Opinion ID: 2286987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of McLarney's Testimony

Text: The City argues [t]he trial court erred in admitting testimony of a third party regarding the lawfulness of the City Council's decision because the testimony of the third party was improper opinion testimony in that it was evidence regarding an ultimate issue of law. Patrick McLarney, an attorney in private practice in Kansas City, testified that he had made the council aware that to reject [the panel] simply because of lack of a minority was discrimination and illegal in [his] opinion. Generally, the opinion of an expert on issues of law is not admissible. Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133, 153 (Mo.App.1992) (citing Young v. Wheelock, 333 Mo. 992, 64 S.W.2d 950, 957 (1933), overruled on other grounds by Executive Bd. of Missouri Baptist Convention v. Carnahan, 170 S.W.3d 437 (Mo.App.2005)). This is because such testimony encroaches upon the duty of the court to instruct on the law. Wulfing, 842 S.W.2d at 153. The trial court, however, did not rule the testimony admissible as an expert opinion but, rather, specifically ruled that this testimony was admissible for purposes of rebutting the testimony given by an earlier witness. The mayor had previously testified that she did not know whether it was illegal for an employer to make employment decisions on the basis of race. McLarney was then allowed to testify that he had notified Mayor Barnes and certain members of the city council that, in his opinion, their rejection of the panel based on racial considerations was illegal in order to refute the mayor's testimony that she was unaware it was unlawful to consider race when making an employment decision. It is established law that [a]ny competent testimony that tends to explain, counteract, repel or disprove evidence offered by [one party] may be offered in rebuttal. [14] State v. Gardner, 8 S.W.3d 66, 72 (Mo. banc 1999). When a party opens the door to a topic, the admission of rebuttal evidence on that topic becomes permissible. Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1166 (10th Cir.2005); see also Union Elec. Co. v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 258 S.W.3d 48, 57 (Mo. banc 2008). Although Howard called Mayor Barnes as a witness, she was clearly adverse. A party calling an adverse party as a witness may contradict that person's testimony. Waters v. Barbe, 812 S.W.2d 753, 757 (Mo. App.1991). A trial court's decision regarding admissibility of evidence is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion, such as when the ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that the ruling shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration. Nelson v. Waxman, 9 S.W.3d 601, 603-04 (Mo. banc 2000). Here, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow McLarney to offer rebuttal testimony relating to whether the mayor and council had been notified that in his opinion it was illegal to reject the panel on grounds of race. This testimony may have been appropriate for a limiting instruction at this stage of the proceedings but no such request was made. This testimony was relevant to the issue of punitive damages to be discussed later.