Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Miranda and Doyle Issues

Text: Defendant claims that his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, were violated by the introduction at trial of parts of a brief conversation that took place between him and law enforcement officers before he invoked his Miranda right to counsel. He further claims that presenting this evidence violated his rights to due process and to the assistance of counsel. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, & 14th Amends.) He maintains that the trial court erred when it denied a motion to exclude his extrajudicial statements. At a hearing on the motion, a detective sergeant explained that he and a colleague interviewed defendant in a police interview room after he had been taken into custody. As the sergeant was plugging in a tape recorder to begin the formal interview, he explained that he and his colleague were there because defendant was a suspect in Lees's murder. Defendant spontaneously admitted escaping from the California Youth Authority work detail, but denied any contact with Lees. He then requested a public defender and the formal interview never occurred. Defendant made his statements before his interrogators could administer a Miranda advisement to him. At trial, the detective sergeant related defendant's statements to the jury. In closing argument, the prosecutor brought up the falsity of defendant's statements to argue that defendant was unworthy of belief and that his story regarding Lees's death should be discounted accordingly. Defendant maintains that permitting the sergeant's testimony violated Miranda principles because his statements were elicited during custodial interrogation before he was cautioned. The People counter that because defendant volunteered his statements before any questioning began, no Miranda (or Sixth Amendment) violation occurred. We agree. Defendants who are in custody must be given Miranda warnings before police officers may interrogate them. ( Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 297, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297.) Innis explained that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term `interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. ( Id. at pp. 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682.) `Clearly, not all conversation between an officer and a suspect constitutes interrogation. The police may speak to a suspect in custody as long as the speech would not reasonably be construed as calling for an incriminating response.' ( People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 301, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170; see People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 993, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) Focus[ing] primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect ( Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682), we conclude that telling defendant he was a murder suspect did not call on him to confess; rather, the effect should have been, and indeed was, the opposite: defendant admitted only the obvious (that he had escaped from a work detail) and denied that he killed Lees. Moreover, here as in Haley, `[t]he record does not establish that defendant was subject to compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct questioning.' ( Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 301, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170.) There was no Miranda violation. Citing the decision in Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, defendant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that defendant implicitly invoked his right to silence by requesting an attorney. Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object to the introduction of this evidence at trial. ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1171, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) In any event, we find no error. In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, the United States Supreme Court held that it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. A similar process of reasoning supports the conclusion that comment which penalizes exercise of the right to counsel is also prohibited. [Citations.] ( People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 878, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423.) But this does not mean that it always is error to permit evidence that a defendant exercised his right to counsel. In Crandell, the prosecutor played a tape recording of a police interview with the defendant, conducted shortly after his arrest, during which the defendant said he wanted an attorney. During argument, the prosecutor invited the jury to play the recording during deliberations and listen to the defendant's `tone of voice' when he asked for an attorney, which the prosecutor argued was a `flippant response.' ( People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d 833, 878, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423.) We rejected the defendant's argument that this violated the rule announced in Doyle: Here the evidence of defendant's invocation of the right to counsel was received without objection and the remarks of the prosecutor did not invite the jury to draw any adverse inference from either the fact or the timing of defendant's exercise of his constitutional right. ( Ibid. ) The same is true here. The prosecutor relied upon defendant's pretrial denial that he had entered the victim's house and killed the victim to attack his credibility. The prosecutor referred to the fact that defendant asked for an attorney only to show that the interview ended after defendant denied any involvement in the victim's death. (See also People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 332, fn. 4, 116 Cal. Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432 [no Doyle error if the evidence of defendant's assertion of his right [to counsel was not] offered to penalize defendant by illustrating consciousness of guilt, but instead . . . to demonstrate a plan to destroy evidence].) In any event, this brief and mild reference to the fact that defendant asked for an attorney did not prejudice defendant. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 66, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30; People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d 833, 879, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423.)