Opinion ID: 1130924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Motion for New TrialPunitive Damages

Text: While punitive damages are included in this Court's ruling on the motion for new trial based on excessive damages, there is an additional issue relating exclusively to the punitive damages which should be resolved at this time. Curtis contends that the punitive damages awarded in this case were excessive and duplicated the damages awarded for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Linscott v. Rainier Nat. Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 606 P.2d 958 (1980), the Court discussed the rationale behind punitive damages and noted: Punitive or exemplary damages are a peculiarity in the law of damages. Unlike other damages awards, their purpose is not to compensate the plaintiff, but to express the outrage of society at certain actions of the defendant. As such, they act as punishment, and serve to deter the defendant, and others in a similar position, from engaging in like conduct in the future. In Idaho the punishment rationale is disfavored. As this court said in a recent case: [W]e feel that the courts in these civil cases should be motivated primarily by a purpose of deterrence and not a purpose of punishment. In other words, the assessment of exemplary damages should be prompted by the court's or jury's desire to assure, to the extent possible via the imposition of a monetary penalty, that similar conduct does not occur in the future. Punishment per se should be left to the criminal law. 100 Idaho at 857, 606 P.2d at 961 (citations omitted). Accordingly, an award of punitive damages serves the dual function of deterrence and expressing society's outrage. In contrast, compensatory damages are defined as damages that will compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more; such as will simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury. Black's Law Dictionary 352 (5th ed. 1983). As has been noted earlier in this decision, physical injury is not a required element for a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Instead, the courts have limited the possibility of fraudulent claims by insisting that there be proof of outrageous intentional conduct which leads to severe emotional distress. Rasmuson v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 102 Idaho 95, 101, 625 P.2d 1098, 1104 (1981). Given the elements which must be proven to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, there may certainly be an overlap in the proof necessary for the compensatory damages for the tort and for punitive damages; e.g., extreme and outrageous conduct and conduct which causes severe emotional distress. [T]here is no significant, if in fact any, difference between conduct by a defendant which may be seen to justify an award of punitive damages, and conduct which may justify an award of damages for emotional distress. Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 362, 699 P.2d 1371, 1376 (1985). We do not view that as dispositive of the question of whether a punitive damage award is proper. The purposes which may make a punitive damage award appropriate are not satisfied by an award of purely compensatory damages. The Court of Appeals has held that [p]unitive damages are not to take the place of future compensatory damages. Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 740, 682 P.2d 1282, 1287 (Ct.App.1984). Thus we hold today that even though there may be identical proof presented in support of both punitive damages and a compensatory award for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the jury may still award damages for both. Appellant has not directed us to anything in the record to support his contention that the jury's award in this case was duplicitous, nor have we found any such support in the record. The jury's verdict is support by substantial and competent evidence and should not be overturned.