Opinion ID: 4435051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dominique Lucas

Text: As in his prior appeal, Lucas challenges his sentence on two grounds. First, he argues that the district court committed procedural error by failing to explain the chosen sentence, especially with reference to Lucas’s arguments for a substantial downward variance. Second, he claims his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Because we agree with Lucas’s first claim, we need not reach the second.
Evidence of Lucas’s involvement in the conspiracy stems mainly from his participation in only two of the controlled buys conducted by police, yielding three-and-a-half oxymorphone pills. Lucas pled guilty to participation in the conspiracy from March 1 to September 30, 2015. Based on the district court’s estimate of 5,000 oxymorphone pills over the course of the whole conspiracy, - 10 - Case Nos. 18-5904/5905, United States v. Montgomery, et al. this meant Lucas was responsible for 1,120 pills, yielding 1,232kg of marijuana. Because of Lucas’s career offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the guidelines range was 188 to 235 months. During Lucas’s original sentencing, he declined to challenge the drug type or rate of distribution established during Montgomery’s sentencing or the corresponding guidelines range calculation. But he took the position in his sentencing memo and at the sentencing hearing that the unreliability of the witnesses, arbitrariness in the drug calculation, the government’s harsh decision to file notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851, and severe childhood challenges merited a significant downward variance under the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court did grant a downward variance, but only a slight one, sentencing Lucas to 180 months and stating that the sentence was “based on [the] Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and on 18 U.S.C. Section 3553.” Lucas appealed, claiming first that the district court had committed procedural error in failing to address the § 3553 factors and his proffered arguments for a lower sentence and second that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. We ruled for Lucas on the former and declined to reach the latter. While we noted that the district court had ruled on Lucas’s objections to the presentence report and heard testimony from a psychologist about Lucas’s childhood and mental abilities, we found that the district court neither addressed Lucas’s arguments for a downward variance nor explained the chosen sentence “with at least some reference to the § 3553 factors.” Merriweather, 728 F. App’x at 526. On remand, Lucas again chose not to challenge the district court’s guidelines calculation and again took the position that the court should grant a significant downward variance under the § 3553 factors. The district court then reimposed a sentence of 180 months. Lucas appeals, - 11 - Case Nos. 18-5904/5905, United States v. Montgomery, et al. arguing that the district court again committed procedural error by failing to explain his sentence, especially by failing to address Lucas’s nonfrivolous arguments for a downward variance.
Lucas argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the court failed to address his arguments for a substantial downward variance. Lucas admits that he did not object to any procedural defects below, so this court reviews for plain error. See United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 802 (6th Cir. 2010). Even though plain error presents a high hurdle for defendants, “[w]hen a defendant raises a particular, nonfrivolous argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.” Id. at 803 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Gapinski, 561 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir. 2009)); id. at 805 (holding that the district court’s failure to acknowledge defendant’s nonfrivolous argument about a sentencing disparity between her and a co-conspirator amounted to plain error); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007) (“Where the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence . . . the judge will normally go further and explain why he has rejected those arguments.”). Meanwhile, on remand, the district court thought that “one issue need[ed] to be addressed”—namely, that the district court needed to explain adequately its “assessment of the [§] 3553(a) factors when imposing [Lucas’s] sentence.” R. 329, Resentencing Hr’g Tr., PID 324243; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553. That is not correct—the prior sentencing suffered from two procedural problems. The sentencing judge needed both to address Lucas’s nonfrivolous arguments and to explain the sentence with reference to the § 3553 factors. We previously held that the district court fell short of § 3553’s procedural requirements because “the judge failed to give due consideration - 12 - Case Nos. 18-5904/5905, United States v. Montgomery, et al. to Lucas’s § 3553-based arguments and to adequately explain his reasons for rejecting them, and that he failed to justify his sentence by reference to the § 3553(a) factors.” Merriweather, 728 F. App’x at 526; see also id. (“The court must go one step further and explain its sentence, including its reasons for rejecting the defendant’s arguments.”) (emphasis added). The arguments not addressed by the sentencing judge the first time around included: “Lucas’s difficult childhood, his mental health issues, the non-violent nature of his crime, the government’s alleged misuse of a § 851 enhancement, and his alleged minor role in a relatively small-scale conspiracy.” Id. at 527. On remand, after listening to statements from both parties at Lucas’s second sentencing hearing, the district judge explained his reimposition of the 180-month sentence in a short, one- and-a-half page soliloquy. The judge listed and endorsed the factors in § 3553(a)(2), noted his understanding of Lucas’s “troubled childhood,” listed Lucas’s past convictions, discussed the seriousness of the opioid epidemic, and connected the chosen sentence to the need to deter Lucas in a way that past convictions had not. R. 329, Resentencing Hr’g Tr., PID 3263-64. Lucas claims that the judge again failed to address the nonfrivolous arguments Lucas raised for a substantial downward variance, including his difficult childhood and resulting mental health issues, the nonviolent nature of his crime, the government’s “misuse” of the § 851 enhancement, Lucas’s lack of success as a drug dealer, and the “arbitrariness” of the drug type and quantity that factored into the guidelines range. We agree. We previously remanded this case for resentencing because the district court failed to explain itself. One would think, then, that the district court would have taken more care on remand. But it did not. Lucas’s sentence is procedurally unreasonable for one of the same reasons that we identified the first time we saw this case: the district court failed to address Lucas’s - 13 - Case Nos. 18-5904/5905, United States v. Montgomery, et al. nonfrivolous arguments or include its reasons for rejecting those arguments. See Merriweather, 728 F. App’x at 526–27. To be sure, the district court made “at least some reference to the § 3553 factors,” but it did not “includ[e] its reasons for rejecting [Lucas’s] arguments.” See id. at 526. The sentencing judge stated that he “gave this case a lot of consideration last time, and [he had] considered it considerably since then,” and imposed the same 180-month sentence. R. 329, Resentencing Hr’g Tr., PID 3263-64. The judge then explained that his choice of sentence was “buttressed” by the § 3553(a)(2) factors in particular, and he made reference to Lucas’s criminal history, the “serious pill epidemic in the country,” and Lucas’s “past sentences, which were often probation[ and] were not enough to deter Mr. Lucas from continuing with his criminal activities.” Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (“history and characteristics of the defendant”). The district court therefore cured one deficiency from the first sentencing, but it failed to cure the second. Any mention of the arguments noted in our prior opinion is virtually absent from the resentencing transcript. Consequently, Lucas’s sentence is, again, procedurally unreasonable. Merriweather, 728 F. App’x at 527; Wallace, 597 F.3d at 805 (holding that “[t]his failure to even acknowledge Defendant’s argument[s] mandates remand in this case,” and that this error was plain). This becomes even more disappointing when considering that some of this court’s cases suggest that a district court can clear this low procedural hurdle by merely acknowledging the defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments. See United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 340 (6th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that “the district court offered clear reasons for its sentence” and that “the district court did acknowledge [defendant’s] family and business circumstances at the sentencing hearing”); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 751 (6th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that the district court “explicitly announced its consideration of [defendant’s] mental capacity”). Of course, - 14 - Case Nos. 18-5904/5905, United States v. Montgomery, et al. “a sentencing judge is not required to explicitly address every mitigating argument that a defendant makes, particularly when those arguments are raised only in passing.” United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 2008). But see id. at 614 (Moore, J., dissenting) (arguing that the sentencing judge “failed to mention or address one of [defendant’s] central arguments for a lower sentence”) (emphasis added). Indeed, only when an argument is not frivolous does a district court need to acknowledge or address it.4 We explicitly listed those arguments in our prior opinion for the district court, but even the minimum standards required by our precedent were not met. Although the district court sentenced Lucas below the guidelines range, i.e., 180 months of imprisonment, Lucas requested a 96- to 120month sentence. And Lucas supported that request with well-developed arguments. Lucas therefore raised nonfrivolous arguments, but based on this record, we cannot say that the district court acknowledged or addressed them. We do not relish sending this case back for yet another resentencing. Our precedent, our prior opinion in this case, and this record nonetheless compel us to conclude that we must do so.