Opinion ID: 853287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Withdrawing a Guilty Plea

Text: Brightman first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his plea. He says his plea was involuntary [1] and his counsel was ineffective. In response, the State argues that Brightman cannot challenge the voluntariness of his plea because he pled guilty. We first address the State's claim that Brightman is barred from presenting this issue on direct appeal under Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind.1996). In Tumulty, we held that once judgment is entered, a defendant may not subsequently challenge his guilty plea on direct appeal. Id. at 395-96. The correct avenue for such claims is post-conviction relief. Id. at 396. The present case differs from Tumulty in a significant way. Brightman sought to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. In response, the trial court heard evidence on the motion, reviewed the claim, and rejected it. Indiana Code § 35-35-1-4(b) governs motions to withdraw guilty pleas. After a defendant pleads guilty but before a sentence is imposed, a defendant may motion to withdraw a plea of guilty. Id. The court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if necessary to correct a manifest injustice. [2] Id. By contrast, the court must deny the motion if withdrawal of the plea would substantially prejudice[ ] the State. [3] Id. In all other cases, the court may grant the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea for any fair and just reason. Id. A trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea arrives in this Court with a presumption in favor of the ruling. Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind.1995). We will reverse the trial court only for an abuse of discretion. Id. In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we examine the statements made by the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide whether his plea was offered freely and knowingly. Id. Voluntariness of the Plea. Judge Gary Miller began the plea hearing by questioning whether Brightman wanted to plead guilty, as his lawyer had indicated. Brightman responded affirmatively. The judge then explained that he was going to ask Brightman several questions about the plea agreement and his rights. The judge said, If you don't understand the questions I ask, please stop me and we will go over them; okay? R. at 224. Brightman again answered positively. Further dialogue between the court and Brightman revealed that Brightman understood that he did not have to plead guilty to any of the State's charges and had enough time to speak to a lawyer. ( Id. ) When questioned, Brightman explained that he had a ninth grade education, is able to read, but does not comprehend everything. [4] (R. at 225.) The judge then confirmed with Brightman's attorney that he had read the charges to his client. ( Id. ) Judge Miller next read both murder counts contained in Brightman's plea agreement. ( Id. ) Brightman asserted that he thought the first murder count charged felony murder and not the regular murder. (R. at 226.) Judge Miller clarified that the first count does charge felony murder and explained, Felony murder occurs when during the commission of a felony someone is killed. ( Id. ) And that's the description of that charge; do you understand that charge? ( Id. ) After conferring with his attorney, Brightman said he understood. ( Id. ) Before discussing the possible penalty for each of the murder counts, the judge again asked Brightman if he understood his charges. (R. at 227.) Brightman responded, Yes, sir. ( Id. ) The judge also explained that a guilty plea waives certain rights including his constitutional rights to a public and speedy trial by jury and to personally confront and cross-examine witnesses presented against him. (R. at 228-29.) The judge then asked Brightman, And, finally do you understand by pleading guilty to these two (2) charges you are admitting you've committed the crimes of murder ... that I read to you a couple of minutes ago? (R. at 229.) Brightman answered, Yes, sir. ( Id. ) Judge Miller next reviewed Brightman's plea agreement, which Brightman previously discussed with his attorney and his mother. He questioned whether Brightman had read the entire agreement before signing it. Brightman replied, It was read to me. I read most of it just so I understood it. If I had questions during it I asked [Inman]. R. at 231. The following exchange also occurred: THE COURT: Do you believe your plea of guilty to these two (2) charges is being made freely and voluntarily? DEFENDANT: I don't understand the question, sir. THE COURT: Well, has anybody forced you or threatened you to get you to plead guilty? DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Did anybody promise you anything to get you to plead guilty other than what is contained in this written plea agreement? DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Are you doing this on your own free will? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the services of Mr. Inman in this case? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Can you think of anything that he hasn't done for you that you think he should have done? DEFENDANT: Gag order but that's nothing. (R. at 232-33.) After the prosecutor read the factual basis for the plea, (R. at 233-37), the judge asked Brightman whether he heard what the prosecutor had said and whether the facts were substantially correct. (R. at 237.) Brightman answered each question by saying, Yes, sir. ( Id. ) Brightman also confirmed that he still wish[ed] to plead guilty to both murder counts. (R. at 238.) The trial court accepted his guilty plea. About seven months later Brightman moved to withdraw the plea. [5] These hearing statements adequately demonstrate that Brightman voluntarily and knowingly pled guilty. Before denying Brightman's withdrawal motion, Judge Miller considered Brightman's statements from the guilty plea hearing as well as his assertions at the hearing on his request to withdraw. The judge explained: I have had the opportunity to observe Mr. Brightman give a number of statements, the television interviews, the interviews with the Sheriff ... I saw his testimony in the Sean Rich trial. I heard him discuss his involvement at the guilty plea. I've also seen the deposition given afterwards in which he denies his involvement, as well as his testimony at [this] hearing. I find that ... his testimony in the matters before us today... is not credible.... (R. at 354-55.) Having reviewed these same materials, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brightman's request to withdraw his guilty plea. Effective Assistance of Counsel. Brightman also contends his lawyer was ineffective within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Brightman claims his lawyer would not render assistance because he believed Brightman was guilty, forced him to lie, and failed to adequately communicate with him throughout the course of representation. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 154 (Ind.1999). Deficient performance is performance that falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Prejudice exists when a defendant shows there is a reasonable probability [i.e., probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome] that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Counsel is presumed competent, and whether a lawyer performed reasonably under the circumstances is determined by examining the whole of the lawyer's work on a case. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A defendant must offer strong and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that counsel prepared and executed an effective defense. Burris v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Ind.1990), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 922, 116 S.Ct. 319, 133 L.Ed.2d 221 (1995). Brightman first asserts that his counsel would not render him assistance because his counsel believed Brightman was guilty. [6] The record reveals that after Brightman made several incriminating statements, his attorney sought to suppress them. After a suppression hearing, the court denied the motion, and Brightman's attorney prepared for trial. The record further reveals that Brightman's attorney participated in numerous pre-trial hearings, participated in voir dire, used several peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors, offered an opening statement at trial, and participated in five days of trial. Only after the State presented its evidence including the admission of the three taped confessions to television stations, numerous taped statements to the police, and the deposition of Brightman's girlfriend who stated he admitted to the crimesdid Brightman withdraw his not guilty plea and enter into a plea agreement with the State. Brightman has not presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that counsel performed competently. Brightman next claims that his counsel forced him to lie. [7] In a hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Brightman asserted he was innocent and claimed his counsel told his mother, He's going to have to take the plea bargain or he's going to get the rest of his life in prison. I'm not going to do anything for him. Brightman's attorney was appointed on January 29, 1998, and the two met for the first time on February 10, 1998. Before the appointment, Brightman had given three taped confessions to the police, and three videotaped confessions to local television reporters. Judge Miller was warranted in concluding that Brightman's attorney did not prompt Brightman to lie before ever meeting him. Looking at the whole of counsel's performance, Brightman's lawyer had to confront the fact that his client had given over eight hours of inculpatory interviews on videotape, that Brightman had confessed to the murders during interviews to three television stations, and that the State had sixty witnesses on its list for trial. In the face of this significant evidence, Brightman's counsel negotiated an agreement that called for a plea to two of twelve felony charges, dismissal of the rest, and a sixty-five year concurrent sentence for the heinous murders of a minister and his wife. We find the previously quoted remarks of Judge Miller, (R. at 354-55), in ruling on Brightman's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, very relevant. Judge Miller made clear that he found Brightman's repeated admissions of guilt credible and his later assertion of innocence incredible. With regard to Brightman's counsel's performance, he went on to say: Mr. Inman's representation was way above the minimum that our Supreme Court, both at the state and federal levels, require for meeting the constitutional definition of effective legal assistance of counsel. (R. at 355-56.) Brightman has not persuaded us that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, he cannot succeed on his claim that he received constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel.