Opinion ID: 853980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Varying Forms of Ineffective Assistance Claims

Text: Woods' claim is based solely on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. [2] Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) established the two-part test of incompetent performance and prejudice for adjudicating challenges to the effectiveness of trial representation. The competence prong ultimately presents a single overarching issue of whether counsel's performance, as a whole, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms. Id. at 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Isolated poor strategy, bad tactics, a mistake, carelessness or inexperience do not necessarily amount to ineffective counsel unless, taken as a whole, the defense was inadequate. Davis v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind.1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nearly fifteen years of practice under Strickland demonstrates that ineffective assistance of counsel embraces a number of quite different issues. Evaluating the assertion that availability of ineffective assistance in postconviction proceedings should be driven by the state of the record on direct appeal requires an analysis of the diverse nature of these contentions. For purposes of the question presented today, issues supporting an ineffectiveness claim can be separated into three broad categories. Some can be evaluated on the face of the trial record (record errors). Examples are failure to tender or object to an instruction or failure to object to inadmissible evidence where the failure is outside the range of reasonable professional judgment and its prejudicial effect is clear. In those situations, there may be no need for delay or the taking of extrinsic evidence on the competence prong of Strickland because the claim may be resolved from the face of the trial record. [3] If so, the interest of prompt resolution of the matter favors permitting it to be raised on direct appeal. For example, in Pemberton v. State, 560 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. 1990), trial counsel aggressively litigated a motion to suppress that challenged the admissibility of a suggestive show-up identification, but inexplicably failed to object at trial to preserve the issue for appeal. In holding that this amounted to deficient performance, this Court reasoned that [t]here is no conceivable rational basis upon which to predicate a decision not to object. This can in no way be characterized as a strategical or tactical decision gone awry. Id. at 527. See also Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 778 (Ind.1997) (distinguishing Pemberton on the ground that counsel's decision to file a motion in limine instead of a motion to suppress could well have rested on strategic reasons), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3434 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1998) (No. 98-5855). Because the omission was found to be inexcusable and prejudicial as a matter of law, the claim was resolvable on direct appeal without extrinsic evidence. Far more common, however, are issues that are not visible at all on the trial record, or that require additional record development to assess either the competence of the attorney or the prejudice resulting from the claimed error. These contentions may require an investigation of facts far beyond the record, and sometimes beyond the knowledge of either trial or appellate counsel, to establish substandard counsel performance (extra-record errors). Typical examples may be failure to pursue a factual defense of alibi or insanity or, as in this case, an undisclosed conflict of interest. Finally, much confusion is generated by issues that are based on an action taken on the record, but whose evaluation requires a showing to rebut the presumption of counsel competence. An example of such a hybrid contention is an act or omission on the record that is perhaps within the range of acceptable tactical choices counsel might have made, but in the particular instance is claimed to be made due to unacceptable ignorance of the law or some other egregious failure rising to the level of deficient attorney performance. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383-87, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). [4] The requirement of a showing of the allegedly unacceptable basis for the error derives from the presumption of attorney competence. [5] Because we assume competence, if an action or omission is in the range of reasonable attorney behavior, it can support a claim of ineffective assistance only if that presumption is overcome by specific evidence as to the performance of the particular lawyer. Where no evidence of deficient representation is presented, therefore, the claim fails. [6] The reasoning of trial counsel is sometimes apparent from the trial record. [7] However, in assessing hybrid contentions it is often necessary for an additional record to be developed to show the reason for an act or omission that appears in the trial record. [8] For the reasons explained below, we conclude that precisely because it can take myriad forms, ineffective assistance of trial counsel eludes once-and-for-all disposition. Guinan v. United States, 6 F.3d 468, 473 (7th Cir.1993) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). [9] Nonetheless, we are dealing with a subject that has the potential for both forfeiture of important constitutional protections and also enormous demands on counsel and the judiciary. Accordingly, the always important objectives of clarity and workability of rules of law take on even greater significance.