Opinion ID: 1350669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: vagueness as prior restraint

Text: The majority does not address appellants' challenge that RCW 9.68.140 and RCW 7.48A.010 are vague and thus act as an unconstitutional prior restraint against speech. A law is unconstitutional when it forbids conduct in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Burien Bark Supply v. King Cy., 106 Wn.2d 868, 871, 725 P.2d 994 (1986). Where a statute involves speech, vagueness is not tolerable. [S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432, 9 L.Ed.2d 405, 83 S.Ct. 328 (1963). The roots of the vagueness doctrine are in constitutional protections of due process. See Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wn.2d 405, 408, 423 P.2d 522, 25 A.L.R.3d 827 (1967). In State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987), the Oregon Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an obscenity statute under the Oregon Constitution. Although it resolved the case by determining that all subjects in its constitution encompasses obscenity, it also approved of the holding of the Oregon Court of Appeals that statutes defining obscenity by contemporary community standards are inherently vague: The indeterminacy of the crime created by [the obscenity statute defined by the Miller test] ... lies in tying the criminality of a publication to contemporary state standards. Even in ordinary criminal law, we doubt that the legislature can make it a crime to conduct oneself in a manner that falls short of contemporary state standards. In a law censoring speech, writing or publication, such an indeterminate test is intolerable. It means that anyone who publishes or distributes arguably obscene words or pictures does so at the peril of punishment for making a wrong guess about a future jury's estimate of contemporary state standards of prurience. (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Henry, supra at 513. I find this analysis compelling. Equally compelling is Justice Brennan's dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 87-88, 37 L.Ed.2d 446, 93 S.Ct. 2628 (1973): [E]ven the most painstaking efforts to determine in advance whether certain sexually oriented expression is obscene must inevitably prove unavailing. For the insufficiency of the notice compels persons to guess not only whether their conduct is covered by a criminal statute, but also whether their conduct falls within the constitutionally permissible reach of the statute. The resulting level of uncertainty is utterly intolerable, not alone because it makes [b]ookselling ... a hazardous profession, but as well because it invites arbitrary and erratic enforcement of the law. (Citation omitted.) Although the United States Supreme Court has not been convinced that its obscenity definition is vague under the United States Constitution, this definition, and the definition of RCW 7.48A.010 violate the Washington Constitution, even without invoking principles of due process. Vague restraints on the freedom of speech act as prior restraints of speech. In State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 374, 679 P.2d 353 (1984), we stated that the plain language of Const. art. 1, § 5 precludes prior restraints, leaving the State with only post-publication sanctions to punish abuse of free speech rights. One type of prior restraint is an order prohibiting publication, such as this court held unconstitutional in Coe. Even less tolerable is a prior restraint in the form of a vague statute, which necessarily results in heavy self-censorship to avoid criminal prosecution. The reason this is even less tolerable is that the materials restrained are not clearly and narrowly defined, and so there will be a broad range of materials suppressed as the publisher attempts what can only be a guess at what speech will offend community standards. I would hold that Const. art. 1, § 5 protects speech on all subjects, including the subjects listed in RCW 9.68.140 and RCW 7.48A.010. The Legislature and citizens of this state have many legitimate means to combat pornography, but a total ban on the publication or sale of materials that offend community standards is not one of them. Moreover, the vague definitions in RCW 7.48A.010 act as an unconstitutional prior restraint on the freedom of speech. I would reverse the convictions. PEARSON, C.J., and BRACHTENBACH, J., concur with UTTER, J. CALLOW, J. I concur in Justice Utter's comments on the unconstitutionality of RCW 7.48A.010 and 9.68.140 in light of Const. art. 1, § 5. I cannot embrace the suggestion that economic coercion is acceptable as a method for suppressing the dissemination of ideas. Reconsideration denied March 23, 1989.