Opinion ID: 2369882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution apply to faculty disciplinary proceedings?

Text: ¶ 18 Mills contends that, even if the closure of his disciplinary hearing was pursuant to a provision of law, it ran afoul of article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution, which says, Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay. We have recognized that, by its terms, article I, section 10 is not limited to trials but includes all judicial proceedings. Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash.2d 51, 60, 615 P.2d 440 (1980). The question is whether it also applies to the quasi-judicial proceedings conducted by administrative agencies. ¶ 19 In Washington Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, 151 Wash.2d 470, 477, 90 P.3d 42 (2004), we said, When interpreting constitutional provisions, we look first to the plain language of the text and will accord it its reasonable interpretation.... The words of the text will be given their common and ordinary meaning, as determined at the time they were drafted. (Citations omitted.) In keeping with this approach, we note that, when article I, section 10 was drafted, the word case was defined as In law: a cause or suit in court; any instance of litigation; as the case was tried last term, Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 17 (emphasis added) (quoting 1 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY 840 (1889)), or A general term for an action, cause, suit, or controversy, at law or in equity. A question contested before a court of justice. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 1 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 175 (1891)). The Framers, it seems, had only the courts within the judicial branch in mind when they spoke of the administration of justice in all cases. ¶ 20 Amicus cites Bellingham Bay Improvement Co. v. City of New Whatcom, 20 Wash. 53, 54 P. 774, aff'd, 20 Wash. 231, 55 P. 630 (1898), for the proposition that justice in all cases embraces the quasi-judicial proceedings conducted by administrative agencies. In Bellingham Bay, we held that a statute that authorized city councils to reassess property did not violate article IV, section 1 of the Washington Constitution, which vests the judicial power of the State in a supreme court, superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the legislature may provide. In so holding, we said that this article of the constitution must have been enacted with the knowledge that quasi judicial powers have from time immemorial been conferred upon administrative bodies and officers. Id. at 58, 54 P. 774 (emphasis added). Amicus asserts that the authors of the state constitution knew that administrative bodies, as well as courts, exercised the power to determine the rights of citizens and, for that reason, justice in all cases must be read as applying to quasi-judicial proceedings, as well as the proceedings of the judicial branch. ¶ 21 Bellingham Bay does not, in our judgment, support this reading of the state constitution. The whole point of that decision was that the term judicial power in article IV, section 1 did not embrace the quasi-judicial power exercised by administrative and executive bodies, even though the drafters of the state constitution knew that such power had been exercised from time immemorial. Since the exercise of quasi-judicial power was not embraced by the term judicial power in article IV, section 1, there is no reason to assume that it was meant to be embraced by the term justice in all cases in article I, section 10. This is especially true given that the great flowering of administrative agencies occurred long after the ratification of the constitution. Furthermore, decisions from the period following the proliferation of administrative agencies indicate that the stage at which justice is `administered' and therefore constitutionally required to be open is not reached until a superior court reviews the action of an administrative agency on appeal. Cohen v. Everett City Council, 85 Wash.2d 385, 389, 535 P.2d 801 (1975). We conclude, therefore, that article I, section 10 does not apply to the quasi-judicial proceedings of administrative agencies.