Opinion ID: 778660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of a prospective juror for cause.

Text: 29 Vialva contends that the district court erred by sustaining the government's challenge to prospective juror Dana Pate on the basis of her inability to consider the penalty of death. In her initial questionnaire, the prospective juror stated, I do not feel I have the right to judge whether a person lives or dies. I could not do that. When asked about this statement during voir dire, however, the prospective juror indicated that she had changed her mind about the death penalty. She explained to the court, this is a real hard thing for me ... I've talked to some people, and we've talked about [the death penalty], and I still don't know if I'm right or not, but if the facts were such that they were proven that the defendant would need that verdict, then I would give it. The government made and the district court sustained a for-cause objection to Ms. Pate on the basis of her inability to adequately consider the death penalty. Vialva argues that the district court erred because the prospective juror expressed a willingness to consider the death penalty in appropriate cases. 30 A court may excuse a prospective juror for cause because of his views on capital punishment if those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with the instruction and oath. United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 340 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). A prospective juror who would automatically vote against the death penalty in every case must be dismissed. Id. (citing United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1355 (5th Cir.1995)). Additionally, the district court has discretion to excuse a juror for cause when the court is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror who would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. Id., (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. 844). While the district court's dismissal of a prospective juror on this basis is reviewed for abuse of discretion, we give the court considerable deference[] because such decisions are based on face-to-face credibility assessments. Webster, 162 F.3d at 340. 31 The record supports the district court's decision. Ms. Pate's initial questionnaire revealed unequivocally that she could not sentence another person to death. When questioned during voir dire, the potential juror explained that under limited circumstances she would be able to sentence another person to death, but she also stated I cannot be sure.... I cannot be sure about this. These statements and others in the record support the district court's conclusion that the prospective juror's bias regarding the death penalty substantially impaired her ability to abide by her oath as a juror. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Ms. Pate.