Opinion ID: 2612943
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure of Investigative Records

Text: We next address Orca's claim on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in allowing Novak to have access to documents obtained by the state through the attorney general's antitrust investigation of Orca. [7] Shortly after beginning its investigation of Orca for antitrust and monopolization violations, the attorney general's office requested and obtained certain documents from Orca pursuant to a civil investigative demand (CID). [8] In November 1988, Novak moved for disclosure of the state's investigative records, claiming that the violations targeted in the attorney general's investigation were identical to those involved in his counterclaim against ORCA and that, therefore, [t]he information sought to be discovered [was] relevant, or [would] likely lead to relevant evidence, for use in [Novak's] prosecution of his claims against [Orca]. After a hearing on the motion, the superior court found good cause for disclosure, because the factual and legal issues in [the] civil case [were] the same as the CID investigation and such shortened discovery was in the public interest. The court granted Novak's motion but expressly provided that Orca could move for a protective order as to any documents in the state's files that might be subject to a claim of privilege. At no point thereafter did Orca seek a protective order. On cross-appeal, Orca claims that the trial court erred in ordering disclosure. The State's disclosure of civil investigative records is addressed in AS 45.50.592(e): Documentary material produced pursuant to a [CID], or copies of it, unless otherwise ordered by a superior court for good cause shown, may not be produced for inspection or copying by, nor may its contents be disclosed to, anyone other than an authorized employee of the state without the consent of the person who produced the material. Here, Orca contends that the trial court mistakenly equated the statutory requirement of good cause for disclosure with mere relevance. Orca argues that good cause should require a showing of substantial need and undue hardship. We have not previously considered the meaning of the good cause requirement in AS 45.50.592(e), and the legislative history is devoid of any definition of good cause. In arguing for a rigorous definition equating good cause to substantial need and undue hardship, Orca relies on State v. Lowry, 802 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1991), where, according to Orca, this standard was adopted under analogous circumstances. Orca correctly observes that Lowry involved documents obtained pursuant to a CID and that disclosure of those documents was subject to a statutory good cause requirement. Id. at 671-72. However, the Lowry documents were also the subject of a statutory witness statement privilege, which specified substantial need and undue hardship as the applicable standard for disclosure of privileged statements. Noting that a showing of substantial need and undue hardship would ordinarily suffice to establish good cause, the Lowry court went on to use this standard, which it evidently deemed more rigorous, as a point of reference for analyzing compliance with both the good cause requirement of the CID statute and the substantial need and undue hardship test of the witness statements privilege statute. Id. at 673. Lowry nonetheless recognized the two standards as distinct, [9] and nowhere did it hold that a showing of substantial need and undue hardship was a necessary prerequisite to establish good cause. Accordingly, in our view, Lowry sheds little light on the good cause issue presented here. Orca further maintains that the definition of good cause it proposes can be gleaned from Alaska Civil Rule 26(b)(3), which permits discovery of certain documents only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. Id. However, this portion of Rule 26(b) governs disclosure of attorney work product, which falls within a privilege that has traditionally barred discovery absent extraordinary circumstances. See generally 4 James Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 26.64 at 26-352 to 26-389 (2d ed. 1992). Orca has advanced no cogent reason why good cause for disclosure, as specified in AS 45.50.592(e), should be equated with the rigorous standard governing discovery of privileged information. Nor do we perceive any such reason. The state's use of CIDs is expressly limited to unprivileged documents: AS 45.50.592(c)(1) provides that a CID may not require the production of documentary material which would be privileged from disclosure if demanded by a subpoena duces tecum. Moreover, in the present case, the trial court expressly ruled that Orca could assert any applicable privilege before the state disclosed its investigative files to Novak. Despite this ruling, Orca raised no claim of privilege. Where, as here, a private party seeks information under AS 45.50.592(e) in aid of civil litigation against the party from whom the information was obtained, we think an appropriate starting point for determining good cause is the general discovery standard set forth in Alaska Civil Rule 26(b)(1), which states that [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. Good cause for disclosure certainly need not be found in all cases where mere relevance is shown. The issue of good cause must ultimately be determined by an exercise of the trial court's sound discretion, based on the court's consideration of the totality of the circumstances in each case. For this reason, beyond establishing relevance, as defined in Rule 26(b)(1), as the starting point for determining good cause under AS 45.50.592(a), we decline to define good cause with greater specificity. In particular, we think no purpose would be served in defining good cause so narrowly as to preclude disclosure under AS 45.50.592(a) when a requesting party shows that the information to be disclosed would likely be fair game for discovery in pending civil litigation and is sought for purposes compatible with the underlying purposes of the state's investigation. These are essentially the grounds upon which the trial court ordered disclosure in the present case. Here, the court expressly found good cause based on the close similarity between the attorney general's investigation and Novak's counterclaim. The state joined in Novak's request for disclosure, and the court's order was expressly tailored to allow Orca to claim privilege as to any of the documents it had provided to the state in response to the CID. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause under these circumstances. [10]