Opinion ID: 2191641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: 27, 29, and 30 Draper as under the influence of cocaine

Text: Kerpelman says in these exceptions: 27. As to Draper, the Record contains a clear inference that he was under the influence of cocaine when he testified before Levin; as a matter of law an attorney cannot be found guilty for a disciplinary violation upon the testimony of one under the influence of cocaine. 29. The witness Draper testified in the case, and then after suspicions were aroused on the part of the Respondent, an Interrogatory was submitted to him asking whether he was on cocaine at the time he testified. Draper took the Fifth Amendment. Levin refused to strike the testimony. Levin accepted the word of Draper as to what had happened over the word of Kerpelman. This exception is that as a matter of law an attorney may not be found guilty under a clear and convincing proof test where the only evidence against the attorney is the uncorroborated testimony of a person who took the Fifth Amendment as to whether he was under the influence of cocaine when he testified. 30. The averments of exception 29 are hereby adopted by reference; Levin's refusal to strike Draper's testimony was severe and substantial error. He fails to point out the portion of the record from which one might perceive this clear inference. As Bar Counsel puts it, Kerpelman builds his case for the lack of competence of Draper upon his own suggestions and innuendoes, which are devoid of proof. We agree. Draper testified on June 18, 1979. If in fact Kerpelman at that time had information that Draper was under the influence of cocaine while testifying, that information should have been brought to the attention of the trial judge then. This allegation was presented to the trial judge at the last hearing in this matter in September 1979. Thus, it was clearly before the trial judge when he evaluated the evidence adduced. He is not clearly in error in his evaluation.