Opinion ID: 2823788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing Under the Act

Text: Â¶12Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Petitioners argue that the CSP fails to comport with the Act because it uses public funds to finance private education. See Â§ 22-54-104(1)(a), C.R.S. (2014) (devising a formula to calculate the amount of money awarded to a school district âto fund the costs of providing public educationâ (emphasis added)). In order to mount this challenge, Petitioners must first establish that they have standing to sue under the Act.Â See Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo. 2004) (âStanding is a threshold issue that must be satisfied in order to decide a case on the merits.â). After scrutinizing the Act and reviewing our case law, we conclude that Petitioners lack such standing.
Â¶13Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Standing is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 856.
Â¶14Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In order to establish standing to sue, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First, he must show that he suffered an injury in fact; second, he must demonstrate that his injury pertains to a legally protected interest. Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (Colo. 1977). Assuming, without deciding, that Petitioners here have alleged an injury in fact, we consider whether that injury implicates a legally protected interest. Â¶15Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In the statutory context, whether the plaintiffâs alleged injury involves a legally protected interest turns on âwhether the plaintiff has a claim for relief underâ the statute at issue. Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856. Generally, if the legislature âenact[s] a particular administrative remedy to redress a statutory violation,â that decision âis consistent with a legislative intent to preclude a private civil remedy for breach of the statutory duty.â Allstate Ins. Co. v. Parfrey, 830 P.2d 905, 910 (Colo. 1992). But if the statute âis totally silent on the matter of remedy,â then the court âmust determine whether a private civil remedy reasonably may be implied.â Id. To answer this question, the court must examine three factors: (1) âwhether the plaintiff is within the class of persons intended to be benefitted by the legislative enactmentâ; (2) âwhether the legislature intended to create, albeit implicitly, a private right of actionâ; andÂ (3) âwhether an implied civil remedy would be consistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme.â Id. at 911. 9 Â¶16Â Â Â Â Â Â Â With these principles in mind, we now address whether the Act confers a legally protected interest upon Petitioners.
Â¶17Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In order for the Act to confer a legally protected interest, it must authorize a claim for relief, either expressly or impliedly. Petitioners concede that the Act does not explicitly permit a private right of action. The question, then, is whether we can infer such a right from the legislatureâs intent. We conclude that we cannot. Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â Â Â At the outset, we reject Respondentsâ contention that the Act houses an âextensive remedial systemâ that automatically forecloses a private right of action. It is true that, where a statute features particular remedies, we will not imply additional remedies. See, e.g., Capital Sec. of Am., Inc. v. Griffin, 2012 CO 39, Â¶Â¶ 2â3, 278 P.3d 342, 343 (holding that the legislature did not intend to imply a disgorgement remedy for violation of a securities statute because the âstatutory scheme adopted by the General Assembly expressly sets forth a number of [other] remediesâ); Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp.Â v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 925 (Colo. 1997) (holding that, because an oil and gas statute only authorized suits for injunctive relief, the legislature affirmatively âchose not to include a private remedy in damagesâ and that âwe will not infer such a remedyâ); Bd.Â of Cnty. Commârs v. Moreland, 764 P.2d 812, 818 (Colo. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff could not sue for violation of a building code in part because different remedies were âspecifically provided by the statute authorizing enactment ofâ the code). But here, the Act features no such explicit remedies. The only language in the Act tangentially relating to the subject of remedy appears in section 22-54-120(1), C.R.S. (2014), which provides that the State Board âshall make reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the administration and enforcementâ of the Act. This is generalized language that in no way articulates a particularized enforcement scheme. As such, the Act is materially different from, for example, a statute that authorizes a public entity that purchased unlawful securities to âforce the seller to repurchase the securities,â Griffin, Â¶ 22, 278 P.3d at 346, or a statute that âclearly permits a private party to seek injunctive reliefâ for violation of an oil and gas statute, Gerrity Oil, 946 P.2d at 925. 10 Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because the Act features no explicit remedies, we must turn to the three Parfrey factors. Supra Â¶ 15. First, it is clear that Petitioners are âwithin the class of personsÂ intended to be benefittedâ by the Act. See Parfrey, 830 P.2d at 911. The Act formally declares that it is designed âto provide for a thorough and uniform system of public schools throughout the stateâ in accordance with article IX, section 2 of the Colorado Constitution. Â§ 22-54-102(1), C.R.S. (2014). That constitutional provision guarantees that âall [school-age] residents of the state . . . may be educated gratuitously.â Colo. Const. art. IX, Â§ 2. Petitioners are school-age Douglas County children (and their parents), and the Act operates to ensure that they may receive a free public education. Thus, they are the Actâs intended beneficiaries. Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â Â Â But the second factorââwhether the legislature intended to create, albeit implicitly, a private right of action,â Parfrey, 830 P.2d at 911âis where Petitionersâ claim falters. As we have made clear, âwe will not infer a private right of action based on a statutory violation unless we discern a clear legislative intent to create such a cause of action.â Gerrity Oil, 946 P.2d at 923 (emphasis added). Here, nothing in the Act suggests that the General Assembly intended to allow private parties to redress violations of the statute in court. To the contrary, the Act instructs the State Board to âmake reasonable rules and regulationsâ to enforce its provisions. Â§ 22-54-120(1). Although this language does not affirmatively create an administrative remedy, see supra Â¶ 18, it nevertheless indicates that the General Assembly contemplated providing a private remedy but ultimately refused to do so, choosing instead to entrust enforcement to the State Board. Cf. Gerrity Oil, 946 P.2d at 925 n.6 (âInferring a private cause of action . . . every time a person violates the [Oil and Gas Conservation] Act or rules issued thereunder would also be inconsistent with the clear legislative intent thatÂ the [Oil and Gas Conservation] [C]ommission have primary responsibility for enforcing the Actâs provisions.â (emphasis added)). Therefore, the Act manifests the General Assemblyâs intent that the State Boardânot private citizensâbe responsible for ensuring its lawful implementation. 11 Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Similarly, the third factorââwhether an implied civil remedy would be consistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme,â Parfrey, 830 P.2d at 911âalso militates against inferring a private right of action. Again, the overarching purpose of the Act is to fulfill Coloradoâs constitutional mandate to provide free public education to school-age children. See Colo. Const. art. IX, Â§ 2; Â§ 22-54-102(1). This is a duty of obvious importance, and its execution necessarily requires both the State Board and the Colorado Department of Education (âthe Departmentâ) to craft complicated procedures and devise detailed funding formulae. See, e.g., Â§ 22-54-106.5(2), C.R.S. (2014) (directing the Department to calculate an amount to be kept in âfiscal emergency restricted reserveâ); Â§ 22-54-114(2), C.R.S. (2014) (requiring the Department to determine funding requirements for each school district); Â§ 22-54-117(1)(a), C.R.S. (2014) (authorizing the State Board to approve payments from the âcontingency reserveâ); Â§ 22-54-129(6)(a), C.R.S. (2014) (instructing the State Board to âpromulgate rulesâ to effectuate the funding of facility schools). Because both agencies must engage in myriad tasks, theyÂ require a degree of flexibility for the Act to function properly. Allowing citizen suits would severely impede this complex process, thereby thwarting the purpose of the legislative scheme. It is inevitable that some members of the public will disapprove of any given government action. But that disapproval does not justify allowing private parties to sue the State Board and the Department for every perceived violation of the Act. Were that the case, these agencies would be paralyzed with litigation from dissatisfied constituents, crippling their effectiveness. Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Finally, we reject Petitionersâ argument that they have taxpayer standing. Generally speaking, taxpayer standing âflows from an âeconomic interest in having [the taxpayerâs] tax dollars spent in a constitutional manner.ââ Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 2014 CO 77, Â¶ 11 n.10, 338 P.3d 1002, 1007 n.10 (alteration in original) (quoting Conrad v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982)). Thus, although we have recognized that Colorado permits âbroad taxpayer standing,â Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856, the doctrine typically applies when plaintiffs allege constitutional violations. See, e.g., Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 247 (Colo. 2008) (holding that the plaintiffs had âtaxpayer standing to challenge the constitutionality of [governmental] transfers of moneyâ (emphasis added)); Conrad, 656 P.2d at 668 (recognizing taxpayer standing because âthe plaintiffs [have] alleged injury flowing from governmental violations of constitutional provisions that specifically protect the legal interests involvedâ (emphasis added)). 12 Expanding taxpayer standing to casesÂ where a plaintiff alleges that the government violated a statuteâas Petitioners seek to do hereâwould effectively nullify the enduring requirement that the statute actually authorizes a claim for relief. See Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856. This in turn would render superfluous Parfreyâs well-settled three-factor test for divining whether the General Assembly intended to imply a private right of action into a statute. We thus decline to endorse Petitionersâ broad and novel conception of taxpayer standing. 13 Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In sum, we conclude that the General Assembly did not intend to imply a private right of action into the Act and that such a remedy would be inconsistent with the Actâs legislative scheme. Therefore, Petitioners cannot state a claim for relief under the Act, meaning it does not furnish them with a legally protected interest, one of the two prerequisites for standing. See Wimberly, 570 P.2d at 539. Accordingly, we hold that Petitioners lack standing to challenge the CSP under the Act. Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because Petitioners lack standing, we need not consider whether the CSP in fact fails to comply with the Act. Instead, we now turn to whether the CSP violates article IX, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution.