Opinion ID: 214581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Monson's Hyde Amendment Motion

Text: Monson argues that the government's prosecution against him was frivolous or vexatious. Monson does not argue that the prosecution against him was in bad faith. [3] Monson first contends that his prosecution was vexatious or frivolous because the district court ruled that the search warrant violated Franks v. Delaware . We reject Monson's contention that a favorable Franks ruling necessarily means that a prosecution against a defendant was frivolous or vexatious. A favorable Franks ruling constitutes a finding that law enforcement deliberately lied or recklessly disregarded the truth when they included information in an affidavit used to obtain a warrant. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674. A Franks ruling does not necessarily mean that government prosecutors (assuming they did not participate in the preparation of the affidavit) deliberately lied or acted with a reckless disregard for the truth. Instead, when a district court finds that a search warrant violates Franks, rather than automatically concluding that the prosecution against the defendant was frivolous or vexatious, we must consider the individual facts of the case. This analysis requires considering whether the falsehoods producing the Franks violation were deliberately or recklessly made and whether (and to what extent) prosecutors participated in the preparation of the challenged warrant. Focusing on the prosecutors' conduct, we first reject Monson's argument that the prosecution against him was vexatious. A prosecution is vexatious if it is without reasonable or probable cause or excuse. Porchay, 533 F.3d at 711 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to this standard, if the government had sufficient evidence to have probable cause to believe that Monson committed the crimes charged, the prosecution against him was not vexatious. [4] Id. We have no trouble concluding that the government possessed sufficient evidence to show probable cause to believe that Monson committed the crimes charged. Nebraska law enforcement seized thirty-three firearms, sixty-seven pounds of marijuana, and 266 marijuana plants from Monson's home. At a preliminary hearing shortly after Monson was charged with possessing marijuana with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime, a federal judge concluded there was probable cause to believe Monson committed the crimes charged. Thus, we reject Monson's argument that the district court abused its discretion by finding that the prosecution against him was not vexatious. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the prosecution against Monson was not frivolous. A prosecution is frivolous if it is utterly without foundation in law or fact. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard requires a consideration of the legal merit to a prosecution. See Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.2009) (defining frivolous as lacking a legal basis or legal merit); see also United States v. Braunstein, 281 F.3d 982, 995 (9th Cir. 2002) (defining a frivolous prosecution as one that is foreclosed by binding precedent or obviously wrong (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re 1997 Grand Jury, 215 F.3d 430, 436 (4th Cir.2000) (defining a frivolous prosecution as one that is `groundless ... with little prospect of success' (quoting Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1299 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.1990)))). The parties appear to agree that the government's prosecution of Monson depended upon its ability to use the thirty-three firearms, sixty-seven pounds of marijuana, and 266 marijuana plants to prove the charges in the indictment. Accordingly, to prove that the prosecution against him was sufficiently lacking in legal merit that it was frivolous, Monson must prove that the government's arguments that it could use this evidence were utterly without foundation in law or fact. Porchay, 533 F.3d at 711 (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted earlier, the district court determined that Keatts made three sets of false or misleading statements or omissions with a reckless disregard for their truth. We address each of these sets of statements and omissions and consider whether the government had non-frivolous arguments for why these statements and omissions did not create a Franks violation. First, the district court found that Keatts misleadingly failed to note that Housh had signed an agreement to cooperate with law enforcement in an investigation of Monson on September 16, 2008. We believe the government had non-frivolous arguments that this omission did not result in a Franks violation. The Eighth Circuit has held that a warrant does not violate Franks when the affidavit used to procure the warrant omitted the fact that an informant was paid for his cooperation. United States v. Williams, 477 F.3d 554, 558 (8th Cir.2007). Here, Housh was not even paid; rather, he merely signed an agreement to be a cooperating individual. The purpose of the agreement was to ensure that Housh knew what to expect from law enforcement and vice versa. Because omitting the fact that an informant was paid for his cooperation does not result in a Franks violation, the government had a non-frivolous argument that omission of Housh's status as an unpaid cooperating individual did not result in a Franks violation. Second, the district court found that Keatts falsely stated that Housh met with Monson on September 12, 2008. The district court did not find that this meeting never occurred at all, but rather that it probably [occurred] months earlier. We believe the government had a non-frivolous argument that this false statement regarding the date of the meeting did not result in the search warrant violating Franks. Even if this date is excised, Keatts's affidavit still contains more than enough information to establish probable cause for searching Monson's residence. Thus, the government still could have had non-frivolous grounds for believing the warrant was valid under Franks even if it conceded that this particular date had to be excised. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (holding that the warrant is only invalid if the un-excised portions of the affidavit do not establish probable cause). Third and finally, the district court found that the planned transaction between Housh and Monson never occurred in any way, shape, or form as [Keatts described in the final paragraph of the affidavit]. From the Franks hearing transcript, it is unclear whether the district court felt Keatts's affidavit falsely stated that some events had occurred at the time Keatts applied for the search warrant, or whether the district court felt Keatts's affidavit included false or misleading statements because the events in Keatts's affidavit did not actually end up happening the way Keatts indicated they would. In either case, we note that we ordinarily interpret affidavits in a common sense fashion that is not hypertechnical. United States v. Hudspeth, 525 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir.2008). As a result, regardless of why the district court ultimately thought the final paragraph included false or misleading information, we think the government's arguments to the contrary were non-frivolous. If the final paragraph falsely stated that certain events had already happened at the time Keatts applied for the search warrant, we believe the government presented a non-frivolous argument that Keatts was making statements regarding future events, not past events. Keatts applied for the affidavit around 5:00 p.m. on September 16, 2008. Although Keatts's affidavit indicated arrangements and contact with Monson were madea verb phrased in the past tenseKeatts indicated that Housh made these arrangements and this contact at 5:15 p.m. and between 5:30 p.m. and midnight, respectively. Of course, at the time Keatts applied for the affidavit at 5:00 p.m., these times had not yet come to pass. Moreover, Keatts ended the paragraph by stating that Housh will make a trade with Monson at Monson's house. Keatts could have eliminated any confusion by simply constructing the verb make in its future tense each time he used the verb in the final paragraph. Even so, however, we still believe the government had non-frivolous arguments that a common sense reading of the affidavit suggested that Keatts was referencing future events, not past events. [5] If, on the other hand, the final paragraph included false or misleading statements because the predicted events did not actually end up happening the way Keatts indicated they would, we believe the government had non-frivolous arguments that any minor deviations from the affidavit were not material to whether the triggering condition in Keatts's anticipatory warrant [6] nevertheless occurred. At the Franks hearing, Monson argued that, contrary to the affidavit, Housh's deal with Monson was not agreed to (1) at about 5:15 p.m. or (2) over the telephone. However, even assuming the affidavit contemplated the occurrence of these events and even assuming these events did not occur, there is no question that Housh did speak with Monson over the telephone at 7:00 p.m. and did exchange cash and drugs for firearms with Monson later that evening. Thus, there is no question that the triggering condition in the affidavit did occur prior to execution of the search warrant. See United States v. Vesikuru, 314 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir.2002) (endorsing common sense interpretations of affidavits when determining whether a triggering condition occurred). Occurrence of the triggering condition did not depend upon Housh finalizing the deal over the phone rather than in-person, or at 5:15 p.m. rather than later that evening. In sum, the district court in this case did not abuse its discretion in holding that the government's prosecution of Monson was neither vexatious or frivolous. The government had strong evidence of Monson's guilt, and the government had non-frivolous arguments for why it should have been able to use this evidence in its prosecution of Monson. Although these arguments did not persuade the district court, that does not mean that the government committed prosecutorial misconduct.