Opinion ID: 2090181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: linnco's purported lien on the estate's mobile home

Text: [¶ 5] Linnco relies on a pair of statutes, see 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 3451, 3452 (1997), [1] to assert that it holds a land rent lien on the estate's mobile home. The Probate Court held that Linnco did not have a land rent lien because it failed to properly perfect such a lien. Because statutory construction is a matter of law, we review decisions regarding the meaning of a statute de novo. See Estate of Jacobs, 1998 ME 233, ¶ 4, 719 A.2d 523, 524. [¶ 6] The statutory land rent lien has been a part of Maine law, in one form or another, since 1823. [2] We have considered the land rent lien, now codified in sections 3451 and 3452, only once before. See Union Water-Power Co. v. Chabot, 93 Me. 339, 45 A. 30 (1899). In Union Water-Power, we construed the land rent lien statutes broadly to attach a continuing lien on the building at the time it is erected on the land and made that lien enforceable against the building whenever land rent becomes due and payable. Union Water-Power, 93 Me. at 344, 45 A. at 31. [¶ 7] The Probate Court, however, erred by applying the land rent lien statutes because a different statute which specifically applies to mobile homes situated in mobile home parks occupies the field and prohibits the type of land rent lien sought by Linnco. See 10 M.R.S.A. § 9097-A (1997). [3] Section 9097-A(2)(C) applies to leases that attempt to create a lien by operation of a rental agreement between a mobile home owner and a mobile park operator. See id. The statute specifically declares lease provisions which seek to require the tenant to give a lien upon the tenant's property, including a tenant's mobile home, for the amount of any rent or other sums due the park owner or operator to be an unfair trade practice and unenforceable. Id. [¶ 8] When statutes appear to contradict, we seek to harmonize those statutes if possible. See Koch Refining Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 1999 ME 35, ¶ 6, 724 A.2d 1251, 1253. Sometimes, statutes diverge to such an extent that harmonization is impossible. It is unrealistic to assume that whenever the legislature passes a statute it has in mind all prior acts relating to the same subject matter. 2B SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.01, at 118 (1992 & Supp.1998). When statutes cannot be harmonized, a statute dealing with a subject specifically prevails over another statute dealing with the same subject generally. Butler v. Killoran, 1998 ME 147, ¶ 11, 714 A.2d 129, 133 (citing 2B SUTHERLAND, supra, § 51.05, at 174). [¶ 9] While section 9097-A applies only to leases that try to establish liens and sections 3451 and 3452 create statutory liens independent of any contract, it defies common sense to suggest, as Linnco does, that the Legislature intended a statutory lien that cannot be created pursuant to a lease. If it is an unfair trade practice to attempt to create a lien by lease, it certainly follows that a statutory lien creating the same result is also inappropriate. [4] Linnco should not receive the benefit of a statutory lien that it could not enforce had it been a provision of part of a lease. The Legislature cannot have intended such an illogical result. Section 9097-A(2)(C) controls here as the specific statute, and we hold that the statutory land rent lien does not apply to mobile homes situated in mobile home parks.