Opinion ID: 1662320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: appeals from an order granting a new trial

Text: While the Kentucky Constitution prohibits the Commonwealth from appealing a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case, [8] this Court has held (in the context of the Commonwealth's appeal from an order granting a JNOV) that the Constitution does not prevent an appeal by the Commonwealth when a jury has returned a verdict of guilty which has been set aside by a ruling of law to a postverdict motion. [9] The same logic supports the conclusion that no constitutional prohibition prevents the Commonwealth from appealing an order granting a new trial. However, because new trial orders have been characterized not as final orders, [10] but as interlocutory orders, the statein the absence of a statute or rulegenerally cannot bring a direct appeal [11] from an order setting aside a jury's verdict and granting a new trial in a criminal case. [12] The Judicial Amendment [13] authorized the General Assembly to prescribe the appellate jurisdiction of the newly-created Court of Appeals: The Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction only, except that it may be authorized by rules of the Supreme Court to review directly decisions of administrative agencies of the Commonwealth, and it may issue all writs necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or the complete determination of any cause within its appellate jurisdiction. In all other cases, it shall exercise appellate jurisdiction as provided by law. [14] And, as part of the legislative package implementing the recently-adopted Judicial Amendment, the legislature enacted KRS 22A.020(4) [15] and authorized the Commonwealth to file an interlocutory appeal [16] from an adverse decision or ruling of the circuit court: An appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals by the state in criminal cases from an adverse decision or ruling of the Circuit Court, but only under the following conditions: (a) Such appeal shall not suspend the proceedings in the case. (b) Such appeal shall be taken in the manner provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of the Supreme Court, except that the record on appeal shall be transmitted by the clerk of the Circuit Court to the Attorney General; and if the Attorney General is satisfied that review by the Court of Appeals is important to the correct and uniform administration of the law, he may deliver the record to the clerk of the Court of Appeals within the time prescribed by the above-mentioned rules. (c) When an appeal is taken pursuant to this subsection, the Court of Appeals, if the record so warrants, may reverse the decision of the Circuit Court and order a new trial in any case in which a new trial would not constitute double jeopardy or otherwise violate any constitutional rights of the defendant. Subsections (a) and (b) of KRS 22A.020(4) are analogous to sections 335 and 337 of Kentucky's former Code of Practice in Criminal Cases: An appeal shall only be taken on a final judgment, except on behalf of the Commonwealth. An appeal by the Commonwealth from a decision of the circuit court shall not suspend the proceedings in the case. The decision of the Court of appeals shall be obligatory on the circuit courts, as being the correct exposition of the law. [17] If an appeal on behalf of the Commonwealth be desired, the Commonwealth's attorney shall pray the appeal ..., whereupon the clerk shall immediately make a transcript of the record and transmit the same to the attorney-general, or deliver the transcript to the Commonwealth's attorney, to be transmitted by him. If the attorney-general, on inspecting the record, be satisfied that error has been committed to the prejudice of the Commonwealth, upon which it is important to the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law that the Court of Appeals should decide, he may, by lodging the transcript in the clerk's office of the Court of Appeals, within sixty days after the decision, take the appeal. [18] In construing those sections, this Court's predecessor stated, Sections 335 and 337, when construed together, appear to authorize this court to review any ruling of the court below in felony cases, whether it be final or not, and without reference to whether the judgment be upon a verdict of a jury or whether it be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. [19] We agree with our predecessor, and in construing KRS 22A.020(4)(a) & (b), we find that the General Assembly has authorized the Commonwealth to appeal a circuit court order granting a new trial in a criminal case regardless of whether or not the order is a final order. [20] The question remaining before us, however, is whether the Commonwealth may appeal a new trial order in a criminal case for the purpose of seeking reinstatement of a trial verdict of guilty or whether the Commonwealth may bring such an appeal only for the limited purpose of certifying the law. Previously, in Commonwealth v. Littrell , [21] this Courtafter reviewing the creation and evolution of the Commonwealth's right of appeal in criminal cases [22] and recognizing the importance of providing the Commonwealth with a means of seeking review of a new trial order [23] held that the Commonwealth's attorney could seek review of a new trial order only for the purpose of certification: [T]he rule which we here enunciate ... is that a review will lie, in proper cases, from the granting of a new trial in a criminal case, but only for the purpose of certifying the law. Obviously, once the law is so certified, it becomes the law of the Commonwealth and, in particular, the law of the case being reviewed. [24] However, in an attempt to fashion a procedure affording the Commonwealth complete reliefi.e., reinstatement of the jury's verdictthe Littrell Court suggested a procedural step for Commonwealth's Attorneys to follow in future cases [25] where an appellate court determines that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial: [I]t then becomes incumbent on the Commonwealth's Attorney, in the trial court, to make such motions and take such steps as are necessary to bring the matter to the trial court's attention for proper reconsideration. [26] We do not believe that this procedure is necessary, and we overrule Littrell to the extent it limits the Commonwealth's appeal of a new trial order to a certification of the law. KRS 22A.020(4)'s immediate statutory predecessor, KRS 21.140, was originally enacted in 1962 upon the repeal of the Code of Practice in Criminal Cases. [27] In 1974, the General Assembly amended KRS 21.140, [28] and, until its repeal in 1976, [29] that provision read as follows: (3) An appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals by the state from an adverse decision or ruling of the circuit judge and such an appeal shall not suspend the proceedings in the case. An appeal by the state shall be taken in the manner provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure, except that the record on appeal shall be transmitted by the clerk of the circuit court to the Attorney General. If the Attorney General is satisfied, after inspecting the record, that error has been committed to the prejudice of the state, upon which it is important to the correct and uniform administration of the law that the Court of Appeals should decide, he may deliver the record to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals within the time prescribed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure. (4) When an appeal is taken pursuant to subsection (3), the Court of Appeals, if the record so warrants, may reverse the decision of the circuit court and order a new trial in any case in which a new trial would not constitute double jeopardy or otherwise violate any constitutional rights of the defendant. [30] KRS 22A.020(4) is therefore almost identical to subsections (3) and (4) of KRS 21.140. Our predecessor Court twice interpreted the provisions of KRS 21.140 to authorize the Commonwealth to bring an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's ruling not merely for certification of the law, but to obtain relief from the ruling. In Commonwealth v. Devine , [31] the trial court granted the defendant a directed verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence, and the Commonwealth appealed. This Court's predecessor construed KRS 21.140(3) and held: KRS 21.140(3), which provides that the Commonwealth may in criminal cases appeal to this court from adverse rulings and decisions of circuit courts, was enacted incident to adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective January 1, 1963. It replaces the substantive law formerly contained in Crim.Code §§ 335, 347, and 352. As pointed out in the introductory General Comment to Section XII (Appeals) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, in the separation and rearrangement of substantive and procedural matters as between the statutes and the rules, provisions regarded as attempts to define double jeopardy were eliminated. As we understand it, therefore, KRS 21.140(3) was intended to allow the Commonwealth an appeal not only for a certification of the law, but also for a reversal in any case in which a new trial would not constitute double jeopardy. [32] As such, the Court clearly expressed its opinion that the legislature hadeven before the 1974 Amendmentsauthorized the Court of Appeals to grant the Commonwealth substantive relief upon appeal. [33] In Commonwealth v. Lewis , [34] the Court again addressed the Commonwealth's right of appeal under KRS 21.140. In Lewis , the defendants successfully moved the trial court to dismiss a felony theft indictment on the grounds that the property had actually been stolen in Virginia instead of Kentucky. The Commonwealth appealed and the Supreme Court, after determining that double jeopardy would not prevent a retrial, indicated that the 1974 amendment to KRS 21.140which added the provision specifically authorizing the Court of Appeals to reverse the circuit courtwas immaterial, reiterated its prior holding in Devine , and reversed the dismissal: Whether KRS 21.140(3) as it existed before amendment by the 1974 General Assembly governs the Commonwealth's right of appeal in this case is immaterial. It was held in Commonwealth v. Devine, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 60, 61 (1965) that KRS 21.140(3) was intended to allow the Commonwealth an appeal not only for a certification of the law, but also for a reversal in any case in which a new trial would not constitute double jeopardy. The judgment is reversed for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [35] After reviewing Devine and Lewis , we conclude that, like its statutory predecessor, KRS 22A.020(4) authorizes the Court of Appeals to grant the Commonwealth substantive relief. In the case sub judice, KRS 22A.020(4) authorizes the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's new trial order and reinstate the judgment entered on the jury's verdict if the Court of Appeals determines that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. We assume that the holdings of Devine and Lewis were not brought to the attention of the Littrell Court since the opinion mentions neither case. While KRS 22A.020(4) was set forth in the opinion, the Court did not discuss subsection (c) or otherwise suggest why that subsection did not authorize the intermediate appellate court to reverse a new trial order and reinstate a trial verdict. All of the cases relied upon by the Littrell Court in support of its holding were decided prior to the 1962 enactment of KRS 21.140(3) [36] which this Court previously held in Devine and Lewis was intended to allow the Commonwealth to appeal for a reversal of a trial court's adverse ruling. As Justice Palmore recognized in Devine , and repeated in Lewis , KRS 21.140(3), was intended to allow the Commonwealth an appeal not only for a certification of the law, but also for a reversal in any case in which a new trial would not constitute double jeopardy. [37] The 1974 amendment to KRS 21.140(3) and the subsequent enactment of KRS 22A.020(4) removed any potential uncertainty by clearly authorizing an appeal by the Commonwealth to the Court of Appeals for the purpose of seeking a reversal of a trial court's decision or ruling unless such a reversal would constitute double jeopardy or otherwise violate any constitutional rights of the defendant. [38] As the relief requested by the Commonwealth would not implicate the constitutional protections against double jeopardy because the Commonwealth seeks reinstatement of the jury's verdict, we hold that the appellate procedure provided by KRS 22A.020(4) does not contemplate merely certification of the law, but rather authorizes the Court of Appeals to grant substantive relief. It has been suggested that an original proceeding seeking extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of prohibition or mandamus would be a more satisfactory method of handling the appeal of an interlocutory order by the Commonwealth. [39] We respectfully disagree for several reasons. First, regardless of any policy arguments to the contrary, the General Assembly has expressly authorized the appeal of such matters to the Court of Appeals subject to certain restrictions set forth in the statute. [40] Thus, the Commonwealth has an adequate remedy by appeal from an order granting a new trial, and extraordinary relief would not be appropriate. Second, in contrast to the record available for review on appeal, the record available to appellate courts in original actions is typically extremely abbreviated and often does not provide the information necessary for a thorough review of the issues presented. Finally, the briefing time for an original action is by necessity shorter than that provided for an appeal, [41] and this may lead to a less than complete discussion of the dispositive issues in the case. For these reasons, in the context of an appeal from an order granting a new trial, we find the KRS 22A.020(4) appellate procedure preferable to the extraordinary relief available only through a proceeding for a writ. [42]