Opinion ID: 703878
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Amir Tobing

Text: 24 In deciding whether to depart upwardly in imposing Tobing's sentence, the court noted that [w]hat is striking about this case is that all of [the upward departure factors listed in Application Note 5] are present as to one defendant or another. Tr. of Afternoon Sentencing, July 13, 1994, at 9. The court then considered to what extent any of these factors were properly attributable to Tobing. 25 The court found, first, that it appears undisputed that after May 17th, [Tobing] did not have any further responsibilities on board the Golden Venture. Id. at 11. As such, the court held that it would not hold him responsible for such reckless conduct as grounding the ship. Id. But, the court found, from the start ... [Tobing] understood that the Golden Venture was a cargo ship, not equipped to hold human passengers. Nevertheless, he agreed to play [a part in the scheme] for a substantial fee. Id. at 12. Thus, the court held that the fact that there were more than 100 people whom he was involved in smuggling, the fact that the[y] were subject to dangerous and inhumane conditions, all seems attributable to him. Id. The court further observed that it's difficult indeed to think of anyone more significant to a smuggling scheme involving a boat than a captain of the boat, particularly when we're talking not about one of these one day smuggling trips.... Id. at 17. 26 Tobing argues that the district court's finding that the conditions on the boat were inhumane within the meaning of Note 5 was clearly erroneous. Tobing admits that the conditions were squalid, but argues that the district court's finding was a subjective one based on Judge Raggi's life experiences, and that [t]o the people who were fleeing their oppressive existences in the People's Republic of China, the conditions on the boat were not inhumane. Brief for Defendant-Appellant Tobing, at 19. Tobing relies, in part, on United States v. Trinidad De La Rosa, 916 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir.1990), in which the First Circuit found that inhumane conditions could not necessarily be implied from the fact that the voyage was dangerous. 27 We cannot agree with Tobing's contention. We find that the district court's determination that the conditions on the Golden Venture were inhumane is fully supported by the testimony elicited at the sentencing hearing, and is in no way erroneous. This case is in no way comparable to Trinidad De La Rosa, which concerned only a fifty-mile voyage from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico, and in which the court found no evidence that [the passengers] were deprived of food or water or suffered any particular hardship on the trip. 916 F.2d at 30 & n. 2. In contrast, the record in this case reveals conditions which stagger the mind--nearly 300 passengers packed somehow into 800 square feet of cargo space for a voyage halfway around the world, lasting more than three months, with inadequate water and food, no toilet facilities, no life preservers or life boats, and only a single ladder providing a means of escape from the hold. Cf. United States v. Trinidad-Lopez, 979 F.2d 249, 253 (1st Cir.1992) (transportation of 104 aliens without food, life jackets or navigation equipment in a boat designed for 15 passengers is both dangerous and inhumane). We believe it is an understatement to call these conditions inhumane, and we cannot imagine that the passengers escaping China thought otherwise. 28 Tobing argues, secondly, that it was unreasonable for the district court to hold him responsible for the dangerous conditions on the boat, when testimony at the sentencing hearing showed that the land-based snakeheads were responsible for the number of passengers and the conditions on board the boat. Again, we cannot agree. As captain of the boat, Tobing cannot escape responsibility for conditions on board. The testimony shows that Tobing was fully familiar with the smuggling operation and the conditions on board the boat from the outset of the voyage, and, yet, he voluntarily chose to participate as captain of the boat--a role crucial to the success of the operation. It thus was not erroneous for the court to conclude that he was, along with others, responsible for the large number of passengers and the conditions on the boat. 29 Tobing argues, thirdly, that the magnitude of the 36-month upward departure was unreasonable. In reviewing the magnitude of an upward departure, we evaluate whether the departure is reasonable in light of the justification given. United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 27 (2d Cir.1992). We consider only the court's stated reasons for departure, rather than any additional rationales supplied by the government. United States v. Barone, 913 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1990). 30 In determining the magnitude of the departure in Tobing's sentence, Judge Raggi found that there are grounds present for both upward and downward departure. And I'm going to have to balance the totality of these facts. Tr. of Afternoon Sentencing, July 13, 1994 at 17. The judge first considered the defendant's responsibility for the dangerous and inhumane conditions on the boat, stating that she wanted to emphasize how culpable I think Mr. Tobing is for the tragedy that is the Golden Venture. Id. The judge then considered the need for general deterrence where, as here, the ringleaders are motivated by nothing other than greed and personal gain. Id. at 19. She found that [i]t is important that such people, such ringleaders, not be able to find experienced seam[e]n to carry out their plans. Id. at 19. Finally, Judge Raggi [c]redit[ed] [Tobing's] cooperation as proffered by the government. Id. at 20. Upon full consideration of these factors the judge found that, absent Tobing's cooperation with the government, a five-year sentence would be justified, but, in light of the government's 5K1.1 letter, a sentence of 48 months of incarceration was reasonable. 31 The judge's departure in this case was substantial, but we think it was entirely merited. In light of the appallingly dangerous and inhumane conditions and the large numbers of aliens on board the boat (certainly substantially more than 100, see U.S.S.G. Sec. 2L1.1, applic. note 5), and, as the district court noted, because of the particular need for deterrence, the court's upward departure from an 18-to-24 month range to 60 months was reasonable and fully supported by the circumstances of the case. 1 32 Finally, Tobing argues that the court abused its discretion by downwardly departing only one year for the substantial assistance he provided the government. As we have held in the past, [i]t is beyond question that we may not review a district court's determination not to grant a downward departure. It follows logically, then, that neither may we review, at defendant's request, the extent of any departure the court may grant. United States v. Lawal, 17 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (emphasis in original)). The only exceptions to this rule are that a defendant may appeal the extent of a downward departure if the departure was made in violation of the law or as a result of a misapplication of the Guidelines. Id. at 562-63. As neither of these circumstances is present in this case, we may not review the extent of the court's downward departure.