Opinion ID: 1942017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Walker's Motion for a Mistrial.

Text: Appellant Walker contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial on grounds that the government failed to substantiate a representation made in its opening statement. Specifically, the prosecutor told the jury, in its opening statement, that Myron Carter, Whittaker's cousin, and a friend of Walker's, would testify that following the stabbing, Walker admitted to Carter that he had stabbed Smith. In defiance of a government subpoena, Carter did not appear in court, and thus the government was unable to substantiate this representation. Walker claims that no possible instruction would cure the prejudicial impact of this statement, and accordingly defense counsel did not request one. The trial court, however, did instruct the jury that the statements and the arguments of counsel [made during opening statement] are not evidence in the case. And you must separate evidence from statements and arguments made by the attorneys. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The law does not require that the opening trial statements be completely supported by evidence introduced during the trial. Robinson v. United States, 361 A.2d 199, 200 (D.C.1976) (internal quotations and citation omitted). This court has further determined that the failure to sustain all opening remarks during the trial is not automatically ground for a new trial. Id. The trial court specifically found that the prosecutor did not make this representation in its opening statement in bad faith. Further, the prosecutor's reference to Carter's proposed testimony was not critical to the government's case, which otherwise was strong. See Lucas v. United States, 522 A.2d 876, 879-80 (D.C.1987). Finally, we conclude that any possible prejudice to Walker was cured by the trial court's instructions to the jury that the arguments set forth in counsels' opening statements are not evidence in the case, and that as jurors, they must separate these statements from the actual evidence. See Robinson, supra, 361 A.2d at 200.