Opinion ID: 550158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is SNEA a proper party?

Text: 51 The State argues that SNEA is not a proper party in this action because employees are the only parties authorized to bring suit for violations of FLSA under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b). 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b) states in pertinent part: 52 Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages..... 53 An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employees shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b). 54 In 1947, Congress amended the FLSA to limit the parties who could bring suit under the FLSA in the Portal-to-Portal amendments. 61 Stat. 87 (1947). The Portal-to-Portal amendments barred unions from bringing representative actions for employees who were union members under Sec. 16(b). Arrington v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., Inc., 531 F.Supp. 498, 500 (D.D.C.1982). Congress specifically intended to bar representative actions: But the second class of cases, namely, cases in which an outsider, perhaps someone who is desirous of stirring up litigation without being an employee at all, is permitted to be the plaintiff in the case, may result in some decidedly unwholesome champertous situations which we think should not be permitted under the law. Arrington, 531 F.Supp. at 501 (quoting 93 Cong.Rec. 2182 (Remarks of Senator Donnell)) (footnote omitted). Section 16(b) was designed to eradicate the problem of totally uninvolved employees [sic] gaining recovery as a result of some third party's action in filing suit. Id. at 502. 55 An individual employee cannot become a party to an action under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b) unless he or she specifically files a consent form with the district court. Partlow v. Jewish Orphans' Home of Southern Cal., 645 F.2d 757, 758 (9th Cir.1981) (Under the FLSA, a member of the class who is not individually named in the complaint is not a party to the lawsuit unless he affirmatively 'opts in' by filing a written consent with the court. 29 U.S.C. Secs. 216(b), 256); see also, United States v. Cook, 795 F.2d 987, 990 (Fed.Cir.1986). 56 We have never directly addressed this issue of whether a representative can sue on behalf of its members under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b). However, in Silverton v. Valley Transit Center, 140 F.Supp. 709 (S.D.Cal.1955), aff'd 249 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.1957), the district court held that because representative actions were barred, plaintiff could not bring an action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b) as the Secretary of Teamsters Local No. 898 on behalf of the union. Id. at 710. We upheld the district court in Silverton on other grounds. 249 F.2d at 409. But cf., Abbott, supra (plaintiff was Virginia Beach Benevolent Police Association); Jacksonville Professional Firefighters Assoc. Local 2691 v. City of Jacksonville, 685 F.Supp. 513 (E.D.N.C.1988) (plaintiff was firefighters' union). 57 In the case at bar, the plaintiffs who filed consent to participate in the action were plaintiffs Jerman, Skomski, Pierce, and Rose. No other members of SNEA filed consent forms in the district court to join the action. Although SNEA is not a union, it is clearly a representative, and this action brought by SNEA is the type of representative action barred by Sec. 16(b). See Arrington v. Nat'l Broadcasting Corp., Inc., 531 F.Supp. at 501. Moreover, the individual members of SNEA cannot participate in this action as plaintiffs, even when represented by SNEA, because they did not file individual consent forms stating their intention to participate in the action, as required by Sec. 16(b). Therefore, SNEA is barred from participating in this action as a plaintiff. 58 SNEA argues that SNEA has standing to assert the claims of its members who are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the acts of defendants. Brief of the Appellees at 12. A plaintiff has standing if he or she has alleged a personal stake in the litigation to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261, 97 S.Ct. 555, 561, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (cites omitted). A plaintiff must allege that he or she has suffered actual injury. Id. The injury may be indirect, but it must be fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant. Id. 59 The Supreme Court has supported the standing of an organization acting as plaintiff on behalf of its members where the members have alleged a personal injury. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973) (organization comprised of parties who were injured by adverse impact of Interstate Commerce Commission's actions alleged sufficient personal injury to withstand motion to dismiss for lack of standing); but cf., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (Sierra Club lacked standing to contest change in use of national park because there was no allegation of individualized harm to itself or its members). Although individual members of SNEA clearly have standing to bring this suit, the clear language and legislative history of Sec. 16(b) indicate that SNEA itself cannot be a party in this action. Thus, the issue of standing is irrelevant. Furthermore, even if individual members of SNEA have standing to bring suit under the FLSA, the individual members cannot proceed unless they file a form of consent with the district court. 60 Therefore, we REVERSE the award of attorney's fees to SNEA and REMAND to the District Court to determine the correct amount of attorney's fees for the individually named plaintiffs only. We also REVERSE the award of backpay to any individuals who did not file a consent form in the district court in this action. 61 AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART.