Opinion ID: 2737842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant Ovando

Text: Ovando contends that the district court committed reversible error by: (1) permitting testimony at trial that Ovando refused to give a written statement to investigators; (2) giving a jury instruction on the mail fraud counts that constructively amended the superseding indictment; and (3) imposing an unreasonable sentence. We briefly address each contention in turn. A. Testimony of Avando’s Refusal to Give a Voluntary Written Statement Our case law is clear: the Government may introduce evidence of silence if it occurred prior to the time of an arrest and a Miranda warning. United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991). Both parties agree that is what 2 Case: 13-10309 Date Filed: 09/29/2014 Page: 3 of 11 happened here. Federal agents asked her for a written statement about her involvement with the accident, and she refused. The district court did not err in allowing a federal agent to testify about her refusal. B. Constructive Amendment The district court’s jury instructions on mail fraud did not constitute a constructive amendment because they did not “broaden the possible bases for conviction beyond what is contained in the indictment.” See United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Keller, 916 F.2d 628, 634 (11th Cir. 1990)). Ovando did not raise this objection in the district court, so we review the district court’s instructions only for plain error. Id. at 1319. For us to reverse a district court’s decision under plain-error review there must “(1) be an error (2) that is plain (3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1321. In charging Ovando with mail fraud, the superseding indictment alleged that Ovando “and other persons known and unknown . . . did knowingly, with intent to defraud, devise and intend to devise a scheme to defraud . . . .” (Doc. 158 at 12). The indictment further indicated that the charged conduct was in violation of not only 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the mail-fraud statute, but also 18 U.S.C. § 2, the aiding and abetting statute. Section 2 “does not define a crime. It simply makes 3 Case: 13-10309 Date Filed: 09/29/2014 Page: 4 of 11 punishable as a principal one who aids or abets the commission of the substantive crime.” See United States v. Walker, 621 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1980). In other words, under the superseding indictment, there were two bases for convicting Ovando of mail fraud: Either she herself devised a fraud scheme or she aided and abetted others who devised a scheme to defraud. In charging the jury, the district court instructed that for Ovando to be guilty of mail fraud, the government had to prove that Ovando “knowingly devised or participated in a scheme to defraud . . . .” Although Ovando argues that the “or participated in” language of the instruction constructively amended the indictment, her argument ignores the fact that she also was charged with aiding and abetting mail fraud. Further, as to aiding and abetting, the district court instructed the jury that Ovando could be found guilty of a substantive charge “even without evidence that the defendant personally performed every acted charged,” if there is proof that she “intentionally join[ed]” with another person to commit the crime, “intentionally associated with or participated in the crime,” and “was a willful participant.” In short, the district court’s instructions, as a whole, correctly charged the jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Ovando intentionally participated in the mail fraud scheme devised by others was sufficient to establish her guilt as an aider and abetter. See United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 508–09 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that we must view the jury instructions in context to 4 Case: 13-10309 Date Filed: 09/29/2014 Page: 5 of 11 determine whether they constructively amended the indictment). Accordingly, the district court’s instructions did not broaden the possible bases for Ovando’s mail fraud convictions beyond what was alleged in the superseding indictment. Ovando has not shown error, much less plain error. C. Substantive Reasonableness of Ovando’s 78-Month Sentence We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). We first look at whether the district court committed any procedural error. Id. And we next look at whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the sentence is substantively unreasonable under the 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) factors. In reviewing the reasonableness of Ovando’s sentence (outside the advisory Guidelines ranges), we take into account the district court’s justification and the extent of the variance, but we do not require extraordinary circumstances to justify such a sentence or presume that such a sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1186–87 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Ovando bears the burden to show her sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2006). Here, Ovando has not met her burden to show that her total 78-month sentence, 21-months above the advisory Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment, is substantively unreasonable. The district court explicitly 5 Case: 13-10309 Date Filed: 09/29/2014 Page: 6 of 11 addressed the § 3553(a) factors, and its reasons for the upward variance were sufficiently compelling to justify the extent of the variance. Ovando’s contention that her sentence is unreasonable because it resulted in an unwarranted sentencing disparity with her codefendants is unavailing. Sentence disparities among conspirators are not “unwarranted” unless the defendants are similarly situated. United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009). The district court adequately explained why Ovando was not similarly situated to the other coconspirators. Ovando’s sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. And under the totality of circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 78-month sentence.