Opinion ID: 2621923
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retrial for Murder

Text: ¶52 The United States Constitution, the Utah Constitution, and the Utah Code all provide citizens with protection from double jeopardy. U.S. Const. amend. V; Utah Const. art I, § 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(2)(a) (2003). [T]he double jeopardy guarantee contained in these provisions protects a defendant from (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1998). ¶53 The double jeopardy guarantee does not protect a defendant from a retrial for an offense when his conviction for that same offense has been reversed on appeal as a result of trial error. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957); see also Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1230-31 ([D]ouble jeopardy does not generally bar a second trial when a conviction was successfully vacated on appeal.). A caveat to this general rule is that when the conviction of a lesser offense implies an acquittal of a greater offense, double jeopardy bars retrial of the greater offense if the conviction for the lesser offense is reversed on appeal. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970); Green, 355 U.S. at 190-91. ¶54 For example, the criminal defendant in Price was charged with murder and convicted of manslaughter, but successfully obtained a reversal of the manslaughter conviction on appeal. 398 U.S. at 324. The United States Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial for murder because the defendant's conviction on the manslaughter charge implicitly acquitted him of the murder charge. Id. at 329; see also Green, 355 U.S. at 190-91 (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial on first degree murder when the defendant was charged with first degree murder, was convicted of second degree murder, and was successful in obtaining a reversal of the second degree murder conviction on appeal). ¶55 The underlying rationale for the caveat is that (1) because a conviction on a lesser offense necessarily implies an acquittal of the greater offense and (2) because double jeopardy bars a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, a defendant who is convicted of the lesser offense cannot be retried for the greater offense, even if the conviction for the lesser offense is reversed on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(2) (A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.); Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1230 ([T]he double jeopardy guarantee . . . protects a defendant from . . . a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. . . . ). ¶56 In this case, Low was charged with first degree murder, but was convicted of manslaughter by a jury. The conviction of the lesser offense of manslaughter constitutes an implied acquittal of the greater offense of murder. [3] Because Low was acquitted of murder, double jeopardy prevents the State from retrying Low for that offense.