Opinion ID: 69473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of the Recorded Conversations

Text: Dillard challenges three audiotapes admitted during his trial which purportedly connect him to Tyler’s drug operation. Government Exhibit 4 (“G- 4”), the audiotape of an alleged drug transaction on August 14, 2003, and its companion transcript, Government Exhibit 4a (“G-4a”), originated from a body wire on a confidential informant who was working with agents involved in investigating Tyler’s drug operation. These agents had the informant call Tyler to arrange a drug deal. Shortly after the confidential informant placed the call, Vicksburg Police Officer DeWayne Smith (“Smith”) saw Dillard drive up to the informant and heard the informant give Dillard money for drugs. G-4 and G-4a were introduced and played for the jury. Smith, who was present when the recordings were made and who was familiar with the parties’ voices, testified that the tape and transcript accurately reflected the conversation he overheard. Furthermore, the identity of the confidential informant and Dillard on the audiotape was established by Keafur Wallace who knew Dillard for five years. Dillard objected to the introduction of G-4 and G-4a, claiming that there was no proper authentication of the voices on the audiotape by someone with knowledge of the conversation. He also claimed that admission of the exhibits violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him since the informant did not testify at trial. 8 08-60577 Government Exhibit 5 (“G-5”) and its accompanying transcript, Government Exhibit (“G-5a”) was an audiotape of a conversation between the confidential informant and Tyler, which was made shortly after Dillard delivered the crack cocaine to the informant in the August 14, 2003 drug sale. After the August 14, 2003 drug sale, the agents had the informant telephone Tyler to complain about being “shorted” on the deal. Vicksburg Police Officer Bobbie Stewart (“Stewart”) along with other agents listened to the informant’s side of the conversation and recorded it. Stewart, who had known Tyler for over ten years, verified that Tyler’s voice was the one talking to the informant. At trial, Stewart testified that the tape and transcript accurately reflected the conversation he overheard. Dillard asserted that G-5 and G-5a should not have been admitted because they were not authenticated and violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him since the informant did not testify at trial. When seeking to introduce a sound recording in a criminal prosecution, the Government bears the burden of going forward with foundation evidence demonstrating that the recording as played is an accurate representation of the conversation or other sounds at issue. United States v. Stone, 960F.2d 426, 436 (5th Cir. 1992). Under Federal Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 901, “the requirement of authentication is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” F ED. R. E VID. 901(a); United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir. 1988). To illustrate acceptable means of authenticating evidence, Rule 901(b) lists testimony of a witness with knowledge and, for identifying a voice, an “opinion based on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker.” F ED. R. E VID. 901(b)(1), (5); Lance, 853 F.2d at 1181. 9 08-60577 Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that G-4/G-4a and G-5/G-5a were properly authenticated. The voices on the audiotapes and the accompanying transcripts were properly authenticated by law enforcement agents who monitored the conversations as they were occurring and who were familiar with the voices of the participants in the conversations. Dillard also argues that the admission of G-4/G-4a and G-5/G-5a violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. We review a Confrontation Clause challenge de novo. United States v. Alvarado-Valdez, 521 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2008). Such claims, however, are subject to harmless error review. Id. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court explained that out-of-court statements of a witness which are testimonial in nature are barred under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, unless the declarant is shown to be unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id. at 54-59. In Crawford, the Court declined to define “testimonial,” but noted that a testimonial statement includes, at a minimum, prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and . . . police interrogations.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. Recently, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 1949, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2009), the Supreme Court opined that for a statement to be “testimonial” within the meaning of Crawford, it must have been made “under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at 2532. In Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court held that certificates of laboratory analysis asserting that material seized by police and connected to the defendant was cocaine of a certain quantity was testimonial in nature because they were prepared specifically for use at petitioner’s trial. Id. at 2540 (“Whether or not 10 08-60577 they qualify as business or official records the analysts’ statements here —prepared specifically for the use at petitioner’s trial—were testimony against petitioner and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.”). Specifically, the Court found that the certificates of analysis were more appropriately described as affidavits and fell within the “core class of testimonial statements” covered by the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 2532. (internal citation omitted). Therefore, the Court concluded that unless the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant had been afforded a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, the Confrontation Clause required that the prosecution call the analysts to testify. Id. Unlike Melendez-Diaz, the present case does not involve laboratory certificates, nor does it involve hearsay admitted through affidavits. Nevertheless, G-4 and G-4a do pose Confrontation Clause issues. In G-4 and G- 4a the informant, on more than one occasion, called out Dillard’s name, testifying in effect “This is John Dillard I am speaking with here.” While the admission of G-4 and G-4a may have violated Dillard’s Sixth Amendment rights, given the overwhelming nature of the evidence against Dillard any error in admitting G-4 and G-4a was harmless. Dillard was observed conducting the drug transaction, which is the subject of G-4 and G-4a, by a law enforcement officer who was familiar with his voice and able to identify it on the audiotape. Under Melendez-Diaz, G-5 and G-5a may pose a Confrontation Clause issue because they were prepared “specifically for use at the petitioners trial,” but because of the overwhelming evidence against Dillard, described above, any error in their admission was harmless. Lastly, the Government offered another audio recording, Government Exhibit 23 (“G-23”) and its companion transcript, Government Exhibit 23a (“G- 23a”), into evidence. The conversation in this exhibit is between Tyler and 11 08-60577 Marinita Bernard (“Bernard”), concerning the arrest of Bernard’s boyfriend Jeff Brown (“Brown”), one of Tyler’s drug associates. The conversation contained comments made by Tyler to Bernard that “we all know what we are doing” (the “we” comment) and that it comes with the danger of arrest. Tyler advised Bernard that anyone arrested should simply do their prison time without cooperating with officials. Dillard asserts that the “we” comment made by Tyler is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial since there is an absence of proof of a connection between him and the conspiracy which the Government says the tape helps to establish. Dillard also asserts that G-23/G-23a should not have been admitted because it did not record co-conspirators’ statements since Bernard was not a named co-conspirator of Tyler or Dillard. Rule 402 provides that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,” except as otherwise excluded by the Constitution, law, or other rule of evidence. F ED. R. E VID. 402. Rule 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” F ED. R. E VID. 401. Rule 403 limits the admissibility of relevant evidence, explaining that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” F ED. R. E VID. 403. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) allows admission of co-conspirator’s statements made “during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178-79 (1987). “Efforts to conceal an ongoing conspiracy obviously can further the conspiracy by assuring that the conspirators will not be revealed and the conspiracy brought to an end.” United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 419 (5th Cir. 2000). Though Rule 801(d)(2)(E) requires that both the declarant (Tyler) and the party against whom the 12 08-60577 statement (Brown and Dillard) is offered be members of the conspiracy, there is no requirement that the person to whom the statement is made also be a member (Bernard). See United States v. Means, 695 F.2d 811, 818 (5th Cir. 1983). In this case, the evidence adduced at trial established that Brown and Dillard were members of Tyler’s ongoing drug organization. A reasonable interpretation of the conversation between Tyler and Bernard was that it was in furtherance of the conspiracy involving Tyler, Brown, and Dillard to persuade Brown, through his girlfriend Bernard, to keep his mouth shut and do his time. Therefore, we conclude that the requirements of Rule of 801(d)(2)(E) were met. Similarly, as the district court recognized, the “we” comment by Tyler could reasonably be inferred to refer to the participants in the conspiracy, and based on the time frame of the recorded conversations, that would include Dillard. Therefore, G-23/G-23a was relevant and probative to establish Dillard’s participation in Tyler’s ongoing drug organization and not unfairly prejudicial. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the audiotapes into evidence.