Opinion ID: 547275
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: collateral attack of appointment

Text: 11 At the onset, the government argues that Plesinski may not collaterally attack the validity of Feldman's appointment in this criminal proceeding, but rather must pursue it in a separate proceeding for that purpose. See United States v. Mitchell, 136 F. 896 (C.C.Or.1905). We disagree. 12 In Mitchell, the defendant filed pleas of abatement 4 challenging the indictment on the grounds the grand jury was not regularly impaneled and the special prosecutor bringing the indictment was improperly appointed. In considering the pleas pretrial, we held, inter alia, that a court-appointed special prosecutor's right to the office cannot be collaterally attacked. Id. at 906. 13 [I]f the office has been lawfully established and a person exercises the functions thereof by color of right, but whose election or appointment thereto is illegal, his official acts therein cannot be successfully attacked in collateral proceedings, but in all such proceedings will be valid and binding until the officer is ousted by the judgment of a court in a direct proceeding to try his title to the office. 14 Id. (quotation omitted). 15 The holding of Mitchell is inapplicable in this case because Plesinski is not collaterally attacking Feldman's appointment. Unlike the defendant in Mitchell who filed a plea of abatement action to test the prosecutor's authority pretrial, Plesinski is challenging Feldman's authority in a direct appeal following his conviction. Both the Supreme Court and this court have permitted similar challenges to the authority of the specially-appointed prosecutor on appeal from a criminal conviction. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987) (reversal of contempt conviction on the grounds the court improperly appointed the beneficiary of the contempt order to prosecute the defendant for an alleged violation of that order); United States v. Hawthorne, 626 F.2d 87, 89-90 (9th Cir.1980) (per curiam). Accordingly, Plesinski may challenge Feldman's authority to act as a special assistant U.S. attorney in this appeal.