Opinion ID: 1638526
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying sentencing instructions d-3 and d-10.

Text: ¶ 80. Whether to give a jury instruction is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Goodin v. State, 787 So.2d 639, 657 (Miss.2001). Chamberlin argues that the trial court erred when it refused to give two proposed instructions, D-3 and D-10. Proposed instruction D-3 read: A mitigating circumstance is that which in fairness or mercy may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or blame which justify a sentence of less than death, although it does not justify or excuse the offense. The determination of what are mitigating circumstances is for you as jurors to resolve under the facts and circumstances of this case. The appropriateness of the exercise of mercy can itself be a mitigating factor you may consider in determining whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penalty is warranted. ¶ 81. Proposed instruction D-10 read: If based upon your consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances each and every one of you agrees that death is the appropriate sentence, you must still consider the final step of the penalty phase process. Just as you are the sole judges of the facts, so too are you the sole arbiters of mercy. Regardless of your consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as the jury, you always have the option to recommend against death. This means that even if you conclude that death is an appropriate sentence based on your consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, you may still show mercy and sentence Ms. Chamberlin to life in prison. As a jury, this option to recommend life must always be considered by each and every one of you before an ultimate and irrevocable sentence may be passed. ¶ 82. Chamberlin argues that Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006), required the trial court to give a mercy instruction in this case. However, Marsh does not speak to or even consider the issue of whether a mercy instruction is required. Rather, the Marsh Court held that the States enjoy a constitutionally permissible range of discretion in imposing the death penalty. Marsh, 126 S.Ct. at 2525 (quoting Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 308, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990)) (internal quotations omitted). [T]he States are free to determine the manner in which a jury may consider mitigating evidence, i.e., whether the evidence should be viewed through the lens of mercy. Marsh, 126 S.Ct. at 2523. ¶ 83. That discretion allows trial courts to avoid the potential arbitrariness of an emotional decision encouraged by a mercy instruction. This Court has repeatedly held that capital defendants are not entitled to a mercy instruction. Jordan v. State, 728 So.2d 1088, 1099 (Miss.1998) (citing Underwood v. State, 708 So.2d 18, 37 (Miss.1998); Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 150 (Miss.1991); Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 788 (Miss.1987); Lester v. State, 692 So.2d 755, 798 (Miss.1997); Jackson v. State, 684 So.2d 1213, 1239 (Miss.1996); Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 850 (Miss.1995); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1299-1301 (Miss.1994); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1171, 1181 (Miss.1992); Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078, 1100 (Miss.1987)). The United States Supreme Court has held that giving a jury instruction allowing consideration of sympathy or mercy could induce a jury to base its sentencing decision upon emotion, whim, and caprice instead of upon the evidence presented at trial. Id. (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 492-95, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1262-64, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990)). Howell v. State, 860 So.2d 704, 759 (Miss. 2003). See also Ross, 954 So.2d at 1012 (holding there was no error in refusing the defendant's proposed instruction specifically citing mercy or sympathy as a mitigator since a capital defendant is not entitled to a sympathy instruction, because, like a mercy instruction, it could result in a verdict based on whim and caprice); King v. State, 784 So.2d 884, 890 (Miss.2001) (neither side is entitled to a jury instruction regarding mercy or deterrence); Wiley v. State, 750 So.2d 1193, 1204 (Miss.1999) ([T]he State must not cut off full and fair consideration of mitigating evidence; but it need not grant the jury the choice to make the sentencing decision according to its own whims or caprice.). ¶ 84. Additionally, the requested instruction D-10 states that even if you conclude that death is an appropriate sentence based on your consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, you may still show mercy and sentence Ms. Chamberlin to life in prison. This Court has found that a defendant is not entitled to an instruction that the jury may return a life sentence even if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances or if they do not find any mitigating circumstances. King v. State, 960 So.2d 413, 442 (Miss.2007) (citing Holland v. State, 705 So.2d 307, 354 (Miss. 1997), Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 150 (Miss.1991), Goodin v. State, 787 So.2d 639, 657 (Miss.2001), Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1301 (Miss.1994)). [T]his Court has repeatedly refused to accept instructions that would nullify the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors, since such instructions might induce verdicts based on whim and caprice. Ross, 954 So.2d at 1012 (citing Manning v. State, 726 So.2d 1152, 1197 (Miss.1998), overruled in part by Weatherspoon v. State, 732 So.2d 158 (Miss.1999)). ¶ 85. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing either instruction. This issue is without merit.