Opinion ID: 887766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 13 Was the District Court's instruction to disregard hearsay referenced in the State's opening statement sufficient to cure the error? ¶ 14 In her opening statement, the prosecutor told jurors they would hear evidence that, after High Elk punched Allen and Rodarte stabbed him, High Elk asked Rodarte, Did you get him? and she replied, Yeah, I got him. High Elk's counsel objected that hearsay could not be quoted, and the District Court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement. High Elk did not move for a mistrial. ¶ 15 At the outset, we note the State's observation that High Elk's objection and the court's ruling could refer only to Rodarte's response, in that High Elk's question to Rodarte was not hearsay, because it was a party's own statement. See Rule 801(d)(2), M.R.Evid. High Elk does not dispute the State's observation. ¶ 16 High Elk argues we should reverse his conviction because the hearsay evidence [of Rodarte's response to High Elk's question] was prejudicial and contributed to the verdict. He relies on State v. Runs Above, 2003 MT 181, ¶ 25, 316 Mont. 421, ¶ 25, 73 P.3d 161, ¶ 25; and State v. Van Kirk, 2001 MT 184, ¶ 47, 306 Mont. 215, ¶ 47, 32 P.3d 735, ¶ 47. In doing so, he misstates the matter before us. In both cited cases, the standard of review which he advances was used in relation to improperly admitted hearsay evidence. Runs Above, ¶ 23; Van Kirk, ¶ 26. What occurred here was not error in admitting evidence, but an improper reference in the prosecutor's opening statement to a hearsay statement by Rodarte, who did not testify at High Elk's trial. ¶ 17 A lawyer's statements are not evidence. See, e.g., State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243, ¶ 26, 323 Mont. 6, ¶ 26, 97 P.3d 1095, ¶ 26 (citation omitted). The jury was so instructed at the beginning of the trial, before opening statements began. Issues surrounding improper comments by counsel generally have arisen in the context of motions for mistrial, the denial of which we review for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Ahto, 1998 MT 200, ¶ 32, 290 Mont. 338, ¶ 32, 965 P.2d 240, ¶ 32 (citation omitted). As stated above, High Elk did not move for a mistrial in the present case, and it would be inappropriate to apply the abuse of discretion standard to an action (or lack thereof) High Elk never requested the District Court to take. ¶ 18 After High Elk's counsel objected to the State's quote of Rodarte, the court immediately instructed the jury to disregard counsel's statement. The State's erroneous four-word reference at the very beginning of a trial, immediately instructed upon, was followed by testimony from six witnesses. The jury heard considerable independent evidence  indeed, it was undisputed  that Rodarte had stabbed Allen repeatedly. Any prejudice to High Elk came from his question to Rodarte  Did you get him?  which was properly referenced during the prosecution's opening statement and properly admitted, without objection, through Allen's testimony. ¶ 19 Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude the District Court's instruction that the jury disregard the prosecutor's quoting of hearsay from Rodarte in her opening statement was sufficient to cure the error.