Opinion ID: 1972350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Determination of a Remedy

Text: We have, then, concluded that preliminary hearings are covered by a trio of constitutional provisions, and that this particular closure was not justified. In short, error occurred. But before a remedy is indicated, a determination must be made as to whether the error was cured at the trial which followed the preliminary hearing. We must presume that the closure of appellant's preliminary hearing was prejudicial because the harm is by nature incalculable and unquantifiable. Knight, supra, 469 Pa. at 65, 364 A.2d at 906. The Third Circuit, in assessing the harm to the defendant whose pretrial hearing was closed held that a defendant who invokes the constitutional guarantee of a public trial need not prove actual prejudice. Such a requirement would in most cases deprive him of the guarantee, for it would be difficult to envisage a case in which he would have the evidence available of specific injury. U.S. ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, supra, 419 F.2d 599, 608 and 608 n. 30. An earlier Third Circuit Court of Appeals came to much the same conclusion in attempting to identify the consequences of this particular constitutional error. One of four defendants accused of Mann Act violations objected to the exclusion of the general public from lurid trial testimony concerning the sale of the defendant's eighteen-year-old niece into prostitution. After examining the historic and fundamental purposes behind the right to a public trial, the court granted a new trial to the protesting defendant. We are duty bound to preserve the right as it has been handed down to us and this we will do only if we make sure that it is enforced in every criminal case, even in such a sordid case as the one now before us. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 924 (1949). The same trial was procedurally fair to the three co-defendants who waived their right to a public trial, but was fundamentally unfair to the defendant, Elizabeth Kobli. The only difference between fairness and fundamental unfairness was that the defendant herself had not consented to waiving her constitutional right to a public trial. In Waller v. Georgia, supra , the Court observed that the harm of an improperly closed suppression hearing was unquantifiable; however, the injury still could be rectified. The Court closely fashioned the remedy to suit the harm and ordered a new suppression hearing, leading to a new trial only if the new suppression hearing yielded a new result. However, in this case, we perceive a fundamental difference between the harm of a closed suppression hearing and that from a closed preliminary hearing. The suppression hearing serves to answer the single question of whether the contested evidence or confession should be admitted at trial. Once admissibility is determined, the question is not addressed again during the trial. In contrast, the preliminary hearing takes a first look at the strength of the Commonwealth's evidence against the accused to determine whether the accused should be held for trial. The strength of the Commonwealth's overall case is again examined at the demurrer stage when the Commonwealth rests, and before the case goes to the jury. Each time, the Commonwealth must pass a more stringent test than the test of its prima facie case at the preliminary hearing. Finally, the Commonwealth must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt when the jury verdict is rendered. Thus, the essential question of the preliminary hearing  the examination of the strength of the Commonwealth's case  is answered at several later stages in the trial. Other pretrial hearing issues are not reexamined during the remainder of the trial. In Waller v. Georgia , the Supreme Court emphasized that the remedy must be closely fashioned to suit the harm. A new, public, suppression hearing was ordered, with a new trial only if the suppression hearing yielded a new result. But we think that ordering a new, public, preliminary hearing (and a new trial only if the hearing yielded a new result) would be an empty and futile remedy here. We find it extremely unlikely that once the Commonwealth had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it would fail to pass the prima facie test at the new preliminary hearing. If the new preliminary hearing somehow did yield a new result, it could only be that certain charges should be dropped, which could not warrant a new trial on those charges. Logically, a new preliminary hearing is foolish once the evidentiary trial is completed without reversible error. Since there was no reversible error in the trial held before the jury, we are loath to order a complete new trial. We see no reason to believe that the constitutional infirmity of the preliminary hearing infected the remainder of the trial. We note that appellant was not without remedy at the trial level nor will future defendants necessarily be denied a remedy. Defense counsel properly objected at the preliminary hearing, but did not petition for certification of an interlocutory order, or petition our Court pursuant to Chapter 15 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Either measure would have been appropriate to vindicate an important constitutional right. [6] Now that the entire trial is completed, we are unable to remedy the wrong. We conclude that there is presumed harm from an improperly closed preliminary hearing, but in this case we think that the harm was cured during the the public trial. We, therefore, find that no remedy is now necessary in this case, even though we find that appellant's constitutional rights were violated. Judgment of sentence affirmed. TAMILIA, J., concurs in the result.