Opinion ID: 2570151
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Award of Attorney's Fees Was Reasonable.

Text: Taggart argues that Sabra should not have been awarded $5,000 in attorney's fees. He asserts that [t]here was no finding by the trial court that Sabra's financial condition in any way prohibited her from litigating the divorce action on a fairly equal plane. He also argues that it was inconsistent to award Sabra attorney's fees after the court concluded that she was not entitled to be reimbursed for credit card debt she incurred to pay for attorney's fees and the children's expenses. Taggart also argues that Sabra received a significant award in the form of mortgage payments and the property division. We will not reverse an award of attorney's fees unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly unreasonable. [37] The superior court did not need to make a specific finding that Sabra would be unable to litigate the divorce on a fairly equal plane. As Taggart recognizes, cost and fee awards in a divorce action are not to be based on the prevailing party concept, but primarily on the relative economic situations and earning powers of the parties. [38] Taggart acknowledges that the superior court awarded Sabra $5,000 [b]ased on the disparity in income between the parties. This was an adequate explanation for this award. We therefore affirm the $5,000 attorney's fees award. Although Taggart has prevailed on some issues on appeal, in Part III.A we affirmed the unequal property division. The amount in dispute as to the property division very substantially exceeds the total amounts in dispute as to issues on which Taggart prevailed at trial and as to those additional issues on which he may prevail on remand. We therefore decline to remand for reconsideration of the attorney's fees award.