Opinion ID: 202406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Two unaddressed legal issues

Text: 18 Before addressing these arguments, we note, without resolving, two legal issues alluded to in the district court but never pursued or resolved. We identify these issues only to avoid any suggestion that we are resolving them by implication. 19 First, Kominsky did not believe that he had the power to demand a passenger's identification in order to write a citation for a seatbelt violation. In fact, no witness testified that it would be reasonable for a police officer to demand a passenger's identification in order to write a citation for a seatbelt violation. To the contrary, Kominsky testified that there's no legal way for me to force [a passenger who is not wearing his seatbelt] to give me the information ... he's entitled to get a citation [] but if he doesn't give me his information I know of no other way [to issue a ticket] other than citing the driver for the violation. 2 Kominsky had testified that he asked Henderson to write down his identifying information and that Henderson voluntarily complied. But the district court never credited this account of voluntary compliance, finding after the first suppression hearing that Henderson asked Kominsky why he had to provide that information. Kominsky did not answer the question, but insisted that Henderson give him the requested information. Henderson I, 229 F.Supp.2d at 37 (emphasis added). Kominsky's supervisor, Lieutenant Ray Rogers, also testified that a passenger could be asked but could not be required to produce identifying information unless there was suspicion that he had committed or was committing a crime. In Massachusetts, a seatbelt violation is not a crime. We have found no Massachusetts case that permits a police officer to demand a passenger's social security number and date of birth in order to write a citation for a seatbelt violation. 20 The second legal issue relates to the absence of any evidence that Henderson failed to wear a seatbelt while the car was moving. Kominsky did not say that he observed any such infraction. Rather, he said that he did not see inside the car until after it stopped. The district court did not say that it had inferred that Henderson was wearing his seatbelt while the car was moving. It is uncontested that some time passed between the stop and Kominsky's approach to the car because Kominsky first made a radio call. The one relevant Massachusetts case that we found concluded that a passenger in a vehicle is not obligated to wear a seatbelt after the vehicle has been stopped by a police officer and cannot be cited on the basis of not wearing a seatbelt during a vehicle stop. See Commonwealth v. Nuñnez, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 536, 2002 WL 31973248 at  (Mass. Super.2002). 21 However, we need not decide the legal question of whether Kominsky could demand Henderson's social security number and date of birth for the purpose of a passenger seatbelt violation citation. Similarly, we need not decide whether Henderson could even be cited for failing to wear his seatbelt on the facts presented. The premise for both of these legal issues would be a finding that Kominsky credibly testified that Henderson was not wearing his seatbelt during the stop. As we now explain, we cannot accept that premise.