Opinion ID: 3004537
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: For use by an employer or its agent or

Text: insurer to obtain or verify information relating to a holder of a commercial driver’s license that is required under chapter 313 of title 49. (10) For use in connection with the opera- tion of private toll transportation facilities. (11) For any other use in response to re- quests for individual motor vehicle records if the State has obtained the express con- sent of the person to whom such personal information pertains. (12) For bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information per- tains. (13) For use by any requester, if the re- quester demonstrates it has obtained the written consent of the individual to whom the information pertains. (14) For any other use specifically autho- rized under the law of the State that holds the record, if such use is related to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). Against the backdrop of the general rule prohibiting disclosures in subsection (a), subsection (b) provides 16 No. 10-3243 both a category of mandatory disclosures and several categories of permissive disclosures. See Graczyk v. West Publ’g Co., 660 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 2011) (identifying the statute’s “countervailing purpose” as “allow[ing] legitimate users to access the records”). The permissive disclosures number fourteen in total and cover a range of purposes and recipients including public entities, insurers, licensed private investigators and certain commercial users such as bulk marketers. On appeal, the Village contends that the placement of the citation on Mr. Senne’s windshield was permitted under the statute either because the disclosure was “[f]or use by a[] . . . law enforcement agency[] in carrying out its functions,” id. § 2721(b)(1), or “[f]or use in connection with any civil[] . . . [or] administrative[] . . . proceeding . . ., including the service of process,” id. § 2721(b)(4). 1 1 The Village does not describe in any length how all the information printed on the ticket served either purpose; instead, it maintains, in effect, that the statute does not require that analysis. In the Village’s view, as long as it can identify a subsection of the law under which some disclosure is permitted, any disclosure of information otherwise protected by the statute is exempt, whether it serves an identified purpose or not. We cannot accept the Village’s position. As we already have explained, it is necessary to view each provision in context, with an eye toward its contribution to the 11 On appeal, the Village no longer asserts that any disclosure was permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(2). No. 10-3243 17 “overall statutory scheme.” See Smith, 255 F.3d at 448 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the statute’s purpose, clear from its language alone, is to prevent all but a limited range of authorized disclosures of information contained in individual motor vehicle records. It is necessary that we respect this textually explicit purpose as we evaluate the coverage of the exceptions within the statute’s broad mandate. Both of the exceptions that the Village identifies, along with most of the other exceptions in the statute, begin with the phrase “[f]or use.” In the Village’s view, these words supply no meaning to the statutory text other than to link grammatically the “may be disclosed” language in the introductory paragraph of § 2721(b) to the specific purposes and recipients identified in its subsections. We believe that this explanation is unsatisfactory. A basic canon of construction requires us to give meaning to every word of a statute. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). Moreover, and especially in light of the particular statutory structure here that sets forth such a broad prohibition against disclosure, the exceptions should not be read to eviscerate the rule they modify. The words “[f]or use” perform a critical function in the statute and contain the necessary limiting principle that preserves the force of the general prohibition while permitting the disclosures compatible with that prohibition. Specifically, when the statutory language says that a disclosure is authorized “[f]or use by a[] . . . law enforcement agency[] in carrying out its functions,” 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1) (emphasis added), that language means 18 No. 10-3243 that the actual information disclosed—i.e., the disclosure as it existed in fact—must be information that is used for the identified purpose. When a particular piece of disclosed information is not used to effectuate that purpose in any way, the exception provides no protection for the disclosing party. In short, an authorized recipient, faced with a general prohibition against further disclosure, can disclose the information only in a manner that does not exceed the scope of the authorized statutory exception. The disclosure actually made under the exception must be compatible with the purpose of the exception. Otherwise, the statute’s purpose of safeguarding information for security and safety reasons, contained in the general prohibition against disclosure, is frustrated. Another part of the statutory language supports our conclusion. As we have noted, the statute provides even greater protection to a special class of data referred to as “highly restricted personal information.” 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(2). Such information includes an individual’s social security number, photograph and medical or disability information. Id. § 2725(4). For this class of information, the statute allows for access under only four of the listed fourteen exceptions, including both the government function exception and the court process exception at issue in this case. Id. § 2721(a)(2) (listing as permissible uses those described in § 2721(b)(1) and (4)). Clearly, this section recognizes the government’s legitimate need for broader access to personal information than the statute otherwise provides. Nevertheless, it does not provide unlimited authority for law enforcement to access or No. 10-3243 19 disseminate the information. Instead, the statute merely allows that certain entities, including law enforcement, may both need and use more kinds of information than other authorized users, within the limitations of the existing exceptions. The fact that the statute maintains for highly restricted personal information the existing exceptions for use and dissemination provides further support for the view that the exceptions must be read narrowly. If, instead, we were to read the exceptions as broadly as the Village asserts, the effect of the “highly restricted personal information” section would be that the officer could have printed Mr. Senne’s photograph and social security number on the citation and left it open to public view. We decline to read this statute, with a chief aim of privacy protection, to allow such a dangerous result. See City of Chicago v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 423 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that we will not read a statute to thwart Congress’s manifest intent). We conclude that the text of the statute limits the content of authorized disclosures of protected information in motor vehicle records through its requirement, clear on its face, that any such disclosure be made “[f]or use” in effecting a particular purpose exempted by the Act.12 12 We pause to emphasize that we do not read “use” to mean “necessary use,” nor do we require the Village to adopt some form of “best practices” not commanded by the statute. 20 No. 10-3243