Opinion ID: 884724
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequacy of the court's interrogation

Text: ¶ 20 A judge's interrogation of a defendant seeking to enter a guilty plea is sufficient if the judge: ... examines the defendant, finds him to be competent, and determines from him that his plea is voluntary, he understands the charge and the possible punishment, he is not acting under the influence of drugs or alcohol, he admits his counsel is competent and he has been well advised, and he declares in open court the fact upon which his guilt is based. State v. Mahoney (1994), 264 Mont. 89, 94-95, 870 P.2d 65, 69 (citations omitted). Appellant only disputes that portion of interrogation requiring the court to establish a factual basis for his guilty plea to attempted deliberate homicide. ¶ 21 Appellant argues that the court failed to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea because he refused to admit that he intended to kill the victim, an essential element of the crime with which he was charged. Appellant points to the colloquy with the court where he admitted stabbing V.F. several times with a small knife but denied intending to kill her. ¶ 22 The State counters that a court need not extract an admission from the defendant of every element of the crime in order to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea. We agree with the State. Section 46-12-212, MCA, provides: Determining accuracy of plea. (1) The court may not accept a guilty plea without determining that there is a factual basis for the plea in charges of felonies or misdemeanors resulting in incarceration. (2) A defendant who is unwilling to admit to any element of the offense that would provide for a factual basis for a plea of guilty may, with the consent of the court, enter a plea of guilty to the offense if the defendant considers the plea to be in the defendant's best interest and a factual basis exists for the plea. Section 46-12-212, MCA, does not require a defendant to establish every element of the offense charged in order for his guilty plea to be accepted. The statute does not preclude the State from offering proof that a factual basis exists for a defendant's guilty plea. Rather, the statute simply requires that a factual basis for the defendant's plea be established. We hold that the absence of an admission from Appellant concerning the mental state element of attempted deliberate homicide did not, of itself, render the court's interrogation inadequate and his plea involuntary. ¶ 23 Appellant next attacks the quality of the evidence on which the court relied to establish a factual basis for the mental state element of the offense. Appellant argues that at best the State's offer of proof demonstrates only that V.F. suffered superficial knife wounds, not that he intended to kill V.F. Appellant's argument is not persuasive. ¶ 24 In State v. Sellner (1997), 54 St.Rep. 1464, ___ Mont. ___, 951 P.2d 996, we stated: Attempted deliberate homicide requires proof that Appellant had the purpose to cause the death of another human being and acted toward purposely or knowingly causing the death of another human being. Sections 45-4-103 and 45-5-102, MCA. Purposely means it was the defendant's conscious object to engage in that conduct or cause that result. Section 45-2-101(63), MCA. A person acts knowingly with respect to a given result when the person is aware of a high probability that the result will be caused by the person's conduct. Section 45-2-101(34), MCA. Sellner, 54 St.Rep. at 1465, ___ Mont. at ___, 951 P.2d at 998. Where purposely or knowingly causing a result is an element of an offense, that element can be established if the result involves the same kind of harm or injury as contemplated by the defendant, although the actual degree of injury is greater than intended. Section 45-2-201(2)(b); State v. Rothacher (1995), 272 Mont. 303, 307, 901 P.2d 82, 85. In Montana, circumstantial evidence is an acceptable and often convincing method of proving criminal intent. State v. Brogan (1993), 261 Mont. 79, 89, 862 P.2d 19, 25-26 (citations omitted). The existence of a mental state may be inferred from the acts of the accused and the facts and circumstances connected with the offense. Section 45-2-103(3), MCA. ¶ 25 Appellant has presented no facts from which a credible argument could be made that when he stabbed V.F. eight times, he was not aware of a high probability that his actions would result in serious bodily injury to or the death of V.F. Appellant admitted stabbing V.F. several times and admitted that these acts were voluntary and not accidental. At the very least, Appellant's admissions, coupled with over 100 exhibits and other circumstantial evidence to which the State referred in its offer of proof, provide a sufficient factual basis from which to believe that Appellant intended to inflict serious bodily injury to V.F. In fact, we do not view it a stretch to infer from the facts and circumstances of the offense that Appellant intended to kill V.F. The record shows that V.F. played dead and that Appellant dragged her to a nearby field and left her for dead. We hold that sufficient evidence was presented during the court's interrogation of Appellant from which the court could establish a factual basis for the mental state element of attempted deliberate homicide. Thus, the first factor weighs heavily in favor of the court's denial of Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. ¶ 26 The State notes that although not labeled as such, Appellant's plea was, in effect, an Alford plea, referring to North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162. In Alford, the United States Supreme Court held that when a defendant clearly expresses his desire to plead guilty despite his belief in his innocence, and the state demonstrates a strong factual basis for the plea, there is no constitutional error in accepting the defendant's plea. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, 91 S.Ct. 160. Appellant correctly points out that this argument was not made to the District Court. We will not address issues or theories raised for the first time on appeal. See Sections 46-20-104(2) and -701(2), MCA; State v. Woods (1997), 283 Mont. 359, 372, 942 P.2d 88, 96-97. Therefore, we decline to address this argument on the merits.