Opinion ID: 1172222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Section 667(a) Enhancements to Option (iii)

Text: (1c) Having concluded that a separate determinate term of enhancement is properly imposed under options (i) and (ii), we now consider the central issue in this case, that is, whether such a term must also be imposed under option (iii). The general provisions of subdivision (c) and (c)(2)(B), which pertain to all three options and were relied on above to conclude that a separate determinate term for enhancements was required for options (i) and (ii), contain no obvious exception for option (iii). (See ante, p. 552, fn. 3.) Indeed, as the Attorney General asserts, an interpretation of option (iii) that does not require a separate determinate term for enhancements would be inconsistent with the language in subdivision (c) and (c)(2)(B). Moreover, we agree with the Attorney General that a failure to add enhancements to the sentence imposed under option (iii) would create anomalous results. To illustrate, suppose Defendant A (like defendant in this case) has four prior serious felony convictions and a current offense of first degree burglary with an upper term of six years. Under option (i), defendant would be sentenced to 18 years, or 3 times the term otherwise provided for the current offense. Under option (ii), he would receive 25 years. Under option (iii), adding the six years and the four 5-year enhancements, he would receive twenty-six years. Thus, as in this case, option (iii) is the greater minimum indeterminate life term. However, under defendant's interpretation, Defendant A does not receive a separate determinate term for enhancements of 20 years. Suppose also that Defendant B, who has only three prior serious felony convictions, committed the same first degree burglary, and was also sentenced to six years. Under option (i), Defendant B would be sentenced to 18 years, or 3 times the term otherwise provided for the current offense. Under option (ii), he would receive 25 years. Under option (iii), adding the six years and the three 5-year enhancements, he would receive twenty-one years. Thus, option (ii) is the greater minimum indeterminate life term. However, under option (ii), a separate determinate term of fifteen years is imposed, thereby causing Defendant B, who has only three prior serious felony convictions, to have a substantially longer overall prison term than Defendant A, who has four prior serious felony convictions. Accordingly, such a result would reward those defendants with more egregious recidivist histories who would most often fall within option (iii), and seemingly be inconsistent with the electorate's intent in enacting section 1170.12, which was to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses. (Ballot Pamp., text of Prop. 184, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 64; § 667, subd. (b).) Defendant in effect claims that by committing one additional prior serious felony, he has spared himself many additional years of incarceration. While defendant asserts that there are no absurd results if a separate determinate term for enhancements is not added to any of the indeterminate terms, we have already rejected the claim that enhancements are not added to options (i) and (ii). In the alternative to his argument that enhancements are not added as a separate determinate term to options (i)-(iii), defendant asserts, relying on People v. Ingram (1995) 40 Cal. App.4th 1397 [48 Cal. Rptr.2d 256], that even if enhancements are added to options (i) and (ii), the language of subdivision (c) and (c)(2)(A) precludes their addition to option (iii). In Ingram, the court concluded enhancements must be imposed in addition to the sentence under option (i) or (ii). (40 Cal. App.4th at p. 1410.) It also stated in dicta, Because the court must first determine the longest minimum term under either option (i), (ii) or (iii), if it finds the longest term is provided by option (iii) by including enhancements, there are no `other enhancement or punishment provisions' to add to the minimum term. ( Ibid., italics omitted; § 667, subd. (e); subd. (c).) Such an analysis misconstrues the role of enhancements in calculating the sentence under option (iii). Under this option, enhancements are added to the sentence for the current offense as a means of calculating the minimum indeterminate life term. They are not an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 405(c).) Likewise, tripling the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current offense under option (i) is not an enhancement, but merely a means of calculating the minimum indeterminate life term. Once the minimum indeterminate term is calculated, other enhancements or punishment provisions, such as section 667(a) enhancements, are added as a separate determinate term to the indeterminate term under options (i), (ii), and (iii). (Subd. (c).) Contrary to defendant's contentions, such a conclusion is not inconsistent with People v. Jenkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th 234. In Jenkins, we held that when a prior serious felony conviction enhancement was used in determining the minimum period of imprisonment for a life term pursuant to section 667.7, [7] a consecutive term for the enhancement was not imposed. (10 Cal.4th at p. 253.) We stated, [n]othing in [section 667.7] suggests that the Legislature intended that those same enhancements be used again to add an additional term of imprisonment onto the life term. (10 Cal.4th at p. 253, italics omitted.) As the Attorney General observes, this rationale does not apply to the three strikes law. Unlike section 667.7, section 1170.12, subdivision (c), expressly states that the indeterminate life term is imposed in addition to any other enhancements or punishment provisions which may apply. In addition, subdivision (c)(2)(B) clearly states that the indeterminate term shall be served consecutive to any other term of imprisonment for which a consecutive term may be imposed by law. Accordingly, unlike section 667.7, the three strikes law expressly subjects a defendant to a separate determinate term for enhancements, even when those enhancements are used in calculating the minimum indeterminate life term. Defendant also asserts that imposition of a separate determinate term for enhancements under option (iii) violates the multiple punishment proscription of section 654. We disagree. As we have already stated, neither subdivision (c)(2)(A), nor an indeterminate life term imposed thereunder, is a sentence enhancement. Consequently, by imposing a separate determinate term for the section 667(a) enhancements under option (iii), the sentence is enhanced only once. (See People v. Martin (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 656, 668, fn. 7 [38 Cal. Rptr.2d 776].)