Opinion ID: 185671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's alternative rationales fail

Text: 15 Mr. Marquez's motions for an extension of time, filed within the seven-day period, cannot be construed as motions for a new trial. Both of Mr. Marquez's motions lacked the essential ingredient for such a motion: they failed to request a new trial. See FED.R.CRIM.P. 47 (providing that a motion must set forth the relief sought). One of the motions stated that ineffective assistance of counsel may be grounds for a new trial, but did not actually request a new trial. See R. D. Moreover, the motion admitted that trial counsel had not been able to draft the motion for a new trial. Id. 16 Similarly, the District Court's suggestion that it would regard the failure to file a motion for a new trial as constituting ineffective assistance of counsel does not cure the problem here. In other pronouncements, the trial judge took responsibility for the mistake of allowing the seven days to lapse and noted that it was not trial counsel's fault. Even if trial counsel's failure to file the correct motion were behavior amounting to ineffective assistance, this would not be grounds for suspending Rule 33. The only exception to the rule's limits is an erroneous ruling by the trial court; a mistake by counsel is insufficient.