Opinion ID: 2166949
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rothermel Majority Rationale Superseded By Amendments

Text: In this case, the Superior Court concluded that stare decisis compelled it to apply the majority holding in Nationwide Insurance Company v. Rothermel, Del.Supr., 385 A.2d 691 (1978). Thus, Harper's action for benefits against her PIP insurer, State Farm, was dismissed because it was not filed within two years of the date of the accident. In Rothermel, however, this Court was asked to construe the statute of limitation relating to PIP provisions in the Delaware No-Fault Insurance Statute in essentially its original form. We have concluded that the subsequent amendments to Section 2118 have superseded the rationale of the majority's holding in Rothermel. Those amendments compel an interpretation of the current statute in accordance with the analysis of Justice Duffy's dissenting opinion in Rothermel and the Superior Court's prior holding in Webster v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Del.Supr., 348 A.2d 329 (1975). Although a claim for PIP benefits still arises from a personal injury, the current statute has at least four provisions that together demonstrate an unambiguous legislative intention to completely separate all litigation regarding the statutory right to PIP benefits from any independent cause of action at common law against a tortfeasor for personal injury. [4] First, the present statute provides that PIP benefits are paid to or for the policy holder by the insured's own carrier, without regard to fault. Second, the statute makes expenses, that are defrayed by the payment of PIP benefits, inadmissible in any lawsuit against an alleged tortfeasor. 21 Del.C. § 2118(h). Third, the PIP carrier no longer has a statutory right of subrogation for reimbursement against the individual tortfeasor who caused the injuries, but now subrogation actions can be maintained only against the tortfeasor's automobile liability insurance carrier. 21 Del.C. § 2118(g)(1). Fourth, since 1977, the no-fault statute has provided that [n]o insurer or self-insurer shall join or be joined in an action by an injured party against a tortfeasor for the recovery of damage by the injured party and/or the recover of benefits paid by the insurer or self-insurer. 21 Del.C. § 2118(g)(4). [5] Thus, the General Assembly's amendments through 1977 illustrate its intention to provide a wholly-separate, statutory remedy for PIP related causes of action. New PIP provisions set forth in the 1982 amendments to Section 2118 reaffirmed that intention. When Rothermel was decided, Section 2118 provided PIP benefits only for injuries ascertainable within 12 months of the accident. Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Rothermel, 385 A.2d at 692 n. 1. There were no statutory exceptions or conditions for extensions. There were also no provisions addressing the submission of bills by the insured to the PIP carrier within any particular time frame. Section 2118 was amended in 1982. 63 Del. Laws, c. 405 § 1 (1982). The PIP provisions in Delaware's No-Fault Insurance Statute now provide: (1) Expenses under subparagraph a. of this paragraph shall be submitted to the insurer as promptly as practical, in no event more than 2 years after they are received by the insured. (2) Payments of expenses under subparagraph a. of this paragraph shall be made as soon as practical after they are received during the period of 2 years from the accident. Expenses which are incurred within the 2 years but which have been impractical to present to an insurer within the 2 years shall be paid if presented within 90 days after the end of the 2-year period. 21 Del.C. § 2118(a)(2)i (emphasis added). The statutory rights and obligations of the PIP carrier and its insured, which must be included in an automobile insurance contract, are now set forth unambiguously in the current legislative mandates. The insured now has a general statutory right to receive PIP benefits for defined expenses that are incurred within two years of the accident date. 21 Del.C. § 2118(a)(2)h. The exceptions to that general rule are also defined by statute. Id. The insured has a reciprocal statutory obligation to submit claims for benefits promptly to the PIP carrier either within two years of receipt or within two years and ninety days of the accident. 21 Del.C. § 2118(a)(2)i. The amended statute would be unworkable if causes of actions for the denial of PIP benefits are time-barred if they are not filed against the PIP carrier within two years of the accident date. The holding in Rothermel was reached when this Court was called upon to construe the statute of limitations for PIP benefits under the original 1972 no-fault statute. Because of the extensive changes in the no-fault statute since Rothermel, its rationale and holding no longer apply to the interpretation of Section 2118, as it is currently written. See Opinion of the Justices, Del.Supr., 295 A.2d 718, 721-22 (1972). We have concluded that the amendments to the Delaware No-Fault Insurance Statute have now completely separated common law actions against a tortfeasor for personal injury from both actions by an insured for PIP benefits and the statutory actions by the PIP insurer for subrogation against the tortfeasor's liability insurer.