Opinion ID: 2671306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Second Summary Judgment Order

Text: ¶ 51. In February 2013, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Town on counts 1, 3 and 4—violation of Article 8 of the Vermont Constitution, common law defamation, and tortious interference with performance of office. The court based its decision largely on procedural grounds, concluding that plaintiff had failed to adequately oppose summary judgment. The court ruled that plaintiff as the nonmoving party had failed to properly demonstrate issues of material fact because her response to summary judgment was not supported by affidavit, deposition or other sworn testimony. We conclude that the procedural grounds for granting the motion were inadequate and that the record in this case, including the July 1 letter and plaintiff’s affidavit, which were attached to the Town’s motion for summary judgment, clearly demonstrates the presence of contested facts and a record which—if the evidence favoring plaintiff is believed—could support a judgment in her favor after trial. [6] ¶ 52. Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), as amended effective January 23, 2012, sets out a mandatory procedure for demonstrating that “a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed.” V.R.C.P. 56(c)(1). The party asserting that a fact is not disputed must file “a separate and concise statement of undisputed material facts” with citations to the record. V.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(A). ¶ 53. In this case, the Town was the moving party. Although the Town included a lengthy factual discussion in its motion for summary judgment, its Rule 56(c) statement of undisputed facts was very brief. It states only that plaintiff never passed the audit process as required by the selectboard and that the Town is a member of the Vermont League of Cities and Towns. To the statement, the Town attached plaintiff’s affidavit, the July 1, 2010 letter, and plaintiff’s responses to written discovery. The statement of facts concludes with three complaints about plaintiff’s discovery responses and attaches a copy of a letter from counsel concerning these deficiencies. There is no concise statement of the undisputed facts which would support the Town’s argument that plaintiff was neither defamed nor forced unlawfully out of office. ¶ 54. If the Town’s statement of undisputed facts is weak in its adherence to Rule 56(c), plaintiff’s response is nonexistent. Plaintiff filed a memorandum and a response to the Town’s statement, but did not file her own statement of disputed facts with reference to the record or in some other way show that the materials cited by the Town did not establish the absence of a factual dispute. V.R.C.P. 56(b), (c)(1) (allowing adverse party to file opposition and statement of disputed facts and requiring party asserting that fact is genuinely disputed to support assertion by filing statement of disputed facts supported by citation to record). In other words, the Town did not lay out an appropriate statement of undisputed facts and plaintiff made even less effort to engage in the Rule 56(c) process. ¶ 55. The requirements of Rule 56 are important and where a party does not adequately dispute a statement of undisputed facts, we have affirmed the court’s acceptance of those facts as admitted. See V.R.C.P. 56(e) (stating that where party fails to properly support assertion, court may, among other options, consider fact as undisputed); Sperling v. Allstate Indem. Co. , 2007 VT 126, ¶ 19, 182 Vt. 521, 944 A.2d 210. Here, however, grant of summary judgment to the Town based solely on plaintiff’s failure to adequately respond was error for two main reasons. First, because the Town failed to provide a proper statement of undisputed facts with citations to the record demonstrating an absence of any controverted material fact, the burden did not shift to plaintiff to show the existence of disputed facts. See Pierce v. Riggs , 149 Vt. 136, 138, 540 A.2d 655, 656-57 (1987) (explaining burden does not shift to nonmoving party until moving party meets its burden of showing absence of dispute over material fact). ¶ 56. Second, plaintiff was not required to submit new evidence in support of her opposition where evidence already in the record supported her position. The parties had both previously filed motions for summary judgment, which contained detailed statements of undisputed facts, with attachments of various important documents. The trial court also conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction. Certainly, it was not the trial court’s responsibility alone to search this record for factual disputes, but the court should not have turned a blind eye to the existence of this evidence either. See Pierce , 149 Vt. at 138, 540 A.2d at 657 (explaining that when deciding Rule 56 motion court should consider entire record, “including affidavits, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories and similar material”); see also V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3) (allowing court to consider material in record even if not cited in required statement of facts). Since plaintiff’s critical evidence—the July 1, 2010 letter and plaintiff’s affidavit—were both attached to the Town’s motion for summary judgment, it was readily apparent that disputed issues of fact existed between the parties. ¶ 57. In addition, plaintiff referenced the letter and facts from her affidavit in her memorandum in response to the Town’s request for summary judgment, although she failed to properly submit a statement of undisputed facts or to include specific references to the record. In effect, the court sanctioned plaintiff with dismissal of the case for failing to appropriately reference the record in her response to summary judgment. Like the rules concerning default judgment, the procedure of Rule 56 “should be liberally construed in favor . . . of resolving litigation on the merits, to the end that fairness and justice are served.” Desjarlais v. Gilman , 143 Vt. 154, 158-59, 463 A.2d 234, 237 (1983). ¶ 58. In other circumstances, the failure of a party to follow the requirements of Rule 56 could result in the granting or denial of the motion for reasons of process only. In this case, however, where neither party has followed the rule, such a ruling cannot be sustained. We turn now to the merits of the remaining claims.
¶ 59. In count 1, plaintiff alleged that the Town had applied 24 V.S.A. § 832, the section allowing the selectboard to raise her bond, in a manner that violated Chapter I, Article 8 of the Vermont Constitution. Article 8 provides that “all voters . . . have a right to . . . be elected into office, agreeably to the regulations made in this constitution.” Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 8. Plaintiff asserted that by improperly raising her bond and then removing her from office, the selectboard unlawfully invalidated the Town vote, which elected plaintiff as treasurer. The court considered this claim on the merits and concluded that Article 8 “does not create a right to retain the office in derogation of a lawful direction to obtain an increased bond.” Thus, the court held that the Town’s decision to require an increased bond under § 832 did not amount to a constitutional violation. ¶ 60. On appeal, plaintiff does not present any argument related to this claim. Although plaintiff argues that the court erred in granting summary judgment on procedural grounds, the court’s decision on this count was not based on procedural considerations, but on the substance of plaintiff’s claim. Absent some argument about why the court’s decision was error, appellant has waived consideration of this issue on appeal. See State v. Brillon , 2010 VT 25, ¶ 5, 187 Vt. 444, 995 A.2d 557 (declining to consider state constitutional claim where it was insufficiently raised and briefed); State v. Taylor , 145 Vt. 437, 439, 491 A.2d 1034, 1035 (1985) (concluding appellant failed to adequately raise issue where brief contained “no specific grounds for the claim” and explaining that this Court’s role is not “to foretell, through the art of divination, those issues which the parties deem appropriate for resolution”).
¶ 61. As to count 3, defamation, the court considered the six required elements: The general elements of a private action for defamation (libel and/or slander) are: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) some negligence, or greater fault, in publishing the statement; (3) publication to at least one third person; (4) lack of privilege in the publication; (5) special damages, unless actionable per se; and (6) some actual harm so as to warrant compensatory damages. Lent v. Huntoon , 143 Vt. 539, 546-47, 470 A.2d 1162, 1168 (1983) (footnote omitted). Noting that truth is a complete defense to defamation, the court concluded that plaintiff had presented nothing more than mere allegations to support her view that there was a dispute of fact as to the veracity of the Town’s statements in the July 1, 2010 letter. The court also concluded that plaintiff had failed to support by affidavit or otherwise her contention that the defaming comments caused her damage. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment to the Town. ¶ 62. The court’s decision is wholly based on plaintiff’s failure to follow the procedural requirements of Rule 56. For the reasons explained above, it was error for the court to grant the Town summary judgment on this basis alone, given the Town’s own failure to comply with the rule and the substantial evidence in the record. The Town did not delineate in its statement of undisputed facts or support with citation to the record that plaintiff agreed the statements in the July 1, 2010 letter were true or that plaintiff was unharmed by any defaming comments. Further, although on appeal the Town claims that several privileges provide a complete defense to this claim, the Town’s statement of fact does not establish the necessary facts to support the asserted privileges. ¶ 63. In addition, it is evident from a review of the record that plaintiff disputes the veracity of the statements in the July 1, 2010 letter, and that she contends that the defaming comments caused her damage. For example, in plaintiff’s July 2010 affidavit, which was submitted along with her original complaint and request for injunctive relief, plaintiff averred that the July 1 letter made “unsubstantiated and false accusations.” Therefore, important facts remained disputed, and the court’s order granting summary judgment on this count is reversed.
¶ 64. Plaintiff’s final claim was for tortious interference with performance of office. The court granted the Town summary judgment, concluding that plaintiff had failed to raise a factual dispute about whether the selectboard acted maliciously and improperly in attempting to oust plaintiff from office. Just as for count 3, the court’s decision here was based on a procedural shortcoming. For similar reasons, we conclude that this decision was incorrect. Because the Town did not set forth facts in its undisputed statement of fact to establish that the decisions the selectboard made relating to raising plaintiff’s bond as treasurer lacked any malicious motivation, the burden to demonstrate a factual dispute on this point did not shift to plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiff’s failure to respond in her reply did not warrant judgment in favor of the Town of this count. ¶ 65. We conclude, however, that the Town was entitled to judgment on other grounds. See In re Cabot Creamery Coop., Inc. , 164 Vt. 26, 29, 663 A.2d 940, 941-42 (1995) (explaining that this Court can affirm on different grounds than relied upon by trial court). Even when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, she has failed to make a prima facie case of tortious interference. ¶ 66. Tortious interference generally refers to interference with performance of an existing contract or a prospective contractual relationship. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (2013). Under this tort, a person is liable if he “intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract.” Id . While plaintiff styles her claim as one for “tortious interference with performance of office,” there is no such enumerated tort in our case law, or in the law of other jurisdictions. The closest analogy, although imperfect, is tortious interference in the employment context, which has been recognized in some states. See Fellhauer v. City of Geneva , 568 N.E.2d 870, 877-78 (Ill. 1991) (setting out elements of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage in an employment relationship). While the elements are described by courts in various ways, under any definition of this tort, the interference with the contract or prospective advantage must come from a third party. See Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. , 869 P.2d 454, 480 (Cal. 1994) (delineating elements of intentional interference claim and emphasizing that tort requires interference from third party, who has no interest in contract); Diederich v. Yarnevich , 196 P.3d 411, 418 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming dismissal of tortious interference claim on grounds that claim requires interference from third party unrelated to employment contract); Farrow v. St. Francis Med. Ctr. , 407 S.W.3d 579, 602 (Mo. 2013) (setting forth elements of tortious interference with contract or business expectancy and explaining that action will lie against third party only); Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian-Univ. Hosp. , 612 A.2d 500, 507-08 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (explaining that cause of action “requires three separate parties; parties to a contract or employment relationship cannot assert this cause of action against each other”). ¶ 67. Here, to the extent that we can apply tortious interference with an employment relationship to plaintiff’s allegation of tortious interference with performance of her office, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to meet the elements of that tort. Plaintiff alleges that selectboard members interfered with plaintiff’s performance of her duties as treasurer. Because the selectboard members are agents of the Town and not third parties, plaintiff has failed to allege interference by a third party, and has not pled a prima facie case for tortious interference. See Farrow , 407 S.W.3d at 602-03; see Puchalski v. Sch. Dist. of Springfield , 161 F. Supp. 2d 395, 411 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that employees acting within scope of employment were not third parties for purposes of tortious interference claim). Therefore, the court was correct to grant judgment to the Town on this count. ¶ 68. In sum, the rulings of the trial court are affirmed in part and reversed in part. Regarding the first summary judgment order, we reverse the judgment in the Town’s favor on count 2, the civil rights violation, and affirm judgment for the Town on count 5, the claim for attorney’s fees under 24 V.S.A. § 901. As to the second summary judgment decision, we affirm summary judgment on count 1, the violation of Article 8 of the Vermont Constitution, reverse judgment on count 3, common law defamation and affirm on count 4, tortious interference. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision . FOR THE COURT: