Opinion ID: 2632408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Impeachment of Joseph with Juvenile Record

Text: Joseph, whom defendant ultimately identified as the only person present at Dorsey's apartment besides defendant and the victims, testified that defendant shot Dorsey and Martin. The trial court permitted defense counsel to impeach Joseph by questioning him about a letter he wrote while in custody on charges related to the Dorsey and Martin murders, in which he threatened to kill his girlfriend, Jalicia P. In addition, defense counsel sought to impeach Joseph by cross-examining him regarding incidents of prior misconduct noted in his juvenile record, including bicycle thefts, burglaries, and the assault of another ward while in placement. Defense counsel specified to the court that he sought to question Joseph about specific acts of misconduct and did not intend to use Joseph's record itself as impeachment evidence. The trial court reviewed Joseph's juvenile record in camera to determine which, if any, of the incidents in this record could be used by defense counsel. The trial court allowed the defense to question Joseph only about his admission of petty theft in juvenile proceedings in October 1987. Defense counsel noted that there were other sustained petitions in Joseph's juvenile record, but the trial court did not confirm if any additional petitions had been sustained. Instead, it stated that, regardless of other sustained petitions, it would exercise its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to limit questioning based on Joseph's juvenile record to his admission of petty theft. Defendant contends that the trial court thus improperly limited the defense's impeachment of Joseph, and that Joseph should have been confronted with his entire juvenile criminal history. The trial court acted within its discretion to permit impeachment as to only one of the incidents in Joseph's juvenile record. Past criminal conduct involving moral turpitude that has some logical bearing on the veracity of a witness in a criminal proceeding is admissible to impeach, subject to the court's discretion under Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 337, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545, citing People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 295-296, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938.) [T]he latitude section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in individual cases is broad. The statute empowers courts to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 296, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938.) Neither during trial nor on appeal has defendant identified specific incidents in Joseph's juvenile file that so demonstrate moral turpitude that they would support a conclusion that excluding them was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. On appeal, defendant now contends that the jury should have been informed of the result of Joseph's juvenile adjudication for his offenses related to the murders of Dorsey and Martin. [6] However, it is not clear that defense counsel sought admission of this evidence during trial or that such evidence would be admissible. (See People v. Lee (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1739-1740, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 723.) Moreover, upon inquiry from the jury, the trial court did inform the jury that Joseph had been charged in juvenile court with two homicides, two robberies, a burglary, and other offenses. Accordingly, defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352. Defendant also contends that the trial court, in not allowing him to impeach Joseph with evidence of the conduct underlying his juvenile adjudications for burglary and assault, violated defendant's federal due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. As the high court has explained, cross-examination is required in order to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. ( Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347.) [A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.... ( Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674.) The trial court, of course, has a wide latitude of discretion to restrict cross-examination and may impose reasonable limits on the introduction of such evidence. ( Id. at p. 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431.) Thus, unless the defendant can show that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced `a significantly different impression of [the witnesses'] credibility' [citation], the trial court's exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth Amendment. ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 946, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183, quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680,106 S.Ct. 1431.) Here, defendant has failed to show that the cross-examination of Joseph sought by defense counselimpeachment based upon Joseph's juvenile recordwould have produced a significantly different impression of Joseph's testimony. The trial court allowed some impeachment of Joseph based on an admitted juvenile offense, as well as with the threatening note written to his girlfriend. Joseph's testimony on direct examination yielded additional evidence unfavorable to his character; he admitted assisting defendant in loading the gun, breaking into Dorsey's safe, and keeping items from the robbery. Additionally, the trial court's statement that Joseph had been charged in juvenile court with homicide, robbery, burglary, and other offenses supplied the jury with further impeachment evidence. Given the wealth of evidence introduced at trial that tended to show Joseph was no stranger to the criminal justice system, defendant has not shown that introduction of conduct underlying additional alleged, and perhaps sustained, juvenile offenses would have produced a significantly different impression of Joseph's testimony. We therefore reject defendant's claim that the trial court deprived him of his federal confrontation right by disallowing defense counsel from introducing any evidence of additional juvenile offenses as evidence to further impeach Joseph.