Opinion ID: 765236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Test to be applied

Text: 38 In a search for guidance in light of these numerous volleys back and forth regarding the meaning of similar, we turn first to some fundamental concepts. We use basic statutory construction rules when interpreting the Guidelines. See United States v. Lewis, 93 F.3d 1075, 1080 (2d Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has observed, in cases involving statutory construction, our starting point must be the language employed by Congress, and we assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (internal quotations and citations omitted). So, 'unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.' Harris v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1992)(quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). Therefore, our first step in interpreting § 4A1.2(c) must be to determine the ordinary or common meaning of similar. 39 According to Webster's Dictionary, similar is defined as having characteristics in common; very much alike; comparable. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2120 (Philip Babcock Gove, ed., 1981). The government itself states that the plain meaning of similar is 'nearly corresponding; resembling in many respects.' (quoting Harris, 128 F.3d at 854)(emphasis supplied). Given these definitions, we find that the broader interpretation of similar used in the multifactor test imparts to similar its regular or ordinary meaning better than the limited interpretation used in the elements approach. While this alone seems very persuasive to us, we think that some of the arguments referred to above deserve further analysis. 40 First, as to the alternative language theories propounded by Martinez and the government, the arguments above demonstrate that each can imagine language that, had it been used, would have better communicated the Commission's intent to define similar more narrowly or more expansively. However, since each points to language that would discredit the other's theory, if only the section were so written, we find these arguments ultimately not dispositive here. 41 On the other hand, we do find Martinez's statutory construction argument helpful. We agree, that at a minimum, we should read the language offenses similar to them to include some offenses beyond the Listed Offenses. To do otherwise would violate a basic rule of statutory interpretation: avoid reading statutory language in a way that would in any way make some of its provisions surplusage. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). Therefore, we reject the government's suggestion that we read § 4A1.2(c) as an attempt merely to circumvent variations in state petty crime nomenclature. 42 Moreover, we are not persuaded by the government's argument that the multifactor test is in tension with the structure of the Guidelines. While actual sentence imposed is a threshold condition for exclusion of prior offenses under § 4A1.2(c)(1), but not under § 4A1.2(c)(2), this does not mean that consideration of prior sentence length in assessing similarity is expressly foreclosed under (c)(2). Nor does it mean that maximum sentence length may not be considered by a district court at a later stage in the similarity inquiry under either (c)(1) or (c)(2). Instead, we view the inclusion of sentence length as a condition for exclusion under § 4A1.2(c)(1) as an indication that the Sentencing Commission found sentence length particularly useful in decidingwhether a prior offense should be counted in a defendant's criminal history. But most importantly, we think the government misconstrues the purpose of looking to the sentence under the multifactor approach. Consideration of sentence length simply offers a court another variable by which to assess the overall seriousness of the unlisted offense. It is not meant to limit the inquiry to only a comparison of past punishments. See Harris, 128 F.3d at 854. 43 As for the Guidelines goal of sentencing certainty, the government may be correct that a narrow reading of similar would lead to the most predictable results. However, the Guidelines are not solely concerned with certainty. They also seek fairness. By using an indeterminate word like similar, the Commission signaled its intent to sacrifice some certainty for a commensurate amount of flexibility and resulting fairness. Interpreting similar more broadly reduces the likelihood that defendants will suffer excessively heavy increases of sentence under the criminal history axis because of relatively trivial misconduct. Further, we feel confident that granting to the district courts this additional flexibility generally will not result in wildly varied sentences. And in those rare cases where the district court veers off course, the similarity inquiry raises an issue of law. As such, we review de novo the district court's decision to include or exclude a prior offense under § 4A1.2(c). 44 We reject the government's argument that this issue does not really matter, since only four criminal history points are in play and the court can always depart downward under § 4A1.3. First, four points can in some circumstances greatly increase a defendant's sentence range, 5 and even one extra month in jail is significant from a defendant's point of view. As to the departure argument, we point out that the reverse is also true. That is, if the multifactor interpretation of similar leads a district court to exclude prior petty offenses so that a defendant's criminal history is under-represented, the court may depart upward pursuant to the same section. More importantly, as Martinez points out, departure decisions are highly discretionary and in some instances not reviewable on appeal. We prefer to give district courts greater leeway to make the comparison as a matter of law than to restrict the scope of their inquiry and force them to resort to discretionary departures to set an appropriate sentencing range. 45 Finally, we emphasize that we do not think that the elements approach is wrong. It is simply too rigid. The statutory elements of the listed and unlisted offenses and the actual conduct engaged in by a defendant may often prove determinative for a district court in its similarity analysis. However, while these two factors may be the most important in some cases, in others the comparison might be aided by consideration of other factors embraced by the multifactor approach. To foreclose a district court from also evaluating the punishments imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses, the perceived seriousness of the offense as indicated by the level of punishment, . . . the level of culpability involved, and the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct in cases where these factors might be helpful limits unnecessarily the scope of the district court's inquiry. (quote from Hardeman, 933 F.2d at 281). 46 In sum, this case is a good example of the growing complexity of the Guidelines and the difficulties in interpreting them. 6 Although we endorse a multifactor interpretation of similar, we see no need to adopt the Hardeman multifactor test verbatim. Instead, we direct the district court to read similar to encompass the factors listed in Hardeman as well as any other factor the court reasonably finds relevant in comparing prior offenses and Listed Offenses. Overall, the court should keep in mind that the goal of the inquiry is to determine whether the unlisted offense under scrutiny is categorically more serious than the Listed Offenses to which it is being compared. Caputo, 978 F.2d at 977.