Opinion ID: 1610239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Relevant Case Law Applying Section 48.193(1)(b) to Telephonic, Electronic, or Written Communications

Text: In Wendt, this Court considered the meaning of [c]ommitting a tortious act within this state under section 48.193(1)(b). Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1258. In particular, the question before this Court in Wendt was whether making telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida from outside of the State can constitute `committing a tortious act' under section 48.193(1)(b). Id. In that case, Wendt, a Florida resident and resident agent for an out-of-state corporation who solicited investors for the corporation, filed a third-party complaint against a nonresident attorney and law firm, claiming that he had relied to his detriment on the attorney's legal advice. Id. at 1254-55. Wendt asserted that the attorney had committed a tortious act in Florida by negligently responding in writing to an investigation by the Division of Securities relating to the alleged sale of unregistered securities and negligently drafting loan documents that were knowingly intended to be evidence of loans to be made by Florida investors to the corporation. Id. at 1255. The attorney moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting that his contacts with Florida only involved telephonic or mail correspondence and never involved travel to Florida. Id. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and, on appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that no tortious act was committed in Florida because the alleged acts were performed in Michigan. Id. at 1256. After reviewing relevant case law, this Court held that a defendant's physical presence is not necessary to commit a tortious act in Florida. Id. at 1260. Rather, `committing a tortious act' in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida. Id. (emphasis added). However, the cause of action must arise from the communications[t]his predicate finding is necessary because of the connexity requirement contained in section 48.193(1). Id. In this case, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that, under Wendt, Marshall would be subject to jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) if her allegedly defamatory posts on her website constituted electronic communications into Florida. Internet Solutions Corp., 557 F.3d at 1296. The determination of whether certain acts constitute communications into Florida is straightforward when the case concerns telephonic communications, written communications, or electronic communications in the form of e-mails or facsimiles, because those communications are directed to reach a specific recipient in a specific forum; in other words, it is clear that the nonresident defendant's communications were made into Florida. For example, in Acquadro v. Bergeron, 851 So.2d 665, 670 (Fla.2003), this Court held that allegedly defamatory phone calls made into Florida by a nonresident could be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction on the basis of Wendt. In Acquadro , a defamation claim was brought against the nonresident defendant based upon a telephone call from Massachusetts to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's sister, and another third party in Florida in which the defendant stated that the plaintiff had AIDS. Id. at 668. The Court noted in a footnote that although the record was not completely clear, it appeared that the telephone call was a conference call in which the third party called the defendant in Massachusetts, and they proceeded to call the defendant in Florida. Id. at 668 n. 7. [7] Other courts, both state and federal, applying Florida law have also held that communications made during a telephone call between a person in Florida and an out-of-state defendant constitute telephonic communications into Florida and confer personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant under section 48.193(1)(b), provided the cause of action arose from the telephonic communication as required by the statute and clarified in Wendt. The cases considering whether a telephonic communication constituted a tortious act in Florida have not explicitly hinged a finding of jurisdiction on whether or not the nonresident defendant initiated the phone call into Florida. Rather, the cases focus on whether the nonresident defendant made the subject communications during a phone call between the out-of-state defendant and someone in Florida. See, e.g., Hou v. United Airlines Corp., No. 806CV-1502-T-27TGW, 2006 WL 2884963, at  (M.D.Fla. Oct.10, 2006) (holding that alleged fraudulent statements by the defendants that occurred during a telephone call initiated by the plaintiff satisfied section 48.193(1)(b) (citing Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260)); OSI Indus., Inc. v. Carter, 834 So.2d 362, 364-65 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that a nonresident defendant who called plaintiff in Florida and allegedly made misrepresentations during the conversation satisfied 48.193(1)(b)). In a case on a similar topic but with distinguishable facts, the Second District Court of Appeal in an en banc decision held that the out-of-state recording of a phone call originating in Florida did not constitute the commission of a tortious act within the state. Kountze v. Kountze, 996 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). The court receded from a previous case in which it had decided that the defendant's interception of the telephone call occurred at the point of origin in Florida and not at the point of reception and recording in the foreign state. Id. at 247. The court instead concluded that a Florida statute that created a private cause of action for the nonconsensual interception of a communication originating within Florida could not transform the nonresident defendant's out-of-state recording into a tortious act within the state for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 248. The court was admittedly influenced by the fact that the act was not illegal in the state where the defendant actually committed it and was not illegal under the federal law that would apply to interstate telephone calls. Id. at 252. In its holding, the court distinguished the case from cases in which a conversation was directed into Florida over an interstate telephone call that was defamatory, fraudulent, or otherwise an element of a traditional intentional tort under the common law. Id. at 248. Courts have also held that electronic communications over the Internet in the form of e-mails and chat room conversations into Florida give rise to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) on the basis of Wendt. In the e-mail context, a Fifth District Court of Appeal case applied section 48.193(1)(b) to an out-of-state defendant who sent an e-mail that allegedly defamed a Florida resident to various members of a veterans' association, some of whom lived in Florida. Price v. Kronenberger, 24 So.3d 775, 776 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). The nonresident defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that personal jurisdiction could not be asserted over him because he addressed the e-mail only to the association members generally and did not specifically target Florida residents as recipients. Id. The court stated that [a] complaint that alleges a nonresident committed a tortious act based on communications directed into Florida telephonically, electronically, or in writing sufficiently alleges personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b). Id. (citing Acquadro, 851 So.2d at 670; Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260). The court held that the plaintiff's complaint did just this when it alleged the [nonresident defendant] sent the e-mail to various members of [the association], some of whom live in Florida. Id. In the chat room context, a Fourth District Court of Appeal case specifically addressed the issue of whether defamatory statements in a chat room constituted electronic communications into Florida under Wendt. Becker v. Hooshmand, 841 So.2d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). In Becker, the plaintiff, a licensed physician practicing in Florida, filed a complaint alleging that the out-of-state defendant was a moderator of an Internet chat room and had posted numerous defamatory comments about him that were targeted to Florida residents, or people likely to seek medical care in the state of Florida, which resulted in injury to his reputation and business. Id. at 561. The district court quoted this Court's decision in Wendt that a defendant's physical presence is not required and that committing a tortious act in Florida can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida. Id. at 562-63. The Fourth District concluded that the alleged defamatory comments in the chat room were sufficient to satisfy section 48.193(1)(b) because the communications that form the basis of the allegations in this case are analogous to cases previously decided by this court and certainly fit within the recent Supreme Court's discussion of electronic communications. Id. at 563. Although the chat room conversation took place over the Internet, we note that statements made in a chat room, such as in Becker, are easily analogized to a conference telephone call because a person typing comments in a chat room is directing his or her communication to a specific group of individuals, much like a person speaking during a telephone conference call, as in Acquadro , or a person sending an e-mail to multiple recipients, as in Price .