Opinion ID: 625721
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Erroneous Curative Instruction

Text: Sanchez next argues that the curative instruction given by the district court actually exacerbated the problem. Generally, jurors are presumed to follow the limiting and curative instructions unless the matter improperly before them is so powerfully incriminating that they cannot reasonably be expected to put it out of their minds. United States v. Smith, 308 F.3d 726, 739 (7th Cir.2002). Absent evidence of an overwhelming probability that the jurors were unable to follow the instructions, they are presumed to have done so. United States v. James, 487 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Eberhart, 434 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir.2006)). The argument of course is that an erroneous limiting instruction is not sufficiently curative. The district court admonished the jurors that they were to disregard the line of questioning because the evidence was irrelevant and had nothing to do with the case. The district court noted that the jurors were outwardly showing acknowledgment of its instruction in that they were nodding their heads in agreement as he gave the instruction. The misstatement in the instruction does not indicate that the jurors would assume there was a third unexplained incident involving alleged drunk driving as Sanchez argues. Furthermore, the curative instruction came the same day as the testimony and referred to a specific and small portion of cross-examination and re-direct examination. The cases relied upon by Sanchez differ from the situation with which he was confronted. The challenged questions in United States v. Impson, 531 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir.1976) and Hill v. Turpin, 135 F.3d 1411, 1419 (11th Cir.1998) dealt with post- Miranda silence, a well-established right from which improper inferences easily arise. Here, the questioning had nothing to do with the case against Sanchez, the district court recognized that and instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. Finally, given the amount of evidence against Sanchez, it is unlikely that a minor misstatement was enough to wrongly persuade the jury. In sum, there has not been a showing of an overwhelming probability that the jury was unable to follow the district court's limiting instruction, albeit misstated as it was. Focusing on the erroneous curative instruction and error in admitting the evidence of alleged bad acts by Sanchez ignores the abundance of evidence which suggested he was guilty. As such, any error was harmless.