Opinion ID: 2631844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Newsworthiness Privilege

Text: Having defined the elements of the tort of invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness, we now consider the defendant's argument that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in his favor because his publication of the plaintiff's name and picture was constitutionally protected speech as a matter of law. We note, as discussed below, that our review is de novo because this is a question of law. Dickerson, the defendant, argues that his article relates to a matter of legitimate public concern and that, therefore, it is constitutionally protected speech. The plaintiff agrees that the circumstances surrounding her arrest and conviction are newsworthy and of legitimate public concern. She does not object to the fact that a local newspaper wrote articles regarding her crime, arrest, trial, and conviction, or that these articles identified her by name. Instead, she argues that the defendant's republication of these same facts in his newsletter, in conjunction with her name and picture, constitutes an invasion of her privacy. She characterizes Dickerson's newsletter as an infomercial that is designed to promote Dickerson's private investigation firm and to attract business for the firm. Hence, she argues that the character of the defendant's article is primarily commercial and that it should not receive the protection of the First Amendment. Under the particular facts of this case, we disagree with the plaintiff's argument. In the context of invasion of privacy by appropriation of name and likeness, there is a First Amendment privilege that permits the use of a plaintiff's name or likeness when that use is made in the context of, and reasonably relates to, a publication concerning a matter that is newsworthy or of legitimate public concern. See, e.g., Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F.Supp. 141, 146 (D.D.C. 1995); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App.3d 409, 421, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342 (1983) (Publication of matters in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know, and the freedom of the press to tell it, cannot ordinarily be actionable.); Haskell v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 26 Kan. App.2d 541, 990 P.2d 163, 166 (1999) (If a communication is about a matter of public interest and there is a real relationship between the plaintiff and the subject matter of the publication, the matter is privileged.). This privilege exists because dissemination of information regarding matters of public concern is necessary for the maintenance of an informed public. Pierson v. News Group Publ'ns, Inc., 549 F.Supp. 635, 639 (S.D.Ga. 1982). In many situations, however, it is not altogether clear whether a particular use of a person's name or likeness is made for the purpose of communicating news or for the purpose of marketing a product or service. After all, many advertisements incorporate factual information as part of their sales message. See McCarthy, supra, § 8:16 ([A]s every marketer knows, the best way to sell is to slip the message `buy me' in between informing and entertaining the prospective customer. Thus, almost all `advertising' both entertains and informs.). To resolve this question, courts must determine whether the character of the publication is primarily noncommercial, in which case the privilege will apply, or primarily commercial, in which case the privilege will not apply. See Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F.Supp. 904, 909-10 (D.N.J.1986) (applying New Jersey law) ([D]efendant would be liable for the tort of misappropriation of likeness only if defendant's use of plaintiff's likeness was for a predominantly commercial purpose.... The use must be mainly for purposes of trade, without a redeeming public interest, news, or historical value.); McCarthy, supra, § 8:13. Under this test, an article that has commercial undertones may still be protected if it concerns a legitimate matter of public concern. See, e.g., Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 883 (9th Cir.1988). The question of whether a use of plaintiff's identity is primarily commercial or noncommercial is ordinarily decided as a question of law. Lee v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., No. CV96-7069SVW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23893, at  n. 2 (C.D.Cal. March 20, 1997); Tellado, 643 F.Supp. at 910; Haskell, 990 P.2d at 166-67. Because the defendant's article has aspects of both commercial and noncommercial speech, we must determine which type of speech predominates. The facts of this case are unusual. We have found no precedent where a convicted felon has brought a tort claim of wrongful appropriation of her identity based upon the defendant's republication of truthful information about her conviction. To determine whether the defendant's use of the plaintiff's name and likeness was for a primarily commercial or noncommercial purpose, we must first define commercial speech. Commercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial transaction. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422-23, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993). It is the content of the speech, not the motivation of the speaker, which determines whether particular speech is commercial. Id. (criticizing the use of speaker motivation to determine whether speech is commercial); Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989). A profit motive does not transform a publication regarding a legitimate matter of public concern into commercial speech. Id. (Some of our most valued forms of fully protected speech are uttered for a profit.). Many news publishers, including newspapers and magazines, are motivated by their desire to make a profit. Courts have repeatedly held that, in order to be actionable, the use of a plaintiff's identity must be more directly commercial than simply being printed in a periodical that operates for profit. See, e.g., Haskell, 990 P.2d at 166 (The cases uniformly apply the newsworthiness privilege to matters published by the media even though they are published to make a profit.). A contrary rule would preclude the publication of much news and other matters of legitimate public concern. Applying the above principles to the instant case, we conclude that the defendant's publication was primarily noncommercial because it related to a matter of public concern, namely the facts of the plaintiff's crime and felony conviction. The defendant's article detailed how the plaintiff, who worked as a secretary at a brokerage firm, stole a customer's bearer bonds from her place of employment and cashed them for personal use. In addition, the article described the defendant's investigation of the plaintiff, the fact that the jury convicted the plaintiff of theft, and how the court ordered her to pay restitution to the theft victim. There can be no question that these details about the plaintiff's crime and conviction are matters of legitimate public concern. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975), the United States Supreme Court stated, The commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions ... are without question events of legitimate concern to the public. In the context of a discussion of the plaintiff's crime and felony conviction, which are legitimate matters of public concern, the use of her name and picture cannot be described as a primarily commercial usage of her identity. The fact that the defendant's article did not appear in a traditional newspaper does not change this result. We have previously stated that [i]t is ... well established that freedom of the press is not confined to newspapers or periodicals, but is a right of wide import and `in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.' In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132 Colo. 591, 593, 296 P.2d 465, 467 (1956) (citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938)). This means that if the contents of an article are newsworthy when published by a local newspaper, then they do not cease to be newsworthy when subsequently communicated by a different sort of publisher. Further, the fact that the defendant's reason for publishing the newspaper may have been his own commercial benefit does not necessarily render the speech commercial. As noted above, a magazine or newspaper article is protected despite the fact that a publisher may publish a particular article in order to make a profit. Similarly, the defendant's speech is protected even if he intends it to result in profit to him, so long as the contents of the speech qualify for protection. The defendant's profit motive does not affect the fact that the article relates to the arrest and circumstances of a felony conviction, which are matters of legitimate public concern. Therefore, we conclude that the defendant's publication was predominately a noncommercial publication. We hold that the publication of a plaintiff's name and likeness in connection with a truthful article regarding the plaintiff's felony conviction is privileged. As such, the plaintiff's claim of invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness cannot prevail.