Opinion ID: 2295379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements in civil pleadings

Text: The plaintiff seeks damages for libel for statements contained in several pleadings filed by Dahar in connection with the civil action by American Snacks, Inc. The pleadings before us reveal that only one, a petition for interpleader, contains the language complained of. In that document the defendant Dahar alleged the following: 4. By a document dated August 16, 1974, lessee, by its guarantor, subleased the premises to the Pewter Pub, Inc., a New Hampshire corporation, which sublease was signed on behalf of the sublessee by John F. McGranahan and Charles C. Karagianis; 5. By the terms of the sublease (Paragraph 32), the sublessee, Pewter Pub, Inc., agreed to pay all real estate taxes over the amount assessed in tax year 1973; the sublessor, American Snacks, Inc., agreed to grant the Pewter Pub, Inc., credit as against the rent due from the Pewter Pub, Inc., for the amount of any decrease in real estate taxes below the amount assessed for the tax year 1973. According to the plaintiff, the latter paragraph means that the tax abatement for the tax year 1973 would benefit Pewter Pub, Inc., and the two paragraphs taken together, along with the external fact that McGranahan was chairman of the board of tax assessors, constitute a charge that plaintiff had engaged in official oppression, [was] a common cheat, a person of no honesty, integrity, worth or substance, secretly accepting illegal kickbacks of taxes, and unworthy of public or probate [sic] [private?] trust. [5] The first quoted paragraph is absolutely privileged because as the plaintiff concedes, it is a true and accurate statement concerning a public official. Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 377, 402 A.2d 651, 655 (1979), citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1974). [6] The question whether an absolute privilege exists with respect to the second paragraph turns on whether the pleaded allegations were pertinent or relevant to the civil action in which they were filed. The question of pertinence or relevance is one of law, which can properly be decided on the pleadings on a motion to dismiss. O'Barr v. Feist, 292 Ala. 440, 296 So. 2d 152 (1974); Macie v. Clark Equipment Co., 8 Ill.App.3d 613, 615, 290 N.E.2d 912, 913 (1972); 50 AM. JUR. 2d Libel & Slander §§ 236, 239 (1970). A statement is presumed relevant unless the person allegedly defamed demonstrates that it was so palpably irrelevant to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety. Scott v. Statesville Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., 240 N.C. 73, 76, 81 S.E.2d 146, 149 (1954); Developments in the Law: Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 923 (1956). A party is permitted to plead any claim or defense, so long as it is not completely frivolous. Sierra Madre Dev., Inc. v. Via Entrada Town Ass'n, 20 Ariz. App. 550, 554, 514 P.2d 503, 507 (1973). [T]he fact that a pleader may have difficulty in sustaining an allegation in a pleading does not make that allegation irrelevant to his case. Spira v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 33, 36, 133 Cal. Rptr. 24, 26 (1976). All doubts are to be resolved in favor of pertinency or relevancy. Dachowitz v. Kranis, 401 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846, 61 App. Div. 2d 783 (1978); O'Barr v. Feist, 292 Ala. 440, 296 So.2d 152 (1974); Macie v. Clark Equipment Co., 8 Ill. App. 3d 613, 616, 290 N.E.2d 912, 914 (1972). Using the foregoing test, we think the allegations in Dahar's pleadings were pertinent to the civil cases in which they were entered. [7] We agree with the plaintiff that the right and title of a third party, the so-called jus tertii defense, is not in and of itself a good defense to an action for conversion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895(1) (1979). Dahar was, nevertheless, entitled to defend himself by challenging American Snacks' right to possession of the check and tax proceeds, a key element of its conversion case. In such a situation, it is appropriate for a party in defendant Dahar's position to deposit the disputed property in court and initiate interpleader. Id., comment g; W. PROSSER, TORTS § 15, at 91 (4th ed. 1971). Dahar's defense cannot be said to be so patently frivolous or irrelevant as to fall outside the class of protected statements. Cf. Dineen v. Daughan, 381 A.2d 663 (Me. 1978) (action for debt, motion challenging method used for attachment); Hammer v. Forde, 125 Minn. 146, 145 N.W. 810 (1914) (action to enjoin nuisance; allegation that city improperly and maliciously leased land on which nuisance occurred). [8, 9] The plaintiff's final argument concerning the civil pleadings is that they should not be privileged because he was not a party to the civil action and therefore he was unable to protect himself against defamatory statements. We disagree. Whether the privilege attaches depends on the nature of the proceedings in which the statements were made; it makes no difference whether the person allegedly defamed was a participant in those proceedings. See, e.g., Sinnett v. Albert, 188 Neb. 176, 195 N.W.2d 506 (1972); Abbott v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 20 Wash. 552, 56 P. 376, aff'd 175 U.S. 409 (1899). We fail to see how the fact of being named as a party would enable a person to prevent publication of the adverse party's pleadings. Although the position of the allegedly defamed party might in some cases indicate a lack of pertinence to the action, in the present case McGranahan, although not technically named as a party, was the agent of the city of Manchester responsible for the allegedly wrongful granting of a tax abatement. McGranahan, therefore, was hardly a stranger to the proceedings. We hold that all statements contained in the civil pleadings in this matter are privileged and cannot be the basis for any action for defamation.