Opinion ID: 1145030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: equal protection under the alaska constitution

Text: Article I, section 1, of the Alaska Constitution provides, in part, that all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights. In State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978), we set forth a comprehensive approach to equal protection challenges under our state constitution. Initially, we must look to the purpose of the statute, viewing the legislation as a whole, and the circumstances surrounding it. It must be determined that this purpose is legitimate, that it falls within the police power of the state. Examining the means used to accomplish the legislative objectives and the reasons advanced therefore, the court must then determine whether the means chosen substantially further the goals of the enactment. Finally, the state interest in the chosen means must be balanced against the nature of the constitutional right involved. Id. at 12 (footnotes omitted). We apply a single test which is nevertheless flexible and dependent upon the importance of the rights involved. Based on the nature of the right, a greater or lesser burden is placed on the state to show that the classification has a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate governmental objective. [38] We shall now apply the Erickson test to the gear license requirement. Seldom, if ever, will a statutory scheme, especially one as complicated as the Limited Entry Act, have a single monolithic purpose. The legislature usually acts with a variety of purposes in mind and each of these purposes deserves judicial recognition. [39] From the legislature's statement of purpose in AS 16.43.010, [40] we discern the following broad purposes: 1) enhancing the economic benefit to fishermen since too many involved in the industry prevented those relying on fishing for a livelihood from securing adequate remuneration; 2) conserving the fishery; and 3) avoiding unjust discrimination in the allocation of a limited number of entry permits. Admittedly, another purpose behind the license requirement was 4) administrative convenience. [41] Undoubtedly, the conservation and economic purposes of the Act are legitimate because they are within the police power of the state. [42] These purposes were fulfilled by limiting the number of entry permits. AS 16.43.240(a). [43] This is accomplished initially by reference to the number of units of gear fished in the specified area in designated prior years, a means independent of the requirement that applicants be prior gear licensees. Consequently, we cannot agree with the Commission that requiring applicants to be prior licensees furthers the purpose of conserving the fishery. The conservation of the fishery was accomplished without any help from AS 16.43.260(a)'s requirement that applicants be prior gear licensees. Having established a method of limiting the maximum number of permits to be issued, the legislature had to specify a means of allocating those permits. This could have been accomplished by any number of methods, including a lottery or auction. [44] The purposes of promoting administrative convenience and avoiding unjust discrimination in the allocation of permits are related to this problem. The gear license requirement relieves the Commission of the burden of processing and ranking all persons choosing to apply. Although the purpose of promoting administrative convenience is legitimate, it cannot outweigh the important right to engage in economic endeavor, [45] which in some cases may involve the right to employment in the industry. [46] The other purpose in limiting the eligible pool of applicants to gear license holders is to prevent unjust discrimination by allocating permits according to the degree of hardship which a person would suffer by exclusion from the fishery. [47] The purpose of preventing unjust discrimination in the awarding of entry permits is undoubtedly legitimate. Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976). Thus, the crucial issue is whether the circumstance of holding a gear license bears a fair and substantial relationship to that purpose sought to be advanced by AS 16.43.260(a), avoiding unjust discrimination in the awarding of entry permits. A consideration in determining unjust discrimination is the loss to be suffered by exclusion from the fishery. In that regard, it is only the former gear license holders who would lose a privilege which they had previously enjoyed  that of operating or assisting in the operation of fishing gear as a gear license holder. Nongear licensees who fished as commercial fishermen are still entitled to participate in the same capacity as before the enactment. They are free to seek employment in the fishery, and there is no restriction on their securing commercial fishing licenses. [48] They are deprived of some opportunities of changing their status in the fishing industry which were previously available, although they may secure an entry permit by transfer, purchase or inheritance. But the deprivation of the opportunity to change status is quite different from the loss of a status previously acquired. An analogy suggested at oral argument seems apt. Assuming that legislation could validly be enacted limiting the number of licenses to practice law and a determination had to be made of those to be entitled to apply for the licenses, based on hardship, one solution would be to limit applicants to those who had licenses in the past. Paralegals and others who would like to seek entry into the profession might be barred from initial eligibility and thus from advancement to a different status from that previously enjoyed. Nevertheless, it could be concluded that the deprivation of the right to a license previously utilized poses a distinct hardship of a different and usually more substantial nature from that encountered by those not previously licensed. The means used to limit the number of licensees would bear a substantial relationship to the purpose of selection according to hardship caused by inability to secure a license. In fact, what has been done by the Limited Entry Act is but a modification of granting grandfather rights, by which those who were previously engaged in a particular activity are authorized to continue in the enterprise, although the entry of others is restricted. Acts conferring grandfather rights have generally withstood equal protection challenges. [49] Admittedly, in the analogy referred to above, as well as in the fishing industry, individual cases will arise in which those barred may be able to show extreme hardship. [50] The legislature in its wisdom could conceivably have better provided for such instances. But equal protection, even under Alaska's stricter standard, does not demand perfection in classification. If it did, there would be few laws establishing classifications that would sustain an equal protection challenge. [51] In determining whether the gear license requirement bears a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of preventing unjust discrimination in allocating entry permits, we also note that those who had gear licenses had to own or lease gear, and, as a result, often would be owners of vessels as well. The license requirement therefore is a rough way of designating a group having most to lose by being excluded from the fishery. [52] In this regard, the gear license requirement furthers the legislative purpose of preventing unjust discrimination because it seeks to protect those having the most to lose by exclusion from the fishery. We conclude that the requirement that applicants for entry permits be past gear licensees does not violate the equal protection provision of the Alaska Constitution. [53] Since the superior court did not have the opportunity to pass on Apokedak's contention that he was in fact a gear license holder by virtue of his alleged partnership or joint venture with gear licensee George Wilson in 1970 and 1971, the case will be remanded for a determination of that issue. REVERSED AND REMANDED.