Opinion ID: 1150220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants' convictions must be reversed in light of People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258

Text: As noted above, although defendants claim that their convictions are fatally flawed in a substantial number of respects, in view of this court's recent decision in People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258 we need only address defendants' principal claim of error, arising from the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from the jury. As we explain, under the circumstances of this case our holding in Wheeler clearly dictates a reversal of the convictions. In Wheeler, as in the instant matter, defendants in a criminal case maintained that the district attorney had violated defendants' constitutional right to a fair trial by jury by the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to exclude all qualified blacks from the jury solely on the basis of their race. (1) Grounding our decision on the relevant provision of our state Constitution, we sustained the defendants' claim, holding that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. (22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) Prior to our Wheeler decision, of course, it had long been clear that the federal Constitution prohibits a state from excluding individuals from a jury on the basis of their race. (See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia (1879) 100 U.S. 303 [25 L.Ed. 664]; Smith v. Texas (1940) 311 U.S. 128 [85 L.Ed. 84, 61 S.Ct. 164].) Wheeler established that under the California Constitution such racial exclusion is no less offensive when it is accomplished under the rubric of a peremptory challenge. In addition to establishing this fundamental constitutional principle, our Wheeler opinion went on to explain how, in practical terms, this constitutional principle is to be implemented. (2) We recognized that in any given instance the presumption must be that a party exercising a peremptory challenge is doing so on a constitutionally permissible ground. (22 Cal.3d at p. 278.) We stressed, however, that if the foregoing constitutional right [to a jury from which jurors have not been excluded because of group bias] is not to be nullified ( id. ), such a presumption must not be rendered realistically incapable of rebuttal. Rather it must be treated as a presumption which a defendant can, as a practical matter, overcome in a given case by reference to the circumstances of the particular jury selection process. Declining to adopt a standard under which the determination of whether or not a defendant has made out a prima facie case of unconstitutional conduct is wholly dependent upon the application of statistical decision theory ( id., at pp. 278-280), we concluded that in this setting it is preferable to rely on more traditional procedures ( id., at p. 280) in assessing the strength of the defendant's showing. (3) We described the contemplated procedure in some detail: If a party believes his opponent is using his peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the ground of group bias alone, he must raise the point in timely fashion and make a prima facie case of such discrimination to the satisfaction of the court. First, as in the case at bar, he should make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible. Second, he must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule. Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association rather than because of any specific bias. (4) We shall not attempt a compendium of all the ways in which a party may seek to make such a showing. For illustration, however, we mention certain types of evidence that will be relevant for this purpose. Thus the party may show that his opponent has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group. He may also demonstrate that the jurors in question share only this one characteristic  their membership in the group  and that in all other respects they are as heterogeneous as the community as a whole. Next, the showing may be supplemented when appropriate by such circumstances as the failure of his opponent to engage these same jurors in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all. Lastly, under Peters [v. Kiff (1972) 407 U.S. 493 (33 L.Ed.2d 83, 92 S.Ct. 2163)] and Taylor [v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522 (42 L.Ed.2d 690, 95 S.Ct. 692)] the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court's attention. (5) Upon presentation of this and similar evidence  in the absence, of course, of the jury  the court must determine whether a reasonable inference arises that peremptory challenges are being used on the ground of group bias alone.... [¶] If the court finds that a prima facie case has been made, the burden shifts to the other party to show if he can that the peremptory challenges in question were not predicated on group bias alone.... (Fns. omitted.) ( Id., at pp. 280-281.) (6) Under the guidelines established in Wheeler, [3] there can be no doubt but that the present defendants made out a prima facie case that the prosecution was exercising its peremptory challenges against black persons solely on the ground of group bias. As we have seen, defendants demonstrated at trial (1) that the district attorney utilized his peremptory challenge to remove every black individual, 14 in all, who was tentatively seated as either a regular or alternate juror; (2) that the excluded black jurors included both women and men, and specifically included a number of individuals whose background indicated that, absent their race, they would in all probability have been considered desirable jurors by the prosecutor; (3) that the district attorney had excluded many black persons after engaging in no more than desultory voir dire; and (4) finally, that, as in Wheeler, the defendants belonged to the group whose members the district attorney had excluded whereas the alleged victim [was] a member of the group to which [all] of the remaining jurors belong. ( Id., at p. 281.) (7) Despite this prima facie showing by defendants, the prosecutor came forward with no evidence or explanation to demonstrate that he had exercised the challenged peremptories on grounds that were reasonably relevant to the particular case on trial or its parties or witnesses. ( Id., at p. 282.) Instead, he took the position that no rebuttal was necessary. Under similar circumstances in Wheeler we held that [t]he trial court ... erred in ruling that the prosecutor was not required to respond to the allegation, and in denying defendants' motions without a rebuttal showing by the prosecutor that the challenges were each predicated on grounds of specific bias. [¶] The error is prejudicial per se.... (Fn. omitted.) ( Id., at p. 283.) Accordingly, under the clear dictates of Wheeler, we conclude that defendants' convictions must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. [4] The judgments are reversed.