Opinion ID: 1489457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Statement of Interest

Text: Under TOPA, an owner of a rental housing accommodation who wishes to sell the property must first give the tenant an opportunity to purchase the accommodation at a price and terms which represent a bona fide offer of sale. D.C.Code § 42-3404.02(a) (2001). To fulfill this requirement, the owner must provide each tenant and the Mayor a written copy of the offer of sale. . . . D.C.Code § 42-3404.03 (2001). The time allowed for the tenant(s) to respond depends upon the number of units in the housing accommodation. For a single-family dwelling, [u]pon receipt of a written offer of sale from the owner . . ., the tenant shall have 30 days to provide the owner and the Mayor with a written statement of interest. D.C.Code § 42-3404.09(1) (2001). If the tenant has provided a written statement of interest in accordance with paragraph (1) of [§ 42-3404.09], the owner must allow additional time for negotiation of a contract of sale, and, if a contract is agreed to, for settlement. D.C.Code § 42-3404.09(2), (3) (2001). The owner argues that the trial court erred both in calculating the time within which the tenant was required to provide his statement of interest and in holding that the tenant had provided that statement when he mailed it on May 18. The tenant wisely concedes error on the first point. The statute states that, [u]pon receipt of the written offer of sale, the tenant shall have thirty days to provide a written statement of interest. D.C.Code § 42-3404.09(1) (2001). The tenant testified, and it was undisputed at trial, that he received the offer on April 30. Thus, the tenant had thirty days from April 30 (until May 30) to provide a statement of interest. TOPA has its own provision for calculating time periods, see D.C.Code § 42-3405.02 (2001), [4] and the trial court erred in relying on a rule of civil procedure to extend the time prescribed by statute. See D.C.Code § 42-3405.11 (2001) (If this chapter conflicts with another provision of law of general applicability, the provisions of this chapter control.); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 1 (2001) (the rules of civil procedure govern the procedure in all suits of a civil nature. . . .) (emphasis added). The remaining question is whether the tenant provide[d] the owner . . . with the statement of interest when he placed it in the mail on May 18 or whether, as the owner contends, the tenant did not provide [him] with the statement until he received it on June 2. The meaning of provide . . . with is a question of statutory interpretation, and we review the trial court's decision de novo. 1618 Twenty-First Street Tenants' Ass'n, Inc. v. Phillips Collection, 829 A.2d 201, 203 (D.C. 2003). When the plain meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, the intent of the legislature is clear, and judicial inquiry need go no further. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Gallagher, 734 A.2d 1087, 1091 (D.C.1999)). In determining the plain meaning, `the words of [the] statute should be construed according to their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.' Id. (quoting E.R.B. v. J.H.F., 496 A.2d 607, 609 (D.C.1985) (additional citation omitted)). Neither TOPA nor the related regulations define the term provide . . . with. See D.C.Code § 42-3401.03 (2001) (definitions section); 14 DCMR § 4799.1 (1991) (same). Thus, it is appropriate for us to look to dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary meaning of these words. 1618 Twenty-First Street Tenants' Ass'n, Inc., 829 A.2d at 203. Provide means to supply for use and is synonymous with furnish. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1827 (2002); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1458 (3d ed.1992) ([t]o furnish, supply, or make available). In order to use the statement  to be able to read it and act upon it  the owner must have access to it. Therefore, to supply [the statement of interest] for use or to make [it] available, the tenant must place it in the owner's possession. Depositing the statement in the mail may give rise to an inference that the owner will at some point receive it, see, e.g., Kidd Int'l Home Care, Inc. v. Prince, 917 A.2d 1083, 1087 (D.C.2007) (There is a rebuttable presumption that a letter properly addressed, stamped, and mailed, and not returned to the sender, has been delivered to the addressee.), but the owner does not have possession of, or access to, the statement while it is in the mail stream. Thus, the plain meaning of the term provide . . . with indicates that the tenant must ensure that the statement reaches the landlord within thirty days. [5] Practical considerations confirm our reading of the statute. Permitting the tenant to invoke his right to purchase by placing a statement of interest in the mail on the thirtieth day would create uncertainty and impose a significant additional burden on the owner, who would have to decide, without guidance from the statute, how long to wait before concluding that the tenant had not responded. In this case, for example, it apparently took two full weeks for the mail to arrive. Requiring the owner to choose between further, potentially costly, delay in the sale or redevelopment of his property and possibly violating TOPA would serve none of the Act's salutary purposes, see D.C.Code § 42-3401.02 (2001 & 2008 Supp.) (stating purposes of the legislation), and we have seen no evidence that the legislature intended this result. [6] Thus, we adhere to the plain meaning of the statute and hold that the tenant must provide the [owner]. . . with a statement of interest by ensuring that it reaches him within thirty days. [7] The tenant's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. He urges us to interpose the mailbox rule that acceptance of an offer generally is effective as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, without regard to whether it ever reaches the offeror.. . . RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 63(a) (1981). We have seen no indication that the legislature intended to incorporate this common law rule by implication, and we do not find the analogy to this one aspect of contract law so compelling that it should alter our interpretation of the statutory deadline for submitting a statement of interest. Cf. Orius Telecommunications, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 857 A.2d 1061, 1068 (D.C.2004) ([W]e cannot endorse the mailbox rule because its application ignores the existence of relevant statutory language and would nullify the essential holding of the director's interpretation that the relevant date under the statute is that of receipt by the claimant.). Indeed, we think cases involving notice of intent to exercise an option to purchase are more pertinent and helpful. It is at least the majority rule that notice to exercise an option is effective only upon its receipt by the party to be notified unless the parties otherwise agreed. Cities Service Oil Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 342 Mass. 108, 172 N.E.2d 104, 105 (1961) (option to purchase during term of lease ending on August 31; letter and deposit mailed on August 31, but received on September 1, did not timely exercise option). Accord, Smith v. Hevro Realty Corp., 199 Conn. 330, 507 A.2d 980, 984 (1986) (Unless the parties have agreed to the contrary, acceptance under an option contract is not effective until it is actually received by the offeror.); Salminen v. Frankson, 309 Minn. 438, 245 N.W.2d 839 (1976) (written exercise of option, mailed on the date option expired and received two days thereafter, was not timely). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63(b) (1981) (an acceptance under an option contract is not operative until received by the offeror). See generally George A. Locke, Annotation, Timeliness of Notice of Exercise of Option to Purchase Realty, 87 A.L.R.3d 805 (1978); but see Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts v. Grant, 404 Pa.Super. 62, 590 A.2d 9 (1991) (notice mailed to lessor before deadline for exercising option to purchase, but received after deadline, was nevertheless effective exercise of option under mailbox rule). [8] Nor are we persuaded by the fact that some provisions of TOPA expressly allow (or require) notice to be sent by mail. See, e.g., D.C.Code § 42-3404.03 (2001) (offer of sale); D.C.Code § 42-3404.11(1) (2001) (application for registration as a tenant organization). Nothing we say in this opinion precludes the tenant from sending his statement of interest by mail. He simply has to make sure that the owner receives it within the thirty-day period. In other words, the tenant who elects to use the mail accepts the risk of delay in receipt. Cf. D.C.Code § 42-3404.11(1) (2001) (relating to accommodations with five or more units; the delivery of the application for registration . . . by hand or by first class mail shall be within 30 days of receipt of a valid offer). Finally, while we recognize that the Council intended that ambiguities in the statute be resolved in favor of strengthening tenants' rights, see D.C.Code § 42-3405.11 (2001); Wilson Courts Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. 523-525 Mellon Street, LLC, 924 A.2d 289, 294 (D.C. 2007); Allman v. Snyder, 888 A.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C.2005), we may not rewrite the statute to create ambiguity where the statutory scheme is unambiguous in establishing the meaning of its terms. 1618 Twenty-First Street Tenants' Ass'n, Inc., 829 A.2d at 204 (citation and internal quotations omitted). [A]s is true of any guide to statutory construction, [this rule] only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961) (footnote omitted). And the fact that the parties (or judges) disagree about the meaning of the statute does not render it ambiguous. Cf. Lumpkins v. CSL Locksmith, LLC, 911 A.2d 418, 422 (D.C.2006) (Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. A contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree over its meaning . . . . (citation omitted)). [9] Having found no ambiguity in the statute, we apply its plain meaning. The tenant acknowledged that he received the owner's offer of sale on April 30, 2001, and he presented no evidence to dispute the owner's testimony that he did not receive the tenant's statement of interest until June 2, 2001, more than thirty days later. See note 3, supra. Accordingly, the tenant did not provide the owner with his statement of interest within thirty days of receiving the offer of sale. Because the tenant did not timely invoke his right to purchase under TOPA, the trial court erred in ordering the owner to negotiate a contract for sale to the tenant. [10]