Opinion ID: 3032334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proper Respondent

Text: That issue, reserved in Padilla, is “whether the Attorney General is a proper respondent to a habeas petition filed by an alien detained pending deportation.” 124 S. Ct. at 2718 n.8. The lineage of this question is well-traced by our earlier decision in Armentero I, so I will not repeat that analysis here. In considering the merits of the issue on which we granted rehearing, the government’s curious litigation position, alluded to earlier, is critical: The government did not argue in Armentero I that the immediate custodian was the proper respondent. Rather, it argued that the proper respondent was the District Director (now the “Field Office Director”) — the supervisor of the local office of the then-INS. Moreover, the government argued then, and continues to suggest now, that, so long as a detainee files his habeas petition in the district of confinement, the immediate custodian rule need not apply.12 In such a case, the government purports to “waive” whether the proper respondent is the Field Office Director or a subordinate, so long as it is no one superior to the Field Office Director. To me, this selective waiver position is untenable. If the immediate custodian rule does not apply, then it does not apply. There is no “next-immediate-custodian,” or “intermediate custodian,” rule that governs in the breach. Nor may the 12 On rehearing, the government has advised the court that it is currently undertaking an internal review of its procedures to determine the appropriate official to name as the respondent in immigration habeas petitions, if not the immediate custodian. I fail to see how the executive branch can by regulation determine the procedural question presently before this court, as that question concerns only judicial, not administrative, proceedings. ARMENTERO v. INS 7383 government through a purported “waiver” dictate a respondent who was not named in this case. We cannot fault a petitioner for failing to name an improper respondent chosen by the government. Consequently, I consider this case on the premise that the government has waived the “immediate custodian” rule, and that we are to decide who is the proper respondent if not the immediate custodian. Our holding in Armentero I was predicated on the conclusion that, once the immediate custodian rule does not apply, there are no reasons that counsel against naming the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security — the officials who ultimately, in reality, can decide whether to keep Armentero detained — as respondents in immigration habeas petitions. I still find that general conclusion persuasive, although I would modify the appropriate custodian in Mariel Cuban cases, for reasons that will appear.
Padilla traced the immediate custodian rule directly to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wales v. Whitney, in which the Court concluded that the federal habeas statute “contemplate[s] a proceeding against some person who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body of such party before the court or judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is shown to the contrary.” 114 U.S. at 574. To the extent that the rule has a statutory foundation, that foundation is one sentence in 28 U.S.C. § 2243, which provides that “[t]he writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained.” Traditionally, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “ad subjiciendum” proceeded in much the same way as a petition for a writ of certiorari proceeds today: Granting the petition was not dispositive of the merits; instead, the writ would issue for good cause shown, to allow the court to inquire into the 7384 ARMENTERO v. INS basis for the prisoner’s confinement. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES -31; Sabino v. Reno, 8 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627 (S.D. Tex. 1998). As one district court recently summarized, We often think of habeas corpus as the remedy the prisoner seeks, i.e., that if the prisoner is entitled to relief, the court will issue a writ of habeas corpus, which will end his imprisonment. But as the older statutes show, the writ of habeas corpus merely initiates the proceedings. It is analogous in this respect to the writ of certiorari, another prerogative writ still in use. When the Supreme Court grants a writ of cer- tiorari, it is bringing the case before it for decision rather than deciding it on the merits. The same is true in the case of habeas corpus. Roman v. Ashcroft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 755, 759 (N.D. Ohio 2001). At the time of Wales, then, directing the writ to the immediate custodian was a practical necessity. It was the immediate custodian who was best suited physically to bring the prisoner before the court, regardless of his authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release. This understanding prevailed until 1941, when the Supreme Court, in Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941), unanimously approved the growing practice of conducting showcause proceedings before issuing the writ.13 Between them, the petition and the respondent’s “traverse,”14 the Court con13 The Court had implicitly sanctioned such show-cause procedures as far back as 1830, see Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 196 (1830), but did not explicitly uphold its universal validity until Walker. 14 A traverse is a common-law pleading that constitutes “[a] formal denial of a factual allegation made in the opposing party’s pleading.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1538 (8th ed. 2004). ARMENTERO v. INS 7385 cluded, would be sufficient to determine the viability of issuance of the writ, unless factual issues were in dispute, and an evidentiary hearing was therefore necessary. See id. at 284. Under that procedure, if the petition is granted and the writ issues, the petitioner can be set free without ever coming into the courtroom. Although courts embraced Walker slowly at first, it has since become standard practice in the federal courts, to the point that most federal habeas petitions today are adjudicated without formal production of the “body.”15 As Roman summarized, As a result of the courts’ approval of show cause orders in lieu of the writ, and of the rule of Walker, now codified in § 2243, actual production of the petitioner’s body in court is necessary only in those cases in which (1) the court does not dismiss the petition sua sponte on the ground that it is facially insufficient; (2) the court issues the writ rather than a show cause order, or the court determines, after considering the return to the show cause order, that a hearing is necessary; and (3) the petition, together with the answer, presents issues of fact. This is a vanishingly small category of cases. 162 F. Supp. 2d at 760. It seems, then, that the immediate custodian rule, at least as enunciated in Wales, is based on what is today a legal anachronism: that the petitioner is actually to be brought before the court. In the pre-Walker context, concerns over the power of the jailer to bring the body before the court were necessarily 15 For an academic version of this argument, and its implications, see Megan A. Ferstenfield-Torres, Who Are We To Name? The Applicability of the “Immediate-Custodian-as-Respondent” Rule to Habeas Claims Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 431, 461-63 (2003). 7386 ARMENTERO v. INS paramount. Today, however, the more central question raised in a habeas petition is whether the respondent has the authority to effectuate the petitioner’s release.16 See, e.g., Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004) (analyzing whether jurisdiction existed over a habeas petition brought by a U.S. citizen detained by the Saudi Arabian government by focusing on the power of the respondent to provide the requested relief). This historical context explains why the immediate custodian is not an inflexible, jurisdictional mandate, but instead is subject to exceptions based on practical considerations. See, e.g., Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2728-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The question we face is which such considerations predominate here, in light of the government’s “intermediate custodian” position.
The primary consideration cutting against the universal application of the immediate custodian rule to immigrationrelated habeas petitions when we decided Armentero I, and at the time the Supreme Court handed down Padilla, was the fact that, at those times, many habeas petitions “filed by an alien detained pending deportation” did not concern aliens who were detained. See Armentero I, 340 F.3d at 1060 n.2 (noting that “non-detainees under INS control, such as those under an order of deportation or removal, may also file habeas petitions”). Instead, most immigration habeas petitions were challenges to final orders of removal.17 In such cases, in my 16 For example, upon a district court’s grant of a habeas petition, presumably the immediate custodian must first contact his superiors to ascertain whether the decision will be appealed before he may release the prisoner. 17 Of the six circuit cases cited in Padilla’s footnote 8 — where the Court reserved the application of the immediate custodian rule to immigration habeas petitions — the other five were challenges to removal/ deportation orders and not to present physical confinement. See RobledoGonzales v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2003); Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2003); Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688 (1st Cir. 2000); Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998); Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 1994). ARMENTERO v. INS 7387 view, under Padilla’s analysis of the immediate custodian rule, that rule would not have applied. See, e.g., 124 S. Ct. at 2719 (“[T]he immediate physical custodian rule, by its terms, does not apply when a habeas petitioner challenges something other than his present physical confinement.”). Several district courts have so decided since Padilla. See, e.g., Somir v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 2d 215, 216-18 & n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that Padilla does not apply to a petition challenging a removal order, not challenging “present physical confinement”); Campbell v. Ganter, 353 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (same). With the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, however, immigration habeas petitions challenging “something other than . . . present physical confinement” have been largely, if not entirely, eliminated. The Act creates new 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), which provides that: Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this Act, except as provided in subsection (e). Id. § 106(a)(1)(B), 119 Stat. at 310. The Conference Report on the REAL ID Act states that “section 106 would not preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders. Instead, the bill would eliminate habeas review only over challenges to removal orders.” H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 109-72, at 175 (2005).18 18 Whether, and to what degree, such a foreclosure of the writ may implicate the Suspension Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), is not an issue in this case, and therefore one upon which I express no opinion. 7388 ARMENTERO v. INS As the new statute is apparently intended to eliminate the class of immigration habeas petitions concerning challenges to removal orders, I consider the present petition on its own facts. This case does concern the propriety of physical confinement.19 Yet, although this case may initially appear close enough to the “core challenges” category described by the Padilla Court that the principles governing the proper respondent should be the same, the government is not willing to embrace that position, presumably because immigration detainees are kept in a wide range of facilities, including some as to which BICE exercises little day-to-day control. See Armentero I, 340 F.3d at 1068-69. I conclude that the government’s proposed respondent, the Field Office Director, is not proper, at least in Mariel Cuban cases.
Like the litigants in many of the recent indefinite immigration detention cases, Armentero is a Mariel Cuban — a Cuban national who was part of the Mariel Boatlift of 1980. Critical to my conclusion is that Mariel Cubans, unlike other classes of immigrants subject to potentially indefinite detention, are covered by a specific regulation adopted in 1987 (the “Cuban Review Plan,” 8 C.F.R. § 212.12) governing their detention and eligibility for parole.20 A “Cuban Review Panel”21 is 19 The crux of Armentero’s case, on the merits, is whether his potentially indefinite detention is unlawful. That issue, seemingly, has been resolved in his favor by Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716 (2005), in which the Supreme Court extended its holding barring indefinite detention of admissible aliens in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), to inadmissible aliens. See Martinez, 125 S. Ct. at 722-27. Whether Martinez does, as appears, foreordain the result in this case is a separate question, and one that I would not reach at this stage, given that we must, on my view of the case, remand to the district court in any event. 20 In rejecting the argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) may be read as authorizing the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens such as the MarARMENTERO v. INS 7389 responsible for periodic review of each detainee’s suitability for parole. If the panel finds the detainee suitable for parole, it so recommends to the Associate Commissioner for Enforcement, who then decides whether to exercise his discretion to release the detainee. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.12(d)(4)(iii). The ultimate decision is up to the Associate Commissioner for Enforcement, director of BICE’s Office of Enforcement in Washington, D.C. See id. § 100.2(c)(2). Under the regulations, once paroled, a detainee may generally be re-detained only at the discretion of the Associate Commissioner. Specifically, “[t]he Associate Commissioner for Enforcement shall have authority, in the exercise of discretion, to revoke parole in respect to Mariel Cubans. A district director may also revoke parole when, in the district director’s opinion, revocation is in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Associate Commissioner.” Id. § 212.12(h) (emphasis added). Importantly, just as the decision to parole a Mariel iel Cubans, the Supreme Court in Martinez presumably rendered the regulations I discuss obsolete. In the five months since Martinez, however, no administrative action to revise the Cuban Review Plan has been proposed by the government. I therefore proceed on the assumption that these regulations remain in force in practice, as well as in theory. 21 The “Cuban Review Panel” is an ad hoc body formed on a case-bycase basis from the staff of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) by the “Director of the Cuban Review Plan,” an official appointed by the Associate Commissioner for Enforcement. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.12(c). As § 212.12(d)(1) provides, A Cuban Review Panel shall, except as otherwise provided, consist of two persons. Members of a Review Panel shall be selected from the professional staff of the Service. All recommendations by a two-member Panel shall be unanimous. If the vote of a twomember Panel is split, it shall adjourn its deliberations concerning that particular detainee until a third Panel member is added. A recommendation by a three-member Panel shall be by majority vote. The third member of any Panel shall be the Director of the Cuban Review Plan or his designee. 7390 ARMENTERO v. INS Cuban is generally the purview of the Associate Commissioner (based on the recommendation of the Cuban Review Panel), see id. § 212.12(b), (d), so too the decision to revoke parole is also generally that official’s responsibility. The district director is only empowered to act when “circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Associate Commissioner.” In my view, the significance of these regulations is that the government has decided that oversight authority over the detention of Mariel Cubans is specifically not the purview of local officials, except in extraordinary circumstances. Were a local official — be it the warden of the jail or the district director — to release Armentero from custody,22 the official would be violating federal regulations by so doing. In this circumstance, a habeas petition naming the immediate custodian or the Field Office Director would be naming a respondent incapable of providing the requested relief. At least in the case of the Mariel Cubans, then, BICE’s internal regulations concerning authority over detention and parole are inconsistent with its invocation of Padilla to require the naming of a local official even if the immediate custodian is not the respondent. The most junior official who can release Armentero is the Associate Commissioner for Enforcement.23 For these reasons, I would not apply BICE’s version of an “intermediate” custodian rule to the Mariel Cubans. 22 Courts have traditionally not adhered to the immediate custodian rule in habeas petitions challenging parole determinations. See, e.g., Billiteri v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976). 23 Consequently, whether the Associate Commissioner is a more suitable respondent than the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security is a question I do not here reach. The government is not arguing that any of these officials is a proper respondent, the majority does not address the question, and the parties have not addressed the significance of the Mariel Cuban regulations. ARMENTERO v. INS 7391
One last point deserves mention: The government, in arguing against our opinion in Armentero I, suggests that the principle there adopted would allow similarly situated petitioners to forum-shop from among any courts with personal jurisdiction over the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security — presumably, all ninety-four district courts. Yet, the government’s post-Padilla satisfaction with an “intermediate” custodian suggests that its ultimate concern is not, as it suggests, the identity of the official the detainee sues, but the forum in which the detainee sues them. So conceived, the government’s custodian rule becomes nothing but an indirect — but effective — means by which the government can generally require habeas petitions to be brought in the district of confinement. As the Supreme Court emphasized over thirty years ago, venue principles provide adequate assurance against forumshopping by habeas petitioners. See Braden v. Thirtieth Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973). Braden rejected Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), in which the Court had held that, absent special circumstances, habeas petitions should generally be filed in the district of confinement.24 Noting that traditional considerations of venue would alleviate any forum-based abuse of the writ and that there is no constitutional basis for the district-of-confinement rule, Braden concluded that a district court need only have personal jurisdiction over the respondent named in a habeas petition. Padilla left Braden intact, at least in these respects. Justice Kennedy so acknowledged in his concurrence for himself and Justice O’Connor. See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2728-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring).25 Additionally, the Court so acknowl24 Braden reached this result by disagreeing with Ahrens over the meaning of the “within their respective jurisdictions” language in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). See 410 U.S. at 495-500. 25 As Justice Kennedy’s and Justice O’Connor’s votes were essential to the result reached by the majority, their view of the scope of the majority’s 7392 ARMENTERO v. INS edged in another case decided on the same day, see Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004) (“No party questions the District Court’s jurisdiction over petitioners’ custodians. Section 2241, by its terms, requires nothing more.” (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 495)); see also Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2721 (“We have interpreted [§ 2241] to require ‘nothing more than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian.’ ” (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 495)). True, Padilla and Rasul do appear at points to be in some tension with regard to the interaction between Braden and the appropriate custodian rule. Still, reading Padilla and Rasul together, I conclude that Braden continues to stand for the propositions that the district-of-confinement requirement enunciated in Ahrens is no longer an appropriate reading of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, at least where the immediate custodian is not the respondent. Instead, venue is the appropriate mechanism to prevent forumshopping by petitioners. Consequently, Braden remains an obstacle to the contention that venue considerations are insufficient to avoid forum-shopping by petitioners. In light of this discussion, then, I see no reason why the district of confinement should have any bearing on the identity of the respondent. Put another way, I do not read Padilla as sanctioning the use of the intermediate custodian rule championed by the government as a means of restoring Ahrens’s district-of-confinement rule through the back door.26 Unless rule is entitled to particular weight. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Because three other justices dissented [in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968)], the vote of either Justice White or Justice Marshall was necessary to the formation of a majority voting for reversal. Justice White’s concurrence has therefore been given particular weight.” (citing Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1200 (11th Cir. 1982))). 26 As Padilla recognized, the immediate custodian rule follows from the language of § 2243, which identifies the immediate custodian as the party to whom the writ of habeas corpus should ordinarily be directed. Section 2243, however, says nothing about any district-of-confinement rule. ARMENTERO v. INS 7393 Padilla requires us to apply the immediate custodian rule — and, for the reasons discussed above, I conclude that it does not in this case, as the rule is not jurisdictional — there is no other independent reason to require a petitioner such as Armentero to name his immediate (or intermediate) custodian as respondent. Moreover, just as petitioners should not be permitted to forum-shop, the government should not be allowed to forumshop either. Yet adherence to BICE’s “intermediate custodian” rule would accomplish just that. By choosing the district of confinement, the government could fix the forum for a detainee’s habeas claim, as well as overwhelm particular district courts. See Armentero I, 340 F.3d at 1069-70.