Opinion ID: 2167211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: absence of members of the jury panel

Text: During jury selection, Grundy's counsel asked to approach the bench and then moved the court to postpone further trial proceedings because there were some jurors missing from the list, that did not show up today. The trial court denied the motion and allowed the trial to proceed. Grundy argues on appeal that the trial court failed to abide by the procedures outlined at KRS 29A.100 and KRS 29A.150: KRS 29A.100. Postponement of service or excusing of juror. (1) Upon the request of a prospective juror prior to his assignment to a trial court, the Chief Circuit Judge, or after his assignment to a trial court, the trial judge may excuse such juror upon a showing of undue hardship, extreme inconvenience or public necessity. (2) In his discretion the judge may excuse a juror from service entirely or may postpone the juror's service temporarily. Whenever possible the judge shall favor temporary postponement of service over permanent excuse. When excusing a juror, the judge shall record the juror's name, as provided in KRS 29A.080, and his reasons for granting the excuse. [15] KRS 29A.150 ContemptFailure to perform jury service. (1) A person summoned for jury service who fails to appear as directed shall be ordered by the court to appear forthwith and show cause for his failure to comply with the summons. If he fails to show good cause for noncompliance with the summons, he may be punished for contempt. (2) A juror who fails to give attention at court, or who leaves the courthouse while the court is in session, or who otherwise fails to complete jury service, without leave of court, may be punished for contempt. [16] Grundy contends that KRS Chapter 29A represents an effort by the General Assembly to bring about reforms in the methods of jury selection in order to insure a fair and impartial jury and to meet the requirements of due process, [17] and Grundy argues that the trial court either: (1) excused jurors outside of the appellant's presence without noting the reasons for the excuse; or (2) failed to issue summons to no show jurors asking them to give cause why they should not be held in contempt. After a careful review of the record and the authorities cited by Grundy, we conclude that Grundy's argument fails to state a coherent claim of error. Further, the whole argument rests on two assumptions for which we can find no support in the record: (1) the trial court excused jurors pursuant to KRS 29A.100; and (2) the trial court made no efforts to initiate contempt proceedings against no show jurors. Quite simply, the record is completely silent with regard to these questions, and, in fact, we have no proof before us that the trial judge excused a single member of the jury panel. As each of the authorities cited by Grundy in support of his argument involved conceded deviations from the statutory provisions of KRS Chapter 29A, [18] we do not believe Grundy's naked innuendo states a cognizable claim. Our predecessor Court held, in Brodgen v. Commonwealth, [19] that a motion, pursuant to RCr 9.34, raising an irregularity in the selection or summons of the jurors [20] must have a factual basis: Kentucky law requires that a motion raising an irregularity in the selection of a jury precede the examination of the jurors. RCr 9.34. Appellants' objections [that the panel was drawn from property owners rather than exclusively from voting lists] were timely, but no effort was made to request a hearing or to present supporting facts until after the notice of appeal was filed. In Williams v. Commonwealth, 254 Ky. 277, 71 S.W.2d 626, 629 (1934), we said: . . . this court may reverse for . . . or any other error of the trial court, in the impaneling a jury or failing or refusing to provide a statutory jury, if demanded by the accused, and timely objections are made, supported by appropriate evidence, and proper exceptions are noted of record . . . . A mere objection, without some factual showing of irregularity in the selection of a jury panel, is not sufficient to challenge the procedure employed in selection of the jurors. The trial court did not err in overruling appellants' objection. [21] Grundy's motion merely asked the trial court to suspend the proceedings because some of the members of the jury panel did not appear on the morning the court called the case for trial. Grundy's counsel never mentioned KRS Chapter 29A during the bench conference in which she made her motion and made no issue regarding undocumented excuses before the trial court. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly denied this motion. This Court simply does not review alleged procedural errors when the appellant did not present the issue before the trial court, [22] and we will not allow appellants, under the guise of developing an argument raised in the trial court, to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate court. [23] The trial court did not deviate from the statutory guidelines in denying Grundy's motion, and we find no error.