Opinion ID: 2982878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Qualified Immunity as to Brickman

Text: As to Apsey’s false arrest claim against Brickman, the parties have stipulated that “L.E.A.D.S. records confirmed that Philip Apsey’s driving privileges were suspended at the time he stopped and was arrested by Chester township Patrolman, Defendant Matthew Brickman,” (R. 38, Page ID # 151). Further, it is undisputed that Brickman checked the LEADS System before arresting Apsey, a check which did not turn up any driving privileges. Under those circumstances, Brickman could have reasonably concluded that Apsey was driving under a suspended license. And even if Apsey was permitted to drive under certain restrictions, Brickman could have reasonably concluded that Apsey was violating those restrictions by driving not to a job site but to the daycare. Brickman could also have reasonably concluded that Apsey’s responses and conduct were intended to stop Brickman from realizing that Apsey was driving in violation of his license restrictions. As Brickman testified, “Once we arrived [on Munn Road], I knew [the -6- No. 14-3875 Philip Apsey v. Chester Township plaintiff] was not being truthful as I asked him to exit the vehicle.” (R. 44, Page ID # 336.) Because Brickman had probable cause to arrest Apsey for driving under suspension and for obstruction of official business, we reverse the denial of qualified immunity to Brickman on the false arrest claim.
In a § 1983 action alleging malicious prosecution, the burden of proving a lack of probable cause is on the plaintiff. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 309–09 (6th Cir. 2010). Apsey has not met that burden. As discussed, the undisputed facts of the encounter between Apsey and Brickman created probable cause to arrest Apsey for driving under suspension and obstruction of official business. Those facts were recounted in a police report written by Brickman. (See R. 44, Page ID # 372–79.) That report, in turn, provided the prosecutors with sufficient evidence of probable cause to prosecute. Nothing in the record suggests that the facts known to Brickman at the time of arrest had materially changed by the time criminal proceedings were initiated so that any existing probable cause would have dissipated, and Apsey makes no argument to that effect. Thus, we reverse the denial of qualified immunity to Brickman on the malicious prosecution claim.