Opinion ID: 1804987
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Witt

Text: In Witt, decided in 1980, we adopted the Linkletter standards. In that case, we held that a change in the law does not apply retroactively  unless the change: (a) emanates from this Court or the United States Supreme Court, (b) is constitutional in nature, and (c) constitutes a development of fundamental significance. 387 So.2d at 931. As to consideration (c), we stated that most major constitutional changes fall into one of two categories: (1) changes which place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties and (2) those which are of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application as ascertained by the three-fold test of Stovall and Linkletter  (the Linkletter factors). 387 So.2d at 929. [24] In Witt, we were concerned that an expansive view of retroactivity would undermine the finality of judicial decisions. We noted that [t]he reasons for narrowly limiting the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments are well known and basic to our adversary system of justice. 387 So.2d at 925 (quoting Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 184, 99 S.Ct. 2235). We also warned that [t]he doctrine of finality should be abridged only when a more compelling objective appears, such as ensuring fairness and uniformity in individual adjudications. Id. We declare[d] our adherence to the limited role for post-conviction relief proceedings, even in death penalty cases.  Id. at 927 (emphasis added). Although when we decided Witt the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence of retroactivity was extremely complex, we distilled the three essential factors outlined above as stated in Stovall and Linkletter. Essentially, then, in Witt we adopted a narrow standard for the retroactivity of decisions, limiting retroactivity to cases involving constitutional issues of fundamental significance.