Opinion ID: 1990508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of the Variance

Text: [¶ 11] We review directly the operative decision of a municipality. Yates v. Town of Southwest Harbor, 2001 ME 2, ¶ 10, 763 A.2d 1168, 1171. A court will not substitute its judgment for that of a board. Greenberg v. DiBiase, 637 A.2d 1177, 1178 (Me.1994). The municipality's decision is reviewed for error of law, abuse of discretion or findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Yates, 2001 ME 2, ¶ 10, 763 A.2d at 1171 ( quoting Sproul v. Town of Boothbay Harbor, 2000 ME 30, ¶ 8, 746 A.2d 368, 372). [¶ 12] Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. Sproul, 2000 ME 30, ¶ 8, 746 A.2d at 372; see also York v. Town of Ogunquit, 2001 ME 53, ¶ 6, 769 A.2d 172, 175. That inconsistent conclusions can be drawn from evidence does not mean that a finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Town of Lincolnville, 2001 ME 175, ¶ 6, 786 A.2d 616, 619; Gorham v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 625 A.2d 898, 903 (Me.1993). [¶ 13] The burden of persuasion rests with the party wishing to overturn the municipal decision. Sawyer Envtl. Recovery Facilities, Inc. v. Town of Hampden, 2000 ME 179, ¶ 13, 760 A.2d 257, 260. Thus, to succeed on appeal, an appellant who bore the burden below, must argue that the evidence compelled the grant of a variance, Twigg v. Town of Kennebunk, 662 A.2d 914, 916 (Me.1995), or that no competent evidence supports the board's decision, Thacker v. Konover Dev. Corp., 2003 ME 30, ¶ 8, 818 A.2d 1013, 1017. [¶ 14] Title 30-A M.R.S. § 4353(4) permits a board of appeals to grant a variance from local zoning ordinances. It reads, in part: [T]he board may grant a variance only when strict application of the ordinance to the petitioner and the petitioner's property would cause undue hardship. The term undue hardship as used in this subsection means: A. The land in question can not yield a reasonable return unless a variance is granted; B. The need for a variance is due to the unique circumstances of the property and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood; C. The granting of a variance will not alter the essential character of the locality; and D. The hardship is not the result of action taken by the applicant or a prior owner. 30-A M.R.S. § 4353(4). [4] While the party seeking a variance must establish all four elements to demonstrate undue hardship, Twigg, 662 A.2d at 916, only the reasonable return element is at issue here because, on reconsideration the Board did not disturb its previous findings regarding elements (B), (C), and (D). [¶ 15] The reasonable return prong of the undue hardship test is met where strict application of the zoning ordinance would result in the practical loss of all beneficial use of the land. Perrin v. Town of Kittery, 591 A.2d 861, 863 (Me. 1991) (quotation marks omitted). Reasonable return is not the maximum return that could be afforded by a property. Id. ; Leadbetter v. Ferris, 485 A.2d 225, 227 (Me.1984). Economic proof that no reasonable return is possible is not required. Greenberg, 637 A.2d at 1179. [¶ 16] On reconsideration, the Board found that Toomey enjoyed a reasonable return on the Lot as it afforded him access to the lake and he was able to dock his boat there. Even if the Lot cannot be developed, the Board found that the recreational benefits of the property afforded a reasonable return. Toomey, as the party seeking to overturn the decision of the Board, has the burden of refuting this finding by showing that the Board was compelled to grant the variance or that there is no competent evidence supporting the decision. [¶ 17] The facts in this case parallel those in Twigg. There the property owner sought a variance to construct a residence on waterfront property and appealed after it was denied. We held that the evidence did not compel the conclusion that the Board erred in not granting the variance because, under the reasonable return analysis, the owner failed to establish that the property could only be used for residential purposes. Twigg, 662 A.2d at 918-19. The record did not indicate that he could not use the property in other ways, for example commercially or recreationally. Id. [¶ 18] Similarly, Toomey has failed to carry his burden to demonstrate that the Board was compelled to grant the variance. There is competent evidence in the record that supports the Board's decision that Toomey enjoys a benefit from the shorefront property. Here, while there is no suggestion that Toomey could use the property commercially, he has used, and may continue to use, the property for recreational purposes. A waterfront lot is a significant benefit to a property owner who owns an inland lot. [¶ 19] We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the Board where a contrary decision is not compelled by the evidence. Trudo v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2008 ME 30, ¶ 12, 942 A.2d 689, 693. The entry is: The judgment of the Superior Court is vacated; the decision of the Town of Frye Island Board of Appeals, dated October 14, 2005, is affirmed.