Opinion ID: 2639442
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the 1994 Tax Deed

Text: ¶ 21 At trial, the State produced six pieces of evidence supporting Ranger Enterprises' ownership of Vance Springs and Hamilton's unlawful presence thereon: (1) the 1994 tax deed, (2) the 1995 quiet title judgment against the Fraternity, (3) the 1996 writ of restitution ordering members of the Fraternity to vacate the property, (4) Hamilton's 1996 trespass convictions, (5) the 1999 quiet title judgment against Hamilton, and (6) the testimony of the owner of Ranger Enterprises that Hamilton did not have permission to be on the property. ¶ 22 Despite this evidence, at the close of the State's case in chief, Hamilton moved to dismiss the criminal trespass charge. He argued that the trial court should rule as a matter of law that the 1994 tax deed was void and that he was the lawful owner of the property. The court denied his motion, concluding, based on the evidence produced by the State, that the criminal trespass charge should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact. ¶ 23 On appeal, Hamilton reasserts this same argument. He contends that since the 1994 tax deed cited to an erroneous statute, the 1994 tax sale was void as a matter of law. Hence, the trial court erred in submitting the criminal trespass charge to the jury. We disagree. ¶ 24 Essentially, Hamilton asks this court to legally undo the series of judgments and actions that occurred after the 1994 tax sale because the 1994 tax deed allegedly was invalid as a matter of law. He believes that removing the 1994 lynchpin event will derail the validity of each subsequent proceeding on Vance Springs. Hamilton misapprehends the law. Even if the 1994 tax deed were technically invalid, Hamilton's argument fails because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the quiet title judgments. Thus, we need not reach the issue of whether an incorrect statutory citation in a tax deed invalidates a tax sale.