Opinion ID: 7191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion To Remand to State Court

Text: 19 Pavone claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to remand his suit to the state court in which it was originally filed. The district court did not favor us with its specific reasons for denying Pavone's motion; rather, it simply observed that the record did not warrant a remand. On appeal Pavone advances two points of error to support his claim that he was wrongly denied remand.a. Timeliness of Motion To Remand 20 Pavone first claims that his motion to remand was timely made. We review the timeliness of a remand motion de novo. 21 Section 1447(c) provides that a motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under Sec. 1446(a). 10 Pavone's motion to remand was filed thirty-three days after the Riverboat Companies filed their notice of removal and mailed a copy of that notice to Pavone. He states that six days elapsed between the date the notice of the removal was filed and the date on which he received his copy in the mail. He contends therefore that (1) he could have filed a motion for enlargement of time or to have his pleading deemed timely filed, either of which motions the district court could have granted; and (2) Sec. 1446(d) requires the removing party to provide prompt written notice, and due process requires that his (Pavone's) motion be treated as timely under the circumstances of the mailing and delivery. Pavone also cites as persuasive authority Chott v. Cal Gas Corporation, 11 a decision in which a district court in Missouri held timely a motion to remand which, like Pavone's, was filed thirty-three days after the opposing party had filed and mailed its notice of removal. 12 The Chott court found the motion timely by applying Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6(e), which provides that 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period whenever a party is required to do some act within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon the party and the notice is served upon the party by mail. 13 22 The Riverboat Companies respond that Rule 6(e) is unavailing to Pavone, as it applies only when the prescribed period for a party to act begins to run after service upon that party; by contrast, Sec. 1447(c) establishes the time to object to a defect in a removal procedure based on when the removal notice is filed with the court. As Pavone did not file his objection within thirty days following the filing of the renewal notice, the Riverboat Companies conclude that Pavone waived any objection to defects in the removal procedure. 23 We agree with the Riverboat Companies that Rule 6(e) does not extend the thirty-day period of Sec. 1447(c), as that rule applies only when a party is required to act within a prescribed period after service, not after filing. As we observed ten years ago in Lauzon v. Strachan Shipping Company, 14 24 [t]he correct inquiry is whether the required actions must be performed within a prescribed period of filing or of service.--If the action is to be taken after filing, the time for action begins to run from that date. If the act is to be taken from service, the three day extension of ... [Rule] 6(e) applies. 15 25 Furthermore, a district court has no discretion to remand to state court when a motion to do so is grounded on improper removal procedures and that motion is not made within thirty days following filing: Under such circumstances, the objection to remove jurisdiction resulting from a defect in the removal procedure is waived. 16 Defects in removal procedure include, inter alia, the removal of an action that could have been filed originally in federal court but could not be removed to federal court if it were filed originally in state court. 17 As Pavone could have filed his Jones Act claim in federal court originally, as did Ketzel, it is clear that Pavone's motion to remand does not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, which cannot be waived. On the contrary, Pavone's motion involves only a defect in removal procedure which, as noted, is waivable. Although in neither Lauzon, 18 nor elsewhere do we appear to have directly addressed the interplay, or lack thereof, between Rule 6(e)'s three-day extension and Sec. 1447(c)'s thirty-day provision, we perceive no meaningful distinction between this case and Lauzon, the decision in which we drew the line limiting Rule 6(e)'s application to periods measured from time of service upon a party. 26 b. Removability of Jones Act Suit 27 Next Pavone raises several arguments as to why his Jones Act suit was not removable. These contentions, however, all go to the merits of his motion to remand. But we have already determined that Pavone's motion to remand merely concerned a defect in the removal procedure; that the defect therefore was waivable; and that Pavone, in fact, waived that defect by failing to file his remand motion within thirty days following the filing of the notice of removal. Consequently, Pavone also waived these assignments of error; thus they are not properly before us. 28