Opinion ID: 1887042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reasonableness of the Jury Verdict

Text: The question raised by Dunn's first argument is whether the jury verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence presented at trial. This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. [1] A jury verdict is presumed to be correct [2] and will be upheld unless it is against the `great weight of the evidence.'  [3] The Delaware Constitution sets forth this Court's standard of review: ... on appeal from a verdict of a jury, the finding of the jury, if supported by the evidence, shall be conclusive. [4] To support her claim that the Superior Court abused its discretion, Dunn relies upon Maier v. Santucci. [5] In Maier we found that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting a new trial after the jury had returned a verdict of zero ($0) damages, even though the evidence conclusively establishe[d] the existence of an injury and the injury ha[d] been established as causally related to the accident. [6] Dunn argues that the circumstances found to require a new trial in Maier are also present here, and that therefore, the Superior Court's denial of her new trial motion after a jury verdict of zero ($0) damages was an abuse of discretion. Dunn's argument fails, because in this case the evidence on the issue of causation was in conflict, and, thus, did not conclusively establish that Dunn's injuries were causally related to the accident. That evidence included two of Dr. Senu-Oke's expert reports, both made after the December accident, in which Dr. Senu-Oke offered contradictory medical opinions about the cause of Dunn's injuries. In his first report, dated in September 2000, Dr. Senu-Oke opined that Dunn's injuries resulted from the July 1999 accident. In his second report, dated February 2001, he opined that Dunn's injuries resulted from the December 1999 accident. Dr. Senu-Oke did not mention the December accident in his first report, nor did he mention the July accident in his second report. At trial, Dr. Senu-Oke was cross-examined before the jury about that glaring inconsistency. The evidence presented in this case differed significantly from that presented in Maier and in other cases where this Court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by not setting aside a jury award of zero ($0) damages. In Maier we found the jury verdict of zero ($0) damages to be unreasonable where the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability and the trial experts all agreed that the plaintiff had suffered some injury as a result of the accident. [7] Similarly, in Amalfitano v. Baker , we held that the Superior Court abused its discretion in refusing to order a new trial where the jury had returned a verdict of zero ($0) damages, despite testimony that the car accident had caused her injuries, and despite the defense's contention that at least some injury had resulted from that accident. [8] In both Maier and Amalfitano, causation was conceded and the only issue confronting the jury was only the extent of the plaintiff's injuries. Here, in contrast, Riley developed evidence during the cross-examination of Dunn's expert, that called into question the reliability of that expert's opinion as to causation. Because both sides presented conflicting evidence on the causation issue, Dunn did not conclusively establish causation, which became a question for the jury. Accordingly, the jury verdict awarding zero ($0) damages was not unreasonable. This case fits more closely Kossol v. Duffy, [9] where we found that the denial of a motion for a new trial after the jury had returned a zero ($0) damages verdict was not an abuse of discretion. In Kossol, the plaintiff had been involved in four other car accidents, two of which occurred before the accident at issue in the case. During the trial there was conflicting evidence as to which of those four accidents had caused the plaintiff's injuries. In Kossol we rejected the plaintiff's argument that his claim was on all fours with Maier, and affirmed the Superior Court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Unlike what occurred in Amalfitano and in Maier, here the evidence relating to causation was highly controverted. Given that conflicting evidence, including the contradictory permanency opinion reports, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Riley's negligence did not proximately cause Dunn's injuries. It is the exclusive province of the jury to make credibility determinations and to resolve conflicts in the testimony. Accordingly, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order a new trial on that basis.