Opinion ID: 365897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: premature dismissal

Text: 35 The result we reach today is in accord with, if not partially compelled by, the well-established principle in this Circuit that premature dismissals of antitrust claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are not favored where the factual and jurisdictional issues are completely intermeshed . . . . McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for Decency Committee,374 F.2d 359, 363 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 389 U.S. 896, 88 S.Ct. 216, 19 L.Ed.2d 214 (1967). See also Battle v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co.,493 F.2d 39, 47 (5th Cir. 1974), Cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110, 95 S.Ct. 784, 42 L.Ed.2d 807 (1975); Mortensen v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 549 F.2d 884, 892-96 (3d Cir. 1977). In such situations the jurisdictional issues should be referred to the merits, for it is impossible to decide the one without the other. 374 F.2d at 363. When jurisdictional issues are intertwined with the merits, the adjudication of the jurisdictional issue in accordance with the procedure under a 12(b)(1) motion fails to offer the procedural safeguards attendant upon proceedings under a 12(b)(6) motion or a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. As the Third Circuit has stated: 36 The basic difference among the various 12(b) motions is, of course, that 12(b) (6) alone necessitates a ruling on the merits of the claim, the others deal with procedural defects. Because 12(b)(6) results in a determination on the merits at an early stage of plaintiff's case, the plaintiff is afforded the safeguard of having all its allegations taken as true and all inferences favorable to plaintiff will be drawn. The decision disposing (of) the case is then purely on the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's case: even were plaintiff to prove all its allegations, he or she would be unable to prevail. In the interests of judicial economy it is not improper to dispose of the claim at that stage. If the court considers matters outside the pleadings before it in a 12(b)(6) motion, the above procedure will automatically be converted into a Rule 56 summary judgment procedure. Here there are further safeguards for the plaintiff: in addition to having all of plaintiff's allegations taken as true, with all their favorable inferences, the trial court cannot grant a summary judgment unless there is no genuine issue of material fact. 37 The procedure under a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is quite different. At the outset we must emphasize a crucial distinction, often overlooked, between 12(b)(1) motions that attack the complaint on its face and 12(b)(1) motions that attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, quite apart from any pleadings. The facial attack does offer similar safeguards to the plaintiff: the court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true. The factual attack, however, differs greatly for here the trial court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction its very power to hear the case there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Moreover, the plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist. 38 Mortensen v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 549 F.2d at 891. Accordingly, dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction prior to trial, and certainly prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery, should be granted sparingly. Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 435 U.S. 738, 746-47, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976). 39 This, of course, is not to suggest that a district court may never dismiss an antitrust suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Where adequate time is given to complete discovery and all the jurisdictional facts are fully developed and placed before the court during an adversary hearing, a district court may, in a clear-cut case, dismiss an antitrust suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1972). But the present case does not involve such a situation. Here, the purchasers' discovery had barely begun at the time of the preliminary hearing. 20 With the facts not fully developed, a fair and conclusive resolution of the jurisdictional issue cannot be made at this stage of the proceedings. We again emphasize that the preferred procedure in cases such as the present one, where the jurisdictional issue is inextricably bound up with the merits, is to defer resolution of the jurisdictional question to a consideration of the merits. 21 Even though the purchasers were ill-prepared for the hearing, they were nonetheless able to present sufficient facts, in our opinion, to stave off the jurisdictional attack. 22