Opinion ID: 1742971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: incurred attorney's fees.

Text: The Court of Appeals concluded that the failure to order Appellee to pay the attorney's fees already incurred was unpreserved for appellate review because Appellant did not name her attorney as a party to the appeal, citing Carter v. Carter, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 400, 402 (1964). Carter , as well as the other cases cited for this proposition in Appellee's brief, i.e., Tyler v. Bryant, Ky., 394 S.W.2d 454, 455 (1965), McDowell v. McDowell, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 814, 816 (1964) and Patterson v. Patterson, Ky., 266 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1954), were all decided under former KRS 453.120, which provided: In actions for alimony or divorce, the husband shall pay the costs of each party, unless it appears in the action that the wife is in fault and has ample estate to pay the costs. In each of the cited cases, an attorney's fee was awarded and was contested on appeal. In Tyler, McDowell and Patterson , the husband sought to contest the fee awarded to the wife's attorney. In Carter , the wife sought to contest the awarded fee as inadequate. In each case, the attorney had a vested interest in the outcome, thus was a necessary party to the appeal. KRS 453.120 was repealed [1] concomitantly with the 1972 enactment [2] of the new Kentucky dissolution of marriage act, which was modeled on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act promulgated in 1970 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. KRS 403.220 was adopted verbatim from Section 313 of the Uniform Act. [3] It provides: The court from time to time after considering the financial resources of both parties may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter and for attorney's fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or after entry of judgment. The court may order that the amount be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in his name. (Emphasis added.) Appellant's motion for attorney's fees already incurred did not request that the fees be paid directly to Appellant's former attorney (apparently Appellant had already paid his fee); thus, the motion was that Appellant be reimbursed for the fees she incurred. Under that circumstance, Appellant's former attorney was not an indispensable party to this appeal. In Tyler v. Bryant, supra, our predecessor Court held that an attorney was an indispensable party to an appeal from an award of an attorney's fee under KRS 453.120 whether the fee was awarded to the wife or whether it was awarded directly to the attorney. Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, Ky., 504 S.W.2d 699 (1973), held that there was no reason why this rule should not continue to apply in marriage-dissolution cases under KRS 403.220. Id. at 701. Upon reconsideration, however, we discern a substantial distinction between awards under former KRS 453.120 and awards under KRS 403.220. Under KRS 453.120, the husband was the principal obligor of the wife's attorney's fee and that was true whether the fee was ordered paid to the wife or directly to the attorney. Unless the wife was in fault in causing the divorce and had a substantial estate of her own, the husband was the primary (if not only) source from which the wife's attorney would be paid. The trial judge simply set the amount of the fee and ordered the husband to pay. Under that circumstance, the real parties in interest to a dispute over the fee were the husband and the wife's attorney, and an appellate court was held to be without personal jurisdiction to review the issue unless the attorney was a party to the appeal. Patterson v. Patterson, supra, at 93; King v. King, 214 Ky. 171, 283 S.W. 73, 74 (1926); Bartlett v. Louisville Trust Co., 212 Ky. 13, 277 S.W. 250, 254 (1925). Under KRS 403.220, the trial judge does not set either party's attorney's fee, but from time to time . . . may order a party to pay a reasonable amount . . . for attorney's fees. If the reasonable amount is ordered paid directly to the attorney, the attorney may enforce the order in his own name and, thus, is the real party in interest and a necessary and indispensable party to any appeal from that order. But if the reasonable amount (which may be less than the actual fee agreed to between attorney and client) is ordered paid to the client, the client remains the primary obligor of the fee, thus is the real party in interest with respect to an appeal from the order. We have so held in several recent non-divorce cases. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glass, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 437, 455 (1997); Knott v. Crown Colony Farm, Inc., Ky., 865 S.W.2d 326, 331 (1993); Louisville Label, Inc. v. Hildesheim, Ky., 843 S.W.2d 321, 326 (1992). Louisville Label, supra , specifically held that unless the fee is awarded directly to the attorney, the client, as the primary obligor of the fee, is the real party in interest and the only indispensable party to the appeal. Id. at 326. The logic of this principle applies as well to fees awarded only to the client under KRS 403.220. To the extent that Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, supra , holds otherwise, it is overruled. Furthermore, this appeal is not from an order awarding an attorney's fee, but from an order denying a motion to reimburse a litigant for an attorney's fee already paid. Under that circumstance, Appellant's former attorney has no interest in the outcome, thus could not be an indispensable party to the appeal. Nevertheless, we affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals on this issue. KRS 403.220 authorizes a trial court to order one party to a divorce action to pay a reasonable amount for the attorney's fees of the other party, but only if there exists a disparity in the relative financial resources of the parties in favor of the payor. Sullivan v. Levin, Ky., 555 S.W.2d 261, 263 (1977), overruled on other grounds, Hale v. Hale, Ky., 772 S.W.2d 628 (1989); Lampton v. Lampton, Ky.App., 721 S.W.2d 736, 739 (1986). But even if a disparity exists, whether to make such an assignment and, if so, the amount to be assigned is within the discretion of the trial judge. Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, Ky., 521 S.W.2d 512, 514 (1975); Russell v. Russell, Ky.App., 605 S.W.2d 33, 37 (1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922, 101 S.Ct. 3158, 69 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1981); Beaver v. Beaver, Ky.App., 551 S.W.2d 23, 25 (1977). There is nothing mandatory about it. Moss v. Moss, Ky.App., 639 S.W.2d 370, 373 (1982); see also Underwood v. Underwood, Ky.App., 836 S.W.2d 439, 444 (1992). In Wilhoit, supra , we affirmed a trial judge's refusal to assign the wife's attorney's fees to the husband. If there had ever been any doubt regarding the discretionary authority of the trial court to allocate court costs and award an attorney's fee, KRS 403.220 laid that doubt to rest once and for all. As matters now stand, an allocation of court costs and an award of an attorney's fee are entirely within the discretion of the court. Id. at 514. The family court's order denying Appellant's motion to require Appellee to pay her attorney's fee does not state the reason for the denial. Perhaps the family court judge concluded that Appellant had unnecessarily dissipated marital resources by expending child support and spousal maintenance payments to rent an apartment while the marital residence remained unoccupied, though heavily mortgaged, and by continuing to enroll the parties' child in an expensive private school over Appellee's objection. Perhaps he believed that a portion of the $35,000.00 certificates of deposit that otherwise would have been divisible as marital property had been expended to pay Appellant's attorney's fee. Perhaps he believed that Appellant could have afforded to pay her own attorney's fee had she chosen to be employed during the course of this litigation. Or perhaps he believed that Appellee's payment of $3,600.00 per month in voluntary maintenance and support prior to and during the early stages of this action provided sufficient financial resources for Appellant to pay her own attorney's fee. Drake v. Drake, Ky.App., 721 S.W.2d 728 (1986). The amount of an award of attorney's fees is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court with good reason. That court is in the best position to observe conduct and tactics which waste the court's and attorneys' time and must be given wide latitude to sanction or discourage such conduct. Gentry v. Gentry, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 928, 938 (1990). Under the facts of this case, the family court judge's denial of Appellant's motion for reimbursement of attorney's fees was not an abuse of discretion.