Opinion ID: 2366553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Whether strict compliance with the bidding requirements is required when NRS 332.185(1) allows for compliance as nearly as possible

Text: The first sentence of NRS 332.185(1) states that all sales of personal property of the local government must be made, as nearly as possible, under the same conditions and limitations as required by [NRS Chapter 332] in the purchase of personal property. However, neither party offers an interpretation of the phrase as nearly as possible. The interpretation of the phrase is key to determining whether a local government is required to strictly comply with the competitive bidding requirements of Chapter 332 when it chooses to sell property through competitive bidding. We conclude that the phrase should be given its plain meaning. [N]early is defined as all but; almost ... with close approximation, and possible is defined as that may or can be, exist, happen, [or] be done. Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1283, 1509 (1996). Using the dictionary definitions of the key words within it, the phrase as nearly as possible means with as close an approximation as can be done. We conclude the phrase was inserted to allow for the differences between purchases and sales. For example, NRS 332.065 requires the award of the contract to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder, but for a sale, it would be to the highest responsive and responsible bidder. Orion argues that even though UMC can choose to sell in any manner, including competitive bidding, pursuant to the second sentence of NRS 332.185(1), it did not have to follow the stringent requirements of competitive bidding. Orion analogizes to this court's statement in a footnote in Harmon v. Tanner Motor Tours, 79 Nev. 4, 12 n. 2, 377 P.2d 622, 626 n. 2 (1963). In that case, the court held that the government entity (Las Vegas airport) could choose to use some form of public bidding process as a matter of convenience without regard to the stringent statutory competitive bidding requirements. Id. Harmon is, however, distinguishable from the case before us. The statute interpreted in that case, NRS 496.090, specifically pertains to municipal airports. Harmon, 79 Nev. at 12 n. 2, 377 P.2d at 626 n. 2. Unlike NRS Chapter 496, NRS Chapter 332 deals extensively with competitive bidding. We conclude that UMC could have chosen to sell in any manner, including competitive bidding, pursuant to the second sentence of NRS 332.185(1). However, once UMC chose to sell through competitive bidding, it had to follow the rules of competitive bidding, as set forth in NRS Chapter 332 for the purchase of personal property, as nearly as possible.