Opinion ID: 198294
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Undue Hardship Dismissals

Text: 33 Both § 1866 and the District Plan permit the district court to excuse prospective jurors prior to voir dire on the ground of undue hardship. Here, the district court excused six jurors on that basis. 34 According to the district court's notes, Juror 3 was excused because he was the only person at his office. Juror 3 stated that he was the only representative of the company in Puerto Rico. I sell generic medicine to Drug [sic] stores and Hospitals [sic] in P.R[.] My Job [sic] is mostly done by telemarketing for which I can not be away from my work for too long. I m[sic] training a part time employee to assist me due the [sic] increase in sales. The district court excused Juror 32 because she was taking care of her mother, who was in the hospital, and her grandmother, who was at home. Although she was the only one who could help them, she stated that she would be very proud to participate as a juror ... and to let [her] know what [she] should do. According to his notes, Judge Fuste excused Juror 70 because he was a night shift medical technician at Fajardo Hospital. 35 Jurors 35, 63, and 72 indicated that they had various business and personal travel plans that would conflict with the trial. Juror 35 stated that she would be traveling during the trial to a Consumers Affairs annual meeting and then intend[ed] to take my vacations. Juror 63 was excused by the district court on account of a pre-arranged vacation. During the trial, she was scheduled to attend a training session and to leave with her family on a previously planned vacation. Finally, Juror 72 was excused because he had a reservation to go to Nevada and California for a month during the trial. 36 The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Jurors 3 and 32, but did impermissibly excuse Jurors 70, 35, 63, and 72. With regard to Jurors 3 and 32, their questionnaires document that acting as Jurors would work an undue hardship. However, the same cannot be said for the others. 37 With regard to Juror 70, we note that under the District Plan, he could have requested to be excused from jury duty. The District Plan states that jury service by medical laboratory technicians would entail undue hardship or extreme inconvenience, and such an individual shall be excused from jury service upon individual request. District Plan at 5 (emphasis added). However, Juror 70 did not request to be excused or object to being a juror. The choice not to serve on the jury at this stage was his and not the court's. The district court acted improperly in unilaterally excusing him from jury service. We cannot be sure whether Juror 70 desired to serve or was unaware of the District Plan's provision. Regardless of his desire or knowledge, however, there was no prima facie reason for him to have been dismissed from the pool at this point. 38 We begin by noting with respect to Jurors 35, 63, and 72 that the district court incorrectly described their situation to counsel the next morning at jury selection. The district court stated: What else was there? And people with paid vacations, which they so said in a note, Judge, I'm leaving on such and such a date. How can I detain those people? 9/14/95 Tr. at 127. After a very close and careful reading of the questionnaires, we did not find any notes on them stating that any of these jurors had paid vacations. If such a statement was made by any of the jurors to the district court, it was not recorded by the Judge on the questionnaires in the record. Jurors 35 intend[ed] to take vacations. For Juror 63, everything was set. Finally, Juror 72 had a reservation. It appears that the district court interpreted those phrases to mean paid non-refundable, non-changeable tickets although those phrases may well not have meant that at all. 39 Jury duty works a burden on all called to serve. There are instances in which previously-made travel plans would cause jury service to become an undue hardship. However, the district court all too willingly accepted the proposed excuses of these jurors without allowing the parties to examine the prospective jurors in voir dire. Exclusions at this stage approach a ministerial function, which is why § 1866 authorizes the clerk of the court under the supervision of the district court--if the District Plan so authorizes--to excuse such jurors. See § 1866(c). If jurors are excused as a result of a non-ministerial exercise of discretion better left to voir dire itself, as occurred here, the prospects for the defendant obtaining a fair cross-section of the community could be improperly diminished. 40 In general, we think it unwise for district judges to engage in ex parte voir dire beyond purely ministerial functions. Ministerial functions permitted by the Plan and Act are usually performed by the clerk, under supervision of the court. If a judge does no more than what a jury clerk is authorized to do in excusing jurors, that may raise an issue of allocation of court resources but does not raise an issue of impropriety. See United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609, 616 (9th Cir.1975). When the court, in the absence of counsel, starts questioning jurors and excusing them based on responses which go beyond basic information about qualifications, obvious bias, or hardship, it is all too easy to slip over the line, as happened here. Whether slipping over the line deprives a defendant of statutory or constitutional rights is another question.