Opinion ID: 1809787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial court erred in allowing the audio tape recording of holloway's statement and transcript to be taken into the jury room during deliberations.

Text: ¶ 30. During the testimony of Officer Gilley, the audio tape recording of Holloway's statement was played for the jury. The jury was also provided copies of a transcript of the statement to allow them to follow along as the recorded statement was played. Both the tape and transcript were admitted as exhibits. When the jury retired to deliberate, the court instructed the bailiff to take all of the instructions and exhibits to the jury room. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel objected to the tape and transcript going back as an exhibit to the jury. The trial judge stated that he would allow the transcript, but not the tape to be used during deliberations. The prosecutor stated that it was appropriate for the tape to go back as it had been admitted as an exhibit. The trial judge then changed his ruling to allow both the transcript and tape to go to the jury. Defense counsel repeated his objection, arguing that by allowing the transcript and tape to go back to the jury, the court was improperly bolstering the evidence. Again, the court overruled the objection, and the tape and transcript were taken to the jury room. The trial judge instructed the jury that the transcript had been admitted for the limited and secondary purpose of aiding [the jury] in following the one content of the conversation ... and also to aid [the jury] in identifying the speakers. The court also stated that whether the transcript correctly or incorrectly reflected the content of the conversation or the identity of the speakers was entirely for the jury to determine and that if the jury should determine that the transcript was in any respect incorrect or unreliable, it should be disregarded to that extent. ¶ 31. Holloway contends that the trial court erred in allowing the audio tape and transcript of Holloway's statement to go to the jury during deliberations. For this assignment of error, Holloway relies upon Scott v. State, 446 So.2d 580 (Miss.1984), and Cobb v. State, 734 So.2d 182 (Miss.Ct. App.1999). In Scott, the State put on a police officer to rebut the testimony of another witness. During the officer's testimony, he began reading from a written statement, which were allegedly notes that he had made as he talked with the witness. This Court held that it was error for the trial court to admit the officer's notes into evidence because no predicate was laid to show that the officer had a faulty memory of the events which would enable him to use the notes to refresh his memory or to testify from the notes. 446 So.2d at 585. The Court also stated that allowing the jury to have the officer's notes while it deliberated amounted to an improper bolstering of his testimony. Id. ¶ 32. In Cobb, the Court of Appeals held that it was error to introduce a police officer's written version of Cobb's statement into evidence as an exhibit since the statement was never adopted by Cobb. Cobb, 734 So.2d at 185. The court explained that the proper method of introducing Cobb's oral confession, in the absence of an actual recording in some form, would have been for the officer to relate from the stand those things that Cobb told him during the interrogation. Id. The court went on to state that to permit the jury, in addition to hearing the officer's testimony from the stand, to have a written version of the statement in the jury room during its deliberations improperly permitted too much emphasis to be placed on the evidence. Id. at 185. ¶ 33. The State contends that neither Scott nor Cobb are authoritative in the case at hand as both cases found that the exhibits in question were inadmissible in the first place, and that the error was compounded in allowing the jury access to the exhibits during deliberation. The State points to Rule 3.10 of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules which provides, in pertinent part, [t]he court shall permit the jury, upon retiring for deliberation, to take to the jury room the instructions and exhibits and writings which have been received in evidence, except depositions. (emphasis added). ¶ 34. Holloway argues that the tape recording and transcript were purely testimonial in nature and that they should not be given emphasis over all other testimony by allowing the jury to utilize them during deliberations. Holloway briefly argues that the videotaped statement is the functional equivalent of a deposition, which Rule 3.10 specifically prohibits in the jury room. Holloway cites no support for this proposition. ¶ 35. This Court addressed an identical argument in Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581 (Miss.1995), in which Walker argued that the trial court erred in allowing the videotape of the statement of another witness along with its typewritten transcript into the jury room. The Court rejected Walker's claim, and Holloway's argument, likewise, should be rejected here. In rejecting Walker's argument, the Court relied on Pettit v. State, 569 So.2d 678 (Miss.1990) and Coulter v. State, 506 So.2d 282 (Miss.1987). The Court stated, Applying the reasoning of the Court in Pettit, this Court has made clear that evidence such as the videotape here at issue should be given to the jury unless, within the court's discretion, the trial judge has a valid reason to exclude it from the jury room. Walker, 671 So.2d at 604. Within the discretion of the trial court is the license to withhold exhibits that may be dangerous or prone to destruction, and the trial court retains broad discretion to regulate the presentation of the tape to the jury, such as limiting the number of replays. Pettit, 569 So.2d at 680. ¶ 36. In Pettit, the trial court did not permit the jury access to a tape recording of an alleged drug transaction. The trial judge commented, They can't listen to the tape any more than they already have. It does not go back into the jury room any more than a transcript of what other witnesses said. Id. at 680. As the Walker Court explained, the Court in Pettit looked to a variety of sources to determine whether the trial court was correct to exclude the tape recording from the jury room: Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-37 (1972) states that [a]ll papers read in evidence on the trial of any cause may be carried from the bar by the jury. More to the point, Miss. Unif.Crim. R. Cir. Prac. 5.14 states in part: The court shall permit the jury, upon retiring for deliberation, to take to the jury room a copy of the instructions and exhibits and writings which have been received in evidence, except depositions. [3] Walker, 671 So.2d at 604 (quoting Pettit, 569 So.2d at 680). The Court in Pettit held that the trial court should have permitted the tape recording to go to the jury, noting that considering the language of 5.14, the rule is, within reason mandatory. Pettit, 569 So.2d at 680. The Pettit Court also considered the opinion of Coulter v. State, 506 So.2d 282 (Miss.1987), in which the defendant assigned as error his confession being taken into the jury room. This Court, citing Rule 5.14, quickly disposed of this claim, emphasizing the rule's mandate that the court shall permit the jury access to all exhibits and writings received into evidence, except depositions. Walker, 671 So.2d at 604 (citing Coulter, 506 So.2d at 282).