Opinion ID: 1989542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Victim's Credibility

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce expert testimony on the credibility of the child victim. Dr. Pamela Langelier, a psychologist, was called by the State as an expert witness to explain to the jury the results of her evaluation of the victim. She related the psychological symptomatology of a sexually abused child of the victim's age. She was asked, Is it your experience in dealing with children who are sexually abused that these symptoms ... can be easily faked? Dr. Langelier stated that they could not, not at a young age, and added, Common sense tells you that little children don't make up stories or fake sexual knowledge. They have no interest in doing it. They gain themselves nothing. Dr. Langelier told the jury that the victim was referred to me to determine whether or not she had been sexually abused ... to what extent, by whom, and indeed if what she was saying is what happened. The witness then proceeded to detail the victim's sexual activity with defendant as told to her by the victim and corroborated by a foster parent. Dr. Langelier concluded that the victim had been sexually abused by defendant and others: So, I think I saw enough to believe that I saw symptomatology indicating sexual abuse had gone on for anywhere from four to five years, but the frequency of which it's hard to gain [sic] because of the environment in which she was raised in the first place. But based on her own records, it seems that the frequency with Uncle Jamie was not as frequent as it was with other parties, but that it was defined with Uncle Jamie with specific memory because it was unusual form of stimulation for a child that age, oral sex. So, she remembered it clearly and it looks like it was twice if not more. Defendant made no objection to the above testimony. Insofar as it amounted to an opinion that the victim had suffered sexual abuse, such an opinion would not be inadmissible. See Cadel v. Sherburne Corp., 139 Vt. 134, 137, 425 A.2d 546, 547-48 (1980) (opinion evidence otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact); State v. Norton, 134 Vt. 100, 104, 353 A.2d 324, 326 (1976) (same); V.R.E. 704 (same). It is a closer call, however, as to whether the testimony, taken as a whole, amounted to a conclusion on the part of the witness about the guilt or innocence of defendant. In effect, the testimony was a summation of the witness's own observations and records, including what the victim herself had said about what had happened to her. To the extent that the testimony amounted to a comment on the credibility of the victim, it would ordinarily be inadmissible. State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. at 370-71, 534 A.2d at 187-88. Inasmuch as defendant did not object, however, he failed to preserve the issue for appeal, and we are bound to reverse only if we find that the trial court's failure to exclude the testimony sua sponte constituted plain error. [1] State v. Recor, 150 Vt. 40, 46, 549 A.2d 1382, 1387 (1988); State v. DeJoinville, 145 Vt. 603, 605, 496 A.2d 173, 174-75 (1985). Plain error will be found only in a rare and extraordinary case where the error is an obvious one, State v. Ramsay, 146 Vt. 70, 75, 499 A.2d 15, 18 (1985), and only if the error affects substantial rights of the defendant. Recor, 150 Vt. at 46, 549 A.2d at 1387; V.R.Cr.P. 52(b). We have previously encountered allegations of plain error under similar circumstances in DeJoinville and Recor. In DeJoinville, the expert witness testified that children would not lie about being sexually abused, and the prosecutor twice repeated the substance of this testimony to the jury in closing argument. DeJoinville, 145 Vt. at 604, 496 A.2d at 174. The defendant made no objection at trial either to the testimony or to the prosecutor's remarks, but on appeal, argued that the court had committed plain error by not excluding the various statements sua sponte. We held there was no plain error, noting that plain error will be found `only in rare and extraordinary cases' and that `the error must be obvious and strike at the very heart of defendant's constitutional rights or result in a miscarriage of justice.' Id. 145 Vt. at 605, 496 A.2d at 175 (quoting State v. Turner, 145 Vt. 399, 403, 491 A.2d 338, 340 (1985)). In Recor, the expert witness, when asked what it meant when a child gave consistent stories over several interviews, testified that it gave the expert a sense that what they are saying happened, happened. Recor, 150 Vt. at 45, 549 A.2d at 1386. That testimony, which was held not to amount to plain error, id. at 46, 549 A.2d at 1387, is of exactly the same tenor as the testimony in the instant case. In short, there is little to distinguish this case from either DeJoinville or Recor. If anything, DeJoinville is more egregious than the instant case because of the repeated emphasis therein placed on the expert's testimony by the prosecutor in closing argument. The issue concerning the scope of Dr. Langelier's testimony was raised by the court at the outset of trial. Prior to opening statements, the court inquired about the State's expert on child sexual abuse, as follows, [S]he's not going to testify on the ultimate issue of credibility? The prosecutor answered, No, she's not.... The State in no way is going to solicit testimony on the credibility issue. We understand how bad that is. It is clear, then, that both the court and counsel had the issue very much in mind. If there were an obvious violation, it should have been noticed by counsel; yet, when the testimony was given, counsel made no objection. As we have stated previously, `[t]he duty to exclude objectionable data lies squarely upon the shoulders of defense counsel.' State v. Kasper, 137 Vt. 184, 190, 404 A.2d 85, 89 (1979) (quoting United States v. Castenada, 555 F.2d 605, 610 (7th Cir.1977)). `If the rule were otherwise, counsel might at times be tempted to remain silent about some fault on the part of the trial court ... and so, without giving it a chance to correct the situation, arm themselves with ground for reversal if the verdict should go against them' Id. 137 Vt. at 190-91, 404 A.2d at 89 (quoting State v. Hood, 123 Vt. 273, 277-78, 187 A.2d 499, 502 (1963)). We note a further distinction between the instant case and Catsam, relied upon by defendant. In Catsam, the Court noted: While admission of this type of expert testimony might be harmless in a case in which there was ample extrinsic evidence of guilt, that is not the case here. Catsam, 148 Vt. at 372, 534 A.2d at 188. The only direct evidence of the offense in Catsam was the testimony of the child-victim herself. In the case before us, there was extrinsic evidence of guilt in the form of an eyewitness to the offense itself: the brother of the victim. It is difficult to imagine stronger, more direct, extrinsic evidence in a criminal case than the testimony of a person who actually witnessed the crime in progress. On the basis of the record before us and our own prior precedents, we conclude that the testimony of Dr. Langelier did not amount to plain error.