Opinion ID: 1133414
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial court's failure to instruct on lesser included offenses

Text: The trial court instructed the jury on two theories of first degree murder: premeditated and deliberate murder and felony murder. The court also instructed on the express malice form of second degree murder. But it refused defendant's request to instruct on the implied malice form of second degree murder. [7] In addition, the trial court refused defendant's request for instructions on involuntary manslaughter. Defendant contends that the failure to instruct on the implied malice form of second degree murder and on involuntary manslaughter was prejudicial error requiring reversal. We disagree. Because the jury in returning its true finding on the special-circumstance allegations that defendant killed baby Amanda while perpetrating the felony offenses of rape and lewd conduct with a child under age 14 ( 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(iii) and (v)) necessarily determined that the killing was first degree murder, any error in failing to instruct on these lesser included offenses was harmless. In a criminal case, a trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) Therefore, even without a request, the court must instruct on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present. ( Ibid. ) [S]econd degree murder with implied malice has been committed `when a person does an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.' ( People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 104, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 864, 840 P.2d 969; see  189 [defining murder].) Involuntary manslaughter is a killing committed `in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection.' ( People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 274, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013, quoting  192, subd. (b) [defining involuntary manslaughter].) In support of his argument that the trial court should have instructed on these two lesser included offenses, defendant points to the following evidence: the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Eva Hauser, a pathologist with the Los Angeles County Coroner's Office, that shaking, together with blunt force trauma, caused baby Amanda's death; that baby Amanda was sexually molested before she was shaken; and that all of the injuries were inflicted within six hours. Defendant also mentions Dennis Morgan's testimony that defendant had told him he shook Amanda to stop her from crying, and defendant notes his own testimony that he shook Amanda to arouse her from unconsciousness. We need not decide whether this evidence constituted substantial evidence supporting instructions on the lesser included offenses of implied-malice second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. The jury expressly found the existence of two special-circumstance allegations, that defendant killed Amanda while perpetrating the felony offenses of rape and of lewd conduct with a child under age 14. ( 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(iii) and (v).) Given these findings, the jury necessarily determined that the killing of Amanda was first degree felony murder perpetrated in the commission of rape and lewd conduct and not any lesser form of homicide. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 324, 464, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610.) [8] Therefore, any error in failing to instruct on implied-malice second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter was necessarily harmless.