Opinion ID: 198347
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probable Cause and Leon 's Good-Faith Exception

Text: 13 Assuming arguendo that the warrant for 26 Parsons Avenue was not supported by probable cause, we agree with the district court that the executing officers reasonably relied in good faith on a facially valid warrant. We therefore need not assess the constitutionality of the warrant and simply hold that the district court committed no error in denying the motion to suppress. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 925, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (courts have discretion to consider the issue of officers' good faith without first addressing Fourth Amendment issue). 14 There are four exclusions to the Leon good-faith exception: (1) when the magistrate ... was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth; (2) where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his [detached and neutral] judicial role; (3) where the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) where a warrant is so facially deficient--i.e. in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized--that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Id. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Owens contends that the 26 Parsons Avenue search implicates the first and fourth exclusions. 15
16 According to Owens, the affidavit improperly misled the magistrate in three respects. First, it claimed that the Boston police had a murder warrant for Don Miley when in fact the murder warrant identified the suspect only as Dwayne Owens. Second, it misstated that business records indicated Be Be's Barbecue was owned and incorporated by Don Miley when Don Miley was only listed in corporate documents as Vice President. And third, its statement that phone number 436-6658 was located at 26 Parsons Avenue improperly omitted that the number listed was in the name of Johnny Stephens, not Don Miley. 3 17 Owens's claims fail because he cannot establish that these misstatements were either knowingly false or reckless. At most, Broadmeadow's errors resulted from negligence, and [a]llegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674. 18 Moreover, even if any of the misstatements were knowingly false or reckless, we do not see how they were material. See United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 662-63 (D.C.Cir.1996) (warrant valid under Leon because false statement not material). The affidavit's statement that a warrant existed for Miley, rather than Owens, was immaterial because the affidavit also indicated that the subject known as Miley used the alias Owens. Nor can the statement that Miley was named in business records as owner rather than Vice President be characterized as material because, in either event, the suspect was linked to Be Be's Barbecue. Cf. State v. Groff, 323 N.W.2d 204, 210 (Iowa 1982) (stating that defendant owns land on which marijuana is growing, rather than that he farms the land, is not materially false). Finally, the affidavit's failure to recite that telephone number 436-6658 was listed in the name of Johnny Stephens was not material under the circumstances. Police questioning of the landlord of 26 Parsons Avenue had already established that a man known as Miley was living at that address. It was immaterial whether Miley was living there alone or with others. 19
20 According to Owens, it was unreasonable for the executing officers to rely on a warrant that he characterizes as so facially deficient as to be bare bones. In particular, Owens complains that the affidavit demonstrated neither the recency of the information relied upon nor a nexus between the firearms and 26 Parsons Avenue. We disagree. 21 Despite Owens's complaints, the affidavit was sufficiently current because it stated that an active warrant existed for Owens, that an informant is cooperating (emphasis added) with Boston police, and that the informant described a Cole Street address as being used (emphasis added) by Owens in his drug business. From this, the executing officers could reasonably have inferred that the informant's data were recent and described an ongoing drug operation and access to firearms. Cf. United States v. Zayas-Diaz, 95 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir.1996) (affidavit not stale because references by informant were in the present tense and therefore implied regular ongoing transactions); United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562, 568 (1st Cir.1996) ([I]t is common ground that drug conspiracies tend to be ongoing operations, rendering timely information that might, in other contexts, be regarded as stale.). 22 Owens's complaint that the affidavit failed to establish any nexus between the firearms and 26 Parsons Avenue similarly fails. The affidavit recited that Owens was wanted for murder, had numerous firearms, and rented a house at 26 Parsons Avenue. Based on this information, it was reasonable for the executing officers to believe that firearms would be found at 26 Parsons Avenue. Cf. United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir.) (nexus between evidence of crime and address to be searched sufficiently established where affidavit recited that suspect lived at that address), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1046, 117 S.Ct. 620, 136 L.Ed.2d 543 (1996). 23