Opinion ID: 2612907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges to Both the Upper and Lower Poorman Claims

Text: Miscovich first contends that Tryck should have been barred from prevailing on his quiet title claim because he failed to allege or prove possession. To prevail in an action to quiet title to real property, a plaintiff must prove possession of the property; otherwise the proper cause of action is ejectment. AS 09.45.010; Welcome v. Jennings, 780 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Alaska 1989); Shope v. Sims, 658 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Alaska 1983). However, the possession requirement may be met through a showing of constructive possession. Welcome, 780 P.2d at 1043. In Welcome, we held that the plaintiff's compliance with statutory requirements ... [relating to discovery, location, and recordation of a mining claim,] is sufficient to establish constructive possession of the claims and permit him to maintain a quiet title action. 780 P.2d at 1043. The superior court found that Tryck performed the required assessment work for 1988 and 1989, filing proof of compliance with the federal government. The court also found that Miscovich, acting in his capacity as lessee and co-owner of the mining claims, had filed the required assessment notices for the other relevant years, except for the period in between 1958-68, in which no other person relocated the claims. See Dodge v. Wilkinson, 664 P.2d 157, 159 n. 3 (Alaska 1983) (holding that where claims were subject to relocation for a considerable period of time because no annual assessment work was performed on the claims, [the] resumption of assessment work ... cured this default because it occurred prior to any relocation by another person.); 2 American Law of Mining § 45.09[1] (2d ed. 1984); 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1988). The trial court found this evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that Tryck and his predecessor in interest, Shropshire, met the requirements for constructive possession and that Tryck could therefore maintain an action to quiet title to the claims. We find no error.
As to both the Upper and Lower Poorman claims, Miscovich argues that Shropshire's prolonged absence from the state, combined with his failure to initiate any contact with Miscovich for over 35 years, constituted abandonment. Abandonment of mining claims must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Kile v. Belisle, 759 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Alaska 1988); Dodge, at 159 (Alaska 1988). In Kile, this court defined abandonment as the intentional relinquishment of a mining claim ... a voluntary act on the part of a claimant [which] consists of a subjective intent to abandon coupled with an external and objective act by which that intent is carried into effect. 759 P.2d at 1295-96; see also 1 American Law of Mining, § 46.01[2]. This court reviews a trial court's determination as to whether an abandonment has occurred under the clearly erroneous standard. Kile, 759 P.2d at 1295. Although Miscovich argues that Shropshire's utter inattention to the Poorman claims for roughly half his lifetime, i.e., 35 years indicated that Shropshire abandoned the claims, Miscovich failed to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the trial court that Shropshire intended to abandon the claims. There is ample evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that Miscovich failed to meet his burden of proving Shropshire's intent to abandon the claims. Shropshire's testimony demonstrated that he had never intended to abandon the claims. When he left Alaska, Shropshire arranged, through the lease, to have Miscovich Brothers work the claims and perform the assessment work. Shropshire testified that, soon after he first left Alaska, he telephoned the recording office and verified that Miscovich Brothers was, in fact, doing the required assessment work; thereafter, he believed that Miscovich had continued to perform the annual assessments. Although Shropshire acknowledged that he received no royalties from the claim, he explained that he knew that mining the claims was not economically feasible during much of the lease period. According to Shropshire, the Miscovichs never told him that they were terminating the lease, and, in 1982, John Miscovich specifically advised him that Howard Miscovich had been working the claims over the years. Given this evidence, the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous.
Miscovich also advances an argument based on the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1701-84 (1988). Enacted in 1976, FLPMA required owners of unpatented federal mining claims to file certain instruments by October 21, 1979, and annually thereafter. Under FLPMA, failure to comply with the filing requirement constitutes abandonment. [2] Miscovich argues that Shropshire lost all right to the mining claims in 1979 by failing to comply with the filing requirements of FLPMA. According to Miscovich, Shropshire therefore had no remaining interest in the claims when he purported to terminate the Miscovich Brothers lease and to convey the claims to Tryck. Miscovich thus contends that he acquired ownership of the claims himself in 1989, when he staked and filed state location notices on the same land, in his own name, shortly after Tryck filed the quiet title action. At trial, Tryck took the position that the assessment notices Miscovich had filed annually on the claims had substantially complied with the filing requirements of FLPMA, thereby preserving the claims. In resolving this issue, the trial court deferred to the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM); the court stated that [t]his question is one which is peculiarly within the agency's specialized field. BLM, in response to an inquiry from Miscovich's attorney, concluded that the claims had not been abandoned through noncompliance with FLPMA, stating that, there is sufficient documentation in the mining claim recordation files to comply with the filing requirements of FLPMA. [3] Given BLM's expertise regarding this issue, the trial court could properly rely on the agency's finding of compliance with FLPMA. BLM's determination appears to be well reasoned, and Miscovich has advanced no ground for rejecting it. Under the circumstances, the trial court could properly find that Shropshire's Upper Poorman claims remained valid after the enactment of FLPMA. Furthermore, even if Shropshire had lost the Upper Poorman claims through noncompliance with FLPMA, Tryck's right to title would not have been defeated by Miscovich's subsequent filing of state claims on the same land. As noted in the treatise, American Law of Mining, One who has contracted or agreed to perform annual assessment work on a claim cannot, by relocating it after his failure to do the work, acquire any interest adverse to that of the prior claimant. Courts have either held his location void, or held him to be trustee for the benefit of the prior locator. 2 American Law of Mining, § 38.03[4] (citing Soule v. Johnson, 34 Idaho 439, 201 P. 834 (1921); O'Neill v. Otero, 15 N.M. 707, 113 P. 614 (1910); Argentine Mining Co. v. Benedict, 18 Utah 183, 55 P. 559 (1898)). Here, Shropshire leased the Upper Poorman claims to Miscovich Brothers in May 1955. The lease, by requiring Miscovich Brothers to perform all the annual assessment work required to be done under law, during the term of th[e] lease, plainly imposed on Miscovich the duty of compliance with FLPMA once that statute became effective. Because any loss of interest Shropshire might have incurred due to noncompliance with FLPMA would have resulted from Miscovich Brothers' failure to perform its duties under the lease, Miscovich was barred from acquiring any interest adverse to Shropshire's on the same claims. The same conclusion holds for the Lower Poorman claims, as to which Miscovich occupied the position of co-owner due to Shropshire's 1954 conveyance of a one-half interest to Miscovich Brothers. It is settled that a relocation by one co-owner will inure to the benefit of all of the co-owners, and that relocation [by a fiduciary] is held void as against the prior claimant. 2 American Law of Mining, § 38.03[1]-[3]. Under the circumstances, any title Miscovich obtained upon relocating state claims on the same land as the original federal claims would be deemed to be held in constructive trust for the original claimant, Shropshire, and for Shropshire's successor in interest, Tryck. 2 American Law of Mining, § 38.03[1]-[4].