Opinion ID: 1658135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the public-interest privilege

Text: We next address the defendant's contention that, in the absence of the application of the statutory privilege, Michigan's long-recognized qualified public-interest privilege protects this publication and its alleged factual errors in the absence of malice. If such a privilege is applicable, plaintiff would be required to prove that defendants published the report with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. [9] Plaintiff would be required to show malice in addition to the elements necessary to demonstrate liability for defamation: (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning plaintiff; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by the publication (defamation per quod ). [3 Restatement Torts, 2d, ง 558. Postill v Booth Newspapers, 118 Mich App 608, 618; 325 NW2d 511 (1982).] In advance of this analysis, it is important to set forth what the lower courts have not found and as a result, what this case is not about. It has not been found that the newspaper report of the plaintiff's arrest and the reasons for the arrest were false. Nor has it been found that, if false, there is liability resulting from negligence. Finally, were there a finding of falsity and negligence, there has been no finding that the plaintiff was damaged thereby. The question presented is whether the trial court was in error in denying the plaintiff an opportunity to prove that the publication was false, that the falsity resulted from a standard of fault less than malice, and that the plaintiff was damaged thereby. [10] The Court of Appeals acknowledged the existence of a public-interest privilege, but it differentiated between matters that promote the public interest and matters which are merely interesting to the public, finding the arrest in this case to fall within the latter category. It therefore declined to apply the privilege. We again arrive at the same result, but by way of a different analysis. The qualified privilege to report on matters in the public interest is deeply rooted in Michigan jurisprudence. A qualified privilege, generally, provides a conditional right to publish otherwise defamatory remarks because the defendant is advancing some interest of social importance.... Where a qualified privilege exists, plaintiff, in order to recover, must affirmatively prove actual malice on the part of the defendant. [ Walker v Cahalan, 97 Mich App 346, 356; 296 NW2d 18 (1980), citing Lawrence v Fox, 357 Mich 134; 97 NW2d 719 (1959).] In Miner v Detroit Post & Tribune Co, supra , this Court's earliest expression on the subject, a public official (police justice of the City of Detroit) claimed to have been harmed by a newspaper article. Justice COOLEY, in approving of the privilege that distinguishes matters of public interest from mere gossip, reasoned: I know of nothing more likely to encourage the license of a dissolute press than to establish the principle that the discussion of matters of general concern involving public wrongs and the publication of personal scandal come under the same condemnation in the law; for this inevitably brings the law itself into contempt and creates public sentiment against its enforcement. [ Miner, supra, p 364.] Closely thereafter, in Bacon v Michigan Central R Co, 66 Mich 166; 33 NW 181 (1887), we said that a qualified privilege was held to extend[] to all communications made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, to a person having a corresponding interest or duty. And the privilege embraces cases where the duty is not a legal one, but where it is of a moral or social character of imperfect obligation. [ Id., p 170.] The duty in that case ran to the defendant railroad employee, who had published an internal report noting that the plaintiff had been discharged for stealing. The Court reasoned that the employee who made the communication owed a duty to the company in the capacity of personnel agent. We observed: It is not only proper, but it is of the utmost importance to the company, and to the public having business transactions with it, that the servants employed by it shall be men of good character.... [ Id., p 171.] In applying the duty/interest privilege, somewhat different from the public-interest privilege, the Bacon Court noted that [t]he occasion determines the question of privilege. The language is only proper to be considered in connection with the question of malice. Id. Bacon also emphasized that [t]he great underlying principle upon which the doctrine of privileged communication stands, is public policy. Id., p 169. In a line of cases following Bacon, we continued to adhere to those privileges. The latest discussion [11] of the public-interest privilege to emerge from this Court appears in Lawrence v Fox, 357 Mich 134; 97 NW2d 719 (1959). [12] In Lawrence, the deputy superintendent of police in Detroit sued several newspapers for the publication of a series of articles charging him with fraud, corruption, and various other violations of the public trust. Plaintiff asserted the falsity of the charges and maintained that defendants had acted in bad faith and out of a desire to ruin him. After tracing the historical roots of privilege in defamation law and noting that privilege necessarily rests upon considerations of public policy, id., p 137, we once again observed that [t]he occasion determines the question of privilege. The language is only proper to be considered in connection with the question of malice. [ Id., p 140.] We further observed: There is no need, at this date in our history, to urge that it is necessary to free institutions that the press itself be free. Today it is. The real issue before us is how free. Governmental interference is not the only threat to its freedom. On the contrary, a narrow or restrictive interpretation of the law of privilege in libel actions is equally dangerous. The publisher often faces a cruel dilemma: The more serious the charge of wrongdoing by a public official, more urgent the need for its airing. Yet, the more serious the charge, the greater the libel. It is in this uneasy and menacing situation that the law provides the publisher a sanctuary of sorts, the defense of privilege. [ Id., p 137.] Thus, at the time we decided Lawrence, in 1959, the public-interest privilege applied to an occasion, not to the status of the parties, even though the principle cases dealing with this privilege involved public official plaintiffs. The policy to be achieved was obvious, although not often articulated: encouragement of a free flow of information about public concerns. Also at that time, the constitutional dimensions of the law of defamation could be simply stated: [L]ibelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech. Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 483; 77 S Ct 1304; 1 L Ed 2d 1498 (1957). As Justice White noted in 1974, For some 200 years โ from the very founding of the Nation โ the law of defamation and right of the ordinary citizen to recover for false publication injurious to his reputation have been almost exclusively the business of state courts and legislatures. [ Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323, 369-370; 94 S Ct 2997; 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974).] In New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254; 84 S Ct 710; 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964), the constitutionally dictated change in the state of libel law began when the United States Supreme Court held that the constitutional guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments required a rule prohibiting a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice,' defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Id., pp 279-280. Thus, the United States Supreme Court in New York Times focused on the status of the plaintiff when it created the constitutional standard. Curtis Publishing Co v Butts, 388 US 130; 87 S Ct 1975; 18 L Ed 2d 1094, reh den 389 US 889 (1967), continued the focus on the status of the plaintiff when it extended application of the New York Times standard to cases involving public- figure plaintiffs. Public figures were defined by a concurring justice as nonpublic officials who are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large. Id., p 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result). In the next relevant case, Rosenbloom v Metromedia, Inc, 403 US 29; 91 S Ct 1811; 29 L Ed 2d 296 (1971), the Court, in a plurality opinion, departed, albeit briefly, from using the status of the plaintiff as a criterion for constitutional protection from libel in the absence of malice. Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, noted: If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. [ Id., p 43.] Although qualified privileges for the protection of mass-media defendants existed in some states prior to the New York Times case, they were limited by numerous restrictions and were often narrowly construed. AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co v Northwest Publications, Inc, 162 Ind App 671; 321 NE2d 580 (1974), cert den 424 US 913 (1976). They traditionally recognized only statements of opinion as privileged; false statements of fact were never privileged. Id., p 675. However, Michigan was one of those states that had more than a fair-comment privilege. [13] It extended protection to nonmalicious errors of fact when they involved matters of public concern, at least when the case involved a public plaintiff. [14] With the release of the Rosenbloom opinion, Michigan's public-interest privilege was definitely subsumed within the constitutional ambit. In a case such as that before us, the only issue under Rosenbloom would have been whether the report of the arrest was within the public interest. Our task in this case, however, has been complicated by the Supreme Court's withdrawal from Rosenbloom in Gertz, supra . Gertz held: [S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. [ Id., p 347.] The Gertz Court also held that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Id., p 349. In the most recent United States Supreme Court case on the subject, the constitutional privilege was further defined. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc v Hepps, 475 US ___; 106 S Ct 1558; 89 L Ed 2d 783 (1986), held that, in a defamation case involving a private-person plaintiff, but speech of public concern, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving falsity. A Pennsylvania statute had required the defendant to bear the burden of proving truth in all cases. The Court clarified that [w]hen the speech is of exclusively private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure, ... the constitutional requirements do not necessarily force any change in at least some of the features of the common-law landscape. Id., 89 L Ed 2d 792. In the area of burden of proof, then, the Court has shifted its focus somewhat from the status of the plaintiff to the subject of the speech. Thus, in a relatively short period of time, during which we have not had an opportunity to revisit the qualified public-interest privilege question, the law of libel has been significantly altered. Much of what was the policy-based law of libel in Michigan prior to New York Times and its progeny, has now become constitutionally mandated. How much in the way of privilege remains outside of the constitutional ambit and what to do with it is the issue that now requires our attention. Although our pronouncements have never explicitly limited application of the public-interest privilege to a public official or a public figure, it is also true that we have never applied the privilege in a case involving a strictly private-person plaintiff. Miner v Detroit Post & Tribune Co, supra (plaintiff was a police justice of the City of Detroit; Fortney v Stephan, 237 Mich 603; 213 NW 172 (1927) (plaintiff was a sheriff); Timmis v Bennett, 352 Mich 355; 89 NW2d 748 (1958) (plaintiff was a police department employee); Lawrence v Fox, supra (plaintiff was a deputy superintendent of police). [15] Also, in Lawrence and other cases, our analysis relied to some extent on the status of the plaintiff as a public official. The immunity of the conditional privilege, then, fragile though it may be, is not without value to the defendant charged with defamation. The newspaper (or any) publisher, commenting upon the performance of duties by a public official, stands before the jury initially (unlike the malevolently officious fishwife) wearing his vulnerable cloak of privilege. It is the plaintiff's burden to destroy it, to prove such abuse that the privilege is lost. [ Lawrence, supra, pp 143-144. Emphasis added.] Likewise in Timmis, supra, p 369, we emphasized that the communication was one criticizing the acts of members of the police department. Thus, Miner, Fortney, Timmis, and Lawrence all involved persons who would now likely be considered public officials or figures under the constitutional standard. Those cases are arguably limited to situations involving public plaintiffs. Such is not the case in the Michigan Court of Appeals, however. That Court has moved beyond Lawrence and the earlier cases discussed, and it has explicitly recognized a qualified privilege to report on matters of public interest in cases involving private -figure plaintiffs. See Peisner v Detroit Free Press, 82 Mich App 153; 266 NW2d 693 (1978) (interlocutory appeal) ( Peisner I ). The federal courts, applying Michigan law, have accepted Peisner I as the law of Michigan. See Bichler v Union Bank & Trust Co, 745 F2d 1006, 1011 (CA 6, 1984) (en banc); Schultz v Reader's Digest Ass'n, 468 F Supp 551, 561 (ED Mich, 1979); Apostle v Booth Newspapers, Inc, 577 F Supp 962 (WD Mich, 1984). However, the same courts were careful to note that this Court had not spoken on the privilege since either New York Times or Gertz. In Peisner, the plaintiff lawyer sued the defendant newspaper for libel on the basis of an article dealing with court-appointed lawyers that had accused the plaintiff of inadequate representation of an indigent criminal defendant in appellate proceedings and with unethical conduct. Peisner v Detroit Free Press, 104 Mich App 59, 62-63; 304 NW2d 814 (1981), aff'd but modified 421 Mich 125; 364 NW2d 600 (1984) (malice and damages issues) ( Peisner II ). In Peisner I, which is the decision most relevant to the issue presented in the instant case, the defendant had claimed both the constitutional privilege, alleging that plaintiff was a public figure, and the qualified privilege on the grounds that the controversy was a matter of widespread public interest .... Peisner I, p 156. The defendant had further claimed that the plaintiff had not shown abuse of the privilege, in that he had not alleged facts from which malice could be inferred. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff Peisner was not a public figure as defined in Gertz, supra . It found the trial court's reason for finding him to be a public figure โ the fact that he was appointed to handle a criminal appeal โ to be an insufficient basis for that finding. Id., p 160. As to the qualified privilege, the Court of Appeals cited the leeway granted to state courts in Gertz, and relied upon our earlier cases of Bacon, Timmis, and Lawrence in finding the privilege applicable to a private-figure plaintiff. [16] It noted: Although [ Lawrence ] involved an article charging a public official with fraud and corruption, it is clear that it was not limited to publications concerning public officials.... [ Id., p 161.] The Court approved of the trial judge's holding that the public's interest in the administration of justice gave rise to a qualified privilege to report on events affecting a judicial proceeding. [ Id., p 163.] The panel in Peisner I found that a question of fact remained regarding the existence of malice, however, and it remanded for a trial on that issue. The definition of malice and the damages issue were appealed in Peisner II, which reached this Court. Thus, it was Peisner I that expressly expanded the scope of the qualified privilege to encompass cases involving private-figure plaintiffs such as Mr. Rouch. The question of privilege was not appealed in Peisner II, and therefore, the instant case represents this Court's first opportunity to approve or disapprove of the privilege, interpreted by the Court of Appeals and by the federal courts applying Michigan law, as applicable in cases involving nonpublic plaintiffs. As noted above, if one were to consider only the cases of this Court, there would be very little evidence of a public-interest privilege applicable in cases involving private-defamation plaintiffs. However, in Peisner II, we acknowledged the privilege as enunciated by the Court of Appeals. Peisner II held that exemplary and punitive damages for libel may be awarded only upon a finding that defendant acted with common-law malice, defined as ill will or bad faith. However, in the process of deciding the issues presented in that case, this Court [r]ecognize[d] that a private defamation plaintiff must face an imposing array of barriers to recover exemplary and punitive damages. In this case, for example, plaintiffs were required to prove constitutional actual malice โ i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth โ simply to defeat defendants' qualified privilege to report on matters in the public interest and thereby establish liability for actual damages. [ Id., 421 Mich 137.] The defendant points to our language in Peisner as an implicit acceptance of the Rosenbloom standard as a matter of Michigan common law. Other Court of Appeals cases have also recognized the private-person public-interest privilege. However, some, like the panel in this case, found the subject matter to be outside the scope of the public-interest privilege. In Weeren v Evening News Ass'n, 2 Mich App 74; 138 NW2d 526 (1965), rev'd on other grounds 379 Mich 475; 152 NW2d 676 (1967), the Court of Appeals applied the privilege in a case involving the defendant television station's airing of a documentary about the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's donation of a bell to a leper colony. The Court also recognized the privilege in Postill v Booth Newspapers, supra , however, because that case was brought by a public-official plaintiff (the Washtenaw County Sheriff), it comports with this Court's narrower definition of the privilege. Gaynes v Allen, 128 Mich App 42; 339 NW2d 678 (1983), represents an expansive interpretation of the privilege. In that case, the Court of Appeals applied it to a case involving a publication about the private plaintiff's alleged incompetency in the profession of optometry. Likewise, in Dienes v Associated Newspapers, Inc, 137 Mich App 272; 358 NW2d 562 (1984), a Court of Appeals panel applied the privilege in a case involving a news report about the health of a private-person plaintiff's cows. In Nabkey v Booth Newspapers, 140 Mich App 507; 364 NW2d 363 (1985), the panel recognized the privilege, but cited Rouch and declined to apply it to the defendant newspaper's alleged false report of the details of the plaintiff's arrest and arraignment: [T]he report of plaintiff's alleged activity did not contribute to the public's interest in reducing or detecting crime, but merely provided interesting or amusing reading for the public. Id., p 513. Finally, in Kurz v Evening News Ass'n, 144 Mich App 205; 375 NW2d 391 (1985), another panel applied the privilege to a case involving a newspaper report about the plaintiff's (a Detroit attorney) arraignment on charges of assaulting a police officer. Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in interpreting our pre- New York Times public-interest privilege decisions as covering nonpublic persons is less important than what the state of the law ought to be in the wake of a veritable revolution in First Amendment defamation law. It is from this broader perspective that we consider the issue presented.
In this section, we address the fundamental question after Gertz: Should there be a qualified public-interest privilege applicable in cases involving nonpublic plaintiffs that is more protective than the constitutional minimum requirements now in place for publications involving both private and public persons? We answer that question in the negative and hereby adopt the Gertz negligence standard in such cases. We decline the opportunity to create further tests and standards to be applied in libel cases involving claims of a public-interest privilege, when the constitutional standard more than adequately addresses the policy concerns that prompted our formulation of the common-law privilege in the nineteenth century and that would militate in favor of one at this time were there inadequate constitutional protection. Our decision is in keeping with the majority of states that have considered this question, and comports with a careful balancing of the very weighty policy concerns that necessarily influence a decision in the area of libel privilege.
Our survey of states that have responded to the Gertz challenge indicate that twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have expressly adopted the Gertz negligence standard as a matter of state law. [17] Eight states have assumed without discussion that Gertz represents the proper standard in cases involving private plaintiffs, and, in two states, federal courts have interpreted state law as having adopted Gertz. [18] By contrast, only four states have expressly adopted the Rosenbloom public-interest standard, [19] and one of those cases was a federal court's interpretation of state law. [20] New York has adopted neither the Gertz nor the Rosenbloom standard, opting instead for a gross-negligence standard. See Chapadeau v Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc, 38 NY2d 196; 379 NYS2d 61; 341 NE2d 569 (1975). The rationale most often given for adoption of a negligence standard is that first enunciated in Gertz, supra : [P]rivate individuals are more deserving of protection because, as a class, they are less likely to seek public attention and comment. Foster v Laredo Newspapers, Inc, 541 SW2d 809, 819 (Tex, 1976). The Supreme Court of Tennessee reasoned that only the Gertz negligence standard `recognizes that the special needs of the private plaintiff require a more stringent standard of liability than is imposed when the plaintiff is a public figure or official who has ready media access and has voluntarily assumed the risk of defamatory comment by placing himself in the public eye.' Memphis Publishing Co v Nichols, 569 SW2d 412, 418 (Tenn, 1978), quoting Note, State court reactions to Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 29 Vand L R 1431, 1444 (1976). State courts that have adopted a negligence standard also rely heavily on their own state constitutions as support for their decisions. [21] The state constitutions have been used most often as support for placing greater emphasis on privacy rights. See, e.g., Troman v Wood, 62 Ill 2d 184; 340 NE2d 292 (1975); Gobin v Globe Publishing Co, 216 Kan 223; 531 P2d 76 (1975); McCall v Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co, 623 SW2d 882 (Ky, 1981), cert den 456 US 975 (1982); Martin v Griffin Television, Inc, 549 P2d 85 (Okla, 1976); Gazette, Inc v Harris, 229 Va 1, 15; 325 SE2d 713 (1985); Denny v Mertz, 106 Wis 2d 636; 318 NW2d 141 (1982). In Troman, supra, p 195, the Illinois Supreme Court observed: The freedom of speech provisions ... recognize the interest of the individual in the protection of his reputation, for they provide that the exercise of the right to speak freely shall not relieve the speaker from responsibility for his abuse of that right. [See also Gobin, supra, pp 231-233.] The Kentucky Constitution was also found to mandate a standard which adequately protects the private individual from defamation. McCall, supra, p 886. In Martin, supra, p 92, the Oklahoma Supreme Court explicitly distinguished the language of the Oklahoma Constitution from that of the federal constitution. Like the previously mentioned state constitutions and our own, the free speech provision of the Oklahoma Constitution requires `[e]very person ... [to be] responsible for the abuse of that right....' Okla Const, art II, ง 22. The Martin court thus found the negligence standard to be more parallel with the Oklahoma Constitution. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also concluded that its state constitution does not provide for broader free press rights than does the federal constitution. Denny, supra, p 655, n 27. [22] Other state courts relied on state statutes or the common law as justification for adopting the negligence standard for private-person-plaintiff cases. See Phillips v Evening Star Newspaper Co, supra ; Troman, supra, pp 194-196; Denny, supra, p 656. At least one state court perceived practical advantages in adopting the negligence standard. The application of the negligence standard in tort cases is so well established that juries can safely be expected to comprehend the term when applied in defamation cases. Nor is the negligence standard unknown to common law defamation. [ Jacron Sales Co, Inc v Sindorf, 276 Md 580, 596; 350 A2d 688 (1976).] A final, and perhaps most significant, reason for state court rejection of anything but a negligence standard emanates from the courts' understanding and interpretation of public policy. See Miami Herald Publishing Co v Ane, 423 So 2d 376, 387 (Fla App, 1982); Cahill v Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp, 56 Hawaii 522, 533-534; 543 P2d 1356 (1975); Troman, supra, pp 194-196 (Illinois); Gobin, supra, pp 231-233 (Kansas); Stone v Essex Co Newspapers, Inc, 367 Mass 849, 856-857; 330 NE2d 161 (1975); Seegmiller v KSL, Inc, 626 P2d 968, 973 (Utah, 1981); Taskett v King Broadcasting Co, 86 Wash 2d 439, 448-450; 546 P2d 81 (1976); Denny, supra, p 656 (Wisconsin). The nonconstitutional policies cited by state courts are numerous, but, generally, the courts tend to focus on the seriousness of the injury to the allegedly defamed party. The Florida Supreme Court, for example, stressed the important role that the defamation action plays in a free society. [It] represents the individual's sole remedy against the occasional excesses of the print and electronic media which often have vast resources to inflict untoward damage upon an individual. Surely, a decent, open society cannot, in the name of press and speech freedom, so thoroughly undermine this remedy as to render it useless to those people who have been damaged by a defamatory falsehood negligently uttered in the mass media and have not in any way sought the public lime-light. [ Miami Herald, supra, p 387.] The Massachusetts Supreme Court likewise emphasized the state's interest in the individual's reputational protection, for this `reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being โ a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.' Stone, supra, p 858, quoting Rosenblatt v Baer, 383 US 75, 92; 86 S Ct 669; 15 L Ed 2d 597 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Utah court equated freedom from defamation with freedom from physical violence. [W]e recognize that the integrity of an individual's reputation is essential to his standing in society, in his vocation, and even in his family. It may indeed be indispensable to one's sense of self-worth. The dignity of virtually every human being depends in part upon his right to be known as the person he truly is. For centuries it has been recognized that an assault upon a person's character may be far more damaging and long-lasting than an assault upon his person. Indeed, freedom from false attacks on one's personality may be viewed as at least as essential to ordered liberty as freedom from physical abuse. [ Seegmiller, supra, p 973.] The courts employed these policies and reasons for distinguishing between public and private individuals. Offering the protection of privilege to all matters of public interest is often said to be too broad an extension of a free press privilege. The Illinois court noted the infrequency of recoveries for actual malice and the fact that [w]hether a matter is one of public interest, ... depends to some degree on whether the media themselves have chosen to make it one. [ Troman, supra, p 196.] The Hawaii court envisioned the negligence standard as one way to make defaming publishers less willing to speak due to the risk of being found negligent. Cahill, supra, p 533. Those states adopting a Rosenbloom public interest-related standard relied most heavily on the constitutional arguments advanced by the Rosenbloom plurality, striking the balance in favor of free speech. See, e.g., Walker v Colorado Springs Sun, Inc, 188 Colo 86; 538 P2d 450 (1975), cert den sub nom Woestendiek v Walker, 423 US 1025 (1975); Diversified Management, Inc v Denver Post, Inc, 653 P2d 1103 (Colo, 1982); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co v Northwest Publications, Inc, supra . While we appreciate the concerns articulated by the courts adopting the Rosenbloom standard, we find the balance struck by the United States Supreme Court in its development of the constitutional privilege to be sufficiently protective of free speech and provides the publisher with more than adequate sanctuary from the cruel dilemma we referred to in Lawrence, supra, p 137.
There are several tension lines along which, to some extent, the original tort-law qualified privileges were developed and along which the United States Supreme Court struggled in developing the latter-day First Amendment privileges. They are basically: the need to balance a free flow of information and ideas necessary to our concept of freedom and democracy with the traditional right of the individual to redress harm to reputation, and the effect of privilege on public versus private figures. These fundamental principles and the conflicts between them have been eloquently expressed in New York Times and its progeny. Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.... [ New York Times, supra, p 270.]    The protection of the public requires not merely discussion, but information. [ Id., p 272.]    The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government. [ Id., pp 274-275.] The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters. [ Philadelphia Newspapers, supra, 89 L Ed 2d 794 (quoting Gertz ).] These concerns are similar to those that we articulated in Lawrence: There is no need, at this date in our history, to urge that it is necessary to free institutions that the press itself be free. Today it is. The real issue before us is how free. Governmental interference is not the only threat to its freedom. On the contrary, a narrow or restrictive interpretation of the law of privilege in libel actions is equally dangerous. [ Id., p 137.] We find that the constitutional privilege that has evolved in the time period since Lawrence is neither narrow nor restrictive. Rather, it has equitably balanced the public's need to know with the individual's right to privacy. As the Court noted in Gertz : [T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues. [ New York Times, p 270.] They belong to that category of utterances which are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. [ Gertz, supra, p 340.] Especially in cases involving the interests of private individuals, the balancing process must not abandon the legitimate need to redress reputational injuries. As Justice Marshall expressed it, The protection of the reputation of such anonymous persons from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being โ a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. ... But the concept of a citizenry informed by a free and unfettered press is also basic to our system of ordered liberty. Here these two essential and fundamental values conflict. [ Rosenbloom, supra, p 78 (dissent).] In concurrence in Rosenbloom, Justice White emphasized that the policies supporting the New York Times standard were much less applicable in cases involving private persons. [23] Similarly, the Gertz majority concluded that the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule should obtain with respect to them. [ Id., p 343.]