Opinion ID: 1737820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: law i. confession

Text: Leatherwood argues that the introduction of his confession to Williams violates both his Fifth and Sixth amendment rights because it was given following his requesting an attorney, and the interrogation was initiated by Williams. The U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), promulgated a formula, a bright line rule for determining whether a confession is free and voluntary. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. 451 U.S. at 484-486, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-1885, 68 L.Ed.2d at 386. The Court held that questioning in violation of this rule was a per se violation of an accused's Miranda rights under the Fifth Amendment that no accused should be compelled to give evidence against himself. Then in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), the Court applied the same prophylactic rule where an accused during arraignment requested an attorney, and was thereafter interrogated by the police, holding such questioning to be in violation of the accused's Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. This bright line, or prophylactic rule has been further delineated in other Supreme Court decisions, namely: Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 105 S.Ct. 1065, 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). No purpose is served by further analysis of the Court's decisions, or criticism of its application by dissenting members. Suffice it to say that the Court has fashioned a certain rigid formula whereby a trial court is obligated to determine whether a confession is competent following an accused's request for an attorney. If the defendant passes this test, then the confession is automatically excluded from being introduced by the State, at least as a part of its case-in-chief. On the other hand, if the test is not met, the trial court determines whether the confession was freely and voluntarily given under all the Miranda standards and our rules of evidence. This Court will, of course, scrupulously adhere to the mandate of the U.S. Supreme Court. Leatherwood's sole basis for attack is that the confession to Williams violates the Edwards rule. He gives no other reason for excluding it. It is clear, however, that Leatherwood has failed to meet the test of Edwards. At the time of his questioning by Williams, and contrary to the situation existing in Edwards and Jackson, the State had made counsel available to Leatherwood. Jefferson B. Stewart had been appointed to defend Leatherwood during the day of May 3, 1985. The record does not reveal what Stewart advised Leatherwood, but presumably he advised him of his rights. (Vol. IV, pp. 571-72) State's Exhibit 3 is a copy of the order of County Court Judge Michael W. McPhail in compliance with Rule 1.04 of our Criminal Rules of Procedure, finding that Leatherwood appeared in his court on May 3, 1985, represented by Stewart, and being fully informed of his Miranda rights. [1] Exhibit 4 is a copy of an order by Judge McPhail on the same date appointing Stewart as Leatherwood's counsel. Beyond this, in this state we have a well-recognized procedure whereby the competency of a confession or admission by an accused to a criminal offense may be determined by the circuit judge in chambers. At such a hearing the State is required to make a prima facie showing that the confession is free and voluntary. If the State makes such a showing, it is then incumbent upon the defendant to offer evidence in support of any reason he has for objecting to the admission of the confession. If he fails to do so, he cannot thereafter complain of its inadmissibility on some evidentiary basis which he failed to present in chambers, when he had an opportunity to do so. Cf. Kelly v. State, 493 So.2d 984 (Miss. 1986); Hemingway v. State, 483 So.2d 1335 (Miss. 1986); Tolbert v. State, 511 So.2d 1368 (Miss. 1987); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317 (Miss. 1987). In this case Leatherwood did not testify in chambers. The only witness he offered was Stewart, who neither disputed nor refuted any of the State's evidence. The record shows that before Leatherwood gave his confession he signed a form acknowledging he had been given all Miranda warnings, including the following: 4. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. 5. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning, if you wish. 6. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.       WAIVER OF RIGHTS: I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kinds has been used against me. s/Alfred Leatherwood State's Exhibit 4. Williams also testified that he had fully given Leatherwood all Miranda rights, including his right to have an attorney present before making any statement. With this evidence before him undisputed, the circuit judge was fully warranted in finding Leatherwood had knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth amendment right to counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). No trial judge should be faulted for concluding under these facts that an accused had intelligently waived his right to counsel. Why should a court be inquired to delve further? If Leatherwood had not indeed knowingly waived his right to have his attorney present when Williams questioned him, he had the opportunity to say so at the hearing in chambers. Moreover, even though the circuit judge held the confession freely and voluntarily given, and competent as evidence, the State made no attempt to introduce it as part of its case-in-chief. On cross-examination by the State, Leatherwood admitted he had been furnished a lawyer by the State on the morning of May 3, that the lawyer was with him when he appeared before the county court judge, and the lawyer had talked to him. He also admitted that prior to the confession Williams had told him that he had a right to a lawyer, and that he understood his rights. When Leatherwood testified, the only reason he gave for attacking the credibility of the confession was that it was a result of a deal Williams made with him to reduce his imprisonment to two weeks, a charge he does not maintain on his appeal. Then, in rebuttal Williams denied promising Leatherwood anything to get the confession, and the confession was introduced without objection into evidence before the jury. The assignment of error is therefore without merit. There was no Edwards violation, but even so the evidence in this case is uncontradicted that Leatherwood manifestly knowingly waived his right to have his attorney present when he confessed to Williams, and finally, the confession was offered without objection as impeachment. United States ex rel. Adkins v. Greer, 791 F.2d 590 (7th Cir.1986); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); U.S. v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919 (10th Cir.1979).