Opinion ID: 1231625
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Open Meeting Law.

Text: The Open Meeting Law generally requires that meetings of state and local governments must be open to the public. Minn.Stat. § 13D.01. Unlike the Data Practices Act, the Open Meeting Law does not expressly mention the University or the Regents. As relevant here, it provides that all meetings, including executive sessions, of the governing body of a public body must be open to the public. Minn.Stat. § 13D.01, subd. 1(b)(6). The statute does not define public body. The Board of Regents is the governing body of the University of Minnesota. Univ. Charter § 4. The question, then, is whether the University is a public body within the terms of the Open Meeting Law. In statutory construction, words are to be given their common meaning. Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (2002). In common understanding, public body is possibly the broadest expression for the category of governmental entities that perform functions for the public benefit. Additionally, in addressing this issue we must remember that because the Open Meeting Law was enacted for the public benefit, we construe it in favor of public access. State by Archabal v. County of Hennepin, 505 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Minn.1993). Although we have not used the precise term public body to describe the University, we have used terms that convey the same meaning. In Knapp v. State, we stated that the University is a state institution established, controlled and carried on by the state itself. 125 Minn. 194, 197, 145 N.W. 967, 968 (1914) (emphasis added). In University of Minnesota v. Chase , we again described the University as a state institution in the legal as well as the colloquial sense and as in the ordinary and functional sense, plainly an agency of the state.  175 Minn. 259, 262, 220 N.W. 951, 952, 953 (1928) (emphasis added). In fact, the Regents do not contend that the University is not a public body. Rather, they argue that the Open Meeting Law does not apply to the Regents because the legislature did not expressly name the Regents as an entity subject to the requirements of the law. The Regents rely on language from Winberg v. University of Minnesota, 499 N.W.2d 799 (Minn.1993), for this requirement of express inclusion. In Winberg, while assessing whether the University was a political subdivision subject to the Veterans' Preference Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 197.455 and .46 (2002), we explained: [I]n the great majority of laws it passes affecting the University, [the legislature] expressly includes or excludes the University or its board of regents as subject to or not subject to the law. Thus, if the legislature had intended the Veterans' Preference Act to apply to the University of Minnesota, it most likely would have included the University by specific reference. Using Minn.Stat. § 645.27, a rule of statutory construction which provides that the state is not bound by the passage of a law unless named therein, the University, which is itself a constitutional arm of the state, would not be bound by the Veterans Preference Act unless explicitly named. Winberg, 499 N.W.2d at 801-02 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). For several reasons, we decline to construe this language from Winberg as creating a generally-applicable rule that the University is not subject to a law unless expressly included. First, the language itself is equivocal, stating only that the legislature most likely would have included the University by specific reference. Id. Second, had we intended the quoted language to create a bright-line rule, no further analysis would have been required. Instead, we proceeded to set forth several additional reasons why the Veterans' Preference Act would not be construed to apply to the University. Id. at 802. Third, in responding to the argument that other statutes that do not expressly name the University nevertheless apply to the school, we did not suggest that those statutes should not apply because of an express inclusion requirement, but instead explained that their application to the University could be based on the broader terms used by the legislature in those laws to define their applicability. Id. Significantly, one of the laws discussed was the Open Meeting Law, and we emphasized that the phrase other public body used therein is broader than the political subdivision language at issue in Winberg. Id. Because the public body language of the Open Meeting Law is certainly broad enough to encompass the University, the Regents are in essence arguing there should be an exception to the stated scope of the Open Meeting Law for the University. However, as the court of appeals pointed out, the Open Meeting Law contains express exceptions for meetings of the commissioner of corrections, state agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions involving disciplinary proceedings and as otherwise expressly provided by statute. Minn.Stat. § 13D.01, subd. 2. The University is not included among those express exceptions. Faced with a similar situation in Chase, we explained: Certainly, while these exceptions were being created and stated, the University would also have been expressly excepted, if such had been the intention. 175 Minn. at 262, 220 N.W. at 953. Given the broadly inclusive language of the Open Meeting Law, our numerous opinions recognizing the University as a public institution, the failure of the legislature to include the University among other expressly-stated exceptions, and our principle of construing the Open Meeting Law to favor public access, we hold that the University is subject to the terms of the Open Meeting Law. The Regents further contend that Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency v. Boyne, 578 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1998), provides support for exempting the Regents from the requirements of both the Data Practices Act and Open Meeting Law. In Boyne, the issue was the applicability of those laws to the Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency (SMMPA). The SMMPA is a municipal corporation and a political subdivision of the state, but the enabling legislation for the SMMPA provides that the agency may exercise all powers which might be exercised by a natural person or a private corporation in connection with similar property and affairs. Boyne, 578 N.W.2d at 363-364 (citing Minn.Stat. § 453.54, subd. 21 (2002)). In Boyne, we relied on this private corporation language to exempt the SMMPA from the requirements of the Data Practices Act and Open Meeting Law, reasoning that a private corporation is not required to comply with those laws. Boyne, 578 N.W.2d at 366. The Regents argue that as the private corporation language exempted the SMMPA, the University's special constitutional autonomy should insulate it from the requirements of the Data Practices Act and Open Meeting Law. But our reasoning from Boyne is not applicable here. In Boyne, our rationale was that the legislature empowered the agency to act as a specific type of entity, a private corporation, which is not subject to the Data Practices Act and the Open Meeting Law. In contrast, although the University has been imbued with special constitutional status, we have consistently held that it remains a public entity, see supra, and have expressly stated that it is in no sense a private corporation. Knapp, 125 Minn. at 197, 145 N.W. at 968. [2] For these reasons, we conclude that both the Data Practices Act and the Open Meeting Law are applicable to the University and its search for a new president.