Opinion ID: 1427943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Involuntary Self-Representation

Text: Mr. Zink asserts that he was deprived of his right to counsel because his decision to represent himself was made involuntarily. He claims that his decision to waive counsel was forced on him and, therefore, was not voluntary due to: (1) insufficient staff in the public defender's office available to assist him; (2) his mental illness; and (3) the trial court's failure to advise him that he could not approach witnesses and he would have to wear a leg brace under his pants prior to him making the decision to waive counsel. A post-conviction motion cannot be used as a substitute for a direct or second appeal. See Tisius, 183 S.W.3d at 212. This Court previously heard Mr. Zink's direct appeal in which he alleged that his waiver of the right to counsel was not given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Zink, 181 S.W.3d at 70. In that appeal, this Court held that Mr. Zink was competent to waive counsel and that this waiver was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Id. at 70. This Court found that: The transcript of the hearing on [Mr. Zink's] motion [to proceed without counsel] and the legal file both confirm that [Mr. Zink] was fully informed of the charges; the potential penalties he faced if convicted, including confinement or death; his rights to appointed counsel and to a trial by jury; the perils of self-representation; and all potential consequences associated with the waiver of counsel. Id. at 70. This Court also noted that the trial court told Mr. Zink that he could change his mind at any time during the trial by simply notifying the court, but that Mr. Zink never did so. Id. at 70-71. While Mr. Zink now raises different factual bases for his claim, the underlying claim is the same. This Court will not review the same underlying claim for a second time. A movant cannot use a Rule 29.15 motion to raise claims that could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal except in rare and exceptional circumstance. Schneider v. State, 787 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo. banc 1990). By adding additional factors that he claims forced him to waive his right to counsel so that his waiver was involuntary, Mr. Zink is attempting to raise claims that could have been and should have been raised on appeal. There are no rare or exceptional circumstances to permit him to do so. Furthermore, even if the issue of waiver of counsel were held to be cognizable in this post-conviction proceeding, the record amply refutes [Mr. Zink's] contention that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to counsel. [12] Henderson v. State, 786 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Mo.App.1990). And, because this Court has found Mr. Zink competent, there can be no prejudice due to counsel's failure to challenge Mr. Zink's competency to waive counsel. The only claim that could arguably be cognizable is Mr. Zink's assertion that his counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him prior to his waiver of counsel that the trial court could require him to be shackled and not permit him to approach witnesses if he waived of counsel. The claim is without merit, however, because Mr. Zink suffered no prejudice. Mr. Zink was aware throughout the trial, including after he was informed that he was required to wear a leg brace and that he could not approach witnesses, that he could change his mind and be represented by the public defenders. Despite being told by the trial court that he could withdraw his waiver, he chose to continue to represent himself.