Opinion ID: 184342
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Concept of Exhaustion

Text: 11 The concept of 'exhaustion' in the context of the demands of comity, Parisi, 405 at 40 n. 6, 92 S.Ct. at 819 n. 6, is in part justified by the same practical considerations that justify exhaustion of administrative remedies generally, namely the need to allow agencies to develop the facts, to apply the law in which they are peculiarly expert, and to correct their own errors. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 756, 95 S.Ct. at 1312; see also id. at 758, 95 S.Ct. at 1313. In connection with court-martial proceedings, the exhaustion requirement is particularly important, because, given the reality that the military must prepare for and perform its vital role of fighting wars, it must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life. Id. at 757, 95 S.Ct. at 1313. Congress recognized these pressing needs when it created an integrated system of military courts and review procedures. Id. at 758, 95 S.Ct. at 1313. 12 The Court in Councilman concluded that the same principles supporting the exhaustion requirement for habeas petitions by service members also governed the proper exercise of the federal courts' equitable jurisdiction over pending court-martial proceedings. Absent truly compelling circumstances, service members are precluded from bringing suit in federal court seeking to enjoin court-martial proceedings on jurisdictional or other grounds, just as they are barred from seeking collateral review of their court-martials before they have exhausted their appeals within the military system. Accordingly, the Court set forth the rule that when a serviceman charged with crimes by military authorities can show no harm other than that attendant to resolution of his case in the military court system, the federal district courts must refrain from intervention, by way of injunction or otherwise. Id. 13 The exhaustion requirement prevented the District Court in Councilman from hearing a suit for injunctive relief brought by an Army captain against whom court-martial charges had been preferred for drug-related activities. The Army captain had claimed in his petition that the offenses charged were not service connected and hence were not within court-martial jurisdiction. Id. at 741-42, 95 S.Ct. at 1304-05. The Court held that [327 U.S.App.D.C. 152] this jurisdictional challenge, although not without support, first had to be fully considered by military authorities, and that the service member had to exhaust any other military remedies that were available to him before a federal court could exercise collateral review over the proceedings. Id. at 759-61, 95 S.Ct. at 1313-15.