Opinion ID: 806648
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer

Text: The Georgia felony offense for obstructing or hindering a law enforcement officer is defined in pertinent part as follows: “Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer . . . in the lawful discharge of his official duties by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer . . . is guilty of a felony.” O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b). The Court of Appeals 8 Case: 11-13064 Date Filed: 08/15/2012 Page: 9 of 13 of Georgia has confirmed that “offering to do violence” or “doing violence to the person of such officer” is an element of the offense, and the statute implies “forcible resistance.” Fairwell v. Georgia, 717 S.E.2d 332, 338 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). We recently held that a similarly worded offense for resisting an officer with violence, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 843.01, constituted a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA.6 See United States v. Nix, 628 F.3d 1341, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2010). In Nix, we expressly adopted the rationale set forth in our unpublished opinion in United States v. Hayes, 409 Fed. App’x 277, 278-79 (11th Cir. 2010). 628 F.3d at 1342. Significantly, in Hayes, we concluded that a violation of § 843.01 “falls squarely within ACCA’s residual clause.”7 409 Fed. App’x at 27879. We reasoned that common sense dictates that the act of resisting arrest “poses a threat of direct confrontation between a police officer and the subject of the arrest, creating the potential for serious physical injury to the officer and others.” Id. at 279 (quoting United States v. Wardrick, 350 F.3d 446, 455 (4th Cir. 2003)). 6 That Florida statute provides: “Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer . . . in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer . . . is guilty of a felony . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 843.01. 7 The Hayes panel did not reach the question of whether the Florida offense would additionally qualify as a violent felony under the “use of force” clause, because it was “satisfied that it falls well within the residual clause.” 409 Fed. App’x at 278. 9 Case: 11-13064 Date Filed: 08/15/2012 Page: 10 of 13 Noting that the statute’s plain language made clear that the offense of resisting arrest with violence is “purposeful, violent, and aggressive,” we had “no difficulty concluding that one who commits the crime of resisting arrest by knowingly and willfully offering or doing violence to an arresting officer has committed a ‘violent felony’ for purposes of ACCA.” Id. Nix cannot be distinguished on the basis of the statutory language analyzed, as the text of the Florida statute at issue there was nearly identical to that of the Georgia statute in the instant case. Both provisions require that a defendant “knowingly and willfully resist[], obstruct[], or oppose[]” an officer “by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer.” O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b); Fla. Stat. § 843.01. Although we need not rule definitively, pursuant to Nix, Morris’s obstruction of an officer conviction would likely qualify as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(b)’s residual clause.8 Equally important, Morris cites no binding 8 We reject Morris’s position that Nix improperly relied only on common sense, and not statistical data, to determine whether the offense posed a risk of injury. See United States v. Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971, 981 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining that, even though “the Supreme Court and this Court have relied on statistics when determining whether offenses are crimes of violence . . . we have never held that statistical evidence is required,” and “when, as here, we are without the benefit of empirical evidence, we rely on our own common-sense analysis of whether [the] conduct poses a serious potential risk of physical injury”) (quotations omitted). Morris’s argument that Nix was otherwise wrongly decided does not warrant extended discussion. Under the prior panel precedent rule, we are bound by Nix “unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Brown, 342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003). Finally, even assuming Nix is not technically binding with respect to the instant analysis, Morris would still be unable to demonstrate plain error. 10 Case: 11-13064 Date Filed: 08/15/2012 Page: 11 of 13 precedent to the contrary. See Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d at 1291.9 We discern no plain error in the district court’s designation of the obstruction of a law enforcement officer conviction as a crime of violence. In sum, the district court did not plainly err when it classified the battery of a law enforcement officer conviction and the obstruction conviction as crimes of violence for Morris’s career-offender enhancement. Nor did the district court commit plain error by failing to specify under which clause of § 4B1.2(a) Morris’s prior convictions qualified as crimes of violence or by failing to perform a modified categorical analysis. Even assuming there was error that was plain, Morris cannot show a reasonable probability of a different outcome because—for the reasons set forth above—both predicate convictions would likely qualify as crimes of violence under at least one of the clauses of § 4B1.2(a).