Opinion ID: 1028082
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Request for FMLA Leave

Text: Pfizer submits that the district court should have granted judgment in its favor because no evidence suggested that Dotson applied for FMLA leave or exercised his FMLA rights. The company argues that it could not have intended to retaliate against Dotson for using his FMLA rights when he did not actually exercise those rights. In addition to providing a substantive (or prescriptive) right to unpaid leave in certain situations, the FMLA also provides proscriptive rights that protect employees from discrimination or retaliation for exercising their substantive rights under the FMLA. Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 546 (4th Cir.2006) (citing Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159-60 (1st Cir.1998)). Section 2615 of the FMLA makes it unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). While the FMLA does not specifically forbid discharging an employee in retaliation for his use of FMLA leave, 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) states that employers are prohibited from discriminating against employees or prospective employees who have used FMLA leave and that employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions, or disciplinary actions. Courts have recognized that the FMLA provides a cause of action for retaliation. Blankenship v. Buchanan Gen. Hosp., 140 F.Supp.2d 668, 671-72 (W.D.Va.2001). Relying principally on a case from the Eleventh Circuit, Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir.2001), Pfizer argues that for Dotson to establish unlawful retaliation under the FMLA, he must show that Pfizer had notice that he was specifically invoking an FMLA right. Simply asserting that an employer had notice of an employee's need for leave for an FMLA-related reason, Pfizer suggests, cannot open the employer to FMLA retaliation liability. Case law and federal regulations make it clear, however, that employees do not need to invoke the FMLA in order to benefit from its protections. The regulations do not require the employee to expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA; instead, the employee may only state that leave is needed for an expected birth or adoption, for example. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c). After the employee makes such a statement, the responsibility falls on the employer to inquire further about whether the employee is seeking FMLA leave. Id. In providing notice, the employee need not use any magic words. Sarnowski, 510 F.3d at 402. There is no question that Dotson gave Pfizer adequate notice of his need for leave during the adoption process. After he provided this information, the burden shifted to Pfizer to determine whether he was requesting FMLA leave. Pfizer has not shown that it made any inquiry into whether his adoption-related leave should have been classified as protected under the FMLA. Pfizer's legal argument would allow it to use its own failure to determine whether leave should be designated as FMLA-protected to block liability for retaliation. We decline to allow an employer to take advantage of its own lapse in such a way. Language in Strickland does appear to countenance the view that, for a retaliation claim to proceed, an employer must be on notice that an employee specifically invoked the protection of the FMLA. See 510 F.3d at 1207. In Strickland, the employee had an argument with his supervisor and then left work. The employee claimed that he told his supervisor and another individual responsible for recording work absences that he was leaving because he was having trouble with his diabetes. Id. at 1202-03. On these facts, the court found that the employer did not have notice that the employee was taking FMLA-protected leave; it did, however, allow the employee to press a FMLA interference claim. Thus, the Strickland court appeared to embrace a higher burden for making a retaliation claim under the statute. In our view, any such elevated evidentiary burden contrasts with the applicable FMLA notice regulations, which do not differentiate between the notice required to make interference claims and other claims under the FMLA. To the extent that Strickland stands for a higher retaliation burden, we decline to follow it. In contrast to the last-minute, confusing statements made by the employee in Strickland, however, Dotson gave clear and advance notice that he was pursuing adoption, an FMLA-qualifying event. His testimony could lead a reasonable jury to find that Pfizer was on notice that he was inquiring about his FMLA options and that Pfizer did not fulfill its duty to inquire about whether his leave should be classified as FMLA-protected. Dotson also proffered evidence showing that he asked about the FMLA and received incorrect or misleading advice from a Pfizer HR official that led him to believe the law could not benefit him. Thus, even if we accepted the higher standard for a retaliation claim implied in Strickland, we would still find that Dotson presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to believe that he was improperly prevented from invoking his FMLA rights and fired in retaliation for actions that should have been protected under the statute. Pfizer cannot use its own oversight to escape liability for retaliation by claiming it had no warning that the statute protected Dotson.