Opinion ID: 440528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Sustain the Conviction of Appellant Tiedeberg

Text: 89 Appellant, Tiedeberg, contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C.A. Secs. 371 and 2314. We must sustain Tiedeberg's conviction if a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence presented at trial establishes Tiedeberg's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. Unit B. 1982) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 356, 103 S.Ct. 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 638 (1983). A conviction, however, must be reversed if a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir.1981). 90 In evaluating Tiedeberg's claim, we begin with the premise that to be convicted of an unlawful conspiracy, a defendant must have knowledge of the conspiracy and must intend to join, or associate himself with the objectives of, the conspiracy. United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 1508, 59 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). 91 The essential elements of a criminal conspiracy are knowledge, actual participation, and criminal intent. The government must prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Patterson v. United States, 432 U.S. 197, 204-16, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2324-2330, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). 92 With these observations in mind, we now consider whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence presented at trial established Tiedeberg's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Bell, 678 F.2d at 549. We first consider whether Tiedeberg had knowledge of the conspiracy. In so doing, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the government. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).
93 The evidence reveals that on August 4, 1982, pursuant to prior arrangements, Shapiro and Tiedeberg went to the hotel room of Agent McShane. Agent McShane invited them inside. Tiedeberg then frisked Agent McShane and searched his room. Shapiro told Tiedeberg to remain in the room. Shapiro left the room and returned shortly carrying a bag which contained the paintings in question. 94 Shapiro gave the paintings to Agent McShane, and McShane began to examine them. During most of the examination, Sarro, Tiedeberg, and Shapiro were standing next to McShane. At one point, Agent McShane took the paintings into the bathroom so that he could more closely examine them. Tiedeberg accompanied him into the bathroom. While in the bathroom, McShane asked Tiedeberg if they would be talking price, and Tiedeberg shrugged his shoulders. 95 At the end of the examination, Agent McShane reentered the hotel room and told Shapiro, Sarro, and Tiedeberg that the paintings looked very good and that they could be Rubens. McShane asked if the paintings were hot paintings and Shapiro stated that they were out for two years. Tiedeberg, although present, did not participate in this conversation. 96 Agent McShane told the men that the paintings would have to be taken to New Jersey and eventually would be going to a customer in Central America. Shapiro reminded McShane that he could have the paintings as soon as he brought them the money. Tiedeberg remained in the room during this entire conversation. 97 After reviewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the government, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed and that Tiedeberg knew of the conspiracy. 98
99 Next, we must determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Tiedeberg intended to join or associate himself with the conspiracy's objectives. United States v. Willis, 646 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d at 1381. 100 The evidence presented at trial established that although numerous telephone calls and meetings were held between agents and various appellants from July 28, 1982, through August 3, 1982, Tiedeberg did not participate in those conversations or meetings, nor was his name mentioned. 101 McShane testified that appellant, James Tortoriello, told him that Tiedeberg was his bodyguard, that he weighed 330 pounds, and that he had a black belt in karate. The agents first saw Tiedeberg on August 4, 1982, when Tiedeberg appeared with Shapiro at Agent McShane's hotel room. At that time, Tiedeberg frisked McShane and searched his hotel room. While in the bathroom examining the paintings, McShane asked Tiedeberg if they would be talking price, and Tiedeberg shrugged his shoulders. 102 At trial, McShane described Tiedeberg's conversation as consisting of uh-huh, and ah-hah, and aw-haw, and yep, with the single exception of a request that McShane remove his shirt. It is clear that Tiedeberg did not indicate an intent to join the conspiracy, but rather served as a guard for the paintings at all material times.
103 It is well established that close association with a co-conspirator or mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient evidence of knowing participation in a conspiracy. United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir.1983). Thus, Tiedeberg's close association with appellant, Tortoriello, and his presence in the hotel room is insufficient evidence of knowing participation in a conspiracy. 104 Furthermore, we have consistently and strongly emphasized that presence followed by flight is inadequate proof of actual and knowing participation in a conspiracy. United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 492 F.2d 109, 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1052, 95 S.Ct. 630, 42 L.Ed.2d 647 (1974). It is, therefore, clear that evidence of Tiedeberg's presence in the hotel room, shrug of his shoulders, uh-huh, uh-hah, aw-haw, yep conversation, frisk of Agent McShane, search of the hotel room, and flight after hearing a large bang on the hotel room door, is not sufficient to sustain Tiedeberg's conspiracy conviction. 105 After evaluating this evidence in a light most favorable to the government, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Tiedeberg intended to join, or associate himself with the objectives of, the conspiracy. 106 We, therefore, hold that the government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tiedeberg had the requisite criminal intent to commit the offense charged. In the absence of substantial evidence to connect Tiedeberg with the illegal agreement, and in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense charged, we reverse Tiedeberg's conviction. Tiedeberg may be guilty of some offense, but not conspiracy to transport stolen paintings interstate.