Opinion ID: 1925659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence

Text: On July 31, 1973about a year and a half after Defendant's conviction and while this appeal was pendingthe inconstant Mr. Doughty appeared at the Penobscot County Sheriff's office and made a statement under interrogation by Defendant's new counsel. After having sworn to tell the truth before a Notary Public, he recanted his trial testimony and said that he had implicated the Defendant falsely because he held a grudge against the Defendant. The Defendant promptly filed a motion for a new trial which, at hearing, he was permitted to amend into a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Eight days later, this motion was heard before a Justice of the Superior Court. The Justice denied the motion. The Defendant's appeal from his denial was argued with his appeal from his conviction. Although the Justice advised Mr. Doughty that if his testimony conflicted with his prior sworn statement it might incriminate him in the crime of perjury, the witness declined to claim the privilege accorded him by the Fifth Amendment. The sworn statement was introduced. Mr. Doughty testified and under oath withdrew his recantation. He again maintained that his trial testimony was the truth. He admitted that he had made the written recantation at the County Jail but said that it resulted from more threats that had been made against his wife and children and also because, he said, I was drinking quite heavy, too, at the time. The Defendant, he reiterated, had participated with him in the Thompson Tree Service, Inc. break. Defendant's counsel offered to produce two deputy sheriffs who would testify that Mr. Doughty was not drunk at the time of the recantation and also the Defendant's trial attorney who would testify as to the recantation which Mr. Doughty had made at his office before trial. We have said that, in order to justify the granting of a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the tests to be applied are: 1. [That] the evidence is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted. 2. [That] it has been discovered since the trial. 3. [That] it could not have been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence. 4. [That] it is material to the issue. 5. [That] it is not merely cumulative or impeaching, unless it is clear that such impeachment would have resulted in a different verdict. State v. O'Clair, Me., 292 A.2d 186, 197 (1972); State v. Casale, 148 Me. 312, 319-320, 92 A.2d 718, 722 (1952). While an out-of-court recantation of a witness since trial may more correctly be termed newly created evidence, we will treat it as encompassed within the newly discovered evidence area of M.R.Crim.P., Rule 33. See Bridgham v. Hinds, 120 Me. 444, 115 A. 197 (1921). The answer to our problem appears when we apply the 5th test to the facts presented to the Justice who heard the Defendant's motion. The evidence which was presented to the Justice was merely impeaching and cumulative impeaching because its evidentiary status would be that of an out-of-court statement inconsistent with his trial testimony (Kolasen v. Great Northern Paper Co., 115 Me. 367, 98 A. 1029 (1916)) and cumulative because he had made a similar inconsistent statement once before. We have said that a recantation by an important state's witness does not as a matter of law entitle a convicted Defendant to a new trial. State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 110 A.2d 588 (1954). Otherwise, as we have noted, the power to give a convicted person a new trial would rest with the witnesses who testified against him. State v. Dodge, 124 Me. 243, 249, 127 A. 899, 902 (1925). What this Justice heard was not a recantation of trial testimony but an admission by Mr. Doughty that he had made an out-of-court recantation of his trial testimony. This admission was coupled with the witness' insistence that his trial testimony was the truth and that his renunciation of it had been made because of fear. The Defendant complains that the Justice should also have heard the testimony of Defendant's trial counsel who would have testified to the earlier, pre-trial recantation and of the two deputy sheriffs who would have said that Mr. Doughty was not drunk at the time he made the second statement. While we believe it would have been preferable for the Justice to have heard the proffered testimony, we see no prejudice to the Defendant by his refusal. The Justice was already aware of the witness' first, pre-trial, recantation. While the witness did add that he was drinking quite heavy, too, at the time, he did not claim that his recantation at the county jail resulted from his being drunk. [2] As the Justice's responsibility of hearing the new testimony, observing the conduct of the witness, weighing the value of the evidence and its potential for resulting in a different verdict if presented at a new trial (State v. Irons, 137 Me. 294, 298, 18 A.2d 798, 801 (1941)) is essentially a determination of fact, his decision must stand on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. O'Clair, supra, 292 A.2d at 197. The Justice knew that the jury had heard that the witness had recanted once before his trial testimony and that the jury had heard his explanation that his recantation had resulted from fear and had still accepted his testimony as true. The Justice evaluated the probable impeachment effect of the additional recantation, along with the witness' in-court repudiation of the recantation, and was not satisfied that it was clear that the new evidence would result in a different verdict if the case was retried. We cannot say that he was clearly wrong. The entry will be: Appeals denied.