Opinion ID: 733989
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fed.R.Crim.P. 25(a) Violation

Text: 3 The district court violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 25(a), which concerns the substitution of judges during trial. Any violation of Rule 25(a) is governed by Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). United States v. Lane, 708 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.1983) (affirming defendant's conviction despite violation of Rule 25(a) where no prejudice suffered). Rule 52(a) provides that [a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). Thus, an improper substitution of a judge which violates Rule 25(a) will require a reversal only where a defendant can show prejudice resulting from the violation. Lane, 708 F.2d at 1396-97. The prejudice must arise from an error committed by the substituted judge. See, e.g., id. at 1397-98 (substituted judge's failure to give a requested instruction not reversible error and not prejudicial because instruction actually given adequately and correctly conveyed the elements of the requested instruction). 4 De La Cruz lists several actions taken by Judge Brewster which purportedly prejudiced him. De La Cruz maintains that if Judge Jones had presided when the jury reported its deadlock after receiving an Allen instruction, Judge Jones would have declared a mistrial. Thus, De La Cruz argues, Judge Brewster's substitution deprived him of a mistrial. This argument fails for several reasons. 5 In his denial of De La Cruz's motion for reconsideration, Judge Jones explicitly stated that he would not have necessarily declared a mistrial when the jury reported its second deadlock. In addition, the question we must answer is whether De La Cruz suffered any prejudice stemming from an error, if any, committed by Judge Brewster. De La Cruz has not shown that Judge Brewster committed error. 6 De La Cruz also complains that Judge Brewster was not familiar with the trial record. De La Cruz does not demonstrate, however, how he has suffered any prejudice. 7 De La Cruz also asserts that Judge Brewster committed error by not showing counsel for both parties the jury note reporting the second deadlock and by not inviting discussion at sidebar before talking to the jury. Upon receiving a note from a deliberating jury, a trial judge must ensure that the message is answered in open court and that [defense] counsel [is] given an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge respond[s]. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39 (1975); see also, United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1469-70 (9th Cir.1986). 8 De La Cruz and his counsel were present in open court when Judge Brewster decided how to respond to the jury's report of a deadlock. Before further instructing the jury, Judge Brewster had two sidebar conferences which allowed counsel an opportunity to present argument. Thus, the district court did not commit error. 9 Lastly, De La Cruz complains of the short dialogue between Judge Brewster and the jury foreperson, in which Judge Brewster recognized the jury foreperson as a son of a friend and as a member of Judge Brewster's church. De La Cruz argues that this recognition improperly bolstered the credibility of the foreperson and may have given him disproportionate influence during jury deliberations. De La Cruz does not argue that Judge Brewster or the jury foreperson harbored any bias against him. Rather, he complains about extrinsic material brought to the jury's attention; namely the foreperson's relationship with the judge. 10 To rise to the level of reversible error, De La Cruz must demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice from Judge Brewster's colloquy with the jury foreperson. See United States v. Maree, 934 F.2d 196, 201-02 (9th Cir.1991). 11 De La Cruz only speculates about the prejudice he suffered as a result of the disclosure of Judge Brewster's relationship to the foreperson's father. Judge Brewster's brief comments would not likely bolster the foreperson's credibility. It is even less clear that any purported bolstering would have affected jury deliberations. It was not clear to defense counsel who failed to object at the time the colloquy occurred. De La Cruz fails to demonstrate actual prejudice.