Opinion ID: 343369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Underrepresentation of Persons Under Forty

Text: 50  Movants have collected data which they contend demonstrate a gross underrepresentation of persons under forty years of age as compared to persons forty years or older. This claim is wholly without merit. In Test, we held that in order to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutionality, the challenger must prove that the group which is allegedly underrepresented is 'distinctive' or 'cognizable.' (United States v. Test, supra, at (688), slip opinion at 5) Evidence of cognizability is also required for a prima facie showing under the Jury Selection and Service Act. (See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (, 93 S.Ct. 1500, 36 L.Ed.2d 188) (1973); United States v. Guzman, 337 F.Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (, 93 S.Ct. 1397, 35 L.Ed.2d 602) (1973); see also Gewin, An Analysis of Jury Selection Decisions, appendix to Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 811 at 819-21) To establish cognizability, it is necessary to prove the following: 51 (1) the presence of some quality or attribute which 'defines and limits' the group; (2) a cohesiveness of 'attitudes or ideas or experience' which distinguishes the group from the general social milieu; and (3) a 'community of interest' which may not be represented by other segments of society. (United States v. Test, supra at (689), slip opinion at 6) 52 There is no evidence in the record before us suggesting that persons between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-nine hold attitudes which are distinctive from those held by the rest of the population. Indeed, movants have offered no evidence concerning any of the three factors just enumerated. Although the cognizability of certain groups may be presumed or inferred from evidence other than these factors (see United States v. Test, supra at (689), slip opinion at 6), this is not the case where the groups are 'created' by arbitrarily subdividing the population into age classification. (See, e. g., United States v. Olson, 743 (473) F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (, 93 S.Ct. 2291, 36 L.Ed.2d 970) (1973), and cases cited therein at 688; United States v. Ross, supra at 1217; United States v. Ditommaso, 405 F.2d at 385, 391 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (, 89 S.Ct. 1209, 22 L.Ed.2d 465) (1968); United States v. Quinn, 364 F.Supp. 432, 436 (N.D.Ga., 1973); United States v. Guzman, supra at 145-46; see also Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 723 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1317) (1968)) 53 Movants seek to distinguish their case from the cited precedents on the ground that the 'group' in question here is relatively large (47.85% of the eligible population). They argue that where an age group is this large it may be held 'cognizable' even without proof of uniqueness of attitudes or of any other elements normally required to establish cognizability. Our research discloses only one reported decision which supports this argument, United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970). There the court confronted the following evidence: 54 TABLE B: UNITED STATES v. BUTERA 6 ----------------------------------- Age Group Percentage Disparity (Comparative) --------------------------------- 21 - 24 92% underrepresented --------------------------------- 25 - 29 82% underrepresented --------------------------------- 30 - 34 51% underrepresented --------------------------------- 35 - 39 15% underrepresented --------------------------------- 40 - 44 17% overrepresented --------------------------------- 45 - 49 29% overrepresented --------------------------------- 50 - 54 29% overrepresented --------------------------------- 55 - 59 30% overrepresented --------------------------------- 60 - 64 37% overrepresented --------------------------------- 65 - 69 53% overrepresented --------------------------------- 70 - 74 17% overrepresented --------------------------------- 75 and over 83% underrepresented --------------------------------- 55 The defendants in Butera 'collapsed' these twelve subgroups into two 'composite' groups, one comprised of persons 21 to 39 years of age and the other comprised of persons 40 or older. This approach was acceptable to the court because all subgroups below 40 were underrepresented in the pool of prospective jurors and all subgroups (with the minor exception of the 75 and over group) were overrepresented. (See United States v. Butera, supra at 570) In other words, the composites could be considered 'groups' because the constituent subgroups of each were internally consistent. It is important to recognize that the continuum of underrepresentation among the subgroups in the first composite and the continuum of overrepresentation among the subgroups in the second composite did not render the composites 'cognizable.' Rather, the existence of these continuums allowed the defendants to treat the composites as groups which might be compared to each other. It was the size of the resulting groups that made them cognizable. 56 This rather difficult principle is best understood by example. Assume we have drawn a sample from a jury wheel and have divided it into the same twelve age groups originally used in Butera. We then compare the number of prospective jurors in each age group with the number we would expect based on census figures. Assume further that the first group (21 to 24) is underrepresented, that the second group (25 to 29) is overrepresented, that the third group (30 to 35) is underrepresented, and that the results for each successive group alternates from overrepresentation to underrepresentation. It should be obvious that we cannot 'collapse' the data for these subgroups into any larger composite groups. If we did, we would have one group comprised of persons between the ages of 21 and 24, 30 and 34, 40 and 44, 50 and 54, 60 and 64, and 70 and 74, while the other group would include those between 25 and 29, 35 and 39, 45 and 49, 55 and 59, 65 and 69, and 75 or over. These would not be 'groups' at all, but rather mathematical artifacts. 57 This is precisely what movants in the present controversy have done. Their data for age groups are summarized in the following Table. 58 TABLE C ------- Percentage in Percentage in Absolute Percentage Jury Wheels Population Difference Age Group -------------------------------------------------------------- 21 to 29 16.01% 27.81% 11.80% underrepresented -------------------------------------------------------------- 30 to 39 19.66% 20.04% 0.38% underrepresented -------------------------------------------------------------- 40 and over 64.44% 52.15% 12.29% overrepresented -------------------------------------------------------------- 59 What is critical about these data is that the jury wheels of this district are a nearly perfect mirror of the community for those persons between 30 and 39 years of age. This 'subgroup' is neither underrepresented nor overrepresented, but there are appreciable disparities for the 21 to 29 year old subgroup and for the over 40 subgroup. What movants have done here is 'collapse' the data for the 21 to 29 year old group (which is underrepresented) with the data for the 30 to 39 year old group (which is not underrepresented), thereby creating a composite of all persons between the ages of 21 and 39. But this composite does not have internal consistency, and its constituent subgroups do not represent a continuum of either underrepresentation or overrepresentation. Put more simply, the age group which is underrepresented, according to movants' evidence, is not comprised of persons under 40, but rather of persons between the ages of 21 and 29. This is nothing more than a shrewd attempt to create a 'group' where none exists. It is exactly for this reason that courts demand proof of cognizability unless the group is inherently distinctive, as is the case for blacks and to some extent Chicanos. The court in United States v. Guzman, supra, stated the problem in these terms: 60 Defendant has not explained why he has selected the age of 30 as a cut-off rather than the age of 26 or 33. He has presented no rationale for his age grouping. The mere fact of similarity in age cannot, by itself, be sufficient to define a cognizable group. If it were, any jury selection system could be successfully attacked by a strategic drawing of age group lines. 61 Among any age group there will be vast variations in attitudes, viewpoints, and experiences. The fact that two persons are the same age does not necessarily give them a community of interest. And although we hear much talk of the generation gap, it is impossible to define that gap with any precision, as the defendant has tried to do. 62 In accordance with the long line of cases cited above, this court cannot accept the proposition that members of arbitrarily drawn age brackets necessarily constitute valid categories for measuring the legality of a jury selection system. (337 F.Supp. at 146 (emphasis added)) 63 We will not accept movants strategic manipulation of their data for the sole purpose of fabricating a 'group' of such size as to circumvent the normal evidentiary requirements of cognizability. Of course, it is possible to analyze the underrepresentation of the 21 to 29 year old group in terms of controlling constitutional and statutory principles, but under the precedents cited above, this group is not sufficiently large to permit any inference of cognizability without proof of distinctive attitudes held by its members and of the other factors described earlier. (See especially United States v. Briggs, 366 F.Supp. 1356, 1362 (N.D.Fla.1973)) 64 Upon the foregoing, we hold that movants have not made a prima facie showing that persons under 40 years of age are a cognizable group. Consequently, movants' constitutional and statutory claims based on the alleged underrepresentation of this 'group' must be rejected. 65