Opinion ID: 494711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Balancing of Federal, Tribal, and State Interests

Text: 54 Even though we conclude that Congress did not expressly consent to Oklahoma's assertion of jurisdiction over Creek tribal lands, the Supreme Court has also recognized that under certain circumstances a State may validly assert authority over the activities of nonmembers on a reservation, and ... in exceptional circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal members. Cabazon, 107 S.Ct. at 1091 (quoting Mescalero Apache, 462 U.S. at 331-32, 103 S.Ct. at 2385). In the present case, however, three of the State's arguments have recently been rejected by the Supreme Court under similar circumstances. The State contends that it has regulatory authority over Creek Nation Bingo for the following reasons: (1) bingo is not a traditional tribal activity, (2) the tribe is marketing an exemption because the state does not permit high-stakes bingo, and (3) the state's interest outweighs the Tribe's interest because of the potential for organized crime. In Cabazon, the Court rejected these same arguments offered by the State of California. See id. at 1092-95. 55 First, with respect to high-stakes bingo not being a traditional tribal activity, the Court rejected the application of the principles of Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 103 S.Ct. 3291, 77 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983), to Indian bingo. Cabazon, 107 S.Ct. at 1094. In contrast to the regulation of liquor at issue in Rice, current federal policy promotes Indian bingo, and state regulation is preempted even if it is not a traditional tribal activity. Moreover, as the lower court in Cabazon concluded, we believe that the State's focus is too narrow. See Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 783 F.2d 900, 906 (9th Cir.1986), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987). 56 The focus in determining whether a tribal tradition exists should instead be on whether the tribe is engaged in a traditional governmental function, not whether it historically engaged in a particular activity. The Tribes in this case are engaged in the traditional governmental function of raising revenue. They are thereby exercising their inherent sovereign governmental authority. 57 Id. In the present case, we also note that at trial the Tribe produced evidence that the Creek Nation in fact historically did regulate gambling. See rec., vol. II, at 100 (testimony of Rennard Strickland). 58 The Court in Cabazon rejected the argument that the Tribe was marketing an exemption from state gambling laws, and distinguished Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980), as follows: 59 In [Colville, id. at 155, 100 S.Ct. at 2082], we held that the State could tax cigarettes sold by tribal smokeshops to non-Indians, even though it would eliminate their competitive advantage and substantially reduce revenues used to provide tribal services, because the Tribes had no right 'to market an exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere.' We stated that '[i]t is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a significant interest.' Ibid. Here, however, the Tribes are not merely importing a product onto the reservations for immediate resale to non-Indians. They have built modern facilities which provide recreational opportunities and ancillary services to their patrons, who do not simply drive onto the reservations, make purchases and depart, but spend extended periods of time there enjoying the services the Tribes provide. The Tribes have strong incentive to provide comfortable, clean and attractive facilities and well-run games in order to increase attendance at the games.... [T]he Cabazon and Morongo Bands are generating value on the reservations through activities in which they have a substantial interest. 60 Cabazon, 107 S.Ct. at 1093-94. 61 The State's argument that its interest in preventing organized crime justifies imposition of its laws on Creek bingo was also rejected in Cabazon. In this case, as in Cabazon, the state does not prohibit all gambling. See id. at 1094. The Court recognized that although the potential for attracting organized crime is surely a legitimate concern, ... we are unconvinced that it is sufficient to escape the pre-emptive force of federal and tribal interests apparent in this case. Id. at 1094; see also id. at 1092-93 & nn. 19, 20 & 21 (federal policies supporting tribal self-determination; opposing state regulation of Indian bingo). In addition, as the district court noted, the Creek Nation also has a substantial interest in preventing the infiltration of organized crime. See rec., vol. I, doc. 106, at 25 n. 19.