Opinion ID: 167914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statistical E vidence - G eneral Principles

Text: Statistical evidence is an acceptable, and comm on, m eans of proving disparate im pact. See, e.g., Sandoval v. City of Boulder, 388 F.3d 1312, 1326 (10th Cir. 2004); Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1312 (“As is typical in disparate im pact cases, [plaintiff] relies on statistical evidence to establish her prim a facie case.”); M ountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1251 (10th Cir. 1995) (“In Title VII em ploym ent discrim ination cases, plaintiffs m ay rely solely on a statistical showing of disparate effect to establish a prim a facie case of disparate im pact.”). The statistics m ust, however, relate to the proper population. For example, when the claim is disparate im pact in hiring, the statistics should be based on data with respect to persons qualified for the job. See W ards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-51 (“It is such a com parison— between the racial composition of the qualified persons in the labor m arket and the persons holding at-issue jobs— that generally form s the proper basis for the initial inquiry in a disparate-im pact case.”); see also Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1314 (“[Plaintiff’s] applicant pool was appropriately limited to persons w ho sought out and were at least m inimally qualified for the position . . . .”). The same requirement applies to other job benefits. See Crum, 198 F.3d at 1309, 1312 (relating to alleged discrim ination in “layoffs, recalls from layoffs, term inations, discipline, hiring, rehiring, -25- evaluations, com pensation, transfers, job duty assignm ents, recruitment, screening, selection procedures, denial of prom otions, demotions, rollbacks, sick leave, subjective decision-m aking practices, and other term s and conditions of em ploym ent” (internal quotation m arks om itted)). The essential requirem ent is that the data concern those persons subject to the challenged em ploym ent practice. After specifying the employm ent practice allegedly responsible for excluding m em bers of their protected class from a benefit, plaintiffs m ust identify the correct population for analysis. In the typical disparate im pact case the proper population for analysis is the applicant pool or the eligible labor pool. The com position of this population is com pared to the com position of the em ployer's workforce in a relevant m anner, depending on the nature of the benefit sought. Smith, 196 F.3d at 368. W hen the selection process is only partially subjective, a disparate-im pact plaintiff should control for the constraints placed upon the decisionm aker’s discretion. See Anderson v. W estinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 266-67 (4th Cir. 2005); cf. W atson v. Fort W orth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“Especially in cases where an em ployer com bines subjective criteria w ith the use of m ore rigid standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in our view responsible for isolating and identifying the specific em ploym ent practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.”). -26- To be sure, the population selected for statistical analysis need not perfectly m atch the pool of qualified persons. Such perfection m ay be impossible to obtain. W hen reliable data regarding that pool are unavailable, a different population m ay be used if it adequately reflects the population of qualified persons. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. W illborn, The Statistics of Discrim ination § 5.04 (2002) (“In som e instances, where applicant data are not available, reliable, or are believed to be biased, and where statistical inform ation regarding the labor m arket is difficult to ascertain, the general population m ight adequately reflect the population of qualified job applicants.”); see also M alave v. Potter, 320 F.3d 321, 326-27 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t was error [to reject] out of hand [Plaintiff’s] statistical analysis sim ply because it failed to conform to the preferred m ethodology described in W ards Cove, given the Suprem e Court’s express endorsement in that decision of alternative methodologies if the preferred statistics are ‘difficult’ or ‘im possible’ to obtain.”); cf. Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (in disparate-treatment case brought before the Civil Rights A ct of 1991, “plaintiffs cannot legitim ately be faulted for gaps in their statistical analysis when the inform ation necessary to close those gaps was possessed only by defendants and was not furnished either to plaintiffs or to the Court” (internal quotation m arks om itted)), vacated on other grounds by Lehman v. Trout, 465 U.S. 1056 (1984), and abrogated on other grounds by Berger v. Iron W orkers Reinforced Rodmen, Local 201, 170 F.3d 1111, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. -27- 1999). For example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U .S. 321 (1977), the Suprem e Court determ ined that plaintiffs who were challenging Alabama’s height and weight requirements for prison guards could use height and weight statistics based on national data for com parison. “[R ]eliance on general population dem ographic data was not m isplaced where there was no reason to suppose that physical height and weight characteristics of Alabama men and wom en differ m arkedly from those of the national population.” Id. at 330. Nevertheless, absent a close fit between the population used to m easure disparate im pact and the population of those qualified for a benefit, the statistical results cannot be persuasive. “[S]tatistics based on an applicant pool containing individuals lacking m inim al qualifications for the job would be of little probative value.” W atson, 487 U.S. at 997. Thus, a statistical analysis cannot establish a plaintiff’s prim a facie case unless it is based on data restricted to qualified em ployees, or (1) reliable data with respect to that group are unavailable and (2) the plaintiff establishes that the statistical analysis uses a reliable proxy for qualification. This approach holds plaintiffs to their statutory burden to “dem onstrate[] that a respondent uses a particular em ploym ent practice that causes a disparate im pact on the basis of . . . -28- sex,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A )(i), without imposing an insurm ountable burden when reliable data on a qualification are not available. 2