Opinion ID: 6337960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant’s Fifth Amendment Claim

Text: 5 This case, of course, does not involve a vehicle being operated where the line encroached upon separates a lane of travel from the road’s edge or shoulder, sometimes called a “fog line.” See State v. Turner, 170 N.E.3d 842 (Ohio 2020). Nor does it involve a vehicle encroaching on the line closest to its lane of travel where a double line separates it from another lane. We do not purport to opine upon those scenarios, which are not presented here. 15 Appellant also argues that Officer Torres violated his Fifth Amendment rights when he asked appellant where the “Patron” bottle was. Appellant failed to raise his Fifth Amendment claim in his pre-trial motion to suppress, first raising the issue orally at the suppression hearing. Judge Smith did not rule on the issue, and appellant failed to seek a ruling. “A party who neglects to seek a ruling on his motion fails to preserve the issue for appeal.” Carter v. District of Columbia, 980 A.2d 1217, 1226 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Thorne v. United States, 582 A.2d 964, 965 (D.C. 1990)). As appellant failed to preserve this claim, we review it only for plain error. Howerton v. United States, 964 A.2d 1282, 1286 (D.C. 2009). The “plain error” standard requires that appellant demonstrate that there was “(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Jones v. United States, 124 A.3d 127, 129 (D.C. 2015) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. The Supreme Court has interpreted this right to mean that the government may not use any statements made by a criminal defendant during a “custodial interrogation” 16 without “demonstrat[ing] the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). However, Miranda warnings are only required when the defendant is subject to (1) custody, and (2) interrogation. In re I.J., 906 A.2d 249, 255 (D.C. 2006). We have stated that “[c]ustodial interrogation for Miranda purposes turns on whether there [is] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Castellon v. United States, 864 A.2d 141, 152 (D.C. 2004) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Therefore, to determine whether appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated, the initial question is whether he was in custody for Miranda purposes at the time he responded to Officer Torres’ question about the “Patron” bottle. The Supreme Court has explained, and this court has repeatedly affirmed, that individuals are not generally in “custody” for Miranda purposes during routine traffic stops. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-41 (1984) (the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop does not constitute “custodial interrogation” for the purposes of the Miranda rule); Karamychev v. District of Columbia, 772 A.2d 806, 809 (D.C. 2001) (“[A]n individual who has been temporarily detained for a traffic stop generally is not considered to be ‘in custody’ for purposes of Miranda.”). 17 However, we have noted that there are exceptions to this general rule. For example, in White v. United States, we held that an individual was in Miranda custody during a traffic stop when the officers “initiated their encounter with [the defendant] by removing him from his car and immediately placing him in handcuffs.” 68 A.3d 271, 279 (D.C. 2013). We noted that “[h]andcuffing does not necessarily transform an investigative detention into an arrest, but it is recognized as a hallmark of a formal arrest.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition to handcuffing, we noted in White that the police did not ask for the defendant’s license or registration, did not tell him what he had allegedly done wrong, and did not assure him that he was not under arrest. Id. at 280. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we found that the defendant was in Miranda custody because the circumstances would indicate to a reasonable person that this was not “an ordinary traffic stop.” Id. at 281. In contrast to White, the circumstances here were much closer to a “routine traffic stop” that the Supreme Court has expressly held does not constitute custody for purposes of Miranda. When Officer Torres approached appellant in the front passenger seat, he told appellant that it was “no big deal” that he was smoking marijuana, and directed him to listen to Officer Mundt explain why they had initiated 18 the traffic stop. At that point, appellant had reason to believe that the encounter was a routine traffic stop because the police had told them that they stopped the car for a traffic violation. Additionally, Officer Mundt’s request that the driver provide his license, registration, and insurance information reinforced the appearance that this was a routine traffic stop. Only seconds later, while appellant was still seated in the car, did Officer Torres notice the “Patron” box and ask appellant about the bottle. Both the fact that Officer Torres asked this question almost immediately after Officer Mundt had requested standard identification documents, and the fact that appellant was still seated in the vehicle, militate against a finding of custody. It takes more than stopping a vehicle for a traffic infraction and asking the occupants a few questions for police action to constitute a “formal arrest” or its functional equivalent. Because we conclude that appellant was not in Miranda custody when Officer Torres asked him about the “Patron” bottle, we need not decide whether the question constituted “interrogation” under the meaning of Miranda. We hold that appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated under any standard of review, much less under plain error.