Opinion ID: 2976739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Liability for Aiding and Abetting

Text: McGee argues that the district court erred when it included an alternative “aiding and abetting” theory of criminal liability in the jury instructions because the single count indictment did not include “aiding and abetting” language or cite 18 U.S.C. § 2, the “aiding and abetting” statute. This alleged error, McGee argues, denied him procedural due process because he was not properly placed on notice of the charges against him. We review jury instructions as a whole to determine “whether they fairly and accurately inform the jury of relevant considerations and explain the applicable law.” United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 760-61 (6th Cir. 2000). No. 06-2158 United States v. McGee Page 3 We begin our analysis, then, with the applicable “aiding and abetting” statute, Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2, which provides: (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. The Sixth Circuit has interpreted aiding and abetting as a theory of liability “embodied in every federal indictment, whether specifically charged or not,” and not a distinct substantive crime. United States v. Floyd, 46 Fed. App’x. 835, 836 (6th Cir. 2002). While all indictments must inform the defendant of the crime with which he or she is charged, Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962), we have long held that “[i]n keeping with the provisions of § 2 . . . an indictment need not specifically charge ‘aiding and abetting’ or ‘causing’ the commission of an offense against the United States, in order to support a jury verdict based upon a finding of either.” United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 72 (6th Cir. 1966); see also Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[A] defendant may be indicted for the commission of a substantive crime as a principal offender and convicted of aiding and abetting its commission although not named in the indictment as an aider and abettor without violating federal due process.”); United States v. Moore, 460 F.2d 1265, 1256 (6th Cir. 1972). Thus, an indictment need not explicitly refer to aiding or abetting to support a jury verdict based on a finding under that theory. Here, McGee attempts to distinguish this line of Sixth Circuit cases by relying on the fact that his indictment not only lacked language referring to aiding and abetting, but also failed to cite 18 U.S.C. § 2. McGee refers to the unpublished decision in United States v. Taniguchi, where this court considered whether an indictment that merely cited 18 U.S.C. § 2 gave the defendant notice of potential liability for aiding and abetting. 49 Fed. Appx. 506 (6th Cir. 2002). Because the indictment in Taniguchi contained a citation to 18 U.S.C. § 2, we reserved for later, in a footnote, “the question of whether the indictment before us would be sufficient had the United States failed even to cite the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2.” Id. at 521 n.4. McGee urges this court to find that such an indictment is not sufficient. However, given this court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 as an alternative theory of liability, and our long-held decisions that aiding and abetting is embedded in federal indictments, we hold that an indictment need not charge or refer to 18 U.S.C. § 2 to support a conviction based on a theory of aiding and abetting. Accordingly, the district court did not err in allowing the jury to consider “aiding and abetting” as an alternative theory of liability.