Opinion ID: 1133749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Pretrial and During the Guilt Phase

Text: Hannon asserts that his trial counsel, Joseph Episcopo, provided ineffective assistance in failing to depose Ron Richardson or request a continuance; in failing to adequately prepare for the State's blood spatter expert, Judith Bunker; and in failing to question Michelle Helm with regard to Ron Richardson's alleged jealousy. Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986). Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court's factual findings (if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence), but reviewing the circuit court's legal conclusions de novo. See Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1032 (Fla.1999). There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The defendant carries the burden to overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Id. It is under this legal framework that Hannon's claims are addressed.
Hannon asserts that trial counsel was deficient in failing to depose Ron Richardson after discovering during trial that Richardson was to testify against Hannon. Hannon claims that trial counsel had a duty to investigate Richardson's relationship with Hannon and his influence on Hannon, as well as to impeach Richardson. This Court has held that when a failure to depose is alleged as a part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must specifically set forth the harm from the alleged omission. Brown v. State, 846 So.2d 1114, 1124 (Fla.2003) (citing Magill v. State, 457 So.2d 1367, 1370 (Fla.1984)). At the evidentiary hearing, Hannon's trial counsel testified that the defense theory was an alibi defense, specifically that neither Hannon nor Richardson was at the crime scene when the crimes were committed, and that both Hannon and Richardson were playing a drinking game at Richardson's house the night of the crimes. [6] Trial counsel testified that he did not direct any investigation into Richardson's background and did not remember if he had ever obtained Richardson's criminal history before the trial began. Trial counsel further testified that he did not obtain any additional investigative material concerning Richardson's relationship with Hannon after Richardson, in a surprise move, turned to testify for the State during trial. Trial counsel stated that the trial judge offered him an opportunity to depose Richardson after the State disclosed during trial that Richardson would be presented as a witness for the State but Hannon's trial counsel decided that he would not conduct a deposition at that point because he believed Richardson's story was totally fabricated, and that his best trial strategy was to question Richardson immediately in the presence of the jury instead of creating an opportunity for Richardson to rehearse his testimony during a deposition. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because postconviction counsel disagrees with trial counsel's strategic decisions. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. . . .); Cherry v. State, 659 So.2d 1069, 1073 (Fla.1995) (The standard is not how present counsel would have proceeded, in hindsight. . . .). In Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000), this Court held that strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct. The record demonstrates important time factors, although not considered by the dissent, and shows that on Friday, July 19, 1991, during the guilt phase of the trial, the State indicated for the first time to the trial court that it had received information that Richardson, who was listed as a defense witness for the trial in this case, might reverse himself and decide to be a prosecution witness against Hannon. On the morning of Monday, July 22, 1991, prior to resting its case, the State listed Richardson as a witness and at that late date provided Hannon's counsel with a copy of a statement by Richardson that had been taken only hours before at 8 p.m. the prior evening. The State had entered into an agreement with Richardson in which he would enter a guilty plea to one count of accessory after the fact and in return receive a sentence of only five years in prison in exchange for his testimony against Hannon. At that point, Hannon's counsel, believing that the evidence would disclose to the jury that Richardson's story was clearly fabricated for purposes of obtaining the deal with the State, decided that his best strategy was to continue with the innocence defense and the alibi basis. Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he consciously and strategically decided that he would not depose Richardson after this last-minute turn of events because it was his strategy and approach to now use the element of total surprise in questioning Richardson with regard to the details of the crime and prevent the State from using the deposition to better prepare Richardson for his trial testimony. Moreover, trial counsel related that Richardson was an integral part of Hannon's alibi defense and, thus, his strategy and goal after Richardson turned to assist the State was to demonstrate and emphasize that Richardson was not familiar with any of the details of the crime scene, thereby bolstering Hannon's argument that neither Richardson nor Hannon was at the scene and that Richardson had changed his story to procure his last-minute agreement with the State. Trial counsel also testified that he was not interested in attempting to portray Richardson as a bad person or as a guilty party before the jury because that would also undermine Hannon's alibi defense, which was predicated on Hannon drinking with Richardson at the time of the murders. Hannon's trial counsel testified that his trial tactic and examination of Richardson was in fact ultimately successful, which the dissent does not consider, because on cross-examination, the defense elicited that Richardson actually knew very little with regard to the victims' apartment: Q. Please describe Mr. Snider and Mr. Carter's apartment or house, apartment house. A. I'm sorry. I can't do that. I'm not familiar with their apartment house. I've only been there one time prior to thisthis deal. Q. So you can't describe any of the rooms? A. Well, as you come in, you come straight into the living room, but that's as far as I've ever been in that house. Q. What color was the furniture? A. II couldn't tell you. Q. Did you ever notice any exercise equipment inside that apartment? A. No. Q. What kind of video equipment was in there? A. II wasn't familiar with the apartment. . . . . Q. Where was the aquarium located in that apartment? A. I'm not that familiar with that apartment, Joe. I couldn't tell you. Further, Richardson conveniently testified that he was leaving the apartment as the shooting of Snider occurred. Hannon's counsel also testified that it was his intention to impeach Richardson with the testimony of his brother, Mike, who was expected to testify that Hannon and Richardson were at Richardson's house at the time of the murder playing a drinking game. Hannon's counsel further stated that he chose not to request a continuance to investigate Richardson after he was disclosed to be a witness for the State because he believed a continuance would only give the State an edge by affording the State additional time to prepare Richardson for trial testimony to the detriment of his client, also a factor not considered by the dissent. The record supports trial counsel's testimony that Richardson was unable to provide any meaningful details of the victims' apartment for the jury. The record also clearly demonstrates that Hannon's counsel successfully revealed to the jury that Richardson had previously supported Hannon's alibi by stating that he and Hannon were playing a drinking game the night of the murders, and that he was not involved with the murder. Moreover, counsel elicited from Richardson that up until even the night before he testified, he denied seeing the wounds to Snider's throat, but within twenty-four hours had completely changed his story. Richardson claimed that he suddenly remembered the wounds; however, it cannot be disregarded that Richardson's memory was restored just in time for him to testify for the State in the case against Hannon. Further, when asked about his drastic change in testimony, Richardson affirmatively testified that he had lied not once, but several times previously. Finally, counsel highlighted to the jury that on the Sunday morning before Richardson's new testimony he was facing the death penalty for two counts of first-degree murder, but by the evening of that same day, in exchange for his testimony against Hannon, Richardson had received a deal for only five years in prison. Clearly, the record supports a carefully considered and planned defense strategy on behalf of Hannon by his trial counsel and provides a full and proper basis for the trial court's determination that Hannon failed to meet the first prong of Strickland in that he has failed to prove that counsel acted deficiently when he made a strategic decision not to take further steps with regard to Mr. Richardson, look into his background, determine his motive for testifying, or develop further information that could have been used to impeach him. Although current counsel may disagree with trial counsel's strategy at that time and would have chosen to abandon the alibi defense when Richardson changed at the last minute to assist the State during trial, such current disagreement does not render trial counsel's performance deficient. Accordingly, we conclude that Hannon has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was deficient in strategically deciding not to depose Richardson, not to seek a continuance, or otherwise conduct an investigation into Richardson's background. Moreover, Hannon has failed to demonstrate any prejudice because he has not even suggested what evidence or information trial counsel would have procured had he deposed Richardson, or requested a continuance, or conducted further investigation, that would have so affected the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined, nor does the dissent provide any insight into the subject. See Maxwell, 490 So.2d at 932. Based upon the foregoing analysis, this claim has no merit.
Hannon asserts that his trial counsel acted deficiently in failing to investigate the credentials of the State's blood spatter expert, Judith Bunker, as well as failing to question her credentials and challenge her testimony at trial. To satisfy the deficiency prong of Strickland, Hannon must demonstrate that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he was aware that Bunker had been hired as the State's expert but decided not to conduct an investigation into Bunker's credentials because her testimony regarding the blood spatter at the crime scene was totally irrelevant to Hannon's alibi defense that he was not at the crime scene on the night of the murders, a factor not considered by the dissent. Trial counsel stated that he did not obtain Bunker's personnel file, was not aware whether Bunker ever completed high school or attended college, and had not seen a group of letters indicating that Bunker had not worked at various places or lectured at certain places as represented on her resume. Trial counsel stated at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that he most likely would not have used this information regarding Bunker to impeach her at trial. Although confronting this witness with this type of information would have made him look sharp, it would not have advanced Hannon's defense in any way and would have only left the jury wondering why counsel was even taking the time to question Bunker if she truly had nothing to do with Hannon's defense. The dissent provides no explanation for this gap. Trial counsel further testified that he chose not to question Bunker's credentials at trial to avoid giving the jury the impression that he was attempting to present an inconsistent defense. Trial counsel testified that Bunker's testimony did not adversely impact Hannon's defense because Bunker was never able to confirm any of the victims' blood on Hannon. He did object to the introduction of crime scene photographs because he believed the photographs were being admitted simply to emphasize the goriness of the crime but decided not to cross-examine Bunker with regard to these photographs. The defense strategy was to continue with the theory that Hannon was not at the crime scene and, therefore, cross-examining this witness would only confuse the jury with regard to why he was attacking a witness that was not at all relevant to Hannon's case. Based on trial counsel's testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Hannon has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel acted deficiently when he made these strategic decisions with regard to witness Bunker. Trial counsel's performance did not fall below a standard of reasonableness in failing to challenge the credentials of a witness who was not at all relevant to any aspect of Hannon's defense that he did not commit the murders and was not present at the victims' apartment at the time of the murders. These reasonable strategic decisions were made in an attempt to avoid confusing the jury by attacking a witness that was not relevant to the defense case. Again, current counsel disagrees with the strategy and would have made the decision to challenge Bunker's credentials, but the evidence does not support the conclusion that trial counsel's performance was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Moreover, trial counsel's tactical decision not to challenge or impeach Bunker's blood spatter testimony was reasonable because Bunker's testimony did not implicate Hannon in the murders, nor was it even an element in the State's case against Hannon. Hannon has also failed to demonstrate prejudice with regard to these strategic decisions. This Court on direct appeal determined that Bunker's testimony relating to the blood spatter evidence was properly admitted at Hannon's trial only to assist the jury in understanding the facts. See Hannon, 638 So.2d at 43. Furthermore, this Court has previously determined in other cases that the presentation of Bunker's allegedly exaggerated credentials to a jury has little effect on the outcome, given that she has been recognized as a blood spatter expert in numerous other cases. See Correll v. State, 698 So.2d 522, 523-24 (Fla.1997); see also Gorby v. State, 819 So.2d 664, 677 (Fla.2002). In Correll, this Court stated: [T]he discrepancies between the level of education, training, and experience Bunker testified to at trial and the asserted level of education, training, and experience she actually had were not so great as to make any difference in the outcome of the case. Moreover, Bunker's vita, which among other things, falsely set forth that Bunker had a high school diploma, was never seen by the jury. Thus, any misrepresentations contained in the vita are irrelevant to Correll's claim. The only alleged misrepresentation of any import was Bunker's assertion that she had worked as an assistant and technical specialist for the medical examiner's office from 1970 through 1982, when in reality she was a secretary at the medical examiner's office from 1970 to 1974, an assistant to the medical examiner from 1974 to 1981, and a technical specialist for the last five months of her employment with the medical examiner's office. In view of the fact that it is undisputed that she worked on thousands of cases while in the employ of the medical examiner, even this discrepancy becomes less serious. However, assuming for the sake of argument that Bunker's testimony did contain serious discrepancies . . . we are convinced that these discrepancies did not have any impact on the outcome of the case in light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial in support of Correll's guilt. 698 So.2d at 524. During Hannon's trial, Bunker made misrepresentations with regard to her credentials similar to those this Court addressed in Correll. Specifically, Bunker testified that from 1970 to 1982 she was employed by the Office of the District Nine Medical Examiner with jurisdiction in Orange, Osceola, and Seminole counties. She testified that as an assistant to the medical examiner one of her primary responsibilities was to assist the medical examiner in the medical/legal investigation of death. She also testified that she had presented courses on blood stain evidence and conducted workshops and lectured at various colleges and institutions. Similar to this Court's conclusion in Correll, any discrepancies in Bunker's testimony in the instant case did not so affect[ ] the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. Maxwell, 490 So.2d at 932. Additionally, Bunker's testimony with regard to the blood spatters did not link Hannon to the crime scene. The dissent fails to address this area of concern, but is critical without substantive support. Accordingly, this claim is also without merit. [7] Hannon further claims that the trial court erred in summarily denying the following claims with regard to Bunker: trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Bunker's background, the State presented unreliable and nonscientific blood spatter testimony through Bunker, and the State's failure to disclose Bunker's qualifications and misrepresentations of Bunker's qualifications as an expert in the field of blood spatter constituted a Brady and Giglio violation. A criminal defendant alleging a Brady violation bears the burden to show prejudice, i.e., to show a reasonable probability that the undisclosed evidence would have produced a different verdict. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 n. 20, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). To demonstrate prejudice under Giglio it must be established that there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). Hannon has failed to demonstrate prejudice relating to any aspect of Bunker's testimony sufficient to establish either a Brady or Giglio violation. Therefore, the trial court's rejection of these claims was not improper.
Hannon contends that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to question Michelle Helm, the former girlfriend of Ron Richardson, regarding her July 9, 1991, deposition testimony. Hannon asserts that Helm testified in her deposition that Richardson was a very jealous person who was violent and had threatened to kill her, often accusing her of sleeping with other men, especially Robbie Carter and Jim Acker. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he was present at Helm's deposition but was not concerned with this information to attack Richardson's testimony at trial because Richardson's specific bad acts were not only irrelevant to Hannon's alibi defense, such specific bad act evidence would not have been admissible at trial. Trial counsel testified that it was his strategy to lessen the focus on anything negative with regard to Richardson because it would be beneficial to Hannon's case with Richardson being Hannon's alibi witness until he altered his position at the end of the trial. Moreover, trial counsel's main focus when cross-examining Richardson after the change in testimony at the last moment was to show the jury that Richardson did not remember the details of the victims' apartment, and this negative information was not necessary to bolster the argument that Richardson's story was fabricated. Based on the foregoing, Hannon has not demonstrated that trial counsel acted deficiently when he made the strategic decisions with regard to the interrogation of Helm concerning her deposition testimony and chose not to use her to attack Richardson. Hannon was not prejudiced by these decisions and accordingly, this claim has no merit.