Opinion ID: 1690295
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the conviction of collins was against the overwhelming weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

Text: ¶ 23. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence in the light most consistent with the verdict and give the State all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Corley v. State, 584 So.2d 769, 773 (Miss. 1991). ¶ 24. Collins was charged by the City with wilfully and unlawfully allowing Lakeith Brown, a person under the age of twenty-one years, in Club O'Hara on October 22, 1994. Collins states the evidence proved she was not present when Lakeith entered the Club. She testified that she did not have any intent to allow someone in the Club under the age of twenty-one that night. Collins asserts that a security guard allowed Lakeith to enter the Club, not her. ¶ 25. Collins argues that the City is holding her guilty for the conduct of her hired security guards when they failed to check Lakeith for proper ID on October 22, 1994. Collins recognizes in Mississippi [i]n misdemeanors, all who aid, incite, participate or abet the commission of such crime as well as those who perpetrate same are guilty as principals. State v. Labella, 232 So.2d 354, 355 (Miss. 1970). Collins even states that under Labella, [i]t is not necessary that [a person] be present at the commission of the crime. Id. ¶ 26. Lastly, Collins argues that she should not be found criminally liable for negligently training her security guards. She states that she could not be found guilty of negligent training or supervision of her employees when the ordinance under which she was charged required her to possess a criminal intent. Collins asserts that in order to sustain the conviction, the City had to prove that she possessed either actual intent or constructive intent. City of Jackson v. Gordon, 119 Miss. 325, 80 So. 785, 785 (1919). ¶ 27. Under the common law, proof of criminal intent is a necessary element in the prosecution of every criminal case, (except those offenses which are merely malum prohibitum). Lee v. State, 244 Miss. 813, 146 So.2d 736, 738 (1962). This Court has stated that intent to commit a crime is not required, but rather the mere intent to commit the act is sufficient where certain acts have been enumerated unlawful by statute. Although it may be said that intent is a necessary element of all crimes, this does not necessarily connote conscious wrongdoing. There are statutory crimes in which the law categorically forbids certain acts without regard to the state of mind of the actor. In that instance the intent to do the act is only element necessary to complete the offense. The Legislature may define a crime which depends on no mental element and consists only of forbidden acts or omissions. Boone v. State, 291 So.2d 182, 186 (Miss. 1974) (internal citations omitted). ¶ 28. This Court has said that the intent to do the forbidden act is the only intent necessary to complete the offense. Roberson v. State, 501 So.2d 398, 401 (Miss. 1987). This Court allows statutes to classify conduct as unlawful, and the same can be said for ordinances. In the case sub judice the ordinance made it unlawful to allow any person under the age of twenty-one years inside a premises licensed to sell beer where beer is permitted to be consumed. Lakeith was allowed to enter into the premises by one of the security guards at the Club. ¶ 29. As Collins concedes, all who aid, incite, participate or abet in the commission of a misdemeanor are guilty as principles. Labella, 232 So.2d at 355. Collins was charged by the City as a principle in the offense in question because she was the permit holder of an establishment that sold beer at retail and allowed persons under twenty-one years of age to be present where beer was consumed. ¶ 30. Collins culpability is established by the following excerpts from her crossexamination testimony at trial. Q. Now who holds the retail permit to sell beer for the Club O'Hara? A. Myself. Q. And who is responsible for making sure that the Club O'Hara is run properly? A. Myself. Q. And who is responsible for hiring the people that check the I.D.s and provide the security? A. Myself. Q. And who is  was responsible for telling those people that if you have a question about this person, check his I.D.? A. Myself. ¶ 31. Collins further stated on cross-examination that every patron did not have to be checked for proper identification. Q. And the fact that he got by was because of your instructions and your instructions as the owner of the permit, the owner of the Club, the instructions you gave your personnel, if you don't think he looks twenty-one  I mean, if you think he looks twenty-one or older, it's okay. A. Not saying it so bluntly. I'm saying every single person that comes through the door, if you know that they are twenty-one or older, you don't have to, you know, bother to identify them by asking for their I.D. So, I try to take the proper channel for keeping this  this under  this under twenty-one age limit at a minimum. Had I known that my security guard would have taken the wrong judgment that night, I don't know if I could have avoided it, but if it wasn't him, it could have been someone else. It could have been just for say you or me  me or someone else thinking well she don't look, ah, twenty-one and ask her for an I.D., but on the other hand, I don't think I need to ask her for an I.D. because she looks twenty-one. But you can't  you can't go on a guess always. But, you know, you don't want to  if you  and, you know, more or less say got a lobby full of people and you're trying to be impartial to everybody, you don't just want to single out every single person. I mean, he can. He did what he was told to do. But, you know, next time he  he just judges for himself. (emphasis added). ¶ 32. In Cuevas, this Court stated that [m]inority was easily determined by the dispenser of intoxicants. Cuevas, 498 So.2d at 348. The ordinance stated that no one under twenty-one years of age was permitted in an establishment that had an on-premises retail beer permit, where beer was consumed. Had Collins required all of her patrons to be checked for proper identification prior to their entering her Club, she could have prevented this violation of the ordinance. It is inconceivable to this Court why Collins would have required all of her patrons to be scanned for weapons, but not checked for proper identification. ¶ 33. It is clear from the record before this Court that the acts of Collins allowed Lakeith Brown to enter Club O'Hara on October 22, 1994. This Court has stated it will not order a new trial unless the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow the verdict to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Corley, 584 So.2d at 773. Given the evidence in the record presented to the lower court and on appeal before this Court, we hold that the verdict was legitimate. Therefore, the lower court verdict should stand and is affirmed by this Court.