Opinion ID: 2065404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Indicia of Reliability

Text: We come now to the second prong of the analysis established in Boucher, supra ; whether, assuming an unduly suggestive confrontation, the identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. In Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), the United States Supreme Court set forth a number of factors which could operate to salvage a suggestive identification by establishing independent guarantees of reliability. These factors include the opportunity of the witnesss to view the criminal actor; the degree of attention paid by the witness; the accuracy of the description; the witness's level of certainty, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243. (Citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972)) None of these factors, applied to the facts of this case, can save the line-up conducted below. The lack of detail supplied by the prosecutrix on direct examination, while perhaps understandable, precludes the operation of many of the factors to support her identification of appellant. Thus, for example, there is no evidence of the conditions under which the act allegedly occurred such as would permit an inference as to the victim's opportunity to view her assailant. Any conclusion as to whether the act occurred in darkness or light, whether the attacker's face was concealed, or any such circumstances could be based only on conjecture. As to the degree of attention, Manson makes clear that this element encompasses the witness's ability to observe, remember and recount details of the act witnessed. 432 U.S. at 115, 97 S.Ct. 2243. Here, however, the witness's tender age and her in-court testimony reflect either a fragile memory or an inability to coherently express her recollections, or both. In a related vein, she gave no description of her assailant, beyond identifying him as a man, and the record does not disclose any indication of a pre-trial description. The fourth element set forth in Manson is the witness's level of certainty. As discussed, supra, the prosecutrix repeatedly failed to identify appellant during her testimony, and the line-up identification was preceded and accompanied by impermissibly suggestive occurrences. Further, there is evidence in the record of only a tentative identification at the line-up. [5] Finally, the time lapse between the alleged crime and the confrontation does not lend reliability to the identification. Trial was held on May 2 and May 3, 1977; the indictment alleges that the act of sodomy occurred on February 11, 1975. Prosecutrix was born on June 18, 1971. Assuming the indictment to be correct, she would have been approximately three and one-half years old at the time of the offense, which would have been nearly two and one-half years prior to the line-up identification. She described the act as happening a long time [ago], although she says she was still five years old at the time. Assuming her latter statement to be correct, the act must have occurred sometime after June 18, 1976perhaps as long as 10 and ½ months prior to the confrontation. [6] It was, in any event, a long time ago, by the witness's estimation. The State properly points to the fact that a young victim of a crime with the traumatic impact of this one is not likely to soon forget its occurrence, or the identity of the perpetrator. As a general proposition, that is undoubtedly so. We cannot, however, derive from that premise the conclusion that appellant was accurately and reliably identified without assuming other facts incompatible with his presumed innocence. The State's argument, for example, presupposes both that prosecutrix's assailant was known to her, and that the act occurred under circumstances permitting of a positive and memorable identification. Such assumptions are unwarranted, and cannot be a basis for sustaining the conviction. [7] In summary, although we cannot say that an in-court line-up violates per se a defendant's right to due process, there are situations where, in the totality of the circumstances, an identification resulting from such a procedure is impermissibly tainted. Such is the case here. We take this opportunity to repeat our earlier disclaimer; this opinion in no way condones in-court line-ups. We find the procedure to be fraught with the possibilities of prejudice, and to be avoided except in the rarest of cases. Appellant is entitled to a new trial. The entry must be: Appeal sustained. Judgment of conviction vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. GODFREY, J., did not sit.