Opinion ID: 1155936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Refusal to Take a Current Polygraph Test

Text: The motion in limine was not based upon the refusal to take a current polygraph test. Nor was an objection made at trial. After the tape was played to the jury and when appellant finally objected, and although the refusal to take a current test was mentioned, the thrust of the objection was to the inclusion therein of the Michigan incident and, perhaps, with the polygraph taken in connection therewith. The objection was:    I think that the implication is very clear by virtue of the video tape and the particular portion which had to do with a polygraph where, number one, the Doctor indicated on that video that he would not take a polygraph, and the reason for him not taking a polygraph was as a result of a matter that had occurred with respect to his daughter, or charge by his daughter, which gave a clear indication that he had previously been charged with some criminal activity; that he had been offered a polygraph and had presumably taken a polygraph.    Error may not be assigned unless objection has been made thereto with a distinct statement of the matter to which objection is made and the grounds for this objection, and indicating with definiteness and particularity the error asserted   . Texas Gulf Sulphur Company v. Robles, Wyo., 511 P.2d 963, 968 (1973). Accordingly, there can be no question but that reversal on this ground can be only for plain error. The elements for plain error are set forth in note 3, supra. It must be emphasized in this connection that not only was no objection made with reference to admission of the refusal to take the current test, but its admission was actually stipulated to by appellant. The motion in limine had to do only with the Michigan incident and perhaps the Michigan polygraph. Accordingly, the application of the plain error rule requires even more caution in this instance wherein the evidence was admitted on stipulation. Again, the potential for invited error is exceedingly great. Although I believe the foregoing is dispositive of this issue, I comment on two considerations relative thereto. First, the question relative to the existence of error in admission of testimony concerning the willingness of a defendant to take a polygraph test is not only presented in cases in which he refused to do so, but often the defendant seeks to evidence the fact that he was willing to do so. Second, cases can be cited to reflect instances in which it was held to be reversible error to admit the testimony, and cases can be cited to the contrary. Cases can be cited wherein any such error was cured by an instruction, and cases can be cited wherein it was not. See Annotation: Propriety and prejudicial effect of comment or evidence as to accused's willingness to take lie detector test. 95 A.L.R.2d 819 (1964). The majority opinion cites and quotes from three cases to support the contention that any admission or reference to refusal to take a polygraph test is prejudicial and, thus, reversible error. The precedent is not that clear-cut, as reflected in the A.L.R.2d annotation, supra. In State v. Emory, 190 Kan. 406, 375 P.2d 585 (1962), one of the cases referred to in the majority opinion, the court found that admission of a refusal to take the test was reversible error, distinguishing the facts of the case from those in State v. Smith, 187 Kan. 42, 353 P.2d 510 (1960), in which the jury was admonished, and reversible error was not found. In a later case, State v. Roach, 223 Kan. 732, 576 P.2d 1082 (1978), the Kansas court held that not only the admission of evidence that defendant submitted to a polygraph test was not reversible error, but the results thereof admitted into evidence were not reversible error in view of a stipulation of the parties to admit the same. In State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962), cited in the majority opinion to hold that reference by the prosecutor to a refusal of the accused to take a lie detector test required reversal, there was much more than a mere reference by the prosecutor. In his opening statement, the prosecutor made a number of references to the refusal to take the test. Portions of defendant's mother's taped statement were played to the defendant, and after each segment, defendant was asked to take a polygraph test. The prosecution emphasized the refusal to do so saying `every time he refused.' At least four witnesses testified to interrogation of defendant, and when it came time for them to testify that he was asked to take a polygraph test and refused, they testified that `I am not supposed to mention that' or a similar response. During the trial the prosecutor made numerous references to the question and answer which could not be mentioned. The court concluded that [t]he entire handling of the lie detector test aspect of the case clearly reveals prejudicial overzealousness on the part of the prosecution, and leaves an appellate court with no recourse but vacation of the conviction. The case does not stand for the proposition that reference by the prosecutor requires reversal. In Mills v. People, 139 Colo. 397, 339 P.2d 998 (1959), the refusal to take the test was offered over objection as evidence `of guilt similar to evidence of flight.' Obviously, such was not the purpose of the comment made by appellant on the video tape which was accepted into evidence pursuant to a stipulation and without objection. In summary, then, I believe that whether or not a reference to the refusal or to the willingness to take a polygraph test is reversible error will depend on the circumstances of each case, with factors such as the emphasis given to it, the manner in which the reference occurred  intentionally or inadvertently  nonresponsive to a question, invited error, through stipulation, etc., whether or not the other evidence of guilt is exceedingly strong or exceedingly weak, and similar considerations. The same approach should be used in each case to determine if a limiting instruction, if one was given, was sufficient to cure the error, if error there was. In this case, the stipulation for admission, the manner in which the reference occurred, and the strength of other evidence should not make reversible error. Finally, with reference to the comment in the majority opinion concerning the unfairness which results from a jury viewing a video tape in the jury room and, thus, giving undue emphasis to a portion of the testimony, I agree. I believe that this Court should, by rule, direct that any verbatim record of question-and-answer testimony, video tape or deposition, or otherwise, whether admitted as an exhibit or otherwise, shall not be subject to jury inspection other than as permitted to be read or shown during that part of the trial in which evidence is being received. However, such a rule was not in effect in this case. There is not even an allegation that the jury viewed the video tape in the jury room, let alone evidence that such was done. There was no objection to the video tape being available for jury inspection. In fact, it was stipulated that it be an exhibit. And the appellant does not make viewing in the jury room an issue on appeal. I do not believe there is reversible error in the admission and use of the video tape in this case.
I agree that the other four errors alleged by appellant will not warrant reversal.