Opinion ID: 8312832
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consummation of the Department's Decisionmaking Process

Text: Under the first prong of the Bennett test, a final agency action must mark the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process and must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. Bennett , 520 U.S. at 177-78 , 117 S.Ct. 1154 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). When considering the first Bennett prong, the D.C. Circuit has looked to the relevant language of the challenged agency decision. See Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass'n v. FDA , 664 F.3d 940 , 944 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The language of the denial letters demonstrates that they marked the Department's final determination that the Individual Plaintiffs' respective employment, and their payments made during that employment, did not qualify for the PSLF Program. 4 The letters sent to Burkhart and Rudert unambiguously stated that the Department reversed [their] previously approved employment period[s] under the PSLF program because [their employers] do[ ] not provide a qualifying service. AR 214, 282. Likewise, the Department's letter to Voigt flatly asserted that it had determined that AILA is not a qualifying employer for PSLF purposes. AR 336. In the letter to Quintero-Millan, the Department stated that, based on its review of her ECFs, her employment [d]oes [n]ot [q]ualify and that she may not participate in employment and payment tracking for PSLF. AR 237-38. This definitive language supports the conclusion that, upon sending the denial letters to the Individual Plaintiffs, the Department had completed its determination that their employment and the loan payments at issue did not qualify. In arguing that the denial letters were not final, Defendants point to the allegedly less-than-definitive language in Quintero-Millan's letter, which stated that her employer does not appear to qualify for PSLF and invited her to reapply if  [she could] provide additional information to show that [her] employment qualifies. AR 237. But this language does not undermine the conclusion that her denial letter was a final agency action. First, other language in the letter was far more categorical about the Department's determination. The Department identified her eligibility status to be, simply, Organization Does Not Qualify. Id. The letter suggested other possible eligibility statuses-for example, Under Review or Missing Information-each of which would have suggested a lack of finality. AR 237-38 (edits to capitalization). But according to Quintero-Millan's letter, neither of those applied to her. Second, even to the extent that the language cited by Defendants suggested that the Department might reconsider its decision, [t]he mere possibility that an agency might reconsider in light of 'informal discussion' and invited contentions of inaccuracy does not suffice to make an otherwise final agency action nonfinal. Sackett v. EPA , 566 U.S. 120 , 127, 132 S.Ct. 1367 , 182 L.Ed.2d 367 (2012). As part of the first Bennett prong, courts also look to the way in which the agency subsequently treats the challenged action. Sw. Airlines Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp. , 832 F.3d 270 , 275 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (collecting cases). The record on this point is particularly clear that the denial letters reflect final agency action. After the Department issued the denial letters, the Individual Plaintiffs did not receive any additional communication from the Department suggesting that the letters were tentative or interlocutory. Moreover, the ABA challenged the Department's basis for the denial letters issued to Quintero-Millan and Burkhart, but the Department reaffirmed its conclusion. AR 192-93. And when Rudert followed up with FedLoan Servicing after receiving his letter, a representative there simply informed him that the Department of Education made the determination and that there was no appeal process put in place. AR 285. To date, and even after the filing of this lawsuit, the ineligibility determinations reflected in the Individual Plaintiffs' denial letters have apparently remained unchanged for periods ranging from 27 to 50 months. Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. B ¶ 12; id. , Ex. C ¶ 18; id. , Ex. D ¶ 10; id. , Ex. E ¶ 13. Simply put, there is no indication in the record that these letters do not represent[ ] the culmination of [the Department's] consideration of an issue. Soundboard Ass'n v. FTC , 888 F.3d 1261 , 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Defendants contend that the Individual Plaintiffs' denial letters are interlocutory and subject to change because the Department does not make a final determination on eligibility for PSLF until the borrower files her application ... after making 120 qualifying payments. Dfs.' MSJ Br. at 15-16. But this argument conflates separate determinations that the Department undertakes in connection with the PSLF Program. Certainly, the Department considers an application to determine a borrower's ultimate eligibility for debt relief only after she has submitted 120 qualifying loan payments. AR 153. But along the way, according to the Department, upon receiving an ECF it verif[ies] that [the borrower's] employer qualifies as a public service organization and notif[ies] [the borrower] in writing of the number of qualifying payments ... made while employed in qualifying public service. AR 155. Through this process, the Department determine[s] the eligibility of loan payments made during a borrower's employment with a particular organization. See AR 143-44. And, if the loan payments are approved as eligible, the Department will request the transfer of all federally-held loans to FedLoan Servicing  from the borrower's original loan servicer and track the number of PSLF qualifying payments going forward. AR 144. That the Individual Plaintiffs have not submitted applications for loan forgiveness does not undercut the conclusion that, at the very least, the denial letters reflect the end of the Department's decisionmaking process concerning whether a borrower's employer qualifies as a public service organization, and whether the loan payments at issue count toward the 120 monthly payments required. Courts have also looked to other agency materials to evaluate whether an action marked the consummation of an agency's decisionmaking. See Holistic Candlers , 664 F.3d at 944 (consulting an FDA manual). In this case, language describing the ECF Process in the Department's guidance documents further underscores, in important ways, the conclusion that the denial letters marked the end of an agency process for the Individual Plaintiffs. For example, the Department's Dear Borrower letter-which was sent to all borrowers interested in the PSLF Program, such as the Individual Plaintiffs, see AR 142-instructed borrowers that, when submitting their final application for loan forgiveness, they do not have to re-submit [ECFs] that have already been validated by the Department, AR 153. In the same letter, the Department informed them that it will review an application for loan forgiveness along with any ECFs  not previously validated by the Department in order to determine if [a borrower] fulfilled all of the requirements to be eligible for PSLF. Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the Department's own language confirms that when it validates a borrower's employment and loan payments made during her time there, its determination marks the consummation of a process that is not revisited. At that point, for all practical purposes [the Department] 'has ruled definitively'  on whether the payments count toward the 120 required by the PSLF statute. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc. , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1807 , 1814, 195 L.Ed.2d 77 (2016) (quoting Sackett , 566 U.S. at 131 , 132 S.Ct. 1367 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ). In considering whether an agency action marks the consummation of a decisionmaking process, the D.C. Circuit has also instructed courts to look to whether the impact of the [agency action] is sufficiently 'final' to warrant review in the context of the particular case. Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. FAA , 896 F.3d 425 , 431 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (quoting Friedman v. FAA , 841 F.3d 537 , 542 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ). Here, the denial letters have impacted the Individual Plaintiffs' careers and finances in a significant way that underscores their finality, and warrants review at this time. 5 After receiving the denial letter, Quintero-Millan interviewed for a director position at ProBAR, but then declined to pursue the position because she could not work at ProBAR if [her] employment would not qualify for loan forgiveness.  Pls.' MSJ Br., Ex. E ¶ 19. Burkhart submits that, with the demands of a family and his growing educational debt, the Department's decision caused him great concern about [his] ability to meet [his] student loan obligations, and to doubt [his] decision to devote [his] career to public service. Id. , Ex. D ¶ 12. If he had received the denial letter earlier, he affirms that he would not have accepted the position at the ABA. Id. , Ex. D ¶ 6. Voigt asserts that the Department's decision made it exceedingly difficult to plan [her] finances responsibly, which led her to delay purchasing a home and refinancing her loans. Id. , Ex. C ¶ 19. And Rudert contends that the denial letter impacted his decisions in employment, housing, marriage, and financial planning. Id. , Ex. B ¶ 16. Had he received his denial letter while employed at VVA, he submits that he would have left and found a job that did qualify. Id. , Ex. B ¶ 14. Defendants argue that the denial letters did not have an immediate or significant practical effect on the Individual Plaintiffs because their eligibility for PSLF had not yet been finally determined. Dfs.' MSJ Br. at 17 n.6. This is nonsense. In the face of growing debt burdens, the Individual Plaintiffs structured their careers and long-term financial plans around their eligibility for the PSLF Program. The Department's determinations quite obviously had an immediate and significant impact on their ability to plan their careers and finances, despite the fact that they have not had (and may never have) the opportunity to submit an application for loan forgiveness. To hold otherwise would be incompatible with the Court's obligation to apply the finality requirement in a flexible and pragmatic manner. Ciba-Geigy , 801 F.2d at 435 (quoting Abbott Labs. , 387 U.S. at 149-50 , 87 S.Ct. 1507 ). Finally, Defendants contend that the Department's statements in the Federal Register during the PSLF negotiated rulemaking process demonstrate that the denial letters fall well short of being the 'consummation' of the agency's decision-making process. Dfs.' MSJ Br. at 14. Of course, these statements are of quite limited value to the Court, insofar as they are not the governing statutes and regulations [that] structure [an agency's] decisionmaking processes. Soundboard , 888 F.3d at 1267 ; see also Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co. , 796 F.2d 533 , 539 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ( Publication in the Federal Register does not suggest that the matter published was meant to be a regulation.). Nonetheless, even on their own terms, they demonstrate nothing of the sort urged by Defendants. Defendants largely rest their argument on part of the proposed rulemaking record. 73 Fed. Reg. at 37 ,705 ; AR 14. And admittedly, at that time the Department considered ... but decided not to adopt the recommendation that it provid[e] for annual borrower submission and Departmental review and retention of the form ... that would be certified by the borrower's employer. 73 Fed. Reg. at 37 ,705 ; AR 14; see also Dfs.' MSJ Br. at 15; Oral Arg. Tr. at 20:4-21:17. But the problem for Defendants is that during the final rulemaking process, the Department largely reversed course. At that point, it decided to establish an annual employment-certification form, which led it to develop the ECF Process. 73 Fed. Reg. at 63 ,241 -42; AR 45-46. More specifically, the Department stated that it would develop a form for borrowers that would include an employer certification section and instructions regarding supporting documentation that the Department will need to determine the borrower's eligibility for the forgiveness benefit. 73 Fed. Reg. at 63 ,241 -42; AR 45-46. Significantly, the Department represented  that borrowers would be able to use the form to collect employment certifications at the close of the 120-month qualifying period, but also at other intermittent times as well. 73 Fed. Reg. at 63 ,242 ; AR 46. The Department did note that it expect[ed] the borrower to collect and retain the necessary records that support the borrower's eligibility for this benefit. 73 Fed. Reg. at 63 ,242 ; AR 46. But in the end, the Department's statements in the Federal Register do not undermine the conclusion that the denial letters represented the consummation of the Department's process in determining whether the Individual Plaintiffs' employment-and loan payments made during that employment-qualified under the PSLF Program. For the reasons described above, the Court concludes that the denial letters sent to the Individual Plaintiffs satisfy the first prong of the Bennett test.