Opinion ID: 3062246
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Baseline

Text: BCA first argues that the Forest Service improperly assumed that the effects created by “previous illegal users are not significant,” 4 Aplt. Br. at 30, without “detailing what those impacts were or why they were not significant.” Reply Br. at 24. But the Forest Service made no such assumption, and its EA recognizes the impact of prior use. BCA’s argument, in essence, asks the Forest Service to assume the Albany Trail never existed as a baseline for the NEPA analysis. 3 (...continued) alternative has new trail designation that crosses three areas identified as having characteristics of riparian, wetlands and potentially fens. Round leaf sundew occurs in sedge dominated fens. Sedges are often palatable to livestock, packstock and big game, therefore this species could be indirectly subject to browsing and/or trampling impacts. In general, livestock avoid fens with quaking mat components because of the instability but will create or use paths worn into the fen vegetation to reach water. Concentrated livestock use in fen habitat could alter the hydrology and water quality of this habitat.” (citations omitted)) 4 It is worth noting that, although the motorized use was not authorized by the 2003 Forest Plan, it does not constitute an “illegal” use. -8- NEPA requires analysis of “major Federal actions.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332. BCA suggests that the Forest Service failed to prevent certain past uses and accordingly asks the Forest Service to consider the impact not only of its actions but also of its inaction in preventing harm. Governmental inaction will generally not constitute a major federal action “where that failure to act is not otherwise subject to review by the courts or administrative agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act or other laws.” Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 198 F.3d 297, 301 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (defining a “major federal action”)). Thus, “NEPA cannot be used to make indirectly reviewable a discretionary decision not to take an enforcement action where the decision itself is not reviewable under the APA or the substantive statute.” Scarborough Citizens Protecting Res. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 674 F.3d 97, 102 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Discretionary agency action that does not alter the status quo does not require an EIS”). BCA does not independently challenge the Forest Service’s response to previous, unauthorized use under the Administrative Procedure Act or any other substantive statute, and, in that context, BCA may not use NEPA to create an independent pathway for federal courts to review agency inaction. In general, NEPA analysis uses a no-action alternative as a baseline for measuring the effects of the proposed action. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (requiring that the agency assess a no-action alternative). “The no action alternative may be -9- thought of in terms of continuing with the present course of action until that action is changed. It establishes a baseline against which the proposed action and its alternatives may be measured.” George Cameron Coggins and Robert L. Glicksman, Discussion of Alternatives—The “No Action” Alternative, 2 Pub. Nat. Resources L. § 17:47 (2nd ed. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, according to BCA, the Forest Service must use the condition of the area before motorcycle usage, rather than the status quo, as its baseline. We have rejected this type of argument before. In Custer County Action Association v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2001), the petitioners argued that a federal agency had erroneously included “unlawful activity”—specifically lowlevel airplane overflights—in its no-action alternative and that a “‘true’ no-action alternative” may only reflect the impacts of lawful activity. Id. at 1040. We were not persuaded and held that, “[i]n requiring consideration of a no-action alternative, the Council on Environmental Quality intended that agencies compare the potential impacts of the proposed major federal action to the known impacts of maintaining the status quo. In other words, the current level of activity is used as a benchmark.” Id. (citations omitted). We also identified the petitioner’s argument as a back door challenge to past agency actions: “The requirement to consider a no-action alternative does not provide Petitioners a vehicle in which to -10- pursue allegations that past [agency] actions received insufficient environmental analysis. The time has passed to challenge past actions.” Id. 5 For the same reasons, the Forest Service did not violate NEPA in considering the effects of past usage on fens as part of its no-action alternative. The Forest Service properly compared its proposed plan to its no-action alternative—a plan that recognized the effects of previous trail use. Other courts have concluded that, once the agency authorizes a user-created route, the agency may be required to assess the impacts of that authorization. See, e.g., Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Connell, 725 F.3d 988, 1008 (9th Cir. 2013) (expressing that a Bureau of Land Management analysis was unsatisfactory in part because it failed to assess the future impact of designating existing user-created routes). But as we explain below, the Forest Service did, in fact, sufficiently evaluate future impacts of its decision to authorize use of the Albany Trail. Thus, the Forest Service properly employed existing usage as the basis for its no-action alternative and the point of reference for measuring significant impacts. 5 In a case with a fact pattern similar to the instant case, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected this type of argument. Pryors Coal. v. Weldon, 551 F. App’x 426 (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). That court held the Forest Service did not err in measuring the impact of its action from the status quo, which included routes that had not been the subject of prior NEPA analysis. Id. at 429. -11-