Opinion ID: 1236089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: prohibition against double jeopardy

Text: While fully cognizant of the interests of the public in seeing that a criminal prosecution is allowed to proceed to a verdict, either of acquittal or conviction, [36] and of the significant public interest in preserving the processes of our criminal justice system from undue and premature interference, we must at the same time be mindful of our supervening duty under both the federal and state constitutions to insure that the important rights and liberties guaranteed criminal defendants by those documents are given effect. In general, the underlying concern reflected in the constitutional prohibition against being placed twice in jeopardy is to prevent the state from repeatedly and unnecessarily bringing the full panoply of its prosecutorial powers and the awesome, sometimes overbearing, weight of its authority to bear against an individual defendant in order to gain a conviction for a single offense. It is this historically justifiable concern which the Supreme Court has voiced in its discussions of double jeopardy. ... [T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. [37] In Illinois v. Somerville, [38] the Supreme Court set forth the following guidelines for measuring the propriety of a judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial: A trial judge properly exercises his discretion to declare a mistrial if an impartial verdict cannot be reached, or if a verdict of conviction could be reached but would have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error in the trial. If an error would make reversal on appeal a certainty, it would not serve the ends of public justice to require that the Government proceed with its proof when, if it succeeded before the jury, it would automatically be stripped of that success by an appellate court. [39] The court made it clear, however, that in exercising this judicial discretion, considerable restraint is in order. The determination by the trial court to abort a criminal proceeding where jeopardy has attached is not one to be lightly undertaken, since the interest of the defendant in having his fate determined by the jury first impaneled is itself a weighty one. [40] This emphasis on restraint is in keeping with the court's previous determination that, in deciding whether it is proper to discharge one jury and impanel a second to try a criminal defendant, doubt must be resolved in favor of the liberty of the citizen rather than allowing the exercise of what could be an ... unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary judicial discretion. [41] Applying these standards to the instant case, I find no facts to indicate such error was committed prior to the declaration of mistrial as would make reversal on appeal a certainty. As to whether an impartial verdict had become impossible at the time of the mistrial, I am of the opinion that such a situation was not shown to exist. Prior to the dismissal of the jury, defense counsel informed the judge that not only was he generally satisfied with the course of the trial, but he was also particularly well pleased with the present jury. Having been thus informed, the judge proceeded to declare a mistrial with no indication that any alternative, less drastic remedy was given consideration. Under these circumstances, I would find that the defendant was improperly deprived of her weighty right to have her fate determined by the jury first impanelled, and would conclude that, there being no manifest necessity to declare the mistrial, the superior court order denying MacPherson's motion to dismiss the charges against her should be reversed.