Opinion ID: 1058303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Future Dangerousness and Vileness Instructions

Text: In assignments of error 67 and 68, Prieto argues that the circuit court erred when it refused to give the jury his proposed instructions H and K. For the future dangerousness aggravating factor, instruction H would have, in part, defined the term probability to mean a reasonable likelihood that the defendant will actually commit intentional acts of unprovoked violence in the future. For the vileness aggravating factor, instruction K would have, in part, defined the term depravity of mind to mean a degree of moral turpitude and debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary malice and premeditation. Because these definitions come from this Court's decision in Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S.Ct. 2419, 60 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1979), Prieto contends they became part of the law in Virginia and have narrowed the meaning of the aggravating factors so as to make them an element of the offense. Prieto asserts that under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 454 n. 6, 125 S.Ct. 847, 160 L.Ed.2d 881 (2005), the proposed instructions should have been given in order to ensure that the jury properly determined whether Prieto was a future danger to society or his conduct was sufficiently vile in order to support a sentence of death. We have specifically rejected the argument Prieto raises with regard to the future dangerousness aggravating factor involved in proposed instruction H. Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 264-65, 661 S.E.2d 415, 447-48 (2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1999, 173 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2009). We see no reason to readdress this ruling at this time. The circuit court also did not err in refusing to give proposed instruction K. We have rejected the notion that the term depravity of mind is unconstitutionally vague, Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 394, 464 S.E.2d 131, 140 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110, 116 S.Ct. 1332, 134 L.Ed.2d 483 (1996), or that an instruction defining depravity of mind needs to be given. Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 515, 323 S.E.2d 539, 553 (1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1096, 105 S.Ct. 2315, 85 L.Ed.2d 835 (1985). We have also found that Virginia's death penalty statutes do not suffer from the same issues found in Ring, 536 U.S. at 592-93, 122 S.Ct. 2428, and Muhammad, 269 Va. at 491, 619 S.E.2d at 39, and that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), does not require the jury to be instructed on the definitions of the subparts of the vileness aggravating factor. Elliott v. Warden, 274 Va. 598, 627, 652 S.E.2d 465, 488-89 (2007). Therefore, no additional instruction was needed in order for the jury to understand the vileness aggravating factor.