Opinion ID: 701744
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeals Panel Review of the Hearing Officer's Decision

Text: 24 Section 1415(c) describes the state agency's review as follows: If the [initial impartial] hearing ... is conducted by a local educational agency ..., any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal to the State Education Agency which shall conduct an impartial review of such hearing. The officer conducting such review shall make an independent decision upon completion of such review. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(c) (emphasis added). The regulation interpreting this provision further provides that the reviewing officer may [s]eek additional evidence if necessary, and may [a]fford the parties an opportunity for oral or written argument, or both, at the discretion of the reviewing official. 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.510(b)(3)-(4) (1993) (emphasis added). Although this language does not explicitly define the appeals panel's scope of review, it suggests a non-deferential standard. 2 The fact that the statute contemplates that the appeals body will make an independent decision suggests not that the appellate body should defer but that it should reach a decision based on its own evaluation of the evidence, independent of the findings of the hearing officer. The language of the regulation, see 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.510(b)(3) (1993), bolsters this interpretation, since the receipt of additional evidence necessarily entails the weighing of the new evidence against the evidence presented in the first (administrative) hearing. 25 As a matter of general appellate principle, however, appeals panels ordinarily defer to the trial presider's factual findings based on credibility judgments about the witnesses presented at the trial or hearing. For example, Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. FED.R.CIV.P. 52(a). See also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (requiring even greater deference to the trial court's findings regarding the credibility of witnesses than to the court's other fact findings). 3 But deference to a factfinder's particular credibility judgment does not necessarily result in deference to all of the findings of fact based on that judgment. 26 While review of credibility-based factual findings is limited, it is not meaningless. Where ... the findings ... are not supported by the record, and indeed, the record supports contrary findings, we must reverse. Ali v. Gibson, 631 F.2d 1126, 1129 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129, 101 S.Ct. 951, 67 L.Ed.2d 117 (1981); see also Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. at 1512 (restricting deference to cases where credibility evidence is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence); Cooper v. Tard, 855 F.2d 125, 126 (3d Cir.1988) (limiting appellate review to an assessment of whether there is enough evidence on the record to support such credibility findings). 27 We thus embrace the Fourth Circuit's approach in Doyle v. Arlington County School Board, 953 F.2d at 105, to the extent that that decision was premised on this specific principle, that credibility-based findings deserve deference unless non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a contrary conclusion or unless the record read in its entirety would compel a contrary conclusion. But beyond this rather narrow class of record-supported, credibility-based factual findings, we think that, to give the statute's language about independent decisions effect, the appeals panel must have much more leeway in reviewing other non-credibility based findings of the hearing officer. See Zirkel, 3 WIDENER J. PUBLIC L. at 892. We will therefore defer to the appeals panel rather than the hearing officer in most circumstances, bringing us closer to the approach taken by the Second and Sixth Circuits in Karl v. Board of Education of Geneseo and Thomas v. Cincinnati Board of Education, respectively. See supra at p. 527. 28 Our approach is also consistent with administrative law principles, which permit an agency or board freely to accept or reject an ALJ's findings and conclusions of law. Section 557(b) of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provides: On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 557(b) (1995). Courts review the board's decisions, not those of the ALJ's. Starrett v. Special Counsel, 792 F.2d 1246, 1252 (4th Cir.1986) (citing 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE Sec. 17.16 (2d ed. 1980)). 29 Moreover, limiting the appeals panel's deference to those situations involving record-supported credibility determinations tracks the approach taken by other administrative regimes, such as that created by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq. (1973 and Supp.1995). See Stein Seal Co. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 703 (3d Cir.1979) (holding that the Board was free to make fact findings contrary to the ALJ's so long as they are supported by substantial evidence); Local 259, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers v. NLRB, 776 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.1985) (upholding the decision of the Board where differences between ALJ and the Board did not result from divergence of views as to credibility of testimony concerning evidentiary facts but instead resulted from differences in overall judgment as to proper inferences and ultimate determination). 30 We thus hold that appeals panels reviewing the fact findings of hearing officers in two-tier schemes (such as Pennsylvania's) exercise plenary review, except that they should defer to the hearing officer's findings based on credibility judgments unless the non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a contrary conclusion or unless the record read in its entirety would compel a contrary conclusion. 31