Opinion ID: 1257044
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: emmette spraker

Text: Appellant contends that the candidacy of respondent Spraker was invalid because he was seeking the office of Clerk of the District Court while he was still a County Commissioner. She cites Article 8 of the Organic Act of the Territory of Idaho, which provides: Members of legislature  Restrictions on holding other public office.  No member of the legislative assembly shall hold or be appointed to any office which shall have been created, or the salary or emoluments of which shall have been increased, while he was a member, during the term for which he was elected, and for one year after the expiration of such term; but this restriction shall not be applicable to members of the first legislative assembly; and no person holding a commission or appointment under the United States, except postmasters, shall be a member of the legislative assembly, or shall hold any office under the government of said territory. Appellant then reasons that at the time Section 8 was enacted, the territory of Idaho had no counties; that when counties were later formed, county commissioners were delegated some of the powers formerly exercised by the legislative assembly, including the power to fix the salary of the clerk of the district court, and hence the prohibition set forth in the foregoing Section 8 thus applies to county commissioners. Appellant then points out that in the first year of Spraker's latest term of office as a county commissioner, he was instrumental in having the commissioners approve a sizeable salary increase for the clerk of the district court. Respondent Spraker in turn points out that Section 8 of the Organic Act, supra, was not included in the Idaho Constitution, which however, does provide in Article 21, § 2: All laws now in force in the territory of Idaho which are not repugnant to this Constitution shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitation or be altered or repealed by the legislature. Even assuming that Section 8, supra, did not expire by its own limitation, and further assuming appellant's ingenious extension of that section to apply to county commissioners to be valid, it is our conclusion that the district court correctly determined that the legislature intended to repeal that section by enactment of subsequent legislation covering the same subject. Idaho Const. Art. 21, § 2. In 1907 the legislature enacted what is now I.C. § 59-102, which prohibits members of the state legislature from being appointed to an office created when said legislator was holding legislative office, under penalty of being found guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to fine in an amount not less that $500 nor more than $5,000. Counties, of course, existed at the time of enactment of I.C. § 59-102, which dealt with the same evil as Section 8 of the Organic Act, although in a somewhat different manner. This evidences an intent to repeal Section 8, if it were still in existence. In 1952, in Extraordinary Session, the legislature enacted an act designated the Idaho Motor Vehicle Reciprocity Act which, among other things by I.C. § 49-210, provided that the provisions of I.C. § 59-102 shall have no application to the provisions of this act   . In 1965 the legislature enacted I.C. § 67-4221, pertaining to the Park Board and its membership, appointment and terms of members thereof. Subdivision (f) of I.C. § 67-4221 exempted the provisions of that section from the provisions of I.C. § 59-102. Had Section 8 of the Organic Act remained in force during 1952 and 1965, the specific exemptions from the operation of I.C. § 59-102, as contained in I.C. § 49-210 and § 67-4221, would be meaningless. It is our conclusion that even if enactment of I.C. § 59-102, did not effectively repeal the provisions of Section 8 of the Organic Act pursuant to Idaho Const. Art. 21, § 2, it was accomplished by the enactment of the two exemption provisions above mentioned. Repeals by implication are not favored; but if inconsistency is found to exist between the earlier and the later enactments, such that the legislature could not have intended the two statutes to be contemporaneously operative, it will be implied that the legislature intended to repeal the earlier by the later enactment. (Citations omitted.) State v. Davidson, 78 Idaho 553, 559, 309 P.2d 211, 215 (1957). Appellant also contends that Spraker was ineligible to run for the office of clerk of the district court because he was not a qualified elector. However, Idaho Const. Art. 6, § 2, states: Except as in this article otherwise provided, every male or female citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old, who has actually resided in this state or territory for six months, and in the county where he or she offers to vote, thirty days next preceding the day of election, if registered as provided by law, is a qualified elector;   . Appellant does not point out any provisions of the constitution which would disqualify Spraker as an elector, nor any facts which reflect any disqualification. I.C. § 34-605 provides in part: Any person legally qualified to hold    office is entitled to become a candidate for office,   . And I.C. § 59-101 provides: Every qualified elector shall be eligible to hold any office of this state for which he is an elector, except as otherwise provided by the constitution. Appellant has failed to point to any additional qualifications required by the legislature, and hence we must conclude that respondent Spraker was not disqualified from running for office on the ground that he was not a qualified elector. It is true that Spraker could not simultaneously hold both the office of county commissioner and clerk of the district court. Technically, therefore, at the time he ran for the office of clerk of the district court he was ineligible to hold that office; but his term of office as county commissioner expired before commencement of his term of office as clerk of the district court. Under Idaho law, a candidate may be elected to an office while under disqualification, provided such disqualification can be and is removed before the new term of office begins. Bradfield v. Avery, 16 Idaho 769, 102 P. 687, 23 L.R.A.,N.S., 1228 (1909). It is only where the disqualification cannot be cured or where the constitution or statutory provision clearly shows an intent that a person be disqualified from seeking election that candidacy or election can be invalidated on the grounds of ineligibility. Bradfield v. Avery, supra, 16 Idaho at 774-776, 102 P. 687, 689.   . The word `eligibility' as used in connection with an office or the person to be elected to fill an office has been variously defined by the courts and various constructions given to the use of such word with reference to whether the same applies to the election to office or the induction into office. The authorities upon both sides of this question are cited in 29 Cyc. 1376, and 10 Ency. of Law, pp. 970, 971. We are satisfied that the better reason is with the proposition that where the word `eligibility' is used in connection with an office, and there are no explanatory words indicating that such word is used with reference to the time of election, it has reference to the qualification to hold the office rather than the qualification to be elected to the office. (Citations omitted.) 16 Idaho at 774, 102 P. at 689. We conclude that respondent Spraker's candidacy was valid, and that I.C. § 34-2001 which authorized the contest of an election of any person to public office on the ground: 2. When the incumbent was not eligible to the office at the time of the election, is of no avail to appellant.