Opinion ID: 4261509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 1986 Contempt Conviction and Injunction

Text: Mr. Brookens has been a member of the bar in other states but has never been licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia. In 1986, he was convicted after a bench trial of criminal contempt based on his unauthorized practice of law in violation of Rule 49. In re Benoit Brookens, No. 84-98 (D.C. 3 Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 1986).1 In a Memorandum Opinion, the trial court found that, Mr. Brookens had ―represented persons and organizations other than himself before the courts of the District of Columbia and before the Rental Accommodations Office on many occasions, in many different cases,‖ mostly involving the tenants of Dorchester House, an apartment building in which Mr. Brookens himself at one point resided. Based on his representation of others in court and his broader identification of himself as a lawyer ―to the general public,‖2 the trial court found that Mr. Brookens had ―regularly engaged in the practice of law‖ in violation of then-Rule 49.3 But the trial court distinguished this culpable 1 Mr. Brookens was tried by a single judge of this court, the Honorable John A. Terry, see Brookens v. Comm. On Unauthorized Practice of Law, 538 A.2d 1120, 1121 (D.C. 1988); see also D.C. App. R. 49 (d) (1986) (authorizing violations of Rule 49 to ―be punishable as contempt and/or subject to injunctive relief‖ after proceedings conducted ―before a judge of this court designated by the chief judge‖). Because he functioned as the fact-finder in the 1986 proceeding, we refer to Judge Terry as ―the trial court.‖ 2 The trial court found that Mr. Brookens‘ had listed himself as an attorney in the business section of the phone book (―the white pages‖) and had regularly used stationary with letterhead identifying himself as an attorney. 3 In 1986, the ―[p]ractice of law in the District of Columbia‖ was defined in Rule 49 (b), which provided in pertinent part that (1) No person shall regularly engage in the practice of law in the District of Columbia or in any manner hold out as authorized or qualified to practice law in the District of Columbia unless enrolled as an active member of the Bar. (continued…) 4 conduct from Mr. Brookens‘s ―activities before the Rental Accommodations [O]ffice.‖ The court explained that these activities had to ―be considered in a different light‖ because they were not prohibited by Rule 49: Because Rule 49 does not deal with representation of others before [District of Columbia] administrative agencies, and because in this instance [Mr. Brookens‘s] activities before the Rental Accommodations Office were authorized under the rules of that agency, the court concludes that [Mr. Brookens] has not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and has not violated Rule 49, by representing persons other than himself before the Rental Accommodations Office. (…continued) (2) No person . . . shall, in the District of Columbia, advise or counsel any person on matters affecting legal rights, or practice or appear as an attorney at law for a person other than such person in any court . . . or hold out to the public as being entitled to practice; or in any other manner assume to be an attorney at law, or assume, or use or advertise the title of lawyer, attorney or counselor, or any equivalent title, in such manner as to convey the impression that such person is entitled to practice law, or in any manner advertise that such person . . . maintains an office for the practice of law in the District of Columbia, without being an enrolled active member of the Bar. (3) The practice of law as used in this rule shall include, but is not limited to, appearing for any other person as attorney in any court, or preparing for any other person . . . any pleadings of any kind in any action brought before any court . . . . D.C. App. R. 49 (1986). 5 Setting aside his conduct before District agencies, the trial court determined that Mr. Brookens should be penalized for his ―past violations of Rule 49 (b), and . . . enjoined from future violations of Rule 49 (b).‖ Accordingly, the trial court, in its Judgment and Order, fined Mr. Brookens $300 and ―permanently enjoined and prohibited [him] from‖: (1) representing any person other than himself . . . in any court in the District of Columbia unless he is a member of the bar of the court in which such representation takes place; (2) using such terms as ―lawyer,‖ ―attorney,‖ ―counsel,‖ ―counselor‖ or ―counsellor,‖ ―Esq.‖ or ―Esquire‖ to refer to himself in such manner as to convey the impression that he is entitled or authorized to practice law in the District of Columbia, or in any way holding himself out as authorized or qualified to practice law in the District of Columbia; (3) engaging in any manner in the practice of law in the District of Columbia, as that term is defined in Rule 49 (b)(3) of the General Rules of this court; and (4) engaging in any other conduct prohibited by Rule 49 (b)(2) of the General Rules of this court. B. The Appeal of the 1986 Contempt Conviction and Injunction Both Mr. Brookens and the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (CUPL) appealed—Mr. Brookens seeking to overturn the determination that he had violated Rule 49 in any way; the CUPL seeking ―reversal of the finding that [Mr.] Brookens‘[s] activities before a District of Columbia agency did not 6 constitute the unauthorized practice of law.‖ Brookens, 538 A.2d at 1122. This court affirmed the challenged judgment and order ―in all respects.‖ Id. at 1127. Specifically, with respect to the CUPL‘s appeal, we rejected the argument that Mr. Brookens had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law ―as defined in [Rule] 49 (b),‖ by virtue of his appearances on behalf of clients before District agencies. Id. at 1125. We not only upheld agency regulations authorizing nonlawyers ―to appear on behalf of clients,‖ id., we also left in place the trial court‘s determination that ―Rule 49 does not deal with representation of others before [District of Columbia] administrative agencies,‖ observing that ―[w]hile it is clear that this court is empowered to define the practice of law so that it either excludes or includes lay representation before agencies, it is also true that such an undertaking implicates important public policy questions.‖ Id. at 1127. We further noted that ―administrative review of [Rule] 49 is currently and formally underway by this court, the affected agencies, and the Committee,‖ and stated that we would not ―interrupt the progress that has already been made in solving the apparent conflict between the rules of this court and the regulations of some District of Columbia agencies.‖ Id. 7 C. The Revision of Rule 49 Rule 49 was eventually revised in 1998. As modified, it governs conduct before District agencies.4 The definition of the ―[p]ractice of law‖ extends beyond conduct in ―court‖ to include, inter alia, ―[p]reparing any . . . pleadings of any kind . . . for filing in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal,‖ D.C. App. R. 49 (b)(2)(D) (2017) (emphasis added), and ―[a]ppearing or acting as an attorney in any tribunal,‖ D.C. App. R. 49 (b)(2)(C) (2017) (emphasis added). D. The 2011 Criminal Contempt Prosecution In April 2011, twenty-five years after the issuance of the 1986 injunction and thirteen years after the revision of Rule 49, the government charged Mr. Brookens with nineteen counts of contempt under D.C. Code § 11-944 (a) (2001),5 for violating the 1986 injunction. Every count in the information related to his 4 Rule 49 was also reorganized such that a general prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law is now located in section (a) and pertinent definitions are located in section (b). D.C. App. R. 49 (2017). 5 D.C. Code § 11-944 (a) provides that, ―[s]ubject to the limitations [regarding punishment] described in subsection (b), and in addition to the powers conferred by [18 U.S.C. § 402], the Superior Court, or a judge thereof, may punish for disobedience of an order or for contempt committed in the presence of the court.‖ 8 continued representation of Dorchester tenants before two District of Columbia agencies: the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) and Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). Ultimately, the government proceeded on only four counts. Two (counts fifteen and sixteen) alleged that Mr. Brookens violated the 1986 injunction by holding himself out as an attorney by signing ―Esquire‖ on two 2005 pleadings he filed with the DCRA. A third (count eighteen) alleged that, ―[o]n at least one occasion‖ between January 1996 and June 2008, Mr. Brookens violated the 1986 injunction by ―engaging in the unlawful practice of law in violation of Rule 49 (b)(2).‖ And, a fourth (count nineteen) alleged that, during the same twelve-year time period, Mr. Brookens violated the 1986 injunction by ―representing a person other than himself (specifically Dorchester Tenants and Dorchester Tenants‘ Association) in the District of Columbia without being a member of the District of Columbia Bar.‖ 6 6 At oral argument, the government alluded to an earlier effort by the CUPL in 2003 to investigate or prosecute Mr. Brookens for similar conduct. The government subsequently moved to supplement the record with a number of documents mostly comprised of CUPL work product and correspondence, spanning a twelve-year period between 1999 and 2011. The government cited no rationale or authority for our consideration of the proffered material to the extent it falls outside of the appellate record, and, with this opinion, we deny that motion. See D.C. App. R. 10 (a) (defining the ―record on appeal‖ to include ―(1) the original papers and exhibits filed in the Superior Court; (2) the transcript of proceedings, if any; and (3) a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the Clerk of the Superior Court.‖). 9 Prior to trial, Mr. Brookens moved to dismiss all four contempt counts. Among other things, he argued that these charges were time-barred by the catchall three-year statute of limitations for criminal misdemeanors set forth in D.C. Code § 23-113 (a)(5) (2001).7 He also argued that the 1986 injunction had not prohibited his conduct before administrative agencies and that his conduct was authorized under the agencies‘ rules. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that D.C. Code § 23-113 did not apply to contempt charges under D.C. Code § 11944 and, even if § 23-113 did apply, the charges were brought within three years of Mr. Brookens‘s ―12 years of engaging in criminal contempt.‖ The court likewise rejected Mr. Brookens‘s argument that he could not be guilty of contempt because his conduct before administrative agencies was authorized, reasoning that Mr. Brookens ―was not charged with the unauthorized practice of law, but with [c]riminal [c]ontempt for violating a restraining order.‖ The trial court further 7 Criminal contempt under D.C. Code § 11-944 may be prosecuted as a misdemeanor or a felony. See In re Marshall, 549 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 1988) (explaining that ―[b]ecause contempt has no statutory penalty limit, . . . we look to the penalty actually imposed‖ to determine if the defendant was prosecuted for misdemeanor or a felony contempt); see also Caldwell v. United States, 595 A.2d 961, 965 (D.C. 1991) (noting ―[t]here is no limitation on the length of the sentence for criminal contempt‖). At the time Mr. Brookens raised his statute of limitations defense, the trial court had already announced that it would not sentence him on any given count to more than 180 days. 10 explained its understanding that this court had ―permanently enjoined [Mr. Brookens] from representing himself as authorized to practice law in the District of Columbia‖ and that ―[r]egardless of whether he was permitted to represent a client before an administrative agency, he was still enjoined from representing himself as authorized to practice law.‖ At trial, the government presented evidence that Mr. Brookens had represented Dorchester tenants before District agencies in a number of related cases over a number of years and, inter alia, had signed pleadings identifying himself as counsel and had sought attorney‘s fees. The government argued that this conduct violated Rule 49. The government relied on the 2008 edition of the rule, a copy of which it submitted to the court over Mr. Brookens‘s objection that it was not the ―proper‖ Rule 49—i.e., that it was not the operative rule when the 1986 injunction was issued. Mr. Brookens did not meaningfully challenge the government‘s evidence regarding his particular conduct. Instead, consistent with his motion to dismiss, he argued that his actions were not prohibited by the 1986 injunction and were ―authorized‖ by agency regulations at the time and by various hearing examiners and administrative law judges.8 As a corollary to this argument, 8 Mr. Brookens argued that District agencies had for years ―authorized, encouraged, ordered and supported [him] in representing the [Dorchester] tenants‖ (continued…) 11 Mr. Brookens argued that because he did not understand the injunction to prohibit him from practicing law before agencies, he did not have the requisite intent to willfully violate the injunction. The trial court found Mr. Brookens guilty on all four counts of contempt, sentenced him to four concurrent sentences (suspended) of 180 days‘ incarceration, and enjoined him from holding a job ―in any capacity, in a District of Columbia law office.‖ This appeal followed.9