Opinion ID: 1359265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Multiple Special-circumstance Findings

Text: The jury found six special circumstance allegations true as to each defendant as a result of the killings of Bobby and Eric Hassan: burglary murder, robbery murder, and multiple murder for the killing of Bobby Hassan, plus the same three special circumstances for the killing of Eric Hassan. As to defendant Ross, the jury also found four special circumstances true as a result of the killings of Michael Taylor: burglary murder, robbery murder, rape murder, and multiple murder. Defendants argue the trial court should have stricken three of the four robbery and burglary special circumstances resulting from the killing of Bobby and Eric Hassan because they occurred during a single course of conduct. (See § 654.) For the same reason, defendant Ross argues that the trial court should also have stricken one of the two robbery and burglary special circumstances resulting from the killing of Michael Taylor. We have in the past rejected a similar contention ( People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 224-225 [260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285]; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 766 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741]) and see no reason to reconsider it here. Defendants further contend the trial court should have stricken one of defendant Champion's two multiple-murder special circumstances, and two of defendant Ross's three multiple-murder special circumstances, [25] as duplicative. They are correct. ( People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1273-1274 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115].) We have, however, consistently found such error to be harmless (see, e.g., People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1149 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757]; People v. Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 225-226), and we do so here.

At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence that on November 6, 1977, defendant Champion was one of eight young men who robbed or attempted to rob three people at a Greyhound Bus Depot in West Covina, County of Los Angeles. The prosecution also introduced, over defendant Champion's objection, evidence that as a result of this episode he was charged in juvenile court with robbery, attempted robbery, and grand theft; that the charges were found true; and that he was made a ward of the court and placed in a camp. The prosecution also called Court Reporter Buelah Pugh, who read to the jury Jose Bustos's juvenile court testimony, in which he stated that a group of five males, including defendant Champion, had robbed and assaulted him. Court Reporter Pugh also testified that juvenile court proceedings are analogous to adult criminal proceedings, that the referees and commissioners who hear juvenile proceeding are, for all intents and purposes, the equivalent of judges, and that a finding of true is the equivalent in Juvenile Court of a finding of guilty in an adult court. (25) Defendant Champion makes two related contentions regarding this evidence. First, Champion argues that the prosecution was not entitled to use the facts surrounding the robberies as evidence in aggravation at the penalty phase of his capital case. He is wrong. At the penalty phase of a capital case, the prosecution may show criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence.... (§ 190.3, factor (b).) Champion concedes that the robbery at the West Covina bus station and the assault and robbery of Jose Bustos each involved the use or attempted use of force or violence, but argues that they did not involve criminal activity because he was a minor when the violent activity occurred. We have rejected a similar contention on several occasions ( People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 295 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052]; People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 688; People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 862 [258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270]). Next, defendant Champion asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence that juvenile court allegations against Champion arising out of the robbery at the bus station were found true. We agree. As we explained in People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 689: `It is not the [juvenile] adjudication, but the conduct itself, which is relevant.' [Citations.] Accordingly,... evidence of a wardship adjudication is inadmissible .... Defendant Champion further contends that the erroneous admission of the juvenile adjudications requires reversal of the judgment of death. He asserts that the prejudicial effect of the adjudications was compounded when the prosecutor elicited testimony from Court Reporter Pugh that juvenile proceedings are analogous to criminal trials of adults. He also notes that during its deliberations, the jury asked to see the file ... regarding West Covina holdup charges. (The trial court denied the request.) We do not agree that the error was prejudicial. The prosecution also introduced evidence of the facts surrounding the robberies; as explained above, the jury could properly consider this evidence in aggravation as part of its penalty deliberations. Although the juvenile adjudications arguably provided the jury with additional evidence that defendant Champion actually committed those robberies, his participation in the robberies was undisputed. There is no reasonable possibility that the evidence of the juvenile adjudications could have affected the jury's penalty verdict in this case.
(26) At the penalty phase of the trial, defendant Champion called as a witness Thomas Crawford, who had been his California Youth Authority parole officer when Champion was arrested. The trial court sustained objections to three questions defense counsel asked Crawford, each of which was designed to elicit testimony that gang members and parolees had told Crawford they did not believe defendant Champion had committed the murders in this case. [26] Defendant Champion contends that the belief by gang members that he was innocent showed that he had been making good faith efforts to `turn his life around' before his arrest for the murders, and that the trial court therefore erred in sustaining the prosecutor's objections to Champion's questions. The questions, however, were not intended to show that defendant Champion had turned his life around. Rather, they were an effort by Champion to introduce hearsay evidence that he was not guilty of the murders. Hearsay testimony is inadmissible at the penalty phase ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 837-838 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436]) and the trial court properly sustained the prosecutor's objections. Defendant Champion maintains that the evidence of what gang members told his parole officer was admissible notwithstanding its hearsay nature. He points out that the United States Supreme Court has held that due process requires the admission of hearsay evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial, even though a state's evidentiary rules are to the contrary, if both of the following conditions are present: (1) the excluded testimony is `highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of trial,' and (2) there are substantial reasons to assume the reliability of the evidence. ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 704 [276 Cal. Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278], quoting Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, 97 [60 L.Ed.2d 738, 741, 99 S.Ct. 2150].) According to Champion, the evidence was highly relevant because it tended to create a lingering doubt regarding his guilt, and he is entitled, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States, to present such evidence as a reason for the jury to spare his life. (See People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 676-677; Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1 [90 L.Ed.2d 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669].) But the fact that unidentified gang members, presumably friends of defendant Champion, told a parole officer that they believed in Champion's innocence had little bearing on whether he actually committed the murders and hence was not highly relevant, nor was there reason to believe that these claims were in any way reliable. Thus, the trial court properly excluded the testimony.

(27) Section 190.3 describes the factors in aggravation and mitigation that the jury may consider in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. In People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861] and in subsequent cases ( People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 144; People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 683; People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1034 [248 Cal. Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017]) we have held that the prosecutor may not argue that the absence of certain potentially mitigating factors transforms those factors into factors in aggravation. Defendants argue that in this case the prosecution engaged in the type of argument prohibited by Davenport. This case was tried before our decision in People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247. In his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed each of the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation to be considered by the jury in its deliberations, telling the jury that because there was no mitigating evidence, it should consider certain mitigating factors as being factors in aggravation. [27] This argument was improper. Defendants, however, never objected to the prosecutor's argument, and therefore have not preserved the issue for consideration on appeal. ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 702 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217]; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 456 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) In any event, we have consistently concluded that arguments of this nature are nonprejudicial (see, e.g., People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 937 [21 Cal. Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277]), and we do so here. The prosecutor's erroneous argument related to the circumstances surrounding the offense; the jury was not misled as to the nature of these circumstances, and was free to weigh them appropriately. In these circumstances, `a reasonable jury would not assign substantial aggravating weight to the absence of unusual extenuating factors.' ( People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 169 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561], quoting People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1234 [275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)
Defendants accuse the prosecutor of misconduct in his closing argument, by appealing to the jury's passion and prejudice and by engaging in inflammatory argument. In his closing argument, the prosecutor noted that some members of the jury might feel anger and outrage at the crimes both defendants had committed. Anticipating that the defense might argue that it is wrong to make your decision in anger, the prosecutor stated: It is wrong only to make your decision solely because of anger. He also argued that by committing the murders, defendants showed that they believed in the death penalty, and he commended the jury in advance for its courage in sentencing defendants to death. Defendants argue that these remarks were improper, but neither defendant objected to them. Even if one assumes that the prosecutor's comments were improper, any conceivable prejudice arising from them could have been cured by a timely objection and admonition. Thus, defendants have not preserved the right to complain about them on appeal. ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 440 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610].) Defendants also assert that other comments by the prosecutor in closing argument implied that they should be sentenced to death because they would be a danger to other prisoners and to prison guards if they were sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. (28) Although we have held that at the penalty phase of a capital case the prosecutor may not introduce expert testimony forecasting that, if sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, a defendant will commit violent acts in prison ( People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 779 [175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446]), we have never held that in closing argument a prosecutor may not comment on the possibility that if the defendant is not executed he or she will remain a danger to others. Rather, we have concluded that the prosecutor may make such comments when they are supported by the evidence. ( People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 963; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 549 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129].) In any event, defendants' failure to object to the prosecutor's comments bars them from complaining about the comments on appeal. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 440.)
At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, when the jury returned its verdicts convicting both defendants of murder with special circumstances, defendants stood up, and defendant Champion uttered an obscenity. The trial court told defendants to sit; they refused and began walking toward the holding area; defendant Champion said he was being railroaded. The bailiff then escorted defendants to the holding area. In his closing argument at the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor commented on this behavior by defendants on three occasions. First, he argued that defendants' behavior showed that they would be a danger to others if they were sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. [28] The prosecutor again briefly referred to this incident when he discussed whether either defendant had acted under the domination of another person in committing the murders. [29] At a later point, the prosecutor argued that defendants' behavior in response to the jury's verdicts showed defendants' lack of remorse for their crimes. [30] Defendants contend the prosecutor's comments were impermissible because a defendant's demeanor in court is not a factor that the jury in a capital case is entitled to consider in aggravation, because jury consideration of such demeanor renders meaningful appellate review by an appellate court that did not observe the conduct impossible. Also, defendants assert, the prosecutor's comment on their demeanor violated their privilege against self-incrimination and their right to due process of law. Neither defendant, however, objected to the prosecutor's comments at trial. Because a timely objection and admonition would have negated any harm arising from the prosecutor's comments, defendants are barred from now attacking the propriety of the prosecutor's argument. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 440.)
In his penalty phase argument, the prosecutor made reference to defendants' tape-recorded conversations, introduced by the prosecution at the guilt phase of trial. (See pt. II.A, ante. ) He suggested that portions of the conversations showed that defendant Ross was the leader in committing the murders in this case, that Ross showed no remorse for his crimes, and that defendants would remain a threat to society if they were sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, because they might try to escape from prison or attack a prison guard. (As previously explained, in the conversations defendants fantasized about wanting to escape and to blow up the driver of the van transporting them to court.) (29) Defendant Ross argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to the tape-recorded conversations in this fashion, because the prosecutor gave no notice that he intended to use the conversations at the penalty phase. He asserts that the prosecutor was obligated to give such notice under section 190.3. Because defendant Ross did not object to the prosecutor's comments regarding the tape-recorded conversations, he has not preserved the right to challenge them on appeal. In any event, section 190.3 provides that the prosecutor need not give notice of evidence in proof of the offense ... which subject[s] a defendant to the death penalty. [31] As the tape-recorded conversations were evidence used at the guilt phase of trial to establish defendant Ross's guilt of the murders for which he is subject to the death penalty, the prosecutor did not have to give notice that he intended to rely on them at the penalty phase.
(30) During his penalty phase argument, the prosecutor made frequent reference to the fact that defendants were gang members. Defendants argue that the prosecutor's comments were improper, because their gang membership had no bearing on any of the statutory factors in aggravation that the jury may consider at the penalty phase of trial. (§ 190.3.) Not so. Because the evidence suggested that the murders in this case were committed by defendants' gang, defendants' membership in that gang was one of the circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) that the jury could properly consider in aggravation. In any event, defendants' failure to object to the prosecutor's comments bars them from raising this issue on appeal.
(31) Defendants argue that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asserting in his closing argument that defendants lacked remorse for their crimes. Defendants did not, however, object to the prosecutor's argument on this ground, and properly so. As we recently explained, lack of remorse, because it suggests the absence of a mitigating factor, is deemed a relevant factor in the jury's determination as to whether the factors in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation, and [is] thus an appropriate subject of comment by the prosecutor, so long as he or she does not argue that lack of remorse constitutes a factor in aggravation. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 150 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) The prosecutor's argument in this case may reasonably be construed as urging the jury not to find remorse as a mitigating factor.
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, on its own initiative, that in its penalty phase deliberations it could consider sympathy or compassion for the defendants. We have consistently held, however, that the trial court does not have to give such an instruction. ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 163; People v. Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 227-228; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 955 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395]; see also California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837].)
The trial court read to the jury CALJIC No. 8.84.1, the standard instruction describing the factors in aggravation and mitigation that the jury may consider in determining penalty. [32] Defendants challenge this instruction in four different respects.
Defendants argue that the trial court should have omitted from the instruction factors (d) (mental or emotional disturbance), (e) (victim's participation in the homicide), (f) (moral justification for the crimes), (g) (duress), (h) (mental impairment), and (j) (defendant a minor participant in the crimes), because these factors were inapplicable to the facts of this case. Defendants concede, however, that we have repeatedly rejected this contention. (See, e.g., People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 465 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992]; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 776-777 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) We see no reason to reconsider these decisions.
(32) Defendants point out that as part of the instruction describing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court told the jury that it could consider: (a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding, and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true; [¶] (b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence, or the express or implied threat to use force or violence; [¶] (c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.... Defendants argue that this portion of the instruction improperly permitted the jury to double count the violent conduct that led to their convictions of burglary, robbery, and murder at the guilt phase of the trial, by considering their conduct both as circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) and as criminal activity ... which involves the use ... of force or violence ( id., factor (b)). Similarly, they argue that the jury may have considered the special circumstances it had found to be true at the guilt phase of trial both as circumstances of the offense ( id., factor (a)) and as prior felony convictions ( id., factor (c)). In People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, we directed that henceforth the trial court should explain to the jury that the violent criminal conduct referred to in section 190.3, factor (b) and the prior felony convictions referred to in factor (c) do not include the evidence underlying the guilt determination. (44 Cal.3d at p. 106, fn. 28.) Because this case was tried before our decision in Miranda, the trial court gave no such explanation. But as we said in People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 938: [W]e have consistently found that the absence of a clarifying instruction on this issue is harmless. The same is true here. In his closing argument, the prosecutor did not suggest to the jury that it should double count the evidence introduced or the jury's findings at the guilt phase of trial; as a result, it is unlikely that the jury gave the evidence and findings duplicative consideration. Defendants complain that the instruction describing aggravating and mitigating circumstances was defective because the jury was not instructed that the fact that [defendants] had been convicted of first degree murder and the fact of the true findings on the special circumstances were not, in themselves, aggravating circumstances. They appear to contend that because the trial court did not give this instruction, the jury may have double counted the circumstances of their offenses by considering the convictions and special circumstances, and by separately considering the facts that led to the convictions and special circumstance findings. Such an instruction would only have confused the jury; therefore, the trial court acted properly in not giving it. Defendant Champion faults the trial court for not telling the jury that it could not consider his felonious assaults on Vincent Verkuilen and Jose Bustos both as violent criminal conduct (§ 190.3, factor (b)) and as a prior felony conviction ( id., factor (c)). We have held, however, that a penalty phase jury is entitled to consider such evidence under both factors. ( People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 939, fn. 34; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 764.)
(33) Defendants argue that the trial court's instruction to the jury describing the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation did not adequately inform the jury that it could consider the mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase. As they point out, the United States Supreme Court has held that at the penalty phase of a capital case, the jury must be permitted to consider `any aspect of a defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ( Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 869].) In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider: (k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. The United States Supreme Court has held that this instruction is not, in and of itself, constitutionally inadequate. ( Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 110 S.Ct. 1190].) But in People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813], decided after the trial in this case, we directed that trial courts should, to avoid confusion, instruct the jury that it may consider any other `aspect of [the] defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ( Id. at p. 878, fn. 10.) In cases that, like this one, were tried before our decision in Easley, we examine the record to determine whether, in context, the sentencer may have been misled to defendant's prejudice about the scope of its sentencing discretion.... ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 544, fn. 17 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440]; see also People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1071 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 526, 839 P.2d 1035].) Having reviewed the record in this case, we see no reason to conclude that the jury was misled regarding the scope of its sentencing discretion. In his closing argument, the prosecutor never suggested that the jury could not consider the mitigating evidence. To the contrary, the prosecutor specifically informed the jury that it could consider any evidence of mitigation, not only surrounding the crime itself, but about [defendants'] lives in general. The prosecutor then discussed the evidence in mitigation offered by defendants, and argued, in essence, that this evidence was inadequate to outweigh the evidence in aggravation offered by the prosecution. We find no reasonable possibility that the jury was misled into believing that it could not consider defendants' mitigating evidence.
(34) The instruction describing the factors in aggravation and mitigation also told the jury that it could consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial. Defendants argue that this portion of the instruction was improper, because it permitted the jury to consider, in aggravation, guilt phase evidence that was unrelated to any of the aggravating factors set forth in section 190.3. Not so. The evidence introduced by the prosecution at the guilt phase of defendants' trial was relevant to prove defendants guilty of the murders charged in this case. So long as it considered the evidence offered at the guilt phase of trial solely for this purpose, the jury was entitled to take into account all of the evidence offered at the guilt phase as part of the circumstances of the crime, an aggravating factor that the jury may consider in its penalty deliberations. (§ 190.3, factor (a).) Therefore, the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury that it could consider guilt phase evidence in its penalty deliberations. True, the jury might also have considered some of the evidence the prosecution introduced at the guilt phase of trial (e.g., evidence that defendants were gang members for many years, that they used profanities and racial slurs in their conversation, and that their nicknames were Evil and Treacherous) as evidence of bad character, and thus as aggravating evidence of a type not statutorily authorized. If defendants had requested the trial court to instruct the jury that it could consider this evidence only for the light it shed on defendants' guilt, such an instruction would perhaps have been appropriate. Defendants, however, did not request such an instruction, and the trial court was not obligated to give such an instruction on its own initiative. ( People v. McLain, supra, 46 Cal.3d 97, 113.)
(35a) In its penalty phase instructions to the jury, the trial court gave the following pattern instruction explaining to the jury the manner in which it was to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances: After having heard all the evidence and after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factor [ sic ] of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed. [¶] If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose the sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole. (See CALJIC No. 8.84.2.) Defendants argue that the italicized portion of this instruction, informing the jurors that they shall impose a sentence of death if they find that the circumstances in aggravation outweigh the circumstances in mitigation, misled the jurors as to their sentencing duties, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and article I, sections 7, subdivision (a) and 15 of the California Constitution. (36) As we explained in People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 541, this instruction might cause a jury to misunderstand its duties in two interrelated respects. First, although individual jurors are free to assign each of the statutory factors whatever weight they deem appropriate, the instruction might lead the jury to believe that the process of weighing factors in aggravation and mitigation is a mere mechanical counting of factors. Second, the instruction might mislead individual jurors into thinking they had to impose the death penalty even if they did not consider death an appropriate punishment under all of the circumstances in the case before them. ( People v. Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 228-229; People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1277; People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 541.) Our task is to examine each case individually to determine whether the instruction misled the jury in a manner that prejudiced the defendant. ( People v. Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 229.) (35b) In this case, the jury was not misled. In their closing arguments to the jury, neither the prosecutor nor the two defense attorneys discussed the nature of the weighing process in depth. The prosecutor discussed each of the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, and applied them to the facts of this case. The defense attorneys stressed that life without possibility of parole was a harsh penalty, that there was no evidence that either defendant was the actual killer of any of the victims, and that Evan Malett, the only robber observed with a gun in the robbery of the Taylor residence and thus the probable actual killer of Michael Taylor, was convicted of murder without special circumstances, and therefore received a lesser sentence than either of the defendants in this case. Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel suggested that the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances was a mechanical process. To the contrary. As counsel for defendant Ross told the jury: Now, when we talk about mitigating circumstances and aggravating circumstances it's not the number, because one mitigating circumstance can be sufficient. One can be sufficient. None of the attorneys told the jury that it could sentence defendants to death without deciding that death was the appropriate penalty under the facts and circumstances of this case. Defendants insist that the prosecutor did so when he argued that the law requires imposition of the death penalty, and that under the guidelines given ... by the judge, [the juror's] duty [to impose the death penalty] is very clear. But these comments, in context, did not misstate the law, as they referred to the absence of discretion to disregard the law or to act on mere unbridled passion and prejudice. ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 166.) The prosecutor's comments did not mislead the jury regarding the nature of its responsibilities. [33]
(37) As mentioned earlier, at the guilt phase of the trial the prosecution presented evidence of both the murder of Teheran Jefferson, with which neither defendant was charged or convicted, and the murder of Michael Taylor, with which defendant Champion was not charged. Defendants contend the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury that it could only consider this evidence as part of its penalty determination if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants committed these crimes. The trial court should indeed have given this instruction. In People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279], we held that the trial court must, on its own initiative, instruct the jury that no juror may consider aggravating evidence that a defendant has committed other violent crimes unless that juror finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed those crimes. Although here it was at the guilt phase that the prosecution presented evidence that defendants had committed other crimes, whereas in Robertson such evidence was presented at the penalty phase, this distinction is not significant, because the trial court in this case told the jury that, in making its penalty determination, it should consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case.... Nevertheless, we conclude that the trial court's failure to give the required instruction was harmless. In his closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that the jury could not consider the evidence of the Jefferson murder (as to both defendants) and of the Taylor murder (as to defendant Champion) unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants committed these crimes, and the prosecutor implied that the jury should not consider those crimes at all. In discussing whether both defendants had engaged in violent criminal conduct other than the murders of which they were convicted, the prosecutor told the jury: Now, I don't know whether the Judge will instruct you additionally in this regard, but I will tell you whether he does or not I do not think for purposes of this particular standard that you should consider the defendants to have committed the Jefferson murder, or that you should consider Mr. Champion to have committed the Taylor murder unless during the guilt phase of the trial you found and you still find beyond reasonable doubt that the two defendants committed the Jefferson murder, and that Champion committed the Taylor murder. [¶] The problem I have at this point is you didn't have to find that in order to make your decision as to the charged counts, and you did not render a verdict on those counts. [¶] Therefore, I do not know what you found, and I'm not going to belabor that by asking you for a finding at this time. [¶] So, my discussion, ladies and gentlemen, will be simply directed towards those crimes  that is, with regard to this rule  with respect to those crimes of which the defendants were convicted in the past, and my discussion later on will be with respect only to those crimes of which the defendants were convicted in the present case. (Italics added.) In the remainder of his closing argument, the prosecutor did not rely either on the Jefferson murder, or on the evidence showing that defendant Champion participated in the murder of Michael Taylor. Thus, in his closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that the jurors could not consider, in aggravation, the fact that defendants had engaged in other criminal activity unless they found beyond a reasonable doubt that such activity occurred. The prosecutor also acknowledged that the jury had not explicitly made such findings at the guilt phase of the trial, and said that he was not asking jurors to make such findings at the penalty phase. Given this concession, we find no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the penalty phase was affected by the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it could consider other crimes evidence only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants committed those crimes. [34]
Defendants briefly contend that California's capital scheme violates the federal Constitution because (a) the statutory factors in aggravation are unconstitutionally vague; (b) the jury at the penalty phase of a capital case is not required to make written findings on the factors in aggravation; (c) the jury at the penalty phase of a capital trial is not instructed that it may consider only those aggravating factors found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it should impose the death sentence only if it determines beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty; (d) this court does not conduct intercase proportionality review of a death sentence; [35] (e) the jury at the penalty phase of a capital case is permitted to consider unadjudicated criminal activity by the defendant in making its penalty determination; (f) the inclusion of adjectives such as extreme and substantial in section 190.3's list of potentially mitigating factors acts as a barrier to the consideration of mitigating evidence; (g) the California statutory scheme contains so many special circumstances that it fails to perform a narrowing function; (h) the prosecutor has unbridled discretion in determining whether to seek the death penalty in a capital case. We have rejected each of these contentions in the past (see, e.g., People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808] [issue (a)]; People v. Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 233 [issues (b), (d)]; People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 786 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297] [issue (c)]; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 268 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643] [issue (e)]; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 208-209 [32 Cal. Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521] [issue (f)]; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 154-155 [issue (g)]); People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th 988, 1024 [issue (h)]), and we decline to reconsider these holdings.
(38) Before ruling on each defendant's motion to modify the jury's death verdicts to the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), the trial court stated that it had read and considered the [probation] reports filed as to each defendant. Defendants argue that this statement indicated an improper reliance on the probation reports, thus requiring that the case be remanded for a new modification hearing. As defendants point out, the trial court must base its ruling on the modification motion solely on the evidence produced at trial; this, of course, does not include a defendant's probation reports. ( People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 150.) But even when the trial court has considered such extraneous information, we assume that it has had no improper influence on the court, absent specific evidence to the contrary. ( People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 150; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 274 [253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906]; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1329 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].) In this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the information contained in defendants' probation reports had any effect on the trial court's decision to deny defendants' motions to modify the verdicts of death. To the contrary, the court recited at length its reasons for denying the motions, none of which had anything to do with the information contained in the probation reports. A remand for a renewed modification hearing is therefore unnecessary.