Opinion ID: 1861746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: respective rights

Text: What are the respective rights of a garnishor judgment creditor and the owner, other than the judgment debtor owner, in a joint account? We addressed this question in Cupit v. Brooks, 237 Miss. 61, 112 So.2d 813 (1959), in which the divorced wife garnished a joint checking account in the name of her former husband and his second wife, and a joint savings account in a savings association in their two names. At trial the second wife testified that the money in the savings association represented her own savings deposited by her, while the funds in the checking account came from a restaurant business owned by the second wife, but in which her husband worked. The proof also showed that the husband had from time to time written checks from this account for support money to his children borne of the first marriage. The chancellor ordered that the funds garnished in the checking account be applied to support money arrears due the first wife. We affirmed. The distinction between that case and this, of course, is that in this case there was no proof Jack Morgan Weaver having any interest of any kind in the jointly held funds. A joint bank or savings account is subject to garnishment. Cupit v. Brooks, supra . In some jurisdictions there is a presumption of equal ownership in joint accounts, and only the interest of the joint debtor is subject to garnishment in the absence of proof by the judgment creditor that the judgment debtor owned a greater interest. Miller v. Clayco State Bank, 10 Kan. App.2d 659, 708 P.2d 997 (1985); Murphy v. Michigan Trust Co., 221 Mich. 243, 190 N.W. 698 (1922); Darst v. Awe, 235 Mich. 1, 209 N.W. 65 (1926); Dover Trust Co. v. Brooks, 111 N.J. Eq. 40, 160 A. 890 (1932). In the majority of jurisdictions, the entire account is vulnerable, but evidence is permitted to show the respective ownership of each depositor. Baker v. Baker, 710 P.2d 129 (Okla. App. 1985); Yakima Adjustment Service, Inc. v. Durand, 28 Wash. App. 180, 622 P.2d 408 (1981); Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N.W.2d 194 (1951). 11 A.L.R.3rd 1465. Republic-bank Dallas v. National Bank, 705 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. App. 6 Dist. 1986); Hayden v. Gardner, 238 Ark. 351, 381 S.W.2d 752, 11 A.L.R.3rd 1461 (1964). In Hayden v. Gardner , the Arkansas Supreme Court succinctly stated the problem, and in our view the better rule, which we followed in Cupit v. Brooks, supra . General Statement. Even a casual research of the authorities reveals that the law relative to the garnishment of joint bank accounts is far from settled or uniform. We know of no better way to emphasize this fact than to refer to an article published in 26 U Chi L Rev, Spring of 1959, pp 376-404, and particularly to the caption given the article as carried in CCH 1959-60 Legal Periodical Digest paragraph 1029. The caption is: Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Muddle. Equally revealing is a case note, Garnishment, Vol 71 Harvard Law Review 557 (1957-58) [Leaf v McGowan, 13 Ill App 2d 58, 141 NE2d 67 (1957)] where we find this statement: Joint accounts are peculiarly difficult to categorize in common-law terminology. Although they contain a survivorship feature, making them analogous to a joint tenancy, this analogy is weakened by the `joint and several' ownership feature  the right of each depositor, as against the bank, to withdraw all the funds. It is not surprising, therefore, that the problem of the extent to which joint accounts are garnishable for the debts of one depositor has given rise to a wide variety of solutions. This note then points out that at one extreme some authorities hold a joint account is immune from garnishment, while, at the other extreme it has been held that the entire account is subject to garnishment on the theory that the creditor is `subrogated' to the power exercisable by the debtor-depositor to withdraw all the money. The note then sets out a third view  that the joint account should be garnishable only in proportion to the debtor's ownership of the funds, as to which parol evidence is admissible to show the respective contributions of each depositor, as well as any intent of one to make a gift to the other. Without attempting to evaluate the merits of the above mentioned theories or views, we conclude that the last mentioned one is the most reasonable, and it is the one which we now adopt... .       ... It is our view that under the facts in this case the court should have held all of the joint bank account was prima facie subject to garnishment, and that the burden was on each joint depositor to show what portion of the funds he or she actually owned. We believe this is the fair and reasonable rule because the depositors are in a much better position than the judgment creditor to know the pertinent facts. [Brackets original] 237 Ark. at 352, 381 S.W.2d at 753-754, 11 A.L.R.3d at 1463-1464. This, likewise, is the rule we adopt in Mississippi, and which was obviously followed by the learned circuit judge. We find no error in his determination that Mrs. Weaver was the true and equitable owner of these funds, and affirm. This question is fully discussed and annotated in 11 A.L.R.3d 1461 (1967). AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, PITTMAN and BLASS, JJ., concur.