Opinion ID: 1708923
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was Jessica Harris denied due process?

Text: Under this assignment of error, Ms. Harris makes basically two arguments: (1) she was denied the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and (2) she was not given notice of the proceedings against her. To take the second issue first, it is clear Ms. Harris was served with a copy of the complaint. The record reflects she was served January 30, 1981. However, she argues she was not aware of the charges as it was necessary to have the charges explained. The complaint of the Commission aims predominantly at Parry Donaldson. The only allegations against Ms. Harris were as follows: I. That respondent Jessie M. Harris exercised little or no control and supervision of Respondent Donaldson and other salespersons working at the Sheleese Realty branch office at Highway 90 East, Ocean Springs, Mississippi, and that the Respondent Harris made infrequent visits to the above-mentioned branch office. XI. That the above conduct of Respondent Jessie M. Harris is in violation of Section 73-35-21(m), Mississippi Code of 1972, to-wit: ... Any act or conduct ... which constitutes or demonstrates bad faith, incompetency or untrustworthiness, or dishonest, fraudulent or improper dealing ... and Rule 6, Mississippi Real Estate Commission Rules and Regulations, to-wit: ... It shall be the duty of the broker to instruct his salesmen in regard to the fundamentals of real estate practice and the ethics of the profession and to exercise strict supervision of their real estate acivities ... In Miller v. State Board of Pharmacy, 262 So.2d 188 (Miss. 1972), this Court reversed and vacated an order by the Board of Pharmacy revoking a license for failure to keep adequate records. The Court was concerned that (1) no standards existed for determining what recordkeeping was adequate, and (2) even if such standards existed through interpretation of statutes, Miller was entitled to be told exactly what records were not kept adequately and in what respects they were inadequate. Miller, 262 So.2d at 190. The Court's concern was vagueness which prevented adequate preparation of a defense. The Court stated that definite, intelligible standards are required to give notice of what is required. The same may be true of the strict supervision rule of the Commission. However, as in Miller, this seems to us to be a question of vagueness. Most recently, this Court identified the required analysis when resolving a question of whether a regulation or statute is impermissibly vague in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: It is the foremost requisite of a legal system that there be general rules. Where those rules are not made clear and are not published and available to persons in the planning of their economic and social activities, the efficacy of the system is in substantial danger. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 46-51, 63-70 (rev. ed. 1969). These notions have acquired constitutional status. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926) states [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process.  269 U.S. at 391, 46 S.Ct. at 127-28, 70 L.Ed. at 328. An unconstitutionally vague statute or regulation is unenforceable. A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 242, 45 S.Ct. 295, 298, 69 L.Ed. 589, 594-95 (1925). Most of the void for vagueness cases have arisen in the context of criminal prosecutions. See ABC Interstate Theatres, Inc. v. State, 325 So.2d 123, 125 (Miss. 1976) (obscenity statute overbroad). It is clear however, that the doctrine applies to civil statutes and to regulations. See A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. at 237, 45 S.Ct. at 296, 69 L.Ed. at 592 (applied to civil statute); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 1760, 48 L.Ed.2d 243, 253 (1976) (applied to regulation). On the other hand, when the doctrine applies in the context of economic regulation its strictures are relaxed. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 371-372 (1982). A rule or standard is not objectionable merely because it is stated in general terms and is not susceptible of precise application. Familiar examples of such general standards abound in our law, e.g., negligence, unconscionability, fraud. We doubt anyone would seriously argue today that these standards are unconstitutionally vague. Transcontinental Gas Pipe v. State Oil and Gas Board, 457 So.2d 1298, 1323 (Miss. 1984) rev. on other grounds, 474 U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 709, 88 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986). It is said that a statute (or in this case a regulation) should be upheld if the statute does not implicate constitutionally protected conduct or it is not impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 369 (1982). This standard means that [a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law. Id. at 495, 102 S.Ct. at 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d at 369. Applying the vagueness analysis to this case does not provide comfort to Ms. Harris. The Commission found that Ms. Harris exercised little or no control over her sales personnel. Ms. Harris has no room to complain about any ambiguity in the term strick supervision. Whatever strict supervision means, it means more than no supervision. The only evidence which would refute the Commission's finding seems to be Ms. Harris' testimony that she did go by the office at least twice a week, and she did explain that any contracts should not be made without her knowledge or presence. This does not call the Commission's finding into question. Next, Ms. Harris argues that she was denied due process because she was not provided an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against her. In Love v. Mississippi State Board of Veterinary Examiners, 230 Miss. 222, 230-21, 92 So.2d 463, 467 (1956) this Court stated: Administrative agencies are, as a general rule, unrestricted by the technical or formal rules of procedure which govern trials before a court. However, in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers, the elementary and fundamental principles of a judicial inquiry should be observed. The inexorable safeguard which the due process clause assures in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial power is that the trier of facts shall be an impartial tribunal legally constituted to determine the right involved, that no finding shall be made except upon due notice and opportunity to be heard, that the procedure at the hearing shall be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial; and that it shall be conducted in such a way that there shall be opportunity for a court to determine whether the applicable rules of law and procedure were observed. 42 Am.Jur. 451, Public Administrative Law, par. 16. The right to a hearing in a case of this kind embraces not ony the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. Though the right to cross-examine witnesses may not have been specifically addressed in Love, Ms. Harris points out that Miss. Code Ann. § 73-35-23(a) (Supp. 1985) provides what could be interpreted to be a statutory right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. That section provides in part: The applicant or licensee or other violator shall have an opportunity to be heard thereon in person or by counsel, to offer testimony in his behalf and to examine witnesses appearing in connection with the complaint. Ms. Harris was given the opportunity to present witnesses in her behalf. The Commission also argues that Ms. Harris was given an opportunity to cross-examine Commission witnesses. The Commission relies on statements in the record attributed to the Commission chairman asking if anyone had additional questions for witnesses before they stepped down. Ms. Harris maintains that these comments were directed at counsel for Parry Donaldson or the Commission, but in any event could not be interpreted as providing a layman, unfamiliar with legal procedure the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. This argument ignores both the less stringent procedural requirements in administrative hearings and Ms. Harris' decision not to bring counsel to the hearing. No doubt had counsel for Ms. Harris been present he would not have been as timid as Ms. Harris in seeking to question witnesses. However, we do not agree that Ms. Harris' reluctance to assert her rights warrants reversal.