Opinion ID: 628033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Instruction to Print Hard-Copy Paper Versions

Text: 23 We first address appellants' contention that the district court erred in finding that their pre-January-order instruction to print on-screen information from electronic federal records was inconsistent with the FRA. 4 This question implicates two parts of this case. First, if the agencies' policy of printing on-screen information did not result in papering all federal records material, then at least some federal records will be permanently lost or destroyed unless the electronic backup records, currently being retained pursuant to the district court's orders, are preserved. This circumstance alone creates the predicate for an order requiring the Archivist and the relevant agency heads to take the statutorily prescribed steps to prevent the destruction of those tapes. 5 Second, if this print screen policy--which was still in effect at the time the district court ruled in January--is inadequate under the FRA, then the district court appropriately issued a declaratory judgment invalidating its future use. 24 In proceeding to decision on this point, we adopt the district court's assumption, based on the appellants' submissions, that both the EOP and the NSC have consistently instructed employees, either orally or in writing, that when any electronic document meets the definition of a federal record, the employee should either print out the information that appears on her computer screen or incorporate that material into a written memorandum. See Appellants' Brief at 7-8; see also id. at 22 ([The agencies] do not require that all information related to an electronic message be preserved, but only that information that is captured when the message screen is printed or incorporated into a written memorandum.). 25 Accepting appellants' factual predicate, however, does not lead us to their legal conclusion that such an approach satisfies the Act. Our analysis is a straightforward one. We begin with the apparently undisputed proposition that the EOP and NSC electronic communications systems can create, and have created, documents that constitute federal records under the FRA. The FRA contemplates that documents qualifying as records [303 U.S.App.D.C. 116] may be stripped of that status only if they are extra copies of documents preserved only for convenience of reference. 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3301. Applied to this case, that means that the mere existence of the paper printouts does not affect the record status of the electronic materials unless the paper versions include all significant material contained in the electronic records. Otherwise, the two documents cannot accurately be termed copies--identical twins--but are, at most, kissing cousins. Since the record shows that the two versions of the documents may frequently be only cousins--perhaps distant ones at that--the electronic documents retain their status as federal records after the creation of the paper print-outs, and all of the FRA obligations concerning the management and preservation of records still apply. See, e.g., id. Sec. 3105 (requiring agency heads to establish safeguards against the removal or loss of records); id. Sec. 3314 (stating that records may only be alienated or destroyed in accordance with FRA provisions, i.e., with the approval of the Archivist). 26 To qualify as a record under the FRA, a document must satisfy a two-pronged test. It must be (1) made or received by an agency of the United States Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and (2) preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency ... as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the informational value of data in [it]. Id. Sec. 3301. The appellants do not contest the fact that many, if not all, of the communications relayed over the electronic system satisfy the public transaction element of this test. At oral argument, the government appeared to acknowledge that the preserved or appropriate for preservation criterion was satisfied as well for some documents on the system. 6 27 To the extent any question remains, we reject the appellants' argument, on brief, that agency heads have sweeping discretion to decide which documents are appropriate for preservation (since we reject this contention, we do not consider whether the disputed documents have also been preserved). The appellants have stipulated that the electronic communications systems contain information on the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, and other activities of the agencies. Joint Statement p 64. Such documents could only fail to qualify as records if, despite their content, the agency has the inherent discretion to consider them en masse as not appropriate for preservation ... as evidence of [the government's] organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations or other activities, 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3301 (emphasis added), an odd proposition to assert in this case since the agency heads admit that they have never surveyed the contents of the electronic systems. See Joint Statement p 67 (Neither the EOP nor the NSC ha[s] conducted any formal examination, inspection, or survey to determine the types of communications recorded on the system, or the amount of information on the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures or other activities of the EOP or NSC recorded in [electronic] files.); cf. American Friends, 720 F.2d at 65. In any case, while the agency undoubtedly does have some discretion to decide if a particular document satisfies the statutory definition of a record, see Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 297 n. 14, the statute surely cannot be read to allow the agency by fiat to declare inappropriate for preservation an entire set of substantive e-mail documents generated by two administrations over a seven-year period. 7 Cf. American Friends, [303 U.S.App.D.C. 117] 720 F.2d at 41 (Congress was certainly aware that agencies, left to themselves, have a built-in incentive to dispose of records relating to [their] 'mistakes'....). Indeed, to conclude that agencies have broad discretion to exempt seven years of substantive documents from record status would flout our prior holding in Armstrong I that the FRA furnishes sufficient law to apply to permit judicial review of agency guidelines relating to the management of federal records. See Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 293 (noting that the FRA contains a detailed definition of the 'records' that agencies must preserve) (emphasis added); see also id. (Although the FRA understandably leaves the details of records management to the discretion of individual agency heads, it does contain several specific requirements....). 28 Having established that the electronic communications systems contain preservable records, we turn finally to the question of whether the government has the discretion to convert only part of the electronic records to paper and then manage only the partial paper records in accordance with the FRA and the Archivist's regulations. The question answers itself. Only one FRA provision exists that would even arguably sanction a document, once denominated a federal record, shedding that appellation at a later point. That provision states that extra copies of documents preserved only for convenience of reference are not records. 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3301. But it is too tight a fit for the government to shoehorn the electronic records at issue here into that exception. Even assuming, without of course deciding, that one set of parallel documents retained in a different records system in a different medium than another set may be classified as a cop[y] under the FRA and thus subject to unobstructed destruction, the electronic records would still not qualify as full reproduction[s] or transcription[s]; imitation[s] of a prototype; ... duplicate[s], WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 404 (2d ed. 1979), of the paper print-outs. This is because important information present in the e-mail system, such as who sent a document, who received it, and when that person received it, will not always appear on the computer screen and so will not be preserved on the paper print-out. See Joint Statement p 46 (When printed on paper, a[n] [e-mail] note will not always identify the sender(s) and recipient(s) of a note by name. Instead, the sender(s) or recipient(s) may be identified only by (a) userid [i.e., user identification]; (b) nickname; or (c) the title given to a distribution list identifying several individuals. Identifying the names of the sender(s) or recipient(s) for such notes requires reference to the distribution lists or directories maintained only in electronic form.) (emphasis added; record citations omitted); see also id. at p 47 (If requested, [the electronic communications system] will provide the sender of a note with a confirmation that it has been received, called an 'acknowledgement.' The acknowledgement records the date and time the addressee of the note opened his or her electronic mail. This information on the date and time the note is received does not appear on the paper copy of the note when it is printed-out.) (record citations omitted). Since employees had never been--at least until the time of the district court's January order--instructed to include these integral parts of the electronic record 8 [303 U.S.App.D.C. 118] in any paper print-out, there is no way we can conclude that the original electronic records are mere extra copies of the paper print-outs. Cf. National Archives and Records Administration, Managing Electronic Records 19 (1990) (Most agencies have decided to meet their recordkeeping requirements for documents that are created using word processing or electronic mail or messaging by printing those documents in hard copy. The success of this approach depends upon a clear understanding by all employees of the obligation to print and file all record material.) (emphasis added). 29 Our refusal to agree with the government that electronic records are merely extra copies of the paper versions amounts to far more than judicial nitpicking. Without the missing information, the paper print-outs--akin to traditional memoranda with the to and from cut off and even the received stamp pruned away--are dismembered documents indeed. 9 Texts alone may be of quite limited utility to researchers and investigators studying the formulation and dissemination of significant policy initiatives at the highest reaches of our government. See 810 F.Supp. at 341 (noting that the omitted information may be of tremendous historical value in demonstrating what agency personnel were involved in making a particular policy decision and what officials knew, and when they knew it). The [t]omorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow of government will be allowed to creep in [their] petty pace from day to day without benefit of the last syllable of recorded time. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act V, scene v, line 19. In our view, as well as the district judge's, the practice of retaining only the amputated paper print-outs is flatly inconsistent with Congress' evident concern with preserving a complete record of government activity for historical and other uses. 10 See 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2902(1) (listing first among Act's goals the [a]ccurate and complete documentation of the policies and transactions of the Federal Government); see also Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 288 (noting the expressed statutory goal of preserving records for historical purposes); American Friends, 720 F.2d at 57 (describing the FRA's legislative history as demonstrating that Congress intended, expected, and positively desired private researchers ... to have access to the documentary history of the federal government); cf. 36 C.F.R. Sec. 1222.38 (Agency recordkeeping requirements shall prescribe the creation and maintenance of records of the transaction of agency business that are sufficient to: ... (e) Document the formulation and execution of basic policies and decisions and the taking of necessary actions, including all significant decisions and commitments reached orally (person to person, by telecommunications, or in conference).). Perhaps that is why, in this court, the appellants seem to have abandoned their former heavy reliance on this theory. 30 Before us they plead an alternative, related, but no more compelling theory of statutory compliance: that the extra information that plaintiffs argue must be preserved is in fact not always 'appropriate for preservation' as evidence of an agency's essential transactions, and that printing the actual message text on the computer screen normally is sufficient for adequate documentation of the agency's business. Since the printed copy is identical to what is on the computer screen, the electronic version of the message that remains is a copy that is nonrecord within the meaning of the statute. Reply Brief for Appellants at 9. In other words, the appellants contend that given the broad discretion [303 U.S.App.D.C. 119] vested in the agencies by the FRA, they may reasonably determine that some parts of a record document--the so-called extra information--are not appropriate for preservation; thus, after the creation of the paper records, the electronic version is a copy because the paper record contains all the material worth preserving from the electronic files. 31 This appeal to discretion, however, relies in the main on snippets of language from different parts of the FRA pasted together in ways incompatible with the overall design of the Act. As noted above, the appropriate for preservation phrase in the definition of records at most allows the agency some discretion in deciding whether a document meets that definition in the first place. See 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3301 (providing that federal records must be, inter alia, preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency ... as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the informational value of data in them). It does not, as appellants imply, grant agencies the discretion to automatically lop off a predesignated part of a whole series of documents that qualify as records (nor would it allow the wholesale destruction of the directories and similar materials if they were perceived to be independent records, see supra note 8). In substance, the appellants are claiming that it satisfies the Act to preserve a second version of a record that is an approximation of the first version if it includes all the material that, in their view, is appropriate for preservation. Even if this argument made sense with respect to a particular document, it cannot be accepted across the board for seven years of records documenting high-level government decisionmaking. Further, as our discussion above makes clear, it cannot be squared with the FRA's extra copies provision. The Act explicitly provides an out of the system for a federal record only when a second version is identical to--i.e., an extra copy of--the first. There is no provision accepting abbreviated or summary versions of the original as the only record if the summary contains all material deemed appropriate for preservation. 11 32 Equally unconvincing is the appellants' suggestion that Congress' directive to preserve adequate documentation of agencies' essential transactions justifies their practice of retaining only the substantive information displayed on the computer screen. The phrases adequate documentation and essential transactions are lifted from 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3101, which states: The head of each Federal agency shall make and preserve records containing adequate and proper documentation of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures and essential transactions of the agency and designed to furnish the information necessary to protect the legal and financial rights of the Government and of persons directly affected by the agency's activities. The purpose of this provision, by its own terms, is to place a general obligation on agency leaders to create and then retain a baseline inventory of essential records. See American Friends, 720 F.2d at 54; see also id. at 56 (summarizing legislative history of this provision and concluding that it provided an enforceable across-the-board requirement that agencies retain certain types of records); S.REP. No. 2140, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1950) (this provision provides a general declaration by the Congress [to maintain adequate records]). Other parts of the FRA, however, go on to prescribe more particularized duties for agency heads that reach beyond their general obligation to adequately document core agency functions. In particular, the Act includes (1) a separate definition of the term records that the appellants acknowledge sweeps in many of the electronic communications at issue here--whether or not preservation of those documents is necessary to maintain adequate documentation of essential transactions--and (2) other statutory provisions that mandate that all records--again, whether or not related to adequate documentation of essential transactions--be managed and retained in accordance with [303 U.S.App.D.C. 120] explicit statutory directives. See 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3314 ([R]ecords ... may not be alienated or destroyed except under this chapter.) (emphasis added); see also id. Sec. 3105 (agency heads must establish safeguards against the removal or loss of records ) (emphasis added). In sum, appellants' arguments fail to detour us from the analytical path we started down and now come close to finishing: (1) substantive e-mail communications satisfy the FRA definition of records; (2) the lone FRA provision for terminating their status as such requires that they be merely extra copies of other documents preserved elsewhere; and (3) since there are often fundamental and meaningful differences in content between the paper and electronic versions of these documents, the electronic versions do not lose their status as records and must be managed and preserved in accordance with the FRA. 33 Contrary to appellants' assertions, the conclusion that agencies must retain and manage these electronic documents in no way collides with Congress' oft-expressed intent to balance complete documentation with efficient, streamlined recordkeeping. See, e.g., S.REP. No. 2140, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950) (It is well to emphasize that records come into existence, or should do so, not in order to ... satisfy the archival needs of this and future generations, but first of all to serve the administrative and executive purposes of the organization that creates them.). Our decision does not require that agencies, in appellants' words, save every scrap of paper they create. Not all scribbles and off-the-cuff comments will qualify as federal records. Nor do we saddle agencies with any new obligations to make additional documents in order to satisfy the needs of researchers or investigators. Cf. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 288 ([P]laintiffs do not seek the creation of any new records, but rather ask only that the records already created be appropriately classified and disposed of....); S.REP. No. 1326, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6150, 6157 (emphasizing the need for economy in records creation because that is where 80% of total recordkeeping costs are incurred). Finally, our decision leaves undisturbed the agencies' ability to purge incidental electronic records from their files by acting, with the Archivist's approval, to dispose of those documents that lack sufficient administrative, legal, research, or other value to warrant their continued preservation. 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3303a(a); see also 55 Fed.Reg. 19,216, 19,216 (1990) (Archivist notes that the burden of managing electronic records can be reduced significantly by promptly scheduling all electronic records, thus limiting the application of [regulatory] requirements to the very small percentage of records that are scheduled as permanent). 34 In sum, we find that the district court was fully justified in concluding that appellants' recordkeeping guidance was not in conformity with the Act. 35