Opinion ID: 2525572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Alternatives to mistrial

Text: The record further demonstrates that the district court understood and considered alternative remedies to mistrial. Glover suggested two: (1) reopening the trial to show the jury the videotape; and (2) instructing the jury that the defense had not seen the tape and did not know what Glover, their client, had said to the police. The former was unworkable. The trial had been conducted on the basis that the tape was not in evidence. The hearsay rule excluded it as untrustworthy; reopening the evidence to play the tape would have given it more impact than it would have had if it had been played during trialand rewarded violation of the district court's evidentiary rulings. It also would have impacted the prosecution's strategy, since the State's case had been presented and argued on the assumption the tape was not coming into evidence. The curative instruction the defense proposed was also unworkable. Telling the jury to disregard the tape and that the defense team did not know what was on it or what their client had said to the police would have required the district court to make an obvious misrepresentation to the jury. Further, as the district court found, such an instruction would have cast defense counsel in a poor light. If the jury believed the instruction, it would have cost the defense counsel's credibility, given his direct representations before the recess that the tape's contents were devastating . . . absolutely devastating to the State's case. It also would have cast defense counsel as incompetent in terms of his knowledge of his client's case. If the jury did not believe the instruction, it cast the court in a dishonest light. The concurring and dissenting opinions fault the district court for not explaining on the record why a simple instruction to the jury to disregard defense counsel's improper argument would not have cured the prejudice. At the beginning of the case the jury had been told that the lawyers' arguments are not evidence, and a similar instruction was included in the final settled set of instructions as instruction number 33. Notably, the defense tied its proposed curative instruction to instruction number 33 but did not argue that instruction 33, standing alone, was adequate to cure the prejudice. On this record, it appears the collective judgment of those involvedthe prosecution, the defense, and the trial judgewas that a simple instruction to disregard the improper argument would not be effective. This conclusion seems fair, given the PowerPoint and videotape displays of the Glover statement, the number of times the issue came up, and the drama that surrounded its exclusion. While it would be helpful for the district court to make an express finding why an instruction to disregard defense counsel's comments would not have sufficed, the court's findings that the more complete curative instruction the defense offered was unworkable and that I don't feel I have much choice . . . and cannot resolve the issue any other way adequately explain its ruling. See Washington, 434 U.S. at 517, 98 S.Ct. 824 (distinguishing between findings that are desirable and those that are constitutionally mandated). These determinations are not ones this court is in a position to second-guess, given the district court's superior vantage point on the content, timing, and manner of delivery of the improper argument and the impact it had on the jury. Other remedies have been suggested as generally available to a district court to control the conduct of the trial attorneys, including discipline, contempt, and the invited response doctrine. These first two remedies, as Washington makes clear, may be invoked any time a lawyer engages in misconduct in front of the court, but they do not cure the problem of a jury that has been unfairly biased by exposure to improper argument. 434 U.S. at 512-13, 98 S.Ct. 824. And while the invited response or invited reply rule, by which the defense counsel argues improperly, provoking the prosecutor to respond in kind, and the trial judge takes no corrective action has received grudging acceptance, United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), this doctrine carries its own costs and is not an alternative a district judge should be second-guessed for failing to endorse. Dee R. Nidiry, Restraining Adversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96 Colum. L.Rev. 1299, 1319-24 (1996).