Opinion ID: 1100720
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in finding the statute of limitations had expired in this case.

Text: ¶ 14. Heard next asserts the trial court erred in finding the statute of limitations expired prior to service of process on Remy. Specifically, Heard maintains the statute of limitations did not run because the case was not dismissed prior to the service of process. Because Heard's analysis of the relevant law is incorrect, this issue is without merit. ¶ 15. It is true that Heard filed suit prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. However, we have previously held that [i]n the event the action is commenced within the period of limitation, the statute of limitations stops running, for a time.  Triple C Transp., Inc. v. Dickens, 870 So.2d 1195, 1199 (Miss.2004) (emphasis added) (citing Watters v. Stripling, 675 So.2d 1242, 1244 (Miss.1996)). If the defendant is not served during the 120-day service period, the statute begins to run again. Dickens, 870 So.2d at 1199-1200 (citing Holmes v. Coast Transit Auth., 815 So.2d 1183, 1185 (Miss.2002) (Filing of a complaint tolls the applicable statute of limitations 120 days, but if the plaintiff fails to serve process on the defendant within that 120-day period, the statute of limitations automatically begins to run again when that period expires.)). Heard failed to serve process within the time allowed by Rule 4(h), and thus the statute of limitations began to run at the conclusion of the 120-day period. ¶ 16. Heard cites Crumpton v. Hegwood, 740 So.2d 292 (Miss.1999), for the proposition that the statute of limitations does not begin to run again upon the expiration of the 120 days allowed for service of process unless the court dismisses the case for failure to serve process. Crumpton, however, makes no such finding. The case turned on the question of whether the plaintiff demonstrated good cause for failure to serve process during the 120-day period allowed by Rule 4(h). Id. at 295. Where good cause is shown for an extension of time to serve process, and process is served within the time allowed, the statute of limitations will be tolled during the extension period. Id. at 294. We remanded in Crumpton for a determination of whether the plaintiff had shown good cause for the extension. Id. at 295. ¶ 17. As we held in Crumpton, an extension of time to serve process continues to toll the statute of limitations only if granted for good cause. If service is made within the additional time, the statute of limitations will not be held to have expired. In the current case, however, the 120-day period expired prior to Heard's application for an extension of time. The trial court granted the requested extension without addressing either the issue of good cause or the issue of excusable neglect for failure to timely file the motion. The trial court later foundand we agreethat Heard did not show good cause for her failure to serve process on Remy. Thus, the statute of limitations began to run again after the initial 120-day service period, and it expired on February 1, 2005. ¶ 18. The trial court erred in granting an extension of time without first addressing the issue of good cause, as required by M.R.C.P. 4(h). [1] However, the trial court cured its own error by subsequently finding good cause had not been shown and the statute of limitations had expired. Therefore, Heard's second assignment of error is without merit.