Opinion ID: 1822704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: level of deference

Text: ¶ 101. The majority begins its analysis by incorrectly finding that LIRC's legal conclusions in this case are entitled to extremely deferential treatment under the great weight standard of review. As this court has previously stated: Great weight deference is appropriate once a court has concluded that: (1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the duty of administering the statute; (2) that the interpretation of the agency is one of long-standing; (3) that the agency employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation; and (4) that the agency's interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency in the application of the statute. Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995); see also UFE v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996); Linsey v. LIRC, 171 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 493 N.W.2d 14 (1992). LIRC has failed to meet the second and fourth prongs of the test. Thus, I would conclude that great weight deference is an inappropriate standard of review. ¶ 102. Though LIRC has experience in interpreting Wis. Stat. § 111.34, LIRC's interpretation of the statute on matters related to this issue is not one of long standing. Therefore, LIRC does not satisfy the second prong of the test. I believe that [t]his is precisely the situation that warrants due weight deference: LIRC has had some experience interpreting [Wis. Stat. § 111.34], yet has not faced the particular circumstances we have here. Brauneis v. LIRC, 2000 WI 69, ¶ 19, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 N.W.2d 635. ¶ 103. Indeed, LIRC has yet to address the specific issue of whether reasonable accommodation under the WFEA includes a duty to eliminate multiple, basic job duties of an employee and to create a wholly different, previously nonexistent job for a disabled employee. LIRC incorrectly cites Fields v. Cardinal TG Co., ERD Case No. 1997-02574 (LIRC Feb. 16, 2001), as conclusive support for the proposition that LIRC has held a reasonable accommodation to require an employer to restructure the physical demands of the job in order to accommodate a disabled employee. Even putting aside that Fields was decided well after the evidentiary hearing in this case, that case actually held that an employer may not restructure the job of a disabled employee such that the employee is no longer able to perform it because of a disability. ¶ 104. Outside of Fields, LIRC cites no legal authority or precedent from its own opinions to directly support its prior history of following the rule it presently advances. Thus, while LIRC may have addressed cases that are similar to this question, this is the first occurrence under these particular circumstances. Therefore, great weight deference should not be afforded to LIRC's interpretation. See Local No. 695 v. LIRC, 154 Wis. 2d 75, 81, 452 N.W.2d 368 (1990). ¶ 105. To the extent LIRC has addressed issues related to modifying jobs as a means of accommodating an employee's disability, it has a spotty history of providing uniformity and consistency in applying § 111.34. In McMullen v. LIRC, 148 Wis. 2d 270, 434 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1988), LIRC was given no deference in its interpretation of § 111.34 due to its inconsistent statements regarding whether a reasonable accommodation could ever include an employee's transfer to another position. Id. at 274. LIRC had stated in its own decision in the matter that transferring a disabled employee to another position may be considered a reasonable accommodation. Id. When facing the court of appeals, however, LIRC reversed its position and argued that an employer's duty to accommodate could never include a transfer. Id. Not only did LIRC contradict itself within the framework of a single case, it did so on a topic similar to the issue in this case. ¶ 106. Indeed, McMullen is not the only case illustrating LIRC's limitations when interpreting § 111.34 on issues related to the present case. In Macara v. Consumer Co-op, ERD Case No. 8802872 (LIRC Feb. 14, 1992), LIRC held that the duty to accommodate does not require creating a position or discharging another employee to allow for a transfer of a disabled employee. Meanwhile, in 1988, the Wisconsin Personnel Commission, LIRC's sister agency, had analyzed § 111.34(2)(a) in light of § 111.34(1)(b) and ruled that the WFEA does not require an employer to create a new job or reassign job duties to other staff as a reasonable accommodation. Harris v. DHSS, Case No. 84-0109-PC-ER (Wis. Personnel Comm'n Feb. 11, 1988). Rather, the employer's obligation is limited to the job-related responsibilities of the handicapped individual's employment vis-à-vis the particular job he or she occupies or for which he or she is applying. Id. at 14-15. In both of these decisions, the foregoing conclusions were not particular to the facts of the case but were offered as general legal principles. ¶ 107. If nothing else, this history indicates inconsistency in agency interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 111.34 on this matter. [S]pecial deference to be afforded an agency is the result of a course of uniform interpretation over a period of time. Local No. 695, 154 Wis. 2d at 84. Given the preceding history, there has hardly been uniform application of § 111.34 by LIRC and the Wisconsin Personnel Commission. Therefore, due weight should clearly be afforded in this case. ¶ 108. Under the due weight standard, a court need not defer to an agency's interpretation which, while reasonable, is not the interpretation which the court considers best and most reasonable. Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at 660 n.4; see also Brauneis, 236 Wis. 2d 27, ¶ 20 (Pursuant to due weight deference, an agency's statutory interpretation is accorded some weight, but is not conclusive.). This court is not bound by LIRC's statutory interpretation. See Brauneis, 236 Wis. 2d 27, ¶ 15. The fact that the agency's interpretation is reasonable does not mean that its interpretation will necessarily be upheld. If a court finds an alternative interpretation more reasonable, it need not adopt the agency's interpretation. UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 287. Therefore, if this court finds, by means of its own independent analysis, an alternative interpretation that is more reasonable, then it need not adopt the agency's interpretation. ¶ 109. By adopting an incorrect level of deference regarding LIRC's legal conclusion, this court has abdicated its role to define the law established under Chapter 111 and has passively allowed the establishment of a wholly less reasonable interpretation of the law. At a minimum, given the inconsistency of the administrative agencies addressing similar issues, and the lack of LIRC decisions addressing this precise issue, this court should have engaged in an independent review of what § 111.34 demands on this question.