Opinion ID: 4435141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Alleged Alleyne Error

Text: Dr. Feldman asserts that even if there was sufficient evidence to support the sentencing enhancement for Counts 2–4, its application in this case was unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). The Government does not dispute that Dr. Feldman adequately preserved this issue below, and we therefore review his claims of Alleyne error de novo. United States v. King, 751 F.3d 1268, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2014). As noted above, in Counts 2–4, Dr. Feldman was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) based on his unlawful dispensing of oxycodone (a Schedule II drug), methadone (a Schedule II drug), alprazolam (a Schedule IV drug), and diazepam (a Schedule IV drug) to the three individuals identified in those counts. 57 Case: 16-12978 Date Filed: 08/30/2019 Page: 58 of 67 The jury rendered that verdict by answering in the affirmative the special verdict form’s 13 first two questions for each count, finding that Dr. Feldman was guilty of distributing and dispensing the Schedule II and Schedule IV drugs identified in the indictment. Although Dr. Feldman challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for conspiracy to distribute these substances and argued that insufficient evidence supported a jury finding that the Schedule II drugs resulted in death, he has not challenged his substantive distribution convictions. And even had he done so, we would have rejected that challenge. There is ample evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Dr. Feldman prescribed all of these substances to the particular victims and that he did so not for a legitimate medical purpose and not in the usual course of professional practice. The maximum penalty for an “unenhanced” conviction based on distribution of a Schedule II drug is 20 years’ imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Thus, without any other enhancements, Dr. Feldman was subject to a 20-year maximum sentence, with no mandatory-minimum provision, for each conviction set out in Counts 2–4. The Government, however, sought an enhanced sentence, alleging that each of the victims identified for purposes of Counts 2–4 had died as a result of their 13 The special verdict form for each victim included four overarching questions, with two of the questions including sub-parts that asked the jury to make findings regarding each specified controlled substance. 58 Case: 16-12978 Date Filed: 08/30/2019 Page: 59 of 67 ingestion of the Schedule II drugs prescribed by Dr. Feldman. Under the Controlled Substances Act’s sentence-enhancement provision, if death results from the use of a Schedule II substance, the person convicted of distributing that drug is subject to a mandatory-minimum 20-year sentence, with a statutory maximum of life imprisonment. Id. § 841(b)(1)(C). Death resulting from ingestion of a Schedule IV substance, however, results in no enhancement. The district court determined that the jury had convicted Dr. Feldman of conduct justifying the above enhancement. As a result, Dr. Feldman was subject to a mandatory-minimum 20-year sentence, and the district court ultimately decided that a 300-month sentence (25-years) was a reasonable sentence based on the conduct underlying these three convictions.14 “Because the ‘death results’ enhancement increase[s] the minimum and maximum sentences to which [a defendant is] exposed, it is an element that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Burrage, 571 U.S. at 210 (citing Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 115–16, and Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). Dr. Feldman asserts that the jury did not convict him of distributing a Schedule II substance from which death has resulted, which, if correct, would mean that the 14 Dr. Feldman received a 10-year sentence for his convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and conspiracy to commit money laundering, a 10-year sentence for his substantive money laundering convictions, and a 25-year sentence for the enhanced distribution of a Schedule II substance, use of which had resulted in death. All sentences ran concurrently with each other. 59 Case: 16-12978 Date Filed: 08/30/2019 Page: 60 of 67 district court violated Alleyne when it sentenced Dr. Feldman as if the jury had so found. Specifically, and relying again on Burrage, Dr. Feldman argues that the jury’s special verdict established only a finding that a combination of Schedule II and Schedule IV drugs in the aggregate killed each victim, not that the victims would have lived “but for” their use of the Schedule II drugs. Accordingly, Dr. Feldman contends that the jury verdict was insufficient to trigger a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement or a statutory maximum exceeding twenty years. To the extent that Dr. Feldman’s Alleyne argument mirrors his sufficiencyof-the-evidence argument, we reject it as a misreading of Burrage. As discussed above, Burrage did not hold that a Schedule I or II drug must be the “only” cause of a victim’s death. Indeed, Burrage reached the opposite conclusion, explaining that a factor can be a but-for cause even if it “combines with other factors to produce the result, so long as the other factors alone would not have” produced the same result. Id. at 211. Under Burrage, but-for causality simply turns on whether the victim would have died “without the incremental effect” of a Schedule I or II drug. Id. In other words, a Schedule I or II drug is a but-for cause of a victim’s death if it made a necessary contribution to the death—“if, so to speak, it was the straw that broke the camel’s back”—such that the victim would have lived if he had not taken the Schedule I or II drug. Id. The existence of other necessary 60 Case: 16-12978 Date Filed: 08/30/2019 Page: 61 of 67 causes, such as other drugs in a deadly cocktail, is “beside the point.” Id. at 212. For a sentencing court to impose an enhanced sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C), a jury need only find that a Schedule I or II drug was a but-for cause of death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 210–11, 218–19. As discussed at length above, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that but for ingestion of the Schedule II drugs dispensed by Dr. Feldman, the victims would not have died. Nevertheless, we agree with Dr. Feldman that the special verdict in this case failed to establish that the jury actually found that the Schedule II drugs were but-for causes of the victims’ deaths. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred under Alleyne by imposing an enhanced sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C). We explain our reasons for reaching this result. The third and fourth questions on the verdict form for each of Counts 2, 3, and 4 focused on the deaths of Mayes, Gonzalez, and Wren, respectively. Aggregating all the drugs dispensed by Dr. Feldman to the victim—both Schedule II and Schedule IV—the third question asked whether the jury found that the victim would not have died but for his use of the listed drugs. 15 The question for 15 Asking for a “yes” or “no” answer, the question read: “We, the jury, find beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of [the victim] resulted from the use of one or more of the following controlled substances: [identifying Schedule II and Schedule IV controlled substances dispensed to victim], that is, but for his ingestion of the controlled substances charged, he would not have died.” 61 Case: 16-12978 Date Filed: 08/30/2019 Page: 62 of 67 Count 2 (Mayes) listed as the relevant drugs oxycodone and methadone, which are Schedule II drugs, as well as alprazolam, which is a Schedule IV drug. The questions for Counts 3 and 4 (Gonzalez and Wren) each listed as the relevant drugs oxycodone, a Schedule II drug, and diazepam, a Schedule IV drug. For each count, the jury responded “Yes,” finding that the victim would not have died but for his use of the listed controlled substances. These findings clearly do not support the district court’s application of § 841(b)(1)(C)’s mandatory-minimum sentence. This is so because, at most, the jury’s “Yes” responses to these questions represented a finding only that the Schedule II and Schedule IV drugs in the aggregate caused the deaths. And Burrage held that it is insufficient merely to show that a Schedule I or II drug was part of a mixed-drug cocktail, which, as “an aggregate force,” was “itself a but-for cause of death.” Id. at 214. Instead, Burrage requires a jury finding that a Schedule I or II drug was itself a but-for cause of the victim’s death—that is, without the specific incremental effect of the Schedule I or II drug, the victim would have lived. See id. at 207, 211, 218–19 (reversing the defendant’s conviction where the evidence showed only that the victim died as a result of a cocktail of drugs, including heroin, oxycodone, alprazolam, and clonazepam, and the Government conceded that no evidence showed the victim would have lived but for his heroin use). 62 Case: 16-12978 Date Filed: 08/30/2019 Page: 63 of 67 The fourth question on Dr. Feldman’s special verdict form purportedly attempted to disaggregate the drugs to seek a finding as to which specific drugs caused the death. Considering all the circumstances, however, we conclude that this question failed to elicit the jury’s finding on what was the relevant question: whether the Schedule II drugs were but-for causes of the victims’ deaths. Specifically, this final question for each of Counts 2–4 asked whether the jury found “beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of [the victim] resulted from the use of the following,” then it listed separately each specific drug dispensed to the victim: both Schedule II and Schedule IV substances. (emphasis added). The jury answered “Yes” for each drug listed. In contrast with the prior question, though, this fourth question entirely omitted any mention of but-for causation and failed to make clear to the jury that absent a finding that the victim would not have died had he not used a particular drug, the jury could not conclude that the victim’s death resulted from that drug. We cannot conclude based on the jury’s response to this final question that it found beyond a reasonable doubt that a Schedule II drug Dr. Feldman prescribed— oxycodone and methadone for Count 2, and oxycodone for each of Counts 3 and 4—was a but-for cause of the victims’ deaths. First, the verdict form’s failure to spell out what “resulted from” meant in the critical and final question raises a significant concern that the jury was unaware of that phrase’s meaning as it 63 Case: 16-12978 Date Filed: 08/30/2019 Page: 64 of 67 pertains to whether death resulted from a specific drug. And because the first “results in” question explained that “resulted from” meant that the victim would not have died but for ingestion of the drugs in the aggregate, but the second question omitted an explanation of what “resulted from” meant, the jury could have concluded that it was once again being asked to find whether all the drugs resulted in each victim’s death, rather than whether each victim would have lived but for his ingestion of a Schedule II drug in particular. Even with the omission of the “but-for” language in this pivotal, final question, we might well reach a different result had the district court’s instructions explained to the jury that, in order to conclude that death had resulted from a particular Schedule II drug, it must find that but for ingestion of that drug, death would not have occurred. Unfortunately, the court’s instructions did not do so. The court instructed the jury only that it “must find beyond a reasonable doubt that but for the decedent’s use of the charged controlled substances distributed . . . the decedent would not have died.” (emphasis added). This plural reference to controlled substances in the instructions necessarily included the Schedule IV substances, which of course cannot trigger an enhancement. And it replicates the first interrogatory on the special verdict form, which directed the jury to make a finding only as to whether the drugs in the aggregate caused each victim’s death. 64 Case: 16-12978 Date Filed: 08/30/2019 Page: 65 of 67 Thus, the court’s instructions failed to make clear that the jury needed to make a specific finding as to whether the victim would have lived but for his use of the Schedule II controlled substance. Indeed, the instructions never indicated that the Schedule II drugs had any special significance in the case, as the court merely instructed the jury that “a more serious offense is committed” whenever “death or serious injury is a consequence of the decedent’s use of a controlled substance.” (emphasis added). Nor did the prosecutor or defense attorney point out in closing arguments the specific determination that the jury was being called on to make. Given this context, we cannot conclude that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims would have lived but for their ingestion of the Schedule II drugs. Admittedly, the jury’s finding that the victims’ deaths “resulted from” each of the Schedule II and Schedule IV drugs is not inconsistent with a finding that the Schedule II drugs were but-for causes of the deaths. As we have explained at length, there can be many necessary causes of a result, and, if a Schedule II drug was a necessary cause of a victim’s death, it would have been “beside the point” that a Schedule IV drug also happened to occupy the same status. Id. at 211–12. But the verdict rendered is likewise consistent with a finding that the Schedule II drugs were nonessential “contributing cause[s],” which did not make a difference to the ultimate outcome but merely “contribute[d] to an aggregate force 65 Case: 16-12978 Date Filed: 08/30/2019 Page: 66 of 67 (such as mixed-drug intoxication) that is itself a but-for cause of death.” Id. at 208, 214. The latter finding, of course, would be insufficient to support a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence under Burrage. Id. at 214–16. And because we cannot determine which of the two findings the special verdict reflects, the jury’s verdict does not constitute the necessary finding that but for ingestion of a Schedule II substance, the victim would have lived.16 That being so, the district court’s application of § 841(b)(1)(C)’s sentencing enhancement cannot stand. 17 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s application of § 841(b)(1)(C)’s 20-year mandatory minimum sentence on Counts 2–4 and remand the case for the district court to resentence Dr. Feldman “to a term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years” as to each of these counts. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (stating that “such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years and if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years or more than life”). 16 We emphasize that we are not saying that the jury acquitted Dr. Feldman of the charge that his dispensing of a Schedule II drug resulted in death. Rather, the outcome of our ruling is the same as it would have been had the Government never sought a specific finding from the jury on this issue. 17 We are aware that an Alleyne error can be subject to harmless error review. United States v. King, 751 F.3d 1268, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014). The Government, however, has not argued that any Alleyne error here would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 66 Case: 16-12978 Date Filed: 08/30/2019 Page: 67 of 67