Opinion ID: 2155550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Review of Massport Determination.

Text: Massport's first argument is that the judge treated the letter of July 1, 1974, of the Secretary of EOEA as an administrative determination that an EIR was required. On the contrary, however, it is apparent that the judge made his own findings on the basis of [v]oluminous testimony by expert witnesses, numerous exhibits including Massport's Preliminary Environmental Impact Report, and the Secretary's letter. [5] Massport argues secondly that the trial judge was in error in not treating its decision not to file an EIR as an agency determination subject only to limited review, that is, examination only of whether the determination was not supported by substantial evidence or was arbitrary and capricious. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the State Administrative Procedure Act, G.L.c. 30A, is not applicable to Massport's determination. The decision not to file an EIR is neither adjudicatory nor regulatory within the meaning of the act, so that the statutory limits on judicial review defined in the act have no bearing. Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authy. 364 Mass. 639, 662 n. 40 (1974). The scope of review undertaken by the trial judge was not limited to whether Massport's determination was arbitrary or capricious but rather was based on the statement in West Broadway Task Force, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 745, 752 (1973), that [c]ourts ... have been keen to override traditional limitations and scrutinize agency action when health or life was at stake. This theory of judicial review was reaffirmed in Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authy., supra, at 663 (1974), although the court there, as in the West Broadway case, refused to engage in that level of review where alternative, nonjudicial remedies remained available to the plaintiffs. We view as correct the action of the judge in relying on the West Broadway case and not limiting the scope of review to that engaged in for ordinary administrative actions. First, there is no doubt that health or life is at stake here. Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authy . at 663. Second, the judge correctly found that there were no administrative remedies which had not been exhausted by the plaintiffs. This follows from Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authy., supra , where the administrative alternative discussed was preparation of an EIR, the very remedy requested here. In our opinion the nature of the review undertaken by the judge was appropriate. We consider this an even stronger case for review than Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authy . In that case there was at least some element of policymaking discretion confided to the agency, while here the decision whether to prepare an EIR can hardly be said to have been committed to agency discretion. Rather, the question is simply whether the agency itself has complied with the requirements of the statute. Gifford v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 328 Mass. 608, 616-617 (1952). Fred C. McClean Heating Supplies, Inc. v. Westfield Trade High Sch. Bldg. Comm. of Westfield, 345 Mass. 267, 269 (1962). It would appear that § 62 was enacted among other reasons because agencies were not felt to be giving sufficient consideration to environmental concerns. Consequently, when an agency makes a decision downplaying the environmental effects of a proposed activity, the court may properly cock a skeptical eye at that decision. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 509, 523-524 (1974). Anderson, NEPA in the Courts, 104-105 (1973). Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 838 (2d Cir.1972) (Friendly, C.J., dissenting), cert. den. 412 U.S. 908 (1973). [6] Any concern for possible uncertainty on the part of agencies as to whether they can act on their threshold determinations without later being reversed in court is minimal. As mentioned earlier, EOTC Reg. 8 provides for the establishment of categorical exemptions from EIR's for each agency within the jurisdiction of EOTC. Exemptions have been defined for Massport; significantly, runway construction is not included. Further, the regulations also provide that agencies may, with the approval of EOEA, establish specific thresholds of adverse environmental impact for specific types of projects. EOTC Reg. 8.2, Class 8. For example, the Bureau of Building Construction has established a threshold exemption from the EIR requirements permitting it to construct new parking spaces not to increase an institution's spaces by more than twenty-five per cent. Massport, by contrast, has not taken advantage of this opportunity. EOTC's regulation on categorical exemptions is further evidence that the agencies themselves have not been given a range of discretion in the matter of filing an EIR which might insulate them from judicial review. Rather it is the EOTC (and ultimately the EOEA which must approve EOTC regulations under § 62) which the Legislature believed was in the best position initially to determine which of its activities involved the potential of environmental impact sufficient to bring it within the scope of ... [§ 62]. Answer of the Justices, 364 Mass. 838, 845 (1973).