Opinion ID: 167472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Willful Obstruction

Text: 15 Bedford first contends that his conduct in eating the evidence was not willful obstruction but was instead attempting to swallow a controlled substance contemporaneously with arrest within the meaning of Application Note 4(d) of the Commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Although not clearly stated, Bedford appears to be making two separate arguments here. The first argument is that his eating of the evidence is specifically excepted by the attempting to swallow example of Application Note 4(d). The second argument is that his conduct occurred contemporaneously with arrest and, therefore, is excepted conduct within the meaning of Application Note 4(d). We address these two arguments in turn. 16 A. Whether Bedford's eating of the evidence is the same as attempting to swallow under Application Note 4(d). 17 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, entitled Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice, provides: 18 If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (I) the defendant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 19 Application Note 4(d) of the Commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 includes as examples of obstructive conduct destroying or concealing or directing or procuring another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding . . ., or attempting to do so. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n. 4(d). Bedford in this case destroyed some of the evidence, or at least attempted to destroy the evidence, by eating the evidence when he was pulled over by the police. Thus, ordinarily, his conduct falls within the kind of examples provided by Application Note 4(d). 20 Bedford asserts that his conduct is the same as attempting to swallow a controlled substance within the meaning of Application Note 4(d). Indeed, the Application Note admits a limited exception for certain conduct directed at concealing or destroying, which occurs contemporaneously with arrest: if such conduct occurred contemporaneously with arrest (e.g., attempting to swallow or throw away a controlled substance), it shall not, standing alone, be sufficient to warrant an adjustment for obstruction unless it resulted in a material hindrance to the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense or the sentencing of the offender. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n. 4(d). However, the examples provided by the Sentencing Commission indicate that the Commission intended for this specific exception to apply only to attempts at obstruction. 3 21 The record in this case shows that Bedford's conduct went beyond mere attempt. Bedford succeeded in swallowing the cocaine base, at a time when the police had no knowledge that he was in possession of incriminating evidence. Had he not later vomited at the police station, the police would not have known that he had cocaine base with him when he was arrested with his co-defendant. Indeed, he might even have denied being in possession of any cocaine. Because Bedford fully realized his ultimate design — he concealed the evidence by successfully swallowing it — his conduct is not the same as attempting to swallow within the meaning of Application Note 4(d). 22 B. Whether Bedford's obstructive conduct occurred contemporaneously with arrest. 23 The second part of Bedford's first argument is that his conduct is not willful obstruction because it occurred contemporaneously with arrest. As mentioned above, Application Note 4(d) provides a limited exception for conduct occurring contemporaneously with arrest. But, this exception is meant to include conduct admitting a spontaneous or visceral or reflexive response occurring at the point arrest becomes imminent. United States v. Lamere, 980 F.2d 506, 515, n. 6 (8th Cir.1992). Here, Bedford stipulated in the plea agreement that he knew that if the police discovered crack cocaine on his person, his state probation probably would be revoked, and that he ate the crack cocaine in order to prevent the officers from finding the crack cocaine. ROA, Vol. I, Doc 89. As another court has stated, in order for the willful obstruction provision of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 to apply, the defendant must consciously act with the purpose of obstructing justice. United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 2006 WL 723449,  (11th Cir.2006); United States v. Revel, 971 F.2d 656, 661 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. Burton, 933 F.2d 916, 918 (11th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir.1990)). Bedford's admission indicates that he acted consciously, rather than spontaneously or reflexively, with the purpose of obstructing justice. 24 There is another reason for concluding that Bedford's conduct in this case was not spontaneous or reflexive. The record shows that Bedford, after he vomited at the police station, attempted to conceal the white matter that he vomited by wiping it up with a red garment he was wearing. The conduct demonstrates his determination to conceal the evidence from the police. It reflects a deliberate action rather than the spontaneous or reflexive conduct which occurs at the point when arrest becomes imminent, excepted by Application Note 4(d). Therefore, even if Bedford's initial conduct in swallowing the evidence occurred contemporaneously with arrest, this later obstructive conduct (wiping up the regurgitated matter) did not occur contemporaneously with arrest because he was already under arrest when it occurred. 25 Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that Bedford willfully obstructed the administration of justice in this case.