Opinion ID: 200188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The CAPE FEAR's seaworthiness

Text: 13 A ship owner has an absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, and this duty extends beyond the physical integrity of the vessel and its equipment to such other circumstances as the procedures crew members are instructed to use for assigned tasks. Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Labarca, 260 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir.2001)(citing Vargas v. McNamara, 608 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir.1979), for the proposition that a jury could conclude that the vessel was unseaworthy due to the unsafe procedure crewm[e]n were directed to employ for cleaning the engine room). It is well established that the seaworthiness of a vessel includes its capacity to carry its intended cargo: [i]f a vessel is loaded so heavily that she cannot safely sail on the voyage contracted for, she is unseaworthy. 2A Benedict on Admiralty § 67. See, e.g., The Silvia, 171 U.S. 462, 464, 19 S.Ct. 7, 43 L.Ed. 241 (1898) (The test of seaworthiness is whether the vessel is reasonably fit to carry the cargo which she has undertaken to transport.); Mobil Shipping & Trans. Co. v. Wonsild Liquid Carriers Ltd., 190 F.3d 64, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); Petition of Long, 439 F.2d 109, 113 (2d Cir.1971) (The overloading of the SMITH VOYAGER made her an unseaworthy vessel.). 14 Appellant does not dispute that, if the CAPE FEAR were routinely overloaded with clams, the court properly could find that appellant breached its duty of seaworthiness. Rather, it maintains that no such overloading occurred. Appellant relies heavily on the expert testimony of David Folsom, a marine engineer and naval architect, who opined that the vessel met Coast Guard stability standards and was safe for its intended voyage when loaded, as appellant contends it was, with 130 cages that were topped off with extra clams to ensure a full load after the original contents of the cages settled. Although the district court concluded that the vessel carried 132 cages, appellant maintains there is no record support for any amount over 130. 15 Putting aside the issue of 132 vs. 130 cages because it makes no difference to our analysis, the record does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that appellant wishes to draw. To analyze the vessel's stability, Folsom needed to select a downflooding point. As we understand his testimony and that of other experts who testified during the proceedings, a standard stability analysis considers whether the vessel is sufficiently stable to withstand expected conditions, including bad weather, recognizing that the downflooding location is a vulnerability. 16 For the specific stability analysis on which appellant relies, Folsom used as a downflooding point a vent six-and-one-half feet above the main deck that opened into the engine room. He acknowledged, however, that this point would not actually be under water unless the boat capsized. He further testified that if either the open # 3 port hatch cover or the one-inch gaps between the # 2 and # 3 hatch covers were used as a downflooding point, the vessel loaded with 130 full cages would fail the stability analysis. 17 Thus, the district court could have rejected Folsom's favorable assessment of the boat's stability on the ground that he failed to utilize more realistic points of flooding for that analysis. In addition, a stability book 8 prepared for the CAPE FEAR's owner by another naval architect about two years before the accident stated that the boat could safely operate with 120 cages and a freeboard — the distance from the water line to the deck — of at least eighteen inches. Lemieux testified that the freeboard on the return trip appeared to be about ten inches. Although he admitted this was an estimate and that the freeboard distance could vary with particular waves, we cannot say that it would have been clear error for the court to conclude that — whatever the precise number — the freeboard was less than the minimum eighteen inches recommended. And certainly a plausible inference is that the freeboard was inadequate because the vessel was overloaded, and for that reason was sitting too low in the water. 18 A finding of unseaworthiness based on overloading is further supported, moreover, by evidence that the CAPE FEAR sank on an even keel, indicating that the water was accumulating on both sides of the vessel and not just on the port side with the open hatch cover. Although the three to five inch gap that Lemieux attributed to the knotted rope undoubtedly exacerbated the situation — and perhaps accounted for the boat's eventual listing to port and capsizing in that direction — the court reasonably could conclude that that gap was not the primary problem. Because the bulkhead between the port and starboard tanks was watertight, the water that evidently was entering on the starboard side could not have originated from the opening in the port side hatch cover. The district court reasonably could have concluded that the short freeboard at the vessel's stern allowed water to enter the gap between the # 2 and # 3 hatch covers. 19 Conflicting testimony also was introduced on the other factors cited by the district court as contributing to the boat's lack of seaworthiness. We need not explore those factors, as the court's ruling did not rest on them, but suffice it to say that we find no clear error in its assessment that the CAPE FEAR's emergency preparedness was less than ideal and that certain problems with the aft hold cover contributed to the lack of seaworthiness by permitt[ing] water to enter the Cape Fear's hold much more easily than if it had been shut. 9 20 Our review thus demonstrates that the district court had ample record support for its finding that the CAPE FEAR was rendered unseaworthy by overloading. That the evidence also might support a contrary finding is often the inevitable reality when cases present difficult factual questions; it is not, however, a basis for reversal. 10