Opinion ID: 167897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Heat of Passion Manslaughter Instruction

Text: 20 Mr. Bland first argues that his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated through jury instructions and prosecutorial argument that prevented the jury from considering his affirmative defense of heat of passion manslaughter. Specifically, he argues that the jury instructions failed to require the State to disprove heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). He also contends that the prosecution improperly argued to the jury that manslaughter could not be considered unless a reasonable doubt existed as to the murder charge. The State argues that he failed to exhaust his Mullaney claim, and also defends the decision on the merits. 21 In his brief on direct appeal to the OCCA, Mr. Bland conceded that the jury was instructed in accordance with McCormick v. State, 845 P.2d 896, 900-01 (Okla. Crim.App.1993), which upheld Oklahoma's instructions on heat-of-passion manslaughter against a Mullaney challenge. Instead, he focused his argument on the prosecution's closing arguments. Br. of Appellant, OCCA Case No. F-98-152, at 34. He argued that [t]he trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to instruct the jury to not consider Mr. Bland's affirmative defense of first degree manslaughter unless the jury had first found reasonable doubt for first degree murder. Id. at 33 (emphasis omitted). In making this argument, Mr. Bland cited both Mullaney and United States v. Lofton, 776 F.2d 918, 921 (10th Cir.1985), a decision from this Court interpreting Mullaney to require the government to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the absence of heat of passion to obtain a murder conviction. Br. of Appellant, OCCA Case No. F-98-152, at 33-34. Essentially, he argued that the prosecution's decision to specifically t[ell] the jury that it could not consider defendant's affirmative defense of first degree manslaughter unless the jury first found reasonable doubt for the offense of first degree murder effectively modified the instructions such that they violated McCormick, Lofton, and Mullaney. Br. of Appellant, OCCA Case No. F-98-152, at 34. Mr. Bland concluded this argument with a one-sentence citation to Mullaney, stating that his right to due process was violated because the State was exempted from its duty to prove first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 35. 22 Noting Mr. Bland's concession that the jury instructions were proper under Oklahoma law, the OCCA construed Mr. Bland's argument solely as one of prosecutorial misconduct. Bland, 4 P.3d at 726. Because defense counsel did not object to the prosecution's argument at trial, the OCCA reviewed Mr. Bland's claim for plain error. Id. The OCCA concluded that because the jury was properly instructed as to the manner in which the murder and manslaughter charges should be considered, and there was no evidence that the jury failed to follow their written instructions, any misstatements by the prosecutor could not have affected the outcome of the trial. Id. 23 In his habeas petition in the district court, Mr. Bland argued both that the trial court should have given an instruction that unless the State disproved the affirmative defense of `heat of passion' it could not convict of murder, and that the prosecution improperly argued that the jury must decide Mr. Bland's guilt on the murder charge before it could consider the manslaughter charge. R. Doc. 18, at 27. In response, the State argued that Mr. Bland did not exhaust state remedies for his challenge to the jury instructions. Mr. Bland replied that the jury instruction argument was exhausted because it is the substantial equivalent to, arose under the same federal constitutional provision as, and was a logical extension of, the argument made to the OCCA. R. Doc. 33, at 2. The district court agreed, and found that Mr. Bland fairly raise[d] the issue of whether the jury instructions given, combined with [the] prosecutorial argument made, misled the jury concerning the prosecution's burden of proof. R. Doc. 61, at 9. The district court nonetheless denied relief because the jury instructions clearly set forth the various offenses for which Mr. Bland could have been convicted, and the prosecutor's comments did not infringe on a particular constitutional right. Id. at 10-11. On appeal, the State reasserts its claim that Mr. Bland failed to present his jury instruction claim to the OCCA.
24 A state prisoner generally must exhaust available state-court remedies before a federal court can consider a habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Hawkins v. Mullin, 291 F.3d 658, 668 (10th Cir.2002). A claim has been exhausted when it has been fairly presented to the state court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). Fair presentation requires more than presenting all the facts necessary to support the federal claim to the state court or articulating a somewhat similar state-law claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982) (per curiam). Fair presentation means that the petitioner has raised the substance of the federal claim in state court. Picard, 404 U.S. at 278, 92 S.Ct. 509. The petitioner need not cite `book and verse on the federal constitution,' id. (quoting Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir.1958)), but the petitioner cannot assert entirely different arguments from those raised before the state court. For example, in Hawkins, 291 F.3d at 669, the defendant argued on direct appeal that the trial court erred in not considering whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived the opportunity to present mitigating evidence. In his request for federal habeas corpus relief, however, he argued that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate possible mitigating evidence. Id. We held that he had failed to exhaust that claim because [w]hile [the defendant's] state-court claims focused on the trial court's actions his federal habeas claims specifically challenge[d] only defense counsel's failings. Id. (emphasis added). 25 Mr. Bland's arguments on direct appeal were limited to objections to the prosecution's mischaracterization of jury instructions directing the jury to consider the murder and manslaughter charges simultaneously. In the course of that argument, Mr. Bland not only neglected to argue that the trial court's instructions were erroneous, but explicitly conceded that the instructions comported with McCormick. His due process argument before the OCCA was limited to misinformation presented by the prosecution and did not mention any errors by the court in issuing its written jury instructions. Br. of Appellant, OCCA Case No. F-98-152, at 35. 26 Mr. Bland contends that the OCCA examined the jury instructions and held that the instructions satisfied Mullaney, and that because the court addressed the claim it was exhausted. See Abdus-Samad v. Bell, 420 F.3d 614, 623 (6th Cir. 2005) (A claim is exhausted if the state court addressed the substance of the asserted claim.). We do not agree. Although the OCCA did note that [t]he jury was properly instructed as to the manner in which the offenses were to be considered, this comment was in connection with the court's consideration of whether the prosecutor's comments had the effect of preventing the jury from following the trial court's instructions. See id. A challenge to the actions of the prosecution differs significantly from a challenge to the instructions given by the court. See Hawkins, 291 F.3d at 669. Because presentation of a somewhat similar claim is insufficient to fairly present a federal claim before the state courts, we conclude, contrary to the district court, that Mr. Bland failed to exhaust his Mullaney claim. 27 Generally, a federal court should dismiss unexhausted claims without prejudice so that the petitioner can pursue available state-court remedies. See Demarest v. Price, 130 F.3d 922, 939 (10th Cir.1997). However, if the court to which Petitioner must present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find those claims procedurally barred, there is a procedural default for the purposes of federal habeas review. Dulin v. Cook, 957 F.2d 758, 759 (10th Cir.1992). There is no question that Oklahoma would deem Mr. Bland's due process claim regarding the jury instructions procedurally barred. Oklahoma's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act requires that [a]ll grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised . . . may not be the basis for a subsequent application. Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1086; see also Medlock v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1314, 1323 (10th Cir.2000) (Oklahoma deems waived claims that were not raised in an initial application for post-conviction relief in a death penalty case.). 28 A petitioner may overcome the procedural bar only if he can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Mr. Bland has neither asserted cause and prejudice excusing this default, nor suggested that this Court must review the merits of his claim to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, Mr. Bland failed to exhaust his claim that the jury instructions violated Mullaney and he is now procedurally barred from raising that claim in this Court.
29 Even were we to agree with the district court that Mr. Bland raised his Mullaney claim before the OCCA, he would not be entitled to relief. In arguing that he exhausted this claim, Mr. Bland takes the position that the state court confronted squarely the appropriateness of the written jury instructions challenged here. Reply Br. of Pet./Aplt. 5. If he is correct, then the OCCA rejected Mr. Bland's Mullaney claim on the merits, the standard of review in § 2254 applies, and we could reverse only if the OCCA's decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 30 Mullaney involved a challenge to a Maine murder statute that allowed any intentional or criminally reckless killing to be punished as murder unless the defendant proves by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it was committed in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, in which case it is punished as manslaughter. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691-92, 95 S.Ct. 1881. The Court declared the statute unconstitutional because the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case. Id. at 704, 95 S.Ct. 1881. Two years after issuing the decision in Mullaney, however, the Supreme Court clarified that its holding should be narrowly construed. In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), the defendant argued that Mullaney prohibited a state from permitting guilt or punishment to depend on the presence or absence of an identified fact without assuming the burden of proving the presence or absence of that fact, as the case may be, beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court rejected that interpretation. Although it acknowledged that Mullaney requires a state to prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt and prohibits a state from shift[ing] the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense, the Court declared it unnecessary to have gone further in Mullaney. Id. at 215, 97 S.Ct. 2319. Patterson thereby limited Mullaney to situations where a fact is presumed or implied against a defendant. See id. at 216, 97 S.Ct. 2319; United States v. Molina-Uribe, 853 F.2d 1193, 1203-04 (5th Cir.1988), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Bachynsky, 934 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir.1991) (en banc). Because the written instructions did not permit the jury to presume malice aforethought, required the State to prove malice aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt, and defined malice and heat of passion as mutually exclusive, the instructions provided to the jury in Mr. Bland's case did not violate Patterson. See Davis v. Maynard, 869 F.2d 1401, 1406-07 (10th Cir.1989) (rejecting a Mullaney challenge to substantially similar jury instructions), vacated sub nom., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), opinion reinstated in part, 911 F.2d 415 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam). 31 Mr. Bland relies on our decision in Lofton, 776 F.2d at 920, to claim that he was entitled to an instruction that the prosecution had the burden to prove the absence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt. In Lofton, we described Patterson as preserving, not limiting, Mullaney's holding that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of any defense that serves to negate an element of the crime. See id. (noting that under the statute in Patterson, malice was not an element of second-degree murder, and the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance therefore did not negate an element of the offense). We held that where malice is an element of murder and a heat-of-passion defense would negate that element, as in Mullaney, the defendant is entitled to instructions informing the jury of . . . the Government's duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion in order to obtain a murder conviction. Id. 32 If this Court's decision in Lofton were controlling, Mr. Bland might well be entitled to relief. Under the AEDPA standard of review, however, a habeas petition shall not be granted unless the state-court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). The decisions of lower federal courts applying Supreme Court precedent are not determinative, see Williams, 529 U.S. at 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, and in this case the lower federal courts have in fact divided as to the proper scope of Mullaney after Patterson. Compare Lofton, 776 F.2d at 920-21, with Molina-Uribe, 853 F.2d at 1203-04. Because the OCCA's decision reasonably applies the correct legal rule from Mullaney, as the Supreme Court construed that rule in Patterson, the OCCA decision is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, notwithstanding the interpretation of that rule in this Circuit.
33 We turn now to Mr. Bland's argument that the prosecutors misstated the jury instruction regarding the lesser included offense, and thus violated due process. To prevail on a claim based on improper remarks by the prosecutor, a petitioner generally must demonstrate that the remarks so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974); see also Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1013, 1018 (10th Cir.2002) (requiring a showing that the trial was fundamentally unfair where the prosecutor's comments appeared to contradict the jury instructions). Because the OCCA considered this claim, AEDPA standards of review apply, and we may reverse only if the OCCA's decision was legally or factually unreasonable. Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 34 During closing argument, the prosecution argued that the jury need not consider the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of first-degree murder. Tr. Jury Trial, Day Six, at 8, 10. The defense did not object to the argument at trial, but Mr. Bland now contends that the argument violated Oklahoma law and misstated the jury instructions by inviting the jury first to consider the murder charges and then only look at the manslaughter if the jury was unable to find murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 106. 35 Reviewing for plain error, the OCCA found none. Both defense counsel and the prosecution reminded the jury to refer to the written instructions during deliberations. See id. at 9 (State's closing argument) (Read the Instructions, study them.); id. at 59 (Defendant's closing argument) (I want you back in the jury room[,] as I know you will[,] to read all of the instructions.). Mr. Bland has conceded that the written instructions provided to the jury were in accord with McCormick, the controlling OCCA precedent. See Bland, 4 P.3d at 726; Br. of Appellant, OCCA Case No. F-98-152, at 34. One instruction provided that [i]f you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of the charges of MURDER FIRST DEGREE (PREMEDITATED) AND MURDER FIRST DEGREE (FELONY MURDER), you must then consider the charge of MANSLAUGHTER FIRST DEGREE BY DANGEROUS WEAPON (HEAT OF PASSION). O.R. Vol. II, at 374. Another instruction explained: 36 If you have a reasonable doubt as to which offense the defendant may be guilty of, Murder First Degree (Premeditated), and/or Murder First Degree (Felony Murder), or Manslaughter First Degree by Dangerous Weapon (Heat of Passion), you may find him guilty only of the lesser offense, Manslaughter First Degree by Dangerous Weapon (Heat of Passion). 37