Opinion ID: 16333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Suppression or Destruction of Brady Evidence

Text: 25 In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. To establish a Brady claim, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to the petitioner, and (3) the evidence was material. See United States v. Ellender, 947 F.2d 748, 756 (5th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). [E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. (internal quotations omitted). However, materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). A court must examine the suppressed evidence collectively in a materiality inquiry; the allegedly suppressed evidence is not considered individually. See id. at 436, 115 S.Ct. at 1567. 26 Little maintains that the prosecution failed to disclose the knife Thomas confessed to using to murder Peter, bloody clothes seized from Thomas during the Peter investigation, the test results of a handprint found on a truck near Peter's home, and skin scrapings found beneath Peter's fingernails. Little also claims that exculpatory evidence was allegedly lost or destroyed by the Liberty County Police Department. 27 Little's Brady claim is untenable. First, his factual assertions that evidence was suppressed were rejected by the state habeas court, and we are bound by that finding. The record indicates that Little's counsel received, prior to trial, Texas Department of Public Safety reports on several pieces of evidence Little now claims were withheld. Second, the reports fail to offer support for any of Little's exculpatory theories. 9 Moreover, the magistrate judge ordered additional testing on several available pieces of allegedly exculpatory evidence. As before, the new round of testing failed to uncover any evidence tending to exculpate Little or corroborate Thomas's confession. 10 Little's conclusory allegations regarding the alleged destruction of exculpatory material fail to show that the state, in bad faith, destroyed any evidence with knowledge of its exculpatory value. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 486-91, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2533-35, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). Accordingly, Little has failed to show that the prosecution suppressed potentially exculpatory evidence or that the evidence allegedly withheld would have had a material impact on any phase of Little's trial.