Opinion ID: 1036031
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of potential for release

Text: ¶58 In a related argument, Benson contends that the trial court violated his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by denying his motion to admit evidence of his potential for release if given a life sentence. Specifically, he argues that the court should have admitted evidence that (1) no mechanism exists for an inmate sentenced to life to apply for parole, (2) Benson’s release would be unlikely in light of the number of inmates actually paroled after serving twenty-five years of a life sentence, and (3) a presumption exists that Benson’s sentences would run consecutively under A.R.S. § 13-711(A), which would ensure he would never be released. He asserts that this evidence constituted relevant mitigation because it militated against any concern jurors might have had that he would pose a future threat to society outside prison. We review an evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Chappell, 225 Ariz. 229, 238 ¶ 28, 236 P.3d 1176, 1185 (2010). ¶59 The trial court acted within its discretion in denying Benson’s motion based on the inadmissibility of the proposed evidence concerning the mechanism for obtaining parole and past parole decisions. Cf. Lockett 16 STATE v. TRENT CHRISTOPHER BENSON Opinion of the Court v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n.12 (1978) (“Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant’s character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.”). Essentially, Benson sought to introduce evidence of the current mechanism for obtaining parole and past actions by the Board of Executive Clemency as a means of predicting what might happen with him in twenty-five years. This Court rejected a similar attempt in Cruz, holding that “testimony on what the Board [of Executive Clemency] might do in a hypothetical future case would have been too speculative to assist the jury.” 218 Ariz. at 160 ¶ 45, 181 P.3d at 207. ¶60 The court also properly refused to admit evidence that it would presumptively impose consecutive sentences pursuant to A.R.S. § 13711(A). That statute provides that sentences will run consecutively unless otherwise specified by the court. We recently stated that § 13-711(A) “creates no presumption in favor of consecutive sentences.” State v. Cota, 229 Ariz. 136, 151 ¶ 78, 272 P.3d 1027, 1042 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 107 (2012). ¶61 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit evidence of Benson’s potential for release if given a life sentence.