Opinion ID: 2975084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff’s Racial Discrimination Claim

Text: The legal framework for analyzing racial discrimination claims is similar to the legal framework used to evaluate disability discrimination claims, which is set forth above. Title VII prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise [ ] discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Noble v. Brinker Int’l, Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2004); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 801 (“Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”). “In Title VII actions, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by the defendant.” Talley v. Bravo Pitino Rest., Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir.1995) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). “A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination either by presenting direct evidence of intentional discrimination by the defendant, or by showing the existence of circumstantial evidence which creates an inference of discrimination.” Id. (citations omitted). In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court set forth the appropriate framework for reviewing claims of racial discrimination in the absence of direct evidence: [t]he complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for 20 No. 06-5553 which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications. 411 U.S. at 802; Talley, 61 F.3d at 1246. “The fourth element may also be satisfied by showing that similarly situated non-protected employees were treated more favorably.” Talley, 61 F.3d at 1246; Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992). The plaintiff must proffer evidence that “for the same or similar conduct he was treated differently than similarly-situated non-minority employees.” Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 583. A plaintiff that meets this initial burden effectively “creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against” him. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). After an employee makes this initial showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the allegedly discriminatory employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Once the defendant advances a legitimate reason for its employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff “to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for [the employment action] were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.” Id. at 805. This inquiry is fact-specific and intimately tied to the evidence adduced by the parties. B. The District Court Properly Dismissed Plaintiff’s Racial Discrimination Claim Plaintiff’s brief to this court fails to meaningfully articulate Lee’s racial discrimination claim. The brief is devoid of any support for the racial discrimination claim beyond the mere assertion that: In this case, Ms. Lee is African American. She was performing her light duty work capably. As set out above, there were no complaints regarding Ms. Lee’s work. Ms. Lee was terminated. Pat Sauer, a 21 No. 06-5553 white female was treated more favorably than Ms. Lee. Ms. Lee has demonstrated a prima facie case of racial discrimination. (Plaintiff’s Br. at 15) Mere conclusory statements regarding alleged discrimination, which are unsupported by specific facts fail to raise a genuine issued of material fact and are insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 6970 (6th Cir. 1982). Lee simply offers no evidence or legal authority to support her racial discrimination claim. As illustrated above, Plaintiff merely alludes to Lee’s alleged disparate treatment vis-a-vis a white co-worker. Lee’s contention that Sauer was treated more favorably, is not supported by the record. With respect to Sauer, the record indicates that: Sauer was a Letter Sorting Machine (LSM) Operator who suffered from a condition that rendered her unable to perform that job. Although she was provided with light duty for a period of time, her request for permanent light duty was denied. Ms. Sauer later was able to return to work, however, because she qualified for, and was the successful bidder on, a MUM clerk position. She later applied for, and was granted, disability retirement. (J.A. 179). As illustrated above, Sauer is not similarly situated to Lee because Sauer held a different position; she was not a FSMO. Like Lee, Sauer was “provided with light duty for a period of time,” id., and her request for reassignment to permanent light-duty was also denied. (J.A. 181) With respect to both temporary and permanent light-duty assignments, Lee and Sauer were treated identically. Unlike Lee, however, Sauer “qualified for, and was the successful bidder on, a MUM clerk position.” (J.A. 179) On the other hand, Lee did not take the typing test required for the MUM or CFS clerk positions; failed to complete the MUM Clerk training; did not bid for a permanent position; and did not otherwise pursue other employment opportunities with Defendant. Plaintiff 22 No. 06-5553 has simply failed to proffer evidence to support the contention that Lee’s race was a motivating factor for Defendant’s actions. Defendant has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for requiring Lee to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination and ultimately removing her. The record simply does not support Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim.