Opinion ID: 4316617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Orders Denying Recusal Motions

Text: Plaintiff also argues that the district judge should have granted Plaintiff’s recusal motions because the judge has connections to, and is allegedly biased in favor of, universities and Jacksonville, Florida—the city where Defendants’ lawyers are from. For example, the district court judge is a member of the Board of Governors for Georgetown University, received royalties from the University of Florida for a book she published, and at one point had worked in Jacksonville. Plaintiff also contends that the judge’s remarks during a hearing, along with her rulings against Plaintiff, demonstrated the judge’s bias. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff’s motions because the standards for recusal were not met. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s recusal motion. “To warrant recusal under [28 U.S.C.] § 144, the moving party must allege facts that would convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists.” Christo, 223 F.3d at 1333. And to determine whether 2 In doing so, we do not address whether Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis or whether she has satisfied the conditions imposed by the district court when it granted Plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss her first action. 6 Case: 17-13644 Date Filed: 09/28/2018 Page: 7 of 7 recusal is necessary under 28 U.S.C. § 455, “the standard is whether an objective, fully informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” Id. “[A] judge, having been assigned to a case, should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.” United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986). Here, Plaintiff does not allege—or provide any evidence even suggesting— that the district judge had any actual connection to Defendants or Defendants’ lawyers. That the judge was affiliated with other colleges, ruled against Plaintiff, made remarks stressing the importance of Plaintiff’s compliance with her discovery obligations, and had once worked out of Jacksonville would not convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists or cause an informed lay observer to have significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality. See Christo, 223 F.3d at 1333; see, e.g., United States v. Young, 39 F.3d 1561, 1569–70 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a judge was not required to recuse himself from a case in which he previously engaged in business dealings with a potential defense witness); Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a judge did not have to recuse himself even though he made “intemperate and impatient” remarks against a party). REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART. 7