Opinion ID: 2457
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alternative Grounds for Ordering a New Trial

Text: Defendant argues that the District Court's grant of a new trial should be affirmed on the following alternative grounds: the District Court erred when it (1) did not adopt defendant's proposed charge on the subjective component of self-defense, (2) precluded defendant from inquiring into the bias, motive, and interest of the police insofar as it related to their potential civil and criminal liability, (3) improperly admitted evidence of defendant's use and ownership of firearms and ammunition, and (4) improperly admitted evidence of the gambling operation under investigation at defendant's place of employmentthe scene of the altercation.
We hold that the District Court did not err in its instructions to the jury on self-defense because, as also discussed above, we cannot say that viewing as a whole the charge actually given, [defendant] was prejudiced. Dove, 916 F.2d at 45. We also find no error in the District Court's exercise of discretion in monitoring cross-examination of the FBI agents. Only when [the trial court's] broad discretion is abused will we reverse a trial court's decision to restrict cross-examination. United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant was permitted to ask Agent Mark Lauer about whether the shooting altercation was likely to become a subject of an investigation and about the appropriateness of the officers' actions. J.A. 127-28, 131-32. Defendant was also allowed to ask Detective Murray whether he knew that the shooting would be investigated, about the possibility of facing criminal charges, and about the fact that investigation had commenced. J.A. 216. The only limitations placed on defendant related to his cross-examination on other questions already asked and answered, and the arrests of officers in other instances, which are irrelevant. J.A. 217.
Finally, we find no error in the District Court's admission of evidence of defendant's firearm possession and knowledge of the gambling operation at his place of employment. We review a district court's ruling to admit or exclude evidence under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, and will reverse [a district court] only where a ruling to admit or exclude evidence is manifestly erroneous. See United States v. Samet, 466 F.3d 251, 254 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants must also show that any error in admitting the challenged evidence was not harmless error. An error is harmless if the appellate court can conclude with fair assurance that the improperly admitted evidence did not substantially influence the jury. Hynes v. Coughlin, 79 F.3d 285, 291 (2d Cir.1996). Even assuming that the challenged testimony was improperly admitted, [w]e will [nevertheless] not grant a new trial unless we find that the introduction of inadmissible evidence was a clear abuse of discretion and was so clearly prejudicial to the outcome of the trial that we are convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice. We measure prejudice by assessing error in light of the record as a whole. Phillips v. Bowen, 278 F.3d 103, 111 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We cannot say that the challenged testimony yielded a seriously erroneous result in the finding of liability here. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err in admitting the contested evidence. We have considered defendant's other arguments and find them to be without merit.