Opinion ID: 613904
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other instances

Text: Barber argues that other instances of discrimination at C1 support a finding that C1's explanation was pretextual. Though he characterizes this argument as one based on other instances of discrimination, he argues primarily about the lack of investigation into his own claim of discrimination and a discrimination claim by Moore. The appropriate scope of investigation is a business judgment, and shortcomings in an investigation do not by themselves support an inference of discrimination. McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855, 863 (8th Cir.2009) (citing Wheeler v. Aventis Pharm., 360 F.3d 853, 859 (8th Cir.2004)). Moore was discharged on January 20, 2009. Subsequently, Moore alleged that his termination for misconduct was discriminatory. As proof of discrimination, Moore listed incidents of misconduct by other employees who were not subsequently fired. Barber alleges that C1 did not investigate Moore's charge of discrimination in contravention of its own written policy. C1 submitted evidence of its investigation to the district court. An employer can certainly choose how to run its business, including not to follow its own personnel policies regarding termination of an employee or handling claims of discrimination, as long as it does not unlawfully discriminate in doing so. Haas v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the case of Moore's allegations, Barber has failed to show either that C1 did not investigate or that any deficiency of investigation was related to unlawful discrimination. The fact that Moore claims he was discriminated against is not on point and fails to demonstrate pretext. See Cherry v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., 361 F.3d 474, 480 (8th Cir.2004). We conclude that Barber has neither provided sufficient evidence to undermine C1's reasons for promoting Simpson over Barber nor come forward with evidence that permits a reasonable inference that racial discrimination motivated its decision. Considering both Barber's individual claims and the cumulative effect of those claims, no reasonable jury could find pretext or discrimination, and we affirm the grant of summary judgment to C1 on Barber's claim that he was not promoted because of racial discrimination.