Opinion ID: 1154947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: content-based regulation of speech

Text: [5, 6] The respondents here argue that even if RCW 9A.36.080(1) applies facially to criminal conduct, it operates only where bigoted thought is present. Since punishment is enhanced only in these circumstances, they reason that the statute effectively punishes bigoted thought. Even if we were to agree with the respondents that enhancement statutes punish bigoted thought, RCW 9A.36.080(1) would still withstand constitutional scrutiny under R.A.V. Noting that content discrimination among various instances of a class of proscribable speech often does not pose [a] threat, Justice Scalia found three exceptions to the prohibition against content discrimination. R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2545. The first exception in R.A.V. is where the basis for the content discrimination consists of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable. R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2545. The examples the Court gave for this exception were (1) prohibitions against only that obscenity which is most offensive in its prurience, (2) threats of violence directed against the President, and (3) regulation of price advertising in only one industry because, in the State's view, the risk of fraud is greater in that industry. R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2546. In accord with this exception, RCW 9A.36.080(1) punishes defendants who act with an even more depraved intent, an intent to target a crime victim because of that person's protected status. The resulting harm is greater than the harm caused by that same conduct absent the special animus underlying hate crimes. The greater harm of such acts justifies the increased punishment. Hate crimes are undeniably more damaging than their content-neutral counterparts. In adopting the malicious harassment statute, the Washington Legislature found that: In recent months incidents of violence and intimidation based on racial or ethnic bias have increased throughout the state. Existing law protects minorities against discrimination in the areas of employment, public accommodation, credit, insurance and real estate transactions; the criminal code addresses assaultive conduct and malicious mischief. However, no current law provides criminal sanctions or civil redress for threats or vicious acts which are racially motivated. Such a law is believed necessary to prevent confrontations and to protect civil rights of all citizens. 1981 Final Legislative Report 155. Moreover, there are other instances in the criminal code where the Legislature has similarly enhanced penalties for targeting a victim based on the victim's status. For example, threats against the Governor are prohibited, RCW 9A.36.090, likewise, intimidating witnesses, RCW 9A.72.110, jurors, RCW 9A.72.130, and judges, RCW 9A.72.160. When criminal conduct is aimed at individuals because of their particular status, the State may legitimately conclude that there is greater harm justifying greater punishment. RCW 9A.36.080 also conforms with the second R.A.V. exception which permits inadvertent content regulation, i.e., where the content is not the object of the regulation. St. Paul had argued in the juvenile court that [t]he burning of a cross does express a message and it is, in fact, the content of that message which the St. Paul Ordinance attempts to legislate. R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2548. Unlike the St. Paul statute, RCW 9A.36.080 is not concerned with the listener's reactions to speech. As with Title VII, RCW 9A.36.080(1) is concerned with the additional harm to the victim of a hate crime and that crime's effect on society as a whole. If the conduct in question can be characterized as speech, RCW 9A.36.080 is concerned only with its secondary effects. As the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington points out in its amicus brief, a malicious harassment statute is a public necessity. Brief of Amicus Curiae, at 15. Experience shows that threats of violence based on personal characteristics or group identity cause deep individual and societal harm and that they diminish, rather than enhance, the exchange of ideas in a free society. Brief of Amicus Curiae, at 15. Scholars agree with the proposition that hate crimes carry harmful secondary effects. Gellman writes that: When attacks are made on one group, members of other disempowered groups may feel threatened as well: a rash of attacks on African Americans by a racist group may well create apprehension among Asians, Jews, gays, or Hispanics in the neighborhood.... Majority group members may feel both relief that they are not targets of such attacks, and fear of victimization should they come to be viewed as minority sympathizers. Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 333, 342 (1991-1992); see also Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 133 (1982-1983). RCW 9A.36.080(1) also falls under the third exception for content regulations of speech that present virtually no danger of eroding First Amendment rights. See R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2547. Where the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy. R.A.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2546-47. The express language of subsection (1)(b) protects such discriminatory ideas and philosophies where they are not combined with criminal acts. Finally, respondents urge this court to follow the reasoning adopted by the Wisconsin and Ohio courts which have held that while punishment of intent is appropriate, statutes cannot constitutionally punish motive. While we concede that there may be a distinction between intent and motive, we are persuaded that in this context it is a distinction without a difference. While the State must prove that the defendant selected a victim because of perceived membership in a specified group, it is not required to establish the motive underlying that choice. As discussed earlier, RCW 9A.36.080 punishes the intentional act of discrimination, not the motive underlying the act. [7] Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that, where evidence of racial intolerance is relevant to the issues, the constitution does not prohibit such evidence simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment. Dawson v. Delaware, ___ U.S. ___, 117 L. Ed.2d 309, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1097 (1992). See also Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. at 2200.