Opinion ID: 199357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying the Principles to the Evidence

Text: 19 Rivera claims that Negron's uncorroborated testimony regarding the single transaction between them is unreliable because Negron agreed to cooperate with the government. However, credibility determinations are uniquely within the province of the jury, and we do not evaluate those judgments on appeal. See Woodward, 149 F.3d at 56. Moreover, Rivera's trial counsel subjected Negron to lengthy cross-examination about his cooperation with the government and his other drug transactions. Despite these efforts to impeach Negron, the jury could have rationally concluded that Negron was telling the truth about his sale of cocaine to Rivera. 20 Rivera also attempted to contradict this testimony by offering the testimony of his ex-wife, Malave, that his residence was occupied by a tenant at the time of the alleged transaction. However, the jury could reasonably have found Negron's testimony to be more credible than Malave's. Malave's recollection of the relevant dates was uncertain, especially on cross-examination, and Rivera's attorney even conceded in his closing argument that Malave's testimony had been all over the place. 21 Rivera further contends that, even if the jury found credible Negron's uncorroborated testimony that Negron sold cocaine to him, this single transaction cannot, as a matter of law, establish his guilt of the crime of conspiracy. We agree that a single drug transaction for the personal use of the purchaser, without prearrangement or other factors indicative of conspiratorial intent, does not establish a conspiracy. SeeUnited States v. Moran, 984 F.2d 1299, 1304 (1st Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, we have found, under certain circumstances, that one drug transaction may provide sufficient evidence for a jury to find the existence of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. See, e.g., Portela, 167 F.3d at 698 (The evidence . . . was thus sufficient to have led a reasonable jury to conclude that [the defendant] was a party to a tacit agreement relating to [the seller's] entire continuing enterprise, despite the fact that there was only a single transaction between them.); Moran, 984 F.2d at 1303 (Even a single sale for resale, embroidered with evidence suggesting a joint undertaking between buyer and seller, could suffice.); United States v. Carbone, 798 F.2d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 1986). Drawing on the body of conspiracy law we have just described, we evaluate the circumstances that support the conspiracy conviction. 22
23 Negron admitted that he sold cocaine for profit, and he testified that he sold one kilogram of cocaine to Rivera. Such a large quantity of drugs supports the inference that Rivera did not intend to use the cocaine merely for personal consumption, but rather intended to acquire it for redistribution. See United States v. Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d 672, 680 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Geer, 923 F.2d 892, 895 (1st Cir. 1991) (The jury could infer the fact of a conspiracy to distribute drugs from the quantities of cocaine and hashish involved - quantities far larger than needed for personal use.). The inference that Rivera's purchase was for resale is strengthened by Ramirez's testimony that Ramirez resold the one kilogram of cocaine he purchased from Negron. 24 Rivera's cash payment of $13,500 to Negron also supports an inference that Rivera was engaged in the business of buying and selling cocaine. Negron testified that Rivera agreed to purchase the cocaine on the afternoon of April 15. Slightly more than twelve hours later, in the early morning of April 16, Rivera gave Negron $13,500 in exchange for the drugs. The ability to gather such a large amount of cash overnight supports an inference that Rivera was more than a one-time, casual purchaser of cocaine. That inference draws further support from the promptness of Negron's phone call to Rivera after coming into possession of the cocaine. Negron did not make random calls. He called Ramirez, to whom he had sold drugs on several occasions, and Rivera, whom he knew. As the government said during its closing argument: This is not a supermarket where you go and you select the product that you want. If you want drugs you have to know where to get them and who sells them because William Negron Zapata would not sell you or any one of you any drugs unless he knew that you were in the same business he was. 5 25 Additionally, there was evidence that Rivera owned multiple properties in Puerto Rico. As the government argues, it is reasonable to question the source of this wealth, particularly because Rivera's automobile shop in his home was not likely to generate the quantity of cash Rivera had available to purchase cocaine from Negron. 6 A reasonable jury could find, on these facts, that Rivera's income was supplemented by money he earned from buying cocaine and selling it for profit. 26 There is ample evidence, in short, that Rivera and Negron shared the common objective of buying and selling cocaine for profit, agreed on a transaction for that purpose, and carried it out. See Portela, 167 F.3d at 695. This transaction was far different than the unplanned spot sale with no agreement beyond that inherent in the sale noted in Moran. Moran, 984 F.2d at 1302. [W]here advanced plans are made regarding the sale of narcotics in wholesale quantities, the participants in the transaction may be presumed to know that they are part of a broader conspiracy. United States v. Harris, 8 F.3d 943, 946 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted). 27 With respect to that broader conspiracy, Ramirez testified that he and Negron engaged in cocaine transactions on numerous occasions, and Negron provided the details of his sale of cocaine to Rivera. Negron also testified that he had participated in endless numbers of drug transactions with Mr. Amador [Irizarry] 7 prior to 1991. Negron and Rivera had known each other since 1986 and met on several occasions in 1990. These contacts over a several year period provided an opportunity for Rivera to know of Negron's involvement in other drug transactions, particularly because Negron had a long history as a drug dealer. Indeed, Negron's familiarity with Rivera is demonstrated by the fact that Negron chose not to bring his bodyguard with him when he delivered the cocaine to Rivera, although he did bring his bodyguard along when he received the two kilograms of cocaine from Padilla. This routine quality of Rivera and Negron's one kilogram transaction in April 1991 supports an inference of Rivera's awareness of Negron's involvement with these other transactions. This knowledge, coupled with Rivera's cash purchase of a large quantity of cocaine for resale, suffices to establish that Rivera was aware that his purchase was part of a larger conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and that he furthered the purpose of that conspiracy with his purchase. That Rivera did not fully understand the details of Negron's many drug transactions is of no import. See Walters, 904 F.2d at 771 (It is not necessary that the government prove that the defendant . . . knew the extent of the conspiracy.). Thus, a rational jury could have concluded that Rivera tacitly acquiesced in the scheme of Negron and the other co-conspirators to distribute cocaine for profit when he purchased the kilogram from Negron. Such a tacit understanding is sufficient for Rivera to be guilty of conspiracy. See Echeverri, 982 F.2d at 679. 28 Rivera relies on our decision in United States v. DeLutis, 722 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1983), to support his contention that a single act is insufficient to hold an individual criminally accountable for conspiracy. In DeLutis, however, there was no drug transaction, no evidence of an intent to sell the defendant a large quantity of cocaine, and only an inference that the defendant intended to buy an undetermined amount of cocaine. See 722 F.2d at 907. Still, we reaffirm the general proposition advanced in DeLutis that a single sale of drugs without more does not establish a conspiracy. Id. at 906. Here there was enough additional evidence to establish the conspiracy charged and to withstand Rivera's sufficiency challenge.