Opinion ID: 2533856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Markels' Sentencing under Apprendi and Blakely

Text: ¶ 19 The United States Supreme Court's recent holding in Blakely dictates that the `statutory maximum' . . . is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.  124 S.Ct. at 2537. This holding clarified Apprendi, which stated that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. ¶ 20 The Markels argue that their cases should be remanded for resentencing because the trial judge made factual determinations properly within the province of the jury under Apprendi and Blakely. Counts I and II of the third amended information allege acts constituting first degree rape of a child, both occurring on or about November 24, 1990. ER at 129-30. Counts IV and V allege acts occurring between September 1, 1990, and November 24, 1990, without alleging specific dates. The Markels suggest vaguely that the jury did not consider or decide exactly when the crimes were committed and, therefore, when the judge sentenced them for separate counts, he was making a factual determination that each count did not involve the same criminal conduct. This, the Markels reason, was an unconstitutional deprivation of their right to have a jury determine facts that increased their penalty because the four separate convictions resulted in the application an offender score of 9 at sentencing. ¶ 21 We first look to RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a), which states as in relevant part as follows: In the case of multiple prior convictions, for the purpose of computing the offender score, count all convictions separately, except: (i) Prior offenses which were found, under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a), to encompass the same criminal conduct, shall be counted as one offense, the offense that yields the highest offender score. Under this sentencing scheme, a same criminal conduct finding is an exception to the default rule that all convictions must count separately. Such a finding can operate only to decrease the otherwise applicable sentencing range. The jury determined that the Markels were guilty of four separate counts, and no aggravating factors were considered by the judge. Accordingly, Apprendi and Blakely are not implicated under the facts of the Markels' cases because the same criminal conduct finding could only have lowered their applicable sentencing range and, therefore, the Markels are not entitled to resentencing. [6]