Opinion ID: 1388611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Theft as lesser included offense.

Text: (17a) Defendant claims all convictions and findings based on robbery must be reversed because the court failed to instruct sua sponte that if he formed the intent to steal only after Burke was killed, defendant was guilty at most of the lesser included offense of theft. The contention lacks merit. (18) Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery, which includes the additional element of force or fear. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 746 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) If intent to steal arose after the victim was assaulted, the robbery element of stealing by force or fear is absent. ( People v. Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346, 351 [216 Cal. Rptr. 455, 702 P.2d 613]; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 54.) (17b) Defendant's testimony that he decided to take Glover's keys and car only after struggling with Burke is substantial evidence that he was guilty of theft, not robbery. (19) When there is substantial evidence that an element of the charged offense is missing, but that the accused is guilty of a lesser included offense, the court must instruct upon the lesser included offense, and must allow the jury to return the lesser conviction, even if not requested to do so. ( People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 690 [268 Cal. Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887]; Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 746; Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 351.) (17c) Contrary to defendant's assertion, the court fulfilled its duty here. The jury received instructions correctly defining robbery and the lesser included offenses of attempted robbery, grand theft from the person, and grand and petty theft. Verdict forms were provided for each lesser offense. No more was required. An accused is entitled on request to nonargumentative instructions that pinpoint the theory of the defense. ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 870 [277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906]; People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1137 [248 Cal. Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049].) However, defendant requested no pinpoint instructions on the issue of after-formed intent. The trial court had no sua sponte duty to provide them. (See generally People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1212.) Defendant suggests our Turner and Ramkeesoon decisions established a sua sponte duty to instruct on after-formed intent. Such is not the case. In Turner and Ramkeesoon, we addressed the presence or absence of after-formed intent instructions only when deciding whether reversible prejudice had arisen from the trial courts' erroneous failure to furnish any instructions or verdict forms on lesser included offenses supported by the evidence. ( Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 690-693; Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 351-353.) In contrast to Turner and Ramkeesoon, the instant trial court did provide a full opportunity for conviction on lesser included offenses of robbery. [17] Defendant's assertion of direct error must therefore be rejected. (20) Defendant's argument also fails as a claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by omitting to request pinpoint instructions. The standard instructions made clear that robbery required a finding of taking by force or fear, while the lesser included theft offenses did not. The evidentiary dispute was between the prosecution's theory of a group-planned killing for robbery, on the one hand, and defendant's claims of theft as an afterthought to self-defense, on the other. Confronted with these two versions, and no other, the jury convicted defendant of conspiracy to rob and conspiracy to murder, based on instructions specifying overt acts that preceded Burke's death. It found defendant guilty of first degree murder under the felony murder rule, i.e., homicide as a result of the actual or attempted commission of robbery with specific intent. It also found that defendant had committed first degree murder other than under the felony murder rule, based on instructions defining premeditated murder and murder by lying in wait. It upheld a robbery-murder special circumstance under instructions that the robbery must not be incidental to the murder. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 59-62.) And it further found as a special circumstance that defendant killed intentionally while lying in wait. Hence, the jury necessarily and specifically rejected defendant's claim of after-formed intent. (See Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 691-693; Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 746-747; see also People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].) Counsel's failure to request pinpoint instructions on the issue thus does not undermine confidence in the outcome. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698]; see People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 584.)