Opinion ID: 1940407
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: post-trotter developments

Text: In 2000, the United States Supreme Court revisited the constitutional importance of peremptory challenges in United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000). The Court in Martinez-Salazar decided the issue left open in Ross of whether, absent the requirement under the federal rules to use a peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous refusal by the trial court to excuse jurors for cause, a denial or impairment of the exercise of peremptory challenges occurs if the defendant uses one or more challenges to remove jurors who should have been excused for cause. Ross, 487 U.S. at 91 n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 2273. The Court determined that Martinez-Salazar's use of a peremptory challenge to cure the trial court's error was consistent with the purpose of peremptory challenges, that is, securing trial by an impartial jury, and was not equivalent to the loss of a peremptory challenge. The Court affirmed the conviction. It is clear from Ross and Martinez-Salazar that there is no federal constitutional right to peremptory challenges. [22] So, absent a showing that an objectionable juror served on the jury, the so-called denial of a full complement of peremptory challenges arising from the use of a peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous denial of a cause challenge does not constitute reversible error. In addition to there being no federal constitutional right to peremptory challenges, this Court has never established a state constitutional right to peremptory challenges. And, contrary to the majority, I believe we should not do so in this case. Since the Ross and Martinez-Salazar decisions, many other states have reconsidered their positions on peremptory challenges. The Wisconsin Supreme Court conducted an excellent analysis of peremptory challenge law in State v. Lindell, 245 Wis.2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (2001), and reversed that state's long-standing per se error position in light of Ross and Martinez-Salazar. A number of other states have followed suit. [23] In fact, the majority of states currently do not require reversal unless a legally objectionable juror actually served on the jury. In Florida, at least one appellate judge has asked the right question and reached the correct conclusion. In his dissent in Gootee v. Clevinger, 778 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), Judge Harris posed the question that is at issue in this case: [I]s the failure to get one's full complement of peremptory challenges itself so prejudicial that a new trial must always be granted? Gootee, 778 So.2d at 1011 (Harris, J., dissenting). Judge Harris succinctly answered his question and, in so doing, showed why such a procedural error should be subjected to a harmless error analysis, not per se reversal. Judge Harris said: Rollins requires an error which affects the fairness of the verdict; Trotter requires only that there have been an error in ruling on the for cause challenge and that (1) the peremptory challenges are exhausted to cure the error, (2) an additional challenge is requested (and denied), (3) for the purpose of challenging a specified juror who ultimately serves on the jury. I submit that although (1), (2), and (3) are essential in order to preserve the error (for without them there would clearly be no harm associated with the court's error), such preservation factors themselves fail to establish harm. Trotter, in effect, grants a reversal of even a fair verdict in order to reward a party for properly following the procedure to preserve the error. Rollins, Hamilton and Farina[ v. State, 679 So.2d 1151, 1152 (Fla.1996),] go further and ask, Now that you have preserved the error, how have you been harmed? Only by asking this question will we subject this procedural error, as we do even constitutional errors, to a harmless error analysis. Gootee, 778 So.2d at 1013 (Harris, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). I agree with Judge Harris. The Trotter requirements are a necessary  and judicially efficient  means of preserving potentially harmful error. However, this Court's original reliance on Swain to require per se reversal is obviously no longer sustainable. [24] And, because a per se reversal rule no longer has any foundation in the federal constitution, we must look to see what state law demands. To do this, we must first determine the state law source of the right to peremptory challenges and then determine what standard of review to apply when a right from such a source is violated.