Opinion ID: 2106660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: aggravation/mitigation phase

Text: A. Whether Introduction of Defendant's Armed Robbery Conviction Requires This Court to Vacate Defendant's Death Sentence At the close of the first phase of defendant's sentencing hearing, the jury found defendant death-eligible based on a single statutory aggravating factor, namely, that Officer Simenson was a peace officer killed in the line of duty (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(1) (West 1996)). The sentencing hearing proceeded to its second, or aggravation/mitigation, phase, where the jury weighed factors favoring imposition of the death penalty against factors favoring mercy toward defendant. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g) (West 1996). One of the nonstatutory aggravating factors argued by the State in the second phase was defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Defendant argues that, in light of our reversal of defendant's armed robbery conviction, the State introduced an improper aggravating factor before the jury which requires this court to vacate defendant's sentence. Defendant cites nine instances where counsel for the State argued the fact of defendant's armed robbery conviction to the jury during the aggravation/mitigation phase of defendant's death penalty hearing. Defendant further directs our attention to an instruction that guided the jury's deliberations at the close of the second sentencing phase. The instruction informed the jury that it could consider as an aggravating factor any other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should be sentenced to death. The instruction also stated that aggravating factors could include factors not specifically listed elsewhere in the instructions. According to defendant, this instruction permitted the jury to weigh nonstatutory aggravating factors, such as the armed robbery conviction, against any mitigating evidence introduced by defendant. Defendant maintains that the jury's consideration of the armed robbery conviction as an aggravating factor impermissibly tainted his death sentence and compels us to vacate the sentence. Defendant's argument raises two issues for our consideration. Preliminarily, we must decide whether the State's reference to defendant's armed robbery conviction constituted error. If we find error, we then must decide whether the error necessitates an automatic reversal and remand for resentencing or, alternatively, whether this court may resolve the error and resentence defendant without remanding the matter to the circuit court. At the time the State's Attorney urged the jury to consider defendant's armed robbery, the armed robbery conviction was a fact. The conviction was also a pertinent event in defendant's criminal history, which the State was permitted to introduce as an aggravating factor and to rebut mitigating factors raised by defendant. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(1) (West 1996). Upon review, this court finds that at the guilt phase of defendant's trial, an improper instruction formed the basis for defendant's armed robbery conviction. We have held that this instruction was incorrect and, accordingly, reversed the conviction. During the second phase of defendant's sentencing hearing, however, the jury believed it had lawfully found defendant guilty of armed robbery. Moreover, defendant has only one armed robbery conviction in his criminal history, so there can be no dispute as to which conviction was referenced by the State. The fact the jury believed defendant was guilty of armed robbery, when legally in fact he was not, constitutes error. Having determined that the jury incorrectly considered an armed robbery conviction as an aggravating factor at the second stage of the sentencing process, this court must now decide whether the error demands an automatic remandment for resentencing or whether this court may assume the sentencing responsibilities. Sentencing in state capital-punishment cases implicates at least three constitutional rights of a criminal defendant: the sixth amendment right to a fair trial, the eighth amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, and the fourteenth amendment right to due process. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745, 746, 748, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1446, 1447, 1448, 108 L.Ed.2d 725, 736, 737, 738 (1990). Neither defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury trial nor his eighth amendment right to avoid cruel and unusual punishment requires this court to remand the proceedings for a new sentencing hearing. The United States Supreme Court has held that decisions concerning punishment do not require a jury's deliberations. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 3376, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140, 1151 (1982). In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459, 460, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3161, 3162, 82 L.Ed.2d 340, 352, 352-53 (1984), the Court stated: [D]espite its unique aspects, a capital sentencing proceeding involves the same fundamental issue involved in any other sentencing proceeding-a determination of the appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual. [Citations.] The Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination of that issue. See also People v. Mack, 167 Ill.2d 525, 534, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437 (1995). Similarly, neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court interpret the eighth amendment as prescribing sentencing by a jury only. The eighth amendment demands that the sentencing decision be based on the facts and circumstances of the defendant, his background and his crime. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 748, 110 S.Ct. at 1448, 108 L.Ed.2d at 738. The twin objectives of the eighth amendment are `measured consistent application [of the death penalty] and fairness to the accused.' Clemons, 494 U.S. at 748, 110 S.Ct. at 1448, 108 L.Ed.2d at 738, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-11, 102 S.Ct. 869, 874, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 (1982). Nothing inherent in the composition of a jury limits fair, consistent or informed sentencing to a jury. A reviewing court can just as easily master these functions, and in some instances, enjoys an advantage over juries in its knowledge of sentencing objectives compatible with the Constitution. See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749, 110 S.Ct. at 1448, 108 L.Ed.2d at 738. Consistent with the eighth amendment, therefore, a reviewing court may engage in a harmless error analysis, and determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentencing jury would have reached the same finding regardless of the introduction of the erroneous evidence, argument or instruction. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 752-53, 110 S.Ct. at 1450, 108 L.Ed.2d at 741. A court of review can also reweigh aggravating factors against mitigating factors, replicating the deliberation asked of a jury at the sentencing phase. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749, 110 S.Ct. at 1448, 108 L.Ed.2d at 738. Parenthetically, when the Clemons Court referred to a reviewing court's authority to reweigh evidence, the Court ascribed a very specific meaning to reweigh. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 745, 749, 110 S.Ct. at 1446, 1448, 108 L.Ed.2d at 736, 738. There are two types of state statutory schemes for imposing the death penalty. Under one type of statute, the trier of fact in a capital sentencing proceeding must consider only statutory aggravating factors, introduced at the eligibility phase, during deliberations at the aggravation and mitigation phase. Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269, 282-83 (5th Cir.1997). The jury must balance these factors against mitigation evidence and determine if the established aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating evidence. Williams, 125 F.3d at 283. In the lexicon of capital sentencing case law, states that employ this scheme are called weighing states. Williams, 125 F.3d at 282-83; Hampton v. Page, 103 F.3d 1338, 1342 (7th Cir.1997). The alternative, or nonweighing, method allows the trier of fact to consider any relevant aggravating factor at the second stage of sentencing, including but not limited to the statutory aggravating, or eligibility, factors. Williams, 125 F.3d at 283; Hampton, 103 F.3d at 1342. Thus, the statutory aggravating factors play no role in the sentencing process above the role of other evidence. Williams, 125 F.3d at 283. Illinois is a nonweighing state. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c) (West 1996). We find nothing in the eighth amendment analysis that would prevent a reviewing court in a nonweighing state from also assuming the sentencing functions of a jury. The determinative inquiry is whether the reviewing court, in performing the sentencing duties of a jury, actually fulfills those sentencing responsibilities in a meaningful manner. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 750-52, 110 S.Ct. at 1449-50, 108 L.Ed.2d at 739-40. In doing so, the court complies with the eighth amendment requirement that there be an individualized determination of whether defendant should be put to death, based on a consideration of defendant's circumstances and the facts surrounding his crime. Hampton, 103 F.3d at 1343. Protection of a criminal defendant's fourteenth amendment due process right, however, requires a separate analysis. Where a statutory sentencing scheme allows a criminal defendant to designate a jury as his sentencing body, the defendant acquires a liberty interest in having a jury deliberate his fate. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 2229, 65 L.Ed.2d 175, 180 (1980); People v. Ramey, 151 Ill.2d 498, 548, 177 Ill.Dec. 449, 603 N.E.2d 519 (1992). The defendant in such a case has a substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion [citation], and that liberty interest is one that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary deprivation by the State. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346, 100 S.Ct. at 2229, 65 L.Ed.2d at 180. A reviewing court may not usurp the jury's authority without stripping the defendant of his liberty interest. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346, 100 S.Ct. at 2229, 65 L.Ed.2d at 180. However, the United States Supreme Court has also ruled that this liberty interest may not be absolute. The scope of a criminal defendant's liberty interest in having a jury decide his fate pursuant to a capital sentencing statute is created by, and therefore is wholly dependent on, the terms of the sentencing statute. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 747, 110 S.Ct. at 1447, 108 L.Ed.2d at 737; Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346, 100 S.Ct. at 2229, 65 L.Ed.2d at 180. If the statute allows a reviewing court to perform the sentencing function, then appellate resentencing would not violate defendant's due process rights. See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 747, 110 S.Ct. at 1447, 108 L.Ed.2d at 737. In Clemons, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725, a criminal defendant argued that Mississippi's capital sentencing act vested the defendant with a liberty interest in having a jury decide whether the defendant could be put to death. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 747, 110 S.Ct. at 1447, 108 L.Ed.2d at 737. The State of Mississippi countered that it could perform the jury sentencing functions itself, thereby implying that any liberty interest bestowed on criminal defendants by its state sentencing scheme was not unqualified. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 747, 110 S.Ct. at 1447, 108 L.Ed.2d at 737. The Supreme Court refused to question Mississippi's construction of a Mississippi statute: if a state, in interpreting its own law, determines that its courts could engage in appellate re-sentencing without violating a liberty interest held by a defendant, then the United States Supreme Court was bound to yield to the state's construction of state law. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 747, 110 S.Ct. at 1447, 108 L.Ed.2d at 737; see also Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 534, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437 (We note that this due process right to sentencing by a jury does not necessarily preclude an appellate court from independently `re-sentencing' the defendant when, due to some error, the jury's sentencing decision cannot stand. Instead, the extent to which a reviewing court may engage in such re-sentencing would appear to depend on State law). Following Clemons, we conclude that if a state sentencing statute permits appellate resentencing, and the appellate panel complies with the sentencing requirements, then defendant's liberty interest will not be imperiled when the reviewing court assumes sentencing responsibilities itself. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746-47, 110 S.Ct. at 1447, 108 L.Ed.2d at 736-37. In the instant appeal, we find that the Illinois capital sentencing statute does not permit a court of review to usurp the jury's role as sentencer without damaging defendant's due process rights. Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 534, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437; People v. Ramey, 151 Ill.2d at 550, 177 Ill. Dec. 449, 603 N.E.2d 519; 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 1996). The statute plainly states that, if a defendant elects to have a jury perform the sentencing function, the jury and the jury alone will determine defendant's eligibility for death and whether any mitigating factor or factors should preclude capital punishment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g) (West 1996). By its terms, the Illinois capital sentencing statute does not permit this court to assume these responsibilities. Defendant has a liberty interest in having a jury make particular findings relative to sentencing. Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 534, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437. We note that defendant's fourteenth amendment due process right does not preclude this court from applying a harmless error analysis to the State's erroneous introduction of the armed robbery conviction. The harmless error inquiry does not require this court to perform any of the jury functions described in the capital sentencing statute. Further, most errors of constitutional dimension are subject to a harmless error analysis. Only those constitutional violations that are structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, such as total deprivation of the right to trial counsel or absence of an impartial trier of fact, are per se error that necessitate remandment for a new proceeding. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264-65, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 (1991). Such error undermines the trial's fundamental function of determining the defendant's guilt or innocence. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308, 310, 111 S.Ct. at 1264, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d at 330, 331. If, however, the error is in the nature of a trial error, i.e., one which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, then the error is subject to harmless error review. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08, 111 S.Ct. at 1264, 113 L.Ed.2d at 330. Such an error does not taint the fundamental truth-seeking function of the trial, and may be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308, 111 S.Ct. at 1264, 113 L.Ed.2d at 330. Error is harmless only if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendant's conviction. People v. Dean, 175 Ill.2d 244, 259, 222 Ill. Dec. 413, 677 N.E.2d 947 (1997). After careful consideration of the record, we find that the erroneous introduction of defendant's armed robbery conviction to the jury at phase two of his capital sentencing hearing is in the nature of a trial error, so that it is subject to harmless error scrutiny by this court. However, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that introduction of defendant's armed robbery conviction as an aggravating factor did not contribute to the jury's verdict. The same jury that found defendant a candidate for the death penalty had, immediately preceding the sentencing hearing, found defendant guilty of the armed robbery. This was defendant's first and only armed robbery conviction and constituted a crime qualitatively different from the drug possession and burglary charges that dominated his criminal history. Defendant's record included arrests for possession of stolen property in 1985, for possession of cannabis in 1987, for residential burglary and for possession of cocaine and battery in 1990, for burglary in 1992, and for possession of drugs with intent to deliver and obstructing a peace officer in 1994. Additionally, defendant had pleaded guilty to the following crimes: a misdemeanor drug sale in 1984, unlawful use of weapons in 1985, misdemeanor retail theft in 1990, and burglary in 1994. The 1994 guilty plea for burglary arose from a crime that occurred in 1992. For that incident, defendant received a three-year sentence in the Illinois Department of Corrections. According to Detective Robert Brenczewski of the Joliet police department, defendant was on parole from that sentence at the time of the Simenson murder. Family and expert witnesses testifying at the aggravation/mitigation phase of defendant's sentencing hearing indicated that defendant's personal history, while troubled, was unremarkable for extreme violence. Defendant's elder sister, Brenda Marshall, stated that defendant was the youngest of nine children, raised in a fun, loving home. Defendant's father died when defendant was 11, and when defendant was 9, defendant's elder brother, Ellis, died of a heart attack. Marshall said defendant had been very close to Ellis. Marshall and defendant's mother made her children attend church, and attempted to impart the value of hard work to her children. Marshall testified that all of her other siblings work hard and work every day. According to Marshall, defendant had been employed in the 11 years preceding the trial. She stated he worked as a parking lot attendant for four years, but left that job for another, because he wanted to better himself. Marshall testified that defendant had also worked in a warehouse in Romeoville, and for the Sunny Hill Nursing Home, but she did not know what he did there. Defendant had talked to Marshall about wanting to work as a Will County sheriff. Defendant occasionally lived with Marshall and her husband. Defendant looked up to Marshall's husband and helped him remodel Marshall's home. Marshall has never seen defendant act violently or abuse drugs. She stated that his biggest problem is that he is a follower. Defendant will do what others want him to do because he does not want to be called a square. Concerning defendant's relationship with his girlfriend, Kari, Marshall averred that, initially, their relationship was a good one. She said that defendant's son, Brandon, is a well-mannered child and an A student. However, Marshall asserted that defendant and Kari's mother, who resided with Kari, would drink excessively when defendant was at Kari's home, causing problems within the household. Wade Hill, defendant's brother and 20 years defendant's senior, also testified. Since May 1992, Hill has seen defendant on at least a weekly basis, when defendant was not in jail. Defendant worked with Hill on construction projects, including some roofing projects in 1994. Hill described defendant as a reliable and good worker. In Hill's opinion, defendant has all the skills necessary to hold a job in the construction trade and could have earned a living using those skills. Although Hill testified that he had never seen defendant abuse any substance other than alcohol, Hill conceded that defendant had a lot of friends who liked to drink. Hill said that defendant would gather with six or seven of these friends in an empty lot and drink beer or whiskey. Veronica Files is Barbara Marshall's daughter and defendant's niece. She testified that before defendant was in and out of prison, she would see him regularly, at least once a day. She said that during the time defendant was out of prison, but before September 28, 1994, defendant was working in a factory and seemed happy. Files maintained that defendant was very close to her two sons and was very generous to her. She described defendant's relationship with his own son as close, and said father and son interacted just about every day. Files believed that defendant's relationship with Kari turned bad only after Kari had a child by someone other than defendant. Files never saw defendant in a fight, and believed he would avoid one if possible. She portrayed defendant as a follower, not a leader. He could be easily persuaded, depending on the situation. Michael Gelbort, a clinical psychologist, testified in mitigation. Gelbort examined defendant's police and Department of Corrections records, and conducted numerous tests on defendant individually. Gelbort found defendant's full scale IQ to be 78, which Gelbort described as upper end of borderline mentally deficient range of functioning. Test results showed defendant to be someone who was well behind his peer group in academic performance and had trouble focusing his attention and concentration. Defendant processes information more slowly than a normal person and has abnormal mental control, meaning a poor ability to focus on a subject. Defendant is also a person that will act on impulses that other persons would inhibit. Persons with defendant's personality profile have difficulty making it through school and difficulty holding a job. Their aspirations exceed what they can achieve, leading to frustration. Defendant is in contact with reality. Defendant exhibits no signs of psychosis or schizophrenia. He is neither aberrant nor abnormal, with the exception that he lacks self-confidence and exhibits very low self-esteem. Defendant tends to be a fairly passive person. While Gelbort admitted the existence of some aggressive behavior in defendant, he did not believe this behavior was significant, since defendant has never caused significant bodily harm to someone else. Defendant is most interested in making himself happy and feeling good. Gelbort described defendant as more a follower than a leader. He is not skilled at anticipating the consequences of his actions. Gelbort opined that he would not expect to find in someone with defendant's personality profile a person who would instruct another to shoot a police officer. Gelbort believed that, had there been two Gregory Shaws at the intersection of Theodore and Burry on the night of the murder, the murder would not have occurred. Gelbort interpreted defendant's actions on September 28, 1994, as defendant's attempt to keep Elton Williams away from the police, because if the two mixed there was going to be a problem. Nevertheless, Gelbort conceded that defendant's IQ would not prevent defendant from planning an escape route from a robbery, nor would it prevent defendant from including in the plan an intent to take care of business in case he was caught. Gelbort testified that defendant has expressed remorse for the murder of Officer Simenson. Defendant talked about the incident on many occasions, and displayed a heartfelt concern for the children that will grow up without a father. Two witnesses, William Beavers and Darryl Butler, testified at the aggravation/mitigation phase of the sentencing proceedings concerning defendant's alleged involvement in the armed robbery. Neither Beavers nor Butler testified at the liability phase of the trial. Beavers testified that, while incarcerated with defendant at the Will County jail, defendant told Beavers that defendant and Williams committed two armed robberies on the date in question. First, they robbed someone of $13 to buy cannabis, and then decided to rob someone else because they needed more money. Darryl Butler testified that, on the evening of September 27, he was robbed in a parking lot approximately one mile from William Chaney's home. Butler was stopped by an African-American male who pointed a gun at Butler and demanded money. Butler gave him $13. The person that robbed Butler was not defendant, Butler said. Butler did not see a white car in the vicinity of the robbery. Although these were not the only witnesses to testify at the aggravation/mitigation phase, their testimony focused the jury's attention on the armed robbery that the State argued to the jury. A review of the trial transcripts reveals that the State used the fact of the armed robbery conviction as more than just an aggravating factor. The State insisted that the conviction undermined defendant's contention that defendant lacked a significant criminal history and that he could yet be a law-abiding citizen. We note that defendant's guilt for all his convictions-armed robbery, felony murder, knowing and intentional murder-rests entirely on a theory of accountability. William Chaney never saw defendant at the scene of the armed robbery. It is undisputed that Williams, not Shaw, fired the gunshots that killed Officer Simenson. In light of these considerations, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that, even without the aggravating factor of an armed robbery conviction, the jury would have found an absence of mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating factors favoring imposition of the death penalty. Defendant urges the court to apply the rationale of People v. Adams, 109 Ill.2d 102, 92 Ill.Dec. 528, 485 N.E.2d 339 (1985), in vacating defendant's death sentence. We need not rely on Adams, however, since we find that the error alleged by defendant does not withstand harmless error scrutiny.