Opinion ID: 3065869
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arizona Supreme Court

Text: On direct appeal, Towery argued that the sentencing court violated Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), when it “determined that the defendant had to show that his background had an [e]ffect or impact on his behavior, and since he did not, rejected that evi2482 TOWERY v. RYAN dence as a mitigating factor.” He argued that the sentencing court violated Eddings’ fundamental principle that “there need not be a nexus between mitigating evidence such as child abuse with the offense.” The Arizona Supreme Court rejected Towery’s argument. See State v. Towery (Towery I), 920 P.2d 290, 310-11 (Ariz. 1996). The court concluded that the sentencing court had properly considered the absence of a causal nexus between Towery’s difficult childhood and the crime only as a means of weighing the evidence, not as a means of discounting it as a matter of law: We independently weigh the mitigating evidence against the aggravating circumstances to determine whether leniency is called for. . . . The trial judge considered evidence of Defen- dant’s abusive family background and did not find mitigating value in it. Citing a line of Supreme Court cases requiring courts to consider family history for independent mitigating weight, Defendant calls the judge’s finding unconstitutional. Although the judge rejected the evidence as a mitigating factor because he failed to establish a nexus between his family background and his crime, Defendant argues that the