Opinion ID: 1133749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Investigate Mitigation

Text: Shockingly, the record reflects that Hannon's counsel did no investigation for mitigation, and, in fact, initially was not going to present any form of mitigation during the penalty phase, even a continuing claim of not guilty. Hannon's counsel stated at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Well, we had nothing to mitigate. He was not guilty. He didn't do it. That was it. However, at the penalty phase the trial judge actually directed him to reconsider this irrational strategy; thereafter, Hannon's counsel presented the evidence relating to the my client is too nice to have done this strategy. The following exchange at Hannon's postconviction evidentiary hearing aptly reflects Hannon's trial counsel's attitude and absolute default as to any investigation into mitigation: Q. And so what did you do between the time when you said you weren't going to present any mitigation to the time that you said you were going to present mitigation? Did you do any investigation into Mr. Hannon's background whatsoever as to mitigation? A. Well, no. The decision was made by him that we're not going to do that and I agreed with it. So what are we going to do a background investigation for? What's the point? Hannon's counsel was also asked, You hadn't provided any investigation, though, into his background as to what he could possibly be waiving, did you? Hannon's counsel replied, He knew what he was waiving. The United States Supreme Court has continually reaffirmed the critical nature of counsel's duty to thoroughly investigate into mitigating factors that are to be presented during the penalty phase of capital cases. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 536, 123 S.Ct. 2527 ([C]ounsel were not in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice regarding the presentation of mitigating evidence because counsel abandoned their investigation of petitioner's background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources.); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (stating that because counsel did not begin to prepare for [the penalty phase] until a week before the trial and failed to present the voluminous amount of [mitigating] evidence . . ., trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.). In its recent decision in Rompilla, for example, the United States Supreme Court held that trial counsel's assistance was ineffective because no reasonable efforts were made to review a prior rape conviction file when it was known that the State would introduce the prior conviction as aggravation through the notice of conviction as well as testimony from the rape victim in that case. 125 S.Ct. at 2464. The Court noted that this was not a case in which defense counsel simply ignored their obligation to find mitigating evidence; in fact, counsel had interviewed the defendant and members of his family, and also examined three mental health experts' opinions. Id. at 2462. The file contained, in addition to the conviction material, information about the defendant's childhood and mental disorders that would have served as helpful mitigation. Id. at 2468. As in Wiggins, and directly on point to the case before us today concerning defense counsel's choice to continue only with an innocence strategy through the penalty phase, the Rompilla Court expressly rejected counsel's few naked pleas for mercy as inadequate and determined counsel's failure to investigate to be both ineffective and prejudicial. Id. at 2469. The Court explained: This evidence adds up to a mitigation case that bears no relation to the few naked pleas for mercy actually put before the jury, and although we suppose it is possible that a jury could have heard it all and still have decided on the death penalty, that is not the test. It goes without saying that the undiscovered mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, `might well have influenced the jury's appraisal' of [Rompilla's] culpability, Wiggins, 539 U.S., at 538, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S., at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495), and the likelihood of a different result if the evidence had gone in is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome actually reached at sentencing, Strickland, 466 U.S., at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Id. at 2469. Rompilla constitutes one in a long line of cases finding counsel's representation ineffective where mitigation was not thoroughly investigated and presented. In addition to Rompilla, Hannon's case is also similar in facts and circumstances to the United States Supreme Court cases in Williams and Wiggins. In Williams counsel did not begin preparing for the sentencing phase of the proceeding until a week before trial. 529 U.S. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Counsel failed to present evidence of the defendant's horrific childhood or of his borderline mental retardation and insufficient schooling. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant had a rightindeed, a constitutionally protected rightto provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to offer. Id. at 393, 120 S.Ct. 1495. [T]rial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background. Id. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, commentary, at 4-55 (2d ed.1980)). In Wiggins, discussed above, trial counsel, well in advance of trial, decided to focus their efforts on `retry[ing] the factual case' and disputing [the defendant's] direct responsibility for the murder. 539 U.S. at 517, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Trial counsel ignored substantial mitigation, including a bleak life history involving sexual and physical abuse and a chronically alcoholic mother who neglected the defendant and his siblings. Id. at 516, 123 S.Ct. 2527. As in this case, trial counsel in Wiggins attempt[ed] to justify their limited investigation as reflecting a tactical judgment not to present mitigating evidence at sentencing and to pursue an alternative strategy instead. Id. at 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527. However, the Supreme Court held that [t]he record of the actual sentencing proceedings underscores the unreasonableness of counsel's conduct by suggesting that their failure to investigate thoroughly resulted from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment. Id. at 526, 123 S.Ct. 2527. This Court has also consistently recognized counsel's duty to investigate into mitigating factors, and has reversed sentences where investigations into mitigating factors proved inadequate and prejudice resulted. Recently, in State v. Lewis, 838 So.2d 1102 (Fla.2002), we declared: [T]he obligation to investigate and prepare for the penalty portion of a capital case cannot be overstatedthis is an integral part of a capital case. Although a defendant may waive mitigation, he cannot do so blindly; counsel must first investigate all avenues and advise the defendant so that the defendant is able to make an informed, intelligent decision. Id. at 1113 (footnote omitted); see also Ragsdale v. State, 798 So.2d 713, 720 (Fla. 2001) (holding that counsel was ineffective when trial counsel failed to investigate into or present significant available mitigating evidence at the penalty phase); Rose, 675 So.2d at 570-74 (finding that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase when failing to present evidence of severe mental disturbance and evidence of the defendant's alcoholism and mistreatment as a child); Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So.2d 4, 8 (Fla.1993) (finding that despite defendant's waiver, counsel was still ineffective for failure to investigate and prepare for penalty phase); Stevens v. State, 552 So.2d 1082, 1085-87 (Fla.1989) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to investigate defendant's background, failed to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase, and failed to argue on defendant's behalf). The federal and state courts are uniform in their holdings that it is essential for counsel to fully investigate available mitigation in order to make an informed choice regarding whether to present the information or not. See Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 557 (11th Cir.1994) (An attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation, including an investigation of the defendant's background, for possible mitigating evidence.). [28] A reasonable investigation did not occur in this case. In fact, trial counsel failed to pursue any investigation, and the subsequent failure to present any mitigation evidence was unreasonable in light of all the circumstances of this case. See Rose, 675 So.2d at 572-73 (finding counsel's performance deficient because, due to counsel's incompetency and lack of experience, counsel never attempted to meaningfully investigate mitigation when there was such mitigation available and no investigation of options or meaningful choice). [29]
In this case counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigation as mandated by case law was complete. The inadequacy of Hannon's counsel's performance included a failure to prepare adequately for the penalty phase, a failure to consider the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases and other resources available to him, a failure to investigate available drug and alcohol abuse mitigation, a failure to investigate mental health mitigation, and a failure to investigate Hannon's family background. Importantly, the majority fails to even acknowledge capital counsel's fundamental obligation to investigate his client's background and counsel's failure to meet this obligation, but rather continuously cites trial counsel's self-serving postconviction testimony and version of his discussions with Hannon's family to support its holding that trial counsel's strategy during the penalty phase was not faulty, without paying more than lipservice to Hannon's family's testimony regarding trial counsel's conduct. As noted above, Hannon's counsel claimed his strategy was only that Hannon was not the type of character to be involved in the crime that occurred. The majority cites penalty phase testimony from Toni Acker and Hannon's mother and father that he did not have the type of character to commit the crime, and holds that this testimony supports trial counsel's strategy. However, even as to this misguided and uninformed tactic, the majority fails to note that trial counsel's investigation and preparation consisted only of brief discussions with Hannon at the jail, brief discussions with his mother and father at the trial during breaks, and a brief discussion with Maureen Hannon outside the courtroom when she was called as a defense witness during the guilt phase. Hannon's counsel prepared Mr. and Ms. Hannon by simply telling them to get up thereand remember this is our defense and basically you've just got to look at the jury and tell them what you feel from your heart. That was it. Although Hannon's counsel stated that he had asked Hannon's family members if Hannon was born with any problems and the family members did not bring any mental health issues to his attention, the testimony of Hannon's family members tells a different story. Hannon's sister stated that Hannon's counsel never asked her about his life before the murders, his drug and alcohol use, or his home life. She asserted, I had actually tried to contact [Hannon's counsel] on more than one occasion and he absolutely refused to listen to what I had to say or contribute. He did not want to talk to me at all. I never had a phone call returned. She was also listed as a witness for the penalty phase by Hannon's attorney but was never called during the penalty phase. Hannon's attorney erroneously had her listed as living in a different state even though she lived in Florida. She stated at the evidentiary hearing, [Hannon's counsel] told me I had nothing to contribute and he didn't need me for anything. Hannon's mother testified that Hannon's counsel did not prepare his family for their testimony at the penalty phase and did not explain the purpose of a penalty phase. At the evidentiary hearing, the following exchange occurred: Q. Did [Hannon's counsel] ever tell you what a penalty phase was for? A. No. Q. Did [Hannon's counsel] ever discuss the purpose of mitigation in a death penalty phase? A. I don't understand mitigation. Q. Have you ever heard that word before? Mitigation? A. No. Q. Okay. Did you have any idea that the purpose of the penalty phase was to mitigate what the jury had the jury's verdict? A. Oh, I understand. No. Q. Did he ever explain to you that the jury didn't believe his alibi defense? A. No. Q. And that he now had to present something? That was never explained to you? A. No. Hannon's father testified that there was not even a discussion concerning the innocence defense, and Hannon's wife stated that Hannon's counsel never consulted with any family members about the penalty phase.
In its death penalty jurisprudence, and especially in its most recent decisions in Wiggins, Rompilla and Williams, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly cited ABA standards to measure counsel's duty. When Hannon's counsel was asked if he had attended any death penalty seminars where defense attorneys are taught how to conduct a death penalty trial in accord with ABA standards, he expressed disdain for such professional activities: No. And I'm not sure that you teach them that. You give them suggestions on what to do. But teach them? You know, you've got toyou've got to when you're in the game, when you're in the heat of battle, you've got toyou've got to fight the way you think it's supposed to be done. And, you know, you can go to a school, but I had a lot of practical experience in these cases [as a prosecutor]. Hannon's counsel had never tried a capital case as a defense attorney, and he did not consult with any experienced lawyers in capital cases. Hannon's counsel had prosecuted capital cases before, but was unfamiliar with the ABA Guidelines for defense counsel conducting death penalty cases, which would have provided guidance to Hannon's counsel and which have consistently been cited by the United States Supreme Court as representative of prevailing standards for competent counsel. [30] These guidelines stress the importance of not only defense counsel's duty to investigate into mitigating factors, but also the idea that strategy can often shift between the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial. ABA Guidelines 11.7.1(A) (stating that in forming a defense theory, counsel should consider both the guilt/innocence phase and the penalty phase, and seek a theory that will be effective through both phases). ABA Guideline 11.4.1 states that investigation for the preparation of the sentencing phase should occur immediately even if the client initially asserts that no mitigation is to be offered. ABA Guidelines 11.4.1(C). In addition, [i]f inconsistencies between guilt/innocence and penalty phase defenses arise, counsel should seek to minimize them by procedural or substantive tactics. ABA Guidelines 11.7.1(B). Moreover, counsel should consider interviewing witnesses familiar with aspects of the client's life history that might affect the likelihood that the client committed the charged offense(s), possible mitigating reasons for the offense(s), and/or other mitigating evidence to show why the client should not be sentenced to death. ABA Guidelines 11.4.1(D)(3)(B). Also, counsel should consider presenting witnesses at the sentencing phase that relate[] to the client's life and development, as well as [e]xpert witnesses to provide medical, psychological, sociological or other explanations for the offense(s) for which the client is being sentenced, to give a favorable opinion as to the client's capacity for rehabilitation, etc. and/or to rebut expert testimony presented by the prosecutor. ABA Guidelines 11.8.3(F)(1), (2). As with his disdain for professional education, when asked about the ABA guidelines, Hannon's counsel replied, I don't care what the . . . American Bar Association says. I don't care what anybody says. This is a decision I made. I'm the guy that makes those decisions [with the input of] the client, the parents, the sister, my co-counsel.
The majority glosses over the fact that Hannon's counsel did not investigate any of Hannon's prior drug use because [i]t had nothing to do with our defense. Hannon's counsel stated that [h]e didn't have a cocaine problem when asked if Hannon had cocaine problems before the trial, even though Hannon's counsel was aware of both Hannon's previous conviction for cocaine possession and delivery of cocaine, and of a charge of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. He did not know that Hannon began using drugs and alcohol at age eleven and had a history of using LSD on a regular basis at the age of fifteen, as well as crystal methamphetamine, hallucinogenic mushrooms, and crack cocaine, nor did he know that Hannon was paranoid when under the influence of drugs. He did not question Hannon's parents concerning Hannon's expulsion from school for smoking marijuana. He did not know that Hannon's daily alcohol consumption before the murders was half a case of beer and a fifth of bourbon, and that on the night of the murders, Hannon drank almost two cases of beer. [31] Hannon's sister testified at the evidentiary hearing that Hannon's behavior was irritated and edgy leading up to the murders. He would drink excessively and use cocaine on a daily basis without sleeping at night. He also used acid a couple of times a month. When asked about these issues, Hannon's counsel responded that [i]t didn't come up because it wasn't an issue. . . . We weren't exploring those things, even though he knew that Hannon had been arrested for owning drug paraphernalia and marijuana plants. Of course, as noted above, that was only the tip of the iceberg concerning Hannon's drug use.
Hannon's counsel was also unfamiliar with the prevailing death penalty case law on mitigation, such as Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), and, critically, he did not have Hannon evaluated for any mental health issues prior to trial. See id. at 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), and stating that defendants must have basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal and that such tools should be provided if a defendant cannot pay for them). In Ake, the Court held: [W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. Id. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Of course, counsel's lack of knowledge of the law cannot constitute tactical maneuvers. Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1979). The majority asserts that the present case is similar to the facts of Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So.2d 466 (Fla.1997). In Haliburton, this Court held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to call a mental health expert, even though the expert could have testified that there was a strong indication of brain damage. Id. at 471. However, the facts in Haliburton and this case are dissimilar. In Haliburton the decision not to present a mental health expert's testimony was deemed strategic because she would have also testified that [the defendant] was an extremely dangerous person and that he was likely to kill again. Id. In Haliburton counsel made a strategic choice concerning the presentation of mitigating factors after investigating into them. Id. In the present case, however, counsel failed to conduct any reasonable investigation. Counsel could not have made a strategic choice concerning information unknown to him, and contrary to Haliburton, there is a reasonable probability in this case that the lack of meaningful mitigation undermined confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase. No investigation into Hannon's mental state or possible brain damage occurred. Psychiatric mitigating evidence has the potential to totally change the evidentiary picture. Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 495 (11th Cir.1988). This case stands in contrast to those cases where this Court has rejected claims of ineffective assistance when counsel decides not to present medical expert testimony after preparing properly and investigating into mitigating factors. See Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216 (Fla.1998) ([W]e find no error in the trial court's finding that trial counsel was aware of possible mental mitigation, but made a strategic decision under the circumstances of this case to instead focus on the `humanization' of [the defendant] through lay testimony.); Bryan v. Dugger, 641 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla.1994) (This is not a case which defense counsel failed to prepare. Counsel had [the defendant] examined by seven mental health experts [but did not call a doctor] as a witness after the doctor told him that his testimony would not be helpful and that it suggested the possibility of malingering.). No investigation occurred in this case; therefore, Hannon's counsel could not have been in a position to make a strategic decision not to present mental health experts in mitigation. According to the testimony of Robert Norgard, a criminal defense expert, it was standard practice for an effective capital defense attorney to hire a mental health expert for the penalty phase of a capital trial because brain damage is not always apparent to a lay person; it requires neurological testing. But Hannon's counsel did not do so. Instead, he stated, And, why would I do that anyway? We're going to get up there and say he's crazy and, therefore, he shouldn't be killed? He wasn't crazy. He did not believe that Hannon had a mental problem. . . . I think I know it when I see it. Hannon's counsel stated that he did not investigate Hannon's mental state or possible brain damage because he had no indication of it; he could determine whether somebody's whacked, in his own words. Dr. Crown testified that in terms of general overall cognitive processing Hannon is within the average range; Hannon was, however, impaired on the most critical subtest that relates to the possibility of brain damage. . . . [W]hat is very apparent is that [Hannon] has processing defects. But Hannon's counsel didn't see anything. . . . Never heard of it until just now. The evidence presented at Hannon's evidentiary hearing established that Hannon had a history of severe drug and alcohol abuse to the point of blacking out and passing out, parental neglect, and neurological impairments resulting in poor impulse control and flawed decision-making. Drs. Crown and Sulton testified that Hannon's impairments impacted his daily functioning. Dr. Crown, board certified in neuropsychology, stated that Hannon was having difficulty with cognitive processing and that there was evidence of head trauma from accidents, from being kicked, from falls. He also testified, In terms of drug [e]ffects the greatest exposure to drugs and the greatest absorption level is in the fronto temporal area and actually the subcortical area relating to the limbic system. And these are areas that are responsible for concentration, attention, control of impulsivity, understanding the long-term consequences of immediate behavior and processing immediate memory, and also it aids in restoring memory function. Dr. Crown also noted that Hannon suffered from rheumatic fever at age seven; its impact on his health was severe and he missed months of schooling. Hannon also suffered various head injuries, including losing consciousness at football practice in the ninth grade, getting kicked in the head by a bull, being hit by scaffolding at work, and being involved in several car accidents. [R]apidly retrieving . . . information and applying it in a new situation is extremely difficult for him, and that's where he falls apart. Hannon was distracted very easily and has difficulties under stress, pressure, drugs, lack of sleep, in fully comprehending information and attending to tasks. Drs. Crown and Sulton both performed the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised, which resulted in a very low score on the subtest that is most indicative of brain damage. [32] Also, Hannon told Dr. Sulton that he had gone AWOL from the military on three separate occasions. Dr. Sulton found several nonstatutory mitigators such as parental neglect, lack of structure, lack of discipline, lack of guidance in his childhood environment, and serious childhood illnesses. Dr. Sulton also termed him an extreme follower and found that Hannon had severe and chronic substance abuse problems, was impulsive, lacked concentration, and had personality changes due to his cocaine addiction. His score of global intelligence was average, but he scored an 8 out of 100 on the digit symbol subtest relating to the rate of speed with which he is capable of learning symbol relationships, which could indicate a learning disability. Dr. Lipman, a neuropharmacologist, stated that Hannon would combine smoking, drinking, taking acid and Quaaludes as a teenager and this could have had a long-term effect on his brain, even before he moved on to crystal meth and cocaine. Even the State's witness, Dr. Sidney Merin, agreed that Hannon had a polysubstance abuse disorder. Therefore, if he had performed an investigation, Hannon's counsel could have presented substantial and persuasive testimony concerning Hannon's mental health to establish a case of mitigation.
Counsel did not question Hannon's parents about his background because [he] had no indication that it was bad. Regarding Hannon's school, military, or medical records, the following colloquy took place at the postconviction hearing: Q: [D]id you obtain any of Mr. Hannon's school records? A: No. Q: Did you obtain his military records? A: No. Q: Did you know he was in the army? A: I don't recall. Hannon's counsel could not remember if he knew that Hannon dropped out of school when he was sixteen. The evidence presented below established that Hannon's parents were constantly absent during Hannon's childhood because Hannon's sister suffered from scoliosis, which required treatment in another town. Hannon's sister testified that their parents drank to excess often and the children got some real good beatings. Concerning the beatings, Hannon's sister stated, My mother had two favorite things she did. One was just grab you by the back of your hair and slam your head in the wall. Hannon's sister also testified, I can't ever remember my parents ever saying the words I love you to my face, not ever. Hannon's sister left home five days after she turned eighteen because she hated it. Also, a cousin that Hannon considered a father figure committed suicide. Hannon's sister stated that Hannon went from job to job, place to place. There was also substantial evidence presented that Hannon needed approval from his sister and friends, and Dr. Sulton and Maureen Hannon both testified that Hannon was a follower. Hannon's mother stated that Hannon had a very close relationship with his sister Maureen, who began using drugs and alcohol, running away, and cutting school at the age of thirteen. Hannon's parents kicked her out of the house when she was sixteen. There was evidence that he also sought approval from his codefendant Richardson, but Hannon's counsel stated, Nobody substantially dominated Pat Hannon. He was an imposing presence himself. The majority has sub silentio chosen to treat this case as one where counsel did do a thorough job of investigation but then made a strategic choice as to what mitigation to present. However, it goes without saying that counsel must first be informed as to available mitigation to be in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice as to what to focus on in mitigation, and the obligation to investigate mitigation before making the choice is fundamental to the role of defense counsel. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536, 123 S.Ct. 2527. In Hannon's case, counsel's failure to carry out this fundamental obligation was not based on strategy. None of the mitigation evidence set out above was discovered by Hannon's defense counsel or presented as mitigation during the penalty phase of the proceedings. Counsel was not aware of and did not present any of the abundant mitigating evidence that has been demonstrated without dispute to have been available; instead, he simply continued with his nice guy strategy by asking vague questions on direct examination of the defense penalty phase witnesses concerning their feelings about whether Hannon could have committed the crime. This questioning simply indicates that Hannon's counsel failed completely to prepare for the penalty phase of the trial except to continue with his nice guy strategy.