Opinion ID: 411653
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Public Hearing

Text: 36 Alleged civil contemnors, like criminal contemnors, have some right to a public hearing. In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 697 (2d Cir.1982). The right derives from the Due Process Clause, Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 1042-43, 4 L.Ed.2d 989 (1960), and exists to the extent that it does not undermine the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. Id. at 618, 80 S.Ct. at 1043; Matter of Fula, 672 F.2d 279, 283 (2d Cir.1982). Thus, while a grand jury witness has no right to have the general public present while a court puts to him the grand jury's questions, he does have the right to insist that the final adjudication of his contempt occur in public. In Levine v. United States, supra, a criminal contempt proceeding, the Court stated that, following the closed-courtroom reading of the grand jury's questions, 37 petitioner then might well have insisted that, as summary punishment was to be imposed, the courtroom be opened so that the act of contempt, that is, his definitive refusal to comply with the court's direction to answer the previously propounded questions, and the consequent adjudication and sentence might occur in public. 38 362 U.S. at 618, 80 S.Ct. at 1043-1044. The Court continued, however, that exclusion of the public is not to be deemed contrary to the requirements of the Due Process Clause without a request having been made to the trial judge to open the courtroom at the final stage of the proceeding. Id. at 619, 80 S.Ct. at 1044. Applying these principles to an adjudication of civil contempt, we have held that the grand jury witness may properly request that the courtroom be open to the public for so much of the contempt trial as is not devoted to a consideration of substantive grand jury matters, and that it is error to refuse such a request. Matter of Fula, supra, 672 F.2d at 283; In re Rosahn, supra, 671 F.2d at 697. 39 Turning to the present case, we conclude that Bongiorno's due process rights were not violated by such exclusion of the public as occurred. Although Bongiorno's counsel has argued that his request for the admission of the general public to the courtroom at the start of the November 3 hearing was crystal clear, we find the contrary to be reflected in the record. As the colloquy quoted above reveals, the matter was first raised in the context of the government's suggestion that Bongiorno's wife should not be present (perhaps a reference to her state of parturient dilation). Then, following the comments of counsel for both sides recognizing that the courtroom should be open if the witness so requests, the court asked, The application is in reference to her [i.e., Mrs. Bongiorno], I suppose? (Tr. 3-4.) Bongiorno's counsel made a reply that appears to have been nonresponsive, but that nevertheless focused squarely on Mrs. Bongiorno and did not mention the public in general; and it appears that the court construed this as an affirmative reply to its question, for at the end of the morning session when Bongiorno's counsel stated that he thought he had asked to have the courtroom completely open, the court stated, Your request was let the wife stay in here. (Tr. 28.) The district court's interpretation of Bongiorno's counsel's reply to its inquiry was entirely reasonable, and we conclude that Bongiorno did not, prior to the end of the morning session, request that the public be admitted. 40 When the request for a public hearing was made, it was granted, and all subsequent proceedings were conducted in a courtroom open to the public. Accordingly, we conclude that Bongiorno's right to a public hearing was not violated.