Opinion ID: 1701473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: possession as adverse

Text: The plaintiff, Brooks, claims that he acquired prescriptive title to the property in question by adverse possession thereof pursuant to Section 28-01-07, N.D.C.C., which provides as follows: In every action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the premises shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by law, and the occupation of such premises by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that such premises have been held and possessed adversely to such legal title for twenty years before the commencement of such action. A relevant statute regarding the nature of the adverse possession required is Section 28-01-11, N.D.C.C., which provides as follows: For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument nor upon a judgment or decree, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and occupied only in the following cases: 1. When it has been protected by a substantial inclosure; or 2. When it has been usually cultivated or improved. As shown by Section 28-01-07, N.D. C.C., the burden of proving adverse possession under that statute is on the person alleging such adverse possession. Further, in Odegaard v. Craig, 171 N.W.2d 133 (N.D. 1969), we noted that the adverse possessor must meet the burden of proof required of him by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence which might support a finding of adverse possession pursuant to Section 28-01-07, N.D.C.C., in the instant case is as follows: 1. Brooks and his wife received the annual rent checks from Clarence Tinjum during the period from 1951 until 1972 when Tinjum rented the land for pasturage. 2. Tinjum fenced the property on three sides to separate it from his property which bordered the property in question on those three sides. Tinjum also fenced the property on the fourth side during a period when he rented the land bordering that fourth side. 3. The plaintiff, Brooks, paid the taxes on the property during the twenty-year period during which he alleges adverse possession as against the defendant. 4. In 1952, the plaintiff, Brooks, told the defendants' father, Joe Clementich, that he (the plaintiff) had been paying the taxes on the property and that plaintiff Brooks and his wife were going to try to get things cleared up so they could dispose of the property. Evidence (or lack thereof) which tends to show that no adverse possession subsisted as against the Clementich defendants during the statutory period was as follows: 1. There is no evidence from which one can infer that Clarence Tinjum's fencing of the property in question can, in fact, be ascribed to his landlords as actions of their tenant rather than the actions of an adjacent landowner. 2. No evidence exists that improvements were made on the land in question by the plaintiff or by his tenant acting in his behalf. In fact, there is no evidence that there were any improvements upon the land whatsoever. 3. No evidence was available at trial from which one could infer that the plaintiff had notified the defendants directly of his intent to hold the property in hostility to their interests. [7] 4. The trial court determined [8] that the property passed by intestate succession pursuant to Chapter 56-01, N.D.C.C. (as opposed to Chapter 30-17, N.D.C.C., or N.D.R. C.1943), therefore the plaintiff's wife held as a tenant-in-common with the defendants during the statutory period. Ellison v. Strandback, 62 N.W.2d 95 (N.D.1953). In the Ellison case, we pointed out in syllabus 6 that: Before possession of real property by one cotenant can become adverse to the others, the cotenant in possession must give notice to the other cotenants either directly or by a course of conduct in direct hostility to their claims so as to show an ouster of the rights of such cotenants. Based upon a review of the evidence adduced at trial (as summarized above), we hold that the trial court's finding that the adverse possession alleged by the plaintiff as against the defendants never appertained is not clearly erroneous.