Opinion ID: 166827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sutterley/Kilgore and the Holzwarths

Text: Although the district court construed Goodyear’s Rule 50(b) motion as a Rule 59(e) motion, it effectively granted Goodyear judgment as a matter of law on two grounds. First, because the jury awards mirrored the amounts Homeowners’ expert testified were appropriate for future repair costs, these damages were impermissible. The Holzwarths and Sutterley/Kilgore would never incur those costs as they had already sold their homes, and thus the awards exceeded the -23- amount which could have been granted based upon the evidence. Second, to the extent future repair costs served as a proxy for the losses these homeowners incurred on selling their homes, the jury was given the opportunity to award them diminution in value damages, but declined to do so. The Holzwarths and Sutterley/Kilgore ask us to reverse the district court’s grant of Goodyear’s motion and to reinstate the full amount of their jury verdicts. They assert that they provided sufficient evidence to support the jury’s awards because future repair costs represented a proxy for the amount they lost on the sale of their homes. Further, they maintain that because the evidence supports the damages awarded, the district court should have given effect to the jury’s intention to award these diminution in value damages. We agree. We review the grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, reviewing all of the evidence in the record. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party and this court does “not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Id. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate “only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the opposing party’s position.” Finley v. United States, 82 F.3d 966, 968 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation and citation omitted). We will reverse the district court if, viewing the record in the -24- light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we find evidence upon which the jury could have properly returned a verdict in its favor. See Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir. 1996). In diversity cases, the substantive law of the forum state governs the analysis of the underlying claims, including specification of the applicable standards of proof. Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 792 (10th Cir. 1997). Under Colorado law, diminution in value is ordinarily the rule applied to measure damages to real property. See Board of County Com’rs of Weld County v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Colo. 1986). The goal in compensating the property owner is to reimburse that owner for the actual loss suffered. Id. Damages are not recoverable, however, for losses beyond an amount that a plaintiff can establish with reasonable certainty by a preponderance of the evidence. Pomeranz v. McDonalds’s Corp., 843 P.2d 1378, 1381 (Colo. 1993). The “rule of certainty” requires a reasonable degree of persuasiveness in the proof of the fact of damages or injury. Western Cities Broadcasting, Inc. v. Schueller, 849 P.2d 44, 48 (Colo. 1993) (interpreting Pomeranz, 843 P.2d 1378) (quotations in original)). Once the fact of damage has been established with the requisite degree of certainty, a plaintiff will not be barred from recovery for failing to prove the amount of loss with mathematical certainty. Id. The amount of damages to be awarded is a matter within the sole province of the jury, and such -25- award may not be disturbed unless it is completely without support in the record. Margenau v. Bowlin, 12 P.3d 1214, 1218 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); see Bennett v. Longacre, 774 F.2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he amount of damages awarded by a jury can be supported by any competent evidence tending to sustain it.”).
Our review of the record reveals the following. At trial, Mr. Holzwarth testified that he and his wife incurred $43,072 in repair costs due to the problems they experienced with their hydronic heating system. He also testified that they considered repairing or replacing the Entran II, estimating the cost to be as much as $200,000. Tr. Vol. XVIII at 1933. The Holzwarths’ expert, Mr. Wilson, supported that estimate. Id. Vol. XXX at 3105. Due to the high cost, the Holzwarths sold their home without replacing the hydronic heating system. Mr. Holzwarth testified that in his opinion, they received $150,000 to $200,000 less for their home then they would have had it contained a fully functional hydronic heating system. Id. at 1938-39. Based on this testimony, the jury could have returned a verdict in the Holzwarths’ favor for $200,000 in diminution in value damages. Mr. Holzwarth, as the twelve-year owner of the home since it was built, was qualified to testify regarding its value. See United States v. 10,031.98 Acres of Land, 850 F.2d 634, 636-37 (10th Cir. 1988). -26- To the extent the district court concluded that $200,000 of the jury’s award to the Holzwarths was attributable to the testimony of Mr. Wilson regarding future repair costs, a different conclusion is not required. The Holzwarth’s decision to forego complete repair or replacement of the hydronic heating system was a function of the high cost of doing so. The jury was free to make the reasonable inference that the purchase price of the Holzwarth’s home was diminished by that amount. This evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s award of $243,072 2 in favor of the Holzwarths. Sutterley/Kilgore, like the Holzwarths, sold their home before trial. At trial, Ms. Sutterley testified that when she first listed her home – prior to her discovery of any alleged defects in the Entran II hose – she listed it for $849,000. Tr. Vol. XXVI at 2701. She later learned about the problems associated with Entran II from a realtor and various plumbers. Id. at 2701-02. After evaluating the difficulties with repairing or replacing the Entran II, Sutterley/Kilgore disclosed the problem and dropped the listing price to $799,000. Id. at 2703-04. Ms. Sutterley eventually sold the home for $750,000. Id. at 2706. In her opinion, she “solidly” lost $100,000 on the sale of her home because of the presence of Entran II. Id. at 2705-06. Ms. Sutterley, as the designer and owner of the home since it was built, was qualified to testify regarding its value. See 10,031.98 2 Goodyear does not challenge the $43,072 portion of the jury award. -27- Acres of Land, 850 F.2d at 636-37. In addition, Mr. Wilson testified that the cost to repair the hydronic heating system in the Sutterley/Kilgore home would be approximately $240,000. Tr. Vol. XXX at 3116. The jury awarded Sutterley/Kilgore $240,071. The testimony of Ms. Sutterley and Mr. Wilson provide sufficient evidence to sustain this award. Ms. Sutterley testified that she lowered the asking price of her home because of the difficulties associated with repairing or replacing the Entran II hose. Mr. Wilson testified that the cost to repair or replace the Entran II hose in the Sutterley/Kilgore home would be approximately $240,000. As with the Holzwarths, the jury was free to make the reasonable inference that the purchase price of the Sutterley/Kilgore home was diminished by the amount Mr. Wilson testified to. Although the $240,000 figure exceeded Ms. Sutterley’s assessment that she “solidly” lost $100,00 on the sale of her home, because Sutterley/Kilgore sufficiently established the fact of damages, it was within the province of the jury to determine the amount of those damages to be awarded. 3 3 Goodyear does not challenge the $44,000 portion of the jury award the district court attributed to the cost of the bridge loan that Ms. Sutterley testified to maintaining while her house remained unsold. Tr. Vol. XXVI at 2705. However, based on the award of $240,071 to Sutterley/Kilgore, it appears that the jury did not award them damages based on these costs. In addition, our review of the record does not reveal a basis for the $71 difference between the amount testified to by Mr. Wilson ($240,000) and the jury award ($240,071). This difference is, however, immaterial to our consideration of the issues presented here. (continued...) -28- Goodyear argues that any claim of Sutterley/Kilgore that future repair costs were a proxy for pre-repair, diminution in value damages was contradicted by counsel’s closing. Counsel suggested $59,000 for the decrease in market value of the Suttereley/Kilgore home. The jury was properly instructed, however, that “statements and arguments are not evidence in this case.” J.A. at 746. Counsel’s closing arguments did not alter the evidence before the jury. Goodyear also urges us to reject the characterization of the damages theory by these homeowners. Goodyear maintains that the Holzwarths and Sutterley/Kilgore made a pretrial election to seek repair or replacement costs and post-repair uncertainty damages 4 that foreclosed them from seeking damages for the diminished prices at which they sold there homes. (Goodyear Ans. Br. at 57). Given the record, though, we cannot accept this contention. Without objection by Goodyear, these homeowners presented evidence at trial that they sold their homes at a diminished price because of Entran II. In fact, counsel for Goodyear diligently cross-examined both Mr. Holzwarth and Ms. Sutterley on this issue. Tr. Vol. XVIII at 1941-43; Vol. XXVI at 2709. Any argument that the Holzwarths and Sutterley/Kilgore were prohibited from seeking damages under a 3 (...continued) 4 Uncertainty damages represent the decrease in the value of the Homeowners’ homes after the hydronic heating systems were repaired or replaced due to the market’s perception of Entran II. -29- diminution in value theory was waived by Goodyear when it implicitly consented to trial of the issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) (pleadings deemed amended when issues tried by consent); Green Country Food Market, Inc. v. Bottling Group, LLC, 371 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004) (“A party impliedly consents to the trial of an issue not contained within the pleadings either by introducing evidence on the new issue or by failing to object when the opposing party introduces such evidence.”). Goodyear also argues that the Holzwarths and Sutterley/Kilgore should be precluded from seeking diminution in value damages under the election of remedies doctrine, citing Lakeside Ventures, L.L.C. v. Lakeside Dev. Co., 68 P.3d 516, 519 (Colo. App. 2002). However, the doctrine of election of remedies is inapposite. “The doctrine of election of election of remedies prevents double recovery by requiring a party to make an election when the remedies sought are inconsistent and contradictory. It has no application where a party seeks only one remedy.” Id. Here, the Holzwarths and Sutterley/Kilgore did not seek inconsistent remedies. They did not seek both pre-repair diminution in value damages and costs to repair or replace. Rather, they argue that future repair costs serve as a proxy by which to measure the losses they sustained on the sale of their homes. Last, Goodyear emphasizes that the Holzwarths and Sutterley/Kilgore -30- provided no basis for their opinions on the value of their property. But both Mr. Holzwarth and Ms. Sutterley are deemed to have special knowledge of their property given their long ownership and familiarity with it. See 10,031.98 Acres of Land, 850 F.2d at 636. Moreover, neither Mr. Holzwarth nor Ms. Sutterley negated their special knowledge by their own testimony. Cf. id. (owner of property in condemnation suit negated the presumption of special knowledge by testifying that he relied on impermissible grounds when opining on the value of his property). Accordingly, they were permitted to offer such testimony without further qualification. Id. Furthermore, in testifying as to the value of their property they were entitled to the privileges of a testifying expert. Id.
The jury placed the total $243,072 it awarded the Holzwarths in the category of the verdict form labeled “reasonable repair and/or replacement costs.” J.A. at 867. The jury awarded Sutterley/Kilgore $240,071 in the category of the verdict form labeled “other reasonable costs or losses.” J.A. at 923. The district court concluded that although the jury was provided the opportunity to award “loss in market value” damages, it declined to do so. J.A. at 1873. It reasoned that the jury’s categorization of the damages was inconsistent with the theory of damages advanced by the Holzwarths and Sutterley/Kilgore. When reviewing jury verdicts, we are guided by our duty to attempt to -31- reconcile the jury’s answers to special verdict questions. See, e.g., Heno, 208 F.3d at 852; Gallick, 372 U.S. at 119 (“We ... must attempt to reconcile the jury’s findings, by exegesis if necessary, ..., before we are free to disregard the jury’s special verdict and remand the case for a new trial.”). If there is any reasonable view of the case which makes the answers consistent, the case must be resolved in that way. See Heno, 208 F.3d at 852; Palmer v. City of Monticello, 31 F.3d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir. 1994). The consistency of a jury’s verdict must be considered in light of the instructions given to the jury, among other factors. See Harvey, 873 F.2d at 1348. The jury was instructed that “[t]he Homeowners have the burden of proving the nature and extent of their compensatory damages by a preponderance of the evidence.” J.A. at 779 (emphasis supplied). The jury was further instructed that “[i]n determining these damages, you shall consider the following: (1) reasonable repair and/or replacement costs, if any; (2) other reasonable costs or losses, if any; and (3) the decrease in market value, if any, to the Homeowner’s homes, as repaired.” Id. (emphasis supplied). We note that category (1) does not state “reasonable repair and/or replacement costs incurred” and a reasonable jury certainly could conclude in light of the evidence that the categories were not mutually exclusive. The Holzwarths put forth evidence to substantiate the nature of their -32- damages. While living at the home, the Holzwarths incurred $43,072 in repair costs due to Entran II, an amount which is uncontested by Goodyear. As discussed, the Holzwarths also provided evidence to support their claim for diminution in value damages. A fair reading of the jury’s verdict suggests the jury accepted the Holzwarths’ diminution in value theory of damages and, as required by the jury instructions, considered the amount Mr. Wilson testified to would cost to repair or replace the Holzwarths’ hydronic heating system. As such, the jury placed the corresponding $200,000 amount in the category for “reasonable repair and/or replacement costs.” The jury was not limited to “reasonable repair and/or replacement costs incurred, and could well have decided that the diminution in value of $200,000 was an excellent proxy for the repair and/or replacement costs that would have been required to remedy this problem. Although other interpretations may be reasonable, this view harmonizes the jury’s verdict and we are bound by it. Accordingly, the jury’s award of $243,072 to the Holzwarths must be reinstated. Sutterley/Kilgore also put forth evidence to substantiate the nature of their damages, i.e., their claim for diminution in value damages. Unlike the verdict form given to the jury for the Holzwarths claims, the verdict form for Sutterley/Kilgore did not have a category for “reasonable repair and/or replacement costs.” Instead, in considering the damages to award -33- Sutterley/Kilgore, the jury had the option to award either “other reasonable costs or losses,” or “the decrease in market value, if any, as repaired.” J.A. at 923 (emphasis supplied). The jury awarded Sutterley/Kilgore $240,071 as other “other reasonable costs or losses.” Id. A fair reading of the jury’s verdict indicates that this was the proper category for the jury to place the award because Sutterley/Kilgore did not have their home repaired. Again, this view harmonizes the jury’s verdict and we are bound by it. As such, the jury’s award of $240,071 to Sutterley/Kilgore must be reinstated.