Opinion ID: 78361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Claim Two: Lamarca's Due Process Rights Were Violated When the State Failed to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense and Presented False and Misleading Testimony

Text: Lamarca claims the State violated his due process rights for not disclosing benefits James Michael Hughes and Jeremy Smith received for their testimony and for permitting false testimony from Hughes and Smith. In his COA application, Lamarca maintains the finding of the state courts and the district court that a deal is a requirement for a Brady violation is contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established law, citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). He asserts [t]he delay in sentencing Hughes [until after Lamarca's trial] in and of itself was a fact that was required to be disclosed. Lamarca also argues communications between the prosecution in his case and the prosecution in Hughes's case should have been turned over to the defense. With respect to Smith, Lamarca claims the State should have disclosed that one of its prosecutors was present at Smith's sentencing hearing. Lamarca raised this claim in two parts of his 3.851 motion claim 8 and claim 12in which he alleged Hughes and Smith received deals, benefits, or agreements from the State. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. A prosecutor's obligation to disclose evidence pursuant to Brady, however, is not limited to the disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence; rather, due process also requires disclosure of impeachment evidence for cross-examination purposes. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. at 3380. Thus, when the credibility of a witness is at issue, the prosecution also is required to disclose evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Furthermore, under Giglio, the prosecution has a duty to correct false statements [w]hen a witness conceals, through false testimony, his bias against the defendant, and the Government knows the witness has testified falsely. United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir.1989). To prevail on a Brady claim, the petitioner must establish (1) the government possessed evidence favorable to him; (2) the defendant did not possess the evidence and could not have obtained it with reasonable diligence; (3) the government suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) the evidence was material. Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir.2006). Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that a different result would have occurred had the evidence been disclosed. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). In turn, a reasonable probability is understood to be a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383. After a five-day evidentiary hearing during which much was made ... over whether Hughes received a benefit or promise in exchange for his testimony, the state trial court determined Lamarca had failed to meet [his] burden of proving that Hughes received anything of benefit in exchange for his testimony, and thus denied this claim with respect to Hughes. The court similarly rejected the claim with respect to Smith, concluding the claim was based on speculation and Lamarca had failed to show that any promises were made to Smith, that the State withheld any evidence of a deal, and that the State permitted false testimony by allowing Smith to testify he received no benefits in exchange for his testimony. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. In its discussion of this claim, the court explained the controlling law under Brady and Giglio, before analyzing, in great detail, the trial court's findings and the evidence presented by Lamarca. Lamarca II, 931 So.2d at 851-53. Based upon its review, the court concluded the record d[id] not support Lamarca's claim that the State suppressed deals made with either Hughes or Smith in exchange for their testimony. Id. at 852. Because the record contradict[ed] Lamarca's allegations and the trial court's decision was supported by competent, substantial evidence, the Florida Supreme Court denied Lamarca's Brady and Giglio claims. Id. at 853. Lamarca raised these Brady and Giglio claims before the district court in his § 2254 petition. He asserted the state possessed favorable information ... which would have impeached prosecution witnesses Hughes and Smiththe only witnesses who testified that Mr. Lamarca had planned and confessed to killing Kevin Flynn. He also maintained the prosecution allowed false statements to go uncorrected as both Hughes and Smith each testified that they had not received any deal. The district court denied Lamarca relief on these grounds, noting the state courts found there were no undisclosed deals or agreements with Hughes or Smith, and Lamarca failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, these factual findings were erroneous. Jurists of reason would not debate the district court's assessment of Lamarca's Brady and Giglio claims. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1604. The state courts articulated the correct law under Brady and Giglio and then considered whether the State had offered a benefit or reward to, or made a deal or agreement with, either Hughes or Smith. Accordingly, Lamarca has failed to show the state courts' analyses were contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Furthermore, the state courts made factual findings that there were no deals made or rewards offered in exchange for Hughes's or Smith's testimony, and Lamarca has not refuted these findings by clear and convincing evidence. See id. § 2254(e)(1). Thus, Lamarca has not demonstrated the state courts' decisions were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See id. § 2254(d)(2). We conclude Lamarca has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, see id. § 2253(c)(2), and he is not entitled to a COA on this claim.