Opinion ID: 1595696
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: heiser's testimony

Text: Caterpillar and General Motors argue that Heiser's testimony was not relevant and should not have been admitted. Both argue that because Heiser did not testify to a specific defect in the engine, the jury could conclude through improper inference that the problems Heiser had with the truck were related to the problems the Genettis had. Caterpillar additionally argues that because Heiser's testimony was admitted against General Motors only on the Warranty Act claim and that that claim was later dismissed, the district court erred in overruling their motions for a new trial. In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules apply, the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Nebraska Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only when the rules make such discretion a factor in determining admissibility. Nickell v. Russell, 260 Neb. 1, 614 N.W.2d 349 (2000); Snyder v. EMCASCO Ins. Co., 259 Neb. 621, 611 N.W.2d 409 (2000). Because the exercise of judicial discretion is implicit in determinations of relevancy and admissibility under Neb. Rev.Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1995), the trial court's decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See, Snyder, supra; Holden v. Wal-Mart Stores, 259 Neb. 78, 608 N.W.2d 187 (2000). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial judge's reasons or rulings are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted for disposition. Holden, supra . We have said that an issue as to the existence or occurrence of a particular fact, condition, or event may be proved by evidence as to the existence or occurrence of similar facts, conditions, or events under the same or substantially similar circumstances. Id. In this case, the Genettis offered Heiser's testimony to show that the engine in the truck broke down a fifth time in a manner that was the same or substantially similar to the previous breakdowns. Heiser testified that after he purchased the truck, he encountered problems where the truck lost power and smoked excessively. Later, the engine locked up and water came out of the exhaust pipe, and it was determined that the engine block on the truck was cracked between the cylinders. As a result, General Motors and/or Caterpillar replaced the engine under the truck's warranty. Thus, Heiser testified that the truck broke down in a same or substantially similar manner as it did during the first four breakdowns. Heiser's testimony was relevant to show that even after repairs were done to the truck in Colorado following the fourth breakdown, the truck still had an unrepaired defect. The testimony was also relevant to disprove allegations that the cause of the fourth breakdown was an overheating of the truck. By presenting evidence that the engine continued to fail in the same manner as it had before, a jury could infer that a defect that went undetected and unrepaired caused not only the fourth breakdown, but the breakdown Heiser encountered as well. As we have previously discussed, we do not require testimony of a specific or precise defect. Evidence of whether a defect continued in the truck and whether the fourth breakdown was caused by a defect as opposed to abuse or misuse of the truck was relevant to the Genettis' theories of recovery under both the Warranty Act and the U.C.C. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting Heiser's testimony. Because we conclude that the testimony was relevant under both of the Genettis' theories of recovery, we further conclude that the district court did not err in overruling Caterpillar's motion for a new trial.