Opinion ID: 3029788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Appointed Counsel

Text: We review the denial of appointed counsel for abuse of discretion. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[B]ecause 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) gives the district 1 Defendants raise the argument that dismissal was appropriate given the effect of Aruanno’s state-court proceedings, which were terminated by summary judgment before his federal claim was filed. Arguing under New Jersey’s “entire controversy doctrine,” a relative of res judicata, Defendants assert that the fact that the state proceedings involved the same allegations means that the § 1983 claim is barred as a 12(b)(6) matter. This is incorrect. See Rycoline Prods. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1997) (“We held in Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978), that if a statute of limitations ‘bar is not apparent on the face of the complaint, then it may not afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).’ This holding applies not only to a statute of limitations defense, but also to any affirmative defense raised pursuant to Rule 8(c), including res judicata and the Entire Controversy Doctrine.”). Thus, the affirmative defense put forward by Defendants cannot be the basis for a 12(b)(6) dismissal, because it was not evident from the face of the complaint. Nor is it at all clear that, even if this doctrine applied, it would be applicable in Aruanno’s case, because the Defendants concede that Defendant Officer Cota was not a party to the statecourt action. Respondent’s Br. 19 n.2. 9 courts broad discretion to appoint counsel, the courts of appeals should reverse that exercise of discretion only where the party seeking appointment has shown that the district court’s decision not to appoint counsel was clearly an abuse of discretion . . . .”). The Magistrate Judge correctly cited Tabron v. Grace, which sets forth the factors to be taken into consideration in determining whether the appointment of counsel is warranted. These factors include whether the suit has “arguable merit;” the plaintiff’s ability to present his case; and the plaintiff’s “education, literacy, prior work experience, and prior litigation experience.” Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156. The “court must also consider the difficulty of the particular legal issues,” assess “the degree to which factual investigation will be required and the ability of the indigent plaintiff to pursue such investigation” and “the extent to which prisoners and others suffering confinement may face problems in pursuing their claims.” Id. Finally, “where the claims are likely to require extensive discovery and compliance with complex discovery rules, appointment of counsel may be warranted,” and “when a case is likely to turn on credibility determinations, appointment of counsel may be justified.” Id. The Magistrate Judge misapplied these factors to the facts before him. In weighing each of the factors, the Magistrate Judge erred by giving insufficient consideration to the uncontroverted medical reports describing Aruanno’s condition and 10 to the overall difficulty Aruanno faced in bringing his suit.2 The Magistrate Judge neglected to mention the most recent medical report describing Aruanno’s condition, instead referring exclusively to an earlier report analyzing Aruanno’s competency to stand trial. The Magistrate Judge then compounded that error by drawing erroneous conclusions from the competency report. “[Aruanno] was found to be aware of the nature and consequences of the charges against him. It was also found that [Aruanno] could adequately participate in the defense of his criminal case. This diagnosis confirms that the plaintiff is capable of defending his pending civil rights case.” App. 21. That framing of the Tabron test flatly distorted it; a defendant’s competency to stand trial does not equate to his being able to manage a civil suit. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge failed to consider that this type of suit, a § 1983 suit against prison officials, would include credibility and discovery issues and would be appropriate for the appointment of counsel under our caselaw. We have said that “[i]f it appears that an indigent plaintiff with a claim of arguable merit is incapable of presenting his or her case, serious consideration should be given to appointing counsel, and if such a plaintiff’s claim is truly substantial, counsel should ordinarily be appointed.” Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156 (citation omitted). In this case, 2 There is a question as to whether the Magistrate Judge misapplied the “arguable merit” factor insofar as he deemed the claims to lack “substantial merit.” App. 15. Even if this was merely a slip of the pen, the factor was misapplied because the claims do possess arguable merit. 11 Aruanno’s claim has arguable merit and his medical condition rendered him incapable of prosecuting his case. The denial of the request was tainted by an unduly restrictive application of Tabron to the facts at hand, and we conclude that the denial of the request for appointment of counsel was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly we will reverse the order and require that counsel be appointed.