Opinion ID: 664140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: 23 The district court granted summary judgment for the City with respect to the Kawaokas' facial challenges. A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Jones v. Union Pac. R. Co., 968 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir.1992); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 629 (9th Cir.1987). Our review is governed by the same standard used by the trial court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1986). We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.1992); Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (9th Cir.1989). 24 To establish a violation of substantive due process, the Kawaokas are required to prove that the City's general plan or temporary water moratorium was  'clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.'  Sinaloa Lake, 882 F.2d at 1407 (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct. 114, 121, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926)). Legislative acts that do not impinge on fundamental rights or employ suspect classifications are presumed valid, and this presumption is overcome only by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 2387, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981); see also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 462, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 2489, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 n. 14 (11th Cir.1989). 25 In a substantive due process challenge, we do not require that the City's legislative acts actually advance its stated purposes, but instead look to whether  'the governmental body could have had no legitimate reason for its decision.'  Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 690 (9th Cir.1993) (citing Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 483 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 [106 S.Ct. 3276, 91 L.Ed.2d 566] (1986) (emphasis in original)). The City's general plan does not violate substantive due process as long as it advances any legitimate public purpose, Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th Cir.1975), and if it is  'at least fairly debatable'  that the decision to adopt the general plan and the water moratorium was rationally related to legitimate governmental interests, the City's actions must be upheld. Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 165 (9th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). 26 Two aspects of the general plan are alleged by the Kawaokas to be irrational and arbitrary: the requirement of a specific plan and the density designation. The Kawaokas also challenge the City's temporary water moratorium.