Opinion ID: 2588259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial Counsel's Competence

Text: In closing argument, the prosecutor suggested to the jury that it begin its deliberations by focusing on robbery and looking at each element of that crime. Accordingly, she described the facts supporting a robbery from Smith's presence and against his will. `The taking was accomplished either by force, violence, fear or intimidation.' Now [Smith] is obviously dead, so he can't fear anything. The law covers that. The law ... has another instruction ... which I'll read to you. The fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or property of anyone in the company of the person robbed at the time of the robbery ... can substitute [for] that fear if the victim's dead. Who is there? Susan Balestri. Was she in fear? Of course she was in fear. Defendant contends the prosecutor's argument misstated the law because it told the jury that Balestri's fear would suffice to satisfy the force or fear element of a robbery of Smith. Defendant faults defense counsel for not objecting to the prosecutor's misstatement of the law and requesting an admonition. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficientit fell below an objective standard of reasonablenessand that defendant was thereby prejudiced. ( People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 728, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248.) Such prejudice exists only if the record shows that but for counsel's defective performance there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.) To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance on appeal `the record must affirmatively disclose the lack of a rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission. [Citation.]' ( People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 403, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 684, 956 P.2d 1137.) Defendant is correct that the prosecutor misstated the law when she argued that Balestri's fear could satisfy the force or fear element of a robbery of Smith. In order `[t]o constitute robbery the property must be removed from the possession and immediate presence of the victim ... by force or fear.' ( People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756, 761, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 14 P.3d 221.) Logically, the fear experienced by one who is not a victim does not supply the force or fear element for robbery of another person. Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's misstatement, and it is difficult to perceive a tactical purpose for not objecting. ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 424, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859.) Assuming, without deciding, that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object, we turn to whether defendant was prejudiced by that omission. Despite the prosecutor's early misstatement, in the later portions of her argument and in summation she urged the jury to find the existence of a robbery-murder special circumstance because defendant formed an intent to rob before bursting into Smith and Balestri's bedroom. The prosecutor pointed to evidence that defendant armed himself, picked a time when Smith and Balestri were likely sleeping, and shot Smith first, all facts indicating that defendant entered the room with an intent to commit a robbery by first killing Smith to eliminate any resistance. Defense counsel, likewise, argued to the jury that it must find a robbery of Smith, not of Balestri, in order to find the robbery-murder special circumstance. In doing so, he specifically told the jury that in order to find the robbery-murder special circumstance based on robbery of Smith it must find that at the time that [defendant] applied the force when he shot Bud Smith, that is when he had already formed the intent to take property.... You must find for that special circumstance that for [defendant] Bud Smith's death was merely a means to an end. Finally, the trial court instructed the jury for the robbery-murder special circumstance it must find the murder was committed in order to carry out or to advance the commission of the crime of robbery.... The special circumstance referred to in my instruction is not established if the robbery was merely incidental to the commission of the murder. In other words, the special circumstance is not present if the defendant's intent is to kill and the related felony of robbery is merely incidental to the murder. In light of this instruction, we reject defendant's contention the jury could have been misled into believing that it could find the robbery-murder special circumstance true, even if it found defendant only formed an intent to rob after he shot Smith. Under these instructions, and in light of the prosecutor's argument regarding the robbery-murder special circumstance, we conclude that defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's misstatement of the force or fear element of robbery cannot have prejudiced defendant.