Opinion ID: 769431
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Text: 67 For the first time on appeal, Morales raises several reasons why he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. While it is not our province as an appellate court to make findings regarding counsel's performance when, unlike the district court, we have not had the benefit of actually having observed it, we will resolve this issue when, as here, both parties ask us to resolve the matter, the question has been briefed and argued, and we have the entire trial record before us. United States v. Reiswitz, 941 F.2d 488, 495 (7th Cir. 1991). 7 In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance, we apply the familiar two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): First, the defendant must prove that his counsel's performance 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,' and second that but for counsel's deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. United States v. Alex Janows & Co., 2 F.3d 716, 721 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted). 68 Morales first contends that his counsel was ineffective by failing to refresh his recollection of his prior testimony before Santos's sentencing hearing, and thus he mistakenly testified to the wrong date of Santos's involvement in the bolita, and squandered his downward departure. But since Morales had already testified consistently at his plea hearing and at the trial that he began working as a collector for Santos in the bolita in 1984, his counsel had no reason to believe that he would need to refresh his recollection. Additionally, the record does not indicate that Morales informed his counsel that he needed to review his prior testimony, or that he intended to change his testimony. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions.). Rather, the record demonstrates that Morales's contradictory testimony at Santos's sentencing hearing was deliberate, and not the result of confusion or mistake. And since the Sixth Amendment does not require defense counsel to take all possible precautions to protect a defendant from testifying falsely and breaching his plea agreement, this claim fails. 8 69 Morales next argues that his counsel was ineffective by failing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea after the government withdrew its sec.5K1.1 motion. A defendant needs a fair and just reason to withdraw a guilty plea. Schilling, 142 F.3d at 398. The plea agreement in this case conditioned the government's obligation to file the sec.5K1.1 motion on Morales's complete, truthful, and candid testimony. Since Morales's testimony was contradictory, untruthful, and material to the issue of Santos's sentencing, he failed to fulfill his part of the bargain, which allowed the government to withdraw its sec.5K1.1 recommendation. Ramunno, 133 F.3d at 484. With no fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea, Morales's counsel reasonably decided not to file the motion. 9