Opinion ID: 2486558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether There Is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact

Text: Having disposed of the threshold issue, we must decide whether MBI has met its burden of introducing admissible evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to defendants' liability. Defendants urge MBI's failure to introduce any expert testimony means it has not met this burden. On a motion for summary judgment, this Court reviews the record de novo to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 966; Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund v. Louisiana Ins. Guaranty Association, 09-23 (La.6/26/09), 17 So.3d 350, 353. A moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial must point out an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim. La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 966(C)(2). If the non-moving party fails to produce contrary factual support sufficient to establish it will be able to satisfy the evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. Whether a particular fact in dispute is material for summary judgment purposes is viewed in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Richard v. Hall, 03-1488 (La.4/23/04), 874 So.2d 131, 137. In order to establish a valid legal malpractice claim, MBI must show evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable trier of fact of (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) negligent representation by the attorney; and (3) loss caused by that negligence. Teague v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 07-1384 (La.2/1/08), 974 So.2d 1266, 1272. MBI has the burden of proving the defendant failed to exercise at least that degree of care, skill, and diligence which is exercised by prudent practicing attorneys in his locality. Ramp v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 269 So.2d 239, 244 (1972). Typically, a plaintiff will retain an expert witness both to establish the standard of care for prudent attorneys in the relevant locality and to show the defendant's actions fell below the standard of care. See Sunset Ins. Co. v. Gomila, 02-633 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/30/02), 834 So.2d 654, 657; Morgan v. Campbell, Campbell & Johnson, 561 So.2d 926, 929 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1990). MBI first argues it has no obligation to retain an expert witness at this point in the proceeding because the trial court has not yet set a deadline for completing expert discovery. This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of summary judgment procedure. There is no requirement for the defendant to wait until all discovery deadlines have passed before filing a motion for summary judgment, and a defendant's motion for summary judgment may be made at any time. La.Code of Civ. Proc. art. 966(A)(1). Once the defendant's motion is filed, the plaintiff must present sufficient factual support to prove every essential element of his claim. La.Code of Civ. Proc. art. 966(C)(2). He cannot simply tell the court that the evidence will be forthcoming at some unknown later date. See Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La.2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, 887-88. [16] MBI did seek the counsel of attorney Scott Love, who believed Weinstein and Durio committed malpractice. MBI asks this Court to accept Love's affidavit as expert testimony. However, Love was not hired as an expert witness; he was retained as counsel to sue Weinstein and Durio for malpractice. [17] Nonetheless, this Court has reviewed Love's affidavit. The affidavit does not demonstrate Love has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in the area of legal malpractice and thus does not meet the necessary prerequisites of La.Code Evid. art. 702. Just as importantly, the affidavit does not set forth the relevant standard of care or explain the specific acts by Weinstein and Durio which, in his opinion, fell below the standard of care. MBI's failure to introduce the testimony or affidavit of an expert witness is not necessarily fatal to its claim. In Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 269 So.2d 239 (1972), this Court recognized (albeit in dicta) that expert testimony is not necessary where the alleged legal malpractice is obvious or the defendant attorney committed gross error. Id. at 244. Indeed, the Ramp court suggested an attorney's malpractice could be so obvious as to be the subject of judicial notice. Accord, Frisard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 06-2353 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/2/07) 979 So.2d 494, 498 (attorney's failure to appear is obvious negligence and no expert testimony is needed); Schlesinger v. Herzog, 95-1127 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/3/96), 672 So.2d 701, 708 (judicial notice of obvious legal negligence could be taken regardless of expert testimony); Watkins v. Sheppard, 278 So.2d 890, 892 (La.App. 1 Cir.1973). We have applied the same principle in medical malpractice cases: Expert testimony is not required where the physician does an obviously careless act, such as fracturing a leg during examination, amputating the wrong arm, dropping a knife, scalpel, or acid on a patient, or leaving a sponge in a patient's body, from which a lay person can infer negligence. Pfiffner v. Correa, 94-0924, 94-0963, 94-0992 (La.10/17/94), 643 So.2d 1228, 1233. Therefore, because MBI did not introduce any competent expert witness testimony or affidavit, summary judgment for the defendants is proper unless the undisputed facts establish malpractice which was so obvious that a lay person would recognize it as falling beneath the necessary standard of care. We address the evidence against each defendant in turn. MBI first argues Weinstein committed malpractice during the course of the Moon Ventures bankruptcy proceeding by, among other things: failing to seek a hearing on injunctive relief, advising MBI to sign a compromise converting its position from a secured position to an unsecured position, testifying to the bankruptcy trustee to the detriment of his client, failing to pursue an action regarding certain allegedly fraudulent statements, and failing to include certain additional claims in the petition. Having reviewed the memorandum and exhibits filed in opposition to the Weinstein motion for summary judgment, we do not find any evidence of a breach of the standard of care which is so clear-cut that a lay jury would recognize it as malpractice. Indeed, these allegations are so far outside the experience of the average juror that expert testimony would be absolutely crucial to establish a breach of the standard of care. MBI also alleges Weinstein committed malpractice by withdrawing from the case in February 2003, approximately three months before the then-scheduled trial date. MBI urges this violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by withdrawing too close to the trial date and by misrepresenting to the court that no trial date had been set. The mere fact of Weinstein's withdrawal is insufficient to establish negligence, as MBI does not explain how it suffered any prejudice as a result. Indeed, Rule 1.16 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides a lawyer may withdraw unless there will be material adverse effect on the interests of the client. MBI has not demonstrated any material adverse effect caused either by Weinstein's February 2003 withdrawal or by his misleading statement to the court. Although an attorney's unexpected withdrawal may be prejudicial if he leaves a client without representation shortly before trial, this is not what happened here. At the time Weinstein withdrew, Durio was lead counsel for MBI. Indeed, according to his billing records, Weinstein had not been working on the case since August 2002, months before the formal withdrawal. MBI knew Weinstein had filed his motion to withdraw, but did not object. Finally, any potential prejudice which Weinstein's withdrawal might have caused MBI was mooted when trial was continued until November 2003, giving Durio several more months to adequately prepare for trial. For these reasons, we find there is no genuine issue of material fact which would support a verdict in favor of MBI against defendant Weinstein. We next turn to the allegations against Steven Durio. First, MBI alleges he negligently missed the pretrial deadlines to add additional defendants and request a jury trial. However, MBI does not explain how adding additional defendants, in this case engineering firms EQE and Porta-Kamp, would have changed the eventual outcome of the litigation. MBI lost this case because it was unable to prove the existence of any valid trade secrets. Simply adding more defendants to the claim would not have changed the outcome. Nor does MBI explain how it was prejudiced by the denial of its request for a jury trial. MBI does not allege that, given the record before him at trial, Judge Duplantier committed any errors of fact. [18] We therefore find no reason or support to believe the result would have been different had the case been tried to a jury. We find this argument seeks, in hindsight view, the proverbial second bite at the apple. MBI also alleges Durio performed inadequately at trial. Specifically, it claims he did not ask questions of key witnesses, thereby failing to expose and put on the record important facts, and did not call all key witnesses to testify, depriving the record of important testimony and corroboration of key facts. These vague allegations are not sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment. MBI makes no attempt to explain how this alleged additional testimony or evidence could have changed the outcome of the case. [19] And again, this is precisely the kind of allegation which requires expert testimony to establish whether Durio's actions fell beneath the applicable standard of care. Without the assistance of an expert, a lay jury would have no basis for deciding whether the decision to call a particular witness or introduce a certain document was within the standard of care for a reasonably competent attorney in the Lafayette area. There is one allegation of malpractice on the part of Durio's firm which is so egregious that a reasonable lay jury could infer his actions fell beneath any reasonable standard of care. In March 2001, Fred Gossen gave Durio a box containing a significant amount of documentary evidence including all relevant agreements, contracts, documents, legal strategy, and other sensitive, confidential and attorney/client privileged information. The documents were given to opposing counsel as part of plaintiffs document production. However, Durio's associate failed to make any copies of the documents first. For two years, the whereabouts of this box was unknown. Although Gossen and Durio eventually managed to recover many of the documents, some remained missing, and the recovered documents were unorganized and out of order. A reasonable lay jury could certainly find handing over a box of client documents without making copies is negligent under any standard. Thus, no expert testimony was necessary to establish these actions fell below the applicable standard of care. However, it is not enough to simply show Durio acted negligently. MBI must also introduce evidence of causation. Although this Court disavowed the case within a case doctrine in Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 422 So.2d 1109, 1110 (La.1982), we reiterated that causation is an essential element of any tort claim. At the very least, MBI must establish some causal connection between the alleged negligence and the eventual unfavorable outcome of the litigation. Id. It has not done so. Although MBI claims some documents were lost, it does not explain which specific documents were never recovered. Nor does it explain how the introduction of those documents prejudiced its ability to win this lawsuit. MBI has therefore failed to establish a prima facie case that the attorney's negligence caused [it] some loss. Id. Therefore, we find entry of summary judgment is proper.