Opinion ID: 220267
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Absence of Formal Adoption

Text: Judge Tatel's Ayeni concurrence also noted that it would be particularly inappropriate to allow the practice of supplemental argument as an ad hoc rule of practice, arguing that any such jury trial innovation should first be subject to a formal rulemaking or legislative procedure  such as an amendment to the rules of criminal procedure  which would permit the kind of rigorous and thorough examination of the benefits and drawbacks of supplemental arguments that so novel and untested a change in longstanding jury procedures requires. 374 F.3d at 1325; see also id. (citing Pan Am. World Airways v. U.S. Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir.1975)). While we do not rest our holding squarely on this point, we agree that absence of formal adoption throws a further shadow upon the practice. In this circuit, the first step of allowing supplemental argument on factual matters  asking a jury to identify its concerns  is not only not authorized by current rule, [11] it seems to run contrary to Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 7.6, in which the district judge tells the jury: Remember that you are not to tell anyone  including me  how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise, on any question submitted to you, including the question of the guilt of the defendant, until after you have reached a unanimous verdict or have been discharged. Further, the Ninth Circuit's Jury Trial Improvement Committee has considered and adopted several jury trial innovations focused on streamlining jury service and improving the efficiency of jury trials within the circuit. See Ninth Circuit Jury Trial Improvement Committee, First Report on Goals and Recommendations (2004); Ninth Circuit Jury Trial Improvement Committee, Second Report: Recommendations and Suggested Best Practices (2006). Among other recommendations, the committee suggested several best practices for improving juror comprehension during the trial process, including: (1) permitting juror note-taking during trial; (2) permitting written questions from jurors during civil trials; (3) providing all jurors with both preliminary and final jury instructions in written form; (4) randomly selecting alternate jurors after closing arguments and instructions; (5) encouraging attorneys to use technology for the presentation of trial exhibits; and (6) permitting juror discussion of evidence as civil trials progress. Ninth Circuit Jury Trial Improvement Committee, Second Report at 10-13. The committee even recommended that interim statements be made during the course of civil trials to help jurors better comprehend and remember facts. Id. at 13-14. Notably absent from the committee's reports and recommendations, however, is the procedure of allowing supplemental argument addressing factual issues, either alone or in conjunction with a deadlock instruction. Such procedure simply has not been vetted through any formal process in our circuit  or, to our knowledge, in any sister circuit. We are aware that at least three states have adopted rules specifically allowing for additional or supplemental closing argument in criminal cases where juries indicate that they have reached an impasse in their deliberations. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 22.4 (Arizona); Cal. R. Ct. 2.1036 (California); N.D.R. Ct. 6.9 (North Dakota). Arizona's rule  the first to explicitly allow for supplemental closing arguments of this nature  was adopted as an alternative means of addressing jury questions and impasse, see Ariz. R.Crim. P. 22.4 cmt. to 1995 Amendments; State v. Fernandez, 216 Ariz. 545, 169 P.3d 641, 647 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2007), after the state's high court banned the use of Allen charges to break jury deadlock on the basis that the evils associated with such charges far outweighed the benefits they presented in avoiding mistrials, State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (1959). But each of these states has had the benefit of the formal rulemaking process to weigh the benefits and risks of allowing supplemental argument. The federal courts have not. While we recognize that the implementation of jury trial innovations may provide for increased judicial economy  a benefit our circuit in particular appreciates  we do not believe that any such radical innovation should be sanctioned without the formal vetting normally attendant to the adoption of an official rule or legislative enactment. See Pan Am. World Airways, 523 F.2d at 1078 ([A] procedure that deviates so sharply from the traditional role of the judiciary cannot be justified as an ad hoc role of practice[.]). Because [t]he sacrifice of efficiency for the preservation of liberty is central ... to the safeguards the Constitution affords criminal defendants[,]... the government, including the courts, may not cut corners when dealing with man's freedom. Williams, 646 F.3d at 652-53. Efficiency and economy gains simply should not come at the expense of the quality or validity of jury verdicts. Cf. Samantha P. Bateman, Comment, Blast It All: Allen Charges and the Dangers of Playing With Dynamite, 32 Haw. L.Rev. 323, 338 (2010) (noting that while dynamite instructions may avoid hung juries and increase the quantity of verdicts, they do so at the cost of decreasing the quality of jury deliberations and result in verdicts based upon peer pressure rather than actual juror beliefs about the facts) (citations omitted).