Opinion ID: 4518274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Interested Prosecutor

Text: “A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.” Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 Cmt. 1. She represents not her own interest but “the interest of society as a whole.” Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202–03 (1979). For this very reason, the Department of Justice holds United States Attorneys and their Assistants to exacting ethical standards, not least with respect to actual and apparent conflicts of interest. See, e.g., U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 1-4.320(F) (“Employees may not engage in outside activities that create or appear to create a conflict of interest with their official duties. Such a conflict exists when the outside activity would . . . create an appearance that the employee’s official duties were performed in a biased or less than impartial manner.”). Moreover, federal law itself contains a criminal prohibition on prosecutors and other government employees “participat[ing] personally and substantially” in a “judicial or other proceeding” in which they have an interest. 18 U.S.C. § 208. AUSA Greg Lesser’s role in the Miller prosecution, however limited, was a clear violation of his ethical and professional duties. Nothing, of course, prevented his father from reporting the embezzlement to the FBI, as through a public tip line or the like. But it was totally inappropriate for AUSA Lesser to, at a minimum, create the appearance of having used his personal contacts in the Bureau as a means to pull strings in favor of an investigation. 11 See U.S. 11 We observe, as does Miller, that the FBI did not produce any “302 reports” detailing its contacts with Greg Lesser, as it would typically have done to memorialize contacts with a complaining witness. 16 UNITED STATES V. MILLER Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.260(A)(3) (“In determining whether to commence or recommend prosecution or take other action against a person, the attorney for the government should not be improperly influenced by . . . [t]he possible affect [sic] of the decision on the attorney’s own professional or personal circumstances.”). And his errors compounded: after helping to initiate the Miller investigation, Lesser faced an obvious duty to report his conflict of interest (and presumptive recusal) to his supervisor as soon as possible. See U.S. Attorney’s Manual § 3-2.170 (“A United States Attorney who becomes aware of circumstances that might necessitate his or her recusal or that of the entire office, should promptly notify [the general counsel’s office] to discuss whether a recusal is required.”) (emphasis supplied); id. § 3-2.220 (same recusal rules apply to AUSAs). Instead, inexplicably, he waited three weeks to disclose his conflict, even while his father was, at the behest of the FBI, secretly recording a conversation with Miller. Just as concerning are AUSA Lesser’s apparent continued attempts to involve himself in the Miller case even after the Central District’s recusal. For example, in January 2013, AUSA Lesser called Special Agent Swanson to inquire, “in his capacity as part-owner (or part-shareholder) of MWRC,” about the status of the case. 12 At some point after that, Greg Lesser solicited his colleagues’ help through his work e-mail to track down information on Mr. Miller’s employment history. These attempts represented a This implies that the FBI agents viewed Greg Lesser, at least initially, not as a witness, but as the prosecutor. 12 Special Agent Swanson merely replied that the investigation was ongoing. UNITED STATES V. MILLER 17 continuing violation of Greg Lesser’s ethical obligations as an Assistant United States Attorney. The question before us, however, is not whether AUSA Lesser acted improperly, which is clear. Our question is whether Lesser’s ethical and professional lapses entitle Miller to dismissal of the indictment. We review the district court’s denial of Miller’s motion to dismiss on Due Process grounds de novo, and we review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision not to dismiss the indictment under its supervisory powers. United States v. Barrera-Moreno, 951 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Restrepo, 930 F.2d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 1991). Although we have held that a prosecutor may violate a defendant’s Due Process rights through conduct that “is so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice,” Restrepo, 930 F.2d at 712 (quoting United States v. O’Connor, 737 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1984)), we think that the facts of this situation do not rise to that level, chiefly because the prosecutorial improprieties had no material effect on the case and because the Department of Justice took every step it could reasonably have been expected to take to cleanse the Miller prosecution of any possible taint from AUSA Lesser’s involvement. Most significantly, after the Central District of California recused itself from any further involvement in the prosecution, an AUSA from the Southern District of California took over the case. She had no contact with Lesser whatsoever, and she came to an independent decision on whether and how to charge Miller. And although AUSA Lesser’s limited attempts to involve himself in the case after the Central District’s recusal were more than sufficient to create an appearance of impropriety, there is no indication that Lesser in any way influenced the prosecutor who was 18 UNITED STATES V. MILLER actually in charge of the case at that time. Further, even during the three weeks before the Central District’s recusal, there is no evidence that AUSA Lesser himself, rather than Special Agent Swanson, was directing the investigation of Miller. On the same analysis, the facts of this situation do not implicate the Supreme Court’s holding in Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987), the chief case on which Miller relies. In Young, the Court exercised its supervisory powers to reverse the criminal contempt convictions of four defendants because the prosecutor who prosecuted the case and obtained those convictions was conflicted. Indeed, the conflict was extreme, as the prosecutor, specially appointed by the district court, was also serving as counsel to the party that was the beneficiary of the injunction that defendants were being prosecuted for civilly violating. Id. at 790. By contrast, AUSA Lesser was not in any material respect Miller’s prosecutor. At most, AUSA Lesser may have induced the FBI to look at the case more closely than it might otherwise have in the case’s early stages. In any event, given the blatant evidence of embezzlement, it would not have taken much to catch the FBI’s attention if, instead, it had been reported by Russell Lesser instead of Greg Lesser, as it most likely would have been. And all the crucial decisions in the investigation and prosecution were made by Special Agent Swanson and the Southern District AUSA who took over the case from the Central District. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Miller’s motion to dismiss the indictment under the court’s supervisory powers. 13 13 For the same reasons, the district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Miller’s motion for additional discovery beyond UNITED STATES V. MILLER 19 Miller also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the ground that the grand jury received materially false testimony. 14 “[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is violated when a defendant has to stand trial on an indictment which the government knows is based partially on perjured testimony, when the perjured testimony is material, and when jeopardy has not attached.” United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974). But here, the false testimony Miller cites — a statement by an FBI agent that Russell Lesser was the majority shareholder of MWRC (while, in reality, Russell Lesser was simply a plurality shareholder, owning an 18% interest in the company) — was not remotely material. 15 The defense argues that the testimony was material because it gave the impression that Russell Lesser had total authority over MWRC, thus potentially leading the grand jury to discount the idea that Miller believed he was authorized to lend himself company money. But the grand jury also heard testimony that Miller had admitted to Lesser that he had taken the funds without authorization. Moreover, the petit jury also considered and rejected this defense at trial, therefore rendering any error in the grand jury testimony harmless. United States v. Bingham, 653 F.3d 983, 998 (9th that discussed below. See United States v. Mazzarella, 784 F.3d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 2015). 14 The district court ordered the Government to produce these transcripts so that the defense could examine “if, for example, Lesser was creating false evidence or something of that sort.” 15 Miller also points to testimony heard by the grand jury that he had only paid back $40,000 of the roughly $330,000 he took from MWRC, while in fact he eventually paid back the entire amount. This is also immaterial, however, because failure to repay is not an element of wire fraud, and intent to repay is not a defense. See supra pp. 13–14. 20 UNITED STATES V. MILLER Cir. 2011) (holding that, after a petit jury convicted the defendant on all counts, “any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision is deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”) (quoting People of Guam v. Muna, 999 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1993)). The district court accordingly did not err in rejecting this Due Process claim.