Opinion ID: 699628
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: upward adjustment for obstruction of justice

Text: 41 The district court concluded that Karterman had engaged in a continuing effort to persuade Ms. Vork [a government witness] to change her testimony, and thus the court upwardly adjusted Karterman's offense level for obstructing justice. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1. 5 Section 3C1.1 provides: 42 If the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 43 Karterman argues that the district court's adjustment was erroneous. We review whether Karterman obstructed justice for clear error. United States v. Gardner, 988 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam). 44 In support of the adjustment, the sentencing court found: (1) Karterman went to Vork's residence and told her that 'if [his case] went to a jury trial, it was going to be a very expensive year for [her]' ; (2) Karterman had at least two conversations with Vork on September 10, 1992, which involved her continuing cooperation with the government; (3) During one of those conversations, Karterman and Vork argued about her anticipated testimony and Karterman struck her in the face; (4) Karterman sued Vork for malicious prosecution based on the assault, even though he was not prosecuted for the incident. 45 Karterman argues that these findings are clearly erroneous because they are not based on a preponderance of reliable evidence. See United States v. Rafferty, 911 F.2d 227, 231 (9th Cir.1990). The court's findings were based primarily on the transcript of a November 1992 hearing in which Karterman, Vork, and Martin testified regarding Karterman's alleged attempt to prevent Vork from testifying at trial. Karterman claims that the court's conclusion is not adequately supported because it rests exclusively on Vork's inherently unreliable hearing testimony. 46 We note that Vork's testimony should be viewed with caution because her reliability is questionable (for example, she received benefits from the government for testifying, she allegedly was an alcoholic, and she admitted she had been a drug user). See United States v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 878 (9th Cir.1994). However, the evidence before the district court was neither as limited nor as incredible as Karterman asserts. Vork's hearing testimony was corroborated in part by Martin's testimony. Martin also testified that Karterman tried to get her to change her testimony. The district court had the opportunity to view and evaluate the credibility of each witness who testified at the hearing, because they all also testified at trial. Thus, the court had a basis for discriminating between the conflicting testimony about Karterman's threatening conduct and for choosing to credit Vork's version of events. 47 In addition to the hearing transcript, the sentencing record contains other evidence to support the lower court's enhancement. For example, it contains a pretrial restraining order preventing Karterman from contacting Vork and information relating to Karterman's arrest for retaliating against a witness. 48 We cannot say that the district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous, and those findings clearly justify a two-level upward adjustment for obstructing justice. See, e.g., United States v. Snider, 976 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1139-40 (9th Cir.1992). The district court did not err by applying this adjustment.