Opinion ID: 1613628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ward's Voluntary Dismissal of Their 1989 Claim, Count I as it Relates to Tax year 1989.

Text: After the district court granted the board's partial summary judgment motion for all of count II and count I as it pertains to tax year 1990, Ward sought leave to voluntarily dismiss the balance of count I pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215. Ward's professed rationale for this rather unorthodox move was to facilitate immediate appellate review of the summary judgment order and thereby avoid having to try the case in an uneconomical, piecemeal fashion should the appeal of the summary judgment order be favorable. It should be noted that Ward did not seek interlocutory appeal of the partial summary judgment order. Since the statute of limitations on filing an appeal from an unfavorable board of review decision has run, see Iowa Code § 441.38, Ward now seeks a reversal of the dismissal order that was granted at their behest. Ward contends that the dismissal was neither voluntary nor without prejudice, and, therefore, they are entitled to a reversal of the dismissal order. Our review is for errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4. We conclude that the grant of dismissal is more properly characterized as being without prejudice even though Ward may as a practical matter be foreclosed from reinstating a protest for the 1989 tax year as a consequence of the applicable statute of limitations. Iowa Code § 441.38 (requiring that appeals be taken within twenty days of the board's adjournment, which was May 31, 1989). Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215 specifies that dismissal under this rule shall be without prejudice, unless otherwise stated. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215. The district court's order of dismissal did not specify whether the dismissal was without prejudice, and, therefore, we presume, consistent with rule 215, that the dismissal was without prejudice. In any event, our jurisdiction over this issue terminated as of the time the dismissal order issued, and, consequently, Ward has no basis on which to prosecute an appeal regarding the voluntary dismissal of count I as it pertains to tax year 1989. Witt Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 237 N.W.2d 450, 451 (Iowa 1976) (effect of a dismissal under rule 215 is final and terminates the jurisdiction of the court thereof); State ex rel. Turner v. Midwest Dev. Corp., 210 N.W.2d 525, 526 (Iowa 1973) (after voluntary dismissal, case is nonexistent and dismissal of appeal is required); Mollring v. Mollring, 184 Iowa 464, 465-66, 167 N.W. 524, 525 (1918) (same). On this basis alone, the matter must necessarily be deemed unreviewable. However, in addition to the unreviewability of Ward's voluntary dismissal order, we note that Ward's right to appeal from a final judgment to which it has consented is not unrestricted. In Hense v. G.D. Searle & Co., 452 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 1990), we held that when a litigant invites an adverse final judgment and the invitation is truly voluntary in the sense that no prior court rulings can fairly be said to have precluded [the litigant] from recovering on their suit, the final judgment is not subject to appeal. Id. at 444-45. Although the voluntary dismissal order is not a final judgment, the rationale we embraced in Searle is, nevertheless, persuasive. Thus, since the motivating impulse behind Ward's dismissal was simple economics and not prior rulings that effectively precluded recovery, we conclude that the invited dismissal was truly voluntary, and, therefore, Ward is also precluded from challenging the order of dismissal under the Searle doctrine.