Opinion ID: 2313776
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Guilt and Penalty Phase

Text: Appellant next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty phases in numerous respects. Appellant's individual claims of trial court error are largely derivative of claims which we have previously deemed waived due to appellant's failure to object below. At the guilt phase, appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to request a prompt curative instruction after Tyrone Powell testified that appellant calmed down after he got out of prison[,] Claim IIB, supra; (2) arguing during his closing argument that the real issue in the case was whether appellant was guilty of first- or third-degree murder; (3) failing to object to the prosecutor's closing argument, in which the prosecutor allegedly argued that appellant had committed prior bad acts, including assaulting Desiree Graves, Claim IV, supra; and (4) failing to request a jury charge on involuntary manslaughter, Claim V, supra. Respecting the penalty phase, appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance because counsel: (5) failed to properly investigate potential mitigating circumstances, including appellant's drug and alcohol use and the alleged personality changes appellant underwent when using drugs and alcohol; (6) failed to produce or investigate psychiatric evaluations and presentence reports available from appellant's prior court contacts, or hospital records that may have revealed injuries to appellant's brain from a blow to the head and inpatient drug and alcohol treatment records; and (7) failed to investigate or present argument on extreme emotional or mental distress as a mitigating factor. In response, the Commonwealth points to Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002), in which this Court held that ineffectiveness claims are generally not reviewable on direct appeal, but should be deferred until collateral review. Appellant makes no argument as to why Grant should not apply. In Grant, this Court announced the general rule that a defendant should wait to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review. 813 A.2d at 738. Grant applied the rule to any other cases on direct appeal where the issue of ineffectiveness was properly raised and preserved. Id. In Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831, 853-54 (2003), this Court recognized a limited exception to Grant. In Bomar, we determined that the appellant's ineffectiveness claims could be reviewed on direct appeal because the extensive record developed on the ineffectiveness claims in the trial court negated any need to rely upon extra-record sources such as averments in appellate briefs or affidavits to resolve the claims. Id. at 854. This extensive record developed because trial counsel withdrew following sentencing, appellate counsel had filed post-sentence motions raising the ineffectiveness claims, the trial court conducted hearings on the post-sentence motions where trial counsel testified, and the court addressed the ineffectiveness claims in its opinion. Id. at 853. Here, new counsel entered an appearance at the conclusion of the penalty phase, and the trial court addressed appellant's ineffectiveness claims in its opinion. However, unlike Bomar, there was no post-trial hearing with testimony from trial counsel. The Commonwealth therefore argues that this case falls under Grant, and concludes that appellant's claims are not reviewable on direct appeal. We agree. In Commonwealth v. Pagan, ___ Pa. ___, 950 A.2d 270 (2008), we examined the application of the Bomar exception to a case in which the claim of ineffectiveness was record-based, but where there was no hearing on the ineffectiveness claim below and, thus, no testimony by counsel. We held that without an ineffectiveness hearing, there is an insufficient factual record to consider the claim. Pagan, 950 A.2d at 287. Additionally, we noted that it was unlikely that the record-based challenges presented by the appellant in Pagan exhausted the universe of claims which might be pursued in the longer timeframe available to counsel upon PCRA review. Id. at 287-88 (quoting Commonwealth v. May, 584 Pa. 640, 887 A.2d 750, 758 (2005)). In the absence of an ineffectiveness hearing where counsel testifies, the mere fact that the trial court addressed appellant's ineffectiveness claim in its opinion does not implicate the Bomar exception to Grant. See May, 887 A.2d at 757-58. The absence of an ineffectiveness hearing, and the likelihood that other ineffectiveness claims will be discovered and raised on PCRA review, weigh against premature review of appellant's collateral claims on direct review. Finally, appellant fails to cite or acknowledge Grant, and thus he forwards no argument as to why we should review his ineffectiveness claims on direct, rather than collateral, review. Accordingly, appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are dismissed without prejudice to his right to pursue PCRA relief.