Opinion ID: 482811
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Amount of the Reduction

Text: 98 To summarize, the fee award made by the district court should have been lower in several respects. Since the attorneys' time records are in many respects too vague to permit precise calculations, this Court estimates the appropriate reductions as follows: 99 (1) No fee is to be awarded for the time spent in connection with the application for fees. The amount of time in this category was, according to the district court, 14 hours with respect to Katz and 31.2 hours with respect to Baden. Baden's 31.2 hours were requested in its supplemental application; we note that additional fee-related hours were reflected, though not quantified, in the time sheets submitted with the initial application. 100 (2) One-third of the time of Levy and of the total remaining time of both Katz and Baden is ascribed to defense of the counterclaims. 101 (3) Of Baden's pre-1984 hours remaining after the exclusion of hours we have designated as counterclaim time, one-half (i.e., one-third of the total pre-1984 hours), are ascribed to Krear II and are not to be compensated in this action. 102 (4) Whatever hours are appropriately compensable in the present action should normally be compensated at rates no higher than those charged at the time the work was done. Since Katz could not recall precisely when he raised his hourly rate from $125 to $150 or from $150 to $175, he will not be compensated at an overall rate higher than his median, i.e., $150 per hour. 103 Applying these reductions and divisions to the records submitted, we conclude that the fees properly associated with Krear's own claim and the counterclaims were approximately as follows: 104 Krear's Own Claim Katz $161,876 Baden 71,261 Levy 3,767 -------- Total: $236,904 Counterclaims 105 Katz $ 80,937 Baden 41,101 Levy 1,883 -------- Total: $123,921 106 Finally, regardless of these totals, the fee to be awarded with respect to Krear's own claim may not exceed one-third of Krear's actual recovery, or $121,061. Since the $123,921 in fees associated with the counterclaim does not exceed the counterclaim's compensatory ad damnum, Krear is entitled to be reimbursed in the amount of $123,921 for those services. Thus, the total amount that the Trustees will be required to pay as a reasonable attorney's fee for services to Krear as prevailing party is $121,061 plus $123,921, or $244,982. 107 Some adjustment is required as well with respect to the court's award of $17,601 in expenses. A total of $650 of the attorneys' claimed expenditures--$400 for Katz and $250 for Baden--was incurred in connection with the fee application; the Trustees are not required to reimburse Krear or its attorneys for these expenses. Further, certain of Baden's expenses prior to 1984 must be ascribed to its handling of Krear II. Since Baden's expense records were inadequate to permit a determination of the nature or timing of the activities that required most individual expenditures, the award for expenses to Baden will be reduced by a further 25%, or $415. Hence, the award for expenses will be reduced to $15,293 for Katz and $1,243 for Baden, or a total of $16,536. 108 We note that the Trustees contend that Krear is not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees unless and until it has paid its attorneys. This contention has some merit since under a contract calling for reimbursement for attorney's fees, such as the present Contracts, a party is not entitled to an award exceeding the amount he has actually paid his attorney. See 379 Madison Avenue, Inc. v. Stuyvesant Co., 242 A.D. 567, 275 N.Y.S. 953 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd, 268 N.Y. 576, 198 N.E. 412 (1935), overruled on other grounds, Columbia Corrugated Container Corp. v. Skyway Container Corp., 32 N.Y.2d 818, 345 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 299 N.E.2d 257 (1973). Nonetheless, the flaw of nonpayment is easily remedied, for this is not a case such as Swiss Credit Bank, 23 Misc.2d at 573, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 830, in which the requested fee was denied because the services had not yet even been rendered. Here, the services have been rendered and the Trustees will simply be required to pay Krear the fee award only after Krear has presented proof that it has paid its attorneys the sums for which reimbursement is ordered.