Opinion ID: 774701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Salinity Test

Text: 59 During his summation, defense counsel argued that the prosecution's theory that the victim's body had been submerged in sea water was inconsistent with the fact that the victim's brassiere showed no signs of having been submerged in salt water: 60 Nothing was done in this particular case to test any of the items for salt. Nothing. Yesterday I had occasion to go upstairs to the vault to take a look at some of the evidence in this particular case. This is the brassiere that was introduced into evidence. You look at it. Did you ever go to the beach, come out of the water, your bathing suit dries. You look at it. Use your good common sense and you decide. We know it hasn't been washed or anything like that. 61 Trial counsel, however, did not have the brassiere scientifically tested for salinity content. With respect to petitioner's claim that this failure deprived him of effective assistance, the County Court held that petitioner had failed to meet his burden of show[ing] that he was deprived of a fair trial by [trial counsel's provision of] less than meaningful representation. The County Court reasoned that, given the Appellate Division's ruling that the evidence presented during the trial... was sufficient to support the conviction of intentional murder, and given trial counsel's diligent and vigorous defense of his client, the exhaustive cross-examination, presentation of defense witnesses and his opening and closing statements which were consistent with a professional, meaningful representation, it would not indulge in speculation as to the reasons defense counsel chose not to bring [the salinity test] forward when the opportunity was presented. (Citing Loliscio, 187 A.D.2d 172.) 62 When asked during the district court hearing whether he was aware that tests existed to determine the salinity of a garment, defense counsel responded: In general. I assumed that such tests could be performed. (Emphasis added.) When asked why he did not have the brassiere tested for salinity content, defense counsel testified as follows: 63 I did not, Judge, consider doing this test. I had tested all of the prosecution's other evidence. I had sent out the DNA evidence to a separate lab to have it tested.... [W]hen I began to cross-examine the [prosecution's] lab people, that was when the idea germinated in my head that they did not perform any salinity tests. I looked at that bra and I could see in my view that it didn't look like it had been submerged. I thought it was almost self-evident that this bra was not in any kind of salt solution. It wasn't stiff. It was soft. It just seemed to me almost a given that this bra was not in salt. If you just took the time to look at it, touch it and smell it. That's what I relied on, and I argued that to the jury in summation and I invited them to do the same thing, and that's why I moved the bra into evidence. 64 Citing cases purportedly holding that the failure of a defense attorney to have scientific tests performed relevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of their client constitutes ineffective assistance, petitioner argues that defense counsel's failure to have the salinity test performed was likewise objectively unreasonable. 65 We disagree for the following reasons. First, the cases relied upon by the petitioner involve types of testing far more standard and obvious than scientific testing of clothing for salinity content. See, e.g., Tucker v. Prelesnik, 181 F.3d 747, 756-57 (6th Cir. 1999) (failure to obtain medical records), abrogated on other grounds, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1996) (failure of defense counsel to follow up on exculpatory report regarding defendant's semen samples); Sparman v. Edwards, 26 F. Supp. 2d 450, 452-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (failure to introduce evidence based on medical examinations that had been performed on the victims in sodomy case), aff'd, 154 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1998). 8 Second, testing of the salinity content of clothing is not a commonly recognized or standard type of test admitted in New York criminal trials. As the state points out in this regard, and petitioner does not dispute, no reported New York criminal decision has discussed the admissibility of such salinity testing. 66 In sum, making every effort... to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, and evaluat[ing] [counsel's] conduct from counsel's perspective at the time, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, we cannot say that counsel's failure to request the salinity test was objectively unreasonable. Indeed, precisely because the use of salinity testing appears to be uncommon in New York criminal trials, defense counsel's strategy of calling to the jury's attention the prosecution's failure to employ such testing and inviting the jury to examine the brassiere for themselves for evidence of salt content can be characterized as effective assistance. Cf. United States v. Tarricone, 21 F.3d 474, 476 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that trial counsel's failure to call handwriting expert did not constitute ineffective assistance because he could reasonably have concluded that the jury could, on its own, recognize that the handwriting on the throughput agreement was not [defendant's).