Opinion ID: 2324461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Exception to the Charge

Text: The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in failing to include certain requests to charge. Specifically defendant argues that the trial justice failed    to explain that the terms `knowingly and wilfully' as they related to R.I. Gen. Laws 11-5-5 must be found together in order to find a violation of the statute and also his failure to apprise the jury of certain language found in State v. Contreras, 105 R.I. 523 at 537, to wit, acting with a bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law    As we understand defendant's argument, she claims that the statute mandates a finding that the act must be both knowingly and willfully done. After reading the indictment and statute to the jury, the trial justice instructed the jury in part as follows: Now, you'll note that the statute says that that striking must be knowingly and wilfully done, and those words are words of everyday use. As you might expect, the words, wilfully and knowingly, mean to act voluntarily and intentionally. It's not an act because of a mistake or accident or another innocent reason. So, if you want to substitute the words, knowingly and wilfully, you'll be using the words, voluntarily and intentionally, and this is what those words mean, and you'll apply that definition when you come to consider whether or not, if you determine that there was a striking here, that's entirely up to you, whether or not that was voluntarily and intentionally or in other words, knowingly and wilfully done. We believe that this instruction, when read in the context of the entire charge, State v. Page, 104 R.I. 323, 244 A.2d 258 (1968), accords with this court's definition of the words knowingly and wilfully in State v. Contreras, 105 R.I. 523, 253 A.2d 612 (1969), which involved the same statute. In Contreras, we said: Very generally, and without intending either to delve into their precise meanings or to explore the nuances which may differentiate one from the other, it may be said that to act either `knowingly' or `wilfully' is to act voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason. Id. at 537, 253 A.2d at 620. We are satisfied that when the charge is read as a whole, it adequately explained the meaning of the words in question as used in the statute and did not mislead the jury. No more was required. State v. Contreras, supra . We find no error in the trial justice's refusal to charge as requested. We have examined and considered all of the other arguments made by the defendant and find them so lacking in merit as to require no discussion. All of the defendant's exceptions are overruled, and the case is remitted to the Superior Court for further proceedings. ROBERTS, C. J., did not participate.