Opinion ID: 775311
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Default of Petitioner's Trial Counsel Claims

Text: 24 We turn to consider one of the State's principal contentions: that both of Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are procedurally defaulted and thus barred from federal habeas review. 25 If anything is settled in habeas corpus jurisprudence, it is that a federal court may not grant the habeas petition of a state prisoner unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process; or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1). To satisfy 2254's exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must present the substance of the same federal constitutional claims that he now urges upon the federal courts, Turner v. Artuz, 262 F.3d 118, 123-24 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 2001), to the highest court in the pertinent state,  Pesina v. Johnson, 913 F.2d 53, 54 (2d Cir. 1990). 26 When a claim has never been presented to a state court, a federal court may theoretically find that there is an absence of available State corrective process under 2254(b)(1)(B)(i) if it is clear that the unexhausted claim is procedurally barred by state law and, as such, its presentation in the state forum would be futile. In such a case the habeas court theoretically has the power to deem the claim exhausted. Reyes v. Keane, 118 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1997). This apparent salve, however, proves to be cold comfort to most petitioners because it has been held that when the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred, federal habeas courts also must deem the claims procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). 27 We have recently observed that dismissal of a habeas claim on the ground that it was procedurally defaulted differs crucially from a dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies. Turner, 262 F.3d at 122. Dismissal for a procedural default is regarded as a disposition of the habeas claim on the merits. This means that any future presentation of the claim would be a second or successive habeas petition, requiring authorization by this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). Id. (citing Carter v. United States, 150 F.3d 202, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1998)). For a procedurally defaulted claim to escape this fate, the petitioner must show cause for the default and prejudice, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim will result in a miscarriage of justice (i.e., the petitioner is actually innocent). Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748-50 (1991). 28 This procedural default doctrine and its attendant cause and prejudice standard are grounded in our concerns for federalism and comity between the state and federal sovereigns. Id. at 730, 111 S. Ct. 2546. It ensures that federal courts respect the States' interest in correcting their own mistakes. Id. at 732, 111 S. Ct. 2546. The doctrine applies whether the default occurred at trial, on appeal or on state collateral review. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490-92, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397, 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986). 29 Upon examination of each of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, we conclude that although each claim is exhausted, each was also procedurally defaulted by Aparicio's failure to raise the issue on direct appeal in the state court. And because Petitioner cannot present a sufficient cause to excuse these procedural defaults, both ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are barred from federal review. 30
31 As discussed above, see supra, at 87 & n.2, this claim was never fairly presented to a state court for review. The State argues that this claim is unexhausted and, therefore, Aparicio's petition should be dismissed in its entirety for being a mixed petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose, 455 U.S. at 510 (1982). 5 We believe it is doubtful, though, that any avenue remains open to Aparicio in state court, and thus that the absence of available State corrective process renders this claim exhausted. 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(B)(i). 32 Petitioner was entitled to one (and only one) appeal to the Appellate Division and one request for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, both of which he pursued long ago. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 450.10(1); N.Y. Court R. 500.10(a).New York does not otherwise permit collateral attacks on a conviction when the defendant unjustifiably failed to raise the issue on direct appeal. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.10(2)(c). The nagging question here is whether Petitioner's failure to assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel (concerning the double jeopardy issue) might be forgiven under 440.10 because of the ineffective assistance of Petitioner's appellate counsel. 33 Given the Appellate Division's determination in the coram nobis proceeding that Petitioner failed to establish that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel, People v. Aparicio, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 697, we are persuaded that it is most unlikely that another state court would suddenly find the performance of Petitioner's appellate counsel to be so ineffective as to justify Petitioner's failure to include this ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in his direct appeal. Thus, any state court to which Petitioner might now present this claim would almost certainly find it procedurally barred. Because requiring a petitioner to seek additional state court review when the results have effectively been predetermined, Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350, 103 L. Ed. 2d 380, 109 S. Ct. 1056 (1989), is inconsistent with the purposes of 2254(b), we deem this particular claim exhausted. 34 Of course, even though the claim is exhausted, it is still procedurally defaulted under Coleman. 501 U.S. at 735. That procedural default can only be cured by a showing of cause for the default plus prejudice, or a showing of actual innocence. Id. at 748-49, 111 S. Ct. 2546. And, of course, just as in our imagined state court proceeding, the only cause Aparicio can offer for the procedural default would be the ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel. 35 A defense counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to properly preserve a claim for review in state court can suffice to establish cause for a procedural default only when the counsel's ineptitude rises to the level of a violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 146 L. Ed. 2d 518, 120 S. Ct. 1587 (2000); Murray, 477 U.S. at 488-89. In other words, ineffective assistance adequate to establish cause for the procedural default of some other constitutional claim is itself an independent constitutional claim. Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451. 36 Our holding later in this opinion that Petitioner's double jeopardy claim is without merit, see infra, at 98 & n.10, in conjunction with the Supreme Court's holdings in Carrier and Edwards, compels us to conclude that Petitioner has not presented an adequate cause for his procedural default here. Thus, we are--and the district court was--precluded from reaching the merits of this claim. 37
38 In stark contrast to the double jeopardy claim, Petitioner did raise, in his coram nobis petition to the Appellate Division, the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel for failing to request an eyewitness identification instruction. See supra, at 86 & n.1. However, the Appellate Division did not explicitly address this claim, writing only, appellant has failed to establish that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. Aparicio, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 697. Although the trial counsel claim was not explicitly addressed, it was, as a technical matter, adjudicated; the Appellate Division denied Aparicio's coram nobis application. Id. Thus, this claim is exhausted. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438, 92 S. Ct. 509 (1971). 6 39 Although this claim is admittedly exhausted, it is nonetheless procedurally barred because the state court rejected it on an adequate and independent state procedural ground. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730. In Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989), the Supreme Court announced what became known as the clear statement rule: that federal habeas review will not be precluded unless the state court clearly and expressly stated that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. Id. at 263, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, in Coleman, the Supreme Court backed away from the clear statement principle, holding it was an essential predicate to the Harris presumption that the state court decision on petitioner's claims be grounded in substantive federal law. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735. Coleman thus recast the clear statement rule, holding that when the state court's decision fairly appeared to rest primarily on resolution of [the petitioner's federal] claims or to be interwoven with those claims, and did not clearly and expressly rely on an adequate and independent state ground, a federal court may address the petition. Id. In the absence of such a reliance on federal law, the Harris presumption of reviewability evaporates and federal habeas courts must ascertain for themselves if the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a state court judgment that rests on independent and adequate state grounds.  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 736. 40 Making that determination here is a vexing challenge, given the dearth of information in the state court decision. Not only did the Appellate Division not explicitly discuss Petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, it did not even acknowledge its existence. Explicating Petitioner's claim, the state court wrote, Application by appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this court . . . . Aparicio, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (emphasis added). With regard to Petitioner's trial counsel claim, we are left with, in essence, a one-word decision: denied. 41 Faced with a spate of similar summary denials, this Court, interpreting Coleman, held that the Harris presumption did not apply to such denials without opinion unless there is 'good reason to question whether there is an independent and adequate state ground for the decision.' Quirama v. Michele, 983 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739). 42 Here, there can be no doubt that the state court's decision on Petitioner's trial counsel claim rested on an adequate and independent state bar: Aparicio never raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his direct appeal. As we discussed above, see supra, at 90, New York law prohibits review of a claim on collateral review when the defendant unjustifiably fails to raise the claim on direct appeal. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.10(2)(c). The Appellate Division's conclusion on coram nobis that Aparicio was not denied effective assistance of appellate counsel disposed of Aparicio's only proffered cause for the failure to raise the trial counsel claim on direct appeal. The Appellate Division's decision concerning Aparicio's trial counsel claim thus had to rest on a state procedural bar; under New York law, the decision could not possibly rest on any other ground. 43 Petitioner's trial counsel claim, then, can only be reviewed on federal habeas if he satisfies the cause and prejudice standard of Coleman. And, similar to the double jeopardy claim, our later conclusion that the performance of Petitioner's appellate counsel in this regard was not so deficient as to violate Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights, see infra, at 99-100 & n.11, serves to reject the only cause Petitioner presented for the default. This claim is also thus barred from federal review.