Opinion ID: 1751529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment here given the circumstances of the crime and the character and history of the defendant?

Text: Mack argues that his punishment is disproportionate because of his deprived upbringing, i.e., that he was reared amid socio-economic conditions comparable to the third world, that he was a special education student and that his parents were illiterate. Under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105(3)(c), this Court must review the record in this case and compare it with the other capital murder cases in which this Court has entered judgment since Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242 (Miss. 1976). Mack argues that the mitigating evidence in this case sets his case apart from other death penalty verdicts. He fails, however, to cite any authority to support his theory that the death penalty is disproportionate merely because mitigating circumstances are present. Mack was allowed to present evidence of mitigating factors before he was sentenced to death. After hearing the evidence the jury apparently concluded that the mitigating factors did not substantially outweigh the aggravating factors. Additionally, Mack argues that his sentence also is disproportionate in light of the trial court's finding that Washington was equally culpable. Washington was allowed to enter a plea to accessory after the fact. This Mack contends is arbitrary and capricious. Under this Court's holding in Culberson v. State, 379 So.2d 499 (Miss. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986, 101 S.Ct. 406, 66 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980), Mack's contention must fall. In Culberson, an accomplice was allowed to plead to manslaughter while Culberson was given the death penalty. This Court held that the imposition of the death penalty was not disproportionate because Culberson's accomplice was allowed to plead to a lesser charge. This Court stated that, [I]f the state is not permitted to exercise prosecutorial discretion in order to obtain the testimony of a participant in a capital murder by permitting the one furnishing the testimony to plead guilty to a lesser crime, crimes such as the one in this case would not be solved and all participants would go free. When two or more persons commit a crime and cannot be identified except by one of the participants, the state must be allowed some discretion in securing the testimony of one of the participants in order to solve the crime. 379 So.2d at 510. The death penalty was not disproportionate as applied in this case.