Opinion ID: 792744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Davis and Hankton's Sentencing Enhancements

Text: 22 We review the district court's determination of drug quantity and role in the offense, in the same manner as before Booker, for clear error. United States v. Sutton, 406 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir.2005)). Reversal will be warranted `only if, after reviewing the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.' United States v. Sheikh, 367 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Frazier, 213 F.3d 409, 417 (7th Cir.2000)). This is a highly deferential standard of review and we refuse to second-guess the sentencing judge. United States v. Cleggett, 179 F.3d 1051, 1059 (7th Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Garcia, 66 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir.1995)). 23 As this court has stated numerous times [t]he law is very clear that a sentencing judge `may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.' . . . A corollary to this general principle is the rule that a sentencing judge `may consider relevant information without regard to the rules of evidence . . . provided that the information has [a] sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.' United States v. Lemmons, 230 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir.2000) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3); see also United States v. Hardamon, 188 F.3d 843, 849 (7th Cir.1999) (stating that during the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding the rules of evidence do not apply and the sentencing judge is free to consider a wide range of evidence including hearsay.). The rationale for this is clear: 24 The sentencing stage of a trial is one of the most important parts of the criminal process. In order for a judge to be well advised of the facts surrounding the defendant's background, and particularly in view of the judge's obligation to the general public, as well as to the defendant, to be fair, reasonable, and just, it is imperative that he be allowed to draw upon a wealth of information concerning the defendant's background, from his date of birth up to and including the moment of sentencing. . . . In order to render justice to all the judge must be able to impress upon a defendant through the expansive contents of an all encompassing sentencing report that we are a country of laws and not men. 25 Hardamon, 188 F.3d at 849-50 (quoting United States v. Gerstein, 104 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir.1997)). Indeed, the federal criminal code makes clear that: No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3661. Accordingly, it is well-settled law that hearsay is not only an acceptable basis for a sentencing determination, United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1100 (7th Cir.1993), it is often an integral part of the sentencing process, United States v. Badger, 983 F.2d 1443, 1459 (7th Cir.1993). 26 Nonetheless, [a] defendant has the due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information. United States v. Salinas, 62 F.3d 855, 859 (7th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Mustread, 42 F.3d 1097, 1101 (7th Cir.1994)). Thus, [s]o long as the information which the sentencing judge considers has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy, the information may properly be taken into account in passing sentence. United States v. Robinson, 164 F.3d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 72 F.3d 533, 543 (7th Cir.1995)). Only if a defendant `shows that the information before the court was inaccurate, and that the court relied on it' can the defendant successfully challenge his sentence. United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1099 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 997 F.2d 248, 254 (7th Cir. June 16, 1993)). In determining reliability we consider the totality of the evidence before the sentencing judge, United States v. Span, 170 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir.1999), but a sentencing determination may be premised on any basis supported by the record. See United States v. Sutton, 406 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Benitez, 92 F.3d 528, 538 (7th Cir.1996)).
27 Both Hankton and Davis challenge the district court's enhancement of their sentences based on drug quantity. Specifically, Hankton argues that: (a) statements made by government witnesses at sentencing constituted unreliable hearsay and should not have been considered; and Hankton and Davis argue that (b) the introduction of plea agreements signed by co-defendants in the case also qualified as unreliable hearsay evidence and likewise should not have been considered. We disagree. 28
29 Hankton's initial argument is that statements made by Agent Darin concerning various wiretap phone conversations should not have been relied on by the sentencing judge in his determination that Hankton was responsible for the distribution of more than 500 grams of crack under the guidelines. We disagree and believe this argument is misplaced. 30 Hankton has failed to point to anything in the record which might render Agent Darin's testimony at sentencing unreliable, aside from his assertion that portions of his Darin's testimony constituted inadmissibly hearsay. However, as stated above, the rules of evidence do not apply during sentencing proceedings and hearsay is not only an acceptable basis for a sentencing determination, United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d at 1100, it is often an integral part of the sentencing process. Badger, 983 F.2d at 1459. 31 In addition, the district judge specifically found Agent Darin to be a credible witness, a determination which bolstered the judge's decision that Darin's testimony concerning the wiretap conversations was reliable. See United States v. Torres-Ramirez, 213 F.3d 978, 980-81 (7th Cir.2000) Under circumstances such as these we are unwilling to find fault with the sentencing judge's decision to credit Darin's statement in determining the drug quantity attributable to Hankton. Torres-Ramirez, 213 F.3d at 980-81. 32 Also, the district court did not rely solely on witness testimony concluding that Hankton was responsible for distributing more than 500 grams of crack. The government also introduced the signed plea agreements of other members of the MCs in which they admitted that they had purchased crack cocaine from Hankton. Although the plea agreements of the co-defendants may have constituted hearsay, see FED. R. EVID. 801, that evidence was corroborated by other evidence submitted at sentencing, and thus could reasonably be considered reliable by the sentencing judge. See United States v. Martinez, 289 F.3d 1023, 1028-29 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that reliability may be established by corroborating evidence). Indeed, the plea agreements were more than sufficiently corroborated at Hankton's sentencing hearing by the credible testimony of the live witnesses, i.e., Agent Darin and Detective Charles. As the district court concluded, given the entirety of the government's submission, [Agent Darin's testimony] is reliable evidence and should be given substantial weight by the court . . . [i]t is corroborated . . . [i]t all ties together. It is consistent with what the court has heard as the various defendants have entered their pleas of guilty. We agree with this assessment. See id. 33 What's more, the evidence submitted at sentencing was internally consistent with the totality of the evidence in the record and various aspects of that evidence corroborated other aspects. For example, the co-defendants' plea agreements state that Hankton sold them primarily crack cocaine—according to the government's calculation, 1156 grams total. This evidence corroborates both the wiretap phone conversations as well as Agent Darin's testimony as to the substance of those phone calls in which Hankton solicited the purchase of large amounts of crack cocaine, e.g., telling Olden that he could supply him with a half, or a half an ounce of crack. See Salinas, 62 F.3d at 859 (stating that [e]ach member of a conspiracy is accountable for the amount of drugs with which he was directly involved, and for amounts involved in transactions that were reasonably foreseeable.). As this court held in United States v. Torres-Ramirez, credible corroborating testimony is sufficient to provide hearsay evidence, such as the plea agreements and the statements therein, with an indicia of reliability and satisfies the defendant's entitlement to have his sentence determined based on reliable evidence. Id. at 980. Also, the reliability of the plea agreements—as well as Agent Darin's testimony for that matter—was bolstered by the fact that, at sentencing, Hankton took advantage of a reasonable opportunity to rebut the hearsay evidence used against him. United States v. Barnes, 117 F.3d 328, 338 (7th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Francis, 39 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir.1994)). 34 Further, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the testimony given by Agent Darin as well as the co-defendants' plea agreements was unreliable, the live testimony of Jammah Olden, without more, supported—or at the least lent great credence to—the conclusion that Hankton distributed in excess of 500 grams of crack cocaine. As recounted above, Olden testified that for a period of five months (between June and October of 2000) Hankton personally supplied him with individual distribution amounts of crack cocaine—ranging in quantity from one eighth of an ounce to one ounce—every three to four days. According to Olden's testimony, which was unrebutted at sentencing, it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that Hankton personally distributed between 134 and 1071 grams of crack cocaine, to Olden alone, in the space of just these five months. 26 See Salinas, 62 F.3d at 859; see also United States v. Durham, 211 F.3d 437, 444 (7th Cir.2000) (stating that estimates of drug quantity are acceptable if they are based on evidence possessing a sufficient indicia of reliability and not nebulous eyeballing). 35 Thus, because the plea agreements submitted at sentencing were corroborated by the credible testimony given by Agent Darin, as well as the live testimony of co-defendant Olden—both of which were subject to thorough cross-examination at sentencing—we hold that the sentencing judge did not err, much less commit clear error when considering this most reliable evidence when determining that Hankton was responsible for distributing in excess of 500 grams of crack cocaine pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. 36
37 Davis also argues that the sentencing court erred by admitting unreliable hearsay evidence when determining that he possessed with intent to distribute 50 to 150 grams of cocaine under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. However, unlike Hankton, Davis does not claim that Agent Darin's testimony was unreliable. Instead, Davis claims only that the introduction of the co-defendants' plea agreements constituted clear error due to the fact that the agreements were inadmissible hearsay. However, as noted above, the relevant inquiry is not whether the plea agreements submitted at sentencing constituted hearsay, see Smith, 3 F.3d at 1100, but whether the plea agreements included a sufficient indicia of reliability to support [their] probable accuracy, Taylor, 72 F.3d at 543, which we conclude that they did. 38 The co-defendants' plea agreements submitted at Davis' sentencing demonstrated that Davis was in the habit of distributing crack cocaine. In particular, Ngaya Brunner admits to purchasing approximately 10 and one-half grams of crack from Davis. This evidence was fully corroborated by the testimony of Agent Darin, which the sentencing judge expressly found to be credible. Specifically, Agent Darin testified as to the meaning and context of a number of intercepted phone conversations Davis had with Hankton and other individuals in which Davis discussed cooking large amounts of powder cocaine in order to produce crack cocaine. In at least one of those conversations Davis states that he purchased powder cocaine specifically for the purpose of further processing it in order to manufacture and distribute the resulting crack. See supra p. 13. Thus, because witness testimony—the testimony of a witness, Agent Darin, whom the district judge had previously determined to be credible—was introduced to corroborate information contained in the co-defendant's plea agreements and thus infused that evidence with an indicia of reliability. See United States v. Martinez, 289 F.3d at 1028-29; Torres-Ramirez, 213 F.3d at 980. This is not to mention the fact that Davis was provided with ample opportunity to rebut the hearsay evidence proffered against him in the form of the co-defendant plea agreements, either by calling his own exculpatory witnesses or through his cross examination of Agent Darin. See Barnes, 117 F.3d at 338. The fact that Davis called no witnesses at sentencing and failed to successfully discredit Agent Darin on cross-examination, however, evinces nothing more than a shortcoming in the presentation of his case and falls far short of establishing error on the part of the trial judge. In other words, Davis must present this court with more than conclusory allegations that a government witness is unreliable; he must present evidence which would in some way rebut that testimony or demonstrate that it is inaccurate and should not have been relied upon by the sentencing judge. See United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1099. 39 Thus, because Agent Darin's credible testimony corroborated the information contained in the co-defendants' plea agreements, the sentencing court did not err in finding that evidence reliable in concluding that Davis was responsible for possessing with the intent to distribute 50 to 150 grams of crack cocaine. 27