Opinion ID: 1136922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the complaint tribunal erred in denying emil's pre-trial motions.

Text: Emil contends that the complaint against him should be dismissed due to the unconstitutional delay from the time of the filing of the informal complaint to the filing of the formal complaint and hearing. He correctly states that disciplinary proceedings are quasi criminal, see Barrett v. The Mississippi Bar, 648 So.2d 1154, 1159 (Miss. 1995), and therefore, due process must be afforded in disciplinary matters. See Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981). However, Emil then makes a leap that this Court has refused to follow. He states that [i]t should be beyond peradventure that fundamental fairness and the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is [sic] part and parcel of due process rights. It is this statement that Emil uses as a springboard to the idea that the constitutional right to a speedy trial also attaches to a disciplinary hearing. This Court has specifically rejected this notion and refused to apply the factors enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in order to determine if there has been a constitutional violation due to delay in disciplinary matters. See The Mississippi Bar v. An Attorney, 636 So.2d 371, 374 (Miss. 1994). In An Attorney, the Complaint Tribunal dismissed charges against an attorney on the grounds that he was denied a speedy resolution of the charges against him. The Tribunal applied the Barker factors in reaching this decision. Id. at 373. The Bar appealed the decision and this Court held: [T]he Tribunal's application of and Respondent's reliance on the Barker factors inapplicable to this case. First, the case sub judice is not a criminal case. The Respondent has a higher duty than does a criminal defendant. He is after all a lawyer, a member of the Bar and a person responsible to his clients, the Courts and Bar and finally responsible to the public at large. It is unseemly for a member of the Bar to assert and argue a criminal defense in a hearing concerning a professional misconduct charge. Id. at 374. The standard proposed in An Attorney is not to apply the Barker factors, but to look at whether the attorney was prejudiced by the delay. This Court adopted the following test in An Attorney. In order to bar disciplinary proceedings due to delay, the respondent must demonstrate substantial prejudice in his ability to present a defense. An Attorney, 636 So.2d at 375. Emil contends that the right to a speedy trial is implicitly included in the due process rights afforded an attorney facing a disciplinary hearing. This Court has recognized that the attorney has due process rights that must be respected. See Mississippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So.2d 210, 212 (Miss. 1987); Attorney K v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 491 So.2d 220, 222 (Miss. 1986); and Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981). However, one must draw the distinction between procedural due process rights and substantive due process rights. We have held that the attorney in a disciplinary matter has the right to notice, a hearing, and cross-examination of the witnesses. See Netterville, 397 So.2d at 884. On the other hand, this Court has declined to extend these due process rights to such substantive aspects as a jury trial. See Asher v. The Mississippi Bar, 661 So.2d 722, 728 (Miss. 1995). If an attorney does not have the right to a jury trial, why should he have a right to a speedy jury trial? The Sixth Amendment provides for both. However, we have failed to extend either right to a disciplinary matter. Thus, this Court finds that the Tribunal erred in applying the Barker factors. Notwithstanding, we must on de novo review, look to see if the attorney was prejudiced in his preparation of a defense to the charges brought against him. If so, then the matter should be dismissed. See An Attorney, 636 So.2d 371, 375 (Miss. 1994). Emil argues that he was prejudiced in two ways. First, he was unable to locate material witnesses as to Counts One, Two, Six and Seven or they had died. Second, he testified to the effect the delay had on his law practice and his mental and physical well-being. He further relies upon the testimony of Aaron Condon, who testified that the delay in this case was prejudicial and a violation of Emil's due process rights. First, we would look at the claim of unavailable witnesses. In regards to count one, Emil identified Ms. Katherine Huggar as a witness with information concerning this count. He also testified that his investigator learned that Ms. Huggar passed away on December 5, 1986. Ms. Huggar died two years before the informal complaint was filed. Accordingly, any prejudice due to her unavailability is not due to the delay in the proceedings. Emil identified Ms. Gwendolyn Catchings as being unavailable to appear at the trial of this cause. However, Ms. Catchings was at the investigatory hearing and was extensively cross-examined by Emil's counsel at that time. Thus, there was no prejudice due to her absence. As to count two, Emil testified that a material witness critical to said count could not be located at the time the formal complaint was filed due to lapse of time. This witness was identified by Emil as Iris Derouen. Emil further testified that I have the investigator here who conducted an extensive search for Iris Derouen. The Bar contends that Derouen was subsequently deposed by Emil's counsel but said deposition was not offered at trial by Emil, nor was she called as a live witness. The Bar has asked that Emil stipulate to this fact. There is no evidence that Emil had made such a stipulation. If it is true that Derouen was deposed prior to the hearing before the Tribunal, it may be implied that any information Derouen was able to give Emil was not crucial to his defense or he would have called her as a witness. Thus, there is no prejudice in respect to this witness. Emil testified that there were five material witnesses to count three who could not be located. The record reflects that one of the witnesses was found. Nonetheless, this issue is moot. Emil has conceded that he committed professional misconduct with respect to count three of the formal complaint. Thus, there is no prejudice present. There were two witnesses, according to Emil, who could not be located for information concerning count six. He identified them as John Skjefte and investigator Jacobs. Emil stated that the substance of Skjefte's testimony would have been that Emil had never offered Skjefte anything. Emil did not disclose what type testimony he would elicit from Jacobs. The Bar contends that either testimony had it been offered would have been irrelevant. This may be true of Skjefte, but we do not know about Jacobs. We have no idea what his testimony would have been. However, this cannot be said to be prejudice in such an overwhelming fashion that it violates the substantive due process rights of Emil. Regarding count seven, Emil submitted that four critical witnesses (Ella Mae Moran, Jadley Moran, Chancellor John Morris and attorney Tom Stennis) were unavailable to testify. However, Ella Mae Moran passed away in January 1986, more than two years prior to the filing of the informal complaint. Again, this cannot be prejudice as a result to the delay. Jadley Moran was declared non compos mentis in August 1987, prior to the filing of the informal complaint. Thus, his unavailability may not be traced to the delay in the proceedings. Chancellor Morris passed away at some undisclosed date. Mr. Stennis passed away on June 1, 1991, some two and one-half (2 1/2) years after the investigatory hearing was held. Emil offered no reason why Mr. Stennis was not called as a witness at the investigatory hearing. Moreover, Emil did not offer any explanation as to the testimony or evidence Mr. Stennis would have provided other than to state that Mr. Stennis knew the work done on [the Moran case] and was involved when the court approved the settlement and the expenses that were claimed to have been incurred in the presentation of that case by the attorneys. Again, Emil has failed to show a substantial amount of prejudice due to the delay in the proceedings which resulted in witnesses being lost. Emil's second assertion of prejudice is that to his own physical and mental well-being and practice of law. It was Emil's testimony that his personal and economic situation had been damaged not only by the alleged delay, but also by the threats of the lawyers who filed the complaint. He testified that all of the following were a result of the delay: (1) He started smoking again. (2) He saw two psychiatrists because he wasn't getting business. (3) He couldn't concentrate on a client or talk to one if one came to see him. (4) He couldn't relate to his wife or two children. (5) He became reclusive, easily agitated, and withdrew from civic, church and bar activities. (6) He had been through a living horror. The Bar notes that Emil did not present any corroborating evidence or medical testimony in support of the aforementioned allegations. Upon cross-examination, Emil testified that his personal income from the practice of law increased from a range of between seventy thousand dollars ($70,000) to one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) in 1988 to approximately one-half million dollars ($500,000) in 1992. Emil continued and continues to practice law while this case awaits its final judgment. There has been no interruption to Emil's privilege to practice law since the date the original informal complaint was filed against him in 1988. In an analogous case, we refused to find prejudice sufficient to dismiss the charges against an attorney. See Barrett v. The Mississippi Bar, 648 So.2d 1154 (Miss. 1995). In Barrett, the complaint was filed in 1982 and the merits of the case were not heard until 1991. Id. at 1155. This nine year delay is much longer, in fact over twice as long, as the delay in the present case. We held that this state does not impose[] the same speedy trial requirements in disciplinary actions that it imposes in criminal cases. Id. at 1159. Thus, this Court looked to see if there was any prejudice that would justify dismissing the charges against Barrett. Barrett alleged that he was prejudiced because some material witnesses could not be located to be called for trial. Id. at 1160. We found that the nine year delay did not prejudice Barrett because there was no evidence in the record that the witnesses would have been called to testify or that they had any thing of value to add. Because there was no prejudice, we held that the speedy trial claim must fail. Id. The present case is analogous to Barrett. If anything, Barrett possibly had a better claim to a speedy trial violation than Emil does. In The Mississippi Bar v. An Attorney , the Court held that there was no prejudice where the attorney continued to practice law throughout the duration of the proceedings. An Attorney, 636 So.2d at 374-75. This Court further held that the mere passage of time will not infer prejudice to the attorney. Id. Emil has offered no proof that he was prejudiced by the delay. We find no substantial amount of prejudice to justify dismissing the charges and therefore Emil's alleged error fails. Emil also contends that the charges should be dropped due to the Rule Time Constraint Delays. Rule 5 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline affirmatively imposes upon the Bar the duty to expeditiously, timely, and speedily handle all complaints. Rule 5 provides in pertinent part as follows: All proceedings under these rules shall be expeditiously conducted to the end that no complainant be deprived of his right to a timely, fair and proper investigation of a complaint and that no attorney be subjected to unfair and unjust charges. Rules of Discipline, Rule 5. Emil contends that under Rule 5 the complaint and charges against him should be dismissed as untimely. However, we have reviewed this exact point of law and found that Rule 5 is directory and not jurisdictional. In The Mississippi Bar v. An Attorney, 636 So.2d 371 (Miss. 1994), this Court was faced with a situation identical to that presented it today. In An Attorney, the attorney contended that the Mississippi Rules of Discipline expressly provide[d] that bar disciplinary proceedings be conducted in an expeditious manner. The attorney specifically cited ... Rule 5. Id. at 374. We have held that the Rules of Discipline are directory rather than jurisdictional. See Myers v. Mississippi State Bar, 480 So.2d 1080, 1090 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813, 107 S.Ct. 64, 93 L.Ed.2d 23 (1986); Fougerousse v. Mississippi State Bar Association, 563 So.2d 1363 (Miss. 1990). Id. (parallel citations omitted). Rule 26 of the Rules of Discipline states that failure to observe directory time interval may result in contempt of the agency having jurisdiction but will not justify abatement of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding. Mississippi Rules of Discipline Rule 5 (emphasis added). Thus, under the Rules of Discipline themselves and our previous case law, this Court holds that the complaint should not be dismissed due to the time constraints imposed by the Rules of Discipline. There has been no showing of an unconstitutional delay in the proceedings against Emil. Thus, this first assignment of error is without merit.
At the Tribunal's hearing of the case on the merits, Emil raised a motion to quash the charges on grounds of multiplicity, but the motion was overruled. Emil contends that since disciplinary proceedings are inherently adversarial of a quasi-criminal nature, the formal complaint may be compared to an indictment in that it lists the various charges against the accused in a formal document. Emil applies Miss. Code Ann. § 99-7-2 to the proceedings at hand. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-7-2 states that an indictment may charge two or more offenses only if the offenses are based on the same act or transaction or the offenses are based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting pars of a common scheme or plan. Emil argues that this statute requires dismissal of the charges against him since all seven were joined in one formal complaint although they all are totally unrelated and are not alleged to be part of a common scheme or plan. This Court has held that disciplinary proceedings are only quasi criminal and not criminal. See Alexander v. The Mississippi Bar, 651 So.2d 541, 546 (Miss. 1995); Harrison v. The Mississippi Bar, 637 So.2d 204, 218 (Miss. 1994); and Attorney K v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 491 So.2d 220, 222 (Miss. 1986). Ergo, § 99-7-2 does not apply to the case sub judice. As previously discussed, this Court has also held that an attorney is not entitled to all those rights afforded a criminal defendant. See, e.g., Mississippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So.2d 210, 219 (Miss. 1987) (holding that an attorney is not entitled to a jury trial). It follows that the statute (and the only authority cited by Emil for this proposition) is inapplicable to the case at bar. This assignment of error is without merit and must fail.
Prior to the introduction of any evidence to the Tribunal, Emil moved for separate trials on the various unrelated counts on the ground that he would be prejudiced by the commingling of evidence from each count that would almost surely result if separate trials were not granted. The formal complaint contains seven counts of solicitation. However, all seven involve separate and distinct activities allegedly taking place over an eight year period extending from 1980 to early 1988. Emil now changes his argument from one of a criminal nature to a civil nature. He relies upon Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure to provide for the separation of trials in order to avoid prejudice to a party. M.R.C.P. Rule 42(b). Emil would have this Court apply the rights and procedure from a criminal trial and a civil trial. In essence, Emil would like any procedure that benefits him to be applied. We have held that the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure do not govern a disciplinary proceeding, but are applicable where the Rules of Discipline are silent. Harrison v. The Mississippi Bar, 637 So.2d 204, 215 (Miss. 1994). The Bar notes that Emil offers no authority or argument to support this allegation of error and that he has shown no prejudice by the counts all being tried together. Emil merely states that the commingling of the evidence as mentioned above, could, and in fact did, cause prejudice to his case. We find this argument void of any merit and it fails.