Opinion ID: 2570436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The superior court properly awarded adoption of S.G. to R.K. and J.A.

Text: The superior court awarded S.G. to R.K. and J.A. on the basis that they had adoption placement preference rights under ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [31] ICWA applies and is controlling because both S.G. and J.G. qualify as Indian children under ICWA. Our review of the superior court's interpretation of ICWA is de novo. [32] In deciding the issue of S.G.'s adoption, the court considered the adoptive placement preferences demanded by ICWA: In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families. [33] The superior court held that both the grandparents (C.L. and C.L.) and the prospective adoptive parents (R.K. and J.A.) qualified as members of the child's extended family under 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a), giving them both equal ICWA placement preference rights. The superior court decided between them on the basis that S.G. had already formed a relationship with, and bonded with, R.K. and J.A., and the same could not be said for C.L. and C.L. The grandparents claim that the superior court erred in interpreting ICWA so as to make R.K. and J.A. members of the child's extended family with ICWA preference rights. However, the superior court did not err in making this determination. The court found that R.K. is S.G.'s second cousin once removed by marriage. Even though this family relationship is distant, the court noted that, under Yupik tradition, kinship relationships can be activated by conduct including providing food and shelter. C.L. and C.L. did not counter this with any evidence that R.K. was not a member of S.G.'s extended family. Therefore, the superior court properly found that R.K. and J.A. were extended family members with adoption preference right under ICWA. C.L. and C.L. also claim that, given that both parties have equal preference rights under ICWA, the superior court erred by favoring R.K., a distant relative of S.G., over C.L. and C.L., who are closer relatives. The superior court correctly noted that 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) does not set forth any order of preference among extended family members who seek to become prospective adoptive parents. The superior court made its decision based on its assessment of S.G.'s existing relationship with R.K. and J.A. The grandparents claim that, under Yupik tradition, placement with closer relatives is required. However, the grandparents failed to introduce any evidence to support this claim. An expert, Dr. Phyllis Morrow, testified that the majority of Yupik adoptions are by grandparents. But she explicitly refused to state that, under Yupik custom, there is any preference for grandparents over other more distant relatives. Therefore, the superior court properly held that both the grandparents and R.K. and J.A. have preference rights under ICWA. The superior court did not err by choosing between these parties based on its assessment of the best interests of S.G.