Opinion ID: 2544661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Robberies

Text: After the case was called for trial, but before jury selection began, the prosecutor brought a motion to admit evidence of two prior criminal incidents to prove that defendant formed the intent to steal before or during the fatal assault on victim Henry Michael Pedersen. The prosecutor alleged that in the first incident, which occurred on a street in San Jose on May 4, 1979, defendant fatally stabbed Cruz Ramirez in the back and then took money from Ramirez's pocket. The prosecutor alleged that in the second incident, which occurred on September 8, 1979, defendant and his girlfriend Frances Ned hitched a ride from Gausena Wijipayala. When Wijipayala stopped the car to allow Ned to go to the bathroom, defendant seized the ignition key and demanded money. After Wijipayala refused, defendant struck him in the head and took $9 dollars and a wristwatch. The defense responded with a motion to exclude evidence of the same two incidents. The defense argued that these incidents were not sufficiently similar to the charged crimes to have any relevance on the issues of motive and intent, and that any probative value these incidents possessed was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect. The court heard argument from both sides on their cross-motions. The prosecutor said he proposed to use evidence of the other criminal incidents only to rebut any defense claim that defendant did not form the intent to steal Pedersen's property until after the fatal assault. The prosecutor also said he was not offering the evidence to prove that defendant and not someone else had killed Pedersen. The prosecutor asserted that if defendant denied that he had killed Pedersen there isn't any disputed issue as to when this intent was formed. The prosecutor suggested that because it was not yet clear whether the time of the formation of the intent to steal would be a disputed issue, it would be premature for the court to rule on this motion at the present time. The prosecutor represented that he would not offer evidence of the prior incidents during the prosecution's case-in-chief unless the defense raised the issue of after-formed intent by cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or otherwise. In reply to the court's questions, defense counsel declined to disclose the nature of the defense and declined to concede the issues of identity, motive, intent, or when the intent was formed. In response, the prosecutor repeated that he would offer evidence of the prior incidents only if the defense raised the issue of after-formed intent, and the prosecutor argued that the court should not give the defense an early ruling on the admissibility of the prior incidents without some assurance that the defense intended to raise that issue. The court then announced what it described as a tentative ruling in these words: There is to be no reference whatsoever to either or both of these prior acts unless and until the district attorney has brought to the court's attention his viewpoint that the proverbial door has been opened. In other words, at this juncture, I do not see that these are even being offered by the People let alone necessary to be ruled upon by the court. The prosecutor did not seek to introduce evidence of the two prior incidents during presentation of his case-in-chief, and the matter was next raised after the prosecution had rested its case. Then, defense counsel asked the court for a provisional ruling on the admissibility of the two prior incidents based on exact offers of proof as to the proposed testimony of four defense witnesses. Defense counsel added that these witnesses were present and had been ordered back, and that [t]he nature of their testimony is quite brief. The prosecutor stated that a ruling would be premature until the court has actually heard the testimony. Defense counsel responded that any ruling would be provisional in the sense that it would be subject to change if the testimony did not conform to the offer of proof. Defense counsel indicated that one proposed witness was a forensic man who would testify to an issue raised by the testimony of Inspector Kenneth Moses concerning prints being wiped off. Another proposed witness would testify as an expert that it is not unusual for someone who is in a trade of whether it be prostitution or an escort, what have you, to receive property in lieu, for barter-barter for services as opposed to currency, or on some occasion collateral, for money to be collected later. The court then stated as a suggestion that presentation of evidence about why a person in defendant's particular profession might have another person's property would put the defense in jeopardy of having the court rule that intent is in issue and that the admissibility of the prior crimes evidence may well come into play and may well face the jury. The prosecutor again asserted that it would be highly irregular for the court to rule in advance on evidence that you really haven't heard. The court responded: Counsel, I have no intention of ruling in advance, and I could not in good conscience. The court added: Again, I haven't heard the testimony. So many words could come into play that would completely change the court's ruling is what I'm concerned about.... I've given you as close as I can to the concern of the court and to the fact that the 1101(B) [referring to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) ], if the witness goes into those details which raise intent, that the court could well rule favorably for the People. Defense counsel replied, Thanks, judge. The defense then called three witnesses: Duayne J. Dillon, James Lord, and Mary Elizabeth Reynolds. The prosecutor offered no evidence in rebuttal. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not ruling on the admissibility of the two prior incidents before presentation of the prosecution's case and again before presentation of the defense case, and also in suggesting that evidence of the prior incidents could well be admissible if the defense offered evidence that persons engaged in prostitution or acting as escorts commonly accept property in lieu of cash in payment for their services. Defendant contends that in so acting the trial court denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We have previously rejected similar contentions with this explanation: No ruling was made below. Accordingly, no review can be conducted here. `[T]he absence of an adverse ruling precludes any appellate challenge.' [Citation.] In other words, when, as here, the defendant does not secure a ruling, he does not preserve the point. That is the rule. No exception is available. [II] Defendant may be understood to maintain that the court did not properly decline to rule. Plainly, the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. [Citation.] The question is close. The court was obviously reluctant to make a decision of this kind in anticipation of facts that might subsequently come to light. Generally, such reluctance cannot be faulted. [Citation.] Here, however, defendant expressed a not illegitimate need for a determination. The better course for the court might have been to make a ruling without prejudice. All the same, the course it actually took cannot be deemed unreasonableespecially in light of the fact that counsel did not take [the witness] on voir dire to determine whether she would in fact testify as he had represented. ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 259-260, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897.) Here, too, the court made no ruling on the admissibility of the prior incidents, and thus the only point preserved for appellate review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to make the ruling based on an offer of proof as to the likely testimony of a defense witness. Here, too, the question is close, at least as regards the failure to rule after the prosecution had presented its case-in-chief. When the issue first arose, before jury selection had even begun, the defense expressed no legitimate need for an advance determination, but once the prosecution had rested, defense counsel explained that the defense needed a ruling to decide which defense witnesses to call. Although this constituted an expression of a legitimate need for an advance ruling, and thus the issue is close, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion by not ruling at that time, especially given the failure of the defense to suggest that the proposed witness's testimony be taken on voir di re out of the jury's presence. Moreover, even if we assume for argument's sake that the trial court erred, the error was not prejudicial. Defendant claims that prejudice must be presumed because the record does not show what additional evidence the defense would have offered if the trial court had ruled in defendant's favor. We disagree. Defendant's trial counsel stated that the defense was planning to call four witnesses, all of whom had appeared and been ordered to return. After the trial court declined to rule, the defense called three of these four witnesses, none of whom testified in conformity with the offer of proof that prostitutes and escorts may take property instead of cash as payment for their services. Thus, the record fairly establishes that because of the trial court's ruling, or lack of ruling, the defense failed to call only one witness, who would likely have testified in conformity with the offer of proof. The defense was not prejudiced by the absence of this witness's testimony. In this regard, we note that in closing arguments to the jury, defense counsel argued that it was reasonable to infer that defendant had obtained Michael Pedersen's property in payment for, or as collateral to secure payment for, defendant's services as an escort. In reply to this argument, the prosecutor briefly questioned whether it was reasonable to infer that defendant would even accept something like that with the business he was in, but then the prosecutor proceeded to make a much stronger argument. The prosecutor said it was highly unlikely that in payment for escort services Pedersen would give a cherished bracelet with his initials on it that he's had for years, ... a camera that belongs to his brother ... [and] a set of opera glasses that he has used for years and years, performance after performance, something that obviously he cherishes .... Applying the general test for harmless error under state law ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243), we conclude that it is not reasonably probable that admission of the proposed defense testimonythat it is not unusual for a prostitute or escort to accept payment in the form of property rather than in cashwould have resulted in guilt verdicts more favorable to defendant. Because the error, if error there was, did not significantly affect defendant's ability to present a defense, it did not violate any of defendant's rights under the federal Constitution.