Opinion ID: 2975131
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Procedural Default of Due Process Claims

Text: Henley believes that the prosecution gave Flatt favorable parole treatment in exchange for his testimony against Henley. Henley’s habeas petition claims that his due process rights were violated when Flatt falsely denied receiving these benefits and the prosecutor let this falsity go uncorrected. He also argues, relatedly, that the prosecution violated his due process rights by withholding evidence of this supposed agreement. Essentially, these arguments present claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Henley pressed neither theory before the state courts, and any attempt to now seek post-conviction relief in the Tennessee courts would be procedurally barred. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102. To overcome this procedural default and have these claims heard by a federal court, Henley must establish that (1) he had good cause for failing to raise them before the state courts and (2) he was prejudiced by the default. See, e.g., Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000).2 A petitioner who has procedurally defaulted a Brady claim satisfies the “cause and prejudice” test for overcoming the default by satisfying the second and third prongs of the Brady test; that is, by showing that “the reason for his failure to develop facts in state-court proceedings was the State’s suppression of the relevant evidence,” and that “the suppressed evidence is ‘material’ for Brady purposes.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999). 2 Henley could also overcome the procedural default without establishing “cause and prejudice” if he demonstrated “a sufficient probability that [the] failure to review his federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451. We do not think this standard is met here. No. 03-5891 Henley v. Bell Page 7 Henley cites Banks for the proposition that he had little responsibility to inquire into the facts surrounding his Brady claims—that is, he “cannot be faulted for not catching a prosecutor in his or her lies or withholding of evidence.” This mischaracterizes Banks. While Banks did reject a rule that “defendants must scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material,” see id. at 695, it retained the rule that good “cause” must be based on “events or circumstances ‘external to the defense.’” See id. at 696 (quoting Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988)). That is, Henley still must demonstrate that because of some external impediment over which he had no control, he cannot be expected to have developed his Brady claim in state court. But he makes no attempt to do so. Henley points to the fact that Flatt was considered for early release in 1989 and paroled in 1991—despite disciplinary violations in prison—long before his 25-year sentence had run its term, and earlier than similarly situated offenders tend to be paroled. He also points to various state officials’ statements indicating that they supported, or at least did not oppose, Flatt’s early release. Even assuming these circumstances suggest a surreptitious deal, Henley never explains why he did not present them in state post-conviction proceedings—which pended more than six years after Flatt’s parole release. For these reasons, we hold that Henley has failed to establish “cause” sufficient to excuse the procedural default of his Brady claims.