Opinion ID: 1454062
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct Method for Demonstrating Discrimination

Text: The terminology in this area of law can be a bit confusing as the word direct is used both for the direct method and direct evidence. See Rudin, 420 F.3d at 720 n. 3. Direct evidence, one of the two types of proof used in the direct method for establishing a triable issue of fact, is an admission by the decision-maker that his actions were based upon the prohibited animus. Needless to say, such admissions are rarely encountered. Rogers, 320 F.3d at 753 (citing Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 576 (7th Cir.2001); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 616 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted)). Evidence used in the direct method is not limited to near-admissions by the employer that its decisions were based on a proscribed criterion . . ., but also includes circumstantial evidence which suggests discrimination albeit through a longer chain of inferences. Luks v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 467 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2006) (citing Sylvester v. SOS Children's Villages Illinois, Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902-03 (7th Cir.2006); Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir.2006)). In the present case, Lewis provides both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence against the defendants sufficient to survive summary judgment under the direct method. Lewis provides direct evidence of alleged discrimination through Williams's statement that he prevented her from participating on the IMF Detail because she was a female and that it was going to be a working trip, and he thought it would be dangerous and that [she] would thank him for it later. Appellant's Brief at 7. This is sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants discriminated against Lewis. The district court, however, rejected this evidence. It determined that Williams's comment must be considered in the context in which it was made. . . . Williams's alleged statement that Lewis could not go on the IMF Detail because she is `female' cannot be characterized as direct evidence of discrimination without a presumption that gender is completely irrelevant to the IMF Detail. [Chief Maurer's memorandum] indicates that gender was relevant to the rooming arrangements. Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Dep't, 428 F.Supp.2d 783, 792-93 (N.D.Ill.2006). The district court erred by improperly weighing the parties' evidence during summary judgment. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the nonmovant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The district court should not weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but rather determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir.2001). The record presents a swearing contest between Lewis and Williams as to Williams's alleged statement as to why he excluded Lewis from the IMF Detail. The reason for that exclusion, whether Williams had discriminatory intent or because of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, is a question of fact for a jury to decide at trial, not for a district court to consider at summary judgment. Lewis is a competent witness to testify because she was present when Williams made the alleged statement, it is an admission by a party-opponent and, if true, is direct evidence of discriminatory intent. FED. R.EVID. 801(d)(2); see, e.g., Stinnett v. Iron Works Gym/Executive Health Spa, Inc., 301 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir.2002) (noting that the evidence relied upon in defending a motion for summary judgment must be competent evidence of a type otherwise admissible at trial). The defendants provide a secondary argument that Williams's comments must also be ignored because he was not a decision maker. Although he consulted with his supervisor, Commander Brown, the record contains evidence to demonstrate that Williams was involved in the process of determining who would be put on the IMF Detail. Therefore, Williams's comments can qualify as direct evidence of discrimination. See Rozskowiak v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 415 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir.2005) (explaining that a decision maker is one who is involved in the process of making the employment decision at issue). Furthermore, a plaintiff can use either direct evidence, circumstantial evidence or a combination of the two types of evidence, to meet her burden under the direct method. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir.1994). Circumstantial evidence demonstrating intentional discrimination includes: `(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written statements, or behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in the protected group; (2) evidence, whether or not rigorously statistical, that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received systematically better treatment; and (3) evidence that the employee was qualified for the job in question but was passed over in favor of a person outside the protected class and the employer's reason is a pretext for discrimination.' Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Sun v. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Illinois, 473 F.3d 799, 812 (7th Cir.2007)). Chief Maurer's memorandum and the ultimate rooming arrangements made in Washington, D.C. provide circumstantial evidence of discrimination that Lewis can also use under the direct method. Chief Maurer's memorandum, when viewed in the light most favorable to Lewis, does not convey a gender neutral concern in regard to hotel arrangements as suggested by the defendants. The Department has the same privacy and efficiency concerns in its rooming arrangements regardless of whether there is a lone female or lone male officer. Despite the universal nature of privacy and efficiency concerns to rooming arrangements for both genders, the memorandum uses the phrase lone female instead of lone female or lone male or lone officer. Additionally, the defendants' argument that the Department's purpose was to avoid single officers in a hotel room does not stand up to the reality that the Department ultimately sent an odd number of male and female officers to the IMF Detail and that four lone officers, three men and one woman, had individual rooms to themselves. Lewis has provided sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to satisfy the direct method of proof on this issue. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendants discriminated against Lewis on the basis of her gender.