Opinion ID: 1198851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jurisdiction of the Executive Director and the District Court

Text: Denver contends that the executive director lacked jurisdiction to hear Winslow's appeal from the manager of revenue's decision, and that, as a consequence, the district court lacked jurisdiction. Denver therefore asserts that the only forum for judicial review of the manager's decision is the Denver District Court under C.R.C.P. 106. We disagree. We first reject Denver's threshold argument that the executive director admitted lack of jurisdiction when she failed to answer the cross claim in district court. To the contrary, the executive director's decision not to participate in litigation in which she claims no interest does not constitute an admission that she lacked jurisdiction over the tax issues raised in this case. Winslow is the real party in interest regarding the tax, and has at no time admitted that the executive director lacked jurisdiction over its appeal. The executive director's decision not to respond to a cross claim cannot deprive a taxpayer of the exercise of its right of appeal under section 29-2-106.1. Jurisdiction is not conferred upon or taken away from a court based on the position of a party regarding the court's jurisdiction; instead, jurisdiction concerns the court's authority to decide the class of cases in which it renders judgment and is determined as a matter of law. See Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 38 (Colo.1997). We therefore proceed to Denver's second jurisdictional argument, that section 29-2-106.1 impermissibly vests the executive director with municipal powers to hear appeals from local government sales and use tax determinations. In this regard, Denver relies on Colorado Constitution article V, section 35, which provides: The general assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever. However, article V, section 35 prohibits only the delegation of municipal function[s]. See Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061, 1069 (Colo.1992) (The purpose of article V, section 35 of the Colorado Constitution is to prevent a legislative commission from intruding upon a city's right of self-government in matters of local concern.). We have previously held that the appellate process governing locally imposed sales or use taxes is a matter of statewide concern. See Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039, 1047 (Colo.1991) (discussing the factors used for determining whether a matter is of local, state, or mixed local and state concern). The executive director is therefore not performing a municipal function in deciding an appeal from a decision by Denver's manager of revenue. Accordingly, both the executive director and the district court had jurisdiction over Winslow's appeal from the manager of revenue's decision.