Opinion ID: 1058201
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Factors for Establishing Legal Maternity

Text: In light of the foregoing analysis, we deem it appropriate to decide this case on particularly narrow grounds. In Davis the primary issue hinged on the constitutional right to avoid procreation, see 842 S.W.2d at 601-02, but in the instant case the issue surrounds the maternity and custody of children who have already been born as the result of techniques for assisted reproduction and egg donation. Children, of course, are not property, and the State's interest in the welfare of children is eminently greater than the State's interest in controlling preembryos. The distinction between Davis and this case thus highlights the complexities involved in determining whether the affirmative attempt to procreate via technological assistance including egg or sperm donation is more closely analogous to procreative autonomy with its corresponding right of privacy or more closely analogous to a private form of adoption and thus more susceptible to governmental regulation in the interest of child welfare. Such a determinationwhich strikes at the very roots of current social valuesis inherently policy-laden and both administratively and fiscally momentous, and its resolution on a broad scale is properly reserved for the legislature. Therefore, in resolving this case we focus closely on its particular facts. Charles and Cindy, an unmarried couple, wanted to start a family and agreed to rear a child together permanently as father and mother, not suspecting that their own relationship would eventually fall apart. Given Cindy's age, they agreed to fertilize anonymously donated eggs with Charles's sperm and to implant the fertilized eggs in Cindy's uterus. Before the procedure, Charles and Cindy executed the Recipient Consent in which Charles acknowledged Cindy's status as mother and in which Cindy agreed to accept all the responsibilities of parenthood: I, Cindy (wife), understand that the child(ren) conceived by this method will not have my genetic material, but will have that of the oocyte [egg] donor and my husband [sic]. However, regardless of the outcome, I will be the mother of any child(ren) born to me as a result of egg donation and hereby accept all the legal responsibilities required of such a parent. Cindy was impregnated and carried not just one but three fetuses to term. After a complicated pregnancy, she gave birth via caesarian section to triplets. Charles allowed Cindy to be named the mother on the children's birth certificates. After the children were born, Charles and Cindy lived together in an arrangement where both Charles and Cindy performed the role of parent. Having recounted these events, we now discuss the relevant factors which we consider to be significant for deciding this case.
Both statute and sound policy support genetics as an important factor in establishing legal maternity. Human reproduction as we now know it cannot take place without the involvement of genetic material. As analyzed above, Tennessee's domestic relations statutes provide for the establishment of legal maternity based on genetic consanguinity. See §§ 36-2-302(4) (defining mother as the biological mother of a child born out of wedlock), 36-1-102(10) (defining biological parents as the woman and man who physically or genetically conceived the child). In emphasizing genetics, Belsito recognizes and honors an individual's decision to procreate or to refrain from procreating. 644 N.E.2d at 766 (The procreation of a child, that is, the replication of the unique genes of an individual, should occur only with the consent of that individual. (citing Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588)). As we held in Davis , such decisions enjoy constitutional protection. 842 S.W.2d at 600-01. However, our recognition in Davis of the constitutional right to control the disposition of one's genetic material does not mean that Davis stands for the proposition that genetics must be paramount in all parentage determinations. In cases such as this one, where a woman has become intimately involved in the procreation process even though she has not contributed genetic material, factors other than genetics take on special significance.
Before the children's birth, both Cindy and the genetic father, Charles, voluntarily demonstrated the bona fide intent that Cindy would be the children's legal mother, and they agreed that Cindy would accept all the legal responsibility as well as the legal rights of parenthood. We consider the intent to take on both parental rights and responsibilities as one important factor among others for resolving this controversy. Although our decision in Davis does not control this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that it is nonetheless instructive. In Davis , this Court had to decide whether a man could prevent donation and implantation against his will of a preembryo (an early-stage fertilized egg) containing his genes. 842 S.W.2d at 589-90. We held that just as an individual enjoys a constitutionally-protected right to procreate, an individual also has a similar right to avoid procreation. Id. at 600-01. We concluded that disputes over the control of preembryos are to be resolved first by looking to the agreement of the progenitors and second, in the absence of agreement, by weighing the relative interests of the male and female providers of reproductive cells. Id. at 604. Davis thus underscored the importance of intent and agreement with respect to the disposition of an individual's reproductive and genetic material. Although Tennessee's parentage statutes recognize maternity on the basis of genetics, see Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-1-102(10), 36-2-302(4), as we have seen that the parentage statutes do not expressly control this case and thus do not necessarily confine the establishment of legal maternity to genetics alone. To the contrary, we determine that taking intent into consideration as a factor is consistent with policy implicit in Tennessee's domestic relations statutes. Significantly, the artificial insemination statute of Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-3-306 (2001) supports the consideration of intent as a factor for establishing legal maternity. This section is entitled Birth from artificial insemination and is contained in the part of the Tennessee Code which addresses vital records. It provides as follows: A child born to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination, with consent of such married woman's husband, is deemed to be the legitimate child of the husband and wife. Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-3-306. Like the parentage statutes, Code section 68-3-306 does not expressly govern this case because the statute contemplates and provides for an agreement within the context of marriage; Charles and Cindy were not married, and in any event there is now a lack of consent. Notwithstanding, it is significant that Code section 68-3-306 confers parental status on a husband even though the child conceived in his wife via artificial insemination is not necessarily genetically related to him. The artificial insemination statute thus reflects a policy which favors taking into account intent in establishing parentage when technological assistance is involved.
Cindy became pregnant and gave birth to the children with the intent of raising them as her own. As mentioned above, historically gestation proved genetic parentage beyond doubt and thus was conclusive of maternity. See Roosevelt, 39 Santa Clara L.Rev. at 97; see also Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction 17 Cardozo L.Rev. 497, 501 (1996) (When the two functions of genetic contribution and gestation were inextricably bound, the issue of legal motherhood at birth was not disputable. The ancient maxim, mater est quam gestation demonstrat (by gestation the mother is demonstrated), unqualifiedly applied to all births.). The common law thus has presumed that the birth mother is the legal mother of the child. See Coleman, 17 Cardozo L.Rev. at 524. It is only quite recently that modern technology has made it possible to separate and to distribute among multiple persons or environments the genetic and gestational roles. We consider gestation as another important factor in determining legal maternity in this case. To be sure, as discussed above, genetics remains an irreplaceable component of human reproduction, and as such genetic consanguinity is and should be particularly important to parentage determinations. And as our analysis above has shown, Tennessee's domestic relations statutes expressly account for genetics in parentage determinations. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-1-102(10), § 36-2-302(4). However, as our analysis above has also shown, Tennessee's parentage and related statutes were simply not designed to control the circumstances of this case. To restrict legal maternity to genetic consanguinity alone where, as in this case, the genetic mother is an egg donor who has waived her parental rights and who has been and remains permanently anonymous would result in the absurdity of children having, for all practical purposes, no legal mother. A child's knowledge that he or she has an anonymous and inaccessible mother somewhere in the world would provide only cold comfort, and demanding such a result in cases like this one could hardly promote the best interests of children. Courts must presume that the Legislature did not intend an absurdity and adopt, if possible, a reasonable construction which provides for a harmonious operation of the laws. Fletcher, 951 S.W.2d at 382 (citing Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn.1995) and Epstein v. State, 211 Tenn. 633, 366 S.W.2d 914 (1963)). We further observe that in this case the genetic mother has donated her eggs to another and has correspondingly waived her parental rights, thereby relinquishing her status as legal mother. As Belsito correctly concludes, a genetic test cannot be the only basis for determining who will assume the status of legal parent. 644 N.E.2d at 767. Although giving birth is conspicuously absent from Tennessee's parentage statutes, as discussed above, there is no indication that the General Assembly sought to exclude it as a basis for legal maternity or even sought to decide questions of maternity at all. In this regard, the artificial insemination statute is once again significant. In addition to recognizing paternity where artificial insemination is involved, Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-3-306 confers parental status on a wife when she gives birth to a child as the result of artificial insemination. This statute displays a policy which favors recognizing gestation and giving birth as a basis for legal maternity. Accordingly, we conclude that sound policy and common sense favor recognizing gestation as an important factor for establishing legal maternity. Although current technology allows the separation between gestation and genetic contribution, it does not follow that gestation is now a less important part of parenthood. Coleman, 17 Cardozo L.Rev. at 517. In our view, the dissent accords too little significance to gestation as a factor for deciding this controversy.
Another factor to consider in resolving this case is the nature of the controversy. Here we are not faced with a controversy between a birth mother and a genetic mother where the genetic and gestational roles have been separated and distributed among two women. In this case, the genetic mother has fully waived her parental rights and remains anonymous. Nor is this a case involving a dispute between a traditional or gestational surrogate and a genetically-unrelated intended mother who wishes to raise the child as her own. Rather, Cindy became pregnant and gave birth to triplets on her own behalf, and the sole dispute is between her and the genetic father, Charles. The other kinds of conflicts present different questions and ones which would be inappropriate for us to decide here. Instead, we limit our holding today to cases where there is no controversy between the gestator and the genetic mother.