Opinion ID: 509231
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prosecutor's Reference to Petitioners' Pretrial Silence

Text: 33 Finally, petitioners contend that their due process rights were violated when the prosecutor made the following comments during the course of his closing argument: 34 I didn't know what the defendants were going to say until they took the witness stand. They have a precious right, which I admire and relish as much as anyone else to remain silent. And they have chosen not to exercise that right in this case. But until they have gotten up here and told you their version of what happened, I--I haven't heard it before.... 35 (App. 63). Petitioners rely on the decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), wherein the Supreme Court held that an accused's post-Miranda silence cannot be used to impeach or discredit an exculpatory explanation offered by him at trial. We find that the oblique references quoted above, although technically improper, were not sufficiently egregious to constitute a violation of the petitioners' rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. We note that the prosecutor did not directly refer to the petitioners' post-arrest silence but, rather, created the indirect inference that the petitioners had not initially disclosed their side of the story, since the prosecutor claimed that he was unaware of their story until they testified at trial. More importantly, we note the single passing reference made during closing argument is clearly distinguishable from the sharp, repetitive questioning found impermissible in Doyle. As noted by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, there must be some prosecutorial focus which highlights a defendant's post-Miranda silence in order to demonstrate prejudicial error. United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583, 595 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977). In the instant case, no rational trier of fact could conclude that the petitioners' exculpatory explanations were discredited or impeached by the prosecutor's remark that he had not previously heard their story. Therefore, the challenged remark does not come within either the mandate or the sphere of Doyle. See Goudlock v. Marshall, 751 F.2d 865, 871-72 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 979 (1985). 36 For all the foregoing reasons, we find that the petitioners were not deprived of their federal Constitutional right to a fundamentally fair trial. Therefore, the judgment of the district court denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.