Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Equal Protection After Carolene Products Co.: Suspect and Quasi-Suspect Classes

Text: In the years since Carolene Products, the Supreme Court has identified two kinds of legislative classifications that require intensive equal protection analysis. These commonly have been called, respectively, suspect and quasi-suspect classes (meaning the legislative classifications, not the people in them, are suspect). The first, suspect classificationwhich the Supreme Court has used to resolve complaints alleging discrimination based on race, [35] alienage, [36] and national origin [37] must receive strict scrutiny from the courts; i.e., for legislative use of the classification to survive, the state must demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 & n. 15, 102 S.Ct. at 2395 & n. 15; see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254 (classifications based on race, alienage, or natural origin . . . will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest). The second, quasi-suspect classificationwhich the Court has used to decide cases alleging discrimination based on gender [38] and illegitimacy [39] requires intermediate or heightened scrutiny; i.e., the state must show that legislative use of the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection that further[s] a substantial interest of the State. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18 & n. 16, 102 S.Ct. at 2395 & n. 16; see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441, 105 S.Ct. at 3255 (gender classification fails unless it is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest; classification based on illegitimacy will survive if substantially related to a legitimate state interest). The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether homosexuals, let alone homosexual couples, constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014, 105 S.Ct. 1373, 1376-77, 84 L.Ed.2d 392 (1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari ). Nor has the Court clearly defined the differences between these two classifications requiring, respectively, strict and intermediate (or heightened) scrutiny. [40] The Court, however, has focused from case to case on several factors to guide the analysis applied to either classification, although the Court has not addressed every factor in every case. As we shall see, these factors have one thing in common: they reflect various ways of evaluating whether intensive court scrutiny and, perhaps, intervention will be necessary, under the equal protection clause, to help substantially powerless classes of people maintain their dignity and receive important rights in the face of harmful, indeed invidious, discrimination by the state (meaning the popular majority). [41] Specifically, the Court will ask: (1) Has the group suffered a history of purposeful discrimination? [42] (2) Is the class the object of such deep-seated prejudice that it is often subjected to disabilities based on inaccurate stereotypes that do not truly reflect the members' abilities? [43] (3) Is the class defined by the presence of an immutable trait that is beyond a class member's control and yet bears no relation to the individual's ability to contribute to society? [44] (4) Is the group a politically powerless minority? [45] Interestingly, the first two of these factors reflect a concern for stigmafor unfair stereotyping. The latter two focus on the ability of the group to avoid the claimed disadvantage through self-helpthe classic Carolene Products concern.