Opinion ID: 1436492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Orders Denying Clarification of the Court's Rulings

Text: Ms. Flax asserts that she was prejudiced by being without counsel during much of the trial court litigation. She contends that during the October 7, 2004 hearing on Flax's counsel's motion to withdraw, Flax secured a promise from Judge Kravitz to give consideration to the claims ignored in his July 26, 2004 order and the court represented its intent to address additional claims but failed to follow through. She asserts that she agreed to her counsel's withdrawal only after the court promised to revisit and clarify its partial summary judgment ruling, [9] and she argues that the trial judge thereafter abused his discretion when he repeatedly refused to reconsider and clarify its order. We are unable to evaluate this claim, and therefore decline to address it, because Ms. Flax has not provided us with a transcript of the hearing at which the promise she describes purportedly was made. [10] See D.C.Code § 17-305(a); D.C.App. R. 10(b)(2); In re Lanier, 905 A.2d 278, 284 (D.C.2006) (appellant has the duty to present us with a record sufficient to demonstrate the error of which she complains). Ms. Flax further contends that the court's orders denying her motion for reconsideration of the partial summary judgment ruling and correction of the record and denying her request for clarification resulted in her being unable to obtain new counsel to represent her in this litigation. She blames the court for refusing to clarify the claims that remained discoverable, and asserts that without the requested clarification, she was rendered unable to explain to potential new counsel what claims remained in the litigation and to conduct effective discovery. We are wholly unpersuaded by this argument. This court has experienced no particular difficulty in reviewing and understanding the trial court's unclarified rulings, and potential new counsel, we presume, would have had no more difficulty. While it is true that counsel for the Lawyers also asked the trial court to determine what issues actually remain in the case, their request appears to reflect uncertainty not about the court's prior rulings, but instead about what was covered by the broad allegation in Ms. Flax's Amended Complaint about the Lawyers' failure to advise that any judgments [Flax] might have obtained for intentional torts against Fischer, Laidlaw, or Miscoll would not be dischargeable and might have resulted in an award of punitive damages. That broad remaining claim, as we have discussed supra, preserved for Ms. Flax some latitude in conducting her discovery and, we think, should have facilitated the task of potential new counsel in thinking about how Ms. Flax's claims that had survived summary judgment might be pursued. Thus, we cannot agree that Ms. Flax was prejudiced by the court's rulings denying her requests for clarification.