Opinion ID: 1351510
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substituting in Alternate Juror at the Penalty Phase

Text: On September 28, 1982, just prior to the testimony of the first penalty phase witness, the trial court announced that Juror Zalamea had become seriously ill and would have to be excused. Alternate Juror Lutz was chosen to take Zalamea's place and was seated on the jury. There was no objection to the substitution and no additional jury instructions were given explaining the substitution to the jury. (33) Defendant contends reversal is required because the trial court failed to instruct the jury to disregard all past deliberations and begin deliberating anew. ( People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687 [131 Cal. Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742].) However, he concedes that Collins is factually distinguishable from this case. In Collins the jury had already begun deliberating when the substitution of jurors occurred. Thus, the need for cautionary instructions was great. By contrast, the substitution of jurors in this case occurred prior to the first witness's testimony at the penalty phase. Since the jury had not yet heard any penalty phase evidence or commenced deliberations on the question of penalty, there were no deliberations to begin anew. Defendant acknowledges that Lutz had been present and had heard all the evidence at the guilt/special circumstance phase, and that therefore [she] was in a position to evaluate the case based on all the evidence at all stages of the trial. Moreover, the jury was instructed at the penalty phase to consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case, including the circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true.... (§ 190.3, factor (a).) We have previously rejected an identical claim in People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135], wherein we concluded that the Collins instruction was not necessary to insure the preservation of the `essential elements of trial by jury....' ([17 Cal.3d] at p. 692.) (46 Cal.3d at pp. 460-461.) We reach the same conclusion here; there is no basis upon which to conclude that defendant suffered any prejudice due to the trial court's failure to fashion, sua sponte, a modified Collins instruction.