Opinion ID: 202607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Velázquez

Text: 19 Velázquez's ADEA and Law 100 claims do not succeed either, but for a more elementary reason. He has not made out a prima facie claim of age discrimination under either statute because he did not suffer an adverse employment action, through either actual or constructive discharge. See Suárez, 229 F.3d at 54 (Just as the ADEA bars an employer from dismissing an employee because of his age, so too it bars an employer from engaging in a calculated, age-inspired effort to force an employee to quit.). We have previously held that constructive discharge is shown where the working conditions imposed by the employer had become so onerous, abusive, or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign. Id. 20 It is evident that Velázquez was not actually discharged, because, though his position as salesperson was eliminated, he was immediately offered a new position as assistant manager, which entailed essentially the same job responsibilities he had been performing for several years. What NCE proposed was the updating of Velázquez's job title to reflect the work he actually performed. 21 It is also evident that Velázquez was not constructively discharged because the new position entailed the same duties, compensation, and benefits as his old position. See Jorge v. Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556, 562 (1st Cir.2005) (no constructive discharge where employee refused to accept transfer that entailed no loss of pay, benefits, status, or the like.). The sole difference under the new position would have been the elimination of Velázquez's car allowance and use of the company car—a change based on the fact that Velázquez had not performed in-person sales calls for some time, and the new position would not require him to do so. Generally, a constructive discharge claim cannot be based solely on the elimination of an allowance, where the job duty that was funded by the allowance was also eliminated based on a legitimate business judgment. This is so because elimination of such an allowance usually will not change working conditions so significantly that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. Súarez, 229 F.3d at 54; see also Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough Del Caribe Inc., 354 F.3d 34, 46 (1st Cir.2003) (no constructive discharge where employee was on extended sick leave and employer asked her to give back the company car and other equipment, inventory, and documents). For example, if a company pays its employees an allowance to fund the purchase of uniforms, and later decides that uniforms will no longer be used, elimination of the uniform allowance—with nothing more— would not constitute constructive discharge. Likewise, if a company provides a travel allowance to fund employee business travel, but later, due to market conditions or technology advances, such travel is no longer necessary or feasible, termination of the travel allowance would not ordinarily constitute a constructive discharge. 22 Because Velázquez has not shown actual or constructive discharge as a matter of law, he has not made out a prima facie case under the ADEA or Law 100. Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment as to these claims.