Opinion ID: 1301325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Breach of the Consent Decree

Text: ¶ 79 As an alternative to requesting monetary compensation as a remedial sanction, the plaintiff class seeks monetary damages for breach of the Consent Decree. The plaintiff class seeks monetary damages for emotional distress suffered by inmates on account of the breach. The circuit court denied this request, primarily on grounds that [m]onetary damages for a violation of the Consent Decree are not even mentioned in the agreement. ¶ 80 The circuit court found that the parties did not enter into the Consent Decree with the expressed intention of creating the opportunity for the award of damages. . . . [Moreover, t]he class action complaint was filed seeking declaratory judgment or injunctive relief. Nowhere in the complaint are monetary damages requested or mentioned. ¶ 81 The circuit court quoted the plaintiffs' trial counsel three different times as saying that the case was not about damages. The court said that monetary damages for breach of the Consent Decree are inappropriate by the very terms of the agreement and by the nature of the pleadings of this action. The court will not exercise its equitable powers to award monetary damages when the language of the Consent Decree clearly does not provide for them. ¶ 82 Monetary damages were not the objective of this class action suit. The original plaintiff, Christensen, filed a pro se writ of prohibition in March 1996. In July 1996, Christensen amended his complaint, with the assistance of counsel, to bring a class action under Wis. Stat. § 803.08. In October 1996, the class was certified by Judge Schellinger. The determination that a class action is appropriate is discretionary with the trial court. Preloznik v. City of Madison, 113 Wis.2d 112, 125, 334 N.W.2d 580 (Ct.App.1983) (citing Mercury Records Prods., Inc. v. Econ. Consultants, Inc., 91 Wis.2d 482, 491, 283 N.W.2d 613 (Ct.App.1979)). A party that radically alters its position after it has successfully invoked a court's exercise of discretion should anticipate that the court will bind the party to its prior position. ¶ 83 In May 2001, Judge Donegan approved the 48-page Consent Decree. Judge Fiorenza found that the Consent Decree was the product of extensive negotiation among the parties. That decree, she determined, did not contemplate monetary damages. Damages in breach of contract cases are ordinarily measured by the expectations of the parties. Handicapped Children's Educ. Bd. v. Lukaszewski, 112 Wis.2d 197, 206, 332 N.W.2d 774 (1983). ¶ 84 Even if we were able to overlook these clear deficiencies, we would not approve monetary damages in this case. The plaintiff class claims damage for humiliation, emotional distress, and mental anguish. In essence, these are damages in tort for a purported breach of contract. ¶ 85 The plaintiff class contends that the County could reasonably foresee that damage of this nature would result from holding prisoners for more than 30 hours without a bed and that [m]onetary damages are the most effective remedy to put the victims of this breach in the position they would have been in had the settlement agreement not been breached. . . . The plaintiff class points to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353 (1981), Loss Due to Emotional Disturbance, which provides the following: Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result. ¶ 86 Wisconsin has not adopted § 353 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts. On the contrary, the court has stated that mental suffering, while recognized as an injury, has been held not a proper element of recoverable damages in actions on contract. Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 464, 102 N.W. 40 (1905). The antiquity of the cited case does not negate the validity of the principle. See Bourque v. Wausau Hosp. Ctr., 145 Wis.2d 589, 596 n. 2, 427 N.W.2d 433 (Ct.App. 1988) (citing Mursch v. Van Dorn Co., 627 F.Supp. 1310, 1317 (W.D.Wis.1986)). ¶ 87 Moreover, even if we adopted § 353 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the plaintiff class still would not be able to recover for emotional distress. In particular, Comment a. to § 353 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts reads in part: Damages for emotional disturbance are not ordinarily allowed. Even if they are foreseeable, they are often particularly difficult to establish and to measure. There are, however, two exceptional situations where such damages are recoverable. In the first, the disturbance accompanies a bodily injury. In such cases the action may nearly always be regarded as one in tort. . . . In the second exceptional situation, the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result. . . . [I]f the contract is not one where this was a particularly likely risk, there is no recovery for such disturbance. (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff class has not provided sufficient evidence of compensable injuries to overturn the circuit court's decision to deny the claim. Cf. Pleasure Time, Inc. v. Kuss, 78 Wis.2d 373, 387, 254 N.W.2d 463 (1977) ([T]he burden rests on the [plaintiff] to prove by credible evidence to a reasonable certainty that damages were suffered and to establish at least to a reasonable probability the amount of these damages.). The plaintiff class has also failed to demonstrate that this contract is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353 cmt. a. ¶ 88 Although we acknowledge that some members of the plaintiff class may have suffered bodily injury, isolated incidents of bodily injury, even if proven, are nearly inevitable in a jail population of approximately 150,000 people over the period of three years (March 2001 to April 2004). Generalized claims of such injuries do not support an award of contract damages for widespread emotional disturbance among the 16,000 members of the class.