Opinion ID: 827256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: champion was correctly decided

Text: The majority claims that Champion “was contrary to the plain language of the CRA,” ante at 19, and, thus, was wrongly decided. Although I generally agree with the majority that the CRA incorporated the common law of agency, the exception to common-law agency principles established in Champion was necessary to give effect to the broad purpose of the CRA and the Legislature’s intent in enacting it. See Henson v City of Dundee, 682 F2d 897, 910 n 21 (CA 11, 1982) (recognizing that “[t]he common law rules of respondeat superior will not always be appropriate to suit the broad remedial purposes” of civil rights statutes).3 Furthermore, this Court has previously considered the 3 This Court has recognized that the purpose of a statute is a relevant consideration when applying the statute in a broad array of cases. See, e.g., Adair v Michigan, 486 Mich 468, 477; 785 NW2d 119 (2010) (stating that “the primary and fundamental rule of constitutional or statutory construction is that the Court’s duty is to ascertain the purpose and intent as expressed in the constitutional or legislative provision in question”) 3 purpose of the CRA as a method of discerning the legislative intent behind the act. See Victorson v Dep’t of Treasury, 439 Mich 131, 143-144; 482 NW2d 685 (1992). Indeed, even the majority recognizes that a statute’s purpose is a relevant consideration in determining the legislative intent. See ante at 20 n 58. The CRA recognizes that “freedom from discrimination because of sex is a civil right.” Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 309; 614 NW2d 910 (2000). Thus, the CRA is intended to “remedy[] discrimination in employment, . . . public accommodations, services, and educational institutions.” Eide, 431 Mich at 31; see, also, Miller v C A Muer Corp, 420 Mich 355, 363; 362 NW2d 650 (1984) (“The Michigan civil rights act is aimed at the prejudices and biases borne against persons because of their membership in a certain class . . . and seeks to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).4 Furthermore, as the majority acknowledges, the CRA is a remedial statute, and “remedial statutes are to be liberally construed . . . .” Eide, 431 Mich at 34. (emphasis added). Indeed, the members of the majority in this case recently found the purpose of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act worthy of lengthy consideration in Mich Ed Ass’n v Secretary of State (On Rehearing), 489 Mich 194; ___ NW2d ___ (2011). 4 The majority’s suggestion that the language of the CRA does not support this interpretation of the act’s purpose is remarkable, given than this Court’s opinions in Eide, Miller, and many other cases have similarly summarized the CRA’s purpose. See, e.g., Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 379; 501 NW2d 155 (1993) (quoting the CRA and concluding that “[t]he Civil Rights Act is aimed at the prejudices and biases borne against persons because of their membership in a certain class, and seeks to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see, also, MCL 37.2102, MCL 37.2202, and MCL 37.2302. 4 In light of this understanding of the CRA’s purpose and the Legislature’s intent in enacting the CRA, I believe that Champion properly advanced the legislative intent by ensuring that clearly discriminatory conduct is eradicated. The majority’s interpretation, however, bars plaintiff from pursuing a claim in furtherance of this goal and ignores “the legislative intent that employers, not the victims of sexual harassment, bear the costs of remedying and eradicating discrimination.” Champion, 450 Mich at 714. The majority erroneously discards Champion’s interpretation of the legislative intent as based “purely on policy considerations,” ante at 22, and ignores the fact that the policy considerations discussed in Champion were the motivation behind the Legislature’s enactment of the CRA.5 As a result, “in seeking to shield employers from liability, the majority instead places the burden of preventing an abuse of authority and the corresponding harm on 5 Ironically, the majority in this case also relies on policy considerations, claiming that Champion creates an unfair “societal burden” and an unbearable financial burden on employers. Ante at 11, 26-27. It is odd that the majority opinion finds it appropriate to rely on these policy considerations while simultaneously rejecting Champion for its consideration of the policy concerns reflected in the CRA. Setting that contradiction aside, however, what is even more telling is the fact that Champion’s policy considerations were rooted in the legislative intent and purpose of the CRA. Indeed, the CRA’s title expressly states that the CRA is intended to “prohibit discriminatory practices, policies, and customs . . . .” Title of 1976 PA 453. The majority opinion in this case does exactly the opposite in furtherance of policy considerations that do not appear in the CRA. Nowhere did the Legislature indicate that the “societal burden” or the financial burden on employers is a valid consideration when interpreting and applying the act. In fact, the CRA indicates that the Legislature intended that governmental employers bear the cost of eliminating sexual harassment, not avoid it, as shown by the specific inclusion of state and political subdivisions and their agents as employers covered by the act. MCL 37.2103(g) and (h) and MCL 37.2201(a); see, also, Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 195; 649 NW2d 47 (2002) (noting that there are areas in which “the Legislature has allowed specific actions against the government to stand, such as the Civil Rights Act”). 5 people powerless to prevent it.” Zsigo v Hurley Med Ctr, 475 Mich 215, 236; 716 NW2d 220 (2006) (MARILYN KELLY, J., dissenting). Moreover, the majority’s reliance on Chambers to support its conclusion that Champion was wrongly decided is misplaced. In fact, Chambers expressly acknowledged Champion’s holding as a valid part of Michigan’s common law related to quid pro quo sexual harassment under the CRA. See Chambers, 463 Mich at 311 (“Vicarious liability exists in the case of quid pro quo harassment because the quid pro quo harasser, by definition, uses the power of the employer to alter the terms and conditions of employment. Champion, supra.”). Similarly, the majority erroneously interprets Zsigo as supporting its conclusion that Champion misinterpreted the CRA. The Zsigo majority expressly recognized that the Champion Court, like many other courts, applied an exception to quid pro quo sexual harassment claims that is very similar to the aided-by-agency exception. Zsigo, 475 Mich at 227 n 28 (listing state and federal opinions adopting the aided-by-agency exception in sexual harassment cases). While I continue to adhere to the Zsigo dissent’s conclusion that a narrowly tailored interpretation of the aided-by-agency exception should be applied outside the context of sexual harassment cases, that disagreement with Zsigo is of no moment in this case, given that the case before us is obviously a quid pro quo sexual 6 harassment claim. Thus, under Chambers and even under the majority opinion in Zsigo, Champion’s exception applies to this case.6 Finally, contrary to the majority’s concern that Champion created an exception that swallows the general agency rules, Champion’s exception “does not extend unlimited liability to employers whose supervisors rape subordinates.” Champion, 450 Mich at 713. A mere supervisor-subordinate relationship is not enough. Rather, an employer is only liable when “the supervisor accomplishes the rape through the exercise of his supervisory power over the victim.” Id. at 713-714 (emphasis added). As Champion explained, this approach is “fully consistent . . . with the legislative intent that employers, 6 Although the majority is correct that Zsigo held that the aided-by-agency exception is not a part of Michigan’s general common law, the majority’s efforts to counter this dissent’s interpretation of Chambers and Zsigo are unavailing because both of those opinions recognized that Champion’s exception applied in the context of quid pro quo sexual harassment cases, as the majority acknowledges. See ante at 18; see, also, Chambers, 463 Mich at 311 (citing Champion for the premise that “[v]icarious liability exists in the case of quid pro quo harassment because the quid pro quo harasser, by definition, uses the power of the employer to alter the terms and conditions of employment”), and Zsigo, 475 Mich at 224 n 19 (recognizing that Champion applies “in the context of quid pro quo sexual harassment under MCL 37.2103(i)”). Indeed, the fact that the majority finds it necessary to expressly overrule Champion today further demonstrates that Chambers and Zsigo did not dispatch the exception created in Champion. The majority’s refusal to accept the fact that Champion has been part of Michigan’s common law for the last 15 years does not make its view so. Rather, as this dissent thoroughly explains, Champion is a longstanding, unanimous precedent of this Court that is consistent with the purpose and legislative intent behind the CRA and with the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court and many other jurisdictions in similar civil rights cases. Accordingly, the majority is mistaken when it claims that I seek to “aggressively expand the law of this state” while it merely seeks to “reaffirm[] . . . common-law rules that have always governed in Michigan.” Ante at 30. Rather, as demonstrated by its need to overrule a deep-rooted opinion of this Court, it is the majority that embarks on an ill-advised major change in the law. 7 not the victims of sexual harassment, bear the costs of remedying and eradicating discrimination.” Id. at 714. Furthermore, as the dissent in Zsigo aptly explained, it is entirely possible to adopt a narrowly tailored interpretation of the aided-by-agency exception in order to avoid swallowing the general agency rules. Zsigo, 475 Mich at 239-243 (MARILYN KELLY, J. dissenting).7 After reviewing various other jurisdictions’ efforts to balance the scope of the aided-by-agency exception, the Zsigo dissent concluded that an opinion from the Vermont Supreme Court represented the most compelling approach. See Doe v Forrest, 2004 VT 37, ¶ 21; 176 Vt 476; 853 A2d 48 (2004), citing Burlington Indus, Inc v Ellerth, 524 US 742; 118 S Ct 2257; 141 L Ed 2d 633 (1998), and Faragher v Boca Raton, 524 US 775; 118 S Ct 2275; 141 L Ed 2d 662 (1998). Doe explained that under Faragher, in order to properly apply the aided-by-agency exception, a court should consider three factors: (1) “the opportunity for contact created by the relationship,” (2) “the powerlessness of the employee to resist the perpetrator and prevent the unwanted contact,” and (3) “the opportunity to prevent and guard against the conduct.” Doe, 2004 7 The majority erroneously implies that I only rely on nonbinding dissenting opinions of this Court to support my conclusion that Champion was correctly decided. Although I think that the Zsigo dissent provides an example of a narrow, workable interpretation of the aided-by-agency exception, the bulk of my analysis in support of my conclusion that Champion was correctly decided rests on the reasoning from Champion’s wellestablished and unanimous opinion, which was not overruled by either of the majority opinions in Chambers and Zsigo. Surprisingly, the majority disparages my analysis for relying on Champion’s reasoning, see ante at 29 n 79, but I am quite certain that relying on longstanding, unanimous precedent from this state’s highest court is a well-accepted method of legal analysis. Furthermore, I disagree with the majority’s claim that Champion is the only “binding Michigan law” supporting my conclusion. Ante at 29 n 79. Rather, I believe that the CRA itself also supports my analysis. 8 VT 37 at ¶ 33; 176 Vt at 491. Thus, in response to the questions posed by the majority regarding when an employer will be held liable for an employee’s conduct, see ante at 32, an employer would only be liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment arising out of an employee’s conduct if the three factors were met, or, as Champion put it, when “the supervisor accomplishes the rape through the exercise of his supervisory power over the victim.” Champion, 450 Mich at 713-714 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Champion can be applied without imposing the boundless liability that the majority fears. In summary, Champion properly relied on the legislative intent and the purpose behind the CRA when it adopted a widely accepted exception to the general rules of agency. And given that the Legislature has not chosen to amend the applicable CRA provisions during the 15 years since Champion was decided, I think that it is fair to conclude that the Legislature believes that Champion accurately reflected the legislative intent behind the CRA, rather than representing a dangerous departure from it, as the majority claims. See, e.g., Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 613-614; 702 NW2d 539 (2005) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting) (explaining the significance of the Legislature’s decision not to modify a statute after this Court has interpreted it). Because it is “‘the nature of the common law that every appellate decision represents the development of the common law,’” Zsigo, 475 Mich at 241 n 11 (MARILYN KELLY, J., dissenting) (citation omitted), Champion has been a valid part of Michigan’s common law for the last 15 years and should be applied in this case. 9