Opinion ID: 803964
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preemption Generally

Text: To determine whether a state or local law is preempted by federal law, we look to Congress's intent. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (congressional intent is the ultimate touchstone of preemption analysis) (internal quotation marks omitted). When Congress expressly codifies its preemptive intent in statutory form, our analysis 'begins with the language of the statute.' Jones v. Vilsack, 272 F.3d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 536 (2001)); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993). We assume that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 532 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985). -14- The existence of an express preemption clause, however, does not immediately end the inquiry because the question of the substance and scope of Congress'[s] displacement of state law still remains. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008). Accordingly, courts may look to the statute as a whole to determine the extent to which Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative field. Id.; accord In re WTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d 352, 372 (2d Cir. 2005) (If the text of the statute is ambiguous . . . as to the extent of an intended preemption, the meaning of the statute may be gleaned from its context and from the statutory scheme as a whole, or by resort to the normal canons of construction and legislative history.); see also Reilly, 533 U.S. at 541 (State action may be foreclosed . . . by implication from the depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field . . . .); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983) (considering the plain language . . . , the structure of the Act, and its legislative history). -15- We assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention clear and manifest. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord N.Y. State Restaurant Ass'n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2009) ([W]here the text of a preemption clause is ambiguous or open to more than one plausible reading, courts have a duty to accept the reading that disfavors preemption.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 3. Preemption of State-Mandated Cigarette Warnings The labeling requirement and preemption provision of the Labeling Act express Congress's determination that the prescribed federal warnings are both necessary and sufficient to achieve its purpose of informing the public of the health consequences of smoking. Altria, 555 U.S. at 79. Accordingly, states may not require that additional warnings be displayed by the manufacturer. See id. [B]oth of the Act's purposes are furthered by prohibiting States -16- from supplementing the federally prescribed warning . . . . Id. In Vango Media, Inc. v. City of New York, this Court invalidated one such effort to supplement federal warnings. 34 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1994). There, a City ordinance required that one public health message pertaining to the dangers of smoking be displayed for every four tobacco advertisements displayed on top of taxi cabs. Id. at 70. We held that this was a requirement with respect to advertising, and therefore preempted by the Labeling Act. Id. at 73-75. Although the ordinance did not impact the appearance of the advertisements themselves, it impose[d] conditions on [the] display of cigarette advertisements. Id. at 74-75. We held that Congress intended to preempt any local law that treads on the area of tobacco advertising, even if it does so only at the edges. Id. at 74.