Opinion ID: 2442854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Administrative Mandamus

Text: Shore Lands argues that the Council would be subject to a writ of administrative mandamus issued by the Circuit Court. Administrative mandamus proceedings are governed by Maryland Rules 7-401 through 7-403. This is our first occasion to comment explicitly on these rules, which entered our canon in 2006, although this Court has long acknowledged the concept of administrative mandamus as an extension of the common law writ of mandamus. See Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379, 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945) (holding that courts have the inherent power, through the writ of mandamus ... to correct abuses of discretion committed by administrative agencies); see also Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 610-13, 937 A.2d 242, 256-57 (2007) (discussing review of administrative agency decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act). Maryland Rule 7-401 outlines the requirements for a writ of administrative mandamus: Rule 7-401. General Provisions. (a) Applicability. The rules in this Chapter govern actions for judicial review of a quasi-judicial order or action of an administrative agency where review is not expressly authorized by law. (b) Definition. As used in this Chapter, administrative agency means any agency, board, department, district, commission, authority, Commissioner, official, or other unit of the State or of a political subdivision of the State. (Emphasis removed.) The plain language of the Rule dictates that in order for administrative mandamus to lie in any given case, the underlying action being reviewed must be quasi-judicial in nature, where quasi-judicial action is synonymous with administrative adjudication, see Maryland Overpak, 395 Md. at 33 n. 14, 909 A.2d at 245 n. 14, and contrasts with legislative action. We are thus faced with the same issue presented in our discussion of the Miles Point property: whether the Council's action in rejecting Shore Lands's application is legislative in nature. We reiterate that it is not a hearing's focus on a particular parcel of land that proves the hearing was quasi-judicial in nature, but rather that the matter taken up at the hearing is disposed of based on the unique characteristics of that property. Md. Overpak, 395 Md. at 39, 909 A.2d at 248-49. The greater a decision-maker's reliance on specific facts relating to a parcel of land, the more likely that the decision made is adjudicatory in nature. See Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. at 712, 376 A.2d at 497. Decisions that are largely predicated on general facts, and on issues of law and policy, are legislative in nature. Id. An examination of the Council's findings of fact regarding the Shore Lands property shows that the Council based its decision largely on legislative facts. The Council discusses the Shore Lands property at the beginning of its findings, including the history of Shore Lands's application and the classification history of the parcel itself. After this initial assessment, however, the Council leaves behind its property-specific discussion, and segues into a larger discussion of the Talbot County Plan. Unlike its analysis of the Miles Point property and the development proposal for that property, the Council did not focus on the County's sewage processing infrastructure in considering Shore Lands's application. Indeed, the Council found that adequate capacity apparently exists to serve the [Shore Lands] property with sewer and water and necessary infrastructure is located adjacent to the property.... Rather, the Council found that reclassification of the Shore Lands property as currently zoned would be inconsistent with the State Smart Growth Law ... and potentially problematic in terms of the Town of Easton's [funding agreements] with the State of Maryland. The Council also found that the Plan specifically discourages development of properties in growth areas at `low septic system densities[,]' and that reclassification would run afoul of this strategic goal. The Council further noted that the Talbot County Planning Commission had found that reclassification of the Shore Lands property would be inconsistent with the Plan. Specifically, the Council acknowledged the Commission's understanding that the development of the property under an A-1 zoning would violate the recommendations related to density in growth areas [by promoting] rural or suburban densities within the Town growth area. The Council found that the Public Works Advisory Board also opposed reclassification. Ultimately, the Council concluded that reclassification would not provide for the orderly expansion and extension of water and sewer service in a manner consistent with both County and Town comprehensive land use plans[,] and that the existing classification was most consistent with the orderly expansion and extension of such services. At no point during the findings of fact leading to this conclusion did the Council indicate a focus on the unique characteristics of the Shore Lands property. Rather, the Council directed its attention to matters of law and policy, including the long-range development strategy of Talbot County. Significantly, reclassification of any A-1 zoned property in Easton's growth area would have proved incompatible with the County's long-range plans. These aspects of the decision-making process are all consonant with legislative action, and not adjudicatory action. Again, the impact on the Shore Lands property does not make the action adjudicatory (or quasi-judicial, in the words of Maryland Rule 7-401). See Bucktail, 352 Md. at 545, 723 A.2d at 447 (holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether a decision adversely affects an individual piece of property but whether the decision itself is made on individual or general grounds.). Because the Council's action was not quasi-judicial in nature, administrative mandamus will not lie in this case, and the Circuit Court was correct in dismissing Shore Lands's complaint.