Opinion ID: 715681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: leader or organizer finding

Text: 17 As set forth previously, to be eligible for the safety valve provision, a defendant may not be a leader or organizer as defined by U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. The Government argues that the district court erred when it reversed its initial finding that Flanagan was a leader or organizer. To support its position that the district court erroneously interpreted the guidelines, the Government refers to the court's statement at the sentencing hearing that it previously had found that Flanagan was a leader to establish a disparity in culpability between Kiker and Flanagan, but [it] didn't intend to establish a 500 percent dispar[i]ty in culpability. In an unconvincing argument intended to circumvent a review under the clearly erroneous standard, the Government contends that the finding should be reviewed de novo because it was based on an erroneous view of the law. It appears the Government's core proposition is that the relevant culpability of the defendants is not pertinent to the application of the safety valve provision. 18 We reject the Government's argument for two reasons. First, this Court will disturb a district court's factual finding regarding whether a defendant was a leader/organizer pursuant to § 3B1.1 only if it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Barreto, 871 F.2d 511, 512 (5th Cir.1989). The Government presents no argument that such finding was clearly erroneous. Rather, the Government relies on the statement by the district court which appears to be an explanation for findings made in previously sentencing the defendant. That previous sentence was vacated by this Court. Our remand was a general remand for sentencing, and any findings previously made were not binding on the district court on remand. The district court's explanation of what he did in the previous sentencing does not show a misapplication of the law in the subsequent sentencing. 19 Second, a defendant's relative culpability is relevant to the application of the safety valve provision. 4 Relying on the legislative history of the safety valve provision, this Court has recognized that the purpose of the provision was to allow less culpable defendants who fully assisted the Government to avoid the application of the statutory mandatory minimum sentences. Rodriguez, 60 F.3d at 196 (emphasis added) (citing H.R.Rep. 460, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.1994)). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has opined that without such a safety valve, for 'the very offenders who most warrant proportionally lower sentences--offenders that by guideline definitions are the least culpable--mandatory minimums generally operate to block the sentence from reflecting mitigating factors.'  Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d at 378 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 103-460, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 1994 WL 107571 (1994)). Thus, if not for the safety valve provision, the 'least culpable offenders may receive the same sentences as their relatively more culpable counterparts.'  Id. 20 For the foregoing reasons, we decline to hold that the district court's discussion regarding the relative culpability of the codefendants was an erroneous view of the law that resulted in an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines. 21 Flanagan's sentence is REMANDED in accordance with the instructions contained in this opinion.