Opinion ID: 2215247
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scope of the Privilege To Use a Firearm

Text: As we have determined that this case must be retried, we reach the issue of what law should govern on retrial as to the officer's privilege to use a firearm. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court overstated the scope of the law officer's privilege. The trial court instructed the jury that an officer is privileged to use a firearm to effect an arrest if he has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a felony and if he reasonably believes that the arrest cannot otherwise be effected. He told the jury: The law and rules relating to felony arrests are as follows: (1) If the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and so committed by the person the subject of the arrestin this case Richard Schumannthe arresting officer may use reasonable force to effect that arrest, which force can include deadly force, that is, a gun shot at the offender meant to strike the offender if he, the officer, reasonable believes that without the use of deadly force the arrest could not be effected. Notice that these three conditions apply to all felonies, and I instruct you that the law governing this case does not make a distinction between violent felonies and other types of felonies, but holds that the officer must have probable cause regarding the offense and the offender, and as I said, must have reasonable cause to believe that without deadly force being applied the arrest could not be effected. The trial court also instructed the jury as to the existence of certain statutes, which are a part of our criminal code and which determine the scope of the law officer's privilege to use force for purposes of determining criminal liability. In instructing on these and other statutes regarding arrest, the trial court told the jury:    But in connection with the officer's duty I will read to you several statutes that I think might have some bearing, but the fact that I read these statutes does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff has or has not complied with or that the statutes apply at all. In other words, you must make that determination in that instance. He then read to the jury the following portions of Minn.St. 629.33, 609.06, and 609.065: § 629.33: If, after notice of intention to arrest defendant, he shall flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all necessary means to effect his arrest. § 609.06: Reasonable force may be used upon or toward the person of another without his consent when the following circumstances exist or the actor reasonably believes them to exist: (1) When used by a public officer or one assisting him    (a) In effecting a lawful arrest. § 609.065: The intentional taking of the life of another is not authorized by section 609.06, except when necessary in the following cases:       (3) By a public officer, or person assisting him, in effecting a lawful arrest for a felony or in preventing an escape of a person held therefor. We have not had the opportunity to rule in the context of a battery case on the scope of the law officer's privilege to use force or a firearm. Plaintiffs urge us to hold the above-quoted instructions improper and to adopt the rule that the privilege protects a law officer from tort liability for the use of a firearm in making an arrest only if the felony, which the suspect is believed to have committed, involved violence or threat to human life. Respondent, on the other hand, urges us to approve the instructions as given, arguing that the tort privilege should not turn upon the violent or nonviolent nature of the felony or the dangerousness of the felon. The issue is one on which the courts have long disagreed. See, Prosser, Torts (4 ed.) § 26, p. 134. In many jurisdictions it is an issue controlled, or at least influenced, by various statutes. See, Note, 12 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 67. As the issue is one of first impression here, some discussion of the various rules and their history is in order. Plaintiffs have characterized the rule they urge us to adopt as the modern rule and the rule adopted by the trial court as the traditional rule. That dichotomy, we believe, oversimplifies the rather complex and long-term debate as to the scope of the officer's privilege to use a firearm. In early common law, at least until the 14th century, the rule was that the felon was an outlaw whose life could be taken in the process of effecting an arrest without regard to whether he could be otherwise detained. The rationale of the rule was that all felonies were punishable by death. See, McDonald, Use of Force by Police to Effect Lawful Arrest, 9 Crim.L.Q. 435, 437; Note, 12 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 67, 68; Note, 15 Va.L.Rev. 582, 583; Moreland, Some Trends in the Law of Arrest, 39 Minn.L. Rev. 479. Within a few centuries the common-law rule was refined to include a last resort test, so that an officer was not entitled to take the life of a fleeing felon unless the arrest could not otherwise be effected. The concept of probable cause to believe the suspect had committed a felony also became a factor at about the same time. Blackstone stated the rule as follows:    Arrests by officers without warrant may be executed    in case of felony actually committed, or a dangerous wounding whereby felony is like to insue, he may upon probable suspicion arrest the felon; and for that purpose is authorized    even to kill the felon if he cannot otherwise be taken   . 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 292. That rule found rather widespread support in the courts in this country in the 19th and early 20th centuries. [6] During that same period, however, some American courts adopted the rule that an arresting officer was not justified in employing a firearm to apprehend a fleeing felon unless the felony itself were a violent one. [7] The distinction between those two rules has always been somewhat blurred, as the rationale of many courts in permitting the use of a firearm without regard to the nature of the felony has been the explicit or implicit assumption that a felon is dangerous to the public. This point was articulately made in Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185, 187, 136 S.E. 375, 376 (1927): The reason for the [common-law] distinction [between felons and misdemeanants] is obvious. Ordinarily, the security of person and property is not endangered by a misdemeanant being at large, while the safety and security of society require the speedy arrest and punishment of a felon. In 1934 the American Law Institute, in its Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 131, adopted the so-called modern rule: The use of force against another for the purpose of effecting an arrest of the other by means intended or likely to cause death is privileged, if (a) the arrest is made for treason or for a felony which normally causes or threatens death or serious bodily harm, or which involves the breaking and entry of a dwelling place, and (b) the actor reasonably believes that the arrest cannot otherwise be effected. In its Restatement of the Law, 1948 Supplement, however, the Institute discarded that rule, substituting the following version of the traditional rule: The actor's use of force against another, for the purpose of effecting a privileged arrest of the other, by means intended or likely to cause death is privileged, if (a) the arrest is made under a warrant which charges the person named therein with the commission of treason or a felony, or if the arrest is made without a warrant for treason or for a felony which has been committed, and (b) the other is the person named in the warrant if the arrest is under a warrant, or the actor reasonably believes the offense was committed by the other if the arrest is made without a warrant, and (c) the actor reasonably believes that the arrest cannot otherwise be effected. Restatement of the Law, 1948 Supp. Torts, § 131. The reporter's notes explained the reason for the change as follows: Several cases have been decided since 1926 which, without citing § 131 are contrary to it:   .       No case has been found which has cited § 131 or which is in accord with it. The dicta relied upon in 1927, together with the analogy to the rule concerning the privilege to kill to prevent the commission of a felony, are now outweighed by recent decisions directly in point by two federal courts and the highest courts in Kentucky and West Virginia. In addition a strong dictum in a recent Tennessee case is contrary to the dictum in the earlier Tennessee case which the Institute relied upon in 1926. The present Reporter believes that § 131 as originally worded stated a desirable rule of law but that the change is necessary in a Restatement of existing authorities. This is not a situation in which there is a split of authority. Every case which actually decides the question agrees that the original English common law is still the law. In addition the wide scope of the original common law rule is given to peace officers by statute in California, Colorado, Kansas and Missouri. Restatement of the Law, 1948 Supp. p. 632. The language used in stating the modified rule in the 1948 Supplement was adopted verbatim in Restatement, Torts 2d, § 131, published in 1965. The Reporter's Comments to the section quote with apparent approval the Reporter's Comments from the 1948 Supplement. Restatement, Torts 2d, Appendix to § 131. As noted above, the Restatement is intended to describe what the law is, not what the law should be. Perusal of the American cases decided since the first Restatement leads us to conclude that the Institute was correct in its determination that the courts have almost unanimously adhered to the rule as set down by Blackstone. [8] The only recent case which we have found to adopt the rule that the officer's privilege to use a firearm turns upon the seriousness of the felony or the dangerous propensities of the felon is Sauls v. Hutto, 304 F.Supp. 124 (E.D.La.1969). The facts of that case were strikingly similar to those of the case at bar. A police officer shot and fatally wounded a 17-year-old boy who was fleeing from the scene of a crash between the stolen automobile he had been driving and a parked car. In an action by decedent's mother, the Federal court, applying Louisiana law, held: Louisiana's courts likely would take this view: a police officer is not justified in shooting at a man who is suspected of stealing an automobile in order to apprehend him. A bullet in the back is not Louisiana's penalty for fleeing to escape arrest. Deadly force may be used only when life itself is endangered or great bodily harm is threatened. 304 F.Supp. 132. The decision was grounded almost entirely, however, upon a Louisiana statute. [9] Although the courts have overwhelmingly favored the common-law rule, commentators, law reformers, police department administrators, and legislatures increasingly tend to favor the more restrictive rule as to the scope of the privilege. The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, promulgated in 1962, would establish the following rule: The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless: (i) the arrest is for a felony; and (ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer; and (iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and (iv) the actor believes that: (1) the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly force; or (2) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed. § 3.07(2)(b), 10 U.L.A. 484. Statutes similar in some respects to that rule have been adopted by the legislatures of New York, Georgia, Illinois, and Louisiana. [10] While the statutes adopted in these states may indicate a modern trend, it should be noted that a far larger number of states have statutes codifying the common-law rule. See, Note, 12 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 67, 72. In recent years, a spate of law review articles has appeared on the question, many of which advocate the legislative enactment of the Model Penal Code. [11] In addition, a large number of metropolitan law-enforcement agencies now instruct their personnel to follow a rule similar to that of the Model Penal Code. Locally, the Hennepin County Sheriff's Department, [12] the Ramsey County Sheriff's Department, [13] and the Minnesota Highway Patrol [14] have adopted the more restrictive rule. [15] The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice has also advocated this rule for law-enforcement authorities. Task Force Report: The Police, p. 189 (1967). [16] The St. Paul Police Department, of which Officer McGinn is a member, however, instructed its personnel on the common-law rule. [17] Plaintiffs urge us to adopt the Model Penal Code rule and to require the trial court to instruct the jury on that rule upon retrial. We decline to do so because we believe for several reasons that the issue of whether to adopt § 3.07(2)(b) of the Model Penal Code is a legislative and not a judicial question. First, the policy embodied in the Model Penal Code has been the subject of widespread and heated debate. The proposal has evoked strong support and equally strong opposition. The nature of the debate reveals that one's view on the Model Penal Code provision is likely to be a highly ideological matter, turning upon one's philosophy of law enforcement. The views of the two opposing camps are typified by the statements of Professors Jerome Mikell and John Barker Waite. Speaking out against the common-law rule, Professor Mikell has stated: It has been said, `Why should not the man be shot down, the man who is running away with an automobile?   ' May I ask what are we killing him for   . Are we killing him for stealing the automobile? If we catch him and try him we throw every protection around him. We say he cannot be tried until 12 men of the grand jury indict him, and then he cannot be convicted until 12 men of the petit jury have proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and then when we have done all that, what do we do to him? Put him before a policeman and have a policeman shoot him? Of course not. We give him three years in a penitentiary. It cannot be then that we allow the officer to kill him because he stole the automobile,    Is it for fleeing that we kill him? Fleeing from arrest is also a common-law offense and is punishable by a light penalty   . If we are not killing him for stealing the automobile and not killing him for fleeing, what are we killing him for? Quoted in Michael & Wechsler, Criminal Law and Its Administration, p. 82, note 3. In opposing the Model Penal Code rule, Professor Waite stated: I am convinced that only through truly effective power of arrest can law be satisfactorily enforced.    [E]ffectiveness in making arrests requires more than merely pitting the footwork of policemen against that of suspected criminals.             I would make the preclusion from flight effective by giving the officer authority to utilize necessary force  .          [T]he danger to socially necessary effective law enforcement is undeniable.    If we pass [§ 3.07(2)(b)] we say to the criminal, `You are foolish. No matter what you have done you are foolish if you submit to arrest. The officer dare not take the risk of shooting at you. If you can outrun him, outrun him.    If you are faster than he is you are free, and God bless you.' I feel entirely unwilling to give that benediction to the modern criminal. Model Penal Code, Tent.Draft No. 8 (1958), Comments on § 3.07, p. 60. This court is not in a position to resolve the conflicting ideologies represented in the two passages quoted above. It is in the legislative forum that the deterrent effect of the traditional rule may be evaluated and the law-enforcement policies of this state may be fully debated and determined. The issues upon which the decision turns are more moral and sociological than they are legal. The legislature, and not this court, is the proper decision maker. As we said in Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 292, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (1962): While the court has the right and the duty to modify rules of the common law after they have become archaic, we readily concede that the flexibility of the legislative processwhich is denied the judiciary makes the latter avenue of approach more desirable. Second, the Model Penal Code provision, as its very name implies, is a proposed statute. It is intended to define justifiable homicide. We have no power to adopt a justifiable-homicide statute. Defining crimes is a legislative prerogative and in Minn.St. 609.065 our legislature has adopted its own justifiable-homicide statute, one that embodies the common-law view of a law officer's privilege to use a firearm. We could, of course, adopt the substance of the Model Penal Code rule to be applied in tort actions involving alleged assaults and batteries by a police officer. Though the legislature has the legitimate authority to define crimes and defenses, we retain the common-law authority to define torts and their defenses. See, Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, supra . If we were to exercise that authority in this case, however, the police officer contemplating the use of force under emergency conditions would be held to conflicting standards of conduct by the civil and criminal law. The confusion which would be engendered by such a situation can only produce unfair and inequitable results. We cannot have differing legislative and judicial policies on the scope of the officer's privilege. Consequently, we desist from creating such a situation. Thus, while we are not technically bound to follow Minn.St. 609.06 as limited by Minn.St. 609.065, we recognize in them a legislative policy toward which we feel we must defer in defining tort liability in the present situation. See, Prosser, Torts (4 ed.) § 2, p. 9. For the foregoing reasons we decline to adopt the Model Penal Code rule, though there is much to recommend it. We believe that there is a need for a thorough study of the issue of the use of firearms by law-enforcement officers, so that a reasoned choice may be made between the competing rules. We also believe that we are not the proper body for the task. We read Minn.St. 609.065 as a codification of the common-law rule. Although its language is not identical to that of the Restatement, its substance is similar. The word necessary in § 609.065 is the practical equivalent of the phrase the actor reasonably believes that the arrest cannot otherwise be effected in the Restatement rule. The lawful arrest language of our statute is to be read as requiring probable cause in instances where there is no arrest warrant. This is substantially the equivalent of the reasonable belief language of the Restatement. Conforming to the legislative policy relating to the use of force in law enforcement, which is enunciated in Minn.St. 609.06 as limited by Minn.St. 609.065, we hold that in a tort action based on battery by a law-enforcement officer, the scope of the officer's privilege to use a firearm rests upon the following rules: (1) Where an officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a felony, he may use reasonable force upon or toward that person in effecting a lawful arrest; and (2) Reasonable force may include the intentional discharge of a firearm upon or toward that person only if the officer reasonably believes that absent such use of a firearm he could not effect the arrest. [18] On the retrial of this case, it is upon these rules, together with such appropriate definitions as the trial judge may consider necessary to assist the jury, that the trial court should instruct.