Opinion ID: 1356674
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Unconditional Ban on Internet Access

Text: As a special condition of his supervised release, Heckman was prohibited from access to any Internet service provider, bulletin board system, or any other public or private computer network for the remainder of his life-without exception. App. 6. He challenges this special condition as plain error. We agree. Since this is an area of law that requires a fact-specific analysis, we consider each of our relevant precedents in some detail. Throughout, we remain sensitive to three factors that have guided our prior holdings in this area: (1) the length and (2) coverage of the imposed ban; and, (3) the defendant's underlying conduct. We first upheld a conditional ban on Internet access in United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir.1999). There the defendant was a 30-year-old resident of New Jersey who met a 14-year-old girl from Minnesota on the Internet. Id. at 125. After corresponding online for several months, Crandon traveled from New Jersey to Minnesota and engaged in sexual relations with the girl. Id. at 128. The District Court imposed a three-year condition on Crandon's supervised release that directed him not [to] `possess, procure, purchase[,] or otherwise obtain access to any form of computer network, bulletin board, Internet, or exchange format involving computers unless specifically approved by the United States Probation Office. ' Id. at 125 (emphasis added). Therefore, Crandon's ban was both limited (to three years) and conditional (subject to exceptions approved by the Probation Office). [4] On appeal, we held that the Internet access ban was justified, given Crandon's conductnamely, that he used the Internet as a means to develop an illegal sexual relationship with a young girl over a period of several months. Id. at 127. With this underlying, directly exploitative conduct in mind, we concluded that the ban was narrowly tailored and ... directly related to deterring [the defendant] and protecting the public. Id. at 128. Four years later, we refused to uphold a more restrictive, five-year ban in United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 2003). There the defendant's offense did not include the direct exploitation of a minor. Instead, it involved the distribution of child pornography by a convicted child molester. [5] The District Court imposed a special condition that was both lengthier (five years rather than three years) and more restrictive (adding a ban on computer equipment in the defendant's residence to a conditional Internet ban). [6] In spite of Freeman's prior criminal record as a child molester, we struck down this five-year ban as overly broad, id. at 391-92, explaining that, since the defendant had not used the Internet to seduce a minor, there was no need to cut off Freeman's access to email or benign [I]nternet usage, especially in light of the fact that a more focused restriction, limited to pornography sites and images, can be enforced by unannounced inspections of material stored on Freeman's hard drive or removable disks. Id. at 392. In this, we explicitly distinguished Crandon, explaining that the defendant in Crandon used the [I]nternet to contact young children and solicit inappropriate sexual contact with them. Id. Importantly, [s]uch use of the [I]nternet is ... more difficult to trace than simply using the [I]nternet to view pornographic web sites. Id. In 2007, we rejected a lifetime, unconditional ban on all computer access in Voelker. There the defendant engaged in an Internet conversation during which he briefly exposed the buttocks of his three-year-old daughter over a webcam. Voelker, 489 F.3d at 146. It was later determined that Voelker, who had no criminal record, also possessed a stockpile of child pornography. Id. at 142-43, 146 n. 5. The District Court imposed a special condition that was much lengthier (lifetime rather than three years) and more restrictive (an unconditional computer ban rather than a conditional Internet ban) than the one we upheld in Crandon. [7] On appeal, we struck down this ban as the antithesis of a `narrowly tailored' sanction. Id. at 145. In so holding, we distinguished Crandon, noting the difference in duration of the special conditions imposed, as Crandon's restrictions remained in place for three years, while Voelker's restrictions will last as long as he does. Id. at 146. We also determined Crandon's offense to be worse than Voelker's, as Crandon used computers and the [I]nternet to actually seek out, and then communicate with, his victim. Id. Finally, we contrasted the coverage of the two bans, as Crandon was allowed to continue using standalone computers and computer equipment, and he retained the right to use the [I]nternet with the consent of the Probation Office. Voelker is not afforded either of those options. Id. In the end, we refused to approve such an all-encompassing, severe, and permanent restriction. Id. (emphasis added). Finally, less than a year ago, we upheld a ten-year, conditional ban on Internet access in Thielemann. There the defendant pled guilty to one count of receiving child pornography, but this understated the magnitude of his conduct. Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 267. Indeed, Thielemann was actively involved in not only distributing child pornography, but also in encouraging (successfully) the direct exploitation of minors. The District Court sentenced Thielemann to the statutory maximum of 240 months in prison and 10 years of supervised release, including a conditional ban on Internet access. [8] Id. at 270. This is the lengthiest ban that we have upheld. In our analysis, we emphasized the relatively limited coverage of Thielemann's ban, noting that he could own or use a personal computer as long as it is not connected to the [I]nternet; thus he is allowed to use word processing programs and other benign software. Id. at 278 (emphasis in original). Further, we added that Thielemann may seek permission from the Probation Office to use the [I]nternet during the term of his ten-year restriction, which is a far cry from the unyielding lifetime restriction in Voelker.  Id. Finally, we noted the importance of Thielemann's underlying conduct. He did more than simply trade child pornography; he [used] [I]nternet communication technologies to facilitate, entice, and encourage the real-time molestation of a child. Id. Given this conduct, we concluded that [t]he restriction on computer and [I]nternet use [was closely related] to the goals of deterrence and protection of the public, and [did] not involve greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary. Id. If upheld, Heckman's ban would be the most restrictive Internet ban that we have permittedboth in terms of the length and coverage of the ban itself and the nature of the defendant's underlying conduct. Considering the ban's length, it is much longer than the three-year ban approved in Crandon and the ten-year ban recently approved in Thielemann. As for its coverage, it is more restrictive than the Internet bans upheld in Crandon and Thielemann, both of which included provisions allowing for access to the Internet on approval by the Probation Office. Finally, focusing on the conduct underlying Heckman's conviction, this would be the first time that we have upheld an Internet ban for a conviction involving the transmission of child pornography rather than the direct exploitation of children. In fact, considering these factors collectively, Heckman's special condition would be the broadest Internet ban upheld by any Circuit Court to date. [9] Even the Government concedes that this condition's validity is a close question. Appellee's Brief 26. There is little doubt that Heckman's extensive history as a sex offender justifies appropriate restrictions whenever he is released from prison. To repeat, the District Court recognized that Heckman's criminal conduct was almost unbroken from the time he was nineteen years old until today at age forty-eight. App. 49-50. For this understandable reason, the Government argues that the most significant factor in this case is that Heckman presents a record of sexual abuse of children which is not remotely matched in any of this Court's prior cases. Appellee's Brief 32. This record cannot be ignored. However, Heckman's criminal history alone does not justify the unprecedented ban on Internet access imposed by the District Court in this case. Indeed, we have long recognized the draconian nature of Internet banseven in cases where we have upheld them. See, e.g., Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128 ([The three-year ban on Internet access] may hamper [the defendant's] employment opportunities upon release, as well as limit his freedoms of speech and association.). [10] Furthermore, even when faced with a well-established sex offender, special conditions still must be tailored to the underlying conduct at issue in the given case, as well as any related actions in the defendant's criminal past. Heckman is undoubtedly a serial offender. Yet he has never been convicted of criminal behavior that involved the use of the Internet either to lure a minor into direct sexual activity (such as Crandon) or to entice another to exploit a child directly (such as Thielemann). In cases upholding similar (though less restrictive) Internet bans, the predatory use of the Internet in the act itself was essential to our holding. In cases involving the straight transmission or possession of child pornography, such as Freeman, we rejected the ban. To uphold Heckman's ban under our precedent, we would have to make the inferential leap that, given his criminal history, it is likely that he will eventually use the Internet to exploit a minor directly (and do so late in his 70s)not just distribute child pornography. Although such an inference may be plausible, there is no indication that Heckman has ever used the Internet for such a purpose. Furthermore, there are alternative, less restrictive, means of controlling Heckman's post-release behavior, [11] including the computer monitoring condition already imposed by the District Court in this case (and that Heckman has not challenged). [12] We do not hold that limited Internet bans of shorter duration can never be imposed as conditions of supervised release for this type of conduct, but when placed within the context of related precedents, the unconditional, lifetime ban imposed by the District Court in this case is so broad and insufficiently tailored as to constitute plain error. We thus hold that this ban involved a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).