Opinion ID: 1788186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether M.R.C.P. 20(a) allows Moody to join his claims against Brierfield with his claims against Mercer in the same case.

Text: ¶ 6. M.R.C.P. 20(a) governs permissive joinder of parties; generally, multiple parties may join as plaintiffs if they maintain that defendants are jointly or severally liable to them or if their alleged right to relief arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action. With respect to defendants, all may be joined in a case where a plaintiff asserts that they are jointly or severally liable to him or his claimed right to relief arises from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. (emphasis added). Id. Before multiple parties may be joined as either plaintiffs or defendants, [b]oth of these requirements must be satisfied in order to sustain party joinder under Rule 20(a).... Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So.2d 31, 46 (Miss.2004) (citation omitted). ¶ 7. The same transaction or occurrence requirement of Rule 20(a) is satisfied, as any potential claims Moody had against either Mercer or Brierfield arose out of one distinct event, the accident of March 14, 2001. Less certain is whether a common question of law or fact will arise as to Mercer and Brierfield, such that they should be joined as defendants. ¶ 8. Moody claims that there is a common issue of law or fact which makes joinder of his claims against Mercer and Brierfield proper and relies on Jamison v. Purdue Pharma Co., 251 F.Supp.2d 1315 (S.D.Miss.2003), to support his position. In Jamison, plaintiffs brought an action in state court and joined as defendants several pharmaceutical companies that made or distributed Oxycontin, two pharmacies which sold it, and a doctor who prescribed it. Id. at 1318. Defendants removed the case to federal court and challenged plaintiffs' joinder of all of the defendants under Rule 20(a). Id. The federal district court, in determining that joinder was proper, stated that the common issue of law or fact requirement does not require that every question of law or fact arising in the action be shared among the parties. `[R]ather, the rule permits party joinder whenever there will be at least one common question of law or fact.' Id. at 1323 (citation omitted). ¶ 9. In Jamison, though the plaintiffs asserted different theories for recovery against the different categories of defendants, the court found that the common issue of law or fact requirement was met because resolution of a claim against the pharmaceutical defendants could affect the liability of the pharmacy defendants and the defendant doctor. Id. at 1323. Moody believes Jamison is very similar to this case; he asserts that his claim against Mercer will have an impact on the litigation of his claims against Brierfield and Brierfield's own claims against Mercer. Moody asserts that the fact that he requested different relief from Mercer and Brierfield should not bar him from joining these claims together in one action. While Moody correctly states the general rule, Mercer raises facts which alter the general application of Rule 20(a). ¶ 10. Mercer, in challenging Brierfield's joinder as a defendant, argues that the requirements of Rule 20(a) have not been met. He contends that Moody only had a right to sue Mercer and that a declaratory judgment action was not proper in this case and cites to Poindexter v. Southern United Fire Ins. Co., 838 So.2d 964 (Miss. 2003), as authority. In Poindexter, the plaintiff sued a party who was responsible for the loss to his automobile and Southern United, that party's insurance carrier, seeking a declaration of coverage. Southern United claimed that it was not a proper party to the case because it had not denied coverage. Id. at 966. This Court recognized that under the 2000 amendment to M.R.C.P. 57, an insured may seek a declaratory judgment establishing coverage, where the insurance company has indicated it may deny coverage of the claim. Id. at 967. While we recognized the limited right of an insurer to seek a declaration of coverage where such coverage is in doubt, we further stated that Rule 57 does not permit an injured party to join an insurance company that has admitted coverage. Id. at 968. Since Southern United admitted coverage for any of the plaintiff's losses in Poindexter, we affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that there were no grounds for the plaintiff to seek a declaratory judgment and that dismissal of Southern United was proper. Id. at 968, 972. (emphasis added). ¶ 11. After looking at the general joinder requirements of Rule 20(a) and the specific rules for bringing a declaratory judgment action against an insurance company under Rule 57, we find that Moody improperly joined Brierfield as a defendant. This Court's decision in Poindexter is on all fours with the instant case. Brierfield has not only admitted that Moody's loss was covered, it has already paid him for his losses. Moody cannot rely on Rule 57 as the basis for bringing suit against Brierfield in the instant case. Rule 57 only allows Moody to seek a declaratory judgment against an insurer when coverage is in doubt, and coverage is not in doubt here. As such, there will be no common question of law or fact litigated between all parties, making joinder of Brierfield and Mercer as defendants improper. Brierfield should therefore be dismissed.