Opinion ID: 2590048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: seqra

Text: The Dollard petitioners and the intervenor United States Department of Energy argue that the Settlement Agreement violates SEQRA. Specifically, they contend that the Governor and administrative agencies had to produce Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) before making or approving this Agreement with LILCO to transfer Shoreham to LIPA for closure and decommissioning. They add that PASNY also had to do a SEQRA review before it agreed to aid LIPA in decommissioning Shoreham by building baseload generating plants for LILCO in the future, if LILCO requested. We agree with the Appellate Division that, as to each aspect of this SEQRA argument, the Settlement Agreement was either statutorily exempt from SEQRA, or so tentative and premature as not yet to trigger SEQRA review (159 AD2d 141, 159). Primary guidance is found in the LIPA Act, which declares that LIPA's acquisition of LILCO's assets or stock is not State action subject to SEQRA, and that SEQRA shall not be applicable in any respect to such acquisition or any action of [LIPA] to effect such acquisition. (Public Authorities Law § 1020-s [2].) Nothing in this respect could be plainer. Appellants and the dissenters, with entirely inapposite authorities, nevertheless urge that the decision to decommission triggered an immediate full-scale SEQRA prerequisite to the Settlement Agreement itself. [O]fficial acts of a ministerial nature, involving no exercise of discretion, are expressly exempt from SEQRA (ECL 8-0105 [5] [ii]). A ministerial act is an action performed in a prescribed manner imposed by law without the exercise of any judgment or discretion as to the propriety of the act (6 NYCRR 617.2 [x] [emphasis added]). Actions of the State Legislature are also exempt (6 NYCRR 617.2 [q] [5]). When it passed the LIPA Act, the Legislature  inescapably aware of the inherent environmental consequences of Shoreham's shutdown  necessarily judged for itself the propriety of closure and decommissioning and mandated such action (Public Authorities Law §§ 1020-a, 1020-h [9]). LIPA's decision to fulfill the legislative objective to close and decommission Shoreham was not an action subject to SEQRA because LIPA had no choice in this respect; its acquisition of Shoreham triggered a legislatively mandated, ministerial consequence, i.e., to shut it down forthwith. Appellants argue that decommissioning was not mandatory on these facts and, thus, is not entitled to the ministerial exemption provision as that highly specialized legal word of art is employed in the SEQRA field. They essentially argue that under Public Authorities Law § 1020-h (9), LIPA's closure and decommissioning of Shoreham were mandatory only if LIPA acquired controlling shares of LILCO or all of LILCO's assets  but not if it just acquired Shoreham. This interpretation is not supported by legislation or logic. First, whether or not LIPA acquired, in addition to Shoreham, the rest of LILCO's stock or remaining assets has no greater or lesser bearing on the potential for environmental consequences arising out of LIPA's acquisition of only the Shoreham asset. Thus, it is not rational to differentiate between the two scenarios. The statute does not do so, and to do so by statutory construction leads to an unacceptable anomaly. The lesser circumstance could not rationally be subject to more severe restrictions than the greater. Second, the Legislature allowed LIPA to acquire Shoreham only, expressed that decommissioning was a central objective of the Act, precluded LIPA from running Shoreham, and certainly understood and intended that if LIPA acquired Shoreham it must forthwith close and decommission it. Forthwith in this circumstance would surely be an oxymoronic usage if the Legislature were deemed to have compelled the SEQRA process in this circumstance only, because that would freeze the shutdown and decommissioning process. Viewed in another light, appellants' restrictive interpretation would compel this syllogism: if LIPA determined that acquisition of LILCO itself would not effect the Act's objectives but that acquisition of Shoreham only would, LIPA must nevertheless choose the total takeover route to avoid SEQRA review of the lesser, common objective. Such a trap makes no sense and could not have been intended. We emphasize that what was ministerial here was LIPA's nondiscretionary action in complying with the Legislature's mandate that Shoreham be decommissioned. It was not up to LIPA to produce an EIS to evaluate the propriety of the legislative policy choice of decommissioning because, in this case, mandating SEQRA review would have the effect of overriding the Legislature's express exemption (6 NYCRR 617.2 [q] [5]). Finally, we agree with the Appellate Division determination that PASNY's agreement to aid LIPA in decommissioning and constructing alternative generating facilities for LILCO, if requested, are proposed actions which had not reached the point at which SEQRA review is required at the time the Agreement was made (159 AD2d 141, 160, supra ; see , Matter of Programming & Sys. v New York State Urban Dev. Corp. , 61 N.Y.2d 738, 739; Matter of Tri-County Taxpayers Assn. v Town Bd. , 55 N.Y.2d 41, 46-47). No decommissioning plan had been proposed or selected; no plans to build generating plants to replace Shoreham had been proposed or formulated; and no decision even to build such plants had been made. The subsequent selection of a specific decommissioning method has already received full environmental review, culminating in a Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement in 1990, which has not been challenged by appellants. PASNY's construction of facilities  if ever undertaken  will be subject to independent SEQRA review when a specific project plan is actually formulated and proposed. All other arguments, including those addressed to whether the PSC satisfied the requirements of the State Administrative Procedure Act, have been reviewed and require no further discussion, as they are without merit or affect on the dispositive analysis or result, or have been addressed in the Per Curiam opinions of the Appellate Division with which we agree. Accordingly, in Matter of Citizens , the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs. In Matter of Dollard and in Matter of Nassau Suffolk Contr.'s Assn. , the judgments should be affirmed, with costs. HANCOCK, JR., J. (dissenting). This case involves the constitutional limits on the reach of gubernatorial power, not the relative merits of nuclear power, the wisdom of a nuclear-oriented national energy policy, or whether the Shoreham nuclear power facility should be decommissioned. [1] The critical issue is whether the Governor, purporting to act under the authority of the LIPA statute, has effectively overruled that statute and defeated its very purpose by: (1) directing that LIPA acquire Shoreham in disregard of the statute's specific provisions making LIPA's authority to acquire any part of the LILCO property conditional on LIPA's replacing LILCO as the public utility on Long Island and being able to furnish power at lower rates; (2) failing to fulfill the statutory aim of providing a public authority as the source of power on Long Island; and, (3) countermanding the legislative policy of substituting public for private power on Long Island with an agreement to bail out the existing private power company and to perpetuate its operation as the power provider on Long Island. Because the central issue is whether the Governor acted in excess of his lawfully delegated authority, the decision necessarily has serious implications for the formulation and implementation of policy in State government and the doctrine of separation of powers ( see, e.g. , Matter of Campagna v Shaffer , 73 N.Y.2d 237, 242; Boreali v Axelrod , 71 N.Y.2d 1, 14; Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York , 65 N.Y.2d 344; Clark v Cuomo , 66 N.Y.2d 185, 189; Matter of Nicholas v Kahn , 47 N.Y.2d 24, 30; Rapp v Carey , 44 N.Y.2d 157, 163; Matter of Broidrick v Lindsay , 39 N.Y.2d 641, 645-646). No one suggests that the Governor's actions were a proper exercise of executive authority under the powers granted generally in article IV of the State Constitution. The Governor acted properly, the majority maintains, under power expressly delegated to him by the Legislature in the LIPA statute (Public Authorities Law §§ 1020  1020-hh). The categorical position of the dissent is that there is no such authority in the LIPA statute and that, moreover, the 1989 Settlement Agreement and the actions which it mandates are in direct violation of the LIPA statute. The detailed analysis of the specific provisions of the statute in part I of this dissent, infra  particularly the analysis of the critical subdivision (1), (2) and (10) of section 1020-h ( infra , at 422-426) which the majority has not challenged  proves that the majority's interpretation flatly contradicts specific language in the statute and the underlying purpose and policy set forth in the legislative declarations and manifested in the statutory scheme and relevant legislative history. The majority opinion contains no analysis and refers to no specific language or portion of the statute or of the legislative history supporting its interpretation. Rather, it simply reaches its conclusion by assuming the validity of the following three propositions which the statutory language refutes: (1) that the closing of Shoreham was one of the statute's two independent primary aims and that [t]he language of the Act and its legislative history cogently portray the Act's objectives: LIPA's acquisition and closure of Shoreham, or LIPA's takeover and replacement of LILCO as a utility provider (majority opn, at 411 [emphasis added]); (2) that despite the statutory language ( see , § 1020-h [1], [2], [10]) making acquisition of any part of the LILCO property (including Shoreham) specifically contingent on LIPA's replacing LILCO as the Long Island utility provider, LIPA is, nevertheless, authorized to acquire Shoreham alone without taking over from LILCO as the utility provider ( see , majority opn, at 407, 409, 411); and (3) that although LIPA is not an agency of the State but an independent corporate entity created under the Public Authorities Law to furnish electricity, and although the statute lacks any language suggesting otherwise, LIPA should, nevertheless, be viewed as an administrative agency of the State endowed by the Legislature with the power and flexibility (majority opn, at 410) to make policy choices ( id. ) in the complex field of nuclear power regulation ( id. , at 410) and that the intricate nuances of the policy determinations required under the LIPA Act deserve some respect from the Court (id.) . Any reading of the statute and its history compels conclusions (diametrically opposed to those reached by the majority) that: (1) the goal of the LIPA statute is to substitute publicly furnished power for private power on Long Island, and that closing Shoreham is entirely incidental to and dependent upon the achievement of that goal; (2) LIPA's exercise of discretion to acquire all or any part of LILCO is expressly contingent on LIPA's replacing LILCO as the utility supplier on Long Island, and that the transfer of Shoreham to LIPA while LILCO remains as the utility provider on Long Island is not authorized by the statute and, indeed, is contrary to it; (3) LIPA is not an administrative agency of the State and has no authority to make rules or policy choices consistent with the enabling legislation (majority opn, at 410) like the executive departments in the cases cited by the majority (majority opn, at 410)  e.g., Boreali v Axelrod (71 N.Y.2d 1 [Department of Health]), Matter of Nicholas v Kahn (47 N.Y.2d 24 [Department of Public Service]), Matter of Bates v Toia (45 N.Y.2d 460 [Department of Social Services]). LIPA is an independent public corporation created under the Public Authorities Law having the general powers that are typically given to public authorities (§ 1020-f) and the specific powers to provide and maintain generating, transmission and resource recovery waste to energy facilities (§ 1020-g) including significantly the following: After the establishment of Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) and the commencement of its function as a utility , LIPA shall acquire from LILCO all franchise and utility service responsibilities for all ultimate consumers of gas and electricity within LILCO's former service territory, including the responsibility to provide safe and adequate service (§ 1020-g [n] [emphasis added]). To be sure, the public authority is given the limited discretion necessary to carry out its corporate purposes (e.g., to negotiate terms of purchase [§ 1020-h (2)], to determine amount of tender offer [§ 1020-h (3)] or to commence a taking by eminent domain [§ 1020-h (4)]). But, it is inconceivable that by giving LIPA its charter the legislators could have intended to set in motion an uncontrollable public entity with sufficient autonomy to subvert the very purpose for which they created it and to violate their express mandate making acquisition of any part of the LILCO property contingent on LIPA's becoming the power provider. How the majority's theory can be adopted without attributing such remarkable intention to the legislators is not explained. The Governor's action in implementing the Settlement Agreement is an assertion of unauthorized executive power and a usurpation of legislative authority in sharp conflict with the doctrine of separation of powers which we have emphatically reaffirmed as a vital principle in New York jurisprudence ( see , Under 21 v City of New York , supra , at 355-356). I, therefore, dissent on this ground. I agree, moreover, with the arguments advanced by the United States Attorney on behalf of the United States and by other appellants that the Settlement Agreement insofar as it calls for the decommissioning of Shoreham without SEQRA review, must be vacated as an invalid action ( see , Chinese Staff & Workers Assn. v City of New York , 68 N.Y.2d 359, 368-369). Any reasoned discussion of the constitutional and separation of powers issues must start with a description of the LIPA statute and a comprehensive analysis of the statute's purpose and underlying policy and of the relevant legislative history.