Opinion ID: 4561629
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Hostile Work Environment

Text: First, we consider the hostile-work-environment claims alleged against Ford (based on the actions of Dr. Khalaf’s subordinates) and Fowler (Dr. Khalaf’s supervisor). The jury found that (1) Dr. Khalaf’s subordinates had subjected him to a hostile work environment based on national origin or race (thereby implicating Ford as a corporation); and (2) Fowler had subjected Dr. Khalaf to a hostile work environment based on national origin, but not race. However, the jury also found that neither Ford’s corporate conduct nor Zhou’s individual conduct had subjected Dr. Khalaf to a hostile work environment. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of defendants’ liability on Dr. Khalaf’s claims of hostile work environment. Therefore, we REVERSE the district’s court’s denial of defendants’ motion for JMOL on these claims. To allege a hostile work environment claim based on race or national origin under Title VII or the ELCRA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) [he] belongs to a protected class; (2) [he] was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on race [or national origin]; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the defendant knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take action.” Phillips v. UAW Int’l, 854 F.3d 323, 327 (6th Cir. 2017); see Boutros v. Canton Reg’l Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198, 203 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying analysis to national-origin based claim); see also Phillips, 854 F.3d at 327 n.3 (“The elements are substantially the same for [the] ELCRA claim.”); Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co., 547 N.W.2d 314 (Mich.1996). When evaluating these claims, this court “look[s] at the totality of the alleged [] harassment to determine whether it was ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [a plaintiff’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Phillips, 854 F.3d at 327 (quoting Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502, 512 (6th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993))). The circumstances we consider include “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Phillips, 854 F.3d at 327 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002) (internal citation omitted)). Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 15 “[T]his court has established a relatively high bar for what amounts to actionable discriminatory conduct under a hostile work environment theory.” Phillips, 854 F.3d at 328. “[O]ccasional offensive utterances do not rise to the level required to create a hostile work environment because, ‘[t]o hold otherwise would risk changing Title VII into a code of workplace civility.’” Id. at 327 (quoting Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 679 (6th Cir. 2008)). For example, in the context of alleged racial discrimination, this court has determined that “even offensive and bigoted conduct is insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment if it is neither pervasive nor severe enough to satisfy the claim’s requirements.” Id. at 328; see also Clay v. United Parcel Service, 501 F.3d 695, 707–08 (6th Cir. 2007). Ford disputes Dr. Khalaf’s surviving hostile-work environment claims against his subordinates and Fowler. As to the charges against Dr. Khalaf’s subordinates, Ford argues that he failed to present any evidence that their alleged harassment of him was “based on race [or national origin],” Phillips, 854 F.3d at 327, and relatedly, that he failed to introduce proof indicating the allegedly discriminatory harassment by his subordinates was sufficiently “pervasive [or] severe enough.” Williams, 643 F.3d at 506, 513; see also Clay, 501 F.3d at 707– 08. As to Dr. Khalaf’s claim against Fowler, Ford argues that Fowler’s alleged criticism of Dr. Khalaf’s English skills is insufficient evidence of national-origin discrimination. We address this proof in more detail below. 1. Hostile Work Environment Allegedly Created by Dr. Khalaf’s Subordinates a. Absence of Harassment “Based on Race or National Origin” In support of his claim of harassment by his subordinates, Dr. Khalaf described specific instances of “disrespect” by employees Jim Miller, Les Javor, and Pauline Burke. R.135, 3.14. Tr., PageID 5733. According to Dr. Khalaf, Miller hung “up the phone on [him] two or three times,” and “when [Dr. Khalaf] would give [Miller] an assignment, [Miller] would say do it yourself.” Id. at PageID 5733-5734. In addition, Dr. Khalaf described how Javor was “[v]ery disrespectful” towards him, and “did not accept assignments from [him].” Id. at PageID 5737. Dr. Khalaf also testified that “Burke had an issue with [his] performance review comments made Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 16 to her” and “would not be happy with [him]” unless he changed them. Id. at PageID 5762, 5783–5784; R.139, 3.21.Tr., PageID 6657–6660; R.140, 3.22.Tr., PageID 6728–6729; see also Appellant’s Br. at 10-12. Dr. Khalaf further referenced anonymous comments submitted by Ford employees in a survey circulated by Ford at the end of 2012. In these responses, as Dr. Khalaf notes, several individuals submitted “‘extremely disrespectful and hostile comments’ about [his] Englishlanguage skills.” R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5741-5743. However, Dr. Khalaf admits that these comments were directed specifically to his “writing and understanding” of English, and did not reference his speech or accent.9 Id. Although, subjectively, these statements from subordinates could have been offensive to Dr. Khalaf, none of these alleged incidents of disrespect10 demonstrates that his subordinates made any comments because of Dr. Khalaf’s Lebanese origin or Middle Eastern ethnicity, as required for him to prove a hostile work environment. Title VII does “not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the work place; it is directed only at ‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of’” protected characteristics under the statutes. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). Mere disrespect or antipathy will not be actionable under the statute unless a plaintiff can prove that such was motivated by discriminatory animus. See id. The “conduct of jerks, bullies, and persecutors is simply not 9In addition to the anonymous comments made by his subordinates in the 2012 survey, Dr. Khalaf references on appeal one comment in particular made by a Ford employee, Rick Radners, that a “[c]ultural block . . prevents [Dr. Khalaf] from being effective” and that Dr. Khalaf was “[r]aised differently.” Appellant’s. Resp. at 14 (quoting R.80-7, PX81, PageID 2575). However, this comment was made by Radners in April 2014, after Dr. Khalaf had ceased managing the group of subordinates (the Quality Analysts), of which he complained during the trial. See id.; DX70, App.1. Radners was a Quality Functional Lead, not a Quality Analyst, and Dr. Khalaf never suggested during his testimony that Radners engaged in any disrespectful conduct, see R.139, 3.21.Tr., PageID 6517, 6660, nor does he even reference Radners by name in his appellate briefing. Therefore, we will not conduct an analysis of Radners’s allegedly discriminatory comment towards Dr. Khalaf because the comment does not represent evidence of discrimination that Dr. Khalaf claimed at trial supported his claim of harassment by his subordinates. 10The evidence Dr. Khalaf presented regarding subordinates’ alleged harassment consists of largely his own testimony. The only testimony he presented from others was that of Michelle Dietline, who stated that Dr. Khalaf’s subordinates did “disrespect” him. However, here too, this evidence does not prove any presence of antiArabic or anti-Lebanese bias attributable to Dr. Khalaf’s subordinates. See R.136, 3.15 Tr., PageID 5951-5954, 5983-5984, 5993. Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 17 actionable under Title VII unless they are acting because of the victim’s [protected status].” Wasek v. ArrowEnergy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 467 (6th Cir. 2012). When denying defendants’ JMOL motion, the district court did acknowledge that “the bulk of the evidence presented demonstrated disrespect by [Dr. Khalaf’s] subordinates.” R.115, JMOL Order, PageID 5120. Such disrespect, standing alone, is not enough to show unlawful discrimination. But, the district court deemed significant one “anonymous comment left in a drop box [by a Ford employee] that criticized [Dr. Khalaf’s] ‘writing and understanding English.’” R.115, JMOL Order, PageID 5120. Although this comment made no explicit mention of Dr. Khalaf’s English speaking abilities, the district court considered the comment to be “relat[ed] to [Dr. Khalaf’s] accent.” Id. As noted above, we have held that in certain circumstances, discrimination based on accent “can be national origin discrimination.” Ang v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 549 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Berke v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 628 F.2d 980, 981 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)). However, this is a fine line, and each factual scenario must be evaluated contextually, considering that “[u]nlawful discrimination does not occur . . . when a Plaintiff’s accent affects his ability to perform the job effectively.” Id. (citation omitted). For example, in Igwe v. Salvation Army, we concluded that there was no evidence of national-origin discrimination towards the plaintiff-employee, given that a single comment by another company employee regarding the plaintiff’s “broken speech” related to concern about the plaintiff’s “communication skills,” as opposed to being motivated by discriminatory animus towards his national origin. 790 F. App’x 28, 36 (6th Cir. 2019). Similarly here, the comments about Dr. Khalaf’s English skills (which did not reference Dr. Khalaf’s accent) related to frustration expressed by Dr. Khalaf’s subordinates about their manager’s ability to manage and communicate clearly with them in preparation for the weekly BPR meetings—a critical activity performed by the group. Because clear communication skills are a fundamental skillset required of managerial positions across the United States, and such ability was a necessary part of Dr. Khalaf’s specific role as QS&PP Department Manager, there is simply no basis, without more evidence, to infer that the comments were motivated by discriminatory animus. Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 18 Nor is there legal merit to Dr. Khalaf’s alternative argument for finding discrimination by his subordinates, which he calls a “differential treatment” theory. He claims that his subordinates treated him differently as compared to how they treated his “predecessor Mike Hardy—who is white and American born.” Appellant’s Resp. 15. As foundation for this argument, he references (1) his testimony that Les Javor had a “smooth relationship” with Hardy, 4.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5735; and (2) Michelle Dietlin’s testimony that Jim Miller “wasn’t interested in doing work that wasn’t specifically requested by Mike Hardy.” R.136, 3.15.Tr., PageID 5953. This court has held that a comparison between one member of a protected class and one employee outside of that protected class is not “comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser[s] treated members of both races in a mixed-race workplace.” Williams, 643 F.3d at 511 (emphasis added). Furthermore, none of the cases referenced by Dr. Khalaf supports the theory that differential treatment of only two individuals, as compared to differential treatment of all individuals in the relevant racial categories, demonstrates discriminatory animus under a “differential treatment” theory. Finally, the two pieces of testimony about Javor and Miller do not demonstrate that the subordinates refused assignments on account of Dr. Khalaf’s race or national origin. In fact, this testimony leaves open a number of non-discriminatory rationales to account for the feelings expressed by the employees, including potentially the fact that they simply preferred Mike Hardy’s management style. Therefore, we determine that Dr. Khalaf failed to introduce sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find the requisite discriminatory animus from his subordinates based on race or national origin. b. Absence of Sufficiently “Pervasive” or “Severe” Discriminatory Harassment In addition to the absence of proof of discriminatory animus, there is another reason why Dr. Khalaf lacks sufficient evidentiary support for his claim of hostile work environment created by his subordinates. He did not introduce evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that he was subjected to harassment that was widespread and significant enough to give rise to a claim. Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 19 “A hostile work environment occurs ‘[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted; alteration in original); see also In re Rodriguez, 487 F.3d 1001, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 2007) (evidence of discrimination based on accent that was sufficient to survive summary judgment on failure-topromote claim was insufficient to support hostile-work-environment claim). Alleged harassment in the context of a hostile-work environment-claim must be sufficiently “pervasive” or “severe” to alter the conditions of employment. Williams, 643 F.3d at 513. This standard sets a high bar for plaintiffs in order to distinguish meaningful instances of discrimination from instances of simple disrespect. In this court’s determination of whether conduct clears that bar, we consider various factors, including “‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Id. at 512–13 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). “Isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of [a plaintiff’s] employment.’” Id. (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). “Occasional offensive utterances do not rise to the level required to create a hostile work environment.” Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 679 (6th Cir. 2008). “To hold otherwise would risk changing Title VII into a code of workplace civility, a result we have previously rejected.” Id. (citation omitted). The alleged comments of Dr. Khalaf’s subordinates regarding his “writing and understanding” of English, do not rise to the level of hostility based on national origin to trigger Title VII or ELCRA liability. R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5741-5743. The same can be said of the several isolated comments submitted in one survey conducted by Ford in 2012. That these survey comments are insufficient to establish a pattern of “pervasive” discrimination, is clear when they are compared to far more problematic statements in other cases that have been insufficient to establish Title VII liability. See, e.g., Williams, 643 F.3d at 513 (holding that multiple “despicable” statements that were “certainly insensitive, ignorant, and bigoted” did not Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 20 constitute “severe or pervasive harassment given their isolated nature and their resemblance to a ‘more offensive utterance’”). Therefore, we determine that Dr. Khalaf failed to introduce sufficient proof for a reasonable jury to find the requisite “severe and pervasive” element for the hostile-workenvironment claim relating to his subordinates. 2. Hostile Work Environment Allegedly Created by Fowler Although the jury rejected Dr. Khalaf’s claim against Fowler of a race-based hostile work environment, it found that Fowler subjected Dr. Khalaf to a national-origin-based hostile work environment. The national-origin claim is a closer call, but we ultimately conclude that Dr. Khalaf presented insufficient evidence to show that Fowler subjected him to a hostile work environment based on either race or national origin. To support the national-origin claim, Dr. Khalaf states that Fowler was “disrespectful” to him during one-on-one meetings. As QS&PP Department manager, Dr. Khalaf reported directly to Fowler, and therefore was required to meet on a weekly basis with him. R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 7515. According to Dr. Khalaf, at these weekly sessions, “Fowler frequently exhibited disrespectful behavior towards [him],” First Appellant Br. at 8, which included Fowler’s “pound[ing] the table with his fist in a hostile manner, shouting demeaning things such as: ‘[W]hat’s wrong with you? Don’t you know English? Don’t you understand English? Do I have to spell every time to you in English? Are you talking down to me? Are you whispering in my ears?’” Id. (emphases added). Dr. Khalaf testified that Fowler was “[v]ery hostile” during their one-on-one meetings. Fowler stated that he was going to “crush” Dr. Khalaf “like an ant.” Id. During “those hostile moments,” Dr. Khalaf testified he “would pray that the earth would open and swallow” him. First Appellant Br. at 8 (quoting R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5717). On other occasions, Fowler would call Dr. Khalaf up to his office, “only to order him to stop and leave as soon as he arrived at the door.” First Appellant Br. at 9 (quoting R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5717-5718). And, on “[o]n still other occasions, when Dr. Khalaf brought documents to Fowler’s office, Fowler ‘bark[ed] commands’ to him like ‘a dog’ telling him not to come close, and to ‘drop what he Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 21 ‘ha[d] and leave.’” First Appellant Br. at 9 (quoting R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5718). Fowler’s comments during these encounters made Dr. Khalaf feel “shocked, horrible, humiliated, [and] devastated,” “week after week after week” for months. First Appellant Br. at 8 (citing R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5717). Dr. Khalaf alleged further abuse from Fowler at departmental meetings. On those occasions, Dr. Khalaf’s role was to lead the meeting, by both “setting up the agenda” and running the group “through reports from various regions.” First Appellant Br. at 10; see R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5722–5723. However, as Dr. Khalaf explained, Fowler treated him “in a demeaning and disrespectful manner,” in front of the entire group, including [] passing him notes [and] demanding that Dr. Khalaf leave the meeting to obtain coffee for [him].” First Appellant Br. at 10; see R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5724-5725. Similar to his experience during the one-onone meetings, Dr. Khalaf found this treatment “to be humiliating,” and he believed “other attendees had the same reaction to Fowler’s conduct.” First Appellant Br. at 10; see R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5724–5728. This behavior continued “every week for months,” and Dr. Khalaf contends it constituted national-origin discrimination because he “was the only person of Middle Eastern descent in those meetings—and the only person Fowler asked to fetch him coffee.” First Appellant Br. at 10; see R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5726. Dr. Khalaf was understandably upset by Fowler’s behavior. But, was there enough proof for a reasonable jury to find a hostile work environment based on Dr. Khalaf’s national origin? We conclude there was not, based on the applicable case law, as we explained below. We turn first to whether the evidence of Fowler’s criticism of Dr. Khalaf’s English skills is sufficient to support the jury’s finding of a hostile work environment. We understand that “accent and national origin” are overlapping concepts, and in some circumstances can be “inextricably intertwined.” Ang, 932 F.2d at 549. Or, in other words, “discrimination based on manner of speaking can be national origin discrimination.” Id. For example, in Rodriguez, we held that a plaintiff had demonstrated a prima facie case of national-origin discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment on a failure-to-promote claim. The plaintiff proffered evidence that the decision-maker in her company had made Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 22 “derogatory remarks about [her] accent and ethnicity and statements to the effect that [the decision-maker] ‘would not allow her to become a supervisor . . . because of [her] Hispanic speech pattern and accent.’” 487 F.3d at 1006. Similarly, in Berke, we found sufficient evidence for a plaintiff’s failure-to-promote claim, concluding that “plaintiff was denied two positions . . . because of her accent which flowed from her national origin.” 628 F.2d at 981. However, both Rodriguez and Berke involved plaintiffs who offered evidence that they were denied promotions on direct account of accent-based national origin discrimination by corporate decision-makers. Our court recognizes the difference between discriminatory animus motivating accent-based comments directed at an employee, as in Rodriquez and Berke, and situations “when a [p]laintiff’s accent affects his ability to perform the job effectively,” when criticism of English skills does not constitute unlawful discrimination. Ang, 932 F.2d at 549; see also Igwe, 790 F. App’x at 36 (determining that in certain contexts where a job requires a specific skillset, it is not unlawful to complain of an employee’s “communication skills–– whether related to his national origin or not”). Other circuits have also recognized the difference between comments motivated by discriminatory intent and legitimate job-specific-related critiques. See, e.g., Hannoon v. Fawn Eng’g Corp., 324 F.3d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 2003); Bina v. Providence Coll., 39 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1994) (“references to audience difficulty in understanding [plaintiff] may reasonably be interpreted as expressing a concern about his ability to communicate to students rather than discriminatory animus based on ethnicity or accent”); Fragante v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596–97 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[t]here is nothing improper about an employer making an honest assessment of the oral communications skills of a candidate for a job when such skills are reasonably related to job performance”) (emphasis omitted)). Dr. Khalaf presents no evidence that Fowler’s statements included any criticism of Dr. Khalaf’s accent. Dr. Khalaf also fails to provide any relevant context regarding the referenced statements by Fowler that would allow a reasonable jury to find discriminatory animus. There is no proof that could help a jury and this court assess what motivated the comments. Undoubtedly, Dr. Khalaf’s role as QS&PP Department Manager required that he communicate clearly with the team he managed, as well as with Fowler. Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 23 And, while Dr. Khalaf was offended by Fowler’s comments, a plaintiff’s mere subjective offense does not rise to the situations we deemed “discriminatory” in Rodriguez or Berke. The plaintiffs in both those cases presented evidence that their accents were the source of their superiors’ decisions to deny them job promotions. Based on those cases, Dr. Khalaf needed to present proof to allow a reasonable inference that Fowler’s remarks about Dr. Khalaf’s English were really about Dr. Khalaf’s accent. Then, Dr. Khalaf would have to offer evidence to allow a reasonable inference that criticism of his accent was related or motivated by Fowler’s animus towards Dr. Khalaf’s Lebanese national origin. This, Dr. Khalaf did not do. Fowler’s derogatory statements, though abusive, were not enough to establish a hostile work environment based on Fowler’s national origin. Rude, yes; discriminatory, no. Therefore, we hold that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Fowler’s criticism of Dr. Khalaf’s English skills and other comments constituted national-origin discrimination.