Opinion ID: 1111580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: adequacy of the instruction given.

Text: {45} The State agrees that the instruction omits an essential element but argues that taken as a whole, the instructions adequately covered the element of agreement. The State relies on the fact that, in order to convict Baca as an accomplice, the jury must have found an implied mutual understanding that Baca positioned his car so that Eccleston could shoot into Comingo's car. We are not persuaded. {46} Accomplice liability and conspiracy are distinct and separate concepts. State v. Armijo, 90 N.M. 12, 15, 558 P.2d 1151, 1154 (Ct.App.1976) (citation omitted). Our conspiracy statute requires that the defendant  knowingly combin[e] with another for the purpose of committing a felony. Section 30-28-2(A) (emphasis added). An agreement is the gist of the crime.... State v. Padilla, 1994 NMCA 070, 118 N.M. 189, 193, 879 P.2d 1208, 1212. [T]he crime is complete when the felonious agreement is reached. Id. (quoting State v. Leyba, 93 N.M. 366, 367, 600 P.2d 312, 313 (Ct.App. 1979)). In addition, it is useful to note that there are really two intents required for the crime of conspiracy. 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4(e)(1), at 76 (1986) [hereinafter Substantive Criminal Law ]. First, the parties must intend to agree. Id. Second, the parties must intend to achieve a particular result which is criminal or which though noncriminal is nevertheless covered by the law of conspiracy. Id. § 6.4(e)(2), at 77 (footnotes omitted). [T]he fact that conspiracy requires an intent to achieve a certain objective means that individuals who have together committed a certain crime have not necessarily participated in a conspiracy to commit that crime. Id. at 78. The accessory statute does not contain language requiring an intentional act: A person may be charged with and convicted of the crime as an accessory if he procures, counsels, aids or abets in its commission and although he did not directly commit the crime.... Section 30-1-13; cf. Model Penal Code § 2.06, at 295, (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1962) (defining liability for the conduct of another, or complicity). {47} The Model Penal Code specifically distinguishes the culpability associated with accomplice liability from that appropriate to liability for conspiracy. When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. Model Penal Code § 2.06(4), at 296. However, the Model Penal Code has taken the position that when recklessness or negligence suffices for the actor's culpability with respect to a result element of a substantive crime, as for example when homicide through negligence is made criminal, there could not be a conspiracy to commit that crime. Model Penal Code § 5.03 cmt. 2(c)(i), at 408. {48} Other scholars have agreed that it is important to make a clear distinction between liability as an accomplice and liability as a conspirator. One source of continuing confusion in this area is whether the doctrines concerning complicity and conspiracy are essentially the same, so that liability as a conspirator and as an accomplice may be based upon essentially the same facts. Is one who is a member of a conspiracy of necessity a party to any crime committed in the course of the conspiracy? Is one who qualifies as an accomplice to a crime of necessity part of a conspiracy to commit that crime? Under the better view, both of these questions must be answered in the negative. See generally Substantive Criminal Law, supra, § 6.8(a), at 153 (distinguishing conspiracy and complicity). {49} The Model Penal Code discusses liability of accomplices, generally, and of conspirators, specifically, and provides a policy basis for the necessary distinctions: The most important point at which the Model Code formulation diverges from the language of many courts is that it does not make conspiracy as such a basis of complicity in substantive offenses committed in furtherance of its aims. It asks, instead, more specific questions about the behavior charged to constitute complicity, such as whether the defendant solicited commission of the particular offense or whether he aided, or agreed or attempted to aid, in its commission. The reason for this treatment is that there appears to be no better way to confine within reasonable limits the scope of liability to which conspiracy may theoretically give rise. Model Penal Code, § 2.06(4) cmt. 6(a), at 307. {50} Based on these authorities and under Section 30-28-2, we conclude that the instruction given on the charge of conspiracy should have, but did not, distinguish that crime from criminal liability as an accessory. The jury was not asked to make the necessary distinctions. Ordinarily, the error Baca has identified would entitle him to a new trial on the conviction for conspiracy to commit depraved-mind murder. However, Baca also argued that conspiracy to commit depraved-mind murder is not a valid charge. For the following reasons, we are persuaded that he is correct.