Opinion ID: 1311745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: merger, multiplicity and double jeopardy

Text: Howard contends the double-jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution were violated in denying merger of Count I with Count II and Count III with Count IV. Because Howard was acquitted of Count II, this analysis deals only with Howard's argument about merger of Count III and Count IV. We agree. The double-jeopardy provision in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, reads, nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The double-jeopardy provision of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11 reads, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. In addition, equal protection is provided by Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11: No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If a jury disagree, or if the judgment be arrested after a verdict, or if the judgment be reversed for error in law, the accused shall not be deemed to have been in jeopardy. The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117, 1119 (Wyo. 1987) (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969)). The clause extends its protections to prohibit a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, to prohibit a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and to prohibit multiple punishment for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). It is the third protection that is implicated here. The ban on double jeopardy has its roots deep in the history of occidental jurisprudence. Fears and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the same conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization. Id. at 733, 89 S.Ct. at 2093, Douglas, J., concurring (quoting Bartkus v. People of the State of Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-55, 79 S.Ct. 676, 695-97, 3 L.Ed.2d 684, reh. denied 360 U.S. 907, 79 S.Ct. 1283, 3 L.Ed.2d 1258 (1959), Black, J., dissenting). Society has more than a legitimate interest in assuring that the government does not violate the rights of its individual citizens and in preventing abusive postures by the government as seen in King v. United States, 69 App.D.C. 10, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir.1938). The Government's brief suggests, in the vein of The Mikado, that because the first sentence was void appellant `has served no sentence but has merely spent time in the penitentiary;' that since he should not have been imprisoned as he was, he was not imprisoned at all. North Carolina, 395 U.S. at 721, n. 17, 89 S.Ct. at 2078-79, n. 17 (quoting King, 98 F.2d at 293-94). The prohibition against double jeopardy when an information charges a single offense in several counts is often termed multiplicity. C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 142 at 469 (1982). See United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F.2d 1247, 1252-55 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied 479 U.S. 938, 107 S.Ct. 419, 93 L.Ed.2d 370 (1986). The multiplicity doctrine is based upon the double-jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, which `assur[es] that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.' See United States v. Fiore, 821 F.2d 127, 130 (2d Cir.1987) (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)). An excellent discussion is presented by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Cathey, 241 Kan. 715, 741 P.2d 738 (1987). Under the federal standard, an analysis of double jeopardy in this situation begins by looking to legislative intent in creating separate statutory offenses. The dominant inquiry is whether the legislature intended these offenses to be separate offenses or the same offense. The test in the multiplicity-double-jeopardy cases is the statutory definition, not the proof utilized in the particular case. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); United States v. Muhammad, 824 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed.2d 666 (1988). Where the same conduct violates two statutory provisions, the first step in the double jeopardy analysis is to determine whether the legislature    intended that each violation be a separate offense. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 2411, 85 L.Ed.2d 764, reh. denied 473 U.S. 927, 106 S.Ct. 20, 87 L.Ed.2d 698 (1985). Where legislative intent is uncertain, that intent is inferred from legislative history, Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13, 98 S.Ct. 909, 913, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978), the purpose of each statute, [w]here two statutes are intended to suppress different evils, the acquittal or conviction on one will not prevent prosecution of the other, Goodman v. State, 601 P.2d 178, 185 (Wyo. 1979), and the Blockburger test: The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Since the search is for legislative intent, where legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history, Blockburger does not control. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779, 105 S.Ct. at 2412. While not completely dispositive of this issue, we note the embezzlement by failure to account in Count I, W.S. 6-7-306, is the same as Count IV, W.S. 6-5-111 (1983 Replacement) (Ch. 75, § 3, S.L. of Wyoming 1982), which replaced W.S. 6-7-306 as of July 1, 1983. The question presented by this issue is generally whether Count III, W.S. 6-3-402(b) and (c)(i) (1983 Replacement), and Count IV, W.S. 6-5-111 (1983 Replacement), were intended by our legislature to guard against the same offense. This accommodates the identical funds except for the $923. [2] W.S. 6-7-306, an embezzlement statute, was replaced by and has elements nearly identical to W.S. 6-5-111 (1983 Replacement). It is the legislative history of W.S. 6-5-111 in replacing W.S. 6-7-306, and the matching of its elements, that convinces us W.S. 6-5-111 is an embezzlement statute designed to curb the evil of embezzlement by public servants. In generic terms, embezzlement embraces failure to account plus conversion. Looking to W.S. 6-3-402(b), (c)(i), and (d) (1983 Replacement), as revised in 1985, we see in (d) the language: Conduct denoted larceny in this section constitutes a single offense embracing the separate crimes formerly known as larceny, larceny by bailee, embezzlement, or related offenses. (Emphasis added.) Our review of W.S. 6-3-402(b) and (c)(i) and 6-5-111, convinces us the legislature did not intend each violation be a separate offense. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985). There might not be a problem in convicting Howard of both W.S. 6-3-402 and 6-5-111, if separate evidence was used as proof of each violation. In State v. Carter, 714 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Wyo. 1986), we said where there is separate evidence of the two offenses, the offenses cannot be said to have merged. By corollary, where the evidence is the same, the offenses merge. While the record is not clear whether some of the same evidence was used in Counts I and IV by virtue of the confusing stipulation relating to the $923 as 1984 postage collection, the State concedes that all the money used in Count III was also used in Count IV. There can also be a problem in dividing up a course of activity in a criminal complaint such as failure to account, by segmenting the charge. We need not pursue that issue here by virtue of the decision we make. [3] The Brannan desk money and the Swanson check were the basis for Count III of Information No. 9691. The Count IV failure to account charge included that money as well as the postage sum of nine hundred twenty-three dollars ($923.00) from 1984. (Emphasis added.) This argument by the State is somewhat confusing in that the State argues against merger upon the basis that the offenses arose from different intents: In the present case, the facts support a charging of different offenses. Appellant took advantage of the opportunities presented to convert unaccounted monies to her own use. The evidence does not support that this was a single continuous intent. (Emphasis added.) But yet, when the State argues joinder of the two informations was proper, one of the bases of its characterization was the offenses are connected together and    constitute a common scheme or plan  (emphasis added), and more significantly involved itemization of the same money. In Carter, 714 P.2d at 1220, where there was a charge of drug possession with intent to distribute and a charge of distributing the controlled substance, we stated: [W]here evidence of the sale of a controlled substance is the only evidence to support a possession charge, the offense of possession with intent to distribute and actual distribution of the same substance have merged into a single offense. In the instant case, we hold that where evidence of embezzlement by larceny is also evidence used to support the charge of a public official's failure to account, these offenses have merged. [4] Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the conviction of Count IV in that proof of Counts I and III prove the crime then again resulting in Count IV. Whether using a logic, transactional, or separate-evidence test, the County Treasurer should only be subjected to taking the same money one time since she took it only one time. Under the facts as evidenced here, the failure to account and embezzlement could not be demonstrated in the statutory terminology to fit within the criteria of separate evidence in each offense. Our decision is constitutional under the purview of the Wyoming Constitution since interpretative tests are not required under statutory analysis. Clearly, a sequential differentiation between Counts III and IV is not demonstrated, which could in effect provide some justification of consideration of the arguments submitted by the State. [5] See United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792 (10th Cir.1986) and United States v. Beachner Const. Co., Inc., 729 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir.1984). See also G. Thomas, Multiple Punishments for the Same Offense: The Analysis After Missouri v. Hunter or Don Quixote, The Sargasso Sea and the Gordian Knot, 62 Wash.U.L.Q. 79 (1984); see also Comment, Successive Prosecutions and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise: The Double Jeopardy Analysis in Garnett v. United States, 13 Hastings Const.L.Q. 785 (1986).