Opinion ID: 2244853
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standard of Review and Analysis

Text: Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we generally review sentencing only for abuse of discretion. Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Ind.1996). The trial court's discretion includes the ability to determine whether the presumptive sentence for a crime will be increased or decreased because of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, Smith v. State, 675 N.E.2d 693, 697 (Ind. 1996), and whether sentences on different counts will be served concurrently or consecutively. Mott v. State, 273 Ind. 216, 402 N.E.2d 986, 988 (1980). When the trial court imposes a sentence other than the presumptive sentence, or imposes consecutive sentences where not required to do so by statute, we will examine the record to ensure that the court explained its reasons for selecting the sentence it imposed. Hammons v. State, 493 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind.1986). The trial court's statement of reasons must include the following three elements: (1) identification of all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances found; (2) specific facts and reasons which lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance; and (3) articulation demonstrating that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in determination of the sentence. Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d at 1073. Defendant argues that the court erred when it failed to find defendant's mental illness to be a mitigating circumstance. At the same time, defendant argues that, while the court paid lip service to defendant's mental illness, it failed to make appropriate findings, and, as a result, defendant concludes that the trial court imposed a manifestly unreasonable sentence. With regard to defendant's assertion that the sentencing court failed to find that defendant's mental illness was a mitigating circumstance, we disagree. It is true that the written sentencing order makes no mention of defendant's mental illness. Nevertheless, the court's oral statement at the sentencing hearing does find that defendant was mentally ill on the day of the offenses. More importantly, however, the court was required to make a finding that defendant was guilty but mentally ill at the time of the offense when it accepted his plea of guilty but mentally ill. Walton v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1134, 1135 (Ind.1995). See also note 1 supra. Mentally ill in this context is defined by statute as having a psychiatric disorder which substantially disturbs a person's thinking, feeling, or behavior and impairs the person's ability to function. Ind.Code § 35-36-1-1 (1993). We conclude that the sentencing court made the required finding of mental illness at the time it accepted defendant's plea and then again orally at the sentencing hearing. To the extent that defendant argues that the court was required to credit one expert over another or to accord a specific weight to defendant's mental illness as a mitigating factor, again, we disagree. A sentencing court is not required to credit or weigh a possible mitigating circumstance as defendant suggests it should be credited or weighed. See Scheckel v. State, 620 N.E.2d 681, 684-85 (Ind.1993); Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind.1993); Hammons v. State, 493 N.E.2d at 1254-55. See also Harris v. State, 499 N.E.2d 723, 730 (Ind.1986). Moreover, when a sentencing court finds that both aggravating and mitigating circumstances are present and performs the required balancing process, the balancing test need not be quantitative, and is generally qualitative. See Penick v. State, 659 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Ind.1995). Thus, even where a sentencing court finds a mitigating circumstance such as a mental illness exists, it generally need not assign a substantial positive or numerical value to the circumstance. [3] The fact that defendant pleaded guilty but mentally ill does not change these fundamental principles. As we have previously emphasized, the guilty but mentally ill verdict invokes no special sentencing scheme. Gambill v. State, 675 N.E.2d 668, 676 (Ind.1996). The statute provides that a court shall sentence a defendant who is guilty but mentally ill in the same manner as a defendant found guilty of the offense. Id. at 676 (citing the statute). See also Scammahorn v. State, 506 N.E.2d 1097, 1099 (Ind.1987); Whitt v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (Ind.1986); Green v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1169, 1174 (Ind.1984). The only special consideration given to the guilty but mentally ill defendant is set out in Section 35-36-2-5(b) (1993 & Supp.1996), which provides that such a defendant, if committed to the Department of Corrections, shall be further evaluated and then treated in such a manner as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness. Gambill v. State, 675 N.E.2d at 676 (citing the statute). Thus, defendant in this case is not automatically entitled to any particular credit or deduction from his otherwise aggravated sentence because he is guilty but mentally ill. Turning to the articulation and balancing of aggravators and mitigators in this case, we conclude that, while the court properly found several aggravating factors, it also inappropriately found, and apparently gave weight to, two aggravating factors that are not applicable in this case. It is not enough for the sentencing court to simply state that defendant is in need of correctional or rehabilitative treatment that can best be provided by commitment of the person to a penal facility. Ind.Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(3)(1993 & Supp.1996). For this aggravator to have effect, the court must explain why defendant is in need of treatment in a penal facility for a period in excess of the presumptive sentence. See Smith v. State, 675 N.E.2d at 697-98. The court did not do so here. Moreover, recent cases have concluded that the statutory aggravating factor imposition of a reduced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime, Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(4), only supports a refusal to reduce the presumptive sentence. The sentencing court should not use this statutory factor when considering whether defendant should receive less than the maximum enhanced sentence, as we gather the court used it here. See, e.g., Grund v. State, 671 N.E.2d 411, 419 (Ind.1996); Penick v. State, 659 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Ind.1995); Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 67 (Ind.1995). With regard to the one mitigating factor, to the extent that the court here makes any effort to go beyond a conclusional assertion that defendant has some psychological problems, the court seems to base its statement on the faulty premise that mental illness is an all or nothing proposition, and that unless a defendant is without any ability to control his actions and behavior by virtue of his mental illness, the court should accord little or no weight to his mental illness as a mitigating factor. Specifically, the court stated that defendant's psychological problems are not to such an extent as to make it impossible for the defendant to control his actions and behavior in society. (R. at 663.) The court's premise is inconsistent with the nature of mental illness, as it has been described by the governing statute which defines it as including any disorder that substantially disturbs a person's behavior and impairs the person's ability to function. Ind.Code § 35-36-1-1. Thus, while a defendant's ability to control his behavior may be one important factor to consider when evaluating the weight to be accorded a defendant's mental illness, it is also appropriate to recognize degrees of impairment of that ability, as well as other factors such as the overall limitations upon functioning and the long-standing nature of the mental illness. [4] Stated another way, there may be many kinds of mental illnesses and different degrees to which a person's behavior can be substantially disturbed or his ability to function impaired, within the meaning of Ind.Code § 35-36-1-1. [5] Thus, in a case where the court finds that defendant, who is mentally ill but able to distinguish right from wrong and therefore not legally insane, [6] suffers from a serious mental illness, particularly a long-standing illness, or where that defendant's visions or voices led to bizarre behavior and played an integral part in the crime, the court may decide not to impose an enhanced sentence or may decide to otherwise accord significant weight to defendant's mental illness as a mitigating factor. [7] On the other hand, where the mental illness is less severe and defendant appears to have more control over his thoughts and actions, or where the nexus between defendant's mental illness and the commission of the crime is less clear, the court may determine on the facts of a particular case that the mental illness warrants relatively little or no weight as a mitigating factor. [8] On the specific facts of this case, the court should have assigned some weight to defendant's mental illness as a mitigating factor. While the experts who diagnosed defendant came to somewhat different conclusions, they were in agreement that defendant had a long-standing mental illness that had affected his ability to control his impulses since he was a child. It is also uncontroverted that throughout his life he has been directed to or has sought out mental health professionals. He was diagnosed as having adjustment and control disorders as early as 1978, at age ten, and 1983, at age sixteen, and with antisocial personality disorder in 1992, two years before he attacked the victim in this case. Mental health professionals prescribed medication for him, apparently as early as the late 1980s and again in 1992. Although there are several aggravating circumstances which the court properly found, and although we agree that the facts in this case are egregious, defendant's mental illness should warrant at least some offset to these aggravating circumstances. We conclude that, because defendant's mental illness is well-documented and long-standing and because it apparently limits his ability to function, it is entitled to some mitigating weight and warrants a reduction of defendant's total sentence. Accordingly, we affirm defendant's convictions. We reduce his sentence on the attempted murder and rape counts each from forty-five (45) to twenty-five (25) years, thus reducing the total sentence from one hundred sixty-five (165) to one hundred twenty-five (125) years. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.