Opinion ID: 8065924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: 1. Standard of Care [4] To prevail on a claim for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove (1) the attorney’s employment, (2) the attorney’s neglect of a reasonable duty, and (3) that such negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to the client. 5 The parties do not dispute that Snyder was a licensed attorney practicing in the State of Nebraska, nor do they dispute that Snyder was hired by appellants to assist in the renewal of their liquor licenses for the 2017‑18 year. Thus, we focus on whether Snyder neglected a reasonable duty. [5] In a legal malpractice action, the required standard of conduct or general rule regarding an attorney’s reasonable duty to his or her client is that the attorney, by accepting employment to give legal advice or to render other legal services, impliedly agrees to exercise such skill, diligence, and knowledge as that commonly possessed by attorneys acting in similar circumstances. 6 (a) Questions of Law and Questions of Fact Appellants assign that the district court erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment and finding that 3 Ecker v. E & A Consulting Group, 302 Neb. 578, 924 N.W.2d 671 (2019). 4 State v. Jackson, 296 Neb. 31, 892 N.W.2d 67 (2017). 5 See Young v. Govier & Milone, 286 Neb. 224, 835 N.W.2d 684 (2013). 6 See Boyle v. Welsh, 256 Neb. 118, 589 N.W.2d 118 (1999). See, also, Wolski v. Wandel, 275 Neb. 266, 746 N.W.2d 143 (2008); Bellino v. McGrath North, 274 Neb. 130, 738 N.W.2d 434 (2007). - 214 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 312 Nebraska Reports KOZAL V. SNYDER Cite as 312 Neb. 208 appellees did not breach the applicable standard of care as a matter of law. Appellants further assert that the district court erroneously engaged in an analysis of both questions of law and questions of fact, ultimately drawing conclusions of fact that it was not authorized to make. [6] In Guinn v. Murray, this court previously clarified what issues in a legal malpractice action are questions of law for the court and what issues are questions of fact for the fact finder. 7 To the extent there is an issue as to what the law was and whether the attorney correctly advised on such law is a question of law for the court. 8 If the court decides that an attorney’s conduct or advice did not comport with the substance of the law at the time it was given, then whether the attorney’s specific conduct in that particular case fell below what the attorney’s specific conduct should have been is a question of fact. 9 Said differently, it is a question of fact whether the attorney’s conduct, under the particular circumstances of the case, was such that the attorney exercised the same skill, diligence, and knowledge as that commonly possessed by attorneys acting in similar circumstances. 10 Accordingly, whether Snyder’s conduct or advice was in conformity with the law at the time it was given is a legal question for the court. If Snyder’s conduct or advice was not in conformity with the law, then the question of whether such conduct or advice was negligent is a fact issue for the jury. If Snyder’s conduct or advice was not erroneous as a matter of law, further analysis regarding the factual determination of whether Snyder’s conduct was negligent is unnecessary. (b) Unsettled Area of Law [7] In order to determine whether an attorney’s conduct was in conformity with the law, the court may consider whether 7 See Guinn v. Murray, supra note 2. 8 Id. 9 Id. 10 See, id.; Wolski v. Wandel, supra note 6. - 215 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 312 Nebraska Reports KOZAL V. SNYDER Cite as 312 Neb. 208 the issue was previously unsettled. In Wood v. McGrath, North, 11 we stated that an attorney is not liable for an error in judgment on a point of law which has not been settled by an appellate court and on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well‑informed lawyers, because an attorney has no duty to accurately predict the future course of unsettled law. This immunity rule encourages practicing attorneys in this state to predict, in a professional manner, the outcome of legal issues relevant to their clients’ cases. 12 Hence, if the law regarding citizen objectors as parties to an appeal was unsettled in Nebraska or a matter of first impression, then Snyder’s judgment on the matter would be immune from suit. Appellants contend that the district court should have concluded that Snyder was professionally negligent as a matter of law because Snyder admitted he did not name the citizen objectors as parties on appeal, and appellants further contend that the issue of naming citizen objectors was a settled area of law. By contrast, appellees contend, and the district court found, that this was an unsettled, complicated issue of first impression. A review of the record indicates that the law regarding citizen objectors in this context was indeed unsettled. In Kozal I, 13 we noted that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 14 specifically § 84‑917, requires that a petitioner name all “parties of record” in the agency proceedings as parties to the proceeding for review. Because the APA did not provide guidance for when a nonagency party is a “party of record,” we next looked in Kozal I to the Nebraska Liquor Control Act (NLCA). 15 11 Wood v. McGrath, North, 256 Neb. 109, 589 N.W.2d 103 (1999). 12 Id. 13 Kozal I, supra note 1. 14 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 84‑901 to 84‑920 (Reissue 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2016). 15 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 53‑101 to 53‑1,122 (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2016). - 216 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 312 Nebraska Reports KOZAL V. SNYDER Cite as 312 Neb. 208 The NLCA, in § 53‑1,115, defines which parties qualify as “part[ies] of record” in the NLCC proceedings, but includes limiting language, “[f]or purposes of this section.” 16 To determine whether the Legislature intended to specifically limit its definition of parties of record to § 53‑1,115(4), we looked to the legislative history surrounding the NLCA and APA. 17 In Kozal I, after reviewing the legislative history surrounding the NLCA and APA, we found that the definition of “party of record” had been enacted in the same bill that amended the NLCA to allow for review through the APA. Further, [t]he fact that the Legislature adopted the definition of “party of record” in § 53‑1,115(4) . . . in the very same bill in which it adopted APA review of the [NLCC’s] orders, leads to the conclusion that the definition in § 53‑1,115(4) is the controlling definition of “party of record” for purposes of APA review of the Commission’s proceedings. 18 We thereafter concluded that the citizen objectors were parties of record in the licensure proceeding before the NLCC. Because the citizen objectors were not named as parties on appeal, the retailers had not complied with the requirements for judicial review under the APA, and the district court lacked jurisdiction over the retailers’ petition for review. The district court’s order was therefore void, and this court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. We vacated the district court’s order and dismissed the appeal. [8,9] An appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words that are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 19 But when a statutory term is reasonably considered ambiguous, a court may examine the 16 See Kozal I, supra note 1. 17 See id. 18 Id. at 948, 902 N.W.2d at 155‑56. 19 In re Estate of Adelung, 306 Neb. 646, 947 N.W.2d 269 (2020). - 217 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 312 Nebraska Reports KOZAL V. SNYDER Cite as 312 Neb. 208 legislative history of the act in question to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. 20 Our decision to include a review of the legislative history, and our use of that history to interpret the meaning of statutory language and to define a party of record, indicates that the law was ambiguous and open to construction. Until this court rendered a decision in Kozal I, the issue of naming citizen objectors on appeal from NLCC decisions was unsettled. At the same time, other attorneys and judges were arriving at similar conclusions on the issue of naming citizen objectors as parties to an appeal, 21 and there were multiple cases decided prior to Snyder’s decision in which citizen objectors were not included as necessary parties to an appeal from the NLCC. 22 Consequently, Snyder is not liable for an error in judgment on a point of law which had not been settled by this court and on which reasonable doubt was entertained by well‑informed lawyers. Snyder had no duty to accurately predict the future course of unsettled law. Appellants, in support of their argument that this area of law was settled, cite to Shaffer v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & 20 Scofield v. State, 276 Neb. 215, 753 N.W.2d 345 (2008). See Bridgeport Ethanol v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 284 Neb. 291, 818 N.W.2d 600 (2012). 21 See, Candyland, LLC v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 306 Neb. 169, 944 N.W.2d 740 (2020); Retroactive, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 298 Neb. 936, 906 N.W.2d 328 (2018). 22 See, Grand Island Latin Club v. Nebraska Liq. Cont. Comm., 251 Neb. 61, 554 N.W.2d 778 (1996); B & R Stores v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 242 Neb. 763, 497 N.W.2d 654 (1993); Gas ’N Shop v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 241 Neb. 898, 492 N.W.2d 7 (1992); Gas ’N Shop v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 229 Neb. 530, 427 N.W.2d 784 (1988); Harrigfeld v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 203 Neb. 741, 280 N.W.2d 61 (1979); Joe and Al’s IGA, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 203 Neb. 176, 277 N.W.2d 693 (1979); City of Lincoln v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 9 Neb. App. 390, 612 N.W.2d 252 (2000), reversed on other grounds 261 Neb. 783, 626 N.W.2d 518 (2001). - 218 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 312 Nebraska Reports KOZAL V. SNYDER Cite as 312 Neb. 208 Human Servs. 23 In Shaffer, this court concluded that an insurance company was a party of record for purposes of the APA where, among other things, it had participated in hearings, was treated as a party, and presented evidence and arguments. Appellants conclude that Snyder therefore should have known that the citizen objectors were parties of record, because like the insurance company in Shaffer, the citizen objectors had participated in hearings and were treated as parties. We do not agree. [10] In Kozal I, this court undertook a multistep analysis wherein we concluded that citizen objectors were parties of record for purposes of the APA because citizen objectors are defined by the NLCA as “‘part[ies] of record’” in the Commission’s liquor license application proceedings and because the citizen objectors acted as and were treated as parties in the Commission’s hearing. 24 Shaffer provided support for the latter portion of the analysis, but did little to resolve the other issues presented where this court questioned the applicability of the NLCA to the APA, and so this court instead referred to legislative history. If Shaffer had indeed settled the issue, this court would likely have forgone such detailed legislative review and merely cited to Shaffer, as an appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not needed to adjudicate the controversy before it. 25 While we are required to reach a conclusion independent of the trial court’s conclusion on questions of law, we agree with the trial court’s interpretation: This was an unsettled, complicated issue of first impression. Thus, even though this court later deemed Snyder’s decision to omit the citizen objectors on appeal to be erroneous in Kozal I, Snyder’s decision was not erroneous as a matter of law at the time it was made. 23 Shaffer v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 289 Neb. 740, 857 N.W.2d 313 (2014). 24 Kozal I, supra note 1, 297 Neb. at 953, 902 N.W.2d at 158. 25 Curry v. Lewis & Clark NRD, 267 Neb. 857, 678 N.W.2d 95 (2004). - 219 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 312 Nebraska Reports KOZAL V. SNYDER Cite as 312 Neb. 208 Snyder did not err as a matter of law when he omitted the citizen objectors from the appeal of the NLCC’s decision. The district court did not err when it concluded the same. (c) Client Consent Appellants argue in the alternative that even if the issue of naming citizen objectors was an unsettled area of law, Snyder breached the applicable standard of care by failing to advise appellants of his decision to omit the citizen objectors and the risks involved with such decision. Appellees argue that the duty to inform or to discuss unsettled legal issues with a client has only been imposed in the context of settlement negotiations. Appellants cite Wood for the proposition that lawyers generally have a duty to reasonably inform their clients of the issues in their cases and allow their clients to make informed decisions. 26 Accordingly, appellants assert that Snyder’s decision to omit the citizen objectors on appeal without first consulting appellants regarding this choice was not protected by the doctrine of judgmental immunity that has been previously applied in the context of unsettled issues of law. But appellants have omitted key information from the Wood opinion which is pertinent to appellees’ argument. In Wood, we addressed an attorney’s negligence in the context of failing to inform a client of unsettled legal issues pertaining to a settlement. We discussed our holdings in Baker v. Fabian, Thielen & Thielen, 27 where we first established: [A]n attorney is not liable for an error in judgment on a point of law which has not been settled by this court and on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well‑informed lawyers. Thus, an attorney’s judgment or recommendation on an unsettled point of law is immune 26 Wood v. McGrath, North, supra note 11. 27 Baker v. Fabian, Thielen & Thielen, 254 Neb. 697, 578 N.W.2d 446 (1998). - 220 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 312 Nebraska Reports KOZAL V. SNYDER Cite as 312 Neb. 208 from suit, and the attorney has no duty to accurately predict the future course of unsettled law. 28 Applying this judgmental immunity rule from Baker in the context of settlement negotiations, we stated: If we conclude that the judgmental immunity rule applies to an attorney’s failure to inform a client of unsettled legal issues relevant to a settlement, an attorney could forgo conducting research or providing a client with information on a relevant legal issue once he or she determined that the legal issue at hand was unsettled in this state. We fail to see how this result promotes the settlement of disputes in a client’s best interests. 29 In Wood, we were tasked with determining whether to extend the Baker judgmental immunity rule to an attorney’s failure to inform a client of unsettled legal issues relevant to a settlement agreement. We concluded that the doctrine of judgmental immunity did not apply in this context, but reiterated that our decision imposed no additional duty as a matter of law to research or inform a client on unsettled legal matters, that an attorney’s ultimate recommendation in an area of unsettled law is immune from suit, and that such a result gives the client the benefit of both professional advice and the information necessary to make an informed decision whether to settle a dispute. 30 Contrary to appellants’ assertions, Wood did not create a general duty of lawyers to inform their clients of procedural or tactical decisions just because the area of law may be unsettled. Appellants have failed to provide any case law that would extend the duty to inform beyond settlement negotiations. And while the duty to inform has not yet been extended past settlement negotiations in this state, we are aware that 28 Wood v. McGrath, North, supra note 11, 256 Neb. at 113, 589 N.W.2d at 106. 29 Id. at 117, 589 N.W.2d at 108 (emphasis supplied). 30 Id. - 221 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 312 Nebraska Reports KOZAL V. SNYDER Cite as 312 Neb. 208 other jurisdictions considering the same issue are split, with some deciding that judgmental immunity should not apply to an attorney’s failure to inform their clients of the nature of the unsettled law. We are also aware that Wood, and specifically the cannon cited therein, may tend to imply the same. However, we reiterate that our holding in Wood was specifically limited to the settlement context upon contention of the parties that the law firm either did or did not have a duty to inform its client of relevant unsettled issues of law when the law firm had presented its client with a settlement. [11] Further, we find the arguments in favor of extending judgmental immunity to be persuasive. For example, in considering judgmental immunity and the duty to inform, the Florida Supreme Court stated: Attorneys cannot be placed in the position of having to accept direction from clients on intricate interpretations of the correct or current state of the law. The attorney, not the client, is the individual trained to interpret the law. . . . [A]n attorney should not be required to compromise a reasoned judgment by having to factor into the judgment the client’s reasoning on a fine point of law. 31 A California court similarly stated that an attorney who acts in good faith and exercises an honest and informed discretion is not culpable for failing to correctly anticipate the resolution of an unsettled legal principle, additionally commenting that “[t]o require the attorney to further advise a client of the uncertainty in the law would render the exercise of such professional judgment meaningless.” 32 Here, evidence in the record, as well as from our decision in Kozal I, shows that the issue of naming citizen objectors as necessary parties on appeal was unsettled. While Snyder’s decision to omit citizen objectors on appeal was later deemed 31 Crosby v. Jones, 705 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1998). 32 Davis v. Damrell, 119 Cal. App. 3d 883, 889, 174 Cal. Rptr. 257, 261 (1981). - 222 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 312 Nebraska Reports KOZAL V. SNYDER Cite as 312 Neb. 208 erroneous by this court, it was not erroneous at the time Snyder made the decision. Snyder did not have a duty to inform his clients regarding the unsettled area of law. Snyder’s conduct was therefore not erroneous as a matter of law, and this assignment of error is without merit. 2. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment In their second assignment of error, appellants assert that the district court erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment. [12] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 33 In the summary judgment context, a fact is material only if it would affect the outcome of the case. 34 Appellants focus their argument on the testimony of an expert who opined that Snyder breached the standard of care by failing to name the citizen objectors on appeal and by failing to inform appellants that he believed this issue was an unsettled area of law. However, to the extent there is an issue as to what the law was and whether an attorney correctly advised on such law is a question of law for the court rather than a question of fact. The expert’s testimony that the law was settled, that Snyder incorrectly advised on that law, and that Snyder had a duty to inform his clients of the law if he believed it was unsettled would not affect the outcome of the case and is immaterial. [13] Appellants next focus on the email received from Snyder on the day our decision in Kozal I was released. In his email, Snyder stated that the appeal was lost and that “[o]bviously, this is my fault.” But while Snyder’s email to appellants 33 Guinn v. Murray, supra note 2. 34 O’Brien v. Bellevue Public Schools, 289 Neb. 637, 856 N.W.2d 731 (2014). - 223 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 312 Nebraska Reports KOZAL V. SNYDER Cite as 312 Neb. 208 did acknowledge that his actions were the reason the appeal was lost, the email was not an admission that Snyder had breached any applicable standard of care, nor does it create a question of fact. Statements or admissions characterized as mistakes or errors do not necessarily mean that a standard of care has been violated. 35 While Snyder’s decision to omit the citizen objectors may be characterized as a mistake, his email admitting to making a mistake does not prove any breach of the standard of care, nor does it impact whether Snyder’s conduct was erroneous as a matter of law. Thus, this evidence also does not raise any issues of material fact. We conclude that appellants’ evidence opposing summary judgment was insufficient to create an issue of material fact and that thus, the district court did not err when it granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Finally, appellants assign that the district court erred in denying their motion for partial summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing disclose no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 36 But, as discussed above, Snyder’s conduct or advice was not erroneous as a matter of law; hence, appellants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Despite appellants’ assertions that the district court should have granted their motion for partial summary judgment based on the undisputed facts, appellants have failed to prove that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Conversely, Snyder was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court did not err when it granted appellees’ motion for 35 See, Fossett v. Board of Regents, 258 Neb. 703, 605 N.W.2d 465 (2000) (doctor admitted that leaving fluid in patient’s abdomen was mistake; this court found that such statement provided no insight into requisite standard of care for treating patient and did not create reasonable inference of negligence); Halligan v. Cotton, 193 Neb. 331, 227 N.W.2d 10 (1975) (doctor’s statements proved causation, but did not prove negligence). 36 Chambers v. Bringenberg, 309 Neb. 888, 963 N.W.2d 37 (2021). - 224 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 312 Nebraska Reports KOZAL V. SNYDER Cite as 312 Neb. 208 summary judgment or when it denied appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment.