Opinion ID: 626467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of Maynard’s Order

Text: At the heart of this appeal lies an issue that has long been the subject of academic debate: the proper balance between the exercise of employer authority and the protection of employee rights. The debate is one that divided the Appellate Division. Placing emphasis on its seemingly deferential standard of review, the majority agreed with the Superior Court that Martin-Liburd’s need for written verification of her income rendered unreasonable Maynard’s order directing her to endorse the unsigned paycheck. Maynard v. Rivera, No. 2005/171, 2010 WL 2851616, at -4 (D.V.I. July 19, 2010). The dissent disagreed with what it characterized as a “new wrongful discharge standard” that 9 In its majority opinion, the Appellate Division omitted any reference to, and did not apply, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test. Given that our inquiry is unaffected by the application of the test, we will not address this omission. 14 placed improper emphasis on the personal needs of employees when analyzing the reasonableness of an employer’s order. Id. at -7 (Gómez, C.J., dissenting). The WDA provision at issue permits the employer to terminate an employee “who wilfully and intentionally disobeys reasonable and lawful rules, orders, and instructions of the employer.” V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 76(a)(4). Our inquiry into this provision focuses on the term “reasonableness.” The question before us is whether Maynard’s order directing Martin-Liburd to endorse an unsigned paycheck as a receipt of payment was reasonable. As a matter of policy, courts have long been loath to interfere in the general day-to-day operations of a business.10 Indeed, it would be improvident for courts to regulate the permissible manner in which an employer may choose to conduct his business and the company policy implemented to facilitate growth and profitability. That is not to say that courts are handcuffed from using judicial means to remedy unlawful employment practices. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476-77 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing framework of Title VII litigation). But where the employer’s order reflects a routine administrative matter, courts have historically upheld such orders as reasonable when subject to challenge. See, e.g., In re 10 Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unlawful Retaliation Under the Title VII Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It When They See It?, 14 Lab. Law. 373, 407 (1998) (“[T]he courts are not, were not intended to be, and should not become, personnel managers overseeing the day-to-day affairs of American businesses.”). 15 Stanczyk, 912 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (concluding that employer order directing employee to attend mandatory training program was reasonable); Noah v. Lindbergh Inv., LLC, 320 S.W.3d 212, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (determining that employee was discharged, in part, for failing to follow employer’s reasonable order that employee immediately meet with employer to discuss employee’s absence from assigned shifts). Maynard’s standing order requiring his employees to endorse their unsigned paychecks as proof of payment in cash is a paradigmatic example of a reasonable administrative order. It is customary in financial transactions to require a receipt for any cash payment, a convention borne out of both mutual convenience and financial accounting necessity. Without a receipt, Maynard could potentially be liable in an action brought by one of his employees claiming that he was never paid for time worked. As prevalent as they are, receipts can take many forms—be they a computer printout, a handdrawn slip, or, in this case, a paycheck endorsed by the payee but unsigned by the payor. Maynard implemented his cash payment policy to serve his own interests as well as the interests of his employees. While his employees benefited from not having to spend their lunch hour on certain Mondays trekking to the bank to cash their paychecks only to stand on long lines, Maynard no longer had to pay his employees for nonproductive company time when his employees would inevitably exceed the allotted one hour for lunch. The method by which he chose to pay his employees undoubtedly constituted a reasonable administrative decision. We are unpersuaded by Martin-Liburd’s attempt to undermine the reasonableness of Maynard’s chosen method of procuring a receipt. Martin-Liburd argues that the 16 unsigned paycheck was an invalid negotiable instrument. Although we agree with that proposition, it does little to advance Martin-Liburd’s cause. 11 Here, the paycheck was never intended to fulfill its traditional role of providing remuneration. Instead, the paycheck functioned as a mere receipt of payment. 12 That the paycheck could not be tendered at the bank is not in dispute or relevant. Further, there is no credence to Martin-Liburd’s argument that regardless of whether Maynard’s order was facially reasonable, it was unreasonable as applied to her. In essence, Martin-Liburd argues that the needs of individual employees should not only be imported into our analysis under the WDA but that those needs should trump compliance with an employer’s reasonable administrative order. We cannot endorse Martin-Liburd’s proposition because the reasonableness of an administrative order cannot be dependent on each employee’s personal needs, whether known or unknown to his employer. 13 We agree with the 11 On several occasions prior to September 30, 1996, after having been paid in cash, Martin-Liburd, and other employees, endorsed the paycheck as requested. 12 As Maynard acknowledged, he never intended for any unsigned paycheck to be a negotiable instrument given that an employee already would have been paid in cash. 13 We do not address the possibility that where an employer is aware that his order jeopardizes an employee’s health or safety, the practical consequences of the order on the employee’s individual circumstances should be considered in determining whether the order is reasonable. See, e.g., McLean v. Unemp’t Comp. Bd. of Review, 383 A.2d 17 dissent that “[o]ur focus, in this context, should be on the request of the employer.” Maynard, 2010 WL 2851616, at  (Gómez, C.J., dissenting). Martin-Liburd provides no support for her argument that employee compliance with an employer’s administrative order is necessary only to the extent that the order does not conflict with the employee’s individual desires. This is a bald assertion with no support that we can discern. Employers promulgate a litany of reasonable administrative orders designed to ensure the systematic management of company affairs. An understanding exists in the relationship between employer and employee that the employee will abide by these orders. If an employee were entitled to unilaterally forego compliance with reasonable administrative orders, company officials would lose the predictability associated with compliance. The employee’s obligation to comply with the order would be illusory and dependent solely on the employee’s willingness to obey. We cannot countenance, as Martin-Liburd has argued, an employment relationship whereby the employee is vested with the authority to pick and choose what facially reasonable administrative orders to follow. In its majority opinion, the Appellate Division 533, 535 (Pa. 1978) (finding employee’s refusal of employer’s request to drive truck with failing brakes not willful misconduct). Moreover, we do not imply that an employer’s administrative order would be reasonable where it conflicts with an employee’s needs, as recognized by federal, state, or territorial law. However, this case raises none of these concerns. 18 concluded that “reasonable minds could disagree as to whether Maynard’s order to Martin-Liburd was reasonable.” Maynard, 2010 WL 2851616, at . Given its review under the substantial evidence standard, the majority determined that the “two permissible views of the evidence” required deference to the Superior Court’s factual determination that Martin-Liburd was wrongfully terminated for failing to comply with an unreasonable order. Id. (quoting John F. Harkins Co. v. Waldinger Corp., 796 F.2d 657, 661-62 (3d Cir. 1986)). But the substantial evidence standard that the Superior Court itself applied is self-limiting, applying only to “[t]he findings of the [DOL] Commissioner as to the facts.” V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 70(b) (emphasis added). While the reasonableness of Maynard’s order is a factual question, see Gonzalez, 549 F.3d at 224, the substantial evidence standard does not insulate legal precepts present in the Superior Court’s decision. See Bryan, 2009 WL 586733, at  (“[The] standard of review in examining the Superior Court’s application of law is plenary.” (citation omitted)). Herein lies the foundational error in the majority’s decision. The majority’s constrained interpretation of its standard of review precluded it from conducting the necessary plenary inquiry under the WDA. Only by exercising such review would the Superior Court’s flawed interpretation of the WDA—rendering talismanic the employee’s individual needs when evaluating the reasonableness of an employer’s order—have been apparent. The WDA requires only that Maynard’s order be reasonable, not that the order satisfy a constantly evolving scale of reasonableness based on each employee to whom that order is directed. We agree with the dissent that the majority’s 19 determination amounted to an untenable intrusion into an employer’s inherent freedom to require uniform employee compliance with a reasonable administrative order. MartinLiburd’s desire to obtain a signed paycheck to qualify for financial assistance from the WIC program “is beside the point” and provided no justification for failing to obey Maynard’s reasonable order. Maynard, 2010 WL 2851616, at  (Gómez, C.J., dissenting). Her termination was therefore permissible under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 76(a)(4). Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s finding that Martin-Liburd was terminated in violation of the WDA, and we will reverse the award of back pay. 14 14 Although the reasonableness of Maynard’s order was unaffected by Martin Liburd’s needs, what also is apparent is that Maynard had provided numerous employees in the past with written verification necessary to obtain government assistance and even had done so on previous occasions for Martin-Liburd. (App. 19, 107.) While MartinLiburd was not permitted to disobey Maynard’s reasonable administrative order simply due to her individual needs, Martin-Liburd acknowledged that she never provided Maynard with the WIC certification form (App. 68), and only stated during her final protest of Maynard’s request that a signed paycheck was needed for her “personal business,” (App. 47). And even this was untrue. Although MartinLiburd claimed that she “needed” a signed paycheck, the WIC certification form introduced at the DOL hearing indicated that Martin-Liburd could have verified her income through a number of means, only one of which required the submission of a signed paycheck. (App. 176.) 20 IV. For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the Appellate Division’s July 19, 2010 Order. 21