Opinion ID: 2959641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Post-Verdict Motions

Text: On October 19, 2009, the Plaintiffs and Akron filed post-judgment motions. The Plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment, requesting additional relief: (1) back pay calculated through the date of judgment or promotion; (2) “grossing up” for tax liability on the wages paid in a lump sum; (3) prejudgment interest; (4) permanent injunctive relief in the form of a promotion for any prevailing plaintiff electing to be promoted; (5) pension adjustments; (6) post-judgment interest from the date of judgment until payment; (7) a posthumous promotion and adjustment for Crawford; (8) permanent injunctive relief in the form of a new equitable, valid promotional process; (9) appointment of a receiver to oversee the development of a new promotional process; (10) court monitoring until all issues related to the case are fully resolved; and (11) “any other relief as set forth in Plaintiffs’ motions for equitable relief.” R. 280 at 1–2 (Pls.’ Rule 59(e) Mot. to Amend. J.) (Page ID #7756–57). Akron filed two motions: A renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, new trial, or remittitur pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b) and 59; and a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, new trial, or remittitur. See R. 282 (Def.’s Renewed Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law “JMOL” or Mot. for a New Trial, or Remittitur) (Page ID #7761–69); R. 283 (Def.’s Rule 59(e) Mot. to Amend J. or Mot. for New Trial, or Remittitur on Pls.’ Title VII Claims) (Page ID #7771–74). Akron argued, inter alia, that the evidence of adverse impact was insufficient. To this end, Akron argued four theories. First, Akron argued that the disparities between the various groups who went through the promotion process were not statistically significant. Second, Akron asserted that pass rates were the appropriate measure of adverse impact—not promotion rates—and the evidence did not support a finding that there was Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 9 a four-fifths-rule violation2 when the experts compared the different pass rates of each group. R. 285 at 11–14 (Def.’s Mem. in Support of JMOL) (Page ID #7788–91). Third, Akron also faulted the Plaintiffs for failing to introduce statistical evidence other than a violation of the four-fifths rule and argued that evidence of a violation of the four-fifths rule was insufficient because the sample size was small. Id. at 16–19, 22–24 (Page ID #7793–96, 7800–01). Finally, Akron complained that the Plaintiffs had not established that Akron was an “unusual employer,” i.e., an employer who discriminates against the majority. See id. at 14–16 (Page ID #7791–93). Alternatively, Akron asserted that it was entitled to a new trial because the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence and the district court made legal errors and admitted certain evidence in error. R. 282 at 7–8 (Def.’s Renewed Mot. for JMOL, New Trial, or Remittitur) (Page ID #7767–68); R. 283 at 3 (Def.’s Rule 59(e) Mot. to Alter or Amend J., New Trial, or Remittitur) (Page ID #7773). Akron also sought a new trial on the issue of damages for two reasons. First, Akron argued that the lock-step damages award for each class of plaintiff was inconsistent with the Plaintiffs’ testimony about their individual damages. R. 285 at 27 (Def.’s Br. in Support of JMOL or Mot. for New Trial) (Page ID #7804). Second, Akron asserted that the jury had not considered that not all of the Plaintiffs would have been promoted had the process been fair. Id. (citing Biondo v. City of Chi., 382 F.3d 680, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2004)). On December 30, 2010, the district court filed a memorandum opinion granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiffs’ and Akron’s Rule 59(e) motions to amend the judgment, denying Akron’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and granting in part Akron’s motion for a new trial on the issue of damages alone. See R. 311 at 1–2 (D. Ct. Mem. Op.) (Page ID #16399–16400). First, the district court concluded that Akron had waived its argument that promotion rates were not an appropriate metric to use because Akron had not advanced this argument in its pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 16–17 (Page ID #16414–15). In the alternative, however, the district court held that promotion rates were 2 The four-fifths rule provides that “[a] selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact.” 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D). Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 10 appropriate criteria for application of the four-fifths rule in a case challenging promotion policies. Id. at 18 (Page ID #16416) (citing Phillips v. Cohen, 400 F.3d 388, 399 (6th Cir. 2005)). Second, the district court found that Akron had “waived” the argument that the Plaintiffs had to prove that Akron is the unusual employer that engages in “reverse discrimination.” Id. at 20–21 (Page ID #16418–19). Although Akron had requested a jury instruction requiring a showing of “background circumstances” that a facially neutral policy adversely impacted the majority, the district court found waiver because Akron had not furthered its argument for the proposed instruction during the charging conference. Id. at 20–21 (Page ID #16418–19) (citing R. 138 at 30 (Proposed Joint Jury Instrs.) (Page ID #3967); R. 148 at 14 (Def.’s Proposed Jury Instrs.) (Page ID #4036); R. 309 at 4–44 (Tr. Trial Vol. 13) (Page ID #16340–80)). Third, the district court rejected Akron’s argument that even if there were violations of the four-fifths rule, the disparities were not statistically significant because of the small size of the sample. Id. at 21– 24 (Page ID #16419–22). When the district court turned to Akron’s motion for a new trial, it rejected the bulk of Akron’s arguments, see id. at 29–34 (Page ID #16427–32), but agreed with Akron that “the jury recognized, but failed to follow, their duty to award damages based on the testimony of the individual Plaintiffs” because the jury had awarded the individual Plaintiffs the same amounts in compensatory damages and front pay, id. at 29 (Page ID #16427) (internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence at trial established that some of the Plaintiffs spent more time preparing for the examinations than other Plaintiffs, and some Plaintiffs failed multiple examinations. Id. at 29–30 (Page ID #16427–28). Accordingly, the district court granted Akron’s motion for a new trial “solely on damages.” Id. at 34 (Page ID #16432). The district court did not address the Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. Soon thereafter, Akron filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment to include a statement seeking certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for one legal question: “Does ‘selection’ refer to pass rates or promotion rates in adverse impact promotional testing cases?” R. 314 at 1 (Def.’s Mot. to Amend J.) (Page ID #8076). The district court denied the motion, in part because it doubted that Akron had preserved the issue, but also Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 11 because Akron had not satisfied the § 1292(b) standard for certification. See R. 324 at 1–4 (D. Ct. Order Re § 1292(b) Certification) (Page ID #8168–71).