Opinion ID: 552756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Impact of the Error

Text: 25 Once we have found the existence of an error, we must then determine whether that error is of such significance as to require a remand of the case for retrial. This court has indicated that [t]he standard for determining when an error in a jury instruction requires reversal is the general standard for determining harmless error after objection. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1339 n. 16 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226, 104 S.Ct. 2678, 81 L.Ed.2d 874 (1984) (citations omitted). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 61, an error requires reversal only if we conclude that the faulty jury instruction affect[ed] the substantial rights of the parties. 4 The Supreme Court has stated that if one cannot say, with fair assurance, ... that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). The proper inquiry is whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the [verdict] cannot stand. Id. This inquiry involves an assessment of the likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the case. Jordan v. Medley, 711 F.2d 211, 218 (D.C.Cir.1983) (citations omitted). 26 We are well aware that the circuits are divided on the appropriate standard of review to apply in gauging the effect of an error in a civil case. 5 In the Jordan case we noted that the Supreme Court in Kotteakos, a criminal case, acknowledge[d] that although the 'substantial rights' test applies to both civil and criminal cases, that 'does not mean that the same criteria shall always be applied' to those separate categories. Jordan, 711 F.2d at 219 n. 6 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 762, 66 S.Ct. at 1246-47). In so doing, we noted the language of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2111 (1976), which requires a court on appeal or on a writ of certiorari to give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. The substantial rights language is the same phrase construed by the Supreme Court in Kotteakos under section 269 of the Judicial Code (then 28 U.S.C. Sec. 391). The present statute, in common with the statute construed in Kotteakos, expresses no distinction between civil and criminal cases. Cf. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 762, 66 S.Ct. at 1246 ([t]he statute in terms makes no distinction between civil and criminal causes). 27 Whatever difference may be appropriate in specific cases with reference to the criteria to be applied under the Kotteakos standard, we have in the past applied the Kotteakos standard to civil cases and do so today. See Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 844 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 1622, 71 L.Ed.2d 855 (1982). Applying that standard to the present case, we conclude there is no way in which the trial court's error could have affected the substantial rights of the parties. Although the subsequent decision in Williams v. Baker specifically negated the causal connection between the physical and emotional damages charged by the district court, errors in jury instructions may be ignored if the erroneous instruction went to an issue that is immaterial in the light of the jury's verdict. See 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Sec. 2885 at 290-91 (1973). In the present appeal, the erroneous jury instruction is irrelevant to the outcome of the case. From our examination of the special verdicts returned by the jury, it is clear that the jury found appellees USEC and Elcon entirely free of any negligence in the design or the maintenance of the elevator. See J.A. at 377. To each of the district court's queries regarding the negligence of the appellees in the design or maintenance of the elevator, the jury replied No. Id. In addition, the court asked the jury [i]s Elcon Enterprises, Incorporated, liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress? Id. To this question the jury also replied No. Id. Under Williams v. Baker, recovery may be obtained for negligent infliction of emotional distress and physical injury if the defendant's negligence caused a plaintiff in the zone of physical danger to fear for her own life or safety. Obviously, a plaintiff must first establish that the defendant was negligent in order to recover for any inflicted emotional distress. This was a burden appellant failed to meet. The erroneous jury charge could not in any way affect the jury's determination of negligence on the part of the appellees as it dealt only with the issue of damages. Thus, the charge could not have risen to the level of harmful error. 28 Because the district court carefully employed a verdict form requiring special verdicts on the questions of negligence and damages, it is easy to ascertain that the erroneous damages instruction could not have influenced the negligence verdict. In instructing the jury on the negligence issues, the district judge defined negligence as the failure to exercise ordinary care or doing something a person using ordinary care would not do or not doing something a person using ordinary care would do. J.A. 361. While he expanded on the standards of care and other matters relevant to the instructed definition of negligence, his instructions on the negligence issues do not involve damages matters. The portion of the charge subsequently rendered erroneous by changes in District of Columbia law went only to damages, to matters inquired of by the special verdict issues listed under number 5 on the verdict form. In examining the court's instructions, we presume[ ] the jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the particular language of the trial court's instructions ... and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1976 n. 9, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (emphasis added). 6 This treatment of jury responsiveness to instruction has been described by the Supreme Court as the almost invariable assumption of the law. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). In the present case, the jurors could not have answered the negligence issues in the negative as they did unless they found no failure of the standard of reasonable care. As they found no such failure, the amount of damages was immaterial. To reverse the district court, we would be forced to assume that the jurors disregarded their instructions and decided the negligence issues in the negative only because they thought no damages were involved. To so hold would be to ignore the approach deemed an almost invariable assumption by the highest court--something we are not at liberty to do even if we wished. 7 29 Although appellant argues that we should attach sufficient importance to the question asked by the jury to reverse, we cannot agree. The jury's question to the court regarding the necessity of tracing emotional distress to a negligently caused physical injury fails to convince us that the error was harmful. The jury's question to the district court concerned the causation requirement in the recovery of emotional damages. Specifically: Do the psychological effects (damages-potential compensation) have to be the result of (related) physical injury? J.A. at 375. Although the court's response was incorrect in light of the intervening change in the law, the question did not deal in any way with the finding of negligence, but only went to the issue of damages. Thus, the judge's response could not have misled the jury with respect to its finding of negligence. Because appellant was unable to establish negligence, her action for recovery of negligent infliction of emotional damages cannot survive as a matter of law. Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d at 1067 (requiring negligent conduct on part of defendant for recovery of emotional distress damages). Consequently, the district court's erroneous response to the jury's inquiry is immaterial in light of the jury's specific finding of no negligence on the part of appellees. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the district court.