Opinion ID: 2159195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cross-examination of Character Witnesses

Text: Defendant contends that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to have allowed the prosecutor to cross-examine character witnesses concerning their knowledge of instances of past conduct not evidenced by a criminal conviction. Defendant cites the prosecutor's interrogation of character witnesses with regard to defendant's acts of violence toward women, and defendant's hostility to and threatening encounters with black youths as examples of cross-examination in violation of Evidence Rule 47. That Rule provides: RULE 47. CHARACTER TRAIT AS PROOF OF CONDUCT Subject to Rules 48 and 55, a trait of character offered for the purpose of drawing inferences as to the conduct of a person on a specified occasion may be proved only by: (a) testimony in the form of opinion, (b) evidence of reputation, or (c) evidence of conviction of a crime which tends to prove the trait. Specific instances of conduct not the subject of a conviction of a crime shall be inadmissible. In a criminal proceeding, evidence offered by the prosecution of a trait of character of the defendant on trial may be admitted only if the judge has admitted evidence of good character offered by the defendant. Character evidence offered by the defendant may not be excluded under Rule 4. The credibility of a character witness testifying on behalf of the defendant may not be impaired by an inquiry into his knowledge of the defendant's alleged criminal conduct not evidenced by a conviction. Prior to the commencement of the penalty phase, the trial court granted defendant's motion, based on Evidence Rule 47, to preclude the prosecution from impeaching defendant's character witnesses by inquiries into their knowledge of misconduct not evidenced by prior criminal convictions. Defendant contends that the trial court ignored its own ruling, and permitted impeachment of defendant's character witnesses in violation of that Rule. We conclude that although the trial court's ruling based on Evidence Rule 47 was erroneous, the trial court did not err in permitting defendant's character witnesses to be cross-examined concerning defendant's past conduct not evidenced by prior convictions. Indeed, Evidence Rule 47 ordinarily would not apply to the penalty phase of a capital case. As Comment 1 to the rule illustrates, Evidence Rule 47 applies when evidence of a trait of a person's character is offered for the purpose of drawing inferences as to the conduct of that person on a particular occasion.    The rule deals with the use of character trait evidence as circumstantial proof of conduct. Rule 47 should not be confused with Rule 46, which applies when a trait of character is actually in issue under the substantive law of this State.    Thus, evidence of a criminal defendant's personal character which is admissible under Rule 46 at a hearing to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed is not ordinarily admissible at his prior trial for murder unless it is otherwise permitted under Rule 47. [Citations omitted (emphasis added).] Accord State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 65 n. 9 (1983). The testimony of defendant's character witnesses during the penalty phase was not offered for the purpose of drawing inferences as to [defendant's] conduct on the night of the shooting. Rather, such testimony was offered to prove mitigating factor c(5)(h), N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h), which reads: (h) Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense. Therefore, Evidence Rule 46 governs the scope of permissible cross-examination of defendant's character witnesses. It provides: When a person's character or a trait of his character is in issue, it may be proved by testimony in the form of opinion, by evidence of reputation, or by evidence of specific instances of the person's conduct, subject, however, to the limitation of Rules 47 and 48. Comment 1 to Evidence Rule 46 observes: When the State seeks the imposition of the death penalty against a convicted murderer the personal character of the defendant is relevant to the determination of the existence of many of the mitigating circumstances outlined in N.J.S. 2C:11-3c(5)   . Thus, we conclude that evidence of defendant's character offered to support mitigating factor c(5)(h) may be impeached under Evidence Rule 46 by evidence of specific conduct. Our determination finds further support in the section of the capital punishment act that governs the presentation of evidence during the penalty phase: At the proceeding, the State shall have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection. The defendant shall have the burden of producing evidence of the existence of any mitigating factors set forth in paragraph (5) of this subsection   .         The State and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any evidence presented by the other party at the sentencing proceeding and to present argument as to the adequacy of the evidence to establish the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor. [ N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(a), (d) (emphasis added).] Although we are satisfied that the use of instances of past conduct to impeach evidence of a defendant's good character is consistent with both the capital punishment statute and the Rules of Evidence, there is a compelling need for the trial court to exercise close supervision over such cross-examination in order to avoid prejudice to the defendant. The State, in the penalty phase, is restricted to proving the statutory aggravating factors and rebutting proof of mitigating factors. Since there is no statutory aggravating factor dependent on proof of prior bad conduct (other than prior murder convictions, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a)), evidence of defendant's specific past conduct is pertinent only to the rebuttal of mitigating evidence of good character. Even if the jury is carefully instructed on the limited relevance of such evidence, infra at 503-509, there remains a substantial danger that inflammatory or misleading evidence of past conduct could be improperly applied by the jury during its deliberations. Thus, a trial court alerted in advance to the prosecutor's intention to interrogate defendant's character witnesses about instances of misconduct would be well-advised to rule in advance on the permitted scope of such cross-examination, outside the presence of the jury. Evid.R. 8. Defendant also challenges the inflammatory nature of the prosecutor's cross-examination of the character witnesses. He argues that since the State is limited in the penalty phase to proving aggravating factors and rebutting evidence of mitigating factors, the prosecutor's repeated references to defendant's past conduct exposed the jury to highly prejudicial allegations that necessarily tainted the jury's deliberations. Focusing on the provocative and accusatory formulation of the interrogation, defendant contends that inadequate limitations by the trial court on the prosecutor's cross-examination necessarily prejudiced the jury's deliberations. We note initially that the cross-examination of the character witnesses occurred without significant objections from defense counsel. Nevertheless, it is well settled and virtually self-evident that the cross-examination of character witness by interrogation concerning prior acts of misconduct is pregnant with possibilities of destructive prejudice. The mere asking by a respected official of such a question, however answered, may well suggest to the jury that the imputation is true. E. Cleary, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 191 at 457-58 (2d ed. 1972) (McCormick); accord 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 988 at 912-21 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). To limit the possibility of prejudice, the trial court should have required a proffer by the prosecutor concerning the accuracy of the allegations referred to in his cross-examination. The procedure of choice is outlined by Professor McCormick: The trial judge, it is believed, should be required, before permitting the prosecuting counsel to cross-examine the character witness on rumors of misconduct of the accused, or upon arrests, charges or convictions, to request the prosecutor to give his    statement to the judge (in the absence of the jury) that he has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that the crimes or misconduct, which are imputed by the rumors, or which are the subject of the arrests or charges, were actually committed by the accused, and that the judgments of conviction inquired about were actually pronounced. Reasonable grounds would require, it is suggested, that the prosecutor's assurance be based on the statements of witnesses, believed to be credible, who purport to have firsthand knowledge. [McCormick, supra, at 458.] The same point was made by Justice (then Judge) Francis, writing for the Appellate Division, in State v. Steensen, 35 N.J. Super. 103, 108-09 (1955): The administration of the rule is in the hands of the trial judge and he has a heavy responsibility to protect the practice from being abused.    A correlative obligation rests upon the prosecutor to display a very high degree of good faith in embarking upon such a cross-examination. [ Id. at 108 (citation omitted).] Accord Gross v. United States, 394 F. 2d 216, 222-23 (8th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1013, 90 S.Ct. 1245, 25 L.Ed. 2d 427 (1970). Because of our conclusion concerning the lack of a limiting instruction focusing on the evidence of defendant's past conduct, we need not decide whether the scope of the prosecutor's cross-examination of character witnesses itself constitutes reversible error. Suffice it to say that the need for close supervision by trial courts of this type of cross-examination in capital cases is particularly acute.