Opinion ID: 783508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of Section 2251 Under Lopez and Morrison

Text: 18 Although other circuits have spoken on the constitutionality of the materials-in-commerce prong of § 2251(a), we have not yet done so. 2 Applying Lopez and Morrison requires us to determine whether, in light of the Morrison factors, the statute regulates an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. The first factor — whether the activity targeted by the statute is commercial or economic in nature — is satisfied here. We accept Congress's conclusions both that there is an extensive commercial market in child pornography and that much of the material that feeds this market is homegrown, that is, produced by amateur pornographers. Producing child pornography, like manufacturing controlled substances — and unlike the activities targeted in Lopez or Morrison — concerns obviously economic activity. Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we find that the activity addressed by the statute is commercial in nature. See, e.g., United States v. Buculei, 262 F.3d 322, 329 (4th Cir.2001) ([T]here can be no doubt that the production of visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, i.e., child pornography, is economic in nature.); see also United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 228 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that possession of child pornography is conduct that is commercial in character, defined broadly; citing the interstate attributes of child pornography). 19 The second Morrison factor, whether the statute contains a jurisdictional element that might limit its application, is at least superficially met here. The statute, as we have seen, proscribes the production of child pornography with materials that have been shipped in interstate or foreign commerce. But we question whether the mere existence of jurisdictional language purporting to tie criminal conduct to interstate commerce can satisfactorily establish the required substantial effect, where, as here, the interstate component underpinning the jurisdictional element, for example, the shipment of a video camera, is attenuated from the criminal conduct — the production of child pornography — which occurs entirely locally. As the Third Circuit observed, [a]s a practical matter, the limiting jurisdictional factor is almost useless here, since all but the most self-sufficient child pornographers will rely on film, cameras, or chemicals that traveled in interstate commerce. United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir.1999). Because we find, however, as discussed below with respect to the fourth Morrison factor, that the activity on the whole bears a significant relationship to interstate commerce, the failure of the jurisdictional element effectively to limit the reach of the statute is not determinative. Cf. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C.Cir.2003) ([T]he absence of such a jurisdictional element simply means that courts must determine independently whether the statute regulates activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect[ ] interstate commerce.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 Turning to the third Morrison factor, we observe that § 2251(a) was well supported by legislative findings documenting both the existence of an extensive national market in child pornography and that market's reliance on the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Although these findings were made in connection with the statute's original passage in 1978 and not at the time of the 1998 amendment, these findings apply with equal force to the amendment. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 189 n. 13, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968) (noting that it was quite irrelevant that the legislative history of the amendments being challenged did not provide a factual basis for extending the original statute because [t]he original Act stated Congress's findings and purposes and [s]ubsequent extensions of coverage were presumably based on similar findings and purposes with respect to the areas newly covered), overruled on other grounds, Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976). 21 Furthermore, the House Report on the amendment emphasized that the absence of the jurisdictional language was inconsistent with the child pornography possession statutes and left a significant enforcement hole in the prosecution of child pornography production offenses. See H.R. Rep. 105-557, at 26 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 695, available at 1998 WL 285821. 3 22 We now reach the final Morrison factor, whether the relationship between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce is attenuated. As we have seen, Congress concluded that there is an extensive interstate market in child pornography and that the existence of this market depends on a distribution network that relies heavily on the mails and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce. In other words, [t]here can be no debate that `interstate trafficking in child pornography has an effect on interstate commerce.' Angle, 234 F.3d at 337 (quoting Rodia, 194 F.3d at 474). Since no one would doubt Congress's ability to regulate a national market in child pornography, the question becomes whether Congress could rationally have determined that it must reach local, intrastate conduct in order to effectively regulate a national interstate market. United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 229. Congress understood that much of the pornographic material involving minors that feeds the market is locally produced, and this local or homegrown production supports demand in the national market and is essential to its existence. See United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir.1998) (affirming a conviction under § 2252(a)(4)(B) because the local possession of child pornography `through repetition elsewhere,' ... helps to create and sustain a market for sexually explicit materials depicting minors and thus substantially affects the instrumentalities of interstate commerce); United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 476 (3d Cir.1999) (affirming a conviction under § 2252(a)(4)(B) based on a market-theory rationale similar to Robinson ). Because much of the child pornography that concerned Congress is homegrown, untraceable, and enters the national market surreptitiously, we conclude that Congress, in an attempt to halt interstate trafficking, can prohibit local production that feeds the national market and stimulates demand, as this production substantially affects interstate commerce. Accordingly, we conclude that insofar as § 2251(a) prohibits the production of child pornography using materials that have moved in interstate commerce, it is a permissible exercise of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. 23 Finally, we turn to Holston's contention that § 2251(a) is unconstitutional as applied to him. He contends that the government was required — but failed — to prove an actual nexus to interstate commerce because it did not prove that he intended to sell the depictions or that they ever entered interstate commerce. This argument is essentially foreclosed by Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam), which involved a Commerce Clause challenge to a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) for the growing of marijuana where there was no evidence that the drug was intended for interstate distribution. We held that when Congress regulates a class of activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, [t]he fact that certain intrastate activities within this class, such as growing marijuana solely for personal consumption, may not actually have a significant effect on interstate commerce is ... irrelevant. 101 F.3d at 14. Moreover, [t]he nexus to interstate commerce ... is determined by the class of activities regulated by the statute as a whole, not by the simple act for which an individual defendant is convicted. Id. at 13. Where, as here, `a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (quoting Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196 n.27, 88 S.Ct. 2017) (internal formatting omitted). The government need not demonstrate a nexus to interstate commerce in every prosecution. See Proyect, 101 F.3d at 14. As we are satisfied that § 2251(a) lies within Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause, the fact that Holston neither shipped the materials interstate nor intended to benefit commercially from his conduct is of no moment.