Opinion ID: 1302649
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of LSD[6]

Text: In his trial brief, the defendant requested an instruction on [u]se of LSD CJI 12:4:01  use of a controled [sic] substance. However, at trial he did not present an argument supporting this request when the court solicited support for instruction requests. We find no concern with the first condition of Stephens; the trial court's reference to the defendant's specific request in his brief satisfies the need for informing the court of the exact offense requested. However, the Court of Appeals analysis of the second condition  that there be an appropriate relation  is not convincing. The Court begins its reasoning by employing the abstract method of Ora Jones, supra, we explicitly reserved for lesser included felony offenses. Although it may be a useful tool to attempt to categorize a misdemeanor as a necessary or cognate offense in determining the relationship to the charged felony, it is neither necessary nor dispositive. Our Stephens decision was constructed by reference to the federal system, which does not recognize cognate offenses, and we require all lesser misdemeanor requests to relate to the evidence  not abstractions. The Court of Appeals concluded: Both offenses, use and possession, would be classified as cognate offenses rather than necessarily included lesser offenses of the offense of delivery. The common element in all three offenses is that the defendant did something unlawful with a controlled substance, here LSD, knowing it to be LSD. This common element is aimed at the same societal interest. Each is designed to protect society from the effects of drug abuse. Each crime also requires proof of an element that the others do not. One requires delivery of LSD; one, use of LSD; and one, possession of LSD. Thus, the offenses are cognate offenses and the second condition of Stephens is also met because there is an appropriate relationship between the charged offense and the requested misdemeanors. Stephens, supra, p 262. [150 Mich App 728, 741; 389 NW2d 164 (1986).] As we discussed above, the second condition requires two inquiries: first, whether the offenses relate to the protection of the same interests, and, second, whether, in general, proof of the misdemeanor is necessarily presented as part of the proof of the greater charged offense. We do not discern the second inquiry in the Court of Appeals opinion. [7] By our reasoning, use is never necessarily presented as part of the showing of delivery. Indeed, we find no evidence of use in connection with the transactions for which the defendant was standing trial. Deciding the propriety of lesser misdemeanor instructions should not be an excursion into abstractions and admissions without relevance to the charged offenses. It was just such a concern which prompted the Whitaker court to require the lesser offense to be established by evidence presented in the proof of the greater offense. In the absence of such restraint defense counsel might be tempted to press the jury for leniency by requesting lesser included offense instructions on every lesser crime that could arguably be made out from any evidence that happened to be introduced at trial. [144 US App DC 349.] The evidence in the case sub judice reveals no use in either transaction; only testimony from defendant's wife that the defendant had taken pills, and testimony from the defendant that he had taken pills like the one Dave gave me.... [8] The Court of Appeals concluded that these admissions provided enough factual evidence for the jury to believe defendant was guilty of use, but not delivery. Because we find the evidence of use to be unrelated to the charged offenses, we reverse the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that an instruction on use of LSD should have been given.