Opinion ID: 4257498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: [1,2] Much of our analysis in this case is shaped by the general verdict the jury returned in favor of the School District. A jury, by its general verdict, pronounces upon all or any of the issues either in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant.4 Because a general verdict does not specify the basis for an award, Nebraska law presumes that the winning party prevailed on all issues presented to the jury.5 Applying the general verdict rule here, we presume the jury found in the School District’s favor on all issues submitted, including whether the contract was breached and how § 11.2 of the contract was to be interpreted. Within this framework, we examine FCMG’s assignments of error. 1. A ffirmative Defenses [3,4] FCMG assigns that the trial court erred in allowing the School District to put on evidence of its affirmative defenses and erred in instructing the jury on the School District’s 4 Heckman v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co., 286 Neb. 453, 837 N.W.2d 532 (2013); Wulf v. Kunnath, 285 Neb. 472, 827 N.W.2d 248 (2013). 5 Id. See, also, Balames v. Ginn, 290 Neb. 682, 861 N.W.2d 684 (2015). - 789 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports FACILITIES COST MGMT. GROUP v. OTOE CTY. SCH. DIST. Cite as 298 Neb. 777 affirm­ative defenses. In a civil case, the admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a substantial right of the complaining party.6 In an appeal based on a claim of an erroneous jury instruction, the appellant has the burden to show that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant.7 Here, the jury was instructed to consider the School District’s affirmative defenses only if it found FCMG had met its burden of proof on the breach of contract claim. Under the general verdict rule, we presume the jury determined the breach of contract issue in favor of the School District. Thus, the jury never reached the question of the School District’s affirmative defenses, and any alleged error in admitting evidence or instructing the jury on those affirmative defenses would necessarily be harmless.8 FCMG’s assignments relating to the School District’s affirmative defenses cannot form the basis for reversible error. 2. Questions From Jury The jury submitted two questions to the court during deliberations. The court responded to both questions without contacting counsel. FCMG argues this procedure did not comply with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1116 (Reissue 2016), which provides: After the jury [members] have retired for deliberation, if there be a disagreement between them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed as to any part of the law arising in the case, they may request the officer to conduct them to the court where the information 6 In re Estate of Clinger, 292 Neb. 237, 872 N.W.2d 37 (2015); Arens v. NEBCO, Inc., 291 Neb. 834, 870 N.W.2d 1 (2015). 7 InterCall, Inc. v. Egenera, Inc., 284 Neb. 801, 824 N.W.2d 12 (2012); Karel v. Nebraska Health Sys., 274 Neb. 175, 738 N.W.2d 831 (2007). 8 See Scheele v. Rains, 292 Neb. 974, 874 N.W.2d 867 (2016). - 790 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports FACILITIES COST MGMT. GROUP v. OTOE CTY. SCH. DIST. Cite as 298 Neb. 777 upon the point of law shall be given, and the court may give its recollection as to the testimony on the point in dispute in the presence of or after notice to the parties or their counsel. [5] FCMG is correct that the procedure utilized by the court did not comply with § 25-1116. However, in Nebraska, the failure of the court to notify counsel of a jury’s question is reversible error only if prejudice results.9 FCMG contends the jury’s questions illustrate it was confused about whether damages could be awarded to FCMG if the jury found the School District had proved “one or both of its”10 affirmative defenses. FCMG does not explain, however, why this is so or how answering the jury’s questions in a different manner or contacting counsel prior to answering, would have made any difference. Nothing about the court’s failure to notify counsel of the jury’s questions can reasonably be interpreted to result in prejudice to FCMG. Again, because the general verdict rule applies, we presume the jury found that FCMG failed to prove the School District breached the contract. FCMG’s argument that the court’s answers confused the jury is premised on the presumption that the jury found a breach and, thus, is directly contrary to the general verdict rule. A similar factual situation was present in State v. Owen,11 and there, the Nebraska Court of Appeals held no prejudice resulted when the trial court referred the jury back to the instructions without notifying counsel of the jury question. Likewise here, the court effectively referred the jury back to its instructions in response to both questions. On this record, we do not find prejudicial error in the trial court’s responses to the questions asked by the jury. 9 In re Estate of Corbett, 211 Neb. 335, 318 N.W.2d 720 (1982). See Brodersen v. Traders Ins. Co., 246 Neb. 688, 523 N.W.2d 24 (1994). 10 Brief for appellant at 27. 11 State v. Owen, 7 Neb. App. 153, 580 N.W.2d 566 (1998). - 791 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports FACILITIES COST MGMT. GROUP v. OTOE CTY. SCH. DIST. Cite as 298 Neb. 777 3. Juror A ffidavits When it moved for a new trial, FCMG submitted the affidavits of two jurors, one of whom signed the verdict returned by the jury and one of whom did not. The affidavits generally reflected the affiants’ belief that the jury’s two questions were poorly phrased by the foreperson and that the jury instructions were confusing regarding the effect of the affirmative defenses. The affidavits did not state that any extraneous information was considered by the jurors or that any outside influence affected the jury. Over objection, the court received the juror affidavits, but overruled the motion for new trial. In its brief on appeal, FCMG relies on the juror affidavits to support its argument that the jury was confused by the instructions. The specific argument presented is that the jury did not think it could award any damages to FCMG if it found for the School District on one or both of the affirmative defenses. Again, such an argument is premised on the jury’s finding the School District breached the contract and then going on to consider its affirmative defenses. This factual scenario is simply not supported by the record before us. Moreover, according to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-606(2) (Reissue 2016): Upon any inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him indicating an effect of this kind be received for these purposes. [6] Pursuant to § 27-606(2), juror affidavits cannot be used for the purpose of showing a juror was confused, as that would - 792 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports FACILITIES COST MGMT. GROUP v. OTOE CTY. SCH. DIST. Cite as 298 Neb. 777 relate directly to the juror’s mental processes in rendering the verdict.12 We find no error in denying FCMG’s motion for new trial. 4. Exclusion of Expert Testimony FCMG argues it was error to limit the trial testimony of two of its experts. In a civil case, the admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a substantial right of the complaining party.13 (a) Purdy Purdy testified as an expert for FCMG at the first trial and again at the second trial. Before the first trial, the School District served interrogatories on FCMG asking, among other things, that FCMG identify each expert witness it intended to call, the subject matter on which the expert would testify, and the “substance of the facts and opinions” to which each witness was expected to testify. On July 1, 2013, FCMG answered the interrogatory and identified Purdy as an expert expected to testify “about any and all aspects of the project, including, but not limited to the scope of the project and changes thereto and to the fees charged.” Purdy was deposed by the School District before the first trial. Purdy did not, either in his deposition or at trial, offer an opinion regarding the interpretation of § 11.2 or how fees should be calculated under the contract. After § 11.2 was found on appeal to be ambiguous and the cause was remanded for retrial, the School District designated Mabrey as its expert who would testify about how fees should be calculated under the contract. FCMG disclosed that Kirchner would be its expert on that issue. FCMG did not supplement its prior expert disclosure as to Purdy. Purdy was called to testify at the second trial, and FCMG attempted to elicit his opinion on how § 11.2 of the contract 12 See State v. Thomas, 262 Neb. 985, 637 N.W.2d 632 (2002). 13 In re Estate of Clinger, supra note 6; Arens v. NEBCO, Inc., supra note 6. - 793 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports FACILITIES COST MGMT. GROUP v. OTOE CTY. SCH. DIST. Cite as 298 Neb. 777 should be interpreted and how it related to calculation of fees. The School District objected to this testimony, arguing it was outside the scope of the opinions FCMG had disclosed for Purdy and resulted in unfair surprise. The trial court sustained the School District’s objection and did not allow Purdy to testify about his opinion on that issue. FCMG argues this was an excessive discovery sanction, and suggests the exclusion of this evidence amounted to prejudicial error and warrants a new trial. [7,8] A trial court’s ruling on a discovery sanction will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.14 The determination of the appropriate sanction is to be considered in the factual context of the particular case.15 [9-11] The Nebraska Court Rules of Discovery in Civil Cases allow a party to discover facts known and opinions held by opposing experts.16 A party may, through interrogatories, require the other party to identify each person intended to be called as an expert witness, disclose the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify.17 Generally, a party who has responded to a discovery request with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement the response.18 However, a party has a duty to seasonably supplement its discovery response with respect to any question directly addressed to the identity of experts expected to be called at trial, the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and the substance of the expert’s testimony.19 14 See Booth v. Blueberry Hill Restaurants, 245 Neb. 490, 513 N.W.2d 867 (1994). 15 Id. 16 Neb. Ct. R. Disc. § 6-326(b)(4). 17 § 6-326(b)(4)(A)(i). 18 § 6-326(e). 19 § 6-326(e)(1)(B). - 794 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports FACILITIES COST MGMT. GROUP v. OTOE CTY. SCH. DIST. Cite as 298 Neb. 777 Neb. Ct. R. Disc. § 6-337 allows a party to apply for an order compelling discovery and allows a trial court to impose discovery sanctions if a party has failed to comply with a court order to provide or permit discovery. And in Norquay v. Union Pacific Railroad,20 we held that a trial court may appropriately exclude all or part of an expert’s testimony at trial as a sanction for noncompliance with the discovery rules requiring supplementation. Norquay observed that when it comes to the expected testimony of an expert: “[I]f a party changes his plans about the expert witnesses he will use at trial or if there is a change in the subject matter on which an expert will testify or the substance of his testimony a supplemental response must be made. This is necessary to carry out the provisions of Rule [§ 6-326(b)(4)] with regard to expert witnesses. With the expert witnesses, as with the persons having knowledge of discoverable facts, any change in plan would routinely come to the attention of the lawyers for the party and the burden of supplementation is very small.”21 [12] Norquay instructs that the appropriate sanction for failing to supplement expert discovery responses should be determined by trial courts based on the factual context of each case, and should be reviewed by appellate courts for an abuse of discretion. When determining what sanction is appropriate, a trial court should consider the explanation for the failure to comply, the importance of the expert’s testimony, the surprise to the opposing party, any time needed to prepare to meet the testimony from the expert, and the possibility of a continuance.22 20 Norquay v. Union Pacific Railroad, 225 Neb. 527, 407 N.W.2d 146 (1987). 21 Id. at 538, 407 N.W.2d at 154 (quoting 8 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2049 (1970)). 22 Norquay v. Union Pacific Railroad, supra note 20. See, also, Brown v. Hansen, 1 Neb. App. 962, 510 N.W.2d 473 (1993). - 795 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports FACILITIES COST MGMT. GROUP v. OTOE CTY. SCH. DIST. Cite as 298 Neb. 777 FCMG argues its February 2013 disclosure did not require supplementation, because it broadly stated Purdy would testify about “‘the fees charged.’”23 FCMG also argues that Norquay and § 6-337 only apply when a party completely fails to respond to a discovery request regarding an expert. Finally, FCMG generally argues that exclusion of evidence is a particularly harsh sanction and suggests that the court here should have imposed a lesser sanction. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of Purdy’s testimony regarding the proper interpretation of § 11.2. FCMG’s February 2013 discovery responses, while broadly referencing fees, said nothing about Purdy’s offering an opinion on the interpretation of the contract provisions generally or § 11.2 in particular. After FCMG served its discovery responses, the School District took Purdy’s deposition and he did not offer an opinion regarding the interpretation of § 11.2; nor was such an opinion elicited from Purdy during the first trial. If FCMG wished to expand the scope of Purdy’s expert testimony in the second trial to include opinions regarding the proper interpretation of § 11.2, it should have supplemented its interrogatory answer accordingly. For the sake of completeness, we expressly reject FCMG’s suggestion that Norquay and § 6-337 only allow a court to exclude expert testimony if there has been a complete failure to disclose anticipated opinions. Although that was the factual circumstance presented in Norquay, we also have applied the Norquay rule to limit an expert’s trial testimony when a party who has failed to supplement prior discovery responses seeks to offer an undisclosed opinion at trial.24 The trial court here had discretion to consider a variety of sanctions, and under the circumstances presented, we find no abuse of discretion in 23 Brief for appellant at 13. 24 See, e.g., Paulk v. Central Lab. Assocs., 262 Neb. 838, 636 N.W.2d 170 (2001). - 796 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports FACILITIES COST MGMT. GROUP v. OTOE CTY. SCH. DIST. Cite as 298 Neb. 777 excluding Purdy’s opinion testimony on the proper interpretation of the contract. (b) Kirchner At trial, Kirchner testified about how FCMG actually calculated its fees, based on his review of the invoices it submitted to the School District. However, the court sustained the School District’s objections to questions seeking to elicit Kirchner’s opinion on whether the method used by FCMG to calculate its fees was legally consistent with the contractual language. The court generally reasoned that Kirchner, as a forensic account­ ant, was not qualified to give an expert opinion on the legal interpretation of the contract. FCMG contends this was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. FCMG relies on Maiz v. Virani 25 for the proposition that Kirchner was qualified to give an expert opinion as to how the contract should be interpreted. In that case, a forensic accounting expert testified about the damages incurred by the plaintiffs in a complicated financial case. In doing so, the accounting expert apparently referenced specific provisions of the parties’ contracts when explaining assumptions he made in arriving at his opinions. On appeal, the defendants alleged his testimony was improper, because he was not qualified to testify as to the meaning of the parties’ ambiguous contract. The 11th Circuit effectively held that the accounting expert did not actually render opinions on the meaning of the contracts, but instead only referenced contractual provisions as the basis for his calculations. As such, the opinion in Maiz actually supports the trial court’s finding that Kirchner was not qualified to give an expert opinion on how the contract should be interpreted—it does not support FCMG’s argument. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to preclude Kirchner from offering an opinion on whether the method actually used by FCMG to calculate fees was consist­ ent with the contractual language. 25 Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641 (11th Cir. 2001). - 797 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports FACILITIES COST MGMT. GROUP v. OTOE CTY. SCH. DIST. Cite as 298 Neb. 777 5. Prejudgment Interest FCMG moved for partial summary judgment seeking a determination that it was entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law. The court denied the motion for partial summary judgment and expressly held that FCMG was not entitled to prejudgment interest. At trial, FCMG made an offer of proof that, if permitted, it had a witness who was prepared to testify that prejudgment interest was owed and who would have calculated the amount due. On appeal, FCMG alleges the trial court erred in refusing to allow evidence of prejudgment interest. In a civil case, the admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a substantial right of the complaining party.26 Again, because the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the School District, we presume the jury found FCMG failed to prove breach of contract. So, on this record, the trial court could not have committed prejudicial error by refusing to allow FCMG to produce evidence of prejudgment interest on damages allegedly owed. 6. Posttrial Motions Properly Denied FCMG contends the damages awarded at trial were clearly inadequate and the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, alternatively, for new trial. We find no error in denying either motion. (a) JNOV FCMG moved for a directed verdict at the close of all evidence, and the district court denied the motion. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the School District, FCMG moved for JNOV, which the district court denied. [13-15] A motion for JNOV may be granted when the movant’s previous motion for directed verdict, made at the 26 In re Estate of Clinger, supra note 6; Arens v. NEBCO, Inc., supra note 6. - 798 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports FACILITIES COST MGMT. GROUP v. OTOE CTY. SCH. DIST. Cite as 298 Neb. 777 conclusion of all the evidence, should have been sustained.27 To sustain a motion for JNOV, the court resolves the controversy as a matter of law and may do so only when the facts are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion.28 On a motion for JNOV, the moving party is deemed to have admitted as true all the relevant evidence admitted that is favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed, and, further, the party against whom the motion is directed is entitled to the benefit of all proper inferences deducible from the relevant evidence.29 Here, FCMG’s motion for JNOV was premised on its claim that the verdict for the School District was the result of confusing jury instructions. Because a motion for JNOV asks the trial court to revisit whether the movant’s prior motion for directed verdict should have been granted as a matter of law, it is improper to rely upon allegedly confusing jury instructions as the basis for a JNOV motion. We have previously addressed, and rejected, FCMG’s assignment that the jury instructions were erroneous, and that issue fares no better reframed as one in support of JNOV. (b) New Trial [16] FCMG moved alternatively for a new trial, asserting the jury’s award of damages was inadequate, not sustained by the evidence, and contrary to law. The district court denied the motion. An appellate court reviews a denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion.30 In its brief, FCMG describes the jury’s verdict as an “award of zero damages”31 and argues the award was inadequate 27 Frank v. Lockwood, 275 Neb. 735, 749 N.W.2d 443 (2008). 28 United Gen. Title Ins. Co. v. Malone, 289 Neb. 1006, 858 N.W.2d 196 (2015); Martensen v. Rejda Bros., 283 Neb. 279, 808 N.W.2d 855 (2012). 29 Frank v. Lockwood, supra note 27. 30 See, Knapp v. Ruser, 297 Neb. 639, 901 N.W.2d 31 (2017); Cisneros v. Graham, 294 Neb. 83, 881 N.W.2d 878 (2016). 31 Brief for appellant at 21. - 799 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports FACILITIES COST MGMT. GROUP v. OTOE CTY. SCH. DIST. Cite as 298 Neb. 777 because “the evidence at trial indisputably showed that FCMG was entitled to be paid for additional work on the project.”32 Its argument is premised on the theory that the jury found in FCMG’s favor on the breach of contract claim, but awarded no damages because it also found for the School District on one or more of its affirmative defenses. But the record does not support that premise. The jury returned a general verdict for the School District, and thus an appellate court must presume the jury found in favor of the School District on all issues, including the breach of contract claim. Furthermore, contrary to FCMG’s assertion that the evidence was “indisputable,”33 Mabrey specifically testified that under the School District’s calculations, FCMG had already been paid more than what was due. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant the motion for new trial.