Opinion ID: 711135
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of a Duty Imposed by Federal Regulations

Text: 13 To make out a claim of negligence under South Carolina law, a plaintiff must show (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by a negligent act or omission; and (3) damage proximately resulting from the breach. Andrews v. Piedmont Air Lines, 297 S.C. 367, 377 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1989). Ordinarily, under the State's public-duty doctrine, public officials are not liable to individuals for their negligence in discharging public duties as the duty is owed to the public at large rather than[to] anyone individually. Jensen v. Anderson County Dep't of Social Services, 304 S.C. 195, 403 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1991). In the case at bar, the district court nevertheless held that Appellees' negligence claim should go to the trier of fact. The district judge reviewed Summers v. Harrison Construction, 298 S.C. 451, 381 S.E.2d 493 (Ct.App.1989), to determine under what circumstances South Carolina courts find that a statute or regulation establishes a special duty of care by which government officials must abide in their dealings with the general public, and may violate only upon pain of being found liable for negligence. The court concluded that the various requirements had been met. 2 14 In Summers, the South Carolina Court of Appeals stated that statutes which create or define the duties of a public office have the essential purpose of providing for the structure and operation of government or for securing the general welfare and safety of the public, and that [s]uch statutes create no duty of care towards individual members of the general public. 381 S.E.2d at 496. The court went on to say, though, that a special duty to particular individuals may be created by such a statute when 15 (1) an essential purpose of the statute is to protect against a particular kind of harm; (2) the statute, either directly or indirectly, imposes on a specific public officer a duty to guard against or not cause that harm; (3) the class of persons the statute intends to protect is identifiable before the fact; (4) the plaintiff is a person within the protected class; (5) the public officer knows or has reason to know of the likelihood of harm to members of the class if he fails to do his duty; and (6) the officer is given sufficient authority to act in the circumstances or he undertakes to act in the exercise of his office. 16 Id. In the instant case, the district court concluded that an essential purpose of the regulation is to protect against a particular kind of harm (unlawful exportation of vehicles), the regulation imposed on specific Government officers a duty to guard against that harm (exporters must present certificates of title to Customs officials), the regulation is intended to protect an identifiable class of persons (lawful owners of vehicles that are in the possession of third parties), the plaintiffs are within that protected class (Appellees held the certificates of title), public officials had reason to know of the harm that could be caused if they failed to fulfill their duty (Customs officials should have known of the losses Appellees could sustain if they did not demand certificates of title), and the officers had been given sufficient authority to carry out the given duty (Customs officials had the power to block exportation pending submission of the certificates). The district court concluded that [t]he violation by Defendant of its own Regulation only serves to establish Defendant's actions in permitting the vehicles to be exported without certificates of title as negligence per se. 17 We believe that the district court erred. South Carolina courts consistently have been reluctant to find special duties statutorily imposed. In Summers, the Court of Appeals held that a state statute requiring officers who issue building permits to secure evidence that the builders and renovators of residences are licensed did not create a special, actionable duty to protect homeowners. 381 S.E.2d at 495-96. The court reasoned that the statute was intended simply to protect the general public by insuring that only licensed builders perform residential building, and that the duty to secure particular documentation did not impose on government officials a duty to guard against poor workmanship. Id. at 496. Similar reluctance is evident in other cases as well. See, e.g., Brady Development Co. v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 312 S.C. 73, 439 S.E.2d 266, 268 (1993) (holding that the town's Development Standards Ordinance was intended to protect the public from over-development, not to protect homeowners from deprivation of water and other services); Bellamy v. Brown, 305 S.C. 291, 408 S.E.2d 219, 220-21 (1991) (holding that statutorily prescribed exceptions to the disclosure requirements of the state's Freedom of Information Act did not establish a duty to maintain confidentiality); Jensen v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Services, 297 S.C. 323, 377 S.E.2d 102, 10507 (Ct.App.1988) (holding that the state's Child Protection Act, which required state and local officials to carry out various training, monitoring, reporting, and investigative responsibilities, did impose on local officials to whom instances of alleged child abuse had been reported a special duty to investigate and intervene, but did not impose on state officials a special duty to protect particular children), aff'd, 304 S.C. 195, 403 S.E.2d 615 (1991); Rayfield v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 297 S.C. 95, 374 S.E.2d 910, 916-17 (Ct.App.1988) (holding that a state statute requiring prison and parole officials to keep records of prisoners' habits and deportment and to prepare adequate reports concerning parole candidates did not create a special duty to protect particular members of the public against crimes committed by released prisoners), cert. denied, 298 S.C. 204, 379 S.E.2d 133 (1989). 18 As in Summers, Jensen, and Rayfield, there is clearly a link in the case at bar between the documentation requirements and the harm eventually suffered: just as requiring a builder's license makes shoddy construction of residences less likely, just as reporting and monitoring requirements decrease the likelihood that children will be abused, and just as documenting and reporting prisoners' habits and dispositions decreases the likelihood that dangerous prisoners will be released, requiring certificates of title decreases the likelihood that cars will be removed from the United States without the consent of their owners. Yet, as in Jensen, [n]o language in the [regulation] charges the specific officers with a duty to prevent such crimes. See 374 S.E.2d at 917. Indeed, the evident purpose of the regulation is not to impose on Customs officials a duty to protect Appellees and certain other identifiable parties from non-payment of debts, 3 but is instead to deter exportation of stolen autos by establishing procedures that must be followed when exporting used cars and by imposing varying levels of liability on importers and exporters that do not follow those procedures. 4 19 We therefore conclude that the district court erred when it held that the federal regulation imposed on Customs agents a special duty, violation of which could subject the Government to liability for negligence under South Carolina law.