Opinion ID: 2603715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Bierman's Right to a Speedy Trial

Text: Bierman contends that her statutory right to a speedy trial under K.S.A. 22-3402(1) has been violated. She acknowledges that the trial commenced with the voir dire on the 90th day following arraignment. However, Bierman argues that the K.S.A. 22-3402(1) phrase brought to trial requires that the defendant must be placed in jeopardy within 90 days. She cites no authority for her position. Bierman's contention is without merit. Under K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c) a defendant is placed in jeopardy when the jury has been impaneled and sworn to try the case. Bierman points out that the jury was not sworn to try the case until the 91st day. The K.S.A. 22-3402(1) phrase, brought to trial, does not coincide with the date a defendant is placed in jeopardy under K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c), but rather relates to the date the jury panel is sworn for the voir dire examination. The State advances three counterarguments: (1) Bierman filed numerous motions which were not ruled on for 13 days; the 13-day period should be charged to Bierman; (2) the trial court extended the 90-day period under K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(c) and (d); and (3) Bierman was brought to trial within 90 days. K.S.A. 22-3402 requires any person charged with a crime and held in jail to be brought to trial within 90 days after arraignment unless the time of trial is extended under the statute. Bierman was arraigned on March 28, 1989. On May 11, 1989, the case was set for trial on June 26, 1989. The journal entry reflecting the May 11, 1989, hearing stated: The Court further finds that all attorneys agree that a special setting is required with special notice being provided. The Court further finds that the criminal trial docket schedule is set through the week ending June 9, 1989; that the courts have prior commitments for the entire week of June 12, 1989; and, that a material witness for the prosecution will be out of the state from June 17, 1989 through June 24, 1989. The Court further finds that June 26, 1989 is the ninetieth (90th) day after both defendants were arraigned. The trial court's order stated: WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3402(c) and (d), the jury trial in this matter is set before the Honorable Bill D. Robinson, Jr., on June 26, 1989, at 9:00 A.M. The order is a permissible extension under K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(c) (time of trial extended beyond the 90 days because material evidence is unavailable) and (d) (time of trial extended beyond the 90 days because of other cases pending for trial). Even if Bierman's jeopardy argument were meritorious, the trial court properly extended the time. Bierman was brought to trial within 90 days. K.S.A. 22-3405(1) states: The defendant in a felony case shall be present at ... every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury. (Emphasis added.) A defendant is brought to trial when the jury panel is sworn for the voir dire examination. The jury panel was sworn for the voir dire examination in the case at bar within 90 days of the arraignment. Bierman's statutory right to a speedy trial under K.S.A. 22-3402(1) was not violated. It is not necessary to address the State's argument that the 13 days Bierman's motions were pending should be charged to Bierman.