Opinion ID: 74984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: 2 The Insurance Company provided the Housing Authority with general commercial liability insurance from October, 1992 to October, 1995. Plaintiffs in the Underlying Suit alleged that, during the coverage period, Campbell was injured as a result of ingesting and inhaling lead from the old and crumbling paint on the walls of a Housing Authority dwelling. The Insurance Company agreed to defend the Housing Authority in the Underlying Suit under a reservation of rights. In this suit, the Insurance Company seeks a determination that it is not liable to the Housing Authority for the costs of defense or indemnification because the policy taken out by the Housing Authority contains a pollution exclusion clause which, the Insurance Company claims, covers liability arising from exposure to lead. The pollution exclusion “movement clause” states that it covers: “Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants. “Pollutants” are defined to include: any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same legal standards as the district court. See Whatley v. CNA Ins. Cos., 189 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate if the 3 evidence before the court shows that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).