Opinion ID: 223162
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy to Defraud Conviction (Count 1)

Text: To convict a defendant of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the government must prove that: (1) there was an agreement to violate the law, (2) the defendant knew the essential objective of the conspiracy, (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy, (4) an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (5) the coconspirators were interdependent. United States v. Bedford, 536 F.3d 1148, 1156 (10th Cir.2008); accord United States v. Nall, 949 F.2d 301, 305 (10th Cir.1991). [7] Mr. Cooper argues that the government failed to present evidence establishing the first element of conspiracy, an agreement to violate the law, because none of [Mr.] Cooper's alleged co-conspirators  Cota, Strand, Gleason, Ruth, and Steelman  testified that they entered an illegal agreement with [Mr.] Cooper. Aplt. Opening Br. at 38. He insists that each alleged co-conspirator testified to the exact contrary. Id. Testimony by a co-conspirator that an illegal agreement was expressly entered into is not required to establish a conspiracy in this context. Rather, [a]n agreement `may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case,' United States v. Sells, 477 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 669 (10th Cir.1992)); in other words, the agreement requirement may be satisfied entirely through circumstantial evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1301 (10th Cir.2000) (stating that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence). Moreover, the jury is empowered to make credibility assessments: resolution of conflicting evidence is exclusively within the discretion of the jury, as the trier of fact, and its verdict must be given added weight when the opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses is considered. United States v. Vigil, 743 F.2d 751, 752 (10th Cir.1984). Thus, a jury is free to discredit any evidence contradicting the existence of an agreement. In support of its contention that an agreement existed between Mr. Cooper and his co-conspirators, the government points to evidence and testimony demonstrating, inter alia: (1) that Renaissance expanded into a scheme to enable anyone associated with Renaissance to avoid paying taxes on their W-2 income ... and [to] fraudulent[ly] claim ... tax deductions by ignoring the ordinary and necessary expenses requirement in the tax code, Aplee. Br. at 9; (2) that Mr. Cooper repeatedly offered false tax advice to promote Renaissance, despite the fact that many of his co-conspirators had brought concerns about the fraudulent nature of the business to his attention; (3) that the co-conspirators prepared false or fraudulent tax returns for IMAs, which were consistent with the fraudulent tax advice espoused by Mr. Cooper and Renaissance; and (4) that Renaissance's business continued to flourish, despite the fact that the conspirators  including Mr. Cooper  knew that the company's tax advice was false and that its tax work was fraudulent. On the basis of the foregoing evidence (among other evidence)  viewed in the light most favorable to the government  we conclude that a rational jury could have found that an agreement existed between Mr. Cooper and his co-conspirators to violate the law. Accordingly, we conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence to support Mr. Cooper's conviction under Count 1 for conspiring to defraud.