Opinion ID: 2976305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arguments Forfeited

Text: Moore first contends that the district court should have granted her motion for new trial because the jury was not unanimous as to whether Hall violated Moore’s civil rights. Contrary to the law as set forth in the Jury Verdict Form (the “Verdict Form”), Moore argues that she maintains an “absolute right to a jury decision as to whether her civil rights were violated,” even where the jury found no proximate causation. We need not address this argument because Moore forfeited it when -6- No. 06-6148 Moore v. Tennessee she neglected to object to the jury verdict form at any time during the trial. See United States v. Blair, 214 F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir. 2000).
In the second issue on appeal, Moore contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for new trial because the district court failed to allow the case to go to trial against the Unknown Deputies in their official capacity. Because Moore never objected to the Verdict Form, which did not reference the Unknown Deputies, she forfeited this argument. According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51, any objections with respect to jury instructions must be made at trial if a party seeks to preserve such objections for appeal. E.g., LibbeyOwens-Ford Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 9 F.3d 422, 427 (6th Cir. 1993); Woodbridge, 954 F.2d at 1235. This circuit, moreover, joins several others in extending Rule 51’s requirements to jury verdict forms as well. See Reynolds v. Green, 184 F.3d 589, 593–94 (6th Cir. 1999); McGuire v. Davidson Mfg. Corp., 398 F.3d 1005, 1009–10 (8th Cir. 2005); Barrett v. Orange County Human Rights Comm’n, 194 F.3d 341, 349 (2d Cir. 1999); Play Time, Inc. v. LDDS Metromedia Commc’ns, Inc., 123 F.3d 23, 29 n.6 (1st Cir. 1997). Where a party fails to object at trial to the character of a jury verdict form, absent plain error, there is no possibility of resuscitating the objection on appeal. Reynolds, 184 F.3d at 593–94; Young v. Langley, 793 F.2d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 1986). -7- No. 06-6148 Moore v. Tennessee Moore failed to object to a jury verdict form that contained instructions pertaining only to defendant Hall and that made no mention of the Unknown Deputies. That silence at trial prevents her from raising any Rule 51 objection now. Although she might argue that plain error exists, Reynolds, 184 F.3d at 594, Moore failed to serve timely process on the Unknown Deputies and failed to argue at trial for liability grounded on the governmental policy of Roane County. The interests of justice, therefore, do not support excusing Moore’s failure to object.
Finally, Moore argues that the defense counsel’s closing argument included an improper and prejudicial statement. Specifically, Moore challenges defense counsel’s inclusion of the following remarks: Now, you know what’s going on here? I’ll tell you exactly what’s going on. This is not state court; this is Federal court. You say, well, let’s give her something, let’s give her a dollar; two dollars, maybe there’s something there. No. If you give her one dollar, this lawyer’s going to come in and ask for attorney’s fees under Section 1998 [sic] and ask for thousand and thousands of dollars. That’s what’s going on, and the only way to stop that is to throw them out and to come back with a defense verdict. (J.A. 409). Once more, the panel need not consider this issue. Moore forfeited her right to raise this issue on appeal because she neglected to present this issue to the district court. Blair, 214 F.3d at 697. -8- No. 06-6148 Moore v. Tennessee B. Moore May Not Now Amend Her Complaint to Identify the Unknown Deputies The one argument Moore did preserve for appellate review fails on the merits. She sought leave from the district court to amend her complaint to identify and name the Unknown Deputies so that she might proceed against them in their individual capacities. The question presented here is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion. Given the expiration of the time permitted for bringing such an action, and the lack of grounds for treating such an amendment as “relat[ing] back to the date of the filing of the complaint” for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), we uphold the district court’s exercise of discretion. The Tennessee statute of limitations8 relevant to Moore’s claim required her to commence her § 1983 action within one year after the cause of action accrued. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 104(a)(3). At the latest,9 Moore’s cause of action accrued after her release from the Roane County Jail. Given that Moore filed her motions for leave to amend the complaint nearly two-and-a-half 8 Well-established case law applies the relevant state’s statute of limitations in a § 1983 claim. See Wallace v. Kato, 127 S. Ct. 1091,1094–95 (2007); Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t. of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The statute of limitations applicable to a § 1983 action is the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the state in which the § 1983 claim arises.”). 9 Although state law governs the statute of limitations in a § 1983 action, the characterization of the claim, including the determination of when the cause of action accrued, is a creature of federal law. See Wallace, 127 S. Ct. at 1095. Although the district court made no finding as to when Moore’s cause of action accrued, it is reasonable to say that, at the latest, she would have known of her injury upon her release from incarceration. -9- No. 06-6148 Moore v. Tennessee years beyond that date, her amendment could not stand unless Rule 15(c) allows it to relate back to the filing date of the original complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). In relevant part, Rule 15(c) provides: (c) Relation Back of Amendments. (1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when: ... (B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading; or (C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: (i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (emphasis added). Notably, the relation-back doctrine requires that the newly added party receive sufficient notice of the action and that the delay in the addition of the new party be the result of a “mistake concerning the party’s identity.” Id. at 15(c) (emphasis added); see also Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996). - 10 - No. 06-6148 Moore v. Tennessee Our circuit precedent is fatal to Moore’s argument. In this court, a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge pertaining to an intended defendant’s identity does not constitute a “mistake concerning the party’s identity” within the meaning of Rule 15(c). See Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Substituting a named defendant for a ‘John Doe’ defendant is considered a change in parties, not a mere substitution of parties.”). Nor are we alone in so holding—our court’s precedent comports with no fewer than seven of our sister circuits. See Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2006); Locklear v. Bergman & Beving AB, 457 F.3d 363, 367 (4th Cir. 2006); Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 696 (8th Cir. 2001); Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1103–04 (11th Cir. 1999); Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 320–21 (5th Cir. 1998); Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466, 470 (2d Cir. 1995), modified 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir. 1996). Moore’s bid for support in Third Circuit law—the only circuit that expressly adopts an opposing position—is unavailing. See Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 211 (3d Cir. 2006); Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t. of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 200–01 (3d Cir. 2001). The district court acted well within its discretion to deny Moore’s motion for new trial with respect to the Rule 15(c) issue.