Opinion ID: 3171240
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Penalty phase procedures

Text: The federal Constitution does not require that the penalty phase jury make unanimous findings beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the existence of particular aggravating factors, or that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. (People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1215; People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 1007; see People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79 [the penalty determination ― ‗is inherently moral and normative, not factual‘ ‖ and therefore not susceptible of a burden of proof].) The United States Supreme Court‘s decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment‘s jury trial guarantee (see Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466) do not call into question these conclusions. (People v. Linton, supra, at p. 1215.) Similarly, neither the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, nor the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that jurors in a capital case be instructed that they may return a verdict of death only if persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors exist, that the aggravating factors outweigh the factors in mitigation, and that death is the appropriate penalty. (People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 1215-1216.) ―The lack of written or other specific findings by the jury regarding aggravating factors did not deprive defendant of his federal due process and 69 Eighth Amendment rights to meaningful appellate review, violate equal protection of the laws or violate defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.‖ (People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1216; accord, People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-778.) Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, there is no Eighth Amendment requirement that California‘s death penalty scheme provide for intercase proportionality review, either in the trial court or on review. (People v. Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 87; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1043; see Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-52 [no constitutional requirement that state courts conduct intercase proportionality review].) Permitting the jury to consider prior unadjudicated criminal conduct as a factor in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b), and imposing no requirement that the jury unanimously find the defendant guilty of the unadjudicated crimes does not violate a defendant‘s right to due process or his Sixth Amendment jury trial right. (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1007; People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1059; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205.) Use of adjectives such as ―extreme‖ and ―substantial‖ in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), respectively, does not create a constitutionally impermissible barrier to the jury‘s consideration of a defendant‘s mitigating evidence. (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 150; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 270.) The trial court was not constitutionally required to instruct the jury that the statutory mitigating factors were relevant solely to mitigation. Nor did the court‘s instruction directing the jury to consider ―whether or not‖ certain mitigating factors were present invite the jury to use the absence of such factors as an aggravating circumstance, in violation of state law and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1216; People v. Doolin 70 (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 456; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 123.)