Opinion ID: 3134967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: Count I of the plaintiffs’ four-count complaint charged the School District with negligence. According to the plaintiffs, the School District required all high school students to take a physical education class. On March 20, 1998, the students in Jeremy’s physical education class were expected to run laps or use roller blades on the wooden gym floor under the supervision of two teachers. The students opting to roller blade paid $7, and the School District provided roller blades with a toe brake, which the plaintiffs characterized as an experimental design. The School District did not provide safety equipment such as shin guards, elbow guards, knee guards, helmets, or gloves. Jeremy chose to roller blade. During class, he fell and broke two bones in his right leg. The plaintiffs asserted that the School District was negligent because it: “a. Failed to provide the necessary safety equipment for rollarblading [ sic ] such as but not limited to helmets, shinguards, kneeguards, elbow pads; b. Failed to provide rollarblades [ sic ] that were suitable for their intended use.” According to the plaintiffs, this purported negligence caused Jeremy’s injury. The plaintiffs’ complaint also included a “Wilful and Wanton Misconduct” count which tracked the allegations of the negligence count, as well as two corresponding counts under the Rights of Married Persons Act (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2000)). The School District filed a motion to dismiss, contending that sections 2–201 and 3–108(a) of the Act defeated the plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, holding that section 3–108(a), which provides immunity from claims alleging a failure to supervise, applied and that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to establish willful and wanton misconduct, an exception to section 3–108(a) immunity. The appellate court held that section 3–108(a) did not apply because the plaintiffs’ complaint did not involve allegations that the School District failed to supervise Jeremy. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 456. Instead, the appellate court characterized the gist of the plaintiffs’ complaint as negligent failure to provide appropriate equipment. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 456. The appellate court discussed discretionary immunity and observed that “section 2–201 of the Act–standing alone–would provide immunity to the School District in this case.” 317 Ill. App. 3d at 458. However, the appellate court noted that in Gerrity v. Beatty , 71 Ill. 2d 47 (1978), Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville Community Unit District No. 10 , 82 Ill. 2d 415 (1980), and Palmer v. Mt. Vernon Township High School District 201 , 169 Ill. 2d 551 (1996), this court “recognized a cause of action for a school district’s failure to fulfill its independent duty to provide appropriate safety equipment to students.” 317 Ill. App. 3d at 459-60. The appellate court reasoned that the policy considerations outlined in Gerrity and its progeny, which militated against immunity under the School Code, applied with equal force to immunity under the Act. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 460. The appellate court hesitantly concluded that section 2–201 did not defeat the plaintiffs’ claims, reversing and remanding “in the hope that the supreme court, in this case or some other, will address the immunities and duties of school districts under the Act.” 317 Ill. App. 3d at 460. We granted the plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. (footnote: 1)