Opinion ID: 1102099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether jurisdiction was properly transferred from youth court to circuit court.

Text: ¶ 7. Buck argues that the Warren County Youth Court's improper transfer of jurisdiction under Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-157 (2000) failed to confer authority in the circuit court to act in her case. The State responds that, while procedurally irregular, the transfer order was sufficient to transfer jurisdiction to circuit court. ¶ 8. Section 43-21-157 establishes an elaborate procedure to be followed in transferring jurisdiction from youth court to another court and states in pertinent part: (1) If a child who has reached his thirteenth birthday is charged by petition to be a delinquent child, the youth court, either on motion of the youth court prosecutor or on the youth court's own motion, after a hearing as hereinafter provided, may, in its discretion, transfer jurisdiction of the alleged offense described in the petition or a lesser included offense to the criminal court which would have trial jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult. The child shall be represented by counsel in transfer proceedings. (2) A motion to transfer shall be filed on a day prior to the date set for the adjudicatory hearing but not more that ten (10) days after the filing of the petition. The youth court may order a transfer study at any time after the motion to transfer is filed. The transfer study and any other social record which the youth court will consider at the transfer hearing shall be made available to the child's counsel prior to the hearing. Summons shall be served in the same manner as other summons under this chapter with a copy of the motion to transfer and the petition attached thereto. (3) The transfer hearing shall be bifurcated. At the transfer hearing, the youth court shall first determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the child committed the alleged offense. For the purpose of the transfer hearing only, the child may, with the assistance of counsel, waive the determination of probable cause. (4) Upon such a finding of probable cause, the youth court may transfer jurisdiction of the alleged offense and the youth if the youth court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there are no reasonable prospects of rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system. (5) [Fourteen factors to be considered in determining reasonable prospects of rehabilitation are listed here.] (6) If the youth court transfers jurisdiction of the alleged offense to a criminal court, the youth court shall enter a transfer order containing: (a) Facts showing that the youth court had jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties; (b) Facts showing that the child was represented by counsel; (c) Facts showing that the hearing was held in the presence of the child and his counsel; (d) A recital of the findings of probable cause and the facts and reasons underlying the youth court's decision to transfer jurisdiction of the alleged offense; (e) The conditions of custody or release of the child pending criminal court proceedings, including bail or recognizance as the case may justify, as well as a designation of the custodian for the time being; and (f) A designation of the alleged offense transferred and of the court to which the transfer is made and a direction to the clerk to forward for filing in such court a certified copy of the transfer order of the youth court. (emphasis added). ¶ 9. In the instant case, the transfer was not initiated on motion of the youth court prosecutor or on the youth court's own motion, [1] but it was brought up by counsel in another related case. Contrary to clear statutory requirements, there was no bifurcated transfer hearing held, and the transfer order does not contain the requisite findings of probable cause. The State, however, responds that Buck waived the above-quoted statutory procedure by requesting that she be certified as an adult and transferred to circuit court. ¶ 10. The very purpose of the Youth Court Law is to preclude allowing Buck to do what she did. A youth court is a division of a county court if the county has a county court, or a division of a chancery court. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-107. As such, No proceeding by the youth court in cases involving children shall be a criminal proceeding but shall be entirely of a civil nature. (emphasis added). The Legislature's goal in creating the youth court was one of rehabilitation: This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that each child coming within the jurisdiction of the youth court shall become a responsible, accountable and productive citizen, and that each such child shall receive such care, guidance and control, preferably in such child's own home as is conducive toward that end and is in the state's and the child's best interest. It is the public policy of this state that the parents of each child shall be primarily responsible for the care, support, education and welfare of such children; however, when it is necessary that a child be removed from the control of such child's parents, the youth court shall secure proper care for such child. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-103. Thus, the objective of all those involved should focus on rehabilitation and what is in the best interests of the child. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated as much in finding the unique nature of the juvenile system is manifested in its noncriminal, or `civil' nature, its focus on rehabilitation and individual treatment rather than retribution, and the state's role as parens patriae in managing the welfare of the juvenile in state custody. In re C.B., 708 So.2d 391, 396-97 (La.1998). This goal surely is the reason for the stringent procedural requirements, for a transfer sends a child from a civil court with a paramount goal of rehabilitation to a criminal court with goals of incarceration and retribution. ¶ 11. It certainly appears that Buck knew precisely what she was doing in requesting certification and transfer to circuit court, although doing so defies any all notions of common sense and self-preservation. We cannot, however, get past the proposition that the State and the youth court, in their exercise of their parens patriae duties to Buck, would have found that certification would be beneficial to her. Nonetheless, the Youth Court judge should not have transferred without the specific statutory findings and conducting a bifurcated hearing.