Opinion ID: 2906310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jeffrey St. John’s proposed jury instruction

Text: Next, we consider Jeffrey St. John’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to adopt his proposed jury instruction on the meaning of the word “willfully.” See United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1998) (“We review a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction only for an abuse of discretion.”). To prove health care fraud, the Government had to show that (1) [Jeffrey St. John] knowingly and willfully executed, or attempted to execute, a scheme or artifice (a) to defraud any health care benefit program or (b) to obtain by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises any money or property owned by or under the custody or control of a health care benefit program; and (2) the scheme or artifice was in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services. United States v. Whitfield, 485 F. App’x 667, 669–70 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a)). The district court instructed the jury that “willfully . . . 2 We also reject Jeffrey St. John’s argument that the rule of lenity counsels in favor of applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. The rule of lenity implements the “dueprocess principle that no individual [should] be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is prohibited. The rule of lenity . . . applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, [a court is] left with an ambiguous statute.” United States v. Rivera, 265 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (second and third alterations in original). “When Congress uses well-settled terminology of criminal law, its words are presumed to have their ordinary meaning and definition.” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997). As it is well-accepted that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply in the criminal context, we decline to interpret the health care fraud statute to state otherwise without statutory language to the contrary. See United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 20 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to expand the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to shield criminal conspiracy); United States v. Stevens, 909 F.2d 431, 432 (11th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1008 (1st Cir. 1984) (same), United States v. S & Vee Cartage Co., 704 F.2d 914, 920 (6th Cir. 1983) (same). 6 Case: 14-10406 Document: 00513187204 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 No. 14-10406 means that the act was committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.” Jeffrey St. John disagreed with the instruction, arguing that the court should have applied the heightened standard of willfulness required in criminal tax cases. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (“[T]he standard for the statutory willfulness requirement is the ‘voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.’”); see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 138 (1994) (applying the heightened standard to violations of a cash transaction reporting scheme). Jeffrey St. John’s requested instruction would require the Government to prove that he had actual knowledge of the underlying Medicare provision he was alleged to have violated and that he acted with specific intent to violate that provision. To prevail, Jeffrey St. John must demonstrate that the “requested instructions were (1) correct statements of the law, (2) not substantially covered in the charge as a whole, and (3) of such importance that the failure to instruct the jury on the issue seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to present a given defense.” Davis, 132 F.3d at 1094 (citation omitted). It is well established that “ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge.” Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 149. However, the Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception to this principle under certain complex statutory schemes, such as the tax code, reasoning that highly technical statutes may “ensar[e] individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct.” Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194 (1998). In those circumstances, the Court has held that a defendant acted “willfully” if the defendant was both aware of the underlying legal duty and intentionally violated that legal requirement. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 146–48. 7 Case: 14-10406 Document: 00513187204 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 No. 14-10406 While Jeffrey St. John draws parallels between the tax code and Medicare in their respective complexities, his argument is undermined by the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 146 (“Had Congress wished to dispense with the requirement [that the Defendant be aware his conduct was unlawful], it could have furnished the appropriate instruction.”). The statute criminalizing healthcare fraud, the offense of conviction, states that “a person need not have actual knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 1347(b); see Whitfield, 485 F. App’x at 670 (requiring the government to prove only that the defendant had knowledge of the Medicare fraud and the intent to further the fraud). In the face of this language, we conclude that Cheek’s rationale does not apply here such that the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Jeffrey St. John’s proposed instruction.