Opinion ID: 1057633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sufficiency of the Termination Proceeding

Text: In the alternative Father argues that the trial court's actions were also insufficient to terminate his parental rights because the court did not make the findings required by that statute. We next consider those assertions. Proceedings to terminate parental rights are involuntary in nature and therefore implicate federal and state constitutional concerns. Few consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (internal quotation omitted). Ultimately, the order terminating parental rights has the effect of severing forever all legal rights and obligations between parent and child. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113( l )(1). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Indeed, the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children [] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by that Court. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). The Tennessee Constitution also gives parents a right of privacy to care for their children without unwarranted state intervention unless there is a substantial danger of harm to the child. [12] In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 187 (Tenn.1999) (citing Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn.1993)). While fundamental, this right is not absolute, and a parent may forfeit that right by abandoning or otherwise engaging in conduct that substantially harms the child. Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Tenn.2002); In re J.C.D., 254 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Tenn.Ct.App.2007). Termination proceedings in Tennessee are also governed by statute. Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 739 (Tenn.2004). Pursuant to section 36-1-113(c): (c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon: (1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and (2) That termination of the parent's or guardian's rights is in the best interests of the child. The party petitioning for termination carries the burden of making both of these showings. In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004); In re S.M., 149 S.W.3d 632, 639 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004). These requirements ensure that each parent receives the constitutionally required individualized determination that a parent is either unfit or will cause substantial harm to his or her child before the fundamental right to the care and custody of the child can be taken away. Swanson, 2 S.W.3d at 188. We have previously determined that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies to both the determination that grounds for termination exist and the conclusion that termination is in the child's best interests. In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn.2006); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn.2002). Therefore, our statute comports with the Supreme Court's holding that due process requires clear and convincing evidence of the allegations in order to terminate parental rights. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48, 102 S.Ct. 1388. Our statute sets forth the available grounds for termination of parental rights. [13] See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g); Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn.2002). The petitioner need only establish the existence of one of those statutory grounds to support a termination. Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 546. If the petitioner establishes grounds for termination, only then does the court determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Marr, 194 S.W.3d 490, 498 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005); White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 192 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004). The statute enumerates factors for the best interests analysis that the court shall consider, but, as opposed to the inquiry into grounds for termination, the best interests analysis is not limited to the factors enumerated in the statute. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i); see In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005). In addition to setting forth the bases for termination of parental rights, the statute also requires trial courts to enter an order that makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of law no later than thirty days after the termination hearing. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k). We have previously stated that, given the importance of establishing the permanent placement of a child who is the subject of a termination of parental rights proceeding, the trial court should include in its final order findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to each ground presented. In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tenn.2003). The required findings facilitate appellate review and promote just and speedy resolution of appeals. Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 861. Our Court of Appeals has repeatedly directed trial courts to issue written orders with the requisite findings and conclusions on all grounds whether they have been requested to do so or not. [14] E.g., In re Tiffany B., 228 S.W.3d 148, 156 (Tenn.Ct.App.2007); In re Giorgianna H., 205 S.W.3d 508, 516 (Tenn. Ct.App.2006). The Court of Appeals, therefore, has routinely remanded contested termination cases to the trial court for failure to make findings of fact and/or conclusions of law, whether related to the grounds for termination or the child's best interests. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Muir, No. M2002-02963-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22794524, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 25, 2003) (remanding because trial court omitted factual findings underlying conclusion that grounds for termination did not exist); In re C.R.B., No. M2003-00345-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL 22680911, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 13, 2003) (remanding due to lack of factual findings to support grounds for termination and failure to state that termination was in the children's best interests); see also Jones, 92 S.W.3d at 839 n. 4 (agreeing with Court of Appeals that trial court erred by failing to make a best interests determination). But see White, 171 S.W.3d at 192 (declining to vacate trial court's judgment for inadequate best-interest findings because case had already been remanded twice, thus prolonging the litigation by three years). This case is complicated by the fact that what began as a hotly contested petition to terminate parental rights apparently lost its contested nature on the day scheduled for the final hearing when Father, through counsel, surprisingly announced in open court that he wishe[d] to agree with that petition and allow the adoption to proceed. Father was then placed under oath and questioned by his attorney about his position. As indicated earlier, he answered that's correct to the question, And is it your intention to freely and voluntarily surrender the rights to these children and allow them to be adopted by [Mother] and her husband, [Stepfather]? He further answered that he believed the surrender and adoption were in everybody's best interest. . . . He was not, however, asked about the truth of the fault allegations made against him in the amended petition. Thus, he neither admitted nor denied those allegations. Mother also testified and swore under oath that all of the information and allegations in th[e] [amended] petition [were] true to the best of [her] information, knowledge, and belief. She was not asked about individual allegations. No other testimony concerning the alleged grounds was solicited or given. The only oral finding made by the trial court was: The court finds the surrender by the natural father is freely and voluntarily made, that the stepfather is the proper person to be allowed to adopt the children. The court hereby awards and grants the adoption. Prepare your order to that effect. The court also found that the children's names should be changed and that all other matters pending before the court were to be dismissed. The final judgment in this matter was entered on April 25, 2007. Although the court made findings about other facts before it, including that [t]ermination of all parental or guardian rights to the children by court order or parental consents which are necessary to proceed with the adoption have occurred, the court made no specific findings that any ground for termination had been proven. The court further found that [t]he termination of parental rights and adoption as set forth herein is in the best interest of the children and that Father had agreed with that proposition, but made no further findings. Since the trial court was silent concerning the grounds for termination or factual findings that would establish the existence of any such grounds, we must determine whether Father's consent to the termination of his parental rights absolved the trial court of the obligation to make findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the grounds. In holding that the trial court was not required to make these written findings and conclusions, the Court of Appeals cited Rainey v. Head, No. W2000-00504-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 277984, at -3 (Tenn.Ct.App. Mar. 20, 2001). Rainey involved a father of a child born out of wedlock who was indicted for aggravated burglary and multiple aggravated assaults with a handgun. The victims of his alleged crimes included the mother of his child, as well as the mother's mother and stepfather (family). The mother filed a petition to terminate the father's parental rights. The father, represented by counsel, ultimately joined with the mother and signed a consent order terminating his parental rights. Just under one year later, the father changed his mind and filed a Petition to Vacate Order Terminating Parental Rights, claiming duress and undue influence and alleging that the family offered not to oppose a prosecutorial grant of diversion of the criminal charges if the father agreed to terminate his parental rights. Id. Distinguishing the typical case where a non-moving parent or guardian opposes the termination of parental rights, the Court of Appeals rejected the father's argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to terminate his rights for failure to make the section 36-1-113(c) findings and conclusions: [the father] entered into a consent order agreeing to terminate his parental rights. It was thus unnecessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether [the father's] parental rights should be terminated. . . . Because it was unnecessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to section 36-1-113(c), we find [father's] argument to be meritless. Id. at . Neither the parties nor the Court of Appeals apparently addressed the fact that, in the absence of an intention to seek a stepparent adoption, the mother did not have standing to file such a petition. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(b). Similarly, in C.J.H. v. A.K.G ., the father was never married to the mother and had never visited the child, although he had paid court-ordered child support. 2002 WL 1827660, at . Both parents filed a joint petition to terminate the father's rights without planning a subsequent adoption. At the hearing, the mother did not specifically testify about the grounds for termination or the child's best interests. The trial court denied the mother and father's joint petition to terminate parental rights because the termination was not shown to be in the best interests of the child. The parents appealed the order denying the petition. The Court of Appeals analyzed the significance of the father's obligation to support the child and reviewed the facts of cases from other jurisdictions where courts rejected voluntary termination of parental rights as a way to circumvent the support obligation. Regarding the father's non-opposition to the petition to terminate, the Court of Appeals reasoned: parents cannot agree to terminate parental rights if such termination is not in the best interest of the child. An action to terminate parental rights in this situation is subject to the same statutory requirements as one that is opposed: proof by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist and that the child's best interests are served by the termination. It is the duty of the courts to examine the entire set of circumstances and make those determinations. Id. at  (footnote omitted). The court also stated, although our statutes allow, in some circumstances, for a voluntary surrender of parental rights, and its concomitant duty to support, those circumstances appear to be present only in the context of an adoption. Id. at . Thus, the court found that the father was not entitled to use any of the statutory procedures for relinquishment of parental rights on the facts of that case. Relevant to the case at hand, the court finally noted that an unopposed action to terminate parental rights is subject to the same proof requirements as one that is opposed: clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist and that the child's best interests are served by the termination. Acknowledging that Rainey held to the contrary, the C.J.H . court stated, [w]e simply disagree. [15] Id. at  n. 6. So do we. The termination statute clearly and unequivocally requires the trial court to make the statutorily required findings and conclusions before granting a petition to terminate parental rights, regardless of whether that petition is opposed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113. In two places, subsections (c) and (k), the statute uses mandatory language to describe the trial court's responsibility to make findings of fact and conclusions of law before terminating parental rights. Those subsections do not distinguish between contested and uncontested termination proceedings. We must adhere to the statute's plain language. Otherwise, we risk infringing on parents' fundamental right to the care and custody of their children, which we deny through the termination of parental rights only upon a determination of [a] parent's unfitness to be a parent. In re D.A.H., 142 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tenn.2004). Explicitly reaching those determinations by clear and convincing evidence is also necessary to protect a parent's due process rights. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48, 102 S.Ct. 1388. Because Rainey makes optional the requirements of the statute and potentially runs afoul of federal and state constitutional protections, we reject its reasoning that the trial court need not always make the written findings and conclusions of sections 36-1-113(c) and (k) before terminating parental rights. Mother and Stepfather argue that, even if we disavow Rainey and adopt the interpretation of the termination statute set forth in C.J.H ., we should still affirm the Court of Appeals. They specifically argue that the driving concern of the C.J.H . courtseeking to avoid depriving a child of a parentdoes not exist in this case because Stepfather's adoption of the children immediately followed the termination of Father's rights. Mother and Stepfather support their reading of C.J.H . by citing several excerpts where the Court of Appeals discussed the parent's obligation to pay child support as it related to the best interests of the child. The problem with Mother and Stepfather's argument is that it leapfrogs to the best interests analysis without addressing the trial court's fatal omission of findings and conclusions relative to the grounds for termination. The best interests analysis is separate from and subsequent to the determination that there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination. [16] In re Marr, 194 S.W.3d at 498; see In re C.B.W., No. M2005-01817-COA-R3-PT, 2006 WL 1749534, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. June 26, 2006) (existence of a ground does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that termination of a parent's rights is in the best interest of the child). Here, because the trial court failed to make the findings and conclusions relative to grounds for termination, we are unable to reach the trial court's determination that termination of Father's parental rights was in the children's best interests. See D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d at 368. Having determined that the required findings regarding grounds for termination were not made in this case, we are constrained to remand it to the trial court for further expedited proceedings. We may not conduct de novo review of the termination decision in the absence of such findings. See Adoption Place, Inc. v. Doe, 273 S.W.3d 142, 151 & n. 15 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2007). In fact, even if the law allowed such review, we could not conduct it here because of the gaps in this record, which basically consists of the allegations in the amended petition and Mother's generalized testimony that the facts and allegations of the amended petition were true to her knowledge. We are mindful of the consequences of our decision for the parties. Remanding this case to the trial court will prolong the uncertainty for both the children and their parents. We do not relish the thought of causing further discord for this family. The requirements of the termination statute, however, and the constitutional implications involved in the termination of perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests, Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, leave us no other choice. On remand the trial court must develop an evidentiary record, ultimately resulting in a written order with findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether clear and convincing evidence establishes the existence of each of the grounds asserted for terminating Father's rights. Should the trial court conclude that clear and convincing evidence of ground(s) for termination does exist, then the trial court must also make a written finding whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that termination of Father's rights is in the children's best interests. If the trial court's conclusion about the children's best interests is based on additional factual findings besides the ones made in conjunction with the grounds for termination, the trial court must also include these findings in the written order. We further direct the trial court to expedite the disposition of the case on remand, consistent with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-124(a) (2005). See State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. F.R.G., No. E2006-01614-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 494996, at  (Tenn.Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2007) ([a] prompt and expedited conclusion to termination proceedings is essential to the child's welfare).