Opinion ID: 614361
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression Proceedings and Opinions

Text: At the time the U.S. government filed this case against Taxpayers, the Philippine Supreme Court had already held that the raid violated the Philippine Constitution's version of the Fourth Amendment. Stonehill I, 274 F.Supp. at 423-24. The United States did not contend that the NBI's search warrants were lawful under either Philippine or U.S. law, but argued that under the silver platter doctrine the evidence should not be suppressed because United States agents did not instigate or participate in the raid. See id. at 426 (documents seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment should not be suppressed if the illegal search and seizure is made by foreign government officers). The major issue in the suppression motion in the district court was the extent of U.S. participation in the planning and execution of the raid. See id. at 424-25. Taxpayers argued that United States agents, primarily Chandler and Hawley, had sufficiently participated in the planning and execution of the raid to make the silver platter doctrine inapplicable. Taxpayers filed their motion to suppress on March 13, 1967. The hearing on the motion to suppress was held between June 12 and June 23, 1967. Nine witnesses provided live testimony, and testimony was read from numerous depositions. The transcript from the hearing totaled 1,257 pages. Much of the evidence at the suppression hearing came from Hawley's and Chandler's testimony. The district court denied Taxpayers' motion to review all government memoranda concerning the raid, granting them access only to all documents which were made from records seized in the Philippines. However, the government did introduce some internal documents and cables dealing with preparations for the raid, as well as summaries of other documents and cables. It is unclear from the current record exactly what the government disclosed, but it was likely a small percentage of what is now available. Included in the documentary evidence introduced by Taxpayers were two pages of paper containing notes about sites that the NBI should raid. Some of the notes were in Chandler's handwriting. These pages were part of a set of photographs, maps, and notes of raid sites. These pages were not provided by the United States but, rather, had been leaked to Taxpayers by someone in the NBI. We refer to these documents as the Picture Folder, which we discuss in detail below. We begin by describing the most important testimony by Hawley and Chandler. We then describe the district court's findings concerning the history of U.S. involvement in the raid, and our conclusions on appeal in 1968. We then describe Taxpayers' subsequent motions to suppress.
Hawley's testimony was introduced through his deposition, which had been taken on January 17, 18, and 31, 1967. The parties have introduced relatively small selections of Hawley's deposition into the record before us in the current proceeding. We describe those selections, and fill in some details based on descriptions in the district court's 1967 opinion and our 1968 opinion. Hawley served as Legal Attache at the American Embassy in the Philippines starting in August 1961. Spielman met with Hawley alone on December 14, 15, and 16, 1961. Most of the information Spielman gave to Hawley concerned violations of Philippine law. Hawley testified, however, that some of Spielman's evidence suggested violations of U.S. law. For example, Spielman told Hawley that Stonehill, together with his agent Ira Blaustein in New York, had mislabeled a machine used to slit cigarette paper in order to pay the lower Philippine import duty for agricultural machinery. Such mislabeling would have constituted a violation of the U.S. Bill of Lading Act. Hawley reported this potential violation to Washington. Hawley testified that he concluded that the majority of potential violations of U.S. law were tax law violations. Hawley therefore suggested that Spielman meet Chandler. See Stonehill I, 274 F.Supp. at 421. Hawley and Chandler together met Spielman on December 18, 20, and 23, 1961. Chandler and Hawley eventually convinced Spielman to talk to Philippine authorities. Stonehill II, 405 F.2d at 741. The first such meeting occurred on January 27, 1962. Present at the meeting were Lukban, Damaso Nocon (Lukban's righthand man), Spielman, Chandler, and Hawley. We describe these meetings in detail in discussing Chandler's testimony. Hawley testified that during the period before the raid, Lukban provided him with copies of wiretaps the NBI had placed on Taxpayers. Hawley testified that he had not asked for these transcripts and that he stopped receiving wiretap transcripts after the raid. He also testified that he showed Chandler some of the wiretaps and technical surveillance reports that Lukban had made available to him. Hawley testified that at some time prior to February 24, 1962, the date the raid was originally scheduled, Secretary Diokno had casually mentioned to him that the raid had been planned. Hawley testified that he had no specific knowledge concerning what was going to be raided, and that Diokno had not asked him for his recommendations as to locations that the NBI should raid. He also testified that he did not ask Diokno to provide him with any information that the NBI recovered in the raid. The raid was postponed. Hawley testified that he had not been told of the postponement. He remember[ed] wondering why by the following Monday, I hadn't seen anything in the paper about [the raid]. Further, Hawley testified that he was never told the final date for the raid. He was asked, On March 3, you didn't know anything about the raids? He responded, No. He testified that he had scheduled a party for March 4. Even on the day of the raid he had no idea of any kind of projected raids or anything. The night of the raid he was home with his wife after spending some time at the office. He testified that he first learned of the raid in the Sunday copy of The Manila Times the day after the raid. He had the following exchange with Stonehill's counsel: Q. When did you first find out that Stonehill was arrested and that the raids had taken place? A. I think it was in the Sunday paper, the Manila Times. Q. That was when you found out and that was delivered to you in the morning when you woke up? A. Yes. Q. At that time, you knew nothing about either the raids or Stonehill's arrest until the time you read it in the Times? A. No. Q. What was your reaction? A. Interested that it had come about. Q. You knew it was planned, actually? You knew it was? A. Yes, but I had no positive date at all. Q. You had no positive date? A. No.
Chandler testified in person at the suppression hearing. He testified that he was assigned to examine Stonehill's 1958 tax return in 1960. He testified that the only time he saw a wiretap transcript was in December 1961, and that Hawley showed it to him. Much of Chandler's testimony included in the record on appeal in 1968 focused on his activity coordinating communications between Spielman and Lukban, and his activity during the days surrounding the raid. Chandler testified that the initial meetings between Lukban and Spielman took place at Chandler's home. Chandler said that Spielman requested that the meetings be there because Spielman wouldn't go near a Philippine government office at that time. Hawley and Diokno attended the meetings once or twice. Chandler testified that he did not set the date for the raid, and that he had not been asked to participate in the raid or to assign any agent to the raid. He was told the date of the raid would be February 24 by someone in the NBI, probably Nocon. During cross-examination, Chandler was asked a series of questions about whether he saw any pictures of potential raid sites. At this point in the hearing neither Chandler nor the government knew that the defense had part of the Picture Folder. Chandler first testified that he had never himself taken or had others take any pictures of the buildings to be raided. Chandler and Taxpayers' attorney then had the following exchange: Q. Mr. Chandler, did you ever see any pictures of any of the locations at which the raids were to be made? A. I don't remember. I hadit seems to me that I had heard the NBI had photographed some of thehad made some photographs. I don't recall whether I ever saw them. Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Chandler, that the NBI made picture folders of each of the locations to be made, and showed them to you? A. I don't recall seeing pictures, no. Q. But you do have some recollection of the NBI taking pictures? A. Yes, I have a recollection that they did do Q. Did you recollect that you were told that by Mr. Danny Nocon? A. I think probably Danny, yes. They continued on the same subject shortly thereafter: Q. Do you recall seeing some files or documents which were called picture folders on March 2? A. I don't recall seeing pictures, and yet I may have. Q. But you are clear A. I may have seen these pictures at some time . . . [b]ut I wouldn't recall if it was March 2nd. Q. But you are clear that any pictures you saw would have been made by the NBI? A. Oh, yes. Taxpayers' attorney then asked Chandler if he had ever made a sketch of several of the buildings to be raided and had given that sketch to Nocon or another NBI agent. Chandler said he may have helped Spielman make a sketch, but he would not have made one on his own. If there were such a sketch, he would have given it to Spielman, not directly to the NBI. Taxpayers then introduced the parts of the Picture Folder in their possession. This consisted of two pages. The first page was divided into three parts. The bottom two parts each contained a sketched floor plan of a building. There were five circled numbers identifying various locations within the two buildings. The top part of the paper had five instructions, which corresponded to the five circled numbers. Next to number one was written, Check cigarette case for stamps. Next to number two was written, Check dummy wall for door. Next to number three was written, Rolls of paper t/b checkedis it actually cigarette paper for slitting[?] Next to number four was written, Check closely all items + area for stamps. Next to number five was written, Check all packing material for stamps. The second page consisted solely of writing and was titled, U.S. Tobacco Co. Picture Folder. It included a list of circled numbers, one through twenty, with comments after the numbers. These comments each seemed to correspond to something different, perhaps to a different picture. For example, next to number one was written, No comment. Next to number two was written, Motor Pool, no significance. Next to number four was written, Goodyear Bldg.John Brook's Confiscate records in separate small adjoining bldg.This is bldg. from which John Brooks carried stamps at night. Next to number nine was written, Goodrich Bldg.Chambon Slitting Machine + Evening News Newsprint supply. Chandler testified that although he had no recollection of preparing these documents, the handwriting on both pieces of paper was his. He testified that the language is Spielman's language. When asked why he would be preparing such a document for an informer, Chandler responded, Spielman was an unusual individual. He pestered the life out of you on things and I figured on something of that nature, I don't know what reason he would have given me, why I should write it down rather than he should write it down, because it was his information. The following three exchanges provide a sense of Chandler's testimony during cross-examination concerning the Picture Folders: Q. Does this language [instructions to check several places from the first piece of paper] recall to you that you did give instructions to the NBI prior to the raids or advice? A. Well, I did relay somedid help Spielman get some of his information to them, because they didn't understand each other. Q. And you did this to help with the raiders, is that correct? A. I presume that would probably be used in the raids, yes. A second exchange was: Q. Now, I call your attention that each of these items I read on the first sheet, Check, check, check, check, and one that says To be checked, I think that is what it means, are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and these numbers are placed in certain areas on these diagrammatic sketches of the buildings. Are these numbers in your handwriting also? A. Yes, those numbers are in mine. Q. So, in other words, those numbers were placed on these three sheets by you. Does that refresh your recollection to the effect that you were trying to specify for the NBI exactly where the places were that the agents and team leaders were to go? A. Well, undoubtedly I was trying to set down Spielman's information. In the third exchange, the questions are coming from the court: Q. Now, can you tell me, how did you know that location 1 was a place to be checked for stamps, location 2 was a dummy wall, location 5 was packing material, how did you know all of that? A. I had listened to Mr. Spielman talk about that for weeks, this type of thing. Q. And you mean to say you got all your information about this building and these locations from Mr. Spielman? A. Yes, your Honor. Q. You never made any personal investigation of these buildings? A. No, your honor. He had told me this many times, he had told the NBI people many times. . . . But it might be exactly an example of what I am speaking of, they did not understand [him], even though he talked with them, just the same as he did with me. On redirect, Chandler further explained that, although he did not specifically remember making these drawings, he often served as a liaison between Spielman and the NBI. There was not altogether rapport between [Spielman] and the NBI. I might have helped him to do something. He might have sketched this out and I might have done some of the writing. Chandler testified that he could not have drawn the diagrams without Spielman because he had never been to the buildings they depicted. Returning to the days surrounding the raid, Chandler testified that late on the night of March 2, the night before the raid, Nocon came to Chandler's house and told him Lukban would like Chandler to come to his house. Chandler testified that he followed Nocon to Lukban's house, where Lukban's associates were preparing search warrants. While there, Chandler asked if they had included the Army and Navy Club as a raid point. Nocon said they had not included the Army and Navy Club, and Chandler persuaded them to do so. Chandler testified that he gave no other advice to Lukban and made no requests of him. Chandler testified that he did not visit the Army and Navy Club that night with an NBI officer, but went straight home from Lukban's house. Chandler testified that on the day of the raid he, along with William Ragland and Bill Reynolds, IRS agents who had recently arrived in Manila, went to an area across the street from the NBI headquarters that Lukban had designated as the place they should wait during the raid. That evening, at around 10 p.m., Lukban called them and said that they had hit the jack pot. He invited them to come to his office in the NBI headquarters. Chandler testified that he saw boxes throughout the headquarters building. While Chandler, Ragland, and Reynolds were with Lukban, an NBI agent reported that they had just seized a tremendous quantity of records and requested help sorting them. Lukban asked if Chandler, Ragland, and Reynolds would help the agent. They followed the agent to a location in the port area. When the three men arrived, they identified the documents they thought were important and placed them in a carton for the NBI to take back to headquarters. Chandler testified that he had felt that this business was rather disorganized. Thus, on the way back from the port out of curiosity I went up to the main office, drove up to the main office of the U.S. Tobacco Corporation, to see whether that was equally disorganized. Ragland and Reynolds remained in the jeep, and Chandler went into the office. Chandler testified that once in the office, he pointed out to NBI agents a back room area that the agents should search. Stonehill II, 405 F.2d at 742. Chandler testified that on the Monday after the raid, March 5, Lukban brought Chandler, Reynolds, and Ragland to the NBI building. Lukban gave them a place to work and made some records available. Once Reynolds and Ragland started work, Chandler left.
The district court denied Taxpayers' motion to suppress on October 16, 1967. Stonehill I, 274 F.Supp. at 420. The district court made the following factual findings. Spielman initially went to Hawley with documents he had obtained from U.S. Tobacco. Id. at 421. Hawley and Chandler eventually convinced Spielman to speak with Lukban. Id. For some time before Colonel Lukban's interview with Mr. Spielman, the [NBI] had been engaged in gathering evidence concerning the activities of Stonehill and Brooks. Id. Lukban eventually decided to proceed with the raid, despite the fact that Chandler negated any procedure which included raiding. [1] Id. at 421-22. The NBI then consummated raid plans, and because Colonel Lukban and Robert Chandler were friends, some of the [raid planning] meetings were held in the home of Robert Chandler. Id. at 422. The court found that at one of the various meetings of members of the [NBI] (at which Robert Chandler was also present) the premises to be raided were mentioned, and Robert Chandler inquired whether the Army and Navy Building was included on the list of premises to be searched. Id. Learning that it was not, he suggested that it be included, and it eventually was included. Id. Sometime during the investigation, a diagram of certain of Stonehill's companies was drawn by Robert Chandler . . . , together with a memorandum. . . . The diagram and memorandum thereafter came into possession of the [NBI]. Id. The court found that during the planning meetings Lukban had promised Robert Chandler that he, Chandler, would be permitted to examine and copy documents and records which the [NBI] obtained in connection with defendants' activities and the activities of their various corporations. Id. On the day of the raid, Chandler, Reynolds, and Ragland were stationed at a small temporary structure. Id. They waited until 10:00 p.m. that evening, at which point Lukban contacted them and requested that they come to his office. Id. They went to his office, at which point Chandler requested permission to copy or photograph some of the records and documents, [but] his request to copy or photograph them was denied. Id. The NBI said they would not allow copying until the NBI had inventoried the items. Id. Chandler was allowed to copy documents the next day. Id. The district court held that Chandler had neither instigated nor participated in the raid. The court concluded that the NBI had defendants under investigation before Chandler did anything. Id. at 424. It concluded, further, that neither Chandler nor any other official participated in, was present at, or a party to the raid. Knowledge of the raid on its own, the court held, was insufficient to require suppression. Id.
We affirmed in a 2-1 opinion on December 9, 1968. Stonehill II, 405 F.2d at 738. The majority opinion largely reiterated the factual findings of the district judge. One key difference, however, was that in discussing the selections of the Picture Folder that Taxpayers had introduced, the majority concluded that the diagram prepared by Chandler of one premises and a memorandum prepared by him on another inadvertently fell into the hands of the NBI. They were not intended as directions to the NBI. Id. at 741 (emphasis added). The district court had found that the NBI had obtained the Picture Folder selections, but had not decided whether they had been inadvertently or intentionally provided to the NBI. The majority also discussed the incident, not mentioned by the district court, in which Chandler accompanied an NBI agent to the warehouse after the raid to help the NBI agent sort the files. Id. at 742. It also discussed the incident in which Chandler, after helping the NBI agent sort the files, drove to the U.S. Tobacco headquarters and asked the NBI agent in charge if they had found the record storage room Spielman had told both Chandler and the NBI about. The NBI agent did not seem to know about it and asked Chandler to point it out. Chandler stepped into the office, pointed out generally the location of the record storage area, and left. Id. The majority agreed with the district court's conclusions, specifically focusing on the following six factual findings: 1) No United States agent selected any evidence for use in a United States investigation or prosecution. . . . [T]he raids were initiated and planned by Philippine officers before United States agents became involved; the sole purpose of the raids was to obtain evidence for Philippine proceedings. 2) All activities of United States agents in connection with the raids took place before the raids commenced or after their termination. 3) Only after the raids were completed and the documents catalogued were the United States agents given permission to copy documents. . . . 4) There is no evidence that any United States agents were attempting to shortcircuit the Fourth Amendment rights of the taxpayers. . . . 5) The United States agents clearly objected to the raids, asking that the raids either not take place or at least that they be postponed. 6) When the United States agents made Spielman's information available to the Philippine authorities, they were not requesting any action whatsoever, much less instigating an unlawful search. Id. at 746. Judge Browning wrote an emphatic dissent. He first noted that the Philippine Supreme Court had already concluded that the raid violated the Philippine Constitution's equivalent of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 747 (Browning, J., dissenting). Judge Browning noted that the American agents contributed to the raid in at least these respects: They brought Spielman and his information to the attention of the Philippine authorities, and, as the majority finds, finally persuaded Spielman to meet with them. Chandler made his home available to the NBI for meetings with Spielman, and for the planning and preparation of the raids. Chandler attended these meetings. In the course of relaying information from Spielman to the NBI, Chandler prepared a diagram and a memorandum of two of the premises to be raided. Chandler suggested an additional location to be raided; and his suggestion was adopted. Chandler, prior to the raids, secured permission from Colonel Lukban to examine and copy records seized in the raids. After the raids had begun, Chandler and his two assistants, at Colonel Lukban's request, went to one of the premises being searched, and pointed out the significant books and records to be seized. From this search location the three American agents, on their own initiative, went to another. There Chandler inquired whether the NBI agents had found a records storage room which Spielman had mentioned, and upon discovering that they had not, Chandler pointed out the location of the storage room to the NBI agent in charge. Id. at 749-50 (footnotes omitted). Judge Browning criticized the majority for its pallid and somewhat misleading description of the relevant incidents. Id. at 750 n. 19. He noted that Chandler, after helping the NBI agent sort the documents, did not leave right away. He examined bobbins of cigarette paper (thought to have been illegally imported by Stonehill) in the warehouse, when the agent didn't seem to be familiar with the thing at all, and told the agent that he probably better check with Colonel Lukban. Id. Furthermore, at the U.S. Tobacco headquarters, Chandler not only told the agent to search a back room, but also showed him where the room was in the building. Id. at 750 n. 20. Finally, Judge Browning emphasized the inadequacy of the trial court's findings, and pointed out that the majority filled the gaps with questionable factfinding of its own. Id. at 752. The district court had made no finding whether the purpose of the raid was to obtain evidence for use in an American tax prosecution. Yet the majority specifically found that the purpose of the raid was to uncover violations of Philippine law, not to obtain evidence for the United States agents. Id. Judge Browning concluded that there was substantial evidence suggesting that the majority incorrectly characterized the purpose of the raid. Id. He also criticized the majority's finding that the diagram Chandler drew of the buildings to be raided inadvertently fell into the NBI's hands and was not intended to provide directions to the NBI, noting that the trial court had found only that the document had ended up in the NBI's possession. Id. at 753-54. Judge Browning pointed out that there was no evidence that its transfer to the NBI was, in fact, inadvertent. Id. at 754. Judge Browning concluded that [a]t the very least . . . reconsideration by the trial court is plainly required. Id. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Stonehill v. United States, 395 U.S. 960, 89 S.Ct. 2102, 23 L.Ed.2d 747 (1969).
In February 1971, Taxpayers filed a renewed motion to suppress based on newly discovered evidence. United States v. Stonehill, 420 F.Supp. 46, 51 (C.D.Cal. 1976) (Stonehill III) . The motion was based largely on an affidavit of Damaso Nocon, Lukban's right-hand man. Nocon's affidavit, executed in November 1970, told a very different story from that told by Hawley and Chandler. Nocon stated that he was an NBI Special Agent and that part of his job was to maintain[ ] liaison with agencies of the United States Government operating in the Philippines. Taxpayers introduced a copy of Nocon's Special Agent ID. Nocon stated that in 1961 Hawley began expressing interest in Stonehill. Nocon stated that [b]ecause of Mr. Hawley's interest, and upon instructions of the NBI Director I commenced tapping Mr. Stonehill's telephones. Nocon turned these transcripts over to Hawley. Nocon further stated that Chandler told him he was interested in making a tax case against Stonehill, and hoped to obtain Philippine assistance in gathering evidence in the Philippines. Nocon stated that Chandler told him that after talking with Spielman he felt he could make a case against Taxpayers, but that he needed more documentary evidence. Nocon stated that he met with Chandler and Hawley on an almost daily basis and talked to Chandler at least four or five times a day. They discussed and laid plans for the raids, and Chandler reviewed all information so the NBI would be certain of raiding all places where any documents might be located. Together, we made a comprehensive list of these locations. Nocon described a meeting at the Philippine Columbian Club on February 6, 1962, attended by Hawley, Chandler, Secretary Diokno, Spielman, and Nocon. Nocon stated that Chandler told Secretary Diokno that the raid would receive full U.S. backing and that special U.S. agents would be flown over to assist in the raid. Chandler also stated that he would try to arrange a meeting between Diokno and Attorney General Kennedy. Nocon further stated that [a]t Chandler's request the NBI made photographs of all target areas for the raid. After this had been done, Chandler and Nocon reviewed the photographs together, and Chandler gave instructions in writing for what to do in each place. Nocon stated that because the NBI had never before been involved in massive raids of this kind, its officials relied heavily on Mr. Chandler's apparent expertise. Nocon also described Chandler's suggestion that they add the Army and Navy Club to the warrants, but stated that Chandler and Nocon went to see the Army and Navy Club together after leaving Lukban's house. Finally, Nocon stated that Chandler made a house available for the NBI to store the seized documents for free, provided, however, that he be given exclusive use of a separate room for photo-copying the seized documents. In response, the United States submitted an affidavit by Colonel Lukban, dated March 2, 1971. Lukban stated that he found Nocon's affidavit inaccurate, misleading and false in a number of its allegations. He stated that Nocon was not a special agent because he did not have the educational qualifications. He said Nocon was his confidential agent. Nocon had no official duties or an official position which called for him to maintain liaison with foreign governments and police agencies. Nocon never made a telephone tap for the NBI as he says in his affidavit, although he may well have made some typewritten transcripts from records. However, his function was strictly that of typing. Lukban further stated that Nocon lied about Chandler's requests for help: I was in charge of the Stonehill investigation, not Mr. Nocon, and I was in charge of all the preparation for the raids, not Mr. Nocon nor anybody else. There were no joint preparations, US-Philippine, for the raids nor was there any joint strategy for the raids. I ordered the investigations into Stonehill's affairs long prior to meeting Spielman solely for purposes of Philippine law enforcement and I ordered the raids on Stonehill's businesses under the authority of then Secretary of Justice, Jose Diokno, with the sanction of President Macapagal, solely for the purposes of Philippine law enforcement. These raids were not a joint effort between Philippine authorities and United States authorities and the raids were not made because of any request by United States authorities or for the purpose of helping United States authorities in any investigation of theirs. Lukban stated that, although he let Chandler see the documents, it was not because Chandler had negotiated a deal. Rather, it was because Lukban believed then and now that there should be cooperation and pooling of information among the various police agencies of the world. He stated that the NBI had conducted large-scale raids in the past, and did not need to rely on, and had not relied on, Chandler's expertise in preparing for the Stonehill raid. The district court denied Taxpayers' Renewed Motion on May 26, 1971. Stonehill III, 420 F.Supp. at 51. Taxpayers filed a Motion for Reconsideration in August 1971. Id. In response the government submitted more evidence. In an affidavit filed September 16, 1971, John McCarthy, the government's lawyer throughout the litigation, stated that he had asked Powers, the IRS representative in Manila, to look into Nocon's status with the NBI. McCarthy stated that Powers had reported that Lukban told him that Nocon was never a Special Agent of the NBI, though Lukban gave Nocon an ID card (which had been introduced by Taxpayers) for his protection so he could legally carry a firearm. Powers told McCarthy that Lukban told him that Nocon was merely an informer and he is not qualified educationally speaking to become a Special Agent of the N.B.I. In the attachments to his affidavit, McCarthy included a certification from the then-current NBI Director that Nocon does not appear in any of the NBI's payroll history, and that he served only as a Confidential Agent to Lukban, paid out of Lukban's discretionary funds. The government also submitted several other documents suggesting that Nocon had never worked directly for the NBI. After hearing oral argument, the court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on November 11, 1971. Id. In May 1975, in connection with the litigation of the substantive tax assessment issues, Taxpayers filed a second Renewed Motion to Suppress, arguing that new evidence discovered since 1968 required suppression. Id. In addition to the evidence just discussed, Taxpayers had Nocon's deposition, taken on September 4, 1974. Nocon testified that Lukban had appointed him the direct liaison with Chandler. He said that the planning of the raid was a joint venture from the very beginning. He further testified that technical surveillance of Stonehill started in the early 1960s based on instructions from the FBI's Tokyo office. The district court denied this motion, and rejected Taxpayers' substantive tax law claims, on July 23, 1976. Stonehill III, 420 F.Supp. at 46. Ironically, given that litigation was to continue for an additional thirty-five years, the district judge began by lamenting the many hundreds of thousands of dollars that had been spent litigating the case, the more than 35 separate court sessions that had been held, and the work put in by the three district court judges who had been assigned to the case at various times. Id. at 51. He also noted the difficulty caused by the unavailability or noncooperation of important witnesses, including Stonehill and Brooks who refused to appear, as well as the allegations of misconduct by both sides. Id. The court then addressed Taxpayers' two new arguments. First, based on Nocon's testimony, Taxpayers argued that U.S. officials were actively investigating Taxpayers much earlier than previous evidence had showed, and that Philippine authorities were acting at the direction of U.S. officials. Id. at 52. The district court found that Nocon's testimony was not credible, and concluded that the NBI conducted the raid for the purposes of Philippine law enforcement. Id. at 52-53. Second, Taxpayers argued that the government's evidence came from illegal wiretaps. Id. at 53. The district court concluded that even if the wiretaps had been illegal, they were NBI wiretaps that had been installed in the course of the NBI's own investigation. Id. It noted that the only evidence to the contrary came from Nocon, whom the court did not believe. Id.