Opinion ID: 6323814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “On Behalf Of”

Text: Schutte’s other textual argument is also not persuasive. Recall that the provision at issue applies if a prior class action was brought “on behalf of the same or other persons.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii). According to Schutte, this language necessarily implies some limitation on the prior class actions. She contends the phrase must require that there be “some connection between the two class actions.” The ﬁrst problem with this argument is that Schutte oﬀers no meaningful guidance about what sort of connection should suﬃce. Nor does she oﬀer a basis in the statutory text or even the history of CAFA’s enactment for answering that question. The “some connection” standard would have no basis in law and would be impossible to apply fairly. Cf. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493–95 (1985) (rejecting similarly elusive and amorphous proposal to require “racketeering injury” under civil RICO statute). Still, Schutte argues, if some connection between the classes were not required, the “on behalf of the same or other persons” language would be rendered surplusage because all class actions are, by deﬁnition, brought on behalf of other persons. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (deﬁning “class action” for CAFA); see generally, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015) (plurality opinion) (relying on canon against surplusage to avoid rendering superﬂuous an entire provision of the relevant statute). This surplusage argument is not persuasive. As this court has recognized, “the presence of some redundance is rarely 22 No. 22-1087 fatal on its own to a statutory reading.” White v. United Airlines, Inc., 987 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2021); see also Territory of Guam v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1608, 1615 (2021) (rejecting eﬀort to try to “avoid surplusage at all costs” (citation omitted)); Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873, 881 (2019) (“Sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy.”). An important empirical study found that drafters of legislation often “intentionally err on the side of redundancy” as a precautionary measure and as a response to political demands. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 934 (2013); see also Nourse, Misreading Law, at 92–93 (explaining how Senate rules encourage redundant statutory language); Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1317, 1448, 1469 (2014) (citing evidence that “repetition (i.e., surplusage) is typically what supporting institutions and groups want from the legislative process” and arguing that the anti-surplusage canon is “antidemocratic in a serious way”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 531, 579 (2013) (book review) (“[T]he rule against surplusage ... is especially problematic because the legislative process operates under the opposite assumption and so that canon will often thwart legislative deals rather than enforce them.”); Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Courts and the Administrative State, 64 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 711, 718 (2014) (observing that “members of Congress often want to be redundant” because they want “to make doubly sure about things,” so courts “should be more careful” in applying the canon); Richard A. Posner, Statutory No. 22-1087 23 Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 812 (1983) (“[A] statute that is the product of compromise may contain redundant language as a by-product of the strains of the negotiating process.”). This case illustrates the limits of the anti-surplusage canon. Schutte is correct that class actions are, by deﬁnition, brought on behalf of other persons. See § 1332(d)(1)(B) (deﬁning a class action as any civil action ﬁled under a statute or rule “authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons”). But suppose that Congress had omitted the “on behalf of” language from the local controversy exception. The exception would then apply only if “during the 3- year period preceding the ﬁling of that class action, no other class action has been ﬁled asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants.” In applying that language, courts and litigants might reasonably wonder whether a prior class action needed to involve the same class representatives or members to qualify—especially given the express requirement that it involve at least one of the same defendants. That issue would have been easy to anticipate, and Congress chose statutory language that made its meaning crystal clear: a prior class action that is factually similar qualiﬁes regardless of whether it was brought “on behalf of the same or other persons.” § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added); see also Brown, 2016 WL 6996136, at  n.13 (“If serving no other purpose, this language emphasizes that an action need not be 24 No. 22-1087 ﬁled by or on behalf of the same purported class of plaintiﬀs to meet the criteria set forth in this section.”). 8 The practical implications of our reading of the mandatory local controversy exception are evident. A series of class actions making similar factual allegations against a defendant in diﬀerent states can fall outside the exception, allowing removal and perhaps making possible pretrial coordination under the federal multidistrict litigation process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The ﬁrst such class action would not be removable, for there would be no prior class action. But as noted, CAFA reﬂects a complex and delicate balance of compromises, and we do our best to enforce it as written. The district court’s order denying remand is AFFIRMED. 8If the text of the provision were not considered sufficiently clear, we could look to the Senate committee’s post-passage report on the final bill for further confirmation. See Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc., 457 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir. 2006) (addressing CAFA’s legislative history “for the sake of completeness”); see also Brill, 427 F.3d at 448 (“When a law sensibly could be read in multiple ways, legislative history may help a court understand which of these received the political branches’ imprimatur.”). The report said: “The inquiry is whether similar factual allegations have been made … regardless of whether the same causes of action were asserted or whether the purported plaintiff classes were the same (or even overlapped in significant respects).” S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 41, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 39 (emphases added). Unlike the advice discussed above in note 5, that statement fits comfortably with the statutory language. It weighs further against Schutte’s contention that some connection between the two classes is required.