Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Appellate Record

Text: Defendant contends his rights under state law and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to a record adequate to permit meaningful appellate review were violated by the trial court's failure to order transcribed (1) a proceeding in which it was established that defendant, contrary to his prior wishes, had chosen not to be absent from the penalty phase of the trial, and (2) in-chambers discussions regarding jury instructions. These claims fail. [6]
During a noon recess in the presentation of the prosecution's opening statement at the penalty phase of the trial, defendant told court staff he did not wish to be present for the remainder of the trial. The trial court subsequently mentioned this on the record outside the presence of the jury, and a second recess was taken to allow defendant to discuss the matter with his attorneys. After that recess, the court held an in camera meeting with defense counsel, at which counsel requested the court adjourn for the day to allow more discussions with defendant. Back in open court, the court adjourned the proceedings until the following morning and also advised defendant the court was concerned that his decision be made in a careful, rational, calm, and reflective manner, mentioning to him that his absence during the penalty phase was likely to make it worse for himself. Defense counsel were directed to report to the court by 8:30 the next morning, at which point the prosecution and the jurors would be notified as to when the proceedings would resume. The following morning, on the record and outside the presence of the jury, the trial court confirm[ed] for the record that at present there is no request from Mr. Rundle at this time to be absent. Defense counsel agreed, and trial proceeded with defendant present. Defendant now contends the court and defense counsel met on the morning o[f] May 25, 1989, to determine whether [defendant] was willing or able to participate in the remainder of the trial. In the absence of a record of these discussions, defendant argues, it is impossible to determine whether defendant was competent to proceed with trial, or whether some improper influence, including possible forced medication, was exerted upon defendant in order to convince him to change his decision to be absent. Defendant, however, has not established that any hearing actually occurred that morning that could have been transcribed. The trial court merely directed defense counsel to contact the court in the morning before proceedings began and report to the court defendant's decision so the jury and the prosecution could be notified when proceedings would resume. The court then confirmed on the record that defendant no longer wished to absent himself from the proceedings, which presumably is what defense counsel reported earlier that morning. Unlike other instances in which the record explicitly mentions off-the-record discussions, here there is no indication anywhere in the record, including in the settled statements on appeal, that any discussion between counsel and the court took place regarding defendant's ultimate decision to attend the proceedings. Defendant's suggestion a meeting occurred at which such a discussion transpired is no more than unsupported speculation, and he has not shown the existing record is inadequate in this respect.
In contrast to the situation discussed above, it is undisputed that a number of informal meetings concerning proposed guilt and penalty phase jury instructions were held off the record and hence were not transcribed. The trial court instead afforded defendant the opportunity to place on the record after the instructions were finalized any objections to the jury instructions to be given or requests for other instructions that were not resolved to his satisfaction during the conferences. As the trial court and the parties later acknowledged, this procedure was erroneous. Section 190.9, subdivision (a)(1), requires that all conferences and proceedings in a death penalty case must be conducted on the record with a court reporter present. We previously have held, however, that such an error is not reversible per se; instead the defendant must demonstrate prejudice. (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 509, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1333, fn. 70, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) We decline defendant's request to reconsider this holding. [S]tate law entitles a defendant only to an appellate record `adequate to permit [him or her] to argue' the points raised in the appeal. [Citation.] Federal constitutional requirements are similar. The due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require the state to furnish an indigent defendant with a record sufficient to permit adequate and effective appellate review. [Citations.] Similarly, the Eighth Amendment requires reversal only where the record is so deficient as to create a substantial risk the death penalty is being imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. [Citation.] The defendant has the burden of showing the record is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review. [Citation.] ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 857-858, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135 ( Rogers ). ) After the unreported discussions regarding jury instructions at each phase of the trial, the trial court discussed the proposed final instructions in open court and invited counsel for both sides to place on the record any continuing objections to those instructions, including requested instructions that were not accepted by the court. In reviewing the guilt phase instructions, the court specifically warned counsel that your silence after a [jury instruction] number is read indicates that we are all in concurrence. If I don't stop myself, stop me because that will be the way we reflect the rulings. Similarly, at the penalty phase, on-the-record, substantive discussions took place concerning all of the instructions before the final instructions were adopted, during which the trial court invited the defense to state agreement or disagreement with the instructions. Defense counsel testified during the record settlement proceedings that all unresolved objections and requests were placed on the record during these transcribed proceedings, and the prosecutor stated that he too confirmed from his notes that all of the defense objections were stated on the record. Defendant observes, however, that even with these explanations thus placed into the record, the specifics as to whether additional objections were raised and how those objections were resolved so as to eliminate any ongoing disputes are absent from the record. [7] He contends that because of this shortcoming, he cannot definitively determine which instructions initially were objected to or requested, whether the resolution of any such objections was the correct outcome or the result of an erroneous application of law or an unreasonable interpretation of the evidence, or whether some instruction that was supported by the evidence was intentionally or negligently omitted. Although there is a gap in the record of the process by which the final jury instructions were compiled, defendant has not carried his burden of demonstrating that this gap in any way affects our ability to undertake meaningful appellate review of the jury instructions. The instructions actually given to the jury are contained in the record, and defendant was afforded the opportunity to make, on the record, all his objections to those instructions, which he did. The record, therefore, is adequate to allow us to determine which objections defendant preserved for appeal and to review the merits of these objections. It is unfortunate that we do not have the added benefit of a more complete record of the bases for the preserved objections or requests, any response to them from the prosecution, and the reasoning of the trial court in overruling an objection or denying a request, but this circumstance does not prevent us from adequately reviewing the preserved challenges to the instructions. (See People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 204-205, 41 Cal. Rptr.3d 593, 131 P.3d 995 ( Huggins) . ) [8] We also are able to adequately review claimsseveral of which defendant has raised and are addressed belowthat the trial court had a duty to give certain instructions on its own motion, because we may assume that when the existing record is silent, no invited error by defense counsel occurred. (Cf. People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1203, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487 ( Young ) [because it cannot be ascertained whether defense counsel specifically requested clarification [of an instruction], we shall give defendant the benefit of the doubt and find the issue preserved for appeal]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 830, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865 [`the court's responsibility [on its own motion to give a required instruction] could be negated only in that special situation in which the defense counsel deliberately and expressly, as a matter of trial tactics, objected to the rendition of an instruction'].) Although defendant's ability to challenge the adequacy of his attorneys' representation vis-à-vis jury instructions may be limited at this point by the absence of a complete record, defendant has not shown that he has been prejudiced in his ability to advance any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel he might have raised on appeal. Defendant has not established that had these conferences been transcribed, the record would demonstrate defense counsel's understanding of the law and counsel's tactical reasons, if any, for objecting to or requesting particular instructions, or choosing not to do so. (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) Accordingly, the error in failing to transcribe the jury instruction conferences was harmless under the applicable state ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243 ( Watson. )) and federal ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705) standards.