Opinion ID: 1959985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Prior-Bad-Act Evidence

Text: Prior to the February 1993 penalty-phase proceeding, defendant moved in limine for a ruling barring the prosecution from introducing evidence of defendant's prior bad acts on cross-examination because the defense did not intend to submit good-character evidence in mitigation. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that several of the defense's proposed mitigating factors implicated defendant's character. The court did rule, however, that the State could not introduce prior bad acts to rebut defense's character evidence until defendant actually offered such character evidence. Thus, according to the court's ruling, the State could not introduce evidence concerning the defense's character evidence during its case in chief. During the penalty-phase proceeding, the State elicited testimony during its case in chief about the circumstances leading up to defendant's arrest and subsequent confession. The arresting officer, Detective Kukk, related that defendant first came to his attention while he was on routine patrol. He spotted defendant and another man, Anthony Lombardi, on the street where one of the men was striking a woman. On direct examination, Detective Kukk testified that defendant was striking the woman, but on cross-examination he admitted that his written report reflected that Anthony Lombardi was the man who had been striking the woman. Detective Kukk further testified that defendant fled the scene in a car, and that Detective Kukk chased him through several intersections. During the chase, defendant almost struck a school bus and he committed several traffic violations. Unable to overtake defendant, Detective Kukk abandoned the chase. Later the same day, based on a tip, Detective Kukk went to defendant's apartment. The car that he had pursued earlier was parked across the street in front of a hydrant. Defendant's mother invited Detective Kukk into the apartment whereupon defendant came out of one of the rooms and yelled at his mother for letting the police into the apartment. Detective Kukk testified that defendant admitted having tried to elude him earlier that day. He also testified that the car that he had identified had been stolen. Detective Kukk did not arrest defendant that day, but told him to turn himself in the next day. Defendant did not turn himself in, and Detective Kukk arrested him a week later at defendant's probation officer's office. During the cross-examination of Detective Kukk regarding whether defendant or Lombardi had struck the woman, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: While [Detective Kukk is] looking for [the written report indicating who had struck the woman], ladies and gentlemen, that would be an example of something that would come in only for a limited purpose. You could not use that incident as relating to the aggravating factors, as making any aggravating factor worse. It can only be considered with any effect it might have or not have on any mitigating factors you present [sic]. After defense counsel had completed the cross-examination of Detective Kukk, he noted for the record that he did not object to Detective Kukk's testimony about the prior bad acts relating to defendant's arrest because counsel assumed that the court had foreclosed such an objection in denying defendant's in limine motion on the issue of character evidence. The trial court disagreed with the defense's characterization of its ruling: I don't agree with that description of what occurred at all, nor do I agree that that has any relationship with any ruling that I made. The ruling that I made has to do with the State's right to rebut character evidence by way of prior bad acts. It may be, since we're going to get into it anyway, that you don't have an objection whether he does it now or does it at the end. I can understand that. But, if anything, the testimony that came [in] and related to the circumstances under which the initial statement was obtained. Had you objected at the time, I probably would have sustained it at the time as not be[ing] relevant but there was no objection. In addition to objecting to Detective Kukk's testimony insofar as it related to prior bad acts (theft of automobile, high-speed chase, yelling at mother), defendant maintains that the testimony of Detective Saunders impermissibly caused the jury to know that defendant previously had been involved in a burglary. On redirect examination during the State's case in chief Detective Saunders testified about defendant's formal confession: Q. Counsel asked you about the gun that was used. Sir, I direct your attention to page three of the statement, again. Did you ask Mr. DiFrisco on the bottom: Q: Where did you get the gun you used? Can you tell me what Mr. DiFrisco's reply was? MS. SOTO: Judge, objection. THE COURT: Basis. MS. SOTO: May I be heard at sidebar? THE COURT: It's already been entered into evidence. MS. SOTO: Judge, I think there's  MR. LIGUORI: Judge, I think there's portions of the statement that are inappropriate to go into evidence. THE COURT: It's already been received in evidence. MR. LIGUORI: Well, could I be heard at sidebar? MR. BOGDANSKI: Judge, she asked about it. THE COURT: Bring the document. (The following takes place at sidebar.) THE COURT: Yes. MR. LIGUORI: Judge, this contains portions that contain bad acts that they're, at this time, are inadmissable [sic]. They may be later on in the proceeding but I would request that if it goes, Judge, as it is, that be excised or that be covered before it goes into the jury in accordance with your Honor's ruling. Otherwise I think that's a bad act not permitted. MS. SOTO: And just to let you know in terms of not  I know it's in evidence, but he did not ask the question on direct and that's why at that time we had no objection to the statement being moved because since he didn't ask it, we were going to ask that it be redacted based on the point he wasn't trying to move it in. So we didn't see  THE COURT: He moved it in without objection. Besides that, it's inadmissable [sic] anyway because it buttresses the question of whether he had a gun and where he got it. The fact that he knows where he got it is certainly evidence. That is admissable [sic]. (The following takes place in open court.) Q. One question you asked, Where did you get the gun you used could you tell us  you probably could tell us better if I gave it back to you. Could you tell me what his answer was at the bottom of that page? A. A: I ended up with the gun after two guys, one was Greg Esposito, burglarized a lumbar [sic] yard at 2925 East Tremont Avenue, Bronx, New York, New Eljam Products, Esposito's father owns it. They got caught. It was Christmas of 1985. They had a shotgun and a box of change. I had a box and didn't get caught. The box had the gun with the silencer on it and some change. I got away. The trial court then gave the jury instructions on how to regard the mention of a prior burglary: That's being allowed in only for the limited purpose of learning about where the gun was obtained or may have been obtained and you may not consider that evidence as adding to or affecting any of the aggravating factors which the prosecutor is attempting to prove. Defendant maintains that the court should have ruled both Detective Kukk's and Detective Saunder's testimony concerning prior bad acts inadmissible because (a) the testimony was irrelevant; (b) its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value; and (c) it was introduced to prove defendant's disposition to commit another crime.
We conclude that both Detective Kukk's testimony describing the events leading up to defendant's arrest of defendant and Detective Saunders testimony regarding defendant's confession were relevant. One of the mitigating factors submitted by defendant was his alleged voluntary cooperation, and Detective Kukk's testimony concerning the events of defendant's arrest clearly tended to rebut defendant's assertion of voluntary cooperation. As such, the testimony was relevant  that is, it had a tendency in reason to prove or disprove a material fact. Evid.R. 401. Similarly, Detective Saunders' testimony concerning defendant's confession  particularly that aspect of the confession relating to defendant's possession of a gun stemming from a prior burglary  was relevant in that it lent a degree of specificity to defendant's confession that would tend to corroborate the confession. As we recognized in Di Frisco I, supra, 118 N.J. at 275, 571 A. 2d 914, corroboration of a confession is vital to establishing aggravating factors behind a reasonable doubt.
Evidence Rule 403 codifies the now-well-settled rule that even relevant evidence may be excluded if its potential for prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. Specifically, Evidence Rule 403 provides: Except as otherwise provided by these rules or other law, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Hence, even if the other-crime evidence is relevant to prove some legitimate trial issue, the trial court must still exclude it unless, under Evidence Rule [403], its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact. State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 336, 605 A. 2d 230 (1992); see State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 322, 580 A. 2d 221 (1990). We accord trial judges broad discretion in applying the balancing test. State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 147, 386 A. 2d 378 (1978). Only where we identify a clear error of judgment do we disturb a trial court's conclusion with respect to that balancing test. State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 313, 548 A. 2d 939 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 813, 102 L.Ed. 2d 803 (1989). We find no error in the trial court's decision to admit both Detective Kukk's and Detective Saunders' testimony. Detective Kukk's testimony was highly probative concerning the issue of defendant's voluntary cooperation with police. Its prejudicial impact was de minimis at best. Considering that defendant confessed to the execution-style killing of Mr. Potcher, the fact that he stole a car, committed a few traffic violations, and yelled at his mother had very little tendency to divert the jurors' attention from their duties. Similarly, the trial court correctly admitted Detective Saunders' testimony. First, the entire confession from which Detective Saunders read had already been submitted into evidence without objection. The confession contained the exact reference to the prior burglary that Detective Saunders related in his testimony. Second, the court twice gave the jury limiting instructions regarding the proper use of the evidence. Third, given the nature of the crime to which defendant pled guilty, the reference to a prior burglary in the context of explaining how defendant came to possess a gun had little prejudicial potential. As previously stated, the evidence was probative in that it tended to establish the consistency and reliability of defendant's confession. Thus, the prejudicial potential did not substantially outweigh the probative value.
Evidence Rule 404(b) provides: Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute. That rule excludes other-crime and prior-bad-act evidence when offered solely to prove a defendant's propensity to commit crime. State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 300, 558 A. 2d 833 (1989). The purpose of the rule is to ensure that juries do not convict defendants or, in this case, punish them more harshly because the defendants' prior crimes make the jury perceive them to be bad people in general. Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 336, 605 A. 2d 230. Because the list of legitimate purposes for which prior-bad-act evidence is admissible is not exhaustive, Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 300, 558 A. 2d 833, such evidence is admissible so long as it is relevant to a material issue in dispute and not offered to prove a defendant's disposition. Neither Detective Kukk's nor Detective Saunders' testimony was offered to prove defendant's disposition in a general sense or his disposition to commit murder in particular. Detective Kukk's testimony tended to prove that defendant had not willingly turned himself into the authorities, not that he was a bad person with murderous proclivities. Similarly, Detective Saunders' testimony  a mere reiteration of defendant's confession  tended to prove that defendant's confession was a genuine account of the murder of Edward Potcher and the circumstances surrounding the murder, not that defendant was a bad person for having been involved previously in a burglary. The testimony of both Detective Kukk and Detective Saunders was relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial, and appropriately limited by the trial court. In comparison to defendant's confession to a cold-blooded murder for hire, the auto theft and burglary charges could not have prejudiced the jury. Thus, we find no error in the court's decision to admit the testimony in both cases.