Opinion ID: 1846967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Hilger's DRE Training and Opinion Testimony

Text: The first step in training a DRE officer is a 2-day preliminary training program, called preschool, which prepares students for the more rigorous training to follow. DRE school itself involves 7 days of classroom instruction, including lectures on physiology and toxicology, specific training on the effects of particular drugs, hands-on exercises in implementing the DRE procedure and interpreting the results, and oral and written examinations. Finally, the certification phase of the training requires students to apply the training in real-world settings on actual suspects under the supervision of a DRE instructor. For a student to be certified, a minimum of 12 evaluations must be completed, involving at least three different categories of drug, and verified by toxicology in at least 75 percent of the cases. At least two different DRE instructors must approve and recommend the student for certification. Certification requires the student to pass a comprehensive, 3- to 4-hour final examination. And continuing education is required to maintain certification. The record establishes that Hilger had been trained in accordance with national standards. And Hilger testified that he performed the DRE protocol as he had been trained to do. Daly does not argue on appeal that Hilger performed the protocol deficiently. Instead, Daly simply asserts that a police officer is not qualified to opine on drug intoxication, because a police officer is not a medical doctor or other expert in drugs, the eyes, vital signs, psychomotor capabilities, symptomology of drugs, [or] human physiology. [30] But in this case, Hilger was not asked to opine as to why or how Daly's use of marijuana caused symptoms of intoxication. It is well established, for instance, in the context of alcohol intoxication, that sufficient foundation may be laid for a police officer to testify to his or her opinion that a driver was under the influence of alcohol. [31] In that context, acceptable foundation includes training to detect the physical and mental effects of alcohol, experience in doing so, and the officer's account of the procedures undertaken to evaluate the driver's intoxicated condition. [32] This is because a police officer need neither explain nor know why consumption of alcohol causes certain symptoms in order to be able to identify those symptoms and reach a conclusion based upon them. Daly offers us no persuasive basis to distinguish drug intoxication, other than taking issue with the substance of the officer's training and procedures. But we conclude that a law enforcement officer with the training and experience offered by DRE certification is sufficiently qualified to testify, based on his or her evaluation, that a suspect was under the influence of drugs. Hilger had successfully completed DRE training, and his opinion was admissible. In a related contention, Daly claims that there is a difference between intoxication and impairment and that Hilger should not have been permitted, based on a DRE examination, to testify that Daly's ability to drive was impaired. We have said that as used in § 60-6,196, the phrase under the influence of alcohol or any drug requires the ingestion of alcohol or drugs in an amount sufficient to impair to any appreciable degree the driver's ability to operate a motor vehicle in a prudent and cautious manner. [33] And we have held that whether impairment is caused by alcohol or drugs, a conviction for DUI may be sustained by either a law enforcement officer's observations of a defendant's intoxicated behavior or the defendant's poor performance on field sobriety tests. [34] The court did not err in permitting Hilger to testify, based upon his observation of Daly and his law enforcement experience, that Daly's ability to drive was impaired. Daly also contends that the DRE protocol is flawed because it depends on police officers, who he argues are inadequately trained to implement the protocol. And Daly argues that there is no data to show inter-rater reliability, [35] which we understand to refer to the ability of different DRE's to successfully apply the protocol. But the qualifications of the officers applying the protocol do not bear on the validity of the protocol itself. Instead, the question is simply whether Hilger, the DRE officer who actually tested Daly and testified at trial, was qualified to render his opinion about Daly. In that regard, Daly contends that the DRE training program offers insufficient training in the DRE protocol. But there is no exact standard for fixing the qualifications of an expert witness, and a trial court is allowed discretion in determining whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert. [36] Unless the court's finding is clearly erroneous, such a determination will not be disturbed on appeal. [37] Experts or skilled witnesses will be considered qualified if they possess special skill or knowledge respecting the subject matter involved superior to that of persons in general, so as to make the expert's formation of a judgment a fact of probative value. [38] And a witness may qualify as an expert by virtue of either formal training or actual practical experience in the field. [39] We find no clear error in the trial court's conclusion that by virtue of his DRE training and experience, Hilger was qualified as an expert in the recognition of drug intoxication. Daly asserts, in passing, that foundation for Hilger's opinion was lacking because there was no video recording showing that Hilger's evaluation was performed correctly. But Hilger testified about his evaluation of Daly and was available for cross-examination about whether the evaluation was performed adequately. Such matters as whether vital signs were measured accurately are appropriate subjects for cross-examination. A video recording of the evaluation was not necessary for Hilger's testimony to be admissible. Daly also argues briefly that [t]he State has asserted a definition of `drug' as generally being a chemical substance taken into the human body that impairs the ability to operate a motor vehicle safely and that [t]his definition is too broad. [40] This is apparently a reference to Hilger's testimony, during which he described the range of substances that the DRE protocol is designed to detect. But Daly did not object to that testimony at trial. And whatever a drug might be for purposes of the DRE protocol, it is not disputed that the only drug at issue here was marijuana, which is clearly a drug within the meaning of both the DRE protocol and the DUI statute. [41] Finally, Daly argues that Hilger's testimony should have been excluded under Neb. Evid. R. 403, [42] which provides that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . . . The fact that evidence is prejudicial is not enough to require exclusion under rule 403, because most, if not all, of the evidence a party offers is calculated to be prejudicial to the opposing party; it is only the evidence which has a tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis that is unfairly prejudicial under rule 403. [43] Hilger's testimony was relevant to whether Daly was operating his vehicle under the influence of marijuana, and his opinion suggested a decision on that basis. It was not unfairly prejudicial, and the court did no abuse its discretion in admitting it.