Opinion ID: 1846260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether kolberg was limited in his right to confront the witnesses against him.

Text: ¶ 124. The State called as one of its witnesses James Donald, who was the nursing coordinator at the time Kolberg brought Madison to the emergency room. Donald was called to gain information (a history) from Kolberg. No doubt, Donald had taken extensive notes in his interview with Kolberg regarding what may have happened to Madison. Donald testified as to the version of events as Kolberg had relayed them to him. Apparently in an attempt to rehabilitate Donald, the State specifically elicited from Donald that he took very extensive notes concerning this conversation between [him] and Mr. Kolberg. The State even had Donald testify that he drew pictures. In short, the State attempted to place reliance on Donald's notes and show that any version of events missing from the notes were missing because Kolberg had not relayed them to Donald. Yet, it is obvious that the defense theory was that if Donald could not remember what Kolberg looked like, it is entirely possible that events not noted by Donald had been conveyed by Kolberg to Donald, and that Donald had simply forgotten them in the twelve year interim. We turn now to that point in the record depicting the events of which Kolberg now complains. ¶ 125. The following event occurred during direct examination: Q. Would you recognize Bryan Kolberg again if you saw him? A. Yes. Q. Which individual is he? A. The gentleman with the green jacket with the glasses. [Witness apparently points to defense attorney Andre Degruy.] Q. That's actually BY MR. SMITH:Objection. Can't lead the witness. A. No, that is not him. BY MS. WOOTEN: (Continuing) Q. Do you knowcan you recall? I know it's been a long time. A. I don't know. Q. Okay. It's been at least twelve years. A. He was dark haired. Q. So one of the individuals over there. Do you recognize them? A. No, I don't. Q. Okay. But you did speak to the boyfriend, the person that brought this individual in? A. Yes. Kolberg now tells us that the following events on cross-examination deprived him of his right to confront the witness against him: Q. Just for the record, Mr. Donald, you and I have never met, right? A. No, sir. Q. Okay. And for the record when you were asked to identify Bryan Kolberg, you pointed out this guy right here in the green jacket, right? A. That is true, but my eyes have gone real bad in the last few years, so unless you're within a certain distance Q.It's easy for anybody to make mistakes, isn't it? A. Right. Q. And I'm going to show you this driver's license [i.e., Mr. Smith was attempting to hand the witness the driver's license of defense attorney Andre Degruy] and see if you can recognize that as the person in the green jacket over there. BY MS. WOOTEN: Your Honor, I object to this. BY MR. SMITH: I just need to make a record. BY MS. WOOTEN: Your Honor, I object. Mr. Donald made a mistake on identifying Mr. Kolberg who he interviewed twelve years ago. I don't think there's a question of who the person was. BY MR. SMITH: (Continuing) Q. Would you agree that that is actually A.I can't tell that's the gentleman over there BY MS. WOOTEN:Your Honor, I've made an objection. BY THE COURT: Objection will be sustained. Kolberg tells us that after the defense proved Donald had identified the wrong person, the defense should have been permitted to rake him over the coals for his mistaken identity. However, if one looks closely at the record, it is obvious that defense counsel had unequivocally made his point with the jury, and that is that the State's witness had absolutely identified co-counsel for the defense as the defendant, Kolberg. In other words, the witness had misidentified the defendant before the jury. The only denial of cross-examination on this point was when the trial court sustained the State's objection when defense counsel was trying to ask the witness if the photo on the driver's license was that of defense co-counsel whom the witness had misidentified as the defendant. First of all, that point had already been made before the jury, and secondly, once the State's objection to that question had been sustained, defense counsel continued his cross-examination of Donald on his misidentification of the defendant. Note the next two questions of defense counsel to Donald after the State's objection had been sustained: Q. You'll agree that even in the calm of the courtroom like this it's easy for people to make mistakes, wouldn't you? A. I would say anything was possible. Q. Right. And when you're really upset and when you're told that a child close to you is potentially dying, it's easier to make mistakes, isn't it? A. I would say so. ¶ 126. The right of confrontation and cross-examination extends to and includes the right to fully cross examine the witness on every material point relating to the issue to be determined that would have bearing on the credibility of the witness and the weight and worth of his testimony. Myers v. State, 296 So.2d 695, 700 (Miss.1974). However, here, Kolberg was not denied his right to confront the witnesses against him based on the trial court's sustaining the objection to one question. After the sustaining of the objection, defense counsel continued the cross-examination of the witness on misidentification and then for whatever reason, Kolberg's counsel chose at some point to move to another line of questioning. No proffer was made as to what evidence would have been offered by Kolberg but for the trial court's purported limiting of cross-examination of a State's witness. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
¶ 127. Kolberg next complains that he was not permitted to impeach some of the State's experts with evidence that they had been found to have committed malpractice in the past. If there is anything about past conduct which reflects upon knowledge, clearly it is admissible. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So.2d 254, 277 (Miss.1985), aff'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 71, 108 S.Ct. 1645, 100 L.Ed.2d 62 (1988). When particular credit is concerned, particular inquiries are proper. 483 So.2d at 277 (citing Wood v. American Life Ins. & Trust Co., 8 Miss. (7 How.) 609 (1843)). The question is whether such past conduct [is] relevant to the inquiry. Id. Bankers Life applied this rule to a doctor who had been impeached by questioning regarding prior law suits filed against him. This Court noted that there was no request made for an in-chambers determination of whether a suit in any way bore upon his professional qualification to express an opinion. Id. The Court concluded by saying: We cannot find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, and even if there were, it was not reversible error. In these litigious times the mere fact that some person has been sued hardly effects either his reputation or credibility. Id. ¶ 128. Applying the abuse of discretion standard, we find this assignment of error is without merit. Kolberg desired to inform the jury that one specific doctor had been sued for malpractice for improperly reading a CT scan. Kolberg argued that this doctor's testimony regarding the importance and accuracy of CT scans was completely inapposite in the deposition taken when he was the defendant than it was on Kolberg's trial. The trial judge did not allow Kolberg to inform the jury that the doctor had been sued for malpractice or any of the facts surrounding that case. However, the trial judge did allow Kolberg to use any prior inconsistent statements, i.e., the depositions from the suit, for impeachment purposes. Because the trial judge allowed the prior inconsistent statements, the error, if any, of not allowing Kolberg to tell the jury that the doctor had been sued for malpractice and settled the case, is without merit.
¶ 129. Kolberg next complains of a note found in Laurel's car. Kolberg had been to the dentist, and Laurel had picked him up. He was not able to talk because he had a mouth full of gauze, so he was writing notes down on a piece of paper and Laurel was verbally responding. The damaging portion of the note was a the written statement: All she has to do is bump into something. The State attempted to establish Kolberg wrote that out of frustration with Madison and in reference to the child. Counsel for Kolberg attempted to fill in the blanks which would have represented Laurel's verbal contribution to the conversation. The following dialogue occurred after the State's objection, and now serves as the basis of Kolberg's complaint: Q. And it's a fair assumption that when he said, uncle, that it was his uncle, John Huber, who was going to pick it up; is that right? MR. MAYFIELD: Excuse me, Your Honor. I see some dialog in there that is not supported by thethere is some in the italicized portion. That's not in evidence, and I assume it came from counsel's head. I am going to object to that. THE COURT: I sustain the objection. I can't read the document. I haven't seen what it's MR. SMITH: (Continuing) Q. It would be fair to say that you probably at some point asked him where he wanted to go? MR. MAYFIELD: That's my objection, Your Honor. MS. WOOTEN: Your Honor, it calls for speculation is why I objected to it to begin with. THE COURT: I sustain objection. Kolberg's basis for his assertion of error now is that the judge should not have sustained the objection if he couldn't see what the objection was about. While the trial judge sustained the objection to that question, the record reveals that Kolberg continued with this would it be fair to say fill in the blank line of questioning. There were no further objections by the State. Thus, Kolberg's questioning in this fashion was not inhibited in any respect. Further, Kolberg specifically said he did not deny that he wrote the note, although we do not see that he ever specifically admitted that it was. Accordingly, we find that this assignment of error is without merit.
¶ 130. Kolberg asserts confrontation violations in regard to more of the State's witnesses in this subsection. He begins with Officer Charlie Crisco. Kolberg tells us the State was permitted, over objection, to elicit hearsay testimony concerning the basis of probable cause for securing his arrest warrant. Kolberg further tells us that this opened the door for him to cross examine Officer Crisco, and that the State's hearsay objections to his questions were improperly sustained. According to Kolberg, this allowed the State to improperly buttress its case by implying that [he] could not have been arrested but for the magistrate's finding of probable cause. ¶ 131. Kolberg refers us to the point in the record where the State asked Officer Crisco Did you have probable cause to get this arrest warrant, to which the officer responded yes. Counsel for Kolberg objected, and this objection was sustained. He tells us that the [State's] hearsay efforts just went on and on, and there was absolutely no basis for any of this line of questioning. (emphasis in original). However, the record reveals that the State immediately dropped the subject, and it was approximately 16 pages later in the transcript before the subject resurfaced. ¶ 132. The State sought to have Officer Crisco testify as to why Kolberg was arrested. However, the State attempted to reintroduce this subject by asking the officer why would you arrest one person over another. Kolberg's objection was sustained on the basis of relevance. The following questioning is what Kolberg now asserts is impermissible as hearsay, and which, he says, opened the door for him: Q. Why did y'all arrest Bryan Kolberg for the murder of Madison Watson? BY MR. SMITH: And I must object to that. BY THE COURT: I'll let him answer that. A. He was arrestedoriginally arrested for aggravated assault on the afternoon or late afternoon of August the 22nd. The investigation revealed that he had sole custody of the child from 8:00 that morning until he took the child to the hospital at approximately 4:00 that afternoon except for the time that he spent with the mother. Based on the fact that he was in sole custody, based on statements given to me by Dr. Vise, who waswho I spoke with on August the 22nd, Dr. Vise indicated to me that BY MR. SMITH:I must object to hearsay, Your Honor. BY THE COURT: Sustained. BY MS. WOOTEN: (Continuing) Q. What conclusions did you draw from Dr. Vise's report? A. That the child had received severe trauma to the head and that these injuries had occurred within a four hour period prior to the arrival of the child at the hospital, from noon until 4 p.m. Q. And based on those facts is that why y'all made an arrest? A. That's correct. There are questions which asked the officer for hearsay responses, and the State even concedes as much. However, as pointed out by the State, Kolberg's objections to the hearsay statements were sustained. ¶ 133. In Swindle v. State, 502 So.2d 652 (Miss.1987), this Court held the admission of out-of-court statements made to a police officer during the course of an investigation was permissible. This Court stated [i]t is elemental that a police officer may show that he has received a complaint, and what he did about the complaint without going into the details of it. Id. at 658 (citing Tolbert v. State, 407 So.2d 815 (Miss.1981)). In Swindle, a narcotics agent testified about a tip he received from a confidential informant as to the whereabouts of the defendant. 502 So.2d at 657. Although the out-of-court statement of an informant is generally inadmissible as hearsay where it is part of the State's proof on the merits of the case, this Court held the tip was admissible to the extent required to show why the officer acted as he did and why the officer was at a particular place at a particular time. Id. at 658. ¶ 134. We do not agree with Kolberg's assertion that Officer Crisco was allowed to testify about hearsay statements. But to the extent he did, if any, it was clearly for the purpose of providing the basis of his investigation, and the ultimate arrest, of Kolberg. Consequently, this assignment of error is without merit. ¶ 135. We also agree with the State that to the extent Kolberg asserts he should have been allowed to elicit hearsay from Officer Crisco during cross-examination, this assignment of error is also without merit. The State directs our attention to our decision in Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290 (Miss.1984), where we said: There is no hearsay exception based upon the scope of examination. You may allow its admission by failing to object to it, but you simply cannot open the door to hearsay. Hearsay is incompetent evidence. You may open the door for collateral, irrelevant, and otherwise damaging evidence to come in on cross-examination, but Mississippi recognizes no rule of law that allows double hearsay to be brought in through this open door. Murphy, 453 So.2d at 1294 (citations omitted). Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit. ¶ 136. Kolberg also complains that he was not allowed to impeach witnesses in more pedestrian ways. For example, Dr. Meador had made a prior inconsistent statement to one of the State's investigating officers, as related in his police report. The defense simply sought to bring this out. The State's hearsay objection was sustained as counsel for Kolberg was attempting to impeach Officer Crisco with Dr. Meador's alleged prior inconsistent statements. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
¶ 137. Kolberg next asserts that the State used Charlie Smith, a crime scene investigator with the Jackson Police Department who took photographs of Madison's body during the autopsy, to introduce the testimony of the pathologist, Dr. Galvez. Kolberg tells us the State did this because it absolutely did not want to call the pathologist in this case. Kolberg's portrayal of Smith's testimony is that Smith said everything Dr. Galvez would have said had he been called to testify. Thus, Kolberg says that he was wrongly denied the right to cross examine Dr. Galvez. Kolberg is in error. While the portions of the record Kolberg cite seem to support his position, a review of Smith's testimony reveals a different story. ¶ 138. Kolberg objected prior to Smith's testimony asserting that he's not an expert and can't possibly describe what they all mean. The court overruled the objection because Smith's testimony was to authenticate the pictures. Counsel for Kolberg said: To identify them I have no problem except for the objection I'm going to make to these gruesome ones in terms of admissibility ... Although Kolberg vehemently argues that Smith testified as to what Dr. Galvez would have said, the record shows that Smith's references to Dr. Galvez were nothing more than that he took certain pictures because he was told to. Smith's testimony authenticated the pictures by relating that he was the photographer and he identified each picture. He offered no interpretation about the significance of the injuries, not from his own perspective, and certainly not from Dr. Galvez's perspective. The State also correctly notes that when counsel for Kolberg asked Smith to express an opinion on the significance of certain photographs, he declined to do so saying instead that I wouldn't know, and I'm not a pathologist. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without foundation in the record and totally devoid of merit.
¶ 139. Kolberg also asserts he was denied his right to confrontation with regard to Morina Jacobs's son, Benjamin Jacobs. Kolberg asserts that at trial he sought to establish that both Morina and Benjamin were prejudiced against him, and that both individuals were making up stories about him. The following portion of the record is the basis for Kolberg's complaint before us: Q. Okay. And in terms of this, do you feel like you are prejudiced against Bryan Kolberg or not? A. Excuse me? Q. Do you feel like you are prejudiced against Bryan Kolberg? A. No. Q. You don't feel like you are a prejudiced sort of person altogether? A. No. Q. You do feel that 99 percent of black people act like you owe them something, though; don't you? MS. WOOTEN: Your Honor, what is this? MR. MAYFIELD: Your Honor THE COURT: Sustained. Objection will be sustained. MS. WOOTEN: That is absolutely outrageous. THE COURT: Mr. Smith, Iyou know, I'm a little disappointed. MR. SMITH: Your Honor THE COURT: Objection will be sustained. MR. SMITH: Your Honor, if I may make a record later on that. THE COURT: You certainly may. MR. SMITH: Thank you. MR. MAYFIELD: Make it in the presence of the jury? MR. SMITH: No. I will make it later outside the presence of the jury if I must. MR. MAYFIELD: I would ask that the jury disregard and counsel be admonished. That's outrageous. THE COURT: The jury will disregard it. MR. SMITH: Note my objection, Your Honor. Thank you. Counsel for Kolberg then quotes us his argument before the trial judge, which was heard outside the presence of the jury. However, to place everyone's arguments in perspective, we will include argument given by the State, as well as, the comments and ruling of the trial judge: MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I need to make a record on the limitation on cross there. I was impeaching that witness with his statement given to my investigator: Well, I guess I am prejudiced. I really don't like themby which he meant black peopleI mean, 99 percent of them act like you owe them something. After which he went on to say that he considered all white trash the same way and that he used people in that way. That is classically what you do in cross-examination. It's to expose biases and prejudice. And a person who is prejudiced is prejudiced. And it's totally legitimate cross-examination. I object to being cut off from doing it. I object to the Court making statements about how that was improper. It is entirely proper. And I request that the jury be instructed that what I did was entirely proper, and I request that I be allowed to complete that impeachment. MR. MAYFIELD: It is not proper, Your Honor. And 616Rule 616, it speaks of bias, requires that prejudice or bias be shown either for or against a party to the actions. That is just for obvious purposes. The Court knows what he was doing. MR. SMITH: No, that is not true. He considers Bryan Kolberg white trash, and he considers that he can say that, and I think that's critical to exposing the biases. THE COURT: Well, you have a way of being very artful in your assessment of the evidence. The defense, like the state, is not authorized or entitled to create their own open door and then leap through that door to evidence which they know is highly prejudicial and totally inadmissible. And the evidence of racial bias, which you have consistently tried to interject in this trial, is not admissible unless it has some relevance to the defense of your client. Your well worded attempts to make that type of evidence relevant falls short. If you attempt to place any more racial prejudice issues before the jury, then I want you to let the Court excuse the jury before you bring that information out, recognizing that there are seven blacks and five whites on the jury. I don't sit here in a vacuum and not understand the motives of your questioning, but the rule that the means justifies the ends is not a judicial principle. MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I understand the Court's ruling. I must take exception. And I understand where the Court is coming from, and please don't think that I am being critical of the Court, but I do object to being accused of racial discrimination. That's not it. Bias and prejudice, and I challenge the state to come up with one case that says that a witness's bias and prejudice is not a legitimate source of cross-examination. I understand the Court's ruling, and I will abide by it, and I will bring it up before I do it, but I vehemently object to it, Your Honor. THE COURT: I am not telling you that that type of evidence may not be at some point in time admissible, and, particularly, if the state creates a circumstance where it would be relevant, but before we present that type of evidence to the jury I want the jury excused and the Court make a ruling on it. Kolberg tells us that it was error for the trial judge to sustain the objection and that it was double error for the trial court to chastise defense counsel, in front of the jury, by saying that he was `disappointed' in counsel. ¶ 140. Miss. R. Evid. 616 provides: For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of bias, prejudice, or interest of the witness for or against any party to the case is admissible. However, the State tells us that [t]here were no racial issues lurking about this case because none of the actors were of different races. Since the witness was white, the defendant was white, and the victim was white, there is no legitimate evidentiary purpose for defense counsel's questions to Benjamin concerning his feelings about black people. Kolberg asserts in his arguments before us that Benjamin regarded him as white trash, but gives us nothing to substantiate this claim. Consequently, we conclude that Kolberg's racial questions were irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and properly excluded. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit. ¶ 141. Finally, Kolberg's claim that it was double error for the trial judge to say that he was disappointed in defense counsel in front of the jury: Kolberg cites Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-35, which states, in pertinent part: The judge in any criminal cause, shall not sum up or comment on the testimony, or charge the jury as to the weight of the evidence. Thus, this statute is not applicable here as counsel's questions were not testimony nor evidence. Likewise, although Kolberg directs us to Wilson v. State, 451 So.2d 724, 726 (Miss.1984), it is wholly inapplicable for precisely the same reasons. In Parker v. State, 401 So.2d 1282, 1285 (Miss.1981), we said: Ordinarily counsel may not complain of slight or not seriously prejudicial impropriety in remarks or comments by the court where they are provoked by himself. Id. at 1285 (quoting Vail v. City of Jackson, 206 Miss. 299, 328, 41 So.2d 357, 361 (1949)). We agree. This assignment of error is without merit.