Opinion ID: 4510490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failing to Warn Mr. Smart

Text: The plaintiffs also argue that Officers Froese and Chaffee failed to warn Mr. Smart before shooting him. Construing the facts in favor of the plaintiffs, Gutierrez, 841 F.3d at 900, we credit Officer Froese’s testimony on this point and assume neither officer warned Mr. Smart before opening fire. Even so, no clearly established law required such a warning in this situation. The Supreme Court has held that “where feasible, some warning [must be] given” before an officer may constitutionally use deadly force against a suspect threatening to inflict serious physical harm. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12 (emphasis added). But the Supreme Court and this court have consistently qualified this requirement as applying only where “feasible” or “practical.” See, e.g., Samuel v. City of Broken Arrow, 506 F. App’x 751, 754 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“Finally, it is clear that ‘some warning’ must be given before an officer uses deadly force if ‘feasible.’” (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12)); Thomson v. Salt Lake Cty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1321 (10th Cir. 2009) (“A warning is not invariably required even before the use of deadly force . . . .”). We have not previously had occasion to address whether officers must give a verbal warning before engaging a suspect in a situation involving, as this one did, an active shooter in a crowded public place.12 But other courts have not required such a 12 None of the cases the plaintiffs cite gives meaningful guidance to officers engaging a perceived active shooter running through a large, chaotic crowd of 23 warning when officers are faced with rapidly evolving circumstances involving deadly threats. See, e.g., Molina-Gomes v. Welinski, 676 F.3d 1149, 1152–53 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding officer’s decision to fire on driver without warning was objectively reasonable where driver sped backwards, dragging another officer along and knocking him to the ground); Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1269 (11th Cir. 2003) (declining to require warning where, “[i]n a split-second, rapidly escalating situation involving perceived deadly force . . . [an officer] acted in an objectively reasonable manner to the apparent imminent threat to his fellow officer to save his life”); McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1994) (declining “to fashion an inflexible rule that, in order to avoid civil liability, an officer must always warn his suspect before firing—particularly where, as here, such a warning might easily have cost the officer his life”). Because no relevant authority required the officers to give a warning under these circumstances, even assuming the officers failed to warn Mr. Smart before opening fire, we cannot conclude their failure to do so violated clearly established law. 3. Shooting Mr. Smart After It Became Apparent He Posed No Threat Finally, the plaintiffs argue a reasonable jury could find that Officer Chaffee violated clearly established law by shooting Mr. Smart after it became clear he posed people. See Lee v. Tucker, 904 F.3d 1145, 1150 n.1 (10th Cir. 2018) (involving the use of a taser on an unarmed suspect during a domestic dispute); Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, 625 F.3d 661, 662–63 (10th Cir. 2010) (involving the use of a taser on a suspect who “may have had a knife and was verbally and physically noncooperative” during a welfare check after a domestic dispute). 24 no threat. We agree and therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this point with respect to Officer Chaffee. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could conclude Officer Chaffee shot Mr. Smart after it became clear Mr. Smart no longer posed a threat. Mr. Wheaton described Mr. Smart as lying “on the ground [with] arms stretched out . . . looking back [shaking] his head . . . like I give up or something,” when Officer Chaffee fired his final shots.13 App. at 201. The plaintiffs’ biomechanics expert opined Mr. Smart’s bullet wounds could not have been inflicted while he was hunched forward as Officers Froese and Chaffee described Mr. Smart’s posture when fleeing. Also, the plaintiffs’ medical expert explained that Mr. Smart’s three “shored” bullet wounds indicated he had been shot three times in the back, while on the ground. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that by the time Officer Chaffee fired his final shots, Mr. Smart was lying face down on the ground with his arms stretched out, was unarmed, and had time to “look[] back” at Officer Chaffee and shake his head. App. at 201. A reasonable jury could also 13 Mr. Wheaton described the officer who fired the final shots as “tall” and “slim,” and he testified he saw only Officer Froese shoot Mr. Smart. App. at 199. Based on this testimony, the officers argue it is a mischaracterization of Mr. Wheaton’s testimony to take it as evidence that Officer Chaffee shot Mr. Smart after he fell. We disagree. Drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, we interpret Mr. Wheaton’s testimony as referring to Officer Chaffee’s actions. This is reasonable given that Mr. Wheaton did not know either officer and identifying this officer as Officer Chaffee is consistent with every other account in the record. Thus, we credit Mr. Wheaton’s testimony as evidence that an officer fired these final shots, and we look to other witnesses’ accounts to infer that that officer was Officer Chaffee. 25 conclude, based on the witnesses’ testimony that they had time to perceive Mr. Smart no longer posed a threat, that Officer Chaffee likewise had the opportunity to perceive that any threat had passed by the time he fired his final shots. We addressed a similar situation in Fancher v. Barrientos, 723 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2013), where a suspect jumped into an officer’s patrol car which contained two loaded guns. As the officer reached in and tried to remove his keys from the ignition, the suspect shifted the vehicle into reverse. Id. at 1196–97. The officer shot the suspect in the chest, saw the suspect slump, and concluded he had hit the suspect. Id. at 1197. The car began to roll backwards, so the officer stepped out of the way. But then, “five to seven seconds” later, the officer fired a second series of shots, killing the suspect. Id. The district court denied qualified immunity as to the second series of shots. Id. at 1193. We affirmed, reasoning the suspect was clearly incapacitated by the time the officer fired the second series of shots, and the officer had “enough time . . . to recognize and react to the changed circumstances and cease firing his gun.” Id. at 1201 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). Similarly, here, the plaintiffs point to several circumstances that, if true, could have put Officer Chaffee on notice that Mr. Smart posed no threat: Mr. Smart fell to the ground, had his arms outstretched with his empty hands visible, and looked back at Officer Chaffee and shook his head. And other eyewitnesses who, just like Officer Chaffee, were in the midst of a chaotic situation, had time to perceive that Mr. Smart did not pose a threat. Therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Chaffee violated Mr. Smart’s right to be free from excessive force by firing the final 26 shots at Mr. Smart after Officer Chaffee had had “enough time . . . to recognize and react to” the fact that Mr. Smart no longer posed a threat (if in fact he ever did pose a threat). Id. (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). Turning now to the second prong of qualified immunity, “it is . . . clearly established that officers may not continue to use force against a suspect who is effectively subdued.” Perea, 817 F.3d at 1204; see also McCoy, 887 F.3d at 1050 n.19 (“[F]orce justified at the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial force has been eliminated.” (alteration in original) (quoting Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 481 (4th Cir. 2005))); Herrera v. Bernalillo Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 361 F. App’x 924, 929 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished); Gouskos v. Griffith, 122 F. App’x 965, 977 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished); Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1463 (10th Cir. 1991).14 Thus, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Officer Chaffee violated clearly established law if he shot Mr. Smart after it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the perceived threat had passed. 14 Perea and McCoy post-dated the events in this case, so our holdings in those cases, standing alone, could not have given the officers notice that their conduct violated clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014); McCoy v. Meyers, 887 F.3d 1034, 1053 n.24 (10th Cir. 2018) (“The dispositive clearly established law inquiry is whether the preexisting law gave adequate notice that the complained of conduct was unconstitutional.”). But both Perea and McCoy dealt with events in 2011 (that is, prior to the events in this case) and, citing case law pre-dating those events, determined that it violated clearly established law to use force against a suspect who has ceased to be a threat. See Perea v. Baca, 817 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2016); McCoy, 887 F.3d at 1038, 1053 & n.24. 27 To be sure, the mere fact that a suspect has fallen and been disarmed does not necessarily mean an officer acts unreasonably by firing additional shots. See Untalan v. City of Lorain, 430 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Within a few seconds of reasonably perceiving a sufficient danger, officers may use deadly force even if in hindsight the facts show that the persons threatened could have escaped unharmed.”). Courts are particularly deferential to the split-second decisions police must make in determining precisely when a deadly threat has passed. See, e.g., id.; Troupe v. Sarasota Cty., Fla., 419 F.3d 1160, 1168 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Even if in hindsight the facts show that the SWAT Team could have escaped unharmed, a reasonable officer could [still] have perceived that [the suspect] posed a threat of serious physical harm.”). If Officer Chaffee shot Mr. Smart even though in retrospect Mr. Smart no longer posed a threat, a jury might still conclude that Officer Chaffee acted reasonably: there might not have been enough time for Officer Chaffee to safely conclude that Mr. Smart posed no further threat.15 But the evidence here, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, would also allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Officer Chaffee should have reacted to the changed circumstances and stopped shooting. Because this version of events would involve a violation of clearly 15 On this note, the officers point to expert testimony about a “reactionary gap”—a delay between stimulus and response during which an officer must observe that a threat has passed, orient to the new situation, decide what to do, and then physically stop shooting at the threat. While this evidence may be relevant to a jury’s determination whether Officer Chaffee acted reasonably under the circumstances, it does not inform our inquiry at the summary judgment stage into whether, “as a matter of law, . . . the risk of physical harm . . . that supported the first shot[s] still existed at the time of the [final shots].” Harris v. Pittman, 927 F.3d 266, 274 (4th Cir. 2019). 28 established law, the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Officer Chaffee’s final shots. B. Reconsideration of Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims The plaintiffs argue for the first time in their reply brief that if we reverse the district court’s dismissal of their § 1983 claim, we should also “direct the district court to ‘reconsider its decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over [their] state law claims.’” Reply Br. at 26 (alteration in original) (quoting Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1222 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005)). It is true that when we reverse a district court’s dismissal of a federal law claim, we often also direct the district court to reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims it dismissed along with the federal claim. See, e.g., Baca, 398 F.3d at 1222 n.4. Here, however, the plaintiffs have waived their right to have this issue reviewed on appeal. See In re: Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 872 F.3d 1094, 1110 n.4 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he general rule in this circuit is that a party waives issues and arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)); cf. United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, No. 2:99-CV-00086, 2007 WL 3053266, at  (D. Utah 2007) (declining to reconsider exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where neither party requested reconsideration nor appealed the decision). Because the plaintiffs failed to raise this issue until their reply brief, and because we have only one page of cursory briefing on whether the district court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims, we decline to consider their request. Instead, the 29 plaintiffs are free to request reconsideration (to the extent the rules permit) in subsequent proceedings before the district court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).