Opinion ID: 2530425
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Substitution for Cause

Text: ¶ 20 Before we begin our analysis, two procedural points deserve comment. The first concerns whether today's opinion is, in fact, purely advisory, as suggested by Justice Garman. See infra ¶ 61 (Garman, J., specially concurring). An opinion is advisory if it is impossible for this court to grant effectual relief to either party. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d 393, 401, 269 Ill.Dec. 440, 781 N.E.2d 237 (2002). In his brief submitted to us, John contends that his petition for substitution for cause should have been granted in light of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009), a case he maintains calls into question the constitutionality of section 2-1001(a)(3). [2] Lisa, on the other hand, contends that substitution for cause was properly denied and due process was satisfied. Thus, the parties dispute the actual standard that is to be used in determining whether a petition for substitution for cause should be granted. If we were to accept John's arguments, he would win a reversal of both the appellate and circuit courts' judgments. We can therefore grant relief in this case. Moreover, notwithstanding Justice Garman's intimation to the contrary, these arguments were squarely raised in the case. Infra ¶ 58 (Garman, J., specially concurring) (noting that at under Rule 316, this court is not required to answer a question if it is not squarely raised in a case). The parties are at issue, and therefore there is nothing advisory about the opinion we render today. See La Salle National Bank v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 375, 379, 121 N.E.2d 486 (1954) (noting duty of the court is to decide actual controversies); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International v. UAL Corp., 897 F.2d 1394, 1397 (1990) (Posner, J.) (it is cases rather than reasons that become moot). ¶ 21 The second procedural point concerns appellate jurisdiction. Lisa argues that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction because John's notice of appeal did not specify or indicate that John was seeking to appeal from the order denying the substitution for cause as is required under Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2). ¶ 22 This court has long recognized that a notice of appeal is to be liberally construed. Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill.2d 427, 433, 31 Ill.Dec. 178, 394 N.E.2d 380 (1979). As a result, we have held that a notice of appeal will confer jurisdiction on an appellate court if the notice, when considered as a whole, fairly and adequately sets out the judgment complained of and the relief sought so that the successful party is advised of the nature of the appeal. Id. at 433 -34, 31 Ill.Dec. 178, 394 N.E.2d 380 (citing Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 67 n. 21, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978)). ¶ 23 John's notice of appeal states that he was taking an appeal from the Judgment entered by the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Lake County Illinois, on February 6, 2007, and all prior orders of court culminating therein to the Appellate CourtSecond Judicial District. As the appellate court correctly recognized, this court has found notices of appeal to confer jurisdiction even if the order was not expressly mentioned in the notice of appeal, if that order was a `step in the procedural progression leading' to the judgment which was specified in the notice of appeal. Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill.2d at 435, 31 Ill.Dec. 178, 394 N.E.2d 380. The denial of John's petition to substitute was a step in the procedural progression leading to the final judgment specified in John's notice of appeal. See Jiffy Lube International, Inc. v. Agarwal, 277 Ill.App.3d 722, 727, 214 Ill. Dec. 609, 661 N.E.2d 463 (1996); In re A.N., 324 Ill.App.3d 510, 512, 258 Ill.Dec. 74, 755 N.E.2d 155 (2001). The appellate court therefore had jurisdiction to review the order. ¶ 24 Turning to the merits, John contends that the order denying his petition must be reversed because Judge Starck erred in using an actual prejudice standard in making his ruling. As explained below, Judge Starck did not use the wrong standard in deciding John's petition.