Opinion ID: 565162
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged misrepresentations

Text: 9 The pilots first contend that ALPA promised the pilots throughout the strike that they would be able to ratify any strike settlement with Continental. 5 The pilots argue that these unfulfilled promises of ratification, if proven at trial, show that ALPA breached its DFR in bad faith. 10 In our original opinion, we held that the pilots had no right to ratify the Continental settlement under section 101(a)(1) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411. See O'Neill, 886 F.2d at 1447-48. This LMRDA voting rights decision was not appealed to the Supreme Court and is now final. See O'Neill, 499 U.S. at ---- n. 2, 111 S.Ct. at 1131 n. 2, 113 L.Ed.2d at 60 n. 2. While it is now settled that the pilots did not have the right to ratify the Continental settlement, we have never considered directly whether alleged promises of ratification could support the pilots' claim that ALPA breached its DFR in bad faith. The pilots cite to our original opinion in which we said that [a] factfinder might infer a breach of ALPA's duty of fair representation if it finds the union misrepresented the right of the membership to ratify any settlement agreement. 886 F.2d at 1448. To support our statement, we relied on Acri v. International Association of Machinists, 781 F.2d 1393, 1397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 73, 93 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), in which the Ninth Circuit said that a duty of fair representation cause of action can be maintained when union representatives make misrepresentations to the union membership during the ratification process. 11 However, ALPA correctly points out that in Acri, unlike the instant case, the membership had the right to ratify the agreement. In Acri, union members struck over a number of issues including limits on severance pay. At a union meeting, union representatives allegedly misrepresented to the union members that the employer had agreed to remove the opposed limit on severance pay. The union members then ratified the new agreement not knowing that it did not contain a change in the severance pay provision. When the union members later learned of the discrepancy, they sued the union for breaching its DFR. It is in this context that the Ninth Circuit said that the duty of fair representation extends to misrepresentations during ratification. 781 F.2d at 1397. Thus the Ninth Circuit was addressing the issue of a union misrepresenting a settlement to its members, thereby eviscerating the members' right to ratify in breach of the union's DFR. 6 ALPA argues that because the pilots had no such ratification right, ALPA could not have breached its DFR in this way. 12 We need not address this particular argument, however, because ALPA's alleged statements do not present a triable issue that it breached its DFR in bad faith. As the Seventh Circuit has explained in affirming summary judgment based on similar alleged misrepresentations by a union to its members: 13 [E]very inaccuracy should not form the basis of a federal suit. A strike often presents unique pressures. The atmosphere may be tense, charged and confused. The situation is intensely adversary. Decisions and statements are sometimes made in haste, under pressure and in the belief that the other side is disseminating manipulated or distorted information to which a response is required. Union leaders, in exhorting the membership, may voice opinions that later prove inaccurate, or make claims that turn out to be hyperbole. So long as such statements are not intentionally misleading and are not of a nature to be reasonably relied upon by the membership ... they may not rise to the level of invidious actions barred by the duty of fair representation. To conclude otherwise would have a chilling effect on the right to strike itself by instilling a fear of unjustifiable lawsuits. 14 Swatts v. United Steelworkers, 808 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir.1986); see also Bautista v. Pan American World Airlines, 828 F.2d 546, 550-51 (9th Cir.1987) (following Swatts in affirming summary judgment dismissing union members' DFR claim for alleged union misrepresentations). 15 The Swatts court's description of the highly charged atmosphere during a heated strike is applicable to the instant case. The Supreme Court accurately described the two-year strike by ALPA of Continental as acrimonious, punctuated by incidents of violence, and the filing of a variety of law suits, charges, and countercharges. O'Neill, 499 U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1130, 113 L.Ed.2d at 58. It is on this backdrop that the union's alleged misrepresentations were made. Like the Seventh Circuit we do not condone fabrications designed to mislead the membership, but we agree that there must be a demanding standard for measuring such violations. Swatts, 808 F.2d at 1225. We further agree with the First Circuit that this demanding standard should be that the alleged union misstatement must be sufficiently egregious to be considered in bad faith under the Vaca standards for establishing a DFR violation. Alicea v. Suffield Poultry, Inc., 902 F.2d 125, 130 (1st Cir.1990); see also Note, Labor Arbitration, the Duty of Fair Representation, and Union Negligence, 54 St. John's L.Rev. 357, 365 (1980) (As a basis for DFR liability, bad faith ... ha[s] been invoked only to remedy the most egregious union conduct.). 16 Viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the pilots, we conclude that the pilots have not presented sufficient evidence that the union's misstatements were sufficiently egregious or so intentionally misleading to be invidious and therefore meet the demanding standard of a bad faith breach of ALPA's DFR. Thus the district court correctly granted summary judgment on this issue.
17 The pilots next argue that ALPA violated its DFR in bad faith by misrepresenting to retired and resigned pilots that they would be included in any settlement with Continental. The pilots allege that, despite these promises, ALPA did not represent pilots who retired or resigned during the strike. 7 The pilots further contend that even after ALPA had conceded the retired/resigned pilot issue to Continental, ALPA continued to tell the pilots they would be included. The pilots argue that ALPA's alleged misrepresentations to the retired/resigned pilots support their bad faith DFR claim in the same way as the other alleged union misrepresentations discussed above. 18 ALPA argues that a DFR is only owed to employees of a unit and that because the retirees were no longer part of the Continental bargaining unit, they had no duty to represent them. 8 See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 181 n. 20, 92 S.Ct. 383, 398 n. 20, 30 L.Ed.2d 341 (1971) (Since retirees are not members of the bargaining unit, the bargaining agent is under no statutory duty to represent them in negotiations with the employer.); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 727 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir.1984) ([T]he union owes no duty of fair representation to retirees since the union's duty runs only to employees within the bargaining unit for whom the union acts as exclusive bargaining representative.), aff'd en banc, 752 F.2d 1293, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1102, 105 S.Ct. 2329, 85 L.Ed.2d 846 (1985). ALPA argues that even a promise of representation to a retiree would not implicate the DFR. See Meza v. General Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1272-73 & n. 11 (5th Cir.1990) (Even if the Union volunteered to represent former employee, it is doubtful whether the Union owed him a duty of fair representation.). 19 Again we need not reach the issue of whether retirees are owed a DFR in this situation. Assuming such a duty exists, ALPA did not breach it in bad faith. First, the pilots rely on alleged misrepresentations made to a single retired pilot. The first one was allegedly in a statement by MEC Chairman Dennis Higgins in a December 1984 meeting; the other was allegedly included in an equivocal letter from ALPA President Henry Duffy in September 1985. As the text of the relevant summary judgment evidence in the margin shows, these statements do not rise to the level of bad faith intentional misrepresentations designed to harm the retired pilots. 9 Second, even if ALPA sacrificed benefits to the retired pilots for the greater good of the entire union membership, this choice will not support an inference of a bad faith breach of ALPA's DFR. In negotiating conflicts such as the one ALPA faced with Continental, some groups within the union will always fare better than others. Arriving at a compromise that includes disparate benefits for various groups is not per se outside ALPA's discretion or the wide range of reasonableness, see Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338, 73 S.Ct. 681, 686, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953), to which it is entitled as the pilots' duly chosen bargaining representative. The Supreme Court has held that this settlement was not arbitrary or discriminatory. The summary judgment record will not support an inference that it was made with a bad faith motive to harm retirees. The district court correctly granted summary judgment on this issue. 20