Opinion ID: 3008595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Grc' , Parker tr

Text: y. % VIII ~/~ LjLyyV(Al%_11, u 1 -ri C S. qrl A .3- 8-5 p (Ky. 2007) (defendant opened fire into a car) ; Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S .W.2d 404 (Ky. 1985) (testimony in murder trial that the plan was only to shoot out victim's tires, and defendant shouted that the gun got away from to A defendant is guilty of wanton murder when, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes the death of another person . KRS 507 . .020(1)(b) A person acts wantonly when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists . The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. KRS 501 .020(3) . 37 him) . However, this case presents the rare situation where the attack was so incredibly brutal that, if the jury believes the facts presented, the act must be either intentional, or wanton with extreme indifference to human life (i.e. aggravated wantonness, supporting a wanton murder conviction) . Based on Hall's own testimony, Hall was present for the entirety of the attack, beginning with the kicking and hitting of the victim with a crock pot, and continuing through sodomizing hire with a 27-inch stick that extended into his lungs . Hall either impaled Clifton Agnew with a stick and bottle, or watched as Edmonds did. At the very least, Hall stood idly by while an unconscious man was beaten further and brutally sodomized. As a principal and/or complicitor, Hall is responsible for the ultimate act, and the attack must be judged as a whole. Under these circumstances, there was no error in refusing to instruct the jury on second-degree manslaughter . See Cecil v. Commonwealth , 888 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Ky. 1994) (no error in instructing on wanton murder but not second-degree manslaughter when defendant shot victim at point blank range, even though defendant claimed the gun went off') ; Crane, 833 S.W.2d at 817-18 (no error in instructing on wanton murder but not second-degree manslaughter when defendant shot store clerk at close range, even though defendant claimed he shot straight up in the air) . c. Complicity Hall argues that the trial court gave an erroneous complicity instruction. KRS 502 .020 creates two types of complicity : complicity to the act under subsection (1), and complicity to the result under subsection (2) : When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, a person who acts with the kind of culpability with respect to the result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense is guilty of that offense when he : (a) Solicits or engages in a conspiracy with another person to engage in the conduct causing such result; or (b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid another person in planning, or engaging in the conduct causing such result; or (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the conduct causing the result, fails to make a proper effort to do so . KRS 502.020(2) (emphasis added) . The Definitions section of Hall's jury instructions defined each type of complicity separately. Hall argues that the Complicity as to a Criminal Result definition should have included the mental state of intentional. This Court held in Harper v. Commonwealth that subsection (2) complicity liability is not limited to non-intentional mental states. 43 S.W .3d 261, 267 (Ky. 2001) . Therefore, an intentional mental state could have been included as a possible mental state for conviction of subsection (2) complicity, but it was not necessary, because Hall was also charged with wanton murder.