Opinion ID: 600744
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of Hartford's Conduct Under Section 767

Text: 40 In determining whether an actor's conduct is proper, Pennsylvania courts are guided by the following factors derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979): 41
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45 (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, 46 (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference, and 47 (g) the relations between the parties. 48 Nathanson, 926 F.2d at 1388-89 (citing Adler, Barish, 482 Pa. at 433, 393 A.2d at 1184 and Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa.Super. 560, 573-74, 422 A.2d 611, 618 (1980)). Whether an alleged interference is improper entails a case-by-case inquiry. Green v. Interstate United Management Serv. Corp., 748 F.2d 827, 831 (3d Cir.1984). 49 The nature of a defendant's conduct is a chief factor in determining whether the conduct is improper or not. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 cmt. c. According to Windsor: 50 There are two types of tortious interference claims--(1) those in which the conduct of the defendant is independently wrongful ...; and (2) those in which the defendant's conduct was not independently wrongful.... Our case falls into the former category, since the misconduct at issue in Windsor's claim for tortious interference with contract also constitutes, independently, a breach of the Director II contracts as against Windsor's clients. 51 We find Windsor's argument untenable. Wrongful conduct requires something more than mere breach of contract. Comment d of § 767, to which Windsor draws our attention, provides in part:If the conduct is independently wrongful--as, for example, if it is illegal because it is in restraint of trade or if it is tortious toward the third person whose conduct is influenced--the desire to interfere with the other's contractual relations may be less essential to a holding that the interference is improper. 52 (emphasis added). Comment d describes independently wrongful as conduct that is illegal or tortious. But breach of contract rises to neither of these levels. 53 Breach of contract, without more, is not a tort. See Glazer v. Chandler, 414 Pa. 304, 308 n. 1, 200 A.2d 416, 418 n. 1 (1964) (To permit a promisee to sue his promisor in tort for breaches of contract inter se would erode usual rules of contractual recovery and inject confusion into our well-settled forms of actions. Most courts have been cautious about permitting tort recovery for contractual breaches and we are in full accord with this policy); 13 see also 3 E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.8, at 194-95 (2d ed. 1990) (Most courts have not infringed on the freedom to keep or to break a contract traditionally afforded a party by the common law and endorsed by the notion of efficient breach.) (citations omitted). 54 Breach of contract is not illegal either under common usage or under comment d to § 767. Cf. John E. Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts, § 117, at 672 (3d ed. 1990) (It is conceivable ... for a legal system to compel the enforcement of promises through its criminal law or at least to allow recoveries to injured promisees which go beyond mere compensation. But the Anglo-American legal system has not chosen this route.) Comment d lists violation of antitrust law as an example of illegal conduct. Comment c to § 767 describes unlawful conduct as: 55 Conduct specifically in violation of statutory provisions or contrary to established public policy.... [F]or example, ... conduct that is in violation of antitrust provisions or is in restraint of trade or conduct ... that is in violation of statutes, regulations, or judicial or administrative holdings regarding labor relations. 56 Unlawful or illegal conduct under § 767 contemplates more than mere breach of contract between private parties. The comments to § 767 do not support Windsor's contention that breach of contract ipso facto constitutes independently wrongful conduct. 57 Nor do any of the cases advanced by Windsor demonstrate that breach of contract constitutes independently wrongful conduct. They suggest the opposite conclusion. All involve innately wrongful conduct such as torts, deprivation of civil rights, and violation of ethical codes. See Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926, 110 S.Ct. 2620, 110 L.Ed.2d 641 (1990) (alleged conduct of defendant in maliciously filing involuntary bankruptcy petition against plaintiff without probable cause stated cause of action for improper interference with contract as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F.Supp. 577 (E.D.Pa.1989), modified, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir.1990) (defendants' conduct in blockading abortion clinics constituted improper interference as well as trespass and violation of patients' civil rights); Adler, Barish, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (conduct of former associates, in soliciting clients of former firm, held to constitute improper interference and violation of attorney disciplinary rules). 58 The concept of independently wrongful conduct becomes useless if breach of contract alone constitutes independently wrongful conduct under § 767. Most interferences with contract and every instance of successful inducement entail a breach of contract. 59 In sum, we are persuaded that Hartford's conduct in imposing the restrictions was neither tortious nor illegal. Because there is no evidence that Hartford's conduct was wrongful by any measure external to the interference itself, we conclude that Hartford's conduct was not wrongful. 60