Opinion ID: 2087736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: PUC's Standard of Review

Text: Having considered the PUC's jurisdiction to review the Providence ordinance, we now turn to the outcome of that review as embodied in the PUC's order and decision. The city argued that even if the PUC had jurisdiction to review the ordinance, the commission should have applied an arbitrary and capricious standard in conducting that review. The utilities countered that the PUC's standard of review was determined by § 39-1-30 and that the commission properly applied the public interest standard called for by the statute. The statute directs that when the PUC reviews a municipal ordinance, the commission shall determine the matter giving consideration to its effect upon the public health, safety, welfare, comfort, and convenience. It is clear and unambiguous that the Legislature intended that the PUC use a public interest standard in reviewing municipal ordinances and regulations. It is also clear that here the PUC misconstrued its obligations under that statutory standard. At the close of its decision, the PUC nullified every part of the Providence ordinance and regulations, with the exception of the $40 A & E fee. As a result, the city was left with no enforceable standard to govern the excavation or reconstruction of its streets. In fact, even the provisions of the ordinance requiring excavators to receive a permit were nullified. To exercise some control over street excavation, Providence was forced to petition this Court for an order allowing the city to enforce the previous ordinance and regulations that had governed street excavation. It is apparent that the public health, safety, welfare, comfort, and convenience were not advanced by the PUC's nearly absolute nullification of the ordinance. It is our opinion that the city requires more freedom to control the issuance of excavation permits than was afforded by the nullification of its ordinance. We arc not convinced that a compromise settlement between the city and the utilities cannot be achieved, as has occurred with Cranston. If such a reconciliation proves impossible upon remand, rather than completely nullifying the ordinance and regulations, the commission after factfinding should set aside only those provisions of the ordinance and regulations that unduly or unreasonably burden or restrict the ability of the utilities to perform necessary tasks. In its decision, the PUC apparently gave little or no weight to the legitimate interests and statutory responsibilities of the city in properly maintaining its roadways. In addressing this matter on remand, the commission must act not only to protect the utilities and their rate payers but also must preserve the city's statutorily mandated interest in regulating street excavation. The fact that the commission nullified virtually every provision of the Providence ordinance is puzzling, given its approval of the utilities' settlement following their challenge to Cranston's similar ordinance and regulations. Many of the provisions of the Providence ordinance that the commission found to be damaging to the public interest were included in the Cranston settlement. For example, the settlement with Cranston provided that under some circumstances the city could require utilities to use flowable fill and infra-red repairs, and the settlement contemplated the imposition of a moratorium on excavation, all hotly contested elements of the Providence ordinance and regulations. Further, the settlement permitted a $75 permit fee, almost twice the $40 A & E fee that the commission allowed Providence to impose. Although the settlement did not impose a degradation index fee, it did require the utilities to guarantee all road reconstruction for a five-year period. If these provisions of the Cranston settlement were in the interest of the public, then surely some similar provisions of the Providence ordinance and regulations would have served the public interest.