Opinion ID: 2800007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Grounds for Affirmance

Text: There are also additional, independent grounds for affirming the dismissal of Joseph’s claims, notwithstanding the general pleading deficiencies identified that independently support dismissal. By way of example, Joseph failed to allege a required element—predicate acts of racketeering activity—for his RICO claims. RICO provides for civil and criminal liability against any person who conducts the affairs of an enterprise through “a pattern of racketeering activity.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1964. Establishing a “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus. Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). As relevant here, this list of predicate acts includes theft from an interstate shipment as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 659 and “fraud in the sale of securities.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). However, pursuant to § 1964(c), a plaintiff may not rely upon “any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities” unless the alleged wrongdoer was criminally convicted in connection with the fraud. Liberally construing the complaint, we find that Joseph alleged both theft and securities fraud as predicate acts. However, although theft from an interstate 11 Case: 14-13989 Date Filed: 05/12/2015 Page: 12 of 17 shipment, as defined in § 659, qualifies as a predicate act for RICO purposes, simple theft is not one of the listed offenses. See § 1961(1). Joseph did not claim that the alleged theft involved an interstate shipment. Similarly, Joseph cannot successfully allege securities fraud as a predicate act because § 1964(c) provides that a plaintiff may not rely upon securities fraud as a predicate act unless the defendant was criminally convicted in connection with the fraud. Thus, the district court did not err by dismissing Joseph’s RICO claims because he failed to allege qualifying predicate acts of racketeering activity. 5 There are also independent grounds for affirming the district court’s dismissal of Joseph’s UITPA and APSA claims. The district court found that the relevant statutes did not provide a cause of action for Joseph’s claims and that, even if they did, Joseph’s claims were nevertheless time barred. We need only reach the former basis for dismissal to support affirmance. UITPA provides that it is an unfair or deceptive practice for any person to knowingly “misrepresent[] the benefits, advantages, conditions, or terms of any 5 Joseph also fails to challenge on appeal an independent ground on which the district court relied in dismissing his claims—that Joseph did not allege proximate cause sufficient to state a RICO claim. A plaintiff in a civil RICO action must satisfy the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), meaning that the plaintiff must demonstrate injury to “business or property . . . by reason of the substantive RICO violation.” Williams, 465 F.3d at 1283 (internal quotation marks omitted). The “by reason of” language requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s substantive RICO violation proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 1287. Because Joseph fails to address the district court’s holding dismissing his RICO claim for lack of proximate cause, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge on that ground, and affirmance is also appropriate for this additional reason. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680. 12 Case: 14-13989 Date Filed: 05/12/2015 Page: 13 of 17 insurance policy.” Fla. Stat. § 626.9541(1)(a)(1). Although the statutory scheme provides a private civil remedy for violations of certain sections of the Act, it does not do so for § 626.9541(1)(a)(1). See id. § 624.155 (authorizing a civil action against an insurer when certain listed subsections are violated). Even if we liberally construe his complaint, Joseph alleged only that Defendants violated Fla. Stat. § 626.9541(1)(a)(1) by misrepresenting the terms of the life insurance policy they sold to Harold. Again, Section 626.9541(1)(a)(1) is not one of the enumerated sections for which UITPA provides a private cause of action. See Fla. Stat. § 624.155. We will not imply a cause of action under UITPA where the courts and legislature of the state of Florida have declined to do so. See Swerhun v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 979 F.2d 195, 198 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Keehn v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1522, 1522–25 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (holding that UITPA did not provide plaintiffs with an independent cause of action for violation of its terms). Accordingly, UITPA does not provide Joseph with a private civil remedy for violation of Fla. Stat. § 626.9541(1)(a)(1). Similarly, with regard to Joseph’s APSA claims, if we liberally construe Joseph’s complaint, we may read it to allege that Defendants unlawfully exploited Harold, in violation of APSA, when they sold him an insurance policy in 1993. Although APSA was amended in 1995 to provide a private cause of action, the 1993 version of the Act did not contain any similar provision. See Fla. Stat. 13 Case: 14-13989 Date Filed: 05/12/2015 Page: 14 of 17 § 415.1111; 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 95-418, § 112. We will not imply a cause of action under the 1993 version of APSA where the courts and legislature of the state of Florida did not do so until 1995. 6 See Swerhun, 979 F.2d at 198. Thus, Joseph did not possess a private civil remedy under UITPA or APSA, and the district court did not err by dismissing his claims.