Opinion ID: 1060898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: life without possibility of parole jury instruction

Text: The defendant also contends that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that life without the possibility of parole was a possible punishment. The State responds that the punishment of life without the possibility of parole was statutorily inapplicable to the defendant's case and that the defendant expressly asked the trial court not to charge it. We agree with the State that the defendant has clearly waived this issue, but we also find that the option was unavailable to the defendant in this case. Prior to 1993, the only punishments available for a person convicted of first-degree murder were life imprisonment or death. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(b)(1991). The legislature later amended the statute to add life without possibility of parole as a sentencing option. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(c) (Supp. 1996). The amendment was specifically made applicable to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993. See 1993 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 473, § 1. Conceding that this offense occurred well before July 1, 1993, the defendant argues that life without parole was a viable sentencing alternative because of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(k)(Supp. 1996), which provides that if a defendant is granted a new trial, either as to guilt or punishment or both, the new trial shall include the possible punishments of death, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or imprisonment for life. Because life without parole is a lesser penalty than death, the defendant also relies upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-112 (1991), which provides: Whenever any penal statute or penal legislative act of the state is repealed or amended by a subsequent legislative act, any offense, as defined by the statute or act being repealed or amended, committed while such statute or act was in full force and effect shall be prosecuted under the act or statute in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. Except as provided under the provisions of § 40-35-117, in the event the subsequent act provides for a lesser penalty, any punishment imposed shall be in accordance with the subsequent act. (Emphasis added). First, the defendant clearly waived this issue prior to trial when he filed a motion in which he specifically requested that the trial court not ... submit to the jury the possible sentence of `Life Without Parole.' Comments prior to jury selection by the trial court and counsel make it abundantly clear that the defendant did not want the jury to be charged on the option of life without the possibility of parole. Furthermore, there is no indication that the State objected to this procedure. Under these circumstances, the issue is waived. Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a). Nevertheless, we will address the issue on the merits to provide further guidance on these statutory provisions. This Court's role in construing a statute is to determine and to give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995). We must determine the legislative intent from the plain language of the statute, read in context of the entire statute, without any forced or subtle construction which would extend or limit its meaning. State v. Davis, 940 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tenn. 1997). As a matter of statutory construction, a specific statutory provision will control over a more general statutory provision. Matter of Harris, 849 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Tenn. 1993). Moreover, a statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively, unless the legislature indicates a specific intention otherwise. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 82. We conclude that the specific enabling provision of the 1993 act, which clearly states that the amendment applies to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993, controls, as a matter of statutory construction, over the more general provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(k) or Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-112. The defendant's crime occurred well before July 1, 1993. The statute in effect at that time, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(k), provided that upon the grant of a new trial, the available sentencing options were life imprisonment and death. There is no indication that the legislature intended that the option of life without parole apply retrospectively to offenses occurring before July 1, 1993. See, e.g., White v. State, 322 Md. 738, 589 A.2d 969, 974 (1991)(trial judge lacked authority to charge the jury on life without parole because the offense was committed prior to the effective date of the statute adding the sentencing option). Accordingly, even had the defendant not waived this issue, the trial court lacked the statutory authority to instruct the jury that life without possibility of parole was a sentencing option in this case.