Opinion ID: 2166953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: request for filing belated ncr plea

Text: Appellant seeks a reversal of his convictions and the sentences imposed thereon because he was not permitted to file a belated not criminally responsible (NCR) plea on the first day of his scheduled trial. We decline to do so and explain. Maryland Code (1982, 1994 Repl.Vol.), § 12-109 of the HealthGeneral Article governs the procedure for filing a NCR plea. It provides in pertinent part: (a) Time and manner of pleading. (1) If a defendant intends to rely on a plea of not criminally responsible, the defendant or defense counsel shall file a written plea alleging, in substance, that when the alleged crime was committed, the defendant was not criminally responsible by reason of insanity under the test for criminal responsibility in § 12-108 of this title. (2) A written plea of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity shall be filed at the time provided for initial pleading, unless, for good cause shown, the court allows the plea to be filed later. The time for the filing of a NCR plea in a circuit court is also addressed in Md. Rule 4-242(b)(3): (3) Time in Circuit Court. In circuit court the defendant shall initially plead within 15 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court pursuant to Rule 4-213(c). If a motion, demand for particulars, or other paper is filed that requires a ruling by the court or compliance by a party before the defendant pleads, the time for pleading shall be extended, without special order, to 15 days after the ruling by the court or the compliance by a party. A plea of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity shall be entered at the time the defendant initially pleads, unless good cause is shown. Johnson, accompanied by his counsel, made his initial appearance before the court on July 18, 1995, at which time he filed a plea of not guilty to the several charges contained in the criminal information lodged against him. As early as April 28, 1995, defense counsel filed a motion for transportation of Johnson from the Allegany County Detention Center to the office of Jeffrey Janoski, M.D. of Lutherville, Maryland who had been retained by the defense for a psychiatric evaluation. In that motion counsel represented that his investigation indicates that substantial mental health issues may exist in the case with regard to both guilt/innocence and penalty issues. The trial court ordered that Johnson be transported for that purpose on May 2, 1995. Nevertheless, as indicated above, no NCR plea was filed at the time Johnson entered his plea at his initial appearance before the court. The trial date was initially set for January 9, 1996. Acting on a joint request of the State and the defense, that date was changed by the court on December 15, 1995, to February 27, 1996. On February 5, 1996, the court announced to counsel that the guilt/innocence phase of the trial would begin on February 27, 1996, and that a sentencing hearing, if necessary, would commence on March 11, 1996. On February 11, 1996, defense counsel again sought a continuance of the scheduled trial date. He represented to the court that Johnson had recently been seen by Dr. Jonathon Pincus, a neurologist in connection with a guilty plea Johnson had entered in an unrelated case. Dr. Pincus had recommended that Johnson be examined by a psychiatrist specializing in multiple personality disorders, and defense counsel wished to pursue that avenue before proceeding to trial. The court granted a continuance, setting a new trial date for April 9, 1996. Subsequent to the psychiatric examination of Johnson, defense counsel informed the court that no NCR plea would be filed. It was not until the beginning of the first day of trial that Johnson sought to file a belated NCR plea. The court found no good cause had been shown for the belated filing of the plea, stating: The fact remains that on any number of occasions, the Defendant has been in a position to ... accounting from July of 1995 to file a plea of not criminally responsible. In fact trial dates were scheduled and continued at Defendant's request for the purpose of allowing neurological and other examinations relating to mental status as late as February of this year after a trial date had been scheduled for February 27. And it's my recollection that the trial date was selected after consultation with Defense to ensure that the Defendant had ample time not only to have the evaluations and examinations performed, but to produce those experts for trial should that become necessary. Hence, today's trial date was essentially arrived at by agreement for the ... at Defendant's convenience ... But for all those reasons, I do not find good cause under the Rule to extend the ... expand the time for filing of a not criminally responsible plea. The time in my view under the way this case has been managed having passed, and no further good cause has been shown. Under both Md.Code, § 12-109 of the Health General Article and Md. Rule 4-242(b)(3), an NCR plea ordinarily must be filed at the time a defendant initially pleads. Only two exceptions to that requirement are provided. The first is not applicable under the facts of this case, [1] and the second requires the defendant to show good cause for the belated plea. The trial judge in deciding whether the defendant had shown cause for a belated NCR plea took into account the fact that Johnson had been represented by counsel since soon after his arrest and that his counsel recognized at the outset that substantial mental health issues were presented by his case. It was for that reason that he moved and was granted an order on May 2, 1995, to transport Johnson for a psychiatric evaluation by a psychiatrist of his choice. The trial judge also was told by defense counsel at the hearing on April 9, 1996, that one factor that weighed in favor of not filing an earlier NCR plea was the belief that Johnson had a limited likelihood of success with an NCR plea. In Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 711, 506 A.2d 580, 593 (1986), we considered the paucity of proof that defendant was not criminally responsible as an important factor justifying the trial judge's refusal to permit the filing of a belated NCR plea on the eve of the date set for trial. We there commented upon the good cause requirement for the exception to the time constraints upon the filing of a belated NCR plea: Although not in the context of the insanity plea, we have previously held that a statutory requirement of good cause vests the trial court with wide discretion. See State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984) (discussing good cause in context of postponement of trial date; State v. Jones, 270 Md. 388, 312 A.2d 281 (1973) (analysis of good cause requirement to permit a requested withdrawal of an accused's jury trial waiver)). We now hold that the good cause requirements of § 12-108 (now 12-109) and former Rule 731 (now 4-242(b)(3)) likewise endow the trial court with broad discretion. Thus the trial judge's determination is entitled to the utmost respect and should not be overturned unless there was a clear abuse of that discretion. Madore v. Baltimore County, 34 Md.App. 340, 346, 367 A.2d 54, 58 (1976). Moreover, the court was aware that the trial had been postponed three times, twice at the request of Johnson to accommodate mental evaluations by experts of his choice. Considering all of these factors, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the filing of a plea at the beginning of the first day of trial, almost nine months after it was required to be filed by the governing statute and rule. Finally, we are not persuaded that the belated NCR plea was justified because the court, at the request of the State, ordered on April 2, 1996, that Johnson undergo a mental evaluation by a psychiatrist of its choice for use solely at the sentencing hearing, if one became necessary. Defense counsel proffered that the decision to forgo a NCR plea was a tactical one based on the belief that the State would not be entitled to a psychiatric examination unless such a plea was filed. [2] Johnson argues that when the trial judge granted the State's belated motion for such an examination, the defense lost the tactical advantage it had hoped to gain. Under those circumstances, it was only fair that the trial judge also extend the time for filing a NCR plea. He contends that, because this trial strategy was undermined by the court's subsequent order granting the State's motion for a psychiatric examination, this constituted good cause which necessarily allowed the entry of a belated NCR plea. Johnson's argument fails for several reasons. First, Johnson's failure to file a NCR plea did not preclude the State from obtaining an evaluation of Johnson's mental status by a psychiatrist of its choice since Johnson intended to rely at any sentencing hearing on a substantially impaired mental status as a mitigating circumstance against the imposition of the death penalty. Md. Rule 4-263(d)(1). Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 564, 611 A.2d 581, 583-84 (1992). The State was entitled to the mental examination, whether or not appellant filed a NCR plea. The trial court's exercise of sound discretion in whether to order a mental examination was in accord with Maryland law. In the circumstances of this case, defense counsel could not alter the degree of this discretion simply by invoking its earlier trial strategy. Second, defense counsel's argument implicitly embraces the premise that the defense was entitled to the tactical advantage it had earlier hoped to achieve by failing to enter a NCR plea. Such a premise is unsound. In a criminal trial, whether it be capital or otherwise, neither side is entitled to a tactical advantage.