Opinion ID: 853423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Tunstill first argues that the evidence did not support the finding that he is an habitual offender because the State failed to establish that the present offense occurred after his two prior felonies. (Appellant's Br. at 7.) [2] During the habitual offender trial, the State introduced a certified copy of the original arrest report that indicated that Tunstill was arrested on October 3, 1997, for a dealing in cocaine charge, with a cause number XX-XXXXXX. Tunstill was convicted of this crime when the court took his guilty plea earlier in the proceeding. Tunstill's sufficiency argument focuses on a moment during the habitual phase when the prosecutor asked Manship whether Tunstill was arrested on October 3, 1977 under cause number XX-XXXXXX for dealing in cocaine as a class A felony? (R. at 132) (emphasis added). Manship answered affirmatively. This answer, Tunstill contends, means that the State did not prove he committed his current crime after being sentenced on his 1997 offense. It is clear from the record that the prosecutor intended to question Manship regarding Tunstill's arrest on October 3, 1997. Both the crime and the cause number recited in the prosecutor's question related to Tunstill's most recent conviction. Inasmuch as the court had just taken Tunstill's plea to this offense, the State need not have proven again the date that the current offense was committed when the trier of fact during the habitual phase is the same trier that just found the defendant guilty. Smith, 543 N.E.2d at 636. The evidence was sufficient to find that Tunstill was an habitual offender.