Opinion ID: 150474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Under Buckley 's Four Principles, the CEP's Single-Election Qualification Criteria Are, on This Record, Constitutional

Text: Acknowledging that the CEP may condition public funds on a significant showing of public support in the previous election, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96, 96 S.Ct. 612, our intuition suggests that the CEP's single-election qualification criteria20% of the vote for full funding, 15% for two-thirds funding, and 10% for one-third fundingcome close to the outer edge of the constitutionally permissible range. A public financing system must account for the potential fluidity of American political life, id. at 97, 96 S.Ct. 612 (quotation marks omitted), including the fact that minor-party candidates do, occasionally, defeat major-party opponents. Conditioning public funds on too high of a showing in the previous election risks entrenching the major parties and shutting out the rare minor-party candidate who is able to garner enough public support to win an election. Nevertheless, following Buckley's example, we must look beyond our intuition to the concrete evidence of the CEP's practical effects. In so doing, we find that data from the 2008 election contradict our intuition and show that a substantial number of minor-party candidates will be eligible for public funding in 2010 under the single-election qualification criteria. Indeed, over one third of the minor-party candidates (fifteen out of forty) who ran in the 2008 General Assembly elections received at least 10% of the vote, thereby qualifying themselves (or another member of their party) to receive partial funding in the same race in the 2010 election. Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 324. Five of those fifteen candidatesrepresenting fully one eighth of all minor-party candidatesreceived over 20% of the vote and qualified for full funding in 2010. Id. Those record facts show that, although the CEP's qualification criteria are high, they are not, as our intuition suggested, set so high as to shut-out minor-party candidates who enjoy public support. [11] Furthermore, even if the CEP's single-election qualification criteria impose some burden on the political opportunity of minor-party candidates, to evaluate whether the burden is unfair or unnecessary we must examine principally whether plaintiffs have shown that the CEP has operat[ed] to reduce their strength below that attained without any public financing. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 98-99, 96 S.Ct. 612. Searching the record, we find insufficient evidence in support of that claim. To the contrary, uncontroverted facts in the record show that minor-party candidates as a whole are arguably stronger and certainly not weakerunder the CEP. In 2006, the election immediately before the CEP went into effect, zero minor-party candidates received between 15% and 19% of the vote and one minor-party candidate received more than 20% of the vote in legislative races. Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 322-23. Yet in 2008, after the CEP went into effect for legislative elections, minor-party candidates achieved more success at the polls: four minor-party candidates received between 15% and 19% of the vote and five minor-party candidates received more than 20% of the vote in legislative races. Id. at 324. This shows that, insofar as particular minor-party candidates are failing to qualify for public financing because of the CEP's high qualification criteria, minor-party candidates as a whole are nonetheless just as strongif not strongerthan they were before the CEP went into effect. [12] Their political opportunity, therefore, does not appear to have been burdened in a way that is unfair or unnecessary. [13] We recognize that in reaching this conclusion, we have relied on data from only one election. Once the CEP has been in place for additional election cycles, there may develop a more complete picture of its effect on minor-party candidates. Following Buckley, therefore, we of course do not rule out the possibility of concluding in some future case, upon an appropriate factual demonstration, that the CEP's single-election qualification criteria have, in fact, operat[ed] to reduce the[ ] strength of minor parties below that attained without any public financing. 424 U.S. at 97 n. 131, 98-99, 96 S.Ct. 612. At present, however, and on the record before us, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the CEP has burdened the political opportunity of minor-party candidates in a way that is unfair or unnecessary. [14]
In sum, although our intuition might suggest, as an abstract principle, that the CEP's single-election qualification criteria20% of the vote for full funding, 15% for two-thirds funding, and 10% for one-third fundingcome close to the outer edge of the constitutionally permissible range, the facts of record (most importantly, the 2008 election data) show that the qualification criteria are not so onerous as to deny funding to a sizeable number of minor-party candidates who enjoy substantial public support. Moreover, insofar as the CEP's single-election qualification criteria may impose some burden on the political opportunity of minor-party candidates, the 2008 election shows that minor-party candidates as a whole are arguably strongerand certainly not weakerunder the CEP. There is, therefore, little reason to think that the CEP has burdened the political opportunity of minor-party candidates in a way that is unfair or unnecessary. Giving proper deference to the Connecticut General Assembly to choose qualification criteria that best accommodate[ ] the competing interests involved, we cannot say that the General Assembly's choice falls without the permissible range. Id. at 103-04, 96 S.Ct. 612. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs have presented insufficient evidence on this record to establish that the CEP's single-election qualification criteria violate the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. We therefore hold that the District Court erred in concluding that the single-election qualification criteria unconstitutionally discriminate against minor parties and their candidates.