Opinion ID: 2520543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether auman's arrest terminated her liability for felony murder

Text: On its face, Colorado's felony-murder statute is broad in scope. The words of the statute provide that if a person commits a specifically enumerated felony and an innocent party dies during that felony or during immediate flight from that felony, then that person commits felony murder: A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if:... [a]cting either alone or with one or more persons, he [or she] commits or attempts to commit ... burglary ... and, in the course of or in furtherance of the crime that he [or she] is committing or attempting to commit, or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of the participants, is caused by anyone. § 18-3-102(1)(b), 6 C.R.S. (1999). Pursuant to the terms of this statute, it does not matter that the defendant had no intent to kill or that the defendant did not cause the killing. Liability arises from the defendant's participation in, and intent to commit, one of the specifically named, or predicate, felonies. According to the felony-murder doctrine, the intent to kill is imputed from the participant's intent to commit the predicate felony. See Whitman v. People, 161 Colo. 110, 114-15, 420 P.2d 416, 418 (1966) (The turpitude of the felonious act is deemed to supply the element of deliberation or design to effect death.). Our felony-murder statute provides severe penalties for those who participate in specifically enumerated felonies involving a risk of death when death is caused during a felony or in immediate flight from that felony. [6] Under this statute, a defendant who commits a predicate felony may be liable when death occurs during either of two events, namely: (1) in the course of or in furtherance of the crime that [the defendant] is committing or attempting to commit; or, (2) in the course of or in furtherance ... of immediate flight therefrom. [7] § 18-3-102(1)(b). Here, we address only whether the death was caused in the course of or in furtherance of immediate flight from the predicate felony, which in this case was burglary. According to the plain language of the immediate flight provision of the statute, there are four limitations on liability for felony murder when a death occurs during flight from the predicate felony. First, the flight from the predicate felony must be immediate, which requires a close temporal connection between the predicate felony, the flight, and the resulting death. See Webster's New World College Dictionary 713 (4th ed.1999) (defining immediate as without delay or of the present time). Second, the word flight limits felony-murder liability in such cases to those circumstances in which death is caused while a participant is escaping or running away from the predicate felony. Id. at 541 (defining flight as a fleeing from ... to run away). Third, the death must occur either in the course of or in furtherance of immediate flight, so that a defendant commits felony murder only if a death is caused during a participant's immediate flight or while a person is acting to promote immediate flight from the predicate felony. See id. at 333 (defining in the course of as in the progress or process of; during); and id. at 575 (defining furtherance as a furthering, or helping forward; advancement; promotion). Fourth, the immediate flight must be therefrom, indicating that the flight must be from the predicate felony, as opposed to being from some other episode or event. In 1971, the General Assembly added the words immediate flight therefrom to the statute. See ch. 121, sec. 1, § 40-3-102(1)(b), 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 388, 418. When these words are read together with the initial words of the statute, which provide that one may act either alone or with one or more persons, immediate flight terminates when a sole participant in the subject felony is subject to complete custody, or, alternatively, when all participants in a predicate felony involving more than one participant are subject to complete custody. [8] The plain language of our statute supports the legal principle that a co-participant in a predicate felony may be liable for felony murder even after arrest while another participant remains in immediate flight. The statute deems conduct as murder when one participates in the predicate felony and a death is caused in the course of or in furtherance of immediate flight, which, by its terms, is not limited to the flight of any particular participant. The felony-murder statute regards all participants as liable for felony murder when a person acts with one or more persons in the commission of a specifically enumerated felony and death is caused by anyone in the course of or in furtherance ... of immediate flight from the predicate felony. § 18-3-102(1)(b). Just as important as what the statute says is what the statute does not say. As it is worded, the statute does not differentiate between liability for participants in the predicate felony who are in immediate flight and those who are not; nor does the statute state that some participants may be liable for a death that occurs in the course of or in furtherance of immediate flight but that others may not. The statute also does not state that if a co-participant's actual flight ends as a result of arrest, and another participant remains in flight, that immediate flight has ended for the co-participant under arrest. Most importantly, the statute does not say that a co-participant may be liable for felony murder for only those deaths caused during that co-participant's immediate flight. We should not construe these omissions by the General Assembly as unintentional. Zamarripa v. Q & T Food Stores, Inc., 929 P.2d 1332, 1339 (Colo.1997). We next turn to the statutory affirmative defense to determine how it affects our analysis of this statutory crime. The General Assembly created an affirmative defense to felony murder that allows a defendant to avoid felony-murder prosecution if he not only had nothing to do with the killing itself, but was unarmed and had no reason to believe that any of his confederates were armed or intended to engage in any conduct dangerous to life. § 40-3-102 cmt., 12 C.R.S. (1963) (1971 Perm. Cum.Supp.). [9] The affirmative defense also provides that if a defendant discovers that a co-participant is armed or dangerous during the commission of the crime or in flight therefrom, the defendant may obtain the benefit of this defense by immediately disengaging from either the predicate felony or the flight. See § 18-3-102(2)(f). Like the plain language of the statutory offense, the affirmative defense provides no support for the theory that arrest, by itself, terminates a co-participant's liability for felony murder as a matter of law. This conclusion, however, does not mean a jury should not consider a co-participant's arrest as a factor in deciding whether the prosecution has satisfied its burden of proving that the affirmative defense does not apply.
Colorado's former felony-murder statute provided that [a]ll murder ... which is committed in the perpetration ... [of a predicate felony] ... shall be deemed murder of the first degree.... § 40-2-3(1), 3 C.R.S. (1963). In Bizup v. People, 150 Colo. 214, 371 P.2d 786 (1962), a pre-code case, we interpreted this statute and held that the perpetration of the predicate felony encompasses the act of flight from that felony. In addition, in McCrary, another pre-code case, we upheld the defendant's conviction for felony murder even though the flight of the defendant and his co-participant was purportedly interrupted twice before the eventual killing: first, when they stopped at a bar for up to a half hour; and second, when the co-participant molested the victim. 190 Colo. at 552-53, 549 P.2d at 1331-32. In that case, we approved the jury's finding that liability continued despite these alleged interruptions. Id. at 553, 549 P.2d at 1332. Under Bizup and McCrary, the concept of flight is broad. Together, these pre-code cases stand for the proposition that, as a matter of law, felony murder does not terminate where death occurs during continuous flight from the predicate felony, nor does it terminate where intervening events interrupt flight. In interpreting the phrase immediate flight therefrom, we have relied upon and applied Bizup, McCrary , and other pre-code cases construing the meaning of flight under our pre-code statute. See People v. Hickam, 684 P.2d 228, 231-32 (Colo.1984). We conclude that the General Assembly's 1971 addition of the words immediate flight therefrom incorporates into our present statute the concept derived from these pre-code cases that a defendant may be liable for felony murder for a death caused either during the predicate felony or during immediate flight from that felony. Our pre-code precedent concerning immediate flight is consistent with judicial decisions from New York interpreting that state's felony-murder statute, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1967), [10] the statute upon which our General Assembly largely modeled section 40-3-102(1)(b). [11] See People v. Irby, 47 N.Y.2d 894, 419 N.Y.S.2d 477, 393 N.E.2d 472 (1979); Donovan, 53 A.D.2d at 33, 385 N.Y.S.2d 385. Like the Colorado General Assembly, New York's legislature added the words immediate flight therefrom to its statute to clarify that felony-murder liability does not terminate upon the completion of the predicate felony. See Practice Commentary, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (McKinney 1967). Further, under New York's statute, arrest does not terminate immediate flight or liability for felony murder as a matter of law. Irby, 419 N.Y.S.2d 477, 393 N.E.2d at 472-73. Interpreting the scope of immediate flight therefrom, the New York Appellate Division's decision in Donovan paralleled our McCrary holding in stating that [t]here is no exact minute on the clock or milepost along the escape route, the passage of which terminates a crime. Donovan, 53 A.D.2d at 33-34, 385 N.Y.S.2d 385 (rejecting argument that the passing of 45 minutes and more than 37 miles between felony and death preclude the jury from finding that defendant was in immediate flight).
The cases cited by Auman to support her view that, as a matter of law, arrest terminates a co-participant's liability for felony murder do not support a different reading of Colorado's felony-murder statute. These cases fall into one of two categories. First, they involve either the arrest of a sole participant or the arrest of all participants, and, as a matter of law, arrest therefore terminates liability for felony murder. [12] The same would be true under our statute as well if Auman had been the only participant, or if Auman and all of her co-participants had been arrested, and the death occurred after arrest. Second, there exists precedent from other jurisdictions where, as a matter of law, the statute in question dictates that arrest terminates liability. [13] Neither category applies to this case.
As discussed, Colorado modeled its felony-murder statute on New York's statute, which treats the issue of whether arrest terminates liability for felony murder as a jury question. Irby, 419 N.Y.S.2d 477, 393 N.E.2d at 472-73. In adopting its present felony-murder statute, New York rejected the arbitrary, strict, and technical legal rules that formerly left a judge to resolve, as a matter of law, the issue of when the commission of a felony ended. See People v. Gladman, 41 N.Y.2d 123, 390 N.Y.S.2d 912, 359 N.E.2d 420, 423-24 (1976); Practice Commentary, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (McKinney 1967). Under the new statute, the scope of immediate flight is a factual question for a jury to decide because immediate flight differs according to the unique facts and circumstances of each case, such as the time and distance between the felony and the killing. Gladman, 390 N.Y.S.2d 912, 359 N.E.2d at 424. In addition, the statute requires a jury to decide the factual issue of whether a defendant is liable for felony murder following the defendant's arrest. Irby, 419 N.Y.S.2d 477, 393 N.E.2d at 472-73. Similarly, Colorado's pre-code cases left it to the jury to decide whether flight had ended under the facts of a given case. See, e.g., McCrary, 190 Colo. at 553, 549 P.2d at 1332. Under McCrary, the jury is left with considerable discretion in deciding when flight ends. See id. at 553, 549 P.2d at 1331-32. Our present felony-murder statute requires a jury to decide factual issues relating to the effect of arrest on felony-murder liability, such as whether, in spite of arrest, the temporal connection between the predicate felony, flight, and death is immediate, and whether a death following a defendant's arrest is still in the course of or in furtherance of immediate flight from the predicate felony. We hold that under our statute and precedent, each felony-murder case involving immediate flight must be decided according to its unique set of circumstances. As a matter of law, arrest, by itself, does not terminate a co-participant's liability for felony murder when a death occurs at the hands of another participant who remains in flight. Hence, whether Auman's arrest terminated her liability for felony murder was properly left to the jury.