Opinion ID: 2281804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Regardless of Whether Issue of Reason for Prater's Painkiller Use Was Collateral, Trial Court had Discretion to Allow Admission of Extrinsic Evidence to Disprove Prater's Assertion on Direct Examination Because She Injected this Issue into the Trial.

Text: Perhaps the most hotly disputed issue in this case is whether the reason for Prater's admitted ingestion of the two prescription painkillers is truly a collateral matter. And we note that whether Prater had taken the prescription painkillers as a result of a particular surgery or injury or for other reasons was not necessarily the linchpin of her guilt or innocence on the reckless homicide charge. For example, it is possible that one might be held liable for reckless homicide for fatal injuries resulting from driving impaired [10] from the side effects of properly prescribed and administered drugsparticularly where the defendant was warned of side effects such as drowsiness. [11] Nonetheless, the fact remains that Prater first injected into the trial the issue of her reason for taking the painkillers; and we must consider the effect of her injecting the issue into the trial. Even assuming that the reason for her taking the prescription painkillers was a collateral matter, Professor Lawson recognizes that an unsettled issue arises, namely: May a party who first opens the door to a collateral issue take advantage of the prohibition against collateral facts impeachment? [12] On the one hand, [t]he damaging effects of issue proliferation do not depend upon who takes the initiative to introduce a collateral issue into the case. [13] On the other, one must harbor at least some doubt as to whether a party should be permitted to raise a collateral matter and then use the law as a shield against full contradiction of that matter. [14] And Professor Lawson notes a split among Kentucky cases before adoption of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. He cites Dixon v. Commonwealth [15] as indicating that impeachment on collateral matters may be permitted when a party opens the door to a collateral issue through that party's testimony on direct examination. He also cites Keene v. Commonwealth [16] as an opposing example where impeachment on a collateral matter was considered improper without any discussion of the fact that the collateral issue was first raised by the defendant upon direct examination. [17] Professor Lawson concludes that this split may suggest that outcomes should depend upon specific facts and circumstances of a case and the exercise of sound discretion by the trial judge. [18] In light of the concerns raised in Professor Lawson's discussiondesire to avoid issue proliferation versus potential use of collateral impeachment rules as a license to lie [19] including an apparent split in authority, we conclude that the trial court has discretion to determine whether or not to permit impeachment on collateral issues when a party has opened the door to such issues by raising them in direct testimony. And we believe that our conclusion is supported by Kentucky precedent. [20] To the extent that some Kentucky cases might appear to hold that a trial court invariably lacks discretion to permit impeachment on a collateral issue raised by a party on direct examination, such cases are hereby overruled. We believe the trial court is in the best position to decide whether the facts and circumstances of that case present a scenario in which the evil of allowing a party to offer voluntarily what may be knowingly false testimony with impunity outweighs the evil of having to devote trial time to impeachment on collateral matters. And we now clearly hold that the trial court has discretion to permit or deny impeachment by extrinsic evidence on a collateral issue raised by a party on direct examination.