Opinion ID: 186348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Beyer's Opinion Testimony

Text: 7 At trial, Morton's strategy was to suggest the gun belonged to her passenger. The prosecuting attorney asked Officer Beyer why the passenger had not been arrested, and Officer Beyer responded: 8 Based on the position of the gun being under Ms. Morton's right thigh, being on her side of the console, which as I stated was pretty high and also used as an arm rest, to us we believe that the passenger did not have knowledge and would not have been able to see the gun sitting there. 9 Morton argues the district court erred in permitting Officer Beyer to opine whether the passenger knew about the gun under Morton's seat cushion and whether the passenger could have seen the gun, testimony which directly undermined her defense. According to Morton, the Government failed to lay an adequate foundation, or indeed any foundation at all, for Officer Beyer's opinion testimony. 10 Morton's trial counsel did not object to that portion of Beyer's testimony. Therefore, as both parties correctly observe, in order for Morton to succeed on appeal she must demonstrate that the trial court committed a plain error that affected her substantial rights. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Where, as here, an appellant failed to raise a contemporaneous objection at trial, a reviewing court may correct only particularly egregious errors, those errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Morton cannot make the requisite showing. 11 First, as the Government argues, the admission of Officer Beyer's challenged statement is not plainly erroneous because it is not apparent that Beyer actually offered opinion testimony. Although Beyer testified that he believed the passenger did not know the gun was in the vehicle, that testimony was not offered to prove what the passenger actually knew; rather, the officer was simply describing his reason for not having arrested the passenger. A witness's testimony about his own state of mind is not opinion testimony. See United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1226 (7th Cir.1990) (What [the witness] called his `opinion' was actually a report of the contents of his mind, of which people are normally assumed... to have direct rather than inferential knowledge). 12 Second, we note that Morton's failure to object to Officer Beyer's testimony for lack of foundation deprived the Government of any opportunity to lay a proper foundation. See Bartleson v. United States, 96 F.3d 1270, 1278 (9th Cir.1996). Morton does not argue the Government would have been unable to lay a proper foundation if it had been called upon to do so. Under these circumstances, the district court did not plainly err in failing to strike Officer Beyer's testimony sua sponte. 13 Finally, the Government maintains that even if the error was plain, Morton cannot show prejudice. We agree. There was ample evidence to support the jury's determination that Morton possessed the firearm without the portion of Officer Beyer's testimony that Morton now challenges. In addition to her own incriminating statements, there was evidence that Morton owned the vehicle in which the gun was found and, most important, the gun was found under her thigh. In light of the evidence against her, Morton cannot show the outcome of the trial would likely have been different if the trial court had corrected the purported error. See United States v. Sumlin, 271 F.3d 274, 281 (D.C.Cir.2001).