Opinion ID: 71507
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Employer practices

Text: It shall be unlawful for an employer—
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In its definitions' section, ADEA defines employer in part as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 6 The parties do not dispute that ADEA's employer and employee provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, we agree with the parties that employer and employee provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. For example, if from the face of plaintiff's complaint it is apparent that defendant-employer does not employ more than twenty employees, then a court could dismiss an ADEA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as ADEA only applies to employers who employ twenty or more employees. Accordingly, because the parties agree employer is jurisdictional, we only need to consider if ADEA's employer and employee also provide a basis for plaintiff's substantive claim for relief. calendar year:.... 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), and employee as an individual employed by any employer.... 29 U.S.C. § 630(f). The section provides no further guidance as to the scope of the employee term. Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1495 (11th Cir.1993). From the plain language of the statute, it appears the elements of an ADEA claim under § 623(a)(1) can be summarized as follow, a plaintiff must prove: 1) an employer, 2) failed or refused to hire or to discharge, 3) any individual, 4) with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 5) because of such individual's age. Stated simply, it seems a plaintiff can only recover if he is able to prove an employer discriminated against him/her on the basis of age. In order to determine if a defendant qualifies as an employer and, consequently, whether ADEA will even apply, we must turn to ADEA's definitions' section. In other words, it seems the section of ADEA that provides the substantive relief, § 623, is intertwined and dependent on the section of ADEA that defines the scope of the act, § 630. An analysis of the two sections is circular as the two sections are dependent on one another. For a plaintiff to recover under the act, plaintiff must prove as part of his claim that an employer discriminated against him/her. To prove that a defendant is an employer, a plaintiff must satisfy the definition of employer set forth in § 630(b). In reaching this analysis, we draw comparisons to securities cases, in which this Court has specifically held that the definition of the term security' in the context of a suit based on the federal securities laws may reach the merits of the case and thereby limit the court's discretion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 416 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981); See also Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.1977); Hilgeman v. National Ins. Co. of America, 547 F.2d 298 (5th Cir.1977). For example, in Williamson, plaintiffs, investors in joint venture interests, filed suit pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Acts), alleging that the joint venture interests were securities within the meaning of the Acts. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction finding that the joint venture interests were not securities. The Fifth Circuit reversed. In doing so, it stated, [i]n this case it is clear that the jurisdictional issue reaches the merits of the plaintiffs' case; if the joint venture interests and notes are not securities, there is not only no federal jurisdiction to hear the case but also no federal cause of action on the stated facts. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 416. Since the Court found the issues intertwined, the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper only if plaintiffs' claim was immaterial or insubstantial. Id. In order to determine if the joint venture interests were securities covered by the Acts, the parties and the district court looked to the Acts' definitions of security and the Supreme Court's analysis of securities in Securities & Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90 L.Ed. 1244 (1946). Similarly, in this case, in order to determine if employers and employees are covered by ADEA, we look to ADEA's definitions of the terms and case law interpreting the terms. As the Court found in Williamson, if [Copenhaver/Bell is not an employer,'] there is not only no federal jurisdiction to hear the case but also no federal cause of action on the stated facts. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 416. Although Williamson is helpful in arriving at the conclusion that whether or not one is an employer is an element of an ADEA claim, we are not sure our discussion can end here. As stated earlier, the significance in determining whether being an employer is an element of an ADEA claim is deciding which standard a judge should apply—Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff is more likely to withstand a motion to dismiss and the case is more likely to be decided on the merits by the fact finder. Thus, the ultimate conclusion reached by our holding that whether or not one is an employer is an element of an ADEA claim, is the belief that the jury, rather than the judge, should decide the disputed question. In support of this belief, we draw analogies from Title VII cases and criminal cases within the Eleventh Circuit.7 In interpreting ADEA's definition of employer, Title VII 7 See also Marine Coatings of Alabama, Inc. v. United States, 792 F.2d 1565, 1566-67 (11th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 932 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir.1991) (Admiralty case where this Circuit found that the government's jurisdictional attack under the statute was also an attack on the merits.). cases are helpful. In addition, most of the cases interpreting the definition of employer are found in Title VII cases. The only notable difference between the two statutes' definitions of employer is the number of employees each statute requires. Title VII requires fifteen or more employees, while ADEA requires twenty or more. At a minimum, Title VII cases interpreting the definition of employer are helpful. As the First Circuit has stated: As the substantive provisions of the ADEA were derived in haeca verba from Title VII, (citation omitted), as was the statutory definition of employer, (which relates to the scope of the law's substantive provisions), we may look to the constructions of the term in the Title VII (and thus the NLRA) context for guidance. (citations omitted). Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecuarias de Puerto Rico, 929 F.2d 814, 820 n. 15 (1st Cir.1991). Because there is no real difference (other than numerical) between the definitions in the two statutes, we turn to Title VII cases for guidance. In Virgo v. Riviera Beach Associates, Ltd, 30 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.1994), plaintiff filed suit against several defendants alleging sexual harassment in violation of Title VII and several pendent state law claims. At the time the alleged harassment took place, Title VII did not permit trials by jury. 8 Accordingly, the judge acted as the fact finder and found that one of the defendants was subject to Title VII liability, despite its contention it did not jointly employ fifteen or more employees with another defendant. 8 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which became effective November 21, 1991, liberalized Title VII by creating a right to trial by jury. Goodgame v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 75 F.3d 1516, 1518 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied and reh'g en banc denied, 86 F.3d 1172 (1996). The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court's findings of fact and affirmed. A similar issue has arisen in criminal cases in which this Court has held that where the jurisdictional element is a material element of the crime, the jurisdictional issue should be decided by the jury and not the judge. United States v. Medina, 90 F.3d 459, 463-64 (11th Cir.1996); United States v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 969, 108 S.Ct. 465, 98 L.Ed.2d 404 (1987). For example in Medina, defendants allege the district court erred by deciding as a matter of law that its vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. On appeal, defendants argued that jurisdiction under 46 U.S.C. § 1903(a) was also an element of the offense and should be decided by a jury. The Eleventh Circuit agreed and vacated the district court's order. The Court held that where the jurisdictional requirement is also a substantive element of the crime, the jurisdictional issue should be determined at trial by the fact finder. Medina, 90 F.3d at 463-64. We believe these cases are persuasive in holding that the question of whether or not a defendant is an employer is a substantive element of an ADEA claim and intertwined with the question of jurisdiction. That being the case, the resolution of the question must be made by the fact finder deciding the merits of the claim. Finally, the most convincing argument that the question of employer status is an element of an ADEA claim is the factual situation of the instant case, where both the employer and employee issues are synonymous. In order to determine whether Copenhaver/Bell is an employer, pursuant to ADEA, the Magistrate Judge also indirectly decided that Garcia was not an employee but an independent contractor. When the Magistrate Judge ruled the other subcontracted emergency physicians were independent contractors and Copenhaver/Bell therefore did not employ twenty or more employees, the Magistrate Judge also implicitly found that Garcia was not an employee, but an independent contractor.9 Should we determine that being an employee in this case is an element of an ADEA claim, the Magistrate Judge would seem to be precluded from resolving questions of fact on the employer issue. Stated differently, if the Magistrate Judge were precluded from conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine that Garcia is an employee, then it would seem that the Magistrate Judge also would be equally precluded from concluding that Copenhaver/Bell is an employer. To allow the Magistrate Judge to decide the 9 Given the particular facts in this case, the employer and employee issues are intertwined. This is so, because ADEA's definitions of employer and employee overlap. ADEA's definition of employer contains the following provision twenty or more employees. (emphasis added). Thus, in some instances, in order to determine whether an employer employs twenty or more employees, one must look at ADEA's definition of employee. Conversely, the issues will not be intertwined in a case where it is undisputed that defendant-employer employs twenty or more employees, thus satisfying the jurisdictional employer requirement under ADEA. For instance, in a case where there is a dispute as to whether a certain individual plaintiff, hired by the defendant-employer is an employee rather than an independent contractor and thus able to assert a claim under ADEA, but no dispute as to the status of the defendant-employer, the issues will not be intertwined. See Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1495 n. 13 (11th Cir.1993) (The ADEA does not provide relief for discrimination against an independent contractor.). employer issue, is to allow the judge (and not the jury) to also indirectly decide the employee issue. Of course, this argument is only applicable if we determine that employee is an element of an ADEA claim.