Opinion ID: 380443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jones & Laughlin's Cross-Appeal

Text: 39 Jones & Laughlin has filed a cross-appeal that is conditional on our reversing the judgment in its favor. Inasmuch as we have reversed the judgment in its favor, we now turn to the claim by Jones & Laughlin that it is entitled to a new trial. 40 1. Jones & Laughlin's Breach of Warranty Claims Barred by the Illinois Statute of Limitations ? 41 The district court granted Johns-Manville's motion for summary judgment on Jones & Laughlin's claim for breach of express warranty and implied warranty of merchantability and fitness as defined by the UCC. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 453 F.Supp. 527, 535 (W.D.Pa.1978). See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 26 §§ 2-313 & 2-314 (1973). The court first decided that, under Illinois law, a contract for the construction of a roof is not a contract for the sale of goods as required by the UCC. It reasoned that because Johns-Manville was employed not merely to supply the roofing materials, but also to assist in the design of the roof and to supervise construction, its relationship to Jones & Laughlin extended substantially beyond the buyer-seller arrangement contemplated by the UCC. 453 F.Supp. at 535-36. 42 Even if the contract at issue were governed by the UCC, the district court went on to hold that Jones & Laughlin's UCC claims would be time-barred. 23 The applicable statute of limitations, section 2-725 of the Code provides: 43 A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. 44 Jones & Laughlin concedes that delivery of the roof occurred more than five years prior to the filing of this lawsuit, but argues that the district court erred in holding that the contract between it and Johns-Manville did not explicitly extend any warranties to the future performance of the roof so that the cause of action accrued when the breach was or should have been discovered. 24 In support of this proposition, Jones & Laughlin points to literature given to it by Johns-Manville during the course of their preliminary negotiations. The literature states in part: 45 Johns-Manville has been producing roofing felts made of asbestos for over 100 years. On the record, Johns-Manville can cite many asbestos roofs that, today, are still performing satisfactorily after more than forty (40) years of exposure to heat, cold, water, air and even fire. And, all of this service with minimum maintenance and repair costs. 46 Improved Fesco Board resists the tensions, twists and pulls created by high winds, tornadoes, hurricanes and building movements. Laboratory tests, pictured here, demonstrate Improved Fesco Board's great tensile strength and outstanding resistance to diagonal shear and horizontal shear . . . Many roof insulations barely meet the Factual Mutual minimum requirements but Improved Fesco Board withstands 120 miles per hour winds with a 100% factor of safety. 47 We are not persuaded by Jones & Laughlin's proffered interpretation of the sales literature distributed by Johns-Manville. The statements regarding the strength and wind resistance of Fesco Board, as well as the boast that many roofs supplied by Johns-Manville are still performing satisfactorily after more than forty (40) years of use, may not reasonably be relied on by Jones & Laughlin as explicit extensions of any warranty to cover the future performance of the product, as is required by § 2-725(2). 25 Nor does knowledge by Johns-Manville of Jones & Laughlin's expectations, or the possible reliance by Jones & Laughlin on Johns-Manville's expertise, transform these representations regarding the performance of existing products, advanced in advertising brochures, into explicit warranties of future performance. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in refusing to apply the § 2-725(2) exception to the four year statute of limitations for claims based on the UCC. Because the statute commenced to run on the date the roof was delivered, August 30, 1967, the district court also did not err in holding that Jones & Laughlin's UCC claims, filed on August 7, 1972, were time-barred. 26 48 Under these circumstances, there is no occasion for us to address the alternative ground relied on by the district court in granting summary judgment in favor of Johns-Manville on the UCC claims namely, that this was a construction contract which is not covered by the UCC. 27 Inasmuch as our resolution of this issue would neither be authoritative nor alter the outcome of this appeal, we decline to address it. 49 2. Were the Jury's Answers to the Special Interrogatories Inconsistent ? 50 At the conclusion of the trial, Jones & Laughlin moved for a new trial on its contract claims on the ground that it was inconsistent for the jury to conclude that Johns-Manville was negligent in its assistance in designing the roof and supervising construction, while also concluding that Johns-Manville did not breach its contractual duties in this regard. The district court denied this motion. 51 The interrogatories dealing with the negligence claim and the jury's answers read as follows: 52 13. Did Johns-Manville undertake to render any services to Jones & Laughlin which were necessary for the protection of Jones & Laughlin's property, where Johns-Manville failed to exercise reasonable care in performing those services?