Opinion ID: 2071703
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Contract for Installation Services

Text: Carpetland uses two forms of standard contract. The first is a Customer Sales Contract, which contains the Installation by Subcontractor provision quoted above. The second is an Installation Subcontract, by which the customer authorizes Carpetland to arrange for installation of the floor covering. This document also contains a Contract for Installation Services that is signed by the installer and an authorized representative of Carpetland. The Contract for Installation Services identifies Carpetland as contractor and the installer as subcontractor. The installer agrees to perform the services called for by the contract at the time and place designated, in a neat, workmanlike manner in accordance with the job specifications applicable to this Contract and established trade practices. Carpetland agrees to furnish the carpeting or floor covering; the installer agrees to provide all other necessary tools and supplies. The installer guarantees his work for one year and agrees to remedy any defect in installation. Further, the contract states that Carpetland will not pay for any additional services requested by the customer unless Carpetland agrees in advance to do so. The installer also agrees to obtain and maintain liability insurance and to furnish certificates of insurance to Carpetland. In addition to paying his own state, federal, and local taxes, the Subcontractor also agrees to elect coverage under any applicable workmen's compensation laws which provide for coverage pursuant to election and to elect to operate or become subject to any applicable unemployment compensation act which permits such election. Finally, the contract is personal to Carpetland and the installer, and may not be assigned or transferred by either party. The parties agree that the appropriate standard of review in this case is the clearly erroneous standard. Nevertheless, the question arose at oral argument whether, because the facts in this case are essentially undisputed, the de novo standard should apply. The Department states that in City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill.2d 191, 205, 229 Ill.Dec. 522, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998), this court departed from its prior holdings that administrative rulings based on the application of law to undisputed facts would be reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Chicago Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 171 Ill.2d 263, 271, 215 Ill.Dec. 655, 664 N.E.2d 52 (1996) (where facts are undisputed, an administrative determination of whether certain property is tax exempt answers a question of law, subject to de novo review). However, in City of Belvidere, we did not entirely abandon the de novo standard in administrative review cases. The standard of review applicable to an agency's decision depends upon whether the question presented is one of fact or law. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill.2d at 204, 229 Ill.Dec. 522, 692 N.E.2d 295. When the decision involves a pure question of law, we will review it de novo. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill.2d at 205, 229 Ill.Dec. 522, 692 N.E.2d 295. When reviewing purely factual findings, the agency's findings and conclusions are deemed to be prima facie true and correct and, thus, are reviewed under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2000); City of Belvidere, 181 Ill.2d at 204, 229 Ill.Dec. 522, 692 N.E.2d 295. Under some circumstances, however, the issue presented cannot be accurately characterized as either a pure question of fact or a pure question of law and, therefore, will be treated as a mixed question, subject to an intermediate standard of review. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill.2d at 205, 229 Ill.Dec. 522, 692 N.E.2d 295. In AFM, we determined that whether certain workers are independent contractors under section 212 of the Act is such a mixed question of law and fact, subject to review for clear error. AFM, 198 Ill.2d at 396, 261 Ill.Dec. 302, 763 N.E.2d 272. Under the clearly erroneous standard, we give somewhat less deference to the agency than we would if the decision related solely to a question of fact, because the decision is based on fact-finding that is inseparable from the application of law to fact. We will reverse only if, after review of the entire record, we are `left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' AFM, 198 Ill.2d at 395, 261 Ill.Dec. 302, 763 N.E.2d 272, quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746, 766 (1948). We note at the outset Carpetland's suggestion that the Department's summary of facts is incomplete and misleading. The Director's representative had at her disposal Carpetland's answers to Department questionnaires, the results of a Department audit of Carpetland, numerous documents, and the testimony summarized above. She prepared a detailed report, which contained findings of fact, analysis, and conclusions. She did not suggest that any of the witnesses were less than entirely credible. Carpetland filed objections to the report. Finding the objections untimely, the Director adopted the report as her decision. Upon remand from the circuit court, the Director responded to the objections and again affirmed the report and recommended decision of the representative. A thorough review of the record reveals several misstatements of fact in the report. For example, the representative found that when Carpetland bid on commercial contracts, installation was included. The record, however, shows that if a commercial job was to include installation, the Carpetland salesperson solicited bids from installers so that he could submit a bid covering both materials and labor. The report also makes several references to individual mailboxes assigned to the installers and to the fact that installers would visit the Carpetland store to retrieve job assignments from the mailboxes. The testimony was clear, however, that only the Munster, Indiana, store utilized the mailbox system to communicate with installers. Thus, this practice is irrelevant to the present case. The report also found that when a Carpetland store began to utilize the services of a new installer, the work was checked closely for the first several installations. In the testimony, however, the word closely was never used. The witnesses indicated that it was rare for someone from Carpetland to visit an installation site. They might do so in the beginning of a working relationship with an installer, to observe the finished installation to see that it was up to standard. The report states that [w]hen work was unavailable from Carpetland[,] the installers worked for other carpet sales stores, creating the impression that their first duty was to Carpetland and that their willingness or ability to work for other stores was contingent on Carpetland's not having any work for them. The record discloses, however, that at least for some installers, Carpetland represented a small portion of their workload and that they had several clients who, in effect, competed for their time. Similarly, the report states that all complaints about installation flow through Carpetland. Lawson, however, testified that he would leave one of his business cards with the customer, so that he could be contacted directly about any problems with the installation. Thus, communication through Carpetland was only one means by which a customer could make a complaint regarding installation. The report also states that each installer was required to sign a written retainage agreement. However, the Carpetland executive who testified regarding these agreements said that Carpetland preferred to have this sort of arrangement with an installer, but did not necessarily refuse to do business with an installer who declined to participate in the retainage arrangement. Finally, this section of the report contains legal conclusions, without reference to any supporting authority, in addition to findings of fact. For example, the report lists as a finding of fact the legal conclusion there was no privity of contract between the customer and the installer. Because the report does not contain a complete and reliable summary of the facts adduced at the hearing, we shall look to the record, as well as to the report, for the relevant underlying facts.