Opinion ID: 878359
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Length and Reason for the Delay:

Text: The 396-day delay consists of three time periods: July 1, 1982 to January 12, 1983, the time between filing of the complaint in Justice Court and the first arraignment in District Court; January 12, 1983 to March 9, 1983, the time elapsing before defendant was actually arraigned after he had a heart attack on January 12th; and March 9, 1983 to August 1, 1983, the time between arraignment and the actual start of trial. The State contends the first time period  July 1, 1982 to January 12, 1983, is attributable to defendant. The State contends defendant failed to contact the court after he returned from Spokane, and the State also contends its resources were involved in two other criminal matters. The reason defendant appeared without counsel on July 8, is because he happened to be in the courthouse on that date on an unrelated civil matter and he was arrested there and immediately taken before the Justice Court. Defendant also testified that after the July 8 continuance, he understood he was to report to the sheriff's office when he returned from Spokane, and that he did so. The State contends he did not. When asked whether Britton had contacted his office after returning, the sheriff testified: ... I can't be sure. He could have. If he did, may response would have been to contact the court. I don't recall anything in court being said that he was to notify me when he got back ... Defendant's testimony that he contacted the sheriff's office was uncontradicted, and the sheriff's testimony does not refute this testimony. At most, it is equivocal. The State contends the case had been continued for only four days, until July 16, 1982, but nothing in the record establishes this assertion. In any event, nothing took place on July 16, 1982, and the record establishes that the State did nothing more to prosecute the defendant other than to file the information in District Court on December 29, 1982, almost six months after the complaint was filed. Finally, the State seeks to excuse the delay because the prosecutor's office and the sheriff's office were tied up in two criminal trials that consumed all the resources and time of those offices. However, the record does not establish this fact, and the two trials did not take place until November and December. Of the 195 days between July 1, 1982 and January 12, 1983, approximately 14 are attributable to Britton, and 181 are attributable to the State. The State then argues that the time between January 12, 1983 and March 9, 1983, is solely attributable to the defendant because he suffered a heart attack at the January 12 arraignment and required hospitalization. However, defendant's attorney, after consultation with doctors, told the court that defendant would be available for arraignment in one to two weeks. Nonetheless, the State did nothing about the arraignment until February 23, when it obtained an order setting the arraignment for March 9, 1983, almost two months after the defendant's heart attack. Although the January 12 arraignment had to be postponed because of defendant's heart attack, the State could have been more diligent in getting the arraignment rescheduled. Defendant could have been arraigned as early as January 20, but instead the arraignment was continued without date and did not take place until March 9. The State gives no reason for the delay other than defendant's heart attack, yet the evidence shows that defendant was available for arraignment at least by January 20th. Of the 56-day delay between January 12, 1983 and March 9, 1983, no more than 14 days are attributable to the defendant and at least 42 days are attributable to the State. The State also blames defendant for the delay between March 9, 1983 and the actual start of trial on August 1, 1983, although it does so in a circuitous manner. Because the State blames defendant for causing the delay until March, the State argues defendant is therefore responsible for any further delay flowing from the March 9 arraignment. At the March 9 arraignment, the trial was set for the next jury term, which was the July jury term, and the State argues defendant caused this delay. But the State is the party which failed to take action after the postponement of the January 9 arraignment due to defendant's heart attack. With no support in the record the State further argues defendant had civil matters pending also and argues he did not want the criminal case to go to trial until the civil matters were tried during the spring of 1983. But the record does not support a conclusion that defendant deliberately delayed the criminal proceedings. When defendant was questioned at the hearing on his motion to dismiss, he denied that he intended any such delay, and no evidence exists to support such contention. Furthermore, defendant would not have been faced with the dilemma of a criminal case and civil case being tried to the same jury panel. The State should have been diligent in getting the case filed in District Court and tried in District Court during the fall 1982 jury term. Instead, the State let the case linger in Justice Court. Of the 145-day delay between March 9 and August 1, most, if not all is attributable to the State as institutional delay. This, when combined with the other two periods, makes the State responsible for approximately 360-368 days of the delay. Much of this delay was institutional delay, but delay nonetheless, and substantial delay at that. It was therefore the State's burden to show defendant was not prejudiced by the delay, and the State failed in that burden.