Opinion ID: 2570544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Allegedly Improper Unanimity Instruction

Text: The prosecution presented to the jury two theories of criminal liability for murder: defendant was either a direct perpetrator (i.e., he killed Uwe Durbin) or an aider and abettor (i.e., he helped one of the codefendants kill him). The trial court instructed the jury that [y]ou need not unanimously agree whether a defendant is an aider and abettor or a direct perpetrator, so long as you're convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she was one or the other. Defendant contends this instruction violated his right to heightened reliability of jury decisionmaking in capital cases as required by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution. We disagree. (11) It is well settled that, to properly convict, a jury must unanimously agree that the defendant is guilty of the statutory offense of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, but it need not decide which of several proffered theories of first degree murder liability governs the case. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 654 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392].) Thus, the jury need not decide unanimously whether a defendant was a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor, so long as it is unanimous that he was one or the other. ( People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1133 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1025 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044]; People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 918-919 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 884 P.2d 81].) Nor is such jury unanimity required as a matter of federal due process. ( Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624 [115 L.Ed.2d 555, 111 S.Ct. 2491] (plur. opn.).) Although defendant recognizes the force of these precedents, he argues these cases addressed the issue of due process only and asserts we should reach a different result under Eighth Amendment principles [d]ue to the `uniqueness' of the death penalty and the oft-mentioned requirement that capital cases require heightened reliability. (See, e.g., People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1228 [259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698] [the United States Supreme Court has frequently stated that the Eighth Amendment and evolving standards of societal decency impose a high requirement of reliability on the determination that death is the appropriate penalty in a particular case . . .].) We are unpersuaded that the absence of a unanimity requirement produces a verdict that satisfies fundamental fairness under the due process clause, yet violates evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. ( Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 101 [2 L.Ed.2d; 630, 78 S.Ct. 590]; see People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 47 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591].) In any event, undisputed evidence showed the victim died of multiple gunshot wounds and was last seen alive when defendant loaded him into his car and drove away with Phillips in the direction of the Highway 91 freeway, where the body was eventually found. Because the jury sustained the section 12022.5 allegation, it necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of the murder. Accordingly, we are confident the jury unanimously found defendant was the direct perpetrator of the killing. Any possible instructional error regarding unanimity was thus harmless under any standard.