Opinion ID: 75772
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consistency with Underlying Federal Policies

Text: 13 The fundamental objective of the IDEA is to empower disabled children to reach their fullest potential by providing a free education tailored to meet their individual needs. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d). There is a split between the circuits, however, as to whether this objective is better served by a short or more lengthy limitations period for judicial appeals of final decisions by an educational agency. Several circuits have emphasized the need for prompt resolution of educational disputes and, therefore, applied the relatively brief limitations periods found in various states' administrative procedure acts. See C.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 241 F.3d 374 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 48, 151 L.Ed.2d 18 (2001) (applying a 60-day statute of limitations); Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir.1994) (applying a 120-day statute of limitations); Amann v. Town of Stow, 991 F.2d 929 (1st Cir.1993) (applying a 30-day statute of limitations); Adler v. Educ. Dep't, 760 F.2d 454 (2d Cir.1985) (applying a 120-day statute of limitations); Dep't of Educ. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.1983) (applying a 30-day statute of limitations). 3 Other circuits, stressing the importance of parents' active participation in the education of their children, have held a brief limitations period is fundamentally inconsistent with congressional goals. See, e.g., Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir.1981) (suggesting the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury and medical malpractice actions should govern IDEA appeals); Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.1984) (applying a two-year statute of limitations grounded in state tort law); Janzen v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484 (6th Cir.1986) (borrowing a three-year statute of limitations from state tort law); Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying a two-year statute of limitations grounded in state tort law). 4 Upon review, we agree with the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, and conclude a relatively short limitations period best serves the policies underlying the IDEA. 14 The most effective means of ensuring disabled children receive an education tailored to meet their specific needs is to provide prompt resolution of disputes over a child's IEP. A brief limitations period guarantees students will receive their statutorily prescribed education when they can most benefit from it. The IDEA recognizes children develop quickly and once correct placement decisions can soon become outdated. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4) (setting forth the IDEA's requirement of annual placement reassessments). If the limitations period for judicial review under the IDEA is too long, appropriate remedies will be delayed by potentially protracted litigation. In the meantime, an already disadvantaged child's education will stagnate, awaiting placement decisions that may become obsolete even before implementation. See C.M. ex rel. J.M., 241 F.3d at 380. As stated by the Fourth Circuit: 15 The Act's intent would obviously be thwarted if placement decisions were not carried out until after a child could benefit from those placements. Senator Williams, the IDEA's principal author, recognized this in the final Senate debate, stating that I cannot emphasize enough that delay in resolving matters regarding the education program of a handicapped child is extremely detrimental to his development. 16 Id. (citations omitted). Conversely, Appellant's request would permit a child who was incorrectly evaluated to remain in an inappropriate educational program for up to two years following the agency's final administrative decision, before judicial review even commenced. In light of the IDEA's stay put provision, Congress could hardly have contemplated a limitations period of two years plus pendency of the proceedings. See Adler, 760 F.2d at 459. 17 Even Department of Education regulations governing the IDEA's administrative proceedings recognize the importance of prompt review. The regulations require that not later than 45 days after a request for an administrative hearing, such a hearing is held and the education agency's final decision is reached. Furthermore, administrative review of final decisions must be completed within 30 days. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(a), (b). Just as deadlines throughout the administrative process are compressed, it follows that judicial review of that same process should also take place in a brief period of time. See Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053, 1061 (7th Cir.1994). 18 Finally, although Appellant contends parental concern for a child's welfare serves as an effective mechanism for ensuring timely review, 5 the effectiveness of a federal statute should not be permitted to fluctuate with varying degrees of parental motivation. Under a two-year limitations period, two children in exactly the same educational dilemma could receive drastically divergent protection under the IDEA, a result Congress could not have intended. To be evenhanded and effective in its application, the IDEA must ensure the intended promptness is unilaterally achieved. 19 Although the brevity of a 30-day limitations period may appear to frustrate parental involvement in a child's education, several facets of the IDEA mitigate the limitation period's potentially harsh effect. First, the parents' sole obligation during the 30-day limitations period is to decide whether to sue under § 1415(i)(2), a decision they need make only after an objection or complaint has been registered with the educational agency, the issues have been defined, the dispute has previously been heard in both informal proceedings and the agency's due process hearing, and an administrative record has been created. Parties contemplating filing for judicial review under the IDEA, like parties considering judicial review under a state's administrative procedure statute, do not face the otherwise ordinary pre-litigation burdens of factual investigation and legal research. Rather, the relevant facts already have been developed in the administrative process. See Amann, 991 F.2d at 933; see also Adler, 760 F.2d at 457. 20 More notably, the IDEA requires IEPs be reviewed and revised at least annually, allowing parents to litigate anew the merits of each subsequent IEP. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i), (ii). Even if parents neglect to appeal within the 30-day limitations period, their children will only lose their appropriate educational placement for a single school year. See Spiegler, 866 F.2d at 468. As compared with the potential for even greater delay under a two-year statute of limitations, this is the better result.