Opinion ID: 1852242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Control of the Litigation First to File.

Text: ¶ 70. In his January 19, 2002, order denying consolidation, the trial court characterized the phrase, first to file an action has a right to prosecute it to its conclusion, as an old established rule, which he held was not diluted by Franklin, which allowed consolidation of two wrongful death suits for the same death. He believed such consolidation required agreement of the parties. Specifically, the trial court stated, The Wrongful Death Statute provides for any beneficiary to bring the action in behalf of all beneficiaries and the `first to file' shall have control of the handling of the case. ¶ 71. Then, in an order dated February 3, 2003, granting the Long's motion for reconsideration, the trial court stated: This court finds the wrongful death statute in no way precludes individual wrongful death claimants from joining in the first filed suit and having their own attorney represent them and this court is respectful of each client's right to retain their individual attorney ... subject to this court's previous ruling wherein this court established that [the Hopkins Firm] shall have control of the litigation. In an attempt to explain what he meant by control of the litigation, the trial court stated: That this court expects [the Hopkins Firm] and Weatherly to cooperate with one another in the prosecution of this wrongful case and coordinate their efforts if possible and not to duplicate their efforts to the detriment of their respective clients where this can be avoided, and suggests to all attorneys representing claimants in this cause that if they can't cooperate then they should seek counsel and advice from the Mississippi Bar Association on these matters; This Court further ORDERS that [Weatherly] shall be entitled to attend any and all depositions and participate in the same as he sees fit, and he shall be entitled to retain any and all expert witnesses that he feels is necessary to prosecute the claim and that he shall be entitled to subpoena any and all records and investigate the claim as he sees fit, subject to the right of [the Hopkins Firm] to control the litigation, which right shall not be exercised in such a way as to preclude [Weatherly] from effectively representing his clients, [the Longs]. ¶ 72. Thereafter, in an order entered March 24, 2003, the trial court again (seemingly) reversed his position by stating that the Order of February 6, 2003, should be and is reconsidered and voided. The trial court went on to hold that the Order of December 19, 2002, is reaffirmed and reinstated.... ¶ 73. In reinstating the December order, the trial court simply reaffirmed the previous refusal to consolidate the two suits. In voiding the February order, the trial court offered no specific finding or guidance regarding the Long's right to have counsel of their choice in Lori's first-filed suit, or Weatherly's right to represent his clients in that suit. It appears the trial court believed the chancery court had signed an order approving Lori's suit on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries, and further approving the representation by the Hopkins Firm of Lori, in her capacity as representative of the beneficiaries. This incorrect belief apparently led the trial court to conclude that neither the Longs nor Weatherly should be allowed to further participate. ¶ 74. Thus, the trial court seems to have abandoned his prior order based on each client's right to retain their individual attorney, to his prior position that control of the litigation was decided by the chancery court. [19] ¶ 75. Confusion concerning control of the litigation and the so-called first to file rule is not limited to the state courts. In attempting to decide cases according predictions of how this Court would hold, federal courts have determined that Mississippi law awards control of the wrongful death suit to the wrongful death heir ... who wins the race to the courthouse. That right encompasses all available trial tactics, including the right to settle. West v. Hughes, N. 3:95CV003-D-A, 1996 WL 33370672 (N.D.Miss.1996); [20] Rampy ex rel. Rampy v. Austin, 718 F.Supp. 556 (S.D.Miss.1989). ¶ 76. We recognize that ample dicta, and even some direct authority, exists under our prior case law which justifies the conclusions reached by the trial court here and by the federal court in Rampy. However, for several reasons, we must reject the proposition that the first heir to reach the courthouse with a lawyer will control the litigation to the exclusion of participation by other heirs who wish to join with other counsel of their choosing. ¶ 77. Perhaps the most glaring fallacy in such a policy is the potential for conflicts of interest which  should a view contrary to our view today prevail  would be both legislatively ordered and court sanctioned. ¶ 78. We are persuaded that, absent the Statute, wrongful death litigation would be reasonably uncomplicated. The rules to be followed are not substantially different from those which apply to any personal injury suit where multiple plaintiffs pursue a claim against one or more defendants. Such matters as joinder, Control of the litigation, and participation by counsel, are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. We observe few problems with such cases, and we are confident that today's decision will bring wrongful death litigation to its rightful place under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.