Opinion ID: 2635296
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Bias and Recusal

Text: In his last argument, Kelly contends that Judge Smith was biased. Specifically, he argues that the judge should have recused himself from the divorce case and granted a new trial because of his strong adverse reaction to pornographic photographs introduced during Kelly's criminal trial  a reaction Judge Smith failed to disclose until Kelly's sentencing hearing, which occurred eight days after the judge had decided the property issues in Kelly's divorce. We review a judge's decision on an issue of recusal for abuse of discretion; [28] we will reverse a judge's refusal to step down from a case only when it appears patently unreasonable [29] or when a fair-minded person could not rationally come to [the same] conclusion on the basis of known facts. [30] When a claim of bias only asserts an appearance of partiality, as distinguished from actual bias, we require the complaining party to make a greater showing for reversal. [31] In deciding whether an abuse of discretion occurred, we consider the totality of the relevant circumstances and facts. [32] As we have already described in the statement of facts, a jury found Kelly guilty in his criminal case in March 2004. Judge Smith imposed his sentence on June 25, 2004. In the interim, in early June, the judge tried the property issues in the divorce case, and on June 17 issued his findings and conclusions resolving those issues. When Judge Smith spoke at Kelly's sentencing hearing, he emphasized the seriousness of Kelly's misconduct; to illustrate the point, the judge described his own strong reaction to viewing the images of child pornography that were introduced at the trial. [33] Pointing to these remarks, Kelly asserts that Judge Smith's reaction was so primal, and so visceral, that he could barely restrain himself. In Kelly's view, Judge Smith's remarks revealed intemperance and established that the judge had formed a bias against Kelly that must have influenced his judgment when he ruled against Kelly in the divorce proceedings. Alternatively, Kelly reasons, if the sentencing remarks fail to show actual bias, they at least create an impermissible appearance of bias. But Kelly specifically asked that Judge Smith be assigned to both of his cases. Moreover, opinions formed by a judge presiding over a trial do not reflect bias when they merely address relevant evidence admitted in the course of the trial. [34] Here, the views expressed by Judge Smith at the sentencing hearing described his reaction to photographs of child pornography admitted during Kelly's criminal trial. Judge Smith had been required to review, evaluate, and rule on the evidence in the course of the trial. The views Judge Smith expressed at the sentencing hearing were confined to the nature and character of the evidence itself and they served only to emphasize the important bearing that this evidence had on one of the primary issues the court needed to evaluate in imposing Kelly's sentence  the seriousness of his crimes. Nothing in the judge's remarks evinced any inclination or intention to rely on his negative reaction to the child pornography except to the extent that this evidence had a legitimate bearing on the disposition of the criminal case then under consideration. And Judge Smith said nothing to suggest that he had formed any generalized bias against Kelly, or that his reaction to the child pornography might color his judgment of Kelly in any other context. Of course, it is undeniably true that Judge Smith voiced a strong negative reaction to the child pornography. But such photographs are inherently powerful evidence: their potential to evoke a strong response from a judge or a juror in a criminal trial cannot reasonably be viewed as unforeseeable or surprising. And Kelly suggests no reason to think that the potential effects of this evidence might not have been apparent to him when he was originally charged with the crimes. In spite of this, Kelly expressly stated that he preferred to have Judge Smith preside over both of his pending cases. More important, Kelly has never specified how any of the views Judge Smith expressed in the criminal case might have carried over and actually influenced the judge's decisions on the matters at stake in the divorce proceedings. Kelly merely suggests that Judge Smith's bias is evidenced by his rulings against Kelly in the divorce. But as we have already determined in reviewing the merits of the disputed rulings, all of Judge Smith's decisions were carefully explained, find strong support in the evidence, and are solidly grounded on applicable law. And in all other respects, Judge Smith appears to have scrupulously kept Kelly's two cases separated  both procedurally and substantively  so as to insulate the decisions in the divorce from any appearance of influence by developments in the criminal case. [35] Finally, as Judge Hensley recognized in independently reviewing and affirming Judge Smith's refusal to recuse himself, Judge Smith's written decision denying Kelly's recusal motion thoroughly explained the judge's basis for refusing to remove himself from the case and persuasively refuted Kelly's accounting of actual and apparent bias. Under these circumstances, Kelly's claim of bias appears to be little more than an expression of [his] dissatisfaction with the superior court's rulings. [36] We thus conclude that the record reveals no actual or apparent bias by Judge Smith and no abuse of discretion in the court's orders denying Kelly's motions for recusal and to set aside the court's earlier order dividing the parties' marital property.