Opinion ID: 676986
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Objections to specific applications and provisions of the Act

Text: 57 Here, as elsewhere, the devil lies in the details. Appellees challenge a host of specific requirements and applications of the Act and its implementing regulations. We address those that merit discussion, beginning with challenges to the application of the record-keeping provisions. 58
59 The record-keeping required of producers can hardly be considered onerous. Such records are routinely required to facilitate the enforcement of our immigration, labor, and tax laws. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1324a(b) (employers must verify identities of employees and maintain proof of verification); 29 C.F.R. Sec. 516.2(a)(3) (1993) (employers must, inter alia, verify their employees' birthdates); 26 C.F.R. Sec. 31.6001-2(a)(1)(i) (1993) (employers must maintain records of employees' names and addresses). Appellees maintain, nevertheless, that the Act's record-keeping requirements impose an impermissible burden on secondary producers. 60 It should be noted at the outset that while secondary producers must maintain records of the ages and identities of the performers depicted in their materials, they 61 may satisfy the[se] requirements ... by accepting from the primary producer ... copies of [the primary producer's] records ... [and by keeping records of] the name and address of the primary producer from whom he received copies of the records. 62 28 C.F.R. Sec. 75.2(b). The Justice Department interprets this provision as enabling secondary producers not in privity with the primary producer to rely on the records provided them by the immediately preceding secondary producer, and so advised the district court. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 9. 63 Contrary to what appellees suggest, the secondary producers' records serve important ends. They confirm the secondary producers' compliance with the Act and provide what is likely to be a more reliable depository of the information identifying and establishing the ages of the persons depicted. The photographer who sells a picture to a magazine may disappear three months later, and his records with him. The magazine, on the other hand, is apt to remain in business. Furthermore, because a given issue of a magazine or book may contain pictures of performers taken by several photographers, it serves the interests of law enforcement efficiency to be able to verify their ages at a single location. Finally, the requirements imposed on secondary producers serve the Government's interests by denying their commercial markets to child pornographers. 64 Appellees assert, nonetheless, that specific features of the record-keeping requirements unacceptably burden speech. They begin with the regulatory mandate that [s]uch records ... be maintained as long as the producer remains in business and for five years thereafter. 28 C.F.R. Sec. 75.4. The Government's need to be able to identify performers and verify conformance with the Act is not dependent on the producer remaining in business. Therefore, the section's requirement that the records remain available for a minimum period of five years, whether or not the producer continues in existence, appears reasonable. The obligation imposed by the regulation, however, is open ended. The Government has offered no reason why the containment of child pornography requires the maintenance of these records indefinitely, and we can think of none. We therefore set aside section 75.4's requirement that the records be maintained as long as the producer remains in business. Pending its replacement by a provision more rationally tailored to actual law enforcement needs, we will accept a period of five years as reasonable. We do so because it conforms with both the five-year statute of limitations applicable to the Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3282 (1988), and the minimum period recommended by the Pornography Commission. Final Report at 621. 65 Appellees also challenge the Act's requirement that producers ascertain any name ... ever used by the performer, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2257(b)(2), and the regulation's requirement that their records be cross-referenced and retrievable as to 66 [a]ll name(s) of each performer, including any alias, maiden name, nickname, stage name or professional name of the performer; and according to the title, number, or other similar identifier of each book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, or other matter. 67 28 C.F.R. Sec. 75.3. They maintain that these provisions are not only onerous (the first being virtually impossible to satisfy--short of employing a detective agency), but do nothing to deter the production of child pornography. The Government, however, interprets section 2257(b)(2) as merely requiring that producers record the aliases and other names provided by the performer in response to a request, citing the President's message transmitting the 1988 Act to Congress. See H.R. Doc. No. 100-129, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1987) (This requirement is satisfied if the producer asks the performer for the information.). 68 So interpreted, the requirement that the primary producer record other names used by a performer imposes a nominal burden at best. We find this appropriate to the protection of children because it enables enforcement officials to detect forged documentation. To illustrate, if it is determined that a particular woman had been pictured using aliases in 1990 and 1991 and using her own name in 1992, and if the documents in the records indicate an age of 18 on each occasion, it may be inferred that at least two of them are forged and that she was likely to be underage on the first two occasions. The cross-referencing of the records allows enforcement officials to locate the documents for comparison. 69
70 We now address appellees' concerns over the statements that both primary and secondary producers must affix to materials depicting sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2257(e). The regulations provide, in relevant part: 71
72 (1) The title of the book, magazine, periodical, film, or videotape, or other matter ... or, if there is no title, an identifying number or similar identifier ...; 73 (2) The date of production, manufacture, publication, duplication, reproduction, or reissuance of the matter; and 74 (3) A street address at which the records required by this part may be made available.... 75 . . . . . 76 (c) The information contained in the statement must be accurate as of the date on which the book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, or other matter is sold, distributed, redistributed, or rereleased. 77 28 C.F.R. Sec. 75.6(a)-(c). 78 As a general matter, we find permissible the requirement that producers affix statements to sexually explicit materials that identify where proof of the depicted performers' ages may be found. Requiring the creation of records is of little avail if they cannot be readily located. We do not find it overly burdensome to require that such statements be printed near the beginning of a book or magazine, or placed at the beginning or end of a film or videotape. See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 75.8. Appellees nevertheless challenge, as both overbroad and unnecessary to the purposes of the Act, the requirement that the statement be accurate as of the date on which [the sexually explicit material] is sold, distributed, redistributed, or rereleased. 28 C.F.R. Sec. 75.6(c). 79 On its face, the regulations' updating requirement would reach wholesale and retail transactions that lie entirely beyond the scope of the Act. See id. at Sec. 75.1(d) (defining sell, distribute, redistribute, and rerelease to include commercial distribution of a book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, or other matter covered by the Act). The Act, however, imposes the obligation to keep records and affix statements only on those who produce[ ] any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, or other matter which ... contains ... depictions ... of actual sexually explicit conduct, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2257(a)(1); and it defines produces to mean produce, manufacture, or publish any [such material] ... and includes the duplication, reproduction, or reissuing of any such matter. Id. Sec. 2257(h)(3). Because the Act does not apply to those solely engaged in the sale of these items, its requirements may not be imposed on them. The Act cannot be read to require a magazine vendor, for example, to revise the statement in a pornographic periodical as of the date on which [it] is sold to a consumer. We find, however, that it is entirely appropriate to require that the information contained in the statement be accurate as of the date that such materials are published, produced, republished, or reproduced (in the sense of produced anew); and we uphold section 75.6(c) insofar as it is so applied. Cf. Final Rule, 57 Fed.Reg. at 15020 (the location statement must be current at the time of republication or reproduction). 80 Another objection concerns the application of the disclosure requirement to photographs exhibited in an art gallery. Because section 75.8 requires that such statements be prominently displayed, appellees assume that the statement would have to be affixed to the front of the photograph, thereby compromising its artistic integrity. This is sheer speculation. We suggest there may be other ways in which the purposes of the Act may be achieved without interfering with the aesthetics of photographs portraying sexual acts--such as affixing the statements to the backs of the pictures. Be that as it may, this question, and others like it, cannot be decided on the basis of hypotheticals. We possess no factual record of an actual or imminent application of [the Act (or the disclosure requirement) to photographs exhibited in an art gallery] sufficient to present the constitutional issues in clean-cut and concrete form. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 321-22, 111 S.Ct. 2331, 2339, 115 L.Ed.2d 288 (1991). 81
82 We are left with four as applied objections that warrant discussion, two of them advanced by the district court. The first objection involves appropriationist artists, photographers who create distinct works that incorporate photographs taken by others--typically, without permission. The record confirms that appropriationists constitute a recognized school of art photography. Appellees assume that appropriationists are primary producers and assert that this imposes on them the impossible task of having to identify and maintain records of performers who appear in pictures taken by other photographers whom they may not be able to locate and whose cooperation (if they are located) can hardly be guaranteed. We disagree with their premise, but understand their mistake. The regulations define a primary producer as any person who actually films, videotapes, or photographs a visual depiction of actual sexually explicit conduct, 28 C.F.R. Sec. 75.1(c)(1) (emphasis added). The italicized language is a tautology, however, because the obvious purpose for creating the category of primary producers is to identify those who have direct contact with the performers and can therefore personally examine and record the identification documents presented by them. Nevertheless, appropriationists appear to fall within the definition of secondary producers. If they do, the application of the Act to them would raise a serious First Amendment problem because of the difficulty they may encounter in securing the information that secondary producers are required to keep on file. It is a problem, however, that cannot be resolved on the present record. See Renne, 501 U.S. at 321-22, 111 S.Ct. at 2338-39. 83 The next objection concerns the inclusion within the definition of secondary producers of persons who duplicate or reproduce sexually explicit materials that are intended for commercial distribution. 28 C.F.R. Sec. 75.1(c)(2). Appellees point out that such persons include printers, film processors, and video duplicators whose roles are functionally indistinguishable from that of photo processors, who are specifically excluded from the definition of producer. See id. Sec. 75.1(c)(4)(i). As we understand the photo processing exception, it applies to persons to whom a producer delivers films for development or the making of prints and who, on completing their work, return the films and prints to the producer. The Government does not explain what interest is served by according different treatment to printers, film processors, and video duplicators whose sole function is to provide similar services to a producer. We agree, therefore, that the Act does not apply to persons who perform such services and return their work product to the producer who employed them. 84 Third, we address the district court's contention that the Act is overly burdensome because it will invade the privacy of adult models and discourage them from engaging in protected expression because [e]xposure of their true names, aliases, and addresses could subject them to stigmatization, harassment and ridicule from others. ALA II, 794 F.Supp. at 419. The Act and its implementing regulations, however, do not require that this information be disclosed to anyone other than the Attorney General or his delegee, 28 C.F.R. Sec. 75.5, the persons for whom they willingly pose while engaged in sexual acts, and those who publish the resulting pictures or videotapes. The first of these has a legitimate right to the information, and we believe we may safely assume that the performers are not concerned over the prospect of being stigmatized, harassed, or ridiculed by the producers they help enrich. 85 Finally, we reject the district court's complaint that the Act will effectively ban foreign produced images of sexually explicit conduct. ALA II, 794 F.Supp. at 418. Foreign producers who wish to peddle their products in the United States should be expected to abide by our laws no less than domestic producers. Compare, e.g., 17 U.S.C. Sec. 602 (1988) (prohibiting the importation of works that infringe on U.S. copyrights). Although the Government may not have other than a humane interest in protecting foreign children from exploitation, it has a most definite interest in plugging a loophole that would be created for domestic child pornographers if they were able to send their wares to secondary producers abroad for reexport to the United States.