Opinion ID: 1715331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: record required for appellate review

Text: Having determined that Bass carried the burden of proving that one of the four exceptions to rule 37(c) existed, we must now address the Court of Appeals' holding that Kaminski nevertheless failed to present a proper record on his appeal to support his assigned errors. The majority noted that the same judge sat at both the underlying trial and at the hearing on the motion and therefore concluded that the judge may have based his decision to deny Kaminski's motion on evidence he heard at the underlying trial. Because Kaminski did not offer the bill of exceptions of the underlying trial into evidence at his motion for expenses, the majority held that it was incapable of determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, and the majority therefore affirmed the district court's decision. Kaminski contends this holding is erroneous, arguing that a motion for expenses pursuant to rule 37(c) is a special proceeding, thereby constraining appellate review to the record made at the hearing on the motion. Implicit in this proposition is the idea that the proceedings on Kaminski's motion for expenses is independent and separate from the proceedings of the underlying trial. This position was espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court in a slightly different context in White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982). The plaintiff in White brought a successful 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the defendant. Approximately 4½ months after judgment was entered, the plaintiff sought attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court awarded fees, but the court of appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that the motion for fees constituted a motion to alter or amend the judgment which must be brought within 10 days of the entry of judgment pursuant to Fed.R. of Civ.P. 59(e). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the motion for fees was a collateral and independent action separate from the trial on the merits. According to the Court: Section 1988 provides for awards of attorney's fees only to a prevailing party. Regardless of when attorney's fees are requested, the court's decision of entitlement to fees will therefore require an inquiry separate from the decision on the meritsan inquiry that cannot even commence until one party has prevailed. Nor can attorney's fees fairly be characterized as an element of relief indistinguishable from other elements. Unlike other judicial relief, the attorney's fees allowed under § 1988 are not compensation for the injury giving rise to an action. Their award is uniquely separable from the cause of action to be proved at trial. 455 U.S. at 451-52, 102 S.Ct. at 1166. In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990), the Supreme Court held that a motion for sanctions under Fed.R. of Civ.P. 11 could be brought after the underlying suit was voluntarily dismissed without prejudiced. The Court specifically rejected the petitioner's contention that the dismissal deprived the district court of jurisdiction to grant a rule 11 motion and impose sanctions, writing: It is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending.... This Court has indicated that motions for costs or attorney's fees are independent proceeding[s] supplemental to the original proceeding and not a request for a modification of the original decree. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170 [59 S.Ct. 777, 781-82, 83 L.Ed. 1184] (1939). Thus, even years after the entry of a judgment on the merits a federal court could consider an award of counsel fees. White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 451, n. 13 [102 S.Ct. 1162, 1166, n. 13, 71 L.Ed.2d 325] (1982).... Like the imposition of costs, attorney's fees, and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits of an action. Rather, it requires the determination of a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process, and, if so, what sanction would be appropriate. Such a determination may be made after the principal suit has been terminated. 496 U.S. at 395-96, 110 S.Ct. at 2455-56. As the Court succinctly stated in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 200, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1720-21, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988), As a general matter, at least, we think it indisputable that a claim for attorney's fees is not part of the merits of the action to which the fees pertain. Such an award does not remedy the injury giving rise to the action. See, also, Stachurski v. Moore, 610 N.E.2d 272 (Ind.App.1993) (motion filed pursuant to rule 37(c) is collateral matter separate from merits of underlying case). As the above excerpts make clear, a motion for attorney fees has routinely been held to be a collateral and independent request from the underlying merits of the case between the parties. We conclude that the same holds true for a motion for expenses under rule 37(c), for such a motion does not bring into question the underlying decision, it simply seeks what is due because of that decision. In other words, a hearing on a motion for expenses pursuant to rule 37(c) is a legal proceeding entirely separate from the underlying trial or proceedings concerning the merits of the case. It therefore follows that the appellate court reviewing a decision on a motion for expenses is to concern itself solely with the evidence established and produced at that hearing. See Abboud v. Cutler, 238 Neb. 177, 469 N.W.2d 763 (1991) (reviewing court considers only evidence that appears in record). We note, however, that our determination in no way prevents a party from introducing portions of the underlying trial. Applying the foregoing analysis to the instant case, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Kaminski's rule 37(c) motion. As noted previously, rule 37(c) states that a district court shall award expenses incurred in proving a statement previously denied unless one of four exceptions are proven. At the hearing on Kaminski's motion, he introduced evidence establishing that Bass was asked to admit that she made the statement that Kaminski was known to be a drug dealer but denied it and that Kaminski incurred expenses in proving she made the statement. The burden then shifted to Bass to prove one of the four enumerated exceptions in rule 37(c). Offering no evidence whatsoever at the hearing, Bass failed to meet this burden. As such, the district court was required to award expenses to Kaminski pursuant to rule 37(c), thereby making the court's overruling of Kaminski's motion an abuse of discretion.