Opinion ID: 1564053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: interpretation of the sam epstein will

Text: The chancellor found that the Sam Epstein will, portions of which are quoted above, vested a fee tail estate in one-fourth of the trust property in each of the three daughters and the widow, Becke Ruth Epstein. We agree. The unlettered opening portion of Part VII of the Sam Epstein will (which deals with the trust) conveys the property to the trustees: ... to be held in trust by them for the use and benefit of my said beloved wife, Becke Ruth Epstein ... and my said children, Helen Epstein Kantor, Sylvia Epstein Angel and Melvyn Epstein Festinger, share and share alike, and unto the heirs of their body and the survivor or survivors of them, per stirpes.... The dispository provisions of Subparagraph (G) of Part VII provides: ... and when, according to the terms hereof, this trust shall cease, then it is my will and I do so hereby devise, will and bequeath all of the remainder thereof, as well as money and all other assets of said trust estate, and the increase thereof, in fee simple and absolute, to the beneficiaries under this trust, share and share alike, and unto the heirs of their body, and the survivor or survivors of them, per stirpes. When the provision of Subparagraph (G) is read and closely related to the unlettered opening paragraph of Part VII, it is clear, we believe, that a one-fourth share in the trust property (real estate) vested, legally and equitably, in each daughter for life, with the remainder over to her bodily heirs, and the remaining one-fourth share vested, legally and equitably, in the mother, with the remainder to the three daughters equally, they being the bodily heirs of their mother. It has been argued here that the order of the words used by Sam Epstein in the dispositive provisions of his will following the termination of the testamentary trust would result in the vesting of a fee simple to the widow and daughters in equal shares rather than a fee tail. In other words, by stating that the trust estate remaining would go in fee simple and absolute, to the beneficiaries under this trust, share and share alike, and unto the heirs of their body, and the survivor or survivors of them, per stirpes, the result is different than if the words in fee simple and absolute had, in that same sentence, followed the words heirs of their body. Had the latter order of words been used, the devise would have been to the beneficiaries and unto the heirs of their body in fee simple and absolute, share and alike. The argument made is that since the language in fee simple and absolute was used at the first portion of the sentence, the gift had been made in fee simple, and the remaining limitation over only to the heirs of the body is void. This argument is based on a line of cases traced from Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 (1840) down through Bernstein v. Bramble, 81 Ark. 480, 99 S.W. 682 (1907) and most recently announced in Langston v. Hunt, Administrator, 269 Ark. 328, 601 S.W.2d 833 (1980). While we recognize the rule in the line of cases above mentioned, we have also, in applying the rule, stated that when the clear, unequivocal and demonstrated intent of the testator is to limit prior devise, the limitation will be given effect. In Langston v. Hunt, Administrator, supra, we stated: The present rule simply stated is that a testator cannot give an estate in fee simple by clear and concise language and subsequently diminish or destroy the devise by use of other language. In other words, once the fee is given to a person or class of persons or other devisee, it cannot thereafter be taken away or diminished unless the terms are clear, unequivocal, and demonstrate the intent to limit the prior devise. (Emphasis supplied.) We believe that here, the testator's intent, expressed over and over almost to the point of repetitiousness, is clear and unequivocal that he wanted the estate to remain in the bloodlines of the mother and daughters. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that whether the words in fee simple and absolute came first or last in the particular sentence should carry no weight and should certainly not be allowed to thwart the many times expressed intention of the testator that the trust properties were entailed to the named beneficiaries and the heirs of their body. It has been argued here that the doctrine announced in Bell v. Gentry, 141 Ark. 484, 218 S.W. 194 (1920), would operate to vest title absolutely in the three daughters of Sam Epstein. This doctrine, which has also been followed in Pletner v. Southern Lumber Co., 173 Ark. 277, 292 S.W. 370 (1927); Eubanks v. McDonald, 225 Ark. 470, 283 S.W.2d 166 (1955); and Creekmore v. Gregory, 244 Ark. 1, 423 S.W.2d 548 (1968), is that a conveyance to A for life, then to B and to the heirs of his body vests title in B in fee simple, absolute. We think that our construction of the will of Sam Epstein eliminates the application of the above doctrine. Each of the three daughters had the estate given her in one-fourth entailed upon her and her bodily heirs. There was no intervening life estate in another. As to the widow's interest, there was an immediate merger of the legal and beneficial or equitable title at her death which also happened to constitute the termination of the trust. No intervening life estate in a third party is indicated as to her interest. On the facts and our interpretation of the will here, the rule of Bell v. Gentry and its progeny would be inapplicable. In accordance with the above, the real estate in the Sam Epstein Trust is owned as follows: each of the three daughters of Sam Epstein owns an undivided one-twelfth interest in fee simple as a surviving heir of the body of Becke Ruth Epstein; each of the three daughters of Sam Epstein has an additional one-fourth interest for life, with the remainder over to her bodily heirs living at her death. The reversion of the estate tail of any daughter dying without bodily heirs will pass to the heirs at law of Sam Epstein in the same manner as if he had died intestate because no additional residuary clause other than that provided by the testamentary trust was contained in his will. See Fletcher v. Hurdle, 259 Ark. 649, 536 S.W.2d 109 (1976); Nowak v. Etchieson, 241 Ark. 328, 408 S.W.2d 476 (1966). We do not overlook Act 183 of 1979 but that statute clearly does not apply to the will of Sam Epstein who died some thirty-five years prior to its enactment. Since a fee tail cannot exist in personalty, Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 (1840); Slaughter v. Slaughter, 23 Ark. 356 (1861), the personal property in the Sam Epstein Testamentary Trust vested one-fourth in each of the three daughters and one-fourth in Becke Ruth Epstein's estate (and from there to the Becke Ruth Epstein Testamentary Trust) at the death of Becke Ruth Epstein.