Opinion ID: 6323639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Phillipses’ Cross-Appeal

Text: A. Standard of Review “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all admissible evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.’” Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Emps. Mut. Cas. Co., 18 F.4th 486, 489 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Kariuki v. Tarango, 709 F.3d 405, 501 (5th Cir. 2013)). That said, a plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting a mere scintilla of evidence in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). B. Claims Against the BSO Defendants The Phillipses appeal the summary judgment dismissing four of their claims. We address each in turn. 1. Failure to disclose exculpatory evidence The Phillipses claim that the BSO defendants violated their Brady obligations by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. The district court 17 Case: 20-30731 Document: 00516240179 Page: 18 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 No. 20-30731 found these arguments were without merit because a Brady violation does not occur as long as the evidence at issue is disclosed before the end of trial. Since there was no trial in this case, the district court concluded that Brady did not apply. On appeal, the Phillipses argue that the district court erred in reaching this conclusion. They contend that the 404(b) hearing was being used to admit evidence for the purposes of the later trial, and that later trial itself would be summary; thus, Brady obligations were triggered. The district court did not err. Brady forbids the prosecutors in a criminal case from suppressing material evidence regarding a defendant’s innocence. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1976); United States v. Beasley, 576 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1978). It “is not a discovery rule, but a rule of fairness and minimum prosecutorial obligation.” Beasley, 576 F.2d at 630. And “[i]t requires a retrial only if, after conviction of a defendant, it is learned that evidence requested and not produced creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist as to the guilt of the accused.” Id. If evidence is provided to the defendant during trial, the court asks instead whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy delivery of evidence. United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1050 (5th Cir. 1994). So, if the defendant is not prejudiced, then he cannot state a claim for a Brady violation. Here, the prosecution dropped the charges against Todd prior to trial, and Todd was never convicted. The necessary implication of this is that Todd was never prejudiced at trial by the evidence, and therefore, his Brady claim fails. 2. Failure to intervene The Phillipses argue that Capt. Phillips knew Lt. Bletz was violating Todd’s rights and had a reasonable opportunity to intervene, but failed to do so. The court was troubled by Capt. Phillips’s failure to act on Detective Lombardino’s report, but nevertheless concluded there was insufficient evidence to prove all the elements of a failure-to-intervene claim. The 18 Case: 20-30731 Document: 00516240179 Page: 19 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 No. 20-30731 Phillipses contend that they put forward enough facts to support their claim. They argue that, through the report of Detective Lombardino, Capt. Phillips was aware of the exculpatory evidence and knew Lt. Bletz was withholding that evidence, but did not order Lt. Bletz to disclose it. Thus, they posit, they have sufficiently supported their claim against Capt. Phillips to proceed to trial. In order to hold an officer liable for failing to intervene, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the officer “(1) knew a fellow officer was violating an individual’s constitutional rights, (2) was present at the scene of the constitutional violation, (3) had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm but nevertheless, (4) chose not to act.” Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 343 (5th Cir. 2020). “Bystander liability requires more than mere presence in the vicinity of the violation; ‘we also consider whether an officer “acquiesced in” the alleged constitutional violation.’” Id. (quoting Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 647 (5th Cir. 2013)). Applying these rules, we found an excessive force claim of bystander liability survived summary judgment when the defendant officer stood by, laughed, and encouraged the beating of the plaintiff. Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995). On the other hand, we dismissed false arrest claims against defendant officers when the officers reported an awareness of the general events of the false arrest but did not actively acquiesce to the violating officer’s behavior. Westfall v. Luna, 903