Opinion ID: 4680148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the [fact finder] to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, and making no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.” In re T.M., 155 A.3d 400, 403 (D.C. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We deem the evidence sufficient if “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Smith v. United States, 175 A.3d 623, 627 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 134 (D.C. 2001) (en banc)) (emphasis in original); see also In re T.M., 155 A.3d at 403 (“The evidence is insufficient when the government produces no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (internal quotations omitted).
6 Appellant Jenkins contends that his conviction for felony assault stemming from the January 16, 2012, assault and robbery must be reversed because the government presented insufficient evidence that Mr. Walls sustained significant bodily injury within the meaning of D.C. Code § 22-404(a)(2) (2020 Supp.). He asserts that though Mr. Walls went to the hospital and undoubtedly suffered “upsetting and painful” injuries, there was no evidence that he suffered significant bodily injury or severe pain. We agree that the government produced insufficient evidence of Mr. Walls’ injuries to sustain a felony assault conviction. Felony assault is committed when a person “unlawfully assaults, or threatens another in a menacing manner, and intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes significant bodily injury to another . . . .” D.C. Code § 22-404(a)(2). The statute defines “significant bodily injury” as “an injury that requires hospitalization or immediate medical attention.” Id. But whether “an injured party immediately goes to a hospital or seeks other medical attention is not, in itself, determinative . . . .” Quintanilla v. United States, 62 A.3d 1261, 1264 (D.C. 2013). Nor is the statutory standard satisfied by evidence of “everyday remedies such as ice packs, bandages, and self-administered over-the-counter medications . . . whether administered by a medical professional or with self-help.” Id. at 1265. The professional medical attention required by the statute must be aimed at one of two 7 ends: “preventing long-term physical damage and other potentially permanent injuries” or “abating pain that is severe” rather than “lesser, short-term hurts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether “immediate medical attention or hospitalization” occurred, but rather “whether medical treatment beyond what one can administer himself is immediately required to prevent long-term physical damage, possible disability, disfigurement, or severe pain.” In re D.P., 122 A.3d 903, 912 (D.C. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). Applying these standards, we conclude that a reasonable jury could not have found that Mr. Walls’ injuries were “significant.” Though the attack on Mr. Walls was undoubtedly violent and traumatic, the evidence fails to show that immediate medical attention was required to prevent long-term physical damage or other potentially permanent injuries. While Mr. Walls received medicine for his pain, a brace, and crutches after going to the hospital, the government failed to elicit any testimony from Mr. Walls about his need for prompt medical attention, and did not call either the paramedics who arrived on the scene or his treating physician to fill that gap in his testimony. Further, nowhere does the record “suggest that [his] injuries demanded treatment of a higher order, requiring true medical expertise, rather than everyday remedies such as ice packs, bandages, and self-administrated 8 over-the-counter medications.” Wilson v. United States, 140 A.3d 1212, 1218 (D.C. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). Although Mr. Walls testified that he thought X-rays may have been taken at the hospital, no evidence was presented that X-rays were actually taken, or what it was about his injuries that would have prompted a doctor to order X-rays. Cf. Cheeks v. United States, 168 A.3d 691, 697-98 (D.C. 2017) (discussing doctor’s testimony describing how “extensive bodily injuries attributable to the beating . . . led her to order CAT tests to determine whether [the victim] had sustained brain damage, broken bones, or other serious internal injuries”). Similarly, the record is silent on “whether the medication [Mr. Walls received at the hospital] required a doctor’s prescription or was available over the counter[,]” or whether Mr. Walls used that medication, the brace, or the crutches after leaving the hospital. Teneyck v. United States, 112 A.3d 906, 911 (D.C. 2015). Nor does the record provide any basis to reach the conclusion that Mr. Walls suffered “long-term physical damage, [] disability, disfigurement, or severe pain” from the loose tooth that he himself pushed back into place. In re D.P., 122 A.3d at 912. In sum, the government’s evidence did nothing more than invite jurors to speculate that because Mr. Walls sought and received medical diagnosis and treatment, his injuries required “hospitalization or immediate medical attention.” D.C. Code § 22-404(a)(2); see 9 also Nero v. United States, 73 A.3d 153, 158-59 (D.C. 2013) (differentiating sufficient evidence of felony assault for a potentially “life-threatening” gunshot wound suffered by one victim from insufficient evidence of felony assault for another gunshot victim requiring only “diagnostic tests, pain medication, and wound care”). Because the government failed to produce sufficient evidence that Mr. Walls’ injury required treatment “of a higher order,” Quintanilla, 62 A.3d at 1265, appellant Jenkins’ conviction for felony assault must be reversed. While the evidence was insufficient to support appellant Jenkins’ conviction for felony assault, the government did introduce sufficient evidence to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of simple assault beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore remand the case for an entry of conviction on that offense and for resentencing. 1 See D.C. Code § 22-404(a)(1); Wilson, 140 A.3d at 1220 (internal citation omitted). 1 Appellant Parker did not raise the same direct challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his felony assault conviction and appears to have served his sentence for felony assault concurrent to his robbery sentence while this appeal was pending. Nevertheless, because the evidence supporting appellant Parker’s felony assault conviction is the same, “the trial court may, after hearing from the parties, determine whether [his] conviction should [also] be reversed” and reentered as a simple assault conviction “in the interest of justice.” Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 105-06 (D.C. 2009). 10
Next, both appellants argue that even if there is sufficient evidence of their participation in the group assault on Mr. Walls to sustain their convictions for simple assault, there is no evidence that they participated in the robbery or intended to rob Mr. Walls on January 16, 2012. Thus, they contend that their robbery convictions based on an aiding and abetting theory must be overturned. We disagree. To sustain a conviction under an aiding and abetting theory, the government must prove that (1) the principal committed a crime; (2) the defendant “assisted or participated in its commission”; and (3) the defendant’s participation “was with guilty knowledge.” Evans v. United States, 160 A.3d 1155, 1160 (D.C. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). Because robbery is a specific intent crime, the evidence must also show that the appellants had the specific intent to aid and abet the robbery. See Lancaster v. United States, 975 A.2d 168, 174 (D.C. 2009) (“Because armed robbery is a specific-intent crime, the government must prove that the aider and abettor shared the same mens rea required of the principals — in this case, the specific intent to steal from Greene.”); see also Williams v. United States, 113 A.3d 554, 560-61 (D.C. 2015) (noting that to establish robbery under 11 D.C. Code § 22-2801, the government must prove: “(1) a felonious taking, (2) accompanied by . . . the carrying away, of (3) personal property of value, (4) from the person of another or in his presence, (5) against his will, (6) by violence or by putting him in fear, (7) [with] the intention to steal” (original brackets omitted)). 2 The evidence in this case was sufficient for a jury to find that appellants aided and abetted the robbery beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented that appellants were leading and/or participating in the violence that sets robbery apart from simple theft. See id. After being confronted and struck in the face by appellant Jenkins inside his apartment building, Mr. Walls ran out of the building and was immediately attacked by approximately fifteen people, including appellant Parker. After Mr. Walls got up and began to flee from the second attack, several of his attackers caught up to him and stripped him of his jacket, keys, and cellphone before he was able to escape. Given these facts, a reasonable jury was entitled to view the entire attack on January 16, as a coordinated venture by a group of assailants. Therefore, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, this evidence supports a “reasonable inference” that appellants’ individual assaults on Mr. Walls were undertaken in conjunction with the group’s 2 Recently, however, we have expressed concern regarding the use of specific intent and general intent as categories of mens rea. See Carrell v. United States, 165 A.3d 314, 323-34 & nn. 26 & 27 (D.C. 2017) (en banc). 12 efforts to take his property. Evans, 160 A.3d at 1161. Thus, we affirm appellants’ robbery convictions because “proof of conduct which [so] designedly encourages or facilitates a crime [] support[s] an inference of guilty participation in the crime as an aider and abettor.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).