Opinion ID: 1778765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Paula Hathorn:

Text: ś 67. Manning asserts that he was allowed only limited impeachment of Hathorn. Manning claims that he was attempting to show that Hathorn could have and should have been charged with felonies instead of misdemeanors on her false pretense charges, subsequent to her stay in the penitentiary. In an effort to do that defense counsel asked Hathorn how much the checks had amounted to. The State objected to the question and the judge sustained the objection. Once the objection was sustained, defense counsel made no attempt to explain to the judge why he sought to elicit the amount of the checks, or what he intended to show with that evidence. ś 68. Mississippi allows wide-open cross-examination of any `matter affecting the credibility of the witness'. Meeks v.State, 604 So.2d 748, 755 (Miss.1992)(quoting Miss.R.Evid. 611(b)); Sayles v. State, 552 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Miss.1989); Miskelley v. State, 480 So.2d 1104, 1111-12 (Miss.1985). The cross-examination includes a witness' possible interest, bias, or prejudice in a case. Meeks, 604 So.2d at 755; Hill v. State, 512 So.2d 883, 884 (Miss.1987); Sayles, 552 So.2d at 1386. ś 69. The State argues that the trial judge cannot be put in error because defense counsel made no attempt to argue to him why this evidence was relevant. Further the State argues that defense counsel was inquiring into the details of misdemeanor crimes that Hathorn admitted she committed, and that inquiry into the details of convictions for impeachment purposes is not allowed. The State cites Williams v. State, 512 So.2d 666, 671 (Miss.1987) as well as Miss.R.Evid. 608(b) to support its position. In Williams, the defendant had on direct examination admitted to the crime of trespassing. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked At that time, you broke in on a little twelve-year-old girl, didn't you? Defense counsel immediately objected and the jury was told to disregard the question. This Court found that the question was improper, but that the admonition to the jury cured the potential error. Id. at 671. ś 70. Miss.R.Evid. 608(b) provides in pertinent part: (b)Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1)concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. Miss.R.Evid. 608(b). The Comment to Rule 608(b) states that details of the crime may not be elicited. ś 71. Manning asserts that defense counsel was not attempting to impeach Hathorn with evidence of the facts underlying the crimes, but was trying to inquire into whether she had received favorable treatment. He cites this Court's decisions in Hill v. State, 512 So.2d 883 (Miss.1987) and Suan v. State, 511 So.2d 144 (Miss.1987), to support his contention that this inquiry was appropriate. ś 72. In Hill, the State's main witness was a co-indictee of the defendant who had yet to be tried. The court impermissibly restricted cross-examination by defense counsel about any promises of leniency. Id. at 885-86. In Suan, defense counsel had attempted to show that a State's witness had been involved in prior criminal activity but had not been prosecuted. The court refused to allow such cross-examination. This Court held that to be reversible error. Id. at 148. ś 73. Both of these cases are distinguishable from the case sub judice. In Suan, this Court found that the nature and purpose of the cross-examination that defense counsel attempted was apparent from the record. Id. at 147. In the present case, the nature and purpose of the cross-examination is not apparent from the record, nor was it apparent to the trial judge. ś 74. In Hill, the witness that defense counsel sought to cross-examine was a co-indictee whose fate was still pending. In the present case, there was no evidence that Hathorn had any pending charges at the time of trial. Additionally, she and the sheriff testified that she had not been offered any sort of leniency in exchange for her testimony. ś 75. The record shows that Hathorn was fully cross-examined by defense counsel concerning her prior charges. She was also asked if she had received any leniency. There is nothing in the record to suggest to this Court or to the trial judge what purpose the defense had in inquiring into the details of Hathorn's prior charges. Miss.R.Evid. 103(a)(2) is controlling in this situation. It provides: (a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and (2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked ... Miss.R.Evid. 103(a)(2). ś 76. Manning is procedurally barred from asserting this claim. Defense counsel should have made an offer of proof where the substance of the evidence was not apparent from the context within which the question was asked. Miss.R.Evid. 103(a)(2). Additionally, this assignment of error is meritless as evidence of the underlying facts or details of the crime should not be elicited. We find no reversible error here.