Opinion ID: 3033188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sierra Club's Motion for Attorney Fees

Text: The City appeals the district court's award of $50,308.09 in attorney fees to Sierra Club, arguing that Sierra Club is not a substantially prevailing party. In granting partial summary judgment in favor of Sierra Club on the issue of whether the City violated its permit in allowing the sanitary sewer overflows to occur unabated, the court determined that the regulations under the Clean Water Act required the operator of a storm sewer system ultimately to either entirely eliminate non-storm water discharges into the storm sewers or seek a permit allowing a certain number of non-storm water discharges. The court found that the City was technically in violation of its permit (Appellant's App. at 333), given the length of time and the number of sanitary sewer overflows that had continued unabated. Despite the violation, the district court declined to award any of the relief Sierra Club sought, which included in relevant part: a declaration that the City was in violation of the Clean Water Act; an injunction ordering the City to comply with its permit, to cease all unlawful discharges, and to clean up prior unlawful discharges; and civil penalties up to $25,000 per day. (Id. at 33-35.) In denying Sierra Club's request for an injunction, the court noted that there was no evidence that the City would not cooperate with the Sewer Committee in carrying out the Sewer Committee's obligations under the Settlement Agreement, as the only record evidence showed that the City had always complied with the Sewer Committee's reasonable requests in the past. (Id. at 333-34.) Under the American Rule, parties to a lawsuit generally foot their own attorney fees absent explicit statutory authority to the contrary. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.V. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001). The Clean Water Act explicitly allows an award of attorney fees to a prevailing or substantially prevailing party. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d). A party prevails either by obtain[ing] an enforceable judgment . . . or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement . . . [that] directly benefit[s the plaintiff] at the time of the judgment or settlement. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992) (internal 5 citations omitted). The Supreme Court has made clear 'that a plaintiff [must] receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail,' Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-04 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987)), such that the relief materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12. Further, the change in the relationship must be judicially sanctioned; a voluntary change in the relationship between the parties as a result of a lawsuit is insufficient to trigger a shift in the general rule that parties pay their own fees. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (rejecting catalyst theory of awarding attorney fees under prevailing party fee-shifting statutes). Sierra Club can point to no actual relief on the merits as against the City. While the Sewer Committee entered a Settlement Agreement and agreed to address the sanitary sewer overflows, the City was not party to the agreement. Although the district court granted summary judgment in Sierra Club's favor, all Sierra Club received was a declaration that the City had violated its permit. The court declined to grant any of the relief that Sierra Club sought, not even a requested order enjoining the City from future violations of its permit. A declaratory judgment . . . will constitute relief . . . if, and only if, it affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff. Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (reversing attorney fee award in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 case in which court found that prison officials violated prisoners' procedural rights in denying request for magazine subscription, where only relief was in form of changed prison policies that did not benefit either plaintiff as neither were in custody at time judgment was entered). [A] judicial pronouncement that the defendant has violated the law, . . . without an enforceable judgment on the merits, cannot render [the plaintiff] a prevailing party. Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp. Inc., 98 F.3d 396, 398 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing attorney fee award where plaintiff received no damage award and no longer worked for the defendant, making any equitable relief unavailable). Sierra Club can point to no effect that the judicial declaration had 6 on the City's behavior toward Sierra Club. Further, without any relief to enforce, Sierra Club did not receive an enforceable judgment and was not a prevailing party. Sierra Club argues that the City's subsequent approval of a 42% sewer rate increase, in response to a request by the Sewer Committee for funding to fulfill the Sewer Committee's obligations under its Settlement Agreement with Sierra Club, constitutes the necessary relief to support an award of attorney fees. It argues that the district court's judgment declaring the City in violation of its permit was necessary to convince the City to approve the rate increase, inferring that but for the court's judgment that the City had violated its permit, the City would not have granted the rate increase, and the court's retention of jurisdiction supplies the requisite judicial imprimatur required by Buckhannon. See 532 U.S. at 605. The facts of the case do not support Sierra Club's conclusion. The relief that Sierra Club sought against the City was an assurance that the City would cooperate with the Sewer Committee to ensure that the Settlement Agreement was implemented. (Appellant's App. at 312.) The district court found that the City had always cooperated with the Sewer Committee in the past and that there was no reason to believe it would not continue to do so. The district court explicitly refused to grant the requested injunction for this very reason. (Id.) Sierra Club cannot rely on the City's subsequent conduct in cooperating with the Sewer Committee as judicially sanctioned relief when the court specifically refused to require the City to take the subsequent action. The facts of this case demonstrate that the Sewer Committee's request was the source of the rate increase, not the district court's finding that the City had violated its permit. Cf. Peter v. Jax, 187 F.3d 829, 835-36 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff was not prevailing party where state defendant agreed to a stipulated injunction based on change in Supreme Court precedent rather than pending litigation), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000). 7 The district court's retention of jurisdiction over issues concerning permit violation remedies does not aid Sierra Club.3 If the City had declined to implement the requested rate increase, the court could not have held the City in contempt under its retained jurisdiction because the City would not have been in violation of any court order. The court order merely declared the City in violation of its permit and the court retained jurisdiction to resolve any issues which may develop regarding remedies for permit violations. (Appellant's App. at 265 (emphasis added).) The court did not address what action, if any, the City was required to take in relation to the Sewer Committee's Settlement Agreement. In short, the judgment did not change the relationship between Sierra Club and the City. [T]he district court's [retained] jurisdiction alone is not enough to establish a judicial 'imprimatur' where the court's jurisdiction does not provide the court with contempt power. Christina A. ex rel. Jennifer A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 993-94 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that district court's retained jurisdiction over private settlement agreement did not elevate agreement to consent decree sufficient to establish prevailing party status; dismissal order approving of settlement agreement and retaining enforcement jurisdiction did not incorporate any settlement terms and at most provided avenue for parties to seek enforcement as a breach of contract, not as violation of a court order). At the end of the day, the judgment . . . afforded [Sierra Club] no relief whatsoever, Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 4, and the district court erred in ordering the City to pay attorney fees.