Opinion ID: 2321640
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Impeachment Evidence

Text: Appellants argue that the workers' compensation interview should not have been used to impeach Daniel Presley because it was inadmissible hearsay and did not actually contradict his testimony. With respect to the hearsay argument, we have largely adopted the traditional common-law rule that a prior inconsistent statement can be used to impeach a witness when the witness testifies at trial in a manner contrary to that [prior] statement; however, the substance of the prior statement cannot be used as evidence of its truth. Johnson v. United States, 820 A.2d 551, 556 (D.C.2003). Here, the record indicates that CMR did not seek the admission of the statements as substantive evidence of its truth, but rather to impeach Daniel Presley. Because the trial court declined to admit the statements as substantive evidence, it is immaterial whether the statement was hearsay. Thus, we reject appellants' contention that Daniel Presley's statements during the worker's compensation interview should have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay. Although the statements were not admitted as substantive evidence, we still need to address appellants' arguments that the prior statements could not be used for impeachment purposes because they were not authenticated and did not actually contradict Daniel Presley's testimony at trial. The trial court addressed both of these issues during final instructions to the jury, as both issues were within the jury's purview. See Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 3-8 (2010 ed. rev.); see also Georgetown Univ. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 862 A.2d 387, 392 (D.C.2004). The trial court instructed the jury to decide whether a witness made a statement on an earlier occasion and whether it was, in fact, inconsistent with the witness' testimony here in court. The trial court further instructed that: If the witness was not under oath and subject to cross examination, they were not at a deposition when he or she made this statement, then you may not treat that prior statement as evidence of the facts in the statement. You may only consider that statement to evaluate the witness' credibility. The trial court's instructions were appropriate and conformed to the Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia. See Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 3-8. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to determine whether Daniel Presley made the prior statements, whether the prior statements were inconsistent, and the effect, if any, that Daniel Presley's prior statements had on his credibility at trial.