Opinion ID: 1298515
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Resolution of the sanction issue.

Text: We have concluded that censure is entirely inappropriate in this case. As noted previously, a judge is guilty of serious misconduct when he commits the very offense for which he is called on to judge and sentence others. Nor do we believe it appropriate to treat a judge's possession of marijuana with a mere reprimand or slap on the hand. We are aware we have perhaps been less severe than appropriate in past treatment of serious offenses  sexual harassment in Ackel and driving under the influence in Biggins. Both of those cases, however, involved non-lawyers elected as justices of the peace. Respondent is a merit selection judge, constitutionally given special protection. See generally arts. 6 and 6.1. We believe he and others in that position should be held to a higher standard than elected, non-lawyers who hold a judicial or quasi-judicial office. Finally, we believe a sanction more serious than censure is required considering the Texas court's finding that respondent's possession was knowing and intentional. For the reasons stated, we deem censure too mild a sanction.
Many of the factors already discussed in this opinion militate against imposing the sanction of removal from office. Among these factors are the following: 1. The possession was evidently for personal use. 2. The judge's previous record in the armed services, at the bar, and in the judiciary. 3. The position of the law enforcement authorities who testified in his behalf. 4. The vote at the retention election in November 1988. We do not bow to popular majorities on these issues, but in determining whether removing respondent from office is appropriate, surely it is proper to consider that with knowledge of respondent's conviction of the offense, the electorate recently voted to retain him in office. 5. Precedent also supports our decision. Even holding respondent to a higher standard than in Ackel and Biggins, it is difficult to justify removing respondent for an offense involving neither corruption, Ackel (as characterized in dissenting opinion of Feldman, J.), nor a danger to others, Biggins; see also Whitaker, 463 So.2d at 1303-04 (judge suspended for one year after personal use of marijuana, association with users and sellers of illegal drugs and with prostitutes, and violating the appearance of impartiality). Recent precedent is even more compelling. Removal and disqualification from future office  a type of judicial capital punishment  seems peculiarly inappropriate for an offense that some may describe as petty, so that an accused is not entitled to a jury trial. See Dolny, 161 Ariz. at 301-302, 778 P.2d at 1197-1198 (Corcoran, J., dissenting). If the ultimate sanction is appropriate for such petty offenses, what is appropriate for the judge who commits a more serious offense  one involving moral turpitude, abuse of the power of office, or corruption in office? For all these reasons, we have come to the conclusion that removal would be unjustified as inappropriately severe.