Opinion ID: 1694928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying edwards his right to represent himself, as guaranteed by article 3, section 26 of the mississippi constitution and the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution. whether the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous as it applied the incorrect standard of legal competence, rather than the correct standard of mental competence, in denying edwards this right.

Text: ¶ 31. Edwards asserts that he was denied his right to represent himself at trial. In addition, Edwards complains that the trial court committed reversible error by applying an incorrect legal competence standard in lieu of the correct mental competence standard. In his brief, Edwards cites eight alleged instances in the record where he claims he asserted his right to represent himself in pretrial and post-trial hearings. ¶ 32. Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution states: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself or counsel, or both ... In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held: The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense... Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation to make one's own defense personallyis thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment. The right to defense is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. ¶ 33. In order for a defendant to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel, the defendant must meet a test for competency to stand trial. Brooks v. State, 763 So.2d 859, 865 (Miss. 2000); Howard v. State, 701 So.2d 274, 280 (Miss.1997). The test for competency to stand trial mandates that a defendant be one `(1) who is able to perceive and understand the nature of the proceeding; (2) who is able to rationally communicate with his attorney about the case; (3) who is able to recall relevant facts; (4) who is able to testify in his own defense if appropriate; and (5) whose ability to satisfy the foregoing criteria is commensurate with the severity and complexity of the case.' Brooks, 763 So.2d at 865 (quoting Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1248 (Miss.1993)). ¶ 34. However, a trial court may forego a competency test in certain circumstances. As this Court said in Conner, `the real question, therefore, is whether `reasonable grounds' existed to believe that [the accused] was insane. If so, then Rule 4.08 mandates a competency hearing. The determination of what is `reasonable,' of course, rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge. He sees the evidence first hand; he observes the demeanor and behavior of the defendant.' 632 So.2d at 1248. For purposes of reviewing a decision to forego a competency hearing, this Court has cited the test applied by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: Did the trial judge receive information which, objectively considered, should reasonably have raised a doubt about defendant's competence and alerted him to the possibility that the defendant could neither understand the proceedings, appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense? Id. at 1248 (citing Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1261 (5th Cir. 1980)). ¶ 35. However, this Court finds that the issue is without merit. The Motion for New Trial and the Motion for JNOV do not reflect that Edwards raised the issue of a right to represent himself. ¶ 36. At the July 21, 1998, motion hearing to amend the indictment to charge habitual offender status, the trial court also addressed the issue of representation for Edwards. A defense attorney informed the court that Edwards had apparently fired him. The trial court asked Edwards about a letter in which he wanted to fire everyone in the court system. When the trial judge asked Edwards on the record whether he was planning to represent himself, Edwards responded that I might have to. A lengthy discussion ensued in which Edwards agreed to speak to Mr. Knochel with the understanding that if he did not like the representation then he would have to hire his own lawyer. ¶ 37. On November 17, 1998, a second hearing occurred. The trial court never ruled on the amendment to the indictment at the July hearing. This earlier hearing focused on the issue of representation for Edwards. At the November hearing, the trial court listened to Edwards's concerns about his case. In regard to the representation for Edwards, the trial court and Edwards exchanged the following remarks in pertinent part: BY THE COURT: Mr. Edwards, Mr. Gautier is going to represent you. Now, listen to me. Do you feel comfortable with Mr. Gautier so far? BY THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. ¶ 38. Again, the hearing concluded with the trial judge stating that if Edwards did not like his attorney then he would represent himself. In addition, the trial judge reiterated that Edwards had a right to represent himself, although she would not recommend it. ¶ 39. At trial, Edwards did not participate in the questioning of witnesses or any other aspect of the trial other than to state his decision not to testify on the record. At the Motion for New Trial hearing, Edwards stated that he wanted to represent himself. Again the trial court warned Edwards against such action but allowed him to present and participate in the hearing. The trial court judge had another lengthy discussion with Edwards concerning his assertion that he had appealed his case to the Supreme Court and explaining the need to have a ruling on the Motion for New Trial. The trial court listened to Edwards's main argument at the hearing of whether a shed was part of a dwelling. In addition, the trial court heard the arguments previously prepared in the Motion for New Trial by defense counsel. ¶ 40. The Court has reviewed the specific instances in the record and looked at the entire context of the interactive discussion between the trial court judge and Edwards. In the July 1998 hearing, Edwards appeared reluctant to relinquish his right to an attorney and proceed pro se. In the November 1998 hearing, Edwards stated he was comfortable with the defense counsel. At trial, Edwards did not participate in the proceedings but rather relied upon defense counsel to conduct the trial on his behalf. At the Motion for New Trial hearing, Edwards participated in the hearing to a greater extent than any of the other participants. ¶ 41. Edwards's assertion that he was denied the right of self representation is without merit. The record reflects that he agreed to have the assistance of counsel at the pre-trial hearings. In fact, defense counsel conducted the entire trial. At the post-trial hearing, Edwards participated in the hearing and expressed all his concerns to the trial court. ¶ 42. As to Edwards's assertion that the trial court applied the incorrect standard of legal competency instead of mental competency, this Court finds the complaint without merit. Edwards is correct in stating that this Court does apply a mental competency standard to determine whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel. Howard, 701 So.2d at 280. Reviewing the record within the proper context of the statements, it is clear that the trial court was only in the process of warning Edwards at the post-trial Motion for New Trial hearing against self-representation. However, the record also reveals that Edwards fully participated in the hearing expressing all his arguments directly to the trial judge.