Opinion ID: 1311837
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Multiple Use of Prior-murder-conviction Special Circumstance.

Text: (27) The jury was required to consider the murder of White  the murder underlying the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance  under section 190.3 factor (a). In addition, the court in its list of possible other criminal activity and prior felony convictions permitted the jury to consider the murder twice more  once as The murder of Minnie Ola White, and once as Defendant's prior conviction of First Degree Murder. (See ante, fn. 13, p. 37.) Asserting that each of the factors is intended to be exclusive, defendant argues the court erred in permitting a triple counting of the White murder. We have previously rejected the claim that the statutory factors are necessarily exclusive. Although factors (b) and (c) pertain only to criminal activity other than the crimes for which the defendant is convicted in the present proceeding ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 105-106), a prior felony conviction that involves a crime of violence can be considered under both factors (b) and (c) ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 764-765). The only limitation is that an individual criminal act cannot be counted twice in aggravation for the same purpose.  ( Id. at p. 765, italics in original.) The purpose of the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance is to circumscribe, as the Eighth Amendment requires [citation], the classes of persons who may properly be subject to the death penalty.... Unlike recidivism statutes, ... section 190.2(a)(2) is directed neither to deterring misconduct nor to fostering rehabilitation. ( People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d 584, 595.) The purpose of section 190.3 factor (b), by contrast, is to show defendant's propensity for violence. And the purpose of factor (c) is to show the capital offense was the culmination of the defendant's habitual criminality  that it was undeterred by the community's previous criminal sanctions. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 764, quoting People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 202.) Given these distinct purposes, there is no constitutional impediment to consideration of a defendant's prior-murder conviction under factors (a), (b) and (c). In the instant case, because the murder of White involved force and violence, it could properly be considered under factor (b). ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 764.) Had the conviction occurred before the instant offense, it could also be considered under factor (c). But because the conviction occurred after commission of the instant offense, the court erred in permitting the jury to consider it as a prior felony conviction under factor (c). ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 203; see Melton, supra . ) The error, however, clearly was nonprejudicial. Nothing in the argument of either party underscored multiple consideration of the prior conviction. The prosecutor never enumerated the statutory factors as such; he merely discussed defendant's prior criminal activity and convictions in general, without reference to their relevance to a particular factor or factors. Neither did he indicate to the jury that it was to count aggravating factors. Rather, both he and defense counsel spoke of the jury's responsibility to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. The jury was fully aware of defendant's first degree murder conviction for the killing of White, as well as the circumstances surrounding the killing. Nothing in the trial, the instructions or the argument was calculated to lead the jury to believe the White murder was more heinous because it came within three, rather than two, factors. We thus conclude the error in instructing the jury concerning application of section 190.3 factor (c) to the special circumstance murder could have had no bearing on its penalty verdict.