Opinion ID: 381797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of foia exemption 3

Text: 7 In reviewing the district court's decision, we first look at whether the court properly applied the statutes cited by the CIA as grounds for invoking FOIA Exemption 3. This exemption protects from disclosure those matters that are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld . . .. 6 8 This court has consistently held sections 403(d)(3) and 403g of Title 50 to be exempting statutes of the type described in FOIA Exemption 3. 7 Section 403(d)(3) provides in pertinent part: That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. 8 Section 403g further provides for the exemption of the CIA from any law that requires disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. 9 9 The district court properly applied a standard exempting under 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) those documents that the Agency demonstrates can reasonably be expected to lead to unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. 10 The Agency attempted to satisfy this standard by means of evidence presented in the deposition of John F. Blake, Deputy Director for Administration for the CIA, 11 and in affidavits from Blake 12 and from Robert E. Owen, Information Review Officer for the CIA. 13 In their statements these officials presented evidence pertaining to disclosure of the two types of information under dispute, the names of attorneys retained for covert CIA activities and the legal fees paid to them by the CIA.
10 Concerning the disclosure of names of attorneys, Deputy Director Blake testified at a deposition that each attorney connected with covert CIA activities and implicated by plaintiff's FOIA request was an intelligence method within the meaning of section 403(d)(3), and that identification of such attorneys could reasonably be expected to lead to the disclosure of other intelligence sources and methods. 14 Both CIA officials explained in their statements that disclosure of attorney names could result in harm to the individuals identified, in harm to the CIA's efforts to recruit other personnel for covert intelligence-related operations, and in harm to other intelligence sources and methods through the providing of useful leads to the intelligence agencies of hostile powers. 15 Based on the affidavits and deposition, the district court concluded that the disclosure of attorney names, even with the deletion of details tending to identify the underlying transaction, could reasonably be expected to lead to unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. 16 11 In reviewing this decision of the district court, we note initially that Congress has indicated that courts should give substantial weight to such agency statements while conducting a de novo review of agency decisions that withhold information on the basis of FOIA Exemption 1. 17 The logic of this judicial review standard applies equally to all national security FOIA cases, whether they arise formally under Exemption 1 or Exemption 3. 18 In past cases this court has interpreted the proper means of applying the substantial weight standard to Exemption 1 and Exemption 3 cases. We have held that summary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith. 19 12 If the agency's statements meet this standard, the court is not to conduct a detailed inquiry to decide whether it agrees with the agency's opinions; to do so would violate the principle of affording substantial weight to the expert opinion of the agency. 20 Judges, moreover, lack the expertise necessary to second-guess such agency opinions in the typical national security FOIA case. Within this limited standard for de novo review, we find that the CIA affidavits and deposition provide more than ample evidence to show the plausibility of the alleged potential harm, in a manner that is reasonably detailed rather than conclusory. 13 Appellant has presented no evidence to contradict the Agency or to show Agency bad faith. On appeal appellant rests on an argument that the Agency's explanations are conclusory, speculative, and insufficient to carry the Agency's burden of proof under a de novo standard of review in the district court. 21 A summary of the details presented by the CIA, however, demonstrates that appellant's argument has no merit, and that the Agency's showing of potential harm is not only plausible but very convincing. 14 First, the CIA statements show that the disclosure of the identity of an attorney doing work for the CIA might expose him to adverse action from hostile powers. Attorneys performing services connected to CIA activities in foreign countries of course face the harshest risk from exposure of their activities, as the CIA affidavits in this case explain. 22 Exposure of a CIA operative in a foreign country can further lead to embarrassment for the United States and disruption of relations with foreign countries. 23 Though the hazards for American attorneys are not so great, public disclosure of an affiliation with the CIA may have adverse consequences for them as well. 24 15 Second, the CIA's inability to protect the anonymity of its agents in any part of the world is a strong disincentive to those who are considering future employment or continued affiliation with the CIA. 25 Deputy Director Blake stated in his deposition that he had personal knowledge of at least two United States attorneys who had been cooperative with us in a classified relationship who, based on continuing disclosures in the last several years, have asked that we would withdraw from the relationship with them. 26 16 Finally, as Deputy Director Blake stated in his affidavit, the primary reason for withholding attorney's identities who are agents of the CIA in intelligence activities is that such disclosure will tend to reveal details of those activities. 27 Blake elaborated on this concern in his deposition: 17 If the name appears in the press, the name is available then to representatives of hostile, foreign intelligence services working in this country who, by a variety of techniques, can undertake courses of action to ascertain what other contacts, what other locations, and then arrive at determinations whether he is doing any other function for the Central Intelligence Agency. 28 18 The functions endangered by such disclosures include legal name changes for defectors, the creation of commercial entities, acquisitions of real estate, and settlements of affairs of deceased CIA operatives overseas. 29 All these functions are performed by lawyers and often require secrecy. Fears of potential harm from unauthorized disclosure of such functions are certainly reasonable, even from the perspective of someone not trained in intelligence operations. 19 Appellant further contends that the CIA's projection of potential harm is pure speculation, and that the CIA is merely hypothesizing a possible way in which intelligence methods might be revealed. 30 A court must take into account, however, that any affidavit or other agency statement of threatened harm to national security will always be speculative to some extent, in the sense that it describes a potential future harm rather than an actual past harm. If we were to require an actual showing that particular disclosures of the identities of CIA-retained attorneys have in the past led to identifiable concrete harm, we would be overstepping by a large measure the proper role of a court in a national security FOIA case. The question that Congress has placed before us is only whether the predicted danger is a reasonable expectation; and it is precisely on this point that a court, lacking expertise in the substantive matters at hand, must give substantial weight to agency statements, so long as they are plausible and not called into question by contrary evidence or evidence of agency bad faith. 20 In the present case, a stricter standard for the showing of potential harm could very seldom be satisfied. As Deputy Director Blake stated, when a hostile intelligence service is properly doing its job it can carry out various counter-intelligence operations against covert CIA operations, without drawing attention to itself, and we have no way of knowing. 31 Appellant's argument that the CIA has not shown any past instances of concrete harm to agency-retained lawyers 32 ignores this fact, and also ignores that the purpose of national security exemptions to the FOIA is to protect intelligence sources before they are compromised and harmed, not after: The problem is to ensure in advance, and by proper procedures, that information detrimental to national interest is not published. 33 21 To summarize our conclusion on the issue of exemption for names of CIA-retained attorneys, we find that the CIA has submitted reasonably detailed, nonconclusory statements showing the applicability of section 403(d)(3), that these statements are plausible on their face, and that the record contains no contrary evidence or evidence of Agency bad faith. Once substantial weight is given to these statements, there remain no substantial and material facts in dispute. The district court's grant of summary judgment is therefore entirely appropriate on the issue of disclosing names of attorneys. 34
22 On the issue of legal fees, the district court found nondisclosure to be justified by both section 403(d)(3) and section 403g of title 50. Based on CIA statements, the court concluded that disclosure of legal fees could reasonably be expected to lead to unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods under section 403(d)(3), because trained foreign personnel could gain useful insights from such information. 35 23 On review we apply the same standards described above for the issue of attorney names. Appellant has not offered evidence to contradict the Agency or to show Agency bad faith. The issue is whether the Agency's statements contain reasonable specificity of detail to support the district court's application of section 403(d)(3). 24 The Agency's general rationale for refusing to disclose rates and total fees paid to attorneys is that such information could give leads to information about covert activities that constitute intelligence methods. For example, if a large legal bill is incurred in a covert operation, a trained intelligence analyst could reason from the size of the legal bill to the size and nature of the operation. 36 This scenario raises a reasonable possibility of harm to the covert activity following from disclosure of the size of legal fees. 37 We note that the CIA's showing of potential harm here is not so great as its showing concerning attorney names. We must take into account, however, that each individual piece of intelligence information, much like a piece of jigsaw puzzle, may aid in piecing together other bits of information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself. When combined with other small leads, the amount of a legal fee could well prove useful for identifying a covert transaction. Viewed in this light, the Agency's statements offer sufficient plausible detail for a court to accord substantial weight to the statements and accept the Agency's expert judgment on the potential effects of disclosing legal fees. We therefore affirm the district court's application of section 403(d)(3) to this matter.
25 The district court also found legal fees to be protected from FOIA disclosure by section 403g of Title 50. This section, quoted above, 38 protects against the disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. The district court held that CIA expenditures for legal fees fall within this language, since they are in the nature of salaries. 39 Appellant contends that CIA-retained attorneys are not personnel employed by the CIA and that payments to them are not salaries. 40 26 Concerning the first of these contentions, it is true that the CIA's standard retainer agreement defines the status of a retained attorney as independent contractor and disclaims any employee-employer relationship. 41 There are of course lines of cases, cited by appellant, that distinguish between employees and independent contractors for various legal purposes. 42 We note, however, that section 403g does not use the term of art employee but rather the phrase personnel employed by the agency. To determine the proper meaning of this phrase in context, we must examine the indications of congressional intent rather than apply a formalistic distinction between employee and independent contractor which was created for legal contexts far removed from section 403g. 27 Section 403g itself contains language indicating Congress's intent. Congress enacted the section to promote the interests of security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, and to further the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure . . . . 43 The foreign intelligence activities of the United States are frequently carried out by personnel who have no formal or regular employee status with the CIA. The nature of the CIA's intelligence function often requires the services of persons affiliated with the Agency only temporarily; this is obviously the case with the services of private attorneys needed from time to time in connection with clandestine CIA activities. Such employment relationships are integral and essential to many Agency functions. 28 Only by recognizing such personnel as employed by the Agency within the language of section 403g can we give reasonable effect to the congressional intent in that section to protect the security of foreign intelligence activities and to further the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The further congressional intent to protect the confidential nature of the Agency's functions 44 leaves no room for a fine and formalistic distinction between functions performed by CIA staff attorneys operating under cover and functions performed by private attorneys pursuant to contract. A contrary interpretation could seriously impair the CIA's ability to conduct classified operations with temporarily affiliated personnel. 29 These same expressions of congressional intent preclude an interpretation of the term salaries that would include only payments to regularly employed CIA staff personnel. Payments to clandestine temporarily affiliated personnel are at least as, probably more, likely to reveal intelligence sources and methods as are payments to CIA staff. To give section 403g the scope Congress evidently intended, we must include as salaries any payments made in compensation for services performed by personnel employed by the Agency. 30 In light of express congressional intent, we hold that such payments to CIA-retained attorneys are in the nature of salaries to personnel employed by the CIA, and are therefore within the listing of specific information protected from disclosure under section 403g. The requested information about legal fees is thus within the narrow interpretation of section 403g described in this court's previous opinions. 45 31 We therefore affirm the district court's exemption of legal fees under both section 403g and section 403(d)(3) of Title 50. Summary judgment was appropriate under these circumstances because, giving substantial weight to the Agency statements under the standards described above, the CIA has succeeded in carrying its burden of showing that no substantial and material facts remain in dispute and that the Agency is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 46