Opinion ID: 765398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Merits of the ADA Claim

Text: 33 A. Job Restructuring The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities in regard to hiring, advancement, discharge, or other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of a disability, a claimant must establish that: 1) he is an individual with a disability; 2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the job requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation; and 3) he was discharged because of his disability. See id. An otherwise qualified individual is one who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. Brickers v. Cleveland Bd. of Ed., 145 F.3d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 34 Although the parties do not dispute that Bratten has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, and that he possesses years of experience as an automotive mechanic, the district court found that Bratten was not an otherwise qualified individual with a disability because he could not perform the essential functions of an automotive mechanic with or without a reasonable accommodation. The district court noted that Bratten's own physician placed significant limits on the tasks he could perform, and that Bratten has not alleged that special tools or similar accommodations could enable him to perform the essential functions of an automotive mechanic. On appeal, Bratten contends that defendants could have reasonably accommodated his disability by restructuring his job duties and continuing the practice of letting other employees perform the more physical tasks of an automotive mechanic for Bratten on an ad hoc basis. 35 Bratten is correct that the ADA requires job restructuring as a reasonable accommodation in appropriate circumstances. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). However, Bratten overlooks that job restructuring within the meaning of the ADA only pertains to the restructuring of non-essential duties or marginal functions of a job. See Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 (8th Cir. 1995); Henchey v. Town of North Greenbush, 831 F. Supp. 960, 967 (N.D. N.Y. 1993) ('job restructuring' may include the shifting of non essential duties to other employees). 36 As mentioned supra, Bratten does not quarrel with the contention that the overhead lifting and like tasks constitute essential functions of an automotive mechanic. The only possible accommodation he identifies is allowing co-workers to perform as much as 20% of the essential automotive mechanic duties for Bratten when he needs such assistance. 2 Courts have continuously found that employers are not required to assign existing employees or hire new employees to perform certain functions or duties of a disabled employee's job which the employee cannot perform by virtue of his disability. See Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 1996) (having a helperperform most if not all of roof bolter tasks were extraordinary, not reasonable accommodations); Benson, 62 F.3d at 1112-13 (re-allocating essential functions of a job to other employees is not a reasonable accommodation within the meaning of the ADA); Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 644 (2d Cir. 1991) (employee's requested accommodation of having co-workers perform essential lifting tasks of job is not reasonable); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 478 (11th Cir. 1983) 3 . 37 Continuing the practice of assisting Bratten in tasks on an ad hoc basis may be sound labor relations policy for defendants, as we can imagine that such circumstances could promote employee loyalty and teamwork. However, employers are not required to do so under the ADA. Therefore, the district court was correct in holding that the requested accommodation of having other workers assist Bratten was not reasonable. B. Job Re-Assignment 38 In the alternative, Bratten argues that defendants violated the ADA by failing to re-assign him to a vacant position within their organizations. For support, Bratten cites Dr. Fishbein's deposition testimony expressing the opinion that Bratten could satisfactorily perform the duties of several other jobs at the Tullahoma facility, namely line equipment operator, storekeeper, truck driver, machine tool repairmen, maintenance machinist, and associate machinist. J.A. at 361 (Fishbein Dep.). Defendants proffer three arguments as to why Bratten's re-assignment claim fails: (1) the ADA does not recognize re-assignment as a reasonable accommodation; (2) Bratten failed to comply with the posting requirements for re-assignment as specified in the CBA; and (3) Bratten was not otherwise qualified for any of the other positions at issue. 39 1. Re-Assignment As A Reasonable Accommodation 40 Defendants first contend that if an employee cannot be reasonably accommodated in his current position, then the employer is under no obligation under the ADA to re-assign that employee to another position in the company. The flagship for this proposition is the Fourth Circuit's decision in Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 1995). 41 Like Austin, Myers has not been well-received by other circuits. The infirmity of Myers was that it relied on case law interpreting the Rehabilitation Act before the statute was amended in 1992. See Myers, 50 F.3d at 284 (citing Guillot v. Garrett, 970 F.2d 1320, 1326 (4th Cir. 1992)). Prior to 1992, the Rehabilitation Act did not include re-assignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation. See Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 497 (7th Cir. 1996). After the ADA was enacted, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to parallel the standards for employment discrimination under the ADA. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)). Of course, the ADA explicitly lists reassignment to a vacant position as a possible reasonable accommodation mandated by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). 42 Thus, pre-1992 Rehabilitation Act decisions such as Guillot holding that re-assignment is not a reasonable accommodation are no longer good law in light of 29 U.S.C. § 794(d), and Myers was wrong to suggest otherwise. See Gile 95 F.3d at 498. Indeed, every circuit--including this one--to consider the issue has properly held that the ADA requires an employer to consider re-assignment to a vacant position if the disabled employee cannot be reasonablyaccommodated in his or her current job. See Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., No. 96-3018, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13185, -38 (10th Cir. June 14, 1999) (en banc); Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 785-86 (1st Cir. 1998); Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284,1300-01 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 1997); Gile, 95 F.3d at 498-99; Benson, 62 F.3d at 1114-15. Additionally, we note the Fourth Circuit itself has since acknowledged its mistake, and professed that the rule set forth in Myers, upon which the district court relied, was contrary to congressional direction. Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 350 n.4 (4th Cir. 1996). 43 Although we did not specifically reject Myers in our decision in Cassidy, we do so now 4 . The ADA plainly states that re-assignment may be required to reasonably accommodate a worker with a disability. Defendants' arguments urging the contrary are unpersuasive. 44 2. Re-Assignment Based On The Facts Of This Case 45 As recounted supra, the CBA outlines procedures for filling job vacancies. In a nutshell, the defendants were required to post vacancies on a bulletin board. Employees, in turn, were to bid on these vacancies, and positions would be filled on the basis of the applicants' qualifications to perform the work and their respective seniority rights as set forth in the CBA. The district court found that all of the positions to which Bratten sought re-assignment had been posted on the bulletin board, but that Bratten did not apply for any of them. Bratten explains that he did not apply for these positions because they were posted while he was absent from the facility recuperating from his injury, and that he was therefore unaware of the openings. Nevertheless, the district court determined that the defendants were not required to breach the collective bargaining agreement by ignoring the job posting and seniority provisions of that agreement in order to accommodate the plaintiff. J.A. at 40 (Dist. Ct. Op.). The district court reached this Conclusion even though it made no finding as to whether any other workers' seniority rights would, in fact, be affected by Bratten's proposed re-assignment. 46 As a general rule, we have accepted that the ADA does not require an employer to re-assign an employee with a disability to a position if such a re-assignment would violat[e] another employee's rights under a collective bargaining agreement. Cassidy, 138 F.3d at 634; see also Lujan v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 165 F.3d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). We express no opinion as to whether the district court's application of the general rule was proper in this case, because we agree that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on an alternative ground. 47 The district court found that although Bratten identified several possible positions to which he could be re-assigned, all of those positions required similar, if not identical, physical skills as an automotive mechanic. The district court reasoned that if Bratten was not otherwise qualified to be an automotive mechanic, then it must logically follow that he was likewise not otherwise qualified to be a light equipment operator, storekeeper, truck driver, machine tool repairman, maintenance machinist, or associate machinist. We find the district court's Conclusion to be well-taken. The physical factors in the job description of an automotive mechanic are substantially similar to those of light equipment operator, storekeeper, truck driver, and maintenance machinist. Compare J.A. at 306 with J.A. at 312, 314, 316, 318. Althoughphysical requirements are not specified for machine tool repairman or associate machinist, those job descriptions are strikingly similar to the other positions. See J.A. at 323, 324. Bratten does not argue that the physical standards as articulated in these jobs are inconsistent with the essential functions of the jobs. 48 The sole support upon which Bratten relies to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was otherwise qualified for the other positions is the deposition testimony of Dr. Fishbein. True enough, Dr. Fishbein did proffer his opinion that Bratten could perform the physical tasks as required by the other jobs. J.A. at 361. However, Dr. Fishbein failed to articulate the basis of his opinion. 49 As did the district court, we find it very difficult to reconcile Dr. Fishbein's latter assertion, that Bratten could perform the other jobs, with his original opinion, that Bratten could not perform the tasks of an automotive mechanic. While we must resolve all doubts in favor of Bratten, we cannot ignore the plain fact that the physical requirements for the other jobs were strikingly similar to those of an automotive mechanic. Hence, we do not believe that Dr. Fishbein's unsupported opinion was enough to sustain Bratten's burden of demonstrating that he was otherwise qualified for the other positions to which he sought re-assignment. See Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173,1186 (6th Cir. 1996) (burden on plaintiff to demonstrate he is otherwise qualified for a position); White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 362 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff offered nothing beyond his own subjective opinion that he could perform various other jobs). We thus agree that the district court's determination, that Bratten was not otherwise qualified for the other positions to which he sought re-assignment, was well-founded.