Opinion ID: 2551235
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Plaintiff's Motion In Limine

Text: The plaintiff next contends that the trial justice committed reversible error and abused his discretion when he denied plaintiffs motion in limine to exclude evidence of her smoking, or at minimum limit its reach, in accordance with Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 states: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The plaintiff argues that there was no probative value of the evidence that she smoked because Dr. Akelman testified that there was no good science one way or the other that smoking impeded the initial nonunion of plaintiff's fracture. The plaintiff contends that any probative value of this type of evidence substantially was outweighed by the unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues and the danger of misleading the jury. Additionally, plaintiff argues the trial justice failed to distinguish the effects of plaintiffs pre-injury smoking from post-surgical smoking. The defendant responds that evidence of smoking was probative to the issues before the jury and further, that plaintiff has taken Dr. Akelman's testimony out of context. After reviewing the record, we agree with defendant. During a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Dr. Akelman opined: I would go out of my way to talk with [a patient] to make sure [the patient] stopped smoking. Because it's an additional risk factor. It adds to your risk of healing. In terms of quantifying it, I don't think there is good science one way or the other about that within the frame of a nondisplaced scaphoid fracture. (Emphasis added.) According to the witness, smoking substantially increased plaintiffs risk of not healing from the time of her first surgery and was a major issue relative to the subsequent nonunion. The defendant contends that the trial justice properly limited the reach of this evidence by giving a preliminary instruction to the jury and by confining Dr. Akelman's testimony about the effects of smoking on bone healing to the period after the surgeries. The defendant also posits that notwithstanding any error on the part of the trial justice, plaintiff failed to preserve this issue for our review. In DiPetrillo, we noted that `[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403    exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.' DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 688 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786). This Court will not reverse a decision of a trial justice admitting or excluding evidence in the absence of an abuse of discretion. State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 153-54 (R.I.2009). When the trial justice's discretion has been soundly and judicially exercised, in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the court and the parties, the decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Morra v. Harrop, 791 A.2d 472, 476-77 (R.I.2002). In this case, during the pretrial arguments, the trial justice noted the potential prejudicial effect of smoking evidence, telling counsel that: [T]here will be no inquiry whatsoever about smoking by the plaintiff prior to the date of injury. It would be highly prejudicial. It's really immaterial and irrelevant to any issue that this jury needs to decide. Because the whole point of the defendant's expert's testimony is, they are going to say, on a going-forward basis, once she had a fracture, her smoking impacted the healing process. Although after the mid-trial voir dire Dr. Akelman was prevented from discussing the effects of smoking on plaintiff's initial fracture, the jury was not informed of this circumstance. Before counsel's opening statements, the trial justice informed the jury that: Smoking may become an issue in this case. Therefore, because some individuals may have strong feelings about this issue, whether you're for smoking or you're against smoking, I must spend a moment discussing it with you.    The plaintiff is a cigarette smoker. That activity is not unlawful. And obviously, you should draw no adverse or negative inference about this plaintiff based on that fact alone. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the trial justice appropriately limited the use of evidence about plaintiff's smoking and did not err in refusing to exclude it. We also note that plaintiff moved mid-trial to strike Dr. Akelman's testimony based on his purported failure adequately to lay a foundation setting forth the number of cases of nonunion of fractures he encountered and the number of patients who were cigarette smokers. The trial justice rejected this motion, finding that the doctor was qualified to render an expert opinion based on his education, training and experience. We agree with this ruling; any challenge to the number of patients Dr. Akelman actually treated for scaphoid fractures would go to the weight of his testimony and not its admissibility. See ADP Marshall, Inc. v. Brown University, 784 A.2d 309, 314 (R.I.2001) (in which we held that once an expert has shown that the methodology or principle underlying his or her testimony is scientifically valid and that it `fits' an issue in the case, the expert's testimony should be put to the trier of fact to determine how much weight to accord the evidence) (quoting Raimbeault v. Takeuchi Manufacturing (U.S.), Ltd., 772 A.2d 1056, 1061 (R.I.2001)). Moreover, the record discloses that plaintiff failed to object to the qualifications of Dr. Akelman to render an opinion.