Opinion ID: 1311837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Disposition of Accomplice's Case.

Text: (33) Crenshaw, defendant's crime partner, pleaded guilty in the White case to a nonspecial circumstance first degree murder for which he received a sentence of 25 years to life and, at the time of defendant's penalty trial, was awaiting trial on a charge of nonspecial circumstance first degree murder in the Benham case. Defendant maintains the court erred in rejecting defense instructions that would have directed the jury in determining the appropriate penalty to consider the disposition of the White charge and the noncapital nature of the Benham charge against Crenshaw. In People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310] we rejected the similar contention that the trial court erred in excluding evidence at the penalty phase of the pleas and negotiated dispositions of the defendant's accomplices. We stated that evidence of the accomplices' negotiated plea dispositions   separate and apart from evidence of their complicity and degree of involvement in the instant offenses  bore no relevance to the jury's properly guided function at the penalty phase. ( Id. at p. 811, italics in original; accord, People v. Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d 26, 69-71.) This conclusion was founded on the principle that the jury, in making its penalty determination, is required to focus on the character and record of the individual offender and, as to these, the disposition of charges against the defendant's accomplices has no relevance. In the case at bench the jury was aware of Crenshaw's plea and sentence in the White case and the nature of the charges against him in the Benham case. Both sides fully argued Crenshaw's and defendant's relative culpability. For the reasons stated in Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pages 811-812, we find the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury to consider the nature or disposition of the charges against Crenshaw in making its penalty determination.