Opinion ID: 3012336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing to Assert Privacy Rights

Text: Determining whether a person has a legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched is a fact-bound question, dependent upon the strength of interest in the property and the nature of control that the person exerts over it. United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438, 442 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n. 12 (stating that the right to exclude others is a key factor in determining whether a person’s expectation of privacy is legitimate). We have also noted that where an individual has the owner’s permission to use the property, society surely recognizes this as reasonable. Baker, 221 F.3d at 443 (citation omitted). Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Eiland the non-moving party on summary judgment we conclude that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house at 2117 Jefferson Street. Eiland, with his daughter’s permission, resided in the house she owned for extended periods of time and received mail there. He occasionally paid his daughter rent and did maintenance on the house in exchange for living there. He also left personal possessions in the house and fixed cars on a regular basis in the garage. In the search warrant application and an affidavit prepared for this litigation, Detective Jackson repeatedly stated that Eiland resided at 2117 Jefferson Street and noted that a criminal history check confirmed that fact. We think that Eiland’s expectation of privacy in the house was one that society would recognize as reasonable. Eiland failed, however, to allege an injury in fact to any privacy right he enjoyed. It is critical to note that he did not and does not contest the validity of the search warrant that was executed at the house. His only claim was and is that there was a failure to knock and announce before a forced entry was made. Thus, the question becomes whether the failure to knock and announce impinged upon Eiland’s right to privacy in a way that exceeded the permissible invasion of privacy occasioned by the execution of a valid search warrant. We conclude that it did not. We recognize that protecting one’s interest in privacy is one of the rationales for the knock-and-announce requirement. Indeed, we have noted that the requirement embodies respect for the individual’s right of privacy, which is to be imposed upon as little as possible in making an entry to search or arrest. Kornegay, 120 F.3d at 396. Yet even if we assume that the officers failed to knock and announce their identity, we do not see how that failure impinged upon Eiland’s privacy interests given that he was not at the house at the time of the forced entry. Eiland has alleged nothing that would lead us to a different conclusion.