Opinion ID: 6534253
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absence of mistake

Text: Hubbard contends that mistake is not an element of the offense and can only be at issue when the defendant raises it as a defense, such as admitting to the act but claiming a genuine mistake in the belief that the act was legal. Here, for example, mistake would have been at issue had Hubbard's defense been that he entered the home believing that he was attending a party or that he mistakenly went to the wrong home for dinner with friends. The State asserts that NRS 48.045 permits prior act evidence to prove absence of mistake or accident, and it is not necessary that the absence of mistake or accident occur on the part of the defendant. The State argues that absence of mistake was relevant because Hubbard claimed he was not present and was shot during an unrelated incident. For the absence of mistake or accident exception under NRS 48.045(2), we have stated that it applies when the evidence tends to show the defendant's knowledge of a fact material to the specific crime charged, such as knowledge of the controlled nature of a substance when such knowledge is an element of the charged offense. Cirillo v. State , 96 Nev. 489 , 492, 611 P.2d 1093 , 1095 (1980) ; cf. Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S. 62 , 69-70, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (observing that evidence that the child had previously been injured was probative on the question of the actor's intent because it showed the child's death resulted from an intentional act by someone and not from an accident regardless of whether the defendant raised the defense of accidental death at trial). Prior act evidence can also be used to rebut a defense of mistake or accident. See Newman v. State , 129 Nev. 222 , 231, 298 P.3d 1171 , 1178 (2013) (observing that proof of prior injuries or abuse may tend to disprove accidental injury, a common defense to a child abuse charge). Thus, the absence of mistake or accident exception may be relevant to proving either the mens rea (the defendant concedes performing the act but claims to have done so mistakenly or with innocent intent) or the actus rea (the defendant concedes harm or loss but argues it resulted from an accident and not of his agency). See Edward J. Imwinkelried,  An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, the Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 419 , 422 (2006). Absence of mistake or accident is grounded in the law of probabilities. Innocent persons sometimes accidentally become enmeshed in suspicious circumstances, but it is objectively unlikely that will happen over and over again by random chance. Id. at 423 . In this case, evidence of the 2012 burglary would be relevant to proving that Hubbard entered the home with a felonious intent rather than by mistake, under some misapprehension, or as an innocent victim of the circumstances surrounding the robbery. But the State did not make that argument for admission of the evidence under this exception, and instead asserted that the evidence was relevant to prove Hubbard was the perpetrator who was shot during the robbery and did not receive the wound during some unrelated accident. 2 Used in this way, the State is essentially trying to prove that Hubbard was correctly identified as the perpetrator. See United States v. Merriweather , 78 F.3d 1070 , 1077 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that absence of mistake on behalf of the government in identifying the perpetrator is not a legitimate basis to admit other acts evidence). Thus, as with intent, the prior act had little relevance on the issue of absence of mistake or accident by Hubbard where he claims he was not present. Given the lack of relevance that the 2012 burglary has to either intent or lack of mistake, it becomes clear that the evidence was instead being used for an impermissible propensity purpose, i.e., if Hubbard committed a burglary before, he must have done so in this case. Thus, the low probative value was substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice, and we conclude that the district court's admission of Davis' testimony regarding the 2012 burglary for purposes of proving intent or absence of mistake was a manifest abuse of discretion.