Opinion ID: 2636170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interpretation of Section 22.A of the Agreement

Text: [¶ 16] This Court applies the standards of contract construction to construe divorce property settlement agreements. Lipps v. Loyd, 967 P.2d 558, 560 (Wyo.1998); Brockway v. Brockway 921 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Wyo.1996); Crawford v. Crawford, 757 P.2d 563, 566 (Wyo.1988). Our cases are legion in which we recite and apply these standards. The parties here agree what those standards are. The parties here also agree that the agreement, including Section 22.A, is unambiguous; that is, it is capable of being understood in only one way with respect to the amount of fees Mrs. Wunsch is to receive on the joint client accounts replaced by Mr. Wunsch. The parties disagree, however, about that understanding; specifically, they disagree about the meaning of the agreement, including Section 22.A, with respect to that amount of fees. The district court decided that the agreement, including Section 22.A, is capable of being understood in only one way, namely, Mrs. Wunsch is to receive in fees an amount equal to two times the annual earnings on the amount replaced. This Court does not accord deference to that decision. Examination Management Services v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 689 (Wyo. 1996). Whether the contract is unambiguous is a question of law; if the Court determines the contract is unambiguous, the next question, what is the contract's meaning, is also a question of law. Id. This Court is at liberty to make a determination as to the existence of ambiguity whether or not the parties here agree thereto one way or the other; and whether or not the trial court has reached a conclusion thereon one way or the other. Id. (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co. of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463, 465 (Wyo. 1980)). [¶ 17] This Court's standards of contract construction include:  in reading a contract our primary purpose is to determine the true intent and understanding of the parties at the time and place the contract was made;  we consider the contract as a whole, reading each part in light of all other parts; meaning should be afforded to all of the language used by the parties if that can be done and a reasonable construction achieved; in other words, we analyze the tenor of the contract;  the presumption is that a particular provision is placed in a contract for a purpose; therefore, we strive to avoid a construction which renders a provision meaningless. Similarly, we strive to reconcile by reasonable interpretation any provisions which apparently conflict before adopting a construction which would nullify any provision;  if we identify an ambiguous term or portion of the contract, we strive to ascertain the meaning of that term or portion from other language of the contract, i.e., from the contract as a whole;  common sense and good faith are the leading characteristics of contract construction;  we determine the parties' intent by an objective approach, i.e., intention is what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would conclude the manifestations to mean. In addition to these standards we have also recognized that: The language of a contract is to be construed within the context in which it was written. In so doing, the court may look to the surrounding circumstances, the subject matter and the purpose of the contract. The purpose of examining the context within which the contract was drawn, however, is limited to ascertaining the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was made. The context cannot be invoked to contradict the clear meaning of the language used, and those extraneous circumstances do not justify a court in proceeding to insert therein a provision other than or different from that which the language used clearly indicates, and thereby, in effect, make a contract for the parties. Examination Management Services, Inc., 927 P.2d at 690 (citations omitted). With these standards in mind, we now consider the parties' contentions. [¶ 18] Mr. Wunsch contends the unambiguous meaning of Section 22.A is that Mrs. Wunsch should receive twice her annual income from the SAM accounts as compensation for her interest in the parties' business. He claims the parties agreed on a fifty-fifty split of the business and that this split is evidenced by language not only in Section 22.A of the agreement, but also in language in other Section 22 provisions, namely, four statements in the introductory part of Section 22, a statement in Section 22.B, three statements in Section 22.D, a statement in Section 22.F, a statement in Section 22.I, and a statement in Section 22.J. In the introductory part of Section 22, he points to the statements that they co-own a business; each party shall pay one-half the former triple net lease obligations; each party is equally responsible for paying employee expenses incurred through June 15, 2004, the date the business will be separated into two entities; and the parties shall be equally responsible for business related expenses, taxes and penalties, and business debts to third party creditors through June 15, 2004. In Section 22.B, he points to the statement that each party has all rights to the income paid through that party's own LPL representative account number. In Section 22.D, Pension Plan, he points to the statements that the parties shall equally pay the amount necessary to fully fund the plan through March 31, 2004, the date benefits were frozen; the parties shall equalize their distribution of pension funds by qualified domestic relations order; and after any payments to third party employees, the parties shall equally divide any funds payable to them. In Section 22.F, he points to the statement that the parties shall equally pay the demand promissory note to the corporation. In Section 22.I, he points to the statement that the parties shall equally defend any claims arising from the business transacted before the division of the business or while the parties continue to do business together. Finally, in Section 22.J, he points to the statement that the parties shall share equally the mediator's cost if there is dispute mediation. [¶ 19] With respect to the language in Section 22.A, Mr. Wunsch contends that the fifty-fifty split of the business is evident in the first sentence that states the parties will share equally any fees earned on joint client accounts paid through the parties' joint account LPL representative number 7, and in the second sentence that states the parties will share equally the fees on any replaced joint client account paid through their joint account LPL representative number 7 until Mrs. Wunsch has received in fees an amount equal to two times the annual earnings on the amount replaced. [¶ 20] Considering the equal division language in the statements in the introductory part of Section 22, Section 22.B, Section 22.D, Section 22.F, Section 22.I, and Section 22.J, Mr. Wunsch concludes that the only reasonable meaning to the language in Section 22.A is an equal division of their assets, resulting in payment for Mrs. Wunsch's fifty percent interest in those replaced joint client accounts, not twice the entire annual earnings received on such accounts. [¶ 21] Countering Mr. Wunsch's position on the unambiguous meaning of Section 22.A, Mrs. Wunsch asserts that Mr. Wunsch's reliance on the few irrelevant statements in Section 22's other provisions is an attempt to impose his interpretation of an industry standard for appraising the value of a business while ignoring Section 22.A's plain language that addresses the parties' settlement on the replaced joint accounts. She points out that Section 22.A is the only provision in the agreement setting forth the amount she was to be paid if Mr. Wunsch decided to replace a joint client account. She asserts that Section 22.A is plain and clear that if he replaced a joint client account, she was to receive two times the annual earnings on the amount replaced. She states that the parties could have used the word her in place of the word the in the sentence in question; but they did not. She argues that Mr. Wunsch would replace the word the with the word her; but that would be rewriting the agreement, which courts may not do. [¶ 22] Mrs. Wunsch asserts that in the agreement the parties specifically stated how each item of property would be divided, sold, or otherwise disposed of. She notes that the agreement treats separately the disposition of each particular asset. In particular, she argues, Section 22.A treats the replaced joint client accounts. She notes that the agreement expresses no general rule that there was to be a fifty-fifty division of the assets, as Mr. Wunsch argues. She asserts that the plain meaning of the specific language in Section 22.A may not be trumped by Mr. Wunsch's non-existent assumption of a fifty-fifty split. [¶ 23] We have carefully considered the parties' arguments in light of our standards of contract construction. When we apply these standards to the agreement dispute at hand, we conclude that Mrs. Wunsch's position is more persuasive. We hold that the language of the agreement is unambiguous in stating that if Mr. Wunsch replaced any of the joint client accounts, the parties will share equally the fees on the replaced accounts until such time as [Mrs. Wunsch] has received in fees an amount equal to two times the annual earnings on the amount replaced. (Emphasis added). The agreement does not mean two times her annual earnings. We reject Mr. Wunsch's construction of the agreement because it defies the plain meaning of the agreement and would rewrite a critical word in the key sentence of Section 22.A. [¶ 24] We affirm the decision of the district court.