Opinion ID: 2595071
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Local Government Has Limited Power Over State Shorelines

Text: ¶ 21 We begin our constitutional analysis with article XI, section 11 of the Washington Constitution. Section 11 includes a specific exception to its simple statement of the general police powers of local governments: Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.  (Emphasis added.); see also, e.g., HJS Dev., Inc. v. Pierce County, 148 Wash.2d 451, 482, 61 P.3d 1141 (2003) (Local jurisdictions may enact ordinances upon subjects already covered by state legislation if their enactment does not conflict with state legislation (citing Lenci v. Seattle, 63 Wash.2d 664, 670, 388 P.2d 926 (1964))). ¶ 22 Any grant of police power to local government is subject to constitutional limitation, which is judicially enforced. Our cases uniformly state that exercises of the police power are subject to judicial review. Petstel, Inc. v. County of King, 77 Wash.2d 144, 154, 459 P.2d 937 (1969). See also State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 313, 147 P. 11 (1915) (observing that if a police power regulation `has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitution' (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887))). Courts will not expand the powers of local government beyond express delegations. See City of Spokane v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 90 Wash.2d 722, 726, 585 P.2d 784 (1978); see also Lauterbach v. City of Centralia, 49 Wash.2d 550, 554, 304 P.2d 656 (1956). ¶ 23 The City belatedly attempted to rely on a new right of local government to issue moratoria on development of private property on shorelines of statewide significance. This argument was based upon a theory of city power that the City did not argue to the trial court or to the Court of Appeals; for good reason, the argument fails. Article XVII, section 1 of the Washington Constitution declares that shorelines were originally owned by the state, and therefore subject to state regulation. Even after sale or lease of shorelines, the state continues to hold remaining sovereign interests of the public. Indeed, the SMA was expressly based on the proposition that shorelines are of statewide significance. Local governments do not possess any inherent constitutional police power over state shoreline use. ¶ 24 The Washington Constitution's recognition of local government police powers not in conflict with general laws must be understood in light of article XVII, section 1. That provision provides: The state of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes. Article XVII, section 1 of the Washington Constitution asserts that powers of the state, in this context, are controlling over any powers of local government. Therefore, the police power question presented in this case involves a simple, bright-line matter of jurisdiction. Under article XVII, section 1, the state has the power to regulate shorelines. ¶ 25 Under the Washington Constitution, local governments have no broad police power over shorelines. Neither the history of article XVII, section 1 nor its interpretation by the courts of this state suggests it allows local governments permit authority over shoreline development in violation of state law or policies, much less power to declare moratoria on shoreline development. See Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 122 Wash.2d 219, 232, 858 P.2d 232 (1993) (the duty imposed by the public trust doctrine devolves upon the State, not any particular agency thereof) aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 128 Wash.2d 508, 910 P.2d 462 (1996). ¶ 26 The limitation on local police power over shoreline use and development is reinforced by the public trust doctrine. See Rettkowski, 122 Wash.2d at 232, 858 P.2d 232 (holding that the public trust doctrine is partially encapsulated in article XVII, section 1). According to the public trust doctrine, the shorelines and state waters are held by the state, in trust for all the people of the state. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892) (The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor and of the lands under them is a subject of public concern to the whole people of the State.), aff'd, 154 U.S. 225, 14 S.Ct. 1015, 38 L.Ed. 971 (1894). The state can no more convey or give away this jus publicum interest than it can `abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.' Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash.2d 662, 669, 732 P.2d 989 (1987) (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453, 13 S.Ct. 110). ¶ 27 Clearly, the interests of all Washington residents in these shorelines cannot be impliedly abdicated to local governments. A state statute, such as the SMA, may serve to delegate some state power. Thus, regulation of the use and development of shorelines under the SMA is derived from the state, which holds all such shorelines in trust for all people of this state under the constitution. ¶ 28 The doubtful existence of any implied city power over state shorelines is further indicated by its belated discovery years after these moratoria were issued. No prior case or statute is directly cited in support of this argument. The City did not rely upon any implied constitutional power when it voted for the ordinance to institute a moratorium nor on the numerous occasions it voted for extended moratoria. The City notices of ordinances do not claim such a power. Instead, the City consistently asserted that there was an express statutory grant of authority. See CP at 136 (Ordinance No.2001-32) (citing RCW 35A.63.220 and RCW 36.70A.390 for authority to adopt moratoria); CP at 139-40 (Ordinance No.2001-34) (citing RCW 35A.63.220 and RCW 36.70A.390 for authority to adopt moratoria). ¶ 29 Strikingly, the City also never argued to the trial court that it had any implied constitutional authority. Moreover, the City admits it never argued for such implied authority to the Court of Appeals. See City of Bainbridge Island's Reply Br. at 3 (The City has never argued that it has `implied' powers that gave it the ability to impose the Moratorium.). The posthoc rationalization made to this court for the offending moratoria is indefensible and inconsistent with the constitution's limitation on local government. See WASH. CONST. article XI, section 11 (granting local government only those powers not in conflict with general laws.).