Opinion ID: 2633554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unlawful Termination: Disparate Treatment Claim

Text: ¶ 15 In Washington, an employer generally has the common law right to terminate an employee for no cause, good cause or even cause morally wrong without fear of liability. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). The WLAD represents a statutory exception to this rule barring race, sex, disability, and other enumerated characteristics from providing a basis for hiring or discharge. [4] ¶ 16 As applicable here, the WLAD forbids an employer from discharging an employee because of the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability. RCW 49.60.180(2). The WLAD also forbids an employer from discriminating against an employee in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of any sensory, mental, or physical disability. RCW 49.60.180(3). RCW 49.60.180(1) prohibits refusing to hire on the same grounds. ¶ 17 The legislature first enacted the WLAD in 1949 to eliminate racial discrimination in employment. See LAWS OF 1949, ch. 183; REM. REV. STAT. § 7614 (Supp. 1949). The statute was extended to prohibit discrimination against handicapped persons in 1973. See LAWS OF 1973, 1st ex. sess., ch. 214. ¶ 18 The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 701), a precursor to the federal ADA, was passed in the same year. When the federal ADA was adopted in 1990, it used the term disability instead of handicapped. We have concluded that the use of the term disability has evolved to the point that its definition in the federal statute and in Washington's should be the same. ¶ 19 In 1993, the legislature amended the WLAD, replacing all uses of the term handicap with the term disability. See LAWS OF 1993, ch. 510. In our jurisprudence the terms handicap and disability are interchangeable. Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wash.2d 172, 191 n. 17, 23 P.3d 440 (2001). ¶ 20 The WLAD makes it unlawful for an employer, [t]o expel from membership any person because of age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability .... RCW 49.60.190(2). These provisions give rise to disability discrimination claims under two theoriesdisparate treatment and failure to accommodate. `An employer who discharges, reassigns, or harasses for a discriminatory reason faces a disparate treatment claim; an employer who fails to accommodate the employee's disability, faces an accommodation claim.' Pulcino, 141 Wash.2d at 640, 9 P.3d 787 (quoting Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 97 Wash. App. 657, 667, 986 P.2d 137 (1999).) ¶ 21 Of central importance here, the legislature has never found it necessary to define the terms handicap or disability within the WLAD. [5] Unfortunately, and with confusing result, applications of the same term disability have led to different definitions, depending on type of claim. We shall attempt to reconcile these differences. ¶ 22 In 1975, however, the Washington State Human Rights Commission (HRC) did adopt a regulation to define handicap, which it later amended several times. As amended, the regulation provides that: (1) Disability is short for the statutory term the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, except when it appears as part of the full term. (2) The presence of a sensory, mental, or physical disability includes, but is not limited to, circumstances where a sensory, mental, or physical condition: (a) Is medically cognizable or diagnosable; (b) Exists as a record or history; (c) Is perceived to exist whether or not it exists in fact. A condition is a sensory, mental, or physical disability if it is an abnormality and is a reason why the person having the condition did not get or keep the job in question, or was denied equal pay for equal work, or was discriminated against in other terms and conditions of employment, or was denied equal treatment in other areas covered by the statutes. In other words, for enforcement purposes a person will be considered to be disabled by a sensory, mental, or physical condition if he or she is discriminated against because of the condition and the condition is abnormal. WAC 162-22-020 (emphasis added) (codifying as amended HRC Order 23, § 162-22-020 (filed July 21, 1975)). This WAC was flawed (as well as unduly complicated). ¶ 23 Just one year later, this court did not utilize this HRC definition of handicap in deciding a vagueness challenge to RCW 49.60.180. [6] See Chic., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Wash. State Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash.2d 802, 805-06, 557 P.2d 307 (1976). This court relied on the plain and ordinary meaning of the term handicap as set forth in the dictionary. A disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult; esp : a physical disability that limits the capacity to work. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1026 (1961). ¶ 24 Nearly 20 years later, we again expressly acknowledged that the HRC regulation was problematic. Doe v. Boeing Co., 121 Wash.2d 8, 15, 846 P.2d 531 (1993). We specifically noted that the regulation was circular: it required a factual finding that the plaintiff was discriminated against  because of the condition in order to determine whether the condition is a `handicap.' Id. ¶ 25 In Pulcino, seven years later, we concluded that the circularity of WAC 162-22-020 rendered it unworkable in the context of accommodation cases. We reasoned that [t]he employee would ... have to prove that the employer failed to accommodate the employee (i.e., discriminated against him or her) because of the employee's abnormal condition. This implies that the employer accommodates other employees; but, obviously, employees who are not disabled do not require such accommodation. Pulcino, 141 Wash.2d at 641, 9 P.3d 787. ¶ 26 Accordingly, Pulcino defined disability to require a claimant to prove that (1) he or she has or had a sensory, mental, or physical abnormality, and (2) the abnormality has or had a substantially limiting effect on his or her ability to perform the job. Id. We further provided that [a]n employee can show that he has a sensory, mental or physical abnormality, by showing that he or she has a condition that is medically cognizable or diagnosable, or exists as a record or history. Id. ¶ 27 A year later in Hill, we reinforced our reasoning in Pulcino, observing that the circularity of WAC 162-22-020 makes it impossible for plaintiffs to satisfy their first intermediate evidentiary burden without simultaneously producing evidence in support of their ultimate allegation, namely, that the adverse action occurred because of that alleged disability. Hill, 144 Wash.2d at 192 n. 19, 23 P.3d 440. While acknowledging that the case did not require us to decide whether Pulcino should be applied to all disability discrimination cases, we noted that we were greatly troubled by WAC 162-22-020, seeing no principled reason why it should be fundamentally harder to establish prima facie cases of disability discrimination under RCW 49.60.180 than prima facie cases of any other form of discrimination made unlawful by [the WLAD]. Hill, 144 Wash.2d at 192 n. 19, 23 P.3d 440. [7] It appears that we would have applied a single definition to both claims had Hill properly preserved her disparate treatment claim. Id. at 193 n. 20, 23 P.3d 440. ¶ 28 The most obvious problem with WAC 162-22-020 is that its definition of disability is at odds with the plain meaning of the term. Where, as here, a statute fails to define a term, rules of statutory construction require us to give the term its plain and ordinary meaning, which we derive from a standard dictionary if possible. Schrom v. Bd. for Volunteer Fire Fighters, 153 Wash.2d 19, 28, 100 P.3d 814 (2004). See also One Pac. Towers Homeowners' Ass'n v. HAL Real Estate Invs., Inc., 148 Wash.2d 319, 330, 61 P.3d 1094 (2002) (stating that we should also keep in mind the context of the statute as a whole and the intent of the legislature). ¶ 29 Bearing this in mind, we earlier relied on the plain meaning of the term handicap in rejecting a vagueness challenge to RCW 49.60.180: Men of common intelligence need not guess at the meaning of handicap because it has a well defined usage measured by common practice and understanding. Handicap commonly connotes a condition that prevents normal functioning in some way. A person with a handicap does not enjoy, in some manner, the full and normal use of his sensory, mental, or physical faculties. A handicap is: ... a disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult; esp: a physical disability that limits the capacity to work.  Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961). It is obvious that handicap has a well understood, common meaning. Men of ordinary intelligence undoubtedly can understand what constitutes a handicap within the context of RCW 49.60.180(1).... Chic., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 87 Wash.2d at 805-06, 557 P.2d 307 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). ¶ 30 The 1993 substitution of disability for handicap in the WLAD did not change this common sense conclusion. Disability means the inability to do something. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 642 (2002). Specifically, it includes a physical or mental illness, injury, or condition that incapacitates in any way. Id. Given this definition, a disability discrimination claimant should be required to show that his condition substantially limited his ability to perform something before he is deemed disabled under the WLAD. McClarty, 119 Wash.App. at 470, 81 P.3d 901. The United States Supreme Court has come to the same conclusion. ¶ 31 That the regulation definition of disability contravenes the purpose of the WLAD was not the only problem. WAC 162-22-020 also conflicts with much of our antidiscrimination jurisprudence because the regulation would require a disability discrimination plaintiff to prove that he has been discriminated against because of his condition to prove that he is disabled in the first place. As acknowledged in the Court of Appeals decision below, this requirement destroys the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme because it forces a plaintiff to prove the ultimate fact of discrimination simply to make a prima facie case. McClarty, 119 Wash.App. at 467, 81 P.3d 901. See also Hill, 144 Wash.2d at 192 n. 19, 23 P.3d 440. ¶ 32 This burden violates the legislature's command that the provisions of the WLAD be liberally construed, RCW 49.60.020, and is inconsistent with the burdens placed upon plaintiffs in other types of discrimination cases. See, e.g., Hill, 144 Wash.2d at 181, 23 P.3d 440 (noting that a prima facie case of racial discrimination requires plaintiff to show simply, inter alia, that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority.). ¶ 33 This analysis requires us to discard the regulation definition, as we did in Pulcino and Hill. Cf. In re Parentage of C.A.M.A., 154 Wash.2d 52, 67, 109 P.3d 405 (2005); Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wash.2d 58, 69-70, 922 P.2d 788 (1996). ¶ 34 Previous definition efforts have also failed because they result in defining disability to include any medically cognizable abnormality. Such a definition is far broader than the plain and ordinary meaning of the term disability and cannot be supported by the text of the statute or the history underlying it. ¶ 35 The WLAD speaks in terms of disability, not of medical condition. Cf. Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 101-02 (2000). [8] Furthermore, `[i]t is doubtful that any legislature intended, or even envisioned, that its handicapped discrimination laws would be interpreted to address the problems associated with a sprained finger or ankle.' Pulcino, 141 Wash.2d at 661-62, 9 P.3d 787 (Madsen, J., dissenting) (quoting 3A ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 107.32(c), at 22-131 (1991)). [9] Illustrating this point, counsel for amicus Washington Employment Lawyers' Association (WELA) conceded at argument that, under the definition in WAC 162-22-020, a receding hairline could constitute a disability. See Wash. State Supreme Court oral argument at 55:30, McClarty v. Totem Elec., No. 75024-6 (Jan. 19, 2005), audio recording by TVW, Washington State's Public Affairs Network, available at http://www.tvw.org. Such an extension trivializes the discrimination suffered by persons with disabilities. Pulcino, 141 Wash.2d at 652, 9 P.3d 787 (Madsen, J., dissenting). ¶ 36 The Pulcino definition also had difficulties. As McClarty and WELA argue, some obviously disabled, e.g. the blind or the paraplegic, may not be considered disabled under a strict reading of the Pulcino definition. They suggest, for example, that a paraplegic applying for a position that did not require mobility might not be considered disabled under Pulcino because the medical condition would not have a substantially limiting effect on his ability to perform that job. In addition, beyond defining disability, Pulcino may confusingly conflate the concept of disability with elements of a failure to accommodate claim. As a result, it is difficult to apply the Pulcino definition outside the accommodation context. ¶ 37 It is true that a court will often give weight to a statute's interpretation by the agency which is charged with its administration. Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash.2d 97, 111, 922 P.2d 43 (1996). However, this court has the ultimate authority to construe statutes, Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc. v. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 123 Wash.2d 621, 627, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994), and statutes must be given a rational and sensible interpretation, State v. Thomas, 121 Wash.2d 504, 512, 851 P.2d 673 (1993). WAC 166-22-020(2) is not a rational and sensible interpretation of the term disability as it is used in the WLAD, and we reject it in favor of a definition better supported by the WLAD's text, the legislature's intent and our jurisprudence. ¶ 38 To provide a single definition of disability that can be applied consistently throughout the WLAD, we adopt the definition of disability set forth in the federal ADA. We hold that a plaintiff bringing suit under the WLAD establishes that he has a disability if he has (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities, (2) a record of such an impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. ¶ 39 This court has held that federal law is instructive with regard to our state discrimination laws. Dedman v. Pers. Appeals Bd., 98 Wash.App. 471, 478, 989 P.2d 1214 (1999). See also Clarke v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412, 106 Wash.2d 102, 118, 720 P.2d 793 (1986); Dean v. Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 104 Wash.2d 627, 638, 708 P.2d 393 (1985). Additionally, this court has previously used definitions given by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to define the ADA when deciding questions of Washington discrimination law. See Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 149 Wash.2d 521, 70 P.3d 126 (2003). See also Herring v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 81 Wash.App. 1, 914 P.2d 67 (1996); Dedman, 98 Wash.App. 471, 989 P.2d 1214. ¶ 40 A physical or mental impairment that is substantially limiting impairs a person's ability to perform tasks that are central to a person's everyday activities, thus are major life activities. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). The United States Supreme Court has held that substantially limited means `[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform' id. at 195, 122 S.Ct. 681 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2001)) and defined major life activities as those activities that are of central importance to daily life. Id. at 197, 122 S.Ct. 681. ¶ 41 Several considerations support the definition we give here. First, and most importantly, it is consistent with the plain meaning of the term disability as utilized by the legislature and the history underlying the WLAD. Second, it accords closely with the definition of the same term disability in the federal ADA. This is appropriate, given that the original federal and Washington laws against disability discrimination were enacted nearly contemporaneously and directed at the same issue. See also Clarke, 106 Wash.2d at 118, 720 P.2d 793 (when Washington statutes or regulations have the same purpose as their federal counterparts, we will look to federal decisions to determine the appropriate construction.). [10] [11] Finally, the proposed definition would ensure that scarce judicial resources are available to those most in need of the WLAD's protections, rather than persons with receding hairlines. This definition should avoid trivializ[ing] the discrimination suffered by persons with disabilities. Pulcino, 141 Wash.2d at 652, 9 P.3d 787 (Madsen, J., dissenting). ¶ 42 We remand to the trial court to apply this definition to McClarty's disparate treatment claim.