Opinion ID: 663911
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims regarding Davis

Text: 4 On May 24, 1988, Harrison and Davis were charged jointly with the two murders and other crimes, and both pleaded not guilty. At a hearing on May 1, 1989, the trial court granted Davis's unopposed motion for separate trials. The prosecutor stated that Harrison would be tried first, and Davis would testify against him. The prosecutor denied, however, having made any offer of leniency to Davis. The trial court permitted Davis to testify against Harrison. It also permitted the jury to be told there was an understanding that if Davis's testimony convinced the prosecution she was guilty only of accessory after the fact, she would be permitted to plead to that offense. 5 On June 5, 1989, Davis pleaded guilty to accessory after the fact, and the prosecutor told her she would not serve any more time if she testified truthfully. On June 20, 1989, she began testifying about Harrison's shooting of Harris Laurie and their disposal of his body. On cross-examination, she testified about her guilty plea. She also testified that even though the murder charges were still pending, she understood she would be prosecuted only for the crimes she had committed; this was her understanding of an April 18, 1987 letter from the prosecutor. On July 5, 1989, Davis testified that she had been sentenced that morning to time served on the accessory after the fact conviction, and other charges were still pending. 6 First, Harrison contends that the trial court violated his right to due process by admitting Davis's testimony, which he claims was coerced. This contention lacks merit. 7 A state court's evidentiary ruling is grounds for federal habeas corpus relief only if it renders the state proceeding so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir.1991). The general rule is that an accomplice who has pled guilty may testify against non-pleading defendants without raising due process concerns. United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1537 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866 (1988). Plea agreements requiring an accomplice to testify against a codefendant will generally be upheld if the jury is informed of the exact nature of the agreement, defense counsel is permitted to cross-examine the accomplice about the agreement, and the jury is instructed to weigh the accomplice's testimony with care. Id. 8 Harrison claims that the state created an undue risk of perjury by promising Davis a reduced sentence in exchange for her testimony. However, the jury was told about her agreement with the prosecution, and she was cross-examined extensively on this subject. See id. Moreover, the jury was instructed that [a]n accomplice may have many self-serving motives that may influence his credibility such as the hope or expectation of leniency in return for testimony which would help convict another. See id. Under these circumstances, the admission of Davis's testimony did not violate Harrison's right to due process. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919-20. 9 Harrison also contends that the trial court violated his right to due process by denying his motion to reopen the case during jury deliberations to inform the jury of Davis's modified sentence. This contention lacks merit. 10 To evaluate whether exclusion of evidence reaches constitutional proportions, we ... consider five factors: (1) the probative value of the excluded evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991). We then balance the importance of the evidence against the state interest in exclusion. Id. 11 On August 9, 1989, while the jury was deliberating, Harrison moved to reopen proceedings to inform the jury that Davis's sentence had been changed from three years in state prison to jail time and probation. The trial court denied the motion, finding: [t]he fact that instead of three years in prison it's three years in jail, that instead of parole it's probation, I consider absolutely legally insignificant on the issue of credibility of Nida Davis. 12 We agree with the district court's assessment that in light of the already extensive impeachment of Davis, the information about her modified sentence would have added little on the issue of her credibility. See id. The evidence was not important, and the jury already was deliberating; accordingly, the trial court did not violate Harrison's right to due process by excluding the evidence. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919-20; Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530.