Opinion ID: 1653411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Simple Escape

Text: The simple escape statute, La.R.S. 14:110, provides in pertinent part: A. Simple escape shall mean any of the following: (1) The intentional departure, under circumstances wherein human life is not endangered, of a person imprisoned, committed, or detained from a place where such person is legally confined, from a designated area of a place where such person is legally confined, or from the lawful custody of any law enforcement officer or officer of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections. (2) The failure of a criminal serving a sentence and participating in a work release program authorized by law to report or return from his planned employment or other activity under the program at the appointed time. (3) The failure of a person who has been granted a furlough under the provisions of R.S. 15:833 or R.S. 15:908 to return to his place of confinement at the appointed time. B. (1) A person who is participating in a work release program as defined in Paragraph A(2) of this Section and who commits the crime of simple escape shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than six months nor more than one year and any such sentence shall not run concurrently with any other sentence. (2) A person who fails to return from an authorized furlough as defined in Paragraph A(3) of this Section shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than six months nor more than one year and any such sentence shall not run concurrently with any other sentence. (3) A person imprisoned, committed, or detained who commits the crime of simple escape as defined in Paragraph A(1) of this Section shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than two years nor more than five years; provided that such sentence shall not run concurrently with any other sentence. .... D. For purposes of this Section, a person shall be deemed to be in the lawful custody of a law enforcement officer or of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections and legally confined when he is in a rehabilitation unit, a work release program, or any other program under the control of a law enforcement officer or the department. E. The provisions of this Section shall be applicable to all penal, correctional, rehabilitational, and work release centers and any and all prison facilities under the control of the sheriffs of the respective parishes of the state of Louisiana. The prison facilities shall include but are not limited to parish jails, correctional centers, work release centers, and rehabilitation centers, hospitals, clinics, and any and all facilities where inmates are confined under the jurisdiction and control of the sheriffs of the respective parishes. (emphasis added). The elements of the statute applicable to the instant case are (1) an intentional departure (2) under circumstances wherein human life is not endangered (3) by a person detained (4) from the lawful custody of any law enforcement officer. Defendant does not contest the first three elements, nor does he contest the lawfulness of his arrest, but argues the fourth element is not satisfied in the present case. He relies on State v. Foster, 509 So.2d 47 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987), for the proposition that the legislature intended the term lawful custody to apply only to persons who have been already placed in a jail facility, and not to persons like him who have been arrested but not yet confined. We find no merit to this contention. In reaching the conclusion that lawful custody did not apply to persons lawfully arrested but not yet confined, Foster relied on section D of the statute. The court found this section contemplated a situation where the defendant had already been convicted and sentenced, and thus modified the term lawful custody as used throughout the statute. The fallacy of the Foster court was its failure to recognize that La. R.S. 14:110 is written in the disjunctive, and applies to two different categories of persons. The first category focuses on prior confinement and deals with an intentional departure by a person imprisoned or committed from a place where such a person is legally confined. Since this category includes persons in rehabilitational, furlough or work release programs who may not be physically confined, section D deems such persons to be in the lawful custody of a law enforcement officer and legally confined for purposes of the statute. [3] The second category, totally distinct from the first, involves the intentional departure of a detained person from the lawful custody of any law enforcement officer. Clearly, there is no requirement of prior confinement in this category. The error of the Foster court was to use section D, which applies to the first category only, to explain the term lawful custody as applied to the second category. In doing so, the court ignored the disjunctive scheme set up by the legislature. After careful review of the statute and its history, we find no indication the legislature intended to limit lawful custody as used in this second category to persons who had been legally confined. Foster erred in applying this limitation, and it is overruled insofar as it conflicts with this opinion. Viewing the evidence in the present case in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude a rational jury could have found the crime of simple escape was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.