Opinion ID: 2054822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: superintendent carda

Text: Once again in Bego, this court summarized the state of the law as concerns school district employees. We find that the state's sovereign immunity does not extend to a state employee unless (1) the action is really one against the state and the employee is sued in his representative capacity only or (2) the employee is engaged in the performance of a discretionary function. 407 N.W.2d at 805. Carda does not contend he falls within the first exception. He does, however, claim sovereign immunity under the discretionary function test. In National Bank of South Dakota v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845, 848 (S.D.1982), we looked to the test established in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895(d) Comment f (1979), to determine what is a discretionary function. (1) The nature and importance of the function that the officer is performing.... (2) The extent to which passing judgment on the exercise of discretion by the officer will amount necessarily to passing judgment by the court on the conduct of a coordinate branch of government.... (3) The extent to which the imposition of liability would impair the free exercise of his discretion by the officer.... (4) The extent to which the ultimate financial responsibility will fall on the officer ... (5) The likelihood that harm will result to members of the public if the action is taken.... (6) The nature and seriousness of the type of harm that may be produced.... (7) The availability to the injured party of other remedies and other forms of relief. Using those criteria, Carda's actions were discretionary. Carda was performing the important function of administering the school system on behalf of Board. In exercising his discretion, he sought to carry out Board's desire to have school facilities fully used by authorizing a summer conditioning program. As part of that responsibility, he secured two fully licensed and certified coaches, Meyer and Freidel, to supervise the conditioning program. For the court to second guess his judgment and that of Board in delegating to him this responsibility would be passing judgment on a coordinate branch of government. If we were to interfere in this type of judgment, it would severely hamper school administrators. Carda had no information that he had secured coaches who were not competent to supervise or that there was a problem in supervising the weight-lifting program. This is the type of decision that normally will not be harmful to the public. Finally, Gasper would always have a cause of action if the coaches' conduct was outside their scope of employment or nondiscretionary acts of commission. Considering all of these factors, the trial court did not err in finding that Carda was protected by sovereign immunity and granting summary judgment.