Opinion ID: 884671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 81 Did the District Court err in admitting evidence of a second blood alcohol test, the results of which were contained in Ingraham's medical records? ¶ 82 On October 17, 1995, the State completed an application for an investigative subpoena to obtain blood samples taken from Greg Ingraham at St. Luke Hospital, Ronan, Montana, on or about October 13, 1995, as well as any medical records pertaining to Ingraham's treatment during that time period. In its application, the State revealed that because the blood sample already in its possession had been preserved with a sodium-based preservative, technicians at the Montana State Crime Lab would be unable to test it for the presence of lithium and Buspar. The State thus sought Ingraham's medical records, alleging in its application for an investigative subpoena that: From previous experience with similar cases I am aware that hospitals routinely perform their own alcohol and drug tests on patients to determine whether those patients are under the influence of any substances which could affect their treatment. Hospital records also reflect statements made by the patient to hospital employees. Both of these items are relevant to the prosecution of this case. ¶ 83 The District Court issued the investigative subpoena on October 17, 1995, concluding that the application has been made in good faith and in the furtherance of a pending criminal investigation, and that there is reason to believe that the aforesaid test results may constitute evidence of possible criminal activities. ¶ 84 On February 20, 1996, Ingraham filed a motion to limit the scope of the investigative subpoena, and to preclude the State from using any records thus obtained from St. Luke's Hospital. Ingraham argued the subpoena was overly broad, and in violation of §§ 46-4-301 and -303, MCA. In a June 14, 1996, order, the District Court denied Ingraham's motion on the grounds that it was unable to conclude ... that [Ingraham's] privacy interest in statements made to hospital employees at or near the time of the accident outweighs the public's right to know. ¶ 85 On June 21, 1996, Ingraham filed a motion in limine seeking to specifically exclude all evidence of the blood alcohol test performed at St. Luke's Hospital at 5:30 a.m., October 13, 199[5]. The court denied Ingraham's motion in limine, noting in part that the State was charged with the responsibility of determining if there was probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. The court concluded the State had a clear compelling need for any evidence tending to establish [Ingraham's] blood alcohol content near the time of the accident. Moreover, the court reasoned that simply because the State had access to the 4:12 test does not mitigate its need for any additional tests performed in the general time period following the collision, and held that Ingraham's privacy interest in the blood alcohol test is outweighed by the State's compelling need to establish the facts as to the collision. ¶ 86 Ingraham argues on appeal that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to exclude evidence of test results from the 5:30 a.m. blood sample. More specifically, Ingraham asserts the court erred in concluding the State demonstrated that its compelling need for those test results outweighed any expectation of privacy he had in his own medical records, and in concluding the State had demonstrated it had probable cause to justify the court's issuance of the investigative subpoena. ¶ 87 In State v. Nelson (1997), 283 Mont. 231, 941 P.2d 441, decided by this Court roughly one year after Ingraham's trial, we had occasion to redefine the standard pursuant to which the State may obtain discovery of protected medical records. In Nelson, we held that in order to establish that there is a compelling state interest for the issuance of an investigative subpoena for the discovery of medical records, the State must show probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and medical information relative to the commission of that offense is in the possession of the person or institution to whom the subpoena is directed. Nelson, 283 Mont. at 244, 941 P.2d at 449. ¶ 88 In Nelson, we held the State had probable cause to believe an offense had been committed and that the defendant's medical records contained evidence of the offense, where the facts indicated that Nelson had consumed a couple of drinks before the accident; that the road was bare and dry; that he ran into a guardrail; that he suffered a broken jaw; and that he had received medical treatment at the Glendive Medical Center. Nelson, 283 Mont. at 244, 941 P.2d at 450. Under the facts in that case, we affirmed the District Court's order denying Nelson's motion to quash the investigative subpoena, or in the alternative to suppress evidence. Nelson, 283 Mont. at 244, 941 P.2d at 450. ¶ 89 In the present case, the State's application for an investigative subpoena set forth facts which demonstrate it had probable cause to believe an offense had been committed and that Ingraham's medical records contained evidence of the offense. In its application, the State asserted that Ingraham's vehicle had crossed over the centerline and struck a pickup truck, and indicated that [w]itnesses at the scene said that Ingraham appeared to be intoxicated, and the officers found a beer bottle and several beer bottle caps in Ingraham's car. The State also noted that two prescription medicine bottles were found in his car. Moreover, it is apparent from the text of its application that the State was aware that Ingraham had received treatment at St. Luke Hospital in the hours following the accident. Applying the standard enunciated by this Court in Nelson, we conclude the State adequately demonstrated it had a compelling state interest for the issuance of an investigative subpoena. We accordingly affirm the District Court's orders denying Ingraham's motion to limit the scope of the investigative subpoena, and denying his motion to exclude evidence of test results from the 5:30 a.m. blood sample.