Opinion ID: 2625402
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: It Was Error To Award Attorney's Fees Against the Alliance.

Text: In AWA II the superior court awarded $4,000 as partial attorney's fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82 against the alliance plaintiffs because it determined that the second complaint was frivolous and brought in bad faith. The alliance argues that it was an abuse of discretion to award fees because the complaint was neither frivolous nor brought in bad faith. We agree. We have held that under Rule 82, it is an abuse of discretion to award attorney's fees against a losing party who has in good faith raised a question of genuine public interest before the courts. [29] But fees may be awarded against a public interest plaintiff if the claim is frivolous or brought in bad faith. [30] The order awarding fees identifies three reasons for deciding that the complaint in AWA II was frivolous and brought in bad faith. First, it states that the action was previously dismissed with prejudice and that the alliance was barred from refiling the complaint under res judicata. Second, it finds that the complaint was subject to a number of obvious affirmative defenses which [the alliance] failed to address or present any good faith argument for overcoming. Finally, it states that the alliance made no effort to explain or justify [its] attempt to collaterally attack the ruling of the prior court on this matter and [it] presented no good faith authority or argument for overcoming the application of res judicata in this matter. We are not persuaded that the filing of AWA II demonstrates bad faith. It was reasonably debatable whether the first complaint had been dismissed on the merits. Although we held above that the alliance's second complaint was barred by res judicata, this result was not so self-evident that the filing of AWA II indicates bad faith. We are also not persuaded that the alliance failed to address several obvious affirmative defenses in its response to the motion to dismiss AWA II. The state argues that the alliance conceded or did not really address five affirmative defenses that the state raised in its motion to dismiss AWA II, and that therefore the alliance's claims were frivolous and brought in bad faith. But the alliance's opposition to the motion to dismiss did respond, at least in some way, to each of the affirmative defense arguments. Its responses may have been less than exhaustive, but they were sufficient to preclude a finding of bad faith. Finally, we are unpersuaded by the order's statement that the alliance made no effort to explain or justify [its] attempt to collaterally attack the ruling of the prior court on this matter and [it] presented no good faith authority or argument for overcoming the application of res judicata in this matter. The question whether res judicata attached to the dismissal in AWA I was reasonably debatable, even though we have ruled for the state on that issue. Moreover, the alliance was not attempting to collaterally attack the dismissal of AWA I. Instead, it assertedin good faith but ultimately unpersuasively that the parties and claims in AWA II were different from AWA I, and that AWA I was not dismissed on the merits. It is true that the AWA II complaint was filed the day after the AWA I complaint was dismissed, and that the alliance did not appeal the AWA I dismissal or ask the superior court to explain its reasoning. But the course the alliance chose to follow does not demonstrate bad faith or that the claim was frivolous. Just because a complaint is found to raise a political question does not necessarily mean it was frivolous. That a complaint is deemed barred by res judicata does not necessarily mean that it was filed in bad faith. We hold that it was error to award the state attorney's fees against these public interest litigants. This result moots the alliance's claim that it was error to deny its motion for reconsideration of the attorney's fees award.