Opinion ID: 6351771
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Real-time CSLI

Text: In Hammond, we declined to categorically extend Carpenter to real-time CSLI. Hammond involved three different types of CSLI: (1) historical CSLI collected pursuant to a § 2703(d) order, (2) historical CSLI collected pursuant to a § 2702 request, and (3) real-time CSLI collected pursuant to a § 2702 request. Hammond, 996 F.3d at 383. A § 2702 request “permits carriers to release records to a governmental entity, ‘if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of information relating to the emergency.’” Id. at 386 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4)). Although the real-time CSLI in Hammond was obtained via a § 2702 request rather than a court order, any distinction between §§ 2702 and 2703 did not affect our analysis of how Carpenter applies to real-time CSLI. No. 21-1614 19 Law enforcement in Hammond used real-time CSLI for several hours on a single day to track the defendant across Indiana. Hammond, 996 F.3d at 381. Of relevance here, the Hammond court held that a request for real-time CSLI did not amount to a search because the defendant was “a suspect for multiple armed robberies, for whom officers had probable cause, where the officers only collected real-time CSLI for a matter of hours while the suspect travelled on public roadways, and law enforcement limited its use of the CSLI to the purpose of finding the armed suspect who they had reason to believe was likely to engage in another armed robbery.” Id. at 392. On those facts, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy, so evidence stemming from the use of realtime CSLI to arrest Hammond did not have to be suppressed. Id. at 391. In the alternative, we concluded that the good-faith exception applied to the collection of real-time CSLI pursuant to a § 2702 request. Id. at 392–93. In light of Hammond, even assuming the use of real-time CSLI in this case amounted to a search, the good-faith exception applies. The officers here relied on § 2703(d)’s “reasonable grounds” requirement when seeking a court order. Prior to Carpenter, good-faith reliance on this provision for the collection of historical CSLI was reasonable. Curtis, 901 F.3d at 848. Historical CSLI raises grave privacy concerns because it allows the government to retrace a person’s movements over time. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. Real-time CSLI, while still implicating privacy interests, is more analogous to tracking a suspect on public roads. Cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that the use of a beeper in a drum of chloroform to track a suspect’s car on public roads was not a search); Hammond, 996 F.3d at 389–90 (discussing Knotts). It follows that the good-faith exception applies not only to 20 No. 21-1614 historical CSLI collected under § 2703(d), but also to real-time CSLI. We leave for another day whether the collection of realtime CSLI after Carpenter ever amounts to a search.