Opinion ID: 1315866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Predicate for License Revocation

Text: At the center of this appeal is the trial court's conclusion that Corporal Cole lacked the predicate factual basis for arresting Appellee for DUI because he could not testify with particularity as to when Mr. Cain last drove his vehicle. The trial court reasoned that the arresting officer must be able to identify specific facts and evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. Because Corporal Cain could not pinpoint when, or if, the petitioner [Appellee] had driven the vehicle, the trial court concluded that the arresting officer did not have sufficient information to conclude that the petitioner drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. This Court previously ruled in syllabus point three of Carte v. Cline, 200 W.Va. 162, 488 S.E.2d 437 (1997), that W.Va.Code § 17C-5A-1a(a) (1994) [authorizing license revocation for DUI] does not require that a police officer actually see or observe a person move, drive, or operate a motor vehicle while the officer is physically present before the officer can charge that person with DUI under this statute, so long as all the surrounding circumstances indicate the vehicle could not otherwise be located where it is unless it was driven there by that person. The issue in Carte, just as in this case, was whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the individual charged with DUI had actually driven his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 200 W.Va. at 166-67, 488 S.E.2d at 441-42. After responding to a call that a vehicle was suspiciously sitting at a stop light at 4:20 a.m., the arresting officer in Carte discovered the driver slumped over the wheel with the engine still running, the car in drive, and the driver's foot on the brake. Upon awakening the driver, the officer noticed the odor of alcohol. As was the case with Mr. Cain, the purported driver in Carte failed all three field sobriety tests, agreed to take an intoxilyzer test, and indicated to the officer that he had been drinking a large quantity of beer. [8] Id. at 163-64, 488 S.E.2d at 438-39. In considering whether an officer must observe the actual driving of a vehicle prior to arresting an individual for DUI in Carte, we recognized that our previous decision in State v. Byers, 159 W.Va. 596, 224 S.E.2d 726 (1976), resolved this issue by ruling that the misdemeanor offense of DUI does not have to be committed in the presence of the officer to justify an arrest. [9] Carte, 200 W.Va. at 167, 488 S.E.2d at 442. The elements of the revocation statute, as we explained in Carte, provide the basis for this conclusion. All that is required to seek a license revocation under West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-2 is that the arresting officer have reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant committed the offense of DUI. Rather than requiring an arresting officer to witness a motor vehicle in the process of being driven, the statute requires only that the observations of the arresting officer establish a reasonable basis for concluding that the defendant had operated a motor vehicle upon a public street in an intoxicated state. See Carte, 200 W.Va. at 167, 488 S.E.2d at 442; accord Lowe v. Cicchirillo, 223 W.Va. 175, 181, 672 S.E.2d 311, 317 (2008) (stating that it is not necessary that an arresting officer observe a driver operating a motor vehicle if the surrounding circumstances indicate that he was the driver of the vehicle). To support a license revocation for DUI, the trial court concluded that the arresting officer has to be able to identify specific facts and evidence that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that a crime was committed. The standard employed by the trial courtrequiring particularized evidence to support a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committedis the standard typically used to analyze the constitutional parameters in search and seizure cases. In Clower v. West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, 223 W.Va. 535, 678 S.E.2d 41 (2009), we recently had the opportunity to review what is required to make an investigatory traffic stop for purposes of complying with both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 6, Article III of our state constitution. Citing our decision in State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428, 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994), we discussed how a reviewing court must evaluate the lawfulness of a traffic stop by examining whether particular facts establish a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed. See Clower, 223 W.Va. at 541, 678 S.E.2d at 47. Because Mr. Cain's vehicle was parked at the time the arresting officer encountered Mr. Cain, the standard governing the lawfulness of an investigatory traffic stop is clearly inapplicable to the case before us. The standard that the trial court should have applied to determine whether the administrative revocation was proper, as we discussed in Clower, is statutorily specified in West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-2(e) (2004). [10] Under that provision, three predicate findings must be established to support a license revocation. Those findings, in pertinent part, require proof that (1) the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person drove while under the influence of alcohol; (2) the person was lawfully placed under arrest for a DUI offense; [11] and (3) the tests, if any, were administered in accordance with the provisions of this article and article five of this chapter. See W.Va. Code § 17C-5A-2(e) (2004). As set forth in West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-2(f), [12] the underlying factual predicate required to support an administrative license revocation is whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the accused individual had been driving his or her vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances, or drugs. The evidence presented to the hearing examiner on the issue of the grounds relied upon by the arresting officer to arrest Mr. Cain for DUI included the testimony of Corporal Cole, the D.U.I. Information Sheet, and the results of the secondary chemical test. In addition to testifying as to Mr. Cain's difficulty standing and walking; his bloodshot and glassy eyes; and his alcoholic breath, Corporal Cole testified that Appellee told him upon being awakened from his drunken stupor that he was just trying to get home. During the interview that occurred after the arrest, Mr. Cain told the arresting officer he had been drinking beer that night and [that] he had five or six [beers]. In making its ruling, the trial court found that the arresting officer had failed to establish with any degree of certainty when, or if, the petitioner had driven the vehicle. In addition to the clear implication that Mr. Cain had driven the vehicle in question from his statement to the arresting officer that he was just trying to get home, the record also contains Corporal Cole's testimony that when he had driven by that same spot less than thirty minutes earlier, no vehicle was parked there. The record is devoid of any factual basis for the arresting officer to believe that Mr. Cain consumed the alcohol he acknowledged drinking only after he parked the vehicle. Corporal Cole's observations plus the statements made by Mr. Cain to the arresting officer combined to fulfill the statutory requirement of reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving while under the influence of alcohol. W.Va.Code § 17C-5A-2(e) (2004). As we established in Carte, the fact that Corporal Cole did not observe Mr. Cain driving his vehicle in an inebriated state is not an impediment to an administrative license revocation under West Virginia Code § 17C-5-1 because all the surrounding circumstances indicate[d] the vehicle could not otherwise be located where it [wa]s unless it was driven there by Mr. Cain. 200 W.Va. at 163, 488 S.E.2d at 438, syl. pt. 3.