Opinion ID: 2598779
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's statements to his wife

Text: On August 16, 1989, the day defendant first confessed to these crimes, he also spoke to his wife twice, once on the telephone and once in person at the jail. Both conversations were tape-recorded. At the guilt phase, defendant testified briefly about these conversations. He said he did not want her to panic, so he tried to soothe her, tell her I was in trouble and prepare for something serious. Defendant knew the police were listening, but he was not told the conversations would be recorded. At the penalty phase, his wife also testified about these conversations. She said defendant told her he had done something really bad, and he was sorry because he messed up my life. He said it was an accident, that he was very sorry, that he prayed to God and was clean with God now, and he expressed concern for her and the people he had hurt. After his wife testified, defendant sought to admit the tape recordings of the conversations under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule (see Evid.Code, ง 1250), arguing that they showed remorse. The prosecutor objected that the statements were hearsay and insufficiently reliable to be inadmissible. The court excluded the statements. Citing Evidence Code section 1252, it determined after listening to the tapes and the circumstances that the primary purpose of the tapes was to placate the defendant's wife and the statements are ruled inadmissible on the basis of their lack of trustworthiness.... It found these conversations different in this regard than the taped confession to the police, which it had found to be trustworthy for admission in these proceedings.... When defendant asserted the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as a basis for admitting the evidence, the court stated that in view of the fact that the testimony was available by virtue of the witnesses that were called and the other testimony which has been received ... the Court did balance and weigh that consideration and take that into consideration in its ruling as well. Defendant contends the court erred in excluding the tape recordings of the conversations with his wife because they showed remorse. The Attorney General argues that defendant did not express remorse for the crimes but only said he was sorry for his wife's sake. Although defendant did primarily express concern for his wife, portions of the conversations might be interpreted as showing remorse. But, even if relevant, the recordings were properly excluded. Evidence offered under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule is inadmissible if the statement was made under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness. (Evid.Code, ง 1252; see People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 819-820, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) The United States Constitution compels the admission of hearsay evidence only if the proponent shows the evidence is highly relevant to a critical issue and is sufficiently reliable. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 839, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481; People v. Edwards, supra, at pp. 837-838, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) Here, the court reasonably found the statements to his wife were untrustworthy because his primary motivation in making them was to placate her. There was `ample ground to suspect defendant's motives and sincerity' when he made the statements. ( People v. Edwards, supra, at p. 820, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, quoting People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 643, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849.) The same lack of reliability that makes the statements excludable under state law makes them excludable under the federal Constitution. ( People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 780, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297.) Moreover, defendant had ample opportunity to present evidence of remorse without the recordings. The court acted within its discretion in admitting the taped confession and allowing the witnesses to testify about the conversations between defendant and his wife while excluding the recordings of those conversations themselves. ( People v. Edwards, supra, at p. 820, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) Defendant also contends the conversations were admissible as prior consistent statements under Evidence Code sections 791, 1236. The issue is not cognizable on appeal because defendant did not present that theory of admissibility at trial. (Evid.Code, ง 354; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 795-796, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192; People v. Livaditis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 778-780, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297.) Moreover, even were the issue preserved, defendant has not clearly shown a basis on which to admit the evidence on this theory. A prior statement consistent with a witness's trial testimony is admissible only if either (1) a prior in consistent statement was admitted and the consistent statement predated the inconsistent statement, or (2) an express or implied charge is made that the testimony is recently fabricated or influenced by bias or other improper motive, and the consistent statement was made before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen. (Evid.Code, ง 791.) Here, defendant's motive to fabricate and make himself look as good as possible existed at the time of these conversations, which occurred after his arrest. Defendant argues that evidence of statements he made in jail in an argument with a nurseโYou better treat motherfuckers like me with respect, I'm in for murder and killing again is nothing; and I'm going to kill her. One more doesn't make a differenceโwas inconsistent both with his trial testimony and the earlier conversations with his wife. The trial court never had an opportunity to rule on this point because defendant did not raise it (see People v. Livaditis, supra, at p. 780, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297), but it is not clear that these words, spoken in the heat of the moment in jail in expressing anger, were inconsistent with defendant's expressions of remorse for the crimes or his conversation with his wife. As far as we can determine, the district attorney never argued the jail statements were inconsistent with the statements of remorse. We see no error and certainly no prejudice.