further, defendant did not object or seek an admonition, forfeiting his claim of error. The court also on many occasions sustained defense objections and sometimes made its own objections to the prosecutor's questions. It also on its own initiative acted to protect defendant. For example, after defense counsel asked Lorraine Ripple if Detective Tarpley had said why he had contacted her, the court called counsel to the bench and warned that the question might open the door to evidence that would cause the jury to learn about all of defendant's criminal activity. In sum, the record does not support defendant's claim that the court allied itself with the prosecutor against him, prevented him from exploring weaknesses in the prosecution's evidence, or prevented him from presenting a full defense.