Opinion ID: 6105180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wanton endangerment in the first degree.

Text: Corbin’s second claim is that the trial court committed palpable error by denying his motions for directed verdict on three counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree. Those charges, and the resulting jury convictions, stem from Sergeant Murphy’s police pursuit of Corbin down a wooded dirt path where Sergeant Murphy’s car bottomed out in a mud pit; and Troopers Bale and Brockman’s search for Corbin in those same woods that night, during which Corbin’s vehicle forced the troopers off the dirt road. Since Corbin failed to properly preserve the argument, we review only for palpable error. KRS 508.060(1) requires the Commonwealth to prove that Corbin “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, [] wantonly engage[d] in conduct which create[d] a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person.” To have acted wantonly, Corbin needed to have been “aware of and consciously disregarde[d] a substantial and unjustifiable risk” with the risk being “of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitute[d] a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” KRS 501.020(3). Finally, the “serious physical injury” referenced in KRS 508.060(1) is defined as a “physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes 8 serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.” KRS 500.080(15). Both parties rely heavily on our recent decision in Culver v. Commonwealth, 590 S.W.3d 810 (Ky. 2019). In that case, this Court upheld the trial court’s denial of Culver’s motion for a directed verdict on a first-degree wanton endangerment charge stemming from his behavior during a police chase. Id. at 818. In Culver, we noted that, generally, we consider the “manner in which a vehicle is operated and the conditions under which that vehicle is operated” in determining whether the defendant’s conduct created a “substantial risk.” Id. at 817. Therefore, in addition to the defendant’s speed, we consider other factors, such as: whether the defendant disobeyed stop signs and red lights; whether the weather was inclement; whether it was dark; and whether the defendant put other vehicles or pedestrians in danger, either by forcing them out of his way, or because the chase occurred in a congested area, such as a school zone or shopping center. Id. We concluded that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence on the wanton endangerment charge because the chase occurred at night, the roads were narrow and winding, Culver’s speed was excessive, driving as much as 25 m.p.h. above the posted speed limit and causing the officers to fear for their lives. Id.
We begin our analysis by noting that although Sergeant Murphy was the only officer to pursue Corbin down the dirt path, Deputy Durbin and Officer 9 Cravens were also involved in the initial pursuit. The Commonwealth charged Corbin with three counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree, one for each officer involved. At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Corbin exceeded the speed limit, at times by nearly 20 m.p.h, down winding country roads and highways, that he passed vehicles in prohibited zones and that he riskily evaded police attempts to bring him to a halt. The jury convicted Corbin on all three counts, but the trial court vacated instructions 5(a) and 8(a), which referred to Deputy Durbin and Officer Cravens because the court regarded the testimony as insufficient to establish an elevated risk. However, the court allowed the conviction with regards to Sergeant Murphy to remain. Unlike the other two officers, Sergeant Murphy was involved in the initial attempt to “box” Corbin in and bring him to a stop, as well as the only vehicle to pursue Corbin down a dirt path meant for ATV’s and not large vehicles. Consequently, Sergeant Murphy’s risk throughout the pursuit was different from either Deputy Durbin or Officer Cravens, whose role the trial court described as merely “following” Corbin. Taken in conjunction with Corbin’s other behavior throughout the chase, the trial court properly ruled that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to present the jury with the first-degree wanton endangerment instruction as it related to Sergeant Murphy.
After being forced to abandon their initial pursuit, the officers prepared to search for Corbin on foot. That night, several officers, including Trooper 10 Bale and Sheriff Brockman, walked the same road down which Corbin had escaped. Eventually the two officers came across the Black Explorer, finding Corbin inside smoking a cigarette. Immediately, Corbin started the vehicle and began driving directly towards the officers. Sheriff Brockman testified that he shouted at Corbin to stop, which apparently caused Corbin to slow his vehicle initially. However, Corbin ultimately decided not to comply and forced the officers off the road. Corbin asserts that his initial hesitation and lack of speed did not create a substantial risk of serious injury to the officers. Corbin’s argument misunderstands, entirely, our reasoning in Culver. Even assuming Corbin’s statements regarding speed are true,9 speed is still only one among several factors we consider. Id. at 817-18. The facts here are simple and unmistakable. Corbin, while facing two pedestrians, intentionally disregarded a police command to stop his vehicle and forced the officers off the road, causing them to fear for their lives. His behavior clearly placed the officers’ lives in danger. As a result, we perceive no error by the trial court in denying Corbin’s motion for a directed verdict regarding Trooper Bale and Sheriff Brockman.