Opinion ID: 3013846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Consequently, “the remedies for

Text: 2. violations of . . . § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are coextensive with the The Supreme Court has interpreted remedies available in a private cause of Section 504 in two principal decisions: action brought under Title VI.” Gorman, Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 536 U.S. at 185. U.S. 397 (1979) and Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). In Davis and Choate, the Court articulated two 14 Section 1003 “abrogated the countervailing legislative concerns that States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity underlie Section 504 and guide courts’ under Title IX, Title VI, § 504 of the interpretation of it: “(1) effectuation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age statute’s objectives of assisting the Discrimination Act of 1975.” Franklin, handicapped; and (2) the need to impose 503 U.S. at 72. 15 reasonable boundaries in accomplishing 504 requires of recipients of federal funds this purpose.” Skinner, 881 F.2d at 1191 in accommodating the needs of disabled (citing Choate, 469 U.S. at 299). The persons.” Sykes, 833 F.2d at 1117. Court struck a balance between these Section 504 does not, by its terms, consideration by reading Section 504 as mandate the issuance of regulations to requiring federal fund grantees to offer implement the statute. See Helen L. v. “meaningful access” to programs they Didario, 46 F.3d 325, 330 n.9 (3d Cir. administer. Meaningful access, as 1995). Section 504's legislative history explicated by the Court, does not require indicate s, however, that Congress that grantees “fundamentally alter” or contemplated the promulgation of such “substantially change” the nature of the regulations. See S. Rep. No. 93-1297, at program. Moreover, grantees need not 40 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. make accommodations that would impose 6390-91; see also Cmty. Television of S. undue financial or administrative burdens. Cal. v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 509 (1983) See Skinner, 881 F.2d at 1192; Nathanson (“[S]ince § 504 was patterned after Title v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1383 VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was (3d Cir. 1991). “Choate and Davis understood that resp onsib ility for therefore contemplate a continuum in enforcing it, insofar as it regulated private which some modest modifications may be recipients of federal funds, would lie with necessary to avoid discrimination but other those agencies administering the federal more substantial modifications are not financial assistance programs.”). required by section 504.” Skinner, 881 F.2d at 1192. In 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. Despite courts’ efforts to interpret 17,871 (Apr. 28, 1976), which required the Section 504 and determine what it requires Department of Health, Education, and of federal grantees, the statute is Welfare (“HEW”) to “establish . . . nonetheless still “‘ambiguous and lacking guidelines for determining what are in specifics.’” Disabled in Action of Pa. v. discriminatory practices, within the Sykes, 833 F.2d 1113, 1117 (3d Cir. 1987) meaning of section 504.” HEW issued (quoting R.I. Handicapped Action Comm. “coordination regulations” in 1978. See 43 v. R.I. Public Transit Auth., 718 F.2d 490, Fed. Reg. 2132 (Jan. 13, 1978). 494 (1 st Cir. 1983)); see also Skinner, 881 F.2d at 1193 (referring to the “difficulty in The HEW regulations now appear determining precisely the extent of at 28 C.F.R. Pt. 41.15 After providing accommodation mandated by section 504). As a result, some courts have 15 “suggested that the relevant federal agency HEW eventually became the and not the court has the chief Department of Health and Human Services responsibility to determine what Section (“HHS”), see 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (1979), and in 1980 President Carter transferred 16 some general prescriptions against 41.56. The regulations’ more specific discrimination in federally funded program accessibility requirements go on programs and activities, see 28 C.F.R. § to distinguish between existing, newly41.51, the regulations specifically address constructed, and altered facilities. employment discrimination and program With respect to new construction, accessibility. See C.F.R. §§ 41.52-58.16 the regulations require that new facilities The pro gram a ccess ibility “be designed and constructed to be readily regulations provide: “No qualified accessible to and usable by handicapped handicapped person shall, because a persons.” 28 CFR § 41.58(a). And recipient's facilities are inaccessible to or “[a]lterations to existing facilities [must], unusable by handicapped persons, be to the maximum extent feasible, be denied the benefits of, be excluded from designed and constructed to be readily participation in, or otherwise be subjected accessible to and usable by handicapped to discrimination under any program or persons.” Id. activity that receives or benefits from After HEW promulgated its federal financial assistance.” 28 C.F.R. § regulations, Congress amended Section 504. As we described above, Congress e n a c t e d S e c t i o n 5 0 5 (a ) ( 2 ) a n d HHS’s coordination and enforcement incorporated by reference Title VI’s authority to the Attorney General. See “remedies, procedures, and rights.” 29 Executive Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). Congress also added 72,995 (Nov. 2, 1980). The DOJ thereafter text to Section 504 requiring federal adopted the HEW coordination regulations agencies to “promulgate such regulations without substantive changes. See Bragdon, as may be necessary to carry out the 524 U.S. at 633. For the sake of internal amendments to this section made by the consistency, we refer to the regulations as Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, the “HEW regulations.” and Developmental Disabilities Act of 16 1978.” 29 U.S.C. § 794. Thus the regulations reflect the concerns that motivated Congress to enact The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 504. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 306- the 1978 amendments as “ma[king] 07 (“In enacting the Rehabilitation Act and explicit” Congress’s theretofore implicit in subsequent amendments, Congress . . . understanding that agencies administering focus[ed] on se veral subs tantiv e federal financial assistance programs areas— employment, education, and the wo uld e n f o r c e S e c ti o n 5 0 4 by elimination of physical barriers to promulgating regulations. Gottfried, 459 access—in which it considered the societal U.S. at 509. The Court has also and personal costs of refusals to provide i n t e rp r e t e d t h e a m e n d m e n t s a s meaningful access to the handicapped to “incorporat[ing] the substance of the be particularly high.”). 17 [HEW] regulations into the statute.” regulations may (instead or additionally) Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. construe non-personal rights or 624, 634 n.15 (1984). 17 As the Supreme obligations that Section 504 creates. Court has repeatedly noted, the HEW Third, the regulations may also create regulations deserve considerable deference distinct rights or obligations—either b e c a u s e t h e y c o n s t it u t e th e personal or non-personal—in addition to “contemporaneous regulations issued by those that Section 504 creates.18 As we the agency responsible for implementing a have explained, only in the first instance congressional enactment.” Id. at 634; see would plaintiffs have a private right of also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 action to enforce the regulations. That is (1998); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. because Section 504's right of action only Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002) allows plaintiffs to enforce personal rights (same); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, that the statute creates, and any regulations 536 U.S. 73, 82 n.4 (2002) (same). Importantly, the HEW regulations 18 require each agency to “issue, after notice We distinguish—as we did in and opportunity for comment, a regulation South Camden—between regulations that to implement section 504 with respect to “construe” a statute and regulations that the programs and activities to which it “create rights or obligations in addition to provides assistance.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.4(a); those that the statute creates.” If Congress see also 28 C.F.R. § 41.4(c)(2). HUD duly authorizes an agency, it may promulgated Section 504 regulations, promulgate both types of regulations. See which we described above, in 1988. 1 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 6.4, at 325-26 (4th ed. That brings us to the question on 2002); see also Chao v. Rothermel, 327 which this appeal hinges: What is the F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing precise relationship between the right of “interpretative” and “legislative” rules); action under Section 504 and the HUD Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & regulations? There is a universe of three Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1108-09 possibilities. First, the regulations may do (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same). Appellees no more than construe personal rights that assume that Congress has so authorized Section 504 creates. Second, the HUD under the Rehabilitation Act and that the HUD regulations are valid. We adopt that assumption for the purposes of 17 As the Court explained, “the this decision. Nothing here is meant to responsible congressional committees cast doubt on the validity of the HUD participated in their formulation, and both regulations themselves. But the validity of these committees and Congress itself the regulations is a different question than endorsed the regulations in their final whether they are privately enforceable. form.” Darrone, 465 U.S. at 634. See South Camden, 274 F.3d at 787. 18 a plaintiff seeks to enforce must merely instance, Section 8.22 provides that new “flesh out” those statutory personal rights. housing projects “shall be designed and Cf. South Camden, 274 F.3d at 790. constructed to be readily accessible “ to handicapped persons. 24 C.F.R. § 8.22(a). An analysis of the HUD regulations And Section 8.26 requires that accessible here reveals that in any event they do not dwelling units “be distributed throughout articulate personal rights. projects.” 24 C.F.R. § 8.26. At the outset, we observe that as a Similarly, the HUD rules have an general matter the HUD regulations are “‘aggregate focus’” and “are not directed at the Housing Authority’s concerned with ‘whether the needs of any obligations as a grantee. Section 8.22, for particular person have been satisfied.’” example, requires that new housing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288 (quoting projects “shall be designed and Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343, 344). In this constructed to be readily accessible to and regard, we emphasize that all but one of usable by individuals with handicaps.” 24 the regulations plaintiffs seek to enforce C.F.R. § 8.22(a). This mandate is not turn on the percentage of units that meet couched in terms of any beneficiary’s accessibility requirements. Five percent of entitlement, but aims at the fund the units in newly-constructed and recipient’s conduct. Id. The regulations, substantially-altered housing projects must to the extent they effectuate Section 504, be accessible to those with ambulatory speak to the regulated state entity and do disabilities, and two percent must be not focus on the individual beneficiary. accessible to those with hearing and visual Words “that focus on the person regulated disabilities. See 24 U.S.C. §§ 8.22(b), rather than individuals protected create ‘no 8.23(a). And when the Housing Authority implication of an intent to confer rights on alters a unit, but not substantially, it must a particular class of persons.’” Sandoval, make the unit accessible unless five 532 U.S. at 289 (quoting California v. percent of the units in the housing project Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)). are already accessible. See 24 U.S.C. § Thus the regulations fall short of the type 8.23(b). of individually-focused entitlement that the Supreme Court has found critical in Thus the Housing Authority can fail determining whether Congress created to comply with the regulations and still not personal rights. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at deny access to a disabled individual. 287; Richman, 367 F.3d at 187-88. Consider, for instance, if the Housing Authority were to build a new 100-unit Equally important, the HUD housing facility and, although none of the regulations plaintiffs seek to enforce relate newly-built units were accessible to the to “institutional policy and practice, not mobility impaired, the Housing Authority individual instances” of discrimination. had a policy of retrofitting every unit to be Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288. So, for accessible whenever an impaire d 19 individual sought public housing. The does exist to enforce the regulations’ Housing Au thority wo uld provide enabling statute (Section 504). But the accessible housing to disabled individuals, right of action that exists under Section yet it would have failed to comply with the 504 only allows plaintiffs to enforce regulations. We do not offer this example personal rights that Section 504 creates. to suggest that Section 504 does not And the HUD regulations do not construe authorize the prophylactic measures the a personal right under Section 504. regulations articulate. Rather, the example Similarly, this case also differs from demonstrates that the mandates the recent cases applying Sandoval. In regulations set forth are not individual- Jackson v. Birmingham Board of oriented and have a systemwide focus. See Education, 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002), Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343-44 (treating cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (2004) and focus on systemwide compliance as Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4 th Cir. inconsistent with the creation of personal 2003) the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits rights). addressed whether plaintiffs had a right of Since the HUD regulations at issue action to enforce anti-re taliation do not articulate personal rights, they of regulations that agencies promulgated course cannot construe personal rights that under Section 601 of Title VI and the Section 504 creates; and whether the HUD parallel provision in Title IX of the regulations otherwise construe general Education Amendments of 1972, 20 obligations that Section 504 creates or U.S.C. § 1681. The issue in those cases create distinct obligations is not was not whether the anti-retaliation dispositive for private right of action regulations articulated personal rights. analysis. Thus, although we assume that Rather, the issue was whether the the HUD regulations properly effectuate regulation articulated a personal right that Section 504, we cannot conclude that the Congress created in Title VI and Title IX, regulations construe a personal right respectively. This is the very type of within Section 504. As a result, plaintiffs question raised in Sandoval itself. The cannot enforce the regulations by way of Fourth Circuit held that the regulations’ Section 504's private right of action. “retaliation prohibition is an interpretation of § 601's core antidiscrimination In reaching our conclusion, we note mandate.” 327 F.3d at 316. The Eleventh that while Sandoval drives our decision, Circuit, in contrast, held that “[b]ecause this case differs from Sandoval. In Congress has not created a right through Sandoval, plaintiffs could not sue to Title IX to redress harms resulting from enforce the disparate impact regulations retaliation, [the Department of Education’s because no private right of action existed regulation] may not be read to create one at all to enforce the statutory provision either.” 309 F.3d at 1346. (Section 602 of Title VI) from which the regulations derived. Here, a right of action Our case is far different because it 20 involves regu lations implementin g accord with our decision here. systemic rights and obligations. Whether D. the HUD regulations construe Section 504 (or create new obligations), Section 504's The reasons that compel us to implied right of action only allows conclude that plaintiffs cannot maintain plaintiffs to enforce personal rights that the their suit to enforce the HUD regulations statute creates and not systemic as a private cause of action under Section obligations. Thus, even if we were to 504 also compel us to conclude that they assume that Congress created the systemic cannot sue to enforce the regulations rights and obligations that the HUD under Section 1983. As we held in South regulations articulate, plaintiffs may not Camden, plaintiffs can only enforce under enforce those rights under Section 504 Section 1983 personal rights that Congress because they are not personal rights. creates. Whether or not Congress created the systemic rights that the HUD Finally, our decision is consistent regulations articulate, plaintiffs cannot with past cases in which plaintiffs have enforce them under Section 1983 because enforced regulations promulgated under they are not personal rights. statutes (including Section 504) that did not contain express rights of action. In III. Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Sykes, 833 For the reasons stated above, we F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1987), for example, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. granted summary judgment to plaintiffs We emphasize, as the defendants concede, seeking to enforce Department of see Appellee’s Br. 26, 32, that plaintiffs Transportation regulations promulgated may continue to bring suit to enforce their under Section 504. The regulations personal rights to access directly under required grantees to make transportation Section 504. Thus those claims, as well as facilities— in Sykes, a particular subway plaintiffs’ motion seeking class station in Philadelphia—accessible when a certification, remain before the District facility is substantially altered. Id. at 1119. Court. We note that the District Court will Those regulations required the City of have to determine the extent to which any Philadelphia to make a common area of the HUD regulations may be relevant to individually accessible; that is, an area that determining whether defendants are liable any disabled individual had to access in under Section 504. See, e.g., Nathanson, order to use the public facility. Thus the 926 F.2d at 1386. Moreover, if plaintiffs regulations construed plaintiffs’ personal continue to seek class certification as well right to access. See also Chaffin v. Kan. as injunctive relief, the Court will have to State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850, 858 (10th address several inter-connected issues Cir. 2003) (finding cause of action to over the course of the proceedings. See enforce regulations promulgated under Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 860 Title II of the ADA ). That is entirely in (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]here a district court 21 grants system-wide injunctive relief, the issues of standing, class certification, and the propriety and scope of relief are often intermingled.”). Finally, HUD retains its independent authority—indeed, its independent obligation—to enforce its own regulations after many years of the Housing Authority’s noncompliance. 22