Opinion ID: 2616600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Making sense of more recent precedent

Text: It appears, therefore, that the discrimination caused by the statutes in question falls under the rationale of Mahoney (1921) and Shattuck (1934). The Department, however, argues that recent authority supports its position. The patina of legislative acts and imprecise judicial language since Mahoney and Shattuck indeed may have obscured art. 9, § 1's protections. We have held that the legislature may divide similar property into different classes. Apache County, 106 Ariz. at 360, 476 P.2d at 661. Still, we have always insisted that there be a rational, discernable basis for the distinctions. Id. at 361-62, 476 P.2d at 662-63; People's Finance, 44 Ariz. at 445-46, 38 P.2d at 645. In Apache County, we held that property used in the railroad industry could be classified separately from similar property used in other industries, noting that a class may be the grouping together of ... things for a common purpose or it may be a ranking of ... things possessing the same attributes. 106 Ariz. at 359, 476 P.2d at 660. Assuming that the constitution's uniformity clause permits either categorization of property for purposes of ad valorem taxation, the Department's suggested distinctions in this case fit neither. These aircraft, whether owned by America West or other airlines, have the same physical attributes and are used in the same industry for the same purpose. By any rational standard, they appear to belong to one class and must, therefore, be taxed uniformly to give effect to art. 9, § 1. It is true that we have upheld rather finely spun classifications even though the uses were generally similar, as long as there was a dividing line. See, e.g., Department of Revenue v. Trico Electric Co-op, Inc., 151 Ariz. 544, 549, 729 P.2d 898, 903 (1986) (property of electric and gas distribution utilities could be separately classed and taxed differently from property of water and gas pipeline utilities). Trico 's result was based on our decision in Apache County that the legislature has the discretion to impose the burdens of government on property in proportion to use, productivity and utility of the property. 106 Ariz. at 361, 476 P.2d at 662. In Apache County, as in Trico, however, the basis for recognizing a separate class was the difference in the nature of the industries in which the property was put to use. Id. at 360-61, 476 P.2d at 661-62; Trico, 151 Ariz. at 548-49, 729 P.2d at 902-03. The present taxing scheme, however, far surpasses any Arizona precedent. Although Apache County and Trico may allow the legislature to place airline company property  a Ford truck, for instance  in one tax class, put identical railroad company property  the same Ford truck  in another, and tax them at different rates, we deal here with a statute creating different tax rates for property with similar physical attributes and productiveness, used the same way and for the same purpose by owners in the same industry. [4] If the uniformity requirement of the constitution has any meaning  and it must  this goes too far. See Minnesota Farmers, 176 N.W. at 757 (Differences between classes must not be so wanting in substance that the classification results in permitting one to escape a burden imposed on another under substantially similar circumstances and conditions.). In fact, our own Mahoney and Shattuck opinions would flatly forbid this result. However, we have never before been asked to review or approve a classification based on the size or value of an owner's other property.