Opinion ID: 3156487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: We must first decide what standard of review to apply to the District Court’s willfulness instruction. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, a party’s failure to object limits our review to whether the District Court committed a plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d); 52(b). The Government argues that Shvets did not object to the jury instruction. We agree. There is no evidence that Shvets’ trial counsel objected to the use of 5 the final instruction on willfulness, either before or after the Court charged the jury. Instead, defense counsel stated that he “agree[d]” with the “willfulness” instruction argued for by the Government, thereby abandoning his prior argument for a stricter level of intent. Defense counsel did request in writing a “willfulness” instruction that would have required the Government to “prove that Natalya Shvets . . . knew of the existence and meaning of the statute and regulations which the government alleges made her conduct criminal.” App. at 110. However, merely requesting the charge before the jury retires “[does not] preserve an objection to the instruction actually given by the court.” United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 221 (3d Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 388 (1999)). As a result of Shvets’ failure to object, her claim may be reviewed only for plain error. See United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 30; Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 631 (3d Cir. 1993)).