Opinion ID: 1259648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Riley-Knight-Wesley Case [9]

Text: In January of 1979, Thomas and Anthony Riley, David Knight, and Shelby Wesley were charged with the robbery of a store. All four defendants were initially represented by petitioner's office. The case was assigned to Attorney Bandy. Before trial, Thomas Riley filed a motion in propria persona requesting appointment of separate counsel. The motion was granted and his case was severed from the others. At the State Bar hearing, Bandy testified that if Riley had not filed his own conflict motion one would have been filed on his behalf. Bandy indicated that petitioner had authorized him to declare a conflict. David Knight went to trial with the remaining codefendants and all of them were represented by petitioner's office. Knight was convicted. On appeal, his conviction was reversed on the ground that he should have been provided with separate counsel. According to Bandy, the office policy at the time of the Riley-Knight-Wesley case was to declare conflicts only when the prospect existed that one codefendant would testify against another. The review department made no finding pertaining specifically to this case.
Petitioner advances two primary contentions. First, he asserts that he was denied due process of law in these proceedings because he had to proceed without counsel at the initial hearing on September 1, 1981. Second, he attacks the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the review department made its findings. These contentions are addressed in the order presented. Petitioner appeared at the September 1st hearing with Attorney Devaney. Devaney stated that he was not prepared to go forward on that date because he was uncertain as to whether he was ethically permitted to examine various confidential client communications which were in petitioner's files. Because of his concerns, Devaney had not yet examined those files. He requested a ruling on the question from the referee. When the referee ruled that confidentiality of client communications was waived in State Bar proceedings, Devaney sought a continuance to prepare for the hearing. Devaney was not formally counsel of record for petitioner. Absent a continuance, he stated he would withdraw from participating further in the proceedings. The referee refused to grant a continuance, because petitioner had had ample time to prepare for the hearing since he was served with the notice to show cause on May 26, 1981. Petitioner waited until only 12 or 13 days before the September 1st hearing to consult with an attorney. Thus, the referee ruled, Attorney Devaney's lack of preparation was due solely to petitioner's own failure to consult promptly with a lawyer after being served with the notice to show cause. The hearing proceeded with petitioner representing himself in propria persona. Petitioner continues to represent himself in this proceeding. (1) Petitioner's claim that he was prejudiced by the refusal of the referee to grant him a continuance on September 1st is without merit. As the referee noted, it was petitioner's own inaction for nearly three months which resulted in Attorney Devaney's inability to prepare for the initial hearing. Had petitioner sought representation earlier, the question of the confidentiality of the materials in his files would have been resolved in advance of the hearing date, either informally or through a formal ruling by the referee. [10] (2a) Though petitioner was not denied due process because of the absence of counsel, his due process rights may have been violated as a result of the referee's failure to rule on the State Bar's motion to amend the notice to show cause. As noted above, the State Bar sought to amend the notice to show cause prior to the September 1, 1981, hearing. (See ante, fn. 3.) The referee denied the request to amend, because petitioner had not received proper notice of the amendments. The State Bar filed a renewal of its motion to amend on September 4th. This second motion to amend was never ruled upon by the hearing panel. Nor, apparently, did the State Bar ever seek a ruling on the motion. (3) It is well established that [t]he license [to practice law] may not be arbitrarily taken away and the holder is entitled to procedural due process in any disciplinary proceedings relating thereto. ( Emslie v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 210, 228 [113 Cal. Rptr. 175, 520 P.2d 991].) This is also true where the State Bar seeks to discipline a member of the bar. ( Woodard v. State Bar (1940) 16 Cal.2d 755, 757 [108 P.2d 407].) In Woodard, after completion of the hearings and without moving to amend the notice to show cause to conform to proof, the State Bar recommended that Woodard be disciplined on charges not presented in the notice. This court disapproved the practice, noting that if the evidence showed violations additional to those not recited in the notice, the State Bar could move to amend the notice to conform to the proof. ( Ibid. ) (2b) In the present case, the State Bar did move to amend the notice. However, the referee never ruled on the motion, and the State Bar never sought to correct the error. Since the notice was not properly amended, the State Bar cannot impose discipline on any of the charges which were not contained in the original notice. This court's decision in Irving v. State Bar (1931) 213 Cal. 81 [1 P.2d 2] supports this conclusion. In that case, hearings were held on four verified complaints, each charging a violation of the same Rule of Professional Conduct. At the conclusion of the hearings, the State Bar examiner obtained leave to amend the complaints to charge a violation of an additional rule. Leave to amend was granted, but the amendments were never actually made. ( Id., at p. 83.) This court held that because no amendments in fact were made, ... the findings must rest on the charges filed [in the original complaints]. ( Id., at p. 85.) The same rule should apply here. Since leave to amend was never granted, only the charges contained in the original notice may be considered. [11] Next, the issue as to the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the review department's findings must be addressed. Of the nine findings of fact set forth by the review department, petitioner objects to all but one. (4) He bears the burden of showing that the findings of the State Bar are erroneous. ( In re Petty (1981) 29 Cal.3d 356, 360 [173 Cal. Rptr. 461, 627 P.2d 191].) (5) Petitioner first challenges the review department's finding No. 2. [12] He asserts that in the Nunez and Rojas matter he advised his clients of the conflict which existed and they specifically wished to have joint representation. However, even assuming this to be true, petitioner did not obtain a written waiver of the conflict from his clients as required by paragraph (B) of rule 5-102. (See ante, fn. 2.) Accordingly, petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating that this finding was erroneous. (6) Petitioner also challenges findings No. 3, No. 4 and No. 5 concerning the Hammond brothers' case. [13] He asserts that the sole basis for his opposition to the appointment of separate counsel to represent Harold Hammond was his desire to see that Madera County counsel, rather than out-of-county counsel, was appointed. However, the record belies petitioner's assertion. Petitioner's own testimony established that he not only challenged the appointment of out-of-county counsel, but represented to the court that he saw no conflict in the matter. The review department's conclusion that a conflict existed between the Hammond brothers is supported by the record. The evidence against each of the defendants was such that inconsistent defenses were called for. Furthermore, petitioner's opposition to Harold's request for separate counsel is a separate and independent breach of the rules. Even after petitioner was relieved as counsel for Harold Hammond, he remained under a duty not to oppose the interests of his former client without that client's consent. (Rule 4-101.) Nowhere does petitioner assert that he obtained his former client's consent as required by this rule. Petitioner seeks to justify his opposition to the appointment of out-of-county counsel by stating that he was merely acting in his capacity as president of the Madera County Bar Association. But petitioner's proferred justification only underscores the basic problem. According to his own explanation, petitioner acted as an advocate for the local bar association contrary to the interests of his prior client. Such conduct is specifically proscribed by rule 4-101. Thus, petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in support of findings Nos. 3, 4, and 5 is without merit. Petitioner next challenges finding No. 6. [14] Since finding No. 6 relates to a charge contained only in the amended notice, it will be set aside for the reasons stated above. (See ante, pp. 420-421.) (7) Next, petitioner asserts that finding No. 7 is untrue. [15] He admits that he presented no evidence to the hearing panel in support of this contention. The bulk of the testimony indicated that petitioner's office policy during this period was not to declare conflicts except when one defendant was to testify against another. Attorney Peterson testified that he understood this to be the policy when he joined the firm in 1976. Attorney Bandy also understood this to be the firm's policy, although he testified that the policy was changed before the Barboza decision was issued in 1981. (Petitioner introduced as an exhibit a memorandum to the Madera County courts, dated September 26, 1980, stating that his firm would no longer represent more than one defendant in a multiple-defendant case.) However, during the period of the contract, the evidence showed that younger attorneys in the firm understood that if one defendant was not going to testify against the other, conflict declarations would have to be approved by petitioner or his wife (also a member of the firm), and that such declarations were very strongly discouraged. There was more than sufficient evidence in the record to support the review department's conclusion. (8) In finding No. 8, the review department concluded that petitioner acted in all of these matters to protect his own financial interests. [16] Petitioner challenges that finding and argues that (1) by 1979, approximately $15,000 was paid to private counsel on appointed cases, and (2) between 1976 and 1979, there was a rapid increase in the number of cases in which private counsel was appointed. In Barboza, this court held that petitioner's contract with Madera County created a financial incentive to avoid declaring conflicts. (29 Cal.3d at p. 380.) The evidence here supports the conclusion that this same financial incentive was behind the policy of finding No. 7 and motivated the actions taken in the Hammond and Rojas-Nunez cases. Accordingly, finding No. 8 is supported by the evidence. (9a) Finally, petitioner challenges finding No. 9, [17] which sets forth several rule violations. Petitioner concedes he should have obtained a written waiver from his clients in the Nunez-Rojas matter. However, he contests the other violations. Rule 4-101 prohibits an attorney from accepting employment adverse to a client or former client from whom he has received information in confidence without obtaining the client's or former client's written consent. In the Rojas-Nunez matter, petitioner impliedly admitted that he represented clients with adverse interests when he conceded that he did not obtain a written waiver of conflict from either of his clients. Petitioner admitted as well that he had received confidential information from these clients. In the Hammond matter, the record indicates that petitioner accepted appointment to represent both of the Hammond brothers despite a conflict. There was no written waiver from the Hammonds before proceeding with their case. Additionally, petitioner argued on behalf of the Madera County Bar Association against Harold Hammond's interests. He did so immediately after having been relieved as Harold's counsel. No attempt was made to inform Harold of this conflict and no written waiver form was signed. With respect to the Rojas-Nunez and the Hammond matters, the record reveals ample evidence that petitioner violated rule 4-101. Further, petitioner violated rule 5-102(B) by representing conflicting interests without the written consent of all the parties. [18]
(10a) In considering what discipline is appropriate, we observe that petitioner's conduct amounts to moral turpitude within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 6106. Moral turpitude has been found where there is gross carelessness and negligence ( Sanchez v. State Bar (1976) 18 Cal.3d 280, 285 [133 Cal. Rptr. 768, 555 P.2d 889]). The state of the law with respect to a defense attorney's duty to investigate and declare conflicts was sufficiently clear at the time petitioner entered into this contract with Madera County. His conduct amounted to gross negligence. (11) Existing case law as of 1976 clearly informed attorneys of their duty to refrain from representing multiple defendants in any criminal case where there was a possibility of conflicting defenses. ( In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 878 [87 Cal. Rptr. 681, 471 P.2d 1]; People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765 [73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106, 34 A.L.R.3d 454]; Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60 [86 L.Ed. 680, 62 S.Ct. 457].) It also taught that each client had a right to conflict-free advice on whether it was in his or her best interests to present such conflicting defenses. Absent such advice, no waiver of separate counsel could have been knowing and intelligent. ( Glasser v. United States, supra, 315 U.S. at pp. 70-75 [86 L.Ed. at pp. 699-701]; People v. Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 773-774.) (10b) Furthermore, the American Bar Association (ABA) had declared that in a multiple-defendant case, the presumption must be against joint representation. Only after it is ascertained through investigation that no conflict is likely to develop may an attorney represent jointly charged defendants: The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more than one of several co-defendants except in unusual situations when, after careful investigation, it is clear that no conflict is likely to develop and when the several defendants give an informed consent to such multiple representation. (ABA Project on Standards for Crim. Justice, Stds. Relating to the Defense Function (Approved Draft 1971) std. 3.5(b).) Petitioner's policy of declaring conflicts at the latest possible stage and of declaring them only when it appeared that one client would have to testify against another, must be deemed gross negligence in light of the case law and the ABA Standards. (9b) Certainly his active opposition to his client Hammond's expressed desire for separate counsel is a breach of the most basic fiduciary obligation not to argue against a client's interest. (12) `Gross carelessness and negligence constitute a violation of the oath of an attorney to discharge faithfully the duties of an attorney to the best of his knowledge and ability and involve moral turpitude, in that they are a breach of the fiduciary relation which binds him to the most conscientious fidelity to his clients' interests. [Citations.]' ( Sanchez v. State Bar, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 285.) (10c) Petitioner has practiced law in Madera County for 30 years free of any disciplinary proceedings. This fact weighs in his favor. (See Abeles v. State Bar (1973) 9 Cal.3d 603, 611 [108 Cal. Rptr. 359, 510 P.2d 719].) Further, petitioner did abandon the policy of refusing to declare conflicts except when one defendant was planning to testify against another. Under these unusual circumstances, this court is satisfied that a public reprimand will constitute sufficient discipline. This opinion shall serve as that reprimand. RICHARDSON, J., [] Concurring and Dissenting. I concur in the court's opinion in every respect except one: the conclusion that a public reprimand will constitute sufficient discipline for the misconduct disclosed in that opinion. In my view, that conclusion is at odds with the court's determination that petitioner was guilty of moral turpitude in his failure to discharge faithfully the duties he owed to his clients because of their conflicting interests. (See Galbraith v. The State Bar (1933) 218 Cal. 329 [23 P.2d 291]; Sheffield v. State Bar (1943) 22 Cal.2d 627 [140 P.2d 376] [three-month suspensions for representing clients with conflicts of interest].) At the very least we should adopt the recommendation of the State Bar in this case that petitioner be suspended from practice for 30 days, with that suspension stayed and petitioner placed on supervisory probation for 1 year, in order to ensure that petitioner fulfills his promise to terminate his objectionable defense policy. MOSK, J. I dissent. This was a strange contract that petitioner had with the County of Madera, and it was probably inevitable that there would be strange results. Basically, however, it was understood that petitioner would use his best professional judgment in determining how indigent defendants were to be represented. He exercised his best professional judgment. Although he may have erred on occasion, to now read moral turpitude into petitioner's conduct is to employ holier-than-thou hindsight. Every case involved in these proceedings was heard in open court. If a potential conflict of interest emerged, or was even suspected, a trial court was perfectly competent to deal with it appropriately. The instance in which a trial court became actively involved was the Hammond matter concerning appointment of an out-of-county attorney. I find it incomprehensible that petitioner should be censured for urging the selection of independent local counsel, rather than an attorney from elsewhere. Even if he was yielding to xenophobia, petitioner's views were expressed in open court and were subject to the trial judge's approval or rejection. The lengthy majority opinion calling for censure of this petitioner, whose record of three decades at the bar and in public life has been impeccable, is a monumental waste of State Bar and judicial resources. I would dismiss the proceeding.