Opinion ID: 1915326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appointments to the CRMC

Text: Having expressed our view that article 1, section 17 has not been impliedly repealed or altered by the adoption of the separation of powers amendments, we must next consider the nature and extent of the legislative power that constitutionally may be exercised pursuant to that provision. We first focus on the language of article 1, section 17 itself: The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore, to which they have been heretofore entitled under the charter and usages of this state, including but not limited to fishing from the shore, the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea and passage along the shore; and they shall be secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the state with due regard for the preservation of their values; and it shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide for the conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal, mineral and other natural resources of the state, and to adopt all means necessary and proper by law to protect the natural environment of the people of the state by providing adequate resource planning for the control and regulation of the use of the natural resources of the state and for the preservation, regeneration and restoration of the natural environment of the state. (Emphasis added.) [11] We have held that the General Assembly's power to regulate marine fisheries is broad and plenary. Riley v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, 941 A.2d 198, 206 (R.I. 2008). Indeed, the justices of this Court have said that the General Assembly's power in this area is plenary    and is no longer open to question. Opinion to the Senate, 87 R.I. 37, 40, 137 A.2d 525, 526 (1958). As recently as last term, this Court found no limitation, in the Constitution, of the power of the General Assembly to legislate in this regard, and [the legislative department] may delegate the administration of [its] regulations to such officers or boards as [it] may see fit. Riley, 941 A.2d at 209; see also Opinion to the Senate, 87 R.I. at 39-40, 137 A.2d at 526. [12] This Court has implicitly recognized that the coordinate branches of government should ordinarily defer to the General Assembly's exercise of its plenary legislative powers. See, e.g., Chang v. University of Rhode Island, 118 R.I. 631, 375 A.2d 925 (1977). In the areas where the General Assembly possesses plenary power, all    determinations [are left] to the General Assembly's broad discretion to adopt the means it deems `necessary and proper' in complying with the constitutional directive. City of Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 56 (emphasis in original); see also Chang, 118 R.I. at 637-38, 375 A.2d at 928-29. However, the plenary powers conferred upon the General Assembly by our Constitution are nonetheless circumscribed by the textual limitations to that power that are specified in the federal or state Constitutions. City of Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 44; see also Riley, 941 A.2d at 209. The foregoing description of the plenary powers of the General Assembly parallels descriptions provided by the United States Supreme Court with respect to the plenary powers of Congress under the United States Constitution; the United States Supreme Court has stated that Congress has plenary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction,    so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)). The Rhode Island Constitution, like the federal Constitution, vests the legislative power of the state in two houses, the one to be called the senate, the other the house of representatives; and both together the general assembly. R.I. Const. art. 6, sec. 2. As is true under the federal constitutional scheme, exercise of the legislative power to make law requires (1) the concurrence of the two chambers of the legislature (bicameralism) and (2) presentation of the adopted bill to the chief executive for endorsement (presentment). Id.; R.I. Const. art. 9, sec. 14. Complete and unlimited delegation of the legislative power to an administrative body, which by its nature cannot satisfy the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, would be unconstitutional. [13] It has long been established, however, that legislatures can delegate so-called quasi-legislative power [14] to other bodies pursuant to the exercise of their plenary powers without offending the nondelegation doctrine, provided that they furnish these entities with sufficient guidance. [15] See, e.g., Almond v. Rhode Island Lottery Commission, 756 A.2d 186, 192 (R.I.2000); see also Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 434 A.2d 266, 271 (R.I.1981) ([I]t is the conditions of the delegation[,] the specificity of the functions delegated, the standards accompanying the delegation, and the safeguards against administrative abuse that we examine in determining the constitutionality of a delegation of power.); see generally Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) ([W]hen Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496, 24 S.Ct. 349, 48 L.Ed. 525 (1904) (We may say of the legislation in this case    that it does not, in any real sense, invest administrative officials with the power of legislation. Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute. To deny the power of Congress to delegate such a duty would, in effect, amount but to declaring that the plenary power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exerted.). The doctrine of separation of powers does not prohibit some overlapping of functions. The resolution of the problems with which government must grapple requires a certain degree of pragmatism; we are not in the pristine realm of algebraic equations, but rather in the complex and infinitely nuanced real world. Accordingly, administrative agencies may combine, to a certain extent, the functions of all three departments of government. See Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 112-13 (R.I.1992) ([R]igid adherence to doctrinaire notions of the nondelegation doctrine would unduly hamper the Legislature's exercise of its constitutionally vested powers.); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121, 96 S.Ct. 612 (noting that there is no hermetic sealing off of the powers delegated to each of the departments of the federal government by virtue of the federal Constitution). [16] Legislative, judicial, and executive functions are routinely and appropriately combined in a single agency. See 1 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, § 2.3 at 40 (4th ed.2002) ([a]gencies are saturated with mixtures of legislative, executive, and judicial powers). Nevertheless, as the United States Supreme Court has noted, the principle of separation of powers will be violated where the legislative department tries to control the execution of its enactments directly, instead of indirectly by passing new legislation. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) ([O]nce Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectlyby passing new legislation.). Direct legislative control of executive powers would be an impermissible usurpation of the central function of a coordinate branch. Given the language of the separation of powers amendments, it is now our task to ascertain whether or not the CRMC exercises executive power. If it does exercise such power to any meaningful degree, then, pursuant to the plain language of the separation of powers amendments, two significant conclusions ineluctably result: (1) no member of the General Assembly nor an appointee of that body may sit on the CRMC; and (2) appointments to the CRMC are to be made exclusively by the Governor (in the exercise of his or her constitutionally conferred appointment power) with the advice and consent of the Senate. Upon examination of the CRMC's organic statute, chapter 23 of title 46, it appears that the CRMC combines functions that must properly be characterized as executive with functions that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature. This is so even though the CRMC is an independent body not subject to direct gubernatorial supervision or control. The executive power is the power to execute the laws, that is, to carry them into effect, as distinguished from the power to make the laws and the power to judge them. 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 255 at 159 (1998); see also 16 Corpus Juris Secundum Constitutional Law § 354 at 593-94 (2005). The executive power is also commonly characterized as being the power relating to the enforcement of the law and the power to administer the law. 16 Corpus Juris Secundum Constitutional Law § 354 at 593. The CRMC's organic statute, which was adopted by the General Assembly pursuant to its plenary power over the state's environmental resources, states that its provisions shall be enforced by the coastal resources management council. Section 46-23-18.4. [17] The CRMC is authorized to administer    programs developed pursuant to its quasi-legislative power to develop policy and adopt regulations. Section 46-23-6(1)(v)(A)(VII). The CRMC may also enforce[] and implement[] riparian rights[.] Section 46-23-6(4)(v). Furthermore, § 46-23-7(a)(2) authorizes [CRMC] staff, conservation officers within the department of environmental management, and state and municipal police    to issue written cease and desist orders in any instance where activity is being conducted which constitutes a violation of any provisions of [the] chapter. In addition, CRMC staff, DEM conservation officers, and police are empowered to apply to a court    for a warrant to enter on private land to investigate possible violations of this chapter. Section 46-23-7(a)(3). The chairperson and the executive director of the CRMC are also authorized to assess an administrative penalty of up to $2,500 for certain violations of the chapter. Section 46-23-7.1(1). It is clear to us that the above-summarized powers and functions of the CRMC are manifestly executive in nature. To state that all of the CRMC's powers and functions are legislative would be to blind oneself to that reality. To do so would be to willfully ignore the language of article 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution, which expressly requires the three departments of government to be separate and distinct. The duties and functions to be conferred on the CRMC pursuant to the proposed legislation are not unconstitutional; the CRMC may constitutionally combine functions that may best be described as quasi-legislative, executive, and quasi-judicial in nature. In our opinion, the proposed CRMC legislation, which is the subject of the questions posed to us, cannot be reconciled with our Constitution to the extent that it would permit sitting legislators to serve on the CRMC and would allow the General Assembly to make some appointments to that body. [18] In other words, in view of the fact that the CRMC exercises executive power, the Governor has the right to appoint its members with the advice and consent of the Senate. We are impressed by the following passage from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976): The position that because [the legislature] has been given explicit and plenary authority to regulate a field of activity, it must therefore have the power to appoint those who are to administer the regulatory statute is both novel and contrary to the language of the Appointments Clause. Id. at 132, 96 S.Ct. 612. We believe that those words are equally applicable to the substantially parallel appointment provision (article 9, section 5) contained in our own recently amended Constitution. Under the Rhode Island Constitution, the Governor has, by virtue of the separation of powers amendments, been explicitly granted the power of appointment, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate; he has that power of appointment with respect to all officers and all members of public bodies exercising executive power. R.I. Const. art. 9, sec. 5. We would observe that the United States Supreme Court in Buckley spoke similarly about the President's power to make appointments: [19] Principal officers are selected by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Inferior officers Congress may allow to be appointed by the President alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary. No class or type of officer is excluded because of its special functions.    Neither has it been disputed    that the [Appointments] Clause controls the appointment of the members of a typical administrative agency even though its functions, as this Court [has] recognized   , may be `predominantly quasijudicial and quasilegislative' rather than executive. The Court [has]    carefully emphasized that although the members of such agencies were to be independent of the Executive in their day-to-day operations, the Executive was not excluded from selecting them. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132-33, 96 S.Ct. 612 (quoting Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625-26, 55 S.Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935)). Without retreating from the foregoing views with respect to the effect of the separation of powers amendments on the appointment process, we would also emphasize that the General Assembly remains fully empowered to carry out its constitutional duty to protect the natural environment of the state through the vigorous and proactive exercise of its legislative powers. Nothing written in this advisory opinion should be construed as implying that the General Assembly does not retain the fullness of its constitutionally bestowed fact-finding powers and oversight responsibility with respect to the protection of the natural environment. We also note that the legislative branch of our state government also retains an important role in the appointment process due to the fact that the Senate may approve or reject gubernatorial appointments. It is also important to note that the General Assembly retains without diminution its vast constitutional power to enact, revise, or repeal laws concerning coastal management and preservation of natural resources. [20] In the course of exercising its plenary legislative power, the General Assembly may, for example, (1) provide specific criteria with respect to CRMC membership composition and qualifications; (2) narrow or expand the mandate of the CRMC; (3) adopt more elaborate oversight procedures and safeguards; (4) mandate training for new CRMC members; (5) require periodic reports on CRMC activities; (6) retain the right to review CRMC decisions in discrete areas relating to budget or revenue; (7) create a joint subcommittee to oversee coastal resources management; (8) create procedures for the thorough and rigorous vetting of CRMC nominees (including disclosure statements); (9) limit the Governor's removal power; (10) assume performance of the CRMC's rulemaking functions; or (11) restructure the CRMC in to one or more bodies exercising either purely quasi-legislative or purely executive functions. [21] Some of these approaches, and others, have been suggested in various bills that were introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate, particularly during the period following adoption of separation of powers, when the organic legislation of many administrative bodies was being brought into conformity with the requirements of the new system. See, e.g., 2005-H 5003, § 27 (concerning qualifications for appointment to the CRMC); 2005-H 5074, § 1 (abolishing the state lottery commission, establishing a state lottery division within the Department of Administration, and proposing a permanent joint committee on state lottery); 2005-H 5271, § 1 (proposing creation of a sunset commission to assist the General Assembly in oversight and review of administrative entities); 2005-H 5818, §§ 1-2 (concerning appointment to the CRMC, procedures for removal, reporting requirements, and training requirements for new members); 2005-H 6172, § 1 (concerning annual reporting requirements of the water resources board); 2008-S 2855, § 1 (concerning appointments to the CRMC, reporting requirements, and training requirements for new members). We do not, by making reference to these previously proposed bills, imply our endorsement of any particular bill, proposal, or statutory scheme, nor should we be read as opining on the constitutionality vel non of any of the various approaches; we simply wish to observe that creative proposals for legislative modifications with respect to the CRMC and other administrative bodies constituted pursuant to the General Assembly's exercise of its plenary powers have been made and surely will continue to be made. In addition to considering the above-noted proposals, the General Assembly is free to adopt, by law, any other approach to carrying out its duty to preserve the natural resources of the state pursuant to article 1, section 17 that is not repugnant to our Constitution. We conclude by respectfully urging the Governor and the General Assembly to discuss the various subjects addressed in this advisory opinion with the goal of reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement regarding the rights and duties conferred upon each department by the terms of our Constitution. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Chief Justice Frank J. Williams /s/ Justice Francis X. Flaherty /s/ Justice Paul A. Suttell /s/ Justice William P. Robinson III /s/