Opinion ID: 2585418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: refusing to grant mistrial

Text: Whitesell argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him a mistrial on several occasions. Specifically, he argues that motions in limine were violated on four occasions; that there were two instances of prosecutorial misconduct; and that there was an instance of juror misconduct, each warranting a new trial.
The trial court may declare a mistrial when prejudicial conduct makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant. K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c). The decision to declare a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. State v. Mayberry, 248 Kan. 369, Syl. ś 8, 807 P.2d 86 (1991); State v. Massey, 242 Kan. 252, Syl. ś 4, 747 P.2d 802 (1987). The trial court is in the best position to determine if its order in limine has been violated and to determine the degree of prejudice a violation may have caused the accused. State v. Aikins, 261 Kan. 346, 378, 932 P.2d 408 (1997). In Stayton v. Stayton, 211 Kan. 560, 562, 506 P.2d 1172 (1973), the court stated: Judicial discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. All judicial discretion may thus be considered as exercisable only within the bounds of reason and justice in the broader sense, and only to be abused when it plainly overpasses those bounds. A party seeking a mistrial has the burden of showing that the party has been substantially prejudiced by the error. State v. McClanahan, 259 Kan. 86, 92, 910 P.2d 193 (1996).
The trial court ordered that no mention be made of the prior stalking trial in response to a motion in limine filed by Whitesell. Whitesell argues that the order was violated when Julie declared in response to a cross-examination question about the preliminary hearing transcript: I thought you were talking about the first trial, that I had theâ the notes from the first trial. Additionally, Whitesell argues that another violation occurred when Moreland referred to the prior trial when explaining on cross-examination that he did not know that his photographs of the wheat field path had not turned out until our first case with this, first trial. Whitesell's motion for a mistrial on both these occurrences was overruled by the trial court. Whitesell does not explain how these two minor statements by Julie and Moreland prejudiced him or denied him the right to a fair trial, nor why the trial court should have granted him a mistrial on the basis of the testimony. Both statements were inadvertent and had no prejudicial effect on the trial. Whitesell has not met his burden of proof in showing that the statements prejudiced his right to a fair trial. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying Whitesell's motion for a mistrial.
Prior to trial, the court ordered that Julie's references to Whitesell's prior mental health history and hospitalizations be limited to identifying where he was at. Whitesell argues that the order was violated on several occasions. Specifically, he argues that Julie violated the order when she testified that after a 1991 argument, she felt like he was anticipating either suicide or killing me. Julie further testified that Whitesell was very upset and suicidal. Detective Varnell also testified to things which Julie had told him, specifically that Whitesell had been in the hospital nine times before and has tried suicide once. Detective Moreland testified that Julie said that [Whitesell] had been hospitalized before and he'd had ... homicidal thoughts. Again, although Whitesell points out testimony which may have allegedly violated the pretrial order in limine, he does not provide any analysis explaining how the violations prejudiced him. Julie's direct testimony was not in violation of the pretrial order. Her comments regarding Whitesell being suicidal were not meant to be a clinical diagnosis or any comment on Whitesell's mental health, but relate to her fear of him and represent her lay perception of his mental state. The comments by Varnell and Moreland cross the line set out by the trial court in this matter concerning Whitesell's mental health history. The trial court specifically limited any discussion of Whitesell's mental history to Julie's comments regarding his location and mentioning that Whitesell had been hospitalized nine times; had been hospitalized before; and that he had tried suicide once violated the order of the trial court. The impact of the violations, however, was slight, given the overall evidence against Whitesell. The trial court is in the best position to determine the degree of prejudice that the violations caused. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.
Prior to trial, the court sustained Whitesell's motion in limine to prohibit Julie from suggesting at trial that Whitesell took advantage of her vulnerability after her brother's death by having sex with her on the night of her brother's funeral. During trial, Julie testified that she became pregnant with her daughter on November 3rd when I buried my brother. The court denied Whitesell's motion for a mistrial. Again, Whitesell does not set forth any substantive argument why this statement was prejudicial to him or why the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. Julie did not testify that she thought Whitesell had taken advantage of her, only that she thought she had conceived her daughter on the night of her brother's funeral. Moreover, the trial court immediately struck Julie's statement when Whitesell made a timely objection. The trial court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial on this issue.
Prior to trial, the court prohibited the State's witnesses from making conclusory statements that they were afraid for Julie's safety. Kyle testified, however, that after meeting [Whitesell]... I'm still fearful for Julie. Whitesell argues that this violation of the pretrial order warrants a new trial. Whitesell did not object during trial and therefore did not preserve this issue for appeal. Whitesell cannot raise an issue on appeal where no contemporaneous objection was made and where the trial court did not have the opportunity to rule. See State v. Sims, 262 Kan. 165, 169-70, 936 P.2d 779 (1997) (failure to object to the admission of evidence at the trial court level precludes review by an appellate court).
Whitesell argues that there were two instances of prosecutorial misconduct which were highly prejudicial and which warrant a new trial. We recently discussed our standard of review for prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument in State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 504-05, 996 P.2d 321 (2000). In Pabst, we said: Reversible error predicated on prosecutorial misconduct must be of such a magnitude as to deny a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. See State v. Sperry, 267 Kan. 287, 308, 978 P.2d 933 (1999). Some complained-of prosecutorial statements were not objected to at trial. If the claimed error has been determined to implicate a defendant's right to a fair trial, our standard of review is the same whether or not an objection was made at trial. If the claimed error rises to the level of a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, the issue will be addressed. State v. McCorkendale, 267 Kan. 263, Syl.ś 6, 979 P.2d 1239 (1999). .... The analysis of the effect of a prosecutor's alleged improper remarks in closing argument is a two-step process. First, we decide whether the remarks were outside the considerable latitude the prosecutor is allowed in discussing the evidence. In criminal trials, the prosecution is given wide latitude in language and in manner or presentation of closing argument as long as the argument is consistent with the evidence. Second, we must decide whether the remarks constitute plain error; that is, whether they are so gross and flagrant as to prejudice the jury against the accused and deny a fair trial, requiring reversal. State v. Lumley, 266 Kan. 939, Syl. ś 12, 976 P.2d 486 (1999).
Whitesell first argues that the prosecutor ignored the trial court's order granting his motion in limine prohibiting any reference to battered woman's syndrome. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: What have you learned about the nature of domestic violence in this case? How victims don't report every single thing, how many times that incidents happened that she did not report them. What have you learned about the dynamics of domestic violence? That if there's a violent episode and that he's crying and then I appease him, and then I appease him, it avoids the violence at the end. You have learned about the circle of violence in this case. Although Whitesell did not object to the prosecutor's closing argument, we must consider the issue in order to determine if it rose to the level of a due process violation. The prosecutor's statement did not violate the order in limine as it did not specifically mention battered woman's syndrome. The prosecutor was merely commenting on the domestic violence nature of the case and did not inflame, prejudice, or mislead the jury by discussing domestic abuse. The prosecutor was within the wide latitude given to her in a criminal trial. This argument is without merit.
Whitesell next argues that prosecutorial misconduct took place when the prosecutor, in closing arguments, implied that the only way to protect Julie from any future danger was to find Whitesell guilty. In closing argument, the prosecutor stated: You must presume that he is not guilty until you are convinced from the evidence that he is. You should have been convinced after the Moreland call, the videotape car stop, and he continued. If you weren't convinced then, you should have been convinced after the McCaffree call when heâ when McCaffree told him stop calling, stop coming by, stop mailing things, and yet he continued to persist after that. It comes out of his own mouth, ladies and gentlemen. He says, I'm not stalking her Marty. I'm not stalking her. Well, Mr. Whitesell, this looks like borderline stalking to me. I didn't mean to scare her. Well, you're scaring her, Mr. Whitesell. You're scaring her. Scout's honor, Marty. This won't happen again. And it did. He stalked her. She was genuinely and reasonably, for somebody who had lived through what she had lived through, afraid. He stalked her. Whitesell did not object to the prosecutor's statements. Later, during the rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated: When [Whitesell] was attempting to commit suicide in 1995, law enforcement made a promise to him. If you will surrender your gun, we will not take you to the hospital.... Law enforcement kept his promise to him. They didn't take him to a hospital. He has not kept his promise to law enforcement. Scout's honor, I won't come back here again. Make him keep his promise and find him guilty of this offense. The statements by the prosecutor merely sum up the evidence and do not amount to a plea to not allow the type of conduct found objectionable in State v. Ruff, 252 Kan. 625, 633, 847 P.2d 1258 (1993). As the stalking charge in this case must focus on a continuing course of conduct, so must the State's evidence and case. The State had to prove that Whitesell had exhibited a pattern of conduct over a period of time which caused Julie to suffer emotional distress. Because part of the element of the crime is a continuing course of conduct, it was proper for the prosecutor to discuss Whitesell's repeated acts. This argument is also without merit.
Whitesell's last mistrial argument is that a mistrial should have been granted when it was discovered that one of the jurors had outside communication with a district court judge from another county. A trial court's decision in ruling on a motion for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. State v. Arney, 218 Kan. 369, 372, 544 P.2d 334 (1975). A high degree of appellate deference is allowed a trial judge's exercise of discretion in assessing the texture and feel of the trial, the credibility of witnesses, and the perceived impact of an allegedly prejudicial event. Saucedo v. Winger, 252 Kan. 718, 731, 850 P.2d 908 (1993). If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Lumbrera, 252 Kan. 54, Syl. ś 5, 845 P.2d 609 (1992). Juror misconduct will not constitute a ground for a new trial unless it can be shown that the rights of the defendant were substantially prejudiced. The party claiming the prejudice has the burden of proof. State v. Cady, 248 Kan. 743, 756, 811 P.2d 1130 (1991). In State v. Coburn, 220 Kan. 743, 747, 556 P.2d 376 (1976), this court discussed juror misconduct and stated: To warrant reversal of a judgment because of improper contact or communication between juror and an outsider, there must be some showing or indication of injury, actual or potential, to the complaining party, or the act or conduct complained of must be such as to afford reasonable grounds to question the fairness of the trial or the integrity of the verdict, or as would tend to destroy or impair public confidence in trial by jury. [Citation omitted.] A few days into the trial, the court announced that a district court judge from another county had informed the court that one of Whitesell's jurors had initiated a conversation with the judge at a ball game. The juror had commented on the breadth of the evidence and asked why the trial was taking so long, to which the judge responded that in his jurisdiction it'd be a one-day trial. Whitesell moved for a mistrial claiming that the communication prejudiced his right to a fair trial. The trial court voir dired the juror, asking him whether he thought he could still be impartial. The juror indicated to the court that he was still impartial and could still fairly judge Whitesell. The juror further indicated that he had not discussed any of the evidence of the case with the outside judge. The juror told the court that the outside judge did not give him any information that would affect his ability to be fair and impartial juror for both sides. The trial court subsequently overruled the motion for a mistrial. After the trial, Whitesell moved the court to subpoena the juror for further questioning in order that the effect of the outside communication with the judge might be better determined, which the court denied. Whitesell has not met his burden of proof in showing that the juror's brief conversation with the outside judge regarding the length of the trial had any prejudicial effect on his trial. This argument is without merit. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Whitesell's motion for a mistrial on the basis of juror misconduct.