Opinion ID: 1341219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeal of Roy Lee Newman

Text: Defendant, Roy Lee Newman, first assigns as error the action of the trial judge in consolidating his cases with those of James Earl Newman for trial. G.S. 15A-926, in pertinent part, provides: (b) Separate Pleadings for Each Defendant and Joinder of Defendants for Trial. (1) Each defendant must be charged in a separate pleading. (2) Upon written motion of the prosecutor, charges against two or more defendants may be joined for trial: a. When each of the defendants is charged with accountability for each offense; or b. When, even if all of the defendants are not charged with accountability for each offense, the several offenses charged: 1. Were part of a common scheme or plan; or 2. Were part of the same act or transaction; or 3. Were so closely connected in time, place, and occasion that it would be difficult to separate proof of one charge from proof of the others. We first note that under the facts of this case the trial judge could have joined the offenses charged pursuant to any one or all of the provisions for joinder set out in G.S. 15A-926(a)(b). Further, the question of consolidation of offenses for trial is a matter which lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling will not be disturbed absent a showing that joinder would hinder or deprive defendant of his ability to present his defense. State v. Greene, 294 N.C. 418, 241 S.E.2d 662 (1978); State v. Braxton, 294 N.C. 446, 242 S.E.2d 769 (1978). Here defendants were indicted for the same offenses, perpetrated against the same person pursuant to a common scheme or plan with each of the defendants present, and participating in each offense. Defendant Roy Lee Newman contends that he was denied a fair trial by the joinder solely because the prosecuting witness erroneously identified Roy Lee Newman as James Earl Newman on more than one occasion. This argument is without merit. We find nothing in this record indicating that the witness erroneously identified Roy Lee Newman as James Newman. Even had there been a misidentification, such a discrepancy would go only to Mrs. Harris' credibility as a witness. This record does not disclose that the joinder of the charged offenses amounted to an abuse of discretion on the part of Judge McLelland or that the joinder in any way deprived defendant of a fair trial or hindered his ability to present his defense. Defendant next assigns as error the denial of his motion for nonsuit at the close of all the evidence. It is his position that because Mrs. Harris made three or more contradictions in her testimony the State was required to produce evidence to corroborate her testimony that she had been raped and kidnapped. Defendant cites no authority in support of this argument. In fact, the rule in North Carolina is that when ruling on a motion for judgment of nonsuit, the trial court is required to disregard any contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence. State v. Witherspoon, 293 N.C. 321, 237 S.E.2d 822 (1977). In Witherspoon, Justice Lake stated the often cited rule as follows: It is elementary that, upon a motion for judgment of nonsuit in a criminal action, all of the evidence favorable to the State, whether competent or incompetent, must be considered, such evidence must be deemed true and considered in the light most favorable to the State, discrepancies and contradictions therein are disregarded and the State is entitled to every inference of fact which may be reasonably be deduced therefrom. Id. at 326, 237 S.E.2d at 826. This assignment of error is overruled. Defendant also contends that the trial judge erred by denying his motion to set aside the verdict of guilty of first-degree rape. He asserts that the motion should have been allowed because there was no corroborative evidence to support the victim's testimony that she was raped. This argument is totally without merit. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that a conviction for rape may be based upon the unsupported testimony of the prosecuting witness. State v. Denny, 294 N.C. 294, 240 S.E.2d 437 (1978); State v. Shaw, 284 N.C. 366, 200 S.E.2d 585 (1973). Neither do we find any substance in defendant's position that the motion should have been allowed because the evidence does not show that he actually committed the rape. When two or more persons aid and abet each other in the commission of a crime, all being present, all are principals and equally guilty. State v. Terry, 278 N.C. 284, 179 S.E.2d 368 (1971); State v. Barrow, 292 N.C. 227, 232 S.E.2d 693 (1977). Here the prosecuting witness positively identified Roy Lee Newman as one of the men who abducted her from the parking lot. She testified that he and James Earl Newman forced her to go to a wooded area where defendant Roy Lee Newman held a knife to her throat while James Earl Newman removed his trousers. Roy then handed the knife to James, who used it to force her to submit to intercourse with him. It is immaterial that Roy Lee Newman did not actually engage in intercourse with the victim. Finally, we note that this motion was addressed to the discretion of the trial judge and his ruling will not be reviewed upon appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Hamm, 299 N.C. 519, 263 S.E.2d 556 (1980). No abuse of discretion is shown. Roy Lee Newman next assigns as error the denial of his motion to dismiss the charge of kidnapping. Relying upon the rationale of State v. Dix, 282 N.C. 490, 193 S.E.2d 897 (1973) and State v. Roberts, 286 N.C. 265, 210 S.E.2d 396 (1974), defendant contends that there was not sufficient asportation to make out a case of kidnapping. In Dix, this Court held that there was not sufficient asportation to constitute the offense of kidnapping where the defendant by use of a gun forced a jailer to go from the front door of the jail to the jail cells, a distance of about 62 feet. In Roberts, the defendant pulled a child a distance of about 80 or 90 feet apparently for the purpose of committing a sexual assault upon her. This Court reversed the defendant's conviction for kidnapping stating: Here, the entire incident occurred during the seconds it took defendant to pull Kathy a distance of 80 to 90 feet, ... To constitute the crime of kidnapping the defendant (1) must have falsely imprisoned his victim by acquiring complete dominion and control over him for some appreciable period of time, and (2) must have carried him beyond the immediate vicinity of the place of such false imprisonment.... 286 N.C. at 277, 210 S.E.2d at 404. Defendant's argument overlooks the fact that Dix and Roberts were decided before the 1975 General Assembly amended G.S. 14-39, the kidnapping statute. As amended, G.S. 14-39(a) now provides: (a) Any person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove from one place to another, any other person 16 years of age or over without the consent of such person, or any other person under the age of 16 years without the consent of a parent or legal custodian of such person, shall be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint or removal is for the purpose of: (1) Holding such other person for ransom or as a hostage or using such other person as a shield; or (2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating flight of any person following the commission of a felony; or (3) Doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the person so confined, restrained or removed or any other person. We considered the effect of this legislation in State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978). There we concluded: It is equally clear that the Legislature rejected our determinations in State v. Dix, supra , and in State v. Roberts, supra , to the effect that, where the State relies upon asportation of the victim to establish a kidnapping, the asportation must be for a substantial distance and where the State relies upon dominion and control, i.e., confinement or restraint, such must continue for some appreciable period of time. Thus, it was clearly the intent of the Legislature to make resort to a tape measure or a stop watch unnecessary in determining whether the crime of kidnapping has been committed. Id. 294 N.C. at 522, 243 S.E.2d at 351. Subsequently, in State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 282 S.E.2d 439 (1981), we considered the asportation element of kidnapping and construed the phrase in G.S. 14-39(a), remove from one place to another, to require a removal separate and apart from that which is an inherent and inevitable part of the commission of another felony. See also State v. Adams, 299 N.C. 699, 264 S.E.2d 46 (1980). The facts in this case show that defendants abducted Mrs. Harris from the parking lot of the Big Star food store. She was taken to a wooded area behind the store. Removal of Mrs. Harris from her automobile to the location where the rape occurred was not such asportation as was inherent in the commission of the crime of rape. Rather, it was a separate course of conduct designed to remove her from the view of a passerby who might have hindered the commission of the crime. To this extent the action of removal was taken for the purpose of facilitating the felony of first-degree rape. Thus, defendant's conduct fell within the purview of G.S. 14-39 and the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction of kidnapping under that section. The trial judge properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of kidnapping. By assignment of error number 5, defendant contends that the trial judge erred by denying his motion to suppress the pretrial identification procedure in this case. He asserts that this procedure was so impermissibly suggestive that it tainted and rendered the prosecuting witness' in-court identification of defendant inadmissible. Initially, we note that the record before us does not show that defendant objected to the in-court identification, or requested a voir dire hearing to determine whether in-court identification was the product of an impermissibly suggestive pretrial procedure. Neither do we find a motion to strike the in-court identification testimony. Thus, defendant waived his right to assert on appeal that the trial court erroneously admitted the prosecuting witness' in-court identification testimony. State v. Black, 305 N.C. 614, 290 S.E.2d 669 (1982); State v. Brady, 299 N.C. 547, 264 S.E.2d 66 (1980). Further, we find defendant's contention that the pretrial identification procedures were improper to be fruitless. He argues that since Mrs. Harris was unable to identify him at the pretrial proceeding evidence of the pretrial identification was inadmissible. In fact, the victim did identify defendant Roy Lee Newman in the pretrial proceedings. It is true that Mrs. Harris incorrectly fixed the date when this identification was made but this error would only affect the weight of her testimony as contradictions and discrepancies in identification testimony are for the jury to resolve. See State v. Wilson, 293 N.C. 47, 235 S.E.2d 219 (1977). The trial judge correctly admitted the pretrial and in-court identification testimony. Defendant, Roy Lee Newman, by his final assignment of error contends that the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence exhibit 1, certain items taken from defendant James Newman's possession at the time of his arrest. He argues that the State failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody and that the items were not sufficiently identified. Generally any object with a relevant connection to a criminal case is admissible into evidence. State v. Sledge, 297 N.C. 227, 254 S.E.2d 579 (1979). However, if the object has a direct role in the circumstances giving rise to the trial, there must be testimony identifying the object as the same object involved in the incident and ordinarily there must be evidence tending to show that there has been no material change in the condition of the object between the time of the alleged crime and the trial. State v. Harbison, 293 N.C. 474, 238 S.E.2d 449 (1977); State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981). In instant case, Officer Smith testified that James Newman had certain grocery items in a bag at the time he was apprehended. The officer tagged these items and put them into a police locker. Detective Smith testified that he obtained the items in question from the police property room and brought them into the courtroom. Officer Morris identified these items as being the ones he tagged on the night of the incident in question. This evidence was clearly sufficient to establish a proper chain of custody. Neither do we find that the evidence was rendered inadmissible because there was no direct testimony tending to show that there was no material change in the condition of the items between the date of the alleged crime and the time of the trial. In State v. Oliver, supra, the co-defendant Moore challenged the admissibility of two football candies, a Robesonian newspaper, a plastic bag of paper money and food stamps, a blue coat with a fur lined collar, two toboggans, several pieces of multi-colored Christmas wrappings, a red pullover shirt with a hood, and a pistol and bullets on the grounds that the State failed to establish that these items had undergone no material change in their condition since the incident occurred. There was no direct evidence that the items had not undergone a change in condition. Rejecting the defendant's contention, this Court, in pertinent part, stated: In the case at bar there is no evidence that the condition of any of the items in question had changed between the time of their recovery on the day of the shootings and the time of trial. Indeed the very nature of the items themselves would make a change in condition extremely unlikely in the short time between the crimes' commission and the trial. All the items were positively identified as being the very items recovered by those investigating the incident in question. Considering the nature of the items themselves and the absence of any suggestion that they had undergone some relevant change between the time of their recovery and the time of trial, we conclude that the failure of the state to offer positive testimony that the objects had undergone no material change was not fatal to their admission. That they had in fact undergone no material change is clearly implied in the testimony of Sampson. His failure expressly to so state does not so detract from his otherwise positive identification of the items so as to render them inadmissible. Id. at 53, 274 S.E.2d at 199. Here, as in Oliver, the absence of material change may be inferred from the nature of the items themselves and the positive identification of the items by Officer Morris. The only remaining question is whether these items had any relevance to an issue in this case. When James Newman was taken into custody shortly after the attack upon Mrs. Harris, he had in his possession items which Mrs. Harris testified she had bought shortly before she was abducted. Therefore exhibit 1 was relevant in that it corroborated the prosecuting witness' testimony as to her abduction and rape and also tended to strengthen the identification testimony to the effect that James Newman was one of her assailants. The fact that Mrs. Harris admitted on cross-examination that she was not absolutely sure that one of the items contained in the challenged exhibit was one that she purchased does not render the exhibit inadmissible since the identification of relevant exhibits need not be absolute and unequivocal. See State v. Bishop, 293 N.C. 84, 235 S.E.2d 214 (1977). This slight equivocation on the part of the witness Harris would relate only to the weight of her testimony. See State v. Fikes, 270 N.C. 780, 155 S.E.2d 277 (1967). We hold that the trial judge correctly admitted exhibit 1 into evidence.