Opinion ID: 2169282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the intrinsic validity of the search

Text: The motion judge, in considering the whole factual context of the search, stated in his opinion (statement in accordance with R. 2:5-6(c)) that when one of the officers walked over to the van, the door was open; marijuana was smelled and the search ensued (emphasis added). If this was meant to imply that the vehicle door was casually or coincidentally open, so that the perception by smell of the odor of marijuana might justify the search, we believe an error in dictation or transcription must have occurred, making necessary a correction of the record. Our careful examination of the motion testimony discloses that all witnesses agreed that the door was affirmatively opened rather than casually open. Both police officers testified that they opened the respective doors of the vehicle and only then were confronted with the smell of marijuana which inspired the search. The defense testimony was that the driver, Pate, opened the driver's side door and stepped out of the vehicle under armed police threat and command. No one testified that the door was coincidentally open. The motion judge himself, at the conclusion of testimony, in mentioning a crucial point in the case, and inviting memoranda of law thereon, posed the question was there a smell of marijuana when that door was opened and Mr. Pate got out of the car? It is apparent that we should amend the motion judge's opinion to concord with the undisputed proofs before him. We therefore conclude that the door was opened either by the police or by Pate at their command. The legal result is the same. Was there justification or probable cause to open the door and, perceiving a possible violation of law, to search the van? We think not. The arrest of Cohen on the invalid warrant was complete. No reasons existed to suspect or implicate Cohen's companions in any precedent or current offense (his had occurred almost three months before). We therefore agree with the sense of Judge Smith's finding that there was no justifiable reason or probable cause for the officers to make the initial intrusion by opening or compelling the occupant to open the van doors. The warrantless search of the vehicle conducted by the Authority police officers fits none of the relevant exceptions to the general search warrant requirement. Since the police officers lacked probable cause to open the vehicle door, the moving vehicle exception to the general requirement cannot be relied on. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed. 2d 419 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); State v. LaPorte, 62 N.J. 312, 316 (1973). For the same reasons the plain view exception is inapplicable. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed. 2d 1067 (1968); State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 56-57 (1968). Finally, the factual circumstances of Cohen's arrest do not support a search incident to a valid arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed. 2d 685 (1969). The motion to suppress was properly granted. The decision of the Appellate Division is modified, and as so modified, affirmed. PASHMAN, J., concurring. I concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice. However, I would address the Port Authority's assertion that its police jurisdiction extends beyond the Port District and its facilities. The issue, which is expressly reserved in the majority opinion, see ante at 341 and n. 5, is concededly not essential to the resolution of this appeal, but I believe that we should dispel any doubts concerning the breadth of the Authority's jurisdiction by definitively interpreting N.J.S.A. 32:2-25 to confer statewide powers on its police force. The issue has been fully briefed and argued by the parties, and amicus curiae Port Authority has represented to us that such powers are necessary to perform its various functions. In addition, there is a public interest in clear delineation of law enforcement responsibilities and powers. The State Police and various municipal police forces have a legitimate interest in knowing whether they will be free to leave certain tasks to Authority police officers, or whether they are legally compelled to discharge certain functions themselves outside the Port District. While the Court's opinion will resolve many of these difficulties because the Port District encompasses a considerable area of the State, see ante at 334, N.J.S.A. 32:1-3, many crimes, such as cargo thefts, necessitate investigative work, and may require arrests in other parts of the State. Rather than utilize the exclusionary rule as a vehicle to define the Authority's jurisdiction, and thus endanger an otherwise valid arrest or search, cf. State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586 (1971), we should take this opportunity to determine the full sweep of N.J.S.A. 32:2-25. My willingness to address this issue is reinforced by the thorough canvassing of the statutory history and relevant policy considerations in the Court's opinion. I have little to add to this treatment. The broad range of Authority activities; the unqualified nature of the statutory language conferring jurisdiction; the long-standing legislative acquiescence to the Authority's extensive police role; and the desirability of conforming with New York's practice, all support a liberal reading of N.J.S.A. 32:2-25. The only countervailing factor is the supposed desirability of confining the Authority police to the territorial limits of their employer, in a manner similar to the limitation expressly placed on municipal police by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152. See State v. Williams, 136 N.J. Super. 544, 548 (Law Div. 1975). Such a restriction would prevent any jurisdictional conflicts which might stem from overreaching by the Authority police. However, the language of N.J.S.A. 32: 2-25 contains no comparable limitation on the powers granted to Authority police. Furthermore, this concern for overlapping responsibilities should have little bearing on the scope of the Port Authority's police jurisdiction since its activities outside the Port facilities are likely to be related to a specialized range of responsibilities whch are far removed from the standard fare of municipal, or even State, police. See ante at 337, 338. Far more persuasive, in my view, is the grant of jurisdiction enjoyed by Authority police officers in New York, see ante at 340, and the need for uniform treatment in both states. Although New York's jurisdictional grant is clearly set forth by statute, we should presume, in the absence of any compelling policy reasons, that our own Legislature would welcome a judicial interpretation which encourages common treatment of the Authority police in both states. Cf. Moonachie v. Port of New York Authority, 38 N.J. 414, 425 (1962), in which Justice Francis said: Since the Authority is an instrumentality of New York and New Jersey, it is eminently desirable, of course, that the path of judicial decision in the courts of the two States be a common one. Consequently, I would reach the issue posed in footnote 5 of the Court's opinion and hold that N.J.S.A. 32:2-25 permits the Authority police to exercise all the powers conferred by law on police officers throughout the State. Justice SCHREIBER joins in this opinion. CLIFFORD, J., concurring in result. While there are valid policy considerations favoring the majority's broad view of Port Authority police jurisdiction (and perhaps supporting even more strongly the approach of Justice Pashman), I would respect what I understand to be the legislative intent and affirm the judgment below, without modification, substantially for the reasons given by the Appellate Division, 139 N.J. Super. 561 (1976). The restrictive language of the first sentence of N.J.S.A. 32:2-25, pertaining to the arrest of any person violating, within the jurisdiction of this State, any order, etc., quite plainly serves to distinguish a violation of traffic rules, regulations or orders occurring on port facilities within the jurisdiction of the State of New Jersey (the only one our statutes could reach) from such a violation occurring within the State of New York. The statute as I read it provides for enforcement by Port Authority police of all laws of this State on the Port Authority facilities mentioned in the statute  and nowhere else. While I might look at the problem differently were the task of establishing policy in this field my responsibility, which of course it is not, I nevertheless can perceive some good and sufficient reasons for the legislature's desire to impose a severe limitation on the area in which Port Authority police should function, not the least of which is a reluctance to encourage the intromission of these officers in their exercise of police power across the jurisdictional lines of other governmental entities and other law enforcement agencies. Judge CONFORD authorizes me to record his concurrence in this opinion. CLIFFORD, J., and CONFORD, P.J.A.D., concurring in the result. For modification and affirmance  Chief Justice HUGHES, Justices MOUNTAIN, SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, CLIFFORD and SCHREIBER and Judge CONFORD  7. For reversal  None.