Opinion ID: 2976592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proof of “Falsity”

Text: Finally, the parties dispute whether a prima facie case for defamation has been established. Under Michigan law, a defamation claim requires “(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by the publication” (defamation per quod). Mitan v. Campbell, 474 Mich. 21, 24, 706 N.W.2d 420 (2005) (citations omitted). The parties dispute whether Ogle has shown falsity. “Where the alleged defamation concerns both a private figure and a matter of private concern, the burden of proving that the statement was not false rests with the defendant. However, where the statements are of public concern, the private-figure plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity.” J&J Constr. Co. v. Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Local 1, 468 Mich. 722, 732 n.11, 664 N.W.2d 728 (2003) (citations omitted). The district court did not reach this issue. And although both parties note the importance of the public/private concern, they utterly fail to discuss the issue or cite any supporting case law. Given this serious failing and the importance of the 18 issue to the case, we remand to the district court to permit it to consider the question in the first instance. See Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 134 (1st Cir. 1997) (refusing to resolve public concern issues at the appellate level). C. State Law Claim - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress under Michigan Law Finally, we turn to Ogle’s IIED claim. The trial court premised its grant of summary judgment on this claim solely on the invalidity of Ogle’s defamation claim. As discussed above, this was erroneous. Thus, to the extent that the trial court determines that Ogle has set forth a prima facie defamation claim, the IIED claim should also be reinstated. Hocker, however, argues that even if the defamation action survives, the IIED claim should still be dismissed because his conduct was not “extreme and outrageous.” We disagree. Although the Michigan Supreme Court has not recognized IIED claims, this Court has assumed that it will do so. Andrews v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 160 F.3d 304, 309 (6th Cir. 1998). The elements of such a claim consist of “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent or recklessness; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional distress.” Id. “The threshold for showing extreme and outrageous conduct is high.” VanVorous v. Burmeister, 262 Mich. App. 467, 481, 687 N.W.2d 132 (2004). Liability attaches only where the conduct is “so outrageous in character, and so 19 extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. (quoting Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 422 Mich. 594, 603, 374 N.W.2d 905 (1985)). “The test is whether the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous.’” Graham v. Ford, 237 Mich. App. 670, 674-75, 604 N.W.2d 713 (1999) (quoting Roberts, 422 Mich. at 603, 374 N.W.2d 905) (internal quotations omitted). Construing all inferences in Ogle’s favor, a reasonable jury could potentially find “extreme and outrageous conduct.” According to Ogle’s version of events, Hocker deliberately spread false rumors of Ogle’s homosexual inclinations on multiple occasions to large audiences. A jury could find that this conduct extends well beyond “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, [and] other trivialities.” Linebaugh v. Sheraton Mich. Corp., 198 Mich. App. 335, 342, 497 N.W.2d 585 (1993) (citing Roberts, 422 Mich. at 603, 374 N.W.2d 905). As such, we cannot say that Ogle’s claim falls short as a matter of law. See id. at 342-43 (circulation of cartoon depicting plaintiff in a sexually compromising position could be basis for IIED claim).