Opinion ID: 2441608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Striking of Affirmative Defenses Issue and the Motions Court's Grant of the District's Summary Judgment Motion As to the Validity of the Taking of Mr. DeSilva's Property

Text: Mr. DeSilva argues that based on this court's holding in Franco I, supra , the order granting the motion to strike affirmative defenses [13] in this case should be vacated and this matter should be remanded for further proceedings. He also argues that because the motions court struck his affirmative defenses, he should have been given notice that the summary judgment motion applied to him and he should have been given an opportunity to respond. The Rumbers complain that they should not have been required to respond to very burdensome and complex issues about taking and public use at the same time that they were claiming they should not be defendants. Appellants also argue that the motions court erred in granting summary judgment to the District on the merits of the taking issue. We now set forth the procedural context for appellants' arguments. On May 8, 2006, the Honorable Natalia M. Combs Greene struck Mr. DeSilva's affirmative defenses because of other cases involving condemnation of property for the Skyland redevelopment in which other trial judges struck similar affirmative defenses. In Franco I, decided on July 12, 2007, we conclud[ed] that the `pretext' defense raises an issue requiring proof, and cannot be stricken for insufficient pleading. Id. at 162. Hence, we reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded that case to the trial court for consideration of appellant's pretext defense. In doing so, we noted that Franco made many specific factual allegations to support this [pretext] claim. . . . Id. at 170. The District added the Rumbers as parties on October 24, 2007. On June 9, 2008, Judge Leibovitz issued the omnibus order denying the Rumbers motion to dismiss and granting the District's motion for summary judgment. We decided Franco II, supra , on August 26, 2010. In Franco II, we concluded that the trial court improperly applied the DeSilva trial court's ruling striking affirmative defenses in the instant case to Franco because he was not a party in this case; thus, the trial court erred in applying issue preclusion on the pretext issue and in granting summary judgment to the District based thereon. Franco II, 3 A.3d at 306. In our Oh decision, released on November 12, 2010, we contrasted the detailed pleading of a pretext defense in Franco I with the conclusory language in Oh and determined that there was no error in the trial court's decision to strike Ms. Oh's pretext defenses [because] [n]either Ms. Oh's answer nor the face of the complaint alleges a single fact that supports her assertion that the taking is for private use under the pretext of a public purpose. 7 A.3d at 1003. Judge Leibovitz issued her omnibus order prior to our decisions in Franco II and Oh. Those decisions bind us as we consider the appeal in this case. Under Franco II, we would be constrained to remand Mr. DeSilva's case on the ground that the trial court improperly applied issue preclusion on his pretext defense since Judge Greene, as did other Superior Court judges considering other cases, struck Mr. DeSilva's affirmative defenses based on decisions in other Superior Court cases to which Mr. DeSilva was not a party. However, we said in Oh that [o]ur case law makes clear . . . that for an affirmative defense to stand (in the sense of entitling the defendant to proceed with discovery as to the defense), facts establishing the elements of the defense `must be particularized in some detail.' 7 A.3d at 1003. Thus, under Oh, we are constrained to conclude that Judge Greene properly struck Mr. DeSilva's affirmative pretext defense since his articulation of that defense is identical to that of the appellant in Oh. Id., 7 A.3d at 1002. While the Rumbers' pretext defense was stated in the exact manner as in the Oh complaint, the District did not seek to strike their affirmative defenses, apparently because of our ruling in Franco I. Judge Leibovitz did not have the benefit of our decision in Oh when she granted the District's motion for summary judgment but, consistent with the legal principle on which this court relied in Oh, Judge Leibovitz should have struck the Rumbers' pretext affirmative defense instead of deciding that issue on the merits. Appellants further claim that the trial court did not give them an opportunity to address the District's summary judgment motion. The District filed its motion for summary judgment as to the validity of the taking on February 29, 2008. Appellants submitted their opposition on March 17, 2008 and took the position that the trial court should first decide the Rumbers' motion to dismiss. In light of her broad discretion over the conduct of litigation, Judge Leibovitz was not obligated to first decide the Rumbers' motion to dismiss. Nor were appellants entitled to proceed to discovery on their pretext defense since they failed to particularize[] in some detail facts establishing the elements of the defense. Id. But, even assuming, without deciding, that we could properly consider the merits of the taking issue and the pretext defense, we would agree with Judge Leibovitz's analysis of the issue, including her reliance on the legislative documents relating to D.C. Law No. 15-286, and her conclusion that Mr. DeSilva's property was taken for a legitimate public use and not as a pretext for private use. See Franco I, supra ; Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984); D.C. Law No. 15-286 (the National Capital Revitalization Corporation Eminent Domain Clarification and Skyland Eminent Domain Approval Amendment Act of 2004). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. So ordered.