Opinion ID: 1798337
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Water Rights Adjudication Act Is Constitutional.

Text: The Water Rights Adjudication Act does not, as urged by the riparian claimants in this action, violate the doctrine of separation of powers, and McKnight, 11 Tex. 82, 229 S.W. 301, is not authority for striking down the present statutes. The act was designed to avoid the constitutional infirmities of the earlier act. It required all claimants to water rights, except for claims under permits or certified filings, to file sworn statements with the Texas Water Commission by September 1, 1969. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 11.303(c). The same statute required statewide notice of the filing requirement. Id. § 11.303(g). In this way, the state for the first time had an inventory of all waters that were being used and claimed. The statute provided further that claims to water would be recognized only if valid under existing law and only to the extent of the maximum actual application of water to beneficial use without waste during any calendar year from 1963 to 1967, inclusive. Id. § 11.303(b). Section 11.304 of the act authorizes the adjudication of water rights. Section 11.305 provides for an investigation of the claims and a report in writing. Section 11.306 requires public and actual notice of adjudication. Persons claiming water rights of any nature, except for domestic and livestock purposes must then file a timely sworn claim with the department. Id. § 11.307. There is notice followed by a hearing on each claim, id. § 11.308, and after all evidentiary hearings are completed, the Commission makes a preliminary determination of each claim, id. § 11.309, and notifies all parties. Id. § 11.312. The parties may then file contests of the preliminary determination. Id. § 11.313. After notice there is a hearing on each contest, id. § 11.314, followed by the Commission's final determination, id. § 11.315. Provision is made for timely rehearings. Id. § 11.316. When all applications for rehearing are ruled upon, the Commission then files a certified copy of its final determination, together with all evidence presented to or considered by the Commission, in a district court. Id. § 11.317. The court then orders the date for filing exceptions to the final determination, the date for the hearings on exceptions, and notifies all parties. Id. Sections 11.320-11.323 are significant changes from the law as it existed in 1921 when this court held that the 1917 Irrigation Act was unconstitutional. Section 11.320 makes clear that the court shall act independently of the Commission's determination, and that substantial evidence shall not be the standard of review. It is also clear that the entire subchapter would not have been enacted without the inclusion of section 11.320. [5] A significant difference between the 1917 Irrigation Act and the procedure under the Water Rights Adjudication Act is that the agency does not make the final determination of rights. There is a two-step procedure. The Commission makes its determination which is followed by an automatic and mandatory judicial review. See Current Problems, Administrative Government in Texas, 47 Tex.L.Rev. 805, 875 (1969). By statute, the standard of review under the Adjudication Act is neither a substantial evidence review nor a de novo review. It is a review made independently of the Commission's adjudication, and a review exercised on those parts of the Commission's determination to which exceptions were timely leveled. In passing on the exceptions, the court may, as in the case now before us, hear additional evidence. Tex.Water Code Ann. § 11.321. The exceptions are the pleadings which the court acts upon with or without a jury trial. The burden of proof is upon the one who levels the exceptions. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 130 Tex. 484, 491, 109 S.W.2d 967, 972 (1937). See also Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440, 455, 36 S.Ct. 637, 643, 60 L.Ed. 1084 (1916); Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 347-48, 198 S.W.2d 424, 440 (1946); City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 263 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex.Civ.App. Galveston 1953, writ ref'd); Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors, 13 Cal.2d 75, 87 P.2d 848, 854 (1939). We conclude that the act, unlike the statutes construed in McKnight, 111 Tex. 82, 229 S.W. 301, and Southern Canal Co., 159 Tex. 227, 318 S.W.2d 619, provides a constitutional method for adjudication. There is a second reason that the Adjudication Act does not violate the principle of the separation of powers. The reason is expounded in Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945). Article XVI, section 59a, of the Texas Constitution, the Conservation Amendment, had not been enacted when the statutes involved in McKnight were considered. The validity of the review procedures for administrative actions concerning oil and gas conservation was discussed in Corzelius and sustained against the same constitutional attack that is now made. The court held that the broad language of the Conservation Amendment empowered the legislature to confer upon the Railroad Commission the power to adjust correlative rights in gas fields, subject to the review by the courts. The court rejected the claimed violation of the separation of powers provision of Article II, section 1, of the Texas Constitution.