Opinion ID: 805640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: At the close of the Government’s proofs Gordon moved the district court for a judgment of acquittal as to Counts V and VI. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Gordon argues that the Government failed to advance sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for material misstatement or bank fraud. “The relevant question in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (internal marks omitted).
A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is comprised of five elements: (1) the defendant made a statement; (2) the statement is false or fraudulent; (3) the statement is material; (4) the defendant made the statement knowingly and willfully; and (5) the statement pertained to an activity within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (6th Cir. 1991)). Gordon argues that his statement to the IRS in the lien subordination process could not have been material because an IRS lien is 19 always subordinate to a purchase money mortgage. Implicit in Gordon’s argument is that the IRS was unharmed. A statement is material for purposes of § 1001 if it has the natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing the federal agency. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995). It is not necessary to show that the statement actually influenced an agency, but only that it had the capacity to do so. United States v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 705 (6th Cir. 1994). Whether the IRS would have issued the subordination does not determine materiality. Moreover, a showing of materiality is a “low bar” for the Government to meet. United States v. White, 270 F.3d 356, 365 (6th Cir. 2001). “A false statement can be material even if ultimately the conclusion of the tribunal would have been the same.” United States v. DeZarn, 157 F.3d 1042, 1051 (6th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Moss, 69 F.App’x. 724, 730 (6th Cir. 2003). For example, in United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 where the defendant falsely listed the name of the inventor on a patent application. The approval by the patent office would not have turned on who was the inventor; nevertheless, the court affirmed the conviction.10 Gordon pursued two objectives through his communications with the IRS. Gordon’s primary aim was to satisfy USBank’s request for a certificate of lien subordination. His second goal was to complete the process without alerting the IRS that he intended to purchase a house worth $1,500,000. To accomplish the latter, Gordon represented to the IRS that he intended to purchase 10 Markham was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1), concealing a material fact, as opposed to the more common charge under § 1001(a)(2). However, the court explained that Markham both concealed material facts and misstated material facts. 20 the Stone Dr. house. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that lying about which house he planned to buy and how much he intended to pay for it were material misrepresentations. The district court did not err by denying Gordon’s motion for acquittal on the §1001 charge.
Next, Gordon argues that no rational trier of fact could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of bank fraud. Gordon’s assertion relies on the idea that submitting fake documents to USBank was not fraudulent because the fake tax returns more accurately stated his income than the false tax returns he filed with the IRS. Essentially, Gordon argues that he never exposed the bank to a risk of loss. To convict a defendant of defrauding a financial institution under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1), the Government must prove that (1) the defendant knowingly executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a financial institution; (2) the defendant had the intent to defraud a financial institution; and (3) the bank involved was federally insured. United States v. Waldroop, 431 F.3d 736, 741 (10th Cir. 2005). Gordon need not have exposed or potentially exposed the bank to a risk of loss to be convicted. United States v. Hoglund, 178 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1999). Consistent with the common law definition of “fraud,” § 1344(1) requires “a misrepresentation or concealment of material fact.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999). The term “scheme to defraud” is not capable of precise definition. Fraud instead is measured in a particular case by determining whether the scheme demonstrated a departure “from fundamental honesty, moral uprightness, or fair play and candid dealings in the general life of the community.” 21 Spencer v. United States, 142 F.3d 436, 1998 WL 165142, at  (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion) (quoting United States v. Ragosta, 970 F.2d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1992)). Gordon’s dealings with the USBank lacked honesty and candor. Gordon’s argument that he did not expose the bank to risk fails for several reasons. First, the bank statements Gordon submitted demonstrating cash on hand dramatically overstated his holdings. This is inconsistent with Gordon’s argument that the information he submitted to USBank was accurate. Second, the Supreme Court held in Neder, 527 U.S. at 23-25, that a conviction under the bank fraud statute does not require proof of reliance or damages. In the same vein, this Circuit holds that exposing the bank to risk of loss or potential loss is merely one way to prove intent to defraud. Hoglund, 178 F.3d at 413. The Hoglund panel sustained a bank fraud conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 where the defendant settled his clients’ cases without their permission and then signed and deposited the checks into his personal account. The defendant argued that he could not have defrauded the bank because the bank did not lose money through the transactions. The panel disagreed. Similarly, in United States v. Reaume, 338 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2003), the defendant opened several checking accounts with small initial deposits and used the checks for purchases at large retailers. He then returned the item in exchange for cash. The defendant argued that he intended to defraud retailers but not the bank and therefore could not be guilty of bank fraud. The Reamue panel disagreed and affirmed his conviction. 22 Gordon’s argument that he would have qualified for a loan is irrelevant, and, considering the testimony of a USBank representative at trial, likely incorrect.11 Gordon’s contention that the lien subordination was meaningless also fails. USBank insisted Gordon secure it prior to closing the loan. Moreover, the false lien subordination certificate was but one of several misrepresentations made to USBank. Gordon represented to the bank that he had a significant amount of cash on hand, $43,500 in one account and $179,485 in another. The actual balances of the accounts were $100 and $56.86. Additionally, through his fake tax returns, Gordon represented to USBank that he acted honestly in his financial dealings by filing and paying taxes. This was not true. The district court did not err by denying Gordon’s motion for acquittal on the bank fraud charge.