Opinion ID: 1401979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Maintenance Award Must Be Reconsidered.

Text: We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the parties' disparate post-divorce circumstances require reconsideration of the family court's maintenance award. Maintenance awards are governed by KRS 403.200, which provides in pertinent part that the court may grant a maintenance order only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance: (a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to h[er], to provide for h[er] reasonable needs; and (b) Is unable to support h[er]self through appropriate employment. As this Court has noted, our statutory scheme envisions post-divorce rehabilitation: KRS 403.200 seeks to enable the unemployable spouse to acquire the skills necessary to support himself or herself in the current workforce so that he or she does not rely upon the maintenance of the working spouse indefinitely. Powell v. Powell, 107 S.W.3d 222, 224 (Ky. 2003). Accordingly, in fixing the amount and duration of an award, the trial court is directed to consider all relevant factors including: (a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to h[er], and h[er] ability to meet h[er] needs independently, . . . ; (b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment; (c) The standard of living established during the marriage; (d) the duration of the marriage; (e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and (f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance. KRS 403.200(2). We have recognized, however, that the statutory goal of rehabilitation will not always be attainable: [I]n situations where the marriage was long term, the dependent spouse is near retirement age, the discrepancy in incomes is great, or the prospects for self-sufficiency appear dismal, our courts have declined to follow that policy [rehabilitation] and have instead awarded maintenance for a longer period or in greater amounts. Powell, 107 S.W.3d at 224. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this may be such a case. While we cannot and do not say that the trial court's original maintenance award amounted to an abuse of discretion, our ruling that the parties' incomes must be redetermined and our clarification of the fact that George's continued benefit from the partnership realty is a factor bearing on the maintenance determination change the landscape enough to require that the maintenance award be revisited. On remand, accordingly, the trial court must again determine a suitable amount and duration of maintenance.