Opinion ID: 2627082
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: alternative means case

Text: ¶ 20 Having concluded that the common law definitions of assault, when submitted as a separate jury instruction, do not constitute alternative means of committing the crime of second degree assault, resolution of this particular case becomes straightforward. We would readily agree with Smith that this is an alternative means case requiring sufficient evidence to support each of the alternative means presented to the jury if the State had alleged that Smith committed second degree assault by more than one of the means listed in RCW 9A.36.021(1). However, the record shows plainly that the jury was instructed on only one, not multiple, means of committing second degree assault: assault of another with a deadly weapon under RCW 9A.36.021 (1)(c). Because separate means of committing the crime were not charged or submitted to the jury, this is not an alternative means case, and the Court of Appeals correctly concluded so. Therefore, as the reviewing court, our duty to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support each separate means presented to the jury has not been triggered. Accord State v. Randhawa, 133 Wash.2d 67, 74, 941 P.2d 661 (1997) (In an alternative means case, the threshold test on review is whether sufficient evidence exists to support each of the alternative means presented to the jury.). [9] ¶ 21 In sum, when viewing the alternative means doctrine in its proper light, we find no merit to Smith's assertion that her right to a unanimous jury verdict was compromised because the jury may have been confused about what conduct the State was alleging was criminal. The record shows that the State did not present different factual scenarios as alternatives for proving second degree assault. Rather, it shows that the State maintained at all times at trial that Smith's conduct constituted assault by means of a handgun, a deadly weapon for purposes of second degree assault. Furthermore, the State asserted that Smith's criminal conduct occurred in the span of a few minutes and was intentionally directed, at all times, toward the same three persons. ¶ 22 Based upon this trial record, any underlying concerns that we may have had that Smith's jury avoided specific factual discussions about what unlawful conduct Smith may or may not have engaged in or concern that the jury did not fairly consider the elements of second degree assault by means of a deadly weapon, have been put to rest by the separate to convict and assault definition jury instructions, by the unanimous guilty verdict on the second degree assault charges alone, and by the unanimous return on the deadly weapon special verdict. Under the factual circumstances of this case, the record does not support Smith's assertion that she was denied her Washington Constitution article I, section 21 right to jury unanimity on the question of her guilt or innocence. This is because, under the trial court's instructions and the verdict forms submitted for its deliberation, Smith's jury not only had to unanimously agree as to Smith's guilt but it also had to unanimously agree to the one means of committing second degree assault presented for its consideration-assault by means of a deadly weapon. Consequently, we determine that the jury could not have been misled as to or confused about the unanimity requirement, and the guilty verdicts were clearly premised on the jury finding that Smith committed one means of committing the offense of criminal assault in the second degree. Therefore, we uphold each of Smith's three assault convictions.