Opinion ID: 1170700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issue: Was the search of Medina's garage under the circumstances a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights?

Text: No. (3) The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and its counterpart, article I, section 19, of the California Constitution, protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and prohibit the issuance of a warrant except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The meaning of these words, and the evils which the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent, have had a long history of judicial construction. Problems arise in the application of these protections which have been perplexing at times not only to law enforcement officers but to the courts. The Supreme Court of the United States observed in Chimel ( supra, 395 U.S. 752, 755 [23 L.Ed.2d 685, 689]) that its decisions on Fourth Amendment law have not always been unanimous nor consistent. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443 [29 L.Ed.2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022], it recognized that it has not reduced such law to complete order and harmony, stating ( id., 403 U.S. p. 483 [29 L.Ed.2d p. 593]) that The time is long past when men believed that the development of law must always proceed by the smooth incorporation of new situations into a single coherent analytical framework. We proceed then to review the challenged search in the light of the pre- Chimel authority, United States v. Rabinowitz (1950) 339 U.S. 56 [94 L.Ed. 653, 70 S.Ct. 430], and the clarifying rules adopted by this court in People v. Cruz (1964) 61 Cal.2d 861, 866 [40 Cal. Rptr. 841, 395 P.2d 889], pursuant to the suggestion in Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23, 34 [10 L.Ed.2d 726, 738, 83 S.Ct. 1623], that states adopt workable rules for determining when a search is unreasonable. Rabinowitz recognized that What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula and that The recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case (339 U.S. 56, 63 [94 L.Ed. 653, 659]). Chimel approves this but adds the limitation viewed in the light of established Fourth Amendment principles ( Chimel v. California, supra, 395 U.S. 752, 765 [23 L.Ed.2d 685, 695]). (4) Whenever practicable law enforcement officers must obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure and in most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances. ( Terry v. Ohio (1967) 392 U.S. 1, 20 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905, 88 S.Ct. 1868].) The burden is upon those seeking an exemption to show the need for it. ( McDonald v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 451, 455-456 [93 L.Ed. 153, 158-159, 69 S.Ct. 191]; United States v. Jeffers (1951) 342 U.S. 48, 51 [96 L.Ed. 59, 64, 72 S.Ct. 93].) (5) The analysis required to determine whether there is probable cause to search is basically the same in situations involving a search with and a search without a warrant. ( Spinelli v. United States (1969) 393 U.S. 410, 417, fn. 5 [21 L.Ed.2d 637, 644, 89 S.Ct. 584].) Courts scrutinize carefully applications made for warrants and perhaps even more closely cases brought before them in which a showing is made that the search was without a warrant. Where there are exigent circumstances the requirement of a warrant may be relaxed (see Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 132 [69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct. 280]) but there must always be a showing made of probable cause for the arrest and of reasonableness of the search made incident thereto without a warrant or without consent. Defendant does not challenge the validity of his arrest. Its validity must be scrutinized by this court, however, in order to determine the validity of the search made incident thereto without a warrant. (6) The rule requiring probable cause should not be understood as placing the ordinary man of ordinary care and prudence and the officer experienced in the detection of narcotics offenders in the same class. Circumstances and conduct which would not excite the suspicion of the man on the street might be highly significant to an officer who had had extensive training and experience in the devious and cunning devices used by narcotics offenders to conceal their crimes. ( People v. Superior Court [ Kiefer ] (1970) 3 Cal.3d 807, 827 [91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449], quoting with approval from People v. Williams (1961) 196 Cal. App.2d 726, 728 [16 Cal. Rptr. 836].) (7a) The circumstances and facts within Officer Miller's knowledge, and the reasonably trustworthy information upon which he relied, were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense had been or was being committed ( Ker v. California, supra, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 [10 L.Ed.2d 726, 738-739]), namely, that a sale of heroin had just occurred in the garage and that defendant kept heroin in the garage for purpose of sale. There was probable cause not only for the arrest but for the search which followed. Had time or circumstances permitted it cannot be doubted that a search warrant could have been obtained by Miller. It is noted that in Vale v. Louisiana (1970) 399 U.S. 30, 34, 35 [26 L.Ed.2d 409, 413, 414, 90 S.Ct. 1969], the majority opinion points out that the officers there had obtained arrest warrants and it states that there was no reason to suppose that it was impracticable for them to have also obtained a search warrant; further, it notes that the officers knew that there was no one in the house, thus rejecting the state's contention that there might be someone who could remove, hide or destroy the evidence before a search warrant could be obtained. Here, however, Miller knew that defendant's wife was in the house, and defendant's adult daughter arrived while the officers were still on the lawn area. There was a possibility of fleeting opportunity to search and possible destruction of evidence or contraband should the officers postpone the search in order to obtain a warrant. [2] (8) Under the rules adopted by this court in People v. Cruz, supra, 61 Cal.2d 861, 866, for determining when a search is incidental to an arrest, the search must be limited to the premises where the arrest is made; must be contemporaneous therewith; have a definite object; and be reasonable in scope. Search of premises where the arrest is made has been construed to mean that the arrest and search must take place on the same premises, and that those premises be under the possession and control of the arrestee. Pre- Chimel searches of an apartment garage, immediately following arrest of the occupant in the apartment [held to be on the same premises, within possession and control of the arrestee] were found not to be unreasonable in People v. Woods (1966) 239 Cal. App.2d 697, 704 [49 Cal. Rptr. 266], certiorari denied, 385 U.S. 950 [17 L.Ed.2d 228, 87 S.Ct. 325]; People v. Rodriguez (1965) 238 Cal. App.2d 682, 688 [48 Cal. Rptr. 117], certiorari denied, 385 U.S. 951 [17 L.Ed.2d 228, 87 S.Ct. 328]; Trowbridge v. Superior Court (1956) 144 Cal. App.2d 13, 18 [300 P.2d 222]; see also People v. Dixon (1956) 46 Cal.2d 456, 459 [296 P.2d 557] [remanded for determination of validity of arrest]. In Harris v. United States (1947) 331 U.S. 145 [91 L.Ed. 1399, 67 S.Ct. 1098], search beyond the room in which the arrest was made (i.e., other rooms in the apartment) was held not to be unreasonable The court there stated ( id., p. 151 [91 L.Ed. pp. 1405-1406]) The opinions of this Court have clearly recognized that the search incident to arrest may, under appropriate circumstances, extend beyond the person of one arrested to include the premises under his immediate control. Incidental search made on different premises from where the arrest was effected, although within a few feet thereof, were held to be unreasonable in Shipley v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 818 [23 L.Ed.2d 732, 89 S.Ct. 2053] [arrest in car]; People v. Cruz, supra, 61 Cal.2d 861 [arrest in car]; People v. Henry (1967) 65 Cal.2d 842 [56 Cal. Rptr. 485, 423 P.2d 557] [arrest on sidewalk]; People v. Jasso (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 955, 965 [82 Cal. Rptr. 229] [arrest in car]; People v. Theobald (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 351, 355 [41 Cal. Rptr. 758] [arrest on motorcycle]. Also significant in each of those cases was the fact that search was of a private dwelling. Incidental searches made where there were both spatial and time differences were held to be unreasonable in Agnello v. United States (1925) 269 U.S. 20, 31 [70 L.Ed. 145, 148, 46 S.Ct. 4], and James v. Louisiana (1965) 382 U.S. 36 [15 L.Ed.2d 30, 86 S.Ct. 151] (several blocks from arrest to search of dwelling); Preston v. United States (1964) 376 U.S. 364, 368 [11 L.Ed.2d 777, 781, 84 S.Ct. 881] (arrest in car, car later searched elsewhere); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. 443 (arrest in house, car later searched elsewhere); Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 486 [11 L.Ed.2d 856, 859, 84 S.Ct. 889] (arrest in one state, search in another state two days later). (7b) Where the arrest and search are simultaneous in time and the spatial distance is minimal it may appear arbitrary to require that the premises be the same and that the premises be under the arrestee's possession and control; or to distinguish situations where the premises are the same but there is as here a distance of some 75 feet between the place of arrest and place of search. This is only an appearance of arbitrariness, however,  a phenomenon that often arises, as this court observed in People v. Cruz, supra, 61 Cal.2d 861, 866, as different fact situations arise and approach a line drawn by law. Prior to Chimel, in most instances distance was neither the sole nor the controlling consideration. ( People v. Aleria (1961) 193 Cal. App.2d 352, 355 [14 Cal. Rptr. 162].) Reasonableness of search incident to an arrest may depend on whether there is a substantial connection between the arrest and search, such that they may be held to be a continuous transaction. ( People v. Parker (1970) 11 Cal. App.3d 500, 507-508 [89 Cal. Rptr. 815].) Here, as in Parker, the connection between the arrest and search was continuous and plain for all to see. There was probable cause for arrest and for search; arrest and search were made simultaneously, on the same premises; the premises were under the control and possession of the arrestee; and the place searched had a closer connection to the arrest than merely being a part of the premises where the arrest took place. There were articulable reasons for Miller to conclude that the garage was the place where a felony had been and was being committed (sale, and possession for sale of heroin) and that specific evidence (heroin) would be found therein. (See People v. Rodriguez, supra, 238 Cal. App.2d 682, 690, cert. den., 385 U.S. 951 [17 L.Ed.2d 228, 87 S.Ct. 328]; People v. Aleria, supra, 193 Cal. App.2d 352, 355-360, cert. den., 374 U.S. 832 [10 L.Ed.2d 1055, 83 S.Ct. 1876]; People v. Kendall (1963) 212 Cal. App.2d 472, 477 [28 Cal. Rptr. 53].) There was no general rummaging among defendant's belongings. Search was limited and it had a definite object. Miller expected to find, and he found, contraband (heroin), instrumentalities (colored balloons), and evidence (white bag with balloons). He found no fruits (money) but he did find other incriminating evidence (milk sugar). Reasonableness of a search may depend on the degree of invasion of privacy which occurs. Here there was no thorough search of petitioner's home extended without reasonable justification beyond the place in which he was arrested condemned in Shipley ( supra, 395 U.S. 818, 820 [23 L.Ed.2d 732, 734-735]). (Italics added.) There was no search of a private dwelling condemned in Vale ( supra, 399 U.S. 30). (9) The degree of intrusion of a garage is significantly less than that of a man's house although both are subject to Fourth Amendment protections. The degree of intrusion here is significantly different than in People v. Hobbs (1969) 274 Cal. App.2d 402 [79 Cal. Rptr. 281]. In Hobbs there was probable cause for believing that the garage contained stolen goods and for obtaining a search warrant. The garage was located only 10 feet from the arrestee's dwelling, but the garage was padlocked and the arrest was made several miles away and an hour earlier. The warrantless search was properly held not to be incident to the arrest. The present case is also distinguishable from People v. Landry (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 370 [80 Cal. Rptr. 880]. There arrest was effected on a road near the house, and a warrantless search was made of a locked dwelling and of a detached locked shed an hour and 15 minutes after the arrest. In People v. Superior Court (Arketa) (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 122 [89 Cal. Rptr. 316], the arrest took place 20 feet from a closed shed. The shed was not owned by the arrestee, the officers had no reason to believe that it was under his possession and control, and a general search thereof, without a warrant and without consent, was held to be unreasonable. Warrantless search of a place of concealment in a yard adjacent to a private house was upheld as incident to a lawful arrest in People v. Medina [not this defendant] (opinion filed January 20, 1972) 6 Cal.3d 484 [99 Cal. Rptr. 630, 492 P.2d 686]. (10) The guiding principle is that enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 9 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 899, 88 S.Ct. 1868]: We have recently held that `the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places' ( Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable `expectation of privacy', id., at 361 (Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring), he is entitled to be freed from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Of course, the specific content and incidents of this right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted. For `what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures but unreasonable searches and seizures.' Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).... (Italics added.) In Katz v. United States ( supra, 389 U.S. 347, 350-353 [19 L.Ed.2d 576, 581-583]), the court emphasized that the doctrine of constitutionally protected areas cannot serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem. Under all the facts and circumstances of this case, considered in the light of Fourth Amendment principles enunciated by the United States Supreme Court as of the time of the arrest and search, it cannot be held that either the arrest or incidental search was unreasonable. Judgment is affirmed.