Opinion ID: 1435115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The FAA provides:

Text: A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). This section of the FAA embodies the national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006). While the courts must respect the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit. AT & T Techs. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (citing United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) and United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570, 80 S.Ct. 1363, 4 L.Ed.2d 1432 (1960)). Thus, the underlying question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator. AT & T Techs. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986). Because arbitration agreements are fundamentally contracts, we review the enforceability of an arbitration agreement according to the applicable state law of contract formation. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-44, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). Any arguments based on the applicability of the FAA to the agreement at issue are, of course, evaluated in accordance with federal case law. Seawright makes four arguments based on state contract law and a fifth argument based on the FAA. Seawright's state contract law arguments are: (1) there was no valid arbitration agreement because she did not actually assent to the EDR Program; (2) there was no valid arbitration agreement because there was no consideration; (3) even if there had been assent and consideration, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it is illusory; and (4) alternatively, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it is an unconscionable contract of adhesion. Seawright's argument under the FAA is that she did not enter into a written agreement as required by the Federal Arbitration Act. We begin by addressing Seawright's arguments based on state contract law.
The issue at hand is whether Seawright's continued employment with AGF constituted assent. Tennessee law recognizes the validity of unilateral contracts, in which acceptance is indicated by action under the contract. Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 F.Supp.2d 891, 895 (M.D.Tenn.2003). The written materials accompanying the arbitration agreement clearly stated that continued employment after the effective date of the EDR Program would constitute the employee's acceptance of the agreement to arbitrate. Thus, under Tennessee law, Seawright expressed a valid assent when she continued to work for AGF. The district court acknowledged that [g]enerally, continued employment constitutes acceptance of an employer's arbitration policy. Seawright, No. 06-2339 DV at 3. Nevertheless, relying exclusively on an unpublished case, Lee v. Red Lobster Inns of America, 92 Fed.Appx. 158 (6th Cir.2004), the district court concluded that merely receiving information and acknowledging the EDR program is not tantamount to assent. This misstates the issue. The question is not whether the mere receipt of an offer constitutes acceptance but whether an action  continuing one's employment  can constitute acceptance. Under Tennessee law, continued employment can constitute acceptance. Fisher, 276 F.Supp.2d at 895 (By continuing to work at GE, the plaintiffs accepted the terms of [the arbitration agreement], a binding contract.); see also Byrd v. CIGNA Healthcare, 2002 WL 32059026 at -3, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26902,  (Feb. 8, 2002 E.D. Tenn.) (By its terms, `accepting employment and being eligible to receive increases in compensation and benefits' binds [an] employee [of the defendant company] to arbitrate employment-related claims.) (quoting the defendant company's employee handbook). Furthermore, Lee is distinguishable from the present case due to two important differences in its facts that the district court did not mention. First, the agreement at issue in Lee did not contain any provision that stipulated continued employment would constitute acceptance. Thus, the agreement could not be accepted by unilateral action. Second, unlike Seawright, the plaintiff in Lee explicitly told her boss that she did not assent to the agreement. [2] Additionally, the court in Lee specifically cautioned against relying on its decision in cases with different facts: The case at bar is distinguishable, of course, from cases in which employer-distributed materials told employees that their continuing to work would constitute acceptance of the employer's dispute resolution plan. Id. at 163 n. 4. The case cautioned against in the footnote is, of course, exactly our case. Seawright also relies on Miller v. Am. Gen. Fin. Corp., 2002 WL 2022536, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16724 (E.D.La. Sept. 4, 2002) to demonstrate that she did not express valid assent. However, the court in Miller based its decision on Louisiana state contract law, which differs significantly from Tennessee state contract law. In Louisiana when special formalities are prescribed for a contract, the same formalities are required for an offer or acceptance intended to form that contract. La. Civ.Code Ann. Art.1927 (West 2001) cmt. c. Thus, the court in Miller reasoned that because the FAA required the agreement to be in writing, Louisiana contract law further required that the acceptance of the agreement be in writing. In Tennessee, however, acceptance of a written agreement can be performed by action under the contract. Fisher, 276 F.Supp.2d at 895. Thus, Miller is inapposite to the case at hand. Noticeably absent from Seawright's brief is a discussion of the knowing and voluntary waiver requirement established by this circuit in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir.2003) (en banc). In Morrison, the court applied ordinary contract principles in determining whether a binding arbitration agreement that included a waiver of a right to sue in court was valid. Id. at 668 (citing Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.1995)). In determining whether an employee knowingly and voluntarily waived the right, the court considers: (1) plaintiff's experience, background, and education; (2) the amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign the waiver, including whether the employee had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity of the waiver; (4) consideration for the waiver; as well as (5) the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 668. In Morrison, the court found that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to sue based on the fact that she was a highly educated managerial employee who was capable of understanding the terms of the agreement and that the waiver of the right to file suit in federal court was plain. Seawright is similarly situated: She is an educated, managerial employee, who was capable of understanding the EDR Program's provisions. Also, like Morrison, Seawright had ample time (in Seawright's case, two months) between AGF's announcement of the EDR Program and the Program's commencement during which she could have consulted with an attorney or decided she did not wish to waive her rights. Finally, the EDR Program clearly stated that employees, by agreeing to the EDR Program, would be waiving their rights to sue in federal court. Though Morrison signaled her assent to the arbitration agreement through a signature and Seawright signaled her assent through action, nowhere in Morrison does the court hold that the waiver must be express and in writing. Indeed, such a requirement would likely be inconsistent with federal case law interpreting the FAA itself. As we elaborate below, arbitration agreements under the FAA need only be written, not necessarily signed. If this court were to equate knowing and voluntary with express and written then we would effectively require that all arbitration agreements be signed to be enforceable. This would be in conflict with both the plain reading of the statute and with past precedent interpreting the statute. Accordingly, we find that, although Seawright did not sign a waiver, her acceptance of the EDR Program  which stated that parties to the agreement waived their right to sue in court  was knowing and voluntary.
Addressing the issue of consideration, the district court stated that the agreement lacked bargained for exchange. The district court seemed to base this conclusion on the fact that Seawright had no ability to affect the terms of the company's policy. That fact, however, is irrelevant to whether there is a bargained-for exchange. Under Tennessee contract law, [m]utuality of promises is `ample' consideration for a contract. A mutual promise `in itself would constitute a sufficient consideration.' Pyburn v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, 63 S.W.3d 351 (Tenn.Ct. App.2001) (quoting Rodgers v. Southern Newspapers, Inc., 214 Tenn. 335, 379 S.W.2d 797, 800 (1964)); see also Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 321 n. 6 (Tenn.1996). In the agreement at issue, the arbitration process was binding on both employer and employee, regardless of who requested arbitration. Thus, employer and employee were equally obligated to arbitrate those disputes falling within the coverage of the plan. This is enough to ensure mutuality of obligation and thus constitute consideration.
Though Seawright's brief does not explicitly argue this point, her statement that in contrast to the employee's inability to challenge the EDR program, the Companies maintained the right to change or terminate the program at any time (Appellee's Br. 6-7) might be construed as an argument that the agreement was illusory and therefore void. Tennessee law requires that a contract not be illusory, that is, that it impose genuine obligations on both parties. Parks v. Morris, 914 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995) (If one or both parties to a contract have the right to cancel or terminate the agreement, then the contract lacks mutuality and is unenforceable) (internal quotation omitted). In Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000) the court found the arbitration agreement to be fatally indefinite because the employer reserved the right to alter the applicable rules and procedures without any obligation to notify, much less receive consent from the employees. Id. at 315-16. The arbitration agreement in this case is distinguishable. While the defendant companies reserved the right to terminate the EDR at any time, they also agreed to be bound by the terms of the agreement for 90 days after giving reasonable notice of the termination and as to all known disputes arising before the date termination. J.A. 341. Thus, the companies were bound by the terms for at least 90 days after the agreement came into effect. [3] This reciprocal obligation to arbitrate at least those claims arising in the 90-day period after the effective date of the agreement satisfies the mutuality requirement.

Seawright argues that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable and/or void because it is a contract of adhesion entered into with unequal bargaining power and because it is substantively unconscionable. (Appellee's Br. 22). The Supreme Court has made it clear that [m]ere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). The Court went on to write, Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds for the revocation of any contract. Id. at 33, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)). Thus, to determine whether a contract is unenforceable we must follow Tennessee law governing the enforceability of contracts of adhesion. The Supreme Court of Tennessee has defined an adhesion contract as being a standardized form offered on what amounts to a `take it or leave it' basis, without affording the weaker party a realistic opportunity to bargain, and under conditions whereby the weaker party can only obtain the desired product or service by submitting to the form of the contract. Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Tenn.1996); see also Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 384 (6th Cir.2005); Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders, Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731, 733-34 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003). However, a contract is not adhesive merely because it is a standardized form offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The last element of adhesion, the absence of a meaningful choice for the party occupying the weaker bargaining position, must also be present. Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir.2004). While the agreement at issue here may fulfill the first three conditions, Seawright has not demonstrated the final element. Applying Tennessee state law, the Sixth Circuit in Cooper held that an employer's mandatory arbitration agreement was not a contract of adhesion based on the failure of a similar condition: To find this contract adhesive, however, there must be evidence that [the employee] would be unable to find suitable employment if she refused to sign [the employer's] agreement. She presented no such evidence. For instance, she did not allege that she looked for comparable jobs but was unable to find one. Generalizations about employer practices in the modern economy cannot substitute for such evidence. See Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, 166 F.3d 308, 324 (6th Cir.1998) (no procedural unconscionability where grain seller failed to present evidence that it searched for other alternatives and that there were none). Cooper, 367 F.3d at 502. In Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc ., the Sixth Circuit reiterated Tennessee's standard for finding a contract of adhesion in an employment context: To find their Arbitration Agreements adhesive, the district court was required to cite evidence that [Plaintiffs] would be unable to find suitable employment if [they] refused to sign [the arbitration] agreement. Id. at 384 (internal quotations omitted). While the court in Walker held that the agreement was unenforceable on other state law grounds, the court had some concerns about whether Plaintiffs demonstrated the final element of an adhesion contract: `the absence of a meaningful choice for the party occupying the weaker bargaining position.' Id. Like the plaintiffs in Cooper and Walker, Seawright has presented no evidence that she would be unable to find suitable employment if she had refused to be a party to the arbitration agreement. Thus, we hold that the agreement is not a contract of adhesion.
Even if Seawright could show that the arbitration agreement was adhesive, she would also have to demonstrate that it was unconscionable. Cooper, 367 F.3d at 503. In Tennessee, adhesion contracts are unenforceable only when the terms are beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person, or oppressive or unconscionable. [4] Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 320; see also Pyburn, 63 S.W.3d at 359 (Tenn.App.2001). A contract is unconscionable when the inequality of the bargain is so manifest as to shock the judgment of a person of common sense, and where the terms are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make them on the one hand, and no honest and fair person would accept them on the other. Haun v. King, 690 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984). Courts will not enforce adhesion contracts which are oppressive to the weaker party or which serve to limit the obligations and liability of the stronger party. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 320 (Tenn.1996). The Tennessee Supreme Court recognizes both substantive and procedural elements of unconscionability. Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 285 (Tenn.2004) (The determination that a contract or term is or is not unconscionable is made in the light of its setting, purpose and effect. Relevant factors include weaknesses in the contracting process like those involved in more specific rules as to contractual capacity, fraud, and other invalidating causes. . . .) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contract § 208, cmt. a (1981)). Seawright does not argue, and this court could not hold, that the arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable. The underlying arbitration agreement is equitable in that it binds both employer and employee to arbitration and does not limit the obligations and liability of the stronger party  the employer. This distinguishes the EDR Program from the arbitration agreements that Tennessee courts have held unconscionable. See, e.g., Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn.2004) (City Auto has a judicial forum for practically all claims that it could have against Taylor. . . . At the same time, Taylor is required to arbitrate any claim that she might have against City Auto.). Seawright's only argument that the contract was procedurally unconscionable is her contention that there was unequal bargaining power. The finding that an employee had less bargaining power is relevant to the procedural-unconscionability analysis. Cooper, 367 F.3d at 504. Seawright did not present evidence of any factors bearing on the relative bargaining position of the contracting parties, including their age, education, intelligence, business acumen and experience, and relative bargaining power. Ibid. (citing Morrison, 317 F.3d at 666). Moreover, given Seawright's education and position as a branch office manager who had worked for the company for two and a half decades, it is unlikely that she could marshal such evidence. This distinguishes Seawright from a low-level employee who may be required to sign an arbitration agreement precisely at the time that he or she is most willing to sign anything just to get a job. Cooper, 367 F.3d at 504 (citing Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F.Supp.2d 771, 780 & n. 8 (M.D.Tenn.2002)). For the forgoing reasons we find that Seawright entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate.
In addition to Seawright's four arguments that the agreement is unenforceable under Tennessee state contract law, she asserts a fifth argument that a federal court cannot compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA because the arbitration agreement at issue was not written as required by the FAA. The FAA provides: A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Seawright analogizes the FAA to the Statute of Frauds; however, unlike contracts that fall under the Statute of Frauds, arbitration agreements under the FAA need to be written, but not necessarily signed. [5] Fisher, 276 F.Supp.2d at 895. The agreement at issue here was written. [6] A pamphlet entitled American General Finance Company's Employee Dispute Resolution Program, was distributed via United States mail to employees. That pamphlet describes the arbitration procedures, makes it clear that the agreement is one for binding arbitration in lieu of a trial, and asserts that [s]eeking, accepting, or continuing employment with AGF means that you agree to resolve employment related claims against the company or another employee through this process instead of through the court system. J.A. 291. [7] Thus, the arbitration agreement, including the provision that continued employment would constitute acceptance, was written. This is in line with the conclusions of other circuits. In Caley v. Gulfstream Aero. Corp., 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir.2005), the Eleventh Circuit held that a similar arbitration agreement satisfied the requirement of being written: Although the employees' acceptance was by continuing their employment and was not in writing, all material terms  including the manner of acceptance  were set forth in the written [Dispute Resolution Program (DRP) ]. The DRP stated that it was a contract and constituted the entire agreement between the employee and Gulfstream as to covered claims. Ibid.; see also Medical Development Corp. v. Industrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1973) (It [is] not necessary that there be a simple integrated writing or that a party sign the writing containing the arbitration clause).