Opinion ID: 668596
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Sever/Spousal Testimony

Text: 50 Nave contends his counsel provided ineffective assistance when he declined the trial court's offer to sever the capital murder count from the counts involving the other crimes. Had the capital murder count been tried separately, Nave could have barred his wife from testifying under the then-existing statute governing spousal immunity. Mo.Rev.Stat. 546.260 (1978); State v. Manning, 657 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Mo.Ct.App.1983). 7 Arguably, his wife was a victim of the kidnapping, so failing to sever these counts destroyed Nave's right to bar her testimony. Nave concedes his wife was called to support his theory of defense, but alleges this decision also demonstrates his attorney's ineffectiveness because the effect of this decision was to provide the state the ability to present the only direct evidence of premeditation, 8 which was necessary to prove capital murder. See Mo Rev.Stat. Sec. 565.001 (1978). 51 For the sake of argument, we will accept as true Nave's claim that, had the crimes been tried separately, Sherry Nave could have been prevented from testifying at the capital murder trial. However, it is important to note that Nave's counsel called Sherry Nave as a witness in her husband's defense. It is conceded that trial counsel's strategy was to present the defense of diminished capacity; to do this, it was necessary to present evidence that Nave had been drinking and was intoxicated when he committed the crimes. The only sources of evidence that Nave was intoxicated at the time the crimes were committed were Nave himself and Nave's wife. 9 Faced with these alternatives, it was reasonable for counsel to call Nave's wife to testify in support of the defense theory. Furthermore, as noted by the Missouri Court of Appeals, [t]he more bizarre and out of control [Nave] was at the time of the crimes, the more it would support [his] claim of blackout, psychosis, and intoxication. Nave v. State, 757 S.W.2d at 253. Thus, it is clear that the decision to try the counts together and call Sherry Nave to the stand was a conscious, strategic decision. 52 In declaring this decision to be constitutionally deficient, we believe the district court was tempted by a line of analysis warned of by the Supreme Court. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.... There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Had counsel's strategy in this case proven effective, the jury might have acquitted Nave of some of the charges because it believed he lacked the intent necessary to commit the crimes. Hindsight now suggests that a different strategy might have been more effective, but this does not mean trial counsel was ineffective. Generally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot be based on a decision relating to a reasoned choice of trial strategy, even when proved improvident. Hayes v. Lockhart, 766 F.2d 1247, 1251 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 922, 106 S.Ct. 256, 88 L.Ed.2d 263 (1985); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight....). Nave's attorney was not constitutionally deficient for employing a strategy that was unsuccessful or that might not have been adopted by a different attorney. 53