Opinion ID: 166442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Claim 6: Voluntary Intoxication Instruction

Text: 89 Next, Mr. Patton challenges the trial court's instruction that homicide with a design to effect death is not the less murder because the perpetrator was in a state of anger or voluntary intoxication at the time. Rec. vol. III, at 536 (instr.29). Mr. Patton contends that this instruction deprived him of the opportunity to present his defense of voluntary intoxication to the jury, thereby violating his federal due process right to a fair trial. 90 In adjudicating this claim, the OCCA considered Oklahoma law. See Patton, 973 P.2d at 288 (citing OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21 § 704 and OCCA decisions). However, as we have noted, the federal due process inquiry is controlled by state law. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85, 106 S.Ct. 2411; Chapman, 302 F.3d at 1196. We therefore view the OCCA's decision on this issue as an application of the federal due process standard, and we consider whether that decision was unreasonable. We note that [a]s a general rule, errors in jury instructions in a state criminal trial are not reviewable in federal habeas corpus proceedings, unless they are so fundamentally unfair as to deprive petitioner of a fair trial and to due process of law. Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1357 (10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 91 In rejecting Mr. Patton's challenge to the voluntary manslaughter instruction, the OCCA first noted that this instruction mirrored the language of a state statute. See OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21 § 704. 6 Then, the court observed that the instruction accurately stated the rule of law that voluntary intoxication is not a complete defense to homicide but merely may reduce the crime to a lesser offense. See Patton, 973 P.2d at 288 (citing Crawford v. State, 840 P.2d 627, 638 (Okla.Crim.App.1992)). 92 Like the OCCA, we see little merit in this argument. Although [t]he right to present a defense is a fundamental element of due process of law, United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1151 (10th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), Oklahoma courts may define the scope of the defense to an Oklahoma crime. See Tyler v. Nelson, 163 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir.1999) (considering state law to determine whether the defendant was deprived of his due process rights through a failure to instruct on self-defense). 93 Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the voluntary intoxication defense, explaining that [a] person is entitled to the defense of intoxication if that person was incapable of forming the specific criminal intent because [of] his intoxication, Rec. vol. III, at 529 (instr.22), but adding that voluntary intoxication, standing alone, is not a defense, see id. at 536 (instr. no. 29). This is an accurate statement of Oklahoma law. The OCCA has stated that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to criminal culpability. See Crawford, 840 P.2d at 638. However, the court recognize[s] an exception to this rule where the accused was so intoxicated that his mental abilities were totally overcome and it therefore became impossible for him to form criminal intent. Id. Thus, [i]f voluntary intoxication is to be relied upon as an affirmative defense, the defendant must introduce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to his ability to form the requisite criminal intent. Id. 94 Accordingly, Mr. Patton is not entitled to relief on this claim.