Opinion ID: 2617599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether NRS 125A.340 should be interpreted to permit grandparent visitation over the objection of natural parents with full legal rights to their children.

Text: Gina contends that the district court erred in granting the Stewards visitation over the objection of both parents because NRS 125A.340 [1] was not intended by the legislature to permit grandparents the right to seek judicially imposed visitation over the objection of natural parents with full legal rights to their children. This is a case of first impression, as the court has not yet had the opportunity to interpret NRS 125A.340. A vast number of states, however, have statutes which provide grandparents with the right to obtain judicially compelled visitation with their minor grandchildren. Some state statutes specifically prevent visitation over the objection of both parents. See Ind. Code § 31-1-11.7-3 (1993); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-16-1 (1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1012 (1993); W. Va. Code § 48-2B-2 (1993). Courts in several states in which the grandparent visitation statute is silent on this issue have ruled that the legislature did not intend to permit grandparents the right to judicially compelled visitation over the objection of both parents, or over the objection of their own child. In Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571 (Iowa 1984), the maternal grandparents sought visitation rights with respect to the grandchildren whose custody had been awarded to their daughter through a divorce decree. The Iowa statute at issue allowed the grandparents to petition for visitation rights when the parents of the child were divorced. Id. at 573. In concluding that the trial court lacked authority to award visitation under these circumstances, the court found that the legislature did not intend the statute to apply where the grandparents seek visitation over the objection of the custodial parent who is their own child, reasoning: The common law rule against coercing grandparent visitation over parental objection demonstrates a respect for family privacy and parental autonomy.... It also recognizes that the parenting right is a fundamental liberty interest that is protected against unwarranted state intrusion. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982). Olds, 356 N.W.2d at 574. The court went on to explain the legislative purpose and the derivative nature of the grandparental rights, stating: [The statute] was enacted to ameliorate the harshness of the common law in situations where grandparents could not seek derivative visitation rights from the parent who is their child. In those situations some event has taken the grandchildren from the custody of the parent from whom the grandparents would normally receive access to their grandchildren. The statutory exceptions thus presuppose a disruption of the family unit that deprives the grandparents of that natural avenue for seeking visitation. They envision a dispute over visitation between the grandparents and a custodian of the children who is not the child of the grandparents. The statute does not provide a means for court intervention, however, when the dispute is between the grandparents and a custodial parent who is their child. Id. In the Matter of the Adoption of A Child by M., 355 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), the New Jersey Superior Court was faced with a statute similar to NRS 125A.340. In denying visitation rights to the parents of the noncustodial parent who had visitation rights, the court reasoned: [I]t would seldom, if ever, be in the best interests of the child to grant visitation to the grandparents when their child, the parent, has such rights. The court need not go so far as to say that the statute should be interpreted as not permitting such right. But visitation by grandparents should be derivative; otherwise the child might have four, or even six people competing for his company: father, mother, paternal grandparents and maternal grandparents. In the Matter of the Adoption of A Child by M., 355 A.2d at 213. Relying on the reasoning of such cases, Gina argues that permitting the Stewards to maintain visitation over the objection of Matthew's natural and custodial parents is unreasonable, is not in Matthew's best interest, and should not be found to be consistent with the legislative intent in enacting NRS 125A.340. It is well established that the court must interpret statutes consistent with the intent of the legislature. See Recanzone v. Nevada Tax Comm'n, 92 Nev. 302, 305, 550 P.2d 401, 403 (1976). In addition, the court must ascribe an intent which will accomplish a reasonable result. Rose v. First Federal Savings & Loan, 105 Nev. 454, 457, 777 P.2d 1318, 1320 (1989). When interpreting a statute, any doubt as to legislative intent must be resolved in favor of what is reasonable, as against what is unreasonable, so as to avoid absurd results. Cragun v. Nevada Pub. Employees' Ret. Bd., 92 Nev. 202, 205, 547 P.2d 1356, 1358 (1976). Gina contends that in drafting NRS 125A.340, the legislature could not reasonably have intended to grant standing to grandparents to seek judicially compelled visitation with their minor grandchildren when both natural parents having full legal rights to the child object to such visitation. The legislative history shows that in 1987 NRS 123.123 [2] was amended and transferred to NRS 125A.340. In enacting NRS 125A.340, the requirement that the grandparent/petitioner be the parent of either the noncustodial parent or a deceased parent was deleted, conceivably allowing a grandparent to seek visitation rights over the objection of both parents, including the objection of his or her own child. The bill which created NRS 125A.340, as originally proposed, would have allowed grandparents to seek visitation even when the natural parents were still married. There were, however, numerous objections to state interference with intact marriages. [3] In response to this concern, the bill was amended to allow for court intervention only when the natural parents were divorced. Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, June 5, 1987 at 12. As Gina argues, in enacting NRS 125A.340 in its present form, the legislature considered so-called egregious circumstances which the statute was designed to remedy. Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, June 4, 1987 at 3-7. These egregious circumstances consisted of situations where grandparents needed to have standing with social services when the parents were somehow unfit and the grandparents wanted to have legal rights to step in and help; where the grandparents had been the sole legal guardian of the grandchild for years at a time (due to the parents' inability or lack of desire to care for the child) and were later prohibited from seeing the grandchild; and where parents had had their parental rights terminated and therefore, the grandparents had lost visitation with the grandchildren. Id. None of the egregious circumstances that were described involved fit parents with full legal rights who had never relinquished responsibility for or custody of the child. Accordingly, we interpret NRS 125A.340 to set up a presumption against court-ordered grandparental visitation when divorced parents with full legal rights to the children agree that it is not in the child's best interest to see the grandparents. Absent the presentation of clear and convincing evidence showing otherwise, the court should not interfere with the decision of the natural parents. Interpreting the statute otherwise would have the absurd result of permitting the state to intrude solely because the parties are divorced, regardless of the fact that both parents are in agreement as to what was in the best interests of their child, and regardless of the fact that both parents have full legal rights to the child and have never abdicated their parental responsibility. Additionally, any other interpretation would undermine the natural parents' liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1983); Smith v. Smith, 102 Nev. 263, 720 P.2d 1219 (1986).