Opinion ID: 202283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 36 This court reviews sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo. United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d 470, 480 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 639, 163 L.Ed.2d 517 (2005). The court must determine whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government—a perspective that requires us to draw every reasonable inference and resolve credibility conflicts in a manner consistent with the verdict—would permit a rational trier of fact to find each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Patel, 370 F.3d 108, 111 (1st Cir.2004). 37 To convict a defendant of a section 1326 violation, the government must prove that (1) the defendant is an alien; (2) he was arrested and deported; and (3) he thereafter entered, or attempted to enter, the United States without the express consent of the Attorney General of the United States to apply for readmission to the United States since the time of his previous arrest and deportation. United States v. Cabral, 252 F.3d 520, 522-23 (1st Cir. 2001). Here, García maintains that the government's paltry evidence was insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person who was deported in 1999 was García. According to García, the probative value of the government's evidence was virtually nil for the same reasons that the evidence—including the affidavit, the Warrant of Deportation, and the identification testimony—was purportedly inadmissible. We are not persuaded. 38 To the contrary, we find that the evidence adduced at trial—all properly admissible—was more than ample to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, all three elements of the section 1326 charge against García. The signed statement admitting alienage, the Warrant of Deportation—with photograph and fingerprint— indicating that García was seen departing the United States in 1999, Plumb's testimony regarding his 2002 encounter of García, Plumb's testimony regarding García's identity, and Sassone's testimony regarding the absence of evidence establishing that García had permission to re-enter the United States, could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that García was guilty as charged. That the government failed to call any witness who personally saw García sign the affidavit or depart from the United States does not lead us to think otherwise. See United States v. Melendez-Torres, 420 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2005) (explaining that circumstantial evidence, if it meets all the other criteria of admissibility, is just as appropriate as direct evidence and is entitled to be given whatever weight the [fact finder] deems it should be given) (quoting United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1998)).