Opinion ID: 745299
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are the Plaintiffs in Privity?

Text: 29 The second requirement of the Kansas collateral estoppel doctrine is that the parties [are] the same or in privity. Jackson Trak Group, 751 P.2d at 128. The Kansas Supreme Court has stated that the definition of privity is not fixed such that it can be automatically applied in all cases. See Goetz v. Board of Trustees, 203 Kan. 340, 454 P.2d 481, 490 (1969). A determination of the question as to who are privies requires careful examination into the circumstances of each case as it arises. Id. The general rule in Kansas is that a judgment may not be rendered for or against one who is not a party to the action or who does not intervene therein. See Winsor v. Powell, 209 Kan. 292, 497 P.2d 292, 297 (1972). Kansas, however, recognizes an exception to this rule where: 30 A person who is not a party but who controls an action, individually or in co-operation with others, is bound by the adjudication of litigated matters as if he were a party if he has a proprietary or financial interest in the judgment or in the determination of a question of fact or of a question of law with reference to the same subject matter or transaction; if the other party has notice of his participation, the other party is equally bound. 31 Id. at 298 (quoting Restatement of Judgments § 84). 32 According to the Restatement, control, for purposes of issue preclusion, refers to the ability to exercise effective choice as to the legal theories and proofs to be advanced, as well as control over the opportunity to obtain review. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 39 cmt. c (1982). However, the control need not be exercised directly by the non-litigating party. It is sufficient that the choices were in the hands of counsel responsible to the controlling person; moreover, the requisite opportunity may exist even when it is shared with other persons. Id. 33 Due to the dismissal of two of the original six plaintiffs from this appeal, the question confronting us is whether appellant Margie Phelps--who was not a party to the motions to dismiss--may be held to be in privity with the remaining plaintiffs--Jonathan Phelps, Charles Hockenbarger, and Fred Phelps--such that she may be bound by the state courts' rulings on those three plaintiffs' motions to dismiss Ms. Hamilton. We hold that Margie Phelps is in privity with the other plaintiffs for two independent reasons. First, our examination of the record in this case leads us to conclude that throughout the state and federal court proceedings in this matter, the plaintiffs have continually asserted that they have been singled out by Ms. Hamilton as one entity because of their common membership in the Westboro Baptist Church and their picketing activities. Second, in applying the definition of control for purposes of finding privity, it is clear that Margie Phelps, as listed attorney for each of the plaintiffs, not only had input into the legal theories and arguments advanced, but could be said to be directly responsible, along with co-counsel, for controlling the entire course of the state court proceedings. On this basis, we hold that privity exists between the parties in this action such that Margie Phelps may be bound by the state court determinations on the other three plaintiffs' motions to dismiss.C. Was this Issue Decided by the State Courts? 34 The final determination under the collateral estoppel doctrine is whether the issue was actually determined and necessary to support the judgment. Jackson Trak Group, 751 P.2d at 128. The Kansas Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked only as to questions and issues shown to have been actually decided in the prior action. Frey v. Inter-State Sav. and Loan Assoc. of Kansas City, 226 Kan. 419, 601 P.2d 671, 674 (1979). While collateral estoppel differs from claim preclusion--in that instead of preventing a second assertion of the same claim or cause of action, it prevents a second litigation of the same issue in connection with a different claim or cause of action--the subject matter and operative facts of the first and second claims must be the same. As stated by the Kansas Supreme Court: 35 The true rule, now well established, is that where a second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue upon the determination of which the finding was made or the judgment rendered, and does not extend to matters which might have been but were not litigated and determined in the former action. 36 Stroup v. Pepper, 69 Kan. 241, 76 P. 825, 826 (1904). Thus, the essential question here is whether the bad faith claim brought in federal court was considered and decided on its merits in the previous state court proceedings. See Jackson Trak Group, 751 P.2d at 128-29. 37 In the first five state court prosecutions, Jonathan Phelps, Charles Hockenbarger, Karl Hockenbarger, and Fred Phelps each moved to dismiss the charges against them--all of which were filed prior to July 14, 1993--on the grounds of bad faith prosecution, government misconduct, and selective prosecution motivated by Ms. Hamilton's disagreement with their constitutionally protected religious and speech activities. See, e.g., Aple's Supp.App. vol. II, at 86 (Mem. in supp. of mot. to dismiss in State v. Jonathan Phelps, Case No. 93-CR-274, dated Mar. 10, 1993). After extensive hearings on the Jonathan Phelps motion to dismiss, the state trial court denied the motion, finding no legitimate reason to disqualify Hamilton and/or her staff as counsel in this case. Aple's Suppl. App. vol. V., at 766 (Order denying defendant's motion to disqualify in State v. Jonathan Phelps, Case No. 93-CR-274, dated Mar. 31, 1993). A second state trial court then ruled upon the remaining three plaintiffs' identical motions to dismiss, finding, based upon the record in the Jonathan Phelps case, that there was no need to relitigate this issue and insufficient evidence to decide to the contrary. Id. at 858, 862 (Transcript of Hearing in State v. Charles Hockenbarger, Case No. 92-CR-3172, dated July 14, 1993). 38 These state court decisions involved the same issue presently before this court with regard to the plaintiffs' claims originating from those same state court prosecutions. In their § 1983 claim, each of the plaintiffs seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from their state criminal prosecutions, claiming that the pending prosecutions by defendant of all plaintiffs [are] unconstitutional because of bad faith, because the prosecutions are based upon the content of plaintiffs' message, and because the prosecutions are primarily motivated by a desire to punish and silence protected speech. Aplts' App. vol. II, at 719 (Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint dated Nov. 15, 1993). Because the state and federal bad faith claims are identical in substance, we hold that the bad faith issue, insofar as it related to the pre-July 14, 1993 claims presently before us, was previously considered and decided by the Kansas state courts and the plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from relitigating that issue as it relates to the first five state prosecutions. 39 The remaining question is whether the plaintiffs' arguments that Ms. Hamilton's bad faith continued past the date of the final state court ruling on the motions to dismiss--e.g., through the filing of six additional criminal charges--should have any effect on whether the underlying state court proceedings determined the issue now brought in federal court. In assessing this question under the first prong of the Kansas collateral estoppel test, the district court held that whether or not additional evidence was discovered subsequent to the state court decisions ... is not persuasive and is not fatal to a finding of finality. Dist. Ct. Order dated Mar. 31, 1995 at 9. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that because a substantial portion of their evidence in this case relates to six additional state cases which were filed after July 14, 1993, and were therefore not considered in the state court rulings, the district court erred in applying full faith and credit to all the criminal cases at issue in this case. 40 As stated above, Kansas law recognizes that collateral estoppel may only be invoked as to questions and issues shown to have been actually decided in the prior action. Frey, 601 P.2d at 674. In applying this standard to the issue before us, we hold that the district court erred in barring the plaintiffs' entire § 1983 suit based upon the state court rulings in the first five, pre-July 14, 1993 cases. The injury the plaintiffs complain of in this case is not limited to the first five prosecutions; it includes Ms. Hamilton's conduct in filing six additional prosecutions after the date of the last state court determination upon which the district court relied. The bad faith alleged with regard to these later-filed cases cannot be conclusively determined based solely upon the facts alleged in the earlier cases. 41 In proving Ms. Hamilton's bad faith with regard to the later-filed prosecutions, the plaintiffs offer a voluminous record of evidence--principally related to the Reverend Weeks incident, which occurred on September 5, 1993--that was not before the state courts when the earlier rulings were made. Where there is neither a state court ruling on the plaintiffs' bad faith claim relating to these later-occurring events 6 nor, in the alternative, a determination by the district court that this additional evidence is not materially different from that presented and ruled upon by the state courts in the earlier prosecutions, we cannot say that this issue was actually determined and was necessary to support the judgment of the state courts. See Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328, 75 S.Ct. 865, 868, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955) (holding that while a judgment may preclude recovery on claims arising prior to its entry, it cannot be given the effect of extinguishing claims which did not even then exist and which could not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598, 68 S.Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948) (Since the cause of action involved in the second proceeding is not swallowed by the judgment in the prior suit, the parties are free to litigate points which were not at issue in the first proceeding....); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. f. (1982) (Material operative facts occurring after the decision of an action with respect to the same subject matter may ... be made the basis of a second action not precluded by the first.). 42 On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we hold that the district court erred in ruling that the plaintiffs' present bad faith claim was entirely precluded under the Full Faith and Credit Act because of the state court rulings in five of the eleven state prosecutions at issue in this case. 7 We remand this issue to the district court for the following considerations. First, the district court should determine whether the state courts have ruled on the bad faith claims in the post-July 14, 1993 cases, and if so, whether the disposition of these claims in state court collaterally estops plaintiffs' claims in federal court. Second, if the state courts have not made findings in the post-July 14 cases, the district court should determine whether the additional evidence surrounding these later-filed claims is materially different from the evidence presented and ruled upon in the earlier state court cases. If the evidence is not materially different, the district court should determine whether collateral estoppel should apply based upon the state court rulings in the pre-July 14 cases. Finally, if the above conditions are not met, the district court should resolve plaintiffs' bad faith claims arising from the post-July 14 cases on the merits. 43 D. Did the Plaintiffs Have a Full and Fair Opportunity to 44 Litigate Their Claim? 45 The plaintiffs raise two additional challenges to the district court's grant of full faith and credit to the state court rulings. First, the plaintiffs argue that full faith and credit should not apply in this case because of a prior district court ruling that the prosecutions were brought in bad faith. Second, they argue that the state court proceedings were so infected with bias that it is impossible to conclude that the constitutional rights of these plaintiffs were protected therein. Aplts' Br. at 38. We analyze both of these arguments under the full and fair opportunity exception to full faith and credit, as recognized in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 95, 101 S.Ct. at 415. 46 As stated above, the Supreme Court has recognized that collateral estoppel should not apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate that issue in the earlier case. Id. Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 970, 979 n. 11, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). In determining whether the state courts' judgments were fundamentally flawed, we may only examine whether the state proceedings satisfied 'the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.'  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587, 591 (10th Cir.1985) (quoting Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1897, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982)). 47 The plaintiffs first argue that full faith and credit should not apply because the district court found evidence that the prosecutions were in bad faith and this is [t]he law of this case. Aplts' Br. at 37. The law of the case doctrine provides that  'when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.'  Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1553 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)). Although the plaintiffs point to no specific order to support their assertion that the district court previously ruled that the prosecutions were brought in bad faith, they imply that the ruling occurred in Phelps v. Hamilton, 840 F.Supp. 1442 (D.Kan.1993). 48 In that case, the district court addressed, among other things, whether the bad faith exception to the Younger abstention doctrine should apply with regard to enjoining the underlying state court prosecutions. Id. at 1459. The court ruled that it would not grant summary judgment because the record reveals several genuine issues of material fact in deciding whether the bad faith exception [to Younger ] applies here. Id. In so ruling, however, the district court specifically stated that the court does not find that the defendant has acted in bad faith in bringing or prosecuting all or any of the pending criminal cases against the plaintiffs. Id. Because the plaintiffs are incorrect that the district court has ruled on the bad faith issue, and because our search of the record reveals no other district court order on point, we reject the plaintiffs' law of the case argument. 49 The plaintiffs' final contention is that this court should not apply full faith and credit to the state court rulings because the state judges were inherently biased. The plaintiffs cite the content and language of the adverse rulings against them as well as the state district court judge's comments during a hearing regarding the shocking nature of their religious activities. To state a due process claim that a judge is biased, the claimant must show either that actual bias existed, or that an appearance of bias created a conclusive presumption of actual bias. See Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1478 (10th Cir.1994). 50 After reviewing the court orders and hearing transcript cited by the plaintiffs, we are unable to conclude that there was actual bias or an appearance of bias on the part of the state court judge in his remarks regarding the plaintiffs' activities, which they themselves admit are controversial. Furthermore, as well-stated by the district court: [T]he fact that plaintiffs/state court defendants were not successful, alone, is not evidence of bias on the part of the state courts. Dist. Ct. Order dated Mar. 31, 1995 at 10. Accordingly, we hold that there is no reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in the state court proceedings. Montana, 440 U.S. at 164 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. at 979 n. 11. 51