Opinion ID: 3013566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finality of the RRB’s decision

Text: Judicial review of decisions of the RRB is governed by § 5(f) of the RUIA, which states in pertinent part that “[a]ny claimant . . . aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c) of this section, may, only after all administrative remedies within the Board will have been availed of and exhausted, obtain a review of any final decision of the Board by filing a petition for review . . . in the United States court of appeals.” 45 U.S.C. § 355(f). In turn, subsection (c) of § 355 refers to several types of decisions of the 5 RRB on the merits of a claim for benefits. See 45 U.S.C. § 355(c). 4 4 45 U.S.C. § 355(c) provides in pertinent part: (2) Any claimant whose claim for benefits has been denied in an initial determination with respect thereto upon the basis of his not being a qualified employee, and any claimant who contends that under an initial determination of his claim he has been awarded benefits at less than the proper rate, may appeal to the Board for the review of such determination.    (3) Any base-year employer of a claimant whose claim for benefits has been granted in whole or in part, either in an initial determination with respect thereto or in a determination after a hearing pursuant to paragraph (1), and who contends that the determination is erroneous for a reason or reasons other than a reason that is reviewable under paragraph (4), may appeal to the Board for review of such determination.    (4) In any case in which benefits are awarded to a claimant in whole or in part upon the basis of pay earned in the service of a person or company found by the Board to be an employer as defined in this chapter but which denies that it is such an employer, such benefits awarded on such basis shall be paid to such claimant subject to a right of recovery of such benefits. The Board shall thereupon designate one of its officers or employees to receive evidence and to report to the Board on whether such benefits should be repaid.    (5)    Any properly interested party notified, as hereinabove provided, of his right to participate in the proceedings may obtain a review of any such decision by which he claims to be aggrieved or the 6 Thus, under the plain language of § 355(f), this Court has jurisdiction to review final decisions of the RRB on the merits of a claim for benefits only after administrative remedies have been exhausted. As a further limitation on our review of RRB decisions, § 355(g) provides that “[f]indings of fact and conclusions of law of the Board in the determination of any claim for benefits . . . shall not be subject to review in any manner other than that set forth in subsection (f) of this section.” There is no provision in the statute allowing the Board to reopen a prior claim for benefits following an untimely appeal, nor is there a provision permitting for judicial review of such a decision. To the contrary, the Board’s authority to reopen prior claims for benefits upon a showing of good cause stems solely from the RRB’s own regulation. See 20 C.F.R. § 260.5(c). Thus, for this Court to have jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision in this matter, Cunningham must show that the Board’s decision not to reopen her prior claim for benefits was a final decision of the Board issued on the merits of her claim after she exhausted her administrative remedies within the meaning of § 355(f). However, Cunningham here has not exhausted her administrative remedies before the RRB because she failed to timely appeal the decision of the Bureau affirming the denial of benefits to the Board within the 60-day time period. Moreover, the Board’s decision refusing to reopen Cunningham’s prior claim for benefits was not a final decision of the Board on the merits of the claim within the meaning of § 355(c). The only final decision in this matter was the Bureau’s October 2, 2000 decision affirming the denial of Cunningham’s motion to reconsider the adjudicating officer’s decision, which became final following the closing of the 60-day appeal window. See 45 U.S.C. § 355(d); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 260.1, 260.9, and 261.1(b). That decision is not properly before this Court. Accordingly, in light of the plain language of § 355(f), determination of any issue therein in the manner provided in subsection (f) of this section with respect to the review of the Board's decisions upon claims for benefits and subject to all provisions of law applicable to the review of such decisions.    7 we lack jurisdiction under the RUIA to review Cunningham’s petition.5 We note that the majority of the circuits that have considered these provisions have reached the same conclusion as we do, that decisions of the RRB not to reopen prior claims are not subject to review under the RUIA. See Roberts v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 346 F.3d 139 (5th Cir. 2003); Rivera v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 262 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2001); Harris v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 198 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1999); Abbruzzese v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 63 F.3d 972 (10th Cir. 1995); Gutierrez v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 918 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1990); Steebe v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 708 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983). 6 Each of these courts found the Supreme Court’s decision in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), persuasive in analyzing 5 At oral argument, counsel for Cunningham argued that a reading of the phrase “aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c)” in § 355(f), to mean that § 355(c) contains the exclusive list of final decisions subject to judicial review under the statute, would render § 355(d) superfluous and unnecessary. We disagree. Section 355(f) clearly states its intention to incorporate the types of decisions listed in § 355(c) as being suitable for review by the courts of appeals. In contrast, § 355(d) concerns itself with the procedures the RRB is to use in arriving at such a final decision. Contrary to counsel’s suggestion, our reading of the statutory scheme in these three provisions is consistent. 6 Although these courts have concluded that decisions of the RRB not to reopen prior claims following untimely appeals are not subject to review, our sister circuits have used differing rationales for their decisions. The Sixth Circuit in Gutierrez assumed for the sake of argument that such a decision would be a “final decision,” but found that the lack of a timely appeal constituted a failure to exhaust administrative remedies within the meaning of § 355(c) and § 355(f). Gutierrez, 918 F.2d at 570. In contrast, the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits held that such a Board decision was not a “final decision” within the meaning of those provisions. See Rivera, 262 F.3d at 1009; Harris, 198 F.3d at 142; Abbruzzese, 63 F.3d at 974; Steebe, 708 F.2d at 254-55. 8 the relevant jurisdictional provisions of the RUIA. In Sanders, the Supreme Court held that the Social Security Act did not grant jurisdiction to the federal courts to review a decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare not to reopen a claim for Social Security benefits. 430 U.S. at 107-08. The Supreme Court rested its decision in part on § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, which limits judicial review to only “final decisions” of the Secretary. Id. at 108. As other courts have noted, the jurisdictional language of the Social Security Act, and in particular § 205(g), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),7 is similar to 45 U.S.C. § 355(f). See, e.g., Roberts, 346 F.3d at 141; Abbruzzese, 63 F.3d at 974. Moreover, because of the similarities between the Social Security Act and the RRA and RUIA, it is “accepted practice to use social security cases as precedent for railroad retirement cases.” See, e.g., Abbruzzese, 63 F.3d at 974 n.3 (internal quotation omitted); Harris, 198 F.3d at 142 n.4. Accordingly, we find Sanders to be persuasive that judicial review of the RRB decision in this matter, as a matter of statutory interpretation, is not appropriate. We have previously applied Sanders in interpreting the jurisdictional provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and have held that decisions by the social security Appeals Council refusing to reopen a prior claim for benefits are not final decisions. See Bacon v. Sullivan, 969 F.2d 1517, 1520 (3d Cir. 1992). In Bacon, the claimant, after being denied certain social security disability benefits, filed an appeal with the Appeals Council one day too late after the expiration of the 60-day appeal period. Id. at 1518. Although Bacon argued that her late filing was due “to an inadvertent and inexplicable oversight in the mailroom” of her attorney, the Appeals Council dismissed the appeal, finding that no good cause existed to extend her time for filing a request for review. Id. (internal quotations omitted). On appeal, this Court was presented with the question of whether the decision of the 7 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provided: “Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days . . . .” 9 Appeals Council not to consider claimant’s late appeal was a reviewable final order within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Id. Construing § 405(g) and the administrative provisions of the Appeals Council, we concluded that a decision not to consider an untimely appeal was not a final decision within the meaning of the statute and held that we lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition. Id. at 1520-21. Cunningham argues that she did receive a final decision in this matter and otherwise exhausted her administrative remedies because she filed a motion to reopen for good cause with the Board, which was denied, and now has essentially nowhere else to go except to this Court. We disagree. As we stated in Bacon, “a ‘final decision’ is a particular type of agency action, and not all agency determinations are final decisions.” Bacon, 969 F.2d at 1519-20 (citing Sanders, 430 U.S. at 107-08). As noted above, the only final decision Cunningham received in this matter was the Bureau’s October 2, 2000 decision affirming the denial of Cunningham’s motions for reconsideration which became final following the expiration of the 60-day appeal window; that decision is not before this Court. It is simply not the case that the Board’s April 23, 2002 decision refusing to reopen her claim for benefits is rendered a final decision because Cunningham has no other procedural remedies available within the RRB. Moreover, Cunningham’s position, if adopted, would frustrate the goal of ensuring finality of RRB decisions on the merits of claims for benefits. See Sanders, 430 U.S. at 108 (noting that “an interpretation that would allow a claimant judicial review simply by filing and being denied a petition to reopen his claim would frustrate the congressional purpose . . . to impose a 60-day limitation upon judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision on the initial claim for benefits”). Here, Cunningham filed her motion to reopen some 14 months after the expiration of her 60-day appeal period, but under the reasoning of her position, there would be no bar to judicial review of a denial of a motion to reopen filed many years after the expiration of the 60-day appeal period.