Opinion ID: 2350326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does the doctrine of invited error bar the appellant from raising in this appeal issues concerning the admission of evidence of his prior conviction?

Text: [¶ 4] Where an objection has been made, we review a district court's decision as to the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. Majors v. State, 2011 WY 63, ¶ 24, 252 P.3d 435, 441 (Wyo.2011). Where no objection is lodged in the trial court to the evidence challenged on appeal, we apply our plain error standard of review. Roden v. State, 2010 WY 11, ¶ 9, 225 P.3d 497, 500 (Wyo.2010). These standards of review are inapplicable, however, where the appellant has not only failed to object at trial, but has affirmatively acted to introduce or allow introduction of the evidence. [T]he doctrine of invited error prohibits a party from raising error on appeal that was induced by the party's own actions. Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 34, 157 P.3d 923, 930-31 (Wyo. 2007); see also Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 35, 150 P.3d 1202, 1212 (Wyo.2007) and Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 29, 123 P.3d 543, 552 (Wyo.2005). The invited error doctrine applies in this case. [¶ 5] The appellant filed a pretrial motion seeking disclosure by the State of any evidence it intended to introduce under W.R.E. 404(b) or under W.R.E. 609. In a nutshell, W.R.E. 404(b) allows admission of uncharged misconduct evidence, under limited circumstances, if such evidence is probative of such things as motive or intent. W.R.E. 609, on the other hand, allows admission of evidence of prior criminal convictions, under limited circumstances, for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness. The State's response to the appellant's motion indicated the State's intent to introduce evidence that the appellant had a prior conviction in Iowa for lascivious acts with a child. While analyzing the evidence primarily under W.R.E. 404(b), the State reserved the right to argue for its admission under W.R.E. 609. [¶ 6] The district court heard the motion during a pretrial conference several months before trial. In the midst of a brief generalized discussion concerning what the district court characterized as the 404(b) issue, the following colloquy occurred: [PROSECUTOR]:.... Probably goes more to 609. THE COURT: All right. [Defense Counsel], what would you like me to know? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, certainly if [the appellant] intends to take the stand within the last ten years of him being releasedI believe it was 2001 from custodyI would think that information should come in. However, without [the appellant] taking the stand, I think this is exactly the type of material that we would hope to keep out. I think it's highly prejudicial. I think without [the appellant's] testimony, based on the evidence the State may introduce, I think there's a good possibility [the appellant] could be convicted, based almost wholly on this charge itself. .... THE COURT: Okay. I'll take this one under advisement.... [¶ 7] The chronology of events and non-events that followed leads us to the conclusion that the appellant is barred from raising this issue on appeal. To begin with, the district court never ruled upon the matter, and it does not appear from the record that the appellant ever sought such a ruling. Further, the State did not mention the prior conviction during its opening statement or during the examination of any of its witnesses, and rested its case with no mention of the prior conviction. The appellant chose to testify, however, and during direct examination by his own counsel, the following exchange occurred: Q. Now, I want to ask you this, [appellant]. Are you a convicted felon? A. Yes, I am. Q. And what were you convicted for? A. Lascivious acts with a minor. Q. And when was that? A. `98. [¶ 8] The State cross-examined the appellant, with the prosecutor's first two questions being as follows: Q. Now, in response to [defense counsel's] question, you have been convicted of a felony, haven't you? A. Yes. Q. And that felony I believe you said was lascivious acts with a minor. A. Yes. [¶ 9] The Iowa conviction is not again mentioned in the record until, after a conference concerning jury instructions, the playing of a tape recording and a limiting instruction not related to this issue, the following discussion was had in chambers: [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, in the defendant's direct counsel elicited the fact that [the appellant] had been convicted of a prior felony. He stated that felony conviction was in 1998, and while that's correct, I think it is still a qualifying offense under Rule 609 because the information that we got fromI believe from Iowa indicates that his discharge and end of sentence was March 6, 2001, so it's well within the ten years. And I'd like to for the record tender the copies that we have that were shared with defense. THE COURT: All right. Very good. [Defense Counsel], anything you want me to know about that? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Excuse me. It's just for the purposes of the court file, not evidence. [PROSECUTOR]: That's correct. I'm not offering that for the record. It's just the nature of a general proffer to clear up any confusion about whether or not it was proper to receive that 609 testimony. THE COURT: The effect in timing of 609, yes. 609 pertains to a number of different touchstones. I'll include that in the court file. All right. So take a look at the limiting instruction. We'll have everybody use the facilities. [Defense Counsel], anything else? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Will we be discussing the limiting instruction when we return? [¶ 10] It is significant in regard to this appeal that defense counsel did not use this opportunity to place on the record any objection to admission of evidence of the prior conviction, and he did not ask for an instruction limiting its use to its intended purposes under W.R.E. 609. [1] Furthermore, the State did not mention the prior conviction in its initial closing argument, nor in its rebuttal closing, even after defense counsel raised the issue of credibility. Apparently, defense counsel concluded that the district court was going to admit the evidence of the prior conviction, so counsel decided to take the sting out of that bite by asking the appellant about it before the State had a chance to do so. That is not an uncommon tactic. See, e.g., Ramirez v. State, 994 P.2d 970, 973 (Wyo. 2000) and Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269, 1271-72 (Wyo.1991). Whether or not it was error for that evidence to be admitted, its admission was not just invited by defense counsel, it was accomplished by defense counsel. [2]