Opinion ID: 749913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: 106 The complete lack of effort by Bloom's trial counsel to obtain a psychiatric expert until days before trial, combined with counsel's failure to adequately prepare his expert and then present him as a trial witness, was constitutionally deficient performance. Counsel left the responsibility of obtaining and preparing this key witness to a third-year law student who, due to counsel's lack of diligence, had no idea what defense theory counsel intended to pursue. Because counsel did not acquire the services of this key witness until days before trial, a hurried and inaccurate report resulted. Presenting the witness at trial was a disaster. Describing [counsel's] conduct as 'strategic' strips that term of all substance. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.1994). 107 The district court found that the defense expert, Dr. Kling, had not requested any background information on Bloom and determined that, in the absence of a request, counsel was under no obligation to provide the expert with background material. 108 It is true that counsel does not have a duty to acquire sufficient background material on which an expert can base reliable psychiatric conclusions, independent of any request for information from an expert.... Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 247, 102 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988). The record, however, does not support the district court's finding that Kling did not request background information on Bloom. 109 For its finding, the district court relied on the testimony of Bloom's counsel. During the evidentiary hearing, counsel consistently responded that he could not recall details about his representation of Bloom. When asked whether Kling had requested any materials, counsel responded, I can't remember. Counsel did not testify that Kling did not request information. 110 Rather than supporting a finding that Kling did not request information, the testimony of Bloom's trial counsel supports a finding that such a request was made. When asked during the evidentiary hearing whether his office provided Kling with any materials prior to Kling's first examination, counsel responded that he believed a first-year law student 2 who was working in his office gave Kling some documents. During his deposition, counsel also testified: 111 Q: When Doctor Kling received his order appointing him to examine Bloom, did he ask for some specific materials? 112 A: I think he asked for prelim., some preliminary materials, and I can't recall what it was, sir.... 113 Q: At that time did he ask you for that materials that he-- 114 A: I can't recall. 115 Q: At some point he conveyed to you a desire to have some certain materials? 116 A: That's correct. 117 Kling and Drury, the law student who drafted the appointment order, testified that Kling requested background information. Drury testified Kling told her he wanted a copy of the preliminary hearing, he wanted a copy of the police report, and he wanted a copy of all relevant data, psychiatric and social. A copy of a note written by Drury after this conversation confirms that Kling asked for relevant data (psychiatric & social). Kling testified that he requested [n]europsychological tests and any additional information that might be available from the social history, family history, medical history. 118 The district court's finding that Kling did not request any information or documents is clearly erroneous. Kling requested information and a number of relevant documents, all of which were available and could have been provided, but were not. Bloom's trial counsel either had significant evidence relating to Bloom's mental state at the time of the murders, or he easily could have obtained that evidence. He had evidence that Bloom had suffered systematic abuse from childhood. He easily could have obtained the Naham report which stated Bloom was in need of inpatient psychiatric care. That report was prepared only months before the murders. Further, trial counsel never consulted Bloom's jail medical records, which were readily available. These records indicated Bloom had attempted suicide and was suffering from hallucinations. 119 We recognize that counsel should not be faulted for failing  'to track down every record that might possibly relate to [the defendant's] mental health.'  Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1512 (11th Cir.1990)). However, when the defense's only expert requests relevant information which is readily available, counsel inexplicably does not even attempt to provide it, and counsel then presents the expert's flawed testimony at trial, counsel's performance is deficient. 120 Trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Bloom during the trial phase of his case. Prejudice in this context is prejudice which undermine[s] confidence in the outcome of the trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. 121 Counsel's theory of defense rested, at least in part, on a psychiatric defense. Indeed, during closing argument, trial counsel emphasized to the jury that Bloom suffered from a mental defect. Even the third-year law student knew the defense needed a psychiatric expert witness. That witness was to be Dr. Kling. As a result of trial counsel's woefully deficient performance, however, Dr. Kling was not provided with sufficient information and, as a result, his testimony not only failed to help the defense, it significantly hindered it. Kling's report (which he now acknowledges was inaccurate) permitted the prosecution to turn Kling's trial testimony against Bloom, and it gave the prosecution the ammunition it needed to secure guilty verdicts of first degree murder with special circumstances on all three counts. 122 The state contends that given the fanciful story Bloom told, and to which he testified at trial, evidence of Bloom's mental capacity would have undercut the theory of defense his trial counsel was stuck with. Thus, trial counsel's failure to provide his expert, Dr. Kling, with available relevant information made no difference because at best Dr. Kling would have testified to Bloom's lack of mental capacity which would have suggested to the jury that Bloom's testimony was not credible. The district court accepted this argument. We reject it. 123 Although trial counsel presented the defense which Bloom apparently wanted, and to which he testified at trial, trial counsel put in issue Bloom's mental capacity to premeditate, to intend to kill, and to act with malice. Trial counsel did this through the testimony of the defense expert, Dr. Kling. Once counsel presented that expert testimony, the case then focused on Bloom's mental state at the time of the murders. Kling provided this focus. What evolved was expert testimony based on Kling's ill-prepared report which the prosecution was then able to use against Bloom. 124 We are satisfied that had it not been for the deficient performance of Bloom's trial counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the verdicts would have been different. See id. Bloom has demonstrated he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel to his prejudice in violation of the Sixth Amendment. IV