Opinion ID: 2521040
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Heading: The Time Limits of C.R.C.P. 60(b) Apply to Challenges to Paternity Judgments on the Basis of Mistake

Text: We begin our analysis by discussing the importance of finality of judgments, both to the legal system as a whole and to individual judicial determinations. Once a final judgment has entered and the time for review has passed, the judgment is generally conclusive between the parties. See, e.g., E.J.R. v. Dist. Court, 892 P.2d 222, 226 (Colo.1995) (We have long recognized that a definite public interest exists in the assured final adjudication of controversies and conclusiveness of judgments.). A court's power to modify or vacate a final judgment is limited, even if aspects of that final judgment are erroneous. See, e.g., People v. Caro, 753 P.2d 196, 200 (Colo.1988). If judgments could easily be set aside, public confidence in the courts would be undermined. As judges and legal scholars have long recognized, protecting the finality of judgments promotes stability, certainty, and consistency in the law, and enhances the credibility of the judicial system: That the formal pronouncements of legal tribunals upon causes submitted to them should enjoy every possible degree of finality and conclusiveness would seem to be a necessary predicate to the proper functioning of the courts themselves. To permit their decisions to be evaded or disregarded for insufficient cause or in modes not sanctioned by law would tend to disrupt the administration of justice and bring courts into disrepute. Public policy requires that. . . judgments, as solemn records upon which valuable rights rest, should not lightly be disturbed or overthrown. 1 A.C. Freeman, Freeman on Judgments § 305, at 602-03 (5th ed. 1925); see also, e.g., Davidson v. McClellan, 16 P.3d 233, 236-37 (Colo.2001); Knapp v. Knapp, 24 Ohio St.3d 141, 493 N.E.2d 1353, 1356 (1986) (Finality requires that there be some end to every lawsuit, thus producing certainty in the law and public confidence in the system's ability to resolve disputes.). Individual parties who rely on existing judgments could be irreparably damaged by subsequent modifications to those judgments. To protect the interests of those parties, we have recognized that there must ordinarily be an ultimate stopping point at which a judgment is considered conclusive and unchangeable. Davidson, 16 P.3d at 236 (It is essential, for practical reasons as well as for fundamental fairness, that there be a point at which litigation reaches a conclusion and that parties be permitted to rely on the outcome.); see also, e.g., Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931) (Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties.); Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 648 A.2d 439, 448 (1994) ([T]he policy of finality serves an important purpose  the parties understand their respective rights and need have no concern about future developments changing their rights.). Occasionally, there are circumstances in which the State's interest in finality must give way to overriding concerns for truth and equity. Davidson, 16 P.3d at 237. Our society will not always permit blatantly erroneous or inequitable judgments to stand solely to promote interests in finality: Litigants, of course, must be provided with some remedy to gain relief from an erroneous or unwarranted judgment. And in recognition of such necessity, the law has established appropriate proceedings to which a judgment party may always resort when he deems himself wronged by the court's decision. 1 Freeman, supra, § 305, at 603. Thus, rules have developed to govern when a judgment may be vacated or amended. Once a valid judgment is entered, the only means by which the trial court may thereafter alter, amend or vacate the judgments is by appropriate motion under either C.R.C.P. 59 or 60. [5] , [6] See, e.g., Caro, 753 P.2d at 200. Relevant to this case, C.R.C.P. 60(b), which balances the preferred rule of finality of judgments and the need to provide relief in the interests of justice in exceptional cases, defines when a court can redress substantive errors in a final judgment. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. O'Neill, 817 P.2d 500, 505 (Colo.1991); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 925 P.2d 785, 790 (Colo.1996); 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2851, at 227 (2d ed. 1995). C.R.C.P. 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment for any of a specified list of reasons, including, most relevantly here, [m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. [7] Strict time limits apply, however. Thus, a motion to set aside a judgment on the basis of mistake must be made within a reasonable time, . . . not more than six months after the judgment. . . was entered. C.R.C.P. 60(b). Thus, any challenge based on mistake is absolutely barred after six months have passed from the date of judgment. The question presented by this case is whether that six-month time bar applies to paternity judgments. [8] Article 4 of Title 19, the title known as the Children's Code, is Colorado's version of the Uniform Parentage Act. It governs all Colorado paternity proceedings. Section 19-4-105(2)(c) provides that a legal finding of paternity may be challenged in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or mistake of material fact, with the burden of proof upon the challenger. Based on the fact that this statute does not specifically articulate a time limit within which such a challenge may be made, the court of appeals concluded that no time limit applied. All proceedings conducted pursuant to the Colorado Children's Code, including paternity proceedings, are governed by the Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure. § 19-1-106(1), 6 C.R.S. (2001). Unfortunately, the Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure are silent as to when a judgment rendered under the provisions of the Children's Code may be modified or vacated. Some guidance is provided, however. Rule 1 states, Proceedings are civil in nature and where not governed by these rules or the procedures set forth in Title 19 . . . shall be conducted in accordance with the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, except as otherwise provided by statute or these rules. This means that unless there is something in Title 19 that would preclude application of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure to paternity proceedings, those rules, including C.R.C.P. 60(b), apply. We find nothing in the text of the Children's Code that suggests that the time limits of C.R.C.P. 60(b) do not apply to it. Section 19-4-105(2)(c) arguably may serve to limit the types of challenges that may be made to paternity judgments. [9] Nowhere, however, does section 19-4-105(2)(c) indicate that the legislature intended to expand the ability of parties to challenge paternity judgments beyond the boundaries provided by C.R.C.P. 60(b), so that challenges to paternity judgments can be brought at any time. Neither section 19-4-119(1)(a), 6 C.R.S. (2001), nor section 19-4-108, 6 C.R.S. (2001), support the result R.L.C. seeks. Section 19-4-119(1)(a) provides the court with continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke a judgment or order . . . [f]or future education or support. It does not vest the court with continuing jurisdiction to modify or vacate paternity judgments. Section 19-4-108 provides that an action to determine the existence of the father and child relationship may be brought at any time prior to the child's eighteenth birthday. The question in this case is not when a paternity action may be brought, but when an existing paternity judgment may be set aside. A rule permitting unlimited challenges would be inconsistent with the public policy in favor of encouraging and respecting the finality of judgments. The policy interests that generally support the need for final judgments, discussed above, are particularly applicable to paternity judgments. The child's relationship with her parent, as well as her financial and psychological stability, are all threatened if an adjudicated father can subsequently challenge the relationship in court. With so much hanging in the balance, courts must be extremely cautious about setting aside or altering adjudications of paternity, particularly when such judgments have existed unchallenged for an extended period of time. We have previously recognized that, [b]ecause a paternity action significantly impacts a child, concern for her welfare should be paramount at every stage of the proceedings. N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 364 (Colo.2000) (also stating that [t]he outcome of a paternity action irrevocably alters a child's current family situation and her future). Thus, we held that paternity determinations must take into account the best interests of the child. Id. ; see also 1 Nina M. Vitek, Disputed Paternity Proceedings § 1.07, at 1-91 (2001) (Courts now hold that the chief purpose of the paternity proceeding is to secure the health, welfare, and happiness of the child.). Similarly, the child's interests must also be considered when deciding whether to permit a legal father to reopen a judgment of paternity. We are not persuaded that it is in the best interests of a child to permit an existing parent-child relationship to be subjected to endless question and challenge. Thus, we hold that any challenge to a paternity judgment on the basis of mistake of material fact must be brought within the six-month time limit set forth in C.R.C.P. 60(b). We acknowledge that the results of this holding may sometimes, arguably, seem harsh or unfair. However, it would often be far more unfair to permit longstanding paternity judgments to be altered in such a manner as to leave children fatherless and without financial support. Alleged fathers in paternity proceedings have an opportunity to litigate the issue. If they wish to take advantage of that opportunity, they must do so at the time the judgment is rendered, or they must bring challenges to such judgments within the reasonable time limits set by C.R.C.P. 60(b)  not years later and in contravention of settled expectations. In this case, R.L.C. had every opportunity to present a defense in court at the time that the issue of paternity was litigated, in 1988. [10] He could have demanded a blood test and a full trial, where he could have presented evidence and cross-examined witnesses. He chose not to. He may not now, more than eleven years after the judgment entered, attempt to reopen the judgment and litigate the issue of paternity. His time for asserting a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment on the basis of mistake of material fact has long since expired.