Opinion ID: 2010322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Theft Offenses

Text: The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the theft offenses. To prevail upon his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant must prove that no rational trier of fact, viewing all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Evans, 150 N.H. 416, 424, 839 A.2d 8 (2003). When the evidence is solely circumstantial, it must exclude all rational conclusions except guilt. Id. Under this standard, however, we still consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and examine each evidentiary item in context, not in isolation. Id.
We first examine the theft by unauthorized taking charge. A person commits theft by unauthorized taking or transfer if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. RSA 637:3, I. The theft by unauthorized taking indictment alleged that the defendant improperly obtained money from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by submitting medical examiner fee forms for examinations he conducted of New Hampshire decedents that should have been, but were not, conducted by a New Hampshire-appointed medical examiner. The defendant argues, and the State does not dispute, that the trial court amended this indictment in its jury instructions by directing the jury to determine if the defendant had the conscious object to obtain money for services he did not perform. Considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational juror could not have found that the defendant committed this offense. A rational juror could not have found that the defendant did not perform the services for which he received compensation from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The State contends that the evidence was sufficient because it establishes that the defendant did not provide the service[ ] for which he charged, i.e., an examination that complied with the New Hampshire statutes. The evidence, however, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, does not demonstrate that the defendant's compensation from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was in any way contingent upon his examinations complying with New Hampshire law. Rather, the evidence shows that the defendant requested and received payment from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for viewing bodies before they were cremated in New Hampshire and that he, in fact, viewed these bodies. Accordingly, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational juror could not have found that the defendant collected money from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for services he failed to perform.
We next examine the theft by deception indictments. A person commits the crime of theft by deception if he obtains or exercises control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. RSA 637:4, I. Deception includes creating an impression which is false and which [the] person does not believe to be true. RSA 637:4, II(a). The two theft by deception indictments alleged that the defendant signed cremation certificates indicating he had viewed the remains of certain other decedents when he had not done so, and that he engaged in this conduct for the purpose of receiving medical examiner fees. Considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational juror could have found that the defendant committed these offenses. A rational juror could have found that the cremation certificates that the defendant signed with respect to the decedents named in the indictments were false. A rational juror could also have found that although the defendant claimed to have examined these decedents before they were cremated, he did not do so. In arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the theft by deception offenses, the defendant examines each piece of evidence in isolation. When addressing a sufficiency of the evidence argument, however, we view the evidence in context. Evans, 150 N.H. at 424, 839 A.2d 8. Any conflicts in the evidence were for the jury to resolve. State v. Wiggin, 151 N.H. 305, 309-10, 855 A.2d 1250 (2004). As the trier of fact, the jury was in the best position to measure the persuasiveness and credibility of evidence and was not compelled to believe even uncontroverted evidence. In re Guardianship of Luong, 157 N.H. 429, 439, 951 A.2d 136 (2008). Having concluded that the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of the theft by unauthorized taking offense, we examine the remainder of the defendant's arguments only as they pertain to the theft by deception charges.
The defendant next argues that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction over the theft by deception offenses because they allegedly occurred in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and because the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was the alleged victim of the thefts. RSA 625:4, I(a) (2007) allows a person to be convicted under New Hampshire laws if [e]ither conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which is such an element occurs within this state. Our statute, which substantially conforms to the Model Penal Code regarding jurisdiction, brings within its ambit any crime which is committed wholly or partly within this State. State v. Harlan, 116 N.H. 598, 605, 364 A.2d 1254 (1976), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kelly, 125 N.H. 484, 484 A.2d 1066 (1984). The question in this case, therefore, is whether any part of the statutory offense of theft by deception was committed in New Hampshire. We conclude that because this offense was partly committed in New Hampshire, jurisdiction in New Hampshire was proper. A person commits theft by deception if he obtains or exercises control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. RSA 637:4, I. In this case, the defendant is a Massachusetts medical examiner who received fees from Massachusetts for viewing bodies in New Hampshire before they were cremated here. The defendant was alleged to have deceived the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by claiming to view bodies when he, in fact, did not do so. He perpetrated this deception by filling out cremation certificates stating that he viewed the bodies and by submitting medical examiner cremation fee forms requesting payment for these views. The medical examiner cremation fee forms were submitted to Bayview, a New Hampshire entity, for authorization, and then forwarded to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in Massachusetts. New Hampshire had jurisdiction over these offenses because the deception itself took place, at least in part, here. The defendant took money from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by submitting medical examiner fee forms to a New Hampshire entity, Bayview, in New Hampshire, that gave the false impression that he had examined bodies in New Hampshire that he never, in fact, examined.
The defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it joined the theft by deception and fraudulent handling offenses. We will uphold the trial court's decision to join the charges unless we conclude that the decision constitutes an unsustainable exercise of discretion. State v. Ramos, 149 N.H. 118, 120, 818 A.2d 1228 (2003). To show that the trial court's decision is unsustainable, the defendant must demonstrate that the ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. Id. Because the defendant does not contend on appeal that Superior Court Rule 97-A governs this case, we examine his joinder arguments under the law as it existed before the rule became effective on January 1, 2008. The law of joinder before Superior Court Rule 97-A became effective gave a defendant an absolute right to sever unrelated charges. State v. Brown, 156 N.H. 440, 442, 938 A.2d 909 (2007). Related offenses were those that were based upon the same conduct, a single criminal episode, or a common plan. Id. The trial court ruled that joinder was proper in this case because the theft and fraudulent handling offenses were part of a common plan. The defendant contends that this was error because the theft and fraudulent handling offenses were independent and not mutually dependent or part of a common plan. The distinguishing characteristic of a common plan is the existence of a true plan in the defendant's mind, which includes the charged crimes as stages in the plan's execution. Id. That a sequence of acts resembles a design when examined in retrospect is not enough; the prior conduct must be intertwined with what follows, such that the charged acts are mutually dependent. Id. In State v. Schonarth, 152 N.H. 560, 562, 883 A.2d 305 (2005), for instance, we upheld the consolidation of seventeen counts of theft by deception, all against the same elderly victim. We ruled that, viewed objectively, the defendant's actions were part of a common plan because they demonstrated a prior design that included the charged acts as part of its consummation. Schonarth, 152 N.H. at 562, 883 A.2d 305. Not only did the charges all involve the same victim, but they were also all based upon the defendant's efforts to defraud the victim of his property through increasingly grandiose schemes connected to the defendant's alleged desire to repay his debt to the victim. Id. By contrast, in Petition of State of New Hampshire ( State v. San Giovanni ), 154 N.H. 671, 919 A.2d 762 (2007), we affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the State's motion to join fifteen theft by deception indictments, which all involved different victims. The defendants operated St. Jude's Residence, a supposed drug and alcohol treatment center. San Giovanni, 154 N.H. at 672, 919 A.2d 762. Certain patients complained that the defendants had obtained their money by creating false impressions about St. Jude's services. Id. at 673, 919 A.2d 762. Seeking to join fifteen complaints made by fifteen different victims, the State alleged a common plan by the defendants. Id. The trial court found that the charges were not part of a common plan because [t]he defendants could have committed their alleged conduct as to one victim, but not to another, and still succeeded as to the first. Id. at 674, 919 A.2d 762 (quotation omitted). We upheld this decision, noting that the indictments involved discrete offenses committed against multiple victims. Id. at 676, 919 A.2d 762. In Brown, as in San Giovanni, we concluded that the charges at issue were not part of a common plan. In that case, the defendant sold drugs on four different occasions to one person who was cooperating with the police, and on two different occasions to another cooperating person. Brown, 156 N.H. at 441, 938 A.2d 909. All the charges were joined for trial. Id. We reversed, observing that each of the sales committed by the defendant was a discrete event and involved different people. Id. at 443, 938 A.2d 909. The sales were not so intertwined as to be mutually dependent because the success of any individual sale did not depend upon the success of any other sale. Id. In the instant case, we are persuaded that the trial court reasonably could have found that the theft by deception and fraudulent handling charges constituted mutually dependent acts that were part of a prior design. The record supports the trial court's finding that the defendant strove to develop an exclusive relationship with the operators of Bayview to increase the number of examination fees he could collect. To do this, he maximized his availability to the crematory, by, for example, signing cremation certificates when he had not conducted the requisite examinations. The more fraudulent transactions he participated in, the more reliant Bayview's operators became upon his services to carry out their own ends of processing as many bodies as possible. Based upon these findings, the trial court reasonably found that each fraudulent transaction or theft in which the defendant engaged was part of an overarching plan of furthering his increasingly profitable relationship with Bayview, and, in this way, the charges were mutually dependent. The trial court reasonably could have found that the defendant was not merely taking advantage of opportunities as they arose, but instead was exhibit[ing] forethought and premeditation in his scheming. Id. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion by joining the fraudulent handling and theft by deception charges.
Finally, the defendant contends that the trial court erred when it found that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally effective assistance. Because we have reversed the defendant's convictions for fraudulent handling of recordable writings and theft by unauthorized taking, we address only his ineffective assistance claims that concern his theft by deception convictions. Both Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant reasonably competent assistance of counsel. State v. Kepple, 155 N.H. 267, 269, 922 A.2d 661 (2007). We first address the defendant's claims under the State Constitution, citing federal opinions for guidance only. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33, 471 A.2d 347 (1983). To prevail upon a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show, first, that counsel's representation was constitutionally deficient and, second, that counsel's deficient performance actually prejudiced the outcome of the case. State v. Sharkey, 155 N.H. 638, 640-41, 927 A.2d 519 (2007). To meet the first prong of this test, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To meet the second prong, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694. Both prongs of the ineffectiveness inquiry involve mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 768, 973 A.2d 299 (2009). Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are not supported by the evidence or are erroneous as a matter of law, and we review the ultimate determination of whether each prong is met de novo. Id. The defendant argues that his trial counsel's failure to object to statements in the prosecution's opening and closing arguments was ineffective assistance. He contends that the prosecutor's arguments were improper because they implied that the defendant was part of a larger conspiracy with Bayview. For example, in his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that the defendant had an exclusive business relationship with Bayview, and that when the police investigated Bayview, they found a lot of stuff ... that really shouldn't have been there, and business shouldn't have been conducted in the way it was. In his closing, the prosecutor referred to the shenanigans at Bayview and told the jury that the defendant helped Bayview do their thing. The defendant contends that [i]t is clear from these arguments that the prosecutor's objective was to try to bolster the State's case against [the defendant by] attempting to portray him as a co-conspirator in the widely publicized atrocities committed by Bayview  conduct in which [he] was not alleged to have played any part. Because of the inflammatory nature of the wrongful conduct at Bayview, the defendant asserts that the prejudice of linking [him] to that conduct is obvious. We first address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. If the defendant is unable to demonstrate such prejudice, we need not even decide whether counsel's performance was deficient. State v. Walton, 146 N.H. 316, 318, 771 A.2d 562 (2001) (quotation and ellipsis omitted); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.). The defendant's conclusion that any prejudice from the prosecutor's remarks is obvious, fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different, Walton, 146 N.H. at 318, 771 A.2d 562 (quotation and ellipsis omitted), had his trial counsel objected to the prosecutor's statements. Trial counsel's opening and closing arguments are not evidence, see State v. Flynn, 151 N.H. 378, 390, 855 A.2d 1254 (2004), and, to the extent that they were improper, they were only marginally so, see Kepple, 155 N.H. at 279, 922 A.2d 661. Having failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different had his counsel objected to the prosecutor's statements, the defendant cannot prevail upon his ineffective assistance claim. Because the standard for determining whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel is the same under both constitutions, necessarily, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do under the State Constitution. Id. at 269, 922 A.2d 661. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.