Opinion ID: 1850321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The In-Court Identification of Terry Lattimore is Critically Flawed and Constitutes Reversible Error.

Text: ¶ 51. On July 16, 2000, Virgie Dycus frantically dialed 911. She told the operator that two n____s are killing my husband. When asked for a description, she said simply that the men were black, both tall, and that one was shirtless. ¶ 52. The investigating police officer testified that her initial description was similarly vague. She told him what she had relayed to the 911 operator, that one man was tall, black, and shirtless, but was unable to give a description of the other man as she was quite understandably very upset. Mrs. Dycus also failed to identify the weapon used to attack her husband. During her 911 call she described the weapon as a stick. Speaking to the police later, she admitted that it could have been a pipe, or a baseball bat. ¶ 53. While these facts most certainly call into question the State's ability to meet the Biggers factors, it is the in-court identification by Mrs. Dycus that slams the lid shut on any argument that she could independently identify Terry Lattimore. ¶ 54. The prosecutor conceded that the in-court identification of Lattimore by Mrs. Dycus failed utterly. [W]e all made a big joke about it, he admitted to the trial court. In an order, the trial judge set the scene: It took Mrs. Virgie Dycus approximately two (2) minutes to make an in-court identification of the defendant. When asked by the Assistant District Attorney, Tucker Gore, whether the man that she had identified in earlier testimony as the person she saw beating her husband was in the courtroom, Mrs. Dycus slowly scanned the entire courtroom from right to left, beginning with jurors in the jury box (to her immediate right). She initially pointed over the Defendant's head at a person in the audience wearing a blue shirt. After a pause, she changed her response by pointing at the Defendant who was wearing a white shirt and tie. Two (2) minutes elapsed from the time of the initial question through the designation of Defendant in response. ¶ 55. Mitchell Creel was an attorney sitting in the audience who, at one point during the two minutes, Mrs. Dycus pointed out as her husband's attacker. However, there is at least one important difference between attorney Creel and Mr. Lattimore: Creel happens to be white. ¶ 56. As he testified: Q: Would you simply, and to the best of your recollection, tell the Court what transpired during the identification process. A: When Mr. Gore asked the witness to identify, Is the defendant in the courtroom today, I believe she responded, Yes. Would you point out the defendant? And at that point, for whatever reason, I don't know if it was age or whatever, she slowly began to look across the courtroom, starting with the jury box first, which really caught my attention because it just seemed unusual, from my profession. Usually those identifications are done immediately. But anyway, she goes around carefully and looks at everybody, a bunch of people in the courtroom. And without quoting the specific language she used, she pointed in my direction, or in that direction. And it's been awhile. I truly can't remember the specifics. I know she pointed in my direction. . . . . Q: And did you feel at any point she was pointing actually at you? A: I mean, she pointed in my direction. But, I mean, it's kind of hard for me to feel or take it serious when clearly myself knew that I had nothing to do with this crime. Q: You and Mr. Lattimore are not of the same race, is that correct? A: No. Q: Would you describe Mr. Lattimore as somewhat light-skinned? A: Mr. Lattimore is a light-skinned African-American. I'm a white Caucasian. A difference in height and size. Certainly a difference. Creel admitted that he thought it was kind of comical almost. ¶ 57. Four other witnesses gave similar testimony. The other man Mrs. Dycus identified as her husband's murderer was a dark-complexioned black man. Again, Lattimore has a light complexion. ¶ 58. If the charade had ended at this point it would have been troubling enough. Yet the trial judge had to be informed of one last fact: Mrs. Dycus only identified Lattimore after her family began pointing at him. Three witnesses testified that Mrs. Dycus looked to her family for help after failing to identify the correct defendant. ¶ 59. Even after settling upon Lattimorewhom she clearly did not recognizeMrs. Dycus was unsure. Q: I see you're pointing. Could you describe who you are pointing at? A: I believe it's the one that's in the blue shirt back there. He's not sitting here. Waitwait a minute. That's him right there I do believe. No. As I say, I've been having trouble. Q: Take your time. A: I still say I believe that that's him best as I can recall. Q: And you're pointing at whom? A: That one. Q: Describe what he has on? A: Pardon? Q: Describe what he has on? A: A white shirt and a tie. Q: And where is he seated? A: Pardon? Q: Wherewhere is he in the courtroom? A: Right there at the end of the table. Q: Are you sure? A: I think I'm sure. Q: Are you sure? A: He looks more like him than anybody else in here that I can see. Let's put it that way. Lattimore's attorney objected to the identification to no avail. ¶ 60. It is undeniably clear that, from the moment Mrs. Dycus dialed 911 to the day of trial, she had no grasp of who attacked her husband other than that it was a shirtless black man. We cannot blame Mrs. Dycus for not being able to identify her husband's attacker; the moment was horrific, and even if she were not under enormous stress, eyewitness identifications are notoriously shaky. The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1933, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1158 (1967). However, we cannot condemn a man to life in prison when we are not extremely sure that he is the one with blood on his hands. The trial court should not have allowed the in-court identification to be entered into evidence.