Opinion ID: 848685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the blank/chadha factors

Text: For the above reasons, we are not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that the factors set forth in the lead opinion in Blank v. Dep't of Corrections, 462 Mich. 103, 611 N.W.2d 530 (2000), adopted from Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983), apply to this case. Blank and Chadha involved the Legislature's power to alter or amend the statute delegating rule-making authority without doing so by statute. Blank held that once the Legislature grants power to an agency by statutory action, it cannot then diminish or qualify that power except by further statutory action. This  legislative veto practice at issue in Blank also had a significant state constitutional history. Const 1963, art 4, § 37 allowed temporary legislative vetoes of agency regulations between legislative sessions. In 1984, the people rejected a proposal to amend § 37 and permit the type of permanent legislative veto at issue in Blank. The fact that the legislative veto at issue in Blank was not permitted by the Constitution and had been rejected by the people further illuminates the Blank decision. No such environment exists here, however, as our Constitution is silent regarding the proper form of legislative approval of tribal-state gaming compacts under IGRA and the people have not expressed a view on this question. Therefore, we do not believe that the Blank/Chadha analysis should be applied here. In response to the Justice Markman's dissent, however, we note that even were the Blank/Chadha analysis to be applied, the factors do not demonstrate that the Legislature's approval of the compacts was an act of legislation.
To make sense, this factor must apply to persons outside the legislative branch who are subject to the Legislature's authority. Here, the compacts do not give the state the power to alter the rights, duties, or relations of anyone subject to the Legislature's authority. Rather, the compacts only set forth the parameters the tribes agree will apply to their operation of gaming facilities. The Legislature has no regulatory duty under the compacts, nor do the compacts confer any rights upon the state other than contractual rights. For example, although the state may inspect tribal facilities and records, it has no power to enforce those provisions. Any contractual disputes under the compacts must be submitted to the dispute resolution procedure outlined in the compacts. All duties and restrictions in the compacts fall on the tribes themselves, who are sovereign entities and have consented to the restrictions and additional duties.
Unlike the actions taken in Blank, HCR 115 did not have the effect of amending or repealing existing legislation when it approved the compacts. As noted above, given the Constitution's silence regarding the form of approval necessary for tribal-state gaming compacts, the Legislature had the discretion to approve the compacts by resolution. Further, as explained above, the compacts do not impose any affirmative obligations on the state, create rules of conduct for Michigan citizens, or create new state agencies. Such changes would require legislation, but are absent from the compacts. Therefore, legislation is not required and this Court should not interfere with the Legislature's discretion in approving the compacts by concurrent resolution.
First, it must be remembered that not all policy decisions made by the Legislature are required to be in the form of legislation. See Blank, supra at 170, 611 N.W.2d 530 (Cavanagh, J.). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944), [t]he essentials of the legislative function are the determination of legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct....  (Emphasis added.) Here, HCR 115 neither promulgated a legislative policy as a defined and binding rule of conduct nor applied it to the general community. Instead, HCR 115 simply assented to the negotiated contract between two sovereign entities, recognizing that the compacts created no new legal rights or duties for the state or its citizens. Indeed, HCR 115 could never be considered a  promulgation of a legislative policy as a defined and binding rule of conduct because the Legislature lacks the authority to bind the tribes at all. Without the tribes' approval, the compacts have no force. Through IGRA, Congress has determined that states may not unilaterally impose their will on the tribes regarding gaming; rather, the states may only negotiate with the tribes through the compacting process.
As noted above, our Constitution differs from the federal constitution: the federal constitution grants Congress its power, while our Constitution limits the plenary power of our Legislature. As this Court has recognized: A different rule of construction applies to the Constitution of the United States than to the Constitution of a state. The federal government is one of delegated powers, and all powers not delegated are reserved to the states or to the people. When the validity of an act of Congress is challenged as unconstitutional, it is necessary to determine whether the power to enact it has been expressly or impliedly delegated to Congress. The legislative power, under the Constitution of a state, is as broad, comprehensive, absolute, and unlimited as that of the Parliament of England, subject only to the Constitution of the United States and the restraints and limitations imposed by the people upon such power by the Constitution of the state itself. [ Young v. Ann Arbor, 267 Mich. 241, 243, 255 N.W. 579 (1934).] Thus, the fourth Chadha factor, which was not applied in Blank, is inapplicable here because our Constitution does not grant authority to the Legislature, but instead limits the Legislature's plenary authority. As explained above, our Constitution's silence regarding the form of approval needed for tribal-state gaming compacts, therefore, does not lead to the conclusion that the Legislature is prohibited from approving the compacts by resolution; rather, it leads to the conclusion that the form of the approval is within the discretion of the Legislature.