Opinion ID: 216354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Liming's Conflict of Interest

Text: McDonald-Cuba further asserts that she demonstrated pretext because similarly-situated male employees also had conflicts of interest with SFPS but were not fired for them. Director Mark Liming, for example, held a New Mexico resident manager license for four other private patrol companies in 2007. McDonald-Cuba contends that these companies are SFPS's competitors and that Liming's actions therefore violated SFPS's Conflict of Interest Policy. She argues that SFPS's justifications were pretextual because Liming was not disciplined or terminated for violating the Conflict of Interest Policy as she was. The evidence shows that Liming was not similarly situated to McDonald-Cuba and the differential treatment he allegedly received therefore does not demonstrate pretext. First, Liming fully disclosed his activities regarding the licenses to SFPS before he became employed at SFPS. Id. at 273 (Liming depo. at 147-48). Although he received $200 per month as a stipend for performing this service from three of the companies involved, neither Terry Cuba nor Maki felt his holding the licenses was a problem. Id. at 277. Second, Liming explained that a resident manager merely acts as a sort of registered agent for out-of-state patrol companies. This does not rise to the level of starting and owning a competing business, as Maki believed McDonald-Cuba had done. In response, McDonald-Cuba contends that she also disclosed her activities at Brahma to SFPS and Maki had no problems with them, at least not initially. See id. at 228. The problem arose later, when Maki discovered the CCR printout and what it suggested about the nature and scope of McDonald-Cuba's business. McDonald-Cuba contends that a similar printout existed regarding Liming. As noted, Liming identified himself to SFPS as a resident manager for four out-of-state companies. A resident manager serves only as a point of contact on behalf of an out-of-state security company that does business in New Mexico. Id. at 272 (Liming depo. at 135). But McDonald-Cuba points to a state-generated printout identifying Liming as a Private Patrol Operations Manager, or PPO Manager. Id. at 242. She asserts that under New Mexico law, a PPO Manager has much greater responsibilities than a resident manager. A PPO manager is responsible for operation, direction, control and management of [a] private patrol company in cases where the company's owner is not licensed as a [PPO] or registered as a level three security guard. Aplt. Opening Br. at 33 (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-27B-23(B)). At his deposition, Liming explained that this printout was in error, and he is in fact only a resident manager, not a PPO Manager, for companies other than SFPS. Aplt.App. at 231 (Liming depo. at 134), 232-33 (Liming depo. at 140-41). Even if the printout was correct, and Liming had an intention to deceive SFPS, McDonald-Cuba points us to no evidence that Maki knew that a New Mexico printout identified Liming as a PPO Manager instead of a resident manager. All Maki knew was what Liming had told her, that he was a resident manager for these companies. Both she and Cuba had already determined that this did not represent a conflict of interest sufficient to avoid hiring Liming or to require firing him. [2] Absent any evidence that Maki knew of the printout in Liming's case, and treated him differently than McDonald-Cuba, McDonald-Cuba fails to show that Liming was a similarly-situated male employee accorded differential treatment.
McDonald-Cuba further alleges that male employee Brett Aduddell owned a security company called Alpha Pro prior to his hiring by SFPS in 2005. She asserts that Maki approved his hiring because she believed that Alpha Pro was inactive, but that Alpha Pro was in fact in good standing with the Colorado Secretary of State during the time she was employed with SFPS. She contends that Aduddell was therefore similarly situated to her, but he was not fired. This showing of pretext suffers from the same deficiency as that concerning Liming. McDonald-Cuba fails to demonstrate that Maki knew about Alpha Pro's status with the Colorado Secretary of State prior to the time Aduddell left SFPS in 2008. He was therefore not similarly situated to her. McDonald-Cuba further argues that both Liming and Aduddell were given the opportunity to ameliorate any violation of the Conflict of Interest Policy when they disclosed their conflicts at the time of hiring, but she was not. This argument ignores the fact that unlike Liming and Aduddell, she did not disclose the conflict (which did not yet exist) at the time of hiring, and in fact did not ever voluntarily disclose the crucial information surrounding her conflict with SFPS. Instead, Maki discovered it through other means. Here again, McDonald-Cuba is not similarly-situated to Liming or Aduddell.
Finally, McDonald-Cuba asserts that evidence of disparate treatment of female supervisors at SFPS meets her burden of showing pretext. She complains that Liming and Aduddell received higher-than-six-percent salary increases in 2007, and were not required to undergo written performance evaluations to receive these increases. This argument ignores Maki's testimony that the increases were provided because Liming and Aduddell had not received increases in previous years and their pay was lagging. McDonald-Cuba cannot contest the fact that in 2007 she was being paid more than Liming or Aduddell. See Aplt.App. at 129. Once again, she fails to show that she was similarly situated to either Liming or Aduddell. She also complains of a favorable action on SFPS's part: her promotion to directorship at SFPS. She contends this was offered only as a sort of fig leaf to hide discrimination against females at SFPS, and was only provided after she complained of discrimination because she was not a director. She objects to the fact that Maki gave her the promotion to make her feel better and to avoid the appearance that SFPS discriminates against women. Id. at 159-60. McDonald-Cuba's argument appears to be that SFPS's actions were condescending and hence redolent of discriminatory animus because they failed to take into account her entitlement to the position as a director, based on merit alone. The district court characterized this argument as absurd. Id. at 32. We need not go that far. We will simply note that we fail to see how a promotion based on a complaint of discrimination, even if provided grudgingly, meets McDonald-Cuba's burden to establish that SFPS's asserted reasons for firing her were pretextual.