Opinion ID: 480192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia, 962 (1974)

Text: 8 Our conclusion does not conflict with that of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Miller v. Ayres, 213 Va. 149, 191 S.E.2d 261 (1972). There, the court found two rational bases for the geographical limitation contained in Sec. 11: (1) the theory that students attending colleges in Virginia would be more likely to settle permanently in the Commonwealth and (2) the notion that administration of loan programs and monitoring of academic standards at eligible institutions would be easier if only Virginia schools could participate. Id. 191 S.E.2d at 272-73. As Phan concedes, Sec. 11, standing alone, has a rational basis. However, the juxtaposition of Sec. 11 with Sec. 10, which permits financial assistance to students at secular, out-of-state institutions, produces the anomalous result complained of. That Virginia could validly offer financial aid only to students attending Virginia schools is irrelevant, because the Commonwealth has not in fact done so. Indeed, it is the Commonwealth's inconsistent choices that highlight the potential irrationality of the funding restrictions 9 For example, Sec. 11 prohibits the appropriation of funds to students attending theological seminaries, see supra, while a recent decision of the Supreme Court indicates that such expenditures would not offend the federal establishment clause. Witters, --- U.S. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at 748 (1986) 10 While we do not decide if such is the case, theoretically Virginia may not monitor church-related in-state schools to determine if aid to their students accords with the limitations of Article VIII, Sec. 11 that aid not given to students who attend church-related schools whose primary purpose is to provide religious training or theological education. If the spirit and letter of Sec. 11 are not being enforced, there would be under familiar principles of a law an irrational and discriminatory application of constitutional provisions which may otherwise have a valid purpose. In that event plaintiff may be entitled either to require strict enforcement of the limitations of Sec. 11 or to be given state aid to attend St. Andrews on the theory that the limitation of Sec. 11 has been rendered nugatory by state administrative procedure 11 In 1956 after the decision in Almond v. Day, Sec. 10 was amended by the tuition grant amendment, which authorized the General Assembly and the localities to appropriate public funds for the education of Virginia students in public and nonsectarian private schools, subject to such limitations as the General Assembly might impose. 2 A.E. Dick Howard Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia, 950 (1974). This constituted a legislative reversal of Almond's holding that tuition grants to students ran afoul of the constitutional prohibition against appropriations to any school not owned or exclusively controlled by the Commonwealth 12 An expert commentator has observed that nothing in the language of Sec. 10 prevents the Virginia courts from adopting the child benefit theory or a similar approach. 2 A.E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia, 962 (1974)