Opinion ID: 3011349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: This matter comes on before this court on an appeal by the Government from an order entered November 30, 1999, dismissing an indictment of the defendant, Joseph Dees, charging him with unauthorized use of access devices to obtain money, goods, and services aggregating more than $1,000 in value in a one-year period, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1029(a)(2) (section 1029(a)(2)). The district court dismissed the indictment on Dees's motion as it agreed with him that the statute of limitations barred the prosecution. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. S 3231 and we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. S 3731. See 18 U.S.C. S 3282. We exercise plenary review on this appeal. See United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 123 n.4 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 618 (1999). The indictment charged that from March 24, 1994, through on or about July 29, 1994, Dees used access devices, i.e., credit cards, to obtain money, goods, and services aggregating more than $1,000 in value, within a one-year period; said offense affecting interstate commerce. The Government proposes to prove three purchases in support of the charge: (1) an automobile purchase of $6,368.20 on March 24, 1994; (2) a chair purchase of $2,000 on March 25, 1994; and (3) a cellular telephone purchase of $100 on July 29, 1994. 2 In moving to dismiss the indictment on statute of limitations grounds Dees pointed out that section 1029(a)(2) provides: whoever . . . knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics in or uses one or more unauthorized access devices during any one-year period, and by such conduct obtains anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more during that period . . . shall, if the offense affects interstate or foreign commerce, be punished. . . . Dees argued that inasmuch as the grand jury returned the indictment on July 22, 1999, 18 U.S.C. S 3282, which states that, except as otherwise provided by law or in a capital offense, an indictment must be found within five years next after such offense shall have been committed, barred the prosecution. He contended that the first two purchases constituted offenses in themselves completed more than five years before the indictment was returned, as these purchases each exceeded the $1,000 threshold in section 1029(a)(2). Accordingly, there could have been a separate indictment for each of those purchases. Thus, he contended that their prosecution in the three-purchase indictment was barred. In his view, it therefore followed that the indictment had to be dismissed because hisfinal use of a credit card did not enable him to obtain a thing equaling $1,000 or more in value. The district court granted the motion on the theory that the original two purchases were not within the five-year period before the return of the indictment. It thus held that the only fraudulent act that is timely for purposes of this statute of limitations occurred on July 29, 1999, and this use does not satisfy the statutory minimum of $1,000. The court did not suggest that its result might have been different if the first two purchases in themselves did not result in Dees obtaining something aggregating $1,000 or more in value.