Opinion ID: 2672293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the broken bb gun introduced into

Text: EVIDENCE WAS A DEADLY WEAPON WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ARMED-ROBBERY STATUTE, WHERE THE ONLY PROOF ADDUCED SHOWED THE TOY WAS BROKEN AND WHEN USED AS A CLUB DID NOT CAUSE SERIOUS BODILY INJURY. ¶8. Section 97-3-79, under which Williams was tried and convicted, states in pertinent part: Every person who shall feloniously take or attempt to take from the person or from the presence the personal property of another and against his will by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of immediate injury to his person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon shall be guilty of robbery . . .. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-79 (Rev. 2006). ¶9. Citing Duckworth v. State, 477 So. 2d 935 (Miss. 1985), Williams acknowledges that whether a particular item is actually a “deadly weapon” as contemplated by statute, has long been held to be a question for the jury’s determination. See Duckworth, 477 So. 2d at 938 (affirming armed-robbery conviction where question whether a blank starter pistol was a deadly weapon was properly resolved by the jury). Williams also acknowledges that both this Court and the Court of Appeals have affirmed armed-robbery convictions where a BB gun was used during the commission of a robbery. See Saucier v. State, 562 So. 2d 1238, 1246 (Miss. 1990), overruled on other grounds (finding that a broken pellet gun weighing 4 “three or four pounds[,]” which could be used as a club to inflict serious bodily injury, met the definition of a deadly weapon under Section 97-3-79); Thomas v. State, 936 So. 2d 964, 967 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming armed-robbery conviction where “[t]here was testimony that a pellet gun can inflict serious bodily injury”). Williams contends, however, the evidence here is uncontroverted that the pellet/BB gun in question was broken and inoperable, which distinguishes his case from Thomas. Williams further contends that no proof was adduced for the jury as to the pellet/BB gun’s weight, and, even though the pellet/BB was used as a club, no serious bodily injury resulted; thus, Saucier is inapplicable. ¶10. In his argument on appeal, Williams makes much of the fact the pellet/BB gun entered into evidence at trial was broken. Unlike the Saucier Court, we do not have the actual pellet/BB gun before us on appeal, and the record does not indicate what exactly Williams means by “broken.” Nevertheless, this fact was for the jury to contend with, not this Court. Based upon the record before us, one reasonably can infer from the additional facts of this case that what broke the pellet/BB gun was the manner in which it was used. That no serious bodily injury resulted from its use simply goes to the victim’s good fortune, not to Williams’s culpability under Section 97-3-79. And the fact that testimony was given as to the gun’s weight is of no moment to this Court. The pellet/BB gun was submitted to the jury for its inspection and consideration of the object’s propensity for harm. ¶11. In Cittadino v. State, 199 Miss. 235, 24 So. 2d 93 (1945), this Court vociferously articulated the legislative intent behind our armed-robbery statute. In addressing the argument that the State had failed to establish the existence of a deadly weapon because there 5 was no proof that a firearm used in a robbery was loaded or that its potential use as a bludgeon was not intimated, the Cittadino Court said this: The evil sought to be abated was the employment of such weapons as are held generally, and therefore by the victim, to be deadly. We do not have a case where the weapon has been shown not to be deadly because not loaded or otherwise incapable of use as a firearm. Nor do we treat of the manner of its use since it was not used to effect a battery but accomplished its purpose by its challenge that the actor was ready, able and quite willing to make it deadly. The limited option, made proverbial by the techniques of a ruthless banditry, of money or life is a representation by the culprit that the weapon is deadly and that he will kill because he can kill. This representation, whether voiced or not, is what the bandit expects or insists that the victim comprehend and so accept as literally true, whereby he is immobilized by a reasonable fear. This is the substance from which a genuine inference of the deadly character of the weapon may be formed. .... These considerations are not advanced to fortify doubts as to the prima facie sufficiency of the proof of deadly character where the weapon used is, as such proved or universally recognized as in that category and exhibited for the purpose of effecting robbery through a fear of immediate injury to the person. The law has from earliest times recognized the right of the victim to justify retaliation by extreme measures upon the reasonable assumption that the threat and danger are real because they have intentionally been so represented by the assailant. If the citizen may so presume in his own defense, the State may do so in defense of society, of which he is a representative unit. The provocation of bloodshed, even at the hands of the victim, was not unworthy of legislative notice. The [trial] court was not, therefore, in error in allowing the jury to draw the inferences which appellant himself intended the victim to draw. Cittadino, 24 So. 2d at 95-96. ¶12. Citing Cittandino, Duckworth, and other cases, the Saucier Court found the BB gun at issue before it was, as a matter of law, a “deadly weapon” within the meaning of the armed-robbery statute. Saucier, 562 So. 2d at 1246. The Court qualified its holding, stating: “Of course, the constitution precludes a directed verdict for the prosecution on any essential element of the offense charged. Accordingly, we may only hold that this weapon was not 6 such that Saucier was entitled to have the issue taken from the jury and decided in his favor.” Id. ¶13. Here, Williams makes the same argument(s) asserted before and rejected by the Cittadino, Duckworth, and Saucier Courts. In line with those holdings, we find Williams was not entitled to a directed verdict on the question of whether the pellet/BB gun constituted a “deadly weapon” under Section 97-3-79. This issue is without merit.