Opinion ID: 3010384
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Professor Courtney

Text: Professor Courtney's circumstances are significantly different from Halpin's. Like Halpin, Courtney knew of his impending retirement far in advance of the actual date. But when the policy was finally applied to him in 1991, triggering the charge-filing period even under the continuing violation theory, he did not assert a claim under the ADEA. Instead, he waited almost a year and a half _________________________________________________________________ 5. La Salle relies on O'Malley which, without analysis, rejected a continuing violation theory where a policy was facially proper. 758 F.2d at 821. Because O'Malley was decided before Lorance and did not consider the issues discussed in our opinion, we do not find it persuasive. 14 before filing the EEOC charge, well beyond the 300 days permitted by 29 U.S.C. S 626(d)(2). Courtney argues, as does Halpin, that he was actively misled by La Salle's statement that he had tenure. But as with Halpin, no reasonable jury could find that Courtney acted in reliance on La Salle's position,6 or that such reliance was reasonable in light of the 1988 letter, which explained La Salle's position with respect to the one year contract. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Courtney's claims arising from his subsequent part-time employment as well. The only distinction between Courtney and those he says are similarly situated is that he was mandatorily retired at age 70 and they were not. Having failed to challenge his mandatory retirement within 300 days, he is barred from complaining of the continuing consequences the retirement has on his employment status. See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. at 504.