Opinion ID: 389473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Evidentiary Claims

Text: 15 During the trial, Village Towers unsuccessfully sought to place in evidence the written contract between the owners and Wasoff. On appeal, the owners assert that submission of the contract, which contained a warranty clause, was necessary to rebut Wasoff's contention that on the day of the accident its officer was present out of mere curiosity. We agree with Judge Lasker that, (r)egardless of the motives that brought Wasoff's officer to 15 Charles Street on January 9th, the fact remains that the evidence adduced at trial will not support a conclusion that any act or omission attributable to Wasoff constituted negligence which contributed to Robinson's death. 484 F.Supp. at 94. Moreover, the case was submitted to the jury on the theory that Wasoff was a general contractor hired to repair the smokestack. The jury evidently accepted this fact since it specifically found Wasoff liable under the Labor Law. The court was well within its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the contract was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing and misleading the jury and unfairly prejudicing Wasoff. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. Moreover, in view of the jury's finding that Wasoff was liable under the Labor Law, any error arising out of this evidentiary ruling would be harmless. 16 Village Towers also argues that Robinson's co-worker, James Castro, should not have been allowed to testify as to what Robinson told him concerning the conversation with Superintendent Rendo. The plaintiff and the third-party defendants counter that the evidence was not objected to, Fed.R.Evid. 103, and in any event was properly admitted under the residual hearsay exception for unavailable declarants, Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(5). The evidence was properly admitted. 17 Six weeks before trial, Modern had sought the addresses of all employees at 15 Charles Street, including Rendo, who Modern mistakenly believed was still superintendent. Village Towers did not respond to these interrogatories. Finally, Modern served notice to Village Towers of its intention to introduce testimony concerning specific statements that were made by Rendo to Robinson, pursuant to the residual hearsay exception of Fed.R.Evid. 803(24) and 804(b) (5). It was not until the first day of trial that Modern learned that Rendo had left Village Towers and could not be located. In a pretrial ruling, Judge Lasker decided to admit the testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(5). See J.App. at 34-35. 5 18 At the outset, the plaintiff and third-party defendants claim that Village Towers, having failed to object at trial, is precluded from raising the objection on appeal. See, e. g., United States v. Del Llano, 354 F.2d 844, 847 (2d Cir. 1965) (in banc). The purpose of requiring a timely objection is to identify the disputed issue and give the trial judge a chance to correct errors which might otherwise necessitate a new trial. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 508 n.3, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1695 n.3, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976); United States v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1965) (in banc), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 907, 86 S.Ct. 887, 15 L.Ed.2d 663 (1966). In this case, however, Modern had served notice pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 803(24) and 804(b)(5) of its intention to use Castro's testimony and had received a pretrial ruling permitting such testimony under Rule 804(b)(5). See J.App. at 34-35. Under these circumstances, the reasons for strictly applying Rule 103 are far less compelling. See, e. g., C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5037 at nn.18-36 (1977 & Supp.1979). We need not make this determination, however, since we are convinced that the evidence was properly admitted. Fed.R.Evid. 804(b) provides: 19 The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 20 (5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. 21 We recognize that the residual exception should be invoked sparingly, see Committee on the Judiciary, Note to Paragraph (24), S.Rep.No.93-1277 at 19-20; Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1979), but conclude that the Castro testimony satisfied the conditions of Rule 804(b)(5). There is no dispute that the evidence was material, nor can there be any serious argument that the statement was not more probative on the point for which it (was) offered than other reasonably available evidence. Castro's testimony was the only evidence indicating that a Village Towers employee who was clearly aware of the condition of the gate prohibited the crew from removing the obstruction or using a safe passage. Such testimony was highly relevant to the negligence of Modern, Village Towers, and the decedent. Finally, the notice provided in this case is conceded to be adequate. Thus, the only issues are whether the testimony bore equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and whether the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice (were) best served by admitting the testimony. 6 22 In this case, Robinson immediately returned from Rendo's apartment to his crew and relayed to them the superintendent's instructions. He had little motive to dissemble, since following Rendo's directions made the job considerably more difficult. The wet and snowy weather conditions supported Robinson's account of why Rendo forbade the use of his apartment to gain access to the garage roof. Moreover, the condition of the garage roof clearly revealed that the area was frequently used by a dog, thus corroborating Robinson's explanation of why Rendo would not permit removal of the gate. 7 It strains credulity that Robinson would have fabricated such a story. Thus, the circumstances surrounding Robinson's statement in this case demonstrate a level of trustworthiness at least equivalent to that of evidence admitted under traditional hearsay exceptions. See United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F.Supp. 554, 559 (E.D.N.Y.) (Weinstein, J.), aff'd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041, 97 S.Ct. 739, 50 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). Nor do we feel that admission of the evidence poorly served the interests of justice. We note that this requirement essentially a restatement of Fed.R.Evid. 102 is commended to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Weinstein's Evidence P 102(01) at 102-10 through 102-15; Huff v. White Motor Corp., supra, 609 F.2d at 291; United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 118 (9th Cir. 1979). Given Modern's good faith efforts to discover the whereabouts of Rendo, the importance and apparent truthfulness of the evidence, and the lack of diligence of Village Towers in responding to the interrogatories or otherwise attempting to locate Rendo, 8 we cannot say that Judge Lasker abused his discretion in determining that admission of the evidence would best serve the interests of justice. See Huff v. White Motor Corp., supra, 609 F.2d at 295.