Opinion ID: 2385596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I never shot anybody in my life.

Text: (N.T. 1/7/82; 81) At this point, a sidebar conference was held outside of the hearing of the jury, wherein the trial court permitted the prosecuting attorney to bring out the appellant's prior conviction for aggravated robbery where a store clerk was shot since the appellant volunteered that he was a nonviolent person. We agree with the Opinion of the lower court which stated that: This voluntary admission constituted, in our view, a direct and forcible introduction of Defendant's character for nonviolence. Defendant, when he attempts to apply its lesson to the case at bar, plainly misconceives the intention of Bighum. That case considered the use of prior convictions to generally impeach an accused's credibility. Here, the use of the prior conviction was limited to the specific rebuttal of Defendant's unsolicited character testimony. (Slip Op. at 9) Thus, the Commonwealth's decision to pursue a line of questioning directed at appellant's prior conviction for aggravated robbery was permissible under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5918(1). See Commonwealth v. Bastone, 211 Pa.Super. 509, 239 A.2d 863 (1968) (where defendant gives testimony impliedly intended to establish his good character or reputation, he subjects himself to attack on cross-examination as to other prior convictions). The appellant next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to attack the jurisdiction of the lower court. Specifically, the appellant contends that the Commonwealth's evidence showed that the substantial step giving rise to criminal liability ( e.g., the delivery of the pistol by appellant), occurred in Philadelphia, and that prosecution in Bucks County was therefore improper. While it is conceded that proof of a substantial step toward the commission of the murder was necessary in order for the appellant to be convicted of criminal attempted homicide, there is no authority for appellant's proposition that jurisdiction is limited to the county in which the substantial step occurred. In the face of a similar jurisdictional challenge in Commonwealth v. Herriott, 265 Pa.Super. 143, 401 A.2d 841 (1979), this Court, after citing extensive authority, held that [w]here, as here, an offense is continuing, or when elements of the same offense occur in several counties, the offender may be tried in any county where an overt act occurred. 265 Pa.Super. at 152, 401 A.2d at 846. Here, the solicitation, agreement and planning of Anthony Sanutti's murder was recorded over a series of several meetings, each of which occurred in Bucks County. Therefore, the jurisdictional requisites noted in Commonwealth v. Herriott, supra , were clearly satisfied and the prosecution in the instant case before the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas was entirely proper. We find appellant's jurisdictional challenge to be patently frivolous and conclude that trial counsel had no obligation to pursue this meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Perkins, 496 Pa. 482, 437 A.2d 1143 (1981). Finally, the appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions because of inconsistencies and the lack of credibility in the testimony of the Commonwealth's witnesses. As we have stated many times: In testing the sufficiency of the evidence, we proceed in several steps. First, we accept as true all the evidence upon which the finder of fact could properly have reached its verdict. Next, we give the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising from that evidence. And finally, we ask whether the evidence, and the inferences arising from it, are sufficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty of the crime of which he has been convicted. (citations omitted) Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 294 Pa.Super. 591, 593, 440 A.2d 623, 624 (1982). So viewed, it is clear that the evidence in the instant case is more than sufficient to sustain the appellant's convictions. The appellant, however, contends that the evidence becomes insufficient due to problems in credibility, primarily between the version of the criminal episode by the Commonwealth's chief witness, William Hill, contrasted against the testimony of the appellant himself, which remarkably was corroborated by the testimony of the purported victim, Anthony Sanutti. [10] The jury, however, chose to believe the Commonwealth's witnesses while disbelieving the defense witnesses. [11] This Court, in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Vitacolonna, 297 Pa.Super. 284, 443 A.2d 838 (1982), stated that: The credibility of all witnesses is in the exclusive province of the fact-finder, Commonwealth v. Barnosky, 264 Pa. Super. 443, 400 A.2d 168 (1979), such that the weight to be accorded to each witness' testimony and whether to believe all, part or none of the evidence is for the trier of fact, and is not to be disturbed unless the `evidence offered to support the verdict of guilty is so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon pure conjecture . . .' Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 60, 354 A.2d 545, 550 (1976). Id., 297 Pa.Superior Ct. at 288, 443 A.2d at 841. Accordingly, as the dispute in the instant case was substantially one of credibility, this Court will not disturb the fact-finder's determination as to credibility on appeal. Commonwealth v. Dobson, 302 Pa.Super. 57, 448 A.2d 92 (1982). Such a determination is solely within the province of the trier of fact. Commonwealth v. Edney, 294 Pa.Super. 67, 439 A.2d 752 (1982). This Court has reviewed the entire record in this case and finds that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to convict appellant of the instant criminal charges. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence of the court below. Judgment of sentence affirmed.