Opinion ID: 70130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 1. Appealability of Temporary Restraining Orders While temporary restraining orders are not generally subject to appellate review, Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 950 F.2d 685, 686 (11th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter HRC I]; McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1472 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 860, 107 S. Ct. 207, 93 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1986), where the order has the effect of a preliminary injunction this court has jurisdiction to review the order and is not bound by the district court's designation of the order. HRC I, 950 F.2d at 686. To determine whether an order denominated as a temporary restraining order is actually a preliminary injunction, we review the duration of the order; whether it was issued after notice and a hearing; the extent of evidence submitted to the district court; and the continuing safeguards installed by the district court. McDougald, 786 F.2d at 1472. After review of the district court's orders, we conclude that they are in fact appealable preliminary injunctions. See November 3 Order. With respect to the district court's October 31 Order, 15 the court explicitly referred to the order as preliminary injunctive relief. October 31 Order at 4. Moreover, the order is of indefinite duration; it was issued after notice and a hearing; the court received evidence and considered declarations from both parties (commenting that no further factual development need be made before ruling); and the court required the parties to report jointly to it every thirty days regarding the status under its order. We conclude that the characteristics of this October 31 Order belie the district court's label as a temporary restraining order; it is in all respects an appealable preliminary injunction.7 Thus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we have jurisdiction over an appeal from that order. With respect to the district court's November 22 Order and November 28 Order granting HRC and the individual Haitian parties relief, but staying portions of that relief during appeal, the district court specifically stated that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the court finds that this Order involves controlling questions of law regarding the rights of [migrants] in Guantanamo Bay which are subject to a difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may advance the ultimate termination of this case. 7 In Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 94 S. Ct. 937, 39 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1974), the Supreme Court observed: A district court, if it were able to shield its orders from appellate review merely by designating them as temporary restraining orders, rather than as preliminary injunctions, would have virtually unlimited authority over the parties in an injunctive proceeding. In this case, where an adversary hearing has been held, and the court's basis for issuing the order strongly challenged, classification of the potentially unlimited order as a temporary restraining order seems particularly unjustified. Id. at 86-87, 94 S. Ct. at 951. Such is the case here. 16 November 22 Order at 2. On December 1, 1994, we exercised our discretion and permitted appeal from these orders, and accordingly, we take jurisdiction of this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 2. Standing In its appeal to this court for emergency relief from the district court's October 31 order, the government raised a question regarding the standing of the Cuban Legal Organizations and the individual Cuban plaintiffs relative to the putative injuries to parties not before the court, specifically all those migrants who expressed a written desire to be repatriated. Appellants' Mot. for Summ. Reversal, or, in the Alternative for An Emergency Stay Pending Appeal (or a Writ of Mandamus), CABA II, at 22 n.65 (filed Nov. 2, 1994). These migrants were prevented from returning to Cuba by the district court's oral order on October 25, 1994, and by the October 31 Order. After our November 7 Order, repatriation of those who had expressed in writing a desire to return to sovereign Cuba was continued as arranged with the Cuban government. Appellant's Brief at 6 n.2. But for our stay, the remaining Cuban migrants in Camp November who had requested to be returned to Cuba would be affected by the district court's order barring their repatriation. The principle of standing is derive[d] from the Article III limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts. Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1536 (11th Cir. 1994). 17 Before rendering a decision . . . every federal court operates under an independent obligation to ensure it is presented with the kind of concrete controversy upon which its constitutional grant of authority is based; and this obligation on the court to examine its own jurisdiction continues at each stage of the proceedings, even if no party raises the jurisdictional issue and both parties are prepared to concede it. Hallandale Professional Fire Fighters Local 2238 v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d 756, 759 (11th Cir. 1991). We recognize two components to the standing doctrine: the minimum constitutional requirements of Article III and the prudential considerations of judicial self-government. Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 115 S. Ct. 641, ___ L. Ed. 2d ____ (1994); F.D.I.C. v. Morley, 867 F.2d 1381, 1386 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 819, 110 S. Ct. 75, 107 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1989). To meet the irreducible minimum constitutional requirements, the plaintiff must show (1) that he has suffered an actual or threatened injury, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. Harris, 20 F.3d at 1121; accord Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S. Ct. 752, 758, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1982); Jackson, 21 F.3d at 1537; Morley, 867 F.2d at 1386. The party must also show that prudential considerations do not weigh against consideration of the claims. Harris, 20 F.3d at 1121; Morley, 867 F.2d at 1386. We have identified three particular situations in which we will decline to address a party's claim for prudential 18 reasons: (1) assertion of a third party's [putative] rights rather than individual legal rights; (2) allegation of a generalized grievance rather than an injury peculiar to such litigant; or (3) assertion of an injury outside the statute's or constitutional provision's zone of interests. Morley, 867 F.2d at 1386. For each claim stated in a complaint, there must be a plaintiff who will achieve some redress by the court's actions. Jackson, 21 F.3d at 1536. As of this interlocutory appeal, the classes sought have not been certified; neither the Cuban Legal Organizations nor the individual Cuban plaintiffs represent the approximate 1000 Cuban residents of Camp November who expressed their desire in writing to be returned to sovereign Cuba as soon as possible. Inclusion of class action allegations in a complaint does not relieve a plaintiff of himself meeting the requirements for constitutional standing, even if the persons described in the class definition would have standing themselves to sue. Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 771 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981); accord Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1340 (11th Cir. 1994) ([U]nless . . . one of the named plaintiffs is in real and immediate danger of being personally injured . . . the plaintiff class lacks standing . . . .); Jones v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 977 F.2d 527, 531 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that a party may only represent a class to the extent that he has standing to bring individual claims), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 113 S. Ct. 2932, 124 L. Ed. 2d 682 (1993). We conclude that the 19 plaintiffs in this case are not suffering any real or threatened injury by the repatriation of any migrant who has expressed, in writing, his or her desire to be returned to sovereign Cuba. None of the individual Cuban plaintiffs claims to have requested repatriation and are therefore, outside the group who is being affected directly by the district court's October 31 Order barring repatriation without prior consultation with a lawyer. However, the individual Cuban migrants may properly challenge the United States' repatriation policies to the extent that they allege that they may suffer imminent injury by being coerced in the future into signing declarations of desire to repatriate or being wrongly repatriated to sovereign Cuba, whether or not they may succeed on the merits of those claims. See Morley, 867 F.2d at 1387 (holding that standing is determined without considering the party's likelihood of ultimately succeeding on the merits of their claims).