Opinion ID: 773469
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: To use him as a shield or hostage.

Text: 39 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 509.040 (Banks-Baldwin 2000). Furthermore, it is a defense [to kidnapping under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 509.040] that the defendant was a relative of the victim and his sole purpose was to assume custody of the victim. Ky. Rev. St. Ann. § 509.060 (Baldwin 2000). At best, Landham could only be charged with custodial interference under Ky. Rev. St. Ann. § 509.070(1) (A person is guilty of custodial interference when, knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes . . . [a] person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person. As the commentary makes clear 40 The combined effects of KRS 509.060 and 509.070 are: to render the statutes on unlawful imprisonment and kidnapping inapplicable to situations involving the acquisition of control over another because of familial affection or considerations, and to create a special offense to deal with conduct involving an interference with lawful custody. While eliminating the possibility of child custody disputes constituting unlawful imprisonment or kidnapping, these provisions reflect a judgment that there exists a need to protect parental custody against all unlawful interruption, even when the child itself is a willing, undeceived participant in the attack on this interest of its parent. Model Penal Code § 212.4, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960). . . . Because of the fact that most cases to arise under this statute will involve custodial disputes in domestic relations situations, a special defense is provided for a defendant who relinquishes his wrongful custody prior to the initiation of the criminal process through arrest or the issuance of a warrant. 41 The penalty structure for the offense of custodial interference is designed to encourage an offender to return his victim to lawful custody on his own even though the defense mentioned above is unavailable to him. A voluntary return, within the contemplation of this provision, is one that is not stimulated by a threat of immediate apprehension or detection by law enforcement officials. The penalty provision also provides lesser sanctions for commission of this offense by a relative as defined in KRS 509.010. 42 Ky. Rev. St. Ann. § 509.060 (Banks-Baldwin 2000), Commentary. 43 Nor could Landham's alleged conduct be a violation of federal law. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(g) (West 2000) (parent exemption to federal kidnapping statute); United States v. Sheek, 990 F.2d 150, 151-53 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that parent exemption to federal kidnapping statute applies to biological parent whose parental rights have been permanently terminated). Thus, had Landham removed Priscilla, he may have been in violation of the DVO, but not the Kentucky kidnapping statute or the Federal Kidnapping Act. Therefore, if Landham was legally incapable of kidnapping Priscilla, he could not legally make a threat to kidnap. 44 In sum, because it is missing two of the three essential elements of a § 875(c) claim, a communication containing a threat, and a threat to kidnap, this count fails as a matter of law and should have been dismissed.