Opinion ID: 166399
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Polygraph Evidence

Text: 36 Mr. Thornburg first argues that his due-process right to a fundamentally fair trial was violated by testimony that Matheson had passed a polygraph examination. Our concern is not whether state rules of evidence were violated; we must confine ourselves to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). The issue here is whether the challenged evidence so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law. Id. at 75, 112 S.Ct. 475. 37 During his cross-examination of Matheson, Mr. Thornburg's counsel asked, How long did you stay in jail? Tr. III at 146. Matheson replied: 38 Like four or five days and I gave a statement to them like when they arrested me in Alex they told me they'd give me a polygraph and if I was telling the truth that they would let me out on an OR [own-recognizance] bond. 39 And I sat in jail five days or longer, I don't know, or less, I don't know, and I passed the polygraph and I come in front of the Judge here and got an OR bond. 40 Id. Although evidence of passing a polygraph examination is inadmissible in Oklahoma, Birdsong v. State, 649 P.2d 786, 788 (Okla.Crim.App.1982), Mr. Thornburg's counsel did not object to this testimony. Confining its analysis to plain-error review, the OCCA wrote: 41 We find that Matheson's reference to the polygraph test was a single, isolated response which was not solicited by defense counsel's question. Although Matheson's response was potentially prejudicial because he not only stated that he took the test but also that he passed the test, this improper testimony was not unduly prejudicial under the facts and circumstances of this particular case. This is because Matheson was not the only witness who testified about the events which are the subject of this case. Significant portions of Matheson's testimony were corroborated by Donnie Scott who also was witness to the events which occurred at Poteet's house. Given the evidence presented against Appellant at trial, we do not find that the improper mention of the polygraph examination rose to the level of plain error in this case. 42 Thornburg, 985 P.2d at 1242 (emphasis added). In short, the OCCA found no plain error because the improper testimony was not unduly prejudicial. 43 Oklahoma's plain-error test is rooted in due process. Two years before its Thornburg decision the OCCA had stated: 44 As the right to a fair trial flows from the Due Process Clause of the state and federal constitutions, it forms the very foundation on which the criminal trial must be based. See Okla. Const. Art. II, § 7; U.S. Const. Amend. 14; Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 106, 75 S.Ct. 145, 99 L.Ed. 135 (1954) (Fourteenth Amendment requires fairness). Error which impinges on the fundamental fairness of trial is plain error. 45 Cleary v. State, 942 P.2d 736, 752-53 (Okla.Crim.App.1997). We see no practical distinction between the formulations of plain error in Thornburg and Cleary and the federal due-process test, which requires reversal when error so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law, Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75, 112 S.Ct. 475. Because the OCCA applied the same test we apply to determine whether there has been a due-process violation, we must defer to its ruling unless it unreasonably appli[ed] that test. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It did not. 46 The prejudicial impact of Matheson's statement was somewhat limited because he did not indicate what portion of his testimony the polygraph found truthful and the prosecution made no mention of the polygraph at any later point in the trial. More importantly, Matheson's testimony was strongly corroborated in its essentials by the testimony of one of the victims, Scott (who even testified that Matheson had shot him), and the evidence of guilt could reasonably be viewed as overwhelming. The OCCA could reasonably have determined that Matheson's unsolicited, isolated comment regarding the results of his polygraph exam did not infect the trial with such unfairness as to deny Mr. Thornburg his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. See United States v. Blaze, 143 F.3d 585, 594 (10th Cir.1998) (single unsolicited mention of a polygraph did not merit mistrial due to other evidence of guilt established at trial); United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1445 (4th Cir.1986) (limited, inadvertent reference to polygraph test did not entitle defendant to mistrial when jury had the opportunity to determine credibility through cross-examination, and other evidence supported defendant's guilt). 47 Mr. Thornburg relies on United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998), to contend that the introduction of the polygraph evidence is a per se violation of his constitutional right to a fundamentally fair trial. But his reliance on Scheffer is misguided. Scheffer held that the per se exclusion of polygraph evidence was not a constitutional violation because of the inherent unreliability of polygraph evidence. Id. at 312. Scheffer does not stand for the proposition that the introduction of polygraph evidence necessarily constitutes constitutional error. 48