Opinion ID: 2973722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Taking the rifle from Thacker

Text: The seizure of personal property by law enforcement officials is unconstitutional if accomplished by the use of excessive force. Collins v. Nagle, 892 F.2d 489, 497 (6th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging the validity of an excessive-force claim for the seizure of property, but granting qualified immunity because the force used against the plaintiffs was not excessive and therefore did not amount to a constitutional violation). In the present case, the deputies arrived while Thacker was allegedly talking with his family. Thacker says that the deputies approached, asked who he was and what he was doing with the rifle, and snatched it unexpectedly out of his hands, all before he had a chance to respond. According to Thacker, only after this incident did he raise his voice and use profanity with the deputies. The scene was chaotic when the deputies arrived, with nine firefighters in two trucks battling the blaze. In light of the 911 call reporting a man with a gun that prompted their arrival, the deputies had a legitimate concern for the safety of those in the area, as well as for their own safety. When they encountered Thacker with the rifle, they made an on-the-spot judgment to take the gun first and get answers to their questions later. Although the handling of this situation might not have been a -12- model of appropriate police conduct, we cannot conclude that the taking of the rifle constituted the use of excessive force. 2. Wrestling Thacker to the ground while attempting to handcuff him After the deputies took the rifle from Thacker, he became upset, raised his voice, and was swearing. Thacker did not calm down despite the deputies’ request that he do so. The parties dispute whether the deputies told Thacker that he was under arrest. Thacker claims that they did not. Even so, the record reflects that the deputies were not attempting to tackle Thacker into the dirt simply for the sake of tackling him. Rather, both deputies attempted to reach for Thacker to restrain him, and the three men fell after each deputy tried to pull Thacker in a different direction. The crime of disorderly conduct is not a violent or serious crime, and this fact weighs in favor of using less force in arresting Thacker. But the deputies were attempting the arrest of an upset, loud, and swearing individual who refused to calm down. Under these circumstances, the deputies did not utilize excessive force in reaching for Thacker and trying to place him in handcuffs. This constitutional application of force ultimately caused all three men to fall to the ground where a struggle ensued, but that unfortunate result does not render the actions of the deputies unconstitutional. Once the men were on the ground struggling, the deputies were within their rights to continue their attempts to restrain Thacker because he admits that was resisting the deputies. The deputies therefore did not violate Thacker’s constitutional rights in the way that they carried out his arrest. 3. Pushing Thacker into the cruiser After Thacker was handcuffed, the deputies took him to the cruiser. Despite being told by Thacker that there was not enough room for him to slide into the back seat through the narrow -13- opening, Officer Bollinger “unexpectedly pushed” him in. Thacker cut his arm on the door latch as he entered the vehicle. Just before Bollinger pushed Thacker into the cruiser, there had been a heated exchange where Thacker raised his voice and was swearing at the deputies. A struggle ensued, resulting in Thacker eventually being handcuffed. Considering the totality of the circumstances, Thacker has failed to show that Bollinger utilized excessive force by pushing him into the cruiser. The record reflects that the unfortunate wound suffered by Thacker in this case was simply the unexpected and unintended consequence of being placed in the car. In sum, Thacker has failed to demonstrate that the deputies violated his constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable seizure and from excessive force. The record simply does not reflect that the deputies acted in a plainly incompetent manner or that their actions were objectively unreasonable. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (holding that qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”). They are therefore entitled to qualified immunity. See Estate of Carter, 408 F.3d at 310-11 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201) (setting forth the qualified immunity analysis). E. Whether the district court properly dismissed Thacker’s state-law claims In addition to his claims for the alleged constitutional violations brought pursuant to § 1983, Thacker contends that he was falsely imprisoned in violation of state law. After the district court properly dismissed all of Thacker’s federal claims, it declined to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim and dismissed it. Such a dismissal was proper and in accordance with the usual course of proceedings in this circuit. See Brandenburg v. Hous. Auth. of Irvine, 253 F.3d 891, -14- 900 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he usual course is for the district court to dismiss the state-law claims without prejudice if all federal claims are disposed of on summary judgment.”)