Opinion ID: 766970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Decision as to the Relevance of Melville's Workfare

Text: 112 We see no indication in the present record that the Commissioner made any evaluation as to whether Melville's prior part-time work experience was relevant within the meaning of the regulatory scheme. Nor, given the transcript excerpts quoted in Part I above, do we see any indication that the ALJ fulfilled his responsibility to develop the record on this issue. Although the ALJ asked Melville if she was currently on welfare, he did not appear to recognize that the prior work to which she referred was workfare, rather than a paid position. For example, when Melville stated that in her seven years of work she had been working for Welfare, the ALJ inquired, You mean the Department of Social Services? (Tr. 8.) That question strongly suggests that the ALJ interpreted working for Welfare as meaning that Melville was simply an employee of the local agency that administered the welfare system. Similarly, in exploring the nature of her activities at DSS, the ALJ asked Melville such questions as what did you do as a clerk for the five years for Welfare? (id.); whether that work was five years at the same place? (Tr. 9); what happened to that job? (Tr. 11.); whether she had been let ... go from that job (id.); and Have you looked for other work? (Tr. 12.) These questions did not indicate an understanding that Melville was not an ordinary paid employee. 113 Although the ALJ questioned Melville as to her physical ability to sit, stand, or walk in the course of her activity at DSS, he asked no questions directed to Melville's occupational ability to perform the normal work of a paid clerk. Nor did he manifest any interest in such questions as whether Melville's duties were minimal from the employer's standpoint, and whether her welfare benefits were conditioned on her productivity as a clerk. Without developing the record along these lines, the ALJ could not properly assess whether Melville's workfare assignment could be considered substantial gainful work; if it could not, Melville's performance of that assignment did not, according to SSA regulations, constitute past relevant work. 114 Nor did the ALJ's written decision suggest any awareness that the nature of Melville's DSS activity was workfare. He explored only her physical capacity to engage in sedentary work. Rather, referring to the DSS position as her past relevant work as a clerk, the ALJ stated that Melville had been employed in this capacity. ALJ Decision at 23. He referred to the DSS activity as her occupation. Id. at 3. 115 We conclude that the ALJ did not make the evaluation that was required by the regulatory scheme. The Commissioner does not appear to have given any greater thought than did the ALJ to the fact that Melville's past assignment at DSS was workfare or to such questions as whether her duties were de minimis and whether her entitlement to a welfare check depended on her productivity. The Appeals Council simply adopted the decision of the ALJ, and that became the final decision of the Commissioner. Although the district court itself reached at least an implicit conclusion on those questions, it is not within the proper scope of review for a court to address those questions in the first instance or de novo, and it would be inappropriate for us to uphold the Commissioner's decision on a basis that the record indicates did not receive proper administrative consideration.