Opinion ID: 2060375
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Correct Entry of Judgment

Text: The descriptive title which Allstate placed on its post judgment motion was MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL OR A REMITTITUR. That motion raised several grounds. Allstate's motion was filed within ten days of the entry of judgment. [5] Under former Md. Rule 1012(d) (now Rule 8-202(c)) it operated to extend the time for noting an appeal until thirty days after its denial. Allstate's post judgment motion included the assertion that the trial court had erred in permitting the jury to return a verdict against this defendant in excess of the limit set forth in said insurance policy. This ground of the motion sought a reduction of the judgment entered on the count of Miller's complaint sounding in contract. Under Md. Rule 2-532(a), a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict does not lie because Allstate had not moved for a judgment at the close of all of the evidence on the issue that Allstate had no liability for any amount in excess of the limits of uninsured motorist coverage. Cf. Md. Rule 2-519(a) (A party may move for judgment on any or all of the issues ... in a jury trial at the close of all the evidence.). Nevertheless, Allstate's motion sought a revision of the judgment and was sufficient to invoke the court's revisory power under Md. Rule 2-535(a). [6] Allstate attached the portion of the policy setting out the policy limits to its motion for reconsideration of the denial of the post judgment motion. That reconsideration was denied before the order for appeal was filed. Because judgment on the contract claim exceeding the $50,000 limit in the policy was erroneous as a matter of law, the circuit court erred in failing to revise the judgment. Review of the denial of revision is available on this timely appeal from the judgment. Allstate argues that a jury verdict against an insurer which exceeds its uninsured third party policy limits should be reduced by the trial judge to the amount of the contractual coverage. Miller responds that Allstate had the burden of establishing and proving the parameters of its liability to the jury; having chosen not to enter the policy limits into evidence at trial, the insurer cannot offer that evidence for the first time in a post-trial motion. That argument might be persuasive had this case gone to the jury on the contract claim against Allstate. But, as we have seen, what actually went to the jury was the question of damages arising from the tort claim of Miller against Sowell. We are dealing with what was functionally presented to the jury as a tort case. Miller relies on Williams v. Bernard, 413 So.2d 198 (La. App. 1982), aff'd, 425 So.2d 719 (La. 1983). In Williams, the intermediate appellate court upheld an $8,000 jury verdict for the plaintiff where the insurance company did not establish the $5,000 ceiling on its uninsured motorist provision. The intermediate appellate court stated: It is clear from this exchange that plaintiff met the burden of establishing uninsured motorist coverage. Despite this stipulation, no mention was made of the $5,000.00 limitation and it was not brought to the jury's attention. Once coverage is established, it then becomes incumbent upon defendant either to offer evidence of the limit of the amount of coverage or to stipulate the limit. Defendant failed to carry this burden. The jury's failure to be aware of the policy limit was attributable to defendant. After coverage has been stipulated, an insurer cannot remain silent on extent of coverage and then complain when a jury awards an amount in excess of the policy limit. 413 So.2d at 200. [7] We decline to follow the reasoning of the Louisiana court. It is evident that Louisiana has merged the concepts of direct action against an insurance company with that of contractual liability in the context of an uninsured motorist case. We are unpersuaded by Williams for the reasons set forth below. In keeping with the majority rule, Maryland generally holds that evidence of a defendant's insurance is inadmissible to show fault or lack thereof. [8] Jones v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 252 Md. 475, 494, 250 A.2d 653, 664 (1969); Takoma Park Bank v. Abbott, 179 Md. 249, 263, 19 A.2d 169, 176, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 672, 62 S.Ct. 134, 86 L.Ed. 538 (1941). Cf. Association of Indep. Taxi Operators, Inc. v. Kern, 178 Md. 252, 260, 13 A.2d 374, 377 (1940). See also McCormick on Evidence § 201, at 593 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). Where the insurance carrier is a party to the suit, the existence of insurance obviously cannot be kept from the jury; however the amount of uninsured motorist coverage should not be disclosed, unless the amount is in controversy. [9] The rationale for this approach is that the coverage amount has no relevant bearing upon the jury's consideration of the issue of damages. Moreover, establishing the availability of a sum certain is likely to distort a jury verdict. See generally International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 42, 127 A. 647, 650 (1925). [10] The jury's knowledge of the available policy limits can work to the disadvantage of either party depending on the circumstances of the case. All of this is perfectly sound tort law, and we apply it here because what the jury was directed to consider, and all the jury was directed to consider, was the issue of damages in a tort case. In this posture of the case, and under these circumstances, rather than require a party to establish uninsured motorist policy limits as an affirmative defense or as a limitation of exposure, the better rule is to allow the jury to make its decision on the issue of damages without being informed of the amount of coverage available. Therefore, the admission of uninsured motorist coverage amounts should not be a tactical decision left to the parties' discretion. The fact of the limit of uninsured motorist coverage is irrelevant to the issue of the amount of tort damages. Here, no jury issue was presented concerning the $50,000 uninsured motorist coverage. Both the parties and the court were aware of the insurance policy limits. [11] Under these circumstances, the jury's verdict should not have been influenced by extraneous factors such as the prospect of recovery or of the availability of a specific sum of uninsured motorist coverage. If the verdict exceeds the coverage amount, the trial court should then reduce the verdict, upon proper post-trial motion, to comply with the limits of the policy. In the present case, Allstate's filing of the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict pursuant to Md. Rule 2-532 was a proper vehicle for the trial judge to correct the erroneous judgment. [12] The trial court erred in denying the motion to reduce the verdict against Allstate so as to comply with the contractual limitations of the insurance policy. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO REMAND TO THE CIRCUIT COURT TO DIRECT JUDGMENT AGAINST ALLSTATE IN THE AMOUNT OF $50,000. THE TOTAL VERDICT OF $120,000 SHOULD NOT BE ALTERED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.