Opinion ID: 2803109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Reformed Affidavit.

Text: Against this backdrop, we turn to the appellant's initial claim of error. Neither party contests the soundness of the district court's plainly supportable finding that Nolet recklessly omitted from her affidavit the three clusters of information limned above. The appellant nonetheless argues that the court misjudged the weight of those omitted facts. As he sees it, a reformed affidavit that includes those facts falls short of establishing probable cause. We begin with the Fourth Amendment's command that no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or -9- affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched. U.S. Const. amend. IV. As a general matter, a district court should pay great respect to the issuing magistrate's determination of probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Where relevant information has been withheld from the magistrate, however, the district court must probe the existence of probable cause anew. See United States v. Gifford, 727 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Burke, 405 F.3d at 82). Our review of the district court's own probable cause determination is de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); Gifford, 727 F.3d at 99. Findings of fact, though, are reviewed only for clear error. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699. In giving effect to the Fourth Amendment's commands, the principal task is to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before [us], including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562, 565 (1st Cir. 1996) (Probable cause exists when 'the affidavit upon which a warrant is founded demonstrates in some trustworthy fashion the likelihood that an offense has been committed and that there is sound reason to believe that a particular search will turn up -10- evidence of it.' (quoting United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 857-58 (1st Cir. 1988))). Performance of this task must take account of the totality of the circumstances. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Within this rubric, the statements of a law-abiding eyewitness to a crime are generally considered reliable without further corroboration. See United States v. Blount, 123 F.3d 831, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Campbell, 732 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir. 1984). Our review of the entire affidavit, supplemented only by the three recklessly omitted clusters of information, supports the conclusion that probable cause existed to search the appellant's home. The most trenchant of the omitted facts — Wiggin's conviction for uttering a false prescription — is surely relevant to the decisional calculus. But the commission of a past crime does not necessarily undercut a person's veracity. See United States v. Rumney, 867 F.2d 714, 720-21 (1st Cir. 1989). Even a prior conviction for a crime of dishonesty is not always dispositive of a witness's reliability. See, e.g., United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1554-55 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, we do not think that the court erred in ascribing such limited significance to the altered prescription conviction. After all, it is not unreasonable to think that a willingness to lie to feed a drug addiction is materially different than a willingness to level false accusations against a third party. -11- To be sure, the second cluster of omitted information, including Wiggin's history of mental instability and his reputation as a police groupie, calls for some degree of increased skepticism. But a factfinder might reasonably think that these black marks against Wiggin's credibility, like his altered prescription conviction, are diminished in importance in light of countervailing indicia of truthfulness. See United States v. Reeves, 210 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). An informant's trustworthiness may be enhanced in a number of ways, including his willingness to reveal his identity, the level of detail in his account, the basis of his knowledge, and the extent to which his statements are against his interest. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 3.3(c)-(e) (5th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2015). A number of such factors bolster the district court's determination that the essence of Wiggin's account was worthy of credence. Wiggin was willing to be identified despite his embarrassment about the potential revelation of his sexual orientation to his loved ones; he candidly admitted that there might be compromising pictures of him in the appellant's possession (and, thus, likely to surface in the search); and the record contains no credible suggestion of any ulterior motive for reporting the crime. All of these are positive factors in assessing Wiggin's veracity. The third cluster of omitted information lacks any decretory significance. The modest discrepancy between Wiggin's -12- interview statements and his notes does not defeat probable cause. The notes indicated that the appellant was watching young man or teen pornography when Wiggin arrived, whereas he stated in the interview that the subjects of the videos ranged from maybe eight to sixteen years of age. But Wiggin also gave a physical description of the subjects, stating that there wasn't really much of any . . . signs I guess, body hair, or facial hair and . . . you can tell when you look at ah, a[n] eighteen year old versus you know, a fourteen year old. Taken together, these statements create a fair probability that one or more of the actors was a minor. No more is exigible. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. We hasten to add that Wiggin's rough guess as to the ages of the minors in the initial video was not the only basis for the conclusion that the appellant possessed child pornography. Wiggin reported seeing a number of other pictures and videos containing sexual depictions of prepubescent children. And the inference that the appellant possessed child pornography was bolstered by plausible indications that the appellant harbored a sexual interest in young boys. The affidavit related that Wiggin first met the appellant when the appellant (a counselor at a summer camp) ogled Wiggin and other young campers as they showered; that the appellant initiated a sexual relationship with Wiggin when Wiggin was still a student at the high school where the appellant worked; that the appellant became aroused when talking about a one-time rendezvous -13- with a teen boy who had lied about his age; and that the appellant had made sexual allusions to the nine-year-old son of Wiggin's girlfriend. We recognize that the question is close. But assuming no duty to investigate further (an issue to which we shortly shall return), we uphold the district court's conclusion that the affidavit, reformed only to include the recklessly omitted facts, remains sufficient to establish probable cause.2 There was no error.