Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Powell's Statements Regarding Her Fear of Defendant

Text: During the prosecutor's direct examination of Braziel, defense counsel objected to Braziel's testimony that [Powell] said `Francisco was in my house when I was asleep and my door was open.' Outside the presence of the jury, counsel argued Powell's state of mind was irrelevant, the statements were inadmissible hearsay, and Powell, of course, was unavailable for cross-examination. The trial court denied defendant's objections, ruling the statements were relevant and admissible under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule to explain Powell's subsequent conduct of jerking away from defendant when he approached her in her car. (Evid.Code, § 1250.) The trial court admonished the jury that Powell's statements could not be considered to prove defendant was in fact in Powell's house as she slept, but were admitted only for the purpose of explaining her subsequent actions, if relevant. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting Powell's statements that she was afraid of him and believed he was in her house while she napped on the day of the murder. He claims such evidence was irrelevant, inadmissible hearsay, and more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. We find no error. The abuse of discretion standard of review applies to any ruling by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence. ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897.) This standard is particularly appropriate when, as here, the trial court's determination of admissibility involved questions of relevance, the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, and undue prejudice. ( Ibid. ) Under this standard, a trial court's ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. ( People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618.) Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove a disputed material fact. (Evid.Code, § 210.) `Hearsay evidence,' defined as evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, is generally inadmissible. (Evid.Code, § 1200.) Evidence of a statement of a declarant's state of mind, when offered to prove or explain the declarant's conduct, is admissible, as long as the statement was made under circumstances indicating its trustworthiness. (Evid.Code, §§ 1250, subd. (a)(2), 1252.) A prerequisite to this exception is that the victim's mental state or conduct be placed in issue. ( People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 621, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160.) Evidence of the murder victim's fear of the defendant is admissible when the victim's state of mind is relevant to an element of an offense. (See, e.g., People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 723, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46 [victim's statements indicating fear of defendants were relevant to prove lack of consent in the burglary and robbery related to her murder].) Here, the trial court properly admitted Braziel's testimony. In a prosecution for forcible rape, evidence is relevant if it establishes any circumstance making the victim's consent to sexual intercourse less plausible. ( People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1123-1124, 113 Cal. Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450.) Powell's statements that she believed defendant came into her house as she napped and that she was afraid of him were clearly probative of her lack of consent to sexual intercourse in the attempted rape. Therefore, Powell's state of mind was relevant to prove the attempted-rape felony murder and the attempted-rape special-circumstance allegation, and thus fell within the state-of-mind exception. (Evid.Code, §§ 1250, subd. (a)(2).) Defendant argues that even if Powell's state of mind was at issue, the statements were unreliable. To the extent the incident Powell described was a dream or hallucination, for example, he argues it would not be trustworthy to explain her state of mind. But the court admonished the jury the statements were not to be considered as proof defendant was actually in Powell's house when she awakened from her nap, but as circumstantial evidence of her belief that he was there. In addition, although the court recognized Powell might have dreamed defendant was in her house or she may have spoken falsely about the incident, such a possibility, without more, is insufficient to render her statements unreliable. (See People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 264, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897.) Defendant also contends the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that Powell's extrajudicial statements were not substantially more prejudicial than probative. We conclude the claim fails. Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352 if it poses an intolerable `risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.' ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 724, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46, quoting People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 204, fn. 14, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) As stated, Powell's statements indicating her fear of defendant were relevant to prove the lack of consent in the attempted-rape felony murder and attempted-rape special circumstance. That Powell believed defendant entered her house as she napped was not inflammatory, as defendant contends, given other witnesses had testified defendant had been in Powell's house throughout the day. Further, the court specifically admonished the jurors not to consider Powell's statements as proof defendant entered her house. We presume jurors follow limiting instructions ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1120, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306), and defendant has not rebutted that presumption. Defendant contends, however, that these statements would have prejudicially impacted the jury in the penalty phase because the court instructed it to consider the evidence admitted at the guilt phase. In doing so, defendant argues, it would have assumed the truth of the statements. But with respect to evidence that was admitted for a limited purpose in the guilt phase, the court reminded the jury in the penalty phase it could consider the evidence only for that limited purpose.