Opinion ID: 672300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Negotiability of the Second Group of Proposals

Text: 28 Not every proposal that is at issue on review was outside the jurisdiction of the interest arbitrator. Proposals 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 27, 43, and 45 were properly before the interest arbitrator because the parties negotiated to impasse over each one of these issues. 3 In its decision, the Authority resolved challenges to the negotiability of these proposals after the Agency head disapproved the arbitrator's award. We now review the Authority's negotiability determinations with respect to these proposals, and those we sustain as negotiable will remain part of the parties' agreement.
29 Proposals 1, 2, 5, and 6 define the following terms: performance elements, performance standards, rating official, performance, and critical element. Each of these terms is already defined by government-wide regulations, promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). See 5 C.F.R. Secs. 430.203, 432.103 (1993). Relying, in part, on the Union's statement of intent that none of the definitions would be applied in a manner inconsistent with statutory or regulatory provisions, the Authority held that each of the definitional proposals was negotiable. We disagree. 30 The FSLMRS clearly forbids bargaining over government-wide regulations. Section 7117(a)(1) states that the duty to bargain in good faith shall ... extend to matters which are the subject of any rule or regulation only if the rule or regulation is not a Government-wide rule or regulation. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7117(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). It is irrelevant that the Union claims that its definitional proposals will be consistent with the OPM regulations. Indeed, there can be no assurance of this, because, if the parties disagree over the implementation of any of these proposals in the future, such disputes will be resolved in grievance arbitration; and it is unclear whether the Agency would have any reasonable recourse if an arbitrator construed a provision in a way to make it inconsistent with OPM regulations. The simple point here is that OPM has established government-wide definitions for performance appraisal terms, and the parties are statutorily prohibited from altering those regulations through negotiation. Therefore, we reverse the Authority and hold proposals 1, 2, 5, and 6 are nonnegotiable.
31 Proposal 27 requires that, in order to be valid, a complaint against a bargaining unit member must be reduced to writing and the complainant ... identified. Negotiability Order, J.A. 453. The Union argues that the Authority erred when it declared proposal 27 nonnegotiable, because the proposal constitutes a negotiable procedure under section 7106(b)(2), or, alternatively, a negotiable appropriate arrangement under section 7106(b)(3). The Authority held that proposal 27 was not a negotiable procedure or an appropriate arrangement because it directly interfered with the Agency's right to discipline its employees--which is a right excluded from bargaining under section 7106(a)(2)(A)--by restricting a type of evidence the agency may use to evaluate an employee's performance. Id. We agree, and reject the Union's arguments on this point. 32
33 While section 7106(a)(2)(A) preserves management's right to discipline its employees, section 7106(b)(2) permits bargaining over procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exercising those rights. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7106(b)(2) (1988). Caselaw holds that a procedural proposal is nonnegotiable if it directly interferes with management's disciplinary rights. See Customs Serv. v. FLRA, 854 F.2d 1414, 1418 (D.C.Cir.1988). The Union insists that proposal 27 itself does not interfere with management's rights, relying on the following dicta in Department of Treasury v. FLRA, 960 F.2d 1068 (D.C.Cir.1992): 34 If the only procedures that qualify under [section 7106(b)(2) ] are those that an agency can violate without fear of a sanction interfering with substantive management rights, then negotiable procedures would seem virtually unenforceable, and paragraph (b)(2) would then lack real content. 35 Id. at 1071. This statement in Department of Treasury is true enough, but it cannot be read to condone proposal 27. 36 The procedure to which the court was referring in Department of Treasury was one that required the agency to provide a written performance evaluation to an employee within forty-five days after an evaluation was prepared. If it failed to do so, the evaluation could not be used and any material it contained that might adversely affect an employee's appraisal or rating would have to be destroyed. Id. at 1070 n. 1. The agency complained that the provision interfered with its right to direct employees and to assign work, because the proposal prohibited management from using evaluative information that is not shared with employees within the stipulated time. 37 Unlike the proposal in Department of Treasury, which imposed a time-frame within which management had to act in order to use a poor evaluation against an employee, proposal 27 does not simply establish a procedural requirement that, if followed, would permit the agency to make full use of its evidence. Rather, proposal 27 effectively eliminates an entire class of evidence--anonymous source evidence--that the Agency can use in disciplining its employees. Such a proposal violates section 7106(a)(2)(A). See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1931 v. FLRA, 32 F.L.R.A. 1023, 1047-50 (1988) (finding that a proposal that required statements used or relied upon in adverse actions be in writing and signed by the employee interfered with management's right to make use of many forms of evidence). Thus, the Authority properly recognized that proposal 27 is not merely a procedure for the exercise of managerial rights, but an encroachment on those rights. 38
39 The Union concedes that it failed to argue below that proposal 27 was an appropriate arrangement, and that such failure normally would bar it from raising the issue on review. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7123(c) (1988) (No objection that has not been urged before the Authority, or its designee, shall be considered by the court....). It insists, however, that because the Authority ruled sua sponte that the proposal was not such an arrangement, it should be permitted to raise the issue in this court. Under established caselaw, it is clear that because it was not properly raised with the Authority, this issue cannot be considered by the court. See NLRB v. FLRA, 2 F.3d 1190, 1195-96 (D.C.Cir.1993).
40 Proposals 43 and 45 deal with the reduction in rank or removal of an Agency employee because of deficient performance. Proposal 43 defines performance-based disciplinary actions to include reduction-in-rank decisions. Proposal 45 outlines several due process procedures (including a specific period during which an unsatisfactory employee is given the opportunity to improve) that the Agency must follow before taking a performance-based disciplinary action. Further, proposal 45 provides that the minimum improvement required to avoid disciplinary action must be reasonably attainable. Unsatisfactory employees must be informed of these rights in writing. 41 The Authority found proposal 43 to be consistent with law and thus negotiable. As to proposal 45, the Authority found much of it negotiable. However, the Authority ruled that the Union could not require that the minimum improvement necessary to avoid demotion or discharge be reasonably attainable, because, in some circumstances, that standard could be something less than acceptable performance. We hold that each proposal is nonnegotiable in its entirety. 42 Prior to the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (CSRA), if an agency wished to remove or demote an employee for poor performance, it had to do so through Chapter 75 of the FSLMRS, which provides the mechanism for taking adverse action against an employee. Under Chapter 75, adverse action can be undertaken, only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7513(a) (1988). Over time, this standard evolved into a significant obstacle to removing inefficient employees, and Congress became concerned about its effect on the quality of public agencies: 43 The patchwork of statutes, regulations, rules, and judicial restrictions [that had] built up over time had conspired, in effect, to tie the hands of the personnel managers. The [i]nordinate procedural requirements and unreasonable standards were condemned [by Congress]. S.REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 reprinted in 1978 [U.S.C.C.A.N.] 2762. The temptation was to keep an unsatisfactory worker on the payroll rather than go through the protracted hassle of discharging him, with no guarantee that the effort would be successful. This happened too often, and the public suffered. 44 Lisiecki v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 769 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed.Cir.1985) (reviewing the legislative history of the CSRA), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108, 106 S.Ct. 1514, 89 L.Ed.2d 913 (1986). 45 In response to this problem, Congress amended Chapter 43 of Title V (governing the evaluation of public employee work performance) when it enacted the CSRA, and provided a basis independent of Chapter 75 for demoting and removing employees for unsatisfactory performance. See Lovshin v. Department of Navy, 767 F.2d 826, 834 (Fed.Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1111, 106 S.Ct. 1523, 89 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986). Under Chapter 43, as amended, an employee who is rated unsatisfactory may be reduced in grade or removed without being subject to the substantive and procedural requirements of Chapter 75. Additionally, Congress strengthened management's hand by lowering its burden of proof when Chapter 43 actions are appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7701(c)(1)(A). Id. (A Chapter 43 action is ... more narrowly reviewable by the board than a Chapter 75 case in which an agency must establish the facts underlying an adverse action by a preponderance of the evidence.). 46 While acting to empower agencies to deal with unsatisfactory employees, Congress was careful to protect the rights of employees affected by performance-based actions. It provided several due process procedures with which an agency must comply before taking action under Chapter 43. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 4303(b)(1) (1988). 4 Thus, Congress obviously intended to strike a delicate balance between the rights of management to eliminate poor performers and the rights of affected employees to procedural protections. 47 The Union's attempt to add to the procedural side of this equation in this case impermissibly frustrates the dominant intent of [Congress] ... 'to simplify and expedite procedures for dismissals of Federal employees whose performance is below the acceptable level within a comprehensive framework for performance evaluation.'  Lisiecki, 769 F.2d at 1564 (quoting S.REP. NO. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2732). Indeed, proposal 45 would represent a large step back toward the problems inherent in performance-based actions arising under Chapter 75, and would substantially hamper management's ability to deal with unsatisfactory performers within the Agency. This is best illustrated by the proposal's requirement that only reasonably attainable performance improvements serve as a basis for performance-based discipline. As the Authority itself found, such a standard would interfere with management's rights by protecting from discipline those employees who are performing unacceptably if their performance improves to a 'reasonably attainable' level under a performance improvement plan.... Negotiability Order, J.A. 477. Finally, we agree with the Agency that requiring it to provide a written performance improvement plan any time it wishes to demote or dismiss an employee, impermissibly curtails its discretion to discipline employees through either Chapter 75 or Chapter 43. The Agency should be free to take such actions through Chapter 75, which does not require a performance improvement plan, and accept as a consequence the procedural obstacles and heightened burden of proof attendant to actions under that Chapter. For the reasons discussed, we hold that proposals 43 and 45 (in its entirety) are nonnegotiable.