Opinion ID: 41378
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Ungars' Standing to Appeal

Text: 11 The Ungars assert that they have standing to appeal the restraining order because it affects their interests. The Ungars also argue that they are the main targets of the restraining order, yet they have had no opportunity to oppose, contest, or be heard. The Ungars contend that their interests are perfectly aligned against the interests of the defendant and the Government, therefore neither party will raise and protect their rights if they are not permitted to do so themselves. 12 By contrast, the Government argues that the Ungars are statutorily barred from asserting HLF's rights in a forfeiture proceeding. The Government asserts that third parties may participate in forfeiture proceedings only (1) in hearings concerning post-indictment restraint on forfeitable property where they can assert their own due process claims or claims of irreparable injury, and (2) in post-conviction ancillary proceedings, where they can assert their interest in the forfeitable property. 13 [W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). The three requirements that constitute the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing are injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (citations omitted). The first, injury in fact, requires that the appellant show personal harm that is concrete, distinct and palpable, as well as actual or imminent. Whitmore v. Ark., 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). To satisfy the second requirement, the appellant must establish a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of some third party not before the court. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 225, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). The third requirement, redressability, is present if there is a substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted, citing Stevens, 529 U.S. at 771, 120 S.Ct. 1858); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) ([A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The [appellant] must clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy these Art. III standing requirements. A federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155-56, 110 S.Ct. 1717. 14 While there is a general rule that non-parties to a suit do not have standing to appeal, we have previously stated that exceptions exist. For instance, in Castillo [,] . . . we reaffirmed the principle that if the decree affects a third party's interests, he is often allowed to appeal. SEC v. Forex Asset Mgmt. LLC, 242 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir.2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If an injunction extends to non-parties, they may appeal from it. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 359 (5th Cir.1983). 15 The indictment's forfeiture count asserts the Government's interest in these blocked assets. The indictment and the Government's application for the restraining order each detail the fact that the HLF property is blocked to all except OFAC and third parties like the Ungars. The purpose of the restraining order was to keep OFAC, the Ungars, and others like the Ungars, from interfering with the Government's interest in these assets. Moreover, the Ungars are specifically mentioned in the Government's Application for Post-indictment Restraining Order, and the restraining order includes a list of, inter alia, the same assets the Ungars claim to have levied in partial satisfaction of their judgment against Hamas. The order of injunction restrains persons, financial institutions, or other entities who have any interest or control over the subject property. If the Ungars are persons who have any interest or control over the property at issue, then the restraining order is directed toward them. The Ungars allege that they have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, and argue that the dispute at bar touches upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. Flast, 392 U.S. at 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Having purportedly levied writs of execution issued by federal district courts against some of the HLF assets expressly named in this restraining order, the Ungars appear to have an interest in, and arguably may have some control over, these assets. 16 It is true that the Ungars did not participate in the proceedings before the Texas district court. 4 Nevertheless, on the face of the injunction and the pleadings that gave rise thereto, it appears that the injunction seeks to keep the Ungars from obtaining specific assets that are the subject of federal writs of execution that the Ungars claim to have levied. Under this scenario, we find that the Ungars have standing to appeal this restraining order. 17