Opinion ID: 1230068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Permanent Injunction To Enforce Restoration Order

Text: Bailey argues that the district court should not have entered the restoration order because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding his ability to pay for the restoration, his knowledge that the property was a wetland, and whether the County was the appropriate defendant. Bailey asserts that he should have been allowed to go to trial on these issues and that we should apply a de novo standard of review to the restoration order. Bailey fails to recognize that he is appealing from a permanent injunction, the entry of which we review for abuse of discretion. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir.2009); United States v. S. Inv. Co., 876 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir.1989); see also United States v. Cumberland Farms of Conn. Inc., 826 F.2d 1151, 1164 (1st Cir.1987) (reviewing for abuse of discretion district court's issuance of an injunction to restore wetland to its previolation condition). A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on a legal error or a clearly erroneous finding of fact. Roach, 560 F.3d at 863 (quoting Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. CBS Corp., 476 F.3d 530, 533 (8th Cir.2007)); cf. Sexton Cove Estates, 526 F.2d at 1301 (setting forth legal standard to be followed in considering environmental restoration, vacating partial restoration order, and remanding to the district court for further proceedings). [9] The Act authorizes district courts to issue injunctive relief for violations of § 1311(a). The district court analyzed the propriety of the permanent injunction and restoration order under the standard set forth in United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc. Under the Sexton Cove Estates line of cases, the restoration plan must: (1) be designed to confer maximum environmental benefits tempered with a touch of equity; (2) be practical and feasible from an environmental and engineering standpoint; (3) take into consideration the financial resources of defendants; and (4) include consideration of defendants' objections. S. Inv. Co., 876 F.2d at 615 (quotation and citation omitted). Bailey agrees with the government that the district court applied the correct legal standard, but he contends that further fact finding is required. Bailey argues that there is no evidence in the record that he had the means to restore the wetland, but he has not argued that he is unable to pay for the work outlined in the restoration plan. At the summary judgment hearing, his attorney conceded that the cost of removing the road would be about the same as the cost of building it. Similarly, Bailey does not argue on appeal that he cannot afford the restoration, but rather contends that the district court should have required more evidence. If Bailey had wished to contest this factor, he should have submitted evidence to the district court. The finding that restoration was within Bailey's financial means was not clearly erroneous. Bailey also argues that he did not know that the site was wetland before or during the construction of the road. Civil liability under the Clean Water Act is strict, and the government was not required to show that Bailey knew that his act of building a road violated the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b); see also United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 715-16 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the Clean Water Act, but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permit's violation). Even assuming that knowledge was required, the record supports the district court's finding that Bailey was well aware that he needed a Section 404 permit to place fill on the site. Again, we find no legal or factual error. Finally, Bailey makes the equitable argument that the County should be required to pay for the restoration because (1) Bailey instructed LaValla to complete the road at the direction of the County; (2) the County was involved in the permitting process; and (3) the County owns the road. The district court examined each of these contentions, supporting its factual findings with citations to the record. The district court did not err in concluding that: An examination of the record demonstrates that Bailey's contentions are meritless. The undisputed fact is that, at all relevant times, Bailey and Bailey alone was the driving force behind the creation of the Road. It was Bailey's decision to clear the sixty-six-foot wide roadway through the wetland and build the Road. It was Bailey who hired LaValla to perform the work. It was Bailey who told LaValla to resume the work after LaValla had been told to stop. And it was Bailey who stood to profit from the construction of the Road. Bailey did have extensive interactions with the County, but the focus of those interactions was not on the Road's compliance or lack of compliance with federal environmental standardssomething that the County had no authority to address. Rather, the focus of Bailey's interaction with the County was on getting the land platted and getting the County to take over responsibility for maintaining the Road. None of this makes the County responsible for Bailey's violations of the CWA. At every step of the way, Bailey was well aware, as he had been since at least 1993, that he needed a Section 404 permit to place fill on the Site. ... It defies belief that Bailey, after being told by the Corps to stop work on the Road until he got a permit from the Corps, would resume work on the road without checking first with the Corps. Thus, even under the most charitable reading of the record, Bailey cannot claim ignorance of the fact that any additional work would be at his own risk. Bailey, 516 F.Supp.2d at 1016, 1017. Bailey disputes the district court's interpretation of the facts and its conclusion that Bailey was solely responsible for the violations of the Act. The district court, however, correctly applied the law and relied on no clearly erroneous fact to reject Bailey's equitable argument. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's order issuing a permanent injunction ordering Bailey to restore the wetland to its previolation condition.