Opinion ID: 789803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Lyons's Confession

Text: 37 Lyons claims the district court correctly found him incompetent at the time he confessed, correctly found the State failed to prove he knowingly waived his rights, and correctly ruled the Missouri Supreme Court's decision on the admissibility of his confession was contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent. Lyons claims the district court erred, however, in concluding the admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State contends the facts surrounding Lyons's confession support the finding it was made after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Alternatively, the State argues any error was harmless because Lyons's competence is shown by his deliberation, which was demonstrated by his statements and actions before and after the shootings. 38 In Lyons's direct appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled his confession was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Lyons, 951 S.W.2d at 591. The court noted Lyons was advised of his Miranda rights three times before the interrogation began. Id. at 590. The court also found no direct evidence was presented to show, at the time of the interrogation and confession, Lyons did not understand his rights. Id. The court concluded the evidence showed the officers carefully and thoroughly informed Lyons of his rights, specifically that he had a right to an attorney and could stop speaking at any time. Id. at 591. 39 The district court assumed without deciding that Lyons's confession was not made knowingly and intelligently, concluding the basis for the state court's decision may well be unreasonable. The district court continued, stating the facts of this case may well warrant a conclusion Lyons was not fully aware of the nature of the rights he was abandoning or the consequences of abandoning those rights and, therefore, the confession was inadmissible. We disagree. Lyons's competence was shown by the evidence of Lyons's advance planning of the murders and his escape, as told to his friend, Jackson; by Lyons's instructions, after the murders, to DePree, his brother, not to tell anyone where to find him, to keep the shotgun, and not to drive Lyons's vehicles because the police would be looking for them; and by Lyons's comment to the police upon his arrest that he had thrown his gun into the river. Lyons's competence also was demonstrated by his actions following his arrest. Lyons was coherent enough after his arrest to request a lawyer, and was told he would get one. Lyons asked if anyone had died, and was told, yes. Lyons asked if all of them had died, then learned they had. Again, at the police station, Lyons asked to speak to an attorney. Then, without questioning from Detective Gentry, Lyons stated he had just just snapped and didn't plan on this. Lyons was later told that if he wanted to talk, he would have to initiate contact with the officers, because he had requested an attorney. After being placed in a holding cell, Lyons told officers he wanted to talk. Following three notices of his Miranda rights, Lyons made an oral statement and dictated a written statement, which he then signed. 40 As noted above, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying suppression of the statements based on Lyons's alleged inability to waive his right to counsel due to his incompetence. We hold the Missouri courts did not unreasonably, nor incorrectly, apply United States Supreme Court precedent. There is no constitutional right for a criminal defendant to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). 41 The finding that Lyons was incompetent to stand trial, regardless of when the finding was made after Lyons's arrest, does not overcome the evidence surrounding Lyons's confession, which shows he was competent, gave a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, and confessed after thrice being advised of his Miranda rights. Further, even if we were to conclude that, in our independent judgment, the Missouri Supreme Court's holding was erroneous, such a conclusion does not make that court's holding objectively unreasonable, as required under section 2254(d)(1). See Clemons, 381 F.3d at 750. 42 Assuming Lyons's confession was not made after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights, we agree with the district court that any error in admitting the confession was harmless. [A]lthough a confession is a particularly potent piece of evidence against a defendant, its erroneous introduction may still be harmless where the other evidence against him was so weighty it assured beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a conviction even absent the confession. United States v. Santos, 235 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir.2000); see also Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir.1992) (holding that while a death-penalty habeas applicant's graphic confession was destructive to his defense, it was far from the only evidence against him, and the district court correctly found the defense was not prejudiced since the outcome would not have been different had the confession been suppressed); United States v. Packer, 730 F.2d 1151, 1157 (8th Cir.1984) (The admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda may constitute harmless error when there remains overwhelming independent evidence as to the defendant's guilt.). Other independent evidence, including eyewitness testimony, physical evidence, and Lyons's own statements before the shootings-all of which were properly admitted-overwhelmingly demonstrated Lyons's guilt. Accordingly, even if Lyons's confession should have been suppressed, any error in admitting the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.