Opinion ID: 836190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: superior jurisdiction of prior proceedings

Text: First, I agree that the guardianship proceedings here precluded defendant from separately seeking custody under the CCA. Ante at 711-12. Generally, when two courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the first court that acquired jurisdiction retains it until the matter is fully resolved. See Schell v. Schell, 257 Mich. 85, 88, 241 N.W. 223 (1932). [5] Accordingly, if a parent's fitness or custody rights are governed by an ongoing proceedingsuch as the guardianship proceeding here or a child protective proceeding under the Juvenile Codethe parent may not separately invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction by filing a simultaneous custody action under the CCA. Because this holding is a crucial element of the majority opinion, I offer an example to illustrate the importance of this jurisdictional rule. Child protective proceedings under the Juvenile Code are designed to protect children from abuse and neglect often by temporarily removing them from their parents' custody under emergency conditionswhile aiding parents to rectify unfit conditions and regain custody of their children. The purposes of these proceedings would be nullified if a parent could avoid them by regaining custody in a separate proceeding under the CCA. The Juvenile Code protects children who, among other things, are subjected to abuse, neglect, or unfit living conditions. MCL 712A.2(b). [6] The code empowers the Department of Human Services (DHS) to petition for temporary removal of a child from his parent's home for these reasons. The court may authorize the petition upon a showing of probable cause that 1 or more of the allegations in the petition are true and fall within the provisions of section 2(b).... MCL 712A.13a(2). If the court orders the child's removal from the parent's custody and orders the child into court or state custody, a process begins during which the DHS works with the parent, if possible, to restore custody with the parent. [7] As I will explain further, this process is statutorily designed to take up to one year. See MCL 712A.19a(1). Within 30 days of the child's removal, and every 90 days thereafter, the DHS must provide service plans detailing its efforts and the services provided to prevent removal or to rectify the conditions that caused removal, as well as the efforts to be made and services to be offered to facilitate the child's return to his parent, if appropriate. MCL 712A.18f. The court generally reviews the case within 182 days of the child's removal and every 91 days thereafter. MCL 712A.19(3). At each review hearing, the court must evaluate the parent's compliance with the service plan, MCL 712A.19(6) and (7), and may order additional services or actions. MCL 712A.19(7)(a). If a child remains outside his home, the court must conduct a permanency planning hearing within one year of the child's removal. MCL 712A.19a(1). At that hearing, if the court determines that the return of the child to his or her parent would not cause a substantial risk of harm to the child's life, physical health, or mental well-being, the court shall order the child returned to his or her parent. MCL 712A.19a(5). If the court determines that the parent poses a substantial risk to the child, it may order the DHS to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights. MCL 712A.19a(6). If termination is not in the child's best interests, the court may also consider alternative placement plans, including a guardianship. MCL 712A.19a(7). Crucially, the burden of proof is elevated to clear and convincing evidence only at this final stage, the termination of parental rights proceeding. MCL 712A.19b(3). Because of the different evidentiary standards in the CCA and the Juvenile Code, a parent could subvert child protective proceedings if the Schell rule did not mandate superior jurisdiction in the child protective proceedings. This is because, as noted, the requisite conditions for removal of a child from his parent's custody under MCL 712A.2(b) of the Juvenile Code must be proved by a showing of probable cause, MCL 712A.13a(2). But, particularly under the majority's interpretation of the CCA, the DHS or a third party custodian can prevent a parent from regaining custody under the CCA only by rebutting the parental presumption by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 722.25(1). Because the CCA creates a higher burden for a third party seeking custody, the parent could regain custody under the CCA; while the initial conditions warranting emergency removal may have been supported by probable cause, the DHS may not yet have gathered enough evidence to meet the heightened clear and convincing evidence standard of the statutory presumption in MCL 722.25(1), as would be necessary to prevent the parent from immediately regaining custody. Thus, if the parent could seek custody under the CCA, the Legislature's carefully crafted child protective processwhich both protects children and ultimately benefits willing parentscould be nullified. A related problem involving guardianships would arise if a parent could invoke the court's jurisdiction under the CCA although the parent's rights were eligible for termination under the Juvenile Code. Indeed, although the court may conclude that a child should not be returned to his parent because the parent poses an ongoing substantial risk of harm, the court may place the child with a permanent guardian in lieu of terminating the parent's rights. MCL 712A.19a(6) and (7)(c). That guardianship may continue until the child is emancipated, MCL 712A.19a(7)(c), and the guardian gains all the traditional parent-like rights and duties inherent in a guardianship established under the EPIC. MCL 712A.19a(8). If the natural parent could nonetheless obtain custody under the CCA, the purposes and terms of these pre-termination guardianships would be obviated. Particularly under the majority's rule, the parent could file under the CCA to shift the burden to the guardian, thereby requiring the guardian to prove by clear and convincing evidence that placement with the parent is not in the child's best interests. The court's determination during the child protective proceedings that the parent posed a significant harm to his child would become irrelevant and the guardian would be forced to litigate in defense of his appointment. In addition to subverting the statutory scheme in favor of pre-termination guardianships, this result likely would cause voluntary guardians to decide against accepting guardianship appointments. [8] In sum, important, practical reasons undergird the Schell rule and the principles of collateral estoppel addressed by the majority. Once a court attains jurisdiction of a child's custody under the Juvenile Code or the EPIC, as the first court to attain jurisdiction over these matters, it retains jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed. Schell, supra, 257 Mich. at 88, 241 N.W. 223. A parent cannot simply file separately for custody under the CCA and regain custody by invoking the parental presumption. Permitting a parent to do so would undermine the very purposes of the other statutory schemes addressing custody and child welfare, not to mention the havoc and confusion in courts attempting to properly protect children and adjudicate parental rights under the correct statutes. Finally, the CCA itself confirms this result by providing a single, explicit exception to the normal application of the Schell rule. MCL 722.26b, which grants a guardian standing to seek custody under the CCA, provides the only apparent context in which a CCA action may override decisions of another court with ongoing jurisdiction over the parties' rights to the children. [9] MCL 722.26b(4) explicitly states that, when a guardian seeks custody, guardianship proceedings concerning that child in the probate court are stayed until disposition of the child custody action and permits an ensuing circuit court order to supersede probate court orders concerning the guardianship of the child. The CCA does not, in turn, permit a parent with the limited rights inherent in guardianship proceedings to sue for custody or stay the guardianship proceedings. Rather, as the majority notes, a parent's recourse would lie in his explicit right to petition the probate court to terminate the guardianship under MCL 700.5208.