Opinion ID: 1311325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of a Continuance and Funds for Psychiatric Assistance

Text: We turn next to McGehee's contention that the district court erred in denying him habeas relief on his psychiatric assistance claim. [3] As recounted above, McGehee requested a continuance and psychiatric assistance to determine whether he suffered detrimental effects from his father's exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam. The trial judge denied the request, noting that McGehee had already been granted a psychiatric evaluation and that the significance of his father's chemical exposure was doubtful. Under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), a defendant's threshold showing that his mental state at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial requires the state to provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance if the defendant cannot otherwise afford to pay for his own expert. Id. at 74, 105 S.Ct. 1087. The entitlement to an Ake expert may extend to the penalty phase of a trial, and to the extent that the district court's opinion suggested otherwise, it was incorrect. See id. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087; Starr, 23 F.3d at 1288 ( Ake also explains that, when appropriate, the right to expert assistance extends to the sentencing phase of capital proceedings.). McGehee was not entitled to an Ake expert, however, because he did not satisfy the initial showing that his mental state was likely to be a significant factor at trial. Ake and the other cases on which McGehee relies all involved elements not present herea readily observable mental impairment or the prosecution's use of a psychiatric expert to establish guilt or aggravating factors at sentencing. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 71-73, 105 S.Ct. 1087; see also Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10, 11, 116 S.Ct. 283, 133 L.Ed.2d 251 (1995) (per curiam) (government presented unrebutted psychiatric testimony concerning the defendant's future dangerousness); Boliek v. Bowersox, 96 F.3d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 1996) (petitioner was an indigent capital defendant with a long history of mental-health problems); Starr, 23 F.3d at 1288-89 (petitioner had been diagnosed as mildly to moderately retarded); cf. Branscomb v. Norris, 47 F.3d 258, 262 (8th Cir.1995) (rejecting an Ake claim because the petitioner failed to produce evidence of mental incapacity). The language in McGehee's motion for a continuance belies the contention that he satisfied Ake 's requisite showing. McGehee asserted that he needed expert assistance to explore the potential inheritance of chemical defects attributable to Agent Orange. Although the state was willing to stipulate that McGehee's father had been exposed to Agent Orange, McGehee offered no evidence that any such exposure had affected his own mental state, and his counsel could only speculate about what tests needed to be performed and what they might show. Moreover, the state did not rely on any psychiatric experts in the guilt or penalty phases of McGehee's trial. Ake requires more than the mere possibility that an expert might be of some assistance to a defendant's case. Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc). Rather, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that an expert would aid in his defense, and that denial of expert assistance would result in an unfair trial. Id. McGehee did not make this showing, and the district court thus properly denied relief on this claim.