Opinion ID: 659857
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility Against Tracy

Text: 42 Rule 403 gives the trial judge discretion to exclude relevant evidence on the ground that its potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. We will overturn a trial judge's determination under Rule 403 only if we determine that the judge acted arbitrarily or irrationally. See, e.g., United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir.1983). Evidence of threats of death is subjected to the same Rule 403 balancing test as other relevant evidence, United States v. Qamar, 671 F.2d 732, 736 (2d Cir.1982), though the stakes may be heightened, for evidence of death threats may be extremely probative when the threats were directed against a witness, see, e.g., United States v. De Lillo, 620 F.2d 939, 946 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835, 101 S.Ct. 107, 108, 66 L.Ed.2d 41 (1980), and the potential for inflaming the jury may be great, see, e.g., United States v. Qamar, 671 F.2d at 736. 43 If the trial court determines that the probative value of the death threat outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice, the defendant against whom it is admissible may request a limiting instruction to the jury, cautioning it not to consider the threat as proof of the defendant's violent character, but only as proof of such matters as the defendant's membership in the conspiracy or consciousness of guilt. Id.; see Fed.R.Evid. 105. If the defendant does not make such a request, the trial judge's failure to give such an instruction is a ground for reversal only if it constitutes an error that is egregious and obvious and if reversal is necessary to redress a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 825 (2d Cir.1990); see United States v. Katz, 601 F.2d 66, 67 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam). 44 We find no error or abuse of discretion with respect to Tracy. The evidence was offered by the government against Tracy to prove, inter alia, that he was a member of the conspiracy and played a role that gave him sufficient familiarity with the operation to enable him to identify the unnamed persons who could have provided the information reflected in the Complaint. His threatening notations on 10 pages of the Complaint were plainly relevant for those purposes and to confirm the testimony of the cooperating codefendants that Tracy's role in the operation was that of enforcer. The trial court properly performed the balancing analysis, recognizing the potentially inflammatory nature of the evidence, and seeking to eliminate any undue prejudice by having the Complaint redacted to conceal the official allegations made in that document. 45 Though Tracy sought to have the document excluded entirely, he did not request a limiting instruction. We cannot conclude that appellate relief is needed here to redress any miscarriage of justice since, as Tracy's attorney stated in trying to have the document excluded entirely, the government ha[d] enough to convict Mr. Tracy without this.2. Admissibility Against Aguilar 46 The issue with respect to Aguilar is somewhat different. He objected to the admission of the Complaint principally on the ground that the threats were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy and hence were inadmissible hearsay as to him. We agree that the Tracy-threat annotations were not admissible against Aguilar. 47 Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) classifies as nonhearsay a statement of a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. In order to admit a statement under this Rule, the court must find (1) that there was a conspiracy, (2) that its members included the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered, and (3) that the statement was made both (a) during the course of and (b) in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2778, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987); see also United States v. Mastropieri, 685 F.2d 776, 786 (2d Cir.1982) (declarations of one member of a conspiracy are admissible against another member only if made 'during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy'  (quoting Rule)). As the in furtherance term implies, the statements must in some way have been designed to promote or facilitate achievement of the goals of the ongoing conspiracy, as by, for example, providing reassurance to a coconspirator, seeking to induce a coconspirator's assistance, serving to foster trust and cohesiveness, or informing coconspirators as to the progress or status of the conspiracy, see, e.g., United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 35-36 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 252 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936, 104 S.Ct. 344, 78 L.Ed.2d 311 (1983), or by prompting the listener--who need not be a coconspirator--to respond in a way that promotes or facilitates the carrying out of a criminal activity, United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933, 110 S.Ct. 324, 107 L.Ed.2d 314 (1989); United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 778 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040, 104 S.Ct. 704, 79 L.Ed.2d 169 (1984). Mere idle chatter does not satisfy the in-furtherance requirement. United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 269, 93 L.Ed.2d 246 (1986). 48 We are not aware of any evidence in the record that would have permitted a finding that Tracy's threats were made during or in furtherance of the conspiracy. Our attention has not been called to any evidence that the threats were communicated to any of their targets, or that assurances of coercive or retributive actions were communicated to any other member of the conspiracy, or that any member of the conspiracy was even aware of the annotations. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the notations were made while the conspiracy with which Aguilar was charged was still in existence. First, the notations were made on the Complaint, which was not issued until October 24, 1991, just one day before Aguilar and the seven codefendants other than Tracy were arrested; and there was no showing that the conspiracy that included Aguilar endured beyond those arrests. Second, the annotated document was not discovered until January 1992, just prior to Tracy's own arrest. It hardly seems likely that the Complaint would have been available to Tracy before his codefendants were arrested; nor is it likely that the threatening notes were made on it in the one day between its issuance and those earlier arrests rather than in the remainder of the three months between its issuance and the eventual arrest of Tracy. 49 It was undoubtedly for these sound reasons that the government did not offer the Tracy-threat annotations against Aguilar and urged the court to advise the jury that the document could not be considered against him at all. The court's response, however, was ambiguous. The instructions and colloquy were as follows: 50 [The Tracy-threat document] in no way can be binding on Mr. Aguilar because it was not done in his presence as far as we know. We have no evidence it was done in his presence. We have no evidence that he knew anything about it, so that it can't be binding on him. 51 Now, there may come a time in the case, as I've told you many times, when I will give you what is called a connection instruction and then you may consider the evidence against anybody involved in the conspiracy. But unless and until that time comes, you must give this separate consideration. Concentrate on Mr. Tracy on this one, not on Mr. Aguilar. 52 MR. GLASSER: Your Honor, may I ask the court also to instruct the jury that for practical purposes that this particular piece of evidence shouldn't be considered against Mr. Aguilar at all. It should just be considered with respect to Mr. Tracy. 53 THE COURT: That's what I tried to tell you. He's stated it more directly than I did but you got the message. All right. 54 (Trial Transcript, December 10, 1991 (Dec. 10 Tr.), at 15-16 (emphasis added).) 55 The content of that message is not clear to us, for the AUSA's statement that the evidence should not be considered against Aguilar at all was not the same as the court's statement that the evidence might be considered against him eventually. We cannot determine from this colloquy whether the court thought that the AUSA meant that the jury should not consider the document against Aguilar at all unless connecting proof were forthcoming--which was the unmistakable meaning of the court's own words--or whether the court meant to modify its own instruction in order to tell the jury that it could not consider that evidence against Aguilar at all, regardless of any connecting evidence. The latter interpretation seems unlikely, given the court's apparent view that the AUSA had merely more directly restated the court's instruction. Further, a later instruction to the jury plainly indicated that the jury was allowed to consider the Tracy-threat annotations against Aguilar. At the close of the evidence, the court stated as follows: 56 THE COURT:.... 57 ... [Y]ou will have heard me say many times throughout the early part of the trial, although I did not bother to refer to it later on, that evidence that was received as to the words or actions of a particular defendant, such as Mr. Aguilar, could not be credited against Mr. Tracy and vi[ce] versa. And I told you that there might come a time when I would give you a connection type instruction. 58 .... 59 ... I will charge you at this time that you have received certain evidence in this case, evidence that Mr. Aguilar said or did something, or Mr. Tracy said or did something, or somebody you heard mentioned as a co-conspirator, in the role of a co-conspirator said or did something outside the presence of either or both of these defendants. Mr. Aguilar may have said or done something outside the presence of Mr. Tracy. Mr. Tracy may have said or done something outside the presence of Mr. Aguilar. I had told you that you could not consider those except as against the individual involved in them. I'm now charging you that those acts and statements of any other individuals, whether it's one of these defendants or a co-conspirator, may be considered by you in determining whether or not the government has proven the charges in the indictment against each of these defendants. 60 .... [Y]ou may consider all of the evidence against these defendants. 61 (Trial Transcript, December 20, 1991 (Dec. 20 Tr.), at 47-49 (emphasis added).) 62 Aguilar contends that this instruction allowed the jury to consider the Tracy-threat evidence against him, and we are inclined to agree. The passages that told the jury it could consider Tracy's statements against Aguilar and could consider all of the evidence against each defendant did not make any discernable exception for the Tracy-threat annotations. This was consistent with the court's initial cautionary instruction with respect to the annotations, which told the jury not to consider them as evidence against Aguilar unless and until the court gave a connection instruction, following which the jury could consider the evidence against anybody involved in the case. (Dec. 10 Tr. 15.) Viewing the instructions in their entirety, we doubt that the jury would have understood the court's terse ostensible agreement with the AUSA as overruling all of the court's fully explicated instructions that preceded and followed. We conclude that the jury would have inferred from all the court said that the jury could indeed consider the Tracy threats in assessing the charges against Aguilar. 63 Nonetheless, we are not persuaded that the evidence of the Tracy-threat annotations had any effect on the jury's consideration of the charges against Aguilar. The indictment charged Aguilar with possessing and distributing cocaine on or about five dates in 1990, to wit, January 24, January 30, February 28, June 15, and July 16, and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute on October 25, 1990. It charged that from approximately June 1989 through October 25, 1990, he engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise and conspired with Tracy, Arnold Aguilar, Alberto Boero, Crucita Sanchez, Carmen Cotto, and Elvis Morales, inter alios, to distribute cocaine. The government's evidence in support of these charges was overwhelming. It included testimony of law enforcement agents as to face-to-face meetings with Aguilar, consensually monitored and tape-recorded telephone conversations, and the testimony of Boero and Sanchez. The evidence showed the following. 64 In June 1989, Aguilar, whose ostensible business was running a fruit store, bought 21 beepers, including an alpha-numeric pager; thereafter, he spent nearly $25,000 in cash on beeper-related expenses. On June 27, shortly after his purchase of the beepers, Aguilar went to Miami, where he and Boero met with two DEA agents who were posing as cocaine smugglers. Aguilar asked the agents if they could sell him 30-50 kilograms of cocaine immediately; he told them he was also looking for a reliable source that could supply his organization with 100 kilograms of cocaine a week. He gave the undercover agents his beeper number, a number that was used to page him throughout the ensuing investigation. On July 10, the agents met with Aguilar, at his instigation, and discussed Aguilar's hope to import 400 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia. 65 At various times during the investigation, Aguilar described his drug dealing enterprise as like a factory, a high-volume, low-priced operation. He said he could get cocaine anytime and could offer discounted prices for purchases of quantities in excess of 10 kilograms. He said his costs of operation included bail money and money to pay lawyers; he also claimed to have on his payroll a high-ranking Mexican official and local officials. 66 Boero, whose association with Aguilar dated back to 1983, worked from mid-1990 in the organization's office to institute controls over its cash receipts. At trial, Boero identified various books and records, seized incident to his arrest, as the drug records of Aguilar's organization. He testified that the organization had cash receipts totaling $10,000 to $15,000 a day. It had more than 20 employees on its payroll and expended more than $21,000 a week in salaries. Boero testified that Aguilar's salary, the highest, was $1,800 to $2,500 a week. 67 Sanchez testified that she began working for Aguilar as a runner in 1989. She would meet Aguilar or Tracy at various spots along a highway, and they would give her one-kilogram or half-kilogram packages of cocaine to deliver to customers. After delivering the cocaine, she would give the money she collected to either Aguilar or Tracy. Sanchez estimated that she personally delivered a minimum of $7,000 worth of cocaine daily. 68 On January 24, 1990, Aguilar had telephone conversations with Jose Segovia, one of his customers who was cooperating with the authorities; eventually, Segovia and Connecticut State Trooper Martin Martinez, acting undercover, agreed to purchase 62 1/2 grams of cocaine from Aguilar for $2,000. Aguilar said he would send a runner to deliver the cocaine. Thereafter, Segovia and Martinez were met by Sanchez at a location chosen by Aguilar; Sanchez delivered the 62 1/2 grams of cocaine in return for the $2,000. 69 On January 30, 1990, Segovia and Martinez paged Aguilar, who promptly returned their call. They told Aguilar they wished to buy 125 grams of cocaine. A few minutes later, they again paged Aguilar; this time they received a return call from Cotto, who said Aguilar had put the call through to her. Cotto told them the cocaine was available for $4,000 and made arrangements for delivery. The sale was consummated that evening as planned. 70 On February 28, 1990, Martinez had a series of conversations with Aguilar, Cotto, and Morales. Aguilar told Martinez that the organization had replenished its cocaine supply and that he was holding 125 grams for Martinez. Cotto thereafter informed Martinez that she had the 125-gram package and that the price was $4,500. Morales then called Martinez and arranged for the delivery, which was made early that evening. 71 In June 1990, confidential informant Vickie Vega introduced Connecticut State Trooper Leslie Norcia, acting undercover, to Aguilar. On June 15, 1990, Vega, under Norcia's direction, negotiated with Boero for the delivery of 1 1/2 ounces of cocaine. The packages were delivered by one of Aguilar's associates that day. 72 In July 1990, DEA Special Agent Grayling Williams posed as one of Segovia's customers, and Segovia introduced him to Aguilar. Aguilar agreed to sell him one kilogram of cocaine for $31,000. The sale was made on July 16. 73 On October 24, 1990, arrest and search warrants for the Aguilar group were authorized. On that day, Williams telephoned Aguilar, who agreed to sell Williams one kilogram of cocaine for $30,000 the following day. Upon Aguilar's arrival at the designated location the next day, he was arrested. From Aguilar's car, agents recovered his beeper, coded for the number used by agents to contact him during the investigation, and a package containing 1,001 grams of 96% pure cocaine. Executing the search warrants, agents seized numerous items from the apartment used by the Aguilar organization to package its cocaine, including eight bottles of cocaine diluents, seven scales for weighing cocaine, thousands of plastic baggies, a heat sealer used in packaging, and cocaine packaged in a style characteristic of that used by the Aguilar organization. 74 In light of this and other evidence to support the charges that Aguilar conspired to and did distribute cocaine and engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, we conclude that the admission against him of the Tracy-threat annotations was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 75 C. The Trial Judge's Geaney Explanation to the Jury 76 Aguilar also contends that the court improperly influenced the jury by disclosing to it the fact and content of the court's Geaney findings, see United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028, 90 S.Ct. 1276, 25 L.Ed.2d 539 (1970). As discussed in Part II.B.2. above, statements that would otherwise be hearsay are admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) as statements of coconspirators only on the condition that a preponderance of the evidence establishes that a conspiracy existed, that the defendant and declarant were members, and that the statements were made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Under the Geaney rule, statements proffered as coconspirator statements may be admitted in evidence on a conditional basis, subject to the later submission of the necessary evidence of those four prerequisites. United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d at 1120; see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. at 179 & n. 2, 107 S.Ct. at 2780 & n. 2 (in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to show that the declarant was a coconspirator of the defendant, trial court may consider the hearsay statements themselves). 77 The decision as to whether the four prerequisites have been met, like all other preliminary questions of admissibility, see Fed.R.Evid. 104(a), is to be made by the court. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. at 181, 107 S.Ct. at 2781. If the government succeeds in persuading the court that the conditionally admitted coconspirator statements were made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy of which both the declarant and the defendant were members, the statements are allowed to go to the jury. If the court is not so persuaded, it either should instruct the jury to disregard the statements, or, if those statements were so large a proportion of the proof as to render a cautionary instruction of doubtful utility, should declare a mistrial. United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d at 1120. 78 In the present case, having in mind his duty to decide these preliminary questions of admissibility, the trial judge told the jury shortly after the start of trial, we'll get to the point eventually where I will be telling you if the government proves a conspiracy. (Nov. 18 Tr. 65.) The judge also gave the jury a lengthy explanation of the Geaney rule, stating that he was allowing certain statements to be testified to subject to connection (Nov. 18 Tr. 73), explaining that he meant that if the magic moment comes and the government's able to prove the conspiracy (id.), he would inform the jury that the necessary connection had been established and that the jury could consider the statements: 79 if I find that the government has proved to my satisfaction the existence of a conspiracy and that this gentleman, Mr. Aguilar, was a member of the conspiracy, then the government has done the connection and I will tell you that all this evidence is admitted against Mr. Aguilar. 80 (Id.) At the close of the evidence, the judge informed the jury that the magic moment ha[d] arrived (Dec. 20 Tr. 47) and that he had determined that all of the statements attributed to either defendant, or indeed to any coconspirator, could be used against both defendants. 81 We agree with Aguilar that the court's statements were inappropriate. We recognize that a trial judge, in making any ruling that proffered testimony is only conditionally admissible, may well alert the jury that there may be a later ruling that the jury is not to consider this evidence after all; and we recognize that, if the judge has so alerted the jury, his eventual instruction that the jury is permitted to consider the evidence will inevitably inform the jury that the preconditions to admission have been met to the judge's satisfaction. We can see no need, however, to instruct the jury as to what facts the judge himself must find in order to rule on admissibility. And there is every need for the judge not to couch his rulings in terms that may unduly influence the jury. Thus, where, as is generally true in a Geaney situation, the preconditions to admissibility include elements of the offenses with which the defendants are charged, disclosure to the jury that the government has established those elements to the satisfaction of the judge is especially inappropriate. When the government has persuaded the judge that the prerequisites for admission of coconspirator statements have been established, the judge should make his Geaney findings outside the presence of the jury, and the jury should not be told what facts the judge believes have been established. Accord United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1285 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847, 107 S.Ct. 168, 93 L.Ed.2d 106 (1986); United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 153 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S.Ct. 1020, 62 L.Ed.2d 756 (1980). See generally 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 104, at 104-56 to 104-63 (1987); id. at 104-63 (When the judge decides admissibility, the jurors should not be told anything about the issue.). 82 Nonetheless, an inappropriate instruction of this nature does not automatically require reversal. See generally United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d at 1286 (finding no case in which an instruction of this type had been held to be reversible error). In reviewing a claim that the defendant was prejudiced by a Geaney-finding revelation to the jury, we will consider principally the degree to which the trial judge indicated to the jury that a conspiracy existed, whether the judge properly advised the jury as to its role in determining whether or not a conspiracy existed and as to the standard of proof the jury is to apply, whether the defendant objected to the Geaney-finding revelation, and the strength of the government's proof on the conspiracy issues. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d at 1286. 83 Consideration of these factors in the present case leads us to conclude that the trial judge's Geaney statements are not grounds for reversal. The express statements that the judge would make a finding as to whether there was a conspiracy were made shortly after the start of the trial. Neither Aguilar nor counsel for Tracy, whom the judge's statements affected equally, objected. The judge accompanied those statements with an instruction that his would be merely an evidentiary finding and that it would remain the responsibility of the jury to determine whether or not the defendants were guilty. The instruction that it was the responsibility of the jury, not the judge, to determine guilt was reiterated at the close of the evidence. In addition, in informing the jury at that time that the government had made the connection required to allow the jury to consider the statements of one coconspirator against another, the judge explained in detail the nature of his own role, stating that his determination had been made on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence, whereas the jury could find the defendants guilty only if it found that the government had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In general, we do not approve of instructing the jury in a criminal case with respect to the contours of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard used by the court to make its admissibility rulings, for it is difficult enough to educate the jury as to the one standard of proof that it must apply in determining the matter of guilt without risking confusing it by explaining a different standard that does not apply. However, since there is no indication that the judge's explanation of the preponderance standard caused any jury confusion, we view it as an explanation that served in this case to mitigate the inappropriateness of the early statements that the judge himself would make a finding as to whether or not there was a conspiracy. 84 Finally, as discussed in Part II.B.2. above, the government introduced abundant non-hearsay evidence of the existence of the conspiracy and of defendants' membership in it, including Aguilar's own statements, the observed conduct of the codefendants, the drug transaction records, and the testimony of coconspirators Boero and Sanchez. We conclude that, in all the circumstances, the error of the trial judge in advising the jury that he would make an evidentiary finding as to the existence of a conspiracy was beyond a reasonable doubt harmless. D. Other Contentions 85 Aguilar also contends that the court erred in allowing government witnesses to testify to hearsay and in explaining to the jury the relevance of various pieces of government evidence. These contentions need not detain us long. 86 Most of the testimony challenged as hearsay was given by investigating agents, describing information received from informants during the course of the government's 1 1/2-year investigation. The testimony was received as background information with respect to that investigation, and we see no abuse of discretion in its admission. See United States v. Lubrano, 529 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818, 97 S.Ct. 61, 50 L.Ed.2d 78 (1976); Fed.R.Evid. 801. 87 As to the court's explanations to the jury of the relevance of certain evidence offered by the government, although they exceeded the commentary that is usually found in such a trial, we suspect that the court was making an effort to explain that relevance to Aguilar, who was proceeding pro se. Even if the court's commentary was inappropriate, the relevant inquiry on appeal is whether the judge's behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial, United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 402 (2d Cir.1985), and the defendant's burden on that question is substantial, see, e.g., United States v. Mickens, 926 F.2d 1323, 1327-28 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 940, 117 L.Ed.2d 111 (1992); United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137, 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 921, 111 S.Ct. 299, 112 L.Ed.2d 252 (1990). Here, in commenting on the evidence, the court took care to instruct the jury that interpreting and weighing the evidence was entirely up to [the jury], and that the court's own comments did not bespeak a belief or disbelief in the testimony of a particular witness. 88 In sum, viewing the record in its entirety, we cannot conclude that Aguilar has sustained his burden of showing that either any improvident admission of hearsay or the explanatory comments of the court denied him a fair trial. E. Challenges to Sentencing 89 Defendants contend that the court erred in calculating their respective sentences under the Guidelines. Tracy contends that the court also erred in imposing his sentence for the present offense consecutively to his 1991 sentence. Only the last of these contentions has merit. 1. Aguilar's Sentencing Challenge 90 The prescribed Guidelines range for Aguilar was 360 months to life imprisonment. As required by the Sentencing Reform Act, Tit. II, Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3551 et seq. (1988), the district court stated its reasons for sentencing Aguilar to 480 months. See id. Sec. 3553(c) (where applicable Guidelines range exceeds 24 months, court must explain its selection of point within the range). Isolating one part of the court's statement, Aguilar claims that the court's selection of a sentence 120 months above the bottom of the guideline range was meant to punish him for exercising his right to go trial. We disagree. 91 The part of the court's explanation to which Aguilar points stated that Aguilar 92 not only minimizes his role in this operation, but negates it. In other words, he claims there was really nothing going on here and that he has been unjustly and unfairly and illegally prosecuted by the government in violation of his constitutional rights. 93 (Aguilar Sentencing Transcript, June 26, 1992, at 56.) We see in this statement nothing to indicate that the court sought to penalize Aguilar for exercising his right to put the government to its proof. Further, the court stated several other weighty reasons for the sentence it selected, including the evidence that Aguilar was the leader of a very large sophisticated drug organization, that he was the decision maker in every facet of the business, that he was connected with every aspect of the operation, and that the organization used violence. (Id. 55-56.) Accordingly, we reject the contention that, in selecting the sentence to be imposed on Aguilar, the court relied on any impermissible factor. 94