Opinion ID: 616285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: APIInformational Standing

Text: In FEC v. Akins, the Supreme Court explained that a plaintiff suffers an `injury in fact' when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998); see also Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (finding that failure to obtain information subject to disclosure under Federal Advisory Committee Act constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue). Following Akins, we have recognized that a denial of access to information can work an `injury in fact' for standing purposes, at least where a statute (on the claimants' reading) requires that the information `be publicly disclosed' and there `is no reason to doubt their claim that the information would help them.' Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 306 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting Akins, 524 U.S. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 1777). Although API brought this suit under the take provision of ESA section 9, its claim to informational standing rests on section 10(c), which requires public disclosure of information contained in permit applications. Specifically, a party who applies for a permit must provide specified information to the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Service, in turn, must make that information available to the public. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(c) (The Secretary shall publish notice in the Federal Register of each application for an exemption or permit which is made under this section.... Information received by the Secretary as a part of any application shall be available to the public as a matter of public record at every stage of the proceeding.). According to API, because, under its view, Feld's treatment of elephants constitutes a take prohibited by section 9, the company cannot lawfully engage in these practices without first applying for and obtaining a permit pursuant to section 10, in which case it will have to submit the information required by that section, information which will then be available to API. This, API argues, gives it informational standing to bring this case. We disagree. For purposes of informational standing, a plaintiff is injured-in-fact ... because he did not get what the statute entitled him to receive. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 444 F.3d 614, 618 (D.C.Cir. 2006); see also Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 923 (D.C.Cir.2008) (Shays's injury in fact is the denial of information he believes the law entitles him to.). To establish such an injury, a plaintiff must espouse a view of the law under which the defendant (or an entity it regulates) is obligated to disclose certain information that the plaintiff has a right to obtain. In Akins, for example, the plaintiffs challenged the Federal Election Commission's determination that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was not a political committee as defined by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and therefore not subject to FECA's disclosure requirements. Akins, 524 U.S. at 13, 118 S.Ct. 1777. Under plaintiffs' contrary view of the lawthat AIPAC's activities rendered it a political committeeAIPAC would be required to disclose information about its donors and contributions, information that plaintiffs would have a right to obtain. See id. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (The `injury in fact' that respondents have suffered consists of their inability to obtain informationlists of AIPAC donors... and campaign-related contributions and expendituresthat, on respondents' view of the law, the statute requires that AIPAC make public.). Because of this, the Supreme Court held, plaintiffs had informational standing to challenge the agency's decision. Were plaintiffs to prevail, AIPAC would have to disclose the information they sought. Similarly, in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Commerce, the plaintiff alleged that the Department violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) reporting requirements by failing to disclose information about its meetings with the North American Competitiveness Council. 583 F.3d 871, 872-73 (D.C.Cir.2009). Much as in Akins, under the plaintiff's view of the lawthat the North American Competitiveness Council and its subgroups qualified as advisory committees under FACAthe Department would be subject to an array of FACA obligations to disclose information about its meetings. Id. at 873. Because plaintiff would have a right to this information, we held that it had standing to sue the Department for reporting violations. This case is very different. As the district court pointed out, unlike the statutes under which plaintiffs sued in Akins and Judicial Watch, nothing in section 9 gives API a right to any information. If API is correct about section 9that Feld's use of bullhooks and chains constitutes a prohibited takethen Feld would be obligated to cease those practices, but nothing in section 9, even under API's view, would entitle plaintiffs to any information. True, if Feld wished to recommence the use of bullhooks and chains, it would have to seek a section 10 permit from the Fish and Wildlife Service, and section 10(c) would then entitle API to obtain the information received by the Service as part of Feld's permit application. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(c). If at that point Feld refused to disclose information in its permit application that API believed the statute required, or if the Fish and Wildlife Service refused to make public the information it received, then API might have informational standing to bring suit for violations of section 10. Compare Found, on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 84-85 (D.C.Cir.1991) (noting, without deciding the informational standing question, that [t]he proposition that an organization's desire to supply environmental information to its members, and the consequent `injury' it suffers when the information is not forthcoming in an [environmental] impact statement, establishes standing without more also encounters the obstacle of Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)), with Friends of Animals v. Salazar, 626 F.Supp.2d 102, 111 (D.D.C.2009) (finding informational standing where plaintiffs alleged that the Fish and Wildlife Service violated section 10(c) by promulgating a rule that eliminated permit requirements for takings of certain antelope). But here API seeks only to enforce section 9; indeed, a suit under section 10 would be entirely premature. Attempting to plead around this problem, API characterizes Feld's unlawful conduct as the `taking' of elephants without permission from the Fish and Wildlife Service pursuant to the process created by section 10 of the Endangered Species Act. Suppl. Compl. ¶ 6. But ESA proscribes the take itself, not the failure to seek a permit, and nothing in the Act entitles the public to information every time a circus or zoo takes an endangered animal. In this sense, ESA is quite different from the statutes at issue in both Akins and Judicial Watch. FECA imposes extensive recordkeeping and disclosure requirements in order to remedy any actual or perceived corruption of the political process. Akins, 524 U.S. at 14, 118 S.Ct. 1777. Likewise, FACA ensure[s] ... that Congress and the public remain apprised of [advisory committees'] existence, activities, and cost. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 446, 109 S.Ct. 2558. By contrast, ESA's primary purpose is to conserve endangered and threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). It achieves this not by imposing extensive reporting requirements on persons who take endangered animals, but rather by prohibiting such takings. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). Section 10's disclosure requirements are secondary to this prohibition, triggered only in the context of an ongoing permit proceeding and intended, not to provide a broad right to information about the activities of any person engaged in a taking, but to allow interested parties to comment on and assist the Secretary's evaluation of permit applications. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(c) (requiring the Secretary to invite the submission from interested parties ... of written data, views, or arguments with respect to the [permit] application). Given the differences between FECA and FACA, on the one hand, and ESA, on the other, we see nothing in Akins that would authorize us to extend informational standing to a situation where, as here, the plaintiff's view of the statute would not directly entitle it to the information it seeks.