Opinion ID: 2161272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Recovery for Personal Injuries.

Text: The jury awarded Mrs. Moritz $6,500 for her personal injuries. The trial judge, after ruling out the possibility of any error occurring on the trial and any passion or prejudice on the part of the jury, decided that the award was excessive. He gave no reasons or explanation for this conclusion. Pursuant to Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co . [5] he found that $3,500 was fair and reasonable compensation for her injuries. This is another instance similar to those in which we have been asked very recently [6] to review (1) a trial court's determination that a jury award for personal injuries is excessive, but not caused by passion, or prejudice, and is not the result of error occurring during the trial, and (2) the sum fixed as reasonable by the trial court under Powers allowing the plaintiff an option of a new trial which he can avoid by remitting the excess above the amount which the court considers reasonable and taking judgment based on that reduced amount. [7] The crucial question to be first resolved is whether the trial court here erred in finding that the $6,500 award for plaintiff's personal injuries was excessive. Several criteria have been established to guide a trial court's review of a jury verdict. 1. The problem of achieving fairness in assessing damages for personal injury is fraught with difficulty. Theoretical nicety is impossible. Under our judicial system, we rely primarily upon the good sense of jurors to determine the amount of money which will compensate an individual for whatever loss of well-being he has suffered as a result of injury. [8] 2. In actions sounding in damages merely, where the law furnishes no legal rule for measuring them, the amount to be awarded rests largely in the discretion of the jury, and with their verdict the courts are reluctant to interfere. [9] 3. A jury may mistakenly assume (without supporting evidence) that there have been, or will be certain effects from an injury or fix compensation for sufficiently proved effects of injury at a figure which is beyond the range of reasonably debatable amounts. In a case where it is clear to the court that the amount awarded must necessarily reflect an allowance for the effects of injury not sufficiently proved or reflect a rate of compensation which is beyond reason, the court will declare the damages excessive. Where the question is a close one, it should be resolved in favor of the verdict. [10] 4. In considering whether the jury's appraisal of damages for pain, suffering, and disability is excessive, we must of course view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. [11] The trial court, however, is not required to search out one or several isolated pieces of testimony, which standing alone might sustain the damages found by the jury, but rather must review all the evidence bearing on damages and then, viewed reasonably as a whole, consider the same in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. [12] 5. In analyzing the testimony as to the existence of any permanency of the injury or the likelihood that the injured person will endure future pain and suffering before recovery may be allowed therefor, there should be competent objective medical findings and the unsupported subjective statements of the injured party are not sufficient. [13] 6. . . . a comparison with other verdicts at best can only be an imperfect analogy affording some guidelines to the solution but not necessarily determining the result. [14] In addition to the above rules for reviewing personal-injury verdicts there is a further rule that is applied where the supreme court is asked to review a determination made by a trial court that a verdict is excessive. That rule is: Where a trial judge has reviewed all of the evidence and has found a jury verdict awarding damages to be excessive and has fixed a reduced amount therefor, and has determined that there should be a new trial on damages unless the plaintiff takes his option for a judgment on the reduced amount, this court will reverse his directions `only if we find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.' [15] This rule was amplified in Boodry v. Byrne , where it was stated: On appeal from a determination by the trial court that the found damages were excessive, this court will not find an abuse of discretion if there exists a reasonable basis for the trial court's determination after resolving any direct conflicts in the testimony in favor of plaintiff. [16] In applying these rules to the instant case we are handicapped considerably by the complete absence of any statement by the trial court of its reasons for its determination that the jury verdict of $6,500 for Mrs. Moritz's personal injuries is excessive. There is no analysis of the evidence and the trial court has not given the parties or this court the benefit of his observations bearing in mind that he not only sees the parties and other witnesses but hears their testimony. We can only read from the transcript. Because of the advantage of personal observation enjoyed by the trial judge, the rule has been evolved that where a trial court determines that damages are excessive, and orders a new trial for that reason, his order will be reversed and directions given by this court to enter judgment on the verdict only if we find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. [17] A trial court reviewing a personal-injury jury verdict and finding such a verdict excessive should state its reasons for its determination. In the absence of such an analysis this court on appeal must, as here, review the entire record as a matter of first impression and ascertain whether, in its judgment, the verdict is excessive. In so doing, this court, of course, applies the same criteria for determining whether or not a verdict is excessive as govern review of the verdict by the trial court in the first instance. At the time of the trial, Mrs. Moritz was a widow, about sixty-eight years old, and had a life expectancy of 9.47 years. She was thrown against the left side of her automobile. She was able to step out of her car, talk to Erickson and then drive her car home unassisted. That night she noticed soreness in her neck, back, and left leg. She saw her physician, Dr. Milsen, for the first time two days later, and complained of pain in her neck, head, back, chest, and left leg. She was given medicine and advised to apply heat. After seeing Dr. Milsen four times, her pains persisted and she was hospitalized on December 16th for a week. During that time she was examined by Dr. Albert Freedman, a specialist in orthopedics and surgery. X rays were taken. She visited Dr. Milsen about seven times through May 25, 1961, and did not see him again until July 11, 1963, just before the trial. Each time she had generally the same complaints as she had on the first occasion, and in addition, also mentioned experiencing headaches and dizziness. As a result of his examinations, Dr. Milsen observed objective symptoms of ecchymosis (superficial bleeding) of the left hip, and muscle spasms in the lower lumbar area, over the cervical spine, and in the back of the neck. The X rays taken in December of 1960, disclosed that Mrs. Moritz had an arthritic condition and that the accident had caused a decrease of a normal cervical lordosis (flattening out of the normal forward curve of the neck). Both doctors testified that the arthritis was a pre-existing condition and that the accident did not cause any boney change. The doctors concluded from their examination and Mrs. Moritz's complaints that the accident aggravated or lit up the pre-existing arthritic condition. On July 11, 1963, on her last trip to Dr. Milsen before the trial, Mrs. Moritz complained of pain in the back, neck, head, left knee, and tenderness in the back. She claimed that her movements were restricted, particularly bending. Any limitation of motion was not specifically described. Dr. Milsen found some spasm in the lumbar area and the cervical spine. Dr. Freedman also took X rays in July of 1963, the only other time he examined Mrs. Moritz. These X rays showed that the neck curve was practically normal and that there had been no marked change in the arthritic condition since the last X rays were taken in December of 1960. Dr. Freedman testified that at the time of the second X ray Mrs. Moritz actually had a lot less arthritis than would be normal in a woman of sixty-eight. Dr. Freedman felt that the flare-up of the arthritic condition was rather permanent in nature while Dr. Milsen thought that the chances were that it was permanent. No percentage finding of permanent disability was made by either doctor. Prior to the accident, Mrs. Moritz had no back problems and was able to do all her own housework and work a garden. She testified that after the collision she was unable to do all of her housework and it is undisputed that she hired two women to help her. However, the evidence is unclear as to exactly how much Mrs. Moritz was curtailed in her activity and as to what phase of the housework she was not able to perform. Outside of a cloth belt which she wore six weeks before discarding because she was starting to get better, the only other treatment prescribed by either doctor was rest, heat, and medication. She was never placed in traction, never required physical therapy, and outside of her stint in the hospital, was not confined to bed. She did not suffer any fractures, or severe cuts. The evidence taken as a whole and looked at most favorably to the plaintiff, does not support the jury verdict of $6,500 for the plaintiff's personal injuries. [18] In essence the evidence establishes that the plaintiff, sixty-eight years of age, complains three years after the accident of a worsening of a pre-existing arthritic condition; that there has been no boney change in this period; that despite the flare-up of arthritis, her condition is still not as severe as is normal in someone her age; that there was a lack of hospitalization or confinement to bed except for a period of examination; that it is unclear exactly to what extent her activities have been curtailed. The verdict is one of those relatively rare cases where the sum awarded by the jury is beyond the range of reasonable amounts and is excessive. Although the verdict is excessive the $3,500 amount fixed as reasonable by the trial court is within the range of reasonable amounts and his finding to this effect must be affirmed.