Opinion ID: 1440076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Granting of Motion In Limine To Exclude Evidence of Undisclosed Damages

Text: Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) requires the disclosure of a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party. Rule 26(e)(1)(A) requires disclosing parties to supplement their prior disclosures in a timely manner when the prior response is incomplete or incorrect. Rule 37(c)(1) gives teeth to these requirements by forbidding the use at trial of any information required to be disclosed by Rule 26(a) that is not properly disclosed. Yeti, 259 F.3d at 1106 (footnote reference omitted). Under Rule 37, exclusion of evidence not disclosed is appropriate unless the failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless. Id. at 1106. Plaintiffs assert that they were substantially justified in failing to disclose damage computations for each opt-in plaintiff because the law is unsettled as to the obligation to disclose such information on an individual basis in FLSA opt-in class of actions. Although the district court accepted Plaintiffs' argument that the right to individualized discovery in this context remains unsettled, compare Adkins v. Mid-American Growers, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 171, 174 (N.D.Ill.1992) (precluding individual discovery in FLSA case as inappropriate under the circumstances) with Krueger v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 163 F.R.D. 446, 451 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (permitting individualized discovery relating to damages in opt-in class action), their argument ignores the fact that each individual opt-in plaintiff was also proceeding on multiple state law causes of action that were not included in the class action. As to those causes of action, Plaintiffs have cited no case, and there appears to be none, to support the argument that disclosure on an individual basis was not required. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) (requiring disclosure by each party of a computation of each category of damages claimed). Disclosure of damage calculations was mandated under Rule 26(a) and the Opt-In Plaintiffs' failure to disclose was not substantially justified. Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that any failure to disclose was harmless because of the district court's decision to sever the claims of the Opt-In Plaintiffs. We disagree. Later disclosure of damages would have most likely required the court to create a new briefing schedule and perhaps re-open discovery, rather than simply set a trial date. Such modifications to the court's and the parties' schedules supports a finding that the failure to disclose was not harmless. See Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1062(9th Cir. 2005), as amended. It was eminently reasonable for the court to require full disclosure of damages for the entire case. Finally, we reject the notion that the district court was required to make a finding of willfulness or bad faith to exclude the damages evidence. To the contrary, the portion of Rule 37 relied on by the district court has been described as a self-executing, automatic sanction to provide a strong inducement for disclosure of material. Yeti, 259 F.3d at 1106 (citation, alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The implementation of the sanction is appropriate even when a litigant's entire cause of action ... [will be] precluded. Id. (citation omitted). Because the district court acted within its discretion when it precluded presentation of undisclosed evidence of damages, we affirm the ruling of the district court. Affirmed.