Opinion ID: 810539
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Examination of Thor’s Bruising

Text: Plaintiffs also argue that Wagner’s examination of Thor’s pubic area for bruising violated Thor’s right to bodily security and integrity. The district court determined that No. 12-1737 23 this argument had been waived, finding that plaintiffs deprived defendants of fair notice by failing to mention this theory of recovery at any stage prior to summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiffs have not articulated any argument challenging the district court’s finding of waiver. The Xiongs suggest only that Wagner’s examination of Thor violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights and reference the relevant facts, without addressing the district court’s conclusion regarding the adequacy of their pleadings. Because plaintiffs have not advanced an argument on appeal challenging the district court’s finding of waiver, their argument concerning the examination of Thor’s bruising is waived on appeal. See, e.g., Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven arguments that have been raised may still be waived on appeal if they are underdeveloped, conclusory, or unsupported by law.”). D. All Plaintiffs’ Rights to Equal Protection The Xiongs next argue that defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights by treating them adversely on the basis of their Hmong ancestry. It is clearly established that such racial or ethnic discrimination would violate the Equal Protection Clause; however, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of these claims. To establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a “state actor has treated him differently from persons of a different race and that the actor did so purposefully.” Billings, 24 No. 12-1737 259 F.3d at 812. If the Xiongs “do not produce evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict in their favor, we shall affirm the district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.” Id. Plaintiffs have not produced evidence sufficient to meet this standard. The Xiongs’ basic argument is that Wagner harbored racial animus toward them dating back to 2005 and that this animus motivated all of Wagner’s subsequent adverse decisions affecting their family. As evidence of racial animus, the Xiongs identify Wagner’s 2005 case note stating that the family was attempting to manipulate the system and his 2009 communication to Weller indicating that he was not sure if the parents were being truthful regarding the first incident of Thor falling out of bed at Lakeview. The Xiongs assert that such animus resulted in, among other things, Wagner’s failure to correct Judge Simanek’s statement that Thor was left alone for “several hours,” his failure to direct doctors to provide Thor with counseling services at Lakeview, and his search of Thor’s pubic area for bruising. While reasonable inferences must be drawn in the Xiongs’ favor, “[e]ven on summary judgment, district courts are not required to draw every requested inference; they must only draw reasonable ones that are supported by the record.” Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011). Based on the record available, no reasonable juror could infer that Wagner’s statements demonstrate the existence of racial animus toward the Xiongs. No reference whatsoever to No. 12-1737 25 the Xiongs’ racial background is contained in Wagner’s aforementioned case note or communication to Weller, nor could a reasonable juror conclude that these statements reflect any sort of discreet racial undercurrent. Without more, the mere fact that the aforementioned events took place and that the involved caseworkers were not of Hmong ancestry does not amount to evidence “sufficient to sustain a jury verdict” in the Xiongs’ favor as to their equal protection claim. Billings, 259 F.3d at 812. Plaintiffs next argue that defendants applied unequal standards to similarly situated individuals. Specifically, they point to the fact that Thor suffered bruising while in foster placement with Collins and at Lakeview that was not investigated in the same fashion as the bruises that Thor manifested while living with the Xiongs. They attribute this disparate treatment to their Hmong ancestry. But as the district court explained, for this claim to prevail, the disparate treatment would have to be in response to reasonably comparable circumstances. Wagner’s investigation of the Xiongs was in response to a physical abuse referral from Thor’s school that was corroborated by information relayed by members of the Xiong family signaling neglect and possible abuse. No formal physical abuse referrals were filed concerning the injuries Thor suffered while in foster care, nor did Wagner’s inquiries surrounding these incidents reveal corroborated information indicating neglect of the sort disclosed by Thor and his siblings. Indeed, Wagner’s inquiries revealed that the circumstances surrounding the incidents of bruising Thor 26 No. 12-1737 suffered while in foster care were entirely distinct from the situation at the Xiongs. Collins herself contacted Wagner following Thor’s injury to inform him of what had occurred. In that instance, Thor was left unattended in his wheelchair for only a brief period while Collins’ husband went into the house, as compared to the hourslong period during which Thor was left at home alone by the Xiongs. At Lakeview, Thor was monitored by professional physicians who provided him with individual treatment and took protective measures in response to his having rolled out of bed. The corroborated information Wagner received suggesting that Thor had been deliberately thrown onto the floor by his stepfather at the Xiongs’ home thus stands in stark contrast to the care Thor received at Lakeview. It is therefore clear that Wagner had “race-neutral reasons” for making different decisions relating to appropriate investigatory measures in each circumstance. See id. at 813. No genuine dispute exists as to whether a “a state actor has treated [plaintiffs] differently from persons of a different race and that the state actor did so purposefully,” id. at 812, and we therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor on this claim. E. Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights Finally, plaintiffs argue that defendants conspired to violate their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. A party may recover damages if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of depriving the No. 12-1737 27 plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). To recover under § 1985(3), a party must establish:
depriving a person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, (3) an act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, and (4) an injury to person or property or a deprivation of a right or privilege granted to U.S. citizens. Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1024. To establish “purpose” under prong two, a plaintiff must demonstrate racial, ethnic, or other class-based “invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ actions.” Id. As discussed, plaintiffs have not made a showing sufficient to establish the existence of racial animus on the part of defendants. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim falls with their equal protection claim, and summary judgment in defendants’ favor is appropriate.