Opinion ID: 1549090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suder's Motion for Summary Judgment and Whiteford's Motion to Dismiss

Text: Whether Downes would have actually challenged the first extension if the defense of the improperly granted fifth extension was not available to him, is a question of fact. As Comment b to Section 53 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers explains, What would have been the result of a previous trial presenting issues of fact normally is an issue for the factfinder in the negligence or fiduciary-breach action. To ascertain what would have happened, the trier of fact should examine the record of the underlying controversy and hear testimony from the parties and counsel. Yet [t]he judges or jurors who heard or would have heard the original trial or appeal may not be called as witnesses to testify as to how they would have ruled. That would constitute an inappropriate burden on the judiciary and jurors and an unwise personalization of the issue of how a reasonable judge or jury would have ruled. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 53 cmt. b (2000). We will not venture as far as the CSA did in concluding that there is no rational reason Gregory Downes would not have challenged the original extension if he did not have available the easier target presented by the late request for a fifth extension. Perhaps Downes would have proceeded against Suder in a different manner if he believed that he could not attack the fifth extension. Or maybe he was simply oblivious to the invalidity of the first extension, a possibility indicated by a passage in his CSA brief: The legal effect of [the first] petition was to preserve the surviving widow's option to take under the will of the decedent or to elect a statutory share.... He may have made this statement because he was actually unaware of the invalidity of the first extension. This is evidence for the trier of fact to consider in deciding what likely would have occurred had Whiteford not breached its duty. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the CSA and remand this case to the CSA, for it to remand to the Circuit Court for Talbot County for a trial on the merits. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR TALBOT COUNTY AND REMAND FOR TRIAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.