Opinion ID: 757295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Morrison's Competency to Stand Trial and to Waive Counsel

Text: 35 Morrison, through counsel, challenges the district court's substantive determination that he was competent to stand trial. We uphold a district court's finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial unless that finding is clearly erroneous. United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 411 (2d Cir.1995). Where the record on competency may plausibly be read to indicate the defendant may not have been competent, we still defer to the judgment of the district court, which had the benefit of examining [the defendant] and hearing from the fact and expert witnesses in person. Id. at 412. For a defendant to be considered competent to stand trial, the defendant must have (1) 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and (2) 'a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'  Id. at 410 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam); United States v. Hemsi, 901 F.2d 293, 295 (2d Cir.1990)). This standard determines both competence to stand trial and competence to waive constitutional rights, such as the right to counsel. See id. at 413; Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). The district court is to determine competency based on the preponderance of the evidence. See Nichols, 56 F.3d at 410; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (1994). In determining competency, the court may consider medical opinion as well as its own observation of the defendant's conduct. See Nichols, 56 F.3d at 411; Hemsi, 901 F.2d at 295. 36 Judge Wood's initial finding that Morrison was competent to stand trial and to waive counsel was not clearly erroneous. The FMC report considered by Judge Wood amply supports her finding of Morrison's competence. While it is possible to conclude from the record that Morrison was irrational or delusional at certain points during the trial process, it is just as possible to conclude that Morrison made some apparently false claims in an attempt to further his defense. We therefore defer to the judgment of the district court. See Nichols, 56 F.3d at 412. That the district court's determination was made without a hearing did not render it defective. See id. at 414 (The validity of [the] initial determination of competency is not necessarily undermined by the fact that it was made without the benefit of a hearing.). While the district court found that there was reasonable cause to believe that the defendant might be incompetent before ordering a psychiatric evaluation of him, it found that no reasonable cause existed to hold a hearing once she received the report of that evaluation. The district court therefore did not need to hold a hearing. See id. at 414 (In deciding that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary, a court may rely not only on psychiatrists' reports indicating competency but also on its own observations of the defendant.). 37 Morrison also challenges on procedural grounds Judge Wood's May 6, 1996, finding that he was competent to waive counsel. He argues that the district court committed reversible error by allowing him to remain unrepresented at the pre-trial conference in which Judge Wood had Dr. Goldstein present to observe Morrison and offer her expert opinion on his competence. Although Judge Wood had already found Morrison competent and allowed him to waive counsel, she revisited the issues of his competency to stand trial and to waive counsel, and of whether Morrison's waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and voluntary, before allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea. In United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir.1990), we held that if a trial court has cause to doubt the competency of the defendant to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel, it must appoint counsel to serve until the issue with respect to competency is resolved. However, in Nichols we declined to extend Purnett to require appointment of counsel where, as here, the district court held a hearing as a precautionary measure after making an initial determination of the defendant's competency based on psychiatric reports and the court's own observation. See Nichols, 56 F.3d at 414-15. We do not require a trial court to reappoint counsel to a pro se defendant every time it revisits the issue of competency. See id. at 415 (We decline to extend Purnett into an automatic adjournment rule every time the district court inquires further into competency.); Wise v. Bowersox, 136 F.3d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that where defendant was already properly representing himself after a fair determination of his competency, trial court did not err in allowing him to continue to represent himself at a second hearing on his competency). 38 Morrison argues that the district court applied the wrong standard in determining Morrison's competency, that it inquired only whether he was oriented as to time and place, and remembered certain events, rather than whether he had sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. We find nothing in the record to support Morrison's claim that the district court applied a less stringent standard than required, and therefore we reject it. B. Morrison's Motion to Recuse Judge Wood 39 Morrison argues that Judge Wood should have recused herself under 28 U.S.C. § 455. Morrison moved for recusal on September 18, 1995, stating in his motion that Judge Wood's husband, Michael Kramer, has an adversarial business and personal relationship with Muhummad Ali ..., Evel Knievel ..., and Arthur Morrison.... Morrison attached an affidavit to his motion alleging that Kramer attempted to establish a business relationship with Morrison, as well as Ali and Knievel, and that the relationship became adversarial because Morrison, Ali, and Knievel declined to allow Kramer access to Ali and Knievel. Morrison alleged that the circumstances surrounding Kramer's attempts to report on these subjects included Judge Wood. He also alleged that Kramer called Morrison and Ali in Baghdad, Iraq, in an unsuccessful attempt to secure an interview with Saddam Hussein, all of which further soured Kramer's relationship with Morrison. 3 40 Thereafter, Morrison included Kramer as a proposed defense witness that he wanted to subpoena. Before issuing subpoenas, the court required Morrison to offer the testimony each witness would provide in his defense. Morrison listed Kramer, stating Kramer could testify as to conversations and [dinner] he had with Muhammad Ali and Ronald Bey at which Morrison was present. Morrison also claimed that Kramer would testify to learning from New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani that Morrison was innocent of the charges in the indictment, and that he had discussed with Mayor Giuliani his intention to secure rights to publish books about Muhammad Ali and Evel Knievel as well as a story about Morrison himself. In an addendum to his list of witnesses, Morrison claimed that Kramer had spoken with Smith Barney representatives, who discussed with Kramer the possibility of dropping the charges against Morrison if Morrison agreed not to sue Smith Barney. Morrison also proposed to call Judge Wood's friend Frank Richardson as a witness in his defense. On May 6, 1996, Judge Wood denied Morrison's motion for recusal, explaining that she had allowed Kramer and Richardson to review the materials submitted by Morrison regarding them and that both credibly stated there was no truth in the allegations and that they had had no contact with Morrison. 41 A federal judge must recuse herself in any proceeding where her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994), where the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, id. § 455(b)(1), or where she knows that her spouse has a financial interest in the subject matter of the controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding, id. § 455(b)(4).  'Since recusal motions are committed to the sound discretion of the district court, ... the issue on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion.'  United States v. Conte, 99 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir.1992)). 42 No abuse of discretion occurred here. While Judge Wood denied Morrison's motion because she found his allegations incredible, at least in part because they were contradicted by the out-of-court statements of Kramer and Richardson, we affirm her decision because Morrison makes no claim that would warrant recusal in any event. 4 In the recusal motion itself, Morrison alleges no interest of Kramer that would cause a reasonable person to question Judge Wood's impartiality.  '[W]here an interest is not direct, but is remote, contingent, or speculative, it is not the kind of interest which reasonably brings into question a judge's impartiality.'  United States v. El-Gabrowny, 844 F.Supp. 955, 961 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (quoting In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir.1988)). Even if it were true that Kramer had developed a poor relationship with Morrison because Morrison had frustrated his pursuit of certain writing and publishing projects, it requires too much speculation to convert Kramer's alleged past frustrated dealings with Morrison into any interest, financial or otherwise, in the outcome of Morrison's unrelated criminal trial. See Drexel Burnham Lambert, 861 F.2d at 1314-15; Union Planters Bank v. L & J Dev. Co., 115 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that possibility that judge's wife owned stock in bank that acquired one of the parties to the suit did not require recusal). 43 Nor did Morrison's requests to call both Kramer and Richardson as witnesses create a duty in Judge Wood to recuse herself, because Morrison failed to offer any basis for believing that any testimony they would provide would have been relevant to his case, and not hearsay or legal conclusion. Morrison alleged, for example, Ronald Bey has ... stated ... that in a telephone call Mr. Kramer said to him, he had conversation with Mr. Rudolph Giuliani, in which he learned that the defendant was innocent of charges in the indictment and Mr. Kramer asked if the defendant could assist in securing the RIGHTS for Mr. Kramer to do the autobiographies of Muhammad Ali and Evel Knievel and that if the defendant helped him to do so, Kramer would write a book about the defendant's own plight. On April 18, 1996, Morrison sent a letter to Judge Wood in which he claimed, without stating the basis for his knowledge, that Kramer had spoken to Smith Barney, which offered to drop the charges against him. Such allegations would not have constituted evidence in Morrison's defense. 44 Morrison also asserts on appeal that Judge Wood committed reversible error by contacting Kramer and Richardson because she thus received ex parte information regarding disputed evidentiary facts (namely the credibility of witnesses). Morrison provides no basis whatsoever for his claim that Judge Wood received any information besides what she already knew about Kramer's and Richardson's lack of contact with the defendant. As Judge Wood stated on the record, she knew that neither Kramer nor Richardson had useful information for Morrison, and asked them only to confirm what she knew. See Sine v. Local No. 992 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 882 F.2d 913, 915 (4th Cir.1989) (finding no requirement to recuse for bias where trial judge received ex parte letter regarding one of the parties that did not contain any information the judge did not already know). 45 Morrison adds a claim that the district court erred by refusing to allow Morrison to refresh the recollection of his witnesses by showing them a photograph of Kramer or to question them in front of the jury regarding contacts with Kramer. Morrison makes no allegation regarding Kramer that would have been relevant to his defense, so we find no error in the district court's exclusion of testimony regarding Kramer. See, e.g., United States v. Scopo, 861 F.2d 339, 345 (2d Cir.1988) ([T]he trial judge has wide discretion to exclude proffered evidence that is collateral, rather than material, to the issues in the case.). C. The Sufficiency of the Evidence 46 Morrison challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for each count for which he was convicted. Morrison carries a heavy burden in making this claim, and we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that the jury might have drawn in favor of the government, and [we] may overturn the conviction only if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir.1996). We defer to the jury's determination of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and to the jury's choice of the competing inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. See United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538, 548 (2d Cir.1994). Proof of the elements of the crimes charged may be entirely by circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Sureff, 15 F.3d 225, 228 (2d Cir.1994). 47 Only with respect to Counts Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen, corresponding to Morrison's calls to Nathaniel Cochrane, from California to New York, between August and October 1989, is Morrison's claim of insufficient evidence even colorable, yet we find he has not met his burden. 5 The evidence established that Morrison made at least three threatening interstate telephone calls to Mr. Cochrane, as charged. Morrison did not dispute that Mr. Cochrane lived in the Bronx, New York, and that Dr. Cochrane and Morrison lived together in California before they broke up in 1989. Mr. Cochrane testified that Morrison called him shortly after the two broke up; while Morrison at first inquired only about where Dr. Cochrane was, Morrison later made statements threatening that he would disfigure Dr. Cochrane or have someone else do so. Cochrane testified that Morrison repeated this threat approximately four times between August and October 1989. Although Mr. Cochrane testified that in at least one of the threatening calls Morrison was calling from New York, he also testified that he received at least three other threatening calls during that period, and that in some of these calls Morrison told Cochrane that he was calling from L.A. Morrison also told Mr. Cochrane that he wanted Dr. Cochrane to leave California and go back to New York, so that he can save face among his friends in California, suggesting that Morrison was still in California. 48 The jury certainly may have concluded that Morrison was outside of New York during this period also from Morrison's own incredible testimony regarding his whereabouts when he called Mr. Cochrane. See United States v. Friedman, 998 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir.1993) (where defendant's exculpatory testimony was not credible, the jury was entitled to conclude that [defendant's] version of the events was false and thereby infer his guilt). Morrison testified that he returned to New York by driving himself, even though he had broken both of his feet, before calling Mr. Cochrane. Morrison also claimed that he saw two acquaintances in New York at least three or four times per week. Neither of these acquaintances, Reynold Francis and Sonny Allen, corroborated this claim. Allen could not recall whether he saw Morrison in New York at all during that period, and Francis testified that he saw Morrison a total of nine or ten times during the three months. The jury was entitled to assess the credibility of Morrison and his witnesses regarding his presence in New York during the relevant period, and to conclude that the testimony was fabricated, so that the opposite was true. 6 See id. We are not at liberty to disturb the inferences drawn by the jury, especially with respect to credibility. 49 We have considered Morrison's claims that the Government offered insufficient evidence to establish that the calls alleged in the other counts occurred over state lines, and we reject them as utterly without merit. D. Morrison's Sentence 50 The district court held an evidentiary hearing on December 18, 1996, on the Government's motion for upward departure. The Government called as its witness Dr. Helen Newton, a friend and colleague of Cochrane. Newton testified that Morrison called her as often as twenty or thirty times a day, at home and at work, for a period of approximately six or seven months after he and Cochrane broke up. Newton testified that in some of the calls, Morrison would threaten to hurt Dr. Cochrane if he ever found that she was seeing someone else. Newton also testified that Morrison threatened that Newton's fourteen-year-old son would be in danger if she did not reveal Cochrane's whereabouts to him. Newton testified that these phone calls made her fear both for herself and her son. On March 31, 1997, the hearing continued, and the Government called Jose Diaz, an inmate at the prison where Morrison was held. Diaz testified that Morrison told him that in retaliation for Judge Wood's initial denial of his motions to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss the indictment against him, Morrison planned to attempt to subpoena Michael Kramer in an attempt to force Judge Wood to recuse herself. Diaz testified that Morrison said that he would falsely claim to have had some business with Kramer as the basis for calling Kramer as a witness. The court refused Morrison's request to require Morrison's victims to testify at the sentencing hearing, because the court doubted such further examination would be helpful to Morrison, because testifying again would be extremely painful to the victims, and because Morrison had already cross-examined the testifying victims regarding the psychological injury he had caused. 51 The district court made substantial upward departures from the Sentencing Guideline range for the crimes for which Morrison was convicted. To a base offense level of 12, as required by U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1, for the threatening communications counts, the court added a six-level enhancement under § 2A6.1(b)(1), because Morrison's conduct showed an intent to carry out his threats. The court granted the Government's request for a two-point adjustment for Morrison's obstruction of justice, on two independent grounds, perjury and fabricating connections to the judge's husband in an effort to force her recusal. The court also made departures under §§ 5K2.3 and 5K2.8 for extreme conduct and extreme psychological injury to Morrison's victims. The court noted, Each of the victims was exceptionally credible and testified clearly and carefully about defendant's threatening and harassing conduct towards them. The court saw in their demeanor the extreme pain, the extreme anxiety and the terror that behavior has caused them in the past, still causes them, and, they legitimately fear, will cause them in the future. The court granted an upward departure of three points for the extreme conduct and extreme psychological injury inflicted upon Cheryl Cochrane, three points for the extreme psychological injury inflicted upon Marianne Spraggins, two points for the extreme psychological injury inflicted upon Lauren Gumes, one point each for Morrison's extreme conduct toward Nathaniel Cochrane, Gussie Cochrane, Helen Newton, the Dominguez Hills Medical Center, and the American Board of Emergency Medicine, and one half-point each for Morrison's extreme conduct toward Patricia Nowak and Smith Barney. Morrison's convictions, grouped according to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(b), would have constituted an offense level of 22. The court's two-level departure for obstruction of justice, plus its departures totaling fourteen levels for extreme conduct and extreme psychological injury, achieved a total offense level of 38. With a Criminal History category of II, this offense level dictated a sentence of 262 to 327 months. While the court stated it would be appropriate to sentence Morrison at the high end of the range, the court chose three hundred months, slightly above the midpoint, in light of Morrison's age. 52 Morrison raises numerous challenges to his sentence. Morrison challenges the district court's decision to depart upward from the Sentencing Guidelines range by six levels for conduct evidencing an intent to carry out his threats, under U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(1), claiming no evidence existed that he intended to carry out his threats, and that the district court improperly considered evidence of events before the threats were made as such evidence. Morrison challenges the district court's upward departure of two levels for obstruction of justice, claiming that evidence was insufficient to find that Morrison committed perjury. Morrison also challenges the district court's upward departures on the grounds that the conduct was extreme and caused extreme psychological injury under U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.8, 5K2.3, claiming that the district court improperly considered effects both on Morrison's victims and on secondary victims, others who were affected by Morrison's conduct. Morrison argues that the effects on the victims were not unusual, that the district court erred in departing based on the same evidence that supported Morrison's conviction, and that the district court erred in considering Morrison's own conduct at trial in assessing the extremeness of the conduct, as an infringement of his right to conduct his own defense. Morrison further claims that the district court should have conducted a more extensive hearing in determining the sentence, and that the sentence he received constitutes vindictiveness on the part of the prosecution for his withdrawal of his guilty plea. We reject each of these claims. 53 On appeal of a sentence, we accept the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Molina, 106 F.3d 1118, 1121 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1859, 137 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1997). Furthermore, we do not overturn the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Phipps, 29 F.3d 54, 56 (2d Cir.1994). We grant particular deference to the district court when its factual findings are based upon the court's observation of testimony. United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 642 (2d Cir.1993). 54 We find no error in the district court's imposition of the six-level enhancement for conduct demonstrating an intent to carry out threats, under § 2A6.1(b)(1). It is true that in order to invoke this section, the conduct proffered as probative of such an intent must have occurred 'either contemporaneously with or after the threat.'  United States v. Kirsh, 54 F.3d 1062, 1073 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Hornick, 942 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.1991)). The district court imposed the six-point enhancement for conduct evidencing an intent to carry out threats with respect to Morrison's conduct charged in Count Six, in his threats to Marianne Spraggins, Counts Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen, involving threats toward Cheryl Cochrane, and Count Fifteen, in his threats to Lauren Gumes. As conduct evidencing an intent to carry out threats made to Spraggins, the district court noted the repeated telephone calls to Spraggins and calls to the chief executive officer of Smith Barney, with threats to him. These calls took place after the phone calls in December 1991 for which Morrison was convicted, when he threatened to break Spraggins's legs and neck, and sufficed to support the upward departure. Judge Wood did cite Morrison's punching of Lauren Gumes's leg the evening they were in Las Vegas as evidence of intent to carry out his subsequent threat to her; Gumes returned to New York to find a threatening message on her machine the next day. However, the court also relied on Morrison's repeated phone calls to Gumes, all of which occurred after the threat for which he was convicted, and which were sufficient to support the enhancement. With respect to Counts Eleven through Thirteen, charging Morrison's threats to Nathaniel Cochrane that he would hurt or destroy Cheryl Cochrane, the court noted a great deal of conduct showing an intent to carry out the threat, including calling family members, making a bomb threat to her employer, distributing derogatory materials about her to her employer and to the Board of Emergency Medicine, and breaking into her apartment. While the bomb threat to the hospital and the break-in of Cochrane's apartment occurred before Morrison's calls to Mr. Cochrane, the post-threat conduct sufficiently supports Judge Wood's departure. We may affirm a ruling regarding the Guidelines where a district court articulates permissible as well as impermissible reasons. United States v. Cousineau, 929 F.2d 64, 69 (2d Cir.1991). 55 Morrison's challenge to his sentence enhancement for perjury fails as well. A sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice is warranted when a defendant testifying under oath gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). Judge Wood noted numerous inconsistencies in the record and made her own assessment of Morrison's credibility by observing his testimony at trial; she cited more than adequate support for her finding that Morrison deliberately lied about material issues in an attempt to affect the outcome of the trial. We find no clear error in the district court's findings in support of the enhancement for obstructing justice. 56 We find that the district court's fourteen level upward departure on the basis of extreme conduct and extreme psychological injury, under U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.3 and 5K2.8, also to be devoid of error. A sentencing court has 'wide discretion' ... in determining whether aggravating circumstances exist to support an upward departure. United States v. Stephens, 7 F.3d 285, 289 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Palta, 880 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir.1989)). The district court based its findings of extreme behavior and extreme psychological injury in large part upon its observation of the extreme pain, anxiety and terror [of victims who] testified at trial. The Guidelines permit an upward departure on the ground of extreme psychological injury when the injury was much more serious than that normally resulting from commission of the offense; for example, when there is a substantial impairment of the intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral functioning of a victim, when the impairment is likely to be of an extended or continuous duration, and when the impairment manifests itself by physical or psychological symptoms or by changes in behavior patterns. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3 p.s. Where the defendant's conduct was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim, the court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the nature of the conduct. Examples of extreme conduct include torture of a victim, gratuitous infliction of injury, or prolonging of pain or humiliation. Id. § 5K2.8 p.s. To qualify as extreme, the conduct must contain  'an aggravating ... circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission'  in formulating the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Fan, 36 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994)). Morrison claims that the district court erred in its departures for extreme psychological injury and extreme conduct because his conduct was within the contemplation of the Sentencing Commission for the crimes for which he was convicted, and because the injury to his victims was not unusual. 57 The district court articulated factual details or circumstances in support of its determinations that the psychological injury to Morrison's victims exceeded what would normally be expected for the crimes charged, and that Morrison's conduct was extreme. Regarding Cheryl Cochrane, the court made specific findings that Morrison not only threatened her, but threatened her as part of a plan to destroy her, forcing her to isolate herself from friends and family and jeopardizing her career, requiring her to change homes and jobs, causing her to consider leaving the country, and significantly changing her personality, making her suspicious and extremely reclusive. With respect to Spraggins, the court noted how Morrison's conduct pervaded Spraggins's life, causing her to experience terror over an extended course of time, and causing her to change her behavior patterns, for example, by taking steps to buy a gun. The court noted, regarding Lauren Gumes, that her testimony that she felt Morrison would stop at nothing to get her was highly credible, that she demonstrated great fear, and that she endured Morrison's terrifying conduct for a full year. The court based its departure for Morrison's extreme conduct toward Nathaniel Cochrane on the prolonged period, three years, in which Cochrane endured calls from Morrison, and the particularly cruel and heinous, nature of Morrison's threats to disfigure Dr. Cochrane and ruin her career, which forced Mr. Cochrane to discontinue his own contact with his daughter. In departing for Morrison's threats to Helen Newton, the court noted the especially cruel and heinous threats Morrison made toward Newton's son, and Morrison's complaint to Newton's employer that she had molested a child patient. The court noted, in making its departure for Morrison's extreme conduct toward Gussie Cochrane, the extreme fear Morrison's threats caused her, particularly his threat that she would not recognize her daughter after he beat her face, and the fact that Morrison's threats caused Dr. Cochrane to miss her grandfather's funeral. The court noted that Morrison's bomb threat to the ABEM caused cancellation of a national examination, affecting thousands of doctors, that Morrison's threatening call to Detective Patricia Nowak included sexually threatening comments to a police officer and a threat to blow up the police department, and that Morrison's threats to Smith Barney included a threat to destroy the firm by contacting national media and all of the nation's black mayors. 58 We find no error in the district court's assessment of the nature and duration of Morrison's threats, as well as the demeanor of the testifying victims, to find the seriousness of his offenses and the effects on his victims greater than that anticipated by the drafters of the Sentencing Guidelines. The departures for Morrison's victims are squarely consistent with our precedent in similar cases. See United States v. Miller, 993 F.2d 16, 21 (2d Cir.1993) (affirming district court's upward departure under § 5K2.3 based on psychological injury sustained by the victim in a threatening communications case where victim's testimony indicated extreme, pervasive fear that caused the victim to want to leave the city where she lived, and made her afraid to answer the telephone or to open her mail for three years as a result of defendant's campaign of harassment); United States v. Pergola, 930 F.2d 216, 218, 219 (2d Cir.1991) (affirming district court's upward departure under §§ 5K2.3 and 5K2.8, resulting in maximum sentence where persistent threats by defendant resulted in victim living in constant fear and being unable to sleep or form close relationships). We also agree that Morrison's bomb threats, given the particular establishments threatened, a hospital emergency room and a police department, and the effects of those threats, constitute extreme behavior. Causing cancellation of a national exam affecting thousands of doctors was extreme. We find no clear error in the district court's finding of facts at trial, and no abuse of discretion in her application of those facts to sections 5K2.3 and 5K2.8. We also find the size of the district court's departures to be reasonable, and that the reasons given by the district court justify the magnitude of each departure. See United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 26 (2d Cir.1992). 59 Nor do we find error in the district court's decision to consider effects on secondary victims. The court considered Morrison's threats to secondary victims to be part and parcel of his threats to primary victims, and we agree. In the case on which Morrison relies, United States v. Hoyungowa, 930 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.1991), the Ninth Circuit reversed an upward departure based on effects on a victim's family who neither witnessed the perpetrators commit the crime nor had direct contact with them. It does not apply to this case because all of the victims the district court considered in rendering Morrison's sentence did have direct contact with Morrison. See United States v. Haggard, 41 F.3d 1320, 1326-27 (9th Cir.1994) (finding family of kidnaping victim to be victim of defendant's crimes within meaning of Sentencing Guidelines for upward departure). 60 We reject Morrison's claim that the district court infringed his right to represent himself by considering in its sentencing determination its observation of Morrison's conduct while representing himself as well as his conduct as a defendant. We find no reason to believe the court did consider Morrison's conduct while representing himself in making its departures. Morrison cites the district court's statement that Morrison showed particular skill at sadistically picking at painful wounds his victims bore as evidence that she considered his conduct examining witnesses in his sentencing. This statement by the court was not given as a reason for any of the court's upward departures, however, but only as one reason she was denying Morrison the opportunity to re-examine the victims of his crimes. We therefore need not decide whether the court could permissibly have taken Morrison's conduct in examining witnesses into consideration in sentencing him. 61 The district court was not required to grant the defendant's request for a hearing at which to cross-examine his victims in order to show that their psychological injury was less than appeared at trial, nor was it required to order the victims to undergo an examination by a mental health professional. A criminal defendant has no right to demand an evidentiary hearing to present his own witnesses at sentencing. See United States v. Pugliese, 805 F.2d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir.1986). We have affirmed numerous upward departures in similar cases where the district court rendered its decision based only on trial testimony and not on expert testimony. See Miller, 993 F.2d at 21; Pergola, 930 F.2d at 219. A sentencing court does not need to hear the testimony of psychologists or psychiatrists to impose an upward departure based on psychological injury. See United States v. Passmore, 984 F.2d 933, 936 (8th Cir.1993). 62 Finally, Morrison claims that his sentence was the product of prosecutorial vindictiveness, and that the Government made an implied promise to him when he withdrew his guilty plea that his sentence would have been in the range of forty-one to fifty-one months. Morrison claims he is entitled to a presumption of vindictiveness, see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), because he received a substantially longer sentence after exercising his legal right to move to withdraw his plea. In Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 803, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989), the Court held that no presumption of vindictiveness arises when a defendant succeeds in having his guilty plea vacated, and then receives a higher sentence after trial. Because Morrison thus has no basis to claim a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness, he must present evidence of actual vindictiveness, which he has not done. As for Morrison's claim that the Government or the district court promised a certain sentence to him if he withdrew his guilty plea, we find no such promise, either implied or express. As the district court ruled below, the record makes it clear that the Government's representations about Morrison's likely sentence were clearly estimates, not promises. E. Other Claims 63 Morrison presents a number of other claims: that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that his pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment were improperly denied, and that the district court should have excluded from evidence tapes of telephone conversations recorded by Morrison's victims. None of Morrison's arguments have merit. 64 Morrison claims that his standby counsel ineffectively assisted him. We have held that there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation ... where [the defendant] shared the duties of conducting her defense with a lawyer. United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 130, 139 L.Ed.2d 80 (1997). As we held in Schmidt, without a constitutional right to standby counsel, a defendant is not entitled to relief for the ineffectiveness of standby counsel. Id. While we stated in Schmidt that we might entertain a claim for ineffective assistance of standby counsel if standby counsel held that title in name only and, in fact, acted as the defendant's lawyer throughout the proceedings, id., the record indicates that Morrison retained control of his own defense throughout the proceedings, so that his standby counsel was in reality, as well as in name, only that. Therefore, we need not examine the effectiveness of Dunn's standby assistance. 65 Morrison makes three arguments finding error in the district court's refusal to dismiss the indictment against him. He argues first that the grand jury was presented with perjured testimony and with altered tape recordings. Both the testimony to which Morrison refers and the tapes were presented to the jury at trial, and the jury convicted Morrison on the relevant counts. The jury's verdict of guilty against Morrison rendered harmless any error resulting from the evidence used to indict him. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72-73, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986); United States v. Ruggiero, 934 F.2d 440, 447-48 (2d Cir.1991) (rejecting challenge to indictment based on alleged exaggeration by prosecution regarding content of tapes to grand jury, since any possibility of prejudice was eliminated by the petit jury's conviction ... after hearing the tapes in their entirety). 66 Second, Morrison argues that material relevant to his defense was destroyed by the Government, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and that his motion to dismiss the indictment was thus wrongly denied. He claims that tapes made of his telephone conversations while he was incarcerated at the Metropolitan Correctional Center and Federal Correctional Institution at Otisville [the MCC tapes], pursuant to prison policy, contained exculpatory evidence and were destroyed by the Government. The district court had ordered certain tapes preserved based on Morrison's assertion that the tapes contained information that would support his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. However, the district court rescinded that order on November 18, 1994, finding that no relevant information was contained on the tapes, based on sworn testimony from Morrison regarding the tapes' contents. After the tapes were destroyed, Morrison moved the court to dismiss his indictment, claiming for the first time that the tapes contained exculpatory material. A conviction should be reversed as a result of withheld exculpatory evidence if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). We give deference to a trial court's rulings with respect to destruction of material claimed to be exculpatory because it is better able to determine the effect the exculpatory materials would have had on the outcome. See United States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir.1987). Given that Morrison had been given an opportunity to testify regarding the contents of the tapes and failed to state any information relevant to his defense, and given, as the district court noted, that [Morrison] previously stated that the information on the tapes was material to the withdrawal of his guilty plea, and that [h]e has now changed his tack and asserts that the information is exculpatory, we do not find error in the district court's judgment that the tapes did not contain exculpatory material. 67 Morrison's third argument that his motion to dismiss the indictment was wrongly denied is based on the officers who arrested him taking him before a United States Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of New York, even though he was arrested in Newark, New Jersey. Rules 5(a) and 40(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure both require that anyone arrested in a district other than that in which the offense was allegedly committed be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate judge. Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(a), 40(a). We have held that where delay is not used to subject defendant to unwarranted interrogation, no prejudice results, and violation of Rule 5(a) does not warrant reversal. See United States v. Grandi, 424 F.2d 399, 402-03 (2d Cir.1970). The Government offered no post-arrest statements into evidence that could have been the result of any improper interrogation; we therefore find no prejudice Morrison could have incurred from any possible violation of Rules 5(a) and 40(a). 68 Morrison makes various arguments regarding the admission at trial of tapes of his communications. Morrison claims that tapes made of calls to Smith Barney were not properly authenticated, and that a tape made of Morrison's call to the Dominguez Hills Medical Center was inadmissible because, he claims, the tape was made against California law. The tapes of calls to Smith Barney were adequately authenticated before being admitted into evidence. Rule 901(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that [t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). Recognizing ... that 'recorded evidence is likely to have a strong impression upon a jury and is susceptible to alteration,'  we require clear and convincing evidence of authenticity for admission of recordings. United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1303 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Fuentes, 563 F.2d 527, 532 (2d Cir.1977)). We review a district court's rulings with respect to sufficiency of evidence of authenticity for abuse of discretion. Id. Morrison claims the tapes were edited or altered, and he called an expert to testify at trial that there were anomalies, edits, and pauses on three of the tapes. The Government rebutted with an expert who testified that nothing on the tapes indicated tampering. The contents of the conversations on the challenged tapes are coherent and flow logically, making it improbable that any material was deleted or added. We find that the Government presented sufficient evidence to support the authenticity of the tapes and that the district court committed no abuse of discretion by admitting them. See United States v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir.1997). We also reject Morrison's challenge regarding the chain of custody of the tapes. Breaks in the chain of custody do not bear upon the admissibility of evidence, only the weight of the evidence, and therefore do not provide us any basis for reversal. See Ruggiero, 928 F.2d at 1304. 69 The tape-recorded conversation of Morrison's conversation with James Spinelli of Dominguez Hills Medical Center was also properly admitted. Morrison claims that the recording violated California law. We need not decide whether it violated California law for Spinelli to record Morrison's call without Morrison's consent, because federal law governs the admissibility of evidence in a federal criminal trial. [E]vidence admissible under federal law cannot be excluded because it would be inadmissible under state law. United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 43 (1st Cir.1985)). It is not unlawful under federal law for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994). Therefore, Spinelli's recording of Morrison's call to the Dominguez Hills Medical Center was lawful under federal law and admissible in Morrison's federal prosecution without regard to whether it was made in violation of California law or would have been admissible in a California court. See United States v. DiFelice, 837 F.Supp. 81, 82 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (finding that victim's recording of telephone conversations with defendant was admissible in federal criminal prosecution even though taping might have violated Massachusetts law). We also find that the Government established the appropriate foundation for admitting the tape as a copy. 70 Morrison argues that the tape of his conversation with Spinelli was not relevant and was more prejudicial than probative, so that it violated Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403. We find that the district court properly admitted the tape under Rule 404(b), in that it gave evidence of Morrison's knowledge, intent, 7 and plan to threaten, harass and terrify Dr. Cochrane and the absence of mistake or accident in Morrison's victim's perception of his threats. Evidence of prior criminal conduct is admissible under Rules 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence if the evidence is relevant to an issue at trial other than the defendant's character, and if the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685-86, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); United States v. Jaswal, 47 F.3d 539, 544 (2d Cir.1995) (per curiam). We review a district court's determination whether to admit similar act evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Aminy, 15 F.3d 258, 260 (2d Cir.1994). Morrison had attempted to show at trial that his communications had not been threatening, and that he had not intended them as such, for instance, that he had called Nathaniel Cochrane only in a friendly, good-faith effort to reunite with his former girlfriend Cheryl Cochrane. The court instructed the jury that it could not consider the evidence of the hospital bomb threat as a substitute for proof that the defendant committed the crimes charged, only that it may, but did not have to, draw an inference that in making threatening communications regarding Dr. Cheryl Cochrane, the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally and as part of a plan, and not because of some mistake, accident or other innocent reason. The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the tape was more probative than prejudicial. 71