Opinion ID: 1782622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court violated todd's right to a fair trial when it refused to order a new trial after the prosecution was revealed to have suppressed exculpatory evidence.

Text: ¶ 13. Todd next argues that the prosecution improperly concealed exculpatory evidence by not informing Todd of Melissa Williams's polygraph exam. However, Todd concedes that the polygraph exam would have been inadmissible. Instead, he argues that had he known that Williams had passed the exam, he could have called her as a witness and been confident that her testimony could have withstood cross-examination, since she could always have just responded to the State with claims of having passed a polygraph test whether it was admissible or not. ¶ 14. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court established the principle that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. However, the Supreme Court has since held that not all failures to disclose exculpatory evidence constitute reversible error. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Rather, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different but for governmental evidentiary suppression which undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). ¶ 15. In determining whether a Brady violation has occurred, thus mandating a new trial, this Court applies the four-prong test articulated in King v. State, 656 So.2d 1168, 1174 (Miss.1995)(adopting four-prong test from United States v. Spagnoulo, 960 F.2d 990, 994 (11th Cir.1992)). The defendant must prove: a. that the State possessed evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment evidence); b. that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; c. that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and d. that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. King, 656 So.2d at 1174. ¶ 16. The State assumes (for the sake of argument, at least) that the polygraph exam was favorable to Todd, and concedes that it did not disclose this information. However, the State suggests that because the information was not in its exclusive possession and it made no effort to hide it, the information was not suppressed, but was simply not disclosed. Further, the State asserts that Todd never even interviewed Williams (who the State listed as a potential witness) and so did not exercise reasonable diligence. The State also argues that Todd has no basis for his conclusion that the jury would have believed Williams over E.K. since the polygraph would have been inadmissible. ¶ 17. Todd concedes not interviewing Williams, but argues that his counsel was ethically precluded from doing so outside the presence of her attorney. This argument is disingenuous. Nothing precluded Todd's attorneys from interviewing Williams in the presence of her attorney and possibly learning about the polygraph exam. Since the exam itself was inadmissible, merely learning from Williams that she had passed the exam would have been just as useful to the defense as actually receiving a copy of the results from the State. ¶ 18. Todd also claims that he and Williams had adverse interests since Williams was a potential witness against him. We disagree. It seems just as likely, if not more so, that Williams would have been inclined to testify on Todd's behalf, since an acquittal in Todd's case might have bolstered Williams's defense in any future criminal proceedings against her. We will never know, because Todd's attorney's apparently did not even try to interview her. ¶ 19. In any case, Brady requires a reasonable probability of a different outcome, not a mere possibility. Todd could have called Williams as a witness, but declined to do so presumably because he thought the jury would not believe her testimony. The fact that a wholly inadmissible polygraph test might bolster Williams's credibility does not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. This issue is without merit.