Opinion ID: 1155733
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Failure to Hold Formal Competency Hearing During Penalty Phase

Text: Defendant complains of the trial court's failure to hold a formal competency hearing during the penalty phase once a question arose as to whether defendant had been overmedicated during his penalty phase testimony. He asserts the omission denied him statutory and constitutional protections, including his due process and confrontational rights under the state and federal Constitutions. We reject the contention. Prior to the guilt phase, defendant had been examined by two psychiatrists who deemed him competent to stand trial. Following the guilt phase, and after the prosecutor had presented his penalty phase evidence, the defense elicited mitigating evidence from defendant personally, and from lay and expert witnesses. As previously indicated, defendant testified personally regarding his childhood, background, criminal experiences, and conversion to Christianity. In addition, he read to the jury a prepared statement expressing his remorse and requesting a fair judgment. Thereafter, one of defendant's experts, Dr. Peter Mayland, testified regarding defendant's life experiences and personal development. Dr. Mayland stressed how calm and controlled defendant appeared when he testified on his own behalf. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited from Dr. Mayland the information that he had prescribed tranquilizers (Valium and Soma) for defendant during the trial. Dr. Mayland indicated that Soma was a muscle relaxant and a relatively light medication which was intended to relax defendant while testifying, and which was not likely to impair defendant's mental processes. Although at one point during defendant's testimony Dr. Mayland was concerned that he may have been overmedicated, Dr. Mayland later concluded that defendant was okay, and was not seriously affected by the drugs. A second defense expert, Dr. Judith Huff, testified regarding defendant's psychological profile, and confirmed that, at various stages of the trial, he had been taking Valium and Soma, as well as Elavil, a strong antidepressant. Dr. Huff opined that her ability to render an accurate psychiatric diagnosis of defendant may have been hindered by the effects of these various medications. She also believed that the dose of Soma prescribed by Dr. Mayland was twice the recommended dose, and that following defendant's testimony at trial, he seemed to lack energy and suffered short-term memory loss. Dr. Huff concluded that defendant's emotionless appearance at trial may have been partially a result of the drugs he was taking. At the prosecutor's suggestion, the court held an inquiry outside the jury's presence to determine the effect of the foregoing drugs on defendant's competence while testifying. Defense counsel consented to this procedure. Dr. Mayland was recalled to testify in more detail regarding the doses, and possible side effects, of the drugs prescribed for defendant. Thus, Dr. Mayland testified that shortly before defendant was scheduled to testify, and at defendant's request, he was taken off Valium and given Soma, a stronger medication aimed at easing his anxiety and anger in the courtroom and permitting him to tell his story [to the jury] as well as possible. Defendant had told Dr. Mayland that he had tried Soma in the past and it was effective in calming his nerves. Dr. Mayland observed only one occasion when defendant appeared possibly overmedicated, namely, when he read to the jury a statement he had composed. At this time, defendant appeared to have trouble reading the statement and his words were quiet, slurred. But Dr. Mayland further explained that immediately following defendant's trial testimony he appeared reanimated, leading Dr. Mayland to conclude that it was the pressure of the public eye in the courtroom, and not defendant's medication, that had affected him. On each occasion following defendant's trial testimony, Dr. Mayland observed and talked with defendant and saw no impairment in his ability to think, remember or communicate. The defense then called Dr. Huff, who expressed her disagreement with Dr. Mayland on several points. First, she opined that defendant's need for high doses of medication to mask a possible depression or anxiety raised serious questions as to his competence to stand trial. She speculated that perhaps defendant was suffering from some underlying problem which should have delayed his trial participation pending a more comprehensive evaluation. Dr. Huff noted that Elavil is very sedating and the doses given to defendant quite likely could have caused some degree of mental confusion. Moreover, a large percentage of persons who are taken off Valium will suffer withdrawal syndromes of varying kinds. In addition, Dr. Huff felt it inappropriate to switch defendant from Valium to Soma without first assessing the possible effects of such a change in medication. Dr. Huff believed that the high dose of Soma given to defendant likely would be highly sedating, and would have a severe influence on his emotional demeanor at trial. Dr. Huff explained that although she did not view any portion of defendant's trial testimony, she talked with him in his jail cell shortly thereafter, and concluded he looked sedated. His gait was slow. His facial expressions were very limited. Dr. Huff also noted some short-term memory loss as a probable result of the Soma. Once the Soma dose was reduced, defendant seemed markedly more like himself. Thereafter, the prosecutor called Dr. Lee Coleman, a physician specializing in psychiatry, who confirmed Dr. Mayland's view that personal observation of a defendant on and off the witness stand would be the best way to evaluate the effect of a given drug on his mental condition. Dr. Coleman also believed defendant's dose of Elavil was a low one, and that it would be unusual for a person discontinuing Valium to suffer a withdrawal syndrome that would affect his testimony at trial. A sheriff's deputy, John Lewis, testified that on one occasion he had noticed defendant seemed temporarily depressed and unusually quiet following some very emotional testimony by his relatives, but that in general Lewis noticed no mood swings or signs of confusion or disorientation. Similar testimony was elicited from another deputy, Frank Noyes. Following Deputy Lewis's testimony, defense counsel asked whether the proceedings should not be deemed a competency hearing under section 1368, and whether a jury should be asked to evaluate defendant's competence. The court responded that it had no doubt as to defendant's competence, and that the limited purpose of the inquiry was to determine whether defendant in fact had a fair opportunity to express himself at trial. At the conclusion of the inquiry, the court announced its ruling. The court first noted that it had observed defendant during his testimony and was impressed at his responsiveness to questions. The court observed that defendant appeared intelligent and articulate, and at no time appeared to have difficulty expressing himself or remembering and relating his testimony. The court further found that although defendant remained calm during his testimony, he was able to express himself without hesitation. Based on the court's observations, it concluded that defendant was not oversedated or affected by drugs during his testimony, and that he was competent and had full opportunity to express himself during trial. (22a) Defendant now argues he was improperly deprived of a full competency hearing accompanied by a formal psychiatric evaluation and jury trial. (See §§ 1367-1369; Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 385 [15 L.Ed.2d 815, 822, 86 S.Ct. 836]; People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531, 538-541 [244 Cal. Rptr. 114, 749 P.2d 769]; People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518 [58 Cal. Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942].) In defendant's view, Dr. Huff's testimony regarding (1) the high doses of medication prescribed for him, (2) his short-term memory loss on one occasion, and (3) his possible underlying depression was sufficient to raise a doubt as to his competence to stand trial. As will appear, however, the testimony in question did not raise a reasonable doubt about defendant's competence, and the contention thus lacks merit. We recently stated the applicable principles in People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757], as follows: A defendant who, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, is `unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner,' is incompetent to stand trial. (§ 1367.) (23) When the accused presents substantial evidence of incompetence, due process requires that the trial court conduct a full competency hearing. ( People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 92 [184 Cal. Rptr. 611, 648 P.2d 578].) Evidence is `substantial' if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competence to stand trial. ( Moore v. United States (9th Cir.1972) 464 F.2d 663, 666.) The court's duty to conduct a competency hearing arises when such evidence is presented at any time `prior to judgment.' (§ 1368; see also § 1367; People v. Zatko (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 534 [145 Cal. Rptr. 643], 548; People v. Melissakis (1976) 56 Cal. App.3d 52, 62 [128 Cal. Rptr. 122].) ( People v. Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1152-1153; see also People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1163 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315]; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 542 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 396-397 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610].) The trial judge's ruling regarding whether a competency hearing is required should be given great deference. An appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant's conduct in the trial court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or sheer temper. ( People v. Merkouris (1959) 52 Cal.2d 672, 679 [344 P.2d 1]; see 5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Trial, § 3003, p. 3683, and cases cited.) Additionally, we have noted that `more is required to raise a doubt [of competence] than mere bizarre actions [citation] or bizarre statements [citation] ... or psychiatric testimony that defendant is immature, dangerous, psychopathic, or homicidal or such diagnosis with little reference to defendant's ability to assist in his own defense [citation].' ( People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353, 358 [222 Cal. Rptr. 13, 710 P.2d 925].) (22b) Applying these principles to the record before us, we cannot say as a matter of law that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to defendant's mental competence. As previously noted, a defendant is mentally incompetent if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner. (§ 1367, italics added.) The evidence regarding defendant's drug doses, and his demeanor on and off the witness stand, indicated at most that he may have been overmedicated, but no substantial evidence was raised indicating he was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings or to cooperate with his counsel. Indeed, based on the observations of those persons who, unlike Dr. Huff, actually witnessed his trial testimony and demeanor, the contrary appears true. In light of the entire record, we conclude the court was not required to order a formal competency hearing. A similar situation arose in People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 324, where, following defendant's heated expression of his concerns regarding his counsel's representation, the prosecutor suggested the court might wish to comment on his demeanor. The court noted for the record that the defendant appeared extremely upset, and under great emotional stress. The court further stated it was unclear whether a 1368 problem was indeed presented. (See id. at pp. 395-396.) Defense counsel, having experience as a social worker, expressed her belief that the defendant may be having a psychotic episode as well as suffering from delusions. The court, declining to express a 1368 doubt, nonetheless appointed a psychiatrist to further examine the defendant and report regarding his competence to stand trial. ( Ibid. ) In Price, the resulting psychiatrist's report was inconclusive, expressing insufficient information to determine the defendant's ability to rationally collaborate with counsel. The court nonetheless declined to commence formal competency proceedings. We rejected a claim of error, finding no substantial evidence of the defendant's incompetence, and rejecting the contention that the court's own expressed concern about the defendant's competence should be deemed an expression of doubt sufficient to trigger formal competency proceedings. As we stated in Price, A trial court's expression of preliminary concerns about competency does not require the commencement of competency proceedings. [Citation.] ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 396-397, italics added; accord, People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 159, 162-163 [276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169].) Similarly, in the present case, the trial court expressed preliminary concerns about defendant's prior opportunity to fully express himself at trial, concerns that were deemed sufficient to justify the limited inquiry that was held. As in Price, we reject the contention that the court was required to take any additional steps to satisfy these concerns. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 397.)