Opinion ID: 3009517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Under international law, [s]hips have the

Text: nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. Convention on the High Seas of 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, art. 5(l). See also, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 501 (A ship has the nationality of the state that registered it and authorized it to fly the ship's flag. . . .). Therefore, a vessel is without nationality if it is not authorized to fly the flag of any state. See H. Meyers, The Nationality of Ships 309 (1967). This situation may arise if no state has ever authorized a particular ship to fly its flag, if a state has canceled its authorization, or if the political entity that authorized a ship to fly its flag is not recognized as an international person. See id. at 309323; 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law § 260 (8th ed. 1955) There may be other situations in which ships would be regarded as without nationality under international law, but we will not attempt to provide a comprehensive catalog here. For present purposes, it is enough to note that, under international law, the core of the concept of a vessel that is without nationality or stateless is that the vessel lacks authorization to fly the flag of any recognized state. Thus, any vessel that falls within this 7 . See also H.R. Rep. No. 323, supra, at 22 (The terms of art used in the proposed [1980] amendment are defined so as to comport with international law. . . .). category is without nationality under 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2), whether or not that vessel also satisfies subsections (A) or (B) of that provision. These subsections add to the concept of a stateless vessel under international law and appear to be designed to make it practicable for Coast Guard ships to ascertain whether a suspicious vessel encountered at sea is stateless. Without subsections (A) and (B), establishing that a vessel is without nationality -- i.e., that no state authorizes it to fly its flag -- would present the difficulties often associated with proving a negative. Subsections (A) and (B) attempt to alleviate these difficulties by placing upon the master or person in charge of the vessel in question the burden of making a claim of nationality or registry. If the master or person in charge makes a false claim of nationality or registry (46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2)(A)), or if, upon request, the master or person in charge, fails to make any claim, the ship is deemed to be stateless. 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(2)(B). In summary, then, we interpret 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2) to mean that a vessel is without nationality if (a) the vessel is stateless under international law, which generally will mean that the vessel is not authorized by any state to fly its flag or (b) that the vessel falls within subsections (A) or (B). With this understanding of 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2) in mind, we now consider the jury instructions given in this case. C. The district court properly instructed the jury that the prosecution could establish that the TUTO was a vessel without nationality by showing that the requirements of 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2)(A) or (B) had been met. However, at the urging of the prosecution, the court then added: You may also consider the totality of the evidence in determining whether a vessel is stateless or without nationality. You may consider but you are not limited in considering whether the vessel was flying a flag, whether it had its home port shown on the hull, whether it was or had been validly registered under the law of any nation, whether it displayed a registration number identified with a specific country, whether there was a fake claim of country or registry. You may consider all of these factors but you are not limited. App. C-381A. The apparent purpose of this instruction was to explain to the jury how a vessel might qualify as one without nationality even if it did not fall within 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2)(A) or (B). As we have attempted to show, a vessel can so qualify if it is stateless under international law. The instruction given by the district court, however, did not correspond with the meaning of a stateless vessel under international law. Instead it implied --incorrectly -- that the jury could find that the TUTO was stateless based on an unstructured weighing of the totality of the evidence, including the factors that the court specifically mentioned.8 We are not 8 . This implication appears to be precisely what the government intended. See, e.g., A-142A (Gov't. district court brief arguing that the determination of statelessness must be based on the aware of any support for such a rule in either international law or the law of this country. In its brief on appeal,9 its district court briefs,10 and its jury instruction requests,11 the government relied on a list of court of appeals decisions as authority for the proposition that a totality of the evidence test was proper.12 (..continued) totality of the circumstances); Gov't's Requested Jury Instruction No. 4. And the district court agreed with the government's position. See C-176A to C-183A; C-236A to-C237A. 9 . See Gov't Br. at 12-13. 10 . See, e.g., A-142A; Gov't's Response to Defendant Pineda's Motion to Suppress at 5-6. 11 . See Gov't's Requested Jury Instruction No 4. 12 . The government relied on the following cases: United States v. Cuevas-Esquivel, 905 F.2d 510, 513 (1st Cir.) (vessel stateless because master or person in charge, on request, did not make claim of nationality or registry that satisfied 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2)); cert. denied, 498 U.S. 969 (1987); United States v. Fuentes, 877 F.2d 898 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Victoria, 876 F.2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1989) (vessel stateless under 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2)(B) because it failed on request to make a claim of nationality or registry); United States v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043 (11th Cir. 1987) (ship assimilated to one without nationality because conflicting claims of nationality made), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 969 (1987); United States v. Gonzalez, 810 F.2d 1538, 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1987) (vessel stateless, apparently because it sailed under authority of two nations and made false claim of nationality); United States v. Matute, 767 F.2d 1511, 1512-13 (11th Cir. 1985) (ship assimilated to one without nationality because sailing under hybrid Colombian/Venezuelan flag); United States v. Marquez, 759 F.2d 864, 867 (11th Cir. 1985) (vessel stateless on ground not registered anywhere); United States v. Martinez, 700 F.2d 1358, 1367 (11th Cir. 1983) (ship assimilated to one without nationality because conflicting claims of nationality made); United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.3 (11th Cir. 1982) (vessel stateless based on false assertion of nationality and conflicting indicia of nationality), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1114 (1983). We have studied these cases, and we do not believe that they support the government's position. While it is certainly true that most of these decisions, in considering whether a particular vessel had been shown to be stateless, rely on one or more of the factors enumerated in the jury instruction at issue, none of the decisions employs a test resembling that advocated by the government and accepted by the district court. Instead, most of these decisions rely on one or more of the enumerated factors in determining whether the requirements of 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2)(A) or (B) (or a related statutory provision) had been met. While we will not discuss all of the cases cited by the government, we will discuss one representative case to illustrate the error in the government's reading of these precedents. The first factor listed in the jury instruction at issue was whether the vessel was flying a flag. In its appellate brief, the government defends this portion of the instruction by citing, among other cases, United States v. Fuentes, 877 F.2d 895, 900 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989). There, the court held that a ship was without nationality under 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2)(B) because the master or person in charge failed, upon request, to make a claim of nationality or registry within the meaning of 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(3). Under this latter provision, one means of making a claim of nationality or registry is by flying [the] flag nation's ensign or flag (46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(3)(B)), and it was in this context that the Fuentes court relied on the fact that the ship in that case flew no flag. See Fuentes, 877 F.2d at 900. Thus, Fuentes does not stand for the proposition that a ship may be found to be stateless based on an unstructured weighing of the totality of the evidence. And the same is true of the other cases on which the government relies. D. While we are convinced that the jury instruction discussed above was incorrect, it is a closer question whether the defendants preserved valid objections to it. Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that [n]o party may assign as error any portion of [a jury] charge . . . unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection. Here, there is no question that the defendants objected, but we must also consider the adequacy of their explanations of the grounds for their objections. In this regard, we have explained: The specificity requirement [of Rule 30] imposes a strict standard on defense counsel, but it is not a mere formalism. United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1128-29 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1029, 106 S. Ct. 1233, 89 L.Ed.2d 342 (1986). Without a clearly articulated objection, a trial judge is not apprised sufficiently of the contested issue and the need to cure a potential error to avoid a new trial. Id. at 1129 (citing United States v. Graham, 758 F.2d 879, 883 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901, 106 S. Ct. 226, 88 L.Ed.2d 226 (1985)). Government of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 631 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 556 (1993). Whether the defendants complied with Rule 30 in this case is not entirely free from doubt. Just as the government's interpretation of the term vessel without nationality was incorrect, the clearest alternative interpretation advanced by the defendants was also erroneous. Under this interpretation, which was embodied in the instructions requested by one of the defendants, a vessel could be found to be without nationality only if the requirements of 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2)(A) or (B) were met.13 As we have explained, however, this interpretation is plainly inconsistent with the statutory language. Moreover, it is not clear that any of the defense attorneys ever provided the district court with a complete and correct interpretation of the term vessel without nationality. Nevertheless, defense counsel, in objecting to the court's charge, did provide a clear and accurate explanation as to why that charge was not supported by the authorities upon which the government relied. To take one example, counsel for defendant Tovar stated that he had read the cases cited by the government and had found that the factors enumerated in the court's charge had been mentioned in those cases merely as ancillary facts and not as the reason for the determination  or the deciding factor. C-180A. See also, e.g., C-234A to C- 236A. Other defense attorneys made similar arguments (see id. at C-179A), and it appears that defense counsel were generally deemed by the district court as having joined in each other's 13 . See Defendant Tovar's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 1. arguments. We also note that the government has not argued on appeal that we should review the portion of the instruction at issue under a plain error standard.14 For these reasons, we hold that the defendants preserved valid objections to the erroneous portion of the instructions. That error was not harmless since it concerned the meaning of one of the elements of the offense and, as discussed below (see page 21, infra), the evidence relating to this element was close. The defendants' convictions must therefore be reversed. E. The defendants contend, however, that we must go further and order the entry of judgments of acquittal because the government's evidence was insufficient to establish that the TUTO was stateless. We hold, however, that prosecution's evidence was sufficient to create a jury question under either 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2)(A) or (B). As previously noted, under subsection (A), the prosecution can establish that a vessel is stateless by showing that the master or person in charge made a claim of nationality or registry that was denied by the flag nation whose registry was claimed. Here, the crew of the boat that we have been referring to as the TUTO told the GALLATIN boarding party that their vessel was Colombian, and that vessel bore the name TUTO and a registration number. The Colombian government could not confirm that the TUTO was registered under the laws of Colombia. Based on these facts, a rational jury could conclude (a) that one or 14 . See Gov't Br. at 3, 26-27. more of the crew members were in charge of the boat and (b) that their oral statement, coupled with the markings on their boat, constituted a claim that the boat was registered in Colombia under the name and number that it bore,15 and that the Colombian government denied that claim. While a rational jury could interpret this evidence differently, we believe that the proof was sufficient to satisfy subsection (A). Similarly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy subsection (B). Under this provision, as noted, if the master or person in charge fails, upon request, to make any claim of nationality or registry, the vessel may be regarded as stateless. By clear implication, we believe, this provision applies when the master of a ship flees and leaves no one in charge, and in this case, a rational jury could certainly find that that is exactly what occurred. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the TUTO was stateless, and the defendants are not entitled to judgments of acquittal.16 15 . The markings on a vessel cannot constitute a claim of nationality or registry. See 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(3). However, when a claim of nationality or registry is made without providing either the name or registration number of the vessel -- for instance, by making an oral claim of nationality without providing any further information (see 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(3)(C)) or by simply flying a flag (see 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(3)(B)) -- it stands to reason that the United States officials who wish to verify the claim may rely on the ship's markings in order to carry out that procedure. Otherwise, the apparent purposes of subsections (A) and (B) would be undermined. 16 . The defendants also argue that they are entitled to dismissal of the indictment because the term vessel in 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(c)(2) is unconstitutionally vague, but we see no merit in this argument.