Opinion ID: 792077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Battery Claim.

Text: 41 We now turn to the parallel question of whether Chanel is entitled to a new trial on her battery claim. As we have noted, plaintiff's counsel asked that the battery question be listed first on the verdict sheet, which would have obviated the problem that we now confront. 5 He also argued, after the jury returned its first verdict, that the jury should be required to answer the battery questions. 42 What plaintiff failed to do is to argue on appeal that, assuming the informed consent verdict is vacated, plaintiff should receive a new trial on her battery claim. Instead, plaintiff argues that the jury implicitly found in her favor on the battery claim by finding that the defendant doctors did not obtain consent for their examinations. This argument lacks merit; in order to find a battery, a jury must find that the contact was both unpermitted and offensive. See Jeffreys, 769 N.Y.S.2d at 189 n. 2, 801 N.E.2d 404. Although the jury found no consent, it did not reach Question VI parts (3) and (4), which asked whether each contact was offensive. The jury having found that the defendant doctors touched Chanel without permission, it was fundamental error to prevent the jury from answering the questions that would have completed its consideration of the battery claim. 43 The failure of plaintiffs to raise this argument in their briefs does not preclude us from reaching it because it presents a pure issue of law, Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir.1993) (resolving a dispositive issue sua sponte because, in part, it was not necessary to resolve any issues of fact), and because failure to reach the claim would work a manifest injustice, United States v. Babwah, 972 F.2d 30, 35 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that a court has discretion to reach an argument not raised on appeal but preserved below to prevent a manifest injustice). There are no issues of fact relevant to the obligation of the jury to consider the battery claim, and manifest injustice will result if we do not reach it because (1) as we have already decided, fundamental error occurred; and (2) without reaching the argument, plaintiff would be forced to retry the informed consent claim on which the jury found in her favor but not be allowed to have a jury consider her battery claim, which the jury's answer to the consent question suggests may have been resolved in her favor. In sum, we direct a new trial because we believe the jury's failure to consider the battery claim was a miscarriage of justice. See Tesser, 370 F.3d at 320. Because Chanel's cross-appeal was dismissed, Dr. Takla is no longer a party to the appeal and we do not consider whether the battery claim against him should be reinstated. 44