Opinion ID: 2211408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Due Process Rights

Text: We originally granted leave in this case to consider the validity of the Court of Appeals decision in Carr, supra at 659, 386 N.W.2d 631, holding that any evidence derived from testimony at a [prison] disciplinary hearing is inadmissible at subsequent criminal proceedings on the underlying charge, save for impeachment or rebuttal, and the accused must be advised before testifying at the disciplinary hearing that his testimony will not be admissible against him at a subsequent criminal trial on the underlying offense. Before addressing that issue, however, we first must consider whether defendant's due process rights were violated when, at his criminal trial, the prosecution introduced defendant's statements from the prior disciplinary hearing despite the contrary assurance made by prison officials. We agree with Judge Markman's opinion below that, because defendant was advised at the disciplinary hearing that his statements would not be admissible against him at a subsequent criminal trial, and those statements were in fact later used against him, elementary notions of due process [2] require that his conviction be reversed. 226 Mich.App. at 695, 575 N.W.2d 48. We have, on two occasions, addressed the enforceability of promises made by state officials in the criminal justice context. In People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 235 N.W.2d 581 (1975), the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the prosecution against the defendant if he passed a polygraph examination administered by the Michigan State Police. The defendant initially passed the examination, and the prosecutor prepared an order of nolle prosequi, which order was approved by the trial court. Subsequently, the prosecutor had doubts about the reliability of the test results and retained another expert who informed the prosecutor that the results could have been distorted if administered to a schizophrenic. The prosecution then filed a new complaint on the same charges. This Court reversed the defendant's conviction on the ground that the prosecutor gave a pledge of public faith which became binding when the nolle prosequi order was approved by the trial judge. Id. at 309, 235 N.W.2d 581. [3] Reagan might be read to suggest that all so-called pledges of public faith must be specifically enforced. However, we reject any such reliance on Reagan because, as we later observed in People v. Gallego, 430 Mich. 443, 451, 424 N.W.2d 470 (1988), the decision in Reagan did not rest on constitutional grounds. Reagan did not purport to hold that due process requires specific performance of all promises made in the criminal justice context. We do, however, find guidance in our subsequent decision in Gallego. In that case, the defendant was arrested following a drug transaction involving an undercover Michigan State Police officer. However, the police failed to recover $33,000 that the undercover officer used to purchase the drugs from the defendant. The defendant subsequently entered into a written agreement with representatives of the state police and the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) whereby defendant would return the $33,000 in exchange for the officers' agreement not to prosecute him for any state or federal drug offenses. After the officers retrieved the money, the defendant was released. However, the county prosecutor did not feel bound by the police agreement and subsequently charged the defendant with delivery of cocaine. Id. at 446-447, 424 N.W.2d 470. The defendant in Gallego sought specific performance of the police agreement on the ground that he had surrendered his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure and his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination in reliance on the agreement he made with the police. Id. at 456, 424 N.W.2d 470. Although we acknowledged the United States Supreme Court's recognition in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), and Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984), that due process provided a right to relief for the violation of an authorized plea agreement, we denied the defendant his requested relief on two grounds. First, we concluded that the police lacked the authority to make a binding promise of immunity or not to prosecute. 430 Mich. at 452, 424 N.W.2d 470. Second, we recognized the presence of an alternative remedy which essentially restores defendant to the position he enjoyed prior to making the agreement in question with the police. Id. at 455-456, 424 N.W.2d 470. In that regard, we concluded that suppression or exclusion of the written agreement and purchase money was an appropriate remedy that cured the defendant's detrimental reliance. Id. at 456, 424 N.W.2d 470. Gallego did not address the precise issue presented here: What remedy must be afforded under due process principles when a defendant surrenders a constitutional right in reliance on an authorized agreement? [4] However, Gallego did recognize that, even in the context of authorized plea agreements, the United States Supreme Court has never held that the constitution compels specific performance. Id. at 450, 424 N.W.2d 470. Indeed, we can discern no basis under due process principles for a requirement that all authorized agreements be specifically enforced. Logic dictates that we should remedy a due process violation by attempting to cure the defendant's detrimental reliance. Accordingly, we apply the Gallego analysis here to conclude that, even if an agreement was authorized, due process requires only that the defendant's detrimental reliance be cured. Here, prison officials promised defendant that any statements he made at the disciplinary hearing would not be used against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding except for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal. After signing the agreement, defendant admitted that he knowingly possessed marijuana, thus partially surrendering his ability to later assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. [5] Defendant's right to due process was violated when his statements were later used against him as substantive evidence. We hold that due process principles require us to cure defendant's detrimental reliance by excluding defendant's statements made at the disciplinary hearing, except for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal. While defendant failed to object to the hearing officer's testimony, reversal is supported by our decision in People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). In that case, this Court held that the plain error rule applies to unpreserved claims of constitutional error. Id. at 764, 597 N.W.2d 130. Under that rule, plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. Id. at 763, 597 N.W.2d 130. To avoid forfeiture of the error, three requirements must be met: (1) error must have occurred, (2) the error was plain, that is, clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected substantial rights. Id. The third requirement usually requires a showing of prejudice, namely, that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Finally, reversal is warranted when the plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, independent of the defendant's innocence. Id. at 763-764, 597 N.W.2d 130. These requirements are fulfilled in this case. A plain error occurred in that the state breached an agreement not to use defendant's statements made at the disciplinary hearing against him in a subsequent criminal trial save for impeachment or rebuttal. As stated, this error affected defendant's substantial rights to due process of law as required by both the federal and state constitutions. Next, defendant has easily met the burden of persuasion regarding prejudice. His first trial, without the error, resulted in a hung jury. Whereas the second trial, which included as substantive evidence defendant's prior statements, resulted in his conviction. Therefore, the error apparently affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Finally, we exercise our discretion in deciding to reverse defendant's conviction. The error in this caseadmitting defendant's statements as substantive evidence of guilt despite a contrary agreement upon which defendant detrimentally reliedfulfills the second prong of the Carines test for reversal in that it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the proceedings. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for a new trial. On remand, the prosecution may not introduce defendant's statements made at the disciplinary hearing as substantive evidence of guilt.