Opinion ID: 2161601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Reference to Federal Case

Text: Appellant also objected to the introduction of evidence relating to a federal charge against him pending at the time of commission of the homicides in the case sub judice. The admissibility of this evidence forms the basis for Grandison's next argument. The State maintains that evidence of appellant's pending federal charge was relevant to show his motive for arranging the murders and thus admissible. We agree. The record reveals that at no time during the proceedings below did the State reveal or attempt to reveal the nature of the pending federal charge against the appellant, its result, or details related to it. The references made to the federal charge only stated that there existed a federal charge against Grandison for which the prosecution had to prove he occupied a particular room at the Warren House Motor Hotel in November of 1982. It is elementary that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal acts may not be introduced to prove that he is guilty of the offense for which he is on trial. Straughn v. State, 297 Md. 329, 333, 465 A.2d 1166, 1169 (1983). We applied this rule, commonly referred to as the other crimes rule, in Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976), where we said: [E]vidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same type, is irrelevant and inadmissible. (Citations omitted). However, the exceptions to this rule are equally well-recognized and virtually as prominent as the rule itself. McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 613, 375 A.2d 551, 556 (1977). [17] See C. McCormick, Evidence § 190 (3d ed. 1984). The admissibility of the challenged evidence must be determined through recognition of this rule and, more particularly, application of its exceptions. We conclude that the scintilla of evidence admitted relating to appellant's federal charge was relevant to establish appellant's motive for arranging the murders. Thus, the evidence does not fall prey to the rule of exclusion enunciated above. As our cases make clear, that rule will act as a bar to other crimes evidence unless the evidence is substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that [the accused] committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character. Ross, 276 Md. at 669, 350 A.2d at 684 (quoting McCormick, supra ) (emphasis supplied). Thus, the trial court did not err. See Straughn, 297 Md. at 333-34, 465 A.2d at 1169 (trial court has broad discretion in admitting other crimes evidence); McCormick, supra. Evidence of the existence of appellant's pending federal charge was relevant to illustrate his motive for arranging the murders; it demonstrated a logical connection between the crucial defense witnesses, the Piechowiczes, and the subsequent homicides. Further, the fact that the State proffered no evidence other than the existence of the pending federal charge renders any potential prejudice to Grandison minimal in light of its probative value. 297 Md. at 333-34, 465 A.2d at 1169.