Opinion ID: 1983484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: duration of incapacitation

Text: Streett argues that the Superior Court improperly substituted its own factual findings for those made by the Board when the court concluded, [t]he record clearly shows that the claimant was incapacitated for at most three days and this Court so finds. State v. Streett, Del.Super., C.A. No. 94A-04-022, Slip. Op. At 5, Barron, J., 1994 WL 682441 (November 3, 1994) (Order). The State responds that the Superior Court correctly disregarded Streett's testimony that she was incapacitated for [a]bout a week, because, as a non-expert, she was not competent to testify as to the extent of her disability. Appellate courts review factual findings by the Board to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Cephas, Del.Supr., 637 A.2d 20 (1994). Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Olney v. Cooch, Del.Supr., 425 A.2d 610, 614 (1981). Only where there is no satisfactory proof in support of a factual finding of the Board may the Superior Court, or this Court for that matter, overturn it. Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 59 Del. 48, 213 A.2d 64, 67 (1965). The claimant has the burden of establishing a work-related injury and the extent of the injury. McCormick Transp. Co. v. Barone, 47 Del. 202, 89 A.2d 160 (1952). Generally, medical evidence must be presented to support the employee's claim. Where the claimant's injury is internal, for example, medical evidence is essential in order to properly determine that an injury in fact has occurred and the extent of such injury. Id. 89 A.2d at 163. However, medical evidence is not the only evidence the Board may rely upon in making its factual determinations with respect to the claimant's injury. In General Motors Corporation v. Freeman, 53 Del. 74, 164 A.2d 686 (1960), the employer disputed the employee's claim that his eye injury was caused by an accident at work. The medical evidence on causation was weak and uncertain, but the Board found in the employee's favor. Id. 164 A.2d at 689. In evaluating whether the Board's finding was supported by substantial evidence, this Court noted the employee's testimony as to the onset of his vision problems and the absence of any similar problems prior to the accident at work. That lay evidence, combined with the marginal expert medical evidence, was held sufficient to sustain the Board's decision. In the present case, both the existence of an injury and its causation were established by undisputed medical evidence. Kloud and Gross agreed that Streett's fall at Gander Hill Prison aggravated pre-existing injuries to Streett's neck and back. Neither doctor had examined Streett immediately after her accident, but both offered opinions as to how long Streett would have been incapacitated by her injuries. Kloud, who had been treating Streett for some time prior to her accident at work, testified that Street would have been incapacitated for at least three days. Gross, who had more limited contact with Streett, apparently thought Streett would have been incapacitated for at most three days. The medical evidence as to the duration of Streett's disability was relatively weak and somewhat inconsistent. However, we are satisfied that duration is an issue, similar to causation, where medical evidence may be supplemented by other credible evidence. Here, the other credible evidence was Streett's testimony that she was suffering significant pain and would have been unable to work for one week following the accident. Streett's testimony was not inconsistent with Kloud's at-least-three-day estimate and, together, they constitute substantial evidence in support of the Board's factual finding.