Opinion ID: 701736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The General Verdict

Text: 16 Nieves-Burgos initially argues that his conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1) cannot stand as the jury's general verdict of guilty was ambiguous in that it was returned on a charge that alleged the use of three firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1), and the evidence at trial was not sufficient to support a conviction as to two of the firearms. The government concedes that the evidence at trial did not support a conviction as to two of the three firearms listed in count four, but argues that the verdict should stand as it is supported by sufficient evidence as to the remaining firearm. 17 This issue was effectively determined in Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991). In Griffin, the appellant had been convicted by jury of an unlawful conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 47, 112 S.Ct. 466, 468, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991). A single count in the indictment charged that the conspiracy had two unlawful objects: impeding efforts of the Internal Revenue Service to ascertain income taxes; and impeding efforts of the Drug Enforcement Administration to ascertain forfeitable income. See id. The evidence presented at trial failed to establish the appellant's guilt with respect to the second object. See id. at 47-48, 112 S.Ct. at 468-69. The trial court's instructions to the jury permitted them to return a guilty verdict if they found the appellant to have participated in either of the two objects of the conspiracy. See id. at 48, 112 S.Ct. at 468-69. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. See id. The Court affirmed the verdict, citing the rule that when a jury returns a general verdict of guilty on a single count charging more than one criminal act, the verdict stands if the evidence sufficiently supports any of the acts charged. See id. at 56-57, 112 S.Ct. at 472-73 (citing Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420, 90 S.Ct. 642, 654-55, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970)). 18 Griffin provides what was a much-needed clarification of the law. Prior to Griffin, Supreme Court authority appeared somewhat disjointed, if not downright contradictory. Compare Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. at 420, 90 S.Ct. at 654-55 (The general rule is that when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.) with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1073, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957) ([W]e think the proper rule to be applied is that which requires a verdict to be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected.). In Griffin, the Court articulated subtle distinctions between the lines of relevant cases, seeking to reconcile them. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. at 52-56, 112 S.Ct. at 470-73. It is appropriate briefly to discuss the Supreme Court's analysis in Griffin before we address the issue as it relates to this case. 19 In Griffin, the Court discussed the long-recognized general rule: a general jury verdict [is] valid so long as it [is] legally supportable on one of the submitted grounds--even though [this gives] no assurance that a valid ground, rather than an invalid one, was actually the basis for the jury's action. Id. at 49, 112 S.Ct. at 469. The Court acknowledged that this doctrine has been settled law throughout this country's existence. See id. Indeed, the rule was declared by Lord Mansfield at King's Bench before the Declaration of Independence: if there is any one count to support the verdict, it shall stand good, notwithstanding all the rest are bad. Peake v. Oldham, 1 Cowper 275, 276, 98 Eng.Rep. 1083, 1084 (K.B.1775), quoted in Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140, 146, 12 S.Ct. 169, 170, 35 L.Ed. 966 (1891), quoted in Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. at 49-50, 112 S.Ct. at 469-70. The rule, Griffin notes, was more recently followed in Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420, 90 S.Ct. 642, 654, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970). In Turner, the appellant had been charged in a single count with knowingly not only purchasing, but also dispensing and distributing heroin in violation of Federal law, and the jury returned a general verdict of guilty on the charge. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. at 419-20, 90 S.Ct. at 653-54. The Court concluded that, because the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the contention that the appellant had distributed heroin in violation of the relevant statute, the verdict should be upheld, whether or not the evidence was sufficient to support the other conjunctive allegations in the count. See id. at 420-21, 90 S.Ct. at 654-55. The Court relied on what it labeled the general rule on the issue: when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged. Id. at 420, 90 S.Ct. at 654, quoted in Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. at 56-57, 112 S.Ct. at 472-73. See also Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. at 420 & n. 42, 90 S.Ct. at 655 n. 42, and cases cited. 20 The primary exception to the general rule, Griffin recognizes, finds its roots in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931). See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. at 52, 112 S.Ct. at 470-71. In Stromberg, the appellant had been charged in a single count of an information of violating a California statute prohibiting the display of a red flag for any of three purposes: as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government[;] or as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action[;] or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361, 51 S.Ct. 532, 533, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (citation omitted). The Court determined that the first of the statute's three clauses violates the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 369-70, 51 S.Ct. at 535-36. In setting aside the jury's general verdict, it stated: [I]f any of the clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld. Id. at 368, 51 S.Ct. at 535, quoted in Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. at 53, 112 S.Ct. at 471. The rule of Stromberg thereafter was applied in many cases involving general-verdict convictions that may have rested on an unconstitutional ground. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. at 55, 112 S.Ct. at 472, and cases cited. 21 In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), the Court extended the rule of Stromberg, and in doing so, created some confusion. Yates concerns the convictions of numerous appellants on a single-count indictment charging them with violating a California statute by conspiring for two unlawful purposes: (1) advocating the violent overthrow of the government; and (2) organizing the Communist Party of the United States. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. at 300, 77 S.Ct. at 1067. The Court determined that the organizing charge was prohibited by the relevant statute of limitations. See id. at 312, 77 S.Ct. at 1073. The Court held: In these circumstances we think the proper rule to be applied is that which requires a verdict to be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected. Id. (citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. at 367-68, 51 S.Ct. at 535; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292, 63 S.Ct. 207, 209-10, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 36 n. 45, 65 S.Ct. 918, 935 n. 45, 89 L.Ed. 1441 (1945)). 22 As the Court acknowledged in Griffin, Yates constitutes a novel and unexplained extension of the Stromberg rule: 23 Yates ... was the first and only case of ours to apply Stromberg to a general verdict in which one of the possible bases of conviction did not violate any provision of the Constitution but was simply legally inadequate (because of a statutory time bar). As we have described, that was an unexplained extension, explicitly invoking neither the Due Process Clause (which is an unlikely basis) nor our supervisory powers over the procedures employed in a federal prosecution. 24 Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. at 55-56, 112 S.Ct. at 472. Griffin notes that none of the three cases cited in Yates to support its holding--Stromberg and two of its progeny, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292, 63 S.Ct. 207, 210, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942), and Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 36 n. 45, 65 S.Ct. 918, 935 n. 45, 89 L.Ed. 1441 (1945)--in fact supports it. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. at 52, 54-55, 112 S.Ct. at 470-71, 471-72. 25 Griffin clarifies Yates by explaining that it extends only to cases in which one of the possible bases of conviction was legally erroneous. See id. at 51-52, 112 S.Ct. at 470-71. Griffin distinguishes cases, like Turner, which concern convictions that may have rested on a basis that was not supported by the evidence, from those concerning convictions possibly resting on an invalid ground as a result of an error of law. See id. at 58-59, 112 S.Ct. at 473-74. It explains: 26 In one sense legal error includes inadequacy of evidence--namely, when the phrase is used as a term of art to designate those mistakes that it is the business of judges (in jury cases) and of appellate courts to identify and correct. In this sense legal error occurs when a jury, properly instructed as to the law, convicts on the basis of evidence that no reasonable person could regard as sufficient. But in another sense--a more natural and less artful sense--the term legal error means a mistake about the law, as opposed to a mistake concerning the weight or the factual import of the evidence.... [W]e are using legal error in the latter sense. 27 Id. at 59, 112 S.Ct. at 474 (emphasis added). 28 Here, Nieves-Burgos asserts, and the government concedes, that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support the firearms conviction with respect to two of the three guns listed in the charge, that is, the two guns found in the cars. Turner and Griffin tell us quite clearly that Nieves-Burgos' verdict shall not be set aside on this basis alone. Rather, the verdict must stand so long as it is sufficiently supported by the evidence concerning the third firearm. We therefore must determine whether the evidence sufficiently supports Nieves-Burgos' conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1) as to the firearm found in room 311. 29 Before we move on, however, we acknowledge that, before Griffin, Yates appeared to set forth a rule that differed, if not conflicted, with the long-standing general rule recognized in Turner. Prior to Griffin, we cited authority relying on Yates in support of the proposition that a general verdict returned on a charge asserting numerous grounds for conviction must be vacated where one or more of the grounds is insufficiently supported by the evidence and it is unclear whether the jury relied on the insufficient ground. See United States v. Moynagh, 566 F.2d 799, 804 (1st Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 917, 98 S.Ct. 1475, 55 L.Ed.2d 510 (1978) (citing United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 325 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1663, 48 L.Ed.2d 175 (1976) (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356)) (We conclude that Moynagh's conviction on these counts cannot be sustained because each count contains a specification charging concealment ... and no evidence was introduced which supports any fraudulent concealment....). Griffin renders this proposition unsound. 4 30 We note that this type of issue may, in proper circumstances, be avoided: [I]f the evidence is insufficient to support an alternative legal theory of liability, it would generally be preferable for the court to give an instruction removing that theory from the jury's consideration. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. at 60, 112 S.Ct. at 474-75. Aside from attempting to unring the bell, however, when there are alternative bases for conviction, the trial court may be well advised to require a proffer of the evidence linking a particular defendant with a particular alternative. Also, the government should consider avoiding alternative pleading altogether, or the trial court might require each of the alternatives to be considered and proved separately.