Opinion ID: 2615014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Individual Counts of Misconduct

Text: As previously indicated, count 1 of the bar complaint alleged that the filing of the complaint against Harris, Palumbo, and Harris & Palumbo, P.C., in the Abril lawsuit violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. This litigation was based on two allegations of wrongdoing by Harris against Abril's interests: first, Harris' execution of the fee agreement with Piatt, and second, Harris' role in assisting Piatt in renewing the Johnson judgments against Abril. Abril's cause of action against Palumbo and, undoubtedly, Harris & Palumbo, P.C., was derivative of his claim against Harris for the judgment renewal, because at the time of the acts complained of, Harris and Palumbo were practicing together. [6] The suit alleged three causes of action against Harris: breach of contract, bad faith, and a request for a declaratory judgment that Harris take no fees from the Globe litigation. [7] The trial court found that defendants had established that Abril was not damaged by Harris' actions in entering the Piatt fee agreement or in consulting with Piatt regarding the judgment renewals: The Court has tried to disregard the animosity which exists between plaintiff's counsel and defendants' counsel. The Court has reflected upon plaintiff's testimony in his depositions. The Court must take as true that a wrong was suffered but no damage sustained. The Court concludes it is a very unusual plaintiff who brings a lawsuit when no loss has been sustained. It is also a very unusual plaintiff who finds fault with an attorney who has been so successful on the plaintiff's behalf. It is a very unusual plaintiff who would be concerned as to whether Harris or Levine & Harris, P.C. is the person or entity which might possibly, in the future, be entitled to a percentage of any recovery from an insurance company. The Court finds a portion of the case to be groundless. The Court finds a portion of the case was not brought in good faith. The Court finds a portion of the case was brought for harassment purposes. The Court finds this litigation has been motivated more by greed than the desire to rectify wrong. Because a majority of the case was brought without substantial justification, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349, defendants shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney[']s fees to be assessed against plaintiff's counsel. (Emphasis added.) The committee agreed with these findings, and independently concluded that respondent had no good faith basis for bringing the lawsuit and, in fact, brought the suit for the selfish motive of obtaining all of the Abril fee in the bad faith suit. The lawsuit was frivolous pursuant to E.R. 3.1, Rule 42, Rules of the Supreme Court. The commission adopted the findings of the committee, with one exception. The commission disagreed with the reasoning of both the trial court and the committee that Abril was not damaged by Harris' role in renewing the Johnson judgment because an existing excess judgment was necessary to show damages in the Globe bad faith litigation, recognizing that case law supported respondent's contention that a judgment need not necessarily exist in order to obtain relief in a bad faith suit. See generally Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 433 Mich. 525, 447 N.W.2d 691 (1989); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App.2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957). However, the commission found by clear and convincing evidence that the suit was frivolous under E.R. 3.1 on the basis that respondent brought the action for improper purposes. The Commission believes Respondent, only after the commencement of the disciplinary proceedings, began embracing the more noble purposes of extending, modifying or reversing the existing law. On appeal, respondent argues that both the committee and the commission erred in rejecting the opinions of his expert witnesses that the Abril v. Harris litigation was not frivolous. All four witnesses testified that they believed the merits of Abril's claims against Harris were objectively well-grounded in legal theory and factual basis. The committee rejected these opinions on the ground that they were based upon insufficient information. The Commission agreed. Respondent argues that these findings were factually incorrect. The simple answer to any allegation that either the committee or the commission misweighed the evidence before it is that this court is the ultimate trier of fact in disciplinary cases. In re Bowen, 160 Ariz. 558, 560, 774 P.2d 1348, 1350 (1989), citing In re Kersting, 151 Ariz. 171, 172, 726 P.2d 587, 588 (1986). From our own review of the expert testimony, it is apparent that respondent's witnesses had less than a complete story before them upon which to opine. For example, James W. Hill testified that he was not aware that Harris had agreed to credit Abril with any fees received from Johnson as a result of the Piatt fee agreement. He also assumed that the Johnson judgment would have abated but for Harris' assistance. In response to committee questions, Mr. Hill testified that if Harris was not the moving force in renewing the Johnson judgments, then Harris hasn't done anything to the detriment of Mr. Abril. Similarly, G. David Gage, respondent's strongest expert witness, testified that he had never talked to Abril or assessed his credibility, that he had never been provided with any documentation indicating that Abril might have known of the fee arrangement between Harris and Piatt, and had no knowledge whether respondent had discussed the potential liability of his own law firm with Abril before undertaking representation. Gene Gulinson testified that he was not provided with Piatt's deposition testimony establishing that Piatt called Harris regarding the renewal of the judgments, but that fact would obviate one of the causes of action against Harris. He also conceded that if the fee agreement resulted in Harris' crediting Abril with the Johnson fee payments, then Abril would be benefitted, not harmed, by the Harris-Piatt agreement. Finally, W. Thomas McLaughlin testified that he was not aware from the materials with which he was provided that Abril was credited with the amount Harris received from Johnson, and that he was under the impression that Harris reminded Piatt to renew the Johnson judgments. Under these circumstances, we agree with the committee and the commission that the opinions of these experts need not be accorded great weight in establishing the objective reasonableness of Abril's claims against Harris. [8] In reviewing the record as the ultimate trier of fact and law, and giving considerable deference to the bar's recommendation, we find that the record supports by clear and convincing evidence the above violations on this count. See In re Cardenas, 164 Ariz. 149, 151, 791 P.2d 1032, 1034 (1990). Respondent had previously assisted Abril in filing two bar complaints in April and May 1985, based on the same allegations, which the bar had dismissed as without merit. Additionally, respondent wrote a letter to the bar in June 1985 asking for reconsideration of those complaints. The committee properly recognized that the dismissal of a bar complaint does not necessarily preclude a right to file a lawsuit for substantive relief. However, the filing of a complaint based on these same grounds within a few days of the rejection of the bar complaints, seeking $41,300,000 in damages for conduct that was implicitly determined not to injure his client, lends strong support to the improper motive and objective unreasonableness of the theories asserted in the complaint against Harris and Palumbo.
Count 2 of the bar complaint alleges that respondent's filing of a petition for special action in the court of appeals from the award of attorney's fees in favor of Harris on summary judgment in the Abril litigation violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. The committee found that the special action was frivolous and totally lacking in merit because [a]t the time the Special Action was filed the trial court had not entered a final order on the issues complained of.... The commission also found the special action frivolous, but disagreed with the committee's reasons: Respondent correctly recognizes that special action proceedings do not require a final judgment.... However, special action proceedings do require the existence of an order, whether the order grants or denies the requested relief. The trial court, when Respondent filed the special action petition, had not entered any order against Respondent which required that he pay fees.... Under these circumstances, the Commission does not believe the appellate court had anything to review. On appeal to this court, respondent argues that both the committee and the commission erred in finding his special action frivolous on these grounds. We agree. Respondent sought special action relief from the trial court's minute entry ruling that [b]ecause a majority of the case was brought without substantial justification, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349, defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney[']s fees to be assessed against plaintiff's counsel. (Emphasis added.) The primary issues raised in the special action, besides the contention that the claims were not frivolous, were whether the trial court could apply A.R.S. § 12-349 to a cause of action that arose before the effective date of that statute, and whether a judgment for attorney's fees could be imposed against plaintiff's counsel, who was not a party to the action. Although the minute entry ruling had not been reduced to formal written judgment at the time the special action was filed, the minute entry clearly set forth an intent to impose fees against respondent personally. Special action jurisdiction could properly be invoked to review that intention. We therefore disagree with the committee that the special action required a final order, and we disagree with the commission that the special action required a ruling on an application for actual fees. Furthermore, the issue whether an attorney may appeal as a party to the litigation when attorney's fees are personally assessed against him had not yet been decided. This was later resolved as a matter of first impression on appeal in Abril v. Harris, 157 Ariz. 78, 754 P.2d 1353 (App. 1987). At the time the petition was filed, special action relief was an objectively reasonable basis to seek relief from a minute entry ruling that attorney's fees were to be awarded against plaintiff's counsel pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349, on the basis that the trial court was threatening to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority. See Rule 3(b), Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special Actions; see also Jacobson v. Superior Court, 1 Ariz. App. 342, 402 P.2d 1018 (1965) (extraordinary relief now encompassed in special action procedure is a preventive measure). We find no clear and convincing evidence of improper motive or bad faith on the record regarding the filing of the special action, and we therefore find no violation of E.R. 3.1 or 4.4 on count 2.
Count 3 of the bar complaint alleges that respondent's role in instituting and maintaining the appeal in the Abril v. Harris litigation violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. In that appeal, respondent argued that the trial court was legally incorrect in concluding that Abril had not been damaged by Harris' participation in Piatt's renewal of the Johnson judgments, because Globe was under no obligation to pay Johnson in the absence of an assignment in the bad faith suit. Prior to that appeal, respondent had filed a motion for new trial, motion to vacate judgment, motion to grant relief from the judgment, and motion to strike applications for award of attorney's fees in the trial court, all of which had been denied. In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals noted: We agree with the comments of the trial judge concerning the lack of merit to this case. A reading of the motions filed by appellants indicate the harassing nature of much, if not all, of them. We note that this appeal was filed January 22, 1987. The mandate of Division One of this court in Abril's case against Globe [reversing punitive damages but affirming compensatory damages of $300,000] issued on January 9, 1987. At the time this appeal was filed, Abril and his attorney knew that the judgments in favor of the injured pedestrian would be paid by Globe and that he would suffer no damage. We find this appeal frivolous. Abril v. Harris , 157 Ariz. at 81, 754 P.2d at 1356. The court of appeals awarded appellees attorney's fees and costs of $9,418.25 to be assessed against respondent personally. The committee found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent's conduct violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. The commission adopted the committee's findings, and added: The Commission believes the rationale which supports the Committee Findings regarding Count One supports the Committee Findings regarding this count. The Commission recognizes the arguments offered by Respondent regarding the absence of any obligation by Globe, the insurer, to satisfy the underlying judgment. The Commission gave import to Mr. Abril's insistence, at all times, that Mr. Johnson receive his money.... The conflict between Respondent's legal position, and Mr. Abril's directions regarding payment, strongly suggests the frivolous nature of Respondent's position. We agree with the findings of both the committee and the commission on this count. Regardless of whether the Globe award was owed to Johnson or to Abril, Abril consistently insisted that Johnson be paid the full amount of the judgment; whether that payment came from Globe or from Abril did not affect Abril's damages as respondent argues. Further, respondent was well aware, prior to filing the appeal, that Abril had not sustained any damages from the Harris-Piatt fee agreement, because Harris was crediting any amounts received from Johnson toward Abril's fees. On this record, we find clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4 by the conduct alleged in count 3.
Respondent petitioned for review of the decision following his appeal in count 3. We declined review, and awarded attorney's fees to defendants in the amount of $1,950. Count 4 of the bar complaint alleges that respondent's conduct in filing the petition for review violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. Both the committee and the commission found respondent in violation of those ethical rules without further discussion. For the same reasons that we find a violation on counts 1 and 3, we find that the record establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent's pursuing the same theories before the supreme court violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4.
Count 5 of the bar complaint alleges that respondent's institution and maintenance of the federal suit against Harris and others [9] seeking an injunction to prevent enforcement of the $7,586.25 judgment for attorney's fees imposed against him by the state trial court in the Abril v. Harris litigation discussed in count 1 violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. Respondent alleged in the federal court: That the tenor and effect of the aforesaid Order and Judgment of the aforesaid Superior Court, and the intent of the defendants herein, was to deny [respondent] his right to due process of law and his right to represent, as an attorney at law, a person of a minority group or class in a legal malpractice action by subjecting the plaintiff to recriminations therefore, and by conspiring to assess attorneys' fees against him without any notice or an opportunity to be heard thereon, and by conspiring to apply, under color of law, a statute of the State of Arizona [A.R.S. § 12-349], in a retroactive fashion, with the intent to deprive the plaintiff of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. On February 26, 1987, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the state court judgment was not reviewable by the federal district court. In reply to respondent's response, defendants requested attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for a defense to a civil rights action which was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. On April 20, 1987, respondent filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, stating that [b]y reason of the fact that the plaintiff now has sufficient funds to post a supersedeas bond to protect his property while he seeks redress in the State appellate courts, and, therefore, the issues raised by the plaintiff in his lawsuit are now moot and plaintiff's action should be dismissed. Accordingly, plaintiff requests that the court issue an Order dismissing this action without prejudice with each party to bear their own costs. Defendants opposed respondent's motion for voluntary dismissal, again requesting attorney's fees and arguing that the whole purpose of his Federal suit was to delay the state court proceedings until Plaintiff was able to secure funds to post the bond, in violation of Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On May 20, 1987, the federal judge dismissed the action with prejudice, and granted defendants an award of $500 towards their attorney's fees, for the following reasons: The court also finds sanctions are appropriate against the plaintiff under Fed. R.Civ.P. 11. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges the defendants conspired with the Superior Court judge to assess fees against the plaintiff personally. The complaint fails to specify however, how the defendants conspired with the judge nor at oral argument could he adequately propound a plausible theory. A reading of the complaint merely shows the defendants wished to execute on the state court judgment against the plaintiff. It is clear that plaintiff had no basis to allege that a conspiracy existed and therefore sanctions are appropriate under Rule 11.... (Emphasis added.) The committee found that the only basis for the federal court lawsuit was Respondent's penurious state and that there is no evidence that the named defendants and the Superior Court judge engaged in a conspiracy, and found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. The commission adopted the committee's findings, further stating that it believed respondent had a full and fair opportunity to argue about an award of attorney's fees in the Abril matter. On appeal, respondent argues that the federal suit was not frivolous because case law exists to support his theory that imposition of attorney's fees against a lawyer personally without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard violates due process. See, e.g., Tom Growney Equip., Inc. v. Shelley Irrigation Dev., Inc., 834 F.2d 833, 835-37 (9th Cir.1987). He also argues that the federal court dismissed his suit not for failure to state a claim, but because of the abstention doctrine of Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 6-8, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1523-24, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). [10] Respondent's arguments overlook the fact that the underlying basis for his federal suit was an allegation, unfounded by any evidence, of a conspiracy between the superior court judge and the defendants to violate his due process rights, which was not an objectively reasonable legal theory under the facts. Additionally, respondent has freely admitted that his subjective purpose in bringing the federal suit was to delay enforcement of the state court judgment until he could raise funds for a supersedeas bond, and when this was accomplished, he sought dismissal of the federal action. We have no difficulty in adopting the findings of the committee and commission as supported by clear and convincing evidence, and find respondent in violation of E.R. 3.1 and 4.4 on count five of the bar complaint.
Counts 6, 7, and 8 of the bar complaint alleged that respondent's institution and maintenance of the suit, appeal, and petition for review of Abril's claims against attorney M. Byron Lewis violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. The original complaint filed in the Abril v. Harris litigation asserted a cause of action against Lewis based upon a theory of strict liability for unauthorized representation, and sought damages of $1,300,000. As previously indicated, the sole involvement of Lewis in the Globe appeal was to ascertain that he could not undertake the offered appellate assistance because of a conflict of interest in his firm. [11] On May 31, 1985, respondent phoned Lewis and advised him that Lewis had been named as a defendant in Abril's suit, and would soon be served with process. Lewis informed respondent of the above facts regarding his limited involvement, and respondent advised him that he would look into the matter and would probably be dismissing the lawsuit as to Lewis. On June 3, 1985, Lewis wrote to respondent, memorializing their phone conversation; he also indicated that no fees were generated to either Harris or Abril as a result of his receipt of the materials from Harris. Lewis' letter concluded: Based on this information, it is my understanding that you will have me dismissed as a defendant from this lawsuit. Due to the fact that I currently have some financing pending with First Federal for some remodeling work I am having done to my home, I would appreciate it if you would make arrangements for immediate dismissal of this lawsuit as to me. Otherwise, it may show up as a contingent liability on a credit check which could hinder the First Federal financing. Respondent testified that when Abril read the letter from Lewis indicating Lewis had a conflict of interest, that kind of just caused [Abril] again to go up the wall, because that was the basis of his complaint against Harris regarding the Piatt fee agreement, and Abril would not let respondent dismiss Lewis from the suit. Lewis called respondent 18 or 19 days after the complaint was filed, and respondent advised that he was not going to dismiss Lewis from the suit. Abril testified that he believed that Lewis had files in his possession that were essential to the case, that would cause him to lose the Globe appeal. On July 23, 1985, Lewis moved for summary judgment and requested an award of costs and fees, arguing that, even if a cause of action for unauthorized representation existed, the undisputed facts established that he never represented Abril, having declined representation after performing a conflicts check. He also argued that, because respondent knew of this limited involvement, he should be assessed attorney's fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(C) and Rule 11 for a frivolous, vexatious, bad faith claim. Respondent responded that plaintiff is agreeable to a dismissal provided that said dismissal is without the imposition of attorney's fees and costs upon either the plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel, but argued that Lewis was liable under the theory of unauthorized representation set forth in Journal-Miner Publishing Co. v. Curley, 31 Ariz. 280, 252 P. 187 (1927). In granting summary judgment in Lewis' favor, the trial court found the claim against Lewis was known by the plaintiff and his counsel to be groundless after a telephone conversation with Lewis on May 31, 1985, and after receipt of a letter from Lewis dated June 3, 1985. The court concluded that Abril had failed to support his legal theory of strict liability for unauthorized representation. The court granted fees after finding that the suit against Lewis was frivolous, that respondent had shown no facts from which he could surmise Lewis held confidential information, and that the suit constituted harassment. Respondent then filed a Motion for a New Trial, as well as a Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for a New Trial Regarding Award of Attorney's Fees, challenging the court's finding of bad faith and the award of fees; all of these motions were denied. The trial court awarded $3,455.50 in fees to Lewis against Abril. Respondent appealed only from the award of fees. His appeal was based only on the claim that his suit against Lewis was not frivolous or groundless. The court of appeals affirmed, and awarded attorney's fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(C) and § 12-349. Abril v. Lewis, 2 CA-CV 87-0023 (Ariz. App. mem. dec. filed May 12, 1987). The court awarded Lewis attorney's fees of $7,373.75 and costs, and $1,500 in damages against respondent personally. Respondent then filed a petition for review with this court, which was denied, with an additional award of fees to Lewis of $3,907.50. In finding the claim against Lewis to violate E.R. 3.1 and 4.4, the committee remarked: [F]rom the outset the incredible number of motions, papers, the appeal and the petition were generated solely to avoid the sanction of fees and costs. Lewis' law firm was compelled to pay approximately $13,000 in fees to Lewis' lawyer to successfully defend what the Committee finds to be a wholly frivolous and groundless action.... Respondent relies on Journal-Miner Publishing Company v. Curley, 31 Ariz. 280, 252 P. 187 (1927) as support for naming Lewis in the lawsuit.... The Committee's reading of Journal-Miner finds that an employed attorney does have the authority to hire associate counsel but without ratification of such hiring by the client the associate counsel can only look to the hiring lawyer for compensation, not to the client. See 31 Ariz. at 283 [252 P. at 188]. Respondent's reading of the case is not supported by the language of the case itself. The commission adopted the findings of the committee, further noting: The Commission finds Respondent's conduct, with respect to Byron Lewis, especially egregious.... Mr. Lewis conducted himself properly throughout his brief involvement in this matter. Still, Respondent sued him.... Respondent cannot demonstrate an unauthorized representation by Mr. Lewis, even if a cause of action for unauthorized representation exists or could exist under an extension of existing law. On appeal, respondent argues that the committee and commission erred in considering that respondent's motive in continuing with the claim against Lewis was avoidance of the fees, because the only conduct charged in count 6 is the act of filing the complaint in the first instance. This statement is factually incorrect: the complaint clearly charges respondent with instituting and maintaining the claim against Lewis in the trial court, on appeal and on review. Respondent's actions during the entire litigation could therefore be considered. We agree with the findings of the committee and commission regarding counts 6, 7, and 8. Respondent's institution of the claim against Lewis was not objectively reasonable under the theory of Journal-Miner, which involved the issue of a client's obligation for payment of fees to an unauthorized associate counsel, nor was it reasonable given the facts of Lewis' limited involvement with Abril's appeal. Lewis was harassed for over two years by this unfounded and unreasonable claim, during which time respondent was made aware consistently, by every court that considered the matter, of the groundless nature of this claim. The record contains clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4 as charged in counts 6, 7, and 8 of the bar complaint.
Count 9 of the bar complaint alleges that respondent's institution and maintenance of the suit against attorney John R. Cunningham on behalf of Abril violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. As with Lewis, the cause of action against Cunningham was for strict liability for unauthorized representation. Count 9 of the bar complaint was based on the following facts. As previously indicated, Cunningham had been employed by Harris to assist with the appellate brief in the Globe appeal. Harris agreed to pay Cunningham directly for his work; Abril was not to be billed for Cunningham's work. Harris testified that Cunningham spent an enormous amount of time on the brief. Harris testified that Abril fired him a few days before the brief was due; Harris did not feel that respondent could prepare an appropriate brief on such short notice, and, because he was still counsel of record, Harris testified: I was very concerned about protecting that judgment. I was concerned about it, quite frankly, about protecting it for me, because I had what I believed to be a vested, accrued interest in 1.3 million dollars. Cunningham testified that he did not believe Abril had an absolute right at that point to fire Harris because of Harris' contingent interest in the judgment. Because Cunningham and Harris were still counsel of record in the court of appeals, Cunningham felt, in my opinion we had not only a right but a duty on behalf of the client as counsel of record to proceed with our representation. Cunningham testified that, shortly before the brief was filed, respondent called him, advising me that he was going to be taking over as Abril's counsel, and asking if I would be interested in continuing my association but with him as opposed to with Harris & Palumbo. Cunningham declined. On August 5, 1985, Kenneth J. Sherk, Cunningham's counsel, and respondent agreed by phone to enter into a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice, with each party to bear their own fees and costs. On August 8, Sherk sent a proposed stipulation to respondent, which included respondent's concession that there was not nor is there now, a valid claim, in fact or law, against defendant John R. Cunningham.... On August 16, respondent returned the unsigned stipulation to Sherk, with the following explanation: I cannot in good faith sign the Stipulation which you proposed for several reasons. First of all, the language of the order is not true. Secondly, it could expose my client and myself to a separate lawsuit in tort for abuse of civil process or malicious civil prosecution. Thirdly, I certainly don't want to give Judge Hendrix the erroneous impression that my client or I go around filing lawsuits against people for no reason. Such an impression could prejudice my client's case against the remaining defendants. On September 10, 1985, Sherk sent respondent a revised form of stipulation, providing that Cunningham would not only waive his claim for attorney's fees and costs, but also for any claim for damages. Sherk also noted that the trial court had dismissed Lewis and granted attorney's fees, and that, if respondent did not sign the stipulation without further delay, Cunningham would also move for summary judgment with an award of fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(C) and Rule 11. On September 13, respondent replied: I, of course, will leave to my client the final decision as to whether or not to sign your proposed Stipulation. All I can tell you is that I do not like the form that you have proposed, because it ask[s] me to stipulate to an Order that contains language that is not true. There was and is a valid claim against John R. Cunningham for willfully undertaking to represent my client after he had actual notice that he had been discharged[.] I believe that his conduct violated Rule 29(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and subjects him to liability to my client. As I have told you many times, my client is willing to dismiss your client with prejudice with each party to bear their own costs but with no other agreement or stipulation of any kind. If this is not agreeable to your client, I certainly don't have any objection to his remaining in the litigation if he insists on this. On December 6, 1985, after Sherk had noticed Abril's deposition at his office, Sherk again returned the proposed stipulation to respondent. On December 13, respondent replied: My client will not authorize me to sign your proposed Stipulation, but wishes me to proceed with a motion for summary judgment and to seek attorney's fees and costs, by reason of the defenses which you interposed in this matter which have caused my client unnecessary delay and a needless increase in the cost of this litigation. On December 19, 1985, Sherk deposed Abril, who testified that he had never spoken to Cunningham, nor paid him any fees. Abril had left the decision whether to dismiss Cunningham to respondent, in his best judgment. On December 26, 1985, Sherk spoke to respondent again about the stipulation; they agreed to change the language to indicate that no valid claim existed against Cunningham at the present time, because respondent was concerned about potential Rule 11 violations and state bar disciplinary proceedings if he conceded that there never was a valid claim against Cunningham. On January 16, 1986, the parties signed the stipulation, and on January 21, 1986, the trial court ordered Cunningham dismissed from the suit. Sherk testified that his fees for representation of Cunningham in this matter totalled $9,700.65, which was paid for by Harris' malpractice carrier. Cunningham testified that his inclusion in this suit had a financial impact on him both personally and professionally because he was required to report the suit to his malpractice carrier for a five-year period, and the suit caused a tremendous amount of trouble with his mortgage lender while he was purchasing a home in late 1985, and untold grief in getting his family moved into their new home. In finding ethical violations on this count, the committee noted the long delay in respondent's dismissal of Cunningham after respondent had conceded that Abril had no claim, and noted, Respondent's actions in pursuing Cunningham are truly perplexing in light of Respondent's attempt to hire Cunningham to continue to prepare the Abril brief after Harris was discharged by Abril. The committee concluded, there was no good faith basis to file suit against Cunningham, the suit was frivolous and the delay in dismissing the case was due to Respondent's selfish motive of avoiding sanctions and his apprehension of a bar complaint. The commission adopted the committee's finding and, in addition, noted, The Commission finds the suit against Mr. Cunningham only slightly less offensive than the suit against Mr. Lewis, as Mr. Cunningham did provide legal services on behalf of Mr. Abril. (Emphasis in original.) On appeal, respondent argues again that, because the commission expressly recognized that a cause of action for unauthorized representation might reasonably be argued, no ethical violation for a frivolous claim can exist. He also argues that the commission erred in considering respondent's personal motives. As we have previously discussed, respondent's motives are relevant to whether he presented a good faith claim. Furthermore, even assuming, without deciding, that the legal basis of the claim against Cunningham was objectively reasonable when made, we find that respondent's actions in delaying the dismissal for months after he had acknowledged he had no claim against Cunningham violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. We therefore agree with the committee and commission that the ethical violations in count 9 were established by clear and convincing evidence.
Count 10 of the bar complaint, as amended, charged that respondent's actions in instituting and maintaining the Levine, P.C. litigation (P.C. litigation) in April 1983 against Harris, Palumbo, and their professional corporation, violated former Rule 29, DR 7-102(A)(1) [12] and DR 7-102(A)(2). [13] This count also alleged that respondent's actions in 1987 in refiling a portion of Abril's action for a declaratory judgment seeking to deprive Harris of the Abril fee, which had been previously dismissed without prejudice, violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. We have previously discussed the multiple suits that respondent filed arising out of the breakup of his seventeen-month relationship with Harris. After unsuccessfully pursuing arbitration appeals and bar complaints, respondent, as sole shareholder and director of his professional corporation, instituted suit on behalf of the professional corporation in superior court against himself, his wife, Harris, Palumbo, their wives, and their professional corporation. Respondent's reason for pursuing modification of the arbitration award through the courts was that the award was unenforceable because it did not specify a sum certain nor give a description of the specific assets awarded him. [14] He brought the additional 1983 P.C. litigation against Harris and Palumbo because he did not believe the professional corporation was a party to the arbitration litigation, and that the corporation had an independent right to a determination of its property rights in the assets divided by the arbitration award. He believed the P.C. suit was kind of a technical kind of lawsuit. It was not a lawsuit and [I] never looked upon it as being anything other than a determination of property rights, and he noted that another attorney initially represented the corporation in that action. Additionally, in 1987 respondent refiled, on behalf of Abril, the declaratory judgment portion of the Abril v. Harris litigation that had been previously dismissed without prejudice as premature. [15] After years of litigation, Harris and Palumbo eventually prevailed with sanctions against respondent for frivolous and harassing suits. In granting summary judgment for defendants in the consolidated litigation and awarding fees against respondent, the trial court specifically found that respondent's claims constituted harassment, were groundless and not made in good faith. It further found that the legal theories present were minimal, and that Harris had requested fees in the sum of $196,304. The trial court awarded $150,000 in fees against respondent, his wife, and his professional corporation. In finding these suits frivolous and brought in bad faith, the committee also determined that the suit resulted from Respondent's desire to secure for himself the fee for Harris' work in Abril's bad faith case. The committee found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent's conduct in filing the P.C. litigation in 1983 violated former Rule 29, DR 7-102(A)(1) and DR 7-102(A)(2), and that respondent's conduct in refiling the 1987 Abril suit violated Rule 42, E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. We agree with the findings of the commission on this count. The claims asserted in the 1983 P.C. litigation had been finally and fully litigated in the arbitration award, which had been confirmed by the superior court, affirmed in the court of appeals, and was the subject of a judgment on mandate; as the trial court correctly concluded, those claims were res judicata as to the professional corporation. We find incredible respondent's contention that he believed his professional corporation was not a party to the arbitration. We further find outlandish his argument that he cannot be held accountable for the P.C. litigation because he did not act as the corporation's attorney on the case. As the committee pointed out, no evidence was presented that anyone other than respondent had control over the professional corporation. Furthermore, we agree with the committee's conclusion that respondent continued the Abril litigation in 1987 not in the interests of his client, but to claim for himself Harris' portion of the contingency fee in that case. In the nine years of this litigation, respondent exhibited unusual animosity toward his former partner and his associates, coupled with a concerted refusal to acknowledge the unreasonableness of his legal position in pursuing these claims. As the commission noted, respondent's actions caused the expenditure of substantial sums, by lawyers, insurance companies and the court systems. The ethical violations alleged in count 10 of the bar complaint are supported by clear and convincing evidence.
As originally pleaded, count 14 of the bar complaint alleged: During the course of the lawsuits instituted on behalf of Anthony Aleman Abril, Jr., set forth in Counts 1-10 above, and through the dissolution proceedings of Levine and Harris, P.C., since 1981 through and including September 6, 1989, you have violated or attempted to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct and Code of Professional Responsibility then in effect by knowingly doing so or doing so through the acts of another. Your conduct violates Rule 29 of the Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court then in effect at the time, specifically DR 1-102 and 9-102 and Rule 42 of the Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court, specifically E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. On the sixth day of testimony before the committee, bar counsel amended the complaint to change the violation of E.R. 4.4 to a violation of E.R. 8.4, [16] due to a typographical error. Both the committee and respondent expressed confusion about the scope of this count throughout the proceedings. Addressing counts 13 and 14 in his opening statement, respondent stated, I submit it really does amount to a ... denial of due process ... for me or anyone to have to defend against allegations that are almost nine years old. [17] Bar counsel, during his opening statement, explained that count 14 was an overlying count. He later explained that count 14, in essence combines the previous counts alleging that the course of conduct by Mr. Levine throughout these proceedings has been in violation of the Ethical Rules and the Disciplinary Rules then in effect at the time. No explanation was offered as to how count 14 added any further allegation of misconduct to the previously alleged counts. After several days of testimony, a committee member questioned whether any of the counts included misconduct regarding that portion of the Abril v. Harris suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Harris should not be entitled to attorney's fees in the Globe litigation. Bar counsel responded that that portion of the Abril suit was included in count 14, because count 14 relates to the entire activity of Jack Levine. At the end of the sixth day of testimony, after respondent had finished his direct testimony on all the counts except for count 14, bar counsel stated, the thrust of Count 14 is the declaratory judgment action filed by Mr. Abril that had been previously dismissed. The following dialogue then occurred between bar counsel and the committee members: MR. CASE: Clarify for me, please, before we start, what lawsuit does Count 14  [BAR COUNSEL]: Count 14 is a lawsuit  let me explain that  is a count that alleges the conduct encompassed by the first 13 counts. Specifically in that count it deals with cause number ... [CV] 87-05413 [Abril's second declaratory judgment action against Harris]. MR. COPPLE: I think part of our concern in trying to figure out the allegation in Count 14 just says during the course of the Abril lawsuits alleged or set forth in Counts 1 through 10. [BAR COUNSEL]: Right. If you look at Count 10 itself it mentions the consolidated actions including CV 87-05413. MR. COPPLE: So what you are doing in essence is realleging the misconduct or the allegations in 1 through 10 and saying that he did that through Mr. Abril? [BAR COUNSEL]: Right.... He has answered all of them, the discussion of the Cause Number 87-05413. MR. COPPLE: Okay. As I read that then, my understanding of that as a Committee member, Jack, is that the State Bar has limited the allegations under Count 14, that whatever misconduct was alleged against you in 1 through 10 individually, that now they say that was also misconduct by doing it through Anthony Abril; is that correct? Because you say through the acts of another. [BAR COUNSEL]: Uh-hum, that is correct. .... MR. COPPLE: Okay. If that's the way the State Bar is telling us it [interprets] Count 14, then I think your testimony need only be limited to your position. Did you try to do all of this through Anthony Abril? MR. LEVINE: ... Are we not going to deal with the second declaratory judgment action? [BAR COUNSEL]: Well, yes, let me explain, and I will take some blame for the confusion in here. Count 10 originally as alleged was to encompass the series of consolidated actions in this case. Upon my review of the notes and the evidence that I had to compile I realized that I wanted to, in fact, limit the discussion in that particular count to the Cause Number 485866. It is my contention and understanding that the cause number which is the declaratory judgment action could also be encompassed under either Count 10 or Count 14 since that was all part of the consolidated actions. The cause number which is the declaratory judgment action in CV 87-05413, which are Exhibits 95 through 104, are simply the reallegation of the declaratory judgment action that existed in the original complaint in 546215 which makes up Counts 1 through 4. But merely when the court dismissed that without prejudice, that was reasserted in the new Cause 87-05413. Now Mr. Abril is being represented by Mr. Levine in this action. MR. LEVINE: All right. I'd like to testify to clarify this, because I know what he's getting at. I think I can explain it and get it clear in your minds. Because of the lateness of the day, however, respondent's testimony regarding this count was continued until the next hearing date, six days later. Before respondent's testimony, bar counsel moved to amend count 14 as noted above, without objection from respondent. Bar counsel further clarified the relationship of the other counts to count 14, changing his position from the previous hearing: [BAR COUNSEL]: Count 10  let me preface this just briefly. Count 10 was to deal with ... the activities that arose from the consolidated actions, specifically there were two cause numbers that were to be brought before the Disciplinary Committee, Cause Number 485866. The other cause number was CV 87-05413. Previously I had indicated that the evidence under CV 87-05413 could come in under Count 14. That was erroneous in talking about that in the fact that I think Friday, at the end of the day I was being questioned on it, and that's erroneous. Bar counsel then amended count 10 to include the second declaratory judgment action by Abril, CV 87-05413, as a violation of E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. When respondent began his testimony regarding count 14, he mentioned cause number CV 87-05413, the second Abril declaratory judgment action against Harris, and explained, which is the subject of Count 14, without correction from bar counsel or the committee. At the end of his testimony about that action, he concluded his presentation of evidence. In closing argument, bar counsel argued: That's what Count 14 is about. It's the use of Mr. Abril or the use of Mr. Thrasher or the use of Mr. Cohen [in the P.C. litigation] to conduct or circumvent the rules of  the Disciplinary Rules or to violate the Ethical Rules. In making his recommendation for sanctions, bar counsel stated: Count 14, since it is merely a reiteration of the counts of 1 through 10, it's the same recommendation as to counts 1 through 10. In its report, the committee made the following relevant findings regarding count 14: Count 14 alleges that Respondent violated the ethical rules by using others to circumvent the rules in filing the actions specifically set forth in Counts 1 through 10. Bar counsel argues that Respondent committed ethical violations through the use of others to be counsel to his professional corporation and by using Abril as a nominal plaintiff when the lawsuits were actually for Respondent's benefit. The Committee finds that Respondent's conduct in having his professional corporation sue Respondent and Harris for among other things conversions and breaches of fiduciary duty is conduct which violates Ethical Rules 8.4(a), (c), and (d).... The Committee finds that the violation of E.R. 8.4(c) is that of misrepresentation; the misrepresentation being the allegation of serious breaches on the part of Harris which Respondent knew to be false. (Emphasis added.) The committee also found the damages request in the original complaint in Abril v. Harris to be absurd monetary claims that damaged the original defendants in that suit by making it difficult for them to obtain malpractice insurance, and found by clear and convincing evidence, without further discussion of the client's involvement, that Respondent's conduct set forth in Counts 1-10 violates E.R. 3.1 and E.R. 8.4, Rule 42, Rules of the Supreme Court and DR 1-102, [18] former Rule 29. Regarding count 14, the commission adopted the findings of the committee without discussion. On appeal, respondent complains that count 14 does not identify any specific conduct that is alleged to be improper, and fails to give respondent due process notice of its scope. The state bar merely responds that the committee's findings speak for themselves. Given the above history of the confusion regarding the scope of this count by not only the committee but bar counsel, we must agree with respondent that count 14 fails to adequately charge respondent with the misconduct that the committee found on this record. As originally charged, count 14 added nothing to the allegations already contained in counts 1 through 10 of the complaint. However, bar counsel's belated attempt to amend the count to charge a violation of E.R. 8.4 added a new theory that the conduct in counts 1 through 10 were also unethical as performed through the acts of another. This might have been a viable theory on this record if bar counsel had not limited and changed the scope and breadth of count 14 continually through the hearings until it became, in our opinion, almost incomprehensible to defend against, as evidenced by respondent's belief, after long discussion over several days, that count 14 now alleged only the second Abril suit for declaratory relief against Harris, and as also evidenced by the committee's apparent confusion about which lawsuits were included in count 14. Bar counsel has the discretion to move to amend a bar complaint to conform to the proof or to include further charges at any time before or during the disciplinary hearing; however, respondent must be given a reasonable opportunity to respond to the amendment. Rule 55(a), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court. We normally will not invalidate a finding of misconduct by the committee due to a technical error in bar counsel's pleading. Rule 54(i), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court. However, a greater concern guides us in this circumstance: a lawyer has the right to procedural due process in a disciplinary proceeding. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968); In re Myers, 164 Ariz. 558, 795 P.2d 201 (1990); In re Riley, 142 Ariz. 604, 691 P.2d 695 (1984). In Riley, we construed the procedural due process guarantee in Ruffalo to allow amendment to a bar complaint during the proceedings to add additional violations if respondent had ample opportunity to respond. 142 Ariz. at 609, 691 P.2d at 700. Additionally, Ruffalo requires that such amendment not be based upon respondent's testimony prior to his knowledge of the amended allegations. 390 U.S. at 551, 88 S.Ct. at 1226. In Myers, we found that, absent such amendment and opportunity to respond, elemental due process would be violated by finding that respondent had committed uncharged ethical violations. 164 Ariz. at 562, 795 P.2d at 205. Here, an allowable amendment was made, but charged a violation so broad and vague that extensive and inconclusive explanation was required throughout the proceedings to unsuccessfully define its scope. Under these circumstances, count 14 did not meet procedural due process by giving respondent either notice of the alleged acts of misconduct or any realistic opportunity to defend himself against them. We therefore do not accept the commission's findings as to this count, and we strike count 14 from the amended complaint.