Opinion ID: 401075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: improper temporary admission of prejudicial evidence

Text: 11 The second question raised by appellant is whether a mistrial is warranted due to the fact that the trial court admitted and then struck Jones' testimony concerning his heart condition. In the case at bar, the trial judge, in the presence of the jury, clearly ruled the evidence irrelevant and out of the case, but only after he had let the evidence in. Then, the court reaffirmed the exclusion of the evidence by telling the jury to disregard any evidence ordered stricken by the court. In United States v. Johnson, 618 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1980), this court discussed whether a mistrial is warranted when a trial judge improperly admits allegedly prejudicial evidence, but subsequently orders the evidence stricken and gives curative instructions: 12 Although curative instructions are not always effective, see, e.g., Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 218, 67 S.Ct. 224, 228, 91 L.Ed. 196 (1946), we have stated that we must assume that the jury followed the curative instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9th Cir. 1978). To proceed properly we must weigh the forcefulness of the instruction and the conviction with which it was given against the degree of prejudice generated by the evidence. See United States v. Taylor, 603 F.2d 732, 735-36 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Eng, 241 F.2d 157, 160-61 (2d Cir. 1957). In fixing the degree of prejudice, the probative force of the inadmissible evidence must be compared with that of the admissible evidence which supports the verdict. Id. 13 618 F.2d at 62. 14 In the case at bar, the two instructions given by the trial judge clearly outweigh any minor prejudice that may have been caused by the disclosure of Jones' heart condition. 15 Appellant contends that prejudice arose from the prosecution's attempt to arouse jury sympathy for the witness. Even admitting such attempts, a prosecution witness who has agreed to cooperate with the government after his own arrest is not likely to arouse the same sympathy as a victim of a crime. The jury was made aware of Jones' arrangement with the government by the testimony of Jones and the questions asked by defense counsel. In order to assess the amount of prejudice caused, the probative force of the inadmissible evidence should be compared with that of the admissible evidence which supports the verdict. In the case at bar, there is no question that there is a great deal of evidence supporting the verdict and little force to the tainted evidence. 16 The trial judge is in the best position to determine the probable impact of the evidence on the jury. His judgment must be accorded deference. United States v. Bagley, 641 F.2d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 1981). A motion for a mistrial is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its determination will be upset only upon a showing that that discretion has been abused. United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 777 (9th Cir. 1980). No such showing has been made in this case.