Opinion ID: 159486
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Speech Was Protected Under First Amendment

Text: 16 The College contends that the district court should have granted its Rule 50 motions on the First Amendment claim because the speech for which it terminated Vanderhurst is entirely unprotected under the First Amendment. The College first argues that much of Vanderhurst's speech constituted profanity, which a college professor has no First Amendment right to utter in the classroom. Additionally, the College asserts that the speech at issue concerned course content at odds with the College's established curriculum, and a teacher enjoys no First Amendment right to determine the educational content of a course. 17 In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the United States Supreme Court held that a New York statute which required the termination of teachers for treasonable or seditious acts or utterances committed or made inside or outside the classroom ran afoul of teachers' First Amendment rights. 385 U.S. 589, 597, 604 (1967). The Court thus recognized that teachers do enjoy some First Amendment protection in their classroom speech, stating, [Academic] freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. Id. at 603. Two years later, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Court delivered its now-famous pronouncement regarding speech in our nation's public schools: It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 18 Indeed, it is widely recognized that teachers' classroom speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Fowler v. Board of Educ., 819 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1987); Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980). In Miles v. Denver Public Schools, however, this court implicitly acknowledged that not every word spoken by a teacher in a public school classroom falls within the protections of the First Amendment. See 944 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1991). The Miles court noted that whether a teacher's speech is constitutionally protected is the first inquiry in the test for determining whether an adverse employment decision violates a public [school teacher's] first amendment rights. 1 Id. 19 The College maintains that because Vanderhurst's speech was profane and because it amounted to an attempt to communicate course content at odds with the College's chosen curriculum, his speech was not constitutionally protected. It thus asserts that this court can rule in its favor without even engaging in the First Amendment analysis established in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, which probes whether the adverse employment action reasonably related to the school's legitimate pedagogical interests. See 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). This suggested approach, however, ignores the analytical dictate of Miles. In Miles, this court stated, In determining whether Miles has satisfied the initial burden of showing his classroom expression is constitutionally protected, we look to the Supreme Court's decision in . . . Kuhlmeier . . . . Miles, 944 F.2d at 775. The Miles court then proceeded to determine whether, under the test established in Kuhlmeier, the actions taken against Miles reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical interest. See id. at 775-79. Concluding that the school's actions against Miles were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical interests, this court finally stated, Miles has [thus] not shown that his classroom comments . . . were constitutionally protected. Id. at 779. 20 The College is therefore incorrect to bifurcate as separate arguments (1) that Vanderhurst's speech was not constitutionally protected, and (2) that his termination was reasonably related to the College's legitimate pedagogical concerns. Under the analytical rubric of Miles, the College's two separate contentions address the same issue; in other words, whether Vanderhurst's termination reasonably related to the College's legitimate pedagogical interests is the test for determining whether his speech fell within the ambit of First Amendment protection. Cf. Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 1999) (utilizing the Kuhlmeier test to determine whether a high school teacher's distribution of lewd materials to a student were protected by the First Amendment). But see Edwards v. California Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) (We do not find it necessary to determine whether the district court's instruction adequately defined 'reasonably related to a legitimate educational interest' standard because, as a threshold matter, we conclude that a public university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the classroom. (emphasis added)). 21