Opinion ID: 1454512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: General Versus Specific Intent.

Text: Appellant complains that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the distinction between general and specific intent. Appellant also complains that the instructions as a whole indicate that proof of general criminal intent is sufficient to support a conviction of murder in the first degree. A review of the instructions, when read and considered as a whole, reveals that this contention is without merit. Instruction No. 13 [12] requires the jury to find the joint union of act and intent consistent with I.C. § 18-114 and also contains language from I.C. § 18-115 allowing the jury to determine intent from the circumstances connected with the offense as well as the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the crime. Instruction No. 14 [13] requires the jury to find specific intent to commit the crime. Instruction No. 22 [14] speaks to specific intent by requiring the jury to find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation. ... Furthermore, Instruction No. 16 instructs the jury in the definitions and elements of first and second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter and each definition included the intent necessary to commit the particular crime. We note that the distinction between general intent and specific intent is a difficult distinction and has been abandoned in the Model Penal Code. See LaFave, W. and Scott, A., Jr., Criminal Law § 28, p. 202 (1972). The jury need not be instructed in the esoteric distinctions between general and specific intent. In the present case the instructions to the jury repeatedly emphasized that before Enno could be convicted he must have acted with the intent to kill Freeman. We specifically hold that the jury instructions, when read and considered as a whole, adequately instructed the jury concerning the elements of murder in the first and second degree and manslaughter, and the distinctions between each including intent. This is sufficient to instruct the jury and we find no reversible error.