Opinion ID: 353818
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the substantive rico violation

Text: 65 J. C. and Recea Hawkins contend that their acts, while arguably violative of other criminal statutes, are not proscribed by the substantive RICO provision under which they were charged, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), in that they were not committed in furtherance of the affairs of an enterprise as required by the Act. At best, they say, the facts disclosed that two brothers confederated to commit a few, isolated criminal acts over a period of six years. Neither the facts nor the law support this contention. 66 Because this prosecution was based on a novel and recently enacted criminal statute, we must, at the outset, determine exactly what that statute denounces as illegal, as relevant to this case. Section 1962(c) provides: 67 It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 68 This section must be read in the context of the statutory definitions of its key terms. Enterprise, as used in the Act, includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). As relevant to this case, a pattern of racketeering activity simply requires at least two acts of racketeering activity committed within ten years of each other. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Racketeering activity includes three broad categories of crimes: (A) any of several specified act(s) or threat(s) . . . chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, including, as relevant here, murder and arson, (B) any act which is indictable under any of several specified sections of Title 18, U.S.C., including, as relevant here, § 659 (felonious theft from interstate shipment), § 1503 (obstruction of justice), and § 2315 (interstate shipment of stolen or counterfeit securities) or (C) federal offenses involving narcotics or other dangerous drugs. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 69 Reduced to its bare essentials, the charge against J. C. and Recea may be restated as follows: 16 70 Being associated with a group of individuals who were associated in fact, J. C. and Recea Hawkins each directly and indirectly participated in the group's affairs through the commission of two or more predicate crimes. 71 The gist of J. C.'s and Recea's objection to their conviction on Count Two is that there was no group of individuals associated in fact no enterprise in whose affairs they could have participated, directly or indirectly. We disagree. 72 In United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976), we noted that Congress gave the term 'enterprise' a very broad meaning. On its face and in light of its legislative history, the Act clearly encompasses not only legitimate businesses but also enterprises which are from their inception organized for illicit purposes. United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1073 (5th Cir. 1977). 17 Similarly, we are persuaded that enterprise includes an informal, de facto association such as that involved in this case. In defining enterprise, Congress made clear that the statute extended beyond conventional business organizations to reach any . . . group of individuals whose association, however loose or informal, furnishes a vehicle for the commission of two or more predicate crimes. The statute demands only that there be association in fact when it cannot be implied in law. There is no distinction, for enterprise purposes, between a duly formed corporation that elects officers and holds annual meetings and an amoeba-like infra-structure that controls a secret criminal network. 73 Here, the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an enterprise comprised of at least five of the defendants. 18 This enterprise can best be analogized to a large business conglomerate. Metaphorically speaking, J. C. Hawkins was the chairman of the board, functioning as the chief executive officer and overseeing the operations of many separate branches of the corporation. An executive committee in charge of the Counterfeit Title, Stolen Car, and Amphetamine Sales Department was comprised of J. C., Delph, and Taylor, who supervised the operations of lower level employees such as Farr, the printer, and Green, Boyd, and Jackson, the car thieves. Another executive committee, comprised of J. C., Recea and Foster, controlled the Thefts From Interstate Commerce Department, arranging the purchase, concealment, and distribution of such commodities as meat, dairy products, Career Club shirts, and heavy construction equipment. An offshoot of this department handled subsidiary activities, such as murder and obstruction of justice, intended to facilitate the smooth operation of its primary activities. Each member of the conglomerate, with the exception of Foster, was responsible for procuring and wholesaling whatever narcotics could be obtained. The thread tying all of these departments, activities, and individuals together was the desire to make money. J. C. might have been voicing the corporation's motto when he told Bob Day, in May, 1976, if it ain't a pretty damn good bit of money, I ain't going to fuck with it. T. 2229. 74 A jury is entitled to infer the existence of an enterprise on the basis of largely or wholly circumstantial evidence. Like a criminal conspiracy, a RICO enterprise cannot be expected to maintain a high profile in the community. Its affairs are likely to be conducted in secrecy and to involve a minimal amount of necessary contact between participants. Thus, direct evidence of association may be difficult to obtain; a jury should be permitted to draw the natural inference arising from circumstantial evidence of association. 19 In this case, persuasive circumstantial evidence of association was buttressed by direct evidence tending to prove the existence of an enterprise. According to Boyd, defendant Delph stated that he had a truck that he was running for J. C. and that they was partners in the deal or some kind of operation or setup. T. 1275-76. William Martin described defendant Taylor's admission that he and others had just gotten through purchasing an airplane for $102,000 to bring heroin into this country, T. 1196, and J. C. told Day that he had virtually bankrupted himself by spending money on airplanes to import drugs. Leon Averett, in the course of selling a trailer load of stolen shirts, stated that his associates had a warehouse in Atlanta big enough to handle several tractor-trailers. 75 Additionally, although the target of the RICO statute is not sporadic activity, 20 we find nothing in the Act excluding from its ambit an enterprise engaged in diversified activity. Indeed, Congress expressly stated that the purpose of the Act was to seek the eradication of organized crime, which it described as a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct . . . . Pub.L.91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (emphasis added). To this end, it directed that (t)he provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. Id., § 904. While earlier cases have considered enterprises engaged in only one type of prohibited activity, 21 a single enterprise engaged in diversified activities fits comfortably within the proscriptions of the statute and the dictates of common sense: 76 As in a firm with a real estate department and an insurance department, the fact that partners bring in two kinds of business on the basis of their different skills and connections does not affect the fact that they are partners in a more general business venture. 77 United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995, 95 S.Ct. 1425, 43 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975). 22 We would deny society the protection intended by Congress were we to hold that the Act does not reach those enterprises nefarious enough to diversify their criminal activity. 23 78 The evidence in this case demonstrated the existence of an enterprise a myriopod criminal network, loosely connected but connected nonetheless. By committing arson, actively assisting a car theft ring, fencing thousands of dollars worth of goods stolen from interstate commerce, murdering a key witness, and dealing in narcotics, J. C. and Recea Hawkins directly and indirectly participated in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern, indeed a plethora, of racketeering activity. We affirm their convictions on Count Two.