Opinion ID: 782078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Wilson Patent

Text: 25 The second piece of information cited by the district court as a basis for its holding of inequitable conduct was the Wilson patent. The district court held that Wilson was material and not cumulative to the prior art already cited to the examiner assigned to the applications that issued as the patents-in-suit. Dayco, 218 F.Supp.2d at 1134. The court concluded that Dayco had the requisite threshold intent to deceive based on the fact that [Dayco's attorney] knew of and intentionally withheld the Wilson '981 patent from [the examiner]. 4 Id. at 1135. 26 In opposition to TCI's motion for summary judgment, Dayco submitted a declaration by its expert urging that the Wilson reference did not meet the threshold level of materiality because it was from a different field of technology and was less pertinent than, and cumulative of, prior art that was before the examiner. (J.A. at 1624-25.) Specifically, Dayco's expert described Wilson as from the field of electrical conduits, which he urged failed to address the point of novelty of the accused patents. ( Id. at 1624.) He also opined that U.S. Patent Nos. 1,915,041 to Wallace, 3,072,174 to Vanderhoof, and 4,400,022 to Wright, which were presented to the examiner, rendered Wilson cumulative to and less pertinent than the cited prior art. 27 TCI argued in its motion for summary judgment that [t]he Wilson '981 patent is not cumulative to the prior art considered by Examiner Arola during prosecution of the patents in suit, because it discloses all of the elements of the claimed combination, with the exception of outward radial expansion, in a single reference. (J.A. at 96.) Thus, through attorney argument, TCI attempted to counter the assertions of Dayco's expert concerning the materiality of Wilson. 28 We conclude that applying either standard of materiality, it was improper for the district court to conclude on summary judgment that the Wilson reference met the necessary threshold level of materiality. The mere fact that examiner Nicholson found the Wilson reference to be material is informative, but not dispositive. Whether Wilson meets the threshold level of materiality would require a detailed factual analysis of the relevance of the teachings of that reference both with respect to the claims of the patents-in-suit and with respect to the other prior art references that were before the examiner. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415, 5 USPQ2d 1112, 1115 (Fed.Cir. 1987) (holding that prior art or information was not material ... because it is less pertinent than or merely cumulative with prior art or information cited to or by the PTO); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1992) (information is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to information already of record or being made of record in the application). 29 On the issue of intent, the district court also erred in concluding that the mere fact that the prosecuting attorney knew of the Wilson reference and decided not to submit it to the examiner established intent. Here, the patentee submitted a declaration from the prosecuting attorney explaining that in good faith he concluded that the reference was not material because [he] considered it to be far afield from the accused patents at the time it was cited. (J.A. at 1612.) That explanation is not on its face implausible. The district court noted that Dayco intended to withhold the Wilson '981 patent from the PTO. Dayco, 218 F.Supp.2d at 1136. However, inequitable conduct requires not intent to withhold, but rather intent to deceive. Intent to deceive cannot be inferred simply from the decision to withhold the reference where the reasons given for the withholding are plausible. The grant of summary judgment of unenforceability based on Wilson must, therefore, be set aside. Based on the present record, there is no basis for a claim of inequitable conduct concerning the withholding of the Wilson reference. 30