Opinion ID: 779363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether This Court Should Remand for a Trial on Contract Formation

Text: 27 Defendants argue on appeal that the district court erred in deciding the question of contract formation as a matter of law. A central issue in dispute, according to defendants, is whether the user plaintiffs actually saw the notice of SmartDownload's license terms when they downloaded the plug-in program. Although plaintiffs in their affidavits and depositions generally swore that they never saw the notice of terms on Netscape's webpage, defendants point to deposition testimony in which some plaintiffs, under repeated questioning by defendants' counsel, responded that they could not remember or be entirely sure whether the link to SmartDownload's license terms was visible on their computer screens. Defendants argue that on some computers, depending on the configuration of the monitor and browser, SmartDownload's license link appears on the first screen, without any need for the user to scroll at all. Thus, according to defendants, a trial on the factual issues that Defendants raised about each and every Plaintiffs' [ sic ] downloading experience is required on remand to remedy the district court's error in denying defendants' motion as a matter of law. 28 Section 4 of the FAA provides, in relevant part, that [i]f the making of the arbitration agreement ... be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof. 9 U.S.C. § 4. We conclude for two reasons, however, that defendants are not entitled to a remand for a full trial. First, during oral argument in the district court on the arbitrability of the five user plaintiffs' claims, defendants' counsel repeatedly insisted that the district court could decide as a matter of law based on the uncontroverted facts in this case whether a reasonably prudent person could or should have known of the [license] terms by which acceptance would be signified. I don't want you to try the facts, defendants' counsel told the court. I think that the evidence in this case upon which this court can make a determination [of whether a contract existed] as a matter of law is uncontroverted. 12 Accordingly, the district court decided the issue of reasonable notice and objective manifestation of assent as a matter of law. [I]t is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 44 (2d Cir.1999) (Having failed to make the present argument to the district court, plaintiff will not be heard to advance it here.). Nor would it cause injustice in this case for us to decline to accept defendants' invitation to consider an issue that defendants did not advance below. 29 Second, after conducting weeks of discovery on defendants' motion to compel arbitration, the parties placed before the district court an ample record consisting of affidavits and extensive deposition testimony by each named plaintiff; numerous declarations by counsel and witnesses for the parties; dozens of exhibits, including computer screen shots and other visual evidence concerning the user plaintiffs' experience of the Netscape webpage; oral argument supplemented by a computer demonstration; and additional briefs following oral argument. This well-developed record contrasts sharply with the meager records that on occasion have caused this Court to remand for trial on the issue of contract formation pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4. See, e.g., Interbras Cayman Co. v. Orient Victory Shipping Co., S.A., 663 F.2d 4, 5 (2d Cir.1981) (record consisted of affidavits and other papers); Interocean Shipping, 462 F.2d at 676 (record consisted of pleadings, affidavits, and documentary attachments). We are satisfied that the unusually full record before the district court in this case constituted a hearing where evidence is received. Interocean Shipping, 462 F.2d at 677. Moreover, upon the record assembled, a fact-finder could not reasonably find that defendants prevailed in showing that any of the user plaintiffs had entered into an agreement on defendants' license terms. 30 In sum, we conclude that the district court properly decided the question of reasonable notice and objective manifestation of assent as a matter of law on the record before it, and we decline defendants' request to remand for a full trial on that question. 31 III. Whether the User Plaintiffs Had Reasonable Notice of and Manifested Assent to the SmartDownload License Agreement 32 Whether governed by the common law or by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a transaction, in order to be a contract, requires a manifestation of agreement between the parties. See Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal.App.3d 987, 991, 101 Cal.Rptr. 347, 350 (1972) ([C]onsent to, or acceptance of, the arbitration provision [is] necessary to create an agreement to arbitrate.); see also Cal. Com.Code § 2204(1) (A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.). 13 Mutual manifestation of assent, whether by written or spoken word or by conduct, is the touchstone of contract. Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 848, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 540, 551 (1999); cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19(2) (1981) (The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.). Although an onlooker observing the disputed transactions in this case would have seen each of the user plaintiffs click on the SmartDownload Download button, see Cedars Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Mid-West Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 118 F.Supp.2d 1002, 1008 (C.D.Cal.2000) (In California, a party's intent to contract is judged objectively, by the party's outward manifestation of consent.), a consumer's clicking on a download button does not communicate assent to contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the download button would signify assent to those terms, see Windsor Mills, 25 Cal.App.3d at 992, 101 Cal.Rptr. at 351 ([W]hen the offeree does not know that a proposal has been made to him this objective standard does not apply.). California's common law is clear that an offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his consent, is not bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he is unaware, contained in a document whose contractual nature is not obvious. Id.; see also Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting & Eng'g, Inc., 89 Cal. App.4th 1042, 1049, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 645, 651 (2001) (same). 33 Arbitration agreements are no exception to the requirement of manifestation of assent. This principle of knowing consent applies with particular force to provisions for arbitration. Windsor Mills, 101 Cal.Rptr. at 351. Clarity and conspicuousness of arbitration terms are important in securing informed assent. If a party wishes to bind in writing another to an agreement to arbitrate future disputes, such purpose should be accomplished in a way that each party to the arrangement will fully and clearly comprehend that the agreement to arbitrate exists and binds the parties thereto. Commercial Factors Corp. v. Kurtzman Bros., 131 Cal.App.2d 133, 134-35, 280 P.2d 146, 147-48 (1955) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, California contract law measures assent by an objective standard that takes into account both what the offeree said, wrote, or did and the transactional context in which the offeree verbalized or acted. 34
35 Defendants argue that plaintiffs must be held to a standard of reasonable prudence and that, because notice of the existence of SmartDownload license terms was on the next scrollable screen, plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of those terms. 14 We disagree with the proposition that a reasonably prudent offeree in plaintiffs' position would necessarily have known or learned of the existence of the SmartDownload license agreement prior to acting, so that plaintiffs may be held to have assented to that agreement with constructive notice of its terms. See Cal. Civ.Code § 1589 (A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known, to the person accepting.). It is true that [a] party cannot avoid the terms of a contract on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing. Marin Storage & Trucking, 89 Cal.App.4th at 1049, 107 Cal. Rptr.2d at 651. But courts are quick to add: An exception to this general rule exists when the writing does not appear to be a contract and the terms are not called to the attention of the recipient. In such a case, no contract is formed with respect to the undisclosed term. Id.; cf. Cory v. Golden State Bank, 95 Cal.App.3d 360, 364, 157 Cal.Rptr. 538, 541 (1979) ([T]he provision in question is effectively hidden from the view of money order purchasers until after the transactions are completed.... Under these circumstances, it must be concluded that the Bank's money order purchasers are not chargeable with either actual or constructive notice of the service charge provision, and therefore cannot be deemed to have consented to the provision as part of their transaction with the Bank.). 36 Most of the cases cited by defendants in support of their inquiry-notice argument are drawn from the world of paper contracting. See, e.g., Taussig v. Bode & Haslett, 134 Cal. 260, 66 P. 259 (1901) (where party had opportunity to read leakage disclaimer printed on warehouse receipt, he had duty to do so); In re First Capital Life Ins. Co., 34 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1288, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 820 (1995) (purchase of insurance policy after opportunity to read and understand policy terms creates binding agreement); King v. Larsen Realty, Inc., 121 Cal.App.3d 349, 356, 175 Cal.Rptr. 226, 231 (1981) (where realtors' board manual specifying that party was required to arbitrate was readily available, party was on notice that he was agreeing to mandatory arbitration); Cal. State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Barrett Garages, Inc., 257 Cal.App.2d 71, 76, 64 Cal.Rptr. 699, 703 (1967) (recipient of airport parking claim check was bound by terms printed on claim check, because a ordinarily prudent person would have been alerted to the terms); Larrus v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Cal.App.2d 884, 888, 266 P.2d 143, 147 (1954) (clearly printed statement on bank card stating that depositor agreed to bank's regulations provided sufficient notice to create agreement, where party had opportunity to view statement and to ask for full text of regulations, but did not do so); see also Hux v. Butler, 339 F.2d 696, 700 (6th Cir.1964) (constructive notice found where slightest inquiry would have disclosed relevant facts to offeree); Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 63 F.Supp.2d 1083, 1089 (N.D.Cal.1999) (under California and federal law, conspicuous notice directing the attention of parties to existence of contract terms renders terms binding) (quotation marks omitted); Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, Inc., 651 F.Supp. 675, 691 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (constructive notice found where minimal investigation would have revealed facts to offeree). 37 As the foregoing cases suggest, receipt of a physical document containing contract terms or notice thereof is frequently deemed, in the world of paper transactions, a sufficient circumstance to place the offeree on inquiry notice of those terms. Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such fact. Cal. Civ.Code § 19. These principles apply equally to the emergent world of online product delivery, pop-up screens, hyperlinked pages, clickwrap licensing, scrollable documents, and urgent admonitions to Download Now!. What plaintiffs saw when they were being invited by defendants to download this fast, free plug-in called SmartDownload was a screen containing praise for the product and, at the very bottom of the screen, a Download button. Defendants argue that under the principles set forth in the cases cited above, a fair and prudent person using ordinary care would have been on inquiry notice of SmartDownload's license terms. Shacket, 651 F.Supp. at 690. 38 We are not persuaded that a reasonably prudent offeree in these circumstances would have known of the existence of license terms. Plaintiffs were responding to an offer that did not carry an immediately visible notice of the existence of license terms or require unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms. Thus, plaintiffs' apparent manifestation of ... consent was to terms contained in a document whose contractual nature [was] not obvious. Windsor Mills, 25 Cal.App.3d at 992, 101 Cal.Rptr. at 351. Moreover, the fact that, given the position of the scroll bar on their computer screens, plaintiffs may have been aware that an unexplored portion of the Netscape webpage remained below the download button does not mean that they reasonably should have concluded that this portion contained a notice of license terms. In their deposition testimony, plaintiffs variously stated that they used the scroll bar [o]nly if there is something that I feel I need to see that is on — that is off the page, or that the elevated position of the scroll bar suggested the presence of mere[ ] formalities, standard lower banner links or that the page is bigger than what I can see. Plaintiffs testified, and defendants did not refute, that plaintiffs were in fact unaware that defendants intended to attach license terms to the use of SmartDownload. 39 We conclude that in circumstances such as these, where consumers are urged to download free software at the immediate click of a button, a reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those terms. 15 The SmartDownload webpage screen was printed in such a manner that it tended to conceal the fact that it was an express acceptance of [Netscape's] rules and regulations. Larrus, 266 P.2d at 147. Internet users may have, as defendants put it, as much time as they need[ ] to scroll through multiple screens on a webpage, but there is no reason to assume that viewers will scroll down to subsequent screens simply because screens are there. When products are free and users are invited to download them in the absence of reasonably conspicuous notice that they are about to bind themselves to contract terms, the transactional circumstances cannot be fully analogized to those in the paper world of arm's-length bargaining. In the next two sections, we discuss case law and other legal authorities that have addressed the circumstances of computer sales, software licensing, and online transacting. Those authorities tend strongly to support our conclusion that plaintiffs did not manifest assent to SmartDownload's license terms. 40
41 Defendants cite certain well-known cases involving shrinkwrap licensing and related commercial practices in support of their contention that plaintiffs became bound by the SmartDownload license terms by virtue of inquiry notice. For example, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.1997), the Seventh Circuit held that where a purchaser had ordered a computer over the telephone, received the order in a shipped box containing the computer along with printed contract terms, and did not return the computer within the thirty days required by the terms, the purchaser was bound by the contract. Id. at 1148-49. In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the same court held that where an individual purchased software in a box containing license terms which were displayed on the computer screen every time the user executed the software program, the user had sufficient opportunity to review the terms and to return the software, and so was contractually bound after retaining the product. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452; cf. Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 293 A.D.2d 587, 587, 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (2d Dep't 2002) (software user was bound by license agreement where terms were prominently displayed on computer screen before software could be installed and where user was required to indicate assent by clicking I agree); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 251, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (1st Dep't 1998) (buyer assented to arbitration clause shipped inside box with computer and software by retaining items beyond date specified by license terms); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 93 Wash.App. 819, 970 P.2d 803, 809 (1999) (buyer manifested assent to software license terms by installing and using software), aff'd, 140 Wash.2d 568, 998 P.2d 305 (2000); see also I.Lan Sys., 183 F.Supp.2d at 338 (business entity explicitly accepted the clickwrap license agreement [contained in purchased software] when it clicked on the box stating `I agree'). 42 These cases do not help defendants. To the extent that they hold that the purchaser of a computer or tangible software is contractually bound after failing to object to printed license terms provided with the product, Hill and Brower do not differ markedly from the cases involving traditional paper contracting discussed in the previous section. Insofar as the purchaser in ProCD was confronted with conspicuous, mandatory license terms every time he ran the software on his computer, that case actually undermines defendants' contention that downloading in the absence of conspicuous terms is an act that binds plaintiffs to those terms. In Mortenson, the full text of license terms was printed on each sealed diskette envelope inside the software box, printed again on the inside cover of the user manual, and notice of the terms appeared on the computer screen every time the purchaser executed the program. Mortenson, 970 P.2d at 806. In sum, the foregoing cases are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present action.
43 Cases in which courts have found contracts arising from Internet use do not assist defendants, because in those circumstances there was much clearer notice than in the present case that a user's act would manifest assent to contract terms. 16 See, e.g., Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020, 1025 (N.D.Cal. 1998) (granting preliminary injunction based in part on breach of Terms of Service agreement, to which defendants had assented); America Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So.2d 423, 425 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.2001) (upholding forum selection clause in freely negotiated agreement contained in online terms of service); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 323 N.J.Super. 118, 732 A.2d 528, 530, 532-33 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1999) (upholding forum selection clause where subscribers to online software were required to review license terms in scrollable window and to click I Agree or I Don't Agree); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 203-04 (Tex.App.2001) (upholding forum selection clause in online contract for registering Internet domain names that required users to scroll through terms before accepting or rejecting them); cf. Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F.Supp.2d 974, 981-82 (E.D.Cal.2000) (expressing concern that notice of license terms had appeared in small, gray text on a gray background on a linked webpage, but concluding that it was too early in the case to order dismissal). 17 44 After reviewing the California common law and other relevant legal authority, we conclude that under the circumstances here, plaintiffs' downloading of SmartDownload did not constitute acceptance of defendants' license terms. Reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility. We hold that a reasonably prudent offeree in plaintiffs' position would not have known or learned, prior to acting on the invitation to download, of the reference to SmartDownload's license terms hidden below the Download button on the next screen. We affirm the district court's conclusion that the user plaintiffs, including Fagan, are not bound by the arbitration clause contained in those terms. 18 45 IV. Whether Plaintiffs' Assent to Communicator's License Agreement Requires Them To Arbitrate Their Claims Regarding SmartDownload 46 Plaintiffs do not dispute that they assented to the license terms governing Netscape's Communicator. The parties disagree, however, over the scope of that license's arbitration clause. Defendants contend that the scope is broad enough to encompass plaintiffs' claims regarding SmartDownload, even if plaintiffs did not separately assent to SmartDownload's license terms and even though Communicator's license terms did not expressly mention SmartDownload. Thus, defendants argue, plaintiffs must arbitrate. 47 The scope of an arbitration agreement is a legal issue that we review de novo. Oldroyd, 134 F.3d at 76. [A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Genesco, 815 F.2d at 847 (quotation marks omitted). Although the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so, Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989), arbitration is indicated unless it can be said with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Thomas James Assocs., Inc. v. Jameson, 102 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir.1996) (quotation marks omitted). 48 The Communicator license agreement, which required arbitration of all disputes relating to this Agreement (excepting any dispute relating to intellectual property rights), 19 must be classified as broad. Coregis Ins. Co. v. Am. Health Found., 241 F.3d 123, 128-29 (2d Cir.2001). Where the scope of an arbitration agreement is broad, 49 there arises a presumption of arbitrability; if, however, the dispute is in respect of a matter that, on its face, is clearly collateral to the contract, then a court should test the presumption by reviewing the allegations underlying the dispute and by asking whether the claim alleged implicates issues of contract construction or the parties' rights and obligations under it.... [C]laims that present no question involving construction of the contract, and no questions in respect of the parties' rights and obligations under it, are beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement. 50 Collins & Aikman, 58 F.3d at 23. In determining whether a particular claim falls within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement, this Court focus[es] on the factual allegations in the complaint rather than the legal causes of action asserted. Genesco, 815 F.2d at 846. If those allegations touch matters covered by the Netscape license agreement, plaintiffs' claims must be arbitrated. Id. 51 To begin with, we find that the underlying dispute in this case — whether defendants violated plaintiffs' rights under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act — involves matters that are clearly collateral to the Communicator license agreement. While the SmartDownload license agreement expressly applied to Netscape Communicator, Netscape Navigator, and Netscape SmartDownload, the Communicator license agreement expressly applied only to Netscape Communicator and Netscape Navigator. Thus, on its face, the Communicator license agreement governed disputes concerning Netscape's browser programs only, not disputes concerning a plug-in program like SmartDownload. Moreover, Communicator's license terms included a merger or integration clause stating that [t]his Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties concerning the subject matter hereof. SmartDownload's license terms contained the same clause. Such provisions are recognized by California courts as a means of excluding prior or contemporaneous parol evidence from the scope of a contract. See Franklin v. USX Corp., 87 Cal. App.4th 615, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 11, 15 (2001). Although the presence of merger clauses is not dispositive here, we note that defendants' express desire to limit the reach of the respective license agreements, combined with the absence of reference to SmartDownload in the Communicator license agreement, suggests that a dispute regarding defendants' allegedly unlawful use of SmartDownload is clearly collateral to the Communicator license agreement. 52 This conclusion is reinforced by the other terms of the Communicator license agreement, which include a provision describing the non-exclusive nature of the grant and permission to reproduce the software for personal and internal business purposes; restrictions on modification, decompilation, redistribution or other sale or transfer, and removal or alteration of trademarks or other intellectual property; provisions for the licensor's right to terminate and its proprietary rights; a complete disclaimer of warranties (as is) and an entire-risk clause; a limitation of liability clause for consequential and other damages, together with a liquidated damages term; clauses regarding encryption and export; a disclaimer of warranties for high risk activities; and a miscellaneous paragraph that contains merger, choice-of-law, arbitration, and severability clauses, non-waiver and non-assignment provisions, a force majeure term, and a clause providing for reimbursement of the prevailing party in any dispute. Apart from the potential generic applicability of the warranty and liability disclaimers, a dispute concerning alleged electronic eavesdropping via transmissions from a separate plug-in program would not appear to fall within Communicator's license terms. We conclude, therefore, that this dispute concerns matters that, on their face, are clearly collateral to the Communicator license agreement. 53 Having determined this much, we next must test the presumption of arbitrability by asking whether plaintiffs' allegations implicate or touch on issues of contract construction or the parties' rights and obligations under the contract. Collins & Aikman, 58 F.3d at 23; Genesco, 815 F.2d at 846. That is, even though the parties' dispute concerns matters clearly collateral to the Communicator license terms, we must determine whether plaintiffs by their particular allegations have brought the dispute within the license terms. Defendants argue that plaintiffs' complaints literally bristled with allegations that Communicator and SmartDownload operated in conjunction with one another to eavesdrop on Plaintiffs' Internet communications. We disagree. Plaintiffs' allegations nowhere collapse or blur the distinction between Communicator and SmartDownload, but instead consistently separate the two software programs and assert that SmartDownload alone is responsible for unlawful eavesdropping. Plaintiffs begin by alleging that SmartDownload facilitates the transfer of large files over the Internet by permitting a transfer to be resumed if it is interrupted. Plaintiffs then explain that [o]nce SmartDownload is downloaded and running on a Web user's computer, it automatically connects to Netscape's file servers and downloads the installation program for Communicator. Plaintiffs add that defendants also encourage visitors to Netscape's website to download and install SmartDownload even if they are not installing or upgrading Communicator. 54 Plaintiffs go on to point out that installing Communicator automatically creates and stores on the Web user's computer a small text file known as a `cookie.' There follow two paragraphs essentially alleging that cookies were originally intended to perform such innocuous tasks as providing temporary identification for purposes such as electronic commerce, and that the Netscape cookie performs this original identifying, and entirely lawful, function. Separate paragraphs then describe the Key or UserID that SmartDownload allegedly independently places on user's computers, and point out that SmartDownload assumes from Communicator the task of downloading various files. Communicator itself could and would perform these downloading tasks if SmartDownload were not installed. Thereafter, the complaints continue, 55 each time a Web user downloads any file from any site on the Internet using SmartDownload, SmartDownload automatically transmits to defendants the name and Internet address of the file and the Web site from which it is being sent. Within the same transmission, SmartDownload also includes the contents of the Netscape cookie previously created by Communicator and the Key previously created by SmartDownload. 56 In the course of their description of the installation and downloading process, plaintiffs keep SmartDownload separate from Communicator and clearly indicate that it is SmartDownload that performed the allegedly unlawful eavesdropping and made use of the otherwise innocuous Communicator cookie as well as its own Key and UserID to transmit plaintiffs' information to Netscape. The complaints refer to SmartDownload's spying and explain that Defendants are using SmartDownload to eavesdrop. Plaintiffs' allegations consistently distinguish and isolate the functions of SmartDownload in such a way as to make it clear that it is through SmartDownload, not Communicator, that defendants committed the abuses that are the subject of the complaints. 57 After careful review of these allegations, we conclude that plaintiffs' claims present no question involving construction of the [Communicator license agreement], and no questions in respect of the parties' rights and obligations under it. Collins & Aikman, 58 F.3d at 23. It follows that the claims of the five user plaintiffs are beyond the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the Communicator license agreement. Because those claims are not arbitrable under that agreement or under the SmartDownload license agreement, to which plaintiffs never assented, we affirm the district court's holding that the five user plaintiffs may not be compelled to arbitrate their claims. 58