Opinion ID: 1919906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defamation Claim Against the State

Text: In order to recover damages for defamation under the New York Times standard, [8] a plaintiff who is a public official must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the defamatory statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 725-26. A public official plaintiff cannot recover for a defamatory statement relating to his or her official conduct, even if false, unless the public official proves actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So.2d 1306, 1308 (La.1978). At the very least, the public official plaintiff must prove that the defendant published the false statement with a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 215, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2686, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989). Or the public official plaintiff must prove that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968). Even if a public official plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant was grossly negligent in publishing false statements, that showing is insufficient to prove that the defendant acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. at 510, 111 S.Ct. at 2429. Instead, a public official plaintiff must clearly prove that the defendant actually knew the published statements were false or that the defendant was highly aware that the statements were probably false. In the present case, plaintiff initially contends that if Borskey's affidavit did not contain defamatory words, then the IG's report, which was based on that affidavit and which clearly contained defamatory words, must have been issued with actual malice. However, the IG's report was not based merely on Borskey's affidavit, but was based upon an investigation in which a number of persons were questioned about plaintiff's conduct in taking bids for Family Day. In concluding that plaintiff had conspired with Gros to manipulate the bidding process, the IG relied upon evidence that consisted not only of Borskey's affidavit, but also of the bid form with scratch-outs, notations and alterations, and of statements given by all three vendors and by plaintiff and Borskey. On the final bid form, certain prices and quantities were scratched out and replaced with new quantities and with revised bid prices for A.I.M. Plaintiff testified that scratch-outs are common on bid sheets and that the changes merely indicated the different prices and quantities agreed upon during the three-way telephone conversation, further explaining that he contacted the other vendors and took their bids after the conclusion of the three-way call and before awarding the order to Gros as the lowest bidder. Under the scenario related by plaintiff, no bidding irregularities occurred. However, other evidence indicated that at least one of the vendors was not given an opportunity to bid on the revised quantities and specifications. Plaintiff testified that both Acadian Advertising and J.W. Toups submitted bids for the revised quantity of 1,500 cups. While Ann Esposito of J.W. Toups confirmed that she bid on 1,500 cups, Evelyn Flynn of Acadian Advertising reported that her only bid was based upon an order for 1,000 cups. Flynn's statement to the IG that she was not given the opportunity to revise her bid after the cup quantity was increased to 1,500 provided support for the bid-rigging charge against plaintiff. Furthermore, plaintiff noted on the bid form that both Acadian Advertising (the overall low bidder for the three items) and J.W. Toups failed to meet the bid specifications for the name tags and that neither could provide the type of tags required. Plaintiff testified at trial that vinyl name tags take longer to manufacture than paper tags, that Acadian and J.W. Toups both indicated to him that they could not provide vinyl tags by October 1, and that Gros of A.I.M. had the design on hand and could meet the October 1 deadline. Both Flynn of Acadian and Esposito of J.W. Toups contradicted plaintiff's version, stating that they were given the opportunity to bid only on paper name tags and not on vinyl tags. Flynn and Esposito insisted that they could have provided vinyl name tags in time for Family Day. A reasonable interpretation of Flynn's and Esposito's statements was that plaintiff telephoned them prior to the three-way conversation and did not give them the opportunity to submit new bids after Borskey agreed that vinyl tags would be acceptable. Therefore, it was not only Borskey's affidavit that provided the information in support of the IG's conclusion that bid-rigging had taken place, but also Flynn's statement that her sole bid was on 1,000 cups and Flynn's and Esposito's statements that they were never given the chance to bid on vinyl tags and could have provided them by the October 1 deadline. Plaintiff's principal contention was that malice formed the very basis of the investigation from the outset. He testified that the investigation focused only on the university president's supporters, with the ultimate goal of ousting the president. [9] The burden of proof on public official plaintiffs in defamation cases concerning their official conduct is indeed a very difficult one. Nevertheless, a public official plaintiff arguably can prove actual malice with his own testimony and sufficient corroborating evidence. The problem in the present case is the lack of corroborating evidence. The fact that the IG's auditor chose to report an incident involving a small bid confected under the pressure of a hasty bidding process not caused by plaintiff, when there was no suggestion of any bidding irregularities ever attributable to plaintiff in the past, lends some weight to plaintiff's assertion that the purpose of the entire investigation was to target and undermine those university officials loyal to the president. But the weight of this circumstantial evidence, added to plaintiff's own testimony, simply does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. The accusations in the IG's report clearly were not arbitrary, because the information gathered in the investigation provided some basis for the conclusions. While it might well have been more reasonable for the IG to have investigated plaintiff's bidding practices more thoroughly before drawing conclusions and publishing a final report that charged plaintiff with criminal activities, a plaintiff cannot satisfy the New York Times actual malice standard by demonstrating only that the defendant failed to investigate fully the truth of the statements before publication. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. at 688, 109 S.Ct. at 2696; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 330, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3002, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 732-33, 88 S.Ct. at 1326; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1991, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967). The IG's failure to investigate further before issuing his report is therefore insufficient to establish that defendants acted with actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth.