Opinion ID: 2286082
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: There Was Sufficient Evidence Of Manslaughter.

Text: With respect to the charge of second-degree manslaughter, we note that if in the course of a robbery a participant other than the defendant commits an act of killing, the defendant may be judged complicit in the killing to the extent that his participation in the robbery establishes, with respect to the killing, a culpable state of mind, whether intent, aggravated wantonness, wantonness, or recklessness. Meredith v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.3d 500 (Ky.2005). To justify an instruction on second-degree manslaughter, which applies to wanton killings, KRS 507.040, the Commonwealth was required to prove that Quisenberry acted wantonly, i.e., that the robbery posed a substantial risk to Harper's life and that Quisenberry consciously disregarded that risk when he participated in the robbery. Repeating his argument that the evidence failed to establish his participation in the robbery, Quisenberry maintains that he likewise could not be deemed complicit in Harper's killing. As discussed above, however, there was sufficient evidence that Quisenberry joined in the robbery. His ability to describe the murder weapon to the detectives, moreover, permits an inference that he knew Williams was armed, and we have held that knowing participation in an armed robbery, where there is obviously a substantial risk that someone will be killed, may be deemed wanton, at least. Kruse v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 192 (Ky.1985). The trial court did not err, therefore, by instructing the jury on second-degree manslaughter.