Opinion ID: 1058661
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reference to Russian Mafia

Text: Teleguz filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the Commonwealth from commenting about or introducing evidence on Teleguz's alleged connection to the Russian Mafia. The trial court took the motion under advisement, commenting that testimony showing the witnesses' fear of Teleguz because of a relationship with the Russian Mafia was appropriate, not for the truth of the matter, but to show the witnesses' state of mind. At trial, Gilkes and Hetrick each stated that they were afraid of Teleguz because they had heard that he was associated with the Russian Mafia. Teleguz objected to the statements, relying on his prior motion and also on the grounds that the statements were inadmissible hearsay. The trial court overruled the objections and instructed the jury that the statements were only to be considered to show Gilkes' and Hetrick's states of mind and not for the truth of the matter being asserted. Teleguz argues that the trial court erred when it allowed Gilkes and Hetrick to testify regarding Teleguz's alleged connections to the Russian Mafia because such statements were highly prejudicial. We disagree. The trial court gave a proper limiting instruction and a jury is presumed to follow the instructions given by the trial court. Muhammad, 269 Va. at 524, 619 S.E.2d at 58 (citing Green, 264 Va. at 611, 571 S.E.2d at 139). The instructions provided by the trial court were designed to focus the jury's attention on the specific purpose for which the jurors needed to consider Gilkes' and Hetrick's statements, namely to show their states of mind in order to explain their actions. For this reason, the trial court's instructions were adequate to address any prejudice caused by the statements, and eliminated the likelihood that the jury would consider the statements as proof that Teleguz was a member of the Russian Mafia. Accord Upchurch v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 408, 410-11, 258 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1979) (approving decision to admit testimony concerning burglary where jury was properly instructed that testimony was not to be considered for the truth of the matter, but rather to establish foundation on another point).