Opinion ID: 2510247
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: attempted voluntary manslaughter jury instruction

Text: {8} Defendant was charged with attempt to commit murder against Washington. While the parties and the court were settling jury instructions, Defendant's attorney tendered an instruction entitled attempt to commit the crime of manslaughter. However, the tendered instruction included only the elements for an attempt to commit a felony instruction. See UJI 14-2801 NMRA (requiring the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant intended to commit the crime; (2) the defendant began to do an act which constituted a substantial part of the crime but failed to commit the crime; and (3) the attempt took place on a certain date). Defendant argued below, and now argues on appeal, that because the court was going to instruct the jury on attempted second-degree murder, there was evidence of sufficient provocation to entitle him to an instruction on attempted manslaughter.
{9} The State's primary argument is that Defendant failed to properly preserve this issue for review because his tendered instruction was an incorrect statement of the law. The instruction tendered by the Defendant was for attempt to commit the crime of manslaughter. Thus, the State contends that since attempted manslaughter is not a crime in New Mexico, the tendered instruction was an incorrect statement of the law. Defendant claims that it was clear from the discussions that the attorneys and the judge knew he was asking for an attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction. The State points out that Defendant also did not tender an instruction defining the elements of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The trial court indicated that aggravated battery was the appropriate instruction and refused the tendered instruction. {10} Generally, to preserve error on a trial court's refusal to give a tendered instruction, the Appellant must tender a legally correct statement of the law. State v. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 54, 126 N.M. 646, 974 P.2d 140. However, if the record reflects that the judge clearly understood the type of instruction the Defendant wanted and understood the tendered instruction needed to be modified to correctly state the law, then the issue is deemed preserved for appellate review. Hill, 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 7, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139. The rationale for allowing such flexibility regarding preservation is reinforced by the actual purpose of Rule 5-608(D) NMRA, [3] which is to alert the trial court to the defendant's argument. See Hill, 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 7, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139. {11} The record in this case demonstrates that the judge understood Defendant was asking for an attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction. See id. The following discussion took place with respect to Defendant's requested instruction number 10, attempt to commit the crime of manslaughter: Ms. Stevens (State's Attorney): I would strongly object to that. Manslaughter is simplyit's second-degree murder reduced because of provocation. There wouldn't be an attempted manslaughter. Would be an aggravated battery. Which is that he knew his acts created a strong probability of great bodily harm. That's aggravated battery. Mr. Mitchell (Defendant's Attorney): And I think in that instance manslaughter applies. And besides this is a case regarding provocation. Ms. Stevens: If you read the elements of manslaughter, though, there's no way to commit attempted manslaughter. Without it simply being aggravated battery. The Court: [A]ggravated battery ... most accurately covers that situation. Rather than attempt to commit manslaughter a more appropriate (inaudible) would be aggravated battery. Defense requested instruction number 10 will be refused. Because voluntary manslaughter is second-degree murder committed with sufficient provocation, UJI 14-220 NMRA; see also State v. Gaitan, 2002-NMSC-007, ¶ 11, 131 N.M. 758, 42 P.3d 1207, Ms. Stevens' comment that [m]anslaughter is simplyit's second-degree murder reduced because of provocation demonstrates that the State understood the discussion was about voluntary manslaughter. Additionally, Defendant's attorney stated this was a case about provocation. Because the parties were discussing the tendered instruction in the context of the issue of provocation, it is clear the judge understood Defendant was asking for an instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter. {12} The fact that Defendant tendered a separate instruction for attempt to commit the crime of involuntary manslaughter is further evidence that the court understood Defendant was also asking for an instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter. New Mexico recognizes two types of manslaughter: voluntary and involuntary. NMSA 1978, § 30-2-3 (1994); State v. Alvarado, 1997-NMCA-027, ¶ 3, 123 N.M. 187, 936 P.2d 869. Because New Mexico only recognizes two types of manslaughter, and in light of the additional instruction for attempted involuntary manslaughter requested by the Defendant, it is only logical that the court and the parties understood that Defendant's requested instruction number 10, attempt to commit the crime of manslaughter, was an instruction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. Defendant's tendered instruction was not refused because Defendant failed to include the word voluntary, but rather because the trial court was persuaded that the appropriate step-down instruction from attempted second-degree murder was aggravated battery. {13} The present case is analogous to Hill, in which the Court of Appeals held the defendant had preserved his argument for a self-defense instruction for appellate review. 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 7, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139. The defendant in Hill, who was convicted of battery on a police officer, requested a self-defense instruction that was refused by the trial court. Id. ¶ 1. On appeal, the State argued the defendant failed to preserve the issue for review because the instruction he tendered did not accurately state the law with respect to self-defense against a peace officer. Id. ¶ 6. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the self-defense instruction was flawed on its face. Id. ¶ 7. However, the court was persuaded that the trial court understood the type of instruction the defendant wanted. Because the trial court understood what instruction the defendant sought, the Court of Appeals explained that the trial court should have modified the instruction to correctly state the law. Id.; see Gallegos v. State, 113 N.M. 339, 341, 825 P.2d 1249, 1251 (1992) (concluding that the purpose of the Rule 5-608(D) language is to allow the court an opportunity to decide a question whose dimensions are not open to conjecture or after-the-fact interpretation). The Court of Appeals held that despite the fact the tendered self-defense instruction was flawed on its face, the defendant made a sufficient record to preserve review because the trial court understood what instruction the defendant sought and had the opportunity to modify the instruction to correctly state the law. Hill, 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 7, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139. {14} We also reject the State's argument that Defendant did not preserve the issue when he failed to tender an instruction defining the elements of attempted voluntary manslaughter. It does not seem to us that the trial court was troubled by Defendant's failure to submit such an instruction. During discussions regarding Defendant's requested instruction number 9, attempt to commit second-degree murder, in addition to objecting to the propriety of giving the instruction, the State pointed out that, as written, the instruction did not provide the elements of the crime. Once the trial court agreed to instruct the jury on attempted second-degree murder, the court modified Defendant's instruction to include the elements for attempted second-degree murder. Had the trial court believed it was appropriate to instruct the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter, we are convinced the trial court would have modified the instruction to correctly state the law, by including all of the essential elements for the crime. [4] See UJI 14-2801 NMRA. {15} The record reflects the judge understood Defendant wanted an attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction and had an opportunity to modify the instruction to correctly state the law, but did not give the tendered instruction because he believed aggravated battery to be the correct step-down instruction. Therefore, we hold that Defendant properly preserved the issue for appeal.
{16} Jurisdictions that have considered whether attempted voluntary manslaughter exists are split. 40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide, § 48 (2004). Jurisdictions that recognize attempted voluntary manslaughter as a crime do so because if circumstances can mitigate an intentional killing, and reduce it from an intentional murder to voluntary manslaughter, it is logical to reduce an attempted intentional murder to attempted voluntary manslaughter when similar circumstances are present but the defendant fails to carry out his intent. See People v. Van Ronk, 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 217 Cal.Rptr. 581, 585 (1985) (There is nothing illogical or absurd in a finding that a person who unsuccessfully attempted to kill another did so with the intent to kill which was formed in the heat of passion or which arose out of an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity of self-defense.); see also State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 1978) overruled on other grounds by State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988); State v. Barnes, 162 Ariz. 92, 781 P.2d 69, 70 (Ct.App.1989); State v. Rainey, 154 N.C.App. 282, 574 S.E.2d 25, 30 (2002); Kauffman v. State, 729 So.2d 424, 425 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999); Ex parte Buggs, 644 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (en banc). {17} Jurisdictions that refuse to recognize attempted voluntary manslaughter as a crime do so because they conclude it would be illogical to apply the crime of attempt, a specific intent crime, to the general intent crime of voluntary manslaughter. See State v. Howard, 405 A.2d 206, 212 (Me.1979) (The crime of manslaughter ... is predicated upon a different mental state from that found in the attempt statute.... Because of the discrepancy in culpable mental states between criminal attempt on the one hand and manslaughter on the other, the proffered crime of `attempted manslaughter' is a logical impossibility.); see also People v. Brown, 21 A.D.2d 738, 739, 249 N.Y.S.2d 922 (N.Y.App. Div.1964); Westbrook v. State, 722 So.2d 788, 792 (Ala.Crim.App.1998); State v. Loa, 83 Hawai`i 335, 926 P.2d 1258, 1273 (1996); People v. Martinez, 81 N.Y.2d 810, 595 N.Y.S.2d 376, 611 N.E.2d 277, 278 (1993); Curry v. State, 106 Nev. 317, 792 P.2d 396, 397 (1990); People v. Stevenson, 198 Ill.App.3d 376, 144 Ill.Dec. 555, 555 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (1990). {18} Although we have implicitly recognized attempted voluntary manslaughter as a crime, we have never squarely held it exists in New Mexico. See State v. Stampley, 1999-NMSC-027, ¶ 48, 127 N.M. 426, 982 P.2d 477 (remanding for a new trial on the charge of attempted first-degree murder by deliberate killing, to include instructions on attempted second-degree murder by intentional killing and attempted voluntary manslaughter); State v. Durante, 104 N.M. 639, 643, 725 P.2d 839, 843 (Ct.App.1986) (finding defendant was not entitled to attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction when defendant created the provocation that would reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter). As in other jurisdictions that have specifically considered whether attempted voluntary manslaughter is a crime, our holding today turns on whether voluntary manslaughter is a specific intent or a general intent crime. We agree that it is illogical to apply attempt, a specific intent crime, to a general intent crime. State v. Johnson, 103 N.M. 364, 367-68, 707 P.2d 1174, 1177-78 (Ct.App.1985). Generally speaking, voluntary manslaughter is a general intent crime. See State v. Beach, 102 N.M. 642, 645, 699 P.2d 115, 118 (1985) (holding, as a matter of statutory definition, that voluntary manslaughter does not contain an element of intent to do a further act or achieve a further consequence). However, voluntary manslaughter is second-degree murder committed with sufficient provocation. See State v. Aragon, 35 N.M. 198, 292 P. 225 (1930). While second-degree murder is commonly held to be a general intent crime in New Mexico, see State v. Campos, 1996-NMSC-043, ¶ 38, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266, second-degree murder has been held to be a specific intent crime under limited circumstances. Johnson, 103 N.M. at 370, 707 P.2d at 1180 (holding that where a defendant fire bombed a mobile home intending to kill someone inside, but knowing that his act created the requisite probability of death or great bodily harm with respect to unknown persons inside, defendant's act could constitute sufficient evidence to convict him of attempted second-degree murder as to the unknown persons). Thus, for the same reasons that in some limited circumstances second-degree murder can be a specific intent crime, see id., under similar limited circumstances voluntary manslaughter may also be a specific intent crime if provocation is at issue. Under such limited circumstances, it is logical to offer an attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction where the court finds it appropriate to offer an attempted second-degree murder instruction and sufficient provocation is an issue. {19} The trial court in this case, over the State's objection, instructed the jury on attempted second-degree murder. An appropriate instruction for attempted second-degree murder would consist of an instruction on attempt, UJI 14-2801 NMRA, immediately followed by the elements for second-degree murder, UJI 14-210 NMRA. See UJI 14-2801 NMRA note 1; Johnson, 103 N.M. at 370-71, 707 P.2d at 1180-81. This sequence for instructing the jury on attempted second-degree murder adequately instructs the jury on attempted second-degree murder as a specific intent crime. Id. at 371, 707 P.2d at 1181. Here, we are persuaded the trial court instructed the jury on attempted second-degree murder as a specific intent crime. Otherwise, it would have been error for the court to instruct the jury on attempted second-degree murder, see id., and the appropriate step-down instruction from attempted first-degree murder would have been aggravated battery. State v. Meadors, 121 N.M. 38, 44, 908 P.2d 731, 737 (1995). {20} We hold that under limited circumstances, where attempted second-degree murder is offered as a greater-included offense and sufficient provocation is at issue in the trial, attempted voluntary manslaughter is a crime in New Mexico. Among the elements of the jury instruction for attempted second-degree murder was the requirement that the jury find [t]he defendant did not act as a result of sufficient provocation. This language is included in a second-degree murder instruction only when provocation is an issue. UJI 14-210 NMRA, use note 1. When provocation is at issue, an instruction on voluntary manslaughter must be given. UJI 14-210 NMRA, use note 4. Therefore, the trial court should have instructed the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter if it found evidence of sufficient provocation.
{21} We next determine whether there was evidence of sufficient provocation to support an attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction. Failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense of a charged offense is reversible error if: (1) the lesser offense is included in the greater, charged offense; (2) there is evidence tending to establish the lesser included offense and that evidence establishes that the lesser offense is the highest degree of crime committed; and (3) the defendant has tendered appropriate instructions preserving the issue. Hill, 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 16, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139 (internal citation omitted). {22} Just as voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of second-degree murder, see State v. Duarte, 1996-NMCA-038, ¶ 1, 121 N.M. 553, 915 P.2d 309 (noting that while defendant was charged with second-degree murder, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter), we recognize that attempted voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of attempted second-degree murder where sufficient provocation is at issue in the trial. As to the third requirement, we stated above that the Defendant has preserved the issue for appeal. The second requirement is the only remaining issue, so our analysis is limited to whether evidence of sufficient provocation was presented at trial to support the attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction. {23} With regard to the second requirement, we consider whether there is a rational view of the evidence that would lead the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the lesser included offense while still harboring a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the charged offense. See Hill, 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 17, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139 (internal citation omitted). That Defendant here was convicted of attempted second-degree murder with regard to Washington is evidence that the jury rejected the State's argument that Defendant exhibited the requisite degree of intent necessary to convict him of attempted-first degree murder. Therefore, we need only consider whether there is evidence of sufficient provocation so that the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed attempted voluntary manslaughter while still harboring a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed attempted second-degree murder. {24} Sufficient provocation is defined as any action, conduct or circumstances which arouse anger, rage, fear, sudden resentment, terror or other extreme emotions. UJI 14-222 NMRA. The provocation must be such as would affect the ability to reason and to cause a temporary loss of self control in an ordinary person of average disposition. Id. Evidence of provocation exists to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction where the defendant feared the victim was attempting to get a gun with which to shoot the defendant, and the defendant acted to prevent the victim from getting the gun. See State v. Wright, 38 N.M. 427, 429, 34 P.2d 870, 871 (1934). Similarly, such evidence should also support an attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction. {25} In this case, Defendant's testimony that he was scared when he believed Washington was reaching for a gun provides evidence of sufficient provocation to support an attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction. See State v. Abeyta, 120 N.M. 233, 240, 901 P.2d 164, 171 (1995) (It is not unreasonable that the accused should be found guilty of voluntary manslaughter where the plea of self-defense fails.) (internal citations omitted). Defendant's testimony could not have been clearer when he stated [W]hen I seen him go for the gun, I was scared, and [i]n my mind, when I seen his hand go for his crotch area, I thought he had a pistol. That's the only reason I shot at him. Defendant further stated, Where I'm from, somebody coming out of that area [the waistline] ... it's more than likely ... that they are going to shoot you. We note also that the judge instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter regarding the killing of Scott, presumably based on Defendant's testimony that he thought Scott had a gun. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to giving the requested instruction, Hill, 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 5, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139, we hold Defendant presented evidence of sufficient provocation to support an attempted voluntary manslaughter jury instruction. Accordingly, we reverse Defendant's conviction for attempted second-degree murder with regard to Count II, and remand to the trial court for a new trial on this count.