Opinion ID: 1373789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Effect of Statute Limiting Recovery Against the Administrator.

Text: Several assignments of error present questions arising out of the statutory limitation of $15,000 on the damages recoverable against the estate of Edward K. Piasecki, deceased. The complaint in each case alleged that the plaintiff was damaged in the sum of $77,000, and prayed for judgment in that amount. The defendants contend that no verdict or judgment against Kathryn A. Piasecki in excess of that against the estate of Edward K. Piasecki, deceased, is lawful, and that, in any event, the court erred in the manner in which the question of damages was submitted to the jury. These questions were raised properly in the trial court and adverse rulings with respect to them are assigned as error. Until the enactment of Chapter 32, Oregon Laws 1937, a cause of action arising out of an injury to the person died with the person of either party, except where the death of a person was caused by the wrongful act or omission of another. See Oregon Code 1930, §§ 5-701, 5-703. The 1937 act permitted an action for injury to the person to be maintained where the wrongdoer died, but limited the recoverable damages to $10,000. It was amended by Oregon Laws 1949, ch 519 (set out, supra, footnote 1), so as to increase the amount recoverable to $15,000. This statute was in effect on November 4, 1951, the date of the accident involved in these cases. In 1953, the statutory amount was increased to $20,000. Oregon Laws 1953, ch 600, § 2, now codified as ORS 30.080. 7, 8. The defendants, to support their contention that the damages recoverable against the defendant, Kathryn A. Piasecki, must not exceed those allowed against her co-defendant, rely on the propositions, well established in this state, that there can be no apportionment of damages between joint tort-feasors, Stamos v. Portland Electric Power Co., 128 Or 310, 274 P 915 (1929), and that where vicarious liability is asserted based solely on the wrongful act of an agent exoneration of the agent exonerates the principal, Fish v. Southern Pacific Company, 173 Or 294, 143 P2d 917, 145 P2d 991 (1944); Dare v. Boss, 111 Or 190, 224 P 646 (1924); Emmons v. Southern Pacific Co., 97 Or 263, 191 P 333 (1920). 9. The rule forbidding apportionment of damages between joint tort-feasors derives from the nature of the wrong. The tort is a thing integral and indivisible, and any claim for injuries arising therefrom, runs through and embraces every part of the tort. The liability of one cannot be carried into any portion of the joint tort that is not followed by an equal liability of the other tortfeasors. Each is liable for the whole, and the injured party may pursue one separately, or he may pursue all jointly, or any number jointly less than the whole number. 26 RCL 763, Torts § 13, quoted with approval in Murray v. Helfrich, 146 Or 602, 606, 30 P2d 1053. See, also, 52 Am Jur 458, Torts § 123. The legislature could, of course, authorize the jury to make an apportionment of damages in such cases, Chrudinsky v. Evans, 85 Or 548, 551, 167 P 562, but that is not what it has done, for the statute does not deal with the function of the jury at all, but with that of the court. The legislature has said, in effect, that regardless of the extent of the damages actually suffered by the plaintiff in an action against the estate of a deceased tort-feasor, recoverable damages may not exceed $15,000. It has not said that where another person is also liable for the tort he shall enjoy a similar partial immunity, nor is this a permissible interpretation of the language of the statute. It is not suggested that such a statute is beyond the powers of the legislature. 10. The present cases, however, do not involve the liability of joint tort-feasors; Bowles v. Creason, 159 Or 129, 157, 78 P2d 324; Feazle v. Industrial Hospital Association, 164 Or 630, 632, 103 P2d 300; Emmons v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, p 297; but of principal and agent, and the liability of Kathryn A. Piasecki depends entirely on the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. The reason why the principal can not be held if the agent is exonerated is, as the court explained in Dare v. Boss, supra, 111 Or 198, that there could be no negligence except that imputed from the relationship of the parties, and so if the collision was without negligence on the part of the driver of the car [the agent], it could not be negligence on the part of any one else. This reasoning, of course, is not germane to the question here, for the verdict of the jury has established that Edward K. Piasecki was negligent. The statutory limitation on the amount of damages recoverable against the estate was not intended and can not be construed to change the law of respondeat superior so as to relieve the principal from liability to the full extent of the damages found by the jury to have been suffered by the plaintiff. 11. If counsel for the defendants are right in their contention, then it would logically follow that, had the action against Edward K. Piasecki abated upon his death (as would have been the case in like circumstances prior to the 1937 enactment), the action against Kathryn A. Piasecki would likewise have abated, but this, we think, is not the law. For while it is true that where liability of a principal for the tort of his agent is charged on the theory of respondeat superior, and they are sued jointly, the judgment must be either in favor of or against both, it is also true that it is not necessary to join the agent at all. Indeed, in the view of many courts, though not of this court, such joinder is not permissible where participation of the principal in the tort is not charged. 35 Am Jur 1028, Master and Servant § 592. Liability of the principal, therefore, does not necessarily depend upon a judgment against the agent, but upon the fact of the agent's negligence. If proof of that fact may be sufficient to establish the liability of the principal where the agent is not made a party, though he might have been, we think it may be equally sufficient even though, because of some rule of law, based on considerations of public policy or the like, an action against the latter is precluded. The underlying principle is set forth in the Restatement of Agency, § 217: (2) A master or other principal is not liable for acts of a servant or other agent which the agent is privileged to do although the principal himself would not be so privileged; but he may be liable for an act as to which the agent has a personal immunity from suit. Comment B on this section contains the following illustration:    Thus, if a servant, while acting within the scope of employment, negligently injures his wife, the master is subject to liability. Abatement of an action as to one party by reason of death has been held not to abate it as to others in the following tort cases: Baker v. Braslin, 16 RI 635, 18 A 1039, 6 LRA 718 (joint tort); Lufkin v. Cutting, 225 Mass 599, 114 NE 822 (action against partners for tort of one of them); Rogers v. Carmichael, 184 Ga 496, 192 SE 39 (idem); Swensen v. McDaniel, 119 FSup 152 (idem); Rice v. Van Why, 49 Col 7, 111 P 599 (action against partners jointly liable). In a number of cases brought under a statute imposing liability on the owner of an automobile for injury caused by its negligent operation when driven with the permission of the owner, it was held that the death of the negligent driver did not abate the action against the owner. Hatch v. Lovejoy, 254 NYSup 35; Sayles v. Peters, 11 CalApp2d 401, 54 P2d 94; Lee v. Deasy, 19 CalApp2d 667, 66 P2d 175; National Automobile Insurance Co. v. Cunningham, 41 CalApp2d 828, 107 P2d 643. While, under such a statute, the liability of the owner is, as the California courts say, direct, yet it depends, as here, upon proof of the negligence of the operator and not, as the court said in Sayles v. Peters, supra, upon a judgment against the operator. See, also, 1 CJS 170, Abatement and Revival § 122; 1 Am Jur 61, Abatement and Revival § 62. 12. It is further urged, as another reason why the judgment against the defendant, Kathryn A. Piasecki, should be limited to $15,000, that she will be deprived of her right of indemnity against the administrator to the extent of $35,000. Authorities cited by counsel for the plaintiff indicate that this is a debatable assumption. Westchester Lighting Company v. Westchester Small Estates Corp., 278 NY 175, 15 NE2d 567; 42 CJS 612, Indemnity § 31; see also, Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F2d 218. We do not pass upon that question, however, for if the consequences are those that counsel claim, they are such only as flow from valid legislation, which the courts are not empowered to ignore or amend. A similar contention advanced in Rogers v. Carmichael, supra, was dismissed by the court as irrelevant, and with that conclusion we agree. Nor do we think it necessary to follow counsel in their argument of hardship, based on hypothetical facts pertaining to the estate of the deceased and its devolution. The conclusive answer to the contention based on the right of indemnity is, as already shown, that where a tort action against a wrongdoer dies with his death, it may still be pursued against the wrongdoer's principal, whether or not the right of indemnity is lost. Before trial, and again at the conclusion of the testimony, the defendants moved to strike from the complaints in each case the figure $77,000 in the allegation of damages and in the prayer for judgment. The ground of these motions as stated by counsel was that, since the amount of recovery against the administrator was limited to $15,000, they have no cause of action for greater than $15,000 and therefore it is improper to allege $77,000, a greater figure than that, in either the damage portion or the prayer. These motions were denied. In its charge, the court submitted to the jury the issue of general damages as to both defendants without mentioning any limitation of amount. Counsel for defendants excepted to this instruction in the following language: Defendant further excepts to the instruction by the court giving the amount of damages generally without limiting them to the sum of $15,000. As heretofore stated, the jury returned a verdict against each of the defendants in the sum of $60,000. Defendants filed a motion for an order setting aside the verdict, on the ground, among others, that the verdict was one upon which a valid judgment could not be entered. The motions were denied and the court entered a judgment against the administrator for $15,000 and against Kathryn A. Piasecki for $60,000. 13. Regardless of the rule in other states (see Annotation, 2 ALR2d 454), it has been the accepted practice in Oregon for the court to instruct the jury that their verdict must not exceed the amount of damages alleged and prayed for in the complaint. A contention that such an instruction was error was dismissed as untenable in Haltom v. Fellows, 157 Or 514, 532, 73 P2d 680. What appears at first glance to be a criticism of a similar instruction in Smith v. Laflar, 143 Or 65, 70, 20 P2d 391, was not so in fact, but, as pointed out in Ridgeway v. McGuire, 176 Or 428, 440, 158 P2d 893, the criticism was directed to other language used by the trial judge in the same instruction, and in the case just cited an instruction that the plaintiffs can not recover in any amount in excess of $1800.00, because that is the amount of secret profit they allege was approved. We have recently held, in a case governed by the statute which limits the amount of recoverable damages against a deceased tort-feasor, that it was error to deny a motion to strike from the complaint an allegation that the plaintiff was damaged in the sum of $200,000. Bailey v. Rhodes, Adm., 202 Or 511, 525, 276 P2d 713. A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on other grounds, but nothing was said in the opinion as to whether denial of the motion to strike was reversible error. 14. So, we think, in the present instance of these consolidated cases against different defendants in which different maximum verdicts were permissible, that the court should have so informed the jury, explaining the reason for the difference. 15. Whether the course which the court took is ground for reversal is another question. The argument of the defendants in that regard is to the effect that had the jury known that the estate of Mr. Piasecki would not be liable for the full amount of the verdict, they would not have returned a verdict against Mrs. Piasecki in so large an amount. This is to say that the jury would not, in that case, have followed the court's instructions to allow the plaintiff such sum of money as general damages as will fully and fairly compensate plaintiff for the injuries that he has suffered as a result of the collision in suit and for the permanency thereof   . We are unwilling to indulge in such an assumption. We think that the error was not prejudicial and, therefore, not reversible. 16. The defendants urge, however, that the court exceeded its authority in entering judgment for a different amount than that found by the jury in its verdict. Reliance is placed upon Fiore v. Ladd, 29 Or 528, 46 P 144, which was followed in Printing Industry v. Banks, 150 Or 554, 46 P2d 596, and State Highway Commission v. Deal, 191 Or 661, 233 P2d 242. In these cases, it was held that for the court to allow interest in the judgment, when the jury has not allowed it by their verdict, is erroneous. But these were cases in which the verdict returned was in every respect valid. In the first two, the judgments were modified by this court by eliminating the interest item. In the Deal case, we held, in reversing, that on a new trial interest should be allowed by the jury. Here, we are concerned with a verdict (in the case against the administrator) which is valid to the extent of $15,000 and invalid and without warrant of law as to the excess. We see no reason why it was not entirely appropriate for the court to enter judgment in accordance with the valid portion. See Schulz v. General Casualty Co., 233 Wis 118, 128, 288 NW 803.