Opinion ID: 1587472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Parole Search.

Text: We note initially that Appellant only challenges the seizure of those items that were not in plain view. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Hazel v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 831, 833 (1992). He concedes in his brief that he opened the door and let in the officers, a concession consistent with the testimony at trial and at the suppression hearing; thus, the officers were lawfully inside the residence when they observed the two shotguns laying on the bassinet in Appellant's living room. The only issue is whether the search, conducted after the officers discovered the guns in plain view and after Appellant volunteered that there were other firearms in the mobile home, was valid. Although a parolee's home, like any other, is protected by the Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches be `reasonable', Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3168, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), Appellant's status as a parolee diminished his expectation of privacy. Id. at 874, 107 S.Ct. at 3169; see Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 473, 474 (1999) (The parole system allows for the early release of convicted criminals from prison, but does not grant complete freedom.). Thus, because of the special needs presented by law enforcement, a state may issue regulations allowing a probation or parole officer to search a probationer's or parolee's property without a warrant. Griffin, supra, at 873-74, 107 S.Ct. at 3168-69; Wilson, supra, at 474 n. 1. However, such regulations and the searches conducted pursuant thereto are still subject to the Fourth Amendment's general requirement of reasonableness. Griffin, supra, at 873-74, 107 S.Ct. at 3168-69. In United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001), the Court further elaborated upon what is reasonable in the context of a search of a probationer's or parolee's residence. The Court held in Knights that a warrantless search of a probationer's residence is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the search is supported by a reasonable suspicion that the probationer is engaged in criminal activity and such a search is authorized by a condition of probation. Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. at 593; see also Coleman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 100 S.W.3d 745, 752 (2002); Wilson, supra, at 475 (warrantless search of parolee's automobile held valid based upon reasonable belief of parole officer that automobile contained contraband). In support of this conclusion, the Court explained, [w]hen an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable. Knights, supra, at 121, 122 S.Ct. at 593. One of the conditions of Appellant's parole was that he refrain from possession or control of a firearm. In addition, Appellant knew that he may be subject to search and seizure if [his parole officer] has reason to believe that [he] may have illegal drugs, alcohol, volatile substance, or other contraband on [his] person or property. (Emphasis added.) Contraband is defined in the penal code as any article or thing which a person confined in a detention facility is prohibited from obtaining or possessing by statute, departmental regulation, or posted institutional rule or order. [2] KRS 520.010(1). Firearms are considered to be dangerous contraband. KRS 520.010(3); KRS 500.080(4)(b). As a paroled convicted felon, Appellant was prohibited by statute from possessing a firearm. KRS 527.040. These conditions of parole are imposed pursuant to regulations adopted by the Kentucky Parole Board. 501 KAR 1:030, § 6 (2002). In addition, Department of Corrections Policy No. 27-16-01 outlines the standard by which a parole officer may conduct a warrantless search of a parolee or his residence: If Reasonable Suspicion Exists to believe that an offender is violating a condition of supervision or the officer has possession of evidence of a violation of the terms and conditions of supervision, an officer may search without a warrant. Kentucky Corrections Policy No. 27-16-01 (Search; Seizure; Chain of Custody; Disposal of Evidence) IV(1)(A)(1), at 3. This policy was incorporated by reference into regulations adopted by both the Justice Cabinet and the Department of Corrections. 501 KAR 6:020E § 1(c) (2002). [3] By signing the release agreement, Appellant knowingly agreed to conditions that, as a parolee, reduced his expectation of privacy in his residence to the extent that his parole officer could conduct a search upon reasonable suspicion that he was in possession of a firearm. Officer Campbell's personal observation of two firearms in plain view and Appellant's advice that there were more firearms in the rear bedroom supported Campbell's reasonable suspicion that there might be other firearms concealed within the residence. That suspicion warranted opening the drawer of the end table next to the chair on which Appellant was then sitting. Cf. Clay v. Commonwealth, Ky., 818 S.W.2d 264, 265 (1991) (parole officer's observation of bullets laying in plain view on a dresser next to the bed on which defendant was lying sufficed to support subsequent search). Campbell was not required to establish ownership of the firearms or to accept Appellant's claim that they were not owned by him. Knowledge that there were firearms present in Appellant's residence was sufficient to trigger the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify the subsequent search.