Opinion ID: 1745503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether a Remittitur Was Properly Granted.

Text: ¶ 41. Martin argues that the trial court erred when it granted USF & G's Motion for Remittitur. The first question here is whether the Policy limits coverage to a maximum of $25,000 or $50,000 for sewer or drain backup damage. Section I.A.4.v. of the Policy states in relevant part: The most we will pay for this Additional Coverage is $25,000 or the Limit of Insurance shown in the Property Coverage Part Declarations for Sewer or Drain Backup, whichever is greater. ¶ 42. The Property Coverage Part Declarations for the original policy and the renewal both list two premises numbers, under which different types of coverage and corresponding dollar amounts are listed. Although there are two premises numbers, the address listed for both premises numbers is the same. The types of coverage and corresponding dollar amounts listed are identical as to both premises numbers 0001 and 0002. Sewer or Drain Backup and $25,000 are listed under both premises numbers. Thus, the Property Coverage Part Declarations form appears to indicate that the maximum coverage for sewer or drain backup under the Policy is $50,000. ¶ 43. The standard of review for trial court decisions regarding a remittitur is the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Stringer v. Crowson, 797 So.2d 368, 370 (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (citing Ross-King-Walker, Inc. v. Henson, 672 So.2d 1188, 1193 (Miss.1996)). However, this Court has held that it has the responsibility to see that such judicial discretion is exercised soundly and, if not, to reverse. Holmes County Bank & Trust Co. v. Staple Cotton Coop. Assoc., 495 So.2d 447, 451 (Miss.1986). The standard for granting a remittitur or additur is whether or not the court finds that the jury was influenced by bias, prejudice, or passion, or ... if the damages were contrary to the overwhelming weight of credible evidence. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Pascagoula Pub. Sch. Dist., 611 So.2d 942, 944 (Miss.1992) (citation omitted). ¶ 44. This Court must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the jury decided, granting that party any favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom. Lewis v. Hiatt, 683 So.2d 937, 941 (Miss.1996). A jury award should not be disturbed unless its size, in comparison to the actual amount of damage, shocks the conscience. Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Bolden, 854 So.2d 1051, 1058 (Miss.2003) (citation omitted). It is well-established that jury awards are not merely advisory and will not under the general rule be set aside unless so unreasonable in amount as to strike mankind at first blush as being beyond all measure, unreasonable in amount and outrageous. Rodgers, 611 So.2d at 945 (citations omitted). This Court has held that the amount of damages awarded is primarily a question for the jury. Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 45. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Martin, in whose favor the jury found, we believe that the maximum coverage for sewer or drain backup is $50,000, and that the record reveals competent evidence in support of the jury award. See, e.g., Lewis, 683 So.2d at 941. Martin's list of damaged items indicates that the approximate amount of damage caused to the Gallery totaled $40,019.44. After adding the amount of damage done to items that were not included in the fine arts and electronics claims (since these are covered in Counts II and III of the jury verdict), we find that Martin suffered $32,132 in general damage to the Gallery. A jury award of $39,329, while approximately $7,000 more than the itemized damage to non-fine arts and non-electronics property, does not demonstrate bias, prejudice, or passion, nor is it against the overwhelming weight of credible evidence. [4] See, e.g., Rodgers, 611 So.2d at 944. In other words, it does not shock the conscience and should not have been remitted by the trial court. See, e.g., Entergy Miss., Inc., 854 So.2d at 1058. As stated by this court in Rodgers, jury awards are not merely advisory. Rodgers, 611 So.2d at 945 (citations omitted). Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in remitting the jury award, and the jury award should be reinstated.