Opinion ID: 204689
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Administrative Deference in the FLSA

Text: When a question arises as to the meaning of the FLSA or the Secretary's regulations, we apply traditional rules of construction and, where required, administrative deference. See, e.g., Webster v. Pub. Sch. Emp. of Wash., Inc., 247 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 457, 117 S.Ct. 905). Thus, if the language of a statute or regulation is unambiguous, we apply the terms as written. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) ([D]eference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous.); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.). By contrast, when Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue, Auer, 519 U.S. at 457, 117 S.Ct. 905, we will defer to the Secretary's regulation so long as it is `based on a permissible construction of the statute.' Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778). If the Secretary's regulations are themselves ambiguous, and the Secretary uses her rulemaking authority to provide clarity, we give controlling deference to the Secretary's view unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (citation and internal quotation mark omitted); see also Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586-87, 588, 120 S.Ct. 1655 ( Auer deference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous.); cf. In re Farmers Ins. Exch., Claims Representatives' Overtime Pay Litig., 481 F.3d 1119, 1129 (9th Cir.2007) (We must give deference to the DOL's interpretation of its own regulations through, for example, Opinion Letters.). Lastly, if the Secretary interprets an unambiguous statute by way of an opinion letter, enforcement guidelines, or the like, her opinion is merely entitled to respect to the extent the interpretation has the power to persuade the court. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587, 120 S.Ct. 1655 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)).