Opinion ID: 3065087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We first address the issue of appellate jurisdiction raised by Cassirer. We have jurisdiction to review “final decisions” of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Final decisions end the litigation on the merits and leave nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Am. States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Typically, a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss is not final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Marx v. Government of Guam, 866 F.2d 294, 296 (9th Cir. 1989). Under the “collateral order doctrine,” we may nonetheless review that “small category of decisions” that are “conclusive [because they] resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on CASSIRER v. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION 12701 appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995) (citation omitted). [1] “[T]he denial of a claim of lack of [personal] jurisdiction is not an immediately appealable collateral order.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1988); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2003) (orders denying motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are not final and are not appealable under the collateral order doctrine). Therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and we dismiss this appeal with regard to that issue. [2] Likewise, we dismiss the appeal with regard to the issues of standing and Article III case or controversy. The district court’s order denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss on these issues is fully reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Therefore, we hold that such a denial is not immediately appealable as a collateral order.6 See Swint, 514 U.S. at 42 (to be immediately appealable under collateral order doc- 6 See also, e.g., Moniz v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 145 F.3d 1278, 1281 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998) (question of standing is not a final decision under the collateral order doctrine); Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Robinson, 10 F.3d 492, 496-97 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993) (denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing does not qualify as a final judgment and is not immediately appealable); Crymes v. DeKalb County, Ga., 923 F.2d 1482, 1484 (11th Cir. 1991) (observing that denial of motion to dismiss on ripeness grounds is not immediately appealable); Shanks v. City of Dallas, 752 F.2d 1092, 1099 n.9 (5th Cir. 1985) (case or controversy considerations are not appealable under the collateral order exception because they obviously “involve considerations that are emeshed in the legal issues surrounding [the merits of the] cause of action”); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 474-75 (2d Cir. 1974) (question of ripeness and standing are not immediately appealable under collateral order doctrine), abrogated on other grounds by Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000). 12702 CASSIRER v. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION trine, decision must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action).7 We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order as it pertains to sovereign immunity. “[A]n order denying immunity under the FSIA is appealable under the collateral order doctrine,” because sovereign immunity is immunity from suit, which is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Gupta, 487 F.3d at 763, 764 n.6.