Opinion ID: 3131353
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Change of Plea Hearing

Text: On March 1, 2012, Figueroa appeared in the district court to enter a straight plea of guilty to the indictment.3 The hearing was conducted with the assistance of a court interpreter. The hearing commenced uneventfully. Figueroa made it clear, both through counsel and personally, that he wanted to plead guilty. Defense counsel stated that his client expressed to us that he would plead guilty rather than go to trial. The district court then confirmed with counsel that Figueroa was pleading guilty to all the counts[,] a [s]traight plea. Defense counsel confirmed that Figueroa was pleading guilty, period. Next, the court asked Figueroa directly whether he had made a conscious decision to plead guilty to every single count of the Indictment. . . . Is that what you want to do, sir? Figueroa answered, Yes. The court asked Figueroa whether he was competent to plead, whether he believed that defense counsel was competent, and whether he had had ample time to discuss his case with counsel. The court 3 The other defendants pleaded guilty separately, each pursuant to largely identical plea agreements. The offense facts stated in these plea agreements and in the subsequently filed presentence investigation reports are identical. - 4 - did not directly ask Figueroa whether he was entering his plea voluntarily and of his own free will. The district court went on to advise Figueroa of certain rights that are waived when [one] plead[s] guilty[,] including the right to trial by jury, the right to be convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, the right to cross-examination, the right to testify, and the right to remain silent. The court failed to advise Figueroa of the right to plead not guilty, or having already so pleaded, to persist in that plea[,] the right to be represented by counsel--and if necessary have the court appoint counsel--at trial and at every other stage of the proceeding[,] and the right to compel the attendance of witnesses[.] Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(B), (D), (E). The court concluded this initial colloquy by asking, [D]o you still want to plead guilty in this case? Figueroa answered, Yes. The district court then summarized the indictment. The court summarized count 1 thus: [Y]ou are a prohibited person, a convicted felon, and you were in possession of a firearm. Summarizing count 2, the court stated, [Y]ou possessed stolen firearms or you aided and abetted others in possessing stolen firearms. The court then described count 3 as the illegal possession of a machine gun or aiding and abetting others in the - 5 - possession of a machine gun. Counsel interjected, It's an automatic gun, whereupon the court amended its explanation of the charge, stating, It's an automatic gun, not a machine gun.4 Finally, the court described count 4 as charging that firearms were possessed in a school zone or that you aided and abetted others in possessing firearms in a school zone. The court asked Figueroa whether he understood that those are basically the charges, although it did not ask whether Figueroa understood the charges themselves. The court did ask Figueroa whether he understood that the Government has to prove . . . who you are and your relationship to these facts alleged in the Indictment so that we can make an association between the facts alleged and you. Figueroa agreed that he understood. The court also asked Figueroa whether he understood that the Government had the burden of proving that all the actions alleged in the indictment were entered into by you knowingly, willfully and unlawfully . . . with a bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, and not because of mistake, accident, or other innocent reason. . . . [Y]ou were doing something that the law forbids and you knew it. Figueroa again agreed that he understood. 4 Count 3 actually alleged that the defendants, aiding and abetting each other, did knowingly and unlawfully possess, a machinegun . . . in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 922(o)]. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1) makes it unlawful to transfer or possess a machine gun. - 6 - The district court then reviewed in detail the Government's burden of proof as to each of the counts. With regard to count 2, possession of a stolen firearm, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: Then another -- Count Two would be that one of those firearms . . . had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the firearm had been stolen. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: He says he didn't know it was stolen.[5] THE COURT: You did not buy from an armory with a license for example? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. THE DEFENDANT: No, no. THE COURT: So would it be fair to say that there was a possibility when you bought it or wherever you bought it or found it or took it, God knows how it got there, it could have been stolen? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 5 It is not clear from the context to whom he refers; he could mean either a co-defendant, or Figueroa, if the interpreter was telling the court what Figueroa said, instead of translating Figueroa's statement word-for-word, as sometimes happens. Nothing in the record indicates that the other defendants were present at Figueroa's change of plea hearing, and there would have been no reason for them to be there, as they had change of plea hearings on different days. - 7 - With regard to count 4, alleging possession of a firearm in a school zone, the colloquy ran as follows: THE COURT: Okay. And . . . on top of that, you and the others unlawfully possessed in and [a]ffecting interstate commerce the firearms and ammunition that we have been talking about within a distance of 1,000 feet of the ground of the Sagrado Corazon Academy school. I guess it's in Santurce? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. THE COURT: A place that you had reason to believe was a school zone. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The client accepts that that happened. He said it was a coincidence. THE COURT: But he knew there was a school there? Everybody knows there's a school, Sagrado Corazon, in Santurce. Well, it's common knowledge. You can see the school from the street. Do you understand that, sir? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. The court subsequently summarized the indictment with a series of confusing questions that, as we explain in part IV.A.2 of this opinion, eliminated the mens rea element from the charges and otherwise produced meaningless replies in an exchange that was typical of an apparently rushed and pro forma approach to the proceeding: - 8 - THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any doubt about the charges that you're pleading guilty to, possessing firearms, being a convicted felon? Possessing one of those firearms that happened to be stolen? Possessing one of those firearms that happened to be an automatic firearm converted or otherwise, and it so happened all these firearms were possessed in a school zone? Do you have any doubt about that? THE DEFENDANT: Si. THE COURT: No doubt? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: No doubt? Do you have a doubt or no doubt? No doubt? THE DEFENDANT: No. The court did not explain aiding and abetting liability to Figueroa. Instead, the district court moved on to sentencing, explaining the possible penalties, including forfeiture, fines, and supervised release, for the charged offenses, and confirming that Figueroa understood. The court also explained that some of the sentences could be consecutive and that a sentence could be imposed within, above, or below the range calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines or as determined by the court, within its discretion, according to the sentencing statute. Figueroa confirmed that he understood. - 9 - The Government then proffered the facts it would have offered at trial. Entirely absent from the Government's proffer was any specific allegation of knowledge or intent as to any element of any of the charged offenses. Also absent from the Government's proffer was any specific allegation that Figueroa was in possession or constructive possession of a firearm at any time or, for that matter, that he knew or had reasonable cause to know there were firearms in the vehicle. Upon completion of the Government's proffer, the district court continued its examination of Figueroa: THE COURT: Do you admit that these facts occurred as outlined by the prosecutor, sir? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: So you, aided and abetted by others, or others aiding and abetting you, whatever way you want to call it, were in possession of these firearms in that car? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. . . . THE COURT: Do you still want to plead, sir? THE DEFENDANT: (Nodding head up and down.) . . . THE COURT: Well, I will accept your guilty plea to these four counts[.] - 10 - While the district court asked Figueroa whether he had been subjected to force, threats, or inducements to plead, and Figueroa denied having been, the court did not make an express finding on the record as to whether Figueroa's plea was knowing and voluntary, nor did it make a finding as to whether there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea.