Opinion ID: 560456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The As-Applied Challenge--Blevins.

Text: 37 Having never sought removal permits, the Blevins plaintiffs occupy an even more vulnerable position. They must overcome the strong presumption that their as-applied claims are not ripe for judicial resolution. See, e.g., Pennell, 485 U.S. at 10, 108 S.Ct. at 856; County of Yolo, 477 U.S. at 348-53, 106 S.Ct. at 2565-68; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 296-97, 101 S.Ct. at 2370-71; Tenoco, 876 F.2d at 1026-27. Recognizing the formidable obstacle posed by the ripeness requirement, the Blevins plaintiffs attempt to evade it in two ways. We consider each stratagem. 38 1. The Loretto Doctrine. Appellants first assert that submitting to the permit process is not essential because the Ordinance effects a permanent physical occupation of their property, which is per se unconstitutional and cannot be saved from invalidity by a permit system. This asseveration invokes the specter of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982). In Loretto, the Court held that, since any permanent physical occupation, however small, effectively destroys an owner's rights to possess, use, and dispose of the property in question, the fact of the occupation is itself sufficient to show that there has been a taking for which compensation is due. Id. at 432-38, 102 S.Ct. at 3174-77. Under Loretto, appellants tell us, resort to the permit process here is unnecessary to establish a taking in the constitutional sense. 39 This argument overlooks, however, that there has been no permanent physical occupation of the kind envisioned in Loretto. See id. at 437, 102 S.Ct. at 3177 (describing permanent physical occupation as [t]he placement of a fixed structure on land or real property). The argument likewise overlooks the Loretto Court's warning that its ruling was very narrow and not intended to question the equally substantial authority upholding a State's broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner's use of his property. Id. at 441, 102 S.Ct. at 3179. The Loretto Court was explicit in stating that its holding was not to be employed to challenge settled doctrine anent regulation of rental housing: 40 [W]e do not agree ... that application of the physical occupation rule will have dire consequences for the government's power to adjust landlord-tenant relationships. This Court has consistently affirmed that States have broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails. 41 Id. at 440, 102 S.Ct. at 3178. Hence, Loretto by its own terms dispels any notion that a regulation like the Ordinance creates the sort of permanent physical occupation which might allow a suit to redress an allegedly unconstitutional taking without regard to the availability of a facially satisfactory permit process. 10 42 2. The Futility Exception. This brings us to the trustees' second contention. Citing Northern Heel Corp. v. Compo Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 456, 461 (1st Cir.1988), where we stated in an unrelated context that [t]he law should not be construed idly to require parties to perform futile acts or to engage in empty rituals, the trustees contend that they should be excused from the permit process since participating in it would be an exercise in futility. Whatever the theoretical possibility that the Board might grant removal permits, the trustees say, such permits are virtually never granted, especially in connection with any effort to occupy cooperative or condominium units or sell such units to persons who desire to occupy them. In support of this otherwise conclusory averment, the trustees mention the 1980 Southview denials, and argue that, since they are functionally in the same position as Southview, except that they have more units, one can infer that the same result would follow. As additional evidence, they cite an affidavit, filed as part of their opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, where it was stated, on the basis of a review of the Board's records, but without any indication as to the number of such applications previously filed, that no removal permit application had [ever] been granted to allow a conventional conversion from apartment use to a condominium or cooperative, or to allow a unit owner or proposed unit owner to move into his or her own unit if it were already occupied by an existing tenant. An affidavit submitted by the defendants on the same issue, after an arguably more cursory review of the same records, reveals that there has been only one (1) application to the Board for removal permits to allow the sale of the units in a rental building as condominiums since January 1, 1982. 11 43 Other courts have recognized that there is a narrow futility exception to the final decision requirement for takings claims which, on rare occasion, may excuse the submission of an application for a variance or other administrative relief. See, e.g., Southern Pacific, 922 F.2d at 504; Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 726-27 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1073, 112 L.Ed.2d 1179 (1991). We agree that there are circumstances in which a party, on grounds of futility, might bypass a permit process and go directly to court seeking judicial review of a law's constitutionality under the Takings Clause. Futility may be found, for example, where special circumstances exist such that a permit application is not a viable option, Herrington v. Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 570 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090, 109 S.Ct. 1557, 103 L.Ed.2d 860 (1989), or where the granting authority has dug in its heels and made it transparently clear that the permit, application or no, will not be forthcoming, e.g., Parkview Corp. v. Department of Army, Corps of Engineers, Etc., 490 F.Supp. 1278, 1282 (E.D.Wis.1980). In our judgment, recognizing a stringently cabined futility exception is consistent with familiar doctrine suggesting that exhaustion of administrative remedies will not ordinarily be required where the hierarchs have made it quite plain that the relief in question will be denied, see City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24, 34, 54 S.Ct. 259, 263, 78 L.Ed. 628 (1934); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir.1988) (administrative review may be futile by virtue of a preannounced decision by the final administrative decision-maker), or where a party has been denied access to administrative remedies, see, e.g., Christopher W. v. Portsmouth School Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1096-97 (1st Cir.1989), or where there is objective and undisputed evidence of administrative bias, see, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe, 840 F.2d at 677-78. 44 The futility exception is far easier to conceptualize than to define. Since obtaining a final municipal decision should be the rule, however, the burden of establishing futility must lie with the party seeking to bypass the permit procedure--and any reasonable doubt ought to be resolved against that party. Thus, although futility can excuse a plaintiff's eschewal of a permit application, the mere possibility, or even the probability, that the responsible agency may deny the permit should not be enough to trigger the excuse. See United States v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 283 U.S. 269, 273, 51 S.Ct. 376, 378, 75 L.Ed. 1025 (1931); Randolph-Sheppard Vendors of America v. Weinberger, 795 F.2d 90, 106 (D.C.Cir.1986). To come within the exception, a sort of inevitability is required: the prospect of refusal must be certain (or nearly so). 12 See James v. United States Dept. of HHS, 824 F.2d 1132, 1138-39 (D.C.Cir.1987) (administrative remedy futile where certainty of adverse decision exists); Randolph-Sheppard, 795 F.2d at 105 (similar); see also Southern Pacific, 922 F.2d at 504 (futility exception inapplicable unless manner of rejection of earlier application makes it clear that no project will be approved). 45 Recognizing the difficulty of formulating precise guidelines for this exception, the Ninth Circuit, relying on County of Yolo, 477 U.S. at 352-53 n. 8, 106 S.Ct. at 2568 n. 8, has held that, at a bare minimum, [a] property owner cannot rely on the futility exception until he or she makes at least one meaningful application for administrative relief. Herrington, 857 F.2d at 569; Kinzli v. Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1454-55 (9th Cir.), amended, 830 F.2d 968 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 775, 98 L.Ed.2d 861 (1988); see also Unity Ventures v. Lake County, 841 F.2d 770, 775-76 (7th Cir.) (Seventh Circuit applies same rule to find due process claim unripe), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891, 109 S.Ct. 226, 102 L.Ed.2d 216 (1988). We adopt this basic approach: the filing of one meaningful application will ordinarily be a necessary, although not alone sufficient, precondition for invoking the futility exception. It follows, therefore, that the Blevins plaintiffs, having never applied for a removal permit, cannot rely on the futility exception. 13 46 Moreover, there is no way, on the basis of what has been pled here, that the trustees can evade the preclusive force of noncompliance with the one meaningful application requirement. It strikes us as a leap of gargantuan proportions to reason that a factfinder could, on Blevins' gossamer allegations, and in light of the detailed procedures and standards set forth for permit proceedings under the Ordinance, 14 draw an inference that it would certainly or nearly certainly have been futile for Blevins to file an application in 1988. Although we understand that, in the pleading stages, a plaintiff's burden to set out facts is relatively light, we have repeatedly warned that minimal requirements are not tantamount to nonexistent requirements. Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988). A reviewing court need not credit bald assertions, periphrastic circumlocutions, unsubstantiated conclusions, or outright vituperation, Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir.1990), even when such phantoms are robed by the pleader in the guise of facts. We have been particularly insistent in section 1983 cases to require a fair degree of specificity--a foundation of material facts--to survive a motion to dismiss. See Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 53; Dewey v. University of New Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 944, 103 S.Ct. 2121, 77 L.Ed.2d 1301 (1983); Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077, 98 S.Ct. 1268, 55 L.Ed.2d 783 (1978). 47 In this instance, appellants' didactic claim of futility, on its face, appears altogether speculative, not only because the trustees never filed even one meaningful application with the Board to convert any of their buildings to condominiums, but also because of the utter lack of other fact-dominated allegations which would serve to bring the appellants within any possible futility exception. To the extent that appellants' averments suggest that the permit process is a sham, the suggestion is a self-serving generality, counting for very little. See Christopher W., 877 F.2d at 1095-96; Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Teague, 830 F.2d 158, 162 (11th Cir.1987). Any attempt to lean on the results of Southview's efforts seems farfetched; not only are the properties different, but appellants' counsel indicated at oral argument before us that the appellants' rekindled interest in condominium conversions very likely came about because the economic situation ... changed between 1980 (when the Southview applications were rejected) and 1988 (when suit was started in the district court). 48 In sum, the allegation of futility contained in the complaint is a matter of rank supposition. We are unable to say that the trustees have presented more than an unsubstantiated conclusion[ ] of the kind that our cases teach is inadequate to pass muster in the face of a motion to dismiss. See Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 52; see also Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 16 (It is only when ... conclusions are logically compelled, or at least supported, by the stated facts, that is, when the suggested inference rises to what experience indicates is an acceptable level of probability, that 'conclusions' become 'facts' for pleading purposes.). Having never sought a removal permit, the trustees' takings claims are premature. 15 49