Opinion ID: 1808830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Threshold Issues of Jurisdiction and Mootness

Text: Campbell, Woodruff, and the Talladega County Judicial Commission (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Talladega County parties) have filed a motion to dismiss the State's appeal, arguing, in the alternative, that subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking and that the issues made the basis of the State's appeal are moot. The Talladega County parties contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter in that this proceeding constitutes an impermissible post-election challenge to the legality of the election for the office of circuit judge for the 29th Judicial Circuit, which they say is precluded by § 17-16-44, Ala.Code 1975. Section 17-16-44 provides:  No jurisdiction exists in or shall be exercised by any judge or court to entertain any proceeding for ascertaining the legality, conduct, or results of any election, except so far as authority to do so shall be specially and specifically enumerated and set down by statute; and any injunction, process, or order from any judge or court, whereby the results of any election are sought to be inquired into, questioned, or affected, or whereby any certificate of election is sought to be inquired into or questioned, save as may be specially and specifically enumerated and set down by statute, shall be null and void and shall not be enforced by any officer or obeyed by any person. If any judge or other officer hereafter undertakes to fine or in any wise deal with any person for disobeying any such prohibited injunction, process, or order, such attempt shall be null and void, and an appeal shall lie forthwith therefrom to the Supreme Court then sitting, or next to sit, without bond, and such proceedings shall be suspended by force of such appeal; and the notice to be given of such appeal shall be 14 days. (Emphasis added.) The Talladega County parties contend that the State defendants' failure to seek appellate review of the trial court's August 31, 2006, order placing Woodruff's name on the November 2006 general-election ballot either deprives this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction or moots this appeal. The Talladega County parties rely upon Bell v. Eagerton, 908 So.2d 204, 207 (Ala.2002) (Therefore, because Bell did not seek and obtain an injunction to stop the November 7, 2000, election for Lowndes County district court judge, and because Bell did not contest the election of Terri Bozeman to that office, this Court cannot nullify her election or order a new election.); and Buskey v. Amos, 294 Ala. 1, 2, 310 So.2d 468, 469 (1975) (In all cases involving election disputes, time is of the essence. It has been a policy of the courts of this state to handle such cases speedily before issues become moot, if requested to do so.). The State's response to the Talladega County parties' motion to dismiss the appeal does not direct us to any statute specifically authorizing this proceeding as an exception to the general rule set forth in § 17-16-44. [4] Instead, the State contends that an appeal from the preliminary injunction entered on August 31, 2006, was unnecessary. The State contends that the confluence of several circumstances justified its failure to appeal the order of August 31, 2006, before the November 2006 general election. First, the State points out that the trial court's order did not declare the 2006 Act unconstitutional; instead, it found that a substantial controversy exists as to the constitutionality of [the 2006 Act] that requires a further hearing or hearings. The State then points to the fact that the secretary of state complied with the injunction and certified Woodruff's name as a candidate to the probate judge of Talladega County. The State thus concludes that on the day of the circuit court's order, the secretary of state took action that rendered any subsequent appeal of the circuit court's order moot. Attorney General's Opposition to Appellees' Joint Motion to Dismiss Appeal, p. 4. The State relies on Morrison v. Mullins, 275 Ala. 258, 154 So.2d 16 (1963), in which this Court dismissed as moot an appeal from the denial of injunctive relief where, pending appeal, the defendant-appellee rescinded the qualifications for taking a test to determine eligibility to fill a position and replaced them with new qualifications, and the plaintiff-appellant had not attempted to establish his eligibility under the new qualifications. In dismissing the appeal, this Court stated: We have held that if an event happening after hearing and decree in circuit court, but before appeal is taken, or pending appeal, makes determination of the appeal unnecessary or renders it clearly impossible for the appellate court to grant effectual relief, the appeal will be dismissed. 275 Ala. at 259, 154 So.2d at 18. Morrison is easily distinguishable, however, because the event the State asserts makes any appeal of the August 31, 2006, order moot is the secretary of state's compliance with the order, an entirely different circumstance than was presented in Morrison, where the defendant-appellee, not subject to an injunction, merely changed the qualifications applicable to the plaintiff-appellant pending appeal. In such instance it is not possible for the appellate court to award meaningful relief. See Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895): The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. It necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from a judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal.  (Emphasis added.) We do not here deal with a changed circumstance that renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief whatever. 159 U.S. at 653, 16 S.Ct. 132. The State could have immediately appealed the August 31, 2006, order, and sought a mandatory injunction from this Court, pending appeal, requiring the secretary of state to set aside the previous certification. If this Court had been so inclined on proper motion by the State, [5] it would have been situated to grant the State effectual relief on the merits. The State next contends that this proceeding is not an election contest and therefore that this Court can ignore the jurisdictional limitations of § 17-16-44. Citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), the State alludes to this Court's inherent authority to review the orders of inferior courts, especially where, as here, the inferior court has used its authority to strike down an act of the Alabama Legislature. Attorney General's Opposition to Appellees' Joint Motion to Dismiss Appeal, p. 6. Noting the presumption of constitutionality applicable to statutes, the State argues that because the 2006 Act was presumed constitutional on the day the November 2006 general election was held, there is substantial doubt as to whether there was a valid, lawful election capable of supporting an election contest. Attorney General's Opposition to Appellees' Joint Motion to Dismiss Appeal, p. 8. Article VI, § 142(b), Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.Recomp.), provides: (b) The circuit court shall exercise general jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law. The circuit court may be authorized by law to review decisions of state administrative agencies and decisions of inferior courts. It shall have authority to issue such writs as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate its powers, and shall have such other powers as may be provided by law. (Emphasis added.) The legislature has restricted the jurisdiction of the circuit courts by enacting § 17-16-44. This Court has previously addressed the effect of this jurisdictional limitation in several cases. In Dennis v. Prather, 212 Ala. 449, 103 So. 59 (1925), this Court construed a predecessor statute to § 17-16-44. This Court noted: The general rule without question is that courts of equity will not interfere by injunction with the holding of elections political in character, nor take jurisdiction of a contest after the election is held. But this court is committed to the proposition that equity will interfere by injunction to restrain elections not authorized by law. It will also restrain the usurpation of office, or the assumption of functions of office where no lawful office exists.  212 Ala. at 452, 103 So. at 61-62 (emphasis added). Speaking to the predecessor to § 17-16-44, the Dennis Court stated:  Statutes restricting the jurisdiction of courts of equity, as defined at common law, and reiterated by statute in Alabama, should be strictly construed. Construing this statute as a whole, it appears, broadly speaking, to cover cases inquiring into the validity of elections theretofore helda proceeding in the nature of a contest of an election, whether the legality, conduct or results of the election be the point of attack. We doubt if it would include a case of injunction against the exercise of any form of official power, derived through or by virtue of an election not authorized by law and therefore wholly void. The equity jurisdiction in such case does not rest so much upon matters going to the conduct of the election, but upon the usurpation or abuse of official power under color of a void election. 212 Ala. at 452-53, 103 So. at 62 (emphasis added). This Court then concluded: Following our former decisions, and, we think, in keeping with sound principles, we hold that the court of equity has the power by injunction to prevent the holding of such election as is here involved [a referendum on moving the site of the courthouse], in a case wholly unauthorized by law, there appearing no adequate legal remedy. 212 Ala. at 453, 103 So. at 62. Based upon Dennis, we conclude that litigation challenging the consequences of a void election does not come within the sweep of the limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction in § 17-16-44. Against this backdrop, we turn to Bell v. Eagerton , in which we held that a disqualified candidate's appeal was rendered moot by his failure to seek and obtain an injunction to stop the election before it took place and his failure to contest the election. However, Bell is distinguishable because the issue in that case was whether the candidate met the residency requirements. We did not deal with that aspect of equitable jurisdiction, the usurpation or abuse of official power under color of a void election, which we held in Dennis was unaffected by the precursor to § 17-16-44. 212 Ala. at 453, 103 So. at 62. Here, on the other hand, we deal with the State's interest, through the attorney general, in upholding the 2006 Act against constitutional challenge in litigation that invokes equitable jurisdiction beyond the context of matters dealing with the conduct of the election such as the credentials of a candidate. [6] Because we are not here dealing with a limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction under the dichotomy recognized in Dennis, [7] the remaining basis for dismissal of the appeal is grounded upon estoppel by reason of delay in prosecuting the appeal until after the election  prudential limitations on the exercise of judicial power not involving subject-matter jurisdiction. Article V, § 137, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.Recomp.), authorizes the legislature to require the attorney general to defend any or all suits brought against the state. Section 36-15-1(2), Ala.Code 1975, requires the attorney general to attend to cases pending in the courts of the state in which the state may be in any manner concerned. Assuming, without deciding, that estoppel might apply under the circumstances here presented in litigation between private parties, dismissal of this appeal based upon the State's failure to take steps necessary to enjoin the occurrence of the election before it took place would impermissibly apply the bar of estoppel to the State of Alabama arising from the attorney general's delay in the discharge of duties owed to the public pursuant to § 137 and § 36-15-1. This we cannot do. See Greenwood v. State ex rel. Bailes, 230 Ala. 405, 407, 161 So. 498, 499 (1935): Reduced to the last analysis, the defense sought to be interposed is in the nature of an estoppel. But this court in State ex rel. Lott v. Brewer, 64 Ala. 287, [298 (1879),] declared that estoppels against the state cannot be favored, and that though they may arise in some instances, yet, upon the broad ground of public policy, they cannot arise, certainly as to the exercise of governmental functions, `from the laches of its officers.' We therefore deny the motion to dismiss the appeal.