Opinion ID: 762619
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Towing Rates

Text: 11 The towing laws also prescribe maximum rates for towing and storage of all vehicles, whether or not the tow in question is governed by DARP or SARD. See Admin. Code § 20-509; 6 RCNY § 2-368. Flat rates for towing and storage are specified for vehicles towed under ROTOW. See Admin. Code § 20-519(c)(1).B. The Federal Law: 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) 12 It is in this context of municipal governance that plaintiffs allege that the New York City towing laws are preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c). That statute declares a state or municipality may not enact or enforce a law ... related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. I 1995) (codifying the FAA Authorization Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-305, § 601(c), 108 Stat. 1569, 1606, as amended by the ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub.L. No. 104-88, § 103, 109 Stat. 803, 899). 13 At the same time, subdivision (2) of § 14501(c), entitled Matters Not Covered, exempts various categories of motor carrier regulation from preemption, two of which are relevant in the case at hand. First, the prohibition on state and local regulation does not 14 restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles ... or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization. 15 Id. § 14501(c)(2)(A). Second, this prohibition 16 does not apply to the authority of a State or a political subdivision of a State to enact or enforce a law ... relating to the price of for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck, if such transportation is performed without the prior consent or authorization of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle. 17 Id. § 14501(c)(2)(C). C. The District Court's Decision 18 Believing, as noted, that § 14501(c) preempted the City's towing laws, plaintiffs sued the City on August 28, 1996 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of those laws. On October 27, 1997 Judge Cote issued an opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, and judgment was entered three days later. See Ace, 1997 WL 669891. 19 In ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the towing laws largely withstood plaintiffs' preemption challenge. See id. at  7- 11. It reasoned that although § 14501(c)(1) generally preempted intrastate regulation of vehicular towing, the safety and financial responsibility exceptions under § 14501(c)(2)(A) were sufficiently broad to exempt the City towing laws from preemption with respect to the SARD, DARP, and ROTOW programs as well as the licensing and eligibility requirements. See id. 20 At the same time the district court ruled that City laws regulating rates for nonconsensual tows were saved from preemption by § 14501(c)(2)(C), it also ruled that the laws pertaining to consensual tow rates were preempted. See id. at  11. Further, Judge Cote declined to find that preemption of the nonconsensual tow rate regulations exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause power. See id. at  11- 12. From this October 1997 judgment plaintiffs appeal, and the City of New York cross-appeals. We affirm the result reached in the district court, although for somewhat different reasons.