Opinion ID: 3194599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: KRPC 3.3(a)(1)

Text: KRPC 3.3(a)(1) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 601) states: A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer. The 47 hearing panel concluded that Hawkins violated this rule in three separate cases: (1) In DA11619, the panel found that Hawkins made false statements when she denied telling Olberding, the deputy clerk, that neither she nor her client would be attending a May 9, 2012, hearing; (2) in DA11730, the panel found that Hawkins submitted a temporary parenting plan and temporary order to the district court which she falsely represented as being approved by opposing counsel; and (3) in DA11918, the panel found that Hawkins made a false statement about her client, G.P., being unable to attend a January 3, 2013, hearing. 1. Statement to Olberding Regarding Attendance at Hearing Hawkins argues that because her testimony and Olberding's testimony sharply conflicted regarding what was said during their phone conversation on the morning of May 9, the panel was prevented from finding that Hawkins told Olberding that neither she nor he client would be attending the hearing scheduled for later that day. In support of this argument, Hawkins cites In re Carson, 252 Kan. 399, 406, 845 P.2d 47 (1993), where this court stated that although the report of the disciplinary board 'is advisory only, it will be given the same dignity as a special verdict by a jury, or the findings of a trial court, and will be adopted where amply sustained by the evidence, or where it is not against the clear weight of the evidence, or where the evidence consisted of sharply conflicting testimony.' [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis added.) The problem with Hawkins' reliance on this statement is that it is no longer the standard applied by this court to review factual findings made by a hearing panel in attorney disciplinary cases. As this court stated in In re Barker, 299 Kan. 158, 165, 321 P.3d 767 (2014): 48 This court does not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. [Citation omitted.] 'Rather, this court examines any disputed findings of fact and determines whether clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's findings. [Citation omitted.] If so, the findings will stand.' [Citation omitted.] See also In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 (2008) (clear and convincing evidence is evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable); In re Lober, 276 Kan. 633, 637, 78 P.3d 442 (2003) (When the panel's findings relate to matters about which there was conflicting testimony, this court recognizes that the panel, as the trier of fact, had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their demeanor. Therefore, we do not reweigh the evidence or pass on credibility of witnesses.). The panel found that Olberding's testimony regarding the May 9 phone conversation—specifically, her claim that Hawkins told her that neither she nor her client would be appearing at the hearing later that day—was more credible than Hawkins' testimony denying the statement. Based on the evidence showing that Olberding, after getting off the phone with Hawkins, memorialized her conversation with Hawkins and immediately told the clerk about the conversation, it is highly probable that her recollection of the conversation was accurate. Thus, clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's finding that Hawkins lied to the district court when she denied telling Olberding that she and her client would not be attending the May 9 hearing. 49 2. Hawkins' Representation that Opposing Counsel Approved Temporary