Opinion ID: 853878
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Indiana's murder statute provides that [a] person who . . . knowingly or intentionally kills another human being . . . commits murder[.] IND.CODE § 35-42-1-1 (1998). However, [a] person who knowingly or intentionally . . . kills another human being. . . while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter[.] IND.CODE § 35-42-1-3(a) (1998). [3] Sudden heat requires sufficient provocation to engender . . . passion which is demonstrated by anger, rage, sudden resentment, or terror that is sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection. Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 507 (Ind.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces otherwise murderous conduct to voluntary manslaughter, see IND.CODE § 35-42-1-3(b) (1998), but is not an element of voluntary manslaughter. See Horan, 682 N.E.2d at 507. Although the State has the burden of negating the existence of sudden heat beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to inject that issue at all the defendant must point to some evidence supporting sudden heat whether this evidence be in the State's case or the defendant's own. Bradford v. State, 675 N.E.2d 296, 300 (Ind. 1996); see also Clark v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1206, 1209 (Ind.1996); Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 593 (Ind.1989); McBroom v. State, 530 N.E.2d 725, 728 (Ind.1988); Raub v. State, 517 N.E.2d 80, 82 (Ind.1987); Smith v. State, 502 N.E.2d 485, 489 (Ind.1987). [4] Jackson contends that he was sufficiently provoked by Howell and that there was inadequate time to engage in cool reflection before the firing of the fatal shot. He points to the following four factors in support of his claim: 1) In the initial struggle, Howell struck Jackson in the face two to four times and knocked Jackson to the ground. 2) Howell was yelling and swearing at Jackson. 3) Howell provoked Jackson by calling him a pussy. 4) The interval between Jackson's being knocked to the ground by Howell and firing the fatal shot at Howell was a minute or less. In evaluating Jackson's insufficiency claim, we do not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. We look to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support the verdict and will affirm the conviction if there is sufficient probative evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1110 (Ind.1997). Existence of sudden heat is a classic question of fact to be determined by the jury. Fisher v. State, 671 N.E.2d 119, 121 (Ind.1996) (citing Bane v. State, 587 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ind.1992)). The trial court properly instructed the jury on the offenses of murder and voluntary manslaughter, including the requirements for sudden heat. The jury's conviction of Jackson for murder was a rejection of his sudden heat contention, see Taylor, 681 N.E.2d at 1110, and there is ample evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict. Howell first approached Jackson, who had been drinking, while Jackson was arguing with Hancock. Howell joined Hancock in requesting that Jackson go upstairs. Jackson then displayed his gun and knife and threatened to put a cap in [Howell's] ass. After Jackson pulled a cocked gun, Kneer and Howell disarmed him. Howell then pushed and punched Jackson, who was still armed with a knife. Jackson retreated to his upstairs apartment where he loaded a shotgun, walked past his neighbors on the balcony, and shot Howell. Immediately after the shooting, Jackson announced that he had fulfilled his earlier promise to put a cap in [Howell's] ass. The jury may very well have concluded that Howell did nothing to provoke Jackson. Insulting or taunting words alone are not sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. Potts v. State, 594 N.E.2d 438, 439 (Ind.1992) (citing Perigo v. State, 541 N.E.2d 936, 939 (Ind.1989)). [5] At the beginning of their confrontation, Howell merely joined Hancock in requesting Jackson to go upstairs. It was only after Jackson revealed that he had a gun and knife and threatened Howell that any type of physical confrontation occurred. Howell's subsequent pushing or punching of Jackson was not itself provocation, but rather a response to Jackson's threat on his life. Moreover, Jackson did not immediately shoot Howell after the physical struggle. Rather, he walked to his second floor apartment where he took the time to load a shotgun and walk past neighbors before shooting Howell. Under these circumstances, the jury could have concluded that this was sufficient time for cool reflection. Finally, Jackson's words after the shooting also support the inference that Jackson was carrying out his earlier desire to put a cap in [Howell's] ass, which existed prior to the physical altercation between the men. In sum, these facts are sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Jackson was not acting in sudden heat when he shot Howell. As a final point, Jackson contends that his case presents an issue of inherently improbable testimony . . . of incredible dubiosity. See Jenkins v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1278, 1278 (Ind.1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The incredible dubiosity rule allows a reviewing court to reverse the trial court when a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the appellant's guilt. Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind.1994). Jackson asserts that Kneer's testimony falls under this doctrine. We disagree. Kneer was not the only person who saw Jackson shoot Howell. Dan and Vicky Bealmear and Heath Garrett also witnessed the shooting. Kristin Cardin and Todd Hochstetler heard the verbal exchange between Howell and Jackson, and Hochstetler saw Jackson with a shotgun seconds before both heard shots fired. Kneer's testimony was in no way contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion. It is corroborated by a wealth of other evidence.