Opinion ID: 152918
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trustees' Appeal.

Text: In the court below, the trustees twice sought attorneys' fees. [4] As part of its adjudication of the trustees' motion for summary judgment, the district court denied their request for an award pursuant to ERISA section 502(g)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). The trustees subsequently made a postjudgment motion seeking attorneys' fees pursuant to ERISA section 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). The district court summarily denied that motion. On appeal, the trustees challenge both orders. We review the two orders under different standards. Where section 502(g)(2) applies, a fee award is mandatory. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2); Foltice v. Guardsman Prods., Inc., 98 F.3d 933, 936 (6th Cir.1996). Thus, we review an order denying remedies under section 502(g)(2) de novo. See, e.g., Pendleton v. QuikTrip Corp., 567 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir.2009); Graham v. Balcor Co., 146 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir.1998). Fee awards under section 502(g)(1) are discretionary. See Cook v. Liberty Life Assur. Co., 334 F.3d 122, 123 (1st Cir.2003) (per curiam); Peterson v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 282 F.3d 112, 122 (2d Cir.2002). We therefore review the disposition of a motion seeking remediation under section 502(g)(1) for abuse of discretion. Janeiro v. Urol. Surgery Prof'l Ass'n, 457 F.3d 130, 143 (1st Cir.2006). 1. Section 502(g)(2). The challenge to the denial of remedies under section 502(g)(2) is readily dispatched. That section mandates the award of certain remedies, such as attorneys' fees, in a successful enforcement action brought pursuant to ERISA section 515, 29 U.S.C. § 1145. Writ large, section 515 requires an employer to comply with its contractual commitments to make periodic contributions to an ERISA plan. Here, however, the trustees' action was not prosecuted under section 515 but, rather, under section 302. As such, section 502(g)(2) is inapposite, and the district court did not err in denying remediation thereunder. 2. Section 502(g)(1). Section 501(g)(1) is a horse of a different hue. That section allows the district court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees in an ERISA action, not within the purview of section 502(g)(2), brought by a plan participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. The Supreme Court recently has clarified the proper mode of analysis with respect to this fee-shifting provision. See Hardt, 130 S.Ct. at 2158. The Hardt Court explained that eligibility for remediation under section 502(g)(1) does not require that the fee-seeker be a prevailing party. Id. at 2157. The Justices did not necessarily prohibit consideration of the five factors delineated in Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F.3d 220, 225 (1st Cir.1996). See Hardt, 130 S.Ct. at 2158 n. 8. The Court nevertheless made clear that these factors could not be applied without modification, and that the focal point of the inquiry should be whether a claimant shows some degree of success on the merits. Id. at 2158. Achieving this benchmark requires something more than a purely procedural victory. Id. The statutory standard is satisfied as long as the merits outcome produces some meaningful benefit for the fee-seeker. Id. The district court did not have the benefit of Hardt and, thus, did not engage in the requisite analysis. Consequently, we vacate the order denying relief under section 502(g)(1). If this motion is renewed following the proceedings on record, the district court should reconsider it in light of Hardt; determine whether the trustees have achieved some degree of success on the merits; and decide whether to award attorneys' fees, costs, and/or other remedies encompassed within section 502(g)(1).