Opinion ID: 399272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: fournelle's participation in unprotected activity

Text: 18 The first question presented is whether Fournelle was properly subject to any discipline for his actions at the union hall. Fournelle contends that he was immune to discipline because his actions were protected by section 7 of the NLRA; 7 Bethlehem and the NLRB respond that the collective bargaining agreement effectively waived any section 7 rights that Fournelle might otherwise have had. 19 Section 7 of the Act grants to employees the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 8 An employee's section 7 rights to engage in concerted activities, however, are neither unqualified nor absolute. 9 Additionally, and more important for present purposes, certain rights granted by section 7 may be waived pursuant to collective bargaining. 20 In the United States, it is commonplace for unions and employers to enter collective bargaining agreements that waive the rights of employees to engage in strikes during the contract term. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2006, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280, 76 S.Ct. 349, 356, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344, 59 S.Ct. 508, 514, 83 L.Ed. 682 (1939). Thus, even though, in the absence of an explicit or implied 10 no-strike promise, economic strikers may be protected from employer discipline, including discharge, 11 an employer may so discipline employees who engage in strikes in breach of contract. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., supra; Silbaugh v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 761 (D.C.Cir.1970). 21 The policies compelling the Board and courts to honor such contractual waivers are fundamental ones under the NLRA. As the Supreme Court stated in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, supra, such waivers enable the parties to substitute peaceful means of dispute resolution-grievance procedures and arbitration-in place of economic warfare. Provided the selection of the bargaining representative remains free, such waivers contribute to the normal flow of commerce and to the maintenance of regular production schedules. 350 U.S. at 280 (emphasis deleted). It has long been understood and accepted practice under the NLRA that a union may ... bargain away (the employee's) right to strike during the contract term, and his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180, 87 S.Ct. at 2006 (footnote omitted). One of the principal reasons for this development in the law was stated by the Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970): As labor organizations grew in strength and developed toward maturity, congressional emphasis shifted from protection of the nascent labor movement to encouragement of collective bargaining and to administrative techniques for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes. Id. at 251, 90 S.Ct. at 1592. It is thus commonplace for the Board and the courts to recognize and enforce contractual strike proscriptions. 22 Fournelle does not dispute that the collective bargaining agreement between his union and Bethlehem effectively waived the rights of the other employees to engage in the July 28 strike. Fournelle Br. at 4 & n.4. Rather, he argues that, because he had left work on July 28 for reasons unconnected with the strike, and because he was forbidden by a company work rule from returning to work once he had left for the day, 12 he cannot be found to have participated in the strike. 23 Although novel, Fournelle's argument has little merit. It is clear that the agreement in this case sought to forbid explicitly a wide range of employees' strike-related activity, i.e., other than the simple withholding of labor. Article XVIII of the agreement explicitly states that during the term of the agreement neither the Union nor any Employee shall instigate, encourage, sanction, or take part in any strike, sit-down, slowdown or other stoppage, limitation or curtailment of work or production, or take part in any picketing, boycotting or other interference with or demonstration against any Yard or its business or operations, either in such Yard or elsewhere.... The Company may terminate the employment of or otherwise discipline any Employee who willfully violates any of the provisions of this Agreement in any material respect. J.A. at 26-27 (emphasis added). It is thus plain that Fournelle's conduct on July 28 was prohibited by the contract. He voluntarily traveled to join the strikers at the union hall. ALJ at 985. When he arrived there, he made a motion and then voted to allow the television crew to remain in the hall, presumably so as to publicize the strikers' grievances. Id. His statements in the television interview indicated his strong support of the strikers' goals. In other words, he encouraged and sanctioned the strike, as specifically forbidden by the contract. 13 24 As an alternative position, Fournelle argues that the Board and the ALJ did not specifically rely on the language of the contract precluding employees from sanctioning or encouraging a strike and, therefore, this court cannot sustain the Board's decision on that basis. Fournelle Rep. Br. at 3 n.3. This argument fails in its initial premise: the ALJ's decision, affirmed by the Board, stated that Fournelle by his conduct at the Union hall in supporting the unprotected strike became a participant therein in violation of the contractual no-strike provision. ALJ at 986. The ALJ clearly had in mind the contractual language at issue, although he buttressed his conclusion with other, arguably inapposite, authority. 14 To require a greater clarity in the ALJ's reasoning would be a meaningless formalism: as the Supreme Court said in another context, (s)ubstantive rights and duties in the field of labor-management do not depend on verbal ritual reminiscent of medieval real property law. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75, 73 S.Ct. 519, 522, 97 L.Ed. 832 (1953). 25 Even though the contract explicitly forbade Fournelle's conduct, we must consider one further argument. Fournelle argues that the contractual provision prohibiting employees from sanctioning or encouraging strikes, if applied to justify his suspension, would constitute an impermissible waiver of his section 7 right to comment freely about the strike and the grievances underlying it. This right to comment, Fournelle contends, cannot be waived in collective bargaining. 26 It is true that the Supreme Court has held that some of the rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Act cannot be waived by collective bargaining. In NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 94 S.Ct. 1099, 39 L.Ed.2d 358 (1974), the Court considered an employer's rule forbidding employees to disseminate literature regarding union elections in nonworking areas of the plant during nonworking time. The Court held that this rule, otherwise invalid, could not be rendered valid by a provision in the collective bargaining agreement that purported to give the employer the power to restrict such dissemination. The Court, citing Mastro Plastics, recognized that section 7 rights in the economic area could be waived through collective bargaining, but held that a different rule should obtain where the rights of the employees to exercise their choice of a bargaining representative is involved-whether to have no bargaining representative, or to retain the present one, or to obtain a new one. 415 U.S. at 325, 94 S.Ct. at 1102. The Court noted that it had anticipated such a distinction in Mastro Plastics when it stated that waivers in the economic area rest on 'the premise of fair representation' and presuppose that the selection of the bargaining representative 'remains free.'  415 U.S. at 325, 94 S.Ct. at 1102 (citing Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S. at 280, 76 S.Ct. at 356). 27 Because the Board properly found that Fournelle did more than just comment on the strike, and because the strike waiver as applied here clearly does not pertain to activity of the sort found to be protected in Magnavox, we can find no merit in this last argument raised by Fournelle. The same policies that support a simple waiver of the right to engage in economic strikes likewise support a waiver of the right to sanction and encourage contractually forbidden strikes. A strike is more than the mere withholding of labor. It may gain impetus, direction and duration as a result of the conduct of employees who, though not contractually obligated to be at work during the strike, nonetheless lend their voices and their presence to strike activity. A contract provision that permits discipline of employees who sanction and encourage strikes, as well as of those who withhold their labor, may thus significantly reduce the frequency and duration of disruptive strikes. Simple waivers of the right to strike are favored because they enable the parties to substitute peaceful conciliation for economic warfare, and thus contribute to the normal flow of commerce and to the maintenance of regular production schedules. Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S. at 280, 76 S.Ct. at 356. Because the same is true of waivers of the right to sanction or encourage strikes, we hold that such waivers are permissible under the NLRA. Fournelle's conduct at the union hall was therefore unprotected and, according to the contract, he could be punished for sanctioning and encouraging the strike. 28