Opinion ID: 848572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: peremptory challenges and automatic reversal

Text: Had no Batson errors occurred here and were the errors under scrutiny no more than the wrongful denial of a peremptory challenge, [6] we should nonetheless issue an automatic reversal. The lead opinion's attempt to apply harmless error review is contrary to the decisions of most other courts that have reviewed the issue. Moreover, harmless error review is simply unworkable and cannot logically apply to rulings on peremptory challenges. The lead opinion departs from the trend set by most other courts that have considered the application of a harmless error analysis to peremptory challenges. It cites United States v. Martinez-Salazar , [7] to demonstrate that a harmless error analysis is appropriate here. Use of this authority illustrates the dangers in relying on dictum. [8] It is undeniable that the cited language is dictum given that the Supreme Court concedes that it need not have reached the issue of an appropriate remedy for the claimed error. Because we find no impairment, we do not decide in this case what the appropriate remedy for a substantial impairment would be. Id. at 317 n. 4, 120 S.Ct. 774. I disagree with the lead opinion's assertion that the dictum of this footnote can constitute a significant shift in the law. The lead opinion's reliance on Martinez-Salazar is further misplaced given that the case dealt with an issue distinct from the denial of the use of peremptory challenges. In Martinez-Salazar, the trial court erroneously refused to remove a juror for cause. The defendant then used a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. Id. at 307, 120 S.Ct. 774. The defendant was not denied the use of his peremptory challenges. In fact, he exercised one so that the objectionable juror did not sit in judgment of him. Therefore, Martinez-Salazar did not deal with the denial of a peremptory challenge, and its dictum should not be read as a comment on the issue before us. The distinction between peremptory denial cases and Martinez-Salazar makes a real difference when we consider whether harmless error review applies. In Martinez-Salazar, the only existing error was the trial court's error in denying a challenge for cause. It was cured when the defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. Consequently, the juror took no part in the trial proceedings. The error arose and was cured before the trial began. On the other hand, when a peremptory challenge is denied, the challenged juror stays on the jury and sits in judgment of the defendant. His or her presence permeates the trial, and the error infects the entire case. [9] The all-encompassing penetration of the error explains why a harmless error analysis is out of place in the review of the wrongful denial of a peremptory challenge. To accurately make a harmless error analysis, the court would have to determine the effect that the challenged juror had on the verdict. In a case directly on point, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed the problem in these words: To subject the denial of a peremptory challenge to harmless-error analysis would require appellate courts to do the impossible: to reconstruct what went on in jury deliberations through nothing more than post-trial hearings and sheer speculation. Annigoni, supra at 1145. Appellate courts have no record of what is said in jury rooms and no record of what potentially subtle influences one juror had on the others. Therefore, no device exists with which to plumb the magnitude of the error. Unlike the typical error subject to harmless error review discussed in Fulminante, errors in leaving individuals on a jury cannot be quantitatively assessed in the context of the evidence presented. Fulminante, supra at 308, 111 S.Ct. 1246. Without a means of comparison or measurement, meaningful harmless error analysis is impossible. For this reason, it is illogical to rule as the majority does. It ignores the plight of courts in future cases that attempt to follow its ruling. Chief Justice Taylor demonstrates in his opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part the difficulty faced in trying to apply the harmless error standard. Although he finds the error harmless, he offers no analysis for his conclusion. Likely, this is because there is no legitimate analysis, beyond mere speculation, that can be applied. In fact, the Chief Justice has demonstrated that the rule now created by the majority is a rule of automatic affirmance. It defies fair appellate scrutiny. The lead opinion implies that a rule requiring automatic reversal would contradict M.C.L. § 769.26. [10] This is inaccurate. Allowing a peremptory challenge error to stand would always amount to a miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice exists if it affirmatively appears that the error undermines the reliability of the verdict. People v. Lukity, 460 Mich. 484, 495, 596 N.W.2d 607 (1999). Given that an error in denying a peremptory challenge changes the makeup of the jury, it potentially changes the verdict. It alters the jury deliberation and interaction process. The point of a peremptory challenge is to remove someone who appears biased but who might not be removed for cause. Rejecting the peremptory challenge leaves this potentially biased or prejudiced juror on the jury, undermining the validity of the verdict. Requiring automatic reversal for peremptory challenge errors is consistent with the plain error standard of review articulated by this Court in People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). Carines gave three requirements for plain error: the error (1) must have occurred, (2) must be clear or obvious, and (3) must affect substantial rights. Id. at 763, 597 N.W.2d 130. Peremptory challenge errors would always meet this standard. A peremptory challenge error becomes obvious after the trial court rules on an objection to it. The error is that either a juror who should not be on a jury remains or one who should remain does not. These errors affect substantial rights because they shape the jury. Peremptory challenges are a means of eliminating extreme beliefs or partiality from a jury. Batson, supra at 91, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The right to a peremptory challenge enables the parties to strike jurors who, although not necessarily excusable for cause, appear biased or hostile in some way. Therefore, the right implicates defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. Those plain errors require reversal because they `seriously [affect] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings . . . .' Carines, supra at 763, 597 N.W.2d 130, quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936). Given the fundamental nature of the jury process, having an unfairly chosen jury raises serious questions regarding the integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceedings. [11] Therefore, the errors require automatic reversal. Id. Because we have no tools to gauge the effect of errors in denying peremptory challenges, a harmless error analysis of them is simply unworkable. Therefore, such errors must result in automatic reversal.