Opinion ID: 1907719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Legislative intent as controlling.

Text: Even if the MMSAA could reasonably be construed as releasing or extinguishing penalties applicable under prior law  and I do not believe that it can  I still could not agree with the majority's disposition. My colleagues accord more or less conclusive weight to the general savings statutes, even where, as here, all other indicia of legislative intent point in the opposite direction. The courts have generally declined to attach controlling significance to the literal terms of savings statutes and similar enactments where to do so would defeat the discernable will of the legislature. [17] I begin with a dose of reality. As Justice Schaefer explained for the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Bilderback, 9 Ill.2d 175, 137 N.E.2d 389 (1956), a general savings statute is at best the statement of a present legislature as to the intention of a future one. It is so easy to show that the statute, when applicable, has often been overlooked by lawyers and judges that it is hard to believe that legislators have always had it in mind. Without looking beyond our own borders, it is clear that here, at least, such a statute has not been an effective substitute for individualized statements of legislative purpose. Id., 137 N.E.2d at 393. If only for the very reason that it is hard to believe that legislators have always had [the general savings statute] in mind, [18] id., the existence of such a statute cannot provide conclusive guidance as to true legislative intent. If the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive as to the outcome, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), then surely, a fortiori, we cannot accept the notion that the Council's perhaps accidental failure to include in the MMSAA an express provision of the kind contemplated by the general savings statutes automatically dooms these defendants and others to lengthy, unnecessary, unintended, and in some cases undeserved terms of incarceration. In general, the courts  including the Supreme Court, see Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 30 S.Ct. 621, 54 L.Ed. 1001 (1910)  have treated general savings statutes not as announcing an inflexible rule of law, but rather as providing a rule of construction ..., which is to be read and construed as a part of all subsequent repealing statutes, in order to effect the will and intent of Congress. Id. at 217, 30 S.Ct. at 623 (emphasis added; citations omitted). In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 28 S.Ct. 313, 52 L.Ed. 567 (1908), on which my colleagues claim to rely, maj. op. at 79-80 n. 44, the Supreme Court expressly stated that the provisions of what is now 1 U.S.C. § 109 cannot justify a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested either expressly or by necessary implication in a subsequent enactment. Id. at 465, 28 S.Ct. at 316. A general savings statute, like a legislative presumption against retroactivity, is not an end in itself. Like any rule of construction, [it] is subservient to the goal of statutory interpretation: to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. Cummings, supra, 386 N.W.2d at 471 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court of California made the point effectively in Estrada, supra : That rule of construction, however, is not a strait-jacket. Where the legislature has not set forth in so many words what it intended, the rule of construction should not be followed blindly in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the legislative intent. It is to be applied only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent. 48 Cal.Rptr. at 176, 408 P.2d at 952 (emphasis added). [19] In Behlog, supra, Judge Hancock, writing for the unanimous New York Court of Appeals, noted that savings clauses were enacted principally to avoid the incongruous results of a common law rule which allowed offenders to go unpunished when a criminal statute was repealed or when the punishment was increased. 544 N.Y.S.2d at 806-07, 543 N.E.2d at 71. He explained that where the legislature has enacted an ameliorative statute, [t]he anomaly which prompted the enactment of the savings clauses does not exist. Absent some valid reason to require the stricter penalty, the `savings clauses' should not be used to mete out the harsher sentence. Id., 544 N.Y.S.2d at 807, 543 N.E.2d at 71-72 (citations omitted). In my opinion, it is our obligation in this case to avoid the potential analytical straitjacket, Estrada, supra, 48 Cal.Rptr. at 176, 408 P.2d at 952, into which the government's argument seeks to force us. In attempting to ascertain the Council's intent in enacting the MMSAA, we must certainly include in our calculus the provisions of the two general savings statutes, as well as the failure of the Council to include any express provision applying the new sentencing scheme to cases pending at the time the Act became effective. We would do well, however, to be just a bit earthy about the problem, and to bear in mind Justice Schaefer's wise observations in Yensavage regarding legislative realities. In the final analysis, I am satisfied, for the reasons stated earlier in this opinion, that the legislative record in this case demonstrates the Council's intent that mandatory minimum sentences not be imposed on these defendants. I believe that the state court cases, beginning with Oliver and ending with Schultz and Behlog, have by far the best of the argument, and that in the absence of binding contrary precedent, we should follow their teaching. I add one further thought. Our decisions have consequences. There is more at stake in this case than in most. If the government ultimately prevails, then the result for the defendants, for their families, and for others similarly situated will be truly tragic. Holiday and the other defendants will be incarcerated for a very long time. This will happen even though each of the three sentencing judges has indicated that he or she would not impose the mandatory minimum term if a less severe sentence were legally authorized. Ill defendants may die in prison, more children of minor drug dealers will suffer unnecessarily, and racial and ethnic minorities will continue to bear disproportionately the brunt of a policy which the Council has rejected. If the Council intended these results, then judicial inquiry is at an end. Courts may not substitute their own views for those of the legislature. But in assessing the Council's intent, it is significant that, so far as I can discern, this protracted mandatory incarceration will serve no useful penological purpose. There will be no deterrence, no relevant incapacitation, no rehabilitation, and only the most selective retribution. Severe punishment will be imposed primarily because, a century and a quarter ago, Congress passed a general savings statute [20] which, in the majority's opinion, tells us in advance what the 1994 Council intended. No judge knows everything. I certainly do not. Perhaps the Council intended the result which the majority now ordains. Because of what is at stake, however, I venture to ask of those who reject my interpretation whether they are sure. I suggest that if there is any real doubt  if the statutes can fairly be read either way  then this case must be decided in favor of allowing the judge to sentence each defendant on the merits of that defendant's own circumstances.