Opinion ID: 1189762
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instruction on Depraved Indifference Murder

Text: Jury instruction 5 was an elements instruction on second degree murder. That instruction states in part: The essential elements of the crime of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, as charged in the Information are as follows: 1. That the defendant, Frank Gene Powell, caused the death of Glen Harry Candland. 2. That he did so knowingly or intentionally, or, 3. That he did so while knowingly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another (Glen Harry Candland) and acted under circumstances that evidenced a depraved indifference to human life. This instruction is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) and (c). Powell first attacks instruction 8, which defined the term depraved indifference. This instruction states: The term depraved indifference is not specifically defined by statute. Thus, the phrase depraved indifference is a concept which must be left largely to the experience and common sense of the jury. To engage in conduct with a depraved indifference to human life, a person must do more than act recklessly, but he need not have as his conscious objective or desire to cause the result; nor, need he be aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Rather, the greatness of the risk which the defendant's actions create and the lack of justification for the creation of the risk is the test to be applied in determining whether the defendant's conduct evidences a depraved indifference to human life. In determining whether any defendant acted with depraved indifference, the circumstances under which the defendant acted are to be viewed objectively from the standpoint of a reasonable person and not subjectively from the state of such defendant's mind. (Emphasis added.) Powell contends that this instruction erroneously included the emphasized phrase that he need not be aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result. He argues that this language is contrary to this court's prior decisions concerning the term depraved indifference to human life. In State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), we reviewed a very similar depraved indifference jury instruction. We disapproved of the first paragraph of the instruction because common experience and common sense do not convey the statutory sense of the term depraved indifference nor would [the jury] impart a reasonable uniform meaning to that term. Id. at 261-62. Additionally, we were critical of paragraph 2 of the instruction because it did not state the gravity or degree of risk to human life that the defendant's conduct must knowingly create. We set out five factors to be included in jury instructions concerning depraved indifference murder: In sum, the jury should be instructed that to convict of depraved murder it must find (1) that the defendant acted knowingly (2) in creating a grave risk of death, (3) that the defendant knew the risk of death was grave, (4) which means a highly likely probability of death, and (5) that the conduct evidenced an utter callousness and indifference toward human life. Id. at 264. We concluded that the trial court had made clear in its instructions that the defendant had to act knowingly in creating a grave risk of death. We further held that while the gravity of the risk of death was not explained with quite the precision set out here, the instructions, nevertheless, were not essentially wrong, and we do not believe the jury was misled. Id. We affirmed the defendant's conviction of second degree murder. Instruction 8 in the instant case is nearly identical to the instruction given in Standiford that we disapproved in part and found wanting in another part. The trial court did not follow our direction in Standiford to instruct the jury that to convict of depraved murder, it must find the five elements enumerated above. Defendant's counsel made no objection to instruction 8, nor did he submit to the trial court a requested instruction which would have remedied any confusion or incompleteness in the instructions that were given. The question then arises whether there is here a manifest injustice, Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c), or plain error, Utah R.Evid. 103(d). In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993), we reiterated: [T]o establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined. Id. We stated that if any one of those requirements is not met, plain error is not established. Id. at 1209. The obviousness prong is related to the harmfulness prong. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n. 8 (Utah 1989). [T]he more harmful an error is, the more likely an appellate court is to conclude that it was objectively obvious, because a high degree of harmfulness might be expected to attract a trial court's attention. Id. We conclude that plain error is not found here because while in Standiford we disapproved of the instruction in part and found it inadequate in another part, the error did not rise to the level of reversible error. In view of that fact, we cannot tag the trial court with having committed plain error. However, we reiterate our direction in Standiford that the instruction not be used but that the jury be instructed more adequately as set forth in that case.