Opinion ID: 6107769
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The History of Theft

Text: Prior to 1989, Tennessee did not have a single, generic definition of theft. Rather, theft offenses were contained in a number of antiquated and confusing statutes and included embezzlement, false pretense, fraudulent conversion, larceny, receiving or concealing stolen property, and shoplifting. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-101 (2014 & 2017 Supp.), Sentencing Comm'n Cmnts. 5 These statutes derived from English common law, which was later applied in the American colonies and then in American states. People v. Williams , 57 Cal.4th 776 , 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81 , 305 P.3d 1241 , 1244 (2013) (recounting the history of theft-like crimes from their common-law roots in Britain and the United States to the early 20th century development of California's consolidated theft statute). Under the common law, larceny was the first theft-like crime. Id. , 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81 , 305 P.3d at 1245 . In the 18th century, by a somewhat ad-hoc process, the British Parliament created separate statutory offenses of theft by false pretenses and embezzlement. Id., 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81 , 305 P.3d at 1245-46 . However, this division of theft-like crimes into separate statutory provisions was criticized as burdensome to prosecutors and arbitrary. Id., 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81 , 305 P.3d at 1246 . Following the expansion of the scope of theft offenses, the move to enact consolidated theft statutes can be traced at least as far back as 1827, when the Parliament of the United Kingdom noted that a failure of justice frequently arises from the subtle distinction between larceny and fraud and allowed, by statute, a conviction for larceny to stand even if a defendant was indicted for false pretenses. State v. Tower , 122 Kan. 165 , 251 P. 401 , 402-03 (1926) (describing this as an act consolidating and amending the laws relating to larceny and offenses connected therewith and citing 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 29, 67 Stat. at L. 168 § 53 (1827)). In 1873, the Virginia Supreme Court opined that various theft offenses were so much alike in many respects and often separated by lines so indistinct, and almost imaginary, that it was difficult for the prosecutor, in most cases, to determine, a priori , which particular crime to charge in the indictment. Anable v. Com. , 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 563 , 580 (1873). This criticism of arbitrary distinctions between larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses, was expanded upon and echoed by many subsequent commentators. See Stuart P. Green, Thirteen Ways to Steal a Bicycle , 17, 284 n. 67 (2012) (hereinafter Green at ___); Com. v. Ryan , 155 Mass. 523 , 30 N.E. 364 , 364-65 (1892) ; Van Vechten v. Am. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. , 239 N.Y. 303 , 146 N.E. 432 , 433 (1925). In the 1950s and 60s, the American Law Institute attempted to resolve some of these arbitrary distinctions by drafting and including in the Model Penal Code a consolidated theft statute, from which  many states borrowed in crafting their own statutes. 6 See Model Penal Code § 223.1 (1962). By 1985, just four years before the General Assembly enacted the consolidated theft statute at issue in this appeal, the Maryland Supreme Court summarized the state of the law throughout the United States and the movement towards consolidation of theft offenses: At least thirty-five states, in addition to Maryland, have enacted consolidated theft-related statutes. While the provisions of these statutes vary from state to state, their purpose appears to be, as in Maryland, to create a single statutory crime encompassing various common law theft-type offenses in order to eliminate the confusing and fine-line common law distinctions between particular forms of larceny. Eleven states have enacted provisions virtually identical to those contained in § 341 of the Maryland statute; they are in general conformity with § 223.1(1) of the Model Penal Code (1962). Jones v. State , 303 Md. 323 , 493 A.2d 1062 , 1067, 1067 n.7-9 (1985) (internal citations omitted). 7