Opinion ID: 2590812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in permitting Jonathan to assert the privilege against self-incrimination

Text: Although defendants generally have the right to confront their accusers at trial, this right is not absolute. If a witness is unavailable at trial and has testified at a previous judicial proceeding against the same defendant and was subject to cross-examination by that defendant, the previous testimony may be admitted at trial. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 609, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302; see Evid.Code, § 1291, subd. (a).) The defendant must not only have had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the previous hearing, he must also have had `an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the [subsequent] hearing.' ( People v. Smith, supra, at p. 611, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) Under these rules, we have routinely allowed admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness. ( Ibid. ) The recent decision of Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, although changing the law of confrontation in some respects, left these principles intact. Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. ( Id. at p. 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) Where testimonial evidence is at issue ... the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. ( Id. at p. 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) A witness who successfully asserts the privilege against self-incrimination is unavailable to testify for these purposes. ( People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 23, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249; Evid.Code, § 240, subd. (a)(1).) Moreover, the fact that Jonathan failed to assert the privilege at the preliminary hearing does not prevent him from asserting it at trial. ( People v. Malone, supra, at p. 23, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249; Overend v. Superior Court (1900) 131 Cal. 280, 284, 63 P. 372; People v. Maxwell (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 562, 570-571, 156 Cal.Rptr. 630.) However, [t]o be found unavailable on this ground, a witness must not only intend to assert the privilege, but also be entitled to assert it. ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 616, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in finding Jonathan entitled to assert the privilege and, for this reason, reversed the judgment. We have never specifically stated the standard of review of a court's ruling on a witness's assertion of the privilege. We review deferentially the trial court's resolution of any factual disputes. ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 894, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) The Attorney General argues that a similar deferential standard applies to the ultimate ruling that the witness may assert the privilege. We disagree, at least when the ruling affects a defendant's right to confront witnesses. When, as here, the relevant facts are undisputed, an appellate court should review independently the trial court's ruling permitting the witness to assert the privilege. In People v. Cromer, supra , we considered the closely similar question how an appellate court should review a trial court's finding that the prosecution exercised due diligence to locate a missing witness. We found the proper standard to be independent, de novo, review rather than the more deferential abuse of discretion test. ( Id. at p. 893, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) Much of Cromer's reasoning applies here. One of the reasons we gave is that independent review comports with this court's usual practice for review of mixed question determinations affecting constitutional rights. ( Id. at p. 901, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) Here, as in Cromer, the ruling we are reviewing affects the constitutional right of confrontation. ( Id. at p. 896, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) We conclude that the independent standard of review we applied in Cromer to a finding of due diligence also applies to a finding that the witness could assert the privilege against self-incrimination.
It is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law, embedded in various state and federal constitutional and statutory provisions, that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves. In an oft-cited case, the high court stated that this privilege must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure. ( Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118.) A witness may assert the privilege who has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer. ( Ibid.; accord, Ohio v. Reiner (2001) 532 U.S. 17, 21, 121 S.Ct. 1252, 149 L.Ed.2d 158.) However, The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in doing so he would incriminate himself  his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. ( Hoffman v. United States, supra, at p. 486, 71 S.Ct. 814.) The court may require the witness to answer if `it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.' ( Ibid. ) To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. ( Id. at pp. 486-487, 71 S.Ct. 814.) To deny an assertion of the privilege, the judge must be ` perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate.' ( Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1, 12, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, quoting Hoffman v. United States, supra, at p. 488, 71 S.Ct. 814.) California's Evidence Code states the test broadly in favor of the privilege: Whenever the proffered evidence is claimed to be privileged under Section 940 [the privilege against self-incrimination], the person claiming the privilege has the burden of showing that the proffered evidence might tend to incriminate him; and the proffered evidence is inadmissible unless it clearly appears to the court that the proffered evidence cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the person claiming the privilege. (Evid.Code, § 404, italics added.) We have said that this section incorporates the standard of Hoffman v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118. ( People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 441-442, 247 Cal.Rptr. 121, 754 P.2d 168; see also People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 617, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) Applying these standards, we conclude the trial court correctly permitted Jonathan to assert the privilege under the circumstances. The Court of Appeal gave two reasons for finding Jonathan should have been forced to testify, neither convincing. The court said that the prosecutor repeatedly assured the trial court the People had no intention of prosecuting Jonathan for the murder or for giving the police false information about the murder. Given these recurrent representations to the court, Jonathan could not have reasonably feared prosecution for falsely identifying Ellis as the killer. Although we agree that, on this record, an actual prosecution appears to have been unlikely, the privilege against self-incrimination does not require, or even permit, the court to assess the likelihood of an actual prosecution in deciding whether to permit the privilege. The court may not force a witness to make incriminating statements simply because it believes an actual prosecution is unlikely. The test is whether the statement might tend to incriminate, not whether it might tend to lead to an actual prosecution or, stated slightly differently, whether the statement could, not would, be used against the witness. (See Evid.Code, § 404.) Forcing a witness to make incriminating statements whenever the court feels that actual prosecution is unlikely would impermissibly weaken the privilege against self-incrimination. Use of incriminating statements must be forbidden, as by a grant of immunity, and not merely unlikely, before the court may force a witness to make them. The second reason the Court of Appeal gave that Jonathan would not incriminate himself is that California does not recognize `lying to the police' as a crime. It concluded that Penal Code section 148.5 (section 148.5) applies to the false reporting of a crime, not false statements to the police in the course of their investigation of a crime, and it found that Jonathan had not violated any other criminal provision, including Penal Code section 148 (section 148). We do not have to decide definitively whether Jonathan committed a crime in his original lie to the police. The issue is not whether the testimony does incriminate but whether it tends to do so, or, as the high court phrased it, whether Jonathan had reasonable cause to apprehend danger from the testimony. ( Hoffman v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. at p. 486, 71 S.Ct. 814.) Under the unusual circumstances of this case, including the fact that all parties  the prosecution, Jonathan's own attorney, and defense counsel  believed that Jonathan's testimony might be self-incriminating, the court correctly concluded that he reasonably apprehended danger if he testified. Section 148 makes it a misdemeanor to willfully resist[], delay[], or obstruct[] any ... peace officer ... in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or employment.... Section 148.5 makes it a misdemeanor to report[ ] to any peace officer ... that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed, knowing the report to be false.... These statutes, and the cases construing them, can cause a person reasonably to apprehend danger from testifying that he had lied to the police about the identity of a killer's accomplice. It may well be, as defendant argues, that merely denying knowledge of a crime would not violate these statutes. But Jonathan did not merely deny knowledge of the crime; he lied about the identity of one of the culprits and caused an innocent person to be arrested. One case said that a common sense reading of section 148.5 suggests that the section is intended to deter false reports of crimes and the resulting inconvenience and danger to other members of the public.... ( Pena v. Municipal Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 77, 82, 157 Cal.Rptr. 584.) The false report here inconvenienced Danny Ellis and, by delaying focus on the real cohort, arguably increased the danger to the public. Defendant argues that mere speech does not violate these statutes. He cites a case stating that section 148 nearly always has been applied to a wide range of conduct beyond speech. ( In re Andre P. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1164, 1175, 277 Cal.Rptr. 363.) But this observation does not mean that mere speech can never violate this section. Jonathan obstructed the investigation by causing the police to focus on, and even arrest, the wrong person. Some of the cases strongly suggest that such verbal conduct might be criminal. But section 148 `is not limited to nonverbal conduct involving flight or forcible interference with an officer's activities. No decision has interpreted the statute to apply only to physical acts, and the statutory language does not suggest such a limitation.' ( In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329-1330, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21, quoting People v. Quiroga (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961, 968, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 446.) Moreover, section 148.5 seeks to avoid waste of law enforcement time and money, [and] defamation of innocent reputations.... ( People v. Lawson (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 60, 67, 161 Cal.Rptr. 7.) Accordingly, there is no rational reason to exclude such false reports [which falsely implicate another person in a crime] from the purview of the statute or to believe that the Legislature intended to do so. ( Ibid. ) Under these circumstances, it does not clearly appear that the testimony could not possibly tend to incriminate Jonathan. (Evid.Code, § 404.) The Court of Appeal's after-the-fact disagreement with the parties, even if ultimately correct as a matter of law (which we need not decide), does not mean Jonathan did not reasonably apprehend danger at trial. Accordingly, the court acted correctly in permitting Jonathan to assert the privilege under the circumstances.