Opinion ID: 1126936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Traffic Congestion

Text: Among the many problems pressing for solution in the crowded metropolitan areas of America, traffic congestion still takes its rightful place near the top of the list. 2 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice (2d ed), 77 § 208. Mr. Justice Emmert in his dissenting opinion in Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, supra (117 NE2d 115), gives pungent expression to the same thought where he says: Our city streets are too often choked with automobiles and automobile traffic, which endanger the general public as well as the traveling public, because cities were planned for horse and buggy transportation. What might have been an unreasonable exercise of the police powers in the days of the Model T may be clearly valid now under the growing menace of the automobile, which in the Nation has been taking an annual toll of more than 30,000 killed and over a million injured. (at p. 122.) 21. In line with the foregoing observations of Yokley and Emmert, J., we take judicial notice of the extraordinary expansion in motor vehicle traffic in the State of Oregon and County of Clackamas, wherein Milwaukie is its second largest population center. From 1946 (the year of the adoption of Milwaukie Ordinance No. 481) to 1953 (the year appellant made its application to build), the registration of motor vehicles in Oregon increased 62.5%. During the same seven-year period the increase of those owned in Clackamas County was 51%. [4] Certainly, these rapid increases in population previously referred to, and these substantial increases in motor registration, give emphasis to the danger of relying too heavily on the factual presentation of any earlier zoning case, be it from Oregon or other jurisdiction. 22. Traffic congestion is a phrase comprehending many facets. As used in a matter of this kind, it implies all of the nuisances, inconveniences and hazards to which the public generally, and those residing in the zone area, may be exposed. Off-street parking would, no doubt, in some places tend to minimize some of the disadvantages of such congestion, but it cannot be expected to avoid all of its resulting annoyances and potential dangers. The incidents of traffic congestion include, among other things, noise, fumes, the intrusion of automobile lights, the blocking of private driveways by parked cars, and delays in normal travel for those using the highways. But most important are the increased dangers to injury of persons and property. We do not mean to infer that the church-going public is less diligent than others in their respect for the traffic laws. However, even the worthy and cautious persons of that class and their children are too often the victims of the careless. Such evidence as the appellant marshals to describe its own use of its projected church is in terms of its stated services and its instruction meetings on certain days of the week, at its appointed times on those days, with the probable number of automobiles to be used by its members at such times. But such a limited presentation of use does not tell the whole story, nor in itself impeach the Council's reasons for denying a building permit on the ground of traffic congestion. The test of whether or not the building of a church in a given zone will produce traffic congestion or augment existing traffic conditions to a point of hazard can not be made solely in terms of what a given number of church members might produce with their probable use of a certain number of automobiles. If a church is, perchance, in an area where few people live or travel, then it might be relatively easy for a zoning board to determine, in the absence of other circumstances, that the building of a place of worship at such a given site, within the restricted zone, would not create traffic problems. If so, it would be unreasonable to deny such a religious organization an opportunity to erect its building at that point. On the other hand, if traffic congestion is already a real or threatening problem near the site where a congregation desires to build, and the church would bring to that community enough additional vehicles to definitely establish congestion at that point, then the Council would be reasonably warranted, if not duty-bound, to deny a permit for its erection. In the absence of appellant's evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed the Council gave consideration to and balanced all of those factors. In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 US 569, 85 LEd 1049, 61 S Ct 762 (1940), members of appellant's faith were arrested for a violation of a statute prohibiting parades in the city streets without first securing a special license therefor from the selectmen of the town or city in which the parade was to be held. In the parade, each of the members participating carried banners propagandizing their religious beliefs. The appellant Cox claimed an infringement of their constitutional liberties by reason of the licensing statute. In disposing of the matter adversely to them, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes says at p 574:    The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. (Emphasis ours.) We can see no difference in principle between the control of traffic congestion by direct legislation to the subject, as in the Cox case, supra, and the supplementation of such control under the police power by a less direct method of avoidance, when necessary through the avenue of the zoning ordinance. 23. The very theory of zoning is one of balancing public interests against private interests. In Shaffner v. City of Salem (201 Or at 52) we quoted with approval a statement from 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed), 82 § 25.40, of which the following was a part:    the detriment to public welfare that would result if zoning restrictions were removed must be weighed against benefit that would accrue to individual property owners   . 24. When we speak of traffic hazards and congestion on the streets of any city, we are talking about a condition of potential danger to life and property which in point of public welfare extends beyond the boundaries of any zoned area and the interests of those who reside within it. Such a hazard touches the lives of all citizens whose social or business interests may temporarily draw them to such a restricted zone. There are few dangers to public welfare that are so all-embracing as are the dangers and hazards to young and old springing from traffic on our highways. In denying appellant's application to build a church and predicating the denial in whole or in part upon probable traffic problems, the Council necessarily considered three, rather than the usual two, points of view, to wit: (1) effect on the appellant as a landowner; (2) effect, if any, on those owning property on residential streets in the residential zone; and (3) the effect on the general public of the community, no matter where they resided in Milwaukie. 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, supra, 83 § 25.40. 25. We are of the opinion that objectives of the Milwaukie zoning ordinance bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens of that city sufficient to warrant regulation by exercise of the police powers; that the council's action in denying appellant a permit to build a church in the residential zone at the particular place chosen because of ensuing traffic congestion with its incident hazards and annoyances was, under the circumstances present here, a reasonable application of the police power in behalf of the public safety and general welfare. It follows that there is no merit in appellant's claim that it has been deprived of the use of its property without due process of law.