Opinion ID: 3066224
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the volunteer was acting within the scope

Text: of the volunteer’s responsibilities in the nonprofit organization or governmental entity at the time of the act or omission; [and] . . . 2 This finding of contempt as to Rieman does not, however, preclude the taking into account of his early resignation by way of mitigation when appropriate remedial sanctions are considered under Part V, below. INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD 39 (3) the harm was not caused by willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by the volunteer . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a). The Plaintiffs raise a host of arguments why the volunteer directors do not qualify for immunity under the VPA. The Plaintiffs contend that the attorney’s fees they seek are not “harm” under § 14503(a); that the board members’ misconduct was willful under § 14503(a)(3); and that they did not act within the scope of their responsibilities under § 14503(a)(1) when they ratified the separation strategy. We need not address these arguments, for we hold that the VPA does not affect our power to hold those bound by our injunction in contempt. We find it highly improbable that when Congress passed the VPA, it intended to prohibit federal courts from finding volunteer board members liable for their acts of contempt.3 The text of the VPA does not specifically mention courts’ equity jurisdiction or their contempt powers. Nor does the VPA’s legislative history provide support for the conclusion that Congress’s purposes included curbing the judicial power 3 The parties largely focus their arguments on whether the VPA applies to federal causes of action, in addition to state causes of action. But whether the VPA applies to federal causes of action is not directly relevant to whether the VPA circumscribes federal courts’ contempt power, and the cases cited are inapposite. See Armendarez v. Glendale Youth Ctr., Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1140 (D. Ariz. 2003); Nunez v. Duncan, 2004 WL 1274402, at  (D. Or. June 9, 2004); Am. Produce, LLC v. Harvest Sharing, Inc., 2013 WL 1164403, at  (D. Colo. Mar. 20, 2013). 40 INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD to enforce orders through contempt. The Committee on the Judiciary’s report observed that “H.R. 911, as amended, immunizes a volunteer from liability for harm caused by ordinary negligence.” H.R. Rep. 105-101(I) at 5 (emphasis added). The committee report also speaks of the “litigation craze” and “[o]ur ‘sue happy’ culture.” Id. It explains that the VPA is “intended to remove a significant barrier—the fear of unreasonable legal liability—to inducing individuals to volunteer their time to charitable endeavors.” Id. (emphasis added). These references indicate that the VPA’s purpose was to curb lawsuits against volunteers, not to curb courts’ contempt power. The importance of the power of courts to punish for contempt makes it highly unlikely that Congress would curtail that power without explicitly indicating its intention. “[T]he power of courts to punish for contempts is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on them by law.” Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911). This power is “inherent in all courts.” Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 65. We acknowledge that Congress may limit lower federal courts’ exercise of the contempt power. See, e.g., Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904); Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873). “Nevertheless, ‘we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles’ such as the scope of a court’s inherent power.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (quoting Weinberger v. Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982)); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 631–32 (1962). Absent a “much clearer expression of purpose,” see Link, 370 U.S. at 631–32, we will not assume that Congress intended to limit our inherent power to punish contempt. INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD 41 We accordingly hold that the VPA does not reach federal courts’ power to find volunteer board members in contempt of their orders. Accordingly, the VPA does not immunize Sea Shepherd US’s volunteer board members from liability for contempt.