Opinion ID: 1470424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adoption of the Referee's Estate Plan

Text: The guardians argue first that the probate court erred in adopting the estate plan drafted by the referee. Specifically, they contend that, [w]hatever concerns the probate court may have had with the[ir] plan, it is clear from [RSA 464-A:26-a, I,] that [the court] did not have the authority to delegate th[e] responsibility [of drafting an estate plan] to a third-party `referee'. Instead, they assert, the court's authority under the statute is limited to either approving or disapproving the guardians' plan. Resolution of the guardians' argument requires interpretation of the language of RSA 464-A:26-a. When interpreting the language of a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used and discern the legislative intent from the statute as written. State v. Doyle, 156 N.H. 306, 308, 940 A.2d 245 (2007). We will not consider what the legislature might have said, or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond it for further indication of legislative intent. Franklin v. Town of Newport, 151 N.H. 508, 509, 861 A.2d 777 (2004). However, we are the final arbiters of the legislature's intent as it is expressed in the words of a statute when considered as a whole. Doyle, 156 N.H. at 308, 940 A.2d 245. The legislative intent of RSA 464-A:26-a is clear on its face. Apart from entitling the statute Estate Planning by Guardian, the legislature clearly demonstrated that it is the guardian's responsibility to draft the ward's estate plan by stating that [t]he probate court may authorize the guardian of the estate to plan for the testamentary distribution of the ward's estate. RSA 464-A:26-a, I (emphasis added). Even in cases such as this one, where the ward's wishes cannot be ascertained, the legislature again chose to limit the probate court to authoriz[ing] the guardian to draft a plan that will minimize taxation or . . . facilitate distribution of the ward's estate to . . . [those] who would be likely recipients of gifts from the ward. Id. Although the probate court has the ultimate discretion of approving or disapproving a submitted plan, see RSA 464-A:26-a, I, II, V, nothing in the statute permits the court to use a referee to draft a plan. Therefore, we hold that RSA 464-A:26-a places the burden of drafting the ward's estate plan, if one is to be drafted, upon the guardian. The respondent argues, relying exclusively upon RSA 547:3-b (2007), that we must nevertheless affirm the probate court's adoption of the referee's estate plan as a valid exercise of the court's equity authority. He asserts that the court was within its equity jurisdiction to fashion a remedy . . . because the otherwise available procedure for preparing a will for Phi had proved to be plainly inadequate. Although RSA 547:3-b bestows upon the probate courts the powers of a court of equity in cases in which there is not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, we do not agree that that equity authority can be exercised in circumvention of the express language of RSA 464-A:26-a, which places the responsibility of drafting an estate plan upon the guardian. Moreover, we disagree with the respondent's implicit assertion that there was no other plain, adequate and complete remedy at law than adoption of the referee's plan. RSA 547:3-b; see also Thurston Enterprises, Inc. v. Baldi, 128 N.H. 760, 764, 519 A.2d 297 (1986) (explaining that equitable jurisdiction lies only when there is no plain and complete remedy at law). RSA 464-A:26-a does not require that an estate plan be drafted for all incapacitated individuals and, assuming that one is not adopted in this case, the legislature has already provided what it deems to be a complete and adequate remedy for dealing with such a situation in the intestacy statutes. See RSA 561:1, II(a) (2007) (providing that, in a case such as this, the entire intestate estate . . . passes . . . [t]o the issue of the decedent). If the probate court believes that the guardians are not acting in the best interests of the ward or have a conflict of interest, it may consider whether they should continue to serve in that capacity. See RSA 547:3, I(e) (2007) (granting probate judges exclusive jurisdiction to appoint[] and remov[e] . . . guardians of . . . mentally incompetent persons); see also RSA 464-A:26-a, VI (explaining that [t]he probate court, prior to authorizing a lifetime gift, shall appoint a guardian ad litem if the proposed gift benefits the guardian personally or otherwise creates a potential conflict of interest between the ward's interests and the guardian's personal interests). But, the court cannot appoint a referee to independently draft an estate plan when the express language of RSA 464-A:26-a clearly makes it the guardians' responsibility. We, therefore, hold that the probate court erred in adopting the estate plan drafted by Mulhern.