Opinion ID: 610638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impeachment of Luke Smith

Text: 38 The plaintiffs' second argument is that the district court erred in allowing the defense to impeach Smith with his conflicting Rule 26 statements. 9 As mentioned above, the plaintiffs filed two separate statements regarding Smith's expert opinion pursuant to Rule 26. The first, filed prior to trial, stated: 39 Pilot William Harry Rhule was rendered incapable of piloting the accident aircraft as a result of his inhalation of fuel vapors. While Rhule was incapacitated, the engine starved for fuel and began to produce intermittent power surges. During the intermittent power surges, the KC-150 autopilot on the accident aircraft was activated and attempted to hold altitude in accordance with its intended manufacturing design. The accident aircraft crashed as a result of the autopilot's attempts to hold altitude during the intermittent power surges. 40 Medivac, Inc. should have employed a fuel transfer system instead of introducing the ferry fuel system into the factory installed system with a T fitting. 41 Immediately prior to his trial appearance, but after Eggspuehler had testified that, but for pilot negligence, the plane could have been landed safely, Smith filed a second statement which read: 42 In order to clear up any confusion on defendants' part regarding the scope of my trial testimony, I take this opportunity to clarify that I will testify regarding all pilot issues pertaining to Rhule and the Lake Renegade 250, including but not limited to my opinion that execution of an emergency off-airport landing in the vicinity of the crash site would likely have resulted in catastrophic damage to the aircraft and personal injury or death to pilot Rhule. 43 As mentioned above, Smith ultimately took the stand as a rebuttal witness for the plaintiffs. Prior to his cross-examination, the plaintiffs argued that the defense should not be permitted to impeach Smith on the basis of a change in his theory. The trial court concluded that the defendants could impeach Smith any way they chose. During cross-examination, the defense pointed out that Smith was testifying to an engine failure/impossible-to-land-safely theory in court but had not previously mentioned engine failure or the ability of the pilot to land safely in his initial Rule 26 statement. Then the following exchange occurred: 44 Q. Isn't it true that you had an entirely different opinion when I asked you these questions two months ago about the cause of the crash? 45 A. Not an entirely different opinion, but my opinion is different from some of the questions you're asking me now, yes. 46 Shortly thereafter, the trial judge concluded that the defense had opened the door to the incapacitation theory and instructed Smith to read, in its entirety, his initial Rule 26 statement, and permitted him to discuss freely his incapacitation theory. Moreover, on redirect, the plaintiffs were able to explore fully the subject of incapacitation. 47 The plaintiffs contend that the defense should not have been permitted to impeach Smith in this way because the defense was the party who successfully barred the evidence concerning incapacitation in the first place. In support of their position, the plaintiffs rely on three cases: Joseph v. Brierton, 739 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir.1984); Bobb v. Modern Products, Inc., 648 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir.1981); Harbin v. Interlake Steamship Co., 570 F.2d 99 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 905, 98 S.Ct. 3091, 57 L.Ed.2d 1135 (1978). Brierton and Harbin are irrelevant to our inquiry because they address improper closing arguments, not improper impeachment techniques. Hence, we need only examine Bobb. 48 In Bobb, the trial court granted a defense motion, refusing to admit a physician's deposition testimony supporting the plaintiffs' case because it was untimely and cumulative. 648 F.2d at 1055. However, during cross-examination, the defense questioned another plaintiff expert on the excluded testimony. Id. The appellate court ordered a new trial stating, cross-examination which attempts to impeach by slipping hearsay evidence into the trial will not be permitted, particularly in a case such as this one where the cross-examiner had previously succeeded in keeping out closely related testimony. Id. 49 Needless to say, the plaintiffs focus on the second clause in the foregoing sentence and argue that Medivac should not have been able to use information it had previously succeeded in excluding. However, when one reads Bobb completely, without a myopic focus on one sentence, it is clear that the court reversed because the defense utilized the improper hearsay question as substantive evidence supporting the defendant's own witness. Id. at 1056. 50 The instant case is distinguishable. Medivac used Rule 26 statements already admitted into evidence, not excluded hearsay, to impeach Smith--in fact, the statements were even read to the jury during the cross-examination. In addition, the Bobb court stressed the fact that the plaintiffs were unable to explain and argue the contents of the physician's deposition because it was not substantive evidence. Here, the plaintiffs were able to delve into the incapacitation issue fully, as they had wanted to do from the start, and were able to argue it to the jury in closing. The plaintiffs' reliance on Bobb is misplaced. 51 The plaintiffs' final contention is a general assertion that the impeachment technique was improper and prejudicial. In the context of this case, we believe it was neither. Federal Rule of Evidence 611 commits the management of cross-examination to the trial court. Thus we will reverse only if allowing this impeachment technique constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 872 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Carter, 910 F.2d 1524, 1530 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1628, 113 L.Ed.2d 724 (1991). In light of the fact that witnesses may be impeached with prior inconsistent statements, FED.R.EVID. 613, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Medivac to impeach Smith with his inconsistent Rule 26 statements. 52 The plaintiffs appear to argue that the impeachment was improper because Smith's theories were not inconsistent. According to the plaintiffs, the plane could have crashed because of a combination of engine failure, pilot incapacitation and the lack of a safe place to land. However, as the defense points out, on the specific issue of causation, Smith's two Rule 26 statements seem inconsistent--certainly inconsistent enough to justify inquiry into them during cross-examination. Smith's first statement did not mention anything that can fairly be interpreted as an opinion that a safe emergency landing was impossible, even by a clear headed pilot. This theory only appeared in the second statement, given after Eggspuehler testified that a safe landing was possible and the pilot was negligent not to have managed one. The defense was entitled to treat these theories as inconsistent as well as to question why Smith had not mentioned the latter one earlier. 53 Moreover, the trial court's handling of the impeachment was fair to both sides. The defense was allowed to show that Smith was willing to testify to a theory that was not his original or strongest opinion; the plaintiffs subsequently were allowed a complete discussion of the incapacitation theory despite the court's earlier ruling that incapacitation could not be discussed by Smith because he was incompetent to offer a medical opinion on the subject. The plaintiffs' contention that the defense opened the door to the incapacitation theory in bad faith so that they could impeach Smith is not borne out by the record. The defense tried to avoid opening the door; in fact, the trial court noted that the defense had made a good faith effort to comply with its rulings. The impeachment technique was not improper. 54 Nor was the impeachment unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiffs. We note that the defense attempted to impeach Smith on several issues, not just his alleged vacillation. Therefore, we are not convinced that Smith's credibility in the eyes of the jury was tarnished solely because of the challenged technique. The plaintiffs insist that they were particularly prejudiced because they could not tell the jury why Smith had not testified to the incapacitation theory during their case-in-chief and why he seemed to have flip-flopped his opinion. The plaintiffs correctly point out that their case likely would have been considerably weakened if they had told the jury that Smith was incompetent to testify about incapacitation. 55 However, the plaintiffs focus on the court's ruling as the source of their problem without acknowledging that the ruling was the direct result of their failure to present a competent medical witness on the incapacitation issue. We will not visit that error on the district court, and note that the plaintiffs do not appeal the court's ruling on the competency issue. Moreover, the court never ruled that the plaintiffs could not explain the ruling; nor did the court refuse a request by the plaintiffs to explain its ruling or give a relevant jury instruction. The plaintiffs simply made a tactical decision not to use this particular argument to explain Smith's behavior. Any prejudice that resulted must be attributed to the plaintiffs' counsel. There was no abuse of discretion by the district judge.