Opinion ID: 2756145
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Additional Corroborative Evidence

Text: Mr. Catchai argues that the BIA erred by failing to recognize that the IJ had an obligation to request additional corroborating evidence from him if his initial showing 5 was insufficient to meet his burden of proof. Construing this pro se argument liberally, see United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009), we note that “[w]here the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (asylum proceedings); see also id. § 1229a(c)(4)(B) (for removal proceedings). This statute, however, does not affirmatively obligate the trier of fact to request corroborating evidence. Further, such a request first requires the trier of fact to find the testimony to be “otherwise credible.” Here the IJ did not so find, and the BIA agreed. The BIA credited the IJ’s adverse credibility determination for the following reasons: (1) Mr. Catchai’s testimony was inconsistent with other evidence of when he received various documents from church associates in Angola that purported to corroborate his story; (2) the certificate of translation of those documents apparently preceded Mr. Catchai’s alleged reception of them; (3) the statements in the documents were vague; (4) Mr. Catchai could not authenticate the signatures of the documents’ purported authors; and (5) the background materials did not support his account. These reasons are properly based on the record, and Mr. Catchai does not challenge the underlying findings. Consequently, his argument (and any implicit challenge to the credibility finding) is unavailing. 6