Opinion ID: 2632884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Motion to Exclude Pretrial and In-court Identifications

Text: Defendant contends the court erred in denying his motions to exclude Gina Wilcox's, Cruz Wilcox's, and Ruth Eyer's pretrial and in-court identifications of him. He claims that, by admitting such evidence, the trial court violated his rights to due process, to counsel, to the effective assistance of counsel, to confrontation, and to a reliable determination of both guilt and penalty, in violation of article I, sections 1, 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the California Constitution and the Fourth, Sixth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 1. Identifications by Gina and Cruz Wilcox As noted, after Gina Wilcox selected defendant's photo from a photo book, Cruz Wilcox picked defendant from a live lineup, and both women identified him at trial as the man standing near the Hailses' truck. a. Right to counsel Defendant first argues that he was impermissibly denied his right to counsel at the live lineup held on July 22, 1992. By that time, Gina Wilcox had tentatively identified defendant. When Detective Madril interviewed defendant on July 13, he admonished defendant pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Although defendant asked for counsel after hearing his rights, none was appointed before the live lineup; evidently, the San Bernardino County Public Defender's office was taking no more special circumstance cases. By the time of the lineup, no criminal complaint had yet been filed against defendant, and the evidence was in conflict as to whether a decision to file had already been made when the lineup was held. Pyle, the local deputy district attorney, indicated that the main office of the district attorney in San Bernardino would decide whether to charge defendant with special circumstances. Pyle testified that he wished to conduct the live lineup, interview more witnesses, and perhaps view the blood test analysis before filing a complaint. Pyle noted that because defendant faced a parole hold, he need not rush to file such a complaint. Public Defender Bynum, however, recalled Pyle's telling him a decision had been made to charge defendant with murder, and the only uncertainty was whether special circumstances would be alleged. The homicide unit held the lineup on July 22, 1992, at the West Valley Detention Center. The district attorney's office was not involved in setting up the lineup or in discussing whether defendant should have counsel present. Witness Cruz Wilcox selected defendant as the man standing beside the Hailses' truck. A criminal complaint was filed later the same day. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the lineup identification for failure to appoint counsel for him. The court found that at the time of the lineup, law enforcement officers were still investigating the case and gathering evidence. The court relied on case law indicating that the right to counsel does not attach until formal adversarial criminal proceedings are initiated. Defendant acknowledges the general rule that the right to counsel attaches only when judicial proceedings have commenced. (E.g., Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1223, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1.) He argues, however, that once suspicion had focused on him as the Hailses' killer, and he had asked for counsel, it was improper to hold a lineup without first appointing counsel for him. In United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 227, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, the high court held that defendants are entitled to counsel at a postindictment lineup to preserve their basic right to a fair trial. The Wade court recognized the grave potential for prejudice inherent in any confrontation between the accused and the victim or witnesses held for identification purposes. ( Id. at pp. 236-237, 87 S.Ct. 1926.) Thereafter, in Kirby v. Illinois (1972) 406 U.S. 682, 689, 691, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 ( Kirby) , a plurality of the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right to counsel does not attach until a judicial criminal proceeding such as an indictment is initiated or a complaint is filed. In Kirby, the officers suspected the defendant and an accomplice of robbery and, weeks before any charges were filed, brought them to the police station for a showup with the robbery victim, who identified them as the robbers. The dissenters in Kirby felt that the initiation of formal proceedings was irrelevant to the question whether counsel is necessary at a pretrial confrontation for identification purposes. (406 U.S. at p. 696, 92 S.Ct. 1877 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).) Subsequent high court cases have confirmed the rule of the Kirby plurality. (E.g., United States v. Gouveia (1984) 467 U.S. 180, 188, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146, and cases cited [The view that the right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings has been confirmed by this Court in cases subsequent to Kirby ].) Defendant observes that Kirby is factually distinguishable from the present case, in that here defendant had been in custody on a parole hold for more than a week before the lineup was held, and the investigation had already begun, whereas in Kirby the showup at the police station was held the same day the defendant was arrested, and he was not charged until many weeks later. (See Kirby, supra, 406 U.S. at pp. 684-685, 92 S.Ct. 1877.) But nothing in Kirby or subsequent federal case law indicates that these distinguishing facts would have made a difference in the ultimate conclusion that, until formal charges were filed, counsel was not required to be present at the lineup under the federal Constitution. Accordingly, there was no violation of defendant's right to counsel under the federal Constitution. The California Constitution does afford a suspect a right to counsel at a preindictment lineup. ( People v. Bustamante (1981) 30 Cal.3d 88, 102, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 634 P.2d 927.) However, the exclusionary rule set forth in Bustamante was abrogated by the passage of Proposition 8, an initiative adopted by the voters of this state on June 8, 1982. Among other provisions, Proposition 8 added section 28 to article I of the state Constitution. That section abrogated judicial decisions requiring exclusion of relevant evidence from criminal proceedings, except as compelled by the federal Constitution or other statutes not implicated here. [Citation.] As defendant's crime occurred after the adoption of Proposition 8, the exclusionary rule[ ] of Bustamante ... ha[s] no application to this case. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 1222-1223, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1, fn. omitted.) b. Identification procedures not unduly suggestive or unreliable Defendant maintains that the procedures used in obtaining the pretrial identifications by Cruz and Gina Wilcox were unduly suggestive in several respects, and that the resulting identifications were unreliable and therefore inadmissible. (See, e.g., People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 989, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519, and cases cited.) The cases hold that despite an unduly suggestive identification procedure, we may deem the identification reliable under the totality of the circumstances, after we consider such factors as the witness's opportunity to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness's degree of attention at that time, the accuracy of the witness's prior description, the level of certainty the witness expressed when making the identification, and the lapse of time between the offense and the identification. ( Ibid. ) Defendant first maintains the identification procedures were unduly suggestive. He observes that the Wilcoxes were permitted to observe and confer with each other during the various identification procedures, including their interview with the officers relating the suspect's description, the assembly and viewing of composite drawings of him, the review of the parolee book, and the physical lineup itself. (See Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178.) Defendant assumes that Gina and Cruz Wilcox conferred with each other before, during, and after these procedures, but he cites no evidence of any actual conferring or other influence these witnesses exerted on each other. The Attorney General notes that, although Gina and Cruz Wilcox were together during the identification procedures, Gina, but not Cruz, picked defendant's picture from the parolee book, and Cruz, but not Gina, positively selected defendant at the live lineup. (During the lineup, Gina picked defendant and another man as possible matches.) When first interviewed on July 12, Cruz Wilcox was unable to provide a description of the man she had seen by the truck, yet at the live lineup on July 22, she picked defendant. Defendant assumes Cruz's identification resulted from her hearing her daughter Gina's description and viewing the composite drawings as well as the photograph Gina selected from the parolee book on July 13. Defendant also notes that most of the photos in the parolee book were of persons looking nothing like him, and at the live lineup, he was much shorter than the other men. Defendant cites cases holding that it would be impermissibly suggestive to hold a lineup in which only the defendant fit the witnesses' description. ( Foster v. California (1969) 394 U.S. 440, 442-443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402; People v. Caruso (1968) 68 Cal.2d 183, 187-188, 65 Cal.Rptr. 336, 436 P.2d 336.) The Attorney General, on the other hand, observes that, under the cases, defendant has the burden of showing that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unfair as a demonstrable reality, not just speculation. (E.g., People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1222, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210 ( DeSantis ).) A due process violation occurs only if the identification procedure is so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. ( Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967,19 L.Ed.2d 1247.) We have held that an identification procedure is considered suggestive if it caused defendant to `stand out' from the others in a way that would suggest the witness should select him. ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 367, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) As for defendant's being the shortest man in the live lineup, the Attorney General observes that the case law does not require that a lineup contain persons resembling the defendant in appearance. ( DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1224, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1241, 1243, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251; People v. Blair (1979) 25 Cal.3d 640, 661, 159 Cal.Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738.) The trial court examined photos of the lineup participants and other information regarding them. It found that defendant was not significantly shorter than the other men in the lineup, that all were white, male adults, relatively similar in body build, that no one obviously stands out in terms of height and weight. The court concluded that these circumstances did not even come close to the kind of gross disparity that would require a suppression. Moreover, the fact that the defendant alone appeared in both a photo lineup and a subsequent live lineup does not per se violate due process. ( DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1224, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210.) We agree with the trial court that defendant has failed to show that the various identification procedures were unduly suggestive. Accordingly, we need not address the Attorney General's alternative arguments that, assuming these procedures were overly suggestive, the Wilcox's identifications were reliable under the totality of the circumstances (see People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 989, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519), and any error in admitting the identifications was harmless. 2. Identification by Ruth Eyer When first contacted by the officers, Ruth Eyer described the man she met at the Hailses' home as clean-cut or clean-shaven and in his 20's, but she doubted she could identify him because she had only seen him briefly. At a live lineup on February 8, 1993, Eyer was unable to make a positive identification. But immediately after the lineup, she told District Attorney Bruins that she was not positive but could eliminate some of the men and wanted to speak further with him about the lineup. Rather than discuss the matter with others present, Bruins told her they would talk later. The next day, Eyer told Bruins that she felt two of the men in the lineup (Nos. 4 and 6) were possibilities, and that if forced to chose, she would select No. 6, who was defendant. At the preliminary hearing, Eyer tentatively identified defendant as the man she had met earlier. Defendant now infers that some suggestive influence intervened between the lineup and her remarks to Bruins on the next day. But Eyer testified at the preliminary hearing that she discussed her identification with no other witnesses, and the trial court, following a hearing, found no grounds for suppressing her identification. As the trial court observed, Eyer's hesitation and tentativeness in identifying defendant might well have served as ammunition to impeach her credibility, but no grounds exist for suppressing her identification of him. For all the foregoing reasons, we agree.