Opinion ID: 789255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Mental Health Condition at Sentencing

Text: 28 Pruden also appeals a condition that the District Court placed on his three-year term of supervised release, which reads: The defendant shall participate in a mental health treatment program at the discretion of the probation officer. At sentencing, Pruden did not object to this condition, and we therefore review the sentence for plain error. See United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 248, 251 (3d Cir.1998); cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Appellant bears the burden of proof of establishing plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Evans sets forth the plain error standard: 29 There must be an error that is plain and that affects substantial rights. The deviation from a legal rule is error, and an error is plain if it is clear or obvious. In most cases, an error affects substantial rights if it is prejudicial, i.e., affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. When such an error exists, the Court of Appeals has authority to order correction, but is not required to do so. We will exercise our discretion and vacate the sentence if the plain error affecting substantial rights also seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 30 155 F.3d at 251 (some internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, if there is plain error, we may correct it, but we must correct it only if it seriously impacts the fairness of the judicial system.
31 The District Court is limited in its discretion to impose conditions on release by the supervised release statute, which is not open-textured. Evans, 155 F.3d at 248. The statute allows the court to impose a condition upon supervised release to the extent that the condition is reasonably related to certain factors set forth in § 3553(a)(1) & (2) and involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the § 3553(a)(2) purposes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). The court must thus consider the following § 3553 factors in setting conditions on supervised release: 32 (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; 33 (2) the need for the sentence imposed — 34 ... 35 (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 36 (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 37 (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 38 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a). [I]t is not necessary for all of the factors identified in § 3553(a) to be present before a special condition of supervised release may be imposed.... United States v. Sicher, 239 F.3d 289, 291 (3d Cir.2000). 39 The § 3553(a) factors are fairly broad, but they do impose a real restriction on the district court's freedom to impose conditions on supervised release. Courts generally cannot impose such a condition — even one with a clearly rehabilitative purpose — without evidence that the condition imposed is reasonably related, that is, related in a tangible way, Evans, 155 F.3d at 249, to the crime or to something in the defendant's history. 40 This is not an especially high standard. At the same time, though, it is a standard with teeth: a condition with no basis in the record, or with only the most tenuous basis, will inevitably violate § 3583(d)(2)'s command that such conditions involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. To facilitate review, a district court should state on the record its reasons for imposing any such condition. See United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 371 (3d Cir.1999). Not surprisingly, our sister Courts of Appeal have set aside conditions that had inadequate support in the record, as set forth in the margin. 3 41 Here, the District Court did not point to any evidence that any of the § 3553(a) factors were present in Pruden's case. As for § 3553(a)(1), neither the nature and circumstances of the offense, here an attempt to purchase a weapon illegally, nor the history and characteristics of the defendant, provide any evidence of a need for mental health treatment. The only evidence of Pruden's history and characteristics came from the PSR, which tends to show that Pruden has a generally good mental state with no history of mental illness. The PSR does detail a troubling family history, although, as the government itself argued at sentencing, this history is no worse than that of many other criminal defendants. And while Pruden has a long criminal history, this alone cannot demonstrate a need for mental health treatment — for if it did, virtually any repeat offender could be required to undergo such treatment. Cf. Evans, 155 F.3d at 249. 42 Similarly, while a district court may impose conditions on supervised release to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner, § 3553(a)(2)(D), we have no indication that there is in fact any need for mental health treatment. Again, the PSR does not report any need for mental health treatment. And no one even suggests that the mental health condition serves the preventive or deterrent functions of § 3553(a)(2)(B) or (C). 43 We are not unappreciative of the good intentions of the District Court, as exemplified by its statement to Pruden that the condition would give you the help you need when you get back on the street. In its desire to try to convert Pruden into a constructive member of society, the District Court indulged the notion that mental health treatment might help. But such a notion does not satisfy our jurisprudence. Moreover, imposition of a condition of supervised release creates significant costs for the probation system, 4 and can result in sanctions on the defendant for violation of the condition. 44 Given the complete absence of facts that would indicate a need for this mental health treatment, we cannot find that this condition is reasonably related to any of the allowable purposes of conditions on supervised release.
45 The condition on supervised release is also invalid because it delegates to Pruden's probation officer the decision whether to require mental health treatment: The defendant shall participate in a mental health treatment program at the discretion of the probation officer. 46 Probation officers have broad statutory authority to advise and supervise probationers, and to perform any other duty that the court may designate. 18 U.S.C. § 3603(10). But the breadth of these powers is limited by the probation officer's status as a nonjudicial officer. United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1078 (8th Cir.2000). The most important limitation is that a probation officer may not decide the nature or extent of the punishment imposed upon a probationer. Id.; see also Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916) ([U]nder our constitutional system the right to ... impose the punishment provided by law is judicial....). 47 This limitation extends not only to the length of a prison term imposed, but also to the conditions of probation or supervised release. United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808 (4th Cir.1995). Several courts have derived this limitation on probation officers' authority from the United States Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(b) (The court may impose other conditions of probation....); United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir.2001), but it is of constitutional dimension, deriving from Article III's grant of authority over cases and controversies to the courts, see United States v. Melendez-Santana, 353 F.3d 93, 101 (1st Cir.2003); United States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir.2001); Kent, 209 F.3d at 1078-79; Johnson, 48 F.3d at 808-09. In United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001), we struck down a delegation to a probation officer for a different constitutional reason, finding that a condition of supervised release that prevented the defendant from possessing pornography was void for vagueness because it gave Loy's probation officer the power to decide what materials met the definition of pornography. 48 To be sure, probation officers must be allowed some discretion in dealing with their charges; courts cannot be expected to map out every detail of a defendant's supervised release. The Second Circuit has reconciled these two imperatives, holding that: If [the defendant] is required to participate in a mental health intervention only if directed to do so by his probation officer, then this special condition constitutes an impermissible delegation of judicial authority to the probation officer. On the other hand, if the District Court was intending nothing more than to delegate to the probation officer the details with respect to the selection and schedule of the program, such delegation was proper. 49 Peterson, 248 F.3d at 85 (citations omitted). We agree with this statement of the standard, which properly balances the need for flexibility with the constitutional requirement that judges, not probation officers, set the terms of a defendant's sentence. Other courts are generally in accord with this view. See United States v. Allen, 312 F.3d 512, 515-16 (1st Cir.2002) (adopting Peterson test and finding that a mental health condition was intended to be mandatory, with the administrative details delegated to the probation officer); Kent, 209 F.3d at 1078-79. 50 We apply the Peterson standard to this case. Here, the District Court thus gave Pruden's probation officer the authority to decide whether or not Pruden will have to participate in a mental health treatment program. 5 As this was an impermissible delegation of judicial authority, this aspect of the sentence was error.
51 We have concluded that the District Court erred in imposing the mental health condition, and in delegating discretion to the probation officer. Given the wealth and unanimity of the precedents on these issues, we believe that the error was plain. A plainly erroneous condition of supervised release will inevitably affect substantial rights, as a defendant who fails to meet that condition will be subject to further incarceration. Evans, 155 F.3d at 252. Similarly, imposing a sentence not authorized by law seriously affects the fairness, integrity, and reputation of the proceedings. Id. Thus, we are required to correct the plain error in this case by vacating this aspect of the sentence. 52 We repeat that this conclusion is no reflection on the fairness, integrity, and reputation of the District Court in this case. No one has questioned that the District Court's motivation in imposing the mental health condition was to help Pruden break the cycle of recidivism into which he seems to have fallen. Indeed, we are hesitant to thwart the District Court's attempt to rehabilitate Pruden, but we conclude that the law compels us to do so.