Opinion ID: 2971887
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Retaliation Claims

Text: Finally, McElroy has challenged the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to Philips on the retaliatory discharge claims asserted under the ADEA and the ADA. The district court found that the filing of the EEOC charge on October 2, 2001, could Nos. 03-6219, 03-6351 18 not have motivated his discharge a month earlier. Without citing to any authority or fleshing out the argument, McElroy asserts that the filing of the original complaint alleging claims of age and disability discrimination under the THRA and the THA should qualify as “protected activity” under the ADEA and the ADA. He argues that the state law discrimination complaint is the “functional equivalent” of a complaint under the ADA and ADEA. The ADEA and ADA, like Title VII, prohibit retaliation against an individual because he “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,” hearing, or litigation “under this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). This court has held, in the context of Title VII, that “the instigation of proceedings leading to the filing of a complaint or a charge, including ‘a visit to a government agency to inquire about filing a charge’ is a prerequisite to protection under the participation clause.” Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989) (internal citation omitted); see also Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2003) (participation in internal investigation conducted pursuant to a pending EEOC charge is protected activity). While our research reveals no cases in which the filing of an action alleging discrimination in violation of state law has been held to be protected under the participation clause of Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA, we need not resolve the issue in this case because plaintiff has failed to make the requisite showing of a causal connection between the filing of the original complaint and his discharge a month later. To show the causal connection necessary to make out a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADEA or the ADA, McElroy must produce sufficient evidence to support an Nos. 03-6219, 03-6351 19 inference that his employer would not have discharged him if he had not filed the complaint in state court. EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997); Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir. 1990). As discussed above, McElroy relied solely on the temporal proximity between the filing of the complaint and his discharge to make this showing. Federal standards are clear that temporal proximity, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a causal connection for a retaliation claim. Little v. BP Exploration & Oil Co., 265 F.3d 357, 363-64 (6th Cir. 2001); Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2000). In fact, as we found with respect to the state law retaliation claim, McElroy maintained that his discharge was both contemplated and had been set in motion before he filed the original complaint alleging the state law claims of discrimination. See, e.g., Cox v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., No. 99-3691, 2000 WL 977309 (6th Cir. July 6, 2000) (unpublished) (no inference of a causal connection where criticisms and clash preceded the protected activity and plaintiff alleged a prior plan to discharge him). Absent a showing of a causal connection, plaintiff would not be able to make a prima facie case of retaliation and summary judgment was properly entered on his claims of retaliation in violation of the ADEA and the ADA. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision granting summary judgment to defendant with respect to the age and disability discrimination claims brought under state and federal law; AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment on the retaliatory discharge claims made under federal law; and REVERSE both the dismissal of, and the denial of summary judgment with respect to, the state law retaliatory discharge claim.