Opinion ID: 1614942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: In his first assignment of error, Bjorklund argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him when an appeal from the overruling of his second motion for new trial had been perfected to this court prior to sentencing. We disagree. Neb.Rev.Stat. ง 25-1912(1) (Cum.Supp. 1994) states in pertinent part: [T]he proceedings to obtain a reversal, vacation, or modification of judgments and decrees rendered or final orders made by the district court, including judgments and sentences upon convictions for felonies ... shall be by filing... within thirty days after the rendition of such judgment ... a notice of intention to prosecute such appeal.... On November 23, 1993, Bjorklund filed a motion for new trial. This motion was heard on December 13 and overruled the same day. Bjorklund filed a second motion for new trial on March 21, 1994, after discovering the ex parte contact between Judge Endacott and the jury at the time of trial. The second motion for new trial dealt with this ex parte contact. This motion was heard by Judge Endacott on March 23, 1994, and overruled the same day. On April 14, the State filed a motion to reopen the hearing on Bjorklund's second motion for new trial (ex parte contact), which motion was granted on April 18, and Judge Merritt was assigned to hear this reopened motion. Judge Merritt overruled this motion on September 1, and Bjorklund appealed the denial of the second motion for new trial, which is docketed as case No. S-94-856. Bjorklund was then sentenced to death by Judge Endacott on September 20, and a mandatory direct appeal initiated pursuant to Neb. Rev.Stat. ง 29-2525(Reissued 1989) was docketed as case No. S-94-994. The first task we have is to determine whether or not we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal docketed as case No. S-94-856. The motion for new trial and the notice of appeal were filed prior to sentencing. We held in State v. Spotted Elk, 227 Neb. 869, 420 N.W.2d 707 (1988), that in a criminal case, the judgment date is the date on which the defendant is sentenced. The three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal under the provisions of Neb.Rev.Stat. ง 25-1902 (Reissue 1995) are (1) an order which affects a substantial right in an action and which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered. State v. Jacques, 253 Neb. 247, 570 N.W.2d 331 (1997); State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 570 N.W.2d 326 (1997). It is clear that in the instant case, the overruling of Bjorklund's motion for new trial neither determined the action and prevented a judgment nor was made on summary application after judgment was rendered. Consequently, we must determine if the trial court's order affected a substantial right in the context of a special proceeding. A substantial right is affected if an order affects the subject matter of the litigation, such as diminishing a claim or defense that was available to the appellant prior to the order from which he or she is appealing. State v. Jacques, supra . In the instant case, it is apparent that such a standard is not met. The claims advanced in Bjorklund's motion for new trial may be addressed and disposed of on appeal after the sentencing. This is illustrated by the fact that the issues presented by Bjorklund's motion in this case have been presented for review in his postjudgment appeal. As Bjorklund suffered no prejudice from the overruling of his motion for new trial that could not be effectively mitigated by a timely appeal taken after the final judgment, we determine that no substantial right of Bjorklund was affected by the overruling of his motion for new trial. Such overruling was not a final, appealable order, and Bjorklund's notice of appeal was premature. Bjorklund's appeal in case No. S-94-856 must be dismissed. In Holste v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 256 Neb. 713, 592 N.W.2d 894 (1999), we held that a notice of appeal from a nonappealable order does not render void for lack of jurisdiction the acts of the trial court taken in the interim between the filing of the notice of appeal and the dismissal of the appeal by the appellate court. We stated in Holste v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 256 Neb. at 729, 592 N.W.2d at 906: [A]ny other rule would be utterly unthinkable. Any party would then be able, at any time before final judgment, to bring the trial of a case to an abrupt halt by merely filing an order for appeal from any ruling of the court. Control of the judicial process would thus pass from the courts to the parties and their counsel. Mistrials and continuances would be available without limitation at the whim of any party. The trial court must have, and does have, the power to determine whether its jurisdiction to proceed has been ousted. Should any abuse of that power ever arise, such abuse could undoubtedly be corrected by prompt appellate action. Quoting Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md.App. 543, 280 A.2d 277 (1971). Therefore, under the holding of Holste v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., supra , the trial court retained jurisdiction to sentence Bjorklund even though a premature appeal had been filed. We conclude that Bjorklund's assignment of error claiming that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him when an appeal from the overruling of Bjorklund's second motion for new trial had been perfected prior to the sentencing is without merit.