Opinion ID: 1931267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Pass/Motion for Mistrial

Text: A motion to pass a case is viewed for all intents and purposes as identical to a motion for a mistrial. State v. LaRoche, 683 A.2d 989, 999 (R.I.1996) (citing State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 974 (R.I.1994)). A trial justice's decision to deny a motion for a mistrial is accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong. State v. Higham, 865 A.2d 1040, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) (quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1033 (R.I.2004)). [T]he trial justice enjoys a ringside seat at the trial and therefore is in the best posture to determine whether a witness's inappropriate remark [or action] has so inflamed the jurors that they no longer would be able to decide the case based on a calm and dispassionate evaluation of the evidence. Id. (quoting State v. Werner, 830 A.2d 1107, 1113 (R.I.2003)). Furthermore, [i]f the prejudice can be cured[,]    a mistrial will be ordered only if we are convinced that the cautionary instructions were untimely or ineffective. State v. Shinn, 786 A.2d 1069, 1072 (R.I.2002) (quoting State v. Kholi, 672 A.2d 429, 433 (R.I.1996)). Certainly, the entire rationale underlying the structure of jury trials and the lyrical deference that is paid to jury findings rests upon the proposition that jurors will obey the admonitions of the trial justice and will apply the law as given to them by the justice presiding. State v. Fenner, 503 A.2d 518, 522 (R.I.1986). In the absence of any indication that the jury was not capable of complying with the trial justices cautionary instruction, this court must assume that the jury did disregard the witness comments as it was instructed to do. State v. Powers, 566 A.2d 1298, 1304 (R.I.1989) (citing Fenner, 503 A.2d at 522). In the first instance, defendant's counsel moved to pass the case after Det. Rocha, a witness for the prosecution, identified Kenner, to whom defendant allegedly sold drugs, as a narcotic user. The trial justice denied the motion and remarked that to say that about the defendant would be so prejudicial that it would be a bell that could not be unrung. To say it about the third party Kenner who apparently is going to be connected to drugs, subsequent testimony is not as much of a concern to the extent that it cannot be cured with a cautionary instruction. I am going to give a cautionary instruction. The trial justice then told the jury: When last you were here and heard testimony there was an objection asserted to an answer given by the witness. The witness was referring to Bryan Kenner and the witness said something to the [e]ffect that Kenner was a drug user. The objection was raised. The objection was sustained. I instructed you to disregard that statement. Now,    let me tell you further that gratuitous statement was beyond the scope of the question, number one. Number two, was without any evidentiary basis in this case. It is a statement that you must disregard because there was no evidence provided linking Mr. Kenner to being a drug user. But more importantly,    there was no evidence in this case and there is no evidence that would link Mr. Kenner's alleged drug use to the defendant or to what the defendant knew or didn't know about Mr. Kenner.    It's so prejudicial that that statement was made that I have to ask you and I'm going to ask each and every one of you if you are able to disregard it, sit on this case, and hear the evidence from this point on without any regard to that prejudicial inappropriate statement and I'm going to take you one at a time and ask if you can do that. The trial justice then proceeded to poll the jurors individually, and all agreed that they would be able to disregard the statement. We are satisfied that the trial justice's comprehensive instruction to the jury was more than adequate to cure any possible prejudice that may have resulted from the witness's comment about a third party. Consequently, we hold that the trial justice did not err in refusing to pass the case at this point. The second motion for a mistrial occurred after the following exchange between the same witness and the prosecutor with regard to a photograph admitted into evidence for purposes of identification: [THE PROSECUTOR]: Officer, showing you State'sI believe that's State's 1 for identification, do you recognize that picture? [THE WITNESS]: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]: And how do you recognize that picture?    [THE COURT]: And, sir, would you make sure to respond just to the question. [THE WITNESS]: You want me to answer that question? It's a picture that I took when I was doing surveillance, a picture of the defendant when I was doing surveillance. The defendant's attorney asserted that the witness's answer exceeded the scope of testimony permitted by the trial justice, and that this prejudiced the defendant. The trial justice again agreed to give a cautionary instruction: Ladies and gentlemen, the witness had been asked a question having to do with how he knew what this photograph depicted. In his answer[,] beyond testifying that he took the photograph[,] he went on to say that it depicted the defendant. He did that after I cautioned him to just answer the question. Now, I am at a point where I have to tell you a little bit about the photograph so you are not prejudiced by what you heard. Number one, this photograph was not taken on the date of the alleged transaction. Number two, the defendant, if the person depicted in the picture is the defendant, because I do not know that, if the person depicted in the photograph is the defendant, he is not depicted at the location described by the officer when he testified as to the location of the alleged transaction. So I'm striking the answer and I'm instructing you to disregard it and I'm specifically telling you those are the reasons why. This photograph is not relevant to this case and is has no probative value. The only reason I allowed any testimony about photographs was because the witness had testified that he had a camera and took photographs[,] but this photograph does not depict the location in question or the date in question. The trial justice then, again, obtained individual assurances from all jurors that they would be able to disregard the picture. She told the jurors that the photograph was taken on a different date from the alleged transaction and that the person depicted in the photograph was shown in a different location from the alleged transaction. As in the first instance, we have no indication that the jury was unable or unwilling to heed the trial justice's advice and to follow her instruction. Again, we find no error in the trial justice's determination that a cautionary instruction was sufficient in this case to fend off any prejudice against the defendant, nor in her denial of the motion for mistrial.