Opinion ID: 463545
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the sentence: compliance with plea agreement

Text: 35 Kamer entered his guilty plea pursuant to a written plea agreement conditioned upon acceptance by the court in conformance with Rule 11(e)(1)(A) and (C). The written plea agreement provided that Kamer would enter a guilty plea to counts 1, 2, and 21 of the indictment, and in return, [t]he maximum sentence imposed by the Court shall be three (3) years or less, with full credit for time served since October 11, 1983. On December 11, 1984, the court accepted the agreement. When sentenced on January 21, 1985, however, Kamer received 16 months imprisonment with credit for time served and was placed on probation for five years. The court further imposed as conditions of probation that Kamer make restitution as ordered by the probation office or the court, that he not re-enter the United States without the permission of the Attorney General or an authorized agent thereof, and that he report to the nearest probation office within forty-eight hours of re-entry. Kamer complains that the sentence imposed fails to comply with the terms of the agreement. 36 Plea agreements are subject to contract-law standards of interpretation. United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.1979). As this court previously stated: 37 In determining whether a plea agreement has been broken, courts look to what was 'reasonably understood by [the defendant] when he entered his plea of guilty.'  United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.1979) (quoting United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21, 27 (3d Cir.1976)). If disputed, the terms of the agreement will be determined by objective standards. 38 United States v. Travis, 735 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir.1984). In order to determine whether the sentence imposed comports with the reasonable understanding and expectations of the defendant as to the sentence for which he had bargained, we look to the objective proof on the record. 39 As previously mentioned, the written plea agreement refers to a maximum sentence of three years or less, but is silent as to any probationary term. The government argues that imposition of the probationary term did not breach the plea agreement because Kamer's only desire was to avoid incarceration of more than three years. See Gammarano v. United States, 732 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir.1984). The government further contends that the probationary term should stand even if probation exceeded Kamer's expectations. Essentially, the government asserts that the plea agreement was silent on this issue because probation is not part of a sentence. Therefore, it claims that Kamer unreasonably concluded that probation could not be imposed. 40 The government contends that Gammarano supports its claim that Kamer intended only to avoid incarceration. Gammarano, however, is distinguishable on its facts. Determining the reasonable understanding and expectations of the parties, the Gammarano court looked to counsel's argument at the sentencing hearing and Gammarano's reaction immediately after the sentence had been imposed. 732 F.2d at 276. The court stressed the fact that counsel had argued eloquently in favor of a noncustodial term, that Gammarano and his counsel thanked the court after sentencing, and that he did not immediately file a direct appeal. Id. The Second Circuit interpreted Gammarano's behavior as objective evidence that his reasonable expectations [that he would not be incarcerated for more than two years] had been fulfilled. Id. 41 By contrast, Kamer filed a notice of appeal immediately after the sentence was imposed. Also unlike Gammarano, nowhere in the record is there any reference by anyone to a noncustodial term prior to actual sentencing. See 732 F.2d at 276. Finally, while the record does not indicate that Kamer objected at the time sentence was imposed, he was acting as his own counsel and may not have believed that oral objection was appropriate at the time. See id. Accordingly, Kamer appears reasonably justified in expecting the sentence to comply with the literal terms of the agreement. Travis, 735 F.2d at 1132. 42 There appears to be a split in the circuits regarding the government's contention that probation is not a sentence,. 3 However, we find Judge Wisdom's analysis in Smith v. United States, 505 F.2d 893 (5th Cir.1974), instructive. Writing for the Fifth Circuit, he explained: In determining whether probation is properly defined as a 'sentence,' we avoid needless terminological distinctions of artificial origin; we focus on the reality of probationary status. 505 F.2d at 895. We similarly urge that antiquated semantic distinctions be laid aside. Probation and similar dispositions are, and should be viewed as, sentences just like any other disposition following conviction.... Probation is an attempt by society to impose a sanction that will accomplish its goals, just as any other sentence is. III A.B.A.,Standards for Criminal Justice 18.80 (1980). We are of the opinion that within the plea bargaining context, where the reasonable understanding and expectations of the parties prevail, probation is commonly understood to be a sentence. 43 Our conclusion that probation is a sentence within the plea bargaining context is further supported by the Second Circuit's holding in United States v. Burruezo, 704 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.1983). The defendant in Burruezo entered into a plea agreement with the government. The government agreed that any prison sentences imposed on [the] pleas of guilty shall not exceed ten years. Id. at 34. At sentencing the trial court imposed imprisonment for eight years with a consecutive five-year term of probation, $3,000 in fines, and a requirement that [defendant] make restitution. Id. at 35. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, however, observing that the court did not follow the sentencing limitations incorporated in the plea arrangement: the sentence imposed was materially different from the terms of the agreement because the possible length of sentence exceeded ten years (including the period of probation).... Id. at 38. 44 It is not uncommon for probation to be one of the considered elements of a plea bargain. Thus, failure to expressly provide for a probationary term must be construed as an intentional omission designed to preclude its imposition. 45 Burruezo additionally suggests that the district court's imposition of restitution likewise amounts to a breach of the plea agreement. There, the appellate court found that the comparative magnitude of the amount of restitution [$400,500] ... created a material change in the plea bargain. 704 F.2d at 38 (quoting United States v. Runck, 601 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S.Ct. 665, 62 L.Ed.2d 644 (1980)). In Runck, the district court judge imposed as a condition of probation restitution of $87,400. The Runck court reversed because, as in Burruezo and the instant case, the plea agreement was silent on the issue of restitution: 46 While the condition of restitution of a small amount might be acceptable because it would not necessarily materially alter the expectations of the parties to the bargain, restitution of a large amount should have been part of the plea bargain or the possibility of its inclusion as a condition or probation made known and agreed to by the bargainers. 47 601 F.2d at 970. 48 Here, the written plea agreement fails to mention restitution. Nonetheless, the government urges that throughout the negotiations Kamer was aware of the possibility of its imposition. The record, however, indicates to the contrary; several times the court seemed to indicate that restitution would not be ordered. 4 Further, subsequent to signing the plea agreement Kamer told the judge it was his understanding that no restitution would be imposed. 49 Restitution, here, is presumably in the millions. Under the circumstances, we agree that [i]f restitution of less than $90,000 [in Runck ] is material enough to demand express inclusion in a plea agreement, it follows ineluctably that restitution of some [one million-plus] must likewise be included. United States v. Garcia, 698 F.2d 31, 36 (1st Cir.1983) (restitution in amount of $900,000 is material alteration of plea agreement). 50 With respect to the court's imposition of re-entry restrictions, the government maintains there is no material variance with the plea agreement since Kamer would already be subject to such restrictions as a general matter of law. The government, however, appears only partially correct. Present law enables the Attorney General to exclude aliens who have been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a)(9) (1970 & 1985 Supp.). Moreover, Kamer's offense would be considered a crime of moral turpitude within the meaning of section 1182. See McNaughton v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 612 F.2d 457 (9th Cir.1980) (fraud is a crime involving moral turpitude). 51 Accordingly, ordering Kamer not to enter the United States without the permission of the Attorney General or an authorized agent thereof merely subjects Kamer to conditions he was already required to obey. The imposition of this restriction, therefore, is harmless error. 52 As to the requirement that Kamer report to a probation office within 48 hours of re-entry, however, the government cites no authority for the proposition that Kamer would have been required to do so absent the court's imposition of sentence. In light of the express language of the agreement and Kamer's expectations that probation would not be imposed at all, we find this additional requirement to be a material breach of the bargain. 53 Since we agree with Kamer that the plea agreement was breached, we vacate the judgment. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498-99, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971).