Opinion ID: 1743864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the lower court erred in granting jo ann's motion for summary judgment regarding equitable distribution and ruling jo ann was entitled to equitable distribution prior to the trial of the matter.

Text: ¶ 8. This Court's standard of review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is well established: Our appellate standard for reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment is the same standard as that of the trial court under Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court employs a de novo standard of review of a lower court's grant or denial of summary judgment and examines all the evidentiary matters before itadmissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. If, in this view, there is no genuine issue of material fact and, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor. Otherwise, the motion should be denied. Issues of fact sufficient to require denial of a motion for summary judgment obviously are present where one party swears to one version of the matter in issue and another says the opposite. In addition, the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists is on the moving party. That is, the non-movant should be given the benefit of the doubt. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So.2d 627, 630 (Miss.1996) (quoting Mantachie Natural Gas Dist. v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 594 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Miss.1992); Clark v. Moore Mem'l United Methodist Church, 538 So.2d 760, 762 (Miss.1989)). Mississippi Dep't of Wildlife, Fisheries & Parks v. Mississippi Wildlife Enforcement Officers' Ass'n, Inc., 740 So.2d 925, 929-30 (Miss.1999). ¶ 9. In October, 1997, approximately two and one-half years after this Court's earlier ruling in Heigle I, Jo Ann moved for summary judgment asking the chancery court to rule that she was entitled to an equitable division of the assets accumulated during the time of the marriage between the parties. Jo Ann filed no additional documents in support of her motion. The chancery court granted Jo Ann's motion, stating that Jo Ann Heigle is entitled to an equitable division of the assets accumulated during the time of the marriage between the parties. ¶ 10. Roger strenuously objected to Jo Ann's motion, noting that the earlier ruling of this Court granting an equitable division of the parties' property has been reversed by the Supreme Court, and the plaintiff now asks the Court to make the same determination prematurely that has already been reversed once. ¶ 11. In Heigle I, this Court held the chancellor in error when he found Jo Ann was entitled to an equitable distribution of the marital estate when the chancellor was unable to value the estate due to bankruptcy. Heigle I, 654 So.2d at 898. This Court stated: In the case of property settlement and lump sum alimony, the court's decision must hinge on the value of the marital estate, or the spouses' separate estates. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928-29 (Miss.1994); Cheatham v. Cheatham, 537 So.2d 435, 438 (Miss.1988). In Ferguson, the Court stated: Property division should be based upon a determination of the fair market value of the assets, and these valuations should be the initial step before determining division. 639 So.2d at 929. In the instant case, that information was not before the court when it made its determination due to the bankruptcy proceedings involving Heigle Farms. The value of Roger's partnership interest could be several thousand dollars, or it might be totally worthless. That being the case, the court's decision to grant JoAnn a property settlement and/or lump sum alimony was premature, and we reverse on this issue. 654 So.2d at 898. ¶ 12. The facts that were before the chancellor in Heigle I were the same facts before the chancellor on remand. Neither Jo Ann nor Roger had filed any further evidence with the court that would serve to support or negate Jo Ann's motion for summary judgment. A review of the transcript of the hearing regarding the motion for summary judgment gives no indication that any new information had been provided the court to help determine the value of the marital estate. The marital estate had not been assigned a value at the time summary judgment was granted as was required by this Court in Heigle I. There was no assigned value at the time of the summary judgment in favor of Jo Ann in 1997. ¶ 13. The 1997 granting of a summary judgment announcing or awarding equitable distribution is no more than announcing that the chancellor intended to follow the precedent established by this Court in Ferguson. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921 (Miss.1994). The trial court's granting of a summary judgment in its November 1997 order without assigning any value to the marital estate and without any division of such an estate was a redundant statement of what the law is and did not in any way change the status of the parties and did no harm to the parties; indeed both parties are entitled to an equitable distribution of the marital assets. ¶ 14. The law is clear on this point. As this Court stated in Ferguson, [p]roperty division should be based upon a determination of fair market value of the assets, and these valuations should be the initial step before determining division. Id. at 929. According to Ferguson, the estate must have a value placed upon it before the chancellor can determine what is an equitable distribution. The chancellor did not place a value on the marital estate when he awarded Jo Ann 40% of the marital estate. In 1997 the chancellor did not evaluate the estate, he merely announced that Jo Ann was entitled to an equitable distribution without deciding what that distribution was. ¶ 15. Therefore, no harm, no foul, no division of estate, and no reversal on this issue.