Opinion ID: 1177818
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Nature of a Closure Decision

Text: The next question is: What kind of a decision was Commissioner Feeney obliged to make when he ruled on the closure motion? Was it the kind of decision in which statutory and/or case law dictated the outcome and with respect to which he had no options?  or  did he have some judicial discretion to exercise? If the Commissioner's obligation falls within the latter category  a higher court cannot utilize mandamus to furnish the answer to the question which the Commissioner contemplated and must  by employing his judicial discretion  decide. If it falls within the former category, then mandamus is proper. § 1-30-102, supra; Williams, supra; and Marsh, supra. We spoke of the nature of closure decision-making in Williams, supra. There we said: ... When ... there is a challenge to the court's order by a representative of the public, then, subject to appellate review, the district court, if the proceeding had been held in a minor court, or this court, if the proceeding had been originally heard in the district court, must determine whether the originating court had abused its discretion ... . The resolving of this issue, when the defendant has yet to proceed to trial, involves the delicate balancing of the public's right of access to information, on the one hand, and the defendant's right to a fair trial on the other. (Emphasis supplied) 589 P.2d at 327. We could not have given a more definitive answer to the question of whether or not closure involves the utilization of judicial discretion. It does !!! In Williams, supra, we adopted standards to which the justice of the peace (court commissioner in this case) is required to conform in a closure case. We said, in adopting the American Bar Association Standards: `Except as provided below, pretrial proceedings and their record shall be open to the public, including representatives of the news media. If at the pretrial proceeding testimony or evidence is adduced that is likely to threaten the fairness of a trial, the presiding officer shall advise those present of the danger and shall seek the voluntary cooperation of the news media in delaying dissemination of potentially prejudicial information by means of public communication until the impaneling of the jury or until an earlier time consistent with the fair administration of justice. The presiding officer may close a preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or any other pretrial proceeding, including a motion to suppress, and may seal the record only if `(i) the dissemination of information from the pretrial proceeding and its record would create a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial, and `(ii) the prejudicial effect of such information on trial fairness cannot be avoided by any reasonable alternative means. `The defendant may move that all or part of the proceeding be closed to the public (including representatives of the news media), or, with the consent of the defendant, the presiding officer may take such action sua sponte or at the suggestion of the prosecution. Whenever under this rule all or part of any pretrial proceeding is held in chambers or otherwise closed to the public, a complete record shall be kept and made available to the public following the completion of trial or earlier if consistent with trial fairness.' To this standard we would add several further requirements. The portion of the pretrial proceeding involved in the determination of closure shall, itself, be closed to the public. Otherwise, there would be no meaningful way of ascertaining whether or not the failure to close the pretrial proceeding would create a `clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial,' nor would there be an effective way of deciding whether or not there exists a reasonable alternative to closure. A record of this preliminary determination shall be kept, and the factual basis for the determination upon which closure is predicated shall be made apparent therein... 589 P.2d at 326. Even though decision-making on the issue of clear and present danger to defendants' fair-trial rights would appear to call for the commissioner to exercise judicial discretion in all cases, it conceivably could be argued that  in a mandamus matter such as that with which we are here concerned  the district court could entertain a petition for a writ of mandamus to examine the record of the in camera proceedings for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there were sufficient facts of record upon which to exercise discretion. In other words, if, upon district court inquiry, the record revealed that neither the litigants nor the record demonstrated at the in camera pre-preliminary hearing, that there would be offered (at the preliminary hearing) matter which would `create a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial, and ... [if] the prejudicial effect of such information on trial fairness cannot be avoided by any reasonable alternative means.' Williams, supra, at 589 P.2d 326, then the district court, in a mandamus action, could, indeed, order the preliminary hearing opened to the public. Why? Because  there being no evidence of a fair-trial threat  the commissioner's duty to open the hearing according to the directives of Williams is relegated to a ministerial function which mandamus will, indeed, reach. § 1-30-102, supra; Williams, supra; and Marsh, supra. But that is not the situation here. We have examined the record in this case with great care. We find, as a matter of law, that there was and is documentation in the record, alluded to in Commissioner Feeney's decision letter, supra, which, while acceptable under the liberal rules that pertain to a preliminary hearing, is such matter as may or may not be admissible at the trial upon the issue of guilt. It is also clear to this court that in the event the aforesaid evidence were to be made public at the preliminary hearing and then excluded at the trial, it would very likely threaten the fairness of defendants' trial. [5] ... `[T]he dissemination of information from the pretrial proceeding and its record would create a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial, ... .' Williams, supra, at 589 P.2d 326. Harriscope's Constitutional Rights and the Writ of Mandamus Harriscope argues that this court is on infirm constitutional grounds when we say that a judicial officer has discretion to close a pretrial hearing if necessary to avoid a clear and present danger to the defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial. We do not agree and it is our opinion that we satisfactorily disposed of that contention in Williams, supra. However, since Williams was decided, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion which has sparked considerable controversy. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979). Since Harriscope asserts both federal and state constitutional rights, we will address Harriscope's constitutional arguments in light of Gannett, supra, and Williams, supra. Harriscope based its application for a writ of mandamus on the following claims: (1) The order of Respondent closing the preliminary hearing constitutes unwarranted censorship of the press in violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution. (2) The order impairs the Petitioner's constitutionally guranteed [sic] rights to gather news and report the news. (3) The order abridges the public's right to know. (4) The order violates Section 8, Article 1 of the Wyoming Constitution which provides that `all courts shall be open.' (5) The order violates the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a public trial. (6) The order exceeds the jurisdiction of Respondent's Court. [6] The constitutional rights of those concerned are these: First: Harriscope's right to be present at the pretrial hearings in question are the same as the public's, Williams, supra, and citations to this proposition therein contained. Second: We are not confronted with a First Amendment freedom-of-speech right in this case. The Commissioner's closure order was not a prior restraint on freedom of speech, which is presumed unconstitutional. Williams, supra, at 589 P.2d 325. In the cases which we consider here, we are not concerned with information in the possession of the news media. The problem here has to do with information which has been restrained and which the media seeks to obtain  not information that it possesses. Williams, supra. Third: Where the public's access to pretrial proceedings is restrained, as it would be were Commissioner Feeney's closure order given effect, the public (which we again emphasize includes the media) has no constitutional right under the First or Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution or any corollary provisions of the Wyoming Constitution to have free access to such preliminary-hearing proceedings or to all information in the possession of the courts. Williams, supra, and citations therein contained. See, also, Gannett, supra. The majority in Gannett recognized  as we did in Williams, that the public has an interest in the Sixth Amendment guarantees for public trial, but this does not create a constitutional right on the part of the public. [7] Fourth: The Sixth Amendment guarantee of right to a speedy and public trial [8] inures to the protection of the defendant. ... [I]ts guarantee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the accused... . Gannett, supra, at 99 S.Ct. 2905, citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 848, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2547, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Fifth: While the public has an admitted interest in the administration of justice during the pretrial proceedings, that interest is protected by the participants to the litigation in our adversary system of criminal justice. Gannett, supra. Sixth: We recognize, as does the United States Supreme Court, that adverse pretrial publicity can endanger the fair-trial rights of the defendant. Williams, supra. And, see Gannett, supra, citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959). Cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965). Gannett holds that in order to safeguard the due process rights of the accused, a trial judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity... . (Citing Sheppard, supra) The Gannett Court goes on to say: ... And because of the Constitution's pervasive concern for these due process rights, a trial judge may surely take protective measures even when they are not strictly and inescapably necessary. Seventh: The Sixth Amendment protections do not guarantee to the defendant the right to compel a private trial ( Gannett, supra), and access to court proceedings should be limited only in exceptional circumstances ( Williams, supra). The Sixth Amendment permits and even presumes open trials as a norm. Gannett, supra. Accordingly, we reject Harriscope's claims that Commissioner Feeney could not constitutionally possess discretion to close the pretrial hearing in order to insure a fair trial.