Opinion ID: 1290055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: validity of the 1973 plan

Text: There is no dispute that the 1973 Plan was not adopted by a document denominated Ordinance. The Court of Appeals reasoned that this failure in formalities rendered the 1973 Plan invalid. In part this was based on a construction of ORS 215.050 (1973), which provides: The county governing body shall adopt and may from time to time revise a comprehensive plan and zoning, subdivision and other ordinances for the use of some or all of the land in the county. The plan and related ordinances may be adopted and revised part by part. This language, according to the Court of Appeals, 28 Or. App. 485, 490-491, 560 P.2d 656, requires that all comprehensive plans in the state of Oregon [4] be adopted or more properly enacted by ordinance, as opposed to resolution, as was the case with the 1973 Plan. This analysis, were it left to stand, would call into question the validity of every post-1973 comprehensive plan not adopted by ordinance. [5] The problem at hand is one of statutory construction, which, of course, is nothing more than the judicial process of discerning and declaring the intent of the legislature. ORS 174.010; ORS 174.020; State ex rel. Cox v. Wilson, 277 Or. 747, 750, 562 P.2d 172 (1977). The text of ORS 215.050 gives no indication that the legislature intended it to compel counties to observe strict ordinance formalities in the adoption of a comprehensive plan. The legislative history of this section reinforces this construction. In 1963 the legislature amended ORS 215.050 to read as follows: [6] The commission shall adopt and may from time to time revise a comprehensive plan for the use of some or all of the land in the county. The plan may be adopted and revised part by part. 1963 Or. Laws 619 § 4. Reference to the commission was to the County Planning Commission, which, until 1973, was the body authorized and required to adopt a comprehensive plan. In 1973, a bill was introduced in the Oregon House of Representatives, HB 2548, to overhaul the county land use planning statute. Section 6 of HB 2548 provided: ORS 215.050 is amended to read: 215.050. The governing body of the county [commission] shall adopt and may from time to time revise a comprehensive plan, prepared by the planning commission, for the use of some or all of the land in the county. The plan may be adopted and revised part by part. There was no reference to ordinances, and the only purpose of this section appears to have been to transfer the duty of promulgating a comprehensive plan from the planning commission to the county governing board. When HB 2548 emerged from the House Committee on Local Government and Urban Affairs on May 19, 1973, the section in question (now Section 4) took the following form: The [commission] county governing body shall adopt and may from time to time revise a comprehensive plan and zoning, subdivision and other ordinances for the use of some or all of the land in the county. The plan and related ordinances may be adopted and revised part by part. Testimony in the House committee indicated that the primary thrust of the whole bill was to address the problem of planning commission abuse and conflicts of interest. See, e.g., 1973 Or. Laws, ch. 552, §§ 2, 9 and 10. This legislative purpose is reinforced by the numerous references in the testimony to our opinion in Fasano v. Washington County Commissioners, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973), which was decided on March 2, 1973. In that opinion we expressed strong disapproval for the abuses which until that time had been inherent in land use decision making, and we mandated quasi-judicial hearings in land use matters before an impartial tribunal with no ex parte contacts, 264 Or. at 588, 507 P.2d 23. There is no indication from either the language of the statute or the legislative history of the 1973 amendments that the legislature intended that its amendment of ORS 215.050 was to be construed as requiring the county governing body to adopt a comprehensive plan with strict ordinance formalities. In the construction of amendatory acts, it is presumed that material changes in language create material changes in meaning. 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 22.30 (1972). It is also said that a presumption exists that amendatory acts do not change the meaning of preexisting language further than is expressly declared or necessarily implied. Id. The word adopt in ORS 215.050, whose meaning under the pre-1973 statute could not have been enact by ordinance, was retained in the post-1973 version. A change in that meaning is not expressly declared nor necessarily implied by the 1973 amendments. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that ORS 215.050 does not require the county governing body to follow strict ordinance formalities in the adoption of a comprehensive plan. However, this does not give that body carte blanche to adopt a comprehensive plan under any procedure it sees fit. In Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 271 Or. 500, 513-514, 533 P.2d 772 (1975), we held that comprehensive plans are legislative and permanent in nature. Thus, they are subject to the procedural requirements prescribed for legislative actions of the Washington County Board of Commissioners. Since it is the people of Washington County who have authorized their governing body to enact legislation in their charter, we must now look at that charter to determine the procedures mandated for comprehensive plan adoption. The Court of Appeals invalidated the 1973 Plan on the alternative ground of lack of authority in the Washington County Charter (Charter) for the procedures used to adopt the 1973 Plan. This court agrees that the validity of these procedures must be determined by the authority delegated by the people of Washington County in the Charter to its governing body. However, we do not agree that this analysis results in striking down the 1973 Plan. At the time the 1973 Plan was adopted, the Washington County Charter made no express provision for the procedures required to adopt a comprehensive plan. [7] Section 20 of the Charter, entitled General Grant of Powers, contains a nonexclusive list of powers of the county. The list includes: (f) Enacting and enforcing planning and zoning ordinances and regulations in any part or all of the county outside cities. The distinction in this section between ordinances and regulations calls our attention to the fact that it may well have been envisioned by the charter that the adoption of a comprehensive plan is a type of regulation rather than ordinance. This is especially true since, under state law at the time of the adoption of the Washington County Charter in 1962, comprehensive plans were to be adopted by county planning commissions, [8] which could not legally enact an ordinance. The Charter, with regard to the procedures mandated for the adoption of comprehensive plans, is ambiguous. Who is charged with resolving this ambiguity and determining the proper procedures by which the Board is authorized to adopt a comprehensive plan? The courts are finally responsible, but we believe that it is the Board itself, composed as it is of popularly elected local officials directly accountable to their constituency, the people of Washington County, that, in the first instance, should have the power and right to interpret local enactments. Cf. Green v. Hayward, 275 Or. 693, 706, 552 P.2d 815 (1976) (interpretation of county comprehensive plan). While the interpretation of the Board cannot supplant our duty, that interpretation is entitled to some weight unless it is clearly contrary to the express language and intent of the Charter. Since we find the Charter to be ambiguous with regard to the procedures for adopting a comprehensive plan, we consider carefully the Board's interpretation of the Charter implicit in its implementation. The Board, by passing Ordinance 120 [9] and following the procedures set out therein, has obviously interpreted the Charter as authorizing such procedures. It is likely that the drafters of the Charter did not have in mind the procedures by which the county was to adopt a comprehensive plan. The drafters did, however, have the foresight to provide for the situation in which we find ourselves at this time. Section 22 of the Charter states: All powers, both legislative and administrative, of the county shall be vested in the board of county commissioners as prescribed by this charter subject to the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the voters by the county. All legislative powers not exercised by the voters shall be exercised by the board of county commissioners and executed as provided for by this charter, or if this charter makes no provision, as provided by ordinance or resolution of the board of county commissioners. The administrative powers shall be exercised by the board of county commissioners or by persons under its authority. (emphasis added) Here, then, is express authority from the people of Washington County for the Board to exercise and execute its legislative powers, in the absence of express provision in the charter, as the Board itself may provide by ordinance or resolution. Ordinance 120 makes such provision. It is not asserted that the procedure set out in Ordinance 120 was not followed or that the procedures followed deprived the plaintiff of constitutional due process (other than the allegation of inadequate notice discussed below). We therefore hold that the 1973 Comprehensive Framework Plan of Washington County was validly adopted. Although we hold that the Washington County Charter, as it existed at the time this case arose, did not require that a comprehensive plan be enacted by ordinance and therefore the 1973 Plan was validly adopted, we believe that, even had the charter required that a comprehensive plan be adopted with ordinance formalities, the procedures, mandated by Ordinance 120 and followed by the Board in adopting the 1973 Plan, were functionally equivalent to the ordinance enactment procedures prescribed by Section 50 of the Washington County Charter. The following chart compares the two procedures: Ordinance Resolution and Order Source of Authority Sec. 50, Washington County Ordinance 120 Charter Readings at Three (by title only upon None Board Meetings unanimous consent) Public Hearings One (by Board) after 3d Two  one by Planning reading Commission, one by Board Public Notice 4 days prior to each reading. 10 days before each Posting of Board agenda at public hearing. county courthouse. By newspaper publication Minimum Time Between First Public Notice 18 days 20 days and Final Adoption Amendments to Additional public reading Modifications by Proposed Plan and hearing Board remanded to Planning Commission for approval Voting Roll call  three of five Planning Commission  5 of 9 Board  3 of 5 Public Availability Copy furnished upon Public inspection request after permitted at least introduction 10 days prior to any public hearing Effective Date 30th day after Upon adoption by enactment unless latter of Planning emergency clause, Commission or Board then upon enactment Availability of Upon petition within No provision Referendum 90 days of enactment Plan inoperative until referendum The procedures are not identical; however, identity of provisions need not be the standard. The legal validity of the Ordinance 120 procedures must be measured by the policy sought to be furthered by the ordinance adoption procedures. Our analysis focuses on how well the Ordinance 120 procedures effectuate the public policies embodied in the charter provisions. The four identifiable public policies represented by the procedural safeguards of the ordinance adoption provisions of Section 50 are: (1) Meaningful opportunity for public input; (2) Assurance of due deliberation and consideration by the governing body; (3) Public accountability for decision making by members of the governing body; and (4) Preservation of the people's right of referendum as guaranteed by the Oregon Constitution, Art. VI, § 10, and the Washington County Charter (Section 50(e) and (f)).