Opinion ID: 761713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kimler's Claims

Text: 4 Kimler argues that his trial and direct appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issues relating to the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution to his sentence. In order to understand Kimler's arguments clearly, we must first set forth the specific details of the district court's determination of Kimler's sentence. 5 In sentencing Kimler, the district court relied in part on the Probation Office's calculation of the appropriate sentence, as reflected in its pre-sentencing report (PSR). The probation officer who prepared the PSR calculated Kimler's sentence using the 1993 edition of the Guidelines Manual. The 1993 guidelines included, for the first time, the codification of the one book rule in § 1B1.11. One provision of the one book rule provides that when a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses, some occurring before and some occurring after a revision of the guidelines manual, the revised edition of the Guidelines Manual is to be applied to both offenses. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.11(b)(3). 6 Kimler committed the mail fraud offenses in 1988 and the counterfeiting offense in 1990. The one book rule, therefore, did not directly govern because it was not added to the guidelines until after Kimler's offenses were completed. However, the 1993 guidelines and the 1990 guidelines in effect when Kimler committed the counterfeiting offense were the same for all relevant purposes other than the one book rule. Because, as we discuss infra, the addition of the one book rule to the guidelines was simply a codification of existing court practices and a clarifying amendment that a sentencing court could properly apply to conduct occurring before the amendment, the probation officer applied the 1993 guidelines. 7 In calculating Kimler's sentence with reference to the 1993 guidelines, the PSR first recommended that because all twelve offenses involved substantially the same harm, as defined in § 3D1.2(d), they should be grouped into a single group for sentencing purposes. 1 The PSR then noted that the total offense level for Kimler's group could be determined with reference either to the guideline applicable to mail fraud, § 2F1.1, or counterfeiting, § 2B5.3, as application of either guideline provided for the same total offense level. Both guidelines provided for a base offense level of six and added offense levels depending on the same levels of loss associated with the offenses. The PSR estimated the amount of loss associated with Kimler's offenses as $5,670,000 and thus, referencing § 2F1.1(b)(1)(O), increased Kimler's offense level by fourteen. The PSR then recommended increasing Kimler's offense level by two pursuant to § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A), because the offense involved more than minimal planning and was a scheme to defraud more than one victim, adding two points under § 2F1.1(b)(4), because the offense involved the conscious or reckless risk of serious bodily injury, and, finally, adding four levels pursuant to § 3B1.1(a), because Kimler acted as an organizer and/or leader of the criminal activity involving five or more participants. In all, the PSR determined that the appropriate offense level was twenty-eight. Based on a criminal history category of I, the appropriate sentence, according to the PSR, was a term of seventy-eight to ninety-seven months. 8 The district court adopted the PSR recommendation in all respects save one. Although the district court stated that the amount of loss reflected in the PSR was an accurate calculation based upon the best evidence available, the court, commenting on the difficulty of calculating the loss in a case such as this, 2 concluded that the fair thing to do in this situation would be to depart to an amount of loss contained in the specific counts of the indictment which Mr. Kimler was found guilty of committing. Thus, the district court applied the amount of loss contained in the indictment, $531,589.27, and increased Kimler's offense level by ten, four less than the PSR recommendation. The district court sentenced Kimler to the minimum sentence possible under the guidelines given an offense level of twenty-four and a criminal history category of I, fifty-one months. 3 9 Kimler claims that his trial and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the district court erred in applying the 1993 version of the sentencing guidelines, the version in force at the time of his sentencing, instead of the 1988 version that was in effect when his mail fraud counts were completed. Kimler claims that the district court's use of the more recent guidelines in computing his sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because his total offense level would have been less under the 1988 guidelines than under the 1993 guidelines. 10 Specifically, Kimler points to two ways in which he received a greater sentence because of the district court's use of the 1993 guidelines. First, Kimler notes that the 1993 version of § 2F1.1, the fraud guideline, included amendments made effective in 1989 which added levels to the fraud loss table, increasing the offense level for both the amount of loss recommended in the PSR and the amount that the district court actually used in sentencing Kimler. Second, Kimler argues that the district court's use of the 1993 guidelines added two additional levels because § 2F1.2(b)(4), which increases the offense level for risking serious bodily injury, did not exist in the 1988 guidelines in effect when he completed the mail fraud offenses. Lastly, Kimler argues that his attorney was constitutionally deficient for failing to argue that the district court erred in applying § 1B1.11(b)(3)'s one book rule, which Kimler contends is the district court's only justification for using the revised sentencing guidelines, because that section was not enacted until 1993. 4