Opinion ID: 794241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: New Loan Programs

Text: 42 Three Appellants (CSB, FBD, and Creditcorp) argue that this appeal is not moot because they intend to develop, or are in the process of developing, a new consumer loan program, and the presence of the Act interferes with their ability to develop new loan products. 3 For example, CSB's response to the suggestion of mootness indicates that at the same time as it is winding down its Payday Loan program, [it] is actively working on a different consumer lending program (the `New Program') with Plaintiff Cash America Financial Services, Inc. . . . CSB Response to Suggestion of Mootness at 2-3 (emphasis added). CSB argues that its new, but different, loan program might comply with the FDIC's new rules but still violate the Act. 43 Similarly, while FBD is discontinuing the particular payday loan program that is the subject of this appeal, FBD asserts that the Act defines the term `payday loans' much more broadly than does the FDIC and more broadly than the type of payday loans that FBD is discontinuing. FBD Response to Suggestion of Mootness at 1. From this statement, FBD also argues that it may develop a new loan program that may comply with the FDIC's new rules but that may still violate the Act. Additionally, Creditcorp indicates that it would consider marketing these bank products in Georgia if the Act were declared invalid. Scoggins Decl. at 1. 44 The fact that some Appellants may be retooling their business plans, may develop another type of short-term loan, and may enter into new servicing agreements with the non-bank parties in Georgia does not keep this appeal from being moot. The precise nature of the new but different loan programs and the manner in which they are to be administered in Georgia remain far too speculative and abstract at this juncture to create an actual case or controversy. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 449, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority `to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions....') (citation omitted). Furthermore, there has been no showing that even if Appellants were to create new loan programs and enter into new servicing agreements, they would be able to satisfy the relevant regulatory authorities. The mere possibility of new loan programs is not sufficient to present a justiciable controversy. If we addressed issues that might arise, we would be rendering an advisory opinion on future conduct and events that may never occur, something which Article III does not permit us to do. 45 Based on a speculative, abstract set of factual circumstances that may or may not come to pass, Appellants are asking this Court to declare preempted and unconstitutional an Act of the Georgia legislature. It may or may not be that a future loan program, if one is developed by Appellants and if it does not run afoul of regulatory authorities, could justify a motion for leave to amend the complaint, or a new motion for a preliminary injunction, if the future turns out the way Appellants hope it does. But those if's, that speculation, and those contingencies cannot keep the current appeal of the preliminary injunction ruling, tied as it is to the prior loan programs and servicing agreements, from being moot. See Ethredge v. Hail, 996 F.2d 1173, 1174-76 (11th Cir.1993) (where plaintiff's initial motion for a preliminary injunction was specific in seeking relief so that plaintiff could display stickers critical of former President Bush, who was no longer in office, appeal was moot because the administrative order at issue only forbade stickers critical of the Commander in Chief; plaintiff's propensity to criticize Presidential policies and likelihood of criticizing future presidents did not present a live controversy as to the appeal of the district court's preliminary injunction ruling); Wakefield v. Church of Scientology of Cal., 938 F.2d 1226, 1229 n. 1 (11th Cir.1991) (This [C]ourt reviews the case tried in the district court; it does not try ever-changing theories parties fashion during the appellate process.). 46 In sum, there is a justiciability gap in this case because Appellants have discontinued their old loan programs and servicing agreements and have not replaced them with any new ones presenting the same legal issues that were decided by the district court when it denied Appellants' motions for preliminary injunction. If we were to rule on those legal issues, which are no longer presented, we would be overstepping our judicial authority by rendering an impermissible advisory opinion about a non-existing set of facts. Cole, 355 F.3d at 1293. 47 Thus, we reject Appellants' claims that their intent, aspirations, or ongoing efforts to develop a new loan program that they hope will dodge any FDIC objections but think may still violate the Act keeps this current appeal from becoming moot.