Opinion ID: 1890528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-Examination of a Witness on the Stand for Impeachment Is Permitted under All Impeachment Categories

Text: Cross-examination of a witness on the stand for the purpose of impeaching that witness through each of the methods just listed long has been permitted in Missouri, subject to the court's discretion in limiting or, in rare instances, precluding such evidence entirely so as to avoid undue prejudice. Freeman, 269 S.W.3d at 427. This is true regardless of the method of impeachment being employed. For instance, Lagud v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Com'rs, 136 S.W.3d 786, 793 (Mo. banc 2004), held it was error to prohibit counsel from cross-examining a witness about his drug use as it goes to a witness's very capacity and competence as a witness to perceive . . . . [5] Numerous cases also approve cross-examination about prior convictions, even though the prior convictions do not involve similar facts, because, when a defendant chooses to testify, he places his credibility in issue and he may be impeached by prior criminal convictions. State v. Carothers, 710 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Mo.App.1986). See also State v. Holden, 278 S.W.3d 674, 681 (Mo. banc 2009); § 491.050, RSMo 2000. Missouri similarly permits cross-examination where the witness's testimony at trial is inconsistent with a prior statement, but here the cases generally require the prior statement to be about a material issue. Black v. State, 151 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Mo. banc 2004), held that a judge cannot preclude a defendant from impeaching a prosecution witness with prior inconsistent statements if the impeachment does not concern an immaterial or collateral matter. But the cases broadly define materiality to include statements affecting credibility. For example, Kearbey v. Wichita Se. Kan., 240 S.W.3d 175, 187 (Mo.App. 2007), held that admission of prior inconsistent statements about marijuana use made by defendant in response to various medical questionnaires was admissible, noting that the jury could infer that a person who is not consistently truthful in statements made to other persons might also be untruthful in his testimony on the witness stand. And it is well-settled that the interest or bias of a witness and his relation to or feeling toward a party are never irrelevant matters. State v. Johnson, 700 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Mo. banc 1985), quoting, State v. Edwards, 637 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. banc 1982). Cross-examination about any issue, regardless of its materiality to the substantive issues at trial, is permissible if it shows the bias or interest of the witness because a witness's bias or interest could affect the reliability of the witness's testimony on any issue. Id. Most relevant here, cross-examination also long has been permitted to impeach a witness on his or her character for truth and veracity. This means of impeachment, however, must be directed only toward the ultimate issue of a witness's credibility; thus, a witness may not be impeached by evidence that his or her general moral character is bad [6] or that his or her general reputation for morality is bad. [7] Therefore, this form of impeachment must be confined to the witness's character for truthfulness and veracity. State v. Gregory, 822 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Mo.App.1992). [8] Traditionally, different limitations on such impeachment applied depending on whether the one whose character for truth and veracity being impeached was (1) the person on the stand or (2) someone else about whom the person on the stand was being questioned. When a person, regardless of whether a party, is being questioned on the witness stand, then long-standing Missouri law holds that the person may be asked about specific instances of his or her own conduct that speak to his or her own character for truth or veracity, even where the issue inquired about is not material to the substantive issues in the case. Accordingly, Sandy Ford Ranch, Inc., states that the trial court did not err in permitting cross-examination of a witness about allegedly objectionable matters, for: It has long been the rule in Missouri that on cross-examination a witness may be asked any questions which tend to test his accuracy, veracity or credibility . . . . 449 S.W.2d at 6. Accord, State v. Williams, 492 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo.App.1973). This rule was applied in State v. Zahn, 823 S.W.2d 18, 22 (Mo.App.1991), to permit the state to cross-examine the defendant about whether he perjured himself during his dissolution case by denying under oath that he had ever had sexual intercourse with [a woman]. After noting the point was not properly preserved, the court stated: Furthermore, it is within the trial court's discretion to permit cross-examination of a witness directed toward testing his or her credibility, however irrelevant such examination may be to the basic issues. State v. Jackson, 768 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Mo.App.1989). It is not error to allow cross-examination regarding specific instances of unconvicted conduct if relevant to impeach the veracity of the defendant. Id. (emphasis added). By contrast, if a witness is called to impeach the character of a different witness in the case for truth and veracity, then the witness on the stand initially may be asked only about the other person's general reputation in the community for truth and veracity. Haynam v. Laclede Elec. Coop., Inc., 827 S.W.2d 200, 205 (Mo. banc 1992); State v. Trimble, 638 S.W.2d 726, 735 (Mo. banc 1982) (by taking the stand, a party places his or her reputation in issue and, therefore, the other party can offer evidence of his or her general reputation for truthfulness). Only once the witness has testified to the other's reputation may he or she be cross-examined in good faith about specific instances of conduct, and even then only as a means of testing the accuracy of the witness's testimony about the other's reputation for truthfulness by asking whether the person on the stand has heard about a particular matter. State v. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d 479, 494 (Mo. banc 1997); Leavell v. Leavell, 114 Mo.App. 24, 89 S.W. 55, 57 (1905). These well-settled rules were put into a state of some confusion 10 years ago in State v. Wolfe, 13 S.W.3d 248, 258 (Mo. banc 2000). Wolfe involved the question of whether defense counsel could cross-examine an adult female witness, who claimed that defendant had kidnapped her, about a kidnapping story she admittedly had fabricated to police when she was 12 years old. Defendant argued that the similarity of the accusation made it relevant and probative and that questions about it were admissible to impeach the witness's character for truth and veracity. And, in fact, under the cases just discussed, the law did so permit, except as limited by the trial court's exercise of its discretion to avoid undue prejudice. The trial court in Wolfe refused to allow any cross-examination on this issue, however. This Court upheld the decision, stating: The impeaching testimony should be confined to the real and ultimate object of the inquiry, which is the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity. In other words, specific acts of misconduct, without proof of bias or relevance, are collateral, with no probative value. 13 S.W.3d 248, 258 (Mo. banc 2000) (citation omitted). Of course, as just noted, Wolfe was correct that reputation for truth and veracity is the real and ultimate object of an inquiry when one asks the person on the stand about someone else's reputation. That was the subject of the sole case cited by Wolfe for this proposition, State v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175, 182-83 (1935), in which six character witnesses were asked about the defendant's reputation for truth and veracity. Williams was not concerned with asking the witness on the stand about his or her own character for veracity, however, much less did it state that such questions must be limited to asking the witness about his or her own reputation for veracity or truthfulness. Indeed, it would make little sense to ask a person on the stand about his or her own reputationand the answer only could be hearsay in any event, for reputation by its nature is the character imputed to a person by those acquainted with him, not what a person thinks of himself. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1303 (6th ed.1990). The effect of mixing these two standards was to eliminate the traditional method of impeachment of a witness on the stand by asking him or her about specific instances of conduct that bore on his or her character for truth and veracity. Sandy Ford Ranch, 449 S.W.2d at 6. Wolfe accomplished this without any discussion, analysis or recognition that it was overruling decades of cases sub silentio. For this reason, even the dissenting opinion, while noting that the majority's statement was inconsistent with many prior cases, did not discuss that the error arose by conflating the two standards for admission of this type of impeachment evidence. To the extent that Wolfe and cases following it hold that a witness may not be impeached by asking him or her about specific instances of conduct relevant to his or her character for truth and veracity, it no longer should be followed. [9] Applying these principles here, the trial court erred in ruling that Missouri law did not permit plaintiffs' counsel to ask Dr. Kardesch about his prior false interrogatory answer and his deposition admissions and explanations of it because the subject of that false answerthat his medical license had been suspendedwas not independently admissible; therefore, the whole issue was collateral. Cross-examination may be had on issues relevant to the witness's character for truth and veracity regardless of whether the subject of the falsehood is material. See, e.g., Zahn, 823 S.W.2d at 22; Roberts v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 362 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Mo.1962). While the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, can limit the admission of evidence if on balance its prejudicial value outweighs its probative value, here plaintiffs agreed to abide by the trial court's ruling that they could not introduce evidence concerning the criminal case that formed the underlying reason for the suspension nor would they imply the suspension was related to Dr. Kardesch's medical ability. Plaintiffs offered to work with the court and opposing counsel (and had worked out a tentative agreement) to introduce this evidence in the least prejudicial wayone that would permit them to make their argument that Dr. Kardesch hid the two-year suspension of his medical license due to embarrassment; although it did not reflect on his ability to practice medicine it did reflect on whether his version of events in regard to his treatment of Mr. Mitchell also was affected by his desire to hide facts so as to avoid embarrassment. On these facts, the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting counsel from examining Dr. Kardesch about his statements about his suspensions in his interrogatory answer and deposition.