Opinion ID: 4571634
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims concerning closing argument

Text: We earlier quoted a lengthy portion of the closing argument. The prosecutor referred to the defense theory at trial that the now-deceased Sanders was the actual third person in the SUV. Some of the closing argument could be seen as making nothing more than the same point we have already accepted as being pre-arrest silence, but there is one part of the argument that goes beyond. The prosecutor made one clear reference to post-arrest silence by suggesting that the following is what Grant effectively was saying: “You know, y’all have arrested me. Y’all have taken me to jail, accused me of killing somebody; but I’m going to be quiet about it.” The reasoned decision by the Louisiana court of appeal did not specifically address the closing-argument claims, either as to the argument itself or counsel’s failure to object. The court reviewed Grant’s Doyle argument generally, but the court’s only quote from the closing argument was this: that is “‘the oldest defense in the world . . . blame it on the dead 10 Case: 19-30289 Document: 00515584414 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/30/2020 No. 19-30289 guy. And I’m going to spring it on the jury on the day of trial.’ The prosecutor said, ‘That’s just stupid. That’s all that it is. And that’s exactly what they’ve given you.’” Grant, 105 So. 3d at 87. The part of the argument where the prosecutor hypothesizes about what Grant was in effect saying after his arrest was not quoted by the state court of appeal. We have guidance on what to do when we need to read between the lines of state court opinions. A rebuttable presumption exists that claims presented to a state court have been adjudicated on the merits when relief is denied; the presumption applies to unreasoned decisions and decisions that address only some claims and omit references to others. Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 293 (2013). The important question for us is not what the state court did not say, but what the applicant for relief did say to that court. Grant’s briefing on direct appeal first discussed at some length the claims we already resolved about cross-examination. That brief said: “The prosecutor concluded this assault on the defendant’s post-arrest silence in his closing argument.” The brief then quoted the entirety of what we quoted in this opinion about closing argument. Later, under the issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, the brief to the court of appeal stated: “Defense counsel failed to even object to the prosecutor’s impeachment of Mr. Grant’s post-arrest silence or his closing argument referencing same.” The issue, both as to the closing argument itself and as to counsel’s silence as the argument was delivered, was presented to the state court. We conclude that the presumption arises that the state court resolved both on the merits. Grant has the burden of rebutting it. Hoffman v. Cain, 752 F.3d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 2014). Rebuttal involves addressing these questions: (1) what the state courts have done in similar cases; (2) whether the history of the case suggests that the state court was aware of any ground for not adjudicating the case on the merits; and 11 Case: 19-30289 Document: 00515584414 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/30/2020 No. 19-30289 (3) whether the state courts’ opinions suggest reliance upon procedural grounds rather than a determination on the merits. Woodfox v. Cain, 772 F.3d 358, 371 (5th Cir. 2014). Though Grant is proceeding pro se, and we liberally construe such briefing, he “must still brief the issues” to preserve his arguments. Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). On the other hand, when the state does not argue that an issue was decided on the merits, there at least is no argument about a presumption to be rebutted. Nonetheless, we conclude there is no justification for rejecting the presumption that the claim was resolved on the merits. The claim was before the state court and is not easily differentiated from what that court did reject as grounds for reversal. We conclude that the claims about closing argument were resolved on the merits. We now examine whether the resolution satisfies deferential review. The extent of the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal’s explanation is that Grant “put Jackie Sanders and his alleged role in the instant crime at issue in his opening statement, during his questioning of state witnesses, and in his own testimony on direct examination by defense counsel.” Grant, 105 So. 3d at 88–89. Of course, even if Grant injected the theory of a then-deceased perpetrator into the trial, the state still could not use Grant’s post-arrest silence about Sanders against him. The court of appeal discussed Doyle and made a factual finding that the cross-examination questions “addressed a time period pre-arrest.” Id. at 89. We have already held that our review under the AEDPA requires us to deny relief as to that. We hold on, analytically, to that part of the state court’s opinion as we move to the unaddressed arguments that were before the state court. The state court accurately commented that “Doyle error is subject to a harmless error review. The harmless error inquiry is whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Id. at 12 Case: 19-30289 Document: 00515584414 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/30/2020 No. 19-30289 88 (quotation marks omitted). We have already upheld the state court decision that the cross-examination was not a violation of Doyle. That questioning validly stressed for jurors that Grant had passed up pre-arrest opportunities to mention an elusive third culprit. Consequently, we see no prejudice when the prosecutor expanded the rhetorical net in one sentence of his closing argument, suggesting that the unbelievability of Grant’s silence also applied as he was being taken to jail. Implicitly, the Louisiana court of appeal was holding that the closing argument did not prejudice Grant. In so holding, the court did not reach “a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” nor one “that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). We do not expand the COA. As to the issue on which a COA was granted, we AFFIRM. 13