Opinion ID: 1036479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hightower v. Terry (2006)

Text: Next, in Hightower, another 2006 decision in a § 2254 capital case, this Court went further and stated that a state court’s denial of a Batson motion may contain implicit findings. Hightower v. Terry (“Hightower II”), 459 F.3d 1067, 1072 n.9 (11th Cir. 2006). 90 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 91 of 128 In his Batson objections, Hightower argued that he had established a prima facie case because: (1) the prosecution had exercised 6 of its 7 peremptory strikes against black venire members; and (2) the prosecutor had “in the past shown a bent and scheme” to remove black persons from juries. Hightower v. Schofield (“Hightower I”), 365 F.3d 1008, 1031 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated by 545 U.S. 1124, 125 S. Ct. 2929 (2005), new opinion on remand, 459 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 952, 127 S. Ct. 2254 (2007). The prosecutor denied any attempt to discriminate, but the court required him to provide strike reasons, which he did. Id. at 1032. The court summarily ruled that Hightower “had failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination, and alternatively, that the prosecutor had ‘presented an articulable, nonrace related reason for striking’ each prospective black juror.” Id. On direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed and its Batson discussion was brief and never explicitly mentioned Batson’s third step. Hightower v. State, 386 S.E.2d 509, 512 (Ga. 1989).25 25 The Georgia Supreme Court’s entire discussion of Hightower’s Batson claim is nine sentences: The defendant contends the prosecution was guilty of racial discrimination. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L.E.2d 69 (1986). The prosecutor used only seven of his authorized 10 peremptory strikes. He used six of those seven strikes against black prospective jurors. The record shows that at least two black prospective jurors were struck by the defendant after having been accepted by the prosecutor. The prosecutor explained his peremptory challenges. 91 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 92 of 128 Hightower’s § 2254 petition asserted that the state courts had misapplied Batson. This Court affirmed the denial of Hightower’s Batson claim. Hightower I, 365 F.3d at 1035. We explained that, assuming Hightower had stated a prima facie case, “the prosecutor gave specific, nonracial reasons for each of his strikes of African-Americans,” satisfying step two. Id. at 1034. As to the third step, the state courts made no explicit findings about the prosecutor’s credibility or about discriminatory purpose, or anything at all relating to that step. Yet, this Court still deferred to “the state court judgment,” stating: “[O]ur task is to determine, in consideration of ‘all relevant circumstances,’ and given our constraints under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, whether the state court judgment in this case runs afoul of federal law. We cannot say that it does.” Hightower I, 365 F.3d at 1035 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Even though the state courts made no explicit fact findings, this Court deferred to the state courts’ judgments and stressed “the trial court’s Four of the challenged prospective jurors were closely related to persons convicted of serious felonies. The other two were conscientiously opposed to the death penalty, although not to the extent they were excused for cause. The trial court found that the prosecutor had articulated legitimate non-racial reasons for his challenges. Even assuming the defendant made out a prima facie case, Cf. Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243(21), 357 S.E.2d. 48 (1987), the trial court’s determination is not clearly erroneous. Compare Foster v. State, 258 Ga. 736(2), 374 S.E.2d 188 (1988). Hightower v. State, 386 S.E.2d 509, 512 (Ga. 1989). In contrast, the state appellate court’s evaluation of Lee’s Batson claim spans five published pages. Lee I, 898 So. 2d at 812–17. In any event, there is no minimum number of sentences or pages required for a state court merits adjudication on a federal constitutional claim to be entitled to AEDPA deference. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at —, 131 S. Ct. at 785; see also Johnson, 568 U.S. at —, 133 S. Ct. at 1094. 92 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 93 of 128 superior position to observe the prosecutor’s ‘credibility’ and ‘demeanor.’” Id. at 1034. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted Hightower’s petition for certiorari, vacated our first opinion in Hightower I, which had been issued in 2004, and remanded for further consideration in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005). Hightower v. Schofield, 545 U.S. 1124, 1124, 125 S. Ct. 2929, 2929–30 (2005). On remand in Hightower II, this Court concluded that “Miller-El does not counsel a decision contrary to the one we reached in Hightower [I], and therefore [we] adhere to that decision.” Hightower II, 459 F.3d at 1069 (2006). We distinguished Miller-El on the basis that, unlike the case in Miller-El, “we did not decide Hightower’s Batson claim on the basis of an augmented record.” Id. at 1070. “[R]ather, we were, and are post-Miller-El, limited to the evidentiary record developed in the state trial court during jury selection and the trial court’s ruling, Hightower’s and the State’s briefs to the Supreme Court of Georgia . . . , and that court’s opinion.” Id. This Court restated its conclusion in Hightower I as still applicable in Hightower II: “Hightower never provided the [state trial] court with any evidence tending to discredit the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s stated reasons for striking black jurors.” Id. at 1071 (alteration in original) (quoting Hightower I, 365 F.3d at 1035) (internal quotation marks omitted). 93 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 94 of 128 This Court in Hightower II (on remand) expressly addressed whether the state courts had erred on Batson’s third step by not entering an explicit finding that the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons were credible. Id. at 1072 n.9. We pointed out “that a trial court’s dispositive ruling may contain implicit findings, which, though unstated, are necessary to that ruling.” Id.26 Applying that “implicit findings” principle, the Hightower II Court noted that “the trial court, after assuming that Hightower had made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, expressly found that the prosecutor had provided an ‘articulable, nonrace related reason’ for each strike, and overruled Hightower’s Batson objection.” Id. Thus, we made “‘the common sense judgment’—in light of defense counsel’s failure to rebut the prosecutor’s explanations and the trial court’s ultimate ruling—that the trial court implicitly found the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible, thereby completing step three of the Batson inquiry,” even though the trial court did not explicitly complete it. Id.