Opinion ID: 1942603
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Challenge State's Case at Penalty Phase

Text: Evans next alleges that trial counsel was deficient for failing to request the appointment of co-counsel to assist in investigating and presenting mitigation in a capital case pursuant to Guideline 2.1 of the American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (1989) (ABA Guidelines). [22] In denying this claim, the trial court determined that Evans failed to establish both prongs under Strickland. We agree. First, the trial court found that Evans failed to establish that defense counsel's performance was deficient. The trial court recognized that defense counsel was bound by Brevard County's guidelines for trying a capital case, not the ABA guidelines, [23] and that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.112, which adopted the ABA guidelines in part and provides that a judge may appoint co-counsel in a capital case, had not been enacted at the time of Evans' trial. Second, even if counsel was deficient, the trial court determined that Evans had not demonstrated how counsel's solo representation prejudiced Evans. As the trial court correctly stated, [t]he mere fact that a Defendant has been represented by one attorney alone is insufficient to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Cole v. State, 841 So.2d 409, 428 (Fla.2003) (The general allegation that mitigating evidence could have been better presented [had co-counsel been requested and appointed] is an insufficient allegation of prejudice.); State v. Riechmann, 777 So.2d 342, 359 (Fla.2000) (denying claim of ineffective assistance for failure to request co-counsel where defendant failed to specifically demonstrate how counsel's solo representation affected outcome of trial). The trial court's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. We affirm.
Evans next claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his background for mental health mitigation to present at the penalty phase. Evans claims that defense counsel was deficient for failing to discover a wealth of mitigating information, including Evans' brain injury and lifelong emotional and behavioral problems, and for failing to present anything other than positive character evidence at the penalty phase. Evans alleges that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient investigation because discovery and presentation of his brain injury and impulse disorder would have led to an instruction on both mental health statutory mitigators. We decline to address whether counsel's investigation was deficient because we affirm the trial court's conclusion that Evans has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to present the mitigation evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. [B]ecause the Strickland standard requires establishment of both [deficient performance and prejudice] prongs, when a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong. Whitfield v. State, 923 So.2d 375, 384 (Fla. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Stewart v. State, 801 So.2d 59, 65 (Fla.2001)); see also Sweet v. State, 810 So.2d 854, 863-64 (Fla.2002) (declining to reach deficiency prong based on finding that there was no prejudice). Evans has failed to establish prejudice because the mitigation evidence he presented at the evidentiary hearing would likely have been more harmful than helpful. An ineffective assistance claim does not arise from the failure to present mitigation evidence where that evidence presents a double-edged sword. Reed v. State, 875 So.2d 415, 437 (Fla.2004). While the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing established that Evans suffered from mental health problems, it also displayed a long history of behavioral problems and escalating violence throughout his school career. Presenting this evidence at the penalty phase would have resulted in the jury hearing about Evans' aggression towards students and teachers, his aggression towards police officers, his pride in being known as a jack-boy because he robs drug dealers, and his habit of carrying a gun. It is just as likely that this evidence would have been more aggravating than mitigating. See Reed, 875 So.2d at 436-37 (denying ineffective assistance claim because even if [defense] counsel had . . . investigated further, the testimony that could have been presented was just as likely to have resulted in aggravation against rather than mitigation for [the defendant]). Moreover, this mitigation evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing is inconsistent with Evans' own testimony at the guilt phase. The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing regarding Evans' uncontrollable rage disorder is inconsistent with his testimony that he had a clear recollection of the shooting because he was focused and in control. Based on the foregoing, Evans has not established that there is a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different had counsel discovered and presented the mitigation evidence Evans presented at the evidentiary hearing. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (establishing that appropriate test for prejudice is whether defendant has demonstrated reasonable probability that outcome would have been different but for counsel's unprofessional errors and defining reasonable probability as probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome). Therefore, we are confident in the outcome and affirm the trial court's denial of this claim.