Opinion ID: 2630917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The offense of second-degree felony murder

Text: We first recognized the substantive offense of second-degree felony murder in Sheriff v. Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 659 P.2d 852 (1983). In Morris , we concluded that Nevada's involuntary manslaughter statute, NRS 200.070, when read in conjunction with Nevada's murder statute, NRS 200.030(2), permitted the offense of second-degree murder under the felony-murder rule. See id. at 113, 117-18, 659 P.2d at 856, 858-59. This court, however, was mindful of the potential for untoward prosecution resulting from th[at] decision. Id. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859. As a result, we specifically limited application of the second-degree felony-murder rule to the narrow confines of this case wherein we perceive an immediate and direct causal relationship between the actions of the defendant, if proved, and the [victim's] demise. Id. We defined the term immediate to mean without the intervention of some other source or agency. Id. at 118-19, 659 P.2d at 859. We further limited the application of the rule to felonies that are inherently dangerous when viewed in the abstract. Id. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859. We recognized that [t]here can be no deterrent value in a second degree felony murder rule unless the felony is inherently dangerous since it is necessary that a potential felon foresees the possibility of death or injury resulting from the commission of the felony. Id. Later, in Labastida v. State, we reaffirmed our narrow and limited holding in Morris , and succinctly stated that the second-degree felony-murder rule only applies when the following two elements are satisfied: (1) where the [predicate] felony is inherently dangerous, where death or injury is a directly foreseeable consequence of the illegal act, and (2) where there is an immediate and direct causal relationship  without the intervention of some other source or agency  between the actions of the defendant and the victim's death. 115 Nev. 298, 307, 986 P.2d 443, 448-49 (1999) (citing Morris, 99 Nev. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859). Because we have repeatedly expressed disapproval at the potential for untoward prosecutions resulting from our decision to recognize the second-degree felony-murder rule and consciously limited application of the rule, these two elements are critical to any second-degree felony-murder jury instruction.