Opinion ID: 2367661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant Was Entitled to Participate in the Hearing

Text: The District of Columbia concedes that, as D.T.'s biological parent, D.F. had a constitutional right to meaningful participation in a proceeding that terminates his parental rights. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) (A fundamental requirement of due process is `the opportunity to be heard' ... which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.) (citation omitted). Although this right was not extinguished by his incarceration, appellant had no right to appear in person. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z980001, 131 Md.App. 187, 748 A.2d 1020, 1023 & n. 2 (2000) (collecting cases). Courts generally agree that `such prisoners do not have the right to be brought into the state for the termination hearing, as long as the parent is represented by counsel and provided with alternative means of participating in the hearing.' Id. (quoting Philip M. Genty, Procedural Due Process Rights of Incarcerated Parents in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: A Fifty State Analysis, 30 J. FAM. L. 757, 775-76 (1991-92)). These alternative means may include participation by telephone, or by reviewing a transcript of the hearing and providing rebuttal testimony, sometimes by deposition. See generally In re Baby K., 143 N.H. 201, 722 A.2d 470, 473-75 (1998); Division of Youth & Family Services v. M.Y.J.P., 360 N.J.Super. 426, 823 A.2d 817, 841-43 (2003). Counsel apparently planned to have his client participate by telephone, and there is every reason to believe that would have been allowed. Magistrate Judge Dalton explained that she has presided over many adoption trials and has always permitted parties, especially incarcerated parties, to participate by telephone when requested to do so. In this case, however, she did not receive a [timely] request from counsel to have the biological father participate at trial by telephone. Instead, on the morning set for trial, counsel requested a continuance, perhaps so he could make such arrangements. As with many procedural rights, a prisoner's opportunity to participate in the show cause hearing may be forfeited if it is not asserted in a timely fashion. Here, Magistrate Judge Dalton concluded (and Judge Long affirmed) that the request for a continuance came too late. Unless the denial of a request for continuance is `so arbitrary as to deny due process,' it is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Robinson v. United States, 797 A.2d 698, 710 n. 16 (D.C.2002) (quoting O'Connor v. United States, 399 A.2d 21, 28 (D.C.1979)). Appellant has not made such a showing here. Therefore, considered as a separate issue, the denial of appellant's day-of-trial request for a continuance did not constitute reversible error. Nevertheless, appellant cites his counsel's failure to make arrangements for his participation by telephone (or by some other means) as one of several grounds for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, and we now turn to that issue.