Opinion ID: 629237
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: used by a person, or

Text: 14 (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, 15 to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown. 16 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1127. 17 In contrast to a trademark, trade dress refers to the total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color, color combinations, texture or graphics. Vision Sports, 888 F.2d at 613. A seller's adoption of a trademark or trade dress that is confusingly similar to a competitor's constitutes unfair competition and is actionable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1125(a). See Le Sportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir.1985). 18 Jensen maintains the blue surround is its unregistered trademark and argues that the blue surround in combination with a black case, a black speaker cone, a dark metallic grille, and the product name in a rectangular box on the lower portion of the grille is fully protectable as a trade dress. Jensen claims Metrosound has infringed on both its unregistered trademark and trade dress by production and marketing of the L.A. Sound speakers. 19 While the scope of trade dress has been said to exceed that of trademark, the analysis for trade dress and an unregistered trademark under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is very similar. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2760, 120 L.Ed.2d 615 (1992) (section 43(a) provides no basis for distinguishing between trademark and trade dress); Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1506 (9th Cir.1987) (section 43(a) provides unregistered trademark in product's trade dress); Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 n. 2 (7th Cir.1987) (courts look to trademark cases for guidance on trade dress and vice versa). 20 Under either theory Jensen must show the Blue Surround trademark and trade dress: (1) is nonfunctional; (2) is either inherently distinctive or has acquired a secondary meaning; and (3) is likely to be confused with Metrosound's products by members of the consuming public. Two Pesos, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2758; HWE Inc. v. JB Research, Inc., 993 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir.1993); First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir.1987). We review the district court's factual determinations on each of these three issues for clear error. Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 509 (9th Cir.1991); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (9th Cir.1985) (en banc). 21
22 A trademark or trade dress is functional if it is essential to the product's use or purpose or if it affects the cost or quality of the article. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir.1987); see also Vaughan Mfg. Co., 814 F.2d at 349 (functional feature is one competitors find necessary to incorporate in order to compete effectively). In determining functionality, a product's trade dress must be analyzed as a whole. First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1381. Our inquiry is not directed at whether the individual elements are functional but whether the whole collection of elements taken together are functional. Fuddruckers, Inc., 826 F.2d at 842. 23 Factors to be considered include: (1) whether a particular design yields a utilitarian advantage; (2) whether alternative designs are available in order to avoid hindering competition; and (3) whether the design achieves economies in manufacture or use. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1121 (Fed.Cir.1985). The district court found, and the parties agree, that the shapes and sizes of car loudspeakers and their components, including the surrounds, are functional. The parties disagree as to whether the color on the surround and Jensen's trade dress as a whole are functional. 24 We have recognized that a color may be functional. In First Brands the manufacturer of Prestone brand antifreeze sought a preliminary injunction preventing other manufacturers from selling their antifreeze in yellow-colored plastic jugs. This court recognized the color depletion theory, noting there are a limited number of colors in the palette. Allowing Prestone to protect yellow as its exclusive color would deplete the palette. 809 F.2d at 1382. If all colors were trademarked, new competitors would be barred from entering the market. In this sense, the color yellow was functional. 25 Similarly, the district court found there was an industry-wide practice of coloring speaker surrounds. Several witnesses testified that consumers desire speakers that both sound and look good and that in response many different manufacturers produce speakers with colored surrounds. Granting Jensen a trademark on blue surrounds, held the court, would improperly deprive Jensen's competitors of the use of a primary color. Under these circumstances, the court found the use of color on a surround to be functional. 26 It is open to question whether the color depletion theory which supports the district court's finding and our holding in First Brands is still persuasive. Our colleagues in the Eighth Circuit believe it is not. In Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.1993), the Eighth Circuit recently stated that while allowing a manufacturer to monopolize a color in all of its shades would indeed deplete the color choices available to other market participants, allowing a manufacturer to monopolize a specific shade of color would not. 27 In other words, a manufacturer cannot claim all shades of red, i.e. the hues between purple and orange, but a manufacturer could claim cadmium red, for instance, as a trademark. Id. at 223. The court noted that there are hundreds of different colors available to manufacturers; one classification scheme places the number of colors at more than 1,200. Id. The court also stated that deciding whether one manufacturer's color trademark infringes another's will be no more difficult than distinguishing whether slogans, symbols, numbers, or words are confusingly similar. Id. 28 While the Eighth Circuit will allow color to be trademarked, the court insists the manufacturer satisfy all the normal requirements for trademark protection, including secondary meaning. Id. These requirements, plus the large number of available colors, mean competitors will not be barred from the market: 29 [A] manufacturer's mere use of a certain color will not automatically grant it proprietary rights--the manufacturer must establish all the normal requirements for trademark protection, including secondary meaning. Until secondary meaning has been established in every distinguishable shade of color and in no color at all, a highly improbable situation, there will always be an option available to a new market entrant. 30 Id. See generally Nancy L. Clarke, Note, Issues in the Federal Registration of Flavors as Trademarks for Pharmaceutical Products, 1993 U.Ill.L.Rev. 105, 108-09 (noting trend extending trademark protection to colors). 31 We need not decide whether to abandon the color depletion theory. Nor need we determine whether the district court's findings as to functionality were correct. As we shall discuss, the district court's decision to deny the preliminary injunction may be affirmed on other grounds. 32
33 Assuming a trademark or trade dress is not functional, the plaintiff must still show that the mark or dress is either distinctive or has a secondary meaning. These are alternate standards: If a mark or dress is inherently distinctive it need not be shown to also have a secondary meaning. Two Pesos, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2757; Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., 996 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.1993); HWE, Inc., 993 F.2d at 696; Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Impact Int'l, Inc., 799 F.Supp. 980, 987-88 (D.Ariz.1992). 34 A mark or dress is distinctive when it identifies the particular source of the product or distinguishes it from other products. Cf. Lisa Frank, 799 F.Supp. at 988 (including arbitrary features that do not describe product or assist in effective packaging makes dress inherently distinctive). Correspondingly, a product's trademark or trade dress acquires a secondary meaning when the purchasing public associates the mark or dress with a single producer or source rather than with the product itself. Levi Strauss & Co., 778 F.2d at 1354. The difference between the two concepts may be thought of this way: A mark or trade dress may be inherently distinctive whereas secondary meaning is a learned association, an acquired distinctiveness. Two Pesos, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2757. 35 While evidence of a manufacturer's sales, advertising and promotional activities may be relevant in determining secondary meaning, the true test of secondary meaning is the effectiveness of this effort to create it. First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1383. Prestone, for instance, perhaps could have created a secondary meaning by urging consumers to look for the familiar yellow jug. Id. However, Prestone's extensive advertising campaign had failed to establish a secondary meaning. 36 Judge Waters found Jensen also had failed to establish a secondary meaning for its trade dress: This conclusion is based upon the evidence presented to this Court relating to consumer association, the degree and manner of advertising, the length and manner of use, and the lack of exclusivity of use of the claimed trademark. The district court did not explicitly address the question of whether Jensen's Blue Surround trademark and trade dress was distinctive, nor did it mention the Supreme Court's Two Pesos decision. While this would have been helpful, it matters little because we base our decision to affirm the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction on its finding regarding likelihood of confusion. 37
38 Regardless of whether a trademark or trade dress is non-functional and distinctive, the plaintiff must still show the defendant's use of the same or similar trademark or trade dress is likely to confuse consumers. Two Pesos, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2758; Sardi's Restaurant Corp. v. Sardie, 755 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir.1985); Lisa Frank, 799 F.Supp. at 993. This is the core element of trademark infringement. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir.1992). 39 A likelihood of confusion exists when consumers are likely to assume that a product or service is associated with a source other than its actual source because of similarities between the two sources' marks or marketing techniques. Metro Publishing, Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, 987 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir.1993) (citation omitted). Although this court has enumerated eight separate factors to consider in determining whether confusion between related goods is likely, see AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir.1979), the district court noted our statement in First Brands that for the limited purpose of a preliminary injunction motion, the differences in the labels are sufficient for a finding of no likelihood of confusion. 809 F.2d at 1384; accord Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir.1984). 40 There was no likelihood of confusion in this case, the district court found: [W]hen the overall appearance of the parties' speaker products and packages are considered, the 'total effect' is distinctly different, obviating any likelihood of confusion.... The court also found that because many other manufacturers used colored surrounds, purchasers were not likely to be confused as to the source of the speakers. See Miss World (UK), Ltd. v. Mrs. America Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d 1445, 1449 (9th Cir.1988) (where there are many similar marks customers learn to carefully pick out one from the other). 41 Jensen has not persuaded us that the district court's finding regarding the likelihood of trademark confusion is clearly erroneous. Moreover, we are satisfied the district court assessed the total effect of the defendant's product and package on the eye and mind of an ordinary purchaser for likelihood of trade dress confusion. First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1383-84. Nor do we accept Jensen's arguments that the court improperly considered some evidence but failed to consider other evidence. Given the court's finding, Jensen is unable to show it would likely prevail on the merits of its federal claims. We may therefore affirm the court's decision to deny Jensen a preliminary injunction based on Jensen's federal claims. 42 Next we must consider whether the district court improperly refused to issue an injunction based on Jensen's pendent state law claims. Jensen first saw Metrosound's L.A. Sound products displayed in Chicago and charged Metrosound with violating the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Illinois Anti-Dilution Statute. 43