Opinion ID: 180654
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of Punishment

Text: Caruto first challenges an instruction to ignore potential punishment in deciding whether to indict. Her argument here is necessarily a narrow one, because we have already rejected a constitutional challenge to a similar instruction. In United States v. Cortez-Rivera, 454 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir.2006), we held that there was no constitutional error in a model charge reading: Furthermore, when deciding whether or not to indict, you should not be concerned about punishment in the event of conviction; judges alone determine punishment. Id. at 1040-41. In its instructions to the grand jury that indicted Caruto, the district court delivered the permissible instruction verbatim, then elaborated on its theme, saying: Furthermore, when deciding whether or not to indict, you should not be concerned about punishment in the event of conviction. Judges alone determine punishment. If you think about it for a minute[,] because your function is a preliminary one anyway, it would presuppose guilt for you to be thinking about punishment. A person is still entitled to a trial, and the outcome of that trial is far from certain up until all the evidence has been presented and the trial jury begins to deliberate. So punishment should not concern you in the performance of your duties whatsoever. Caruto contends that the judge's off-script addition to the model chargein particular, the instruction that punishment should not concern you in the performance of your duties whatsoever  (emphasis added)rendered it unconstitutional. She argues that the added emphasis of whatsoever eliminated the limited room ... for a grand jury to consider punishment that she maintains saved the instruction in Cortez-Rivera from unconstitutionality. Cortez-Rivera, 454 F.3d at 1041 (internal quotation marks omitted). Caruto misapprehends the basis for our decision in Cortez-Rivera. In that case we deemed [t]he distinction between `should' and `shall' ... dispositive. Id. at 1041. We concluded, following Marcucci and Navarro-Vargas, that the instruction did not invade upon the grand jury's constitutional role because the instruction used the term `should,' making the instruction permissive rather than mandatory. Id. at 1040-41. It was this permissiveness, not the degree of emphasis in the remainder of the instruction, that le[ft] roomalbeit limited roomfor a grand jury to consider punishment and thus preserved the grand jury's historical prerogative. Id. at 1041 (internal quotation marks omitted). The addition of whatsoever to an already emphatic model instruction did not effectively change its character from permissive to mandatory. Because that is the distinction that matters under our precedent, we must reject Caruto's attempt to distinguish this instruction from the one that we previously upheld. Any error here was harmless, in any event. We recently observed that the Supreme Court, in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988), adopted the standard ... that for errors brought to the district court's attention `prior to the conclusion of the trial,' dismissal of the indictment `is appropriate only if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations.' United States v. Navarro, 608 F.3d 529, 539 (9th Cir.2010). Nothing in this case supports the proposition that the grand jury would have refused to indict Caruto, who imported 34.5 kilograms of cocaine into the United States with the intent to distribute it, even if it had known that she was facing a ten-year sentence. Drug smugglers and dealers are not sympathetic figures. No facts about Caruto or her crime have been identified to us that might have generated sympathy in her particular case sufficient to fend off indictment. Facts that might prompt sympathy in a particular case are not likely to be known by the grand jury anyway, because defense counsel does not have a right to make a presentation to the grand jury, and the prosecutor is not obligated to present exculpatory evidence. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992). Caruto has given no reason for us to have any serious concern, let alone to have grave doubt, that the grand jury would not have indicted her had the district court's instruction not departed from the model charge. Any error here was harmless.