Opinion ID: 783861
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Threat to Officer Edinburg

Text: 13 Officer Edinburg contends that Mr. Scott threatened him with a deadly weapon by trying to back over him with the Mustang. He submits that this action justified his use of deadly force to protect himself. The plaintiffs argue, however, that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning this matter that precludes summary judgment. We agree. 14 It is clear that, when an individual threatens a police officer with a deadly weapon, the officer is permitted to use deadly force in self-defense if the use is consistent with the principles set forth in Tennessee v. Garner. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1694; Muhammed, 316 F.3d at 683. Moreover, an automobile may be used as a deadly weapon. See Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir.1992). However, in Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243 (7th Cir.1993), we noted that, even [w]hen an officer faces a situation in which he could justifiably shoot, he does not retain the right to shoot at any time thereafter with impunity. Id. at 247. In Ellis, we reversed a grant of summary judgment in a police officer's favor when he shot an unarmed burglar in the back after the suspect threw a bag at the officer and fled. We concluded that the threat to the officer had ceased once the suspect had thrown the bag and fled and that the legality of the use of deadly force ended with the expiration of the threat. See id. Thus, the timing of Officer Edinburg's first shot is critical. It is undisputed that every shot after the first one was fired while the car was moving away from Officer Edinburg, see R.65, Ex.C at 43, but the timing of the first shot is unclear. 4 Officer Edinburg's own deposition testimony is the only evidence in the record directly addressing the instant that the first shot was fired. 15 In their response to the defendants' Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Uncontested Facts, the plaintiffs agreed with the defendants that at the point where the vehicle stopped moving towards Defendant Edinburg and began moving away from Edinburg, he fired his weapon at Scott. R.63 at ¶ 16; R.58 at ¶ 16. However, in his deposition testimony, Officer Edinburg initially stated that the car was in the process of backing up and stopping when he fired the first shot. See R.63, Ex.3 at 26 (The brake lights came on after I backed up, yelled stop police at which time I fired a shot.). On the next page, Officer Edinburg was asked if the car had stopped when he fired the first shot, and he responded no. See R.63, Ex.3 at 27. Four pages later, the following exchange occurred: Q. At the time you fired the first shot, was the vehicle backing up, standing still or moving away from you? A. Moving away from me. R.65, Ex.C at 31. The discrepancy in Officer Edinburg's testimony is significant. 16 If the fatal shot was fired while Mr. Scott was driving away, then the argument that Officer Edinburg was compelled to fire in order to protect himself would be significantly weakened. Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the timing of the first shot, which precludes a grant of summary judgment based on Garner's justification for self-defense.