Opinion ID: 2521277
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Comment During Voir Dire

Text: During voir dire at the second penalty phase trial, the court questioned a prospective juror concerning one of his answers on the juror questionnaire: [Trial Court]: When you were asked, question number 27, express your views of the death penalty, you indicated, `Unless it was in self-defense or to retaliation [ sic ] against abuse that it should be the death penalty.' That of course is not the law. But do you feel you could follow the law as I would instruct you at the end of the case? A. Yes, I do. Q. Thisthe evidence I don't think will show either one of those situations took place, but could you listen to the evidence and depending upon what the evidence showed vote for the death penalty? A. Yes. Q. Could you listen to all the evidence and depending on what the evidence showed also vote for life imprisonment? A. Yes. Q. So you could vote either way depending upon the evidence which you would hear or see in this courtroom? A. Yes. Defendant asserts that the court's comment, that the evidence I don't think will show either self-defense or retaliation against abuse, constituted an erroneous and prejudicial comment on the evidence. The Attorney General asserts that defendant forfeited this issue by failing to object at trial to the court's comment, (See People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.) Defendant responds that no objection was required, because Code of Civil Procedure section 647 provides that any statement or other action of the court in commenting upon or in summarizing the evidence is deemed to have been excepted to. ( Delzell v. Day (1950) 36 Cal.2d 349, 351, 223 P.2d 625.) Assuming, without deciding, that the issue may be raised on appeal, we conclude that the trial court's remark did not constitute an improper comment on the evidence. Article VI, section 10, of the California Constitution provides, in pertinent part: The court may make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the cause. We examined this provision in People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 766, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113, stating: On its face, the constitutional language imposes no limitations on the content or timing of judicial commentary, deferring entirely to the trial judge's sound discretion. The appellate courts have recognized, however, that this powerful judicial tool may sometimes invade the accused's countervailing right to independent jury determination of the facts bearing on his guilt or innocence. Hence, the decisions admonish that judicial comment on the evidence must be accurate, temperate, nonargumentative, and scrupulously fair. The trial court may not, in the guise of privileged comment, withdraw material evidence from the jury's consideration, distort the record, expressly or impliedly direct a verdict, or otherwise usurp the jury's ultimate factfinding power. [Citations.] (See also People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 948, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574 [In the present case, the trial court's questions and comments were within the bounds of propriety. Its role was one of clarification rather than advocacy.].) The trial court's single remark that it did not believe the evidence would show self-defense or retaliation against abuse was proper under the foregoing standard. The remark was accurate and did not distort the record. By convicting defendant of murder, the jury at the guilt phase had determined that the evidence did not establish self-defense. The remark was temperate, nonargumentative, and scrupulously fair. The court stated what it thought the evidence would demonstrate, but asked whether the juror could listen to the evidence and base his verdict upon what the evidence showed. The court did not withdraw material evidence from the jury's consideration, expressly or impliedly direct a verdict, or otherwise usurp the jury's ultimate factfinding power. To the contrary, the court concluded by posing the question: So you could vote either way depending upon the evidence which you would hear or see in this courtroom? Furthermore, the court clearly was attempting to protect defendant's rights by determining whether the juror could vote for either penalty, depending upon the facts to be presented. The court's isolated remark, made during jury selection and prior to the receipt of any evidence by the second jury, was not error. (Cf. People v. Flores (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 579, 588, 95 Cal.Rptr. 138.)