Opinion ID: 754797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 10
11 We have jurisdiction to review a district court's order denying summary judgment on a qualified immunity defense under the collateral order doctrine. Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.1996). However, our jurisdiction is limited to purely legal issues. The collateral order doctrine does not sanction review of a district court's order denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds when the basis for the defendant's motion is that the evidence in the pretrial record is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id. at 1317 (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-19, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995)). Since the district court found genuine issues of fact concerning the reasonableness of Officer Chew's actions, our review is limited to determining whether clearly established law existed at the time of the incident that Officer Chew's actions could have violated. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 317, 115 S.Ct. 2151 (limiting interlocutory appeals of 'qualified immunity' matters to cases presenting more abstract issues of law). 12 For purposes of the appeal of the denial of immunity, we must take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary judgment for [a] (purely legal) reason. Id. at 319, 115 S.Ct. 2151. In cases like this one where the district court does not explicitly set out the facts that it relied upon, we undertake a review of the pretrial record only to the extent necessary to determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed. Id. We review the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Chief Samuels and Officer Chew under those constraints. 13
14 [A] municipality is not entitled to the shield of qualified immunity from liability under § 1983. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 473, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985); see also Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1439 (9th Cir.1994). Ordinarily, denial of summary judgment that does not dispose of all claims against all parties is not a final appealable order. See Cheng v. CIR, 878 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that orders granting partial summary judgment, because they do not dispose of all claims, are not final appealable orders under section 1291). However, Oakland requests that we take pendant jurisdiction over the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment because the officers' claim of qualified immunity is inextricably intertwined with the issue of Oakland's liability. See Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 51, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995). In Swint, the Supreme Court set out a general rule against exercising pendant jurisdiction over related rulings but left open the possibility that appellate courts could extend such jurisdiction if the rulings were inextricably intertwined. Id. 15 We do not find the district court's denial of summary judgment to Oakland inextricably intertwined with the denial of qualified immunity to Officer Chew and Chief Samuels. In Chew, we held that the liability of Los Angeles for a police dog bite was separate from the officer's qualified immunity defense. See 27 F.3d at 1445 (affirming the district court's grant of qualified immunity while reversing the district court's award of summary judgment to the City of Los Angeles). We reasoned that: 16 Under the Monell doctrine, Chew may recover from the city if his injury was inflicted pursuant to city policy, regulation, custom, or usage. City policy need only cause the constitutional violation; it need not be unconstitutional per se. City policy causes an injury where it is the moving force behind the constitutional violation, ... or where the city itself is the wrongdoer. 17 Id. at 1444 (internal citations omitted). As Watkins' claim challenges Oakland's canine policy, customs and usage, it is not inextricably intertwined with Officer Chew's and Chief Samuels' qualified immunity claims. Therefore, we decline to extend jurisdiction to Oakland's appeal of the denial of its summary judgment motion. 18