Opinion ID: 2130336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable

Text: (a) [Unchanged.] (b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: (1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. (2) - (4) [Unchanged.] (5) Deposition Testimony. Testimony given as a witness in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. For purposes of this subsection only, unavailability of a witness also includes situations in which: (A) The witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (B) On motion and notice, such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interests of justice, and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used. LEVIN, J. ( separate opinion ). The transcript of Patricia Dudash's deposition testimony is indeed hearsay in that it reflects out-of-court statements made by her offered by the plaintiff in evidence to prove the truth of the matter so asserted by her. [1] Once we move on from that first level of hearsay, her deposition testimony, reflected in that transcript, relating what she observed, is not hearsay. If she had testified concerning what someone else might have told her, that would have been second-level hearsay. Because Dudash's deposition testimony concerned only what she observed, the instant case concerns only first-level, not second-level, hearsay. Plaintiff's lawyer properly read Rule 2.308(A) as providing a first-level hearsay exception for Patricia Dudash's deposition testimony without regard to whether she was available to testify at the trial. That rule provides that a party may use at the trial for any ... purpose the deposition so far as admissible under the rules of evidence of a person who was an employee of another party at the time of the transaction or occurrence out of which the action arose. I would make the change in the meaning of Rule 2.308(A) and the amendments of the court rules and the Rules of Evidence today adopted by the Court fully prospective and remand for a new trial under the new rule. I The Rules of Evidence concerning hearsay mainly address the second-level hearsay question. There are also provisions concerning first-level hearsay, the use of depositions. The first-level hearsay exceptions, in the Rules of Evidence, state that the deposition testimony of an expert witness is ordinarily admissible even though the witness is available to testify at the trial, [2] and that the deposition testimony of any witness is ordinarily admissible if the witness is unavailable, [3] defined as including where the witness has died or is physically or mentally ill or infirm or the proponent has been unable to procure the witness' attendance. [4] Court Rule 2.308(A) states overlapping rules regarding first-level hearsay (the use of deposition testimony), providing in effect that in certain instances the deposition is admissible without regard to whether the witness is available. The clause, in Rule 2.308(A), so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, concerns evidentiary questions, for example, second-level hearsay questions, other than the first-level hearsay question. To read Rule 2.308(A) otherwise is to read it into oblivion. To read so far as admissible under the rules of evidence as barring a deposition unless it is admissible under the Rules of Evidence is to read it as saying that a deposition of a witness may be used under 2.308(A) only if it also may be used under another rule  the Rules of Evidence; so read, Rule 2.308(A) is superfluous. If the deposition testimony of a person who is not an expert, admissible under the terms of Rule 2.308(A), is nevertheless not admissible because it constitutes hearsay ( first-level hearsay ), unless it ceases to be first-level hearsay by reason of the hearsay definition or an exception in the Rules of Evidence, then Rule 2.308(A) might as well be a blank page. If so far as admissible under the rules of evidence means, as the majority today holds, that the deposition of an employee who at the time of the transaction or occurrence out of which the action arose [5] is not admissible unless either not hearsay or within a hearsay exception under the Rules of Evidence, then  deposition of a person who was an officer, director, employee, or agent of a party at the time of taking the deposition [6] is not admissible unless the deposition concerns a matter within the scope of his agency or employment; and [7]  the deposition testimony of a witness who resides at a distance greater than fifty miles from the place of the trial [8] is not admissible unless either admissible under the first-level hearsay exceptions in the Rules of Evidence for unavailable witnesses, which do not include distance from the place of trial within the definition of unavailability, or some other hearsay exception or exclusion from the hearsay definition perchance applies. [9] II The Court is today amending the court rules and the Rules of Evidence to rectify the manifest implications of today's decision regarding the fifty-mile rule and the admissibility of the deposition of a person who was an officer, director, employee or agent of a party either at the time of taking the deposition or at the time of the transaction or occurrence. [10] The Court should make today's rule-changing decision and the amendment of the court rules and Rules of Evidence fully prospective so as not to defeat the expectations of the bench and bar who understandably took Rule 2.308(A) at face value: as overlapping, but not inconsistent with, the Rules of Evidence  as providing more generally regarding the first-level hearsay problem than the Rules of Evidence. Lawyers and judges properly read Rule 2.308(A) as providing a first-level hearsay exception for [t]he deposition of a party or anyone who at the time of the transaction or occurrence out of which the action arose or at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, employee, or agent of a party [11] without regard to whether the witness was available and thus without any need to show that the witness was dead, physically or mentally ill or infirm, or his attendance could not be procured, or, in the case of an agent or servant, that the deposition concerned a matter within the scope of his agency or employment. III The wisdom of some of the specific provisions of Rule 2.308(A) may indeed be debatable. The Court adopted the rule and a majority can change it. The Court, having adopted Rule 2.308(A), is responsible for any resulting obscurity in meaning. With respect, I do not believe there is any obscurity. The Court should in fairness make today's rule-changing decision fully prospective. I would remand for a new trial under the new rule. ARCHER, J. ( dissenting ). This Court granted leave to appeal to reconcile the conflicting prerequisites of MCR 2.308(A)(1) [1] and the Michigan Rules of Evidence regarding the admissibility of a deposition at trial. I would hold that the trial court erred in excluding the deposition because it was properly admissible pursuant to MCR 2.308(A)(1)(b). However, the contents of the deposition should have been subject to consideration under the hearsay rules as provided within MCR 2.308(A). Accordingly, I would reverse the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.