Opinion ID: 3038948
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner’s Motion to Reopen Proceedings and

Text: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Petitioner raises his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time in his petition for review to this court. Nonetheless, we conclude we may review it since it is his first opportunity to raise it, and the claim asserts a due process vioGRANADOS-OSEGUERA v. GONZALES 11925 lation. Accordingly, we remand to the BIA to reconsider the motion to reopen in light of Granados-Oseguera’s IAC claim. [2] The general rule that “administrative remedies be exhausted does not preclude” petitioners from raising due process claims where those claims are not based on procedural errors that the BIA could have corrected.5 Bagues-Valles v. INS, 779 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir. 1985). Ineffective assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding rises to the level of a due process violation where the proceeding was “so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.” Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1985)). Thus, we have jurisdiction over a class of IAC claims asserted for the first time in a petition for review, even if they have not been exhausted. [3] Granados-Oseguera’s IAC claim falls into this class — he asserts an IAC claim that rises to the level of a due process violation. To establish a valid due-process IAC claim, [A]n alien must . . . clear several hurdles, both substantive and procedural. First, the alien must demonstrate that the attorney’s deficient performance was prejudicial. “Where an alien is prevented from filing an appeal in an immigration proceeding due to counsel’s error, the error deprives the alien of the appellate proceeding entirely.” In cases involving such error, the proceedings are subject to a “presumption 5 We distinguish two types of cases from this case: those where, without excuse, no motion to reopen was ever filed, e.g., Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1995); Arreaza-Cruz v. INS, 39 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 1994), and those where a motion to reopen was filed by new counsel. E.g., Ontiveros-Lopez v. INS, 213 F.3d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Granados-Oseguera was represented by the same counsel throughout his proceedings before the agency, foreclosing all opportunity to argue to the BIA the defalcations of his counsel. The dissent fails to recognize this distinction. 11926 GRANADOS-OSEGUERA v. GONZALES of prejudice,” and we will find that a petitioner has been denied due process if he can demonstrate “plausible grounds for relief” on his underlying claim. Ray v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).6 [4] Ray also clearly explains the procedural hurdles. In Matter of Lozada, 9 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), the BIA held that an alien alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must: (1) submit an affidavit demonstrating and explaining his agreement with prior counsel regarding legal representation, (2) submit evidence that he has informed prior counsel of the allegations of ineffective assistance and provided the attorney with an opportunity to respond, and (3) file a complaint against the attorney with proper disciplinary authorities or explain why such a complaint has not been filed. Ray, 439 F.3d at 587-88. [5] While these so-called Lozada requirements help to provide notice and “ensur[e] that a legitimate claim actually exists,” id. at 588, they “are not sacrosanct.” Id. (quoting Castillo-Perez, 212 F.3d at 525). In fact, “we have not hesitated to address ineffective assistance of counsel claims even when an alien fails to comply strictly with Lozada” where the record shows a “clear and obvious case of ineffective assistance.” Id.; Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th 6 The dissent relies on Ray as requiring Granados-Oseguera, through new counsel, to seek reopening before the Board. However, new counsel, recognizing the numerical bar imposed by the BIA, instead sought relief in our court. We note also that this case was pre-Ray. We decline to require counsel to violate the numerical rule and to anticipate that a narrow exception to the rule might be recognized. We conclude that exhaustion before the agency in this case is not required. GRANADOS-OSEGUERA v. GONZALES 11927 Cir. 2002); Castillo-Perez, 212 F.3d at 525 n.11; EscobarGrijalva v. INS, 206 F.3d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 2000). This is such a case. The substantive hurdle is surmounted in this case, and prejudice is clear. Also clear is the record of ineffective assistance by counsel, so that, despite the fact that the Lozada requirements have not yet been satisfied,7 we may find that Granados-Oseguera has established a due process IAC claim. [6] Granados-Oseguera received such poor counsel that he was “prevented from reasonably presenting his case,” thereby denying him due process. Lopez, 775 F.2d at 1017. Counsel failed to petition for review of the BIA’s summary affirmance, forfeiting permanently his client’s opportunity to challenge the underlying order of removal. Then, counsel failed to seek an extension of his client’s voluntary departure period when his client’s daughter and father fell ill and required his care. After failing to seek an extension, counsel then failed to file a motion to reopen within Petitioner’s 30-day voluntary departure period where counsel knew or should have known that Petitioner would be barred from relief if he failed to file within the 30-day departure period. The record is also absolutely clear that counsel received notice several times, from the IJ directly in court followed by written notice after the IJ’s decision; written notice also followed the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ, warning of the consequences if Petitioner failed to depart within his 30-day window. In addition, case law at the time was clear that motions to reopen filed after the voluntary departure period had expired would be denied as untimely. Shaar, 141 F.3d at 956. [7] There is also no doubt that these failures by his counsel were prejudicial to Granados-Oseguera’s claim. The BIA denied his motion to reopen for procedural reasons — it was 7 However, as a condition of reconsideration, the BIA may require compliance with Lozada. 11928 GRANADOS-OSEGUERA v. GONZALES filed well outside of his 30-day voluntary departure period. This untimeliness was the direct result of the inadequacy of Petitioner’s counsel. The government has not rebutted this. In a similar case, we held that the petitioner’s efforts to seek adjustment of status, particularly in the wake of the Department of Labor’s approval of his labor certification provide “plausible ground for relief.” Ray, 439 F.3d at 588 (quoting United States v. Jimenez-Marmolejo, 104 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1996)). The BIA could “plausibly” have found that Granados-Oseguera was eligible for the relief sought — an opportunity to seek adjustment of status in light of his pending labor certification, particularly following the Department of Labor’s approval of his application in December, 2002. We thus find that his counsel’s inadequate performance was prejudicial. [8] Because the BIA has not yet had the opportunity to consider Granados-Oseguera’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and his request for adjustment of status, we are reluctant to “rule on the merits of an issue that the BIA has not itself addressed.” Ray, 439 F.3d at 591. To remedy an otherwise intractable injustice, we grant Granados-Oseguera’s petition for review, and remand this case to the BIA to reconsider Granados-Oseguera’s motion to reopen in light of his IAC claim. PETITION GRANTED, in part; DISMISSED, in part; DENIED, in part.