Opinion ID: 1194929
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background on Section 1983

Text: Section 1983, [2] a long-dormant Reconstruction-era civil rights statute, gained modern vitality in Monroe v. Pape (1961) 365 U.S. 167 [81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492], overruled in part by Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 663 [98 S.Ct. 2018, 2022, 56 L.Ed.2d 611]. (Schwartz, Litigating Section 1983 Claims: Civil Rights and Official Misconduct Cases in Federal and State Courts (Cont.Ed.Bar 1985) p. 1.) (1) Its primary purposes are compensation and deterrence for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law. ( Howlett v. Rose (1990) 496 U.S. 356, 358 [110 S.Ct. 2430, 2433, 110 L.Ed.2d 332], fn. omitted; Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981) 453 U.S. 247, 267-268 [101 S.Ct. 2748, 2759-2760, 69 L.Ed.2d 616].) Section 1983 claims may be brought in either state or federal court. ( Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 358 [110 S.Ct. at p. 2433].)
(2) Neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are person[s] within the meaning of section 1983 when sued for damages. ( Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 71, fn. 10 [109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45]; Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 365 [110 S.Ct. at p. 2437] [[T]he State and arms of the State ... are not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court.].) Hence, neither can be sued for damages under section 1983, even in state court. (See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, supra, 491 U.S. at pp. 63-64, 71, fn. 10 [109 S.Ct. at pp. 2308-2309, 2312].) In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra, 436 U.S. 658, the high court overruled that portion of Monroe which held that local governments were not person[s] within the meaning of section 1983, and hence were wholly immune from suit. ( Id. at pp. 663, 690 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 2022, 2035-2036].) (3) Under Monell, local governments can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. Moreover, ... local governments ... may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental `custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels. ( Id. at pp. 690-691 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 2035-2036].) Local government includes counties as well as cities. ( McMillian v. Monroe County (1997) 520 U.S. 781, ___-___ [117 S.Ct. 1734, 1735-1736, 138 L.Ed.2d 1] [if sheriff's actions constitute county as opposed to state policy, then county is liable under section 1983]; Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 690, fn. 54 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2036] [Section 1983 applies to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.].) However, a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor  or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. ( Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 691 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2036], original italics.) Thus, a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. (436 U.S. at p. 694 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 2037-2038]; see Pembaur v. Cincinnati (1986) 475 U.S. 469, 481 [106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299, 89 L.Ed.2d 452] (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.) [Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. [Fn. omitted.]].) (4) Moreover, it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the `moving force' behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights. ( Bd. of County Com'rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown (1997) 520 U.S. 397, ___ [117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L.Ed.2d 626], original italics.) [P]roof that a municipality's legislative body or authorized decisionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably. Similarly, the conclusion that the action taken or directed by the municipality or its authorized decisionmaker itself violates federal law will also determine that the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains. ( Id. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1389].)
(5) Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. ( Kentucky v. Graham (1985) 473 U.S. 159, 165 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114].) Official-capacity suits, in contrast, `generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.' ( Ibid. ; Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 71 [109 S.Ct. at p. 2312] [While state officials literally are persons, a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. [Citation.] As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.]; see Brandon v. Holt (1985) 469 U.S. 464, 471-472 [105 S.Ct. 873, 877-878, 83 L.Ed.2d 878].) As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. ( Kentucky v. Graham, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 166 [105 S.Ct. at p. 3105].) When it comes to defenses to liability, an official in a personal-capacity action may, depending on his position, be able to assert personal immunity defenses.... See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 [96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128] (1976) (absolute immunity); [citations]. In an official-capacity action, these defenses are unavailable. [Citations.] The only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment. ( Kentucky v. Graham, supra, 473 U.S. at pp. 166-167 [105 S.Ct. at pp. 3105-3106], fn. omitted.)
(6) The availability of immunity from liability under section 1983 in state court is governed by federal, not state, law. ( Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 375, 383 [110 S.Ct. at pp. 2442, 2446-2447].) In Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409 [96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128], the high court held that state prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under section 1983 for conduct that is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. ( Id. at pp. 430-431 [96 S.Ct. at p. 995].) Such conduct includes initiating a prosecution and presenting the state's case ( id. at p. 431 [96 S.Ct. at p. 995]), and participating in a probable cause hearing ( Burns v. Reed (1991) 500 U.S. 478, 487 [111 S.Ct. 1934, 1939-1940, 114 L.Ed.2d 547]). Imbler accorded prosecutors absolute immunity under these circumstances out of concern that fear of potential liability would undermine a prosecutor's performance of his duties by forcing him to consider his own potential liability when making prosecutorial decisions and by diverting his `energy and attention ... from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law.' ( Buckley v. Fitzsimmons (1993) 509 U.S. 259, 270, fn. 4 [113 S.Ct. 2606, 2614, 125 L.Ed.2d 209], quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 424-425 [96 S.Ct. at pp. 992-993].) Suits against prosecutors would devolve into `a virtual retrial of the criminal offense [in] a new forum,' [citation], and would undermine the vigorous enforcement of the law by providing a prosecutor an incentive not `to go forward with a close case where an acquittal likely would trigger a suit against him for damages.' ( Ibid. ) The court also expressed concern that the availability of a damages action might cause judges to be reluctant to award relief to convicted defendants in post-trial motions. ( Ibid. ) Prosecutors are only entitled to qualified immunity, however, for conduct not intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, including giving legal advice to police, or conducting investigations regarding an individual before there is probable cause to have that individual arrested. ( Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 430 [96 S.Ct. at pp. 994-995]; Burns v. Reed, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 496 [111 S.Ct. at pp. 1944-1945]; Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, supra, 509 U.S. at pp. 272-275 [113 S.Ct. at pp. 2615-2617].)