Opinion ID: 172239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Unambiguous Need Requirement of Section 4152(b)

Text: Section 4152(b) states that [t]he formula shall be based on factors that reflect the need of the Indian tribes and the Indian areas of the tribes for assistance for affordable housing activities. [6] 25 U.S.C. § 4152(b) (emphasis added). This language explicitly and unambiguously mandates that the factors in HUD's allocation formula reflect  in other words, have some connection or nexus with  the need of Indian tribes and Indian areas of the tribes. The language does not permit of any other reading. [7] Moreover, though HUD argues to the contrary, there is no other language in the statute creating ambiguity such that we would have to apply deference under Chevron's step two. First, HUD contends that the language in the statute regarding Indian areas permits HUD to introduce a geographic component to the allocation formula. Aplee. Br. 18. NAHASDA does state that the formula must be based on the need of the Indian tribes and the Indian areas of the tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 4152(b). This language, at first blush, suggests that Congress might have contemplated a requirement that a tribe exercise court jurisdiction over a geographic area. However, NAHASDA's definition of Indian area makes it clear that Congress did not open the door for a requirement of court jurisdiction when it used the term Indian area. NAHASDA's definitional section states that [t]he term `Indian area' means the area within which an Indian tribe ... provides assistance under this Act for affordable housing. Id. § 4103(10). According to this definition, all that the use of the term Indian area in § 4152(b) indicates is that HUD must take into consideration the need of the area in which the applicant Indian tribe provides housing assistance  it does not indicate that HUD may exclude an Indian tribe from receiving funding under 24 C.F.R. § 1000.324 simply because the tribe does not exercise court jurisdiction over that area. Second, HUD claims that NAHASDA is ambiguous in that Congress enumerated several factors that HUD could consider in creating the allocation formula and included a catch-all factor arguably broad enough to permit the jurisdictional requirement of 24 C.F.R. § 1000.302. NAHASDA does list as one factor such [o]ther objectively measurable conditions as the Secretary and the Indian tribes may specify. 25 U.S.C. § 4152(b)(3). However, the existence of this catch-all factor does not create ambiguity in the statute, because even the other objectively measurable conditions must be related to need. When interpreting the meaning of this statutory language, we must examine the... language in context, not in isolation. United States v. Nichols, 184 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 4152(b) states that the formula must be based on factors that reflect the need of the Indian tribes and the Indian areas of the tribes for assistance for affordable housing activities, including three specific factors. 25 U.S.C. § 4152(b). Included in the list of three factors is the other objectively measurable conditions factor. See id. § 4152(b)(3). Thus, it is clear from looking at the structure and language of § 4152(b) in its entirety that Congress did not allow for non-need-based considerations when it included subsection (b)(3). Rather, subsection (b)(3) is simply one of the need-based factors that Congress explicitly specified; to the extent it functions as a catch-all factor, it is a catch-all for need-based considerations only. Finally, HUD argues that the fact Congress delegated to HUD the authority to create an allocation formula means that we should defer to HUD's construction of that formula. While it is true that Congress delegated significant authority to HUD, 25 U.S.C. § 4152(a) (The Secretary shall ... establish a formula to provide for allocating amounts available for a fiscal year for block grants ....), that does not grant HUD license to ignore the parameters set forth by Congress. The same section that delegates authority to HUD expressly states that when HUD establishes an allocation formula, it must do so in accordance with the requirements of this section. Id. As we have seen, one of those requirements is that [t]he formula shall be based on factors that reflect the need of the tribes. Id. § 4152(b). Accordingly, while HUD may create a funding formula and may exercise significant discretion in doing so, the factors it adopts must reflect the need of applicant tribes. Because the regulations do not meet this standard (for the reasons discussed below), they violate the intelligible principle Congress set forth to guide HUD. Our system of administrative law is premised on the rule that when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must `lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.' Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., 531 U.S. 457, 473, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928)) (emphasis omitted). We would stand this rule  and our system of administrative law  on its head if we were to simply accept the delegation itself as the license for HUD to establish a non-need-based factor, contrary to the guidelines established by Congress. The dissent makes much of the fact that jurisdiction is referenced in 25 U.S.C. § 4112(c), the section setting forth statutory requirements for Indian Housing Plans. [8] Dissent at 2-4. However, we are not convinced that the reference renders § 4152 ambiguous. First, and most importantly, the reference to jurisdiction in its generic sense does nothing to suggest that HUD was free to impose a requirement of court jurisdiction. The dissent assumes that the terms jurisdiction and court jurisdiction are automatically co-terminous, but they are not necessarily so in this context. See, e.g., Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908, 910-11, 915-22 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that an Indian housing project was not Indian country and that the tribe did not have exclusive court jurisdiction over it even though it was overseen by an Indian housing authority that exercised some degree of control  or jurisdiction  over the project). In fact, HUD's own regulations make it clear that they are not synonymous, given that the regulations state that [w]henever the term `jurisdiction' is used in NAHASDA it shall mean `Indian Area' except where specific reference is made to the jurisdiction of the court. 24 C.F.R. § 1000.10. In turn, the regulations demonstrate that Indian area does not have a court jurisdiction aspect, as Indian area simply means the area within which an Indian tribe operates affordable housing programs. Id. Here, it is the term court jurisdiction that the UKB objects to, given that it is the term used in the challenged regulation. 24 C.F.R. § 1000.302. Accordingly, the use of the term jurisdiction has no particular relevance to the inquiry as to whether NAHASDA unambiguously prohibits a court jurisdiction requirement. Furthermore  even indulging the unwarranted assumption that the two terms are synonymous  rather than suggesting that § 4152 is ambiguous, the inclusion of the jurisdiction language in § 4112(c) demonstrates that Congress explicitly excluded court jurisdiction from the need-based formula under § 4152. [9] Because Congress demonstrated its awareness of a jurisdictional element in one section of the statute, it is clear that it could have allowed for court jurisdiction in another section of the statute if it had wished to do so. But it did not. Accordingly, the reference to jurisdiction in § 4112(c) does nothing to undermine our conclusion that § 4152 unambiguously excludes non-need-based factors such as court jurisdiction.