Opinion ID: 2175753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: explicit and demonstrable understanding between the two agencies/zone of interest of seizing officers

Text: I believe that these two factors are so closely related in the instant case that I will address them together. As I will explain below, I find that the facts in the instant record reveal a troubling nexus between the officers who seized the evidence and the Tax Fraud/State Police detective who initiated the tax proceeding. This nexus weighs in favor of applying the exclusionary rule. Here, the majority finds no evidence of bad faith, collusion between agencies, or unethical behavior on the part of the law enforcement agents.... MALLETT, J., ante at 236. The majority is ignoring the obvious. Since the times of Al Capone, law enforcement efforts have involved multiagency cooperative efforts. Even though there may be no bad faith on the part of the officers involved, there certainly may be a cooperative attitude among the various agencies. Common sense tells us that there must be a working and on-going cooperation between the agencies or else cases like this would not be instituted. [24] The appellee alleged in her brief to the Court of Appeals: There is considerable proof that at least in Michigan, there is a coordinated effort between criminal prosecutions, civil forfeiture actions and tax assessments such as the instant one. The officer who seizes drugs and money has indeed contemplated the subsequent aspect of civil penalties that are part of the all out war against drugs. Even though no specific proof of cooperation or collusion was produced in this case, the record does reveal curious facts. For instance, the illegal search occurred on July 7, 1989, by officers assigned to the Western Wayne Narcotics Team. Officer Robert Manes, after being duly sworn, stated in his affidavit: 1. I am a Detective Sergeant employed by the Michigan State Police and assigned to the Tax Fraud Division of the Michigan Department of Treasury. 2. That I make the within Affidavit based upon personal knowledge. 3. That in the course of my assignment, I was contacted by law enforcement officers assigned to the Western Wayne Narcotics Team and advised of the arrest of Dianne [sic] Lee Kivela. Said contact occurring on or about September 18, 1989. 4. That I was further advised that Kivela had been charged with the sale of marijuana and was requested to check to determine whether or not she had paid any taxes as a result of said sales. 5. That I checked the records of the Department of Treasury.... 6. That as a result of this check, I further determined that the said Dianne Lee Kivela had never registered with the Department of Treasury for sales, use or withholding tax. 7. That I obtained certain ledgers from the Western Wayne Narcotics Team which were seized during the execution of the search warrant on July 7, 1989.... [Emphasis added.] The criminal charges were dismissed on September 27, 1989. When constitutional rights are at issue, we should not be blind to reality. Here, it was the Western Wayne Narcotics Team that contacted the Tax Fraud Division, in particular, a detective of the Michigan State Police who was assigned on a regular basis to the Department of Treasury. The Department of Treasury did not need to track this case down, because the officers who did the actual illegal search came to the Department of Treasury. As Governor Engler has now merely made official, the Tax Fraud Division apparently was in reality closely connected to the Department of State Police. Moreover, the Tax Fraud Division, as initially represented by Michigan State Police Detective Manes, was on the case within two and one-half months  a full week and one-half before the criminal charges were dismissed because of the unconstitutional search warrant. If this does not show that the Western Wayne Narcotics Team members had tax consequences in mind at the time that they were pursuing the criminal prosecution, I do not know what would. Moreover, this was not an isolated incident of the police officers who conducted the search and seizure contacting the Department of Treasury. [25] For example, in Garcia v Treasury Dep't, 6 MTTR 466, 468 (Docket No. 120484, June 12, 1990), a department auditor indicated that it is common procedure for the police to contact the department in order to inquire as to the department's possible interest in `doing a tax case' so as to back up the forfeiture [action]. The facts in this case reveal a nexus that is simply too close for comfort when constitutional rights are at stake. [26] I would weigh the zone of primary interest factor in this case in favor of applying the exclusionary rule. Admittedly, the explicit and demonstrable understanding factor is too ambiguous on these facts to clearly weigh in either direction. III I would hold that under the federal authority, the balancing test factors clearly weigh more heavily in favor of applying the exclusionary rule. I am most persuaded by the criminal nature of jeopardy assessments and fraud penalties, and by the actual connection between the seizing officers and the Tax Fraud/State Police detective and the division of the Department of Treasury. The incremental deterrent effect is substantial and undeniably outweighs the slight societal cost of delaying tax assessment proceedings until the case can proceed through the ordinary tax collection procedures. There would be no cost to society of the ultimate collection of the revenue from the ordinary taxes from sales, use, income, and single business assessments because such taxes may be appropriately pursued through the normal civil tax proceedings that govern all citizens. See Wolf, supra at 194. The only cost would be the loss of the fraud penalty assessments and of the timing of the collection because of the accelerated jeopardy collection mechanism. These costs are slight because the primary source of revenue has not been impeded. However, in cases that arose after the effective date of Governor Engler's reorganization order, no balancing test will be required because the seizing officers and the tax agents are now members of the same agency. The deterrent effect would no longer be incremental; it would be primary because the very agency violating the individual's constitutional rights would be punished by precluding the use of the evidence in civil tax proceedings as well as suppressing the evidence in criminal proceedings. [27] All would not be lost to society, because the government would be allowed to attempt to secure independent nontainted evidence to support applicable tax assessments. [28] Therefore, I would affirm the result of the Court of Appeals decision.