Opinion ID: 2979036
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Deposition of Craig Minch

Text: Olmstead was not entitled to take the deposition of Craig Minch because CUI redesignated Minch as a non-testifying expert. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A) states that a “party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert witness whose opinions may be presented at trial.” In the case of a non-testifying expert, a party is only entitled to take the deposition of another party’s expert upon a showing of special circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). The district court correctly determined that Olmstead was not entitled to depose Minch before the court ruled on the pending motions for summary judgment, even though CUI originally designated Minch as a testifying expert. As the district court stated, “the overwhelming majority of courts hold that a party may re-designate an expert as non-testifying, and that this insulates the expert from deposition by other parties absent a showing of ‘exceptional circumstances.’” See, e.g., In re Shell Oil Refinery, 132 F.R.D. 437, 440 (E.D. La. 1990). This position is consistent with the No. 09-3428 R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, LLC, et al. Page 13 purpose of Rule 26(b), which is to help lawyers prepare to cross-examine expert witnesses who will testify at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee’s note (1970). Olmstead argues that CUI’s re-designation of Minch was an unfair attempt to prevent CUI from deposing Minch and a violation of Rule 26(b)(4)(A). However, Rule 26(b)(4)(A) says nothing about the timing of the deposition of an expert witness, except that if the expert witness is required to file a report, the deposition may only occur after the report is provided. Olmstead has not pointed to any case or rule stating that a district court abuses its discretion in not allowing an opposing party to take an expert witness’s deposition before ruling on summary judgment motions. Olmstead seeks to use Minch’s deposition testimony to survive summary judgment, hoping that Minch will testify that there were enough similarities between Olmstead’s software and CUI’s software to create a genuine issue of material fact. Such use of an opponent’s experts is what the revisers of Rule 26 sought to avoid: Past judicial restrictions of discovery on an adversary’s expert, particularly as to his opinions, reflect the fear that one side will benefit unduly from the other’s better preparation. The procedure established in subsection (b)(4)(A) holds the risk to a minimum. Discovery is limited to trial witnesses, and may be obtained only at a time when the parties know who their expert witnesses will be. A party must as a practical matter prepare his own case in advance of [the time when the parties designate their expert witnesses], for he can hardly hope to build his case out of his opponent’s experts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee’s note (1970). Olmstead sought to do what the procedure mandated by Rule 26 sought to proscribe—build a case on the basis of an opponent’s expert. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to compel the deposition of Craig Minch.