Opinion ID: 844274
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prospective Alternate Juror John B.

Text: During voir dire, the court questioned Prospective Alternate Juror John B. at the bench about disclosures in his questionnaire concerning child abuse. After this topic was explored, defense counsel requested permission to ask John B. one question. He then asked whether a person who has committed cold-blooded, premeditated murder in the commission of a robbery has forfeited his right to live and should automatically get the death penalty regardless of his circumstances? John B. disagreed with the word automatically and said he would not vote for death automatically. He explained, however, that he could imagine circumstances when a murderer would forfeit the right to live, such as if the victim was murdered even when doing his or her best to cooperate. When defense counsel asserted that is precisely what the People are going to try to prove, John B. admitted that, in that case, he would lean very strongly in favor of voting for death. The court interrupted the juror and asked if the prosecutor had any questions. In response to the prosecutor's questioning, John B. repeatedly stated that he would weigh the circumstances in deciding whether to impose the death penalty and would not impose death automatically. John B. stressed that he would always take the circumstances of the case into account. He could vote for life imprisonment without parole, but he conceded that in certain circumstances, like the murder of a compliant victim, he would lean strongly toward the death penalty. Defense counsel interposed the beginning of a question: But if a person goes out of his way to take a robbery victim who is not resisting, and take them to another area and murder them by repeatedly stabbing them . The court sustained an objection, and counsel rephrased the question. Directing John B.'s attention to a questionnaire response stating that a person who committed premeditated murder had `forfeited the right,' defense counsel asked whether a fact pattern of premeditated murder would cause John B. to automatically vote for death. John B. responded, I'm going to object to the term `automatic.' I would lean much more heavily towards it. But I mean, there are circumstances that would have to be weighed all the way around. The next day, defendant moved to dismiss John B. for cause, arguing there was no reasonable possibility John B. would impose life imprisonment without parole under the facts of this case. The court denied the challenge. Having observed John B.'s demeanor at sidebar, the court found him to be very thoughtful in his answers, and ... very credible. Although John B. said he would strongly lean toward death in certain cases, the court concluded this statement was not a sufficient basis for disqualification. The court observed, Yes, he's a strong pro-deather. But he made it very, very clear that he would be willing to look at the circumstances, although his feelings on the subject matter are very strong. After his cause challenge was denied, defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse John B. and exhausted all four peremptory challenges allotted for the selection of alternate jurors. However, defense counsel did not express dissatisfaction with the jury as sworn. (6) As a general rule, a party may not complain on appeal of an allegedly erroneous denial of a challenge for cause because the party need not tolerate having the prospective juror serve on the jury; a litigant retains the power to remove the juror by exercising a peremptory challenge. Thus, to preserve this claim for appeal we require, first, that a litigant actually exercise a peremptory challenge and remove the prospective juror in question. Next, the litigant must exhaust all of the peremptory challenges allotted by statute and hold none in reserve. Finally, counsel ... must express to the trial court dissatisfaction with the jury as presently constituted. ( People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 186 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 153, 226 P.3d 276].) Defendant satisfied the first two of these requirements, but not the third. We have declined to find claims forfeited under these circumstances in cases tried before 1994, when the expression of dissatisfaction requirement was clarified in People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 121, footnote 4 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887] (see Mills, at pp. 186-187); however, defendant's trial was in 1995. (7) Even if defendant's claim had been preserved, it would fail on the merits. Defendant first argues the court erred in limiting his attorney's questioning of John B. In general, both parties are entitled to ask prospective jurors questions that are specific enough to determine if those jurors harbor bias, as to some fact or circumstance shown by the trial evidence, that would cause them not to follow an instruction directing them to determine a penalty after considering aggravating and mitigating evidence. [Citation.] ( People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 720-721 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332].) However, [o]ur decisions have explained that death-qualification voir dire must avoid two extremes. On the one hand, it must not be so abstract that it fails to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in the case being tried. On the other hand, it must not be so specific that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty issue based on a summary of the mitigating and aggravating evidence likely to be presented. [Citation.] In deciding where to strike the balance in a particular case, trial courts have considerable discretion. [Citations.] ( Id. at pp. 721-722.) Defense counsel had ample opportunity to question John B. and did so at length. This questioning was cut short on only one occasion, when the court sustained an objection to counsel's question whether John B. would impose the death penalty upon a person who had moved an unresisting robbery victim to another location and then repeatedly stabbed them. This hypothetical question included several key facts about defendant's alleged crime: (1) The murder was committed during a robbery; (2) the victim did not resist; (3) the victim was moved to another location; and (4) in that location, the victim was stabbed repeatedly and killed. Given this specificity, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the question improperly called for Prospective Alternate Juror John B. to prejudge the penalty determination based on evidence likely to be presented. (8) Defendant next argues substantial evidence does not support the court's denial of his challenge of John B. for cause. A prospective juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views regarding capital punishment only if those views would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844]; People v. Crittenden [, supra , ] 9 Cal.4th [at p.] 121 ...; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 456 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].) ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519].) If a juror's responses are conflicting or equivocal, the trial court's ruling is binding on us. [Citations.] If not, we will uphold the trial court if the ruling is fairly supported by substantial evidence in the record, giving deference to the trial court which had the opportunity to observe and listen to the juror. [Citations.] ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 651 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213].) Substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that John B. could remain impartial and apply the law despite his personal beliefs regarding the death penalty. The trial court found John B.'s responses to be thoughtful and credible, and we defer to this assessment. ( People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 490 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182]; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 122.) John B. repeatedly averred that he would not impose the death penalty automatically, but would consider all the relevant circumstances in making a decision. Although he admitted he would lean toward death in the case of a robber who proceeded to murder a cooperative victim, he stressed that no particular penalty would be automatic. In context, John B.'s statements appear to convey his view that the premeditated murder of an unresisting victim presents, in the abstract, a collection of aggravating circumstances that tip the balance heavily in favor of death. John B. did not rule out a different result, however, if mitigating circumstances were also taken into account.