Opinion ID: 802092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The ALJ's RFC Determination

Text: In her determination, the ALJ stated she gave significant weight to Dr. Steiner's opinion, which was supported by the record. The ALJ indicated Dr. Steiner's opinion was generally consistent with the opinions of Dr. Schwender and Dr. Vorlicky. However, while the ALJ noted she considered Dr. Agre's opinion, she stated she did not give that opinion controlling weight because it was largely based on Renstrom's subjective allegations of pain, which the ALJ found not to be fully credible, and not supported by objective evidence. Specifically, the ALJ concluded that despite Renstrom's allegations of leg weakness and foot drop, physical examinations consistently demonstrate normal strength, no associated neurological loss, no objective findings to support the loss of propioception reported by Dr. Agre, and the claimant demonstrates the ability to use foot controls based on his reported ability to drive. On appeal, Renstrom contends the RFC determination was incorrect because the ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinions of his treating physicians, Dr. Schwender and Dr. Agre, and discount the opinions of the Social Security medical experts. Renstrom further asserts Dr. Schwender's opinion was not consistent with Dr. Steiner's, and the ALJ provided no specific basis to show otherwise. Moreover, Renstrom challenges the ALJ's reliance on Dr. Vorlicky's opinion, who only saw Renstrom twiceonce in 2004 and once in 2006. Generally, [a] treating physician's opinion is given controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence. Perkins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, [a] treating physician's opinion does not automatically control, since the record must be evaluated as a whole. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An ALJ may discount or even disregard the opinion of a treating physician where other medical assessments are supported by better or more thorough medical evidence, or where a treating physician renders inconsistent opinions that undermine the credibility of such opinions. Id. at 897-98 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). After careful review, we conclude the ALJ properly decided to give Dr. Agre's opinion non-controlling weight. First, the ALJ noted Dr. Agre's opinion was largely based on Renstrom's subjective complaints. See Teague v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 611, 616 (8th Cir.2011) (concluding the ALJ properly discounted a doctor's report, in part, because it cited only limitations based on [the claimant's] subjective complaints, not his own objective findings). Second, the ALJ found Dr. Agre's opinion was not consistent with the other medical experts, who determined Renstrom could perform light work within a modified RFC. Because [Dr. Agre's] determination contradicted other objective evidence in the record, the ALJ's decision to give less weight to [Dr. Agre's] determination was reasonable. Partee v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir.2011). See also Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 925 (8th Cir.2011) ([W]hen a treating physician's opinions are inconsistent or contrary to the medical evidence as a whole, they are entitled to less weight.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 931 (8th Cir.2010) (The ALJ noted the conflicting opinions regarding [the claimant's] ability to perform work activities and chose not to give controlling weight to [the treating psychiatrist's] opinion.). Finally, Dr. Agre's finding that Renstrom was totally disabled gets no deference because it invades the province of the Commissioner to make the ultimate disability determination. Perkins, 648 F.3d at 898. Accordingly, the ALJ was permitted to disregard [Dr. Agre's] conclusory statement, unsupported by the objective medical evidence, that [Renstrom] is disabled. Choate v. Barnhart, 457 F.3d 865, 870 (8th Cir.2006). As for Dr. Schwender's opinion, we agree with the district court that the ALJ only mentioned this particular opinion in passing by noting Dr. Schwender's opinion was generally consistent with the other medical experts. Nonetheless, while the ALJ was required to develop the record fully, she was not required to provide an in-depth analysis on each piece of evidence. See Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir.2000) (Although required to develop the record fully and fairly, an ALJ is not required to discuss all the evidence submitted, and an ALJ's failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that it was not considered.). This is particularly true here, because the ALJ found Dr. Schwender's opinion to be generally consistent with the other medical expertswho the ALJ did discuss in more depth. Like the other experts, Dr. Schwender's notes indicate Renstrom was improving with treatment, and that he could work with lifting restrictions, position changes, occasional reaching overhead and bending and twisting, and occasional kneeling, squatting, and climbing. In sum, [i]t is the ALJ's function to resolve conflicts among the opinions of various treating and examining physicians. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir.2001). While it may have been more preferable for the ALJ to discuss Dr. Schwender's opinion in more depth, there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ's finding because four out of five medical sources were consistent with the ALJ's RFC finding for a restricted range of light work. Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's determination with respect to the medical experts.