Opinion ID: 3008606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysi s

Text: Appellant argues that Appellee acted outside of her jurisdiction in denying his motion to dismiss the second case. According to Appellant, the Halpins' claims have not accrued and are therefore unripe because they relate to the first case which has been reversed . Accordingly, Appellant contends he is entitled to a writ of prohibition pursuant to CR 76.36, on the basis that the circuit court is without jurisdiction . We disagree. A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and should only be granted in exceptional circumstances . James v. Shadoan, 58 S.W .3d 884, 885 (Ky. 2001) (citing Bender v. Eaton, 343 S .W.2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1961)) . The standard for issuing a writ of prohibition is as follows : A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted. Hoskins v. Maricle 150, S .W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004) . We review the Court of Appeals' decision to deny the writ for abuse of discretion . Id. at 5 (whether to grant or deny a petition for a writ is not a question of jurisdiction, but of discretion) . In support of his argument that the circuit court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Appellant cites Doe v. Golden 8s Walters, PLLC, 173 S.W.3d 260 (Ky. App. 2005), for the proposition that tort claims purporting to relate to a judgment that remains pending on appeal are not ripe for adjudication . Doe involved a series of federal civil rights class actions against the Lexington- Fayette Urban County Government . Claims of the latter-filed class actions were dismissed as time-barred . Members of the class actions which were dismissed filed a class action in state court against the plaintiffs of the earlier-filed, non-time-barred class actions, their attorneys, and the attorneys' law firms, alleging legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation . The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Doe is not controlling here . Doe primarily addressed ripeness as it relates to legal malpractice . At issue in that case was when the damages for legal malpractice become fixed and non-speculative . When an attorney is alleged to have committed litigation malpractice, whether the attorney's negligence has caused any injury or damages necessarily is contingent on the final outcome of the underlying case and [a]ny alleged injury is merely speculative until the result of the appeal of the underlying litigation is final and the trial court's judgment becomes `the unalterable law of the case.' Id . at 271 . Thus, we conclude that the Doe holding is limited to prematurely-filed claims . In the present case, the injury was not speculative because any damages caused to the Halpins occurred when Appellant's alleged fraudulent conduct rendered them unable to collect on the judgment. Kentucky law makes it clear that an appellant who fails to file a supersedeas bond does so at his own risk and that execution may proceed. CR 60.03(1), Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Marvland v. Helm, 217 Ky. 384, 289 S.W. 280 (1926) . Since Kentucky law makes it clear that the holder of a judgment on appeal is entitled to seek enforcement of that judgment if no supersedeas bond has been filed, efforts to enforce such judgments are ripe and constitute a justiciable controversy . Therefore, the Halpins' claims are ripe for adjudication and within the circuit court's general jurisdiction . See Ky. Const. § 112(5) ; KRS 23A .010(1) . Appellant is not entitled to a writ of prohibition because he has failed to show that the circuit court is without jurisdiction or that he will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief. See Hoskins, 150 S .W.3d at 10. Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition .