Opinion ID: 1622371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Immunity of Deputy Haralson

Text: Deputy Haralson argues that he is an executive officer of the State pursuant to the Alabama Constitution of 1901, Art. V, § 112. Deputy Haralson argues that as an executive officer he is entitled, under Art. I, § 14, to immunity from being sued. Deputy Haralson argues that his immunity extends to the execution of the duties of his office and that Griffith's complaint fails to allege any of the enumerated exceptions to such immunity. See Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442 (Ala.1987). Finally, Deputy Haralson argues that even when sheriffs or deputy sheriffs are sued under theories of negligence or bad faith, the only exception to § 14 allowed by this Court is to enjoin the conduct of the State official, and, here, no such injunctive relief was requested. See Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So.2d 1142 (Ala.1994). Griffith argues that Deputy Haralson is not entitled to immunity simply because he asserts that he is a State officer. See Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801, 806 (Ala.1992). Instead, Griffith argues that Deputy Haralson is entitled to immunity only if he was on duty and/or was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Griffith claims that it is not clear whether Deputy Haralson was acting under the authority of the State at the time of the accident, and that without evidence indicating that he was acting under such authority, the trial court correctly denied his motion to dismiss. A sheriff is an executive officer of this State pursuant to the Alabama Constitution of 1901, Art. V, § 112. Parker, 519 So.2d at 443. As an executive officer, a sheriff is immune from being sued in the execution of the duties of his office under Art. I, § 14, Alabama Const.1901. Id. at 442-43. Furthermore, a sheriff, as an employee of the State, is immune from suit, in his official capacity, for negligent performance of his statutory duties. Alexander, 652 So.2d at 1143; Parker, 519 So.2d at 442-43; Wright v. Bailey, 611 So.2d 300, 303 (Ala.1992). This Court has held that deputy sheriffs are immune to the same extent sheriffs are immune because `[t]he deputy sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff. Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So.2d 209, 210 (Ala.1991) (quoting Mosely v. Kennedy, 245 Ala. 448, 450, 17 So.2d 536, 537 (1944)). A deputy sheriff acting in his official capacit[y] and individually is immune from suit when the action is one against the State. See Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So.2d 81, 83 (Ala.1989). See also Hereford, 586 So.2d at 210 (deputy sheriffs were entitled to State immunity for their actions in releasing a prisoner); see also Wright, 611 So.2d at 303 (deputy sheriffs were entitled to State immunity for their negligent failure to arrest a motorist); Drain v. Odom, 631 So.2d 971 (Ala.1994) (deputy sheriff was entitled to State immunity, in his official capacity, for actions taken in performance of his duties as deputy sheriff); Alexander, 652 So.2d at 1144 (deputy sheriff was entitled to State immunity for actions taken while on duty). Under Art. I, § 14, Alabama Const.1901, the only exceptions to State immunity for State officers such as deputy sheriffs sued in their official capacity are as follows: [A]ctions brought (1) to compel him to perform his duties, (2) to compel him to perform ministerial acts, (3) to enjoin him from enforcing unconstitutional laws, (4) to enjoin him from acting in bad faith, fraudulently, beyond his authority, or under mistaken interpretation of the law, or (5) to seek construction of a statute under the Declaratory Judgment Act if he is a necessary party for the construction of the statute. Parker, 519 So.2d at 443. Deputy Haralson argues that he is entitled to immunity under the holding of Parker with respect to the performance of his official duties. In his reply brief to this Court, Deputy Haralson contends that he was operating a [sheriff's department] vehicle, in uniform, and on sheriff's department business at the time of the accident. However, the record presently contains no evidence as to whether Deputy Haralson was acting in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff at the time of the accident. As Griffith argues in her brief: There is no testimony to support that [Deputy Haralson] was in `hot pursuit' of a suspect, creating [a] roadblock while working on an accident report, or some other official duty that would require a deputy to be on an interstate highway. Furthermore, he was not even within the boundaries of his authorized jurisdiction, Lowndes County. We cannot conclude, at this early stage of the proceedings, without evidence showing that at the time of the accident he was acting within the line and scope of his employment, that Deputy Haralson is entitled to immunity. No State officer, such as a deputy sheriff, can avoid tort liability simply by claiming that his `mere status as a [S]tate official cloaks him with the [S]tate's constitutional immunity.' Phillips, 555 So.2d at 83 (quoting Barnes v. Dale, 530 So.2d 770, 781 (Ala.1988)); see also Mitchell, 598 So.2d at 806. It is conceivable that Griffith could prove facts that would show that at the time of the accident Deputy Haralson was on a personal errand or otherwise had departed from the line and scope of his employment. If so, Griffith may possible prevail on her claims. See Nance, 622 So.2d at 299. Given the question presented by this mandamus petitionwhether the trial court should have dismissed Griffith's claims against Deputy Haralson on the ground that he is entitled to State immunitywe conclude that Deputy Haralson has not shown that he has `a clear legal right ... to the order sought.' Butts, 775 So.2d at 178 (quoting Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d at 503). We emphasize that this mandamus petition asks us to direct the trial court to dismiss Griffith's claims, not to enter a judgment for her on the merits. After the parties have had the opportunity to conduct discovery, Deputy Haralson can, if he considers the evidence sufficient to establish immunity, seek a summary judgment on that ground. If he makes such a motion and the trial court denies it, he can again ask this Court to review his immunity claims, either by petitioning for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P., or by petitioning for a writ of mandamus pursuant to Rule 21, Ala. R.App. P. Furthermore, Deputy Haralson's claim that Griffith's claim for punitive damages is barred because such damages are prohibited under § 6-11-26, Ala.Code 1975, must await a determination whether this action involves actions Deputy Haralson took in his official capacity.