Opinion ID: 1933310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Nature and Elements of Undue Influence.

Text: It is axiomatic that a gift or bequest must be free and unconstrained. If the recipient has obtained property by unduly influencing the donor, the conveyance is invalid and must be set aside. Hurd v. Cramer, 40 App.D.C. 349, 369-70, cert. denied, 229 U.S. 623, 33 S.Ct. 1051, 57 L.Ed. 1356 (1913). The duty of [distinguishing] freedom of will on the one hand [from] `undue influence' on the other is extremely difficult. Whitmire v. Kroelinger, 42 F.2d 699, 704 (W.D.S.C.1930). We have held, in the context of will contests, that undue influence consists of physical or moral coercion that forces the testator to exercise the judgment of another rather than his own. Estate of Broun v. Broun, 413 A.2d 1310, 1313 (D.C.1980). To constitute undue influence, the pressure on the testator must destroy his agency and free will. Himmelfarb v. Greenspoon, 411 A.2d 979, 984 (D.C.1980). It is not influence, but undue influence, that is ... necessary to overthrow a will. Beyer v. LeFevre, 186 U.S. 114, 124, 22 S.Ct. 765, 769, 46 L.Ed. 1080 (1902). Undue influence is influence gained by improper means. In re Estate of Weir, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 404, 408, 475 F.2d 988, 992 (1973). As the court stated in MacMillan v. Knost, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 261, 262, 126 F.2d 235, 236, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 641, 63 S.Ct. 32, 87 L.Ed. 516 (1942), quoting with approval the trial court's jury instruction, `[o]ne has the right to influence another to make a will in his favor. He may ... lay his claims for preferment before the testator. They may be based on kinship or friendship or kindness or service or need or any other sentimental or material consideration. One can use argument and persuasion so long as it is fair and honest and does not go to an oppressive degree where it becomes coercive.' Legitimate persuasion ends, however, and undue influence begins, when the free agency of the donor has been destroyed, so that the conveyance is effected by the will of the donee, not of the donor. Nelson v. Dodge, 76 R.I. 1, 68 A.2d 51, 57 (R.I.1949), see 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURIS-PRUDENCE, § 951, at 780 n. 2 (5th ed. 1941); see also Himmelfarb, supra, 411 A.2d at 984. Although, as the trial judge noted, the concept of undue influence has been recognized in this jurisdiction only in the context of challenges to wills, we now join courts elsewhere which have recognized that its logic applies to gifts inter vivos as well. See, e.g. O'Hearn v. O'Hearn, 327 Mass. 242, 245, 97 N.E.2d 734, 735 (1951); Nelson, supra, 68 A.2d at 57 (invalidating gifts to church secured by undue influence). In fact, the burden on the plaintiffs may be less onerous here than it would be if they were challenging a testamentary disposition. In Whitmire, supra, 42 F.2d at 711, the court stated that in the case of gifts inter vivos the doctrine of undue influence is stronger and more rigidly applied than in the case of wills. In First Christian Church v. McReynolds, 194 Or. 68, 72, 241 P.2d 135, 137 (1952), the court observed that [a] grantor is required to possess greater competency in the execution and delivery of a deed than a testator is required to possess in executing a will . . . . Generally, a grantor, unlike a testator, must cope with another party to the transaction, that is, with a grantee. (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) See also 3 POMEROY, supra, § 951, at 779 (doctrine of undue influence is specially active and searching in dealing with gifts). Exaction of a bequest or gift through undue influence is undoubtedly a wrongful act. Nevertheless, we agree with the trial judge that no separate tort of undue influence has been recognized in this jurisdiction or, so far as we are aware, in any other. We are not disposed to create such a novel cause of action by judicial fiat. On the other hand, the courts have long recognized the doctrine of equitable restitution, which provides that where a gift is obtained by fraud, undue influence, or imposition exerted by the donee, the donor may recover it on the principle that no man should be permitted to secure any benefit from his own wrongful act. Myers v. Myers, 185 Md. 210, 219, 44 A.2d 455, 459 (1945); [20] see also Hurd, supra, 40 App. D.C. at 369-70, cert. denied, 229 U.S. 623, 33 S.Ct. 1051, 57 L.Ed. 1356 (1913); Annotation, Undue Influence in Nontestamentary Gift to Clergyman, Spiritual Adviser, or Church, 14 A.L.R.2d 649, 651-53 (1950 & Supps.1987 & 1991) [hereinafter Undue Influence ]. This is the pith and substance of the plaintiffs' undue influence claim here; they have asked for return of their contributions, upon the ground that the money was secured from them by undue influence through the abuse of what they allege to have been a confidential relationship. [21] Finally, there are significant differences between fraud and undue influence, even though the two concepts sometimes co-exist, and even though they are sometimes loosely lumped together. As the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia recognized more than a century ago, undue influence and importunity, sufficient to invalidate a will, may be exercised without the existence of fraud. Stewart v. Elliott, 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) 307, 319 (1883). Fraud ... is characterized by false representations, concealment, or deception, whereas there may be undue influence although all facts are truly represented and full disclosure of them [is] made. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Duress and Undue Influence § 35, at 396 (1966). Unlike fraud, undue influence need not be attended at all with deception or circumvention. Gockel v. Gockel, 66 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Mo.1933) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 2 POMEROY, supra, § 951, at 780 n. 2.