Opinion ID: 1190662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ambiguity extrinsic aids are applicable search for legislative intent is justifiable

Text: The statute is ambiguous. Legislative intent should be controlling and the use of extrinsic aids in search of legislative intent would be sound legal doctrine and very pertinently applicable. In support of the foregoing, the following considerations are pertinent: (a) The volume and variety of litigation, the number of decisions of this court involving § 4706, are in themselves indicative, and proof of ambiguity. (b) Analysis of the language of the statute reveals a certain looseness in meaning and considerable lack of clarity. The operative words can be interpreted to confer immunity upon school districts relative to either six or three things, items, or situations, depending on how the statute is read. In other words, the contemplated immunity from suit could relate to any, (1) park, or (2) playground, or (3) field house, or (4) athletic apparatus, or (5) appliance, or (6) manual training equipment. On the other hand, and as interpreted and applied in various decisions of this court, the immunity would only relate to three things, (1) athletic apparatus, or (2) appliance, or (3) manual training equipment. In this latter instance, under our decisions, the words park, or playground, or field house would seem to be interpreted as words of limitation applicable to two items, namely, (a) athletic apparatus or (b) appliance; the words manual training equipment being the third thing or item in the series, would appear to stand alone, perhaps modified, perhaps not, by the words park or playground or field house. The latter analysis is outlined in Judge Main's opinion in Stovall v. Toppenish School District No. 49, 110 Wash. 97, 188 Pac. 12, 9 A.L.R. 908 (1920). Incidentally the latter more restricted interpretation has been followed in all of the decisions of this court as to § 4706, although the opposite and more expansive interpretation is certainly a possible one. On this basis alone, therefore, the statute is ambiguous. (c) Section 951, Rem. Code, and § 4706 are statutes in pari materia. Therefore, interpretation, construction and a search for legislative intent would certainly be indicated. (d) Section 951, a territorial enactment, is a remedial statute canceling pre-existing common-law immunity of school districts. This territorial statute was continued in effect by Art. XXVII of the state constitution. Remedial statutes are liberally construed to ... subserve the right rather than that which may perpetuate a wrong. Ingersoll v. Gourley, 72 Wash. 462, 472, 130 Pac. 743 (1913). Hence, § 951 must be liberally construed in favor of claimants and against immunity for school districts under Rem. Rev. Stat., § 4706. (e) Section 4706 must be regarded as an implied repealer respecting § 951. There is a presumption against repeals by implication. 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed. Horack), p. 468, § 2014. In other words, an implied repealer, or § 4706, should be strictly construed. Sections 2006 and 2007, p. 454, of Sutherland throw further light on the problem and are quoted, in part, as follows: Sec. 2006. The entire problem of determining the extent to which existing legislation is repealed by subsequent statutes ultimately resolves itself into one of legislative intent. Sec. 2007.... Thus, in determining whether or not a repeal has been effectuated, the environment, association and character of the statute in its field of operation, the history of previous legislation, the legislative history of the act, and the nature of the defect sought to be remedied by its enactment are all important factors to be considered by the courts.... The foregoing discussion has related mainly to ambiguity, application of rules of statutory construction and justification of a search for legislative intent as to § 4706. Attention shall now be given to the following: (a) INTENT OF LEGISLATURE IN ENACTING SEC. 4706; (b) FURTHER DISCUSSION AS TO APPLICATION OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION RULES In the Stovall case, supra, Judge Main referred to the fact that three cases against school districts were pending in the state supreme court at the opening of the legislative session in 1917; that the first bill introduced at the session was one to amend Rem. Code, § 951; that the bill as originally introduced employed the legislative draftsmanship device or technique of amending a pre-existing statute, the particular amendment being drawn in form of a proviso to be added to Rem. Code, § 951. He points out that the original bill passed the Senate, was rejected by the House, which substituted the language now found in § 4706; that the latter was accepted by the Senate, signed by the governor, and became Rem. Rev. Stat., § 4706, in its present form.