Opinion ID: 679948
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Compensatory Damages to Washington Surgi-Clinic

Text: 53 Finally, we address Operation Rescue's contention that the district court improperly awarded compensatory damages for bushes trampled during a blockade at the Washington Surgi-Clinic in November, 1989, because appellees did not prove damages by clear and convincing evidence. Appellants' Brief at 34. NOW responds that because appellees' evidence of damages was uncontroverted, they met their evidentiary burden under whatever standard is appropriate. Appellees' Brief at 37-38. 54 A party moving for civil contempt must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has violated a court order. Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. Washington Post, 626 F.2d 1029, 1031 (D.C.Cir.1980). Some courts have held that once a violation has been established, damages need be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Graves v. Kemsco Group, Inc., 864 F.2d 754 (Fed.Cir.1988) (applying 7th Circuit law). Other courts have held that damages must also be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Nelson Tool and Machine Co., Inc. v. Wonderland Originals, Ltd., 491 F.Supp. 268, 269 (E.D.Pa.1980). The question is unsettled in this circuit. 55 Here, however, it is of no import whether the standard is clear and convincing evidence or mere preponderance, and therefore we need not decide which standard applies. Appellees introduced into evidence a written estimate of the replacement cost prepared by the same landscaper who had initially installed the bushes. Dr. Fogel, head of the Washington Surgi-Clinic, testified this estimate was reasonable. J.A. 195. Appellants declined to cross-examine Dr. Fogel on this point, or to introduce their own evidence in rebuttal. J.A. at 191-96. Based on this evidence, the district court found damages of $3,800. Operation Rescue objects that the district court improperly shifted the burden to appellants to show the estimate was not fair and reasonable, citing the district court's own summary of the evidence: Plaintiffs introduced into evidence an estimate of $3,800 for repair of the bushes. Defendants did not introduce any evidence that this estimate was not fair and reasonable. See 747 F.Supp. at 777. Reasonableness is, under these circumstances, an element of proof of damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Sec. 929 (when trespass harms land, landowner may recover cost of restoration that has been or may be reasonably incurred); id. at Sec. 911, cmt. b (damages are measured by market values, reflected in comparable sales or amounts that have been bid and asked for substantially identical things). We read the district court's statement not to shift the evidentiary burden as to the reasonableness of the restoration cost, but merely to indicate that appellants did not rebut appellees' evidence on this point. 56 The trier of fact need not accept even uncontroverted evidence if it doubts the credibility of that evidence. Smith v. C.I.R., 800 F.2d 930, 935 (9th Cir.1986). Here, however, the district court placed credence in the uncontroverted evidence offered by appellees. Even on a clear and convincing evidence standard, which requires a showing of more than 'mere preponderance of the evidence,' but still somewhat less than ... 'beyond a reasonable doubt,'  Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C.Cir.1977), we cannot conclude that the district court's finding on the question of damages was clearly erroneous.