Opinion ID: 203882
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to use the word dominion

Text: We also reject appellant's contention that by failing to use the word dominion, the court omitted an essential element of the offense. We have stated generally that [w]ithin wide margins, the district court maintains discretion in the precise manner that it explains legal concepts to the jury. McFarlane, 491 F.3d at 59. More specifically, we have recognized that the definition of constructive possession may or may not include dominion as a separate concept, stating that `[c]onstructive possession' is commonly defined as the power and intention to exercise control, or dominion and control, over an object not in one's `actual' possession. United States v. Zavala Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 7 (1st Cir.1994) (emphasis added). We have even rejected a defendant's contention that the district court [improperly] used the conjunction `or' rather than `and' in the phrase dominion or control, noting that [a]t times, we have used the conjunctions `and' and `or' interchangeably in this very context. United States v. Rogers, 41 F.3d 25, 30 & n. 5 (1st Cir.1994). In Rogers, we explained that, because dominion is generally defined to include the concept of control, the instruction properly conveyed to the jury the notion that there could have been no conviction absent a finding of control. Id. at 30. The same is true here. The court emphasized that, to justify a finding of constructive possession, appellant must have had the power and ability to exercise control over the substance at issue. We discern no meaningful difference between the instruction as given and one which would have included the word dominion.