Opinion ID: 1801839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction on Weighing of Aggravation and Mitigation

Text: Defendant assigns several constitutional flaws to CALJIC No. 8.88's command to jurors that [t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole, but we have previously rejected his claims in this regard. The instruction's reference to aggravation substantial[ly] outweighing mitigation is not impermissibly vague; nor is the instruction misleading in permitting a death verdict when the jurors find that sentence warrant[ed]. By advising that a death verdict should be returned only if aggravation is `so substantial in comparison with' mitigation that death is `warranted,' the instruction clearly admonishes the jury to determine whether the balance of aggravation and mitigation makes death the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980]; accord, People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 320 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 30, 132 P.3d 235].) Nor is the instruction deficient in failing to expressly tell jurors they must return a verdict of life without possibility of parole if mitigation outweighs aggravation; that principle is clearly implicit in the standard instruction. ( Perry, at p. 320.) And, as already noted, the instruction was also not deficient in failing to state that neither party bore the burden of proving whether death was the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 939.)