Opinion ID: 4442755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: R.S. (2019) (emphasis added).2

Text: ¶28 The two verdicts are legally and logically inconsistent. Sustaining these convictions would mean that Delgado was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of taking R.B.’s items by force. But it would also mean that Delgado was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of taking those same items, from the same victim, during the same occurrence, without any force. ¶29 Our plain language resolution is bolstered by precedent. In People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Colo. 1990), we analyzed the Legislative Council’s comment to the proposed “theft from the person” subsection. That comment stated that theft from a person “is an act of ‘stealing,’ without circumstances of force or violence as would constitute robbery.” Id. (quoting Colo. Legis. Council, 45–98, at 36 (1964), http://www.law.du.edu/images/uploads/library/CLC/98a.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUW2-Z4RE]). Unlike robbery, “theft from the person of another is intended to cover those thefts involving an invasion of the victim’s person of which the victim is unaware, but which are not accomplished through the use of force, threats, or intimidation.” Id. Warner therefore confirms what the 2We focus our attention on force because the People have not argued that Delgado used threats or intimidation. 13 plain language already indicates: Elements of robbery and theft are mutually exclusive when they are predicated on a single taking. ¶30 This raises the question of what the trial court should do to avoid mutually exclusive guilty verdicts. The answer is that the trial court should instruct the jury that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple crimes when the elements of those crimes are mutually exclusive. Thus, here, the court should have instructed the jury that Delgado could be convicted of robbery or theft, but not both. The failure to give such a carrying instruction constituted error. ¶31 The trial court compounded this error by telling the jury to do just the opposite. Instruction 14 explicitly stated that the jury should consider “each count . . . separately, uninfluenced by [its] decision as to any other count.” 3 This gave the jury license to consider the theft-from-a-person charge without pausing to consider the elemental conflict as to the robbery charge. In addition, the court told 3 Jury Instruction 14 states in its entirety: In this case a separate offense is charged against the defendant in each count of the complaint. Each count charges a separate and distinct offense and the evidence and the law applicable to each count should be considered separately, uninfluenced by your decision as to any other count. The fact that you may find the defendant guilty or not guilty of one of the offenses charged, should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged against the defendant. The defendant may be found guilty or not guilty of any one or all of the offenses charged. 14 the jury that it could find Delgado guilty of “any one or all of the offenses charged.” This then culminated in the court erroneously entering judgment on mutually exclusive guilty verdicts. C. The Error Was Plain ¶32 Even so, the error (whether in improperly instructing the jury or in receiving and entering judgment on the verdicts) wasn’t preserved. Thus, the error must have been plain to warrant any remedy.4 As we stated above, an error is plain when it’s “obvious and substantial,” Miller, 113 P.3d at 750 (quoting Stewart, 55 P.3d at 120), and “so undermine[s] the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction,” Hagos, ¶ 18, 288 P.3d at 120 (quoting Wilson, 743 P.2d at 420). The “error must generally be so obvious that a trial judge should be able to avoid it without the benefit of an objection.” Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16, ¶ 16, 390 P.3d 832, 835 (citing People v. Pollard, 2013 COA 31M, ¶ 39, 307 P.3d 1124, 1133). ¶33 Typically, the alleged error must violate “(1) a clear statutory command; (2) a well-settled legal principle; or (3) Colorado case law.” Id. (quoting Pollard, 4We reject Delgado’s invitation to find that the error at issue here is structural without any precedent from the Supreme Court or this court stating as much. Furthermore, our conclusion that the error here was plain renders structural error analysis superfluous. 15 ¶ 40, 307 P.3d at 1133). The People argue that there isn’t a case directly on point. That is, there isn’t a case that says in no uncertain terms that “robbery and theft from a person are mutually exclusive.” But even if Frye doesn’t satisfy the command of “Colorado case law” or “a well-settled legal principle” because our statement there was dicta, the court of appeals has applied Frye in several cases like this one reaching back decades. See Weare, 155 P.3d at 529–30 (applying the Frye rule); People v. Beatty, 80 P.3d 847, 852–53 (Colo. App. 2003) (same); People v. Lee, 914 P.2d 441, 447–48 (Colo. App. 1995) (same). ¶34 Perhaps even more importantly, the error here was obvious on its face. The difference between theft from a person and robbery as to force couldn’t be more stark: They are diametrically opposed. ¶35 The error was also substantial. The jury essentially found Delgado not guilty of the robbery, through its guilty finding on the theft-from-a-person charge, while simultaneously finding him guilty on the robbery charge. And, it “cast[s] serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of convictions” because it’s impossible to know whether the jury believed that Delgado did or did not use force. Hagos, ¶ 18, 288 P.3d at 121 (quoting Wilson, 743 P.2d at 420). 16 ¶36 Thus, the error was plain.5