Opinion ID: 2629208
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Testimony of Ducharme's Friends

Text: At trial, the court permitted Ducharme to testify as to what she had told her friends about the murder and burglary and how Thomas was involved. The court also permitted Ducharme's friends, Alexandra Wright and Marcy Robinson, to testify as to what she had told them about the night of the murder. The court's rationale for allowing the friends to testify as to what Ducharme said was that it was evidence of a prior consistent statement offered to rebut a claim of recent fabrication pursuant to ER 801(d)(1)(ii). First, Thomas argues that his cross of Ducharme did not rise to the level of an expressed or implied claim that Ducharme had recently fabricated her story; therefore, ER 801(d)(1)(ii) was not triggered. Second, he argues that Ducharme had a motive to fabricate her story in order to shift blame to Thomas. Third, if the testimony of Ducharme's friends was admissible, Thomas argues that it was unnecessary as Ducharme's testimony would have been sufficient. ER 801(d)(1)(ii) provides that a statement is not hearsay if: The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross examination concerning the statement and the statement is ... (ii) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.... If there is an inference raised in cross examination that the witness changed her story in response to an external pressure, then whether that witness gave the same account of the story prior to the onset of the external pressure becomes highly probative of the veracity of the witness's story given while testifying. State v. McDaniel, 37 Wash.App. 768, 771, 683 P.2d 231 (1984) (same rule cited with approval in State v. Purdom, 106 Wash.2d 745, 750, 725 P.2d 622 (1986)). Accordingly, the proponent of the testimony must show that the witness's prior consistent statement was made before the witness's motive to fabricate arose in order to show the testimony's veracity and for ER 801(d)(1)(ii) to apply. McDaniel, 37 Wash. App. at 771, 683 P.2d 231. During cross examination of Ducharme, defense counsel began questioning with: Q (By [Defense Counsel]) The agreement you worked out if you testified in this case, it was that you would be charged with robbery in the first degree. The State would recommend 48 months in prison. You would also be charged with rendering criminal assistance in the first degree. They would recommend 14 months to run concurrent, meaning that it wouldn't be added to the 48. It gets run together. Is that how you understood it? A Yes. Q It also says that the State has no objection to a defense plea to the sentencing judge for the low end of the range, which is 36 months. So your attorney can argue to the judge that you receive a sentence of 36 months? A Yes. Q Which is also a possibility in this case? A Yes. . . . . Q So you would have what, about four more months to go? A Right. Q Given what you were charged with, aggravated murder in the first degree, the penalties for that are life without the possibility of parole? A Yes. Q And the death penalty? A Right. Q So getting out in possibly as little as four months is certainly better than never getting out? A Right. Q Better than being hanged, isn't it? A Yes. RP at 3862-64. The next set of questions regarded Ducharme's divorce from Thomas that enabled her to testify against him. Thomas then asked about Ducharme's first interview with police on March 30, 1998, and pointed out both consistencies and inconsistencies in her statements between this initial interview and the one on January 26, 1999. Thomas alleges that he was merely trying to establish that Ducharme's statements to police were inconsistent with each other and with her testimony on direct at trial. Thomas rebuts his own argument with his explanation of the cross-examinationhe was, by his own admission, trying to show her testimony was changed. The portion from the cross examination above strongly suggests that Thomas was trying to show Ducharme may have motive to change her story in order to receive a plea agreement for testifying against Thomas. [7] If not an express claim of recent fabrication it was certainly implied. Thus, ER 801(d)(1)(ii) was triggered. Apparently anticipating that result, Thomas's next argument is that Ducharme had motive to change her story in order to shift the blame to Thomas and minimize her involvement. Whether she had motive to do so and how much weight was to be given that determination was properly left within the auspices of the jury. The tool for doing so, once the claim was made by Thomas, was to allow hearsay testimony by her friends indicating that the story Ducharme told police in January 1999 was the same as the story she told her friends in August 1998, long before striking any plea agreement with the State. Finally, Thomas contends that if the testimony of Ducharme's friends was admissible, it was unnecessary as Ducharme's testimony would have been sufficient. Evidence that a witness repeatedly told the same story is not admissible to corroborate her testimony, unless the defense attack's her credibility by suggesting her fabrication of the story or motive to lie. State v. Alexander, 64 Wash. App. 147, 152, 822 P.2d 1250 (1992) (citing Thomas v. French, 99 Wash.2d 95, 659 P.2d 1097 (1983)). This is because `repetition is not generally a valid test for veracity.' Id. (quoting State v. Harper, 35 Wash.App. 855, 857, 670 P.2d 296 (1983)). Here, though, Thomas did challenge Ducharme's credibility. Allowing only Ducharme's testimony would not have been sufficient since her story at trial is precisely what Thomas was attempting to undermine. The allegation of motive and fabrication having been made, the State was then allowed, pursuant to ER 801(d)(1)(ii), to rebut that allegation. And, in essence, Thomas set himself up for it by alleging motive and fabrication in the first place. Nothing in the rules prohibits the prior consistent statements that the trial court allowed.