Opinion ID: 764753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Orders Denying and Granting Arbitration

Text: 16 United first appeals the district court's January order denying United's motion to compel arbitration regarding the 4.3 million pounds of paid-for seed. For the reasons stated above, that issue is moot. 4 17 We now reach the substance of the dispute. The district court conducted a two-day hearing on the arbitrability of the twenty-nine disputed invoices. The court then ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration on twelve invoices on which Lebanon had made partial payment, and denied arbitration for the remaining seventeen invoices. United appeals that portion of the order denying arbitration, and Lebanon cross-appeals that portion ordering arbitration. 18 We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(b) for an appeal of an interlocutory order denying arbitration. We review de novo the district court's decision to grant or deny arbitration. See Nordin v. Nutri/System, Inc., 897 F.2d 339, 344 (8th Cir.1990). The factual findings of the district court are reviewed for clear error. See id. Arbitration is a creature of contract. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). Without a clear and unmistakable delegation of the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator, the arbitrability of a dispute must be decided by the courts. See id. at 944. The relevant language from Rule XVI(1) of the ASTA Rules states: [A]ll differences which cannot be amicably resolved ... arising from a contract started or concluded under these Rules, shall first be decided by arbitration before it can be submitted to a court of law. The general phrase any controversy in an arbitration agreement does not satisfy the express delegation required by Kaplan. See McLaughlin Gormley King Co. v. Terminix Int'l Co., L.P., 105 F.3d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir.1997). We find that the phrase all differences in the arbitration clause at issue here is similarly too general to amount to an express delegation of the issue of arbitrability. Thus it was for the district court to determine arbitrability of this dispute. 19 Under the language of the arbitration agreement, the parties have a right to arbitration only as to disputes arising from a contract started or concluded under [the ASTA rules]. The contracts between United and Lebanon contain the language: This memo is subject to the trade rules of the American Seed Trade Association, thus effectively incorporating the ASTA arbitration provision into contracts between Lebanon and United. The district court properly concluded that there must first be a contract between the parties that is in dispute before any right to arbitration can arise. 5 20 To prove a contract, United offered sales memoranda in the form of contracts that it sent to Lebanon, and accompanying invoices. None of these are signed by Lebanon. United first argues that the disputed invoices and memoranda are addenda, or supplemental contracts to contract M-2020, and thus the arbitration clause in M-2020 gives it the right to present all the disputed invoices to an arbitration. In the alternative, United argues that each memoranda is a separate, valid, and enforceable contract, each providing for arbitration. 21 Contract M-2020 was for 1.25 million pounds of Kentucky 31. There is no dispute that all of this seed was shipped and paid for. The district court found that contract M-2020 was unambiguous as to the amount of seed it covered and that the contract in no way suggests that additional seed sales are contemplated under contract M-2020. United cannot create a relationship between contract M-2020 and the disputed invoices out of whole cloth simply by claiming that a relationship exists. 6 Thus the district court denied arbitration based on the arbitration agreement contained in contract M-2020. 22 United argues that once the court found that M-2020 was a valid contract with an arbitration clause, its inquiry should have ended with all issues being sent to arbitration. We disagree. The arbitration agreement provides relief for disputes arising from a contract started under the ASTA rules. Finding a valid contract under the ASTA rules is only the first step of the district court's inquiry. The court must also make sure that the dispute arises from that contract. When a court determines arbitrability of a dispute, it looks to more than the mere existence of a valid arbitration agreement. It also measures the scope of that agreement and determines whether the present dispute is included within its reach. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45; Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., Inc., 31 F.3d 692, 694-95 (8th Cir.1994). 23 United asserts that under Fleet Tire Service of North Little Rock v. Oliver Rubber Co., 118 F.3d 619 (8th Cir.1997), the arbitration clause at issue is broad rather than narrow, and as a result, the question of whether the claim relates to the contract with the arbitration clause is for the arbitrator to decide. United misconstrues the holding of Fleet Tire. In Fleet Tire, this court followed Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 704 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.1983), in recognizing a distinction between narrow and broad arbitration agreements. See Fleet Tire, 118 F.3d at 621. A court deciding arbitrability under a broad agreement leaves for the arbitrator the issue of whether the controversy in question relates to the agreement containing the arbitration clause, i.e., the scope of the clause. See id. However, there are significant differences between the arbitration clause in Fleet Tire and that contained in the ASTA Rules. The agreement in Fleet Tire read in pertinent part: Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement ... shall be settled by arbitration.... The arbitration provided for ... shall be the exclusive remedy for any dispute between [the parties], as a substitute for any and all legal remedies and proceedings that would otherwise be available to them. Id. at 620. Contrary to United's argument, it is not the phrase any controversy or claim which places the Fleet Tire clause in the broad category. The Fleet Tire court expressly relied on the additional and more general phrase relating to  to find that the arbitration clause was broad. See id. at 621. The arbitration agreement in this case has none of the mentioned distinguishing language and is therefore not a broad arbitration clause. Thus we find the district court properly determined whether the disputed invoices arose from contract M-2020. 24 Since United cannot compel arbitration of the disputed invoices on the basis of contract M-2020, it can do so only if the individual invoices and sales memoranda amount to valid contracts between the parties. From the evidence presented, the district court found that the parties changed their method of entering into a contract because of the volatility of the seed market. The new method provided for a series of smaller contracts. Lebanon would pay United for seed that United procured in the marketplace, processed and shipped to Lebanon's customer to fill an order. The parties did not intend to consummate a contract until United provided Lebanon with a bill of lading showing that seed had been delivered to Lebanon's customer. The disputed invoices were for seed that United purchased, processed, and placed in inventory for Lebanon. The disputed invoices did not have bills of lading showing shipment to a customer, and the seed was in fact not shipped to Lebanon's customers. Thus, the unpaid invoices and accompanying memoranda are not contracts between the parties. Without a contract from which the dispute arises, there can be no applicable arbitration clause. 25 United asserts that the invoices and sales memoranda it sent to Lebanon are sufficient to create valid contracts under Missouri law. United relies on that portion of the Uniform Commercial Code that allows a confirmation sent from one merchant to another to satisfy the writing requirement of the statute of frauds. 7 United argues that, by operation of the statute, Lebanon is bound by the contracts because it did not object to them within ten days. This argument must fail. The only impact of the statute is to eliminate the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense, a defense Lebanon did not raise. Without more, a binding contract cannot be created by simply sending documents to a party who then does not respond. The burden remains on United to establish the existence of the underlying contract evidenced by the writing, and the terms of that agreement. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 400.2-201, comment 3. We agree with the district court that United has not established the existence of a contract from which the unpaid disputed invoices arise. 26 Lebanon cross-appeals that portion of the district court's order directing arbitration to proceed on the partially-paid invoices. Lebanon's sole argument is that United's demand for arbitration over the disputed invoices was untimely. We have no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. This court has previously recognized the strong pro-arbitration tilt of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. See Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 15 F .3d 93, 96 (8th Cir.1994). Although interlocutory orders denying arbitration are appealable, interlocutory orders directing arbitration to proceed are not. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1), (b)(2); In re Pisgah Contractors, Inc., 117 F.3d 133, 135-36 (4th Cir.1997). An order granting arbitration may be appealed if it is a final order to certified by the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The issue of arbitrability in this case is not independent, but rather embedded in the larger action concerning the final disposition of the preliminary injunction and United's remaining counterclaims--issues yet to be resolved by the district court. In Gammaro we adopted a bright line rule that an embedded proceeding cannot give rise to a final decision subject to section 16(a)(3) review. Gammaro, 15 F.3d at 96. Lebanon's appeal is neither certified by the district court, nor final, thus the order is interlocutory and not appealable for that portion granting arbitration. See id.; Pisgah Contractors, 117 F.3d at 135-36; McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 981 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.1993).