Opinion ID: 785013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of the Prior Acquittal of Alexander

Text: 10 Crayton makes a number of arguments based on the prior acquittal of his coconspirator Alexander. None have merit. 11
12 The district court properly denied Crayton's motion to dismiss the superseding indictment based on the rule of consistency, which would require that one coconspirator could not be convicted when all other co-conspirators are acquitted at the same trial, because that rule is no longer good law. Before his second trial, Crayton moved to dismiss the superseding indictment because the indictment still contained Alexander's name, even though Alexander had been acquitted as a co-conspirator at the previous trial. This court reviews de novo a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on legal grounds. United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 398 (6th Cir.2002); In re Ford, 987 F.2d 334, 339 (6th Cir.1992). 13 The rule of consistency at one time required that, where all possible co-conspirators are tried together, and all but one are acquitted, the remaining conspirator's conviction must be reversed for lack of sufficient evidence. United States v. Walker, 871 F.2d 1298, 1304 n. 5 (6th Cir.1989) (dictum). However, the rule of consistency did not apply when co-conspirators were tried separately and all but one were acquitted. United States v. Roark, 753 F.2d 991, 995-96 (11th Cir.1985) (cited in United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir.1986)). Likewise, if the charges against all but one alleged co-conspirator had been dismissed, the rule of consistency was inapplicable. Sachs, 801 F.2d at 845. 14 The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984), rendered the so-called rule of consistency no longer good law. Before Powell, this court applied the rule of consistency in United States v. Williams, 503 F.2d 50 (6th Cir.1974). In Williams, a father and his adult son flew into a Cleveland airport, but one of their suitcases was lost. Williams, 503 F.2d at 52. The airline lost baggage department found the bag and discovered that it contained large amounts of cocaine and heroin. Id. The airline gave the bag to the Drug Enforcement Administration, who substituted the real narcotics with a non-narcotic substance and gave the bag to the son. Id. The agents followed the son to the motel room and eventually caught the father, son, and another man, Willie Johnson, attempting to flush the narcotics down the toilet. Id. All three men were charged with possession and conspiracy, and the jury found the father guilty of possession but could not reach a verdict as to the conspiracy of the father or the other two men. Id. Prior to the second trial, the possession charges against the son and Johnson were dismissed. Id. At the second trial, all three men were convicted of conspiracy. Id. 15 The court held that there was insufficient evidence to sustain Johnson and the son's conspiracy convictions. Id. at 54. The court then announced the rule of consistency by stating [s]ince we have found that the convictions of Johnson and Williams, Jr. cannot stand, the conviction of Williams, Sr. must also fall. Where all other alleged co-conspirators are acquitted, the conviction of one person for conspiracy will not be upheld. Id.; see also United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir.1986) (stating in dictum, if co-conspirators are tried together, an acquittal on conspiracy charges as to all but one coconspirator mandates acquittal on conspiracy charges as to the remaining defendant). 16 Since we last applied the rule of consistency in Williams, a unanimous Supreme Court has held that inconsistent jury verdicts are permissible. See Powell, 469 U.S. at 68-69, 105 S.Ct. 471. The defendant in Powell was convicted of using the telephone to commit the felony of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, but she was acquitted of knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. Id. at 60, 105 S.Ct. 471. She argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because she was found guilty of conspiring to do something that she was acquitted of, namely possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. Id. The Court reaffirmed the holding of Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932), that where truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, `[t]he most that can be said ... is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt.' Id. at 64-65, 105 S.Ct. 471. The Court rejected the argument that courts must assume that an inconsistent acquittal is necessarily the one the jury `really meant.' Id. at 68, 105 S.Ct. 471. It is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the compound offense, and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense. Id. at 65, 105 S.Ct. 471. 17 The Powell Court relied specifically on the rationale that inconsistencies often are the product of jury lenity, recognizing the jury's historic function, in criminal trials, as a check against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the Executive Branch, and, that the Government is unable to invoke review of such lenity. Id. at 65-66, 105 S.Ct. 471. The Court rejected as imprudent and unworkable a rule that would allow criminal defendants to challenge inconsistent verdicts on the ground that in their cases the verdict was a product of some factor other than lenity. Id. at 66, 105 S.Ct. 471. Finally, the Court relied on the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts to afford protection against jury irrationality or error. Id. at 67, 105 S.Ct. 471. 18 Powell does not discuss inconsistent jury verdicts among co-conspirators, but as a number of our sister circuits have held, Powell rendered the rule of consistency no longer good law. Thus, the acquittal of all but one co-conspirator during the same trial does not necessarily indicate that the jury found no agreement to act. See United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 40 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 877-79 (5th Cir.1992) (en banc); United States v. Valles-Valencia, 823 F.2d 381, 381-82 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Andrews, 850 F.2d 1557, 1560-62 (11th Cir.1988) (en banc). Other circuits have recognized that the rule of consistency does not survive Powell, without actually so holding. United States v. Dakins, 872 F.2d 1061, 1065 (D.C.Cir.1989) ( Powell cast[s] doubt upon rule of consistency); United States v. Mancari, 875 F.2d 103, 104 (7th Cir.1989) (rejection of rule of consistency makes good sense in light of Powell ); Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138, 142 n. 6 (3d Cir.1985) (rule of consistency may be a vestige of the past). See also Chad W. Coulter, Comment, The Unnecessary Rule of Consistency in Conspiracy Trials, 135 U. Pa. L.Rev. 223 (1986). 19 The only contrary circuit opinion appears to be that of the Tenth Circuit. In United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469 (10th Cir.1990), that court, while affirming convictions based on the existence of unindicted co-conspirators, suggested that the rule of consistency may have continuing vitality. The court noted that the trial court's conclusion that the rule of consistency was no longer good law is substantially undercut by the fact that the Powell opinion does not discuss Hartzel[v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 64 S.Ct. 1233, 88 L.Ed. 1534 (1944)] or expressly overturn the traditionally recognized exception. Suntar Roofing, 897 F.2d at 475. As the First Circuit has reasoned, however, the Tenth Circuit's concern is not well founded: 20 [T]he Hartzel decision to which the Tenth Circuit referred did not involve inconsistent jury verdicts. Instead, the only co-conspirators of petitioner named in the indictment had their convictions set aside by judges due to insufficient evidence. 322 U.S. at 682 n. 3, 64 S.Ct. 1233.... It has been, and remains, the law that where the evidence against all of an individual's alleged co-conspirators is deemed legally insufficient, the evidence against that individual is by definition also insufficient. See, e.g., Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 93, 54 S.Ct. 281, 78 L.Ed. 664[] (1934); Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 116, 123, 53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed. 206[] (1932); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1090-1091 and n. 13 (3d Cir. 1989) (expressly noting it was not applying the rule of consistency, court held that an earlier appellate finding of insufficient evidence to convict the only alleged co-conspirator required finding insufficient evidence as to the remaining defendant.); United States v. Levario, 877 F.2d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir.1989) (trial court's granting motion for judgment of acquittal as to only alleged co-conspirator precluded conspiracy conviction); United States v. Hernandez-Palacios, 838 F.2d 1346, 1348-49 (5th Cir.1988) (same). A court's determination that there is insufficient evidence to convict cannot be equated with a jury's determination that a defendant, for whatever reason, should be acquitted. Accordingly, rather than there being any conflict between Powell and Hartzel,  Suntar Roofing, 897 F.2d at 475-476, the Court's emphasis in Powell on the sufficiency of the evidence fully embraces the Hartzel ruling. See Andrews, 850 F.2d at 1562 n. 15. 21 Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d at 596-97. 22 The reasoning of Powell applies to co-conspirator cases even though Powell itself did not involve co-conspirators. As the First Circuit reasoned, an apparent failure to prove an essential element of the offense would not distinguish conspiracy from any other case involving an inconsistent verdict. Id. at 597. In a co-conspirator case just as much as in Powell, inconsistencies may be the product of jury lenity, given the jury's historic function as a check on arbitrary exercises of power. In a co-conspirator case just as much as in Powell, a rule that depended upon whether jury lenity was actually a factor would be imprudent and unworkable. And finally, in a co-conspirator case just as in Powell, the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts affords protection against jury irrationality or error. It is thus clear that the rule of consistency previously recognized in this circuit did not survive Powell.
23 Even if the rule of consistency survived Powell, reversal would not be required in the present case. We have held that an individual's conviction for conspiracy may stand, despite acquittal of other alleged co-conspirators, when the indictment refers to unknown or unnamed conspirators and there is sufficient evidence to show the existence of a conspiracy between the convicted defendant and these other conspirators. United States v. Anderson, 76 F.3d 685, 688-89 (6th Cir. 1996). Like the indictment in Anderson, Count 1 of Crayton's superseding indictment specifically mentions Alexander and other persons, known and unknown. The record presents ample evidence for a reasonable jury to have concluded that Crayton conspired with unknown people in California who sent the package to Crayton, or unknown people in Louisville, to facilitate the delivery and/or distribution of the cocaine. Thus, Crayton's conviction in the second trial would not violate the rule of consistency even if it were still good law.
24 Contrary to Crayton's contentions, the Government moreover did not constructively amend the superseding indictment during the trial by not removing Alexander's name and the aiding and abetting language from Counts 2 and 3 of the superseding indictment. See e.g., United States v. Chilingirian, 280 F.3d 704, 712 (6th Cir.2002). Count 2 of the superseding indictment states ... Crayton ... and... Alexander, each aided and abetted by the other, did attempt to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute... cocaine.... Count 3 is identical except attempt to is omitted. The case law of this circuit disposes of this claim. In Anderson, in language almost identical to that of Count 2 in this case, the indictment stated that the defendant aided and abetted two individuals who were acquitted at the same trial. Anderson, 76 F.3d at 689. In that case we held, 25 The indictment gave defendant notice that he was being charged under count two both with being an aider and abettor and with the substantive crime of attempt. Indeed, the punctuation of the indictment sets off the aided and abetted phrase from the crime of attempt to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. The jury was entitled to find defendant guilty of the substantive crime of attempt even though his codefendants were found not guilty of attempt or aiding or abetting his attempt. 26 Id. For identical reasons, there was no constructive amendment of Crayton's superseding indictment. 27
28 Finally, the district court did not somehow create a mandatory presumption that Alexander was a co-conspirator by including Alexander's name in the jury instructions. Alexander's name was only mentioned in the jury instructions when Count 1 of the superseding indictment was read. The district court never mentioned any type of presumption, and it clearly mentioned that the burden of proof was on the Government when the court stated [t]he indictment ... against the defendant is not evidence of guilt. The defendant is presumed innocent by the law, and the presumption of innocence is always there.... The defendant need not prove anything.... The United States has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.... J.A. at 778-79. The district court therefore did not err by reading Alexander's name in the indictment with the jury instructions.