Opinion ID: 1804374
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Correctness of Ruling on Contract Claim.

Text: As indicated in our recitation of the facts, the trial court denied recovery under a theory of breach of contract on the basis that the public bidding law should have been followed and was not. See Kunkle Water & Elec., Inc. v. City of Prescott, 347 N.W.2d 648, 656 (Iowa 1984) (noting that contracts let without required public bidding are void, not merely voidable). The first step in our analysis, therefore, is to decide whether the court's determination that the competitive bidding statute applied is correct. Before we consider this issue, however, we address Bluestem's concern that error was not preserved. A. Error preservation. The district court's initial consideration of the competitive bidding law was in its ruling on Bluestem's motion to adjudicate law points. In that ruling, the court held that the public bidding requirements of division VI of Iowa Code chapter 384 applied if the cost thresholds established by statute were met. See Iowa Code §§ 331.341(1) (requiring county to submit project for public bidding where cost to county exceeds amount specified in section 309.40 ($50,-000)), 384.96 (requiring city to submit project for public bidding where cost to city exceeds $25,000). The court observed whether these cost thresholds were satisfied was a factual issue that would be determined at trial. In its ruling after trial, the court again addressed the public bidding requirements. Referring to its earlier ruling, the court summarily stated that the competitive bidding law applied to the project undertaken by Bluestem and EnviroGas. It held, therefore, that EnviroGas was precluded from recovering under its contract with Bluestem. Nonetheless, EnviroGas was ultimately successful at trial, obtaining a judgment of damages on its fraud claim. Ordinarily, a successful party need not cross-appeal to preserve error on a ground urged but ignored or rejected by the trial court. Johnston Equip. Corp. v. Indus. Indem., 489 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Iowa 1992). Bluestem contends, however, that this principle should not be applied where the trial court ruled on the contested issue in response to a motion to adjudicate law points. See generally Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.454 (providing a mechanism for the pre-trial adjudication of legal issues) (formerly Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 116). This contention rests on the provision in rule 1.454 that states an adjudication of a point of law shall not be questioned on the trial of any part of the case of which it does not dispose. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.454. We reject Bluestem's argument that the nature of an adjudication of law points dictates that such a ruling be considered sacrosanct even on appeal unless the party on the losing side of such a ruling files a notice of appeal. In our view, there is no logical nexus between the principle that a rule 1.454 ruling cannot be questioned at trial and the ability of the ultimately-successful party to challenge such a ruling on appeal like any other adverse district court ruling. We further note that a motion-to-adjudicate-law-points ruling is not as unalterable as Bluestem suggests. Despite the language of rule 1.454, we have condoned a district court's correction of its own prior ruling on a motion to adjudicate law points. See Woods v. Schmitt, 439 N.W.2d 855, 865-66 (Iowa 1989). For all these reasons, we hold that EnviroGas's failure to file a cross-appeal does not preclude this court from reviewing the trial court's decision on the applicability of the competitive bidding law.