Opinion ID: 2521277
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction to View Defendant's Extrajudicial Statement With Caution

Text: As noted above, defendant gave two statements to the police shortly after committing the offenses. In his second statement, he admitted shooting the victims but claimed that he shot Littleton after Littleton pointed a gun at him and that the gun just kept going, causing defendant accidentally to shoot the other two victims. Defendant testified at trial that he shot Littleton and DeRouen in self-defense and shot Keith accidentally. At the guilt phase and the second penalty phase, the trial court gave the jury an instruction (based upon CALJIC No. 2.71) that stated: An admission is a statement made by a defendant other than at this trial which does not by itself acknowledge guilt of the crime for which the defendant is on trial, but which tends to prove guilt when considered with the rest of the evidence .... [¶] Evidence of an oral admission of a defendant should be viewed with caution. Although defendant did not object in the trial court to this instruction, the propriety of the instruction nonetheless is reviewable on appeal to the extent it affects his substantial rights. (§ 1259.) Defendant contends the trial court erred in giving this instruction at the guilt phase and at the second penalty phase trial, because there is a reasonable likelihood that it caused the jury to view with suspicion the exculpatory portions of defendant's statements. Defendant asserts the instruction should not have been given at all, because defendant's statements were tape-recorded and the tape recording was played for the jury. Although defendant is correct that the trial court should not have so instructed the jury, for the reasons he gives, the error was harmless. When evidence is admitted establishing that the defendant made oral admission, the trial court ordinarily has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that such evidence must be viewed with caution. ( People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 455, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1.) We have explained, however, that the purpose of the cautionary instruction is to assist the jury in determining if the statement was in fact made. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 456, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1.) Accordingly, we also have held that this cautionary instruction should not be given if the oral admission was tape-recorded and the tape recording was played for the jury. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 776, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) To the extent that defendant's admissions were inculpatory, it is clear that defendant could not have been prejudiced by the giving of an instruction that the jury should view this evidence with caution. Defendant contends, however, that he suffered prejudice because there is a reasonable likelihood that the instruction caused the jury to view with suspicion the exculpatory portions of defendant's statements. The instruction, however, defined an admission as an out-of-court statement by defendant which tends to prove guilt. In light of the definition of `admission,' if the jury determines a statement does not tend to prove guilt when considered with the other evidence, it is not an admission. The cautionary language instructs the jury to view evidence of an admission with caution. By its terms, the language applies only to statements which tend to prove guilt and not to statements which do not. ( People v. Vega (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 310, 317, 269 Cal.Rptr. 413.) Juries understand that this instruction by its terms applies only to statements tending to prove guilt, not to exculpatory ones. To the extent a statement is exculpatory it is not an admission to be viewed with caution. [Citation.] ( People v. Senior (1992) 3 Cal. App.4th 765, 777, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 14.) Defendant could not have been prejudiced, therefore, by the erroneous giving of the instruction to view his admissions with caution. Moreover, in addition to the introduction of his out-of-court statements, defendant's testimony offering his explanation for the shooting was received at the guilt phase of the trial. The jury was not instructed to view his testimony with caution and yet demonstrated, by its verdict of guilty, that it disbelieved his testimony. It does not appear, therefore, that the giving of the instruction to view defendant's admissions with caution led the jury to disbelieve defendant's explanation for the shooting. With reference to the giving of CALJIC No. 2.71 at the second penalty phase, defendant cites People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 782-784, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297, in which we held that a court is required to give the cautionary instruction at the penalty phase only upon defense request. We observed that a defendant may not desire such an instruction at the penalty phase, because [w]hether a particular statement is aggravating or mitigating is often open to interpretation. ( Id. at p. 783, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297.) We distinguished the holding in People v. Vega, supra, 220 Cal. App.3d 310, 269 Cal.Rptr. 413 that the jury would understand to apply the instruction only to statements that were inculpatory, on the ground that [a]t the penalty phase, the distinction between mitigation and aggravation is often more blurred than the distinction between a statement that incriminates and one that does not. ( People v. Livaditis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 784, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297.) Offering as an example a statement in which a defendant states he is sorry he stabbed the victim, we noted that such a statement is aggravating, because it admits guilt, but also mitigating, because it expresses remorse. Defendant's statements in the present case are distinguishable. Defendant did not admit guilt; he disclaimed all responsibility for the crimes, stating he acted in self-defense and accidentally. Unlike the example considered in Livaditis, the distinction between mitigation and aggravation was not blurred. Defendant admitted firing the gun, but he claimed he did so innocently. It is not reasonably probable that the jury would have applied the instruction (to view defendant's admissions with caution) to his statements that he acted in self-defense and accidentally. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's error in instructing the jury to view with caution defendant's tape-recorded admissions was harmless. It is not reasonably probable the guilt phase jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendant had the instruction not been given ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 393, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708), and there is no reasonable possibility that the second penalty phase jury would have rendered a different verdict in the absence of the error ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1018, 1019, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519).