Opinion ID: 888159
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of the Ranchers' Claims under Article II, Section 29.

Text: ¶ 131 It is well-established that the rights enumerated in the Declaration of Rights of Montana's 1972 Constitution (i.e., those set forth in Article II) are fundamental rights. Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, ¶ 74, 316 Mont. 103, ¶ 74, 68 P.3d 872, ¶ 74; State v. Tapson, 2001 MT 292, ¶ 15, 307 Mont. 428, ¶ 15, 41 P.3d 305, ¶ 15; Wadsworth v. State, 275 Mont. 287, 299, 911 P.2d 1165, 1172 (1996). This means that each of the Article II rights is a significant component of liberty, the alleged infringement of which triggers the highest level of scrutiny and, thus, the highest level of protection by the courts. Walker, ¶ 74; Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 302, 911 P.2d at 1174; see also e.g. State v. Mount, 2003 MT 275, ¶ 98, 317 Mont. 481, ¶ 98, 78 P.3d 829, ¶ 98; Mont. Environmental Info. Center v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 1999 MT 248, ¶ 64, 296 Mont. 207, ¶ 64, 988 P.2d 1236, ¶ 64. For the reasons discussed earlier in Part II-B, our analysis under Article II, Section 29 does not involve scrutiny of the governmental action, except insofar as the requirement of a public use has been raised. But our analysis must afford the highest level of protection of private property rights. Walker, ¶ 74. ¶ 132 In this connection, we interpret Article II rights mindful of the other rights set out in the Montana Constitution. In Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364, we explained that Montana's Constitution, and especially the Declaration of Rights, is not simply a cook book of disconnected and discrete rules written with the vitality of an automobile insurance policy. Rather, our Constitution, and in particular its Declaration of Rights, encompasses a cohesive set of principles, carefully drafted and committed to an abstract ideal of just government. It is a compact of overlapping and redundant rights and guarantees. Armstrong, ¶ 71. ¶ 133 We accordingly have interpreted independent sections of Montana's Constitution together, so as to give effect to Article II's coordinate, overlapping, and redundant guarantees. Possibly the most repeated example of this is our interpretation of the right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures (Article II, Section 11) in conjunction with the right to privacy (Article II, Section 10). See e.g. State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 257-78, 934 P.2d 176, 180-92 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Kuneff, 1998 MT 287, ¶ 19, 291 Mont. 474, ¶ 19, 970 P.2d 556, ¶ 19. [2] ¶ 134 In Siegal, we explained that while we analyze most search and seizure questions implicating Article II, Section 11 of Montana's Constitution under traditional Fourth Amendment principles enunciated by the federal courts and adopted in our own case law, in certain instances where Montana's constitutional right of privacy, Article II, Section 10, is also specially implicated, we must, of necessity, consider and address the effect of that unique constitutional mandate on the question before us. Siegal, 281 Mont. at 264-65, 934 P.2d at 184. Similarly, in Walker, we reasoned: Just as we read the privacy provision of the Montana Constitution in conjunction with the provisions regarding search and seizure to provide Montanans with greater protections from government intrusion, so too do we read the dignity provision of the Montana Constitution together with Article II, Section 22 to provide Montana citizens greater protections from cruel and unusual punishment than does the federal constitution. The federal constitution does not expressly provide for the right to human dignity. Walker, ¶ 73. We thus have recognized that while traditional principles enunciated by the federal courts and adopted in our own caselaw may inform our analysis, our decision must ultimately take account of the unique structure of the Montana Constitution and, in particular, the coordinate, overlapping, and redundant guarantees of Article II. ¶ 135 In the present case, therefore, the fundamental right to just compensation to the full extent of the loss for a taking or damaging of private property must be interpreted mindful of other pertinent rights in the Montana Constitution. One such right is the inalienable right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3. In City of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 264 Mont. 76, 869 P.2d 790 (1994), we observed that [p]rivate real property ownership is a fundamental right, Art. II, § 3, Mont. Const., and any statute which allows the government to take a person's property must be given its plain interpretation, favoring the person's fundamental rights. Vaniman, 264 Mont. at 79, 869 P.2d at 792. We reaffirmed this principle in McCabe Petroleum Corp. v. Easement and Right-of-Way, 2004 MT 73, 320 Mont. 384, 87 P.3d 479, stating that because eminent domain interferes with the fundamental right of private ownership of real property, any statute which allows a condemnor to take a person's property must be strictly construed, giving the statute its plain interpretation, but favoring the person's fundamental rights. McCabe, ¶ 28 (citing Vaniman, 264 Mont. at 79, 869 P.2d at 792). Although these two cases refer to real property, we have never excluded other types of property  e.g., personal, intangible, and intellectual  from the principle that any statute which allows a condemnor to take a person's property must be strictly construed, giving the statute its plain interpretation, but favoring the person's fundamental rights. Indeed, there is no basis in the constitutional text for limiting this principle to real property, given that Article II, Section 3 recognizes the inalienable right to acquire, possess, and protect property, not just real property. ¶ 136 With this general approach in mind, I turn to the questions of whether the Ranchers possess constitutionally protected property interests and whether a part or a whole of those interests has been taken or damaged for public use.
¶ 137 The Constitution protects, but does not create, property interests. Seven Up Pete, ¶ 26; Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 164, 118 S.Ct. 1925, 1930, 141 L.Ed.2d 174 (1998). Rather, property interests are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001, 104 S.Ct. at 2872 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Seven Up Pete, ¶ 26; Germann, ¶ 27. Critically, the term property, as used in Article II, Section 29, contains only one qualifier: [p]rivate. It is not otherwise restricted to any particular type of property. Rather, by its terms, the constitutional requirement of just compensation applies broadly to [p]rivate property. ¶ 138 Notably, the term private property, as used in the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, encompasses a wide variety of interests. It includes real property, personal property, and intangible property. Huntleigh, 525 F.3d at 1377-78. It also `denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.' PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2041 n. 6, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980) (brackets in PruneYard ) (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378, 65 S.Ct. 357, 359, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945)). Property interests are about as diverse as the human mind can conceive, Florida Rock Industries v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1572 n. 32 (Fed.Cir. 1994), and the Takings Clause is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess, General Motors, 323 U.S. at 378, 65 S.Ct. at 359. ¶ 139 The premise underlying these open-ended definitions of property is that the term is not frozen in time to the conceptions of property existing in 1791, but rather takes its meaning from contemporary understandings. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated as much. See e.g. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2901, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (noting the Supreme Court's traditional resort to ` existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law' to define the range of interests that qualify for protection as `property' under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (emphasis added)). There is no reason to construe the term property in Article II, Section 29 differently. Nothing in the text or history of this provision and its predecessor (Article III, Section 14 of the 1889 Constitution) suggests that the meaning of property and the rights associated with ownership are limited to the conceptions existing in 1889 or 1972. To the contrary, given that the term is only qualified by the word private, the reasonable conclusion is that property in Article II, Section 29 (as in the Fifth Amendment) takes its meaning from contemporary understandings. ¶ 140 The Montana Code defines property broadly. It is not simply land, a fence, a car, or some office furniture. It is anything that a person has the right to possess and use to the exclusion of others. Section 70-1-101, MCA. By way of example, property interests exist in all inanimate things which are capable of appropriation or of manual delivery, all domestic animals, all obligations, such products of labor or skill as the composition of an author, the goodwill of a business, trademarks, and signs, and rights created or granted by statute. Section 70-1-104, MCA. Nothing in Montana property law, however, suggests that the meaning of property depends on arbitrarily drawn lines or rigidly constrictive tests devised by the federal courts. The Court's adoption of such tests in Kafka ( see Kafka Opinion, ¶ 46)  thereby restricting the definition of property under Article II, Section 29 to those interests which satisfy the standards created by courts of some other jurisdiction not accountable to Montanans  is indefensible. ¶ 141 In the present case, the Ranchers seek just compensation for the taking or damaging of several property interests: their alternative livestock business, inventory, and equipment, which includes fixtures, facilities, and the alternative livestock. The State, the Sportsmen, and the Court do not dispute that these are compensable property interests; however, before proceeding to the question of whether a part or a whole of these interests has been taken or damaged for public use, I note the following considerations regarding the Ranchers' businesses. In the same way that the opportunity to pursue employment is a necessary incident to the fundamental right (under Article II, Section 3) to pursue life's basic necessities, Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 299, 911 P.2d at 1172, the opportunity to operate one's business as a going concern is a necessary incident to the fundamental right (also under Article II, Section 3) to acquire, possess, and protect property. Indeed, operating one's business as a going concern is, like employment, the vehicle by which many Montanans pursue life's basic necessities; and the property interests associated with a going business are, therefore, entitled to the highest level of protection by this Court.
¶ 142 Article II, Section 29 guarantees just compensation to the full extent of the loss where private property has been taken or damaged for public use. The Ranchers do not contend that the public use requirement has not been met; thus, the only question here is whether their property has been taken or damaged. ¶ 143 The Court is of the view that Article II, Section 29 applies only to eminent domain proceedings and inverse condemnation actions arising out of, or related to, a direct appropriation of property. See Opinion, ¶¶ 67-69. The Court asserts that Article II, Section 29 provides no protection whatsoever against property loss or damage occasioned by government regulation. Opinion, ¶ 69. This, of course, moots the difficult question of how far is too far under Article II, Section 29. Cf. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922) (The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.). Apparently now, no regulation ever goes too far under the Montana Constitution. ¶ 144 As noted, I strenuously disagree with this emasculation of Article II, Section 29. Tellingly, the Court's corresponding analysis is as thin as the homeopathic soup that was made by boiling the shadow of a pigeon that had been starved to death. Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13, 1858), in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln vol. 3, 245, 279 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers University Press 1953). ¶ 145 First, the Court misstates that Article II, Section 29 was adopted verbatim from the 1889 Constitution. [3] Opinion, ¶ 65. The Court then cites Less v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 72 P. 140 (1903), and Knight v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 165, 642 P.2d 141 (1982), for the proposition that the `or damaged' language of the provision has been interpreted to apply to eminent domain proceedings, including inverse condemnation proceedings, where private property is taken or damaged for public use. Opinion, ¶¶ 65-67. Of course, this proposition does not establish that the or damaged language applies only to those contexts. Neither Less nor Knight involved a regulation of property, and neither case confined the or damaged clause in the way the Court now declares. For that matter, the Court's reliance on Knight is highly questionable given our statement that our holding is limited to the situation here, where a physical taking across the street occurred. Knight, 197 Mont. at 174, 642 P.2d at 146. In any event, Less and Knight simply do not stand for the Court's assertion that Article II, Section 29 does not recognize a taking or damaging of property caused by government regulation. ¶ 146 Next, the Court cites Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 10 Cal.4th 368, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658, 895 P.2d 900 (1995), for the proposition that California's or damaged clause does not apply beyond the ambit of eminent domain and public improvements. Opinion, ¶ 68. Customer Co., however, did not involve a claim based on government regulation of property. Rather, it involved a claim that just compensation is owed when public employees (e.g., law enforcement officers), in the pursuit of their public duties, cause damage to private property. The court held that the public entities involved may be held liable, if at all, only in a tort action, not an inverse condemnation action. Customer Co., 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658, 895 P.2d at 901. Customer Co. is also inapposite. ¶ 147 Moreover, assuming, as does the Court, that the high courts of sister states may dictate the meaning of the Montana Constitution, I note that the North Dakota Supreme Court has applied Article I, Section 16 of the North Dakota Constitution to a regulatory taking or damaging claim. See Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850 (N.D.2005). This provision, like Article II, Section 29, states that [p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having been first made to, or paid into court for the owner. N.D. Const. art. I, § 16. Notably, the North Dakota Supreme Court has said that this constitutional provision is broader in some respects than its federal counterpart because the state provision was intended to secure to owners, not only the possession of property, but also those rights which render possession valuable. Wild Rice, ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, Article I, Section 16 of the Washington Constitution states that [n]o private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having been first made, or paid into court for the owner. In Manufactured Housing Communities v. State, 142 Wash.2d 347, 13 P.3d 183 (2000), the Washington Supreme Court observed that a regulation can violate Article I, Section 16 when it effects a total taking of all economically viable use of one's property, has resulted in an actual physical invasion upon one's property, destroys one or more of the fundamental attributes of ownership (the right to possess, exclude other and to dispose of property), or [was] employed to enhance the value of publicly held property. Manufactured Housing, 13 P.3d at 187. Similarly, in Alaska, Article I, section 18 of the Alaska Constitution provides that [p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. Property owners enjoy broader protection under the Alaska Constitution than under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. R & Y, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289, 293 (Alaska 2001). The Alaska Supreme Court has applied this broader protection to government regulations. See R & Y, 34 P.3d at 293-96. ¶ 148 The Court evidently overlooks these cases (and perhaps others), accusing this Dissent of not citing a single case for the proposition that the or damaged language is intended to provide any greater protections in the regulatory taking context than does the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or that it applies to anything other than the consequential damages to the property of persons affected by a physical condemnation, or similar actions, initiated by the State. Opinion, ¶ 69. ¶ 149 Lastly, the Court turns to the actual language of Article II, Section 29. The Court asserts that neither the 1889 nor the 1972 Constitutions evince any intent that [the or damaged language of Article II, Section 29] apply to regulatory takings or damages resulting therefrom. Opinion, ¶ 69. There are two obvious problems with this assertion. First, as explained above, the language of Article II, Section 29 must be interpreted so as to give effect to Article II's coordinate, overlapping, and redundant guarantees  a point the Court utterly fails to address. Second, the Court's assertion could also be made about the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, which simply states: nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. There is no more reason to conclude that this language encompasses regulatory takings than there is to conclude that the pertinent language of Article II, Section 29 (Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.) encompasses regulatory takings. Yet, the former does encompass regulatory takings, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), as the Court concedes, see Opinion, ¶ 74. If Justice Holmes can perceive in the language of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause the notion that if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking, Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415, 43 S.Ct. at 160, we can reasonably conclude that he would perceive the same principle in the language of Article II, Section 29, which is identical in all pertinent respects aside from the additional words or damaged. ¶ 150 As a final point, the Court reasons that because Article II, Section 29 states that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having been first made to or paid into court for the owner, Article II, Section 29 obviously contemplates only a condemnation of property. Opinion, ¶ 69. I disagree for the simple reason that the Court's interpretation is inconsistent with the or damaged clause and leads to an absurd result. The clause relied on by the Court (having been first made to or paid into court for the owner) requires the State to pay just compensation to the full extent of the loss in advance. Certainly, this may be done when the State sets out to take property. But it is pure folly to suggest that the State may do the same with respect to damaging property. How could it possibly be known, in advance, all of the properties that will be damaged during the course of a public works project and what the full extent of the loss will be? Obviously, it cannot be known. The Court creates an absurd result by applying the advance-payment clause to the damaging clause. Cf. In re Marriage of McMichael, 2006 MT 237, ¶ 14, 333 Mont. 517, ¶ 14, 143 P.3d 439, ¶ 14 (We interpret a statute to give effect to its purpose and to avoid absurd results.). ¶ 151 In sum, there is nothing in the text of Article II, Section 29 limiting its applicability in the way the Court does today. Article II, Section 29 states: Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation to the full extent of the loss having been first made to or paid into court for the owner. In the event of litigation, just compensation shall include necessary expenses of litigation to be awarded by the court when the private property owner prevails. If the State passes a regulation permitting a telecommunications company to run a fiber optic cable through private lands, there is no textual basis for concluding that the property owners cannot prevail under Article II, Section 29 on a claim that their property has been taken or damaged. Cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982). If the State passes a regulation completely depriving a property owner of all economically beneficial use of her property, there is no textual basis for concluding that the property owner cannot prevail under Article II, Section 29 on a claim that her property has been taken or damaged. Cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). If the State passes a regulation destroying one or more of the fundamental attributes of ownership, there is no textual basis for concluding that the property owner cannot prevail under Article II, Section 29 on a claim that her property has been taken or damaged. Cf. Manufactured Housing Communities v. State, 142 Wash.2d 347, 13 P.3d 183, 187 (2000). ¶ 152 The Court's contrary interpretation, limiting the reach of Article II, Section 29 to direct appropriations, amounts to the improper insertion of language into the provision. Cf. § 1-2-101, MCA (In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted.). Article II, Section 29 does not in any way describe, define, or circumscribe the ways in which private property may be taken or damaged. It simply states, Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use.... Clearly, property is taken for public use in an eminent domain proceeding. Property may also be damaged as a result of a public works project. But I reject the Court's assertion that property cannot be taken or damaged for public use by government regulation. Nothing in the text of Article II, Section 29 requires such a construction. In fact, given that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause reaches regulatory takings, and given that Article II, Section 29 is facially broader than the Fifth Amendment, the logical conclusion is that Article II, Section 29 also reaches regulatory takings (and damagings). ¶ 153 The notion of construing Article II, Section 29 more broadly than its federal counterpart is well-established. In Less v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 72 P. 140 (1903), this Court stated: Constitutions which provide that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation are but declaratory of the common law, and contemplate the physical taking of property only. Under constitutions which provide that property shall not be taken or damaged it is universally held that it is not necessary that there be any physical invasion of the individual's property for public use to entitle him to compensation. Less, 28 Mont. at 32, 72 P. at 141. The Less Court's restrictive interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause as contemplating only a physical taking is clearly no longer valid. See e.g. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) (recognizing regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment). That, however, is not the point. Rather, the point is that the damaging clause was intended, from its inception, to provide a broader range of protection than the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted in extant jurisprudence, provides. It is untenable to suggest, as the Court does today, that while the reach of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause (ratified in 1791) grew broader over time to accommodate changing needs, the reach of Article III, Section 14 (1889) and, subsequently, Article II, Section 29 (1972) remained frozen in time. ¶ 154 In support of this originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, the Court relies on the fact that the delegates' discussion of Article II, Section 29 during the 1972 Constitutional Convention centered primarily on taking property for highway purposes. Opinion, ¶ 67. This discussion, however, is inapposite. The delegates were considering a motion by Delegate Davis to strike the clause having been first made to or paid into court for the owner. See Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 9, 1972, pp. 1826-27. (Notably, Delegate Davis pointed out that I don't think that you can make a determination of what the full extent of the loss is until after the construction takes place. Verbatim Transcript, p. 1826.) But the delegates did not even discuss government regulation of property, let alone express the view that Article II, Section 29 should not apply to government regulations. Their discussion, therefore, does not lend one shred of support to the Court's proposition that Article II, Section 29 does not apply to regulatory cases. ¶ 155 In this connection, the Convention transcripts read as a whole support the contrary view that Montana property owners are protected against uncompensated regulatory infringements on their property rights. One cannot read the transcripts of the debates without recognizing that Montana's Constitution is a progressive constitution. The delegates wrote into our Constitution fundamental rights  protections, really  to protect citizens from the government's inexorable reach into their lives and property. Article II, Section 3 is an apt example. It guarantees to every person certain inalienable rights, including the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways. Recognition of many of these rights as inalienable is unique to Montana's Constitution. ¶ 156 Article II, Section 4 recognizes  again, uniquely  that the dignity of the human being is inviolable. This section also requires the government to treat persons equally under the law, and it prohibits discrimination. Article II, Section 7 states, more broadly than the First Amendment, that every person shall be free to speak or publish whatever he will on any subject. Article II, Sections 8 and 9 guarantee the public's right to participate in governmental decision-making and the right of each person to examine documents and observe the deliberations of all public bodies and agencies. Neither of these rights is protected by the federal constitution. ¶ 157 The Montana Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, explicitly protects the right of individual privacy at Article II, Section 10. Montanans enjoy a broader protection of the right to bear arms under Article II, Section 12 than they do under the Second Amendment. The right to vote is explicitly and broadly protected by Article II, Section 13. Article II, Section 15 grants persons under the age of 18 all of the fundamental rights in Article II  a guarantee not contained in the federal constitution. Article II, Section 16 requires that every person have access to the courts and a speedy remedy for every injury of person, property, or character. ¶ 158 Article II, Section 18 declares that the State and its governmental subdivisions are subject to suit (i.e., that sovereign immunity is abrogated) except as specifically provided by law. Article II, Section 19 states that the privilege of habeas corpus shall never be suspended  a right not provided by the federal constitution. Certain clauses of Article II, Sections 23, 24, 25, and 26 provide guarantees to a greater extent than like provisions of the federal constitution. And Article II, Section 29 is textually broader than the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. ¶ 159 The delegates intended the Declaration of Rights `to stand on its own footing and ... provide individuals with fundamental rights and protections far broader than those available through the federal system' in order `to meet the changing circumstances of contemporary life.' Dorwart v. Caraway, 2002 MT 240, ¶ 94, 312 Mont. 1, ¶ 94, 58 P.3d 128, ¶ 94 (Nelson & Trieweiler, specially concurring) (citation omitted). This intent to give the Declaration of Rights teeth could not be more apparent than in the delegates' adoption of another fundamental right, Article II, Section 34. Although this provision guarantees unenumerated rights, and Article II, Section 29's protections are enumerated, the intention of the Bill of Rights Committee is still pertinent. The Committee considered Section 34 to be a crucial part of any effort to revitalize the state government's approach to civil liberties questions and the source of innovative judicial activity in the civil liberties field. Montana Constitutional Convention, Comments on the Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, February 22, 1972, p. 645. ¶ 160 Yet, against this backdrop of broader fundamental rights, the Court today eviscerates the protections of Article II, Section 29 by declaring this section to provide no more protection than does the Fifth Amendment. Opinion, ¶¶ 69, 74. To make matters worse, the Court chooses to march lockstep with the confused muddle of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. [4] I simply cannot abide the Court's decision. It ignores the plain language of Article II, Section 29. It ignores the interconnectedness of the Article II rights  in particular here, the right to acquire, possess, and protect property (Article II, Section 3) and the right to just compensation for a taking or damaging of that property (Article II, Section 29). It ignores the broad property rights statutorily defined in §§ 70-1-101 and -104, MCA. And it ignores the overriding theme and fabric of the Declaration of Rights: to protect the fundamental rights of Montanans irrespective of how those rights may be interpreted under like provisions of the federal constitution and to revitalize the government's approach to civil liberties. ¶ 161 Long ago, when Montana first joined the Union, the citizens of this state were unwilling to leave their property rights to the whims of the property-related provisions of the federal constitution and the Supreme Court's interpretations of those provisions. Rather, they included in our Constitution an explicit assurance that private property would not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. Mont. Const. art. III, § 14 (1889). This provision was carried forward into the 1972 Montana Constitution, with the additional requirement that compensation be provided to the full extent of the loss  language which clarifies unequivocally that whether property was taken or damaged depends not on what the government got, but on what the property owner lost. Mont. Const. art. II, § 29 (1972). ¶ 162 It is this Court's responsibility  indeed, its obligation  to acknowledge Article II, Section 29 as the free-standing provision it is and not relegate it to the status of a mere constitutional redundancy. We previously recognized this obligation in Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 372, 207 P. 993 (1922), when we refused to ignore our own Constitution and simply adopt the Supreme Court's holding in a closely related case: Were we content to accept the views expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States as the rule of property rights in this state, our task in determining the questions presented would be comparatively easy. However, the danger of establishing such a principle in this state is apparent, and although we entertain the very highest regard and respect for the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, we do not feel constrained to follow blindly its determinations affecting the rights of our citizens, especially in view of our own constitutional guaranties.... ... Since the constitutionality of the act is attacked, both under the federal and state Constitution, we believe it to be our duty, irrespective of the holdings of other courts, to consider and apply the provisions of our own Constitution and general statutes thereto, and declare the rule of property for Montana. Gas Products, 63 Mont. at 380-81, 388, 207 P. at 994, 996-97. ¶ 163 Thus, some 86 years ago, this Court announced that it would not blindly follow the determinations of the Supreme Court affecting the property rights of our citizens, and we acknowledged our duty, irrespective of the holdings of other courts, to declare the rule of property for Montana based on the provisions of our own Constitution and general statutes thereto. Gas Products, 63 Mont. at 380-81, 388, 207 P. at 994, 996-97. We have utterly failed in recent years to abide by this approach, choosing instead, as the Court does today, to look[ ] to federal case law for guidance when considering takings claims brought under Article II, Section 29. Opinion, ¶ 63. As a result, the confusion and uncertainty encumbering federal regulatory takings jurisprudence ( see ¶ 160 n. 4) have infected our own takings jurisprudence. This situation is untenable. It is long past time that we articulate appropriate standards for analysis under Article II, Section 29 and quit allowing federal court decisions to dictate the meaning and substance of Montana's Constitution. ¶ 164 Construing Article II, Section 29 in light of the coordinate guarantees in Article II, I conclude that this provision applies to situations in which property is taken or damaged by virtue of government regulation. I further conclude that this provision affords broader protections than the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Based on these conclusions and the foregoing discussion, I now address whether a part or a whole of the Ranchers' property interests has been taken or damaged, entitling them to just compensation to the full extent of the loss pursuant to Article II, Section 29. Given the impact of I-143 on the alternative livestock industry  outright obliteration  I consider this to be a relatively easy question to answer. ¶ 165 I-143 forced the Ranchers out of business, as it was intended to do. Consequently, the goodwill and going-concern value of the Ranchers' businesses have been totally destroyed. See Kafka Dissent, ¶¶ 197-211. In this respect, I-143's effect is dramatic. For all intents and purposes, the Ranchers have been ousted from their domain vis-à-vis the goodwill and going-concern value of their businesses. Cf. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539, 125 S.Ct. at 2082 (Each [of our regulatory takings inquiries] aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.). I would hold that this constitutes not merely a damaging of their businesses, but an outright taking of them. ¶ 166 The Court reasons that businesses themselves cannot be taken unless the government physically condemns those businesses and runs them itself. Opinion, ¶ 89 (citing Kafka, ¶¶ 55-63). This reasoning is lifted, almost verbatim, from the Sportsmen's appellate brief, where they argue: The cases in which courts have determined whether businesses were even compensable property involve physical appropriation of the property with governmental intent to itself take over the operation of the business it appropriated. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 335[338] U.S. 1, 12[, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787] (1949); United States v. 0.88 Acres, 760[670] F.Supp. 210 (W.D. Mich.1987).... The 0.88 Acres court was emphatic that even where the business property was physically appropriated, damages for the loss of goodwill or loss of the going-concern value of a business are not compensable unless the government has condemned the business property with the intention of carrying on the business. Id. emphasis added; See also Kimball Laundry, 335[338] U.S. at 12[, 68 S.Ct. 1375] (where the government appropriated a laundry and ran it as a laundry during World War II, compensation for the business was appropriate). As I explained in Kafka, however, this interpretation of Kimball Laundry is erroneous. See Kafka Dissent, ¶¶ 213-214. Moreover, it is illogical. The rule which the Court and the Sportsmen have completely distorted is that when a business is unable to transfer its goodwill and going-concern value to another location (e.g., because the government has taken over the business, or because transfer is prohibited), then compensation is required. See Kafka Dissent, ¶¶ 208-210. ¶ 167 As for the Ranchers' inventory, equipment, fixtures, and facilities  most of which were procured and designed for the specific purpose of alternative livestock ranching and, thus, have little or no salvage value  I would hold that the Ranchers are entitled to just compensation for a damaging of property. Likewise, the Court points out that the Ranchers' alternative livestock lost roughly 95% of its value as a result of I-143. See Opinion, ¶ 90 n. 6. Even if the Ranchers have not been deprived of all economically viable use of the livestock  a questionable proposition, which the Court asserts in ¶ 80  I would hold that they are entitled to compensation to the full extent of the loss, i.e., for the 95% devaluation. Mont. Const. art. II, § 29. ¶ 168 In rejecting the Ranchers' claim with respect to their alternative livestock, the Court asserts that although the Ranchers' herds were disease free, the Ranchers knew that their alternative livestock carried with them an inherent danger of spreading CWD which could never be eliminated and which could prove uncontrollable if it made its way into the genetic make-up of the native wildlife populations. Opinion, ¶ 98. The Court thus concludes that any investment-backed expectations the Ranchers had in their alternative livestock were unreasonable. ¶ 169 The irony in the Court's reasoning, which the Ranchers point out in their briefs, is that they would have been better off (as it turns out) if their alternative livestock had contracted CWD. See 9 C.F.R. § 55.2 (The Administrator is authorized to pay for the purchase and destruction of CWD positive animals, CWD exposed animals, and CWD suspect animals.). In other words, what the Court fails to recognize is that if the Ranchers should have known that their livestock could contract CWD, thus necessitating destruction, then they had investment-backed expectations in receiving at least something for the livestock. As it is, however, they are receiving nothing because their herds are healthy. That point aside, to the extent Article II, Section 29 requires us to consider the Ranchers' investment-backed expectations, I do not agree with the Court that those expectations were unreasonable. See Kafka Dissent, ¶¶ 230-238. ¶ 170 The Court criticizes my analysis as failing to explain how Article II, Section 29 would apply in less-dramatic instances of government regulation of property. Opinion, ¶ 71. It is not necessary, however, to articulate a rule applicable to all possible cases. As the Supreme Court has stated, most regulatory takings require a case-by-case approach. In any event, we cannot refuse to find a taking or damaging of property under Article II, Section 29 on the ground that there may be borderline cases in which we will have to engage in a more complex balancing analysis. Cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3176, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) ([T]his Court has not declined to apply a per se rule simply because a court must, at the boundary of the rule, apply the rule of reason and engage in a more complex balancing analysis.). The Court's criticism is also incongruous, given that the Court refuses to develop any jurisprudence under Article II, Section 29, choosing instead to eviscerate the provision and march lockstep with the federal courts' pronouncements under the Fifth Amendment. Nevertheless, I note that we purported to adopt and apply a test in Knight v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 165, 642 P.2d 141 (1982), for determining when property has been damaged: `whether the interference is sufficiently direct, sufficiently peculiar, and of sufficient magnitude to cause us to conclude that fairness and justice, as between the State and the citizen, requires the burden imposed to be borne by the public and not by the individual alone.' See Knight, 197 Mont. at 173, 642 P.2d at 145 (quoting Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 587 (10th Cir.1962) (Murrah, C.J., dissenting)). ¶ 171 Here, as discussed earlier in this Dissent, the Sportsmen represent the voices of thousands of Montana men and women who believe I-143 is vital to the protection of Montana's wildlife and to the tradition of fair chase hunting. According to the Sportsmen, I-143 was designed and enacted to address very serious dangers to Montana's wildlife and fair chase hunting heritage. Based on the principle that the State may not force some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole, I would hold that the costs of achieving the Sportsmen's goals for all Montanans must be borne by the public, not disproportionately placed on the shoulders of the alternative livestock ranchers.