Opinion ID: 24281
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants’ Apprendi Claims

Text: We review “the defendants’ challenges to their sentences for plain error in light of their failure to raise the objections below.”35 Defendants argue that, in two respects the district court’s determination of the quantity of cocaine involved without submitting the issue to the jury, resulted in their being sentenced in violation of their constitutional rights as clarified by the Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey.36 They first challenge their respective terms of imprisonment, although in doing so, they 35 United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 575 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 834 (2001), petition for reh’g, 244 F.3d 367 (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (reviewing for plain error even though the case on which the defendants relied had not been decided at the time of trial)). 36 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 22 expressly concede that this argument is barred by our recent precedent applying Apprendi to similar cases.37 As we are bound by this precedent, we are precluded from considering these claims. We do, however, find merit in Brown’s claim that the district court committed plain error by sentencing him to eight years of supervised release as specified in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (the penalty provision corresponding to § 841(a)(1) requiring a showing that the defendant’s drug offense involved between at least 500 grams of cocaine). Because Apprendi requires that Brown be sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(C) (the penalty provision corresponding to § 841(a)(1) which does not require the showing of a quantity of drugs) and that provision, as interpreted by our decision in United States v. Meshack,38 allows a maximum of six years’ supervised release irrespective of drug amount —— in light of the fact that he was convicted of a prior offense39 —— Brown’s eight-year term of supervised release cannot stand. Therefore, because Brown was 37 See, e.g., United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784 (5th Cir. 2000). 38 225 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2000). 39 Meshack, 225 F.3d at 578. There, we reconciled the apparent discrepancy between the requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) that the period of supervised release be “at least 6 years” (emphasis added) and the requirement of the applicable sentencing guideline, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2), that the period of supervised release be “no more than five years” (emphasis added) permitting a defendant convicted pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(C) to be sentenced to no more than six years of supervised release. 225 F.3d at 578 (citing United States v. Kelly, 974 F.2d 22, 24-25 (5th Cir. 1992)). 23 sentenced to an eight-year term of supervised release, the district court plainly erred.40 Although Cage did not expressly raise a similar objection, he did voice a general challenge that his term of imprisonment violated Apprendi. It is at least arguable that this challenge should be construed as encompassing any and all Apprendi errors committed by the district court in the course of sentencing Cage. Moreover, even if the manner in which Cage presented this challenge was too general to have raised the specific issue of Apprendi’s effect on his term of supervised release, “we have discretion to suspend the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ‘for good cause shown.’”41 On those occasions in which we are concerned that it would be “anomalous” to correct an error preserved as to only one defendant “when all defendants suffer from the same error, we consider the argument[] to be adopted [by all]. This adoption does not prejudice the government which had the opportunity to fully brief all issues in response to the various contentions of the defendants.”42 We find this to be an appropriate instance in which to exercise that discretion. As with Brown, Apprendi requires us to consider Cage’s conviction as occurring pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(C) which, under our 40 Meshack, 225 F.3d at 578. 41 United Sates v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1980). 42 Id. (citations omitted). 24 interpretation of Apprendi in United States v. Meshack,43 here allows for a maximum period of supervised release of six years. We are therefore constrained to conclude, as we did with Brown, that the district court plainly erred in sentencing Cage to eight years of supervised release. We thus vacate the terms of supervised release of both Defendants and remand to the district court so that it may modify this aspect of their sentences in accordance with our decisions in Meshack and United States v. Kelly,44 to fall somewhere from the minimum term of five years specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2) (the applicable sentencing guideline provisions for class B felonies, the offense class under which a violation of § 841(b)(1)(C) falls) to the maximum of six years specified in § 841(b)(1)(C).