Opinion ID: 853659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Immunity Objection

Text: Brown also claims that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the State's evidence, which he contends was derived from his testimony in his co-conspirators' trial. There is no dispute that Brown was given use and derivative use immunity for his testimony. See generally In re Caito, 459 N.E.2d 1179, 1182-83 (Ind.1984) (explaining use and derivative use immunity). Brown contends that the State failed to demonstrate that it did not use his testimony or any evidence derived from his testimony in the case against him. The State responds that the prosecution established in a pretrial conference that none of Brown's testimony would be used against him. The State also contends that Brown's testimony was essentially the same as his statements to police that were not made under a grant of immunity, and therefore nothing was derivable from his testimony that was not equally available from his earlier nonimmunized statements. On October 5, 1998, shortly before the start of Brown's trial, Brown objected to the State's evidence based on his grant of immunity. Specifically, he claimed that the State had the burden to show that it would not use his immunized testimony and that this burden could not be carried because the information Brown had given had colored the way in which the investigation was conducted and the witnesses were questioned. The State responded that it would present both eyewitness testimony and Brown's nonimmunized statements to the police. The State contended that neither would use any information obtained from Brown's immunized testimony. The State also claimed that the witnesses in Brown's co-conspirators' trial did not hear any of his testimony in that matter or see transcripts of Brown's testimony. The trial court concluded that the State has established that there is an independent source to the information that these witnesses provide and overruled Brown's objection. Indiana Code § 35-37-3-3 provides for the grant of use and derivative use immunity for a witness in a trial. Once immunized, any evidence that the witness gives, or evidence derived from that evidence, may not be used in any criminal proceeding against that witness. Ind.Code § 35-37-3-3 (1998). Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held that use and derivative use immunity statutes are not unconstitutional infringements of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Zicarelli v. New Jersey, 406 U.S. 472, 475-76, 92 S.Ct. 1670, 32 L.Ed.2d 234 (1972); Caito, 459 N.E.2d at 1183-84. To ensure that the prohibition on using immunized testimony against the witness was effective, the Supreme Court stated: Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence. This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate, is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S.Ct. 1653 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n. 18, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964)). The same burden must be carried in a state prosecution of an immunized witness. See Caito, 459 N.E.2d at 1184 (applying Kastigar language to Indiana state courts). The State has the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-62, 92 S.Ct. 1653. Although courts in this State have never addressed the sufficiency of a Kastigar hearing, it requires more than generalized arguments about the sources of the State's evidence. See, e.g, United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1532 (11th Cir.1985) (courts generally resolve Kastigar issues with an adversarial evidentiary hearing); State v. Peters, 637 N.E.2d 145, 149-50 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). In this case, the hearing conducted by the trial court was essentially an oral argument of counsel, not an evidentiary hearing. This is insufficient to establish that the evidence used against Brown was obtained wholly through independent sources, not through any of his immunized testimony. See Block v. Consino, 535 F.2d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir.1976) (good faith allegations are not enough, the government must show how it acquired the evidence). Under these facts, however, it does not appear that a Kastigar hearing was necessary. Brown gave two statements to the police, one shortly before his arrest and one five months later. Neither of these statements was subject to his grant of immunity. At his trial, Brown testified that he had earlier testified at his brother's trial. He responded affirmatively when asked, And your testimony that you gave at the trial, was it substantially the same thing that you said in the statement to the detective in December? In United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir.1985), the Ninth Circuit held that there was no need for a full hearing where there were only minimal differences between the May 1980 nonimmunized statements and the December 1980 immunized statements[.] [A] subsequent hearing would have served no purpose.... Because the May and December statements were substantially identical, all of the government's information reasonably could have derived from the May statements. We agree with the Ninth Circuit that a full Kastigar hearing is not required where the immunized testimony of the defendant/witness is already in the public domain. Cf. United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559, 1580 (11th Cir.1988) (a full hearing is not necessary in all cases). Therefore, there was no error in failing to conduct a full hearing or in allowing the State to present its evidence at trial.