Opinion ID: 3015661
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Opportunity to Raise Federal Claims in a

Text: Pennsylvania State Land Use Appeal Having found that ASI’s challenges to the state and local land use policies implicate important state interests, we will uphold the District Court’s decision to abstain from those claims if the land use appeal afforded ASI an adequate opportunity to raise those claims. Even where exercising jurisdiction over certain federal claims would implicate issues of extreme importance to the state, abstention would still be inappropriate if the precise claims raised to the federal court could not be litigated in the relevant ongoing state proceeding. See Heritage Farms, 671 F.2d at 746-47. In this case, ASI claims that the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas is unable to consider constitutional and civil rights challenges to land use statutes and ordinances in the context of land use appeals. Citing the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s opinion in Barnes Found. v. Township of Lower Merion, 927 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Pa. 1996), ASI argues that the ability to adjudicate federal civil rights challenges in land use appeals is restricted by the limited jurisdiction of local zoning hearing boards. Section 909.1 of the MPC (codified at 53 P.S. § 10909.1) governs the subject matter jurisdiction of the township zoning hearing boards and does not specifically empower these administrative bodies to review the validity of state land use statutes. ASI asserts that the Court of Common Pleas is thus prohibited from considering challenges to land use policies because “any appeal from the Zoning Hearing Board to the state court would similarly be limited with regard to subject matter.” 22 Barnes, 927 F. Supp. at 879. We disagree. First, MPC § 909.1 does in fact empower local zoning boards to entertain “[s]ubstantive challenges to the validity of any land use ordinance.” 53 P.S. § 10109.1(a)(1). Similarly, MPC § 1006-A specifically grants the Court of Common Pleas the power in land use appeals to invalidate local zoning ordinances. 53 P.S. § 11006-A. Therefore, ASI’s challenge to the validity of section 12.400 of the Township Zoning Ordinance was fully available in the land use appeal, and the District Court thus did not abuse its discretion by applying Younger abstention to that claim. The only remaining question is whether challenges to the validity of the State Municipalities Planning Code may be adjudicated in a land use appeal. Again, we disagree with ASI’s contention that the Court of Common Pleas’ jurisdiction is necessarily restricted by the limited subject matter jurisdiction of the Zoning Hearing Board. ASI ignores, as did the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Barnes, Pennsylvania’s Local Agency Law, which allows “[a] party who proceeded before a local agency under the terms of a particular statute” to question the validity of that statute in an appeal of the agency’s action. 2 Pa.C.S.A. § 753. Moreover, 2 Pa.C.S.A. § 754(b) allows for reversal of an administrative action by the reviewing court if there has been a violation of constitutional rights. Therefore, we believe that ASI could raise the issue of the validity of MPC § 621 in the land use 23 appeal.12 We are not certain, however, that all of ASI’s claims alleging the discriminatory nature of § 621 are fully available in the land use appeal. ASI’s federal complaint contained three types of challenges to the terms of § 621. In Counts III, IV, and V, ASI claims that § 621 violates the ADA and RA and seeks (1) to enjoin the enforcement of the statute, and (2) to recover damages under the ADA and RA. The third type of challenge, contained in Count VII, alleges that § 621 violates the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. MPC § 1006-A sets forth the relief the Court of Common Pleas may grant in land use appeals and does not 12 Although § 753 requires parties to raise all issues before the local agency, “notwithstanding the fact that the agency may not be competent to resolve such question,” the reviewing court may consider issues not raised before the local agency upon a showing of due cause. 2 Pa.C.S.A. § 753(a). The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has stated that constitutional challenges in particular need not be raised before the agency in order to be considered by the Court of Common Pleas. Newcomer v. Civil Service Comm’n of Fairchance Borough, 515 A.2d 108, 110 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986); see also Gentlemen's Retreat, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 109 F. Supp. 2d 374, 380 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“[The third] prong is satisfied, however, even if the constitutional claims could not be raised in an administrative proceeding but could be raised in a state-court review of that administrative proceeding.”) (citing Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. at 629). 24 specifically empower the court to award damages. Our review of Pennsylvania case law also seems to indicate that damages may not be available in a land use appeal. See J.B. Steven, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Wilkens Township, 643 A.2d 142, 147 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (“the sole difference between the statutory [land use] appeals and the mandamus actions is the possibility that JBS could be awarded damages in the equity suit.”); see also Hankin Family P’ship v. Upper Merion Township, No. 01-1622, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4987, at  (E.D. Pa. 2002) (noting that, under § 1006-A, the Court of Common Pleas may only determine whether an ordinance is valid, but “[c]onversely, in federal civil rights suits, a plaintiff may seek compensatory damages.”). Rather, there appears to be a two-step procedure for seeking damages arising from the unfavorable application of a zoning ordinance in Pennsylvania. The first step is to challenge the ordinance through a land use appeal, and if that challenge is successful, the party may then file a separate mandamus action to recover damages arising from the application of the now-invalid ordinance. See Unger v. Hampton Township, 263 A.2d 385, 388-89 (Pa. 1970); J.B. Stevens, 643 A.2d at 147.13 Within this framework, damages are probably unavailable in the land use appeal itself. 13 Compare Stoner v. Township of Lower Merion, 587 A.2d 879 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (permitting an action for damages in mandamus to go forward without first completing a land use appeal where the plaintiff did not seek to challenge of the validity of the land use ordinance). 25 Although we have gleaned this framework from our reading of Pennsylvania case law, we have not found any state statute or decision from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania definitively stating that this is the only avenue for seeking damages in zoning cases. We have also been unable to find any state statute or decision of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressly prohibiting the Court of Common Pleas from awarding damages in a land use appeal. Thus, although ASI has not yet requested damages in state court, its ability to do so has not been expressly foreclosed under state law.14 To the extent that Pennsylvania law on the availability of damages in a land use appeal is uncertain, we are faced with a scenario that our decision in Gwynedd Properties does not address – a claim, the availability of which may be 14 We also note the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Jonnett v. Bodick, 244 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1968). There, the plaintiff did not pursue a land use appeal and instead filed a separate action for damages arising out of an unfavorable zoning decision. In dismissing the damages claim, the court noted that the plaintiff “had a full statutory remedy which he chose to ignore” in the land use appeal. Id. at 753 (emphasis added). The phrase “a full statutory remedy” may be interpreted, consistent with our reading of the procedure for seeking damages under Pennsylvania law, as only referring to the injunctive relief expressly made available by statute (i.e. MPC § 1006-A). However, we have found no definitive statement from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopting this interpretation. As such, the court’s finding that a land use appeal provides a “full” remedy creates at least some ambiguity in our analysis regarding whether the Court of Common Pleas would be able to adjudicate a claim for damages in this case. 26 unsettled under state law, that was raised in federal court but has yet to be raised in the relevant ongoing state proceeding. Although not directly applicable to this case, the Supreme Court’s decision in R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941), counsels against deciding unsettled issues of state law where it is not necessary to do so. See id. at 499500. We find, however, that we need not decide this state law issue in order to resolve the question before us – whether Younger abstention is applicable to ASI’s claims for damages. As noted, Younger abstention is only appropriate where the precise claims raised in federal court are available in the ongoing state proceedings. Where the availability of a claim in state court is questionable, our abstention jurisprudence weighs in favor of retaining jurisdiction. Cf. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 705 (“abstention rarely should be invoked”); Gwynedd Properties, 970 F.2d at 1199 (abstention is only appropriate “in a few carefully defined situations”) see also England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 426 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The fact that [state law] questions are complex and difficult is no excuse for a refusal by the District Court to entertain the suit.”). Moreover, in considering whether abstention is proper in case such as this one, where ASI may still attempt to seek damages in the ongoing state proceeding, “[t]here is no problem if the federal court merely postpones decision for a time to await an opinion of a state court in an action already pending.” Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 4246 (1988). The difference 27 between staying the damages action and dismissing it, as the District Court did here, could have a decisive impact on ASI’s ability to recover. If the federal court abstains from a claim in which the availability of damages in state court is questionable, and the state court later determines that damages are not available, the plaintiff may well have forfeited its federal claims for damages because of untimeliness. This is particularly true here, where, although uncertain, it appears unlikely that ASI will be able to seek damages in the state land use appeal. Thus, the proper course of action in the face of such uncertainty is for the District Court to retain jurisdiction and stay the damages claims pending the outcome of the state litigation. If ASI does not present its damages claims in the state proceeding, or if they are presented and disallowed in that forum, the claims may then be litigated in the District Court. Even if we could say with certainty that ASI’s claims for damages are not available in the state proceeding, staying the federal damages claims would still be advisable in order to avoid friction between the federal and state courts. Immediate adjudication of the damages claims in federal court could virtually nullify the ongoing state proceeding, even if the land use appeal is limited to ASI’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. In order to decide whether ASI is entitled to damages based on discriminatory terms in § 621, the District Court would have to first decide whether the statutory terms are in fact discriminatory. This is the same issue that the Court of Common Pleas will have to decide in 28 adjudicating ASI’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief arising from the alleged invalidity of the statute. Thus, even though the three-pronged Younger analysis may be inapplicable to ASI’s claims for damages under the ADA and RA, the District Court should consider staying the proceedings with respect to those claims in order to avoid federal-state friction.15 Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[A] district court, when abstaining from adjudicating a claim for injunctive relief, should stay and not dismiss accompanying claims for damages. . .when such relief is not available from the ongoing state proceedings.” (citation and internal quotations omitted)); see also Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202-203 (1988) (the 15 We recognize that state court stayed the land use appeal pending the outcome of the underlying federal proceedings and that a stay of these proceedings may be inconsistent with the state court’s apparent desire to defer to the federal courts. However, to the extent that this Court is required to evaluate the status of the land use appeal, we determine only whether it is ongoing for Younger abstention purposes. Having determined that the land use appeal is still pending notwithstanding the state court’s stay, it appears that resolution of certain federal claims would improperly interfere with the state court’s ability to decide issues of extreme importance to the Commonwealth, including the facial validity of MPC § 621. Whatever one state court’s motivations may have been in granting the stay, the bottom line for our purposes is that a state proceeding involving important state interests is still pending, and the principles of comity underlying Younger counsel against deciding those issues in federal court at this time. 29 Third Circuit’s approach “allows a parallel state proceeding to go forward without interference from its federal sibling, while enforcing the duty of federal courts to assume jurisdiction where jurisdiction properly exists.” (internal quotations omitted)). In sum, because only certain forms of relief are clearly available in the land use appeal,16 we will affirm only the District Court’s decision to abstain from ASI’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief relating to the validity of MPC § 621 and section 12.400 of the Township Zoning Ordinance. However, the third prong of the Younger analysis is not applicable to ASI’s claims alleging that it is entitled to damages arising from the discriminatory terms of MPC § 621, and the District Court should not have abstained from entertaining those claims.