Opinion ID: 163797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: What was the sentence imposed?

Text: 11 According to Defendant, under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) and its commentary the district court should have considered only the 90-day sentence originally imposed for his 1997 drug-trafficking conviction, ignoring the fact that the suspended sentence was subsequently imposed when he violated his probation. We disagree. Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) speaks of a conviction... for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months. The sentence imposed after revocation is imposed for the original conviction. As the Supreme Court recently explained: A suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of conviction. Once the prison term is triggered, the defendant is incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying offense. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662, 122 S.Ct. 1764, 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002). 12 Application note 1(A)(iv), on which Defendant relies, does not address how to treat an initially suspended sentence that is imposed upon the revocation of probation. It says only: If all or any part of a sentence of imprisonment was probated, suspended, deferred, or stayed, `sentence imposed' refers only to the portion that was not probated, suspended, deferred, or stayed. USSG § 2L1.2, comment. (n.1(A)(iv)). Upon revocation of probation, however, Defendant's sentence was no longer suspended. 13 We agree with the other two circuits that have discussed the matter. In United States v. Compian-Torres, 320 F.3d 514, 515 (5th Cir.2003), the Fifth Circuit wrote: The Commentary [ i.e., application note 1(A)(iv) ] applies to probated sentences, not probation revocations.... A sentence imposed on revocation is actually `imposed' as described in the Guideline and not `probated' as excepted in the Commentary. The court concluded, An interpretation of `sentence imposed' as `sentence originally imposed' is untenable. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Moreno-Cisneros, 319 F.3d 456, 458 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit said, [T]he Guideline and application note ... do not limit the sentence imposed to the sentence as it was originally imposed, and we can see no reason to infer such a limitation from the wording of the provisions. 14 Moreover, including the sentence imposed upon revocation of probation as part of the sentence imposed for the purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) is consistent with how such sentences have been treated under other provisions of § 2L1.2. In United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281 (2d Cir.2002), the Second Circuit construed § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), which mandates an eight-level enhancement for defendants deported after a conviction for an aggravated felony (defined to include certain offenses for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G)). The defendant had initially been sentenced to six months' incarceration plus five years' probation on a prior state-court conviction; after he violated his probation, however, the probationary sentence was revoked and he was sentenced to one year in jail. The defendant argued that the sentence imposed upon revocation of his probation should not be considered part of the sentence imposed for that crime, and that only the initial sentence imposed should be considered under the guideline. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d at 285. The Second Circuit rejected the argument, holding that the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment following revocation of probation is a modification of the original sentence, and must be considered part of the `actual sentence imposed' for the original offense. Id. The Ninth Circuit agrees. See United States v. Jimenez, 258 F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (9th Cir.2001). 15 We are not persuaded by Defendant's policy argument that the 16-level enhancement is reserved for only the most serious prior convictions, and a later probation revocation sentence is not relevant to the seriousness of th[e] offense. Aplt.'s Opening Br. at 10. As the Ninth Circuit stated: 16 [W]e can discern no basis for treating an original sentence of over thirteen months incarceration as more serious than a sentence of over thirteen months incarceration that consists of the original sentence plus the result of the revocation of probation. A defendant who does not abide by the terms of his probation has demonstrated that he should not have been given probation in the first place. 17 Moreno-Cisneros, 319 F.3d at 458. 18 Finally, although not determinative, our interpretation of the guideline provision is consistent with a clarifying amendment to § 2L1.2 that the United States Sentencing Commission submitted to Congress on May 1, 2003. Unless modified or rejected by Congress, the amendment will take effect on November 1, 2003. The amendment would delete the current application note 1(A)(iv), and replace it with a new application note 1(B)(vii), to read: 19 `Sentence of imprisonment' has the meaning given that term in Application Note 2 and subsection (b) of § 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History), without regard to the date of the conviction. The length of the sentence of imprisonment includes any term of imprisonment given upon revocation of probation, parole, or supervised release. 20 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 68 Fed.Reg. 26,960-01, 26,974 (May 16, 2003) (emphasis added). The Sentencing Commission explained that its approach in clarifying this definition is consistent with the case law interpreting the term and the use of the term in Chapter Four of the guidelines. Id. 21 We conclude that the district court did not err when it considered the 1- to 15-year sentence imposed upon revocation of Defendant's probation to be part of the sentence imposed for the 1997 drug-trafficking offense. Thus, there was no plain error.