Opinion ID: 70404
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Upward Departure Granted by the District Court

Text: 30 The trial court found that the Prices' crimes went beyond the heartland of typical cases, see U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.0, and departed upward by two levels from the applicable guidelines in calculating their sentences. (R. 31 at 103.) In deciding that this case merited departure, the court found that three aspects of the Prices' activities were not adequately considered by the guidelines: (1) their extreme conduct, including the fact that harassment of Leon Capouano was motivated by racial and ethnic prejudice, and that the Prices planned to mutilate IRS agent David Huff; (2) the risk of harm to innocent bystanders because of the plan to blow up Capouano's law firm; and (3) the extreme psychological injury to Kenny Price and other victims. 8 The court treated these factors as a group, assigning no relative weight to one factor over another in making the decision to depart from the guidelines. The Prices challenge the departure, arguing that the sentencing guidelines adequately considered all aspects of their crimes, and that there was insufficient factual support for the trial court's findings. The government originally moved for a four-level departure, but on appeal urges us to affirm the two-level departure as reasonable. 31 In sentencing determinations, a court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the guidelines, if the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b) (1988). We review such departures by applying a three-step analysis. United States v. Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323, 1325 (11th Cir.1994) (citing Weaver, 920 F.2d at 1573). We review de novo a decision as to whether the guidelines adequately consider a particular factor so as to preclude a sentencing court's reliance on it as a basis for departure. Id. Second, we review the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to depart for clear error. Id. Finally, we review the departure itself for reasonableness. Id.; accord United States v. Passmore, 984 F.2d 933, 937 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that extent of upward departure is a judgment call by district court). We deal with each factor relied upon by the trial court in turn. 32
33 The Prices do not challenge the trial court's determination that racist or anti-semitic motivation for a crime was a proper basis for departure. 9 Instead, they argue that their actions were not racially or ethnically motivated, and that it was clear error for the trial court to find that they were. Our review, then, is limited to determining whether the trial court's factual findings are clearly erroneous. 34 We find no clear error in the trial court's finding that the Prices were motivated by ethnic hatred in their harassment of Leon Capouano. While it is true that the court, as well as the government, acknowledged that two primary motivators for the Prices' conduct were greed and business litigation, the trial court concluded that racial and ethnic prejudice also played a part. See McAninch, 994 F.2d at 1388 (affirming trial court's conclusion that hatred was motivator of crime despite evidence that psychological problems could have been the cause). The Prices knew that Capouano was Jewish, and when they vandalized his home they painted swastikas and anti-semitic and racist remarks designed to strike at his religious heritage. The Prices also made repeated anti-semitic remarks about Capouano and Jews in general. While the Prices counter that any racist and anti-semitic conduct was impulsive and isolated, there is evidence that the Prices put some thought into what they did and how they did it. See United States v. Sanders, 41 F.3d 480, 485 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that racist and anti-semitic letters, though short and simplistic, evidenced deliberation where defendant had to look up addresses and tailor each message to the group he was attacking), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2010, 131 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1995). 35 As for the proposed mutilation of IRS agent Dwight Huff, the Sentencing Commission did not adequately provide for such a grisly variety of the crime when it designed the applicable guidelines for conspiracy, solicitation, or murder-for-hire. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.8 (allowing departure where defendant's conduct was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to victim). As the trial court concluded, these crimes were more depraved than the typical cases the guidelines were designed to cover, so that a departure based in part on the proposed mutilation of Huff was warranted. Further, we find no clear error in the trial court's underlying factual findings. John Price explicitly ordered Huff's well-damaged carcass in a taped conversation with the FBI. 36
37 The trial court held that the potential for injury even to the point of death to a multitude of unknown victims as a result of the defendants' criminal activity was a factor not adequately considered in the applicable guidelines. (R. 31 at 104.) The factual predicate to this holding was the probability of injury to innocent bystanders had the scheme to blow up Leon Capouano's law office succeeded. The Prices argue that any risk to bystanders was already taken into account by the guidelines. 38 We first examine the guidelines to determine whether the district court correctly concluded that the danger to innocent bystanders from a bombing was not adequately considered. Reading U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K1.4, we agree with the Prices that the risk of harm to third parties is already incorporated into the guideline applicable to property damage caused by explosives. The presentence investigation reports explicitly applied guideline Sec. 2K1.4(a)(1), which provides for a greater base offense level where the crime created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to any person other than a participant in the offense.... (emphasis added). This includes people caught inside a building as well as bystanders injured in a blast. There may well be bombing cases involving risks to third parties of a kind outside the heartland of such cases. But the government points to nothing in the record demonstrating that this is such a case. As a result, we hold that the trial court misapplied the guidelines to the extent that the risk to third parties was double-counted; the court's reliance on the harm to innocent bystanders was thus misplaced as a ground for departure. 39
40 The Prices also challenge the court's reliance on its finding of extreme psychological harm to several of the victims, most notably Kenny Price, as a basis for upward departure. The Prices do not question the court's capacity to increase their sentences where their victims suffered severe psychological injury. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.3. They only argue that the evidence introduced by the government did not show that Kenny Price or the other victims suffered an injury much more serious than that normally resulting from being a target for murder. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.3, p.s. Our review, then, is limited to reviewing the court's factual findings for clear error. 41 To be sufficiently severe to warrant a departure, there must be a substantial impairment of the intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral functioning of a victim likely to last for an extended duration and to manifest itself by physical or psychological symptoms, or by changes in behavior. U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.3. See United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d 214, 218 (11th Cir.1993) (stating that [w]e doubt that feelings of foolishness, anger, or disappointment are so far beyond the heartland of fraud offenses to rise to the level of extreme psychological harm). While we have never decided the extent of harm needed to show extreme psychological injury, other circuits have affirmed trial courts that departed from the guidelines based on factual findings similar to those in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 5 F.3d 795, 804-805 (5th Cir.1993) (upholding departure based on letter of victim describing her ordeal and its effects on her life), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1118, 127 L.Ed.2d 428 (1994); United States v. Miller, 993 F.2d 16, 21 (2d Cir.1993) (upholding departure where victim was afraid to answer phone, open mail, or stay in New York area). 42 Upon review of the presentence investigation reports (PSIs), we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that several of the victims suffered severe psychological injuries of the type addressed by U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.3. The PSIs state that this ordeal was very traumatic for Kenny Price. He attended counseling sessions, and at one point contemplated suicide. Kenny suffered from depression, and he stated that he no longer felt safe in his home or when he went anywhere. IRS agent Dwight Huff stated in the PSIs that his whole family changed their lifestyle to be extra cautious of their surroundings, and he also said that his children were psychologically affected. Leon Capouano and David Hawthorne installed security systems in their houses and also restricted their activities outside their homes after the incidents at issue in this case. We find no error in the trial court's reliance on this evidence of extreme psychological injury as a basis for upward departure under U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.3. 43
44 Our final task in weighing the trial court's decision to depart is to evaluate the overall departure for reasonableness. Dailey, 24 F.3d at 1325. The trial court did not separately assign a departure level to each ground in ordering an overall departure of two levels. In light of our determination that one of the three grounds for the departure was already considered in the relevant guidelines, we are unable to say that the overall departure would have been the same based only on the other two grounds. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 202-03, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1120-21, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992). Therefore, we vacate the sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.