Opinion ID: 412040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the two step inquiry

Text: 7 When jurisdiction is sought pursuant to a long-arm statute, a dual analysis is normally required: first, it must be determined whether the statutory language, as a matter of construction, purports to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant; and second, assuming that the answer to the first question is affirmative, it must be determined whether the statutory assertion of personal jurisdiction is consonant with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Haynes v. James H. Carr, Inc., 427 F.2d 700, 703 (4th Cir.1970). The two inquiries may be interrelated, however. The Virginia long-arm statute, as in the case of other state statutes as well, 1 has been construed to extend in personam jurisdiction to the outmost perimeters of due process. See Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., Inc., 211 Va. 736, 740, 180 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1971) (It is manifest that the purpose of Virginia's long arm statute is to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in this State to the extent permissible under the due process clause.); Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 456, 164 S.E.2d 703, 707 (1968) (Admittedly, Chapter 4.1, Title 8 of the Code is a deliberate and conscious effort on the part of the General Assembly of Virginia to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permissible by the Due Process Clause.). 8 Counsel for Hollywood conceded at oral argument that the statute could be applied constitutionally to confer jurisdiction and restricted argument to the proposition that, while Virginia could have written the statute in such a way as constitutionally to subject Hollywood to the jurisdiction of its courts, the Commonwealth has, nevertheless, not, in point of fact, done so. While that position is difficult to reconcile with the announced rule of Virginia jurisprudence that the words transacting any business in this Commonwealth reach to the extent permissible under the due process clause, that legal proposition has not been tested in a context quite like the one presented here. We, therefore, from an abundance of caution, proceed to the customary two step analysis.
9 The Virginia long-arm statute, Va.Code Sec. 8.01-328.1, provides in pertinent part: 10 A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's: 11
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