Opinion ID: 8415631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ruling on Motion for Additional Discovery

Text: Precision also asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Williams because additional discovery was required to adequately address the issues raised in the motion for summary judgment. Because the district court denied Precision’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the court also implicitly denied Precision’s request for additional discovery in the summary judgment proceedings. Precision’s motion for additional time to conduct discovery is governed by Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(f), which states: Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. (emphasis added). Because the district court “may refuse the application,” it has discretion to do so. Mallory v. Noble Corr. Inst., et al., 45 Fed.Appx. 463, 467-68 (6th Cir.2002) (“a district court’s discovery ruling should not be overturned unless the district court abused its discretion and that abuse of discretion resulted in substantial prejudicef ]”) (emphasis added) (citing Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1338 (6th Cir.1992); Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 356 (6th Cir.1989)); see also McCurry v. Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586, 592 (6th Cir.2002) (“by providing that a District Court ‘may’ relieve a party from a final judgment or order, ... allows for some discretion.... Consequently, we review such a decision for an abuse of discretion.”). In the discovery context we evaluate the exercise of a district court’s discretion against the five factors articulated in Plott v. General Motors Corp., Packard Electric Division, 71 F.3d 1190, 1196-97 (6th Cir.1995):(1) when the appellant learned of the desired discovery topic; (2) whether the desired discovery would have changed the ruling below; (3) how long the discovery period had lasted; (4) whether the appellant was dilatory in its discovery efforts; and (5) whether the appellee was responsive to discovery requests. However, each of these individual factors can be determinative. See Gordon v. Barnes Pumps, Inc., 999 F.2d 133, 138 (6th Cir.1993); Woods v. McQuire, 954 F.2d 388, 391 (6th Cir.1992) (finding no abuse of discretion when the trial date and discovery deadline was extended twice); Tarleton v. Meharry Medical College, 717 F.2d 1523, 1534-35 (6th Cir.1983). Because Precision’s motion for additional discovery is not in the record, the specific discovery sought by Precision and when Precision learned about the discovery topic are unknown. 1 Precision’s objections to the report and recommendation indicate only that the defendants allegedly delayed the discovery process through untimely responses. In Precision’s memorandum opposing Williams’ second motion for summary judgment, Precision refers to its arguments concerning its discovery request made in its response to Williams’ first motion for summary judgment. However, this response filed on January 5, 1998, is not in the record. Precision had almost a year after the denial of the first motion for summary judgment to conduct further discovery before the pending motion for summary judgment. Further, Precision’s motion for reconsideration states that Precision was entitled “to take critical depositions of defendants’ personnel for evidence opposing the granting of Summary Judgment” because, according to an affidavit of counsel, Williams delayed the original discovery. However, Precision presented no affidavit outlining the areas in which it sought further discovery. Hence, the instant case is distinguished from Glen Eden Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, Inc., 740 F.2d 428 (6th Cir.1984), where the district court was found to have abused its discretion in granting summary judgment despite a documented and supported request for additional discovery. In this case, the record does not disclose what information could have been obtained through the additional discovery or whether the information sought in discovery might have persuaded the district court to deny the summary judgment. However, the record does indicate that, prior to the district court’s ruling on Williams’ second motion for summary judgment, Precision had over a year to conduct discovery, because the lawsuit was filed in November, 1997, and the deadline for discovery established by the pretrial scheduling order was February 22, 1999. The record also establishes that Precision was dilatory in its efforts to secure the information that it requested, as Precision did not file its motion to compel discovery until March 22, 1999, a month after the discovery deadline. On April 3, 2001, Precision filed a motion to reconsider the prior ruling, and submit- ■ ted arguments and new evidence. The district court stated that the court “had an opportunity to fully review this matter and believes that it contains the same issues ruled upon by the Court and the allegedly newly discovered evidence would not change this conclusion.” The additional evidence that Precision did submit after two years of further discovery in the case against Kenco was insufficient to change the court’s mind about its prior ruling. Based on the record before this court, we find no grounds for concluding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing Precision’s requests for further discovery, nor does the record show that Precision was substantially prejudiced by this ruling.