Opinion ID: 2746007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: verburg’s sentence

Text: On appeal, Verburg contends that the district court erred in denying him a mitigating-role adjustment. As Verburg has pointed out, in this nine-person conspiracy, “only one other participant . . . had a lesser quantity attributed to her than did Mr. Verburg.” Appellant Br. at 17. Thus, “[m]athematically speaking, Mr. Verburg was clearly less culpable than most other participants.” Id. at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, Verburg argues that “he was not involved in the planning of the conspiracy, was not an essential part of it, and lacked knowledge and understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise.” Id. at 19. In addition, Verburg argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable, because the district court did not fully address his arguments for a variance; in his view, it did not “provide a reasoned basis for its sentencing decision.” See id. at 13, 36.
Section 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides: Based on the defendant’s role in the offense, decrease the offense level as follows: (a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels. (b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 3B1.2 (2013). The comments accompanying this section state that a minimal participant “is intended to cover defendants who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group.” Id. at cmt. n.4. Minor participants are “less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.” Id. at cmt. n.5. “The determination whether to apply subsection (a) or 5 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. subsection (b) . . . is based on the totality of the circumstances,” making the district judge’s final conclusion heavily fact-dependent. Id. at cmt. n.3(c). The defendant “bears the burden of proving a mitigating role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Roberts, 223 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2000). We have traditionally reviewed a district court’s denial of a mitigating-role adjustment for clear error. Id. at 379–80. In United States v. Gort-DiDonato, 109 F.3d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 1997), however, we announced a two-part standard of review for examining aggravating-role adjustments. Under this standard, a district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id. Our decision in United States v. Owusu, 199 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2000), appeared to extend this two-part framework to cover mitigatingrole adjustments as well. Id. at 337 n.2. Yet we need not resolve this legal question today, as our result would be the same under either standard. Verburg argues “that he qualified for at least a minor role reduction, if not a minimal role reduction.” Appellant Br. at 23. Verburg’s request for a minimal-role adjustment fails on its face. As we explained in United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, “[u]nder the sentencing guidelines, a minimal participant is someone who played a single, limited role in the conspiracy.” 148 F.3d 577, 595 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Verburg’s involvement, from the beginning of the conspiracy (purchasing the Trinity Center property and building living quarters on it) to its end (collecting money and physically transporting funds to California), clearly falls outside the scope of this minimal-participant umbrella. 6 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. On his request for a minor-role adjustment, Verburg bases his claim on two different grounds. First, he notes that he was found accountable for 106.34 kilograms of marijuana for guideline computation purposes. Appellant’s Br. at 18. The only co-defendant held accountable for less was Catherine Weitz (accountable for 10.63 kilograms). Verburg PSR at ¶ 116. By contrast, several co-defendants were held accountable for nearly 900 kilograms of marijuana. See id. at ¶¶ 106–29. Second, he argues that he played a non-essential role in the conspiracy, “act[ing] as a courier essentially transporting money back to his kids.” R. 427 (Verburg Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 8) (Page ID #2129). Both of Verburg’s arguments are unavailing. With respect to Verburg’s first contention—the amount of marijuana—we have held previously that “[d]efendants may be minimal or minor participants in relation to the scope of the conspiracy as a whole, but they are not entitled to a mitigating role reduction if they are held accountable only for the quantities of drugs attributable to them.” United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1303 (6th Cir. 1990)). In Campbell, we went on to deny the defendant’s claim for a mitigating-role adjustment, noting that the defendant had been held “accountable for at least 100, but less than 200 grams of cocaine, which was the amount of drugs that [defendant] actually purchased and distributed or used.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “the district court held [defendant] accountable only for the quantity of drugs attributable to him,” rather than the full amount involved in the conspiracy. Id. Like the defendant in Campbell, Verburg was, for purposes of sentencing guideline computations, found accountable only for the quantity of drugs attributable to him: 106.34 7 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. kilograms of marijuana.1 Section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that drug offenses involving at least 100 but not more than 400 kilograms of marijuana have a base offense level of 26. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (2013). By comparison, the Guidelines provide a base offense level of 30 for members of the conspiracy found accountable for 700 to 1000 kilograms of marijuana. Id. In other words, by prescribing Verburg a lower base offense level, the Guidelines have already taken into account his reduced role within the conspiracy. See, e.g., Roberts, 223 F.3d at 380 (“The thrust of Roberts’s argument is that his minimal role in the overall conspiracy warrants a § 3B1.2 adjustment, even though the larger conspiracy was not taken into account in establishing Roberts’s base offense level. As we have in the past, we reject this argument.”). Our decision to reject Verburg’s argument is consistent with a majority of circuit courts that have considered the same issue. Id. (collecting cases). Verburg’s second argument—that he played a non-essential role in the conspiracy—is likewise unconvincing. To be clear, “[a] defendant does not qualify for a mitigating role reduction merely because someone else planned the scheme and made all the arrangements.” United States v. Sheafe, 69 F. App’x 268, 270 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Miller, 56 F.3d 719, 720 (6th Cir. 1995)). Rather, “[a] defendant who plays a lesser role in a criminal scheme may nonetheless fail to qualify as a minor participant if his role was indispensable or critical to the success of the scheme, or if his importance in the overall scheme was such as to 1 This number was obtained by dividing the total value of the marijuana sales attributable to Verburg ($750,000) by the cost per pound of marijuana ($3200), and then converting this number to kilograms for Guideline purposes. See Verburg PSR at ¶ 104. Verburg did not object to being held accountable for this amount. R. 427 (Verburg Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 10) (Page ID #2131). 8 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. justify his sentence.” United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 458 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); cf. United States v Samuels, 308 F.3d 662, 672 (6th Cir. 2002) (“As Samuels played a key role in brokering the drug transaction, he did not play a limited role in the conspiracy. Instead, he was indispensable to the completion of the operation.”) (emphasis added). Here, a number of facts illustrate the critical role Verburg played within this conspiracy. Purchasing the Trinity Center property, building structures on the property, and delivering collection proceeds from Michigan to California—each of these actions evidence the key part Verburg played in this conspiracy. While Verburg might not have planned or directed operations, he certainly “was a fully integrated member of a substantial drug conspiracy.” United States v. Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 924–25 (6th Cir. 2002) (upholding district judge’s denial of a minor- and minimal-role adjustment for member of conspiracy who offered his property “as a base of operations” and “personally received at least one large shipment of marijuana.”) The district court did not err in refusing to grant Verburg a minor-role reduction for his participation.
In determining whether a sentence is procedurally reasonable, we must consider whether the district court “‘(1) properly calculated the applicable advisory Guidelines range; (2) considered the other § 3553(a) factors as well as the parties’ arguments for a sentence outside the Guidelines range; and (3) adequately articulated its reasoning for imposing the particular sentence chosen, including any rejection of the parties’ arguments for an outside-Guidelines sentence and any decision to deviate from the advisory Guidelines range.’” United States v. 9 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. Barahona-Montenegro, 565 F.3d 980, 983 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2007)). We review sentences under an abuse-of-discretion standard in cases where a party has objected to a procedural defect at his sentencing hearing. United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 802 (6th Cir. 2010). In cases where a party has not objected at sentencing, we review for plain error. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). To demonstrate plain error, the defendant must show “(1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected defendant’s substantial rights and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 386 (citing United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872–73 (6th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As an initial matter, we note that during Verburg’s sentencing hearing, Verburg’s counsel raised a single objection—to the district court’s decision to deny his request for a mitigating-role adjustment. R. 427 (Verburg Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 3) (Page ID #2124). We have already discussed this objection above. The arguments presented on appeal by Verburg regarding the procedural reasonableness of his sentence were not presented to the district court. The next issue is whether the district court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors and, if not, whether the district court committed plain error. As we have stated, the key “question is whether the record makes clear that the sentencing judge listened to each argument, considered the supporting evidence, was fully aware of the defendant’s circumstances and took them into account in sentencing him.” Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Lapsins, 570 F.3d 758, 773 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the district judge must show that “he has considered 10 Nos. 13-2164/2205 United States v. Verburg et al. the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking . . .”). Again, in Vonner, we noted that “[a]lthough Congress requires a court to give ‘the reasons’ for its sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), it does not say that courts must give the reasons for rejecting any and all arguments by the parties for alternative sentences.” 516 F.3d at 387. Verburg’s sentencing transcript indicates that the district court judge engaged in a sufficient discussion of the various § 3553(a) factors.2 The district judge, for instance, discussed “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” as required under § 3553(a)(1). The transcript reveals a conversation surrounding (1) Verburg’s role in the conspiracy, see id. at R. 427 (Verburg Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 6–9) (Page ID #2127–30); (2) his military service, see id. at 13–14 (Page ID #2134–35); (3) his legal 2 § 3553(a) reads, in relevant part: (a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider— (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed— (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— (A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines—