Opinion ID: 2584286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Counsel's Failure To Object to Mr. Elmore Appearing before the Jury in Shackles

Text: ¶ 110 On the first day of voir dire at his sentencing trial, Mr. Elmore appeared before the jury panel in shackles. He now argues counsel's affirmative agreement to the shackling constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. The majority agrees with Mr. Elmore that counsel's failure to object to his client appearing before the jury in shackles fell below an objective reasonableness standard for counsel in a capital case. Majority at 348. Nevertheless, the majority asserts counsel's error is harmless, distinguishing our decision in State v. Finch, 137 Wash.2d 792, 975 P.2d 967 (1999), on the grounds that Elmore was shackled only on the first day of the sentencing trial. Majority at 348. The fact that Mr. Elmore was shackled before the jury for only one day is not particularly persuasive since Mr. Elmore's shackled appearance, even for one day, is sufficient to indicate[] to the jury that [Mr. Elmore] is viewed as a `dangerous' and `unmanageable' person . . . who cannot be controlled, even in the presence of courtroom security. State v. Finch, 137 Wash.2d at 863, 975 P.2d 967. ¶ 111 The majority continues, unlike the defendant in Finch, Elmore's trial strategy was to demonstrate remorse and to accept responsibility, and [t]his evidence was sufficient to off-set any implication of dangerousness created by Elmore's appearance in shackles. Majority at 348. This makes little sense. By affidavit Mr. Komorowski testified one of the defense team's primary mitigation themes in addition to remorse was Mr. Elmore's lack of future dangerousness. Decl. of Jon Komorowski at 4. In Finch we held, [s]hackling sends a message to the jury that, in the court's view, the defendant is so dangerous that he or she cannot be allowed to attend the proceedings, even with other security measures, without physical restraints. Finch, 137 Wash.2d at 864-65, 975 P.2d 967. Finch did not hold that the shackling of a criminal defendant conveys feelings of remorse. ¶ 112 [F]uture dangerousness or the probable lack of future dangerousness of the defendant is a relevant factor for a jury's consideration in deciding whether to impose a death sentence. Finch, 137 Wash.2d at 864, 975 P.2d 967; see also Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 748 (9th Cir.1995) (In the penalty phase of a capital trial, the jury knows the defendant is a convicted felon. But the extent to which he continues to be dangerous is a central issue the jury must decide in determining his sentence.). I agree with the majority that counsel's failure to object to his client appearing before the jury in shackles fell below Strickland's standard for reasonableness. Unlike the majority, I believe Mr. Elmore was unfairly prejudiced by counsel's error and I do not agree the error was harmless. See Finch, 137 Wash.2d at 865, 975 P.2d 967 (presence of the defendant in physical restraints prejudiced him in such a manner that warrants a reversal of his death sentence). ¶ 113 Because counsel's performance was deficient and prejudicial enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of Mr. Elmore's trial, his petition for relief should be granted and his conviction and death sentence vacated. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. ¶ 114 I therefore dissent.