Opinion ID: 64891
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Garza’s Retaliation Claim

Text: The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework also applies to Garza’s unlawful retaliation claim because he has not provided direct evidence of retaliation. Turner, 476 F.3d at 348 (citation omitted). Garza must demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that: (1) he “engaged in protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Id. (citation omitted). Garza contends that he engaged in protected activity by making a presentation to the LISD Board of Directors. After reviewing the transcript of Garza’s statement at the LISD Board of Directors meeting, we agree with the district court’s determination that Garza did not engage in protected activity at that time. The statement was a general complaint regarding the current principal and the manner in which the school functioned, but Garza did not once state that there were issues of racial or national origin discrimination. Garza used the word discrimination in his introductory paragraph, but a review of the entire transcript makes clear that he was providing complaints regarding the functioning of the school generally. It is undisputed that Garza engaged in a protected activity by filing a complaint with the EEOC. Garza’s brief, however, does not allege that any adverse employment actions occurred after he filed his complaint with the EEOC. An adverse employment action is any action that might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007). Instead, Garza outlines numerous incidents of retaliation he suffered as a result of his presentation to the LISD Board of Directors, and after becoming “[c]onfident that the district was not going to protect [him], he made contact with [the] Texas Commission of Human Rights.” Garza’s brief does not allege that he was retaliated against after filing his charge with the EEOC. 7 No. 08-40387 Assuming, however, that some of the incidents of retaliation recounted by Garza continued to occur after Garza filed his charge of discrimination with the EEOC, this Court finds that they do not constitute adverse employment actions. Garza stated that he was retaliated against because (1) meetings were conducted in a biased, unprofessional, and hostile fashion; (2) meetings were called to blame him for the actions of the district including the loss of VMT’s buildings; (3) most of the staff stopped talking to him, acknowledging his presence, or displaying basic morning and afternoon courtesy greetings; (4) school staff would scorn his students outside of his classroom; (5) the administration would give inaccurate information to students about him and would tell others that Garza was not to be liked; (6) the Academic department suspended some of his programs; (7) students were allowed to eat lunch and breakfast in his classroom, leaving a mess; (8) his end of semester programs lacked attendance and support; (9) he was prevented from holding fund-raising activities while other colleagues were able to do so; (10) janitors neglected to clean his classroom; (11) staff members attempted to persuade the principal to cancel the Hispanic Festival because he was the co-coordinator and master of ceremonies; (12) custodians handled the United States flag inappropriately; (13) safety officers failed to observe safety issues; (14) steel chairs in his classroom were replaced with plastic ones while other academic colleagues had cushioned chairs in their classrooms; and (15) staff addressed him with sarcasm. A review of previous cases decided by this Court demonstrates that the incidents of retaliation described by Garza do not reach the level of an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Peace v. Harvey, 207 F. App’x. 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that a plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action after she (1) received a note detailing leave approval procedures, (2) was not provided a designated seat at a ceremony, (3) was assigned “menial and degrading work,” (4) was told she could no longer park in her assigned space, (5) was yelled at by a supervisor, and (6) was told to move out of her office); McCullough v. Kirkum, 212 F. App’x 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2006) 8 No. 08-40387 (holding that (1) comments by unnamed employees, (2) a transfer to a different division, and (3) relocating an employee from one desk to another did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action); Grice v. FMC Techs. Inc., 216 F. App’x 401-404 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that an adverse employment action did not take place after finding that the employer (1) watched the plaintiff closely, (2) accused the plaintiff of forgery, (3) falsified an incident report to place blame on the plaintiff, and (4) did not allow the plaintiff to be a step-up lead in the absence of the Lead Assembler). Garza fails to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation, and we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of LISD’s motion for summary judgment based on Garza’s retaliation claim.