Opinion ID: 2623374
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Budget Limitations.

Text: [¶ 76] Given the procedural posture of this case, this Court must accept as true those facts alleged in the amended complaint. The facts as alleged in the amended complaint do not suggest that budget limitations had any bearing on the events which resulted in Graumann's escape from the NCDC. 11. Whether the Enactment Imposing the Duty is Designed to Protect Against the Risk of a Particular Injury. [¶ 77] Section 18-3-603 states that [e]ach sheriff has charge of the jail and the prisoners therein confined in his county. Nothing in the language of § 18-3-603 suggests that the statute is designed to protect against the risk of particular injury. Section 18-3-603 merely charges the sheriff with the general responsibility of operating the jail within his county. [¶ 78] This case presents the circumstance where, applying the balance of the factors test, this Court must determine as a matter of law that the county defendants did not owe a duty to plaintiff. The intentional acts of Graumann in killing O'Brien were attenuated from his escape and not foreseeable by the staff at NCDC. The remaining factors likewise militate against finding a duty. B. There is no common law duty to protect or warn third parties. [¶ 79] There is not now, nor has there ever been, a common law duty to act for the protection of others or to control the conduct of a third person to prevent him from causing physical harm to another. State Dep't of Corrections v. Vann, 650 So.2d 658, 660 (Fla. App.1995). This absence of duty has been recognized in §§ 314 and 315 in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Restatement provides as follows: § 314. Duty to Act for Protection of Others The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.     § 315. General Principle There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314, 315 (1965). [¶ 80] The above Restatement sections have been often employed by various courts in determining that the government does not owe a duty to the victim of a prison escapee. For instance, in Thompson v. Cty. of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 733-34 (1980), the court recognized the general rule that one owes no duty to control the conduct of another. Absent an exception to this general rule, there is no duty to protect a third party from harm. There is no special relationship or exception which could give rise to the finding of a duty on the part of the county defendants in this case. [2] [¶ 81] Similarly, in Davenport v. Community Corrections of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc., 962 P.2d 963, 967 (Colo.1998), the Colorado Supreme Court applied Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 to determine that the correction facility did not owe a duty to the victim for the conduct of an escaped prisoner. In Solano, the Colorado Court of Appeals resorted to the general duty principles contained in the Restatement in holding that the correctional facility was not liable to the murder victim of an escaped prisoner. The Colorado court noted that in general no duty is imposed upon a person to take action for the protection of another even if it is reasonably apparent that such action is necessary. 985 P.2d at 54. [¶ 82] As Judge O'Brien noted in his dissenting opinion in Pickle: [P]ublic entities ... do not owe a duty in tort to individual members of the public unless: 1) there was a special relationship between the governmental body and those individuals; or, 2) it is clearly the intent of the legislature to impose a tort duty for the benefit of the plaintiffs irrespective of any special relationship. 764 P.2d at 270 (O'Brien, D.J., dissenting) (citing Tarasoff v. Regents, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, and Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash.2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978)). [¶ 83] In this case, there is no allegation or evidence of a special relationship between the county defendants and O'Brien. Additionally, there is no clear legislative intent of a statutory duty for the benefit of O'Brien. Thus, as a matter of law, the county defendants did not owe a duty to O'Brien. [¶ 84] O'Brien's estate argues that this Court should find the existence of a duty on the part of the county defendants because the murder of O'Brien occurred in the course of inmate Graumann's escape from NCDC. In support of this argument, the estate cites Webb v. State, 91 So.2d 156 (La. Ct.App.1956). Not only does Webb not support the estate's argument, the case actually accentuates the infirmities of the estate's action against the county defendants. [¶ 85] In Webb, the prisoner escaped from Angola Prison after stealing an employee's gun in the process. The inmate also consumed drugs and alcohol which were stolen from prison employees. The morning following his escape, the inmate shot a victim at a residence which was near the prison. In finding the existence of a duty in Webb, the Louisiana court found the temporal and geographical proximity of the escapee's violent act to be determinative. That court stated: The loose security in failure to check [inmate] exposed the inhabitants of the community in the immediate proximity to Angola, including [victim], to just the type of injury she sustained. Were it not for the State's negligence this injury would not have happened. It is definitely foreseeable that convicts escaping through the negligence of the state would harm the people in the Angola area. This injury was directly within the risk area created by the negligence by the State and its employees. 91 So.2d at 162 (emphasis added). The court further stated, It is clearly foreseeable that an armed, and possibly crazed, convict might shoot someone in the risk area while attempting to perfect an escape. Id. [¶ 86] In the instant case, the murder of O'Brien occurred approximately two days following Graumann's escape. In addition, the murder occurred in Denver, Colorado, approximately 280 miles from NCDC. The rationale used by the Louisiana court in Webb has no application to this case. However, as mentioned earlier, a Louisiana case which does bear some similarity to this case is Graham v. State, 354 So.2d 602 (La.Ct.App. 1977). [¶ 87] The Graham case involved an escapee's attack on a victim more than 100 miles from the point of escape. The Graham court determined that the attack was not within the immediate proximity of the escape nor was it in the risk area of the negligence of the institution employees. Accordingly, the court in Graham held that the attack was not foreseeable and that the state institution did not owe a legal duty to the victim. Id. at 605. I would follow the reasoning of the court in Graham and determine that the county defendants did not owe a legal duty to O'Brien. See also LeBlanc v. State, 393 So.2d 125, 127 (La.Ct.App.1980) (court determined that corrections officials did not owe a duty to the victim of an escaped convict). [¶ 88] O'Brien's estate apparently asks this Court to disregard the first two factors of the balance of factors test employed by this Court to assist in determining whether a legal duty exists. [3] The estate cites to Justice Cardine's dicta in Pickle, 764 P.2d at 265 (the first two factors are rather vague and not often useful) in an effort to have this Court ignore the lack of foreseeability and lack of connection between Graumann's escape and the murder of O'Brien. Common sense tells us that the dicta in Pickle does not suggest that Wyoming courts should disregard the first two factors. Rather, the language merely establishes that the balance of factors must be individually considered on a case by case basis. Indeed, in decisions subsequent to Pickle, this Court has considered all factors, giving each factor the consideration it is due under the facts of the particular case. With this basic ad hoc premise in mind, this Court must apply the relevant factors to the facts of this case. [4] [¶ 89] In this case, the first two factors (foreseeability and causal connection) must be given considerable weight. Otherwise, a duty would be found to exist in every case involving harm inflicted by an escaped prisoner. Considering factors three through eight, it is clear that the degree of certainty that the victim suffered injury would not change whether the escaped inmate committed murder two days or two years after his escape. Similarly, the moral blame as argued by O'Brien's estate would not be lessened over time if a death has occurred at the hands of an escaped prisoner. Further, the policy of preventing future harm will remain static, and will not be altered no matter how much time passes between escape and harm. Finally, the burden, cost, and consequences will remain the same for any case when an escaped inmate harms a member of society. Accordingly, to follow the estate's argument and disregard foreseeability and causal connection would mean the imposition of a duty on defendants no matter how attenuated or distant the violent act is from the escape. [¶ 90] The estate's approach is contrary to the duty law of this state and other jurisdictions. Indeed, O'Brien's estate acknowledges in its response brief that a duty cannot be found in every case involving an escaped prisoner. However, to avoid a preordained result regarding the existence of a duty, this Court must consider the pertinent factors which are subject to change in every case: foreseeability and causal connection. [¶ 91] The facts of this case, alleged by O'Brien's estate, establish that the actions of Graumann were not foreseeable by the county defendants. His actions occurred approximately two days after escape, at a location almost 280 miles from NCDC. Under such circumstances, Graumann's actions were simply unforeseeable. In addition, considering the time and distance from his escape at NCDC, there is no causal connection between the alleged negligence on the part of the county defendants and the random murder committed by Graumann. [¶ 92] Other jurisdictions to consider the issues of foreseeability and causal connection in relation to the conduct of an escaped inmate have similarly held that the government defendants owed no legal duty to the victim. In Moss v. Bowers, 216 N.C. 546, 5 S.E.2d 826 (1939), an individual was killed by an escaped prisoner. In Moss, the escaped prisoner commandeered a vehicle and traveled some distance to another city where he shot and killed the victim. The victim's wife then filed suit alleging that the sheriff had been negligent for allowing the escape as well as for failing to properly report the escape to surrounding communities. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of respondent's complaint stating: [I]n this case, considered as to its foreseeability, and in the most favorable light thrown on the transaction in the complaint, we do not regard the injury and death of plaintiff's intestate as being within the natural and probable consequences of the negligent or wrongful acts imputed to the sheriff and his co-defendant. Id. at 828. Similarly, in Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Vester, 956 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1997), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that actions of an escaped inmate were not foreseeable by the government defendant. In Vester, the victims lived fifty miles from the prison and their deaths occurred six days after the escape. Based on the time and distance involved between the escape and the harm, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the respondent's complaint should properly be dismissed. Id. at 206. Considering the time and distance between Graumann's escape from NCDC and his murder of Daniel O'Brien, I would follow the overwhelming weight of this line of cases and determine as a matter of law that the county defendants did not owe a duty to O'Brien. [¶ 93] O'Brien's estate also erroneously relies on Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572 (Wyo.1996), in support of its argument that the county defendants owed a duty to O'Brien. The general principles enunciated in Darrar have no application to this case. In Darrar, the district court determined as a matter of law that the peace officers involved were entitled to qualified immunity. This Court reversed, holding that factual questions existed whether the peace officers involved were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 577. This Court did not pass on the question of duty. Indeed, the singular issue determined was whether good faith immunity could be determined as a matter of law. The issue of qualified immunity is not present before the Court. The underlying question whether county defendants owed a duty to O'Brien is a question which must be determined as a matter of law. In this case, there is no basis for the imposition of a duty against the county defendants. [¶ 94] Courts from other jurisdictions faced with the same issue involved in this case have almost universally held that the government defendants did not owe a duty to the victim of an escaped inmate. See State Dep't of Corrections v. Vann, 650 So.2d at 660. Many of these courts rely on §§ 314 and 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the general proposition that there is no duty to act for the protection of others, and therefore there is no duty owed to the victim of an escaped inmate. See, e.g., Solano, 985 P.2d at 54. O'Brien's estate ignores the weight of authority and does not address the application of Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314 and 315. The estate simply claims that the county defendants' duty in this matter was established, at least in part, by statute. However, the estate does not cite to a Wyoming statute which creates a duty on the part of the county defendants to protect O'Brien. [¶ 95] Rather, O'Brien's estate asks this Court to rely on the so-called Good Samaritan law and impose a duty on county defendants. The Good Samaritan law is found at Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. The estate's reliance on the Good Samaritan law is without merit. Simply stated, the Good Samaritan law provides that a party, without a preexisting legal duty, who chooses to act for the benefit of a third party, must do so with reasonable care. As is apparent, this rescue doctrine has no relation to this case. See Ellsworth Brothers, Inc. v. Crook, 406 P.2d 520, 524 (Wyo.1965) (Restatement § 342A provides reasonable protection to the Good Samaritan who chooses to act for the benefit of a third person). [¶ 96] O'Brien's estate apparently argues that the county defendants were good samaritans in this case. Applying the estate's apparent logic, the argument follows that the county defendants did not owe a duty to O'Brien, but gratuitously decided to act for the protection of O'Brien. This argument is nonsensical. There is no evidence that the county defendants knew of the existence of O'Brien as a probable victim of Graumann. Accordingly, there is simply no application of the Good Samaritan law to this case. [¶ 97] O'Brien's estate also cites Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309 (Ak.1985), for the proposition that the county defendants owed a duty to O'Brien. Once again, the legal authority cited by the estate does not support its argument. In Kotzebue, an individual called the police department and advised the police that he intended to kill another individual. The caller identified himself as well as his specific location. Fifteen minutes later, the caller killed another person. Under those circumstances, the Alaska court determined that the harm to the victim was foreseeable. Id. at 1314. However, the Alaska court was careful to construct a very narrow exception to the common law rule that there is no duty to protect a third person. The Alaska court stated that [r]ecognition of a duty and allowance of civil recovery in this case, however, does not make the city responsible for injuries sustained by victims of criminal activity when the police receive vague, non-specific calls in which the victim, the assailant, and the assailant's location remain unidentified. Id. at 1314-15 (emphasis added). [¶ 98] As is apparent, the Kotzebue opinion does not support the estate's case. In fact, the opinion points out the weakness of the estate's duty argument. As the Court is aware, the identity of the victim was unknown in this case. Similarly, the whereabouts of Graumann following his escape was unknown to county defendants. Accordingly, there is no basis to impose a legal duty against county defendants for the unforeseeable actions of Graumann almost 280 miles from the point of his escape. As there is no duty to protect O'Brien, the estate's complaint must fail as a matter of law.