Opinion ID: 2630572
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allocution Under the Common Law and Utah Law

Text: ¶ 46 At common law, allocution was the formal inquiry of one already convicted of a capital or treasonous offense before passing sentence; it was used to determine if a legal cause would prevent the sentence's execution. See Caren Myers, Note, Encouraging Allocution at Capital Sentencing: A Proposal for Use Immunity, 97 Colum. L.Rev. 787, 798-99 (1997). The standard question asked was, Do you know of any reason why judgment should not be pronounced upon you? See Paul W. Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L.Rev. 115, 115 (1944). As the practice of allocution developed, it took on a less formalistic character, becoming also a means for the defendant to request understanding and mercy. See 1 Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 700 (photo. reprint 1978) (London, A.J. Valpy 1816). ¶ 47 Even prior to the writing and adoption of our state constitution, Utah territorial law required the physical presence of a convicted felon at sentencing. Compiled Laws of Utah, Code of Criminal Procedures, Title VII, § 5102 s 326 (1888). If a defendant did not appear for sentencing after being released on bail, and was subsequently brought to court pursuant to a bench warrant, defendant had to be asked whether he has any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him. Id. at § 5108 s 332. Subsequently, the Utah Constitution guaranteed a defendant the right to appear and defend in person.  Utah Const., art. I, § 12. Thus, from the beginning of the development of this state's criminal procedures, a high value was placed on a defendant's availability and opportunity to speak at trial and sentencing. ¶ 48 Allocution is an inseparable part of the right to appear and defend in person guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Utah 1996). This court has previously addressed allocution, literally [a] speaking to [or] addressing[,] 1 Oxford English Dictionary, 236 (1961), under article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution in State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 358-59 (Utah 1993) (convicted person denied allocution before sentencing phase for aggravated murder where death penalty requested by the state). In Young, the court considered whether allocution is constitutionally guaranteed, but decided that it did not have to answer that question to resolve the claim raised. Three years later in Anderson, reviewing a convicted person's voluntary absence from his sentencing, we stated that under article I, section 12 of the Utah constitution: Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 implements the constitutional right [of allocution], providing: (a).... Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109-10 (emphasis added) (quoting Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a)). While Anderson concluded that the defendant had voluntarily waived his right to be present, it nonetheless affirmed the existence of a right to allocution: The right to allocution is nowhere specifically granted in... the state . . . constitution. It is an inseparable part of the right to be present. Id. at 1111 (emphasis added). Thus, in Anderson, this court clearly and thoughtfully recognized a constitutionally guaranteed right to allocution. ¶ 49 The right to allocution would be meaningless if a convicted person's allocution statements could be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution. Under such a rule, a competent attorney would almost always advise the client against allocuting, at least in any case in which an appeal is contemplated. See Myers at 789 n. 9. Trial judges would have to inform defendants at allocution that their statements could be used against them at any retrial. It is not likely that defendants would be willing to make any incriminating admissions after such a warning. ¶ 50 This case need not turn on constitutional questions, however, because the policy embodied in rule 24(d) is determinative. [7]