Opinion ID: 4541658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 3d at 1208; Lee, 935 A.2d at 876-77.

Text: As we have found in our recent decisions and as the parties before us agree, Factor 3, regarding a finding of scienter, and Factor 5, addressing whether the behavior is a crime, provide little weight to the analysis of whether sexual offender registration and notification provisions are punitive. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1214, 1216. This Court in regard to Factors 3 and 5, following the United States Supreme Court, has observed that “where the concern of a sex offender registration statute like SORNA is protecting the public against recidivism, past criminal conduct is ‘a necessary beginning point.’” Id. at 1214 (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 105). Given the agreement that these factors provide little [J-104-2019] - 31 guidance in determining whether the statute is punitive, we will not discuss them further in this analysis. a. Factor 1: Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint Applying the first Mendoza-Martinez factor, the trial court acknowledged this Court’s recent analysis in Muniz. In Muniz, this Court emphasized the distinctions between the registration requirements of the then-applicable SORNA and those which this Court reviewed in Williams II and that the United States Supreme Court considered in Smith. We contrasted the absence of required in-person updates in Smith with SORNA, which imposed a minimum of 100 in-person updates in the first twenty-five years and likely many more due to updates for changes of address, phone numbers, appearance, and other required updates. This Court in Muniz additionally rejected the Commonwealth’s attempt to analogize the quarterly in-person updates to the monthly counseling sessions for SVPs, which were deemed non-punitive in Williams II. We distinguished the in-person updates in SORNA by emphasizing that SORNA’s reporting requirements did not involve any sort of counseling to aid the offender in preventing relapse as was the case in Williams II. Thus, this Court’s found that the registration and notification provisions of SORNA constituted an affirmative disability or restraint. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1211. The trial court in the case at bar recognized that the amendments to Revised Subchapter H were intended to address the Muniz decision. It observed that the recent amendments included a provision which allowed for the substitution of telephonic updates for the in-person quarterly and semiannual updates for Tier II and III offenders who complied with all registration requirements for the first three years and met other requirements. The court also acknowledged that an offender could petition to be relieved [J-104-2019] - 32 of the registration requirements after twenty-five years. The trial court opined that the reduction in registration requirements from SORNA to Revised Subchapter H was “largely ephemeral” as the offender remains “for all intents and purposes, on probation for the entirety of their lives, with all the regulation, control, and sundering of privacy that such status entails.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 61.20 It additionally opined that the provision for review after twenty-five years was “illusory and akin to no post-deprivation process at all.” Appellee Brief at 62. It, therefore, concluded that this factor weighed in favor of finding Revised Subchapter H’s requirements punitive. We acknowledge that the court’s analysis of this factor does not overtly rely upon Appellee’s scientific evidence. Nevertheless, the trial court’s recounting of the impact of the registration updates and the publication of the relevant data are to some extent informed by the expert’s evidence of the negative effects of registration on sexual offenders, as discussed in more detail in regard to other factors below. Accordingly, in balancing all of the factors, the court may have weighed this factor more heavily as punitive because of the court’s acceptance of Appellee’s expert evidence. Therefore, we find it appropriate for the trial court to reevaluate this factor after a full hearing on the scientific evidence. b. Factor 2: Whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment 20 The trial court expressively emphasized the imposition on the offender: They cannot change their address without reporting it to the police. They cannot begin school or switch schools without notifying the police. They cannot buy a new car without informing the police. Nor can they take a new job without reporting it to the police, so that this fact, along with the rest of the personal aspects of their lives, can be further disseminated to anyone in the world via the Internet. Tr. Ct. Op. at 61. [J-104-2019] - 33 In Muniz, this Court opined that the registration and notification provisions of SORNA were comparable to the established punitive measures of probation and shaming. We again distinguished the United States Supreme Court’s 2003 analysis of registration provisions in Smith, observing that the “technological environment” had changed in the years between 2003 and 2017 such that the shaming aspect of the registration provisions differed dramatically. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1212. While Smith had distinguished colonial era shaming from Alaska’s 2003 online registry by emphasizing that shaming depended on face-to-face ostracism by the community, this Court recognized that the current technology and social media usage created a world in which “[y]esterday’s face-to-face shaming punishment can now be accomplished online.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747, 765-66 (Pa. Super. 2014)). We additionally opined that the in-person reporting requirements of SORNA, as distinguished from the statute reviewed in Smith, resembled the periodic meetings imposed upon those on probation and similarly included the threat of incarceration for failure to abide by the reporting requirements. This Court concluded that these attributes of SORNA weighted this factor toward finding the statute punitive. Id. at 1213. The trial court in the case at bar concluded that “nothing about the [Revised Subchapter H] amendments to SORNA alters” this Court’s analysis in Muniz. Tr. Ct. Op. at 65. It opined that Revised Subchapter H’s “slightly ameliorated in-person appearances do not change the global nature of the public shaming or the intensity of the probationarystyle onus on the offender.” Id. It, therefore, found this factor also weighed in favor of viewing Revised Subchapter H as punitive in nature. We recognize that, similar to Factor 1, the trial court’s analysis of this factor does not specifically draw upon the scientific evidence presented by Appellee. Instead, it is reliant upon the analysis in Muniz. Nevertheless, we recognize that the expert evidence [J-104-2019] - 34 addressing the effects of the registry on offenders may have altered the trial court’s assessment of the degree to which the online public registry is akin to public shaming and probation. As with the first factor, we conclude that consideration of the scientific evidence presented on remand may alter the trial court’s weighting of this factor. c. Factor 4: Whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence In Muniz, we distinguished SORNA’s provisions from the Megan’s Law II provisions addressed in Williams II. While the criminal offenses involved in Megan’s Law II were generally serious crimes where the deterrent effect of registration paled in comparison to the substantial incarceration terms, we emphasized that SORNA’s registration provisions applied to a much wider range of offenses, many of which carried minimal terms of incarceration.21 We concluded that the registration and notification provisions, therefore, entailed a more significant deterrent effect in SORNA than in past iterations. 21Specifically, we pointed to following predicate offenses that could be graded as misdemeanors: interference with custody of children, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2904; luring a child into a motor vehicle or structure, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2910; indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1) - (6), (8); invasion of privacy, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7507.1(b); and obscene and other sexual materials and performances, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5903(a)(3)(ii), (4)(ii), (5)(ii), (6). SORNA predicate offenses that may have a maximum incarceration term of two years or less under federal law are as follows: video voyeurism, 18 U.S.C. § 1801; misleading domain names on the internet, 18 U.S.C. § 2252B; and abusive sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 2244. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1215 n.20. [J-104-2019] - 35 We also concluded in Muniz that the retributive aspects of the registration provisions were greater than in the sexual offender registration provisions reviewed in Smith or Williams II, observing that “SORNA has increased the length of registration, contains mandatory in-person reporting requirements, and allows for more private information to be displayed online.” Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1216. Given the increased deterrent and retributive aspects of SORNA as compared with prior statutes, we concluded that this factor weighed more heavily in favor of finding the provisions to be punitive. Id. In the case at bar, the trial court concluded that the analysis of this factor in Muniz controlled as “[t]he Act 10 amendments to SORNA did nothing to alter the deterrent and retributive effects of the pre-amendment Act.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 68. It emphasized that Revised Subchapter H “still requires lengthy, often lifetime, registration, still requires inperson registration, places onerous reporting burdens on offenders, and allows very private information to be published worldwide over the Internet.” Id. at 68-69. The trial court supported this analysis by additionally questioning the legitimacy of the Commonwealth’s asserted goal of protecting the public from sexual offender recidivation. In addressing this factor, the court explicitly referenced the scientific evidence presented by Appellee indicating that sexual offender registries are ineffective. Id. at 67. While this factor could arguably be addressed solely by comparing the provisions of the current Revised Subchapter H to those of SORNA analyzed in Muniz, the trial court’s analysis demonstrates its consideration of the effectiveness of sexual offender registries in addressing this factor. As with the other factors, we conclude that the court’s analysis of this factor also favors remanding for further consideration in light of any additional scientific evidence. [J-104-2019] - 36 d. Factor 6: Whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it The appellant in Muniz conceded that the sixth Mendoza-Martinez factor weighed in favor of finding SORNA non-punitive when he agreed that there was a rational connection between the sexual offender registration and notification provisions and public safety. This Court, nevertheless, addressed this issue based upon the claims raised by an amicus curiae in the case, contesting the rationality of the connection. The amicus cited scientific evidence that “most offenders will not commit another sexual offense,” that “SORNA therefore produces an illusion of security from stranger perpetrators when the majority of sexual crimes are committed by someone known to the victim[;]” and that “SORNA diverts law enforcement efforts away from the most serious offenders and from effective methods of crime control and treatment.” Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1216. The Commonwealth’s amicus curiae, in turn, cited contrary scientific evidence allegedly supporting the legislative presumption that sexual offenders pose a high likelihood of recidivation. In response to these arguments of amici in Muniz, this Court, understandably, concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to overturn the legislative finding that “[s]exual offenders pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses and protection of the public from this type of offender is a paramount governmental interest.” Id. at 1217 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(a)(4)). We additionally observed that “the General Assembly legislated in response to a federal mandate based on the expressed purpose of protection from sex offenders.” Id. As has been repeatedly quoted by the Commonwealth parties in this case, we additionally opined: We recognize there are studies which find the majority of sexual offenders will not re-offend, and that sex offender [J-104-2019] - 37 registration laws are ineffective in preventing re-offense; we also recognize there are studies that reach contrary conclusions. In this context, we find persuasive [the] argument that policy regarding such complex societal issues, especially when there are studies with contrary conclusions, is ordinarily a matter for the General Assembly. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Hale, [128 A.3d 781, 785 (Pa. 2015)] (where “substantial policy considerations” are involved “such matters are generally reserved . . . to the General Assembly”). Id. at 1217. We continued reasoning that “[a]though there are contrary scientific studies, we note there is by no means a consensus, and as such, we defer to the General Assembly's findings on this issue.” Id. Accordingly, we concluded that “there is a purpose other than punishment to which the statute may be rationally connected and this factor weighs in favor of finding SORNA to be nonpunitive.” Id. In regard to the sixth factor, the trial court acknowledged this Court’s analysis in relation to SORNA. The trial court, however, respectfully concluded that “the evidence presented in court on July 9, 2018, gives rise to serious concerns about the rationality of [Revised Subchapter H’s] connection to its alleged non-punitive purpose.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 70. The court instead concluded that the connection between the registration requirements and the intended purpose of public protection was “anything but rational.” Id. It, therefore, weighed this factor in favor of finding the statute punitive. Nevertheless, acknowledging that this Court could conclude otherwise based on Muniz, it opined that it would still find Revised Subchapter H’s requirements punitive even if the sixth factor was weighted as non-punitive. Even though the trial court expressly limited the impact of this factor on its eventual balancing of the seven factors, it cannot be disputed that the trial court’s evaluation of the Appellee’s experts’ evidence affected its view of the case. Indeed, it expressly references its evaluation of this factor in its consideration of Factor 7. Thus, the trial court’s analysis of this factor also counsels in favor of a remand to develop the record. [J-104-2019] - 38 e. Factor 7: Whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. This Court in Muniz recognized that it had expressed hesitation concerning this factor in Williams II regarding the absence of any procedure by which, in that case, an SVP could later assert that he or she no longer posed a danger to the public. Notably, however, the SVP determination process in Williams II entailed an initial individualized assessment of risk of danger. In contrast, we recognized in Muniz that “SORNA categorizes a broad range of individuals as sex offenders subject to its provisions, including those convicted of offenses that do not specifically relate to a sexual act.” Muniz 164 A.3d at 1218. We, therefore, concluded that “SORNA's requirements are excessive and over-inclusive in relation to the statute's alternative assigned purpose of protecting the public from sexual offenders.” Id. The trial court recited our analysis in Muniz and opined that Revised Subchapter H “has no impact on the concerns raised by [this Court] with respect to this factor.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 71. Referencing back to its conclusions regarding Factor 6, the court continued that this Court’s conclusion regarding the excessiveness factor in Muniz “is even more compelling when the rationality of SORNA’s relationship to its professed non-punitive purpose is deconstructed and debunked.” Id. at 71. Thus, the trial court’s evaluation of this factor is also tied to the strength of Appellee’s scientific evidence, which may require reevaluation following the presentation of any additional scientific evidence on remand. f. Balancing of Factors Weighing the factors in Muniz, this Court concluded that all of the relevant factors, other than Factor 6, weighed “in favor of finding SORNA to be punitive in effect despite its expressed civil remedial purpose.” Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1218. Specifically, we held that “SORNA involves affirmative disabilities or restraints, its sanctions have been historically [J-104-2019] - 39 regarded as punishment, its operation promotes the traditional aims of punishment, including deterrence and retribution, and its registration requirements are excessive in relation to its stated nonpunitive purpose.” Id. Likewise, weighing all the factors, the trial court in the case at bar opined that the balancing applied in Muniz was applicable to Revised Subchapter H such that it “is still sufficiently punitive in effect to overcome the General Assembly's stated non-punitive purpose.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 72. The court additionally reasserted, that while not determinative of its balancing of factors, it would nevertheless weigh Factor 6 more heavily in favor of finding Revised Subchapter H punitive because it did “not consider SORNA to be rationally connected to any legitimate non-punitive purpose because of the evidence presented before [it] on July 9, 2018.” Id. We observe that the scientific evidence presented by Appellee during the postsentence motion arguably influenced the trial court’s consideration of all five relevant factors and overtly drove the analysis of three. Accordingly, we conclude that its labeling of Revised Subchapter H as punitive was impacted by its assessment of Appellee’s expert evidence such that reevaluation of the balancing of the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors is appropriate following presentation of additional scientific evidence on remand. The trial court’s conclusion that Revised Subchapter H is punitive inevitably resulted in the court’s determination that the registration requirements were part of Appellee’s criminal sentence, and thus, subject to the various constitutional and statutory protections. Evaluating each challenge raised by Appellee, the trial court concluded that (1) Revised Subchapter H violated the dictates of Apprendi and Alleyne because it subjected offenders to increased registration provisions without a jury determining that the offender posed a risk of future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the registration periods constituted illegal sentences in excess of the statutory maximum [J-104-2019] - 40 terms of incarceration; (3) the provisions resulted in an excessive sentence in violation of the federal and state constitutional provisions related to cruel and unusual punishments; and (4) Revised Subchapter H violated the separation of powers doctrine by “encroach[ing] upon the judiciary’s fact-finding and individualized sentencing responsibilities.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 78. As these holding flow from the trial court’s determination that Revised Subchapter H is punitive, they too should be reevaluated following remand. V. Conclusion It is abundantly clear that the trial court’s various declarations of Revised Subchapter H’s registration and notification provisions as unconstitutional derived directly from the court’s acceptance of and reliance upon Appellee’s experts’ evidence challenging the legislative determinations underpinning Revised Subchapter H, specifically (1) that all sexual offenders pose a high risk of recidivation and (2) that the tier-based registration system of Revised Subchapter H protects the public from the alleged danger of recidivist sexual offenders. Unfortunately, the procedural posture of this case prevents tidy resolution of the matter by this Court. While Appellee presented a colorable argument that the General Assembly’s factual presumptions have been undermined by recent scientific studies, we are unable to affirm the trial court’s several conclusions finding Revised Subchapter H unconstitutional. We note that the evidence of record does not demonstrate a consensus of scientific evidence as was present to find a presumption not universally true in J.B., 107 A.3d 17-19, nor the “clearest proof” needed to overturn the General Assembly’s statements that the provisions are not punitive, which we have noted “requires more than merely showing disagreement among relevant authorities,” Lee, 935 A.2d at 885. We hesitate to find these standards met by the stipulated admission of three experts’ [J-104-2019] - 41 affidavits, without an opportunity to weigh this evidence against contrary evidence, if any exists.22 22 The Dissent in favor of affirmance frames this remand as “forgiv[ing]” the Commonwealth and providing it an “excuse” by imposing “a heavy burden” on Appellee challenging the constitutionality of Revised Subchapter H. Dissenting Op. at 2 (Donohue, J., dissenting). Respectfully, it is not an excuse but our constitutional duty to impose that burden in order to uphold the separation of powers between this Court and the General Assembly. Indeed, as detailed above, we defer policy making determinations to the legislative branch absent a challenger’s demonstration that those determinations result in a statute that clearly, palpably and plainly violates the constitutional rights of citizens. Shoul, 173 A.3d at 678. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the current record does not meet that burden and accordingly remand for further determinations. Rather than remanding, the Dissent in favor of affirmance independently examines the scientific evidence cited by the Commonwealth and determines that it supports the conclusion that prior precedents have been mistaken regarding the high rates of recidivism relied upon to support sexual offender laws. Dissenting Op. at 2 (Donohue, J., dissenting). As support, the Dissent correctly quotes the study referenced by the Commonwealth as acknowledging “a substantial gulf between the sexual recidivism rates observed in the empirical studies and the rates supposed by the laity and endorsed by the [United States] Supreme Court.” Id. at 16 (quoting Scurich at 4). The authors of the study, however, do not concede the validity of that gap in terms of actual recidivism as opposed to the recidivism observed in some studies. Instead, without endorsing a specific reoffense rate or taking a “position on the propriety of sexual offender legislation[,]” they nevertheless “question challenges to that legislation to the extent [the challenges] are based on current empirical assertions that sexual offender recidivism is ‘low.’” Scurich at 4. The paper then sets forth various factors of the empirical studies, such as those relied upon by Appellee, that underestimate the recidivism rate of sexual offenders. We generally agree with the Dissent’s analysis that “the relevant question should not be whether convicted sexual offenders are committing unreported sexual crimes, but rather whether sexual offenders commit more sexual crimes than other groups not subject to similar registration laws.” Dissenting Op. at 18 (Donohue, J., dissenting). We respectfully disagree, however, with the Dissent’s conclusion that the legislature’s finding that sexual offenders pose a higher risk of recidivation has “been debunked,” id, to such a degree as to justify overturning the legislature’s policy determination that “[s]exual offenders pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses and protection of the public from this type of offender is a paramount governmental interest.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(a)(4). [J-104-2019] - 42 However, reversal is likewise inappropriate because it was the Commonwealth’s tactics at the post-sentence hearing that potentially prevented the necessary development of the record. As noted, the Commonwealth forwarded an argument that the trial court did not have authority to overturn the legislative policy determinations based upon the proffered scientific evidence, an argument we refuted in J.B. and continue to reject today. As stated above, the courts of this Commonwealth have the inherent authority as a co-equal branch to strike legislative acts if they violate the rights protected by our Constitutions. J.B., 107 A.3d at 14 (citing Nixon v. Com. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 839 A.2d 277, 286 (Pa. 2003)). We recognize that the Commonwealth parties relied upon our recent statement in Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1217, rejecting similar expert evidence calling into question the legislature’s assessment of sexual offender recidivism risks and the effectiveness of tierbased registration systems. In light of this reliance, we emphasize that all cases are evaluated on the record created in the individual case. Thus, a court need not ignore new scientific evidence merely because a litigant in a prior case provided less convincing evidence. Indeed, this Court will not turn a blind eye to the development of scientific research, especially where such evidence would demonstrate infringement of constitutional rights. Nevertheless, we also emphasize that it will be the rare situation where a court would reevaluate a legislative policy determination, which can only be justified in a case Instead, we deem it prudent to remand for further hearing to allow the parties to proffer evidence and argument regarding whether Appellee’s scientific evidence sufficiently undermines the fact-finding foundation of the legislative policy determinations. As discussed above, we emphasize that the present case is distinguishable from J.B., where the research presented by the juvenile defendants was corroborated by a growing body of caselaw which emphasized the rehabilitative aspects of juveniles and the distinctions between adult and juvenile offenders generally, see supra at 14-15. [J-104-2019] - 43 involving the infringement of constitutional rights and a consensus of scientific evidence undermining the legislative determination. We reiterate that while courts are empowered to enforce constitutional rights, they should remain mindful that “the wisdom of a public policy is one for the legislature, and the General Assembly's enactments are entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality rebuttable only by a demonstration that they clearly, plainly, and palpably violate constitutional requirements.” Shoul, 173 A.3d at 678. As is apparent from the trial court findings, the evidence presented by Appellee provides a colorable argument to debunk the settled view of sexual offender recidivation rates and the effectiveness of tier-based sexual offender registration systems underlying the General Assembly’s findings as well as various decisions of this Court and the United States Supreme Court. Nevertheless, as the trial court did not have the benefit of the opposing science, if any, the evidence currently in the record does not provide a sufficient basis to overturn the legislative determination. Accordingly, we conclude that the proper remedy is to remand to the trial court to provide both parties an opportunity to develop arguments and present additional evidence and to allow the trial court to weigh that evidence in determining whether Appellee has refuted the relevant legislative findings supporting the challenged registration and notification provisions of Revised Subchapter H. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the trial court’s order declaring the registration requirements of Revised Subchapter H of SORNA unconstitutional and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Justices Todd, Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion.