Opinion ID: 200940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: R. at 389 n.1.

Text: The principal opinion contends that such cases must have been wrongly decided in light of the 1987 advisory committee notes to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008, which emphasize express consent. See Op. at 8 n.2. That argument, however, is undercut by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Roell v. Withrow, 123 S. Ct. 1696 (2003), in which the Court held that consent to proceedings before a federal magistrate judge can be implied from a party's litigation conduct. Id. at 1703. In Roell, as in this case, a federal rule interpreting the underlying statute required advance, written consent from both parties. Id. at 1701. As in this case, that rule was not satisfied. Nevertheless, the Roell Court held that under the terms of the statute itself, implied consent was all that was required. Id. at 1703. The same logic applies under § 157(c), which requires only consent, not express consent. Moreover, Congress knew how to require express consent when it wanted that result -- it did so in § 157 only a few paragraphs later. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (express consent is required from all parties -38- before the bankruptcy court may hold a jury trial). In light of Roell and Congress's calculated choice of words in § 157, the principal opinion's restrictive interpretation of the consent requirement in § 157(c) is unjustified. Under the view adopted by the principal opinion today, a party's complete failure to object to core treatment is not sufficient to show consent. That position, if adopted by this court, would place this circuit directly in conflict with the views of at least five of our sister circuits. See In re Tex. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 52 F.3d 1330, 1337 (5th Cir. 1995) (A party who fails to object to a bankruptcy court's assumption of core jurisdiction consents to that court's entry of final judgment.); Abramowitz v. Palmer, 999 F.2d 1274, 1280 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding implied consent where [n]either party object[ed] to the bankruptcy court's entering a final judgment); In re Johnson, 960 F.2d 396, 403-04 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding implied consent because the parties failed to object to the bankruptcy court's determination of the matters in dispute); In re Daniels-Head, 819 F.2d at 919 (failure to raise a timely objection to core treatment constitutes implied consent); In re Men's Sportswear, Inc., 834 F.2d 1134, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1987) (party's failure to object to bankruptcy court's exercise of core jurisdiction despite multiple opportunities to lodge such an objection can only be construed as implied -39- consent).21 The leading treatise on bankruptcy law likewise concludes that the failure to object to core treatment should be enough to show consent. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy § 3.02[6][b] (rev. 15th ed. 2003) (It is unstated, but probably implied in section 157(b)(3), and it has been held, that failure to make timely objection to the characterization of the proceeding as a core proceeding will be deemed a consent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to enter dispositive orders and judgments in like manner as section 157(c)(2).); id. § 3.03[4] (The effect of failure to interpose an objection [to core treatment] at the pleading stage should be consent to the final order being entered