Opinion ID: 2714924
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Preparation ofDr. Ophovenfor Trial

Text: Gomez finally argues that Moser's trial preparation ofDr. Ophoven fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because he failed to provide her with necessary medical records on time and inform her of the elements of homicide by abuse. Gomez's complaints about Moser's preparation of Dr. Ophoven appear to fall into two categories: (a) Moser's general preparation of Dr. Ophoven for trial and (b) Moser's alleged failure to prevent Dr. Ophoven from conceding abuse at trial. Both are unfounded. a. Moser's General Preparation of Dr. Ophoven for Trial Gomez claims that her trial was prejudiced because her expert, Dr. Ophoven, believed that CPS had confirmed a history of abuse when in fact CPS had investigated but never confirmed the allegations. This is based on Dr. Ophoven's declaration that reads in part, Given what I understood to be confirmed prior physical abuse resulting in longstanding CPS involvement, I gave the manner of death as 'undetermined.' Without the prior abuse, I would have classified the manner of death as 'natural.' App. 58, at 4. Gomez reads 25 In re Pers. Restraint of Gomez No. 86711-9 this to mean that Dr. Ophoven would have concluded that the cause of death was natural had she known that abuse was never officially confirmed by CPS. This interpretation is reaching and disregards much of the trial record and other portions of Dr. Ophoven's declaration. For example, one paragraph earlier, Dr. Ophoven declared that[ d]espite the history of abuse, this was a relatively straightforward asphyxiation case. !d. at 3. This indicates that Dr. Ophoven recognizes the history of abuse in this case. Consequently, Gomez's reading of her previous statement is inconsistent with the record. Instead, the only reasonable interpretation of her statement is this: had the records indicated no prior abuse, she could have testified that the death was natural. However, Dr. Ophoven testified at trial that the medical records did reflect abuse. Dr. Ophoven's report indicates that she noted abuse based on [t]his constellation of traumatic injuries-not the CPS reports. App. 19, at 8. Accordingly, we have no reason to believe that Dr. Ophoven would testify any differently today than she did in 2007. This is especially clear given that her testimony at trial regarding abuse was based almost entirely on her review of the medical records such as histological slides and x-rays rather than CPS reports. This confirms that even if Moser was at fault for Dr. Ophoven's misunderstanding about the history of abuse, Gomez cannot prove prejudice. 26 In re Pers. Restraint of Gomez No. 86711-9 Gomez also contends that Moser's preparation of Dr. Ophoven was deficient because he did not provide her with materials in a timely fashion. However, a thorough review of the trial record does not support such a conclusion. Even if Moser's preparation of Dr. Ophoven was deficient, Gomez cannot show prejudice. By the time of her testimony, Dr. Ophoven had received all the necessary material, created a full report, and provided adequate medical testimony on behalf of the defendant. In support of the proposition that Moser's preparation of Dr. Ophoven was deficient, Gomez quotes Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267, 1278 (9th Cir. 1997): Where defense counsel's only expert 'requests relevant information which is readily available, counsel inexplicably does not even attempt to provide it, and counsel then presents the expert's flawed testimony at trial, counsel's performance is deficient.' Am. Opening Br. ofPet'r at 67. Bloom is readily distinguishable from this case. In Bloom, the court found ineffective assistance of counsel where the defense attorney did virtually nothing to obtain an expert witness until a few days before trial. Bloom, 132 F.3d at 1271. In fact, counsel failed to contact the expert or file the court paperwork appointing him as a witness. This was discovered less than three weeks before trial by a law student working with counsel. ld. 27 In re Pers. Restraint of Gomez No. 86711-9 Counsel then did almost nothing to prepare the witness. The expert was never given a theory of the case or the materials he needed. In fact, there was significant evidence readily available to trial counsel, such as previous psychiatric reports, which was never discovered or given to the expert. Id. at 1274. The result was a severely damaging psychiatric report that the prosecution used against Bloom. Id. at 1271. The Ninth Circuit has since distinguished Bloom in a case much more akin to this one. In Raley v. nst, 470 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2006), the court rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as to the guilt phase of a murder trial where defense counsel conducted a reasonable investigation and made a reasonable, strategic decision not to present expert testimony regarding a mental defect claim. Counsel had consulted three different mental health experts and determined that their testimony would not be beneficial to the defendant. The court also rejected the petitioner's claim that defense counsel failed to provide the experts with enough information about his childhood to support an informed expert opinion. !d. at 801. Here, Moser originally contacted Dr. Ophoven in June of 2005, nearly two years before trial. Moser provided the bulk of material to Dr. Ophoven in January 2006, over a year before trial. Although Dr. Ophoven may have 28 In re Pers. Restraint of Gomez No. 86711-9 received some materials such as histological slides inconveniently close to her testimony, she was able to review them, write a complete report, and provide adequate testimony on behalf of the defendant. Accordingly, Moser's alleged ' failure to provide materials in a timely fashion does not constitute ineffective assistance. b. Moser's Alleged Failure To Prevent Dr. Ophoven from Conceding Abuse at Trial Gomez claims that Moser failed to discover and correct Dr. Ophoven's misunderstanding regarding the question of abuse. This supposedly led to Dr. Ophoven conceding that Rafael was an abused child at trial. Gomez is unable to prove that Moser deficiently prepared Dr. Ophoven for several reasons. Even if Moser failed to correct Dr. Ophoven's misunderstanding that the history of abuse had been officially confirmed by CPS, it in no way prejudiced Gomez's defense. Dr. Ophoven's passing references to abuse were most certainly warranted given the record that she reviewed. These references to abuse were de minimis amid her medical opinions, as well as in light of the testimony of many other witnesses. Most importantly, Gomez errs when she contends that Dr. Ophoven conceded an element of the crime. This assertion is a misstatement of the law. Abuse is not an element of homicide by abuse. 29 In re Pers. Restraint of Gomez No. 86711-9 At trial, Dr. Ophoven testified under oath that she detected a pattern of abuse when she reviewed the records. This testimony could not have prejudiced Gomez given that abuse is not an element of the crime of homicide by abuse. In explaining what she meant by abuse, Dr. Ophoven testified that it is [a] child that's been hurt by their caregivers in a context of what I would consider to be inappropriate or criminal behavior. But I can't say who. I just said somebody has been hurting the child. 11 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Mar. 5, 2007) at 2317. She then testified that her definition of abuse is broad enough to include neglect. Notably, Moser made it abundantly clear in closing argument that the defense did not concede the perpetration of either assault or abuse by Gomez. It is true that Dr. Ophoven testified that she detected a pattern of abuse when reviewing the records in preparation for trial. She further testified that her definition of abuse is broad enough to include neglect. However, she did not testify that she noted a pattern of assaults or torture. Under the homicide by abuse statute, the relevant element of the crime is just that: a pattern or practice of assault or torture. RCW 9A.32.055(1 ). It is indisputable that assault is distinct from abuse under Washington law. See RCW 26.44.020(1) (defining abuse or neglect); c.f RCW 9A.36.011-.041 30 In re Pers. Restraint of Gomez No. 86711-9 (defining assault in the first, second, third, and fourth degrees); RCW 9A.36.120-.140 (defining assault of a child in the first, second, and third degrees). The trial judge, sitting as the trier of fact, carefully parsed through the different definitions and applied the correct one. Given that, even if Dr. Ophoven' s testimony could be attributed to some deficiency on counsel's part, Gomez has not shown a reasonable probability that the result would be different. Under RCW 9A.32.055(1), A person is guilty of homicide by abuse if, under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, the person causes the death of a child ... , and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of said child. (Emphasis added.) The name of this crime-homicide by abuse-is somewhat of a misnomer, as was noted by the trial court. See VRP (Mar. 28, 2007) at 12. In other words, although the crime is called homicide by abuse, abuse is not actually an element of the crime. Under our law, abuse can be something very different from assault and torture. Commendably, Judge Antosz acknowledged this distinction several times in his verdict: 31 In re Pers. Restraint of Gomez No. 86711-9 [I]fyou look at the definition of abuse [it] is a different concept [from assault]. It doesn't require an intent to harm. Abuse or neglect can be simply the result of not laying hands on a child. It can be the result of leaving a child in a dangerous position and causing harm. So this is a different test than just simply of was there ... abuse here. !d. Notably, Judge Antosz explained, [S]ome physicians testified that they were clear acts of abuse. And, again, that's not the test. It's not abuse. It's whether they were assaults. I d. at 29; see also id. at 40 (So, for instance, when the experts testify that abuse occurred, the Court has to go further than that to determine if assault occurred. Every assault is an abuse. Not every act of abuse is an assault.). Judge Antosz further explained his belief that the Court must look at each injury individually and determine whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assaults. I d. at 19. With this in mind, Judge Antosz determined that the upper arm injury, occipital fracture and epidural hemorrhage, bruised/gouged ear injuries, and lacerated nipples were all the result of assaults by Gomez. These excerpts from Judge Antosz's verdict are especially crucial because this was a bench trial-not a jury trial. The transcript provides an 32 In re Pers. Restraint of Gomez No. 86711-9 accurate accounting of what Judge Antosz considered when rendering his decision. Because this was a bench trial, we can be certain that there was no confusion regarding the abuse/assault distinction. We know this because Judge Antosz made an outstanding record on the point. This further supports the conclusion that Gomez was not prejudiced by Dr. Ophoven's concession of abuse. Moser's alleged failure to prevent Dr. Ophoven from conceding abuse at trial did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Moser's preparation of Dr. Ophoven fell within the acceptable range of professionally competent behavior. Moreover, based on the record at hand, it is apparent that Dr. Ophoven's testimony regarding previous abuse did not prejudice Gomez. This is evident because abuse is not an element ofhomicide by abuse, and Judge Antosz made it abundantly clear that he understood and respected this distinction.