Opinion ID: 320436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Search

Text: 62 No blanket rule can be stated for the admission of former testimony as there are many grounds upon which it will be admitted or denied admission. We are here concerned with the admission of such evidence where the witness is absent because he has disappeared and the party proffering his prior testimony is unable to find him. On this precise point Wigmore states: 63 If the witness has disappeared from observation, he is in effect unavailable for the purpose of compelling his attendance. Such a disappearance is shown by the party's inability to find him after diligent search. The only objection to recognizing this ground of unavailability is the possibility of collusion between party and witness; but supposing the Court to be satisfied that there has been no collusion and that the search has been 'bona fide', this objection loses its force. 64 V Wigmore, Evidence 1405 at 155 (3d ed. 1940). The foregoing statement fits this case like a glove and, since no collusion is shown here or even claimed, it refutes the ground upon which the majority would deny the admission of Miss Brown's testimony. The search that was made here was reasonably diligent by applicable legal standards. 6 In applying this rule all courts, except the majority here, recognize that what constitutes 'due diligence' is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court and that its ruling will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse thereof. 7 In my opinion there is no abuse of discretion whatsoever in the finding of the trial court. 65 The majority opinion, however, states that the Government did not prove it made 'a search exercised . . . in good faith . . ..' Majority Op. at 1023, supra. However, further on it states it does 'not hold, that the prosecution acted in bad faith in attempting to locate Miss Brown.' Majority Op. at 1024, supra. So the majority cannot find 'bad faith' but refuses to find 'good faith'-- an overly subtle distinction on the evidence here and an inadequate basis for upsetting a contrary finding by the trial court. 66 What the majority opinion does assert is 'that the government's efforts were insufficient' (Majority Op. at 1024, supra). It bases this claim of 'insufficiency' on the following assertion: 67 The prosecution does not claim to have inquired at the local hospitals, area police departments, the morgue, or of Miss Brown's employer. 68 Majority Op. at 1024, supra. Essentially, then, the majority contends that unavailability was not established because the Government failed to make a sufficient effort to locate Miss Brown. The decision of the majority reversing this murder conviction depends wholly upon the weight and validity of this argument. In my view it has no force whatsoever, and is merely a judicially contrived makeweight. This asserted basis of the majority opinion demonstrably lacks any support in the evidence since the record proves that one of the suggested inquiries was made and disproves the probability that any of the others would have been fruitful. See detailed discussion, infra, at 1030. Moreover, it is of some significance that appellant's counsel, who was also trial counsel, and thoroughly familiar with the background of the disappearance and search for the witness, never had the temerity on this appeal to suggest that the search might have been deficient for any of the four reasons the majority opinion now asserts. In fact, at the trial he twice objected to allowing any time for a search. 69 The evidence demonstrates that in fact the Government did make a good faith effort to locate the witness. First, she was personally served with a subpoena (Tr. 459) and she appeared in response thereto. Thereafter, not having been called on Friday (Tr. 459), she was orally directed under the continuing compulsion of the subpoena to appear at 8:30 on Monday morning (Tr. 459, 476) and agreed to do so (Tr. 389, 459). When she failed to appear on Monday (Tr. 477), the Government called another witness and then took immediate steps to locate Miss Brown (Tr. 389). After two witnesses testified the trial was recessed at 11:13 A.M. until 3:09 P.M. to give the Government a further opportunity to find the witness (Tr. 386, 389). In the process of the search a detective and the U.S. Attorney attempted to locate Miss Brown, contacted her family and visited her house. They also went to the home of her grandmother (Tr. 477), interrogated her as to Miss Brown's whereabouts and ascertained that the grandmother thought she was across the street at an apartment with another girl (Tr. 477). Thus, their earliest contacts indicated that the witness was most likely in the neighborhood. They then went to this apartment and the detective knocked the 'kicked the door . . . to make sure whoever was in would have heard me' (Tr. 477-78). When no one responded they then returned to the grandmother's house and asked one of Laverne's younger brothers to try to arouse the occupants. He was unable to do so (Tr. 478). The detective and the U.S. Attorney then cruised the general area seeking to find her on the street (Tr. 478). 70 Not finding her, they posted a detective at the house, and reported back to the court where the Government requested a further reasonable opportunity to produce the witness. At this point the defense objected to any further continuance to attempt to locate the witness because she 'has been available . . .. She is the key Government witness (and) she didn't show up today' (Tr. 390). The court, however, noted that because of local demonstrations and near riots local transportation was impeded and the court had not had the usual support of the Police Department and the Marshal's office because of their 24-hour involvement with the demonstrations (Monday, May 3, 1971) and again recessed the trial and continued it until the next morning to allow the Government a reasonable opportunity to continue its search for the witness (Tr. 389-92, 397). 71 That evening at 7 P.M., the detective again visited the grandmother at her home, who stated she had not seen Miss Brown, but if she did she would call the Homicide Office and she knew how to contact the detective (Tr. 478). Again, at 10 P.M., the detective went back to the grandmother's house, but Miss Brown had not been heard from (Tr. 478). The detective then left instructions, through the lieutenant in charge, for the detectives who relieved him to have two men from the police department go to the grandmother's house in the morning to attempt to locate the witness and 'if she was not there, to cross the street (to the friend's apartment)' (Tr. 470). The search for Miss Brown continued in this manner but without success (Tr. 479). Two detectives remained at the apartment in the hope of finding Miss Brown and were still there when court convened (Tr. 396). However, all efforts to find her or to secure her attendance as a witness up until testimony was closed proved unsuccessful (Tr. 396). It was subsequently learned that Miss Brown was in the apartment when the detective first knocked, but she did not respond; she spent the night in the apartment and left around 6 A.M. in the morning before the detectives arrived (Tr. 396, 460, 479). 8 Upon the above showing at a voir dire hearing the court formally ruled that the witness was 'unavailable' (Tr. 485) and reconvened the trial. 72 At this point the Government decided to call Wade as a witness and defendant's counsel again objected on the ground that it was 'just a delaying tactic to give the Government more time to find Mrs. Brown' (Tr. 399). Meanwhile the Government continued the search. Thus, despite the objections of the defendant, the Government continued its attempt to find Miss Brown but their efforts were unsuccessful. 73 Such an extensive, round-the-clock search, indicating that the witness was alive and moving from place to place, absolutely refutes the majority findings that the search was 'insufficient' because the detectives on the police force did not inquire 'at the local hospitals, (and) the morgue.' Under the facts outlined here inquiry at those places would be clearly useless and hence was not required. Why look at the morgue or a hospital for a person you know is alive and moving around? It is also significant that we presently know, and as the judge knew at the time of his ruling (Tr. 396, 460, 479), that the detectives were looking in the places where Miss Brown had been and was likely to be. 74 As for inquiring at 'area police departments,' it was area police detectives who were conducting the search, so the Government did comply with that requirement. As for questioning 'Miss Brown's employer,' there was no showing at the hearing or now that Miss Brown had an employer. She was only about 17 or 18 years old at the time of trial (Tr. 317). Therefore this appellate court cannot honestly base 'insufficiency' in the search on any of the four hypothetical inquiries it now asserts the Government should have made. None of the four suggestions contrived by the majority opinion, none of which were raised by appellant at trial or on this appeal, are, by any practical measure, adequate to support its finding of insufficiency-- two were useless and unreasonable under the circumstances, one was fully satisfied and there was no basis whatsoever in the record to suggest the fourth. 75 Nevertheless, on such grossly inadequate grounds, the majority opinion overturns the findings of the trial court that the Government had demonstrated the 'unavailability' of the witness and reverses a murder conviction. To quote Shakespeare, 'Sir, you speak a language that I understand not.' 9 76 Unavailability is the converse of 'availability' which means 'ready, handy, convenient . . . obtainable.' Webster's Third New International Dictionary. It is submitted that the diligent and continuous search for Miss Brown conducted by two detectives (relieved by two more detectives) at the places where Miss Brown was likely to be, clearly supports the finding of the trial court (Tr. 485) that the witness was not 'ready, handy, convenient . . . obtainable.' There is thus no basis for this court on appeal to conclude, as it does, that this finding of the trial court was erroneous. 77 The trial was recessed twice to permit the detectives to make an extended search for her. In view of this it is highly unreasonable to suggest that the search was not 'reasonably diligent' on the claim that the prosecution should have asked for additional time within which to find her. This would have necessitated a further recess of the trial. While a less busy and congested court than the District Court of the District of Columbia might be able to deal with its calendar in such a leisurely fashion as the majority suggest, it is my view that given the great demands on the trial courts of this circuit and their 'established practice' which sets specific dates for the trial of all cases long in advance of trial, that the recesses that were taken, with the court delay they encompassed, were all that was reasonably required under the circumstances. The witness was obviously secreting herself and there was no assurance then, nor claim now, that she could have been located within the period of another recess. In fact, the only reason the court granted the extended recesses it did was because of the irregular local conditions which resulted from the demonstrations and riots in the city (Tr. 483). 78 The whipsawing that the Government receives between the defendant's objections at trial and the majority opinion on appeal is especially disconcerting and clearly irregular. Defense counsel at trial twice opposed allowing the Government additional time to search for Miss Brown (Tr. 390, 399). Now the majority opinion finds that the prosecution erred because it had not 'asked the court for additional time within which to find her.' (Majority Op. at 1024, supra). In my view it is an improper administration of justice, to which I vigorously dissent, for an appellate court to reverse a murderer's conviction because the Government finally acceded to the objections of his counsel against delaying the trial to search for a missing witness. The Government continued its search until the last available moment and the defense never complained at trial that the search was inadequate-- only that the Government was being allowed too much time for the search. Moreover, counsel for appellant at trial stated: 'I think the Government has done everything it legitimately can do to bring this case to justice, at least insofar as prosecuting Mr. Lynch is concerned' (Tr. 400). 79