Opinion ID: 1195082
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenges Involving Mitigation Evidence

Text: Defendant challenges the court's finding that his capacity to know right from wrong and to assess wrongful conduct was not seriously impaired. He cites his previous treatment at the Southern Arizona Mental Health Center and psychiatric testimony that he acted impulsively in strangling the victim. He further claims that he was under the influence of alcohol after having consumed three beers prior to the murder. Dr. Otto Bendheim, the defense psychiatrist, reported that defendant was raised in a disturbed home by a mother who was mentally ill and a father with a deviant personality. The doctor testified that defendant was more likely to act impulsively than most other people, and when angered would not act violent, but usually he tried to keep it all within and then would explode at an inopportune moment. His diagnosis, however, falls short of the significant impairment required by (G)(1). As described in his written report: [I]t is quite obvious that we are dealing with an acute emotional disturbance in a person, who was extremely vulnerable to-ward that sort of thing. His pre-existing feeling of inadequacy and his more recent extreme anger [over his wife], frustration and conviction of having been dealt unjustly culminated in an act of tremendous violence, with disastrous results. Other evidence refutes defendant's claimed impairment. For instance, he contends that while in the motel he had periods during which he mistook the victim for his estranged wife. Dr. Bendheim's report, however, indicates that a dissociative reaction, coming and going in rapid succession, is not a very convincing story. The psychiatrist further opined that defendant knew right from wrong and was aware that he was committing a wrongful act. The state's psychiatrist, Dr. Cleary, found no indication of any mental illness or disorder that would have rendered defendant unable to perceive the nature and quality of his acts or unable to distinguish right from wrong in a legal sense. As far as intoxication is concerned, police testimony confirmed that three beer cans were found in the motel room. However, even if defendant was buzzed from the beer, this cannot constitute (G)(1) mitigation without evidence that he was too intoxicated to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law or to appreciate its wrongfulness. See State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 17, 870 P.2d 1097, 1113 (1994). The record is devoid of such evidence. The judge considered defendant's claim of impairment and questioned Dr. Bendheim at the aggravation/mitigation hearing. He then clearly rejected the first prong of § 13-703(G)(1) (significantly impaired capacity to appreciate wrongfulness of conduct). Defendant suggests, however, that the second prong (significantly impaired capacity to conform conduct to law) was found, but the court's language indicates otherwise. The judge stated, [T]he Court has taken into consideration that you are more impulsive than the average person and that your capacity to conform your conduct to the requirements of the law was to some extent impaired. (Emphasis added.) This does not comport with the statutory requirement of significant impairment. See A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). At any rate, in our independent review we do not find either aspect of (G)(1). Defendant further asserts that the court only weighed this evidence against the (F)(2) aggravating circumstance. At sentencing, however, the judge said he reviewed ... all of the matters proffered to the Court in mitigation. I have weighed those factors, the evidence supporting them and their significance vis-a-vis the two statutory aggravating factors proved beyond a reasonable doubt.... Thus, it appears that he properly viewed the evidence in light of all the aggravation. We also find no proof of the (G)(2) factor (perpetrator was under unusual and substantial duress) in the record. The court found that defendant was under substantial stress but not under duress. We agree that his stress, stemming from the breakup of his marriage and the termination of his college and military careers, is entitled to some nonstatutory mitigating weight. The court rejected the (G)(4) factor (grave risk of death not reasonably foreseeable). According to the verdict form, the jury found intent to kill. This was supported by testimony regarding the victim's extensive hemorrhages and contusions (indicating that a great deal of force was used), and the time required for death to occur. The evidence also strongly suggested that defendant must have continued to strangle the victim for several minutes after she lost consciousness, despite his claim that he merely wanted to prevent her from calling the police. The judge concurred with the jury and rejected Dr. Bendheim's opinion that defendant lacked intent to kill. We do not disagree, nor can we accept defendant's contention that the risk of this woman's death was unforeseeable. The court found defendant's age of twenty-one years at the time of the offense to qualify under § 13-703(G)(5), and we concur. No other statutory mitigators were alleged, and our independent review yields none.
Defendant contends that once the judge found the evidence insufficient to meet the (G)(1) or (G)(4) criteria, he erroneously failed to consider it as nonstatutory mitigation. If a trial court finds that impairment does not rise to the level of statutory mitigation, it must consider the offered evidence further to determine whether it in some other way suggests the defendant should be treated with leniency. State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 553, 804 P.2d 72, 86 (1990) (citation omitted). The transcript shows that the judge followed this mandate. Although he did not specifically discuss each piece of evidence first as statutory and then as nonstatutory mitigation, he clearly considered it all, even that which did not qualify under any subsection of 13-703(G). For example, although (G)(1) was not met, the court concluded that the defendant was more impulsive than the average person, was to some extent impaired, and was under substantial stress at the time of the offense.
Defendant argues that the trial court refused to consider his good conduct during incarceration. He has also referred us to testimony about his good military record, apparently as some evidence of his ability to do well in a structured environment. For reasons discussed in Part II(B), we believe that the court examined the materials submitted but found them unpersuasive. Claims of in-custody good behavior are subject to close scrutiny. See State v. Lopez, 175 Ariz. 407, 416, 857 P.2d 1261, 1270 (1993). Although defendant received positive work evaluations and acted as a law clerk in the library, he was no model prisoner. The presentence report discloses that he was placed on facility probation for secreting a razor blade in his cell. He was also the subject of prison disciplinary actions for disobeying an order and destroying property. Amidst his good work evaluations are some with ratings of average or even poor and comments such as very moody, needs to work on cooperation with staff, and has shown a lack of judgment and responsibility through his actions in the library. Finally, defendant's military record is tarnished by an attempt to make himself sick in order to obtain a medical discharge. In our judgment, therefore, his conduct was entitled to little if any mitigating weight, even considering the additional affidavits submitted three weeks after sentencing. Defendant further argues that his remorse should mitigate the sentence. Immediately after the murder, he went to his pastor's home and reported that he had strangled someone. The defendant then drove both of them to his parents' house where he phoned the police and turned himself in. At trial, the pastor testified that when defendant appeared at his doorstep he showed a lot of anguish and pain but was not crying. The witness had no concerns about defendant's nerves being too unsteady to drive. Dr. Bendheim testified that defendant told him he wished to die, later explaining that [r]emorse ... is present, but the decision to possibly seek death was not based mainly on remorse. The trial court expressly addressed this issue and found: Your entire manner and demeanor before, during and since this trial, your treatment of this process as merely some new intellectual game leads this Court to the conclusion that your only familiarity with remorse is the spelling and pronunciation of the word. You wrote to me, the knowledge that Charlie is forever gone from this plane of existence is made especially painful by the fact that her life literally passed through my hands. You may think that to have been a clever turn of phrase; I find that it is a snide word game describing a foul murder perpetrated by you. It speaks volumes not of remorse or of respect for Ms. Regan, but of a mind so supercilious and full of self that it believes it is permissible to be cute about this crime. It says that you committed these crimes with a depraved mind and a malignant heart. Where the trial judge disbelieves a defendant's statements claiming remorse, the circumstance is generally not established. See State v. James, 141 Ariz. 141, 148, 685 P.2d 1293, 1300 (1984). We agree that evidence of true remorse is lacking in this record. Defendant submits that his cooperation with police constitutes mitigation. We note, however, that although he spoke with officers immediately after the murder, he later retracted those portions of his statement in which he admitted the sexual assault. This would seem to minimize the positive effect of any cooperation. Defendant also asserts that recent traumatic events, coupled with his childhood, family, and emotional problems, impacted the ability to control his impulsiveness. As discussed in Part II(C), the court addressed these aspects of defendant's character and gave them some weight as nonstatutory mitigation. We agree with the findings. Next, defendant argues that substantial residual doubts about his guilt should be considered in mitigation. He asserts that his confession was given involuntarily and in violation of Miranda, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and that no independent evidence corroborated a sexual assault. He challenges the admissibility of some of the state's evidence and complains that the required elements of kidnapping were not proven. Once a person is found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, unsupported claims of innocence do not constitute mitigation for sentencing purposes. See State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 179, 800 P.2d 1260, 1287 (1990) (citations omitted). There was ample support for the jury verdict. Defendant's confession to the assault was bolstered by physical evidence at the scene. The proof of kidnapping included the extended length of time defendant kept the victim in the motel room. With the exception of the involuntariness claim, which we decided against him, defendant did not raise these issues on his first appeal. In affirming his convictions, however, we conducted a fundamental error review and found none. See State v. Schackart, 175 Ariz. 494, 503, 858 P.2d 639, 648 (1993). Defendant's claims of doubt regarding his guilt are implausible and do not constitute mitigation. See State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 653, 832 P.2d 593, 670 (1992). Finally, the trial court considered defendant's lack of contact with the criminal justice system, at least until the assault on his wife. It also credited his positive activities as a youth. We agree that defendant's early years exhibited promise, shown in part by his high school participation in writing and speaking programs, internships, and other community activities, as well as his enrollment at a university. We accord some mitigating weight to these elements.