Opinion ID: 742666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriateness and Form of Relief

Text: 58 Congress prescribed the form of government in the 1906 Act as amended, thereby restricting the Tribe's power to create a form of government inconsistent with the statutory form. The principle that only Congress has the power to amend an otherwise proper federal statute is well settled. For example, in Kennerly v. District Court of the Ninth Judicial District of Montana, 400 U.S. 423, 425-26, 91 S.Ct. 480, 481-82, 27 L.Ed.2d 507 (1971) (per curiam), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a state's claim that it had jurisdiction over a civil case arising on the Blackfeet reservation because the state legislature had not taken affirmative legislative action to extend such jurisdiction in accordance with a federal statute. In light of the statute, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the Blackfeet Tribal Council's specific authorization of coordinate state court jurisdiction in such cases was sufficient. Id. at 427, 429, 91 S.Ct. at 482, 483. Kennerly, thus, confirms that action by a recognized tribal authority cannot overcome a statutory requirement, even where protection of a tribal interest underlies the statute. 59 As an appellate court, we have the power to provide an appropriate and meaningful remedy to correct judicial error of a district court. In this case, the district court had far more than a causal relationship to the referendum process. The district court ignored numerous requests for a ruling on the sovereign immunity issue, proceeded without jurisdiction, assumed powers which can only be described as legislative in scope, and commanded a constitutional referendum-a remedy far in excess of that requested by the pleadings-despite a congressional act and precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court and this circuit to the contrary. In this case, the appropriate and meaningful remedy is to restore the form of government established by the 1906 Act by striking down the inconsistent form created by the 1994 Constitution and to declare the extension of the franchise void. 60 The District of Columbia Circuit granted a similar remedy in Morris v. Watt, 640 F.2d 404 (D.C.Cir.1981), where the court vacated the results of tribal referendum elections adopting new constitutions for the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations on grounds of procedural irregularities. 33 Other courts have also formed remedies in tribal election disputes even though the remedies interfered with some aspect of tribal control over the election. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe of S. Dakota v. Driving Hawk, 534 F.2d 98 (8th Cir.1976) (affirming district court's order directing a tribal secretary to issue a certificate of election to all but two candidates in a tribal election where the court determined the candidates had been properly elected even though the tribal election board had refused to certify the election results and had ordered a new election); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 839-42 (8th Cir.1975) (holding tribal members stated a claim against the tribal election board for interference with their right to vote in tribal elections under § 1302(8) based on allegations of procedural misconduct aimed at ensuring the election of the incumbent council president), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958, 96 S.Ct. 1436, 47 L.Ed.2d 364 (1976); Solomon v. LaRose, 335 F.Supp. 715 (D.Neb.1971) (issuing a preliminary injunction prohibiting tribal council from executing its resolutions ousting three newly-elected council members because the council exceeded its authority over tribal elections as set by tribal election ordinance). 61 Both Individual Plaintiffs and the new Osage National Council, in its amicus brief, assert that the Osage National Council possesses sovereign immunity which precludes us from granting the relief requested by Tribal Defendants. However, the immunity of the Osage Tribe was properly asserted by Tribal Defendants at the outset of this suit, and granting the relief requested by Tribal Defendants vindicates that immunity. Indian tribal sovereign immunity would be a poor shield if it could be disregarded at the will of a district court or if a court could command resolution of tribal affairs in such a way as to put the vindication of immunity beyond the fashioning of a remedy at the appellate level. The Osage National Council cannot assert that immunity to bar relief. 34 62 Federal Defendants point to Two Hawk v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 534 F.2d 101 (8th Cir.1976), and Wheeler v. Swimmer, 835 F.2d 259 (10th Cir.1987), as examples of the reluctance of federal courts to interfere with the results of tribal elections or involve themselves in internal tribal disputes. However, both cases are distinguishable. 63 In Two Hawk, the Eighth Circuit dismissed an appeal regarding a challenge to a tribal election as moot where the appellant failed to seek a stay of the election, which was completed during the appeal. The Two Hawk court carefully noted that the case did not involve an attack on an allegedly invalid election ordinance or a statute which imposed unwarranted burdens on candidates in future elections and, thus, future elections would not be affected. In contrast, the 1994 Constitution and the new government at issue in this case pose enduring conflicts with the 1906 Act and Tribal Defendants' cognizable interests. 64 In Wheeler, we affirmed the district court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over the claims of defeated candidates in a tribal election, where resort to the tribal judicial system was available, under the rationale of Santa Clara. In this case, we are following the animating principle of Wheeler and Santa Clara by providing Tribal Defendants their requested relief. 65 Individual Plaintiffs and Federal Defendants contend that the decision to recognize officially an Indian tribe is exclusively committed to the executive branch and that we should leave the task to that branch. Many administrative functions concerning Indian affairs have been delegated to the executive branch by way of the Department of the Interior, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1-9, and the Department has procedures for officially recognizing Indian tribes, see 25 C.F.R. Part 83 (1996). Congress, however, has the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, and Congress has spoken to the governing of the Osage Tribe in the 1906 Act. There is no textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue[s] relevant to this case to the executive branch to render the case nonjusticiable. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The principal issue in this case is the adherence of the district court and the parties, including Federal Defendants, to the 1906 Act and the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity as interpreted in binding precedent such as Logan and Santa Clara. 35 Construction of the 1906 Act and the applicable precedent and judging the adherence to this authority are eminently judicial tasks. 36 66 In summary, the appropriate and meaningful remedy in this case is to resurrect the restriction of the franchise to headright owners and to restore the government established by the 1906 Act, by striking down the inconsistent form created by the 1994 Constitution. This remedy is justified by the inseparable role of the district court in the referendum and its error in refusing to honor the sovereign immunity of the Osage Tribe urged repeatedly by Tribal Defendants. The remedy is fundamentally appropriate given the departures from the 1906 Act and vindicates the Tribe's sovereign immunity.