Opinion ID: 2520120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Applicable law for determining any misconduct and prejudice

Text: We first determine whether there was any misconduct. Misconduct by a juror, or a nonjuror's tampering contact or communication with a sitting juror, usually raises a rebuttable `presumption' of prejudice. [Citations.] ( In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 295.) However, [t]he introduction of much of what might strictly be labeled `extraneous law' cannot be deemed misconduct. The jury system is an institution that is legally fundamental but also fundamentally human. Jurors bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters of law and fact that find their source in everyday life and experience. That they do so is one of the strengths of the jury system. It is also one of its weaknesses; it has the potential to undermine determinations that should be made exclusively on the evidence introduced by the parties and the instructions given by the court. Such a weakness, however, must be tolerated. `[I]t is an impossible standard to require ... [the jury] to be a laboratory, completely sterilized and freed from any external factors.' ( Rideau v. Louisiana (1963) 373 U.S. 723, 733, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (dis. opn. of Clark, J.).) Moreover, under that `standard' few verdicts would be proof against challenge. ( People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 950, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676.) The safeguards of juror impartiality ... are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. ( Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78.) If we conclude there was misconduct, we then consider whether the misconduct was prejudicial. This standard is well established. [W]hen misconduct involves the receipt of information from extraneous sources, the effect of such receipt is judged by a review of the entire record, and may be found to be nonprejudicial. The verdict will be set aside only if there appears a substantial likelihood of juror bias. Such bias can appear in two different ways. ( Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 653, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) First, we will find bias if the extraneous material, judged objectively, is inherently and substantially likely to have influenced the juror. ( Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 653, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) Under this standard, a finding of `inherently' likely bias is required when, but only when, the extraneous information was so prejudicial in context that its erroneous introduction in the trial itself would have warranted reversal of the judgment. Application of this `inherent prejudice' test obviously depends upon a review of the trial record to determine the prejudicial effect of the extraneous information. ( Ibid. ) Second, even if the extraneous information was not so prejudicial, in and of itself, as to cause `inherent' bias under the first test, the nature of the misconduct and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the misconduct must still be examined to determine objectively whether a substantial likelihood of actual bias nonetheless arose. ( Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 653-654, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) Under this second, or `circumstantial,' test, the trial record is not a dispositive consideration, but neither is it irrelevant. All pertinent portions of the entire record, including the trial record, must be considered. `The presumption of prejudice may be rebutted, inter alia, by a reviewing court's determination, upon examining the entire record, that there is no substantial likelihood that the complaining party suffered actual' bias. ( Id. at p. 654, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) The judgment must be set aside if the court finds prejudice under either test. ( Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 653, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) Whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct ... is a mixed question of law and fact subject to an appellate court's independent determination. ( People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 582, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87 ( Nesler ) (lead opn. of George, C.J.).) However, [w]e accept the trial court's credibility determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence. ( Ibid. ) We emphasize that before a unanimous verdict is set aside, the likelihood of bias under either test must be substantial .... [T]he criminal justice system must not be rendered impotent in quest of an ever-elusive perfection. The jury system is fundamentally human, which is both a strength and a weakness. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 950, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676.) Jurors are not automatons. They are imbued with human frailties as well as virtues. If the system is to function at all, we must tolerate a certain amount of imperfection short of actual bias. To demand theoretical perfection from every juror during the course of a trial is unrealistic. ( Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 654-655, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.)