Opinion ID: 792290
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: TaShea and Trina's Testimony Concerning their Conversation with Jessica

Text: 27 The trial court precluded Mr. Horton from asking either Trina or TaShea Horton about their conversation with Jessica, in which she admitted that she had had sex with Randy on four or five occasions. Because this testimony would have contradicted Jessica's claim at trial that she and Randy had had sex only once, Mr. Horton contends that its exclusion violated his constitutional right to present a defense. According to Mr. Horton, this evidence substantiated the defense's theory that Jessica falsely accused him of sexual abuse in order to avoid punishment for her consensual sexual relations with Randy; it also exposed one of Jessica's lies and therefore impeached her credibility. The State responds that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that, although the trial court improperly held this evidence to be irrelevant to the trial, no federal constitutional right was violated because Mr. Horton had an opportunity to present substantially similar evidence. 28 In cases of sexual abuse, in which there are usually neither eye witnesses nor physical evidence and, consequently, the state's case in large part depends on the victim's testimony, courts have recognized the need to be especially sensitive to the importance of careful exploration of matters of credibility. 11 Therefore, the claim that the state trial court's evidentiary rulings cut off an important avenue for Mr. Horton to expose potential inconsistencies in Jessica's testimony is worthy of close examination. To the degree that the testimony in question would have established that Jessica lied when she denied having sex with anyone but Mr. Horton, and when she claimed that she only had sex with Randy once, it would have corroborated the defense's theory that Jessica was willing to falsify charges to protect herself and Randy from punishment. 29 On the other hand, unlike the situations in the cases relied upon by the defendant, 12 the Wisconsin trial court did not wholly bar Mr. Horton from testing Jessica's claim that she only had sex with Randy once. First, on recross-examination, defense counsel was permitted to ask TaShea what prompted her on March 1 to ask Jessica if Randy was the father of the baby. TaShea responded, [b]ecause I had seen Jessica and Randy have sex twice and she used to tell me sometimes that they had sex. R.45 at 137. This testimony substantiated the claim that Jessica and Randy had had sex on numerous occasions and therefore challenged directly Jessica's contrary account to her mother and to the police, as well as in her testimony at trial. Additionally, even though she continued to insist that she only had had sex with Randy once, Jessica did admit under oath that she had misrepresented her relationship with Randy to her mother and had disclosed their sexual contact only after it was clear that Mr. Horton was not the father of the child. 13 In sum, the trial court merely prohibited the defense from add[ing] extra detail to the claim of bias, which does not implicate constitutional guarantees. United States v. Sasson, 62 F.3d 874, 883 (7th Cir.1995) (distinguishing between a complete bar on the introduction of testimony on a witness' bias and adding mere detail to evidence already in the record) (citations omitted); see also Wade v. Mantello, 333 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir.2003) (The Constitution leaves to the judges who must make [evidentiary] decisions `wide latitude' to exclude evidence that is `repetitive . . . , [or] only marginally relevant.') (citations omitted). Based on this review of the record, we cannot conclude that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied federal law in holding that the exclusion of testimony by Trina and TaShea about a specific conversation in which Jessica had admitted having sex with Randy multiple times did not completely preclude the defense from presenting its theory on this point. R.12, Ex.E at 8. 30