Opinion ID: 548450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Government Witness Testimony

Text: 12 Garry Newbrough, a special agent with the IRS, testified on behalf of the government at trial as an expert summary witness. Bosch claims that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Newbrough to testify beyond his expertise, to testify on the law, and to testify on the issue of Bosch's guilt or innocence. The decision to admit expert testimony is committed to the discretion of the court and will not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous. United States v. Kinsey, 843 F.2d 383, 388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1223, 108 S.Ct. 2882, 101 L.Ed.2d 916 (1988). Bosch's trial counsel failed to object to Newbrough's testimony. We find, however, that even if there had been an objection, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Newbrough's testimony. 13 Bosch claims that Newbrough testified beyond his expertise when he stated his opinion that Bosch's activities aided and abetted the distribution of cocaine. Bosch argues that the government failed to lay a proper foundation for Newbrough's expertise on narcotics trafficking, as opposed to impeding IRS functions. Thus, according to Bosch, under Fed.R.Evid. 702, Newbrough should not have been allowed to opine on a subject which was not within his expertise. 14 Newbrough testified that in addition to his training as a special agent with the IRS, he attends a yearly narcotics conference and had conducted in excess of one hundred narcotics investigations. Moreover, Newbrough did not give a sweeping general statement that Bosch aided and abetted cocaine distribution, as Bosch implies, but gave a detailed explanation of activities which in his opinion had that effect: 15 A. My opinion is that those services rendered would, and did, in fact, aid and abet the distribution of cocaine, in that the renting of houses in selected neighborhoods, the false identification which would impede law enforcement efforts, the different vehicles, et cetera, without these services the distribution of cocaine would be ineffective, yes. 16 Q. Is that because the cocaine distribution organization was basically Colombian? 17 A. Yes, sir. Most of these individuals are Colombian. They do not have a command of the language, nor do they have a command of the customs, and thereby don't know where to locate themselves. 18 That's why the assistance, as provided, is needed. 19 United States v. Bosch, No. CR-86-746-RAG-1 (C.D.Cal.), Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings (RT) at 88-89 (Nov. 5, 1986). Because Newbrough had training and experience in conducting narcotics investigations and explained a basis for his opinion that would help the jury determine Bosch's role in the charged offense, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this testimony. See United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (Expert testimony on the structure of criminal enterprises is allowed to help the jury understand the scheme and assess a defendant's involvement in it.). 20 Bosch also claims, however, that this testimony violated Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which provides in part, No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged. Fed.R.Evid. 704(b); accord Kinsey, 843 F.2d at 388. Newbrough did not explicitly state that Bosch was guilty or that he had the mental state constituting an element of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Bosch argues, however, that such an opinion can be inferred from Newbrough's statement that Bosch did, in fact, aid and abet the distribution of cocaine, when combined with the trial judge's instruction to the jury that [y]ou may consider it reasonable to draw the inference and find that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done. RT at 25-26 (Nov. 19, 1986). 21 Rule 704, on the other hand, also provides that [e]xcept as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Fed.R.Evid. 704(a); accord Kinsey, 843 F.2d at 388. Newbrough's testimony, rather than opining on Bosch's mental state or his guilt, was directed primarily at whether Bosch's activities helped in the distribution of cocaine. See United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (9th Cir.) (recogniz[ing] the difference between opinions of a defendant's guilt or innocence and expert testimony regarding the various roles played by persons involved in illegal enterprises), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 464, 74 L.Ed.2d 614 (1982). While Bosch's role in the offense is an ultimate fact, testimony on a defendant's role in the offense generally is admissible. See United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 612 (9th Cir.1987) (In a series of cases, we have upheld admission of a law enforcement officer's expert testimony that the defendant's activities indicated that he acted in accordance with usual criminal modus operandi.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 968, 108 S.Ct. 1243, 99 L.Ed.2d 441 (1988). 22 Of course, the extent to which expert testimony may be of assistance to the jury in understanding the evidence is a matter of degree and will vary according to the circumstances of each case. A trial court should not routinely admit opinions such as those admitted in the present case, but should carefully weigh the testimony's probative value against its possible prejudicial effect. 23 Id. (citations omitted). Here, as Bosch claims, Newbrough's testimony conceivably could be taken as an opinion on the mental state or guilt of Bosch, and thus would have unduly prejudiced the jury. Bosch's trial counsel, however, recognized this and brought out on cross-examination that all the activities on which Newbrough based his opinion would only be criminal if Bosch knew and intended that they be done in furtherance of cocaine distribution, [a]nd it is the province of the jury to determine whether that has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, in addition to the instruction on the inferences that the jury could reasonably draw, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the weight it might ascribe to opinion testimony given at trial. 1 Id. at 613. Therefore, it is unlikely that the jury drew the improper inference that Bosch identifies from Newbrough's testimony, and the admission of this testimony was not an abuse of discretion. 24 Finally, Bosch claims that Newbrough improperly testified on the legal requirements of filling out a CTR form: The bank has the responsibility of filling out [the CTR], and if you did it, then your name would appear on the form as the person conducting the transaction. RT at 84 (Nov. 5, 1986). We need not discuss this claim, however, because any error in admitting this testimony was harmless in view of our reversal of Bosch's conviction on count three of the indictment (conspiracy to defraud the United States), the only count which involves the CTR requirements.