Opinion ID: 151577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Denial of Motions for a Continuance

Text: On several occasions, defendants moved for a continuance to obtain the impeachment evidence they sought from the Government or to process the evidence they had already received. We review the district court’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. United States v. Orlando, 553 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2009). That review requires us to consider four factors: (1) the extent of appellant’s diligence in his efforts to ready his defense prior to the date set for hearing, (2) how likely it is that the need for a continuance could have been met if the continuance had been granted, (3) the extent to which granting the continuance would have inconvenienced the court and the opposing party, including witnesses, [and] (4) the extent to which the appellant might have suffered harm as a result of the district court’s denial. United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1995) (alterations omitted). The first and third factors weigh against defendants in this case, and the fourth factor—the requirement of prejudice—is decisive. “[I]n order to obtain a reversal, appellant must show at a minimum that he has suffered prejudice as a result of the denial of his request.” Id. at 314–15. Because the defendants suffered no prejudice from the timing or absence of the disclosures they sought under Brady and the 12 Jencks Act, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motions for a continuance. VII. The Request for a Specific Unanimity Instruction Defendants argue that the district court should have specifically instructed the jury that to satisfy the statutory definition of an illegal gambling business under 18 U.S.C. § 1955, all members of the jury would have to agree that the same five participants were involved in the business for the same 30-day period. Defendants did not request such an instruction, so the court’s decision not to issue one is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2010). “Usually a general unanimity instruction suffices.” United States v. Gilley, 836 F.2d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1988). This case is no exception. The court’s decision not to issue a specific unanimity instruction sua sponte was not plainly erroneous, because this case was “sufficiently simple and clear in its presentation that unanimity can be assumed based on the general instruction,” United States v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1983), quoted in Gilley, 836 F.3d at 1212. Unlike Gilley, this case posed no serious risk of jury confusion. This case dealt with one cast of characters involved in a single gambling business that operated (during the relevant time period) at just one location. Under those circumstances 13 the district court’s decision not to issue a more specific unanimity instruction did not “prejudice[] the defendant[s’] substantial right to a unanimous jury verdict as granted by Article III, § 2, and the Sixth Amendment.” Gilley, 836 F.3d at 1212. VIII. The District Court’s Response to the Jury’s Question Concerning Counts 5–8 The jury asked the district court to clarify its instruction concerning Counts 5–8, and both Brunn and Terragna objected to the district court’s response. We generally review a response to a jury’s inquiry for abuse of discretion, but we review de novo whether an instruction misstates the law or violates due process. See United States v. Verduzco, 373 F.3d 1022, 1030 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004). Brunn’s argument is that the district court’s instructions, as clarified by the court’s response, would have allowed the jury to “convict[] both Brunn and Terragna as aiding and abetting in the substantive Hobbs Act counts without establishing that some principal had the requisite intent.” That is not true; the instructions on aiding and abetting to which the district court referred the jury explicitly stated that the Government had to prove that the underlying offense had been “committed by someone.” Brunn’s argument therefore fails. See United States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The jury instruction was not so misleading that the jury would have believed it could convict one or both 14 defendants of aiding and abetting without believing that the law had been violated.”). Terragna’s argument is similarly problematic. She argues that the district court’s response to the jury’s query would have allowed the jury to convict Terragna of aiding and abetting without ever finding that a principal had committed the underlying offenses. But as mentioned above, the district court’s instructions required the Government to prove that the underlying offense had been committed. Moreover, the district court’s response stated that the jury could not convict Terragna of aiding and abetting Brunn unless they found that Brunn had “indeed committed the crime.” IX. The Sufficiency of the Evidence against Terragna and Brunn Both Terragna and Brunn challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict them of certain counts. We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges in two steps. First, we “must consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). This requirement precludes the extensive reweighing and selective examination of facts in which both appellants’ briefs engage. Our second task is to determine whether the “evidence, so viewed, is adequate to allow ‘any rational trier of fact [to find] the essential elements of the crime beyond a 15 reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Terragna challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict her of Counts 1–3. To convict Terragna of each conspiracy count, Counts 1 and 3, the Government had to prove that she entered the conspiracy and that at least one conspirator performed at least one overt act in furtherance thereof. See Mincoff, 574 F.3d at 1198. To convict her of Count 2, the Government had to prove that she conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed, or owned all or part of the illegal gambling business. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955. The evidence presented at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the Government, was sufficient to convict Terragna on all three counts. Particularly relevant was Charles Gilman’s testimony that he and Terragna had an agreement to open a cockfighting operation together, his testimony that Terragna received a fourth of the proceeds from the cockfights and $1000 out of every $4500 collected at the gate, John Saguibo’s testimony that Terragna was a partner in the cockfights, his testimony that Terragna anticipated being able to set up a new cockfighting operation if she broke away from Gilman, and his testimony that Terragna had advance notice of when the Narcotics/Vice gambling detail would be coming to the cockfights. 16 Brunn challenges his convictions on Counts 3–8. Just as in Terragna’s case, to convict Brunn of each conspiracy, the Government had to prove that he entered the conspiracy and that at least one conspirator performed at least one overt act in furtherance thereof. See Mincoff, 574 F.3d at 1198. To convict him of the four extortion charges, the Government had to prove that he (1) in any way or degree obstructed, delayed, or affected commerce (2) by extortion, which is (3) the obtaining of property from another, (4) with his consent, (5) induced by wrongful use of (a) actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or (b) under color of official right. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Just as with Terragna, the evidence against Brunn was sufficient to convict him. Particularly relevant was Charles Gilman’s testimony that Brunn sent a patrol vehicle to park in front of the cockfights to teach Charles Gilman a lesson, Charles Gilman’s testimony that he made payments to Terragna and Brunn because he feared that Brunn would send police to the cockfights to stop them, and John Saguibo’s testimony that Brunn attended a meeting with Charles Gilman and Bryson Apo where they discussed the cockfights and keeping quiet about bribes that were being paid to police officers. 17 X. Whether Count 4 Merged with Counts 5–8 as to Terragna Terragna argues that the district court should have entered a judgment of acquittal for Counts 5–8 (which alleged that she aided and abetted Brunn’s extortion from Charles Gilman) because the jury found her not guilty of Count 4 (which alleged a conspiracy to extort money from Gilman). We review the denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. See United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 959 (9th Cir. 2007). In general, a defendant can be convicted both for a conspiracy to commit a crime and for committing that crime. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643–44 (1946). Wharton’s Rule is a judicial presumption against dual prosecutions for conspiracy and certain substantive crimes: those that necessarily entail an agreement between two people, such as adultery, incest, bigamy, and dueling. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 773–74 & n.5, 782–83 (1975). Terragna argues that Wharton’s Rule should have precluded dual prosecutions for conspiracy and aiding and abetting.1 But the rule does not apply to the crime of aiding and abetting. That crime does not require an agreement, so it can be charged 1 Terragna does not mention Wharton’s Rule by name in her brief, but her attorney did so at the hearing concerning Terragna’s posttrial motion for acquittal. 18 and punished separately from conspiracy. See United States v. Huber, 772 F.2d 585, 591–92 (9th Cir. 1985).