Opinion ID: 183803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A. Whether the District Court Erred in Granting Gelita's Motion for Summary Judgment on Haigh's ADEA Claims

Text: Haigh first argues the district court should have allowed his age discrimination claim to be submitted to the jury along with his disability discrimination claim because there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude he was terminated due to his age. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a). We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences, without resort to speculation, in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Durham D & M, L.L.C., 606 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting Johnson v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 424 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir.2005)). An issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the party opposing the motion. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The ADEA protects individuals aged 40 and over by prohibiting employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against such individuals with respect to their compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of their age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). In order to prove his claim, Haigh must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the but-for cause of the challenged adverse employment action. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2352, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) (The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision.); Clark v. Matthews Int'l Corp., 628 F.3d 462, 469 (8th Cir.2010) ([The plaintiff] is required to prove that his age was the `but-for' cause of [the employer's] challenged decisions regardless of whether he uses direct or circumstantial evidence to prove his age-discrimination claims.) (citing Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2351). Because Haigh has no direct evidence of discrimination, his claims are analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Clark, 628 F.3d at 469 (The Supreme Court in Gross declined to answer whether use of this evidentiary framework is appropriate in the context of ADEA claims ... [but] [o]ther circuits ... have continued to apply it.). First, Haigh is tasked with establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing (1) he was at least 40 years old; (2) he was terminated; (3) he was meeting his employer's reasonable expectations at the time he was terminated; and (4) he was replaced by an individual who was substantially younger. Roeben v. BG Excelsior Ltd. P'ship, 545 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir.2008). If Haigh establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Gelita to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. Id. Finally, if Gelita provides such a reason, the burden returns to Haigh to prove Gelita's reason was mere pretext for discrimination. Id. at 642-43. The district court concluded Haigh failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to his prima facie case under the ADEA. Even assuming Haigh could meet his prima facie case, the court determined he could not show Gelita's proffered reasons for termination were pretext for age discrimination. Instead, the court concluded nothing in the record showed disparate treatment or even a reference to Haigh's age. To the contrary, the court noted Gelita hired Haigh when he was 60 years old, which, although not fatal to Haigh's claim alone, went against his case because there was no evidence that Gelita developed a discriminatory attitude toward Haigh's age after he was hired when he was well above the protected age under the ADEA. The only element at issue in the prima facie case on appeal is whether Haigh was meeting Gelita's reasonable expectations at the time of his termination. Haigh argues he was qualified for the position, which is all he needs to show in order to satisfy the element. See Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir.2001) ([T]he qualification necessary to shift the burden to defendant for an explanation of the adverse job action is minimal; plaintiff must show only that he possesses the basis skills necessary for performance of [the] job.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To establish he was qualified, Haigh asserts he was employed by Gelita as an engineer for five years, and thus his qualifications may be inferred based on his experience. Haigh challenges Gelita's assertion that he was the lowest-rated engineer under Russell, because he was rated as good and Russell was not his supervisor at the time he was terminated. Gelita contends Haigh failed to demonstrate he was meeting its reasonable expectations at the time of his termination because he had serious performance and interpersonal issues throughout his tenure. While working for each of his supervisors, Gelita argues, Haigh received subpar ratings in the areas of judgment, interpersonal skills, and communication skills. Moreover, while working for Skibinski, the supervisor at the time of his termination, Gelita asserts Haigh failed to respond to regular notices of violations from the city concerning Gelita's wastewater permit and management duties. Gelita contends Skibinski addressed five deficient areas in a memo to Haigh whereby Haigh was informed his performance was unacceptable and needed to improve. After Haigh responded that it was impossible to meet these expectations and he could not continue working for Skibinski, Gelita claims Tolsma then informed Haigh that the two parties should part ways, to which Haigh agreed. Under these circumstances, Gelita argues, even assuming Haigh possessed the minimal qualifications for the position, the fact he was made aware of his performance deficiencies established that he was not meeting Gelita's legitimate expectations and thus he cannot establish his prima facie case. In analyzing this question, we note there appears to be somewhat conflicting case law in the circuit. Gelita relies on Erenberg v. Methodist Hospital, 357 F.3d 787, 793 (8th Cir.2004), in which this court held a plaintiff could not meet her prima facie case of age discrimination where she failed to meet the qualification prong based on deficiencies in her work performance. In Erenberg, it was undisputed that the employer identified deficiencies in the plaintiff's work performance and communicated the deficiencies to the plaintiff on a regular basis. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded the plaintiff was aware that she was not performing her duties in a way that met [the employer's] legitimate expectations, and thus the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. Id. Later, in McGinnis v. Union Pacific Railroad, we held the district court misapplied the second element of the prima facie case for age discrimination when it stated, the evidence shows [the plaintiff] received a number of rule violations which would cause him to not be qualified for his job. 496 F.3d 868, 874 n. 2 (8th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). McGinnis concluded that [u]nder the qualification prong, `a plaintiff must show only that he possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job,' not that he was doing it satisfactorily. Id. (quoting Slattery, 248 F.3d at 92). As a result, we held the district court incorrectly applied a higher standard for the prima facie case, because `where discharge is at issue and the employer has already hired the employee, the inference of minimal qualification is not difficult to draw.' Id. (quoting Slattery, 248 F.3d at 92) (alteration in original omitted). The district court's approach misapplied the qualification prong, McGinnis reasoned, because it required the plaintiff to disprove the reasons given for the discharge during his prima facie case, short-circuiting the analysis under McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 875 n. 3. We are of the view that the reasoning in McGinnis is more sound under the burden-shifting framework because the plaintiff should not be tasked with anticipating and disproving his employer's reasons for termination during his prima facie case. However, to the extent Erenberg and McGinnis conflict, we need not resolve such a conflict in this case. Compare T.L. ex rel. Ingram v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir.2006) (When we are confronted with conflicting circuit precedent, the better practice normally is to follow the earliest opinion, as it should have controlled the subsequent panels that created the conflict.), with Graham v. Contract Transp., Inc., 220 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir.2000) (When faced with conflicting precedents we are free to choose which line of cases to follow.). Even if we assume Haigh established a prima facie case of age discrimination, Gelita articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination based on Haigh's failure to meet Gelita's reasonable expectations by refusing to work for Skibinski, and Haigh failed to demonstrate the reason was mere pretext. The record shows Gelita was concerned for some time about Haigh's interpersonal and communication problems, as reflected in his performance evaluations under multiple supervisors. These concerns led to meetings and expectations being set in an attempt to address the problems. However, rather than comply with Gelita's goals, Haigh articulated his desire not to work under Skibinski and his inability to meet Gelita's expectations. Faced with Haigh's adamant refusal to work for Skibinski, Gelita terminated Haigh. Rather than refusing to work for Skibinski, Haigh contends he refused to be held accountable to Skibinski when Skibinski was setting him up to fail. However, Haigh's justifications for his failure to meet Gelita's expectations are not evidence that creates a genuine issue of fact as to whether Gelita's reasons were mere pretext. Cf. Riley v. Lance, Inc., 518 F.3d 996, 1002 (8th Cir.2008) ([The plaintiff's] attempt to justify his failure [to meet the employer's requirements] does not create a genuine issue as to the legitimacy of the requirement.). [T]he showing of pretext necessary to survive summary judgment requires more than merely discrediting an employer's asserted reasoning for terminating an employee. A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the circumstances permit a reasonable inference of discriminatory animus. Roeben, 545 F.3d at 643 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nothing in the record permits such an inference here; to the contrary, there is evidence against any age discrimination in this case. Gelita hired Haigh when he was 60 years old, well above the 40-year-old limit set in the ADEA. We have noted it is unlikely a supervisor would hire an older employee and then discriminate on the basis of age, and such evidence creates a presumption against discrimination. Fitzgerald v. Action, Inc., 521 F.3d 867, 877 (8th Cir.2008) (citing Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515, 522 (8th Cir.2005)). Accordingly, there was a presumption against any age discrimination in this case, which Haigh failed to rebut with any evidence permitting a reasonable inference of discriminatory animus. Finally, we note this case is illustrative of the general principle that we may not second-guess an employer's personnel decisions, and we emphasize that employers are free to make their own business decisions, even inefficient ones, so long as they do not discriminate unlawfully. Hanebrink v. Brown Shoe Co., 110 F.3d 644, 646 (8th Cir.1997). [The ADEA and Title VII] serve the narrow purpose of prohibiting discrimination based on certain, discreet classifications such as age, gender, or race. These statutes do not prohibit employment decisions based upon poor job performance, erroneous evaluations, personal conflicts between employees, or even unsound business practices. Hill v. St. Louis Univ., 123 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir.1997). While there certainly appears to be a personal conflict between Haigh and Skibinski that led, in part, to Haigh's termination, there is no suggestion of age discrimination to allow Haigh to survive summary judgment. Thus, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Gelita on Haigh's age discrimination claim.