Opinion ID: 2357909
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Removal Proceedings

Text: We hold that a judge who accepts a bribe must be removed from office. There can be no exceptions whatsoever. One might argue that there might conceivably be some bribery case somewhere with mitigating circumstances sufficient to justify discipline other than removal. That case will have to be argued elsewhere. In New Jersey nothing other than removal will do, no matter what the circumstances. [5] Respondent contends that the removal statute requires the Supreme Court (or the three-judge panel) to hear the underlying evidence that constitutes the cause for removal, that reliance on a criminal conviction is impermissible. He further contends that this Court should disqualify itself because it prejudged his guilt. We know of no doctrine defining what effect must be given in these removal proceedings to the judge's bribery conviction. We are not barred by constitutional law from according it full collateral estoppel consequences. All of the conditions of that doctrine are present (the issues were in fact litigated, the burden of proof is the same, the parties, essentially, are identical). The constitutional restraint, in New Jersey, inhibits the use of collateral estoppel only in subsequent criminal proceedings. State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 216-17 (1981). The proceedings here are not criminal. Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Conda, 164 N.J. Super. 386, 391 (Law Div. 1971); accord, e.g., McComb v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 138 Cal. Rptr. 459, 463-65, 564 P. 2d 1 (Cal.Spec.Trib. 1977). Nor are we required to accord collateral estoppel effect to the bribery conviction and the factual determination upon which it was based. Collateral estoppel is not mandated by constitution or statute. Rather it is a doctrine designed to accomplish various goals, a rule not to be applied if there are sufficient countervailing interests. Plainfield v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 82 N.J. 245, 258-59 (1980). Given the unique nature of these proceedings and their unequalled importance, collateral estoppel's application must depend completely on its consistency with the goals of removal proceedings. In New Jersey, where these proceedings are constitutionally based, and where the Constitution imposes responsibility on the Legislature for both their substance and procedure, N.J. Const. of 1947, art. VI, § VI, para. 4, legislative intent on that issue is critical. The removal statute itself is no help in determining what effect the Legislature intended a criminal conviction to have. Respondent, in support of his contention that this Court must again try these issues, notes that the removal statute permits the issuance of subpoenas to witnesses and the production of evidence at the hearing before the Court or the three-judge panel. Obviously those statutory provisions were designed to allow live testimony where appropriate, but not to compel it where inappropriate. Those provisions are nothing more than the necessary tools to assure production of live testimony when and if required. They tell us nothing except that some removal proceedings may require such testimony. They do not at all suggest that the many rules of evidence used in ordinary trials to dispense with live testimony (through documents or exceptions to the general hearsay exclusion) are not applicable in these proceedings. The statute simply does not tell us what effect may be given to the admission in evidence of the judge's conviction. The only section suggestive of a clue  N.J.S.A. 2A:1B-10  is, upon analysis, not helpful at all. That section prohibits a hearing on the removal charge until civil, criminal or administrative proceedings dealing with the same matter have been fully concluded. That prohibition applies only if the proceeding was one in which the judge had an opportunity to prepare his defense and was entitled to be represented by counsel. Ibid. One implication of the quoted material, along with the prohibition against simultaneous removal proceedings, is that the judge, having had the benefit of counsel, should be bound by the results of those proceedings. Further analysis, however, suggests the contrary. The burden of proof in removal proceedings is beyond a reasonable doubt. N.J.S.A. 2A:1B-9. The Legislature could not have intended that a judge, held liable in a civil or administrative proceeding under facts found by a preponderance of the evidence, would be foreclosed from challenging those facts in a removal action where the same facts have to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge may, therefore, contest facts in a removal proceeding that were previously found in a civil or administrative proceeding. The section of the statute here involved ( N.J.S.A. 2A:1B-10) treats criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings in an identical fashion. We therefore must conclude that the section itself provides no support for the contention that a criminal conviction is conclusive in removal proceedings, since civil or administrative determinations, treated identically in the statute, could not be given conclusive effect. [6] Nor does the statute's legislative history provide much help. Article VI, § VI, para. 4 of our Constitution delegates to the Legislature the authority to enumerate the causes for which and the manner by which the Supreme Court may remove judges of the Superior Court from office. This legislative power lay unexercised from the adoption of the Constitution in 1947 until the enactment of the removal statute in 1970. During the intervening years the procedure for protecting the public from incompetent judges, namely impeachment pursuant to art. VI, § VI, para. 4, was regarded as impractical, and loss of judicial office as a result of disbarment ( see In re Mattera, 34 N.J. 259, 268-69 (1961)) had proven a cumbersome alternative. The disciplinary sanctions available to this Court were widely recognized to be insufficient to the task of maintaining public confidence in the judiciary. The legislative response pursuant to the constitutional power was provoked in part by the call to provide this Court with a direct vehicle for removing from the bench judges who had engaged in criminal conduct. See Legislation needed for Judicial Discipline and Removal, 92 N.J.L.J. 336 (1969) (editorial); Removal of Judges Senate No. 166, 93 N.J.L.J. 52 (1970) (editorial). The procedural particulars, beyond the fundamental parameters such as burden of proof, composition of the tribunal, and respondent's right to have counsel and to offer evidence, left much to the Supreme Court's discretion, both by implication  by failing to define proceedings in more detailed and restrictive terms  and explicitly  by providing that, [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this act, proceedings shall be governed by rules of the Supreme Court. N.J.S.A. 2A:1B-8. Removal proceedings are unique. The interests involved are so great that the Legislature required that the matter be heard directly by the Supreme Court or through its designated three-judge panel. No other proceeding is given this primacy. That the interests served by collateral estoppel ( e.g., efficient administration of justice, avoidance of conflicting judicial determinations, avoidance of harassment through repetitive litigation) would also be served is not dispositive of the question. We must satisfy ourselves additionally that the application of collateral estoppel would not compromise the interest of the State in the integrity of these proceedings. Our conclusion that the criminal conviction here was intended by the Legislature to conclusively establish Judge Coruzzi's guilt is to some extent based on the identical effect given to such convictions in attorney disciplinary matters. Long before the 1970 adoption of the judicial removal statute, the rule was firmly established that the conviction of an attorney conclusively established the underlying facts in disciplinary proceedings. In re Hughes, 90 N.J. 32, 36 (1982); In re Mirabelli, 79 N.J. 597, 601-02 (1979); In re Mischlich, 60 N.J. 590, 593 (1972); In re Isserman, 9 N.J. 316, 321 (1952), cert. den. sub nom. Isserman v. Ethics Committee, 345 U.S. 927, 73 S.Ct. 706, 97 L.Ed. 1357 (1953). We assume that the Legislature was aware of that fact when it enacted the removal statute. Yanow v. Seven Oaks Park, Inc., 11 N.J. 341, 350 (1953). In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we also assume that the Legislature intended convictions to have the same effect in judicial removal proceedings which, while unique, are similar in some significant respects to attorney disciplinary proceedings. In both an officer of the law is subject to removal, in both the integrity of the judicial system is at stake, in both the burden of proof exceeds a preponderance of the evidence, and in both the destruction of a professional career is involved. The Legislature, thus charged with knowledge of the conclusive effect given to criminal convictions in ordinary civil cases and in attorney disciplinary cases, might have contemplated the same effect in judicial removal proceedings. [7] Considerations of policy greatly strengthen this conclusion concerning legislative intent. Without question, the most significant goal of judicial removal statutes is the preservation of the public's confidence in the judicial system. See In re Spitalnick, 63 N.J. 429, 431-32 (1973); Nicholson v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 50 N.Y. 2d 597, 608, 409 N.E. 2d 818, 822, 431 N.Y.S. 2d 340, 345 (1980); In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 300-302, 245 S.E. 2d 766, 772 (1978); In re Heuermann, 90 S.D. 312, 240 N.W. 2d 603, 608 (1976). That confidence is shaken when a judge commits an offense that subjects him or her to removal; the removal proceedings are designed to restore faith. The acquittal by this Court of a judge previously convicted by a jury would have a shattering impact on that faith. The incomprehensible scene of a unanimous conviction by twelve of his peers, after a trial in which the judge is afforded every conceivable protection, followed by an acquittal by this Court, perhaps by a 4-3 vote, would overwhelm all attempts at analysis or justification. The niceties of distinctions between a jury and this Court would be totally lost by the public. Nor would matters be helped when our order permitting the resumption of his judicial functions was delivered to the place where he was serving his prison sentence. The public might conclude that the judge succeeded where he had previously failed because the jury was composed of citizens and the Court composed of judges. In our view, the Legislature would never countenance even the possibility of such a result. The situation might conceivably be different if some significant new evidence were to be discovered after conviction and after all appeals had been exhausted, or if the underlying proceedings had been clearly contaminated by fraud or criminality on the part of the prosecution, the judge, or the jury, or something of that kind. But there is nothing of that even remotely suggested here. All we have is the contention that, as a matter of law, the statute requires a completely independent proceeding, a full and new trial before the Supreme Court, and, presumably, a total disregard of the prior conviction by the jury. For the reasons stated above, we disagree. In these proceedings the conviction is conclusive as to guilt and as to all facts on which it is based. [8] Respondent's contention that this Court should disqualify itself in toto requires only a brief response. First of all, we doubt that the New Jersey Constitution in granting the power of removal to the Supreme Court (art. VI, § VI, para. 4) intended the power to be exercised by a court composed exclusively of judges of other courts. We suspect that even if grounds existed for disqualification of the entire Court, the rule of necessity would nevertheless require that the entire Court hear the matter. See Traction Co. v. Board of Public Works, 56 N.J.L. 431, 439-40 (Sup.Ct. 1894); New Jersey State Bar v. New Jersey Ass'n of Realtor Bds., 118 N.J. Super. 203, 209 (Ch.Div. 1972); accord United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed. 2d 392 (1980). Furthermore, on the merits, there is absolutely nothing here that would require anyone to be disqualified. Respondent's counsel points to the language of the initial complaint, filed by the Court, which, in conclusory terms, alleges that respondent is guilty of bribery. The difference between such formal allegations contained in a complaint and the assertion of a belief by this Court or any of its members in the facts alleged is too obvious to require further comment. This Court prejudged nothing about respondent. We simply reacted, and appropriately we believe, to matters brought to our attention that in our judgment, called for the institution of removal proceedings. The removal statute explicitly authorizes such action. N.J.S.A. 2A:1B-3. The remaining contention of respondent is that one or more members of the Court, perhaps all  the contention is not that specific  should be disqualified for having in some way participated in the prosecution of respondent. His contention rests on his unsupported belief that evidence of Court involvement in his prosecution will turn up, creating an improper appearance of partiality. This proposition is too tenuous to warrant disqualification. Discovery is sought on this issue, the only complaint being that such discovery has been denied the respondent. But no such denial ever occurred, since no such request for discovery was ever made. The first occasion on which it is suggested that such discovery is needed is found in respondent's brief before this Court. That is obviously neither the right time nor place to initiate such a request. Furthermore, where discovery is sought of those holding high office, there must be, at the very least, a solid showing of the need for and relevance of the predicted testimony. Hyland v. Smollok, 137 N.J. Super. 456 (App.Div. 1975), certif. den. 71 N.J. 328 (1976) (request to depose Attorney General denied, absent showing that Attorney General had relevant knowledge and that deposition was essential to prevent injustice). A claim based on the denial of discovery must indicate the matter which the applicant hopes will be developed. Here we have nothing more than the general assertion of some kind of involvement in the prosecution. [9]