Opinion ID: 149043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Certification of REBA's Claim to the SJC

Text: We first vacate the district court's entry of judgment against REBA on its unauthorized-practice-of-law claim. The district court interpreted state law and held that NREIS's activities do not constitute the unauthorized practice of law under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, §§ 46, 46A. We certify questions regarding REBA's claim to the SJC. The Massachusetts certification rule provides for certification if there are involved in any proceeding before [the federal court] questions of law of this State which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decision of this court. Mass. S.J.C. R. 1:03 § 1; see also Hundley v. Marsh ( In re Hundley ), 603 F.3d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 2010) (When Massachusetts law is at issue, the SJC has provided that we may certify questions to it in cases where we `find[] no controlling precedent, and where the questions may be determinative of the pending cause of action.') (quoting In re Engage, Inc., 544 F.3d at 52) (alternation in original). The conditions for certification are met. Should the SJC decide that the activities NREIS has engaged in do not constitute the unauthorized practice of law, that may be determinative of this case. There is no controlling precedent from the SJC. A 1935 opinion of the SJC, In re Opinion of the Justices, notes that the practice of law embraces conveyancing. 194 N.E. at 317. But there is no controlling precedent that establishes a definition for conveyancing or the extent of activities that constitute conveyancing. The district court correctly noted that there was no SJC precedent directly on point on what activities constituted conveyancing and that the SJC has not explicitly addressed whether the practice of law embraces all the interconnected activities of a real estate conveyance. REBA I, 609 F.Supp.2d at 142-43. The district court was also correct to note that state law provided little guidance as to the level of involvement an attorney must have in the conveyancing activities. Id. at 143. Of course, even in the absence of controlling precedent, certification would be inappropriate where state law is sufficiently clear to allow us to predict its course. In re Engage, Inc., 544 F.3d at 53. This is not such a case. The district court's conclusion that the statute has not been violated is at least in tension with the view of the two state trial court determinations in Massachusetts, and perhaps one determination by a single SJC justice. REBA cites a decision by a single justice in a disciplinary case, In re Eric Levine, No. BD-2002-075, 2004 WL 5214985 (Mass. St. Bar Disp. Bd.2004), which found a suspended attorney had engaged in the practice of law when the attorney continued to provide closing services following his suspension, even though a licensed attorney attended the actual closings. Id. at . These opinions, as the district court recognized, are not opinions of the full SJC and so are not dispositive. REBA I, 609 F.Supp.2d at 142. NREIS, in turn, relies on several SJC opinions holding that certain other economic activities, such as filling in tax forms, preparing a reaffirmation form in a bankruptcy proceeding, and conducting research on real estate titles in the registry of deeds and then reporting and making recommendations to a lawyer based on the research, did not constitute the practice of law. See In re Chimko, 444 Mass. 743, 831 N.E.2d 316, 321-22 (2005); Goldblatt v. Corp. Counsel of Boston, 360 Mass. 660, 277 N.E.2d 273, 277 & n. 4 (1971); Lowell Bar Ass'n, 52 N.E.2d at 34. None of those authorities is analogous to this case, and NREIS itself acknowledges that they do not directly address REBA's claim. Unlike other certification cases in which there is mere risk of error by the federal courts in ruling on state law issues, see Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 529 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2008), here there are even stronger reasons to commit these questions to the SJC in the first instance. Apart from the lack of certainty in state law, it is especially appropriate to certify this question to the SJC because whether NREIS's various activities here constitute the unauthorized practice of law raises serious policy concerns regarding the practice of law that will certainly impact future cases. Such policy judgments are best left to the SJC, which is responsible for defining the practice of law in Massachusetts. See In re Engage, Inc., 544 F.3d at 57; Boston Gas Co., 529 F.3d at 14-15. Indeed, the interests of federalism are best served by certification. We have been particularly mindful of those concerns and have certified before when the issues concern the SJC's control over the practice of law. E.g., In re Engage, Inc., 544 F.3d at 57-58 (certifying, inter alia, the question of whether a state attorney lien statute applies to patents and patent applications). Federal law recognizes that states have an especially great interest in regulating the practice of law. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975) (The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice....). The authority to regulate the practice of law has been left to the states [s]ince the founding of the Republic. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442, 99 S.Ct. 698, 58 L.Ed.2d 717 (1979). [2] There are also strong federalism interests that are furthered by providing the state courts with the opportunity to decide on underlying unsettled questions of state law. Cf. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993) (noting circumstances in which principles of federalism and comity dictate deferring to state courts, such as when the federal action raises difficult questions of state law bearing on important matters of state policy). We therefore certify to the Massachusetts SJC the following questions: 1. Whether NREIS's activities, either in whole or in part, based on the record in this case and as described in the parties' filings, constitute the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, §§ 46 et seq. 2. Whether NREIS's activities, in contracting with Massachusetts attorneys to attend closings, violate Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, §§ 46 et seq. We would welcome the advice of the SJC on any other relevant aspect of Massachusetts law which it believes would aid in the proper resolution of the issues.