Opinion ID: 1058965
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Refusal to Permit Expert Healthcare Testimony at Sentencing

Text: The trial court granted Muhammad's motion under the provisions of Code ง 19.2-264.3:1 for the appointment of mental health experts to assist him in his defense. Thereafter, Muhammad gave notice of his intent to use expert psychiatric testimony at the sentencing phase to prove mitigating factors. In response, the Commonwealth moved the trial court for an order appointing an expert for the Commonwealth pursuant to Code ง 19.2-264.3:1(F). At the hearing on the Commonwealth's motion for the appointment of an expert, the trial court granted Muhammad's request that the Commonwealth's expert be prohibited from inquiring into circumstances of the crimes alleged or Muhammad's relationship with Malvo. This restriction was based upon Muhammad's declaration that he did not intend to present evidence that he acted under extreme mental disturbance or failed to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. At that time, the trial court advised Muhammad that if he refused to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert, it could result in the exclusion of Muhammad's expert's testimony. Muhammad acknowledged to the trial court that he understood the requirements and the potential consequences for noncompliance. Nonetheless, on October 8, 2003, Muhammad refused to be interviewed by the Commonwealth's expert without his counsel present. Also, he objected to the expert's use of a video camera during the interview. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court permitted counsel to be present at the interview by the Commonwealth's expert and further ruled that the interview could be recorded by video camera. Nonetheless, the following day, Muhammad refused to meet with the Commonwealth's expert under any circumstances. In response, the Commonwealth moved the trial court under the provisions of Code ง 19.2-264.3:1 to prohibit Muhammad from presenting expert testimony from his court appointed experts at sentencing. At the hearing, the trial court again directly addressed Muhammad concerning the potential effect of his refusal to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert. Muhammad indicated that he understood and that he had made the choice not to cooperate. The trial court exercised its discretion under the statute and barred Muhammad from presenting expert testimony from his court appointed experts regarding mitigating factors at the sentencing proceeding. Despite the trial court's ruling, at the conclusion of the evidence in the guilt phase of the trial, Muhammad moved the trial court to permit him to present expert testimony from one of his court appointed mental health experts, Dr. Cunningham, in the sentencing phase. Muhammad represented that Dr. Cunningham would not testify based upon anything he learned from his examination; rather, he would testify based upon statistical analyses about prison populations. Apparently, this testimony would be offered as relevant to the question of Muhammad's future dangerousness. The Commonwealth objected, but the trial court overruled the Commonwealth's objection at that time and invited Muhammad to present Dr. Cunningham's testimony outside the presence of the jury for a determination of its admissibility. Muhammad did not do so. After all of the evidence had been presented to the jury in the sentencing phase and after both sides rested their case, Muhammad announced that he would present a proffer from Dr. Cunningham. An affidavit from Dr. Cunningham was thereafter submitted to the trial court. In assignments of error 29, 75, and 76, Muhammad attacks various rulings of the trial court on this matter. Muhammad argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny him the opportunity to present expert testimony. He further states, in conclusory fashion, that the denial violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He further complains that he was not able to present lay testimony in mitigation. Finally, he argues that, because of the notice of intent to use expert testimony in a limited fashion, the Commonwealth was not entitled to an expert evaluation of Muhammad. Considering the Commonwealth's right to an evaluation of Muhammad, the trial court found, and Muhammad agreed, that the issue of notice of use of evidence in a limited fashion was not raised before the trial court ruled on the matter. It was raised for the first time in post trial proceedings. The trial court ruled that it was waived. Objections must be stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the trial court's ruling in order to be preserved for appellate review. This objection will not be considered on appeal. Rule 5:25. Consideration of Muhammad's arguments on these matters requires a clear understanding of what the trial court ruled concerning these issues. The trial court ruled that Muhammad could not present expert testimony on mitigation factors at sentencing because of his refusal to abide by the trial court's order to submit to an evaluation by the Commonwealth. The trial court did not bar the presentation of non-expert testimony on this issue. Thereafter, Muhammad sought the ability to present limited expert testimony purporting not to be based upon expert interviews. The Commonwealth objected. The trial court overruled the Commonwealth's objection and gave Muhammad the opportunity to present evidence out of the presence of the jury that would allow the trial court to rule on its admissibility. Muhammad did not take advantage of this invitation. Only after all the evidence was presented at the sentencing phase and both parties rested their case did Muhammad offer an affidavit as a proffer of Dr. Cunningham's testimony. He may not be heard to complain about the exclusion of Dr. Cunningham's limited testimony when he did not give the trial court the contemporaneous opportunity to evaluate its admissibility. Rule 5:25. Nothing in the trial court's ruling prohibited non-expert testimony on mitigating factors in the sentencing proceeding. Muhammad cites Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. 216, 257, 585 S.E.2d 801, 825-26 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1006, 124 S.Ct. 2018, 158 L.Ed.2d 523 (2004), and suggests that somehow that case further prohibits such testimony in the absence of expert testimony. Nothing in Lovitt suggests such a bar. Considering the main thrust of Muhammad's argument, we turn our attention to the claim that the trial court abused its discretion, and that its decision barring expert testimony on mitigation factors and the statutes that permit such a decision are unconstitutional. Muhammad makes no argument on brief that the statutes are overbroad or vague. His only argument is that their application to him under these circumstances violated various constitutional rights. The trial court provided Muhammad with the experts he requested at state expense. The trial court granted Muhammad's request that his counsel be present during any evaluation by the Commonwealth. The trial court engaged Muhammad directly in court on multiple occasions concerning the potential consequences of his failure to cooperate with the evaluation. On these occasions, Muhammad affirmatively expressed his understanding and further acknowledged that he freely decided not to cooperate. After the trial court made its ruling, it even considered permitting expert mitigation testimony not based upon his own expert's interview with him. Muhammad did not avail himself of the opportunity. Muhammad is correct that limiting the evidence that a criminal defendant may present in his defense implicates numerous constitutional rights. What Muhammad fails to appreciate is that he may, by his knowing and informed decisions, waive such rights. These rights may be as venerated as the right to a jury, the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to exclusion of evidence seized in an unconstitutional manner. As the Supreme Court recently noted, Waiver of the right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must be a `knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances.' Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). We have no difficulty including the right to present mitigating testimony within the panoply of constitutional rights that may be waived by the accused. Upon review of the record, we agree with the trial court that Muhammad's decision not to cooperate was knowingly and intelligently made. The real issue presented is whether the trial court's exercise of discretion was reasonable under the circumstances. The detailed and balanced statutory scheme provided by Code ง 19.2-264.3:1 anticipates decisions made by the accused and the Commonwealth regarding expert mental health evaluations and testimony regarding sentencing issues in a capital murder trial. One of those circumstances arises when the defendant gives notice of intent to present certain types of testimony at sentencing. In response, the Commonwealth may request an evaluation of the defendant. The statute explicitly provides that the trial court must advise the defendant on the record in court that a refusal to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert could result in exclusion of the defendant's expert evidence. Code ง 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1). The statute explicitly provides the remedy for lack of cooperation: the court may admit evidence of such refusal or, in the discretion of the court, bar the defendant from presenting his expert evidence. Code ง 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2). The Supreme Court has recognized that the prosecution has the right to a fair rebuttal of mental health evidence presented by the defendant. In Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987), the defendant challenged the introduction of evidence from a psychiatric report prepared upon joint motion of the defendant and the prosecution. The Court stated, if a defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested. Id. at 422-23, 107 S.Ct. 2906. We agree with the Commonwealth's characterization of the circumstances presented on this question. By his own deliberate conduct, the defendant sought to gain an unfair benefit by obtaining an evaluation that the Commonwealth would be powerless to contest at trial either by meaningful cross-examination or by presenting its own expert testimony. The trial court's remedy thus was protective of the interests of all parties in a fair trial and was not punitive. The trial court's ruling was not unreasonable, especially considering that it was willing to consider expert testimony from Dr. Cunningham not based upon interviews with Muhammad, but Muhammad did not avail himself of the opportunity. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Muhammad's expert witness testimony concerning mitigation factors at sentencing.