Opinion ID: 2507746
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gregg's Cross-Appeal

Text: On cross-appeal, Gregg asserts by a number of arguments based on policy and precedent that the court improperly denied her liquidated damages. [56] Upon proof of a violation of the FMLA a plaintiff is entitled to lost wages, actual damages, and interest, plus an equal award of liquidated damages. [57] The court, in its discretion, may reduce the plaintiff's award to compensatory damages alone if the defendant proves to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission which violated [the Act] was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a violation of [the Act]. [58] The trial court declined to award Gregg liquidated damages, finding only that Woodward's lack of knowledge on the applicability of the FMLA when he informed Theresa that her leave without pay request had been denied does not establish that he was acting in bad faith. This finding does not satisfy the requirements of the Act. The Act requires liquidated damages unless the court makes express findings that the employer violated the Act in good faith and that there was a reasonable factual basis for the employer's action; in that case, the court may reduce the amount. [59] In the superior court's written decision there is no indication that the Municipality proved to the court that it refused Gregg's April leave request in good faith, or that there was a reasonable basis for the Municipality to do so. Given the incomplete findings of the trial court, we cannot resolve the issue, but on remand the court shall determine if the Municipality affirmatively established that its refusal to grant additional leave was in good faith and that reasonable grounds supported its decision.
Gregg further claims that the court should have applied the higher state statutory prejudgment interest rate rather than the federal. The main thrust of Gregg's argument is that since she pursued state and common law claims in addition to her cause of action under the FMLA, the higher state rate should apply. She relies in chief upon a Pennsylvania Superior Court case, Humphries v. Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Co. [60] Humphries presented the question whether the state rule of prejudgment interest applied to an action brought in state court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). [61] The court first noted that, albeit a federal court sitting in diversity must look to local law to determine the availability of prejudgment interest, such is not the rule in cases arising under federal law. [62] Since FELA neither provides nor prohibits an award of prejudgment interest, the court held that it was appropriate to look to local law to fix the rate of the award. [63] On the other hand the FMLA expressly provides for interest on a plaintiff's award. As noted above, where a federal claim predominates, federal law governs the compensatory measure of prejudgment interest. [64] The federal rule of prejudgment interest is to leave the setting of rates at the discretion of the trial court, and the court did not abuse its discretion here.