Opinion ID: 2634388
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Failure to Instruct on Use of Victim Impact Evidence

Text: Defendant asserts the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to give an instruction that would have explained the proper use of victim impact evidence and admonished the jury not to base its decision on emotion or improper facts. At trial, he proposed the following special instruction: Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing the specific harm caused by the defendant's crime. Such evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be considered by you to divert your attention from your proper role of deciding whether defendant should live or die. You must face this obligation soberly and rationally, and you may not impose the ultimate sanction as a result of an irrational, purely subjective response to emotional evidence and argument. On the other hand, evidence and argument on emotional though relevant subjects may provide legitimate reasons to sway the jury to show mercy. The trial court declined to give this instruction. For several reasons, the trial court did not err in declining to give defendant's proposed instruction. First, the substance of the requested instruction, insofar as it correctly stated the law, was adequately covered by the slightly modified version of CALJIC 8.84.1 the trial court gave; [t]he proposed instruction would not have provided the jury with any information it had not otherwise learned from CALJIC No. 8.84.1. ( People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 455, 110 Cal. Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78 [affirming refusal to give virtually identical proposed instruction].) [23] Second, the requested instruction is misleading to the extent it indicates that emotions may play no part in a juror's decision to opt for the death penalty. Although jurors must never be influenced by passion or prejudice, at the penalty phase, they may properly consider in aggravation, as a circumstance of the crime, the impact of a capital defendant's crimes on the victim's family, and in so doing [they] may exercise sympathy for the defendant's murder victims and ... their bereaved family members. [Citation.] ( Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1195, 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353, italics added.) Because the proposed instruction was misleading ..., and because the point was adequately covered by the instructions that the court did give, the trial court acted correctly in refusing to use the instruction defendant proposed. ( People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 556, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have, on its own motion, given a different instruction, which ad vised: Victim impact evidence is simply another method of informing you about the nature and circumstances of the crime in question. You may consider this evidence in determining an appropriate punishment. However, the law does not deem the life of one victim more valuable than another; rather, victim impact evidence shows that the victim, like the defendant, is a unique individual. Your consideration must be limited to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, not an emotional response to the evidence. Finally, a victim-impact witness is precluded from expressing an opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference whatsoever by a witness's silence in that regard. The earlier discussion of the instruction defendant proposed at trial fully applies to the third sentence of the instruction he now offers on appeal, which would have advised the jury that its consideration of victim impact evidence must be limited to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, not an emotional response to the evidence. Insofar as this proposed instruction is legally correct, it would not have provided the jurors with any information they did not otherwise learn from CALJIC No. 8.84.1. Moreover, because jurors may, in considering the impact of a defendant's crimes, exercise sympathy for the defendant's murder victims and ... their bereaved family members ( Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1195, 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353), the proposed instruction is incorrect in suggesting that a juror's emotional response to the evidence may play no part in the decision to vote for the death penalty. The first two sentences of the proposed instruction were adequately covered by another instruction the trial court gave, CALJIC No. 8.85. In this regard, the trial court instructed the jury to consider, take into account, and be guided by, among other factors, the circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding. We have held that this instruction adequately instructs] the jury how to consider victim impact evidence. ( People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 573, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137 ( Brown ).) The remainder of the proposed instruction, even if we assume it to be legally correct, [24] is not the type to give rise to a sua sponte duty to instruct. A trial court must instruct sua sponte only on those general principles of law that are closely and openly connected with the facts before the court and necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. [Citation.] ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 442, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610, italics added.) Instructions informing the jurors that the law does not deem the life of one victim more valuable than another, and cautioning them not to draw an adverse inference from a victim impact witness's silence regarding capital punishment, were not necessary to the jury's understanding of this case. Therefore, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to give such instructions. (Cf. People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 521, 133 Cal. Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182 [no sua sponte duty to instruct jurors not to draw adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify]; People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1241, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163 [no sua sponte duty to instruct jurors to disregard defendant's absence, because no inevitable prospect of prejudice exists when a defendant voluntarily absents himself and the jury is so informed]; People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 566, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776 [no sua sponte duty to give cautionary instructions regarding [a jailhouse] informant's `testimony]; People v. Gardner (1969) 71 Cal.2d 843, 854, 79 Cal.Rptr. 743, 457 P.2d 575 [no sua sponte duty to instruct jurors not to draw adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify, because instruction is not necessary for the jury's understanding of the case].)