Opinion ID: 6330595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instructional and Sufficiency Challenges

Text: We move next to Appellants’ arguments that insufficient evidence supported their RICO and arson convictions, and that the jury instruction pertaining to the substantive arson offense was flawed.
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2017). But to reverse a conviction on appeal, a defendant carries a “heavy burden.” United States v. Demott, 906 F.3d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). To prevail, Appellants must show that “no rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotations omitted). And in reviewing how a rational trier of fact would rule, “we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” Martoma, 894 F.3d at 72 (quotations omitted). We thus “credit[] every inference that could have been drawn in the government’s favor[] and defer[] to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of the evidence.” Id. (quotations omitted). With those principles in mind, we first turn to Appellants’ challenges to their convictions for substantively violating RICO and conspiring to violate RICO, 22 as charged in Counts 1 and 2, respectively. Appellants contend that the Government offered insufficient proof that their criminal syndicate qualified as a RICO enterprise and therefore their convictions on Counts 1 and 2 must be vacated. We disagree. As relevant here, RICO makes it unlawful for “any person employed by or associated with any enterprise” whose activities affect interstate or foreign commerce “to conduct or participate . . . in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,” or to conspire to do so. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d). Congress defined “enterprise” for purposes of RICO broadly. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944-46 (2009). An enterprise “includes any . . . group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Such a group has “at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946. Or to put it plainly, an association-in-fact enterprise is “simply a continuing unit that functions with a common purpose.” Id. at 948. Because of the expansive nature of an association-in-fact enterprise, it may help to think of the concept by what qualities are unnecessary. The group need 23 not have a name. Id. Nor must it “have a hierarchical structure or a ‘chain of command.’” Id. Its members “need not have fixed roles.” Id. And the group need not continually commit crimes—its associates may “engage in spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence.” Id. The breadth of what encapsulates such an enterprise means that its existence “is oftentimes more readily proven by what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.” United States v. Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). Thus, while the enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity are separate elements, “proof of various racketeering acts may be relied on to establish the existence of the charged enterprise.” Id. (quotations omitted); see Boyle, 556 U.S. at 947 (explaining that “the evidence used to prove the pattern of racketeering activity and the evidence establishing an enterprise ‘may in particular cases coalesce’” (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981))). With that backdrop, the proof at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, established that Appellants’ criminal syndicate qualified as an enterprise for purposes of RICO. 24 To start, there was considerable overlap in the individuals who committed the racketeering offenses. At least two criminal syndicate members committed eight of the nine extortions. And for the last extortion, which Tsvetkov committed alone, Tsvetkov immediately informed Gershman and another syndicate member right after he assaulted his victim, and further discussed with Gershman what he (Tsvetkov) had told the police. The syndicate members had broad involvements in the other crimes as well: most of the syndicate members took part in the illegal gambling, arson, and marijuana trafficking. The dissent contends that there was “narrow” overlap between the gambling and marijuana operations. Dissent at 6. But the evidence shows otherwise. The gambling operation had six partners: Gershman, Tsvetkov, Krugly, Malkeyev, Yusufov, and Zelinger. Of those six partners, four also had roles in the marijuana distribution business. Gershman and Malkeyev ran that business. Tsvetkov served as one of the marijuana business’s main suppliers. Yusufov created fake law enforcement paperwork to make it appear that a quantity of marijuana had been stolen, thereby allowing the business to keep that marijuana without having to pay for it. And when someone stole marijuana from 25 the business, Gershman asked Yusufov to arrange a meeting with the suspected thief, where that person was attacked by Gershman, Tsvetkov, and Malkeyev. And even when a member did not directly take part in a particular crime, that member would often still lend a hand. For instance, Gershman helped Yusufov handle problems with Yusufov’s cocaine business, serving as Yusufov’s “go-to guy” and “muscle.” App’x 459-60. This would include Gershman setting up meetings and committing acts of intimidation and violence for Yusufov. Still further proof of the existence of an enterprise came from how syndicate members interacted with one another. Although lacking a formal structure or official titles, the syndicate still operated with a rough hierarchy in which certain individuals, like Gershman, Tsvetkov, and Yusufov, were above a drug runner like Bobritsky. And taking Bobritsky as an example, Yusufov was only able to bring in Bobritsky to work as a cocaine runner after securing permission to do so from Gershman. The planning of the arson of the Voorhies Avenue Poker Spot further reflected the hierarchical role of certain individuals, with Gershman directing others to turn off their phones and Tsvetkov asking who would burn down the spot, a job that ultimately was assigned to lower-level syndicate members. 26 The members also would share proceeds, with lower-level members often having no say in the cut they received. The dissent downplays the number of times when “alleged syndicate members were paid for loansharking referrals, help with an extortion, or some other odd job.” Dissent at 10. Yet the evidence adduced at trial revealed that it was common for Gershman and others to share proceeds of their crimes with fellow syndicate members, including with lower-level members and ones who did not participate in the particular crime. Specific instances of such payments include: (1) Gershman paying syndicate member Artiom Pocinoc $1,500 for assisting in an extortion; (2) Gershman paying Malkeyev $1,000 for referring him to a loan shark customer; (3) Gershman paying Bobritsky $1,000 for helping extort Kotovnikov; (4) Gershman paying Bobritsky $50 to $100 each time he picked up loan money; (5) Malkeyev paying Bobritsky $50 to pick up loan money; (6) Gershman and Malkeyev paying Librado Rivera about $40,000 a year to be a drug runner; (7) Tsvetkov paying Yusufov $1,200 for helping to defraud Progressive Insurance; (8) Gershman, Malkeyev, and Bobritsky supposedly evenly sharing profits from the marijuana business, with Gershman and Malkeyev secretly taking a larger cut; and (9) Gershman sharing a cut from an extortion with Yusufov, even though Yusufov was not involved in that act. 27 In addition to these specific instances, the jury heard more general testimony that syndicate members routinely shared proceeds. Yusufov testified, for instance, that the members “were a group of friends,” so they wanted to “make sure that everybody ate,” and “everybody looked after one another.” App’x 542. As Yusufov explained, when “people made money, . . . [the members] took care of each other.” Id. This evidence of sharing proceeds all tracked what the Indictment alleged: that the principal purpose of the enterprise was “to generate money for its members.” Indictment ¶ 3. A rationale juror could look at the collective evidence showing that “a group of friends” who “took care of each other” and wanted to “make sure that everybody ate,” App’x 542, was a syndicate that was created to generate money for its members. See United States Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 41, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding sufficient evidence to show a RICO enterprise where the “principal purpose . . . was to generate money for its members and associates by means of various legal and illegal activities” even though “the nature of the services that were performed or attempted varied widely” (emphasis omitted)). The syndicate’s interaction with a rival crew further reinforces that it functioned as an enterprise. When Gershman, Tsvetkov, and Malkeyev attacked 28 a rival crew member, the rival crew retaliated by tailing a different syndicate member, Bobritsky. The fact that this rival crew decided to retaliate against a different syndicate member than the ones who attacked its member suggests that others viewed Appellants’ group as “a continuing unit that function[ed] with a common purpose.” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948. The dissent is critical of reading too much into this conflict with the rival crew, pointing out that the dispute started when the rival crew “stole from Gershman’s marijuana business, and Bobritsky was the drug runner for that business.” Dissent at 12 n.5. In the dissent’s view, that the crew retaliated against Bobritsky merely “shows his affiliation with Gershman’s marijuana business, not with some overarching organization.” Id. But at this stage, we must review the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. See Martoma, 894 F.3d at 72. Given that Bobritsky had no role in the attack that instigated the retaliation, a reasonable juror could easily conclude that the rival crew viewed Bobritsky as part of an overarching organization. 8 8 Assuming that Bobritsky was in fact targeted because the dispute centered on the marijuana business, that would only reinforce Tsvetkov’s role in that part of the enterprise. After all, the altercation was triggered by Tsvetkov—along with Gershman and Malkeyev—attacking a member of that rival crew. Why would Tsvetkov agree to help attack someone over a dispute that only involved the marijuana business unless he too was part of that marijuana operation? 29 Many of Appellants’ arguments urging a contrary result also simply provide different spins on the evidence. For instance, Gershman contends that he gave money to other members in the group not as payment for the crimes they committed but because he was being “generous with proceeds he received.” Gershman Reply Br. 9-10. While that may be one explanation, a rational juror could instead infer that Gershman paid other members for their services to the enterprise. In that same vein, Appellants contend that the evidence shows only that they “were small-time criminals” who at “times joined together” but never had “the structure or continuity necessary to establish an enterprise.” Gershman Opening Br. 22 (quotations omitted); see also Tsvetkov Opening Br. 24-25. In their view, the group lacked continuity because the syndicate members changed over time. And, according to Appellants, the group lacked common goals because syndicate members committed “similar [criminal] activities” without other members participating and because the members had conflicts with each other. Tsvetkov Opening Br. 25. But again, the jury need not have viewed the evidence that way. An enterprise “may continue to exist even though it undergoes changes in 30 membership.” Eppolito, 543 F.3d at 49; accord United States v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 60 (2d Cir. 2010). It therefore does not matter that, as Gershman notes, one of the top members, Zelinger, joined the syndicate after other members had already begun associating with each other. Nor do internal disputes or members committing outside crimes negate the existence of a RICO enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 710 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 156061 (2d Cir. 1991). That makes sense. Criminal enterprises often endure infighting for money and power, and experience changes in their membership. Appellate scrutiny of the sufficiency of the trial evidence of a criminal enterprise is not conducted in isolation. We instead review the collective proof, remaining “mindful that we consider the evidence presented in its totality.” United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). Here, each piece of evidence may on its own have been too thin a thread to allow a rational jury to find a racketeering enterprise beyond a reasonable doubt. But the evidence weaved together to create a rope strong enough to hold the conviction. A rational juror could look collectively at the aforementioned evidence—(1) members having considerable shared involvement in committing many crimes, (2) the syndicate having a rough hierarchy, (3) members sharing proceeds from their 31 income-generating criminal activity including with members who were not involved in that particular activity, and (4) a rival crew retaliating against a member who had not targeted the rival—to find that the Government proved a racketeering enterprise beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirm Appellants’ RICO convictions and RICO conspiracy convictions.
Appellants also appeal their convictions for arson and conspiracy to commit arson, as charged in Counts 17 and 18. They challenge an aspect of the jury instruction on the substantive offense as well as the sufficiency of the proof for the conspiracy offense. We will start with the challenge to the jury charge. “We review challenged jury instructions de novo but will reverse only if all of the instructions, taken as a whole, caused a defendant prejudice.” United States v. Afriyie, 929 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). The defendant has the “burden to show prejudice.” Id. “A jury instruction is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law.” Id. (quotations and alteration omitted). Appellants first argue that the District Court erred by instructing the jury that it could find Appellants guilty of substantive arson as reasonably foreseeable 32 to the illegal gambling conspiracy, based on a theory of liability under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). A Pinkerton charge “informs the jury that it may find a defendant guilty of a substantive offense that he did not personally commit if it was committed by a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, and if commission of that offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiratorial agreement.” United States v. McCoy, 995 F.3d 32, 63 (2d Cir. 2021). For a substantive offense taken by a coconspirator to be reasonably foreseeable, it must be “a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.” United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 648). Over Appellants’ objections, the District Court instructed the jury that it could find Gershman or Tsvetkov guilty of substantive arson, as charged in Count 18, if it found that (1) the charged arson, i.e., the arson at the Voorhies Avenue Poker Spot, was committed by a member of the arson conspiracy or the illegal gambling conspiracy, (2) the arson was committed pursuant to a common plan and understanding as part of that conspiracy, (3) the defendant was a member of the conspiracy when the arson was committed, and (4) the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that arson might be committed by his coconspirator. The District Court further defined an offense as being reasonably foreseeable “if it is a 33 natural or necessary consequence of the unlawful agreement.” App’x 2098. This was a legally accurate Pinkerton instruction. But in Appellants’ view, the District Court erred in delivering this instruction because it was not reasonably foreseeable that the illegal gambling conspiracy would lead to the arson. 9 The trial testimony allowed the jury to conclude otherwise. Gershman and Tsvetkov were both at the meeting that planned the arson to protect their illegal gambling operation. At that meeting, Zelinger said that the Voorhies Avenue Poker Spot was a “problem” that “needed to [be] fix[ed]” because it competed with their nearby Coney Island Poker Spot. Id. at 583. The coconspirators then discussed several violent options to deal with this problem, including arson. And the arson plan was in fact adopted at this meeting, with two of the attendees identified as the arsonists. In other words, Gershman and Tsvetkov were both at (and in fact facilitated) a meeting where the attendees discussed how committing arson could “shut down” a competing gambling location and therefore help their own illegal gambling establishment, with the decision made to commit arson by the conclusion of the meeting. A 9 Appellants objected to a Pinkerton charge as to the illegal gambling conspiracy only, not as to the arson conspiracy. 34 rational juror could therefore conclude that the arson was a “natural consequence of the” gambling conspiracy. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 648. 10 Appellants resist this conclusion by arguing that the Government’s description of reasonable foreseeability during its closing argument “compound[ed] the erroneous [jury] instruction” by misstating the elements necessary for Pinkerton liability. Gershman Opening Br. 32. During his closing argument, the prosecutor analogized Pinkerton liability to choosing among dinner options with friends: You are with your friends talking about dinner. You suggest Chinese food, but all your other friends suggest pizza. You don’t object. Later that night, your friends buy a pizza. That was reasonably foreseeable to you. That’s a natural consequence of that discussion. App’x 1977. In essence, the prosecutor offered an analogy to show that, even if Appellants did not expressly agree to the arson plot, it was reasonably foreseeable to them that their coconspirators would commit the arson to further the gambling conspiracy after they heard their coconspirators lay out the arson plan and did not 10 The evidence about what happened at this meeting came from a cooperating witness, Yusufov, who testified at trial that he was present at this meeting. Appellants go to great lengths to urge us to reject Yusufov’s testimony, arguing that another testifying attendee did not share Yusufov’s recollection. We will not do so. In reviewing a jury verdict, we “draw[] all inferences in the government’s favor and defer[] to the jury’s assessments of the witnesses’ credibility.” Parkes, 497 F.3d at 225 (quotations omitted). 35 object. This analogy did not misstate reasonable foreseeability for purposes of criminal liability under Pinkerton. Moreover, even if there were flaws in the analogy, Appellants do not meet their “heavy burden” of showing that the prosecutor’s misstatement was “so severe and significant as to result in the denial of [the] right to a fair trial.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). “[T]he Government has broad latitude in the inferences it may reasonably suggest to the jury during summation.” Id. at 87 (quotations omitted). And given the legally correct jury instruction and the strong evidence of reasonable foreseeability, the single analogy did not “rise to the level of prejudicial error.” Id. at 86 (quotations omitted). 11 For many of the same reasons, Appellants’ challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their arson conspiracy convictions fare no better. To convict someone for conspiracy, “the government must present some evidence 11 In any event, any error in including the illegal gambling conspiracy in the Pinkerton charge would be harmless. Appellants were found guilty of arson conspiracy, and the arson was clearly a reasonably foreseeable result of that conspiracy. Also, because Appellants cannot overcome harmless error review, we need not address the Government’s argument that Appellants failed to preserve their challenge to the prosecutor’s analogy, thus triggering plain error review. 36 from which it can reasonably be inferred that the person charged with conspiracy knew of the existence of the scheme alleged in the indictment and knowingly joined and participated in it.” Anderson, 747 F.3d at 60 (quotations omitted). The Government may show “the defendant’s knowing participation in a conspiracy through circumstantial evidence.” Id. (quotations omitted). Relevant circumstantial evidence includes “a defendant’s association with conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy” and “his presence at critical stages of the conspiracy that cannot be explained by happenstance.” Id. (quotations omitted). The Government presented ample evidence to convict Gershman and Tsvetkov of an arson conspiracy. Again, Gershman and Tsvetkov joined in a meeting to discuss how to address the problem they were facing as a result of competition from the Voorhies Avenue Poker Spot. Gershman began the meeting by having everyone turn off their phones, which, as Yusufov explained, Gershman would do whenever they were having “meeting[s] about . . . street stuff.” App’x 583. After Zelinger proposed setting the Voorhies Avenue Poker Spot on fire, Tsvetkov asked who would set the fire, with two other attendees soon being identified as the would-be arsonists. Gershman and Tsvetkov then both “nodded” their assent to the plan. App’x 589. This evidence allowed a reasonable juror to 37 conclude that Appellants agreed with the arson plan. See United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[A] federal conviction may be supported by the uncorroborated testimony of even a single accomplice if that testimony is not incredible on its face.” (quotations and alteration omitted)). Nor did the Pinkerton instruction, as Appellants claim, risk having the jury “mistakenly infer the existence of the arson conspiracy from the combination of the substantive arson and the admitted membership in the gambling conspiracy.” Gershman Opening Br. 36. In making this argument, Appellants point to language in United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1974), where we counseled against giving Pinkerton instructions when the jury would need to resort to Pinkerton’s inverse—that membership in the conspiracy must “be inferred largely from the series of criminal offenses committed”—to convict a defendant for conspiracy. See id. at 1342. But as discussed, evidence that Appellants took part in the arson conspiracy was strong—and the evidence of their participation in the gambling conspiracy was overwhelming. Thus, Sperling’s caution does not fit this case. See United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1050 (2d Cir. 1976) (rejecting Sperling challenge when evidence that defendant was a conspiracy member was “overwhelming”). 38 We therefore affirm Appellants’ arson and conspiracy to commit arson convictions.