Opinion ID: 3011706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unity of Personnel Policies Emanating

Text: from a Common Source We begin by interpreting the language of this prong to require the factfinder to focus the inquiry less on the hierarchical relationship between the companies (as such relationships may be considered in other aspects of the test) than on whether the companies actually functioned as a single entity with regard to its r elationships with employees. That GECC and CompTech did not share labor policies, or even coordinate their labor policies, is essentially undisputed.8 Affidavits fr om CompTech and GECC employees demonstrate that CompTech had its own personnel managers who never received any dir ection from GECC regarding their duties, and no evidence has been _________________________________________________________________ 8. We believe that a coordinated labor policy would be as relevant as a unified policy; for instance, in double-br easted operations, there is obviously no unity of policy -- and yet this is precisely the type of situation that the test is meant to capture. 38 offered to contradict these statements. But even were we to accept the plaintiffs' theory that Villa, as GECC's agent, at some level instituted all of CompTech's policies, including labor policies, on GECC's behalf, such evidence is not sufficient to satisfy this prong of the test in the absence of indications that GECC had a particular inter est in how CompTech's labor policies were designed, or issued specific directives to Villa on the subject. The evidence that plaintiffs have offered to demonstrate that GECC had an interest in controlling the personnel policies at CompTech is scant, and largely amounts to establishing that CompTech, pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement (and on a very few occasions) sought GECC appr oval for decisions to institute bonus programs and to pay salaries in excess of $100,000. Such limited monitoring of compensation expenditures as part of a general loan agreement requiring oversight of CompT ech's spending in a number of areas is not sufficient to demonstrate a unity of personnel policies emanating from a common source. There are some inconsistencies in the evidence submitted by GECC. GECC submitted the affidavit of Jeanette Chen, who swore that GECC had never attempted to control the hiring or firing of CompTech employees, and that the loan restriction preventing CompTech fr om paying salaries in excess of $100,000 was intended to ensure that CompTech maintained a frugal budget. But both of these statements were contradicted by other pieces of evidence in this litigation. Gaffney's letter to GECC specifically states that he resigned his post as CEO of CompTech at GECC's request, and other deposition evidence indicates that he was asked to resign due to GECC's dissatisfaction with his strategies for CompTech. Moreover , internal GECC memoranda characterize the salary restriction as part of an effort to ensure that GECC could monitor the hiring of key personnel. Finally, the existence of theVilla Call and the references to Benton as a back up president seem to show that GECC, if nothing else, conceived itself as having control over the hiring and firing of CompT ech's president. Despite these inconsistencies, we do not believe that plaintiffs have created a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a unity of policy. Even if we were to 39 disregard Chen's affidavit entir ely and focus solely on the other evidence, the fact that GECC may have contr olled the hiring and firing of the company's president and chief executive officer, and monitored the hiring of a few other high-level managers (there is no evidence that GECC ever suggested that a particular person other than Benton be hired, or prevented a candidate fr om being hired), simply is not enough to find a unity of personnelpolicy. The plaintiffs alternatively urge us to weigh this factor in their favor on the ground that the analogouscentralized control of labor prong from the integrated enterprise test permits an inquiry into whether the par ent corporation, though perhaps not involved in day-to-day employment policies, mandated the employment practice at issue. Plaintiffs allege that GECC made the decision to close the plant, and because the plant closing is the r elevant practice giving rise to the litigation, submit that that decision is enough to tip the balance. However, as explained above, we believe that, for WARN Act purposes, allegations of this kind of direct control are more appropriately considered as part of the de facto exercise of contr ol factor, discussed infra. We conclude that the plaintif fs have not created a genuine issue of fact as to the existence of a unified personnel policy, and we will weigh this factor in the defendant's favor.