Opinion ID: 1384716
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Nexus Requirement Was Met

Text: Matthews next contends that the district court erred in failing to require a meaningful nexus between the grand jury proceeding and his attempts to conceal the weapon. The instructions, he claims, permitted the jury to convict him even if it found that he only intended to impede an investigation, rather than a proceeding. At times, Matthews goes so far as to say that he should not have been convicted unless he knew that a proceeding was pending. As he preserved these arguments for appeal, our review is de novo. See Darif, 446 F.3d at 709. We begin by considering whether 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) requires a showing of nexus. In Arthur Andersen, the Court held that § 1512(b)(1) encompasses a nexus requirement. 544 U.S. at 707-08, 125 S.Ct. 2129. This means that to convict a defendant of obstructing justice under that subsection, the [obstructive] act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995). The government had argued against finding a nexus requirement under § 1512(b)(1), because to convict a defendant under any of 18 U.S.C. § 1512's subsections, an official proceeding `need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.' Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707, 125 S.Ct. 2129 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e)(1), now codified at § 1512(f)(1)). However, the Court admonished: It is . . . one thing to say that a proceeding `need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,' and quite another to say a proceeding need not even be foreseen. A `knowingly . . . corrupt persuader' cannot be someone who persuades others to shred documents under a document retention policy when he does not have in contemplation any particular official proceeding in which those documents might be material. Id. at 707-08, 125 S.Ct. 2129. We believe that logic applies with equal force to § 1512(c)(1) because that subsection, like § 1512(b)(1), speaks in terms of the relationship between obstructive acts and a proceeding. Compare § 1512(b)(1) (requiring that a defendant act with intent to . . . influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding), with § 1512(c)(1) (requiring that defendant act with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding). Accordingly, before a defendant may be convicted of obstruction under § 1512(c)(1), he must believe that his acts will be likely to affect a pending or foreseeable proceeding. See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707, 125 S.Ct. 2129; United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir.2007) ([A] `knowingly . . . corrupt persuader' must believe that his actions are likely to affect a particular, existing or foreseeable official proceeding.). [3] We think the jury instructions did an adequate job of conveying the nexus required under § 1512(c)(1). The instructions required the jury to find that Matthews attempted to conceal . . . an object, and that he did so with intent to impair the object's availability for use in an official proceeding.  (Emphasis added). The district court then specified that this official proceeding was the federal grand jury for the Southern District of Illinois. Under these instructions, the jury could only convict Matthews if it found that he attempted to conceal the gun with the intent to prevent its use in the federal grand jury. Contrary to Matthews's claim that the instructions eliminated any nexus, this instruction directly connected his acts with the grand jury proceeding. And, under these instructions, the jury could not have convicted Matthews without finding that he foresaw the grand jury proceedings; Matthews could not have acted with intent to impair the grand jury proceedings without some inkling that those proceedings were upcoming. The instructions did not misstate § 1512(c)(1)'s nexus requirement.