Opinion ID: 780053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Katz's Claim of Qualified Immunity Via Collateral Estoppel

Text: 37 A § 1983 claim of false arrest based on the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures may not be maintained if there was probable cause for the arrest. See, e.g., Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996); Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.1995) (There can be no federal civil rights claim for false arrest where the arresting officer had probable cause.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1189, 116 S.Ct. 1676, 134 L.Ed.2d 779 (1996). It appears to be undisputed that this principle applies as well to a claim of false arrest under Vermont law. Where a court has already determined the issue of probable cause to make an arrest that is the subject of a claim of false arrest, a party may, in appropriate circumstances, be estopped from relitigating that issue. See generally Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 868-69 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1221, 112 S.Ct. 3032, 120 L.Ed.2d 902 (1992). 38 In considering Katz's claim of qualified immunity based on the contention that Kent is collaterally estopped because of the Vermont District Court's July 16, 1996 finding of probable cause, we look to Vermont law and give that court's finding whatever preclusive effect it would be given under Vermont law. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-83, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). Under Vermont law, collateral estoppel is not appropriate unless, inter alia, an issue was actually litigated and was necessary to the final judgment in the prior case, and the party against whom estoppel is asserted had adequate opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue: 39 Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the subsequent relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the parties, so long as there was a final judgment on the merits and the issue was necessary to resolution of the action.... The elements of issue preclusion are the following: 40 (1) preclusion is asserted against one who was a party or in privity with a party in the earlier action; (2) the issue was resolved by a final judgment on the merits; (3) the issue is the same as the one raised in the later action; (4) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action; and (5) applying preclusion in the later action is fair. 41 Bull v. Pinkham Engineering Assocs., Inc., 170 Vt. 450, 461, 752 A.2d 26, 35 (2000) (quoting Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265, 583 A.2d 583, 587 (1990)). 42 In determining whether collateral estoppel should apply, courts must look to the circumstances of each case, including, among other things, the incentive for the party (against whom estoppel is claimed) to litigate the issue. 43 Bull v. Pinkham Engineering Assocs., Inc., 170 Vt. at 462, 752 A.2d at 35. 44 Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that collateral estoppel is inapplicable for several reasons. First, the Vermont judge's July 16 finding of probable cause inscribed on the Original Information was not a final judgment. Such a finding was required as a threshold matter in order to permit the prosecution to proceed because there had been no warrant and no indictment, see Vt. R.Crim. P. 5(c); but that finding was open to reconsideration, see Vt. R.Crim. P. 5(h) (Upon request of the defendant, the judicial officer shall review the finding of probable cause.). 45 Second, although there eventually was a final judgment in the criminal proceeding against Kent, that judgment did not decide the issue of whether Katz had probable cause to arrest Kent for DWI. The DWI charge was changed by the State to one of Negligent Operation, alleging simply that Kent had turn[ed] his steering wheel back and forth within his lane (Amended Information); Kent pleaded nolo contendere to the latter charge; and Negligent Operation, not DWI, is the charge that was resolved by the final judgment. Further, the affidavit of Kent's friend Robert Miller, submitted by the State to support the Negligent Operation charge, could not have supported a finding of DWI. Miller indicated that he and Kent had been on Macrae Road driving toward each other on June 20, 1996, and that Kent had turned his steering wheel back and forth a few times to signal Miller to slow down and stop for a quick chat ( see Affidavit of Robert Miller dated September 13, 1996, ¶¶ 13); but Miller also stated that, in that chat, Kent had appeared normal and that Miller did not detect any alcohol on his breath. ( Id. ¶ 4.) In sum, there was no final judgment that decided the question of probable cause to believe that Kent had driven while under the influence of alcohol. 46 Nor, given the amendment of the Information to charge Kent with Negligent Operation rather than with DWI, could it be said that a decision as to whether Katz had probable cause to arrest Kent on suspicion of DWI was necessary to the resolution of the criminal case. Intoxication is not an element of the offense of Negligent Operation. 47 Further, the issue of probable cause to arrest Kent was not actually litigated. As discussed above, the Vermont judge's initial finding of probable cause was, under the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure, subject to review if so requested by Kent. Kent did move for a Good Cause Hearing, but his motion was adjourned several times and was never heard because in January 1997, he and the State agreed to settle the case, eliminating the DWI charge on which Katz had arrested him. 48 Moreover, given the State's substitution of the Negligent Operation charge for that of DWI, Kent plainly no longer had any incentive to litigate in the criminal case the existence of probable cause to arrest him for DWI. Nor, since the conduct that formed the basis for the Negligent Operation charge was not witnessed by Katz, did Kent have any incentive to seek an adjudication as to what Katz had actually observed before placing him under arrest. 49 Finally, we note that the summary proceeding ostensibly initiated pursuant to § 1205 when Katz filed his § 1205 Affidavit, asserting that he had probable cause to believe that Kent was guilty of DWI in violation of § 1201, did not result in any estoppel of Kent. A § 1205 proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, but rather is a proceeding to determine whether there should be a suspension of an operator's driving privilege because of his refusal to carry through his implied consent to submit to a sobriety test. State v. District Court, 129 Vt. 212, 214, 274 A.2d 685, 686 (1971) (discussing prior version of § 1205). Consequently, the issues are different, and the driver may well have less of an incentive to contest a temporary loss of driving privileges than he would have to challenge a criminal charge. More importantly, although § 1205 requires the officer to file an affidavit in order to initiate a § 1205 proceeding, it does not require him to show probable cause. It requires a showing only of reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving under the influence of an intoxicant. 23 V.S.A. §§ 1205(a) and (b)(3). Thus, a license may be suspended even if the driver persuades the § 1205 court that the officer had less than probable cause to suspect him of being intoxicated, so long as the officer met the statutory standard of reasonable grounds. Accordingly, even had the § 1205 proceeding been properly commenced or conducted against Kent, Kent would have had no incentive in that proceeding to litigate Katz's inflated assertion that there existed probable cause. And finally, the state court did not adjudicate under § 1205 even the question of reasonable grounds, much less Katz's assertion that he had probable cause to believe Kent was intoxicated. As described in Part I above, the State conceded in favor of Kent on the suspension issue. 50 In sum, although the Vermont District Court stated on July 16, 1996, that it had found probable cause, that was not a final decision; Kent had not theretofore had an opportunity to litigate the issue of the probable cause for his arrest for DWI; the probable cause issue was not thereafter actually litigated; Kent had no incentive to litigate that issue after the DWI charge was dropped; and no finding of probable cause to arrest Kent for DWI was either encompassed in or necessary to the final judgment convicting him of Negligent Operation. We conclude that the Vermont District Court's finding does not collaterally estop Kent from asserting in this action for false arrest that Katz arrested him for DWI without probable cause.