Opinion ID: 821419
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Complaint

Text: On appeal, the parties dispute which set of allegations is subject to appellate review — those of the Consolidated Amended Complaint (“AC”) or the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint (“SCAC”). The District Court evaluated the AC in granting defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs, however, requested leave to file the SCAC in their motion to alter or amend the judgment, filed April 20, 2011. This request was denied by the District Court because, inter alia, it determined that plaintiffs’ proposed amended allegations were futile, and could not cure the substantive deficiencies the court had identified in the AC. Because the District Court considered the merits of the SCAC to arrive at its futility determination, plaintiffs 3 argue that the SCAC is the applicable complaint for us to consider in deciding the issues they raise on appeal. Permission for leave to amend should be freely granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave to amend may be properly denied, however, if the amendment would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). We review de novo a denial of a request for leave to amend when such a denial is based on a determination that the proposed complaint does not state a claim on which relief can be granted. Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2012). Here, the record makes plain that the District Court’s analysis below included an examination of the merits of the allegations in the SCAC. Therefore, we must consider whether the SCAC fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted de novo. Id. For the purposes of this review we take as true all factual allegations pleaded in the SCAC. See Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 85 n.1 (2d Cir. 2011). “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). However, for the reasons that follow, we hold that the SCAC fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the Plus Plan. We hold also, as set forth in our companion Opinion, filed today, that the District Court erred in applying the presumption of prudence as to the SIP. This holding, however, is not based on any additional allegations set forth in the SCAC, but rather is based on our reasoning in In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2011) and Gearren v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 660 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Gearren II”). The error below 4 that we identify in our companion Opinion was a legal one, and our holding therein is not altered in any way by the additional allegations set forth in the SCAC. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court ultimately did not exceed its allowable discretion in denying plaintiffs leave to amend and file the SCAC, save in one respect. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007) (“A district court has discretion to deny leave [to amend] for good reason, including futility . . . .”). The District Court did exceed its allowable discretion in denying plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint only insofar as its denial effectively prevented plaintiffs from shortening the alleged class period. (See JA-250 (alleging class period from March 13, 2007 to October 16, 2008 in AC); JA-600 (alleging class period from March 17, 2008 to October 16, 2008 in SCAC)). We see no persuasive reason to prevent plaintiffs from so amending their allegations, and thus hold that leave to amend the AC should be granted only insofar as plaintiffs’ allegations should reflect the shorter class period set forth in the SCAC.