Opinion ID: 799034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Akinsade’s Alleged Aggravated Felony

Text: With these principles in mind, we turn to whether Akinsade’s conviction for embezzlement by a bank employee was an aggravated felony such that he was removable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and ineligible for relief from removal. 9 A. The Categorical and Modified Categorical Approach “In general, the BIA and this Court have applied either a ‘categorical’ or a ‘modified categorical’ approach to determine whether a specific crime falls within a grounds for removability.” Wala, 511 F.3d at 107. Under the categorical approach, a reviewing court “look[s] only to the elements of the offense of conviction and not to the factual circumstances of the crime.” Ming Lam Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2001). By contrast, where a statute is “‘divisible,’ such that some categories of proscribed conduct render an alien removable and some do not,” application of a “modified categorical” approach is appropriate. Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2009); see also Wala, 511 F.3d at 107; VargasSarmiento v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 448 F.3d 159, 167 (2d Cir. 2006); Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Where . . . a criminal statute encompasses diverse classes of criminal acts – some of which would categorically be grounds for removal and others of which would not – we have held that such statutes can be considered ‘divisible’ statutes.”). Under the modified categorical approach, “we may refer to the record of conviction to ascertain whether a petitioner’s conviction was under the branch of the statute that proscribes removable offenses.” Wala, 511 F.3d at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has held that the record of conviction consists of materials including “a charging document (such as an indictment), a signed plea agreement, a verdict or judgment of conviction, a record of the sentence; a plea colloquy transcript, and jury instructions.” Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 128-29 (holding that IJ erred by relying on presentence report and restitution order to find that alien was convicted of fraud involving loss greater than $10,000); but see Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2302-03 (holding that 10 an IJ is not limited to considering the evidentiary materials permitted under the modified categorical approach when determining whether the loss involved in a prior fraud or deceit conviction amounted to at least $10,000). With respect to guilty pleas, under the modified categorical approach as applied to immigration proceedings, “the BIA may rely only upon facts to which a defendant ‘necessarily pleaded’ in order to determine the type of conduct that represented the basis of an alien’s conviction.” Wala, 511 F.3d at 108; see Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 131 (holding that the BIA may only consider “facts to which a defendant actually and necessarily pleaded in order to establish the elements of the offense, as indicated by a charging document, written plea agreement, or plea colloquy transcript” (emphasis added)). “[T]he ‘necessarily pleaded’ language refers not just to whether a petitioner pled guilty to elements of the underlying . . . offense, but also to whether by pleading guilty, he pled those facts necessary to establish that he violated a divisible statute in a manner that satisfies the grounds” for removal. Wala, 511 F.3d at 108; see also Dickson, 346 F.3d at 48-49 (“In reviewing a conviction under a divisible statute, the categorical approach permits reference to the record of conviction for the limited purpose of determining whether the alien’s conviction was under the branch of the statute that permits removal.”). “[A] petitioner necessarily pleads to facts when, for example, he actually admits specific facts in his plea colloquy or comparable judicial record that establish he violated a divisible statute in [a] manner that satisfies the criteria of the pertinent removability statute.” Wala, 511 F.3d at 108. If a statute “requires no finding of the particular element at issue and there is no charging document that narrows the charge to those limits, the only certainty in a pleaded case of that finding lies in the defendant’s own admissions or accepted findings of fact 11 confirming the factual basis for a valid plea.” Id. at 110 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 25 (2005)). B. The BIA’s Error The IJ accepted Akinsade’s argument that he could have been convicted either for acting with the intent to defraud or to injure the bank, and “if it [was] to injure the bank it would not fall within the fraud or deceit provision and, therefore, the respondent would not have been found to have been convicted of an aggravated felony under that section of the law.” J.A. 86. Similarly, the BIA assumed “that the statu[t]e in question is divisible in nature.” Id. at 3. Finally, the government agrees that the IJ and BIA were obligated to employ the traditional modified categorical approach when determining whether Akinsade committed an aggravated felony. Resp’t’s Br. 18 & n.7. Cf. Pierre, 588 F.3d at 773 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that under Nijhawan, a “circumstance-specific” approach is permitted when “determining whether the monetary threshold” in §1101(a)(43)(M)(i) has been met) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lanferman v. BIA, 576 F.3d 84, 89 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that “Nijhawan does not change the list of documents that may be considered in the divisibility analysis, and we do not extend it to such a context.”). Thus, for the purposes of this case we assume the statute is divisible and proceed under the modified categorical approach to examine whether Akinsade’s record of conviction necessarily admits facts establishing that he committed an offense involving fraud or deceit.5 More specifically, because the government conceded at oral argument that the intent to defraud rather than the intent to injure was required to sustain the removability charge, Tr. 5 This Court has yet to decide on an “approach for determining when a statute is . . . divisible.” Oouch v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 633 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2011). Because the IJ and the BIA proceeded as if § 656 was divisible, it is unnecessary for us to address this open question. 12 12:25-13:8, the issue is whether Akinsade’s record of conviction necessarily supports the result. We hold that it does not, and that the BIA erred in deeming Akinsade removable. In Akinsade’s case, the record of conviction consists of an information, a judgment of conviction, and a plea colloquy transcript. None of these documents reveals that Akinsade actually and necessarily pleaded that he acted with an intent to defraud or deceive. Petitioner pled guilty to the information, which merely set forth the elements of the offense of embezzlement by bank employee under § 656 – an offense that the government acknowledges can be committed with either an intent to injure or an intent to defraud. See United States v. Lung Fong Chen, 393 F.3d 139, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Section 656’s intent requirement is properly read in the disjunctive and thus proof of intent to injure or defraud is sufficient to support a conviction.”). Neither the information nor the judgment reveals the intent with which Akinsade committed the offense. Likewise, the plea colloquy transcript does not resolve this issue. During the colloquy, Akinsade accepted guilt for embezzlement. The record, however, is silent as to his intent at the time he perpetrated the offense. As evidence that Akinsade acted with an intent to defraud, the government points to Akinsade’s concession at his plea colloquy that what “essentially . . . happened” in his case was that he “process[ed] fraudulent checks presented by accomplices” and that he “knowingly embezzle[d]” money from the bank. J.A. 279-80. But neither of these statements equate to Akinsade admitting that he knew the checks were fraudulent at the time he committed the offense or that he had knowingly processed fraudulent checks. Instead, from these statements, the IJ and the BIA inferred that Akinsade acted with a specific intent to defraud. Under the modified categorical approach, the BIA cannot make such an inference, even if it is 13 reasonable. See Wala, 511 F.3d at 109-10. For instance, in Wala, we considered a BIA determination that an immigrant convicted of third-degree burglary under a Connecticut statute had committed a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Id. We vacated the BIA’s decision after finding that the BIA considers a burglary a CIMT only if it is a permanent taking and, under the modified categorical approach, the BIA could not “infer” from Wala’s plea colloquy that he “intended a larceny offense involving a permanent, rather than a temporary, taking of property.” Id. at 103, 109-10. Significantly, we reached this conclusion despite our observation that the BIA’s inference was reasonable and that an alternative inference – e.g., that “Wala . . . [took] the [victim’s] jewelry with the intent to loan it to his girlfriend for one ‘night on the town’ and then return it” – may have been “improbable.” Id. at 109.6 Like Wala, because Akinsade “did not admit to, was not charged with, and was not required to plead to,” id., acting with an intent to defraud, his plea does not necessarily rest on facts identifying his conviction as an offense involving fraud or deceit. The government’s brief inconsistently asserts that: (1) the IJ properly employed the modified categorical approach to determine if Akinsade committed an aggravated felony; and (2) 6 Our holding that the BIA erred in inferring that Akinsade acted with a specific intent to defraud is supported by the Third Circuit’s opinion in Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2002), which considered whether a conviction under § 656 “qualifie[d] as a crime ‘involving fraud or deceit.’” Id. at 210. Upon review of the record of conviction, the court found that “Valansi accepted guilt for theft and an intent to injure, but did not clearly accept guilt as to any fraudulent intent.” Id. at 217. Thus, because the court did “not know and [could] not speculate . . . whether Valansi would have accepted that her conduct amounted to an intent to defraud rather than to injure her employer,” it concluded that the BIA had erred in finding that Valansi’s conviction under § 656 was an aggravated felony. Id. 14 embezzlement necessarily involves fraud or deceit, regardless of the specific intent with which it is perpetrated because in order to embezzle “‘there must be an intentional and fraudulent appropriation or conversion of . . . money.’” Resp’t’s Br. 22 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary at 468 (5th ed. 1979)). We need not address the latter of these arguments in light of the government’s concession at oral argument that if Akinsade’s record of conviction does not show that he acted with the specific intent to defraud, the conviction “fall[s] outside the fraud or deceit scope of the aggravated felony provision.” Tr. 13:7-8. The Supreme Court has underscored “the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this country.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). In such circumstances, the need for precision and clarity in plea agreements and allocutions is especially acute. Finally, we pause to express a concern, unrelated to the grounds on which we resolve this appeal. At argument, we asked the government, for informational purposes, whether Akinsade’s case might be one in which relief from prosecution would be exercised, pursuant to the Morton Memoranda. See Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to All ICE Employees (Mar. 2, 2011) (“Subject: Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens”); Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, All Chief Counsel (June 17, 2011) (“Subject: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens”). Under the terms of the Morton Memoranda, the government announced that it would be reviewing all immigration cases 15 as part of its initiative to focus on those who have committed violent crimes, and with the prospect of granting relief from prosecution in the exercise of discretion as to cases that met certain criteria. The government responded that Akinsade’s having filed a coram nobis petition in another proceeding challenging the constitutionality of his underlying conviction was a factor in the government’s decision not to exercise its prosecutorial discretion. See Tr. 20:4-7 (“[T]his is an individual who’s attacking his removal order and is attacking his criminal conviction. And I would doubt that [ICE officials] would exercise prosecutorial discretion in this case . . . .”); id. 22:1-7 (Whether an individual is “pursuing his rights” is “certainly in the background that could be looked at in this case in terms of why should we exercise prosecutorial discretion with respect to this particular individual. And that will be part of the mosaic that the immigration authorities would look at.”). We would be troubled if indeed it is the government’s position that petitioners will be penalized for exercising their legitimate rights to pursue their arguments fully. See Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that differential treatment based on the “‘intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights’” was basis for selective enforcement claim) (quoting LaTriest Rest. & Cabaret v. Village of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994)).