Opinion ID: 1661690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of the Objection

Text: C.Cr.P. 804 states that [i]n all cases the court shall charge the jury ... The duty imposed by this article is mandatory, and exists without the necessity of a special request by counsel. If, at the conclusion of the jury charge, the trial judge has not informed the jury that reasonable doubt may arise from the lack of evidence in the case, then the judge has not discharged his statutory duty. Of course, a defendant may not wait until his appeal before he complains of the trial judge's failure to comply with C.Cr.P. 804. See State v. Gibbs, supra. But see State v. Williamson, 389 So.2d 1328 (La.1980) (exception carved out for jury charge which misdefines the crime with which defendant is charged). Rather, he must bring the error to the attention of the trial judge at a time when the judge can cure the error. State v. Lee, 346 So.2d 682, 685 (La.1977). Otherwise, his objection shall be deemed waived. C.Cr.P. 841. In the past, this court has held that objections to the judge's general charge are untimely if lodged after the jury has retired for deliberations. See, e. g., State v. Jefferson, 379 So.2d 1389 (La.1980); State v. Williams, 366 So.2d 1365 (La.1978); State v. Beard, 312 So.2d 278 (La.1975). These cases are premised on the belief that, once the jury has retired, it is too late for the trial judge to correct his error. State v. Jefferson, supra, involved a charge given after the jury returned. Defendant objected, in a general way, after the jury again retired to deliberate. We held, not only that the issue was not before us (because of the lack of a contemporaneous objection), but that there was no merit in the assignment. State v. Williams, supra, and State v. Beard, supra, were cited as authority. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928 provided, in article 391 (later preserved in R.S. 15:391 but omitted from the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1966, see Acts 311, 312 and 313 of 1966) that objections to the charge or to the failure to give a special requested charge shall be by means of a bill of exceptions reserved before the jury shall have retired to deliberate. The omission was for simplicity, since the matter was covered by Title 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with bills of exceptions, arts. 841-845. C.Cr.P. 841 was amended in 1974 to eliminate bills of exceptions, around which a body of technical jurisprudence had arisen. C.Cr.P. 841 contains the following: ... It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take, or of his objections to the action of the court, and the grounds therefor. We recognize today that trial judges may, and frequently do, recall the jury for further instructions. See C.Cr.P. 808, providing for additional charges in open court with the defendant and counsel for both sides present. We hold therefore, that an objection to the judge's general charge [1] is properly preserved if made immediately after the jury is retired, particularly if that is the first opportunity to object. Defense counsel is not required to interrupt the judge during the charge and have the jury removed while the point is argued. Careful practice would suggest that C.Cr.P. 801 be followed, and the charge reduced to writing on defendant's request and copy provided to defendant before reading. In busy courts today, however, we recognize that this course would use precious time of judge, jury and counsel. State v. Jefferson, supra; State v. Williams, supra and State v. Beard, supra, are therefore overruled to the extent that they are in conflict with this opinion.