Opinion ID: 2101605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Identification Evidence Properly Admitted

Text: Farrell argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a pre-trial and an in-court identification of him by Handley because the pre-trial identification procedure was so unduly suggestive that it tainted the victim's in-court identification. We address this issue because it is likely to arise on retrial. Due process of law requires suppression of testimony concerning an out-of-court identification when the procedure employed was unnecessarily suggestive. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Dillard v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 282, 286, 274 N.E.2d 387, 389. The reviewing court must determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification process was conducted in such a way that it created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Harris v. State (1993), Ind., 619 N.E.2d 577. Factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of a misidentification include (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness's degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal, and (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness. James v. State (1993), Ind., 613 N.E.2d 15, 27. Thus, if the pre-trial identification procedure was unduly suggestive, then testimony relating to it is inadmissible. We address first the photographic array. One day after the crime, Handley was shown facial color photographs of three males. She selected Farrell's as the perpetrator. Farrell complains that this procedure was flawed because (1) Handley was told by a detective that it was possible that the suspect might be in the photographic array; (2) the array should have included more than three photographs; and (3) the two other photographs were not similar enough to his own. Indiana courts have recommended that photo arrays consist of at least five or six individuals. Porter v. State (1979), 272 Ind. 267, 269, 397 N.E.2d 269, 271. Depending upon the surrounding circumstances, however, an array of fewer than five does not render the testimony regarding the identification inadmissible per se. Id. In the present case, police officers testified that they included only three photographs in the array because they were unable to find more than two other individuals sufficiently resembling the defendant. Each of the three photographs showed a white male having dark eyes, moderate hair length, and no facial hair. The victim herself testified that the photographs depicted individuals having a similar appearance. We do not perceive that the fact that Farrell wore a dark t-shirt or had a hair style slightly different from the others resulted in an impermissibly suggestive array. There is no requirement that law enforcement officers perform the improbable if not impossible task of finding four or five other people who are virtual twins to the defendant. Pierce v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 240, 246, 369 N.E.2d 617, 620. It is sufficient if the defendant does not stand out so strikingly in his characteristics that he virtually is alone with respect to identifying features. Id. Handley had sufficient opportunity to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime. She testified that it was not difficult for her to see his face and she had the opportunity to view him at close range under good lighting conditions. She provided police with a detailed description of his appearance which was consistent throughout. Upon selecting his photograph from the array, she indicated she was one hundred per cent certain that he was the perpetrator. Under these circumstances, we do not perceive that the photo array was unduly suggestive. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the pre-trial lineup was not impermissibly suggestive, and this evidence was properly admitted. Accordingly, we need not address whether an independent basis existed for Handley's in-court identification because it was also properly admitted by the trial court. Harris, 619 N.E.2d 577. Contrary to Farrell's assertion, an in-court identification does not become invalid merely because ten months passed between the time of the crime and the in-court identification. Wolf v. State (1990), Ind., 562 N.E.2d 414, 416.