Opinion ID: 1239238
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Townsend's Fourteenth Amendment claim against Security Director Fuchs

Text: We first address Townsend's argument that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment for Security Director Fuchs. Townsend essentially reasserts the argument that he made before district court. Specifically, he contends that Fuchs violated his due-process rights under Sandin and Wilkinson by placing him in TLU without procedural protections. Because it is undisputed that Townsend was not afforded a hearing or other procedural protections before he was placed in TLU, his argument turns on whether he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding placement in TLU. See Ky. Dep't of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 491-92 (7th Cir.2006). The Constitution itself does not create an interest in avoiding transfer within a correctional facility. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 222, 125 S.Ct. 2384; Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). Nevertheless, in Sandin the Supreme Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment provides to inmates a liberty interest in avoiding placement in more restrictive conditions, such as segregation, when those conditions pose an atypical and significant hardship when compared to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293. However, since the Court decided Sandin, we have repeatedly determined that even extremely harsh prison conditions may not be so atypical as to create the liberty interest the Court contemplated. See, e.g., Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 609 (7th Cir.2005); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 760-62 (7th Cir. 1998); Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175-76 (7th Cir.1997). To that end, we have concluded that inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to discretionary segregationthat is, segregation imposed for administrative, protective, or investigative purposes. See Lekas, 405 F.3d at 608-09 & 608 n. 4 ([R]eassignment from the general population to discretionary segregation does not constitute a deprivation of a liberty interest.); Crowder v. True, 74 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that placement of inmate in non-disciplinary segregation for three months did not create liberty interest). Indeed, there is nothing atypical about discretionary segregation; discretionary segregation is instead an ordinary incident of prison life that inmates should expect to experience during their time in prison. See Lekas, 405 F.3d at 608-09; Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir.1997) (Even a prisoner who had committed a white-collar crime and had been assigned to the lowest-security prison in the state's system might find himself in segregation for a nondisciplinary reason.); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 414 (7th Cir.1987) (Given the broad uses of administrative segregation . . . inmates should reasonably anticipate being confined in administrative segregation at some point in their incarceration.). Here, it is clear that Townsend's assignment to TLU was discretionary. In fact, by admitting that his placement in TLU was contingent upon prison officials' continuing investigation into whether he destroyed evidence related to the prison riot, Townsend concedes that he was placed in TLU for discretionary reasons. See Wis. Admin. Code DOC § 303.11(1), (4)(a); see also Lekas, 405 F.3d at 608 & n. 4; Thomas, 130 F.3d at 761. Townsend's concession comports with the WDOC's administrative scheme governing TLU placement. According to the administrative code, TLU is, by its very nature, discretionary; it is a nonpunitive segregated status that allows prison officials to complete an investigation, cool down a volatile situation or hold a disciplinary hearing. See Wis. Admin. Code DOC §§ 303.02(22), 303.11 note; cf. Russ v. Young, 895 F.2d 1149, 1153-54 (7th Cir.1989) (noting that TLU determinations are discretionary because they are dependent only on the subjective decision of the security officers). Moreover, the evidence submitted to the district court reflects that Townsend was assigned to TLU solely for discretionary reasons. Townsend received two WDOC notices explaining that he was being held in TLU for investigative reasons that he, in turn, acknowledged. Townsend was then transferred back to New Lisbon's general population as soon as he was cleared of any wrongdoing, and he never was disciplined in connection with his time in TLU. Simply put, it cannot be disputed that Townsend's time in TLU constituted discretionary segregation, in which he had no liberty interest avoiding. See Lekas, 405 F.3d at 608 & n. 4; Thomas, 130 F.3d at 761. Townsend continues, however, that although he was placed in TLU for discretionary reasons, the conditions he endured while in TLU were sufficiently harsh to trigger the due-process protections announced in Sandin. Specifically, Townsend renews his contention that the conditions he faced in TLUthe double bunking, the sharing of the small wet cell and its amenities, and the limited human contactwere sufficiently analogous to the conditions of the state Supermax prison in Wilkinson to create a liberty interest in avoiding TLU. Townsend misreads Wilkinson, and in so doing commits a mistake that renders inapt any comparison between the conditions in TLU and the conditions of the Supermax prison. As we noted in our recent decision Gillis v. Litscher , the Supreme Court in Wilkinson did not determine that the conditions in the Supermax prison created a liberty interest by themselves. See Gillis, 468 F.3d at 492. Although the Court briefly summarized the conditions that inmates faced in the Supermax, the Court based its holding largely on the fact that placement was indefinite and disqualified otherwise eligible inmates from consideration for parole. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24, 125 S.Ct. 2384; Gillis, 468 F.3d at 492. Indeed, absent the indefinite placement and disqualification from parole, the Court stated that the conditions of confinement at the Supermax likely would apply to most solitary confinement facilities, suggesting that the conditions themselves were ordinary incidents of prison life that inmates have no liberty interests in avoiding. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224, 125 S.Ct. 2384; see also Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 587 (7th Cir.2005). In short, the Court in Wilkinson did not delineate what specific harsh conditions give rise to a liberty interest. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224, 125 S.Ct. 2384; Gillis, 468 F.3d at 492. And because Townsend's placement in TLU neither was indefinite, nor affected his parole eligibility, nothing in Wilkinson requires us to reconsider our established position that inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding placement in discretionary segregation. See Gillis, 468 F.3d at 492; see also Holly v. Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir.2005) (citing Wilkinson to support proposition that being placed in segregation is too trivial an incremental deprivation of a convicted prisoner's liberty to trigger the duty of due process). The district court thus correctly granted summary judgment for Security Director Fuchs. This is not to say that Townsend has no avenue to seek redress for the conditions he experienced while in TLU. We conclude only that the conditions have no bearing on whether New Lisbon prison officials were required to provide Townsend with procedural protections before placing him in TLU. The issue of the cell conditions in TLU is best analyzed as a claim brought under the Eighth Amendment, cf. Gillis, 468 F.3d at 492-95, which Townsend raised against Sergeant Allen, and to which we now turn.