Opinion ID: 2216612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appropriate Court on Remand

Text: The Attorney General asks this court to remand this appeal to the First District, as the First District is the court that first acquired jurisdiction of its appeal under the Public Utilities Act. AT & T argues that the Attorney General has forfeited this issue because it was not raised in the Attorney General's petition for leave to appeal. The Attorney General asserts it has previously raised the argument that the First District first acquired jurisdiction of this appeal. Specifically, the Attorney General raised the argument in defending against AT & T's original motion to transfer to the Fourth District, in the Attorney General's motion to dismiss AT & T's appeals, and in the Attorney General's petition for rehearing in the Fourth District. However, forfeiture is ultimately irrelevant, as the issue in this case is one of jurisdiction, which any reviewing court has an obligation to consider. Franson v. Micelli, 172 Ill.2d 352, 355, 217 Ill.Dec. 250, 666 N.E.2d 1188 (1996). The appellate court has jurisdiction to review administrative decisions only as provided by law. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 6; Town & Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 225 Ill.2d 103, 121-22, 310 Ill.Dec. 416, 866 N.E.2d 227 (2007). When the appellate court undertakes direct review of an administrative decision, it exercises special statutory jurisdiction. Town & Country Utilities, 225 Ill.2d at 122, 310 Ill.Dec. 416, 866 N.E.2d 227. Special statutory jurisdiction is limited to the language of the act conferring it. Town & Country Utilities, 225 Ill.2d at 122, 310 Ill.Dec. 416, 866 N.E.2d 227, quoting Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 218 Ill.2d 175, 182, 300 Ill.Dec. 15, 843 N.E.2d 273 (2006), quoting Fredman Brothers Furniture v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill.2d 202, 210, 93 Ill.Dec. 360, 486 N.E.2d 893 (1985). Thus, we are presented with the question whether the Public Utilities Act has conferred jurisdiction on either the First or Fourth District. The Public Utilities Act specifically requires appeals to be brought in particular judicial districts. The Act provides that parties may appeal to the appellate court of the judicial district in which the subject matter of the hearing is situated. 220 ILCS 5/10-201(a) (West 2006). The Act further states: The court first acquiring jurisdiction of any appeal from any    order    shall have and retain jurisdiction of such appeal and of all further appeals from the same    order    until such appeal is disposed of in such appellate court. 220 ILCS 5/10-201 (West 2006). The Public Utilities Act thus limits the appellate court's special statutory jurisdiction to districts that encompass the matter under review by the Commission. This court has recognized that it is the notice of appeal which, when timely filed with the trial court, vests jurisdiction with the appellate court. In re Tekela, 202 Ill.2d 282, 288, 269 Ill.Dec. 119, 780 N.E.2d 304 (2002). Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., 193 Ill.2d 186, 189, 249 Ill.Dec. 770, 737 N.E.2d 160 (2000). 155 Ill.2d R. 301. In the context of administrative review, the petition for review submitted to the appellate court serves the function of the notice of appeal. 155 Ill.2d R. 335, Committee Comments, at cxxxii; ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill.2d 26, 31, 245 Ill.Dec. 288, 727 N.E.2d 1022 (2000). Therefore, for the appellate court to acquire jurisdiction, the petition for review must be timely filed. In this case, the Attorney General acknowledges that AT & T first filed its petitions for review in the Fourth District. Still, the Attorney General contends that because those petitions were not timely filed, jurisdiction never vested with the Fourth District. We note neither the First nor the Fourth District has made a determination whether, under the Public Utilities Act, it first acquir[ed] jurisdiction. The Fourth District merely concluded, in its dismissal of the Attorney General's appeal, that the Attorney General's petition for rehearing was not timely. The First District also declined to make a determination of its jurisdiction in transferring the Attorney General's appeal to the Fourth District. That court strongly emphasized it made no finding as to whether it or the Fourth District had jurisdiction over either of the parties' appeals. People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 369 Ill. App.3d 126, 127, 307 Ill.Dec. 805, 860 N.E.2d 459 (2006). Nor did the appellate court make a determination as to whether the subject matter of the Commission's review was situated in the reviewing court's district. Because an appeal of a Commission decision is allowed by law only in those districts where the subject matter of the appeal is situated, the appellate court must meet that statutory requirement, even before it can determine which district first acquired jurisdiction. We note the Attorney General contends that the matter is situated in the First District, because the bulk of AT & T's affected customers are geographically located there, while AT & T asserts that its customers are also located in the Fourth District. The record before this court is not sufficiently developed to make that determination. Thus, although we hold that the appellate court has jurisdiction over the Attorney General's appeal with respect to the timeliness of her application for rehearing with the Commission, we remand to the Fourth District with instruction to consider whether the subject matter of the Commission's order is situated in the First or the Fourth District, if either, and for a determination whether the First or the Fourth District first acquired jurisdiction over the Attorney General's appeal, pursuant to section 10-201(a). Finally, we note that Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) (210 Ill.2d R. 303(a)(2)) and Rule 335 (155 Ill.2d R. 335) may be applicable to the question of jurisdiction. However, neither party has briefed the issue, and so we instruct the Fourth District to also consider its jurisdiction in light of Rules 303 and 335.