Opinion ID: 2614599
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the jury's verdict logically inconsistent?

Text: McCubbins argues that the verdict is logically inconsistent because the jury awarded damages in some categories but failed to award them in corresponding categories. We agree that the jury's verdict awarding damages for future medical expenses but not for diminished earning capacity was inconsistent. We will not disturb a jury verdict if there is a theory which reconciles the apparent inconsistencies. Yang v. Yoo, 812 P.2d 210, 215 (Alaska 1991). No logical theory exists for the jury's award of $28,800 for future medical expenses, but its failure to award anything for diminished future earning capacity. The jury's award of $28,800 for future medical expenses closely approximated the $28,600 cost for McCubbins's treatment at a pain management clinic, as estimated by his expert. Thus, it is very likely that the jury's award for future medical expenses was intended to cover the costs of McCubbins attending a pain management clinic, especially since one of the State's main arguments at trial was that McCubbins suffered from chronic pain syndrome. The State acknowledges this but argues that the jury could have reasonably concluded that attendance and participation in a pain management clinic would enable McCubbins to resolve his chronic pain problems without impairing his future earning capacity. This argument fails to address the inconsistencies in the jury's verdict. The State's own witness, Dr. Smith, testified that pain clinic programs generally are at least five days a week, eight hours a day, lasting for four to eight weeks. Thus, by traveling to and attending such a clinic, McCubbins will necessarily miss at least four to eight weeks of work. His future earning capacity is diminished by at least the amount of money he would have made in the time necessary to complete a pain management clinic. The jury's failure to award any amount for loss of future earning capacity is therefore internally inconsistent with its award of $28,800 for future medical expenses. Thus, the superior court abused its discretion by not ordering a new trial on the issue of damages. [6] Cf. State v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 24, 26-27 (Alaska 1990) (superior court abused its discretion in refusing to order a new trial given that the jury's verdict about the amount of just compensation owed to plaintiff was internally inconsistent). We have held that when an issue requiring reversal is fairly separable from the other issues involved in the case, we may grant a partial new trial, setting aside only so much of the judgment as is affected by error. Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 275 (Alaska 1975). The most typically separable issues are those of liability and damages. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 795 (Alaska 1981) (citations omitted). Those issues are separable in the present case and therefore we order a new trial on the issue of damages only. Cf. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 615 P.2d 621, 624 (Alaska 1980) (in this case the evidence on liability is almost entirely separate from the evidence on damages ... [therefore,] [i]n order to limit the time and expenditure required by a new trial, we direct that there shall be a partial new trial on the issue of liability).