Opinion ID: 4543682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State-Law Claims (Counts II, V)

Text: Richards also filed state-law claims for false arrest/imprisonment (count II) and malicious prosecution (count V). Berent asserted state-law immunity under Michigan law, which requires that he demonstrate: (1) the challenged acts were undertaken during the course of his employment and that he was acting, or reasonably believed that he was acting, within the scope of his authority; (2) the acts were undertaken in good faith and; (3) the acts were discretionary, as opposed to ministerial. Odom v. Wayne County., 482 Mich. 459, 480 (Mich. 2008). Unlike federal § 1983 jurisprudence, “the burden continues to fall on the governmental employee to raise and prove his entitlement to immunity as an affirmative defense.” Id. at 479. Although only the second factor is in dispute, the district court rejected Berent’s claim of immunity as it held that, under Michigan law, a lack of good faith could be inferred from the lack of probable cause. In Odom, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that a lack of good faith requires the official to act “maliciously or with a wanton or reckless disregard of the rights of another.” Id. at 11 Case No. 18-2432, Richards v. Cty. of Washtenaw, et al. 474. So long as an officer “honestly believed he had probable cause to arrest, even if he later learned that he was mistaken,” he is entitled to immunity. Id. at 481. Furthermore, Odom held that “a claim of false arrest or false imprisonment cannot be sustained if the arrest was legal.” Ibid. We have held that Berent was not unreasonable in arresting Richards. That demonstrates a lack of subjective malice or wonton recklessness and is therefore enough to grant Berent governmental immunity for the state false-arrest claim. As to the malicious-prosecution claim, Richards is required to show that Berent “instituted or maintained the prosecution.” Matthews v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 456 Mich. 365, 379 (Mich. 1998). The discussion in the preceding section demonstrates that there is not enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Berent instituted or maintained the prosecution. We thus reverse the district court’s denial of state-law immunity for these counts.