Opinion ID: 2447042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the skiers responsibility act[13]

Text: First, we consider the Act, which provides the statutory context within which the Release operates. The trial court held that the Act did not bar appellees' lawsuit, citing Crews. Although the Superior Court was presented with arguments pertaining to the Act, the panel focused instead on the validity of the Release and did not render a holding on the Act's applicability, notwithstanding that the alternative argument, if meritorious, would have required affirmance. This lapse has introduced a level of complexity that could have been avoided. As noted above, the doctrine of assumption of the risk was largely eliminated in the Commonwealth when the General Assembly enacted the Comparative Negligence Act in 1987. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a)(b). Nevertheless, shortly after enacting the Comparative Negligence Act, the General Assembly amended the statute to include the Skier's Responsibility Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(c). The Act states: (c) Downhill Skiing. (1) The General Assembly finds that the sport of downhill skiing is practiced by a large number of citizens of this Commonwealth and also attracts to this Commonwealth large numbers of nonresidents significantly contributing to the economy of this Commonwealth. It is recognized that as in some other sports, there are inherent risks in the sport of downhill skiing. (2) The doctrine of voluntary assumption of the risk as it applies to downhill skiing injuries and damages is not modified by [42 Pa.C.S. § 7102](a) and (b). Thus, the Act explicitly preserved the common law assumption of risk defense as applied to injuries suffered while engaged in downhill skiing. See Hughes, 762 A.2d at 341. Because the Act did not create a new or special defense for the exclusive use of ski resorts, but instead kept in place longstanding principles of common law, a review of those principles is instructive. The assumption of the risk defense, as applied to sports and places of amusement, has also been described as a no-duty rule, i.e., as the principle that an owner or operator of a place of amusement has no duty to protect the user from any hazards inherent in the activity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 496A, CMT c, 2 (where plaintiff has entered voluntarily into some relation with defendant which he knows to involve the risk, he is regarded as tacitly or impliedly agreeing to relieve defendant of responsibility, and to take his own chances); Hughes, 762 A.2d at 343-44 (citing Jones v. Three Rivers Mgmt. Corp., 483 Pa. 75, 394 A.2d 546 (1978)). Our decision in Hughes made clear that this no-duty rule applies to the operators of ski resorts, so that ski resorts have no duty to protect skiers from risks that are common, frequent, and expected, and thus inherent to the sport of downhill skiing. Where there is no duty, there can be no negligence, and thus when inherent risks are involved, negligence principles are irrelevantthe Comparative Negligence Act is inapplicableand there can be no recovery based on allegations of negligence. See, e.g., Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. Cohen, 562 Pa. 547, 756 A.2d 1166 (2000) (primary element in any negligence cause of action is that defendant owes a duty of care to plaintiff). Accordingly, in Hughes, we laid out a two-part inquiry for determining whether a skier assumed the risk of a particular injury, asking first whether the skier was engaged in the sport of downhill skiing at the time of the injury, and second, whether the injury arose out of a risk inherent to the sport of skiing. Hughes, 762 A.2d at 344. In answering the first question, we clarified that the sport of downhill skiing encompasses more than merely skiing down a hill. It includes those activities directly and necessarily incident to the act of downhill skiing. Such activities include boarding the ski lift, riding the lift up the mountain, alighting from the lift, skiing from the lift to the trail and, after a run is completed, skiing towards the ski lift to start another run or skiing toward the base lodge or other facility at the end of the day. 762 A.2d at 344 (emphasis added). Because the sport of downhill skiing encompasses all these necessarily associated activities, we further determined that the risk of downhill skiing must include the risks inherent to them. We reasoned that to construe the Act otherwise would be to interpret it improperly in an extremely narrow, hypertechnical and unrealistic manner. Id. Thus, we concluded that skiing towards the lift after completing a run was part of the sport of skiing and, as to the second part of the inquiry, we determined with little difficulty that colliding with another skier was an inherent risk of skiing because such collisions are common, frequent, and expected. Therefore, we held that the injured skier was barred by the Act from recovering damages and summary judgment was appropriate. Id. at 345. We have not addressed the Act since Hughes, but the Superior Court has done so, and it applied a much narrower definition of inherent risks in Crews, supra . The panel majority there concluded that the Act did not bar an injured skier's claim against the ski resort because the specific risk of collision on the slopes with an allegedly intoxicated minor was not inherent to the sport of skiing. The majority held that this particular danger was a risk that could be removed without altering the fundamental nature of skiing. Crews, 874 A.2d at 105. As noted, Judge Lally-Green dissented and would have held that Crews had assumed the risk of a collision. Id. at 108. For purposes of our decision here, we need not ultimately determine whether we agree with the decision in Crews or with the limitation that Crews seems to have placed upon our holding in Hughes. [14] It is enough to state, consistently with Hughes, that boarding and riding a ski lift are inherent to the sport of downhill skiing and inherently dangerous activities, the most obvious danger of whicha risk that is common, frequent and expectedis undoubtedly falling from the lift. Clearly, it is this very obvious and common risk that prompted Lori to ask the operator to stop the lift. But the lift operator had no duty to comply with Lori's request; boarding a moving ski lift is simply how this aspect of the sport is done. See Jones, supra (where defendant did not deviate in some relevant respect from established custom plaintiff may not recover in inherent risk case). And, despite the fact that the operator did not stop the lift a second time as requested, Lori herself still boarded it in the face of a well-known and obvious dangerand did so safely. It is difficult to imagine a clearer example of assumption of the risk, and there can be no viable claim of negligence under such circumstances. See, e.g., Carrender v. Fitterer, 503 Pa. 178, 469 A.2d 120 (1983) (landowner owes no duty to protect against known and obvious dangers presented by icy patch on parking lot surface); Jones, supra (sports facility owes no duty to protect against common, frequent and expected risks which are inherent in the amusement activity, and where defendant has not deviated in some relevant respect from some established custom). Where there is no duty, there can be no negligence, and the General Assembly recognized this principle in its preservation of the doctrine of assumption of the risk for downhill skiing. Indeed, the clear legislative intent to preserve the assumption of the risk doctrine in this particular area, as well as the broad wording of the Act itself, dictates a practical and logical interpretation of what risks are inherent to the sport. See, e.g., Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, L.P., 550 F.3d 263 (3d Cir.2008) (ski resort owed no duty under Pennsylvania Skier's Responsibility Act to protect skier from lack of safety netting, improper course plotting and placement of course gates, or soft loose snow; cognizable risks inherent in ski racing are legion); Burke v. Ski America, Inc., 940 F.2d 95 (4th Cir.1991) (under Pennsylvania law, ski resort had no duty of care to injured skier because inherent dangers of skiing double black diamond expert slope with rocks and trees were obvious); Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir.1983) (under Pennsylvania law, skier assumed risk of injury when he voluntarily chose to ski expert slope after viewing other skiers having trouble with steep, icy slope, and seeing that unpadded poles from snowmaking equipment lined center of headwall); Savarese, supra (skier was barred from recovery under Pennsylvania law where injury occurred while he attempted to board ski lift when bottom of chair was not folded down for seating; relying in part on Hughes and the Act). It would frustrate the purpose of the Act were we to hold that it mandates a broad reading of the sport of skiing, but simultaneously requires a narrow definition of what risks are inherent to that sport. [15] We therefore reject appellees' argument that Lori did not assume the specific risk involved here. We hold instead that appellees' action for damages arises out of the general risk of falling from a ski lift, which is an inherent risk of skiing from which Hidden Valley owed no duty of protection, and thus is barred by the Act. Hidden Valley was entitled to summary judgment on this ground.