Opinion ID: 719627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the alibi jury instruction

Text: 7 McCall's alibi was his exclusive defense, yet he never requested an alibi jury instruction at trial. On appeal, McCall now argues that the district court's failure to provide such an instruction, sua sponte, merits a reversal. In general, a defendant may assign error to the omission of a criminal jury instruction only when the defendant has requested the instruction and objected to its omission before submission of the case to the jury. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30. If the defendant has failed to request a particular instruction or object to its omission, this court reviews the omission only for plain error. See United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1456 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Hamilton, 684 F.2d 380, 385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976, 103 S.Ct. 312, 74 L.Ed.2d 291 (1982). 8 We recognize that this court has previously held that the failure to give an alibi instruction may be plain error when appropriate alibi evidence has been presented. See Hamilton, 684 F.2d at 385. We note, however, that in Hamilton, the defendant made a clear request for an alibi instruction, and the district court simply failed to include it, without explanation. Although the Hamilton panel observed that the defendant should have specifically objected to the omission, it concluded that the district court's failure to include the instruction was nonetheless plain error, given the defendant's explicit request. In the instant case, by contrast, McCall never once alerted the district court to the need for an alibi instruction. In other words, not only was the district court deprived of an adequate opportunity to correct any potential mistake by McCall's failure to object, but also the district court was deprived of the knowledge that defendant even desired an alibi instruction by McCall's failure to request one. Given that the primary function of the alibi instruction is to remind the jury as to the government's burden of demonstrating all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including defendant's presence at the crime scene, see District Judges Association of the Sixth Circuit, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, 6.02 (1991), 1 given that the district court here did charge the jury that [t]he government must prove every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, Tr. at 225, and given that McCall argued in his closing that the government had failed to prove his presence at the bank beyond a reasonable doubt, Tr. at 207, we conclude that the omission in the instant case did not rise to the level of plain error. 9 We note that the federal circuits are not in agreement as to whether the failure to give a requested alibi instruction is reversible error. Compare Hamilton and United States v. Zuniga, 6 F.3d 569, 571-72 (9th Cir.1993) with United States v. Laury, 49 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 162, 133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995), and United States v. Agofsky, 20 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 280, 363, 130 L.Ed.2d 196, 316 (1994). However, all courts are in agreement that the failure to give an unrequested alibi instruction should not be deemed plain error. See Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 77, 16 S.Ct. 216, 219, 40 L.Ed. 343 (1895); United States v. Atkins, 487 F.2d 257, 259 (8th Cir.1973); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 503 (2d Cir.1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903, 94 S.Ct. 2598, 41 L.Ed.2d 209 (1974); United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888, 93 S.Ct. 195, 34 L.Ed.2d 145 (1972). We follow these decisions and hold that omission of the instruction is not plain error, as long as the jury is otherwise correctly instructed concerning the government's burden of proving every element of the crimes charged, and the defendant is given a full opportunity to present his alibi defense in closing argument.