Opinion ID: 1659535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: constitutionality of the death penalty for felony murder

Text: The final issue raised on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in overruling the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the death penalty is unconstitutional. The defendant challenges the death penalty itself as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. We find no merit to this argument. It has been considered and rejected many times by this Court. State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 185 (Tenn. 1991); and State v. McCormick, 778 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Tenn. 1989). Although the defendant has not directly raised the issue, we wish to address the issue of the constitutionality of Tennessee's death penalty statute as punishment for felony murder. A majority of the present Court has held that the death penalty per se does not violate Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution, see State v. Black, supra, 815 S.W.2d at 189-91, but we have not yet considered the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty as punishment for felony murder. The imposition of the death penalty for the crime of murder has a long history of acceptance both in the United States and in England. The common-law rule imposed a mandatory death sentence on all convicted murderers. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-198, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1462-1463, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). And the penalty continued to be used into the 20th century by most American States, although the breadth of the common-law rule was diminished, initially by narrowing the class of murderers to be punished by death and subsequently by widespread adoption of laws expressly granting juries the discretion to recommend mercy. Id., at 199-200, 91 S.Ct., at 1463-1464. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289-292, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2984-2985, 49 L.Ed.2d 944. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-77, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2927, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 876-77 (1976). In Tennessee, under the pre-1989 law, first-degree murder was defined as follows: [e]very murder perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, or by other kinds of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing, or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any murder in the first degree, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. ... Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-202(a) (1982 & Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). With the exception of the inclusion of different underlying felonies over the years, the so-called felony murder statute remains essentially the same as that enacted in § 3 of Chapter 23 of the Public Acts of 1829. [2] The 1829 Act was modeled on the Pennsylvania Act of 1794, 1794 Pa. Laws, ch. 1766, § 2, which divided the common-law offense of murder into two degrees in order to achieve proportionality in punishment and to restrict the imposition of the death penalty. See Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U.Pa.L.Rev. 759 (1949); see also Bratton v. State, 29 Tenn. 103, 110 (1849) (recognizing the Pennsylvania statute is almost identical to Tennessee's). Under Tennessee's statutory definition of felony murder, prior to the 1989 Code Revision, the prosecution is not required to prove the elements of malice, deliberation and premeditation, or that the defendant intended to kill the victim. State v. Johnson, 661 S.W.2d 854, 861 (Tenn. 1983); Farmer v. State, 201 Tenn. 107, 115, 296 S.W.2d 879, 883 (1956); State v. Hopper, 695 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); Tosh v. State, 527 S.W.2d 146, 147-48 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975). Instead, where the offense is committed in the perpetration of a designated felony, the elements of malice, deliberation and premeditation are implied. See State v. Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659, 671 (Tenn. 1988); State v. Norris, 684 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). [3] The Tennessee offense extends both to the killer and his accomplices. A defendant who is a willing and active participant in a robbery becomes accountable for all of the consequences flowing from the robbery and may be convicted of first-degree murder where a co-perpetrator of the felony is the actual killer. Dupes v. State, 209 Tenn. 506, 512, 354 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1962); Woodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 537, 51 S.W.2d 843, 845 (1932); Moody v. State, 46 Tenn. 299, 305-307 (1869); State v. Brown, 756 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Hopper, supra, 695 S.W.2d at 535. The result of the felony murder doctrine in Tennessee is thus to impose a rule of strict liability allowing the underlying felonious intent to supply the required mens rea for the homicidal actus reus and to impose vicarious liability for the acts of another. See, generally, Comment, The Constitutionality of Imposing the Death Penalty for Felony Murder, 15 Hous. L.Rev. 356, 366-369 (1978). Therefore, Tennessee's statute allows convictions for first-degree felony murder of those who commit accidental killings, and of persons who did not kill the victim and may not have intended that the victim be killed or suffer any physical harm. Courts have often stated that the purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter felons from accidentally or negligently killing in the course of felonies by holding them strictly liable for the results of their dangerous conduct. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (1965); State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 631, 664 P.2d 1358, 1369 (1983); Payne v. State, 81 Nev. 503, 506, 406 P.2d 922, 924 (1965). Consistent with that purpose, many courts have limited the scope of the rule to felonies that are dangerous to human life. [4] The felony murder doctrine has been frequently and negatively criticized by courts and legal commentators, the criticism by commentators becoming even more intense when felony murder is used to make a defendant death eligible. See, e.g., People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980); Finkel, Capital Felony-Murder, Objective Indicia, and Community Sentiment, 32 Ariz.L.Rev. 819 (1990); Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C.L.Rev. 1103 (1990); Roth & Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 Cornell L.Rev. 446 (1985); Comment, The Constitutionality of Imposing the Death Penalty for Felony Murder, 15 Hous.L.Rev. 356 (1978). As more refined standards of culpability have developed, some courts and commentators have said that the intent to commit a felony is not equivalent to the other mental states associated with murder. See W. LaFave and A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, § 71, at 554 (1972). As a result of this and other criticisms, some jurisdictions have abolished the felony murder rule by statute or by judicial action. [5] Nonetheless, the vast majority of states that have the death penalty permit it to be imposed in cases of felony murder under some circumstances. Few legislatures have repealed the doctrine, and the courts have generally continued to enforce it. There are thirty-six states which allow the imposition of the death penalty, and thirty-two of these states allow the death penalty for felony murder. Finkel, Capital Felony-Murder, Objective Indicia, and Community Sentiment, 32 Ariz.L.Rev. at 890. Most states impose the death penalty only where killings perpetrated during felonies are intentional, deliberate, purposeful or knowing. The number of states allowing capital punishment for pure felony murder, or felony murder simpliciter, is a distinct minority. Tennessee moved out of that status in 1989 by amending its first-degree murder statute to provide that first-degree murder occurs only where a killing in the perpetration of one of the listed felonies is reckless. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (1991). [6] The minimum standards for determining whether a sentence of death may be constitutionally imposed under the United States Constitution for felony murder are indicated by the United States Supreme Court in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), which dealt with the problem of imposing the death penalty in cases of vicarious liability for felony murder, i.e., where an accomplice in the felony, one who did not actually kill the victim, is convicted of murder under the felony murder doctrine and receives the death penalty. Under the rules of those cases, the death penalty is only permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who himself kills, attempts to kill, or intends that a killing take place or that lethal force will be imposed, Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797, 102 S.Ct. at 3376, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1151, or for one whose personal involvement in the underlying felony is substantial and who exhibits a reckless disregard or indifference to the value of human life  although there is no intent to kill, Tison, 481 U.S. at 157-58, 107 S.Ct. at 1687-88, 95 L.Ed.2d at 144. These federal standards do not, however, answer the question under the state constitution. As Justice Brock observed in his dissent in State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tenn. 1981), we may not impinge upon the minimum level of protection established by Supreme Court interpretations of the federal constitutional guarantee, but may impose higher standards and stronger protections than those set by the federal constitution. The present Court first examined the constitutionality of the imposition of capital punishment under Article I, § 16 of the state constitution in State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991). There, we elected to follow the analysis of Gregg v. Georgia, supra , under which three inquiries are required: First, does the punishment for the crime conform with the contemporary standards of decency? Second, is the punishment grossly disproportionate to the offense? Third, does the punishment go beyond what is necessary to accomplish any legitimate, penological objective? State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 169, 524 A.2d 188, 210 (1987) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173, 96 S.Ct. at 2925, 49 L.Ed.2d at 874-75). In Black , a majority of the present Court reaffirmed the prior holdings of this Court that the death penalty does not per se violate Article I, § 16, of the Tennessee Constitution. 815 S.W.2d at 190-91. As a part of our analysis, we said that the legislative and constitutional history of Tennessee indicates a clear intent that the death penalty is, in some cases, an appropriate form of punishment, and that by reason of the language of the Constitution, the framers recognized the acceptability of capital punishment. Id., 815 S.W.2d at 188. In addition, we noted that nothing in the constitutional legislative history mandates that death is invalid per se as cruel and unusual punishment under Article I, § 16. Id. In determining whether the death penalty conforms with contemporary standards of decency for the crime of felony murder, we recognize that an assessment of contemporary values is relevant and that the standards of decency are not static, but are evolving as society matures. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642 (1958). As Gregg v. Georgia teaches, this assessment of contemporary values is not subjective, but an examination of objective indicia that reflect the public attitude towards a given sanction. 428 U.S. at 173, 96 S.Ct. at 2925, 49 L.Ed.2d at 874. It is evident that a large proportion of Tennessee society continues to find the death penalty for felony murder an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction. This approval is clearly evidenced by the actions of the General Assembly in re-enacting the 1977 felony murder statute after the 1972 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), and our own state court decisions declaring the prior statute allowing the death penalty unconstitutional. See Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Morgan v. Tennessee, 434 U.S. 905, 98 S.Ct. 303, 54 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977); State v. Hailey, 505 S.W.2d 712 (Tenn. 1974). The General Assembly's response to these court actions was to enact new statutes addressing the concerns expressed by the Furman court, but which continued to provide for the death penalty for felony murder. Legislatures of at least thirty-four other states took similar actions. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 179-80, 96 S.Ct. at 2928, 49 L.Ed.2d at 878. As recently as 1989, the General Assembly reaffirmed that position. See Revised Criminal Code of 1989, 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 591, § 1. Examination of other state systems reveals that capital punishment for felony murder in some circumstances is acceptable in at least thirty-two of the thirty-six states with the death penalty. Finkel, Capital Felony-Murder, Objective Indicia, and Community Sentiment, 32 Ariz.L.Rev. at 890. In four states  Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and Wyoming  there is presently no requirement of culpability. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04, and § 921.141(5)(d) (West Supp. 1992); Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1101 and § 27-2534.1 (Michie 1988); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1) (Law.Coop.Supp. 1991); and Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-101(a) and § 6-2-102(h)(iv) (Supp. 1991). Tennessee, as noted above, was previously a member of this minority position. In addition to the legislative response, as Gregg v. Georgia points out, the jury is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved and because it maintains a link between contemporary community values and the penal system. 428 U.S. at 181, 96 S.Ct. at 2929, 49 L.Ed.2d at 879. Since the reimposition of the death penalty for felony murder in 1977, juries have consistently imposed the death penalty for that offense. See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1990); State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. 1988); State v. Bell, 745 S.W.2d 858 (Tenn. 1988); State v. Sparks, 727 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1987); State v. Goad, 707 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. 1986); State v. Hartman, 703 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. 1985); State v. Matson, 666 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Simon, 635 S.W.2d 498 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Coleman, 619 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn. 1981). The second question that must be answered under the Black test, adopted from Gregg , is whether the punishment of death is disproportionate in relation to the crime for which it is imposed. We are concerned here only with the imposition of capital punishment for the crime of felony murder in the abstract. As stated earlier, under the statute prior to the 1989 revision, a person was guilty of first-degree murder under the felony murder doctrine without regard to intent to kill so long as the killing occurred during the perpetration of a felony. Yet, this absence of intent does not render the death penalty disproportionate. As Justice O'Connor observed, writing for the majority in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. at 157, 107 S.Ct. at 1688, 95 L.Ed.2d at 144: [S]ome nonintentional murderers may be among the most dangerous and inhumane of all  the person who tortures another, not caring whether the victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim's property. This reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an intent to kill. (Emphasis added.) See also Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991). In the early case of State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127 (Tenn. 1981), the defendant argued that felony murder resulted in imposition of the death penalty in the absence of premeditation and in cases involving the least, rather than the most `blameworthy' of murderers, because, it is insisted, the statute contains no guidelines for ascertaining culpability or the degree of culpability that will prevent disproportionate application of the death penalty. Id., 621 S.W.2d at 140. This Court replied, [t]he short answer to the issue posed by defendant is that, conceding such a result may be possible in the trial court, it is the statutory and inherent obligation of this Court to correct the error on appeal. An integral part of the death penalty statute that must be construed in pari materia is the automatic review of every death sentence by this Court. T.C.A. § 39-2406. Subsection (c) of that statute enumerates our duties that include eliminating any arbitrary, excessive, or disproportionate imposition of the death penalty.... Id. Accordingly, rather than an absolute rule of per se disproportionality, this Court has in the past relied on its statutory duty of review under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-205 [now § 39-13-206] to assure that the sentence in each case is not disproportionate or excessive. We agree with that approach and with Justice Blackmun's rejection of the per se proportionality approach in his dissent in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 613-19, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2969-71, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 995-98. He observed in that connection that a sentence in felony murder should be based on evidence of a particular defendant's participation in homicide and his mens rea in regard to the homicidal act. We, therefore, reaffirm the rejection of a per se proportionality approach in favor of the required statutory proportionality review. The third question for the Court under the Black test is whether the infliction of the death penalty for felony murder goes beyond that necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological objective. On the one hand it has been argued that, because felony murder encompasses unintentional and accidental murders, the legitimate penological objective of deterrence is not satisfied. In response, we observe that the legislature may decide that the death penalty is even more effective in deterring felony murders than simple atrocious murders since an experienced felon is more likely to assess the consequences of his acts than other murderers who are more likely to act on passion or impulse, unmindful of the consequences of their actions. Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1104 (5th Cir.1982) (replying to an equal protection/due process challenge to capital felony murder). See Crump & Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 Harv.J.L. & Pub.Pol'y 359 (1985). The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 183, 96 S.Ct. at 2929-30, 49 L.Ed.2d at 880. As we commented in Black : [w]hile increasingly questioned, retribution remains a valid penological justification for the death penalty. [C]apital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183, 96 S.Ct. at 2930. Channeling man's natural instinct for retribution serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law for the seeds of anarchy are sown when people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they `deserve.' Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 308, 92 S.Ct. at 2761 (Stewart, J., concurring). State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d at 190. Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 184, 96 S.Ct. at 2930, 49 L.Ed.2d at 880-81. We conclude that the death penalty for felony murder in Tennessee does not per se violate Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. As we observed in Black , the issue of whether or not the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is, in the last analysis, a moral question which has been resolved in this State by our legislature as the representative of the people. It is not the role of this Court to superimpose personal morality in difficult issues, State v. Campbell, 103 Wash.2d 1, 34, 691 P.2d 929, 948 (1984), nor to act as a good reflex of a democratic society. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525, 71 S.Ct. 857, 875, 95 L.Ed. 1137, 1161 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For these reasons, we reaffirm the prior holdings of this Court that the death penalty in felony murder does not per se violate Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution.