Opinion ID: 498409
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denied Informant Discovery

Text: 25 Before trial, in October 1985, Valona sought an order disclosing the identity of the informant, ... the prior record, and any and all considerations given to the informant, or anticipated to be given to the informant by the government, as well as providing defense counsel an opportunity to interview the informant. In July 1986 Valona sought any and all performance records of the confidential informant Arthur Rapkin [a]nd any and all notes and memorandum of any conversation between any law enforcement officers and Arthur Rapkin, prior to and during, Rapkin's involvement in any events that led to the arrest of James Valona on May 11, 1983. 26 The government neither opposed the disclosure of Rapkin's identity nor the interviewing of Rapkin. Due to the government's acquiescence, the trial court (adopting the magistrate's recommendation) determined an order on the identity-interview request was unnecessary. The trial court (again, adopting the magistrate's recommendation), nevertheless, did deny without prejudice Valona's request for information regarding Rapkin's prior record and information regarding the consideration paid to Rapkin, absent a particularized need. 27 Valona claims he was entitled to Rapkin's criminal record and record of his performance as an informant in order to impeach the hearsay declarations of Rapkin: [G]overnment witnesses on numerous occasions, both on direct and cross-examination, testified to statements made by Rapkin, including statements that Valona was willing to purchase 10 kilograms of cocaine from Schabilion for $450,000. Although Valona has characterized this argument as an improper limitation of discovery his argument truly complains of an improper limitation of discovery and a concomitant inability to introduce necessary impeachment evidence. 28 The district court has wide discretion within the rules to determine the manner and course of discovery. Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, U.A., 657 F.2d 890, 902 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct. 1710, 72 L.Ed.2d 134 (1982). A trial court's limitation on the manner and course of discovery will be reversed by this Court only upon a showing that the limitation 'is improvident and prejudices a party's substantial rights.'  Brown-Bey v. United States, 720 F.2d 467, 471 (7th Cir.1983) (quoting In re Rassi, 701 F.2d 627, 631 (7th Cir.1983)). 29 As in discovery matters, our review of evidentiary rulings is governed by the abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Abayomi, 820 F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 189, 98 L.Ed.2d 142 (1987). Under the 'abuse of discretion' standard of review, the relevant inquiry is not how the reviewing judges would have ruled if they had been considering the case in the first place, but rather, whether any reasonable person could agree with the district court. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 563 (7th Cir.1984) (emphasis in original). In other words 'if reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the [district] court's action, no abuse of discretion has been shown.'  Abayomi, 820 F.2d at 905 (bracket in original) (quoting Smith v. Widman Trucking and Excavating, Inc., 627 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir.1980)). 30 Appellant has left the impression that substantial weighty hearsay statements of Rapkin were interjected at trial and seriously affected the decision-making process. After a thorough review of the transcript we can see this exaggerates the extent of the Rapkin hearsay before the jury. It is true that agent Schabilion testified Rapkin stated that the defendant would have monies at a place to exchange for whatever. However, this is not the same as testifying that Rapkin stated Valona was willing to purchase 10 kilograms of cocaine from Schabilion for $450,000[,] the characterization of the statement given in Valona's brief before this court. This is the only statement that even begins to suggest that an inability to fully impeach prejudiced Valona. Even if we imply that whatever was simply another way of describing cocaine, such an indefinite term is not the stuff of reversal. In fact, even if we attributed more probative value to this statement than it merits, it is obvious that Valona's counsel had sufficient opportunities to impeach this statement. In large measure Valona's counsel took advantage of these opportunities. 31 Defense counsel elicited information regarding Rapkin's status during his cross-examination of Schabilion. Schabilion testified that he knew Rapkin was to receive ten percent of whatever money was recovered from Valona and that Rapkin ultimately was paid $40,000-$45,000 for his part in the Valona matter. During cross-examination of Hehr defense counsel again elicited the ten percent and $40,000-$45,000 figures. Hehr also testified that no pending criminal charges against Rapkin figured into the deal. (This merely reemphasized the direct examination, in which the government's counsel elicited testimony from Hehr that Rapkin was to receive ten percent and ultimately received approximately $45,000 for his role in the Valona matter.)Also, during the Schabilion cross-examination, out of the jury's presence, Rapkin's role in sting operations involving persons besides Valona was discussed. Defense counsel argued that these stings as well as the Valona matter were merely revenue-generating operations. The trial court determined information regarding the other stings was irrelevant to the Valona prosecution. At a later stage of the trial, again out of the jury's presence, the trial judge instructed defense counsel that he could go into any of the arrangements that Mr. Rapkin had with the government as it pertains to Mr. Valona. The trial court again denied the request to go into other Rapkin-government arrangements, determining that they were irrelevant to the Valona sting and prosecution. In addition, at the point the government rested its case, defense counsel stated that I discussed with Mr. Rapkin and made the decision some time ago, but only just now told his lawyer ... that I was not calling Mr. Rapkin, although I had made that decision long before today. Finally, in closing argument defense counsel stated it was within my ability to bring Arthur Rapkin into the courtroom. But rest assured I wasn't going to do it. Because based upon the picture that I have heard in the last two days about Arthur Rapkin, it was a foregone conclusion that Mr. Rapkin would not have helped me. Sight unseen, he would not have helped me. He received $45,000. Neither the government nor Valona called Rapkin as a witness. 32 Before the jury were the details of the Rapkin-government deal, including the $45,000 payment and the lack of any pending criminal charges against Rapkin. Defense counsel interviewed Rapkin and had an opportunity to call Rapkin as a witness and decided not to. Counsel argued against Rapkin's credibility in closing. Numerous times before and during trial the trial court heard arguments and considered the necessity of exploring further information regarding Rapkin. It appeared that defense counsel wished to use information of other Rapkin-government agreements to show that the government's prosecution of Valona was, like these several other arrangements, a ploy to make money for the government and not to convict drug traffickers. The trial court determined that these other agreements were irrelevant to the Valona prosecution. 33 We believe that the trial judge could properly find that some tenuous money making allegation was not relevant to whether or not Valona had attempted to purchase ten kilograms of cocaine. Likewise, Valona has not demonstrated that the trial judge abused his discretion when he restricted the use of prior crime evidence. The trial court does not abuse its discretion when it precludes cumulative and confusing cross-examination into areas already sufficiently explored to permit the defense to argue personal bias and testimonial unreliability. United States v. Robinson, 832 F.2d 366, 373 (7th Cir.1987) (trial court limited cross-examination of informant). See United States v. Hinton, 683 F.2d 195, 200 (7th Cir.1982), aff'd sub nom. Dixon v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 104 S.Ct. 1172, 79 L.Ed.2d 458 (1984). The trial court has not abused its discretion: it properly limited both the scope of discovery and the use of impeachment material.