Opinion ID: 1367785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: compensatory fine payable to child's mother

Text: In his last assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing on him a compensatory fine payable to the child's mother, to compensate her for wages that she lost while she accompanied her daughter to court for the trial of defendant's case. The Court of Appeals held that the child's mother was not a victim entitled to payment of a compensatory fine under ORS 137.101, because she did not suffer direct physical injury when her daughter was raped and sodomized. State v. Barkley, supra, 108 Or.App. at 765, 817 P.2d 1328. The court vacated that portion of defendant's sentence and remanded the case to the circuit court for resentencing. Ibid. ORS 137.101 provides: (1) Whenever the court imposes a fine as penalty for the commission of a crime resulting in injury for which the person injured by the act constituting the crime has a remedy by civil action, unless the issue of punitive damages has been previously decided on a civil case arising out of the same act and transaction, the court may order that the defendant pay any portion of the fine separately to the clerk of the court as compensatory fines in the case. The clerk shall pay over to the injured victim or victims, as directed in the court's order, moneys paid to the court as compensatory fines under this subsection. This section shall be liberally construed in favor of victims. (2) Compensatory fines may be awarded in addition to restitution awarded under ORS 137.103 to 137.109. (3) Nothing in this section limits or impairs the right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal acts to sue and recover damages from the defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defendant has paid or been ordered to pay compensatory fines under this section may not be introduced in any civil action arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the compensatory fine. However, the court in such civil action shall credit any compensatory fine paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment for punitive damages in favor of the victim in the civil action. ORS 137.103(4) defines the term victim as used in ORS 137.101: `Victim' means any person who[ ] the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities; `victim' shall not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities. This court has not previously considered whether, under ORS 137.101, a sentencing court may order payment of a compensatory fine to a parent of a child who was injured by a defendant's criminal activities, where that parent did not suffer a direct physical injury as a result of those activities. In deciding that question, our task is to discern the intent of the legislature. ORS 174.020; Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or. 353, 357, 839 P.2d 217 (1992). We begin with the text and context of the statute. ORS 174.010; Boone v. Wright, 314 Or. 135, 138, 836 P.2d 727 (1992). Related provisions are part of that context. See Boone v. Wright, supra (applying that principle). ORS 137.101, the compensatory fine provision, and ORS 137.103, the definition section for that provision, are silent on the question whether the person or victim injured by a defendant's criminal activities must have suffered a direct physical injury. Because the text and the context of the statute do not make the legislature's intention clear, we turn to the legislative history to aid us. Bartz v. State of Oregon, supra, 314 Or. at 357, 839 P.2d 217. ORS 137.101 was enacted by the legislature in 1981. Or Laws 1981, ch 637, § 2. The statute was amended to its present form by a voters' initiative in 1986. Or Laws 1987, ch 2, § 11. ORS 137.103, which supplies the definitions for ORS 137.101, was enacted in 1977 as part of a statute providing for restitution to victims of crime. ORS 137.103 to 137.109; Or Laws 1977, ch 371, § 1. [12] ORS 137.103 to 137.109 were enacted in 1977 in response to a decision of this court, State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 552 P.2d 829 (1976), construing a prior restitution provision, ORS 137.540(10) (1975). [13] In Stalheim, the defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide after the car that he was driving struck an oncoming vehicle, killing two people. The sentencing court placed the defendant on probation and, pursuant to ORS 137.540(10) (1975), ordered that he pay restitution in the amount of $2,500 to the survivor of the persons killed. This court held that, under ORS 137.540(10) (1975), `restitution' [means] the return of a sum of money, an object, or the value of an object which a defendant wrongfully obtained in the course of committing the crime. `Reparation'    encompass[es] only reimbursement for the victim's liquidated or easily measurable damages resulting from the charged offense. This construction would embrace medical expenses, wages actually (not prospectively) lost, and reimbursement for easily measurable property damage. The damage valuation problems we have mentioned are particularly severe when the loss is suffered    by the deceased victim's family. Moreover, when a defendant is ordered to make reparation to persons other than the direct victim of a crime, the rehabilitative effect of making the offender clearly appreciate the injury caused by his offense would    be significantly diluted. Therefore, we construe `aggrieved party' to refer to the direct victim of a crime, and not to other persons who suffer loss because of the victim's death or injury.  275 Or. at 687-88, 552 P.2d 829 (emphasis added). As stated, in 1977 the legislature responded to that decision by enacting a separate and detailed restitution statute, ORS 137.103 to 137.109. In a meeting of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Dennis Bromka, Legal Counsel to the Interim Committee on the Judiciary, explained to the committee that the definition of victim in House Bill 2012 (codified as ORS 137.103) included any person who has suffered pecuniary damages and also included, but is not limited to, anyone who is legally responsible for the support of one who has suffered pecuniary damages, for example a surviving spouse. Tape Recording, House Committee on the Judiciary, February 21, 1977, Tape 10, Side 2. In a later meeting of the same committee, Bromka discussed a related bill, House Bill 3097, which was eventually tabled and provisions of which were incorporated into House Bill 2012. He explained that the intention of [the phrase] `be paid to any person' is that the person who the court determines was damaged by the offense could be the victim, the spouse of the deceased victim, the child of a deceased victim or any person damaged by the actit's a wide-open definition. The chair of the committee responded that he understood that the language was intended to obviate the statutory interpretation made by the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Stalheim, supra . Tape Recording, House Committee on the Judiciary, April 12, 1977, Tape 29, Side 2. See also Minutes, House Committee on the Judiciary, April 29, 1977, p 12 (similar statement of intention). In a meeting of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Edward Sullivan, Legal Counsel to the Governor and Chair of the Governor's Task Force on Corrections, explained that the bill was an attempt to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in [ State v. Stalheim, supra ]. The decision was that only the direct victims of an offense could receive restitution. What this does is allow the victim, the victim's family and injured third parties to collect restitution in a manner which is prescribed either by the court, as a part of the sentence, or by the Parole Board as a condition of parole. Tape Recording, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 31, 1977, Tape 40, Side 2. In a later meeting of that Senate committee, then-Senator Carson asked whether the definition of victim in the bill included an employer who suffered loss. Sullivan responded: What we tried to include was not only the direct victim, but the victim's family and also any third party who may have been injured. We tried to keep it as tight as possible while getting every conceivable victim. Id., June 2, 1977, Tape 38, Side 2. Finally, in the floor debate before passage of House Bill 2012 in the Senate, it was again repeated that the bill was intended to broaden the interpretation of the term victim declared by this court in Stalheim: Given the right factual situation, `victim'    would include not only the person upon whom the assault takes place or the theft is made, but also those who are dependent upon him or her for income or support or whatever it may be. So we broaden the definition of victim. Tape Recording, Senate Floor Debate, June 11, 1977, Tape 40, Side 1. [14] When ORS 137.101, the compensatory fine provision at issue in this case, was enacted in 1981, it provided in part: Whenever the court imposes a fine as penalty for the commission of an intentional crime resulting in serious physical injury    the court may order that the defendant pay    compensatory fines in the case. (Emphasis added). Most of the discussion in the relevant committeesthe House Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on Justicecentered around the above-emphasized phrases in the statute. Tape Recording, House Committee on the Judiciary, May 13, 1981, Tape 378, Side A and Tape 377, Side B; Tape Recording, House Committee on the Judiciary, May 19, 1981, Tape 398, Side B; Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Justice, July 9, 1981, Tape 276, Side A. The floor debates contained nothing pertinent to the question presented in this case. In sum, in enacting ORS 137.101, the 1981 legislature neither confirmed nor disavowed the broad interpretation of the term victim adopted in 1977 in relation to ORS 137.103(4). [15] The requirements of intentional crime and of serious physical injury were deleted in the 1986 ballot measure amendments to ORS 137.101. Or Laws 1987, ch 2, § 11. From the foregoing history, we conclude that ORS 137.101 does not require that the person or victim injured as a result of a defendant's criminal activities must have suffered a direct physical injury thereby. The legislative history establishes the legislative intent to allow a sentencing court to order a defendant to pay a compensatory fine to the parent of a child against whom the defendant's criminal conduct was directed. However, two other hurdles remain to be cleared before a sentencing court orders a compensatory fine in a particular case. As we noted at the beginning of this discussion, victim is defined in ORS 137.103(4) as any person who[ ] the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages. Those damages are defined as all special damages    which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and shall include, but not be limited to, the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken or otherwise harmed, and losses such as medical expenses and costs of psychological treatment or counseling. ORS 137.103(2). Similarly, ORS 137.101(1) limits the imposition of a compensatory fine to a situation in which the person injured by the act constituting the crime has a remedy by civil action. In this case, the compensatory fine that the sentencing court ordered defendant to pay was intended to compensate the victim's mother for wages that she lost while she accompanied her daughter to court. That loss was a form of special damages resulting from defendant's criminal activities; the compensatory fine was statutorily permissible in that respect. The remaining question, which is dispositive of this case, is whether those damages were recoverable against the defendant in a civil action. ORS 137.101(1); ORS 137.103(2); see State v. Dillon, 292 Or. 172, 182-83, 637 P.2d 602 (1981) (applying that analysis to an award of restitution under ORS 137.103 and 137.106); see also State v. Lefthandbull, 306 Or. 330, 758 P.2d 343 (1988) (reviewing award of restitution pursuant to ORS 137.106 in light of definitional terms in ORS 137.103; restitution order reversed). Here, under the facts that the record discloses, we are aware of no theory of civil liability under which the child's mother could recover her lost wages from defendant. Therefore, one statutory criterion was not met, and the order directing the payment of a compensatory fine to her was not authorized. See State v. Dillon, supra (reaching similar conclusion). The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, in part on other grounds. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed except for the portion of the sentence ordering the payment of a compensatory fine, which is vacated. The case is remanded to the circuit court for resentencing.