Opinion ID: 2514211
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Search Warrants

Text: Clark contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress physical evidence seized from his van and residence because his van was impounded without a warrant and without probable cause and the search warrant subsequently issued was also without probable cause. Specifically, Clark argues there was no probable cause to impound his van because Detective Herndon performed a search of the van the previous day and found nothing obviously incriminatory. Therefore probable cause to search the van was lacking. Further, Clark argues, the warrant issued subsequent to the impounding lacked probable cause in part because the affidavit supporting the warrant merely mentioned that Clark had a previous criminal history involving a similar crime, and that Clark had failed a polygraph test with respect to the Doll disappearance. Clark further claims the affidavit contained intentional or recklessly made material omissions, and was merely a boilerplate affidavit. Moreover Clark claims the warrant, once issued, was overbroad and lacked particularity with respect to evidence to be seized. Therefore, Clark contends the state and federal constitutions compel suppression of the evidence seized as fruit of these searches. Since further search warrants four in totalrelied on evidence seized from the van and had supporting affidavits indistinguishable in basic form from the first objectionable warrant, Clark argues that virtually every piece of physical evidence found in this case should be suppressed as tainted fruit of the illegal van search. The state challenges each of these assertions with respect to the first affidavit because the validity of the subsequent affidavits, containing substantially the same evidentiary foundation, will stand or fall with the first. As a threshold matter, no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In this regard we have noted: The concept of probable cause requires the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a man of ordinary caution to believe the accused is guilty of the indicated crime. It is only the probability of criminal activity and not a prima facie showing of it which governs the standard of probable cause. State v. Seagull, 95 Wash.2d 898, 906-07, 632 P.2d 44 (1981) (citations omitted). Further [i]n determining whether probable cause exists, a magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances set forth in the affidavit, State v. Condon, 72 Wash.App. 638, 642, 865 P.2d 521 (1993) (citing State v. Helmka, 86 Wash.2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d 115 (1975)), and his determination is given great deference by a reviewing court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Seagull, 95 Wash.2d at 907, 632 P.2d 44. The affidavit must be read in a common-sense manner and doubts should be resolved in favor of the warrant. State v. O'Connor, 39 Wash.App. 113, 123-24, 692 P.2d 208 (1984). With this in mind we turn to Clark's specific allegations.

The affidavit in support of the telephonic warrant issued by Judge Fisher on April 3, 1995, set forth: Roxanne Doll was reported missing by her mother, Doll-Iffrig, at about 10:00 a.m. on April 1, 1995; Doll-Iffrig last definitely saw Roxanne alive at about 8:30 p.m. the previous night upon putting Roxanne and her siblings to bed; Clark and Roxanne's father, Iffrig, were drinking at that time at the next-door neighbors' house while Doll-Iffrig left with a friend to see a movie; Doll-Iffrig returned home about midnight to find her husband passed out on a living room sofa; Doll-Iffrig thought but was not certain she saw Roxanne in bed with the latter's sister in the top bunk of their bunkbed at midnight; that Clark returned to the Iffrig house around 1:00 a.m. that morning; Clark was at the Iffrig house earlier that evening and was seen driving his van to and from the residence; Clark has a 1988 conviction for unlawful imprisonment when he restrained a four-year-old girl and sexually molested her; a polygraph test was administered on Clark by an agent of the FBI on April 2 during which Clark denied knowledge of and responsibility for Roxanne's disappearance; in the FBI agent's opinion, Clark was clearly deceptive in his denials during the polygraph examination; had the victim been removed from her house in the van she would have left trace evidence behind in the van; and that when questioned after the polygraph examination Clark stated he had not hurt Roxanne. The trial court found that although the affiant, Detective Herndon, did not use the word kidnap during the telephone conversation with Judge Fisher, the latter knew the crime with which he was dealing. The police knew that they were restricted to searching for trace evidence left behind after a kidnapping. 5 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 993. Clark contends that his presence near the victim's house on the night she disappeared, his prior conviction, and his purported failure of a polygraph examination are insufficient bases for probable cause. However [p]rior convictions of a suspect are a factor which can be considered in determining whether probable cause exists. State v. Stone, 56 Wash.App. 153, 158, 782 P.2d 1093 (1989). Here Clark's prior conviction was for unlawful imprisonment of a young girl for ostensibly sexual purposes (the affidavit set forth that after binding her in his garage with a pair of socks, Clark groped this girl's vaginal area outside her clothing). This was a crime of the same general nature as that in which Detective Herndon was attempting to uncover evidence, and therefore was not only proper but helpful in establishing probable cause. Greenstreet v. County of San Bernardino, 41 F.3d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1207 (3d Cir.1993)). Further, although polygraph results are not admissible at trial unless stringent conditions have been met, see State v. Renfro, 96 Wash.2d 902, 905-08, 639 P.2d 737 (1982), such evidence may be considered in a magistrate's probable cause determination. State v. Cherry, 61 Wash.App. 301, 305, 810 P.2d 940 (1991). Here Clark's polygraph performance was deemed deceptive by the administering FBI agent. Clark challenges the conclusion of the FBI agent in that his qualifications and indicia of reliability were not set forth in Detective Herndon's affidavit. However in State v. Lair, 95 Wash.2d 706, 712, 630 P.2d 427 (1981), we noted that information from a reliable informant has corroborative value even if the informant's basis of knowledge is not specified. Here the FBI agent's basis of knowledge is the administration of the polygraph and his clinical and common-sense observation of Clark's performance. Clark seems to be claiming that no foundation is laid in the supporting affidavit to support the agent's qualifications. But the agent need not submit a curriculum vitae to the affiant for his conclusions developed during the administration of the polygraph to be probative and corroborative as the magistrate makes his probable cause determination. The state compares the affidavit in this case to that in State v. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d 570, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995), where the challenged affidavit set forth that a young girl had been sexually assaulted and murdered; that the hair of a black person was found on her shirt; that Gentry, a black man, was seen near the time of the murder within a mile of where the body was found; and that Gentry had been previously charged (in an unrelated event) with the rape of a young girl. The facts in this case are similar in that a young girl had been kidnapped; Clark had a previous conviction for the restraint of a young girl; Clark was undisputedly in and around the victim's house around the time of her suspected abduction. While Clark may be correct that no single one of these evidentiary bases may have been enough to establish probable cause per se, there is no basis for believing that, taking this information on the whole, the issuing magistrate could form no reasonable belief that Clark was probably involved in the criminal activity under investigation.
Clark claimed under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), that Detective Herndon made two material omissions or misstatements to the issuing magistrate, viz., failing to mention that he had made a brief but inconclusive search of the van prior to applying for the search warrant and failing to mention that Doll-Iffrig told him she thought she saw Roxanne in bed with her sister when she returned at midnight of April 1, 1995. Clark contends that had these facts been included in the affidavit, no reasonable magistrate could have found probable cause to issue the search warrant. In order to invalidate the warrant on this ground Clark must show evidence of deliberate material omission or statements made in reckless disregard of the truth. State v. Garrison, 118 Wash.2d 870, 872, 827 P.2d 1388 (1992). `[A]llegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.' Id. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674). As the court noted in O'Connor, 39 Wash.App. at 117-18, 692 P.2d 208, Franks and the relevant Washington decisions do not illuminate what constitutes reckless disregard for the truth. However O'Connor applied the test of United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C.Cir.1979), where the court deemed recklessness shown where the affiant `in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth' of facts or statements in the affidavit. O'Connor, 39 Wash.App. at 117, 692 P.2d 208 (quoting United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C.Cir.1979) (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968))). Such serious doubts are shown by (1) actual deliberation on the part of the affiant, or (2) the existence of obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports. O'Connor, 39 Wash.App. at 117, 692 P.2d 208 (citing Davis, 617 F.2d at 694). If these requirements are not met the inquiry ends. Garrison, 118 Wash.2d at 873, 827 P.2d 1388. At Clark's Franks hearing, the trial court found the following with respect to Detective Herndon's affidavit: [T]he omission of details regarding Ms. Doll-Iffrig's statement of her observations is not material. The statement in the affidavit that Ms. Doll-Iffrig was unsure of whether she saw Roxanne is truthful. This was the substance of oral statements made to Det. Herndon by Ms. Doll-Iffrig; the progression of Gail's thought processes was indicated by the fact that her second written statement is more vague than her first statement. The court finds that the failure to recite all of Ms. Doll-Iffrig's statements or comments was neither an intentional nor a reckless attempt to mislead Judge Fisher. The omission of a statement describing Det. Herndon's cursory search of the van on April 2, 1995 was not relevant or material. The purpose of the April 3, 1995 search warrant was for trace evidence. During his initial cursory search on April 2, Det. Herndon did not see anything remarkable; this does not mean that there would not be trace evidence in the van. This was not an intentional nor a reckless misleading omission. Since there were no misleading misrepresentations or omissions contained in any of the affidavits, no portions of the affidavits will be excised. 5 CP at 995-96. The trial court found no actual deliberation or effort to omit material information by Detective Herndon, or obvious reasons to doubt his veracity in making the affidavit. A trial court's finding on whether an affiant deliberately excluded material facts is a factual determination, upheld unless clearly erroneous. State v. Cord, 103 Wash.2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81 (1985) (citing In re Welfare of Sego, 82 Wash.2d 736, 513 P.2d 831 (1973)). With respect to Detective Herndon's statement that Doll-Iffrig was unsure whether Roxanne was in bed at midnight on April 1, 1995, this would seem to be an accurate summary of Doll-Iffrig's statements on the matter. Doll-Iffrig turned the light on in her daughter's room only momentarily, and was unsure whether she saw Roxanne or a large doll, which she testified her daughters often slept with. With respect to Detective Herndon's April 2, 1995, consensual search of Clark's van, he testified he was merely looking for something obvious that would connect with Roxanne Doll and not for trace evidence of Doll. RP (Jan. 29, 1996) at 23 (3.6 hearing). Herndon further testified at the Franks hearing he neither intentionally omitted information from his affidavit nor had he lied. The trial court had the latitude to believe Herndon's testimony, and nothing else in the record would support the conclusion that the trial court's findings on this issue were clearly erroneous. Assuming the trial court clearly erred in that the failure to include information about the prior consensual search was a material omission, and that Detective Herndon materially misstated what Doll-Iffrig saw in her daughter's bed on April 1, 1995, the test is to add the omitted facts to the affidavit and subtract the misstatements. Garrison, 118 Wash.2d at 873, 827 P.2d 1388; Kinder v. Mangan, 57 Wash.App. 840, 846, 790 P.2d 652 (1990). If probable cause nevertheless exists the warrant stands. Given the difference between the search for trace evidence contemplated by the search warrant and the cursory search Detective Herndon performed the day before, and given Doll-Iffrig's numerous statements as to her uncertainty whether she saw Roxanne in bed, we would uphold the probable cause determination even under the Garrison test.
Clark contends that because the April 3 search warrant merely authorized a search for trace evidence it failed to meet the constitutional requirement of particularity about the thing to be searched and the evidence to be seized. The trial court at Clark's Franks hearing rejected that contention. Whether a warrant meets the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is reviewed de novo. State v. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d 668, 691, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 1193, 140 L.Ed.2d 323 (1998). In Stenson we gave the particularity requirement thorough treatment. We recalled: To comply with the mandate of the Fourth Amendment particularity clause, a search warrant must be sufficiently definite so that the officer executing the warrant can identify the property sought with reasonable certainty. Thus, search warrants are to be tested and interpreted in a common sense, practical manner, rather than in a hypertechnical sense. In general, the degree of specificity required varies according to the circumstances and the type of items involved. A description is valid if it is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity, or crime, under investigation permits. The fact that a warrant lists generic classifications ... does not necessarily result in an impermissibly broad warrant..... [W]here the precise identity of items sought cannot be determined when the warrant is issued, a generic or general description of items will be sufficient if probable cause is shown and a more specific description is impossible. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 691-92, 940 P.2d 1239 (citations omitted). The scope of the search warrant Detective Herndon sought was based on the following language in the affidavit: [Y]our affiant is requesting the search warrant for Mr. Clark's van, a 1978 Dodge van, beige in color, Washington license 45297H ... registered to Mr. Richard Clark.... Mr. Clark was seen at the residence with the above listed van and left several times in this van. If Roxanne was removed from her residence by use of the van, there would be trace evidence from the victim in the van. 7 CP at 1265 (emphasis added). As a term of art, trace evidence means small items of a foreign material left on another, Br. of Resp't at 31 (citing 13A Seth A. Fine & Douglas J. Ende, Washington Practice: Criminal Law § 507, at 100 (2d ed.1998)), of which there are many possible types, including blood, hairs, fibers.... 4 Cyril H. Wecht, Forensic Sciences § 36.04(d)(1)(i), at 36-44, 36-45 (1998). Due to the inherent size and multiplicity of kinds of trace evidence, their prior identification in a warrant is impossible and thus a generic classification, under Stenson, is appropriate. Such generic classifications are frequently upheld. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 211-12, 687 P.2d 861 (1984) (specific items plus `any other evidence of the homicide' (quoting language of warrant)); State v. Lingo, 32 Wash.App. 638, 640-42, 649 P.2d 130 (1982) (`any and all evidence of assault and rape including but not limited to' specified items (quoting language of warrant)); State v. Benner, 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 533 N.E.2d 701, 709 (1988) (fibers and hairs and other trace evidence for comparison). It therefore appears the April 3, 1995, search warrant was not impermissibly broad, as it limited the search to trace evidence in Clark's van of Roxanne Doll. Merely because the search for trace evidence involved the search of many items in the van for trace evidence, including parts of the walls and floors of the vehicle, does not therefore make the search a `general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings' prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)).
Clark argues that under article I, section 7, of the Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution the warrantless seizure of his van on April 3, 1995, was impermissible and that its illegality taints the subsequent search warrants and all evidence seized thereafter as fruit of the impounded van. A motor vehicle may be impounded if there is probable cause to believe that it was used in the commission of a felony. State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.2d 170, 189, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). Clark's argument that the police lacked probable cause to impound his van is based on the same argument that the magistrate lacked probable cause to issue a search warrant, viz., knowledge of Clark's previous conviction for unlawful imprisonment coupled with his failed polygraph test did not constitute probable cause in light of Detective Herndon's cursory search of the van the previous day. However this argument must fail in light of the analysis set forth above, as there was probable cause to impound the vehicle based on this amassing of corroborative evidence that began to link Clark to the abduction under investigation. This is the same corroborative evidence which allowed the magistrate to issue a search warrant for the van hours after it was impounded.