Opinion ID: 2582487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Trial Court's Exclusion of Jurors 39, 52, and 74 for Cause

Text: ¶ 23 Yates contends that the trial court improperly granted the State's challenges to jurors 39, 52, and 74. Under the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution, a defendant has a right to an impartial jury. State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 593, 940 P.2d 546 (1997); State v. Brett, 126 Wash.2d 136, 157, 892 P.2d 29 (1995), vacated on other grounds, 142 Wash.2d 868, 16 P.3d 601 (2001). To ensure an impartial jury, the trial court in a capital case must death qualify the jury  that is, the court must satisfy itself that prospective jurors will be able to impose the death penalty if the state meets its statutorily mandated burden. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 593, 940 P.2d 546. Thus, the trial court may dismiss for cause any juror whose views on capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)); State v. Davis, 141 Wash.2d 798, 856-57, 10 P.3d 977 (2000). When dismissing an equivocal juror  one who expresses personal opposition to the death penalty yet offers some assurances that he or she could set aside those views  the trial court need not find the juror's bias `unmistakably clear'; rather, the court must be left with [a] definite impression of the juror's inability to apply the law impartially. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-26, 105 S.Ct. 844 (rejecting the test set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968)). [9] ¶ 24 Because a juror's competency to serve impartially is a credibility determination that the trial court is necessarily in the best position to make, this court applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse the trial court's determination only if the court has manifestly abused its discretion. State v. Rupe, 108 Wash.2d 734, 749, 743 P.2d 210 (1987); Witt, 469 U.S. at 428-29, 105 S.Ct. 844; Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 601-02, 940 P.2d 546; Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.). ¶ 25 As a prospective juror in the case, juror 39 filled out the lengthy written questionnaire. She responded [n]o to the following question: In your opinion, should death ever be imposed as a sentence for punishment of a crime? Confidential Juror Questionnaire (CJQ) 39, at 29. Asked to indicate [w]hich of the following best describe[d] [her] view of the death penalty, she marked the box Opposed in every possible circumstance.  Id. (emphasis added). She left blank the questions asking for the best arguments for and against the death penalty. Id. at 30. When the State questioned juror 39 individually (and outside the presence of other jurors), she stated that her views on the death penalty were based on a philosophy of [hers], [her] personal opinion. 34 VRP at 2276. She affirmed three times that she was opposed to the death penalty in every circumstance. Id. at 2275-77. She later indicated that she could vote to impose the death penalty, id. at 2279, and she admitted the response was contradictory. Id. at 2280. Defense counsel's leading question elicited an ambiguous response: Q And your firm belief that  your strong belief that the death penalty, you're generally opposed to it, won't affect your ability to follow his instructions; is that right? A No. Id. at 2282. It is unclear whether juror 39 was agreeing with defense counsel's statement or responding negatively to the tag question is that right? The trial court followed up: I need to understand your answers. . . . . . . . . . . Would you ever vote for the death penalty? A I want to say, because my beliefs says, no. I would do that if it has occurred, yes, if I'm supposed to, weighing all the evidence, yes. Id. at 2282-83. ¶ 26 Weighing the State's motion to excuse juror 39 for cause, the trial court pointed to her written responses that the death penalty should never be imposed and that she was opposed in every possible circumstance. Id. at 2286. The trial court granted the State's motion: I'm convinced that her ability is substantially impaired by her personal beliefs, and even in response to my question she drew upon her personal beliefs. Id. Here, the trial court's ruling was not a manifest abuse of discretion. The court weighed her written and oral responses before concluding that her personal views would substantially impair her ability to impose the death penalty. [10] ¶ 27 Juror 52 responded [n]o to the following written question: In your opinion, should death ever be imposed as a sentence for punishment of a crime? CJQ 52, at 29. To describe her view of the death penalty, she checked the box Generally opposed with very few exceptions. Id. Asked to state in greater detail [her] opinion about the death sentence, she wrote, I guess because I've been brought up in church we're not to take a life. Id. Similarly, her best argument against the death penalty was that [n]o one has the right to take another life. Id. at 30. In response to questions from the State, she explained that she was a lifelong member of the Church of God and Christ, which opposed ever taking a life. 35 VRP at 2403-04. When asked whether she could vote for the death penalty, she reiterated that her religious views made such a question uncomfortable for her: Would I vote? That's a hard thing, because it's like going against what I've been taught to go against, to take a life. Id. at 2410, 2412. However, under questioning by defense counsel, juror 52 responded affirmatively to a series of questions regarding civic duty and her ability to follow the law impartially. Id. at 2413-15. ¶ 28 The trial court granted the State's motion to excuse juror 52 for cause. Id. at 2418. The court concluded that juror 52's religious beliefs and personal commitment are such that she would decline the death penalty in the case. Id. While the trial court heard her responses to defense counsel's structured questioning, the court reasonably concluded that such responses were of less consequence than her written and oral statements about the importance of her church's teachings on capital punishment. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1039, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (observing that the trial court properly may choose to believe those statements that were the most fully articulated or that appeared to have been least influenced by leading). The ruling was not a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion. ¶ 29 In her written responses, juror 74 unequivocally expressed her [v]ery strong opposition to the death penalty. CJQ 74, at 29. She stated that the death penalty should never be imposed and described her view of the death penalty by checking the box Opposed in every possible circumstance.  Id. (emphasis added). She wrote that she did not believe in the death penalty, that a person's life [was] not [hers] to take, and that there was [n]o good argument for the death penalty. Id. at 29, 30. In response to the State's questioning, she affirmed her written answers and explained that her views, which she had held for [m]ost of [her] adult life, were based on a religious and philosophical belief that if we cause another human being death, we come down to the level of that person. 37 VRP at 2686. Juror 74 admitted that there was probably no possibility she could vote for the death penalty because it would be a real difficult thing for [her] to do and would cause [her] an extreme amount of anxiety. Id. at 2686-87. When defense counsel asked her if she could follow the court's instructions impartially, her answer was equivocal: Yeah, if I had to, probably.  Id. at 2687-88 (emphasis added). ¶ 30 The trial court's decision to grant the State's motion to exclude juror 74 for cause was plainly no abuse of discretion. In light of her emphatic written and oral statements, the court reasonably concluded that her beliefs or opinions would substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror. Id. at 2691.