Opinion ID: 2455584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency challenges

Text: ¶ 17 Charges are factually sufficient if taken as a whole they ... state sufficient facts to identify to the electors and to the official being recalled acts or failures to act which without justification would constitute a prima facie showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of oath of office. Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wash.2d 268, 274, 693 P.2d 71 (1984). [4] Voters may draw reasonable inferences from the facts; the fact that conclusions have been drawn by the petitioner is not fatal to the sufficiency of the allegations. West, 155 Wash.2d at 665, 121 P.3d 1190. To be legally sufficient, the charges must specifically allege substantial conduct amounting to misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of the oath of office. Id. at 667, 121 P.3d 1190 (citing Kast, 144 Wash.2d at 815, 31 P.3d 677). The legal sufficiency requirement protects officials from being recalled for appropriately exercising the discretion granted him or her by law. Chandler, 103 Wash.2d at 274, 693 P.2d 71. Officials may not be recalled for their discretionary acts absent manifest abuse of discretion. In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wash.2d 255, 264, 961 P.2d 343 (1998) (citing In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wash.2d 662, 670, 953 P.2d 82 (1998)). When an official is charged with violating the law, there must be evidence presented that leads to the conclusion that the public official intended to commit an unlawful act. Id. at 263, 961 P.2d 343 (citing Sandhaus, 134 Wash.2d at 668, 953 P.2d 82). Even if the charge is legally sufficient as pleaded, if an elected official can show a legally cognizable justification ... that justification renders a recall petition legally insufficient. Greco v. Parsons, 105 Wash.2d 669, 671, 717 P.2d 1368 (1986) (holding that auditor could not be recalled for failing to implement ordinance requiring precinct boundaries to be withdrawn when the county failed to allocate sufficient time or money to make it so). ¶ 18 We review legal questions de novo, but [w]e do not consider claims insufficiently argued by the parties. State v. Ford, 137 Wash.2d 472, 477 n. 1, 973 P.2d 452 (1999) (citing State v. Elliott, 114 Wash.2d 6, 15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990)). We construe the statute in favor of the voter. See West, 155 Wash.2d at 663, 121 P.3d 1190 (citing Kast, 144 Wash.2d at 813, 31 P.3d 677). ¶ 19 Washam brings general challenges to the factual sufficiency of all the charges on the theory that since the attachments were not verified, the court should not rely upon them. Since we find the amendment was proper, the trial court could consider the three investigative reports Farris filed with her charges. Thus his general challenge to the factual sufficiency of the charges is unavailing. [5] We turn to his challenges to legal sufficiency. ¶ 20 Charge 1. Farris charged that Mr. Washam violated the Pierce County Code 3.14.030(c) Reporting Improper Government ActionEmployee Protection, Pierce County Code 3.14.030(d) Retaliatory Action Prohibited, and Pierce County Code 3.14.030(e) Confidentiality of a Person Filing a Complaint. CP at 195. This charge arose from alleged retaliation against Sally Barnes. An investigator hired by the county found such retaliation. Such retaliation specifically violates Pierce County Code (PCC) 3.14.030. [6] Judge Felnagle summarized the charge as retaliating against an employee for filing a complaint against him between January 22, 2009 and March 16, 2010. [7] CP at 549. ¶ 21 Washam contends that he had a legally cognizable justification for discretionary personnel decisions, Opening Br. at 30, but he does not further elaborate what that cognizable justification might have been. While our review is de novo, mere invocation of a legally cognizable justification is not enough. We need a more substantial statement of the alleged justifications before we can weigh whether they are cognizable or lawful. This charge is legally sufficient. ¶ 22 Charge 2. Farris charged Gross Waste of Public Funds as defined in RCW 42.40.020(5). [8] CP at 196. She pointed to the use of hundreds of thousands of dollars pursuing criminal charges for his predecessor's use of statistical valuation rather than the physical inspections required by law and briefly outlined the history of Washam's attempt to pursue his predecessors. CP at 196-97. This charge was summarized by the trial court as grossly wasting public funds in pursuing criminal charges against his predecessor as Assessor-Treasurer from January 2, 2009 until October 29, 2010. CP at 549. ¶ 23 It is, as Farris concedes, entirely proper for elected officials to examine the lawfulness of their predecessors' (or contemporaries') actions. It may even be laudable. In the general course of events, it is not a recallable offense. In many cases it may be appropriate for an official to pursue mandamus or other legal issue against the advice of counsel. Only if such an activity can be properly characterized as gross waste of public funds does it satisfy the legal sufficiency requirement. A trial judge found that the predecessor's actions were legally justifiable because he had been given insufficient funds to perform a physical inspection, and yet Washam spent an enormous amount of his office's time, and the time of the state auditor, attorney general, and the Pierce County prosecuting attorney, pushing for some sort of sanction. An investigator specifically found that Washam's pursuit of his predecessor was uses of public funds grossly deviating from what a reasonable person would do. CP at 144. [9] ¶ 24 Judge Felnagle struggled with the legal sufficiency of this claim. As he said: What about legal sufficiency? There are a couple of questions there. One, was his pursuit of the issues surrounding his predecessor within the realm of his discretion, and/or was it legally cognizablewas it legally something that was within his area of justification? Could he justify it legally, I guess is the best way to say that. And I would say that there's a good argument for it being within his area of discretion and for it being legally justifiable for him to have pursued the issue up to a point, and that point is where you begin to get legal advice and you begin to, arguably, reject or ignore the legal advice. The next question becomes, was this intention or was it just a question of bad judgment. You know, that's a hard line to draw, but I liken this, when I thought about it, to the novel Moby Dick. And in Moby Dick, Captain Ahab is obsessed with getting the white whale, and he's obsessed with getting the white whale to the extent that he's willing to take down his ship and his crew in the process. And what we see here is an allegation that, when warned about the lack of legal basis, the argument goes that the elected official continues on seeking out his white whale, in this case, his predecessor in office, even to the extent that it's going to jeopardize his crew, in this case, the tax-paying public. VRP (Dec. 16, 2010) at 35-36. Judge Felnagle concluded that the charge was legally sufficient on the theory that any elected official is required to be a good steward for the public's money, and to not do so is to not perform your duties in a proper manner and it's not following or discharging the duty required of you as a public, elected official. Id. at 36-37. The simple fact is that we do not consider claims insufficiently argued by the parties. Ford, 137 Wash.2d at 477 n. 1, 973 P.2d 452 (citing Elliott, 114 Wash.2d at 15, 785 P.2d 440). Washam's arguments in this case are conclusory and unhelpful. ¶ 25 At some point, appropriate investigation becomes a gross waste of public funds under RCW 42.40.020(5) and a recallable charge. An investigation specifically found a gross waste of public funds and that Washam misrepresented to the Pierce County prosecutor what the attorney general had told him on the subject. We find this charge of gross waste of public funds is factually and legally sufficient. ¶ 26 Charge 3. Farris charged that Mr. Washam violated the Pierce County Code Chapter 3.14.030(C), Improper Governmental Action, by failing to rectify his retaliatory acts and 3.16 Equal Employment Opportunity Policy. `Under Chapter 3.16, he failed to protect Sally Barnes from retaliation, false accusations, or future improper treatment and has not taken reasonably prompt and effective measures.' CP at 197. This charge was summarized by the trial court as failing to protect the employee from retaliation, false accusations or future improper treatment between January 22, 2009 and March 16, 2010, and by failing thereafter to rectify his retaliatory actions against his employee. CP at 549. ¶ 27 Washam claims that this charge must be struck because he had an unnamed legally cognizable justification and lawful intent for his actions. Opening Br. at 31-32. We note that the investigative reports lay out in painstaking detail how Washam violated local whistleblower law, and Washam does not elaborate as to what his legally cognizable justification might have been. See, e.g., CP at 31-35, 52-57 (laying out retaliation in detail); see also chs. 3.14, 3.16 PPC (protecting whistleblowers). The facts support an inference of willful intent. This claim is legally sufficient. ¶ 28 Charge 4. [10] Farris charged that Washam Violated Pierce County Code 3.16.080(A)Deliberate non-participation in Discrimination and Retaliation investigation held on August 7, 2009, May 25, 2010, and August 12, 2010, and RCW 42.20.080, Other Violation by Officers. CP at 198. Farris briefly outlines how all three investigators found Washam had not cooperated. This charge was summarized by the trial court as refusing to participate in investigations of whether he had discriminated and retaliated against his employees between January 22, 2009 and March 16, 2010. CP at 549. ¶ 29 Washam was required by law to cooperate with the investigators, and the investigative reports lay out in detail how he failed to do so. E.g., CP at 23-24, 135-37, 146 (investigators detailing lack of cooperation); PCC 3.16.080(A); [11] RCW 42.20.080. [12] While Washam suggests there was a question of intent, the facts presented support an inference that it was unlawful. This charge is legally sufficient. ¶ 30 Charge 5. Farris charged that Mr. Washam violated his Oath of Office by knowingly and purposefully violating the RCW 42.20.080 and Pierce County Code 3.14.030(C), 3.14.030(D), 3.14.030(F), 3.15.020(B)(2), 3.16.090 and the intent of the law covered under RCW 42.40.020(5). CP at 199. She alleged this was a violation of his oath of office to support the laws. This charge was summarized by the trial court as discharging his duties in an unlawful and biased manner from January 2, 2009 until October 29, 2010. CP at 549. Washam contends that he had a legally cognizable justification for all he did regarding discretionary personnel decisions, without informing us of the basis of this claim. Opening Br. at 33. Without that information, his argument is unavailing.