Opinion ID: 717160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Permit Cross-Examination

Text: 9 During cross-examination defendant's counsel sought to impeach the testimony of co-conspirator Barrett as tainted by bias and ulterior motive by eliciting testimony regarding his plea agreement with the government. Defendant, on appeal represents the following as having occurred: 10 Counsel first attempted to elicit from Barrett whether he had any discussions about any recommendations the U.S. Attorney would give regarding his sentence. The Court interrupted by stating in the presence of the jury, I do not accept recommendations from anybody, the United States Attorney or anybody else, so you don't have to answer any questions along that line. Subsequently, while attempting to elicit from the witness Barrett testimony of his subjective belief as to what benefit his testimony would bring him, the Court again cut defense off, stating, I do not accept recommendations from anybody, the United States Attorney or anyone else. So, you are wasting your time. 11 Appellant's Brief at 9-10 (citations to transcript omitted). 12 The District Court erred to the extent that it restricted, in barring cross-examination on the witness' understanding of his plea bargain, important impeachment evidence. The record, however, shows that between the District Court's two statements quoted, defense counsel successfully elicited from witness Barrett that he knew he was facing a possible sentence of twenty to thirty years and had received a letter from the government assuring him of a recommendation of a two to four year sentence. JA at 222. Thus, the jury was aware of the essential information regarding Barrett's bias and motive for providing testimony favorable to the government and that the witness was not disinterested in this case. He had a motive to curry favor with the prosecution; he had cut a deal. 6 Even though the jury had the information, the District Court's comments were still arguably prejudicial in that they may have mislead the jury into thinking that the prosecution's recommendation was of no value to the witness, because it was of no value to the judge. If so, then the government's recommendation would have been unlikely to give the witness motive to lie. 13 We agree with the Ninth Circuit that [t]he right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, stemming from the confrontation clause,' is especially important with respect to accomplices or other witnesses who may have substantial reason to cooperate with the government. United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir.1994) (discussing the importance of plea bargain as impeachment). We further agree with dicta in that opinion, however, that abridging that right may, under certain circumstances, constitute harmless error, Id., and consider whether it was harmless in this case. 7 Because the essential impeachment information was obtained, the restriction on cross-examination was slight and the court's comment was not directed at defendant or his counsel, we believe any error here was harmless 14 While Barrett was an important witness, nevertheless, without Barrett's testimony, there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt of the possession and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. At trial, defendant's girlfriend testified that defendant gave her a Lazarus bag (a shopping bag, JA at 248) to keep at her house, JA at 154, a bag which she gave to the police, JA at 158, 248, and which contained cocaine powder and cocaine base weighing nearly four kilos. JA at 225. Defendant's fingerprint was on the bags which contained cocaine. JA at 170-71, 269. There was testimony that he possessed five automobiles (bought by him but some under his Ms. Bowman's name), JA at 156-57, that he paid frequently for additional cars to be rented, as well, JA at 131-32, 139, that he paid for and used a cellular phone and pager, JA at 147, and paid for all the ordinary incidents of life, JA at 145, and there was no evidence of a legal source of income for such significant expenditures. 15 In short, the jury had abundant evidence on which to convict defendant on the possession counts and possession with intent to distribute. Furthermore, as emphasized supra, while the District Court's comments were improper, the jury was nevertheless able to gather that witness Barrett was cooperating with the government in the hopes of a lighter sentence. Thus, we believe the error harmless as having had little or no effect on the jury. United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1033 (1993); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). 16