Opinion ID: 432297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 794's DEATH PENALTY PROVISION

Text: 31 The district court recognized that, after Furman and its progeny, a sentencing authority's discretion to impose the death penalty must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). The district court believed, however, that the constitutional problems with the statute would be cured if it formulated the necessary guidelines limiting its discretion itself, and it proposed to do so when the sentencing stage was reached. In this regard, the district court clearly erred. 32 In Furman, the Supreme Court struck down a death penalty statute that left the decision whether to impose the death penalty to the unfettered discretion of the sentencing authority. In Gregg, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the revised Georgia death penalty statute because the discretion of the sentencing authority to impose the death penalty had by then been suitably limited and guided by the legislature. See also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). The question presented by this case is whether the guidelines plainly required by Gregg and its companion cases must be contained in the statute or may be formulated by the sentencing judge at the time of sentencing. Although this is a question of first impression, the cases cited above leave no room for the argument that the guidelines may be formulated by the judge at the time of sentencing or at any other time. 33 First, it would certainly be anomalous to hold that the guidelines, which are required in order to limit the discretion of a sentencing authority, may be supplied by the sentencing authority itself. Whenever the judge is the sentencing authority, the guidelines would, under the district court's theory, be no limitation at all. The requirement that the discretion be suitably limited and directed clearly requires an external limitation. 34 Moreover, the Court's opinions compel the conclusion that, whether the sentencing authority is the judge or the jury, the guidelines must come from Congress, not from the courts. Gregg is replete with references to the peculiarly legislative character of sentencing determinations, and the particularly limited role of judges in this area: 35 [T]he requirements of the Eighth Amendment must be applied with an awareness of the limited role to be played by courts.... 36 ... [W]e may not act as judges as we might as legislators.... 37 .... 38 [T]he constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards. [I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people. Furman v. Georgia, supra, [408 U.S.] at 383 [92 S.Ct. at 2749] (Burger, C.J., dissenting).... [Specification of punishments] [is] peculiarly [a] question[ ] of legislative policy. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 [78 S.Ct. 1280, 1285, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405] (1958). 39 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174-76, 96 S.Ct. at 2925-27 (plurality opinion). 40 The district judge in this case himself quoted some of the foregoing language for the proposition that Congress's determination that the death penalty is appropriate for some acts of espionage must be given great deference; and, indeed, the Gregg Court employed the language in a similar context. The principles enunciated, however, are just as germane to the question of where the required guidelines must come from. If the will and ... moral values of the people, id. at 175, 96 S.Ct. at 2926, are particularly important in sentencing decisions, and if specification of punishments is therefore peculiarly a legislative function, then specifying the circumstances under which someone may be put to death must also be a function of the elected representatives of the people. It is for that reason that, in finding Georgia's revised procedures constitutional, the Court emphasized that the guidelines were statutory: [Under the revised Georgia procedures, the jury] must find a statutory aggravating circumstance before recommending a sentence of death. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197, 96 S.Ct. at 2936 (emphasis in original). The Court has thus plainly required that guidelines be expressly articulated by the legislature in the statute authorizing the death penalty. See also id. at 192, 96 S.Ct. at 2934 (It seems clear ... that the problem [of unfettered jury discretion to impose the death penalty] will be alleviated if the jury is given guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision. (emphasis added)). 41 The conclusion that the Constitution requires legislative guidelines in death penalty cases is thus inescapable. That is the position not only of petitioner, but also of the government, whose brief on this issue in the district court stated that section 794's death penalty provision is unenforceable and void because it sets forth no legislated guidelines to control the fact-finder's discretion ... (emphasis added). The Department of Justice has long been of the view that Furman rendered section 794's death penalty provision unconstitutional. See Imposition of Capital Punishment: Hearings on S. 1, S. 1400, and S. 1401 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1973) (statement of Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice); To Establish Constitutional Procedures for the Imposition of Capital Punishment: Hearings on S. 1382 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1977) (statement of Mary Lawton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice); Capital Punishment: Hearings on S. 114 Before the Comm. of the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1981) (statement of D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice). Moreover, the Senate has recently passed a bill, supported by the Justice Department, that would authorize the imposition of the death penalty for certain crimes, including espionage. S. 1765, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 Cong. Rec. S1491-93 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1984). 42 In light of the above, we believe it clear that the death penalty provision of the espionage statutes is unconstitutional. It cannot be saved by judicial formulation of the missing, but essential, statutory guidelines.