Opinion ID: 2322376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Third-Party-Perpetrator Evidence

Text: The defendant also contends on appeal that the trial justice erred when he ruled that the defense would not be permitted to cross-examine Detective O'Connell with respect to a statement made to the detective which suggested that one or more third parties may have had a motive to perpetrate the murder of Deivy Felipe. We first briefly summarize the relevant facts. The day after Deivy Felipe was found shot to death, Detective O'Connell interviewed and took a written statement from one Ana Rocathe woman with whom Mr. Felipe had been living prior to his murder. [19] In that statement, Ms. Roca told the police that, at some point between August 2004 and January 2005, the tenants who lived on the first floor of the building in which she and Mr. Felipe lived had hosted a party. Ms. Roca indicated in her statement that, during that party, Mr. Felipe fought with several of the guests, stabbed four of them, and smashed a bottle over one person's head. She stated that, about a week after the party, the windows of [her] car were smashed. Ms. Roca also stated that one of the first-floor tenants told her that Mr. Felipe was wanted because he had stabbed the four guests at the just-referenced party; according to Ms. Roca, the tenant added that the individuals who had been stabbed had not reported the incident to the police. Ms. Roca further indicated in her statement that Mr. Felipe had been so concerned about the individuals who had been involved in the fight at the party that he left Providence and lived in New York from December 2004 to January 2005 in the hope that things [would] cool off. However, according to Ms. Roca's statement to Detective O'Connell, Mr. Felipe continued to be in fear of the same individuals once he had returned to Providence; she said that he had indicated to her that he wanted to obtain a gun because he kept encountering them. Ms. Roca also stated to the detective that, a few weeks prior to his death, Mr. Felipe had started to sell drugs; she told the detective that many people owed Mr. Felipe money in connection with drug sales. By the time of defendant's second trial, the defense continued to be unable to locate Ana Roca to testify at trial regarding the contents of her statement to the police. For its part, the prosecution filed a motion in limine prior to the second trial whereby it sought to preclude defense counsel from asking Detective O'Connell detailed questions about Ms. Roca's statement. The trial justice ruled that, although a criminal defendant is entitled to present a defense that implicates another person, Mr. Barros had failed to make the reasonably specific offer of proof that our case law requires. In reviewing the trial justice's in limine ruling that defense counsel would not be permitted to cross-examine Detective O'Connell about certain statements made to him by Ms. Roca as part of a third-party-perpetrator defense, it is our duty to consider whether the evidence at issue was erroneously excludedand, if so, whether that exclusion was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute reversible error. See State v. Gomes, 881 A.2d 97, 111 (R.I.2005). It is a self-evident proposition that an appropriate defense to a charge of criminal misconduct is that another person was the true perpetrator of the crime. State v. Wright, 817 A.2d 600, 609 (R.I. 2003); see also Gomes, 881 A.2d at 111 (There is no question that a defendant is entitled to present a defense that implicates another person.). At the same time, however, this Court has repeatedly indicated that when a criminal defendant wishes to mount such a third-party-perpetrator defense, the defendant must make an offer of proof that is reasonably specific. Gomes, 881 A.2d at 111; see also State v. Scanlon, 982 A.2d 1268, 1275 (R.I.2009); State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816, 824-25 (R.I.1980). Such a reasonably specific offer of proof to the effect that another person had a motive to commit the crime with which a defendant is charged must not only allude to the motive but must also point to evidence tending to show the third person's opportunity to commit the crime and a proximate connection between that person and the actual commission of the crime. Gazerro, 420 A.2d at 825; see also Gomes, 881 A.2d at 111; Wright 817 A.2d at 610; State v. Brennan, 526 A.2d 483, 488 (R.I.1987). A review of the record reveals that, in making his offer of proof, defense counsel focused almost entirely on the motive of the unnamed individuals referred to in Ms. Roca's statement to Detective O'Connell. It is apparent that he offered absolutely no evidence (1) to establish that the individuals to whom Ms. Roca referred in her statement had an opportunity to commit the crime or (2) to establish a proximate connection between these individuals and the murder of Deivy Felipe. On appeal, defendant simply suggests that in the unique circumstances of this case, in which (in defendant's view) the existence of third parties with a motive and opportunity is not in doubt but the identity of those individuals is unknown, we should not strictly apply our long-standing criteria with respect to third-party-perpetrator evidence. It is clear to us, however, that those criteria should not be disregarded in this case; to do so would constitute an impermissible invitation to the jury to speculate on a collateral matter. See Gazerro, 420 A.2d at 825; see also Scanlon, 982 A.2d at 1275; Gomes, 881 A.2d at 112. We have repeatedly insisted that offers of proof in this area be reasonably specific in order to ensure that there not be such speculation by the jury, and we are unconvinced that we should depart from that salutary rule. The trial justice did not err in granting the prosecution's motion in limine to preclude the admission of the third-party-perpetrator evidence.