Opinion ID: 3008595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Raised by Both Appellants

Text: 1. Humanizing/Victim Impact Evidence During Guilt Phase Appellants claim they were prejudiced by the testimony of Kaye Thomas, who visited a comatose Clifton Agnew in the hospital after hearing about his case on the news, and eventually became his legal guardian . Before trial, the prosecutors indicated they were going to call Thomas as their traditional humanizing witness as allowed under McQueen v. Commonwealth , 669 S.W .2d 519 (Ky. 1984) . Appellants made written pretrial motions in limine to exclude Thomas's testimony, arguing it would be mostly irrelevant and highly prejudicial, and any probative value would be substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect . See KRE 403. Appellants' motions in limine were denied . Before Thomas was called by the Commonwealth at trial, Appellants renewed their objections to the entirety of her testimony, and specifically objected to any testimony about Thomas's card campaign, an e-mail campaign asking everyone who received it to send a card to the victim's hospital room and to forward the e-mail to their friends. Defense counsel conceded that traditional humanizing testimony would be permissible. The Commonwealth agreed that the cards and letters Thomas solicited on the victim's behalf should not. be admitted into evidence, bt_at argued Thomas should be able to testify about them. The court ruled that the fact that Thomas read letters to the victim would be allowed, but that she would not be permitted to testify that this case garnered national attention or that people from around the nation sent letters to the victim. Specifically, the court said, her testifying that this was national, and that everybody in the nation sent letters, that is where I'm gonna have to stop you . The Commonwealth then asked for the court to give it- a couple seconds just to tell [Thomas] where your cutoff is. The defense further objected to any discussion of the quantity of the cards the victim received . The court concluded Thomas could testify about her observations of the victim's injuries and pain and suffering as a lay person could, and that she could testify about what she did with him, but she could not testify about what others did for him, including her card campaign and the number of cards the victim received. Thomas began by describing how she came to hear about the attack on Clifton Agnew on the news, and how she decided to visit him in the hospital. She described the fact that his organs were still swollen outside of his body, and covered with clear surgical plastic. The Commonwealth asked Thomas, After you got back from the hospital that [first] day, what did you do? She testified that she went home and e- mailed her friends, telling them of the horrific thing she had just seen, and that the victim was a vegetable. tier e-mail requested her friends to send the victim a card for two reasons : First, as an act of protest against the violence that had been done to him, and second, as an act of kindness to show a man that probably had not had a lot of kindness in his life . The Commonwealth then asked Thomas whether any of her friends who received her e-mail sent cards, and she responded that all twenty of them did. She continued by testifying that the following day he was sent seventy-five cards, and then 120, and so on. She testified that on one day, the victim received 666 cards, so she bought an extra card because she thought he'd already met the devil once and he didn't need to meet him again. She then described how her initial e-mail was forwarded from her friends to their friends until the victim had received thousands of cards from all over the world, which she said she read to hire one at a time. While holding his hand, she read to him these wonderful, magical cards that were all filled with love and compassion and hope and inspiration to someone who probably hadn't gotten a lot of cards in his life. She thought that as she read those cards to him, somehow there would be a connection between the sender of the letter and the victim, and that somehow miraculously there would be some hope and maybe he would get better . Directly contrary to the court's restriction on Thomas's testimony, the Commonwealth specifically asked, How many cards did Clifton get after you sent out that first e-mail, and Thomas responded that he eventually received 6,286 cards. She described how the University of Louisville baseball team sent him a baseball, and how RCA Records, the Secretary of State of New Jersey, and a Native American tribe all sent him cards . She said that she found out that Agnew liked Elvis, and played Elvis music for him . The Commonwealth then moved on and asked Thomas to describe the physical condition of the victim during the fifty-six days he was in a coma before dying. She replied that there was never any reaction from the victim, and also described his partial paralysis. She then testified that she became Agnew's legal guardian after he had been in a coma for over a month, and he was moved to a nursing home that volunteered to house him even though he was indigent. She found out where the victim was born, and located his exwife. Thomas described how Agnew had lost a tremendous amount of weight because he had lost three-quarters of his stomach, and was on a feeding tube. Thomas then specifically discussed the day the victim died in the nursing home, a day which she at first felt may have had hope. She talked about how for the very first time his eyes were opened, and they were opened just like my eyes are open right now. During all of her visits to see the victim, his eyes had always been brown when she peeled his eyelids open, but on this day his eyes were sky blue and she thought this was a good sign. She said she really had hope that day, but nevertheless Agnew passed away that evening. Thomas testified for approximately eighteen minutes, and cried softly several times . The Appellants made no objections during Thomas's heartfelt, testimony. After she testified on direct examination, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The court declined to make a finding that the Commonwealth elicited the numbers and the extent of the card campaign, and denied the motion for a mistrial, finding that because the physical condition and injuries of the victim were not in dispute, there was no prejudice from this testimony. The Commonwealth argues that Thomas's testimony was appropriate as humanizing evidence, and to provide information about the victim's condition from the time he was attacked until the day he died . McQueen v. Commonwealth permits the prosecution to provide a humanizing witness, in order to show that the victim was a living person, more than just a nameless void left somewhere on the face of the community and more than just a statistic. 669 S .W.2d at 523. See also Ernst v. Commonwealth, 160 S .W.3d 744, 763 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Sussell v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W .2d 111, 113 (Ky. 1994)) ([A] certain amount of background evidence regarding the victim is relevant to understanding the nature of the crime.) . This testimony has generally included basic background information about the victim. See , ej~. , Hilbert v. Commonwealth, 162 S.W.3d 921, 926 (Ky. 2005) (mothers of victims briefly described dates of birth, number and sex of siblings, and the fact that one victim had a nine-year-old son); Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 824, 847 (Ky. 2000) (victims' sons testified that victims were elderly and infirm, that they worked hard to accumulate what was stolen, and that they attended church on the day they were killed) ; Tanlnic v. Commonwealth, 973 S . W.2d 13, 35 (Ky. 1998) (mothers of victims introduced life photos of sons) . While humanizing evidence generally comes from family members, there is no rule limiting it to family members, nor should there be . Such a rule would limit humanizing evidence to those with families . This Court recognizes that, for victims with no family or friends, humanizing evidence may need to be presented differently. The fact that. Mr. Agnew had no family does not make him any less entitled to evidence that. he was more than just. a statistic. However, much of Thomas's testimony was evidence of the effect of the crime on others, and not mere victim background evidence. Such testimony exceeds the scope of what is allowed during the guilt phase: [While the Commonwealth is entitled to show the jury that the victim was not a mere statistic, buts a living person . . . we have expressed disapproval of the introduction of victim impact evidence during the guilt phase of a trial . . . . The reason, of course, is that. such evidence is generally intended to arouse sympathy for the I -~illies of the victims, which, cilthol ..i``ii relevant t% file issue of' penalty, is largely irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence. We reiterate that this type of evidence should be reserved for t:he penalty phase of the trial. Bennett v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 322, 325-26 (Ky. 1998) (citations omitted). Much of Thomas's testimony was not about the victim, but was instead about her reaction and the community's response to his plight, i.e. more akin to victim impact testimony. It is error to introduce victim impact evidence during the guilt phase of a criminal trial. See Ernst, 160 S.W.3d at 763 . The portions of Thomas's testimony dial exceeded permissible litirminizirig evidence were error. The question then becomes whether this error was harmless . RCr 9.24 . A non-constitutional evidentiary error must, have a substantial influence on the jury's verdict to require reversal. Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 688-89 (Ky. 2009) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U .S. 750 (1946)) . Under the circumstances of this case, Thomas's testimony was harmless error. There is overwhelming evidence of the Appellants' guilt, including blood on the Appellants' clothing, DNA evidence linking the blood to Clifton Agnew, Hall's confession, and Hall's testimony at trial implicating both himself and Edmonds . With regard to Thomas's testimony about Agnew's injuries, far more graphic evidence of these injuries was introduced through medical testimony and photographs shown to the jury. Upon consideration of the whole case, the improper victim impact-type testimony did not have a substantial influence on the jury's verdict. Those portions of Thomas's testimony that were error were therefore harmless error. 2. Hearsay Testimony and Photo Array Identification Larry Milligan was an eyewitness to the attack who did not testify at trial. He was homeless and it was believed he had left the state. On the morning of the attack, however, he gave a taped statement to Detective Jeff Wheeler and he identified Hall from a photo array. He then disappeared and was never found. Because he failed to identify Edmonds, Edmonds sought to have tile statements introduced as exculpatory evidence while Hall sought to keep the inculpatory hearsay identification out. The trial court granted Hall's written pretrial motion in limine to exclude any evidence about Milligan's statements because it was hearsay and violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. However, over Hall's objection, the trial court allowed Milligan to be discussed first in Dewayne Edmonds' opening statement ., 4 saying that he saw two black men and identified Hall from a photo . Over Hall's renewed objection, the trial court later allowed Detective Gary Williamson and Detective Wheeler to repeat Milligan's hearsay statements about the men he saw in the alley, including Milligan's identification of Hall, and it allowed Detective Wheeler to say Milligan picked Hall out of a photo array (although the trial court did keep the actual array out) . Additionally, Williamson testified as to double hearsay when he said he was told by other officers that Milligan was an eyewitness who had seen two men in the alley and that he had picked Hall out of a photo array. testified He also stated that he to the gland jury about what Milligan had said. An objection to the last comment on the grounds of hearsay was sustained by the trial court. At the close of the trial, Milligan had not been called to testify and Hall moved for a mistrial, which was denied . 4Dewayne Edmonds, the brother of Appellant Derek Edmonds, was a third codefendant at this trial who pled guilty to second-degree robbery as the trial was ongoing, and thus he is not a party to this appeal. 13 The Commonwealth concedes theses st_atemelits were hearsay. However, because Hall had confessed in multiple statements that he was present at. the crime, though claiming varying degrees of involvement, there is no reasonable basis to believe that the statements 'had a substantial effect on the verdict against Hall, since they did little more than place him at the scene . The statements were actually favorable to Edmonds, who had wanted them admitted. Though error, it was harmless . 3. Limitations on Individual Voir Dire Appellants allege error in the trial court's limitation of the individual voir dire required in death penalty cases. Specifically, Appellants claim the trial judge abused her discretion by limiting their voir dire questioning of each prospective juror to two minutes each for the Commonwealth and the three defendants (before Dewayne Edmonds was dismissed), by limiting questions about possible mitigation evidence, and by limiting leading questions, thus denying their rights to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution . Contrary to Appellants' claims, however, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in conducting individual voir dire. First, the voir dire questioning of the first juror took over twenty minutes. The trial court realized there were over one hundred prospective jurors remaining, and thus limited each party's questioning to two minutes . The jurors had already been shown a six-minute video presentation explaining the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, the penalty ranges for each defendant, the and aggravating and mitigating factors . Additionally, trial court. began individual voir dire by asking each prospective juror whether he or she had seen any media coverage or formed an opinion about the case . The judge then referenced a chart showing the range of possible penalties and asked each '' - juror whether he or she could consider the full range of penalties if selected to serve and deliberate in the penalty phase, including the twenty-year minimum penalty and the maximum penalty of death. The Appellants also had each juror's response to the death penalty qualification questionnaire . Therefore, before Appellants even began their questioning, the primary issues for individual voir dire had already been addressed and the Appellants already had a response by each juror to key issues . Given the multitude of information the Appellants already had for each juror, the trial court's two-minute limitation was permissible. The mere fact that more detailed questioning might have somehow helped the accused in exercising peremptory challenges does not suffice to show abuse of the discretion in conducting the examination . Wbodall v . Commonwealth, 63 S .W.3d 104, 116 (Ky . 2001) . Appellants do not cite a case in which a two-minute limit in individual voir dire was error. The authority from other jurisdictions cited in Appellants' reply briefs is readily distinguishable . Several of those cases involved excessive limits on overall voir dire, 5 where no such limit existed in this case, or 5 See State v. Strange, 619 So.2d 817 (La. CLApp. 1993) (error to limit overall voir dire to ten minutes) ; McCarter v. State , 837 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (error to limit overall voir dire to 30 minutes) . 15 limitations that were not even enforced . The other cases involve limits on individual voir dire .? 'Those cases, however, involved much more stringent limits than here. Ultimately, the voir dire of each juror here, which, counting the video and questioning, was at. least 14 minutes per juror, was far greater than that found wanting in other jurisdictions . Additionally, Appellants' cited authority is not binding in Kentucky, and this Court concludes that the twominute-per-defendant limit in individual voir dire was not an abuse of discretion under the facts of this case. Second, the trial judge only permitted a generalized inquiry into mitigation. Under Woodall, however, this was also a permissible exercise of the trial court's discretion . In that case, [Appellant] Woodall sought to question the jury about. specific mitigating circumstances rather than a generalized inquiry as allowed by the trial judge . Woodall, 63 S.W .3d at 116. This Court, held that because [t]he judge permitted Woodall to question jurors extensively regarding mitigating circumstances so long as the questions were general and did not inquire into specific mitigation, the trial court in that case did not abuse its discretion . Id . In this case, after the Commonwealth objected to defense counsel's attempt to ask questions about specific mitigating 6 See People v. Odle , 754 P.2d 184 (Cal. 1988) . Sine the limit in that case was not enforced, it is unclear why Appellants even cite it . 7 See Clemments v. State, 940 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Ct.App . 1996) (one-hour overall limit on voir dire was unreasonable where 30 minutes was used to question entire panel, leaving approximately 30 seconds per juror to individually question 60 venire members) ; O'Hara v. State , 642 So.2d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1994) (abuse of discretion to limit voir dire of 24 jurors to 40 minutes) ; State v. Williams, 860 P.2d 860, 863 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (error to limit voir dire of 25 jurors to 40 minutes, about 96 seconds per panel member) . 16 circumstances, the judge gave counsel a mitigation definition that they could tell the jurors, and she reminded counsel that. her video presentation had explained to the jurors what mitigation evidence was. As in Woodall, because Appellants were allowed to ask about mitigation generally, lilt was not. an abuse of discretion by the trial judge to restrict the voir dire . . . concerning specific mitigation evidence which [they] planned to present. Id . Not only did the judge not abuse her discretion, but what the Appellants' counsel asked to do has been held to be impermissible : [A]sking potential jurors how they would weigh specific mitigating circumstances would ignore well-settled precedent that it is impermissible to ask voir dire questions designed to commit jurors to certain theories . Sherroan v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Ky. 2004) . Finally, the trial court restricted Appellants' leading questions. Defense counsel, however, was attempting to use hypothetical scenarios to pin down jurors on a specific penalty phase decision, without referencing any specific evidence . This sort of questioning violates the proscription against. questions designed to commit jurors to certain theories, as noted in Sherroan . Moreover, this Court has recognized : It is well (sic) to remember that the lay persons on the panel may never have been subjected to the type of leading questions and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed . Prospective jurors represent a cross section of the community, and their education and experience vary widely . Also, unlike witnesses, prospective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to taking the stand . . . . .. Penman v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 237, 251 (Ky. 2006) (qt.iofhig Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1039 (1984)) . Due to defense counsels' attempts to have jurors commit to specific penalties when given hypothetical scenarios, [t]he trial court correctly limited defense counsel's questioning when it became clear that jurors found the inquiry confusing. Furnish v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 34, 44 (Ky. 2002) . Therefore, the individual voir dire in this case fits within the wellestablished rule that [tihe trial judge has broad discretion in the area of questioning on voir dire. Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Ky. 1985) . 4. For-Cause Challenges to Jurors Appellants claim the trial court erred in denying several for-cause challenges to jurors and in improperly striking some jurors for cause . The Appellants exhausted their peremptory challenges and thus this issue is preserved . See Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 340-41 (Ky. 2007) ( `When a defendant does exhaust all of his peremptory challenges, he has been denied the full use of his peremptory challenges by having been required to use peremptory challenges on jurors who should have been excused for cause.'  (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 252, 259 (Ky. 1993))). This Court reviews a trial court's determination regarding the exclusion of a juror for cause for an abuse of discretion . Fugett v. Commonwealth, 250 8Several jurors' responses have been attacked on multiple grounds, requiring more than one for-cause analysis for each, thus these responses are discussed more than once below. S .W.3d 604, 613 (Ky . 2008) . [']he decision to exclude a juror for cause is based on the totality of the circumstances, not in response to any one question. Id. The test for determining whether a juror should be stricken for cause is `whether, after having heard all of the evidence, the prospective juror can conform his views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict.' Thompson v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W. 3d 22, 51 (Ky . 2004) (quoting Mabe v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Ky. 1994)) ; see also RCr 9 .36(1) . Juror 160394 said that on the morning of her voir dire she had seen part of a television report about the case, but that she had not formed any firm opinions on the case, though she noted during her lengthy individual voir dire (lasting over twenty minutes)9 that her initial opinion was that the Appellants were probably guilty . When she said, If the police found enough evidence to bring them to trial then I would assume that it would be likely that they are guilty, she was essentially describing what amounted to a layperson's (largely correct) understanding of probable cause to bring charges . Moreover, she repeatedly asserted that she could put any previous opinions aside and would have to first consider the evidence before making a final decision, and she responded that she could consider the entire range of penalties .  `[I]n order to merit disqualification of a juror, the media reports must engender a predisposition or bias that cannot be put aside, requiring the juror 9 The length ofJuror 160394's individual voir dire prompted the trial judge to impose the two-minute limitation . to decide a case one way or the other . . . . The Coristifution does not require ignorant or uninformed jurors ; it requires impartial jurors.' Furnish, 95 S.W.3d at 45 (quoting McQueen v. Scrod, 99 F.3d 1302, 1319-20 (6th Cir. 1997)). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found Juror 160394 was able to set aside any impression she may have had from the news report. Jurors 155059, 152182, 155132, 146941, 153474, 156261, 148992, 150450, 161976, and 162784, in response to hypothetical scenarios posited by the defense, responded that they could not consider lesser penalties such as twenty years under the specific scenarios . The trial judge, however, did not strike these jurors because she found that from the totality of their answers they could in fact consider the full range of penalties . The trial judge properly may choose to believe those statements that were the most fully articulated or that appeared to have been least influenced by leading. Mabe , 884 S .W.2d at 671 . Disqualification of these jurors was not warranted . Jurors 146941 and 161305 both said they could consider the full range of penalties, even though they said they were more likely to impose a harsher punishment . [Elxcusal for cause is not required merely because the juror favors severe penalties, so long as he or she will consider the full range of penalties. Id. at 119. Disqualification of these jurors was not warranted . During the voir dire of Jurors 153641, 145910, 146941, 149216, and 163414, the defense attempted to ask questions regarding specific types of mitigation . Again, asking potential jurors how they would weigh specific mitigating circumstances would ignore well-settled precedent, that it is impermissible to ask voir dire questions designed to commit jurors to certain theories . Sherroan, 142 S-W.3d at 13-14 . Disqualification was not warranted. ,. . Juror 149359 had previously worked in the United States Attorney's, Office, was married to a. Louisville Metro Police Department officer, and she currently worked for a law firm. [Tjhe party alleging bias bears the burden of proving that bias and the resulting prejudice. Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 357 (Ky. 2004) . Once this is shown, (t)he court rmust weigh the probability of bias or prejudice based on the entirety of the juror's responses and demeanor. Shane, 243 S.W.3d at 338. This juror's previous employment, her husband's employment, and her current employment, standing alone, are connections too tenuous to constitute the close relationship required to presume bias or prejudice. Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1991) ; but see Marsch v. Commonwealth, 743 S.W. 2d 830, 833 (Ky. 1987) (close relationship existed where two potential jurors were married to victim's second and third cousins, visited funeral home to express condolences to victim's family, and one juror had known victim since he was a . teenager and worked with him in church) . Because the close relationship was not established, Juror 149359 could be qualified, and disqualification was not warranted . Jurors 161911 and 151644 said they could not impose the death penalty. As a result, the judge struck them, which Appellants claim was improper . However, [dleath qualification ofjurors is not unconstitutional . Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S .W.3d 635, 678 (Ky. 2003) . These jurors were properly disqualified .