Opinion ID: 1723757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to prosecutorial strikes against females.

Text: ¶ 23. On direct appeal, Ricky Chase raised the following issue: The State intentionally struck African-Americans and women from the jury in this case in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and state law. This Court considered this issue and made the following ruling: On the question of gender-based discrimination, Chase argues that no gender-neutral explanations were offered for peremptory challenges against women. However, no objection was raised by the defense and no such explanation was requested. Chase concedes that the holding in Batson has not been applied to gender discrimination. The bigger problem is that Chase did not raise this issue at trial and allow the prosecutor an opportunity to respond or give the trial judge an opportunity to make a ruling or finding of fact. This failure alone insures that this issue cannot be the basis of reversal. Chase's claim of gender-based discrimination in jury selection is procedurally barred on appeal by our rule requiring contemporaneous objection as a prerequisite to preservation of the issue on appeal. Alternatively considering this assignment on its merits, Chase also does not make a case for purposeful exclusion of women. The reasons given by the prosecutor for exercising the peremptory challenges on five of the women were not only race neutral, they were also gender neutral. Chase also used seven of his peremptory challenges, more than the prosecution, to exclude women from the jury. Despite the exclusion of women by both sides, the jury panel ultimately consisted of a majority of women. Chase's assignment fails not only for failure to preserve the issue, but also for failure of any supporting proof. In addition to the other considerations, it should also be pointed out that the prosecutor only used a total of eight peremptory challenges. This considerably weakens any argument by Chase. If the prosecutor were intent on purposeful discrimination based on either race or gender, then the additional challenges could have been used to exclude blacks or women who ultimately served on the jury. Chase, 645 So.2d at 843-44. Chase was decided on February 24, 1994. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), which found that the rule of Batson was to be applied to gender-based discrimination, was decided on April 19, 1994. ¶ 24. Chase now argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to object the State's peremptory challenges of six females, based not on racial discrimination but on gender discrimination. Chase argues that though J.E.B. v. Alabama would not be decided for another four years, it was altogether reasonable for trial counsel to have been aware of this potential issue especially since the use of peremptory challenges to discriminate on the basis of gender had been held to violate the principles of Batson by other courts. Despite trial counsel's lack of foresight, he did obtain on the record findings for five of the six strikes in question, which were all gender neutral. The trial court required no reasons for the strike on Rosemary Cesario, apparently a white female. We hold that trial counsel was not ineffective solely for failure to obtain some gender neutral reasons for the peremptory strike against Cesario.
¶ 25. On direct appeal, Ricky Chase raised the following issue: The trial court erred in excusing jurors for cause in violation of Mississippi law and the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. The specific jurors in question were Freddie Jackson, Nellie Tillman and Dena Hall. As to these potential jurors, this Court found: Since Chase raised no objection to any of these rulings, his claim is procedurally barred. Without relaxing the bar, this Court also looks to the underlying merits of the claim. A. Freddie Jackson The trial court stated that Mrs. Freddie Jackson was excused because of conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty. Mrs. Freddie Jackson vacillated back and forth, more or less, but she said `I don't think I could vote for the death penalty under the circumstances... .' No objection was raised by Chase. B. Nellie Tillman Chase devotes two short paragraphs to arguing that Ms. Nellie Tillman was improperly excused as a juror. Chase contends that there is nothing in the record to support excusing this juror for cause. The record indicates otherwise. While neither the prosecutor nor the judge stated why Ms. Tillman was excused, the record shows that Ms. Tillman knew Chase but stated that she could be impartial. Ms. Tillman was a diabetic and had high blood pressure. She had read about the case in the newspaper and heard it on television and, in addition, she worked with Chase's sister-in-law. Ms. Tillman had a ten year old daughter, the child's father worked on the road as a truck driver, and there was nobody to take care of the child. She indicated that this would definitely weigh heavily on her mind. As the State noted, this Court in Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445, 457 (Miss. 1984), stated: Generally a juror who may be removed on a challenge for cause is one against whom a cause for challenge exists that would likely effect his competency or his impartiality at trial. In this instance, there were several grounds to support the challenge for cause of Ms. Tillman. C. Dena Hall Dena Hall was excused pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-1 (1972). This section excludes persons under the age of 21 from jury service. Ms. Hall was nineteen years old. Chase contends that this provision violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 3, §§ 14 and 26 of the Mississippi Constitution. This Court has previously considered the exclusion of persons under 21 from jury service and has consistently held that the exclusion does not violate the state or federal constitution. This assignment of error is procedurally barred and, alternatively, without merit. Chase, 645 So.2d at 844-45 (citations omitted). The standards used in Chase have been followed in more recent capital cases decided by this Court, including Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581 (Miss. 1995); Jackson v. State, 672 So.2d 468 (Miss. 1996); and Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246 (Miss. 1996). As this Court considered the matter on the merits and found that the jurors were properly excused, we find that trial counsel was not ineffective for failure to object.
¶ 26. On direct appeal, Ricky Chase raised the following issue: The court's refusal to remove a juror for cause denied Ricky Chase a fair and impartial trial in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution and law of Mississippi. Mary Welch stated on voir dire that she had heard about the case on the news and had been robbed three times. She stated at one moment that anything might influence her feelings and that it might bother her to sit on the jury [i]f it was proved that's what they were doing at the time this happened. She then denied that this experience would hamper her ability to be objective and impartial. Trial counsel for Chase challenged Welch for cause. The circuit court made no explicit ruling but did not excuse her. Counsel for Chase then accepted Welch, using his last peremptory challenge on the next person in the venire, Karen L. Boone. The Court found that there was no error in Welch not being excused for cause because her answers were satisfactory, and because defense counsel still could have used a peremptory challenge on her. Chase, 645 So.2d at 845-46. ¶ 27. Chase now argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to obtain a ruling on his challenge for cause, and for failure to preserve the error by using his last remaining peremptory challenge on her. This Court finds that Chase got his ruling; after he made his challenge for cause, Welch remained on the panel, therefore, the challenge was denied. As to the failure to then excuse Welch with a peremptory challenge, the State argues that trial counsel engaged in reasonable trial strategy by using the last peremptory challenge on the next person in the venire, Karen Boone. Considering that Boone's daughter may have been enrolled in a day care center where Elmer Hart's great niece worked; Boone's father was in the Highway Patrol; and Boone's uncle was a murder victim, this certainly could come under the parameters of trial strategy. This issue is without merit.