Opinion ID: 758809
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requirements for Commercial Bribery under the Pennsylvania Statute

Text: 34 At the outset, it must be noted that the language of the Pennsylvania commercial bribery statute makes its reach quite broad. It requires that an employee solicit or accept a benefit from another in order to influence the employee's conduct in relation to his employer's affairs. The statute contains no requirement that the affected conduct be in relation to the official duties of an agent or employee, nor does it require a showing that an offender's conduct was adverse to the interests of the employer. In construing the language of the commercial bribery statute and in determining the meaning of conduct in relation to the affairs of an employer, we turn to the case of Commonwealth v. Bellis, 484 Pa. 486, 399 A.2d 397 (Pa.1979), for direction. 35 In Bellis--the only Pennsylvania Supreme Court case which discusses this issue directly--the court affirmed the judgment of sentence of a city councilman convicted of commercial bribery. 8 Bellis, 399 A.2d at 400. Councilman Bellis had represented private parties before city agencies in order to help these companies secure contracts with these agencies. The companies rewarded his efforts accordingly. Among other contentions, Bellis argued to the court that he was not guilty of commercial bribery because the conduct at issue did not interfere with his official duties as a councilman. His conduct involved contracts between third parties and other city agencies and departments, quite apart from any matter before city council or otherwise affecting his role or responsibilities as a councilman. The Bellis court found that it was uncontested that the defendant's acceptance of these bribes did not affect the performance of his official duties as a city councilman and that he did not take any action in City Council on behalf of private parties. Id. at 398. The court stated, however, that whether a particular activity was among an employee's official duties was irrelevant to the commercial bribery inquiry. Id. at 400. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the bribe must impact one's official duties in order to comprise conduct in relation to the affairs of his employer or principal. 36 The Bellis court recognized that commercial bribery was criminalized on the theoretical premise that such acts represent a violation of the duty of loyalty that an employee owes to an employer. The court stated that 37 [t]he purpose of Section 4667 is to require an agent, employe or servant to possess an undivided loyalty to his principal. It is impossible for an agent to retain this loyalty as long as he solicits and/or receives money from third parties in return for acting on their behalf (i.e., showing ... favor or disfavor) in his principal's affairs. By representing private parties before city officials while he was a councilman, appellant showed favor or disfavor in the affairs of his principal (the City of Philadelphia) in that he negotiated on behalf of and in the best interests of private parties in their dealings with the city. Hence, appellant violated Section 4667. 38 Bellis, 399 A.2d at 400. Thus, the court determined that a violation of the employee's duty automatically occurs when an agent or employee offers or receives money which causes him to act in a certain way--namely as the payor wishes--in the conduct of the affairs of his employer. The court viewed the violation as being implicit in the conduct. The act of accepting a benefit to show favor is the gravamen of the crime. 39 The above-quoted language in Bellis makes it disloyal, and criminal, for an employee to accept money to show favor to third parties in his principal's affairs. We view this reasoning as undermining the position taken by our dissenting colleague that being influenced for money in one's job is criminal only if found to be against the interests of the employer. Neither the Pennsylvania legislature, nor its courts, have inserted such a requirement into the offense of commercial bribery. The Bellis court did not examine the contracts in question to determine whether they were good for the City. Nor do we believe that such an inquiry is appropriate under the plain meaning of the statute. The Bellis court made clear that the showing of favor or disfavor on the basis of money paid is the harm addressed by the commercial bribery statute. The court need not make a determination as to whether the choice of a particular vendor influenced by a monetary payment was detrimental to the employer. In U.S. v. Johns, 742 F.Supp. 196, 220 (E.D.Pa.1990), the court found the defendant guilty of commercial bribery under § 4108 even though the parties had stipulated that the price and quality of the products obtained from the favored vendor were more favorable than any offered by competitors. While it is true that other states have included this requirement as a statutory element or interpreted it to be a requirement, those cases are not our guide. 9 Courts should not legislate by reading into the laws provisions not included by the legislature. 10 This principle was recently reiterated by this court in Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 527-28 (3d Cir.1998). There, interpreting a different section of Pennsylvania's commercial bribery statute, we rejected an attempt by one of the parties to insert an additional element--that of the defendant's motivation--into the statute. Id. We noted that the crime of commercial bribery is carefully circumscribed, consistent with our view that elements which do not appear in the statutory language should not be read into the law. 11 40 In order to find the payment of money influenced the employee's conduct in relation to the employer's affairs, we must define the scope of the union's affairs. In so doing, we will consider not only the mission and activities of the union but whether the conduct in question was consistent with the scope of the union agents' employment. Thus, in this case, we must determine if the port agents were performing their jobs in advising the seamen as to counsel for work-related injuries and whether this practice of referral was a concern of the union and part of its affairs. Appellants do not seek to define affairs but contend that whatever it means, the referral to counsel was not part of the affairs of the union. We believe the evidence supports the opposite conclusion. 41