Opinion ID: 1140735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the circuit court erred in instructing the jury.

Text: (A) Instructions P-5 and D-8. ¶ 26. Instruction P-5 was given to the jury by the circuit court and provided: [i]n order for your verdict to be for [Valentine] and against [Fitch], you must find the following: 1. That the conduct of [Fitch] was wrongful; 2. A loss of affection or consortium was suffered by [Valentine]; and 3. That this wrongful conduct caused the loss of affection or consortium. If you determine the above statements to be true, yo[u] must return a verdict for [Valentine] and award him damages in accordance with the Court's instructions. If [Valentine] fails to prove any one or more of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for [Fitch]. Instruction D-8, which was rejected by the circuit court as repetitive, stated [y]ou are instructed that in determining the cause of the loss of Sandra's affections [Valentine] must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [Fitch's] direct interference in his marriage caused Sandra to lose affections for him. ¶ 27. While conceding that Mississippi law has commonly listed the elements of the tort of alienation of affections just as in Instruction P-5, see Saunders, 607 So.2d at 1215, Fitch argues that: as far back as Stanton v. Cox, [162 Miss. 438,] 139 So. 458, 461 (1932), it is settled law that [Valentine] must prove [his] loss was occasioned by the direct interference of [Fitch]. Because the lower court's instruction allowed the jury to find liability without the predicate finding of proximate cause specific to this tort, the matter should be reversed for a new trial. . . . ¶ 28. In response, Valentine initially contends that Fitch waived this argument because [t]o preserve an objection to a jury instruction, the specific ground for the objection must be stated in the original objection. The issue raised on appeal may not be based on a different legal theory. See Shields v. Easterling, 676 So.2d 293, 296 (Miss.1996) (Shields did not put this objection to the trial court in any specific meaningful manner. Thus, the trial judge had no opportunity to rule on it. . . . Thus, this Court is barred from reviewing this issue.) (emphasis added). At trial, Fitch objected to Instruction P-5 initially because he perceived the wording to be cumbersome. Once the language was rephrased, Fitch raised no further objection. As to Instruction D-8, the circuit judge refused the instruction because i[t] becomes somewhat repetitive. According to Valentine, Fitch has failed to show that Instruction D-8 properly stated the law and was necessary to fully inform the jury of the law considering the totality of the instructions[.] [13] ¶ 29. This Court has stated that it [i]f other instructions granted adequately instruct the jury, a party may not complain of a refused instruction on appeal. Purina Mills, Inc. v. Moak, 575 So.2d 993, 996 (Miss.1990). . . . [T]he trial court has considerable discretion in instructing the jury. Southland Enter. v. Newton County, 838 So.2d 286, 289 (Miss.2003). This Court first finds this argument to be procedurally barred as Fitch failed to object after Instruction P-5 was rephrased and therefore failed to properly preserve for appeal his Instruction D-8 argument. Procedural bar notwithstanding, this Court concludes that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in finding Instruction D-8 repetitive of Instruction P-5. Therefore, this issue is without merit. (B) Instruction P-8 ¶ 30. Instruction P-8 was given to the jury by the circuit court and provided: [y]ou are instructed that just compensation is a decision to be made by the jury. Your discretion as to the measure of damages is wide, but not unlimited, and you may not act arbitrarily. Exercise your discretion as to the amount of damages reasonably, intelligently and in harmony with the evidence of the case and the Court's instructions. The damages cannot be assessed by an fixed rule, but you are the sole judges as to the measure of damages in this case. Should you find for [Valentine] then you must determine the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate him for the value of the consortium he has lost. You should consider the following elements of damage as have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence in this case: a. The loss of society, companionship, love and affection; b. The loss of aide, services, and physical assistance provided by [Sandra]; c. The loss of sexual relations; d. The loss of participation together in the activities, duties and responsibilities of making a home; e. Any mental and emotional distress proximately resulting from [Fitch's] conduct; and f. Any other damages proven to have proximately resulted from any wrongful act of [Fitch]. ¶ 31. Fitch cites Cousar v. State, 855 So.2d 993 (Miss.2003), for the proposition that [g]ranting instructions not supported by evidence is error. Id. at 997 (citing Haggerty, 838 So.2d at 955). Fitch then argues that the circuit court erred by approving an instruction on damages which the evidence did not support, specifically allowing the jury to consider an award for any damage the jury thought appropriate despite the fact that [Valentine], on evidentiary grounds, abandoned all damages beyond the consortium lost with his wife and child. [14] Furthermore, Fitch contends that [t]here is no temporal restrictions placed on the instruction. . . . These questions were significant insofar as [Valentine] continually prevented [Fitch] from going into matters that preceded or followed the marriage. ¶ 32. In response, Valentine maintains that: [t]emporal restrictions were placed both on types of damages recoverable and as to what period of time the jury should consider since the jury was instructed to only award damages proven during the course of the trial to have proximately resulted from the wrongful acts of [Fitch]. The jury heard the evidence presented and unanimously determined the amount of damages that were proximately caused by [Fitch's] wrongful acts. (Emphasis added). Furthermore, Valentine notes that [t]he instructions must be read as a whole[,] Phillips v. Dow Chemical Co., 247 Miss. 293, 304, 151 So.2d 199, 203 (1963); Court Instruction No. 4 provided that any damages were to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence; and it is and should be presumed that the jury followed the law. ¶ 33. This Court must view the instruction in light of all the other instructions which were given to determine whether the jury was properly instructed. Munford, Inc. v. Fleming, 597 So.2d 1282, 1286 (Miss.1992). . . . [T]he trial court has considerable discretion in instructing the jury. Southland Enter., 838 So.2d at 289. Instruction P-8 stated [y]ou should consider the following elements of damages as have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence in this case[.] (Emphasis added). As such, the damages awarded were limited to those proximately resulting from Fitch's wrongful acts during Valentine and Sandra's marriage. Granting such an instruction was proper and well within the circuit judge's discretion. Therefore, this issue is without merit.