Opinion ID: 1402432
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Defense Hearsay Evidence

Text: Tamara Nichols testified for the defense. She was Richard Graybill's girlfriend in late 1977 and was also acquainted with Colman and defendant, whom she knew as Speed. Defendant sought to have her testify about a statement Graybill, who had died by the time of the retrial, made to her regarding the shooting. The prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds. As an offer of proof, Nichols testified outside the presence of the jury that Graybill left her home around 7:00 p.m. on December 7, 1977, saying he had some business to take care of. He returned around 2:00 a.m. the next morning, nervous, very excited, and white as a sheet. Speaking very rapidly, Graybill made the following statement that defendant sought to introduce: [A] business deal had gone sour. And that there was a shoot-out and that Speed was shooting everything in sight. On cross-examination, Nichols testified that Graybill and defendant were in frequent contact by telephone and in person during that time period. Defendant argued the statement was admissible as a spontaneous declaration. The prosecutor responded that there was no indication Graybill was describing what he had personally observed instead of merely repeating what someone else, possibly defendant, had told him. After taking the matter under submission, the court excluded the evidence. It expressed doubt the statement was spontaneous, but based its ruling mainly on the absence of an indication Graybill had personally perceived the events. Defendant contends the court erred in excluding the evidence. He argues, first, that the statement was admissible under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid.Code, § 1240.) Evidence Code section 1240 provides: Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception. (Italics added.) The italicized language makes clear that a hearsay statement, even if otherwise spontaneous, is admissible only if it relates to an event the declarant perceived personally. Otherwise, the statement would be hearsay on hearsay and admissible only if each layer of hearsay separately met the requirements of an exception to the hearsay rule. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 149, 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) Defendant does not suggest that any statement from an unidentified other source to Graybill would itself qualify as an exception. Thus, assuming Graybill's statement to Nichols was otherwise spontaneous, its admissibility turns on whether he was relating events he saw himself or repeating what he had heard from some other source. As this is a factual question, we will uphold the trial court's determination if it is supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Jones (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 653, 660, 202 Cal.Rptr. 289.) We review for abuse of discretion the ultimate decision whether to admit the evidence. ( Ibid.; see also People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 894, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712; People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082.) A similar question arose in Ungefug v. D'Ambrosia (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 61, 58 Cal.Rptr. 223, which involved a fatal automobile accident. There, the trial court admitted as a spontaneous statement an ambulance driver's testimony that he had heard someone say the victim had been hit twice, once by another car that failed to stop. ( Id. at p. 64, 58 Cal.Rptr. 223.) The Court of Appeal found the court erred. It must ... appear `in some way, at least, and with some degree of persuasive force' that the declarant was a witness to the event to which his utterance relates. [Citation.] Although this does not require direct proof that the declarant actually witnessed the event and a persuasive inference that he did is sufficient, the fact that the declarant was a percipient witness should not be purely a matter of speculation or conjecture. [Citations.] ( Id. at p. 68, 58 Cal.Rptr. 223.) The court found the inference, if any, that the declarant actually witnessed the accident is not persuasive in the instant case, partly because there was no evidence that there were eyewitnesses to the accident or that there were others in the immediate vicinity of the scene of its occurrence. ( Ibid. ) The court acted within its discretion in this case. Graybill's statement to Nichols did not indicate he had personally observed the events. There was virtually no evidence that there were eyewitnesses to the [crime] or that there were others in the immediate vicinity of the scene of its occurrence ( Ungefug v. D'Ambrosia, supra, 250 Cal.App.2d at p. 68, 58 Cal.Rptr. 223) other than the occupants of the two vehicles, i.e., other than Rose, Colman, and defendant. Rose and Colman both testified there was no third vehicle at the scene. The only contrary evidence was that several days after the crime, Rose nodded his head affirmatively when asked whether another vehicle was present. However, Rose was badly hurt and heavily sedated at the time and gave a number of incorrect responses. He testified that he could have said anything during those days. Defendant argues that Nichols's testimony supports the inference that Graybill was personally present during the shooting. She testified that, shortly before the shooting, Graybill left, telling her he had some business to take care of. She also said that in November 1977, she overheard discussions involving Graybill about some building supplies, that he was involved in girls, some prostitution that was going on, and she heard some mention about drugs. She recalled some mention of a couple of building contractors from the coast that they were going to supply some ... building materials to. It seem[ed] to her it had to do with insulation, although she was not sure. Graybill mentioned that defendant was involved and said vaguely that there was a meeting set up and that they were going to supply the building materials at that meeting. In light of the uncontradicted testimony of Colman and Rose that no third vehicle was at the scene, these comments did not compel the trial court to conclude that the business Graybill had the night of the crime was the transaction involving Bartulis or Rose (rather than, for example, prostitution or drugs) or to find a persuasive inference ( Ungefug v. D'Ambrosia, supra, 250 Cal.App.2d at p. 68, 58 Cal.Rptr. 223) that Graybill had somehow witnessed the crime. Defendant also argues that Nichols's testimony about Graybill's demeanor shows the events greatly affected him, indicating that he personally observed them. However, even hearing of these events involving persons he knew could have affected Graybill greatly. The evidence supports the court's finding that Graybill could have been repeating what he had heard from someone else such as defendant himself. Colman testified that defendant told her to state falsely that there had been a shootout, and that, after the crime, she and defendant stopped to wash blood from the windshield and to get gas. No one asked her at trial whether defendant made a telephone call during this stop. Moreover, as the Attorney General notes, it is hard to believe that an actual observer of the events would talk about the shooting without even mentioning the fire and the spectacle of a flaming Rose appearing to rise from the dead, only to be hit by defendant's car. Because the court properly excluded the evidence, we need not decide whether the statement otherwise qualified under Evidence Code section 1240 as a spontaneous statement. Defendant argues the evidence was also admissible as a statement against Graybill's penal interest under Evidence Code section 1230. The statement was against defendant's penal interest, but not Graybill's. Defendant argues it was against Graybill's penal interest because it put him at the scene of the shooting. As discussed above, it put him at the scene only if he was relating what he saw rather than what someone told him. Moreover, mere presence at a crime scene is not a crime. The evidence was no more admissible under this exception than under the spontaneous statement exception. Defendant also argues that, even if the court properly excluded the statement under California law, its exclusion violated his rights to due process and to present mitigating evidence under the United States Constitution. (See Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1; Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738.) We disagree. [Neither this court nor the high court has suggested that the rule allowing all relevant mitigating evidence has abrogated the California Evidence Code. ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 837, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused's right to present a defense. ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, 226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99.) Exclusion of hearsay testimony at a penalty phase may violate a defendant's due process rights if the excluded testimony is highly relevant to an issue critical to punishment and substantial reasons exist to assume the evidence is reliable. ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 704, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278.) Defendant contends the evidence was relevant to the critical issue whether the shooting of Rose and Bartulis was a premeditated killing or the end result of a shootout. However, absent some basis for concluding that Graybill related his personal observations, rather than repeated what someone else told him, no substantial reason exists to assume the statement is reliable. Its exclusion violated none of defendant's constitutional rights.