Opinion ID: 2071076
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: COUNT II: SCR 20:3.1(a)(3)

Text: ¶ 50. We turn to the second count in the disciplinary complaint filed against Arthur. The disciplinary complaint alleged and the referee found that Arthur violated SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) which provides that, in representing a client, a lawyer shall not file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such an action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another. ¶ 51. Arthur levies several challenges to the referee's findings and conclusion. We will address the most significant of these arguments. The referee's extensive findings in relation to this court are summarized as follows: Arthur told Attorney Schmukler that Ms. Doyle might find the litigation process unpleasant. Arthur and his wife, Attorney Mary Kathleen Arthur, sent a series of letters attempting to intimidate Attorney Schmukler, such as indicating that Mary Kathleen was a former district attorney in Dodge County, alleging conspiracy and abuse of process, and threatening to sue Attorney Schmukler personally if the Doyle action was not dismissed. In response to Ms. Doyle's complaint, filing an amended complaint alleging Ms. Doyle acted in concert with the Keefes to defame or otherwise injure him. Approving Attorney Mary Kathleen Arthur's filing of a petition for supervisory writ in the court of appeals, including the execution of affidavits accusing the judge of ulterior motives and bias without specific facts to support the claims. Following the default judgment against him, filing an indemnification claim with his insurance carrier, impleading Ms. Doyle and her attorney, alleging they had maliciously conspired with the Keefes to harm him, notwithstanding previous rulings that they had not so conspired. See Heritage Mutual Ins. Co. v. Arthur et al., 97 CV 9686. Filing a complaint with the Department of Agriculture against the Keefes one day before Randy Keefe was scheduled to testify in the disciplinary matter. Other examples of harassing litigation tactics employed by Arthur in other cases, such as suing judges and opposing counsel in various actions in order to harass or induce them to withdraw from cases, in one instance commenting that he had an attorney by the nuts and was going to jerk them for the next five years by filing an action unless they agreed to his terms. ¶ 52. Arthur suggests that any findings made in connection with the Juneau County lawsuit should be considered void based on his contention Attorney Schmukler committed misconduct by submitting certain documents to the court. With respect to the specific comment made to Attorney Schmukler that Ms. Doyle might find the litigation process unpleasant, Arthur defends this statement and expresses incredulity that he would be disciplined for what he deems to be his effort to take the moral high-ground. He suggests the Referee's Report seems to assert that it constitutes professional misconduct for a lawyer to indicate in writing that he or she even intends to abide by SCR 20:8.3. Similarly, he disputes that he intended to intimidate opposing counsel. ¶ 53. The referee obviously found otherwise. Discerning the intent behind an attorney's statement to opposing counsel frequently requires a credibility determination by the referee. Here, Arthur did not persuade the referee that the Juneau County default judgment should be wholly ignored because of Attorney Schmukler's conduct, or that his own comments to Attorney Schmukler were made in good faith. Nor, apparently, did he persuade the referee that the Keefes were wholly lacking in credibility, or that he, himself, was entitled to much credibility. It is well settled that where there is conflicting testimony, the referee, as finder of fact, is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses. See, e.g., Swartwout, 116 Wis. 2d 380; Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 87 Wis. 2d 243, 274 N.W.2d 647 (1979). We will not disturb the referee's credibility determinations here. ¶ 54. Arthur generally defends his litigation style and strategy. He blames the Keefes, who certainly contributed to the extent of the litigation. Arthur also challenges the referee's findings regarding his conduct in litigation not mentioned in the disciplinary complaint. He asserts that he had inadequate notice of these allegations, and suggests this implicates his due process rights. While the complaint contains specific allegations regarding the transactions and litigation among the Keefes and Ms. Doyle, it is true that the complaint does not reference allegations of Arthur's conduct in other court proceedings. ¶ 55. The referee made findings that Arthur has engaged in a pattern of harassing conduct for more than a decade, finding, specifically, that Arthur has sued opposing counsel and judges in various matters, and has threatened to file disciplinary grievances against lawyers and judges in other matters; noted other trial courts have found such tactics to be frivolous, commenced, used, and continued in bad faith and solely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring another. The referee also made reference to statements by several judges that Arthur was not credible. [7] ¶ 56. We conclude that there is no need for this court to decide whether there was sufficient notice of the findings regarding Arthur's misuse of the litigation process beyond the Doyle and Keefe matters, because these findings are not necessary to sustain a conclusion that Arthur violated SCR 20:3.1(a).