Opinion ID: 2519784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: constitutionality of the annexation statute

Text: ¶ 7 On appeal, Emery County and Green River first argue that the trial court erred in granting Grand County declaratory judgment that section 17-2-6(2) is unconstitutional. In ruling that section 17-2-6(2) is unconstitutional, the trial court concluded that section 17-2-6(2)'s requirementthat a county wishing to annex a portion of the territory from an adjoining county must first acquire a concurrent resolution passed by a two-thirds majority of both houses of the legislature approving the annexation proposal and then the governor's signature approval on such a resolutionviolated the general law provision of article XI, section 3 of the Utah Constitution, which establishes the general procedure and voting requirement regarding county annexations and the legislature's power to delineate the conditions of the annexation process. See Utah Const. art. XI, § 3. ¶ 8 Emery County and Green River maintain that section 17-2-6(2), H.B. 49, which amended section 17-2-6, and House Concurrent Resolution 6, H. Con. Res. 6, 53d Leg., Gen. Sess., 2000 Utah Laws 1660-61the resolution passed by the legislature approving the annexation proposaleither are not special laws, or in the case of the concurrent resolution, is not a law at all, and therefore, they do not violate article XI, section 3. ¶ 9 Article XI, section 3 of the Utah Constitution provides: No territory shall be stricken from any county unless a majority of the voters living in such territory, as well as of the county to which it is to be annexed, shall vote therefor, and then only under such conditions as may be prescribed by general law. Utah Const. art. XI, § 3. ¶ 10 This provision sets forth the basic requirements and framework for annexation and delegates to the legislature the authority to dictate the conditions under which annexation may occur. However, the legislature's power to set those conditions is limited by the provision in that the legislature may prescribe such conditions only by general law. Id. ¶ 11 Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the legislature enacted title 17, chapter 2 of the Utah Code. Specifically, section 17-2-6 prescribes the conditions under which one county can annex a portion of the territory of an adjoining county. This section of the statute sets forth two different annexation methods. ¶ 12 The first annexation method (the traditional method) allows for a majority of the voters in an area of a county to petition their county legislative body to allow the area in which they live to be annexed by an adjoining county. Utah Code Ann. § 17-2-6(1)(a). The county legislative body, upon receiving such a petition in accordance with the provisions of the statute, must submit the annexation proposal to the voters of the county from which territory is to be annexed and to the voters of the county to which the territory is to be annexed. Id. § 17-2-6(1)(b). Under this annexation method, an annexation proposal is approved if a majority of those voting in each county have voted in favor of [the] annexation. Id. § 17-2-8(2)(a) (Supp. 2001). ¶ 13 The second or alternative annexation method (the amended alternative method), which is at issue in this case, was amended by the passage of H.B. 49 during the 2000 general session of the legislature. The amended alternative method provides for a similar petition process but goes further and sets forth a modified and supplemental procedure applicable where the area seeking to be annexed shares a common boundary with the annexing county and where the area proposed to be annexed (1) is located within a city or town whose boundaries extend into the proposed annexing county, (2) is contiguous to the portion of the city or town that is located within the proposed annexing county, and (3) includes all of the city or town that is within the county from which the area is proposed to be taken. Utah Code Ann. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(i)(A)-(C). Under these circumstances, one county can annex a portion of an adjoining county if by a two-thirds vote of each house, the Legislature passes a concurrent resolution approving the annexation proposal, id. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(ii), the governor signs the concurrent resolution, id. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(iii), and an economic analysis of the annexation proposal is conducted and the analysis demonstrates that the cost and revenue effects of the annexation proposal fall within the specific parameters described in the statute, id. § 17-2-6(2)(b). In an election on an annexation proposal brought under the amended alternative method, an annexation proposal is approved if a majority of voters living in the area proposed for annexation and a majority of voters living in the county to which the area is proposed to be annexed have voted in favor of annexation. Id. § 17-2-8(2)(b). ¶ 14 In order to determine if section 17-2-6, as amended by H.B. 49, is constitutional under article XI, section 3, we must determine if it is a general law. The standards for evaluating challenged legislation under the general law provisions of the Utah Constitution are set forth in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Ass'n: A general law applies to and operates uniformly upon all members of any class of persons, places, or things requiring legislation particular to themselves in the matters covered by the laws in question. On the other hand, special legislation relates either to particular persons, places, or things or to persons, places, or things which, though not particularized, are separated by any method of selection from the whole class to which the law might, but for such legislation, be applied.... The constitutional prohibition of special legislation does not preclude legislative classification, but only requires the classification to be reasonable. 564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977); see also 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 5 (1974). Furthermore, where the legislature has made such a legislative classification, the classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so long as there is some basis for the differentiation between classes or subject matters included as compared to those excluded from its operation, provided the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act.... .... ... If a reasonable basis to differentiate those included from those excluded from its operation can be found, it must be held constitutional. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 564 P.2d at 755-56 (quotations omitted). In other words, a law is a general law where, to the extent it makes a classification, that classification (1) is reasonable and (2) applies and operates uniformly as to all members composing the class. ¶ 15 Section 17-2-6, as amended by H.B. 49, is a general law. It is clear that the amended alternative method provided for in section 17-2-6(2) creates a legislative classification and differentiates between portions of counties generally and those portions that are cities or towns that straddle county boundaries. Neither of the parties disputes the reasonableness of this classification. ¶ 16 While the plain language of H.B. 49 does not provide an express indication of the legislature's basis for differentiating between portions of counties generally that seek annexation and those areas of counties that are portions of cities or towns that straddle county lines that seek annexation, and there does not appear to be any legislative history associated with H.B. 49 to guide us, it is not difficult to discern from the language of the bill and the statute that the legislature was concerned about keeping cities and towns wholly within a single county instead of two counties. The cities and towns belonging to the class occupy the unique position of straddling a county boundary and falling within two counties. [1] The purpose of the legislation is to provide an additional, and in some respects easier, method of annexation for the cities and towns caught in the awkward position of straddling a county line. The legislature did not arbitrarily include or exclude members from the class to which the statute is applicable, but instead, included only members to which the purpose of the statute might apply. Therefore, the legislature's basis for differentiating between the members of the class subject to section 17-2-6(2) and other portions of counties in general bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act and is otherwise reasonable. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 564 P.2d at 756. ¶ 17 As to the uniform operation requirement for general laws, Grand County essentially argues that section 17-2-6(2) was enacted specifically to address the Green River situation and that the statute will not operate uniformly as to the other members of the class because the statute includes no legal standards related to the passage of a concurrent resolution by the legislature or approval of such a resolution by the governor. Grand County argues that under the statutory scheme as it now stands, there is no guarantee that any of the other class members will be able to successfully lobby the legislature and the governor for passage and approval of a concurrent resolution similar to the one secured by Emery County and Green River in this case. Grand County's arguments are unavailing. ¶ 18 Section 17-2-6(2) applies uniformly to the members of the class. As previously indicated, there are four cities/towns that are presently members of the class. One of those class members, Green River, has successfully employed the procedure provided for in the statute. Any of the other class members may utilize the section 17-2-6(2) procedures in the same manner as Green River did. Under the uniform operation of the statute, those class members would be required to lobby the legislature for a concurrent resolution, to secure the governor's signature of such a resolution, to conduct the required economic analysis, and ultimately to gain the approval of a majority of the voters living in the appropriate areas. The procedure for the class members is identical. Green River was afforded no special treatment in the application of the law, and there is no indication that any other class member would be treated any differently or required to meet any disparate burdens. The mere fact that Emery County and Green River were successful in utilizing the amended alternative method does not render the statute a special law. ¶ 19 Grand County further argues that even if the underlying annexation statute is a general law, the concurrent resolution passed by the legislature and signed by the governor is a special law, or has the effect of a special law, since such a resolution is required by the underlying statute and no vote on annexation can go forward without the resolution. The trial court appeared to endorse essentially the same argument when it concluded in its memorandum decision that the concurrent resolution approved by the Governor is functionally indistinguishable from legislation. We disagree. ¶ 20 The concurrent resolution is not a law and therefore is not subject to the general law limiting language of article XI, section 3 because a resolution of the Utah Legislature is not legislation and does not have the force or effect of law. Salt Lake City v. State Tax Comm'n, 813 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1991); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 3 (1974) ([T]he general rule is that a joint or concurrent resolution adopted by the legislature is not a statute, [and] does not have the force or effect of law ....). ¶ 21 Nor does the requirement of a concurrent resolution passed by the legislature and signed by the governor transform the underlying general law into a special one. The concurrent resolution required as part of the amended alternative method has no effect of law. It neither grants nor denies annexation to a city or town or county. It merely represents a condition precedent to an annexation proposal brought under the amended alternative method being presented to the relevant voters in the county or area to be annexed. Article XI, section 3 of the Utah Constitution clearly indicates that such conditions may be set by the legislature. ¶ 22 Finally, in its memorandum decision the trial court characterized the requirement of a concurrent resolution as giving the last word on any county boundary change to the legislature and the governor instead of to the voters. This is incorrect. ¶ 23 We read the plain language of the statute as a whole, interpreting its provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and `with other statutes under the same and related chapters.' Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶ 17, 5 P.3d 616 (quoting Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993) (per curiam)). The trial court's analysis and conclusion ignore the presence of the traditional method in section 17-2-6(1). The concurrent resolution requirement does not give the legislature and the governor the last word on county boundary changes because a city or town that is unsuccessful in utilizing the procedures of the amended alternative method in section 17-2-6(2) by not acquiring a concurrent resolution from the legislature, or for that matter, an economic analysis that meets the requirements of the amended alternative method, would always have recourse to the traditional method found in section 17-2-6(1), which is free from all of the additional requirements of the amended alternative method. ¶ 24 Therefore, the trial court erred when it concluded as a matter of law that section 17-2-6, as amended by H.B. 49, was an unconstitutional special law because the legislative classification made by the statute has a reasonable basis that is reasonably related to the purposes of the statute and because the statute applies and operates uniformly as to the members of the class.