Opinion ID: 853847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay and Confrontation Clause Issues

Text: Simmons also contends that the trial court erred when it overruled a hearsay objection to Fuqua's report of Rashida's statement that Rob [Simmons] killed R.B. [Brown]. The trial court admitted the testimony as an excited utterance under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(2). Hearsay is admissible under this rule when the statement relates to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. The issue is whether the declarant was still under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event when the statement was made. Yamobi v. State, 672 N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (Ind.1996). Here, Fuqua testified that she went outside when she heard gunshots, and her daughter Rashida was screaming, [h]e killed him. Fuqua brought Rashida in the house, where the child told her mother that Simmons killed Brown. Rashida's statements were made within a minute of the shooting. Simmons contends that Rashida was not acting while under stress because Fuqua said she had to calm Rashida down. It was well within the trial court's discretion to conclude that Rashida, eight years old, was still incapable of thoughtful reflection one minute after witnessing five gun shots and a death.
Simmons next contends that even if the declarant's statement falls within the hearsay exception, the statement is still barred by the Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution because the declarant, Rashida, could have been subjected to cross-examination, and that unavailability of the declarant is a constitutional requirement for the admission of hearsay. [1] He contends that in almost all of our previous holdings regarding the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, the declarant was a murder victim and thus unavailable to testify. See Taylor v. State, 697 N.E.2d 51 (Ind.1998); Montgomery v. State, 694 N.E.2d 1137 (Ind. 1998); Yamobi, 672 N.E.2d at 1345. In this case, however, the declarant was alive and in the jurisdiction at the time of the trial. Simmons, however, did not object on Confrontation Clause grounds during the trial; he objected only that Rashida's statement occurred after a calming down period that followed the shooting. A defendant may not raise one ground for objection at trial and argue a different ground on appeal. Willsey v. State, 698 N.E.2d 784, 793 (Ind.1998) (citing Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308, 316 (Ind.1993)). Moreover, the crux of Rashida's statementthat Simmons shot Brownwas uncontested. Two other witnesses saw Simmons shoot Brown. Simmons also made clear, both at trial and in his appellate brief, that the issue in this case was intent, not mistaken identity, and that the shooting was in self-defense. The hearsay statements concerned only the identity of the perpetrator of the crime, not his motive, so cross-examination would accomplish nothing. Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause claim is neither preserved nor prejudicial.