Opinion ID: 1133683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in handling the State's objections to defense counsel's closing arguments at the guilt phase of the trial.

Text: ś 195. Rubenstein argues the trial court erred in sustaining three of the State's objections to the defense's closing argument. The first assignment of error arises from the defense's comment that Doris and David Rubenstein could have testified by the State. They don't want them here. The trial court interjected that the defense's comment was a mis-statement because the witnesses were equally available to both sides. However, defense counsel continued his argument, stating Rubenstein is presumed innocent, the defense does not have to call witnesses, and the State should have called Doris rather than reporting what she said. ś 196. Rubenstein argues the trial court's statement amounted to an improper comment on the defendant's burden at trial. However, he cites no authority for this proposition, so the issue is procedurally barred. Bell v. State, 879 So.2d 423, 434 (Miss.2004) (Failure to cite relevant authority obviates the appellate court's obligation to review such issues.). ś 197. Procedural bar notwithstanding, this issue is without substantive merit. The record reflects Rubenstein made his argument to the jury despite the State's objection. Moreover, the defense opened the door for the objection and the trial court's ruling. We have held that `the failure of either party to examine a witness equally accessible to both is not a proper subject for comment before a jury by either of the parties.' Griffin v. State, 533 So.2d 444, 449 (Miss.1988) (quoting Phillips v. State, 183 So.2d 908, 911 (Miss. 1966)). ś 198. Rubenstein next claims the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection to the defense's comment that [n]ow the State's case is totally based upon and they are permitted and they are mandated to prove November 16, 1993. This assignment of error is without merit because the defense's assertion is factually incorrect. In Dennis v. State, 555 So.2d 679, 684 (Miss.1989), this Court held that it is the duty of the trial counsel to promptly make objections and to insist upon a ruling by a trial judge if he deems opposing counsel to be overstepping. . . . Here, the indictment provided the crimes occurred on or about the 16th day of November, 1993. . . . (Emphasis added). Furthermore, neither side's experts could pinpoint an exact date of death. For these reasons, the issue is meritless. ś 199. Finally, Rubenstein argues the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection to the defense's closing remarks regarding the hairs discovered. Rubenstein also takes issue with the trial court's allegedly improper comments regarding the relevancy of the tests. The record reflects the defense was discussing the hair tests requested by the parties in the first trial versus the second trial. In sustaining the State's objection, the trial court reasoned, [t]hat is outside the scope of the proof. Despite, the trial court's ruling, the defense continued to discuss the various tests. [21] ś 200. Rubenstein fails to demonstrate how the defense was hindered or the trial infected by the trial court's ruling. While the trial court sustained the State's objection, the defense proceeded with its closing argument, pointing to each test done by the State. The defense continued to refer to the first trial, the availability of testing on the hairs, and the stipulation that the hairs did not belong to Rubenstein. We find the trial court did not err in ruling the defense's closing argument was outside the scope of the evidence introduced. Moreover, any error in the trial court's ruling is harmless because Rubenstein nonetheless made his argument regarding the hairs to the jury. This assignment of error is without merit. XXI. Whether the trial court erred in denying Rubenstein's requests for exhumation of the victims' bodies and DNA tests. ś 201. Before both his first and second trial, Rubenstein requested the victims' bodies be exhumed in order to collect fingernail scrapings for DNA testing. Rubenstein also requested that hairs found at the scene of the crime near Krystal's body be tested for DNA. The trial court refused to provide the funds for the exhumations and testing. Rubenstein claims the exhumation and DNA testing would provide critical evidence to assist in his defense. Therefore, Rubenstein requests his conviction be reversed. ś 202. This Court has held that the [d]etermination of whether the State must pay for an expert witness for an indigent defendant must be made on a case by case basis. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 782 (Miss.1997) (citing Davis v. State, 374 So.2d 1293, 1297 (Miss.1979)). We have also held that DNA evidence is not always valuable enough to warrant a trial delay. Coleman, 697 So.2d at 782 (citing Rhymes v. State, 638 So.2d 1270, 1274 (Miss.1994)). Given the expense and time required to conduct DNA testing, we will not require the State to pay for DNA testing where there is no showing that it would significantly aid the defense. Coleman, 697 So.2d at 782. The trial court conducted extensive hearings on these matters before denying Rubenstein's requests. We find that on both issues, Rubenstein fails to demonstrate that DNA sampling would benefit his case. Exhumation of the bodies ś 203. Rubenstein wanted the bodies exhumed to collect fingernail scrapings for DNA tests. He reasoned that at least one of the victims had defensive wounds, and a DNA analysis of fingernail scrapings could exclude him as the assailant. [22] The record reflects the trial court addressed this issue numerous times prior to both trials. Indeed, the trial court's ruling before the first trial that the bodies should not be exhumed primarily relied on the lack of probability of success in the DNA testing. The trial court considered four experts' opinions, the state of decomposition before burial, the burial in a water-logged Louisiana cemetery, and the passage of six years since the burials. This information led the trial court to find there was a lack of proof that DNA was recoverable from the bodies. While the trial court cited trial delay as part of its reasoning, that was merely a secondary ground for denying the exhumations. ś 204. Rubenstein again filed a motion to exhume the bodies before the second trial, and the trial court denied this motion as well. The trial court referenced its prior ruling that, based on scientific evidence, the probability of finding DNA was remote. Also, the trial court believed Rubenstein merely wanted to delay the trial. Finally, the trial court pointed out that the motion was filed late. [23] ś 205. We find the trial court denied the exhumations based upon the lack of probability of DNA and, to a lesser extent, the delay in the request and delay to the trial. The findings in the first trial concerning the probability of retrieving DNA justified denying the motions. See Coleman, 697 So.2d at 782. Therefore, the issue is without merit. Hair follicles near Krystal's body ś 206. Rubenstein argues the trial court erred in denying the testing of hairs found near Krystal's body. Rubenstein argues that if DNA from the hairs did not match his or Krystal's DNA, then it would prove someone else was in the cabin, which might influence the jury. ś 207. The State responds by pointing out that, prior to the first trial, crime lab services were offered, but no requests were made for testing. Some testing was performed on the hairs prior to the second trial. The limited results revealed that, of the twenty-three hairs found near Krystal's body, thirteen were Caucasian head hairs, and the other hairs were also Caucasian but from an unknown part of the body. Except for one hair and one fragment, all of the head hairs had the same microscopic characteristics as Krystal's hair. The remaining hair was determined to be a chemically tinted, reddish brown color. ś 208. Notably, Rubenstein fails to mention in his brief that an agreed stipulation concerning the hairs was read to the jury by the trial court. The stipulation stated, State of Mississippi hereby stipulates, and the defendant hereby stipulates, that the hairs found on or under the body of the victim, Crystal Perry, are not those of Alan Michael Rubenstein. And that the State of Mississippi does not know who the hairs belong to. The defense used this information in its opening statement when it argued that no physical evidence linked Rubenstein to the murders. Also, the defense previewed the stipulation in opening argument, noting, the State agreed and admitted these hairs do not belong to Alan Michael Rubenstein and that they do not know who they belong to, proving Mike Rubenstein's innocence. ś 209. Rubenstein disingenuously claims that the lack of testing was critical to his defense, but he used the stipulation to his advantage and claimed it proved his innocence. Further, the trial court found the stipulation accomplished the same end as a DNA test â determining the hairs did not belong to Rubenstein. Under the facts of this case, Rubenstein fails to show a substantial need for the DNA testing he requested at trial. Thus, the issue is meritless. XXII. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Rubenstein's attorneys to withdraw before the second trial. ś 210. Rubenstein next argues the trial court erred in refusing to allow his attorneys to withdraw before the second trial. Rubenstein retained Louisiana attorney James Shields, Sr., to represent him following his extradition to Mississippi. Shields appeared on a pro hac vice basis with local counsel Leigh Triche Janous, a member of Shield's law firm who was licensed in Mississippi. ś 211. Following the eleven-day trial that resulted in a mistrial, Shields moved to withdraw from the case because he had not been paid. Shields made his announcement to the trial court when the 11-1 vote to convict was revealed, and the trial court instructed Shields to make a written motion. The State asserts that during the first trial, Shields and Janous represented to the trial court that they were handling the case pro bono. The State's response to defense counsel, contained in the record, provides that Rubenstein furnished an affidavit stating he entered into a contingency contract to pay Shields $75,000 if he obtained an acquittal. [24] Rubenstein informed the trial court that he was satisfied with his attorneys, and he asked the court not to appoint anyone else. ś 212. On December 23, 1999, Shields and Janous filed a motion for court appointed status. An order setting the second trial for January 25, 2000, was executed on December 30, 1999. On January 7, 2000, Janous filed a motion to withdraw as counsel because she had accepted new employment with the Department of Human Services (DHS) handling child support cases. Janous represented to the trial court that she would be responsible for the prosecution and/or quasi -prosecution of cases, and that Rubenstein was fearful of a conflict and the possibility of undue influence on Janous by the State. Shields also filed a motion on behalf of Rubenstein to have Janous recused. ś 213. The trial court heard the motions to withdraw and denied them, finding no evidence of a conflict. First, the trial court stated that Rubenstein had conveyed his desire to retain the same attorneys in an affidavit filed with the court. Additionally, the trial court expressed incredulity that the representation of welfare receiving clients in the Delta in Chancery court [would] conflict[ ] with the representation of Mr. Rubenstein in the Circuit Court of Pike County. The trial court further determined the motions were merely an attempt to delay the second trial that was set for January 25, 2000. The trial court concluded that it would be a travesty of justice to require somebody else to come in and pick upon [sic] this case. ś 214. On January 13, 2000, the trial court granted the motion requesting Shields and Janous be appointed Rubenstein's attorneys. The order stated, in part: That the Court finds that [Shields] and [Janous] were previously given the opportunity to withdraw as counsel because of the absence of present payment and declined to do so and continued to represent Mr. Rubenstein honorably and effectively; and . . . the Court finds that [Shields] and [Janous] should be appointed to represent Mr. Rubenstein. ś 215. In Taylor v. State, 435 So.2d 701, 703 (Miss.1983), this Court held, the trial court has discretion in considering a motion of an attorney to be discharged. Additionally, certain restraints must be put on the reassignment of counsel lest the right be `manipulated so as to obstruct the orderly procedure in the courts or to interfere with the fair administration of justice.' Id. (quoting United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 936 (2d Cir.1963)). ś 216. Here, the record does not reflect the trial court erred in denying the motions to withdraw. The trial court heard the motions and made a detailed finding that no conflict existed. The trial court also determined the motions were pretextual and designed to delay the trial date. We find this assignment of error is without merit. XXIII. Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the burden of proof at the guilt phase of the trial. ś 217. Rubenstein argues a number of refused jury instructions should have been given because the State's evidence was circumstantial. Rubenstein relies upon the lack of eyewitnesses to the crime scene; testimony about an unknown van parked outside his cabin; a witness who testified she saw one of the victims on December 2, 1993; and his experts who believed the time of death was two weeks, not one month, prior to finding the bodies. ś 218. Rubenstein relies upon Jones v. State, 797 So.2d 922, 928-29 (Miss.2001), for authority that a defendant must receive a two-theory instruction if the State relies on circumstantial evidence for a conviction. The proposed instructions at issue are D-19, D-20, D-24, D-27, and handwritten instruction 1. ś 219. Proposed instruction D-19 states: The Court instructs the jury that if there be a fact of [sic] circumstance in this case susceptible of two interpretations, one favorable and the other unfavorable to the Accused, and when the jury has considered such fact or circumstances with all the other evidence, if there is a reasonable doubt as to the correct interpretation, they must resolve such doubt in favor of the Accused and place upon such fact of [sic] circumstance the interpretation favorable of the Accused. ś 220. Proposed instruction D-20 states: The Court instructs the jury that a person charged with a crime is presumed to be totally innocent. A person is not required to prove himself innocent, or to put on any evidence at all upon the subject. In considering the charges against Alan Michael Rubenstein in this case, you must consider the testimony and evidence in the light of that presumption, guaranteed to Alan Michael Rubenstein under the Constitution of the United States, that he is totally innocent. It is a presumption that abides with Alan Michael Rubenstein throughout the trial, and unless the evidence convinces you to the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, it is your sworn duty to find Alan Michael Rubenstein not guilty. ś 221. Proposed instruction D-24 states: The Court instructs the Jury that the circumstan[t]ial evidence used by the prosecution in this case to maintain its theory of Alan Michael Rubenstein must be so strong, in every part and parcel, as to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but must also be so strong as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis or supposition, except that of guilt. ś 222. Proposed instruction D-27 states: The Court instructs the Jury that if the prosecution has resorted to any degree, to the use of circumstantial evidence for the prosecution and every part and parcel of it not only must be so strong as to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must also exclude every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence. ś 223. Proposed handwritten instruction 1 states: [The] Court instructs the jury that if there be any fact or circumstances in this case susceptible of [two] interpretations, one favorable [and] the other unfavorable to the [defendant], [and] is a reasonable doubt as to the correct interpretation, they must resolve such doubt in favor of the [defendant] and place upon such fact or circumstance the interpretation favorable to the [defendant]. ś 224. This Court's standard of review for jury instruction issues is well-established. When considering a challenge to a jury instruction on appeal, we do not review jury instructions in isolation; rather, we read them as a whole to determine if the jury was properly instructed. Scott, 878 So.2d at 966. In determining whether error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. Coleman, 697 So.2d at 782 (quoting Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918 (Miss.1997)). There is no error if all instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law. . . . Scott, 878 So.2d at 966 (citing Milano v. State, 790 So.2d 179, 184 (Miss.2001)). ś 225. With respect to jury instructions involving the issue of circumstantial evidence, [where] all the evidence tending to prove the guilt of the defendant is circumstantial, the trial court must grant a jury instruction that every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt must be excluded in order to convict. Givens v. State, 618 So.2d 1313, 1318 (Miss.1993). A circumstantial evidence instruction must be given only when the prosecution can produce neither an eyewitness nor a confession/statement by the defendant. Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 750 (Miss.1991). Direct evidence may also consist of a confession by the defendant, including the defendant's admission to a person other than a law enforcement officer. Manning, 735 So.2d at 338 (citing Ladner, 584 So.2d at 750). Finally, an admission by the defendant on a significant element of the offense . . . operate[s] to render unnecessary the circumstantial evidence instruction. Manning, 735 So.2d at 338. ś 226. In the second trial, the trial court readopted its findings on the instructions from the first trial. At the first trial, the trial court determined the State's case was not completely circumstantial. Handwritten instruction 1 was submitted during the second trial, and the trial court refused the instruction, finding it was covered by other instructions. ś 227. Rubenstein argues the statements of Ballinger should not count as direct evidence because he was a jailhouse informant. Rubenstein contends the State's case is almost entirely circumstantial, and the so-called `direct' evidence is obviously false. ś 228. The State provides numerous examples to demonstrate its case was not completely circumstantial. Much of the evidence at trial was direct evidence in the form of confessions and admissions by Rubenstein to other people. See Manning, 735 So.2d at 338. ś 229. Ballinger stated that while in a Louisiana jail awaiting extradition, Rubenstein told him that he was wanted for shooting his wife, his daughter, and his daughter's boyfriend. Ballinger also testified that Rubenstein said he shot his wife for being a bitch and having drinking problems, his daughter for running around with black men and their drugs, and he gave no reason for killing the boyfriend. Rubenstein also told Ballinger the crime happened five years ago. As it turned out, these facts were incorrect; nevertheless, Ballinger testified only as to what Rubenstein told him. ś 230. Stevens, an inmate housed in Pike County with Rubenstein in 1999, also testified: At that time [Rubenstein] told me that he had planned to hire somebody to kill his stepson, daughter-in-law and the granddaughter. He changed his mind. He was coming to his camp in Summit about two weeks before Thanksgiving. He went there, he killed his stepson, his daughter-in-law with a knife. He did not specifically say how he killed his granddaughter, it was strangulation, choked, or suffocation. And that after he left, he went to the Jackson's house. These were neighbors of his. He asked if they saw them. They told him â I forgot what he said they told him. He left there, went back to New Orleans to wait. Nobody ever found the bodies. Later on in December he went back. The bodies were still there, same places. His granddaughter was on the bed nude. His stepson, the eyes were gone, there were maggots on him. And his daughter-in-law was laying where she was at. She had a hole in her stomach the size that you could put our fist in. Rubenstein also told Stevens about the insurance policy on Krystal. ś 231. A Pike County jailer, Phelps escorted Rubenstein to the restroom during trial. Rubenstein asked Phelps's opinion of Stevens's testimony and whether he thought it damaged his case. Then Rubenstein said, I told him [Stevens] what went on up there at Summit, but I didn't know he was going to turn it into a confession. At this point, Phelps informed the prosecution of the conversation. ś 232. Further, Rubenstein told numerous people how the victims died prior to the autopsy reports. This is significant because the bodies were severely decomposed, and the cause of death was not initially clear to officials. ś 233. We find there was sufficient direct evidence to render the proposed circumstantial instructions unwarranted. This issue is without merit. XXIV. Whether the trial court erred in excluding double hearsay during Officer Donald Lindley's testimony. [25] ś 234. Investigator Donald Lindley (Officer Lindley) was employed by the Pike County Sheriff's Department from the early 1990's until April of 1998. The defense questioned Officer Lindley about his role in the investigation of the murders, including his interview of Dora Fales. The State objected on hearsay grounds to the officer's testimony regarding what Fales told him. The trial court allowed the questioning so long as it related to the actions taken by Officer Lindley in his investigation and not to the substance of Fales's comments. When the defense asked Officer Lindley what Fales said to him, the trial court sustained the State's objection as to hearsay. The trial court, outside the jury's presence, heard the proffered testimony of Officer Lindley. He testified that Fales said Page told her that he had seen Darrell in Mississippi around Thanksgiving. The trial court then again sustained the State's objection. After further discussion outside the presence of the jury, the trial court stated the testimony was unnecessary to explain the officer's actions; rather, the defense was trying to submit what Fales told the officer for the truth of what was said. The trial court affirmed its ruling to sustain the objection. ś 235. Rubenstein argues the trial court erred in refusing Officer Lindley's testimony. The only authority cited by Rubenstein to support the admission of the double hearsay is Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). Chambers was charged and tried for the murder of a police officer. Id. at 286-87, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Gabe McDonald allegedly confessed to various individuals that he shot the officer. Id. McDonald's confession was transcribed, and he was placed in jail. Id. At his preliminary hearing, McDonald reputiated his prior sworn confession. Id. at 288, 93 S.Ct. 1038. ś 236. Chambers sought to treat McDonald as an adverse witness in questioning him about his prior confession to the crime Chambers was charged with committing. Id. at 291, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Chambers also sought to use hearsay testimony of three witnesses who would have testified that McDonald had confessed to them that he shot the officer. Id. at 287-90, 93 S.Ct. 1038. The trial court rejected both attempts. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that exclusion of the critical evidence and failure to permit Chambers to cross-examine McDonald denied him a trial in accordance with traditional and fundamental standards of due process. Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. The Court limited its holding in to the facts and circumstances of this case. Id. at 303, 93 S.Ct. 1038. ś 237. The facts here are readily distinguishable from those in Chambers. Rubenstein attempted to introduce the double hearsay of Fales telling Officer Lindley what Page told her. In this case, Page actually testified, and the defense had ample opportunity to cross-examine him about seeing Darrell around Thanksgiving. Additionally, the trial court did not prevent Rubenstein from questioning Page on this issue, so whether or not Page saw Darrell did not have to come in through hearsay from Officer Lindley. Finally, Page never confessed to murdering the family. Therefore, this case is dramatically different from Chambers, which was limited to the facts and circumstances of that case. Rubenstein fails to demonstrate the trial court erred in denying the hearsay testimony. This issue is without merit. XXV. Whether the jury instructions on the sentencing options in this case were proper. ś 238. Rubenstein argues the trial court erred in denying proposed jury instructions D-1, D-3, and D-10, all of which included the sentencing option of life imprisonment without parole. The trial court refused the instructions for failure to give an accurate statement of the sentencing options or repeating information presented in accepted instructions. ś 239. This Court has repeatedly held that jury instructions are within the sound discretion of the trial court. Goodin v. State, 787 So.2d 639, 657 (Miss.2001). When jury instructions are challenged on appeal, we do not review them in isolation; rather, we read them as a whole to determine if the jury was properly instructed. Milano, 790 So.2d at 184. ś 240. The following instructions are relevant to this assignment of error. [26] Proposed instruction D-1, which was refused, provides: The Court instructs the Jury that if you see fit, whether mitigating circumstances exist or not, you may recommend mercy for the Defendant and sentence him to imprisonment for the rest of his natural life. This recommendation is solely in your discretion and not controlled by any rule of law. You may make such recommendation with or without a reason. ś 241. Instruction D-8, as given, states: The Court instructs the Jury that, whether mitigating circumstances exist or not, you may recommend mercy for the defendant and sentence him to life imprisonment. This recommendation is solely in your discretion and not controlled by any rule of law. You may make such recommendation with or without a reason. ś 242. The trial court also gave instruction D-7, which states, in part, Mitigating circumstances are those circumstances that tend to justify the penalty of life imprisonment as opposed to death. ś 243. The trial court refused instructions D-3 and D-10. Proposed instruction D-3 provides: The Court instructs the Jury that a decision to afford an individual defendant mercy and thereby sentence him to life imprisonment without possibility of parole or probation or to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole would not violate the laws if this State or your oath as jurors. Even if you find there are no mitigating circumstances in this case which are worthy of your consideration, then, nevertheless, you still may sentence defendant [sic] to life imprisonment without possibility of probation or parole or life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. [27] ś 244. Proposed instruction D-10 states: If you sentence defendant to life imprisonment without possibility of probation or parole, defendant will never be eligible for parole or probation. If you sentence defendant to death, he will be executed by lethal injection. ś 245. In lieu of proposed instructions D-3 and D-10, the trial court gave instruction D-6: The Court instructs the Jury that it is now your duty to determine what punishment must be imposed upon Alan M. Rubenstein. You must determine which of the following punishments is appropriate to impose on Alan M. Rubenstein (1) Life imprisonment or (2) Death by lethal injection. ś 246. The instructions given by the trial court provided the jury with only two sentencing options: life imprisonment or death by lethal injection. Rubenstein argues he was entitled to have the jury instructed that it had a third option, that is, life without possibility of parole. The State contends Rubenstein is procedurally barred from asserting this error on appeal because he never objected to the trial court's ruling that the option of life without parole was inapplicable to his case, and that this Court should reconsider the holding in [ Watts v. State, 733 So.2d 214, 237 (Miss.1999)] to the extent that case relaxed the procedural bar as to this issue. ś 247. Rubenstein tendered jury instructions which clearly attempted to instruct the jury that it had the option of sentencing him to life without possibility of parole. The trial court rejected these instructions and failed to fashion any instruction which properly instructed the jury of its three options. It is well settled that the refusal of instructions offered by the defendant need not be objected to in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Green v. State, 884 So.2d 733, 736 (Miss. 2004). An error concerning the refusal of jury instructions is procedurally preserved by the mere tendering of the instructions, suggesting that they are correct and asking the Court to submit them to the jury. Edwards, 737 So.2d at 310. When the instructions are refused, there is no reason why we should thereafter require an objection to the refusal unless we are to place a value upon redundancy and nonsense. Carmichael v. Agur Realty Co., 574 So.2d 603, 613 (Miss.1990). ś 248. In Duplantis v. State, 708 So.2d 1327, 1339 (Miss.1998), the defendant claimed the trial court erred in refusing his proposed jury instructions. The State argued Duplantis was procedurally barred from presenting the error on appeal because he did not object to the denial of his proffered instructions at the trial court level. Id. We disagreed, stating, [a]lthough in dicta [in Nicholson ex rel. Gollott v. State, 672 So.2d 744, 752 (Miss.1996)] we indicated that we could impose a procedural bar, we did not intend to overrule existing caselaw and therefore require litigants to object to the denial of instructions they themselves have offered. Duplantis, 708 So.2d at 1339. The defendant only needed to tender his suggested jury instruction in order to preserve review. Id. at 1340. ś 249. Based on our well-established precedent, Rubenstein sufficiently preserved this assignment of error for appellate review when he tendered sentencing instructions including the life without parole option. Requiring a party to object to the refusal of its own jury instructions would be illogical and oppressive, and we hold that Rubenstein is not procedurally barred from raising this issue. Accordingly, we will now address the merits of the argument. ś 250. Several statutes are relevant to this discussion. Miss.Code Ann. Section 97-3-21 provides: Every person who shall be convicted of murder shall be sentenced by the court to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary. Every person who shall be convicted of capital murder shall be sentenced (a) to death; (b) to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary without parole; or (c) to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary with eligibility for parole as provided in Section 47-7-3(1)(f). Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (1994) (emphasis added). Prior to the enactment of the 1994 amendment, the capital murder sentencing scheme provided only two sentencing options: life imprisonment or death. ś 251. Section 47-7-3(1)(f), which provides the conditions for eligibility for parole, states: No person shall be eligible for parole who is charged, tried, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment under the provisions of Section 99-19-101. Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-3 (1994). ś 252. Section 99-19-101(1), concerning the jury's role in capital murder sentencing proceedings, provides, in part: Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of capital murder or other capital offense, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, or life imprisonment. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (1994) (emphasis added). ś 253. Finally, Section 99-19-1 states: No statutory change of any law affecting a crime or its punishment or the collection of a penalty shall affect or defeat the prosecution of any crime committed prior to its enactment, or the collection of any penalty, whether such prosecution be instituted before or after such enactment; and all laws defining a crime or prescribing its punishment, or for the imposition of penalties, shall be continued in operation for the purpose of providing punishment for crimes committed under them, and for collection of such penalties, notwithstanding amendatory or repealing statutes, unless otherwise specially provided in such statutes. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-1 (1994) (emphasis added). ś 254. Also significant to this discussion is the following language from the amending act for Section 97-3-21, the capital murder penalty statute quoted above, which states, [t]he provisions of this act shall apply to any case in which pre-trial, trial or resentencing proceedings take place after July 1, 1994. 1994 Miss. Laws ch. 566, § 5. ś 255. Although Rubenstein committed the crimes in 1992, his trial did not commence until January 2000. The trial court determined the sentencing option of life without parole was inapplicable to Rubenstein because this case falls within the gap between the two laws. Thus, the trial court incorrectly concluded the amended statute did not apply to Rubenstein. We previously addressed the appropriate application of the amended penalty statute in West v. State, 725 So.2d 872 (Miss.1998). ś 256. In West, the defendant was indicted on March 23, 1993, for the December 1992 murder of a store clerk. Id. at 876-77. The trial began on August 8, 1994, and the jury found West guilty of capital murder. Id. at 877. West argued the amended penalty statute (Section 97-3-21 quoted supra ) applied to his case, and he repeatedly submitted jury instructions including the life without parole sentencing option. Id. The trial court refused them all and held that, because West was indicted, arraigned, and his trial set before the amendment's enactment, he would be sentenced under the previous sentencing statute. Id. Given the choices of death or life with the opportunity for parole, the jury sentenced West to death. Id. ś 257. This Court acknowledged that prior to the amendment, defendants who were convicted of capital murder could only be sentenced to either death or life with the possibility of parole. Id. However, we specifically noted the amending act stated, `[t]he provisions of this act shall apply to any case in which pre-trial, trial or resentencing proceedings take place after July 1, 1994.' West, 725 So.2d at 877 (quoting 1994 Miss. Laws ch. 566 § 5) (emphasis added). Because West's trial began on August 8, 1994 â after the July 1, 1994, effective date â the plain language in Section 97-3-21 required the trial court to instruct West's sentencing jury on the sentencing options of life, life without parole, or death. West, 725 So.2d at 877. ś 258. We clarified any potential confusion with Section 99-19-1 by explaining: Section 99-19-1 provides that all laws prescribing punishment will continue to govern the penalties of all crimes committed under them, notwithstanding amendatory or repealing statutes, unless otherwise especially provided in such statutes. The amendment to § 97-3-21 especially provides that it is to apply to crimes that were committed before its effective date. Thus, the proscriptions of § 99-19-1 do not preclude the application of the amendments to West. Id. at 878-79 (emphasis in original). Because Section 97-3-21 clearly and lawfully directed capital defendants whose pre-trial, trial or resentencing proceedings take place after July 1, 1994 to have their sentencing juries given the option of life without parole in addition to life with the possibility of parole and death, we held that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to give West's jury the life without parole option. Id. at 882. This Court vacated West's death sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. Id. ś 259. In Watts, 733 So.2d at 237, the trial court determined that since the crimes occurred in December 1993, before the amended penalty statute was enacted, the jury would be strictly instructed in the sentencing phase that it had two options â life imprisonment or death â and parole could not factor into their deliberation. This Court criticized the trial court's position and held that because Watts's trial occurred in August 1995, Section 97-3-21, as amended, should have been applied. Id. Furthermore, correcting the trial court's error was of such paramount importance that this Court disregarded a procedural bar to the issue. Id. We held, [p]rocedural bar notwithstanding, Sentencing Instruction No. 2 erroneously instructed the jury that it had only two sentencing options: life in prison or the death penalty. A third option, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, should have been presented pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. §§ 97-3-21 and 99-19-101. Id. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded the case for resentencing. Id. ś 260. Rubenstein was convicted of capital murder after enactment of the amendment. The trial court here, like the trial courts in West and Watts, was required to instruct the jury as to the option of life without parole as provided in the amended statute. ś 261. We also addressed the issue of sentencing options in Flowers v. State, 842 So.2d 531 (Miss.2003). In Flowers, the jury received sentencing instructions with the two possibilities of death or life imprisonment without parole. Id. at 556. Reading the relevant statutes in concert, this Court found, a defendant on trial for capital murder may only be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the eligibility of parole. According to § 47-7-3(1)(f), there is no longer the possibility of life imprisonment. Id. at 557. Although the trial court only gave the options of death and life without parole, it properly instructed the jury on the appropriate sentencing options. Id. at 558. ś 262. Under West, Watts, and Flowers, we are required to find in today's case that the trial court's exclusion of life without parole in the sentencing instructions was erroneous. Omitting the option of life with the possibility of parole would not have been prejudicial to the defendant, and we would have found no error. See Flowers, 842 So.2d at 558. However, the trial court in this case eliminated the option of life without possibility of parole. It is reasonable to conclude that many jurors, unsure about imposing death but resolved that the defendant should never be allowed out of jail, would opt for death rather than simply life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Discussions between the jury venire and the trial court in Wiley v. State, 691 So.2d 959 (Miss.1997), demonstrate this disturbing reality. ś 263. Wiley was decided under the prior capital murder sentencing scheme where the only two sentencing options were death and life imprisonment. Id. at 963. While the case may not illuminate the substantive issues of the instant case, it does illustrate the potential thinking of jurors faced with sentencing a person to die or, perhaps worse in their minds, someday seeing that person walking the streets free. [28] During the general voir dire of the jury venire, the following exchange took place: Juror: Is this life with no parole or do they â will there be an opportunity for this jury to distinguish no parole as opposed to the death penalty? Court: The law says life in prison. The courts or the juries have absolutely nothing to do with parole laws. . . . [I]f the jury sentences him to life, we don't know whether it's life with or without [parole] because that's up to the executive department.    Juror: So he could get out after 20 years? Court: I think the jury is just going to have to . . . take this and weigh it and make your decision based upon the way you see the evidence, not upon some uncertainty unknown down the road which you have no control over and I have no control over and just call it the way you see it at the conclusion of the trial.    Juror: If the jury decides â does not unanimously decide for the death penalty and life imprisonment is the decision, who â when is â when is it justified â when would it ever be decided that it would definitely be life without parole? I was under the impression that decision could be made in lieu of the death penalty. And what I'm understanding you to say is that the death penalty is not the choice â there is a possibility that he would be given life imprisonment with parole as a possibility. Is that what you're saying? Court: That's a possibility, yes. Juror: But no jury has the right to say that it's life without parole? Court: The current status of the law is . . . if you prescribe death, that's your decision; if you prescribe life in prison, that's your decision.    Juror: Is that like a hole in the law? . . . [I]f I look at this case and see that I think this man would be a menace to society for the rest of his life and I don't vote for the death penalty but life imprisonment, I would be inclined more to vote for the death penalty because I don't know if he's going to get out.    Juror: So even if we vote for life imprisonment, we're not guaranteed life in prison. Court: No ma'am. You'll be doing exactly what the law says. That's what the law says. If there's parole down the road somewhere, I don't have any control of it.    Juror: In other words, what you're saying, Your Honor, is that if given the choice of life imprisonment or the death penalty, if the jury went with life in prison, the defendant could get out tomorrow, he could be paroled tomorrow technically? Court: Well, not tomorrow. Juror: Well, as soon as the trial is over, as soon as he goes back to jail? Court: Well, at some point in time, possibly yes, I don't know. Wiley, 691 at 962-63 (emphasis added). The jury later sentenced Wiley to death. Id. at 960. ś 264. We include the above exchanges to demonstrate the importance of including the middle-ground option of life without the possibility of parole in capital murder sentencing instructions. As one juror noted, I would be inclined more to vote for the death penalty because I don't know if he's going to get out. Id. at 963. While the trial court in Wiley did appropriately present the only two sentencing options applicable at the time of that trial â life imprisonment and death â the same cannot be said in this case. ś 265. West provides a more concrete example of the significance of the life without parole instruction. During West's original sentencing, the trial court presented the jury with two options â death or life with the possibility of parole â and the jury returned a sentence of death. West, 725 So.2d at 877. We vacated West's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing based on the trial court's failure to give the option of life without parole. Id. at 882. On remand, West was instead sentenced to life without parole. West v. State, 820 So.2d 668, 669 (Miss. 2001). ś 266. The State argues this Court should create a requirement that any defendant charged with a capital murder that occurred prior to the enactment of the 1994 statutory amendment must (a) voice a contemporaneous objection to the absence of an instruction on the option of life without parole, and/or (b) clearly request a legally correct instruction as to the option of life without parole. In making this request, the State seems to forget that our duty is to interpret the laws as enacted by the Legislature, not to make up our own additional demands at the behest of one party. The Legislature determined that a person convicted of capital murder whose trial begins after July 1, 1994, shall receive sentencing instructions that include the option of life without parole. Our precedent has respected this requirement, and we will continue to demand its application. ś 267. If there is any statute that demands strict application, it is the sentencing statute for death penalty cases. We find the trial court's failure to include the statutorily required sentencing option of life without the possibility of parole constitutes reversible error. XXVI. Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury with regard to sympathy. ś 268. Rubenstein argues the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could not consider sympathy. Instruction C-1 provides, in pertinent part: It is your duty to determine the facts and to determine them from the evidence produced in open court. You are to apply the law to the facts and in this way decide the case. You should not be influenced by bias, sympathy or prejudice. Your verdict should be based on the evidence and not upon speculation, guesswork or conjecture. ś 269. Rubenstein failed to raise a contemporaneous objection to this instruction, so the issue is procedurally barred. Williams, 684 So.2d at 1203. Additionally, this assignment of error is likewise without merit. Rubenstein's argument has been repeatedly rejected by this Court. ś 270. The trial court never instructed the jury to completely disregard sympathy in toto in violation of the Eighth Amendment. King v. State, 784 So.2d 884, 899 (Miss.2001). The trial court merely stated the jury should not be influenced by bias, sympathy or prejudice. Further, this language has already survived scrutiny by this Court. See Scott, 878 So.2d at 981-82; Holland, 705 So.2d at 351, Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1225 (Miss.1996); Ladner, 584 So.2d at 759. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in giving these instructions, and this issue is without merit. XXVII. Whether there is cumulative error. ś 271. Rubenstein argues the cumulative effect of the errors in his trial warrant reversal. In Wilburn v. State, 608 So.2d 702, 705 (Miss.1992), this Court held that individual errors, not reversible in themselves, may combine with other errors to make up reversible error. The question that must be asked in these instances is whether the defendant was deprived of a fundamentally fair and impartial trial as a result of the cumulative effect of all the errors at trial. Id. In Byrom, 863 So.2d at 847, also a death penalty case, we stated: What we wish to clarify here today is that upon appellate review of cases in which we find harmless error or any error which is not specifically found to be reversible in and of itself, we shall have the discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, as to whether such error or errors, although not reversible when standing alone, may when considered cumulatively require reversal because of the resulting cumulative prejudicial effect. ś 272. None of the issues raised by Rubenstein with respect to the guilt phase of his trial rise to the level of reversible error, either standing alone or when considered together. The guilty verdicts find substantial support in the evidence, and Rubenstein fails to demonstrate any corresponding procedural or substantive errors that warrant reversal. There is no cumulative error, and thus no need to reverse his convictions. Because we did find reversible error as to the inaccurate sentencing instructions, we need not address Rubenstein's cumulative error argument concerning the sentencing proceedings.