Opinion ID: 2180889
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: City's Contract Contentions

Text: The City contends that the Court of Appeals erred in finding a valid contract between Speckman and the City. The City claims that the opinion of the Court of Appeals conflicts with existing precedent insofar as it allows a contract to be formed with a municipality absent strict compliance with the applicable statutes. The City contends that the mayor must sign all contracts. [1] As a corollary of this claim, the City contends that the Corporation Counsel did not have the authority to sign a contract binding the City. The City also argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously decided a new question by holding that officers and agents with apparent authority may bind the City. We conclude these claims are without merit. The applicable statutes certainly do not preclude the mayor from delegating his duty to sign contracts, and it is impractical to require the mayor to sign every single written agreement to which the City is a party. The act creating the corporation counsel is sufficiently broad to permit the mayor to delegate authority to that person. Ind. Code § 36-3-5-2 (Burns 1981 Repl.). Furthermore, counsel for the City are estopped from presenting arguments concerning the ability of the Corporation Counsel to bind the City in light of the representation which the Corporation Counsel made in the text of the agreement itself: The legal division, City of Indianapolis, has reviewed the foregoing consent agreement and finds it to be proper in all respects. (Record at 24). The City further claims that the Court of Appeals erroneously decided a new question of law by expanding the definition of executed consideration to support an employment contract by including the release of claims for intentional torts such as defamation. We presume this refers to the independent consideration found to support the contract, and discuss it in section II below.