Opinion ID: 249231
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The evidence as to damage was sufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment.

Text: 23 (a) Causal connection between restraint and damage. 24 Richfield concedes that once Karseal had shown that the defendant had violated the anti-trust laws, and the further fact that Karseal actually suffered damage to its business or property as a result of such violation, the jury was permitted to make a just and reasonable estimate of the amount of plaintiff's damage. But Richfield insists that there must be first, proof not only of an unreasonable restraint of trade by the defendant, but also a causal connection between defendant's act and a loss of anticipated revenue to plaintiff. 25 Karseal concedes this general statement of the law but asserts that having shown the illegal restraint applied to its product, it had proved the causal connection between the defendant's wrongful act and the loss of revenue. We agree. It seems patent that the restraint applied would result in some loss of business. 26 Wolfe v. National Lead Co. (supra), is cited by Richfield for its holding that there was no proof that the plaintiffs had suffered damage. Richfield states, 'In affirming the court pointed out the important distinction in the quantum of proof required as to the fact as distinguished from the amount of damages.' In the case at hand there was clear causal connection between the alleged restraints applied and damage suffered. 27 Contrast the factual basis in Monticello Tobacco Co., Inc. v. American Tobacco Co., 2 Cir., 1952, 197 F.2d 629, with the factual situation here. In Monticello, plaintiff could not prevail because of absence of a showing of causal connection between the illegal acts of the defendants and the 'jobbers' refusals to handle plaintiff's product.' At page 633. Here the impact of Richfield's exclusive dealing practices on Karseal was shown by evidence the jury was entitled to and did believe. 28 (b) A just and reasonable estimate of damage. 29 How then is plaintiff to make a showing which will permit the jury to make a just and reasonable estimate of its damage? The Richfield brief concedes, 'It is, of course, true that the quantum of proof required to establish the amount of damage is not and should not be as great as that required to establish the fact of damage. If there is substantial evidence that damage to the plaintiff in fact resulted from wrongful conduct of defendant, it is proper to permit the jury to make a just and reasonable estimate of the amount thereof.   '. 30 'A study of the adjudicated cases in this area readily dispels any impression that this question of damages is governed by an application of the common law rule of reasonable certainty. The cases have long since departed from this rule in antitrust legislation. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson, supra, 282 U.S. at page 565, 51 S.Ct. 248,' Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, supra, 246 F.2d at page 391. See the general discussion following the above quotation, at pages 391-394. 31 There is no particular way for a plaintiff, injured by a defendant's violation of the anti-trust laws to show precisely what sales it lost. It certainly cannot prove precisely how may cases of 'Wax Seal' were not sold. 32 To assist the jury in making a 'just and reasonable estimate of damage,' plaintiff offered proof which the jury could believe and consider, that 'Wax Seal' sold on the free market, as well or in many instances 3 to 7 times better than a product known as 'Mac's,' and that 'Mac's' was generally a comparable product. Evidence was offered which the jury was entitled to believe that during the period of time involved in this case that Richfield purchased from Mac's Super gloss Company, 4,707 cases of 'Mac's' polish. Karseal then contended that the jury could infer that 'Wax Seal' outsold 'Mac's' 3 to 1, and that therefore had plaintiff not bee denied access to the 3,000 Richfield service stations during the six years between 1947 and 1953, that an estimate of approximately 14,121 cases of 'Wax Seal' would have been sold at Richfield stations. Karseal offered evidence which the jury were entitled to believe, that it was staffed, equipped and able to produce sufficient 'Wax Seal' to meet these additional sales. It also offered evidence, which the jury was entitled to believe, that its net profit per case of 'Wax Seal' for the period in question was 57cents per case. 33 Had the jury based its verdict on this computation, the result of course would have exceeded the verdict rendered by about $150 but the jury could have well taken into account that some 'Wax Seal' was actually sold by the Richfield stations. 34 We do not see much difference between the suggested formula as an assist in arriving at just and reasonable damages, and a chart placed on a blackboard in a personal injury case, where plaintiff's lawyer outlines his computations as to loss of earnings, pain and suffering, and the various other items of damage. The plaintiff is not required to prove with mathematical certainty the amount of its damage resulting from a defendant's violation of the anti-trust laws. 35 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., supra, 282 U.S. at pages 562-563, 51 S.Ct. at page 250, states: 36 '   It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but there was none as to the fact of damage; and there is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount. The rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount    37 'Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness and precision that would be possible if the case which he alone is responsible for making, were otherwise.   .' 38 Bordonaro Bros. Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 2 Cir., 1949, 176 F.2d 594, at page 597, states: 39 '   Damages in such a situation necessarily cannot be assessed with mathematical precision; but the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness, Samuelson, 'while purely and estimate and introduced as such, was proof of a kind as definite and certain as the subject-matter admitted.' William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of U.S. and Canada, 2 Cir., 42 F.2d 152, 155, certiorari denied Associated Bill Posters of U.S. and Canada v. William H. Rankin Co., 282 U.S. 864, 51 S.Ct. 37, 75 L.Ed. 765. Defendants must not be allowed to create their own immunity by the extent and duration of their conspiracy.   ' 3 40 The record showed a restraint in interstate commerce on waxes and polishes which moved in interstate commerce, and particularly a restraint upon 'Wax Seal' manufactured and sold by Karseal. It is patent that damage would result. The jury could conclude from the evidence that this restraint applied to Karseal was a planned and continuous one, and that it generally affected to a greater or less degree the majority of the 3,000 Richfield service stations. The jury had evidence before it which indicated that Karseal out-sold on the free market a comparable product such as 'Mac's' and had evidence as to how much of the 'Mac's' product was sold in Richfield stations during the time involved. 41 We equate the just and reasonable estimate of damage to the just and reasonable verdict the jury must render in a personal injury case. Both are Tort actions. In neither can the plaintiff prove to any mathematical certainty, what are the damages in dollars and cents. 42 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., supra, 282 U.S. at page 565, 51 S.Ct. at page 251, states: 43 '   There are many cases in which damages are allowed where the element of uncertainty is at least equal to that in the present case-- as, for example, copyright and trade mark cases, cases of unfair competition, and many cases of personal injury   '. 44 Under all the facts in the case the damages must have a reasonable and fair relationship to the type, extent and period of the restraint applied, the number of outlets affected by the restraint and the kind of product, its price and salability, the profit made on sales, and an estimate of the amount of profit lost by reason of the illegal activities of the defendant. There was here proof of such matters. 45 In Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord (supra), plaintiffs were in their first year of working for themselves with no prior record of the success of their business. In the case at hand there was proof of gross dollars sales of $130,000 in the yeat ending June 30, 1948 and gross dollars sales of $501,000, $675,000, $799,000, $621,000 and $686,000 in the following years. This was not proof of business activity prior to the application of the illegal restraints, but during the period thereof. We see no reason why a plaintiff who has a substantial volume of sales during a period of illegal restraints would not be damaged by such restraint even if its business started during such period of restraint. The jury might have believed such volume of business indicated no restraint and no damage, but it found to the contrary. 46 The case is not controlled by Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord (supra), or Wolfe v. National Lead Co. (supra). Both are distinguishable. Here there was proof of illegal restraint, obvious causal connection between restraint and damage and proof of sufficient facts to permit the jury to make a just and reasonable estimate of damages. 47 Although Karseal sued for $135,000, its counsel realistically approached the problem and presented to the jury a realistic formula, not as exact proof of its damage but to assist the jury in arriving at a just and reasonable verdict. The instructions on damages, unchallenged, were fair and accurate and presented fully the applicable law on damages in this type of action. 4 Looking at the entire record, we cannot say that a verdict of $7,900 as the damage suffered for restraint applied on a majority of 3,000 service stations in a six year period was unjust or unreasonable.