Opinion ID: 739316
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count One: Conspiracy (Appellants Manges and Myers)6

Text: 51 Appellants claim that there was no proof of the essential nature of the alleged conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir.1977) (dismissing the indictment for lack of proof that the defendants conspired to commit the same fraud). They assert that the evidence was insufficient to show a coherent scheme to retain the lease to tract 350, particularly in light of the inconsistent stories they told state officials to explain the tract's failure to produce. 52 The fact that the conspirators changed their account in the face of official skepticism does not negate the existence of a conspiracy. The government's explanation makes more sense. The prosecution posited a conspiracy aimed at concealing appellants' failure to fulfill the conditions of their lease:Each co-conspirator had a role. McLester (who pleaded guilty) furnished phony reports of production. Myers encouraged McLester's falsities, and was instrumental in giving an aura of propriety to false documents that helped convince GLO that the lease terms had been satisfied. Shanklin contributed to Myers' deceit by preparing bogus reports and invoices reflecting work done on State Tract 350 in intervals of less than 60 days. ... [A]nd Manges distributed the funds to help the co-conspirators. 53 On the evidence, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants were engaged in a scheme to retain the lease by fraudulent means. 54
55 Conspiracy to commit mail fraud requires at least the level of intent necessary for mail fraud itself. United States v. Sneed, 63 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir.1995) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 712, 133 L.Ed.2d 667 (1996). However, there is no specific intent requirement with respect to the mailing element of mail fraud. United States v. Massey, 827 F.2d 995, 1002 (5th Cir.1987). The test is one of reasonable foreseeability: the prosecution need only prove that the defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud in which they contemplated that the mails would likely be used. Id. 56 The mailing at issue is the September 19, 1989, letter from the GLO to Redfish Bay Operating Co., stating that the lease to tract 350 had been maintained. As the government points out, the object of the conspiracy was to obtain a clean bill of health for tract 350. The GLO was in Austin; Myers and Jaffe were based in San Antonio, 75 miles away. The letter's author, Pittman, testified that the GLO routinely transacted business by mail. 57 Appellants contend that this evidence is not enough. They argue that since none of them was employed by the land office, they could not have known that the GLO routinely transacted business through the mail. They also claim that the distance between Austin and San Antonio does not support the conclusion that the use of the mails was foreseeable, especially in light of their own habits of delivering documents by hand and traveling to Austin to do business with the GLO. 58 Even if appellants' argument were not implausible on its face, the only precedent they cite in its behalf is the first panel opinion in Brumley. See United States v. Brumley (Brumley I), 59 F.3d 517, 520-22 (5th Cir.1995), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh'g, 79 F.3d 1430, 1432 (5th Cir.1996), opinion vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 91 F.3d 676 (5th Cir.1996). Appellants insist that the first Brumley opinion is still good law. They are mistaken. 7 See 5TH CIR. R . 41.3; United States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 102 (5th Cir.1992) (once rehearing en banc is granted, panel decision is vacated and of no precedential value). 59 We conclude that the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that use of the mail was reasonably foreseeable to appellants. 60