Opinion ID: 2808718
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A system for data access in a packet-switched

Text: network, comprising: a sender/computer including an operating unit, a first memory, a permanent storage memory and a processor and a remote receiver/computer including an operating unit, a first memory, a perma- nent storage memory and a processor, said sender/computer and said receiver/computer communicating through said network; said sender/computer further including means for creating digital digests on data; said receiver/computer further including a net- work cache memory and means for creating digi- tal digests on data in said network cache memory; and said receiver/computer including means for com- parison between digital digests. ’717 patent col. 10 ll. 31–45 (emphases added). The Board construed “sender/computer” to mean a computer that sends data and “receiver/computer” to mean a computer that receives data, and further determined that both terms were broad enough to encompass intermediaries. The Board then concluded that claims 1, MICROSOFT CORPORATION v. PROXYCONN, INC. 11 3, 10, 22, and 23 were anticipated by the “Santos” reference and that claims 1, 3, and 10 were additionally rendered obvious by the “Yohe” and “Perlman” references. Proxyconn argues on appeal, as it did before the Board, that the terms “sender/computer” and “receiver/computer” should be limited to just those two computers; they should not be construed as encompassing the separate intermediary gateway and caching computers. Microsoft disagrees, arguing that the ’717 patent does not limit either term to a single machine or a single function. The Board erred in concluding that the terms “sender/computer” and “receiver/computer” were broad enough to include the intermediary gateway and caching computers for similar reasons as explained above. The language of the specification consistently refers to the sender/computer, receiver/computer, gateway, and caching computers as separate and independent components of an overall system. The figures of the ’717 patent separately identify and number each component of the system. And nowhere does the ’717 patent indicate that the gateway and caching computer are the same as, or can be sub- sumed within, the sender/computer and receiv- er/computer. It is true, as Microsoft and the Board point out, that Figure 4 describes a system wherein the receiv- er/computer can perform its own caching, calculating, and comparing functions. See ’717 patent col. 7 ll. 27–37. But the mere fact that the receiver/computer can perform those functions in the invention’s most basic embodiment does not mean that the claim term “receiver/computer” is the same as, or is broad enough to include, the separately identified “gateway” and “caching computer” that are associated only with the invention’s more complicated Figure 11 embodiment. To the contrary, each time the terms “gateway” and “caching computer” are used in the ’717 patent, they are differentiated from the “sender/computer” and “receiver/computer.” 12 MICROSOFT CORPORATION v. PROXYCONN, INC. The Board’s reliance on the specification’s statement that the gateway may be “integrally formed with the caching computer,” id. at col. 9 ll. 6–8, is misplaced. The cited sentence merely explains that the gateway and the caching computer can be integrated together; it says nothing about integration of those intermediaries with the sender/computer and receiver/computer. Nor was the Board correct in basing its constructions on an observation that the described computers may or may not be located in separate housings. The patent does not use the word housing at all, much less give any indication that the proper construction of “sender/computer” and “receiver/computer” depends on the physical location of the claimed computers. Stated simply, the Board’s construction of “sender/computer” and “receiver/computer” to include the intermediary gateway and caching computers does not reasonably reflect the language and disclosure of the ’717 patent. Because the Board’s determination that claims 1, 3, 10, 22, and 23 were unpatentable was based on an unreasonably broad construction of the terms “send- er/computer” and “receiver/computer,” we vacate the Board’s findings of unpatentability of claims 1, 3, 10, 22, and 23 and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.