Opinion ID: 2507343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Palisbo is distinguishable.

Text: In Palisbo, the defendant, Palisbo, testified that his friend, Kanohokula, arrived at Palisbo's home in a van and that Kanohokula indicated that the vehicle belonged to a cousin. 93 Hawai`i at 349, 3 P.3d at 515. At Kanohokula's request, Palisbo drove the vehicle, whereupon the police stopped the van and arrested both Palisbo and Kanohokula. Id. The vehicle did not belong to Kanohokula's cousin but was, in fact, stolen. Id. at 351, 3 P.3d at 517. Palisbo was charged with unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS  708-836, id. at 347, 3 P.3d at 513, and he sought to assert the mistake-of-fact defense at trial, id. at 354, 3 P.3d at 520. The circuit court refused to give Palisbo's proposed mistake-of-fact instruction, and he challenged the circuit court's ruling on appeal. Id. The Palisbo court held that the circuit court correctly declined to give the mistake-of-fact instruction, reasoning that: Here, the only factual mistake which would have absolved [Palisbo] from liability under the statute would be a mistaken belief that the owner himself had authorized [the d]efendant's use of the vehicle. [Palisbo] did not adduce evidence suggesting he had obtained the consent of . . . the van's [actual registered] owner [] to operate it. If [Palisbo] had presented evidence tending to show that he was under the mistaken belief that the owner had authorized him to operate the vehicle, then the jury would have had to be instructed on the mistake of fact defense. However, [Palisbo's] defense had nothing to do with believing that he himself had the owner's consent. Indeed, on appeal, [Palisbo] maintains that the mistake of fact instruction should have been given since `he believed that Kanohokula's use of the vehicle was lawful.' (Emphasis added.) Id. at 355, 3 P.3d at 521 (emphases in original). The prosecution relies on the Palisbo court's conclusion that, Here, the only factual mistake which would have absolved [Palisbo] from liability under the statute would be a mistaken belief that the owner himself had authorized [the d]efendant's use of the vehicle. Id. In the prosecution's view, the only mistake that could have absolved Lopez or Mainaaupo of liability under HRS  702-218 would be a mistaken belief that the true owners of the vehicles had themselves given Lopez and Mainaaupo permission to drive the cars. We do not, however, read Palisbo so broadly. The sentence cited by the prosecution is prefaced by the word here and proceeds to address the specifics of the case. See id. As Lopez and Mainaaupo observe, the defendant in Palisbo plainly admitted that he was aware that the person who had authorized his use of the vehicle was not the vehicle's owner but, rather, merely the cousin of the alleged owner. Id. at 349, 3 P.3d at 515. Thus, Palisbo did not claim a mistaken belief that he had permission to use the vehicle from the person who owned the car. See id. That is, however, precisely the claim advanced in the present matter by both Lopez and Mainaaupo. Therefore, in our view, Palisbo simply does not speak to the specific question before us. Putting Palisbo aside, we now turn to the plain language of HRS  702-218. 2. The plain language of HRS  702-218 dictates that Lopez and Mainaaupo were each entitled to assert the mistake-of-fact defense with respect to the authorization element of HRS  708-836. HRS  702-218 provides in relevant part that it is a defense that the accused engaged in the prohibited conduct under ignorance or mistake of fact if . . . [t]he ignorance or mistake negatives the state of mind required to establish an element of the offense. . . . See supra note 2 (formatting altered). The elements of an offense are such (1) conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and (3) results of conduct, as . . . [a]re specified by the definition of the offense. . . . HRS  702-205 (1993) (formatting altered). In the present matter, Lopez and Mainaaupo were each charged with unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS  708-836, see supra note 3, which provides in relevant part that [a] person commits the offense of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle if the person intentionally or knowingly exerts unauthorized control over another's propelled vehicle by operating the vehicle without the owner's consent, HRS  708-836(1). Owner is defined to include the registered owner of the vehicle. Id.  708-836(4). Accordingly, the elements of the relevant iteration of HRS  708-836 are (1) the person's conduct of exerting control over a thing by operating it, (2) the attendant circumstance of the thing being another's ( i.e., the registered owner's) propelled vehicle, and (3) the attendant circumstance of the person's control/operation being without the registered owner's consent [hereinafter, the authorization element], see State v. Aiwohi, 109 Hawai`i 115, 127, 123 P.3d 1210, 1222 (2005) (`[A]ny circumstances defined in an offense that are neither conduct nor the results of conduct would, by default, constitute attendant circumstances elements of the offense.' (quoting State v. Moser, 107 Hawai`i 159, 172, 111 P.3d 54, 67 (App.2005))); cf. id. at 128, 123 P.3d at 1223 (holding that, under the manslaughter statute, the defendant did not recklessly cause the death of another person, because the attendant circumstance of personhood did not exist at the time the defendant engaged in the allegedly culpable conduct of prenatally ingesting methamphetamine, insofar as the defendant's inchoate child, who died after being born, was a fetus at the time of the defendant's proscribed conduct, and a fetus is not a `person' within the plain meaning of the statute); State v. Valentine, 93 Hawai`i 199, 207, 998 P.2d 479, 487 (2000) (holding that the elements of a firearm possession statute include the conduct of a person possessing a thing and the attendant circumstance of the thing exhibiting the attributes of a firearm). With respect to the authorization element, Lopez and Mainaaupo each assert a mistaken belief that the person who authorized his use of the vehicle was the registered owner of the vehicle. Assuming that HRS  708-836's intentional or knowing state of mind applies to the authorization element, an attendant circumstance, see HRS  702-205, the mistake alleged by both Lopez and Mainaaupo would negative[ ] the state of mind required to establish [the authorization] element of the offense. See supra note 2. Thus, the question becomes whether the state of mind specified by the statute applies to the authorization element. We agree with Judge Nakamura that HRS  702-207 provides guidance in addressing this question. See Nakamura dissent at 5-6. HRS  702-207, entitled Specified state of mind applies to all elements, provides that, [w]hen the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. The state of mind prescribed by HRS  708-836 is intent or knowledge, and the statute does not distinguish among its elements. See supra note 3. Accordingly, the intentional or knowing state of mind required by HRS  708-836 applies to the authorization element, unless the statute plainly appears to hold that state of mind inapplicable to the authorization element, see supra note 4. In our view, HRS  708-836 does not, on its face, evidence a clear intent to hold its expressly articulated requisite state of mind inapplicable to the authorization element but, on the contrary, provides that a person commits the offense if he intentionally or knowingly exerts unauthorized control, see supra note 3. See Kalama, 94 Hawai`i at 66, 8 P.3d at 1230 (holding that the intentional state of mind set forth in an indecent exposure statute applied to all elements of the offense, because on its face the statute did not `distinguish among [its] elements' (quoting HRS  702-207)); State v. Pone, 78 Hawai`i 262, 265-66, 892 P.2d 455, 458-59 (1995) (holding that the intentional mind state set forth in a fourth degree criminal property damage statute applied to each of its elements, because no contrary purpose `plainly appears' on the face of the statute (quoting HRS  702-207)); In re Doe, 76 Hawai`i 85, 92, 869 P.2d 1304, 1311 (1994) (holding that, inasmuch as the intentional state of mind is prescribed by a harassment statute and no contrary purpose `plainly appears' on the face of the statute, the intentional state of mind is the requisite state of mind for each of the elements set forth in [the statute] (quoting HRS  702-207)). As Judge Nakamura observed, a defendant cannot intentionally or knowingly exert `unauthorized' control unless the defendant intended or knew that his or her use of the vehicle was without the owner's consent, and, consequently, under the most natural and common reading of the statutory language, proof that the defendant knew that his or her use of the vehicle was without the owner's use is required. Nakamura dissent at 5. Nevertheless, the thrust of the prosecution's argument, in light of its heavy reliance on legislative history, appears to be that a contrary purpose plainly appears in the legislative history of HRS  708-836 sufficient to render the statute's expressly recited state of mind inapplicable to the authorization element. This court may not, however, rely upon a statute's legislative history, unless the statute's language is ambiguous or produces an absurd or unjust result, see Thompson, 112 Hawai`i at 475, 146 P.3d at 1052, because, as this court has explained: We cannot change the language of the statute, supply a want, or enlarge upon it in order to make it suit a certain state of facts. We do not legislate or make laws. Even when the court is convinced in its own mind that the Legislature really meant and intended something not expressed by the phraseology of the Act, it has no authority to depart from the plain meaning of the language used. State v. Dudoit, 90 Hawai`i 262, 271, 978 P.2d 700, 709 (1999) (quoting, inter alia, State v. Meyer, 61 Haw. 74, 77-78, 595 P.2d 288, 291 (1979)) (emphasis omitted); see also State v. Smith, 103 Hawai`i 228, 233, 81 P.3d 408, 413 (2003); State v. Mueller, 102 Hawai`i 391, 394, 76 P.3d 943, 946 (2003). The prosecution does not argue, and we do not discern, that the language of HRS  708-836 is ambiguous with respect to the applicability of the state of mind requirement to the authorization element. See ICA's Lopez mem. op. at 5-8; ICA's Mainaaupo mem. op. at 6-8. To the contrary, the prosecution affirmatively characterizes the statute's language as plain, and, as we mentioned previously, the statute provides that the applicable state of mind for the authorization element is intentional or knowing. Cf. State v. Klie, 116 Hawai`i 519, 525, 174 P.3d 358, 364 (2007) (questioning the prosecution's resort to an examination of the legislative history of a street solicitation statute, because the prosecution did not assert that [the statute] is ambiguous). Nor has there been any suggestion by the prosecution that a straightforward reading of the statute would yield an absurd or unjust result. In short, because the language of HRS  708-836 plainly and unambiguously applies its prescribed state of mind to the authorization element and because a forthright reading of the statute does not appear to produce an absurd or unjust result, we are not at liberty to rely upon legislative history in interpreting the statute, see Thompson, 112 Hawai`i at 475, 146 P.3d at 1052, even if the history may show that the legislature `really meant and intended something not expressed by the phraseology of the [statute],' see Dudoit, 90 Hawai`i at 271, 978 P.2d at 709 (quoting, inter alia, Meyer, 61 Haw. at 77, 595 P.2d at 291); see also T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. County of Hawai`i Planning Comm'n, 106 Hawai`i 343, 352-53, 104 P.3d 930, 939-40 (2005) (holding that, inasmuch as this court has previously recognized a statutory term to be plain and unambiguous, [this court is] not at liberty to look beyond the statute's plain and obvious meaning); State v. Yamada, 99 Hawai`i 542, 552-53, 57 P.3d 467, 477-78 (2002) (Inasmuch as the statute's language is plain, clear, and unambiguous, our inquiry regarding its interpretation should be at an end.); Kalama, 94 Hawai`i at 64, 8 P.3d at 1228 (declining to rely upon the legislative history of an indecent exposure statute in determining whether the statute encompassed nude sunbathing, because the statute was not ambiguous). To summarize, because HRS  708-836 does not plainly appear to render its specified state of mind inapplicable to the authorization element, the intentional or knowing states of mind apply to the authorization element. See supra note 3; cf. Nakamura dissent at 5-6. Consequently, we hold that a defendant prosecuted under HRS  708-836 may assert the mistake-of-fact defense with respect to the authorization element, where he claims that he mistakenly believed that the person who authorized his operation of the vehicle was the vehicle's registered owner, because such a belief would potentially negative[ ] the state of mind required to establish [the authorization] element of the offense. See supra note 2. In this case, Lopez and Mainaaupo requested that the circuit court instruct the jury on the mistake-of-fact defense, because each testified to his belief, which each later realized was mistaken, that the person who consented to his use of the vehicle (Greg Ramba and Doug, respectively) was the registered owner of the vehicle. The prosecution argues that, while Mainaaupo may have testified that Doug gave him permission to use a car, Mainaaupo did not testify that Doug gave him permission to use Cordova's Nissan Maxima in particular and, therefore, whatever permission Mainaaupo may have allegedly received from Doug could not have extended to the operation of Cordova's Nissan Maxima. Nevertheless, Mainaaupo did testify that Doug told him that the car was located at Shark's Cove, that he waited on the evening of June 4, 2005 until only one car remained in the parking lot at Shark's Cove, and that the key he received from Doug unlocked the doors to that car. Thus, although Mainaaupo admitted that Doug did not disclose the make or model of the car, he did articulate the process of elimination by which he attempted to identify the car that he claimed to believe belonged to Doug. However weak Lopez and Mainaaupo's testimony may have been, we think that they were each entitled to have the circuit court give their mistake-of-fact jury instructions. See State v. Hironaka, 99 Hawai`i 198, 204, 53 P.3d 806, 812 (2002) (`[A] defendant is entitled to an instruction on every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence, provided such evidence would support the consideration of that issue by the jury, no matter how weak, inconclusive, or unsatisfactory the evidence may be.' (Quoting State v. Maelega, 80 Hawai`i 172, 178-79, 907 P.2d 758, 764-65 (1995).)). Thus, the circuit court erred in declining to give their requested instructions. The circuit court did, however, over Mainaaupo's objection, give Prosecution's Proposed Instruction No. 7, which directed that, [u]nder the law relating to the offense of `unauthorized control of propelled vehicle[,]' [ ] a non-owner of a vehicle has a legal duty to obtain consent to operate the vehicle directly from the registered owner of the vehicle. We agree with Judge Nakamura that the instruction essentially mandated that, [b]ecause the defendant ha[d] the duty of obtaining consent directly from the vehicle's registered owner, the defendant [was] subject to criminal liability if he or she fail[ed] to do so, and, therefore, implied that it is no defense that the defendant obtained consent from someone the defendant believed was the vehicle's owner if the belief turns out to be wrong. Nakamura dissent at 3. Prosecution's Proposed Instruction No. 7 was both prejudicial and misleading because it improperly undermined Mainaaupo's mistake-of-fact defense. Id. at 14; see also Van Dyke, 101 Hawai`i at 383, 69 P.3d at 94. Consequently, the circuit court further erred in giving this instruction to the jury. Because there is a reasonable possibility that the circuit court's erroneous jury instructions contributed to both Lopez's and Mainaaupo's convictions, we vacate the judgments against them and remand their cases for new trials. See Van Dyke, 101 Hawai`i at 383, 69 P.3d at 94.