Opinion ID: 2634763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The ICA Erred In Characterizing the Probable Cause Standard.

Text: In describing the probable cause standard, the ICA made the following statement: The probable cause standard ... is less demanding than ... proof by a preponderance of the evidence. This statement improperly characterizes the probable cause determination as set forth by this court, and we therefore reject it. This court, in describing the probable cause determination, has stated: Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within one's knowledge and of which one has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed. This requires more than a mere suspicion but less than a certainty.  Carlisle ex rel. State v. Ten Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Seven Dollars in U.S. Currency ($10,447.00), 104 Hawai`i 323, 331, 89 P.3d 823, 831 (2004) (quoting State v. Detroy, 102 Hawai`i 13, 18, 72 P.3d 485, 490 (2003)) (emphasis added). [3] This standard has two components. The first sentence describes the standard for determining the presence of probable cause. The second sentence describes the quantum of proof necessary to satisfy the standard.
We have stated that probable cause requires more than a mere suspicion but less than a certainty. $10,447.00, 104 Hawai`i at 331, 89 P.3d at 831 (quoting Detroy, 102 Hawai`i at 18, 72 P.3d at 490); see also State v. Brighter, 63 Haw. 95, 101, 621 P.2d 374, 379 (1980) (stating that probable cause requires more than a mere suspicion but less than a certainty); State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142, 433 P.2d 593, 597 (1967) (It is clear that the term probable cause, according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Certainty, of course, is considerably greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence, which means that the existence of a fact is more likely than not. This court's formulation of the quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause is thus more demanding than that suggested by the ICA, which would lower the bar for the presence of probable cause to less than a preponderance of the evidence as a per se matter. The ICA, in support of its formulation, cites to the plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), which states that probable cause does not demand any showing that [a belief that a crime has been committed] be correct or more likely true than false. [4] While it is helpful to look at United States Supreme Court precedent when interpreting a provision of the Hawai`i Constitution that is parallel to the federal constitution, [5] this court has emphasized that federal decisions do not... prevent this court from extending greater protection in interpreting the state constitution where we determine it to be appropriate. Texeira, 50 Haw. at 142, 433 P.2d at 597. This court has also repeatedly insisted that as the ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawai`i Constitution, we are free to give broader protection under the Hawai`i Constitution than that given by the federal constitution. State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai`i 382, 398, 910 P.2d 695, 711 n. 14 (1996) (quoting State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai`i 17, 36, 881 P.2d 504, 523 (1994)). Thus, because this court's interpretation of probable cause affords more expansive protection under the Hawai`i Constitution, to the extent that the plurality holding in Brown is in conflict with this interpretation, we reject it. The ICA also cites Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), for the proposition that the probable cause standard is less demanding than the preponderance of the evidence standard. The ICA, however, misinterprets Gates. The Gates Court said that [f]inely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the probable cause decision. 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Contrary to the ICA's characterization, this statement does not imply that probable cause is less demanding than proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, it merely states that probable cause is a less finely-tuned standard. Gates, therefore, does not address the requisite quantum of proof in the establishment of probable cause; rather, it addresses how the probable cause determination should be made, which will be discussed next.
We have long held that the standard for determining probable cause is a practical and nontechnical concept, which involves a balancing of the citizens' right to be free from unreasonable interference with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime, and the needs of the community to be protected by law enforcement: [T]he long-prevailing standards on probable cause: ... seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. State v. Delmondo, 54 Haw. 552, 555, 512 P.2d 551, 553 (1973) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). See also State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 143, 433 P.2d 593, 597 (1967) (The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests.). We believe that the probable cause standard of requiring more than a mere suspicion but less than a certainty provides the flexibility necessary in determining probable cause, and preserves the necessary balance between the competing interests of law-abiding citizens and law enforcement. The ICA's attempt to water down the probable cause standard would unreasonably disturb this balance. We expressly reject the ICA's formulation, and reconfirm that probable cause for arrest requires more than a mere suspicion, but less than a certainty. Accordingly, we vacate Section III.A. of the ICA's Opinion to the extent that it improperly narrows the probable cause standard as expressed by this court.