Opinion ID: 3051961
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intermediate Scrutiny Is the Appropriate

Text: Standard As discussed above, the school uniform policies at issue here implicate the First Amendment only insofar as they place content-neutral restrictions on students’ pure speech and place incidental restrictions on students’ expressive conduct.32 Because neither type of restriction is governed by Tinker, see supra Part II.A.1, we must now decide how to evaluate the constitutionality of these policies. [12] Outside the school speech context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a law restricting speech on a viewpoint- and content-neutral basis is constitutional as long as it withstands intermediate scrutiny—i.e., if: (1) “it furthers an important or substantial government interest”; (2) “the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression”; and (3) “the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 661-62. The same is true of a regulation that has an incidental effect on expressive conduct. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).33 argument that his school’s uniform policy facilitates communication of conformist messages at all. Second, under Dresser’s logic, any policy requiring students to behave like their fellow students could be seen as favoring conformity and disfavoring non-conformity, yet nobody would seriously contend that requiring students to raise their hands before speaking, being polite to classmates, or—perhaps most relevant to this case— wearing a gym uniform, would be a viewpoint-based “speech” restriction containing an implicit preference for conformist “expression.” 32 Notably, these restrictions apply only during the school day and do not limit all speech, just “speech” that is communicated via students’ clothing. 33 O’Brien contemplates a fourth prong of the intermediate scrutiny analysis—namely, that the regulation be within the government’s power to enact. 391 U.S. at 377. Because Plaintiffs do not question the District’s power to implement mandatory school uniform policies under N.R.S. § 392.458, no further discussion of this prong is necessary. Accord Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 286. JACOBS v. CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. 5203 [13] We agree with the district court that this same level of scrutiny should extend to the school speech context. See Jacobs, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1181; accord Canady, 240 F.3d at 443.34 Applying intermediate scrutiny to school policies that effect content-neutral restrictions upon pure speech or place limitations upon expressive conduct (or, as is the case here, do both) not only strikes the correct balance between students’ expressive rights and schools’ interests in furthering their educational missions, but, as the Fifth Circuit explained, is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court’s other school speech precedents, not to mention the remainder of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. See Canady, 240 F.3d at 442-43.35 [14] Accordingly, if the District’s school uniform policies advance important government interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech, and do so in ways that effect as minimal a restriction on students’ free expression as possible,36 34 If anything, the scrutiny should be even less demanding, as “the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, and . . . the rights of students must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because we find that the District’s school uniform policies withstand intermediate scrutiny, however, we have no occasion to consider whether an even more lenient standard would be consistent with the Constitution. 35 Although we have never applied intermediate scrutiny in the student speech context, we have recently suggested that the standard might be appropriate for “assessing content-neutral regulations that restrict [student] speech or inherently expressive conduct.” See Pinard, 467 F.3d at 759 n.1 (declining to apply intermediate scrutiny because parties did not brief the issue, but inviting parties to explore that issue on remand). 36 While “the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [must be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the government’s] interest, . . . a regulation need not be the least speechrestrictive means of advancing the [g]overnment’s interests,” Turner, 512 U.S. at 662 (emphasis added); it need only promote “a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,” id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 5204 JACOBS v. CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. then the uniform policies should be upheld. We now turn to whether those criteria are satisfied here.