Opinion ID: 1843933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: armstrong's counterclaim

Text: The standard of review for findings of fact by the trial court in a proceeding under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act has been previously set forth. That is, such findings will not be set aside unless clearly incorrect, and the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the successful party, with the court resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the successful party and giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence. Kumar v. Douglas County, 234 Neb. 511, 452 N.W.2d 21 (1990); Gatewood v. City of Bellevue, 232 Neb. 525, 441 N.W.2d 585 (1989). Therefore, in analyzing the city's second assignment of error we will again review the evidence in the light most favorable to Armstrong and Andersen. The parties in this case pled that the ambulance was owned by the City of LaVista and stipulated that the ambulance driver was responding to a legitimate Code 3 emergency call at the time the accident occurred. It is also clear from the evidence that the ambulance's emergency lights and siren were activated at the time of the accident. As mentioned earlier, under these circumstances an ambulance is privileged to safely exceed posted speed limits and proceed past red lights and stop signs. See §§ 39-602(5) and 39-608(3). Upon the immediate approach of an emergency vehicle with its lights or siren activated, drivers are under a duty to yield the right-of-way until the vehicle passes. Neb. Rev.Stat. § 39-640(1)(a) (Reissue 1988). Andersen testified that he did not see the ambulance until the collision. It is settled in this state that failing to see one favored under the rules of the road constitutes negligence as a matter of law. Gatewood, supra ; Maple v. City of Omaha, 222 Neb. 293, 384 N.W.2d 254 (1986); Mitchell v. Kesting, 221 Neb. 506, 378 N.W.2d 188 (1985); Steinauer v. Sarpy County, 217 Neb. 830, 353 N.W.2d 715 (1984); Stephen v. City of Lincoln, 209 Neb. 792, 311 N.W.2d 889 (1981), citing Bonnes v. Olson, 197 Neb. 309, 248 N.W.2d 756 (1976). Therefore, Andersen was negligent as a matter of law in failing to see or hear the ambulance prior to his entering the intersection. As discussed above, by entering judgment against the City of LaVista on its claim, the trial court necessarily found Amweg contributorily negligent in a degree more than slight. Similarly, by entering a judgment in favor of Armstrong on its counterclaim despite Andersen's negligence, the trial court necessarily found that such negligence was slight when compared with that of Amweg, whose negligence was gross. See, Gatewood, supra ; Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-21,185 (Reissue 1989). Again, the decision in Gatewood is helpful in analyzing appellant's second assignment of error. The evidence regarding the plaintiff's conduct in that case revealed that the light governing her lane of traffic turned green prior to her arrival at the intersection and that she proceeded through without slowing down, having not seen or heard the police vehicle until seconds before the collision. There was also evidence that traffic in the lanes adjoining hers had stopped for the cruiser despite the green light. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff in her claim against the city, concluding that the woman's negligence did not contribute in a degree more than slight to causing the accident. This court affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. There is little to distinguish Andersen's conduct in this case from that of the plaintiff in Gatewood. Both approached an intersection as the traffic signal governing their lane turned green, and both proceeded through the intersection without slowing down. Neither saw the approaching emergency vehicle, though its lights and siren were activated. Here, the city relies on evidence that other east-west vehicles were stopped at the intersection, a fact which should have put Andersen on notice of potential danger. However, there is evidence in the record that at least one vehicle proceeded through the green light ahead of Andersen. As for Andersen's failure to see or hear the ambulance's emergency lights and siren, there is evidence that Andersen looked north on 84th Street upon approaching the intersection, but thereafter concentrated on a vehicle he feared might attempt to turn left in front of him. A fact finder could reasonably conclude that Andersen did not breach his duty of care in diverting his attention from the north side of the intersection under these circumstances. Finally, of the three witnesses who testified to hearing the siren, one testified that she heard it when the ambulance was only three to four car lengths away, and Morgan testified that he heard the siren just as the traffic signal turned from yellow to red, which was just prior to his observing the truck approaching from a couple hundred feet away. From this evidence, the trial court might have concluded that by the time Andersen heard the siren, he could not have stopped in time. Bearing in mind that it is not the province of this court to resolve evidentiary conflicts or to reweigh the evidence, Central States Health & Life v. Miracle Hills Ltd., 235 Neb. 592, 456 N.W.2d 474 (1990), we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that Andersen's negligence did not contribute in a degree more than slight to causing the accident. However, under the statute governing this case, when the plaintiff in a personal injury suit engages in negligence contributing to the injuries sustained, but not to a degree sufficient to bar the suit, the plaintiff's contributory negligence  shall be considered by the jury in the mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff.... (Emphasis supplied.) § 25-21,185. Cf. Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 25-21,185.01 to 25-21,185.06 (Supp.1991) (revising law regarding contributory negligence for actions accruing on or after January 1, 1992). Here, the trial court awarded Armstrong the stipulated amount for damage to the truck, $9,113.57, plus $1,250 for loss of use of the truck. In so doing, the court awarded Armstrong the full amount of damages it proved resulted from the accident. Thus, it is clear the trial court did not reduce Armstrong's award in an amount proportional to the degree to which Andersen's negligence contributed to causing the accident. Because § 25-21,185 requires such mitigation, we reverse and remand for a comparison of the respective percentages of fault and a reduction of Armstrong's award accordingly. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.