Opinion ID: 1175478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: propriety of excluding juror for opposition to death penalty

Text: (8) Defendant contends that the exclusion for cause of prospective juror Blaisdell was prejudicially erroneous because her opposition to the death penalty was not made sufficiently clear. Under the applicable standard, such exclusion may be based on the juror's views [which] would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath,' and it is not necessary that the juror's bias be proved with `unmistakable clarity.' ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 852, 105 S.Ct. 844] [quoting from Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45 (65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589, 100 S.Ct. 2521)]; accord: People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 767.) The trial judge asked Mrs. Blaisdell whether, because of conscientious opposition to the death penalty, she would automatically vote for something other than first degree murder at the guilt phase in order to end the death penalty question once and for all. She first answered, I'm afraid I would vote against the death penalty. The judge then reworded the question twice. Her answers were, respectively, I'm afraid I would and Yes. I am, in my mind, would vote against murder in the first degree. In answer to defense counsel's questions, Mrs. Blaisdell stated that as to guilt, she would have to vote however I felt about the witnesses and the proof shown. But when the judge then rephrased his earlier question, whether she would vote against guilt of first degree murder regardless of the evidence in order to avoid the death penalty question, she replied: I'm afraid I would avoid the death penalty. I would vote so that I wouldn't have the death penalty on my mind. She continued to repeat this affirmative response in various forms. Finally, defense counsel asked whether at the penalty phase, she could set aside your own personal feelings and apply the law and consider the death penalty. She replied: ... If I voted for the death penalty, I would be voting for that, for death, and this would be something I โ I just wouldn't want to vote anyone โ regardless, I guess, of the evidence, I just wouldn't want to โ `Thou shalt not kill,' one of the Ten Commandments, comes to mind.... Although this voir dire arguably left open a possibility that Mrs. Blaisdell could set aside her feelings against the death penalty in determining guilt, it made clear that in any event she could not vote to impose the death penalty. She was properly disqualified because her views would have prevented or substantially impaired the performance of her duties as a juror. ( Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-852]; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 767.)