Opinion ID: 2995027
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Application of 18 U.S.C. sec.

Text: 924(e) Skidmore first challenges his sentence by contending that he was unconstitutionally sentenced as an armed career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(e)(1). He argues that, although the crime for which the jury convicted him--being a felon in possession of firearms in violation of sec. 922(g)(1)-- only carries a sentence of up to ten years, he was improperly sentenced under sec. 924(e)(1), the Armed Career Criminal Act, which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, based on his having been previously convicted of three separate violent felonies. Skidmore asserts that under Apprendi, whether he had been convicted of three separate violent felonies is a fact that should have been presented to the grand jury, tried before the jury, and found beyond a reasonable doubt before he was sentenced under sec. 924(e)(1). Because the jury was not presented with the question of whether Skidmore had been convicted of these crimes, he argues that the district court’s imposition of a sentence pursuant to sec. 924(e)(1) was invalid. Thus, he asks this Court to reverse and remand with instructions to the district court to re-sentence him to no more than 120 months. Section 922(g)(1) explains that it is unlawful for any person: who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Skidmore is correct that ordinarily the maximum sentence for a violation of sec. 922(g)(1) is ten years. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(a)(2). However, a defendant that is found to have violated sec. 922(g) and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another . . . shall be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(e)(1). Thus, in this case, because Skidmore had been convicted of three separate violent felonies,/4 as defined by 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(e) (2)(B),/5 the maximum sentence Skidmore faced was life imprisonment. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1998), a case decided before the Court’s decision in Apprendi, the Court concluded that recidivism used to enhance a defendant’s maximum penalty is not an element of a crime that must be charged in an indictment and found beyond a reasonable doubt but instead is a sentencing factor. Id. at 239, 243-44. Recognizing that this holding forecloses his argument here, Skidmore argues that Apprendi severely undermines the validity of Almendarez-Torres. In Apprendi the Court held that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 466. While the majority opinion in Apprendi noted that it is arguable that Almendarez- Torres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested, 530 U.S. at 489 (footnote omitted), the Court specifically carved out and maintained the exception for prior convictions explained in Almendarez-Torres. See id. Thus, Apprendi does not overrule the holding of Almendarez-Torres . . . that penalty enhancements based on recidivism need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Brough, 243 F.3d 1078, 1081 (7th Cir. 2001). Because Skidmore’s three separate violent felony convictions were the reason he was subjected to the enhanced statutory maximum provided by sec. 924(e) for his violation of sec. 922(g)(1), we conclude that his sentence of 262 months was proper under Apprendi. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(e)(1); see also United States v. Thomas, 242 F.3d 1028, 1034 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (finding no Apprendi violation in imposition of 295 month sentence where jury found the defendant guilty of violating sec. 922(g) and defendant had three prior violent felony convictions because sec. 924(e)(1) authorizes a punishment of not less than fifteen years (which means up to life imprisonment) for violation of sec. 922(g) where the defendant has previously been convicted of three violent felonies or serious drug offenses); United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 586-88 (10th Cir. 2000) (dismissing defendant’s claim that 210 month sentence violated Apprendi when sentence was imposed pursuant to sec. 924(e) after jury convicted defendant of violating sec. 922(g)(1) and defendant had three prior violent felony convictions); United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 235 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that Apprendi did not affect defendant’s 262 month sentence, imposed pursuant to sec. 924(e), after a jury found defendant guilty of violating sec. 922(g)(1) because the statutory maximum for that defendant, who had three prior violent felony convictions, was life imprisonment). 2. The District Court’s Calculation of Skidmore’s Sentence Under the Sentencing Guidelines Skidmore also challenges his sentence by asserting that the district court’s use of U.S.S.G. sections 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) and (c)(2) to increase his sentence violated his due process rights in light of Apprendi. Skidmore was sentenced as an armed career criminal pursuant to section 4B1.4 because his three prior violent felony convictions rendered him subject to an enhanced sentence under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(e). U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual sec. 4B1.4(a) (1998). At Skidmore’s sentencing hearing, the district court determined that Skidmore had been in possession of a silencer. Because this silencer was a type of firearm described in 26 U.S.C. sec. 5845(a)(7), U.S.S.G. sections 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) and (c)(2) required Skidmore’s base level offense to be set at 34 and his criminal history category to be set at VI./6 This combination resulted in a sentencing range of 262-327 months. The court proceeded to sentence Skidmore to 262 months, the low end of this range. Skidmore argues that the increase in his sentence provided for by sections 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) and (c)(2) is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi and Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 120 S. Ct. 2090, 147 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2000)./7 According to Skidmore, these guideline sections impermissibly increased his sentence based on the district court’s determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he possessed a specific type of firearm described in 26 U.S.C. sec. 5845(a). Skidmore contends that Apprendi and Castillo mandate that whether he possessed a silencer is a fact that should have been presented to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not agree. We certainly recognize, as other circuits have observed, that four dissenting justices in Apprendi expressed concern that the principle that they understood underlies the majority’s ruling threatened the validity of fact- finding by a sentencing judge in applying the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 2001). Indeed, one member of the Apprendi majority intimated in a footnote that Apprendi’s reasoning might extend to fact-finding for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 183-84. We have concluded, however, along with every other circuit to consider this issue, that a district court may make various factual determinations under the guidelines, thereby affecting a defendant’s sentence, so long as such determinations do not cause the defendant’s sentence to exceed the prescribed statutory maximum for that crime. See Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) (Apprendi does not affect application of the relevant- conduct rules under the Sentencing Guidelines to sentences that fall within a statutory cap.); accord United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d at 184; United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 863 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Obi, 239 F.3d 662, 667 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 444 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Aguayo- Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 934 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hernandez- Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Wilson, 244 F.3d 1208, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829 (11th Cir. 2000); In Re: Sealed Case, 246 F.3d 696, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The statutory maximum for Skidmore’s conviction was life imprisonment. Because Skidmore’s sentence was within this maximum, we dismiss his claim that the district court’s factual findings under the sentencing guidelines improperly increased his sentence under Apprendi. As we explained in Talbott, when the statutory maximum is life imprisonment, Apprendi is beside the point. Talbott, 226 F.3d at 869.