Opinion ID: 396160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limitation of Remedy.

Text: 26 Rachelle contends that there was evidence from which the jury could have found that the parties intended Upjohn's exclusive remedy to be the expense of obtaining replacement drugs from other sources. It bases this argument on paragraph 13 of the contract, which provides: 27 In case a default within the reasonable control of RACHELLE prevents the delivery of the products sold to UPJOHN, other than as provided for in paragraphs 8 or 12, UPJOHN may purchase during the period of such default only the normal quantities of orders not filled by RACHELLE from other sources if RACHELLE does not correct the default and make delivery according to this Agreement within thirty (30) days after notice of default from UPJOHN. If UPJOHN purchases tablets or powder from other sources pursuant to this paragraph and despite the exercise of reasonable diligence (which diligence shall include purchase from other sources meeting FDA and DPSC requirements for tablets or powder but not necessarily RACHELLE's or UPJOHN's specifications referred to in paragraph 3(a)) pays a price in excess of the prices specified in Exhibit B, RACHELLE shall be responsible for the excess price of the tablets or powder to UPJOHN. 28 The District Court, relying on MCLA § 440.2719(1)(b) and Official Comment 2 to that section, 7 held as a matter of law that paragraph 13 was not an exclusive remedy provision. This conclusion is clearly correct, and Rachelle's argument that this question should have been submitted to the jury is without merit. 29 Finally, Rachelle asserts that the parties intended to exclude the implied warranty of merchantability, and that sufficient evidence was introduced to warrant the submission of that issue to the jury. For the reasons set forth in the District Court's memorandum opinion, we dismiss this argument without further discussion. 30