Opinion ID: 771615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hoffman's Fifth Amendment Claim

Text: 46 The Supreme Court decided Estelle v. Smith in 1981, over a decade before Hoffman's conviction became final. In Estelle, a Texas trial court sua sponte ordered the state's attorney to arrange a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 456-57. The defendant was found competent, and, after a jury trial, convicted of murder. See id. at 457. As required by Texas law, a separate proceeding was then undertaken before the same jury to consider whether the defendant should receive the death penalty. See id. at 458. During the sentencing hearing, the state offered the testimony of the court-appointed psychiatrist, who had interviewed the defendant solely for competency purposes, to establish the defendant's future dangerousness. The psychiatrist testified before the jury that the defendant is a very severe sociopath, that he will continue his previous behavior,  that his condition will only get worse, and that he has no remorse or sorrow for what he has done. Id. at 459-60. After hearing the psychiatrist's testimony, the jury imposed the death penalty. See id. 47 The Supreme Court in Estelle concluded that the Fifth Amendment applied to the defendant's interview with the psychiatrist, when the incriminating statements made by the defendant formed the basis of the psychiatrist's testimony, which was considered by the jury in determining the sentence to be imposed on the defendant. Id. at 462-69. The Supreme Court began its Fifth Amendment analysis by noting that the availability of the . . . [Fifth Amendment] privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites. Id. at 462 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then found that the consequence at stake in capital sentencing, the ultimate penalty of death, triggered the constitutional protection of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 462-63. Just as the Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal defendant from being made `the deluded instrument of his own conviction,' it protects him as well from being made the `deluded instrument' of his own execution. Id. at 462 (internal citations omitted). 48 One year later, this court concluded that under Estelle, the Fifth Amendment applied to inculpatory statements made during a presentence interview with a probation officer. See Jones v. Cardwell, 686 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1982) (The reasoning that underlies the decision in Estelle supports application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to the sentencing procedures in the instant case.). We reasoned that although not 49 every encounter between the state and a convicted but unsentenced defendant brings the Fifth Amendment privilege into play. . . . [W]here, as here, the state's agent seeks from the convicted defendant a confession of additional criminal activity and that confession is used to enhance a defendant's sentence, we think it beyond peradventure that the defendant may properly claim the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. 50 Id. 51 Hoffman's claim that his Fifth Amendment privilege applied during the presentence interview is controlled by the Supreme Court's ruling in Estelle that a capital defendant's inculpatory statements made during an interview with a psychiatrist are protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege, and this court's ruling in Jones that a defendant's inculpatory statements made during a presentence interview are protected by the Fifth Amendment when the statements may be used to increase the severity of sentencing. We therefore reject the government's argument that Hoffman's Fifth Amendment claim is barred by Teague, and proceed to consider the claim on the merits. 52 Hoffman's Fifth Amendment claim is undercut by the fact that Hoffman was advised that he could exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during the presentence interview. See Hoffman, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. Hoffman does not argue on appeal that the damaging statements made during the presentence interview were involuntary in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Cf. Jones, 686 F.2d at 757 (holding statements involuntary where probation officer instructed defendant to answer all questions and questioned defendant about additional criminal activity). We conclude that although the Fifth Amendment privilege applies, it was not violated in the circumstance of this particular case.