Opinion ID: 4279187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiffs’ RFRA Claims

Text: RFRA provides that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the Government “demonstrates that the application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b). A person whose religious exercise has been burdened may assert a claim against the Government under RFRA. Id. § 2000bb-1(c). If the claim is successful, courts may craft exceptions to statutory government programs to accommodate religious beliefs, but the Government may resist such accommodations with “evidence” that they would “seriously compromise its ability to administer the program.” See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435 (2006). Similarly, although the Government may be required to expend additional funds for such accommodations, the cost to the Government of modifying a program is an important factor in determining the viability of an accommodation for purposes of the least-restrictive-means analysis. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 (2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc- 3(c)); see also id. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that certain less restrictive means might not be viable if it would be “more difficult and expensive to accommodate a governmental program to countless religious claims”).1 In sum, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege the following elements of a RFRA claim: (1) the plaintiff seeks to engage in (or avoid engaging in) conduct that constitutes an exercise of religion; (2) the Government has placed a substantial burden on that plaintiff’s exercise of religion; and (3) the Government either has no compelling interest in imposing that burden or (4) the Government has another less restrictive means of achieving its compelling interest. 1RFRA’s framework differs from the Supreme Court’s test for First Amendment-based free exercise claims, which are governed by the standard set forth in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). No. 16-4345 New Doe Child #1, et al. v. Congress of the United States, et al. Page 6
Before addressing whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a RFRA claim, we consider the Government’s argument that some of the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring RFRA claims because they have not established Article III injury-in-fact. See Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 206 (6th Cir. 2011) (recognizing standing as a “threshold matter”). Some Plaintiffs allege injury in the form of stigma, ridicule, peer pressure, and exposure to religious dogma, which the Government argues are insufficient for Article III standing. The Complaint lists certain allegations specific to individual Plaintiffs, and it is true that some individualized allegations state merely that a Plaintiff feels offense or fears ridicule. The Complaint, however, is not limited to these individual allegations. Read in full, the Complaint’s allegations go beyond mere “observation of conduct with which one disagrees.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982) (denying standing to taxpayers who alleged their tax payments were used in violation of the Establishment Clause but did not allege any direct connection or exposure to the misuse). The Complaint alleges not only that Plaintiffs take offense at the Motto’s inscription on currency, but also that the Government has burdened all the Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs by pressuring them to alter personalized conduct in which they regularly engage. Cf. Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Sch., 33 F.3d 679, 683 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding that Establishment Clause plaintiff had standing because he “has continuing direct contact with the object at issue,” and therefore the injury was “not remote, vicarious or generalized as in Valley Forge”). An allegation that the Government is compelling a particular person to violate personal religious beliefs (as opposed to an allegation by a taxpayer that the Government has violated a generalized constitutional mandate) states an Article III injury-in-fact. Construing the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs and accepting its allegations as true, Plaintiffs allege injury-infact sufficient for Article III. Certain members of Congress and others argue as amici curiae that all Plaintiffs lack Article III standing because they “have not alleged any governmental coercion to do, or refrain from doing, anything.” This argument appears to conflate Article III injury-in-fact with RFRA’s No. 16-4345 New Doe Child #1, et al. v. Congress of the United States, et al. Page 7 substantial burden element. Whether Plaintiffs have alleged an injury-in-fact sufficient for Article III standing is distinct from the analysis of whether they have alleged a substantial burden on their religious exercise under RFRA. “[J]urisdiction is not defeated by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (citation and ellipses omitted). Rather, the district court has jurisdiction if the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another, unless the claim clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the existence of Plaintiffs’ right to recover depends on how RFRA is applied, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, Article III does not appear to require injuries caused by government coercion, even if stating a RFRA claim might. Cf. Washegesic, 33 F.3d at 681–83 (recognizing that psychological injury caused by seeing school’s portrait of Jesus Christ was sufficient continuing injury-in-fact for an Establishment Clause claim even after the student had graduated and only returned to the school for social purposes). RFRA explicitly states that it permits standing for claims to the full extent permitted by Article III. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c). We accordingly reject the standing arguments of Defendants and amici.
To state a RFRA claim, Plaintiffs’ Complaint must first allege that the conduct at issue is an exercise of religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). In assessing whether a plaintiff has alleged a protected exercise of religion, the court’s function is to ensure that the claim is based on a sincere religious belief. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. Courts are “to determine whether the line drawn” by the plaintiff between conduct consistent and inconsistent with her or his religious beliefs “reflects an honest conviction.” Id. at 2779 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)). Sincerity is distinct from reasonableness. Hobby Lobby teaches that once plaintiffs allege that certain conduct violates their sincerely held religious beliefs as they understand them, it is No. 16-4345 New Doe Child #1, et al. v. Congress of the United States, et al. Page 8 not within the court’s purview to question the reasonableness of those allegations. Id. at 2777– 78. Nor is it the court’s role “to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.” Id. at 2779. Accordingly, even if they must evaluate the substantiality of the burden, courts do not ask whether the particular exercise of religion is a substantial part of the plaintiff’s faith. See Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 566 (6th Cir. 2014) (courts are not “to inquire into the centrality to a faith of certain religious practices—dignifying some, disapproving others”). But the first RFRA element is not unlimited. In addition to being sincere, plaintiffs must allege that the conduct at issue is based on a religious belief, not merely a personal, non-religious belief. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (a challenge “must be sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other motivation”)2; Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 410 (6th Cir. 2010) (a RFRA claim must be based on “a religious belief rather than a philosophy or way of life” (citation omitted)). We rejected a RFRA claim upon finding “ample evidence” that the claimant’s belief about marijuana was “primarily a personal one, and to suggest that he was using the [church] as a means of protection from criminal sanctions.” United States v. Barnes, 677 F. App’x 271, 277 (6th Cir. 2017).3 Plaintiffs’ allegations must also show an actual incompatibility between their religious beliefs and the conduct at issue. See Robinson v. Jackson, 615 F. App’x 310, 313 (6th Cir. 2015) (because a meal containing no meat or alcohol qualified as Halal by the inmate’s own definition, the prison’s provision of vegetarian meals rather than Halal meat was not inconsistent with his religious beliefs as he defined them). The Complaint alleges that the Plaintiffs have “sincerely held religious beliefs” regarding “what they consider to be religious truth.” The Plaintiffs (besides Clayman) allege that among their “religious beliefs” are that they “do not trust in any ‘G-d,’” and “their religious ideologies mandate that they act with honesty.” The gravamen of the Complaint is that carrying and 2Although Holt involved a claim under RFRA’s “sister statute,” the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), RLUIPA “mirrors RFRA” and the same standards apply to each. Id. at 859–60; see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761–62. 3Barnes considered evidence, not just allegations, because it was considering the denial of the claimant’s motion to dismiss a criminal indictment after a hearing at which Barnes had the opportunity to present evidence, rather than considering a grant of a motion to dismiss a civil RFRA claim, as we are here. Id. at 275. No. 16-4345 New Doe Child #1, et al. v. Congress of the United States, et al. Page 9 transacting with currency containing the words “In God We Trust” is inconsistent with their religious beliefs because, according to Plaintiffs’ understanding of their religious beliefs, it causes them to bear, affirm, and proselytize “a religious message that is the antithesis of what they consider to be religious truth.” Clayman alleges that he believes that “participation in any activity that ultimately leads to the superfluous printing of G-d’s name on secular documents or to the destruction of G-d’s printed name is sinful.” Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Complaint alleges that carrying and completing transactions with currency containing the Motto is inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ beliefs. Therefore, as long as these views are sincere and religious, the desire of these Plaintiffs to avoid carrying or using currency with the Motto falls within RFRA’s broad coverage of “any exercise of religion.” Plaintiffs explicitly allege that their beliefs are sincere and religious, and the Government does not dispute those assertions. On a motion to dismiss, we accept the Complaint’s allegations as true and decline to question Plaintiffs’ allegations that their views are sincerely religious, especially when the Government has not challenged the sincerity or religiosity of Plaintiffs’ beliefs.4 See Haight, 763 F.3d at 565–56 (court had no basis for deciding the fact question of sincerity without “a properly developed record (including testimony from the [claimants], reference to religious texts, etc.)”). Plaintiffs contend that carrying currency in violation of their sincere religious beliefs is an exercise of religion within the meaning of RFRA. They allege that they are forced to engage 4In an amicus curiae brief, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty argues that the Plaintiffs apart from Clayman are not engaged in an “exercise of religion” because Atheism is a philosophy rather than a religious belief. (The Becket Fund ignores the fact that some Plaintiffs allege that they are Humanists rather than or in addition to being Atheists.) Defendants do not raise this argument, so it need not be resolved here. Self-Ins. Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Snyder, 827 F.3d 549, 560 (6th Cir. 2016) (amici “may not raise additional issues or arguments not raised by the parties” (citation omitted)). Regardless, precedent does not support this argument. RFRA’s definition of religious exercise is as broad as the Constitution permits. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g). In Hobby Lobby, Justice Kennedy wrote in concurrence that the right of free exercise includes the right “to establish one’s religious (or nonreligious) selfdefinition in the political, civic, and economic life of our larger community.” 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). We have held the same more directly: “The Religion Clauses, it turns out, do protect the religious and nonreligious.” Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Warren, 707 F.3d 686, 694 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–54 (1985)). Furthermore, a court’s attempt to distinguish between what is or is not a religious belief might implicate the Establishment Clause. See New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977) (striking down a state provision that would require the state to determine whether classroom examinations involved religious meaning because “[t]he prospect of church and state litigating in court about what does or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the constitutional guarantee against religious establishment”). No. 16-4345 New Doe Child #1, et al. v. Congress of the United States, et al. Page 10 in personalized conduct—handling currency—that is inconsistent with their beliefs. Currency is an item an individual owns, carries on his or her person, and uses to engage with the world in a way that is distinct from mere exposure to objectionable speech or ideas. For these reasons, we conclude that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that they seek to engage in an “exercise of religion” protected by RFRA. The arguments of the Government and amici to the contrary are not persuasive. The Government argues that the Supreme Court’s dictum that the “bearer of currency is . . . not required to publicly advertise the national motto” forecloses Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Motto’s inscription on currency compels them to bear and proselytize the Motto’s message. But Plaintiffs’ allegation is a factual one, not a legal one—it alleges that Plaintiffs believe that the Motto’s presence on the currency forces them to bear and proselytize its message, and that doing so violates their sincere religious beliefs. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777–78 (the Court accepted claimants’ factual claim that they believed that providing insurance might facilitate abortions and thus violate their religious beliefs). The Wooley Court’s observation that carrying money does not require people to advertise the Motto is irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ beliefs that carrying and transacting with currency is inconsistent with their religious views. Cf. Haight, 763 F.3d at 567 (the Government “may not use a manual written by government officials to allow other government officials to decide on that basis alone that a practice is not central to this or that faith”). The Government also relies on Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009), to argue that Plaintiffs cannot challenge the Motto’s inscription on currency because the Government “is entitled to say what it wishes.” Generally that is true, but Summum explains that there are nonetheless constraints on government speech. In addition to being limited by the Establishment Clause, “[t]he involvement of public officials in advocacy may be limited by law, regulation, or practice.” Id. at 468. Stated more directly, “statutory provisions . . . may limit government speech.” Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015). Suffice it to say that we do not accept the argument that the Government’s choice of currency inscription can never implicate an exercise of religion protected by RFRA. The Complaint in this case alleges an exercise of religion. No. 16-4345 New Doe Child #1, et al. v. Congress of the United States, et al. Page 11
The Complaint must next allege a substantial burden by the Government on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise. The substantial-burden test asks whether the Government is effectively forcing plaintiffs to choose between engaging in conduct that violates sincerely held religious beliefs and facing a serious consequence. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2275–76. In Hobby Lobby, the consequence for the corporate plaintiffs was paying “an enormous sum of money”— millions of dollars. Id. at 2779. In Holt, the consequence for the inmate plaintiff was “serious disciplinary action.” 135 S. Ct. at 862. In O Centro, the Government conceded that it imposed a substantial burden: The plaintiff’s sacramental substance could trigger a criminal prosecution. 546 U.S. at 425. We have stated that the Government substantially burdens an exercise of religion when it “place[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs . . . or effectively bar[s] his sincere faith-based conduct.” Haight, 763 F.3d at 565 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike in Hobby Lobby, Holt, and O Centro, Plaintiffs do not allege that they are required by law to engage in the conduct they allege violates their religious beliefs (carrying and using currency inscribed with the Motto). The Government argues that this difference dooms Plaintiffs’ claims under RFRA. The Government’s position finds some support in Hobby Lobby, which distinguished two cases that had rejected Free Exercise claims for lack of government coercion. 134 S. Ct. at 2779. In each of those cases, the plaintiffs were “unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their religious beliefs.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) and discussing Bd. of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (“Appellants have not contended that the New York law in any way coerces them as individuals in the practice of their religion.” (emphasis added))). But legal penalties are not the only form of coercion that may burden religious exercise. Indeed, Congress invoked Sherbert v. Verner in the text of RFRA, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1), a case noting that religious exercise may be substantially burdened through “the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.” 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). No. 16-4345 New Doe Child #1, et al. v. Congress of the United States, et al. Page 12 Even if a substantial burden for RFRA purposes might exist absent formal legal coercion,5 a plaintiff would need to allege at least that the Government has placed “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior.” Haight, 763 F.3d at 565. We recently addressed what level of governmental pressure constitutes a substantial burden in a RLUIPA case. Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp., 858 F.3d 996 (6th Cir. 2017). Livingston instructs that the substantial-burden inquiry is a question of law. Id. at 1001. The inquiry should be “functional and factually driven.” Id. at 1011. “[N]ot just any imposition on religious exercise” creates a substantial burden; “a burden must have some degree of severity to be considered ‘substantial.’” Id. at 1003 (citation omitted). It must be more than a “mere inconvenience.” Id. at 1009 (quoting Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 F. App’x 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2007)). Unlike the deference to the plaintiff’s subjective beliefs in the exercise-of-religion analysis above, Livingston conducted an objective analysis of whether the Government had imposed a substantial burden, holding as a matter of law that requiring students to travel an additional 12.1 miles was not a substantial burden, but rather a “mere inconvenience.” See id. Livingston surveyed other circuits and found that courts regularly consider a few factors when determining whether a land-use regulation imposed a substantial burden on a religious institution, including whether the claimant “had a feasible alternative location” and “whether [its] burden was self-imposed.” Id. at 1004. Applying Haight and Livingston to this case, the inscription of the Motto on currency would place sufficiently substantial pressure on Plaintiffs to violate their alleged religious beliefs only if using payment methods other than cash is more than a mere inconvenience, such as if Plaintiffs have no feasible alternative to using cash to engage in necessary transactions. The Complaint includes the necessary allegation, but in a conclusory fashion: “Defendants’ acts force Plaintiffs to choose between either relinquishing their rights to participate in much of their everyday commerce (by using the nation’s monetary instruments) or violating their religious beliefs.” The Plaintiffs can survive a motion to dismiss only if they back up this conclusory