Opinion ID: 763283
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The indictment failed to state an offense

Text: 18 Gatewood argues that the indictment fails to allege an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Specifically, he claims that the indictment does not include one of the elements of the offense--a false statement. The elements required to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 are as follows: 19 (1) the making of a statement; (2) the falsity of such statement; (3) knowledge of the falsity of such statement; (4) relevance of such statement to the functioning of a federal department or agency; and (5) that the false statement was material. 20 United States v. Hixon, 987 F.2d 1261, 1266 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that the defendant's conviction for representing that he was not self-employed must be set aside because in fact he was employed by a corporation that he owned). 21 At the time of Gatewood's indictment, § 1001 provided in pertinent part as follows: 22 Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, [violates this provision]. 23 Count 1 of the indictment reads as follows: 24 On or about November 26, 1992, ... Gatewood knowingly and willfully made a false, fictitious and fraudulent statement and representation of a material fact, in that he certified that he had made payments to subcontractors and suppliers from previous payments received under a contract with the United States Navy when in truth and in fact as he then well knew he had not made full payment to the subcontractors and suppliers from previous payments received from the United States Navy ... 25 Gatewood argues that his certification as set forth in the indictment was not literally false on its face. This court has stated that 26 [A] prosecution for a false statement under § 1001 or under the perjury statutes cannot be based on an ambiguous question where the response may be literally and factually correct.... An indictment premised on a statement which on its face is not false cannot survive. 27 United States v. Gahagan, 881 F.2d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir.1978)) (bracket, emphasis, and ellipses in original). In Gahagan, the defendant's conviction for his denial of ownership of a vehicle was reversed because on its face [it was] not a false representation given that he had transferred title to the vehicle prior to the certification. See id. 28 The indictment in the instant case purports to raise a direct conflict between the certification that Gatewood made and the actual facts. Specifically, the indictment contrasts the contention that Gatewood certified that he had made payments to subcontractors and suppliers from previous payments received under a contract[,] with the allegation that he in fact had not made full payment to the subcontractors and suppliers from previous payments received from the United States Navy. The indictment presents a false dichotomy, because certifying that one has made payments to subcontractors is not inconsistent with having yet to pay the subcontractors in full. The indictment therefore simply does not present a false statement. 29 In contrast, a false statement would have been present if the certification had stated that Gatewood had made payment in full to all of the subcontractors when in fact he had not made payment in full to all of them. Accordingly, we conclude that the indictment in the instant case is premised on a statement which on its face is not false. See Gahagan, 881 F.2d at 1383. Because an indictment must include all of the elements of the offense, and because a false statement is an element of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the indictment is fatally defective. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (stating that an indictment must  'fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.' ) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612, 26 L.Ed. 1135 (1881)). 30 Although we are cognizant of the fact that the indictment must be read liberally in this case, we find no way to ignore the term full as set forth in the indictment. First, the term full is not superfluous to the indictment, given that the lynchpin of the government's case was that Gatewood never made full payment to Driveways, Construction Quality, or D & D. Second, given that the evidence at trial showed that Gatewood made partial payments to Construction Quality and D & D, deleting the term full would have exposed the government to an insufficiency of the evidence challenge because Gatewood did in fact make payments to subcontractors. 31 The government argues that our adoption of Gatewood's interpretation of the indictment would make it impossible for any party to be found guilty of making a fraudulent certification. (emphasis in original). We find this argument unpersuasive. Here, the root of the problem lies in the certification itself, which could have been more artfully drafted. If the Navy had wanted to be sure that all payments then due the subcontractors had been made, it should have drafted the certification to reflect that desire. For example, the certification for subsequent progress payments could have stated the following: 32 I hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that ... all payments due to subcontractors and suppliers at the time of the last payment received under the contract have been made ... 33 The inclusion of the italicized language above would have enabled the government to pursue the conviction it sought against Gatewood--a conviction based on falsely certifying that he had made all payments due to the subcontractors and suppliers at the time he had received his last progress payment. 34 Although we are sympathetic to the government's plight in this case, we echo the Supreme Court's sentiments as expressed in a related context: 35 It may well be that petitioner's answers were not guileless but were shrewdly calculated to evade. Nevertheless, ... any special problems arising from the literally true but unresponsive answer are to be remedied through the questioner's acuity and not by a federal perjury prosecution. 36 Vesaas, 586 F.2d at 104 (quoting Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362, 93 S.Ct. 595, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973)) (ellipses in original). 37 For all of the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the indictment cannot within reason be construed to charge a crime. Hart, 640 F.2d at 857-58.