Opinion ID: 1196295
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Secure Waiver of Right to Present Defense

Text: (33) Lastly, defendant asserts the failure to present a guilt phase defense or closing argument ( ante, part III.B.5.) was tantamount to a guilty plea or to a Bunnell-Mosley `slow plea.' (See Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602-605 [119 Cal. Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086]; In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 922-925 [83 Cal. Rptr. 809, 464 P.2d 473]; see also Brookhart v. Janis (1966) 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 [16 L.Ed.2d 314, 319, 86 S.Ct. 1245].) The court thus should have secured a waiver of his fundamental constitutional rights before the jury began deliberating. (See generally Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [460 P.2d 449].) In People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d 584, [d]efense counsel presented no opening statement, cross-examined only a few of the prosecution's witnesses and those not extensively, ... called neither defendant nor any other witnesses, ... and made no closing argument. [17] ( Id., at p. 592.) Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Mosk thoroughly explicated our reasons for not compelling an express waiver under such circumstances: In People v. Murphy (1972) 8 Cal.3d 349, 365-366 ..., we considered and rejected the same contention that defendant raises here  viz., that when counsel elects to present a `minimal defense' or `no defense at all,' the court is required to obtain from the defendant a personal, on-the-record waiver of his Boykin-Tahl rights. We explained: `The rationale of Tahl and its offspring is to assure that the record demonstrably discloses the defendant knows of and voluntarily waives the three specified rights ... surrendered by a guilty plea. [Citations.] The mandate of Tahl, however, applies only to pleas of guilty and situations tantamount to a plea of guilty. [Citation.] Nothing in our decisions following Tahl indicates that the principles expressed therein were intended to apply to jury trials, even where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. When a defendant undergoes a jury trial any competent defense counsel will inform him of his right to call witnesses on his own behalf, on his right to testify or not to testify, and, in the absence of unusual circumstances, will cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution.' [Citations.] We implicitly recognized two points in Murphy. First, the Boykin-Tahl reasoning applies only when the defendant agrees to a submission procedure, such as a guilty plea or a submission on the preliminary hearing transcript, by virtue of which he surrenders one or more of the three specified rights. Second, there is no such surrender when the defendant undergoes  and thereby exercises his right to  a jury trial and has the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to refuse to incriminate himself. ( People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 592-593; see also People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011, 1029 [251 Cal. Rptr. 643, 761 P.2d 103].) We also distinguished those cases relied on by defendant: each involve a submission by virtue of which the defendant surrendered at least his right to a jury trial.... ( People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 593.) We remain persuaded by this analysis; defendant offers no convincing argument for reexamining our determination under these facts. [18] (See also People v. Murphy, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 366-367.) Furthermore, counsel represented that defendant agreed with the chosen strategy. (Cf. People v. Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 815 [counsel cannot refuse to honor defendant's clearly expressed desire to present a defense at guilt/special circumstances phase of trial].) When the record reflects a tactical choice to curtail presentation of defense evidence or closing argument with the defendant's purported knowledge and acquiescence, it would amount to an untoward interference with the attorney-client relationship to suggest the trial court has an obligation to question the defendant as to his concurrence in counsel's trial strategy and to secure a waiver of any rights incidentally relinquished. (Cf. People v. Thomas (1974) 43 Cal. App.3d 862, 867 [118 Cal. Rptr. 226] [no duty to advise represented defendant of right to testify or not to testify or to explain ramifications of either choice]; People v. Mosqueda (1970) 5 Cal. App.3d 540, 545 [85 Cal. Rptr. 346] [[A] trial judge may safely assume that a defendant, who is ably represented and who does not testify is merely exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is abiding by his counsel's trial strategy; otherwise, the judge would have to conduct a law seminar prior to every criminal trial.].)