Opinion ID: 2979360
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discriminatory remarks by agency officials

Text: While discriminatory remarks can constitute direct evidence, they also serve as probative evidence of pretext. Risch, 581 F.3d. at 393. This is true even when remarks are made by a nondecisionmaker, or fail “to coincide precisely with the particular actors or timeframe involved in the specific events that generated a claim of discriminatory treatment.” Id. (citing Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 356–57). In determining the significance of a discriminatory remark, “courts must carefully evaluate factors affecting the statement’s probative value, such as the declarant’s position in the 12 No. 09-3823 [employer’s] hierarchy, the purpose and content of the statement, and the temporal connection between the statement and the challenged employment action, as well as whether the statement buttresses other evidence of pretext.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In the instant case, Gail Lewin, Plaintiff’s supervisor, and Kathleen Lehman, the selecting official at the agency, informed him that his 34 years on the job were “enough”; joked about whether he had taken up “antiquing or traveling or something like that”; and suggested that Plaintiff should retire—a topic that Plaintiff had neither broached nor privately considered. Because these statements were made by DCMA decisionmakers just weeks before the promotion decision, and because the ostensible motivation of the comments was to hasten Plaintiff’s departure from the agency, these remarks provide strong “probative evidence of pretext.” See Risch, 581 F.3d at 393. Furthermore, when coupled with record evidence suggesting that Plaintiff was as qualified if not more qualified than the selectee, these statements create triable issues of fact on the question of pretext. See, e.g., Risch, 581 F.3d at 393–94 (summary judgment not proper based on plaintiff’s qualifications and remarks by supervisors); Marsico v. Sears Holding Corp., 370 Fed. App’x 658, 659 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2010) (summary judgment improper on ADEA claims where, four months prior to an adverse employment decision, employer stated “[y]ou know, you’ve been around here a long time”). Although these discriminatory comments only concern the Plaintiff’s age, they establish pretext with respect to both of Plaintiff’s unlawful discrimination claims because they cast doubt on the basis in fact of Defendant’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 545 (6th Cir. 2008). 13 No. 09-3823 3. Employer’s explanation for the promotion decision Plaintiffs may also demonstrate pretext by showing that an employer’s stated reason for an adverse employment action either “(1) has no basis in fact, (2) was not the actual reason, or (3) is insufficient to explain the employer’s action.” White, 533 F.3d at 393. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we find that a jury could “reasonably disbelieve” Defendant’s proffered explanation that Lucas was the best-qualified candidate for the position at issue. Id. at 394. Although Lehman testified that she promoted Lucas without conducting interviews because of her personal knowledge and familiarity with the job applicants’ experience, backgrounds, and competency, Lehman was unable to answer basic questions about the candidates’ qualifications, including whether Lucas, whom she hired based in part on her “significant experience in contract negotiations which was a critical function of the position,” had ever completed a single contract negotiation; and whether Greenberg, another candidate considered for the job, had previously been a university lecturer. The fact that Lehman was unable to describe the candidates’ credentials creates a triable issue of fact as to the actual basis for Defendant’s promotion decision, suggesting it was pretext for discrimination based on sex and age. In summary, because Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to suggest that DCMA’s proffered explanation for its promotion decision was pretextual and has no basis in fact, we hold that Plaintiff has met his burden under McDonnell Douglas and Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s age and sex discrimination claims. 14 No. 09-3823 4. Other allegations of pretext and the district court’s evidentiary rulings Because Plaintiff has demonstrated that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to pretext on the record considered by the district court, we need not reach the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to “receive further evidence” in connection with Plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment, pursuant to its powers under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In addition, we decline to reach the issue of whether Defendant’s record of promotions provides further evidence of pretext since Plaintiff has already rebutted Defendant’s alleged non-discriminatory grounds. However, since these arguments go toward the ultimate issue of whether DCMA engaged in intentional discrimination, they should be considered on remand.