Opinion ID: 155185
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Incorrect Jury Instruction

Text: Initially, defendant asserts that the instruction given to the jury on the definition of “use” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 2 was erroneous. Prior to Bailey, this court defined “use” as when the firearm “(1) is readily accessible, (2) is an integral part of the criminal undertaking, and (3) increases the likelihood of success for that undertaking.” United States v. Conner, 972 F.2d 1172, 1173 (10th Cir. 1992). In Bailey, the Supreme Court narrowed this construction, holding that a conviction of “use” under § 924(c)(1) “requires evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes 2 Section 924(c)(1) provides an enhanced sentence for anyone who “uses or carries a firearm” “during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime.” -5- the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.” 116 S. Ct. at 505. The Court held that “‘use’ must connote more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a drug offense,” id. at 506, and does not extend to a situation “where an offender conceals a gun nearby to be at the ready for an imminent confrontation,” id. at 508. The instruction given to the jury here stated: Section 924(c)(1) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides that it is unlawful for any person to use or to carry a firearm during and in relation to any drug trafficking crime. In order to establish the offense proscribed by that statute, the Government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant used or carried a firearm, as described in the Indictment; Second, that the defendant had knowledge that he was using or carrying the firearm; and Third, that the using or carrying of this firearm by the defendant was during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. For the purposes of this case, “a drug trafficking crime” means a violation of Section 841(a)(1) of Title 21 of the United States Code which prohibits possession with intent to distribute cocaine. If you find the defendant under consideration is guilty of violating Section 841(a)(1) of Title 21 of the United States Code, as explained earlier in these instructions then, as a matter of law, this violation constitutes a “drug trafficking crime.” For the purposes of this case, the word “firearm” means any weapon which will or is designed to or may be readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. -6- You are also instructed that the word “carry” includes when a defendant in possession of a firearm transports the firearm or causes the firearm to be transported. R. Vol. I, tab 17, App. “C.” Specifically, defendant claims that although he was charged alternatively with “using” or “carrying” a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking offense, the instruction given to the jury defined only “carrying.” He claims that because the jury might have convicted on the “use” prong without proper instruction as to the elements of the charge, the court’s omission was error fatal to the verdict. The government argues that because no evidence was presented to prove that defendant “used” a firearm, and because the evidence was sufficient to convict under the “carry” prong of § 924(c), defendant’s conviction should stand regardless of the omission in the instruction. We agree, albeit under a slightly different rationale. This court very recently affirmed the denial of a § 2255 motion in a case where a defendant charged alternatively with “using” or “carrying” a firearm under § 924(c)(1) was convicted pursuant to an erroneous pre-Bailey “use” instruction. See United States v. Holland, No. 96-1102, 1997 WL 364290 (10th Cir. July 2, 1997). We opined that the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction on the legally valid “carrying” ground does not eliminate the possibility of prejudice “unless we can be assured the jury did in fact rely on the -7- valid ground, or unless, in convicting [the defendant], the jury necessarily made the findings required to support a conviction on the valid ground.” Id., 1997 WL 364290, at . In reaching that conclusion, we held an erroneous “use” instruction does not require reversal of the conviction when the jury was also instructed without objection on “carry,” the defendant did not dispute that the firearm was carried on his person or in his vehicle, and the jury verdict necessarily includes an inherent finding of “carrying during and in relation to the drug crime.” The essential inquiry is whether the jury’s verdict, under the instructions given and the nature of the evidence, required the jury to find all the elements of a “carrying” violation, or stated another way, whether the verdict was the functional equivalent of such a finding. We must be convinced that it was impossible upon the evidence and instructions for the jury to have returned a “use” conviction without finding all the elements of a “carrying” violation as well. Id., 1997 WL 364290, at  n.4. The government asserts the evidence presented at trial showed that defendant constructively possessed and transported the gun during the course of the drug transaction. 3 Because these were elements the jury would have had to find to convict defendant under the “carry” prong of § 924(c)(1), we are certain that a jury did not convict defendant “for conduct that the law does not make criminal.” Holland, 1997 WL 364290, at . Moreover, the defendant concedes no evidence was presented at trial that he “used” the firearm, and he has not 3 As we will discuss later in this order and judgment, we were provided with no trial transcript and, therefore, we cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence presented. -8- presented us with a record basis for challenging the government’s representations of the evidence. See United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1257 (10th Cir.) (reviewing court can be sure that defendant was not convicted on legally invalid ground, “if, for example, there was no evidence whatsoever to support a conviction on the legally erroneous ground”), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 443 (1996), and partially overruled on other grounds by Holland, 1997 WL 364290. 4 The following factors together satisfy us that the omission of a “use” definition in the instructions did not constitute reversible error: (1) there was no evidence of “use” at trial; (2) there was no jury instruction defining “use;” (3) there was a guilty verdict following a proper “carrying” instruction; and (4) because the record is inadequate, there is an assumption of sufficient evidence to support a conviction for “carrying.” 4 In Miller, 84 F.3d 1244 and in United States v. DeSantiago-Flores, 107 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir. 1997), we concluded that an erroneous “use” instruction to the jury required reversal. In Holland, the court overruled both cases to the extent that they were inconsistent with the holding that an erroneous “use” instruction does not constitute reversible error if “it was impossible upon the evidence and instructions for the jury to have returned a ‘use’ conviction without finding all the elements of a ‘carrying’ violation as well.” 1997 WL 364290, at  n.4 -9-