Opinion ID: 1277029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: ¶ 63 This case requires the court to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's determination. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is narrow: Appellate courts in Wisconsin will sustain a jury verdict if there is any credible evidence to support it. Morden, 235 Wis.2d 325, ¶ 38, 611 N.W.2d 659. Thus, if the evidence gives rise to more than one reasonable inference, [the court must] accept the particular inference reached by the jury. Id., ¶ 39, 611 N.W.2d 659. Similarly, the court must accept the jury's inference even if stronger and more convincing evidence supports a contradictory inference. Id. ¶ 64 In this case, the standard of review is even more stringent because the circuit court approved the jury's verdict. Id., ¶ 40, 611 N.W.2d 659. Thus: We afford special deference to a jury determination in those situations in which the trial court approves the finding of a jury. In such cases, this court will not overturn the jury's verdict unless there is such a complete failure of proof that the verdict must be based on speculation. Id. (quoting Coryell v. Conn, 88 Wis.2d 310, 315, 276 N.W.2d 723 (1979)). ¶ 65 With this standard of review firmly in mind, an appellate court must search the record for credible evidence that sustains the jury's verdict, not for evidence to support a verdict that the jury could have reached but did not. Morden, 235 Wis.2d 325, ¶ 39, 611 N.W.2d 659. After having reviewed the record, I conclude credible evidence supports the jury verdict. [2] ¶ 66 At trial, the defendants contested the causal connection between the accident and Hanson's radiculopathy. Causation turns on whether the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in producing the injury. Nieuwendorp v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 191 Wis.2d 462, 475, 529 N.W.2d 594 (1995). The jury's decision to limit Hanson's recovery of medical expenses to pre-surgery medical expenses is consistent with a finding that the accident caused some of Hanson's medical problems, but that neither the accident nor Dr. Lloyd's allegedly negligent treatment of Hanson's accident-related injury caused the structural damage (radiculopathy), which prompted Dr. Lloyd to operate. ¶ 67 Credible evidence presented at trial supports the inference that the jury determined the accident caused temporary soft tissue damage but did not cause, and was otherwise completely unrelated to, any structural damage. Accordingly, the jury could have correctly awarded Hanson the medical expenses she incurred after the accident but before the surgery without violating the rule set forth in Selleck. ¶ 68 In his closing argument, defense counsel forcefully argued that Hanson suffered two distinct injuries or conditions caused by two different sources. He stated: [I]t is from a biomechanical standpoint impossible that she could have had any structural damage causing surgery. It may be your judgment as a jury that she had some temporary soft tissue discomfort as a result of the accident. We are not saying, we are not trying to claim that that's impossible. But if that's the case, her damages should be limited accordingly. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 69 The closing argument was not the first instance where the record displays evidence of two distinct injuries. In defense counsel's opening statement, he stated: The evidence is going to show with someone like [the plaintiff], an accident like this at the most is going to cause some temporary soft tissue soreness in the neck.... And that's the extent of what this accident had caused. Defense counsel also stated to the jury that he was going to present a witness, Dr. Alfred Bowles, who was going to testify that, from a physical standpoint . . . there was [not] enough force or even injury in the accident to cause any sort of structural problem in the spine that would give rise to surgery. ¶ 70 Defense counsel fulfilled the promise he made to the jury in his opening statement. The record is replete with evidence that the plaintiff suffered from two distinct injuries or conditions. For instance: (A) When cross-examined, Dr. Lloyd stated that the initial injury from the accident was post-traumatic cervical dorsal strain or muscle strain. The muscle strain was of the type one would receive by lifting something too heavy, but it did not involve any problems with the spinal cord or nerve root associated with structural damage. From this evidence, the jury could have inferred that there were two distinct injuries, one caused by the accident and one not caused by the accident. (B) During re-direct examination, Dr. Lloyd stated that Hanson had two distinct injuries: permanent nerve root injury and muscle and soft tissue injury. Again, the jury could have found different causes for each distinct injury. ¶ 71 The record also contains evidence that the accident did not cause or lead to treatment that caused the structural damage: (A) Hanson testified that she had done some horseback riding and sledding before the accident and had done some shoveling after the accident. From this statement, the jury could have inferred that these other activities, not the accident, caused the structural damage that led to the surgery. (B) Upon direct examination, Dr. Lloyd stated that since the time of the accident, Hanson had complained of posterior neck pain radiat[ing] into her right arm and numbness into her hand, and that she also noticed weakness of her right arm. Upon cross-examination, however, Dr. Lloyd acknowledged that even before the accident, Hanson had complained of some hand numbness. The jury could have inferred from these statements that because Hanson experienced some of the same symptoms of structural damage before the accident, the structural damage existed before the accident, and that the accident did not cause the structural damage. (C) Upon direct examination, one of the defendant's experts, Dr. Bowles, stated that there was no evidence of a causal relationship between the accident and the structural damage: I can't find a . . . causal relationship between the impact, the impact related movement of the car and her body that would lead to the types of medical problems that are seen and treated down the road, especially related to the cervical spine and cervical nerve roots and pain and symptoms in the upper extremity. He acknowledged, however, that the accident could have caused some kind of minor injury, such as muscle strain. The jury could have determined that the accident caused the muscle strain but not the structural damage. (D) Upon cross-examination, Dr. Bowles stated that the structural damage could have been caused by an impact-related injury, but that it could also have been caused by a non-impact-related injury. Dr. Bowles stated that there are other factors that cause nerves not to conduct well. ¶ 72 While the record contains evidence contrary to the inference that the accident caused structural damage, [3] an appellate court must view[ ] the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict and ... accept[ ] the particular inferences drawn by the jury. Morden, 235 Wis.2d 325, ¶ 41, 611 N.W.2d 659. The majority fails to search the record for evidence supportive of the jury verdict and dismisses the possibility that the jury could have reasonably found that there were two distinct injuries or conditions, one caused by the accident and one unrelated to the accident or the subsequent treatment. By ignoring this possibility and awarding full damages as a matter of law, the majority either usurps the role of the jury or effectively eliminates one element of negligence: causation. [4] By allowing Hanson to recover damages for an injury that may not have been caused by the accident or by subsequent treatment of an accident-related injury, the majority expands the Selleck rule and embraces a fallacy. ¶ 73 The Selleck court stated: The plaintiff is not held responsible for the errors or mistakes of a physician or surgeon in treating an injury received by a defect in the street or sidewalk, providing she exercises ordinary care in procuring the services of such physician. Selleck, 100 Wis. at 163, 75 N.W. 975 (emphasis added). The Selleck rule, therefore, recognizes liability for unnecessary medical treatment, but only for treatment of injuries caused or aggravated by the accident. ¶ 74 The importance of first establishing a causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the injury aggravated or caused by a treating physician's negligence was made clear in Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hospital, 51 Wis.2d 281, 285-86, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971). The court explained that the Selleck rule reflects a public policy determination as to where the line of causation should end. Id. at 286, 187 N.W.2d 349. Thus, the Selleck rule presupposes causation and becomes relevant once a plaintiff establishes a causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's bodily injury for which treatment is provided. See id. ¶ 75 Whether the defendant's negligence caused the structural damage to Hanson's cervical vertebrae was hotly disputed at trial. Nevertheless, the majority assiduously avoids the question of whether the surgery was causally related to the accident. Rather, the majority focuses its discussion on whether the surgery arose from an initial injury that itself was caused by the accident. Id. Under this extension of the Selleck rule, a plaintiff is able to recover damages for any medical treatment as long as the treatment was prescribed as a result of inquiry about an accident-related injury. ¶ 76 To illustrate, imagine that a plaintiff is injured in a car accident and immediately experiences pain in her big toe and then, a couple days later, experiences inflammation and discomfort in the ball of her foot. She visits a doctor who finds that she has fractured her big toe, and who diagnoses her as in need of surgery to remove an extra bone in the ball of her foot. [5] The doctor reasons that the accident probably aggravated the tendon that attaches to this extra bone. It turns out, though, that the doctor was wrong in two regards: (1) the surgery was not necessary, and (2) the aggravation of the plaintiff's tendon was caused not by the accident but by the plaintiff having run a marathon three days before the accident. ¶ 77 Under the majority's interpretation, if the jury were to find that the accident caused the fractured toe, then, as a matter of law, the defendant would be liable not only for the damages associated with the fractured toe, but also for the damages associated with the inflamed tendon, including the resulting surgery, even though there was no causal connection between the accident and the presence of the extra bone. [6] ¶ 78 Thus, the majority effectively eliminates the need to prove causation in certain situations. This makes Wis JICivil 1720 a dead letter, replacing it with the reasoning of post hoc, ergo propter hoc.