Opinion ID: 786696
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intra-Military Immunity

Text: 19 The Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of intra-military immunity in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. 153. There the Court held that uniformed members of the armed forces may not bring suit against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for injuries that arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service. Id. Since Feres, the courts have expanded the doctrine 6 so that it now generally protects the government from suit for injuries arising from activit[ies] incident to [military] service. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987). 7 Most important for our purposes, the Feres doctrine prevents members of the military from challenging military decisions through actions brought under Title VII. Roper, 832 F.2d at 248. 20 The Supreme Court has observed that the Feres doctrine is designed in large measure to prevent civilian courts from interfering with military discipline and decision-making. 21 In the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty. 22 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963) (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112, 75 S.Ct. 141, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954)); accord United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985). Such litigation would require civilian courts to evaluate military decisions and disciplinary actions at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness. Id. at 59, 105 S.Ct. 3039. The Court has expressed concern[] with the disruption of `[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors' that might result if the soldier were allowed to hale his superiors into court. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. 2362 (second alteration in original) (quoting Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 676, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 23 The Feres doctrine also acts to prevent federal courts from exercising constitutional powers that are delegated to Congress and the Executive Branch. 24 [J]udges are not given the task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting up channels through which such grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and upon the President of the United States and his subordinates. The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters. 25 Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953); see also Dibble v. Fenimore, 339 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Orloff ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2068, 158 L.Ed.2d 619 (2004). 26 Inasmuch as the Feres doctrine only bars suit where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to [military] service, Stanley, 483 U.S. at 672, 107 S.Ct. 3054 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. 153) (internal quotation marks omitted), however, it does not exclude all suits by service men and women. If the underlying claim is not incident to military service, members of the armed forces can bring suit, even though, as the Supreme Court has noted, barring such suits might further insulate the military from judicial intrusion. See id. at 681, 107 S.Ct. 3054 (observing that, although the Supreme Court has not done so, one might conceivably disallow [ Bivens actions] by servicemen entirely); see also Lutz v. Sec'y of the Air Force, 944 F.2d 1477, 1488 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that the Feres doctrine did not bar a suit by an officer against military inferiors who broke into her office, stole personal correspondence, and then disseminated it in an effort to damage her reputation, describing these actions as not `incident to service'); Durant v. Neneman, 884 F.2d 1350, 1354 (10th Cir.1989) (When military personnel are engaged in distinctly nonmilitary acts, they are acting, in effect, as civilians and should be subject to civil authority.); Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 369 (8th Cir.1984) (permitting an African-American National Guardsman to pursue a civil claim against fellow soldiers who subjected him to a mock lynching at an on-base party). 27 At the same time, courts have recognized that the incident to military service test may bar a claim in federal court even though its pursuit, under the particular circumstances of the case, might not weaken military discipline or interfere with discretion as to military matters. See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682, 107 S.Ct. 3054. The process of determining case-by-case the impact of litigation on the operation of the military would itself unduly intrude into military affairs. Id. 28 A test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular suits would call into question military discipline and decisionmaking would itself require judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters. Whether a case implicates those concerns would often be problematic, raising the prospect of compelled depositions and trial testimony by military officers concerning the details of their military commands. Even putting aside the risk of erroneous judicial conclusions (which would becloud military decisionmaking), the mere process of arriving at correct conclusions would disrupt the military regime. The incident to service test, by contrast, provides a line that is relatively clear and that can be discerned with less extensive inquiry into military matters. 29 Id. at 682-83, 107 S.Ct. 3054. 30
31 The Feres doctrine's bar to lawsuits that are incident to military service has generally been applied to suits by Guard Technicians arising while they are being paid as civilian employees. Despite the fact that their employment may be denominated civilian, the duties that they are performing are typically military in nature. Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether the Feres doctrine applies to a Guard Technician's lawsuit arising from his or her dual-status employment and brought against another Guard Technician, the state, or the federal government, the Circuit Courts of Appeals have: They have nearly unanimously applied the Feres doctrine to bar such suits. See, e.g., Fisher v. Peters, 249 F.3d 433, 443 (6th Cir.2001) (applying the Feres doctrine to a Title VII action brought by a Guard Technician); Brown v. United States, 227 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir.2000) (same). And they have done so even in cases in which the injuries complained of were incurred while the plaintiff was allegedly performing the nominally civilian aspects of his or her employment. See, e.g., Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 589 (1st Cir.1993) (applying the Feres doctrine to a section 1983 action brought by a Guard Technician and allegedly related to his civilian duties); Stauber, 837 F.2d at 399 (applying the doctrine to a state tort law claim brought by a Guard Technician and allegedly related to his civilian duties); NeSmith v. Fulton, 615 F.2d 196, 201 (5th Cir.1980) (applying the doctrine to a section 1983 claim brought by a Guard Technician and allegedly related to his civilian duties). But see Mier, 57 F.3d at 748 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that the Feres doctrine bars a Title VII claim by a Guard Technician only if the suit involves personnel actions integrally related to the military's unique structure). 8 32 There are at least two persuasive reasons to conclude that the Feres doctrine may apply to a lawsuit based on alleged actions taken while the Guard Technician is being paid as a civilian employee. 33 First, a Guard Technician's employment as a civilian is ordinarily in support of a mission that is ultimately military in nature. The broad purpose of the National Guard Technicians Act of 1968, 32 U.S.C. § 709, which grants Guard Technicians their dual status, is to insure that the military mission of the National Guard ... be carried out effectively and efficiently. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 730 F.2d 1534, 1545 (D.C.Cir.1984) (describing the legislative history of the act). [M]ilitary preparedness is the sine [ qua non ] of the ... Act. Id. at 1546. Congress gave Guard Technicians dual status in order to make these positions more attractive, i.e., for the limited purpose of making fringe and retirement benefits of federal employees and coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act ... available to National Guard Technician employees of the various states. Id. at 1536-37; accord Wright, 5 F.3d at 588. 9 The military characteristics of [Guard Technicians'] duties are paramount. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 730 F.2d at 1544. As the First Circuit observed, under the Technician Act's composite regime, technicians are considerably more than nominal members of the military establishment. Wright, 5 F.3d at 588. 34 Thus, the civilian employment of Guard Technicians is often incident to military service. [A] suit based upon service-related activity necessarily implicates the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the military mission.... Civilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in military activities. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 682, 691 & n. 11, 107 S.Ct. 2063, 95 L.Ed.2d 648 (1987) (holding nonjusticiable a lawsuit against a civilian agency for allegedly negligent assistance of a military mission); accord Shearer, 473 U.S. at 55-56 (holding nonjusticiable a suit brought by the mother of a member of the military who was killed allegedly as a result of the Army's negligence while he was off duty); Stauber, 837 F.2d at 400 (relying on Johnson with reference to a suit by a Guard Technician). 35 Second, there are concerns about the intrusive nature of the inquiry that would be necessary for a federal court to disentangle a plaintiff's civilian and military duties if the Feres doctrine were applicable only to suits arising out of the latter. [T]he mere process of arriving at correct conclusions would disrupt the military regime. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683, 107 S.Ct. 3054; see also Lutz, 944 F.2d at 1487 ([W]here it is sufficiently ambiguous whether challenged actions were `incident to military service,' and the process of disentangling conduct not incident to service from that incident to service would itself work an impermissible intrusion upon military matters, Feres must be applied to the whole course of conduct.). 36 In a decision with a setting strikingly similar to the present one, Stauber v. Cline, 837 F.2d 395 (9th Cir.1988), the Ninth Circuit observed that the [harassing] conduct that occurred at the maintenance shop cannot give rise to actionable tort claims without impinging on military authority and calling into question matters which are exclusively the subject of military remedies. Id. at 399. The court continued, [The plaintiff] and the defendants were always under the direct command of active-duty military officers. The parties shared the same direct military relationships whether on civilian or military status. Their conduct was subject to military discipline, and indeed, plaintiff requested that his superiors step in to improve the situation. Id. at 400. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activities would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry into military judgments. Id. (quoting Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 107 S.Ct. 2063; internal quotation marks omitted). The court concluded that the Feres doctrine was applicable. 37 Overton has not argued that his claims are not incident to military service, as he might have. That issue is therefore not before us. See Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir.2004) (`On a motion invoking sovereign immunity to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that jurisdiction exists.' (quoting Garcia v. Akwesasne Hous. Auth., 268 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir.2001))); Wake v. United States, 89 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that the Feres doctrine concerns the waiver of sovereign immunity). We therefore need not address the question whether the Feres doctrine applies because Overton's claims arise out of or ... in the course of activity incident to [military] service. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. 153; cf. Brown, 739 F.2d at 368 (holding that Feres did not bar claims against national guardsmen who participated in a mock lynching). 10 38