Opinion ID: 1057924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Term Limits Amendment

Text: In the early 1990s, limitations on the number of years that an individual could serve in office became a popular theme. Steven F. Huefner, Term Limits in State Legislative Elections: Less Value for More Money?, 79 Ind. L.J. 427, 428 (2004). These measures attracted widespread support on the premise that they would oust from office entrenched incumbents who had lost touch with their constituents, free office holders from the control of special interests, and restore law-making institutions to their proper composition by enabling a more representative and diverse group of citizens to serve in government. Id. Proponents of term limits proclaimed that forcing incumbents from office at regular intervals would make campaigns more competitive and interesting, bringing in fresh ideas and providing a more attractive selection of candidates. Id. at 439. Consistent with the national trend, the people of Knox County, as indicated above, voted in favor of a charter amendment in November of 1994. Effective January 1, 1995, the provision declared ineligible from service any person in any elected office of Knox County if during the previous two terms of that office the person in question has served more than a single term. Charter of Knox County, Tennessee, art. VIII, § 8.17. The chancellor found no fault with the referendum procedure and concluded that it was reasonable for the voters of Knox County to believe that the amendment applied to all of the elected officeholders in the Knox County government, not part of it. Although the question was not specifically addressed, the chancellor implicitly rejected the constitutional claim that the amendment failed as either vague in content or overly broad in its application in violation of the law of the land of our state constitution and the due process clause of our federal constitution. The chancellor concluded, however, that the term limits provision was invalid on procedural grounds because it was neither filed nor codified in accordance with article VIII, section 8.05E of the charter. In this appeal, Knox County contends that the term limits amendment should be limited to its local legislative body and the county mayor, the only offices (other than law director) with duties specifically and comprehensively addressed in the 1990 charter. The county also argues that the 1994 amendment is overly broad, creating possible unintended consequences, in violation of the state and federal constitutions. Commissioner Schmid asserts that the term limits provision should be extended to all elected offices of Knox County government explicitly created by the charter, including the county mayor, the county commissioners, and the law director, as well as to the sheriff, to which office the charter makes general reference. [9] He further claims that the term limits provision more broadly applies to any elected offices of Knox County government implicitly created by the charter, including the trustee, the property assessor, the county clerk, and the register of deeds, traditional county officers performing purely administrative roles. Term limitations imposed on public officers by constitutional provisions and local charters have generally been upheld as constitutionally valid. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309, 1328 (1991) (concluding that state interest in incumbency reform was sufficiently rational and compelling when weighed against the residual burden placed on the rights and privileges of elected officeholders and their supporters); Nevada Judges Ass'n v. Lau, 112 Nev. 51, 910 P.2d 898 (1996); Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F.Supp. 816, 822 (S.D.Ohio 1993), aff'd, 45 F.3d 126 (6th Cir.1995) (holding that charter provision did not violate First or Fourteenth Amendment of United States Constitution or state constitution because it did not create an invidious class distinction, it did not unreasonably restrict franchise, and it served a legitimate and compelling public policy). Only months ago, in Bailey, this Court upheld the concept of term limits, concluding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-210(4), which permits a county charter to establish the qualifications of the county legislative body, did not violate Tennessee's constitution. Bailey, 188 S.W.3d at 545. We held as follows: [T]he third paragraph of Article VII does not contain any prohibition on authorizing a chartered county to set the qualifications for members of its legislative body. To the contrary, Article VII grants broad authority to a county to go so far as to replace its existing government in favor of an alternate government, provided the people approve. It follows that a chartered county, as authorized by Article VII and statutes enacted by the legislature, may establish the qualifications of the members of its own legislative body. See Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 713 (Tenn. 2001) (chartered counties possess broad authority for the regulation of their own local affairs). Furthermore, we note that Article I, section 1, of Tennessee's constitution provides that the people have an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they may think proper. The constitution is the truest expression of the will of the people, and it is their intent in adopting a constitutional provision that must prevail. See Williams v. Carr, 218 Tenn. 564, 404 S.W.2d 522, 526 (1966). . . . [W]e continue to adhere to the principle that the constitution does not mandate a uniform structure of county governments across the state. It specifically authorizes legislation creating different forms of local government, and the General Assembly has very broad powers and discretion in this regard. Leech [v. Wayne County, 588 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tenn.1979)]. Bailey, 188 S.W.3d at 546. This Court determined that the term limits are a qualification for holding office and that even though Article VII states that county officials shall be elected for `terms of four years,' the phrase should not be construed to mean that such officials must be capable of being elected to more than one term. Id. at 544-45. This Court construed terms of four years as merely referring to the duration of each term. Id. In consequence, we ruled that our constitution does not prevent a county from placing a limit on the number of terms that may be served. Id. at 545. This Court observed that if delegates to the Limited Constitutional Convention of 1977 had intended to prohibit a term limitation amendment, that language should have been included in their proposal. Id. Our opinion in Bailey specifically addresses term limits for members of the county legislative body within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-210(4). A preliminary question is whether the General Assembly, by enacting the enabling legislation found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-201 to -215, gave charter counties the right to establish a qualification for the other elected officers of a county by a term limits amendment. Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-210(6) directs that a county charter shall provide . . . [f]or the names or titles of the administrative and executive officers of the county governments, their qualifications, compensation, method of selection, tenure, removal, replacement and such other provisions with respect to such officers, not inconsistent with general law, as may be deemed necessary or appropriate for the county. Id. (emphasis added). In Bailey, this Court directed that the statute be liberally construed as a utilization of the constitutional power granted by article VII. Bailey, 188 S.W.3d at 544; see Tenn.Code Ann. § 5-1-201(b). Because the statute permits a county charter to prescribe the qualifications of other elected county officials and based upon our finding in Bailey that the enabling act authorizes county voters by referendum to establish term limit qualifications for their legislative body, this Court holds in the present case that voters may also set eligibility requirements, including term limitations, for the other elected officials in county government. Stare decisis, of course, is a fundamental principle of law. The appellate courts are not composed of judges free to write their personal opinions on public policy into law. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, Journal of Supreme Court History, 1991, at 13, 16. This doctrine is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). The opinion in Bailey controls on this important point. Having established that the electorate may as a matter of law set term limits for each office subject to popular vote, the next question is whether the 1994 amendment survives constitutional scrutiny. When there is a challenge, the judicial branch of government has a duty to determine the substantive constitutionality of statutes, ordinances, and like measures. City of Memphis v. Shelby County Election Comm'n, 146 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tenn. 2004). Referenda are to be construed with great deference, because [w]hen citizens vote in a referendum, they are presumed to know the issue on which they are voting. Pidgeon-Thomas Iron Co. v. Shelby County, 217 Tenn. 288, 397 S.W.2d 375, 378 (1965). Generally, referendum results are entitled to a presumption of favorability: The people once having voted the courts give great weight to their voice and should not lightly invalidate their action, but should look to those things which make the referendum effective and legal rather than to those which might invalidate it. Id. (emphasis added). This Court must, therefore, when at all possible, interpret either statutes or charter amendments adopted by referendum as compatible with our state constitution. If a provision can be legitimately construed in a variety of ways, `[i]t is our duty to adopt a construction which will sustain the statute and avoid [that] constitutional conflict, if its recitations permit such a construction.' State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tenn.2001) (quoting Marion County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Marion County Election Comm'n, 594 S.W.2d 681, 684-85 (Tenn. 1980)). Our primary purpose in interpreting a charter amendment must be  to effectuate the intent of the electorate that adopted it. 42 Am.Jur.2d Initiative and Referendum § 49 (Supp.2006) (emphasis added). Absent ambiguity, a court may presume that voters intend the meaning apparent upon the face of an initiative measure, and a court may not add to the statute or rewrite it to conform to an assumed intent that is not apparent in its language. Id. By the express terms of the 1994 petition, no person shall be eligible to serve in any elected office of Knox County if the individual has already served the previous two full terms in that office. The ballot question as prepared by the Knox County Law Director's office differed, adding the word government and specifically providing that no individual shall be permitted to hold the same elected office of Knox County Government more than two (2) consecutive terms. While the petition and the amendment later codified exempted judges, the ballot did not. [10] When addressing the language in the amendment, the chancellor made the following observation: When the voters approved a charter form of government, it was reasonable for them to assume that Knox County had a charter that covered its government, not part of its government. When the voters of Knox County were presented with a ballot in 1994 imposing term limits upon individuals holding an elected office of Knox County government, it was reasonable for those voters to assume that term limits would apply to all of the elected office holders in the Knox County government, not part of it. Jordan v. Knox County, Tennessee, No. 166799-1 (Knox Co. Ch. Ct., June 9, 2006) at 56 (emphasis added). The term limits provision at issue in this case is different from the term limits provision in Bailey. Shelby County's term limits provision was explicit as to the offices affected. Only the mayor and the commissioners were targeted by the amendment. Our decision in Bailey affects only the commissioners. [11] The term limits provision in Shelby County Charter specifically provided as follows: No County Mayor nor any member of the Board of County Commissioners shall be eligible to be elected to or hold the office of County Mayor or County Commissioner for more than two consecutive four-year-terms. Provided, however, if an individual is appointed to fill an unfilled term either for Mayor or County Commissioner, this term shall not be counted as part of the two consecutive elected terms. Shelby County Charter, art. II, § 2.03(G) (emphasis added). The Knox County term limits amendment would broadly preclude service of more than two terms for any elected office. Whereas the 1994 ballot language referred to hold[ing] the same elected office of Knox County Government, the language of article VIII, section 8.17 of the amendment, taken verbatim from the actual citizen petition, prohibits serv[ice] in any elected office of Knox County. Because term limits may be adopted by the electorate, the question is whether the ballot terminology Knox County government applies to only the county mayor and commission (and law director), offices with duties specifically defined in the 1990 Knox County Charter, or more extensively applies to any elected office of Knox County  any county officeholder who must seek election. If the latter, the amendment could be interpreted to affect not only the offices in the county but also state officials, like the public defender, the district attorney general, and members of the Knox County Board of Education, all of whom exclusively serve within the same jurisdictional limits. Members of the board of education and the court clerks qualify as elected Knox County officers. Under state law, however, the term limits amendment cannot extend to a school board member and has no application to court clerks. The Education Improvement Act of 1991, a general law of the state, preempts the imposition of term limits for a school board member. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-2-201(a)(1) (Supp.2006) (The members of the board shall be elected for a term of four (4) years and may succeed themselves.); Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 60 S.W.3d 65, 79 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) ([T]he provisions of the Education Improvement Act of 1992 repeal and supercede the private act applicable to Knox County. . . .); Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 97-041, 1997 WL 188745 (April 7, 1997); Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 95-007, 1995 WL 69246 (Feb. 15, 1995). The statute trumps the charter amendment as to members of the school board. See Family Golf of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 964 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997) (Local governments may decide for themselves how best to exercise . . . powers delegated by the General Assembly as long as their decisions do not conflict with state law.). Moreover, the 1994 amendment would appear to prohibit more than two terms of consecutive service for the circuit and criminal court clerks, offices existing pursuant to article VI, section 13 of the Tennessee Constitution, and not controlled by article VII or the charter. The enabling legislation at Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-204(f)(1), specifically provides as follows: Nothing contained within the provisions of this section shall be construed to affect the judicial system in any county adopting a charter form of government except as its charter or ordinances may direct the imposing, levying or collection of fines, penalties, fees or court costs or the procedures for the filling of vacancies as required by law. Tenn.Code Ann. § 5-1-204(f)(1) (Supp. 2006) (emphasis added). Vacancies in the offices of the court clerks are filled by the county legislative body. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-15-210; Shelby County Election Comm'n v. Turner, 755 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tenn.1988); State ex rel. Webster v. LaBonte, 597 S.W.2d 893, 894 (Tenn.1980); Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen., No. 88-131, 1988 WL 410205 (July 29, 1988). The circuit and criminal court clerks are considered to be county officials. See Overton County v. State ex rel. Hale, 588 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tenn.1979). The positions, however, are created as part of the judicial branch of the government. Court clerks may not, therefore, be subjected to term limits, as those offices, as indicated, are addressed under article VI of our constitution, rather than article VII. The enabling legislation permitting the implementation of term limits relates to article VII officers, not officials holding office under article VI. Although not at issue, the district attorney general, while holding an elected office in Knox County, is a state official. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-42-101(3)(C) (Supp.2006). The public defender, an office which is also not at issue, holds a similar status. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-14-208 (Supp.2002). Although with a jurisdiction limited to Knox County, criminal court judges, circuit court judges, and chancellors are state officials. Tenn.Code Ann. § 17-1-203 (1994). General sessions judges and juvenile court judges, if not otherwise protected by the terms of the ballot or the 1994 amendment, are excluded by the enabling statute. Tenn.Code Ann. § 5-1-204(f)(1); see Spurlock v. Sumner County, 42 S.W.3d 75, 79 (Tenn.2001) (general sessions judges and juvenile court judges are county offices). The record clearly demonstrates that the members of the Charter Commission drafted the proposal believing that the offices of sheriff, trustee, register of deeds, county clerk, and property assessor would be preserved regardless of the content of the charter. It was their belief that the constitutional officers would be retained in their traditional roles by the terms of the state constitution. The chancellor confirmed that in his opinion. Each of these officers, however, qualifies as elected to office in Knox County Government. They are, therefore, subject to the term limitation. We hold that the procedural deficiencies after the adoption of the amendment are of no consequence. This Court finds the nature of the charter's terms governing process are directory rather than mandatory. See Marks v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 943 So.2d 1028, 1035 (La.2006) (If the terms of the statute are limited to what is required to be done, i.e., procedural rules, then the statute is considered directory even though mandatory language is employed.). [12] When there is a vote of the people, the presumption of favorability must prevail. And, while an amendment to a county's charter clearly cannot apply to state and local officials over which it has no authority, the 1994 referendum results from Knox County demonstrate the obvious intent to limit the terms of county officials to the extent possible under the law. As stated, the collective intent of the people is the object of the Court's search when legislation is enacted by referendum. See Washington State Dep't of Revenue v. Hoppe, 82 Wash.2d 549, 512 P.2d 1094, 1096 (1973); 42 Am.Jur.2d Initiative and Referendum § 49 (Supp.2006). In this case, our goal has been to ascertain the intent of the electorate that adopted the amendment. If the real intent of the voters of Knox County was to limit the terms of  every elected official in Knox County, our law precludes that result. Some offices are protected by the constitution. Others are exempt by statute. The voters, however, overwhelmingly approved the amendment despite the uncertainties as to its application and the questionable wisdom of limiting the terms of county officials exercising purely administrative roles. The term limits provision meets constitutional muster, and its intent must be applied to the extent possible. In consequence, not only are the Knox County Commissioners subject to term limitations, but that same restriction applies to those other county officers identified in the state constitution under article VII, section 1. Despite the irony of their election and re-election since 1994 and despite the approval by the voters in 2006 after term limitations became an issue, the Plaintiff commissioners, the sheriff, the county clerk, the trustee, and the register of deeds are all ineligible for another term. While the limitations concept may be worthy, at least in theory, its application to popularly elected individuals, who have demonstrated competence and professionality in their service to the community and who remain the people's choice for an office, is trying. The terms of these public servants who are ineligible for another term do not, however, end with the filing of this opinion. Pursuant to article VII, section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution, every officer shall hold office until a successor is elected or appointed and qualified. In order to assure the continuous representation of all of the people of Knox County in local governmental affairs and as a means of preserving, without interruption, the continuation of essential governmental services, those county commissioners and state constitutional officers otherwise precluded from holding the offices to which they were recently elected may continue as de facto officers until their successors are named in accordance with law. [13] See Hogan v. Hamilton, 132 Tenn. 554, 179 S.W. 128, 129 (1915); see also Cook v. State, 91 Ala. 53, 8 So. 686, 688 (1890) (holding that a circuit clerk who was no longer qualified to serve was a de facto officer until his successor qualified).
The charter alternatives created by the 1977 Limited Constitutional Convention empowered Knox County to create its own form of local government. While there were deficiencies in the adoption of the 1990 charter, substantive and procedural, we hold that Knox County exists as a de facto governmental body. We also hold that the constitutional county offices were by inference retained under the charter form and have continued to exist under the de facto doctrine. The term limits amendment, enacted under the de facto charter, meets standards of due process and must be upheld as a component of the governmental unit. Any procedural deficiencies subsequent to its adoption have been resolved. The 1994 amendment applies to all elected officials in Knox County government except for the two court clerks and the school board member, each of whom is protected by either the state constitution or by statute. We must conclude, therefore, that under article VII, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution, the county commissioners and the constitutional officers are subject to term limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the chancery court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. This opinion is not subject to rehearing under Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Clerk is directed to certify this opinion as final and to issue the mandate immediately. Costs are taxed to the Plaintiffs and their sureties, for which execution may issue if necessary.