Opinion ID: 1473494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Law of Causation

Text: In their several motions for summary judgment, appellees asserted that appellants had failed to produce any evidence that appellees' products were the proximate cause of their asbestos-related illnesses. It is, of course, incumbent on the plaintiff in any product liability action to show that the defendant's product was the cause of his or her injuries. Although causation issues have not previously been addressed by this court in any asbestos-related case, we see no reason to depart from our generally applicable standards for proving proximate cause. In 1972, in District of Columbia v. Frick, 291 A.2d 83, 84 (D.C.1972), this court adopted the proximate cause standard set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). Section 431 states: The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm. [Emphasis added.] Legal cause, otherwise known as proximate cause, has two elements: a cause-in-fact ... element and a policy element. Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 320 (D.C. 1980) (footnote omitted). [7] Thus a defendant cannot be held liable unless that defendant has in fact caused the plaintiff's harm, and then only if certain liability-limiting considerations which relieve the defendant of liability for the harm he actually caused are not applicable. Id. at 320-321. Although it is often said that proximate cause is an issue for the jury, [8] it can also be a question of law for the court to consider in the first instance, before the case even goes to the jury. See J.D. LEE & B.A. LINAHL. MODERN TORT LAW § 4.05 (Rev.Ed.1988). If there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant's conduct caused harm to the plaintiff, the court must direct a verdict for the defendant. See District of Columbia v. Freeman, supra note 8, 477 A.2d at 716 (the question becomes one of law ... when the evidence ... will not support a rational finding of proximate cause). In addition, if the court determines that a certain chain of events appears highly extraordinary in retrospect, the case should also be taken from the jury. Lacy, supra, 424 A.2d at 321 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Several courts faced with the issue of causation in asbestos-related cases have employed the Restatement's substantial factor test. [9] In 1986, however, in Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., supra , the Fourth Circuit formulated a frequency, regularity, and proximity test in determining whether a specific asbestos product contributed to, or was a substantial cause of, the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff, having gone to trial against seven manufacturers of asbestos products, had argued that if he could present any evidence that a company's asbestos-containing product was at the workplace while the plaintiff was at the workplace, a jury question has been established as to whether that product contributed as a proximate cause to the plaintiff's disease. 782 F.2d at 1162. The Court of Appeals, rejecting this argument, held instead that whether a plaintiff claiming an asbestos-related injury could get to the jury (or defeat a motion for summary judgment) would depend upon the frequency of the use of the product and the regularity or extent of the plaintiff's employment in proximity thereto. Id. The trial court in this case relied in large part on Lohrmann in granting summary judgment for appellees, and appellees urge us to do likewise. But because this court reviews summary judgment de novo,  Kendrick v. Fox Television, 659 A.2d 814, 818 (D.C.1995) (citation omitted), we need not follow the same legal theory as the trial court in order to affirm its ruling. Thus this court need not decide whether to adopt a new, asbestos-specific test based on Lohrmann because, under the existing District of Columbia law found in such cases as Frick and Lacy, the result in this case would be the same as it would be under Lohrmann. Moreover, there can be no doubt that both Lohrmann and our own case law are derived from the same source, section 431 of the Restatement. See Lohrmann, supra, 782 F.2d at 1162; Frick, supra, 291 A.2d at 84. Lohrmann makes clear that its specialized test for asbestos cases is merely an elaboration of the Restatement's substantial factor test applicable to any determination of proximate cause. 782 F.2d at 1162. In seeking reversal and a remand for trial, appellants focus on the statement in Dr. Eliasson's affidavit that any exposure to asbestos fibers is unsafe and medically significant. We must read this statement, however, in the context of Dr. Eliasson's deposition testimony that asbestos-related diseases do not appear until after significant exposure and significant amount of period  or significant number of years. Thus Dr. Eliasson admits that even though any exposure is unsafe, the development of asbestos-related disease  which is the gravamen of appellants' complaint  requires significant exposure and a significant number of years. In any event, neither Dr. Eliasson's affidavit nor his deposition testimony can alter the legal principle that an essential element of the plaintiff's case [is] the identification of the named defendant as the manufacturer or supplier of the defective product. W. PAGE KEETON, et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, at 713 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted); see District of Columbia v. Frick, supra, 291 A.2d at 84 (plaintiff must prove a reasonable causal connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the plaintiff's injury (emphasis added)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(1) (1965) (the burden of proof that the tortious conduct of the defendant has caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the plaintiff (emphasis added)). Thus appellants must identify and prove which manufacturers of allegedly hazardous products caused their injuries. [10] Dr. Nicholson's deposition testimony about fiber drift does not alter our conclusion. The gist of the fiber drift theory is that asbestos fibers, once released, may remain aloft for significant periods of time and may even travel as far as half a mile through the air. Nevertheless, it still remains the law in the District of Columbia that a plaintiff suing in tort must prove causation, Frick, supra, 291 A.2d at 84; see Lacy, supra, 424 A.2d at 321, and thus, in a product liability case, must identify the manufacturer or distributor of the particular product which caused, or was a substantial cause of, his or her injury. When the Third Circuit, in applying Pennsylvania law which included the frequency, regularity, and proximity standard, was confronted with the fiber drift theory, it declared: The fiber drift theory cannot stand alone; it must be supported by evidence showing the frequency of a product's use and the regularity of the plaintiff's employment in an area into which there is a reasonable probability that the fibers drifted. Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 380 (3d Cir.1990). Other courts have rejected the fiber drift theory outright, stating, for example, that it is inconsistent with the requirement ... that an actor's negligence be a substantial factor in causing the injury. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 217, 604 A.2d 445, 463 (1992). The Maryland Court of Appeals ruled in Eagle-Picher that evidence of causation in fact under the `fiber drift theory' was so extremely attenuated that it was insufficient as a matter of law to impose liability. Id. The Robertson court did not go so far. It acknowledged that the fiber drift theory may be useful in extending the zone of proximity, but it also made clear that the fiber drift theory could not, standing alone, allow a plaintiff to circumvent the other requirements of [the frequency, regularity, and proximity test]. 914 F.2d at 383. We need not decide whether to follow Robertson or the more exacting holding of such cases as Eagle-Picher because, even under the more lenient Robertson standard, the fiber drift theory will not support the imposition of liability on a particular defendant without at least some showing that the products of that defendant were responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. The remaining question to be answered here is whether the individual appellants offered sufficient evidence of their own exposure to appellees' products to withstand the summary judgment motions. To that question we now turn our attention.