Opinion ID: 2480904
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Danger of Absurdity

Text: Curiously, the appellate court stated: We are not asked to determine whether the State of Illinois can unilaterally enact a valid statute of limitations applicable to claims against Bi-State or whether such an enactment requires identical Missouri and Illinois laws along with Congress's approval. Contrary to the dissent's assertion, we take no position on that issue. Our only task is to answer the certified question, and in order to answer that question, we must determine the legislature's intent. For the reasons noted above, our only holding in this decision is that the legislature did not intend to include Bi-State within the Tort Immunity Act's definition of a `local public entity.' 393 Ill.App.3d at 1028-29, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64. This disclaimer is perplexing. Rather than taking no position on the issue, the appellate court repeatedly stated that Illinois and Missouri must enact identical legislation on matters involving Bi-State's powers, which must also receive congressional approval. 393 Ill.App.3d at 1023, 1025, 1026, 1028, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64. In determining the legislature's intent, the appellate court expressly reasoned that the legislature shared the court's erroneously narrow view of interstate compacts and, accordingly, could not have intended to sweep Bi-State into the purview of the Tort Immunity Act with the general catchall phrase `all other local governmental bodies.' 393 Ill.App.3d at 1028, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64. As explained above, the appellate court's alleged nonposition plainly misconstrues the law of interstate compacts and the Compact in this case. By overlooking significant aspects of interstate compacts, the appellate court's construction of the Compact was so narrow that it could possibly render an absurd result. [A] court construing the language of a statute will assume that the legislature did not intend to produce an absurd or unjust result ( State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill.2d 533, 541, 178 Ill.Dec. 745, 605 N.E.2d 539 (1992)), and will avoid a construction leading to an absurd result, if possible ( City of East St. Louis v. Union Electric Co., 37 Ill.2d 537, 542, 229 N.E.2d 522 (1967)). In almost all instances  pragmatic accommodations can be made [for an interstate compact entity] which do not strain the letter or the intent of existing statutory or constitutional requirements. F. Zimmerman & M. Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts 11 (1976). This is why interstate compact analysis acknowledges persuasive decisions of federal and state courts, and recognizes that courts should promote consistency in interpreting an interstate compact. Although [a] definition has yet to be drawn of its precise nature, the Bi-State Agency is essentially a local government itself. M. Ridgeway, Interstate Compacts: A Question of Federalism 133 (1971). Based on our analysis, and consistent with significant persuasive authority, we hold that Bi-State is a local public entity within the purview of the Tort Immunity Act. Consequently, the Act's one-year statute of limitations applies to civil actions against Bi-State, and plaintiff's complaint is time-barred.