Opinion ID: 1230130
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: LuGrain and Ross also contend the evidence was not sufficient to convict them of violating rule 20. Both point to undisputed evidence that no drugs were found in their possession, that they had never been charged with a drug related offense, and that both had never before been disciplined for possession of drugs. Finally, they argue that an inability to produce a urine sample is not sufficient to support a finding that the rule was violated. The evidentiary standard for prison disciplinary cases was clearly stated and explained in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2774-75, 86 L.Ed.2d 356, 365 (1974) (citations omitted): We hold that the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits. This standard is met if there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced.... Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. We decline to adopt a more stringent evidentiary standard as a constitutional requirement. Prison disciplinary proceedings take place in a highly charged atmosphere, and prison administrators must often act swiftly on the basis of evidence that might be insufficient in less exigent circumstances. The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact. Revocation of good time credits is not comparable to a criminal conviction, and neither the amount of evidence necessary to support such a conviction, nor any other standard greater than some evidence applies in this context. (Emphasis added.) Under this standard we need not weigh in the balance the undisputed evidence LuGrain and Ross rely on. We need only concern ourselves with whether there is any evidence in the record to support the committee's decision. Here the committee was not required to believe the inmates' unsubstantiated defenses that they were unable to urinate in front of people. Indeed, the committee expressly rejected the defenses as not credible. The clear inference from this rejection is that the committee found that the two inmates had refused to provide urine samples. This is far different from finding that the inmates were unable to do so, as they suggest. Because of the refusal finding, the presumption of drug possession remained unrebutted and was some evidence to support the committee's decision. See Rametta v. Kaslo, 68 A.D.2d 579, 580-82, 418 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114-15 (1979) (where evidence presented to rebut a presumption raises credibility issue, determination of whether the presumption has been defeated is for the trier of fact).