Opinion ID: 2058848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Definition of Discarded Material

Text: The Agency contends on appeal that AFI was receiving and processing discarded material within the plain meaning of the definition of waste within section 3.535 of the Act (415 ILCS 5/3.535 (West 2002)), thus requiring AFI to secure a permit. The Agency further argues that the term discarded should be construed from the perspective of the supplier, such that a material is considered discarded if it is used for a purpose other than that originally intended by the generator of the material. AFI responds that when the phrase discarded material is read in conjunction with section 3.380 of the Act (415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 2002)), it is apparent that the materials it receives are not discarded and, therefore, are not waste requiring a permit. The parties agree the Act does not define the term discarded. [3] The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill.2d 493, 503-04, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528 (2000). The language of the statute is the most reliable indicator of the legislature's objectives in enacting a particular law. Hawes v. Luhr Brothers, Inc., 212 Ill.2d 93, 105, 287 Ill.Dec. 583, 816 N.E.2d 345 (2004). We give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, and, where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill.2d at 504, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528. We must not depart from the plain language of the Act by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent. Hawes v. Luhr Brothers, Inc., 212 Ill.2d at 105, 287 Ill.Dec. 583, 816 N.E.2d 345. Moreover, words and phrases should not be construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill.2d at 504, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528. Section 21 of the Act lists prohibited acts, stating, in relevant part, [n]o person shall:    (d) Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation: (1) without a permit granted by the Agency   .    (e) Dispose, treat, store or abandon any waste, or transport any waste into this State for disposal, treatment, storage or abandonment, except at a site or facility which meets the requirements of this Act and of regulations and standards thereunder. 415 ILCS 5/21 (West 2002). The Agency issued a violation notice alleging a violation of section 21(d)(1) because [w]aste was stored and treated without a permit granted by the Illinois EPA. It also alleged a violation of section 21(e) of the Act because [w]aste was stored and treated at [AFI's] facility which does not meet the requirements of the Act and regulations thereunder. The Act defines waste as: any garbage, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility or other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining and agricultural operations, and from community activities   . (Emphasis added.) 415 ILCS 5/3.535 (West 2002). In this section, the Act uses the term discarded only as a modifier to the term material. The Act does not elaborate as to who or what subject exactly performed the discard action. Rather, the focus remains on the object: material. Given that the Act does not specify the subject, the Agency's proposition  that the modifier discarded should be construed from the perspective of the supplier  is not unequivocally erroneous. However, a look at another pertinent portion of the Act demonstrates that the Act retains its focus on the material itself as it passes between entities. The Act uses the term discarded in section 3.380 of the Act (415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 2002)), which reads as follows: `Recycling, reclamation or reuse' means a method, technique, or process designed to remove any contaminant from waste so as to render such waste reusable, or any process by which materials that would otherwise be disposed of or discarded are collected, separated or processed and returned to the economic mainstream in the form of raw materials or products. (Emphasis added.) 415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 2002). Under this phrasing the legislature has categorized items that may be recycled, reclaimed, or reused into two main categories: (1) waste from which contaminants may be removed and (2) materials. 415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 2002). Materials are further subdivided into those that are discarded and those materials that would otherwise be disposed of or discarded [which] are collected, separated or processed and returned to the economic mainstream in the form of raw materials or products. 415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 2002). While the legislature has not defined discarded materials, the legislature has mentioned what it is not: materials that would otherwise be disposed of or discarded [which] are    returned to the economic mainstream in the form of raw materials and products. Thus, materials are discarded unless they are returned to the economic mainstream. Here, AFI was not removing contaminants from the triple-rinsed containers or from wood. The contaminants had been removed by the triple-rinsing process before they arrived at AFI's facility and there is no indication in the record of proposed removal of contaminants from wood. Therefore, the solid at issue is a material. We next consider whether this material was otherwise discarded or if it was collected, separated or processed and returned to the economic mainstream in the form of raw materials or products. AFI processes the plastic containers and returns the materials as a product into the economic mainstream, as demonstrated by the contract with Illinois Power. Under the Act, the materials are, therefore, not discarded. The comparison of AFI's facility to the statutory definitions for recycling center and pollution control facility reinforces this interpretation. Under the Act, `recycling center' means a site or facility that accepts only segregated, nonhazardous, nonspecial, homogenous, nonputrescible materials, such as dry paper, glass, cans or plastics, for subsequent use in the secondary materials market. 415 ILCS 5/3.375 (West 2002). By contrast, a pollution control facility is any waste storage site, sanitary landfill, waste disposal site, waste transfer station, waste treatment facility, or waste incinerator. This includes sewers, sewage treatment plants, and any other facilities owned or operated by sanitary districts organized under the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Act. 415 ILCS 5/3.330 (West 2002). The aim of AFI was not to store, landfill, dispose, transfer, treat, or incinerate waste. Rather, AFI shreds the plastic materials that have already been triple rinsed by Tri-Rinse, Inc., and sells the chips to Illinois Power. While AFI's facility does not neatly fit into the category of recycling center because it does more than simply accept materials, AFI's facility retained more characteristics of a recycling center than a pollution control facility, chiefly because it handles materials rather than waste. In its petition for rehearing, the Agency argues that our interpretation here conflicts with the definition of recycling in the Illinois Solid Waste Management Act (415 ILCS 20/1 et seq. (West 2002)). The Agency specifically refers to the definition of recycling in section 2.1, which provides: [T]he process by which solid waste is collected, separated and processed for reuse as either a raw material or a product which itself is subject to recycling, but does not include the combustion of waste for energy recovery or volume reduction. 415 ILCS 20/2.1 (West 2002). This provision is inapplicable. As is obvious from its title, the Illinois Solid Waste Management Act governs the disposal of solid waste. 415 ILCS 20/1 (West 2002). Though the plastic chips are eventually sold to Illinois Power for energy recovery, we have held that AFI is not processing waste under the Act. Thus, the process creating the chips does not constitute recycling under this definition. Furthermore, our holding that AFI's facility is not a pollution control center is not to be read as a determination that the facility is a recycling center under the Act. Therefore, our interpretation of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act is consistent with the Illinois Solid Waste Management Act. We therefore reject the Agency's contention that discarded is defined solely from the viewpoint of the supplier in that a material is putatively discarded as any material which is not being utilized for its intended purpose of the generator. There is nothing in the statute which would dictate this definition. Rather, the Act contemplates that materials that may otherwise be discarded by the supplier may be diverted from becoming waste and returned to the economic mainstream. On rehearing, the Agency contends that this court's interpretation of the Act is out of step with a series of federal court decisions construing the term discarded material contained in a similar definition of solid waste in the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000) (defining solid waste). We disagree and find our application of the Act to AFI's facility is in harmony with the RCRA. We initially note that under basic rules of statutory construction, we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, and, where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill.2d at 504, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528. Because we find that the plain language of the Act does not require AFI to secure a permit, a review of decisions construing a similar statute is not necessary. Nevertheless, a review of the RCRA definition cited by the Agency and of cases construing it does not persuade us that a different result is warranted. The RCRA establishes a regulatory structure overseeing the safe treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste. American Petroleum Institute v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 906 F.2d 729, 732 (D.C.Cir.1990). Congress'overriding concern in enacting the RCRA was to establish the framework for a national system to insure the safe management of hazardous wastes. United States v. ILCO, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir.1993). Before the material can be a hazardous waste subject to the RCRA, it must first meet the RCRA's definition of solid waste, as well as additional requirements pertaining to the hazardous nature of the waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2000) (defining hazardous waste). Under the RCRA, the term solid waste means any garbage, refuse, sludge    and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities   . 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000). While this provision is virtually identical to the Act's definition in section 3.535 (415 ILCS 5/3.535 (West 2002)), the Agency's argument ignores our reliance on section 3.380 of the Act to determine whether the material at issue was discarded material. 415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 2002). Accordingly, the Agency's present argument on rehearing suffers from the failure to cite a parallel provision of the RCRA which would similarly guide our interpretation of the term discarded material. Furthermore, the RCRA grants the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) enforcement powers and authority to promulgate regulations establishing a comprehensive management system for hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921 through 6939b (2000). For instance, the USEPA has promulgated regulations under the RCRA, which further define the phrase solid waste as any discarded material and it further defines discarded material. 40 C.F.R. Pt. 261.2 (2003). Notably, this definition of discarded material includes certain materials which are [b]urned to recover energy or are [u]sed to produce a fuel or are otherwise contained in fuels (in which case the fuel itself remains a solid waste). 40 C.F.R. Pt. 261.2(c)(2) (2003). Moreover, the USEPA has also expressly explained that this regulatory definition applies only to wastes that are hazardous. Section 261.1(b)(1) states: The definition of solid waste contained in this part applies only to wastes that also are hazardous for purposes of the regulations implementing subtitle C of the RCRA. For example, it does not apply to materials (such as non-hazardous scrap, paper, textiles, or rubber) that are not otherwise hazardous and that are recycled. 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(b)(1) (2003). Thus, the RCRA definition of solid waste is distinguishable from the case at bar because of its a priori reflection of Congress' overriding concern with hazardous materials. There is no dispute that the materials that AFI processes are not hazardous. When the plastic containers arrive at AFI's facility they have already been triple-rinsed by Tri-Rinse, Inc. Thereafter, the plastic containers are shredded into chips and then sold to Illinois Power. The remaining potential danger posed by the plastic derives from the burning of the plastic. However, that concern has been addressed by the Agency's permit issuance to Illinois Power. The Agency's proffered cases are also inapposite because of their procedural posture. In each case, the courts reviewed USEPA regulations or orders that were made pursuant to the statute regarding facilities that handled hazardous wastes. Owen Electric Steel Co. of South Carolina, Inc. v. Browner, 37 F.3d 146 (4th Cir.1994) (reviewing USEPA order concerning whether a slag processing area within a facility that treated, stored, or disposed of hazardous waste was a solid waste management unit); United States v. ILCO, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir.1993) (reviewing a USEPA regulation as applied to smelting of spent batteries to produce lead ingots which produced several specific hazardous wastes); American Mining Congress v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 907 F.2d 1179 (D.C.Cir.1990) (reviewing USEPA rule relisting as hazardous six wastes generated from metal smelting operation); American Petroleum Institute v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C.Cir.1990) (reviewing USEPA rule exempting the slag residues that result from the treatment of KO61 in zinc smelters from the RCRA's restrictions on land disposal of hazardous wastes); American Mining Congress v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C.Cir.1987) (reviewing USEPA regulation that amended the definition of solid waste to establish and define the Agency's authority to regulate secondary petroleum and mining materials reused within an industry's ongoing production process). In each case, the USEPA argued that its specific interpretation was entitled to deference under a Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) analysis. In short, the courts determined if the USEPA regulations or orders were a permissible or reasonable construction of the definition of discarded under the RCRA which were entitled to deference under Chevron. Owen Electric Steel Co., 37 F.3d at 150; ILCO, 996 F.2d at 1130; American Mining Congress, 907 F.2d at 1186; American Petroleum Institute, 906 F.2d at 740; American Mining Congress, 824 F.2d at 1182. In contrast to the federal cases, the Agency does not argue that its interpretation of discarded material in this litigation is entitled to the same deference under the Chevron analysis. Furthermore, the Agency points to no regulation, federal or otherwise, that further defines discarded materials which would apply to the present nonhazardous material. Therefore, these cases are distinguishable. We note that this may not be the final word on whether this type of industry may remain outside of the Agency's purview. As AFI's counsel stated at oral argument before this court, the Agency may deem this industry worthy of regulation through a properly promulgated regulation which further defines discarded materials. Until such a clarifying regulation is in place, the plain meaning of the Act does not dictate that the present materials are discarded and therefore waste. Hence, we find that AFI is not a pollution control facility requiring a permit which would further require local siting approval.