Opinion ID: 2586252
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Heading: Nelson's Claim of Negligent Entrustment Arises From Siuleo's Negligent Act.

Text: Alaska recognizes the common law tort of negligent entrustment and follows the definition in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965), which states: One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.[ [15] ] Nelson relies on our discussion of negligent entrustment in Ardinger v. Hummell [16] to support her claim that because negligent entrustment is considered an independent cause of action, it arises from the independent negligence of the entrusting defendant and is therefore complete upon the act of entrustment. In Ardinger, we noted that negligent entrustment is an independent cause of action against the [vehicle] owner and is not dependent on theories of agency, joint venture, or other forms of vicarious liability. [17] Nelson asserts that Form 9330 of the Progressive policy, which exempts from coverage claims that aris[e] from an accident or loss involving a vehicle . . . operated by the excluded person does not bar coverage because her claim arose at the moment the Uliseses entrusted their vehicle to Siuleo. In other words, Nelson contends that her claim arose before Siuleo began driving the vehicle. Ardinger does not go as far as Nelson would propose. Ardinger indicates that an entrustor need not actively participate in or direct the entrustee's actions in order to be held liable for foreseeable harm done by the entrustee. [18] This does not, however, mean that the entrustor's liability did not arise from the entrustee's negligence. The entrustee's act, and the resulting injury, are still required. [19] Nelson relies on the Kansas Supreme Court case of McCart v. Muir [20] to support her argument that liability for negligent entrustment arises from the act of entrustment, not the relationship of the parties. [21] Nelson's reliance is misplaced. In McCart, a jury found the father of a negligent driver liable for negligently entrusting a car to his son. [22] The issue in McCart was whether an entrustor must pay for an entrustee's portion of the total negligence in apportioning fault. Answering in the negative, McCart held that the jury should have been instructed on comparative negligence because [t]he nature and extent of negligence of the entrustor and entrustee are separate and distinct. The percentages of fault may be different in amount and should be determined separately. [23] McCart was concerned with comparative liability. Nowhere does McCart suggest that an entrustee's negligence in producing the injury is not a required element of the claim. On the contrary, the court noted all elements of negligent entrustment were shown: (1) the father . . . was instrumental in furnishing the motor vehicle to his son, Stephen; (2) the father knew or should have known Stephen was an incompetent driver; and (3) the negligence of Stephen in operating the vehicle was a cause of the damages.  [24] Several courts have concluded that where the entrustee's excluded act is a but for cause of the injury, the injury is not covered under any theory of liability. [25] The Ninth Circuit drew this same conclusion when interpreting Alaska law in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ellison. [26] In upholding an exclusion in a homeowner's policy for injuries arising out of the use of an airplane, the court stated: Negligent entrustment requires both negligent use by the entrustee and negligence by the entrustor. Recovery must depend on the ownership or the use of the excluded vehicle. [27] The Wisconsin Supreme Court echoed this reasoning in Bankert v. Threshermen's Mutual Insurance Co., [28] noting that [the] negligent entrustment [of an automobile] is irrelevant unless the person to whom [the vehicle] is entrusted acts in a negligent manner (creates an unreasonable risk) and in fact inflicts injury as the result of such conduct. [29] We cited Ellison with approval in Jones v. Horace Mann Insurance Co., [30] a case in which a plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to recover damages for negligent entrustment under a homeowner's policy that contained an exclusion covering motorized vehicles. [31] The victim in Jones was injured in an accident involving a snowmachine being operated by a ten-year old friend. The victim sued the driver's parents for negligent entrustment, and the homeowner's insurer denied coverage. The exclusion at issue read: This policy does not apply to bodily injury or property damage which results directly or indirectly from . . . the ownership, operation, maintenance, use, occupancy, renting, loaning, entrusting, supervision, loading or unloading of motorized vehicles . . . owned or operated by or rented or loaned to an insured. [32] We held that the policy did not cover the accident itself, and for that reason concluded that a change in the legal theory of liability did not give rise to coverage. [33] Nelson attempts to distinguish Jones from the present case by arguing that Jones involved an exclusion for a specific instrumentality (a snowmachine), whereas the case before us involves an exclusion for a specific driver (Siuleo Ulisese). This difference does not distinguish the case. Other jurisdictions considering negligent entrustment cases have consistently held that the analysis of exclusionary language is not limited to the type of policy at issue. [34] We therefore hold that any liability on the part of the Uliseses for their alleged negligent entrustment necessarily required the underlying negligence of Siuleo in operating the vehicle.