Opinion ID: 331405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: refusal to hear petitioner's oral motions at trial

Text: 46 In addition to outlining procedures for the submission of papers directly to Judge Edelstein, Trial Order No. 3 required that all motions be submitted to the Court upon ten days' notice, with the exception of discovery motions which were to be submitted upon five days' notice. The effect of this order was to eliminate the parties' opportunity to make oral motions during trial, an opportunity which had already been substantially undercut by the trial court's refusal to entertain a number of motions at trial on an oral basis. We agree with Judge Edelstein that the burden of hearing oral motions may prove onerous and even distracting during the course of a lengthy trial. We do not interpret the type of motion embraced within the purview of Trial Order No. 3 as covering the normal motions, of necessity made during a trial, such as objections to the admission of testimony or exhibits, motions to strike, etc. Hammond-Knowlton v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 26 F.Supp. 292 (D.Conn.1939). And we believe that the judge himself intended no such interpretation. Accordingly, oral motions have been described as 'obviously necessary to expedite the hearing or trial', 2A Moore's Federal Practice (1974 ed.) P 7.05. They are not only contemplated but, absent unusual circumstances, virtually mandated by Federal Rule 7(b)(1), entitled 'Motions and other Papers', which provides in part: 47 An application to the court for an order shall be made by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing. . . . (emphasis supplied) 48 In Alger v. Hayes, 452 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1972) the Court held that 49 The type of 'hearing' at which there is no need for reducing a motion to writing is one in which the proceedings are recorded. 50 452 F.2d at 843 (citations omitted). 51 As long as an oral motion is made during a proceeding which falls under Alger's liberal definition of 'hearing', the trial court cannot refuse to tender it or attempt to exclude it from the record, notwithstanding that the judge may reserve his decision on the motion until a later date. 52 We think that so far as the requirement of writing is concerned, it is sufficient that the motion was made in open court and entered upon the record immediately following the rendition of the verdict. It is not necessary that a motion be made in writing if made 'during a hearing or trial'. Witt v. Merrill, 208 F.2d 285, 286 (4th Cir. 1953). 53 IV. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE FEBRUARY 7, 1975 STIPULATION AND THE FILING OF THE AFFIDAVITS ADDRESSED THERETO--THE MOTION TO SEAL 54 Following one of IBM's requests for admissions, IBM moved the trial court for an order directing the Government to respond to the requests which had been submitted to it. This matter had allegedly been made the subject of a stipulation between IBM and the Government which led to a heated dispute between opposing counsel. IBM's motion was opposed by the Government, and IBM subsequently sought to file certain reply papers which are the subject of the Government's motion to seal presently before this Court. We issued a temporary order on October 16, 1975 granting the Government's motion pending our decision of IBM's petition for writ of mandamus. We have been advised that Judge Edelstein has determined to hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to this matter. Since we have already stated that the parties' papers are entitled to be filed with the Court and hereafter transmitted to the Clerk for the purpose of making a complete record, and since the Government's papers are already on file, both in the interests of fairness and compliance with Rule 7(b)(1) we see no reason why IBM's papers should not be filed. If either party upon good cause shown wishes to move to seal, such application can be made to the trial judge.