Opinion ID: 2255082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of Established Precedent

Text: In Johnson, a capital case, the trial court dismissed the postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. This court affirmed. Johnson, 183 Ill.2d at 184, 233 Ill.Dec. 288, 700 N.E.2d 996. The petition was accompanied by a report prepared by a psychologist who evaluated Johnson after his conviction. The doctor wrote that Johnson was intellectually incapable of understanding the admonitions of the trial court regarding his waiver of jury for sentencing. Johnson, 183 Ill.2d at 192, 233 Ill.Dec. 288, 700 N.E.2d 996. Based on this assessment, Johnson argued that his intellectual limitations rendered him unable to `understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense,' thus rendering him unfit for trial. Johnson, 183 Ill.2d at 192-93, 233 Ill.Dec. 288, 700 N.E.2d 996, quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 113 (1975). After noting that the critical inquiry is whether the facts presented in defendant's post-conviction petition raised a bona fide doubt of his fitness to stand trial ( Johnson, 183 Ill.2d at 193, 233 Ill. Dec. 288, 700 N.E.2d 996), this court concluded that Johnson failed to meet his burden of showing that, at the time of trial, there were facts in existence which raised a substantial and legitimate doubt as to his mental capacity to cooperate with counsel and meaningfully participate in his defense. Johnson, 183 Ill.2d at 193-94, 233 Ill.Dec. 288, 700 N.E.2d 996. Specifically, this court stated that he had offered no evidence regarding his demeanor or that he acted irrationally at trial. In addition, there was no prior medical opinion on defendant's competence to stand trial. Johnson, 183 Ill.2d at 194, 233 Ill.Dec. 288, 700 N.E.2d 996. Thus, none of the factors identified in Eddmonds as indicators of a bona fide doubt were present. Further, the only new evidence offered was the psychologist's opinion that Johnson was incapable of understanding the court's admonitions because of his inability to comprehend complex sentences. This court concluded that the facts offered by defendant fall short of raising a bona fide doubt of his fitness. Johnson, 183 Ill.2d at 194, 233 Ill.Dec. 288, 700 N.E.2d 996. In the present case, the only objective indicator of possible doubt as to petitioner's fitness is the fact that he was taking psychotropic medication at the time of trial. This fact, standing alone, is insufficient to create a bona fide doubt. People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d 312, 330, 245 Ill.Dec. 1, 727 N.E.2d 254 (2000). Like the defendant in Johnson, petitioner now claims to have been unable to understand the proceedings at trial but, like Johnson, he offers no evidence regarding his demeanor at trial or that he acted irrationally at trial ( Johnson, 183 Ill.2d at 194, 233 Ill. Dec. 288, 700 N.E.2d 996) and no prior medical opinion on his competence to stand trial. In Mitchell, we again affirmed the dismissal of a postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing in a capital case. At the time of his trial and sentencing, Mitchell had been taking two medications to control his epilepsy. His petition alleged that the trial court had been aware of his condition, which had existed since a head injury when he was six years old, and that he was taking psychotropic medications to control his seizures. Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d at 323, 245 Ill.Dec. 1, 727 N.E.2d 254. The petition was accompanied by an affidavit by a pharmacology consultant, who listed the probable side effects of the drugs as `sedation, hallucinations, dizziness, incoordination, depression, emotional changes and behavioral deterioration, psychosis and aggression.' The affidavit also stated that the `combination of the effects of both of these drugs can cloud the sensorium (alter the ability to think clearly) and thus effect [ sic ] any individual's ability to make certain decisions.' The consultant concluded that the `overall sedative effect may have caused Mr. Mitchell to appear too relaxed or too detached during court proceedings.' Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d at 323, 245 Ill.Dec. 1, 727 N.E.2d 254. In addition, Mitchell's petition included an affidavit from a clinical psychologist, who tested him in prison and determined that his verbal IQ was 73, his performance IQ was 75, and his full scale IQ was 73. The psychologist also found that his math skills were at a fourth-grade level and that his reading and spelling skills were below the third-grade level, characterizing the defendant as having a severe language-based learning disability. The psychologist stated that the defendant's cognitive abilities were limited and that, although defendant's IQ scores showed that he was borderline mentally retarded, his inability to read and his slowed information-processing speed left him functioning more like someone in the mildly to mild/moderately impaired range. Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d at 353-54, 245 Ill.Dec. 1, 727 N.E.2d 254. This court found that the record belied any claim that he had not understood the nature of the proceedings or was unable to assist in his defense. Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d at 334, 245 Ill.Dec. 1, 727 N.E.2d 254. Specifically, we noted: Defendant's exchanges with the trial judge do not display any confusion about the nature of the proceedings, and defendant assisted in his defense by testifying in his own behalf. Defendant testified to his whereabouts at the relevant times, denied any involvement in the crime, and asserted that his confession to the police was coerced. Defendant's testimony covered over 50 pages of the report of proceedings and does not disclose any signs of confusion about the nature or purpose of the proceedings. Similarly, defendant gave extensive testimony in support of his motions to suppress statements and evidence, and there is no indication that defendant did not understand the nature or purpose of those proceedings. Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d at 334-35, 245 Ill.Dec. 1, 727 N.E.2d 254. We also noted that while a trial judge cannot rely on trial demeanor to dispense with a fitness hearing in the face of evidence of a bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness, there was no evidence in the record suggesting a bona fide doubt of fitness at the time of trial. Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d at 335, 245 Ill.Dec. 1, 727 N.E.2d 254. Similarly, in the present case, petitioner's exchanges with the trial court do not display any confusion about the nature of the proceedings. Although petitioner elected not to testify at his bench trial, he presented a lengthy statement, which he had written himself, at his sentencing hearing. The fact that the sentencing hearing was held several months after the bench trial weighs little in light of the fact that petitioner not only continued to take the psychotropic medication at the time of his sentencing, he credited the medication with an improvement in his mood and outlook. As in Mitchell, the record in this case belies petitioner's claim. In addition, in Mitchell, even the presence of affidavits from a pharmacologist and a clinical psychologist did not negate the trial record, which demonstrated that the defendant fully understood the nature of the proceeding against him, and was able to cooperate in his defense. Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d at 337, 245 Ill.Dec. 1, 727 N.E.2d 254. Petitioner in the present case offers only affidavits from his mother and aunt, who state that prior to his arrest, petitioner was diagnosed as bipolar and that he has made several suicide attempts, and medical records documenting this diagnosis. In Easley, the postconviction petitioner claimed that he had asked counsel to arrange for a physical examination and a brain scan because he believed that something was wrong with his brain and he experienced a lot of headaches. He stated that when he got angry or upset, he would blank out  my mind goes blank; my nerves jump and I can't think clearly. Also, when he read or spoke, he forgot everything that he was reading or thinking. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 320, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. Counsel did arrange for a psychological evaluation, but Easley refused to cooperate because he believed that the psychologist had been sent by the State. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 319-20, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. This court concluded that this evidence does not help defendant because fitness speaks only to a person's ability to function within the context of a trial. It does not refer to sanity or competence in other areas. A defendant can be fit for trial although his or her mind may be otherwise unsound. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 320, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. Easley also made several irrational statements during his trial, including an outburst at a pretrial hearing. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 320, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. Based on a colloquy between Easley and the trial judge, this court concluded that he understood the nature of the proceeding. His hostile conduct was not a sign of unfitness, but was based on his belief that the criminal justice system demeaned him. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 321-22, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. Affidavits regarding postconviction psychological examinations indicated that Easley had long-standing mental problems at the time of trial that affected his ability to understand written and oral instructions. When under extreme stress, [he] suffered from thought and personality disorder, paranoia, and episodic breaks with reality. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 322, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. This court noted that the fact that a defendant suffers from mental disturbances or requires psychiatric treatment does not necessarily raise a bona fide doubt as to [his] ability to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel in the defense. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 322, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. Then, taking his allegations as true, this court concluded that his postconviction petition did not raise a bona fide doubt of his fitness to stand trial and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore, failed. Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 323, 249 Ill.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975. Compared to Easley, the quantum of evidence alleged by petitioner in support of his claim is minuscule. He offers only his self-serving statement that he did not understand what was going on at his trial, which is belied by the record, and the statements of his mother and aunt that he had a history of mental illness prior to his trial, that he was suicidal at times, and that he was being treated with psychotropic drugs. He offers no objective evidence, either in the record or by means of affidavit, of the existence of facts that, if known at the time of trial, would have raised a bona fide doubt of his fitness. In Burt, the petitioner was evaluated by a psychologist prior to trial. The doctor found him fit and defense counsel stipulated to the contents of the report. As a result, no fitness hearing was held. Petitioner was taking psychotropic medications at that time and counsel and the court were aware of this fact. Burt, 205 Ill.2d at 33, 275 Ill.Dec. 477, 792 N.E.2d 1250. Against the advice of counsel, Burt subsequently changed his plea from not guilty to guilty. He was convicted and sentenced to death. Burt, 205 Ill.2d at 33-34, 275 Ill. Dec. 477, 792 N.E.2d 1250. In his postconviction petition, he asserted that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a fitness hearing. We affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the petition without a hearing. His petition alleged that his decision to plead guilty was irrational and illustrated that his `will had become flattened' and `his desire for self-preservation disappeared.' Burt, 205 Ill.2d at 40, 275 Ill.Dec. 477, 792 N.E.2d 1250. We found this allegation contradicted by the record, which revealed that he willfully rejected the advice of counsel and that he responded to the trial court's admonishments by stating that he wished to plead guilty. Burt, 205 Ill.2d at 40, 275 Ill.Dec. 477, 792 N.E.2d 1250. In addition, he clearly understood the consequences of a guilty plea, because the trial court informed him of these consequences and he stated that he `understood fully.' Burt also alleged that he had difficulty concentrating during court proceedings and pointed to a defense request for a continuance because he could not participate in jury selection as a result of his medication and difficulty sleeping. The trial judge granted the request. Later, when he attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, the court observed that he appeared to be alert in court and participated in his defense. Burt, 205 Ill.2d at 42, 275 Ill. Dec. 477, 792 N.E.2d 1250. Finally, Burt offered an affidavit from one of his trial attorneys, describing his frequent mood swings, his belligerent or explosive behavior, and his threat to become violent in the courtroom. He argued that this was evidence of a bona fide doubt of his fitness. Based on our review of the record, we concluded that these things did not affect his understanding of the proceedings or his ability to participate in his own defense. Burt, 205 Ill.2d at 43, 275 Ill.Dec. 477, 792 N.E.2d 1250. Thus, he failed to establish the prejudice prong of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Burt, 205 Ill.2d at 44, 275 Ill.Dec. 477, 792 N.E.2d 1250. In the present case, defendant offers only his use of psychotropic medication during trial and a bare assertion, without specific factual allegations, that he did not understand the proceedings. If the allegations in Burt, including the objectively verifiable fact that he required a continuance as a result of the effects of his medication, were insufficient to survive dismissal without a hearing, surely the allegations in the present case are insufficient. In People v. Harris, 206 Ill.2d 293, 276 Ill.Dec. 286, 794 N.E.2d 181 (2002), the postconviction petition included allegations that, at the time of trial, Harris suffered from depression, dependent personality disorder, and organic brain disorder. Harris, 206 Ill.2d at 302, 276 Ill.Dec. 286, 794 N.E.2d 181. His petition was accompanied by a report of a postconviction psychological assessment confirming these diagnoses. Harris, 206 Ill.2d at 303, 276 Ill.Dec. 286, 794 N.E.2d 181. Taking these allegations as true, we stated that they did not necessarily establish that he was unfit: In this case, the record clearly illustrates that defendant understood the nature and purpose of the proceedings. On several occasions, the court provided defendant with a detailed explanation of the proceedings and informed defendant of his rights during those proceedings. Following these admonishments, defendant stated that he understood. Furthermore, the record shows that defendant participated in his own defense; communicated and conferred with his trial counsel; expressed to the court his understanding of the proceedings, including his decisions to litigate rather than agree to a plea, waive his right to testify, and waive his right to a jury at the sentencing hearing; and articulated a clear statement in allocution during mitigation. Harris, 206 Ill.2d at 305, 276 Ill.Dec. 286, 794 N.E.2d 181. In the present case, despite his ingestion of psychotropic medication and his subsequent allegation that he did not understand the proceedings, petitioner also expressed to the court his understanding of the proceedings, including his decisions to waive his right to a jury and his right to testify. He also articulated a clear statement at his sentencing hearing. In People v. Johnson, 206 Ill.2d 348, 276 Ill.Dec. 399, 794 N.E.2d 294 (2002), we affirmed the dismissal of postconviction petition without evidentiary hearing where the petitioner claimed both that the trial court had actual doubts as to his fitness and failed to hold a fitness hearing and that certain facts existed that would have raised a bona fide doubt of his fitness had the trial court been aware of them at the time it accepted his guilty plea. Facts known to the trial court included an apparent suicide attempt at the time of his arrest that made the trial court attuned to the possibility that his mental state was less than stable. Johnson, 206 Ill.2d at 365, 276 Ill.Dec. 399, 794 N.E.2d 294. New facts alleged in the petition included his mother's testimony at the sentencing hearing regarding his history of mental illness and the report of the clinical psychologist, who testified at the hearing on petitioner's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Petitioner argued that the evidence developed after he pleaded guilty, when considered in combination with the information known to the trial court at the time, was sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt of his fitness to stand trial or to enter a knowing and intelligent guilty plea. Johnson, 206 Ill.2d at 361, 276 Ill.Dec. 399, 794 N.E.2d 294. We concluded that no bona fide doubt as to petitioner's fitness would have existed at the time he pleaded guilty, even if the trial court had been aware of the facts now available. Johnson, 206 Ill.2d at 373, 276 Ill.Dec. 399, 794 N.E.2d 294. We gave great weight to the fact that the trial court specifically inquired of defense counsel whether he had any concerns about his client's fitness and he replied that he did not. In addition, the trial court made a record of its own observations of the defendant in the courtroom setting and its opinion that he well understood what the proceedings were about. Johnson, 206 Ill.2d at 373, 276 Ill.Dec. 399, 794 N.E.2d 294. In the present case, when the trial court became aware that petitioner was taking psychotropic medication, it conducted a similar inquiry and counsel responded that he had no concerns about his client's fitness. Similarly, the trial court made a record of its own observations of petitioner in the courtroom setting, finding no indication of unfitness. See also People v. Moore, 189 Ill.2d 521, 536, 245 Ill.Dec. 95, 727 N.E.2d 348 (2000) (affirming dismissal of postconviction petition without evidentiary hearing where defendant exhibited rational and competent behavior at trial    engaged in colloquies with the trial judge in which he was responsive and appropriately acknowledged certain rights); People v. Shum, 207 Ill.2d 47, 278 Ill.Dec. 14, 797 N.E.2d 609 (2003) (affirming dismissal of postconviction petition without evidentiary hearing; petition accompanied by neuropsychiatrist's report that petitioner experienced auditory verbal memory retrieval problems as a result of a brain injury, social worker's report that petitioner had a family history of mental illness including schizophrenia, and report of psychiatrist that petitioner insisted on controlling his own case and refused to cooperate with counsel; these facts, if known at the time of trial would not have raised a bona fide doubt of fitness in light of fact that petitioner filed pro se motions, waived certain rights, and spoke clearly in allocution at sentencing). In sum, petitioner in the present case knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights, speaking clearly to the court during admonishments, and spoke clearly at his sentencing hearing. He points to no objectively verifiable fact in existence at the time of his trial, other than the mere fact of his taking psychotropic medication, that might suggest he was unfit. Like the petitioners in each of these cited cases, he has not made sufficient allegations, supported by affidavit or other form of proof, to demonstrate that a bona fide doubt of his fitness would have existed at the time of trial if the court had been aware of the facts. These cases can be distinguished in one important respect from the present case. That is, each of these cases is a capital case in which the petitioner likely had the assistance of counsel to prepare a postconviction petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a) (West 2006). Petitioner in the present case filed a pro se postconviction petition. As such, the standard of Hodges applies to his claim. Nevertheless, these capital cases do summarize this court's previous approach to using the record to assess postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to obtain a fitness hearing. If the records in these cases belied postconviction claims of unfitness for trial, the record in the present case surely belies petitioner's claim. Under the Hodges standard, the petitioner is not required to include legal argument or citation to authority. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill.2d 239, 244-45, 258 Ill. Dec. 753, 757 N.E.2d 442 (2001). However, he must still plead sufficient facts to assert an arguably constitutional claim. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d at 9, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204. This means that he must plead sufficient facts to create an arguable question of fact whether a bona fide doubt of his fitness to stand trial existed at the time of his trial had the trial court been aware of the facts now alleged. This court has had few occasions to address the first-stage dismissal of a pro se postconviction petition in a noncapital case. However, in People v. Hanson, 212 Ill.2d 212, 288 Ill.Dec. 114, 817 N.E.2d 472 (2004), a direct appeal, we reviewed the defendant's argument that his due process rights were denied because he was not given a fitness hearing. The defendant was convicted in a bench trial of aggravated battery and resisting a peace officer. Defense counsel requested a fitness evaluation, alleging in the motion that a bona fide doubt existed of his client's fitness to stand trial. Hanson, 212 Ill.2d at 214-15, 288 Ill.Dec. 114, 817 N.E.2d 472. The court ordered a psychiatric evaluation. The psychiatrist found the defendant fit and counsel withdrew the motion. Hanson, 212 Ill.2d at 215, 288 Ill.Dec. 114, 817 N.E.2d 472. One issue on appeal was whether the trial court's granting of the motion implicitly signaled the court's belief that there was a bona fide doubt as to defendant's fitness. Hanson, 212 Ill.2d at 216, 288 Ill.Dec. 114, 817 N.E.2d 472. We rejected the contention that the mere granting of a motion for a fitness hearing necessarily establishes a bona fide doubt. Hanson, 212 Ill.2d at 218, 288 Ill.Dec. 114, 817 N.E.2d 472. We then turned to the defendant's claim that the record supported a finding of bona fide doubt of his fitness to stand trial. We applied the Eddmonds factors to conclude that no such doubt existed: After reviewing the transcript of the pretrial proceedings, we cannot say that, under the first factor, defendant's conduct supports a finding of bona fide doubt. Defendant's demeanor and behavior during these proceedings were interested, rational, and appropriate. While a cold record may be an imperfect means of evaluating defendant's behavior and demeanor, we note that the trial court had the opportunity to observe defendant's conduct and demeanor firsthand during the proceedings, yet expressed absolutely no concerns about defendant's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings or to work with counsel. Hanson, 212 Ill.2d at 223-24, 288 Ill.Dec. 114, 817 N.E.2d 472. As to the second Eddmonds factor, we stated: [T]he motion for psychological examination filed by defense counsel asserted that `[c]ounsel feels that there exists a bona fide doubt as to whether the Defendant is able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him and assisting [ sic ] in his defense.' This court stated in Eddmonds, however, `an assertion by counsel that a defendant is unfit does not, of itself, raise a bona fide doubt of competency.' [Citation.] We do not give great weight to this factor in this case because the motion failed to provide any facts to substantiate counsel's `feeling' that doubt existed. Hanson, 212 Ill.2d at 224, 288 Ill.Dec. 114, 817 N.E.2d 472. And, as to the third Eddmonds factor, we stated: In Eddmonds, we recognized that the existence of a mental disturbance or the need for psychiatric care does not necessitate a finding of bona fide doubt since `[a] defendant may be competent to participate at trial even though his mind is otherwise unsound.' [Citation.] Here, the record shows that defendant had been diagnosed at various times with a lengthy list of problems, including organic personality and brain disorder or syndrome, alcohol dependence, dementia, seizure disorder, amnestic disorder, and bipolar disorder. Nonetheless, any connection these problems may have had to defendant's fitness at the time the motion was filed remains unexplained. Hanson, 212 Ill.2d at 224-25, 288 Ill. Dec. 114, 817 N.E.2d 472. The petitioner in the present case offers even less support for his claim that he should have been given a fitness hearing than did the defendant in Hanson. In Hanson, we did not give great weight to defense counsel's opinion that doubt existed about his client's fitness. Yet, the majority gives no weight at all to defense counsel's assertion that petitioner spoke very coherently to me, seemed fine, and that he had no problem communicating with him. Based on my review of the petition and the record, I find petitioner's claim to be factually baseless because he offers no new objectively verifiable evidence that, if true, would negate the clear record of his fitness at the time of trial. Further, if the quantum of evidence alleged in this petition is sufficient to create a bona fide doubt of fitness despite the record in this case, then all a postconviction petitioner must do to survive summary dismissal is to make a nonspecific allegation that he was confused at trial and did not understand what was happening. I do not believe that it was this court's intent in Hodges to preclude summary dismissal of a postconviction petition even when the claim raised therein is belied by the record.