Opinion ID: 3012894
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applying St. Cyr’s Principles

Text: Guided by St. Cyr’s analysis of a similar provision in IIRIRA, we join the First, Second and Ninth Circuits in concluding that, because § 2242(d) of FARRA fails to state explicitly that a district court may not exercise jurisdiction over habeas corpus claims or mention 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the District Court retains that jurisdiction.20 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 312 (holding that a statute must “explicitly mention[ ] habeas, or 28 U.S.C. § 2241,” to “speak[ ] with sufficient clarity to bar jurisdiction pursuant to the general habeas statute”); see also Demore, 123 S.Ct. at 1714 (describing St. Cyr as “establish[ing] ‘a superclear statement, “magic words” requirement for the congressional expression of ’ an intent to preclude habeas review”) (quoting St. Cyr, 533 20. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr, the Ninth Circuit concluded that habeas review was available for CAT claims. CornejoBarreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court reasoned that, although § 2242(b) of FARRA did not provide a new grant of jurisdiction to federal courts, nothing precluded them from “look[ing] to existing jurisdictional statutes to entertain a petition for review.” Id. at 1015. After St. Cyr, the First and Second Circuits recently concluded as well that habeas review is available for CAT claims. Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 200 (1st Cir. 2003); Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2003). We note that several district courts in this Circuit have anticipated our holding in this case, apparently assuming that, as a result of St. Cyr, district courts have jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus claims alleging CAT or FARRA claims. See, e.g., Builes v. Nye, 239 F. Supp. 2d 518, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2003); Chinchilla-Jimenez v. INS, 226 F. Supp.2d 680, 683 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 15 U.S. at 327 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); Wang, 320 F.3d at 141 (“[A] statute must, at a minimum, explicitly mention either ‘habeas corpus’ or ‘28 U.S.C. § 2241’ in order to limit or restrict § 2241 jurisdiction.”). We note first that the same constitutional concern that guided the Supreme Court to its conclusion in St. Cyr is present in this case. As in St. Cyr, the Government asks us to interpret a statute in a way that would foreclose an individual’s ability to invoke the writ of habeas corpus. To determine whether this foreclosure violates the Suspension Clause of the Constitution would require us to construe that Clause’s scope, a task the Supreme Court concluded should be a last resort in light of the considerable differences of opinion on the breadth of the Clause. 533 U.S. at 301 n.13. The danger of a Suspension Clause violation here is as acute as in St. Cyr because this case involves the “historical core” of the writ of habeas corpus: providing a means for “reviewing the legality of Executive detention,” including the detention of aliens. Id. at 301. We decline to consider the Government’s argument that “ ‘[a]cknowledging no habeas corpus remedy for a narrow subject-matter category of claims does not effect an outright ‘suspension’ of the writ of habeas corpus.” Resp’t Br. at 24-25. Accepting or denying the truth of this statement is, spot on, what the St. Cyr Court sought to avoid. 553 U.S. at 301 n.13 (“The fact that this Court would be required to answer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects is in and of itself a reason to avoid answering the constitutional questions that would be raised by concluding that review was barred entirely.”). We follow the Supreme Court’s lead and thus forgo construing the Suspension Clause. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300-01; see also Wang, 320 F.3d at 141 (noting desire to “avoid serious constitutional concerns”). We note also that the reasons to require a clear statement of Congressional intent are also present here. As discussed above, while Ogbudimkpa initially sought review of the final order of removal issued in his case, that petition was dismissed by our Court for lack of jurisdiction. If we were to conclude here that there is no habeas jurisdiction, no Article III court will review Ogbudimkpa’s CAT claims. 16 We are reluctant to construe the statute to bar any type of judicial review without a clear statement from Congress indicating its intent to do so. Accord St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299. In addition, the construction that the Government proposes would eliminate habeas jurisdiction, something that also requires a clear statement of intent on the part of Congress. Id. at 298. With these considerations in mind, we turn to the language of FARRA. A side-by-side comparison (with emphasis added) of the provision of IIRIRA at issue in St. Cyr that most closely mirrors the language of FARRA at issue here convinces us that FARRA does not foreclose habeas review. IIRIRA § 306(a) FARRA § 2242(d)4 “Notwithstanding any “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no other provision of law, . . . court shall have jurisdic- nothing in this section tion to review any final shall be construed as pro- order of removal against viding any court jurisdican alien who is removable tion to consider or by reason of having com- review claims under [CAT] mitted” certain enumer- or this section . . . except ated criminal offenses. as part of the review of a final order of removal pur- suant to section 242 of the [INA].” With strong indication from the Supreme Court that nothing will suffice but the most explicit statement that habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is repealed, and because § 2242(d) of FARRA does not mention habeas corpus or 28 U.S.C. § 2241, we conclude, by analogy to St. Cyr, that FARRA does not foreclose a district court from exercising habeas jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of CAT. 17