Opinion ID: 2360987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Real Actions

Text: [¶ 8] King contends that the court erred by finding that the location of the Highland Terrace Road had not changed significantly since 1932 and that the road is a public way, and therefore erred by denying her real action [5] for a declaration of her exclusive possession of the portion of the road that runs next to Lot 29 as well as of seized portions of Lots 28 and 29. King also asserts that the court erred by denying her real action as to the Main Street Lot. [¶ 9] King had the burden of proof on her claims. We will not set aside the court's finding against her unless the evidence below compelled a contrary conclusion. Blackmer v. Williams, 437 A.2d 858, 862 (Me.1981). We review questions of law de novo. Collins v. Trius, Inc., 663 A.2d 570, 572 (Me.1995). [¶ 10] The court's findings as to the prescriptive use [6] of the road render the issue of its exact location superfluous. Even assuming arguendo that the road shifted [7] to a location which rendered it part of Lot 29 according to the quitclaim deeds issued by the Town in 1966 and 1974, the road already had become a public way by open, notorious, visible, and uninterrupted use for at least 20 consecutive years well prior to the late 1950s. [8] Inhabitants of Town of Kennebunkport v. Forrester, 391 A.2d 831, 833 & n. 1 (Me.1978); see MacKenna v. Inhabitants of Town of Searsmont, 349 A.2d 760, 762-63 (Me.1976) (once prescriptive easement is acquired, use is not restricted to the type or extent of traffic that occurred during the prescriptive period; any use consistent with a public way is permitted). According to the evidence adduced at the trial, including King's own testimony, that use continued unabated throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, the court did not err by concluding that the Highland Terrace Road is a public way and, to the extent that conclusion determined its disposition of King's real action as to Lots 28 and 29, the court did not err by denying those claims. King's contentions as to the related issue whether the Town overstepped its limited rights to improve the Highland Terrace Road are likewise unavailing. See Briggs v. L & A Horse R.R. Co., 79 Me. 363, 366-67, 10 A. 47 (1887) (once a public way is established the municipality may maintain and repair it as conditions warrant); Estes v. Inhabitants of Troy, 5 Me. 368, 369 (1828) (same). [¶ 11] Finally, the court did not err by denying King's real action for declaration of her exclusive possession of the Main Street Lot given the lack of evidence as to the Town's possession of any portion of the lot and its removal years earlier of the construction materials it had piled there.