Opinion ID: 2247422
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Policy Supports the Inapplicability of the Journey's Account Statute

Text: The Worker's Compensation Act was passed to provide a regime for efficiently and fairly resolving injuries in the workplace. It creates a right of compensation without a showing of fault and prescribes the amount of compensation. An employee with a claim must raise it within two years, or lose it. To permit Cox to proceed several years later under the Worker's Compensation Act based on a failed intentional tort claim would at least open the door to, and perhaps invite, the repetitive and extensive litigation that the Worker's Compensation Act is designed to discourage. If the Journey's Account Statute operated as Cox urges, any injured employee could easily circumvent the two year time limit for filing a worker's compensation claim by filing an intentional tort action. If the tort action fails, the employee could start over before the Board by invoking the Journey's Account Statute. This result would undermine the goal of prompt and efficient disposition of work related injuries and upset the lodestar principle of regular and predictable liability for employers under the Act. Baker, 637 N.E.2d at 1274. Cox's contention raises a second problem as well. In the usual application of the Journey's Account Statute the second suit is substantially the same as the first. However, significant unfairness could result from regarding claims before the Board as actions under the Journey's Account Statute. In this case, the consequences of holding for Cox might not be a significant burden on the employer. AAC was alerted to Cox's lawsuit, and the preparations necessary to mount a defenseinvestigation, location of witnesses, discoverypresumably largely included those needed to defend against a worker's compensation claim. But if Cox had first filed an unsuccessful worker's compensation claim and then, up to five years later in reliance on the Journey's Account Statute, sued AAC for an intentional tort, the potential of unfairness to the employer is significant. The employer would for several years believe itself faced with a statutorily defined financial exposure and the need to offer proof on limited issues. The employer's devotion of effort and expense to the defense would be guarded by that belief. It is fundamentally unfair to convert the proceeding into a general tort lawsuit years after the event. Finally, nothing prohibits an employee from filing a claim with the Board and initiating a lawsuit concurrently, although administrative proceedings have been described as serving only to complicate resolution of the matter. Tribbett v. Tay Mor Industries, Inc., 471 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind.Ct.App.1984). If there were a need to do so, Cox certainly could have done that in this case. He knew one year before the two year window had expired that AAC disputed the jurisdiction of the court to hear the lawsuit. He and his attorney also were both familiar with the two year filing requirement. The result in one proceeding may operate as res judicata in the second if the first results in a disposition on the merits, Riverview Health Care v. Wright, 524 N.E.2d 321, 323 (Ind.Ct.App. 1988), but that is a difficulty faced by any plaintiff seeking to pursue concurrent remedies.