Opinion ID: 1194191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards for termination of prospective relief under the PLRA.

Text: Under the PLRA, the Stewart injunctive orders should not have been terminated if, on the record presented, they satisfied the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). The Act provides that relief shall not terminate if it remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of [a] Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and . . . is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). [14] Review of an injunction pursuant to the PLRA's standards is thus sometimes referred to as a need-narrowness-intrusiveness inquiry, Handberry v. Thompson, 436 F.3d 52, 64 (2d Cir.2006). This standard requires an assessment of the circumstancesboth legal and factualat the time termination is sought. See Gilmore, 220 F.3d at 1010(citing Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 166 (2d Cir.1999)). As state pretrial detainees, plaintiffs are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as well as specific substantive guarantees of the federal Constitution, such as the First and Eighth Amendments. Under the Due Process Clause, detainees have a right against jail conditions or restrictions that amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). This standard differs significantly from the standard relevant to convicted prisoners, who may be subject to punishment so long as it does not violate the Eighth Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Absent evidence of express punitive intent, it may be possible to infer a given restriction's punitive status from the nature of the restriction. Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002); see Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir.2004) (noting that to constitute punishment, the harm or disability caused by the government's action must either significantly exceed, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement). As the Supreme Court has explained, the determination of whether a particular condition or restriction imposes punishment in the constitutional sense will generally turn on whether an alternate purpose is reasonably assignable: if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not without more, amount to punishment. Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goalif it is arbitrary or purposelessa court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (alterations in original) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963)); see id. at 539 n. 21, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (noting that a de minimis level of imposition is permissible). Legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives include maintaining security and order and operating the [detention facility] in a manageable fashion. Id. at 540 n. 23, 99 S.Ct. 1861. The Due Process Clause also protects detainees' state-created liberty interests. See Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). For a state statute or regulation to create a liberty interest protected by the Constitution, two things must be true: [f]irst, the law must set forth `substantive predicates' to govern official decision making and, second, it must contain explicitly mandatory language, i.e., a specific directive to the decisionmaker that mandates a particular outcome if the substantive predicates have been met. Valdez, 302 F.3d at 1044(quoting Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462-63, 109 S.Ct. 1904). [15] Finally, pretrial detainees retain other specific constitutional guarantees. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861. As with the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process analysis, however, the detainees' rights may be subject to restrictions and limitations based on legitimate government concerns: when an institutional restriction infringes a specific constitutional guarantee, such as the First Amendment, the practice must be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional security. Id. at 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Assuming the prospective relief at issue is found to be necessary to correct a current and ongoing constitutional violation, we must consider whether § 3626(b)(3)'s need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria are met. A determination of whether the relief goes no further than necessary to correct the violation and is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation will obviously rest upon case-specific factorsnamely, the extent of the current and ongoing constitutional violations. See, e.g., Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 378 F.3d 42, 54-55 (1st Cir.2004); see also Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 870 (9th Cir.2001) ( Armstrong '01 ) (noting, for example, that a few isolated violations affecting a narrow range of plaintiffs would not provide a basis for system-wide relief). The parties operated under the agreement that the burden of proof to terminate the Stewart orders pursuant to § 3626 was on the County. We proceed under this assumption, without so holding, because the assignment of the burden of proof is not dispositive of any issue raised by the parties. [16]