Opinion ID: 4114125
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Narrow Construction of the FLSA’s Exemptions

Text: We find Defendant’s expansive interpretation particularly implausible in light of the longstanding rule that the exemptions in § 213 of the FLSA “are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them.” 13 We address here only automobile dealerships. There is some suggestion in the legislative history that partsmen employed by farmimplement dealers were understood to sell farm implements. But we have found no suggestion—in the legislative history or otherwise—that automobile partsmen sell cars. 22 NAVARRO V. ENCINO MOTORCARS Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960); accord Mitchell v. Ky. Fin. Co., 359 U.S. 290, 295 (1959) (holding that the principle of narrow construction of the FLSA’s exemptions is “well settled”). We must apply exemptions only to “those [employees] plainly and unmistakably within [the FLSA’s] terms.” A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945). In order to conclude that § 213(b)(10)(A) encompasses service advisors, we would be required to do the opposite—construe the exemption broadly. We are bound by Supreme Court precedent to construe the exemption narrowly. In recent years, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the rule of narrow construction with respect to the exemptions listed in § 213, but the Court has held that the rule does not apply to interpretations of other provisions of the FLSA, such as the general definitions codified in § 203. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 879 n.7 (2014); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2172 n.21 (2012). Because this case involves interpretation of terms appearing in § 213 and not defined in § 203, the Supreme Court’s longstanding principle of narrow construction applies here. We recognize that some members of the Supreme Court have questioned the soundness of the rule of narrow construction. E.g., Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2131 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But we may not disregard the Court’s existing, binding precedent. See, e.g., Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2016) (per curiam) (“It is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); id. (“Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have NAVARRO V. ENCINO MOTORCARS 23 raised doubts about their continuing vitality.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).14 In sum, we are convinced that Congress intended to exempt only salesmen selling cars, partsmen servicing cars, and mechanics servicing cars. We agree with Defendant that, under an expansive interpretation of the literal category of a “salesman . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles,” the statute could be construed as exempting service advisors. But in light of the ordinary meaning of the exemption’s words and the rule that we must interpret exemptions narrowly, we find that interpretation implausible. We nevertheless assume that Defendant’s interpretation creates an ambiguity. Accordingly, we examine legislative history below.