Opinion ID: 2382800
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Issue 5: Cruel and Unusual Punishment Argument

Text: Garza argues his life sentence violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. He argues this issue was preserved for appeal because he stated the sentence would amount to cruel and unusual punishment in his departure motion. Finally, Garza cites the applicable analysis in State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 367, 574 P.2d 950 (1978), and argues the test for disproportionality is satisfied because the punishment for this offense is greater than the punishment for more serious crimes. The State argues this issue should not be reached because it is raised for the first time on appeal, citing State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, Syl. ¶ 2, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008). The State also argues the first prong for the Freeman analysis is factually driven and must be raised before the district court. In the alternative, the State argues the sentence is not unconstitutional. In previous cases, this court declined to review this issue for the first time on appeal. State v. Easterling, 289 Kan. 470, 485-87, 213 P.3d 418 (2009); State v. Spotts, 288 Kan. 650, 652-54, 206 P.3d 510 (2009); State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 160-61, 199 P.3d 1265 (2009); Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161, 194 P.3d 1195. These cases used the three-part test established in Freeman to determine whether a sentence is a cruel and unusual punishment. This test provides: (1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be examined with particular regard to the degree of danger present to society; relevant to this inquiry are the facts of the crime, the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the extent of culpability for the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the prescribed punishment; (2) A comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed in this jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and if among them are found more serious crimes punished less severely than the offense in question the challenged penalty is to that extent suspect; and (3) A comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the same offense. 223 Kan. at 367, 574 P.2d 950. Since these factors include both legal and factual inquires and the district court did not make these required findings, this court declined to address the issue. Easterling, 289 Kan. at 487, 213 P.3d 418; Thomas, 288 Kan. at 161, 199 P.3d 1265. Garza argues this barrier should not apply because he raised the issue in his departure motion. But this argument has limited merit under State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715, 721, 217 P.3d 443 (2009), in which this court remanded the issue for the district court to make the necessary findings. In Seward, the defendant mentioned this claim during plea negotiations, included it in his written downward departure motion, and reiterated the claim on the record at the sentencing hearing. This court held the issue was sufficiently raised before the district court. It then addressed whether the failure to move for additional findings under Supreme Court Rule 165 barred the claim. See Rule 165 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 239). The court concluded it was not barred. This court remanded the issue to the district court to make the required factual and legal determinations. 289 Kan. at 720-21, 217 P.3d 443. But the Seward court cautioned: We emphasize that we believe this case to be exceptional. In the future, a defendant who wishes to appeal on the basis of a constitutional challenge to a sentencing statute must ensure the findings and conclusions by the district judge are sufficient to support appellate argument, by filing of a motion invoking the judge's duty under Rule 165, if necessary. 289 Kan. at 721, 217 P.3d 443. Garza's claim is distinguishable from Seward because he failed to sufficiently raise the issue before the district court. In his departure motion, Garza stated a life sentence would constitute a cruel and unusual punishment. But he did not cite any authority, address the three-prong Freeman test, or argue this point during the departure hearing. In contrast to the defendant in Seward, there is no evidence of an effort to preserve this issue for appeal. Issues raised in passing that are not supported by argument or cited authority are deemed waived. Morningstar, 289 Kan. 488, Syl. ¶ 4, 213 P.3d 1045.