Opinion ID: 152954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: McNamee Has Minimum Contacts with Texas Under the Calder Effects Test

Text: However, even if Clemens must meet the Calder requirements, he has done so. It is undisputed that Clemens is a resident of Texas with many civic and business activities in that state. In addition to his residency in Texas, Clemens played baseball for the Houston Astros for three years shortly before the events in question. Taking Clemens's allegations in the complaint as true, McNamee intended to cause particular harm to Clemens in Texas because he was aware that Clemens resided in Texas and that the brunt of the impact of his statements would be felt by Clemens in Texas. This conduct constitutes the kind of deliberate targeting that the Calder Court found dispositive in analyzing personal jurisdiction. In Calder, the National Enquirer published an article alleging that Shirley Jones, a nationally-known actress, drank alcohol so heavily as to interfere with her professional obligations as an actress. 465 U.S. at 789 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1482. Jones sued both the author and the editor of the article in California state court. The Court found that, despite the limited or total absence of physical connections between the defendants and the forum state, personal jurisdiction over the defendants was proper in California based on the `effects' of their Florida conduct in California. Id. at 789, 104 S.Ct. 1482. The Court emphasized that the defendants' intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California because the defendants knew the devastating impact the article would have upon Jones, and that the brunt of the injury would be felt by Jones in California, where she lived and worked. Id. at 789-90, 104 S.Ct. 1482. Thus, under Calder, personal jurisdiction is appropriate over McNamee because McNamee knew that Clemens resided and worked in Texas and that Clemens would feel the brunt of the impact of his allegedly defamatory statements in Texas. See Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 772 (5th Cir.1988) (In Calder, the Supreme Court held that when an alleged tort-feasor's intentional actions are expressly aimed at the forum state, and the tort-feasor knows that the brunt of the injury will be felt by a particular resident in the forum, the tort-feasor must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there to answer for its tortious actions.); Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 628 (5th Cir.1999) (Even an act done outside the state that has consequences or effects within the state will suffice as a basis for jurisdiction in a suit arising from those consequences if the effects are seriously harmful and were intended or highly likely to follow from the nonresident defendant's conduct.); Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 688 F.2d 328, 333 (5th Cir.1982) (holding that specific personal jurisdiction existed in defamation action even though the nonresident defendant was not present in the forum state, but concluding that, [i]f, as is alleged in this case, [the defendant] causes injury in [the forum state], he is covered by the [long-arm] statute). For his part, McNamee does not dispute that Clemens suffered particular injury in Texas as a result of McNamee's allegations. Instead, McNamee contends, and the majority opinion apparently agrees, that because he said the steroid injections occurred only in New York, this case has no connection to Texas, citing Revell and Fielding. However, unlike Revell, where the defendant was unaware of the plaintiff's residence, here McNamee was acutely aware of Clemens's relationship to Texas from his visits there and from his overall training relationship with Clemens. Further, the defendant in Revell had no relevant contacts with Texas and no other facts demonstrated that the defendant had intentionally directed his allegedly tortious conduct toward the plaintiff in Texas. In this case, McNamee's training relationship with Clemens in Texas and his knowledge that Clemens resided and had recently played professional baseball in his home state of Texas demonstrate that McNamee purposefully directed his allegedly defamatory statements at Clemens's personal and professional reputation in Texas. See Revell, 317 F.3d at 475-76 (observing that knowledge of the forum at which the defendant's conduct is directed will often provide sufficient evidence that the forum is the focal point of the tortious activity). Similarly, Fielding is inapposite. In Fielding, the plaintiffs were living overseas in the Swiss embassy in Germany. The court observed that it was unclear if and when the appellants ever lived in Texas because during virtually the entire time relevant to this lawsuit, [the appellants] appear to have been residents of Germany. 415 F.3d at 423-24 n. 2. The allegedly libelous articles focused on the appellants' social lives in Germany, and the brunt of the injuries suffered by the appellants occurred overseas. In contrast, Clemens's life is anchored in Texas, and McNamee was well aware of this fact at the time he made the allegedly defamatory statements about Clemens. Further, unlike the German newspaper at issue in Fielding, which was unlikely to be read in Texas, SI.com is widely available and likely to be read by Clemens's fan base in Texas. In short, the SI.com publication is much more similar to the publication at issue in Calder, where the Court found personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. By focusing exclusively on the setting of McNamee's allegedly defamatory statements, the majority opinion unduly narrows the minimum contacts and specific jurisdiction inquiry to a mechanical or technical formulation, rather than the highly realistic approach urged by the Supreme Court. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (The Court long ago rejected the notion that personal jurisdiction might turn on `mechanical' tests or on `conceptualistic . . . theories' . . . . Instead, we have emphasized the need for a `highly realistic' approach . . .); Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. 154 (It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line . . . cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. . . . Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws . . .). Indeed, were this case to proceed to trial, McNamee and Clemens would no doubt testify extensively regarding their training relationship, including the relationship in Texas, both in the off-seasons and while Clemens played with the Houston Astros. The scope of the trial certainly would not be limited to the events that did or did not transpire in New York on the particular dates alleged by McNamee. Employing the highly realistic approach advocated by the Supreme Court, Clemens has alleged sufficient facts to show that McNamee intentionally directed his allegedly defamatory remarks at Clemens's personal and professional reputation in Texas. Thus, I would conclude that McNamee had sufficient minimum contacts with Texas under the Calder effects test because McNamee was aware that Clemens resided and worked in Texas and that the brunt of the impact of his defamatory statements would be felt by Clemens in Texas.