Opinion ID: 2124187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Federal and State Right to Counsel

Text: Under the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right `to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.' This is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty ( Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 462 [1938]). The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights, and the guaranty would be nullified by a determination that an accused's ignorant failure to claim his rights removes the protection of the Constitution ( id. at 465). The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution ( see Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 [1963]). Article I, § 6 of the New York State Constitution provides in pertinent part that a defendant shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel. New York State has provided greater protection to the right to counsel than required by the Federal Constitution ( see People v Bing, 76 NY2d 331, 338-339 [1990]). It is well settled that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel ( McMann v Richardson, 397 US 759, 771 n 14 [1970]). Further, the United States Supreme Court has recognized on numerous occasions that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial ( Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 684 [1984]; see also Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45, 69 [1932]). A defense counsel has a duty to advocate the accused's cause and to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process ( see Strickland, 466 US at 688). Under the Sixth Amendment, courts do not have the power to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel ( Zerbst, 304 US at 463). There is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, . . . and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege' ( Brookhart v Janis, 384 US 1, 4 [1966], quoting Zerbst, 304 US at 464 [internal citation omitted]). Whether an accused has properly and intelligently waived the right to counsel depends, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused ( Zerbst, 304 US at 464).