Opinion ID: 786496
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Commission's Authority to Consider Relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1).

Text: 12 Under section 10(a), if an employer fails to timely contest a citation within 15 working days, the citation and the assessment, as proposed, shall be deemed a final order of the Commission and not subject to review by any court or agency. 29 U.S.C. § 659(a). But section 12(g) of the Act provides that the Commission is authorized to make such rules as are necessary for the orderly transaction of its proceedings. Unless the Commission has adopted a different rule, its proceedings shall be in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 29 U.S.C. § 661(g). Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) provides that [o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.... Id. 13 Harms Construction contends the Commission should have found it was entitled to relief under the excusable neglect standard. The Secretary maintains that under section 10(a), citations that are not timely contested are not subject to review by any court or agency, which precludes the Commission from applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). 14 The Secretary acknowledges that her contention conflicts with J.I. Hass Co. v. OSHRC, 648 F.2d 190 (3d Cir.1981), in which we set aside a Commission order dismissing a late notice of contest and directed the Commission to consider whether the employer was entitled to relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Id. at 195. After examining Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)'s general applicability to Commission proceedings, we held Rule 60(b) authorizes the Commission to reconsider its final orders. Id. at 192-94. Although the Secretary contended that since the notice of contest was not timely filed, the Commission never had jurisdiction in the first place, we held the Commission must have had jurisdiction at some point or the citations would be final orders of a Commission which never had jurisdiction, and thus would have no effect. Id. at 193. 15 Reconciling the apparent conflict between section 10(a) and section 12(g) to reach the result Congress most likely intended, we reasoned that if section 10(a) were interpreted the way the Secretary desired, no circumstances would ever permit a late notice of contest. Id. at 194. We did not believe Congress intended such a harsh result. Id. For those reasons, we held the Commission had jurisdiction to entertain a late notice of contest under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Id. at 195. 16 The Secretary urges us to reevaluate and overrule Hass, claiming that intervening legal developments have weakened its `conceptual underpinnings.' United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 286 (3d Cir.2001) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989)). The Secretary urges judicial deference to the reasonable interpretations of the federal agency charged with implementing an ambiguous provision of a statute, in this case the Secretary of Labor. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Since Hass was decided, the Secretary notes, the Supreme Court has held that the Secretary, as opposed to the Commission, is charged with overall responsibility for administering the Act, and when their interpretations diverge, deference is due to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation. Martin v. OSHRC (CF & I Steel Corp.), 499 U.S. 144, 156-58, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). The ambiguity cited by the Secretary is the conflict between section 10(a) and section 12(g) of the Act. 17 We recognize that we may reevaluate a precedent in light of intervening authority even without en banc consideration. See United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d at 286 ([A]lthough a panel of this court is bound by, and lacks authority to overrule, a published decision of a prior panel, a panel may reevaluate a precedent in light of intervening authority.) (internal quotations omitted). At issue is whether intervening authority warrants reevaluation of the matters resolved in Hass or even reconsideration by en banc review. 18 Despite the Secretary's assertion, its interpretation of the Act is not entitled to Chevron deference. An agency interpretation qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). Otherwise, an agency's interpretation may merit the more limited deference recognized in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (recognizing that reasonable agency interpretations carry at least some added persuasive force where Chevron is inapplicable) (internal quotations omitted); see also Madison v. Res. for Human Dev., Inc., 233 F.3d 175, 186 (3d Cir.2000) ([I]nformal agency interpretations are not binding but are entitled to respect under Skidmore deference to the extent they are persuasive.). The Secretary's interpretation of section 10(a) was not developed in the course of a regulatory action. Rather, its interpretation represents a position taken in the course of litigation. This is not a situation in which we owe deference to the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. Chao v. Russell P. Le Frois Builder, Inc., 291 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir.2002). An informal interpretation that lack[s] the force of law does not warrant full Chevron deference. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000). Because Chevron deference need not be accorded to the Secretary's interpretation that section 10(a) precludes review by the Commission of an untimely notice of contest, the conceptual underpinnings of Hass have not been undermined. 19 Moreover, Chevron deference only applies to reasonable interpretations by the Secretary. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 158, 111 S.Ct. 1171 ([R]eviewing court should defer to the Secretary only if the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable. ) (emphasis added). Although we made no explicit comment in Hass, it is at least arguable that we implicitly found the Secretary's Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) position unreasonable. See 648 F.2d at 194 (disagreeing with the Secretary's interpretation of section 10(a) because we did not believe Congress intended the harsh result that once an employee signed for a citation, no circumstances would permit a late notice of contest). And an interpretation that is arguably unreasonable is not sufficiently persuasive to warrant Skidmore deference. 20 On appeal, the Secretary advances an alternative interpretation from that which it put forward in Hass — that section 10(a) acts as a statute of limitations that may be subject to equitable tolling where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, ... has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass, Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (footnote omitted), or in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights. Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 (3d Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). This interpretation, the Secretary contends, ameliorates the undue harsh results that concerned the Hass court. 21 The Secretary's alternative interpretation does not warrant Chevron deference because it is an informal opinion. But neither is it persuasive under the more limited Skidmore deference. We discern no basis for the Secretary's contradictory position that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to consider relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) but has jurisdiction to consider equitable tolling. A tribunal cannot exercise an equitable remedy unless it first has jurisdiction. If the Commission is not barred by section 10(a) from applying equitable tolling, as the Secretary now asserts, then it also should not be barred from granting Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) relief. As noted, section 10(a) provides that the citation shall be deemed a final order of the Commission and not subject to review by any court or agency. It would seem to therefore bar both equitable tolling and excusable neglect or neither, but not one or the other. Accordingly, the Secretary's alternate interpretation does not compel overruling Hass. Moreover, equitable tolling requires deceit or some other extraordinary grounds for relief and is not equivalent to the Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) excusable neglect standard. 22 We recognize that Hass is in conflict with a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Chao v. Russell P. Le Frois Builder, Inc., 291 F.3d 219 (2d Cir.2002) (2-1 decision), in which the court concluded the Commission may not exercise jurisdiction based on Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). Id. at 229. Like us, the court held the Secretary's interpretation was not entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at 228. But applying Skidmore deference, the court found persuasive the Secretary's position that the Commission lacks jurisdiction when an employer fails to file a timely notice of contest. Id. at 228-29. The court disagreed with our reasoning in Hass that `uncontested citations become final orders of the Commission' and that the Commission must have had jurisdiction at some point because `if it never had jurisdiction, the citations would be final orders of a Commission which never had jurisdiction, and thus would have no effect.' Id. at 229 (quoting Hass, 648 F.2d at 193). The court reasoned that when an employer misses a deadline, the citation does not become a final order of the Commission on the basis of which it can grant Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) relief; instead, under section 10(a), it is deemed to be a final order. Id. Accordingly, the court rejected the proposition that the Commission has some residual authority over uncontested citations that may permit it to grant relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). Id. The dissent agreed with our holding in Hass, reasoning that whether deemed or actual-an order of the Commission must be one that is within its jurisdiction and thus subject to reopening or reconsideration. Id. at 231 (Pooler, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that though neither section 12(g) of the Act nor Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) gives the Commission jurisdiction, the Commission, nonetheless, has inherent authority to reconsider or reopen its own deemed orders and Rule 60(b) provides the appropriate standard for acting on an application to reopen. Id. Notwithstanding Le Frois, we believe that Hass was correctly decided and has not been undermined by more recent decisions. 23 For these reasons, Hass is still binding and revision is unwarranted. Under Hass, section 10(a) is not a bar to Commission review, and it has jurisdiction to entertain a late notice of contest under the excusable neglect standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). 648 F.2d at 194-95. 24