Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether evans' confession was made during plea negotiations.

Text: ś 47. Evans next challenges the admissibility of his confessions on the basis that they were precipitated by plea negotiations and were therefore inadmissible under M.R.E. 410. Specifically, Evans argues that his confessions were made in conjunction with plea negotiations wherein Evans agreed to lead investigators to the body if he was allowed to plead guilty to federal kidnapping charges. ś 48. A review of Evans' Motions to Suppress and the argument presented before the trial court reveals that Evans did not assert this specific ground in arguing his confessions were inadmissible at trial. Although Evans argued during the hearing on the Motion to Suppress that his previous pro se offers to plead guilty to capital murder were inadmissible under M.R.E. 410 and Miss.Crim. R. Cir. Ct. Prac. 4.03, Evans did not argue that his confessions were inadmissible for these same reasons. On numerous occasions, this Court, has held that an objection on one ground waives remaining grounds for purposes of appeal and that the failure to raise an issue in the trial court requires this Court to impose a procedural bar on appeal. Notwithstanding Evans' failure to raise this specific ground before the trial court, this Court may, alternatively, consider the merits of the argument. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 845 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 (1995); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1270 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1019, 115 S.Ct. 1365, 131 L.Ed.2d 221 (1995), reh'g denied, 514 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 1992, 131 L.Ed.2d 878 (1995). ś 49. M.R.E. 410 provides (in pertinent part): Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: (1) A plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; (2) A plea of nolo contendere; (3) Any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Mississippi statutory or rule of court provisions regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or (4) Any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which does not result in a plea of guilty or which results in a plea of guilty later withdrawn. ś 50. The initial issue before this Court is whether Evans' confessions fall within the ambit of M.R.E. 410. That rule specifically provides that inadmissible discussions are those with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which does not result in a plea of guilty or which results in a plea of guilty later withdrawn. We, however, are not faced with a situation wherein the discussions sought to be admitted were between Evans and a prosecuting attorney. The record clearly reflects that Evans' statements were made to Detective Whitney Carvin and FBI Agent Holder. Moreover, the record reflects that AUSA Golden discontinued his discussions with Evans' prior to any statements. ś 51. A review of M.R.E. 410 and URCCC 8.04 clearly reveals that the only governmental officer with authority to enter into plea negotiations is the prosecuting attorney. This view is entirely consistent with federal interpretation of the language contained in Fed.R.Evid. 410 and Fed. R.Crim. Prac, 11(e)(6) which mirror M.R.E. 410. ś 52. In United States v. Keith, 764 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir.1985), the Fifth Circuit held that Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6) makes clear that the sort of plea bargain discussions that are inadmissible under it are only those had with a government attorney. Discussions with a law enforcement agency in the spirit of cooperation and with hope for leniency, are not inadmissible under 11(e)(6)(D). Id. (citing United States v. Jimenez-Diaz, 659 F.2d 562, 568 (5th Cir.1981)). See also United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir.1994) (FBI agent is without authority to enter into negotiations regarding charges or sentence); United States v. Davidson, 768 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir.1985) ([T]he automatic exclusion rule of Rule 11(e)(6) `does not extend to statements made to law enforcement agents, as distinguished from government counsel'.). Applying this reasoning to the case sub judice compels the conclusion that Evans was not engaged in the type of discussions contemplated by M.R.E. 410. ś 53. In United States v. Kettering, 861 F.2d 675 (11th Cir.1988), the defendant, like Evans, sought to enforce a plea agreement made by a law enforcement officer. There, the court conducted the following two-pronged inquiry to determine whether the plea agreement was enforceable: [T]he general rule requiring governmental adherence to promises made during plea negotiations is subject to two conditions. First, the agent making the promise must be authorized to do so, and second, the defendant must detrimentally rely on the promise. If either condition is lacking, then the agreement is unenforceable and the government may withdraw its offer. Id. at 677 ( quoting Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir.1985)). ś 54. As indicated earlier, Agent Holder and Detective Carvin were not authorized to conduct plea negotiations with criminal defendants. Moreover, prior to Evans' first statement, AUSA Golden, the only government officer with authority to conduct plea negotiations, left the jail and terminated all discussions with Evans. Golden testified that the only directive given to Agent Holder and Detective Carvin was the admonition not to proceed with a statement unless Evans was advised of his rights. There is simply no evidence in this record to support the conclusion that Holder and Carvin were authorized to conduct any type of plea negotiations with Evans. ś 55. Moreover, a review of the testimony presented at the Motion to Suppress clearly reveals that Evans was not involved in plea negotiations. Prior to making his initial statement to law enforcement, Evans' primary concerns were to be housed in a federal facility and to have visitation privileges with Gail Stewart. Evans' objective, therefore, was to cooperate with federal authorities and provide enough information to establish federal jurisdiction. Specifically, Evans had to establish that he transported Beatrice across state lines. ś 56. Evans relies on Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 97 S.Ct. 202, 50 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976), where the United States Supreme Court held that a confession is not per se inadmissible in a criminal trial because it was made subsequent to an agreed upon plea bargain that did not call for such a confession. However, in Hutto, the Court clearly stated that the issue in that case was not the admissibility in criminal trials of statements made during the plea negotiation process. Id. at 30, n. 3, 97 S.Ct. at 203, n. 3. ś 57. Evans also relies on United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.1977), and United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1978), wherein the Fifth Circuit addressed whether statements made by defendants were inadmissible at a subsequent criminal trial pursuant to Fed.R.Crim. P.11 (e)(6) and Fed.R.Evid. 410. Fed.R.Evid. 410 and Fed. R.Crim. Prac. 11(e)(6) mirror M.R.E. 410. ś 58. The analysis set forth in Robertson is instructive. There, the Court, en banc, held: Plea negotiations are inadmissible, but surely not every discussion between and accused and agents for the government is a plea negotiation. Suppressing evidence of such negotiations serves the policy of insuring a free dialogue only when the accused and the government actually engage in plea negotiations: discussions in advance of the time for pleading with a view to an agreement whereby the defendant will enter a plea in the hope of receiving certain charge or sentence concessions. (citations omitted). Id. at 1365. In Robertson, the court directed that trial courts should carefully consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a discussion should be characterized as a plea negotiation. Id. at 1366. Recognizing the vulnerability of confessions if the accused's subsequent account were the sole determinative factor, the Robertson court directed trial courts to apply a two tiered analysis and determine, first, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances. Id. The Robertson court held that the distinction within this analysis is between offers to do something in furtherance of a negotiated plea, which are inadmissible, and independent admissions of fact, which may be admitted. Id. at 1367 (citations omitted). The Robertson court, citing Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30, 97 S.Ct. 202, 203, 50 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976), held that confessions or admissions which are either made in the absence of plea negotiations or which are wholly independent from any plea negotiations are still admissible. Id. Continuing, the court stated: Generally, a person who has been fully advised of his rights may make a full or partial admission to the arresting officers. Such a statement, if otherwise admissible under the general law of confessions, still is admissible despite the fact that the accused makes some request of those in charge. Such a request, without more, does not transform a confession into a plea negotiation. Id. ś 59. Applying the Robertson analysis to the present case reveals that Evans' statements were not made during plea negotiations. Foremost is the fact that AUSA Golden repeatedly testified that he was not engaged in plea negotiations with Evans. Golden testified that while negotiations had taken place, these were not tied to a plea. Moreover, as reflected in the record, Evans' attorney agreed with Golden during the federal guilty plea hearing that while some agreements had been made, they were not necessarily tied to this plea. As stated earlier, a frustrated Golden left the Detention Center and terminated any discussions. ś 60. At the time Golden left the courthouse, no plea bargain been established. Prior to Golden's departure, a sheet of paper with Evans'desires had been passed between Evans and Golden, but as testified to by Golden, no plea negotiations had taken place nor had Golden expressly agreed to the conditions written on the paper. Golden repeatedly testified that he instructed Evans that he could not agree to allow Evans to plead guilty to federal kidnapping charges because he was not sure that federal authorities had jurisdiction. Following Golden's departure, Evans gave a statement. ś 61. From the record, it appears that Evans was negotiating with the federal authorities with regard to Evans' placement in a federal facility as well as with regard to Evans' desire to plead guilty to federal kidnapping charges. However, after several hours and no basis in fact to establish that a federal crime had occurred, the AUSA left the jail. Therefore, any plea negotiations clearly terminated. Moreover, Evans and his attorney were advised that Golden had left and from this point forward it was a state investigation. Evans' decision to make a statement was clearly motivated by his desire to be housed in a federal facility. A necessary prerequisite to federal housing is of course that Evans be prosecuted for a federal offense. Evans' first inculpatory statement was made after Golden's departure. Therefore, if any plea negotiations had in fact occurred, these had terminated and Evans was now cooperating in order to establish federal jurisdiction. ś 62. Whatever Evans' subjective impressions may have been at the point at which he made his August 10, 1991 statements, this expectation was not reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances. See United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978). Moreover, the case sub judice clearly demonstrates the distinction set forth in Robertson where that court held, distinction will be drawn between offers to do something in furtherance of a negotiated plea, which are inadmissible, and independent admissions of fact which may be admitted. Id. Evans' statements were independent admissions of fact and were therefore admissible. There is no merit to this issue.