Opinion ID: 1160457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Objection to Cross-examination of Codefendant Ross

Text: On direct examination, defendant gave testimony in which he presented an alibi for the time and place of the charged robbery and murder of Allen Birkman. In the course of cross-examination by the People, he denied that he had acted violently during an argument with Neetelfer Hawkins at the latter's home on May 16, 1987, the day before the crimes in question. In her case, Ross took the witness stand in her own defense. On direct examination, in an effort to shift responsibility for the charged robbery and murder off her shoulders and onto defendant's, she testified in substance that she did not even suspect what he had evidently intended, but had accompanied him out of fear. On cross-examination by the People, Ross was asked, Why were you afraid of him?, and answered, Because I had just witnessed what he did to ... Miss Hawkins. Later in the People's cross-examination, Ross was asked, What was the thing at Neetlefer's [ sic ] that made you afraid of [him]?, but was prevented from answering by defendant's objection that any response would be irrelevant. At defendant's request, the People then made an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury, by taking Ross on voir dire: She testified about defendant's argument with Hawkins as a lover's quarrel type of thing, in the course of which she screamed and swore at him and he forcibly covered her mouth almost to the point of stifling and handled her roughly, she telling him she was going to call the police and he threatening her he would kill her if she did. Defendant restated his objection that any response by Ross to the People's question about his argument with Hawkins would be irrelevant. In addition, he raised objections that such response would be unduly prejudicial and would amount to inadmissible character evidence, i.e., evidence of his character or a trait of his character offered to prove his conduct on the specified occasion of the charged robbery and murder (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a)). After a hearing, at which it ultimately appears to have accepted the People's position that whether Ross was afraid of defendant was the nut of her defense and why she was afraid of him was crucial thereto, the superior court generally overruled all defendant's objections to Ross's expected response to the People's question about his argument with Hawkins, but sustained that based on undue prejudice as to any threat to kill. Subsequently, on cross-examination by the People, Ross was asked about defendant's argument with Hawkins, and she answered in accordance with her testimony on voir dire, making plain that he had acted violently, but without mentioning his threat to kill Hawkins. Later, in their case-in-rebuttal, the People called Hawkins and Sergeant Coyle. Hawkins denied that defendant had acted violently during the argument. Sergeant Coyle asserted that she had told him the opposite. (23) Defendant now contends that the superior court erred by generally overruling his irrelevance, undue prejudice, and inadmissible character evidence objections to the People's question to Ross about his argument with Hawkins. As stated, an appellate court reviews a trial court's passing on an objection based on irrelevance for abuse of discretion. The same is true for an objection based on undue prejudice. (See People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1239.) Likewise, for an objection based on inadmissible character evidence. ( People v. Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 864.) There was no abuse of discretion. The superior court was not unreasonable in impliedly determining that Ross's expected response about defendant's argument with Hawkins would be relevant. It had a tendency in reason to prove a disputed fact bearing on a material issue, viz., the relative responsibility of defendant and Ross for the charged robbery and murder. To the extent that his argument with Hawkins would show a supported fear of him on her part, it might be able to diminish her culpability over against his. But to the extent that it would not, it might not. Defendant argues the evidence was irrelevant: insofar as it would favor Ross's position vis-a-vis the People, it could be presented by her but not elicited by them. He furnishes no support for his assertion, and we find none. Relevance does not depend on the identity of the evidence's proponent. Neither does admissibility. With exceptions not applicable here,  all relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 351, italics added.) [18] Neither was the superior court unreasonable in impliedly determining that Ross's expected response about defendant's argument with Hawkins would not be unduly prejudicial (except as to his threat to kill her). Certainly, even though it could be considered somewhat collateral and would (and in fact did) lead to rebuttal testimony by Hawkins and Sergeant Coyle, it did not threaten substantial harm to the fairness of the proceedings, as by confusing the issues or misleading the jury. In contrast, it promised substantial benefit to the reliability of the outcome. It arguably constituted the strongest evidence supporting Ross's fear of defendant. Evidence in support was indeed needed: Ross's fear could not be accepted at face value. Defendant argues the evidence was unduly prejudicial. At most, he shows that his argument with Hawkins might have been used by the jury to draw a forbidden inference. That is not enough. [19] Lastly, the superior court was not unreasonable in impliedly determining that Ross's expected response about defendant's argument with Hawkins would not amount to inadmissible character evidence. True, it might have provided an indication of a propensity toward violence on his part. But it was not offered to prove his conduct on the specified occasion of the charged robbery and murder. Defendant argues the evidence was inadmissible character evidence. Here, as above, the most that he shows is that it might have been used by the jury to draw a forbidden inference. Here, as above, that is not enough. [20] Even if the superior court had, in fact, erred by overruling any of defendant's objections to the People's question to Ross about his argument with Hawkins  which it did not  reversal would not be called for. (24) It is the general rule for error under [California] law  which we believe is applicable here  that reversal requires prejudice and prejudice in turn requires a reasonable probability of an effect on the outcome under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [299 P.2d 243]. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1253.) [21] Such a probability does not appear. In view of all the evidence that was properly admitted on each of the charged crimes, Ross's testimony concerning the lover's quarrel between defendant and Hawkins was of no marginal significance.