Opinion ID: 2520120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of the law to these facts

Text: Disregarding the italicized portions of the juror declarations, we now consider whether any misconduct occurred, and if so, whether that misconduct was prejudicial. We conclude that the unsolicited comments from Juror K.A.'s pastor, Juror B.P.'s conversation with her pastor, and the introduction of the Bible passages to the jury room were misconduct, but that this misconduct was not prejudicial. We begin with Juror K.A.'s conversations with her husband and her reading the Bible. Juror K.A.'s husband noticed she was on edge and told her it would be permissible for her to speak to her pastor because a pastor is a person of higher authority. Juror K.A. did not discuss the case or the deliberations with her husband, but only the stress she felt in making the decision. Her husband advised that reading scripture from the Bible might be of benefit to her, and showed her the Book of Numbers, chapter 35, verses 16 through 25 and 30 through 31. It is misconduct for a juror during the course of trial to discuss the case with a nonjuror. ( People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 207, 155 Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91.) Here, however, Juror K.A. did not discuss the case or deliberations with her husband, but only the stress she was feeling in making the decision. That is not misconduct. As for Juror K.A.'s reading the Bible during deliberations, defendant concedes a juror may read Bible passages in the privacy of her home without committing misconduct. He notes, An inquiry into whether a juror privately studied his/her Bible at home during the time when their jury was deliberating would involve a degree of intrusion that our society would deem beyond the permissible.... Even if Juror K.A.'s reading of the Bible passages given to her by her husband was misconduct, we conclude it was not prejudicial. [A] finding of `inherently' likely bias is required when, but only when, the extraneous information was so prejudicial in context that its erroneous introduction in the trial itself would have warranted reversal of the judgment. ( Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 653, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) Moreover, we do not reverse unanimous verdicts because there is some possibility the juror was improperly influenced. Rather, the likelihood of bias under the inherent prejudice test must be substantial.  ( Id. at p. 654, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) Application of this `inherent prejudice' test obviously depends upon a review of the trial record to determine the prejudicial effect of the extraneous information. ( Id. at p. 653, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) Objectively considering the Book of Numbers passage in light of the compelling penalty phase evidence in this case, we conclude the passage was not inherently and substantially likely to influence, i.e., bias Juror K.A. Defendant was convicted of the premeditated murder of his sleeping cellmate. In his statement to police, defendant implied that he had killed Mr. Holt in order to receive the death penalty. Defendant had suffered six prior first degree murder convictions. All of the victims were strangers to defendant, and he indicated to police the stabbings were unimportant because the victims were bums. While defendant was incarcerated, he committed two other stabbings, and expressed frustration he had failed to kill one of these victims. He also fashioned and concealed several sharp weapons. During his penalty phase testimony, defendant expressed no remorse for his crimes, stating, I would not change a thing that I did in my life. He also strongly implied he would continue to be violent in a controlled setting, and apparently threatened the jury. While defendant introduced evidence he was schizophrenic, that evidence was not only disputed, but according to defendant's own medical experts, a significant aspect of this mental illness was that defendant derived great sadistic pleasure in attacking other people. Dr. Bittle testified that defendant is a sadist.... [W]hen I asked [defendant] to describe his feelings about the murders in Los Angeles, [he] became sexually excited. That is one of the motivations for Mr. Danks' behavior. Dr. Hill testified that defendant had a delusional self-concept that ... he is righteously performing murders or harming people[,] something that he also enjoys greatly. Moreover, even if defendant cooperated with his medication regimen, which he had on occasion refused to do in the past, he remained, as Dr. Hill testified, an extraordinarily dangerous individual regardless of whatever level of psychiatric improvement he may have. Similarly, Dr. Bittle testified that even in a treated and improved condition, defendant is an extremely dangerous individual. In addition, there was no guarantee that defendant would not ultimately be returned to the general prison population if the jury imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Such a possibility posed a continuing threat to the safety of prison personnel and other inmates. Indeed, even if defendant spent the rest of his life in solitary confinement, he was still a threat to prison personnel who for any reason needed to come into contact with him, for example, medical personnel who might be required to involuntarily medicate him. Weighing this penalty phase evidence against the exposure of Juror K.A. to the Book of Numbers passage, it does not appear the extraneous material, judged objectively, [was] inherently and substantially likely to have influenced or biased Juror K.A. ( Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 653, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) Having concluded the Book of Numbers passage was not inherently prejudicial, we now consider the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding circumstances to determine whether it is substantially likely Juror K.A. was nevertheless actually biased as a result of reading this passage. ( Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 579, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87.) As noted above, defendant concedes a juror may read the Bible in the privacy of her home without committing misconduct. Thus, he implicitly also concedes he suffered no actual bias as a result of Juror K.A. reading the relevant passage. Moreover, while Juror K.A. later shared this Bible passage with her fellow jurors, [a]t no time did [she] or anyone else argue or state that Mr. Danks should be put to death because of what that passage of the Bible said. Finally, consideration of the significant penalty phase evidence further diminishes the possibility defendant suffered actual bias as a result of Juror K.A.'s reading the Bible. We next consider Juror K.A.'s conversation with her pastor. [11] At church on Sunday evening, she encountered her pastor. Her pastor knew she was a juror in defendant's case. Juror K.A.'s husband said this might be a good time to talk to the pastor either about the Bible verses she had read or her feelings about the verdict. She said she did not need to discuss anything. The pastor said that he understood she had read several scripture verses. Juror K.A. said that she had read the scriptures and they gave her comfort. The pastor said those were good scriptures and jokingly said that if he were a juror, he would impose the death penalty on defendant. It is misconduct for a juror during the course of trial to discuss a case with a nonjuror. Here, Juror K.A. told her pastor she did not need to discuss anything with him, and mentioned that the scriptures passages had given her comfort. While these statements may or may not be misconduct, more critically, her pastor responded that those were good scriptures and jokingly said that if he were a juror, he would impose the death penalty on defendant. We have previously held that a juror's inadvertent receipt of information that [has] not been presented in court falls within the general category of `juror misconduct.' ( Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 579, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87.) Although inadvertent exposure to out-of-court information is not blameworthy conduct, as might be suggested by the term `misconduct,' it nevertheless gives rise to a presumption of prejudice, because it poses the risk that one or more jurors may be influenced by material that the defendant has had no opportunity to confront, cross-examine, or rebut. ( Ibid. ) Assuming Juror K.A.'s conversation with her pastor, and in particular her pastor's response, was misconduct, we conclude it was not prejudicial. In light of the extraordinary penalty phase evidence, the conversation as a whole, and the pastor's gratuitous personal view of the appropriate penalty in particular, judged objectively, were not inherently and substantially likely to have influenced, i.e., biased, Juror K.A. Nor is it substantially likely Juror K.A. was actually biased against defendant as a result of this conversation. We consider the nature of the misconduct, the surrounding circumstances, and the penalty phase record. ( Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 653-654, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) Juror K.A. told her pastor she had nothing to talk to him about, and he nevertheless insisted on imparting his personal, unsolicited view regarding the appropriate penalty verdict. The conversation then apparently ended, at least on this subject. Thus, unlike Nesler, where the juror upon inadvertently hearing a diatribe about the defendant did not leave the area, but continued to listen for a half hour, here the pastor stopped talking immediately and Juror K.A. did nothing to continue the conversation. ( Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 572, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87.) Moreover, again unlike Nesler, there is no evidence Juror K.A. repeated the pastor's comment in the jury room. ( Id. at pp. 573-574, 579, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87.) Thus, the juror's conduct and the surrounding circumstances fail to demonstrate actual bias. Moreover, the significant penalty record in this case further diminishes the possibility Juror K.A. became actually biased against defendant because of her pastor's comment. Defendant argues that Juror K.A. and her husband understood that her talking with her minister was in violation of the trial court's order not to discuss the case, and that they justified what [Juror K.A.] was about to do by subordinating the law given by the trial court to what they perceived to be divine law. Of course, it was Juror K.A.'s husband who said it would be permissible to speak with [their] pastor, and that this was permissible because a pastor is of a higher authority. As noted above, Juror K.A. told her pastor she did not need to discuss anything. We next consider Juror K.A.'s conduct in bringing a copy of the Book of Numbers passage into the jury room, and passing it around to the other jurors. This was misconduct. ( Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 465-467, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) However, just as in Juror K.A.'s private reading of the Book of Numbers, nothing in these verses, viewed objectively and in the context of the compelling penalty phase evidence, was inherently and substantially likely to influence, i.e., bias the jurors. Indeed here, one juror specifically commented that God played no role in the penalty decision. [12] Nor do we conclude Juror K.A.'s misconduct in sharing the Bible passages with her fellow jurors demonstrated either the substantial likelihood of her actual bias, or that it is substantially likely it resulted in the actual bias of other jurors. We emphasize that unlike the juror in Nesler, Juror K.A. did not repeatedly refer to this extrajudicial information despite admonitions from other jurors not to do so. ( Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 588, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87; id. at p. 589, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87.) Juror K.A. merely shared [her] personal view and did not purport to validate it as truth or impose [her] view on others. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 391, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34 ( Lewis ).) Indeed, there is no evidence that after the copy circulated the passages were even discussed, other than perhaps one juror's comment that God did not have a role in the jury's decision. While Christian beliefs were at some point discussed, we have no information as to what that conversation entailed. Moreover, we have previously observed that it is to be expected and is not misconduct that jurors ... consider their religious beliefs during penalty deliberations. ( Lewis, at p. 389, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.) Consideration of the significant penalty phase evidence further diminishes the possibility defendant suffered actual bias resulting from juror exposure to these passages. We next consider Juror B.P.'s conversation with her pastor during the penalty deliberations. Juror B.P. told her pastor she was a juror on a murder case, and asked, Is there anything in the Bible which speaks against the death penalty? She also told him she had made up her mind about the verdict. Her pastor stated, [B], I think I know what case you are on. There is no place in the Bible that takes the law out of the Bible. If you are sitting on the case I'm thinking you are sitting on, if I was in your shoes, I would not hesitate to give him the death penalty. When Juror B.P. returned to deliberations, on all occasions she voted for the same verdict as she had three times on Friday. At no time during the deliberations did she relate to the other jurors what her pastor had said, or argue or state that the death penalty should be imposed because of anything said in the Bible. [13] As noted above, it is misconduct for a juror to discuss a case with a nonjuror. Here, Juror B.P. asked her pastor about the Bible's stand on the very issue she was deliberating. Thus, her misconduct was more egregious than that of Juror K.A. We nevertheless conclude this misconduct was not prejudicial. Viewed objectively in light of the compelling penalty phase evidence in this case, Juror B.P.'s conversation with her pastor, and in particular, unsolicited information that Juror B.P.'s pastor would vote for the death penalty in a case he thought Juror B.P. was sitting on, was not inherently and substantially likely to influence her. Nor does the record demonstrate a substantial likelihood Juror B.P. was actually biased against defendant as a result of this conversation. Juror B.P. had already voted three times for the death penalty on Friday, and made up her mind, presumably after an impartial consideration of the evidence and application of the law before her, as to the appropriate penalty in this case. [14] Her general inquiry to her pastor was to determine not whether her vote was correct, but whether it violated a religious proscription. Moreover, her pastor's personal view of the appropriate penalty in the case he thought Juror B.P. was sitting on was unsolicited. As in the case of Juror K.A., and unlike the situation in Nesler, Juror B.P.'s conversation with her pastor apparently ended at this point at least on this subject. Also, like Juror K.A., and again unlike Nesler, Juror B.P. did not discuss the content of her conversation in the jury room. Thus, the juror's conduct and the surrounding circumstances fail to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of actual bias. Finally, the penalty record in this case further diminishes the possibility defendant suffered actual bias as a result of Juror B.P.'s conversation with her pastor. Thus, with respect to each individual matter, and viewing these matters collectively, we conclude the presumption of prejudice arising from the misconduct was rebutted, and there was no prejudicial misconduct. Having found no prejudicial juror misconduct, we conclude defendant's state and federal constitutional rights to an impartial jury and reliable penalty verdict were not violated. Nor under the circumstances of this case do we conclude that defendant's right to confrontation, or to the extent it is even implicated, his right to be free of an establishment of religion, were violated. We further reject defendant's other arguments on this issue, and in particular his argument that the jurors' sense of responsibility for their penalty decision was diminished, and that they substituted a source of law, other than California law as instructed by the trial judge, for the determination of the penalty. After exhaustive appellate review, we have concluded there is no substantial likelihood either that the Bible passages or the conversations with the pastors were inherently prejudicial or that they resulted in any juror's actual bias. In particular, no objective evidence in the record demonstrates a substantial likelihood any juror felt he or she had less of a weighty responsibility of making a penalty determination after these events occurred. While this case involves religious beliefs, an intensely private area, we are unwilling to ascribe to any perceived stereotype that jurors who receive advice from Christian spiritual leaders, or are exposed to Biblical passages, per se suffer a diminished sense of responsibility for their penalty verdict, and are automatically rendered incapable of fairly evaluating the evidence and law before them. Moreover, although we have found misconduct, albeit nonprejudicial, in certain instances above, we reiterate that nothing in our opinion is intended to convey that a juror's consideration of personal religious, philosophical, or secular normative values is improper during penalty deliberations. (See Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 389-390, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.) As we have repeatedly stated, the task of jurors at the penalty phase is qualitatively different from that at the guilt phase. At the penalty phase, jurors are asked to make a normative determination  one which necessarily includes moral and ethical considerations  designed to reflect community values. (See, e.g., People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 263, 275, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118.) `The court in no way means to suggest that jurors cannot rely on their personal faith and deeply-held beliefs when facing the awesome decision of whether to impose the sentence of death on a fellow citizen.' ( Lewis, at pp. 389-390, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34; cf. People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 194, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862 [We do not mean to rule out all reference to religion or religious figures so long as the reference does not purport to be a religious law or commandment].) As one author has noted, the discretion given to a jury to extend or withhold mercy ... will never produce `a wholly rational, calculated, and logical process'.... [D]eterminations of the appropriate punishment involve factors which are not only `too intangible to write into a statute' but are also too abstract for a jury to rely on independent of their personal values.' (Note, Thou Shalt Not Quote the Bible: Determining the Propriety of Attorney Use of Religious Philosophy and Themes in Oral Arguments (1998-1999) 33 Ga. L.Rev. 1113, 1176.) In concluding Jurors K.A. and B.P. were actually biased, Justice Moreno's concurring and dissenting opinion is unable to marshal objective evidence demonstrating a substantial likelihood of such bias, but instead relies on misstatements of the record and speculation to reach its conclusion. In particular, there is no evidence Jurors K.A. and B.P. took the extraordinary step of discussing their possible death verdict with their pastors. (Conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 811, 82 P.3d at p. 1285.) Rather, Juror K.A. states she told her pastor she did not need to discuss anything. Juror B.P. told her pastor she had made up [her] mind about the verdict, and simply wanted to know if there was anything in the Bible which speaks against the death penalty. Nor does Juror K.A.'s declaration include any evidence, even inadmissible evidence, she discussed the case first with her husband. (Conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 815, 82 P.3d at pp. 1288-89; id. 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 816, 82 P.3d at p. 1289 [Juror K.A. `felt the necessity' of talking to her husband about the case].) Rather, Juror K.A. states, I did not discuss the case or our deliberations with [my husband], but simply the stress I felt in making the decision. The concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that B.P. candidly acknowledged that she spoke with her pastor about `the difficulty of making the decision.' Her pastor then told her that he `would not hesitate' to give defendant the death penalty. The damage was done. Juror E.M. stated that, after this meeting, and `[d]uring the penalty phase deliberat[i]ons in the [Danks] case, [B.P.] told me that she had talked to her pastor for guidance on the case.' Simply stated, if B.P. had been certain of her verdict, she would not have asked her pastor for guidance in making this difficult decision. (Conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 816, 82 P.3d at p. 1290.) Juror E.M.'s single sentence statement fails to place the reported conversation into any meaningful context. Nevertheless, we know from Juror B.P.'s declaration what she meant by guidance. When that declaration is read as a whole, it is apparent that while Juror B.P. acknowledged the difficulty of making the penalty decision, she told her pastor she had already done so. What she sought guidance regarding was whether anything in the Bible spoke against the death penalty. The concurring and dissenting opinion conveniently omits this portion of Juror B.P.'s declaration, and conflates the sentences to make it improperly appear that the pastor's comment was not unsolicited, which it was, but was in response to an inquiry by Juror B.P. about which penalty decision she should make. Moreover, contrary to the manner in which the conversation is portrayed by both concurring and dissenting opinions, the pastor further stated he was not certain what case B.P. was serving as a juror on. (Conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J., 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 807-808, 82 P.3d at pp. 1282-83.) Justice Moreno's concurring and dissenting opinion notes in concluding Juror B.P. was actually biased that while Juror B.P. did not discuss the content of her conversation with her pastor with fellow jurors, she did, as noted above, reportedly tell Juror E.M. that she had asked her pastor for guidance. (Conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 817, 82 P.3d at p. 1290, fn. 5.) From this, the dissent concludes, Thus, even if B.P. did not relate to other jurors the specifics of that conversation, she apparently did not hesitate to make the jury aware that such a conversation took place. ( Ibid. ) The dissent later states, B.P. also informed other jurors during deliberations that her pastor offered her guidance on this difficult decision. ( Id., 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 819, 82 P.3d at p. 1292.) Contrary to the concurring and dissenting opinion's assertion, there is no evidence B.P. ... informed other jurors during deliberations that her pastor offered her guidance on [the penalty] decision. (Conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 819-20, 82 P.3d at p. 1292.) Rather, as noted above, we know from Juror B.P.'s declaration what guidance she is referring to, i.e., whether the death penalty violated a religious proscription. That inquiry does not demonstrate actual bias. Nor could her mention of the fact of this conversation in the jury room, without more, demonstrate her actual bias. The concurring and dissenting opinion relies on the fact that Christian beliefs were discussed during ... deliberations. (Conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 820, 82 P.3d at p. 1292; id., 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 821-22, 82 P.3d at p. 1294.) We are not given any information as to what this discussion entailed, and there appears to be no basis to conclude the discussion was improper. ( Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 657, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985 [We will not presume greater misconduct than the evidence shows].) Indeed, Juror K.A. specifically stated that [a]t no time did I or anyone else argue or state that Mr. Danks should be put to death because of what that passage of the Bible said, and Juror B.P. stated, At no time during the deliberations ... did I argue or state that the death penalty should be imposed because of anything said in the Bible. Most important, as set forth at length above, and contrary to the strong implication of the concurring and dissenting opinion, there is nothing improper with a penalty jury discussing normative beliefs in reaching a penalty decision. 2. Alleged Miranda Violation Defendant contends his judgment of death must be reversed because the trial court erroneously admitted his 1987 statement to police concerning the earlier murders. He contends the police violated his Miranda rights in obtaining this statement by ignoring his invocation of the right to counsel. Defendant does not attack the validity of his six prior murder convictions. Rather, he contends that without this statement, none of the evidence concerning the stabbing of derelicts in Los Angeles would have been admissible, since none of it would have connected [defendant] with the stabbings. However, defendant apparently concedes some such evidence would have been admissible, since he also contends that absent his statement, the jury in this case would have only received a minute order stat[ing] the bare fact of the six prior murder convictions, with no description of the underlying facts and not even anything to connect the conviction[s] with the stabbings of derelicts described by witnesses. The jury may not even have realized that the evidence of the stabbings referred to by witnesses pertained to the same murders as the 1990 conviction. Defendant also contends that absent his statement, the jury would not have heard his callous remark, It ain't nothing, man, three or four bums. I don't see what the big fucking deal is, what the big fucking deal is, man. Assuming defendant can at this point attack his 1987 statement in an unrelated crime that is being used in this case solely for penalty phase evidence purposes, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1037, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544 ( Bradford ).) Significantly, defendant does not challenge the validity of his six prior murder convictions, and at the penalty phase the prosecution was entitled to delineate the circumstances underlying those convictions. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 818, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481 [this court has repeatedly rejected the contention that only the fact of the prior conviction is admissible, not the details of the offense]; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 640, 250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189.) Moreover, during his penalty phase testimony, defendant stated, I did stab them bums in their back, in the back of their neck, in their side while they were laying down, while they were asleep.... In addition, the witnesses describing the stabbings, and documentary evidence such as death certificates, indicated all but one of the victims were dead, and defendant's own witnesses noted defendant called himself a bum buster and repeatedly maintained the people he had stabbed and allegedly killed were not dead. Thus, even without defendant's 1987 statement, the jury could not have failed to link defendant's prior murder convictions to the stabbings described by witnesses. Furthermore, while defendant was callous in his remark that stabbing bums was not serious, defendant's planning and execution of Mr. Holt's murder also evidenced extreme callousness, as did his expression of apparent irritation in failing to kill fellow patient Mr. McCully during that attack. 3. Alleged Error Regarding Number of Special Circumstances Defendant contends the trial court erroneously submitted six, rather than one, prior murder conviction special-circumstance allegations to the jury. The indictment filed against defendant included two counts. Count 1 alleged assault by a person serving a life sentence with force likely to produce great bodily injury which resulted in death (§ 4500), and count 2 alleged premeditated murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). Count 2, but not count 1, also included six allegations of prior first degree murder convictions. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2); hereafter section 190.2(a)(2).) Section 190.2(a)(2), added by initiative in 1978, provides in relevant part: The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the following special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4 to be true: [¶] ... [¶] ... The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first or second degree. Thus, to find the allegation true, a jury simply must find a defendant has suffered a prior first or second degree murder conviction. When a defendant has more than one prior first or second degree murder conviction, the most reasonable reading of the language of section 190.2(a)(2) is that a defendant is subject to a prior murder special circumstance for each of these convictions. Section 190.2(a)(2) does not say that only one such prior conviction may be used, or that all such convictions must be combined into a single special circumstance. The electorate could reasonably conclude a defendant who previously murdered six people, and suffered six prior murder convictions as a result, is more culpable than a defendant who previously murdered only one person, and sustained only one prior murder conviction. It seems unlikely that section 190.2(a)(2) was intended to impose only one special circumstance for both individuals despite their disparate records. By contrast to section 190.2(a)(2), section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3) provides as a special circumstance that [t]he defendant, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree. Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3) does not permit a separate multiple-murder special circumstance to be attached to each murder conviction sustained in the capital case because such duplicative use of multiple-murder special circumstances artificially inflates the seriousness of the defendant's conduct. ( People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1148, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757.) However, no such duplication or artificial inflation arises when a special circumstance is charged for each earlier murder of which the defendant was previously convicted. Moreover here, the special circumstance allegations attached only to count 2, not to both counts. Indeed, while we do not appear to have previously decided the question, our cases have assumed a defendant is subject to a prior murder special circumstance for each prior first or second degree murder conviction. ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 325, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846 [noting jury found true two special circumstance allegations under section 190.2(a)(2) for the defendant's two prior murder convictions]; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 561, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893 [the defendant admitted the truth of the three alleged prior-murder special circumstances, having been previously convicted of the murders of his three children]; id. at p. 567, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893; People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 588-589, 595-596, 238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350 [upholding under section 190.2(a)(2) two prior murder conviction special circumstances imposed for two prior murder convictions; rejecting challenge that special circumstances were invalid because murders in prior convictions occurred after the capital crimes].) The cases defendant cites are inapposite, since in both cases the defendant had suffered only one prior murder conviction. ( People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 206, 221, 224, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285 [striking two of three prior murder special circumstances when the defendant had one prior murder conviction, and three current murder convictions]; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1244, 1246, 1274, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115 [same].) 4. Alleged Instructional Error Defendant makes numerous claims of instructional error. We find none meritorious. In particular, the trial court did not err in failing to require the jury to make unanimous separate findings of the truth of specific aggravating evidence, or to render a statement of reasons for its verdict in the event it imposed death. ( Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 263, 275, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 782, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Nothing in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, or Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, affects our conclusions in this regard. ( Prieto, at pp. 263, 275, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) Nor did the trial court violate defendant's Eighth Amendment rights when it failed to instruct the jury it did not have to unanimously agree on mitigation. The penalty phase instructions conveyed unmistakably that jurors were to undergo an individualized process of weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.... [T]here was little likelihood of the jury's reading into the instructions a requirement that they agree unanimously on any circumstance or evidence as mitigating. ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 769, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) Nor should the jury have been instructed that the reasonable doubt standard governed its penalty determination, i.e., that to impose a sentence of death they had to be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances were so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that they warranted death, and that death was the justified and appropriate sentence in view of all the evidence. ( Medina, at p. 782, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2; Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1059, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) Nothing in Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, or Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, mandates a different conclusion. ( Prieto, at pp. 263, 275, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.)