Opinion ID: 2980053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Supreme Court set forth the standard for challenges based on sufficiency of the evidence, holding that “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319 (emphasis in original). “This is a very heavy burden” for the defendant to meet. United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Jackson standard “gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. -14- No. 10-5150 United States v. Campbell Campbell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence related to his convictions on Counts 1, 2, and 3. Each argument is evaluated in turn below. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence for conviction on Count 1 (distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) Campbell’s main challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his conviction for the distribution of a controlled substance (Count 1) is that the only supporting evidence was his uncorroborated statement given at the police station. But “corroborative evidence does not have to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance, as long as there is substantial independent evidence that the offense has been committed, and the evidence as a whole proves beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty.” Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954). “Nor does it have to prove each element of the offense charged.” United States v. Brown, 617 F.3d 857, 862 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of corroboration is to ensure the reliability of the confession or admission of the accused.” United States v. Trombley, 733 F.2d 35, 37 (6th Cir. 1984). So long as extrinsic evidence exists that tends to corroborate the confession, “the confession as a whole is admissible, and some elements of the offense may be proven entirely on the basis of a corroborated confession.” Id. at 38. “[O]ne available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense through the statements of the accused.” Smith, 348 U.S. at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted). “And independent corroboration of one part of the statement may corroborate the entire statement.” Brown, 617 F.3d at 863. -15- No. 10-5150 United States v. Campbell In this case, ample physical evidence was seized from Campbell to corroborate his confession at the police station. Campbell admitted that he received the gun found on his person outside of Max’s from a “junkie” in exchange for crack cocaine that Campbell provided in a transaction that occurred approximately two weeks before his arrest in this case. In addition, Campbell was found in possession of .8 grams of crack cocaine at the time of his arrest. The firearm alone connects Campbell to the crime that he confessed to; namely, exchanging crack cocaine for that specific firearm. See id. (holding that the “independently established fact that certain specified items,” including the gun that Brown possessed, “were stolen from Helms’ house thus lends support to Brown’s confession that he possessed the gun”). And the fact that Campbell possessed crack cocaine at the time he was arrested shows that he had access to the drug around the time he confessed to exchanging it for a firearm. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell had exchanged crack cocaine for the gun found on his person. The prosecution therefore presented sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Campbell on Count 1. 2. Sufficiency of the evidence for conviction on Count 2 (possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence in connection with his conviction on Count 2, Campbell first argues that his conviction on that count should be overturned because it is based on the predicate offense in Count 1, which he contends should itself be set aside for lack of sufficient evidence. For the reasons set forth in Part II.B.1 above, however, we conclude that there was -16- No. 10-5150 United States v. Campbell sufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count 1. We therefore reject Campbell’s argument that his conviction on Count 2 cannot be supported by the Count 1 drug offense. Campbell next argues that his conduct did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because trading drugs for a firearm should not be considered a violation of that provision. Section 924(c) provides in pertinent part as follows: [A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years. This court has held that § 924(c) criminalizes two separate offenses: (1) using or carrying a firearm during or in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, which connotes “more than mere possession and requires some active employment of the firearm by the person committing the drug offense”; and (2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, which requires a showing that the “firearm was possessed to advance or promote the commission of the underlying drug trafficking offense.” United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 932 (6th Cir. 2004) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). In Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 79 (2007), the Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot be convicted under the “uses or carries” prong of § 924(c) simply by engaging in a barter transaction in which the defendant exchanges drugs for a firearm. See id. (“[W]hen Watson handed over the drugs for the pistol, the informant or the agent used the pistol to get the drugs, . . . but regular speech would not say that Watson himself used the pistol in the trade.” (internal quotation -17- No. 10-5150 United States v. Campbell marks omitted)). The Supreme Court, however, did not address the possession prong of § 924(c) in Watson. Id. at 83. But this court did reach the possession prong in United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2001). It held that the “in furtherance” language found in the possession prong of § 924(c) requires that “the weapon must promote or facilitate the crime.” Id. Stated differently, there must be a specific nexus between the drug crime and the possession of the firearm in order to violate the possession prong of § 924(c). Id. at 462. And in United States v. Frederick, 406 F.3d 754, 764 (6th Cir. 2005), this court held that “the acquisition of a firearm in exchange for drugs is a sufficient specific nexus between the drugs and the guns to constitute possession in furtherance of the drug sale.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). So Campbell is correct that he cannot be convicted under the “uses or carries” prong of § 924(c). Based on Frederick, however, he was properly convicted under the “possession” prong of the statute. The evidence showed that (1) he possessed a gun, and (2) he received the gun in exchange for crack cocaine. We therefore conclude that a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that, based on this evidence, Campbell violated § 924(c)’s possession prong. 3. Sufficiency of the evidence for conviction on Count 3 (being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) Campbell next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He specifically asserts that the government failed to adequately prove the interstate-commerce nexus required by § 922(g). Section 922(g) provides that it is unlawful for any person convicted of a felony “to ship or transport in -18- No. 10-5150 United States v. Campbell interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” To prove a violation of § 922(g), the government must establish that “(1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment; and (3) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 374 (6th Cir. 2008). In this case, Campbell stipulated that he had been previously convicted of a felony. And the evidence at trial showed that he possessed the firearm specified in the indictment, the same firearm that he admitted to possessing on the night that he was arrested outside of Max’s. Because elements one and two are satisfied, Campbell’s challenge focuses on the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to the third element, the interstate-commerce element. Although Campbell stipulated that the firearm found in his possession in Tennessee was manufactured outside of the state, he asserts that the government nonetheless failed to prove that the firearm affected interstate commerce. To aid in his defense on this point, Campbell proffered an economics expert who would have testified that Campbell’s alleged possession of the firearm at issue “had no real or material impact on interstate commerce.” But the magistrate judge excluded the proposed testimony, concluding that such testimony would have been irrelevant because “the government need only show that the firearm, at some point in time, crossed a state line prior to defendant’s alleged possession.” We review the magistrate judge’s decision to exclude the testimony of Campbell’s expert witness under the abuse-of-discretion standard. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999). The magistrate judge relied on Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), in -19- No. 10-5150 United States v. Campbell reaching his decision to exclude the expert’s testimony. In Scarborough, the Supreme Court interpreted the predecessor to § 922(g). It held that a showing that the firearm had been, at some time, in interstate commerce was sufficient to prove the interstate-commerce element of the statute. Id. at 575. This court, in United States v. Fish, 928 F.2d 185, 186 (6th Cir. 1991), likewise decided that “firearms possessed in a state other than the state of manufacture constitute firearms in or affecting commerce.” It therefore concluded that “evidence that the firearm was manufactured outside the state of possession is sufficient to prove an interstate commerce nexus in [a § 922(g)] case.” Id. Here, Campbell stipulated to the fact that the gun found in his possession in Tennessee was manufactured in Massachusetts. This stipulation alone satisfies the interstate-commerce element of § 922(g). See id. The magistrate judge therefore did not abuse his discretion in excluding Campbell’s proffered expert testimony as irrelevant. And because a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the government had proven all of the elements for conviction under § 922(g), sufficient evidence existed for Campbell to be convicted on Count 3.