Opinion ID: 795105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the response to desert palace

Text: Prior to Desert Palace, mixed-motive claims were not subjected to analysis under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework; instead, establishing a mixed-motive claim required direct evidence that a discriminatory reason was a motivating factor in an employment decision, and the employer [could] avoid liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not considered the plaintiff's gender. Cesaro v. Lakeville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 953 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir.1992). Our pre- Desert Palace view that direct evidence was required to establish a mixed-motive case, see Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 315 (6th Cir.1989), kept mixed-motive claims distinct from claims analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework, which was applied when the plaintiff relied on circumstantial evidence. However, because Desert Palace has now made it clear that mixed-motive claims can be based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary to consider what effect, if any, this has on our approach to mixed-motive claims. Because this court has never addressed the question of the impact of Desert Palace on the treatment of mixed-motive claims at the summary judgment stage, a review of the approaches taken by our sister circuits is useful. The Fifth Circuit has adopted the modified McDonnell Douglas approach, which folds the mixed-motive inquiry into the McDonnell Douglas framework. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir.2004); see also Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 341 (5th Cir. 2005). Under this approach, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and the defendant provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision, the plaintiff can rebut this reason and have her case proceed to trial if she demonstrates either (1) that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual (the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden), or (2) that the defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (mixed-motives alternative). 1 Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the plaintiff succeeds on the second alternative, it then falls to the defendant to prove that the same adverse employment decision would have been made regardless of discriminatory animus. If the employer fails to carry this burden, plaintiff prevails. 2 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This approach, however, does not accurately screen for unlawful employment practices as Congress defined them in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Unlawful discrimination occurs when the protected characteristic was a motivating factor, not only when it was the primary motivating factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). The plaintiff should not be required to present a prima facie case to proceed on a mixed-motive claim because, as the Supreme Court has explained, the primary purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to eliminate[ ] the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the [adverse employment decision]. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089. The plaintiff in a mixed-motive case can still succeed when a nondiscriminatory reason was a motivating factor in the adverse decision, so long as a discriminatory reason was also a motivating factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Making the showing of a prima facie case a predicate to proceeding on a mixed-motive claim would therefore improperly allow summary judgment to defeat claims when one or more of the most common nondiscriminatory reasons played some role in the adverse decision, but when a discriminatory reason also played some role. In those circumstances, the plaintiff might not be able to maintain a prima facie case, but might be able to present evidence that a discriminatory reason was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision. In such cases, the plaintiff would have a cognizable mixed-motive claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), but her claim would otherwise be barred under the modified McDonnell Douglas approach, Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312. The Eighth Circuit has rejected the modified McDonnell Douglas approach, Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312, on the ground that Desert Palace applied only to the post-trial issue of when a mixed-motive jury instruction was appropriate and thus did not influence that court's summary judgment precedents. 3 Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004). The court was skeptical that Desert Palace had such an effect on McDonnell Douglas because Desert Palace did not mention McDonnell Douglas and because the Supreme Court applied McDonnell Douglas in a case following Desert Palace. 4 Id. (citing Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 124 S.Ct. 513, 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003)). By putting a gloss on the meaning of direct evidence, the Eighth Circuit held that Desert Palace had no effect on its case law. Id. at 736. The court defined direct evidence as not the converse of circumstantial evidence, but rather as evidence showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, in the Eighth Circuit, even after Desert Palace, a plaintiff can avoid the McDonnell Douglas framework and proceed on a mixed-motive theory only when she presents strong (direct) evidence, that is, evidence that clearly points to the presence of an illegal motive. Id. The Eighth Circuit did not explain how this holding was consistent with Desert Palace's multiple statements that no heightened or special evidentiary showing is required to proceed on a mixed-motive as opposed to a single-motive theory. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 98, 101, 123 S.Ct. 2148. In Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-86, 297-98 (4th Cir.2004) (en banc), a case raising both single- and mixed-motive claims, the Fourth Circuit continued to apply the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework in considering whether the district court was correct in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's single-motive claims. Id. at 298. On the plaintiff's mixed-motive claims, the court instead evaluated whether the plaintiff presented legally sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence that her sex or age was `a motivating factor' for her termination, without reference to the McDonnell Douglas framework. 5 Id. at 297 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)); see also Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir.2005) (noting that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is a mechanism peculiar to the pretext framework). The Fourth Circuit thus appears at first blush to apply distinct inquiries for the single- and mixed-motive claims. However, the court in effect collapses the mixed-motive approach into the single-motive approach by stating that `the ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination,' and that to prove this, the plaintiff must present evidence that the illegitimate reason `had a determinative influence on the outcome.' Hill, 354 F.3d at 286 (emphasis added) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). Hill quotes this determinative influence language from Reeves, which only addressed the plaintiff's burden regarding a single-motive employment discrimination claim and did not consider the standard for a mixed-motive claim. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141-48, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit, as well as other courts of appeals, have equated determinative influence with but-for causation between the protected trait and the adverse employment decision, that is, that the adverse employment decision would not have been made if the protected trait were not considered. See Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1144 (4th Cir.1995), rev'd in part on other grounds by Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02, 123 S.Ct. 2148; Wagner v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 17 Fed.Appx. 141, 147-48 (4th Cir.2001) (unpublished opinion); Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 321 (7th Cir.2003); Kelley v. Airborne Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 350-51 & n. 5 (1st Cir.1998); Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 595-96 (3d Cir.1995) (en banc). This heightened showing is at odds with Congress's definition of the plaintiff's burden in a mixed-motive case, which is to demonstrate that an illegitimate reason was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphases added); see also Fuller, 67 F.3d at 1142-44 (clearly distinguishing the motivating factor standard governing mixed-motive cases and the determinative influence/but-for standard governing single-motive cases); Miller, 47 F.3d at 595-96 (3d Cir.1995) (explaining that the determinative influence/but-for standard does not apply to mixed-motive claims); Wagner, 17 Fed.Appx. at 147-48 (distinguishing the determinative influence/but for standard from the motivating factor standard set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). In fact, the Fourth Circuit's description of the plaintiff's burden in a mixed-motive case in Hill closely mirrors what the employer can show to limit its liability under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The Ninth Circuit has taken yet another approach to mixed-motive claims. Although the Supreme Court left the question open as to when, if ever, [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)] applies outside of the mixed-motive context, Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 94, 123 S.Ct. 2148 n. 1, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a violation through a preponderance of evidence (whether direct or circumstantial) that a protected characteristic played a motivating factor. Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir.2003) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is not the exclusive means by which an employee may defeat summary judgment on a single-motive claim based on circumstantial evidence. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir.2004). Rather, when responding to a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff is presented with a choice regarding how to establish his or her case. Id. The plaintiff may proceed using the McDonnell Douglas framework, or alternatively, may simply produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the defendant's decision. 6 Id. This approach towards McDonnell Douglas also applies in the mixed-motive context: the plaintiff may invoke McDonnell Douglas to prove that an illegitimate reason was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision, or the plaintiff may present other evidence — direct or circumstantial — to meet this burden. Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep't, 424 F.3d 1027, 1042 (9th Cir.2005).