Opinion ID: 744671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: imposition of a 57-month upward departure to a total

Text: 26 SENTENCE OF 120 MONTHS ON THE UNLAWFUL POSSESSION CHARGE. 27 Finally, Old Chief argues that the district court made an unreasonable upward departure in his sentence on the unlawful possession charge, thus, violating the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Sentencing Guidelines. Old Chief's arguments on this issue have merit. 28 Because this was his third felony assault conviction in federal court, Old Chief was designated a career offender. Given this designation and the levels of his current offenses, the maximum sentence Old Chief could have received under the Guidelines was 51-63 months. The district court, however, departed upward to a sentence of 120 months, imposing an additional 57-month sentence on the unlawful possession count. The term of 60 months on the assault charge, was to be served concurrently. Thus, in effect, what should have been a five-year sentence, became a ten-year sentence. Moreover, the Guidelines impose a mandatory five-year enhancement on the use conviction, which the judge ordered to be served consecutively. 29 This Court established a three-step process for the review of an upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines in United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.1991)(en banc). First, the reviewing court must determine if the district court had legal authority to depart. Id. at 746. Second, any factual findings supporting the existence of an aggravating circumstance used to support an upward departure must be reviewed for clear error. Id. Third, the extent of the upward departure must be reasonable in light of the structure, standards and policies of the Guidelines. Id. at 751. 30 Apparently, the district court based its upward departure on the reports of the Probation Officer and U.S. Attorney that Old Chief's serious record as a juvenile offender was not reflected in his current offender designation. An upward departure is warranted when reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct. See United States v. Streit, 962 F.2d 894, 903 (9th Cir.1992). However, the district court must specify the events in the defendant's criminal history that it believes are inadequately represented in the guidelines criminal history calculation. Id. (citing United States v. Hoyungowa, 930 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.1991)). The current record is, unfortunately, silent in this regard. 1 31 The district court's only statement regarding Old Chief's prior history was that Mr. Old Chief and I have got [sic] to be friends over the years. Although we might assume that this statement was meant to be an adoption of the specific factual findings contained in Old Chief's presentence report, see Streit, 962 F.2d at 903, the district court's statements in the current record are too ambiguous to explain the extent of its upward departure. See United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885, 894-95 (9th Cir.1994). 32 In order to facilitate appellate review, the district court must explain in detail the reasons behind the imposition of a particular sentence, analogizing to other Guidelines provisions. Id. at 894 (quoting United States v. Hicks, 997 F.2d 594, 599 (9th Cir.1993)). Here, the court simply stated ... here again we find that [Old Chief] had just been released from custody very shortly before this occurred. There is the loaded gun. And he is a danger to the community, and a serious danger. I think there's no question about that. Even if we accept these statements as an indication of aggravating factors in support of an upward departure, the district court failed to articulate the specific reasons for the extent of its departure-nearly double the maximum sentence-by analogy to other Guidelines provisions. See Hicks, 997 F.2d at 599. 33 If the district court fails to articulate reasons for the extent of departure or if the analogy is not reasonable, [the panel on appellate review] must vacate and remand. Id. (emphasis in original)(quoting Streit, 962 F.2d at 903). Here, because the district court neither articulated the reasons for such an extreme departure, nor analogized the reasons to particular provisions of the Guidelines, we are unable to evaluate the reasonableness of the sentence imposed as required under Lira-Barraza. Thus, we vacate Old Chief's sentence and remand the case for resentencing consistent with the guidelines set forth above.