Opinion ID: 2166740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: denial of access to documents

Text: Hammond alleged in Count II of its petition an abuse of discretion on the part of the Authority in denying Hammond access to certain of the documentation concerning Augusta Lumber, submitted with the City of Augusta's application. Where, as here, the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court, not receiving additional evidence, the Law Court will directly examine the record as developed before the administrative agency. Radin v. Crowley, 516 A.2d 962, 964 (Me.1986); Spain v. City of Brewer, 474 A.2d 496, 498 (Me.1984). In this instance our review is limited to determining whether the Authority acted within its discretion or committed an error of law in denying Hammond access to the documents it sought. Id. Our independent review of the record leads us to conclude that the Superior Court correctly determined that the Authority did not abuse its discretion. At the time of the hearing, June 26, 1985, confidentiality of material submitted to the Authority was governed by 10 M.R. S.A. § 975 (Supp.1984) [7] and § 1063(2). Section 975 read in pertinent part: Except as provided in this section and in [section] 1063, no member, officer, agent or employee of the authority may knowingly divulge or disclose any information submitted to, or developed by, the authority in connection with an application for ... revenue obligations, securities or financing of any project under this chapter, except to the extent that the disclosure is deemed by the authority to be necessary or convenient for evaluation of any application submitted to the authority. (Emphasis added.) The disclosure language in section 1063(2), which has not been amended and was referred to in section 975, reads in pertinent part: If any such party [objecting to the project] presents such objections with reasonable specificity and persuasiveness, the authority may divulge whatever information concerning a project which it deems necessary for a fair presentation by the objecting party and evaluation of such objections. (Emphasis added.) Hammond argues that because the Authority found it to be a party objecting to the City of Augusta's application with reasonable specificity and persuasiveness under section 1063(2), the statutes mandate that it be given access to all of the materials submitted with the application. The statutory language does not support Hammond's assertions. Section 975 proscribes disclosure, except in those instances the Authority deems necessary and convenient for evaluation of an application. Section 1063(2) provides that the Authority may disclose whatever it deems necessary for use by an objecting party. The Superior Court correctly concluded that disclosure is left entirely within the discretion of the Authority. Since section 975 is not ambiguous, the new section 975-A, [8] which mandates disclosure of materials to appropriate persons under section 1063, cannot be relied on to come to a different conclusion. Later legislative enactments can serve to aid the court in statutory interpretation only if there is ambiguity in the language being interpreted. Singal v. City of Bangor, 440 A.2d 1048, 1053 (Me.1982); Delano v. City of South Portland, 405 A.2d 222, 226 (Me. 1979). In limiting disclosure of information to Hammond, the Authority acted within its discretion. Moreover, an examination of the entire record leads us to agree with the Superior Court's conclusion that Hammond's possession of all of the documents at the administrative hearing would not have resulted in a different decision by the Authority. The entry is: Judgment of dismissal vacated. Case remanded to Superior Court with instructions to enter judgment affirming the action of the Finance Authority of Maine. All concurring.