Opinion ID: 2518032
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Trial Court's Grant of New Penalty Trial Motion

Text: The trial court granted defendant's motion for a new penalty trial based principally on juror misconduct. Jurors considered the relative positions of defendant and Rose at the time of the shooting. The trial court found that a juror's use of his home computer to make a diagram based on trial testimony and a demonstration by jurors in the deliberation room were prejudicial misconduct. The People appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of a new penalty trial. There was no misconduct.

Dr. William Sherry, the forensic pathologist, testified during the guilt phase that the bullet entered the upper right rear of Rose's head and exited through the right forehead. The absence of stippling, tattooing and searing indicated the gun was at least 18 inches from Rose when it was fired, but could have been as far away as 100 feet. Dr. Sherry also noted that Rose had small abrasions on the left hand, a scratch on the right knee, an abrasion just below the knee, and a bruise on the left elbow. These injuries occurred while Rose was still alive. The prosecutor asked Dr. Sherry if he had an opinion about the direction of the gunshot wound. In response, Dr. Sherry and the prosecutor engaged in the following colloquy: A. All I can say is assuming the body in the standard anatomic position, which means hands down at the side and standing and looking straight ahead, the gunshot wound in that particular position would be back to front, slightly left to right, and slightly downward. Q. When you say `slightly downward,' that would mean that the person doing the shooting would have to be a little taller or hold a weapon a little over the head; is that correct? A. It would be consistent with that. Q. Would it also be consistent with perhaps two people who are the same size, but one person is kneeling which could account for the abrasion on the knee? A. It would be consistent with that. On cross-examination, defense counsel and Dr. Sherry engaged in the following exchange: Q. Isn't it true that the anatomical position or the position of the person who has been shot, more precisely, has a great deal of impact upon the bullet track within the body? A. You mean the position of the head? Q. Yes. A. Yes. The head can be turned in any of a number of positions at that time that the gunshot was sustained so that with relationship to the rest of the body, the standard anatomic position may not apply. Q. It would be possible, would it not, for someone to have a wound with a downward track if, for example, that person's head was tilted backwards, for example, when the bullet struck the head. A. You are correct. Q. And there are probably millions of different possibilities depending upon the position of the weapon and the position of the body and specifically the head of the person who was struck? A. Yes. In her closing argument at the penalty trial, the prosecutor discussed the circumstances of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a): [Defendant] killed [ sic ] Fred Rose in the back of the head. When based on the evidence Mr. Rose was either on his knees pleading for mercy or running away from defendant. Defense counsel objected and the trial court advised that the statements of counsel are not evidence. The prosecutor continued, He executed this father of three and then went out and partied. At the conclusion of the guilt phase the jury was admonished with CALJIC No. 1.03 as follows: You must not make any independent investigation of the facts or the law or consider or discuss the facts as to which there is no evidence. This means, for example, that you must not on your own visit the scene, conduct experiments or consult reference works or persons for additional information. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury was told it was to be guided by applicable and pertinent guilt phase instructions.
After the jury's penalty verdict, defense counsel joined a conversation between the prosecutor and jurors and learned that deliberating jurors conducted a demonstration of the shooting, using a protractor and string. The jurors' comments were reported in the Los Angeles Times. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct. The trial court decided to conduct an evidentiary hearing rather than rely on declarations. Jurors G.B. and C.C. and Jury Foreperson W.B. testified, recounting events that occurred during the penalty phase deliberations. We note at the outset that portions of the testimony elicited at the evidentiary hearing were inadmissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), which provides: Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence may be received as to statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined. During the hearing, no objections were made by the prosecutor or defense counsel on this basis. Juror G.B. was questioned first. He noted Dr. Sherry's testimony about the bullet's entry and exit points and its downward trajectory. G.B. testified: Well, I went over this. We had three months to think about this case and after having seen a lot of injuries during my tours of Vietnam, I know that that type of injury, and I had seen several, were only created by one of two ways and that was an execution type of shooting or an individual hit while being shot from helicopters or gunships which would give it the downward trajectory. So during deliberations, the term `executed' was used on different occasions. This tended to upset one of the jurors and the question was asked how do you know? Well, on my computer, I worked out height patterns and came up with the fact that anyone standing six feet away from another person would have to just about be standing on a stool two and a half feet high to get a downward trajectory through the back of the skull of an individual .... More specifically, G.B. explained: I marked off six feet, two inches in the scale. I marked off five foot ten inches, and six feet, two inches referring to approximately the height of [defendant] and five foot, ten inches of the approximate height of Fred Rose. [¶] Then I separated the two approximately six feet in scale and used an angle of trajectory, slight downward angle of approximately five to seven degrees to give an approximate location where the person's hand would have to be in order to identify a weapon at that distance and at that angle. G.B. relied on trial testimony for defendant's height; Rose's height was noted in the coroner's report. Juror G.B. explained that in the deliberation room the next day he conducted a demonstration with the assistance of Juror C.C. G.B. did not tell the jurors about his computer use, but relied on it to back up the statements that were made in the deliberation room about an execution instead of a murder. C.C., who was about Rose's height, took the position of the victim. G.B. used a string from his jacket and a protractor, which G.B. found in the jury room. The jacket string was about six to eight feet long. G.B. stated: For the string you could have substituted a piece of paper or yardstick. For the protractor somebody holding their hands straight out in a position such as [a] crucifix just to maintain a straight line. The protractor was placed against Juror C.C.'s temple at a slight downward angle as described by Dr. Sherry, at approximately five to 10 degrees. Juror G.B. testified they did not determine any angles and stated, There was no testimony as to the degree of trajectory, absolutely none. We used what Dr. Sherry said, a slight downward angle. The string was positioned at the center of the protractor and held six feet away by G.B., who explained that six feet was used because the closest footprints that were found by the investigating officers at the scene of Fred Rose's shooting were six feet away from Fred Rose. G.B. stated that the protractor was used only as a straightedge and not to measure specific angles. The demonstration was conducted with C.C. both standing and kneeling. G.B. testified that the diagram on the computer and the demonstration in the deliberation room were based solely on testimony received in court. Juror C.C. testified that some of the jurors did not understand the evidence regarding the shooting. There were discussions one day and the next day we were still discussing it. Jurors illustrated the shooting on the board, but no one could draw well so they couldn't make sense out of it. C.C. said jurors just wanted to visually see more. C.C. confirmed the demonstration as described by Juror G.B., although C.C. thought the protractor was used to show the particular angle. C.C. testified that the string was six foot ... something like that. C.C. did not recall any comment from any of the jurors about the significance of the six-foot length of string. During the demonstration, C.C. knelt and stood and moved his head as requested by the other jurors. He said that everybody was looking at different things, and all the jurors were involved. C.C. was asked by the prosecutor if any jurors indicated their recollection of defense counsel's examination of Dr. Sherry. C.C. replied, I think that's why everybody was asking different possibilities and not just one and we went through all the different possibilities. No one mentioned any outside research. C.C. testified the demonstration was based on what he heard in the courtroom, and he recalled that it only lasted a few minutes. Foreperson W.B. recalled only that Juror G.B. stood with a string and a protractor while Juror C.C. knelt. G.B. was trying to prove his point that the victim was kneeling when shot. The reenactment was brief, but Foreperson W.B. did not recall any details. The position of the victim did not make a difference to W.B. He did not know where the protractor came from, and assumed G.B. provided the protractor and string. G.B. mentioned his knowledge of guns to jurors, but not his military experience. W.B. stated that G.B. did not bring any outside information into the jury room and the reenactment of the shooting appeared to be based on the trial testimony.
After the three jurors testified, the trial court invited defense counsel to file a revised motion for new trial in light of testimony that the demonstration occurred during the penalty phase, and not the guilt phase as originally thought. Defense counsel subsequently filed a motion for a new penalty phase trial on the grounds of juror misconduct as well as prosecutorial misconduct. [26] During a proceeding on another matter, the trial court noted receipt of briefing on the new trial motion. It invited additional points and authorities on three issues of concern to the court, including comments made by the prosecution [during closing argument] calling for the exercise of vengeance. [27] Neither party filed points and authorities. At the hearing on the new trial motion, the trial court stated that it was now additionally concerned that during closing argument the prosecutor had conveyed the family's desire for a death verdict. The prosecutor responded that she was not prepared to address this issue, which was newly raised by the court. The trial court also advised defense counsel to address testimony by prosecution witness Fred Joseph regarding other crimes alleged to have been committed by defendant. The trial court invited further briefing and the hearing was continued. No additional briefing was submitted.
At the continued hearing on the motion for a new trial, the trial court addressed three issues which it identified as follows: (1) juror misconduct based on improper experiments; (2) argument by the prosecutor that the victim's family preferred the death penalty; and (3) evidence about other crimes committed by defendant, disclosed during unforeseen outbursts by witness Fred Joseph. The trial court concluded that [f]or each and all of the foregoing reasons, the defense motion for a new trial as to the penalty phase only is granted. With regard to jury misconduct, the trial court determined that Juror G.B., as a result of his experience in the Vietnam War, had a strongly held belief that the type of injury suffered by Rose could have resulted only from an execution-style killing or a shot fired from a helicopter. The court stated that G.B. performed on his home computer what can only be described as a simulation model from which he concluded that his preconceptions were in fact correct .... The court stated further, Having gathered and developed this information outside the jury room, [G.B.] then ... proceeded to duplicate the experiment inside the jury room by posing different jurors in the role of victim and executioner. The court found that, although the manner in which the protractor got into the jury room was unknown, angles were discussed and a difference between five degrees in an angle would have an impact on distance and the number of feet and the circumstances of the offense. This is a type of experiment that would not be allowed in open court without a proper foundation being laid. No such foundation could be laid in the jury room and this evidence ... that was brought into the jury room and created in the jury room was not subject to cross-examination or confrontation of any kind. But perhaps even of greater difficulty is the ultimate fact that the creation of this experiment gave the impression of scientific certainty and took a set of circumstances that were an arguable possibility and gave them the imprimatur of scientific truth. The court stated that the jury's conclusion seemed to have been motivated by their observation that footprints were found six feet away and this experiment confirmed the magic figure of six feet. The court noted that Detective Castillo clarified that the closest distance of the Nike shoe prints to the blood pool was 15 feet. The trial court found a substantial likelihood that the improper consideration of this evidence influenced the outcome of the jurors' decision. It noted the testimony at the evidentiary hearing indicating the manner of killing was an issue of concern during deliberations, and that jurors reported the experiment as a salient feature when they spoke about the case immediately following the recording of the verdict. Additionally, the court stated that the jury developed and considered information regarding an execution-style killing in the context of the prosecutor's argument regarding vengeance and retaliation. Thus, it was logical for jurors to look at the question of whether or not there should be an execution in exchange for an execution ....
The People appealed and the Court of Appeal reversed the order granting defendant a new penalty trial and reinstated the jury verdict fixing the penalty at death. [28] The court first determined that the jury room demonstration was not misconduct because there was nothing improper about the demonstration, nor did it involve any improper outside evidence. The court noted that all the factual assumptions explored by the demonstration were well within the evidence, and observed that even if the protractor was used to demonstrate angles, that effort was no different from using a ruler to mark linear measurements. As to Juror G.B.'s use of his home computer, the Court of Appeal stated the People concede [it] was technically misconduct, but not prejudicial. [29] The court accepted the People's concession without discussion and agreed that no prejudice resulted. The court stated: First, the juror never mentioned his use of his home computer to other jurors. Thus, its use had no effect on other jurors and did not in any way enhance the opinion of the offending juror. Second, there was no evidence the offending juror obtained information from the computer or did computations he otherwise could not have done. While he used the computer to draw the heights and distances to scale, the drawing was nothing more than he could have done on paper or on the blackboard. Third, the offending juror used the computer only to help himself visualize the relative positions of Rose and Collins. Some jurors were unsure about the prosecutor's argument that Collins essentially executed Rose while Rose was on his knees or running away. The offending juror already agreed with the argument, and merely used the computer to help him visualize his thoughts to more effectively persuade his fellow jurors. Finally, the evidence against Collins was strong. Thus, the technical misconduct was not prejudicial, and the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new penalty trial on this record. Defendant sought review in this court on the issue of juror misconduct. We denied review without prejudice to subsequent consideration after judgment. Defendant now asserts that both Juror G.B.'s computer use and the demonstration in the deliberation room were misconduct, violating his rights to trial by jury, to confront witnesses, and to a reliable penalty determination. [30] Respondent states that G.B.'s home computer use was arguably improper as a violation of the trial court's order not to conduct an independent investigation, but maintains that the juror's computer use was based on the evidence and merely allowed him to visualize his beliefs. Respondent contends that the jurors' demonstration in the deliberation room was not misconduct.
Under section 1181, items 2 and 3, the trial court may grant a new trial when the jury has received any evidence out of court, other than that resulting from a view of the premises, or of personal property (§ 1181, item 2), or the jury has been guilty of any misconduct by which a fair and due consideration of the case has been prevented (§ 1181, item 3). We first determine whether there was any juror misconduct. Only if we answer that question affirmatively do we consider whether the conduct was prejudicial. ( People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 303 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82 P.3d 1249].) In determining misconduct, [w]e accept the trial court's credibility determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 582 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87].) Here, the historical facts regarding Juror G.B.'s computer use and the deliberation room demonstration are essentially undisputed. The inquiry is whether those facts constitute misconduct, a legal question we review independently. [31] The trial court described Juror G.B.'s computer use and the deliberation room demonstration as improper experiments in which G.B. and the other jurors created evidence that was not subject to confrontation and cross-examination. The trial court's characterization of these events is incorrect. Neither G.B.'s consideration of the evidence at home nor the jurors' demonstration in the deliberation room resulted in the acquisition of new evidence. (21) This court established the framework for analysis of a jury misconduct claim based on experimentation nearly a century ago in Higgins v. L. A. Gas & Electric Co. (1911) 159 Cal. 651 [115 P. 313] ( Higgins ). Justice Hinshaw explained: It is a fundamental rule that all evidence shall be taken in open court and that each party to a controversy shall have knowledge of, and thus be enabled to meet and answer, any evidence brought against him. It is this fundamental rule which is to govern the use of exhibits by the jury. They may use the exhibit according to its nature to aid them in weighing the evidence which has been given and in reaching a conclusion upon a controverted matter. They may carry out experiments within the lines of offered evidence, but if their experiments shall invade new fields and they shall be influenced in their verdict by discoveries from such experiments which will not fall fairly within the scope and purview of the evidence, then, manifestly, the jury has been itself taking evidence without the knowledge of either party, evidence which it is not possible for the party injured to meet, answer, or explain. ( Id. at pp. 656-657, italics added.) The Higgins court cited with approval, and by way of example, two contrasting cases. ( Higgins, supra, 159 Cal. at pp. 657-659.) In Wilson v. United States (9th Cir. 1902) 116 Fed. 484, the defendant was charged with smuggling opium prepared for smoking. A sample of the smuggled drug was admitted at trial, but the prosecution offered no evidence that it had been prepared for smoking, nor did it explain how the jury could resolve that question. After the presentation of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that it could test the opium to determine whether it would burn, and thus determine whether the opium was prepared for smoking. This instruction was improper. Whether the opium had been prepared for smoking was an essential element of the crime that was not proven by the prosecution. `Yet the jury was left to determine that essential fact for themselves, by experiment ....' ( Higgins, supra, 159 Cal. at p. 658, quoting Wilson v. United States, supra, 116 Fed. 484.) Conversely, in Taylor v. Commonwealth (1893) 90 Va. 109 [17 S.E. 812], in which defendant was charged with murder, evidence showed that expended cartridges at the scene had been fired from a Winchester rifle of a given caliber and that defendant had such a rifle. The defendant responded by introducing his rifle and four empty shells that had been fired from it. He contended that his gun was not the murder weapon because the marks made by the firing pin on the four shells were different from the marks on the expended cartridges recovered at the scene. During trial the rifle was exhibited, but not taken apart. In deliberations the jurors dismantled the rifle, examined the firing pin, and concluded it had been tampered with. The Higgins court agreed with the Virginia Supreme Court that the jurors' examination was proper. The jury examined the rifle to weigh the evidence that had been given. The question of whether defendant's rifle had fired the shells recovered at the scene was squarely raised. Their examination of the gun did not invade a new field and fairly fell within the scope and purview of the evidence received. The Higgins court observed: A more acute prosecuting attorney might have caused the examination to have been made in open court and thus have demonstrated the trick and fraud, but his failure to do so afforded no ground for overthrowing the verdict of an intelligent and scrutinizing jury which, making its own examination of the evidence admitted to prove or disprove the very fact, discovered that the [firing pin] `had been ... tampered with and fixed for the occasion of the trial.' ( Higgins, supra, 159 Cal. at pp. 658-659, quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, supra, 90 Va. 109.) In contrasting the two cases, the Higgins court noted that in the opium case, the jury conducted an experiment by which it gathered evidence not presented in court. ( Higgins, supra, 159 Cal. at p. 659.) In the rifle case, the jury merely subjected an exhibit to a more critical examination than had been made of it in court and by such examination reached a conclusion upon a contested fact by a more careful scrutiny .... ( Ibid. ) In other words, under the rule established by Higgins, the jury's experiment in the opium case invaded a new field of inquiry. In the rifle case, the jury's examination of the gun did not invade a new field, but rather fell within the scope and purview of the evidence received. (See id. at p. 656.) (22) In the century since Higgins, numerous cases have reiterated the distinction between an experiment that results in the acquisition of new evidence, and conduct that is simply a more critical examination of the evidence admitted. The former is misconduct; the latter is not. In People v. Cooper (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 844 [157 Cal.Rptr. 348] ( Cooper ), officers testified they were driving down the street when they saw Cooper look over his shoulder in their direction, reach into his waistband and toss a shiny object onto a lawn about 15 feet away. The officers stopped Cooper and recovered the item, which was a bag of heroin. Cooper testified he had not possessed the drug and had not thrown the bag. As part of a motion for a new trial, the defense contended the jury committed misconduct when it reenacted the officers' testimony and demonstration of how the bag had been thrown. In rejecting the misconduct argument the Cooper court noted: It is clear ... that experiments by the jury are prohibited only where the result is the production of `new' evidence. [Citation.] ... The general rule is that the jurors may engage in experiments which amount to no more than a careful examination of the evidence which was presented in court. [Citation.] ( Id. at pp. 853-854, italics added.) The Court of Appeal then concluded that the jury reenactment was not misconduct because the experiment did not produce new evidence: During the trial, [the officer] had demonstrated the manner in which defendant had thrown the contraband. The jurors simply repeated the officer's reenactment. Nothing requires that the jury's deliberations be entirely verbal, and we would expect a conscientious jury to closely examine the testimony of the witnesses, no less so when that testimony takes the form of a physical act. There was no error in denying the motion for new trial on this ground. ( Id. at p. 854.) Wagner v. Doulton (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 945 [169 Cal.Rptr. 550] was a personal injury case arising from a car accident. In support of a motion for a new trial, two jurors submitted affidavits stating that one of the jurors, an engineer, prepared a scale map of the accident scene and the vehicles involved, which was shown to the other jurors. ( Id. at p. 947.) In response, the juror in question also submitted an affidavit, declaring that he prepared a diagram of the accident scene only from information presented in court, contained in his notes or based on his memory. ( Ibid. ) In affirming the denial of a new trial, the Court of Appeal held that while jurors may not receive evidence out of court and may not conduct experiments which put them in possession of evidence not offered at trial [citations] it is not misconduct for a juror to make a diagram in the jury room based solely on the evidence received in court. Nor should the fact that a juror is an engineer and perhaps more skillful at drawing make any difference. ( Id. at p. 950, italics added.) The juror did not act improperly because his diagram did not introduce any new evidence. Instead, the pictorial representation of the juror's idea of the testimony merely constituted an examination of the evidence that had been received. ( Id. at p. 951.) In People v. Cumpian (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 307 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 861] ( Cumpian ), the defendant was charged with robbery. A security guard testified that he saw the defendant take a duffel bag from a store, put other property inside, and leave without paying. The guard approached the defendant in the parking lot and asked him to return to the store. The duffel bag hung at the defendant's side from a strap around his neck. The defendant swung a large safety pin at the guard and fled. ( Id. at p. 310.) A police officer chased and arrested defendant, finding the bag still hanging from his neck and the safety pin, with keys attached to it, lying at his feet. The defense argued that the crime was a petty theft, not a robbery. The defendant testified that he merely reacted when someone grabbed his arm, and did not intend to injure the guard. He ran because he was embarrassed. He had tried to drop the bag but could not do so because it was tightly strapped to his body. ( Ibid. ) During deliberations, jurors examined the duffel bag and its contents, which were admitted in evidence. Several jurors carried the bag as witnesses had described to determine how easily it could be removed. The defendant sought a new trial alleging juror misconduct based on an unlawful experiment. ( Cumpian, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 311.) The Court of Appeal framed the issue as follows: The question is whether the jury, in attempting to replicate the position of the bag on defendant's shoulder while in the jury room, received extrinsic evidence or was subjected to an outside influence. ( Cumpian, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 313.) It held there was no misconduct, explaining its reasoning as follows: Here, the jury's use of the exhibit did not invade new fields nor did their experiment with the duffel bag involve matters not within the scope and purview of the evidence. In fact, the declarations state that the jury used the exhibit in a similar fashion to that testified to and demonstrated by [the security guard.] It is not the use of the exhibit which creates misconduct but its use in some manner outside the offered evidence.  ( Id. at p. 315, italics omitted & added.) Relying on Higgins, supra, 159 Cal. 651, and Cooper, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d 844, the Cumpian court concluded: [I]t is clear the concept of the receipt of evidence out of court entails evidence not presented during the trial .... The jury's reenactment of [the evidence presented at trial] did not constitute the receipt of evidence out of court, but was merely an experiment directed at proffered evidence. ( Cumpian, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 316.) [N]ot every [jury] experiment constitutes ... misconduct. `[J]urors must be given enough latitude in their deliberations to permit them to use common experiences and illustrations in reaching their verdicts. [Citations.]' ( United States v. Avery (6th Cir. 1983) 717 F.2d 1020, 1026.) To prohibit jurors from analyzing exhibits in light of proffered testimony would obviate any reason for sending physical evidence into the jury room in the first instance. ( Ibid. ) An evaluation of a misconduct claim must necessarily focus on whether the experiments were based on evidence received in court. ( Id. at p. 317.) Similarly, in People v. Bogle (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 770 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 739] ( Bogle ), the jury's closer analysis of a trial exhibit was not misconduct. The defendant in Bogle was accused of murdering a husband and wife with whom he lived. The victims' safe and the defendant's keys were admitted into evidence. The defendant testified and identified the lock each key would open, but never said that any of the keys opened the safe. During deliberations, the jury inserted one of the keys into the safe and unlocked it. Defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that the jurors had conducted a prohibited experiment. The trial court disagreed and denied his motion. On appeal, defendant relied on Higgins, supra, 159 Cal. 651, to characterize the jury's conduct as an experiment invading a `new field' not presented at trial. ( Bogle, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 779, 781.) The Court of Appeal rejected this argument. It noted that the keys and the safe were both properly introduced into evidence and given to the jury for examination. It stated: Contrary to the defendant's implication, the term `field,' as used in Higgins, does not mean one specific fact. A `field,' instead, is an area of inquiry, such as the extent of the defendant's access to the contents of the safe or whether the defendant was a credible witness. ( Bogle, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 779.) [T]he jury here did not consider new evidence. While the jurors reexamined the evidence in a slightly different context, it was within the `scope and purview of the evidence' presented ... and did not invade a new field. ( Higgins ..., supra, 159 Cal. at p. 657.) This careful scrutiny of the evidence was not a prohibited experiment. ( Id. at p. 781; see also People v. Baldine (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 773, 778 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 570] [finding no misconduct when jurors turned on defendant's police scanner admitted in evidence, rebutting defendant's claim it was not working].) These cases of proper jury behavior are easily distinguished from those cases in which misconduct occurred. People v. Conkling (1896) 111 Cal. 616 [44 P. 314] ( Conkling ) involved a murder in which the distance between the shooter and the victim was a vital issue in the case. ( Id. at p. 627.) The victim's clothing, admitted in evidence, showed no powder burns. During trial, two jurors borrowed a rifle similar to that with which the deceased was killed, bought some cotton drilling, retired to the outskirts of the city, and there made experiments by firing the rifle, for the purpose of determining at what distance powder marks would be carried by the fire. ( Ibid. ) We concluded: Jurors cannot be permitted to investigate the case outside the courtroom. They must decide the guilt or innocence of the defendant upon the evidence introduced at the trial. ( Id. at p. 628.) Later, we described the circumstances of Conkling as a clear case of the jury's obtaining evidence by unauthorized experiments made without the presence and knowledge of the defendant. ( Higgins, supra, 159 Cal. at p. 659.) In People v. Castro (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 849 [229 Cal.Rptr. 280] ( Castro ), a defendant was found guilty of arson and other offenses resulting from a riot at a county jail. A correctional officer, standing 50 to 100 yards away, used binoculars to identify the defendant as a participant in the arson. During deliberations, a juror `went home and used binoculars to see if [the officer] could have possibly seen what he ... said he did.' ( Id. at p. 852.) The juror then reported his finding to the other jurors. ( Ibid. ) The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. The Court of Appeal reversed, describing the juror's actions as an improper experiment. There was no showing that the juror's binoculars were similar to those used by the officer or that the lighting conditions and distances were similar to the conditions at the time of the officer's observation. ( Id. at pp. 853-854.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the juror's experiment enabled [him] to receive evidence outside the presence and knowledge of [the] appellant going to the crucial element in the ... case, the identity of the appellant. ( Id. at p. 854.) In Bell v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 919 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 541], the plaintiff claimed he was falsely arrested. He testified that police officers grabbed his arms and held his wrists, behind his back up to his neck, forcing him to bend over and stand on his toes. ( Id. at p. 925.) He testified that officers forced him to walk down the stairs and out of the building in this position. ( Ibid. ) The trial court did not permit a recreation of the actual hold during trial because of risk of injury. ( Id. at p. 932.) During deliberations one of the jurors advised the others that she and a third party had tried to replicate the manner in which the plaintiff said he was held by police. The juror reported that she fell over, leading her to disbelieve the plaintiff's testimony. ( Id. at p. 930.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of a new trial motion based upon juror misconduct and quoted the trial court: `The incident the juror was attempting to replicate is not subject to experimentation because of the inability to accurately duplicate critical factors such as the size, strength and height of the individuals, the amount of force involved, and the specific or unusual physical characteristic of each individual involved.' ( Id. at p. 932.) `[T]his particular experiment would not have been within the lines of offered evidence even had it been conducted in the jury room with all twelve jurors present. The fact that the experiment was performed by one juror, aided by unknown third parties, outside of the court room and the deliberations, is more egregious and resulted in outside influences or extrinsic evidence permeating the jury's deliberation on perhaps the key factual determination in the case.' ( Id. at p. 933, italics added.) The cases above concerned juror experiments conducted outside the deliberation room. In Smoketree-Lake Murray, Ltd. v. Mills Concrete Construction Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1724 [286 Cal.Rptr. 435] ( Smoketree ), the court addressed jurors' consideration of extraneous information while they deliberated. A condominium association sued a developer for damages arising from faulty concrete and grading work in the complex. Evidence was presented during trial that concrete slabs were improperly constructed. ( Id. at pp. 1730-1731.) During deliberations, a juror created a model of a concrete foundation with a small box, kitty litter and some crayons she brought into the deliberation room. She told fellow jurors she was knowledgeable about concrete construction and used the model to explain how concrete is poured onto sand slabs. In the course of her demonstration, she explained that defects in the concrete could be caused by persons walking across the building slabs and leaving foot impressions before the concrete is poured. ( Id. at pp. 1745-1746 & fn. 16.) The Court of Appeal referred to People v. Cooper, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d 844, in which jurors reenacted the police officer's demonstration of how a bag of drugs was thrown. The Smoketree court stated: Here, unlike the Cooper case where the jurors merely duplicated a demonstration presented at trial, [the juror] presented a new demonstration (i.e., there was no kitty litter and crayola demonstration conducted by any of the experts in the case). Further, when [the juror] conducted the demonstration, she represented she had special knowledge about concrete practices ... and presented new evidence regarding inconsistencies in the sand. ( Smoketree, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 1749.) [The] [d]eveloper had no opportunity to challenge the accuracy of [the juror's] demonstration nor her representations of special knowledge about concrete practices. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal concluded the juror's demonstration constituted misconduct because it introduced new evidence into the deliberations. ( Ibid. ) (23) From the venerable authority of Higgins and its progeny, several principles emerge. Not every jury experiment constitutes misconduct. Improper experiments are those that allow the jury to discover new evidence by delving into areas not examined during trial. The distinction between proper and improper jury conduct turns on this difference. The jury may weigh and evaluate the evidence it has received. It is entitled to scrutinize that evidence, subjecting it to careful consideration by testing all reasonable inferences. It may reexamine the evidence in a slightly different context as long as that evaluation is within the `scope and purview of the evidence.' ( Bogle, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 781.) What the jury cannot do is conduct a new investigation going beyond the evidence admitted. (24) Before we apply these principles here, we emphasize the confines of the evidence we may properly consider in determining whether juror misconduct occurred. [W]hen a criminal defendant moves for a new trial based on allegations of jury misconduct, the trial court has discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of the allegations. ( People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 415 [272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260].) However, in conducting that hearing, the trial court must take great care not to overstep the boundaries set forth in Evidence Code section 1150. ( Id. at p. 418.) Evidence Code section 1150 distinguishes `between proof of overt acts, objectively ascertainable, and proof of the subjective reasoning processes of the individual juror, which can be neither corroborated nor disproved....' ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1261 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225].) `The only improper influences that may be proved under [Evidence Code] section 1150 to impeach a verdict, therefore, are those open to sight, hearing, and the other senses and thus subject to corroboration.' ( Ibid. ) The evidentiary hearing in this case consisted not only of descriptions of G.B.'s home computer use and the jury demonstration in the deliberation room, but also juror opinion, conclusions drawn by others about jurors' states of mind or level of understanding, and the particular significance jurors attached to the evidence at trial. These were improper intrusions into the subjective reasoning process of the jurors in violation of Evidence Code section 1150. ( People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1261.) As to the testimony of the three jurors, no objections were interposed by either the prosecution or defense on the ground that testimony was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150. Nor did the trial court otherwise enforce the limitation of section 1150. Thus, the court repeatedly received testimony regarding the subjective reasoning process of the jurors. In conducting our review, we limit our consideration to the overt acts reflected in the testimony. (27 Cal.4th at p. 1261.) We turn first to the jurors' conduct in the deliberation room. Dr. Sherry testified that Rose was shot at a distance of 18 inches to 100 feet, with the bullet travelling through the skull, from back to front, slightly left to right. [32] Rose's injuries were consistent with the victim being shot from above while kneeling. The victim's head also could have been tilted backward when the bullet entered the skull. The victim's injuries were consistent with myriad possibilities depending upon the position of the gun and the victim's head. In her closing argument, the prosecutor argued that defendant executed the victim by shooting Rose in the back of the head while he was on his knees or running away. The overt acts described at the evidentiary hearing were as follows: Following discussion about the manner in which Rose was killed and after efforts to illustrate the shooting on the board, Juror G.B., with assistance from Juror C.C., attempted to demonstrate how Rose sustained a wound with a downward trajectory. G.B., who was similar in height to defendant, stood as the shooter, and C.C., who was similar in height to Rose, took the position of the victim. A six- to eight-foot string from G.B.'s jacket was held in place at C.C.'s temple by a protractor. [33] There was no discussion regarding the use of the six-foot distance. The protractor was used either as a straight edge to hold the string or to measure the angle. The string was pulled back and upwards by G.B. at a five-to-10 degree angle to show the path of the bullet. The demonstration was performed with C.C. kneeling and standing, and with his head in different positions, including tilted backward. C.C. changed positions as requested by the jurors. In response, he and G.B. demonstrated different possibilities and not just one. The trial court concluded that the jurors had conducted an experiment for which there was no foundation. The court analogized the jury's actions to those of the juror in Castro, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 849, who went home and used binoculars to test whether the corrections officer could have seen the events he claimed he witnessed. The Court of Appeal in Castro observed that there was no showing that the juror's binoculars were similar to those used by the officer or that the lighting conditions and distances were similar to the conditions at the time of the officer's identification, and thus the juror's experiment resulted in the receipt of evidence beyond the record. ( Castro, supra, at pp. 853-854.) The trial court here stated: [W]hat occurred in this case is of far more moment and calls for greater caution, it calls for greater scientific technical evidence than the mere examination of a distance through a binocular lens. The court further stated: The creation of this experiment took a set of circumstances that were an arguable probability and gave them the imprimatur of scientific truth. Although the trial court's reasoning is a bit opaque, it appears to have equated the jury's selection of certain variables as the receipt of new evidence. Apparently referring to Dr. Sherry's testimony that there were many possible positions of the shooter and victim, the trial court stated that the manner of Rose's shooting presented innumerable variables. The court expressed concern that angles were discussed, given that Dr. Sherry did not mention a specific angle. The court also faulted the use of a six-foot distance between the shooter and victim because Detective Castillo had indicated that defendant's closest shoe print was 15 feet from the pool of blood where Rose's body was found. The court's conclusions regarding the demonstration are not supported by the record. Unlike the improper experiment in Castro, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 849, the jury here did not go beyond the record in its attempt to evaluate the trial evidence. The manner in which Rose was killed was placed in issue as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a). None of the variables relied upon by the jury were outside the scope of the evidence. Dr. Sherry testified to a slight downward angle of trajectory for the bullet's path and the two autopsy photos showed the entry and exit locations in Rose's skull. The jury's use of a seven-to-10-degree angle for the trajectory reflected its interpretation of Dr. Sherry's description of a slight downward angle. The heights of the victim and defendant were in evidence. Juror G.B. recalled Detective Castillo testifying that defendant's shoe print was six feet from the blood pool. Even if G.B.'s recollection was erroneous, the six-foot distance was within the range of Dr. Sherry's testimony based on the ballistic evidence. Moreover, there was no evidence that the shoe print represented the point at which defendant fired the gun. There was ample evidence that the areas close to Rose's body had been walked over by many at the scene. As the Court of Appeal noted, [A]ll the factual assumptions explored by the demonstration were well within the evidence. Within the range discussed by Dr. Sherry and the variety of possible physical positions, jurors conducted a demonstration to evaluate alternatives that could have produced the downward trajectory of Rose's wound. The jurors directed Juror C.C. to assume various positions. They specifically examined the prosecution's theory that Rose was executed while on his knees, and also considered whether Rose was shot while standing with his head tilted back. Their evaluation critically considered the evidence presented. It did not invade a new field. (See Higgins, supra, 159 Cal. at p. 657.) The conduct of Juror G.B. at home requires a different analysis. Defendant argues that G.B. used his computer to create a model that allowed him to determine, under his interpretation of the evidence, the relative positions of the shooter and victim. He describes G.B.'s computer use as an improper experiment that provided him with new facts, and thus violated the trial court's admonition not to conduct experiments or independently investigate facts. As we shall explain, defendant mischaracterizes G.B.'s conduct. G.B.'s use of his computer was simply his own permissible thinking about the evidence received, and was not an experiment resulting in the acquisition of any new facts. When Juror G.B. used his computer, he had already formed the opinion that defendant must have been on his knees when he was shot. [34] Based on his recollection of the evidence received, G.B. used his computer to diagram the positions of defendant and Rose in order to visualize how Rose suffered his particular wound. G.B. marked off six feet, two inches in the scale for defendant, and five foot ten inches for Rose. He separated them by approximately six feet. He employed a five-to-seven degree angle for the downward angle of the gun held by the shooter. (25) Juror G.B.'s scale diagram did not interject any information outside the record. G.B. relied on the coroner's report for Rose's height, and trial testimony for defendant's height. The distance separating the two men was within the range given by Dr. Sherry. G.B. used a five-to-seven degree angle to comport with Dr. Sherry's testimony that the trajectory of the bullet was slightly downward. The visualization afforded by the diagram allowed G.B. to confirm his view that the bullet trajectory showed that defendant shot Rose while standing above him, a scenario acknowledged by Dr. Sherry during trial. The diagram did not provide any new evidence. Nor was Juror G.B.'s conduct improper because it occurred outside the presence of other jurors. The diagram assisted him in thinking about the evidence at a time when he was permitted to form an opinion about the case. He was not limited to thinking about the case in the deliberation room. As we observed in People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657]: Jurors must be admonished not to form an opinion concerning the case or to discuss it with anyone before it is submitted to them. (§ 1122.) Once the case has been submitted to the jurors for decision, they may not deliberate except when all are together. (§ 1128.) Although the deliberation process of course includes thinking, defendant has failed to cite any authority suggesting that jurors must be directed not to think about the case except during deliberations. A juror participates in the deliberative process by `participat[ing] in discussions with fellow jurors by listening to their views and by expressing his or her own views.' ( People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 485 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225].) Indeed, it would be entirely unrealistic to expect jurors not to think about the case during the trial and when at home. ( Id. at p. 729.) The Court of Appeal's opinion in Bormann v. Chevron USA, Inc. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 260 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 321] ( Bormann ) is instructive. In Bormann, one of the deliberating jurors prepared a statement, or notes, of her view of the evidence during a weekend recess. ( Id. at p. 262.) When the jury reconvened, the juror read to the jury her typewritten statement, which comprised a strong argument, from the evidence, against Chevron's having been negligent. The statement contained no facts that had not been elicited at trial. The writing apparently was not read by any other jurors, nor did it become part of the record. ( Ibid. ) The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeal affirmed. (26) The Court of Appeal observed that the written statement that Juror C. read comprised her own views of the evidence, albeit arranged and transcribed at home, during a weekend separation of the jury. ( Bormann, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 262.) The court observed that [a]ppellant's argument of misconduct hinges squarely on the circumstance that the juror composed her thoughts, and her writing, outside the jury room. Appellant contends that both forms of conduct constituted forbidden deliberation outside the presence of the whole jury. But the notion that a juror may not think about the case out of court after it has been submitted is not only impracticable but also legally inaccurate. ( Ibid. ) The court noted that Code of Civil Procedure section 611, reflected in BAJI No. 15.40, provides in relevant part that when jurors are permitted to separate, either before or after submission of the case, they must be instructed that it is their duty `not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally submitted to them.' Thus, the code provides that following submission jurors may, as they must, form opinions about the case, which involves thinking about it. ( Bormann, at p. 263.) Although jurors must not deliberate until all 12 are together in the jury room, the Bormann court distinguished jury deliberation as the collective process and not the the solitary ruminations of individual jurors. ( Ibid. ) The court continued, If Juror C.'s pondering the case outside the jury room was not misconduct, the remaining question is whether it was misconduct for her to prepare and then consult in the deliberations her out-of-court reduction of her thoughts to writing. ( Bormann, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 263.) The court answered that question as follows: The declarations showed that Juror C. prepared this writing as a recital of her impressions of the evidence, in order to assist her in orally communicating those ideas to the rest of the jury. To hold this to be misconduct would mean the same would be true of a few words on scratch paper, or a gummed reminder of a question, which a juror wished to raise in deliberations when they reconvened. But as long as such notations are the product of the juror's own thought processes and the evidence, rather than extraneous influences, their making or consultation does not exceed the boundaries of proper conduct. ( Id. at p. 264, fn. omitted.) The Court of Appeal concluded: Appellant's position ultimately is that the integrity of jury deliberations requires that jurors not be permitted to think about the case except when assembled together, and that they refrain from introducing into deliberations ideas about the evidence developed outside one another's presence. This may or may not be a worthy ideal. But the Legislature has long resolved to permit jurors to recess and separate during deliberations, while strictly barring them from receiving outside evidence or influences. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 611.) These rules do not, as they cannot, prohibit jurors who have reached the stage of being entitled to form opinions about the case ( ibid. ) from individually contemplating the evidence and the outcome while separated. Moreover, the permissibility of jurors' recording ideas that they wish to share in deliberations is consistent with the requirement and promise that all jurors actively and fully participate in those deliberations. [Citation.] Juror C.'s conduct in this case was not misconduct. ( Bormann, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 265.) Likewise here, because the jury was deliberating, there was nothing improper in Juror G.B.'s contemplating the case while separated from the other jurors. Like the juror's notes in Bormann, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 260, G.B.'s diagram was the product of the juror's own thought processes and the evidence, rather than extraneous influences. ( Id. at p. 264.) The diagram was a visual representation of what the testimony and exhibits established, based on G.B.'s recollection and interpretation of the evidence. He drew the diagram to test his own view of the evidence, which allowed him to argue his position to the jury. Making the diagram did not exceed the boundaries of proper conduct. Nor did Juror G.B.'s use of the computer to draw his diagram elevate his actions to misconduct. The computer did not create evidence that was not already before him. The variables of height, distance and angle were based on G.B.'s recollection of the evidence. The diagram contained no information beyond the record. The computer was simply the device that allowed G.B. to draw his diagram with ease and accuracy in order to visualize the evidence. There was no showing that the computer or its software performed any analytical function or provided any outside information. As the Court of Appeal observed, While [G.B.] used the computer to draw the heights and distances to scale, the drawing was nothing more than he could have done on paper or the blackboard. Nevertheless, we caution that a computer may be misused to investigate the evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1466 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 402] [juror's online search for definition of great bodily injury was misconduct]; People v. Wadle (Colo. 2004) 97 P.3d 932, 934 [juror's downloading of Internet description of Paxil, which she read to other jurors, was misconduct]; Brown v. State (2005) 275 Ga.App. 281 [620 S.E.2d 394, 397-398] [juror's use of MapQuest to determine distances was misconduct]; Wardlaw v. State (2009) 185 Md.App. 440 [971 A.2d 331, 338] [juror's Internet research of oppositional defiant disorder was egregious misconduct]; People v. Lara (N.Y.App.Div. 2007) 44 A.D.3d 488 [843 N.Y.S.2d 311] [juror's obtaining weather information from Internet was misconduct]; Thompson v. Krantz (2006) 2006 OKCIVAPP 60 [137 P.3d 693, 697-698] [juror's Internet research of myelogram procedures and plaintiff's medications was misconduct]; State v. Boling (2006) 131 Wn.App. 329 [127 P.3d 740, 741] [juror's Internet research of alcohol poisoning as cause of death was misconduct]; U.S. v. Wheaton (6th Cir. 2008) 517 F.3d 350, 358-362 [juror's use of Internet mapping program to determine locations of and distances between cities was misconduct].) If, for example, a juror conducts an investigation in which he or she relies on software that manipulates the data, subjecting it to presumptions written into the program, such use would likely constitute an improper experiment. The computer in such a circumstance is analogous to the use of the juror's binoculars in Castro, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 849, or the juror's gun in Conkling, supra, 111 Cal. 616. As with the binoculars and the gun, the computer in these circumstances creates extraneous evidence not admitted at trial. (27) In sum, Juror G.B.'s computer use was part of his individual contemplation of the evidence after the matter had been submitted to the jury. ( Bormann, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 265.) The jury's demonstration in the deliberation room was simply a more critical examination of the evidence admitted. ( Higgins, supra, 159 Cal. at p. 659.) In neither situation did jurors receive extrinsic evidence. As a result, there was no basis for the trial court's conclusion that jurors committed misconduct, and thus no basis for granting of a new penalty phase trial. [35]