Opinion ID: 2776907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The First Lee Factor

Text: The first Lee factor required the trial judge to inquire into and assess the reasons for the government’s failure to disclose in advance of trial that its ballistics expert would testify that a Mac 10 or Mac 11 made the firing pin and breech face 8 It perhaps bears emphasizing that appellant never suggested in the trial court that a mistrial was required because the expert’s opinion could be helpful to his defense if he were afforded an opportunity to incorporate it into his preparation and strategy. Many of the factual assertions appellant makes on appeal as to how the defense could have proceeded and how the trial would have been different had a mistrial been granted were not made to the trial judge; and especially because they involve factual considerations, the judge cannot be faulted for not considering them sua sponte. We are cognizant that counsel are not expected to present, in the midst of trial, arguments as thought-out as counsel have been able to prepare and present on appeal — particularly in response to unexpected testimony. But the trial court expressed its preference to have the jury hear the government expert’s full opinion and permit the defense to respond to it. At the time, it appears that the response was expected to be from a countervailing defense expert who would contradict or question Freese’s opinion. The judge offered a continuance to permit defense counsel to obtain such an expert, an offer that defense counsel declined. Counsel did not ask for additional time to consider further implications of Freese’s testimony, such as its potential usefulness to the defense, an argument newly made on appeal. We cannot fault the trial judge for not having conceived of that rather counter-intuitive proposition, cogent as it may be when presented on appeal. 21 impressions observed on the cartridge primer. The judge did so. Preliminarily, the judge found that this information was indeed not disclosed in, or readily discernible from, the expert’s report and worksheets or the other discovery the government had provided to the defense. Although that material included a photograph of the firing pin and breech face impressions, and — at the prosecutor’s invitation — defense counsel interviewed Freese in advance of trial, the judge recognized that this did not put the defense on notice of what the expert might say on this particular point and fell short of the disclosure that should have occurred under Criminal Rule 16.9 The judge took defense counsel’s “word that she was surprised” by Freese’s testimony.10 9 We agree with appellant and the trial court that the government’s disclosure did not come close to satisfying the requirements of Rule 16 with respect to Freese’s testimony identifying the weapon that left the firing pin and breech face impressions as a Mac 10 or Mac 11 (and the government itself no longer contends otherwise). The disclosure of the photograph of the impressions and other information may have supplied appellant with the bases of Freese’s opinion, but it “fail[ed] to summarize [Freese’s] expected testimony [and] . . . describe [his] actual opinions[.]” Murphy-Bey v. United States, 982 A.2d 682, 688 (D.C. 2009). 10 We note, however, that prior to the court’s decision on what sanction to impose, defense counsel told the court that “a few weeks before trial,” she met with Freese and asked him “about what was in the report[.]” Counsel said that Freese had mentioned the Mac 10. She also acknowledged that she said to Freese during the interview “something like the Mac 10 wasn’t listed on there. Does that mean that’s not one of the firearms and he said well . . . the SWD manufactured it.” Thus, as the prosecutor emphasized to the court, defense counsel was able to “even include the Mac 10” in her discussion with Freese. Further, defense counsel made (continued…) 22 The judge also found that the prosecutor had no sound reason for this failure of disclosure. The prosecutor denied having purposefully withheld Freese’s opinion as to the identity of the weapon from the defense in discovery; he professed not to have focused on this particular information or appreciated its potential significance.11 Even so, the prosecutor admittedly learned of Freese’s opinion over a month before trial; he was not under the mistaken impression that he actually had disclosed it to the defense; and his elicitation of that opinion at trial was not inadvertent. The judge perceived that the prosecutor “had to be aware of the significance of this type of testimony.” (…continued) no objection when the prosecutor reminded the court that, during the meeting with Freese, “there was a conversation about the nature of the SWD gun and that it was in fact explained to her that that was the manufacturer of the Mac 10.” She also candidly acknowledged to the court that she could not recall whether the “specific issue [of the firing pin or breech face impressions] came up” during the meeting with Freese. 11 Before the court determined what sanction to impose, the prosecutor explained that his questioning that elicited Freese’s undisclosed opinion was focused not on establishing that the spent cartridges came from a Mac 10 (the prosecutor said that he “didn’t really think about that particular part of it”), but on teeing up an opportunity for Freese to describe “what a Mac 10 looked like,” with the “idea being that his description would be consistent with the way Mr. Dorsey and Ms. Stover described it.” The prosecutor told the court that he could not even recall what Freese had said about the breech face impression. The prosecutor also pointed out that Freese’s statements were about “the consistency of the gun” with a Mac 10 or Mac 11, and that Freese had not said that the gun “was a Mac 10.” 23 Ultimately, while he faulted the government for having “played it too close to the vest,” the judge took the prosecutor at his word that he had not withheld Freese’s opinion with the intent to deceive the defense or gain a tactical advantage, and that he honestly thought he had complied with Rule 16. Appellant takes issue with this credibility assessment and argues that the judge should have found that the prosecutor acted in bad faith — a finding that, appellant contends, would have weighed heavily in favor of granting his request for a mistrial.12 This was not appellant’s position at trial, however. His counsel told the trial judge that the defense “certainly [was]n’t suggesting that there was bad faith” and that the prosecutor had been “very helpful turning over things.” This would be enough for us to reject appellant’s argument, for “[w]e have repeatedly held that a defendant may not take one position at trial and a contradictory position on appeal.” Brown v. United States, 627 A.2d 499, 508 (D.C. 1993). But even if we excuse appellant’s reversal of position on appeal, we cannot say the trial judge, who had the advantage of assessing the prosecutor’s demeanor, clearly erred in 12 Cf. Wiggins v. United States, 521 A.2d 1146, 1149 (D.C. 1987) (noting that “a negligent failure to disclose does not invite severe sanctions to the extent that a purposeful withholding would”). 24 crediting the prosecutor’s good faith. The judge in fact articulated a legitimate reason for coming to that conclusion — essentially, that after the prosecutor had provided Freese’s work papers to the defense and had learned of Freese’s undisclosed opinion, he undertook to make Freese available to defense counsel for an interview in which counsel could explore the expert’s views without any limitations. This was not sufficient to comply with the prosecutor’s obligations under Rule 16, and we do not suppose it was reasonable for the prosecutor to assume Freese would make the necessary disclosure to defense counsel when the prosecutor had not specifically asked him to do so. But the judge reasonably could find, as he did, that the prosecutor’s invitation to defense counsel to interview Freese “militate[d] against any conclusion of bad faith”13 (especially given defense counsel’s assurance that appellant was not questioning the prosecutor’s good faith). In sum, we are satisfied that the trial judge did not erroneously exercise his discretion in assessing the first Lee factor. While that factor supported the 13 Cf. United States v. Christopher, 923 F.2d 1545, 1555 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial after the government failed to meet its Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 obligation to disclose certain statements and then offered them in evidence through witness Ramey, reasoning that “Ramey was made available to Christopher’s counsel so that he could have learned Ramey’s testimony”). 25 imposition of a stern and effective sanction in this case, we cannot agree with appellant that it weighed in favor of declaring a mistrial.