Opinion ID: 555138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court's Denial of Tabacca's Motion For Judgment of Acquittal

Text: 17 Tabacca argues that the District Court erred for two reasons in denying his motions for Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a). First, he asserts that a violation of 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(j) 3 requires that the safety of the aircraft be endangered, and that there was insufficient evidence in this case to make such a finding. Second, Tabacca argues that even if endangering the safety of the aircraft is not required, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that Tabacca had intimidated Pamela Martinez.
18 On appeal, in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the appellate court should determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the jury could reasonably find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Hazeem, 679 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 848, 103 S.Ct. 106, 74 L.Ed.2d 95 (1982). 19 The requirements for a violation under 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(j) is a question of statutory interpretation, and is therefore subject to de novo review by this court. United States v. Fredman, 833 F.2d 837, 838 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 827 (9th Cir.1982). 20 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences favorable to the government. The conviction will be upheld if any reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1165, 105 S.Ct. 926, 83 L.Ed.2d 938 (1985). 21 B. Interpretation of 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(j); Sufficiency of the Evidence as to the Endangerment of the Aircraft 1) Legislative History of Sec. 1472(j) 22 In support of his position that he must have endangered the safety of the aircraft to have violated Sec. 1472(j), Tabacca points to remarks made by the provision's sponsor, Senator Engle. 23 When the Senate bill introducing Sec. 1472(j) was first drafted, it applied only to interference with the cockpit crew, and not with the flight attendants. A subsequent House amendment made it applicable to flight attendants as well. 107 Cong.Rec. 17170 (August 28, 1961). In the debate on the Senate floor concerning acceptance of the House amendment, Senator Engle made the following statements: 24 I believe we were right in the first instance in not applying to stewardesses the provision which applied to flight crew members who were actually employed in duties directly involving the safety of the aircraft. But the crime having to do with interference with stewardesses may be prosecuted, either under section 1 or the other section. We assume that, if it was a minor crime, like that of a drunk quarreling with a stewardess over whether or not he could keep his bottle, he would not be charged under the major punishment portion of the bill, but under the minor provision, which would not carry the heavy penalty. 25 Id. The House amendment was subsequently accepted by the Senate and became part of the statute as passed. 26 Relying on Senator Engle's statement, Tabacca argues that minor crimes directed at flight attendants should be punished pursuant to less severe provisions than Sec. 1472(j), such as Sec. 1472(k ). 4 27 However, Tabacca's use of Senator Engle's remarks to support his construction of the statute is not persuasive.--If [statutory] language is unambiguous, and if Congress has not clearly expressed a contrary intent, we will regard that language as conclusive. United States v. Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 679 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890, 107 S.Ct. 290, 93 L.Ed.2d 264 (1986) (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 17, 104 S.Ct. 296, 297, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983)). The remarks of a legislator, even those of the sponsoring legislator, will not override the plain meaning of a statute. 5 See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 1510, 1517 n. 15, 71 L.Ed.2d 715 (1982) (The contemporaneous remarks of a sponsor of legislation are not controlling in analyzing legislative history.) 28 This panel finds 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(j) to be clear on its face; therefore the plain language of the provision controls. Looking to that language, there is no indication that the safety of the aircraft need be endangered. Rather, an act of assault, intimidation, or threat must merely interfere with the performance of the flight attendant's duties. 2) Sufficiency of the Evidence 29 Since we find that Sec. 1472(j) does not require that the aircraft be endangered for a violation to occur, it is unnecessary to reach the issue of whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to prove that element of the offense. 30 C. Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Intimidation 31 Tabacca argues that there was not enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that he had intimidated Martinez. 32 Under Sec. 1472(j), proof that the victim was in fact frightened for his own physical safety [is not] required in order to find that a defendant performed the criminal act of intimidation. It is sufficient that the conduct and words of the accused would place an ordinary, reasonable person in fear. United States v. Meeker, 527 F.2d 12, 15 (9th Cir.1975). In determining whether there is sufficient evidence of intimidation, this court must look to the totality of the circumstances and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Id. at 16. 33 Tabacca was charged with assaulting, threatening, and intimidating Martinez, but the jury found him guilty of intimidation only. Tabacca therefore argues that since the jury rejected the assault charge, that necessarily means they rejected the government's assertions that Tabacca had grabbed or pushed Martinez. Thus, the only remaining evidence on which a finding of intimidation could be based is the conversation between Tabacca and Martinez, which Tabacca argues is insufficient. 34 The jury could easily have dismissed the assault charge without rejecting the evidence that a physical battery occurred. The jury instruction on assault read: 35 Any willful attempt or threat to inflict injury upon the person of another, when coupled with an apparent present ability so to do, and any intentional display of force such as would give the victim reason to fear or expect immediate bodily harm, constitutes an assault. An assault may be committed without actual touching, or striking, or doing bodily harm, to the person of another. (emphasis added). 36 It is feasible that the jury could have concluded that although Tabacca grabbed and shoved Martinez, he lacked the requisite intent necessary to find assault. 6 37 Based on the above, the District Court made no error in denying Tabacca's two Motions for Judgment of Acquittal. A finding that Tabacca endangered the safety of the aircraft is not necessary for a conviction under Sec. 1472(j). Further, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Tabacca had intimidated Martinez. 38