Opinion ID: 1788509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying latiker's motion for a directed verdict and whether the jury's verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

Text: ¶ 9. Our standard of review for a post-trial motion is abuse of discretion. Withers v. State, 907 So.2d 342, 352 (Miss. 2005). When reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give the State the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Seeling v. State, 844 So.2d 439, 443 (Miss.2003). In the recent case of Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836 (Miss.2005), we clarified the distinction between the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence and reviewed numerous cases where the lines between the two have been blurred. ¶ 10. Although Latiker, like Bush, mixes the two, it is clear that Latiker asks the Court to reverse on both weight and sufficiency grounds. At the conclusion of the trial, he moved for a directed verdict (sufficiency), which the trial court denied. Subsequently, Latiker filed a motion for a new trial (weight), and in the alternative, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (sufficiency). In Bush we stated: In Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 889 (Miss.1968), we stated that in considering whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction in the face of a motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction. However, this inquiry does not require a court to `ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (citations omitted)(emphasis in original). Should the facts and inferences considered in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, the proper remedy is for the appellate court to reverse and render [i.e. reverse and discharge]. Edwards v. State, 469 So.2d 68, 70 (Miss.1985)(citing May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss. 1984)); see also Dycus v. State, 875 So.2d 140, 164 (Miss.2004). However, if a review of the evidence reveals that it is of such quality and weight that, `having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense,' the evidence will be deemed to have been sufficient ... When reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial, which challenges the weight of the evidence, we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 957 (Miss.1997). A reversal on the grounds that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, unlike a reversal based on insufficient evidence, does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict. McQueen v. State, 423 So.2d 800, 803 (Miss.1982). Rather the court simply disagrees with the jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony. Id. This difference of opinion does not signify acquittal any more than a disagreement among the jurors themselves. Id. Instead, the proper remedy is to grant a new trial. Bush, 895 So.2d at 843-44. ¶ 11. Law enforcement officials arrested Latiker at his parents' residence, where the drug transaction took place. Agent Ragan identified Latiker in court as the man from whom he bought the crack cocaine. Furthermore, Agent Ragan's identification was based on his unobstructed, trained observation of Latiker at a close distance during daylight hours. While Agent Ragan's description does not perfectly match the description of Latiker at trial, the two are similar enough that it becomes a jury issue. ¶ 12. The jury had the opportunity to weigh the testimony of Latiker and the witnesses offered in support of his alibi defense. Admittedly, this testimony was a stark departure from the testimony of Agent Ragan. However, it is common for the jury to be called upon to resolve sharp and irreconcilable differences in the evidence presented for its consideration. It is the jury's job to balance the weight and credibility of the witnesses. Shamblin v. State, 601 So.2d 407, 412 (Miss.1992). We conclude that the evidence before this Court does not point so overwhelmingly in favor of Latiker that reasonable men could not have arrived at a guilty verdict or that allowing the verdict to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Therefore, Latiker's first assertion of error is without merit.