Opinion ID: 2976987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: vindictive sentencing claim

Text: Gonzales claims that the thirty-year sentence imposed as the result of his third trial violated his due process rights because it exceeded the twenty-year sentence imposed following his first trial. The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a court from imposing a harsher sentence on a defendant to punish him for exercising his right to appeal. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In order to protect this right, appellate courts must apply a presumption that the trial court acted vindictively when a harsher sentence is imposed following appeal. Id. at 726. When this presumption applies, reversal is required unless the reasons for the longer sentence are apparent from the record. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized some exceptions to this rule for situations in which such a presumption is not warranted. One such exception is made where a different judge imposes sentence after appeal. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140 (1986). This exception arises from the recognition that a sentencing judge uninvolved in the imposition of the 23 No. 06-4437 earlier sentence would lack a “personal stake” in the outcome of later proceedings and would thus have little motive to act vindictively. Id. at 140 n.3. The judge that sentenced Gonzales after his first trial was not the same as the one who sentenced him at his third trial. As a result, no presumption of vindictiveness applies, and Gonzales must demonstrate actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge. Since Gonzales has offered no such proof, the state court’s holding that Gonzales’ sentence did not violate Pearce was not an unreasonable application of federal law.