Opinion ID: 3003227
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Termination of Bilal’s Employment

Text: The district court ruled that Bilal failed to present sufficient evidence that she was terminated on the basis of her gender under either the direct or indirect methods of proving discrimination. Bilal contests this ruling and claims she should prevail under either method. For the direct method, Bilal must show either through direct or circumstantial evidence that impermissible consideration of her gender motivated her termination. See Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 938-39 (7th Cir. 2003). Where there is no direct evidence of an No. 08-2371 Page 11 employer’s discriminatory animus, a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that points directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s action” may suffice. Sartor v. Spherion Corp., 388 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Bilal argues that she has satisfied the direct method of proof because “the record reflects that Oury stated to her that he could make her problems go away at work, if she complied with his sexual advances – and then terminated Daphne after she rebuffed him.” But this is not evidence that “points directly” to a discriminatory reason for Bilal’s termination. Sartor, 388 F.3d at 278. Without more to tie Bilal’s rejection of Oury to her firing, there is insufficient direct evidence that discriminatory animus motivated his termination. Bilal also fails to establish that genuine issues of material fact exist under the indirect method established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, (1973). Under that test, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir.2002). With the prima facie case established, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. O’Neal v. City of Chicago, 392 F.3d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff can then present evidence that the reason is pretextual. Id. In order to make her prima facie case, Bilal must show that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing his job satisfactorily; (3) she experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably. Traylor, 295 F.3d at 788. Here, even assuming that Bilal could satisfy the first three prongs of the prima facie test,2 she has failed to satisfy the fourth prong. In order to satisfy the fourth part of the prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably than she was. Bilal claims that Rotec employees Larry Bey and Edward Roman were similarly situated individuals who were treated more favorably. However, other than identifying Roman as a Human Resources representative and purchasing manager, Bilal presents nothing in her appellate brief (and presented nothing in her summary judgment brief or Rule 56.1 statement below) to show why these employees were similarly situated or how they were treated more favorably. Thus, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to 2 We have some doubt as to whether Bilal could have satisfied the second prong, as she admitted that she engaged in an argument with her supervisor, Chesterine Lombardo immediately before she was terminated. See Stringel v. Methodist Hosp., 89 F.3d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 1996) (insubordination is a legitimate reason for discharge). But we need not consider this issue at length since Bilal has clearly failed to meet her burden of showing similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably. No. 08-2371 Page 12 defendants on the discrimination claim.