Opinion ID: 759248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Walker's Sentence

Text: 88 Walker received a statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment, based on the district court's conclusion that he had committed an offense involving more than 50 grams of cocaine base at a time when he had two prior final felony drug-offense convictions. [T]he Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986[, 100 Stat. 3207, 21 U.S.C. § 841 et seq.,] and subsequent legislation established a regime of extremely high penalties for the possession and distribution of so-called 'crack' cocaine. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 478, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). ADAA § 1002 created a new drug penalty classification for large-scale offenses involving certain narcotics, such as ... trafficking in more than one kilogram of heroin. For first-time offenders in these high-volume narcotics crimes, Congress authorized sentences of 10 years to life imprisonment. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 401, 111 S.Ct. 840, 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991). And, 21 U.S.C. § 841 mandates a term of life in prison without parole for a defendant convicted of committing a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) involving more than 50 grams of crack cocaine after two prior felony convictions for drug offenses have become final. 89 Section 841(a) makes it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Section 846 criminalizes a conspiracy to commit any offense defined in this subchapter[,] ... subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. 21 U.S.C. § 846. Walker was convicted of engaging in a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the object of which was the commission of a violation of section 841(a)(1), thus making him subject to the penalty provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). 90 Walker contends that he should not have received a life sentence, arguing that he had only one final prior felony conviction at the time he committed the first overt act in the conspiracy, because at the time, he had not been sentenced on one of his two felony drug convictions; collaterally, he contends, the cocaine in that first sale should not be included in the amount personally attributable to him, meaning that he is responsible for less than the 50-gram threshold specified in the statute. He also argues, alternatively, that it is inappropriate to aggregate the separate overt acts in the conspiracy to reach a 50-gram total; he should only be subject to a life sentence if a single transaction was for more than 50 grams. These disputes raise issues of statutory interpretation, and we therefore conduct de novo review. United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 482 (6th Cir.1998). 91 Central to an understanding of Walker's challenges is an understanding of the following chronology of his convictions for other felonies and his sales of controlled substances at issue in this case: Date Event 92 6/22/92 Walker pleads guilty to aggravated trafficking in drugs and 93 possession of criminal tools (case number 91 CR 621), a 94 state felony 95 1/3/93 Walker pleads guilty to drug abuse (case number 92 CR 793), a 96 state felony 97 3/24/93 Walker receives a suspended sentence and two years of 98 probation on the aggravated-trafficking charge 26 99 4/9/93 Walker sells 5.5 grams of crack cocaine 100 4/21/93 Walker receives a suspended sentence and two years of 101 probation on the drug-abuse charge 102 4/30/93 Walker sells 5.8 grams of crack cocaine 103 8/11/93 Walker sells 22.8 grams of crack cocaine 104 9/1/93 Walker sells 19.7 grams of crack cocaine 105
106 We first consider whether Walker's April 9, 1993, sale is properly treated as having been made after two ... prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become final, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), since at the time Walker had pleaded guilty to both prior drug offenses but had been sentenced only on one. 107 [T]he meaning of the phrase 'have become final' in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) [i]s a question of federal law rather than state law. United States v. Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272, 1280 (5th Cir.1997). The statute itself contains no definition of the term final, see United States v. Howard, 115 F.3d 1151, 1158 (4th Cir.1997), and we therefore turn to the relevant case law. We find it well-settled that a prior conviction is final within the meaning of section 841(b) when the time for taking a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction has expired. See id.; United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1163 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ----, 118 S.Ct. 78, 79, 139 L.Ed.2d 37 (1997), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 720, 139 L.Ed.2d 659 (1998); cf. United States v. Hughes, 924 F.2d 1354, 1359 (6th Cir.1991). 108 In accordance with Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(A), a criminal defendant must file a direct appeal within thirty days after sentence is imposed. See OHIO REV.CODE ANN.APP. R. 4(A). Walker did not file an appeal from this second conviction, and accordingly, the conviction became final on May 21, 1993, well after two of the four sales he was held accountable for, amounting to 11.3 grams of the total 53.8 grams of cocaine base directly attributable to him during this conspiracy. 109 Therefore, Walker's second prior conviction was not a final conviction at the time of this conspiracy, and on April 9, 1993, the date he committed the first overt act of the conspiracy. 110 Having resolved that much, we must now consider the legal effect of this conclusion. Walker has urged that any cocaine sold prior to the time both convictions became final should not be included in the calculation of the total amount sold, and that therefore, he was not responsible for selling 50 grams, and the statutory sentence has not been triggered. There is no question that this reasoning has a certain appeal, as a plausible means to avoid what is a Draconian sentence. But to follow this route would be to ignore the logic of a conspiracy charge. While it is true that the conspiracy came into existence before the second conviction was final, it is also indisputably true that Walker continued to be involved in the conspiracy after both prior convictions were final. Thus, he 'committed' the crime of conspiracy throughout the duration of the conspiracy. Lovell, 16 F.3d at 497. And therefore, it must be said that Walker committed the crime of conspiracy after he had two final felony drug-offense convictions. 111 Walker's argument would require that we give unwarranted legal significance to the date of each overt act. But Walker was not charged with four discrete violations of the drug laws, one for each sale. He was charged with a single, ongoing conspiracy. He committed the conspiracy every day over the life of the agreement, and the timing of each separate overt act is not controlling. We conclude, therefore, that Walker committed a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 at a time that he had two prior final convictions. We also conclude that the violation involved more than 50 grams of cocaine base. Therefore, the district court properly applied the statutory sentence mandated by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 112
113 What we have said above effectively answers Walker's contention that a conspiracy conviction involving multiple sales that together total more than 50 grams does not constitute a violation within the meaning of the statute. We disagree because, as we have said, a conspiracy is a single violation of the drug laws, and the fact that this particular conspiracy was characterized by separate transactions is a fact of no legal significance. We note, too, that Walker's reliance on our decision in United States v. Winston, 37 F.3d 235 (6th Cir.1994), is misplaced because of important factual distinctions. 114 In Winston, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and of two counts of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in the amount of 23.4 grams and 37 grams each. Winston was arrested when his codefendant sold 23.4 grams of crack cocaine to a confidential informant, and the codefendant informed authorities that he had gotten the crack from Winston. The police obtained a search warrant for Winston's house, where they found 37 grams more of crack. 115 Following his conviction, Winston was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). As an initial matter, this court held as follows: 116 It is obvious from the statute's face--from its use of the phrase a violation--that this section refers to a single violation. Thus, where a defendant violates subsection (a) more than once, possessing less than 50 grams of cocaine base on each separate occasion, subsection (b) does not apply, for there is no single violation involving 50 grams or more of cocaine base. This is true even if the sum total of the cocaine base involved all together, over the multiple violations, amounts to more than 50 grams. 117 Id. at 240. 118 The court then considered the precise charges against Winston, and noted that only the conspiracy charge was a charge involving 50 grams or more of crack--to be precise, 50.4 grams--as the other two substantive charges involved 23.4 and 37 grams. Thus, it concluded only this first charge can trigger the imposition of a life sentence pursuant to this section. Id. at 241. But although the indictment had charged a conspiracy involving 50 grams, the government had not proved that such a conspiracy existed: When sentencing ..., the lower court expressly found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conspiracy ... involved only the 23 grams of cocaine base sold by Winston's codefendant to the CI. Id. Further, 119 [t]here was no evidence linking the conspiracy to the 37 grams found at Winston's house. The government conceded at oral argument that there was no evidence that the defendants had sold drugs together before, and that there was a problem with the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the claim that the count one conspiracy involved more than 50 grams of cocaine. It follows that, despite the language in the indictment describing an amount of cocaine base in excess of 50 grams, the amount of drugs that the court determined to be involved in the conspiracy was insufficient to justify the imposition of an enhanced sentence.... 120 Id. 121 We conclude that not only does Winston not aid Walker, it in fact compels a result unfavorable to him. The Winston court made clear that a conspiracy involving more than 50 grams would have been a violation within the meaning of section 841(b)(1); further, it did not suggest that there was any barrier to aggregating the separate overt acts of the conspiracy to reach a total of 50 grams. See United States v. Pruitt, 156 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir.1998). And unlike in Winston, there is no dispute here regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the conspiracy involved a total of more than 50 grams. The Winston court held that the sole barrier to sentencing under section 841(b)(1) was that the particular conspiracy charged and proven involved less than 50 grams. Implicit in this reasoning is the counterfactual: if the conspiracy had involved 50 or more grams, the enhanced sentence would have been appropriate. In the course of his membership in this conspiracy, Walker was directly responsible for selling more than 50 grams, and the statutory life sentence was therefore necessarily imposed.
122
123 As we have mentioned, Walker pleaded guilty in the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, on June 22, 1992, to the state-law offense of aggravated trafficking in drugs and possession of criminal tools. At the guilty-plea hearing, Walker was represented by attorney Michael Morley. 124 Walker now argues that this conviction was constitutionally defective, and therefore cannot be a predicate for the imposition of the statutory mandatory sentence. Specifically, he contends that his plea was neither knowing nor voluntary. In considering and ultimately rejecting Walker's challenge to the constitutionality of this conviction, the district court found as follows:A Plea Form was submitted to Walker during the change of plea hearing which he completed and signed. The judge personally addressed Walker and explained the sentence he could receive for the entry of a guilty plea; inquired as to whether he was coerced; whether the elements of the offense were explained to him by counsel and that he was entitled to a confront [sic] witnesses against him during a trial by jury. Walker was asked by the judge whether he understood everything on the Plea Form to which he replied Yes, Your Honor. [The trial judge] also inquired whether he had any questions, to which Walker replied, No, Sir. 125 The district court further found that [t]he plea hearing transcript reveals that the court inquired as to whether Walker read and understood the plea form before he signed it. Walker unequivocally stated ... that Morley went over the plea form with him and that he understood the elements of the charge. The court also found as follows: 126 On July 24, 1995, Michael Morley testified before this Court during an evidentiary sentencing hearing that he had counseled Walker concerning [his guilty plea]. Morley testified that he advised Walker that the State had a strong case against him and that he would try to have the charges reduced so they would be probationable. Morley further testified that Walker is a bright young man, and that he fully understood his options before entering guilty pleas. Morley stated that he went over the agreement with Walker line by line until Walker understood the form completely. 127 The district court rejected as not credible Walker's testimony that he did not wish to enter a guilty plea, that he advised Morley that he wanted to go to trial, and that Morley did not go over the Plea Form with him, but merely told him where to sign it. The court noted, however, that Walker and Morley did agree on one point: Walker is a bright young man. 128
129 Walker here criticizes the state court judge who took the guilty plea for failing to inquire into Walker's educational level or whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Further, Walker argues, his answers during the colloquy were simply, Yes, your Honor, without further elaboration, and therefore, they provide an insufficient basis for concluding that his plea was knowing and voluntary. Finally, he complains that the state court did not establish a factual basis for the plea, and did not identify the elements of the offense. 130 Under 21 U.S.C. § 851(c), a defendant subject to enhanced sentencing on the basis of a prior conviction is permitted to challenge the constitutionality of that conviction: 131 (1) If the person denies any allegation of the information of prior conviction, or claims that any conviction alleged is invalid, he shall file a written response to the information.... The court shall hold a hearing to determine any issues raised by the response which would except the person from increased punishment.... The hearing shall be before the court without a jury and either party may introduce evidence. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the United States attorney shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of fact. At the request of either party, the court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. 132 (2) A person claiming that a conviction alleged in the information was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States shall set forth his claim, and the factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response to the information. The person shall have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on any issue of fact raised by the response. 133 21 U.S.C. § 851(c). 134 It is well-established that [o]nce the government establishes the fact of a prior conviction based upon a guilty plea, the defendant must prove the invalidity of the conviction by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Barlow, 17 F.3d 85, 89 (5th Cir.1994) (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 32-34, 113 S.Ct. 517, 525, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992)); see 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(2). Thus, the district court's conclusion that a plea is voluntary is to some degree a factual finding, subject to review for clear error. See Barlow, 17 F.3d at 89; Dorrough v. United States, 385 F.2d 887, 893 (5th Cir.1967); see also United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir.1991). Obviously, however, the ultimate question whether a plea was voluntary requires a legal conclusion, one reached by applying legal rules to facts. United States v. Wildes, 910 F.2d 1484, 1486 (7th Cir.1990). Our review of this ultimate question is, therefore, de novo. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343,1352 (11th Cir.1993); see also Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.1995). 135 There is no requirement that in order to rely on a defendant's answers in a guilty-plea colloquy to conclude that the defendant pleaded guilty knowingly and voluntarily, those answers must be lengthy and all-encompassing; a straightforward and simple Yes, your Honor is sufficient to bind a defendant to its consequences. Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). The defendant simply has not presented sufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance that his plea was other than knowing and voluntarily; he cannot overcome his affirmations at the plea hearing that his counsel had informed him of the elements of the crime, and that he understood his rights. While it is true that the state court proceedings did not set forth a factual basis for the plea, that is not constitutionally required; further, the plea form that Walker affirmed he understood recited the elements. Walker has not presented anything to lead this court to believe that a factual basis was actually lacking; there is no reason to suspect, that is, that he was not pleading guilty for any reason other than that he actually was guilty. 136 We conclude, therefore, that there is nothing constitutionally infirm about the state-court conviction following his guilty plea to aggravated trafficking, and there was no constitutional bar to the district court's use of the conviction as a predicate under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).