Opinion ID: 779713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: concurrent/successive tortfeasors

Text: 29 During trial, the Government attempted to prove that physicians at San Juan Regional Medical Center (San Juan Regional), where Haceesa visited and was treated on April 27 and 28 (after his visit to Shiprock Hospital on April 25), were negligent in failing to accurately diagnose Haceesa's illness. The Government further argued that damages should be apportioned between it and San Juan Regional. In its post-trial decision, the district court made no factual findings regarding Haceesa's treatment at San Juan Regional, nor did it reach any conclusions regarding San Juan Regional's alleged negligence. Instead, it concluded that [u]nder New Mexico law, ... the negligence of the [Government] [wa]s successive, and not concurrent with, any negligence of San Juan Regional Medical Center on April 27th and 28th, 1998, and that, accordingly, the Government was liable for all damages incurred by plaintiffs. Aplt.App. at 125. 30 On appeal, the Government contends that the district court erred in labeling it and San Juan Regional as successive rather than concurrent tortfeasors. The Government further argues that the district court should have quantified the fault of the Government relative to that of San Juan Regional and reduced the damages to be paid by the Government. For the reasons outlined below, we agree with the district court that the Government and San Juan Regional were successive tortfeasors, but we reject the district court's conclusion that the Government is responsible for all damages incurred by the plaintiffs. 31 Joint tortfeasor liability in New Mexico is governed by section 41-3A-1 of the New Mexico Statutes, entitled Several liability. This provision in effect defines two distinct categories of cases. One category involves cases [w]here a plaintiff sustains damage as the result of fault of more than one person which can be causally apportioned on the basis that distinct harms were caused to the plaintiff. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-3A-1(D). As to cases in this category, each tortfeasor is severally liable only for the distinct harm which that person proximately caused. Id. The other category involves any cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies, id. § 41-3A-1(A), which category implicitly consists of all joint tortfeasor cases not covered by § 41-3A-1(D). As to cases in this category, each tortfeasor who establishes that the fault of another is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury shall be liable only for that portion of the total [damages] ... that is equal to the ratio of such defendant's fault to the total fault attributed to all persons. Id. § 41-3A-1(B). These two categories have come to be identified in New Mexico case law respectively as cases involving successive tortfeasors and those involving concurrent tortfeasors. See, e.g., Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025, 1028-29 (1995) ([Defendants] are not concurrent tortfeasors; they are successive tortfeasors by reason of divisible and causally-distinct injuries.). 32 In Lujan, the court listed several factors that are relevant in determining whether tortfeasors are successive or concurrent. These factors include: 33 1) the identity of time and place between the acts of alleged negligence; 2) the nature of the cause of action brought against each defendant; 3) the similarity or differences in the evidence relevant to the causes of action; 4) the nature of the duties allegedly breached by each defendant; and 5) the nature of the harm or damages caused by each defendant. 34 Id. at 1029. Although those factors have since been criticized, see Lewis v. Samson, 128 N.M. 269, 992 P.2d 282, 299-300 (App. 1999) (Hartz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), they remain valid. See Lewis v. Samson, 131 N.M. 317, 35 P.3d 972, 984 n. 3 (2001) (noting criticism of factors but declining to engage in further examination of distinction between concurrent and successive tortfeasors). 35 Although several factors perhaps could be construed either way, we conclude that the first and fifth factors strongly support the district court's conclusion that the Government and San Juan Regional were successive tortfeasors. It is uncontroverted that the acts of alleged negligence committed by Shiprock Hospital and San Juan Regional occurred days apart from one another and in different locations. In light of the fact that hantavirus is a rapidly progressing disease, and that Haceesa presented to San Juan Regional with more severe symptoms than he did when he visited Shiprock Hospital, we conclude that the alleged negligent acts of Shiprock Hospital and San Juan Regional, though similar in type (i.e., failure to properly diagnose and treat), were distinct. 36 More importantly, we conclude that the nature of the harm caused by each of the hospitals was different. In Alberts v. Schultz, 126 N.M. 807, 975 P.2d 1279 (1999), the court recognized the loss-of-chance-of-survival theory. In describing the theory, the court noted that [a] claim for loss of chance is predicated upon the negligent denial by a healthcare provider of the most effective therapy for a patient's presenting medical problem, and [t]he negligence may be found in such misconduct as an incorrect diagnosis, the application of inappropriate treatments, or the failure to timely provide the proper treatment. Id. at 1282. The court further noted that [e]very patient has a certain probability that he or she will recover from the presenting medical problem, and [u]nder the loss-of-chance theory, the health provider's malpractice has obliterated or reduced those odds of recovery that existed before the act of malpractice. Id. (emphasis added). The court emphasized that the patient does not allege that the malpractice caused his or her entire injury,  but rather claims that the health care provider's negligence reduced the chance of avoiding the injury actually sustained.  Id. at 1283 (emphasis added). Consistent with these statements, the court noted: We see no reason at this time to limit lost-chance claims to those cases in which the chance of a better result has been utterly lost. Id. at 1285. 37 Here, the Government concedes that Haceesa's [condition] was far more serious when he visited [San Juan Regional] on April 27 and 28, 1998, than when he first visited Shiprock Hospital on April 25, 1998. Govt. Br. at 23-24. This admission, in our view, acknowledges that Haceesa had lost a significant chance of survival between his visit to Shiprock Hospital and his subsequent visits to San Juan Regional. Stated differently, we conclude that the Government's failure to properly diagnose and treat Haceesa on April 25 reduced his chance, to some degree, of recovering from his illness, and that San Juan Regional's subsequent failure to properly diagnose and treat Haceesa on April 27 and 28 further reduced his chances, thus resulting in separate and divisible injuries. 6 38 The remaining question is whether the Government is responsible for all of the plaintiffs' damages, including those emanating from San Juan Regional's alleged negligent treatment. Plaintiffs assert that the Government was an original tortfeasor and thus liable for San Juan Regional's subsequent medical negligence. In support of their assertion, plaintiffs point to the following statement by the court in Lewis: the original tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable for the entire harm to the plaintiff, including the original injury and any foreseeable enhancement of the injury by medical negligence. 35 P.3d at 985. 39 We reject plaintiffs' arguments. Lewis involved an original tortfeasor who stabbed the plaintiff, and a subsequent tortfeasor who committed medical malpractice while endeavoring to treat the injuries resulting from the original tort. In discussing the liability of the original tortfeasor, the court was careful to emphasize that its discussion was limited to the narrow class of cases involving an initial injury caused by tortious conduct and a subsequent enhancement of the initial injury caused by foreseeable medical negligence occurring during the course of medical treatment for the initial injury.  Id. at 984 (emphasis added). Here, in contrast, Haceesa's initial injury was not caused by the Government, but rather by the hantavirus. In other words, the medical negligence allegedly committed by San Juan Regional occurred during an attempt to treat the condition caused by the hantavirus, not during an attempt somehow to treat the injury (loss of chance) caused by the Government's own medical negligence. 7 Thus, Lewis is distinguishable from the instant case, and the district court erred in characterizing the Government as an original tortfeasor responsible for all of plaintiffs' damages. On remand, it will be necessary for the district court to make findings of fact regarding the loss of chance of survival caused by the Government's medical negligence and the amount of damages associated exclusively with that loss of chance.