Opinion ID: 2544339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amended complaint and special verdict form

Text: Gonsalves argues that the circuit court improperly denied his motion for leave to file a second amended and supplemental complaint in order to clarify his claims. Relatedly, Gonsalves argues that the circuit court erred by giving a verdict form without Gonsalves's negligence claim. In pertinent part, HRCP Rule 15(a) provides that a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. In interpreting this rule, this court has looked to the general standard applied by federal courts: In the absence of any apparent or declared reasonsuch as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.the leave sought should, as the rules requires, be freely given. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 89 Hawai`i 157, 162, 969 P.2d 1275, 1280 (1998) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)). Here, the circuit court explained its decision to deny Gonsalves's motion to amend his complaint: In terms of the motion to file second amended and supplemental complaint, I'm going to deny it. I think that thethe evidence that was presented is basically part and parcel of claims that have already been pled, in particular the sex discrimination and promissory estoppel claims. Gonsalves conceded that his motion to amend was simply to clarify his retaliation, negligence, and implied contract claims. Because Gonsalves's filed complaint sufficiently articulated those claims, an amendment was unnecessary or futile. Gonsalves was not precluded from arguing those claims, cf. HRCP Rule 15(b) (When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.), and in fact, the circuit court expressly stated in its denial that it was not foreclosing an implied contract claim based on Kinoshita v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 68 Haw. 594, 724 P.2d 110 (1986). Furthermore, the jury received instructions as to all of these claims. Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. With regard to the special verdict form, contrary to Gonsalves's assertion, the form did include Gonsalves's negligence claim. Assuming Gonsalves could prove a sex discrimination claim, that claim was premised on the negligence of Nissan in conducting a fair and thorough investigation. In addition, Gonsalves's claim that Nissan failed to abide by a proper standard of care was included in the defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Thus, the circuit court submitted a special verdict form adequately addressing the issues involved and did not abuse its discretion.