Opinion ID: 150474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: COUNTS TWO & THREE: Whether the CEP's Trigger Provisions Violate the First Amendment

Text: In Counts Two and Three, plaintiffs challenge the CEP's so-called trigger provisions. As discussed above, the trigger provisions provide additional public funding to candidates when certain conditions are triggered. The trigger provisions include the excess expenditure provision (Count Two) and the independent expenditure provision (Count Three). The District Court struck down the trigger provisions, concluding that they imposed a substantial burden on the exercise of First Amendment rights and that the state ha[d] failed to advance a compelling state interest that would otherwise justify that burden. Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 373. We agree with those conclusions and affirm the District Court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs on Counts Two and Three.
As a threshold matter, defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the trigger provisions. We agree with the District Court, however, that plaintiffs do have standing on Counts Two and Three. See Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 369-70. To qualify for standing, a claimant must present an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged behavior; and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2768 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). Defendants' primary claim is that plaintiffs have failed to allege an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent. Id. With respect to the excess expenditure provision, plaintiffs have submitted very little evidence to suggest that any member of the Green Party or the Libertarian Party will ever raise enough money (or spend enough of his or her own money) to trigger the excess expenditure provisions. As discussed above, see Count One, section I, ante, Davis addressed the so-called Millionaire's Amendment, which imposed a penaltyin the form of a disadvantageous asymmetrical regulatory schemeon candidates for Congress who spent large amounts of their own money on their campaigns. Id. at 2766. Davis recognized that a potential candidate had standing to challenge the Millionaire's Amendment where the candidate had declared his candidacy and his intent to spend more than $350,000 of personal funds in the general election campaign. Id. at 2769. There, however, it was undisputed that the candidate's personal wealth was sufficient to enable him to spend more than $350,000 on his campaign. Here, by contrast, no plaintiff (or member of one of the plaintiff minor parties) has declared an intention to spend enough personal wealth to trigger the excess expenditure provision, and there is very little evidence to suggest that any minor-party candidate in Connecticut could plausibly raise enough money through private contributions to trigger the excess expenditure provision. Nonetheless, the record shows that the Green Party does, on occasion, choose to endorse a major-party candidate for a particular office rather than run a candidate of its own (this is referred to as cross-endorsement). Insofar as the Green Party cross-endorses a major-party candidate who declines to participate in the CEP, the Green Party members may choose to make contributions to that candidate, and those contributionscombined with the candidate's other fundraising effortscould cause the candidate to trigger the excess expenditure provision. Therefore, the existence of the excess expenditure provision could have the effect of chilling plaintiffs' contributions to cross-endorsed candidates. See Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 368-69. We conclude that this injury is sufficiently concrete, particularized, and ... imminent to provide plaintiffs with standing to assert Count Two. The analysis is similar with respect to the independent expenditure provision. If the Green Party chooses to cross-endorse a major-party candidate, any independent expenditures made by the Green Party advocating for the defeat of the candidate's opponent could trigger the independent expenditure provision. We conclude, therefore, that the potential chilling effect on plaintiffs' independent expenditures, see id., is sufficient to provide plaintiffs with standing to assert Count Three.
Turning to the merits of plaintiffs' challenge, we agree with the District Court that the CEP's trigger provisions violate the First Amendment because they operate in a manner similar to the law that the Supreme Court struck down in Davis v. Federal Election Commission, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008). Federal law establishes certain restrictions on financial contributions given to candidates for Congress. For example, [c]ontributions from individual donors during a 2-year election cycle are subject to a cap, which is currently set at $2,300. Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2765-66 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A), (c)). The so-called Millionaire's Amendment at issue in Davis eased some of those restrictions for candidates whose opponents have spent more than $350,000 of their (the opponents') own personal funds in an election. Consider, for instance, a race for Congress between Candidate A and Candidate B. The Millionaire's Amendment would apply if Candidate A were to spend $350,000 or more of her own money on her campaign. The Amendment at that point would ease certain restrictions for Candidate B. Most notably, Candidate B would be allowed to accept contributions from individual donors at three times the ordinary cap$6,900 instead of $2,300. The restrictions would not, however, be eased for Candidate A, who would still be limited to accepting contributions at the $2,300 limit. Davis emphasized, as an initial matter, that the Supreme Court had upheld contribution limits on individual donors. See 128 S.Ct. at 2770 (This Court has previously sustained the facial constitutionality of limits on discrete and aggregate individual contributions and on coordinated party expenditures. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 38, 46-47 n. 53; Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 437, 465, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001))). Thus Davis observed that if the Millionaire's Amendment had simply raised the contribution limits for all candidates, the plaintiffs' challenge would [have] plainly fail[ed]. Id. But because the Millionaire's Amendment raise[d] the [contribution] limits only for the non-self-financing candidate (Candidate B in the example above), Davis held that the Amendment imposed an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercise[d] his or her right, under the First Amendment, to spend personal funds for campaign speech. Id. at 2771. Accordingly, Davis determined that the Millionaire's Amendment created a substantial burden on the exercise of the First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech, and held that the Millionaire's Amendment could be upheld only if it was justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 2772 (quotation marks omitted). Applying that standard, Davis struck down the Millionaire's Amendment, concluding that the asserted government interestto level electoral opportunitieswas not compelling. Id. at 2773-74 (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court's analysis in Davis directly governs plaintiffs' challenge to the CEP's trigger provisions in Counts Two and Three. A. The Excess Expenditure Provision The similarity between the claim in Davis and the claims raised by plaintiffs in Counts Two and Three is clearest with respect to the CEP's excess expenditure provision. Consider a race for a state office in Connecticut between Candidate A and Candidate B. Candidate A intends to spend her own money on the race and has, as a result, elected not to participate in the CEP. Candidate B, however, decides to participate in the CEP. Candidate B proceeds to qualify for the CEP, and he receives a full grant of public money and becomes subject to the CEP's expenditure limit. Under the excess expenditure provision, if Candidate A spends so much of her own money on the race that her expenditures exceed Candidate B's expenditure limit, then Candidate B will receive additional public money to make up for the deficit. In other words, as Candidate A spends more and more of her own money above a certain threshold, Candidate B will receive more and more public money to compensate (up to twice the full CEP grant). That plainly causes Candidate A to shoulder a special and potentially significant burden if she chooses to exercise her First Amendment right to spend personal funds on her campaign, for Candidate A can only spend above the excess-expenditure threshold if she accepts that her opponent will receive additional public money. Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2772. As a result, the excess expenditure provision imposes what can only be deemed a penalty on Candidate A's choice to spend personal funds for campaign speech. Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2771. The penalty imposed by the excess expenditure provision is, to be sure, slightly different from the penalty imposed by the Millionaire's Amendment in Davis. We agree with the District Court, however, that insofar as the two penalties are different, the penalty at issue in this case is more constitutionally objectionable. Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 373. In Davis, the penalty consisted of a a new, asymmetrical regulatory schemecontribution restrictions were relaxed for the non-self-financed candidate. 128 S.Ct. at 2766. In Davis, therefore, there was some possibility that the non-self-financed candidate (Candidate B, above) would be unable to raise additional money under the relaxed restrictions. Here, however, the penalty imposed by the excess expenditure provision consists of a voucher of public funds given directly to Candidate B. See, e.g., Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-713(a); see also Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 373. The penalty imposed by the excess expenditure provision, therefore, is harsher than the penalty in Davis, as it leaves no doubt that Candidate B, the opponent of the self-financed candidate, will receive additional money. Accordingly, the excess expenditure provision imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of the First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech. Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2772. To be upheld under plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge, the provision must be justified by a compelling state interest. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Applying that standard, we agree with the District Court that Connecticut's asserted interestpromot[ing] participation in the CEPis not compelling. Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 373. Davis was clear that a burden ... on the expenditure of personal funds is not justified by any governmental interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption. 128 S.Ct. at 2773. Since the CEP is justified by a governmental interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption, pursuant to the Supreme Court's teaching in Davis, encouraging participation in the CEP does not justify the burden on First Amendment rights caused by the excess expenditure provision. Moreover, insofar as the excess expenditure provision is the result of a desire to level electoral opportunities, they are, under Davis, clearly unconstitutional. Id. at 2773 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, we conclude, pursuant to Davis, that the CEP's excess expenditure provision violates the First Amendment. We therefore affirm the District Court's judgment for plaintiffs on Count Two. [19] B. The Independent Expenditure Provision The only difference between the independent expenditure provision and the excess expenditure provision is the fact that independent expenditure provision applies to individuals and organizations who are not themselves candidates in any race. We do not think that this difference carries any significance, as nothing in Davis suggests that the right to spend personal funds for campaign speech is limited to candidates only. Id. at 2771. Consider again the race between Candidate A and Candidate B. If a resident of the district strongly favors the election of Candidate Aand strongly disfavors the election of Candidate Bthe resident may choose to spend his personal funds to advocate the defeat of Candidate B. Under the independent expenditure provision, however, if the amount of the resident's expenditure of personal fundswhen combined with the amount of Candidate A's own expendituressurpasses Candidate B's expenditure limit, the state will provide additional funding to Candidate B to make up for the supposed inequality. In this way, the independent expenditure provision clearly acts as a penalty on the resident's choice to spend personal funds for campaign speech. Id. at 2771; see also Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359-62 (8th Cir.1994) (holding unconstitutional a similar law penalizing independent expenditures). As the resident spends more and more money advocating against the candidate he opposes, Candidate B, the state will give more and more money to that candidate. Accordingly, like the excess expenditure provision, the independent expenditure provision imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of the First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech. Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2772. To be upheld under plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge, the provisions must therefore be justified by a compelling state interest. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Applying that standard, we once again agree with the District Court that, under the principles enumerated by the Supreme Court in Davis, the state's asserted interests cannot justify the independent expenditure provision. See Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 373. As discussed in connection with the excess expenditure provision, neither an interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption nor an interest in level[ing] electoral opportunities can justify a burden... on the expenditure of personal funds. Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2773-74 (quotation marks omitted). Nor can such a burden be justified by the state's asserted interest in promot[ing] participation in the CEP, Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 373, as that interest merely derives from Connecticut's interest in establishing the CEPthat is, the state's interest in encourage participation in the CEP derives from its interests in eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption. Thus, we conclude that the CEP's independent expenditure provision violates the First Amendment as it is construed by the Supreme Court in Davis. We therefore affirm the District Court's judgment for plaintiffs on Count Three.
Having determined that CEP's trigger provisionsthat is, the excess expenditure provision and the independent expenditure provisionviolate the First Amendment, we must determine whether the trigger provisions are severable from the CEP or whether the entire CEP must be struck down along with those provisions. Defendants argue that the Connecticut General Assembly designed the CEP so that many of its individual provisions could be severed. Plaintiffs respond that one section of the larger CFRA suggests that the General Assembly intended the entire law to rise and fall together. That statute, which was recently amended, now reads in full: (a) If, during a period beginning on or after the forty-fifth day prior to any special election scheduled relative to any vacancy in the General Assembly and ending the day after such special election, a court of competent jurisdiction prohibits or limits, or continues to prohibit or limit, the expenditure of funds from the Citizens' Election Fund established in section 9-701 for grants or moneys for candidate committees authorized under sections 9-700 to 9-716, inclusive, for a period of seven days or more, (1) sections 1-100b, 9-700 to 9-716, inclusive, 9-750, 9-751 and 9-760 and section 49 of public act 05-5 of the October 25 special session shall be inoperative and have no effect with respect to any race of such special election that is the subject of such court order until the day after such special election, and (2)(A) the amendments made to the provisions of the sections of the general statutes pursuant to public act 05-5 of the October 25 special session shall be inoperative until the day after such special election with respect to any such race, (B) the provisions of said sections of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to December 30, 2006, shall be effective until the day after such special election with respect to any such race, and (C) the provisions of subsections (g) to (j), inclusive, of section 9-612 shall not be implemented until the day after such special election with respect to any such race. (b) Except as provided for in subsection (a) or (c) of this section, if, on or after April fifteenth of any year in which a state election is scheduled to occur, a court of competent jurisdiction prohibits or limits, or continues to prohibit or limit, the expenditure of funds from the Citizens' Election Fund established in section 9-701 for grants or moneys for candidate committees authorized under sections 9-700 to 9-716, inclusive, for a period of thirty days or more, (1) sections 1-100b, 9-700 to 9-716, inclusive, 9-750, 9-751 and 9-760 and section 49 of public act 05-5 of the October 25 special session shall be inoperative and have no effect with respect to any race that is the subject of such court order until December thirty-first of such year, and (2)(A) the amendments made to the provisions of the sections of the general statutes pursuant to public act 05-5 of the October 25 special session shall be inoperative until December thirty-first of such year, (B) the provisions of said sections of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to December 30, 2006, shall be effective until December thirty-first of such year, and (C) the provisions of subsections (g) to (j), inclusive, of section 9-612 shall not be implemented until December thirty-first of such year. If, on the April fifteenth of the second year succeeding such original prohibition or limitation, any such prohibition or limitation is in effect, the provisions of subdivisions (1) and (2) of this section shall be implemented and remain in effect without the time limitation described in said subdivisions (1) and (2). (c) If, during a year in which a state election is held, on or after the second Tuesday in August set aside as the day for a primary under section 9-423, a court of competent jurisdiction prohibits or limits the expenditure of funds from the Citizens' Election Fund established in section 9-701 for grants or moneys for candidate committees authorized under sections 9-700 to 9-716, inclusive, for a period of fifteen days, or if said Tuesday occurs during a period of fifteen days or more in which period such a court continues to prohibit or limit such expenditures, then, after any such fifteen-day period, (1) sections 1-100b, 9-700 to 9-716, inclusive, 9-750, 9-751 and 9-760 and section 49 of public act 05-5 of the October 25 special session shall be inoperative and have no effect with respect to any race that is the subject of such court order until December thirty-first of such year, and (2)(A) the amendments made to the provisions of the sections of the general statutes pursuant to public act 05-5 of the October 25 special session shall be inoperative until December thirty-first of such year, (B) the provisions of said sections of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to December 30, 2006, shall be effective until December thirty-first of such year, and (C) the provisions of subsections (g) to (j), inclusive, of section 9-612 shall not be implemented until December thirty-first of such year. If, on the April fifteenth of the second year succeeding such original prohibition or limitation, any such prohibition or limitation is in effect, the provisions of subdivisions (1) and (2) of this section shall be implemented and remain in effect without the time limitation described in said subdivisions (1) and (2). (d) Any candidate who has received any funds pursuant to the provisions of sections 1-100b, 9-700 to 9-716, inclusive, 9-750, 9-751 and 9-760 and section 49 of public act 05-5 of the October 25 special session prior to any such prohibition or limitation taking effect may retain and expend such funds in accordance with said sections unless prohibited from doing so by the court. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-717 (as amended by Public Act 10-2 on April 14, 2010). Because the District Court struck down the entire CEP, it had no occasion to determine whether the trigger provisions were severable. We therefore remand to the District Court to consider the severability issue in the first instance. Because the meaning of § 9-717 is far from clear, the District Court should develop the record to determine how § 9-717 applies given our judgment for defendants on Count One and our judgment for plaintiffs on Counts Two and Three.