Opinion ID: 2356070
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Equitable Remedy of Contribution

Text: Contribution is based on the principle that a party who discharges a liability shared with another should not bear the sole obligation for payment. Hall v. George A. Fuller Co., 621 A.2d 848, 850 n. 3 (D.C.1993). In the District of Columbia, contribution is an equitable remedy, see, e.g., id.; Paul, 758 A.2d at 49 n. 16, that has been established by case precedent rather than by statute. District of Columbia v. Washington Hospital Center, 722 A.2d 332, 336 (D.C.1998) (en banc). Under these precedents, it is now well settled that there is a right of equal contribution among joint tortfeasors. Id. As we explained in Paul, the right of contribution does not arise `without a finding that the party seeking contribution is a joint tortfeasor along with the party from whom contribution is sought.' 758 A.2d at 46 (citing Hall, 621 A.2d at 850). Liability as a joint tortfeasor may be either judicially established, Drs. Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C. v. Burke, 917 A.2d 1110, 1112 n. 1 (D.C.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), or conceded by a stipulation of all parties. Berg v. Footer, 673 A.2d 1244, 1251 (D.C.1996). We previously determined that, if GWU had a right to contribution at all, it would have become enforceable . . . when it agreed to pay Paul $2,000,000[,] . . . while the litigation against Dr. Bier was still in progress. . . . Paul, 758 A.2d at 47. In light of its mid-trial respite from the litigation, GWU does not claim that its liability as a joint tortfeasor was actually adjudicated, nor does it assert that there was a stipulation of liability by all parties. Nevertheless, GWU now insists that it is a joint tortfeasor. This belated, self-serving, and unilateral assertion of responsibility does not establish the joint liability necessary to trigger a right of contribution. Cf. Washington v. Washington Hospital Center, 579 A.2d 177, 189 (D.C.1990) (we decline to hold that allegations in pleadings can replace findings of fact for purposes of applying a credit against the verdict intended to substitute for the non-settling defendant's contribution claim). Even if Ms. Paul is bound by the settlement agreement to support GWU's current claim that it is liable, that would not amount to a stipulation of all parties. Cf. Berg, 673 A.2d at 1251 n. 13 (distinguishing a stipulation by only the plaintiff and a settling defendant). Perhaps GWU could have asked to remain in the case after the settlement so that joint liability could be established by the jury's verdict or by the court. See, e.g., Paul, 758 A.2d at 45-46 (noting that if a settling defendant has a right to contribution from a non-settling defendant, it must have available a procedural mechanism to establish the predicate joint tortfeasor liability). Cf. Rose v. Associated Anesthesiologists, 163 U.S.App. D.C. 246, 247, 501 F.2d 806, 807 (1974) (while the jury trial proceeded against the non-settling hospital, the court, without a jury, tried the cross-claims of the settling defendants against the Hospital for indemnification or contribution); but see id. at 250, 501 F.2d at 810 (settling defendants cannot equitably insist on a continuing involvement in the litigation for the purpose of invoking contribution to lessen their payment when they have no exposure to an increase in payment if contribution should be sought from them). [4] In addition, GWU might have negotiated a settlement that extinguished the liability of all defendants, but it did not. Indeed, as noted above, it agreed with Ms. Paul that nothing contained [in the settlement agreement was] intended to release or shall have the effect of releasing [Dr. Bier]. We decline to treat anything that has happened thus far as establishing that GWU and Dr. Bier are joint tortfeasors. GWU argues in the alternative that it should be allowed to try the malpractice case anew, seeking this time to establish that it and Dr. Bier are joint tortfeasors. [5] It urges this court to hold that settling defendants are entitled to seek contribution from non-settling defendants, even when their liability has not been established and the stipulation has not been agreed to by all the parties. However, we continue, as we did in Paul, to reserve the issue of whether (and, if so, under what circumstances) a settling defendant has a right to contribution. See Paul, 758 A.2d at 46; see also District of Columbia v. Washington Hospital Center, 722 A.2d at 342-43 & nn. 13-15; Berg, 673 A.2d at 1253-54 n. 17. [6] For the purposes of this opinion, we assume that a settling defendant does have that right, and that there must be some available procedural mechanism to establish the predicate joint tortfeasor liability, even though as a result of settlement, it is no longer party to the lawsuit. Paul, 758 A.2d at 46.