Opinion ID: 1198748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of Mandamus Remedy.

Text: The respondent assessors, while not contesting this court's authority or original jurisdiction to issue writs in the nature of mandamus, [3] contend that mandamus is inappropriate here. First, they argue that the action sought to be compelled is discretionary and that mandamus may not be used to compel the exercise of discretion. Prior to the 1976 Act, [4] county assessors were required to accomplish any State Board ordered increases in assessed valuations by making horizontal increases in the assessments of all properties. The respondents admit that their obligation under that prior act involved no discretion. The 1976 amendment, however, required increases in assessed valuations to be accomplished only by reassessing individual properties. [5] Respondent assessors claim that this provision grants them discretion which cannot be directed by a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is an appropriate remedy where there has been a failure to perform a statutory duty. County Commissioners v. Edwards, 171 Colo. 499, 468 P.2d 857 (1970); see Tasher v. Trentaz, 165 Colo. 97, 437 P.2d 529 (1968). A writ of mandamus, however, may not direct how discretion is to be exercised. People ex rel. Griffith v. Bundy, 107 Colo. 102, 109 P.2d 261 (1940) (canvassing of votes); State ex rel. Holmes v. Peck, 92 Colo. 224, 19 P.2d 217 (1933) (certification of sufficiency of a petition); Lindsey v. Carlton, 44 Colo. 42, 96 P. 997 (1908) (county court's discretion in divorce proceeding); Orman v. People, 18 Colo.App. 302, 71 P. 430 (1903) (canvassing of votes). Nevertheless, officials in whom the law has vested a duty involving discretion may be required by mandamus to exercise that discretion. Thus, while courts will not, by mandamus, direct the manner in which the discretion of an officer shall be exercised, they will direct an officer to proceed and exercise the discretion vested in him by law. People v. McNichols, 91 Colo. 141, 143, 13 P.2d 266, 267 (1932) (duty to make an audit) (emphasis added). See Van DeVegt v. Board of County Commissioners, 98 Colo. 161, 55 P.2d 703 (1936) (duty to consider granting a liquor license); State Board of Corrections v. Denver, 61 Colo. 266, 156 P. 1100 (1916) (duty to consider caring for insane person in state hospital); People ex rel. Pettingell v. Grand County Commissioners, 53 Colo. 494, 127 P. 960 (1912) (duty to consider repairing bridge). In the present case, the State Board has sought a writ of mandamus only to compel the respondent assessors to perform their statutory duty to increase the aggregate assessments of their respective counties. Statutes in effect for many years have imposed on county assessors a clear duty to obey such an order from the State Board. Sections 39-5-127, [6] 39-9-107, [7] C.R.S.1973. There is no attempt through this mandamus action to direct the respondents how to exercise their discretion in performing their statutory duty. The discretionary aspects of the assessors' duties, therefore, would not be impeded by the issuance of a writ compelling them to exercise their discretion. Secondly, the respondent assessors claim that mandamus is inappropriate here because the statute and State Board orders are vague, ambiguous, and fail to provide adequate guidelines for the required reassessments to increase aggregate valuations. In support of this contention, the respondents argue that Colo.Sess.Laws 1976, ch. 154, 39-9-103(5)(b)(III) at 764 expressly deprives them of the normal assessment guidelines contained in Articles 1 to 13, Title 39, C.R.S.1973. Our reading of the 1976 Act leads us to reject the respondents' interpretation. The statute must be read and considered as a whole to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. See Howe v. People, 178 Colo. 248, 496 P.2d 1040 (1972). Thus the 1976 amendment must be read, not in a vacuum, but in the context of the entire preexisting statutory assessment scheme. Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Division, 183 Colo. 335, 516 P.2d 634 (1973). If possible, a statute should be construed to accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted. The construction suggested by the respondents is illogical and would deprive the statute of its effectiveness. We interpret the 1976 Act as leaving intact all the normal, preexisting guidelines provided for assessment, and these guidelines, in addition to the new guidelines set out in the 1976 Act, are available in performing any reassessment ordered by the State Board. Thus the State Board's order is not vague or ambiguous but sufficiently definite to support mandamus. We hold that mandamus is an appropriate remedy.