Opinion ID: 1683656
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Attempted burglary in the second degree

Text: The jury returned verdicts of guilty on murder in the first degree and burglary in the first degree. There are three elements to the crime of murder in the first degree: A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if he [1] knowingly [2] causes the death of another person [3] after deliberation upon the matter. Section 565.020. In the present case, however, the State argued O'Brien's guilt on the basis that he was an accessory, or an accomplice, to the murder of Woods. On appeal, the State argues that it need only prove that O'Brien aided in Wood's death with the conscious purpose of causing that death. In support of its position, the State cites State v. Hunter, 782 S.W.2d 95 (Mo.App.1989). There, the court of appeals held that liability as an accomplice for murder first degree requires that one aid another or others with the conscious object of causing the offense. Proof of dual intent, that is, both an intent to commit murder after coolly and fully reflecting upon it and an intent purposely to promote the commission of murder is not required to establish accomplice liability for murder first degree. Proof of the latter intent is sufficient. Id. at 100. [Citations omitted.] Hunter cites State v. Johns, 679 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. banc 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034, 105 S.Ct. 1413, 84 L.Ed.2d 796 (1988), and State v. White, 622 S.W.2d 939 (Mo. banc 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 963, 102 S.Ct. 2040, 72 L.Ed.2d 487 (1982), in support of this holding. Johns , relying entirely on White , affirmed the use of instructions requiring only that the jury find the defendant acted with the purpose of promoting the commission of first degree murder and held the failure of the instructions to also require a finding that the defendant reflected upon this matter coolly and fully was not error. Johns, 679 S.W.2d at 259-60. In White , the Court held that [i]f the Legislature had intended to require an aider to have a dual intent, it would have said so in the statutes. White, 622 S.W.2d at 944. The Court went on to conclude that an instruction that required only a finding that the defendant with the purpose of promoting its commission aided [the other] in committing that offense [first degree murder] was sufficient. Id. at 945-46. The key to White , and that which Johns and Hunter overlooked, is that the Court, in White , went on to state that the instruction was proper only insofar as it meant acting with the conscious object of causing premeditated murder, defendant aided in causing capital murder. Id. at 946. [Emphasis added.] The unique role of premeditation in the law of accomplice liability was clarified in State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1368, 122 L.Ed.2d 746 (1993), where this Court held that, pattern instructions to the contrary notwithstanding, a first-degree murder instruction premised on accessory liability must ascribe deliberation to the defendant. And where the State's theory is accomplice/accessory liability, the jury must also find that the defendant had a purpose to aid another in the commission of the crime. Id. at 923. [Emphasis added, citations omitted.] This is so because it is the element of deliberation that sets first degree murder apart from all other forms of homicide. Both second degree murder and first degree murder require that the act be intentionally done. Only first degree murder requires the cold blood, the unimpassioned premeditation that the law calls deliberation. Only where the defendant himself harbors this most despicable mental state does society inflict its severest punishments. Thus, in Ervin , the Court made clear that, while the act of homicide may be imputed to an accessory, the element of deliberation may not be. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d at 923. See also State v. Isa, 850 S.W.2d 876, 899 (Mo. banc 1993) (first degree murder instruction made clear to jury that [defendant], herself, `deliberated' ). Proof that the defendant merely aided another with the purpose of facilitating an intentional killing cannot be sufficient to prove first degree murder and, therefore, Ervin clearly overruled Johns and Hunter . Additionally, to the extent that White has been read to require less than proof of the defendant's own premeditation in every case, it too was overruled. Therefore, for the State to have made a submissible case on first degree murder, it must have introduced evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) O'Brien committed acts which aided Blount in killing Wood, (2) it was O'Brien's conscious purpose in committing these acts that Wood be killed, and (3) O'Brien committed these acts after coolly deliberating on Wood's death for some amount of time, no matter how short. The State's case falls far short of this standard. There is evidence that O'Brien aided Blount in the commission of the robbery of Wood and that O'Brien understood and intended that his acts would have that effect. Additionally, there is evidence that Blount killed Wood and that he did so during the course of the burglary. There is no evidence, however, from which any juror could reasonably infer that O'Brien intended Wood's death, let alone that O'Brien coolly deliberated Wood's fate. It is properly said that it will be presumed that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts. State v. Hammonds, 459 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Mo.1970). In a homicide trial, an intent to kill or do serious bodily injury may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon on some vital area of the defendant's body. State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S.Ct. 309, 98 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987). So, too, may this inferred intent be imputed to an accomplice who shares in another's purpose to kill, State v. Betts, 646 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. banc 1983) (defendant's intent to kill inferred from his statement that anyone in house would have to be killed even though an associate actually shot the victim); State v. Grebing, 787 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Mo. App.1990) (evidence sufficient to convict defendant as an accomplice to first degree murder where defendant asked another to help waste the victim, defendant and accomplice drove off with victim and victim was later found killed by a bullet from defendant's gun), or who knows that his accomplice is armed and that a death is substantially certain to occur. State v. Simpson, 778 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Mo.App. 1989) (even if defendant did not shoot victim, he accompanied accomplice as he got a weapon and trailed the victim and shared his motive for the attack); State v. Oliver, 791 S.W.2d 782, 788 (Mo.App.1990) (defendant knew brother had a gun, helped hold the victims captive and shared the motive for the attack). Here, however, there was no deadly weapon used and, for all the evidence tells us, the instruments of Wood's death were Blount's feet. Assuming that Blount killed Wood intentionally, and such is the reasonable inference when the evidence shows that the victim was stomped to death, we hold that the evidence was insufficient to impute this intent to O'Brien. Absent an agreement to kill Wood, or O'Brien's knowledge that Blount was going to commit the robbery using a deadly weapon, there is simply no basis for attributing to O'Brien an intent to kill Wood. Deliberation, like most elements of mens rea, must ordinarily be proved through proof of the circumstances surrounding the killing. State v. Gilmore, 661 S.W.2d 519, 525 (Mo. banc 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 945, 104 S.Ct. 1931, 80 L.Ed.2d 476 (1984). Where the defendant commits a murder which, because of the particular method of attack, required some time to complete, this Court has permitted an inference of deliberation. See, e.g., State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 72 (Mo. banc 1987) (inference of premeditation supported by the fact that defendant bypassed four separate opportunities to abandon his plan to kill second victim and by fact that defendant, finding himself manacled in police custody, still managed to kill the second victim by stomping him to death), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1755, 100 L.Ed.2d 217 (1988); State v. Grubbs, 724 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Mo. banc) (facts that victim was bound hand and foot, that he had thirteen broken ribs and that his throat was cut supported an inference of premeditation), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931, 107 S.Ct. 3220, 96 L.Ed.2d 707 (1987); State v. Sandles, 740 S.W.2d 169, 177-78 (Mo. banc 1987) (twenty stab and slash wounds provided sufficient basis for inference of deliberation), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993, 108 S.Ct. 1303, 99 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988); State v. Sturdivan, 497 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Mo.1973) (premeditation may be reasonably inferred from the bare hand strangulation of defendant's victim and the subsequent application of the towel for two or three minutes longer to make sure he was dead), overruled on other grounds, State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534, 542 (Mo. banc 1974). In each of these cases, however, the defendant personally caused the death of the victim. Thus, the circumstances of the killing could reasonably be used to show the defendant's own premeditation. Where the defendant is simply an accessory and does not participate in the act of killing, any inferences which may be raised by the manner in which the victim was killed cannot serve to prove the defendant's premeditation. Where an accomplice has been found guilty of first degree murder, the evidence of the defendant's own actions must be sufficient to support an inference of his having premeditated upon the eventual death of the victim. See Isa, 850 S.W.2d at 898-99 (mother guilty as accomplice to first degree murder where evidence showed she had held daughter from behind while the girl's father stabbed her to death); State v. Six, 805 S.W.2d 159, 164-65 (Mo. banc) (detailing defendant's acts which, though charged as accomplice, support an inference of his premeditation on the death of the victim), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 206, 116 L.Ed.2d 165 (1991); State v. Petary, 781 S.W.2d 534, 538-39 (Mo. banc 1989) (premeditation properly inferred from facts that defendant bought duct tape and plastic gloves, drove accomplice to victims' house, threatened to kill entire family, held family at knife point and kidnapped victim), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1075, 110 S.Ct. 1800, 108 L.Ed.2d 931, aff'd on remand, 790 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. banc 1990); State v. Stewart, 714 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Mo. App.1986) (evidence supported finding of premeditation where defendant was part of coordinated attack on the victim, allowing accomplices to encircle and stab him). In the present case, the State presented no evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that O'Brien had deliberated upon Wood's death. The only circumstances shown by the State are (1) that O'Brien lured Wood out of the tavern for the purpose of aiding in robbing him, (2) that O'Brien saw Blount grab Wood and drag him into a darkened alley, and (3) that O'Brien then sought to cover his tracks by returning to the tavern to look for Wood. This evidence comes almost exclusively from O'Brien's own statements to the police and, the State argues, it need not be believed. While this is certainly true, the State fails to offer any contrary evidence in its place. Moments before the jury retired to deliberate, the State summarized its argument, stating: We don't know for sure what the defendant did, but we do know he was involved in this crime. We do know that don't we, because he sits up there and tells you some cocking [sic] bull story about how it happened, and we know it's not the truth.... Simply because a defendant's self-serving statements may not be credible does not give the jury license to speculate on what happened when there is nothing else to go on. Certainly, the jury was not required to believe O'Brien, but neither was it permitted to invent a version of facts unsupported by any evidencethat fits the crimes charged. In short, the State failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that O'Brien intended the death of Wood after having coolly deliberated upon that outcome. O'Brien's conviction for first degree murder must be reversed.