Opinion ID: 3066813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: I. MHSAA is not a state agency entitled to deference. ¶13. MHSAA argued in its initial brief that its “eligibility decisions are entitled to the substantial evidence standard of review given to its member school boards. At the beginning of this case, [MHSAA] filed a motion in limine requesting the chancery court to adopt this appellate standard and exclude evidence not considered by [MHSAA].” (Emphasis added.) HHS countered that MHSAA was not a state agency and that the proceeding in chancery court “was not an appeal of a decision following a proper administrative hearing conducted by a legislatively created state agency.” (Emphasis added.) HHS also argued that the only way it could “get a review of the MHSAA proceedings was to file an independent action against the Association for injunctive or equitable relief.” ¶14. We agree with HHS that MHSAA is not a state agency. We also find that there is no right of appeal from MHSAA’s decisions. Because these issues are so closely intertwined, we discuss them together. 5 We note that MHSAA has been a party before this Court on very few occasions, and this Court never has addressed the precise question presented today. See MHSAA v. Trail, 163 So. 3d 274 (Miss. 2015); MHSAA v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768 (Miss. 1994); and MHSAA v. Farris, 501 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1987). 6 ¶15. First, simply put, there is no authority—statutory or otherwise—that authorizes an appeal of right from the decisions of a voluntary, private organization. And while it is true that one may pursue an appeal in chancery court when there is no adequate remedy at law, that avenue is available only when appealing a state board or agency decision. See, e.g., Prisock v. Perkins, 735 So. 2d 440, 443 (Miss. 1999) (“where there is no statutory scheme for appeal from a decision of a state board or agency and the injured party does not have a full, plain, complete and adequate remedy at law, the chancery court has jurisdiction for judicial review of the board or agency decision.”) (Emphasis added.) ¶16. We disagree with MHSAA’s argument that it is similar to an administrative agency—specifically, a school board—and is therefore entitled to deferential treatment on appeal. First, school boards were specifically created by the Mississippi Legislature, and their functions are strictly regulated by statutory law. In other words, as HHS argues, state statutory law “provide[s] due process and legal protection for students, parents, employees, staff, the administration and the public transacting business with the school districts.” Such is not true for MHSAA, as it is a “non-profit organization in which membership is voluntary.” Mississippi High Sch. Athletic Activities Assoc. v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768, 771 n.1 (Miss. 1994). ¶17. Secondly, we have found no other case in which this Court has granted an agency-like right of appeal from the decisions of a private organization, along with the deference that accompanies that right. On the contrary, this Court previously has specifically denied agency-like deference to other private, nongovernmental organizations. See Owens Corning v. Mississippi Ins. Guar. Assoc., 947 So. 2d 944, 945-46 (Miss. 2007) (“MIGA is not a state 7 agency, and therefore its interpretation of the Insurance Guaranty Act is not entitled to deference . . . . MIGA is not an entity akin to the Mississippi Division of Medicaid or any other administrative agency.”) and Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n v. Union Fire Insurance Co., 86 So. 3d 216, 222 (Miss. 2012) (“Like MIGA, MWUA is not an administrative agency and, thus, is not entitled to deference.”) ¶18. Finally, MHSAA places much emphasis on this Court’s decision in Mississippi High School Athletic Activities Association v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768 (Miss. 1994). There, this Court was faced with constitutional challenges to MHSAA’s recruiting rule. Id. at 772-73. The Coleman Court did state that the “power to regulate athletic programs is conferred upon the local school boards by the Mississippi Legislature,” and that the “school boards, in turn, delegated this authority to [MHSAA].” Id. at 774. But this statement was made in the context of determining whether MHSAA’s conduct was “state action” for purposes of the constitutional analysis. Id. Coleman simply does not stand for the proposition that MHSAA should be treated as a state agency. Delegation by the member school boards of their authority to regulate athletes and athletic events simply does not extend so far as to also “delegate” their agency status. ¶19. In short, MHSAA is a private “non-profit organization in which membership is voluntary.” Coleman, 631 So. 2d at 771 n.1. As such, it is not a state board or administrative agency, and the common-law right of appeal to chancery court is therefore unavailable. The parties have pointed to no authority—and we cannot find any—that authorizes an appeal of right from the decisions of a voluntary, private organization. II. HHS did not allege a legally cognizable claim. 8 ¶20. We now turn to the issue contemplated by this Court’s question on supplemental briefing—when may parties challenge the decisions of a private, voluntary organization in chancery court? Stated differently, does an aggrieved athlete, parent, or school ever have recourse from an adverse decision made by a private organization like MHSAA? The answer is simple: yes, if they allege a cognizable legal claim. ¶21. The courts of this state “are not authorized to resolve every claim and dispute that may arise between our citizens. The plaintiff must file a complaint which alleges some cognizable claim or cause of action against the defendant.” In Re Bell, 962 So. 2d 537, 541 (Miss. 2007) (emphasis added). “And even though Section 159 of the Mississippi Constitution gives chancery courts jurisdiction over ‘[a]ll matters in equity,’ that jurisdiction has limits.” Greater Fairview Missionary Baptist Church v. Hollins, 160 So. 3d 223, 229 (Miss. 2015) (citing Miss. Const. art. 6, § 159). ¶22. “It is true of course that, in a proper case, restraining orders and injunctions are within the jurisdiction of our chancery courts.” In Re Bell, 962 So. 2d at 541 (emphasis added). “But these and other cases require that an application for injunctive relief be predicated upon some legal or equitable claim which will, at some point, proceed to the merits.” Id. (emphasis added). “Indeed, an applicant for injunctive relief must demonstrate, inter alia, a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the claim.” Id. (emphasis added). ¶23. The entirety of HHS’s cause of action as stated in its complaint reads as follows: 10. Despite the minor Plaintiffs having met the necessary residency requirement, MHSAA has wrongfully denied approving them for athletic participation. 9 11. The Association’s actions and conduct did not follow its own rules and regulations regarding residency determination of the minor Plaintiffs. 12. The MHSAA’s actions in denying the minor Plaintiffs eligibility for competition in athletic activities were arbitrary and capricious. 13. The MHSAA did not have any substantial basis to deny the minor Plaintiffs eligibility for athletic activities. 14. The MHSAA failed to follow its own rules, by-laws, and constitution in that it did not properly investigate and consider the matter as required by said rules, by-laws and constitution. 15. [HHS] has no other adequate remedies at law or otherwise and that [HHS] will suffer irreparable harm, damage and injury, unless the Defendants’ acts complained of are enjoined. The minor Plaintiffs will not be able to practice or participate in team competition and will not be covered by insurance. T.M.G. will lose her ranking as Mississippi top female student athlete in Girls Basketball for the 2011-2012 Season, and prohibit her ranking as a Dandy Dozen Student Athlete for the State of Mississippi. Nowhere in its complaint does HHS allege a breach of contract, a tort, fraud, or any other legally cognizable claim. Contrary to the dissents’ position, there simply is no cause of action for “arbitrariness,” in the absence of a contractual provision or some other legal duty requiring otherwise. For example, MHSAA could decide arbitrarily to paint all of its office doors chartreuse, but unless some contractual provision or other legal duty mandates otherwise, no cause of action arises. As such, HHS’s complaint for injunctive relief was not “predicated upon some legal or equitable claim which will, at some point, proceed to the merits,” and therefore was not within the Forrest County Chancery Court’s jurisdiction. In Re Bell, 962 So. 2d at 541. ¶24. Chief Justice Waller argues that we reach a decision that “stands in direct conflict with longstanding precedent recognizing that a member of a private, voluntary association may 10 seek relief in court from the association’s arbitrary decision.” Waller Dis. at ¶36. First, the “longstanding precedent” cited by Chief Justice Waller is mostly nonbinding decisions from other jurisdictions and from our court of appeals. And although Chief Justice Waller does cite two cases written by this Court, those cases are easily distinguishable. ¶25. In Lowery v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 130 So. 2d 831 (Miss. 1961), Walter Lowery sued The International Brotherhood of Boilermakers in chancery court, requesting that the court reinstate him to his former membership in the union and to award damages for his wrongful suspension. Id. at 832 (emphasis added). This Court also noted that the chancery court had jurisdiction over the case, because “it was alleged that there were funds or property in the hands of a third party belonging to the appellee.” Id. at 834 (emphasis added). Clearly then, Lowery had alleged a breach of contract,6 as well as a dueprocess type of argument. It was in the context of reviewing those claims that this Court acknowledged that it would not interfere with the union’s decisions absent arbitrariness. Id. at 836. In fact, in the sentence immediately following the portion quoted by Chief Justice Waller, this Court said: The courts will, however, grant relief where property rights are involved or where there is not a provision for a hearing under the contract, and will determine whether or not a hearing was contrary to natural justice or was had without proper notice. “When property rights of members of voluntary associations are involved, the courts will lend assistance for their protection.” 6 “It is now a well-settled rule that a Union Constitution is a contract between the members of the union and the association. ‘The articles of agreement of a labor union, whether called a constitution, charter, by-laws, or any other name, constitute a contract between the union and its members, as well as a contract between the members of the union, which the courts will enforce, if not immoral or contrary to public policy or the law of the land.’” Id. at 834 (citation omitted). 11 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In short, the Lowery Court was not simply reviewing the union’s decisions for “arbitrariness,” as intimated by the dissents. ¶26. And in Multiple Listing Service of Jackson, Inc. v. Century 21 Cantrell Real Estate, Inc., 390 So. 2d 982 (Miss. 1980), this Court again faced a due-process argument: “The authorities are in general agreement that judicial review of disciplinary proceedings of a voluntary association should be limited to determining only whether the member disciplined received procedural due process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .” Id. at 983. And again, it was in the context of reviewing whether an association member had been afforded due process during a disciplinary proceeding that this Court quoted Lowery and its “arbitrariness” language. Id. at 984. There simply was no independent “review for arbitrariness,” contrary to Justice Chief Justice Waller’s assertions. Waller Dis. Op. at ¶40. ¶27. So a fair and thorough reading of both Lowery and MLS reveals that they do not conflict with our holding today. Neither case holds that this Court has the authority simply to review the decisions of a private, voluntary organization for “arbitrariness.” Rather, the plaintiffs in those cases presented legally cognizable causes of action that were brought properly in the trial court and then argued before this Court on appeal. ¶28. Chief Justice Waller also claims that we reach a decision that “conflicts with this Court’s barely six-month-old decision upholding a student’s standing to sue the MHSAA for misapplying its rules in an eligibility decision.” Waller Dis. Op. at ¶ 36. This accusation is easily dismissed as well. Simply put, the one and “only issue before [this Court in Trail was] 12 whether a high school athlete has standing to challenge adverse decisions concerning the student’s eligibility to participate in high school athletics.” Mississippi High Sch. Activities Ass’n, Inc. v. Trail, 163 So. 3d 274, 275 (Miss. 2015) (emphasis added). So as this Court itself specifically acknowledged, the sole issue before it in Trail was standing. ¶29. This Court held ultimately in Trail that students had standing as third-party beneficiaries to challenge MHSAA’s eligibility decisions. Id. at 280. As such, this Court acknowledged that a contract exists between the member schools and MHSAA, and that this contract could be breached. And it was in that context that this Court made the statement relied on so heavily by the dissents: “once a school decides to create a sports program and establish eligibility rules, the school—or as in this case, MHSAA—has a duty to follow those rules; and it may be held accountable when it does not do so.” Id. at 280; Waller Dis. Op. at ¶36; King Dis. Op. at ¶79. ¶30. What this Court did not do, though, is make any findings about what the schools or students had to allege, or what they had to prove in order to proceed in chancery court with a challenge to MHSAA’s eligibility decisions. No one raised the issue of whether Trail had stated a legally cognizable claim, and this Court therefore did not review Trail’s complaint or pass on its sufficiency. But that is the question we face today in this appeal. ¶31. As a final note, both dissents argue strenuously that HHS asserted a claim for breach of contract. But it is clear from the record that the parties did not proceed below as if a breach-of-contract claim had been pleaded. And nowhere in the chancellor’s sixty-sevenpage order does she analyze a breach-of-contract claim; in fact, the phrase “breach of 13 contract” is never used. Rather, the chancellor analyzed MHSAA’s actions to determine only if her decision was arbitrary and/or supported by substantial evidence (i.e., the agencyappeal standard), finding: It stands to reason that [if] decisions of school boards (which are administrative bodies) are subject to review, then the actions of the MHSAA should be subject to review and their decisions will not be disturbed “unless said decision appealed from was unsupported by substantial evidence; was arbitrary or capricious; was beyond the (association’s) scope of peers; or violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the aggrieved party . . . MHSAA offered plaintiffs no adequate administrative remedies to appeal its agency decisions. When no adequate administrative remedy is available, exhaustion is not required . . . The reviewing court is charged to study the record and the legislative facts to which the challenged order points and divine a rational basis upon which the administrator may have acted. ¶32. In sum, we reaffirm the sound principles espoused by this Court in In Re Bell. HHS’s complaint for injunctive relief was not “predicated upon some legal or equitable claim which will, at some point, proceed to the merits,” and it therefore was not within the Forrest County Chancery Court’s jurisdiction. In Re Bell, 962 So. 2d at 541. And none of this Court’s decisions cited by the dissents conflicts with our holding today.