Opinion ID: 2533377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court erred when it decided disputed, material factual issues in granting plaintiffs' motion to enforce settlement.

Text: ¶ 11. A review of this Court's cases reveals that trial judges presented with motions to enforce settlement agreements customarily make findings of fact related to the existence and/or terms of the settlement agreements as necessary to rule on the motions to enforce settlement. Further, this Court has not found such trial-court action to be improper. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. McDaniel, 951 So.2d 523, 525-26 (Miss.2006) (trial judge made findings of fact in deciding plaintiffs' motion to enforce settlement agreement); Howard v. TotalFina E & P USA, Inc., 899 So.2d 882, 888-89 (Miss.2005) (trial judge made findings of fact regarding existence of a settlement agreement in denying plaintiff's motion to enforce settlement agreement); Tupelo Redevelopment Agency v. Abernathy, 913 So.2d 278, 282-85 (Miss.2005) (trial judge made findings of fact in denying defendant landowners' motion to enforce settlement agreement); WRH Props., Inc. v. Estate of Johnson, 759 So.2d 394, 395 (Miss.2000) (trial judge made findings of fact regarding existence of a settlement agreement in granting defendant's motion to enforce settlement agreement). ¶ 12. In this case, the trial judge made informed findings of fact and law. The trial judge reviewed all of the parties' pleadings, considered all of the other affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs' attorney, Peirce, and ICRR's attorney, Peters, describing their understanding of the settlement negotiations, and conducted two quite lengthy hearings on the disputed issues of fact. Moreover, multiple attorneys representing ICRR appeared before the trial judge and had ample opportunity to present evidence and argument. ¶ 13. ICRR never asked the trial judge to hold a hearing in addition to the two that were held. In fact, at the second hearing, the trial judge even invited the parties to request an additional hearing if they deemed it necessary, but ICRR evidently chose not to request one at that time. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the trial judge prevented ICRR from acquiring additional evidence regarding what Peirce and Peters had agreed to at the Pittsburgh meeting by, for example, deposing Peirce or calling witnesses at either hearing. ¶ 14. In addition, this Court previously has held that unless substantial rights are affected, issues not presented to the trial judge are procedurally barred from being raised for the first time on appeal. Dora v. State, 986 So.2d 917, 925 (Miss.2008). In this case, the record reveals that ICRR never raised the issue of the need for an evidentiary hearing either in addition to or in lieu of the hearings which were held. We conclude that it was proper for the trial judge to make findings of fact in ruling on plaintiffs' motion to enforce settle agreement.