Opinion ID: 2514968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: A Mandatory Parole Term under Colorado Law Is Distinct from a Term of Imprisonment.

Text: Applying this understanding of maximum term of imprisonment possible to Colorado law, it is clear that the phrase does not include the mandatory parole portion of a Colorado convicted defendant's sentence. The ICA mistakenly reasoned as follows: The mandatory parole term can be revoked and the defendant reincarcerated for any period of time remaining on the defendant's parole term. CRS § 17-22.5-403(8). Because mandatory parole is part of the defendant's sentence, reincarceration after a parole violation is not a new prison sentence but incarceration on an already imposed sentence. People v. Barber, 74 P.3d 444, 446 (Colo.Ct.App.2003). 116 Hawai`i at 387-88, 173 P.3d at 534-35. The ICA concluded that because Heggland could have been sent back to prison for a parole violation until his mandatory period of parole expired, his instant Hawaii felony was committed `within the maximum term of imprisonment possible' after his Colorado conviction. Id. at 388, 173 P.3d at 535. The ICA reached this conclusion by erroneously focusing on the fact that Colorado's mandatory parole component is part of the same sentence as the incarceration component, rather than focusing on whether it constituted part of the maximum term of imprisonment. See id. at 387-88, 173 P.3d at 534-35 (Because mandatory parole is part of the defendant's sentence, reincarceration after a parole violation is not a new prison sentence but incarceration on an already imposed sentence. (Emphasis added.)). The issue is not whether Heggland was still serving some part of his sentence, but whether the PDD offense was committed within the maximum term of imprisonment possible. HRS § 706-606.5(2)(f) (emphasis added). [7] The law in Colorado also distinguishes the mandatory parole component from the imprisonment component of a criminal sentence. The sentencing statute relevant to Heggland's Colorado offense states that [t]he mandatory period of parole ... shall commence immediately upon the discharge of an offender from imprisonment in the custody of the department of corrections. Colo. Rev.Stat. § 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(D)(Westlaw, Colorado Statutes 1996Annotated) (emphasis added). Moreover, [i]f the offender has been granted release to parole supervision by the state board of parole, the offender shall be deemed to have discharged the offender's sentence to imprisonment ... in the same manner as if such sentence were discharged pursuant to law. Id. (emphasis added). The mandatory period of parole must also be served [w]hen an offender is released by the state board of parole or released because the offender's sentence was discharged pursuant to law. Id. Another statutory provision specifies that [n]o person sentenced to a correctional facility for the commission of a felony shall be subjected to imprisonment for a term exceeding the term provided by the statute fixing the length of the sentence for the crime of which the person was convicted and for which the person was sentenced. See id. § 16-11-302 (Westlaw, Colorado Statutes 1996Annotated) (current, unchanged version at § 18-1.3-404 (2007)). These statutory provisions make clear that the mandatory period of parole was envisioned by the Colorado legislature as an entity separate from the term of imprisonment. Moreover, because mandatory parole can be served even after the maximum range of a prison sentence is completed, it can exist outside of the maximum term of imprisonment possible. [8] Caselaw from Colorado confirms that the mandatory parole period is distinct from the term of imprisonment to which convicted defendants may be sentenced in that state. As the ICA points out, mandatory parole [in Colorado] is part of the defendant's sentence, so that reincarceration after a parole violation is not a new prison sentence but incarceration on an already imposed sentence. See 116 Hawai`i at 387-88, 173 P.3d at 534-35 (citing People v. Barber, 74 P.3d 444, 446 (Colo.Ct.App.2003)). Accord People v. Norton, 63 P.3d 339, 344 (Colo.2003) ([A]lthough under mandatory parole the length of the parole term ceased to be related to any unserved portion of confinement in the DOC [Department of Corrections] and instead became statutorily predetermined, there is no indication in the legislative history or otherwise that parole did not continue to be part of an offender's `sentence.' Although not served within the confines of an institution, parole is nevertheless a clear infringement on an offender's liberty, and thus logically part of his or her sentence.). However, notwithstanding this fact, the Supreme Court of Colorado has made clear that [a]lthough mandatory parole is part of the overall `sentencing regime,' it is a distinct element of sentencing, separate from the terms of imprisonment or length of sentence imposed by the trial court. People v. Johnson, 13 P.3d 309, 313 (Colo.2000) (emphasis added). [9] Therefore, the possibility that a convicted defendant may be reincarcerated for violating the mandatory period of parole does not bring that period within the maximum terms of imprisonment possible to which the trial court may have sentenced the defendant. HRS § 706-606.5(2)(f) is a broad statutory provision, encompassing within its reach prior felonies committed in any jurisdiction outside of Hawai'i. In crafting it, the legislature did not specifically state how to treat prior convictions from jurisdictions with sentencing schemes different from Hawai`i, such as Colorado. Rather, the legislature applied a concept familiar in Hawai`i lawthe maximum term of imprisonment possibleas a way to measure the gravity of prior offenses from other jurisdictions. In considering how this term should be applied to sentencing schemes that do not fit the Hawai`i mold, it behooves this court to strictly apply the words of the statute, with their focus on terms of imprisonment, rather than potentially more expansive renderings to which the legislature gave no specific consideration. Therefore, the ICA erred when it interpreted the mandatory parole term required by Colorado law to be served after the term of imprisonment as part of the maximum term of imprisonment possible, even though reincarceration could subject a parolee to additional time in prison.