Opinion ID: 1326617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Discussion in the Closed Meeting.

Text: The Council members contend that the trial court erred in finding that the matters discussed in the closed meeting were beyond the scope of the exemption for legal matters provided in § 2.1-344(a)(6). They argue that the closed session should be regarded as a briefing by an attorney, Mayor Marsh, and by staff members pertaining to potential litigation of the anti-annexation bills and also pertaining to alternatives to litigation in the form of The Proposal. We disagree. The motion to convene in executive session stated that the purpose was to discuss legal matters within the jurisdiction of the City. In the trial court and before us the Council members advanced the theory that they relied on that language in the exemption statute authorizing a closed meeting for [c]onsultation ... pertaining to ... potential litigation. Although the order entered by the trial court incorporated the court's finding that seven specified matters had been discussed in executive session, and that the discussion exceeded the bounds of the legal matters exemption, the trial court previously had made an oral finding during the hearing that no actual or potential litigation was discussed or, if it was, it went far beyond the exemption permitted on that ground. There is ample evidence to support the finding of the trial court that discussions during the closed session ranged beyond exempted topics. We will assume, without deciding, that the Council members could lawfully discuss in closed meeting exempted matters other than those specifically stated in their closure motion. It is apparent, however, that the discussions were not restricted to legal matters or to potential litigation under a narrow construction of those terms. The focal point of the discussion was The Proposal made by the City that the Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield cooperate by assuming a proportionate share of the cost of services and facilities provided by the City for the benefit of residents of all three jurisdictions. Mayor Marsh was not appearing as an attorney for the City; he was representing the City in his official capacity as an advocate of regional cooperation by means of The Proposal. The need to keep secret the City's position in respect to potential litigation over the annexation immunity laws was minimal, if not nonexistent, when representatives of the adversary parties to such litigation were present and participating in the discussion. Council members have not suggested that any item within The Proposal was sensitive information for litigation purposes, and indeed it was stressed before the meeting that the material was of vital importance to the citizens of the area. The most that can be made for the Council members from the record is that Mayor Marsh advised those present that the City would litigate the annexation immunity laws unless the Counties would agree to various concessions. If this constituted potential litigation, it was too remote and speculative to come within the statutory exemption. It was no more than a threat to litigate unless potential adversaries were willing to negotiate. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in finding that the Council members discussed matters in executive session beyond the scope of the exemption provided by § 2.1-344(a)(6), and in ruling that in so doing they violated the Act.