Opinion ID: 2071294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility of the Journal Entries.

Text: The State claims J.A.L. failed to preserve error on this issue arguing J.A.L. needed to do more than just file a motion in limine to preserve error. In his pre-trial motion in limine, J.A.L. argued the State could not use the journal entries as character evidence under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404( a )(1) to prove that he acted as alleged in the delinquency petition. In his motion, J.A.L. also argued: while [rule] 5.404( b ) [of the Iowa Rules of Evidence] does permit character evidence to be admissible for matters such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, etc., none of these materials contain statements other than the angst and hopelessness expressed by a teenage boy who has drifted from placement to placement and for whom the juvenile system has been a complete and total failure. At the start of the delinquency adjudication hearing, the juvenile court indicated it would take the motion in limine under advisement and ultimately file a ruling on the motion. The State then formally resisted the motion on the record and offered the journal entries as eleven separate exhibits, subject to the motion in limine, with the understanding J.A.L. was objecting to the admissibility of the journal entries for the reasons set forth in his motion. The court admitted the journal entries subject to the motion in limine. This record is sufficient to preserve error on the admissibility of the journal entries. The district court allowed the journal entries into evidence as character evidence under rule 5.404( a )(1). Character evidence of the accused is only admissible if offered by the prosecution to rebut character evidence offered by the accused. Iowa R. Evid. 5.404( a )(1). On appeal, the State acknowledges the journal entries are not admissible under rule 5.404( a )(1), because J.A.L. never offered any evidence of his character. Therefore, admitting the journal entries under rule 5.404( a )(1) constituted an abuse of discretion. The State now argues the journal entries are admissible under rule 5.404( b ) on the issue of the identity of the perpetrator. See DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 62-63 (Iowa 2002) (recognizing appellate court may uphold evidentiary rulings on a theory not urged at trial based on the realization that on retrial the error could easily be corrected). Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404( b ) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Iowa R. Evid. 5.404( b ). Journal entries can be other-acts evidence under rule 5.404( b ). See Turpin v. Kassulke, 26 F.3d 1392, 1399-1400 (6th Cir.1994) (holding diary entries displaying defendant's longings for wealth are admissible to show the defendant had arranged her husband's death out of a desire to collect on his life insurance). To determine if other-acts evidence is prima facie admissible, courts must determine whether the other-acts evidence is relevant `to a legitimate issue in the case other than a general propensity to commit wrongful acts.' State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 124 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 25). Even though the court may determine the other-acts evidence is prima facie admissible, the other-acts evidence must be excluded if the court determines the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the person against whom the evidence is offered. Id. Although both sides in oral argument conceded the identity of the perpetrator was a legitimate issue at the adjudication hearing, we still must decide whether the journal entries were relevant to the issue of identity. The State maintains the journal entries were relevant to establish the author of the threats. The State points to two of the eleven exhibits referencing bombing. One exhibit uses the phrase Justice Of Bombers, while another contains the word bombs several times. It further argues all eleven exhibits contain statements and/or attacks against authority figures and are relevant to establish the identity of the author of the threats. From these journal entries, the State contends the finder of fact could infer J.A.L. wrote the threats found in the computer room at the school. Evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Iowa R. Evid. 5.401. To permit the inference that similar acts establish the same person committed both acts, we have required that the other acts must be strikingly similar or of a unique nature. State v. Barrett, 401 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 1987); State v. Walsh, 318 N.W.2d 184, 186 (Iowa 1982). Similarity or uniqueness is required to prevent identification based on the forbidden inference of propensity. See United States v. Pisari, 636 F.2d 855, 858-59 (1st Cir.1981); 2 Joseph M. McLaughlin et al., Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 404.22[5][c], at 404-122 (2d ed. 2004). A review of J.A.L.'s journal entries indicates J.A.L. was fascinated with suicide, death, and murder. The journal entries, however, do not offer any indication J.A.L. was preparing to place a bomb threat at the school. The entries do not contain any plans to place a bomb threat or to kill any of his fellow students. A reader of the journal must use his or her imagination to fill in any planning or operational aspects of a plan to place a bomb threat at the school or a plot to kill his fellow students. Although the journal entries indicated J.A.L. was a troubled young man, the journal entries do not make it more probable that J.A.L. was the author of the notes found at the high school on March 4. See Barrett, 401 N.W.2d at 189 (holding sketchy plans for carrying out crimes contained in defendant's journal were not similar to the modus operandi of the crimes for which defendant was being tried and were not admissible). The juvenile court was incorrect to admit into evidence the eleven exhibits containing the journal entries. Admitting other-acts evidence that is not relevant to identity constitutes an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lail, 846 F.2d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir.1988) (holding despite some similarities between a prior bank robbery committed by the defendant and the bank robberies that were the subject of the defendant's trial, the prior bank robbery was not sufficiently similar to be admissible on issue of identity; thus, the trial court's admission of the prior bank robbery was an abuse of discretion requiring the appellate court to reverse the conviction). We need not decide if the juvenile court's decision to admit the journal entries into evidence was harmless error because our review on whether the evidence established J.A.L. violated Iowa Code section 712.7 beyond a reasonable doubt is de novo on the record. We will not consider any of J.A.L.'s journal entries in our de novo review.