Opinion ID: 204045
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We first hold that we have jurisdiction to hear this case. CRMC does not raise any challenge to standing, mootness, or ripeness.5 Massachusetts, in its brief amicus curiae to this court (but not to the district court), argues broadly that there is no case or controversy here, based on standing, mootness, and lack of ripeness. Amici cannot insert new arguments, not made by a party, into a case. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 74 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, we review standing, mootness, and ripeness in the constitutional sense to see whether we have Article III jurisdiction because we are independently obligated to do so, regardless of whether the parties raise the issue. Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2006). For the reasons discussed below, we are satisfied we have jurisdiction. We first address standing. Massachusetts asserts that because Weaver's Cove has not shown that a decision in their favor 5 Because CRMC has not itself challenged the district court's finding with respect to mootness, we do not address CRMC's challenge to the jurisdictional questions raised in footnote 18 of the district court's opinion. In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 1998) ([F]ederal appellate courts review decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees--not opinions, factual findings, reasoning, or explanations.). -17- will relieve a discrete injury to them, Weaver's Cove lacks standing. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It argues that events completely unrelated to CRMC's regulatory processes have prevented the project from proceeding. Massachusetts is not entirely clear in explaining what those events are, but its brief's earlier description of the project suggests it is referring to challenges Weaver's Cove has faced in satisfying other state and federal permitting requirements. Because CRMC's regulatory requirements do affect Weaver's Cove's ultimate ability to receive federal approval, we conclude that Weaver's Cove has standing. A plaintiff wishing to establish standing must show a concrete and particularized injury in fact, a causal connection that permits tracing the claimed injury to the defendant's actions, and a likelihood that prevailing in the action will afford some redress for the injury. City of Bangor v. Citizens Commc'ns Co., 532 F.3d 70, 92 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Me. People's Alliance & Natural Res. Def. Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 283 (1st Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff need not show that the defendant's actions are the very last step in the chain of causation for the injury. Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997). It suffices if the plaintiff can show -18- injury produced by determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone else. Id. In this case, CRMC's actions have directly affected the federal regulatory processes that determine whether the LNG terminal project can proceed. Consistency review is a condition for FERC approval, and FERC has stated it has no authority to address CRMC's refusal to act.6 While CRMC's inaction may not be the exclusive reason federal approval has not been granted, it is clear that failure to obtain concurrence from CRMC has a determinative or coercive effect on the federal agencies. Bennet, 520 U.S. at 169. Weaver's Cove therefore has standing to make its CZMA-related claims. In addition, Weaver's Cove has standing to make its preemption claims because it suffers a concrete injury from Rhode Island subjecting it to a preempted state law. Even if CRMC's concurrence in Weaver's Cove's consistency certification were presumed, Category B Assent would still bar LNG construction if we did not address it here. This would impose a palpable and considerable hardship on its project. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201-02 (1983). 6 The Army Corps also requires Weaver's Cove to submit verification that its application to CRMC is complete before it can complete its review. -19- This case is not rendered moot by Weaver’s Cove's failure to achieve complete regulatory approval for its original proposal or by its submission of the Offshore Berth Amendment. “[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). We will only find a case moot if an intervening event “makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief.” Gulf of Me. Fisherman’s Alliance v. Daley, 292 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Weaver’s Cove’s efforts to obtain regulatory approval for the LNG terminal from all of the relevant actors do indeed constitute a live issue. These efforts are ongoing and the Offshore Berth Amendment represents an attempt by Weaver's Cove to address some of the concerns that may have earlier delayed approval. While Weaver’s Cove still has conditions to meet following the amendment, Weaver's Cove did, for example, get approval from the Coast Guard, which previously had been a hurdle. Since CRMC's consistency certification remains a requirement of FERC and of the Army Corps, that question is clearly live. This is especially so because the Offshore Berth Amendment itself does not render moot the dispute here with Rhode Island. As the Army Corps has itself noted, the planned dredging activities in Rhode Island -20- have not changed, even under the amendment.7 A decision in favor of the plaintiff in this case would provide effectual relief because it would clear a barrier to achieving approval for the project. This case is also ripe. Although federal regulatory approval for the Offshore Berth Amendment is ongoing, our review of this case is neither “advisory” nor “irrelevant to the ultimate approvability of the project.” Fall River, 507 F.3d at 8. Massachusetts cites Fall River in an attempt to argue that this case will lack ripeness until the project receives authorization from several key federal agencies. But it disregards important differences in the facts and procedural background of this case. In Fall River, we held that a challenge to FERC's conditional approval of this project was not ripe because the decision was not final until the completion of reviews by the United States Coast Guard and the Department of the Interior. Id. at 7. Because FERC's decision was not final we could not be sure our opinion would not be advisory. Id. at 7-8. In contrast, the plaintiff's requested relief in this case would be final. CRMC's consistency review and Category B Assent requirements would cease 7 We affirm the district court's holding that the Offshore Berth Amendment does not affect CRMC's consistency review. Weaver's Cove, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 275-78. That FERC is reviewing the Offshore Berth Amendment is irrelevant and does not moot this appeal regarding findings by a Rhode Island agency. What effect that amendment may have on dredging activities in Massachusetts is not at issue before us. -21- to be barriers to ultimate approval of the project. Another difference from Fall River is that FERC and the other relevant agencies have expressly declined to resolve the issue raised by this appeal on the grounds that they have no authority to do so. It is true that resolutions of these issues might not secure the project's ultimate approval, but it would neither be advisory nor irrelevant. B. CZMA Consistency Review: Conclusive Presumption of Concurrence We hold that CRMC’s concurrence with Weaver’s Cove’s dredging plans must be conclusively presumed under 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A). We affirm the district court. Weaver’s Cove, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 270-75. A district court may grant summary judgment on a finding that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is genuine 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,' and a fact is material if it has the 'potential to affect the outcome of the suit.' Velázquez-García v. Horizon Lines of P.R., Inc., 473 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 224, 248 (1986); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000)) (citation omitted). On appeal, we review a district court's grant of summary -22- judgment de novo. Torrech-Hernandez v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir. 2008). We review the district court’s holding that, in this case, a letter certifying acceptance of dredged material, as listed in section 300.9(C)(7) of the CRMP, did not constitute necessary data and information within the meaning of 15 C.F.R. § 930.58(a)(2) because Weaver’s Cove did not intend to dispose of the waste in Rhode Island.8 Weaver’s Cove, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 271-72. If, as CRMC contends, the letter is necessary data and information required by the CRMP, CRMC is not compelled to commence reviewing the consistency certification until Weaver's Cove provides it. 15 C.F.R. § 930.60(a)(2). The six-month deadline for presumed concurrence would be tolled until that time. Id. If, on the other hand, the letter is not necessary data and information, as the district court found, the six-month period from Weaver's Cove's submission of the consistency certification in July 2004 has clearly expired, and we are required to find CRMC's concurrence 8 We note that Weaver’s Cove no longer intends to dispose of the dredged materials at any “upland facilit[y]” and instead now plans to dispose of the waste at an offshore site. As CRMC points out in its reply brief, this was not the case at the time of the original consistency review application. Weaver’s Cove at that time planned to dispose of the waste at its Fall River Facility. We do not address this change, because it occurred after the time concurrence would have been presumed, and neither party has raised it on appeal. -23- presumed. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A). We affirm the district court's conclusion. As the district court noted, the state CRMP does not define approved upland facilit[y]. Weaver's Cove, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 271. However, other Rhode Island laws have shed light on the language's meaning. Rhode Island's Marine Waterways and Boating Facilities Act of 2001 (Waterways and Boating Act), R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 46-6.1-1 to -10, and associated regulations, set forth a comprehensive system regulating dredging activities and disposal of dredged materials in the state. The district judge relied on these regulations to conclude that facilities outside of Rhode Island are not among the approved upland facilities from which the CRMP requires a letter of acceptance. Weaver’s Cove, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 271-72. We agree with the district court that the language of section 300.9(C)(7) of the CRMP can only be read to cover facilities located in the state of Rhode Island because the state's regulatory framework for dredging only provides for the identification of approved upland facilities within the state. We begin with the Rhode Island statutes that govern regulation of dredging in the state. Rhode Island law makes the CRMC responsible for prepar[ing], adopt[ing] and maintain[ing] . . . a comprehensive plan for dredged material management for dredging that takes place in the coastal zone. R.I. Gen. Laws. -24- § 46-6.1-5(a). But the same statute delegates to RIDEM the task of adopt[ing] by rule a list of upland sites and types of areas suitable for beneficial use and disposal of dredged materials. Id. § 46-6.1-5(b). This list is then incorporated in the [CRMC's] comprehensive plan for dredged material management. Id. The Waterways and Boating Act does not define upland sites, but it does define [u]pland areas as areas that are not in the coastal zone. Id. § 46-6.1-4(16). Thus, while both agencies may be responsible for interpreting whether upland disposal facilities can include out of state disposal facilities, only RIDEM is charged with approving upland sites. RIDEM has in turn promulgated its own Rules and Regulations for Dredging and the Management of Dredged Material (Dredging Regulations) pursuant to the Waterways and Boating Act. R.I. Dept. of Envtl. Mgmt., Rules and Regulations for Dredging and the Management of Dredged Material § 2, available at http://www.dem.ri.gov/pubs/regs/regs/water/dred0203.pdf [hereinafter R.I. Dredging Regulations]. These regulations are also intended to be consistent with the CZMA, id., and must be implemented according to a written protocol jointly adopted by CRMC and RIDEM, id. § 3. Among the stated purposes of these regulations is to [i]dentify and list upland sites suitable for beneficial use and/or disposal of dredged material, id. § 1.5, and, as the district court noted, the Dredging Regulations apply to all -25- aspects of dredging proposed in marine waters of the State of Rhode Island, id. § 3. The Dredging Regulations do not contain an express definition for approved upland facilities, but they do define Upland Areas more narrowly than the corresponding term in the Waterways and Boating Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-6.1-4(16), as [a]ll areas of the state that are not in the coastal zone. R.I. Dredging Regulations § 4.20 (emphasis added). Since RIDEM is tasked with approving upland disposal facilities, R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-6.1-5(b), and it only approves upland facilities within the state of Rhode Island, R.I. Dredging Regulations § 4.20, it follows that the approved upland facilities referred to by section 300.9(C)(7) of the CRMP should be read to be facilities within the state of Rhode Island. To hold otherwise would render the C[R]MP's specific language a nullity. Weaver’s Cove, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 272. In any event, appellant has not pointed to any regulatory process for the approval of upland sites outside of Rhode Island, nor has it produced a list of approved facilities outside of the state. Absent language in Rhode Island law to the contrary, we presume state laws, like this one, not to have extraterritorial effect. Cf. Carnero v. Boston Sci. Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006). CRMC responds that it has an interest in confirming that material dredged from its coast is properly disposed, regardless of -26- the ultimate location, and that the district court improperly relied on another agency's interpretation of the Waterways and Boating Act, which it administers. Citing language from both the Waterways and Boating Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-6.1-3(1), and the CRMC's organic statute, id. § 46-23-1(e), that designate CRMC as the lead agency for purposes of regulating dredging activities, CRMC argues that federal courts must defer to its broader interpretation of its own regulations for its own purposes. It explains that although RIDEM may, in its limited role of approving disposal sites, only be concerned with upland facilities within Rhode Island, CRMC is more broadly concerned with ensuring the proper disposal of dredged material.9 CRMC cites no authority in support of its view, and in this context, the view is untenable. Since for the purposes of CZMA consistency review, we are only concerned with the requirements of the CRMP, CRMC's argument that it is entitled to deference in its interpretation of the Waterways and Boating Act is inapposite. We are concerned only with its interpretation of 9 Thus, in order to prevent a hypothetical trash barge to nowhere scenario, in which Rhode Island is forced to dispose of dredged material that no one else will accept, CRMC is entitled to demand proof that Weaver's Cove's proposed upland disposal facility will accept it. Of course, this is not a barge to nowhere situation, because Weaver's Cove has identified a disposal site subject to the jurisdiction of other agencies that play a role under the CZMA. -27- section 3009.(C)(7) of the CRMP, and complementary regulatory schemes to the extent they shed light on its meaning. It is true, as CRMC points out, that federal agency interpretations of their own regulations (when authorized by Congress) are controlling unless 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). However, even if we applied that standard here, CRMC cannot satisfy it because the plain language of section 300.9(C)(7) of the CRMP calls for approved upland facilities (emphasis added). Thus, even if upland facilities can be interpreted to include facilities outside of Rhode Island, CRMC has not pointed to any regulatory scheme that deals with the approval of out-of-state facilities or even a list of approved outof-state facilities. The only regulatory scheme for approving upland facilities is that administered by RIDEM, and CRMC's interpretation of its regulation is therefore clearly erroneous.10 This construction of state law also permits us to avoid an issue of whether a different construction would violate federal law. As noted, see supra note 1, an individual state may not 10 We also reject CRMC's argument that it deserves deference under Mountain Rhythm Resources v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 302 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2009). That case involved review of a federal agency's decision to adopt a state's interpretation of its coastal management plan under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. at 966. Here we are reviewing the state agency's interpretation itself. -28- purport to undertake out of state regulation for consistency review purposes without getting NOAA's consent. 15 C.F.R. § 930.154(e). C. Preemption of State Category B Assent to Dredging by Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act and by FERC's Conditional Approval We review the district court's finding that CRMC's state law licensing program for coastal dredging, the Category B Assent process, is preempted by the NGA, at least on the facts here. At stake is whether CRMC may still delay the project based on Weaver's Cove's failure to satisfy section 300.9(C)(7) of the CRMP or other CRMP requirements, despite our conclusion that concurrence in Weaver's Cove's consistency certification should be presumed. Our standard when reviewing a district court's finding of preemption is de novo. Fitzgerald v. Harris, 549 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2008); SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir. 2007). While the district court found the Category B Assent process preempted on a number of grounds, Weaver’s Cove, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 279-85, we affirm for the narrowest reason, that of conflict preemption. In its order, FERC analyzed Weaver's Cove's proposed dredging activities in both Rhode Island and Massachusetts, assessed the environmental impact the dredging would have and compared it with alternatives, and analyzed the effect on the water and wildlife, land use, recreation, ship traffic, and air quality. Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC, 112 F.E.R.C. at ¶ 61,540 (discussing -29- environmental issues reviewed and adopting the findings of FERC's Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)); Office of Energy Projects, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Docket No. CP04-36-000, Weaver's Cove LNG Project Final Environmental Impact Statement (May 2005) [hereinafter Weaver's Cove FEIS]. Further, FERC concluded that the dredging was part of the construction and operation of the terminal project. Thus, Category B Assent clearly conflicts with FERC's exclusive authority, as exercised here, to license the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of LNG terminals. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1).11 To simplify a complex area of law, preemption arguments are generally divided into three categories. Fitzgerald, 549 F.3d at 52. The first, express preemption, results from language in a statute revealing an explicit congressional intent to preempt state law. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996). The second, field preemption, is that Congress may implicitly preempt a state law by creating a pervasive scheme of regulation. Fitzgerald, 549 F.3d at 52; N. Natural Gas Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 377 F.3d 817, 823 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding a state's 11 This provision of the NGA was not in effect until August 8, 2005, after FERC issued its order on July 15, 2005. However, FERC's interpretation of its own preemptive authority under the NGA to regulate construction of LNG facilities was clearly articulated before this provision came into force. Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC, 112 F.E.R.C. at ¶ 61,546. Further, FERC reaffirmed its approval of Weaver's Cove's application after the provision became effective. Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC, 114 F.E.R.C. at ¶ 61,185-86. -30- site-specific environmental review field preempted because FERC has authority under the NGA to consider environmental issues). The third category is conflict preemption. In this category, state law is pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Id. at 53 (quoting Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 501 F.3d 29, 47 (1st Cir. 2007)). Weaver's Cove asks us to find preemption under the first two grounds. It also stresses the district court's application of a field preemption test set forth in a NGA preemption case. Weaver’s Cove, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (citing Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 301). We prefer to decide on the narrowest grounds: conflict preemption. In this case, FERC has interpreted the dredging activities in the Weaver's Cove's project, including those in Rhode Island, to be within its preemptive jurisdiction. See Fitzgerald, 549 F.3d at 55 (The proposition that federal agency action, taken pursuant to its interpretation of a statute, may itself preempt is quite correct.). CRMC does not argue that the proposed dredging is not a part of the LNG terminal's siting, construction, . . . or operation under 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1), although Massachusetts, as -31- amicus, does.12 In its original order, FERC extensively reviewed the dredging as part of the overall terminal construction and operational plan. Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC, 112 F.E.R.C. at ¶ 61,535-36, 61,545, 61,550. Here, FERC carefully reviewed the very dredging Rhode Island seeks to further regulate and, after considering environmental impacts, authorized the project. Id. at 61,546. The FEIS, adopted by reference in the FERC order, id. at 61,540, found that the dredging was necessary to accommodate the passage of LNG ships to the facility, Weaver's Cove FEIS, at 2-25 (May 2005), and that it would be impossible to reduce the volume or extent of dredging and still satisfy the objectives of the project at the proposed site, id. at 3-70. Thus, FERC concluded that the dredging was part of the construction and the operation of the terminal facility. That ruling is final and binding because no objections were made to FERC's findings on these points in the parties' request for rehearing.13 Further, the dredging is in an approved federal navigation channel. 12 Rather CRMC argues that Section 10 of the River and Harbors Act saves Category B Assent from preemption by the NGA, a contention we consider below. 13 The parties never raised objections to these findings in their request for rehearing to FERC and thus courts have no jurisdiction to review this determination by FERC. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a) (No proceeding to review any order of the Commission shall be brought by any person unless such person shall have made application to the Commission for a rehearing thereon.). -32- By finding the dredging activities were part of the construction and operation of the terminal facility, FERC has interpreted the Rhode Island dredging at issue in this case to be within its jurisdiction. Thus, the Category B Assent process utilized by Rhode Island clearly collides with FERC's delegated authority and is preempted. FERC made this clear in its order regarding Weaver's Cove's application, which stated that state agencies could not use state law to prohibit or unreasonably delay the construction or operation of facilities approved by this Commission. Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC, 112 F.E.R.C. at ¶ 61,546. FERC affirmed this point on rehearing, in response to the City of Fall River's challenge. Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC, 114 F.E.R.C. at ¶ 61,185-86. CRMC's handling of the Category B Assent process both conflicts with and is an obstacle to the authority FERC has asserted in this case. Unlike CZMA consistency review, which allows the CRMC to review the dredging proposals, limited by a sixmonth deadline and administrative and federal judicial review, the Category B Assent process contains no such limitations, and to this date the appellant has not processed this application or reached any decision on the merits. CRMC has taken the position that it must carry out the Category B Assent process concurrently with the consistency review, and because the consistency review has not commenced, it cannot address the application for Category B Assent. -33- Thus, even if concurrence were presumed, CRMC's position is that the Category B Assent process would itself independently block full licensing of the facility. This is clearly an application of state law that delays or has the potential to prohibit the ultimate licensing and construction of the LNG terminal. Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC, 112 F.E.R.C. at ¶ 61,546. Further, CRMC's two bites at the apple approach necessarily conflicts with the federal process for and interest in defining what is necessary data. Because CRMC's actions here conflict with FERC's jurisdiction and the limits for consistency review, it is preempted.14 14 CRMC and Massachusetts also incorrectly argue that the district court based its Category B Assent preemption on the doctrine of federal navigational servitude and that a finding of preemption under the servitude was improper because Congress failed to invoke it expressly within the NGA. The argument misreads the district court's holding and is irrelevant. Congress's power to preempt state regulation here emanates not only from its power to regulate navigation but also from its power to regulate commerce itself. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, [and] navigation . . . .); see also First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Com., 328 U.S. 152, 182 (1946) (The states possess control of the waters within their borders, 'subject to the acknowledged jurisdiction of the United States under the Constitution in regard to commerce and the navigation of the waters of rivers.' (quoting United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404 (1940)). In its reply brief, CRMC raises a new argument that while Congress could preempt commercial regulation under the Commerce Clause, it could not displace Rhode Island's property rights without invoking the navigational servitude doctrine. Because arguments raised for the first time in reply briefs are procedurally barred, we need not consider this contention. United States v. Hall, 557 F.3d 15, 20 n.3 (1st Cir. 2009). In any event, the argument is wrong. The Supreme Court has held that state -34- D. Rivers and Harbors Act Finally, CRMC argues that the federal Rivers and Harbors Act saves its state Category B Assent process from preemption. Pointing to language in the NGA qualifying FERC's exclusive authority to the extent that it affects law related to the authority of other federal agencies, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1), CRMC argues that the NGA preserves not only the Army Corps's role in approving dredging activities but also the entire body of law related to that role. Since the Army Corps's approval process under the Rivers and Harbors Act does not preempt state licensing schemes, CRMC argues that the savings clause in the NGA must therefore protect Category B Assent. These arguments, assuming arguendo they were preserved in the district court, are meritless. The language of § 717(b)(e)(1) is plainly aimed at preserving the authority of federal agencies and not that of state agencies like CRMC. CRMC's argument that its state licensing program is related to the authority of FERC is also untenable. As CRMC points out in other parts of its brief, CRMC's authority to require Category B Assent derives from Rhode Island's status as a sovereign, whereas the Army Corps's authority derives from the federal government. The fact that the Rivers and property interests in land may not preempt federal statutes enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 283-84 (1977). -35- Harbors Act does not itself preempt Category B Assent is therefore irrelevant to the NGA's preemptive effect. Under its exclusive authority, FERC considers the dredging in Rhode Island to be a part of the LNG construction. FERC, as required by the NGA, has provided CRMC an opportunity to review the project through CZMA consistency review. CRMC cannot now avoid presumed concurrence by relying on a nearly identical state law licensing procedure. The district court's judgment is affirmed. -36-