Opinion ID: 2506624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Parent's Constitutional Rights to Custody of Children

Text: Because family and circuit courts have discretion in determining whether to appoint a guardian for a minor, we must next consider whether the lower courts abused their discretion in denying the guardianship petition in this case. Specifically, the circuit court affirmed the family court's refusal to appoint Carol G. as Antonio's guardian, finding that there is no basis in law for a child, of any age, to take away his or her own fit parent's right to custody and nominate a third-party guardian.... A biological parent's right to the custody of his or her child is rooted in the due process clauses of both the West Virginia and the United States' Constitutions: In the law concerning custody of minor children, no rule is more firmly established than that the right of a natural parent to the custody of his or her infant child is paramount to that of any other person; it is a fundamental personal liberty protected and guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the West Virginia and United States Constitutions. Syl. Pt. 1, In re Willis, 157 W.Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973). [4] Of course, a biological parent's constitutional right to the custody of his or her child is not unfettered. This Court has held that, in any case involving child custody, [t]he controlling principle ... is the welfare of the child and ... in a contest involving the custody of an infant the welfare of the child is the polar star by which the discretion of the court will be guided. State ex rel. Kiger v. Hancock, 153 W.Va. 404, 405, 168 S.E.2d 798, 799 (1969). To this end, we have held that a parent's natural right to the custody of his or her child is limited in cases in which the parent is found to be abusive, neglectful or otherwise unfit: A parent has the natural right to the custody of his or her infant child and, unless the parent is an unfit person because of misconduct, neglect, immorality, abandonment or other dereliction of duty, or has waived such right, or by agreement or otherwise has transferred, relinquished or surrendered such custody, the right of the parent to the custody of his or her infant child will be recognized and enforced by the courts. Syllabus, Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W.Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960). Admittedly, striking a balance between a biological parent's constitutional rights and the child's best interests can be difficult. This Court specifically considered this delicate balance in Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W.Va. 448, 388 S.E.2d 322 (1989). In that case, a non-offending, fit, biological father sought custody of his daughter. Id. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 323-24. From an early age, the child had lived with her biological mother, step-father and half-sibling. Id. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 323. Following the mother's tragic death, and pursuant to the mother's last will and testament, the child's step-father was appointed as her guardian. Id. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 323-24. The biological father filed a petition arguing that an unoffending natural parent should be entitled to custody of his or her child if such parent has not abandoned such child nor has in any manner been proven unfit. Id. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 324. The circuit court agreed, granting custody to the biological father, despite the step-father's contention that the child's best interests would be served by allowing the child to continue to live with him and the child's half-sibling. Id. at 450-51, 388 S.E.2d at 324. On appeal, this Court recognized that the child's best interest is of immeasurable importance, but further acknowledged the right of a biological parent to raise his or her own child. Id. at 451, 388 S.E.2d at 324. It stated that [a]lthough the polar star concept is adhered to by this Court in child custody cases, we have refused to apply it in cases where the parents have not abandoned the child or have in no manner been proved to be unfit to have the care and custody of such child. Hammack v. Wise, 158 W.Va. 343, 347, 211 S.E.2d 118, 121 (1975). This concept will not be invoked to deprive an unoffending parent of his natural right to the custody of his child. Hammack, 158 W.Va. at 347, 211 S.E.2d at 121. Id. Moreover, the Court recognized that `a strong presumption' exists that `the welfare of the child is well protected when he is in the custody of an unoffending natural parent.' Id. at 451, 388 S.E.2d at 324-25 (quoting Hammack, 158 W.Va. at 347, 211 S.E.2d at 121). Accordingly, the Court in Honaker affirmed the lower court's decision to return custody to the biological father, utilizing a lengthy transitional period. In the instant case, Gina H. argues that, because the allegations of abuse and neglect were found to be unsubstantiated, she too is a non-offending, fit, biological parent, who has a constitutional right to the custody of her minor child. The petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the circuit court erred by focusing solely on Gina H.'s constitutional rights, without giving due consideration to Antonio's best interests. They argue that not only is the best interest analysis the polar star of all child custody proceedings, West Virginia Code § 44-10-3 specifically requires consideration of the child's best interests in guardianship cases. In 2008, this Court squarely addressed the tension between a child's best interests and a biological parent's right to the custody of his or her child in the context of a guardianship petition filed by a third party. Abbigail Faye B., 222 W.Va. 466, 665 S.E.2d 300. In that case, an infant, Abbigail, was born to a teenage mother, Autumn, who was still residing with her parents. Id. at 470, 665 S.E.2d at 304. The grandparents contributed significantly to Abbigail's care from her birth until her mother moved out, approximately six months later. Id. at 470-71, 665 S.E.2d at 304-05. When Autumn decided to move out and take Abbigail with her, the grandparents filed a petition for guardianship, alleging that Autumn had abandoned Abbigail at various times and that she was not properly caring for Abbigail's special needs. Id. at 471, 665 S.E.2d at 305. Following an investigation, Child Protective Services determined that Abbigail was not an abused or neglected child and that Autumn had not abandoned her. Id. at 472, 665 S.E.2d at 306. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the petition for guardianship and concluded that the grandparents had failed to prove that abuse or neglect had occurred or that Autumn was not a fit parent. Id. Thus, the circuit court denied the grandparent's petition for guardianship and returned custody of Abbigail to Autumn. Id. On appeal, this Court found that West Virginia Code § 44-10-3 permits a court to appoint a guardian for a minor child if the proposed guardian is competent and fit, but requires the court to accord priority to the child's mother or father. 222 W.Va. at 477, 665 S.E.2d at 311. The Court then noted that [d]ivesting a child's biological parent of his/her guardianship, or custody, is a very serious matter. This Court repeatedly has recognized the inherent rights parents have to the custody of their own children, and any party seeking to interfere with such rights must bear a heavy burden. Id. at 478, 665 S.E.2d at 312 (footnote omitted). After reviewing and affirming the circuit court's findings that Abbigail had not been abused or neglected and that Autumn was a fit parent, this Court turned to the issue of the child's best interests. Id. at 478-79, 665 S.E.2d at 312-13. The Court explained that `[a]lthough parents have substantial rights that must be protected, the primary goal ... in all family law matters... must be the health and welfare of the children.' Id. at 480, 665 S.E.2d at 314 (quoting Syl. Pt. 3, in part, In re Katie S., 198 W.Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996)). The Court found, however, that we typically have been reluctant to change a child's custodial placement unless such a change will materially promote the child's best interests. 222 W.Va. at 480, 665 S.E.2d at 314. In considering the facts of the case before it, the Court recognized that the grandparents could provide a fine home for Abbigail, and that they had been very involved in her care. Id. at 481, 665 S.E.2d at 315. Nevertheless, `[w]hile courts always look to the best interests of the child in controversies concerning his or her custody, such custody should not be denied to a parent merely because some other person might possibly furnish the child a better home or better care. ' Id. at Syl. Pt. 12 (quoting Syl. pt. 3, Hammack v. Wise, 158 W.Va. 343, 211 S.E.2d 118 (1975)) (emphasis added). Thus, the Court concluded that: we agree with the circuit court's assessment that Abbigail's best interests require her to be placed with her parents, Autumn and Josh. Although Abbigail has bonded significantly with [the grandparents], she should also be afforded the opportunity to bond with her biological parents, Autumn and Josh. Simply because [the grandparents] have been in a position to provide substantial care for Abbigail, at times to the exclusion of Autumn and Josh, does not presumptively make them a better placement for Abbigail.... Absent evidence that Abbigail's safety would be endangered by awarding her guardianship to her parents, we cannot find any justification in the record to indicate that her welfare and best interests would not be served by placing her with her parents, Autumn and Josh, particularly in light of our prior findings that they are fit and competent to serve as her guardians and have, thus, been accorded a statutory preference pursuant to W. Va.Code § 44-10-3(a). 222 W.Va. at 481, 665 S.E.2d at 315. As the circuit court noted, the facts of the instant case are very similar to those of Abbigail Faye B. and many of the same legal principles apply. A court may not divest Gina H., Antonio's biological mother, of her custodial rights simply because Carol G. would be a fit guardian. Undoubtedly, Carol G. has played a very important role in Antonio's life, but the fact that she might possibly furnish the child a better home or better care, is not sufficient to divest Gina H. of her rights as Antonio's biological parent. See id. at Syl. Pt. 12. Moreover, because Antonio had been living with Gina H. for the three years prior to the filing of the guardianship petition, the lower courts were properly reluctant to change Antonio's custodial placement. See id. at 480, 665 S.E.2d at 314. Accordingly, the circuit court correctly concluded that Gina H.'s constitutional rights as Antonio's biological mother would be violated by appointing a third party as Antonio's guardian.