Opinion ID: 3006119
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion to dismiss as moot

Text: After the filing of this appeal, Jewel and Hainan filed a joint motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s appeal as moot, asserting that once the district court vacated Plaintiff’s Rule B attachment of the funds, Holland & Knight distributed those funds to Jewel and Hainan, who then transferred them out of the district through their ordinary course of business. Plaintiff had made no request that the funds be held pending the outcome of the appeal, and no court had ordered that the status quo be maintained. Because the funds were no longer in the district,1 Appellees argued that the district court lacked in personam jurisdiction over Quail, and thus the question whether the district court erred in vacating Plaintiff’s Rule B attachment was moot. Plaintiff countered that, with a Rule B attachment, in personam jurisdiction existed over the defendant—as opposed to in rem jurisdiction over the res itself— and therefore the fact that the property had left the district did not moot the appeal 1 Jewel and Hainan provided affidavits to support their assertion that the funds had indeed left the district. 8 Case: 14-14838 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 9 of 18 because the district court would again have personal jurisdiction over Quail if the attachment were reinstated. Plaintiff further argued that the removal of the money from the district was premature because Hainan and Jewel were required to wait 14 days following the entry of judgment, which they had not done. 2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a). “If events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be dismissed.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001). “The burden of establishing mootness rests with the party seeking dismissal.” Beta Upsilon Chi Upsilon Ch. at the Univ. of Fla. v. Machen, 586 F.3d 908, 916 (11th Cir. 2009). Rule B attachments are known as “quasi-in-rem” proceedings, because they are not actions directly against the res as a fictitious person, as is the case in in rem actions, but are actions against a party who is not personally present in the district but whose property is present. The Fifth Circuit has explained Rule B attachments, as follows: An in personam admiralty or maritime claim is instituted by a complaint which may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant’s property found within the district. Whenever property is attached any person claiming an interest therein is entitled to a prompt hearing at which the plaintiff is required to furnish evidence 2 Hainan and Jewel have not responded to this last argument. 9 Case: 14-14838 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 10 of 18 supporting the attachment or other appropriate relief. It is sometimes inaccurately stated that the writ of attachment gives the district court quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the defendant. A more precise understanding is that a good-faith allegation in the complaint that the res is present within the geographical jurisdiction of the court is the jurisdictional fact which gives the court in personam jurisdiction over the defendant purported to own the res. Great Prize, S.A. v. Mariner Shipping Party, Ltd., 967 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1992) (footnotes omitted). Whether the subsequent departure of the res from a district in which it was originally present thereby deprives the court of jurisdiction is a question that is not entirely settled. Generally, however, “[s]tasis is not a . . . prerequisite to the maintenance of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the person survives a change in circumstances . . . .” Republic Nat’l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 88 (1992). Noting that a civil forfeiture proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 881 should “conform as near as may be to proceedings in admiralty,” the Supreme Court has held that an appeal in an in rem forfeiture action is not mooted, and “the Court of Appeals is not divested of jurisdiction, by the prevailing party’s transfer of the res from the district.” Id. at 84, 88–89. Other circuits have applied this holding to Rule B attachments, determining that the departure of the attached res does not destroy jurisdiction. See Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Ancora Transp., N.V., 59 F.3d 879, 882 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We read . . . the Court’s holding to eliminate any requirement on a party seeking to institute a maritime attachment to obtain a stay 10 Case: 14-14838 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 11 of 18 or post a supersedeas bond to preserve the district court’s jurisdiction over the garnished funds while it appealed the release of the garnished funds.”); Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co., Ltd., 708 F.3d 527, 540–41 (4th Cir. 2013) (same); see also 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 21-2, at 521 (5th ed. 2011) (“Even if the res is released [in a Rule B attachment action], the court retains jurisdiction.”). Therefore, even though this Court has not directly confronted the question of whether the Republic National Bank of Miami principle extends to Rule B attachments, the above persuasive authority leads us to assume that a Rule B attachment is not mooted simply by the fact that the res has left the district. Indeed, even in a maritime in rem action, where the action is directly against the res, the departure of the res from the district does not necessarily moot the case. Republic Nat’l Bank of Miami, 506 U.S. at 84 (“[T]he Government relies on what it describes as a settled admiralty principle: that jurisdiction over an in rem forfeiture proceeding depends upon continued control of the res. We, however, find no such established rule in our cases.”); see also United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, Serial No. 35A-280, Registration No. YN-BVO, 836 F.2d 1571, 1579 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Vance, J., dissenting) (“As the doctrine of personification of the ship loses force, so should the rules which rest on it. Among the many such rules which courts have begun to jettison is the rule that the 11 Case: 14-14838 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 12 of 18 presence of the res within the jurisdiction of the court is an absolute prerequisite to the court’s jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)). 3 Rather, the departure of the res moots the case only if further proceedings would be “useless,” and as the Supreme Court made clear, the “enforceability of judgments” does not “depend[] absolutely upon the continuous presence of the res in the district.” Republic Nat’l Bank of Miami, 506 U.S. at 87–88. The purpose of a Rule B attachment, as the Second Circuit has explained, is two-fold: “first, to gain jurisdiction over an absent defendant; and second, to assure satisfaction of a judgment.” Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty Ltd., 460 F.3d 434, 437–38 (2d Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldh: Overseas Pty Ltd., 585 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2009). If an absconding res does not necessarily undermine the enforceability of a judgment, nor revoke the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant, then mootness does not result. This interpretation, moreover, makes good sense, because it removes an incentive for defendants or garnishees to remove the res from the district. See Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 59 F.3d at 882–83 (“Maintaining a continuous-control requirement 3 The majority of this Court in One Lear Jet held that in an in rem forfeiture action jurisdiction was lost because the res was removed from the district after the district court’s final judgment, but before the appeal was heard. 836 F.2d at 1573 (“Where an appellant fails to file a stay of judgment or a supersedeas bond, and the res is removed from the court’s territorial jurisdiction, the appellate court does not have in rem jurisdiction.”). One of our subsequent applications of that holding, however, was reversed by the Supreme Court in Republic National Bank of Miami,