Opinion ID: 1478174
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Town's Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: [¶ 20] Governmental entities are immune from suit pursuant to the MTCA, subject to specific, limited exceptions enumerated in section 8104-A. Maynard v. Comm'r of Corr., 681 A.2d 19, 23 (Me.1996). Statutory exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed. Id. [¶ 21] Priscilla Reid argues that the Town waived its sovereign immunity through the indemnification clause in the Agreement with Waste Management. In Diamond International Corp. v. Sullivan & Merritt, Inc., we held that an indemnification clause contained in a contract, which clearly and specifically contained a waiver of immunity, could be sufficient to waive the immunity enjoyed by employers under the Workers' Compensation Act. 493 A.2d 1043, 1048 (Me.1985). The present case involves the MTCA, not the Workers' Compensation Act, and therefore, Diamond International is not controlling. Furthermore, the language contained in the indemnification clause in the Agreement between the Town and Waste Management is nothing more than a contractual agreement between two parties to hold each other harmless for the negligent acts of their own employees. It does not constitute a waiver of the Town's MTCA immunity to benefit a third party. [¶ 22] Our opinion in Adriance v. Town of Standish, 687 A.2d 238 (Me.1996), addressing a MTCA claim for an injury at a transfer station also is of no help to Priscilla Reid's claim. The principal issue in Adriance, discretionary function immunity, id. at 239, is not at issue in this case. Furthermore, in Adriance, the transfer station was deemed a public building pursuant to 14 M.R.S. 8104-A(2). Id. at 240. It was permanent, fully enclosed and completely open to the public. Id. The transfer station here is an open area with a portable trash hopper. It is not a building, and Priscilla Reid does not claim otherwise, basing her claim on the proposition that the dumpster was machinery or equipment, listed in 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(1)(G). [¶ 23] A governmental entity will be liable for its negligent acts or omissions in the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle, special mobile equipment, trailer, aircraft, watercraft, snowmobile, as well as any [o]ther machinery or equipment. 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(1)(A) to (G). Our previous decisions give a narrow interpretation to the phrase [o]ther machinery and equipment, and establish that dumpsters do not fall into that category. [¶ 24] In New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Department of Transportation, we recognized that the items listed in section 8104-A(1)(A) through (F) have certain similar characteristics: they are capable of transportation, mobile, likely to come into contact with the general public, constitute fairly ordinary transportation devices with which people have a degree of familiarity, accidents with them are common, insurance is readily available, and they are not affixed to a permanent structure. 1999 ME 67, ¶ 8, 728 A.2d 673, 676. In order for a government entity to be liable for the negligent use or operation of [o]ther machinery or equipment, however, the  risk from the negligent use of the `other machinery or equipment' [must] be comparable to the risk that results from the negligent use of the vehicles listed in section 8104-A(1)(A) through (F). Id. ¶ 6, 728 A.2d at 675 (emphasis added). The major risk from the negligent use of vehicles specifically enumerated in section 8104-A(1)(A) through (F) is that they will be driven or transported in locations where the general public is exposed to the possibility of a collision and resulting harm. Id. ¶ 9, 728 A.2d at 676. [¶ 25] Priscilla Reid argues that dumpsters share similar characteristics with the vehicles enumerated in section 8104(A)(1) (A) through (F) because they are capable of transportation, mobile, likely to come into contact with the general public, and are not affixed to a permanent structure. However, dumpsters do not have the power to move on their own, and certainly would not be considered ordinary transportation devices. In addition, accidents with dumpsters are not nearly as common as accidents with vehicles, and dumpsters are unlikely to be insured. [¶ 26] Finally, the complaint alleges negligence in the placement of the dumpsters and in the failure to maintain adequate safety measures around them. Without proper placement and safety precautions, there is a risk that someone could be injured from falling into, or backing a vehicle into, a dumpster. This differs significantly from the risk of injury associated with the vehicles listed in section 8104(A)(1)(A) through (F). The major risk posed by motor vehicles, aircraft, snowmobiles, etc. is that they will be negligently operated on public ways and collide with the public, resulting in personal injury or property damage. In contrast, the harm alleged in the present case did not result from a collision with the dumpster, but rather, from the use of a dumpster while in a fixed position. [¶ 27] Because [t]he Legislature did not intend the general phrase `other machinery or equipment' . . . to include all other possible machinery and equipment that is negligently owned or operated by a governmental unit and could therefore cause some form of personal injury or property damage, New Orleans Tanker Corp., 1999 ME 67, ¶ 10, 728 A.2d at 676, we affirm summary judgment in favor of the Town.