Opinion ID: 2336953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Stalking in the First Degree

Text: Lowry first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree stalking, under Ark.Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Repl.1997), which provides in pertinent part: (a)(1) A person commits stalking in the first degree if he purposely engages in a course of conduct that harasses another person and makes a terroristic threat with the intent of placing that person in imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury or placing that person in imminent fear of the death or serious bodily injury of his or her immediate family and he: (A) Does so in contravention of an order of protection consistent with the Domestic Abuse Act of 1991, § 9-15-101 et seq., or a no contact order as set out in subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section, protecting the same victim or victims, or any other order issued by any court protecting the same victim or victims; or . . . . (C) Is armed with a deadly weapon or represents by word or conduct that he is so armed. Under this provision, the State was required to prove that Lowry purposely engaged in a course of conduct to harass Sandra Lewellen and made a terroristic threat with the intent of placing her or her immediate family in fear of death or serious bodily injury, and that he did so in contravention of an order of protection or while he was armed with a deadly weapon or represented that he was so armed. Appellant argues that there was insufficient proof that he made a terroristic threat during the time that the order of protection was in effect. The term terroristic threat, is not defined in section 5-71-229, nor has it been defined in this court's cases interpreting that provision. However, we may glean its meaning from prior decisions from this court and the court of appeals interpreting the separate offense of terroristic threatening, Ark.Code Ann. § 5-13-301 (Repl.1997). The conduct prohibited by section 5-13-301 is the communication of a threat with the purpose of terrorizing another. Smith v. State, 296 Ark. 451, 757 S.W.2d 554 (1988). See also Mason v. State, 361 Ark. 357, 206 S.W.3d 869 (2005). However, a terroristic threat need not be verbal. Davis v. State, 12 Ark.App. 79, 670 S.W.2d 472 (1984) (upholding a conviction for terroristic threatening where the defendant chased the victims in a car for over three miles and tried to run them into a ditch). Nor is it necessary that the threat be communicated by the accused directly to the person threatened. Richards v. State, 266 Ark.App. 733, 585 S.W.2d 375 (1979) (upholding a conviction for terroristic threatening where the defendant told a third party that he'd better get the victim away from him or he would shoot the victim). Moreover, it is not necessary that the recipient of the threat actually be terrorized. Smith, 296 Ark. 451, 757 S.W.2d 554 (citing Richards, 266 Ark.App. 733, 585 S.W.2d 375). Finally, there is no requirement that it be shown that the accused has the immediate ability to carry out the threats. Wesson v. State, 320 Ark. 380, 896 S.W.2d 874 (1995); Knight v. State, 25 Ark.App. 353, 758 S.W.2d 12 (1988). In the present case, the evidence demonstrated that following the issuance of the order of protection on May 29, 2002, [2] Lowry engaged in a course of conduct spanning more than two months in which he harassed and threatened Sandra Lewellen and her immediate family on at least three occasions. The first occurred on June 21, 2002, when Lowry apologized to Sandra's teenaged daughter Kim for something that he was going to have to do, and was later overheard by Dustin Tuberville to say, They're going to burn for this shit. Some seven hours later, Sandra and Kim awoke to find their vehicles on fire in their driveway only a few feet from their mobile home. The second threatening event occurred the following day when Lowry chased Kim at a high rate of speed through East End until the girl got close to her home. The third threat occurred on August 7, 2002, when Lowry waited for Sandra to leave for work and then pulled in behind her and proceeded to tailgate her while holding up a handmade sign and while armed with a loaded gun. These three incidents constitute sufficient evidence of a terroristic threat as provided in section 5-71-229. We thus affirm Lowry's conviction for first-degree stalking.