Opinion ID: 2709198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal and State False Arrest Claims

Text: First, the district court dismissed Serino’s § 1983 and state‐law claims for false arrest1 as time‐barred. We agree.
To begin with the federal claim: in § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the injury took place. Hondo, Inc. v. Sterling, 21 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994). In Indiana, such claims must be brought within two years. Ind. Code § 34‐11‐2‐4. But federal law determines when that statute be‐ gins to run. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). 1 At times, Serino’s complaint alleges both false arrest and false impris‐ onment. But as “false arrest and false imprisonment overlap,” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007), we will use the shorthand “false arrest.” 4 No. 13‐1058 The general rule is that a § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Hondo, 21 F.3d at 778. There is a spe‐ cific rule, however, for false arrest claims. The Supreme Court held that for these claims, the action begins to run “at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process”—that is, when the arrestee is bound over by a mag‐ istrate or arraigned on charges. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 397; ac‐ cord City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d at 682. Thus, Serino needed to bring his false arrest claim by September 15, 2010—two years after his arraignment. He did not file his complaint un‐ til March 28, 2012. His claim is time‐barred. Serino argues that the statute did not begin to run until March 31, 2010, the day the state dropped his second crimi‐ nal charge. He invokes Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 claim based on an unconstitutional conviction does not accrue until the conviction has been invalidated. Id. at 489–90. Serino’s theo‐ ry is that the Heck rule operated to delay the accrual of his false arrest claim—a claim that could imply that the charges against him were meritless—until there was no longer a pending state criminal proceeding. But this argument is a non‐starter, because Heck relied on the principle “that civil tort actions,” as opposed to habeas corpus petitions, “are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstand‐ ing criminal judgments.” Id. at 486 (emphasis added). And in Wallace, the Supreme Court explicitly clarified that “the Heck rule for deferred accrual is called into play only when there exists a ‘conviction or sentence that has not been … invali‐ dated,’ that is to say, an ‘an outstanding criminal judg‐ ment.’” 549 U.S. at 393 (emphasis omitted). Here, as in Wal‐ lace, Serino was never convicted. As such, at the time Se‐ No. 13‐1058 5 rino’s false arrest claim began to accrue, “there was in exist‐ ence no criminal conviction that the cause of action would impugn.” Id. Heck cannot help Serino here.
Indiana’s two‐year statute of limitations also bars Se‐ rino’s state false arrest claim. In reviewing a state tort claim, we apply Indiana law regarding the applicable limitations period and when the claim accrues. City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d at 679. Conveniently, Indiana has embraced the Wallace rule for false arrest claims. The Indiana Court of Appeals held that the statute begins to run when the alleged false impris‐ onment ends—i.e., the time of arraignment. See Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008);2 City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d at 682 (explaining the same). Again, Serino filed his complaint well over two years after his arraign‐ ment. His false arrest claim is untimely. Serino tries to avoid this result by appealing to the con‐ tinuing wrong doctrine. Indiana courts will apply the doc‐ trine “where an entire course of conduct combines to pro‐ duce an injury”—in other words, when the defendant carries out a continuing wrongful act. Johnson, 885 N.E.2d at 31. But, as discussed above, Hensley’s “entire course of conduct” giving rise to Serino’s false arrest claim necessarily conclud‐ 2 When a state supreme court has not ruled on an issue of state law, we look to decisions of the state appellate court “unless there are persuasive indications that the state supreme court would decide the issue different‐ ly.” Much v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 266 F.3d 637, 643 (7th Cir. 2001). We have previously found Johnson v. Blackwell to be “persuasive authority on the approach the [Indiana] high court would take.” City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d at 680 n.3. 6 No. 13‐1058 ed once Serino was held pursuant to legal process. See id. at 30. Serino claims that he experienced emotional distress after that point, but this only goes toward the issue of his damag‐ es. Serino was aware of the facts surrounding his wrongful arrest as soon as he was arrested and charged; he did not need to wait until the charges were dismissed to establish the elements of his claim. See id. at 31 (“[T]he doctrine of con‐ tinuing wrong does not prevent the statute of limitations from beginning to run when the plaintiff learns of facts that should lead to the discovery of his cause of action, even if his relationship with the tortfeasor continues beyond that point.”). As such, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of both the federal and state false arrest claims.