Opinion ID: 166407
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory text and precedent.

Text: Having rejected the arguments that deference under administrative law compels adoption of the BLM’s statutory interpretation or that the precedent of Hodel compels adoption of state law, we turn then to the statute and to general principles of interpretation of federal law. R.S. 2477 was originally enacted as Section 8 of An Act granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and for other Purposes, commonly called the Mining Act of 1866. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253. The language is short, sweet, and enigmatic: “And be it further enacted, that the right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is 52 hereby granted.” There is little legislative history. 14 Interestingly, Sections 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9 of the Act make explicit reference either to state law or to the “local customs or rules of miners” in the district. For example, Section 2 gives persons who discover certain minerals on public land, “having previously occupied and improved the same according to the local custom or rules of miners in the district where the same is situated,” the right to apply for and obtain a patent for the tract. Section 5 provides that “in the absence of necessary legislation by Congress, the local legislature of any State or Territory may provide rules for working mines involving easements, drainage, and other necessary means to their complete development.” This shows that when Congress intended application of state laws it did so explicitly. On the other hand, Sections 7, 10, and 11 make explicit reference to other federal laws. Section 7 refers to laws authorizing the President to appoint certain officers, Section 10 preserves the prior claims of homesteaders under the Homestead Act, and Section 11 authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to designate portions of the mineral lands that are “clearly agricultural lands” as such, making them subject to “all the laws and regulations applicable to the same.” Section 8 refers to neither state law nor federal law. The Hodel court suggested that “[t]he silence of section 8 reflects the probable fact that Congress 14 What little legislative history exists is summarized in the 1993 D.O.I Report to Congress, at 9-10. 53 simply did not decide which sovereign’s law should apply.” 848 F.2d at 1080. The real question, we think, is not whether state law applies or federal law applies, but whether federal law looks to state law to flesh out details of interpretation. R.S. 2477 is a federal statute and it governs the disposition of rights to federal property, a power constitutionally vested in Congress. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917) (observing that the Property Clause gives Congress the power over the public lands “to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass and injury, and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them”); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976). As the Supreme Court has stated, “The laws of the United States alone control the disposition of title to its lands. The states are powerless to place any limitation or restriction on that control.” United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1935). “The construction of grants by the United States is a federal not a state question.” Id. at 28. Even where an issue is ultimately governed by federal law, however, it is not uncommon for courts to “borrow” state law to aid in interpretation of the federal statute. The Supreme Court has explained that “[c]ontroversies . . . governed by federal law, do not inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules. . . . Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter 54 of judicial policy ‘dependent upon a variety of considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon them of applying state law.’” United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979) (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947)); see also Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 671-72 (1979) (same); P. Bator, et al., Hart & Wechsler’s, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 768 (2d ed. 1973) (“[I]t may be determined as a matter of choice of law, even in the absence of statutory command or implication, that, although federal law should ‘govern’ a given question, state law furnishes an appropriate and convenient measure of the content of this federal law.”), quoted in Wilson, 442 U.S. at 672 n.19. In the specific context of federal land grant statutes, the Court has explained that courts may incorporate state law “only in so far as it may be determined as a matter of federal law that the United States has impliedly adopted and assented to a state rule of construction.” Oregon, 295 U.S. at 28; see United States v. Gates of the Mountains Lakeshore Homes, Inc., 732 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The scope of a grant of federal land is, of course, a question of federal law. But in some instances ‘it may be determined as a matter of federal law that the United States has impliedly adopted and assented to a state rule of construction as applicable to its conveyances.’”) (quoting Oregon, 295 U.S. at 28) 55 (internal citation omitted). In determining when to borrow state law in the interpretation of a federal statute, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to consider: whether there is a “need for a nationally uniform body of law,” whether state law would “frustrate federal policy or functions,” and what “impact a federal rule might have on existing relationships under state law.” Wilson, 442 U.S. at 672. Those were the considerations the Hodel court consulted in determining that state law should govern the “scope” of R.S. 2477 grants. Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1082-83. It follows that to the extent state law is “borrowed” in the course of interpreting R.S. 2477, it must be in service of “federal policy or functions,” and cannot derogate from the evident purposes of the federal statute. State law is “borrowed” not for its own sake, and not on account of any inherent state authority over the subject matter, but solely to the extent it provides “an appropriate and convenient measure of the content” of the federal law. Bator, et al., supra, at 768. 15 15 To be sure, R.S. 2477 constitutes an offer of rights of way, which requires acceptance by public authorities of the State. Such acceptance could entail public responsibilities for upkeep. See Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1941) (“[The] authorities are bound to keep the road open and in suitable repair, and, if obstructions be placed thereon, it is their duty to remove the same, and care for the rights of the public.”). Accordingly, some states might wish to impose a higher standard for acceptance of the grant than is required under federal law. See, e.g., Tucson Consol. Copper Co. v. Reese, 100 P. 777, 778 (Ariz. Terr. 1909) (requiring that all roads “be located and recorded by authority of the [county] board of supervisors” after a “petition of 10 or more resident (continued...) 56 To modern eyes, R.S. 2477 may seem to stand on its own terms, without need for reference to any outside body of law. At the time of its enactment, however, the creation and legal incidence of “highways” was an important field within the common law, with well-developed legal principles reflected in numerous legal treatises and decisions. See, e.g., Isaac Grant Thompson, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Highways (1868); Joseph K. Angell & Thomas Durfee, A Treatise on the Law of Highways (2d ed. 1868); John Egremont, The Law Relating to Highways, Turnpike-Roads, Public Bridges and Navigable Rivers (1830); Byron K. Elliott, A Treatise on the law of Roads and Streets (1890); see also James Kent, 3 Commentaries on American Law 572-76, -35 (10th ed. 1860) (subject covered in chapter on law of real property). When Congress legislates against a backdrop of common law, without any indication of intention to depart from or change common law rules, the statutory terms must be read as embodying their common law meaning. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989). It is reasonable to assume that when Congress granted rights of way for the construction of highways across the unreserved lands of the West 15 (...continued) taxpayers within the county” before such roads can be considered “public highways” under R.S. 2477). Such limitations apply not as a matter of federal law, but as an expression of the authority of the state to govern its own acceptance of rights of way. 57 in 1866, it was aware of and incorporated the common law pertaining to the nature of public highways and how they are established. In the decades following enactment of R.S. 2477, when disputes arose, courts uniformly interpreted the statute in light of this well-developed body of legal principles, most of which were embodied in state court decisions. In one early case, a landowner acquired title to a parcel of land from the United States and constructed a fence across what had been used, in previous years, as a public pathway between the town and its school. The Supreme Court of California held that under state law, five years of public use was sufficient for the public to acquire the right to use the path as a public way. McRose v. Bottyer, 81 Cal. 122, 125 (1889). “The fact that the land was public land of the United States at the time the right to use it as a public way was acquired . . . makes no difference. The act of Congress of 1866 (sec. 2477, R.S. U.S.) granted the right of way for the construction of highways over public land not reserved for public uses. By the acceptance of the dedication thus made, the public acquired an easement subject to the laws of this state.” Id. at 126. The Hodel court cited some fifteen decisions in which state law definitions of “acceptance” of a public highway were employed to resolve R.S. 2477 disputes, 848 F.2d at 1082 n.13, and we have 58 located many more. 16 One prominent example is the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Pacific Railway Co. v. Alameda County, 284 U.S. 463 (1932), which involved a conflict between two rights of way in the bottom of a California canyon, one a public highway laid out in 1859 and “formed by the passage of wagons, etc., over the natural soil,” and the other a right of way granted to the Central Pacific Railway Company under Acts of Congress in 1862 and 1864. Id. at 467. The ultimate question was whether R.S. 2477 applied retroactively to validate rights of way established prior to the enactment of the statute in 1866. The Court held that it did, and in the course of so holding, the Court acknowledged that state law governed the acceptance of the relevant R.S. 2477 right of way: “[T]he laying out 16 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Puddicombe, 918 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Alaska 1996); Hamerly v. Denton, 359 P.2d 121, 123 (Alaska 1961); Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1958); Lovelace v. Hightower, 168 P.2d 864, 866-67 (N.M. 1946); Leach v. Manhart, 77 P.2d 652, 653 (Colo. 1938); Bishop v. Hawley, 238 P. 284, 285 (Wyo. 1925); State ex rel. Dansie v. Nolan, 191 P. 150, 152-53 (Mont. 1920); Sprague v. Stead, 139 P. 544, 545-46 (Colo. 1914); Stofferan v. Okanogan County, 136 P. 484, 487 (Wash. 1913); Hughes v. Veal, 114 P. 1081, 1082-83 (Kan. 1911); City of Butte v. Mikosowitz, 102 P. 593, 595 (Mont. 1909); Montgomery v. Somers, 90 P. 674, 677 (Or. 1907); Van Wanning v. Deeter, 110 N.W. 703, 703-04 (Neb. 1907), rev’d on other grounds, 112 N.W. 902 (Neb. 1907); Okanogan County v. Cheetham, 80 P. 262, 264 (Wash. 1905), overruled on other grounds by McAllister v. Okanogan County, 100 P. 146, 148 (Wash. 1909); Walcott Tp. of Richland County v. Skauge, 71 N.W. 544, 546 (N.D. 1897); Wells v. Pennington County, 48 N.W. 305, 307-08 (S.D. 1891); Murray v. City of Butte, 14 P. 656, 656-57 (Mont. Terr. 1887); Barker v. County of La Plata, 49 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1214 (D. Colo. 1999). 59 by authority of the state law of the road here in question created rights of continuing user to which the government must be deemed to have assented [when it passed R.S. 2477].” Id. at 473 (emphasis added). Furthermore, when the railroad challenged the county’s right of way as having been abandoned, the Court incorporated state law to guide its decision, citing a string of five state court decisions for the proposition that “the continuing identity of [a] road must be presumed until overcome by proof to the contrary, the burden of which rests upon the [party challenging the validity of an established road].” Id. at 468. In contrast to this and the many other decisions employing state law standards to resolve R.S. 2477 disputes, the parties have not cited, and we have not found, any cases before its repeal in which R.S. 2477 controversies were resolved by anything other than state law. This unanimity of interpretation over a great many years is entitled to weight. See Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1080 (10th Cir. 1988) (practice under a statute is relevant evidence of how that statute should be interpreted) (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 473 (1915). It was the consistent policy of the BLM, as well as the courts, to look to common law and state law as setting the terms of acceptance of R.S. 2477 grants. In 1902, in The Pasadena and Mount Wilson Toll Road Co. v. Schneider, 31 Pub. Lands Dec. 405 (1902), the Department of the Interior considered whether toll 60 roads could be R.S. 2477 highways. Its answer to that question drew directly from the common law of “highways,” as reflected in state court decisions, common law treatises, and legal dictionaries: Section 2477 of the Revised Statutes grants “the right of way for the construction of highways over the public lands not reserved for public uses.” A highway is “a road over which the public at large have a right of passage” (Dic. Loc. V.) and includes “every thoroughfare which is used by the public, and is, in the language of the English books, “common to all the King’s subjects’” (3 Kent. Com., 432). Toll roads are highways, and differ from ordinary highways merely in the fact that they are also subjects of property and the cost of their construction and maintenance is raised by a toll from those using them, instead of by general taxation, Commonwealth v. Wilkinson (16 Pick., Mass., 175, 26 Am. Dec., 654 [1834]); Buncombe Turnpike Co. v. Baxter (10 Ired., N. Car., 222 [1849]). The obstruction of a turnpike toll road is indictable, under a statute against obstruction of highways. (Nor. Cent. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 90 Pa. St., 300 [1879].) A highway may be a mere footway. (Tyler v. Sturdy, 108 Mass., 196 [1871].) Neither the breadth, form, degree of facility, manner of construction, private, corporate, or public ownership, or source or manner of raising the fund for construction and maintenance, distinguishes a highway, but the fact of general public right of user for passage, without individual discrimination, is the essential feature. The necessities and volume of traffic, difficulties of route, and fund available for construction and maintenance, will vary the unessential features, but the fact of general public right of user for passage upon equal terms under like circumstances is the one constant characteristic of a highway. Id. at 407-408. In its first regulation addressing R.S. 2477 claims, issued in 1939, the BLM stated that “[t]he grant [under R.S. 2477] becomes effective upon the construction or establishing of highways, in accordance with the State laws, over public lands not reserved for public uses.” 43 C.F.R. § 244.55 (1939) (emphasis 61 added). BLM regulations continued to incorporate state law as the standard for recognizing R.S. 2477 rights of way until the repeal of R.S. 2477 in 1976. See 43 C.F.R. § 244.58 (1963) (“Grants of rights-of-way [under R.S. 2477] become effective upon the construction or establishment of highways, in accordance with the State laws, over public lands, not reserved for public uses.”); 43 C.F.R. § 2822.2-1 (1974) (“Grants of rights-of-way [under R.S. 2477] become effective upon the construction or establishment of highways, in accordance with the State laws, over public lands, not reserved for public uses.”); see also Solicitor’s M- Opinion, Limitation of Access to Through-Highways Crossing Public Lands, M- 36274, 62 I.D. 158, 161 (1955) (“Whatever may be construed as a highway under State law is a highway under [R.S. 2477], and the rights thereunder are interpreted by the courts in accordance with the State law.”). Both before and after repeal, and until very recently, BLM administrative decisions took the same position. See, e.g., Kirk Brown, 151 IBLA 221, 227 n.6 (1999) (“Normally, the existence of an R.S. 2477 road is a question of state law.”); Homer D. Meeds, 26 IBLA 281, 298 (1976) (“[T]his Department has considered State courts to be the proper forum to decide ultimately whether a public highway under [R.S. 2477] has been created under State law and to adjudicate the respective rights of interested parties.”). This did not mean, and never meant, that state law could override federal 62 requirements or undermine federal land policy. For example, in an early decision, the BLM determined that a state law purporting to accept rights of way along all section lines within the county was beyond the intentions of Congress in enacting R.S. 2477. Douglas County, Washington, 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 446 (1898). The Department described this state law as “the manifestation of a marked and novel liberality on the part of the county authorities in dealing with the public land,” and stated that R.S. 2477 “was not intended to grant a right of way over public lands in advance of an apparent necessity therefor, or on the mere suggestion that at some future time such roads may be needed.” Id. at 447. 17 Similarly, in 1974, the BLM issued regulations clarifying that R.S. 2477 rights of way are limited to highway purposes, and do not encompass ancillary uses such as utility lines, notwithstanding state law to the contrary. See 43 C.F.R. § 2822.2-2 (1974). In none of the cases applying state law was there any suggestion of a conflict between the state law and any federal principles or interests. Rather, state law 17 Ultimately, consistent with its policy of not adjudicating R.S. 2477 claims and leaving the resolution of those claims to courts, see pages 32-34 supra, the Land Department declined to make express reservation for the asserted right of way in a patent for a land grant. It explained: “If public highways have been, or shall hereafter be, established across any part of the public domain, in pursuance of law, that fact will be shown by local public records of which all must take notice, and the subsequent sale or disposition by the United States of the lands over which such highways are established will not interfere with the authorized use thereof, because those acquiring such lands will take them subject to any easement existing by authority of law.” Douglas County, Washington, 26 Pub. Lands Dec. at 447. 63 was employed as a convenient and well-developed set of rules for resolving such issues as the length of time of public use necessary to establish a right of way, abandonment of a right of way, and priorities between competing private claims. We do not believe application of state law in this fashion offends the criteria set forth in Wilson for appropriate borrowing of state law in the interpretation of federal statutes. The first question is whether there is a “need for a uniform national rule” regarding what steps are required to perfect an R.S. 2477 right of way. See Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 673 (1979). We think not. Although the substantive content of state law could in some cases conflict with the purposes of federal law (the second Wilson criterion), we do not think uniformity for uniformity’s sake is necessary in this area of the law. Indeed, there is some force to the view that interpretation of R.S. 2477 should be sensitive to the differences in geographic, climatic, demographic, and economic circumstances among the various states, differences which can have an effect on the establishment and use of routes of travel. A panel of the Ninth Circuit, for example, held that its decision in an R.S. 2477 case involving an Alaska claim “must take into account the fact that conditions in Alaska present unique questions, not easily answered.” Shultz v. Dep’t of Army, 10 F.3d 649, 655 (9th 64 Cir. 1993). 18 Judge Fletcher, writing for the court, explained: Due to its geography, its weather, and its sparse and scattered population, Alaska’s “highways” frequently have been no more than trails and they have moved with the season and the purpose for the transit – what travelled [sic] best in winter could be impassable kneedeep swamp in summer; what best accommodated a sled was not the best route for a wagon or a horse or a person with a pack. By necessity routes shifted as the seasons shifted and as the uses shifted. What might be considered sporadic use in another context would be consistent or constant use in Alaska. Id. (footnote omitted). Analogous considerations might pertain in the southern Utah canyon country in which this case arises. The sparse population, rugged terrain, scarcity of passable routes, seasonal differences in snow, mud, and stream flow, fragile and environmentally sensitive land, and paucity of towns or other centers of economic activity, could have an effect on the location of roads. Moreover, for over 130 years disputes over R.S. 2477 claims were litigated by reference to non-uniform state standards, a fact that casts serious doubt on any claims of a need for uniformity today. See 1993 D.O.I Report to Congress, at 2 (“There have been few problems regarding R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in most public land states although states have handled the issue differently. This may be because of the differences among state laws . . .”). When the BLM proposed 18 On panel rehearing, the opinion in Schultz was withdrawn, 96 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1996). We therefore cite the opinion not as authority but for its persuasive value. 65 nationwide standards for the first time in 1994, Congress responded by passing a permanent appropriations rider forbidding the implementation of those standards absent express authorization from Congress. U.S. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies’ Appropriations Act, 1997, § 108, enacted by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). At the time it took this action, Congress was aware that there were no uniform federal standards. See 1993 DO.I. Report to Congress, at 21 (noting the existence of “numerous and conflicting state and federal court rulings on R.S. 2477”). Congress’s decision to perpetuate non-uniform standards provides support for the view that there is no “need for a uniform national rule.” Wilson, 442 U.S. at 673. The second Wilson criterion is whether “application of state law would frustrate federal policy or functions.” Id. As we discuss specific state law standards, we will advert to congressional intention and other indications of federal policy. To the extent adoption of a state law definition would frustrate federal policy under R.S. 2477, it will not be adopted. The third Wilson criterion, the “impact a federal rule might have on existing relationships under state law,” id., points in favor of continued application of state law. Both right-of-way holders and public and private landowners faced with potential R.S. 2477 claims have an interest in preservation 66 of the status quo ante. That is best accomplished by not changing legal standards. In Hodel, this Court observed that “R.S. 2477 rightholders, on the one hand, and private landowners and BLM as custodian of the public lands, on the other, have developed property relationships around each particular state’s definition of the scope of an R.S. 2477 road.” 848 F.2d at 1082-83. The same can be said of the existence of an R.S. 2477 road. We therefore conclude that federal law governs the interpretation of R.S. 2477, but that in determining what is required for acceptance of a right of way under the statute, federal law “borrows” from long-established principles of state law, to the extent that state law provides convenient and appropriate principles for effectuating congressional intent. The applicable state law in this case is that of the State of Utah, supplemented where appropriate by precedent from other states with similar principles of law.