Opinion ID: 895973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: warden's detention authority

Text: [¶ 20] Albaugh argues, even if the initial stop of his van at the checkpoint was valid, Chrest had no authority to detain him after ascertaining he had not been hunting. The State concedes that, once Chrest found the occupants of Albaugh's van had not been hunting, Chrest's further detention of Albaugh was a separate seizure apart from the checkpoint stop. [¶ 21] To analyze this argument, we examine a game warden's statutory authority. The legislature has equipped game officers with all the powers of peace officers to enforce wildlife laws and rules. NDCC 20.1-02-15. Additionally, NDCC 20.1-02-15.1 invests game officers with other powers: Additional powers of director, deputy director, chief game wardens, or district game wardens. The director, deputy director, chief game wardens, or district game wardens have the power of a peace officer in the following circumstances: 1. To enforce state laws and rules on any game refuge, game management area or other land or water owned, leased, or managed by the department. 2. When responding to requests from other law enforcement agencies or officers for aid and assistance. For the purposes of this subsection, a request from a law enforcement agency or officer means only a request for assistance as to a particular and singular violation or suspicion of violation of law, and does not constitute a continuous request for assistance outside the purview of enforcement of the provisions of this title.... Thus, a game warden is empowered to assist police officers for a particular purpose. [¶ 22] In this case, Chrest detained Albaugh for further investigation of the open containers. He was not then enforcing state laws or rules on wildlife under NDCC 20.1-02-15, nor did his actions take place on a game refuge, game management area, or land owned, leased, or managed by the Department under NDCC 20.1-02-15.1(1). Therefore, whether Chrest had authority under the aid and assistance subsection of NDCC 20.1-02-15.1(2) is the dispositive question. [¶ 23] When police officers and game wardens are working together as a team on a game-and-fish checkpoint, a reasonable construction of the statute permits the implication of a request from police officers among the team for aid and assistance on other and non-wildlife offenses discovered during checkpoint activities. The statute cautions that the request may not constitute a continuous request for assistance outside the purview of enforcement of the provisions of this title. Thus, for example, a county sheriff could not make a continuing, blanket request to all game wardens to arrest motorists for speeding when the wardens are individually out and about on duty within the county. However, in this case, Chrest was clearly enforcing game laws within the provisions of NDCC Title 20.1 when conducting the checkpoint. The team context reasonably implies a request from the participating police officers for aid and assistance by a game warden when the warden happens to discover a non-game violation. Thus, under NDCC 20.1-02-15.1(2), Chrest had the team power of a police officer, including the authority to detain Albaugh briefly for further investigation, after seeing the open beer cans in the van. [¶ 24] The Department's policy requires a police officer be present at a game-and-fish checkpoint: The local game warden shall contact the state patrol, sheriff's department, or the local police department for assistance in selecting a site and help with traffic direction.... This policy calls for the game officials and police officers to work as a team in conducting the checkpoint, and this context implies a request for aid and assistance if a game warden discovers other violations incidental to the checkpoint purposes. [¶ 25] We construe statutes to avoid absurd results. State v. Trosen, 547 N.W.2d 735, 739 (N.D.1996). There is a potentially dangerous result under the statute if we interpret it to mean Chrest had no authority to briefly detain Albaugh for the few moments necessary for Chief Danzeisen to walk over to investigate further. The trial court suggested Chrest's proper course of conduct would have been to let Albaugh go, then tell Chief Danzeisen about the open containers observed. The trial court thought Chief Danzeisen would then have had reasonable suspicion to pursue and stop Albaugh's van to investigate. An enforcement procedure that would permit a drunk driving suspect to go on his way after he had been lawfully stopped and aroused a reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct but then would require the nearby officer to chase him down would be absurd; it would create a greater potential of danger. Such an interpretation would elevate form over substance in the worst possible way, and it would unduly confine the intent of the statute. [¶ 26] We conclude Chrest had statutory authority to briefly detain Albaugh for further investigation after discovering the open cans of beer in plain view in Albaugh's van.