Opinion ID: 2348653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Exclusion for Sexual Molestation

Text: In light of this conclusion, we are also faced with the interpretation of another undefined term in ACIC's insurance policy in determining the insurer's duty to defend: namely, sexual molestation. According to the definition of bodily injury as recited above, ACIC's policy does not provide coverage for bodily injuries arising out of actual, alleged or threatened sexual molestation of a person. Porto and BSA argue that the term sexual molestation can beapplied only to activities involving physical contact with the victim. Thus, they assert, the family's allegations about Jimmy's alleged visual exposure to pornography and to live sexual acts cannot be included within the definition of sexual molestation as that term is used in Porto's policy. [7] ACIC counters that the term sexual molestation does not presuppose physical contact. Rather, it asserts that the plain meaning of the phrase sexual molestation includes those nonphysical activities listed in the family's complaint that allegedly also caused the bodily injuries in question. Porto and BSA maintain that [c]ourts have consistently found that conduct constitutes sexual `abuse' or `molestation' only where there has been physical sexual contact, citing McAuliffe v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 69 F.3d 277, 279 (8th Cir.1995); Community Action for Greater Middlesex County, Inc. v. American Alliance Insurance Co., 254 Conn. 387, 757 A.2d 1074, 1083 (Conn.2000) ( Community Action ); Jones v. Doe, 673 So.2d 1163, 1164-65 (La.Ct.App.1996); New World Frontier, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Co., 253 A.D.2d 455, 676 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (N.Y.App.Div.1998). A reading of these cases, however, reveals that none of them actually limits the term sexual molestation to unwanted physical contact, as Porto and BSA suggest. In fact, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Community Action specifically acknowledged the broad nature of the term. See Community Action, 757 A.2d at 1082 (holding that the phrase `actual or threatened abuse or molestation by anyone of any person' is broad language that may include many things within its purview, including, but not limited to unwanted contact of a sexual nature). [8] After surveying the above-cited case law construing this term, we conclude that neither these courts nor any others have accepted the constricted definition of sexual molestation that Porto and BSA have urged us to adopt. Rather, the courts that have considered this issue have acknowledged the broad nature of the term sexual molestation, noting how it embraces the multiple dictionary definitions for the words molest and molestation. See American National General Insurance Co. v. Jackson, 203 F.Supp.2d 674, 678-79 (S.D.Miss.2001) (holding that the definition of sexual molestation includes, among other meanings [t]o subject to unwanted or improper sexual activity, and applying the term to nonphysical occurrences, including verbal sexual harassment) (quoting American Heritage Dictionary 1133 (4th ed. 2000)); Community Action, 757 A.2d at 1082 n. 15 (quoting from the multiple definitions of molest in Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1455 (1981)); Newby v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 738 So.2d 93, 97 (La.Ct.App.5 Cir.1999) (rejecting the equation of sexual molestation with sexual acts, and concluding that the term molest has multiple definitions) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 1455); Farmers Union Mutual Insurance v. Kienenberger, 257 Mont. 107, 847 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Mont.1993) (defining sexual molestation, in part, as an annoying sexual advance) (citing Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 764 (1984)). It is well settled that the tenets of contract law apply to the interpretation of insurance policies. Mallane, 658 A.2d at 20; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sullivan, 633 A.2d 684, 686 (R.I.1993); Malo v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 459 A.2d 954, 956 (R.I.1983). According to these principles, a court should afford terms within an insurance policy their literal meaning, unless the language is ambiguous. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 583 A.2d at 551-52. The proper test for ambiguity focuses on determining what ordinary readers and purchasers of the insurance policy would have understood the policy to cover if they had read it. Pressman, 574 A.2d at 760 (citing Elliott Leases Cars, Inc., 118 R.I. at 326, 373 A.2d at 812). This Court refrains from engaging in mental gymnastics    to read ambiguity into a policy where none is present. Sjogren, 703 A.2d at 610 (quoting Mallane, 658 A.2d at 20). As the Connecticut Supreme Court observed in Community Action after it reviewed the pertinent case law, insurance policy exclusions for sexual abuse or molestation are not generally viewed as ambiguous. Community Action, 757 A.2d at 1083 (noting that the court in that case could uncover no precedent holding policy exclusions for abuse and molestation ambiguous). We agree and hold that the concept of the actual, alleged, or threatened sexual molestation of a person is not ambiguous as it was used in this policy; rather, it is a term that is commonly understood to describe a broad range of unwanted or inappropriate sexual activities, including subjecting another individual to indecent or nonconsensual advances for the perpetrator's own sexual gratification. Black's Law Dictionary 1021 (7th ed.1999) (defining molestation, in part, as [t]he act of making    indecent advances to or on someone, esp. for sexual gratification). Such advances may or may not involve actual physical contact with the victim. Moreover, the plain meaning of the term threatened sexual molestation is not limited to situations involving unwanted sexual contact of a physical nature, but it also extends to otherinappropriate conduct of a sexual nature that merely threatens an actual sexual assault  such as verbal advances or displaying sexually explicit images or suggestive pictures to the victim. Such acts are not only typically pursued for the actor's own sexual stimulation or gratification, but also they may threaten to and sometimes lead to an actual sexual assault upon the victim. In sum, the family's complaint alleged that Jimmy suffered bodily injuries when he was sexually assaulted by Abbott, and that Porto's negligence caused these injuries. The complaint described in one sentence the nature of the alleged sexual assaults, including within this description exposure to pornography and to live sexual acts, as well as physical assaults of a sexual nature. Porto's ACIC insurance policy provided coverage for bodily injuries caused by Porto's negligence  but only if these injuries did not arise out of actual, alleged, or threatened sexual molestation. Here, the policy clearly stated that ACIC did not afford coverage for bodily injuries arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened sexual molestation of a person. Thus, ACIC's duty to defend Porto turns on whether the family's complaint alleged bodily injuries arising from acts that did not constitute actual, alleged, or threatened sexual molestation. Most importantly, the family has not alleged that Porto's negligence proximately caused any bodily injuries that did not arise out of the sexual-molestation claim; rather, the complaint avers that Abbott's alleged criminal acts of sexual molestation upon Jimmy were responsible for causing this harm. And even though Abbott's conduct in allegedly exposing Jimmy to pornography and to live sex acts may not have involved physical contact with him, these activities still constituted unwanted sexual advances upon Jimmy for Abbott's own sexual gratification. Further, the complaint described these activities as a part of Abbott's alleged sexual assault, averring that Abbott sexually assaulted [Jimmy] by fondling him, engaging in oral sexual activity, and exposing [Jimmy] to pornography and live sexual acts.  (Emphasis added.) Given these allegations, we agree with the motion justice that this averment described multiple manifestations of alleged sexual assaults committed by Abbott against Jimmy, rather than stating independent causes of action for each different type of alleged sexual misconduct. Further, we hold that each of these alleged sexual activities, whether considered singly or in the aggregate, comes within the purview of what is commonly understood to constitute actual, alleged, or threatened sexual molestation under the plain, ordinary and usual meaning of that term. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 583 A.2d at 552 (quoting Sentry Insurance Co. v. Grenga, 556 A.2d 998, 999 (R.I.1989)). This remains true even when we employ a narrow interpretation of the term arising under. [9] Because the family's complaint alleged only different kinds of sexual molestation as proximate causes of Jimmy's injuries, the exclusion applies to bar coverage.