Opinion ID: 773394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Kimel

Text: 15 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kimel, plaintiffs had prevailed in this action. Regarding the sequence of events relative to a Supreme Court pronouncement, when that Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review. Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). 16 The Eleventh Amendment provides The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 17 U.S. Const. amend. XI. That Amendment bars suits that seek either money damages, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (recognizing that a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment), or injunctive relief, see Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1982) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment by its terms clearly applies to a suit seeking an injunction). 18 Although sovereign immunity extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment to bar a citizen from suing his own state under federal question jurisdiction, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890), there are two recognized exceptions to the bar: when Congress authorizes such a suit through enforcement of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and where a state consents to being sued. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post-secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). Kimel examines the first exception with respect to the ADEA. 19 To determine whether Congress properly abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, two questions are asked. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73. First, did Congress unequivocally express its intent to abrogate immunity? And second, did Congress act pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority? Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 59 (1996). The Supreme Court answered the first question yes, saying that the plain language of the ADEA clearly demonstrates Congress' intent to subject the States to suit for money damages at the hands of individual employees. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 74. But the answer to the second question was no. 20 The Supreme Court had previously ruled that the ADEA's embrace of state governments within its ambit was constitutional as an exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause powers under Article I of the Constitution. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983). Kimel, however, reaffirmed the holding of Seminole Tribe that Article I [did] not include the power to subject States to suit at the hands of private individuals. 528 U.S. at 80. The Court therefore turned its attention to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment where it applied a congruence and proportionality test to decide whether a federal statute is appropriate remedial legislation or improper legislation that purports to redefine the Fourteenth Amendment right at issue. Id. at 81-82. Because age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection clause, states may discriminate on the basis of age if the age classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 83. 21 Surveying cases in which states were found not to have violated the Equal Protection clause by relying on broad generalizations regarding age, the Supreme Court observed that it is clear that the ADEA is'so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.' Id. at 86 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)). Nothing in the legislative history of the ADEA, the Court continued, indicated Congress had identified a pattern of age discrimination by the states, or that any discrimination rose to the level of a constitutional violation. Id. at 89-91. Hence, it concluded: 22 In light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive requirements, and the lack of evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age discrimination by the States, we hold that the ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ADEA's purported abrogation of the States' sovereign immunity is accordingly invalid. 23 Id. at 91. 24 Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Kimel by seizing upon the opinion's language reviewing the rational relationship test under the Equal Protection clause and the ADEA's legislative history. Plaintiffs highlight defendants' willful violations of the ADEA. Yet, while no one disputes the willful nature of defendants' actions, the Supreme Court made clear that ADEA violations do not necessarily translate into violations of the Equal Protection clause. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86 (The [ADEA], through its broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating factor, prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.). 25 Pressing their argument, plaintiffs maintain that defendants' calculation of death benefits is a form of age discrimination with no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Even assuming defendants' conduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation, such would not show a pattern of unconstitutional age discrimination by the states across the nation sufficient to justify the broad prohibitions in the ADEA. Moreover, nothing in Kimel suggests sovereign immunity is limited under the ADEA should a state engage in age discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection clause. Rather, the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that the ADEA does not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity. Id. at 92. 26 Consequently, while an aggrieved party can pursue avenues other than the ADEA when faced with age discrimination, see id. at 91-92 & n., it clearly cannot mount an ADEA claim against a state without its consent in federal court, see id. at 73 ([T]he Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against non-consenting States.). Since plaintiffs in this case assert federal question jurisdiction premised solely on the ADEA, they may continue their suit only if defendants waived immunity. We turn next to that issue.