Opinion ID: 550274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Initial Indictment

Text: 17 The defendants next argue that the district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the initial indictment with prejudice. The defendants assert that the district court incorrectly assumed the blame for violating the Speedy Trial Act, and they contend that the district court failed to make the statutory findings of fact required by United States v. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. 2413 (1988). 18 The decision to dismiss with or without prejudice for noncompliance with the Speedy Trial Act is within the discretion of the district court. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 2419; United States v. Jones, 887 F.2d 492, 494 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1137 (1990). The Speedy Trial Act, however, confines the exercise of that discretion more narrowly, mandating dismissal of the indictment upon violation of precise time limits, and specifying criteria to consider in deciding whether to bar reprosecution. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 2423. The Act lists three factors to be considered in deciding whether to dismiss an indictment with or without prejudice: 19 [T]he court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of [the Act] and on the administration of justice. 20 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3162(a)(2). 21 In Taylor the Supreme Court ruled that a district court's dismissal with prejudice under section 3162(a)(2) was an abuse of discretion where the court failed to set out relevant factual findings and to clearly articulate its application of the statutory factors to the facts of the case. Jones, 887 F.2d at 494. The Court held: 22 Where, as here, Congress has declared that a decision will be governed by consideration of particular factors, a district court must carefully consider those factors as applied to the particular case and, whatever its decision, clearly articulate their effect in order to permit meaningful appellate review. 23 108 S.Ct. at 2419. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion under the Speedy Trial Act because it failed to consider all the relevant factors under the Act and because the factors it did rely on were unsupported by factual findings or evidence in the record. Id. at 2423. 24 The defendants correctly assert that the district court failed to articulate clearly its application of the statutory factors when dismissing the indictment. Two views have emerged on the consequence of a district court's failure to articulate specifically the statutory factors. In United States v. White, 864 F.2d 660, 661 (9th Cir.1988), the Ninth Circuit relied on Taylor and reversed a conviction because the district court failed to make specific factual findings and to discuss the statutory factors in support of its decision to dismiss the original indictment without prejudice. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for an analysis and articulation of the application of the statutory factors as required by Taylor. Id. 25 On the other hand, in United States v. Jones, 887 F.2d 492, 495 (4th Cir.1989), the Fourth Circuit held, Though we certainly do not minimize the importance of the Court's holding in Taylor with regard to articulation of the statutory factors, where the record amply supports the district court's decision, we do not believe Taylor requires automatic reversal. Instead, the court applied the abuse of discretion standard and scrutinized the record to ensure that the judgment is supported in terms of the factors identified in the statute. Id. (quoting Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 2420). The court distinguished White by observing that the record here is sufficient for us to make a determination of whether the district court's decision to dismiss without prejudice was an abuse of discretion. Id. The Fourth Circuit applied the statutory factors and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Id. at 495-96. 26 We shall follow the Fourth Circuit's approach in this case because the record is sufficient for us to review the district court's dismissal of the indictment in terms of the statutory factors. The first factor to be considered is the seriousness of the crime. In Jones, the court recognized that mail fraud is a very serious crime and, therefore, the sanction of dismissal with prejudice should ordinarily be imposed only for serious delay. Jones, 887 F.2d at 495. 27 The second factor to consider is the facts and circumstances which led to the dismissal. In this case, the district judge expressly accepted blame for the delay and stated that the reason for the delay does not lie at the doorstep of the United States. The district judge stated that every delay that has come about has been because of something that was filed because of the defendant. The district judge explained that the delay occurred because he did not rule on the defendants' motions and reassign the case. Thus, this factor favors dismissal without prejudice since the government was not responsible for the delay. 28 The third factor to be considered is the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of justice and on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act. Because the delay was not purposeful and the defendants have not shown that they were prejudiced by the delay, this factor also favors dismissal without prejudice. Jones, 887 F.2d at 495; see United States v. Williams, 711 F.2d 748, 751 (6th Cir.1983). Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the indictment without prejudice.