Opinion ID: 1195356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim of error in denying motion for change of venue

Text: Before trial, defendant moved for a change of venue on the ground that his constitutional right to a fair trial had been prejudiced by pervasive pretrial publicity. In support of the motion, he offered copies of 93 newspaper articles describing the crimes, his arrest, the victim's funeral, comments by the local police chief regarding the crimes, and developments in the police investigation of the case. He also referred to ongoing radio and television coverage of the case, without specifying whether or to what extent this coverage was prejudicial. The trial court denied the motion, stating the bulk of the clippings that you allude to were in the papers in the very beginning ... or right immediately thereafter. I would agree that now we will be seeing some more in the papers about the case. [¶] However, I don't think that from what you have submitted that it rises to a reasonable likelihood that the defendants cannot receive a fair and impartial trial in Van Nuys. I don't think simply the showing of the publications rises to that level. [¶] Obviously, during the course of jury selection the defense is free to renew this type of a motion if we see that in fact we are not able to obtain a fair and impartial jury. [¶] So the motion at this time will be denied. The motion was not renewed at the time of jury selection. Defendant contends on appeal that the denial of his motion for change of venue constituted a denial of his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial and to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. He relies in large part upon the evidence of negative pretrial newspaper publicity that was the basis for his motion in the trial court. He also contends, without citation to the record, that 61 of 152 potential jurors stated they had prior knowledge of the case. He also asserts that three persons selected for jury service stated on their juror questionnaires that they had some familiarity with the case. He states that only one of these was questioned by defense counsel regarding her exposure to publicity. We do not find any error in the trial court's order denying the motion for change of venue. Section 1033, subdivision (a), requires a trial court to grant a motion for change of venue if there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county. We have explained that [t]he phrase `reasonable likelihood' in this context `means something less than more probable than not,' and `something more than merely possible.' [Citation.] In ruling on such a motion, as to which defendant bears the burden of proof, the trial court considers as factors the gravity and nature of the crime, the extent and nature of the publicity, the size and nature of the community, the status of the victim, and the status of the accused. ( People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 523, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) On appeal, `the defendant must show both that the court erred in denying the change of venue motion, i.e., that at the time of the motion it was reasonably likely that a fair trial could not be had, and that the error was prejudicial, i.e., that it [is] reasonably likely that a fair trial was not in fact had.' ( People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 523, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100, italics in the original.) On appeal, we undertake a de novo review of the five controlling factors noted above (as demonstrated by the evidence before the trial court at the time of the motion), in order to resolve the first question whether the trial court erred. Further, [w]ith regard to the second part of the showing, in order to determine whether pretrial publicity had a prejudicial effect on the jury, we also examine the voir dire of the jurors. ( Id. at p. 524, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) The crime was of the gravest order, involving the murder of a police officer, and although this circumstance weighs in favor of a change of venue ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 852, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906), it does not by itself require a change of venue. (See People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1276, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Defendant's motion for change of venue was made upon the basis of assertedly prejudicial and extensive publicity. Although his motion and argument to the court referred to television and radio coverage, all the examples of prejudicial publicity to which he refers on appeal were disseminated through the print medium. He alludes to articles extolling the victim and explaining that he was murdered in connection with the prosecution of another of defendant's crimes, and to articles sympathetically depicting the victim's family at the victim's funeral, relating the opinion of investigating officers that defendant was the leader of a conspiracy to kill the victim and that he had made attempts to commit the crime before accomplishing it, references to confessions of codefendants, and former Los Angeles Police Chief Gates's comment that defendant was a heartless' killer. He also contends his race was made obvious through photographs. Although extensive and sometimes editorial, the bulk of this coverage dated from the time the crime was committed, some two years before the hearing on the motion for change of venue, and all the articles dated from at least 10 months prior to the motion. Such a lapse of time weighs against a change of venue. ( People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 525, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100, and cases cited; see also People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 225, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643 [the passage of time weighs heavily against a change of venue].) The trial occurred in Van Nuys in Los Angeles County, an exceptionally populous area. (See People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1276, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1 [involving a trial held in Los Angeles County's San Fernando Valley for the murder of a police officer]; see also People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 363, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009 [`The larger the local population, the more likely it is that preconceptions about the case have not become imbedded in the public consciousness.'].) Although the victim was a police officer, apart from that status neither the victim nor defendant was prominent  or notorious  in the community. (See People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1276, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1 [similar facts].) The density of the population in the area, the lapse of time between the conclusion of the publicity and the hearing on the motion, and the lack of prominence of the victim and defendant lead us to conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for change of venue. In addition, with respect to the issue of prejudice, the record does not establish a reasonable likelihood that defendant did not in fact receive a fair trial. There was no indication that the pretrial publicity had a prejudicial impact upon the jurors' ability to remain fair and impartial. Only three jurors who served on defendant's jury indicated in their juror questionnaires that they had heard of the case prior to trial. The first had no information other than that the names of the defendants were recognizable, that he had no idea of the source of this information, and that he knew so little about the case that the publicity would have no effect on his views regarding the matter. The second juror was aware that the case involved a police officer who had been killed as he picked up his son from school, but the juror believed this information would have no effect on his views regarding the case. The third juror was uncertain whether she had heard of the case, because it had been so long since her exposure to any publicity, but she believed it involved a man picking up his son from school. She also stated the publicity would have no effect on her view of the case. On voir dire, this juror also stated that she vaguely recalled reading in a newspaper at the time of the crime that it involved a man who was shot while picking up his child from school. She did not recall any other facts and stated that the publicity would have no impact upon her deliberations. According to defendant, no other seated juror was questioned on voir dire regarding publicity. We recall that there is no presumption of a deprivation of due process of law aris[ing] from juror exposure to publicity concerning the case. ( People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 527, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) Defendant fails to point to any evidence establishing that the three jurors noted above who served on his case were exposed to or recalled any prejudicial element of the pretrial publicity. Their exposure to publicity was minimal and harmless. As we have observed: Vague recollections of news reports by a few jurors do not compel a change of venue. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1169, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Minimal exposure well before the commencement of trial, by a small number of jurors who reliably report that their exposure will not color their view of the case (see People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 527, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100), does not establish a reasonable likelihood that defendant did not in fact receive a fair trial. Defendant also contends it was error to transfer the case from downtown Los Angeles to the San Fernando Valley and to retain it for trial there. The case initially was assigned to a downtown court, and over defendant's objection was transferred for trial to Van Nuys, where the crime had occurred. When he moved for change of venue, defendant also made an alternative request that the matter be returned for trial to a downtown court. Defendant contends on appeal that he was less likely to receive a fair trial in the San Fernando Valley, where the crime occurred, the population density was less than it was downtown, and fewer members of the community shared his ethnic background. The same considerations apply to an intracounty transfer as apply to a motion for change of venue to another county, and because we have found no error in the trial court's denial of the motion for change of venue, we find no error in the assignment of the case for trial in Van Nuys. ( People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1276, fn. 17, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) [3] Defendant appears to contend that the trial court should have granted his motion for change of venue because of certain developments during voir dire. He alleges that during voir dire there was much discussion of appellant's case, and dissemination of false and damaging rumors. The spread and impact of such rumors, and the trial court's refusal to adequately voir dire concerning those rumors ... provides further evidence that the community of Van Nuys was itself tainted by both pretrial publicity and more informal sources of prejudicial `information,' and that a change of venue was required. Any claim that such a motion should have been granted based upon developments at voir dire was waived by defendant. The trial court denied the motion for change of venue before the commencement of jury selection based upon proffered evidence of pretrial publicity, subject to renewal of the motion in the event voir dire established any further basis for questioning whether defendant would receive a fair trial in the county. Trial counsel did not renew the motion. Because trial counsel failed to cite occurrences at voir dire as the basis for a renewed motion for change of venue, he afforded the trial court no opportunity to grant the relief that defendant now contends should have been accorded him. Thus we conclude that defendant's claim has been waived to the extent it is based upon occurrences at voir dire. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 312, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) [4]