Opinion ID: 1805497
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Six and Eighteen

Text: Kimbrough alleged that counsel was ineffective (1) when, during voir dire, counsel failed to discover a juror's connection with the FDLE; and (2) when defense counsel failed to move for a mistrial after the State disclosed that the juror, Eddie Julian, had a connection with an FDLE employee. Julian's fiance worked in the FDLE crime lab, and Julian had taken courses in DNA. The State argued that these factors do not establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if these facts had been brought out on voir dire. At trial, defense counsel filed a motion for new trial and a motion to voir dire Julian. After a detailed hearing conducted August 8, 1994, at which Julian was thoroughly examined, the court denied the motion for new trial. As the postconviction court stated, The underlying substance of this claim is clearly Mr. Julian's potential bias, an issue which could have been raised on direct appeal because it was thoroughly addressed at the conclusion of the trial. On this basis, the court rejected the claim as procedurally barred, finding that it could have been raised on direct appeal. To the extent Kimbrough seeks review of the substantive issue underlying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we agree. See Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726 (Fla.1996) (holding that postconviction relief claims which either were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal were properly denied without an evidentiary hearing); see also Sireci v. State, 469 So.2d 119, 120 (Fla.1985) (Claims previously raised on direct appeal will not be heard on a motion for post-conviction relief simply because those claims are raised under the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel.). As to Kimbrough's claim that counsel was ineffective, Kimbrough has failed to establish prejudice. Thus, summary denial was proper. See Gaskin v. State, 737 So.2d 509, 516 (Fla.1999).