Opinion ID: 147688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: standard of review

Text: “To qualify for restriction on removal, an alien must demonstrate that his life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal because of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Sarr v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). If an applicant can demonstrate past persecution based on a protected ground, it is presumed that his life or freedom would be threatened in the future on the same basis. Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005). By contrast, an alien seeking relief under the CAT need not show that the persecution will occur on account of a statutorily protected ground. But he must show that he has a greater chance of being persecuted than -7- not, and that “the persecution would be so severe that it would rise to the level of torture.” Id. at 1196. Because the BIA issued a reasoned, albeit short, opinion in this case, we limit our review to the reasons expressed therein. We may, however, consult the IJ’s opinion to the extent it enhances our understanding of the BIA’s reasoning. See Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining different methods of BIA decision making and implications for judicial review). We review the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence, rejecting them only if “the record demonstrates that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Sarr, 474 F.3d at 788-89 (internal quotation marks omitted). We review legal determinations de novo. Herrera-Castillo v. Holder, 573 F.3d 1004, 1007 (10th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 25, 2010) (No. 09-9834). Restriction on Removal In this case, the BIA made a factual determination that Ahmed was arrested and beaten, not because of his political opinion or membership in his family, but because the authorities sought information concerning his brother. To reverse this finding, we would have to say that the evidence not only supports another conclusion, but compels it. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992). Ahmed argues that the evidence supports a reversal, even ignoring his own testimony and the attendant credibility issues. He points out that both his brother -8- and sister testified that his family was considered a political enemy, and he argues this fact is further bolstered by the burning of his family’s home and the murder of his parents. But the BIA made no findings concerning his family’s political views or the extent to which those views caused them to suffer. Rather, it found, based on Ahmed’s own testimony, that his mistreatment stemmed from his refusal to divulge his brother’s whereabouts, which is neither a political belief nor an immutable characteristic. We conclude that substantial evidence supports this determination. That is, we agree that Ahmed’s own testimony was fatal to his claim. Even if his ties to the UPC played some part in his arrest, Ahmed consistently testified that the beatings and prolonged detention occurred because of his refusal to tell the authorities where his brother was. Furthermore, even if his brother was wanted for political reasons–a finding the evidence does not compel–Ahmed has cited no authority that would protect him from removal based on past mistreatment for failing to divulge his brother’s whereabouts. We also reject Ahmed’s argument that the BIA wrongly required him to show that his mistreatment constituted a “form of punishment.” Read in context and alongside the IJ’s parallel reasoning, these words added no additional requirement to Ahmed’s already heavy burden. Restriction on removal requires an alien to show that his “life or freedom would be threatened . . . because of [his] . . . membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added). In our view, the BIA’s denial of relief based -9- on Ahmed’s failure to show he was mistreated “as a form of punishment,” simply reflects the statutory requirement that the alien’s mistreatment be tied to a protected ground. Relief under the CAT Finally, we decline Ahmed’s invitation to revisit his claim for relief under the CAT. He argues the BIA erred in rejecting this claim because protection under the CAT does not depend on the torture occurring on account of a statutorily protected ground. This may be so, but Ahmed’s failure to make this point to the BIA precludes our consideration of it. We have recognized that neglecting to take an appeal to the BIA constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to any issue that could have been raised, negating the jurisdiction necessary for subsequent judicial review. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction only over those claims that were presented to the BIA and were properly appealed to this court . . . . Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1017 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A review of the administrative record reveals that Ahmed made no argument specific to his CAT claim in his brief to the BIA. The BIA therefore upheld the IJ’s denial of that claim, and we are not at liberty to overturn that decision. -10-