Opinion ID: 211779
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Product Design

Text: Under Fifth Circuit law, trade dress protects only the overall appearance of a product. Eng’g Dynamics v. Structural Software, 26 F.3d 1335, 1350 (5th Cir. 1994); Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 1989); Elmer, 67 F.3d at 1578. In order to prevail on its trade dress infringement claims for the product configuration, Hartco was required show that the trade dress was “nonfunctional, distinctive, and has acquired a secondary meaning.” See Eng’g Dynamics, 26 F.3d at 1350. Second, it had to show a likelihood of customer confusion. Id.; see also Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 505 U.S. 763 (1992). We reject Hartco’s argument that the hitchcover design is inherently distinctive and thus it does not have to show that the trade dress acquired secondary meaning as to the product. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000). Rather, a product design cannot be inherently distinctive as a matter of law. Id. at 215. Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether Hartco met its burden of presenting 04-1480, -1481, -1482, -1523 9 sufficient evidence to support a finding of secondary meaning. See Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 (5th Cir. 1999). Under Fifth Circuit law, length and nature of use, sales volume and advertising, consumer surveys and testimony, and appellants’ intent are the relevant factors regarding secondary meaning. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, 155 F.3d 526, 541 (5th Cir. 1998). Reviewing the record, we note that although Hartco sold its hitchcover for four years before appellants released their own version, it offered no evidence that sales volume, advertising, nature of use, or appellants’ intent proved that its trade dress had acquired secondary meaning. Moreover, Hartco introduced no survey evidence, which is the most direct and persuasive evidence for establishing secondary meaning. Sugar Busters, 177 F.3d at 269. We thus conclude that Hartco did not meet its burden of establishing secondary meaning and thus that the trade dress of the product is not protectible. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 766, n.4; see also Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851, n.11 (1982). Therefore, substantial evidence does not support a finding of trade dress infringement on the product design. As no reasonable jury could have concluded that Hartco showed secondary meaning, we reverse the district court’s denial of judgment of noninfringement as a matter of law, together with the award of damages relevant to trade dress infringement.