Opinion ID: 1835855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Void Tax Deed as Color of Title

Text: Although the litigation between these parties is rather convoluted, the issue before this Court is a narrow one: Did the void tax deed provide the Greens with color of title under § 6-5-200? The invalidity of the tax sale and the tax deed is undisputed. The Greens have also abandoned any claim that the short statute of limitations entitles them to possession of the mineral interests. Simply put, color of title is a writing that appears to transfer title but that in reality does not. Bradley v. Gordon, 240 Ala. 556, 200 So. 736 (1941); Bowles v. Lowery, 181 Ala. 603, 62 So. 107 (1913). Under § 6-5-200(a)(1), color of title, as opposed to a rightful claim to title, requires only that a deed or other writing purporting to convey title be recorded in the probate office of the county where the land lies and that it has been recorded for 10 years before the action is filed. Lewis v. Hardin, 512 So.2d 96 (Ala.1987). Color of title is only a facadeit is the appearance that matters and not what is behind it. Generally, even a defective, irregular, or void deed can constitute color of title. Any instrument purporting to convey an interest in land may be color of title, however defective or imperfect it is, and no matter from what cause it is invalid, Edmonson v. Colwell, 504 So.2d 235, 236 (Ala. 1987), citing Van Meter v. Grice, 380 So.2d 274 (Ala.1980). Moreover, void tax deeds have specifically been held to furnish color of title. Turnham v. Potter, 289 Ala. 685, 271 So.2d 246 (1972); Pierson v. Case, 272 Ala. 527, 133 So.2d 239 (1961); Brannan v. Henry, 142 Ala. 698, 39 So. 92 (1905). Certainly, the tax deed to John Green, Sr., appeared to convey title to the subject property. It was recorded in 1933; thus, the 10-year requirement was easily met. The tax deed, while not a valid title itself, thus appears to have the attributes necessary to constitute color of title. The trial court, however, held that the specific exclusion of void tax sales under § 3107 stripped the tax deed of any status, including that of color of title. The trial court's order read: [Section 3107] expressly provided it did not apply to void sales; i.e. that a void tax sale would not be of any benefit to the tax purchaser under § 3107. In other words, the express language of § 3107 made it clear that a void tax sale did not constitute color of title for statute of limitations purposes under § 3107. This holding is erroneous for several reasons. First, § 3107 is the wrong statute to apply in this case. In Odom v. Averett, 248 Ala. 289, 27 So.2d 479 (1946), this same statute was at issue; the Court held it inapplicable, stating: [Section] 3107 of the Code of 1923, which was in force at the time the property was sold for taxes and bought in by the State, expressly provided that the statute of limitations of three years for the recovery of lands sold for the payment of taxes did not apply to void tax sales. But this provision excepting void tax sales from the operation of the statute was omitted in the Revenue Act of 1935. [Citations omitted.] [The statute] which was in effect at the time of the filing of this suit ... is the statute which has application to the instant case. Under our decisions, statutes of limitations affect the remedy and unless the act creating the limitation expressly shows a contrary intention, the statute of limitations existing at the time of trial applies. 248 Ala. at 291, 27 So.2d at 480. Thus, the proper statute of limitations to apply is the statute currently in force, § 40-10-82, Ala. Code 1975. [4] That statute does not expressly exclude void sales and, accordingly, does not support the proposition that a void tax deed cannot constitute color of title. Second, even if § 3107 were the proper statute to apply, we would find the trial court's reading of it to be overly broad and unreasonably prohibitive. The trial court interpreted § 3107 to bar any use whatever of the tax deed by the tax purchaser. However, in enacting § 3107, the Legislature provided only that it would not apply to void sales. Nowhere in the statutory language did the Legislature express an intention to deprive a tax purchaser of the color of title provided by a void tax deed. The trial court reasoned that if a void tax deed could not provide color of title under § 3107, then it likewise could not provide color of title under the adverse possession statute, § 6-5-200. In light of our decision that § 3107 has no bearing on this case and, in any event, does not prevent a void tax deed from furnishing color of title, then certainly a void tax deed can furnish color of title for the purpose of adverse possession. We would also note that we disagree with the trial court's alternative conclusion that the Greens cannot claim color of title because no action for possession was ever brought and title was thus vested in the Parker heirs and assignees. While the Greens are certainly barred from claiming title as of right, because of the short statute of limitations, they are not barred from claiming that they hold mere color of title. We agree with the Greens that the character of the tax deed is not changed by the expiration of the period provided by the short statute of limitations. Therefore, we conclude that the void tax deed to John Green, Sr., provided color of title to the Greens for the purposes of § 6-5-200.