Opinion ID: 56906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion To Recall

Text: We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a § 2255 motion as second or successive. McIver v. United States, 307 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). While Holt contends that his Motion to Recall is not a § 2255 motion, federal courts “have an obligation to look behind the label of a motion filed by a pro se inmate and determine whether the motion is, in effect, cognizable under a different remedial statutory framework,” United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 624-25 3 (11th Cir. 1990) (affirming a district court order which treated a motion filed under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) as a successive § 2255 motion). The district court properly determined that Holt’s Motion To Recall was in reality a successive § 2255 motion. Holt insists in his reply brief that his Motion to Recall is not a § 2255 motion but “one of jurisdictional character” or in the alternative, a violation of his constitutional rights, Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2, 3, yet both arguments fall within § 2255's ambit: A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 1 (emphasis added). In addition to the jurisdictional and constitutional claims, Holt also argued in his Motion to Recall that the district court retained broad inherent authority to recall an imposed sentence. We rejected a prisoner’s argument that the district court had inherent authority to resentence him in United States v. Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2002). We stated that a district court could modify a sentence only through Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, or “to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute.” Id. at 1315-16 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582). A 4 district court only retains jurisdiction to modify a sentence on a defendant’s motion for seven days after the imposition of sentence. Rule 35(a); Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d at 1317. The notes to the 1991 Amendments to Rule 35 explicitly contemplate that a defendant detained pursuant to an illegal sentence “could seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 if the seven day period provided in [Rule 35(a)] has elapsed.” Id. at 1316 (quoting Rule 35 advisory committee notes (1991)). Our opinion in DiazClark makes clear that a district court’s authority to modify a current criminal sentence is restricted to Rule 35 or § 2255. Because the seven-day period for modifying a sentence had elapsed here, § 2255 was the only available statutory basis for the relief sought by Holt. Our 2005 Holt opinion made clear that common law relief is not available where post-conviction relief is available through § 2255 as it is here. Holt, 417 F.3d at 1175. Therefore Holt’s only avenue of relief for these claims is through § 2255, which encompasses all of his arguments. The district court properly construed Holt’s Motion To Recall as a § 2255 motion. Because Holt had not received prior authorization from us under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), the district court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a second or successive § 2255 motion. See Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Accordingly, we affirm the 5 district court’s order dismissing Holt’s Motion To Recall.