Opinion ID: 2317381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: John Davenport and Charles Baker

Text: The record certified on the application of John Davenport and Charles Baker indicates that Mrs. Carpenter's confrontation with the principal at the Hartford high school on the morning of May 7th generated widespread rumors that she had been or would be dismissed from the faculty. Although efforts were made by broadcasts over the public address system by Mr. Berne and Mrs. Carpenter to thwart the rumors and avert a demonstration, a student walkout in protest against the Carpenter dismissal took place at two o'clock in the afternoon. Both of the teachers, Davenport and Baker, participated in this protest by joining the students in leaving the school building and assembling at a rally on the lawn. Both of these teachers refused to return to their classrooms and scheduled classes when so directed by the principal. This conduct was included in the statement of reasons for their suspension by the superintendent. Although some of the students of these teachers remained in their assigned classrooms, both testified that they elected to join the protest of those who had rallied outside the building. This much of the evidence is undisputed and the board found accordingly. The school board also found, on ample evidence, that Principal Berne requested Davenport and Baker to return to their respective classrooms and they failed to comply with this direction. As a result of the disruptions and unrest of May 7, the principal called a faculty meeting at three in that afternoon. Neither Mr. Davenport nor Mr. Baker was excused and neither attended. A further charge of insubordination was asserted against the petitioner Baker. Shortly before the walkout, a study hall, supervised by this teacher, was visited by the principal. Students were standing on tables, some cheering and some booing the raising and lowering of the flag outside. The petitioner Baker testified that Mr. Berne directed him to `(t)ell the students to take their seats' and I replied, you are the principal, tell them yourself. Baker explained that he did not consider the principal's request to be a reasonable order. Mr. Baker testified that during this period a student asked him if he was going to walk out. I said, yes, I was. The board's specific findings as to both the teachers, Baker and Davenport, are well founded on evidence that is in little, if any, dispute. The findings conclude with the determination that both of these teachers failed to attend to duties and failed to carry out reasonable orders and directions of the Superintendent and School Board, and ordered these teachers dismissed. The petitioners complain that their discharge for failure to carry out orders and directions cannot be sustained since the orders which were disobeyed were given by the principal, rather than the superintendent or school board, as specified in the statute. The argument is not persuasive. It is implicit in the power confided to the board of school directors under the educational law, that authority may be delegated to subordinate school officials, including superintendents, principals and teachers. And the orders of those subordinates directed to those under their control, whether they be teachers or students, will be recognized and enforced by the courts, provided they are reasonable and consistent with the valid policy of the board and within the limits of the statute. Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224, 228. This results by necessary implication from the provision of law requiring good discipline. Sherman v. Inhabitants of Charleston, 8 Cush. 160 (Shaw, C. J.). In the emergency situation which prevailed at the Hartford high school at the time under investigation, it is not open to question that orders of the principal were reasonable. It is clear that his directions were in keeping with the interests of orderly conduct of the school. There was neither time, nor an occasion, to refer the principal's decision to the superintendent and the school board for their approval and direct communication to the teachers involved. Unlike the Carpenter case, supra, the application of 16 V.S.A. § 1752(b) to the teachers Davenport and Baker, does not cut across constitutionally protected freedoms. Their contractual engagement in the public schools of Hartford did not call upon them to surrender liberties of thought, speech or assembly secured by the First Amendment. Beilan v. Board of Public Education, supra, 357 U.S. at 405, 78 S.Ct. at 1321, 2 L.Ed.2d at 1419. However, they did assume obligations of cooperation and obedience to lawfully constituted school administrative authority in the discharge of their teaching duties. And the school board had the right and duty in maintaining the integrity of the school to examine this aspect of their conduct to determine their competency to continue as teachers. Beilan v. Board of Public Education, supra, 357 U.S. at 405, 78 S.Ct. at 1321, 2 L.Ed.2d at 1419. The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time. The contitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471, 484. This statement in Cox confirms the established doctrine of many cases that the fundamental liberties, protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are not absolute. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357, 1363; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095, 1104 (Brandies, J., concurring). There can be little disagreement in the proposition that school officials should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline and good order in their institutions. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, supra, 393 U.S. at 526, 89 S.Ct. at 747, 21 L.Ed.2d at 749. (Harlan, J., dissenting). The State has a legitimate interest in protecting its educational system from disorderly disruption during classes scheduled for the instruction of students. And a teacher who encourages or participates in action which militates against this interest, in relating to his students or his superiors, fails in his duties within the meaning of the statute. See, Beilan v. Board of Public Education, supra, 357 U.S. at 405, 78 S.Ct. at 1321, 2 L.Ed.2d at 1419; Tichenor v. Orleans Parish School Board. (La.App.) 144 So.2d 603, 4 A.L.R.3d 1084, 1089, and accompanying annotation, §§ 5(a), 6(a). There is no extraordinary ambiguity in failure to attend to duties or failure to carry out reasonable orders. Teachers with common intelligence are not called upon to guess at its meaning. Nor do we conceive there is a danger that its application will have a chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights within the forbiddance of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604, 87 S.Ct. 675, 684, 17 L.Ed.2d 629, 641. The record manifests a deep-seated sympathy in the petitioners Davenport and Baker for the predicament of their fellow teacher, Mrs. Carpenter. But that attitude on their part did not justify intransigent action against the legitimate concern of the school authorities in maintaining discipline and good order in the Hartford high school. The record at hand fails to establish that the application of 16 V.S.A. § 1752, with the specific statement of charges under subsection (b), offended against the rights of the petitioners under the First and Fourteenth Amndments of the Constitution of the United States. The applications of John Davenport and Charles Baker for writs of certiorari are denied.