Opinion ID: 1151153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Acquiring presumed father status by obtaining constructive receipt of the child

Text: A man becomes a presumed father under section 7004, subdivision (a)(4) (hereafter section 7004(a)(4)) if  [h]e receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child. (Italics added.) It is undisputed in this case that petitioner openly held out the child as being his own. Petitioner, however, did not physically receive the child into his home. He was prevented from doing so by the mother, by court order, and allegedly also by the prospective adoptive parents. Respondents contend the statutory scheme allows a mother to preclude her child's father from acquiring presumed father status and thereby eliminate the need for his consent regardless of whether he is a demonstrably fit parent. Petitioner responds that such result is impermissible under the federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. He claims he should be deemed to be the presumed father under section 7004(a)(4) because he did all that he could do under the circumstances to receive the child into his home. He contends we should not construe the statute in such a way that the mother can unilaterally bar the father from receiving their child into his home and thereby deprive him of presumed father status and the concomitant right under section 221.20 to withhold consent to the child's adoption by third parties. (2a) Petitioner asserts that constructive receipt is sufficient under section 7004(a)(4) to provide him with presumed father status and the right to withhold consent. Petitioner's argument in favor of constructive receipt is based largely on the federal Constitution rather than on section 7004(a)(4). He does not contend that either the language or legislative history of the statute supports his view. Indeed, he agrees that the law as literally written does permit a mother to interfere with the father-child relationship and does deny a natural father equal protection with a natural mother. Rather, he argues that his constitutional right (and that of other natural fathers) to equal protection and due process will be violated unless we construe the statute to provide for constructive receipt. Alternatively, he argues that we should hold the statutory scheme to be invalid under these circumstances. (3) Petitioner is correct that when possible we should read a statute in a manner that avoids a potential for conflict with the federal Constitution. ( California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 594 [131 Cal. Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193].) As Justice Frankfurter observed, Invalidating legislation is serious business.... ( Morey v. Doud (1957) 354 U.S. 457, 474 [1 LEd.2d 1485, 1497, 77 S.Ct. 1344] (dis. opn. of Frankfurter, J.).) We cannot, however, construe a statute contrary to legislative intent merely to eliminate a potential constitutional conflict. The threshold question therefore is whether the statutes support the notion of constructive receipt advocated by petitioner. We conclude the statutes provide no such support. (4a) We begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task in construing a statute is to determine the Legislature's intent. ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 724 [257 Cal. Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406].) We must begin with the words of the statute. ( Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798 [268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934].) (2b) Section 7004(a)(4) states that a man is a presumed father if [ h ] e receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child. (Italics added.) On its face, the statute refers to actual receipt of the child. The statute does not refer either explicitly or implicitly to attempted receipt or constructive receipt. As explained above, petitioner acknowledges this much and makes no argument based on the language of section 7004(a)(4). (4b) The statutory language, of course, is the best indicator of legislative intent. ( Ex Parte Goodrich (1911) 160 Cal. 410, 416-417 [117 P. 451].) If the Legislature has provided an express definition, we must take it as we find it. ( Delaney v. Superior Court, supra, 50 Cal.3d 785, 804.) To construe section 7004(a)(4) to allow constructive receipt, we would have to insert words into the statute so that it would read receives or attempts to receive. Doing so would violate the cardinal rule that courts may not add provisions to a statute. ( People v. Campbell (1902) 138 Cal. 11, 15 [70 P. 918]; Ross v. City of Long Beach (1944) 24 Cal.2d 258, 260 [148 P.2d 649].) (2c) Even if the statute were ambiguous, petitioner does not point to any legislative history supporting a theory of constructive receipt. Nor are we aware of any extrinsic evidence that the Legislature did not mean what it said in section 7004(a)(4). To the contrary, the legislative history of this issue suggests the Legislature was well aware of the restrictions it was placing on unwed fathers. In 1986, the Legislature added subdivision (d)(2) to section 7017. The amendment sets forth the factors for the trial court to consider in determining the rights of a natural (i.e., nonpresumed) father when the mother has relinquished the child for adoption. One of the enumerated factors is the efforts made by the father to obtain custody. If petitioner were correct that a father's efforts to obtain custody bestowed on him presumed father status under the statutes, the provisions regarding natural fathers who try but are unable to obtain custody would serve no purpose. Under petitioner's view, such fathers would be presumed fathers. The express statutory distinction between presumed fathers and fathers who attempt unsuccessfully to gain custody demonstrates that the members of the latter group are not presumed fathers within the Legislature's intent. Prior judicial decisions also provide slender support for reading into section 7004(a)(4) a provision for constructive receipt. (We will later discuss whether they support the ultimate result sought by petitioner.) In Adoption of Marie R. (1978) 79 Cal. App.3d 624 [145 Cal. Rptr. 122], a divided court rejected a natural father's argument that he should be deemed a presumed father under section 7004(a)(4) because his efforts to establish contact with his child had been rejected by the mother. More recently, a different Court of Appeal questioned whether the constructive receipt doctrine exists after California's adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act (§ 7000 et seq.) and noted, that [W]e are neither cited to nor have found any cases affirming the doctrine.... ( In re Sabrina H. (1990) 217 Cal. App.3d 702, 710 [266 Cal. Rptr. 274].) Our decisions provide little guidance on the issue. In In re Richard M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 783 [122 Cal. Rptr. 531 [537 P.2d 363] ( Richard M. ), we decided under former section 230, the statutory predecessor to section 7004(a)(4), that a father had legitimated his child by receiving it into his home for brief periods. We observed, Nor have the courts been strict in insisting that the child be actually physically present in the father's home; a constructive reception may suffice. [Fn. omitted.] In Estate of Maxey [(1967)] 257 Cal. App.2d 391 [64 Cal. Rptr. 837], for example, the father's conduct constituting receipt of his son into his family consisted of seeing the child at the mother's house. The boy apparently visited his father's apartment on only one occasion, at which time he was addressed as `son' in the presence of other people. (14 Cal.3d at p. 795, italics added.) Despite this seemingly favorable comment on constructive receipt, too much should not be read into the decision. First, the footnote in the quoted paragraph stated, It is unnecessary for us here to consider the extent to which courts have expanded the concept of `receiving.' Blythe v. Ayres [(1892)] 96 Cal. 532 [31 P. 915], probably goes the farthest in liberally construing this requirement, since the father was found to have satisfied the statutory mandate without ever actually seeing the child. It is noteworthy that this determination was subsequently criticized by this court in Estate of De Laveaga (1904) 142 Cal. 158, 169-170 [75 P. 790]. ( Richard M., supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 795, fn. 9.) Richard M. seems to suggest some physical contact with the child is required. Second, the father in Richard M., supra, 14 Cal.3d 783, had in fact received the child into his home, albeit briefly. The court therefore was not faced with the question before us, i.e., whether constructive receipt is sufficient when the mother prevents actual receipt. (5) `It is the general rule that the language of an opinion must be construed with reference to the facts presented by the case, and the positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with such facts.' ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d 711, 734-735, quoting River Farms Co. v. Superior Court (1933) 131 Cal. App. 365, 369 [21 P.2d 643].) (2d) Third and most important, Richard M., supra, 14 Cal.3d 783, was decided in a statutory context much different from the one that now exists. At that time, the determination was whether the child had been legitimated by the father. The Richard M. court stressed this fact. Because of the stigma and unfavorable legal treatment that attends classification of a child as illegitimate, California courts have almost consistently held that [former] section 230 must be liberally construed in favor of finding legitimation. ( Id., at p. 793.) If a child were not legitimated, it had no legal father. In 1975, however, the Legislature enacted California's Uniform Parentage Act, which abolished the concept of legitimacy (or illegitimacy) and replaced it with the concept of parentage. (§ 7002; In re Sabrina H., supra, 217 Cal. App.3d 702, 709, fn. 7.) Subsequent decisions have observed that the policy reason for straining to find legitimation by expanding the doctrine of constructive receipt is no longer present. In situations like the one before us, the baby will end up with a father ...  either the biological father if he is granted presumed father status or the adoptive father. ( Adoption of Marie R., supra, 79 Cal. App.3d 624, 629, italics added.) More recently, we referred to the notion of constructive receipt with apparent disfavor in Michael U. v. Jamie B., supra, 39 Cal.3d 787 ( Michael U. ). As in the present case, a biological father sought custody of his child despite the mother's objection and her desire to have it adopted by third parties. We reversed an order granting the father temporary custody. In explaining the statutory framework, the lead opinion stated, Michael is a natural father, not a presumed father, because he has not yet received Eric [the child] into his home. [Citation.] If, however, he actually acquired physical custody, he could receive Eric into his home and thereby acquire the status of a presumed father. [Citations.] ... Thus the present controversy, although nominally about the temporary custody of Eric pending the adoption proceeding, will probably determine the fate of the proposed adoption. ( Id., at p. 791, fn. omitted.) The lead opinion also cited without criticism the statement in Adoption of Marie R., supra, 79 Cal. App.3d 624, 630, that constructive receipt is insufficient under section 7004(a)(4). ( Michael U., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 791, fn. 3.) The observation in Michael U., supra, 39 Cal.3d 787, does not resolve the question before us because the issue of constructive receipt was not before the court, and the quoted statements were unnecessary to the decision. Michael U. therefore provides no authority for deciding whether the doctrine of constructive receipt is valid under section 7004(a)(4). ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d 711, 734-735.) Moreover, the observation as to constructive receipt was made in a lead opinion signed by only two justices. (6) [A]ny proposition or principle stated in an opinion is not to be taken as the opinion of the court, unless it is agreed to by at least four of the justices. ( Del Mar Water, etc. Co. v. Eshleman (1914) 167 Cal. 666, 682 [140 P. 591]; see generally 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 808, pp. 787-788.) (2e) In summary, nothing in the language or legislative history of section 7004(a)(4) supports the claim of constructive receipt. The decisions of the Courts of Appeal have also rejected the claim. We have not previously decided the question and, to the extent we have noted the issue, our decisions either provide little guidance or cast doubt on the notion of constructive receipt, especially in light of the statutory abrogation of illegitimacy. Petitioner therefore correctly admits that section 7004(a)(4) does not by itself provide for presumed father status based on a father's constructive receipt of the child, i.e., his unsuccessful attempts to obtain custody over the mother's objection. We cannot accept petitioner's invitation to construe section 7004(a)(4) to avoid the alleged constitutional conflict. To do so would require us to judicially rewrite the statute. There remains, however, the question of whether a natural father's federal constitutional rights are violated if his child's mother is allowed to unilaterally preclude him from obtaining the same legal right as a presumed father to withhold his consent to his child's adoption by third parties. We now turn to that difficult constitutional question. [6]