Opinion ID: 1355928
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions on Mitigating General Character-background Evidence

Text: (10) Under separate headings, defendant argues that the trial court misinstructed the jury on the proper role of general character-background evidence at the penalty phase, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument, exacerbating the error. In reviewing such claim, we examine the instructions and arguments as a whole to determine whether the jury was adequately informed of the proper scope of mitigating evidence. ( California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. 538, 546 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 943 (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.)]; see Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 113-115 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 10-11, 102 S.Ct. 869]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 777 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250]; People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 536-537, 544, fn. 17; People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, & fn. 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].) We first observe that the jury was not instructed at the penalty phase with the no-sympathy language embodied in CALJIC No. 1.00. (Compare People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 536-537, vacated sub nom. California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934] [wherein the high court held that the giving of the California standard antisympathy instruction (CALJIC No. 1.00) at the penalty phase is not itself unconstitutional per se].) [11] (11) The jury in this case did receive instruction in the unadorned, literal terms of section 190.3, factor (k). In Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d 858, we found factor (k) (reproduced in former CALJIC No. 8.84.1) potentially confusing in that it spoke only of a circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime. We therefore imposed the prospective requirement that trial courts  in instructing on the factor embodied in section 190.3, [factor] (k)  should inform the jury that it may consider as a mitigating factor `any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime' and any other `aspect of [the] defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ( Id., at p. 878, fn. 10.) Nevertheless, our review of the arguments and instructions as a whole in this case reinforces our conclusion that the jury must have understood its obligation to consider and weigh all of defendant's mitigating evidence. In discussing factor (k), the prosecutor told the jury: This is the area in the law that permits, for the first time in this case, the exercise of pity. Mercy. [¶] What does it tell you? Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it's not a legal excuse. [¶] That catch-all factor [( k )] would seem to indicate that even if you don't find any legal excuse, you consider any other factor that tends to extenuate the criminal conduct. [¶] Well, if that broad door is open, what is there? I suggest nothing to extenuate or justify this conduct, even though not a legal excuse. [¶] The fact that defendant grew up in a relatively broken home with no father  does that justify taking Leonard Wesley Polk's life with two bullets to the back of the head? Does it explain or in any way extenuate it? I suggest I [ sic ] doesn't. [¶] The fact that he was a relatively good son who cared for his younger siblings when he was in the home  does that justify the taking of Leonard Wesley Polk's life, even though not legally in the moral sense? Is it okay for a kid from a rough background to take life like this? I suggest no. [¶] What is there if you can stretch your minds or imagination? What has been presented that shows you an extenuation, a mitigation, not legal, but perhaps moral or emotional? [¶] Anything at all that you can find?  (Italics added.) Later in his argument, the prosecutor again characterized factor (k) as anything that would give you a moral excuse, not legally but something morally compelling that would say to you, `Well, we can understand and possibly forgive here.' Defense counsel likewise urged the jury that factor (k) dealt with whatever other factors you want to consider, and concluded, I submit to you that [factor] k is the one that always leads towards mitigation. Our review of the penalty phase arguments, considered together with the instructions as a whole, convinces us that the jury was adequately informed of the full nature of its responsibility to consider sympathy, general character and background evidence.