Opinion ID: 1785702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unavailability of Declarant

Text: Where the State seeks to admit testimonial hearsay evidence, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). However, Crawford does not elaborate on what constitutes unavailability for purposes of satisfying this constitutional standard. Contreras asserts that the Fourth District correctly concluded that [g]eneralized `harm' from testifying does not make a witness unavailable within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Contreras, 910 So.2d at 907. The Fourth District reasoned that [i]f witnesses are unavailable for Confrontation Clause purposes merely because of subjective mental anguish and emotional scarring from testimony, this protection would cease to have the certainty and categorical effect that Crawford holds it was designed to have. Id. The State counters that Crawford simply receded from the Roberts reliability/trustworthiness standard and in no way changed the unavailability standard. Commentators who have discussed the impact of Crawford have expressed some questions regarding the parameters of unavailability for child victims. For example, in a recent article in The Florida Bar Journal, a criminal trial attorney concluded that the question of when a witness is unavailable in the context of Crawford is one of the issues that will have to be clarified in the coming years. See William D. Matthewman, Crawford's Impact on Florida Criminal Law, Fla. B.J., Apr. 2006, at 10, 16. In another Florida Bar Journal article that was published shortly after the Crawford decision was released, a criminal law professor questioned the continued viability of Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990), which approved testimony by a child victim via closed circuit television after a specific finding that the child would suffer emotional trauma if forced to testify in the presence of the defendant. See Yetter, supra, at 30. Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority in Crawford, authored a dissenting opinion in Craig stating the position that is now the linchpin of the majority decision in Crawford,  namely that the Confrontation Clause's guarantee of face-to-face confrontation means, always and everywhere that the defendant has the right to meet face to face those who give evidence against him. Yetter, supra, at 30 (quoting Craig, 497 U.S. at 862, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Another post- Crawford article also questions how Craig and Crawford will intersect in child victim cases. See Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness Exceptions After Crawford, Crim. Just., Summer 2005, at 24. While these legal commentaries present educated analysis and discussion, we have no definitive statement from the Supreme Court as to the precise meaning of unavailability for purposes of a Crawford analysis. However, we note that the declarant in Crawford was not physically unavailable to testify, but was instead excluded based on a marital privilege exemption. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Florida's statutory law and the decisions from other courts offer some guidance on this issue. Section 90.804(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), defines unavailability as including a declarant who is unable to be present or testify at the trial because of a then-existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. [4] This is consistent with the requirement in section 90.803(23) that the court must find that the child's participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a substantial likelihood of severe emotion or mental harm. Thus, Florida statutes provide that a witness's unavailability can be premised on a mental or emotional infirmity or harm, as well as physical absence. Other courts that have considered Crawford challenges to the admission of testimonial hearsay statements by a child witness have concluded that a child's tender years and emotional trauma can render him or her unavailable as provided in Crawford. See, e.g., People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal.App.4th 1396, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 753, 756 (2004) (finding four-year-old victim was unavailable based on her inability to express herself so as to be understood and her inability to understand the duty to tell the truth); Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So.2d 66, 67 & n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (ruling that three-year-old victim was unavailable based on her refusal to repeat the statements she had made to her parents about the incident, her age, a potential learning disability, and certain language disabilities). We agree with these courts that a child witness can be unavailable under Crawford due to mental or emotional harm that testifying can cause. In the instant case, the Fourth District also concluded that even if mental or emotional harm would satisfy the unavailability requirement of Crawford, the record here does not support unavailability on that basis. Contreras, 910 So.2d at 907. The Fourth District noted that the child's testimony at the second discovery deposition demonstrated her understanding that she would have to testify at trial and her readiness to do so. Id. Thus, the Fourth District concluded, the child was not unavailable as a witness under section 90.803(23), which requires a finding by the court that the child's participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm. § 90.803(23)(a)(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). A trial judge's finding regarding the likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm to the child due to participating in a trial or proceeding will be upheld on appeal, absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Perez v. State, 536 So.2d 206, 210 (Fla.1988). In the instant case, psychologist Dr. George Rahaim, who is an expert on the psychological harm caused by sexual abuse on minors, evaluated the child and opined that she would suffer severe emotional and psychological harm if required to testify in person. Dr. Rahaim submitted his report in July 2002 after reviewing the child's February 1999 videotaped interview with the CPT worker; interviewing the child's mother, the guardian ad litem, and the state attorney involved with the case; conducting a clinical interview and psychological tests with the child; and reviewing letters and notes written by the child to her defendant father. Specifically, Dr. Rahaim reported that the child suffers from serious and painful psychological distress and turmoil, is depressed and subject to debilitating anxiety and very damaged self-esteem, has very unstable emotions, and blames herself for her father's incarceration. Dr. Rahaim also reported that the child expressed fears of participating in the trial and that both her mother and the guardian ad litem expressed concerns for her psychological well-being if she were required to testify in her father's presence. Dr. Rahaim also reported that the child has fantasies about the deaths of people close to her, including her father and herself, when she is reminded of the case. Based on this expert opinion, the trial court found that there was a substantial likelihood that the child would suffer severe emotional or mental harm if required to participate in the case and thus found her unavailable within the meaning of section 90.803(23). The Fourth District faulted the psychologist for not considering the child's own testimony at the second deposition in May 2000 regarding her ability to testify at trial. At that second deposition, which was nearly two years after the abuse incident and almost sixteen months after the child's statement was videotaped, the child stated that she expected to be required to testify at trial and that she now understood that she was not at fault for what happened. While the psychologist did not mention the May 2000 deposition testimony in his report, he certainly relied on a wide range of information in forming his opinion that the child would be harmed if required to testify. The trial court's order on this matter states in detail the harm cited by Dr. Rahaim. Furthermore, the order cites the May 2000 deposition to show that even with the passage of time, the child reiterated the same facts that she had stated in her initial February 1999 videotaped statement. In light of the wide range of evidence presented and considered, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding the child unavailable due to the substantial likelihood of harm. The Fourth District erred in this regard. Finally, the Fourth District also concluded that the child victim, who was thirteen years old at the time of trial, no longer qualified for unavailability under section 90.803(23). The statute provides, in pertinent part, that an out-of-court statement made by a child victim with a physical, mental, emotional, or developmental age of 11 or less describing any act of child abuse or neglect, any act of sexual abuse against the child, [etc.] . . . is admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding if the child is found unavailable as a witness. Nothing in the statute provides that a finding of unavailability is limited by the victim's current age. The only age requirement is that the statement being admitted as hearsay must have been made by a victim eleven years or less in age. The victim in the instant case was eleven when she made the statements in question. Thus, we conclude that the statute was applicable to her and the Fourth District erred in this regard. Based on the above, we conclude that the second Crawford requirement of unavailability was met in this case.