Opinion ID: 2826086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Factual basis for the plea, W.R.Cr.P. 11(f)

Text: [¶21] Mr. Williams next argues that he did not provide a factual basis sufficient to support his guilty plea. “Notwithstanding the acceptance of the plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.” W.R.Cr.P. 11(f). “The district court must be satisfied that the appellant possessed an understanding of the law and its relation to the facts of his case.” Peper, 768 P.2d at 29. In Nguyen, we explained: The intent of the procedural requirement of a factual basis is to prevent the individual charged with a crime from being misled into a waiver of substantial rights. Sami v. State, 2004 WY 23, ¶ 9, 85 P.3d 1014, [1017] (Wyo. 2004). A sufficient inquiry to obtain a factual basis includes a determination that the defendant understood his conduct, in light of the law, to be criminal. Id. However, the factual basis for accepting a plea may be inferred from circumstances surrounding the crime and need not be established only from the defendant’s statements. Id. W.R.Cr.P. 11 does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant who pleads guilty is actually guilty nor does it require complete descriptions of the elements. 2013 WY 50, ¶ 11, 299 P.3d at 686 (quoting Maes v. State, 2005 WY 70, ¶ 21, 114 P.3d 708, 714 (Wyo. 2005)). The factual basis inquiry “should protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge[.]” Van Haele v. State, 2004 WY 59, ¶ 13, 90 P.3d 708, 712 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 938 (2d ed. 1992)). [¶22] In Sami v. State, 2004 WY 23, ¶ 10, 85 P.3d 1014, 1018 (Wyo. 2004), we articulated the scope of information available to the court for establishing a factual basis prior to acceptance of a plea: A record composed of the defendant’s testimony and admissions and/or the state’s presentation of evidence discloses a factual basis. The trial judge may properly draw inferences from the defendant’s admissions or the evidence presented by the state to satisfy all elements of the crime to which the defendant is pleading guilty. 11 [¶23] In order to establish a factual basis for Mr. Williams’ guilty plea, the district court needed to elicit testimony from Mr. Williams or receive evidence from the State to satisfy the element of “causes submission of the victim by any means that would prevent resistance by a victim of ordinary resolution.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(ii). [¶24] We addressed this element in Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246 (Wyo. 1982), an appeal from a jury conviction for second-degree sexual assault under the same subsection at issue here. At trial, the victim reported that she was forcibly abducted from her yard, then driven to a park where she was strangled and raped. Id. at 1255. This Court upheld the conviction, relying on the disparate relationship between the victim and her attackers: Even if the victim here were not handicapped by a degree of deafness and mental retardation, her odds of putting up any effective resistance were practically nil. She was a very small woman of childlike proportions. The disparity in her physical strength compared to the superior strength of her aggressors would create reasonable fear and apprehension and discourage resistance by any reasonable person; this is more consistent with submission rather than consent. Id. at 1258. [¶25] Mr. Williams stated that he had been acquainted with A.S. for over a year; he went to her residence in response to a phone call inviting him over; Mr. Williams believed A.S. was interested in “more of an intimate relationship”; A.S. was breathing supplemental oxygen and in bed, naked under the covers; she lowered the blanket to expose her chest and breast area so that Mr. Williams could rub her chest; Mr. Williams massaged her chest above her breast and then touched her breast; she told him to stop and he stopped; and Mr. Williams apologized for his actions and left. None of these facts support the element of “causes submission of the victim by any means that would prevent resistance by a victim of ordinary resolution.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(ii). Indeed, Mr. Williams described a situation where A.S. told him to stop and he immediately withdrew his contact and offered an apology for overstepping his bounds. Mr. Williams provided no facts showing that he took any action that would have prevented a victim of ordinary resolution from resisting. We conclude the district court failed to establish a factual basis for the third-degree sexual assault charge prior to accepting Mr. Williams’ guilty plea, and therefore committed a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. [¶26] Under our plain error analysis, we must consider whether the district court’s failure to establish a factual basis under W.R.Cr.P. 11 denied Mr. Williams a substantial right which materially prejudiced him. To make that determination, we review the entire record. In Nguyen, we adopted the Tenth Circuit’s scope of record review when 12 determining whether a Rule 11(f) deviation resulted in a denial of a substantive right materially prejudicing the defendant: In [United States v.] Landeros-Lopez, 615 F.3d [1260,] 126364 [10th Cir. 2010], the Tenth Circuit also ruled that in determining whether the factual basis was sufficient to justify the district court’s acceptance of the guilty plea, the reviewing court may consider only the information in the record at the time the plea was accepted. However, in deciding whether an error in accepting a guilty plea without a sufficient factual basis affected the defendant’s substantial rights, the entire record may be considered. Id. The Tenth Circuit indicated the district court erred by accepting the factual basis, but ruled the defendant was not prejudiced because the entire record, particularly the presentence investigation report, provided a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea. Id. Nguyen, 2013 WY 50, ¶ 19, 299 P.3d at 689; see also United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58-59, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 1046 (2002) (When a defendant is silent regarding a Rule 11 error, he then has the burden of satisfying the “plain-error rule and . . . a reviewing court may consult the whole record when considering the effect of any error on substantial rights.”). [¶27] Here, our review of the record reveals sufficient support for the plea. In discussing the nolo contendere plea, the prosecutor set forth an extensive description of A.S.’s infirmities. See supra ¶ 7. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Williams discussed numerous corrections he wished to make to the Criminal History in his PSI. Although the Criminal History described the incident with A.S., stating that Williams touched A.S.’s breasts, chest, abdomen and vaginal area, and that “she felt scared and ‘kept him talking’ because she didn’t know what to do[,]” Mr. Williams had no correction to this description of his actions. The PSI also incorporated the affidavit of probable cause, and Mr. Williams was provided the opportunity to contest the statements given to the police by A.S. and her physician referenced therein at his sentencing but failed to do so. See Deeds v. State, 2014 WY 124, ¶ 26, 335 P.3d 473, 480 (Wyo. 2014) (Defendant’s due process right was not violated when he had the opportunity to contest information contained in the PSI but failed to do so.). Those statements indicate that Mr. Williams, without permission, entered the home of A.S. on October 26, 2012; he got into bed with her; he used his hands to make contact with A.S.’s breasts and vaginal area; A.S. was “scared” and stayed on her back the entire time with her oxygen mask on; she did not want him to hurt her, so she never told him to stop or tried to fight back; and she was afraid to get up quickly because of her heart condition. Other facts in the affidavit incorporated into the PSI indicate that A.S. is unstable and has very poor balance; she has 13 no peripheral vision; and she can’t walk anywhere without oxygen and becomes “hypoxic with exertion.” [¶28] A.S.’s considerable infirmities created significant physical disparity between her and Mr. Williams. If a victim similar to A.S. were confronted in bed by an assailant similar to Mr. Williams, it would not be unreasonable for such confrontation to “create reasonable fear and apprehension and discourage resistance by any reasonable person[.]” See Wilson, 655 P.2d at 1258. We therefore conclude that there were sufficient facts in the record to support the elements of third-degree sexual assault under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(ii). Mr. Williams was not materially prejudiced by the district court’s failure to establish a sufficient factual basis at the plea hearing. Thus, there was no plain error, and we affirm his guilty plea to third-degree sexual assault. II. Did the district court adequately explain the nature of Mr. Williams’ abuse of a vulnerable adult charge and obtain a sufficient factual basis for his nolo contendere plea? A. Nature of the charge, W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) [¶29] Mr. Williams argues that the elements of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult were not adequately explained during the Rule 11 colloquy on his plea of nolo contendere. He claims the district court should have defined the terms “abuse” and “vulnerable adult,” and without such information he did not understand the nature of the charge. As we noted in Peper, 768 P.2d at 29, a district court may need to define complex legal terms in the course of explaining the nature of the charges. Here, we do not find the terms overly complex. A person of Mr. Williams’ intelligence, represented by counsel, could easily determine the meaning of those terms without the assistance of the district court. Id. at 30. As discussed, see supra ¶ 20, Mr. Williams stated he had discussed his plea with counsel, and we apply the presumption that his counsel explained the elements of the crime to which he was pleading. The district court established that Mr. Williams made sexual contact with A.S. without her permission, and that she was lying in bed, on oxygen, and recovering from surgery at the time. Viewing the arraignment proceedings as a whole, we hold the district court sufficiently described the charge to appellant and sufficiently made him aware of the specific conduct which led to that charge. By eliciting that he had, without permission, terminated his court-ordered residency at the community correctional facility and failed to return to that facility, the district court assured that appellant was not misled as to the nature of the charges against him. The elements of the offense are quite simple, both conceptually and in the manner articulated by the legislature. 14 Peper, 768 P.2d at 30. We find, as we did in Peper, that the district court elicited the necessary facts and that Mr. Williams was adequately informed of the charges against him. Accordingly, there was no transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. B. Factual basis for “nolo” plea [¶30] Regarding Mr. Williams’ argument that the district court failed to establish a factual basis for his nolo plea, we note that a nolo contendere plea is distinct from a guilty plea in that the defendant entering such a plea neither admits nor disputes the charges against him. From this premise, we have stated that “a factual basis is unnecessary upon acceptance of a nolo contendere plea, so long as the charging document, whether it be an information, indictment, or other charging form, contains an accurate and complete statement of all the elements of the crime charged.” Van Haele, 2004 WY 59, ¶ 13, 90 P.3d at 712 (citing Peitsmeyer v. State, 2001 WY 38, ¶ 7, 21 P.3d 733, 734 (Wyo. 2001)). [¶31] Because Mr. Williams pled nolo contendere to the abuse of a vulnerable adult charge, the district court was only required to ensure that the Information contained an accurate and complete statement of all the elements of the crime charged. Id. Count III of the Information states: On or about the 26th day of October, 2012, intentionally abused a vulnerable adult, namely: A.S., contrary to W.S. §6-2-507(a) ABUSE OF A VULNERABLE ADULT[.]” The Information accurately and completely stated that on October 26, 2012, Mr. Williams intentionally or recklessly abused, neglected, abandoned, intimidated, or exploited a vulnerable adult, and therefore the district court was not required to establish a factual basis. 6 We find no plain error. [¶32] We conclude that the district court adequately described the nature of the abuse of a vulnerable adult charge, and furthermore, because it accurately and completely recited the elements of the charge, no factual basis was necessary.