Opinion ID: 855585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Whitaker’s May 20, 2010, Letter

Text: Ceres argues that the ALJ and the Board erred in admitting, post-trial, Dr. Whitaker’s May 20, 2010, letter. Dr. Whitaker was Ceres’ own expert witness. At trial, Ceres had introduced earlier reports in which Dr. Whitaker provided medical 1 33 U.S.C. § 920(a). 2 Decisions of the ALJ are reviewable only as to whether they are in accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence in light of the entire record. This deferential standard of review binds both the Board and this Court. See Lollar v. Ala. By-Products Corp., 893 F.2d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 1990). “Substantial evidence” has been defined as “more than a scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971). 2 Case: 12-11661 Date Filed: 03/19/2013 Page: 3 of 11 opinions relevant to the case. On March 8, 2010, the ALJ issued a notice scheduling trial for May 25, 2010, and instructing the parties to exchange documents and list the witnesses they intended to call at least fourteen days before the date of the trial. On May 14, 2010, just eleven days before the date of the hearing, Ceres chose to solicit an additional opinion from Dr. Whitaker. Ceres asked: “Do you agree with Dr. [Kevin] Murphy that [claimant’s] work from September 29, 2007 to January 12, 2009 aggravated and worsened her knee condition [and] thus contributed to her need for knee surgery in January, 2009?” His May 20, 2010, letter in response answered “no.” He then added: “This cannot be definitively stated. My impression is that the patella injury is what led to further surgery . . . which would have led to [surgery] for persistent symptoms regardless of [claimant’s] occupation.” Although Ceres received this letter on May 21, 2010, four days before trial, it was not introduced into evidence at trial or otherwise mentioned. The ALJ found that Ceres concealed it. Because the facts relating to the discovery process are not in the administrative record, we decline (as did the Board) to rely upon the reasoning of the ALJ–i.e., that Ceres had a duty to supplement the record with the May 20 letter. We also decline to rely upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26. However, it is clear that, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 923(a) and 20 C.F.R. § 702.338, the ALJ 3 Case: 12-11661 Date Filed: 03/19/2013 Page: 4 of 11 enjoys broad discretion with respect to the admission of evidence and with respect to reopening the hearing for the receipt of evidence. See also Guise v. Dep’t of Justice, 330 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“A determination to allow or exclude witness testimony is within the sound discretion of the administrative judge.”). Under the circumstances here, we readily conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in admitting Dr. Whitaker’s May 20 letter. Ceres also argues that the ALJ abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Whitaker’s letter because the letter was privileged work product. We can assume arguendo that the opinions of Dr. Whitaker might in the abstract have been privileged. However, we agree with the ALJ and the Board that Ceres waived any privilege. Ceres waived the privilege by introducing at trial previous opinions of Dr. Whitaker and by stating at trial that “no doctors disagreed” with the proposition that subsequent employment aggravated claimant’s knee condition. See Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1417 (11th Cir.) (stating that the “great weight of authority” holds that the privilege is waived “when a litigant places information protected by it in issue through some affirmative act for his own benefit, and to allow the privilege to protect against disclosure of such information would be manifestly unfair to the opposing party”), modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994). We conclude there was no abuse of discretion in 4 Case: 12-11661 Date Filed: 03/19/2013 Page: 5 of 11 admitting the May 20, 2010, letter from Dr. Whitaker. Finally, Ceres argues that the ALJ and the Board violated its due process rights by denying permission to depose Dr. Whitaker. A few additional facts are relevant. After the May 25, 2010, hearing, Gulf Terminals somehow obtained a copy of Dr. Whitaker’s May 20 letter and moved the ALJ to reopen the record to admit same. Thereupon, Ceres, for the first time, requested permission to depose Dr. Whitaker. The ALJ ruled on July 6, 2010, admitting into evidence Dr. Whitaker’s May 20 letter and denying Ceres’ due process-based argument for permission to depose Dr. Whitaker. The ALJ and the Board concluded that Ceres had waived its due process rights. Under the circumstance here, we conclude that Ceres did waive its due process rights. As the ALJ and the Board pointed out, Dr. Whitaker was Ceres’ own witness. It had ample opportunity to question him or depose him before the May 25, 2010, hearing. Only a lack of due diligence prevented Ceres from enjoying fuller due process rights. Ceres has provided no excuse for waiting until the eve of trial to seek a supplemental opinion from Dr. Whitaker, especially considering that Dr. Whitaker provided an opinion in this case as early as December of 2009, months before the trial. Also, we see no valid excuse for Ceres’ failure to disclose the May 20 letter or address its significance until a copy was somehow obtained by Gulf Terminals and offered into evidence 5 Case: 12-11661 Date Filed: 03/19/2013 Page: 6 of 11 post-trial. And we see no valid excuse for Ceres’ representation during trial that “no doctor disagreed” with the proposition that subsequent employment aggravated claimant’s knee condition when the May 20 letter indicated the opposite. We cannot conclude that the ALJ and Board erred in concluding that Ceres chose to conceal the May 20 letter rather than disclosing it and pursuing due process rights to depose Dr. Whitaker. We cannot conclude that the ALJ and Board erred in concluding that Ceres had ample opportunity to pursue full due process rights, and that it was only Ceres’ own actions that caused a waiver of any additional process.3