Opinion ID: 1960214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Timeliness of Objections

Text: The defense did not object to the prosecutor's use of his first three peremptory challenges against three black females, Cheryl Eaglin, Irma Miller (who had earlier been accepted by the prosecutor), and Denise Garrett. After the prosecutor exercised his fourth peremptory challenge against Stacy Thomas, a black female, the defense raised a Batson objection as to all four peremptory strikes. By that time, however, Eaglin, Miller and Garrett had left the courthouse, having been excused from previous panels (one on the previous day). The prosecutor gave race-neutral reasons as to Thomas only, stating that he did not have his notes in court regarding the other three. The judge ruled that objections to the first three jurors were untimely since the jurors were no longer under any instructions in the case. The judge further noted that he was satisfied, based upon the record and the answers from the other prospective jurors during voir dire examination, that the challenges were not exercised in a discriminatory manner. The issue of the timeliness of Batson objections is difficult because a pattern of discrimination may not become evident in early stages of voir dire. In State v. Snyder, 98-1078 (La.4/14/99), 750 So.2d 832, the prosecutor strategically accepted one African-American juror early in the jury selection process, arguably to thwart any pattern of discrimination from emerging after his exclusion of all subsequent black jurors, and then backstruck the juror later. Although Snyder's jury was all white, this court in a divided opinion held that the defense waived any Batson objections by failing to lodge the objections timely. The problem in the instant case, as it was in Snyder, is the ability of the trial judge to fashion a remedy, when the first Batson objection is raised, as to jurors previously excused. Here, defendant contends that since he objected before the jury was empaneled, his Batson claim was preserved, and the trial judge should have held a hearing as to the challenges of Eaglin, Miller and Garrett. Thus, defendant suggests that this court at least should order a remand for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the reasons for the prosecutor's first three peremptory challenges. While this remedy, among others, may be available in an appropriate case, the record of voir dire in the present case reveals that the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes was so clearly justified that our consideration of a remand to determine the existence of discriminatory intent is not warranted. Eaglin, on her jury questionnaire, expressed sentiments that the death penalty is wrong unless a person deliberate[ly] has taken someone life without a probable cause. Although stating that I am all for making someone do the time if they do the crime, she reiterated her preference for a life sentence over the death penalty, especially if the person was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the killing. She also did not think that the death penalty was appropriate for first offenders. She further admitted that her brother-in-law was killed during a drug deal, that his killer was sentenced to life imprisonment without probation or parole, and that she felt justice was served in that case. Miller, on her jury questionnaire, wrote, I feel that the death penalty is warranted on severe, heinous crimes where no chance of rehabilitation is foreseeable for the person committing the crime. Although she attested to some strong religious views, she indicated that she could follow the law. She admitted that her twenty-seven-year old son was convicted of receiving stolen goods and that she visits him in prison regularly. See State v. Lindsey, 543 So.2d 886 (La. 1989) (considering the fact that a family member is a convicted criminal to be a racially-neutral reason for excluding a prospective juror). Miller also confirmed that she has visited a former schoolmate who is in prison for murdering a store owner during a robbery. She stated she had two brothers who are pastors and one brother who was shot to death in 1970, but no one had been convicted of that crime. Garrett, during voir dire, elaborated on her feelings about capital punishment: Okay. I feel it is appropriate if the person that's up on trial, all the evidence and everything is in, and they are, you know, under no circumstances they are found guilty; all the evidence is right there, then I'm for it. But if there's any question in mind, I'm against it. When the prosecutor told the panel he was asking them to order defendant to be strapped on a gurney and injected with death-causing material, Garrett reacted visibly, according to the prosecutor. She then explained, I would still be for it, butI'm kind of on both sides, put it like that. Garrett admitted that her brother was presently incarcerated on an armed robbery conviction, that he had been in and out of jail, and that she had visited him regularly in prison. Garrett also stated that she had been the victim of a robbery while she was employed at a convenience store and that she had been successful in personally turning around some troubled young people. Based on the totality of the responses and the trial judge's observation that the three challenges were not exercised in a discriminating manner, we conclude that the prosecutor was justified in striking these jurors.