Opinion ID: 1060884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: The tenant, Woods, citing constitutional provisions, contends that the chancery court erred in dismissing his complaint. The landlords argue that the suit was properly dismissed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-105(a), which states in part that “[t]he general sessions and circuit courts of this state shall exercise original jurisdiction over any landlord or tenant with respect to any conduct in this state governed by this chapter.” We agree that Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-105(a) expressly addresses and resolves the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, but we disagree that it controls the issue of dismissal or transfer of the lawsuit. We addressed this issue under similar procedural facts in Flowers v. Dyer County, 830 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. 1992). The plaintiff filed a complaint for damages in the Dyer County Chancery Court under the Government Tort Liability Act (GTLA). The defendant, Dyer County, moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-307, which states that, in part, “[t]he circuit courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any action brought under this chapter. . . .” The chancellor denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that it had concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-2-506(29)(A), which, in creating the chancery court for that judicial district, granted it concurrent - 3 - jurisdiction with the circuit court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the specific provisions of the GTLA requiring suits be filed in circuit court controlled over the statutory provision relied upon by the chancellor. The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the case should have been dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 51-52. We began our review in Flowers by agreeing with the Court of Appeals that the circuit court, not the chancery court, had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the lawsuit under the GTLA. With regard to whether the case had to be dismissed, however, we looked to the following statutory provisions: (a) The chancery court has concurrent jurisdiction, with the circuit court, of all civil causes of action, triable in the circuit court, except for unliquidated damages for injuries to person or character, and except for unliquidated damages for injuries to property not resulting from a breach of oral or written contract; and no demurrer for want of jurisdiction of the cause of action shall be sustained in the chancery court, except in the cases excepted. (b) Any suit in the nature of the cases excepted above brought in the chancery court, where objection has not been taken by a plea to the jurisdiction, may be transferred to the circuit court of the county, or heard and determined by the chancery court upon the principles of a court of law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11-102 (emphasis added). Given that the statute permits certain cases to be transferred to the circuit court where an objection has not been made to jurisdiction, we concluded that “implicit in the provisions of T.C.A. § 16-11102 is the positive inference that, where a jurisdictional objection has been made, such a transfer is mandated.” Id. at 53. Accordingly, we held that the lower courts erred in dismissing the suit and we remanded the case to the trial court with orders to transfer it to the appropriate court. Id. More recently we cited Flowers with approval in Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1995). There we said that “the general rule governing transfer is that a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction over a case has no authority to - 4 - transfer it, unless that authority is specifically conferred by statute, rule, or constitutional provision.” Id. at 319 (citing, C.J.S. Courts, § 195 (1990); Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3827 (1973)); see also Coleman v. Coleman, 190 Tenn. 286, 229 S.W.2d 341 (1950)(following general rule). In discussing Flowers and the application of the general rule, we said that the plaintiff’s action under the GTLA should have been transferred from chancery to circuit court because “the general statute governing the jurisdiction of circuit and chancery courts, Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11-102, mandated the transfer.” Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d at 320. We think our decision in Flowers, supra, although not cited by either party to this appeal, controls the present case. Like the plaintiff in Flowers, Woods filed an action in chancery court when the governing statutory law required it to be filed in circuit court or general sessions court. As in Flowers, the jurisdictional provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11-102 required the chancery court to transfer the lawsuit under the URLTA to circuit court for further proceedings. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that there was no subject matter jurisdiction in the chancery court, but incorrect in failing to require a transfer to the court with jurisdiction, the circuit court.