Opinion ID: 2609747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial judge's misconduct towards defense counsel

Text: Essential to the ethic of fairness in our system of criminal jurisprudence is the responsibility of a trial judge to maintain the attitude and appearance of impartiality. The attitude of impartiality is necessary because in those matters entrusted to the trial judge's discretion fundamental fairness requires that he exercise that discretion guided solely by the facts and the law and not by his idiosyncratic pique against a party or counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Dellinger, supra, 470 F.2d at 387; Territory v. Van Culin, 36 Haw. 153, 158 (1942). The appearance of impartiality is essential for at least two reasons. First, it fosters respect for the law in general by offering visible evidence of the judiciary's integrity. And second, in a jury trial the appearance of judicial impartiality helps excise from those matters under the jury's consideration the judge's necessarily influential views on the merits of a party's position. See, e.g., Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933); Territory v. Peterson, 23 Haw. 476, 484 (1916). These considerations of fairness embrace a trial judge's treatment of counsel no less than of the parties themselves. An injudicious attitude held and expressed against an attorney is likely to color the judge's approach to matters in the case entrusted to his discretion as well as to impress the jury with the idea that he disfavors the attorney and, inferentially, the position the attorney represents. See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 441 F.2d 1204, 1213-1216 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830, 92 S.Ct. 73, 30 L.Ed.2d 59 (1971); Davis v. State, 242 Ark. 43, 411 S.W.2d 531, 536 (1967). So serious is the danger to a fair trial posed by a judge's unwarranted remarks demeaning defense counsel in the presence of the jury, that the law considers them errors of constitutional proportions. The constitutional rights of the defendant compromised by such conduct include the rights to due process of law, assistance of counsel in a criminal prosecution, and trial by an impartial jury. Once this type of error is identified, therefore, an appellate court must reverse a resulting conviction unless it can conscientiously conclude that in the setting of [the] particular case [the error is] so unimportant and insignificant that [it] may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, for if there is a `reasonable possibility' that the matter complained of might have contributed to the conviction, the error must give rise to a reversal. United States v. Porter, supra, 441 F.2d at 1215, quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963). A crucial if not determinative consideration in assessing whether a constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is the strength of the prosecution's case on the defendant's guilt. See Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at 22, 87 S.Ct. 824. For example, United States v. Porter, supra , held constitutionally harmless a trial judge's criticisms of defense counsel in the presence of the jury only because the court viewed the record as a whole as presenting a strong case of guilt. 441 F.2d at 1215. Accord, Kinna v. State, 84 Nev. 642, 647, 447 P.2d 32, 35 (1968) (the amount of misconduct necessary to reverse depends on how strong and convincing is the evidence of guilt). But see People v. Williams, 40 A.D.2d 690, 336 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1972) (even where evidence of guilt is strong, misconduct towards defense counsel may warrant reversal). In this connection, a case of guilt is never strong if evidence essential to conviction is the testimony of an alleged accomplice whose credibility the defendant subjects to severe attack. A trial judge's departure from the desired norm of impartiality in such a case is necessarily reversible error. State v. Thomas, 36 Ohio St.2d 68, 303 N.E.2d 882, aff'g 33 Ohio App.2d 7, 291 N.E.2d 780 (1973); see Dale v. State, 441 P.2d 476, 478 (Okl.Cr. 1968) (in a close case, where the evidence is sharply conflicting, it is prejudicial error to rebuke counsel in the presence of the jury and ... the same requires reversal). The trial judge's hostile attitude towards defense counsel was evident from the inception of these cases. Prior to trial, for example, the appellant Pokini moved the trial judge to disqualify himself on the ground that he held a personal bias against Pokini. Pokini's counsel, Matthew Pyun, accompanied this motion and Pokini's supporting affidavit with a certificate of good faith, as required by HRS § 601-7(b). Although this certificate was limited to a statement of Pyun's good faith belief that Pokini honestly believed the matters contained in the motion and affidavit, the trial judge erroneously placed Pyun on the witness stand and challenged his good faith belief in the facts averred by Pokini in the affidavit. Cf. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921). After a lengthy exchange as to the purpose of such a procedure, the trial judge suddenly and petulantly found that Pyun had not acted in good faith, and thereupon dismissed the motion to disqualify. This incident, and others out of the presence of the jury, [4] reflect[ed] the trend of the court's mind during the trial. Territory v. Van Culin, supra, 36 Haw. at 158. Coupled with the many other instances of impropriety towards defense counsel committed by the trial judge in the presence of the jury, they reveal a deep and thorough-going bias against and contempt for the appellants' legal representation. The trial judge's state of mind and conduct in this regard were fundamentally at odds with his judicial responsibilities. [5] Similarly, it cannot be said that the jury was not likely affected by the many vituperative outbursts against defense counsel the trial judge made in their presence. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Quercia v. United States, supra, 289 U.S. at 470, 53 S.Ct. at 699: The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight and his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling. There follows a catalogue of some of the trial judge's criticisms of defense counsel in the presence of the jury. They go far beyond his lightest word or intimation on the quality of the defense. During the opening statement to the jury by the appellant Moore's counsel, Michael Sherwood, the trial judge interrupted on his own motion several times to admonish Sherwood not to argue the law. When Sherwood objected to these interruptions, [6] the trial judge rejoined: When you conduct yourself in a competent manner, the Court will not interrupt you, Mr. Sherwood. Please proceed competently... . And please conduct yourself in a proper manner as a lawyer... . In response to an objection by Mr. Pyun during Mr. Sherwood's opening statement, the trial judge also announced, for the jury to hear: [E]very time you speak up against the Court when the Court has said something, the Court will have a comment against you, Mr. Pyun. I want you to know that, Mr. Pyun. [7] Later, while engaged in his own opening statement, Mr. Pyun suggested to the jury that if he seemed angry during the trial the jury should not hold it against his client. Though there was no objection to this language by the prosecution, the trial judge interjected: The court would like to request counsel if he would kindly leave his angry self out of the courtroom from here on out. The court will appreciate it. Upon Mr. Pyun's objection to the tenor of this comment, the trial judge responded: Very well. Mr. Pyun, you keep on rising and keep on making statements. The court hopes that one day you will learn not to keep on rising, but just let matters lie. In the course of Mr. Sherwood's cross-examination of a key prosecution witness, alleged accomplice Philip Sylva, the trial judge ruled inadmissible questions concerning Sylva's involvement in a murder unconnected with the case. The following colloquy then occurred: Mr. Sherwood: Is the Court precluding me totally from going into matters which might have relevance to the character and credibility of this man's testimony? The Court: Mr. Sherwood, if you believe that it has standing you should proceed as a lawyer in this case. The Court has already sustained the objection. If you do not understand the area you are in the Court suggests that you think about it. [8] It is clear that these remarks in the presence of the jury, conveying the trial judge's contemptuous opinion of the capabilities of defense counsel, were palpably improper. [9] As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held on a record reflecting similar improprieties committed by a trial judge, gratuitous implications of ineptness, before the jury, especially with the added impact of sarcasm, were not justified, and constituted reversible error. United States v. Dellinger, supra, 472 F.2d at 387-388. The prejudicial nature of the trial judge's misconduct towards defense counsel is accentuated by the factual record on the question of the appellants' guilt. It shows that the prosecution's case turned largely on the testimony of Robert Low and Philip Sylva, two alleged participants in the robbery who had been granted immunity from prosecution in return for their testimony against Moore and Pokini. The defense rested for the most part on extensive challenges to the credibility of these witnesses. Where the credibility of alleged accomplice testimony is a key issue, it can never be said, as it was in United States v. Porter, supra, 441 F.2d at 1215, that the case of guilt is strong. State v. Thomas, supra . Indeed, the lengthy deliberations of the jury in these cases, during which at one point the foreman indicated that the jury was deadlocked, lend even more credence to the argument that the cases were close. This court stated, in Territory v. Van Culin, supra, 36 Haw. at 159, quoting Sharpton v. State, 1 Ga. App. 542, 548-549, 57 S.E. 929, 932 (1907): Every practitioner knows how eagerly alert jurors are to every utterance from the bench, and how sensitive is the mind of the juror to the slightest judicial expression. The trial judge's short-tempered abuse of defense counsel in the presence of the jury, exacerbated by repetition, clings to the mind like a tattoo on the epidermis. Carlile v. State, 129 Fla. 860, 865, 176 So. 862, 864 (1937). Counsel's efficacy in the eyes of the jury could have been diminished by the trial judge's remarks; and in a trial such as this, where the entire defense is premised on counsel's ability to impeach the credibility of accomplice testimony, such conduct from the bench is especially devastating. The five members of this court are unanimous in their disapproval of the trial judge's remarks  the only difference among us is whether those remarks were reversible or non-reversible error. However, since these cases are to be reversed on other grounds anyway, hopefully the trial judge will draw guidance from our disapproval should he preside at the retrial of these cases.