Opinion ID: 844218
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted Errors During Voir Dire

Text: Defendant contends the trial court conducted constitutionally inadequate questioning of the prospective jurors concerning possible biases arising from the circumstances of the shooting of Deputy Blair. Specifically, he claims the trial court should have asked questions regarding (1) any racial prejudices the prospective jurors may have held and (2) the legal concepts of self-defense and defense of another, particularly in the context of a gang member shooting a police officer. (3) Defendant did not ask the trial court to pose any question regarding racial biases, and therefore that portion of his appellate claim is forfeited. ( People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 539 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931] [the defendant must ask for questioning concerning racial bias; the trial court need not make the inquiry on its own initiative]; Turner v. Murray (1986) 476 U.S. 28, 37 [90 L.Ed.2d 27, 106 S.Ct. 1683] [a defendant cannot complain of a judge's failure to question the venire on racial prejudice unless the defendant has specifically requested such an inquiry].) We have recognized no exception to this requirement in cases in which the potential for racial bias assertedly was obvious, and we decline defendant's invitation to do so now. Defendant's remaining claim similarly is unavailing. Prior to commencing voir dire of the venire panel, the trial court advised the parties that it intended to question the prospective jurors itself, without the participation of counsel, and also without having the panel answer written juror questionnaires. Although the prosecutor objected, defense counsel expressly agreed to the court's plan to conduct voir dire. The court invited the parties to submit suggested questions the court should pose, and defendant submitted three questions concerning self-defense and defense of others: (1) Can you accept the concept in the law that if one's life is illegally placed in peril by another, one may kill in self-defense[?]; (2) Could you accept this legal premise if the evidence shows that a uniformed police officer illegally placed the life of a street gang member in peril, and that officer is then killed in self-defense?; and (3) Can you accept the concept in the law that if the life of one's friend is illegally placed in peril by another, deadly force may be legally used in response? In response to defendant's suggestions, the trial court stated, Most jurors believe there is such a thing as self-defense. The concern is that jurors understand that if there is a self-defense issue, that they have to follow the court's instruction on the law regarding what constitutes self-defense. And will they do that and put aside their own ideas of what constitutes self-defense. Accordingly, the court agreed to give some brief comment to that effect [] that they should not necessarily adhere to their own feelings of what constitutes self-defense, that they must follow the court's instruction. Defense counsel did not object to the court's plans. Later, near the conclusion of voir dire, defense counsel asked the trial court at a sidebar conference whether it planned to ask any more followup questions of the prospective jurors. When the court stated it did not, counsel stated, Okay, I would ask that you at least touch on self-defense. The court subsequently did so, telling the jurors, [I]t is very importantI think we all have ideas of when the idea of self-defense is appropriate and when it isn't. I want to make sure that the jurors understand that if you are instructed on what the law says is appropriate for self-defense, that you follow my instructions on the law. [¶] Anybody have any question about that? . . . [¶] Let me make sure of this. The court then asked a prospective juror, do you understand what I just said? . . . [¶] You may have in your own mind when you came in here an idea of when self-defense is appropriate. [¶] But you understand that if I instruct youI am not saying I willbut if I instruct you on the law of self-defense, you must follow my instructions? The prospective juror agreed he would follow the court's instructions. The court then asked if everybody else understood, and confirmed this with two other prospective jurors. Defense counsel did not object to the trial court's questions, nor did he request that the court pose any other question concerning the subject. (4) On appeal, however, defendant contends the trial court's questioning was insufficient to ascertain whether the jurors harbored any biases that might prevent them from impartially entertaining a claim that a gang member's killing of a peace officer was justified by the need to defend one's self or a fellow gang member and from evaluating the evidence of such a defense. Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to raise this issue below, when the trial court could have remedied the alleged shortcoming. It is true defendant did initially submit proposed questions concerning the specific context of a claim of self-defense or defense of others in this case (highlighting that a gang member had killed a police officer), and the trial court did not pose those questions during voir dire. Defense counsel, however, did not object that general questioning concerning the prospective jurors' ability to follow the court's instructions on self-defense would beor subsequently wasinsufficient to uncover any biases the prospective jurors might have held. Accordingly, this claim is not preserved for appeal. ( People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 61-62 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129].) Defendant's attempt to distinguish Sanchez on its facts is misplaced. The controlling principle is that a defendant may not challenge on appeal alleged shortcomings in the trial court's voir dire of the prospective jurors when the defendant, having had the opportunity to alert the trial court to the supposed problem, failed to do so. It is not sufficient, as in the present case, for a defendant merely to suggest that particular questions be asked, and then silently stand by when the trial court suggests and subsequently takes a different coursea trial court reasonably could view such silence as constituting assent to the court's approach. (5) In any event, even if defendant had not forfeited his claim, we would conclude it lacks merit. We have observed that the adequacy of voir dire is a matter ``not easily subject to appellate review. The trial judge's function at this point in the trial is not unlike that of the jurors later on in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and responses to questions.'' [Citations.] The applicable standard is a demanding one: `Unless the voir dire by a court is so inadequate that the reviewing court can say that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair, the manner in which voir dire is conducted is not a basis for reversal. [Citation.] . . .' [Citations.] [¶] . . . `The right to voir dire, like the right to peremptorily challenge [citation], is not a constitutional right but a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury. [Citation.]' ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1250-1251 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544].) Defendant fails to establish any possibility that his trial was fundamentally unfair due to inadequate voir dire of the prospective jurors. To the extent our decision in People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392 [174 Cal.Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869] ( Williams ), upon which defendant relies, remains persuasive although one of its central holdings was abrogated by the passage of Proposition 115 (see People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 168, fn. 5 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150] [that proposition changed the scope of legitimate inquiry on voir dire by requiring that the examination of prospective jurors be conducted only in aid of the exercise of challenges for cause, not in aid of the parties' making peremptory challenges]), Williams is distinguishable. The erroneous limitation of voir dire that led to our reversal of the judgment in Williams concerned the prospective jurors' thoughts regarding the legal concept that a person has no duty to retreat before he or she may use reasonable force to resist an attacker. As we noted, that rule was controversial, and there was a real possibility the average juror might disagree with the rule. ( Williams, supra, at p. 411.) Also implicit in Williams is an acknowledgement that the rule likely would be unknown to an average juror were it not addressed in voir dire. Moreover, there was no suggestion the prospective jurors in Williams were made aware of any facts of the case that would have indicated that the question of a duty to retreat would be at issue, and therefore that their ability to follow the law as the court would instruct might have been inhibited in that regard. We also pointed out in Williams that two of the prospective jurors had expressed doubts, even in the abstract, concerning their ability to follow self-defense principles with which they might disagree, and the trial court had foreclosed any further exploration of those responses. ( Ibid. ) The oral voir dire in the present case met constitutional standards. The trial court questioned the prospective jurors concerning their ability to follow the law of self-defense as the court ultimately would instruct them, and none expressed any doubt regarding an ability to do so. The prospective jurors were aware of the basic facts of the case, that is, that defendant was accused of shooting and killing a police officer engaged in his official duties. Questions concerning the prospective jurors' knowledge of and biases against gangs and gang members also had been posed, and the jurors were told they were required not to prejudge the case based upon any evidence of defendant's having associated with a gang. Because the prospective jurors were aware of the basic facts of the case, it was reasonable to assume they had these particulars in mind when the trial court admonished them concerning their duty and questioned them concerning their ability to follow any self-defense instructions the court might give them. Accordingly, defendant's proposed questions, although more focused than the trial court's queries, were not so significantly more likely to expose strong attitudes antithetical to defendant's cause ( Williams, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 410) that we could conclude the court's voir dire failed to aid in the exercise of challenges for cause or otherwise resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. We also observe that defendant has not pointed to any evidence in the record suggesting that any sitting juror actually was prejudiced against his claims of self-defense and defense of another.
Defendant contends the trial court's voir dire concerning the issue of the jury's role in the penalty phase of the trial, and the court's excusing for cause two prospective jurors who expressed reluctance regarding imposing the death penalty, denied him his state and federal constitutional rights to an unbiased jury and a reliable penalty decision. We are not persuaded. To the extent defendant contends the manner in which the trial court questioned the prospective jurors erroneously resulted in a jury that was prone to impose the death penalty, he forfeited any such challenge by not objecting below. A defendant ordinarily cannot obtain appellate relief based upon grounds that the trial court might have addressed had the defendant availed himself or herself of the opportunity to bring them to that court's attention. ( People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 635 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175].) Defendant maintains we nonetheless should reach the merits of his contention because the right to a fair and unbiased jury, and the trial court's general duty to ensure a fair proceeding, are fundamental. There is, however, no evidence in the record suggesting the jury in this case actually was unfair or biased; that is, that these fundamental rights were compromised. Even if, as defendant urges, the manner in which the trial court conducted voir dire improperly tended to remove prospective jurors supposedly more favorable to the defense, this does not mean the remaining prospective jurors could not be fair and unbiased. We also observe that defendant does not allege that the trial court erroneously denied any challenge for cause he made against a prospective juror. (6) Defendant further contends the trial court violated his constitutional right to an impartial jury by excusing for cause two prospective jurors, Prospective Juror C. and Prospective Juror L., based on their answers expressing reservations concerning their ability to impose the death penalty. [9] The law regarding such appellate challenges is well established. In this context, the right to an impartial jury afforded by the state and federal Constitutions mandates that persons who oppose the death penalty are not disqualified from serving as a juror in a capital case simply by virtue of their personal views on that punishment. (See Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 6 [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218]; People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 425 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 732, 213 P.3d 77].) Qualification to serve on a capital jury is not limited to determining whether the person zealously opposes or supports the death penalty in every case. Under federal and state law, a prospective juror may be excluded for cause where his views on capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ([ Wainwright v. Witt (1985)] 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844], clarifying Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770] [framing issue as whether it is `unmistakably clear' the prospective juror would `automatically' (italics omitted) vote for life or death].) . . . At bottom, capital jurors must be willing and able to follow the law, weigh the sentencing factors, and choose the appropriate penalty in the particular case. [Citations.] ( People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 20 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896, 163 P.3d 896] ( DePriest ).) (7) `Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The trial court must determine whether the prospective juror will be `unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case.' [Citation.] A juror will often give conflicting or confusing answers regarding his or her impartiality or capacity to serve, and the trial court must weigh the juror's responses in deciding whether to remove the juror for cause. The trial court's resolution of these factual matters is binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]' [Citations.] ( People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 78-79 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 608, 158 P.3d 157] ( Lancaster ).) Indeed, where answers given on voir dire are equivocal or conflicting, the trial court's assessment of the person's state of mind is generally binding on appeal. [Citation.] The trial court is in the unique position of assessing demeanor, tone, and credibility firsthandfactors of `critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.' [Citation.] Hence, the trial judge may be left with the `definite impression' that the person cannot impartially apply the law even though, as is often true, he has not expressed his views with absolute clarity. [Citation.] ( DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 21; see also Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 20.) Affording the appropriate substantial deference to the trial court's assessment of each prospective juror's state of mind, we conclude the decision to excuse them did not violate defendant's constitutional rights. Before the court examined any individual prospective juror concerning the death penalty, it made extensive introductory remarks, advising that there are a lot of things I want to say about this. The court proceeded to inform the panel that discussing the death penalty was not meant to imply any outcome for the trial, but was intended to enable the court and the parties to explore the prospective jurors' feelings about the death penalty. The court explained the mechanics of the two phases of a capital trial, including the issues and types of evidence presented in the penalty phase (if there were to be one), and contrasted the jury's role in a capital case with that of a jury in a noncapital case, in which the jury does not consider the issue of the defendant's punishment if he or she is found guilty. The court also noted, however, that a juror in a capital case is not permitted to consider the possible punishment when considering the issue of guilt, but must decide whether the defendant is guilty or not based upon only the evidence presented at that phase of the trial. In describing the process of determining the penalty, the court explained the required weighing of mitigating and aggravating evidence, and the circumstances in which a sentence of life without the possibility of parole or death would be permissible under the law. The court then explained that it had been going into all of this because the law promises each side, the defense and the prosecution, jurors who can make a decision between life without parole and death based upon the evidence. [¶] Jurors who would automatically vote for death cannot sit. Jurors who would automatically vote for life cannot sit. [¶] We need people who can consider all the evidence and make a decision between these two very serious consequences. The court stressed that it was not talking about some hypothetical situation. We're not going to be asking you, gee, could you vote to put Adolph Hitler to death. That is not the question here. [¶] The question is, can you look in your heart and tell us that you can consider the evidence in a case like this and make a decision. The court emphasized that it would not be prejudging anybody and was not trying to convince any one of you to take a position one way or the other, stating, I want to know what is in your heart and what is in your mind, okay. Please, please, be straight with us. It is very important. The trial court then discussed its view that prospective jurors generally would fall into four types. First, people that would always vote for death regardless of what the evidence was. They believe in the death penalty. Eye for an eye. That's it. An officer was killed, [the] man should always get the death penalty. Second, [t]here are going to be people that would never ever under any circumstance vote for the death penalty. They don't believe in it. They think it is wrong morally. They think it is wrong for religious reasons or for some other reason they could never ever impose the death penalty. In the court's view the third type of prospective jurors are people that say they believe in the death penalty but when they really get down to it, even if they believe that the evidence that is aggravating outweighs substantially the mitigating evidence, they themselves can't impose the death penalty. They just can't do it. The trial court then told the panel of a case the court had presided over in which a jury had been sworn, but before any evidence had been presented, one of the jurors began crying after realizing that the case would be too much for her. The court cautioned the jurors, Ladies and gentlemen, if you feel that wayyou are sitting in judgment on a fellow human beingtell us now, please. [¶] Don't get into something that is going to be over your head. You know yourselves better than we do. And I just implore you to not bite off more than you think you can chew, so to speak. Finally, the court explained that the fourth kind of person, the [kind of] person that we're looking for to serve on this jury, is the kind of person that can keep an open mind, not prejudge this case, wait to hear all the evidence, look at the totality of all the aggravating and all the mitigating evidence and then make a decision. And the decision would be one of two choices, life without parole or death. And you must presume that the jury's decision will be carried out. [¶] Now, again, I am not telling you how you should decide this case. My only goal is to find jurors that can make a decision based upon the evidence. Finally, the trial court told the panel that it would be asking each prospective juror to discuss his or her views concerning the penalty decision, and it reminded them to answer from your heart. [¶] We had some jurors this morning that were crying at the prospect of even being close to a case like this. Well, that is fine. I don't prejudge that. That is their business. If they are opposed to the death penalty, that is fine. I told them so. I admire the fact that they told us what their feelings were. That is all what we want you to do, is tell us straight from the heart how you feel. The court then proceeded to question each prospective juror. Regarding Prospective Juror C., when the trial court asked her what she thought of the court's discussion of the death penalty, she answered, I am really nervous. In response to the trial court's question whether that meant she should not serve on the jury, she answered, I would like to be on the panel but probably not on a murder case. Prospective Juror C. agreed that this case was probably too much for her because she was very sensitive. She continued, I cry over [ sic ] when I see things in the street . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] People that are homeless on the street. So I could imagine what I would be hearing in this case. The trial court confirmed that she disliked violence, including the depiction of it in movies. The court then turned specifically to whether she would be able to vote in favor of the death penalty, asking her whether it would be very difficult for you to vote for death. She replied that she initially was thinking maybe I haven't heard the evidence so that is why I didn't raise my hand when you asked that question [whether anyone was automatically opposed to the death penalty], but having had a chance to consider the subject further, she agreed that it is going to be very difficult. The trial court asked whether it would be impossible, and she responded, somewhat cryptically, Considering it is about [a] police officer, I have very high regard for police officers. Seeking to clarify her answer, the trial court asked her whether you have very high regard for police officers, but are [a] very sympathetic person, and are very emotional and it is going to be difficult for you to make a decision in this case? Prospective Juror C. agreed. The court then asked her whether really deep down you think it is highly unlikely that you would ever vote for death regardless of the evidence. She answered yes. After the sidebar conference in which defense counsel expressed his view that there was not enough information concerning her ability to serve as a juror, the trial court questioned her again, first confirming that it would be highly unlikely she would ever vote for the death penalty. The court then asked her whether it was correct that she saw herself as falling in that third category of people, the people that say, you know, I believe that the death penalty is okay, but I really couldn't do it. Prospective Juror C. again answered yes. Although on appeal defendant characterizes Prospective Juror C. as a thoughtful juror poised to determine penalty by balancing the evidence in aggravation against that in mitigation, the trial court reasonably could have been left with the definite impression that she would be too emotional to serve as a juror in this capital case. She consistently expressed concern that her sensitive nature would make it too difficult for her to sit on the jury. As her answer to the court's final question made clear, it was highly unlikely she would be able to vote in favor of a death sentence, not because she was opposed to the death penalty, but because she doubted she possessed the emotional fortitude to sit in judgment of defendant. As we recently stated in similar circumstances: Although there might have been some indication that she could, in the abstract, vote in favor of a death sentence, her subsequent responses reflected significant hesitation regarding her emotional ability to impose the death penalty. The trial court was in a position, which we are not, to view her demeanor as she responded, and its determination of her state of mind is binding. Substantial evidence supports its ruling that [Prospective Juror C.'s] views concerning the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair her performance as a juror. ( People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1089 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 210 P.3d 361].) Regarding Prospective Juror L., when the trial court asked for her views on the death penalty, she stated, I don't have a problem weighing the evidence to determine innocence or guilt but I do have a problem voting for the death penalty. She denied that she would never ever vote for death, but maintained that she would have a real problem doing so. The trial court then asked her whether she was saying that it is very unlikely that you would ever vote for death? She answered yes. During the sidebar conference, defense counsel expressed his view that they did not have enough information regarding Prospective Juror L.'s ability to serve on the jury. The trial court, however, stated, Oh, I felt she was real strong. The court subsequently excused her without posing any more questions to her. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by excusing Prospective Juror L. for cause because her statements that she would have a problem voting for death and that it was very unlikely she would ever do so did not establish substantial impairment of her ability fairly and conscientiously to follow the law in choosing the appropriate penalty in this case. Although the trial court certainly might have asked more probing questions concerning her ability to fairly weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence, there nonetheless is substantial evidence in the record supporting the trial court's decision to excuse her. First, we observe that it appears the trial court's decision relied to some degree upon Prospective Juror L.'s demeanor, because the court expressed its view that her feelings on the subject were real strong. Second, she herself contrasted her ability fairly to weigh the evidence in reaching a determination of the issue of defendant's guilt with her ability to consider a verdict of death at the penalty phase. Her statements also must be viewed in light of the trial court's extensive preliminary remarks, in which it focused the area of inquiry on the prospective jurors' ability to keep an open mind, not prejudge this case, wait to hear all the evidence, look at the totality of all the aggravating and all the mitigating evidence and then make a decision. We also note that Prospective Juror L. was the last prospective juror questioned on this subject, and she therefore had heard the trial court explore this issue many times with the other prospective jurors. In keeping with the trial court's focus, her comments addressed her ability to vote in favor of a death sentence within the context of the case and all the court's instructions, not her personal views regarding the death penalty as a general matter. Accordingly, the trial court could reasonably view Prospective Juror L.'s own statements that she could be fair in assessing guilt but not penalty, that she would have a real problem voting for death, and her agreement that, although perhaps not impossible, it would be very unlikely she ever would vote for death, as establishing that her ability to follow the law would be substantially impaired. As with the prospective jurors at issue in Lancaster, substantial evidence supports the trial court's decision to excuse Prospective Juror L. even though she may have acknowledged a slight possibility she could vote to impose a sentence of death. (See Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 80 [distinguishing People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 446-447 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271] and People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 964-966 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53], in which the record did not support the trial court's decision to excuse the prospective jurors for cause]; see also People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 430 [the trial court's decision to excuse a prospective juror for cause is entitled to deference despite the juror's declaration of a theoretical possibility that she could vote for the penalty of death].)