Opinion ID: 768365
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ford v. Wainwright

Text: 5 This circuit has never been presented with the opportunity to examine the adequacy of a state's procedures to determine whether a death-row prisoner is competent to be executed pursuant to Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). In Ford, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from executing a prisoner who is insane. See 477 U.S. at 409-10. A majority of the Justices did not reach the issues of what constitutes insanity in this context or what state procedures would adequately address a prisoner's Ford claim. Therefore, this court must look to the position taken by Justice Powell, who concurred in the judgment on the most narrow grounds, for the Court's holding on these issues. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). 6 First, Justice Powell concluded that prisoners will be considered insane for the purposes of competency to be executed when they are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they areto suffer it. Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). In Ford, a psychiatrist's findings showed that the death-row prisoner believed that he would not be executed but rather understood the death penalty to have been invalidated. This led Justice Powell to conclude that [i]f this assessment is correct, petitioner cannot connect his execution to the crime for which he was convicted as required under the competency standard. Id. at 422-23 (Powell, J., concurring). It appears that the Supreme Court has accepted this competency standard as the Ford holding. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989) (noting that under Ford v. Wainwright, someone who is 'unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it' cannot be executed (citation omitted)). 7 Second, Justice Powell determined that in evaluating a prisoner's competency-to-be-executed claim, the state must comply with the Due Process Clause and that, under these particular circumstances, the clause requires the state to provide the prisoner with a fair hearing. Ford, 477 U.S. at 424 (Powell, J., concurring). In Ford, the Governor of Florida was responsible for deciding a prisoner's competency to be executed and for appointing a panel of three psychiatrists to evaluate the prisoner. The prisoner was not given the opportunity to present any material for the Governor to consider in making a competency determination. Justice Powell noted that the opportunity to be heard is a fundamental requisite of due process. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). The prisoner was not given this fundamental opportunity to be heard, and the decision on his competency was made solely on the basis of the findings from the state-appointed experts. Justice Powell stated that [s]uch a procedure invites arbitrariness and error by preventing the affected parties from offering contrary medical evidence or even from explaining the inadequacies of the State's examinations and does not, therefore, comport with due process. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). 8 Justice Powell cautioned, however, that he would not require the kind of full-scale 'sanity trial' he thought implied in Justice Marshall's opinion. Id. at 425 (Powell, J., concurring). 1 Although a prisoner is entitled to due process on a Ford claim, [d]ue process is a flexible concept and its procedural protections may vary depending on the context of a particular situation. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). A competency-to-be-executed claim only raises the issue of when a prisoner will be competent for execution and does not challenge the validity of the prisoner's conviction or sentence. Although an important question, it is not comparable to the antecedent question whether [the prisoner] should be executed at all.Id. (Powell, J., concurring). Therefore, Justice Powell asserted that the heightened procedural protections usually required in capital cases are not applicable in this context. See id. (Powell, J., concurring). In addition, because the prisoner necessarily was found competent to stand trial in order to be convicted, Justice Powell concluded that [t]he State therefore may properly presume that petitioner remains sane at the time sentence is to be carried out, and may require a substantial threshold showing of insanity merely to trigger the hearing process. Id. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Finally, Justice Powell noted that the competency determination requires a basically subjective judgment based on expert analysis in a discipline fraught with 'subtleties and nuances.' Id. (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979)). Therefore, ordinary adversarial procedures - complete with live testimony, cross-examination, and oral argument by counsel - are not necessarily the best means of arriving at sound, consistent judgments as to a defendant's sanity. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). 9 Accordingly, Justice Powell concluded that a state need not carry out a formal trial to determine a prisoner's competency. At a minimum, he stated, [t]he State should provide an impartial officer or board that can receive evidence and argument from the prisoner's counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence that may differ from the State's own psychiatric examination. Id. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring). However, [b]eyond these basic requirements, the States should have substantial leeway to determine what process best balances the various interests at stake as long as the states observe the requirements of basic fairness under the Due Process Clause. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).