Opinion ID: 848813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the nature of the srca

Text: In Lynch, the opinion stated that the SRCA clearly serves a punitive and deterrent purpose, 463 Mich. at 586, 624 N.W.2d 180, and that the act was indisputably punitive, not compensatory, id. at n. 4. These statements were made in response to the plaintiff's argument that the statute was remedial and should be applied retroactively under the exception to the general rule of prospective application. Defendant maintains that under Michigan case law, punitive damages are not available absent a showing of malicious or willful misconduct. In support of this argument, defendant cites Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 421 Mich. 125, 364 N.W.2d 600 (1984). In Peisner, the Court considered whether exemplary and punitive damages under the Michigan libel statute, M.C.L. § 600.2911(2)(b), resulted in plaintiff being compensated twice for the same injury. [6] In resolving this question, the Court stated that exemplary and punitive damages for libel cannot be awarded in the absence of a finding that the defendant acted with common-law malicein the sense of ill will or bad faithin publishing the libel. Id. at 136, 364 N.W.2d 600. There are distinct differences between the language of the libel statute and that of the SRCA. The libel statute does not identify any particular mental state surrounding the libel before liability for exemplary or punitive damages attaches, whereas the SRCA expressly predicates liability on an intentional failure to pay. In addition, the libel statute explicitly permits the consideration of the good faith of the defendant, M.C.L. § 600.2911(2)(b), whereas the SRCA is conspicuously silent on the subject. [7] The textual difference between the statutes militates against the application of the Peisner holding to the facts of this case. The double-damages provision of the SRCA is irrefutably punitive rather than compensatory in the sense that it provides for an award of damages above and beyond that necessary to make plaintiff whole under the contract. However, that conclusion is not controlling or even relevant to the proper construction of this unambiguous statute. The clear and unambiguous language of the statute penalizes intentional failure to pay, without regard to the motivation of the principal. Under the language of the statute, it appears that the only cognizable defense to a double-damages claim is if the failure to pay the commission were based on inadvertence or oversight. The Legislature is certainly within its power to award punitive-type damages for such actions if it chooses to do so. The imposition of a contrary judicial gloss is inappropriate where the Legislature has clearly expressed its intentions in the words of the statute. Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Road Comm., 463 Mich. 143, 150, 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000); Chmielewski, supra at 606, 580 N.W.2d 817; People v. Gilbert, 414 Mich. 191, 324 N.W.2d 834 (1982).