Opinion ID: 569222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Methamphetamine Defense.

Text: 12 Ms. Morris argues that her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to recognize the legality of her alleged use of methamphetamine prior to her arrest, and in advising her not to disclose the methamphetamine use in connection with her defense to the charge of cocaine use. At the least, she says, her counsel should have researched the question before effectively depriving her of her defense to the charge of which she was convicted. The district court rejected this argument on the ground of judicial estoppel. It based its ruling on Ms. Morris's testimony at trial that she had taken only three prescription drugs--Tylenol with codeine, Fiorinal, 1 and penicillin. The trial transcript reflects the following colloquy: 13 Prosecutor: Then what you're saying is these symptoms [observed by Deputy De Los Santos] aren't due to amphetamines or some other drug you may have been taking that night? [Defense counsel's objection was overruled and Ms. Morris answered]. 14 Ms. Morris: I feel that my high pulse rate was attributed to being on the freeway and being scared to death and then being treated so unprofessionally by Deputy De Los Santos. 15 P: Had you been drinking alcohol that night? 16 M: No, I had not. 17 P: Had you been smoking marijuana that night? 18 M: No, I had not. 19 P: Had you been taking anything other than the medication that you've described already? 20 M: All I had taken were the three prescriptions. 21 P: Okay. Tylenol with codeine, penicillin and the what? 22 M: Fiorinal. 23 P: Fiorinal. And that's it? 24 M: That's correct. 25 Ms. Morris now states that she perjured herself at trial. The district court ruled that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes her from subsequently changing her story. 26 As a general principle, the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars a party from taking inconsistent positions in the same litigation. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 716 (9th Cir.1990); Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2915, 115 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991); In re Corey, 892 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 56, 112 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990); Stevens Tech. Servs. v. SS Brooklyn, 885 F.2d 584, 588 (9th Cir.1989). Although this circuit has adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel, we have not yet determined the circumstances under which it will be applied. See Milgard Tempering, Inc., 902 F.2d at 716; Stevens Tech. Servs., Inc., 885 F.2d at 589. The majority of circuits recognizing the doctrine hold that it is inapplicable unless the inconsistent statement was actually adopted by the court in the earlier litigation; only in that situation, according to those circuits, is there a risk of inconsistent results and a threat to the integrity of the judicial process. See Milgard Tempering, Inc., 902 F.2d at 716 (citing Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir.1982); Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir.1982); United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir.1986); Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 939 (D.C.Cir.1980); Scarano v. Central R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir.1953)); Stevens Tech. Servs., Inc., 885 F.2d at 588-89. The minority view, in contrast, holds that the doctrine applies even if the litigant was unsuccessful in asserting the inconsistent position, if by his change of position he is playing fast and loose with the court. See Milgard Tempering, Inc., 902 F.2d at 716 (citing Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir.1987)). In either case, the purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Accordingly, the doctrine of judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion. Russell, 893 F.2d at 1037 (quoting Religious Tech. Center v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir.1989) (Hall, J., dissenting)). 27 We need not decide in this case whether to adopt the majority or minority view regarding the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. In either instance, we would hold that Ms. Morris is not barred from asserting that she told her attorney she had ingested methamphetamine prior to her arrest. No circuit has ever applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar a criminal defendant from asserting a claim of innocence, and we will not do so now. As noted above, the doctrine of judicial estoppel serves the function of preserving the integrity of the judicial process. In the context of a criminal proceeding where a defendant who claims to be innocent allegedly made untruthful statements solely because her attorney was ignorant of the law and told her incorrectly that telling the truth would constitute an admission of a crime, the integrity of the judicial process is best preserved by permitting the judiciary to consider her claim. Justice would not be served by holding the defendant to her prior false statements, and our concerns over compromising the sanctity of the oath must yield. Cf. Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir.1982) (judicial estoppel does not apply unless party was successful in getting first court to accept his position; simply recanting sworn testimony is insufficient). Ultimately, we exercise our discretion not to invoke an equitable doctrine where its use would serve to keep a conviction in effect regardless of the innocence or guilt of the defendant. Accordingly, we proceed to consider the merits of Ms. Morris's claim. 28 In support of her allegation that her attorney misinformed her as to the legality of methamphetamine use, Ms. Morris introduced two declarations--her own, and that of her trial counsel. In her declaration, she stated that she had ingested methamphetamine prior to her arrest, and that she had not ingested cocaine. She said that she had informed her trial counsel of that fact, and that he had told her that being charged with being under the influence of methamphetamines was the equivalent to being charged with being under the influence of 'cocaine.'  The declaration of Ms. Morris's trial counsel makes identical representations. It states: During the time that I represented both appellant and her husband, they both advised me that appellant was under the influence of methamphetamine and tylenol with codeine at the time of her arrest in the within action. They both denied the allegation that she was under the influence of cocaine at the time of her arrest. These representations were made to me both before, during and after appellants [sic] trial in the within action.... I was of the opinion that being under the influence of methamphetamine or cocaine were each respectively, a violation of Health and Safety Code Section 11550. However, at no time prior to or during appellant's trial did I confirm that being under the influence of methamphetamine was described, or included in, or proscribed by Health and Safety Code Section 11550. 2 .. I advised the appellant that since it was an offense to be under the influence of methamphetamine (even though it was not) she should not offer it as a defense to the charges of under the influence of cocaine. 29 In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Ms. Morris must show, first, that counsel's performance was deficient, and second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Deficient performance requires errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. Prejudice requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. Ms. Morris's allegations, if proven, would satisfy that two-part test. 30 First, assuming that the declarations are true, the performance of Ms. Morris's trial counsel was clearly deficient. Once she informed her attorney that she had been under the influence of methamphetamine, and not cocaine, he should have investigated and discovered that being under the influence of methamphetamine was not illegal at the time. 3 Additionally, his advice to her that methamphetamine use and cocaine use were equally incriminating was far below any objective standard of reasonableness. See id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. 31 Second, if Ms. Morris's counsel had either been familiar with the law or done his homework and discovered that being under the influence of methamphetamine was not illegal, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Certainly, had counsel not been deficient in the performance of his duties, he would have directed Ms. Morris to testify fully as to the drugs she had ingested prior to her arrest. Then he could have presented expert testimony showing that the effects of methamphetamine use are nearly identical to those of cocaine use. Combined with the complete absence of any physical evidence showing cocaine use, this could well have raised a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as to Ms. Morris's guilt. If the allegations set forth in the affidavits submitted by Ms. Morris are true, a court could not have confidence that the jury would have reached the result it did nor that the result is a reliable one. Thus, if the facts are as Ms. Morris asserts, she has established ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. 32 Because the district court ruled that Ms. Morris was estopped from asserting that she had been under the influence of methamphetamine, it never inquired into the veracity of her allegations. We therefore remand for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the methamphetamine issue. 33