Opinion ID: 1944931
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excusing a Potential Juror for Cause

Text: Rodgers contends that the trial court erred in dismissing a potential juror for cause, claiming that the juror testified he could impose the death penalty. A trial court has discretion to exclude a juror for cause if the person's opposition to the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)); accord Hertz v. State, 803 So.2d 629, 638 (Fla.2001) (citing Wainwright ). On review, we will not reverse absent evidence of manifest error. Hertz, 803 So.2d at 638 (citing Fernandez v. State, 730 So.2d 277, 281 (Fla.1999)). Having reviewed the record, we find that during voir dire questioning the prospective juror repeatedly stated that if given the choice between recommending life or death, he would always choose life in prison and emphasized that this was his strong personal belief. Accordingly, the prospective juror evidenced a strong opposition to the death penalty, and appellant has not demonstrated that the trial court's decision to excuse the juror was manifest error.