Opinion ID: 1710689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: township powers

Text: Premium challenges Township's attempted regulation of its finishing buildings and sewage lagoons, asserting they are farm buildings and/or farm structures exempt from Township's general zoning power. Premium also contends Township may not maintain an action for public nuisance. It is an established principle that local governments have no inherent powers but are confined to those expressly delegated by the sovereign and to those powers necessarily implied in the authority to carry out the delegated powers. This rule of relatively strict construction of enabling statutes has been known as Dillon's Rule, and although it has suffered some debilitation in zoning cases, it nevertheless retains considerable vitality. Robert H. Freilich, Missouri Law of Land Use Controls: with National Perspectives, 42 UMKC L. REV. 1, 27 (1973). This Court has held: [C]ounties, like other public corporations, can exercise the following powers and no others: (1) those granted in express words; (2) those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; (3) those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation and the power is denied. We have repeatedly approved this quotation. Lancaster v. County of Atchison, 352 Mo. 1039, 180 S.W.2d 706, 708 (banc 1944) (quoting Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Section 89; and citing State ex rel. City of Blue Springs v. McWilliams, 335 Mo. 816, 74 S.W.2d 363 (banc 1934); State ex rel. City of Hannibal v. Smith, 335 Mo. 825, 74 S.W.2d 367, 372 (banc 1934)). Section 65.270, RSMo 1994, of the Revised Missouri Statutes specifically states that [n]o township shall possess any corporate powers, except such as are enumerated or granted by this chapter, or shall be specially given by law, or shall be necessary to the exercise of the powers so enumerated or granted. The two issues presented here concern the powers granted to Lincoln Township by section 65.677, already set out, section 65.260 which allows townships [t]o sue and be sued, in the manner provided by the laws of this state, and section 65.697, which permits enforcement of township regulations.
Although section 65.677, RSMo provides townships authority to set aside land for agricultural use, it specifically states that the zoning powers granted to townships by sections 65.650 to 65.700 shall not be exercised so as to impose regulations or to require permits ... with respect to the erection, maintenance, repair, alteration or extension of farm buildings or farm structures. Premium contends in its motions for summary judgment that the setback requirements for its finishing buildings and sewage lagoons imposed through Township's zoning regulations are attempts to regulate farm structures and farm buildings in contravention of section 65.677's specific exception to the general grant of zoning power. They also claim the bonding requirements for sewage lagoons are not permitted because the enabling act does not expressly grant townships the power to impose bonds. In the absence of ambiguity, statutes are given their plain and ordinary meaning relying on the actual words used. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Mo. banc 1993). The plain and ordinary meaning of farm includes the raising of livestock. Wesbster's Third New International Dictionary, 824 (1981) (a plot of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals; to engage in the business of raising crops or livestock); Black's Law Dictionary, 606 (6th Ed.1990) (A tract of land devoted to agriculture, pasturage, stock raising, or some allied industry. Includes dairy, stock, and poultry farms.). The legislature has defined farming for purposes of its Farming Corporations chapter as meaning the use or cultivation of land for the production of (a) agricultural crops; (b) livestock or livestock products; (c) poultry or poultry products; (d) milk or dairy products; or (e) fruit or other horticultural products, provided; however, `farming' shall not include a processor of farm products or a distributor of farming supplies contracting to provide spraying, harvesting or other farming services. Section 350.010(6), RSMo 1994. Farm products is also defined in section 400.9-109(3), RSMo 1994, as [g]oods that are crops or livestock or supplies used or produced in farming operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states (such as ginned cotton, woolclip, maple syrup, milk and eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations. In determining whether a concrete pad was a structure for purposes of municipal regulation, the court of appeals has defined a structure as a thing built, erected, or fabricated as a building, a dam, or a bridge. Yet, in its broadest and widest sense `structure' means any construction. Easy Living Mobile Manor, Inc. v. Eureka Fire Protection District, 513 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Mo.Ct.App. 1974). Because the finishing buildings and sewage lagoons are structures and are incident to the raising of livestock, which is farming, they are farm structures. Accord Kuehl v. Cass County, Iowa, 555 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 1996) (hog confinement facilities are farm structures exempt from county zoning); Thompson v. Hancock County, 539 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1995) (large hog barns are farm structures exempt from county zoning); DeCoster v. Franklin County, 497 N.W.2d 849 (Iowa 1993) (hog lagoons are farm structures exempt from county zoning). Nevertheless, Township argues that the statutory language is ambiguous. It asserts that a plain language approach is improper and that summary judgment is inappropriate because a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether such buildings are agricultural buildings as opposed to farm buildings. Township contends that agricultural uses may be regulated, though farm buildings and structures may not, and that Premium's operation is agriculture as opposed to farming. Township points to language in section 65.677 which states that townships may regulate and restrict, by order of record, in the unincorporated portions of the township, the height, number of stories, and size of buildings, the percentage of lots that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of population, the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes, including areas for agriculture, forestry, and recreation. Township asserts that this language permits regulation of agricultural land and that because Premium's operation is agricultural, Township may regulate Premium's buildings and appurtenances. Although there is authority from other jurisdictions holding agriculture and farming to be distinct activities, we need not address that issue here. We will not create an ambiguity in order to depart from the plain meaning of a statute or ordinance. Estate of Thomas, 743 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo. banc 1988). A plain reading of section 65.677 reveals no ambiguity. While the statute generally grants the township power to restrict certain areas for agricultural, forestry, and recreation uses, it does not authorize the regulation of agricultural uses, as Township contends. Additionally, the statute specifically provides that the zoning power shall not be exercised so as to impose regulations or to require permits ... with respect to the erection, maintenance, repair, alteration or extension of farm buildings or farm structures. This is a clear and direct limitation upon more general powers otherwise granted. We hold that the livestock sewage lagoons and the livestock finishing buildings at issue here are farm structures within the meaning of section 65.677 and that setback and bonding requirements are not authorized and are, therefore, impermissible. There is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the nature and composition of the lagoons and finishing buildings. Premium is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Township counterclaimed for enforcement of its comprehensive zoning plan based upon its statutory powers to pursue equitable relief. It also sought an injunction to stop further development of White Tail Farm and to enjoin further use of the facilities already established based upon the theory of public nuisance. The issues are whether Lincoln Township has been granted express power to bring a public nuisance action or, alternatively, whether the power to prosecute a nuisance action is necessary to the exercise of some express township power. As we have already stated, townships and other local governments possess only those powers expressly granted or that are necessary to execute the express powers so granted. No express authority to prosecute a nuisance action has been granted townships. Counties have been granted the power to pursue equitable relief under certain circumstances to abate a public nuisance, sections 67.410, 263.262, RSMo 1994, as have cities, towns and villages, sections 71.285, 77.530, 77.560, 79.370, 79.380, 79.383, 80.090, RSMo 1994. Townships have been granted no such authority. The legislature's grant of such authority to some local government entities and its failure to do so in the townships' enabling act indicate an intention to withhold the power. Potashnick Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Sikeston, 351 Mo. 505, 173 S.W.2d 96, 100 (1943) (municipality, itself, has direct power summarily to abate nuisances); State ex rel. Thrash v. Lamb, 237 Mo. 437, 141 S.W. 665, 668 (banc 1911) (A court of equity has jurisdiction to restrain existing or threatened public nuisances by injunction, at the suit of the Attorney General ... and at the suit of the state, or the people, or municipality, or some proper officer....); City of Lee's Summit v. Browning, 722 S.W.2d 114 (Mo.Ct.App.1986). Nor is the power to prosecute a public nuisance action necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted townships in chapter 65. The sections relating to the issue are sections 65.260, 65.677, 65.697. Section 65.260 permits a township to sue and be sued in the manner provided by the laws of this state. Section 65.677 merely permits townships to impose regulations for the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, comfort or the general welfare of the unincorporated portion of the township, to conserve and protect property and building values, to secure the most economical use of the land, and to facilitate the adequate provision of public improvements through its comprehensive plan and zoning regulations. Similarly, section 65.697 merely provides townships the power to bring an action to enforce the zoning regulations. Section 65.697(2) specifically provides: In the event [any regulation is violated], the township board, the township planning commission, the township zoning commission, the prosecuting attorney, or any officer or official appointed or designated under the provisions of Section 65.665, or the owner of any private property or any public body the property of whom or which is or may be affected by any such violation, may institute in the circuit court of the county, any appropriate action or proceedings to prevent such [violation]. Section 65.697(2) only applies to such unlawful and illegal acts as are declared misdemeanors in section 65.697(1), that is, actions which are in violation of the comprehensive plan and zoning regulations otherwise properly promulgated. Thus, power to pursue enforcement of township regulations is granted. Power to advance the public interests of the township's citizens through a public nuisance action is not. Township's counterclaim seeking an abatement of Premium's operations was properly dismissed.