Opinion ID: 78632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness in general

Text: [A] sentence in excess of that recommended by the Chapter 7 policy statements will be upheld if it can be determined from the record to have been reasoned and reasonable. United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). This is the same analysis as the reasonableness standard of review under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). See United States v. Rodriguez-Quintanilla, 442 F.3d 1254, 1256-57 (10th Cir.2006) (citing United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.2004)). [4] Our appellate review for reasonableness includes both a procedural component, encompassing the method by which a sentence was calculated, as well as a substantive component, which relates to the length of the resulting sentence. United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 803 (10th Cir.2008). In [ Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)], the Supreme Court identified failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors and failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence as forms of procedural error. Id. (quotations omitted). On the other hand, [a] challenge to the sufficiency of the § 3553(a) justifications relied on by the district court implicates the substantive reasonableness of the resulting sentence. Id. at 804. Steele claims his sentence is procedurally flawed and substantively unreasonable.
When a defendant violates a condition of supervised release, the district court may, as it did here, revoke the term of supervised release and impose prison time. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). In imposing a sentence following revocation of supervised release, a district court is required to consider both [the] policy statements [contained in Chapter 7 of the sentencing guidelines], as well as a number of the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Cordova, 461 F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). Those factors include: The nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; pertinent guidelines; pertinent policy statements; the need to avoid unwanted sentence disparities; and the need to provide restitution. Id. at 1188-89 (quotations omitted). The sentencing court, however, is not required to consider individually each factor listed in § 3553(a), nor is it required to recite any magic words to show us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to consider before issuing a sentence. Id. (quotations omitted). Because Steele did not raise his procedural objection (failure to adequately explain the decision to deviate from the guidelines' recommendation) with the district court, our review is for plain error. United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir.2007) (because defendant did not object to the district court's lack of explanation after it announced his sentence, plain-error review is appropriate); see also Cordova, 461 F.3d at 1186 (applying plain error review to sentencing arguments challenging the revocation of a term of supervised release because arguments not raised with district court). We find plain error only when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects substantial rights, and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Romero, 491 F.3d at 1178. Because we discern no error, we need not go beyond the first step of the sequential analysis. The district court considered the Chapter 7 policy statements as well as the § 3553(a) factors, in particular, the nature and circumstances of the violations, the history and characteristics of the defendant and the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence and protect the public. It also adequately explained its decision to deviate from the guidelines' recommendation. While it acknowledged Steele's provision of support for his children was exceptional, it also noted this admirable conduct was inconsistent with and eclipsed by his decision to continue to violate the law by using marijuana. It was also concerned that he refused to learn from past mistakeslesser past punishment proved not to be an adequate deterrentand he failed to benefit from counseling and treatment. To the extent explanation was required, it was more than met.
We consider the substantive reasonableness of the length of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. A district court abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable. United States v. Landers, 564 F.3d 1217, 1224 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 198, 175 L.Ed.2d 139 (2009) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir.1986) (Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court's decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.). This standard applies without regard to whether the district court imposes a sentence within or outside the advisory Guidelines range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. The United States Sentencing Commission debated two different approaches to sanctioning a violation of supervised release: (1) consider the defendant's failure to follow the court-imposed conditions of ... supervised release as a `breach of trust' or (2) sanction the defendant for the particular conduct triggering the revocation as if that conduct were sentenced as new federal criminal conduct. USSG Ch. 7, Pt. A(3)(b). The Commission chose the former approachat revocation the court should sanction primarily the defendant's breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator. Id. This was Steele's second breach of trust in a fairly short time. Under the guidelines, recidivism is generally a reason for increased sentencing severity. [5] The seriousness as well as the persistence of Steele's violations, while not the primary focus, is also relevant. These were not mere technical violations; possession of marijuana is both a federal and state crime. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 2-402(A)(1), (B)(2). Steele's sentence was patently reasonable. AFFIRMED.