Opinion ID: 168802
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Second, Third, and Eighth Circuit Decisions

Text: The district court relied heavily in its decision to grant W edelstedt’s habeas petition on decisions from the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits. Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006); Fults v. Sanders, 442 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2006); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005). The Levine, Fults, and Woodall courts each determined that the BOP regulations at 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20 and 570.21 contradicted the clear and unambiguous congressional intent expressed in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Levine, 455 F.3d at 87; Fults, 442 F.3d at 1092; Woodall, 432 F.3d at 249. Each court interpreted § 3621(b) to clearly and unambiguously require the BOP to consider the five factors set out in § 3621(b)(1)-(5) when making placement and transfer decisions, and interpreted the C CC placement restrictions in § 570.21 as preventing the B OP from fully considering of each of these factors. Levine, 455 F.3d at 87 (“Section 3621(b) establishes clear parameters for the BOP’s exercise of discretion in 4 (...continued) Because it determined the BOP regulations were contrary to clear congressional intent, the district court did not reach W edelstedt’s Administrative Procedure Act claim. -7- making prison placements and transfers. By sorting prisoners’ eligibility for [CCCs] only according to the portion of time served, the BOP has unlaw fully excised these parameters from the statute.”); Fults, 442 F.3d at 1092 (“[T]he BOP’s regulation necessarily conflicts with § 3621(b) by excluding an entire class of inmates— those not serving the final ten percent of their sentences— from the opportunity to be transferred to a CCC.”); Woodall, 432 F.3d at 249 (“[W ]e are faced with a statute providing that the BOP must consider several factors in CCC placement, and a regulation providing that the agency may not consider those factors in full. The conflict between the regulations and the statute seems unavoidable.”). Under Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources D efense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984), these courts ruled the regulations were invalid. Because each court determined § 3621(b) includes a clear assertion of congressional intent, each rejected the B OP’s argument that, under Lopez v. Davis, 531 U .S. at 242, the promulgation of §§ 570.20 and 570.21 was a permissible exercise of the BOP’s categorical rulemaking authority. Levine, 455 F.3d at 85; Fults, 442 F.3d at 1091; Woodall, 432 U.S. at 246-47. 5 5 The statutory provision at issue in Lopez was 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), which provides the B OP with discretion to reduce a nonviolent offender’s sentence by up to one year after the prisoner successfully completes a substance abuse treatment program. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 232 (2001). The BOP promulgated a regulation to categorically exclude from the possibility of early release any inmate whose current offense was a felony that involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 550.58). The Lopez Court interpreted the statute authorizing the BOP rule to (continued...) -8-