Opinion ID: 2602047
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct During Cross-examination

Text: Defendant argues that, during the cross-examination of two defense witnesses, the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly insinuating defendant had committed other crimes. He contends the alleged misconduct violated state law and the federal Constitution requiring reversal. We disagree.
Defendant identifies four alleged examples of misconduct. The first instance occurred during the prosecutor's cross-examination of Jenks Janes, a Jehovah's Witness and recovering addict who testified on direct examination that he took defendant to an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting in August or September 1994. On cross-examination, Janes testified that defendant wanted to go to the meeting because he wanted to turn his life around and that Janes believed defendant to be sincere. The prosecutor then asked whether defendant had expressed any other reason for going to the meeting and whether defendant had told Janes that he had been ordered to attend such meetings. Janes answered no to both questions. The prosecutor sought to have a document marked as an exhibit and the court asked the attorneys to approach the bench. At sidebar, the prosecutor said she had a certified copy of a court order, dated October 11, 1994, requiring defendant to attend two Alcoholics Anonymous meetings per week. She intended to ask the witness whether defendant had ever told him that he had been ordered to attend meetings. Defense counsel argued the document was hearsay and pointed out that the order's date was after the meeting discussed by the witness. The prosecutor noted the timing did not mean defendant was not aware, prior to the order, that he would be ordered to attend the meetings. Defense counsel argued it was irrelevant and requested an admonition because the reference to the order had created a false impression of the facts. The prosecutor said defendant had been arrested for driving under the influence in August 1994 and one could infer he had a motive for attending the meetings other than turning his life around. The court was dubious of the prosecutor's rationale and was concerned about the order being dated months after the Alcoholics Anonymous meeting about which the witness was testifying. The trial court said it would admonish the jury that there was no order that defendant attend an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting in August 1994. While the court acknowledged that evidence of defendant's arrest was relevant to defendant's motivation for attending the meetings, it concluded that the prosecutor's mention of a court order suggested that not only had defendant been arrested, but that he had also been convicted and had a prior crime. Accordingly, the court concluded that further testimony about the arrest or the order would be more prejudicial than probative. The trial court admonished the jury, reminding it that questions are not evidence and that it should not make any assumptions based on a question being asked. Additionally, the court told the jury that [s]pecifically as to any court orders, you should disregard any question with respect to that and not draw any inferences that there was ever any court order. In response to defense counsel's request, the court further clarified that, [y]ou should not assume that because there is no evidence that there was such a court order. The cross-examination proceeded and the prosecutor did not return to the topic. The second alleged instance of misconduct occurred later the same day during the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant's wife. On direct examination, defendant's wife testified defendant told her, after he had been arrested for murdering Evans, that he had also raped Pamela B. On cross-examination, the prosecutor inquired about the night defendant raped Pamela B. After asking some initial questions about the events of the evening, the prosecutor asked whether the witness suspected defendant had committed the rape and defendant's wife answered No. The prosecutor then asked, Does he have a ninja mask? The witness answered, No. The third alleged instance of misconduct also occurred during the cross-examination of defendant's wife. The prosecutor questioned defendant's wife about defendant's drug use. The witness testified defendant used drugs throughout most of her pregnancy with their younger child and during his relationship with his stepson. The prosecutor asked whether defendant was spending the money that he made at work, in part, on drugs. The witness responded, Some of it. After eliciting testimony that defendant and his wife had been experiencing financial problems and that it was expensive to raise two children, the prosecutor asked, [b]ut he was spending some of the money on his choice, which was methamphetamine. Is that right? The witness answered, Yes. The prosecutor asked, How was he getting all this money to support this drug habit that he had? and the witness responded, From work. Later the prosecutor asked a series of questions about defendant's conduct around the time of the rape and the murder in an effort to show that defendant was not remorseful or affected by the crimes he had committed. As evidence, the prosecutor elicited testimony that defendant had, in the days after killing Evans, purchased a brand new Toyota, was not crying himself to sleep at night, and took his wife out for a romantic dinner. The fourth alleged instance of misconduct also came during the cross-examination of defendant's wife. The prosecutor asked defendant's wife a series of questions about photographs of defendant and his family that had been admitted into evidence. The prosecutor elicited that one of the photographs, taken in 1991, showed defendant with long hair. The prosecutor then began to show the witness a photograph to see whether it accurately reflected the way defendant used to look. Defense counsel requested a sidebar at which she challenged the relevance of the photograph. The prosecutor explained the photographs showed defendant had changed his appearance, including the length and color of his hair, from time to time. The prosecutor argued defendant's altering of his appearance shows a manipulative kind of character. The trial court was unconvinced, but did not rule on the objection nor did defendant press for a ruling. Back in front of the jury, the prosecutor asked the witness whether defendant had changed his appearance. Defense counsel objected on relevance grounds and the trial court sustained the objection. At the conclusion of the day's testimony, after the jury had been excused, the trial court indicated it had some concerns. The trial court said that, during the guilt phase closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury, I'm sure you have many questions in your mind. If you don't now, you will in the course of deliberation. And at the conclusion of this phase, the nextI won't be able to talk to you at the conclusion of this phase. But at the end of your service on this case, I'll be available to answer any questions that you have. The next day, defense counsel objected and requested an admonition, arguing that the prosecutor's closing argument had implied that there was additional evidence indicating defendant's guilt that the prosecutor could discuss with the jury at the conclusion of the case. The prosecutor explained that she was merely referring to a general ability to talk to the jury and answer any procedural questions. The trial court credited the explanation and denied defendant's request for an admonition and a mistrial. The trial court now expressed its concern that, in light of the prosecutor's comments during the guilt phase closing argument, the questions about defendant changing his appearance and about the source of his money could invite a defense argument that the jury was being urged to speculate whether there were other crimes. The prosecutor responded that, regarding defendant's finances, she was merely trying to show that defendant was choosing to spend his income from work on drugs rather than on his children, and not to imply anything else. Regarding her comments at sidebar about how defendant's change in appearance could be evidence of manipulative behavior, the prosecutor said she noticed the way the court looked at her and she decided to rethink that area. Regarding the questions about the ninja mask, the prosecutor argued that whether defendant's wife noticed a mask went to the witness's credibility. Defense counsel pointed out that there had never been testimony about a mask, but rather of a T-shirt that was tied around defendant's face ninja style. The court indicated it had no problem with the ninja question in light of Pamela B.'s testimony. Defense counsel explained that she did not object to the question about defendant's spending of money because it was phrased in a way that made it clear that it referred to defendant's decision to spend money on drugs rather than his children and the answer was not a problem. The court adjourned for the day. The following morning, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. Defense counsel identified four alleged instances of misconduct: (1) the prosecutor's mention of a court order in relation to defendant's motive for attending an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting; (2) the prosecutor's question about a ninja mask; (3) the prosecutor's questions regarding where defendant got the money to purchase drugs and regarding his purchase of a new Toyota; and (4) the questions regarding defendant changing his appearance. Defense counsel argued that, cumulatively, the prosecutor's questions invited the jury to draw an inference that this person is going out with a ninja mask and other crimes are being done . . . and there are all kinds of crimes nobody knows about.... The prosecutor responded that the questions regarding defendant's motive for going to the Alcoholics Anonymous meetings were relevant and reasonable in light of the timing of defendant's arrest and Janes's memory of the timeline. She also pointed out that the trial court had admonished the jury to disregard the mention of the court order. Regarding the reference to the ninja mask, the prosecutor pointed out that Pamela B. had herself described the face covering defendant was wearing during the rape in similar terms. With regard to defendant's spending, the prosecutor explained that she wanted to show defendant was choosing to spend his money on drugs, rather than on his children, and that her question about where the money came from was merely to see whether defendant had been taking the money from other sources such as a savings account or an inheritance. With regard to defendant changing his appearance, the prosecutor pointed out that Pamela B.'s neighbor had told the police that she thought defendant's wife dyed his hair after the rape. The prosecutor thought evidence of defendant changing his appearance, especially with his wife's help, went both to defendant's lack of remorse as well as his wife's bias. After listening to both counsel's arguments, the trial court concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct and denied the request for a mistrial. The trial court concluded that evidence of defendant spending money on drugs instead of his children despite limited financial resources was probative. Additionally, evidence that defendant changed his appearance immediately after the rape was probative of his lack of remorse. While the court felt that evidence of defendant's motivation for attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings was relevant, it concluded that evidence about the court order was more prejudicial than probative. However, the court noted that it had already adequately admonished the jury. Defense counsel asked the court to admonish the jury that there was no other criminal activity related to other factors in the case and, in response, the court invited defense counsel to submit a proposed special instruction. The court, at defense counsel's request, also directed the prosecutor to limit questions about defendant's finances to the limited nature of the resources, rather than the source of the money. The court also excluded any further questioning with respect to defendant's occasional changing of his appearance, but concluded that evidence of defendant changing his appearance immediately after the rape was permissible. The penalty phase proceeded. Defendant did not submit a proposed instruction to the trial court admonishing the jury that there was no other criminal activity related to other factors in the case.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by asking questions of Jenks Janes and defendant's wife that improperly implied defendant had committed other crimes. He further argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial and concludes that the misconduct and denial of his motion for a mistrial require reversal of the penalty verdict. We disagree. At the outset we note defendant has forfeited this claim. After the trial court denied his motion for a mistrial, defendant asked the court to admonish the jury that there was no other relevant criminal activity. In response, the court invited defendant to submit a proposed instruction to give to the jury. Such an instruction could have cured any potential harm by informing the jury there was no evidence defendant had committed other crimes. Defendant's failure to submit an instruction, even after the court invited him to do so, forfeits the claim. [14] ( People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 858.) Even were the claim not forfeited, we conclude it is without merit. Regarding the cross-examination of Janes, defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by attempting to elicit inadmissible evidence about defendant's conviction for driving under the influence. We disagree. The point of the prosecutor's question was to establish that defendant had an alternative motive for going to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, not to prove he had been convicted of another crime. This was, as the trial court acknowledged, a logical inference that reasonably could be drawn from the evidence. ( People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 491-492 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271].) Additionally, even if the question was improper, defendant suffered no prejudice. The trial court sustained defendant's objection and admonished the jury to disregard the question and not draw any inferences from it. We assume the jury followed the admonition and that prejudice was therefore avoided. ( People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 168.) Moreover, while the question made reference to defendant being ordered to go to meetings, it made no mention of a court order. [15] Further, the court specifically admonished the jury there was no evidence of a court order. Thus, there is no `reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the [prosecutor's] complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.' [Citation.] ( Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 427.) Regarding the prosecutor's mention of a ninja mask, defendant argues the prosecutor insinuated defendant kept a mask to disguise himself while committing more crimes. To the contrary, the brief reference obviously alluded to Pamela B.'s description of the disguise defendant used during the sexual assault. [16] For that reason, the trial court stated, I don't see the ninja mask question being particularly significant. The question did not constitute misconduct. Nor is there a reasonable likelihood the jury interpreted the question to mean defendant kept a ninja mask for use in a crime spree. Regarding the question about defendant's money, defendant argues the prosecutor implied defendant was out committing other robberies and burglaries to obtain money. We disagree. With regard to the source of defendant's money, in context it is clear the question was part of an effort to show defendant chose to spend his limited resources on drugs rather than on his children. Indeed, in explaining her decision not to object to the question, defense counsel admitted as much. The question therefore did not constitute misconduct. Moreover, defendant suffered no prejudice. It was a single, brief question, defendant's wife's answer indicated the source of defendant's money was his job, and the prosecutor moved on without following up. The same is true of the prosecutor's reference to defendant purchasing a new Toyota. The prosecutor was asking questions in an effort to show defendant was not acting remorseful or as if he had been affected by his commission of the crimes. To that end, the prosecutor elicited that defendant had taken his wife out for a romantic dinner, was sleeping well at night, and purchased a new Toyota. The reference to defendant purchasing a new Toyota was clearly intended to establish defendant was living a normal life, not that he was spending money other than that earned at work. The statement did not constitute misconduct. Additionally, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury construed the stray reference to the new Toyota to mean defendant was engaged in a crime spree to get more money. Regarding the question about the change in appearance, defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by insinuating defendant was disguising himself in order to commit other crimes. We disagree. At sidebar, the prosecutor explained she thought defendant's changes in appearance were probative of his manipulative kind of character. While the trial court was doubtful of the prosecutor's theory of relevance, it did not rule on defendant's objection nor did defendant press for a ruling. Back in front of the jury, the prosecutor asked the witness whether defendant had changed his appearance over the course of their relationship. Defense counsel immediately objected and the trial court sustained the objection. There was no misconduct. First, the prosecutor did not insinuate defendant was disguising himself to commit other crimes and there is no reasonable likelihood the jury construed her question in such a fashion. Second, the prosecutor did not violate a court order as the trial court did not rule on defendant's objection and defendant failed to press for a ruling. Third, even if the prosecutor's question was misconduct, defendant suffered no prejudice. It was a brief question, defendant's objection was immediately sustained before the witness answered, and the prosecutor did not return to the subject. Because we conclude the complained-of remarks did not constitute misconduct, either cumulatively or on their own, we also conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. That decision is within the sound discretion of the trial court ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 430) and the trial court did not abuse its discretion here.