Opinion ID: 2297501
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Heading: Negligence Claim Against DOT

Text: We now turn to the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim against DOT. The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it found that his claim concerns DOT's discretionary function and, on that basis, ruled that DOT was immune from liability. We disagree. Under discretionary function immunity, the State and its agencies are immune from liability for conduct that involves the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary executive or planning function or duty on the part of the state or any state agency or a state officer, employee, or official acting within the scope of his office or employment. RSA 541-B:19, I(c) (2007). The existence of immunity for discretionary functions is fundamental to our system of separation of powers. Appeal of N.H. Dep't of Transp., 159 N.H. at 74, 977 A.2d 451. Discretionary function immunity is premised upon the notion that certain essential, fundamental activities of government must remain immune from tort liability so that our government can govern. Id. (quotation omitted). [I]t seeks to limit judicial interference with legislative and executive decision-making because to accept a jury's verdict as to the reasonableness and safety of a plan of governmental services and prefer it over the judgment of the governmental body which originally considered and passed on the matter would be to obstruct normal governmental operations. Tarbell Adm'r, Inc. v. City of Concord, 157 N.H. 678, 684, 956 A.2d 322 (2008) (quotations, citation and brackets omitted). In resolving discretionary immunity questions, we distinguish between planning or discretionary functions and functions that are purely ministerial. Appeal of N.H. Dep't of Transp., 159 N.H. at 74, 977 A.2d 451 (quotation omitted). When the particular conduct which caused the injury is one characterized by the high degree of discretion and judgment involved in weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and planning, governmental entities should remain immune from liability. Id. (quotation omitted); see also Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 156 N.H. 202, 220, 932 A.2d 831 (2007) (discretionary functions falling within the protection of the discretionary function immunity doctrine are limited to discretionary decisions involving ... policy-making or planning.). DOT argues that deciding how best to plan and allocate limited State resources in response to widespread power outages caused by a severe ice storm is a discretionary function entitled to immunity. We agree. As DOT explains: Decisions regarding the setting of priorities and alternatives to responding to severe winter weather ... require numerous planning and policy choices and alternatives, involving safety, economic, equipment, debris and personnel factors. Such decisions rest on the exercise of judgment and discretion and represent planning and policymaking. They fit squarely within the category of discretionary functions entitled to... immunity. Sorenson v. City of Manchester, 136 N.H. 692, 694, 621 A.2d 438 (1993). Our conclusion is consistent with our cases on this issue. See Appeal of N.H. Dep't of Transp., 159 N.H. at 75, 977 A.2d 451 (DOT's detour plan protected by discretionary function immunity because it involved weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy); Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 422, 666 A.2d 982 (1995) (State's decision as to whether to install flashing beacon at certain intersection is discretionary function entitled to immunity); Sorenson, 136 N.H. at 694, 621 A.2d 438 (decisions regarding traffic control and parking regulations are discretionary functions entitled to immunity); DiFruscia v. N.H. Dept. of Pub. Works & Highways, 136 N.H. 202, 205, 612 A.2d 1326 (1992) (We do not doubt that the decision to place or not to place a guardrail on a roadway is conduct characterized by the high degree of discretion and judgment involved in weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and planning. (quotation omitted)). The plaintiff argues that the negligence he alleges concerns DOT's failure to carry out a ministerial act, not a discretionary function. He contends that DOT was required to abide by section 4D.02D of the 2003 edition of the Federal Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), see Fed. Highway Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Manual On Uniform Traffic Control Devices, at page 4D-1 (2003) available at http://mutcd.fhwa.dot. gov/pdfs/2003r1r2/coverintrotoc.pdf, and that its failure to do so constitutes a failure to implement State policy. See Everitt, 156 N.H. at 211, 932 A.2d 831 (explaining that in assessing whether discretionary function immunity applies, we distinguish between policy decisions involving the consideration of competing economic, social, and political factors, and operational or ministerial decisions required to implement policy decisions). Assuming, without deciding, that section 4D.02D of the MUTCD even applies when traffic lights are rendered inoperable by an ice storm, we disagree that this provision established a mandatory duty. The MUTCD is published by the United States Department of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration under 23 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 655, Section F and has been adopted by the DOT. See State v. Downs, 157 N.H. 695, 696-97, 958 A.2d 985 (2008). Section 4D.02 of the 2003 edition of the MUTCD provides, in pertinent part: Section 4D.02 Responsibility for Operation and Maintenance Guidance: Prior to installing any traffic control signal, the responsibility for the maintenance of the signal and all of the appurtenances, hardware, software, and the timing plan(s) should be clearly established. The responsible agency should provide for the maintenance of the traffic control signal and all of its appurtenances in a competent manner. To this end the agency should: ... D. Provide for alternate operation of the traffic control signal during a period of failure, using flashing mode or manual control, or manual traffic direction by proper authorities as might be required by traffic volumes or congestion, or by erecting other traffic control devices. MUTCD, supra at 4D-1 (emphases added). The plain language of this section does not create a mandatory duty. [W]hile the word `shall' establishes a mandatory duty, the word `should' requires [DOT] to use its discretion and ... judgment. Dunlap v. W.L. Logan Trucking, Co., 161 Ohio App.3d 51, 829 N.E.2d 356, 361 (2005) (interpreting Ohio's state manual); Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 886 P.2d 330, 337-38 (1994) (interpreting earlier version of MUTCD). As the introduction to the MUTCD explains, those portions of the manual that are termed Guidance refer to a statement of recommended, but not mandatory, practice in typical situations.... MUTCD, supra at I-3. By contrast, those portions of the manual that are designated Standards refer to a statement of required, mandatory, or specifically prohibitive practice regarding a traffic control device. Id. at I-2; see Johnson v. Agency of Transp., 180 Vt. 493, 904 A.2d 1060, 1063 (2006) (only MUTCD Standards are binding on Vermont's Agency of Transportation). The MUTCD provision upon which the plaintiff relies is Guidance, and is, therefore only a recommended practice, not a mandate upon government decision makers. Dane County v. O'Malley, No. 2008AP59, 2008 WL 2468666, at  (Wis.Ct.App. June 19, 2008). We rejected a similar argument in Bergeron, 140 N.H. at 422-23, 666 A.2d 982. In Bergeron, the manual at issue was a State publication setting forth traffic control standards, statutes and policies. Bergeron, 140 N.H. at 419, 666 A.2d 982. Although the manual suggested that a flashing beacon is warranted when three accidents occur at a particular intersection during a one-year period, the State elected not to install a flashing beacon at the intersection at issue even though four accidents occurred at the intersection between December 1985 and December 1986. Id. at 419-20, 666 A.2d 982. The trial court concluded that DOT was not entitled to discretionary function immunity because the plaintiffs did not challenge the adoption of the DOT's policy regarding installing flashing beacons, but rather challenged DOT's implementation of this policy. Id. at 421, 666 A.2d 982. We disagreed, in part, because the manual in Bergeron provide[d] guidelines rather than mandates. Id. at 422, 666 A.2d 982. It [did] not eliminate the DOT's discretion with regard to traffic control, but rather invit[ed]... the DOT to exercise discretion. Id. Similarly here, the MUTCD does not eliminate DOT's discretion with regard to responding to traffic lights rendered inoperable because of severe, winter weather-related widespread power outages. For all of these reasons, therefore, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's negligence claims. Affirmed.