Opinion ID: 2618356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Comparative Negligence vs. Contributory Negligence

Text: Riebe contends that the trial court erred when it denied Riebe's motion in limine to try the case under contributory negligence rather than comparative negligence. This issue arises from the parties' stipulated dismissal of Lewis' original action against Riebe. Lewis was injured on June 30, 1983, and his original complaint against Riebe was filed in March 1984. On August 30, 1984, the parts of Arizona's comparative negligence statute pertinent to this case, A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 to -2509, became effective. Pursuant to the parties' March 1985 stipulation, the trial court ordered the dismissal of Lewis' original action against Riebe without prejudice. [4] Lewis filed a new complaint against Riebe in April 1985. Lewis acknowledges that he dismissed and refiled his action against Riebe in order to take advantage of the new comparative negligence statute. By its terms, the comparative negligence statute applies only to cases filed on or after August 30, 1984. Laws 1984, Ch. 237, §§ 3, 5. Lewis contends that he met this requirement by dismissing his original action and refiling it in April of 1985. We agree. The stipulated dismissal of Lewis' original action became final when the time for filing an appeal passed. See Edgar v. Garrett, 10 Ariz. App. 98, 101, 456 P.2d 944, 947 (1969), citing Casa Grande Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Ariz. App. 163, 165, 444 P.2d 521, 523 (1968). Once the dismissal was final, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over the case. See Crawford v. Crawford, 20 Ariz. App. 599, 600, 514 P.2d 1050, 1051 (1973); Spring v. Spring, 3 Ariz. App. 381, 383, 414 P.2d 769, 771 (1966). In effect, the case no longer existed because `voluntary dismissal of a suit leaves the situation ... as though the suit had never been brought....' Spring, 3 Ariz. App. at 383, 414 P.2d at 771, quoting A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 197 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir.1952). Lewis was then free to file a new complaint, which he did. Because the second case against Riebe was filed after the effective date of the comparative negligence statute, it met the statute's filing requirement. Riebe argues, however, that even if Lewis met the requirements of the comparative negligence statute, the trial court should have granted Riebe's motion in limine because Riebe did not intend to allow Lewis to take advantage of the new statute. We find this argument to be without merit. The fact that parties are bound by their stipulations is well established in Arizona law. E.g., State v. Sorrell, 109 Ariz. 171, 173, 506 P.2d 1065, 1067 (1973), quoting Gangadean v. Flori Inv. Co., 106 Ariz. 245, 248, 474 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1970); Rutledge v. Board of Regents, 147 Ariz. 534, 549, 711 P.2d 1207, 1222 (App. 1985); Pulliam v. Pulliam, 139 Ariz. 343, 345, 678 P.2d 528, 530 (App. 1984); Harsh Building Co. v. Bialac, 22 Ariz. App. 591, 593, 529 P.2d 1185, 1187 (1975). It was within the trial court's discretion to refuse to relieve Riebe from the terms of its stipulation, Harsh Building Co., 22 Ariz. App. at 594, 529 P.2d at 1188, quoting Los Angeles City School Dist. v. Landier Mgmt. Co., 177 Cal. App.2d 744, 752, 2 Cal. Rptr. 662, 665-66 (1960), and we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion. Riebe argues that if Riebe had consented to Lewis' use of the comparative negligence statute, the stipulation would have reflected that consent. However, Lewis' counsel avows that he discussed his intention to take advantage of the comparative negligence statute with Riebe's counsel before the stipulation was signed. [5] The stipulation does not refer to the comparative negligence issue; it simply states: The parties, by and through their respective counsel, hereby stipulate that the above-entitled action may be dismissed without prejudice with leave to refile. Parties further stipulate that all discovery of documents and all discovery completed by the parties in action No. 21734 shall be preserved and made a part of any amended or refiled action involving the alleged injury and occurrence as is generally set forth in the Complaint. The trial court found that the stipulation is just a plain vanilla stipulation to dismiss but preserving the discovery.... So, I'm going to leave it the way it is. This is [a] stipulation to dismiss, period. Because of the wording of the stipulation and the conflicting information about the parties' intentions, this decision was not an abuse of discretion. Moreover, construing the stipulation in light of the surrounding circumstances, see Brandt's Estate, 67 Ariz. 42, 48, 190 P.2d 497, 501 (1948), we find it difficult to believe that Riebe consented to the dismissal without knowing that Lewis would be able to take advantage of the new statute. Many cases were dismissed and refiled in this same time period in order to take advantage of the new statute. See, e.g., Quadrone v. Pasco Petroleum Co., 156 Ariz. 415, 752 P.2d 504 (App. 1988). Riebe obviously contemplated that Lewis might refile his action because of the stipulation concerning the use of prior discovery. Even if Riebe somehow overlooked the consequences of its stipulation, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Riebe's motion in limine  a motion which was filed several years after the stipulated dismissal. Riebe further argues that the trial court should have granted its motion in limine in light of Cheney v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 446, 698 P.2d 691 (1985), a case in which this court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to dismiss a case so that it could be refiled under the comparative negligence statute. The Cheney decision was based on this court's conclusion that the loss of the right to plead contributory negligence as a defense is the loss of a substantial right. However, Cheney is distinguishable from the present case. In Cheney, the defendant preserved his right to assert contributory negligence by opposing the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. See Hall v. A.N.R. Freight System, Inc., 149 Ariz. 130, 141, 717 P.2d 434, 445 (1986). The trial court in Cheney also had the discretion to deny the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Here, however, Riebe stipulated to the dismissal, and the dismissal was effective without the trial court's approval. See Rule 41(a), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure; Theriault v. Scottsdale Enter., 157 Ariz. 77, 78, 754 P.2d 1352, 1353 (App. 1988) (stipulation of dismissal automatically dismisses claim without any action by trial court). We find that the trial court did not err when it denied Riebe's motion in limine to submit the case to the jury under the theory of contributory negligence. By stipulating to the dismissal of Lewis' original action, Riebe lost its right to assert the defense of contributory negligence.