Opinion ID: 2818498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pit River’s Geothermal Steam Act Claims

Text: Because the Geothermal Steam Act does not expressly provide for a private right of action, Pit River relied on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to bring its challenge to BLM’s 1998 decisions to vacate its lease extension decisions and continue the 26 unproven Glass Mountain leases as a unit. Under § 10(a) of the APA “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. BLM does not dispute that Pit River has Article III standing PIT RIVER TRIBE V. BLM 19 to bring its claims.13 In addition to Article III standing, in order to bring a cause of action under § 10(a), the interests a plaintiff asserts “must be ‘arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute.’” Match- E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). The district court reasoned that because “[t]he statute and regulations applicable here . . . do not permit, much less require, consideration of environmental concerns or competing land uses when BLM acts on continuation of an existing lease,” Pit River’s interests do not fall within the statutory lease-continuation provision’s “zone of interests.”
The Supreme Court first articulated the zone-of-interests test in 1970 in Data Processing. 397 U.S. at 153. The Court stated that standing “concerns, apart from the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” Id. In 1987, the Supreme Court explained in Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, that: 13 Pit River I establishes that the requirements of Article III standing are met here: Pit River suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to BLM’s conduct and that would likely be redressed by a favorable decision. See 469 F.3d at 778–80 (holding that Pit River had standing to challenge BLM’s extension of geothermal leases in Medicine Lake Highlands). 20 PIT RIVER TRIBE V. BLM The ‘zone of interest’ test is a guide for deciding whether, in view of Congress’ evident intent to make agency action presumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular agency decision. In cases where the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the contested regulatory action, the test denies a right of review if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit. The test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff. 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987) (footnotes omitted). The zone-of-interests test should be applied consistent with Congress’s intent “to make agency action presumptively reviewable” under the APA. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish, 132 S. Ct. at 2210 (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399). The Supreme Court has often characterized the zone-ofinterests test as a “prudential standing” requirement. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997). But last year, in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., the court rejected the “prudential standing” label and made clear that whether a plaintiff’s claims are within a statute’s zone of interests is not a jurisdictional question. 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387–88 (2014); see also Chaudhry v. City of L.A., 751 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[U]nlike PIT RIVER TRIBE V. BLM 21 standing, ‘the absence of a valid . . . cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.’” (quoting Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.4)). The Court explained: Although we admittedly have placed [the zone-of-interests] test under the “prudential” rubric in the past, it does not belong there . . . . Whether a plaintiff comes within “the zone of interests” is an issue that requires us to determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim. As Judge Silberman of the D.C. Circuit recently observed “prudential standing is a misnomer” as applied to the zone-of-interests analysis, which asks whether “this particular class of persons ha[s] a right to sue under this substantive statute.” Id. at 1387 (citations omitted) (quoting Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 675–76 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring)). Because Lexmark addressed a claim arising under the Lanham Act rather than under § 10 of the APA, the Supreme Court did not directly revisit its APA zone-of-interests precedent. Id. at 1383. But in discussing the Court’s prior APA decisions, Lexmark reaffirmed its consistent statement “that the [zone-of-interests] test ‘forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed’ that Congress authorized that 22 PIT RIVER TRIBE V. BLM plaintiff to sue.” Id. at 1389 (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-SheWish, 132 S. Ct. at 2210). B. Pit River’s claims fall within the applicable zone of interests. The pivotal question here is whether Congress intended to create a cause of action encompassing Pit River’s claims when it enacted the Geothermal Steam Act. See id. at 1387. The parties dispute whether the court may look to the Geothermal Steam Act’s overall statutory scheme to determine whether Pit River’s claims fall within the Act’s zone of interests, but Bennett v. Spear clearly answered this question. Bennett held, “[w]hether a plaintiff’s interest is ‘arguably . . . protected . . . by the statute’ within the meaning of the zone-of-interests test is to be determined not by reference to the overall purpose of the Act in question . . . , but by reference to the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies.” 520 U.S. at 175–76 (first two alterations in original) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). We agree with the district court that, contrary to Pit River’s argument, Pit River’s ability to challenge the subject leases cannot be determined by looking to the broad objectives of the Geothermal Steam Act. But we do not agree that Pit River’s claims can be fairly described as arising only from § 1005(a). In 2012, when Pit River’s two cases were consolidated into one, Pit River stipulated that it would “only assert causes of action related to the May 18, 1998 lease extensions” in its amended complaint. At the hearing on BLM’s and Calpine’s motions for judgment on the pleadings, Pit River explained that the amended complaint’s allegations regarding inclusion of the unproven leases within the Glass Mountain Unit were PIT RIVER TRIBE V. BLM 23 pleaded only as facts, not as distinct legal challenges. The district court interpreted this explanation as meaning that Pit River waived all of its Geothermal Steam Act claims except those in Paragraph 107(d) of the amended complaint, which alleged BLM “[u]nlawfully and retroactively continued the 26 Leases . . . for an additional period of 40 years in May 1998 in the absence of any commercial production.” The district court concluded that Pit River’s remaining Geothermal Steam Act claim relied on only the Act’s leasecontinuation provision, § 1005(a). But neither the stipulation nor the amended complaint expressly limited Pit River’s claims to any particular provision of the Geothermal Steam Act, and Pit River never limited its claims only to § 1005(a). The transcript from the hearing on the motion for judgment on the pleadings makes this clear. First, the district court inquired about the nature of the claims in Pit River’s amended complaint. Pit River’s counsel stated that Pit River was not merely challenging BLM’s lease continuation decision under § 1005(a), but was also challenging BLM’s decision to reverse course and decide that the leases could be continued under § 1005(a) as a unit rather than being subject to lease-by-lease extensions under § 1005(g). As counsel explained: Our view is twofold. One is a legal issue and one is a factual issue. First of all, on the legal issue, . . . BLM had taken the position the leases were not under this mandatory extension but under a discretionary extension and then changed [its] mind[]. . . . 24 PIT RIVER TRIBE V. BLM [A]t the time the decisions were made, there was a provision, 1005(g), that allowed for these five-year extensions, and that’s, in fact what the BLM believed it was originally extending these leases under. . . . . . . So the first question is whether they were properly under 1005(a) or 1005(g) as it existed at the time . . . . [W]e believe that decision whether to renew under § 1005(a) or 1005(g) is a challengeable decision. But even if we were under Section 1005(a), . . . the agency has to find that geothermal steam is produced or utilized in commercial quantities. (Emphasis added.). The district court acknowledged this argument, asking BLM’s counsel: “Why don’t the plaintiffs have a right to challenge that determination? That’s the legal question she says exists now. I grant your motion if 1005(a) applies. If 1005(g) applies, that presents different issues and problems for you.” After BLM responded that it was “precisely the application of 1005(a) that the plaintiffs challenge here,” the district court pressed further: How do they challenge then the decision of BLM then to . . . , as [Pit River’s counsel] argues, at one point BLM is proceeding under 1005(g) and then a second opinion comes out and says: No, no. 1005(a) applies. Why don’t they have a right to challenge that decision? PIT RIVER TRIBE V. BLM 25 If they disagree, someone should have a right to challenge it, shouldn’t they? BLM’s counsel’s answer was not especially responsive: Not necessarily. It is not necessarily the case that any party has standing to challenge a particular administrative action. That is the Doctrine of Standing. Because they lack standing, the question: How do they challenge it just doesn’t arise. They don’t. They cannot challenge a decision under that provision of the statute. The district court concluded that Pit River had actually abandoned its challenge to BLM’s decision to apply § 1005(a) rather than §1005(g). The court said to Pit River’s counsel: You’re arguing to me, again, the evidence is going to show that they didn’t qualify, that the secretary or the solicitor or whoever makes the decision, that the leases should be extended got it completely wrong. Again, as I understand the government’s response to that is: Too late. It doesn’t matter. You’ve abandoned those claims. You should have challenged those, that decision earlier. Again, it comes back to me—there’s two decisions here: Were those conditions actually met? Second, do we have to grant the lease extensions? This lawsuit is only about: Were the lease extensions legal? And so, again, I’m having a hard time getting past how we started 26 PIT RIVER TRIBE V. BLM this argument, which is, none of that is relevant. But Pit River did not concede that it had abandoned its challenge to BLM’s May 18, 1998 change of course; instead, it made clear, as it stated in the district court hearing, that it thought “the court needs to look at what was done here in order to determine whether the BLM’s last-minute reversal to make this a ministerial, rather than a discretionary decision, was proper under the law.” Additionally, contrary to the district court’s suggestion, Pit River could not have challenged the decision earlier because it appears that BLM first communicated its changed interpretation of § 1005 and the implementing regulations when it issued the 1998 letter retroactively continuing the unproven Glass Mountain leases. Pit River’s challenge plainly included whether BLM lawfully vacated its earlier § 1005(g) extension decisions and changed its interpretation of § 1005 to continue the leases for up to 40 years. Because Pit River’s operative complaint challenges BLM’s announcement that the leases were subject to continuation rather than extension, we conclude that Pit River’s claims include a challenge under § 1005(g). Pit River I held that BLM must conduct NEPA and NHPA review before granting discretionary extensions under the 1998 version of §1005(g).14 469 F.3d at 788. 14 Amendments to the Geothermal Steam Act in 2005 eliminated BLM’s discretion to consider environmental and cultural factors in making leaseextension decisions under § 1005(g). Pit River I, 469 F.3d at 780. Thus, if Calpine elected to have its leases subject to the updated regulations, see 43 C.F.R. § 3200.7 (2007), future extensions of these leases may not be subject to NEPA or NHPA review. Id. PIT RIVER TRIBE V. BLM 27