Opinion ID: 221854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Certification Agreement

Text: Yannacopoulos argues that General Dynamics also falsely certified its compliance with the Certification Agreement, which he interprets to forbid General Dynamics from capitalizing HBDIC. In Paragraphs 4 and 6 of that agreement, General Dynamics made three certifications relevant to this appeal: (1) that the material or components to be provided under the Purchase Agreement are predominantly of U.S. manufacture; (2) that all non-U.S. origin or non-U.S. manufactured items and components, and non-U.S. services procured or to be procured specifically for this Purchase Agreement are identified in a document attached thereto; and (3) that, aside from commissions and contingent fees, any funds General Dynamics received from the United States government would not be used to purchase services ... utilized in the execution of the Purchase Agreement from non-U.S. contractors or individuals that are not resident in the United States of America, unless the financing of such services is expressly authorized by the DSAA. Each certification, Yannacopoulos argues, forbade General Dynamics from using United States funds to pay for the HBDIC costs without the DSAA's prior authorization. Because each certification concerns a distinct subject matter, we address each in turn. The first certification, referring to material or components, did not bar General Dynamics from spending FMF funds on the HBDIC costs. Neither stock nor management personnel can be considered material or components, as the first certification used those terms. As we observed in our discussion of Article 9.4, the word material typically refers to a substance or part from which something is made. The term component also does not reach the HBDIC aspects of the contract. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 387 (defining a component as a constituent element, as of a system or a part of a mechanical or electrical or electrical complex). The first certification is limited to material and components capable of being manufacture[d], a description clearly inapplicable to stock and management personnel. [9] Yannacopoulos contends the second certification was false because General Dynamics failed to identify the HBDIC costs among the non-U.S. origin or non-U.S. manufactured items and components and non-U.S. services procured or to be procured specifically for Contract 5/86. Turning to the second certification, we see that General Dynamics did in fact indicate that it had identified all such items, components, and services in a document attached to the Certification Agreement. General Dynamics did so by checking a box in the second certification; a box in that certification informing the DSAA that such items, components, and services could be found in Contract 5/86 was left unchecked. The document attached to the Certification Agreement made no mention of the HBDIC costs. In arguing the falsity of the second certification, Yannacopoulos overlooks the undisputed fact that the DSAA had already been notified of General Dynamics' payment of the HBDIC costs when it received Contract 5/86 for review. In light of that undisputed disclosure, no reasonable jury could think General Dynamics' failure to check the proper box in the Certification Agreement was a material false statement, as required for liability under the False Claims Act. See United States ex rel. Longhi v. United States, 575 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir.2009) (requiring that false statement on which FCA claim is based be material); United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir.2008) (same); United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Management Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 443 (6th Cir.2005) (same); see Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 665, 128 S.Ct. 2123, 170 L.Ed.2d 1030 (2008) (requiring that defendant have intended that false statement be material to the Government's decision to pay or approve the false claim); cf. United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir.2008). The Certification Agreement relating to Contract 5/86 was signed by General Dynamics in late February 1987, weeks after Contract 5/86 was submitted to the DSAA for review. That contract required General Dynamics to pay the HBDIC costs and to provide management personnel in Greece. The best that Yannacopoulos can claim is that General Dynamics, by neglecting to refer explicitly to Contract 5/86 in the second certification, failed to remind the DSAA of what was already clear from the contract itself: that General Dynamics was paying a number of costs associated with the establishment of a foreign business development corporation. General Dynamics' failure to remind the DSAA of information set forth in some detail in the contract it had just recently received for review could not reasonably be deemed material to the DSAA's decision. See Rogan, 517 F.3d at 452. Yannacopoulos also argues that the third certification, in which General Dynamics certified that the funds it received from the United States government would not be used to purchase services ... utilized in the execution of the Purchase Agreement from non-U.S. contractors or individuals that are not resident in the United States, was false. This language says nothing about whether General Dynamics could expend any funds on HBDIC stock. Corporate stock is clearly not a service of any kind. Nor can this certification be read to say that General Dynamics would not expend any funds on the HBDIC management personnel. The third certification restricted General Dynamics' use of government funds only to pay for services utilized in the execution of the Purchase Agreement (emphasis added). Such services might include, for example, the manufacture of individual components installed in the F-16s sold to Greece, or the assembly of F-16s from components manufactured in the United States or elsewhere; in other words, services General Dynamics obtained for the purpose of fulfilling the obligations it undertook under Contract 5/86. This language simply cannot reasonably be read to pertain to any services that may have been provided by the HBDIC management personnel. General Dynamics was required to certify that it was in compliance with Contract 5/86, which required it to fund and support HBDIC. The third certification cannot be interpreted to have required General Dynamics to violate Contract 5/86 itself. For all of these reasons, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for General Dynamics on all of Yannacopoulos' claims related to HBDIC.