Opinion ID: 1450285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sewell and Third-Party Actions

Text: If I were writing on a clean slate, my analysis could end here. But in Smith v. Sewell , we determined that [chapter 33] is applicable to Chapter 2 causes of action and held that an intoxicated person suing a provider of alcoholic beverages for his own injuries under Chapter 2 will be entitled to recover damages only if his percentage of responsibility is found to be less than or equal to 50 percent. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d at 356. Although our holding was not limited to first-party claims ( i.e. a drunk suing a dram shop), our reasoning arguably supports such a limitation: Chapter 2 is intended to deter providers of alcoholic beverages from serving alcoholic beverages to obviously intoxicated individuals who may potentially inflict serious injury on themselves and on innocent members of the general public. But when it is the intoxicated individual who is injured due to his own intoxication, it is particularly appropriate that his conduct in contributing to his injury should be considered in assessing the amount of recovery, if any, to which he is entitled. Application of the principles of comparative responsibility to causes of action brought under Chapter 2 establishes a consistent and equitable approach to the issue of dramshop liability generally, and first party dramshop liability specifically. This approach provides an effective solution to a difficult and controversial issue. Id. Even if limited to first-party claims, however, Sewell presents another, more difficult, problem. In Sewell, we held incorrectly, in my opinionthat a provider should be included in the apportionment question because its conduct violated an applicable legal standard. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d at 356 (quoting percentage of responsibility definition and holding that [b]ecause Chapter 2 clearly establishes a legal standard and creates a cause of action for conduct violative of that legal standard, the definition of `percentage of responsibility' provides additional support for our determination that the Comparative Responsibility Act is applicable to Chapter 2 causes of action). Implicitly, therefore, we held that the provider in a dram shop case must have caused or contributed to cause the harm for which recovery of damages was sought. For the reasons set forth above, that simply need not be the case. While Sewell remains workable for first-party claims, as apportionment between the drunk and the provider approximates what would occur in an indemnity action, [6] Sewell's reasoning breaks down when applied to third-party dram shop actions. Submitting both the drunk and the provider as parties who caused or contributed to cause the harm, rather than imputing the drunk's actions to the provider, would allow the provider to lessen or escape liability altogether. Thus, for example, a jury could determine that a provider's percentage of responsibility is zeroa not unlikely scenario given that the provider's actions are compared with a person so obviously intoxicated he posed a danger to himself and othersnotwithstanding that the drunk's intoxication proximately caused the harm. This contravenes the purpose as well as the text of the Dram Shop Act, which imposes liability even absent causation relating to the provision of alcohol, and is unnecessary to a proper application of chapter 33. See TEX. AL CO. BEV.CODE § 1.03 (requiring that the Dram Shop Act be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose of protecting the welfare, health, and safety of the people). To paraphrase Dean Prosser, it simply cannot be the law that a defendant can be relieved of the consequences of his wrongful conduct by the occurrence of the very risk which made his conduct negligent in the first instance. Apportioning Responsibility, 55 BAYLOR L.REV. at 650. In Sewell, we were faced with a person suing a dram shop for damages he suffered in a one-car accident due to his own intoxication. Although Sewell correctly held that chapter 33 applies to first-party Dram Shop Act claims, its holding regarding the submission of the provider in the apportionment question cannot apply to third-party claims, and its reasoning for that submission does not comport with the statute's terms. Thus, I would limit Sewell to first-party claims and overrule its holding that the provider is properly included within those persons who caused the harm. III