Opinion ID: 2823798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sexual Assault on a Child â Pattern of Abuse Is Subject to Mandatory Sentencing

Text: Â¶16Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We first consider whether sexual assault on a child â pattern of abuse is subject to the same range, on the bottom end, as any other crime of violence. We conclude that it is. Â¶17Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Coloradoâs sentencing scheme divides felonies into six classes, which are distinguished from one another by the range of penalties that each carries (i.e. the presumptive sentencing range). Â§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A). In a case with extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, a court may sentence an offender âto as little as half the minimum of the presumptive range or as much as twice the maximum of the presumptive range for the class of felony of which a defendant stands convicted.â Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274, 1276 (Colo. 2007) (citing Â§ 18-1.3-401(6)). Hunsaker contends that count II does not permit a minimum sentence in the aggravated range. We disagree. The pattern offense is a per se crime of violence, which is subject to aÂ minimum sentence between the presumptive midpoint and twice the presumptive maximum.
Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Sexual assault on a child is a class 4 felony, but when it is committed as a pattern of abuse, the crime becomes a class 3 felony that requires sentencing under section 18-1.3-406, the mandatory sentencing statute. Â§ 18-3-405(2)(d)â(3). It is what we have termed a âper seâ crime of violence. See Terry v. People, 977 P.2d 145, 149 (Colo. 1999) (defining per se crimes of violence as those crimes for which a court must sentence a defendant in accordance with the mandatory sentencing statute (citing People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 379 (Colo. 1990))). 2 Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Subsection 18-1.3-406(1) of the mandatory sentencing statute differentiates between crimes of violence that involve sex offenses and those that do not. Paragraph (1)(a), which governs crimes of violence generally (i.e. non-sex-related offenses), states: âAny person convicted of a crime of violence shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of section 18-1.3-401(8) . . . for a term . . . of at least the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range provided for suchÂ offense . . . .â Â§ 18-1.3-406(1)(a) (emphasis added). Paragraph (1)(b), which governs crimes of violence involving sex offenses, states: [A]ny person convicted of a sex offense . . . that constitutes a crime of violence shall be sentenced . . . for an indeterminate term . . . of at least theÂ midpoint in the presumptive range specified in section 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A) up to a maximum of the personâs natural life, as provided in section 18-1.3-1004(1). Â§ 18-1.3-406(1)(b) (emphasis added); see also Â§ 18-1.3-1004(1)(b). The parties urge different constructions of these provisions and debate whether the General Assembly intended to prescribe a different sentencing standard for the bottom end of a crime of violence involving a sex offense. Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Under Hunsakerâs reading, which the post-conviction court adopted, paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) mandate different sentences. Hunsaker argues that the general crime of violence paragraph, (1)(a), requires courts to sentence defendants to a bottom-end sentence between the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range. If Hunsaker were subject to sentencing under this paragraph, the bottom end of his sentence for count II (a class 3 felony with a presumptive range of four to twelve years) would be eight to twenty-four years. He agrees that under the sex offense paragraph, (1)(b), the minimum term in his bottom-end sentence likewise increases to the presumptive midpoint, but he contends the maximum term in the presumptive range does not change. He reasons that, unlike (1)(a), paragraph (1)(b) does not state that the maximum term in the bottom end can be twice the maximum of the presumptive range. Hunsaker thus concludes the post-conviction court rightly determined count IIâs sentencing range is eight to twelve years. Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The prosecution contends this narrow reading is inconsistent with the plain language of the overall statutory scheme, which reflects legislative intent to provide an expansive sentencing framework for sex offenses. It postulates that, read in context, paragraph (1)(b) requires sentencing under the same standard delineated in paragraph (1)(a) for general crimes of violence: a term between the midpoint in, and twice the maximum of, the presumptive rangeâhere, eight to twenty-four years. Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because the mandatory sentencing statute is susceptible to either of these reasonable interpretations, we conclude that paragraph (1)(b) is ambiguous. We therefore look beyond its plain language to resolve the ambiguity.
Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The pre-LSA version of the mandatory sentencing statute made no distinction between violent sex offenses and non-sex-related violent offenses. Rather, a defendant convicted of sexual assault on a child â pattern of abuse was sentenced to at least the presumptive midpoint but not more than twice the presumptive maximum. Ch. 240, sec. 11, Â§ 18-3-405(3), 1995 Colo. Sess. Laws 1250â51 (referencing the predecessor mandatory sentencing statute, section 16-11-309). Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Â Â When the General Assembly enacted the LSA in 1998, it distinguished between violent sex offenses and non-sex-related violent offenses by adding what is now paragraph (1)(b) to the mandatory sentencing statute: â[A]ny person convicted of a sex offense . . . that constitutes a crime of violence shall be sentenced to an indeterminate term of incarceration of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range up to a maximum of the personâs natural life.â Ch. 303, sec. 9, Â§ 16-11-309(1)(c), 1998 Colo. Sess.Â Laws 1291 (codified as amended at Â§ 18-1.3-406(1)(b)). 3 The Actâs sponsor emphasized, however, that the LSA was not intended to alter then-existing sentencing guidelines, other than to allow for lifetime supervision. See Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1279 (citing Hearing on H.B. 98â1156 Before the House Judiciary Committee, 61st Legis. 2nd Reg. Sess. (Jan. 27, 1998)). 4 While a sponsorâs words regarding the purpose of a bill are not conclusive, they can be powerful evidence of legislative intent. Id. They are a âstrong indicationâ here. See id. Â¶25Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Moreover, â[w]hile the legislature has typically included the words, âbut not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range,â to emphasize that its modification of the lower end of the sentencing range has no effect on its upper limits, this is not always the case.â Id. The legislature sometimes leaves the upper limit to be inferred from its specific reference to the presumptive sentencing scheme of section 18-1.3-401. See id. (citing Â§ 18-6.5-103(4), C.R.S. (2014) (âIf the offender is convicted of robbery of an at-risk adult or an at-risk juvenile, the court shall sentence the defendant to the department of corrections for at least the presumptive sentence under 18-1.3-401(1).â); Â§ 18-1.3-401(1)(b)(II) (â[E]xcept that any person who has been twice convicted of a felony . . . shall be sentenced to at least the minimum sentenceÂ specified in [the presumptive ranges of section 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A)] . . . .â); Â§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(III)(E) (â[A] person who has been twice convicted of a felony . . . shall be sentenced to at least the minimum sentence specified [in the presumptive ranges of section 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A)] . . . .â)). Â¶26Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In interpreting an ambiguous statute, we also consider the consequences of possible interpretations. See Â§ 2-4-203(1)(e), C.R.S. (2014); Stamp, 172 P.3d at 443. Adopting Hunsakerâs interpretation would drastically limit the discretion of sentencing courts to consider aggravating circumstances and differentiate among sex offenders. See Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1278 (rejecting a proposed statutory interpretation that would be inconsistent with sentencing courtsâ discretion). Narrowly confining sentencing courts to a minimum term of eight to twelve years in every case involving a class 3 felony sex offense against a child is antithetical to the legislatureâs goal of increasing sentencing options in this context. Â¶27Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We therefore conclude that in enacting the LSA, the General Assembly did not intend to change mandatory sentencing for violent sex offenses. Paragraph (1)(b) simply dictates that violent sex crimes, unlike violent crimes generally, are also subject to indeterminate life sentencing; it does not alter the bottom-end sentencing range.