Opinion ID: 1662210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Specifications of Misconduct

Text: The hearing before the commissioner involved two general specifications: 1. That in July, 1970 the respondent Edwins (a) improperly solicited employment as attorney from Ralph Thomas to represent him in a seamen's suit, (b) improperly advanced financial assistance to Thomas during his representation of him, and (c) when the suit was settled in May 1972, improperly neglected to account to Thomas for the withholding of advances and expenses (in addition to his fee) from the proceeds of the settlement. 2. That, during his representation of Donald Selzer in a seamen's suit from MarchJune 1972, Edwins improperly advanced some funds to his client. We will discuss these specifications in the order thus set forth. Specification 1(a): Solicitation The commissioner's report finds: The evidence in this case is clear and convincing to the effect that Respondent [Edwins], with the aid of an employee (Johnson) and the assistance of a stranger (Enos Danos) did call upon Ralph H. Thomas at his trailer home in Raceland, Louisiana. As a result of this visit, respondent obtained a contract of employment to represent Thomas in the capacity of an attorney at law. Thomas did not seek out respondent for advice nor did he make any effort to contact respondent. It was a suggestion from Danos to Johnson that led Johnson to Thomas and ultimately resulted in the visit by respondent to Thomas. The virtually uncontradicted evidence supports this factual conclusion by the commissioner. Nevertheless the commissioner could not find that the conduct in question violated any disciplinary rule. The Association excepts to this conclusion. Disciplinary Rule 2-103(A), above quoted, prohibits an attorney from recommending his own employment to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer. A lawyer cannot circumvent this disciplinary rule through the action of another, Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(2), such as by his employee (Johnson) or by a non-lawyer third person (Danos) who (without authorization from a claimant) informs the attorney of some claimant's need for legal representation, even though that third person requests the lawyer to go by and visit the claimant. The issue, thus, is whether Edwins through his employee Johnson solicited employment to represent Thomas, either from Thomas himself or from Danos, a third party who was not authorized by Thomas to request an attorney to come see Thomas. If, on the other hand, Thomas did request Danos to secure an attorney for him, then no solicitation by Edwins occurred he came to see Thomas at the request of Thomas (through the latter's agent in the matter, Danos). The attorney Edwins' chief defense is that he and his employee Johnson did not solicit employment; that they contacted Thomas only at the request of Danos, a stranger to them; and that they presumed that Danos was authorized by Thomas to attempt to locate an attorney for him, since Danos was a former employer, a quasi-landlord, and a responsible businessman who was Thomas's friend. Neither Danos nor Johnson was subpoenaed to testify by either the Association or Edwins. Edwins contends that the failure of the Association to call these two as witnesses constitutes a failure on its part to produce the clear and convincing proof of solicitation required for disciplinary proceedings. We were given some pause by this contention. After all, knowing of the relationship between Danos and Thomas, Edwins might not unreasonably have concluded that Danos was authorized by Thomas to assist him in securing an attorney to represent him. On the other hand, the evidence of Thomas and his wife is to the effect that Danos knew of their need for an attorney, but that they did not request him to secure one. In the face of the evidence, in our opinion, the burden shifted to Edwins to secure the testimony of Danos to disprove their testimonyespecially since there is no testimony in the record that Edwins was in fact informed by anyone that Danos was authorized by Thomas to help him secure an attorney. Likewise, we conclude that the burden was on Edwins to produce Johnson as a witness. An indicia of solicitation arises from the circumstance that an attorney's paid employee calls upon a claimant who denies that he had authorized anyone to help him secure an attorney. The attorney cannot, after acting through such a non-lawyer employee (whom the evidence indicates solicited employment from a non-lawyer), then claim that his responsibility for the employee's act is not proved. He cannot contend the Association failed in its burden of proof because it did not call the attorney's former employee as a witness to present a possibly exculpatory explanation. (The evidence here shows that Edwins could have, but did not, subpoena the employee, Johnson. We are not faced with a situation where the testimony, exculpatory or inculpatory, of the witness was unavailable.) We therefore conclude that solicitation was proved. We also conclude that, under all the circumstances shown by the evidence, Edwins should be suspended from the practice of law for ninety days from the date of finality of this decision. In the first disciplinary instance before us of improper (near) solicitation, we merely imposed a reprimand. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Rutledge, 270 So.2d 535 (La.1972). The conduct was not, however, held to constitute solicitation. (Should further violations occur subsequent to the finality of this decision, we shall consider imposing a sanction more severe than the present one, if the facts of the solicitation so warrant.)