Opinion ID: 2076061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the younger children.

Text: In his initial written decision in this case, the trial judge concluded that the other three respondents are neglected in that their sibling, [S.G.], was abused by their father, Mr. [B]; and that under all the circumstances of that abuseand its repetitionthe other three respondents are in imminent danger of similar abuse. Counsel for the stepfather contended on appeal that this finding [8] was insufficiently detailed and, following oral argument, this court remanded the record to the trial court and directed the judge to elaborate upon the basis for his finding of imminent danger. In response to our order, the judge made supplemental findings which included the following: [The stepfather's] abuse of [S.G.] occurred repeatedly over a period of more than a year. It was not an isolated or impulsive incident but rather consisted of a pattern of conduct posing a continuing risk to those who are vulnerable and within the range of danger from such conduct. On at least two occasions, in January of 1987 and in July of 1987, [S.G.] was molested by [the stepfather] while his youngest child, A.B., was in the same room, and on the latter occasion while another child (a visiting friend of [S.G.'s]) was in the same bed. The stepfather thereby demonstrated inability or unwillingness to shelter other children, including his own, from such conduct. The three younger children are respectively six and half years old, eighteen months old and eight months old, and are thus even less capable of protecting themselves than [S.G.] was at the time of the abuse inflicted upon her. The judge also alluded, albeit rather obliquely, to the stepfather's continuous alcohol abuse, violence, and lapses of memory after drinking. [9] This reference to the stepfather's drinking problem was fully supported by the record. S.G. testified that the stepfather drank frequently and was always drunk when he abused her. The mother related that her husband drank continuously, usually beginning before breakfast, and that drinking sometimes made him violent, caused him to fall asleep, and led him to forget events that had occurred. The term neglected child is defined in our statute as including a child who is in imminent danger of being abused and whose sibling [10] has been abused. D.C. Code § 16-2301(9)(E). The plain language of this provision requires the government, when it seeks to invoke this definition, to establish both the abuse of the sibling and imminent danger to the child before a finding of neglect may be made. The statute is thus incompatible with any notion that abuse of one sibling, per se, constitutes neglect of another. In the present case, the government has not alleged any direct abuse of the three younger children, but relies solely on the abuse of S.G. and the surrounding circumstances. The issue now before us is whether there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the judge's finding that these children were in imminent danger of mistreatment. This question is not an easy one. S.G.'s stepfather is the natural father of the three younger children. He is not alleged to have abused them. They were removed from his custody solely on the basis of his conduct vis-a-vis S.G., who was his step-daughter, not his own child. The primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. In re S.K., supra, 564 A.2d at 1390; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1541, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents.... Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); accord, In re N.H., 569 A.2d 1179, 1181-82 (D.C. 1990). Important as these considerations are, however, we have held that in a civil proceeding predicated on alleged child neglect or abuse, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration. In re S.K., supra, 564 A.2d at 1388. Neglect statutes authorizing state intervention on a child's behalf are remedial, and they should be liberally construed to enable the court to carry out its obligations as parens patriae. Id.; see also In re O.L., No. 89-229, slip op. at 8 (D.C. July 10, 1990). Although the precise issue here presented does not appear to have been previously addressed by this court, [11] a substantial number of decisions in other jurisdictions support the proposition that a trial judge may legitimately find, on the basis of a parent's abusive conduct towards one child, that the child's siblings are also in danger of abuse and should be removed from the home for their own safety. Appellate decisions so holding include In re Christina Maria C., 89 A.D.2d 855, 857, 453 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34 (2d Dept.1982) (brutal treatment of seven-year-old boy warranted finding that one-year-old half-sister was likewise in imminent danger of excessive corporal punishment and should be removed from home); In re Edward C., 126 Cal.App.3d 193, 203, 178 Cal.Rptr. 694, 700 (1981) (physical abuse of an eight-year-old girl, Marlee, created unacceptable danger for her brothers, aged nine and six, because the court could reasonably infer that the father, with Marlee removed, would substitute either one or both of the boys as an object of his ruthless drive for religious protection); In re K.D.E., 210 N.W.2d 907, 910 (S.D.1973) (court sustained extreme remedy of termination of parental rights as to brother and sister, [12] though only brother had been physically abused, holding that [w]here the trial court has determined that neglect or abuse exists in regard to one child, it is within its discretion to determine the likelihood of abuse of other children in the same family); In re State ex rel. Thaxton, 220 So.2d 184, 188 (La.1969) (mother's brutal treatment of three-year-old son warranted protective action by the court over younger child as well; the court noted that placement outside home was not necessarily permanent, for custody is always reviewable in matters such as this); In re Phelps, 145 Mont. 557, 402 P.2d 593, 595 (1965) (adoptive parents' physical mistreatment of eleven-year-old boy warranted removal from home of four-year-old girl, where statute authorized such intervention where home was unfit for child by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity of parents). Several decisions by various trial courts also support the approach taken by the trial judge in the present case. In In re Katherine C., 122 Misc.2d 276, 471 N.Y. S.2d 216 (1984), for example, a stepfather had sexually abused a ten-year-old girl over a substantial period, eventually impregnating her at the age of twelve or thirteen. Her mother had failed to prevent the abuse, apparently because she never became aware of it. The court found that the girl's two brothers were also neglected children even though there was no evidence of injury to them. The court explained that the parents' faulty understanding of the duties of parenthood created a substantial risk that the children's mental, emotional and physical condition is in imminent danger of becoming impaired. Id. at 282, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 221. In In re Baby Boy Santos, 71 Misc.2d 789, 336 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1972), a neglect petition had been filed on behalf of a five-day-old boy following the brutal abuse of his 1½-year-old half-sister (who was only eight months old at the time of that abuse). In holding that the boy would be likely to suffer serious harm if placed in the parents' household, the judge wrote that it had been her own experience, as well as [the experience of] authorities in the subject of child abuse, that there is in effect a `child abuse syndrome' and that when one abused child is removed from the home, that another child in the home may become the object of abuse by the parent (Dr. Ray E. Helfer, The Battered Child, Univ.Press 1968), Matter of Abeena H., 64 Misc.2d 965, 316 N.Y.S.2d 16 [1970]. Id. 71 Misc.2d at 791, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 819. [13] In In re J., 71 Misc.2d 47, 335 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1972), the court found that a newborn baby girl was likely to suffer serious harm if placed in the home in which her two sisters had previously been abused. Acknowledging that there was not a scintilla of evidence that the parents had harmed the youngest child, who had indeed never been in their custody, the court reasoned as follows: Experience has shown that a parent who abuses one of his children is likely to abuse his other children. This has become a rule of evidence in child protective proceedings. Accordingly, when an abused child has been removed by a Family Court order from its parents, a social welfare worker or other proper petitioner may file a neglect petition against such parent for the removal of his other children, alleging that such parent is likely to abuse them too. Such petition will not be dismissed as legally insufficient.       In child protective proceedings, by logical extension of the doctrine, it is also the function of the trial court to determine not only whether neglect or far more serious child abuse exists, but that it is likely to exist. The court sitting as parens patriae cannot be limited in this type of proceeding to conditions already existing or which have happened in the past. Indeed, this court could not be fulfilling its proper function if it limited its necessary broad sweeping horizon of child health, safety and welfare to the past and present situation only when the warning flags from the storms of neglect are still flying and, to borrow a familiar saying from another branch of the law, there is abundant evidence of a clear and present danger to children. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470 [1919]. Id. 71 Misc.2d at 791, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 819-20 (emphasis in original). In the present case, the trial judge has found that the sexual abuse of S.G. continued for a substantial period. On two occasions, one of the younger children was present. [14] According to the judge, the stepfather lied about the abuse. His conduct while intoxicated was violent and unpredictable. The judge was in the courtroom and could assess first-hand whether the man before him was a danger to his children; our own vantage point is a great deal more remote. To be sure, one might plausibly argue that, if the stepfather did not abuse his own children before the discovery of his misconduct vis-a-vis S.G., there was no imminent danger that he would abuse them thereafter, but this is a permissible rather than a mandatory inference for the trier of fact. Given all of the circumstances and our limited scope of review, see pp. 774-775, supra, we are not prepared to second-guess the trial judge on a very difficult call. The stepfather argues in his supplemental brief that he was permitted to have supervised visits with the three younger children while the case was pending, that nothing untoward occurred, and that these events are incompatible with a finding that he represented an imminent danger to the children. Subsequently, the father was given supervised visitation rights with his own three children (though not with S.G.) in the trial judge's disposition order, provided that he participated in psychotherapy and in an alcohol treatment program. We think that the judge exercised his discretion judiciously in setting these conditions, and in attempting to maintain a relationship between the three younger children and their father. His authorization of such contacts, as well as the similarly non-punitive approach by the social workers, were altogether consistent with the finding of neglect. That constructive and humane remedial steps were taken does not detract from the seriousness or imminence of the initial danger. As the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated in Thaxton, supra, 220 So.2d at 188, permanent custody of these children is not [necessarily] forever barred to respondent. In In re Edwards, 70 Misc.2d 858, 863, 335 N.Y.S.2d 575, 582 (1972), the court, in ordering the removal of an abused child and his brother from their parents' home, expressed the hope that there could eventually be a joyful reunion of children with the parents.... The walls that are laid in darkness may laugh to the kiss of the sun. The trial court retains jurisdiction of the present case and is in a position to reunite the three younger children with their father or mother or both if it is found to be consistent with the children's best interest for such a step to be taken. Our affirmance of the order on appeal does not restrict the trial court's discretion as to any future steps in this regard. [15]