Opinion ID: 184408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Congress' Contingent Consent Was a Lawful Delegation

Text: 18 In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1892), the Supreme Court articulated what has come to be known as the delegation doctrine. However, since Field, the Court has invalidated statutes on grounds of unlawful delegations on only two occasions, both of which occurred prior to the full development of the regulatory state ushered in by the New Deal. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935). In recent decades, it has become widely accepted that Congress may, as a general matter, confer substantial authority upon a coordinate branch of government, as long as it provides an intelligible principle to guide the delegatee's exercise of the power conferred. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372, 109 S.Ct. 647, 654-55, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989).
19 In the instant case, Congress made its consent contingent upon a finding by the Secretary that the Compact was in the compelling public interest of the Compact region. This act of contingent legislation is not substantially different from countless pieces of legislation passed by Congress over the last several decades--including many which have been challenged under the delegation doctrine and found to be constitutional by reviewing courts. We are unpersuaded by Appellant's efforts to distinguish the delegation in this case, on the grounds of both the nature of the legislative power delegated and the extent of executive action involved, from delegations that have been upheld as constitutional. 20 Appellant argues that consent to the Compact does not entail on-going administration of a regulatory scheme by the Executive Branch, on the assumption that this matters. However, precedent does not support Appellant's suggestion that contingent legislation is permissible only when associated with the administration of an on-going regulatory scheme. Rather, the Supreme Court has adopted the general rule that  '[a] constitutional power implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to effect its purposes.'  Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 1748, 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996) (quoting Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 1313, 92 L.Ed. 1694 (1948) (alteration in original)). See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26, 64 S.Ct. 660, 668, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944) (Congress is not confined to that method of executing policy which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to administrative officers.). 21 The Court frequently has upheld Congress' delegation of responsibilities to the Executive through contingent legislation requiring an executive agent to take some action upon the finding of specified conditions. For example, in upholding Congress' delegation to the Price Administrator to fix commodity prices that would be fair and equitable and would effectuate the purposes of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, the Court stated: 22 The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct.... These essentials are preserved when Congress has specified the basic conditions of fact upon whose existence or occurrence, ascertained from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, it directs that its statutory command shall be effective. 23 Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424-25, 64 S.Ct. at 667. Thus, the relevant distinction between the legislative and the executive is one of function, not of frequency. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 758, 116 S.Ct. at 1744 ( 'The true distinction ... is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. This first cannot be done; to the latter no objection can be made.' ) (quoting Field, 143 U.S. at 693-94, 12 S.Ct. at 505) (alteration in original). 24 In any case, the Secretary's delegated role here is consistent with the Secretary's role in the regulation of milk prices nationwide. In this instance, the Secretary was not asked to regulate milk prices directly. Instead, he was asked to determine whether permitting the Compact Commission to override the national minimum price for milk, in the case of the Compact states pending reform of the federal milk-pricing scheme, would be in the compelling public interest of the Compact region. This question implicates the Secretary's administrative role in regulating milk prices. 25 Appellant asserts that congressional consent to interstate compacts must be effective of its own force, with no role for the Executive, Brief for Appellant at 11, but fails to offer any compelling reason why the compact consent clause should be understood differently from Congress' other Article I powers for the purposes of the delegation doctrine. Cf. Loving, 517 U.S. at 767, 116 S.Ct. at 1748 (Congress' power to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (Clause 14) is no less plenary than other Article I powers) (citations omitted). If, as the Court held in Loving, Congress can lawfully delegate the power to define crimes--a power which is arguably at the height of that which might be defined as legislative--then surely it can lawfully delegate to the Secretary the power to authorize an interstate compact upon the finding that the Compact would serve a compelling public interest in the Compact region. Although it may still be possible to posit hypothetical instances of delegations which might be found unlawful, we are unconvinced that this is such an instance. 26 Appellant notes that, in Loving, the Court observed at length that the Executive has traditionally played a significant role in the regulation of the military, see id. at 758 - 768, 116 S.Ct. at 1744-48, thus suggesting that Loving should not be viewed as a weighty precedent in this case. There is nothing in the Loving opinion that we can find, however, indicating that this historical fact is a limiting principle governing application of the delegation doctrine. Indeed, such a reading of Loving would conflict with previous statements of the Court. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385, 109 S.Ct. at 661 (Our constitutional principles of separated powers are not violated ... by mere anomaly or innovation.). Rather, it appears that the Loving Court examined the historical practice of England as a tool for ascertaining the Framers' intent in drafting Clause 14. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 765, 116 S.Ct. at 1747 (... the Framers knew well this history ...). In addition, the Court emphasized the lack of any clear and absolute rule against the delegation at issue in Loving. See id. at 767-768- 116 S.Ct. at 1748. Although Appellant maintains that the delegation at issue here is a novelty, it fails to identify any clear and absolute rule against such a delegation. 27
28 Where the power at issue is a delegable power, Congress may provide discretionary authority to a coordinate branch of government [s]o long as Congress 'lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform.'  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372, 109 S.Ct. at 655 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 48 S.Ct. 348, 351, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928) (second alteration in original)). Applying this general rule over the last several decades, the Supreme Court has upheld, without deviation, Congress' ability to delegate power under broad standards, id. at 373, 109 S.Ct. at 655, including delegations authorizing the Executive to take action upon finding that it would be in the public interest to do so. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1013-14, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943) (upholding delegation to FCC to regulate broadcast licensing in the public interest); New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24, 53 S.Ct. 45, 48, 77 L.Ed. 138 (1932) (upholding delegation to ICC to authorize the consolidation of carriers where it finds that such consolidation would be in the public interest); see also Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425, 64 S.Ct. at 667-68 (It is no objection [under the delegation doctrine] that the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the statutory standards and declaration of policy call for [the delegated agent's] judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administrative policy within the prescribed statutory framework.) (citations omitted). 29 The compelling public interest in the Compact region standard falls well within established intelligible principle parameters. Indeed, Appellant's arguments in support of its APA claim convincingly demonstrate that the compelling public interest standard is discernible and demanding. In advancing this argument, Appellant has no difficulty--nor do we--in defining the scope of the compelling public interest standard. 30