Opinion ID: 176473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Co-Defendant Fernandez's Invocation of the Fifth Amendment

Text: We first consider two challenges relating to Fernandez's refusal to testify on Flores-Blanco's behalf. After Fernandez pleaded guilty, Flores-Blanco subpoenaed Fernandez to testify. At a hearing held outside of the presence of the jury, counsel for Flores-Blanco informed the district court that Fernandez had exculpatory evidence to offer in her client's favor. In response to the district court's request for an offer of proof, counsel claimed that Fernandez would testify [t]hat [it] was his job and [Flores-Blanco] had nothing to do with it. Fernandez then interjected, [Flores-Blanco] had nothing to do with it. Nonetheless, after conferring with counsel and being warned by the district court that he would be subject to cross-examination if he testified, Fernandez twice stated that, if called as a witness, he would assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Counsel for Flores-Blanco asked the government, and then the district court, to grant Fernandez use immunity, but both refused. At a later hearing convened to clarify that Fernandez's plea agreement did not prohibit him from testifying, Fernandez again stated his intention to invoke the Fifth Amendment if he were called to testify. Flores-Blanco first challenges the district court's refusal to compel the government to grant Fernandez use immunity. We conclude that there was no error. [1] To require the district court, as a matter of due process, to compel use immunity for Fernandez, Flores-Blanco had to make two showings. First, he had to show that Fernandez's anticipated testimony was relevant. United States v. Straub, 538 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir.2008). Second, Flores-Blanco was required to show either that: (a) the prosecution intentionally caused [Fernandez] to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination with the purpose of distorting the factfinding process; or (b) the prosecution granted immunity to a government witness in order to obtain that witness's testimony, but denied immunity to [Fernandez,] whose testimony would have directly contradicted that of the government witness, with the effect of so distorting the fact-finding process that [Flores-Blanco] was denied his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial. Id. at 1162. Even if we assume that Fernandez's testimony would have been relevant to Flores-Blanco's defense, Flores-Blanco has not met either of the last two requirements. Nothing in the record indicates that the government deliberately caused Fernandez to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights. Counsel's contention at oral argument that the district court intimidated Fernandez into asserting his Fifth Amendment rights also has no support in the record. Nor does anything in the record indicate that the government denied use immunity to Fernandez while granting use immunity to a government witness: there were no immunized government witnesses. There also was no plain error in the district court's failure to conduct additional inquiry into the propriety of Fernandez's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. [2] The district court was not required to inquire into Fernandez's reasons for asserting the Fifth Amendment. Instead, [t]o sustain the privilege, it need only [have] be[en] evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it [was] asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might [have] be[en] dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). Here, the district court did not plainly err by concluding that cross-examination of Fernandez on his assertion that Flores-Blanco had nothing to do with the charged offenses would have resulted in Fernandez incriminating himself in criminal activity. For similar reasons, the district court did not plainly err by not inquiring into the scope of Fernandez's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Although a district court must ordinarily determine whether a witness will invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to specific questions, ... [the district court] may recognize a witness's blanket privilege against self-incrimination if the court, based on its knowledge of the case and of the testimony expected from the witness, can conclude that the witness could legitimately refuse to answer essentially all relevant questions. United States v. Klinger, 128 F.3d 705, 709 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Tsui, 646 F.2d 365, 367-68 (9th Cir.1981)). Here, the district court knew from Flores-Blanco's proffer that Fernandez's testimony inevitably would concern Fernandez's own role in the offenses. The district court also was aware that Fernandez faced un-dismissed charges, despite pleading guilty to Count 3. Accordingly, even if we assume that Fernandez's invocation of the Fifth Amendment could be construed as a blanket refusal to testify, the district court did not plainly err by allowing Fernandez to assert the Fifth Amendment without requiring him to be subjected to specific questions.