Opinion ID: 304354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Wiretap Authorization

Text: 9 We turn initially to appellants' contention that the government, in seeking judicial authorization for the wiretap, failed to conform to the procedural requirements of the Crime Control Act. Specifically, the contention is that, as in United States v. Robinson, No. 71-1058 (5th Cir., Jan. 12, 1972); United States v. Aquino, 338 F.Supp. 1080 (E.D.Mich. 1972); 4 and United States v. Cihal, 336 F.Supp. 261 (W.D.Pa.1972), the authorization to apply for the wiretap warrant was issued not by the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General, as required by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(1), but by their assistants. That statute provides in pertinent part: 10 The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a Federal agency having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which application is made. . . . 11 In Robinson, Cihal and Aquino, each court was presented affidavits from the participants showing the Justice Department's procedure in those cases involved neither former Attorney General John Mitchell nor former Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson. Instead, General Mitchell's Executive Assistant, Sol Lindenbaum, designated Wilson to authorize the application and Deputy Assistant Attorney General [now Assistant Attorney General] Henry Peterson sent the letter of authorization signing Wilson's name thereto. Finding legislative history evidencing a congressional intention to affix upon the publicly visible officers named in the statute the responsibility to consider whether a wiretap was warranted in each particular case, and finding that neither of the statutorily named officers ever scrutinized the application as required, those courts held that procedure vitiated the wiretap order and the evidence procured by it. 12 The present case, however, is factually distinguishable from those cases. Here, Peterson's affidavit 5 demonstrates that the application from the Bureau of Narcotics was first considered by an attorney in the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department for strict adherence to the required statutory, judicial and Constitutional standards. That attorney then forwarded his favorable recommendation to the Deputy Chief of the Section, who commended the application to Peterson. Peterson examined the file and forwarded it to the Office of the Attorney General with a detailed recommendation that the authorization be granted. As Lindenbaum's affidavit 6 and General Mitchell's personally initialed memorandum 7 show, the Attorney General then considered the application and sent a memorandum to Mr. Wilson reciting Pursuant to the powers conferred on me by Section 2516 of Title 18, United States Code, you are hereby specially designated to authorize Calvin K. Hamilton 8 to make the above described application. Mr. Peterson thereupon sent Mr. Hamilton a letter of authorization to seek the wiretap order, signing Mr. Wilson's name.