Opinion ID: 472146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: exclusion of dr. schepers' prior inconsistent testimony

Text: 7 The first issue in this appeal centers around the district court's refusal to allow the introduction of prior inconsistent statements made by Dr. Gerritt Schepers during appellant National Gypsum's case. Dr. Schepers, the former director of the Saranac Laboratory, testified on the second day of trial during the appellee's case-in-chief regarding numerous matters, including the general medical knowledge available as to the hazards of asbestos exposure from approximately the 1930's to date. On cross-examination, he also testified that sometime during the late 1950's, he corresponded with National Gypsum employees after learning from advertisements that the company was intending to incorporate asbestos into their gypsum products and that it would be terrible to hide asbestos in this manner in an otherwise safe product. Schepers testified that although he had no copies of the letters sent to National Gypsum, he nevertheless clearly expressed his concerns over the concept of incorporating asbestos into gypsum boards, which would be sawed and abraded, as well as into the matching gook that fills in the cracks. [Rec., Vol. 6, at 259]. 8 At the end of the third day of trial, immediately before the close of the defense's case, appellant National Gypsum sought to introduce transcripts of prior inconsistent testimony given by Dr. Schepers on three earlier occasions. On those three occasions, Dr. Schepers did not recall having any dealings with National Gypsum. Furthermore, in one instance he testified to having corresponded with U.S. Gypsum Company in regards to advertisements of products containing gypsum mixed with asbestos, not with National Gypsum Company, as he had testified the previous day. National Gypsum's counsel assured the lower court that he had no knowledge of Schepers' prior inconsistent statements during his examination the day before, and that only later did he learn of their existence after researching Schepers' testimony in other cases in light of this surprise testimony. Appellee objected to the introduction of the testimony indicating that he was unable to bring Dr. Schepers, who resides in Virginia, back to Savannah to clarify or explain the inconsistency. Wammock's counsel further represented to the court that if given the opportunity to explain, Schepers would testify that his recollection had been refreshed by documents presented to him during his direct examination tieing Saranac Laboratory to National Gypsum, documents that had not been available when he was testifying on the three previous occasions. Although reserving ruling, the court nevertheless opined that the solution was perhaps a telephone deposition that evening and observed that if Schepers could return, he would of course be permitted to testify the next day. 9 The following morning after hearing extensive argument, the district court refused to allow the admission of the prior inconsistent testimony. The court noted that although National Gypsum's trial counsel himself had no specific knowledge of this prior testimony, undoubtedly its national counsel and/or legal department did, and that perhaps the decision would be different were that not the case. The court went on to offer an alternative whereby the prior inconsistent statements would be admitted, if the defendant would stipulate to the jury that Dr. Schepers, if present, would testify that his recollection had been refreshed by his subsequent examination of the documents tieing Saranac Laboratory to National Gypsum. Otherwise, inasmuch as Schepers had been present to testify earlier, the court in its discretion would refuse to allow introduction of transcripts of his prior statements without an opportunity for him to explain the inconsistency. 10 On appeal, National Gypsum urges that the three prior inconsistent statements were admissible both as substantive evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) and for impeachment purposes under Rule 613(b), and that the lower court was simply wrong in imposing a prior confrontation requirement antecedent to the use of the testimony. The appellant further asserts that the surprise nature of Schepers' trial testimony, coupled with its significance to the punitive damages issue, would at any rate justify the admission of his earlier statements on their own. Finally, National Gypsum contends that the true motivation for the lower court's ruling was its unreasonable and prejudicial haste to move the trial to a rapid conclusion. 11 Focusing on the exclusion of Dr. Schepers' prior statements in relation to Rule 613(b), 1 numerous authorities have recognized that traditional foundation requirements have been modified by the modern rule. Traditionally, prior inconsistent statements of a witness could not be proved by extrinsic evidence unless and until the witness was first confronted with the impeaching statement. Rule 613(b) modifies this approach, however, by merely requiring that the witness be provided an opportunity to explain the statement at some point in the proceedings. There need be no particular sequence or timing, so long as the witness has that opportunity to explain the statement. See Notes of Advisory Committee On Proposed Rules, Fed.R.Evid. 613; 10 Moore's Federal Practice, Sec. 613.02, at VI-214 (1976 & 1985 Supp.). The Rule also permits the trial court some discretion to dispense with the opportunity to explain where the interests of justice otherwise require. See id. 12 It is equally clear, however, that Rule 613(b) does not supplant the traditional method of confronting a witness with his inconsistent statement prior to its introduction into evidence as the preferred method of proceeding. See United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 255-56 (1st Cir.1976); Hearings Before The Subcomm. on Criminal Justice on Proposed Rules of Evidence, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 75 (Supp.1973). In fact, where the proponent of the testimony fails to do so, and the witness subsequently becomes unavailable, the proponent runs the risk that the court will properly exercise its discretion to not allow the admission of the prior statement. See Barrett, 539 F.2d at 256. For this reason, most courts consider the touchstone of admissibility under Rule 613(b) to be the continued availability of the witness for recall to explain the inconsistent statements. See United States v. McLaughlin, 663 F.2d 949, 953 (9th Cir.1981) (lower court erred in excluding evidence of prior inconsistent statement where the witness could have been recalled to explain or deny the statement); Strudl v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 242, 244-45 (8th Cir.1976) (where the witness was recalled and given the opportunity to explain the prior inconsistent statement attributed to her, no error in admitting that extrinsic evidence); Barrett, 539 F.2d 256 (where the district court dismissed the extrinsic evidence out of hand and made no inquiry into the witness's availability for recall, the appellate court found no basis upon which to conclude that the witness was unavailable and held it was error to exclude the testimony). See also United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1204 (6th Cir.1984) (where the defendants had the opportunity to call surrebuttal witnesses and would have made arrangements to recall the witness after his release had the matter been of great importance, the court found no reversible error in admitting the extrinsic evidence of the witness's prior inconsistent statement). 13 While there are expressions to the contrary, 2 in Wilmington Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Life Ins., 749 F.2d 694, 699 (11th Cir.1985), this circuit followed the Barrett line of authority. The court determined that where the party opposing the admission of extrinsic testimony of a prior inconsistent statement failed to request that the witness be recalled in surrebuttal to explain the statement or to request the reopening of its case, that party had waived the confrontation requirement under Rule 613(b). The import of Wilmington Trust is clear--if the witness is or might be available for recall and the opposing party simply fails to recall him, there has been a sufficient opportunity to explain such that the extrinsic evidence should be admitted under Rule 613(b). Therefore, one key to the admissibility of the extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent statement is the availability of the witness for recall. 3
14 In each of the cases cited above, including Wilmington Trust, the witness was either clearly available for further explanation or the court assumed that the witness could be recalled without extensive discussion of the availability issue. Although National Gypsum urges that likewise Dr. Schepers was available for recall and that the appellee simply failed to do so, we disagree. Having reviewed the record, we are persuaded that the district court implicitly found to the contrary and that finding was not erroneous. 15 In deciding whether to admit the prior inconsistent statements, the lower court clearly focused on the availability of the doctor as crucial to its inquiry. The court offered alternatives such as a telephone deposition, which never came to fruition. Furthermore, appellee's counsel represented to the court that the witness's whereabouts were not known subsequent to his appearance, a representation that the lower court apparently found credible in light of the witness's Virginia residence. In short, although the district court did not make a specific factual finding that the doctor was no longer available, its deliberations were clearly premised upon that finding. The lower court was in a superior vantage point to make such a determination, and we are not inclined to reach a contrary conclusion on this record. 16 This case differs, therefore, from each of the cases relied upon by the appellant in that here we are faced with the situation of an unavailable witness. The parties have not cited any case authority addressing the precise issue that results from that conclusion--review of a district court's discretion under Rule 613(b) to exclude prior inconsistent statements in the interests of justice where the witness is now unavailable. 4 17
Inconsistent Statements 18 We turn then to the question of whether the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the prior inconsistent statements assuming that Dr. Schepers was not available for further examination or explanation. Judge Weinstein suggests that the trial court's discretion to dispense with the witness's opportunity to explain away the contradiction should rarely be exercised. The one clear situation to the contrary exists when the statement came to counsel's attention after the witness testified and the witness, through no fault of counsel is not available to be recalled. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, p 623, at 613-22 to -23 (1985). The appellant, of course, attempts to paint itself within this classic example by emphasizing that trial counsel had no knowledge of Dr. Schepers' prior inconsistent testimony until after he had testified and that the appellant was not responsible for his unavailability. 19 As to the knowledge of appellant's trial counsel, the lower court found that he had no specific knowledge of the three previous inconsistent statements at the time Dr. Schepers was testifying, and we accept that finding. More importantly, however, it is clear that counsel did have sufficient knowledge of Schepers' past performance to immediately recognize that his trial testimony deviated substantially and significantly from that general body of testimony. Counsel's familiarity with Dr. Schepers as a witness, a well-travelled and often used plaintiff's expert who had testified numerous times on the state of medical knowledge concerning the hazards of asbestos exposure, is well borne out by the record. Counsel candidly admitted at trial that he was astounded by the nature of Dr. Schepers' testimony concerning his involvement with National Gypsum where he ha[d] testified absolutely to the contrary before, [Rec. Vol. 7, at 339; Vol. 8, at 15], and that had he known that the doctor would answer as he did, the question would never have been asked. The problem, as we see it, is not that trial counsel learned of prior inconsistent statements by a witness after the witness testified. Rather, it appears from counsel's own admissions that he had sufficient knowledge to recognize the inconsistency while the witness was still on the stand, and failed to react in any discernible way to bring that discrepancy into issue while the witness was available. 20 In cases of true subsequent discovery, as in cases where the inconsistent statement occurs after the witness testifies, it is simply impossible to cross-examine the witness regarding the inconsistency while the witness is initially on the stand. See United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1169 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007, 98 S.Ct. 1877, 56 L.Ed.2d 388 (1978). Cf. Harre v. A.H. Robbins Co., 750 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir.1985) (counsel could not be faulted for failing to discover perjury during cross-examination where there was no discovery information to indicate testimony was false and perjury came to light only through witness's testimony at subsequent trial). In the instant case, however, trial counsel did not have such a complete lack of knowledge that would make questioning regarding the inconsistency impossible. Counsel understandably would have been hesitant to undertake extensive cross-examination without ready access to Dr. Schepers' exact prior testimony. Nevertheless, we are convinced that counsel had sufficient knowledge such that action of some kind was required, whether it be to generally inquire of the witness as to his unprecedented testimony or to alert the court to the fact that counsel sought to pursue the matter later after further preparation. Having failed to do either, counsel ran the risk that the witness would become unavailable, just as occurred here. 5 21 The appellant seeks additional support from the fact that the appellee's pretrial witness list described Dr. Schepers solely as an expert witness. The contention is that the surprise factual nature of his testimony created a situation where the appellant was completely unprepared to respond, justifying the presentation of the prior transcripts after the witness had left the stand. The problem with this argument, of course, is that defense counsel did not bring this contention to the trial court's attention in a timely manner while Schepers was testifying by motion to strike or otherwise, waiting instead to first broach the issue the next day at the close of its case in the context of presenting the doctor's prior inconsistent statements. If the appellant found Dr. Schepers' factual testimony to be a problem, it was obligated to notify the trial court at the time it arose. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). By failing to do so, opposing counsel and the court were essentially lulled into believing that there was nothing amiss as to Schepers' testimony, nor any reason in this regard to preserve his availability. See Bibbs, 564 F.2d at 1169 (one purpose of the traditional foundation requirement is to avoid unfair surprise by giving the opposite party an opportunity to draw a denial or an explanation from the witness on redirect examination); McGuire, 744 F.2d at 1203-04 (failure to put the defense on notice of prior inconsistent statement until after the witness was excused and had left town described by the court as a questionable trial tactic); 3 Weinstein, supra, at 613-24 (The impeaching party would seem sufficiently to comply with the rule [Rule 613(b) ] if he informs the court and opposing counsel at the time the witness testifies that he intends to introduce an impeaching statement and that his opponent may therefore prefer to keep the witness available to be called to explain it if he desires to do so.). In short, the time to object to the surprising factual nature of Schepers' testimony was while he was available, and having missed that opportunity, the appellant (perhaps unwittingly) contributed to his later unavailability. 6 This factor is relevant to the district court's discretion to exclude the prior statements under Rule 613(b). 22 On this record, we conclude that this case does not involve the type of subsequently discovered prior inconsistent statements that would require a lower court to admit those statements in the witness's later absence. Appellant's counsel admittedly had knowledge of both the expected substance of Schepers' testimony and his deviation therefrom as contrary to prior testimony. In addition, counsel's failure to timely raise the issue of the surprising factual nature of that testimony contributed to the witness's later unavailability. This is not a classic case of subsequently discovered prior inconsistent statements, the exclusion of which would be an abuse of discretion.
23 Having concluded that this situation does not fall within the context of a subsequently discovered prior inconsistent statement, we nevertheless must consider whether there are additional factors under these circumstances as a whole, that mandate a finding of abused discretion in failing to admit the transcripts of Dr. Schepers' prior inconsistent statements despite his unavailability. The appellant vehemently urges that the interests of justice required the admission of Schepers' prior testimony to prevent the jury from having an incomplete picture on a crucial issue. We perceive this argument as being bottomed in considerations of fairness--that the purpose behind Rule 613(b) is merely fairness to ensure that a witness has an opportunity to explain an apparent contradiction that may be explained away. See Bibbs, 564 F.2d at 1169; Notes Of Advisory Committee, supra. The appellant's argument here, by analogy, must be that Schepers' opportunity to explain may be dispensed with because the contradiction between his testimony is self-evident and simply cannot be explained. We do not agree. 24 In some circumstances, a prior statement may be so contradictory to a latter statement that the two simply cannot be reconciled. In such a case, there may well be no reason to exclude the prior inconsistent statement, regardless of the witness's unavailability. Such is not the case here. At trial, appellee's counsel informed the court that in fact, he had anticipated the problem that an apparent inconsistency would arise if Dr. Schepers identified National Gypsum rather than U.S. Gypsum in the context of correspondence regarding the hazards of mixed asbestos and gypsum products. Appellee's counsel informed the court that Dr. Schepers' prior testimony occurred in cases where his attention was not directed to National Gypsum, but other companies, and that his testimony then was that he did not recall dealing with any gypsum company but U.S. Gypsum Company. Furthermore, Dr. Schepers indicated to counsel that his memory had been refreshed by the contents of documents sent between Saranac Laboratories and National Gypsum. Those documents, which had already been admitted into evidence, were not presented to him for examination during any of his prior testimony. 25 Examination of Dr. Schepers' prior testimony, as well as the correspondence between Saranac and National Gypsum, reveals that this explanation is entirely plausible. The documents in question, Plaintiff's Exhibits 28-33, are documents sent between Saranac and National Gypsum, many bearing received stamps and the signature of Schepers' secretary. Furthermore, some of the correspondence was with a Mr. Pollard, identified by Schepers as National Gypsum's safety director who had attended a Saranac conference in 1955. Although the correspondence is not directed to Dr. Schepers himself, there does appear to be enough information in the documents relating to Saranac and National Gypsum, as well as in the circumstances of his prior testimony, to lend credence to his explanation that his recollection had been refreshed as he indicated to counsel. 26 The appellant argues that failing to admit the prior inconsistent statements left the jury with a mistaken impression as to Dr. Schepers' testimony. The argument stands up only if there is no explanation for the discrepancy. Assuming that there is a reasonable explanation for the inconsistency, doing away with the opportunity to explain could be the source of misimpression to the jury. Rule 613(b) inherently recognizes as much by ordinarily providing the witness with some opportunity to explain. We need not, and of course cannot, determine whether the doctor's memory was refreshed or whether, as the appellant contends, he simply testified incorrectly. But where there is a reasonable explanation for the prior inconsistent statement and the witness is no longer available to present it, the interests of justice do not necessarily weigh more heavily in favor of admitting the prior statement than excluding it. 7 27 In sum, the district court was faced with inconsistent statements on significant testimony that might be explained were the witness still available. As noted earlier, defense counsel did not indicate that this matter would be raised subsequently so that the witness's availability could be preserved. The inconsistent statements were offered as the last item of the defendant's case, the day after the witness had testified, and all other testimony was concluded. Counsel also had failed to timely raise other objections to the witness's testimony, which if sustained would have obviated the need to utilize the prior inconsistent statements. Finally, the location of the witness was unknown, and despite appellant's assertion to the contrary, we find nothing in the record to indicate that recessing the trial and returning the witness to Savannah in a day or two was a viable option. Under such circumstances, we cannot find that the interests of justice required the admission of Dr. Schepers' prior inconsistent statements or that the district court abused its discretion in excluding that evidence.