Opinion ID: 1852206
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: double jeopardy implications of retrial following mistrial

Text: Under both the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Michigan Constitution [7] and its federal counterpart, [8] an accused may not be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. The Double Jeopardy Clause originated from the common-law notion that a person who has been convicted, acquitted, or pardoned should not be retried for the same offense. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). The constitutional prohibition against multiple prosecutions arises from the concern that the prosecution should not be permitted repeated opportunities to obtain a conviction: The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. [ Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).] From this fundamental idea, the United States Supreme Court has over the years developed a body of double jeopardy jurisprudence that recognizes, among other related rights, [9] an accused's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.... Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949); see also Washington, supra, 434 U.S. at 503, 98 S.Ct. 824; Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 466, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973). Jeopardy is said to attach when a jury is selected and sworn, see Somerville, supra, 410 U.S. at 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066; Hicks, supra, 447 Mich. at 827, n. 13, 528 N.W.2d 136 (GRIFFIN, J.), and the Double Jeopardy Clause therefore protects an accused's interest in avoiding multiple prosecutions even where no determination of guilt or innocence has been made. See Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at 87-92, 98 S.Ct. 2187; Crist, supra, 437 U.S. at 33-34, 98 S.Ct. 2156. It is this interest that is implicated when the trial judge declares a mistrial, thereby putting an end to the proceedings before a verdict is reached. Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at 92, 98 S.Ct. 2187; Crist, supra, 437 U.S. at 33-34, 98 S.Ct. 2156. However, the general rule permitting the prosecution only one opportunity to obtain a conviction `must in some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.' Washington, supra, 434 U.S. at 505, n. 11, 98 S.Ct. 824, quoting Wade, supra, 336 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. 834. [I]t is axiomatic that retrial is not automatically barred whenever circumstances compel the discharge of a factfinder before a verdict has been rendered. Hicks, supra, 447 Mich. at 827, 528 N.W.2d 136 (GRIFFIN, J.). It is well settled, for instance, that where a defendant requests or consents to a mistrial, retrial is not barred unless the prosecutor has engaged in conduct intended to provoke or goad the mistrial request. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675-676, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); Hicks, supra, 447 Mich. at 828, 528 N.W.2d 136 (GRIFFIN, J.). Additionally, retrial is always permitted when the mistrial is occasioned by manifest necessity. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. at 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083; Washington, supra, 434 U.S. at 505, 98 S.Ct. 824; Hicks, supra, 447 Mich. at 828, 528 N.W.2d 136 (GRIFFIN, J.). The concept of manifest necessity was introduced in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824), in which the Court addressed the propriety of the retrial of an accused following the discharge of a deadlocked jury without the accused's consent. Noting that in such a case the accused has not been convicted or acquitted, the Court held that the declaration of a mistrial under these circumstances poses no bar to a future trial. Id. at 580. However, the Court indicated that trial courts are to exercise caution in discharging the jury before a verdict is reached: We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital cases especially, Courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life, in favour of the prisoner. But, after all, they have the right to order the discharge; and the security which the public have for the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of this discretion, rests in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the Judges, under their oaths of office. We are aware that there is some diversity of opinion and practice on this subject, in the American Courts; but, after weighing the question with due deliberation, we are of opinion, that such a discharge constitutes no bar to further proceedings, and gives no right of exemption to the prisoner from being again put upon trial. [Id. (emphasis supplied).][ [10] ] As noted in Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 323-324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984), [i]t has been established for 160 years, since the opinion of Justice Story in [Perez], that a failure of the jury to agree on a verdict was an instance of `manifest necessity' which permitted a trial judge to terminate the first trial and retry the defendant, because `the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.' See also Washington, supra, 434 U.S. at 509, 98 S.Ct. 824 (the mistrial premised upon the trial judge's belief that the jury is unable to reach a verdict [has been] long considered the classic basis for a proper mistrial); Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. at 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083 (the hung jury remains the prototypical example of a situation meeting the manifest necessity standard); People v. Thompson, 424 Mich. 118, 128, 379 N.W.2d 49 (1985) (we have consistently held that retrial after a mistrial caused by jury deadlock does not violate the Michigan Constitution or the United States Constitution); Duncan, supra, 373 Mich. at 660, 130 N.W.2d 385, quoting People v. Parker, 145 Mich. 488, 499, 108 N.W. 999 (1906) (Michigan case law has without exception recognized that the doctrine of former jeopardy does not preclude retrial after discharge of a jury `for inability to agree, or for some other overruling necessity'). Defendant nevertheless contends, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that his retrial constituted a violation of his constitutional right to be free from successive prosecutions because the trial court precipitously declared a mistrial without manifest necessity to do so. We disagree and hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar defendant's second trial or convictions.