Opinion ID: 71962
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Raised By Singletary

Text: 10 The first issue raised by Singletary is whether the district court erred in granting habeas relief based upon Grubbs's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in filing the Anders brief. We review this issue de novo since it presents a mixed question of law and fact. See Duest v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 472, 477 (11th Cir.1992). 11 Generally, an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is analyzed under the two-prong test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir.1991). The test requires a defendant to show both that (1) appellate counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See id. However, a number of courts have held that in an Anders context, where appellate counsel must submit a brief advising the court of anything in the record that is arguably meritorious, a defendant need not satisfy the prejudice prong. See, e.g., Evans v. Clarke, 868 F.2d 267, 268 (8th Cir.1989). Rather, the defendant need only show that appellate counsel was deficient in failing to comply with Anders. 12 The district court concluded that Grubbs's appellate counsel was deficient in failing to comply with Anders since her brief (1) did not advise the court of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (2) did not present other arguably meritorious claims in the manner of an advocate. See Grubbs, 892 F.Supp. at 1490-91. The district court then concluded, without requiring a showing of prejudice, that these omissions rendered appellate counsel's performance constitutionally ineffective. 13 Without deciding whether the district court was correct in not requiring a showing of prejudice, we conclude that the district court erred in concluding that Grubbs's appellate counsel's was deficient in failing to comply with Anders. 14 Grubbs's appellate counsel's failure to advise the court of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the Anders brief does not amount to deficient performance since such a claim generally is not susceptible to review on direct appeal. See Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So.2d 1377, 1384 (Fla.1987). In fact, Grubbs's counsel in this appeal stated at oral argument that he could not find any Florida cases in which counsel raised an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on direct appeal. The absence of any such case likely is due to the fact that defendants can raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in a motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850, which has been recognized as a more effective remedy for such claims than direct appeal since the resolution of a Rule 3.850 motion, unlike a direct appeal, allows for a full evidentiary hearing. See id. 1 Grubbs's appellate counsel cannot be faulted for preserving the more effective remedy and eschewing the less effective. Id. 15 Similarly, the way in which counsel crafted her Anders brief did not in our view constitute constitutionally deficient performance. The brief contained a thorough statement of facts and four arguably meritorious claims with accompanying relevant authority. Although the brief may have only marginally complied with Anders, it nonetheless complied. We conclude, therefore, that the district court erred in granting Grubbs relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to comply with Anders. 16 The second issue raised by Singletary is whether the district court erred in effectively concluding that Grubbs's claim that the Second District Court of Appeal did not follow Anders was not procedurally defaulted. We review this issue de novo. See Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206, 210 (11th Cir.1993). 17 Federal courts may not grant relief on claims that have not been presented in state court if the state court would have found the claims to be procedurally defaulted, unless the petitioner is able to show both cause for the default and prejudice resulting therefrom. See id. The district court did not determine whether Grubbs's claim that the Second District Court of Appeal did not follow Anders was procedurally defaulted. Instead, it merely concluded that the claim was effectively linked to Grubbs's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel since both involved the procedural requirements of Anders. 18 This conclusion erroneously sidesteps the important issue of procedural default. Had the district court addressed the issue, it likely would have concluded, as we conclude, that Grubbs procedurally defaulted his claim since he did not raise it in the state courts and would be procedurally barred from doing so in a second or successive motion or petition. See Johnson v. Singletary, 647 So.2d 106, 109 (Fla.1994)([N]ew claims [cannot] be raised in a second petition when circumstances upon which they are based were known or should have been known at the time the prior petition was filed.). Further, we conclude that Grubbs has failed to show sufficient cause to overcome the default. 19 It is unclear whether the district court's grant of relief was based to any extent on Grubbs's claim that the Second District Court of Appeal failed to comply with Anders since the district court did not make any specific findings with regard to the merits of the claim. However, if the grant of relief was based on the court's alleged failure to comply with Anders, such a grant was improper since the claim was procedurally defaulted and Grubbs did not show sufficient cause to overcome the default.