Opinion ID: 2537276
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Error in Guilt-Phase Closing Arguments

Text: During closing argument, the prosecutor stated that Alan Wade chose Bruce Nixon as our witness. Wade argues that this was improper because it placed the onus on Wade for forcing the State to use Nixon as a witness. We disagree. The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the evidence and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985). Here, the jury was aware and the State had made it clear that Nixon was involved in these murders and testified pursuant to a plea agreement. In context, the prosecutor made the disputed remark to emphasize that it was Wade who invited his friend Nixon to join the robbery-murder scheme after obtaining Jackson's approval. Accordingly, the prosecutor's statement did not constitute improper argument but was fair comment on the evidence adduced at trial. Wade next argues that the prosecutor improperly tried to minimize the plea agreement that Nixon made with the State and misrepresented Nixon's actual sentence to the jury. On cross-examination defense counsel questioned Nixon about his plea agreement for second-degree murder, under which the trial court could pursuant to the original scoresheetsentence Nixon to a term of fifty-two years up to life for each murder. The twenty-year-old Nixon responded that he saw no difference between getting first-degree murder and get[ting] 52 to life. . . . It's carrying the same amount of time. Then, in closing argument, the prosecutor pointed to this testimony to preempt any defense claim that Nixon was lying by pointing out that Nixon thought that under the plea agreement he would essentially get a life sentence, which isn't really a great deal. Accordingly, the prosecutor's statement was fair comment on the evidence. Wade also claims that because Nixon was sentenced to forty-five years in prison for the murders, the State misrepresented Nixon's potential lowest sentence to the jury. Nixon, however, was not sentenced until after Wade's penalty phase was conducted; thus, the prosecutor did not know what sentence would actually be imposed. As explained in the foregoing section, Nixon's scoresheet was revised downward at Nixon's sentencing because the armed element of the kidnapping and robbery charges was removed, as it was for all of the defendants in the case. During an extended closing argument, the prosecutor separately made the following three statements: (1) So why would this guy lie, to get that deal? To get life? That's why he's lying?; (2) There's no way Bruce Nixon is that bright; and (3) The only reason [Nixon] was involved was because he wanted money and his best friend [Wade] gave him the opportunity and he [Nixon] told the police the truth. Wade argues that these three statements constituted improper vouching. We have previously stated that improper vouching or bolstering occurs when the State places the prestige of the government behind the witness or indicates that information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony. Williamson v. State, 994 So.2d 1000, 1013 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Hutchinson v. State, 882 So.2d 943, 953 (Fla.2004)). In their context, the challenged statements of the prosecutor did not constitute such improper vouching. The first statement, as explained above, was rebuttal to Wade's argument that Nixon was willing to lie for a lighter sentence. The other two statements were made as part of the prosecutor's explanation of how all the evidence presented at trial by law enforcement officers, the medical examiner, and other witnesses corroborated Nixon's testimony. The statements were thus part of a fair reply to the defense argument that Nixon was not credible. See id. at 1013 (holding that the prosecutor's suggestion that a witness's testimony was credible was fair reply to defense argument that it was not). Wade next argues that the prosecutor made an impermissible comment on his constitutional right not to testify. In discussing Nixon's testimony, the prosecutor stated the following: Bruce Nixon was the last one in and the first one out. There is no evidence that Alan Wade said a word to law enforcement about Bruce Nixon. Why is Bruce Nixonnot in March. Why is Bruce Nixon in July right after these crimes telling the police Alan Wade, my best friend, the son of my de facto mother, is committing these crimes with me? All he had to do was give up Tiffany Cole and Michael Jackson. Wade specifically challenges the statement underlined above. Viewed in isolation, the prosecutor's statement might be construed as referring to Wade's silence. However, in context it is clear that the prosecutor was simply relying on the fact that Wade had not implicated Nixon to demonstrate that Nixon had no reason to lie about his best friend's involvement in the crimes at the time he confessed to police. Nevertheless, even if the comment was erroneous, it does not constitute fundamental error. See Poole v. State, 997 So.2d 382, 391 (Fla.2008); see also Jones v. State, 998 So.2d 573, 589 (Fla.2008) (stating that to require mistrial, an improper comment must deprive the defendant of a fair trial).