Opinion ID: 2231122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Representation to the Public

Text: ¶ 20 Perfection argues that the circuit court erred in its decision that Perfection was not entitled to a ruling as a matter of law pertaining to K & S's status as a member of the public. The DTPA does not define the phrase the public. However, courts have interpreted the phrase. State v. Automatic Merchs. of Am., Inc., 64 Wis.2d 659, 663, 221 N.W.2d 683 (1974); Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002 WI App 70, ¶ 44, 252 Wis.2d 676, 643 N.W.2d 132; Bonn v. Haubrich, 123 Wis.2d 168, 174, 366 N.W.2d 503 (Ct.App.1985). ¶ 21 In Automatic Merchandisers, the court considered whether § 100.18(1) applied to oral representations made in private conversations to prospective purchasers. Automatic Merchs., 64 Wis.2d at 662, 221 N.W.2d 683. To address the issue, the court interpreted § 100.18(1) in relation to its scope, history, context, subject matter and the object intended to be remedied or accomplished. Id. at 663, 221 N.W.2d 683. Based on an amendment by the legislature to expand the types of marketing methods covered, the court concluded that the legislature intended to protect the residents of Wisconsin from any untrue, deceptive or misleading representations made to promote the sale of a product. Id. ¶ 22 The Automatic Merchandisers defendants argued that their conduct fell outside of the scope of § 100.18(1) because allegations in the complaint related to private statements made to prospective purchasers that had responded to notices in the classified sections. Statements made in private, the argument went, were not made to the public. ¶ 23 The Automatic Merchandisers court rejected the proposition that statements made in private were not made to the public. The court concluded that a statement made to an individual could be a statement made to the public. Id. at 664, 221 N.W.2d 683. The court also noted that when it comes to determining if a plaintiff is a member of the public, [t]he important factor is whether there is some particular relationship between the parties. Id. Applying its interpretation of the public, the court stated that [h]ere there is no peculiar relation between the defendants and the prospective purchasers which would distinguish the prospective purchasers from `the public' which the legislature intended to protect. Id. ¶ 24 The Automatic Merchandisers court did not specify when a relationship was particular enough to exclude a plaintiff from the public. In this regard, it followed the lead of the court when it interpreted the phrase public utility in Cawker v. Meyer, 147 Wis. 320, 326, 133 N.W. 157 (1911). The Cawker court stated the following: While we find it quite easy to ascertain the true spirit and intent of the law, yet we deem it inexpedient and unsafe to attempt to define in more specific terms than the statute what does and what does not constitute a public utility. Each case will depend upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances and must be tested by the statute in light of such facts and circumstances. Id. The use of the public, in the context of § 100.18(1) and utility law, did not lend itself to the formulation of a bright-line test. ¶ 25 Subsequent to this court establishing the presence of a particular relationship as an important factor, the court of appeals has provided some further guidance on who and when a plaintiff is a member of the public. First, the substance of a representation made to induce an obligation, rather than the form of the initial contact, has more significance in determining whether a plaintiff is a member of the public for the purpose of § 100.18(1). Bonn, 123 Wis.2d at 174, 366 N.W.2d 503. In Bonn, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated § 100.18(1) when he made misrepresentations about the appreciation value of rubies and the liquidation value of a ruby the plaintiff purchased from him. The relationship between the plaintiff and defendant commenced when the defendant telephoned the plaintiff to inquire about his interest in investing in gem stones. The defendant argued that he did not violate § 100.18(1) because the relationship commenced with a phone call, not an advertisement. The court rejected the argument, stating that [t]he fact that the alleged untrue, deceptive or misleading representations were made to [the plaintiff] as part of a sales promotion is sufficient to afford him protection under sec. 100.18(1). Id. at 173, 366 N.W.2d 503. The court conclude[d] that the fact that [the plaintiff] was initially contacted by telephone rather than by media advertisement [was] not controlling. Id. at 174, 366 N.W.2d 503. ¶ 26 Additionally, a plaintiff is no longer a member of the public for the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) once he or she has entered into a contract to purchase the offered item. Kailin, 252 Wis.2d 676, ¶ 44, 643 N.W.2d 132. In Kailin, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated § 100.18(1) when they failed to disclose a tenant's history of delinquency in rent payments. The tenant was in default both at the time the defendant accepted the offer to purchase and at the time of closing. The court concluded that [o]nce the contract was made, the Kailins were no longer `the public' under [§ 100.18(1)] because they had a particular relationship with Armstrong-that of a contracting party to buy the real estate that is the subject of his post-contractual representation. Id., ¶ 44. Accordingly, the Kailins' § 100.18(1) claim was limited to alleged misrepresentations made before they entered into the contract to purchase. ¶ 27 Based on the existing interpretations of the public, a plaintiff remains a member of the public unless a particular relationship exists between him or her and the defendant. The existence of a particular relationship will depend upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances and must be tested by the statute in the light of such facts and circumstances. Cawker, 147 Wis. at 326, 133 N.W. 157. ¶ 28 Perfection has argued that a particular relationship existed between it and K & S, meaning K & S fell outside the scope of the public for the purpose of § 100.18(1). Before the circuit court, Perfection challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. Assessing the evidence as overwhelmingly in favor of there being a particular relationship, it moved the circuit court to address K & S's status as a member of the public as a matter of law. However, the circuit court denied each of Perfection's challenges of the sufficiency of the evidence. ¶ 29 When circuit courts consider challenges of the sufficiency of the evidence, Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1) provides the following test: No motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law to support a verdict, or an answer in a verdict, shall be granted unless the court is satisfied that, considering all credible evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a finding in favor of such party. Appellate courts overturn only a clearly erroneous denial of a motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 2004 WI 97, ¶ 17, 274 Wis.2d 143, 682 N.W.2d 389; Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis.2d 250, 273, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, circuit courts are accorded substantial deference because they are in a better position to decide the weight and relevancy of the evidence presented. Id. ¶ 30 A circuit court's decision to submit a question to the jury is clearly erroneous if it is a question of law. See, e.g., Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis.2d 406, 438, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978). However, in this case, whether K & S was a member of the public presented a question of fact. Based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could have made conflicting inferences or found in either party's favor. The circuit court did not err in denying Perfection's motions pertaining to K & S's status as a member of the public. ¶ 31 On one hand, the jury could have reasonably found that a particular relationship existed between Perfection and K & S. The jury heard evidence that K & S had purchased a roll former from Perfection in the past. It heard that Klusken, an owner of K & S, and Broderick, a Perfection sales representative, entered into an agreement for Perfection to find K & S a suitable press, after the parties agreed that a suitable press was not in Perfection's inventory. If a jury inferred from these facts that a particular relationship existed between Perfection and K & S, it could have reasonably concluded that K & S was not a member of the public when it received the quotation that contained the misrepresentation. ¶ 32 On the other hand, a jury could reasonably find that K & S was a member of the public when Perfection faxed the quotation, as the jury did in this case. Evidence supporting this finding includes that Perfection held itself out as having the country's largest inventory of used late model presses, fabricating & metalworking equipment, according to its quotation. Given the nature of Perfection's business as an industry leader, the jury could reasonably infer that K & S contacting Perfection for a used press would not be a sufficient fact to create a particular relationship. Additionally, K & S bought the roll former from Perfection back in 1996, but had purchased nothing else either before or after that purchase. The purchase could be construed as too isolated to establish a particular relationship. The jury also heard the following testimony from Broderick, the Perfection sales representative: I always try to help customers. I always try to help them out; try to sell a machine. If I could earn their business, help them out, do them a favor, the hope is that they will want to come back and buy other equipment from us and you can get repeat sales. So, yes, it is standard procedure that I would, I would offer: Hey, what are you looking for? If I can find that, I'll let you know. As far as suiting their needs, it's more of I'm looking for this machine XYZ; let me know if you find one  then I can do that. But I'm not an engineer or manufactor. From this testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that the agreement that Broderick made with Klusken to make K & S aware of any suitable presses he found did not rise to the level of Perfection and K & S having a particular relationship if Broderick always tried to help customers in the same way he offered to help K & S. If a jury inferred from these facts that a particular relationship did not exist between Perfection and K & S, it could reasonably conclude that K & S was a member of the public when it received Perfection's quotation. ¶ 33 Based on the evidence, a question of fact existed over whether K & S was a member of the public when the circuit court took Perfection's motions to dismiss under advisement at the close of K & S's evidence and at the close of all evidence. The question also existed when the circuit court submitted the question to the jury. After the jury answered the question of fact in favor of K & S, sufficient evidence was in the record to sustain the jury verdict and deny Perfection's motion for directed verdict. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err because whether K & S was a member of the public under § 100.18(1) presented a question of fact that the court properly submitted to the jury.