Opinion ID: 1442323
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Hearsay Statement

Text: The prosecution was permitted to introduce on rebuttal at the penalty phase defendant's remark to police officers that he was either born or trained to be a killer, and always wanted to be a killer. Defendant had objected to the introduction of such evidence as constituting improper rebuttal evidence and inadmissible hearsay. The trial court ruled, however, that the statement was admissible as a relevant declaration against defendant's interest. (21) Defendant, acknowledging the statement at issue was a mere bravado boast, nonetheless asserts its admission was reversible error. He contends the statement was inadmissible as a declaration against his interest because, among other reasons, he was available as a witness at the penalty phase. (See Evid. Code, § 1230.) But as the People explain, the trial court's ruling can be sustained on a separate ground not relied on, namely, that the statement was an admission relevant to rebut defendant's own penalty phase testimony that he had no malicious intent to kill his three murder victims (Mrs. Lyman, and two other crimes victims, Blundell and Glashien), as well as to rebut his general good character evidence. (See id., § 1220; People v. Wright, ante, p. 367 [276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221]; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 791-792; People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776.) Although defendant's killer remark would not conclusively rebut his good character evidence, it was certainly relevant to the inquiry. As the trial court observed, defendant's penalty phase evidence attempted to depict him as not the type of a person who would go around killing people, except on extreme provocation. [¶] This [referring to defendant's remark] is a statement by him which contradicts that image.... (22) Defendant contends the trial court failed explicitly to weigh the purported relevance of the statement with its likely prejudice to defendant. (See Evid. Code, § 352; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 25.) Here, defense counsel based his objection on three grounds: that the statement was not admissible as a statutory aggravating factor, that it was hearsay, and that it constituted improper rebuttal. After the court denied his objection, he asked that the record reflect that the evidence was highly prejudicial, without citing Evidence Code section 352, or requesting a weighing of relevance with prejudice, and the court reiterated its ruling. We think that under the foregoing circumstances, including the belated invocation of an objection based on prejudice, the trial court was not obligated to make an express ruling weighing relevance and prejudice under Evidence Code section 352. We note that the requirement of such an explicit ruling can be a trap for a trial judge presented, as here, with multiple objections to the same evidence. For that reason, we think the requirement should be triggered only if defendant either expressly invokes Evidence Code section 352 as a ground for objection, or at least affirmatively argues that the risk of prejudice outweighs the relevance of the proffered evidence. (Cf. People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1009-1010 [248 Cal. Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017] [the probative/prejudicial issue was before the court because of defense counsel's reference, in his objection, to the danger of undue prejudice outweighing the probative value of the challenged evidence]; People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1129, fn. 3 [defendant failed even to allude to Evidence Code section 352]; People v. Frank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 711, 732 [214 Cal. Rptr. 801, 700 P.2d 415] [defendant invoked Evidence Code section 352 several times]; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 24 [counsel's argument that probative value is outweighed by prejudicial effect impliedly invoked Evidence Code section 352].)