Opinion ID: 1992848
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to allow cross-examination about other perpetrators

Text: Defendant did not testify, nor did he present any witnesses at the guilt phase of the trial. Rather, the defense pursued the following three theories to raise doubt about whether he had committed the murder of Marsh: (1) that there were multiple perpetrators involved in the robbery, or third-party guilt; (2) that defendant did not commit the crime but only found the wallet after the murder; and (3) that the murder resulted from a robbery gone bad. In cross-examining members of the police force who had investigated the Marsh murder, defendant attempted to elicit testimony supporting the theory that multiple perpetrators may have been involved in the robbery of the Exxon station. The trial court twice refused to allow certain questions of police witnesses, and defendant complains that those restrictions deprived him of his right to confront witnesses and present a defense. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c limits death-penalty eligibility to those defendants convicted of murder committed by their own conduct. [A] capital-murder defendant may focus his or her efforts in the guilt phase on raising a reasonable doubt about issues that trigger the penalty phase, rather than vigorously contesting guilt or innocence on the murder charge. State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 517, 651 A. 2d 19 (1994). Patrolman Thomas Maple was called by the State to testify about the police investigation of the murder scene. During direct examination, the officer described the police arrival at the scene, the appearance of the gas station, and the victim's appearance. Maple further testified that there was no evidence of a struggle. During his testimony, Maple relied upon his partner's report of the crime scene to refresh his recollection. During cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to ask the following question: Patrolman Maple, was there anything in your investigation on May 5th, 1992 between 6:15 in the morning and 9:00 in the morning which would eliminate the possibility of multiple actors involved with this particular robbery/homicide? The trial court sustained an objection, finding that the question was outside the scope of direct examination. The trial court added: [t]o the extent that you want to cover areas not covered by his direct examination, I do believe he is listed on the defense witness list.... You want the officer to be available for recall on defense case, you certainly may do that, but this line of questioning must stop. Defendant chose not to call Maple and address these questions. Cross-examination is generally limited to the scope of direct examination, N.J.R.E. 611(b). At trial, defense counsel argued that the question was within the scope of direct examination because the report written by Maple's partner that Maple used to refresh his recollection, discussed suspect[s], raising the implication of multiple perpetrators. The trial court correctly rejected that attempt, because that reference to a single line in a report that was not admitted into evidence did not constitute part of the direct examination. Defendant now contends that, because Maple discussed the crime scene, it was legitimate to question him about whether the crime scene revealed any evidence about multiple perpetrators. That contention would bring the question into the scope of direct examination if trial counsel had raised it with the trial court. However, any error was harmless because the trial court clearly informed defendant that he could recall Maple and raise those questions. R. 2:10-2. Thus, defendant's right to present a defense was not compromised at all. The State also presented Sergeant Joseph Mosner. Mosner described the layout of the gasoline station and the office, including the locations where blood and bullets were found. Defense counsel then cross-examined Mosner about the details of his description of the layout, and elicited from the officer the fact that the police had found several fingerprints in the office (none matched the defendant). Then, suddenly, defense counsel asked: Sometime later you were asked to check or investigate the brother of Donald Loftin, Ronald Loftin? The trial court refused to allow the question under the third-party guilt doctrine. The third-party guilt doctrine is implicated when a defendant seek[s] to prove that another agency produced the death with which he is charged. State v. Sturdivant, 31 N.J. 165, 179, 155 A. 2d 771 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 956, 80 S.Ct. 873, 4 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1960). Because of the ease in which unsupported claims may infect the process, we have held that third-party guilt evidence is admissible only when the proof offered has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State's case. Ibid. In State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 300, 548 A. 2d 939 (1988) ( Koedatich I ), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 813, 102 L.Ed. 2d 803 (1989), we reaffirmed the Sturdivant standard and noted that the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of third-party guilt is a particularly fact-sensitive one. However, courts have recognized that evidence that tends to create reasonable doubt that someone else, generically, rather than defendant, committed the offense, is admissible. State v. Jorgensen, 241 N.J. Super. 345, 351, 575 A. 2d 31 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 386, 585 A. 2d 389 (1990). Thus, in Koedatich I, the defendant sought to introduce testimony that a small sports car was in the vicinity of the murder, while the defendant drove a large car; the defendant further sought to introduce evidence that an identified third-party owned such a sports car. We refused to allow testimony about the specific third-party since no evidence linked that person to the crime; however, we did allow evidence about the sports car since it tended to create reasonable doubt about whether someone other than the defendant committed the crime. Koedatich I, supra, 112 N.J. at 306, 548 A. 2d 939. Defendant does not argue, nor did he argue at trial, that he has any evidence linking his brother to the crime. Thus, the trial court correctly applied Koedatich I and Sturdivant in refusing to allow any questions about Ronald Loftin. As in Koedatich I, defendant was free to introduce evidence tending to prove that a generic someone else did the crime, but he could not identify any specific individual without more notice. The trial court's ruling was therefore correct.