Opinion ID: 1841473
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Federal Regulation

Text: The federal regulation is similar but not identical. It provides, in 49 C.F.R. § 392.21, that No motor vehicle shall be stopped, parked, or left standing, whether attended or unattended, upon the traveled portion of any highway outside of a business or residential district, when it is practicable to stop, park, or leave such vehicle off the traveled portion of the highway. Here as elsewhere in this opinion we must keep in mind the clearly stated federal policy: the Federal Highway Administration's regulations in no way displace state law unless they impose a higher standard of care than that law. 49 C.F.R. § 392.2. Otherwise federal regulations require that Every motor vehicle must be operated in accordance with the laws, ordinances and regulations of the jurisdiction in which it is being operated. 49 C.F.R. § 392.2. The question before us is whether § 392.21 of the federal regulations imposes a higher standard of care than Mississippi's § 63-3-903. We have carefully studied and compared the two. Though slightly different wording is employed, we regard that they impose a legally identical standard of care upon Freeman/Long. Federal Regulation § 392.21, like Mississippi's § 63-3-903, applies only outside a business or residential district. Indeed, the first sentence of federal § 392.21 is virtually identical to the first sentence of state § 63-3-903(1). The federal regulation uses the word practicable in place of the state statute's practical. The sixth definition of practical, in Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1780 (1971), is practicable. Though there are differences between the two words, the draftsmen of statutes and regulations can hardly be held to know them, nor judges to pay them any mind, when the meaning intended in one instance is so obviously the same as in the other. Predicating Appellant Administratrix' claim that Long was negligent in failing to pull off the road upon 49 C.F.R. § 392.21 adds nothing to the claim already asserted based on § 63-3-903(1). Technically, of course, she was entitled to have that claim submitted to the jury. See Whitfield Tank Lines v. Navajo Freight Lines, 90 N.M. App. 454, 458, 564 P.2d 1336, 1340 (1977) (party entitled to instruction on a theory of violation of federal highway safety regulations if pled and supported by evidence). As a practical matter, artfully drafted jury instructions covering the state § 63-3-903(1) claim would be sufficient to cover the claim based on the federal regulations. [9] Having held that a jury question was presented under state § 63-3-903(1), we hold likewise under the federal regulation. Appellant Administratrix was not entitled to a peremptory instruction on the breach of duty issue here.