Opinion ID: 2033504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Overbroad and Vagueness Issue.

Text: During trial, Reed moved unsuccessfully to dismiss the charge of ongoing criminal conduct on the basis of overbreadth and vagueness. Because Reed raises constitutional issues, our review is de novo. State v. Ryan, 501 N.W.2d 516, 517 (Iowa 1993). Iowa Code section 706A.2(4) provides that [i]t is unlawful for a person to commit specified unlawful activity as defined in section 706A.1. Iowa Code section 706A.1(5) defines specified unlawful activity to mean any act, including any preparatory or completed offense, committed for financial gain on a continuing basis, that is punishable as an indictable offense under the laws of the state in which it occurred and under the laws of this state. Reed contends that the terms preparatory and continuing basis, as used in section 706A.1(5), are both constitutionally overbroad and vague. A. Overbreadth. A statute is overbroad in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution `if it attempts to achieve a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation by means which sweep unnecessarily broad and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.' Ryan, 501 N.W.2d at 517 (quoting City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Iowa 1992)). The overbreadth analysis is confined to an alleged violation of First Amendment rights. Id. at 518. The problem with Reed's overbreadth claim is that, while he does attempt to show how Iowa Code section 706A.1(5) is overbroad, he fails to adequately explain what First Amendment right is violated, or at the very least, to make a First Amendment connection. For this reason, we have nothing further to review. We therefore consider Reed's overbreadth argument waived. See id. B. Vagueness. 1. The void-for-vagueness doctrine. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, `the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983)). In Hunter, we noted that the void-for-vagueness doctrine protects several important values: First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague statute `abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,' it `operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.' Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to `steer far wider of the unlawful zone ... than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.' Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28 (1972)). 2. Standing. When the State charges a defendant with violating a statute, the defendant has standing to claim the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him or her. Id. This does not mean, however, that the defendant necessarily has standing to claim, in addition, that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to others, i.e., a facial challenge. Id. If the statute is constitutional as applied to the defendant, the defendant lacks standing to make a facial challenge to the statute unless a recognized exception applies. Id. In Hunter, we recognized that a facial challenge is permitted if a statute reaches a `substantial amount' of protected conduct under the First Amendment. Id. at 464. Here, as the State correctly notes, Reed does not contend that Iowa Code chapter 706A reaches any protected conduct under the First Amendment. We therefore analyze this issue on an as applied basis only. 3. Vagueness as applied. As mentioned, specified unlawful activity means any act, including any preparatory or completed offense, committed for financial gain on a continuing basis, that is punishable as an indictable offense under the laws of the state in which it occurred and under the laws of this state. Iowa Code § 706A.1(5) (emphasis added). As we said, Reed contends the terms preparatory and continuing basis are vague and have no fixed and understandable meaning in relation to the activity sought to be outlawed by the statute. a. Preparatory: Does the word preparatory refer to act or completed offense? As to the word preparatory, Reed argues that it is not clear whether the term refers to act or completed offense. He asks whether the legislature intended the word preparatory to encompass any act that is done in preparation for the commission of an indictable offense or any completed offense. He concludes that, if the legislature was not speaking of completed offenses, there remains no guidance to inform the individual as to what acts are covered by this statute. In support of his argument, Reed points out that Iowa Code section 706A.1(5) is based upon the Model Ongoing Criminal Conduct Act [hereinafter Model Act] presented by the President's Commission on Model State Drug Laws. As he correctly notes, section 706A.1(5), unlike the Model Act, fails to include a listing of inclusive predicate offenses. See State v. Olsen, 618 N.W.2d 346 (Iowa 2000). Such a listing in the Model Act, Reed argues, makes clear that the definition of specified unlawful activity refers to completed offensesthe identified predicate offenses that represent key components of ongoing criminal networks. Reed concludes that the absence, however, of such a listing in section 706A.1(5) leaves the statute open to argument that the term preparatory need not refer to offenses and may well refer to the word act. Reed argues that if preparatory refers to act a person of ordinary intelligence would have no guidance as to what conduct is prohibited by section 706A.1(5). He contends that any act could be viewed as preparatory to the commission of an offense. He points out, for example, that the purchase of dark clothing could be viewed as preparatory to the commission of a burglary. We reject Reed's argument. The word preparatory clearly refers to offenses rather than to acts. Additionally, the preparatory offense referred to in section 706A.1(5) is limited to those offenses committed for financial gain on a continuing basis and that are punishable as an indictable offense. See Model Act § 4 cmt. It is true that the Model Act limits the preparatory or completed offenses to trafficking in controlled substances, homicide, robbery, extortion, extortionate extensions of credit, trafficking in explosives or weapons, trafficking in stolen property, or obstruction of justice. Model Act § 4(e)(1). It is also true that section 706A.1(5) does not similarly limit preparatory or completed offenses. We view this omission as legislative intent to make our statute more inclusive. See Olsen, 618 N.W.2d at 350. However, as we noted, the preparatory or completed offenses in section 706A.1(5) are still limited to those offenses committed for financial gain on a continuing basis and that are punishable as an indictable offense. We conclude the word preparatory is not unconstitutionally vague on this ground. b. Whether the words preparatory and continuing basis are unconstitutionally vague. Reed alternatively argues that the words preparatory and continuing basis lack a clearly definable meaning. Therefore, he argues, the words offer no guidance to the individual or to the officials charged with enforcing the laws. For reasons that follow, we reject Reed's argument that the words preparatory and continuing basis are unconstitutionally vague. As the State points out, statutory terminology provides a defendant fair warning if the meaning of such terminology is `fairly ascertainable by reference to similar statutes, prior judicial determinations, reference to the dictionary, or if the questioned words have a common and generally accepted meaning.' Hunter, 550 N.W.2d at 465 (quoting State v. Kueny, 215 N.W.2d 215, 217 (Iowa 1974)). i. Preparatory. The dictionary meaning of the word preparatory is preparing or serving to prepare for something. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1790 (unabr. ed.1993). Earlier we noted that the Model Act limits preparatory or completed offenses to trafficking in controlled substances, homicide, robbery, extortion, extortionate extensions of credit, trafficking in explosives or weapons, trafficking in stolen property, or obstruction of justice. Model Act § 4(e)(1). The comment to this section states that specified unlawful activity in section 4(e)(1) of the Model Act should include not only the core offenses, such as offenses related to the provision of illicit goods and services such as drugs, fraud, theft, gambling, prostitution, child pornography, etc. but also offenses related to support services such as violence, corruption, obstruction of justice, money laundering and fencing. Model Act § 4(e)(1) cmt. (emphasis added). These latter offenses are considered preparatory because they prepare or serve to prepare for the core profit-making criminal offenses. In the same vein, we think the Iowa legislature intended the term preparatory in section 706A.1(5) to extend the reach of unlawful activity beyond core offenses in criminal networks and enterprises such as narcotics trafficking and theft to offenses related to support services such as violence, corruption, obstruction of justice, money laundering and fencing. See Iowa Code § 706A.1(1) (defining criminal network), (2) (defining enterprise). ii. Continuing basis. We note that, unlike section 706A.1(5), the Model Act does not contain the language on a continuing basis. Continue means to be steadfast or constant in a course or activity. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 493. As the State suggests, continuing basis in section 706A.1(5) requires proof of a course of criminal activity as opposed to an isolated or one-time act. But as we shall explain, we think continuing basis means more than that. We recently considered the concept of continuing criminal activity in Midwest Heritage Bank, FSB v. Northway, 576 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1998). In Midwest, we had before us a claim of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1995) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). That statute makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (emphasis added). We were considering in Midwest what constitutes a pattern of racketeering. The statute expressly required at least two acts of racketeering. Midwest, 576 N.W.2d at 590, 591. In addition to the two acts, however, we noted that there must also be a showing of a relationship between the predicates [acts of racketeering] and the threat of continuing activity. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern. RICO's legislative history reveals Congress' intent that to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued activity. Midwest, 576 N.W.2d at 591 (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2900, 106 L.Ed.2d 195, 208 (1989)). We also noted in Midwest that [t]he relationship element of a pattern can be shown if the predicate acts `have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.' Id. (quoting H.J., 492 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. at 2901, 106 L.Ed.2d at 208). We further noted in Midwest that, as to the continuity element, H.J. said: `Continuity' is both a closed and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition. It is, in either case, centrally a temporal conceptand particularly so in the RICO context, where what must be continuous, RICO's predicate acts or offenses, and the relationship these predicates must bear one to another, are distinct requirements. A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time. Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement: Congress was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct. Often a RICO action will be brought before continuity can be established in this way. In such cases, liability depends on whether the threat of continuity is demonstrated. Whether the predicates proved establish a threat of continued racketeering activity depends on the specific facts of each case. Id. (quoting H.J., 492 U.S. at 241-42, 109 S.Ct. at 2902, 106 L.Ed.2d at 209) (emphasis added). Given the similarity between the underlying purposes of RICO and Iowa Code chapter 706A, we think the interpretation given to pattern of racketeering activity by the United States Supreme Court in H.J. is a reasonable one for continuing basis in section 706A.1(5). Applying that interpretation here, we conclude Reed's conduct falls squarely within the conduct targeted by the Iowa legislature. The relationship element is easily met: the predicate actsat least three completed offenses of dealing drugs over a two-month periodhave the same or similar purpose. That purpose, of course, was to make a profit by dealing drugs. The predicate acts and the circumstances surrounding those acts also established a threat of continued drug dealing. The stash of drugs recovered, the evidence of numerous past drug sales, and the payment of $30 per month to store the stash all indicate that Reed (1) had an ongoing business in dealing drugs and (2) intended to continue such business in the future.