Opinion ID: 2644344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Woods’s Title VII Complaint

Text: Thereafter, Woods filed a pro se Title VII complaint in the Northern District of Georgia. Woods alleged that CFCA terminated him because of his race and that “[s]imilarly-situated non-African-American employees with equal or less seniority were not laid off.” Woods requested $51,308.00 in backpay, as well as $10,000 “for related anguish and stress” and $350 for court costs. C. CFCA’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Woods’s Response 8 Case: 13-11642 Date Filed: 11/26/2013 Page: 9 of 15 Following discovery, CFCA moved for summary judgment. CFCA made three arguments; specifically, that: (1) because Woods’s position as a high school science teacher was a “religious position,” CFCA’s termination of Woods’s employment fell under the the “ministerial exception” to Title VII, first recognized by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); (2) Woods had not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination; and (3) even if Woods had established a prima facie case, CFCA had offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Woods, and Woods had not shown that this reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. In opposition to CFCA’s summary judgment motion, Woods responded that: (1) the ministerial exception did not apply because he had “entered into a legitimate contract following the approval of an application . . . with the understanding that the school does not discriminate based on race”; and (2) he had established a prima facie case by showing that he was “laid off when no other fulltime teachers in the school were laid off.” D. The District Court’s Grant of CFCA’s Summary Judgment Motion Thereafter, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) recommending granting CFCA’s summary judgment motion. The magistrate judge concluded that “Woods’[s] position [fell] under the ministerial 9 Case: 13-11642 Date Filed: 11/26/2013 Page: 10 of 15 exception to Title VII.” Alternatively, the magistrate judge determined that Woods had not established a prima facie case of race-based discrimination because he had “failed to present any evidence of similarly situated non-African American individuals who were treated differently than him.” The magistrate judge further advised that, even if Woods had established a prima facie case, he had not rebutted CFCA’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating him. Woods objected to the R&R. The district court overruled Woods’s objections, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, and granted the summary judgment motion. Woods timely appealed.