Opinion ID: 762554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Prior Acquittal.

Text: 11 We have squarely held that, as a general matter, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of a prior acquittal on a related charge. In United States v. Kerley, 13 the defendant, an officer in the sheriff's department, repeatedly struck an individual held in custody. A state jury acquitted the defendant on a battery charge, and the defendant attempted to introduce this evidence in a federal trial arising from the same incident. The trial court refused to admit the prior acquittal, and the defendant urged that the exclusion of the evidence required reversal. We pointed out the fallacies behind this argument. 12 Although a judgment of acquittal is relevant with respect to the issues of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel, once it is determined that these pleas in bar have been rejected, a judgment of acquittal is not usually admissible to rebut inferences that may be drawn from the evidence admitted.... [E]vidence of a prior acquittal is not relevant because it does not prove innocence but rather merely indicates that the prior prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt at least one element of the crime. 14 13 Furthermore,  'a judgment of acquittal is hearsay'  not otherwise exempt  'from the operation of the hearsay rule.'  15 And, even if not for these barriers to admissibility, evidence of a prior acquittal will often be excludable under Fed.R.Evid. 403, because its probative value likely will be substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. 16 Other circuits overwhelmingly agree that, for all the reasons enumerated, evidence of prior acquittals are generally inadmissible. 17 There are seven sister circuits that have, in varying contexts, endorsed this view--the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and DC Circuits. 18 We are aware of no contrary authority. 14 De La Rosa has advanced no claim of double jeopardy or collateral estoppel to support admission of his prior acquittal. Nor does he suggest any justification for departing from the norm in his case; the only grounds he offers for admitting evidence of his acquittal are those that are foreclosed by our precedent, supported by the authority from our sister circuits. De La Rosa fails even to acknowledge--let alone distinguish--this vast body of authority. 19 15