Opinion ID: 4533546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: a. District Attorney Opat, Chief Brown, and Agent Virden The law enforcement defendants argued in district court that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Banks’s Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim. The district court 19 relied on the clearly-established-law prong of the qualified immunity test and found that immunity applied because Mr. Banks had identified no authority “holding that the Fourth Amendment is violated by the specific facts presented here.” ROA, Vol. II at 164-65. We agree that qualified immunity applies under the second prong. The district court in Mr. Banks’s criminal case determined that investigators relied in good faith on Judge Platt’s wiretap orders in intercepting his text messages. “[R]easonable person[s] in [their] position would not know that [their] actions violated the Fourth Amendment for the same reasons [that] establish the good faith defense to liability under [18 U.S.C. § 2520].” Frierson v. Goetz, 99 F. App’x. 649, 654 (6th Cir. 2004). Where, as here, “the requisites of the statutory good faith defense are met, then the standard for qualified immunity as a defense to Fourth Amendment violations is also satisfied.” Kilgore v. Mitchell, 623 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. 2520(d) (providing that good-faith reliance “is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law” (emphasis added)). The district court correctly dismissed Mr. Banks’s Fourth Amendment claims against the law enforcement defendants. Sprint Mr. Banks failed to allege Sprint engaged in state action. He claimed Sprint (1) received a wiretap order that did not cover text messages, (2) intercepted those messages, and (3) disclosed them to the other defendants. But the amended complaint did not allege Sprint participated in procuring the wiretap order, obtained aid from state officials, or performed acts attributable to the state. Thus, Mr. Banks failed to allege Sprint’s 20 compliance with Judge Platt’s order constitutes state action. The district court correctly dismissed Mr. Banks’s Fourth Amendment claim against Sprint. D. Civil Conspiracy14 “Allegations of conspiracy may . . . form the basis of a § 1983 claim.” Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998). “[T]o recover under a § 1983 conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights; pleading and proof of one without the other will be insufficient.” Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir. 1990). Likewise, “[a] civil conspiracy is not actionable under Kansas law without commission of some wrong giving rise to a tortious cause of action independent of conspiracy.” Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1268 (10th Cir. 2005). 14 The amended complaint does not say whether this claim is predicated on § 1983 or Kansas law. The claim fails under both. To the extent Mr. Banks is attempting to assert a federal common-law conspiracy claim, courts generally construe such claims as § 1983 conspiracy claims, and we do the same. See Burdett v. Reynoso, No. C-06-00720 JCS, 2007 WL 2429426, at  (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2007) (finding common law conspiracy claim properly construed as § 1983 claim and collecting authority recognizing a § 1983 conspiracy claim), aff'd, 399 F. App’x 276 (9th Cir. 2010). Mr. Banks does not appear to be advancing a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim, which “generally describes a conspiracy of two or more persons for the purpose of depriving . . . another of equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1447 (10th Cir. 1990). 21 Mr. Banks alleged that District Attorney Opat and Agent Virden “knowingly conspired with one another to commit the substantive count in th[e] complaint,” ROA, Vol. II at 12, and that they knew or should have known the wiretap orders were unlawful. The district court determined that Mr. Banks’s conspiracy claim failed because there was neither an underlying unlawful act nor sufficiently pled facts of a conspiracy. We agree with the latter determination. An actionable conspiracy “requires at least a combination of two or more persons acting in concert and an allegation of a meeting of the minds, an agreement among the defendants, or a general conspiratorial objective.” Brooks v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Stoldt v. City of Toronto, 678 P.2d 153, 161 (Kan. 1984) (stating elements of a civil conspiracy as: “(1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds in the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result thereof” (quotations omitted)). “[A] plaintiff must allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action amongst the defendants” because “conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a valid § 1983 claim.” Brooks, 614 F.3d at 1228 (quotations omitted and alterations incorporated). Mr. Banks’s allegation of a conspiracy is conclusory. It identifies no agreement between District Attorney Opat and Agent Virden to work together to achieve an unlawful objective. See, e.g., Vieux v. E. Bay Reg’l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1343 (9th Cir. 1990) (observing that “[a] civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons who, by some concerted action, intend to 22 accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another which results in damage,” and concluding that there was no evidence of an illegal objective despite correspondence and discussions between the defendants). The district court appropriately dismissed Mr. Banks’s civil conspiracy claim. III. CONCLUSION We affirm the district court’s judgment in part, but we reverse and remand for further proceedings on Mr. Banks’s statutory wiretap claims about the law enforcement defendants’ interception and disclosure of extra-territorial communications and Sprint’s interception and disclosure of text messages. Also, we deny Mr. Banks’s request for the assistance of appellate counsel, and we remind him to continue making partial payments until the entire filing fee has been paid.15 Entered for the Court Scott M. Matheson, Jr.