Opinion ID: 2567467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the court of appeals correctly applied the schoolcraft test

Text: ¶11 In Schoolcraft, we identified two policies that govern whether an individual has standing to challenge a presumption of paternity: (1) preserving the stability of the marriage and (2) protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their paternity. [9] The policy of preserving the marriage extends not only to the preservation of spousal unity, but also to the preservation of parent-child relationships created by the marriage. Further, when a marital father has assumed parental responsibility for a child born into his marriage, and the father has established a father-child relationship, any challenge to the father's paternity is disruptive and unnecessary. Accordingly, we hold that granting Thanos standing to challenge Kelly's presumption of paternity would undermine the policies that the Schoolcraft test protects.
¶12 In three previous cases, we have allowed challenges to a marital father's presumption of paternity but in circumstances much different than the case at hand. In Schoolcraft, we allowed a challenge to the presumption of paternity when the marital father had been separated from the mother for seven months to a year before she gave birth to a son, whom she soon abandoned. The marital father in Schoolcraft had no knowledge of the child's existence until nine months after his birth and had never developed a relationship with the child. When the marital father sought to assert his paternity at the abandonment proceedings, we allowed the guardian ad litem to challenge his presumption of paternity in part because the child had never had a relationship with [the marital father]. [10] ¶13 In two other cases decided before Schoolcraft, we also allowed challenges to the presumption of paternity. In Teece v. Teece, [11] we allowed such a challenge because the marital father was in Canada at the time of conception, while his wife remained in the United States. [12] Further, the marital father refused to accept responsibility for his wife's child, and his wife filed for divorce soon after the child's birth. [13] ¶14 In Lopes v. Lopes, [14] we allowed a challenge to the marital father's presumption of paternity. In that case, the marital father filed for divorce while his wife was pregnant with the biological child of another man. [15] ¶15 In Schoolcraft, Teece, and Lopes, the marital father and mother were separated or had filed for divorce prior to or shortly after the birth of the child. [16] Moreover, in each case, there was no relationship between the child and the marital father. Therefore, we allowed challenges to the presumption of paternity. ¶16 The facts in this case are much different. Here, prior to the birth of Z.P., Kimberlee agreed that Kelly would be Z.P.'s father. After the birth, Kimberlee and Kelly remained married and took steps towards solidifying their relationship. During this period, Kelly accepted an equal share of the custody of and responsibility for Z.P. Kelly and Z.P. developed a strong father-son relationship that has continued following the dissolution of the Pearsons' marriage. The facts that Kimberlee and Kelly were married at the time of Z.P.'s birth and that Kelly assumed a paternal role following the birth distinguishes this case from any other that we have previously examined. ¶17 We agree with the court of appeals that preserving the marriage does not [lose] all relevance upon divorce. [17] [T]he Pearsons' efforts to maintain their marriage after Z.P.'s birth remain relevant to the Schoolcraft analysis, even post-divorce. [18] Indeed, the policy of encouraging the marital father to stay married to the child's mother and to assume parental responsibility for the child is not rendered irrelevant by the fact that this particular marriage ended in divorce. The parent-child relationships created by marriage last beyond the dissolution of the individual marriage. Recognition and protection of these relationships encourages the acceptance of parental responsibility and the formation of relationships between marital fathers and children who are born into their marriage. We have previously emphasized the importance of preserving family harmony between spouses as a policy consideration for favoring legitimacy. [19] Favoring legitimacy also promotes family harmony between parents and children by protecting and preserving these crucial relationships. Therefore, we interpret the first part of the Schoolcraft test broadly to encourage the development of these parent-child relationships and to protect them once they have developed. ¶18 Furthermore, a marital father should not be exposed to attacks on his paternity after voluntarily assuming parental responsibilities for a child conceived outside of the marriage. When a marital father is committed to raising a child born into the marriage and actively assumes the role of father following the child's birth, any challenge to paternity runs afoul of the first part of the Schoolcraft test because it undermines the preservation of marital stability. ¶19 After Kelly committed to raise Z.P. as his son, he fulfilled that commitment by acting as a father to Z.P. during the first years of his life. Moreover, the Pearsons continued to raise Z.P. together after their separation, maintaining the same parent-child relationships that existed during their marriage. Because the Pearsons' marriage was intact when Z.P. was born and Kelly, as a marital father, voluntarily assumed parental responsibility for Z.P., the presumption of paternity cannot be challenged in this case.
¶20 In Schoolcraft, we held that granting the guardian ad litem standing to challenge the presumption of paternity was not disruptive to any father-child relationship because the child in that case had no relationship with either his mother's husband or his biological father, and thus the child had no expectations as to who his father [was]. [20] ¶21 In Teece and Lopes, the children who were the subject of the paternity challenge did not have relationships with the fathers into whose marriages they were born. In Teece, the marital father refused to accept responsibility for his wife's child and consequently did not develop a parental relationship with the child. In Lopes, the child was not born at the time the marital father initiated divorce proceedings and the presumption of paternity was challenged, so no father-child relationship had developed. ¶22 In this case, Z.P. has established a relationship with Kelly and recognizes him as his father. Kelly is listed as Z.P.'s father on his birth certificate. Kimberlee treated Kelly as Z.P.'s father for at least the first sixteen months of Z.P.'s life, even after the couple had separated. Kelly developed a strong father-son relationship with Z.P. during the marriage that has continued beyond the Pearsons' divorce. ¶23 On the other hand, Thanos had very little contact with Z.P. during the first years of his life and did not develop a relationship with Z.P. until Kimberlee and Kelly had separated. Z.P. views Thanos as an additional caregiver, while he considers Kelly to be his father. ¶24 In assessing the disruptiveness of a challenge to Z.P.'s paternity, the district court relied heavily on the findings of the custody evaluator, Dr. Sanders. Dr. Sanders's report stressed the importance of Z.P.'s relationship with both Thanos and Kelly but never specifically concluded whether it would be disruptive for Thanos to displace Kelly as Z.P.'s recognized legal father. The district court erred when it used Dr. Sanders's finding that Thanos's presence in Z.P.'s life was not disruptive to support its conclusion that Thanos's challenge to Kelly's paternity would not be disruptive. Thus, the district court misapplied the Schoolcraft test to Dr. Sanders's findings. ¶25 While parties interested in the well-being of a child may be entitled in certain cases to some third-party access, a child can have only one legal father. As the court of appeals recognized, The entire motivation for Thanos's attempt to intervene was to establish that he, rather than [Kelly], was to fulfill the paternal role in Z.P.'s life. [21] We agree with the court of appeals that Dr. Sanders's report was not responsive to the question of whether a challenge to Z.P.'s paternity would be disruptive and unnecessary. [22] Although Thanos's relationship with Z.P. is beneficial, a challenge to Kelly's paternity of Z.P. is disruptive in light of Z.P.'s established expectation as to the identity of his father. ¶26 Because Kelly voluntarily assumed parental responsibility for Z.P. during the course of Kimberlee and Kelly's marriage and established a father-son relationship with Z.P., any challenge to Kelly's paternity is disruptive and unnecessary.