Opinion ID: 2974361
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Importance of Fee Shifting

Text: Plaintiffs begin with an impassioned argument about the importance of attorney-fee awards to the enforcement of union democracy laws. Plaintiffs explain that such cases can be time consuming and expensive to prosecute; typically involve equitable relief, or damages that are rarely substantial; and tend to be brought on behalf of individual union members with No. 05-2057 7 limited financial resources. To be sure, plaintiffs illustrate the significance of fee-shifting to claims brought under the LMRDA and point to some of the same reasons that led the Supreme Court to find that allowing an award of attorney fees under the common benefit theory would be consistent with the purposes of the LMRDA. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13 (1973). At the same time, unlike the statutory fee-shifting provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the authority to award fees under Hall arises under the equitable power of the courts to rectify the inequity of allowing other union members to share in a common benefit without sharing in the cost of attaining it. Id. at 6. More importantly, to the extent plaintiffs are suggesting that these interests militate against waiver, the Supreme Court has held that even a prevailing civil rights plaintiff’s eligibility for attorney fees under § 1988 may be waived in a settlement of the entire action. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 731-38 (1986); id. at 731-32 (“while it is undoubtably true that Congress expected fee shifting to attract competent counsel to represent citizens deprived of their civil rights, it neither bestowed fee awards upon attorneys nor rendered them nonwaivable or nonnegotiable”). Similarly, the asserted importance of fee-shifting to the enforcement of union democracy laws does not prevent plaintiffs from waiving the right to seek attorney fees under Hall.