Opinion ID: 2385171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Remarks Of Trial Court.

Text: In this State, although the jury is still the judge of the law as well as the facts, an amendment to Article XV § 5 of the Constitution, effective December 1, 1950, empowered the court to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain conviction. The amendment has been implemented by statute (Code [1957] Art. 27 § 593), and by the rules of this Court (Rule 738, a, b). See Auchincloss v. State, 200 Md. 310, 89 A.2d 605 (1952). Cf. Wright v. State, 198 Md. 163, 81 A.2d 602 (1951). Rule 738 a, supra, provides, in part, that [a]t the conclusion of the evidence offered by the State the accused may request an instruction that the evidence is insufficient in law to sustain his conviction. (Emphasis added.) The rule does not require the motion to be made out of the presence of the jury. Since the defendant was not represented by counsel, it was not improper for the court to inform him of his right to file the motion, but instead of treating it as having been filed and forthwith denying or overruling it, the court should have inquired of the defendant whether or not he desired to interpose such motion. Obviously the motion should be received and considered when, and only when, it is requested by the accused or his counsel. However, we are not persuaded that the court committed reversible error in this respect. It is apparent the trial court was trying to assist the accused to preserve his rights under the rule. What the court said in treating the motion as offered and refused, was nothing more than a legitimate conclusion that the State had made out a prima facie case. It was improper for the court to treat the motion as it did, but it was no more prejudicial than it would have been if the defendant, when informed of his rights, had himself made a request for the motion. In that event the court's action in overruling the motion in the presence of the jury would not have been prejudicial error. It was also not improper, of course, for the trial court to inform the defendant that he was not required to testify and the legal effect of his election to remain silent, as well as the consequences which might ensue should he elect to waive the constitutional privilege, leaving it to the defendant to decide what he should do. But, in so doing, the court should not have commented on the weight of the evidence or suggested that the defendant should take the stand and testify. On this occasion, the trial court was attempting to assist the defendant to make a decision as to whether he should testify or remain silent, but, in so doing, we think it is clear that what the court said constituted irremediable error. The remarks  if you don't testify I would think that the case which the State has made out    would be pretty strong and substantial against you and in support of    [the] indictment  were not only unnecessary for the purpose intended, but such remarks could only have prejudiced rather than helped the defendant irrespective of what he thereafter did. Generally, the prejudicial effect of improper remarks may not be raised on appeal unless preserved by an appropriate objection, i.e., a motion to withdraw a juror and declare a mistrial, or a motion to strike out the remarks and instruct the jury to disregard them. Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955). In the instant case, the defendant, who was not informed of his right to do so, did not object either when the remarks were made or at any time during the course of the trial. Moreover, he did not move for a mistrial or for an instruction that the remarks be disregarded. The defendant was subsequently informed of his right to move for a new trial, but he did not avail himself of this right either. Instead he entered this appeal. The State contends that, even if error was committed by the court in causing the defendant to take the stand and testify, he thereby waived his right to object to what the court had said or done before. In the view we take of this case, we do not reach that question. Instead, we are convinced that the error  which we think was material to the rights of the defendant  was such as the court could not have corrected even if it had attempted to do so. Under such circumstances we think we must of our own motion take cognizance of and correct the plain error by awarding the defendant a new trial even though such error may not have been properly includible in the assignment of errors in this case. Maryland Rule 739 g.