Opinion ID: 4512513
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntary abandonment

Text: {¶ 15} “A claimant’s eligibility for permanent-total-disability compensation may be affected if the claimant has voluntarily retired or abandoned the job market for reasons not related to the industrial injury.” State ex rel. Black 6 January Term, 2020 v. Indus. Comm., 137 Ohio St.3d 75, 2013-Ohio-4550, 997 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 14. Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D), which provides guidelines that “shall be followed” by the adjudicator of an application for PTD compensation, states: If, after hearing, the adjudicator finds that the injured worker voluntarily removed himself or herself from the work force, the injured worker shall be found not to be permanently and totally disabled. If evidence of voluntary removal or retirement is brought into issue, the adjudicator shall consider evidence that is submitted of the injured worker’s medical condition at or near the time of removal/retirement. (Emphasis added.) Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(d). Navistar’s first proposition of law asserts that this regulation requires a hearing officer who is adjudicating a claim for PTD compensation to consider evidence of a claimant’s nondisability retirement and to address the issue of voluntary abandonment in the subsequent order. {¶ 16} However, the existence of that obligation depends on whether evidence of voluntary abandonment has been brought into issue. As we have explained, “[b]ecause voluntary abandonment of all employment is an affirmative defense and an issue critical to eligibility for compensation for permanent total disability, if evidence of voluntary abandonment has been brought into issue, a hearing officer’s failure to address the issue constitutes a mistake of law.” State ex rel. Stevens v. Indus. Comm., 142 Ohio St.3d 313, 2015-Ohio-1352, 29 N.E.3d 972, ¶ 17, citing Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(d). Conversely, however, the Tenth District has concluded that if the defense of voluntary abandonment has not been brought into issue at the SHO hearing, then it is an abuse of the hearing officer’s discretion to address it, because the claimant has not been afforded due process, 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO i.e., sufficient notice and an opportunity to present evidence on the issue. State ex rel. Jenkins v. Indus. Comm., 2017-Ohio-7896, 98 N.E.3d 944, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.). Similarly, in State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman, an employer argued that the commission had abused its discretion by failing to initiate the issue whether voluntary abandonment precluded PTD compensation. 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 81-83, 679 N.E.2d 706 (1997). This court refused to relax the rule that issues not previously raised are waived and will not be considered by a reviewing court. Id. This court went on to explain that relaxing that rule would “deny the claimant a meaningful opportunity to respond,” id. at 82, and “forc[e] an already overworked commission to comb the files of every PTD case in search of issues that could potentially be raised by both sides at the hearing table,” id. at 82-83. {¶ 17} The question is, therefore, whether Navistar brought evidence of voluntary abandonment into issue at the SHO hearing. While Navistar presented no argument regarding voluntary abandonment to the commission prior to its motion for reconsideration, Navistar asserts that it brought voluntary abandonment into issue by presenting “written evidence and testimony related to the subject” at the SHO hearing. However, this court rejected the same argument in Quarto Mining. In that case, the employer argued that the issue of voluntary abandonment “raises itself by virtue of being manifest in the record.” Id. at 81. This court disagreed, stating that the employer has the burden “to raise and produce evidence on its claim that other circumstances independent of the claimant’s allowed conditions caused him to abandon the job market.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 84. {¶ 18} Navistar attempts to distinguish Quarto Mining by pointing out that the employer in that case first raised the issue of voluntary abandonment in a petition for a writ of mandamus, while Navistar first argued the issue in its motion for reconsideration before the commission. That distinction makes no difference: either way, the claimant has been denied the opportunity to present evidence on the issue. See Jenkins at ¶ 5; see also Quarto Mining at 81-82. The purpose of 8 January Term, 2020 reconsideration of a hearing officer’s order is to address new or changed circumstances, fraud, clear mistakes of law or fact, or errors by the hearing officer—not to permit a party to present additional arguments or evidence that could have been presented at the hearing. See Industrial Commission Resolution No. R08-1-01. In its motion for reconsideration, Navistar argued that the commission had made a mistake of law by not addressing voluntary abandonment, but, as explained above, that argument contradicts Quarto Mining. {¶ 19} Navistar did no more than the employer in Quarto Mining: it merely presented evidence that could relate to voluntary abandonment and then waited for the SHO to “initiate the issue,” Quarto Mining, 79 Ohio St.3d at 83, 679 N.E.2d 706. Navistar has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that it brought Bisdorf’s alleged voluntary abandonment into issue at the SHO hearing. Accordingly, we reject Navistar’s first proposition of law.