Opinion ID: 2222062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Motion for Visitation.

Text: We next analyze the appealability of the denial of Suzette's motion for visitation. Suzette argues in effect that denial of visitation with her children is tantamount to the termination of her parental rights. Given the facts of the case, we conclude that the denial of Suzette's motion for visitation did not affect a substantial right, and therefore, the order is not appealable. As noted above, the terms of Suzette's rehabilitation and potential reunification with her children have been outlined in the rehabilitation plans adopted by the juvenile court in this case over several years and remain in effect. Those terms include Suzette's finding suitable housing for the children, finding a legal source of income, and profitably participating in therapy. Furthermore, after remand and notwithstanding the filing of the second motion to terminate, the stated permanency goal in this case remains reunification. The success of Suzette's being reunified with her children does not hinge solely on whether or not she engages in visitation with her children at this time, but, rather, on her overall progress in meeting the reasonable goals of the reunification plan, see, e.g., In re Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S., 227 Neb. 251, 417 N.W.2d 147 (1987), so that the children can be returned to her custody and cease their out-of-home placement status. The juvenile court's order denying visitation does not purport to terminate visitation. See In re Interest of Zachary L., 4 Neb.App. 324, 543 N.W.2d 211 (1996). Rather, Suzette remains free to regain visitation upon a showing that such visitation is in the best interests of the children. The court is aware of the case of In re Interest of B.J.M. et al., 1 Neb.App. 851, 510 N.W.2d 418 (1993), in which the Court of Appeals reversed an order terminating a father's parental rights to his four children based upon abandonment, following a no contact order imposed by the juvenile court. The Court of Appeals found the State had systematically created [a] series of impediments to the father's efforts to see his children, first by the action of the Department of Social Services and later by the juvenile court. Id. at 864, 510 N.W.2d at 426. The Court of Appeals determined that based upon the evidence in that case, the actions by the State and the juvenile court had effectively blocked repeated efforts by the father to see his children, and thus the State had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the father had abandoned his children for a period of 6 months immediately prior to the filing of the petition. Thus, our jurisprudence allows for recognition that a no contact or a no visitation order can significantly impact parental rights and that a no visitation order can affect substantial rights. Indeed, it has been held that an order terminating visitation can be a final order. In re Interest of Zachary L., supra . In contrast to the proceedings in In re Interest of B.J.M. et al., the termination proceedings pending against Suzette are not based upon her lack of visitation with or abandonment of the children. In the instant case, the State and the guardian ad litem seek to terminate Suzette's parental rights based upon the out-of-home placement of the children for 15 of the most recent 22 months. See  43-292(7). The out-of-home placement of the children, in turn, is due to Suzette's own sexual abuse of the children and her failure to protect the children from sexual abuse and other abuses by her boyfriend. Indeed, it is undisputed that the children were initially removed from the home and adjudicated due to the faults and habits of Suzette. In sum, it is the habits of Suzette and her failure to rehabilitate herself rather than the suspension of visitation which perpetuate the out-of-home placement of her children. The denial of visitation in the context of the instant case did not affect a substantial parental right of Suzette to raise her children. See In re Interest of Anthony G., 255 Neb. 442, 586 N.W.2d 427 (1998). We conclude, therefore, that the court's order denying Suzette's motion for visitation does not affect a substantial right and, accordingly, is not a final order for purposes of an appeal. In the absence of a judgment or appealable order, this court has no authority or jurisdiction to act, and in the absence of such judgment or order, the appeal will be dismissed.