Opinion ID: 2525107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prospective Jurors Gertrude W., Patrice V. and Alicia B.

Text: After the court asked the panel some questions, the defense commenced its voir dire by noting some people believe only individuals like Adolf Hitler or Jeffrey Dahmer deserve death. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's asking a prospective juror whether she could vote to execute Hitler or Dahmer. The prosecutor used her voir dire to explain, without objection, the concepts of accomplice liability and the felonymurder doctrine. When asked, Prospective Juror Gertrude W. confirmed she would not impose the death penalty in a case, like the instant one, where the defendant did not personally commit one of the murders, and did not plan or premeditate the other. She told the court, I don't think I would consider voting for death. The court excused Prospective Juror Gertrude W. for cause. At the conclusion of the first panel's voir dire, the trial court remarked the first questioning went very smoothly. Neither party disagreed with this characterization. With respect to future panels, the court warned the defense not to ask whether jurors would favor the death penalty for individuals such as Jeffrey Dahmer or Charles Manson, but instead to limit its inquiry to the facts of the instant case. The court likewise cautioned the prosecutor not to ask prospective jurors if they could impose the death penalty for an unintentional felony murder, since there was a second, intentional murder charged. Thereafter, the court questioned Prospective Juror Patrice V., who noted on her questionnaire her belief that the death penalty was state sanctioned murder. She stated that [i]t would be very difficult for her to sentence someone to death. She thought she could set aside her personal feelings if she received very clear instructions about what my obligation was. Prospective Juror Alicia B. stated she did not fully agree with the death penalty. The prosecutor described the general principles of accomplice liability and felony murder. She asked prospective jurors whether they could return a death verdict if, in one of the charged murders, defendant did not personally shoot the victim, and, in the other, defendant neither planned nor premeditated the murder. Upon inquiry, Prospective Juror Patrice V. confirmed she considered the death penalty state sanctioned murder. Patrice V. agreed she would not consider the death penalty in this type of case. Prospective Juror Alicia B. confirmed she did not really agree with the death penalty. She did not feel she would consider death as a possible penalty, as this was not the right kind of case for capital punishment. The court later followed up the prosecutor's questions by asking whether Alicia B. would consider voting for death if she heard about defendant's prior violent misconduct during the penalty phase. Prospective Juror B. answered, This is my position. That this case is not the case for [the] death penalty, no matter what evidence the People presented during the penalty phase. The trial court excused both Prospective Jurors Alicia B. and Patrice V. for cause. After a brief recess, the defense expressed its concern that the court precluded defense questions about capital punishment in the Dahmer or Manson cases, yet allowed the prosecutor to use a misleading nonegregious hypothetical when questioning those same jurors. The court reiterated its ban on the defense's Hitler/Dahmer/Manson inquiries, and noted the prosecutor had offered her hypotheticals without timely objection. The court found it fair for the prosecutor to point out [that a felony] murder may be accidental, nonintentional or it may be intentional as well. For future questioning, the court granted the defense some rebuttal voir dire after the prosecutor had finished. The defense announced its intention to ensure the hypotheticals accurately described the evidence in the case. Because there had been no objection, the court refused to revisit any of the excusals the court had already allowed. The court stated its belief, however, that almost all of [the jurors excluded on the People's motion] were what we would call Witherspoon [v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776] excludables. Most, if not all, were those that were adamantly opposed and would not impose [the death penalty under] any circumstances.