Opinion ID: 1399686
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prosecutor's Statement Regarding the Reasonable Doubt Standard Favored by Defense Attorneys

Text: Two Elk posits that a second statement by the prosecutor also amounted to misconduct. The prosecutor remarked, [t]here's an old saying in the law, that if the standard of proof had to be met as articulated by defense attorneys, every crime would have to be witnessed by a bus load of nuns with video cameras. Two Elk's counsel objected and the judge overruled her. On appeal, Two Elk suggests that the prosecutor thereby directed a personal, unsubstantiated attack[] on the character and ethics of his defense counsel which may have induce[d] the jury to trust the Government rather than its own view of the evidence. We think this statement was arguably improper. It had the potential both to obfuscate the reasonable doubt standard and to impugn the defense counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 413 F.3d 770, 775 (8th Cir.2005) (reversing, on ground of prosecutorial misconduct, where prosecutor told jury that defense attorney was using smoke and mirrors to divert their attention and implied that the attorney had conspired with client to fabricate testimony). Again, even assuming it was improper, we do not believe that it deprived Two Elk of a fair trial. First, the statement's cumulative effect was likely negligible. Far from an ad hominem attack on the defense counsel, the statement seems more like an inopportune attempt at levity. Cf. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) ([A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning....). More importantly, the statement was unlikely to alter the jury's understanding of the reasonable doubt standard. See United States v. Foley, 508 F.3d 627, 637-38 (11th Cir.2007). The judge instructed the jury on the proper standard and both the prosecution and defense discussed the standard during their closing arguments. As to the second factor, the statement pales in comparison to the government's evidence of Two Elk's guilt. And the final factor reinforces our belief that the statement had little cumulative effect: the jury instructions clarified the reasonable doubt standard, and the court labeled the statement as just argument on the record immediately after it was made. See Eagle, 515 F.3d at 806 (asserting district court's instruction that closing arguments are not evidence is a curative action that serves to alleviate any risk of prejudicial impact). The trial judge thereby dismissed the import of the statementand for good reason, it was too insubstantial to skew the trial's fundamental fairness.