Opinion ID: 1496482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Transportation Code Section 251.102

Text: SBC contends, however, that this rule does not apply when another statute pointedly requires a governmental entity to pay relocation costs. That, SBC argues, is the case with section 251.102. We have held, however, that if a statute creates a liability unknown to the common law, or deprives a person of a common law right, the statute will be strictly construed in the sense that it will not be extended beyond its plain meaning or applied to cases not clearly within its purview. Satterfield v. Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex.1969). This is one such case. In its current form, section 251.102 provides that [a] county shall include the cost of relocating or adjusting an eligible utility facility in the expense of right-of-way acquisition. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 251.102 (emphasis added). Eligible is undefined, and the Fifth Circuit noted its ambiguity in this context. CenterPoint Energy Houston Elec. LLC v. Harris County Toll Road Auth., 436 F.3d 541, 545 (5th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 907, 126 S.Ct. 2945, 165 L.Ed.2d 956 (2006) (noting that we have examined the statute, as noted above, and find that the words `eligible utility facility' remain ambiguous). Originally enacted in 1963 as former article 6674n-3, the statute provided that [i]n the acquisition of all highway rights-of-way by or for the Texas Highway Department, the cost of relocating or adjusting utility facilities which cost may be eligible under the law is hereby declared to be an expense and cost of right-of-way acquisition. Act of May 16, 1963, 58th Leg., R.S., ch. 240, § 1, 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 654, 654 (emphasis added). The emergency provision of that Act stated that it was necessary in order to clarify existing law as to the proper classification of costs incurred for the relocation or adjustment of utility facilities as a part of the acquisition of right-of-way. Id. § 4. The statute was passed apparently in response to Hardin County v. Trunkline Gas Co., 311 F.2d 882, 884 (5th Cir.1963), in which the court held that a county was not obligated, indeed could not legally obligate itself, to pay costs incurred by a gas company forced to extend the casing enclosing its pipelines when the state widened the highways. The Fifth Circuit held that the gas company's claim was not a legal claim, as the county was not authorized to contract to improve, construct or reconstruct a State highway ... [and was] expressly prohibited from expending county funds therefor. Id. at 883, 885. While the gas company's petition for writ of certiorari was pending, the Legislature passed what is now section 251.102. Trunkline Gas Co. v. Hardin County, 375 U.S. 8, 8, 84 S.Ct. 49, 11 L.Ed.2d 38 (1963) (granting certiorari and vacating judgment, noting that it appear[s] that the State of Texas has passed a statute in connection with controversies of this kind since the petition for a writ of certiorari was filed in this Court). On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that the newly enacted statute did not change the result, because [t]he Legislature cannot, by curative statute, appropriation, or otherwise, authorize payment under a contract made without authority of law. Hardin County v. Trunkline Gas Co., 330 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir.1964). When the 68th Legislature adopted the County Road and Bridge Act (former Article 6702-1) in 1983, article 6674n-3 was the source law for section 4.303 of the new law, which stated that [t]he county should include the cost of relocating or adjusting eligible utility facilities in the expense of right-of-way acquisition. (V.A.C.S. Art. 6674n-3.). Act of May 20, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 288, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1431, 1489 (emphasis added). In 1995, section 4.303 was codified, without substantive change, as section 251.102 of the Texas Transportation Code. Act of May 1, 1995, 74th Leg., R. S., ch. 165, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 1025, 1159, 1871 (now codified at TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 251.102). In one of only two decisions interpreting section 251.102, [4] the Fifth Circuit, in an Erie [5] guess about Texas law, held that eligible utility facility meant eligible under the law, which equated to a statutory right to reimbursement that operated prospectively, dealt with a matter in which the public has a real and legitimate interest, and was not fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious, based on our decision in City of Austin. Centerpoint, 436 F.3d at 549-50. City of Austin, however, involved a different statuteand one in which eligible was clearly defined. City of Austin, 331 S.W.2d at 740. The relevant statute in that case (passed six years before what is now section 251.102) provided that utilities required to relocate as part of the improvement of highways established as part of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, would do so at the cost and expense of the State ... provided that such relocation was eligible for Federal participation. Act of May 23, 1957, 55th Leg., R. S., ch. 300, § 4A, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 724, 729, repealed by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 165, § 24(a), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 1031, 1970 (current version at TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 203.092(a)(1)). The statute was passed for the purpose of securing the benefits of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, which authorize[d] the use of Federal funds to reimburse the state for the cost of relocating utility facilities in the same proportion as such funds are expended on a given project, with the proviso that Federal money shall not be used for that purpose when payment to the utility violates either state law or a legal contract between the utility and the state. City of Austin, 331 S.W.2d at 740 (citing U.S.C. § 123). [6] The utilities' (Southwestern Bell Telephone Company among them) eligibility for reimbursement was undisputed; the only issue we considered was whether the State's payment of relocation costs would be an unconstitutional donation for a private purpose. We concluded that it would not be and, in doing so, noted: In the absence of assumption by the state of part of the expense, it is clear that respondents could be required to remove at their own expense any installations owned by them and located in public rights of way whenever such relocation is made necessary by highway improvements.... While public utilities may use [roads and streets] for laying their lines, such use is subject to reasonable regulation by either the state, the county or the city, as the case may be. The utility may always be required, in the valid exercise of the police power by proper governmental authority, to remove or adjust its installations to meet the needs of the public for travel and transportation .... Compensation is not required to be made for damage or loss resulting from a valid exercise of the police power. Id. at 741-43; see also id. at 746 (noting that [n]o part of the expense will be paid by the state, of course, if the relocation is not eligible for Federal participation). In concluding that the reimbursement of relocation costs was not an unconstitutional gift, we relied on three factors: the statute operated prospectively, dealt with a matter in which the public had a real and legitimate interest, and was not fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious. Id. at 743. In CenterPoint, the Fifth Circuit examined these three factors to conclude that the relocation costs were eligible, rather than constitutional a rationale the court of appeals in this case then adopted. CenterPoint, 436 F.3d at 549-50; 263 S.W.3d at 58-60. Harris County asserts-and the State agreesthat the Fifth Circuit's interpretation is incorrect. Instead, Harris County argues, eligible utility facility in section 251.102 means that the project in question is eligible for federal participation or the utility has a compensable property interest in the land occupied by the utility, based on the current version of the statute we construed in City of Austin and the caselaw at the time section 251.102 was originally enacted. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 203.092(a)(1) and (2) (providing that a utility shall make a relocation ... at the expense of this state if ... relocation of the utility facility is required by improvement of a highway in this state established... as part of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways and the relocation is eligible for federal participation or the utility has a compensable property interest in the land occupied by the facility to be relocated) (emphasis added); City of Austin, 331 S.W.2d at 746 (reimbursement required if relocation was eligible for federal participation); Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v. City of Tyler, 348 S.W.2d 537, 543 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1961, writ ref'd) (reimbursement required if utility had purchased easements from private owners). Harris County's argument is plausible, if too narrow. Section 251.102 does not define what is eligible; it merely states that counties shall include relocation costs for such facilities. Other statutes clearly speak to the subject. As noted, relocation costs must be paid if the relocation is eligible for federal participation, if the utility has a compensable property interest in the land occupied by the facility to be relocated, or, under certain circumstances, if the project involves improvement of a segment of the state highway system that was designated by the commission as a turnpike project or toll project before September 1, 2005. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 203.092(a)(1), (2), and (3). Yet another statute provides for discretionary reimbursement by the highway department if the commission finds that relocation is essential to the timely completion of the project, continuous utility service is essential to the public well-being, the utility's ability to operate would be adversely affected if it paid the relocation cost, and the utility and the department agree regarding appropriate safeguards, minimization of disruption, and choice of contractors. Id. § 203.0921. Still another provides that a county may pay for relocating a water line under certain circumstances, provided the water district agrees to repay the funds within twenty years and with interest. Id. § 251.103. Section 203.094, dealing with timely relocations, speaks to a utility that is eligible for reimbursement under section 203.092 or that is eligible for reimbursement under applicable law and the policies of the department for the cost of relocating facilities. Id. § 203.094. Each of these statutes describes various scenarios under which utilities might be eligible for reimbursement of relocation costs. These laws indicate that, when the Legislature has determined that the government should pay a utility's relocation costs, the statutes clearly delineate classes of relocations that are eligible for reimbursement. By contrast, section 251.102 contains no such definition. If the Legislature intended for counties to pay all utility relocation costs, it would have been a simple matter to so state. See, e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 227.029( l ) (providing that the department, as part of the cost of the project, shall pay the cost of the relocation... of a public utility facility); id. § 366.171 (stating that regional tollway authorities shall pay the cost of relocation of a public utility facility); id. § 370.170(h) (regional mobility authority shall pay the cost of relocation of a public utility facility). Instead, the statute provides only that the county include relocation cost in acquisition expenses, and only for those utilities that are eligible. Id. § 251.102. SBC's relocation costs in this case are not clearly within the statute's purview, and SBC cites no other provision that would make it eligible. [7] Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d at 459. SBC asserts that Harris County ignores the equities of requiring toll road users, rather than the general public, to pay the true costs of constructing a toll road. While requiring reimbursement of utility relocation costs for toll roads may be the better policy, that is a decision for the Legislature. Moreover, mandating reimbursement under section 251.102 would mean that all counties would have to reimburse all utility relocation costs for all acquisition projects, not just toll roads. Absent a clearer indication from the Legislature, we cannot conclude that this is what the statute requires. D