Opinion ID: 400927
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Infringement of Rights

Text: 20 The district court also explained its dismissal of the County saying that children are not an insular minority, see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783-84 n.4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938), and that the policy therefore withstood the lesser degree of scrutiny required in equal protection claims when no suspect class is involved. Strict scrutiny is required, however, when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. Tsosie v. Califano, 630 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Massachussetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976)), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 940, 101 S.Ct. 2022, 68 L.Ed.2d 328 (1981). A fundamental right may also require strict scrutiny under the due process clause. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 93 S.Ct. 705, 728, 35 L.Ed.2d 137 (1973). 21 Family life, in particular the right of family members to live together, is part of the fundamental right of privacy. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-99, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (plurality opinion) cited with approval in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 375 at 385, 98 S.Ct. 673 at 680, 54 L.Ed.2d 618. The plurality opinion in Moore stated that when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499, 97 S.Ct. at 1935. The ordinance in Moore prohibited a household from including certain extended family members. The policy in this case prohibits a household from including immediate family members-that is children. A fundamental right is even more clearly involved here because the rental policy infringes the choice of parents to live with their children rather than the choice of more distant relations. Moore, 431 U.S. at 500, 97 S.Ct. at 1936 (plurality opinion), 431 U.S. at 536, 97 S.Ct. at 1954 (Stewart dissenting); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). A fundamental right to be free from state intrusion in decisions concerning family relationships in the nuclear family has been clearly recognized. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 145 (1944), cited in Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384-86, 98 S.Ct. at 679-81; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S.Ct. at 1212. 22 Not every state action that infringes upon a fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny. See Tsosie, 630 F.2d at 1337; Socialist Workers Party v. March Fong Eu, 591 F.2d 1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 2167, 60 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1979). Because the state action in this case infringes upon a fundamental right, we must reverse the district court's dismissal of Halet's due process and equal protection claims to enable it to consider whether, under the recently-decided Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water Transportation Facilities Division, 651 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981), a genuinely significant deprivation of a fundamental right has occurred. Id. at 664-65. If such a deprivation has occurred, then the court must determine whether the adults-only policy can survive strict scrutiny.