Opinion ID: 2049617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Composition of the Jury.

Text: On the second day of the trial in this case, the alternate juror, Richard Kenaston, was seated on the panel. [5] At the close of the evidence defense counsel was advised by plaintiff's attorney that Kenaston may have been a party in a prior employment contract suit brought in Maine. Defense counsel notified the presiding justice who made an extensive inquiry of Kenaston in chambers and on the record, but outside the presence of counsel. The juror disclosed that he in fact had been the plaintiff in an employment contract case against a Maine school district in the early 1970s. [6] This disclosure confirmed that Kenaston had failed to respond during the court's voir dire of the jury pool when the justice asked whether any member of the pool had ever been involved in an employment contract case in court. Kenaston explained his nondisclosure by stating that he had not thought of his case in years and that the case had not made a significant impact on him. He further stated that the prior case would not affect his ability to deliberate impartially in the instant case. After the questioning, the justice advised counsel of Kenaston's nondisclosure and the reasons therefor. The court then asked whether either party wanted to challenge the juror. Defense counsel made no request of the court to voir dire the juror. Instead, he immediately moved for a mistrial, whereupon the justice asked if counsel would be agreeable to proceeding with seven jurors. When defense counsel refused to consider the seven juror alternative until the court ruled on his request for a mistrial, the justice stated that he was satisfied that Kenaston was not tainted or prejudiced by his prior experience and, given the remoteness in time of the prior lawsuit and the absence of bitterness or disappointment on his part arising out of the former suit, found that he was perfectly capable of being a fair and impartial juror. The justice then denied counsel's motion for a mistrial. Defendant claims that this ruling prejudiced his right to be tried by a disinterested, unbiased jury. We disagree. We note initially that the present case presents no facts that would lead a factfinder to conclude that Kenaston intentionally misled the trial court during voir dire so as to avoid being excluded from the jury panel. The trial justice found, after inquiry, that Kenaston's failure to respond on voir dire resulted from a combination of the fact that a great amount of time had elapsed since the resolution of his suit and the fact that the case had little emotional impact on him. As such, Kenaston's non-disclosure was an innocent, as opposed to an intentional, misrepresentation. In cases where a juror during voir dire innocently withholds information that denies counsel information material to his decision as to whether to exercise a challenge under M.R.Civ.P. 47(c)(3), a new trial is not automatically required. [7] Isaacson v. Husson College, 332 A.2d 757, 764-65 (Me. 1975). Instead, a new trial should be ordered only if such [nondisclosure] has otherwise caused prejudice to the party seeking the new trial insofar as it prevented him from becoming aware of a bias of the juror as probably, not speculatively, existent. Id. The presiding justice retains broad discretion in determining whether a new trial is appropriate and the Law Court will reverse the justice's decision only upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. We conclude that the justice below acted properly within his discretion when he denied defendant's mistrial motion. Before he ruled, the justice carefully examined Kenaston regarding his prior involvement in an employment contract suit and the circumstances surrounding his nondisclosure on voir dire in the present suit. In his brief to this Court defendant argues that since Kenaston's suit presented legal issues similar to those raised in the present case, Kenaston's bias as a juror is clearly demonstrated. The similarity of Kenaston's suit to the instant case, however, is only one factor that the presiding justice properly considered in deciding the issue of Kenaston's probable bias. The remoteness in time of Kenaston's prior claim, the innocence of his nondisclosure and the lack of connection of Kenaston's suit with plaintiff's cause of action were also factors properly considered by the trial justice and resolved by him against the position taken by defendant. To have concluded on this record that Kenaston harbored a probable bias against defendant would have required speculation by the Superior Court. The presiding justice exhibited a proper exercise of his discretion when he denied defendant's motion for a mistrial.