Opinion ID: 1893812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Object to Verdict Directors

Text: Tisius alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object at the instruction conference to the verdict directors for first and second-degree murder because the instructions failed to meaningfully distinguish between the two offenses. Tisius argues that the definition of deliberation in the first degree murder verdict director focuses on the passage of time and, by that focus, eliminates consideration of `cool reflection,' which is the essence of `deliberation.' The verdict director for first degree murder was patterned after MAI-CR 3d 313.02 and contained the following paragraph: Third, that the defendant did so after deliberation, which means cool reflection upon the matter for any length of time no matter how brief. The verdict director for second degree murder was patterned after MAI 3d 313.04 and was the same as the first-degree verdict director except that it omitted the deliberation instruction. The instruction properly states the statutory definition of deliberation. See, section 565.002(3). Similar challenges to this definition have previously been denied. State v. Middleton, 998 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Mo. banc 1999); State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 851-52 (Mo. banc 1998). Counsel is not ineffective for declining to raise an objection that is foreclosed by settled authority. Scott v. State, 741 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Mo.App.1987). The motion court did not clearly err in denying relief on this claim.