Opinion ID: 609734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: comments by the prosecution

Text: 100 Boisoneau alleges that he was unfairly prejudiced by improper comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument. First, Boisoneau challenges the following passage from the prosecutor's rebuttal argument at the close of the case, in which the prosecutor sought to justify the government's $250,000 payment to Scott in exchange for his cooperation: 101 What did the government know before Jeffrey Scott walked into the [DEA] in contrast to what the government knew as a result of Jeffrey Scott's cooperation? And even on pure dollars and cents, consider the amount of forfeitures, the seizures that it led to. But go beyond that, because if you do a cost benefit analysis you must also consider the cost that was saved to society by dismantling an operation like the one you've heard about here.... 102 Boisoneau made no objection to these remarks during trial, and our review is therefore limited to plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 103 Boisoneau now argues that the prosecutor's statement was an improper allusion to facts not in the evidence, namely, to some actual cost-benefit analysis commissioned by the government showing the advantages and disadvantages of the payment to Scott. These remarks do not suggest to us that some actual cost-benefit analysis was undertaken: they are nothing more than an argument, using the latest fashionable jargon, that the payment was reasonable in light of the results obtained. The prosecutor's own language--if you do a cost benefit analysis--shows that he was merely suggesting a way for the jury to look at the payment. 104 Boisoneau also objects to the prosecutor's statement in closing that the trial judge alone would determine the sentences for each of the cooperating witnesses, and that the jury therefore should not think that the witnesses were getting a walk. Boisoneau points out that in fact the government had dismissed, or elected not to assert, numerous criminal charges against many of the cooperating witnesses and also had promised to make motions for downward departures with respect to certain witnesses. Therefore, Boisoneau argues, the government in fact had far more significant influence on the witnesses' ultimate sentences than the prosecutor's disclaimers would suggest. 105 We agree that the prosecutor's statement told only half the story, but it is usually the function of opposing counsel to remind the jury of the other half. Indeed, witnesses are normally cross-examined as to just such inducements. Perhaps in some instances a prosecutor's incomplete version of events might involve so much distortion that a cautionary instruction by the trial judge would be required. In this instance, no objection was made at the trial nor any instruction sought, and there is no plain error here in the court's failure to give such an instruction sua sponte. We have similarly examined Boisoneau's other claims of prejudicial error arising out of the prosecutor's closing arguments and find them unpersuasive. 106 Nor do we see any merit in Thompson's suggestion that the prosecutor's closing argument contained improper vouching for the government's witnesses. The line between the legitimate argument that a witness's testimony is credible and improper vouching is often a hazy one, to be policed by the trial court in the first instance. See United States v. Martin, 815 F.2d 818, 822-23 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825, 108 S.Ct. 89, 98 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987). Here, at worst the challenged remarks--for example, the prosecutor's statement that [t]he testimony of the witnesses in this case is well corroborated ... [a]nd as a result, you know that the witness's testimony is true--fell in the grey area. Thompson did not object to the remarks at trial when a curative instruction might have been given, and we think that is the end of the matter.