Opinion ID: 1251439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: mokoli'i island

Text: The directed verdict that title to Mokoli'i Island was in the Bennetts logically depends on the theory that a deed from King Kamehameha III in 1850 conveyed the island to the Bennetts' undisputed predecessor in interest, Gerrit P. Judd. It is undisputed that this deed effectively conveyed to Judd the bulk of the ahupua'a of Kualoa I and Kualoa II (hereinafter collectively referred to as Kualoa). [3] The Bennetts argue that the deed manifests a clear intent to convey Mokoli'i as a part of Kualoa. The City contends, first, that whatever the deed intended, Kamehameha was powerless to convey the island to private parties, and secondly, that even if Kamehameha had the power to convey it, the deed as properly construed does not manifest an intent to convey the island. We consider first whether or not Kamehameha III had the power on November 20, 1850, the date of the deed to Gerrit Judd, to convey Mokoli'i to a private party. The City relies on a Privy Council resolution dated August 29, 1850, which the City interprets as preventing private ownership of offshore islands. The resolution and the council minutes immediately preceding it state: Kekuanaoa on behalf of Victoria [Kamamalu], having asserted her right to participate in the Anchorage dues in certain places, the following Resolution was passed. RESOLVED that the rights of the King as Sovereign extend from high Water Mark to a Marine league to Seaward, and to all Navigable Straits and passages, among the Islands, and no private right can be sustained, except private rights of fishing, and of cutting Stone from the Rocks, as provided for and reserved by law. [4] The City argues that, because Mokoli'i and other offshore islands are within the area extending from high Water Mark to a Marine league to Seaward, ... no private right can be sustained with regard to such islands, except perhaps the right to quarry stone from them. The City has introduced no evidence that the resolution addressed itself to the question of offshore islands. Rather, considering the reference in the council minutes to a dispute over the government's sharing of its anchorage fees with a private landlord (who apparently owned certain fisheries in which ships were being anchored), it is at least as likely that the resolution was intended to deal solely with rights of anchorage, navigation, fishing and coral quarrying [5] in or under the sea. Furthermore, even if the Privy Council clearly intended to prevent private ownership of offshore islands, this court has held that Privy Council resolutions did not have the force of law. [T]he privy council had no power to enact laws. The only power they had ... was to advise the king. Territory v. Liliuokalani, 14 Haw. 88, 91 (1902) (ruling on the same resolution of August 29, 1850). [T]he privy council was a part of the executive branch of the government with powers of an advisory nature... . At no time did the privy council possess legislative powers. In re Title of Pa Pelekane, 21 Haw. 175, 182 (1912). The City's theory that there could be no valid conveyance of offshore islands to private parties is inconsistent with at least one land commission award previously noted by this court and a royal patent grant noted by the United States Supreme Court. In State v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 48 Haw. 152, 153, 397 P.2d 593, 596 (1964), this court referred to the land commission award of Kahaka'aulana Island in Keehi Lagoon, Oahu, to a private party, and we noted that the Territory of Hawaii had conceded in 1941 that the island was privately owned; while in Damon v. Hawaii, 194 U.S. 154, 160, 24 S.Ct. 617, 619, 48 L.Ed. 916 (1904), the Supreme Court indicated that three offshore islands had been included in the royal patent grant of the ahupua'a of Moanalua to a private party: This patent describes the ahupuaa by metes and bounds, and then the granting clause goes on: ... `The islands of Mokumoa, Mokuonini and Mokuoco [ sic ] are a part of Moanalua, and are included in the above area.' [6] The theory that only the government can own offshore islands is also contradicted by the following passage from a letter introduced into evidence by the Bennetts, dated August 17, 1937 and purportedly from R.D. King, Principal Cadastral Engineer ( i.e., principal surveyor), to the [Territorial] Commissioner of Public Lands, in response to a request by the Commissioner for a study of the legal status of a particular sand islet in Kaneohe Bay: A notable instance where the government has granted offshore islands is that on the south coast of Oahu where three islands were included in the boundary certificate and Royal Patent ... of the ahupuaa of Moanalua... . In the case of the crown ahupuaa of Kualoa, the island of Mokolii, just offshore from that land in Kaneohe bay, was specifically included in the deed of Kamehameha III to G.P. Judd ...; and in the case of the crown iliaina of Kawailoa, ahupuaa of Kailua, the island of Popoia in Kailua bay ... was included in the boundary certificate of Kawailoa. Two cases involving offshore islands not specifically mentioned in the original titles, have recently come before the Land Court... . [A]ll the [above-mentioned] offshore islands are located within the sea fisheries which are appurtenant to their neighboring lands, and I think this was one of the factors the [Land] Court took into consideration in rendering its decision in favor of the applicant and against the government... . The probable existence of land commission awards, boundary certificates, royal patents and Land Court decrees all purporting to award private ownership of offshore islands tends to support the Bennetts' position that offshore islands could validly be granted to private parties. More fundamentally, the City's contention that Kamehameha III had no legal authority to convey offshore islands loses sight of the cornerstone proposition that the modern Hawaiian system of land ownership and all Hawaiian land titles proceed from Kamehameha III, the sovereign who instituted Hawaii's Great Mahele. As this court stated in Carter v. Territory, 14 Haw. 465, 470 (1902), rev'd on other grounds, 200 U.S. 255, 26 S.Ct. 248, 50 L.Ed. 470 (1906): Kamehameha III, who ruled the Hawaiian Islands before there was any written laws or Constitution, as well as after the adoption of a written Constitution, was in the fullness of the common law phrase `the universal lord and original proprietor of all lands in his kingdom.' He was the source of title. He could give and take from. His will was law... . [7] Although it is undoubtedly true that certain limitations on the powers of Kamehameha III were self-imposed during the course of his reign, such limitations would have to be clearly expressed and clearly applicable in order for us to find today that an act by that king was void. Because the City has failed to point to any constitutional provision or law depriving Kamehameha III of the power to grant offshore islands, this court finds that he did have such a power. The City's second major argument is that, even if Kamehameha III had the power to convey offshore islands, his deed to Judd does not manifest an intent to convey Mokoli'i. The Bennetts contend that the deed manifests a clear intent to convey the island. The dispute over Kamehameha's intent centers on the following passage, which immediately follows the deed's metes and bounds description of the mainland portion of Kualoa: Then following along upper edge of Pali rock to end of first line run, Including an area of about 622 Acres more or less, and known as the lands of Kualoa first and second also the above described boundaries includes all the sea or fishing grounds adjoining both said lands and the Island called Mokoli. The City construes the last clause of this passage as merely conveying fishing rights in that part of the sea which adjoin[s] both said lands and the Island called Mokoli, i.e., the City contends that Mokoli is mentioned merely as an aid in locating the fishing grounds conveyed. The Bennetts contend that Mokoli is an object of the verb includes, so that the meaning of the passage is that the above described boundaries includes ... the ... fishing grounds adjoining both said lands and the Island called Mokoli. (Emphasis added). We find that the disputed clause, considered solely by itself, is susceptible of both interpretations advanced. However, at the outset we note a common sense presumption that when a small, nearby offshore island is expressly named in an ambiguous clause of a Kamehameha grant whose language can easily and naturally be construed as conveying the island; where the grant conveys a sizeable ahupua'a; and the shoreline of that ahupua'a is only a fraction of a mile from the island [8] and is much closer than any other ahupua'a; [9] and the grant specifically conveys the appurtenant fishing grounds of the ahupua'a; [10] then, in the absence of other facts, it is more likely than not that the intent of the grant was to include the named island as a part of the ahupua'a. [11] This court finds that the trial court was correct in granting a directed verdict in accordance with the Bennetts' construction of the deed. The Bennetts introduced extensive, undisputed evidence strengthening the presumption that conveyance of the island was intended, while the City introduced evidence of only the slightest probative value to rebut the presumption. The sole evidence supporting the City's construction of the deed is the Privy Council resolution discussed supra. The City argues that even if the resolution lacked the force of law, Kamehameha III probably would not have acted contrary to it, since his own Privy Council promulgated it. There would be merit to this argument, if the resolution was in fact intended to limit the ownership of offshore islands by private parties; but, as discussed supra, such an intent is speculative and unclear. Therefore, we find that the resolution does not substantially support the city's construction. In contrast to the City's failure of evidence, the Bennetts produced evidence that the successors to the original parties to the deed have for many years mutually construed the deed to convey Mokoli'i. By direct testimony the Bennetts proved possession of the island, by themselves or their predecessors, under claim of exclusive title, since at least the 1930s. They proved payment of all Territorial and State taxes since at least 1933. They exhibited [Territorial] Senate Resolution No. 24 of 1931 which requested the Commissioner of Public Lands, with the assistance of the Attorney General and the Territorial Surveyor, to ascertain the status of the islands lying offshore from the northeast and east districts of Oahu, and they exhibited the Commissioner's reply, listing the islands in question and stating that [a]ll of these islands, except Mokolii, are claimed by the Territory. (Emphasis added). Similarly, they introduced into evidence the Governor's Executive Order No. 532, dated May 7, 1932, which stated that the Islands along the Northeast coast of Oahu ... as listed were to be set aside as a bird, animal and plant preservation. Mokoli'i was not included in the list of islands. The Bennetts introduced the letter, quoted supra, from the principal cadastral engineer (principal surveyor) of the Territory to the Commissioner of Public Lands, dated August 17, 1937, which stated that [i]n the case of the crown ahupua'a of Kualoa, the island of Mokolii, just offshore from that land ... was specifically included in the deed of Kamehameha III to G.P. Judd... . Even the City and County resolution authorizing condemnation of Mokoli'i, i.e., Resolution No. 357 dated December 1, 1970, specifically stated that Mokoli'i is a portion of the land conveyed by Kamehameha III to G.P. Judd by deed dated November 20, 1850... . In State v. Midkiff, 49 Haw. 456, 492, 421 P.2d 550, 570 (1966), wherein the State and private parties had disputed the boundaries of a land commission award which had described the land solely by its ancient Hawaiian name, this court concluded that [t]here has emerged a pattern of construction by the parties which tips the scale... . (Emphasis added). In State v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 48 Haw. 152, 176, 397 P.2d 593, 607 (1964), which also involved a dispute between the State and private parties over the extent of an imprecise land commission award, this court held that [i]f considered ambiguous, the construction given a deed by the parties to it will be given effect unless it contravenes some rule of law. In the instant case, although the evidence shows only construction by the successors to the original parties, the fact that G.P. Judd's successors and Kamehameha III's successors, including the Territory and the City, have for many years mutually construed the deed as conveying Mokoli'i tends to prove that such construction is the correct one. Taking this evidence in conjunction with the presumption, articulated supra, that an island which is specifically named in a grant and which has a very close geographic relationship to the primary lands granted is probably included in the grant, this court finds that the evidence in this case allows but one inference, namely, that Kamehameha III intended to convey the island to Judd. We affirm the trial court's directed verdict that title to Mokoli'i was in the Bennetts.