Opinion ID: 345557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trident Wharf and Turning Basin

Text: 1 Draft EIS, March 9, 1973 (Ex. 163) 2 Final EIS, December 10, 1973 (Ex. 11) J. Trident Office Building, Bangor, Washington 1 Environmental Impact Assessment, December 10, 1973 (Ex. 23) K. Indian Island Conventional Ordinance Facility 1 CEIS, November, 1974 (Ex. 24) Finding of Fact No. 100; J.A. at 739a-41a. 7 For example, the Joint Venture changed the design of offshore facilities to incorporate pile-supported structures so that the salmon migrations could continue to utilize the shallow water near the shore. Finding of Fact No. 82; J.A. at 733a 8 Final EIS, vol. I, Figure 14 9 These community characteristics, along with many others, are set out in the Final EIS and the impact of Trident on each trait is also analyzed. The impact analysis is broken down into the following sections: social impact, economic impact, transportation impact, visual quality impact, historical and archeological impact, air quality impact, water resources and geologic impact, flora impact, fauna impact, noise impact, utilities impact, radiological impact, and other operational impacts. See Final EIS, vol. I at i-xi 10 The standing issue which the Navy raises was clearly and properly decided by the district court. J.A. at 754a-55a. It found that the organizational appellant, Concerned About Trident, is a non-profit corporation formed for the primary purpose of taking all steps necessary to prevent the construction and operation of the proposed Trident project. 145 of its members live in Kitsap County. Hood Canal Environmental Council, another appellant, is also a non-profit corporation which is interested in the proper management of the natural resources of the Hood Canal area. It has 165 members living in Kitsap County. The other organizational appellants, (Friends of the Earth, Washington Environmental Council, and the Wilderness Society), have similar characteristics. As the organizations have shown the requisite injury in fact to their members and are certainly within the zone of interests protected by NEPA, their right to bring this suit is well-established. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S.Ct. 832, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970) Walter Heller, an individual appellant, owns land in the vicinity of the Bangor Annex and lives there some months out of the year. Appellant Max Starcevich also lives on property located along the Hood Canal in Kitsap County. As the district court found, (t)heir interests in the environment of the area surrounding their properties are the kinds of aesthetic, conservational and recreational values recognized in Sierra Club and SCRAP, supra. 11 The Navy is joined in this argument and others by intervenor Pacific Legal Foundation which is a non-profit California corporation formed for the purpose of engaging in matters affecting the public interest. See Finding of Fact No. 11; J.A. at 698a 12 See generally Note, The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement Requirement, 74 Mich.L.Rev. 349, 359 (1975) 13 Department of Defense, Interim Guidelines on Environmental Statements, 1 Env.L.Rep. 46021 (1971) 14 See note 3 supra 15 The impacts of the Bangor dedicated site decision in general, along with numerous other social and economic impacts, are analyzed in the preliminary environmental assessments and the Draft and Final EIS's, making a separate Bangor dedicated site EIS, such as appellants seek, redundant and therefore unnecessary 16 For an outline of the irretrievable or irreversible impacts expected to result from the Trident Program, see Final EIS, vol. I at 495-97 17 The district court found: As soon as sufficient information was available to identify the sites that appeared to be suitable for the Trident System, preparation of the CEIS was initiated. Finding of Fact No. 64; J.A. at 722a 18 For an extensive analysis of various cases dealing with the program impact statement problem see Comment, Planning Level and Program Impact Statements Under the National Environmental Policy Act: A Definitional Approach, 23 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 124 (1975) 19 See note 4 supra 20 The district court found that the Environmental Protection Agency reviewed the Final EIS and saw no reason to object to the proposed plan. Finding of Fact No. 113; J.A. at 749a 21 Finding of Fact No. 74; J.A. at 728a-29a 22 The appellants also contend that an EIS on the alleged decision to accelerate the Trident Program should have been prepared. As the appellants concede in their brief, 1978 was the first time there was a definite Initial Operating Capability (IOC) date. Appellants' Brief at 63. Since the time that 1978 was selected, the firm date for the operation of Trident has been set back to 1981 and 1983. See note 5 supra. There being no evidence that the firm date for the initial operation of the project was in fact accelerated, there remains no question of whether an EIS need be prepared on this aspect. Similarly, the appellants' argument that formal EIS's were not submitted along with congressional appropriation requests for 1972-74 carries little weight in view of the facts that environmental assessments were continually being prepared during those years and hence, were always available to the legislators and the public, and the Final EIS was submitted en masse to Congress. See note 6 supra. In this way the environmental source material needed by Congress to make relevant decisions was always at hand. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (1972) 23 Section 102(2)(C) provides: (C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 24 Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982, 994 (5th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 296 (8th Cir. 1972) 25 As noted in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton: . . . The subject of environmental impact is too important to relegate either to implication or to subsequent justification by counsel. The Statement must set forth the material contemplated by Congress in form suitable for the enlightenment of the others concerned. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, supra at 836. 26 For example, the discussion of the impacts on transportation, visual quality, water, flora, fauna, and utilities is limited to Kitsap County. The analysis of the impacts on historic and archeological values, air quality, and noise is delimited to only parts of Kitsap County. The major portions of the Final EIS, those dealing with the social and economic impacts of Trident, explore the impacts in Kitsap County as well as referring in a general way to the impacts on other surrounding counties. Final EIS, vol. I passim 27 This analysis is set forth in full for both options of off-site military housing and on-site military housing. Final EIS, vol. I at 194-207 28 Final EIS, vol. II at 63-64 29 See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (1971) Each section of the Final EIS contains a subsection on Ameliorative Measures which sets forth the steps which either have been taken, will be taken, or should be taken to blunt the impact of the Trident Program. Final EIS, vol. I at 127-30, 209-11, 226-28, 240-42, 269-70, 289-96, 314-17, 345-50, 371-73, and 407-08. 30 A few of the environmental studies extended through 1983, but in the main, the studies reflected impacts only up to 1981. J.A. at 794a; Appellees' Brief at 14 31 See, e.g., Final EIS, vol. I at 248, 361 32 See generally Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766, 775-77 (7th Cir. 1975); Rankin v. Coleman, 394 F.Supp. 647, 655-57 (E.D.N.C.1975); Appalachian Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F.Supp. 105, 115-17 (D.N.H. 1975) 33 Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 499 F.2d 1069, 1084 (1974); Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 395, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092-93 (1973); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, supra at 837 1 See Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 295-96 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 2749, 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973). See also Maryland-National Cap. Park & Planning Com'n v. U. S. Postal Service, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 158, 171, 487 F.2d 1029, 1042 (1973) 2 I do not accord the Navy's conduct the homage of good faith, for that usually involves objective reasonableness. The record gives at least some support to appellant's contention that even after NEPA became effective, the Defense Department was engaging in reevaluation of the strategic concept without considering any environmental consequences, and was, in fact, using its environmental planning activities only as a smokescreen 3 Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.Pa.L.Rev. 509, 527 (1974) 4 Cf. Maryland-National Cap. Park & Planning Com'n, v. U. S. Postal Service, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 158, 171-72, 487 F.2d 1029, 1042-43 (1973) (denial of injunctive relief may be conjoined with conditions protective of the environment)