Opinion ID: 2356024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the Post-conviction Review Statute's Jurisdictional Prerequisite

Text: [¶ 12] Ngo argues that if the jurisdictional prerequisite of the post-conviction review statute does not allow him to maintain a cause of action for post-conviction review, then the statute is unconstitutionally arbitrary as applied to him. [¶ 13] The right to post-conviction review is not a fundamental right and thus, the statute is constitutional if it is rationally related to the government's interest. [4] See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997); PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1st Cir.1991); Swan v. Sohio Oil Co., 618 A.2d 214, 219(Me.1992). [¶ 14] When a statute is reviewed under the rational basis standard, it bears a strong presumption of validity. Anderson v. Town of Durham, 2006 ME 39, ¶ 29, 895 A.2d 944, 953. A statute runs afoul of the Due Process Clause only if it `manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.' United States v. Neal, 46 F.3d 1405, 1409 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975)). [T]he statute's justification need not be expressly articulated or readily apparent `so long as a court can divine some rational purpose.' Id. (quoting United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C.Cir.1989)). [¶ 15] The jurisdictional prerequisite of the post-conviction statute, 15 M.R.S. § 2124, is constitutionally sound. Limiting actions for post-conviction review is rationally related to legitimate state interests in promoting timely resolution of criminal charges, protecting the finality of judgments, and providing closure for injured victims. See Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 378-80, 383, 121 S.Ct. 1578, 149 L.Ed.2d 590(2001). [¶ 16] There is a rational distinction between Ngo's situation and the restraints and impediments described by section 2124, which are all imposed by a government as a criminal punishment. The deportation that Ngo may face, based on the criminal judgment he seeks to challenge, is a civil sanction and one that is not imposed as punishment for a crime. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 491, 119 S.Ct. 936; INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050, 104 S.Ct. 3479. Federal courts treat the immigration consequences of state court convictions that Ngo potentially faces as collateral consequences, not as punishment. See, e.g., Resendiz, 416 F.3d at 957; United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2000). Therefore, it is rational to distinguish between persons in Ngo's position and persons who can demonstrate one of the direct or indirect impediments described in 15 M.R.S. § 2124. Because the jurisdictional prerequisite of the post-conviction review statute is not utterly lacking in rational justification, Neal, 46 F.3d at 1409, it is not unconstitutionally arbitrary as applied to Ngo and does not violate his right to substantive due process. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. LEVY, J., concurring. [¶ 17] I join in the Court's opinion. I write separately to emphasize that the sole constitutional issue raised by Ngo is whether the post-conviction review statute, 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121-2132 (2007), violates his right to substantive due process under the United States and Maine Constitutions. Therefore, we have not addressed whether the statute affords all of the process that is constitutionally required for an individual who claims, long after completing any incarceration and probation, to be harmed by serious collateral consequences arising from an allegedly unconstitutional criminal conviction. See State v. Trott, 2004 ME 15, ¶ 13, 841 A.2d 789, 792-93 (finding it unnecessary to address a defendant's claim to the writ of coram nobis where the defendant otherwise qualified for post-conviction review under 15 M.R.S. § 2124(1)(C)); see also Thoresen v. State, 239 A.2d 654, 655 (Me.1968) (finding the writ of coram nobis no longer available).