Opinion ID: 621371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Calloway’s Life Sentence

Text: Calloway asserts various constitutional arguments in an attempt to show that the district court erred in sentencing him to life in prison. We review de novo a constitutional challenge to a sentence. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 2010). Calloway first argues that “innumerable criminal defendants have been unconstitutionally sentenced” pursuant to Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which allows for judicial factfinding of previous convictions. But as we have recently held, Almendarez-Torres is still good law, and will remain so until the Supreme Court explicitly overrules it. United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367, 371 (6th Cir. 2011). The district court judge therefore did not err in finding the fact of Calloway’s previous convictions by a preponderance of the evidence. Calloway next claims that his life sentence violates the Eight Amendment because it is grossly disproportionate to the crimes he committed. Calloway was sentenced pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which provides for a term of life imprisonment for possession of certain quantities 5 Calloway’s reliance upon Martinez is unavailing. Martinez is factually distinguishable because it involved an expert’s nonverbal conduct in a video that he was making in preparation for trial. Martinez, 588 F.3d at 311. The question here—whether possession of contraband can be considered nonverbal assertive conduct—is entirely different. Further, while Martinez does reference the dissenting opinion in United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1051 (6th Cir. 1980) (Merritt, J., dissenting), which suggested that “nonverbal conduct showing possession and distribution of a large volume of stolen merchandise” can be considered assertive conduct, that does not disturb the fundamental principle that nonverbal conduct is not an assertion unless it is intended as such. Martinez, 588 F.3d at 311. And once again, no showing of intent has been made here. -22- United States v. Jeffries, et al. Nos. 09-5861, 09-5862, 09-5863 of controlled substances, where the defendant has already committed two or more drug offenses. Calloway was held responsible for 39.395 kilograms of cocaine. In evaluating Eighth Amendment challenges to sentences, “this court adheres to the Supreme Court’s narrow proportionality principle . . . stating that the Eighth Amendment only prohibit[s] extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.” Graham, 622 F.3d at 452 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Under this test, this court “has continued to reject Eighth Amendment challenges to mandatory life sentences in repeat-offender drug cases.” United States v. Thornton, 609 F.3d 373, 379 (6th Cir. 2010). Sharply undermining his claim, Calloway makes no attempt to distinguish his case from United States v. Hill, 30 F.3d 48, 50–51 (6th Cir. 1994), in which we found life sentences for repeat drug offenders constitutional. See United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 247 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding failure to distinguish Hill fatal to Eighth Amendment challenge to sentence). Further, his life sentence, based on the amount of cocaine for which he was held responsible and his repeat-offender status, is squarely in line with similar cases. See, e.g., Thornton, 609 F.3d at 379 (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge and upholding life sentence for repeat offender responsible for 72 kilograms of cocaine). Calloway’s sentence therefore is not grossly disproportionate to his crime. Calloway further argues that his life sentence violates the separation of powers. This argument is clearly foreclosed as we have “‘flatly rejected’ the claim that mandatory minimums unconstitutionally violate separation-of-powers principles.” United States v. Cecil, 615 F.3d 678, 696 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Odeneal, 517 F.3d 406, 414 (6th Cir. 2008)). Other -23- United States v. Jeffries, et al. Nos. 09-5861, 09-5862, 09-5863 circuits have held the same. See, e.g., United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 252 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Holmes, 838 F.2d 1175, 1178 (11th Cir. 1988). Calloway’s due process challenge fares no better. He argues that due process demands that he receive more individualized consideration at the hands of a judge with greater discretion. However, “[t]his contention has no merit since ‘the scope of judicial discretion with respect to a sentence is subject to congressional control.’” United States v. Dumas, 934 F.2d 1387, 1389 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989)). Therefore, Calloway’s due process challenge also fails.