Opinion ID: 3149117
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Law of the Circuit Doctrine

Text: Melvin's challenge is foreclosed by our earlier panel decision in Bryant. There, we held that a New York state conviction for attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance3 was a controlled substance offense for the purpose of determining career offender status. Bryant, 571 F.3d at 156–58. Under the law of the circuit doctrine, we are bound by a prior panel decision, absent any intervening authority. United States v. Mouscardy, 722 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Grupee, 682 F.3d 143, 149 (1st Cir. 2012)). Even an argument that an earlier panel fundamentally misinterpreted then-existing precedent does not allow us to overturn prior panel precedent; rather, [o]nly the Supreme Court or an en banc court 2 The government also makes a third argument: that the law of the case doctrine forecloses Melvin's challenge to his career offender status because he had the opportunity and incentive to raise the issue in his first appeal but failed to do so. However, the government did not raise this argument before the district court. Because our affirmance is supported by two other grounds, we do not decide whether this argument was waived or whether the law of the case doctrine forecloses Melvin's appeal. 3 Although the decision in Bryant did not identify the statute of offense by section number, the parties agree that it was the same as the statute at issue here: New York Penal Law § 220.39. The New York state decision relied on by Bryant also makes clear that the conviction at issue was under § 220.39. See Bryant, 571 F.3d at 158 (citing People v. Samuels, 780 N.E.2d 513, 515 (N.Y. 2002)). - 4 - can overturn prior panel precedent in ordinary circumstances. United States v. Holloway, 499 F.3d 114, 118 (1st Cir. 2007). Melvin argues that Bryant does not control because it found New York Penal Law § 220.39 to be a predicate offense only under one prong of the definition of a controlled substance offense, and he is challenging the applicability of the other prong. That argument is meritless. A controlled substance offense is defined as: an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits [1] the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or [2] the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). Because that definition employs a disjunctive construction, the government need only show that § 220.39 is a controlled substance offense under either prong of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). Because Bryant establishes that § 220.39 is a controlled substance offense under the second prong, the possession clause, Bryant disposes of this appeal notwithstanding Melvin's arguments about the inapplicability of the other prong. Melvin also challenges the reasoning of Bryant. However, he does not point to any intervening authority that requires us to reconsider Bryant and instead suggests that Bryant - 5 - was incorrect when decided. Because that is not sufficient to defeat the law of the circuit doctrine, Bryant controls.4