Opinion ID: 168971
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Shift-Bidding Policy

Text: 51 To make her prima facie McDonnell Douglas case for sex discrimination, Piercy must establish (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) she was qualified for the position at issue; and (4) she was treated less favorably than others not in the protected class. Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 531 (10th Cir.1998). The district court found Piercy could not establish an adverse employment action because EPSO's shift-bidding process created a mere inconvenience that did not rise to the level of an adverse action. 52 The Supreme Court most recently addressed the contours of adverse employment actions in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). The Court made clear the substantive discrimination provisions of Title VII are limited to [adverse] actions that affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace. 126 S.Ct. at 2412. Thus, while Burlington Northern modified our retaliation standards for adverse actions, it had no similar effect on our discrimination jurisprudence. 12 Accordingly, we continue to examine claims of adverse action on the basis of race or sex discrimination on a case-by-case basis, examining the unique factors relevant to the situation at hand. Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 532. 53 Adverse employment action includes significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1032-33 (10th Cir.2004). But we still will not consider a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities to be an adverse employment action. Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 532 (internal quotations omitted). 54 In Sanchez, we held that a female teacher denied transfer to a position with the same salary and benefits . . . [and] substantially similar duties did not suffer an adverse employment action because the position was a purely lateral transfer. Id. If a transfer is truly lateral and involves no significant changes in an employee's conditions of employment, the fact that the employee views the transfer either positively or negatively does not of itself render the denial or receipt of the transfer [an] adverse employment action. Id. at 532 n. 6. 55 Piercy's allegation of discrimination in shift-bidding fails for the same reasons as the claims in Sanchez. Most of Piercy's arguments go to the desirability of certain shifts at CJC. But all of the shifts had similar duties and responsibilities, and, on this record, cannot be seen as substantially different than one another. Piercy, moreover, was eligible for different shifts, it was only the frequency with which she succeeded in her bids that was at issue. In this context, the district court properly found EPSO's shift-bidding policies that required certain numbers of female and male guards to be available at CJC were a mere inconvenience and did not constitute an adverse employment action. We agree with the district court's assessment. 13