Opinion ID: 171597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The March 7, 2007 Motion for Attorney Fees

Text: On February 13, 2007, the district court issued an order addressing several post-trial matters. Relevantly, the district court: (1) granted Mr. Whitehead's motion to enter judgment; (2) denied Mr. Whitehead's motion for attorney fees in its present form; and (3) noted [s]ubject to [the district] court's determination, Plaintiff Whitehead may have his reasonable attorney fees upon filing an application to this court in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) and United States District Court of the District of Colorado Local Rule 54.3. App. at 77-78. In response to this order, Mr. Whitehead and American Family filed a joint motion for extension of time on February 23, 2007. This motion assumed that the February 13, 2007 order constituted entry of judgment, triggering the deadline for several possible motions. Both parties requested extensions of these deadlines. Mr. Whitehead requested the deadline for a motion for attorney fees be moved from February 27, 2007 to March 6, 2007. On February 26, 2007, the district court granted this motion by text entry. The next dayFebruary 27, 2007the district court entered a final judgment order. This document again ordered that the motion to enter judgment is granted and commented that Mr. Whitehead will be awarded reasonable attorney fees subject to the court's review and ruling on the motion submitted. On March 6, 2007, Mr. Whitehead's counsel filed a declaration with several attachments and exhibits. On March 7, 2007, Mr. Whitehead's counsel filed a motion for attorney fees. The district court denied the motion for attorney fees for several reasons. First, the court found the motion was untimely and that no excusable neglect was shown that would justify its untimeliness. Second, the court noted that the local rules required the motion to be supported by an affidavit, but Mr. Whitehead's counsel submitted a declaration. Third, the court found counsel's hourly rates to be inconsistent. Fourth, the court found counsel's computations to be inconsistent. As a result, the court struck the exhibit detailing the services provided and time allotted to those services. Lastly, the court noted that the motion did not contain the required description of services, time, rate, and total amount claimed. That information appeared in the exhibit that was struck. Mr. Whitehead challenges several aspects of the district court's denial of his motion for attorney fees. First, Mr. Whitehead contends that his motion was timely. Second, Mr. Whitehead contends that the form of his motion did not justify its denial.
Generally, we review for abuse of discretion a district court's ruling on a motion for attorney fees under Rule 54(d)(2). Quigley v. Rosenthal, 427 F.3d 1232, 1236 (10th Cir.2005) (citing Rodriguez v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 360 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir.2004)). A district court abuses its discretion where it commits a legal error or relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, or where there is no rational basis in the evidence for its ruling. Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir.2002). To the extent the appeal implicates the district court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we apply a de novo standard of review. Id. (citing Esposito v. United States, 368 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir.2004), for the statement We review de novo the district court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.).
While we are unconvinced by the district court's reliance upon the time constraints of Rule 54(d)(2)(B) and the distinctions between an affidavit and a declaration See 28 U.S.C. § 1746these errors were harmless. The district court also disputed several aspects related to the calculation of Mr. Whitehead's attorney fees. Citing discrepancies between the true and correct summary of attorney fees and the detailed accounting of the services, time, and pay rate per attorney, the district court struck the exhibit. On appeal, Mr. Whitehead asserts that the only discrepancy was that some of the information was contained in an attachment instead of in the body of the motion. Aplt. Br. at 13. This assertion is incorrect. The summary of attorney fees and the detailed time entries contained several contradictions. As the district court noted, Julie Cliff summarizes her hourly rate as $225, claims 192.75 hours of work $225/hour  192.75 hours = $43,368.75 but requests $40,906.25. Calculating the fee based on the time entries gives a sum of $42,368.75. [4] Regarding the work of paralegal Megan Waples, the summary lists that she performed 39.50 hours of work at an hourly rate of $95; the detailed time entries list only 8 hours of work at an hourly rate of $175. We agree with the district court's description that these are glaring errors. App. at 231. Although not discussed by the district court, the CAARA provision that applies to the award of attorney fees adds increased significance to these errors. In no event shall the ... court enter an award of attorney fees which is in excess of actual reasonable attorney fees. Colo. Rev.Stat. § 10-4-708(1.7)(c)(III). The plain language of this statute mandates that the court determine the actual, or existing in fact, reasonable attorney fees. Brody v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 194 P.3d 459, 461 (Colo.Ct.App.2008). Mr. Whitehead's submissions made it impossible to determine his actual attorney fees. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied the request for attorney fees.