Opinion ID: 1963229
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: availability of adequate alternate remedy

Text: The defendant has asserted as another question involved in this appeal that the plaintiff is afforded an adequate remedy in the condemnation proceedings initiated in 1951 and therefore the relief of declaratory judgment is not available to him. N.J.S. 2 A :16-61 provides that the court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment, when, if rendered or entered, it would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. There is no doubt here that the declaratory judgment would terminate the uncertainty or controversy that gave rise to the action for declaratory judgment: namely, the status as cemetery lands under L. 1941, c. 227, supra, of the 20.70 acres of land involved. Therefore we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's retention of jurisdiction even where the declaratory judgment sought will not resolve the principal controversy, the issue of the value of the 20.70 acres, already taken by the plaintiff. The statute provides that it is remedial and Its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations. N.J.S. 2 A :16-51. It is to be liberally construed, ibid., although it must be borne in mind that liberal construction does not connote an extension of the boundaries delineated by the statutory phraseology as commonly used. Grogan v. DeSapio, 11 N.J. 308, 315-316 (1953). The statute is liberally administered, however, to carry cut its purposes and intent. Blackman v. Iles, 4 N.J. 82, 87 (1950). It broadens the rationale of remedies long cognizable in other courts. Cf. New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, supra (3 N.J., at pages 239-240). In that respect the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law supplements, and is not a substitute for, existing remedies, Weissbard v. Potter Drug & Chemical Corp., 6 N.J. Super. 451, 456 ( Ch. Div. 1949), affirmed for the reasons expressed in the opinion of Judge Freund in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, 4 N.J. 115 (1950). These principles call for a determination whether the plaintiff would be afforded an adequate consideration of the matter of the validity of and defendant's purported compliance with L. 1941, c. 227 ( N.J.S.A. 8:3-4.2), supra, in the condemnation proceedings. The power of eminent domain is a high sovereign power that has been allotted to the legislative branch of the government since the Magna Carta. See Blackstone's Commentaries ( Browne's ed. 1897), pp. 39, 44; Jahr, Eminent Domain (1953), sec. 1, pp. 1-5. Accord: Bergen County Sewer Authority v. Borough of Little Ferry, 5 N.J. 548, 552 (1950); State Highway Comm. v. City of Elizabeth, 102 N.J. Eq. 221, 225 ( Ch. 1928), affirmed 103 N.J. Eq. 376 ( E. & A. 1928); The Tide-water Company v. Coster, 18 N.J. Eq. 518, 520-522 ( E. & A. 1866). It has been held that constitutions do not give, but merely place limitations upon, the power of eminent domain which otherwise would be without limitation. See for example, City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 404-407, 32 S.Ct. 267, 56 L.Ed. 481, 485-486 (1912); Jahr, Eminent Domain, supra, p. 3; 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, secs. 7-10, inclusive, pp. 635-639; cf. Currie v. New York Transit Company and National Docks Railway Company, 66 N.J. Eq. 313, 315 ( E. & A. 1904); Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 145 ( Sup. Ct. 1839). Cf. 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3 rd ed. 1909), sec. 448, pp. 806-807. The proof of the above statements may be succinctly demonstrated. Clause 39 of the Magna Carta provided No freeman shall be    disseised    unless by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.  (Emphasis supplied). This was the apparent common law origin of the placement of the sovereign power of eminent domain in the legislative branch of the government, Blackstone's Commentaries, supra. There is no doubt that the power remained so ensconced at the time of the American Revolution, and this fact is attested by the authorities hereinbefore cited. The Constitution of 1776, by its specific terms was a charter for the government of the colony of New Jersey ( N.J. Const. 1776) to be a temporary departure from the government of the crown of Great Britain (see N.J. Const. 1776, last paragraph). It provided ( N.J. Const. 1776, par. XXII): That the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been heretofore practiced in this colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be altered by a future law of the legislature; such parts only excepted, as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this charter;   . This clause clearly continued the common law authority of the Legislature to retain and exercise the sovereign power of eminent domain. The rights and privileges expressed in the 1776 charter did not dissipate this ancient legislative prerogative. N.J. Const. 1844, Art. IV, Sec. I, par. 1, vested the legislative power in the Senate and General Assembly, and the common law powers were continued in the following language ( N.J. Const. 1844, Art. X, par. 1): The common law and statute laws now in force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitation, or be altered or repealed by the legislature; There was no constitutional restriction placed upon the Legislature's status as custodian of the sovereign power of eminent domain. N.J. Const. 1947, Art. IV, Sec. I, par. 1, is identical with N.J. Const. 1844, Art. IV, Sec. I, par. 1, supra; N.J. Const. 1947, Art. XI, Sec. I, par. 3, provides, inter alia: All law, statutory and otherwise    in force at the time this Constitution or any Article thereof takes effect shall remain in full force until they expire or are superseded, altered or repealed by this Constitution or otherwise. Thus the 1947 charter continued the legislative authority to provide for the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, restricted only by the pertinent clauses of that Constitution. The restrictions (other than such as relate to general rights) are concerned solely with the matter of compensation to persons whose property is taken under an exercise of this legislative power. In both the New Jersey Constitution of 1844 and the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 these references to compensation, coupled with the clear mandate continuing existing common law principles, constitute recognition of the broad common law authority of the Legislature to control resort to the sovereign power of eminent domain. The right to exercise this sovereign power of eminent domain has been delegated by the Legislature of this State to numerous agencies of the State and its political subdivisions. The scope of the exercise of the power by the persons or courts delegated to exercise it must necessarily be circumscribed by the legislative enactment. Prior to the enactment of L. 1953, c. 20, it was held that the courts did not exercise their general jurisdiction in these matters, but only the statutory jurisdiction. Bergen County Sewer Authority v. Borough of Little Ferry, supra (5 N.J., at page 552). As hereinbefore stated, the specific authority in the plaintiff (and his predecessor in office) to acquire the lands of the defendant in question by condemnation stems from L. 1947, c. 328 (which authorized Route 4 Parkway), L. 1945, c. 83 (under which, in L. 1947, c. 328, supra, the Legislature designated Route 4 as a parkway), R.S. 27:7-1 et seq. (the general authority of the State Highway Commissioner over highways  section 22 of which, R.S. 27:7-22, provided that his exercise of the power of eminent domain should be in the manner provided in R.S. 20:1-1 et seq. ), and the general statutes on eminent domain, R.S. 20:1-1 et seq. Therefore the solution to the question involved on this aspect of the case rests in the terms of the latter statutory provisions. R.S. 20:1-2 authorized certain judicial officers to appoint three condemnation commissioners to fix the compensation to be paid for lands taken or to be taken by the petitioning party. In this respect the most the appointing judicial officer could have determined was whether he was authorized to make the appointment so the specific controversy upon which the present action is grounded was not within the scope of that proceeding. Cf. Bergen County Sewer Authority v. Borough of Little Ferry, supra (5 N.J., at page 552). We do not determine the scope of the Superior Court's power under R.S. 20:1-2, as amended by L. 1953, c. 20, sec. 1, effective July 1, 1953, which provides that the court shall have and shall exercise its full jurisdiction, since the order appealed from in the present case was entered April 29, 1953, prior to the effective date of the amendatory legislation. Nor (for the same reason) do we consider the effect of R.R. 4:92 (formerly Rule 3:81 C, adopted June 25, 1953, to be effective July 1, 1953). Upon appointment and qualification the condemnation commissioners' authority was to proceed to view and examine the land or other property and make a just and equitable appraisement of the value of the same, and an assessment of the amount to be paid by the petitioner for the land or other property    as of the date of the filing of the petition and order thereon. R.S. 20:1-9. Scrutiny of these provisions discloses no authority in the condemnation commissioners to declare a statute unconstitutional nor to refuse to recognize it on the premise that it is unconstitutional, without the mandate of an adjudication of a competent judicial tribunal to that end. In Schwartz v. Essex County Board of Taxation, 129 N.J.L. 129, 132 ( Sup. Ct. 1942), affirmed 130 N.J.L. 177 ( E. & A. 1943), it was held that: It is indisputable that the determination of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature rests with a judicial body; not with a quasi -judicial body    and administrative tribunals must accept a legislative act as constitutional until such time as it has been declared to be unconstitutional by a qualified judicial body. That philosophy is controlling on this aspect of the matter sub judice. Cf. State Highway Commission v. Dey, 110 N.J.L. 197, 198 ( E. & A. 1933). The remaining facet of this question involved is whether the statutory appeal for review of the condemnation commissioners' report afforded an adequate medium for the disposition of the controversy between the plaintiff and defendant concerning the validity and application of L. 1941, c. 227 ( N.J.S.A. 8:3-4.2, supra ). We are persuaded that it did not. R.S. 20:1-16 provided that the court to which the appeal was taken was vested with power to hear and adjudge the same and to direct a proper issue for the trial to be framed. This limited the review to the questions determined by the condemnation commissioners. Cf. State Highway Commission v. Dey, supra; Packard v. Bergen Neck Ry Co., 54 N.J.L. 553, 564 ( E. & A. 1892); Leeds v. Camden & Atlantic R.R. Co., 53 N.J.L. 229, 231 ( E. & A. 1890). We do not, however, determine whether the same result would obtain under R.R. 4:92 (formerly Rule 3:81 C, effective July 1, 1953), supra, and R.S. 20:1-16, as amended by L. 1953, c. 20, sec. 25 (effective July 1, 1953), in view of the language contained in R.S. 20:1-2, as amended by L. 1953, c. 20, sec. 1, supra. The query is invited by the defendant's brief whether the plaintiff was afforded an adequate remedy by way of an action in lieu of certiorari, the relief in which would appear to be a judgment setting aside the instruments and official actions whereby the defendant acquired the large tract of land including the 20.70 acres involved herein if the plaintiff were to prevail on either the premise of unconstitutionality or the premise of non-compliance with the statute. See Packard v. Bergen Neck Ry Co., supra . We find it unnecessary to determine whether the plaintiff is clothed with sufficient authority to initiate such a direct proceeding. His authority, however, is not concurrent with the authority of the Attorney-General. The present application by the plaintiff relates only to the specific 20.70 acres and his sole interest is protection of the public, not in relation to burials, but in relation to the price the public is to pay for that specific portion of the defendant's lands. The former prerogative writs have been superseded and in lieu thereof review, hearing and relief shall be afforded in the Superior Court, on terms and in the manner provided by rules of the Supreme Court. N.J. Const. 1947, Art. VI, Sec. V, par. 4. Rule 3:81-2 (now R.R. 4:88-2) provides that civil actions in lieu of the former prerogative writs be filed in Law Division of the Superior Court. The rules provide for actions in lieu of prerogative writ to be initiated by complaint as in other civil actions. Rule 3:81-3 amended December 7, 1950 (now R.R. 4:88-3). An action for declaratory judgment and an action in lieu of prerogative writ are both actions within the general jurisdiction of the Superior Court, Law Division  the sole difference in the present practice pertinent to the questions involved in this appeal lies in the extent and nature of the relief sought. This, then, seems an appropriate action under R.S. 2:26-68, supra, which permits the declaratory relief to be granted    whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. (Emphasis supplied.) Upon consideration of the limited relief sought and the nature of the proceedings in eminent domain instituted in this case, we are of the opinion that the retention of jurisdiction by the Superior Court, Law Division, was not an abuse of discretion. No other completely adequate proceeding was available to the plaintiff for the relief sought.