Opinion ID: 1990819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finality of Board Actions

Text: [¶ 16] Absent special and narrow exceptions, appeals may only be considered from final judgments, or final rulings of administrative agencies. See Rockland Plaza Realty Corp. v. City of Rockland, 2001 ME 81, ¶ 6, 772 A.2d 256, 258; Lakes Environtmental Ass'n v. Town of Naples, 486 A.2d 91, 95-96 (Me.1984). A final judgment or final administrative action is a decision that fully decides and disposes of the entire matter pending before the court or administrative agency, leaving no questions for the future consideration and judgment of the court or administrative agency. See In Re Adoption of Matthew R., 2000 ME 86, ¶ 5, 750 A.2d 1262, 1264; Mechanic Falls Water Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 381 A.2d 1080, 1087 (Me. 1977); Hazzard v. Westview Golf Club, Inc., 217 A.2d 217, 222 (Me.1966); accord Musson v. Godley, 1999 ME 193, ¶ 5, 742 A.2d 479, 481. [¶ 17] Findings of fact and conclusions of law reached by an administrative agency in the course of its deliberations, but prior to issuance of a final decision, are not final administrative actions. Although the administrative decision-making may have indicated what action the administrative agency might take with respect to a particular issue, such decisions are not sufficient to transform the fact-findings or legal conclusions into a final order or judgment. Mechanic Falls Water Co., 381 A.2d at 1087. [¶ 18] As this case demonstrates, with several preliminary administrative decisions approving and disapproving the waiver of the 1000-foot limit, no local decision-making process can be considered over until it is over. Boards of Appeals, like other decision-making bodies, are subject to change of mind and change of membership which can sometimes lead to change of result between preliminary and final decision-making. See Sawyer Environmental Recovery Facilities, Inc. v. Town of Hampden, 2000 ME 179, ¶¶ 8-11, 760 A.2d 257, 259-60 (noting the Town's change of position during consideration of a land use application). [¶ 19] Votes or decisions addressing individual issues during the course of consideration of an application that requires rulings or fact-findings on several points are not final decisions. A person is not required to file an appeal to protect a challenge to each particular decision, prior to issuance of a final decision on the overall application. [¶ 20] Neither the July 11, 2001, vote against waiving the 1000-foot limit nor the October 3, 2001, or November 7, 2001, votes for waiving the 1000-foot limit were final decisions. There is no rule of law that requires that a first, or third, or fifth decision on a particular issue be the final decision where, as here, an agency has authority to consider an application de novo and to allow amendments of an application during the course of its consideration. At some point, excessively long, repeated, and inconsistent consideration of an issue, without a final result, may become a due process concern, but no such issue is presented here. [¶ 21] After the Board of Appeals' July 11, 2001, vote rejecting the waiver, the Limogeses were not required to cease participation before the Board of Appeals and file any amended plans as new proceedings before the Planning Board. [3] Likewise, after the November 7, 2001, vote approving the waiver, Carroll was not required to file an appeal within thirty or forty-five days or waive the right to challenge approval of the waiver. The vote of November 7 was not confirmed until the final approval of the subdivision on December 19 and adoption of the purported findings of fact on December 26, 2001. [¶ 22] The Limogeses assert that our decision in Vachon v. Town of Kennebunk, 499 A.2d 140 (Me.1985), and the statutes governing appeals from the Board of Appeals specify that the time for appeal began to run from the vote on November 7 and not from issuance of the decision. The Limogeses' argument is unclear as to why the time for appeal should begin to run from the November 7 vote instead of the July 11 vote, the October 3 vote, or any of the other preliminary votes that were taken in the course of consideration of their subdivision application. Focusing on November 7, 2001, they point to the language of Vachon which states that the appeal period should start to run immediately when the Board took its final public action, both because that time is easily determined and precisely fixed and because all parties to the public proceeding will ordinarily know of the Board's public vote at the time it is taken. Id. at 142. In Vachon, our reference to the final public action addressed the final approval or disapproval of an application when a board casts its public vote. Id. Here, that final approval or disapproval occurred with the December 19 vote, confirmed by the December 26 issuance of the purported findings of fact. [¶ 23] State law governing appeals from boards of appeals, 30-A M.R.S.A § 2691(3)(G) (1996), is consistent with this interpretation. Subparagraph 3(G) states: Any party may take an appeal, within 45 days of the date of the vote on the original decision, to Superior Court from any order, relief or denial in accordance with the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 80B. We will not infer that the Legislature intended an illogical or absurd result in a statute it enacted. Brent Leasing Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 2001 ME 90, ¶ 6, 773 A.2d 457, 459. The date of the vote on the original decision necessarily means the vote finally approving or disapproving an appeal or an application, not any of the many preliminary votes that may be taken in the course of consideration of an appeal or an application. [¶ 24] Because Carroll's appeal was filed within forty-five days of the date of the final vote on the administrative appeal, the Superior Court erred in dismissing Carroll's appeal of the Board of Appeals approval of the waiver of the 1000-foot limit.