Opinion ID: 2435252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Allegations of Specific Jurisdiction

Text: When specific jurisdiction is alleged the inquiry is two-pronged: First, the defendant's activities must have been `purposefully directed' to the forum, and second, the litigation must result from alleged injuries that `arise out of or relate to those activities.' Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 734 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Tex.1987) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. at 2181), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063, 108 S.Ct. 1022, 98 L.Ed.2d 986 (1988). The plaintiffs seek to establish specific jurisdiction over NISA on the grounds that their claims arose out of NISA's conspiracy with Texas Mining to (1) defeat a government ban on the use of silica and (2) promulgate inadequate warnings regarding the dangers of silica. The plaintiffs first allege that NISA and its members, including Texas Mining, actually opposed a regulatory ban on the use of silica sand, and offer in support two letters from NISA to all its members relating to efforts by NISA and its members to influence National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) standards and OSHA regulations regarding the use of silica sand. However, petitioning the government for redress on matters of concern to a party is a freedom protected by the Bill of Rights in the federal constitution. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138, 81 S.Ct. 523, 530, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961). Just as the United States Supreme Court has held that a campaign directed towards obtaining favorable government action for a party cannot be the subject of antitrust liability, we hold that such actionsincluding letters reporting the progress of these activitiescannot constitute an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy. Id. at 139-40, 81 S.Ct. at 530-31; see Diaz v. Southwest Wheel, Inc. 736 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied). Civil conspiracy is a combination by two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983). The letters at issue here are a legitimate exercise of the right to influence government action. They demonstrate no unlawful purpose or means, and accordingly do not support the exercise of specific jurisdiction by NISA. The plaintiffs also argue that an alleged conspiracy between NISA and Texas Mining to promulgate inadequate warnings regarding the dangers of silica sand should serve as a basis for the trial court's assertion of specific jurisdiction over NISA. The plaintiffs' theory of the case is that labels recommended by NISA for silica sand products warned of the dangers of prolonged exposure to silica but failed to warn of the potential dangers of short exposure. [3] Our inquiry must focus on whether NISA demonstrated such minimum contacts with Texas that it could not reasonably foresee being sued in a Texas court regarding the warnings. The only evidence in the record before the trial court regarding the allegation of inadequate warnings consists of (1) a letter from NISA addressed to all its members passing along a warning promulgated by NIOSH for silica sand products and advising members that they might want to consult their own legal counsel [4] ; (2) a deposition excerpt from Robert Curry (corporate identity unknown) that he always took under consideration the recommendations made by NISA regarding warnings and that those warnings would always be discussed by his corporation's legal counsel; and (3) a deposition excerpt from Sherrod Kilmer, a high level executive at Texas Mining, stating that (a) the corporation relied upon and followed the recommendations of NISA to protect the safety and health of its employees, and (b) in regard to a particular warning utilized by Texas Mining in 1987, the corporation weighed all recommendations (including NISA's) and then made its decisions. [5] There is thus some evidence that NISA wrote letters passing along warnings regarding silica sand to all its members. Specifically, there is evidence that NISA advised its members to consult their own legal counsel, and that Texas Mining did so in developing its warnings. Such evidence is insufficient to support jurisdiction over NISA by a Texas court because it fails to demonstrate that NISA purposefully directed any of its efforts to Texas. In other words, evidence that a nonresident defendant sent allegedly insufficient warnings to its members, including one in Texas, with the recommendation that legal counsel be consulted, does not demonstrate that the plaintiffs' alleged cause of action arises out of or relates to NISA's contact with Texas to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a Texas court. In fact, the evidence in the record before the trial court demonstrates that NISA's only contacts with Texas was limited to various correspondence with Texas Mining. That correspondence fails to demonstrate sufficient contact with the state of Texas for in personam jurisdiction. Finally, in support of their argument that the trial court may assert specific jurisdiction over NISA, plaintiffs argue that NISA's conduct in opposing a governmental ban of silica sand and its promulgation of inadequate warnings affected Texas residents, including the plaintiffs. This argument is a reprise of the plaintiffs' attempt to attribute the acts of alleged co-conspirators within the forum to NISA to support the exercise of jurisdiction by a Texas court. The mere allegation that the effects of NISA's allegedly tortious behavior resulted in the development of the disease in the plaintiff, a resident of Texas, is insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction over NISA. Jurisdiction based upon the effects of extra-territorial conduct within a particular forum is proper only when the extra-territorial conduct focuses upon a plaintiff residing in that forum. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, 104 S.Ct. at 1486. In Calder, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the mere fact that it was foreseeable that an allegedly slanderous article would be circulated and would have an effect in a particular state was an insufficient basis for an assertion of jurisdiction by that state's court over the non-resident defendants, an author and editor. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295, 100 S.Ct. at 566). Instead, the assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants by the state of the plaintiff's residence was proper because the defendants' intentional actions were expressly aimed at the plaintiff and the defendants knew that the article would have its most devastating effect in the state in which the plaintiff lived and worked. Id. 465 U.S. at 789-90, 104 S.Ct. at 1486-88. In line with Calder, the assertion of jurisdiction over NISA by a Texas court based solely upon the effects of the letters mailed to its entire membership is improper. Therefore, we find no basis for the trial court's assertion of specific or general jurisdiction over NISA. Accordingly, we further conclude that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in overruling NISA's special appearance. In addition, we hold that the erroneous assertion of jurisdiction was so arbitrary and without regard to guiding principles as to place this case within the limited exception recognized in Canadian Helicopters, 876 S.W.2d at 308-09. The trial court was not faced with a voluminous record filled with contradictory evidence, but only with the plaintiffs' bare allegations of conspiracy lacking any evidence of conspiratorial acts in or directed to Texas. See id. at 309 (citing Lupo v. Lineberger, 313 Ark. 315, 855 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1993), which approved extraordinary relief where the undisputed facts in the record suggested no jurisdiction over the petitioner). There was thus no basis on which to assert specific jurisdiction. Moreover, NISA's contacts were not so continuous and systematic that the exercise of general jurisdiction could comport with the due process requirements of fair play and substantial justice. See Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 226 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76, 105 S.Ct. at 2183-84). In this case, the total and inarguable absence of jurisdiction justifies extraordinary relief. Canadian Helicopters, 876 S.W.2d at 309 (quoting Barnes v. Thomas, 96 Wash.2d 316, 635 P.2d 135, 136-37 (1981)). An ordinary appeal is inadequate to remedy the irreparable harm to NISA caused by the trial court's denial of the special appearance. See id. at 308-09. Because the traditional elements of personal jurisdiction are totally absent in this case, we conditionally grant NISA's petition for writ of mandamus. Writ will issue only if the trial court fails to withdraw the order overruling NISA's special appearance to sustain the same.