Opinion ID: 218954
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Third Circuit Remand

Text: In Yusupov I, this court did not comment regarding the sufficiency of the evidence as to whether either Petitioner falls within the national security exception. Rather, we limited our decision to an interpretation of the statutory language that provides withholding of removal is unavailable if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States. INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv). We deferred to the Attorney General's interpretation that reasonable grounds to believe is satisfied if there is information that would permit a reasonable person to believe, a standard akin to probable cause in criminal cases. Yusupov I, 518 F.3d at 200. In addition, we found that the Attorney General was reasonable to interpret the exception as allowing the consideration of any evidence that is not intrinsically suspect, including evidence that would not be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. (internal quotation omitted). However, as relevant here, we overruled the Attorney General's reading of the statutory phrase is a danger as requiring merely that an alien may pose a danger. Id. at 201. Instead, we held that the provision applies only to individuals who actually pose a danger, reasoning that the term is simply does not mean `may.' Id. We refrained from determining the contours of risk to our Nation's defense, foreign relations, or economic interests that would pose the requisite danger, deferring to the Attorney General's interpretation that the danger must be nontrivial. Id. We found the standard includes an inherent seriousness requirement. Id. at 204 (noting that the Attorney General was not unreasonable ... to ensure that immigration judges do not consider trivial dangers in applying the national security exception). This court remanded to the BIA for application of the correct standard.