Opinion ID: 2066016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: voluntariness of jury waiver for death sentence hearing

Text: Defendant claims that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to be sentenced by a jury, because the trial court did not advise him that the vote of one juror would be sufficient to prevent imposition of a death sentence. This argument has been repeatedly rejected by this court. (See People v. Ramey (1992), 152 Ill.2d 41, 59-60, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275; People v. St. Pierre (1992), 146 Ill.2d 494, 511, 167 Ill.Dec. 1029, 588 N.E.2d 1159; People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill.2d 258, 334-35, 154 Ill.Dec. 785, 568 N.E.2d 1234; People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill.2d 1, 20-21, 138 Ill.Dec. 201, 547 N.E.2d 170; People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill.2d 72, 107, 104 Ill.Dec. 698, 503 N.E.2d 255; People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill.2d 284, 292, 97 Ill. Dec. 669, 493 N.E.2d 332; People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill.2d 201, 220-21, 88 Ill.Dec. 77, 478 N.E.2d 392; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill.2d 504, 534-36, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246.) In Ramey, 152 Ill.2d 41, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275, the defendant argued that his waiver of a jury for the death sentencing hearing was not knowing and voluntary, because he had not been informed that the vote of one juror could preclude imposition of the death penalty. In finding his argument unpersuasive, this court observed that under Illinois law, it is sufficient, for a valid jury waiver, that    the trial court explain to the defendant that he is waiving the right to have a jury consider the capital sentencing issues and that the sentencing decision would, therefore, be made by the judge alone. ( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 59, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275, citing People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill.2d 1, 20-21, 138 Ill.Dec. 201, 547 N.E.2d 170.) This court concluded that [i]nasmuch as the defendant need not know of the nonunanimity rule before his jury waiver will be held to have been knowing, intelligent and voluntary, what he would have done had he known of the rule is simply irrelevant to that determination and is an insufficient basis for a contrary conclusion. Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 60, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275. We find the reasoning of Ramey equally applicable to the present case. The record indicates that defendant consulted with counsel before defendant reached his decision, and that defendant advised the trial court that he understood the consequences of his waiver, a view shared by defendant's trial counsel. ( People v. Morgan (1986), 112 Ill.2d 111, 140-42, 97 Ill.Dec. 430, 492 N.E.2d 1303.) Consequently, the record supports a determination that defendant's death sentence jury waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. ( Henderson, 142 Ill.2d at 334, 154 Ill.Dec. 785, 568 N.E.2d 1234.) It was not incumbent on the trial court to advise defendant of the juror-nonunanimity rule. The circumstance that defendant might have decided differently had he known of the nonunanimity rule does not render his jury waiver invalid. Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 59-60, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275; Guest, 115 Ill.2d at 107, 104 Ill.Dec. 698, 503 N.E.2d 255.