Opinion ID: 446623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Consent Search/Miranda Issue

Text: 23 Ritter contends that Agent Nicely should have given him Miranda warnings before requesting permission to look in the car trunk and handle the packages contained therein. There is, however, no basis for the suggestion that a request to search must be preceded by Miranda warnings, or that the lack of prior Miranda warnings vitiates a consent to search. United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 472 (9th Cir.1977) (a consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement toward which the fifth amendment is directed), accord Tremayne v. Nelson, 537 F.2d 359, 360-61 (9th Cir.1976). 24 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the Supreme Court refused to impose a knowing and intelligent waiver standard in consent search situations. The Court pointed out the vast difference between the rights protected by Miranda, which go to the essence of a fair trial, and those protected by the fourth amendment, namely, the right to privacy and to be left alone. Id. at 242, 93 S.Ct. at 2055. 25 Unlike fourth amendment rights, Miranda rights affect the integrity of the truth finding process in a criminal trial. Thus, there is the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. But fourth amendment rights are of a wholly different order, and have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial. Id. The Supreme Court refused to require that a warning of the fourth amendment right to refuse consent be given before consent is requested. Id. at 231-32, 93 S.Ct. at 2049-2050. It would, therefore, make little sense to require that Miranda warnings, which advise one of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, be given by police before requesting consent. 26 To validate a consent search, the government must demonstrate that the consent was voluntary. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct. at 2058-2059. Whether Miranda warnings were given is one factor for the court to consider. See generally United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); United States v. Perez, 644 F.2d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir.1981). 27 The absence of Miranda warnings is not, however, dispositive of whether an individual voluntarily consented to a search. Hubbard v. Jeffes, 653 F.2d 99, 103-04 (3rd Cir.1981); accord United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1218 n. 10 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Tobin, 576 F.2d 687, 695 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051, 99 S.Ct. 731, 58 L.Ed.2d 711 (1978); United States v. Garcia, 496 F.2d 670, 673 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 960, 95 S.Ct. 1347, 43 L.Ed.2d 436 (1975). See also United States v. Kunkel, 417 F.2d 299 (9th Cir.1969) (no merit in defendant's contentions where he had signed consent form, and failed to object to admission of evidence at trial). 28 In this case, Ritter does not contest the voluntariness of his consent to the search of his car trunk. In fact, he concedes that he readily gave Agent Nicely permission to look in the trunk. (Appellant's Opening Brief at 6.) Therefore, there is no legal basis on which he can challenge the validity of the consent search, and the denial of the motion to suppress the fruits of that search is upheld. 29