Opinion ID: 780283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantive Issue Regarding Wiretap Application Evidence

Text: The federal wiretap statute was first enacted as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212-223, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 374 (8th Cir.1994). The law has dual purposes, `(1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized.' Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968-2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153). The statute broadly prohibits wiretaps [e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). The federal statutes governing wiretap applications clearly require that such applications must be authorized by the Attorney General or other such designated authority specifically enumerated in the statute. Id. at § 2516(1). All wiretap applications must identify the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application, and the designated Attorney General representative authorizing the application. Id. at § 2518(1)(a). According to the statutory scheme, the court may suppress evidence acquired through wiretapping, upon motion of [a]ny aggrieved person if (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval. Id. at § 2518(10)(a). Noncompliance with the statutory provisions governing the application procedure are contemplated by the relief available for aggrieved persons under the statute. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (explaining that § 2518(10)(a)(i) provides for suppression of evidence directly or indirectly obtained in violation of the pre-approval provisions of the chapter and that these provisions were intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme and thus violation thereof amounts to the unlawful interception of wire and oral communications). Determining whether suppression is warranted in a particular case requires an examination as to whether the statutory requirement violated (here, the failure to identify the applicant's authority to make the application) occupies a central, or even functional, role in guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 578, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380 (1974). Suppression is required under § 2518(10)(a)(i) & (ii) [4] only for failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527, 94 S.Ct. 1820 (holding, in part, that suppression under § 2518(10)(a)(i) for unlawfully intercepted communications includes constitutional violations as well as failure to satisfy certain statutory requirements); see also Moore, 41 F.3d at 375 (analyzing whether a facial insufficiency violated a core statutory requirement in a § 2518(10)(a)(ii) case). Suppression is not justified if the facial insufficiency of the wiretap order is no more than a technical defect. Moore, 41 F.3d at 374. According to Moore, our analysis is two-tiered, first identifying the omission or defect at issue (i.e., whether the challenged document is insufficient on its face), and second, determining whether that defect violates a core statutory requirement or whether it is a mere technical defect not warranting suppression. Id. at 375. The government asserts that the boilerplate statement in the wiretap application itself that an appropriate official of the Criminal Division had given authorization, fulfilled the statutory purpose  that just by saying someone authorized by the Attorney General had signed off on it, the issuing judge was made aware that the central role in guarding against the unwarranted use of wiretapping had been fulfilled. So, argues the government, the failure to attach the actual authorizing documents was merely a technical defect. The district court disagreed, holding that omitting these documents could not be a mere technical defect because correct authorization and proof thereof is the center of the whole statutory scheme limiting the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device. In Giordano, the Supreme Court stated it was confident that the provision for pre-application approval was intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme and that suppression must follow when it is shown that this statutory requirement has been ignored. 416 U.S. at 528, 94 S.Ct. 1820. In Giordano, the Court suppressed evidence when it became apparent that at the time the wiretap applications were made, the application erroneously purported to have been authorized by a specially designated Assistant Attorney General. Id. at 509, 529, 94 S.Ct. 1820. Later, however, it developed that the first wiretap application had not in fact been authorized by a specially designated individual, but rather the Attorney General's Executive Assistant, an individual not statutorily authorized to do so. Id. at 510, 94 S.Ct. 1820. Because the officer approving the application had been misidentified, the motion to suppress was granted under § 2518(10)(a)(i) as to evidence obtained from the execution of the first wiretap and any wiretap thereafter that relied upon the first faulty application. Id. at 533, 94 S.Ct. 1820. Later, in Chavez, the Court again visited this issue. There, the Court held that suppression was not necessary where the Attorney General had actually authorized the challenged wiretap but the application incorrectly identified the Assistant Attorney General (a potential, statutorily designated official that could have been designated by the Attorney General) as the authorizing official. 416 U.S. at 568-69, 94 S.Ct. 1849. The Court acknowledged the facial sufficiency of the wiretap application because it clearly identified on its face the name of the authorizing Assistant Attorney General. Id. at 573-74, 94 S.Ct. 1849. Stated differently, the application in Chavez stated that a specifically named, statutorily designated official actually gave the authorization. In light of Chavez, the government's argument that the statement on the application itself that the appropriate approval had been received carries some weight. The critical difference is, however, that in Chavez, the face of the application included the name of the specific individual that had purportedly authorized the application whereas the application in this case just states generically that an appropriate official of the Criminal Division had authorized the application. Id. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 1849. Unlike Chavez, one cannot tell from the face of the application at issue here exactly who the authorizing individual was, just generically that authorization was received, which does not allow the authorizing judge to issue an interception order with the knowledge contemplated by Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a) (requiring that each application include the identity of the officer authorizing the application). The Eighth Circuit has likewise weighed in on this matter. In Moore, the defendant challenged a wiretap application that had been approved by the judge, and although the judge thought he signed the application order, there was no signature by the judge on the order. 41 F.3d at 373. There, we denied the motion to suppress, determining that the absence of the judge's signature was only a technical defect. Id. at 375-76. The court held that the requirement of judicial approval is obviously at the core of the congressional purpose underlying the statute, but noted that written approval was not actually required. Id. And, there was testimony from the authorizing judge that he indeed approved the application and fully intended to sign it. Id. In fact, the judge testified that he found sufficient probable cause to issue the order and believed he had signed the order along with all of the other original papers presented to him for his signature at the time of the application. Id. at 372-73. On those facts, the absence of the judge's signature did not reflect a violation of any underlying statutory requirement. Id. at 375. Moore is thus inapposite to the issue uniquely presented here. The application in the instant case is insufficient on its face, as it does not comport with the § 2518(1)(a) requirement. And despite the government's arguments to the contrary, the omission here is not technical as has been determined in other cases. See United States v. Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1160-63 (10th Cir. 2003) (denying suppression because even though the name of the authorizing official was omitted from the wiretap order, there was no dispute that the applications identified the appropriate DOJ individual); United States v. Fudge, 325 F.3d 910, 917-18 (7th Cir.2003) (denying suppression even though the order granting the wiretap application did not specifically identify the authorizing DOJ official because attached to the application were two letters specifying the approval and authorization, along with an affidavit supporting the same). By way of this statutory scheme, Congress intended: not only to limit resort to wiretapping to certain crimes and situations where probable cause is present but also to condition the use of intercept procedures upon the judgment of a senior official in the Department of Justice that the situation is one of those warranting their use. It is reasonable to believe that such a precondition would inevitably foreclose resort to wiretapping in various situations where investigative personnel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court and the court would very likely authorize its use. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527-28, 94 S.Ct. 1820. The authorizing judge in the instant case had no way of knowing the name of the actual, statutorily designated official that had indeed authorized the application even though the application states as much in general terms  one of the core components of this legislation. And, the government offered no evidence (such as was received in other cases) that the judge indeed knew the identity of the appropriate authorizing official, or that the name of the statutorily designated official was otherwise disclosed. Such evidence would have demonstrated compliance with all the fundamental statutory safeguards that protect against unauthorized or unwarranted wiretap surveillance. [5] See Moore, 41 F.3d at 375 n. 2 (justifying a determination that an omission was a mere technicality by focusing on the relevant perspective of the parties to the events, where all present, including the judge, proceeded as if the judge had signed the order as he fully intended, thus Congress's purpose in requiring judicial approval was substantially fulfilled). Despite the fact that the government intended and may very well have thought the appropriate authorizing documents were attached to the application, they were not, and there is nothing in the record to give us reason to believe that the judge authorizing the wiretap  the person for whose benefit the statutory requirement is written  knew that the requisite authority was obtained. It was not until the magistrate judge conducted the supplemental hearing in the instant case that the government offered the supporting documents. Given the congressional intent to strictly limit the use of this electronic interception, failing to include the name of the authorizing official, and failing to include the documents that could have easily established confirmation or proof of such authorization, was not a minor, or merely technical, defect. [6] We therefore affirm the district court's suppression order on this basis.