Opinion ID: 2503042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Representative StandingFirst Prong

Text: The first prong of our standard for representative standing requires that ACT must show that at least one of its members would have standing to sue in their own right. This prong requires us to make two determinations. First, who are ACT's members for purposes of our representational standing doctrine. Second, does even one of ACT's members have standing to sue in their own right based upon the facts of the case. ACT's Membership: The record contains two affidavits from ACT's director, Steve White. In the first affidavit, dated March 28, 2008, Mr. White attests that: The central objects and princip[les] of ACT include but are not limited to protecting, aiding and assisting affiliated local unions and members with regard to wages, hours and working conditions of construction workers; providing construction contract bid information; monitoring compliance with State and Federal wage and bidding laws; and providing legal services to aid in the achievement of those goals. In a second affidavit, dated March 23, 2010, Mr. White attests that ACT is a labor organization that represents more than 20,000 residents of West Virginia and surrounding counties[.] Many of the construction workers represented by ACT are regularly employed in construction projects such as the construction of the King Coal Highway. Mr. White explains that the 20,000 residents it represents are from a total of 56 local unions and 5 local building trade councils, which are directly interested in public construction within the State of West Virginia. Mr. White further attests that many of the affiliated local unions, who have collective bargaining agreements with contractors, are directly involved in the construction of public projects similar to the construction of the King Coal Highway. Mr. White's affidavit also attests that [a]ll of the local unions affiliated with ACT are protecting and representing the interests of the construction workers of their local union through ACT's prosecution of this civil action. Mr. White concludes his March 23, 2010, affidavit by noting that one of the objects and princip[les] of ACT is to carry out the duties and objectives set forth in the Constitution and By-laws and for such additional purposes and objectives not inconsistent therewith and which will further the interest of the Council and its members directly or indirectly[.] The record shows that ACT is a division of the West Virginia State Building and Construction Trades Council (Trades Council). The Trades Council in turn is comprised of local construction unions and their members who work in West Virginia. As the United States Supreme Court observed in Brock, the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others and, further, that [t]he very forces that cause individuals to band together in an association will thus provide some guarantee that the association will work to promote their interests. Brock, 477 U.S. at 290, 106 S.Ct. 2523. It is clear to this Court that ACT is a labor organization and that it represents the interests not only of its affiliated unions, but the thousands of individual workers who make up those affiliated unions. To separate the organization of a union and say that each level of the union is mutually exclusive is to deny the individual members the purpose for their having joined a union and, more generally, the purposes behind unionization, e.g., for vindicating interests that they share with others. Brock, Id. This is especially so in the present case because the members number in the thousands, are all construction and trades workers, and are spread over such a large geographic area. That those members, seeking a means to best express their collective voice, would create from within their ranks an umbrella organization such as ACT is both reasonable and expected. That those members would expect ACT to vindicate their interests is equally reasonable and expected. In making this determination we observe that one of ACT's functions is to assist its members with collective bargaining agreements. Regarding this function, we note that in the West Virginia Labor Management Relations Act for the Private Sector, W.Va.Code, 21-1A-1, et seq. the legislature declared: It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this State and the purposes of this article to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining by protecting the exercise by employees of full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection; to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations; to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other; to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations; to define and prescribe practices on the part of labor and management which are inimical to the welfare, prosperity, health and peace of the people of this State; and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes. This article shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the State for the protection of the welfare, prosperity, health and peace of the people of this State. W.Va.Code, 21-1A-1(a) [1971] (Emphasis added.). As we have previously observed, the West Virginia Labor-Management Relations Act defines a labor organization as: Labor organization means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. W.Va.Code, 21-1A-2(a)(5) [1971] (Emphasis added.). In just this one scenariocollective bargainingit is clear that ACT, as a labor organization, represents not only its local unions, but the individual union workers who benefit from ACT's representation. Additionally, ACT's very nameThe Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation and the fact that it is a Division of the West Virginia State Bulding and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO, is unmistakably a name and form [identifying] collective interests. Brock, 477 U.S. at 290, 106 S.Ct. 2523, citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951). The hierarchy of ACT's membership structure is better seen from the bottom up. An individual joins a union and becomes a member of that union. The union that the member joins is also affiliated with a trades foundation, with the latter having as part of its purpose the mission statement of: protecting, aiding and assisting affiliated local unions and members with regard to wages, hours and working conditions of construction workers; providing construction contract bid information; monitoring compliance with State and Federal wage and bidding laws; and providing legal services to aid in the achievement of those goals. (Emphasis added.). Steve White affidavit, supra. It is clear to this Court that the individual union members, who joined their respective unions, clearly believed they would benefit from ACT's mission statement. Simply because unions are the intermediary does not mean that ACT does not have standing to represent the collective interests of the individual union members under our representative standing doctrine. Members standing to sue: Having determined that ACT's members include both its affiliated unions and the individual members of those affiliated unions, we must next consider whether any of those members, standing alone, has a disputed injury capable of being redressed by a favorable judicial decision, i.e., would the individual member have standing in his or her own right to file suit. See Syllabus Point 2 of this Opinion. See also Syllabus Point 5, Findley, supra . ACT asserts that its members have been injured by the DOH's failure to seek competitive bidding for the Red Jacket public highway project and by the failure of the DOH to require Nicewonder to pay a prevailing wage to those who worked on the public highway project. The question is, would even one of ACT's members have standing, under the standard set forth in Syllabus Point 5 of Findley, to sue in their own right for those alleged injuries. We find that they would. In Syllabus Point 1 of Shobe v. Latimer, 162 W.Va. 779, 253 S.E.2d 54 (1979), we held that: When significant interests are directly injured or adversely affected by governmental action, a person so injured has standing under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, W.Va.Code § 55-13-1 et seq. [1941] to obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations. We further held in Syllabus Point 2 of Shobe that [f]or standing under the Declaratory Judgments Act, it is not essential that a party have a personal legal right or interest. In Syllabus Point 3 of our decision in West Virginia Utility Contractors Association v. Laidley Field Athletic and Recreational Center Governing Board, 164 W.Va. 127, 260 S.E.2d 847 (1979), we held that [f]or the purposes of a declaratory judgment action, a justiciable controversy exists when a legal right is claimed by one party and denied by another. In Laidley, the defendants awarded a $1,100,000 public project contract to a contractor without a competitive bidding process. The Contractors Association filed suit for a declaratory judgment seeking to void the contract and require the defendants to seek competitive bidding. In responding to the declaratory judgment action, the defendants in Laidley moved to dismiss, arguing that a justiciable controversy did not exist and the Contractors Association did not have standing. Regarding the standing issue, we held that: In analyzing the facts of the case before us, it is clear that the appellants, members of the West Virginia Utility Contractors Association, and Richard G. Jackson, a member of that association and the president of a construction company, were precluded from competing for, and obtaining, contracts to perform work at Laidley Field by the action of the Laidley Field Athletic and Recreational Center Governing Board in awarding contracts without submitting them for competitive bidding. In that sense their rights were affected by governmental action. Under our analysis in Shobe the appellants clearly have standing to obtain a declaration of the legal right of the Laidley Field Athletic and Recreational Center Governing Board to enter into contracts without submitting them to competitive bidding. Laidley, 164 W.Va. at 130, 260 S.E.2d at 849. Based on our discussion above, we find that ACT's members who were interested in bidding for the Red Jacket project were ostensibly denied a claimed legal right. ACT claims that the DOH's letting of the Red Jacket contract to Nicewonder is in violation of our state law governing competitive bidding for highway construction projects, W.Va.Code, 5-22-1 et seq. The DOH and Nicewonder dispute that state law required competitive bidding for the project. The trial court can resolve that dispute by hearing the case on the merits and entering a declaration as to whether state law required that the Red Jacket Project be submitted for competitive bidding. Regarding ACT's request for a declaration that the Red Jacket contract violated W.Va. Code, 21-5A-1 et seq. on the basis that it did not require Nicewonder to pay a fair minimum rate of wages, we also find that ACT's members were denied a claimed legal right sufficient to establish an actual controversy. In W.Va.Code, 21-5A-2, the legislature declared the public policy underlying its adoption of our prevailing wage law for construction of public improvements, stating: It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of West Virginia that a wage of no less than the prevailing hourly rate of wages for work of a similar character in the locality in this State in which the construction is performed, shall be paid to all workmen employed by or on behalf of any public authority engaged in the construction of public improvements. The legislature thus made clear its intention that prevailing wages be paid in public improvement construction projects. Section 6 of the Act requires the inclusion into any public project contract the requirement that workmen be paid those prevailing wages. Our Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, W.Va.Code, 55-13-2 [1941](emphasis added), allows that: Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. The any person in the appeal before us includes any of ACT's affiliated members. ACT's union members have an undeniable interest in determining whether state law has been violated by the DOH's failure to include a prevailing wage requirement in the Red Jacket project. The Red Jacket project entails the expenditure of millions of dollars of public funds. Reason suggests the strong likelihood that a project of that size and duration would eventually depress the local prevailing wage and affect ACT's members. In addressing the federal prevailing wage Act (Davis-Bacon Act), the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in L.P. Cavett Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 101 F.3d 1111, 1113 (6th Cir.1996), appropriately noted that: The dual purposes of the [Davis-Bacon] Act are to give local laborers and contractors fair opportunity to participate in building programs when federal money is involved and to protect local wage standards by preventing contractors from basing their bids on wages lower than those prevailing in the area. We agree. For the reasons discussed, we find that at least one of ACT's members meets the first prong of our standard for representation standing, i.e., that at least one of an organization's members would have standing to sue in their own right. 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