Opinion ID: 1972242
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: memorandum of past recollection recorded

Text: A further exception to the hearsay rule that might be raised is the doctrine relating to the admissibility of a memorandum of past recollection recorded. We have recognized this doctrine in both civil and criminal cases. See, e.g., Mercurio v. Fascitelli, 116 R.I. 237, 240, 354 A.2d 736, 738-39 (1976); State v. Contreras, 105 R.I. 523, 540, 253 A.2d 612, 621-22 (1969). In Mercurio, 116 R.I. at 240, 354 A.2d at 739, we referred to McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 300 at 713 and 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 747 at 100 (Chadbourn rev. 1970), as setting forth the necessary predicate for admissibility of a memorandum of prior recollection recorded as opposed to the use of a memorandum for the purpose of refreshing present recollection. This requirement is succinctly set forth in McCormick, § 299 at 712. As the rule permitting the introduction of past recollection recorded developed, it required that four elements be met: (1) The witness must have had firsthand knowledge of the event, (2) the written statement must be an original memorandum made at or near the time of the event and while the witness had a clear and accurate memory of it, (3) the witness must lack a present recollection of the event, and (4) the witness must vouch for the accuracy of the written memorandum. (Emphasis added.) McCormick goes on in § 302 at 714-15, to state: The traditional formulation of the rule, still adhered to by most courts, requires that before a past recollection recorded could be received in evidence the witness who made or recognized it as correct must testify that he lacks present memory of the events and therefore is unable to testify concerning them. If examining the writing refreshes the recollection of the witness, under this approach the writing is thus rendered inadmissible and the witness must testify from his newly refreshed recollection. The record in the present case discloses no testimony by Donna that would meet the requirement of laying the foundation for the introduction of excerpts from her prior statements under the doctrine of past recollection recorded. At no point did she testify that she had no present recollection of the events that took place on March 14, 1981, surrounding the fire at the Welfare Building located next door to her apartment. Her testimony both at the motion to suppress and during the course of the trial indicated an uncertainty concerning the identification of both defendants. That uncertainty was greater in respect to defendant Lato than to defendant Coppola. Nevertheless, the closest she came to identifying defendant Coppola occurred at the suppression hearing when she stated that he resembled one of the persons whom she saw leaving the building after she heard the noise at the time of the fire. Although she expressed uncertainty, she did not state at any time that her observations of the events at the time of the fire were accurate and clear, that she had recorded such observations, and that at the time of trial that recollection had become exhausted. Consequently, the prior statements Donna made to the police officers and to the grand jury could not be properly admitted as memoranda of past recollection recorded.