Opinion ID: 1429543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Applicable Legal Test (Hancock) and Its Elements

Text: The question, then, is whether CDC, a legislative body, exercises an executive function. The court of appeals has established a test to determine if one branch of government is exercising `the powers properly belonging to either of the others.' J.W. Hancock Enterprises v. Arizona State Registrar of Contractors, 142 Ariz. 400, 405-06, 690 P.2d 119, 124-25 (App.1984) (quoting Ariz. Const. art. III). In Hancock, the court adopted the test formulated by the Kansas Supreme Court in State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786, 792-93 (1976). In Bennett, the court stated, When a statute is challenged under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, the court must search for a usurpation by one department of the powers of another department on the specific facts and circumstances presented. Bennett, 547 P.2d at 792. The court is to evaluate the following factors: the essential nature of the powers being exercised, the degree of control by the legislative department in the exercise of the power, the objective of the Legislature, and the practical consequences of the action, if available. Id. This court adopts the test of the court of appeals, agreeing that the test provides the necessary flexibility to government, yet preserves the essential goal of the separation of powers theory, to prevent the concentration of the whole power of two or more branches in one body. Hancock, 142 Ariz. at 406, 690 P.2d at 125. Accordingly, we will evaluate A.R.S. § 41-401 under this test.
According to A.R.S. § 41-401(F), CDC may initiate and pursue ... in the name of this state any action concerning a law, regulation, order, policy or decision of the United States or any agency of the United States, including court ruling, that the council determines will further its purposes. CDC argues that it does not perform an executive function because it is not enforcing laws enacted by the Legislature. However, Arizona case law holds that acts necessary to carry out the legislative policies and purposes already declared by [the Legislature] are administrative. Pioneer Trust Co. v. Pima County, 168 Ariz. 61, 65, 811 P.2d 22, 26 (1991) (citing Lincoln Property Co. No. 41 v. Law, 45 Cal.App.3d 230, 119 Cal.Rptr. 292, 294 (1975)). CDC's essential function is to carry out the Legislature's policies and purposes that are specified within the statute itself. See A.R.S. § 41-401(B) (The purpose of the council is restoring, maintaining, and advancing the state's sovereignty and authority over issues that affect this state and the well-being of its citizens by taking any action it deems appropriate.) It is clear that CDC is performing an executive function. CDC next argues that it does not perform an executive function because, rather than enforcing laws enacted by the Legislature, it is defending against the federal government's unlawful intrusion in the self-governmental authority of the State. But the executive branch of government has more responsibilities than merely to enforce laws enacted by the Legislature. It is responsible for carrying out the policies and purposes of the Legislature. One of those purposes, as stated in A.R.S. § 41-401, is to restore, maintain, and advance the state's sovereignty and authority over issues that affect this state and the well-being of its citizens. A.R.S. § 41-401(B). The United States Supreme Court has held that litigation conducted on behalf of the United States is subject to the direction, and within the control of, the Attorney-General. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139, 96 S.Ct. 612, 692, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (quoting Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 458-59, 7 Wall. 454, 458-59, 19 L.Ed. 196, (1868)). In the same respect, conducting litigation on behalf of the state, as authorized by the Legislature, is an executive function, because doing so carries out the purposes of the Legislature. See Pioneer Trust Co., 168 Ariz. at 65, 811 P.2d at 26. Therefore, CDC performs essentially an executive function.
The next prong of the Hancock test is whether the Legislature's involvement is a cooperative venture or a coercive influence. Hancock, 142 Ariz. at 405, 690 P.2d at 124. We have already pointed out that the Legislature retained dominant control over CDC. See supra Separation of Powers, part I. The 1996 amendments were clearly intended to enhance the Legislature's control and remove the Attorney General or any representative of the executive from any semblance of control.
When evaluating the objective of the Legislature, the court in Hancock asked, Is the intent of the Legislature to cooperate with the executive by furnishing some special expertise of one or more of its members or is the objective of the Legislature obviously one of establishing its superiority over the executive department in an area essentially executive in nature? Hancock, 142 Ariz. at 405, 690 P.2d at 124 (quoting Bennett, 547 P.2d at 792). Again, the Legislature's actions through its amendments to A.R.S. § 41-401 are relevant. See supra Separation of Powers, part I. The Legislature's actions in amending A.R.S. § 41-401 show its intent to take over an executive function by eliminating the Attorney General from the litigation process and adding two members of the Legislature as advisory members to CDC. CDC argues that appointing two legislative members as advisory members of CDC does not violate separation of powers because the members are not necessary for a quorum and have no voting rights. However, although the members have no voting rights, they still have the ability to influence the decisions of the board. Otherwise, no purpose exists in having them as members. Allowing members of a legislative body to serve, even as advisory members, on a board that performs an executive function may violate separation of powers. See Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826-27 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. dismissed, 513 U.S. 88, 115 S.Ct. 537, 130 L.Ed.2d 439 (1994) (holding that Congress's appointment of the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House as non-voting members of the Federal Election Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine).
In Hancock, the court held that a fourth consideration for determining whether a statute violated separation of powers could be the practical result of the blending of powers as shown by actual experience over a period of time where such evidence is available. 142 Ariz. at 405, 690 P.2d at 124 (quoting Bennett, 547 P.2d at 792). Although the amendments had been in effect for only a few months at the time the petition for special action was filed, conflict already existed. CDC claims that no real conflict exists because it is representing the Department of Corrections, its client, with its approval. The Attorney General responds that CDC is responsible for the conflict by undertaking to represent a state agency, whose representation is the responsibility of the Attorney General. Under A.R.S. § 41-192, no state agency other than the attorney general shall employ legal counsel or make an expenditure or incur an indebtedness for legal services except those agencies specifically listed in the statute. A.R.S. § 41-192(E) (Supp.1996). The Department of Corrections is not an exempted agency; therefore, it is not permitted to employ legal counsel other than the Attorney General. CDC, however, is an exempted agency under the 1996 amendment to A.R.S. § 41-192. See A.R.S. § 41-192(E)(9) (Supp.1996). Accordingly, the Department of Corrections, which is not allowed to employ outside counsel under A.R.S. § 41-192, may now employ outside counsel through CDC. A conflict exists because the agency is required to use the Attorney General, and therefore is represented by the Attorney General, but the agency is also represented by CDC, which is not required to use the Attorney General. This result creates more than a theoretical conflict, as is evidenced by the present conflict in federal court between the Attorney General and CDC.
CDC performs an executive function, yet is controlled by members appointed by representatives of the Legislature. This legislative control is in accord with the intent of the Legislature in amending A.R.S. § 41-401 in 1996 to remove any executive control from CDC. The practical result of the legislation is to create conflict between an executive agency and a legislative agency performing an executive function. All of the Hancock factors support a finding that CDC is a legislative body performing an executive function. A.R.S. § 41-401 is therefore unconstitutional because it violates the express terms of article III of the Arizona Constitution.