Opinion ID: 791980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Derivative Citizenship Claim

Text: 20 We turn, finally, to the merits of Jordon's derivative United States citizenship claim. Jordon presents his derivative citizenship claim under the former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a). Congress repealed § 1432(a) with its enactment of the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (CCA), § 103, Pub.L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631. The CCA had an effective date of February 27, 2001, 120 days following its enactment. Because all relevant events respecting Jordon's claimed derivative citizenship occurred prior to the CCA's effective date, § 1432(a) controls our analysis. 9 See Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 257 n. 3 (3d Cir.2005) (citation omitted); see also Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir.2005) (derivative citizenship is determined under the law in effect at the time the critical events giving rise to eligibility occurred.) (citations omitted). Section 1432(a) provides that 21 A child born outside of the United States of alien parents, or of an alien parent and a citizen parent who has subsequently lost citizenship of the United States, becomes a citizen of the United States upon fulfillment of the following conditions: 22 (1) The naturalization of both parents; or 23 (2) The naturalization of the surviving parent if one of the parents is deceased; or 24 (3) The naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents or the naturalization of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation; and if 25 (4) Such naturalization takes place while such child is under the age of eighteen years; and 26 (5) Such child is residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the parent last naturalized under clause (1) of this subsection, or the parent naturalized under clause (2) or (3) of this subsection, or thereafter begins to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years. 27 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1999), repealed by CCA, § 103, Pub.L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631. 28 Section 1432(a) thus provides several avenues by which a child born outside of the United States to alien parents can become a United States citizen. The parties agree that two of these avenues — [t]he naturalization of both parents, § 1432(a)(1), or [t]he naturalization of the surviving parent if one of the parents is deceased, § 1432(a)(2) — are inapplicable. Subsections (3), (4) and (5) set forth, in combination, a third avenue for establishing derivative citizenship: If the child can establish (1) [t]he naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents; and (2) that [s]uch naturalization takes place while such child is under the age of eighteen years; and (3) that [s]uch child is residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the parent last naturalized under clause (1) of this subsection, or the parent naturalized under clause (2) or (3) of this subsection, or thereafter begins to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years[,] the child is a United States citizen under § 1432(a). See 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3)-(5). 29 There is no dispute that subsection (5) has been satisfied here, and because the facts clearly establish that Jordon's mother was naturalized before Jordon turned 18, subsection (4) has also been satisfied. The disagreement between the parties centers on whether subsection (3) — specifically the first clause of subsection (3), requiring [t]he naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents — has been satisfied. Jordon frames two issues under § 1432(a)(3): 1) whether § 1432(a) requires that Jordon's mother already be `legally separated' at the time she is naturalized; and 2) whether Jordon's parents' marital separation was a sufficiently `legal' separation for § 1432(a) purposes. He argues that the District Court properly answered these questions no and yes, respectively, and therefore properly found that he was a derivative citizen under § 1432(a). For the reasons that follow, we disagree as to Jordon's suggested answer to the first inquiry he frames, and must therefore reject his claim of derivative citizenship. 30 In Jordon's view, the critical term in the first clause of § 1432(a)(3) is when. He contends that when should not necessarily be read in its temporal sense (i.e., after), suggests it could be read in its conditional sense (i.e., if), and in any event argues that when modifies having legal custody of the child, not naturalization. We need not labor over the proper construction of § 1432(a)(3)'s first clause or its use of when, however, because a decision of this Court issued post-briefing in this case sets forth the controlling interpretation of § 1432(a)(3)'s first clause. See Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252 (3d Cir.2005). In Bagot, we made crystal clear that a child seeking to establish derivative citizenship under § 1432(a) must prove four essential facts under § 1432(a)(3): 31 (1) that his [parent] was naturalized after a legal separation from his [other parent]; (2) that his [parent] was naturalized before [the child] turned eighteen; (3) that he was residing in the United States as a permanent legal resident at the time of his father's naturalization; and (4) that his [parent] had legal custody at the time of [the parent's] naturalization. 32 398 F.3d at 257 (emphasis added). As such, Bagot conclusively rejects Jordon's (and the District Court's) view that the custodial parent need not be legally separated from his or her spouse prior to the custodial parent's naturalization for purposes of § 1432(a)(3). See also Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1076 (stating that in order to satisfy the first clause of subsection (3), the petitioner must establish that at the time of his mother's naturalization, `there ha[d] been a legal separation of the parents.') (citing § 1432(a)(3)) (brackets in original). 33 Bagot 's conclusion that legal separation must occur prior to naturalization in order to satisfy the first clause of § 1432(a)(3) compels us to reject Jordon's derivative citizenship claim because the evidence conclusively demonstrates that Jordon's mother was naturalized long before his parents' legal separation. The evidence is undisputed that Jordon's mother was naturalized on March 13, 1985, and that any legal separation occurred no earlier than some time in 1988 (by virtue of Jordon's father's abandonment), and possibly as late as July 11, 1991 (by virtue of the issuance of a final divorce decree). 10 Accordingly, Jordon cannot establish an essential element of his derivative citizenship claim under § 1432(a), and we will therefore deny Jordon's petition for review. 11