Opinion ID: 507354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the sixth amendment challenge

Text: 13 Before trial, Nocella moved in limine to bar the prosecution from using the tape recording made during Glover's February 10 visit, or the fruits thereof, on the ground that the surreptitious recording of the conversation out of the presence of appellant's lawyer infringed defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. This argument prescinded from the convergence of four circumstances: Nocella's December 1986 arrest, the attendant state possession of marijuana charge, retention of counsel in that case, and the continued pendency of the state charge when Glover came to call. 1 The district court found appellant's contention to be meritless. So do we. 14 The right to counsel in a criminal case is of constitutional stature. It exists to insure that the accused not be left irretrievably to his own devices, without legal help when the heavy artillery of prosecutorial power is brought to bear. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1146, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). Once a person stands formally accused of a crime, he is vulnerable to certain  'critical' stages in the criminal justice process 'where the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.'  Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 106 S.Ct. 477, 484, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (citations omitted). In order appropriately to safeguard the accused at such potentially decisive moments, the constitutional right to counsel inheres at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated.... Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1239, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). After the right has attached, it prohibits law enforcement personnel, and those acting in concert with them, from deliberate elicitation of statements from an accused in the absence of counsel. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-07, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 1201-04, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). From that time on, the prosecutor and the police alike are constrained by an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the right to counsel. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171, 106 S.Ct. at 485. 15 In this case, the government admits that it deliberately instigated the February 10 meeting between Glover and Nocella, but contends that the confrontation was not designed to obtain incriminating statements concerning the pending state marijuana charge, and was therefore permissible. In the government's view, the crime of distributing (or conspiring to distribute) cocaine--a federal crime for which Nocella was being investigated, but for which he had not yet been indicted--was separate and distinct from the earlier state charge. An even sturdier wedge divides the intimidation charge, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b)(3), from the marijuana count. 16 Predictably, appellant sees the mise-en-scene through a wider-angle lens: he claims that because the state charge and the February confrontation arose in the context of an ongoing, state-federal investigation of drug trafficking, his right to counsel--which had admittedly attached upon the bringing of the state charge--inhered to protect him from continued undercover investigation of the sort employed here and likewise barred the use of the evidence obtained in respect to any of the federal charges. 17 As a general rule, when a defendant's right to counsel has attached for one crime, he is not insulated against interrogation as to other crimes, notwithstanding the absence of counsel. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 431, 106 S.Ct. at 1146-47; Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 179-80, 106 S.Ct. at 489-90. Moulton illustrates the point. Because the authorities suspected an indicted defendant, Moulton, of scheming to slaughter a witness, they secured the agreement of his codefendant, Colson, to wear a body wire. During an ensuing conversation between the two (recorded for the officers' benefit), Moulton made incriminating statements about the theft for which he and Colson stood indicted. The Court held that the sixth amendment barred admission of those statements because there was deliberate elicitation of incriminating statements with regard to a pending charge, after the right to counsel had attached thereon: 18 The police thus knew that Moulton would make statements that he had a constitutional right not to make to the[ ] agent prior to consulting with counsel.... By concealing the fact that Colson was an agent of the State, the police denied Moulton the opportunity to consult with counsel and thus denied him the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 19 Id. at 177, 106 S.Ct. at 488 (footnote omitted). But the Court plainly indicated that, as to other (uncharged) crimes, a different standard obtained: Incriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached, are, of course, admissible at a trial of those offenses. Id. at 180 n. 16, 106 S.Ct. at 490 n. 16 (dictum). As Justice Brennan explained: 20 ... [T]o exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was obtained, simply because other charges were pending at the time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in the investigation of criminal activities. 21 Id. at 180, 106 S.Ct. at 490. A few months later, Justice O'Connor wrote that Moulton 22 made clear ... that the evidence concerning the crime for which the defendant had not been indicted--evidence obtained in precisely the same manner from the identical suspect--would be admissible at a trial limited to those charges. 23 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 431, 106 S.Ct. at 1146-47. 24 Based on this precedent, we conclude rather easily that, even after the state marijuana charge was proffered, it was entirely proper for the task force to continue its investigation of defendant's suspected criminal involvement in other offenses, such as dealing harder drugs. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 178-80, 106 S.Ct. at 488-90; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 206-07, 84 S.Ct. at 1203-04. As we recently remarked, to hold that a defendant's right to counsel for one crime creates a right to counsel for the prosecution of any other crime committed after indictment on the first crime would be essentially to immunize a defendant from further prosecution. United States v. Batista, 834 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1987). The Constitution, as we read it, does not require the administration of so potent a vaccine. 25 Inasmuch as the probe itself was unexceptionable, and the record is barren of evidence suggesting bad faith, there seems, on the face of things, no sound basis for blocking introduction of the tape recording in this case. It is crystal clear that the task force did not aspire pretextually to manipulate the continuing investigation so as to unearth admissions for use against Nocella in the state case. The defendant does not seriously contend the contrary, nor does he intimate that the state sought to introduce his February 10 admissions as evidence against him in connection with the earlier marijuana charge. Under Moulton and Massiah, such usage would, as the government concedes, clearly be prohibited. In February 1987, the task force's focus was exclusively on new crimes rather than on the old one. The admissions obtained were introduced only in connection with the trial of this indictment. Thus, unless some circumstance beyond the mere pendency of the state charge necessitates a ruling that the right to counsel had attached with regard to the federal case as early as February 10, appellant's argument must fail. 26 Though laboring mightily, the best appellant can do is to question whether the pending charge was so closely linked to, or inextricably intertwined with, the other suspected crimes that the sixth amendment protection which had attached to the former somehow carried over to the latter. We believe that the answer to this inquiry is to a large extent adumbrated by our recent opinion in United States v. Batista, supra. There, the defendant was indicted on state drug charges. While that indictment was still pending, federal drug charges were brought against him for subsequently-occurring conduct. Batista, 834 F.2d at 2-3. Like Nocella in this case, Batista argued that, 27 since he had been indicted earlier on the state charges, his right to counsel attached then with respect to the state charges.... [and] since the federal crime for which he was convicted arose out of what he characterize[d] as a joint state-federal operation, his right to counsel also attached with regard to the federal charges as of the moment he was indicted on the state charges. 28 Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Albeit in dicta, we rejected this plea, stating that, even if the 'critical stage' of the state case had not passed by the time of the [federal arrest], appellant still was not entitled to counsel on the separate offense for which he was later indicted. Id. 29 Batista, appellant tells us, is inapposite because in his case the joint state-federal task force bracketed the critical events in a temporal sense. He adverts to several facts: the federal and state authorities jointly embarked upon an investigation into the defendant's cocaine sales before the initial search occurred and before the state charge was brought; that investigation continued notwithstanding preferment of the state charge; the state case was in full flower when the task force, as a part of the ongoing investigation, arranged the uncounselled confrontation between Nocella and the government actor, Glover; both sets of charges involved appellant's suspected commerce in narcotics; and the same investigators ran the operation throughout. We deem these circumstances, individually and collectively, to be of little moment. 30 The fact that the state investigation was not separate from the federal investigation was plainly of no consequence. In Moulton, for example, a single agency--the Maine State Police--was involved, yet the Court indicated that, despite the earlier charges which the police had preferred against Moulton, the fruits of their further investigation would be admissible as evidence pertaining to other charges as to which the sixth amendment right to counsel had not yet attached. 474 U.S. at 180 & n. 16, 106 S.Ct. at 490 n. 16. What matters most is that, notwithstanding the pendency of the state charge, the government's objective in sending Glover to appellant on February 10 was legitimately concerned with the new, not the old--and was, therefore, investigatory, not accusatory. 31 By the same token, the temporal overlapping of which Nocella complains does not cut any constitutional mustard. The crucial factor--common to this case and to Batista --is that the later-charged crimes were independent of, and distinct from, the earlier-charged crime. In Batista, we noted that the right to counsel had attached only with regard to an entirely separate state offense, [and] did not require the presence of counsel during the investigation ... of a later unrelated federal offense. Batista, 834 F.2d at 5. The case at bar, we think, fits snugly with this integument, notwithstanding that here--unlike in Batista --federal and state actors cooperated in the second arrest. We elaborate briefly. 32 The fact that the joint investigation was concerned with drug violations does not erase the obvious differences between the state crime of marijuana possession and federal offenses involving threats to a witness and distribution of cocaine. 2 The distinctions between these sets of crimes are sufficiently pronounced as not to require exegetic comment. The intimidation charge is, of course, a completely different breed of cat, and the cocaine sales, though conceptually linked to the marijuana possession if broad rubrics like drug-related are employed, were to all meaningful intents and purposes distinct offenses. The crimes arose out of different nucleii of operative fact, necessitated proof of different elements, and occurred at different times. The state and federal offenses were not, in our judgment, so inextricably intertwined as to demand that they be treated as an impartible unit. Rather, they were scissile. And to ignore their separateness would, we suggest, be thrice wrong: wrong as a matter of law, wrong as a defilement of common sense, and wrong as needlessly frustrat[ing] the public's interest in the investigation of criminal activities. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180, 106 S.Ct. at 490. 33 We hold unhesitatingly that the pendency of an indictment for one drug offense does not preclude the government, in the person of the same team of sleuths, from continuing to investigate the accused for separate and distinct drug offenses. If in the process the accused retains counsel on the earlier charge, he is not thereby immunized from questioning in the absence of his attorney as to other discrete offenses. Incriminating statements made by the suspect in the course of such a continued indagation, though deliberately elicited by law enforcement personnel, may be used against him on separate charges thereafter brought--charges as to which the constitutional right to counsel had not vested when the elicitation occurred. As the Court has taught: The Sixth Amendment's intended function is not to wrap a protective cloak around the attorney-client relationship for its own sake any more than it is to protect a suspect from the consequences of his own candor. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 430, 106 S.Ct. at 1146. 34 The proper size and shape of the right to counsel has been fashioned by the Court and we must cut our sample along the lines of those measurements. Once we do so, it becomes readily apparent that the breadth of the sixth amendment is not so vast as to enswathe this situation. We conclude that the record and the law support the district court's denial of the motion in limine. Nocella's constitutionally assured right to counsel was not abridged by the elicitation and use of the recorded admissions against him in connection with the federal charges which were eventually brought. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 431, 106 S.Ct. at 1146-47; Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180 & n. 16, 106 S.Ct. at 490 n. 16; United States v. Batista, 834 F.2d at 4-5.