Opinion ID: 1821713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: conformity clause.

Text: Atwater argues that the conformity clause in the burglary insurance policy operates to substitute the statutory definition of burglary for the policy definition. The conformity clause reads: 14. Terms of Policy Conformed to Statute. Terms of this policy which are in conflict with the statutes of the State wherein this policy is issued are hereby amended to conform to such statutes. The burglary definition in the policy reads: [T]he felonious abstraction of insured property (1) from within the premises by a person making felonious entry therein by actual force and violence, of which force and violence there are visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals upon, or physical damage to, the exterior of the premises at the place of such entry, or    (3) from within the premises by a person making felonious exit therefrom by actual force and violence as evidenced by visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals upon, or physical damage to, the interior of the premises at the place of such exit. Minnesota Statutes § 609.58, subd. 2 (1982), reads: Whoever enters a building without the consent of the person in lawful possession,    with intent to commit a crime in it, or whoever remains within a building without the consent of the person in lawful authority, with intent to commit a crime in it, commits burglary. The question is whether the two definitions actually conflict with each other. We conclude that they do not. The statutory definition of burglary operates to impose criminal sanctions on those whose acts fall within its purview. The purpose of the policy definition, however, is to limit the risk the insurer is willing to underwrite. There is no reason an insurer must necessarily define terms in its contracts in the same manner as a statute that exists for an entirely different purpose. We do not agree, however, with the insurer's argument that a conformity clause operates to substitute statutory provisions for policy provisions only where the statute is one that directly regulates insurance. Maryland Casualty Co. v. American Lumber & Wrecking Co., 204 Minn. 43, 282 N.W. 806 (1938), cited by Western to support its argument, merely stands for the proposition that where there is a statute regulating the insurance industry, the industry must conform to that statute. We hold that an insurance policy provision must be in direct conflict with a statute before a conformity clause operates to substitute the statutory provisions for the policy provision. It makes no difference whether the statute is one regulating insurance. An insurer may limit the risks against which it is willing to indemnify the insured. The policy definition of burglary is different and more limited than the criminal statute definition, but there is no conflict between the two given their disparate functions. The difference between the two, however, has a bearing on the insured's reasonable expectations in purchasing burglary insurance.