Opinion ID: 11168
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Three Sentencing Issues

Text: 46 The presentence report placed the adjusted offense level at 35 based on a determination that the base offense level for the crime of accessory after the fact to a bank robbery involving a murder during the flight by the bank robbers was 30 plus an enhancement of three levels for the shooting of the state trooper by Alonzo and two levels for obstruction of justice. The district court approved the report. The district judge, noting that the appellant had no prior criminal record and appeared to be an otherwise productive member of society, sentenced him to 168 months, the minimum for level 35 under the guidelines. 10 47 A sentence based on the United States Sentencing Guidelines must be upheld unless the appellant demonstrates that it was imposed in violation of the law, was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the guidelines, or was outside the range of the applicable guidelines and was unreasonable. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); United States v. Matovsky, 935 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir.1991). 48 We hold that the district court was correct with respect to the base offense level, but erred in adding the five levels for the shooting of the state trooper and obstruction of justice. Our analysis follows. 49 1. The Applicable Base Offense Level for Accessory after the Fact in this Case. 50 The guideline for accessory after the fact calls for a base offense level of six levels below the offense level for the underlying offense, with the caveat that the maximum base offense level is 30. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (hereinafter USSG) at § 2X3.1(a). Application Note 1 to the guideline states as follows:  'Underlying offense' means the offense as to which the defendant is convicted of being an accessory. Apply the base offense level plus any applicable specific offense characteristics that were known, or reasonably should have been known, by the defendant; ... 51 The presentence investigation report found that the underlying offense was robbery, which under USSG § 2B3.1(a) has a base offense level of 20. The robbery guideline lists a series of specific offense characteristics at USSG § 2B3.1(b). The specific offense characteristics include an increase of two levels if a victim sustained bodily injury, four levels if a victim sustained serious bodily injury, and six levels if a victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury. There is no specific offense characteristic addressing the death of a victim. Instead, the guideline includes a cross reference, USSG § 2B3.1(c), which states, If a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 11 had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction, apply § 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder). 52 Because of the murder of Parker in the aftermath of the bank robbery, the presentence investigation report recommended applying the cross-reference to the murder guideline. The base offense level for murder is 43. Because of the upper limit provision of the accessory after the fact guideline, the appellant's base offense level was set at 30. 53 We reject the appellant's first argument that he was wrongfully sentenced based upon a murder in which he did not participate. First, such an argument ignores the very nature of being an accessory after the fact: the criminal activity occurs subsequent to the underlying crime. The only rational way to punish for such an offense is to link the sentence to the underlying crime, albeit with reduced responsibility for the offender's lesser role. The sentencing guidelines, by imposing a base offense level six levels below the level for the underlying offense, with a maximum base offense level of 30, balances the reduced role for the after the fact offender with the severity of the underlying crime. 54 The appellant also misperceives the nature of his sentence. Contrary to his assertions, he was not sentenced for the murder itself; he was sentenced for assisting in preventing the apprehension of the conspirators responsible for the murder. The difference is more than academic. If the appellant truly were being sentenced for the murder, his base offense level would have been 43, pursuant to USSG § 2A1.1. Instead, as an accessory, his base offense level was capped at 30, in recognition of the reduced responsibility of an accessory after the fact. 12 55 We also reject the appellant's argument that a literal adherence to Application Note 1 of the accessory after the fact guideline, quoted on page ---- supra, allows the district court to add specific offense characteristics to the base level but does not permit using a guideline's cross-reference to enhance a sentence even further. Following such a path would lead to an obvious anomaly: a court could enhance a sentence if a victim were seriously (or even slightly) injured but could not enhance a sentence if a victim died. A common-sense interpretation of the guidelines requires the conclusion that the accessory after the fact application note did not intend such a result. Consequently, we find the district court correctly determined the base offense level. 56 2. The Three-Level Enhancement. 57 Paragraph 196 of the presentence investigation report recommends adding three levels as a victim-related adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(a), the official victim section of the guidelines. 13 There is no further explanation of the adjustment in the 40-page report. Because the only official victim of the crime was Trooper Bynum, we presume the recommendation was based on his injuries. 14 58 The appellant's counsel objected to this enhancement. The district judge, in overruling the objection, mistakenly referred to the enhancement as a vulnerable victim adjustment and cited the vulnerable victim guideline (Section 3A1.1) 15 rather than the official victim guideline:You have also objected to the three level increase for the vulnerable victim under 3A1.1A 16 in paragraph 196 of the presentence report, ... I think that the adjustment for the vulnerable victim has been appropriately and correctly applied. The Court therefore overrules that objection. 59 (Sentencing transcript, R. 17 at 2) (emphasis added). The trial judge did not state further why she believed the vulnerable victim enhancement should be provided. The only crime victim arguably meriting vulnerable status would be the elderly Parker. 60 We conclude based upon this limited dialogue in the record that the district court, in purportedly adopting the presentence investigation report, believed the adjustment was being applied because of the murder of the Parker, pursuant to § 3A1.1, rather than the shooting of Trooper Bynum, pursuant to § 3A1.2. 17 61 Thus the record reveals a conflict. On the one hand, the district court announced it was adopting in full the presentence investigation report, which included an official victim enhancement under § 3A1.2(a). On the other hand, in adopting that enhancement, the court referred to § 3A1.1, the vulnerable victim provision. Therefore, it is unclear whether the appellant's sentence was enhanced due to the vulnerable victim status of Parker or the official victim status of Trooper Bynum. We find it unnecessary to resolve this question because an enhancement based upon the victim status of either victim is erroneous. 62 With respect to Parker, at the time the appellant became an accessory, he was told that the conspirators had robbed a bank and Sephus shot somebody. (R.8 at 7). Contrary to the requirements of § 3A1.1, he neither knew nor should have known that person who had been shot was unusually vulnerable. The appellant thus lacked the requisite mens rea to support enhancement based upon the vulnerability of Parker. 63 With respect to Trooper Bynum, we find more confusion due to imprecise or inaccurate references to the sentencing guidelines. The presentence investigation report recommended enhancement based upon § 3A1.2(a). However, it is clear that § 3A1.2(b), addressing assaults on law enforcement officials while fleeing from a crime, is more applicable to the circumstances surrounding the shooting of Trooper Bynum. 18 The latter subsection calls for enhancement only if the person inflicting injury is the defendant or a person for whose conduct the defendant is otherwise accountable. The shooting of Trooper Bynum was committed by Alonzo in conjunction with Jones. The record does not support the conclusion that the appellant had any relationship with Alonzo and Jones which would make him accountable as an accessory after the fact for the acts of these two conspirators, who were in custody before the appellant even knew of the robbery. 19 64 Thus enhancement based upon § 3A1.2(b) would have been inappropriate. Enhancement based upon § 3A1.2(a), as recommended in the presentence investigation report, also would be erroneous because the appellant's offense of conviction, i.e., accessory after the fact, was not motivated by the government employee status of Trooper Bynum. 65 3. The Obstruction of Justice Enhancement. 66 The addition of two levels for obstruction of justice was also erroneous. Application Note 6 to § 3C1.1, the obstruction of justice guideline, states the following: 67 Where the defendant is convicted for an offense covered by ... § 2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact), ... this adjustment is not to be applied to the offense level for that offense except where a significant further obstruction occurred during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the obstruction offense itself (e.g., where the defendant threatened a witness during the course of the prosecution for the obstruction offense). 68 (emphasis added). The purpose of this limitation is to avoid double counting by preventing a person from being convicted of a crime and receiving an adjustment for the same conduct. United States v. Bell, 953 F.2d 6, 7 n. 1 (1st Cir.1992) (quotation omitted). Importantly, the application note counsels that the obstruction warranting the enhancement must be distinguishable from the obstruction inherent in being an accessory after the fact. 69 The presentence investigation report recommended adding the two levels for obstruction of justice because the appellant 1) burned evidence, 2) hid money and 3) told Embreall Victorian that if she cooperated with the FBI it would be her butt, a statement she took as a threat and a warning by [the appellant]. (Report at pp 185-87). Contrary to the direction of Application Note 6, there was no apparent attempt in the presentence report or by the district court to determine whether such acts constituted a significant further obstruction over and above the accessory offense itself. Indeed, none of the conduct cited in the presentence investigation report appears distinguishable from the conduct upon which the accessory after the fact charge was based. Nor did the conduct occur during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the obstruction offense itself; rather, it occurred during the investigation of the underlying offense of bank robbery resulting in murder. In sum, the facts as outlined in the presentence investigation report and adopted by the district court do not constitute the distinctive conduct necessary to support an obstruction of justice enhancement to a conviction based upon being an accessory after the fact. 70 Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for resentencing without enhancements for victim-related adjustment or obstruction of justice.