Opinion ID: 150080
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arising From a Protected Act

Text: Kamran must also demonstrate that the suit against him arises from his protected act of filing a trademark application. In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity. Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 89, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703 (2002); see also City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69, 76-77, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695 (2002) ([T]he mere fact an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean it arose from that activity.). The district court relied on two California court of appeal cases in which the court concluded that attorney malpractice claims do not arise from a protected act. See Benasra v. Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP, 123 Cal.App.4th 1179, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 621 (2004); Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton, 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 52 Cal. Rptr.3d 712 (2006). It is true that in several cases involving attorney malpractice claims, courts of appeal have concluded that the alleged malpractice does not arise from a protected act under the anti-SLAPP statute. See PrediWave Corp. v. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, 179 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1221-26, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 (2009) (describing cases). For example, in Benasra, the court determined that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to a former client's suit against a law firm for breach of loyalty. The court reasoned that [t]he breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit may follow litigation pursued against the former client, but does not arise from it. Benasra, 123 Cal.App.4th at 1189, 20 Cal. Rptr.3d 621. In Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp, 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 7 Cal. Rptr.3d 715 (2003), the court held that the malpractice action fell outside of the anti-SLAPP statute when it alleged the attorneys' failure to respond to discovery requests and to comply with court orders. In Kolar, the court explained, In a malpractice suit, the client is not suing because the attorney petitioned on his or her behalf, but because the attorney did not competently represent the client's interests while doing so. 145 Cal.App.4th at 1540, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 712. However, there is no categorical exclusion of claims of attorney malpractice from the anti-SLAPP statute. The California Supreme Court has observed that [n]othing in the statute itself categorically excludes any particular type of action from its operation. Navellier, 29 Cal.4th at 92, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703. The anti-SLAPP statute's definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff's cause of action but, rather, the defendant's activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liabilityand whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning. Id. Each of Mindys' causes of action arises not out of a general breach of duty, but out of Kamran's act of filing the trademark application in Sonya's name. The trademark application was not incidental to the causes of action, see Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal.App.4th 719, 732, 64 Cal. Rptr.3d 867 (2007), but was their gravamen, see Cotati, 29 Cal.4th at 79, 124 Cal. Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695. But for the trademark application, Mindys would have no reason to sue Kamran. Because Mindys' claims arose from Kamran's act of applying to register the trademarks in Sonya's name, they are properly subject to an anti-SLAPP motion.