Opinion ID: 866146
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counts Six and Seven (Washington Street

Text: Transaction) Counts Six and Seven concerned Ralph's engagement with the Washington Street property transaction, and he asserts two main challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting these convictions. First, he argues that the government failed to present evidence that Ralph knew the representations on the loan application were false or misleading. Ralph relies heavily on the notion that Robinson, the property's purchaser, dealt primarily with Ernst. The government introduced other evidence demonstrating Ralph's interactions with Robinson, however, including Robinson's testimony that he spoke with Ralph regarding the transaction on at -10- least one occasion, and that Ralph was present briefly at the closing. Additionally, another conspirator testified that Robinson came to the office multiple times looking for Ralph, and witnessed Ralph, Ernst, and Robinson meeting at the office on at least one occasion. These facts establish that Robinson had at least some interaction with Ralph regarding the loan transaction. Moreover, testimony from one of Lindley's employees established that Ralph acted as the broker representative on the transaction, and that he put his name on a number of fax transmissions with Lindley's office. Ralph also listed himself as the interviewer on the loan applications that contained the false statements, as well as other forms related to the transaction. The false verification of rent from the lender file listed Ralph as the requesting party and gave New England Merchants' address as the location of Robinson's landlord.3 This compilation of evidence gives rise to the reasonable inference not only that Ralph was an active participant in the transaction, but also that he participated with the specific intent to defraud. See United States v. Alfonzo–Reyes, 592 F.3d 280, 291 (1st Cir. 2010) (Direct evidence is not required to find [a defendant] guilty, and juries are entitled to draw reasonable inferences at trial based on circumstantial evidence.). These 3 Some of the documents described above have not been made part of the record on appeal. We thus rely on the government's descriptions of them, which appellant has not disputed in any way. -11- facts, joined with Ralph's general awareness of the mechanics of appellants' scheme, Daniel Appolon, 695 F.3d at 59, are more than sufficient to meet the government's burden. Ralph's second contention is similarly unavailing. He posits that New England Merchants' offices permitted any employee to use the computer system to generate and transmit forms, thus making it possible that his brother Ernst or some other employee forged Ralph's signature and engaged in the inculpatory wire communications. But Ralph's ability to construct an alternative (and rather speculative) reading of the evidence does not invalidate the jury's conclusion. We ask only whether a rational fact finder could find that the government proved the essential elements of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Marin, 523 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2008). As we have explained, the record bears more than sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion. More fundamentally, a wire fraud conviction does not require that Ralph have had any personal involvement in initiating the wire transfers; instead, the use of the wires need only have been 'a reasonably foreseeable part of the scheme in which he participated.' United States v. Vázquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 723 n.6). The evidence described above, particularly Ralph's signatures on the transmitted documents, his interactions with WMC Mortgage, and his awareness of the general contours of the fraudulent scheme, was sufficient to -12- demonstrate that he should have foreseen the use of wire transmissions as a result of his involvement in the Washington Street transaction. For these reasons, Ralph's conviction on Counts Six and Seven must stand.