Opinion ID: 2570146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fiduciary Duty, Vice Principal Doctrine, Civil Conspiracy, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Text: ¶ 42 In N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 1999 OK 88, n. 47, 998 P.2d 592, 602 we noted authority discussing the problem of evaluating the contours of a fiduciary duty between an ecclesiastical organization and a member thereof. Id. at n. 47, 998 P.2d at 602, citing Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 177 Misc.2d 897, 677 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438-39 (1998) (evaluation of fiduciary duty between religious organization and parishioner impermissible under First Amendment.). We had previously noted a similar problem in Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw, 1993 OK 105, ¶ 29, 857 P.2d 789, 795-796, and we explained that in analyzing and defining the scope of a fiduciary duty owed persons by their clergy, the Court would be confronted by the same constitutional difficulties encountered in articulating the generalized standard of care for a clergyman required by the law of negligence. . . . Id. 857 P.2d at 795. ¶ 43 The negligent supervision claim we address today is in the context of an employer's duty to supervise employees. No First Amendment defense to this claim has been asserted by the Archdiocese that would prohibit it from acting as a non-ecclesiastical employer. Indeed, it argues that it should be treated as other employers. The argument made by Schovanec on certiorari does not specifically address the problem we discussed in Bladen, that is, identifying the scope of the fiduciary duty apart from a court assessing particularized denominational standards of conduct as a basis of liability. However one of the four opinions he cites in support of fiduciary duty on the part of an archdiocese to its parishioners, Doe v. Evans, 814 So.2d 370 (Fla.2002), states that a fiduciary duty may be adjudicated based upon neutral principles unrelated to religious doctrines. For example, it states that Under section 874 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Violation of Fiduciary Duty, [o]ne standing in a fiduciary relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the relation. Thus, [a] fiduciary who commits a breach of his duty as a fiduciary is guilty of tortious conduct to the person for whom he should act. . . . [T]he liability is not dependent solely upon an agreement or contractual relation between the fiduciary and the beneficiary but results from the relation. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 cmt. b (1979). Moreover, [a] fiduciary relation exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of that relation. Id. at cmt. a. Id. 814 So.2d at 374. This indicates the duty to act for or give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of a fiduciary relation. Schovanec attempts to define the scope of the fiduciary relationship to include duties on the Archdiocese to investigate and monitor Father Imming's daily activities. However, we need not address this argument further, because there is no evidentiary support for a breach of a fiduciary claim. ¶ 44 The Archbishop and Archdiocese contend that no fiduciary duty exists. The testimony of Archbishop Beltran is that a bond of trust exists between a priest who's providing counseling and the person they are providing counseling to. O.R. Vol. III Tab 12, Exhibit 30 at 87-88. Schovanec argued on summary judgment that the archdiocese admits this special bond of trust, confidence, and reliance exists between a parishioner, his priest, church, and diocese. Tab 12, at 5, citing, Exhibit 31 at 34-35 and Exhibit 30 at 87-88. The materials cited do not clearly state what Schovanec represents them to state. The referenced two exhibits are the depositions of Archbishops Beltran and Quinn. Archbishop Quinn was asked whether there is a special bond of trust between that parishioner and his church or Archdiocese? After objections to the form of the question, the Archbishop answered Yes. No other questions were asked relating to this bond of trust or facts relating to the parishioner-archdiocese relationship, or exactly what the witness understood and meant by the phrase bond of trust. A similar and more indirect form of the question was asked of Archbishop Beltran, Would you agree with me, Archbishop, that there is a bond of trust between a bishop or, excuse me, between a priest who's providing counseling and the person they are providing counseling to? After the objections to the form of the question, the Archbishop stated Yes. No other questioning on the specific relationship of parishioner-archdiocese was made. No facts are presented on the nature of a confidential relationship allegedly existing between Schovanec and the Archdiocese. No facts appear in the summary judgment record to show the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the archdiocese and Schovanec. The existence of fiduciary or confidential relationship is usually highly fact-specific and determined by a jury, Sellers v. Sellers, 1967 OK 34, 428 P.2d 230, 236, unless the evidence will not support sending the issue to the jury, Shoemaker v. Estate of Freeman, 1998 OK 17, ¶¶ 26-27, 967 P.2d 871, 877. We affirm that part of the summary judgment on Schovanec's fiduciary relationship claim. [23] ¶ 45 Schovanec argues that the Archdiocese and the Archbishop are liable for the sexual abuse based upon the doctrine or theory of vice principal. A vice principal is the representative and alter ego of the principal, his master. Chap-Tan Drilling Co. et al. v. Myers, 1950 OK 304, 225 P.2d 373, 375. The doctrine was used to establish liability on the part of the master or employer for the injury caused by one employee against another employee. For example, we stated the following: The law presumes that all persons engaged in the common employment of the same master, though different in rank, are fellow servants, and the burden is on him who claims damages for an injury caused by the negligence of one employed by the same master to show that his co-employé is a vice principal and stands in the place of the master. Mollhoff v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 1905 OK 78, 82 P. 733 (Syllabus by the Court). None of the Oklahoma opinions cited by Schovanec move the duty-liability regime beyond the employment relationship, and no cogent argument is made for the necessity or desirability of such a move. We decline to research the argument further, Fent v. Contingency Review Board, 2007 OK 27, nn. 58, 59, 163 P.3d 512, 525, and affirm the trial court's summary judgment on Schovanec's vice principal claim. ¶ 46 Schovanec also alleged that the Archdiocese is liable based upon a theory of civil conspiracy. In Brock v. Thompson, 1997 OK 127, 948 P.2d 279, we stated that A civil conspiracy consists of a combination of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means and we noted that a common-law action for civil conspiracy was also recognized in Texas. Brock, at n. 66, citing Closs v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. School Dist., 874 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1994, no writ). Closs states the following: Actionable civil conspiracy is a combination by two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.1983). The essential elements are: (1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result. Id. Civil conspiracy is an intentional tort. Id. at 933. As a general rule, an actionable conspiracy must consist of wrongs that could have been actionable against the individual conspirators. Closs, 874 S.W.2d at 871-872 (emphasis added). ¶ 47 Facts relating to intent are also necessary for Schovanec's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. For example, in Computer Publications, Inc. v. Welton, 2002 OK 50, 49 P.3d 732, we stated the following. ¶ 7 Oklahoma first adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known as the tort of outrage, in Breeden v. League Services Corp., 1978 OK 27, 575 P.2d 1374. The tort is governed by the narrow standards of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46.FN2 Id. The tort requires evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct coupled with severe emotional distress. Gaylord Entertainment Co. v. Thompson, 1998 OK 30, ¶ 45, 958 P.2d 128, 149. To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the resulting emotional distress was severe. Id. at ¶ 7, 49 P.3d at 735. We then stated the following. The court, in the first instance, must determine whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery or whether it is necessarily so. Where, under the facts before the court, reasonable persons may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether the conduct in any given case has been significantly extreme and outrageous to result in liability. Likewise, it is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether based upon the evidence presented, severe emotional distress can be found. It is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, severe emotional distress in fact existed. Computer Publications, at n. 8, 49 P.3d at 735, quoting Miller v. Miller, 1998 OK 24, ¶ 34, 956 P.2d 887, 901. Again, we are called to determine if there is an entire absence of facts and inferences therefrom on this issue. Schovanec essentially argues that the priests who knew of the skinny-dipping, boys temporarily residing with Father Imming, and parties in the rectory stated that they did not, or would not have, reported Father Imming to the Archbishop. On the other hand, some priests who did not know of these activities stated that they would have reported it to the Archbishop had they only known. Schovanec cites to a priest's deposition stating that the priest did not want to make trouble for Father Imming, and the conclusion he draws from the testimony is that the Archdiocese had a pattern of concealment. ¶ 48 Paraphrasing Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd., 1993 OK 160, 867 P.2d 1241, as a general rule, it is not within the scope of an employee's employment to commit an intentional tort upon a third person. Id. at 1245. We then stated that: However, this general rule does not apply when the act is one which is fairly and naturally incident to the business, and is done while the servant was engaged upon the master's business and be done, although mistakenly or ill advisedly, with a view to further the master's interest, or from some impulse of emotion which naturally grew out of or was incident to the attempt to perform the master's business. . . . An employee's act is within the scope of employment if it is incident to some service being performed for the employer. . . . Rodebush, 867 P.2d at 1245 (citations omitted). The deposition testimony is clear that one of the functions of a priest acting within the scope of his duty is to report the improper conduct of another priest. The motion and brief for summary judgment on the civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress is sought based upon the concept that no knowledge of the Archdiocese's priests or employees (such as Carole Goodwin) may be attributed to the Archdiocese. We have rejected that view herein. The party seeking summary judgment has the burden to establish that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Reeds v. Walker, 2006 OK 43, ¶ 32, 157 P.3d 100, 116. The burden of the party opposing summary judgment is not a mirror image of the burden imposed on a party seeking summary judgment. For example, in Copeland v. Lodge Enterprises, Inc., 2000 OK 36, 4 P.3d 695, we stated the following. While the mere contention that material facts are in dispute is not sufficient to defeat a plea for summary judgment, neither is the nonmovant to be held to the standard of producing forensic evidence. The nonmovant must merely present something which shows that when the date of trial arrives, he will have some proof to support his allegations. For an item of evidentiary material to be insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, it must either facially lack probative value or be incapable of conversion at trial to admissible evidence. Id. at ¶ 9, 4 P.3d at 699, footnotes omitted and quoting Davis v. Leitner, 1989 OK 146, ¶ 13, 782 P.2d 924, 926. Schovanec testified of his past and continuing therapy and that he sought funds from the defendants to pay for the therapy. Given the evidence of sexual abuse, the evidence that priests knew of certain conduct (and that reasonable minds could differ on whether the conduct was actual notice of sexual abuse), Father's Imming's known reputation to Archbishop Salatka of not complying with directions from the Archbishop, and the priests' duty of reporting conduct to the Archbishop, we conclude that summary judgment was erroneously granted to the Archbishop and the Archdiocese on Schovanec's claims of civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We reverse the trial court's judgment on those claims.