Opinion ID: 4564881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Second Federal District Court Order

Text: The State asked the district court to reconsider its order, explaining that, contrary to the basis for the court’s grant of habeas relief, the Nevada Supreme Court actually had addressed Anderson’s double jeopardy claim on the merits, and rejected it. This did not sway the district court, but the court did attempt to shore up its factually flawed basis for habeas relief in an order denying reconsideration. In this second order, the district court concluded that the Nevada Supreme Court’s double jeopardy ruling applied United States Supreme Court precedent incorrectly, but in so arguing the district court incorrectly relied on language from a plurality decision it referred to as “the Court in Dixon.” The district court further acknowledged that “there is a possibility that the State would have been able to prove a different predicate offense [at trial] for the felony DUI charge against Anderson,” but because “there is also [a] probability that it would not have been able to do so[,] that is sufficient to undermine the outcome of Anderson’s criminal proceeding.” The court afforded no deference to Anderson’s counsel’s weighing of these possibilities, or Strickland’s admonition that petitioners claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that the likelihood of a ANDERSON V. NEVEN 19 different result is “substantial.” Rather, the court concluded that the “reasonable probability” that Anderson might have prevailed at trial on a double jeopardy defense was enough to establish prejudice to Anderson under Strickland. The district court did not attempt to connect its new analysis to the actual arguments in Anderson’s federal habeas petition, and “decline[ed] to reconsider [its] prior ruling.”