Opinion ID: 77354
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entitlement to a Hearing and Discovery

Text: 43 Arthur argues that he was entitled to develop his claim of actual innocence and that a hearing is necessary to assess the reliability of High and Melson's affidavits. He maintains that the district court erred by applying the due diligence requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) because he was seeking to establish a gateway claim of actual innocence to excuse his untimeliness and not a review of the merits of the claim. He also contends that he should not be held responsible for his counsel's failure to investigate or develop the record. He maintains that, because of the advancements in DNA technology since his trial, tests on the physical trial evidence could produce new evidence that could not have been developed at trial. 44 While his habeas petition was pending, Arthur moved for leave to conduct discovery related to his claim of actual innocence and good cause for his failure to raise the actual innocence claim in state proceedings. Specifically, he sought physical evidence from the murder 9 and documents concerning the Holman Prison death row library. 10 The district court denied the request for the physical crime evidence finding that the evidence regarding his actual innocence claim would [a]t best . . . impeach Judy Wicker's testimony and would not establish his actual innocence claim. 11 R3-55 at 7. The court denied the request for the Holman prison library evidence because it bore no relation to a constitutional claim. The district court held that Arthur was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to question High and Melson because he had made no attempt to show he diligently pursued the factual predicate of his alibi claim in [any] state court. Id. at 15. 45 Generally, [a] habeas petitioner. . . is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course, but may obtain leave of court to conduct discovery pursuant to Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases upon showing good cause, Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904, 117 S.Ct. at 1796-97, and diligence in pursuing the claim for which discovery is sought, consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1249 (11th Cir.2002). Good cause is demonstrated `where specific allegations. . . show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he. . . is entitled to relief.' Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09, 117 S.Ct. at 1799 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1091, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969)). A petitioner claiming actual, and not legal, innocence will typically show that the wrong person was convicted of the crime. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339-41, 112 S.Ct. at 2519-20. A district court's denial of discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion where the petitioner has shown `good cause' for the discovery.' Bracy, 520 U.S. at 909, 117 S.Ct. at 1799(citation omitted). 46 In reviewing a state writ of habeas corpus in which the petitioner failed to develop the factual basis for a claim in the state court proceedings, the district court 47 shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that — 48 (A) the claim relies on — 49 . . . . 50 (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 51 (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 52 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). In this statute, Congress has given prisoners who fall within § 2254(e)(2)'s opening clause an opportunity to obtain an evidentiary hearing where the legal or factual basis of the claims did not exist at the time of state-court proceedings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 1490, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [A] failure to develop the factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel. Id. at 432, 120 S.Ct. at 1488. 53 The question is not whether the facts could have been discovered but instead whether the prisoner was diligent in his efforts . . . . Diligence for purposes of the opening clause depends upon whether the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court; it does not depend . . . upon whether those efforts could have been successful. Though lack of diligence will not bar an evidentiary hearing if efforts to discover the facts would have been in vain, and there is a convincing claim of innocence, only a prisoner who has neglected his rights in state court need satisfy these conditions. 54 Id. at 435, 120 S.Ct. at 1490 (citations omitted). 12 Although a defendant represented by constitutionally ineffective counsel will not be held responsible for attorney error, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must have first been presented to the state court before it can be used to establish cause for the default. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488-89, 106 S.Ct. at 2645-46. A district court properly applies § 2254(e)(2)'s diligence requirement in determining whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Isaacs, 300 F.3d at 1248-49. 55 Arthur failed to satisfy the diligence requirement of § 2254 both as to the requested discovery and as to the evidentiary hearing. He failed to pursue the testing of the requested crime-related physical evidence during his three trials or through a state postconviction relief petition. See id. at 1249-50 (affirming the denial of an evidentiary hearing where the petitioner knew of the factual basis at the time of his state appeal, and had multiple opportunities to raise the issue during state court proceedings over a period of ten years). He failed to show that his claim of actual innocence was unavailable to him before the statute of limitation expired. He also failed to demonstrate good cause for his failure to seek the requested crime-related discovery. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Arthur's request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing.