Opinion ID: 1249738
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lying-in-wait Guilt and Special-circumstance Findings.

Text: (35) It was undisputed at trial that Gardner was killed as he walked a gauntlet of inmates lounging against the walls of a corridor. The state did not present evidence that defendant concealed himself; according to its evidence he was standing in the hall waiting for Gardner, and attacked him from behind as he passed by. Evidence was also presented that defendant had been loitering in the hall for a few minutes before the attack. Defendant submitted a written motion for a judgment of acquittal on the lying-in-wait special-circumstance allegation on the basis that no evidence of concealment had been introduced. Defendant also asked for a different instruction on lying in wait for special circumstance purposes that would have told the jury the murder must have occurred during the lying in wait or that the lethal acts flowed continuously from that time. The court denied the motion and, after the parties agreed on the language of the instruction, the court told the jury that The term `lying in wait' is defined as a waiting and watching for an opportune time to act, together with a concealment by ambush or some other secret design to take the other person by surprise. Concealment may manifest itself either by ambush or by the creation of a situation where the victim is taken unawares even though he sees his murderer. It is only a concealment which puts the defendant in a position of advantage from which it can be inferred that lying in wait was part of the defendant's plan to take his victim by surprise. To find defendant guilty of first degree murder, the murder must be immediately preceded by lying in wait. The lying in wait need not continue for any particular period of time provided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation. As for the lying-in-wait special circumstance, that allegation could be found true only if (1) ... the defendant intentionally killed the victim, and [¶] (2) ... the murder took place during the period of time that the defendants were lying in wait, or the lethal acts began and flowed continuously from the point in time the lying in wait ended. [¶] Lying in wait is defined elsewhere in these instructions. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder for the killing of Gardner, and also that the special circumstance of lying in wait was true. Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the lying-in-wait instructions, the verdict finding him guilty of the first degree murder of Gardner, or the finding of the lying-in-wait special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). He also contends the lying-in-wait special-circumstance statute as applied is unconstitutional because the only difference between his case and one in which a prisoner walked to another inmate's cell and stabbed him to death would be locomotion; yet the hypothetical inmate would not be death-eligible on that basis. This scheme, defendant contends, violates the federal Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, because it cannot be applied in a principled manner to distinguish cases meriting death from those that do not. ( Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 427, 433 [64 L.Ed.2d 398, 409-410, 100 S.Ct. 1759].) In People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 553-556 [257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244], a majority held that a jury was properly instructed that to find a defendant guilty of first degree murder on a theory of lying in wait, physical concealment was not required; it was enough to take the victim unawares even though she saw her attackers. ( Id. at p. 555.) With regard to the special circumstance finding, we concluded that section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15), was constitutionally sound because it meaningfully distinguished between other forms of premeditated murder as long as the murder was committed under circumstances that included (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.... (48 Cal.3d at p. 557.) Again, no physical concealment is required. ( Ibid. ) Given the evidence of the events that preceded the killing of Gardner, the instruction, verdict, and finding met the statutory requirement of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15), that the murder occurred while lying in wait. ( People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 558.) The holding in Morales also defeats defendant's constitutional argument.