Opinion ID: 2009898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant states (Brief at 30-32) his contentions as to the insufficiency of the evidence to support the murder conviction as follows: There was no evidence that Ruffin pre-meditated or deliberated a homicide. Even assuming, arguendo, that appellant fired the fatal shot (from a gun never found) he was at most guilty of second degree murder, not of a premediated and deliberated murder.... In sum, Shawn Ruffin simply had no motive to murder George Younger in cold blood.... Since he lacked the mens rea for the premeditated murder of George Younger, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for the premeditated murder of Marcia Williams under the doctrine of transferred intent. Appellant argues in conclusion (Brief at 46) that this court must reverse his first-degree murder conviction and order a new trial on the lesser included offense of the second-degree murder of Marcia Williams.... We preliminarily note that first-degree murder is a purposeful killing with premediated and deliberate malice, D.C.Code § 22-2401 (1989), while second-degree murder is unplanned or impulsive. Watson v. United States, 501 A.2d 791, 792 (D.C.1985); Hall v. United States, 454 A.2d 314, 317 (D.C.1982). To support a finding of premediation the government must show that before acting the accused gave thought to the idea of taking a human life and reached a definite decision to kill. Mills v. United States, 599 A.2d 775, 781 (D.C.1991) (quoting McAdoo v. United States, 515 A.2d 412, 427 (D.C.1986)). Deliberation requires a showing that the accused acted with consideration and reflection upon the preconceived design to kill, Mills, supra, 599 A.2d at 781, and may occur in a period as brief as a few seconds. Watson, supra, 501 A.2d at 793. Premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances. McAdoo, supra, 515 A.2d at 427; Hall, supra, 454 A.2d at 317. A motive to seek revenge, particularly if it arises well before the commission of the crime, reinforces such an inference. Mills, supra, 599 A.2d at 781. Our standard of review when the defendant asserts insufficiency of the evidence at trial is whether there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. McAdoo, supra, 515 A.2d at 427 (quoting Jones v. United States, 477 A.2d 231, 236 (D.C.1984) (quoting Head v. United States, 451 A.2d 615, 622 (D.C.1982))). In order to make this determination this court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, with due regard for the jury's right to weigh the evidence, to determine the credibility of witnesses, and to draw reasonable inferences. Mills, supra, 599 A.2d at 780 (citing Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 30 (D.C.1989)). We do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence. Jones, supra, 477 A.2d at 246; Byrd v. United States, 388 A.2d 1225, 1229 (D.C.1978). Applying our standard of review to this record, we find ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that appellant formed an intent to kill George Younger with the requisite premeditation and deliberation to support his conviction of murder in the first degree. The evidence presented at trial showed that at the time of the attack on Younger, appellant occupied the front passenger seat of a car driven by George Jeffries. The other passengers in this vehicle were the brothers Dwight and Garnett Davis, and a juvenile, Niles Dabney. Tr. I, 625-26. [2] The attack was the culminating event in an ongoing beef that paired Younger and his friend Bimbo against the Davis brothers and their companions. The beef began when Younger and Bimbo alleged that Garnett Davis and Tony Watkins had burglarized Bimbo's apartment and that Garnett Davis had stolen $30,000. Tr. I, 607-15, Tr. 6/12 P.M., 45-46. One week prior to the shooting, Bimbo and Younger had gone to the Davis' home to discuss these allegations. [3] At that meeting, Dwight Davis argued with Bimbo, stating that his brother had not been involved in the theft. Tr. I, 614-15; Tr. 6/12 P.M., 48-49. Appellant was observed standing in the hall-way of the Davis' home at the conclusion of the meeting but was not in the kitchen where the discussion took place. Tr. 6/12 P.M., 49-50. The next day appellant, as well as Dwight Davis, George Jeffries and Tony Watkins were riding in Davis' car when they saw Younger walking his dog. They exited their vehicle and Dwight Davis stepped forward to question Younger as to whether Younger still believed Davis' brother was involved in the burglary. Tr. I, 616-19. Younger responded that nothing had changed and then lifted his shirt to display a pistol he was carrying in the waistband of his pants. Tr. 6/12 P.M., 53-56. Appellant and his friends then returned to their car. Tr. 6/12 P.M., 56. Although appellant was present during this confrontation, he did not say anything. Tr. I, 617; Tr. 6/12 P.M., 84. Prior to the shooting on the evening of July 9th, appellant, the Davis brothers, Jeffries and Dabney, all of whom were armed, drove Dwight Davis' girlfriend to an appointment in Maryland. Tr. I, 624-25. As the six of them drove back into their neighborhood, Garnett Davis saw Younger's car moving in the opposite direction and told the driver, George Jeffries, to turn around and follow Younger. Tr. I, 629, 716. [4] Jeffries made the necessary turns around a block so that they could follow Younger's vehicle. During this time appellant and the others stopped the car in order to enable Davis' girlfriend to alight from the vehicle. Tr. I, 630, 814. Appellant and the others then followed Younger for half of a mile, a route that takes two and one-half to four minutes to travel. Tr. II, 47. There was evidence that as they followed Younger's car Jeffries tried to persuade the others not to do it because there were too many cars around. Tr. I, 709-10. [5] The others responded that this was the best time. Tr. I, 709. They approached Younger's car when it was stopped at a traffic light. By happenstance, Ms. Williams' car was nearby. Appellant was seated in the front passenger seat. They veered to the left in order to pull up alongside Younger's vehicle. Tr. I, 631. Then, appellant, Jeffries, Dabney and the Davis brothers opened fire, unloosing ten to fifteen shots which wounded Younger, killed Ms. Williams and wounded her son. [6] We are persuaded on the basis of this evidence that the jury could reasonably conclude that appellant acted with consideration and reflection upon the preconceived design to kill. Mills, supra, 599 A.2d at 781. The jury could properly find a motive supporting a reasonable inference of premeditation and deliberation on the part of appellant upon the basis of his aligning himself with the Davis brothers in their beef with Younger, followed by Younger's hostile display of his pistol when appellant and others confronted him on the street after the meeting at the Davis' home. See Mills, supra, 599 A.2d at 780-84; Hall, supra, 454 A.2d at 317; Harris v. United States, 375 A.2d 505, 508 (D.C.1977). Moreover, there was evidence that appellant and the others, after sighting Younger's car and turning to follow it, stopped to discharge from their vehicle the woman who was with them and the further evidence that in spite of one participant's attempt to dissuade the others from their pursuit of Younger, they continued to pursue his car. A jury could reasonably find on the basis of all of this evidence that appellant and the other men in the car had reached a decision to pursue and kill Younger and that they had had time to reflect on that decision. See Watson, supra, 501 A.2d at 795; Hall, supra, 454 A.2d at 318. Finally, appellant's decision (and that of his associates) to carry weapons in the car while driving to the scene of the shooting provides additional evidence probative of premeditation and deliberation on appellant's part. See Thacker v. United States, 599 A.2d 52, 57 (D.C.1991) (citing McAdoo, supra, 515 A.2d at 427); Hall, supra, 454 A.2d at 318. Moreover, the modus operandi, employed by appellant and the others in unloosing a hail of bullets at Younger is characteristic of a drive-by shooting and reflects planning and calculation. [7] See McAdoo, supra, 515 A.2d at 427 (manner and circumstances of decedent's death support conclusion of planned and calculated intent to kill) (citations omitted).