Opinion ID: 1439481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Attorney-client Privilege

Text: The attorney-client privilege, codified in Evidence Code section 954, provides in pertinent part: Subject to Section 912 and except as otherwise provided in this article, the client, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer.... The attorney-client privilege has been a well established part of Anglo-American jurisprudence for over 400 years. (McCormick, Evidence (2d ed. 1972) § 87, pp. 175-179.) It has been part of California statutory law in one form or another since 1851. (See Cal. Civil Practice Act, Stats. 1851, ch. 5, §§ 395-399, p. 114.) (1) As this court has previously noted, the privilege seeks to insure `the right of every person to freely and fully confer and confide in one having knowledge of the law, and skilled in its practice, in order that the former may have adequate advice and a proper defense.' ( Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 599 [208 Cal. Rptr. 886, 691 P.2d 642], citing Baird v. Koerner (9th Cir.1960) 279 F.2d 623, 629.) If a lawyer could not promise to maintain the confidentiality of his client's secrets, the only advice he or she could provide would be, `Don't talk to me.' ( Welfare Rights Organization v. Crison (1983) 33 Cal.3d 766, 771, fn. 3 [190 Cal. Rptr. 919, 661 P.2d 1073, 31 A.L.R.4th 1214].) Application of the privilege will occasionally shield relevant information which may very well create obstacles for the party seeking the privileged information; however, the Legislature and the courts of this state have determined that the party's concern is outweighed by the importance of preserving confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship. ( Mitchell v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 599.) (2) (See fn. 7.) The United States Supreme Court has commented on the importance of the privilege in a regulatory setting. [7] In United States v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. (1915) 236 U.S. 318, 336 [59 L.Ed. 598, 606-607, 35 S.Ct. 363], the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) sought to examine confidential communications between the railroad and its lawyers, based on its power to examine records and correspondence pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act. The court rejected the ICC's position, stating: The desirability of protecting confidential communications between attorney and client as a matter of public policy is too well known and has been too often recognized by text-books and courts to need extended comment now. If such communications were required to be made the subject of examination and publication, such enactment would be a practical prohibition upon professional advice and assistance. ( Ibid. [59 L.Ed.2d at p. 607]) The court's ruling in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., supra, is particularly relevant to the instant proceedings because the commission, as did the ICC in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., claims its investigatory powers may permit it to examine confidential communications between a regulated company and its attorneys. (3) There is no indication in the relevant statutes that the privilege is limited to judicial proceedings. On the contrary, it is evident that the privilege applies in the administrative law setting. Evidence Code section 910, which codifies the scope of several evidentiary privileges including the attorney-client privilege, provides: Except as otherwise provided by statute, the provisions of this division apply in all proceedings. The provisions of any statute making rules of evidence inapplicable in particular proceedings, ... do not make this division inapplicable to such proceedings. (Italics added.) Evidence Code section 901 defines a proceeding to include any action, hearing, investigation, inquest, or inquiry (whether conducted by a court, administrative agency, hearing officer, arbitrator, legislative body, or any other person authorized by law) in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given. (Italics added.) [8] We agree with the comment of the district court in Civil Aeronautics Board v. Air Transport Association of America (D.D.C. 1961) 201 F.Supp 318, that when an agency has the power to compel testimony, its power must be tempered by the attorney-client privilege, unless there is unambiguous statutory directive to the contrary. Although the commission is granted broad powers under the Constitution, [9] no provision exempts it from complying with the statutory attorney-client privilege. [10] We conclude that the commission's powers pursuant to the state Constitution in this context are subject to the statutory limitation of the attorney-client privilege.