Opinion ID: 2811805
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: aggravated-role enhancement

Text: In challenging his sentence, Defendant argues that the district court erred in finding that he was an organizer or leader of the conspiracy and therefore in applying a four-level, aggravated-role enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). “A district court’s determination as to a defendant’s role in the offense is a finding of fact subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review.” United States v. Yates, 990 F.2d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding of facts at sentencing reviewed for clear error). A clear error is one that gives this Court the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. Any contested fact relied upon in sentencing a defendant must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence standard, which requires “reliable and specific evidence.” United States v. Bernardine, 73 F.3d 1078, 1080 (11th Cir. 1996). A party’s mere factual assertion 11 Case: 14-10746 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 12 of 26 does not constitute reliable, specific evidence unless those facts have been admitted. United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2013.) Although we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, “[w]hether a particular provision of the guidelines applies to a given set of facts is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Yates, 990 F.2d at 1182 (citing United States v. Kirkland, 985 F.2d 535, 537 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1249 (11th Cir. 2008) (questions of law, including the application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, reviewed de novo). Under the Guidelines, the court is instructed that “[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase [the offense level] by 4 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). For that enhancement to apply, we require “evidence that the defendant exerted some control, influence or decision-making authority over another participant in the criminal activity.” United States v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 2009); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.2) (“the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants”). With regard to the applicability of § 3B1.1 in this case, the extensiveness of the criminal organization is not contested. Rather, the key legal questions are (1) 12 Case: 14-10746 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 13 of 26 what suffices to make a person a leader and (2) when can someone who helps a conspirator be deemed a participant. On the first point, Factors the court should consider include the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4). On the second point, “[a] ‘participant’ is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted. A person who is not criminally responsible for the commission of the offense . . . is not a participant.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.1). The commentary gives as an example of a non-participant “an undercover law enforcement officer.” Id. Initially, the Presentence Investigative Report (“PSR”) prepared by the Probation Office had not recommended that Defendant be considered a leader in the conspiracy. But after the Government’s objections to the absence of a role enhancement, the probation officer revised the PSR to recommend the four-level enhancement for aggravating role. This revised PSR provided general information concluding that Defendant exercised a supervisory role over other participants in the cocaine trafficking conspiracy because he hired crew for the vessels and coordinated their activities and because he directed Abreu to purchase engines that 13 Case: 14-10746 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 14 of 26 would be used on one of the vessels.3 From the outset, Defendant contested the Government’s characterization of him as a leader in the conspiracy: first in the change-of-plea hearing; then in response to the Government’s objections to the original PSR’s lack of a leadership enhancement; then in response to the revised PSR that included the enhancement; and finally at the sentencing hearing. As noted, imposition of the leadership enhancement is based on Defendants’ interaction with (1) the vessel crews and (2) with Abreu. Because those relationships are factually discrete and raise different legal issues, we discuss them separately.
As to the August 2012 shipment (which was indicted in the District of Puerto Rico), the Government stated that recordings made of Defendant’s conversations indicate that he had supplied the vessel used in that shipment, had supplied telephones to the crew of the vessel, and had communicated with the crew 3 The revised PSR’s full description of Defendant’s role states: Jose Diaz-Rosado organized the shipment of kilogram quantities of cocaine from South America Venezuela [sic], through the Caribbean, with either the Dominican Republic or Puerto Rico as the final destination. According to the Government, the defendant hired and supervised the crew members of the vessels, staged the vessels, and coordinated and supervised the maritime transfer of cocaine and its ultimate off-loading onto land. Additionally, the defendant also directed the cooperating individual to purchase engines for a vessel. Diaz-Rosado is responsible for 2,189 kilograms of cocaine and his role as an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants, or which was otherwise extensive, warrants a four-level enhancement, pursuant to § 3B1.1(a).3 14 Case: 14-10746 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 15 of 26 to coordinate their activities with others “higher up in the food chain.” As for the December 2012 shipment that gave rise to the offense of conviction in the present case, the Government stated that Defendant had performed similar supply and oversight duties, and had even helped recruit the crew in the Dominican Republic. At the sentencing hearing, Defendant denied that he had in any way supervised the two crewmen involved in the August seizure, but he did not want to comment further, given that the indictment charging this transaction was still pending in Puerto Rico. As to any leadership role with respect to the two crewmen involved in the December seizure, he disputed that characterization and cited evidence to support his position that he did not fit the crewmen’s description of the man who had hired them. 4 Defendant also stated that his communications with other participants in the conspiracy had been limited to relaying information between them. Because Defendant disputed the facts articulated by the Government in support of the requested enhancement, it became the Government’s burden at sentencing to prove those facts by a preponderance of the evidence. See Martinez, 584 F.3d at 1027 (“[O]nce a defendant objects to a fact contained in the PS[R], the government bears the burden of proving that disputed fact by a preponderance of the evidence.”) The district court recognized this to be the case with these 4 The crewmen had reported that they were hired by a much younger Dominican man and their description of this Dominican’s hair did not match Defendant. 15 Case: 14-10746 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 16 of 26 objected-to facts and seemingly acknowledged the thinness of the Government’s evidence, stating at one point, “The Eleventh Circuit is going to say, where’s the beef?” Although the Government offered to put on audio recordings to support its allegations about Defendant’s conduct toward Abreu, it never offered to do the same with regard to the crew. This is despite the fact that the PSR states that the Government had audio recordings that proved that Defendant exercised leadership over the crew. Instead, from the sentencing transcript, it seems apparent that the Government had decided to focus on Defendant’s interaction with Abreu in its efforts to prove that Defendant had exercised leadership authority during the conspiracy. In short, despite Defendant’s clear denial of the accuracy of allegations about his conduct toward the crewmen, the Government failed to provide the necessary evidence to prove those allegations. It is true that Defendant did admit to certain conduct involving the crewmen, but none of it is sufficient for § 3B1.1 purposes. Specifically, the Government cites Defendant’s admission that he helped the December 2012 crewmen put the vessel in the water, provided them with phones, and passed messages between them and others during the operation. But there is nothing in these facts that suggests a leadership role. Section 3B1.1 “requires the exercise of some authority in the organization.” United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1198 (11th Cir. 2006). None of the admitted conduct reveals such authority. In Martinez, another 16 Case: 14-10746 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 17 of 26 drug-trafficking case, we held that the facts that the defendant “orchestrated” shipments of drugs and “utilized other individuals” in the process were “not enough” to establish his leadership role for § 3B1.1 purposes. 584 F.3d at 102728. Much the same is true here. In the end, the sentencing transcript reveals that the district court accepted as proven the Government’s allegations and statements in the PSR5 regarding Defendant’s role vis a vis the crewmen. But no evidence, much less a preponderance of the evidence, supported the existence of actions by Defendant that could have given rise to the § 3B1.1 enhancement. Without any evidence from the Government to support Defendant’s leadership role over the crewmen, the court therefore erred in finding that the conduct alleged in the probation officer’s response had been proved. See Yates, 990 F.2d at 1182 (reversing district court where there was “no evidence that [the defendant] had any control over [the] organization”). That leaves only the conduct relating to Abreu.
The PSR also states that Defendant supervised Abreu. Abreu, who had become acquainted with Defendant through the latter’s Latin music promotion business, informed law enforcement officers in early 2013 that Defendant was part 5 Paragraphs 4 to 15 of the PSR, insofar as they allege leadership conduct, allege that conduct solely in relation to Abreu. The probation officer’s response states that the Government claims to have audio recordings of Diaz instructing the four crewmen involved in the two vessel seizures. 17 Case: 14-10746 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 18 of 26 of a drug-trafficking organization. Abreu had learned of Defendant’s illegal activity after he, at Defendant’s request, registered under his own business’ name a vessel owned by Defendant and also purchased outboard motors for another of Defendant’s vessels. When the latter boat was interdicted and seized in December of 2012, Defendant then contacted Abreu, informed him of what had happened, and advised him “not to say anything” if contacted by law enforcement. Rather than follow Defendant’s advice, Abreu went to law enforcement authorities and began working as an informant. As an informant, Abreu communicated with Defendant and was again instructed by him to deny that they knew each other, should he be approached by law enforcement. Defendant also offered to involve Abreu in further cocaine-trafficking activities. At the sentencing hearing, the Government reiterated the allegations in ¶¶ 4- 15 of the PSR. To the extent those paragraphs pertain to Abreu, Defendant had previously admitted most of the conduct. 6 The Government called a witness, Drug Enforcement Agency Special Agent Jesse Ricks (“Agent Ricks”), to testify about the conduct alleged in ¶ 14, the essence of which was that Defendant “repeatedly lied to law enforcement.” But this allegation supported the enhancement for 6 Defendant did object to some details of those allegations at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, Defendant initially objected to ¶¶ 8, 10, 12, and 14 of the PSR. The objection to ¶ 8 was minor, as Defendant only contested the statement that the two outboard motors Abreu purchased were “for another boat [Defendant] had previously purchased.”6 He eventually withdrew his objections to ¶¶ 10 and 12, both of which pertained to his meetings with Abreu. 18 Case: 14-10746 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 19 of 26 obstruction of justice, and based on Agent Ricks’ testimony about Defendant’s misstatements to interviewing officers, the court accepted as proved the conduct in ¶ 14 and applied the enhancement for obstruction of justice. For his part, as to any role enhancement based on his interaction with Abreu, Defendant emphasized that Abreu was not part of the criminal conspiracy, pointing out that Abreu had initially been told that the vessels were being used as part of a music promotion, “to entertain artists and their family members.” Defendant also cited the Government’s similar position in the grand jury proceedings that Abreu “was an innocent third party.” The Government did not rebut Defendant’s argument on this point. Further, as the PSR itself makes clear, Abreu contacted law enforcement as soon as Defendant told him about the conspiracy. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the Government had met its burden of proof in establishing the conduct alleged in the PSR in support of the role enhancement, and it applied the leadership enhancement. We, however, find insufficient the evidence in support of that enhancement. As Defendant correctly notes, before attempting to figure out whether Defendant had supervised Abreu as to requested tasks, one must first determine whether Abreu was a criminal participant at the time. Abreu cannot be considered a participant because the Government has nowhere alleged any criminal responsibility on Abreu’s part. At sentencing, the Government did point out that 19 Case: 14-10746 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 20 of 26 Defendant gave directions to Abreu prior to Abreu becoming an informant. Yet, the Government still did not contend that any of Abreu’s actions at this earlier time made him responsible for any crime. Cf. United States v. Dyer, 910 F.2d 530, 533 (8th Cir. 1990) (government informant could be counted as a participant because he criminally participated in the drug conspiracy prior to becoming an informant). As we explained in Williams, neither unethical conduct nor involvement with an extensive criminal organization suffices for the enhancement, absent criminal responsibility. 527 F.3d at 1249 (citing Yates, 990 F.2d at 1182). Without alleging, much less proving, that Abreu’s conduct made him in any way criminally responsible, the Government provided the district court with no foundation upon which to consider Abreu a participant for purposes of § 3B1.1. As a last-ditch argument on appeal, the Government concedes that if Abreu cannot be a participant for § 3B1.1 purposes, Defendant’s conduct toward him still proves his organizational leadership “because they show his efforts to direct the conduct of another in order to prevent the detection of the smuggling operation.” But that argument runs directly against Martinez’s requirement of “evidence that the defendant exerted some control, influence or decision-making authority over another participant in the criminal activity.” Martinez, 584 F.3d at 1026 (emphasis added); see also U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.2) (“the defendant must 20 Case: 14-10746 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 21 of 26 have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants”) (emphasis added). Thus, that argument fails. In summary, because no evidence was provided to support Defendant’s leadership role with respect to the four crewmen and because Abreu cannot be considered a participant, we conclude that the district court erred in applying the § 3B1.1(a) enhancement to Defendant’s offense level. We therefore VACATE Defendant’s sentence and REMAND to the district court for resentencing without the leadership enhancement. See United States v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2009) (“remand for further findings is inappropriate when the issue was before the court and the parties had an opportunity to introduce relevant evidence”) (citing United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 399 n.11 (4th Cir. 2000).