Opinion ID: 4534282
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpreting the Regulation

Text: The regulation (and the statute later codifying key pieces of it as applied to “motions to reopen”) gives aliens, such as Reyes-Vargas, two avenues to reopening. First, an alien, or the Immigration Service, may file a “motion to reopen.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2018) (providing aliens the statutory right to file “one motion to reopen”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). 14 But the regulation limits the alien’s right to file this kind of motion in two ways important to this appeal: 15 (1) a time bar (“A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion . . . .”) and (2) a postdeparture bar (“A motion to reopen . . . shall not be made by or on behalf of a person . . . subsequent to his or her departure from the United States.”). 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). Thus, for an alien’s motion to reopen to be legally operative under the regulation, it must be filed within ninety days of a removal order and while the alien is still in the United States—an alien must avoid both bars. 16 14 As discussed supra Section III.A, the statute incorporated the regulation’s requirements. 15 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (“Subject to the exceptions in this paragraph . . . a party may file only . . . one motion to reopen proceedings.”). 16 Consider the following two situations: First, if a party files a motion to reopen outside of ninety days, the regulation bars any consideration of the motion, even if the alien remains in the United States. Or second, if a party files a motion to 16 But this appeal does not concern this first avenue. After all, Reyes-Vargas’s petition to the IJ admitted that he was too late (more than ninety days past his removal order) to file a “motion to reopen.” R. at 99. Instead, both parties agree that this appeal concerns the second avenue, 17 which allows a case to be reopened “upon [the IJ’s] own motion at any time.” 18 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). With this second avenue, the regulation provides a much broader, though less certain, avenue than the “motion to reopen.” For two reasons, we conclude this regulation unambiguously grants the IJ jurisdiction to reopen “at any time” under this avenue, even when the alien has departed the United States. Thus, we do not defer to the Board’s interpretation. reopen within ninety days, but after the alien has left the country, the regulation bars any consideration there too. This court struck down the post-departure bar in this second situation. Contreras-Bocanegra, 678 F.3d at 813 (invalidating the postdeparture bar as an improper limit on the statutory right to file one motion to reopen). 17 In its decision, the Board noted that Reyes-Vargas’s case turned on the IJ’s sua sponte authority. R. at 3 (“[Reyes-Vargas] admits that his motion to reopen is untimely, as it was filed more than 90 days after the entry of a final administrative order of removal. He does not allege that any . . . exception exists. He therefore relies on the Immigration Judge’s authority to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte.” (citations omitted)). 18 Nothing in the regulation prevents an alien from furnishing the IJ with bases on which the IJ might choose to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings. In fact, we note that in Mata the Supreme Court recognized the difference between an alien’s motion to reopen and an alien’s invitation (request) that the IJ exercise its sua sponte authority. See 135 S. Ct. at 2155 (“That decision . . . hinged on ‘constru[ing]’ Mata’s motion as something it was not: ‘an invitation for the [Board] to exercise’ its sua sponte authority.” (first alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 17 First, § 1003.23(b)(1) limits the post-departure bar to a party’s “motion to reopen,” which, as noted, differs from the IJ’s sua sponte motion to reopen removal proceedings. 19 Addressing the IJ’s sua sponte power, § 1003.23(b)(1) reads as follows: “An Immigration Judge may upon his or her own motion at any time . . . reopen or reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision, unless jurisdiction is vested with the Board of Immigration Appeals.” The rest of § 1003.23(b)(1) concerns something else—“motions to reopen” filed by “the Service or the alien.” Included in this remainder language are the time and post-departure bars. Importantly, they apply only to a “motion to reopen.” Id. (“A motion to reopen . . . shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States.” (emphasis added)); id. (“[A] party may file only . . . one motion to reopen proceedings . . . within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion . . . .” (emphasis added)). Thus, the IJ may move sua sponte to reopen removal proceedings even when either or both the ninety-day time bar or the post-departure bar would defeat an alien’s “motion to reopen.” 19 When an IJ on her own sua sponte “motion” reopens removal proceedings, the IJ acts solely on her own behalf. In contrast, a party’s “motion to reopen” is filed “by or on behalf of a person.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). Treating the IJ’s sua sponte motion as one made on behalf of someone apart from the IJ would cast the IJ as an advocate, not a neutral decisionmaker. 18 Second, the regulation’s plain language leads to a sensible result. Oftentimes, the alien’s good reason for reopening removal proceedings takes time to manifest itself. Reyes-Vargas’s situation offers a good example. Vacating a state felony conviction for constitutional error, Padilla error or otherwise, likely takes more time than an alien has in which to stave off removal. Had the agency written its regulations to attach a post-departure bar to the IJ’s and Board’s sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings, the resulting sua sponte authority would be next to worthless. By its language, § 1003.23(b)(1) sensibly gives the IJ unlimited time to consider an alien’s exceptional circumstances—whether by learning of them by its own efforts or, more likely, from the alien’s needed prompt, as here. Without this, the IJ’s sua sponte power would be unavailable when most needed. Thus, we conclude that the IJ’s sua sponte power to reopen removal proceedings is independent of, so not subject to, the post-departure bar because § 1003.23(b)(1)’s plain language limits only “motions to reopen” to the ninety-day and post-departure bars, while for sua sponte, the IJ may reopen “at any time.” Id. In no way is this regulation “genuinely ambiguous.” So as Kisor instructs, in this circumstance, we “ha[ve] no business deferring to” the agency’s interpretation. See 139 S. Ct. at 2415. For the reasons given above, § 1003.23(b)(1)’s post-departure bar does not apply to the IJ’s sua sponte motion to reopen removal proceedings. Thus, we hold that the Board erred by concluding that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to consider ReyesVargas’s invitation for sua sponte relief. And for that reason, we grant Reyes19 Vargas’s petition for review, reverse the Board’s decision, and remand for it to consider whether the IJ properly rejected Reyes-Vargas’s sua sponte request on the merits.