Opinion ID: 170091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Mr. Hamilton Established a Fair and Just Reason for Withdrawal

Text: Our review of a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is for abuse of discretion. United States v. Kramer, 168 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir.1999). Although a motion to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing should be freely allowed, we will not reverse a district court's decision unless the defendant can show that the court acted unjustly or unfairly. Id. (quotations omitted). Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B), a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea before the court imposes a sentence if the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal. The defendant bears the burden of establishing a fair and just reason. United States v. Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir.2000). In determining whether a defendant has met this burden, we consider seven factors: (1) whether the defendant has asserted his innocence, (2) prejudice to the government, (3) delay in filing defendant's motion, (4) inconvenience to the court, (5) defendant's assistance of counsel, (6) whether the plea is knowing and voluntary, and (7) waste of judicial resources. United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1572 (10th Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Elias, 937 F.2d 1514, 1520 (10th Cir.1991)). Because Mr. Hamilton's argument for withdrawal focuses on his assertion of innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel, we address these factors first.
Mr. Hamilton contends that he asserted his innocence on both counts in his motion to withdraw. As to the possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, he argues he asserted his legal innocence by claiming that the seizure of the drugs violated the Fourth Amendment. With respect to the firearms charge, he argues he asserted his innocence by claiming he did not possess the firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime as required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). We find both arguments unconvincing. We begin by noting that a defendant may satisfy the assertion-of-innocence factor by asserting legal innocence. When Rule 32 (now Rule 11) was amended to require that the defendant show a fair and just reason for withdrawal, the Advisory Committee indicated that whether the movant has asserted his legal innocence is an important factor to be weighed. Fed. R.Crim.P. 32 Advisory Committee's note to 1983 amendments; see also United States v. Maxwell, 498 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir.2007) (noting that district court may consider assertion of legal innocence); United States v. Rosen, 409 F.3d 535, 546 (2d Cir.2005) (same); United States v. Negron-Narvaez, 403 F.3d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1206 (D.C.Cir.1995) (same). But see United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 818 (3d Cir.2001) (In assessing a defendant's claim of `legal innocence' for purposes of withdrawal of a guilty plea, we must first examine whether the defendant has asserted his or her factual innocence.). In addition, we have previously indicated that an assertion of legal innocence could, in some cases, satisfy the first factor. See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes, 115 Fed.Appx. 1, 7 (10th Cir.2004) (unpublished) (suggesting that a legally cognizable defense could satisfy the assertion-of-innocence factor). But although the assertion of legal innocence may satisfy this factor in some instances, the mere assertion of a legal defense is insufficient; the defendant must present a credible claim of legal innocence. See Cray, 47 F.3d at 1209 (holding that a defendant must affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent); see also United States v. Hickok, 907 F.2d 983, 985 n. 2 (10th Cir.1990) ([T]he assertion of a defendant's subjective belief in his own innocence does not mandate allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty. (quotation and alteration omitted)). In other words, the defendant must make a factual argument that supports a legally cognizable defense. See United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 220 (D.C.Cir.1975) (en banc) (If the movant's factual contentions, when accepted as true, make out no legally cognizable defense to the charges, he has not effectively denied his culpability. . . . ). [2] In the present case, Mr. Hamilton has not presented a factual argument in support of a Fourth Amendment defense to the drug offense. Instead, he emphasizes that, early in his case, he told his attorney to file a motion to suppress evidence, but his attorney did not do so. He also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at this time. But as we discuss below, Mr. Hamilton's ineffective-assistance claim is based on his attorney's conduct in determining his potential sentence. He makes no argument that his attorney was ineffective in not filing a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Indeed, he presents no argument in support of such a motion. Consequently, he has not effectively asserted his innocence as to the drug offense. We reach the same conclusion regarding Mr. Hamilton's assertion of innocence as to the charge of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). He argues that he is innocent of this offense because he did not possess the firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. In specific support of this contention, he notes that he was not near his vehicle and was not distributing crack cocaine when the firearms and drugs were seized. These arguments do not, however, amount to assertions of factual or legal innocence. First, Mr. Hamilton has not repudiated his admission of guilt or otherwise asserted that he is actually innocent of the underlying drug offense to which he pleaded guilty. This offense, possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), qualifies as a drug trafficking crime for purposes of the firearms charge. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(2). Second, police found the firearms and drugs together in the same vehicle. This is sufficient proof that the firearms were possessed in furtherance of the possession with intent to distribute. See United States v. Trotter, 483 F.3d 694, 702 (10th Cir.2007) (`When guns and drugs are found together and a defendant has been convicted of possession with intent to distribute, the gun . . . may reasonably be considered to be possessed in furtherance of an ongoing drug-trafficking crime.' (quoting United States v. Garner, 338 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir.2003))). His arguments do not therefore amount to an assertion of factual or legal innocence.
Mr. Hamilton argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea because he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to inform him of the effect the career-offender guideline could have on his sentence. He also argues that his plea was not voluntary because he received ineffective assistance. Our review of both questionswhether Mr. Hamilton received ineffective assistance of counsel and whether his plea was voluntaryis de novo. See United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 796 (10th Cir.2006) (A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and law, which we review de novo.); Black, 201 F.3d at 1300 (noting we review de novo the question of whether a plea was knowing and voluntary). When a defendant's challenge to a guilty plea is based on ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). To prevail under this test, Mr. Hamilton must show both (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that this deficiency prejudiced [his] defense. Carr, 80 F.3d at 417 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In order to establish that his attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient, he must show that the attorney's performance fell outside the wide range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. To demonstrate he suffered prejudice as a result of the alleged deficiency, Mr. Hamilton `must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.' Id. at 418 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366). In this case, we need not decide whether the attorney's performance was deficient because Mr. Hamilton has failed to show that he suffered prejudice as a result of his attorney's representations regarding his potential sentence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.). Mr. Hamilton repeatedly affirmed his understanding of how his sentence would be determinednamely, that the court would determine the sentence and could impose a much greater sentence than Mr. Hamilton expected. For example, by signing the plea agreement, Mr. Hamilton acknowledged that any estimate of the likely sentence received from any source is a prediction, not a promise, and that the Court has the final discretion to impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum. He also acknowledged that the sentence to be imposed upon [him] will be determined solely by the sentencing judge. In signing the plea petition, he further acknowledged that sentencing is a matter left exclusively in the province of the Court and that his sentence is solely a matter within the control of the Judge. The petition also contains a statement indicating that Mr. Hamilton knew his attorney had no authority to make promises regarding his sentence. Moreover, at his change-of-plea hearing, Mr. Hamilton responded affirmatively when the court asked whether he had read and initialed each page of the plea agreement and whether he had read and understood every part of the petition. The court then explained to him that it could impose a maximum sentence of life. When asked whether he understood these potential penalties, Mr. Hamilton said yes. Finally, after he signed the plea agreement and the court informed him of the consequences of his plea, Mr. Hamilton pleaded guilty to both counts. In light of the court's careful explanation of the plea's consequences and Mr. Hamilton's testimony that he understood those consequences, Mr. Hamilton's allegation that he would have gone to trial but for his attorney's failure to advise him of the career-offender provision is insufficient to establish prejudice. [3] See Gordon, 4 F.3d at 1571 (holding that the mere allegation that defendant would have gone to trial but for counsel's failure to warn him about the use of relevant conduct at sentencing was insufficient to establish prejudice); see also Bethel v. United States, 458 F.3d 711, 718-19 (7th Cir.2006) (holding that an attorney's failure to inform a defendant of the possible application of the career-offender guideline did not result in prejudice when the defendant repeatedly acknowledged under oath that he understood his sentence could be greater than expected). That is, Mr. Hamilton has failed to show that, but for counsel's conduct, he would have insisted on going to trial. Moreover, because Mr. Hamilton's argument regarding the voluntariness of his plea is based on his allegation of ineffective assistance, he has also failed to show that his plea was involuntary.
Mr. Hamilton argues that the other four factors (prejudice to the government, timing of the motion, inconvenience to the court, and waste of judicial resources) weigh in his favor. Regarding the timing of his motion, even if the delay in filing was reasonable, as Mr. Hamilton argues, a reasonable delay is not a fair and just reason for withdrawal. In addition, given that Mr. Hamilton has not asserted his innocence or prevailed on his ineffective-assistance claim, his arguments concerning the remaining factors are irrelevant because these factors speak to the potential burden on the government and the court, rather than the defendant's reason for withdrawal. That is, even if these factors weigh in a defendant's favor, they cannot establish a fair and just reason for withdrawal. Indeed, we have previously held that a court need not address prejudice to the government unless a defendant presents a fair and just reason for withdrawal. Hickok, 907 F.2d at 986. Similarly, a court need not address the timing of the defendant's motion, the inconvenience to the court, or the waste of judicial resources unless the defendant establishes a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. [4] In sum, because Mr. Hamilton has not established a fair and just reason for withdrawal, he has failed to show that the District Court abused its discretion by acting unjustly or unfairly in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.