Opinion ID: 1195208
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nexus Between Purported Persecution and Political Opinion

Text: Zoarab contends that because the Prince is a member of the U.A.E. royalty, he is an embodiment of the government. Thus, impugning the integrity of the Prince is the same as impugning the integrity of the government. By calling the Prince a thief, so the argument goes, Zoarab expressed a political opinion that identified him as a threat to the government for which he was and fears will be persecuted. The IJ rejected the argument, characterizing the matter as a personal business dispute, not a political matter. The IJ's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. Zoarab was clearly acting as an angry investor, not a political dissident, when he and his cousin-in-law sought to confront the Prince. Asylum is not available to an alien who fears retribution solely over personal matters. Matter of Y-G, 20 I & N Dec. 794, 799 (BIA 1994) (explaining that a love quarrel with a Haitian soldier was a purely personal matter); see also Matter of Pierre, 15 I & N Dec. 461, 463 (BIA 1971) (holding that a fear of retribution from a husband, a high political official, was a strictly personal matter). Courts have routinely rejected asylum applications grounded in personal disputes because without a firm footing in one of the five protected bases, asylum law offers no succor. Marquez, 105 F.3d at 380-81 (concluding that a commercial dispute with a Philippine military officer was apolitical); see also Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2005) (rejecting an asylum claim based on the applicant's whistleblowing against a corrupt employer as essentially a personal dispute); Marku v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 982, 986 (6th Cir.2004) (Evidence must be presented which suggests that the applicant was persecuted on account of or because of the political opinion. (emphasis in original)); Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a dispute with a Bulgarian secret service agent over employment was personal, not political); Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F.2d 995, 1000 (4th Cir.1992) (Even aliens with a `well-founded fear' of persecution supported by concrete facts are not eligible for asylum if those facts indicate only that the alien fears retribution over purely personal matters. . . .). The Seventh Circuit's decision in Marquez is instructive. Like Zoarab, Marquez and his wife had a dispute with government authorities after a commercial project went south. Marquez, 105 F.3d at 377. Harassment of the couple began after Marquez denounced on public radio the prevailing corruption in his country. Id. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that political agitation against state corruption might well be [a ground for asylum], but the court did not find that Marquez's actions established a sufficient ground. Id. at 381. Marquez's public outburst against certain officials did not convince the court that the harassment was on account of political speech. Id. Rather, the dispute between Marquez and the public officials was motivated by greed and jealousy, not politics. Id. at 380. The court explained that its conclusion may have been different if the applicant had founded an anticorruption political party, or assumed an active role in one. Or that he had spoken out repeatedly as a public gadfly about reforming a corruption-ridden government. Id. at 381. Zoarab relies principally on a decision of the Ninth Circuit, Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir.2000). In that case, the asylum applicant had served as a policeman and a customs officer in the Philippines. Id. at 1179. In the course of his official duties, he uncovered widespread and entrenched corruption by his supervisors. Id. He eventually went public with his findings; thereafter, he received death threats, his property was vandalized, and his pets were poisoned. Id. at 1180. He and his family sought asylum in the United States, which the BIA rejected. Id. On petition for review, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court recognized that whistleblowing could, under certain circumstances, constitute political activity. Id. at 1181. The court went on to decree: When the alleged corruption is inextricably intertwined with government operation, the exposure and prosecution of such an abuse of public trust is necessarily political. Id. (emphasis added). Concluding that the BIA had used the wrong legal standard for political activity, the court remanded the case back to the BIA to determine whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. at 1182. Zoarab contends that the interests of the Prince are inextricably intertwined with the interests of the government, and, therefore, calling the former a thief is akin to calling the government corrupt. As recognized in Marku, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Grava has no precedential authority in this circuit. 380 F.3d at 988. Nor do Zoarab's circumstances fit within Grava 's logic. First, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Al-Wafa had any direct involvement in government operations. Any problems associated with the management or administration of the private business venture thus cannot be linked with corruption involving government operations. Moreover, there are differences of degree and kind between the public campaign in Grava and Zoarab's private outburst. In Grava, the asylum applicant's complaints (a) were public; (b) were widely publicized; (c) targeted widespread government corruption; and (d) resulted in an official investigation and criminal charges. 205 F.3d at 1179-80. In contrast, Zoarab has not presented evidence compelling the conclusion that [Prince Mohammad] or anyone else knew or should have know that [he] was even opposed to government corruption or had any other political opinion. Marku, 380 F.3d at 989. The record shows that Prince Mohammad knew that Zoarab opposed the Prince's management of Al-Wafa. Yet, in his single confrontation with the Prince, Zoarab did not raise any issue of public corruption, nepotism, lack of political rights, or anything that could reasonably be construed as political in nature. Nor was the confrontation part of a relatively public campaign. Id. at 988. Even though the U.A.E.'s restrictions on freedoms of speech and press limit a resident's ability to expose government corruption, Zoarab has been living in the United States for several years. He has offered no letters to the editor, editorials, pamphlets, internet blog entries, or any other evidence of political expression he made against the U.A.E. Simply put, Zoarab has offered no evidence that either before or after the confrontation he led a public (or even private) campaign against the government or individual members of the royalty-he just (quite understandably) wanted his money back. Any persecution resulting from the confrontation was motivated by personal business interests, not political sentiments. For these reasons, Zoarab does not qualify as a refugee for purposes of asylum. Because being classified as a refugee is a necessary condition for asylum, we need not address the BIA's alternate ground that Zoarab does not have a well-founded fear of persecution.