Opinion ID: 678853
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: District Court's Sua Sponte Comments

Text: 28 Fruth maintains that the district court's interruptions during his attorney's closing argument was improper. On the first occasion, the court interrupted defense counsel as he was characterizing the government's burden in the case, and particularly the meaning of the reasonable doubt standard. We initially observe that, prior to trial, the court twice indicated to defense counsel that this court has clearly stated that the jury should be given no instruction as to the meaning of reasonable doubt. See United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 393, 126 L.Ed.2d 341 (1993). Thus, despite the two pretrial rulings, Fruth's attorney pressed on and attempted to define reasonable doubt. Fruth also asserts that the district court's interruption was unfairly prejudicial, because the district court stated that defense counsel's assertion regarding reasonable doubt and the government's burden was not exactly true. Whatever incidental effect this might have had on the jury's perception of Fruth or his attorney was eliminated immediately thereafter, when the court added, It's true as it relates to any element of the case the government has to prove. Given this set of facts, we simply cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Mitan, 966 F.2d 1165, 1174-75 (7th Cir.1992) (finding no error where district court attempted to curb defense counsel's improper statements and behavior). With respect to the second interruption, the court merely corrected the attorney's misstatement, reason to doubt, with the proper reasonable doubt. Fruth's claim of prejudice as a result of this correction is meritless. In sum, there is no basis for a new trial as a result of the court's comments during Fruth's closing arguments.