Opinion ID: 2739896
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dore

Text: Dore challenges his conviction on appeal, arguing that: (1) statements made by the government in summation at his trial violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination; (2) the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain historical cell-site records obtained from T-Mobile; and (3) without those records, there was insufficient evidence to convict him. Dore contends that the government’s exhortation to the jury to “look to see whether [defendants’ counsel] attempt to have any explanation whatsoever for some of the most devastating evidence in th[e] case” impermissibly referred to Dore’s failure to testify, suggesting that the jury should draw a negative inference from that failure. We 5 review Dore’s argument that the government’s statements violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination for plain error, because Dore did not object on those grounds at trial,1 and therefore did not “bring the matter to the judge’s attention, outside the presence of the jury, at the end of the summation, so that the court [could] consider whether to attempt curative instructions or to declare a mistrial.” United States v. Briggs, 457 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir. 1972). An inappropriate remark by the prosecution “is not ground for reversal . . . unless the remarks caused the defendant substantial prejudice. Determination of whether there should be a reversal requires an evaluation of the severity of the misconduct, the curative measures taken, and the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct.” United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1549 (2d Cir. 1994). The government is not permitted to comment on a defendant’s exercise of his right not to testify. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). The government may, however, “comment on defendant’s failure to call witnesses to contradict the factual character of the Government’s case, as well as on defendant’s failure to support his own factual theories with witnesses.” United States v. McDermott, 918 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1990). We have explained that such comments violate the Fifth Amendment only “when 1 Counsel for Dore’s co-defendant raised a different objection to the statements made by the government, arguing that they constituted an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof from the government to the defense. The District Court responded to that objection by instructing the jury before the defense summation that “the defense . . . has no burden whatsoever . . . . The burden is on the government. So the defense has no obligation to explain or prove anything,” and again in its final charge to the jury that “the burden is on the prosecution to prove each defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to the defendant . . . .” To whatever extent the objection was well taken, that instruction adequately cured any error. 6 the evidence that the defendant has not adduced is in the control of the defendant alone or where the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret the Government’s summation as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify . . . .” Id. Neither scenario applies to the government’s statements here, and we see no plain error in the government’s statements. Indeed, Dore’s own argument to the jury that the cell-site location evidence was insufficiently accurate to place him at the scenes of various robberies demonstrates that the evidence to rebut the government’s case was not “rebuttable solely by the defendant.” United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 1977). Inviting the jury to consider whether the arguments of defense counsel undermine the inferences that the government urges the jury to draw from various pieces of evidence is not “naturally and necessarily” a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify, but can, as here, “constitute[] fair comment on the weakness inherent in the entire defense case.” United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 437 n.10 (2d Cir. 1974). We have stated that “[a] defendant who seeks to overturn his conviction based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct in summation bears a heavy burden” and “must show that the comment, when viewed against the entire argument to the jury and in the context of the entire trial, was so severe and significant as to have substantially prejudiced him, depriving him of a fair trial.” United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 167 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). The District Court reminded the jury at the close of trial that “a defendant has no obligation to testify or present any evidence” and that the jury was not to “attach any significance to the fact that the defendants did not testify” or draw any “adverse 7 inference” therefrom. In light of the district judge’s instructions and in the context of the trial as a whole, the government’s statements in its summation did not deprive Dore of a fair trial or cause him to suffer substantial prejudice. Next, Dore argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress historical cell-site records obtained from T-Mobile. A defendant bears the burden of proving that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in an object such that he can claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in challenging the government’s search of that object. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980); United States v. Watson, 404 F.3d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 2005). As Dore conceded below, he did not submit an affidavit establishing that the cell phones in question belonged to him or that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in them. Nor did Dore assert a privacy interest in the cell phones in some other manner. Consequently, Dore does not have standing to assert Fourth Amendment rights in those phone records. See United States v. Ruggiero, 824 F. Supp. 379, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1995); cf. United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 545 F.2d 785, 796 (2d Cir. 1976). The District Court therefore correctly denied Dore’s motion to suppress that evidence. Because Dore did not establish his standing to challenge the government’s obtaining of the records, we need not address the District Court’s alternative argument that the records were lawfully obtained and used. Finally, Dore argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. That argument is without merit. Even without the historical cell-site records, the 8 testimony of Dore’s co-conspirators alone would have been sufficient grounds to sustain a conviction. See United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1990). The totality of the evidence presented, including those records, made a powerful showing of guilt. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction as to defendant Dore. For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the District Court are AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court 9