Opinion ID: 2622018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Act Is Void for Vagueness

Text: ś 89 A vague statute violates the basic principle of due process contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution [12] if it fails to (1) provide fair notice of the proscribed conduct or (2) provide clear standards. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications. Id. at 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (footnotes omitted); see also State v. Williams, 144 Wash.2d 197, 203, 26 P.3d 890 (2001). ś 90 The Post Home contends the Act violates the first aspect of the vagueness test. It argues the Act's definition of place of employment is vague as to what private facilities are exempt. ś 91 The majority asserts the statute is not vague because no private facility is exempt from the prohibition on smoking in places of employment. That is simply not true. Smoking is permitted in a private enclosed workplace, within a public place, even though such workplace may be visited by nonsmokers. . . . RCW 70.160.060. As the trial judge noted, I'm not sure what that means, because in my interpretation of what's been done here, if that so-called private workplace had employees, then this law covers them. So how do you have a private workplace without employees? Report of Proceedings at 40. If a learned trial judge is unable to make heads or tails out of the Act, how is a person of ordinary intelligence expected to be able to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct? Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294. ś 92 The majority all but concedes the point, but dodges the issue because the Post is asserting only an as-applied vagueness challenge. Majority at 328. [13] According to the majority the interplay between these exceptions [private facility and private workplace within a public place] and their application in other situations (such as hotel rooms) . . . are not before the court. . . . Id. ś 93 I agree with the majority insofar as we are not discussing hotel rooms. However, that does not answer the question of whether a reasonable person would understand the Act prohibits smoking at the Post Home or other private member-run organizations with member-employees. The Act prohibits smoking at places of employment but permits smoking at private facilities and private enclosed workplace[s], within a public place. RCW 70.160.060. ś 94 I agree with the trial judge; I am not sure what this means or how it applies (or perhaps not applies) to the Post Home. As such, the statute is vague.