Opinion ID: 871078
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantially different harm or evil

Text: Additionally, HRS § 701-112(1)(a) requires the former and subsequent offenses be intended to prevent substantially different harms or evils. Taylor does not challenge the ICA's conclusion that HRS §§ 708-830(1) and 708-830.5(1)(a) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1170(b) are intended to prevent substantially different harms or evils. Moreover, any such argument is without merit. In determining the harm or evil a statute is intended to prevent, this court looks primarily to the language of the statute. See, e.g., State v. Rapozo, 123 Hawai`i 329, 338, 235 P.3d 325, 334 (2010) (HRS § 702-236 further requires consideration of `the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense[.]' As with all efforts to determine legislative intent, that inquiry relies primarily on the plain language of the statute.) (brackets in original) (citations omitted); State v. Kupihea, 98 Hawai`i 196, 206, 46 P.3d 498, 508 (2002) (citation omitted) (noting that legislative intent is obtained primarily from the language of the statute). This court has explained that the purpose of Hawai`i's theft statute is to protect[] owners from the deprivation of their property[.] State v. Freeman, 70 Haw. 434, 439, 774 P.2d 888, 892 (1989). As noted by the ICA, the United States Supreme Court has identified the harm or evil intended to be prevented by 18 U.S.C. § 371, concerning conspiracy, as follows: It is well settled that the law of conspiracy serves ends different from, and complementary to, those served by criminal prohibitions of the substantive offense. Because of this, consecutive sentences may be imposed for the conspiracy and for the underlying crime. Our decisions have identified two independent values served by the law of conspiracy. The first is protection of society from the dangers of concerted criminal activity.... The second aspect is that conspiracy is an inchoate crime. This is to say, that, although the law generally makes criminal only antisocial conduct, at some point in the continuum between preparation and consummation, the likelihood of a commission of an act is sufficiently great and the criminal intent sufficiently well formed to justify the intervention of the criminal law. The law of conspiracy identifies the agreement to engage in a criminal venture as an event of sufficient threat to social order to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions for the agreement alone, plus an overt act in pursuit of it, regardless of whether the crime agreed upon actually is committed. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693-94, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (citations omitted). Applying the rationale of Feola here, the state theft offense with which Taylor was charged addresses a harm or evil (the deprivation of property rights) different from that addressed by the federal conspiracy statute, which addresses the threat posed by agreements to commit criminal conduct. Moreover, the purpose of NAGPRA has been articulated by the federal courts as follows: The primary purpose of NAGPRA, which is to assist Native Americans in the repatriation of items that the tribes consider sacred, differs from that of the Antiquities Act, which is directed against the unlawful taking or destruction of property. Because the intended purposes of the two acts differ significantly, they should not be treated similarly for sentencing calculations. United States v. Corrow, 941 F.Supp. 1553, 1567 (D.N.M.1996), aff'd, 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir.1997). Accordingly, NAGPRA and the state theft statutes were intended to prevent substantially different harms or evils, because the protection of graves and cultural items that is the purpose of NAGPRA and the protection from the deprivation of property that is the purpose of Hawaii's theft statute, constitute substantially different interests. While both statutes involve a deprivation of some interest, the theft statute seeks to protect general property interests, while NAGPRA protects a very specific interest in Native American cultural items and graves. Moreover, NAGPRA contains a savings provision that expressly states that the statute is in no way intended to interfere with either state or federal theft law. 25 U.S.C. § 3009(5) (Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to ... limit the application of any State or Federal law pertaining to theft or stolen property.). Therefore, the ICA correctly held that Taylor's theft offense required proof of facts which his federal conspiracy offense did not, and was designed to prevent a substantially different harm. Accordingly, Taylor's prosecution in state court is not barred under HRS § 701-112 and the circuit court did not err in denying Taylor's motion to dismiss in this respect. [39]