Opinion ID: 4511512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: She told me she was opening the door so I could – I

Text: think she might of said look or search. I don’t remember the exact[] verbiage, but she was opening the door to get out so we could search the car. Q. She was just getting out of your way so you [could] search? A. Exactly, yes, sir. Q. So, based on – at least by her actions she was consenting to your search of the vehicle; is that right? A. Yes, sir. Trooper Lamm then told Peart that he needed her to complete some paperwork for a search of the rental car. He gave her the State Highway Patrol form “Written Consent to Search,” completed the form himself, and obtained Peart’s signature on the form. Trooper Lamm performed an initial search of the rental car and found cocaine in the backseat area of the Nissan. He notified Trooper Ellerbe to place defendant in handcuffs, and Trooper Ellerbe did so. Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the trial court entered an order on 14 July 2015 which denied defendant’s motion to suppress. On 20 July 2015, defendant pleaded guilty to the offenses of (1) trafficking in cocaine by transporting more than 200 grams but less than 400 grams of cocaine, -9- STATE V. REED Opinion of the Court and (2) trafficking in cocaine by possessing more than 200 grams but less than 400 grams of cocaine. In exchange for defendant’s guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the charges against his codefendant, Peart; to consolidate his two trafficking offenses for one judgment; and to stipulate to an active sentence of seventy to ninety-three months of imprisonment with a $100,000.00 fine. The trial court accepted defendant’s plea, sentenced defendant to seventy to ninety-three months imprisonment, and imposed a $100,000.00 fine and $3,494.50 in costs. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. In his original appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence which was discovered pursuant to an unlawful traffic stop. Specifically, defendant asserted that the trial court made findings of fact which were not supported by competent evidence because his “initial investigatory detention was not properly tailored to address a speeding violation.” Defendant further contended that Trooper Lamm seized him without consent or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when Trooper Lamm ordered him to “sit tight” in the patrol car. Defendant therefore maintained that Trooper Lamm unlawfully seized items from the Nissan Altima vehicle during the ensuing search of the car and that these objects were “the fruit of the poisonous tree.” The Court of Appeals agreed. In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals determined that Trooper Lamm’s authority to seize defendant for speeding had ended when Trooper Lamm informed defendant that the officer was going to issue a warning citation for speeding and -10- STATE V. REED Opinion of the Court provided defendant with a copy of the citation. The majority of the lower appellate court ultimately concluded that Trooper Lamm lacked reasonable suspicion to search the rental car after the traffic stop had been completed because the evidence relied upon by the trial court in support of its finding of reasonable suspicion constituted legal behavior which was consistent with innocent travel. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to suppress. On 5 October 2016, the State filed a petition for writ of supersedeas and a motion for temporary stay of this matter with this Court. On the same date, we allowed the State’s motion for a temporary stay. The State filed a Notice of Appeal on 25 October 2016 pursuant to a dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals which supported the State’s position that the traffic stop was properly executed and that the disputed evidence was therefore admissible. On 2 November 2017, this Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals and remanded the matter for reconsideration in light of this Court’s recent decision in State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 805 S.E.2d 671 (2017). Upon remand, the Court of Appeals opined: In Bullock, after the officer required the driver to exit his vehicle, he frisked the driver for weapons. The Supreme Court held this frisk was lawful, due to concerns of officer safety, and the very brief duration of the frisk. The officer then required the driver to sit in the patrol car, while he ran database checks. The [C]ourt determined this did not unlawfully extend the stop either. The [C]ourt then held the officer had reasonable suspicion to thereafter extend the stop and search defendant’s vehicle. The defendant’s nervous demeanor, as well as his contradictory and illogical statements provided evidence of drug activity. -11- STATE V. REED Opinion of the Court Additionally, he possessed a large amount of cash and multiple cell phones, and he drove a rental car registered in another person’s name. The [C]ourt determined these observations provided reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, allowing the officer to lawfully extend the traffic stop and conduct a dog sniff. State v. Reed, 257 N.C. App. 524, 529, 810 S.E.2d 245, 249 (2018) (citations omitted). The majority of the panel below went on to conclude: In reconsideration of our decision, we are bound by the Supreme Court’s holding in Bullock. Therefore, we must conclude Trooper Lamm’s actions of requiring [d]efendant to exit his car, frisking him, and making him sit in the patrol car while he ran records checks and questioned [d]efendant, did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop. Yet, this case is distinguishable from Bullock because after Trooper Lamm returned [d]efendant’s paperwork and issued the warning ticket, [d]efendant remained unlawfully seized in the patrol car . . . [T]he governing inquiry is whether under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person in the detainee’s position would have believed that he was not free to leave. Here, a reasonable person in [d]efendant’s position would not believe he was permitted to leave. When Trooper Lamm returned [d]efendant’s paperwork, [d]efendant was sitting in the patrol car. Trooper Lamm continued to question [d]efendant as he sat in the patrol car. When the trooper left the patrol car to seek Peart’s consent to search the rental car, he told [d]efendant to “sit tight.” At this point, a second trooper was present on the scene, and stood directly beside the passenger door of Trooper Lamm’s vehicle where [d]efendant sat. Moreover, at trial Trooper Lamm admitted at this point [d]efendant was not allowed to leave the patrol car. A reasonable person in [d]efendant’s position would not feel free to leave when one trooper told him to stay in the patrol car, and another trooper was positioned outside the vehicle -12- STATE V. REED Opinion of the Court door. Therefore, even after Trooper Lamm returned [d]efendant’s paperwork, [d]efendant remained seized. To detain a driver by prolonging the traffic stop, an officer must have reasonable articulable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot. As we concluded in our first opinion, Trooper Lamm did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify prolonging the traffic stop. The facts suggest [d]efendant appeared nervous, Peart held a dog in her lap, dog food was scattered across the floorboard of the vehicle, the car contained air fresheners, trash, and energy drinks—all of which constitute legal activity consistent with lawful travel. While Trooper Lamm initially had suspicions concerning the rental agreement, the rental company confirmed everything was fine. These facts are distinguishable from Bullock in which the officer observed the defendant speeding, following a truck too closely, and weaving briefly over the white line marking the edge of the road. Then the defendant’s hand trembled as he handed over his license. Additionally, the defendant was not the authorized driver on his rental agreement, he had two cell phones, and a substantial amount of cash on his person. He failed to maintain eye contact, and made several contradictory, illogical statements. Id. at 529–32, 810 S.E.2d at 249–50 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals again held in a divided opinion that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress and reversed the trial court’s judgment. The State then exercised its statutory right of appeal to this Court based upon the dissenting opinion in the court below. In the instant appeal, the State challenges the Court of Appeals decision which reverses the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. In doing so, the -13- STATE V. REED Opinion of the Court State contends that Trooper Lamm’s actions during the traffic stop were reasonable and, therefore, consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The constitutionality of Trooper Lamm’s search-and-seizure activities following the traffic stop is the sole question before us.