Opinion ID: 618268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs' Other Federal Claims Fail

Text: Plaintiffs raise three additional constitutional claims, all of which fail. First, plaintiffs argue that the Takings Clause prohibits the Commonwealth from collecting and asserting custody over the duplicate payments because no legitimate purpose is fulfilled by the Commonwealth's scheme. Plaintiffs characterize Law 230 and its Amendments as a forced loan imposed on plaintiffs by the Commonwealth in an illegitimate use of government powers to cover[] its budget shortfall. Although plaintiffs raise this claim under the Takings Clause, and rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005), as the Court explained in that case, such a challenge to the underlying validity of a regulation is logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a taking. Id. at 543, 125 S.Ct. 2074. The Takings Clause does not prohibit government from interfering with property rights, but rather requires just compensation for an  otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987)). Plaintiffs' grievance is with what they characterize as the Commonwealth's misuse of governmental powers. They argue that [t]he takings clause cannot be used to obtain forced loans from citizens even if the government institutes a fair repayment procedure. (Emphasis added). Plaintiffs thus have mischaracterized what is in fact a substantive due process claim as a takings claim. Plaintiffs' argument that the Commonwealth's purpose in collecting and retaining custody over the duplicate payments is not legitimate is an argument that goes to the core of substantive due process law. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (We have emphasized time and again that `[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government,' whether the fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness, or in the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective. (internal citations omitted)). Plaintiffs concede as much at points in their takings argument, in which they rely heavily on substantive due process law. We reject this attempt by plaintiff to cast their due process claim as an independent takings claim. If plaintiffs have another theory of takings, they have not clearly articulated it and we deem their takings claim waived. However, plaintiffs do raise an independent substantive due process challenge to the compulsory insurance reimbursement scheme, which we now address. Plaintiffs argue that Law 230 and its amendments are so arbitrary and illegitimate as to violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. We reject this challenge to the underlying validity of the compulsory insurance scheme. It is not unconstitutional for the Commonwealth to charge plaintiffs the duplicate fees upfront in order to guarantee coverage, and thereafter take custody of the payments, provided that the Commonwealth also implements a meaningful notice and refund process that complies with due process. Plaintiffs also argue that the burdens Procedure 96 imposes on individual claimants constitutes a separate violation of procedural due process. The district court rejected this argument finding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate on the facts that Procedure 96 was excessively burdensome under the Due Process Clause. García-Rubiera v. Fortuño, 752 F.Supp.2d at 187. We agree with the district court. We also reject plaintiffs' remaining claims and, reviewing for abuse of discretion, Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 186 (1st Cir.1989), affirm the district court's decisions denying plaintiffs' request for disclosure of a sealed agreement between JUA and the Commonwealth and request to deem certain facts presented by plaintiffs as conceded by the Commonwealth. García-Rubiera v. Fortuño, No. 3:02-cv-01179 (Sept. 14, 2010).