Opinion ID: 2569746
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Case law examining similar provisions

Text: Finally, we look to case law examining similar provisions. Although this court has not had occasion to interpret the word settling, various other jurisdictions have explained its meaning. Souza v. Corvick [18] and Winters v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. [19] are the most persuasive in this regard. Souza stands for the proposition that settling involves the condition of the ground. [20] After the insured presented evidence that her house had settled due to explosions, the trial court in Souza granted the insurer a directed verdict, based on the policy exclusion for settling. [21] The appellate court reversed, finding that `settling' should be interpreted to mean the gradual subsidence of a structure resulting from the condition of the ground. [22] The court concluded, since it certainly can be inferred that the subsidence involved here resulted from something other than the condition of the ground, we cannot say as a matter of law that the damage to [the insured's property] was excluded from the coverage of her policy. [23] The facts of Winters are even more akin to the case at hand. In Winters, the parties stipulated that a water line broke in plaintiffs' clubhouse which caused soaking and subsequent shifting of the soil beneath the building, leading to structural damage. [24] The court denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment based on an exclusion for settling, holding that the term has generally been taken to mean a gradual, natural process that every building endures. When the settling occurs from an accidental cause and happens abruptly and unexpectedly, that is not the sort of `settling' to which the policy language refers. [25] Other authorities that have addressed the issue concur. One commentator defines settling or subsidence in a policy exclusion to occur when the soil compacts downward vertically over time. [26] The Ninth Circuit, applying California law, has characterized the conclusion slightly differently, focusing on the unanticipated versus the inevitable: [A]n all physical loss home policy excluding coverage for damage sustained as a result of `settling,' would not cover damage sustained due to a house settling into the soil thereunder unless the immediate cause of the settling is an unanticipated event or casualty rather than an inevitable occurrence. [27] Similarly, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Phelps, the home suffered damage from a leaking underground pipe. [28] When the water was pumped from beneath the house in repairing it, the house settled causing additional damage. [29] The Florida District Court of Appeal was of the view that the exception as to settling, cracking, etc., is not applicable to the factual situation in this case. [30] Elsewhere, a New York trial court, contrasting settling with collapse, held that, [a]s applied to houses, settling has a ... connotation ... of a building initially coming to rest after construction. [31] All of these definitions indicate that settling does not preclude coverage where water from a frozen pipe seeps under the house. For its broad interpretation of the term settling, Umialik relies on this court's interpretation of the term earth movement in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bongen , which rejected the man-made versus natural dichotomy. [32] Bongen, however, has no applicability to the settling language in the present policy. In Bongen, the earth movement exclusion was preceded by a lead-in clause precluding coverage for earth movement loss regardless of the cause. [33] Furthermore, the lead-in clause specifically excluded earth movement caused by both natural and external forces. [34] Indeed, Bongen acknowledges that, [u]ntil insurance companies added the lead-in clause, courts often limited the earth movement exclusion to natural disasters. [35] Therefore, since the settling exclusion in the Umialik policy is not preceded by a similar lead-in clause, Bongen does not support Umialik's position.