Opinion ID: 2122024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Challenges to Weliczko's Testimony

Text: The majority refuses to consider whether the failure of defendant's trial counsel to learn that Weliczko lacked any credentials or experience in the mental health field may have deprived defendant of the effective assistance of counsel. The majority claims that the defendant's opportunity to raise an argument regarding defense counsel's failure to verify Weliczko's credentials arose on direct appeal. (161 Ill.2d at 89, 204 Ill.Dec. at 235, 641 N.E.2d at 459.) The majority offers that [a]ny inadequacy there may have been with counsel's representation with respect to Weliczko was evident when Weliczko was cross-examined. (161 Ill.2d at 89, 204 Ill.Dec. at 235, 641 N.E.2d at 459.) The majority concludes that defendant failed to take issue with that representation on direct appeal and so is procedurally barred from doing so here [citation]   . 161 Ill.2d at 89, 204 Ill.Dec. at 235, 641 N.E.2d at 459; see also 161 Ill.2d at 87-88, 204 Ill.Dec. at 234, 641 N.E.2d at 458. I disagree with the majority on this issue. The defendant's argument of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the Weliczko testimony is not waived, because the pertinent evidence on this issue, presented by the defendant in his post-conviction petition, is evidence that does not appear in the record of his trial court proceedings. Also, this new evidence supports an argument the defendant did not make and could not make on direct appeal: that Weliczko's testimony was fraudulent and perjured because Weliczko had no bona fide training, experience, or background in psychology that would warrant introduction of his report and opinions. To justify its finding of waiver, the majority minimizes the nature of the defendant's claim, reasoning as follows: There is nothing in the content of the affidavit and documents here offering more than what is evident from the record itself. The issue of prejudice resulting from Weliczko's testimony could have been raised on direct appeal based on the testimony elicited during the sentencing hearing. Weliczko had admitted that his academic background was in theology and ministry and that, in fact, he was not a psychologist. The admissions were fixed in the record as a result of the cross-examination. The affidavit and documents reveal no more than Weliczko's own testimony. Finding no reason to excuse the procedural default, defendant's claim must be dismissed. 161 Ill.2d at 88, 204 Ill.Dec. at 235, 641 N.E.2d at 459. However, defendant does offer more than what was evident from the appellate record. Defendant alleged two glaring falsities in Weliczko's trial testimony. First, Weliczko testified on cross-examination that he earned a doctorate degree in counseling psychology from the Chicago Theological Seminary. According to defendant's post-conviction petition, Weliczko did not receive a degree in counseling psychology; he received a doctor of ministry degree. Second, Weliczko testified at the sentencing hearing that he earned a B.S. degree in psychology and philosophy from Gordon College. According to defendant's post-conviction petition, Weliczko did not receive a B.S. degree in psychology and philosophy; he received a B.A. degree in philosophy. Consequently, contrary to Weliczko's trial testimony, Weliczko allegedly did not have the education, background, or training in psychology to qualify him to provide a psychological evaluation of the defendant. The new evidence submitted in support of defendant's post-conviction went far beyond the revelations to which Weliczko admitted when he testified at the defendant's sentencing hearing. The record reveals that the trial court admitted Weliczko's opinion based upon the trial court's allegedly mistaken belief that Weliczko was a qualified psychotherapist, whose opinion regarding defendant's mental and emotional condition could aid the court in its decision whether to impose the death penalty. Contrary to the impressions of the trial court, however, Weliczko allegedly was not a qualified mental health provider, and his opinion was therefore of no genuine value to the trial court. According to defendant's post-conviction petition, the trial court erroneously relied upon Weliczko's evaluation of the defendant, although that evaluation allegedly was an incompetent and grossly inaccurate assessment of the defendant's mental and emotional condition. Defendant's post-conviction petition alleged that the report prepared by Weliczko does not constitute a competent psychiatric evaluation report because it deviates significantly from what is customarily found in a competent psychiatric report in a number of ways. Defendant offered the affidavits of qualified mental health professionals, who stated that Weliczko's report was wholly inadequate, grossly inaccurate, and contained an utterly erroneous psychological evaluation of the defendant. The psychological evaluations offered in support of defendant's post-conviction petition indicated that defendant had been raised in a troubled and dysfunctional family and suffered from neurological deficit caused by several head injuries and years of polysubstance abuse. In comparison, Weliczko testified that defendant suffered from a personality disorder, and made no reference to defendant's trouble childhood, dysfunctional family and upbringing, or defendant's suffering from neurological damage or substance abuse. It is also noteworthy that in his post-conviction petition, defendant submitted various documents relating to a Federal prosecution in which Weliczko plead guilty to bank fraud. Memoranda written by attorneys in the United States Attorney's office indicate that Weliczko had a pattern of defrauding individuals and companies, and noted his false testimony in the instant cause as an example of this pattern of behavior. The evidence of Weliczko's pattern of fraud and perjury was not presented to the trial court at defendant's death sentence hearing. Given the evidence submitted in support of defendant's post-conviction petition, it is difficult to discern a lawful basis for the majority's decision to find that defendant has waived his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument. The majority wholly ignores that the defendant's arguments, with respect to the failure to investigate and present evidence that Weliczko had no credentials to provide any testimony regarding a psychological profile of the defendant, relies upon evidence outside the record of the defendant's direct appeal. As such, the defendant's arguments, which relied upon this evidence, could not have been raised in his direct appeal, and are not waived in defendant's post-conviction proceeding. In People v. Hall (1993), 157 Ill.2d 324, 193 Ill.Dec. 98, 626 N.E.2d 131, this court stated: Defendant    contends that his trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance during the death sentence hearing   . [Citation.] Defendant claims that his trial counsel failed to present, or even investigate, meaningful mitigation evidence. The State initially responds that defendant has waived this issue in this post-conviction appeal by failing to raise it on direct appeal. It is true that where a post-conviction petitioner has previously taken a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, issues that could have been presented on direct appeal but were not are deemed waived. People v. Flores (1992), 153 Ill.2d 264, 274 [180 Ill.Dec. 1, 606 N.E.2d 1078]; People v. James (1970), 46 Ill.2d 71, 74 [263 N.E.2d 5]. However, defendant's post-conviction claim relies on affidavits of several alleged mitigating witnesses. Those affidavits were not part of the record on direct appeal. Thus, defendant could not have raised the issue in his direct appeal. Accordingly, the issue is not waived in a post-conviction proceeding. Eddmonds, 143 Ill.2d at 528 [161 Ill.Dec. 306, 578 N.E.2d 952]; People v. Owens (1989), 129 Ill.2d 303, 308-09 [135 Ill.Dec. 780, 544 N.E.2d 276]. (Emphasis added.) Hall, 157 Ill.2d at 336-37, 193 Ill.Dec. 98, 626 N.E.2d 131. In light of this reasoning in Hall, the defendant in the instant case cannot be barred, under the doctrine of waiver, from raising the argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and introduce evidence that is not found in the record of the defendant's direct appeal. The majority's decision is particularly disturbing and troubling because it needlessly and wrongfully conflicts with clear, unambiguous, and respected precedent of this court. For example, in People v. Eddmonds (1991), 143 Ill.2d 501, 161 Ill.Dec. 306, 578 N.E.2d 952, and People v. Owens (1989), 129 Ill.2d 303, 135 Ill.Dec. 780, 544 N.E.2d 276, the waiver doctrine was not applied because the evidence relied upon by the defendants did not appear in the record of their direct appeals. In both of the decisions, this court held that a defendant is permitted to present, in post-conviction petitions, allegations based on matters that could not have been presented in a direct appeal, because they arose outside the scope of the trial court's original proceedings. This long-standing rule has been recognized in other decisions of this court as well as our appellate court. See Eddmonds, 143 Ill.2d at 528, 161 Ill.Dec. 306, 578 N.E.2d 952; Owens, 129 Ill.2d at 308-09, 135 Ill.Dec. 780, 544 N.E.2d 276; People v. Wright (1986), 111 Ill.2d 18, 25-26, 94 Ill.Dec. 726, 488 N.E.2d 973; People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 91, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868; People v. Stepheny (1970), 46 Ill.2d 153, 155, 263 N.E.2d 83; People v. Thomas (1967), 38 Ill.2d 321, 324-25, 231 N.E.2d 436; People v. Hartfield (1992), 232 Ill.App.3d 198, 204, 173 Ill.Dec. 79, 596 N.E.2d 703; People v. Davis (1990), 203 Ill. App.3d 129, 139, 148 Ill.Dec. 475, 560 N.E.2d 1072; People v. Lee (1989), 185 Ill.App.3d 420, 427, 133 Ill.Dec. 536, 541 N.E.2d 747; People v. Taylor (1988), 165 Ill.App.3d 1016, 1019, 117 Ill.Dec. 556, 520 N.E.2d 907; People v. Mitchell (1987), 163 Ill.App.3d 1007, 1009, 115 Ill.Dec. 55, 517 N.E.2d 20; People v. Cobb (1986), 150 Ill.App.3d 267, 270, 103 Ill.Dec. 382, 501 N.E.2d 699; People v. Nix (1986), 150 Ill.App.3d 48, 51, 103 Ill.Dec. 508, 501 N.E.2d 825; People v. Carroll (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 365, 367, 86 Ill.Dec. 603, 475 N.E.2d 982; People v. Edsall (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 469, 472-73, 49 Ill.Dec. 923, 418 N.E.2d 943; People v. Mengedoht (1980), 91 Ill.App.3d 239, 241, 46 Ill.Dec. 840, 414 N.E.2d 893; People v. Edwards (1980), 83 Ill.App.3d 128, 131, 38 Ill.Dec. 540, 403 N.E.2d 771; People v. Turner (1979), 74 Ill. App.3d 840, 844, 30 Ill.Dec. 400, 393 N.E.2d 55; People v. Owsley (1978), 66 Ill.App.3d 234, 237, 22 Ill.Dec. 795, 383 N.E.2d 271; People v. Hudson (1978), 65 Ill.App.3d 422, 424, 22 Ill.Dec. 326, 382 N.E.2d 646; People v. Summers (1977), 50 Ill.App.3d 33, 35, 8 Ill.Dec. 3, 365 N.E.2d 241; People v. Dennis (1973), 14 Ill.App.3d 493, 495, 302 N.E.2d 651; see also People v. Johnson (1993), 154 Ill.2d 227, 182 Ill.Dec. 1, 609 N.E.2d 304; People v. Jones (1985), 109 Ill.2d 19, 23-24, 92 Ill.Dec. 552, 485 N.E.2d 363; People v. Myers (1970), 46 Ill.2d 270, 271, 263 N.E.2d 113. Most recently, in People v. Thompkins (1994), 161 Ill.2d 148, 204 Ill.Dec. 147, 641 N.E.2d 371, this court again acknowledged and reaffirmed that there is a valid and important distinction between ineffective-assistance-of-counsel arguments that are waived because the arguments rely upon matters presented at trial, and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel arguments that are not waived for post-conviction review because the arguments present additional matter not found in the record of the trial court proceedings. The majority's contrary result in the instant cause is patently unfounded in legal precedent of this court. The majority's waiver analysis in the present case is also untenable, because its reasoning has been rejected or disavowed by several Federal courts of appeal. In Guinan v. United States (7th Cir.1993), 6 F.3d 468, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted precedent, particularly with respect to preserving an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument for post-conviction review, that is similar to the precedent of this court which the majority now tacitly overrules. The Seventh Circuit has held that if a defendant postpones raising the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel until the collateral stage he must have a valid reason for the postponement   . ( Guinan, 6 F.3d at 472.) According to the court, one valid reason for postponement is that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim required proof of facts outside the record of the direct appeal. ( Guinan, 6 F.3d at 472.) In a concurring opinion, Judge Easterbrook noted that [t]hree [Federal] courts of appeals have held that ineffective-assistance claims are forfeited when not presented on direct appeal and that the Solicitor General has confessed error on all three cases once petitions for writ of certiorari were filed before the United States Supreme Court ( Guinan, 6 F.3d at 475, citing Billy-Eko v. United States (2d Cir.1992), 968 F.2d 281, vacated on confession of error (1993), ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2989, 125 L.Ed.2d 685; Chappell v. United States (7th Cir.1989), 878 F.2d 384, vacated on confession of error (1990), 494 U.S. 1075, 110 S.Ct. 1800, 108 L.Ed.2d 931; Diaz-Albertini v. United States (10th Cir.1990) (unpublished), vacated (1991), 498 U.S. 1061, 111 S.Ct. 776, 112 L.Ed.2d 839). In his concurring opinion in Guinan, Judge Easterbrook also made the following cogent observations: Like my colleagues, I yearn for a system under which one appeal resolves the entire case. Unfortunately, ineffective assistance of counsel eludes once-and-for-all disposition. Trial counsel cannot be expected to attack his own performance, and a new lawyer representing the defendant on appeal finds that it is impossible to upset a conviction by pointing to his predecessor's actions. Why impossible? Because the absence of a complete record prevents definitive action. No matter how odd or deficient trial counsel's performance may seem, that lawyer may have had a reason for acting as he did. [Citations.] Or it may turn out that counsel's overall performance was sufficient despite a glaring omission, or that the shortcoming did not prejudice the defendant. [Citations.] The trial judge is best situated to assess overall performance and prejudice, yet a claim of ineffective assistance presented on direct appeal asks the court of appeals to act without the [trial] judge's views.    Rules of procedure should be designed to induce litigants to present their contentions to the right tribunal at the right time. For ineffective assistance of counsel, the court of appeals on direct appeal is the wrong tribunal at the wrong time.    Failure to call essential witnesses might show both deficient performance and prejudice, but on direct appeal all we will have is defendant's say-so that an uncalled witness was critical. To have any hope of success, the defendant must enlarge the record with affidavits establishing what testimony the witness would have provided if called, and demonstrate that his lawyer was actually aware of this potential testimony or grossly deficient in failing to find out about it. This is precisely the type of complaint that should not be presented on direct appeal. It must be developed in an evidentiary hearing [for post-conviction relief]. Guinan, 6 F.3d at 473-74. As the observations made in Judge Easterbrook's concurrence show, the majority's reasoning in the instant cause suffers from a fundamental infirmity: it never acknowledges or explains how the defendant should have brought to this court's attention, in his direct appeal, the merits of his claim that his trial attorney was ineffective because of a failure to determine that Weliczko was a fraud and a sham who had no credentials, experience, or background in psychology, psychotherapy, or counseling. The record from defendant's direct appeal does not reveal that Weliczko was a fraud and a sham. In fact this court on direct review specifically and explicitly referred to Weliczko as a psychotherapist. (See People v. Erickson (1987), 117 Ill.2d 271, 285, 111 Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367.) The record of defendant's direct appeal would not have provided the necessary factual basis for the arguments presented by defendant in the present post-conviction proceeding. The majority's ruling, and its failure to provide clear guidance with respect to its decision, necessarily places all criminal defendants of this State into a classic catch-22, where they run the risk of being trapped in a number of losing scenarios. For example, if a defendant argues on direct appeal that his attorney was ineffective for failure to investigate certain witnesses, the court might reject his claim on the ground that the defendant cannot show what the investigation would have revealed, if the investigation had been performed. (See, e.g., People v. Williams (1991), 147 Ill.2d 173, 258, 167 Ill. Dec. 853, 588 N.E.2d 983; People v. Orange (1988), 121 Ill.2d 364, 390, 118 Ill.Dec. 1, 521 N.E.2d 69.) If the defendant argues on direct appeal that his attorney was ineffective for failure to investigate certain witnesses and his appellate counsel includes pertinent affidavits in the briefs or record on appeal, the court may reject his argument on the theory that defendant is not permitted to supplement the record on appeal with evidentiary matters outside the record of the trial court proceedings. (See, e.g., People v. Jones (1985), 109 Ill.2d 19, 23-24, 92 Ill.Dec. 552, 485 N.E.2d 363 (amendments of record on direct appeal are limited to those necessary to correct record, not add new material never presented to trial court).) If the defendant files a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance for failure to investigate certain witnesses, the court may deem the issue waived, as it does in the present case, reasoning that defendant should have presented his claim on direct appeal. Given the majority's ruling in the instant cause, I question how criminal defendants in this State will now be able to preserve and present the merits of their claims based on a failure to investigate witnesses prior to trial. The majority's waiver decision will be especially confusing for the criminal trial bar, the trial courts, and our courts of review. In light of the majority's ruling, one is left to speculate, in uncertainty, whether a claim of perjured testimony, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel, must always be presented in the defendant's direct appeal, regardless of whether the evidence supporting the argument derives from matters outside the appellate record. The majority performs a grave disservice in its lack of clear insight or guidance on these matters. Illinois once had a well-publicized reputation for having devised post-conviction requirements that created a procedural labyrinth    made up entirely of blind alleys ( Marino v. Ragen (1947), 332 U.S. 561, 567, 68 S.Ct. 240, 244, 92 L.Ed. 170, 175 (Rutledge, J., concurring)) that effectively insulated the court from ruling on the merits of a defendant's constitutional challenges to his criminal conviction and sentence. Our Post-Conviction Hearing Act was adopted in 1949 to overcome these shortcomings. (See generally Leighton, Post-Conviction Remedies in Illinois Criminal Procedure, 1966 Ill.L.F. 540, 568-71.) Unfortunately, the majority's decision harkens back to this earlier era, when technical rules of procedure were manipulated in order to avoid or preclude substantive review of the criminal defendant's constitutional arguments.