Opinion ID: 4545108
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Claim: Asylum and Cancellation

Text: Moore primarily argues that he was denied due process because the discretionary denials of asylum and cancellation of removal were allegedly tainted by the IJ’s reliance on unproven allegations in criminal indictments and the IJ’s biased condemnation of Moore’s HIV status. We disagree. To prevail on a due process claim, a petitioner must show that he was deprived of a “full and fair opportunity” to present his case and resulting prejudice. Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008). “[W]hen an IJ’s conduct results in the appearance of bias or hostility such that we cannot conduct a meaningful review of the decision below, we remand.” Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2006). In finding Moore not credible and not worthy of a discretionary grant of asylum and cancellation of removal, the IJ relied heavily on one of Moore’s criminal indictments. While the agency may consider a record of conviction when considering discretionary relief, we have cautioned the agency against crediting the allegations in charging documents as true. See Padmore v. Holder, 609 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2010) (“While the BIA may consider . . . arrest reports, it may not base its decision denying relief upon the assumption that the facts contained in such documents are true.” (internal citation omitted)). That said, Moore has not demonstrated prejudice from the IJ’s reliance on the criminal indictments because the BIA’s denial of relief as an exercise of discretion was based on a de novo review of discretionary factors and did not rely on allegations in the indictment. To the contrary, the BIA concluded that positive factors were outweighed by undisputed facts admitted by Moore under oath: his years-long association with a gang and his conviction for conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. Accordingly, any error by the IJ was not repeated by the BIA. Moore also claims that the IJ was biased against him because of his HIV-positive status and his sexual relationships. But the IJ did not condemn Moore for being HIV positive and sexually active generally; instead, he was concerned that Moore’s current partner who was already healthcompromised had been unknowingly exposed to the virus. More critically, the IJ was not verbally 1 Moore has failed to demonstrate that our recent decision in Santana-Felix and other pertinent binding precedents do not apply here, much less that they have been abrogated. Where, as here, the petitioner’s conviction is for an inchoate offense, our decision in Santana-Felix governs our inquiry and confirms that, for purposes of applying the categorical approach, we consider the statute of the object of the conspiracy. See Santana-Felix, 924 F.3d at 55. That Moore’s inchoate offense of conviction was a misdemeanor, as opposed to a felony like in Santana-Felix, is of no moment to our analysis here. 4 abusive or hostile such that meaningful review was impossible, cf. Islam, 469 F.3d at 56, and there is no indication in the record that the IJ declined to exercise discretion in Moore’s favor because Moore was HIV positive.