Opinion ID: 2630605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment

Text: ¶ 19 Despite our conclusion that Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over D.A., federal law nevertheless mandates that we consider whether exercising jurisdiction over her comports with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The juvenile court concluded that asserting jurisdiction over D.A. did not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because she had sufficient contacts with the State of Utah. The court further concluded that even if D.A. lacked the requisite degree of contact, asserting personal jurisdiction over her was sustainable under the status exception on the ground that parental termination proceedings involve the adjudication of a child's status vis-a-vis its parents. We address the juvenile court's latter conclusion and affirm. [5] ¶ 20 The United States Supreme Court has explained that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where that defendant has certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (internal quotations and citation omitted). An exception to this minimum contacts requirement exists, however. Indeed, the Supreme Court observed more than a century ago that cases involving the status of a plaintiff are unique and can be pursued in the plaintiff's home state even if that judicial forum does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877). In particular, the Court in Pennoyer stated the following: To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion [regarding the Fourteenth Amendment], it is proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by any thing we have said, that a state may not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, which would be binding within the State, though made without service of process or personal notice to the non-resident. The jurisdiction which every State possesses to determine the civil status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe the conditions on which proceedings affecting them may be commenced and carried on [in] its territory. Id. at 734 (emphasis added). ¶ 21 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the existence of the status exception in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). There, the Court explained that  Pennoyer itself recognized ... that cases involving the personal status of the plaintiff, such as divorce actions, could be adjudicated in the plaintiff's home State despite the defendant's absence from the state. Id. at 201, 97 S.Ct. 2569. Importantly, the Court also noted that although an assertion of personal jurisdiction must ordinarily comply with the standard set forth in International Shoe, nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment suggest[s] that jurisdictional doctrines ..., such as the particularized rules governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent with the standard of fairness. Id. at 208 n. 30, 97 S.Ct. 2569 (citing Roger J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tex. L.Rev. 657, 660-61 (1959)). [6] Thus, the Court has acknowledged that the status exception comports with due process requirements when properly applied even though the defendant lacks minimum contacts with the forum. ¶ 22 Given that the United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that certain types of cases involving status may not offend the Fourteenth Amendment, we must decide whether the status exception extends to parental termination proceedings. We conclude that it does for three reasons. First, parental termination proceedings clearly involve the determination of a child's status vis-a-vis its parents. See In re Interest of M.L.K., 13 Kan.App.2d 251, 768 P.2d 316, 319 (1989) (holding that the status exception extends to termination proceedings because the [t]ermination of parental rights is nothing more than a determination of the legal status between the natural parent and the child); In re M.S.B., 611 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex.Civ.App.1980) (declaring that [i]t cannot be doubted that the parent-child relationship creates a status, and that a suit seeking to terminate such relationship is a status adjudication). Second, such proceedings are analogous to [a] court's termination of the marriage relationship between a husband and wife, In re Interest of M.L.K., 768 P.2d at 319, and the Supreme Court has determined that the status exception applies to divorce proceedings, see Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208 n. 30, 97 S.Ct. 2569 (citing Traynor, supra, at 660-61); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734-35. Finally, although there is some authority to the contrary, [7] the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have concluded that the status exception extends to parental termination proceedings. See In re Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JS-734, 25 Ariz.App. 333, 543 P.2d 454, 459-60 (1975); In re Interest of M.L.K., 768 P.2d at 319-20; In re J.J.C., No. E2000-01223-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 256161, at -2, 2001 Tenn.App. Lexis 171, at -5 (Tenn.Ct.App. Mar.15, 2001); Graham v. Copeland (In re Adoption of Copeland), 43 S.W.3d 483, 487 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (relying on status exception in parental rights termination proceeding against a father in prison); In re M.S.B., 611 S.W.2d at 706. Cf. Wenz v. Schwartze, 183 Mont. 166, 598 P.2d 1086, 1091-92 (1979) (concluding personal jurisdiction over a parent is not necessary in order to terminate parental rights, without specifically discussing status exception), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071, 100 S.Ct. 1015, 62 L.Ed.2d 753 (1980); In re A.E.H., 161 Wis.2d 277, 468 N.W.2d 190, 198-200, (focusing on child's contacts with the state in order to terminate parental rights), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 925, 112 S.Ct. 338, 116 L.Ed.2d 278 (1991). ¶ 23 Likewise, we note that the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed whether the status exception applies in the similar situation of child custody determinations have concluded that it does. See People ex rel. Wyoming v. Stout, 969 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo.Ct.App.1998); Balestrieri v. Maliska, 622 So.2d 561, 563 & n. 1 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1993) (citing cases from fourteen other states applying the status exception in child custody cases); Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 6-7 (Iowa 2001); Joliff v. Joliff, 829 P.2d 34, 36 n. 5 (Okla.1992); In re S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex.1992). Hence, there is persuasive authority to extend the status exception to parental termination proceedings. ¶ 24 Despite opportunities to clarify the status exception's application to parent-child relationships, [8] the United States Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the status exception as it applies to termination of parental rights. Contrary to D.A.'s arguments, our decision to extend the status exception to parental termination proceedings is consistent with the Court's decision in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953). In that case, the Court addressed whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution required Ohio to enforce a child custody decree rendered in Wisconsin even though the Wisconsin court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant mother when it issued the decree. A majority of the Court concluded that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require Ohio to accept the disposition made in Wisconsin. Id. at 528-29, 535, 73 S.Ct. 840. ¶ 25 In reaching that conclusion, four justices within the majority reasoned that it was unnecessary to determine the children's legal domicile because, even if it be with their father [in Wisconsin], that does not give Wisconsin, certainly as against Ohio, the personal jurisdiction that it must have in order to deprive their mother of her personal right to [custody]. Id. at 534, 73 S.Ct. 840. D.A. insists that this statement in May, namely, that a child's domicile is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent, precludes us from extending the status exception to termination proceedings. We find this contention without merit. ¶ 26 In our view, the statement on which D.A. relies is not controlling legal authority because May did not decide whether a child's domicile could confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent. Indeed, although four justices in May agreed that the question to be decided was whether a court of a state, where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor present, [could] cut off her immediate right to the care, custody, management and companionship of her minor children without having jurisdiction over her in personam, id. at 533, 73 S.Ct. 840, Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, which constituted the fifth and final vote in favor of reversal, significantly narrowed the question addressed by the Court. Specifically, his concurring opinion stated that the only thing the Court decides ... is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Ohio, in disposing of the custody of children in Ohio, ... to accept ... the [custody] disposition made by Wisconsin [over the mother]. The Ohio Supreme Court felt itself so bound. This Court does not decide that Ohio would be precluded from recognizing, as a matter of local law, the disposition made by the Wisconsin court. For Ohio to give respect to the Wisconsin decree would not offend the Due Process Clause. Id., at 535-36, 73 S.Ct. 840 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Justice Frankfurter's concurrence establishes the parameters of May. See McAtee v. McAtee, 174 W.Va. 129, 323 S.E.2d 611, 616 (1984) (Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion ... is widely acknowledged as having set forth the better view and May . . . has been interpreted in accord with that concurrence.); see also Fernandez v. Fernandez, App. No. 85-104-II, 1986 Tenn.App. Lexis 3586, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. July 15, 1986) (concluding that it is widely acknowledged that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion permitting states to recognize foreign custody decrees rendered without personal jurisdiction over an absent parent is the better rule of law); Hudson v. Hudson, 35 Wash. App. 822, 670 P.2d 287, 294 (1983) (declaring that  May has been interpreted in accord with Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion). Since Justice Frankfurter's concurrence establishes the parameters of May, the plurality's statement regarding personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent is mere dicta. ¶ 27 Moreover, no other jurisdiction has found May dispositive when addressing whether the status exception applies to parental termination proceedings. To the contrary, our research reveals that jurisdictions that have had occasion to address May's effect on such proceedings have uniformly rejected its applicability. For example, in In re Appeal in Maricopa County, the Arizona Court of Appeals distinguished May on the ground that May dealt with a custody proceeding, rather than a parental termination proceeding, and held that personal jurisdiction was not required over the nonresident parent because the relationship of parent and child is a status in which the state has a preeminent interest. [9] 543 P.2d at 459; see also In re J.J.C., at -2, 2001 Tenn.App. Lexis 171 at -5 (distinguishing May and concluding that the status exception extended to parental termination proceedings). Thus, contrary to D.A.'s assertion, May does not preclude the juvenile court from asserting personal jurisdiction over her. ¶ 28 Since we conclude that the status exception extends to parental termination proceedings, it is irrelevant whether D.A. had minimum contacts with the state. Nevertheless, we must still determine if exercising jurisdiction in this case otherwise meets the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that it does for the reasons that follow. ¶ 29 First, it is clear that the interests of this state are paramount to the interests of any other state. W.A. is present in this state and all relevant information concerning [his] welfare, progress, needs, and potential adoptive family are easily accessible here. E.A., 2002 UT App 72 at ¶ 54, (Bench, J., dissenting). This state has been financially, emotionally, and physically supporting W.A. since he was adjudicated a dependant child in February 1998. Additionally, our legislature has affirmatively expressed its interest in having Utah courts determine the interests of children located in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-110(13). Perhaps most importantly, we are concerned that if we refuse to exercise authority over D.A., no other state would be able to assert jurisdiction to resolve W.A.'s status. Therefore, because this state clearly has an interest in the outcome of this case paramount to that of any other state, it is only appropriate for the termination of parental rights to occur in Utah. ¶ 30 Second, we note that statutory provisions amply protected D.A.'s rights in this case. Indeed, she has benefitted significantly from procedural protections provided by Utah's statutes protecting her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. As previously mentioned, the statute authorizing jurisdiction provides for, and D.A. actually received, notice of the proceeding. See id. Additionally, due to other statutory provisions, she was appointed counsel and given an opportunity to present evidence, to summon witnesses, to have her rights fully and carefully considered by the juvenile court, and to appeal the decisions of that court within thirty days. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-110, -406, -909, -913 (2002). These procedural protections, along with the notice she received, provided more than adequate safeguards to preserve D.A.'s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. ¶ 31 The fact that parental rights have been designated fundamental liberty interest[s], Santosky II v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), does not alter our analysis. Cases dealing with status often involve a fundamental liberty interest. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has allowed courts to exercise jurisdiction in such cases where standards of fairness are not violated. For instance, notwithstanding the fact that the right to marry has been deemed of fundamental importance, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978), the Supreme Court in Shaffer still recognized it is appropriate for a state to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant for purposes of terminating a marriage, see 433 U.S. at 208 n. 30, 97 S.Ct. 2569 (citing Traynor, supra, at 660-61). D.A.'s rights have been given due consideration. Indeed, the interests of D.A., along with the interests of W.A. and the state, have been given the consideration required by the Termination of Parental Rights Act which expressly states that it was designed to safeguard the rights and interests of all parties concerned and promote their welfare and that of the state. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-402(1) (2002) (emphasis added). However, because courts are mandated to make determinations in the best interest of the child when grounds exist for parental termination, the rights of the child attain importance paramount to the rights of the parent. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-402(2). Thus, even though parental rights are a fundamental liberty interest, given the facts of this case, exercising jurisdiction over D.A. is justified. ¶ 32 After considering these several factors, we conclude that Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns have been met. Accordingly, we hold that the juvenile court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over D.A. comports with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.