Opinion ID: 712983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Depth of Conviction

Text: 17 A conscientious objector has no constitutional or statutory right to be discharged from active service after voluntary enlistment. Sanger, 507 F.2d at 817; MILPERSMAN 1860120(1). We recognize, however, a national policy ... not to subject bona fide conscientious objectors to combatant training and service in the armed forces. Harris v. Schlesinger, 526 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir.1975). Pursuant to this policy, the Department of Defense has developed procedures to discharge qualified applicants. See 32 C.F.R. § 75. Military branches may discharge an objector: 18 (1) Who is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form; 19 (2) Whose opposition is founded on religious training and beliefs; and 20 (3) Whose position is sincere and deeply held. 21 Id. § 75.5. The Navy's implementing regulation is similar. See MILPERSMAN 1860120(14) (belief must be sincere and deeply held). 3 22 At issue is the requirement that the applicant's belief be both sincere and deeply held. Roby's conscientious objector application was denied because he failed to demonstrate that his beliefs were deeply held. He asks us to join the First and Eighth Circuits in rejecting depth of conviction as an independent element of the conscientious objector test. 4 See Hager v. Secretary of the Air Force, 938 F.2d 1449 (1st Cir.1991); Kemp v. Bradley, 457 F.2d 627 (8th Cir.1972). We decline the invitation. 23 In Kemp, 457 F.2d at 629, the Eighth Circuit wrote: 24 'Depth of conviction' requires theological or philosophical evaluation. We think it unwise to adopt this more complex concept as the requirement which a Selective Service registrant or member of the Armed Forces must fulfill in order to qualify for conscientious objector classification. 25 In Hager, 938 F.2d at 1459, the First Circuit explicitly adopted the Eighth Circuit's reasoning, adding that when 26 the military undertakes to measure the depth with which the applicant holds [his] belief, we think the inquiry becomes an impermissible subjective look into his heart and soul. The question is, does he believe, not, how deeply does he believe. 27 Id. (emphasis in original). We do not find this reasoning persuasive as we explain below. A. Military Deference 28 We are puzzled by the lack of deference to the military's own regulation in Hager and Kemp. Neither opinion considers whether the court has authority to disregard the military's test for conscientious objectors, but disregards it nonetheless. We recently discussed deference to military regulations in Meinhold v. Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir.1994) (construing 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A (1991) and MILPERSMAN 3630400(1) (1992)). We said: 29 As we consider the regulation in this case ... we are guided by [a] long-settled rule: The military's 'considered professional judgment,' is 'not lightly to be overruled by the judiciary.' ... Our review, therefore, is as deferential as our constitutional responsibilities permit. 30 Id. at 1476-77 (citations omitted). 31 We need not decide in this case whether our deference goes so far as to preclude even review to determine whether a regulation is a rational means to achieve a legitimate purpose. Compare Turpin v. Resor, 452 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.1971) ([I]nsofar as the wisdom or rationality of the [conscientious objector] regulation is concerned, the courts have nothing to say.) 5 with Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684-85 (D.C.Cir.1994) (It is hard to imagine a more deferential standard than rational basis, but when judging the rationality of a regulation in the military context, we owe even more special deference....). We assume without deciding that rationality is required of the regulation. 32 Here, the regulation is not being challenged on constitutional grounds. At most, we are asked to disregard the test because it might be subjective, 6 cf. Hager, 938 F.2d at 1459, or difficult to apply, 7 cf. Kemp, 457 F.2d at 629. In the absence of some constitutional or statutory conflict, it is not clear that we have the power to set aside a regulation based merely on its subjectivity or difficulty of application. We do not believe that these are sufficient grounds for ignoring our usual deference to the military's internal regulations. 33 Furthermore, we believe that there is an important function served by having the applicant demonstrate that his beliefs are both sincere and deeply held. The regulatory term sincere distinguishes between military personnel who genuinely believe something, and those who lie about their beliefs. The term deeply held distinguishes, from among those who are telling the truth, those who feel strongly about their belief that participation in war is wrong, and those who do not. These inquiries are distinct. 34 This distinction applies well in Roby's case. His reviewers all thought Roby honestly believed that war was wrong. But they also thought that the recency and shallowness of the bases for his belief (a couple of books and movies) meant it was not a deeply held conviction. People sometimes have bursts of passion that amount to sincere convictions about their identities, loves, career choices, political preferences and other important matters, especially in their youth, all based on little or nothing and changing frequently. The military has a justifiable interest in ensuring that fleeting beliefs do not serve as a basis for ending one's service commitment. B. Ninth Circuit Precedent 35 The Ninth Circuit has often applied a depth of conviction requirement, which we have drawn from Supreme Court language and from military regulations. Although the Court does not specifically refer to deeply held beliefs in its description of the test for conscientious objectors, 8 it has discussed the depth of an applicant's conviction. In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 337, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 1795, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970), the Court wrote: 36 [the applicants'] objection to participating in war in any form could not be said to come from a 'still, small voice of conscience'; rather, for them that voice was so loud and insistent that both men preferred to go to jail rather than serve in the Armed Forces. There was never any question about the sincerity and depth of [their] convictions. 37 The Court specified that among those registrants who obviously could not receive exemption were those whose beliefs are not deeply held. Id. at 342, 90 S.Ct. at 1797. See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176, 85 S.Ct. 850, 859, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965) (test for whether a personal moral code could rise to the level of religious objection might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption....); Witmer, 348 U.S. at 383, 75 S.Ct. at 396 (noting that applicant had failed to produce evidence of his allegedly deeply felt religious convictions against participation in war.). 38 We have often applied a depth of conviction test based on the Court's language and military regulations. In United States v. Coffey, 429 F.2d 401 (9th Cir.1970), we held that [o]nly two groups of registrants may be excluded from conscientious objector status: 'those whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection to war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle....'  Id. at 404 (quoting Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342, 90 S.Ct. at 1797); see also United States v. Hodgins, 485 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir.1973) (conscientious objector denial can be founded on a view that the [application] was legally insufficient or upon a finding of lack of sincerity or necessary depth of belief.). More recently, in Woods v. Sheehan, 987 F.2d 1454, 1457 (9th Cir.1993), which was decided after both Hager and Kemp, we quoted the deeply held language from the Marine Corps's implementing regulation. C. Conclusion 39 Where a regulation is not being challenged on constitutional grounds we owe the military great deference. We have applied all elements of the military's conscientious objector test in this circuit over the past several decades. Based on these considerations, we will apply the Navy's requirement that the applicant show that his beliefs are deeply held.