Opinion ID: 1958828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Extent of the Interest Subject to Administration in Probate.

Text: The probate court's order clearly identifies the interest that is subject to administration in probate pursuant to section 249A.5(2)( d ) as Mary's one-third interest in the subject property. Notwithstanding that finding on the court's part, it proceeded to order the sale of the entire property with the provision that one-third of the proceeds after costs of sale were to be utilized for the payment of the medical-assistance claim under Medicaid and the costs of administering the estate. Although this disposition may have been prompted by the court's desire to accelerate a possible future order for partition among the joint owners of the property, we are convinced that it was beyond the power of the court to order the sale of Allan and Pearl's interests in the property at this stage. It is axiomatic that a decedent's personal representative is only empowered to sell the decedent's interest in property owned at the time of death in order to satisfy claims. This rule has been expressed as follows: A decedent's personal representative's authority to sell real property extends only to the decedent's estate's interest in the property; a personal representative is not empowered to exercise dominion over property that was never owned by the decedent or the estate. Thus, if the decedent held title to the property as a tenant in common, only that interest may be sold. 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors & Administrators § 739, at 498 (2002). Similarly, in Green v. Gustafson, 482 N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1992), the court stated: We agree . . . that [the personal representative's] authority to sell the property extended only to Marvin's estate's interest therein, which consisted of Marvin's 1/3 interest and the 1/3 interest of George's heirs which was quieted in Marvin's estate in the action to quiet title. . . . It is axiomatic that the personal representative is not . . . empowered to exercise dominion over property which was never owned by either the decedent or the estate. Green, 482 N.W.2d at 846. We modify the district court's order so as to limit the property that may be sold by the personal representative to the one-third joint interest owned by Mary immediately prior to her death. As an alternative to a sale of property to satisfy the Medicaid-reimbursement claim, the probate court established a buyout figure. In describing that figure in their argument on appeal, Allan and Pearl suggest that the figure was the amount of the Medicaid-reimbursement claim plus accumulated interest. In reading the probate court's order it appears to us that the figure was the court's valuation of Mary's one-third interest in the property immediately prior to her death. We are satisfied that any buyout figure that the Estate Recovery Program can be made to accept in lieu of a sale of the property must require payment of its claim plus all accumulated interest. Of course, the parties are free to negotiate an alternative buyout figure that would avoid the sale of Mary's interest in the property. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the orders of the probate court should be affirmed as modified in our opinion. Costs on appeal are assessed to Allan and Pearl. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.