Opinion ID: 313659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is this suit a class action?

Text: 15 The district court's failure to rule whether this case was a class action apparently escaped the attention of all the parties in the proceedings below. Nowhere in the record do we find a motion by plaintiff-appellant that his cause be determined a class action, and likewise missing from the record is any objection by defendants-appellees that it would be improper to frame this suit as a class action. Roadway raises this issue for the first time on appeal, and presents this court with a novel question: Can a class action exist without a formal, explicit determination by the court? For the reasons stated below we conclude that in this case we may infer that the trial court approved the class action nature of this lawsuit. 16 It was apparent from the beginning that Bing intended his suit to be a class action. The action was brought by Bing on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. He complained that Roadway's no-transfer rule discriminated against himself and all others similarly situated, and his complaint alleged that the union's regulations and policy were discriminatory toward Negroes and prevented Negroes from having equal employment. . . . For relief he asked the court to enjoin the union from discriminating against petitioner and others similarly situated, to award him damages and all other relief that was just or required. Thus this case differs from Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 5th Cir. 1971, 447 F.2d 159, where we held that class relief was not appropriate because . . . class action relief must be predicated upon a proper class action complaint satisfying all the requirements of Rule 23. Id. at n. 10, p. 164. In that case plaintiff's complaint alleged only discrimination against herself and requested relief only for herself. In this case Bing alleged harm to a class and requested relief for a class. 17 Although the complaint must have notified Roadway and the union that Bing sought class relief, the record reveals no objection to, or motion to dismiss because of, the class nature of this action. We infer from the record's silence that all parties to the action knew of its class nature and acquiesced in it. 18 We infer that the trial court also believed the suit to be a class action. After this court remanded the case for remedial proceedings, Bing moved to amend his complaint. In its order denying the motion to amend, the court said, [t]his case was originally filed as a class action. . . . The court described the amendment in a manner that indicated awareness and approval of the action's class nature. 19 By such amendment the plaintiff seeks to specify certain members of the class for the purpose of presenting their claims for differential back pay and seniority rights. 20 The court in that order went on to express misgivings about the appropriateness of awarding back pay in a class action. Furthermore, the court indicated that defendant-appellee Roadway also believed the action to be a class action. The defendant has filed a brief in opposition to the plaintiff's motion to amend arguing that relief in a class action is proper only for general and future relief. 21 The judgment rendered by the trial court indicates that the suit retained its class nature throughout the proceedings below. It recited that Bing had brought the action on behalf of himself and all black employees of Roadway. It enjoined Roadway and the union from engaging in any act or practice at the Roadway Express, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia facilities which has the purpose or effect of discriminating against any individual because of his race or color. It also ordered Roadway to abolish its no-transfer rule and judge its city employees' OTR applications by the same standards applied to all other applicants. Seniority for all transferees going from one bargaining unit to another would be full company seniority for fringe benefits and unit seniority for other purposes. In other words, the court enjoined present and future discrimination against Roadway's black employees and thus gave relief that was aimed at a class of people. Such relief is in keeping with the thesis that the trial court believed the suit to be a class action. 22 We conclude that the trial court implicitly determined that this suit would be maintained as a class action. Roadway discriminated against a class, class relief was sought, and class relief was given. The parties and the court believed that this was a class action. No objection was registered below. To say that this is not a class action would be to ignore the substance of the proceedings below in favor of an excessively formalistic adherence to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We believe the trial court's implicit determination of the class action question satisfies Rule 23(c)(1). 23