Opinion ID: 4531772
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Manzoni’s Conviction Was Supported by

Text: Sufficient Evidence Finally, Manzoni challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her fraud and conspiracy convictions. Our standard of review on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is plenary. United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 36 (3d Cir. 2010). But that plenary review is greatly tempered by giving substantial deference to the jury’s finding of guilt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). Employing that deference, and applying the applicable legal standards, we find the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict. The Supreme Court of the United States has explained: [T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be … to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In conducting this review, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of sustaining the verdict. United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1996). Reversal of a conviction is only appropriate where there is “no evidence, regardless of how it is weighted, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). Manzoni was charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. To prove wire fraud, the government had to show that Manzoni had the intent to commit fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343. So the question here is whether Manzoni’s participation in the VOG scheme was knowing or intentional. Manzoni argues that the evidence presented at trial at most showed that she said things as a VOG representative that were not true, not that she was a knowing participant in the fraud. She claims that this case should be controlled by United 37 States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 542–43 (3d Cir. 1978), in which we reversed the fraud convictions of lowly sales representatives who only read from a sales script, without knowing that the script contained false statements. In light of the evidence admitted at trial, we find that Pearlstein does not apply. First, Manzoni was no lowly sales representative—she was one of the managers at VOG. From her position as a manager, and her long experience in the timeshare industry, a jury could reasonably infer that she knew that statements in VOG’s phone scripts were false. Second, even before she was a manager, while working as one of VOG’s closers, Manzoni did more than just mechanically read false statements from a controlled sales script. She showed initiative by inventing fake payoff amounts for the customers, without approval—much less direction—from her supervisors, and then creating urgency by imposing arbitrary deadlines by which these (fake) offers had to be accepted before they expired. Based on this evidence, as the District Court correctly found, a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Manzoni was “a knowing, even integral part, of [the] fraud scheme.” SA 1151.