Opinion ID: 1114117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claims Against Thaxton and Hy-Tech

Text: In arguing that the circuit court erred in entering the summary judgment in favor of Thaxton and Hy-Tech as to her AEMLD claim, Vernda Hicks contends first that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the pipe stopper was defective within the terms of the AEMLD. In order to establish liability under the AEMLD, a plaintiff must show the following: (1) he suffered injury or damages to himself or his property by one who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff as the ultimate user or consumer, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. Kelly v. M. Trigg Enterprises, Inc., 605 So.2d 1185, 1191 (Ala.1992) (quoting earlier cases); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford, 406 So.2d 854, 855 (Ala.1981). Liability under the AEMLD turns upon whether a product is unreasonably dangerous when put to its intended use. Koehring Cranes & Excavators, Inc. v. Livingston, 597 So.2d 1354 (Ala. 1992); Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So.2d 128, 133 (Ala.1976). This Court has further stated: `The manufacturer of a product which may be reasonably anticipated to be dangerous if used in a way which he should reasonably foresee it would be used is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to give reasonable and adequate warnings of any dangers known to him, or which in the exercise of reasonable care he should have known and which the user of the product obviously could not discover. Reasonable care means that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same circumstances.' Bean v. BIC Corp., 597 So.2d 1350, 1353 (Ala.1992) (quoting Dunn v. Wixom Brothers, 493 So.2d 1356, 1360 (Ala.1986) (quoting Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil), 32.07, and stating that A.P.J.I. 32.07 was a correct statement of the law)). In opposition to the summary judgment motion filed by Thaxton, Vernda Hicks submitted the deposition testimony of Fred A. Lewter III and J. Albert McEarchern, Jr., two engineering experts, regarding the Thaxton pipe stopper, its jaws, and the instructions and warnings that accompanied the product. After conducting numerous hydrostatic tests using the pipe stopper and jaws that had failed and led to the death of John Hicks, and other pipe stoppers manufactured by Thaxton, Lewter and McEarchern concluded generally that, although this fact is not readily discernible, the jaws from different sets were not uniform in size; that the jaws were easily detachable from the pipe stopper; that the jaws from different sets were interchangeable; that a pipe stopper with jaws from different sets does not function properly and has a strong propensity to dislodge during a hydrostatic test; that the jaws of the pipe stopper recovered after the accident were mismatched; and that the mismatching of the jaws in the pipe stopper was a cause contributing to the accident. On the basis of these findings, the experts concluded that the pipe stopper was unreasonably dangerous. For example, McEarchern stated: [The mismatching of the jaws] was a factor in what caused this plug to come out.... . . . . ... [T]here is a serious potential for mismatching even if you keep the `E's' and `X's' together. So, there is a definite defect here in the concept of this design in the fact that it is very easy to mix up or confuse these. And nowhere in the instructions does it tell you not to. . . . . ... [I]f you had a tool box full of these, I mean these inevitably come apart when you throw them in a box. I mean, it's very easy for this o-ring to come off and I won't do it here or I will end up with them all over the floor. But, it is very easy when you throw these in a tool box for these to become a pile of parts. . . . . ... [I]t is very easy to mismatch them. . . . . Unless you are warned not to. Lewter and McEarchern concluded that Thaxton should clearly and conspicuously mark the jaws so that they would not be easily mismatched and concluded that the instructions accompanying the pipe stopper should be amended to warn against mismatching. Lewter and McEarchern also concluded that the pipe stopper was unreasonably dangerous because its design did not include a gag or safety chain to prevent it from flying loose if it dislodged. Thaxton marketing literature states that gags should be used as an additional safety precaution in certain types of pressure testing; however, this literature did not list hydrostatic testing as one of the types in which a gag should be used. Lewter concluded that a gag or safety chain should be attached to the plugs during all types of pressure tests, including hydrostatic tests. Thaxton argues that the evidence presented does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the pipe stopper was sold in a defective condition. Relying on Onderdonk's deposition testimony that he properly attached the pipe stopper and did not mismatch the jaws on the pipe stopper before the accident, Thaxton argues, in effect, that the tests conducted by the plaintiff's experts, in which the pipe stopper with the mismatched jaws became dislodged, are not probative or material because, when conducting these tests, the plaintiff's experts did not tighten the hex nut, which attached the pipe stopper to the vessel, with sufficient torque. In their deposition testimony, however, both of the plaintiff's experts concluded that, contrary to the opinion of Thaxton employees, torque applied to the hex nut did not significantly affect the ability of the pipe stopper to hold in place under pressure. Further, the conflict between Onderdonk's testimony that he did not mismatch the jaws in the pipe stopper that later became dislodged and killed John Hicks, and Lewter and McEarchern's testimony that the jaws recovered from the scene of the accident were mismatched simply creates another genuine issue of fact for the jury. Relying on the operating instructions that accompanied the pipe stopper when it was sold, Thaxton contends that it provided an adequate warning of the risk of harm to which John Hicks was exposed. The relevant part of the operating instructions states: BEFORE USE, A SPECIAL WORD OF CAUTIONThaxton, Inc., engineers and manufactures a superior testing product, but pressure testing is generally recognized as an inherently hazardous operation, hence general safety precautions should be observed: check rating and overall condition of all connections, flanges, valves, and other testing equipment against planned testing pressure. Vent all air if hydrostatic testing and provide a remote or automatic pressure control away from the test assembly. Do not stand in front of test plug or other enclosure while the test is in progress.  (Emphasis added.) Because Taylor-Wharton received this warning and because, Thaxton says, a manufacturer may rely on an employer to convey such warnings and instructions to its employees who use the product, Thaxton contends that even if the pipe stopper was defective, as the plaintiff alleged, John Hicks was adequately warned of the danger that led to his death, specifically the danger posed by standing in front of the plug during a test. Without commenting on the merit of Thaxton's argument that a warning given to an employer is somehow deemed, as a matter of law, to have been given to its employees who use the product, we hold that the testimony presented by the plaintiff's experts at least creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding the adequacy of the warning in the instructions accompanying the pipe stopper manufactured by Thaxton. Whether the provision of the operating instructions warning users not to stand in front of the pipe stopper during a test adequately apprises users of the risk of injury and death presented by the mismatching of the jaws of a pipe stopper is a question of fact for the jury. Citing Ford Motor Co. v. Rodgers, 337 So.2d 736 (Ala.1976), Thaxton also argues that it had no duty to warn because, it says, the danger that a pipe stopper could become dislodged during a hydrostatic test was common knowledge among the employees of Taylor-Wharton. Thus, Thaxton contends, the presence of the warnings recommended by the plaintiff's experts would not have supplied the users of the pipe stopper with any information that the management and employees of Taylor-Wharton did not already have. Although the testimony of the Taylor-Wharton employees raises an inference that the danger posed by a pipe stopper's slipping loose was commonly known, that evidence does not create an undisputed inference that users of the pipe stopper knew that mismatching the jaws of the pipe stopper would greatly increase the propensity of the pipe stopper to dislodge during a hydrostatic test. With regard to the issue of defectiveness, Thaxton argues, last, that the pipe stopper is unavoidably unsafe and that Vernda Hicks failed to show how Thaxton could have designed the pipe stopper differently so as to avoid the risk of its failure. This argument, however, ignores the considerable and specific testimony of the plaintiff's experts regarding changes in design that would have eliminated or greatly reduced not only of the risk of failure but also, more importantly, the risk of injury and death. We conclude that Vernda Hicks presented substantial evidence from which an impartial trier of fact could reasonably infer that the pipe stopper, as manufactured and sold by Thaxton, was defective within the terms of the AEMLD. Vernda Hicks argues also that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the condition of the plug used in the hydrostatic test had been substantially altered. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Harris, 630 So.2d 1018, 1027 (Ala.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2135, 128 L.Ed.2d 865 (1994), the Court stated the following applicable legal principles: An essential element of an AEMLD claim is proof that the product reached the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. Clarke Indus., Inc. v. Home Indemn. Co., 591 So.2d 458, 462 (Ala.1991); see also Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford, 406 So.2d 854 (Ala.1981). However, the mere fact that a product has been altered or modified does not necessarily relieve the manufacturer or seller of liability. Johnson v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 555 So.2d 88, 91 (Ala.1989). A manufacturer or seller remains liable if the alteration or modification did not in fact cause the injury, Johnson, 555 So.2d at 91 (quoting Industrial Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co., 475 So.2d 472, 476 (Ala. 1985)); Bullen v. Roto Finishing Systems, 435 So.2d 1256 (Ala.1983); Brown v. Terry, 375 So.2d 457 (Ala.1979), or if the alteration or modification was reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer or seller, Clarke Indus., 591 So.2d at 462; Beloit Corp. v. Harrell, 339 So.2d 992 (Ala.1976). Thaxton contends that Vernda Hicks did not present sufficient evidence that it sold the pipe stopper with mismatched jaws and that if the pipe stopper that dislodged and killed John Hicks had mismatched jaws, it did so because an employee of Taylor-Wharton had mismatched them. Any such mismatching of the jaws of the pipe stopper, Thaxton argues, constituted a substantial alteration of its product, and that alteration, it says, was not reasonably foreseeable. No evidence shows that Thaxton sold the pipe stopper to Taylor-Wharton with mismatched jaws. Circumstantial evidence tends to show that the jaws were mismatched at the manufacturing facility of Taylor-Wharton. Although the mismatching of the jaws of the pipe stopper is undisputedly a substantial alteration of the product, a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether that substantial alteration was reasonably foreseeable to Thaxton. Vernda Hicks presented substantial evidence from which an impartial trier of fact could reasonably infer that Thaxton could have reasonably foreseen that the jaws of the pipe stopper could easily be mismatched during the productive life of the product. Thaxton markets o-ring kits for the purpose of replacing the pipe stopper's o-ring and neoprene seal when they deteriorate or wear out. Vernda Hicks also produced testimony from George Piel, vice president of Thaxton, who stated: Q.... You all advertise the sale of a neoprene seal after the heavy parts of the product reach the user, do you not? [Piel]: We sell seal kits, yes, sir. Q. Seal kits. And you also advertised the o-ring? [Piel]: Yes, sir. That is part of the seal kit. Q. Once the o-ring is destroyed or used up for its life expectancy and once the neoprene seal is used up for its life expectancy, is there anything to hold those jaws next to the mandrel so they are not mismatched? [Piel]: No, sir. We hold that Vernda Hicks presented substantial evidence from which an impartial trier of fact could reasonably infer that the alleged substantial alteration, i.e., the mismatching of the jaws, was reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer Thaxton. Finally, Vernda Hicks argues that the circuit court erred in entering the summary judgment in favor of Thaxton and Hy-Tech on the ground that John Hicks misused the pipe stopper, was contributorily negligent, and assumed the risk of injuryall, as a matter of law. `When asserting misuse as a defense under [the] AEMLD, the defendant must establish that the plaintiff used the product in some manner different from that intended by the manufacturer. Stated differently, the plaintiff's misuse of the product must not have been `reasonably foreseeable by the seller or manufacturer.' Kelly v. M. Trigg Enterprises, Inc., 605 So.2d 1185, 1192 (Ala.1992) (quoting Edward C. Martin, Alabama's Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD), 13 Am.J.Trial Advoc. 983, 1040 (1990)), quoted in Sears, Roebuck & Co., 630 So.2d at 1028. These principles apply to the use of the product by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's decedent as they do to the use of the product by third parties. Kelly, 605 So.2d at 1192. Ordinarily, whether someone misused an allegedly defective product is a factual issue for the jury. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 630 So.2d at 1028; Kelly, 605 So.2d at 1192; Banner Welders, Inc. v. Knighton, 425 So.2d 441, 448 (Ala.1982); Beloit Corp. v. Harrell, 339 So.2d 992, 997 (Ala.1976). Thaxton contends that the pipe stopper was misused either by one or more employees of Taylor-Wharton, who altered the pipe stopper by mismatching its jaws, or by John Hicks, who failed to examine the adequacy of the pipe stopper before the test commenced. We hold, however, that there are genuine issues of fact for the jury as to Thaxton's affirmative defense of product misuse. First, there are the issues whether John Hicks or any other employee of Taylor-Wharton misused the pipe stopper by mismatching its jaws and by not inspecting it properly before beginning the test. Second, if a jury finds that another employee of Taylor-Wharton, or John Hicks himself, misused the pipe stopper, then there arises the issue whether these alleged misuses of the product were reasonably foreseeable to Thaxton. Thaxton has simply not conclusively shown that the pipe stopper, if it was not being used properly, was being used in a way that was not reasonably foreseeable. Vernda Hicks argues also that the evidence fails to show that John Hicks was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. She argues first that contributory negligence is no longer an affirmative defense under the AEMLD after Dennis v. American Honda Motor Co., 585 So.2d 1336 (Ala.1991). However, this Court has decided in General Motors, Inc. v. Saint, 646 So.2d 564 (Ala.1994), and in Campbell v. Cutler Hammer, Inc., 646 So.2d 573 (Ala.1994), that contributory negligence remains an affirmative defense under the AEMLD. The standard for determining whether a person was contributorily negligent as a matter of law has been stated as follows: In order to sustain a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law, there must be a finding that the plaintiff put himself in danger's way, Mackintosh Co. v. Wells, 218 Ala. 260, 118 So. 276 (1928), and a finding that the plaintiff appreciated the danger confronted, Wilson v. Alabama Power Co., 495 So.2d 48 (Ala.1986); Marquis v. Marquis, 480 So.2d 1213 (Ala.1985); Baptist Medical Center v. Byars, 289 Ala. 713, 271 So.2d 847 (1972); Mackintosh Co. v. Wells, supra . Moreover, it must be demonstrated that the plaintiff's appreciation of the danger was a conscious appreciation at the moment the incident occurred. Marquis v. Marquis, supra ; Elba Wood Products, Inc. v. Brackin [356 So.2d 119 (Ala.1978)]. Mere `heedlessness' is insufficient to warrant a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Decatur Light, Power & Fuel Co. v. Newsom, 179 Ala. 127, 59 So. 615 (1912). Central Alabama Electric Co-op. v. Tapley, 546 So.2d 371, 381 (Ala.1989), quoted in Smith v. U.S. Construction Co., 602 So.2d 349, 350-51 (Ala.1992); Empiregas, Inc. of Belle Mina v. Suggs, 567 So.2d 271, 273 (Ala.1990). Viewing the evidence in favor of the nonmovant and resolving all doubts in her favor, we hold that the circumstantial evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact as to whether at the time John Hicks placed himself in danger, he had a conscious appreciation of the danger posed by the possibility that the pipe stopper would dislodge and hit him. Although employees of Taylor-Wharton testified in deposition that employees at the Taylor-Wharton manufacturing facility were commonly aware of the danger of blow-outs, no such blow-out had occurred in more than a decade. Undisputed testimony showed that John Hicks conducted on average of two tests each working day. The circumstantial evidence does not conclusively show that John Hicks specifically appreciated the risk of harm or death at the time of the accident. Evidence of mere heedlessness is alone insufficient to warrant a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Last, Vernda Hicks argues that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether John Hicks assumed the risk of harm or death as a matter of law. We acknowledge that in defining the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk under the AEMLD, the cases have not been altogether consistent and that in some cases the Court has intimated that assumption of the risk is a form of contributory negligence. However, for purposes of this appeal, we resort to the definition of assumption of the risk stated in Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134 (Ala.1976): `If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.' 335 So.2d at 143 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment n (1965). In an AEMLD action, whether the injured person assumed the risk of injury or death is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Atkins, 335 So.2d at 143. Thaxton contends that, considering John Hicks's knowledge of and his long experience with the hydrostatic testing, the Court must concluded that, as a matter of law, John Hicks assumed the risk of injury by standing in front of the pipe stopper during the test. We hold, however, that the circumstantial evidence presented by Vernda Hicks and Thaxton creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether, at the time of the accident, John Hicks was specifically aware of the danger posed by the pipe stopper and whether he voluntarily and intelligently assumed the risk of death by standing in front of the pipe stopper during the test. We conclude, therefore, that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the affirmative defenses of product misuse, contributory negligence, and assumption of the risk, asserted by Thaxton and Hy-Tech.