Opinion ID: 1180060
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: Was Benji Morris's contributory negligence properly an issue for consideration by the jury? We hold that it was. We therefore vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals and reverse the trial court's order granting plaintiffs' motion for new trial.
The undisputed proof shows that Pat Sorrells's passengers had urged him to drive faster at various times before the accident and that he relied on them for directions. After Mike Carver told Pat Sorrells that someone had said he could drive the street they were on at seventy miles per hour, Benji Morris said yeah! and slapped the seat. Pat Sorrells then sped up. Pat Sorrells expected to be told to slow down, but such a statement never came. A passenger has a duty to caution a driver if the driver is driving recklessly, Matchen v. McGahey, 455 P.2d 52 (Okla. 1969); Bradshaw v. Fields, 572 P.2d 552 (Okla. 1977). Whether Benji Morris violated this duty was a question of fact for the jury. The Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise. The trial court granted plaintiffs motion for new trial because it believed the verdict was a miscarriage of justice. The trial court's perception arose from the jury's act of assessing more than fifty percent of the negligence to Benji Morris, which served to deprive plaintiffs of the right to damages. The trial court believed it could properly grant a new trial if it found the jury's apportionment of negligence to have been so unjust as to constitute a miscarriage of justice. We disagree. In Cosmo Construction Company v. Loden, 352 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1960), we said, It is error for the trial court to grant a new trial upon the ground that he cannot conscientiously agree with the verdict of the jury, where negligence and contributory negligence are alleged and supported by competent evidence for the reason that these issues are for the jury to decide and the court cannot substitute its opinion for that of the jury. Id., 352 P.2d at 913, quoting with approval from Neely v. Morris, 333 P.2d 301 (Okla. 1958); Fletcher v. Meadow Gold Company, 472 P.2d 885, 888 (Okla. 1970). To grant a new trial under such circumstances violated Article 23, § 6 Okla. Const.: The defense of contributory negligence ... shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall, at all times, be left to the jury. Here, the trial court's duty to evaluate the evidence of Benji Morris's comparative negligence ended when it properly held that there was evidence in the record upon which the jury could base a finding that Benji Morris had been contributorily negligent.
The Court of Appeals majority relied on Vaughn v. Baxter, 488 P.2d 1234 (Okla. 1971), in support of the proposition that contributory negligence is unavailable as a defense to a defendant whose conduct was willful and wanton. Vaughn, however, is inapplicable to the facts of this case. In Vaughn, defendant, Baxter, was chasing the car in which plaintiff, Vaughn, was a passenger. Baxter admitted that he intended to inflict bodily harm on Vaughn and his driver if he caught them. The facts here are far different. Pat Sorrells was doing what he thought his friends wanted him to do; he expected his friends to tell him when to slow down. Oklahoma law, defines wanton and willful negligence as an entire absence of care for the life, person or property of others which exhibits indifference to consequences. See Barall Food Stores v. Bennett, 194 Okla. 508, 153 P.2d 106, 110 (1944). The trial court and the Court of Appeals majority erred in holding as a matter of law that Pat Sorrells was wantonly and willfully negligent, and, therefore, not entitled to a comparative negligence instruction. [2] We VACATE the opinion of the Court of Appeals, REVERSE the order of the trial court granting plaintiffs a new trial, and REMAND with INSTRUCTIONS to the trial court to reinstate the judgment for defendant Pat Sorrells on the jury verdict.