Opinion ID: 804288
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tullock’s Intent

Text: This element is easily satisfied. Chattman has shown that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Tullock intended that Chattman be disciplined. Both Smith and Chandler denied making any recommendation about disciplining Chattman for the horseplay incident during their initial meeting with Tullock. Yet, Tullock called Lane and informed him that “Ben [Chandler] and I were both recommending termination and Scotty [Smith] as well.” After being told by Lane to conduct a further investigation, but without being informed of a disciplinary 15 No. 10-5306 Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am. Page 16 determination, Tullock then emailed Verbruggen, claiming that Lane had agreed to terminate Chattman during their phone conversation. Tullock made these recommendations knowing them to be false and notwithstanding the fact that horseplay was common at the plant and several white employees had engaged in horseplay without being terminated. The Staub Court made clear that [a]nimus and responsibility for the adverse action can both be attributed to the earlier agent [Tullock] if the adverse action is the intended consequence of that agent’s discriminatory conduct. So long as the agent intends, for discriminatory reasons, that the adverse action occur, he has the scienter required to be liable under [the Act]. 131 S. Ct. at 1192. There can be little doubt that Tullock desired Chattman’s termination when he made his recommendation and fabricated the agreement of the other supervisors in his communications with Lane and Verbruggen. We do not believe the fact that Chattman was ultimately issued a final written warning rather than terminated alters this or the proximate cause analysis.11