Opinion ID: 167492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mandatory Minimum Sentences After Booker

Text: 43 Finally, Harris asserts that the mandatory imposition of a fifteen-year sentence violates the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), which concluded that the mandatory application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines was unconstitutional. It remedied the constitutional violation by allowing courts to continue to apply the sentencing guidelines, but only in a discretionary fashion, subject to review for reasonableness. United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir.2006). Harris's challenge, in essence, is that mandatory minimums for career criminals also violate the Sixth Amendment by taking away from the court the discretion to impose a lower sentence. 44 Under the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), Harris's potential sentence was a maximum of 10 years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Under the ACCA provision, § 924(e), however, not only did Harris face the mandatory minimum sentence, but the minimum sentence was above the maximum penalty he otherwise would have faced. Harris thus argues that since the district court in this case did not have discretion to sentence [him] to anything less than the 15 year statutory minimum,. . . [his] sentence was imposed in violation of Booker and [the Sixth Amendment]. Aplt. Br. at 21. 45 Booker, however, does not apply to statutory minimum sentences. While it is true that the district court has no discretion to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum, the Supreme Court's holdings in Apprendi and Shepard still apply the prior conviction exception. Thus, although it is typically unconstitutional to mandatorily enhance a sentence based on a judge-found fact, because the mandatory enhancement here is based on prior convictions, neither the Sixth Amendment nor Booker require a jury finding. The Supreme Court in Apprendi excluded increases based on the fact of a prior conviction, and the majority in Booker preserved that exclusion. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738 ([W]e reaffirm our holding in Apprendi. ). It then follows that Booker does not preclude a court from imposing a statutory minimum established by Congress based on a defendant's record of prior convictions. See, e.g., United States v. Warford, 439 F.3d 836, 845 (8th Cir.2006) (rejecting defendant's argument that mandatory minimum sentences are `constitutionally suspect' in light of Booker and holding that Booker does not render unconstitutional a statutory minimum sentence). 46 Accordingly, we reject Harris's argument that Booker prohibits the application of § 924(e) in his case.