Opinion ID: 1944992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statement Made by the Child to Foster Mother

Text: At the termination trial in Family Court, Alexis's foster mother, Yolanda, testified that in February 2004, as she was dressing him, he was not cooperating and she asked him what was wrong. Alexis answered other mum bad baby pao pao. [11] As he said this, he was hitting himself in the face, Yolanda stated. Counsel for respondent objected and moved to strike. Both DCYF and Alexis's guardian ad litem argued that the child's purported statements to his foster mother were admissible under G.L. 1956 § 14-1-69. Although the trial justice stated he would take the objection under advisement, immediately thereafter he permitted the foster mother to reiterate the child's statements, again over an objection. Notably, Alexis made similar statements to nurses at the hospital in November 2003-statements that had been admitted into evidence earlier at trial. Section 14-1-69 is a statutory exception to the hearsay rule that applies to disputes involving custody and/or termination of parental rights. In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d 572, 574 (R.I.1988). Section 14-1-69 provides as follows: In any custody and/or termination trial and/or a hearing on a motion or probable cause hearing where a petition has been filed by the department of children, youth, and families in accordance with §§ 14-1-11, 40-11-7 and/or 15-7-7 in the family court, the court may, in its discretion, permit as evidence any statement by a child under the age of thirteen (13) years old about a prescribed act of abuse, neglect, or misconduct by a parent or guardian, if that statement was made spontaneously within a reasonable time after the act is alleged to have occurred, and if the statement was made to someone the child would normally turn to for sympathy, protection, or advice. This Court has recognized § 14-1-69 as a statute that liberalized the common law excited-utterance doctrine for admission of out-of-court statements made by children concerning physical abuse. In re Veronica T., 700 A.2d 1366, 1367 (R.I.1997); In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d at 574. The Legislature eliminated the requirement that the child be under the stress of nervous excitement at the time he or she made the statements. In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d at 574; cf. State v. Oliveira, 961 A.2d 299, 314-15 (R.I.2008) (broadly construing excited-utterance exception in child molestation cases). Section 14-1-69 ensures reliability, instead, by requiring that the child communicate the statements concerning physical abuse (1) spontaneously, (2) within a reasonable time after the alleged act(s) of abuse occurred, and (3) to a trusted adult. In re Veronica T., 700 A.2d at 1367; In re Rocco W., 706 A.2d 1302, 1303 (R.I.1998). See also In re Thomas V., 540 A.2d 1027, 1027 (R.I.1988) (statements of two-year-old child admissible because § 14-1-69 does not require that the child be competent to testify in order for his or her statements to be admitted into evidence). We recognize that the timeliness of statements at issue may be reflective of their spontaneity. Our treatment of spontaneity in cases decided before adoption of § 14-1-69 involving the hearsay statements of children remains instructive. In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d at 574; see, e.g., State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d 980, 982 (R.I. 1983) (spontaneous statements need not be initiated by the declarant; even responses to inquiries can be properly characterized as spontaneous); State v. Nordstrom, 104 R.I. 471, 476, 244 A.2d 837, 840 (1968) (the test to be applied is whether from the facts of a particular case the statements were spontaneous or impulsive or whether they were the product of reflection and deliberation). On review, we note, a trial justice has broad, discretionary powers in evidentiary matters of this nature, and the trial justice's decision will be reversed only if that discretion has been abused. In re Jessica C., 690 A.2d 1357, 1360 (R.I.1997). The respondent contends that the three-month passage of time that Alexis was in his foster mother's care before making these statements was unreasonably removed from the alleged acts of physical abuse, [12] and the trial justice should have precluded his statements. This Court has declined to set specific parameters regarding the timeliness and spontaneity of statements under § 14-1-69. See In re Rocco W., 706 A.2d at 1304. However, there are still limits to allowing such hearsay statements by children into evidence. Id at 1303-04. We have held that significant lapses of time, ample opportunity for reflection and deliberation, and numerous previous disclosures of abuse suggest that the statements had not been made spontaneously or at the child's first opportunity to safely disclose the abuse. In re Jessica C., 690 A.2d at 1361. In terms of timeliness, we have held that the passing of a few days or weeks between a child's disclosure of abuse and the date that the alleged abuse occurred, or the date when the child was removed from the scene of the abuse, constitutes a reasonable time lapse for purposes of § 14-1-69. For instance, in In re Veronica T., 700 A.2d at 1367-68, we held that a child's out-of-court statements made about two weeks after the alleged abuse occurred satisfied the timeliness requirement of § 14-1-69. See also In re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625, 631 (R.I.1989) (statements made within three days after a child's placement in foster care were made within a reasonable interval from the time she was removed from the scene of her abuse); In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d at 575 (the passing of four days between the date of the assault and its disclosure represents a reasonable interval under § 14-1-69). We have held unreasonable, however, the passing of several months between the acts of alleged abuse and a child's disclosure. For example, we opined that the limits of § 14-1-69 were exceeded in In re Jessica C., 690 A.2d at 1360-61, when the children's hearsay statements were made between two and twelve months after the children either had been removed from the scene of the alleged abuse or had made initial allegations. See also In re Rocco W., 706 A.2d at 1304 (hearsay statements made about six months after the child was removed from the home where the abuses occurred were not made spontaneously within a reasonable time after the alleged abuse occurred). As these cases demonstrate, we consistently have declined to delineate any precise temporal limitations. In light of the circumstances of this case, we conclude that Alexis's statement to his foster mother was not made within a reasonable time after the alleged abuse. Here, Alexis had been living with his foster mother for a significant amount of time, over three months, at the time the statement was made, and the testimony at trial indicated they had formed a close bond long before. Moreover, Alexis had made virtually identical statements closer in time to when he was removed from his parent's custody. [13] We are satisfied, therefore, that the trial justice abused his discretion by allowing its admission. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that admission of this hearsay testimony, even though erroneous, does not demand a reversal of the trial justice's decision to terminate the parental rights of respondent. See In re Jessica C., 690 A.2d at 1361. The trial justice based his decision not upon abuse allegedly inflicted on Alexis by respondent but rather upon her failure to protect her son from his father's abuse, of which she admittedly was aware. [14] The trial justice determined that Lopez-Navor failed to come to [Alexis's] aid when a reasonable mother would have been expected to protect him in one way or another and had failed to provide a safe and secure home for him. It is the law in this jurisdiction that a parent who ignores or stands by while child abuse or neglect occurs is tantamount to the parent inflicting the abuse him/herself for purposes of a termination proceeding. In re Chester J., 754 A.2d 772, 778 (R.I.2000) (interpreting G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)). Accordingly, the trial justice found that the mother's failure to act on behalf of Alexis is evidence of conduct of such a nature [as] to rise to the level of cruel or abusive. The erroneously admitted hearsay statement had little, if any, weight in the trial justice's decision-making and, thus, does not warrant reversal.