Opinion ID: 2002011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim of Incompetency of Trial Counsel.

Text: Defendant's final argument in support of his claim that he should be granted a new trial is an assertion that the failure of his trial counsel to request that the element of criminal intent be placed in the marshalling instruction deprived him of his constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel. In evaluating this claim, we apply a standard which seeks to determine whether under all circumstances counsel's performance was within the range of normal competency. State v. Aldape, 307 N.W.2d 32, 41-42 (Iowa 1981); State v. Sunclades, 305 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 1981). In addition to showing a performance of counsel below the range of normal competency, a defendant must also show prejudice. State v. Combs, 316 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Iowa 1982); Aldape, 307 N.W.2d at 45. In applying these principles to the present claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we are convinced that not every right to insist that a particular instruction be given need be availed of by counsel in order to satisfy the standard of normal competency. In arguing over what elements should be included in a marshalling instruction, defense counsel's primary concern will necessarily be those elements which are essential to the theory of the defense which is being advanced in the particular case. In this regard, defendant urges that exclusion of any essential element from the marshalling instruction makes it easier for the State to secure conviction and that therefore any omission of this type is prejudicial to a defendant. The facial appeal of such an argument is diminished in those situations where practical considerations make it unlikely that the inclusion of a particular element in the marshalling instruction would have produced any difference in the verdict of the jury. In the present case, the fighting issue was whether the sex act between the defendant and the victim was consensual or carried out against the victim's will. It is quite unlikely that a jury would find that an accused who forced a victim to engage in a sex act would not have acted knowingly and intentionally in perpetrating such an act. As stated in 4 J. Yeager & R. Carlson, Iowa Practice § 8 (Supp.1983), In the context of sexual abuse prosecution ... the act itself is one which is seldom if ever done unintentionally.... Based upon these considerations, we conclude that defendant's counsel could have justifiably concluded that the inclusion of an intent element in the marshalling instruction was of little significance in presenting the defense. Defendant has failed to establish that a constitutional deprivation existed with respect to the performance of his trial counsel. We have considered all contentions urged by the defendant and find no basis for reversing his conviction. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.