Opinion ID: 1859512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: For his first point for reversal, Mr. Harmon argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of battery in the first degree. Particularly, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate (1) that he had any involvement in the crime; (2) that he caused a serious physical injury; or (3) that he acted with the requisite mental state. Mr. Harmon was charged with violating Ark.Code Ann. § 5-13-201(3)(Repl.1997), which provides that a person commits battery in the first degree if: He causes serious physical injury to another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.] The test for determining sufficient proof is whether there is substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the verdict. Johnson v. State, 337 Ark. 196, 987 S.W.2d 694 (1999). On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and sustain the conviction if there is any substantial evidence to support it. Tigue v. State, 319 Ark. 147, 889 S.W.2d 760 (1994). Evidence is substantial if it is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Id. In determining whether there is substantial evidence, we consider only that evidence tending to support the verdict. Johnson, supra . We do not weigh the evidence presented at trial, as that is a matter for the factfinder. Freeman v. State, 331 Ark. 130, 959 S.W.2d 400 (1998); Dabney v. State, 326 Ark. 382, 930 S.W.2d 360 (1996). Where, as here, the trial is before the bench, the trial judge sits as factfinder. See Gray v. State, 311 Ark. 209, 843 S.W.2d 315 (1992); State v. Watson, 307 Ark. 333, 820 S.W.2d 59 (1991). The evidence showed that on October 27, 1996, Kevin Anglin was beaten by several individuals in the parking lot of the Discovery Club in Little Rock. Mr. Anglin testified that he had no actual memory of the beating, but that the last thing he remembered seeing were the faces of Mr. Harmon and Mr. Benjamin Brown. At trial, Mr. Anglin identified Mr. Harmon for the record. Mr. Anglin testified that as a result of the beating he suffered very, very acute injuries and was placed in the intensive care unit for three days. Mr. Anglin testified that he suffered injuries to the left side of his face, for which he underwent plastic surgery to repair. Mr. Anglin stated further that since the beating, he suffered a loss of his senses of taste and smell and a loss of memory. Finally, Mr. Anglin indicated that as of the time of trial some sixteen months after the incident, he had no sense of taste or smell and that he continued to suffer a loss of memory. Mr. Ali Kaan Aydulun testified that he witnessed Mr. Anglin being beaten that night at the Discovery Club. He stated that he and his friend were walking in the parking lot when they encountered Mr. Brown, standing in the lot cussing. Mr. Aydulun and his friend were about to say something to Mr. Brown, when Mr. Anglin advised them to leave Mr. Brown alone because he was drunk. Mr. Aydulun stated that he and his friend began to walk away, and that when he turned around, he saw Mr. Brown and several other persons attack Mr. Anglin. Mr. Aydulun stated that Mr. Anglin had done nothing to provoke the fight. According to Mr. Aydulun, six or seven assailants punched and pushed on Mr. Anglin and eventually pulled him to the ground and started kicking him in the ribs, legs, face and the back of the head. Mr. Aydulun made an in-court identification of Mr. Harmon as one of the assailants. He had previously identified Mr. Harmon in a photo-lineup. Mr. Aydulun testified that Mr. Harmon kicked Mr. Anglin in the face. He explained that Mr. Harmon's foot missed Mr. Anglin the first time, but that on the second attempt Mr. Harmon backed up one step and ran at Mr. Anglin's head like a field-goal kicker runs toward a football. Mr. James Patrick Cady also witnessed the attack. He testified that five or six people began hitting and kicking Mr. Anglin and then stomping on his head as he lay on the ground. Mr. Cady selected Mr. Harmon's photograph out of a photo-lineup as looking like one of the assailants. He stated that when the fight ended and the assailants dispersed, one assailant gave several last kicks to the victim's head before getting into a car and leaving. He identified Mr. Harmon as looking like the person who inflicted those last blows to the victim's head. Mr. Cady told police that the assailant had driven away in a white Honda, license plate number YTS 020. Within approximately fifteen minutes of the incident being reported to the police, a Little Rock police officer stopped a white Honda, license plate number YGS 020, on Cantrell Road, not far from the Discovery Club. Mr. Harmon was driving the car, and Mr. Brown was the only passenger. The State also offered the testimony of Dr. Ali Krisht, which was taken during the previous trial against Mr. Brown. Dr. Krisht, an expert in neurosurgery, testified that he treated Mr. Anglin in the hospital in October 1996. He stated that a CAT scan of Mr. Anglin's head revealed contusions on the brain surface in more than one area, mostly on the left side. He explained that contusions are small hemorrhages that are usually caused by trauma. He stated that Mr. Anglin was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury. Dr. Krisht also stated that a loss of short-term memory, taste and smell can be associated with such an injury, and that those losses can be permanent. Dr. Krisht further noted that during a subsequent visit to the clinic, Mr. Anglin complained that he was having problems with short-term memory and his sense of smell. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find substantial evidence to support Mr. Harmon's conviction of battery in the first degree. Mr. Harmon's first argument in opposition to this conclusion is an attack on the credibility of two of the State's witnesses: Mr. Aydulun, who identified Mr. Harmon as one of the assailants who kicked the victim in the head; and Mr. Cady, who reported that a person who looked like Mr. Harmon inflicted the last blows to the victim's head and drove away in a car that was eventually stopped by the police. The attack on the credibility of these witnesses is premised on certain inconsistencies in their testimony. The defense specifically points out that Mr. Aydulun indicated that some of the assailants, including Mr. Harmon, were wearing baseball caps and cowboy boots, and that a group of them left the scene in a blue Mazda. Whereas, Mr. Cady indicated that Mr. Harmon left the scene in a white Honda and the police officer testified that when he stopped the white Honda, he did not notice Mr. Harmon wearing a baseball cap or cowboy boots and he did not notice any blood on him. Finally, the defense also challenges the credibility of the witnesses by noting that some of the people identified during the investigation as possible look-alikes were merely fillers in the photo-lineup and were not actually involved in the assault. The matters emphasized by Mr. Harmon bear exclusively upon the credibility of the State's witnesses. This court, however, does not attempt to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. That lies within the province of the trier of fact. Williams v. State, 338 Ark. 178, 992 S.W.2d 89 (1999). We are bound by the factfinder's determination on the credibility of witnesses. Kitchen v. State, 271 Ark. 1, 607 S.W.2d 345 (1980); Thomas v. State, 266 Ark. 162, 583 S.W.2d 32 (1979). Likewise, we have long held that the trier of fact is free to believe all or part of a witness's testimony. Freeman v. State, 331 Ark. 130, 959 S.W.2d 400 (1998); Patterson v. State, 326 Ark. 1004, 935 S.W.2d 266 (1996). Moreover, inconsistent testimony does not render proof insufficient as a matter of law, and one eyewitness's testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See Williams v. State, supra ; Rawls v. State, 327 Ark. 34, 937 S.W.2d 637 (1997). Mr. Harmon contends that the purported inconsistencies in the testimony of the State's witnesses make their identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime inherently improbable, physically impossible, and so clearly unbelievable that reasonable minds could not differ thereon. Kitchen v. State, supra . We disagree. We cannot say with assurance that it would have been physically impossible for Mr. Harmon to discard incriminating evidence, such as clothing, between the time he fled the scene and the time the officer stopped the vehicle he was driving. Furthermore, the officer admitted that he was not specifically looking for blood, cowboy boots, or baseball caps when he made the DWI arrest. The defense fully explored all inconsistencies and weaknesses in its cross-examination of the State's witnesses. Nevertheless, the trial judge found their identification credible. The accuracy of the eyewitness identifications and any alleged weaknesses were matters of credibility for the trial court to resolve. Davis v. State, 284 Ark. 557, 683 S.W.2d 926 (1985). Mr. Harmon has presented us with no valid reason to disregard the trial judge's assessment of the witnesses's credibility. We therefore hold that substantial evidence linking Mr. Harmon to the crime does exist. Mr. Harmon next asserts that the State's evidence was insufficient to establish that he caused a serious physical injury. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-1-102(19) (Repl. 1997) defines serious physical injury as: Physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Mr. Anglin testified that as a result of the injuries sustained in the fight, he spent three days in the hospital's intensive care unit. He also stated that he suffered a loss of his senses of taste and smell, and a loss of memory as a result of the beating. At trial, some sixteen months after the incident, Mr. Anglin indicated that these symptoms continued to persist. During Mr. Anglin's hospitalization in October 1996, Dr. Krisht diagnosed Mr. Anglin with traumatic brain injury. Dr. Krisht also confirmed that the protracted loss of memory, taste, and smell experienced by Mr. Anglin can be associated with the type of injury he sustained. A photograph showing the severity of the injuries to the left side of Mr. Anglin's face was also introduced into evidence, and Mr. Anglin testified that he underwent plastic surgery to repair those injuries. Whether a victim has sustained a serious physical injury is an issue for the jury, or, as in this case, the trial judge sitting as factfinder. Bangs v. State, 338 Ark. 515, 998 S.W.2d 738 (1999); Weaver v. State, 324 Ark. 290, 920 S.W.2d 491 (1996). Likewise, the question whether injuries constitute a temporary or protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member or organ is for the factfinder to decide. Purifoy v. State, 307 Ark. 482, 822 S.W.2d 374 (1991). In this case, the victim's testimony about the injuries he sustained on October 27, 1996, was corroborated by his doctor's testimony as well as a photograph of his face after the beating. We cannot say that the factfinder could not reasonably infer from this evidence that Mr. Anglin sustained a serious physical injury as a result of the beating, and particularly that he suffered a protracted impairment of the function of bodily organs or members. We therefore conclude that substantial evidence to support the finding of serious physical injury does exist. This conclusion is consistent with our holding in Lum v. State, 281 Ark. 495, 665 S.W.2d 265 (1984), where we held that three blows to the head with a fist resulting in fractures to the face and the victim's hospitalization for five days was sufficient to support a finding of serious physical injury. Mr. Harmon finally asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he acted with the requisite mental state for battery in the first degree. A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or cause such a result. Tarentino v. State, 302 Ark. 55, 786 S.W.2d 584 (1990) (citing Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (1987)). Because of the obvious difficulty in ascertaining the actor's intent or state of mind, a presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts. Id. The factfinder may draw upon common knowledge and experience to infer the defendant's intent from the circumstances. Id. The trial court's conclusion in this case that Mr. Harmon acted with the purpose of causing serious physical injury is supported by Mr. Aydulun's testimony that Mr. Harmon came at Mr. Anglin's head like a field-goal kicker approaches a football, and by Mr. Cady's testimony that Mr. Harmon was the last one to leave the scene, and did so only after delivering several more kicks at Mr. Anglin's head. This conclusion is consistent with our holding in Anderson v. State, 312 Ark. 606, 852 S.W.2d 309 (1993): Repeated blows to the head by kicking or `stomping' when [a] man [is] down [exhibit] purposeful action to inflict serious physical injury whether it be risk of death or protracted disfigurement or impairment. Id.; see also Lum v. State, supra ; Bangs v. State, supra ; Tarentino v. State, supra ; Golden v. State, 265 Ark. 99, 576 S.W.2d 955 (1979). Furthermore, there is substantial evidence to support a finding that Mr. Harmon acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, pursuant to section 5-13-201(3). The plain meaning of that phrase demonstrates that the circumstances must by necessity be dire and formidable in terms of affecting human life. Tigue v. State, 319 Ark. 147, 889 S.W.2d 760 (1994). In short, first-degree battery involves actions which create at least some risk of death which, therefore, evidence a mental state on the part of the accused to engage in some life-threatening activity against the victim. Id. (citing Jones v. State, 282 Ark. 56, 665 S.W.2d 876 (1984)). The foregoing evidence demonstrates that Mr. Harmon, along with five or six other assailants, kicked Mr. Anglin in the face and head multiple times while Mr. Anglin was on the ground. This evidence certainly supports the conclusion that Mr. Harmon engaged in life-threatening conduct against the victim. Moreover, the evidence of life-threatening conduct in this case is distinguishable from the circumstances addressed in Tigue v. State, supra , where we held that immersion of the victim's hands in hot water causing third-degree burns was not life-threatening conduct. Likewise, Bolden v. State, 267 Ark. 504, 593 S.W.2d 156 (1980), is inapposite because the police officer in that case did not know what caused his injury (a broken jaw and ribs) and [t]he physician who examined the officer shortly after the incident testified that he had not observed any contusion on the officer's head, and there was no physical evidence of a severe blow to the back of the head. Id. We therefore conclude that there is substantial evidence from which the trial judge, sitting as factfinder, could have reasonably determined that Mr. Harmon acted with the purpose to cause serious physical injury to Mr. Anglin under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.