Opinion ID: 2638174
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of Grisham's Physical Injury Claims

Text: As noted, Grisham's other claims involve primarily physical rather than economic injury. Although denominated under various headings such as fraud, negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty, these claims all allege that cigarette smoking caused various serious ailments, including emphysema and persistent and chronic periodontitis and gingivitis. Suit was filed within a year of the diagnosis of those ailments, and nothing on the face of the complaint appears to suggest that these claims are time-barred. In these claims, her addiction, although potentially harmful, is not alleged to have manifested appreciable physical harm until Grisham contracted a serious physical ailment. Philip Morris nonetheless argues that all of Grisham's causes of action are timebarred, inasmuch as all her causes of action began to accrue at the point she discovered that she was addicted to cigarettes. Philip Morris relies on Soliman. In that case, the plaintiff was diagnosed in January 2000 with two respiratory ailments attributable to smoking, dyspnea and orthopnea, after having smoked cigarettes for 32 years. He filed his complaint in March 2000, and it was eventually removed to the federal court, which dismissed his complaint on statute of limitations grounds. ( Soliman, supra, 311 F.3d at pp. 969-972.) The plaintiff argued before the Ninth Circuit that the statute should have begun to run when he was diagnosed with respiratory ailments in January 2000. The Soliman court rejected this position: The relevant date ... is not when Soliman knew about these particular injuries, but when he should have known of any significant injury from defendants' wrongful conduct. (Id. at p. 972.) In support, the Soliman court quoted California cases. `[I]f the statute of limitations bars an action based upon harm immediately caused by defendant's wrongdoing, a separate cause of action based on a subsequent harm arising from that wrongdoing' is normally barred. Miller v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n [(1991)] 1 Cal. App.4th 1611, 1622[, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 796]____ `[Although a right to recover nominal damages will not trigger the running of the period of Limitation, the infliction of appreciable and actual harm, however uncertain in amount, will commence the statutory period.' Dairies v. Krasna [(1975)] 14 Cal.3d 502, 514[, 121 Cal.Rptr. 705, 535 P.2d 1161].... ( Soliman, supra, 311 F.3d at p. 972.) The court then stated that Soliman alleges that he suffered a number of significant injuries from the cigarettes he smoked. The injury he should have known about first is the one that starts the statute of limitations. (Ibid., fn. omitted.) The Soliman court then concluded that the injury from addiction was the one the plaintiff should have known about first. Although recovery of damages for addiction alone was a novel theory of recovery, the Soliman court concluded it need not decide whether the theory was valid, because Soliman can't claim that his addiction is an appreciable injury and, at the same time, ask us to ignore it in determining when his claim accrued. If Soliman had actual or constructive knowledge of his addiction before he was diagnosed with respiratory illness, the date of actual or constructive knowledge of addiction would govern. ( Soliman, supra, 311 F.3d at p. 973; see also Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (Ala.2003) 872 So.2d 101, 114-115 [agreeing with Soliman that the statute of limitations on all claims by smokers against tobacco companies begins to run when addiction is or should have been discovered].) The Soliman court then concluded, for reasons discussed in part in the previous part of this opinion, that Soliman did have constructive knowledge of addiction and that therefore all his claims were barred. Philip Morris takes essentially the same position. It does not argue that Grisham would have had a viable cause of action when she discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, her addiction to cigarettes. Nor does it argue that we should recognize a cause of action against a company that causes an individual to become addicted to its products, independent of any physical injury resulting from use of the product. Rather, its position, as stated in its answer brief in this court, is that [w]here a plaintiff alleges that addiction is a serious, severe, and/or incapacitating condition that caused appreciable injury, actual or constructive knowledge of addiction will trigger the statute of limitations, and under the single-injury rule all smoking-related claims that accrue, even if the plaintiff has not yet been diagnosed with other illnesses stemming from tobacco use. Because Philip Morris's argument that knowledge of addiction should trigger the statute of limitations is based on Grisham's allegations that such addiction caused appreciable harm that predated her diagnosis with serious tobacco-related illnesses, our starting point in evaluating that argument must be to understand precisely what kind of appreciable harm Grisham is alleging. As noted in the previous section of this opinion, the alleged injury from addiction that predated the 2001 diagnosis was economic in nature: Grisham was allegedly compelled by the addiction to devote a steady stream of her income to the purchase of cigarettes. We do not read Grisham's complaint as alleging an appreciable physical harm from addiction prior to 2001. [11] The question then is whether, assuming Grisham had discovered or should have discovered a viable unfair competition cause of action based on economic injury from addiction long before she was diagnosed with serious physical ailments, the statute of limitations began to run at that point of discovery on both her physical injury and economic injury causes of action. The argument that all her causes of action are time-barred is based on the rule against splitting a cause of action, and in order to evaluate that argument, a discussion of this rule is in order. The longstanding rule in California ... is that `[a.] single tort can be the foundation for but one claim for damages.' ( DeRose v. Carswell (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1024, 242 Cal.Rptr. 368, fn. 5 (DeRose ).) This rule is a corollary of the primary right theory found in California law. As we have explained: The primary right theory is a theory of code pleading that has long been followed in California. It provides that a `cause of action' is comprised of a `primary right' of the plaintiff, a corresponding `primary duty' of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty. [Citation.] The most salient characteristic of & primary right is that it is indivisible: the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action. [Citation.] A pleading that states the violation of one primary right in two causes of action contravenes the rule against `splitting' a cause of action. ( Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 881 P.2d 1083 (Crowley) .) As we further explained: The primary right theory has a fairly narrow field of application. It is invoked most often when a plaintiff attempts to divide a primary right and enforce it in two suits. The theory prevents this result by either of two means: (1) if the first suit is still pending when the second is filed, the defendant in the second suit may plead that fact in abatement (Code Civ. Proc, § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]) or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation.]. ( Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 881 P.2d 1083.) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891,151 P.2d 846; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 603, 63 Cal.Rptr. 566), or a different remedy for the same injury (see, e.g., Hatch v. Bank of America (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 206, 5 Cal.Rptr. 875; McCaffrey v. Wiley (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 621, 230 P.2d 152), or a somewhat greater factual elaboration of the same injury (see, e.g., McCloskey v. Carlton Builders (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 689, 211 Cal.Rptr. 659; Wick v. Wick Tool Co. (1959) 176 Cal. App.2d 677,1 Cal.Rptr. 531). The rule against splitting a cause of action is distinct from the rule, discussed above, that the infliction of appreciable and actual harm, however uncertain in amount, will commence the running of the statute of limitations. ( Dairies v. Krasna, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 514, 121 Cal.Rptr. 705, 535 P.2d 1161.) The rule against splitting a cause of action is neither an aspect, nor a restatement, of the statute of limitations; rather, it is in part a rule of abatement and in part a rule of res judicata. ( Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1146, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 701, 998 P.2d 403 (Hamilton) , italics in original.) These two rules may intersect, however, when a single wrongdoing gives rise to two or more different injuries, manifesting at different times, raising the question whether the two injuries are invasions of two different primary rights. Some courts have held that the earlier injury, even if less serious than the later injury, sets the statute running as to both injuries, and expiration of the statute on the earlier injury bars a suit on the later one. (See Miller v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 1622, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 796; DeRose, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1024, m. 5, 242 Cal.Rptr. 368.) Other courts have found that, under various theories, suit on a later manifesting injury was not time-barred even when suit on the earlier injury would be. ( Zambrano v. Dorough (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 169, 174, 224 Cal.Rptr. 323; see Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell Inc. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 316, 326-327,164 Cal.Rptr. 591.) Amicus curiae for Grisham cites a number of out-of-state cases holding that distinct injuries manifesting at different times caused by the same exposure to or ingestion of a toxic substance can give rise to more than one cause of action. [12] We confronted the same issue in Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th 1127, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 998 P.2d 403, in which the plaintiff alleged that mesothelioma is a separate and distinct injury from asbestosis, although both were caused by the same exposure to asbestos, and that therefore accrual of a cause of action for one of these injuries does not commence the running of the statute of limitations on the other. The majority never addressed the question whether the plaintiff had a separate primary right to be free of each of the two diseases; instead, the court resolved the issue on statutory grounds, concluding that under the special statute of limitations for asbestos victims, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.2, which commences with the date of disability, neither cause of action was time-barred. ( Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1144-1145, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 998 P.2d 403.) Justice Brown in her concurring opinion would have resolved the issue by holding that mesothelioma and asbestosis injuries formed the basis for two separate and distinct causes of action. (Id. at p. 1150, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 998 P.2d 403 (cone. opn. of Brown, J.).) We need not resolve whether and under what circumstances two different physical injuries arising out of the same wrongdoing can give rise to two separate lawsuits, or whether the two injuries in the present case can be conceived of as invading two different primary rights. Here, what is alleged are two different types of injury, one serious physical injury or injuries, the other an economic injury, giving rise to two different types of action. The economic injury was a more or less immediate result of Grisham's addiction to cigarettes, whereas her physical injuries occurred after many years of smoking. The addictiveness of a product is distinct from its capacity to cause serious physical injury, as demonstrated by the fact that other addictive products are not associated with the same harmful consequences. (See Juliano, Is Caffeine a Drug of Dependence? (Feb.2001) Psychiatric Times [as of Feb. 15, 2007] [caffeine documented as commonly creating significant physical and psychological dependence].) Philip Morris cites no authority, and we have found none, for the proposition that the rule that the statute of limitations commences with the infliction of appreciable injury bars suits biased on a later manifesting injury of a different type. (See, e.g;, Davies v. Krasna, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 514,121 Cal.Rptr. 705, 535 P.2d 1161 [statute of limitations commences when plaintiff incurred earlier economic injury based on intellectual property theft, not later injury of the same type]; Miller v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 1622, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 [plaintiff cannot sue on later developed physical injuries when earlier physical injuries are appreciable]; DeRose, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1024, fn. 6, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 [recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on later-developed emotional injury from childhood sexual assault barred when original injury could have given rise to the same cause of action].) Indeed, Davies v. Krasna, which first announced the appreciable harm rule, was concerned that a plaintiff not delay bringing an action until there was a more certain proof of damages ( Davies v. Krasna, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 515, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 535 P.2d 1161), and did not address whether an appreciable injury would bar a suit based on a later-discovered injury of a different type. We decline to extend the appreciable harm rule to the circumstances of this case, when there is an earlier manifesting economic injury and a later manifesting physical injury, because such an extension would be inconsistent with the discovery rule. In Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th 797, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914, we faced a similar issue. The plaintiff in Fox suffered serious complications after gastric bypass surgery. She sued the surgeon and hospital for medical malpractice. In the course of discovery, the plaintiff learned that the complications may have been due in part to a defective stapler manufactured by defendant Ethicon. The plaintiff amended her complaint to add Ethicon as a defendant and to add a products liability cause of action, and Ethicon demurred on statute of limitations grounds. We upheld the Court of Appeal's reversal of the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer, holding that discovery and accrual of the medical malpractice cause of action did not necessarily mean discovery that the products liability action had accrued. In so ruling, we rejected the holding in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 959, 966, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 298, that [w]hen a plaintiff has cause to sue based on knowledge or suspicion of negligence the statute starts to run as to all potential defendants, regardless of whether those defendants are alleged to be wrongdoers in a different cause of action. One of the reasons for our rejection was that [i]t would be contrary to public policy to require plaintiffs to file a lawsuit `at a time when the evidence available to them failed to indicate a cause of action.' [Citations.] Were plaintiffs required to file all causes of action when one cause of action accrued, as they would be under the Bristol-Myers Squibb rule, they would run the risk of sanctions for filing a cause of action without any factual support. [Citations.] Indeed, it would be difficult to describe a cause of action filed by a plaintiff, before that plaintiff reasonably suspects that the cause of action is a meritorious one, as anything but frivolous. At best, the plaintiffs cause of action would be subject to demurrer for failure to specify supporting facts (see, e.g., 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed.1997), Pleading, § 339, p. 436 [requirement of pleading facts]). In sum, the interest of the courts and of litigants against the filing of potentially meritless claims is a public policy concern that weighs heavily against the Bristol-Myers Squibb formulation of the discovery rule. ( Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 815, 27 Cal. Rptr.3d 661,110 P.3d 914.) In the present case the rule proposed by Philip Morris, like the Bristol-Myers Squibb rule we rejected in Fox, would compel cigarette smokers either to file groundless tort causes of action based on physical injury against tobacco companies as soon as they discovered they were addicted to cigarettes and had an unfair competition cause of action (again, assuming such a cause of action exists), or risk losing their right to sue in tort for such physical injury. This rule would violate the essence of the discovery rule that a plaintiff need not file a cause of action before he or she `has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements.' [Citation.] (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807, 27 Cal. Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914.) It would directly contravene the interest of the courts and of litigants against the filing of potentially meritless claims. (Id., at p. 815, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914.) Indeed, Philip Morris nowhere argues that tobacco addiction inevitably or even probably leads to serious physical ailments. (See, e.g., Risk and Life Expectancy, Lung Cancer and Smoking Statistics, Cancer Research UK, [as of Feb. 15, 2007] [the cumulative risk of dying of lung cancer by age 75 for a lifelong male smoker is 15.9 percent].) Philip Morris contends that Fox is distinguishable because it involved misconduct by two different defendants. But this distinction was not a basis for our ruling. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807, 27 Cal. Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914 [failure to discover the identity of the second defendant does not toll statute of limitations].) Fox's basic rationalethat the discovery of one cause of action does not necessarily mean plaintiff should have discovered the factual basis for a qualitatively different type of actionis fully applicable in the present case. If anything, its application has greater force here, where, unlike in Fox, the injury that was the crucial element of the later suit had not yet manifested at the time the earlier cause of action accrued. We therefore conclude that Grisham's discovery of her alleged unfair competition cause of action and related causes of action for economic injury based on smoking addiction did not start the statute of limitations running on her tort causes of action based on later-discovered appreciable physical injury. Rather, these latter causes of action did not begin to accrue until the physical ailments themselves were, or reasonably should have been, discovered. We leave for another day the question of whether and under what circumstances two physical injuries with different manifestation periods arising out of the same wrongdoing can be the legitimate basis for two different lawsuits.