Opinion ID: 2373626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Reason for the Delay and Assertion of Right

Text: [¶ 12] This case presents a slightly unique situation in that the appellant raised with the district court the issue of a speedy trial violation regarding only the post-arrest delay. It was not until this appeal that the appellant raised the issue of a potential speedy trial violation which also included the pre-arrest delay. As we stated above, the speedy trial clock begins to run at the time of arrest, information, or indictment, whichever occurs first. See supra ¶ 8. However, because the appellant only asserted a violation resulting from the post-arrest delay, our analysis with regard to the reason for the delay and assertion of right factors changes slightly. Because of this situation, we find it appropriate to address the second and third factors together. [¶ 13] The second factor requires us to examine the reasons for the delay, including which party was responsible for the delay in bringing the appellant to trial. Humphrey, 2008 WY 67, ¶ 23, 185 P.3d at 1244; see also Wehr, 841 P.2d at 112-13. Regarding this factor, we have said: A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. Wehr, 841 P.2d at 112-13 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192). We also determine which delays are attributable to the defendant and weigh those delays against the delays attributable to the State. Strandlien, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 10, 156 P.3d at 991. Unquestionably, delays attributable to the defendant may disentitle him to speedy trial safeguards. Berry, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 35, 93 P.3d at 232. With regard to the third factorassertion of one's right to a speedy trialwe have repeatedly held that to prevail on a speedy trial claim, one must not necessarily assert that right below. Strandlien, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 13, 156 P.3d at 991; Berry, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 45, 93 P.3d at 236. However, failure to assert the right to a speedy trial is weighted heavily against the appellant. Id. [¶ 14] In this case, the appellant unquestionably asserted his right to a speedy trial on numerous occasions, which included filing a demand for speedy trial approximately a month after being arrested, and again following the dismissal and re-filing of charges, as well as filing a Motion to Dismiss based on speedy trial grounds. However, as noted above, at the hearing relating to the appellant's Motion to Dismiss, the appellant's trial counsel argued for dismissal on speedy trial grounds, but only raised the issue of the post-arrest delay. The appellant's trial counsel did not raise the pre-arrest delay and, as a consequence, the district court never considered that delay in its Barker analysis. The problem on appeal is that the failure to raise that issue below resulted in no development of the facts and circumstances relating to the pre-arrest delay. It is true that the State carries the burden of proving that the delays in bringing the appellant to trial were reasonable and necessary. Berry, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 31, 93 P.3d at 231. However, because the appellant did not raise the pre-arrest delay with the district court, the State was not required to explain the reasons for that delay. [3] As to the post-arrest delay, the appellant did assert his right to a speedy trial and the record is fairly clear regarding the reasons for the delay during that period of time. During the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss, the prosecutor made the following statements relating to the post-arrest delay, specifically addressing the reason the State needed additional time to dismiss the original case and re-file charges: As the Court mentioned, we did have discussions in chambers about the issues that came up while we were investigating the case. And there was [sic] some time frames that didn't seem to fit with the original Information that was filed in this matter. Again, we're relying on the recollection of a 9 year oldnow an adult, a young ladyto try to get those time frames correct. So the reason for the delay, I think, is reasonable based upon the things that I've just mentioned. [¶ 15] As a result of the appellant's failure to raise the pre-arrest delay with the district court, it is inappropriate automatically to attribute that portion of the delay to the State, mainly because we cannot be certain as to the reason for the delay. See Strandlien, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 11, 156 P.3d at 991 (A delay between indictment and arrest should not be weighted against or in favor of either party where the record is silent as to reason for the delay.). Regarding the post-arrest delay, it is difficult to imagine how that delay could be attributed to anyone except the State. The delay was due largely to the fact that the State had the wrong dates of the alleged incidents and needed time to correct them, which included additional time to investigate. However, nothing in the record indicates that the delay was done for the purpose of hampering the defense. Moreover, we cannot say that the delay was not for a valid purpose; namely, corroborating the precise dates with the victim after nearly a dozen years had passed since the alleged incidents. Accordingly, this factor is neutral. [¶ 16] Regarding the third factor assertion of rightit has been stated that a defendant should not be taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest where it was not shown that he was even aware that charges were pending against him prior to his arrest. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. at 2691. However, we simply cannot ignore the fact that when the appellant asserted his right to a speedy trial below and complained of the post-arrest delay, he did not also raise the issue of the pre-arrest delay. See Wehr, 841 P.2d at 113 (Although assertion of the right to a speedy trial is not imperative for a successful speedy trial claim, whether the right was asserted, and how vigorously, should be considered in determining the reasonableness for the delay.); Campbell, 999 P.2d at 656 ([L]ess than vigorous assertions of the right to a speedy trial are given little weight....). Regarding the failure to assert one's right to a speedy trial, we have noted a distinction between cases where the defendant was represented by counsel and those where counsel was not involved. See Wehr, 841 P.2d at 114. In drawing a distinction between those cases, we stated that we give less weight to a defendant's claim of deprivation when he failed to assert the speedy trial right while being advised by an attorney. Id. at 113. Because the appellant raised the issue of speedy trial with regard to the post-arrest delay, but failed to raise any issue with the pre-arrest delay, even though he was represented by counsel, at most we can only say that this factor slightly favors the appellant. We also note that in finding that this factor slightly favors the appellant, we find it significant that the post-arrest delay about which the appellant originally complained was slight in comparison to the pre-arrest delay which the appellant wholly ignored below.