Opinion ID: 1700595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Matters of Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion.

Text: In considering the matters of claim and issue preclusion presented in the arguments on appeal, we begin by observing that claim preclusion, as distinguished from issue preclusion, applies only if the claim for relief litigated in the previous proceeding was the same as the claim of the present action. Fournier v. Illinois Casualty Co., 391 N.W.2d 258, 259-60 (Iowa 1986); Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Iowa 1982). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments' suggested test for the determination of the dimensions of a single claim is as follows: When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger and bar ... the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982). The doctrine of issue preclusion focuses not on the identity of claims for relief, but rather on subsidiary issues of law or fact necessarily resolved in the process of adjudicating a previous claim. Brosamle v. Mapco Gas Prods., 427 N.W.2d 473, 475 (Iowa 1988); Selchert v. State, 420 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Iowa 1988). This doctrine prevents the parties from relitigating issues previously resolved if they were necessary in deciding the prior litigation. Id. Applying the foregoing principles to the district court's summary judgment ruling, we conclude that the only portion of West's present claims that are barred by claim preclusion are those portions that seek money damages that are in some way dependent upon the termination of his contract with the school district or measured by the loss of that contract. The appellees in the district court have proceeded in this litigation on the theory that all of West's claims for money damages are dependent upon the contract termination or are measured by the loss of that contract. Some support for that point of view is to be found in West's statement of disputed facts, which spans ninety pages in the appendix. Various matters therein contained relate almost exclusively to actions taken by the defendants in the process leading to the termination of West's contract. In addition, in West's brief on this appeal, he ties these facts to his claim for relief in the following manner: Even if it were res judicata that the defendants followed the technical steps enumerated in section 279.24 and discharged the duty to terminate only upon a reasonable foundation, that hardly resolved the issues of whether their prior breaches wrongfully caused the reasonable foundation to exist and the termination decision to be predetermined. This statement strongly suggests that the primary basis for West's claim for money damages is the economic consequences of having lost his superintendent's job with the school district. We conclude that the prior adjudication that district representatives accomplished that termination in accordance with law precludes recovery of damages for that loss. West does, however, identify three claims for relief that are not dependent on the termination of his contract. These are: (1) alleged breach of contract by the school district under Count I during the time that contract was still in force; (2) alleged willful falsification of a misconduct claim in resisting West's application for unemployment insurance benefits embraced within the claims of Counts II, IV, and VI; and (3) a claim of tortious interference with West's prospective contractual relationship with another school district embraced within the claims of Count V. As to these issues, we conclude that the record discloses genuine issues of material fact with respect to the first and third matters identified. Although factual issues also exist as to the actions in resisting West's unemployment insurance claim that were not adjudicated in the termination litigation, that claim is not actionable for other reasons. The unemployment insurance matter would fall under either Counts II, IV, or VI of the petition but for obvious reasons it is not actionable against any of the defendants under those counts. Count II presents a claim sounding in tort for violation of the same contractual duties invoked against the school district in Count I. None of the defendants named in Count II were parties to that contract and thus may not be found liable on this theory. See Porter v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 217 N.W.2d 221, 228 (Iowa 1974) (contract must impose duty on the actor sought to be held liable). The claims of Count IV are limited to the period of time that West was acting as superintendent. They do not extend to matters that arose after his contract was terminated, such as the unemployment insurance dispute. Count VI is the § 1983 claim. In matters before the administrative agency that processes unemployment insurance claims, school district employers stand on the same footing as private employers. There is thus no special cloak of state law that attends the action of school district representatives in dealing with the agency on such matters. We do not believe that West's claim, viewed most favorably to him, states a cause of action under § 1983 based on the unemployment insurance dispute. See Triplett v. Azordegan, 570 F.2d 819, 823-24 (8th Cir. 1978) (it is the nature of the act performed by a state official not the status of the official as such that is determinative of the application of § 1983). The appellees urge that matters essential to sustaining West's claims of alleged contract breach by the school district and tortious interference with West's prospective contractual relationship with the Thompson School District by the other appellees were brought up by West during the contract termination proceedings and rejected on the merits. Based on this contention, appellees urge that issue preclusion applies to bar West from pursuing these claims in the present litigation. We disagree for two reasons. First, the administrative law judge, the district court, and the court of appeals all scrupulously avoided adjudicating these matters in the contract termination proceeding. Second, even if the facts surrounding West's breach of contract and tortious interference claims had been in any way ruled on in the contract termination proceedings, those matters were not necessary and essential to the resulting judgment. See Selchert, 420 N.W.2d at 818 (before issue preclusion applies, the determination of the issue in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment); Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1981) (same).