Opinion ID: 881853
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: pretrial punishment

Text: The appellant is correct in asserting that the City Court may not set bail which effectively guarantees pretrial detention as a means of punishing an indigent defendant. The purpose of bail is to honor the presumption of innocence while ensuring the defendant's presence at trial. Section 46-9-101, MCA; Bell v. Wolfish (1979), 441 U.S. 520, 536-37, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872-73, 60 L.Ed.2d 447, 467; State v. Seybert (1987), 229 Mont. 183, 185, 745 P.2d 687, 688. To punish a defendant prior to an adjudication of guilt is a violation of his right to due process. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S.Ct. at 1872, 60 L.Ed.2d at 466. To incarcerate a defendant solely because of his indigence is a violation of the defendant's right to equal protection. See Tate v. Short (1971), 401 U.S. 395, 398-99, 91 S.Ct. 668, 671, 28 L.Ed.2d 130, 133. The courts have long recognized the tension between the criminal defendant's right not to be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt and the state's interest in assuring a criminal defendant's presence at trial. The framers of our constitutions attempted to balance these conflicting interests by providing a right to reasonable bail. That balance, however, becomes difficult to maintain when the rights of indigent defendants are placed on the scales. Justice William O. Douglas has spoken eloquently on this dilemma when considering the right to bail pending appeal: This traditional right to freedom during trial and pending judicial review has to be squared with the possibility that the defendant may flee or hide himself. Bail is the device which we have borrowed to reconcile these conflicting interests. The purpose of bail is to insure the defendant's appearance and submission to the judgment of the court. It is assumed that the threat of forfeiture of one's goods will be an effective deterrent to the temptation to break the conditions of one's release. But this theory is based on the assumption that a defendant has property. To continue to demand a substantial bond which the defendant is unable to secure raises considerable problems for the equal administration of the law. We have held that an indigent defendant is denied equal protection of the law if he is denied an appeal on equal terms with other defendants, solely because of his indigence. Can an indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy man would not, because he does not happen to have enough property to pledge for his freedom? It would be unconstitutional to fix excessive bail to assure that a defendant will not gain his freedom. Yet, in the case of an indigent defendant, the fixing of bail in even a modest amount may have the practical effect of denying him release. The wrong done by denying release is not limited to the denial of freedom alone. That denial may have other consequences. In the case of reversal, he will have served all or part of a sentence under an erroneous judgment. Imprisoned, a man may have no opportunity to investigate his case, to cooperate with his counsel, to earn the money that is still necessary for the fullest use of his right to appeal. Bandy v. United States (1960), 81 S.Ct. 197, 197-98, 5 L.Ed.2d 218. In some cases, Justice Douglas's other consequences may precipitate a spiraling burden on both the defendant and the state. The defendant who is held in pretrial detention because he is indigent loses any opportunity for gainful employment. Because he cannot earn money, he cannot pay his fines or his bills. He may lose whatever property he owns in inadequate attempts to satisfy creditors. When he is in jail, the state must bear the cost of maintenance and detention. When he is released, he may become an even greater burden on the state's social services. It is difficult to see how the state's interest in prosecuting two traffic tickets outweighs the burden imposed on the state and on the defendant by pretrial detention. Though not addressing the issue of pretrial detention on failure to make bail, the United States Supreme Court has held that a state's interest in collecting traffic fines does not outweigh the equal protection rights of indigents. In Williams v. Illinois, the Supreme Court struck down the application of an Illinois statute which required indigents to work off fines for petty theft at $5.00 per day when the resulting incarceration exceeded the maximum permissible jail sentence under the state's petty theft statutes. Williams (1970), 399 U.S. 235, 242, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 2023, 26 L.Ed.2d 586, 593-94. In Tate v. Short , the Court relied on Williams to strike down a Texas statute which required indigents to work off traffic fines through incarceration at a municipal prison farm even though the substantive traffic statutes did not allow jail sentences. Tate (1971), 401 U.S. 395, 397, 91 S.Ct. 668, 670, 28 L.Ed.2d 130, 133. The principle in Williams and Tate is the same; incarceration solely on the basis of indigence is unconstitutional. If equal protection for indigents applies to defendants convicted of a crime, it should also apply to indigents who have not been found guilty of anything. See Allen v. Burke (E.D.Va. June 4, 1981), No. 81-0040 Civ. 28, 1981 WL 15186. The rule of Williams and Tate will not prevent incarceration of indigents in every case. A court may have no reasonable alternative to detaining defendants who cannot make bail. Williams and Tate, however, place a heavy burden on the court to search for the least oppressive means. The present record indicates that City Court Judge Bjertness not only failed to look for the least oppressive means, but instead used the opportunity in a wholly inappropriate exercise of judicial power to punish the appellant. Having determined that Layzell would not make bail, the court set an excessively late trial date, in effect sentencing the appellant to a sixty-five-day jail term prior to conviction for any crime. We are aware of the busy calendars faced by the municipal courts. However, we find it incredible that in over two months the court could find no time in which to try these simple traffic violations. We note the remarkable coincidence between Layzell filing habeas corpus proceedings on April 22 and three days later the City Court's sudden discovery of an opening in its calendar. Even the one month Layzell actually spent in jail is inexcusably excessive. We are aware that Layzell made the City Court's task difficult. He refused to appear for trial, provoked the court with verbal abuse, and generally resisted reasonable and expeditious settlement of the charges. Obstinance, however, is not a waiver of constitutional rights. If anything, it is a warning that increased vigilance is required. It most definitely is not justification for the use of judicial power to incarcerate the appellant at the court's personal whim. We would overturn Layzell's conviction but for one reason; during the entire duration of his incarceration, Layzell held the keys to his own cell. At the habeas corpus hearing, Layzell testified that he never inquired into the possibility of satisfying his bail through any friend, relative or surety company. Lt. Ross, commander of the detention facility, testified that Layzell could have obtained a sufficient surety bond for $50. When arrested, Layzell had $47 and change. By failing to even attempt to procure the difference, Layzell assured his continued incarceration. In technical terms, Layzell lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the City Court's acts because his own unwillingness to borrow three dollars caused his injury. The recalcitrance of both the appellant and the City Court transformed these two routine traffic tickets into significant constitutional questions. Layzell acted with the apparent intention of provoking the City Court into violating his constitutional rights. The court played into Layzell's hands by using pretrial detention as punishment. While we soundly condemn the court's actions, we will not find a constitutional violation when the appellant intentionally created and prolonged the incident.