Opinion ID: 2519072
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We Uphold the Arbitrators' Decisions.

Text: Arbitrator William Dorsey conducted a full hearing and issued a nineteen-page decision on the merits to decide the following question: Did the grievant's failure to report for work as scheduled on October 15, 2001 give the employer just cause (as that phrase is used in Article 5 of the parties' 2000-2003 contract) to dismiss him? This formulation of the issue was framed with the consent of the parties. The arbitrator considered Baseden's arguments regarding his legitimate reasons for not reporting to work on October 15, 2001, as scheduled, including that Baseden had cause to distrust the employer's representatives and that Baseden did not receive a complete position description for the new position (PCN 25-2311) which the state was offering him. Arbitrator Dorsey decided, however, that Baseden's concern over the change of PCN did not warrant absenting himself from work because Baseden had been notified that he would be returning to work as an Engineer/Architect III, and it is this classification, not the PCN, which determines an employee's salary. Moreover, Arbitrator Dorsey found that because the state had already hired someone else to fill Baseden's old PCN, and because Baseden knew that fact prior to receiving notice of the reinstatement offer, Baseden knew or should have known that he would be working as an Engineer/Architect III under a different PCN whenever he returned to the payroll. Arbitrator Dorsey also found that the duties and tasks described on Baseden's incomplete position description were exactly the same as those he had under his former PCN. After considering these factors, Arbitrator Dorsey concluded: The grievant had no legitimate reason for his failure to report for work at DOT & PF on October 15, 2001 as scheduled, and therefore his failure to return to work for the employer on that day was deliberate. . . . . . . . Under all of the facts and circumstances of this case, the grievant's deliberate failure to report for work at DOT & PF as scheduled on October 15, 2001 constituted an immediately dischargeable offense under Article 5 of the parties' contract. The Dorsey decision is further supported by the Gaunt decision, in which Arbitrator Gaunt ruled that deference to Arbitrator Dorsey's decision was warranted under the circumstances because Baseden received a full and fair prior hearing and Arbitrator Dorsey issued a clear and well-reasoned opinion. Baseden's pro se briefing does not specifically articulate any reasons why the Dorsey decision was either gross error or arbitrary and capricious, and is instead directed towards the superior court's failure to properly evaluate the arbitrators' decisions. [16] Baseden argues that special circumstances warranted his rejection of the offer of reinstatement. Baseden's special circumstances included the fact that he was bound by statute to use a grievance procedure, that he was an employee of the state of Alaska, and that he would have lost his remaining rights in his first grievance by accepting the position. [17] Baseden does not make clear the legal relevance of the first two factors, and he provides no factual or legal support for the proposition that his return to work would have terminated his remaining rights under his first grievance. To the contrary, the state notified Baseden in its letter of September 24, 2001, that [r]egardless of the ultimate resolution of [Baseden's claim to compensatory damages and attorney's fees], none of these matters interfere with Mr. Baseden's ability to return to work. Moreover, the record indicates that Arbitrator Dorsey fully considered these facts and concluded that Baseden was not justified in refusing to return to work. Because Baseden's claims are without support, and because the arbitrator's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, we affirm the arbitrator's decision regarding Baseden's eligibility for wages and benefits subsequent to October 15, 2001. Baseden also argues that the chronological order of the arbitration hearings somehow deprived him of his rights because Arbitrator Dorsey made his decision without the benefit of knowing that Arbitrator Gaunt would conclude two years later that the state was not allowed to unilaterally settle the grievance procedure. Baseden's claim that he was prejudiced by the order of the arbitration is without merit because Arbitrator Dorsey was fully informed of the underlying circumstances, and because Arbitrator Gaunt's review of the Dorsey decision resulted in her own decision to give it deference. Because the Dorsey decision is well-reasoned and legally supported, and because Baseden has not shown it to be either arbitrary and capricious or gross error, we affirm the superior court's decision not to vacate it. 2. Arbitrator Gaunt did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner in declining to grant additional benefits or in deferring to the Dorsey decision on the matter of wages and benefits following October 15, 2001. Arbitrator Gaunt issued a thirty-eight-page decision which likewise followed a full hearing. Arbitrator Gaunt decided the following issues pertaining to the first grievance: 1. In light of the State's concession that it violated Article 5 of the collective bargaining agreement when it terminated Mr. Baseden on April 14, 2000, was the grievance over that termination settled when the State offered Mr. Baseden reinstatement and restoration of back wages and benefits? 2. If not, what is an appropriate remedy? 3. Did the State violate Article 10.2(B) of the collective bargaining agreement when processing the [first] Baseden grievance? 4. If so, what is an appropriate remedy? On issues one and three Arbitrator Gaunt ruled in Baseden's favor, finding that the first grievance was not settled when the state offered reinstatement and back wages, and finding that the state violated Article 10.2(B) when it refused to arbitrate the first grievance following its offer of reinstatement. Those aspects of the Gaunt decision are not on appeal here. Baseden appears to request that the Gaunt decision be vacated to the extent that Arbitrator Gaunt refused to overturn the Dorsey decision and with respect to the appropriate remedies. The Gaunt decision deferred to the Dorsey decision on the issue of whether just cause existed for Baseden's termination after Baseden failed to report to work on October 15, 2001. Before arriving at her conclusion, Arbitrator Gaunt heard arguments by APEA as to why she should circumvent the Dorsey decision, examined the fairness of the Dorsey hearing, and considered the legal reasons and the contractual reasons for considering the Dorsey decision final and binding. Based on our review of the decision and record, we conclude that Arbitrator Gaunt's decision to defer to the Dorsey decision was well-reasoned and not arbitrary or capricious. Baseden sought damages for his initial wrongful termination and sought additional damages to compensate him for the way the state had handled his grievances. Arbitrator Gaunt had the ability to grant additional creative remedies where warranted [18] and considered several remedies including punitive damages, front pay, and an award for emotional distress. After reviewing in a full hearing the facts of Baseden's grievance and the state's subsequent unilateral offer of judgment, Arbitrator Gaunt determined that Baseden's grievance was appropriately remedied by the award of back wages and benefits that he would have earned if he had remained employed by the state from April 14, 2000, through the date of his failure to return to work, October 15, 2001. This was the same make-whole offer that the state had attempted to unilaterally grant. Arbitrator Gaunt awarded Baseden interest on that money, and awarded APEA certain additional attorney's fees to compensate Baseden's union for the expense of extra litigation. Ultimately, Arbitrator Gaunt decided not to grant Baseden additional compensation of the type that he sought in his subsequent 2006 case. In light of the state's offer of back-pay and reinstatement and Baseden's refusal to return to work, we conclude that the decision not to award Baseden additional compensation was not in gross error or arbitrary and capricious. Because Baseden fails to substantiate any allegation that the Gaunt decision was either clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious, and because our review of the record reveals no such error, we affirm the superior court's decision not to vacate the order. 3. Baseden is not entitled to bring a new claim or receive an amended arbitration award based on the theory that he was not an employee at the time of his alleged second discharge. Baseden argues that he was not an employee on October 15, 2001, when he was offered reinstatement. He argues that regardless of the existence of just cause, a nonemployee cannot be terminated and therefore his rejection of the state's reinstatement offer cannot result in his termination. The superior court held that this argument was waived because it was not raised before the arbitrators. We agree that the argument was not raised and was therefore waived. [19] Moreover, it was APEA, Baseden's representative, that chose to frame the issue as a termination. APEA explicitly noted in its step two grievance filing in the Dorsey arbitration that because the effect of Baseden's alleged voluntary relinquishment of the October 2001 job was the same as a termination, the state had violated Article 5 by terminating Baseden for a second time without just cause. In essence it appears that Baseden's union representatives framed the issue of Baseden's refusal to return to work within the part of the CBA that the situation most closely approximated. In his brief before this court, Baseden presents this argument in a new light, arguing that the parties did not agree to submit to arbitration the issue of offer rejection. As the state notes in its brief, Baseden's argument is without merit because regardless of the label attached to Baseden's situation in October 2001, the parties did submit to arbitration the merits of whether or not Baseden reasonably refused to go to work when offered the position and what his entitlement was to any subsequent wage and benefit accrual. Baseden argues that he did not waive his argument that he was not an employee because in step two of the grievance process APEA also included the following paragraph: APEA/AFT disagrees that Mr. Baseden voluntarily relinquished his position. There are several problems with the State's action. First, Mr. Baseden was non-retained by the State on April 15, 2000 from PCN 25-3185. Mr. Baseden has never been reinstated as a permanent employee to PCN 25-3185 by the State. How can he relinquish something that he was already terminated from over a year ago? It was in this same letter, however, that the union chose to file the new grievance and chose to frame the issue as a violation of Article 5 of the CBA regarding termination without just cause. It would be nonsensical to simultaneously allow the parties to frame the question for arbitration and then allow the grievant to complain that the central issue was not arbitrated. The merits of this issue were reached in arbitration, and to the extent that the argument was not addressed in arbitration it is waived. Finally, as Judge Collins adroitly noted, there is nothing in the CBA or in our case law that dissuades employers from offering reinstatement, even prior to the completion of all facets of a grievance dispute. [20] After an employee unreasonably refuses an offer of unconditional reinstatement, the employee is not entitled to continued claims for lost wages and benefits. [21] Arbitrator Dorsey found that Baseden's refusal to return to work was unreasonable, and thus Baseden is not entitled to lost wages and benefits for the time period after October 15, 2001. 4. The arbitrators' decisions are not invalid due to fraud. Baseden raises the issue of fraud before this court. Alaska case law holds that arbitration decisions, though given great deference, can be overturned where there has been gross negligence, fraud, corruption, gross error or misbehavior on the part of the arbitrator. [22] However, Baseden's allegations of fraud seem to misunderstand our case law. Instead of alleging fraud on the part of the arbitrator or fraud within either the Dorsey or Gaunt arbitration proceedings, Baseden's fraud allegations center on the actions that the state took in offering reinstatement to Baseden in October. Because all of the facts that Baseden alleges were part of the record considered by the arbitrators, there is no fraud-based reason for this court to overturn the arbitration decisions.