Opinion ID: 2353690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: marriage

Text: The trial court found, inter alia, the following facts: The parties began to live together in 1974, without the benefit of marriage. When the plaintiff became pregnant in 1976, they decided that they would get married. The decision to marry was prompted by their parents' concern and also by the feeling of both the plaintiff and the defendant that it would be better for their child if they were married. The parties asked their friend Sandra McLanahan, who was both a physician and an ordained minister of Paramahamsa Sannyasa of Srimat Sankaracharya, to perform a marriage ceremony for them. They took out a marriage license, had blood tests performed, and participated in a ceremony at the home of the defendant's brother in March of 1976, which many of the parties' relatives and friends attended. During the ceremony the parties exchanged flower garlands and pledged themselves to one another. Following the formal ceremony, the parties had a reception which included the traditional cutting of a wedding cake. The court specifically found that [t]he marriage license was signed by the plaintiff, defendant and Dr. McLanahan at the end of the ceremony. The license was then given to the defendant for him to file with the town clerk. It was never filed, and could not be produced at trial. [1] The defendant claims that the trial court's finding of a valid marriage was clearly erroneous. He does not argue that the mere failure to file the marriage license makes the marriage void. See Carabetta v. Carabetta, 182 Conn. 344, 349, 438 A.2d 109 (1980). He does claim, however, that the failure to file the license is evidence which, when taken with other evidence offered at trial, shows that the parties never intended to be married. He asserts that the marriage was simply a sham. If neither party had intended to be married, their lack of mutual consent would render the marriage contract void. Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 201-203, 175 A. 574 (1934). The making of a contract does not depend upon the secret intention of a party [however,] but upon the intention manifested by his [or her] words or acts, and on these the other party has a right to proceed. Nutmeg State Machinery Corporation v. Shuford, 129 Conn. 659, 661, 30 A.2d 911 (1943). The trial court found that the plaintiff intended at all times to enter into a marriage, and that the acts of both parties clearly indicated such an intent. To support his claim of error, the defendant outlines testimony which could indicate that the parties did not intend a valid marriage to take place. The only relevant uncontroverted evidence he offers, however, is that the parties did not intend to file the marriage license. The trial court chose not to credit the defendant's other evidence, and found that the plaintiff, at least, did intend to marry. [2] This court may reject a factual finding if it is clearly erroneous, in that as a matter of law it is `unsupported by the record, incorrect, or otherwise mistaken.' Kaplan v. Kaplan, [186 Conn. 387, 392, 441 A.2d 629 (1982)]; Schaffer v. Schaffer, 187 Conn. 224, 228, 445 A.2d 589 (1982); Practice Book § 3060D. The record in this case demonstrates that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the parties intended to be married when the ceremony was performed, and we cannot find it to be clearly erroneous.