Opinion ID: 885206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the District Court erred in failing to enforce the written agreement entered into by the parties in January 1998.

Text: ¶ 20 When a district court determines the unconscionability of a marital and property settlement agreement, it engage[s] in discretionary action which cannot be accurately categorized as either a finding of fact or a conclusion of law. These discretionary judgments made by the trial court are presumed to be correct and will not be disturbed by this Court absent an abuse of discretion by the lower court. In re Marriage of Bukacek (1995), 274 Mont. 98, 103, 907 P.2d 931, 934 (quoting In re Marriage of Caras (1994), 263 Mont. 377, 380-81, 868 P.2d 615, 617; In re Marriage of Hamilton (1992), 254 Mont. 31, 36, 835 P.2d 702, 704-05). ¶ 21 The District Court determined in this case that the January 28, 1998 agreement was not of a final nature; was altered by the actions of the parties, i.e., via reconciliation; and was the product of coercion and domination. Consequently, the court found that the agreement was unconscionable. ¶ 22 David argues that the agreement was not unconscionable given the short duration of the marriage and the disparity between the assets David brought to the marriage and the assets Christine brought to the marriage. David contends that because the agreement was drafted by lay persons rather than attorneys, they should not be held to the same standard of expertise as are attorneys when drafting agreements. Moreover, David maintains that there is nothing ambiguous about the language used by the parties and, because the terms of the agreement are simple, explicit and understandable, he contends that the District Court should have enforced the agreement. ¶ 23 Christine contends that if David had intended this agreement to be final in nature, he would not have requested different terms in his Petition for Dissolution, nor would he have referred in his petition to the possibility of their reaching an agreement. Christine argues that rather than being a final agreement, the January 28, 1998 agreement actually reinstates the arrangement they had prior to their marriage wherein David agreed to set aside $10,000 for Christine, in case the marriage did not work out, so that Christine could have some operating funds with which to move out, pay her interim expenses, and obtain an attorney. ¶ 24 Moreover, Christine points out that in his Petition for Dissolution, David expressed his willingness to consider and negotiate other terms for a final settlement if Christine would not accept the terms he offered in his petition. It was not until after Christine filed for temporary maintenance that David asserted that a final settlement agreement had already been executed by the parties. ¶ 25 Under Montana law, property settlement agreements are considered contracts and must be construed under the law of contracts. In re Marriage of Woodford (1992), 254 Mont. 501, 504, 839 P.2d 574, 576 (citing In re Marriage of Quinn (1981), 191 Mont. 133, 136, 622 P.2d 230, 232; § 40-4-201(5), MCA). See also Heath v. Heath (1995), 272 Mont. 522, 527, 901 P.2d 590, 593. If the language of a property settlement agreement is clear and explicit, it controls the agreement's interpretation. Woodford, 254 Mont. at 505, 839 P.2d at 576. ¶ 26 This Court has stated that [s]ince consent is an essential element of a contract, § 28-2-102, MCA, and consent is not mutual unless all the parties agree upon the same thing in the same sense, § 28-2-303, MCA, the extent and nature of the parties' consents to the property settlement agreement are questions of fact which must be first determined. Soha v. West (1981), 196 Mont. 95, 99, 637 P.2d 1185, 1188 overruled on other grounds by Eschler v. Eschler (1993), 257 Mont. 360, 849 P.2d 196. Moreover, pursuant to § 28-2-401, MCA, an apparent consent is not free when obtained through duress, menace, fraud, undue influence, or mistake. ¶ 27 While we agree with David's contention that the handwritten agreement was not abrogated by reconciliation of the parties because the reconciliation was conditional upon entering into a postnuptial agreement which the parties never did, the facts in this case bring into question the validity of the agreement as a final agreement. First, in his Petition for Dissolution, filed only one week after he signed the handwritten agreement, David prefaced his proposals as to the distribution of property with the statement: If the parties are unable to reach an agreement as to division of property and indebtedness,... Second, it is no coincidence that the amount mentioned in the parties' January 28, 1998 agreement is the same amount that the parties testified David was to place into a bank account in Christine's name at the time of their marriage to ensure that Christine would have funds to live on temporarily if the marriage fell apart. Third, both parties had been married and divorced previously and it is no stretch of the imagination that Christine would not have considered the agreement final until she had a chance to review it with her attorney. Fourth, the agreement is ambiguous in that it does not state that it is either a temporary agreement or a final agreement. Consequently, we agree with the District Court's finding that there was no meeting of the minds regarding final settlement terms. ¶ 28 Moreover, under § 40-4-201(2), MCA, the terms of the separation agreement... are binding upon the court unless it finds, after considering the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties ... that the separation agreement is unconscionable. Here, the economic disparity between the parties allowed David to take unfair advantage of Christine's situation. ¶ 29 Accordingly; we hold that the District Court did not err in failing to enforce the handwritten agreement entered into by the parties on January 28, 1998, as the parties' final settlement agreement.