Opinion ID: 795373
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions and Verdict Form

Text: 28 Jay requested the following jury instruction: Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement. The parties' course of performance is also relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with such course of performance. 29 2 J.A. at 638 (Jay's Revised Proposed Jury Instructions). The district court instructed the jury as follows: 30 Now, as to the packaging overcharge claim, it involves the assertion that JCI and Jay agreed that, one, Jay would ship VN front seat pedestals in returnable containers. Jay would initially purchase the containers and JCI would repay Jay for its purchase of the containers including interest through a temporary increase in the piece price for the parts, and two, JCI would pay Jay 1.62 per part for Jay's temporary use of expendable packaging until returnable packaging was available. 31 JCI has the burden of proving, one, that one or more of these agreements were formed, and two, that Jay breached one or more of these agreements. On this claim your answer to Part I Question 1 will be yes if you decide that JCI has proved each of these elements. On this claim your answer to Part I Question 1 will be no if you decide JCI has not proved one or more of these elements. 32 With regard to this claim, parties can enter into an agreement even though a particular term is not explicitly agreed to. In such a case the term can be established by the conduct of the parties. It is for you to decide in your answers to Part I Question and Part I Question 2 whether or not the parties by their actions came to such an agreement. 33 3 J.A. at 708-09 (Trial Tr. at 133-34). 34 This court reviews a district court's refusal to give requested jury instructions under an abuse of discretion standard. Hisrich v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc., 226 F.3d 445, 449 (6th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The refusal to give the requested instructions is error if: (1) the omitted instructions are a correct statement of the law; (2) the instruction is not substantially covered by other delivered charges; (3) the failure to give the instruction impairs the requesting party's theory of the case. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A judgment may be reversed only if the instructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading, or prejudicial. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 35 Jay contends that each of these requirements for error is satisfied in this case. First, the requested instructions are based upon U.C.C. § 2-208 and are thus a correct statement of the law. Jay concedes that the instruction given did address the issue of the parties' conduct; however, Jay asserts that this instruction only demonstrated that conduct could indicate the existence of additional contractual terms rather than showing that the parties did not agree to disputed terms. Appellant Br. at 41. Finally, Jay claims that the district court's failure to give the instruction struck at the core of Jay's primary trial defense against the existence of an amortization agreement . . . . The jury was not told that course of performance could show no agreement ever arose, could show modification of an agreement, or could show that a party had waived its contract rights. Appellant Br. at 41-42. 36 Jay's argument as to waiver is without merit due to the lack of evidence of JCI's intent, as discussed in the previous section. Because this court will not reverse a decision on the basis of an erroneous jury instruction where the error is harmless, any possible error with regard to the issue of waiver is not grounds for reversal in this case. Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 822 (6th Cir. 2000). In addition, JCI points out that Jay was not impaired in its presentation of its theories; as Jay itself admitted, it introduced a wealth of evidence tending to show that the parties' course of performance proved that an amortization agreement did not exist. Appellant Br. at 40. In United States v. Jackson, 347 F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir.2003), we stated, the failure to give [the requested] instruction did not substantially impair [the] defense because the jury was already well aware of his theory of the case. 11 Because the instructions given were not confusing, misleading, or prejudicial to Jay, Hisrich, 226 F.3d at 449, the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury.
37 Jay also argues that the district court erred in refusing to use Jay's proposed verdict form, which contained the question, [d]id Jay and JCI agree to an amortization contract for returnable containers? 2 J.A. at 622 (Jay's Proposed Verdict Form). The verdict form given to the jury stated as follows: 38 Did Jay breach the parties' agreement for the manufacture and sale of the three VN 127 front seat pedestals or any related agreement by continuing to charge JCI $1.62 per part after it began shipping the parts in returnable packaging and had been reimbursed for the cost including interest of the returnable packaging? 39 2 J.A. at 646 (Verdict). We review the content of verdict forms for an abuse of discretion. Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596, 605 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 865, 116 S.Ct. 179, 133 L.Ed.2d 118 (1995). 40 Jay asserts that the verdict form effectively assumed the existence of [the amortization] agreement. Appellant Br. at 44. However, [w]e review jury charges as a whole, and will not find a cause for reversal unless it is likely the jury has been misled. Piper v. Goodwin, 20 F.3d 216, 221 (6th Cir.1994). As set forth above, the district court clearly instructed the jury that JCI had the burden of proving the existence of an amortization agreement. There is therefore no basis to reverse the judgment of the district court on this issue.