Opinion ID: 2425406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mootness of the Injunctive Claims

Text: Of course, a class action cannot be sustained without a named plaintiff who has standing. Kendall v. Emps. Ret. Plan of Avon Prods., 561 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir.2009) (In a class action, once standing is established for a named plaintiff, standing is established for the entire class.) The district court held that the claims of those appellants who have been released are moot and that the relation-back doctrine does not preserve those claims for judicial review. Because the claims of all plaintiffs were then dismissed for either mootness or a failure to exhaust, the district court stated [t]here is no need to grant Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, which is hereby denied. Amador, 2007 WL 4326747 at . We conclude that the relation-back doctrine applies to the claims of the plaintiffs who have been released and preserves their claims for adjudication for purposes of a class action. The standing requirement winnows out disputes that would be inappropriate for judicial resolution for lack of three constitutionally required elements: (i) an injury in fact (ii) that is fairly traceable to the defendant and (iii) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. School Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 284 (2d Cir.2004). Similarly, the mootness doctrine ensures that the occasion for judicial resolution established by standing persists throughout the life of a lawsuit. See Comer, 37 F.3d at 798. Consequently, in the usual case, if the basis for the claim has been rectified or if the plaintiff is no longer subject to the challenged conduct, the claim is moot. See Armstrong v. Ward, 529 F.2d 1132, 1135 (2d Cir.1976). The relation-back doctrine, however, has unique application in the class action context, preserving the claims of some named plaintiffs for class certification purposes that might well be moot if asserted only as individual claims. For example, in Gerstein v. Pugh, a class challenged Florida's practice of pre-trial detention without a probable cause hearing. 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). Although the named class representatives had been convicted after the district court's certification of the class and before the court was able to pass on the claims, the Court held the case was not moot because it fell within a narrow class of cases in which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class. 420 U.S. at 110 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854 (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975)). The Court reasoned that the issue was unlikely to be resolved before a plaintiff was convicted or released. Id. An individual could, therefore, suffer repeated deprivations under the challenged practice, and it was certain that a continuing class of similarly situated persons would suffer the constitutional harm alleged. Id. In both Sosna and Gerstein, the mootness of the named representative's claim arose after certification of a class. Each decision noted that the usual case required a live controversy at the time of the filing of the complaint and the class certification. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 398, 402, 95 S.Ct. 553; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854. Sosna, however, recognized that in certain cases, the claims of the named plaintiffs might become moot before the district court had ruled on a certification motion: In such instances, whether the certification can be said to `relate back' to the filing of the complaint may depend upon the circumstances of the particular case and especially the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade review. 419 U.S. at 402 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 553. We have applied the relation-back theory to recipients of public assistance alleging that action on their applications for public assistance was unlawfully delayed by the state. See Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir.1993). In that decision, we concluded that because the state would almost always process a delayed application before relief could be obtained through litigation and some of the appellants alleged that they expected to need public assistance in the future, the claims were not mooted by their receipt of benefits after the filing of the complaint. Id. at 938-39. We have also applied the relation-back doctrine to class claims of racial discrimination and segregation in public housing in New York by low-income minority individuals. Comer, 37 F.3d at 797-801. We held that, because of the particular combination of a highly fluid public housing population, whose claims were acutely susceptible to mootness, and a two-year delay before the district court denied class certification, the class certification, which was granted on appeal, related back to the complaint. Id. Whether claims are inherently transitory is an inquiry that must be made with reference to the claims of the class as a whole as opposed to any one individual claim for relief. See U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399-400, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854. According to the supervisory appellees, there is nothing inherently transitory about appellants' claims because inmates serve a range of terms of imprisonment. Thus, they argue, while some inmates may be released before their claims can be adjudicated, others will remain incarcerated long enough for courts to adjudicate their claims. We disagree. We have previously observed that a significant characteristic of claims subject to the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception is that the mootness resulted from a factor closely related to the essence of the claim. Swan v. Stoneman, 635 F.2d 97, 102 n. 6 (2d Cir.1980). As such, these claims involve[] issues that [are] likely to evade review, no matter who prosecute[s] them. Id. Although a close issue, we conclude that this exception applies. This action is brought on behalf of all women inmates in DOCS custody, alleging constitutionally defective policies and procedures in failing to protect female inmates from sexual harassment, abuse, and assault by male staff. While the entire class may be exposed to the risks caused by the constitutionally defective policies and procedures alleged, as noted, the grievance procedure may be triggered only by an inmate who has been a victim of sexual misconduct. Because the number of inmates subjected to acts of misconduct can be a small fraction of the total inmates at risk, the odds of an inmate being able to complete the grievance procedure and litigate a class action while still incarcerated are rather small. All thirteen appellants were in DOCS custody when they commenced the action; only four remained incarcerated when the district court rendered its September 13, 2005 decision. [6] Four appellants have been released and subsequently reincarcerated during the course of these proceedings, [7] and of these, only two, remained in custody following the filing of the notice of appeal. [8] Accordingly, we conclude that it was error for the district court to dismiss as moot the claims of the individual plaintiffs who had been released from prison after the filing of the amended complaint. See Wilkerson v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 117, 121 (3d Cir.1987) (It would seem to us that the principle espoused in Geraghty is applicable whether the particular claim of the proposed class plaintiff is resolved while a class certification motion is pending in the district court (as in the present case) or while an appeal from denial of a class certification motion is pending in the court of appeals (as in Geraghty ). In neither event is the plaintiff automatically disqualified from being a class representative....); Wade v. Kirkland, 118 F.3d 667, 670 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that, in light of the potential for a prisoner's claim to be inherently transitory, the action could qualify for an exception to mootness, and if so found on remand, the district court could validly certify a class, since the `relation back' doctrine will relate to [plaintiff's] standing at the outset of the case).