Opinion ID: 2622602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Foucha

Text: Foucha was a challenge to the Louisiana civil commitment system. Louisiana allowed the continued detention, without regular court review, of criminal defendants acquitted by reason of insanity so long as they were still dangerous. Regaining sanity was never grounds for release. In Foucha, the United States Supreme Court found this violated due process. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 73, 112 S.Ct. 1780. The defendant had been acquitted, by reason of insanity, of burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm and committed to a psychiatric facility. Four years later the superintendent recommended conditional discharge because Foucha no longer manifested signs of mental illness. Two doctors commissioned by the trial court concluded Foucha's mental illness was in remission, but neither of them could certify he was not a menace to himself or others. One of the doctors concluded Foucha had suffered from drug-induced psychosis at the time of the crime, but currently showed no symptoms. However, Foucha did suffer from antisocial personality  which is neither a mental disease nor treatable illness. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75, 112 S.Ct. 1780. Nonetheless, the trial court denied the petition for conditional release. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed placing the burden of proof on Foucha to prove he was not dangerous and found he had not met this burden. In a sharply divided decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding Foucha's continued detention based on dangerousness and antisocial personality disorder violated his right to due process. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75-78, 112 S.Ct. 1780. The Court held that [d]ue process requires that the nature of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983)). Detainees are entitled to constitutionally adequate procedures to establish the grounds for his confinement. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972)). Further, the Court stressed the substantive component of the due process clause, which bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions `regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.' Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990)). Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982)). Notwithstanding these overarching principles, not all detention schemes fail. The Court cited three examples of constitutional detention or commitment: (1) confinement of convicted criminals for purposes of retribution and punishment, (2) commitment of the mentally ill based on clear and convincing evidence of mental illness and dangerousness, and (3) pretrial detention based on a legitimate and compelling interest in preventing crime by the arrestee. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80-81, 112 S.Ct. 1780. Concurring, Justice O'Connor (who provided the vital fifth vote for the majority) stressed the Court's holding should not be read to mean an insanity acquittee who regained sanity should always automatically be released. It might therefore be permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquittee who has regained sanity if, unlike the situation in this case, the nature and duration of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continuing dangerousness. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 87-88, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor counseled we stay close to the traditional due process analysis, warning `courts should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments' about the relationship between dangerous behavior and mental illness. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 87, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983)). This is precisely the current issue before this Court. Reading the Justice White majority and Justice O'Connor's concurrence together to determine the holding, the United States Supreme Court has articulated three due process considerations for civil committed systems such as ours: (1) the need for a current determination of mental illness and dangerousness, (2) constitutionally adequate procedures to establish the grounds for confinement, and (3) compliance with the substantive component of the due process clause preventing arbitrary confinement. Foucha at 504 U.S. at 78-80, 112 S.Ct. 1780. A narrowly tailored scheme confining insanity acquittees after they have regained their sanity does not automatically run afoul of due process, but a blanket scheme will. Compare Foucha, 504 U.S. at 87-88, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (O'Connor, J., concurring) with Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78-80, 112 S.Ct. 1780. Our system does not run afoul of the due process concerns articulated in Foucha. Insanity acquittees shall have a current examination of his or her mental condition ... at least once every six months. RCW 10.77.140. Given the frequency of this review, the first concern articulated in Foucha does not apply here. Second, there must be constitutionally adequate procedures to establish the grounds for confinement. Under chapter 10.77 RCW, detainees are entitled to regular review and may petition the court for release. RCW 10.77.140, . 150, .220. The detainee is entitled to counsel, exams at state expense, and an adversarial hearing. Chapter 10.77 RCW has recently been upheld in the face of a Foucha based challenge. We found insanity acquittees could constitutionally be made to bear the burden of establishing both sanity and lack of dangerousness. State v. Platt, 143 Wash.2d 242, 249-50, 19 P.3d 412 (2001). In reaching that conclusion, this Court noted: Those subject to criminal commitment have been found beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed an act which, except for their insanity, would have been a criminal act subjecting them to criminal penalties.... [P]ast conduct is heavily indicative of the likelihood that a person will commit similar acts which will again endanger others. Therefore, it is logical that those who have reached the attention of the State because of serious antisocial acts, would be subject to more procedural burdens in obtaining their release than are those whose acts are less threatening to the public safety. Platt, 143 Wash.2d at 252, 19 P.3d 412 (quoting State v. Platt, 97 Wash.App. 494, 505, 984 P.2d 441 (1999)). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted [t]he state has a substantial interest in avoiding premature release of insanity acquittees, who have committed acts constituting felonies and have been declared dangerous to society[, b]ecause `the insanity acquittal supports an inference of continuing mental illness.' Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 548 (9 th Cir.1983) (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 366, 103 S.Ct. 3043), quoted with approval in Platt, 143 Wash.2d at 250, 19 P.3d 412. This is in stark contrast with the statutory system invalidated in Foucha. The detention scheme at issue in Foucha allowed the indefinite confinement of a detainee until he or she could prove by preponderance of the evidence he or she was no longer dangerous. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82, 112 S.Ct. 1780. The statute also failed to provide an adversarial hearing to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the detainee was not dangerous. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 81, 112 S.Ct. 1780. Unlike other detention statutes upheld by the Court, the detention scheme adopted by Louisiana was not narrowly focused. The Washington State Legislature took care to incorporate significant procedural safeguards, therefore, protecting the interests of the criminally insane. The safeguards provided under RCW 10.77.150, the conditional release statute, and RCW 10.77.200, the final release statute, may be summarized as follows: (1) the detainee has a right to make application to the secretary, (2) the detainee has a right to directly petition the court, (3) the detainee has a right to an adversarial hearing, (4) if indigent, the detainee has a right to have an appointed, qualified expert or professional person examine him or her, upon the detainee's request, and (5) the detainee has a right to request a jury. These procedures were also provided under the former RCW 10.77.200, under which Reid petitioned. See former RCW 10.77.200 (1993). As explained by Justice O'Connor in Foucha : It might therefore be permissible... to confine an insanity acquittee who has regained sanity if ... the nature and duration of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continuing dangerousness. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 87-88, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In this instance, conditional release is narrowly tailored to protect the compelling and legitimate concern for public safety. At the time of Reid's commitment, he had been diagnosed by two doctors as suffering from major depression and psychosis triggered by his ingestion of illegal drugs and inability to successfully deal with personal stressors, both of which made him unable to tell right from wrong at the time of the shooting. All expert witnesses have agreed if Reid were to use drugs again, it is more likely than not he would suffer another psychotic episode. There was also evidence that Reid would suffer another psychotic episode should he not successfully deal with the personal issues that contributed to his disorder. Because Reid has no history of successful independent living in the community, it is in the best interest of the community, as well as Reid, that he gradually work his way into the community, living eventually away from Western State Hospital and working independently. Outlining the terms of Reid's conditional release in its order of conditional release, the trial court took care to tailor the nature and duration of Reid's conditional release, reflecting the pressing public safety concerns related to his continuing dangerousness. Amongst other conditions outlined in the trial court's order of conditional release, the order provides: (1) that Reid must reside at Western State Hospital, (2) that the community program staff determines the specific residence or ward within the Legal Offender Unit in which Reid is to reside, the length of stay, and the privileges granted, (3) that in the future, Reid may move into a community residence or community supervised facility, subject to the approval of the community program staff, and (4) that the community program staff is required to submit a report to the court every six months or if there is a substantial change in the treatment plan or Reid's condition. CP at 33-35. These terms bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose of Reid's confinement. The United States Supreme Court identified a third problem with the Louisiana statute; that it violated substantive due process. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780. Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780. Foucha speaks approvingly of narrowly tailored detention schemes serving legitimate state interests. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80-82, 112 S.Ct. 1780. Louisiana's scheme permit[ted] the indefinite detention of insanity acquittees who are not mentally ill but who do not prove they would not be dangerous to others. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 83, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (emphasis added). Reid's confinement is not indefinite; he may petition for release at any time. I therefore respectfully dissent. Conditional release, rather than final release, is clearly contemplated by the statute, and does not offend due process. The trial court and the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. BRIDGE and IRELAND, JJ., concur.