Opinion ID: 867239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-Examination on Psychiatric History

Text: ¶ 13 During a police interview several days after the shooting, Wilson said he had not been taking certain prescribed medications. After reviewing this interview, the defense obtained Wilson's records from Correctional Health Services (CHS). These records indicate that Wilson told CHS staff that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia in Indiana, but they do not contain an independent diagnosis of schizophrenia or a confirmation of any previous diagnosis. ¶ 14 The State moved in limine to preclude Delahanty from inquiring into Wilson's mental health history at trial, arguing that no evidence suggested that mental disease affected his ability to perceive and relate events and that discussing mental health would confuse and unduly prejudice the jury. Delahanty responded, attaching an entry from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders which stated that schizophrenia can cause delusions and hallucinations. ¶ 15 Delahanty supplemented the response with a report from Dr. George DeLong, a clinical psychologist, who noted that in the CHS records, Wilson report[ed] that he has been diagnosed with Schizophrenia. Dr. DeLong concluded, however, that Wilson's use of drugs throughout his childhood and adult life confounds the ability of any practitioner to make a diagnosis of Schizophrenia as an independent illness in this case. Dr. DeLong further noted that Wilson had a number of conditions and/or symptoms that research conclusively demonstrates to negatively impact a person's abilities to attend, concentrate, and recall. ¶ 16 The trial court denied the motion in limine in part and granted it in part, stating as follows: The Court finds that the ability to perceive is always a relevant fact. The Court also recognizes under [Rule] 403 issues of confusion. The Court would allow either party to elicit that Mr. Wilson . . . had been prescribed medicine May 10th, 2005, and he was on it or not on it, and what he self perceives his ability to perceive was. The Court would not admit any testimony by any other lay person in terms of any diagnosis, effects of any particular medicine, but would allow any percipient witness to testify regarding the demeanor, ability to perceive of Mr. Wilson, during the relevant period . . . . There will be no evidence regarding schizophrenia. The Court finds insufficient proffer of what impact, if any, a diagnosis of schizophrenia has on a witness' ability to perceive or relate events. During cross-examination, Wilson testified that he had stopped taking his medications a month before the murder because they were too expensive, but that his memory was not affected. ¶ 17 Delahanty contends that precluding evidence of Wilson's alleged schizophrenia denied him a fair trial. We review limitations on the scope of cross-examination for abuse of discretion. State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509, 513, 658 P.2d 162, 166 (1982). ¶ 18 Evidence of a witness's psychological history may be admissible when it goes to [his or] her credibility. United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 347 (2d Cir. 1995). However, recognizing that [m]any psychiatric problems do not affect a witness's credibility or capacity to observe and communicate, we have held that the psychiatric history of a witness may be excluded under Arizona Rule of Evidence 403 unless the proponent make[s] an offer of proof showing how it affects the witness's ability to observe and relate the matters to which he testifies. Zuck, 134 Ariz. at 513, 658 P.2d at 166 (upholding exclusion of evidence of paranoid schizophrenia). Some federal cases take a seemingly broader approach, suggesting that a schizophrenia diagnosis is generally admissible to attack a witness's credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 256 F.3d 330, 343 (5th Cir.2001) ([T]he decisions of this and other circuits stand for the general principle that a diagnosis of schizophrenia . . . will be relevant, unless the diagnosis is too remote in time from the events alleged in the indictment.). ¶ 19 In this case, however, there was no diagnosis of schizophrenia presented. The only evidence in the record suggesting that Wilson suffered from schizophrenia was an unconfirmed statement he made to a CHS employee. Dr. DeLong, a defense expert and the only mental health professional to address the issue, concluded that Wilson's history confounds the ability of any practitioner to make a diagnosis of Schizophrenia. (Emphasis added.) Delahanty did not request an independent examination of Wilson. Moreover, although nothing in the trial court's order prevented Dr. DeLong from testifying about Wilson's alleged cognitive deficiencies, Delahanty chose not to call Dr. DeLong as an expert witness. ¶ 20 Wilson was subjected to lengthy cross-examination about his credibility, including extensive reference to his plea bargain. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Santiago, 872 F.2d 1073, 1085 (1st Cir.1989) (upholding trial court's exclusion of evidence of a witness's psychiatric evaluation when the witness received a complete and thorough grilling by defense counsel on all matters that properly went to her credibility). More importantly, Wilson was not the only eyewitness to the murder. His account was substantially similar to that of Armendariz. It thus seems quite unlikely that his testimony resulted from a schizophrenic delusion. ¶ 21 On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Delahanty from mentioning schizophrenia during Wilson's cross-examination.