Opinion ID: 1133622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Court's Refusal to Give Defendant's Requested Instructions Regarding Mitigating Factors

Text: The trial court refused a number of defendant's proposed instructions regarding mitigating factors. Defendant contends that the absence of proper instructions resulted in a failure to guide the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence as relevant to his personal culpability, thereby violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and analogous provisions in the California Constitution. (See Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302, 317-328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1015, 1022, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) In evaluating defendant's contention, we consider the instructions and arguments as a whole to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions in a manner that precluded the consideration of mitigating evidence. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1021, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 472, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Section 190.3, factor (i) requires the jury to take into account, if relevant, [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime. One of defendant's proposed instructions stated in relevant part: Chronological age, by itself, is a matter over which the defendant has no control, and which is not relevant to the choice of penalty. [¶] However, the factor relating to `defendant's age,' as set forth in these instructions, refers to any matter concerning defendant's age, maturity, and judgment which common experience or morality might indicate to be relevant to the issue of penalty. [¶] You shall therefore give any age-related factors and argument consideration in arriving at a judgment as to penalty. This instruction paraphrased the discussion of section 190.3, factor (i) in People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 301-302, 247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052, which rejected the defendant's argument that factor (i) could be considered only in mitigation. The opinion in Lucky states: [T]he word `age' in statutory sentencing factor (i) is used as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty. Accordingly, either counsel may argue any such age-related inference in every case. (45 Cal.3d at p. 302, 247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052.) The trial court gave no reason for its refusal to give defendant's proposed instruction, and it gave no other instruction explaining section 190.3, factor (i). Defendant contends that the court's refusal to give his requested instruction precluded the jury from considering his mental age as evidence in mitigation. Defense experts testified that defendant has an IQ between 67 and 72  within the mildly mentally retarded range  and a mental age equivalent score of 11 years. Without his requested instruction regarding age, defendant contends, no instruction specifically addressed the issues of his mental age or mental retardation, and the jury thus was precluded from giving the proper mitigating effect to this evidence. Defendant relies upon Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256, which held that the sentencing jury must be instructed that it can consider evidence of a defendant's mental retardation and background of abuse in determining whether to impose the death penalty. According to defendant, this requirement was particularly important in the present case because the prosecutor argued that defendant, who was 48 years of age at the time of the crimes, is much less deserving of mercy than a young inexperienced defendant who has never experienced the consequences of his criminal acts. Penry is distinguishable. In that case, the trial court was required to sentence the defendant to death if the jury answered yes to three questions: whether the defendant acted deliberately, whether there was a probability that he would pose a continuing threat to society, and whether the killing was an unreasonable response to provocation, if any. ( Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, 492 U.S. at p. 310, 109 S.Ct. 2934.) None of these questions permitted consideration of the defendant's retardation or background. In contrast, section 190.3, factors (d), (h), and (k), require consideration of whether the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental disturbance, whether the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, and any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime. The trial court's instruction that the jurors must consider these factors informed them that they were to consider evidence of defendant's mental retardation and mental age in deciding the appropriate penalty. (See People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 189, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 [section 190.3, factor (k) allows consideration of any mental condition]; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1252, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1 [ Penry's requirement of supporting instructions is met by the section 190.3, factor (k) instruction].) Accordingly, there was no instructional error. [20] Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that section 190.3, factor (i) is not impermissibly vague simply because it can be either aggravating or mitigating: Both the prosecution and the defense may present valid arguments as to the significance of the defendant's age in a particular case. Competing arguments by adversary parties bring perspective to a problem, and thus serve to promote a more reasoned decision, providing guidance as to a factor jurors most likely would discuss in any event. We find no constitutional deficiency in factor (i). ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 977, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750.) In closing argument, defense counsel told the jurors that they should decide whether defendant's mental age falls within section 190.3, factor (i), and defense counsel also mentioned defendant's intelligence and mental retardation in connection with section 190.3, factors (d), (h), and (k). In light of this argument and the court's direction that the jury consider those three factors, we find no reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled to believe it could not consider the mitigating evidence regarding defendant's mental age and retardation. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his request to exclude section 190.3 factors for which no evidence was introduced, and that the court should have identified which factors were mitigating and which were aggravating. The court instead instructed the jury, pursuant to defendant's request, that some factors would be inapplicable because they were not shown by the evidence, and that the jury was to disregard any factor not shown by the evidence; in addition, the jury was instructed that the absence of any mitigating factor could not be considered as an aggravating factor. We repeatedly have rejected the claims now made by defendant, and he provides no compelling reason for us to revisit them. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1026-1027, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1183, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 674-675, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) [21] We also consistently have rejected defendant's claim that a trial court prejudicially errs in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte at the penalty Phase to disregard the no-sympathy instruction given at the guilt phase. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1026, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously refused his instruction stating that mitigating factors are unlimited. Although we have mentioned such an instruction with approval (e.g., People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 807, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485), we also have stated that the catchall section 190.3, factor (k) instruction allows the jury to consider a virtually unlimited range of mitigating circumstances. ( People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1192, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) The absence of defendant's proposed instruction thus was not reasonably likely to have misled the jury into believing that its consideration of mitigating circumstances somehow was limited. Because we find no instructional error affecting the jury's consideration of mitigating factors, defendant's claim of heightened prejudice from cumulative instructional error is without merit.