Opinion ID: 732155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bolton's Criminal Record

Text: Smith alleges that the government committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose an informant's criminal record. The informant, Byron Bolton (Bolton), lied about his record at trial. The government did not reveal this information until approximately ten months later. Smith contends that this information could have impeached the informant's testimony. See United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1198 (9th Cir.1995) (A Brady violation occurs when the government withholds material, exculpatory evidence.); see also Bagley v. Lumpkin, 798 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that Brady obligations include a duty to produce impeachment evidence). We review the district court's Brady determination de novo. Manning, 56 F.3d at 1198. In assessing a Brady violation, we must first ascertain the appropriate standard for materiality. This, in turn, hinges upon the prosecution's knowledge of the evidence. United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir.1989). Smith alleges that the government either knew, or should have known, of Bolton's record prior to trial. The district court determined that the government did not know, nor should it have known, about Bolton's criminal record. The district court then held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the impeachment material would have affected the outcome. Concluding that such a likelihood did not exist, the district court denied the motion for new trial. We review the district court's determinations for clear error. Id. at 454 (providing standard of review). Because the government was unaware, the exculpatory evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 455. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 455 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (1985)). Bolton's trial testimony was important to the prosecution. As a DEA informant, he contacted Smith and communicated with him throughout the investigation. The DEA monitored Bolton's activity until Smith's arrest. At trial, Bolton testified about Smith's extensive involvement in the transaction. The court ruled that much of Bolton's criminal history would have been admissible to impeach his testimony. This included Bolton's two misdemeanor convictions for crimes involving dishonesty or false statements. In addition, the defense could have utilized evidence that Bolton had lied at previous trials. However, even a thorough discounting of Bolton's testimony does not create a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. The government provided extensive evidence which did not hinge on Bolton's credibility. This included: a FBI agent's testimony corroborating Bolton's assertions about Smith's role in the agreement to supply cocaine; taped transcripts of conversations between Bolton and Smith's co-defendant, discussing Smith's role; and, evidence that Defendant arrived at the arranged location, rented a hotel room, and occupied it at the time that cocaine was being delivered. Even a complete impeachment of Bolton's testimony fails to undermine confidence in the outcome, and the district court correctly denied Smith's motion for a new trial.