Opinion ID: 2982752
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alternative Grounds for Affirming

Text: Aker abandons any defense of the district court’s reasoning. Instead, it argues that, even properly analyzing the facts and circumstances here, Sharp cannot demonstrate a causal connection. See Airline Prof’ls Ass’n of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Airborne, Inc., 332 F.3d 983, 986 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003) (“It is well-established that a prevailing party may assert in a reviewing court any ground in support of his judgment, whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the trial court.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We disagree. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Sharp, one could reasonably infer that Aker declined to rehire Sharp in retaliation for his then-pending discrimination action. Yes, it was fifteen months later. But because Aker terminated Sharp months before he disclosed his -7- Case No. 14-5415 Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc. intent to sue, no opportunity for retaliation manifested until the staffing agency tried placing Sharp back at DuPont’s Louisville plant. Aker rejected Sharp on the same day it received his application. And Atkins, the Aker employee who fielded the proposal that Sharp fill Aker’s vacancy at the DuPont plant, became personally involved in the underlying lawsuit just two months before rejecting him. This combination of circumstances means that the fifteen-month interval between letter and rejection could be consistent with a retaliatory motive. In addition, Sharp offers evidence that his co-worker, Gary Stanfield, brought a smart phone to the plant daily between 2008 and Sharp’s rejection. (Sharp’s Br. at 27–28; R. 25-4, Ex. C, Stanfield Dep. at 25–26, 29–31; R. 29-3, Ex. B, Sharp Dep. at 87, 90.) The record supports Sharp’s contention that Stanfield’s phone came equipped with video recording equipment and that Stanfield used the phone to take pictures while at the plant. (R. 29-3, Sharp Dep. at 99–102, Ex. 12.) Despite Hudson’s deposition statements that such conduct violated worksite policies, Aker never disciplined Stanfield. (See R. 25-2, Hudson Dep. at 40–44; R. 25-4, Stanfield Dep. at 28–30.) A jury could reasonably find, therefore, that Stanfield brought a multi-purpose, handheld electronic device to the plant and used it as a camera or recording device. These facts similarly situate Stanfield and Sharp in all aspects relevant to Aker’s stated reason for rejecting Sharp’s application: “the use of electronic recording devices on company property.” Given Sharp’s low burden of production at this first stage of the inquiry, see Dixon, 481 F.3d at 333, the evidence concerning Stanfield and the chronology of events establishes a prima facie case of retaliation. Aker objects to this reasoning on several grounds, none availing. Citing Plumb v. Potter, 212 F. App’x 472 (6th Cir. 2007), Aker first contends that Sixth Circuit precedent dooms Sharp’s argument that evidence of swift retaliation by an employer once the opportunity arises can -8- Case No. 14-5415 Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc. counterbalance a lengthy interval between the protected activity and the adverse action. But Plumb neither binds us nor persuades us that Sharp’s opportunity-based argument is defective as a matter of law. In Plumb, the plaintiff claimed that his employer denied him a promotion in retaliation for an EEOC complaint that he filed eight years previous. Plumb argued that his employer had no opportunity to retaliate until he applied for a promotion. Id. at 482. The court rejected this argument, noting the fact that Plumb’s employer had other opportunities to retaliate during the eight-year interval between Plumb’s EEOC complaint and his promotion request. Id. at 482–83. In contrast, Aker terminated Sharp before he filed his age-discrimination lawsuit, and therefore could not retaliate against him in any manner until he returned seeking temporary employment a year and a half later. Evidence showing that an employer had no opportunity to retaliate sooner supports a finding of temporal proximity. See Fischer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 390 F. App’x 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that the plaintiff could establish causation after two-and-a-half-year interval based on the “practical reality” that he took an extensive period of medical leave during that time); Dixon, 481 F.3d at 335 (holding similarly in the context of a reinstatement case). Aker also challenges Sharp’s use of Stanfield as a comparator in several ways. First, it argues that Sharp cannot analogize Stanfield’s smart-phone use to the use of MP3 players because the devices implicate different worksite policies. Aker notes that while DuPont’s Site Policies Brochure prohibits cameras and recording devices on plant premises, it permits cell phone use in certain locations and under certain conditions. But when Atkins listed both as examples of prohibited safety hazards in his email to Sharp’s staffing agency, he never distinguished the policies governing these two devices. And Sharp presents evidence that -9- Case No. 14-5415 Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc. DuPont considered MP3 players and other digital music players “radios” and permitted their use on plant premises to the same extent as cell phones. (See R. 25-4, Stanfield Dep. at 32–34; R. 29-3, Sharp Dep. at 89–90.) Second, there remains a genuine dispute of fact over Aker’s assertion that DuPont distinguishes between audio and video recording devices in its effort to protect trade secrets. DuPont’s use of a slash to connect “recording devices” with “cameras” in its written prohibition suggests no distinction. And Aker’s own evidence conflicts on whether the prohibition against recording devices applies equally to smart phones and MP3 players. (Compare R. 25-2, Hudson Dep. at 40–44, R. 25-13, Atkins Email, and R. 25-6, Ex. E, Taylor Dep. at 22–31, with R. 25-4, Stanfield Dep. at 28–30, 57–58.) Aker next argues that only job applicants, as opposed to regular employees like Stanfield, were similarly situated to Sharp. In many cases a plaintiff’s status as an applicant, probationary employee, or regular employee might distinguish him from a putative comparator, but not here. Aker maintains that it rejected Sharp’s application as a direct result of actions he took at DuPont’s plant as an Aker employee. Because the record supports Sharp’s claim that Aker never disciplined other employees in any fashion for violating DuPont’s worksite policy, a jury could reasonably infer that Aker enforced it against Sharp on account of the pending lawsuit. See Martinez, 703 F.3d at 917; Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992). Finally, Aker contends that Sharp cannot point to evidence in the record that Atkins also knew of Stanfield or other employees violating DuPont’s worksite policies. In support Aker cites Wallace v. Methodist Hospital System, where the Fifth Circuit rejected several of the plaintiff’s proposed comparators because “no one in a supervisory capacity was aware of the [proposed comparators’] actions.” 271 F.3d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 2001). Unlike Wallace, however, - 10 - Case No. 14-5415 Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc. the record in this case includes evidence that Hudson, Aker’s highest ranking supervisor at the DuPont plant, knew of Stanfield’s smart-phone use. (See R. 25-4, Stanfield Dep. at 25–31.) And Sharp offers evidence that Hudson instructed Atkins on the scope of DuPont’s worksite policies. (R. 25-2, Hudson Dep. at 26; R. 25-3, Atkins Aff. ¶¶ 4–5.) In sum, none of Aker’s objections persuades us that, as a matter of law, Sharp cannot establish a prima facie causal connection.