Opinion ID: 2518547
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preserving the constitutionality of the statute as a whole

Text: We must also interpret the language of the savings clause to preserve, if possible, the constitutionality of the statute. Kamal, 88 Hawai`i at 294, 966 P.2d at 606. Interpreting the savings clause such that any hearing conducted after the effective date could be considered a separate proceeding or that the defendant has not incurred the penalties set forth in Act 44 until the date sentence is imposed could expose some provisions of Act 44 to constitutional challenges. This court has stated that [t]he ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution[,] U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1[,] prohibits states from enacting retrospective penal legislation. In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), the United States Supreme Court was presented with the question whether the application of a Texas statute, which was passed after respondent's crime and which allowed the reformation of an improper jury verdict in respondent's case, violate[d] the Ex Post Facto Clause. . . . Id. at 39 [110 S.Ct. 2715]. In summarizing the meaning of the ex post facto clause, the Court stated: It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation may be dispensed with, that any statute [(1)] which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done[,(2)] which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or [(3)] which deprives one charged with [a] crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.  Id. at 42 [110 S.Ct. 2715] (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)). The Beazell formulation is faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause: Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.  Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Von Geldern, 64 Haw. 210, 212, 638 P.2d 319, 321 (1981) (no new punitive measure may be applied to a crime already consummated. . . . Such legislation would be [an] ex post facto law[.]). State v. Nakata, 76 Hawai`i at 375, 878 P.2d at 714 (emphasis in original) (footnote and some citations omitted) (some brackets added and some in original) (some underlining omitted in original). By its plain language, the savings clause set forth in section 29 applies to the entirety of Act 44. [29] See supra note 1. Act 44, section 3 provides for enhanced penalties for exposing children to the process of manufacturing or distributing methamphetamine, as well as new penalties for injuries to others arising out of the manufacture or distribution of the drug. See 2004 Haw. Sess. L. Act 44, § 3 at 206-08. If proceedings and incurred are interpreted to allow application of Act 44 to a defendant charged before July 1, 2004 but sentenced thereafter, the provisions of Act 44, section 3, as an example, if properly pled and proven, could be susceptible to challenge as unconstitutional ex post facto measures because, at sentencing, they would (1) punish[] as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done[, or (2)] . . . make[] more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, Collins, 497 U.S. at 42, 110 S.Ct. 2715. 4. The legislature unambiguously intended that the provisions of Act 44 would not be available to defendants whose criminal prosecutions commenced prior to July 1, 2004. The language of Act 44, section 29 does not present us with a situation [w]here the intention of the legislature . . . is incapable of ascertainment, Von Geldern, 64 Haw. at 215, 638 P.2d at 323. Rather, we must presume that the legislature knows the law when enacting statutes, Agustin v. Dan Ostrow Constr. Co., 64 Haw. 80, 83, 636 P.2d 1348, 1351 (1981) (the legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting statutes, including this court's interpretations of statutory language), and, hence, we must presume that the legislature, in enacting Act 44, was aware (1) of this court's interpretation, in Van den Berg, 101 Hawai`i at 191, 65 P.3d at 138, of the term proceedings as being synonymous with the initiation of a prosecution through the issuance of criminal charges and (2) of the crucial analytical role the absence of a savings clause played in Koch and Von Geldern; yet the legislature nevertheless chose to include a savings clause that plainly states that its provisions do not apply to proceedings begun prior to July 1, 2004. [30] The preceding analysis, in sum, leads to the conclusion (1) that proceedings, absent ambiguity arising from subject matter peculiar to the legislation, means criminal prosecutions of which sentencing hearings are an inseparable component [31] and (2) that the legislature did not intend to allow the sentencing provisions of Act 44, section 11 to apply prospectively to a sentencing hearing conducted after July 1, 2004, which resulted from a criminal prosecution initiated prior to that date. Therefore, we hold that the term proceedings, as employed in Act 44, section 29, unambiguously means the initiation of a criminal prosecution against a defendant through a charging instrument and subsumes within its scope hearings and other procedural events that arise as a direct result of the initial charging instrument. Hence, because Reis was charged on January 5 and April 13, 2004, prior to Act 44's effective date of July 1, 2004, the circuit court erred in applying Act 44's ameliorative amendments to her sentence by failing to observe the statutory command of Act 44, section 29, Aplaca, 96 Hawai`i at 22, 25 P.3d at 797. Furthermore, in keeping with this court's holdings in Smith, 103 Hawai`i at 234, 81 P.3d at 414, and Walker, 106 Hawai`i at 10, 100 P.3d at 604, and insofar as Reis conceded that she qualified as a repeat offender under HRS § 706-606.5 in light of a prior conviction of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, the circuit court could not sentence Reis to probation pursuant to HRS § 706-622.5 (Supp.2002), the first-time drug offender statute in effect at the time of the commission of her offenses. Rather, the circuit court was required to apply HRS § 706-606.5 to sentence her to a mandatory minimum sentence of one year and eight months.