Opinion ID: 1174398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: C. 32-906 provides in pertinent part:

Text: All other property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, including the rents and profits of the separate property of the husband and wife, is community property, unless by the instrument by which any such property is acquired by the wife it is provided that the rents and profits thereof be applied to her sole and separate use; in which case the management and disposal of such rents and profits belongs to the wife, and they are not liable for the debts of the husband. In Idaho there exists but one cause of action for personal injuries to a married resident of this state arising out of the tortious conduct of a third party. Muir v. City of Pocatello (1922), 36 Idaho 532, 212 P. 345; Swager v. Peterson (1930), 49 Idaho 785, 291 P. 1049. That single cause of action is a property right and, together with any proceeds recovered therefrom, is the community property of both spouses. Muir v. City of Pocatello, supra ; Swager v. Peterson, supra . The wife's interest in community property is a present vested estate, not a mere expectancy, and vests at the time of its acquisition and is equal in degree, quantity, nature and extent with that of her husband's except only as to its management and control. Anderson v. Idaho Mutual Benefit Assoc., 77 Idaho 373, 292 P.2d 760; Hansen v. Blevins, 84 Idaho 49, 367 P.2d 758. This action was commenced by Cloyd Doggett and the cause of action was the community property of both spouses. Charlottie Verlene Doggett's interest in the cause of action was a property right equal in nature and extent to that of her husband. The action, therefore, was brought by Cloyd Doggett as the manager of the community. Any proceeds that might have been recovered, if he had not died, would have been community assets. Here the property was acquired and vested prior to the dissolution of the community by the death of the husband. In the early days of the common law of England a wife was little more than a chattel. As stated by Professor Brockelbank in his The Community Property Law of Idaho: For the common mass the common law was the incident of every day living. The wife was incompetent to contract and she lost nearly everything by marriage. As Charles A. and Mary Beard have said: `Marriage under the common law system is equivalent to civil death for the wife.' Perhaps one of the longest steps forward in relieving wives of many of the cruel injustices of the common law was the enactment of community property statutes. Those statutory schemes generally place the ownership of property acquired during coverture equally between husband and wife. Professor Brockelbank states: The traditional pattern of `reception' of the common law in America, as the main body of the law, modified a bit here and there as the needs of the moment make desirable, has produced results in many fields that are not unsatisfactory. But this is not true in the field of the property relations of the spouses. There are two reasons. The common law system is so illogical and unjust as to be beyond the possibility of correction by mere tinkering. And the public attitude toward women and their proper place in the social fabric has undergone a complete change. Professor Brockelbank points out that a wife theoretically and in the most desirable scheme of things is equally responsible for the acquisition of the family assets and she suffers equal financial loss when the family is deprived of its assets or its ability to acquire assets because of the wrongful acts of a third person. We hold therefore that, to the extent that there has been alleged, and the appellant can prove, damage to the community by way of depletion of community assets, reduction of the ability of the community to earn income, costs and expenses chargeable against community property, and the general damages for pain and suffering, such cause of action survives the death of the deceased spouse and no other person and the damages are restricted to those which accrued prior to the death of Doggett. As is well stated in Haney v. Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964): The reason the courts have denied their logical impulses and have continued to enforce an unfair rule of law is because they have been nurtured and sustained by another ancient and firmly fixed doctrine, that is, stare decisis et non quieta movere  to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established. But when established things are no longer secure in a fast changing world, the court should re-examine the precedents and determine if they provide a proper standing under present conditions. We have examined the precedents and the reasons for the rule of non-survivability of causes of action following the death of a plaintiff. We find the precedents unclear and unsatisfactory and the purported reasons for the rule virtually non-existent. We suggest therefore that a continuation of such a rule serves no purpose. The orders of the District Court denying the substitution or addition of the appellant as party plaintiff herein, the granting of the motion for summary judgment for defendants, and the order dismissing the action are reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. Costs to appellant. McFADDEN, C.J., and McQUADE, DONALDSON and SPEAR, JJ., concur.