Opinion ID: 588163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Newly Discovered Evidence and Governmental Misconduct I

Text: 143 Case No. 91-8329 is an appeal from the district court's denial of Swindall's first post-trial motion for either a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence or dismissal of the indictment on the ground of governmental misconduct. After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the district court that Swindall's claim of prosecutorial misconduct is without merit. We reject this claim without discussion and turn to the district court's denial of Swindall's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We review under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See United States v. Russo, 717 F.2d 545, 550 (11th Cir.1983). 37 144 Swindall contends that the government withheld the contents of three surveillance tapes 38 in which Swindall was mentioned by LeChasney, Agent Mullaney, and Amado Hernandez (Hernandez), a confidential informant who assisted Agent Mullaney in the money-laundering investigation. 39 145 Whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that was suppressed by the government is controlled by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963): [T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 146 The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Impeachment evidence ... falls within the Brady rule, id. at 676, 105 S.Ct. at 3380, when the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). 147 To state a claim under Brady, a defendant must show: 148 (1) that the government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment evidence); (2) that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. 149 United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932, 110 S.Ct. 322, 107 L.Ed.2d 312 (1989) (citations omitted). Because we agree with the district court that Swindall has not satisfied the fourth prong, we will limit our discussion to why Swindall cannot show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different if the newly discovered evidence had been disclosed to the defense. 150 Swindall's allegations include that the tapes reveal (1) a plot between LeChasney, Agent Mullaney, and Hernandez to set up Swindall to put him in a compromised position, and (2) that Agent Mullaney gave false testimony about the connection between LeChasney's $150,000 check and the larger deal. 151 It must be remembered that Swindall was convicted of perjury, not money-laundering. Tapes relating to an alleged entrapment plot would not be relevant to whether Swindall knowingly made false statements to the grand jury. As the government notes, there is no perjury trap defense available to Swindall here. See United States v. Chen, 933 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir.1991). This evidence is therefore relevant only to impeaching the credibility of witnesses LeChasney and Agent Mullaney. 152 Unfortunately for Swindall, the star witness against him was himself. In Counts Two, Three, Five, Six, and Eight, Swindall was convicted for falsely testifying about conversations in which he had participated or about actions that he had personally taken. With respect to most of these counts, Swindall's grand jury statements were contradicted by Swindall's earlier tape recorded statements. Attacking the credibility of other witnesses could not undermine confidence in these convictions. 153 Impeaching the credibility of LeChasney and Agent Mullaney is relevant only to Count Seven, in which the government charged that Swindall falsely stated that the $150,000 check from LeChasney had nothing to do with the proposed $850,000 deal with the agent. In fact, even in Count Eight, Swindall's own tape recorded statements tied the $150,000 check so closely to the larger deal that it is difficult to imagine how impeaching LeChasney and Agent Mullaney could undermine confidence in the conviction. 154 In a tape recorded September 25 conversation, after Swindall received the $150,000 from LeChasney but before he returned it, Swindall and Agent Mullaney engaged in the following colloquy: 155 Swindall: All right. Let me see if I understand this before we get together. Here is my objective: I have signed an assignment and given Charles the original note. 156 Agent: Right. 157 Swindall: Each time Charles gives me his check for a hundred and fifty, I will sign another note-- 158 Agent: Right. 159 Swindall: --that updates it to the eight-fifty. There will never be--As far as I'm concerned, I will always be taking Charles' money. 160 (Emphasis added.) Further, as noted above, (1) Swindall signed a document acknowledging that the check was an advance on the larger loan, and (2) Swindall's actions in returning LeChasney's check after rejecting the deal with Agent Mullaney strongly indicate that Swindall testified falsely about one having nothing to do with the other. 161 Further, we note that LeChasney was so thoroughly discredited during the original trial that the prosecutor in his closing statement was forced to tell the jury: 162 I want to talk about Charles LeChasney, and I want to give Mr. LeChasney a grade. Let's give Mr. LeChasney a score. I would like to suggest a score for Mr. LeChasney, if you don't mind me giving you a suggestion: Zero. Zero. Give Charles LeChasney a zero, except where Charles LeChasney's testimony is corroborated either by statements made by Patrick Swindall or by his brother or by other witness[es]. Give him a zero. 163 It is hard to imagine how further diminution of LeChasney's credibility is possible, let alone likely to have affected the outcome of the trial. 164 We note also that the statements of Agent Mullaney recorded on the tapes were made in the agent's undercover role as a representative of Colombian drug dealers. The district court found that Agent Mullaney made the statements in keeping with his assigned pose. We agree with the district court that such statements do not diminish the credibility--or even contradict--the statements that Agent Mullaney made under oath in the trial. We therefore need not delve deeply into appellant's assertions about how the statements on the tapes should be interpreted. 40 165 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Swindall's first post-trial motion. 166