Opinion ID: 2455414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 9 This court has original jurisdiction over writs of quo warranto or mandamus, but only appellate and revisory jurisdiction over writs of prohibition. Wash. Const. art. IV, § 4. Nonetheless, we can issue a writ to prohibit a state officer from exercising a mandatory duty. Wash. State Labor Council v. Reed, 149 Wash.2d 48, 55-56, 65 P.3d 1203 (2003). The only relief requested by petitioners in their petition against state officer was a writ of prohibition. Pet. Against State Officer at 1-2. In later briefings, petitioners expanded this remedy to include a writ of mandamus. Accordingly, we treat petitioners' action as one for mandamus. ¶ 10 Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy appropriate only where a state official is under a mandatory ministerial duty to perform an act required by law as part of that official's duties. Cmty. Care Coal. v. Reed, 165 Wash.2d 606, 614, 200 P.3d 701 (2009). The mandate must specify the precise thing to be done or prohibited. Walker v. Munro, 124 Wash.2d 402, 407, 879 P.2d 920 (1994) (citing Clark County Sheriff v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 95 Wash.2d 445, 450, 626 P.2d 6 (1981)). And the mandate must define the duty with such particularity `as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.' SEIU Healthcare 775NW. v. Gregoire, 168 Wash.2d 593, 599, 229 P.3d 774 (2010) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Clark v. City of Seattle, 137 Wash. 455, 461, 242 P. 966 (1926)). ¶ 11 Petitioners present two related arguments. First, petitioners argue that sections 204(3) and 306(17) of the 2009-2011 transportation budget violate Washington Constitution article II, section 40 restrictions on the expenditure of motor vehicle fund moneys. Petitioners assert that these two transportation provisos impose a duty to value and transfer the two center lanes. Since the center lanes were constructed, in part, using motor vehicle fund moneys, petitioners' reason that any transfer of the lanes would essentially be an unlawful diversion of motor vehicle fund moneys. Second, petitioners broadly argue that article II, section 40 prohibits the State from entering into any agreement with Sound Transit for use of the two center lanes of I-90 for high capacity light rail.