Opinion ID: 175190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reed

Text: In granting qualified immunity to Reed, the district court concluded that Montaño failed to demonstrate Reed’s personal participation in any adverse 27 employment action, noting that “the record is devoid of evidence that Reed had authority to make personnel decisions within LANL . . . .” J.A. at 1080. On appeal, Montaño contends that (1) “the district court erred when it considered only one [potentially] adverse employment action, i.e., Mr. Reed’s failure to intervene in [the other] defendants’ refusal to consider Mr. Montaño for two Internal Audit Group leadership positions in 2004,” Aplt. Br. at 48, and (2) the district court erred in concluding that Reed’s failure to intervene is not actionable under the First Amendment. Montaño’s allegations against Reed proceed pursuant to a theory of supervisory liability. Although “[t]here is no concept of strict supervisory liability under § 1983,” Serna v. Colo. Dept. of Corrs., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation and citations omitted), supervisors may nonetheless be held liable for constitutional violations perpetrated by their subordinates under the statute. In order to establish a supervisor’s liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must not only “show the supervisor’s subordinates violated the constitution,” id., but also that “an ‘affirmative link’ exists between the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise,” Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008). In addressing Montaño’s appellate arguments, we begin by noting that the district court correctly concluded that Reed cannot be subject to § 1983 liability 28 for his decision not to advocate for Montaño to be hired as Internal Audit Group Leader in September of 2004. Reed averred in his affidavit that he “d[id] not have responsibility for approving personnel actions at [the Lab] other than with respect to the audit director,” J.A. at 285, and Montaño’s “[v]ague, conclusory statements” to the contrary “do not suffice to create a genuine issue” regarding this fact. 9 Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 674 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, even if Montaño’s failure to be awarded the Internal Audit Group Leader position did somehow constitute actionable retaliation under § 1983, which we doubt, Reed cannot be liable because there is nothing which affirmatively links him to this action. 10 9 In his opening brief, Montaño contends that proper consideration of (1) “the fact that Mr. Reed, as the University’s Auditor, oversaw the Lab’s audit function, so he had supervisory responsibility for the Internal Audit Group,” (2) “the fact that Mr. Reed was also the administrator of the University’s whistleblower policy, yet he was ratifying the other defendants’ ongoing retaliation,” and (3) “the fact that Mr. Reed had told Congress that he did not know of any prior problems at the Lab, yet Mr. Montaño (along with Messrs. Hook and Wadt) had repeatedly reported problems to Mr. Reed,” suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Reed’s personal participation in the decision not to award Montaño the Internal Audit Group Lead position in September of 2004. Aplt. Br. at 49-50. 10 As we recently observed in Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1227 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010), the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. (2009), “has generated significant debate about the continuing vitality and scope of supervisory liability . . . in § 1983 suits . . . .” However, as was the case in Lewis, “we need not stake out a position in this debate today,” because we conclude that Reed neither personally violated Montaño’s First Amendment rights, nor directed others to do so, nor was deliberately indifferent to the fact that a constitutional violation was occurring. 29 Likewise, Montaño’s argument that the district court erred in ignoring certain other of Reed’s actions also fails. First, Montaño’s suggestion that “Reed’s failure to supervise or his having tacitly authorized the offending acts [of other defendants] is sufficient evidence to impose supervisory liability on him,” Aplt. Br. at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted), is simply too vague create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Reed’s personal participation in any allegedly retaliatory behavior. See Adler, 144 F.3d at 674. And second, Montaño’s allegation that Reed called his co-worker, Hook, a “whistleblower” during a meeting in the spring of 2003 does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action taken against Montaño. 11 Simply put, a supervisor’s imprudent, off-the-cuff remark made to and about a co-worker during a private meeting would not deter a reasonable person from exercising his or her own First Amendment rights.