Opinion ID: 1668763
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Laches, estoppel, and ratification

Text: Crystal and Nevada assert that Warmack is barred by laches, estoppel, and ratification because (1) he took no action to develop the 120 acres until 1985 when he farmed his interest out to the Tullos Group, (2) he signed a 1985 division order acknowledging the interests of Crystal and Nevada, and (3) he accepted an interest in the 1963 lease when he entered negotiations with some parties claiming interests under the 1963 lease and accepted those interests as consideration for settlement of a dispute. We have no quarrel with the citation of Pope v. Pennzoil Producing Co., 288 Ark. 10, 701 S.W.2d 366 (1986), for the proposition that oil and gas properties are unusual and require diligence on the part of interested parties. Laches, however, requires a showing of some sort that the party asserting the doctrine has suffered or changed its position as a result of the lack of diligence or delay in assertion of rights. Gordon v. Wellman, 265 Ark. 914, 582 S.W.2d 22 (1979). The same is true of estoppel; there must be some showing of reliance. Hope Education Ass'n v. Hope School Dist., 310 Ark. 768, 839 S.W.2d 526 (1992). There was no showing of reliance or change of position by Crystal or Nevada. We agree with Warmack's position that he clearly is not claiming under the 1963 lease, but under his 1979 top lease. Thus, he is not, as Crystal and Nevada would have us conclude, placing any reliance on the 1963 lease, in which he may have accepted an interest in a settlement. We cannot consider the argument about the division order allegedly signed by Warmack as it does not appear in the abstract. Not all division orders are alike, see, Anadarko Petroleum Co. v. Venable, 312 Ark. 330, 850 S.W.2d 302 (1993), and Pope v. Pennzoil Producing Co., supra , and we have no idea, based on the record in this case, what was contained in the one alluded to here. This case has been very difficult for every member of the Court to understand. Not only is the appellant's abstract almost fatally deficient, but a good deal of extrapolation on our part was required to understand the arguments enough to perceive the merits of this case. While we recognize that it is impossible to avoid some usage of legal jargon, we take this opportunity to ask and suggest that, particularly in specialized cases such as those dealing with oil and gas and mineral rights, members of the bar attempt to avoid legal jargon where regular words would do. We also hope cryptic argument in these cases may become a thing of the past and that more care will be taken to explain and to present the record by abstract in a more complete manner. Affirmed.