Opinion ID: 1632866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the trial court err in restricting cross-examination of elbert and in rebuking defense counsel in the presence of the jury for attempting proper cross-examination of elbert regarding his bias and prejudice against defendant?

Text: Sayles poses three instances where the trial court allegedly erred in sustaining objections during the cross-examination of the State's eyewitness, Elbert. The court ruled that the matters inquired about were irrelevant, the substance of which includes: (1) Elbert's eye sight as evidenced by a recent traffic accident; (2) Elbert's bias and prejudice against Jerome because of a sexual affair between Elbert's wife and Sayles; and (3) Elbert refused to discuss the case prior to trial with defense counsel, as the same related to the veracity of his statement at trial. The prosecutor cites Shearer v. State, 423 So.2d 824 (Miss 1982), and contends that a trial judge has considerable discretion in determining the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. This is undoubtedly true but the prosecution has misapplied Shearer, which stands for the usual standard of relevancy as applied to testimony offered on direct examination. The function of relevancy in evaluating the credibility of the witness' direct testimony, is not relevancy to the main issue but relevancy in assessing the probative value of the direct testimony by evaluating the witness' credibility. Mississippi allows wide-open cross-examination of any ... matter affecting the credibility of the witness. M.R.E. 611(b). A witness on cross-examination may be interrogated regarding his interest, bias or prejudice in a case. Hill v. State, 512 So.2d 883 (Miss. 1987). The same rule is provided in Miss. Code Ann., Section 13-1-13 (1972). Sayles was entitled to full and adequate cross-examination of Elbert. However, cross-examination on an irrelevant point is not permitted. The scope of cross-examination though ordinarily broad, is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court possesses inherent power to limit cross-examination to relevant matters. Pace v. State, 473 So.2d 167 (Miss. 1985); Dozier v. State, 257 So.2d 857 (Miss. 1972). Against this background we test the three complaints of Sayles. Sayles first attempted to impeach Elbert by trying to show a deficiency in his eye sight. This exchange followed: Q. BY MELVIN McFATTER: Isn't it a fact that about a year ago right in front of Reed's Store you pulled out in front of a highway patrol car because you didn't see it? BY MR. PATRICK: Objection. That's irrelevant. BY THE COURT: Sustained. BY MR. MCFATTER: Your Honor, we feel it's relevant to his ability to see. BY THE COURT: I sustained the objection, Mr. McFatter. The awkward form of the question by counsel for Sayles renders this portion of his assignment of error without merit. If properly predicated Sayles could have cross-examined Elbert on the deficiency of his eyesight. However, the issue was not properly predicated and it was irrelevant to the issue in this case whether Elbert pulled out in front of a police car or not. Sayles tried to impeach Elbert by showing that he had a personal grudge against Sayles on account of an alleged affair between Sayles and Elbert's wife. This exchange followed: Q. BY MR. MCFATTER: Isn't it a fact, Mr. McDaniel, that Defendant, Jerome Sayles, used to fool around with your wife, Johnie Pearl,  BY MR. PATRICK: Objection. BY THE COURT: Sustained. A. (Laughter by Mr. McDaniels) Q. You don't have any reason to be lying on him, do you? A. No. I don't. Here the trial court erred. If Sayles had an affair with Elbert's wife it is relevant to a matter affecting the credibility of Elbert as a witness. M.R.E. 611(b). Evidence that Sayles had an affair with Elbert's wife is probative of the bias of the witness and hostility toward the defendant. This should have been developed, if possible, through cross-examination to shed light on the direct testimony of Elbert. Lastly, Sayles tried to impeach Elbert by showing a lack of veracity because he refused to discuss the matter with defense counsel prior to trial. The following exchange occurred: Q. BY MELVIN McFATTER: You do recall, I believe you testified when I came out in January to the fire station, I told you I was Jerome's attorney and I wanted to talk to you about what you were going to testify to. You recall that don't you? A. That's right Q. And you refused to talk to me, didn't you? A. Yes I did. Q. Is that because you knew you were lying and didn't want me to catch you in it? BY MR. PATRICK: Objection. A. No, it was because  BY MR. PATRICK: Objection. BY THE COURT: Sustained. The trial judge was correct in excluding this evidence as irrelevant. Elbert's refusal to talk to an attorney prior to trial is not indicative of lack of veracity. The criteria of relevancy to shed light on the credibility of the witness and his direct testimony is vague. However, Elbert's refusal to speak with defense counsel is not relevant to credibility. It is not enough to say that the judge erred in limiting the scope of cross-examination unless it can be shown that the error was a reversible one. A judge has wide discretionary control over the extent of cross-examination but the arbitrary curtailment upon a proper subject of cross-examination may be grounds for reversal. Suan v. State, 511 So.2d 144 (Miss. 1987). Also, under M.R.E. 103(a), before error can be predicated at all upon an adverse evidentiary ruling it must appear that a substantial right of the party is affected. The judge's action in denying cross-examination on the matter concerning the alleged affair did infringe on the right of cross-examination. This substantially affected the right of Sayles to impeach Elbert. In Hill v. State, 512 So.2d 883 (Miss. 1987), and Suan v. State, 511 So.2d 144 (Miss. 1987), this Court reversed the trial court because there was a curtailment of cross-examination of the prosecution's chief or principal witness. Both cases deal with the trial court's denying defense counsel impeachment of the eyewitness by trying to show bias. Here defense counsel was trying to show bias and prejudice on the part of the State's eyewitness because of a grudge caused by an alleged affair between the defendant and the witness' wife. The prosecution relied heavily on Elbert's testimony. The only other evidence introduced was that Sayles had possession of the stolen watches. We may only speculate what a jury might have done had it been apprised of the circumstances concerning Elbert's direct testimony and his possible motive to perhaps slant his testimony against Sayles. The evidence of the prosecution was largely circumstantial, with the exception of Elbert. The denial of this right to a broad and extensive cross-examination of Elbert substantially affected the rights of Sayles. Not only is this right secured by evidentiary rules, it is a function of the confrontation clauses of federal and state constitutions. Suan v. State, 511 So.2d 144, 148 (Miss. 1987). The accused in a criminal trial has a fundamental right, implicit in the confrontation clauses of our state and federal constitutions, to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Miss. Const. Art. 3, Sec. 26; Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111 (Miss. 1987). The prosecution contends, however, that even if the cross-examination was improperly excluded reversal is not warranted because Sayles testified about the alleged affair and it would only have slight relevancy anyway because the affair took place some two to five years ago. In this position the prosecution relies upon Knox v. State, 502 So.2d 672 (Miss. 1987). This is a misapplication of Knox, which is clearly distinguishable. Knox deals with evidence for evidence sake, not evidence for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness. The jury heard the evidence in Knox and the source from which it came had no bearing. In this context, the error would hardly rise to the dignity of reversible error. However, the source of the evidence in the prosecution's case against Sayles is of primary concern. Sayles was trying to elicit the effect his alleged affair had on Elbert and therefore on his credibility. Only Elbert's testimony could establish this, not Sayles' own testimony. That is the primary purpose for allowing cross-examination to impeach a witness' credibility. The state relies on Pace v. State, 473 So.2d 167 (Miss. 1985), in their contention that the error is only marginally relevant, because of the time that had elapsed between the affair and trial, and therefore the exclusion was not error. In Pace, the witness testified that she was scared of the defendant because of information he knew which would ruin her marriage. We upheld in that case the trial court's denial of cross-examination of the state's witness, deferring to the trial court's discretion and because we do not think a detailed exploration of embarrassing events in the witness' past would have been of probative value. Id. at 169. In this case, however, the denial of cross-examination dealt with a probative matter as to credibility and that denial substantially affected Sayles' rights. The contention that the affair took place some two to five years ago would not make cross-examination marginally relevant. It is still likely that Elbert could or would have a grudge against Sayles, and this question should be determined by the jury. As to the assignment that the trial judge rebuked defense counsel in the jury's presence, therefore showing bias and prejudice against the defendant, the exchange complained of is included below. BY THE COURT: Mr. McFatter, the court does not desire to rebuke an attorney now, but if you insist along this line I'm going to have to. BY MR. MCFATTER: Your Honor, I believe that I should be permitted to go into any reason that this witness would have to fabricate or prejudice his testimony against my client. That's the only purpose that I was  BY THE COURT: I sustained the objection. Let's move on. BY MR. MCFATTER: Yes sir. The next morning, the trial judge stated the following in the record: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I would like to explain my remarks made to Mr. McFatter yesterday during the testimony of Elbert McDaniels. It had been a long and tiring day and we had just finished a two and half or three day trial. Although this is no excuse, I would like to offer my apologies to Mr. McFatter. Can each of you assure me that you can disregard the remarks and not let them influence you in any way in your decision? All the jurors responded affirmatively. While the rule of law cited by Sayles in Thompson v. State, 468 So.2d 852 (Miss. 1985), is a correct statement, it does not apply to the factual situation in the case at bar. Sayles' argument is circular. He asserts that the judge's threat to rebuke counsel if he continued to pursue matters on cross-examination were comments with the weight and dignity of the court behind them. On the other hand he ignores the explanatory statement and the apology and the affirmative response of the jury on the following morning. Assuming the trial judge's remarks were error, the judge cured this error by instructing the jury to disregard his statements. Parker v. State, 401 So.2d 1282 (Miss. 1981), and Harmon v. State, 453 So.2d 710 (Miss. 1984).