Opinion ID: 2631133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Miscellaneous Constitutional Issues

Text: Defendant asserts California's death penalty law is unconstitutional on several grounds, requesting that we reconsider our prior decisions rejecting these same arguments. We decline to do so. We summarize below the holdings of those decisions. The trial court need not instruct on a `presumption of life' at the penalty phase of trial. ( People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 321, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 30, 132 P.3d 235.) The federal Constitution does not require the penalty phase jury's written findings or unanimous agreement on the existence of aggravating circumstances ( People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 641, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 115 P.3d 472), and the absence of these requirements in California's death penalty law does not deprive a capital defendant of meaningful appellate review ( People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 939, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494). California's death penalty law comports with the Eighth Amendment's requirement of narrowing because the special circumstances narrowly define the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. ( People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 904-905, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15; People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 467-468, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808.) Section 190.3, factor (a), allowing the penalty phase jury to take into account the circumstances of the offense and the existence of any special circumstances found true, is not unconstitutionally vague. ( People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 192, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) California's death penalty law is not unconstitutional in not requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt or a preponderance of the evidence as to the existence of aggravating circumstances, the greater weight of aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances, or the appropriateness of a death sentence. ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401, 15 Cal. Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) Therefore, it follows that the trial court here did not err in not instructing on the burden of proof. (See People v. Perry, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 321, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 30, 132 P.3d 235.) Intercase proportionality review is not constitutionally required. [Citation.] Nor does equal protection require that capital defendants be afforded the same sentence review afforded other felons under the determinate sentencing law. ( People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 940, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494.) The terms extreme and substantial as used in section 190.3 have commonsense meanings that the jury may be expected to use in applying the instructions. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 189, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) The use of the word `extreme' in section 190.3, factor (d) (`extreme mental or emotional disturbance') does not preclude consideration of mitigating evidence in violation of the Constitution. ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1078, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68; see also People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 188-189, 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 [factor (g) (`extreme duress or ... substantial domination of another person') ].) The use of the phrase whether or not in certain factors (e.g., section 190.3, factor (d), [w]hether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance) does not suggest that the absence of such factors amount[s] to aggravation. ( People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1078-1079, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) `[P]rosecutorial discretion to select those eligible cases in which the death penalty will actually be sought does not in and of itself evidence an arbitrary and capricious capital punishment system or offend principles of equal protection, due process, or cruel and/or unusual punishment.'  ( People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1024, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248, quoting People v. Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 505, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081.) And the [California] death penalty law does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers by delegating sentencing authority to the prosecutor. Ultimate sentencing power remains at all times with the judicial branch. (Ibid.) Our rejection of defendant's arguments is not affected by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 and Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435. (See People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 571-572, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417; People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 642, 134 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 453-454, 110 Cal. Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.)