Opinion ID: 2499407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Expressions of Personal Opinion About Peppers' Guilt

Text: Peppers argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct twice by giving a personal opinion about Peppers' guilt. Prosecutors must not state a personal opinion regarding the ultimate guilt or innocence of the defendant. The reason for prohibiting prosecutors from commenting on their opinion of the defendant's guilt is that such expressions of personal opinion are a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony, not commentary on the evidence of the case. State v. Corbett, 281 Kan. 294, 315, 130 P.3d 1179 (2006). See also State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 852, 257 P.3d 272 (2011); State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 766, 234 P.3d 1 (2010); State v. Miller, 284 Kan. 682, 717, 163 P.3d 267 (2007). But this court has allowed a directional statement by a prosecutor that can best be characterized as serving as an opening for the prosecutor's upcoming summation of the evidence. State v. Mann, 274 Kan. 670, 689, 56 P.3d 212 (2002). This court also has stated that a prosecutor's comments asking the jury not to let the defendant get away with the crime is in most instances permissible comment. State v. Finley, 273 Kan. 237, 244-45, 42 P.3d 723 (2002) (citing State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 332, 979 P.2d 679 [1999]). The first statement Peppers challenges as an expression of personal opinion about guilt was: Now, when [Peppers' counsel] finishes up, I'm going to have an opportunity to come talk to you again and when I do, I'm going to ask that you find this defendant, Antwan Peppers, guilty of murder in the first degree and guilty of attempted murder in the first degree. Why? Because he did it. Second, Peppers objects to the prosecutor's statement during the second segment of his closing argument: When you come back in after your deliberation after reviewing the evidence, you need to come in, you need to look at the defendant, and you need to tell him he's guilty and you need to look him in the eye and say you are guilty of murder and you are guilty of attempted murder because he is. It is permissible for a prosecutor to argue that the evidence demonstrates a defendant's guilt. For example, in Mann, 274 Kan. at 688-89, 56 P.3d 212, we approved of a prosecutor's statement near the beginning of closing argument that [t]he [S]tate believes that [the victim] was killed with premeditation intentionally, first degree, and this is why, which led into discussion of the evidence pointing to guilt. State v. Bennington, 293 Kan. 503, 530-31, 264 P.3d 440 (2011) (prosecutor's statementThat's what he diddid not exceed wide latitude afforded prosecutorwhen the prosecutor relating the facts to elements of crime). It is necessary, however, for a prosecutor to say something akin to the evidence shows defendant's guilt in order to make a statement merely directional and not an expression of the prosecutor's personal opinion. The prosecutor failed to include any directional language in this case, and we, therefore, hold that the two comments challenged by Peppers strayed into impermissible expressions of prosecutor's personal opinion on Peppers' guilt. This was misconduct and must be evaluated for plain error necessitating reversal. Under the second step of the prosecutorial misconduct analysis, this court must consider whether the remarks prejudiced the jury against Peppers and denied him of a fair trial. Three questions guide our analysis: Was the misconduct gross and flagrant? Does the misconduct show ill will? Was there a reasonable possibility that the misconduct affected the verdict? See State v. Chanthaseng, 293 Kan. 140, 148, 261 P.3d 889 (2011). In assessing whether gross and flagrant conduct has occurred, appellate courts should look to whether the prosecutor `repeated or emphasized the misconduct.' State v. Simmons, 292 Kan. 406, 417-18, 254 P.3d 97 (2011) (quoting State v. Madkins, 42 Kan.App.2d 955, 961, 219 P.3d 831 [2009]). Similarly, a prosecutor's ill will is usually `reflected through deliberate and repeated misconduct or indifference to a court's rulings.' Madkins, 42 Kan. App.2d 955, 961, 219 P.3d 831 (citing State v. Bunyard, 281 Kan. 392, 407, 133 P.3d 14 [2006]). Chanthaseng, 293 Kan. at 148-49, 261 P.3d 889. Gross and flagrant conduct may also be demonstrated by an accumulation of comments that would not individually be cause for reversal. Miller, 284 Kan. at 719, 163 P.3d 267. Ill will may be found when the prosecutor's comments were `intentional and not done in good faith.' [Citation omitted.] 284 Kan. at 719, 163 P.3d 267. Peppers argues that the prosecutor's misconduct in this case was repeated and that it violated the district judge's pretrial order in limine. In Peppers' view, this demonstrates that the improper comments by the prosecuting attorney were both gross and flagrant and the product of ill will. We disagree with these answers to the first two questions. The two comments were very brief and virtually identical. When seen as the minor component of argument that they were, they do not evidence indifference to the district judge's limine ruling. This is not a situation in which a prosecutor persisted in bad behavior after being warned or admonished contemporaneously by the trial judge. See, e.g., Inkelaar, 293 Kan. at 430, 264 P.3d 81 (quoting Madkins, 42 Kan. App.2d at 961, 219 P.3d 831) (a prosecutor's ill will is usually `reflected through deliberate and repeated misconduct or indifference to a court's rulings'). The remaining question is whether the State has demonstrated that there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected [the defendant's] substantial rights, i.e., that there is no reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict. Chanthaseng, 293 Kan. at 149, 261 P.3d 889. Peppers argues that the evidence was not direct and overwhelming because the State had no physical evidence that linked Mr. Peppers to the crime, and the witnesses who testified against Mr. Peppers were hardly credible. Although it is true that there was no physical evidence against Peppers, there was ample direct and circumstantial evidence in the form of eyewitness accounts that included multiple identifications and a detailed explanation of his possible motive. There was corroboration of Hayes-Osby's description of telephone calls and Kelley's account of Peppers' self-incrimination. We do not re-evaluate credibility a jury has already determined. See State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 543, Syl. ¶ 12, 256 P.3d 801 (2011). The relative weakness of Peppers' allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, combined with the cumulative magnitude of the evidence presented against him at trial, persuades us that there is no reasonable possibility the prosecutor's expressions of personal opinion about Peppers' guilt affected the jury's verdict. Chanthaseng, 293 Kan. at 149-50, 261 P.3d 889.