Opinion ID: 2127461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Special Weight of Aggravators

Text: Benirschke claims the trial court erred by giving one of the aggravators special weight or a special ranking that violated the standards directed by IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9. This statute provides first that the death penalty may be recommended by the jury only if there is a finding that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the aggravating circumstances exists and, second, that any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances. Our death penalty statute further provides the court is to make the final determination of the sentence after considering the jury's recommendation and the sentence shall be based on the same standards that the jury was required to consider. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court made the following observation: The [c]ourt, reviewing the types of murders that qualify for the death penalty, under the Indiana Penal Code, there are twelve in number... . Here, you have a double homicide. I say, again, there are ten other types of murder that qualify for the death penalty, where only one life is taken. On a scale of one to twelve, this probably would be a twelve. Record at 905-06. The court further stated: Again, the [c]ourt believes that if ever a murder qualified for the death penalty, if ever a scenario qualified for the death penalty, this is it. Record at 909. The court found that the State proved Benirschke intentionally killed both Walter Muvich and James Cromwell and took eleven hundred dollars ($1,100) from Cromwell's body and, therefore, found the jury was justified in finding the existence of at least one of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant reasons these statements made by the court indicated he gave a special ranking to this aggravator over and above all others enumerated by the legislature and indicated a mind-set by the judge which precluded his giving proper consideration to any of the mitigating circumstances or from doing anything except imposing the death penalty. Benirschke further reasons that this standard the judge had fixed in his mind was a different and higher standard than that used by the jury. We do not agree. In imposing sentence, the trial judge did not give as his reason the fact that this aggravator is the most serious of all and somehow requires the death penalty solely on the ground that the defendant committed this crime. These statements by the judge were made preliminary to his judgment. It was necessary for him to find at least one aggravator had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and to further find the crime for which the defendant was convicted and the manner in which it was committed, plus the character of the defendant, all taken together merited imposition of the death penalty. The judge did find this aggravator had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and in a peremptory manner indicated that this was a particularly heinous crime, one that qualified as an aggravator because two people were killed rather than one, and the circumstances justified imposition of the death penalty. There was justification for this observation inasmuch as Benirschke admitted he killed the second man solely for the reason that he would be a witness to the killing of the first. The court then proceeded to enumerate considerations of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the weight he gave to them and the conclusion of a sentencing judgment based thereon. We will consider the sufficiency of these findings in the next issue. We find no reversible error in the manner in which the court expressed his attitude in making his findings.