Opinion ID: 2995671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Such devices, instruments or

Text: paraphernalia shall include, but are not limited to, phallic shaped vibrators, dildo’s, muzzles, whips, chains, bather restraints, racks, non-medical enema kits, body piercing implements (excluding earrings or other decorative jewelry) or other tools of sado-masochistic abuse. Section 125.21 imposes a fine of up to $2,500 for any violation of the Ordinance. Finally, Section 125.23 contains a severability clause: If any section, subsection or clause of this Ordinance shall be deemed to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the validity with the remaining section, subsection and clauses shall not be affected thereby. Shortly after its enactment, plaintiffs sued Mishawaka, seeking a permanent injunction against enforcement of the Ordinance, damages, and declaratory judgment. Mishawaka agreed not to enforce the Ordinance until the district court reached a decision on summary judgment. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted Mishawaka’s motion and entered judgment in its favor. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that: (1) the Ordinance’s definition of regulated businesses is facially overbroad; (2) the ban on the sale of sexual devices is facially void-for-vagueness and overbroad and violates the right to privacy; (3) requiring applicants and employees to provide significant personal information in order to obtain licenses violates the First Amendment; (4) the Signage and Painting Restrictions violate the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause; (5) the Open Booth Restrictions violate the First Amendment; and (6) the judicial review provision is invalid. A. Standard of Review We review de novo the question of whether a state law or municipal ordinance violates the United States Constitution. See Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2000). However, in assessing the constitutionality of an allegedly vague or overbroad state law or ordinance, a federal court must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1982). In the present case, no Indiana court has interpreted the Ordinance, and therefore, we have no authoritative judicial construction of the Ordinance’s terms./3 See Gresham, 225 F.3d at 908. B. Regulated Businesses Plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance is impermissibly overbroad because the definition of regulated Media incorporates an excessive amount of protected speech. The Ordinance provides the following relevant definitions: Adult Bookstore, Adult Novelty Store or Adult Video Store means a commercial establishment which has as a significant or substantial portion of its stock-in- trade or derives a significant or substantial portion of its revenues or devotes a significant or substantial portion of its interior business or advertising to the sale or rental, for any form of consideration, [from:]
printed matter, or photographs, films, motion pictures, video cassettes, slides, or other visual representations [collectively Media] which are characterized by the depiction or description of [nudity] or [sexual activities]. Section 125.02(A)(2). Although municipalities may regulate adult bookstores, they may not impermissibly burden protected speech, see, e.g., Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1210-12 (7th Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs argue on behalf of third parties who are deterred from engaging in protected speech by what plaintiffs regard as the Ordinance’s substantial threat of overbreadth. For a facial overbreadth challenge to be successful, plaintiffs must establish a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1984). Plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance restricts protected speech of parties not before the court thereby establishing a realistic danger of overbreadth. Plaintiffs argue that the definition of regulated Media would bring any magazine or book within the Ordinance’s scope that mentions sexual activities or shows nudity and, thus according to the plaintiffs, the Ordinance is overbroad. In determining whether Section 125.02(A)(2) is overbroad, we look at its plain meaning. See Schultz v. Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 849 (7th Cir. 2000). The Ordinance defines Adult Bookstore, Adult Novelty Store, and Adult Video Store as commercial establishments that, inter alia, derive[ ] a significant or substantial portion or [their] revenues from Media characterized by the depiction or description of nudity or sexual activities. See Section 125.02(A)(2) (emphasis added). Characterized means to be a distinguishing characteristic of, and characteristic means belonging to . . . essential nature of [characteristic] of the epic>. Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 376 (1986) (emphases added). The Ordinance’s plain language limits its application to Media of which nudity or sexual activities form the essential component. Thus, protected speech remains outside the scope of the definition, and we reject plaintiffs’ facial overbreadth challenge./4