Opinion ID: 889885
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Holt's Sentencing Claim May Be Reviewed on Appeal

Text: ¶ 25 At the outset, there is some question as to whether Holt preserved for appellate review his challenge to the parole-eligibility condition. As a general rule, a party may raise on appeal only those issues and claims that were properly preserved through timely objection in the trial court. State v. West, 2008 MT 338, ¶ 16, 346 Mont. 244, 194 P.3d 683. A review of the November 24, 2009 sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the District Court first sentenced Holt on the burglary conviction and then sentenced him on the failure-to-register conviction. The main discussion relating to the sexual offender treatment condition took place during the first half of the sentencing hearing. And, as the Court notes, Holt raised no objection to the condition at that time. ¶ 26 But there are certain other facts which militate against the conclusion that Holt waived this issue. First, the sexual offender treatment condition was not part of the plea agreement. The District Court decided to add the condition only after receiving the psychosexual evaluation. Second, at the July 27, 2009 change-of-plea hearing, during the parties' verbal explanation of their plea agreement to the District Court, the State made the following representation: The only thing I would like to put on the record is that for the failure to register conviction, it is my understanding that he will undergo a psychosexual evaluation and the State at the time of sentencing will be asking that the defendantthat the Court order that the defendant follow all of those treatment recommendations as part of his judgment in that case. [Emphases added.] Third, at the sentencing hearing, the court referred to these previous discussions in explaining why it had decided to impose a sexual offender treatment condition on Holt's sentence despite the fact that this condition had not been a part of the plea agreement. This certainly could lead one to understand that the court intended to place the condition on the failure-to-register sentence, as opposed to the burglary sentence, in accordance with the prosecutor's representation during the previous discussions. ¶ 27 Given these facts, the lack of a contemporaneous objection to the sexual offender treatment condition is not as clear-cut as the Court implies. On the record before us, and as a purely factual matter, I am unwilling, as the Court does, to leap to the conclusion that Holt acquiesced in the imposition of the condition on his burglary sentence. ¶ 28 But more importantly, as a legal matter, I strenuously disagree with this Court's continuing policy of allowing the courts of this state to impose unauthorized sentences if a defendant acquiesces in the illegality. See State v. Walker, 2007 MT 205, ¶¶ 30-40, 338 Mont. 529, 167 P.3d 879 (Nelson & Warner, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Clark, 2008 MT 391, ¶¶ 45-47, 347 Mont. 113, 197 P.3d 977 (Nelson, J., specially concurring). This whole line of authority, which started with State v. Micklon, 2003 MT 45, 314 Mont. 291, 65 P.3d 559, is legally untenable, not to mention downright ridiculous. ¶ 29 It is one thing to acquiesce in an error, which takes away the right of objecting to it. Section 1-3-207, MCA. But it is quite another to acquiesce in an illegality. The Court's acquiescence policy treats these as the same, but they are not. A party may acquiesce in a trial court's misapplication of the hearsay rules, or its provision of flawed instructions to the jury, or its reliance on misinformation when imposing sentence. But a party cannot acquiesce in a court's exercise of power that it does not have. ¶ 30 This much is clear from our statement, in case after case after case, that a court which lacks jurisdiction cannot acquire it by consent of the parties. Stanley v. Lemire, 2006 MT 304, ¶ 31, 334 Mont. 489, 148 P.3d 643. [1] The reason is that a court's jurisdictionits power and authority to hear and decide the matter before itis conferred only by the Constitution or statutes adopted pursuant to the Constitution. Stanley, ¶¶ 30, 52; accord Pena v. State, 2004 MT 293, ¶ 21, 323 Mont. 347, 100 P.3d 154. ¶ 31 Likewise, we have uniformly held that courts do not have the power to impose a [criminal] sentence unless authorized by a specific grant of statutory authority. State v. Burch, 2008 MT 118, ¶ 23, 342 Mont. 499, 182 P.3d 66; accord State v. White, 2008 MT 464, ¶ 22, 348 Mont. 196, 199 P.3d 274; State v. Hicks, 2006 MT 71, ¶ 41, 331 Mont. 471, 133 P.3d 206; State v. Ruiz, 2005 MT 117, ¶ 12, 327 Mont. 109, 112 P.3d 1001; Pena, ¶ 24; State v. Nelson, 1998 MT 227, ¶ 24, 291 Mont. 15, 966 P.2d 133. Indeed, it is well established that a court's authority to impose a criminal sentence is defined and constrained by statute and that [a] sentence not based on specific statutory authority is an illegal sentence. White, ¶ 22; accord Hicks, ¶ 41; Ruiz, ¶ 12; Pena, ¶ 24. ¶ 32 In Pena, we distinguished between an error in sentencing and an outright lack of power to impose a sentence. We said: Whether a district court commits a statutory error in imposing a sentence must not be confused with the question of whether the court had the `power' or `capacity' to impose the sentence in the first instance. An error in sentencing does not divest a district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case before it. Pena, ¶ 22. ¶ 33 The point is that this whole notion of acquiescence in illegal sentences is totally devoid of any legal foundation. To be sure, a defendant can acquiesce in an error committed in the process of imposing sentence, which generally means (absent plain error review) that he cannot obtain review of it on appeal. But there is no way that a defendant can acquiesce in a sentence which a court does not have legal authority to impose. A party can no more acquiesce in a court's exercise of nonexistent sentencing authority than a party can acquiesce in a court's exercise of nonexistent jurisdiction. This principle is self-evident and irrefutable, and the Court does not even attempt to refute it. Rather, the Court simply ignores it. ¶ 34 In State v. Evert, 2004 MT 178, 322 Mont. 105, 93 P.3d 1254, the prosecutor, Evert (through counsel), and the district court all agreed to resentence Evert five years after his original, final, and legal sentence was pronouncedthough the court lacked authority to do so. In going forward with the patently illegal sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor candidly acknowledged on the record: [B]y statute and by numerous rulings by the Supreme Court, ... a district court judgment, once it has been passed, is basically set in stone. However, it's always been my practiceand also been the practice of this Courtthat if a Defendant who has previously been sentenced appears before either myself or you and shows good cause as to why his sentence should be amended, generally mitigated, we don't object to that. We don't hold firm to the technicalities of the statute or the Supreme Court rulings. Evert, ¶ 6 (emphasis added). Rightly, the Evert Court was appalled: The laws of the State of Montana are written to ensure that justice is served and the well-being of society and individuals is safe-guarded. Contrary to the County Attorney's pronouncement to the District Court that we don't hold firm to the technicalities of the statute or the Supreme Court rulings, adherence to the legislative enactments and the decisions of this Court is not a matter of convenience or prosecutorial preference. No court or officer of the court has the prerogative of circumventing or modifying the procedures established by law. Evert, ¶ 19 (emphasis added). We only promote such disregard for the technicalities of the law when we ignore the law ourselves and allow acquiescence in an illegal act to preclude appellate review. ¶ 35 In State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 602 P.2d 997 (1979), this Court observed that [t]he sentencing authority of a court exists solely by virtue of a statutory grant of power and therefore cannot be exercised in any manner not specifically authorized. Id. at 342, 602 P.2d at 1000 (internal quotation marks omitted). We accordingly held that an appellate court [may] review any sentence imposed in a criminal case, if it is alleged that such sentence is illegal or exceeds statutory mandates, even if no objection is made at the time of sentencing. Id. at 343, 602 P.2d at 1000 (emphasis added); accord West, ¶ 19; State v. Southwick, 2007 MT 257, ¶¶ 21-23, 339 Mont. 281, 169 P.3d 698; State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, ¶ 18, 335 Mont. 344, 151 P.3d 892; State v. Garrymore, 2006 MT 245, ¶¶ 10-15, 334 Mont. 1, 145 P.3d 946. ¶ 36 For these reasons, the Court's assertion that Holt's supposed acquiescence in the sexual offender treatment condition precludes him from raising it on appeal is flat wrong. Opinion, ¶ 10. It is true that he may not challenge the reasonableness of the condition, Opinion, ¶ 10, or obtain review of whether the condition is improper, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion, Opinion, ¶ 17. Indeed, our precedents are well settled on this point: failure to object at sentencing precludes review of the reasonableness of the sentence. State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83, ¶¶ 9, 22, 342 Mont. 187, 179 P.3d 1164; State v. Stiles, 2008 MT 390, ¶ 14, 347 Mont. 95, 197 P.3d 966. But, similar to the distinction we drew in Pena between an error in sentencing and an outright lack of power to impose a sentence, we made clear in Ashby that there is a difference between an objectionable sentence and an illegal one; and while the former is not reviewable in the absence of a contemporaneous objection, the latter is. Ashby, ¶ 22 ([I]n the event an illegal, rather than objectionable, condition is not challenged contemporaneously, we will continue to review such challenge on appeal under [ Lenihan ].). ¶ 37 Holt is not challenging the reasonableness of the parole-eligibility condition. He is challenging its legality. See e.g. Br. of Appellant at 4 (The court erred and exceeded its statutory authority in sentencing Mr. Holt for burglary by requiring him to . . . complete sex offender treatment . . . .); id. at 8 (The unlawful sentencing provisions on the burglary conviction that require Mr. Holt to... complete sex offender treatment in MSP. . . must be stricken from the burglary sentence.). Thus, we should be determining whether that condition is statutorily authorized. The Court errs in failing to do so. ¶ 38 My ensuing discussion proceeds as follows. I first review the standards for determining whether a term or condition of sentence is statutorily authorized. I then address whether there is statutory authority for the sexual offender treatment condition on Holt's parole eligibility. Lastly, I express my concern with the State's argument in support of the Level 3 sexual offender designation in Holt's burglary sentence.