Opinion ID: 1934270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Parental Immunity Doctrine

Text: The doctrine of parental immunity was first recognized in Delaware by the Superior Court in the case of Strahorn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Del.Super., 50 Del. 50, 123 A.2d 107 (1956). The facts of Strahorn are similar to the facts in the case sub judice. A little boy evaded his father's grasp, ran to an escalator, fell, and injured his fingers in the escalator apparatus. In Strahorn, the Superior Court noted, the majority rule is that an unemancipated minor cannot sue a parent in tort in a case of ordinary negligence. Id. 123 A.2d at 108 (citations omitted). The Superior Court adopted the majority rule, relying in part on the public policy of preserv[ing] the peace and harmony of the home. Id. Accordingly, the Superior Court held the action was barred by the doctrine of parental immunity, notwithstanding the fact that the action was for contribution from the minor child's parent, as opposed to a direct action against the parents for damages by the minor child. Id. 123 A.2d at 109-10. This Court first addressed the doctrine of parental immunity in the case of Williams v. Williams, Del.Supr., 369 A.2d 669 (1976). In Williams, a father, as next friend of the child, brought a direct action against the minor child's mother for injuries the child sustained in an automobile accident. This Court held that an absolute rule of parental immunity in tort has no rational basis under modern day conditions and circumstances and allowed the minor's suit to stand. Id. at 673. This Court did not completely abrogate the doctrine of parental immunity in Williams and was careful to point out that Strahorn had not been overruled. The holding in Williams was limited. It only permitted an unemancipated minor child to sue an insured parent for negligence arising from an automobile accident. In Williams, we stated, [w]hether this Court will adopt the doctrine of parental immunity when ... issues of parental authority and discretion are presented must await another case. Id. Three years later, in Schneider v. Coe, Del.Supr., 405 A.2d 682 (1979) ( Schneider I ), this Court decided the question that Williams left unresolved. [2] In Schneider I, a minor child ventured into a neighbor's yard and was kicked by a pony. The issue presented was whether a parent who negligently supervises his unemancipated child can be liable for the resulting injury to his child. Id. at 682. This Court ruled that evidence regarding the parent's negligence was inadmissible. Williams was distinguished because [u]nlike driving an automobile, supervision of one's children involves issues of parental control, authority, and discretion that are uniquely matters of a very personal type of judgment. Id. at 684. Reciprocal rights and duties inhere in the parent-child relationship. Anything creating conflict between parent and child, or interfering with the authority, discretion, or control that a parent has the right to exercise in supervising his child is repugnant to the institution of the family, and therefore is against public policy. Parental immunity will not be abrogated where the duty arises from the family relationship, for to do so would manifestly tend to disturb domestic tranquility. Id. In Schneider I, this Court explicitly declined to extend the holding in Williams to abrogate entirely the doctrine of parental immunity. After recognizing the exception to the parental immunity doctrine in Williams, this Court held that where parental control, authority, or discretion is involved, the rule of parental immunity must be preserved. Id. ( citing Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Liability of a Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child Caused by Parent's Negligence, 41 A.L.R.3d 904, 976-80 (1972)).