Opinion ID: 1512561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the testimony satisfy M.R.Evid. 803(4)?

Text: Sickles argues that some testimony exceeded the scope of M.R.Evid. 803(4) [4] by attributing fault or blame. With emphasis added to that portion Sickles claims exceeded the scope of the exception, Tyre's testimony follows in pertinent part: I asked Erin to describe what had happened to her, and she said she had been touched, she said, down there and pointed to her genital area, and she said that a finger had been put in her and moved back and forth and did a finger motion between her legs like that (demonstrating). She said she  she said it hurt. She said she asked that it stop, and she said she was scared. We have approved the admission of hearsay testimony pursuant to 803(4) when the statements to a physician are pertinent to treatment but not when they merely affix fault or blame. See e.g., State v. Rosa, 575 A.2d 727, 729 (Me.1990) (finding a victim's statements that she had been forced to have sex pertinent to medical treatment, and that she had been threatened with a knife relevant to treatment for emotional trauma when physician testified that he was treating the victim for this emotional trauma); State v. Leone, 581 A.2d 394, 399 (Me.1990) (finding defendant's statements to a doctor that he was shot while trying to get away and that he didn't do it to be inadmissible because they attributed fault or blame); State v. True, 438 A.2d at 467 (finding pertinent to treatment those statements describing the impetus for seeking treatment and noting the date of the alleged rape, but not those statements identifying the perpetrator or the scene of the incident). While Sickles asserted, during the court's consideration of his motion for a judgment of acquittal, that the victim was an incompetent witness, he neither explained this assertion nor objected to the testimony on the ground that the victim did not have the requisite state of mind or motive to make these statements for purposes of securing treatment. We therefore focus on whether the statement was one insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. M.R.Evid. 803(4). The reason why the doctor asks a question is self-evidently relevant to the issue of medical pertinence. Pertinence, within the contemplation of Rule 803(4), is an objective consideration beyond the declarant's state of mind. Cassidy v. State, 74 Md.App. 1, 536 A.2d 666, 686 (1988). Pertinence may be tested by asking whether the information is of a type on which a physician could reasonably rely to form a diagnosis or provide treatment. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001, 101 S.Ct. 1709, 68 L.Ed.2d 203 (1981). See also Cassidy v. State, 536 A.2d at 686 (quoting J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence ¶ 803(4)[01], at 803-146 (1984)). That the victim, as Tyre phrased it, asked that it stop, is not clearly pertinent to Tyre's diagnosis. Tyre's role in examining the victim was limited to providing emergency room care. Tyre did not indicate whether or how the knowledge that the victim may have asked that it stop helped her in her diagnosis. The statement is irrelevant to her diagnosis or opinion that the victim's physical symptoms were consistent with the incident as the victim described. The instant case is distinguishable from Cassidy and Leone in that the statements in those cases identify the accused. Identity is not at issue in the instant case, nor is the statement at issue problematic for the reason that it identified Sickles. The statement did, however, speak to the intent of Sickles, acknowledged by the State to be the only issue generated. The victim's description of her statement to Sickles contained not only information about how it occurred, but also an indication that Sickles may have been aware of her at least at one point during the incident. This indicates intent. Absent some stronger showing that the statement was pertinent to Tyre's diagnosis, the statement should have been excluded. Because the State presented other evidence from which the jury could infer intent, the error does not amount to obvious error. State v. True, 438 A.2d 460 (Me.1981). Contrary to Sickles' contention, the other evidence was not admitted in error and therefore did not compound the error of admitting the victim's statements through Tyre. Specifically, it was not error to admit the detective's statement that Sickles hung his head, acknowledged that he knew the person in bed next to him was not his wife, and admitted he needed help, as an admission of a party-opponent, M.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). From the detective's statement and through an assessment of the credibility of, inter alia, Sickles' defense, the jury rationally could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Sickles was guilty of the crime charged. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring.