Opinion ID: 150167
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Placement Agreement and the Handbook

Text: Under the Placement Agreement and the Handbook, the Home had the right to control many facets of I.H.'s care. Under the Agreement, Norton was assigned a Topton foster care caseworker. [11] In addition, Norton agreed that [f]requent contacts between the caseworker ... and the foster parents [we]re necessary [so] both c[ould] discuss observations, difficulties, general development, and future plans regarding [I.H.]. To that end, the Agreement provided for biweekly visits by the caseworker to the foster home for the first two months of placement and monthly visits thereafter (at the discretion of the caseworker and supervisor). Apart from these ongoing visits, the Home also set various standards for I.H.'s care. In its Handbook, the Home detail[ed] foster care practices, foster parent/Topton roles and responsibilities, and current foster care regulations. As new foster parents, the Nortons were required to participate in an orientation, which outlined Topton philosophy, practices, foster parent and Topton's roles and responsibilities, and applicable regulations for foster care. These practices and regulations included rules dealing with a foster child's money, clothing, medical and dental treatment, education, employment, transportation, recreation, religious practices, tobacco use, and vacations. They also included standards that governed its foster parents on everything from disciplinary practices to the frequency of photograph-taking. The Home even reserve[d] the right to question the adequacy of meals, clothing, recreational opportunities, or other needs being provided by the foster family. In addition to these paper provisions, the level of control that the Home actually exercised during I.H.'s placement further suggests the limited scope of foster parent autonomy within the Home's foster care programwith the Home's frequent phone calls and visits (to say nothing of their direct interventions involving the Nortons and I.H.). While true that the relationship between Norton and I.H. was not that of a biological parent and his children, [12] this does not settle the master-servant question. The test is not whether Norton retained as much control over I.H. as a biological parent; it is whether the Home had sufficient control over Norton to result in a master-servant relationship. We hold that it did not. First, in the Placement Agreement, Norton agreed to be responsible for meeting the physical, social[,] and emotional needs of [I.H.] on an ongoing basis, leaving the Home with the related responsibility of assisting Norton in achieving these goals. This passage alone suggests a division of labor inconsistent with a master-servant relationship, with Norton responsible for daily parenting decisions and the Home merely responsible for setting goals and providing additional support (as needed). Under Pennsylvania law, that the Home set[] certain standards in order to maintain a uniform quality of ... service only addresse[d] the result of the work and not the manner in which it [wa]s conducted. Myszkowski, 634 A.2d at 627 (emphases in original). This is insufficient to establish a master-servant relationship. Second, in the specific context of transportation, the Home's responsibilities under the Service Contract were narrow, and its control over Norton attenuated: the Home simply agreed to guarantee[] all drivers hold a valid, appropriate driver's license. The Placement Agreement is not in tension with this. Rather than exerting continuous control over Norton's manner of driving, the Home stipulated that anyone driving I.H. had to have a driver's license and adequate insurance coverage subject to certain common-sense (and state-imposed) safety guidelines. [13] Indeed, the Home even permitted other adults to drive I.H., at the discretion of Norton, subject only to the expectation that Norton knows the driver, the destination, and is able to validate that the driver has a current motor vehicle driver's license and adequate insurance coverage. Taken together, these requirements fulfilled the Home's obligations under the Service Contract and established less extensive control over Norton's transportation responsibilities than in other areas. Finally, the source of many of the more invasive requirements within the Placement Agreement was the Commonwealth itselfeither through statute or regulationnot the Home. Under Pennsylvania law, these requirements alone do not result in a master-servant relationship. In Universal Am-Can, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an agreement between a hauling company and the owner-operator of a tractor-trailer did not establish a master-servant relationship. On examining the agreement between the parties, the Court observed that its provisions were for the most part governed by federal regulations, including requirements for mandatory inspections, for observing speed limits, and for covering loads with tarps. Universal Am-Can, 762 A.2d at 334, 335. It added: Factors which demonstrate compliance with government regulations do not assist in the application of the [right-of-control] test. The existence of the regulations precludes [the parties] from negotiating any terms subject to the regulations. Neither party has bargaining power, or the ability to control the work to be done, when dealing with matters subject to regulation. Id. at 334-35. As a result, the Court concluded that the regulations were not probative of the master-servant issue, as they reflect the control of the government, not the motor carrier. Id. at 336. Because federal and state regulations controlled the essential elements of the trucker's work, the Court concluded that other features of the Agreement (which were not dictated by government regulations) also fell short of establishing a master-servant relationship. These additional features included requirements to communicate with the dispatcher every 12 or 24 hours, submit fuel and toll receipts, and take a mandatory one-hour stop for meals. See id. at 337-38 (Cappy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [14] The Home argues that the same is true here. And, indeed, the Placement Agreement and Handbook do overlap with state regulations in many key areas. For instance, the Pennsylvania Administrative Code reads: The county agency shall provide an opportunity for a child placed in a foster home or child care facility which it administers to participate in religious activities, services[,] and counseling, taking into account the choices specified by the parents or guardian or the child. 55 Pa. Code § 3130.86. The Placement Agreement largely tracks the Code's language, providing that [a]ll children are to be given reasonable opportunities for religious expression within the broad religious preferences of their choice or that of their parents. This is only one of several examples of how the Placement Agreement and the Handbook track state regulations. Others include the regulation of a foster child's money, [15] education, [16] safety, [17] medical and dental care, [18] residence, [19] grievance procedures, [20] transportation requirements, [21] and constraints on parental autonomy (including methods of discipline [22] and training [23] requirements). I.H. counters that not every provision in the Placement Agreement and Handbook was a product of state regulations. For instance, the Home included certain disciplinary practices beyond those enumerated under Pennsylvania law. The Home also exercised final authority over whether a child could partake in certain childhood rights-of-passage, including holding a summer job and driving a car. Finally, foster parents were prohibited from sign[ing] any papers or documents other than school absence excuses, report cards[,] or items of a routine nature. I.H. contends that, even if Universal Am-Can applied, these additional provisions, among many others, would be enough to establish a master-servant relationship. We disagree. Universal Am-Can does not mean that all requirements within an agreement must be the product of government regulations. Instead, in this case we must consider the foster care agency-foster parent relationship in light of related state regulations, as well as the provisions imposed by the Home itself.