Opinion ID: 2193348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the propriety of the summary judgment

Text: The central issue presented in this appeal is whether or not the district court properly granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment. The legal litany governing the grant of summary judgment is well-established. A summary judgment may be based upon pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, interrogatories and the inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533, 537 (N.D.1981). The court may, in its discretion, consider oral testimony in a summary judgment proceeding; matters that are subject to judicial notice and exhibits that are otherwise admissible may also be received in ruling on the motion. [5] See 6 Moore's Federal Practice 56.11(8)(9) (2d Ed. 1948), and 10 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2723. Whatever evidence is used by the trial court in considering a motion for summary judgment, that evidence [must] be reviewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Johnson v. Haugland, supra, 303 N.W.2d at 537. The burden of proof is on the movant to show clearly that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Albers v. No. Dak. Racing Club, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 355, 358 (N.D.1977). Summary judgment is improper if reasonable differences of opinion exist as to inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts. Benson Cty. Co-op, Etc. v. Central Livestock, 300 N.W.2d 236, 239 (N.D. 1980). The Schollmeyers argue that the only undisputed fact in this case is the fact that a sum of money was borrowed from the Bank. In their view, there are two versions of the events ensuing after the loan: (1) the Bank's claim that the note was in default after two payments, and (2) their claim that the note was consolidated into a subsequent note, and that insurance proceeds ... were specifically earmarked for its reduction. The Schollmeyers argue that these differing accounts created a factual dispute that should have been resolved at trial. To answer the Schollmeyers' contention that the $221,120.58 note extinguished the $24,000 note, the Bank marshals a mass of oral and documentary evidence. [6] A sham issue of fact is the characterization the Bank places on the Schollmeyers' claim that the insurance proceeds were intended to reduce the $24,000 note. The Bank says, [Mr. Schollmeyer's] mistaken belief that [the note] was to have been paid doesn't alter the fact that he owed the Bank the unpaid balance of the [$24,000] note. We hold that the district court erred in granting the Bank's motion for summary judgment. Several unresolved issues of material fact regarding the relation between the two notes are raised by the Schollmeyers' affidavits. For example, the assertions concerning the incorporation of the $24,000 note into the subsequent $221,120.58 note cause us to wonder whether there was an agreement between the parties which extinguished the earlier note. The law is that the taking of a new note does not operate to discharge the indebtedness unless it is agreed that the indebtedness should be discharged. Anderson v. Kain, 40 N.D. 632, 169 N.W. 501, 503 (1918). While the Schollmeyers' affidavits may appear flimsy against the black and white ledgers of the Bank, the movant is not entitled to summary judgment merely because the facts [it] offers appear more plausible than those tendered in opposition, or because it appears that the adversary is unlikely to prevail at trial. 10 Wright & Miller § 2725 at 514. Accordingly, the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Bank is reversed and the case is remanded for a trial on the merits. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and VANDE WALLE, SAND and PAULSON, JJ., concur.