Opinion ID: 2487095
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury-instruction errors.

Text: First, Brown contends that the trial court's jury instruction defining reasonable doubt confused and misled the jury, violating the Due Process Clause. Specifically, he argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that the instruction did not violate the principles in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), and in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). Because Brown did not object at trial to the trial court's reasonable-doubt instruction, our review is for plain error. To sustain a criminal conviction, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). In Cage, the United States Supreme Court held that a trial court's instruction to the jury that equated a reasonable doubt with a `grave uncertainty' and an `actual substantial doubt,' and stated that what was required was a `moral certainty' that the defendant was guilty could have been interpreted by a reasonable juror to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. 498 U.S. at 41, 111 S.Ct. 328. In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 and n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991), the United States Supreme Court made clear that the proper inquiry was whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did apply the instruction in an unconstitutional manner, not whether it could have applied it in an unconstitutional manner. In Victor, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that [t]he constitutional question ... is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard. 511 U.S. at 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239. In discussing one of the jury instructions challenged in Victor, the United States Supreme Court recognized that it had stated that `[p]roof to a moral certainty is an equivalent phrase with beyond a reasonable doubt.' Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308, 317, 22 S.Ct. 662, 46 L.Ed. 922 (1902)(approving reasonable doubt instruction cast in terms of moral certainty). 511 U.S. at 12, 114 S.Ct. 1239. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that historically the phrase moral certainty in a jury instruction meant the highest degree of certitude based on [the] evidence but that the term may have lost its historical meaning over time. 511 U.S. at 11, 114 S.Ct. 1239. The United States Supreme Court, however, concluded that when an instruction equated moral certainty with proof beyond a reasonable doubt the instruction satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause and was constitutionally sufficient. The United States Supreme Court emphasized that, although it did not condone the use of the phrase moral certainty, if the jury was instructed that its decision was to be based on the evidence in the case, then the jury understood that moral certainty was associated with the evidence of the case and no constitutional error occurred. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court addressed the use of the phrase substantial doubt and emphasized that when that phrase was used in context to convey the existence rather than the magnitude of doubt there was no likelihood that jury applied the charge unconstitutionally. In this case, the trial court, throughout its instruction to the jury, reminded the jury consistently that its exclusive function was to decide the facts of the case. For example, the trial court instructed the jury: You decide what actually happened on the occasion testified about and complained about. And when you've decided these facts, then you apply the law as I give it to you in my charge and thereby arrive at your verdict. Now, as I've said, you are the trier of the facts. You decide what actually happened from the testimony from the witness stand and from the exhibits introduced into evidence. With regard to the definition of reasonable doubt, the trial court instructed the jury: You will want to know what a reasonable doubt is. That is sometimes rather difficult to define. When I say that the State is under the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, that does not mean that the State must prove an alleged crime beyond every imaginable or speculative doubt and beyond all possibility of mistake because that would be impossible. A reasonable doubt means an actual, substantial doubt arising out of the testimony in this case, or it could arise from the lack of testimony in this case. It is a doubt for which a reason can be assigned. And the expression `to a moral certainty' means practically the same thing as beyond a reasonable doubt. Because if you're convinced to a point you no longer have a reasonable doubt, then you are convinced to a moral certainty. We conclude that the trial court's reasonable-doubt instruction did not lead the jury here to convict on a lesser showing than due process requires. The trial court emphasized that the jury's decision was to be based upon the evidence. The trial court defined the phrase moral certainty as being a synonym for reasonable doubt and explained that a reasonable doubt arose from the evidence in the case or the lack of evidence. Therefore, because the trial court informed the jury that its decision had to be based upon the evidence, no reasonable likelihood exists for a conclusion that the jury would have disassociated the phrase moral certainty from the evidence. Additionally, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have equated a reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt. The trial court made clear that the term substantial was used in the sense of existence, i.e., a doubt arising from the evidence or the lack of evidence. Nothing in the instruction lends itself to the conclusion that substantial doubt refers to the magnitude of doubt. Instead, the trial court stated, [i]t is a doubt for which a reason can be assigned. Therefore, no reasonable likelihood exists that the jury would have interpreted the trial court's instruction as allow[ing] a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. 498 U.S. at 41, 111 S.Ct. 328. Viewing the trial court's jury instruction in its entirety, we hold that the trial court did not commit plain error when instructing the jury on the concept of reasonable doubt. See Ex parte Beavers, 598 So.2d 1320, 1325 (Ala. 1992) (holding a similar reasonable-doubt instruction did not violate Cage ). Brown also contends that plain error occurred when the trial court failed to instruct the jury that a robbery committed as a mere afterthought of the killing is not sufficient to support a conviction for murder made capital because the murder was committed during the course of a first-degree robbery or an attempt thereof. Specifically, he argues that the trial court's instruction that the murder must occur in the course of or in connection with the commission of or in the immediate flight from the commission of the robbery did not adequately instruct the jury that a robbery committed as a `mere afterthought'... will not sustain a conviction under § 13A-5-40(a)(2)[, Ala.Code 1975,] for the capital offense of murder-robbery. Connolly v. State, 500 So.2d 57, 63 (Ala. Crim.App.1985). A review of the trial court's instructions, however, fails to establish that plain error occurred. The trial court specifically instructed the jury that the intent to rob and the intent to kill would have to coexist in the defendant's mind in order for the capital offense to occur. Although the trial court did not state specifically that for the jury to find Brown guilty of capital murder-robbery the taking of the property could not be a mere afterthought of the murder, the trial court's instruction adequately communicated the law by instructing the jury that the robbery had to occur during the course of the murder and that the intent to murder and the intent to rob had to coexist. Plain error did not occur in this regard. See Ex parte Windsor, 683 So.2d 1042, 1058-60 (Ala.1996); Reeves v. State, 807 So.2d 18, 42-44 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000); and Woods v. State, 789 So.2d 896, 932-33 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (recognizing that although the taking of property as a mere afterthought will not support a capital-murder conviction based on an underlying robbery, the trial court does not have to use the term mere afterthought in its jury instructions on the robbery element of the capital murder).