Opinion ID: 2508855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Witness's Invocation of Fifth Amendment Privilege

Text: As noted in the statement of facts, a latent fingerprint belonging to Lance Reedy was found in the townhouse. Other than his parents' ownership of a home nearby, no evidence was introduced of a connection between Reedy and the victims. Appearing with counsel, outside the presence of the jury, Reedy successfully invoked his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination when asked whether he knew the victims, killed them, or lived in his parents' house at the time of the killings. Defense counsel nonetheless called Reedy as a witness, but asked only questions calling for identifying information. Although defendant did not seek at trial to have Reedy invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury  defense counsel thrice conceded such a procedure was improper  he now contends the trial court erred in denying the opportunity to have Reedy do so. Defendant claims his waiver should be excused because any objection to the procedure actually employed would have been futile in light of existing California law (Evid.Code, § 913; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388 ( Mincey )) establishing a criminal defendant is not entitled to compel a witness to invoke the privilege before the jury. He further argues that Mincey was incorrectly decided and its application here deprived him of his right, under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, to present a defense. We disagree both as to waiver and on the merits. In practically the same breath as he asks us to overrule Mincey, defendant argues he did not forfeit the issue below because counsel could not be expected to lodge an objection on the expectation that this Court would change the rule it pronounced in Mincey.  To the contrary, we believe that if defendant wanted to preserve his claim that application of the Mincey rule deprived him of his constitutional rights, he was required to object, in some form, to application of that rule in the trial court. (See Evid.Code, § 354, subd. (a); People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 778, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297.) Defense counsel in no way requested that Reedy be forced to invoke his privilege before the jury, nor does defendant claim the trial court had a sua sponte duty to have Reedy do so. This court could not, therefore, reverse the judgment on the ground of any trial court error, even were we to hold that a defendant is entitled to have the jury hear a witness invoke the privilege. In any event, we do not so hold; instead, we reaffirm the rule expressed in Mincey, which follows necessarily and directly from our Evidence Code. Evidence Code section 913, subdivision (a) provides: If in the instant proceeding or on a prior occasion a privilege is or was exercised not to testify with respect to any matter, or to refuse to disclose or to prevent another from disclosing any matter, neither the presiding officer nor counsel may comment thereon, no presumption shall arise because of the exercise of the privilege, and the trier of fact may not draw any inference therefrom as to the credibility of the witness or as to any matter at issue in the proceeding. Subdivision (b) of the same statute provides that the court, on a party's request, is to instruct the jury not to make any inference from the witness's exercise of a privilege. In People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743, 280 Cal.Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197, we noted that in light of Evidence Code section 913, to put a witness on the stand for the purpose of having the witness invoke the privilege against self-incrimination would only invite the jury to make an improper inference. In Mincey, we reiterated this reasoning, holding that having the witness exercise her privilege in the jury's presence would be in direct violation of Evidence Code section 913. The court's refusal to do so was therefore proper. ( Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 441, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) We also rejected the argument that refusing to do so deprived the defendant of his right to present a defense, observing that a person may invoke the privilege for reasons other than guilt, and [a] defendant's rights to due process and to present a defense do not include a right to present to the jury a speculative, factually unfounded inference. ( Id. at p. 442, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388; accord, People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 991-992, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618.) Although Evidence Code section 913 applies equally in civil litigation as in criminal prosecutions, defendant suggests that case law in civil cases has nonetheless allowed comment to be made on and inferences to be drawn from a witness's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. From that premise he argues that if such inferences are permitted in civil cases, so must they be in criminal cases where the witness is not the defendant, but a third party who is not facing immediate criminal sanction. The probative value of an invocation, defendant argues, does not change because the proceeding is denominated criminal or civil. Defendant's argument founders on its premise that California evidence law differs in this respect between civil and criminal litigation. The only decision he cites on this point is Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107, 130 Cal.Rptr. 257, 550 P.2d 161. [9] We did say in that case that [w]hen a claim of privilege made on this ground in a civil proceeding logically gives rise to an inference which is relevant to the issues involved, the trier of fact may properly draw that inference. ( Id. at p. 117, 130 Cal.Rptr. 257, 550 P.2d 161.) We based that statement on a pre-Evidence Code decision, Nelson v. Southern Pacific Co. (1937) 8 Cal.2d 648, 67 P.2d 682, and on an earlier case upon which Nelson itself relied. In Shepherd v. Superior Court , however, we failed to observe that the 1965 enactment of Evidence Code section 913  prohibiting the drawing of adverse inferences in criminal and civil cases alike  had abrogated the holding in Nelson. As stated in the official comment accompanying the section's enactment as part of the new Evidence Code (see Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (Jan.1995) reprinted at 29B pt. 1 West's Ann. Evid.Code pp. XXXIX et seq.), Section 913 [w]ill, in effect, overrule the holding in the Nelson case, for it declares that no inference may be drawn from an exercise of a privilege either on the issue of credibility or on any other issue, whether the privilege was exercised in the instant proceeding or on a prior occasion. The status of the rule in the Nelson case has been in doubt because of the recent holdings in criminal cases; Section 913 eliminates any remaining basis for applying a different rule in civil cases.  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary com. on 1965 Evid.Code, 29B pt. 3 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foll. § 913, p. 168, italics added.) In light of the intervening enactment, our decision in Shepherd v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d 107, 130 Cal.Rptr. 257, 550 P.2d 161, erred in repeating the rule of Nelson and is overruled to that extent. California law, then, makes no distinction between civil and criminal litigation concerning adverse inferences from a witness's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination; under Evidence Code section 913, juries are forbidden to make such inferences in both types of cases. ( In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 815-816, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 605, 61 P.3d 402.) No purpose is served, therefore, in either type of trial by forcing a witness to exercise the privilege on the stand in the jury's presence, for, as we observed in Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at page 442, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388, the court would then be required, on request, to instruct the jury not to draw the very inference [the party calling the witness] sought to present to the jury. (Evid.Code, § 913, subd. (b).) We reject defendant's contention, founded on the misconception that inferences from exercise of the privilege are deemed valuable and permissible in civil cases, that such inferences must also be permitted to be raised by a criminal defendant.