Opinion ID: 2615597
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of Evidence Other Than the Record of Conviction or Certified Prison Records Under Section 969b

Text: We turn first to the threshold question of whether evidence other than the record of conviction and certified prison records under section 969b is admissible to show that a defendant served prison terms for prior felony convictions. As we explain, we agree with Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 1468, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 204, that provided it satisfies applicable rules of admissibility, such evidence is admissible to establish matters other than the nature and circumstances of the conduct underlying a prior conviction. We begin by considering the language of section 969b, which provides in relevant part: For the purpose of establishing prima facie evidence of the fact that a person being tried for a crime or public offense under the laws of this State has been convicted of an act punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, county jail or city jail of this State, and has served a term therefor in any penal institution, ... the records or copies of records of any state penitentiary, reformatory, county jail, city jail, or federal penitentiary in which such person has been imprisoned, when such records or copies thereof have been certified by the official custodian of such records, may be introduced as such evidence. (Italics added.) As defendant explains, section 969b is essentially a hearsay exception that allows certified copies of the specified records to be used for the truth of the matter asserted in those records, i.e., that a person served a prison term for a prior conviction. (See People v. Castillo (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1020, 1024, fn. 5, 266 Cal.Rptr. 271.) However, section 969b `is permissive and not mandatory.... [I]t does not restrict the People from using other forms of proof...' to establish the fact of previous imprisonment. [Citation.] ( People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 122, 60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586.) No statute requires the prosecution to produce the [section 969b] prison packet to prove that a defendant served a prior prison term. ( People v. Tenner (1993) 6 Cal.4th 559, 563, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 862 P.2d 840, original italics.) Next, we consider the extent to which Guerrero limits admission of evidence other than certified prison records under section 969b to show that a defendant served a prison term for a prior felony conviction. Guerrero reconsidered People v. Alfaro (1986) 42 Cal.3d 627, 230 Cal.Rptr. 129, 724 P.2d 1154 ( Alfaro ), which addressed the scope of evidence a trier of fact may consider in determining whether a prior conviction was a `serious felony' for purposes of sentence enhancement. ( Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 345, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150.) In both cases, the prosecution sought to prove that the prior conviction was for burglary of a residence. ( Id. at p. 348, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150; Alfaro, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 630, 230 Cal.Rptr. 129, 724 P.2d 1154.) Alfaro held that in determining this question, the trier of fact was limited to matters necessarily established by the prior judgment of conviction. ( Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 348, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150.) In Guerrero, we concluded that the authorities on which Alfaro relied did not support this evidentiary limitation. Specifically, we explained that In re McVickers (1946) 29 Cal.2d 264, 176 P.2d 40 established that a court may look to the entire record of the conviction to determine the substance of [a] prior foreign conviction; but when the record does not disclose any of the facts of the offense actually committed, the court will presume that the prior conviction was for the least offense punishable under the foreign law. ( Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 352, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150, italics added.) We also explained that In re Seeley (1946) 29 Cal.2d 294, 176 P.2d 24 and In re Finley (1968) 68 Cal.2d 389, 66 Cal.Rptr. 733, 438 P.2d 381 recognized and applied the In re McVickers rule that a court may look to the entire record of the conviction to determine the substance of the prior conviction. ( Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 354, 355, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150.) We concluded that, far from establishing that proof of the substance of a prior conviction is limited to matters necessarily established by the prior judgment of conviction, those cases declare that the court may look to the entire record of the conviction for this purpose, i.e., to establish the substance of the prior conviction. ( Id. at p. 355, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150, italics added.) Although Guerrero contains language arguably suggesting its evidentiary limitations apply to proof of all issues related to the truth of a prior-conviction allegation ( Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 345, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150), a close reading of the decision demonstrates its scope is not so sweeping. As our discussion shows, the only question at issue in Guerrero and in Alfaro, which Guerrero reconsideredwas the permissible scope of proof to establish the substance of a prior conviction, i.e., the nature and circumstances of the underlying conduct. Neither case considered matters of proof relating to other aspects of a prior conviction, such as the identity of the defendant or service of a prior prison term. Cases are not authority for propositions they do not consider. ( Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 372, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 330, 853 P.2d 496.) As we have subsequently explained, Guerrero establishes that the trier of fact may look to the entire record of conviction to determine the substance of the prior conviction. [Citation.] ( People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 223, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 914 P.2d 184.) Its limitations apply only to proof of the circumstances of the prior crime. ( Id at p. 225, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 914 P.2d 184.) Moreover, the justifications for limiting proof of the substance of a prior conviction do not apply to proof of the matter at issue here, i.e., the identity of the person who served prison terms for the prior convictions. As Guerrero explains, the rule limiting proof of the substance of a prior conviction effectively bars the prosecution from relitigating the circumstances of a crime committed years ago and thereby threatening the defendant with harm akin to double jeopardy and denial of speedy trial. ( Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 355, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150.) Alfaro noted that limiting proof of the substance of a prior conviction also avoid[s] the `great inconvenience' of relitigating the circumstances of long past convictions. ( Alfaro, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 635, 230 Cal.Rptr. 129, 724 P.2d 1154.) Permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence other than the record of conviction or certified prison records under section 969b to show the identity of the person who served prison terms for prior convictions does not implicate these concerns. Thus, the reasons underlying Guerrero 's rule do not justify extending its reach to the matter at issue here. Defendant argues, however, that by not referring to CLETS and other criminal records data banks in enacting or amending several statutes expressly dealing with the use of computer records, the Legislature has indicated these records do not qualify under an exception to the hearsay rule other than section 969b. Principally, he cites enactment in 1996 (well after his trial) of the Criminal Convictions Record Act (CCRA) (Stats.1996, ch. 642), which provides in part that: (1) superior and municipal court clerks shall prospectively certify and submit for entry into the Department's computer system specified court records that relate to criminal convictions (Gov.Code, §§ 69844.5, 71280.5); (2) a court may judicially notice these computer-generated official court records under Evidence Code section 452 (Evid.Code, § 452.5, subd. (a)); and (3) [a]n official record of conviction certified in accordance with subdivision (a) of [Evidence Code] Section 1530 is admissible pursuant to [Evidence Code] Section 1280 to prove the commission ... of a criminal offense, prior conviction, service of a prison term, or other act, condition, or event recorded by the record. (Evid.Code, § 452.5, subd. (b).) Defendant argues the Legislature's failure to address the admissibility of CLETS records when it enacted these provisions, despite its presumed awareness of Matthews, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 930, 280 Cal.Rptr. 134, suggests its acquiescence in Matthews and its intent that CLETS records not be used as evidence of prior convictions and service of prior prison terms. Defendant's arguments are unpersuasive. The Legislature declared that the CCRA's purpose was merely to simplify recordkeeping and admission in evidence of records of criminal convictions by establishing a central computer data base of that data, and by authorizing admission in evidence of this computer data. (Stats. 1996, ch. 642, § 2, italics added.) In enacting the CCRA, the Legislature did not question the accuracy or trustworthiness of existing information sources, such as CLETS. On the contrary, in describing the legal background to the CCRA, one legislative analysis explained that prosecutors receive preliminary criminal history information through [the Department's] Criminal Identification and Information System, which provides timely accurate posting of criminal history data. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1387 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 22, 1996, p. 2, italics added.) Moreover, in arguing that the Legislature endorsed Matthews by passing the CCRA in August 1996 without mentioning CLETS, defendant ignores two significant facts: (1) Matthews did not identify the computer printout there at issue as a CLETS document, but referred to it as an unlabeled computer printout ( Matthews, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 934, 280 Cal.Rptr. 134) or a state rap sheet[] ( id. at p. 935, 280 Cal.Rptr. 134); and (2) the Legislature was also presumably aware of Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal. App.4th 1468, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 204, which was issued in September 1993. Thus, we do not agree that by establishing through the CCRA a simplified process for proving facts relating to a defendant's criminal history, the Legislature intended to exclude other methods of proof, such as admission of CLETS records. [4]