Opinion ID: 1861263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntariness of waiver of right to remain silent and of confession.

Text: Prior to the omnibus hearing, defense counsel moved that defendant's statements to police officers be excluded because obtained improperly under the Minnesota Constitution, Article I, and the United States Constitution, Amendments IV, V, VI, XIV as the fruits of an illegal arrest. The district court denied the motion, and the statements were admitted at trial. Defendant argues on appeal that because of improper police inducement, he did not voluntarily waive his right to remain silent and, consequently, his confession is inadmissible. In order for a statement taken from an accused during custodial interrogation to be admitted, the prosecution must prove that the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his right against self-incrimination, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 (1966), and that the statement was freely and voluntarily made, see, Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1343, 10 L.Ed.2d 513, 520 (1963). Waiver is defined as `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938). Thus, an accused must know his rights before he can waive them. The principal function of the warning required by the Miranda decision is to ensure that the accused is aware of his constitutional rights. 384 U.S. at 468, 86 S.Ct. at 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d at 720. But the prosecution must not only show that the warning has been given, it must also demonstrate that the accused voluntarily waived his rights. [3] An express statement by the accused that he is willing to answer questions is the best indication that he has voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. But waiver can be inferred from other conduct, for example, answering questions without hesitation or volunteering information in the absence of questioning. To determine whether a defendant's conduct implies an effective waiver, a court must look at the circumstances of the particular case. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724. Absent circumstances indicating that the accused did not understand the warning or that his statements were not freely and voluntarily made, a confession made by an accused after he has been given a Miranda warning may imply that he has voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. [4] The burden is on the state to prove that such circumstances did not exist. [A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will    show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. at 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d at 725. Similarly, to determine whether a confession is voluntary, or whether the statements made by police officers to an accused have induced a confession, a court must look at the totality of the circumstances. See, Haynes v. Washington, supra, 373 U.S. at 513, 83 S.Ct. at 1343, 10 L.Ed.2d at 521; State v. Raymond, 305 Minn. 160, 174, 232 N.W.2d 879, 888 (1975); State v. Biron, 266 Minn. 272, 282, 123 N.W.2d 392, 398 (1963). If the circumstances indicate that the accused's will was overborne, his confession is not voluntary. See, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 920, 9 L.Ed.2d 922, 926 (1963). The interrogator need not use threats of physical harm or intimidating interrogation techniques for a court to find that he has exerted improper influence. See, Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 18 S.Ct. 183, 187, 42 L.Ed. 568, 573 (1897). The leading case in Minnesota on the issue of improper influence by police officers in obtaining a confession is State v. Biron, supra . This court stated in that case: It should be realistically conceded that the trustworthiness of a confession should not in every instance be discounted because investigative officers in their interviews might have made discursive or imprecise statements to the defendant. But it should also be conceded that persuasive arguments calculated to induce a confession might be as objectionable as outright coercion. 266 Minn. 282, 123 N.W.2d 399. The circumstances of the Biron case easily led to a conclusion that the confession was involuntary. The defendant was expressly told that if he cooperated the police would have his case brought before juvenile court, and that if he did not cooperate, they would not even consider seeking juvenile court proceedings. The police clearly implied that they had influence with the juvenile court. 266 Minn. 272, 277, 123 N.W.2d 392, 395. The police also held out the possibility that the defendant might be charged with a lesser offense if he confessed. Id. at 275, 123 N.W.2d at 395. [5] In the present case, appellant contends that the detectives' statements led him to believe that if he made a statement he would be charged with manslaughter. Thus, he claims, his statements were involuntary because improperly induced and should have been found inadmissible. The facts are essentially undisputed. At the beginning of the trip to the jail, defendant was given a Miranda warning and asked if he understood his rights. He then said that he did not know anything about the crime. One or both of the two detectives informed defendant that they had enough evidence to establish probable cause to charge him with first degree murder, that there were different degrees of murder, depending on the circumstances of the crime, and that in a previous case a man had been charged with manslaughter under similar circumstances. After these statements were made, defendant said that he would give a confession when they got into town. The detectives continued to question defendant, and he made inculpatory statements both in the car and, later, at the courthouse. [6] In a phone call to his mother following his statements, defendant said he was being held for manslaughter. The question presented is whether the detectives' statements to defendant amount to persuasive arguments calculated to induce a confession. [7] State v. Biron, supra, 266 Minn. at 282, 123 N.W.2d at 399. Here, the detectives did not make any actual or implied promises to defendant. Although he may have concluded that he would be charged with manslaughter (as implied by his statement to his mother), the officers did not say that he would be so charged. The rules that waiver and confession must be voluntary are designed to deter improper police interrogation, but the police must also be allowed to encourage suspects to talk where the suspect has not clearly refused. The statements of the officers here were designed to encourage defendant to talk by informing him about the evidence against him and the possible charges. Defendant had not clearly asserted his right to remain silent and could freely and voluntarily decide to make a statement.