Opinion ID: 2514236
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: A Remand Is Required for Reconsideration of the Punitive Damages Award.

Text: In addition to the $106,815.43 award of compensatory damages, the superior court awarded an identical amount of punitive damages to Faulk. In this appeal, MAPCO claims that the award of punitive damages was improper because (1) Faulk abandoned his claim for punitive damages and because (2) the award itself was manifestly unreasonable.
MAPCO claims that Faulk abandoned his claim for punitive damages by failing to mention them in his initial disclosures, in response to an interrogatory, and at trial. [45] Civil Rule 26(a)(1)(G) states that a party's initial disclosures must state all categories of damages claimed. In his initial disclosures, Faulk did not explicitly mention punitive damages, but he stated that documents supported the damages claimed. This can certainly be read to refer to the damages claimed in Faulk's complaint, including both compensatory and punitive damages. The requirements of Rule 26(a)(1)(G) are fulfilled here by the reference in the initial disclosures. All parties were on notice of the punitive damages claim in the complaint, and we decline to treat any later failures to mention punitive damages as waiver or abandonment of the punitive damages claim. MAPCO also claims that punitive damages were not mentioned in response to a specific interrogatory from MAPCO on damages. This interrogatory stated: Please list all damages claimed by the Plaintiff. Faulk responded with Please see Plaintiff's Documents No. 000066 through 000076 and Documents No. 000242 through 000285; Faulk claims that these documents were pertinent to claims for both compensatory and punitive damages; however, Faulk implies that the documents only directly support claims for compensatory damages. Nevertheless, we decline to hold that this answer constitutes a waiver or abandonment of the punitive damages claim. Finally, MAPCO notes that punitive damages were not mentioned or discussed at trial. However, the circumstances of the trial were unusual. Judge Reese stated at the onset of the trial that an opening statement was not necessary because the court was familiar with the case. Nevertheless, because the plaintiff's first witness had not yet arrived, Faulk's counsel used the time to make a short opening statement that did not raise the issue of punitive damages. Closing arguments were waived by both parties, because MAPCO's counsel had scheduling difficulties and, as revealed at oral argument, a death in the family. Thus, while Faulk never waived his claim for punitive damages at trial, MAPCO never had an opportunity to address the question of punitive damages. Because we remand the issue for further consideration and findings, the superior court should give the parties an opportunity to address the issue of punitive damages through oral or written argument on remand.
We have most recently discussed the requirements for an award of punitive damages in Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Stewart: [46] Punitive damages may not be awarded in an action, whether in tort, contract, or otherwise, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence. To support a claim for punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's conduct was outrageous, such as acts done with malice, bad motive, or reckless indifference to the interests of another. We have stated that a showing of malice is not required; however, [the plaintiff] must establish that [the defendant's] conduct amounted to reckless indifference to the rights of others, and conscious action in deliberate disregard of [those rights]. [47] Two aspects of the superior court's punitive damages award are problematic: the court's award is based on a finding that is not supported by any evidence in the record, and the increase in the award between the verdict of November 1, 1999 and the final judgment of December 7, 1999 is not explained by the court. The superior court's award of punitive damages is based on the following factual finding: [T]he intentional trespass was authorized [by] Mr. Farnsworth on behalf of MAPCO after being informed of the problem that the trespass was causing ... and it was therefore done with the deliberate intent to cause injury to the Faulk property. (Emphasis added.) There is no evidence in the record to support the finding that the trespass was done with the deliberate intent to cause injury to Faulk's property. There is evidence that tends to show that MAPCO negligently or willfully failed to stop stockpiling snow on the MAPCO property, after Faulk warned MAPCO several times that there was a problem with the snow pile. However, this is not evidence that tends to show that MAPCO had a deliberate intent to cause injury. As noted above, although a finding of malice is not required to support an award of punitive damages, a finding of reckless indifference is required. [48] We remand to the superior court for findings in accordance with the proper standard. Also, the increase in the punitive damages award between November 1, 1999 and December 7, 1999 is not supported by any explanation, reasoning, or analysis. On November 1, 1999, the superior court awarded $65,856.43 in punitive damages. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the superior court increased this figure without any reasoning or explanation to $106,815.43. As discussed earlier, we must reverse the superior court's findings under Rule 52(a) when no findings are made to support the court's conclusion. [49] We have held that a number of considerations go into the award of punitive damages. These include: (i) the magnitude and flagrancy of the offense, (ii) the importance of the policy violated, (iii) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and (iv) the wealth of the defendant. [50] The superior court in this case did not explicitly consider any of these factors, and in granting the December 7 increase implicitly considered only the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, since the ratio remained at 1:1. Yet we have repeatedly stated that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is not the determinative factor. [51] Because this increase from $65,856.43 to $106,815.43 was not explained by any findings, we must reverse the award of punitive damages and remand to the superior court for reconsideration of punitive damages and findings.