Opinion ID: 2253031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Varying Interpretations of the 1979 Statute Possible.

Text: When the legislature reorganized Indiana Code § 35-43-4-2 into subsections (a) and (b) in 1979, what was it trying to accomplish? As we read it, there are several possible interpretations. One interpretation, consistent with the Walden, Hunt, and Byrd holdings, is that the legislature meant to create two entirely separate offenses, authorizing the State to prosecute an actual thief for Theft under subsection (a) and one who is not an actual thief for Receiving Stolen Property under subsection (b). This interpretation would in essence hold that it was the intent of the 1979 legislature to enact by statute our holding in Coates v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 357, 229 N.E.2d 640. [10] Under this interpretation, proof that a defendant is the actual thief under subsection (a) will defeat a charge of receiving under subsection (b). Another interpretation, also consistent with Walden, Hunt, and Byrd, is that the statute now permits prosecution for Theft under subsection (a) whether the accused is the actual thief or not but permits prosecution for Receiving Stolen Property only of one who is not the actual thief. Such an interpretation would recognize that under the language of the 1977 Act, an accused not the actual thief could be prosecuted for Theft and the legislature in 1979 did not change any of the language of the theft statute, but only denominated it subsection (a) and added a new subsection (b). The legislative intent inferred here would be that, in addition to Theft, the legislature wanted to give the State an additional and alternative basis for proceeding in stolen property crimes where the accused is not the actual thief.