Opinion ID: 181046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The plausibility of Santiago's claims

Text: A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Other than the conclusory allegations just discussed, the remaining allegations regarding the Supervising Officers are as follows: Chief Michael Murphy is Police Chief of Warminster Township Police Department. Chief Murphy is a founding member and director of the CBSRT. Although Chief Murphy was not present at the scene on May 13, 2006, he ordered and approved the plan to execute the arrest warrants.... Christopher Springfield was a police officer with Warminster Township Police Department. On May 13, 2006, he held the rank of Lieutenant and was in placed in [sic] charge of the surround and call out operation by Chief Murphy. Lt. Springfield was responsible for all assets including the CBSRT and Warminster Township Police Officers.... Lt. James Donnelly is an officer with the Warminster Township Police Department. On May 13, 2006, he was also the Tactical Team Leader of CBSRT. Chief Murphy ordered Lt. Donnelly to plan and help execute an early morning surround and call out operation.... As Tactical Team Leader of CBSRT, Lt. Donnelly was responsible for the actions of Alpha Team.... (Third Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 21-23.) For purposes of analyzing the motions to dismiss, we take those factual allegations as true and also accept as accurate the factual allegations regarding Alpha Team's execution of the operation. In summary, the allegations against Alpha Team are that the officers ordered everyone to exit the house one at a time; that Santiago exited first under threat of fire; that Santiago was patted down in a demeaning fashion, found to be unarmed, and subsequently handcuffed; that the remaining occupants of the home then exited, some of whom were handcuffed while others were not; that Santiago's daughter was coerced into consenting to a search of the home; and that Santiago was left restrained for thirty minutes while her home was searched, during which time she had a heart attack. The question then becomes whether those allegations make it plausible that Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly directed Alpha Team to conduct the operation in a manner that they knew or should reasonably have known would cause [Alpha Team] to deprive [Santiago] of her constitutional rights, Conner, 847 F.2d at 397, or that Lt. Springfield had knowledge [that Alpha Team was using excessive force during the raid] and acquiesced in [Alpha Team's] violations. A.M., 372 F.3d at 586. (1) The plausibility of the claims against Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly First, with respect to Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly, we consider whether the fact that they planned the operation coupled with the fact that the operation resulted in excessive force against Santiago makes it plausible that the plan called for the use of excessive force. We conclude that it does not. Santiago has only alleged that excessive force was used against her. The complaint does not allege that any other occupant was threatened with fire. It specifically states that the other women were not handcuffed. It does allege that the two grandsons were handcuffed, but one of them was the subject of the arrest warrant and there are no allegations stating whether the other was found to be armed or a risk of flight. Consequently, there is no basis in the complaint to conclude that excessive force was used on anyone except Santiago. Even if someone else had been subjected to excessive force, it is clear that the occupants were not being treated uniformly. Thus, Santiago's allegations undercut the notion of a plan for all occupants to be threatened with fire and handcuffed. While it is possible that there was such a plan, and that Alpha Team simply chose not to follow it, possibility is no longer the touchstone for pleading sufficiency after Twombly and Iqbal. Plausibility is what matters. Allegations that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability or show the mere possibility of misconduct are not enough. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, given the disparate treatment of the occupants of the home, one plausible explanation is that the officers simply used their own discretion in determining how to treat each occupant. In contrast with that obvious alternative explanation for the allegedly excessive use of force, the inference that the force was planned is not plausible. Id. at 1951-52 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Where, as here, an operation results in the use of allegedly excessive force against only one of several people, that use of force does not, by itself, give rise to a plausible claim for supervisory liability against those who planned the operation. To hold otherwise would allow a plaintiff to pursue a supervisory liability claim anytime a planned operation resulted in excessive force, merely by describing the force used and appending the phrase and the Chief told them to do it. Iqbal requires more. (2) The plausibility of the claim against Lt. Springfield We next ask whether the allegation that Lt. Springfield was placed in charge of the operation, coupled with what happened during the operation, makes it plausible that Lt. Springfield knew of and acquiesced in the use of excessive force against Santiago. Again, we conclude that it does not. The complaint implies but does not allege that Lt. Springfield was present during the operation. Assuming he was present, however, the complaint still does not aver that he knew of the allegedly excessive force, nor does it give rise to the reasonable inference that he was aware of the level of force used against one individual. See McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 460 (3rd Cir.2009) (holding that a supervisor's presence in the vicinity of the arrest at some point after [plaintiff] was handcuffed... is not a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find knowledge and acquiescence). Consequently, the allegations are insufficient to nudge [Santiago's] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In sum, while Santiago's complaint contains sufficient allegations to show that the Supervising Officers planned and supervised the operation and that, during the operation, Alpha Team used arguably excessive force, her allegations do nothing more than assert the element of liability that the Supervising Officers specifically called for or acquiesced in that use of force. As a result, her allegations may get[] the complaint close to stating a claim, but without further factual enhancement [they] stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Because the Third Amended Complaint does not give rise to a plausible claim for relief against the Supervising Officers, the District Court did not err in dismissing the claims against them. [10]
We now turn to the dismissal of Santiago's claim against Warminster. The District Court dismissed that claim because Santiago had failed to allege that Chief Murphy was a final policymaker, which, under Monell, was necessary to the survival of her claim against the Township. Santiago offers two arguments for why the dismissal was improper. First, she argues that, while she may not have used the words final policymaker, the factual averments of the complaint are more than sufficient to show that Chief Murphy was the `final policymaker' with respect to the tactical decisions made here. (Appellant's Opening Brief at 23.) Second, she argues that the District Court applied the wrong standardconsidering whether Chief Murphy was a final policymaker as a factual question instead of a legal one, as required under Supreme Court precedent. Not only are those arguments inconsistent, they miss the point. The dispositive point is that, whether or not Chief Murphy is a final policymaker, Santiago has failed to plead facts showing that his plan caused her injury. Under Monell, for municipal liability to attach, any injury must be inflicted by execution of a government's policy or custom. 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Drawing all factual inferences in favor of Santiago, as is required at this juncture, we nevertheless cannot conclude that the Third Amended Complaint alleges municipal liability. The complaint does not allege that Chief Murphy had policymaking authority, [11] nor does it allege what action he took that could fairly be said to be policy. The allegation that Chief Murphy ordered a plan to execute arrest warrants does not imply the existence of an official policy in violation of Santiago's constitutional rights. See McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir.2009) (a claimant must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was); see also McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 685 (7th Cir.2004) ([T]he plaintiff must first allege that a defendant is a final policymaker. Only then can a court proceed to the next question of whether the single act or single decision of that defendant constituted municipal policy.) More to the point, though, we have already held that Santiago's pleadings fail to plausibly allege that Chief Murphy directed others to violate her rights. Thus, even if Chief Murphy were a final policy maker and his plan were deemed to be official Warminster policy, Santiago has failed to properly plead that the plan was the source of her injury. Therefore, she has not shown that her injury was inflicted by execution of [Warminster's] policy or custom, Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, and she has no claim against the Township.