Opinion ID: 2624037
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Professional Rescue Doctrine

Text: ¶ 7 The rescue doctrine allows a voluntary rescuer to seek recovery for injuries incurred while reasonably undertaking the rescue of a person who has negligently placed himself in a position of imminent peril. Maltman v. Sauer, 84 Wash.2d 975, 976-77, 530 P.2d 254 (1975); accord French v. Chase, 48 Wash.2d 825, 830, 297 P.2d 235 (1956) (setting forth elements of rescue doctrine). The professional rescue doctrine bars professional rescuers from recovering under the rescue doctrine because a professional rescuer assumes certain hazards not assumed by a voluntary rescuer. [1] Maltman, 84 Wash.2d at 978, 530 P.2d 254. Under the professional rescue doctrine, a professional rescuer may not recover for injuries stemming from hazards inherently within the ambit of those dangers which are unique to and generally associated with the particular rescue activity. Id. at 979, 530 P.2d 254. However, if the hazard is hidden, unknown, and extra hazardous or otherwise not reasonably anticipated or foreseen, the professional rescuer may seek recovery. Id. ¶ 8 The case at hand requires us to determine whether Beaupre may recover for injuries sustained as a result of a fellow officer's intervening negligence during a rescue operation. This court has never addressed the issue; however, the Court of Appeals has recognized that the professional rescue doctrine does not apply when an independent or intervening act causes the professional rescuer's injury. Sutton v. Shufelberger, 31 Wash.App. 579, 587-88, 643 P.2d 920 (1982); Ward v. Torjussen, 52 Wash.App. 280, 286-88, 758 P.2d 1012 (1988); Ballou v. Nelson, 67 Wash.App. 67, 71-74, 834 P.2d 97 (1992). In Sutton, a car struck a police officer as he dismounted his motorcycle after pulling over another driver for a traffic violation. 31 Wash.App. at 580, 643 P.2d 920. The driver of the car that hit Sutton argued that the risk of being hit by a passing car while on the side of the road during a traffic stop was inherent in [Sutton's] work and thus, the professional rescue doctrine barred Sutton's action. Id. at 587, 643 P.2d 920. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that the professional rescue doctrine did not apply to forgive negligent or intentional injury to the official by an intervenor. Id. at 588, 643 P.2d 920. ¶ 9 Similarly in Ward, the Court of Appeals refused to apply the professional rescue doctrine to bar an officer's recovery for injuries sustained when a car hit her patrol car while in route to a prowler assist call. 52 Wash.App. at 287-88, 758 P.2d 1012. The court reasoned that the risk of a collision was not a risk inherent in a prowler assist call. Id. The court further held that the professional rescue doctrine relieves the perpetrator of the act that caused the rescuer to be at the scene; it does not relieve a party whose intervening negligence injures the rescuer. Id. at 287. Likewise in Ballou, the Court of Appeals held the professional rescue doctrine did not bar officers from suing individuals who intentionally hit them. 67 Wash.App. at 73-74, 834 P.2d 97. The court reasoned that the doctrine was inapplicable because the officers were not injured by the defendants' negligence; rather, they were injured by the defendants' criminal assaults. Id. at 73, 834 P.2d 97. ¶ 10 Although Pierce County agrees with the Court of Appeals holdings in Ward, Sutton, and Ballou, it nonetheless asserts that the professional rescue doctrine bars Beaupre's recovery. [2] According to Pierce County, fellow officers are not intervening parties. Appellant's Reply Br. at 12-13. For support, the county cites to a line of California cases holding that the professional rescue doctrine bars law enforcement officers from suing officers from other law enforcement agencies. E.g., Calatayud v. State, 18 Cal.4th 1057, 959 P.2d 360, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 (1998). ¶ 11 In Calatayud, the California Supreme Court held that the professional rescue doctrine barred a city police officer from suing a highway patrol officer and the patrol officer's employer for injuries sustained while the officers were involved in a joint rescue. Id. at 1062, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 959 P.2d 360. The Calatayud court noted that under California law, officers may not sue their employer for negligence resulting in injury and must instead recover under the State's workers' compensation program. Id. The court then held that the legislature did not intend a statutory exception to the doctrine to apply where an officer involved in a rescue operation caused the injury of an officer from another agency. Id. at 1064, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 959 P.2d 360. The court stated that holding otherwise would undermine the exclusivity of the State workers' compensation system: We can discern no rational reason the Legislature would intend liability to depend solely on whether the plaintiff and defendant wore different badges and uniforms when the risk of injury is the same. Id. at 1072, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 959 P.2d 360. The court likewise listed several other public policy considerations in support of its holding: (1) allowing officers to respond to issues of public safety without the worry of injury to fellow officers, (2) relieving public agencies of the financial burden of litigation, and (3) promoting efficient judicial administration by preventing the causation problems inherent in such suits. Id. at 1068-72, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 959 P.2d 360. Pierce County argues that we should adopt the same approach. ¶ 12 California law, however, stands in stark contrast to Washington law. In California, officers may not sue their own agency for negligence; rather, California law requires officers to recover exclusively under the workers' compensation system. See id. at 1072, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 959 P.2d 360. In contrast, the Washington Law Enforcement Officers' and Fire Fighters' Retirement System Act (LEOFF), chapter 41.26 RCW, specifically grants officers the right to sue their employers for negligence in addition to recovering workers' compensation. See RCW 41.26.281 (right to sue provision); Fray v. Spokane County, 134 Wash.2d 637, 952 P.2d 601 (1998). In Fray, we noted that the State specifically enacted LEOFF to provide greater benefits to injured police officers and fire fighters than they would receive under the workers' compensation system, including the `right to sue' their employers for negligence. Id. at 643, 952 P.2d 601 (emphasis added). Further, unlike Washington law, California law does not distinguish between the individual responsible for bringing the rescuer to the scene and an intervenor. Instead, California recognizes only those statutory exceptions in California Civil Code, section 1714.9. ¶ 13 Pierce County also relies on New York cases for the proposition that the professional rescue doctrine applies to fellow officers. New York courts apply the doctrine to bar those claims for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow police officer when the injury is related to the dangers that are associated with police. Cooper v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 584, 591, 619 N.E.2d 369, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1993). However, unlike Washington courts, New York jurisprudence does not recognize an independent act exception when an intervening party injures an officer. E.g., id. at 590, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432, 619 N.E.2d 369. ¶ 14 We thus reject Pierce County's argument and hold that the professional rescue doctrine does not bar Beaupre's law suit. The doctrine does not apply to negligent or intentional acts of intervening parties not responsible for bringing the rescuer to the scene. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of summary judgment on this issue.