Opinion ID: 3053943
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: Richard Miller appeals the district court’s denial of his “Motion to Dismiss Revocation Petition and Request for Immediate Release from Custody” (“Motion to Dismiss”). Relying primarily on United States v. Sullivan, 504 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2007), Miller argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release and sentence him because, according to Miller, at the time the violation occurred, his supervised release term had ended. We affirm the district court’s conclusion that Sullivan does not apply here. Unlike the defendant in Sullivan, Miller was transferred to the Bannock County Jail Work Release Program1 (hereinafter “Bannock County Jail” or “Work Release Program”) while still serving his federal sentence. This transfer occurred pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c), under which Miller remained “imprisoned” and under the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) until his release from Bannock County Jail. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2008), amended by Pub. L. 110117, Title V, § 505, Jan. 7, 2008, 121 Stat. 2542.2 Sullivan, by contrast, involved a state prisoner in Montana who, while serving a state sentence, was transferred to a Montana state pre-release center. We agree with the district court that the time that Miller 1 Such pre-release programs are also commonly referred to as halfway houses, community corrections centers, work release programs and residential reentry centers. 2 All references herein to this statute are to the version of 18 U.S.C. § 3624 effective January 7, 2008 to April 8, 2008. UNITED STATES v. MILLER 15295 spent at Bannock County Jail constituted “imprisonment,” and not, as Miller contends, supervised release. Miller’s supervised release term therefore did not commence until his release from the Bannock County Jail Work Release Program. Accordingly, the district court did have jurisdiction to revoke Miller’s supervised release and sentence him to fourteen months imprisonment and twenty-one months of supervised release. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Miller’s Motion to Dismiss.
In September 2002, Richard Miller was charged in Utah with possession of ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).3 On January 31, 2003, Miller entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to thirty months in custody and three years of supervised release. On March 27, 2003, Miller entered the Federal Correctional Institution in Florence, Colorado to begin his prison sentence. Approximately fifteen months into his thirty-month sentence, on June 22, 2004, Miller was transferred to the Bannock County Jail Work Release Program in Pocatello, Idaho. Miller’s transfer was pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c), which requires the Bureau of Prisons to provide for a pre-release program where practicable during the last six months of a person’s incarceration. United States v. Miller, 2007 WL 4261929, at  (D. Idaho Nov. 30, 2007). During his incarceration at Bannock County Jail, Miller was required to “go directly to [his] place of employment and[,] at the end of each workday, return directly to the jail following work.” And, during his incarceration, Miller was required to attend counseling sessions, receive treatment, and make nominal “subsistence 3 Miller was stopped for a minor traffic infraction: driving without registration or a driver’s license. Officers also found certain drug paraphernalia consistent with the sale or distribution of methamphetamine and ammunition. 15296 UNITED STATES v. MILLER payments” to Bannock County for sustenance and for his housing. Under the terms of the Work Release Program, Miller remained under the custody of the BOP while he was incarcerated at Bannock County Jail. Miller was also required to follow and abide by all rules set forth by Bannock County Jail and the Bureau of Prisons. The Work Release Program’s terms stated that “willful failure to return to [Miller’s] place of confinement at the time specified by the jail officials” could be considered an “escape” or an “absconding.” Miller remained at Bannock County Jail until October 6, 2004, when he sustained a work-related injury to his hand. The injury prevented Miller from continuing his job. As a result, Miller was placed on house arrest beginning October 6, 2004 and ending December 17, 2004.4 The following day, December 18, 2004, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3205, the Utah Federal District Court transferred jurisdiction from the District of Utah to the District of Idaho. The order, entitled “Transfer of Jurisdiction,” also stated that Miller’s three-year supervised release term was set to commence on December 18, 2004 and terminate on December 17, 2007. On August 4-5, 2007, Miller was stopped for a traffic violation. The officers determined that Miller was under the influence of drugs and then seized 2.2 grams of methamphetamine and various drug paraphernalia from Miller’s vehicle. Miller admitted to and tested positive for methamphetamine use. On August 7, 2007, the government filed a petition alleging that Miller had violated the terms of his supervised release (“First Supervised Release Petition”). On September 11, 2007, the district court sentenced Miller to one month imprisonment 4 Miller’s placement on house arrest after his injury was consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2), which authorizes the Bureau of Prisons to “place a prisoner in home confinement” for a limited period of time. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2). UNITED STATES v. MILLER 15297 with credit for time served and thirty-five months of additional supervised release. Approximately two months later, on October 18-19, 2007, Miller tested positive for methamphetamine use and was charged with associating with persons engaged in criminal activities, failing to submit for a mandatory drug test, and operating a motor vehicle. On October 30, 2007, the government filed a second petition (“Second Supervised Release Petition”) alleging that Miller violated his supervised release terms. On November 19, 2007, Miller moved to dismiss the government’s Second Supervised Release Petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Idaho Federal District Court denied Miller’s motion and his timely appeal is before us.