Opinion ID: 4401994
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Unsubstantiated Assertions

Text: 8 ¶16. As to the merits of this request, we agree with the Court of Appeals plurality that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Parker’s motion for a mental evaluation. ¶17. “This Court weighs on a case by case basis whether the denial of expert assistance for an accused is prejudicial to the assurance of a fair trial . . . .” Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 577, 590 (Miss. 1988). We “will grant relief only where the accused demonstrates that the trial court’s abuse of discretion is so egregious as to deny him due process and where his trial was thereby rendered fundamentally unfair.” Id. ¶18. “[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist” who will examine and assist him. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1096, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985). “Of course a defendant must come forth with concrete reasons, not unsubstantiated assertions that assistance would be beneficial.” Harrison v. State, 635 So. 2d 894, 901 (Miss. 1994) (citing Butler v. State, 608 So. 2d 314, 321 (Miss. 1992); Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 125 (Miss. 1991); Griffin v. State, 557 So. 2d 542 (Miss. 1990)). ¶19. Parker relied exclusively on (1) his assertion he did not know the victim and could not remember anything about the night of the assault and (2) his own personal recollection about his mental-health history. This history included his taking prescription drugs for anxiety and depression and a suicide attempt three years earlier. But, as the Court of Appeals plurality aptly put it, Parker’s history of treatment for anxiety and depression “has no apparent relevance to his ability to know right from wrong at the time of the offense.” Parker, 2018 9 WL 1602585, at . Cf. Sanders v. State, 63 So. 3d 497, 506 (Miss. 2011) (“Just because a person is schizophrenic does not mean that person is M’Naghten insane.” (citing Laney v. State, 486 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Miss. 1986))). Nor does Parker’s testimony that he does not remember shooting Eric establish M’Naghten insanity. Not being able to remember is not the same thing as not being able to distinguish right from wrong. See, e.g., United States v. Holsey, 995 F.2d 960, 963 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the defendant’s testimony that he “had ‘blacked out’ and did not remember robbing the bank” did not amount to evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental defect rendering the defendant “unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts”); Williams v. State, 228 S.E.2d 806, 807 (Ga. 1976) (“This testimony by appellant, that he does not remember what happened, does not require a charge on insanity.”); Jackson v. State, 253 S.E.2d 874, 877 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (“Evidence that the defendant does not remember or was in a ‘blanked out’ state of mind during the commission of the acts charged is insufficient to raise the issue of insanity.” (citations omitted)); Sparkman v. State, 469 S.W.2d 692, 696-97 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) (“Insanity and amnesia are distinct conditions, even though amnesia sometimes is an incident of insanity. Insanity is incapacity to discriminate between right and wrong, while amnesia is simply the inability to remember.”); Jeffley v. State, 938 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (“Loss of memory, however, is insufficient to show insanity.”); Ex parte Saylee, No. 03-18-00124-CR, 2019 WL 1413043, at  (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2019) (“Not remembering conduct is distinct from not knowing that conduct is wrong and does not entitle an accused to the insanity defense.”). This is especially so when the memory loss may be 10 attributable to voluntary intoxication or drug use.5 See Smith v. State, 445 So. 2d 227, 231 (Miss. 1984) (“[I]f a person, when sober, is capable of distinguishing right and wrong and voluntarily intoxicates or drugs himself to the extent that he does not know or understand his actions, e.g., steals, robs, or murders, he is responsible and he may be convicted and sentenced for the crime.” (citing McDaniel v. State, 356 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (Miss. 1978) (Sugg, J., specially concurring))); Patterson v. State, 127 So. 3d 1124, 1131 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that not being able to remember committing the crime due to voluntary intoxication is not a viable insanity defense). ¶20. At best, Parker’s testimony suggested “diminished capacity”—a defense that is not recognized under Mississippi law. Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713, 720 (Miss. 1984); Patterson, 127 So. 3d at 1131. When it come to insanity, however, we agree with the Court of Appeals plurality that Parker failed to present “any concrete reason” establishing a mental evaluation was necessary or that Parker had a viable insanity defense. Parker, 2018 WL 1602585, at . Thus, “given the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in determining whether to order a mental evaluation[,]” we find no reversible error. Harden v. State, 59 So. 3d 594, 603 (Miss. 2011).