Opinion ID: 202178
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpretation of Evidence

Text: 60 Lizardo claims that the district court erred in allowing Yturrino and several officers to interpret recorded telephone conversations. He argues that interpretation was unnecessary because the language was clear, and he also argues that the interpretations unduly influenced the jury.
61 Yturrino was presented as a lay witness, 4 and the admissibility of lay opinion testimony is determined by Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which provides 62 If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 63 A lay witness[] with . . . inside knowledge [may] give [his] opinion[] as to the meanings of `code words' used by fellow conspirators in taped conversations, so long as that testimony comports with the requirements of Rule 701. United States v. Gaines, 170 F.3d 72, 77 (1st Cir.1999). A witness may also testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue. United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 780 (1st Cir.1995). We review the admission of lay opinion testimony for manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Kornegay, 410 F.3d 89, 94 (1st Cir.2005). 64 At trial, Yturrino interpreted the following statements from recorded telephone conversations: 5 65 (1) You are using your feet, man, not your head, man. What's going on with you, man? 66 (2) You know he could go in for that. You know that's a federal. 67 (3) This is 10 talking, listen. 68 (4) Have you talked to the tiger. 69 (5) I can't tell you over the phone, but take care, okay. 70 (6) What's the first sign of this place? 71 (7) The . . . the . . . the one with the stripes. 72 (8) I even paged him and stuff and put 911 and he hasn't got back to me. 73 (9) No. Right there in any of those places. 74 Lizardo argues that the meanings of the statements in the recorded conversations are clear, and it was thus error to allow Yturrino to interpret them. With respect to statements (3), (4), (7) and (8), we disagree, as those statements clearly contain terms that could be construed as code words. 75 Yturrino's interpretations were also useful in understanding statements (1), (2), (5), (6), and (9). In statement (2), Lizardo chastised Bello for posting bail for a person who could be charged with a federal crime. Yturrino explained: 76 In other words, if federal authorities were to get involved in that, . . . their ways of investigation usually range far beyond just what's going on at that point. 77 The average juror probably does not understand the difference between federal and state criminal prosecutions, and Yturrino's experience as a drug dealer allowed him to explain the meaning of Lizardo's statement. In statements (1), (5), (6), and (9), Bello and Lizardo did not employ code words, but the statements were either deliberately ambiguous or of uncertain meaning. Yturrino, as a co-conspirator, was present at or a participant in many conversations between Bello and Lizardo. He was thus in a position to understand even the unclear conversations in which he was not a part. Because of his first-hand familiarity with the surrounding events and conduct, we find no manifest abuse of discretion in allowing his interpretations of these statements. See Gaines, 170 F.3d at 77. 78 Even if we were to find that the district court manifestly abused its discretion, Lizardo never states specifically how Yturrino's interpretations prejudiced him at trial. He states that the interpretations usurped the jury's function and gave the telephone calls importance that they otherwise lacked, improperly drew inculpatory inferences, and put stamps of approval on the government's theory. In claiming prejudice, Lizardo only referred to Yturrino's interpretation of statement (2), which we quoted above. We do not find this interpretation to be significantly prejudicial.
79 Lizardo asserts that interpretations of the conversations made by officers Jaime Cepero, Bryan Joyce, and Richard Prior were also prejudicial. These contentions are easily disposed of. First, in a conversation between Bello and Lizardo, Lizardo requested a meeting at the restaurant that begins with the numbers. Sergeant Prior surmised that he meant the Ninety-Nine Restaurant. Lizardo did not object to this testimony, and this testimony was not in error, never mind plain error. 80 Lizardo also contests Trooper Cepero's testimony that he concluded from statement (2) that Lizardo was involved in criminal activity. This was not an improper interpretation for two reasons. First, it was Cepero's subjective conclusion after hearing the conversation and not an interpretation of the meaning of the conversation. See United States v. Morton, 391 F.3d 274, 277 (D.C.Cir.2004). Second, this statement was elicited on cross-examination by Lizardo's counsel, who cannot now contest his own invited error. See McDonald v. Fed. Labs., Inc., 724 F.2d 243, 248 (1st Cir.1984). 81 Finally, Lizardo argues that Trooper Joyce improperly interpreted the phrase one of those places as a plan by Lizardo and Bello to arrange for a pickup of drugs by Bello. However, on the pages of the transcript cited by Lizardo, Joyce does not provide any interpretation of the phrase one of those places.
82 At trial, Lizardo sought to present Deputy Sheriff Aguilar as a witness to present non-inculpatory interpretations of the conversations between Lizardo and Bello. The district court committed no error in excluding this testimony. Lizardo did not present Aguilar as an expert witness, and he failed to establish any foundation for Aguilar's testimony as a lay witness by showing that Aguilar's opinions or inferences would have been rationally based on [his] perception[s] and helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 701.