Opinion ID: 2330508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Blodgett's Additional Claims

Text: Each of Blodgett's remaining claims fails as a matter of law, and we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment. See Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 42 (D.C.1979) ([A] motion for summary judgment should be granted if (1) taking all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, (2) a reasonable juror, acting reasonably, could not find for the nonmoving party, (3) under the appropriate burden of proof. (emphasis in original)). A. Defamation/False Light Blodgett claims that the defendants defamed him by compiling and using the written report of the investigative committee. He also complains about comments supposedly made by defendant Farrell to the other Board members describing threats allegedly made by persons who supported Blodgett. [12] To state a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3) that the defendant's fault in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence; and (4) either that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm. Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005). These elements are similar to those of an invasion of privacy-false light claim, which requires a showing of: (1) publicity (2) about a false statement, representation or imputation (3) understood to be of and concerning the plaintiff, and (4) which places the plaintiff in a false light that would be offensive to a reasonable person. Kitt v. Capital Concerts, Inc., 742 A.2d 856, 859 (D.C.1999) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977)). '[A] plaintiff may not avoid the strictures of the burdens of proof associated with defamation by resorting to a claim of false light invasion.' Klayman v. Segal, 783 A.2d 607, 619 (D.C.2001) (quoting Moldea v. New York Times Co. ( Moldea II ), 306 U.S.App. D.C. 1, 10, 22 F.3d 310, 319 (1994)). In fact, where the plaintiff rests both his defamation and false light claims on the same allegations, as Blodgett has done here, the claims will be analyzed in the same manner. See Harrison v. Washington Post Co., 391 A.2d 781, 784 n. 8 (D.C.1978). 1. The Investigative Report After the Board voted to temporarily suspend Blodgett on January 14, President Scott Beck appointed a two-member committee to investigate the complaints against him. They interviewed twenty-five persons, including Blodgett, and summarized their interviews in a written report which they presented at the February 3 Board meeting. The investigators began each interview by reading a statement which requested, among other things, that the interviewee treat [the investigation] confidentially to preserve the integrity of the investigation and . . . to be sensitive to the privacy concerns of those involved. We have not been directed to evidence that the report itself was seen by anyone apart from the Board (and persons involved in this litigation). Acknowledging that the defendants were not the original declarants, [13] Blodgett claims that the Board defamed him by repeating the statements of the witnesses and endors[ing] the Investigative Report by deciding to expel him. We will assume that the defendants' discussion of the report amounted to publication. See Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 886 n. 6 (D.C.2002). We will also assume that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning the truth or falsity of some of these statements. Nevertheless, the record establishes that the Board's creation and use of the report were protected by the qualified common interest privilege. [14] See Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1024 (D.C. 1990). Because Blodgett voluntarily joined the Club and agreed to be bound by its by-laws and rules, his conduct within the Club became a matter of common interest to the defendants. Cf. Heard, 810 A.2d at 886 n. 6 (common interest privilege applied to discussions among church members concerning disciplinary action against pastor); Aspell v. American Contract Bridge League of Memphis, Tennessee, 122 Ariz. 399, 595 P.2d 191, 192 (Ct.App.1979) (common interest privilege applied to the disciplinary proceedings of a voluntary association where the subject of the communication is a member of the association); Preston v. Land, 220 Va. 118, 255 S.E.2d 509, 510-11 (1979) (qualified privilege protected statements of one private club member describing to board of directors alleged behavior of two other club members). To come within the protection of the `common interest' privilege, the statement must have been (1) made in good faith, (2) on a subject in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has, or honestly believes he has, a duty to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, (3) to a person who has such a corresponding interest. Moss, 580 A.2d at 1024 (citing Ingber v. Ross, 479 A.2d 1256, 1264 n. 8, 1268-69 (D.C.1984)); accord, Smith v. District of Columbia, 399 A.2d 213, 220 (D.C. 1979) (opinion of trial court expressly adopted by this court). [O]nce it is decided that the communication is privileged, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the privilege has been abused. Alfred A. Altimont, Inc. v. Chatelain, Samperton & Nolan, 374 A.2d 284, 290 (D.C.1977). The plaintiff may defeat the privilege by showing that the statement was made with express malice or malice in fact. Moss, 580 A.2d at 1024. Here, it is obvious from the circumstances that Blodgett's conduct was a matter of common interest to the Club and its Board. See Columbia First Bank v. Ferguson, 665 A.2d 650, 655 (D.C.1995) (Whether a statement is protected by a privilege is a question of law for the court.). The defendant Board members, called upon to perform their disciplinary duties under the by-laws, had a legitimate interest in conducting an investigation before voting on the question of expulsion. And the investigation was conducted in a circumspect manner. As the contents of the report reveal, the investigators focused on elicit[ing] first hand knowledge of events, language or conduct, rather than hearsay. They also asked each interviewee for both favorable and unfavorable information about Blodgett, and requested that each one treat the investigation confidentially, to be sensitive to the privacy concerns of those involved. In order to defeat this qualified privilege, Blodgett must either: (1) provide extrinsic proof that the defendants who produced and used the report acted with express malice, or (2) demonstrate that it is so excessive, intemperate, unreasonable, and abusive as to forbid any other reasonable conclusion than that the defendant[s] [were] actuated by express malice. . . . Moss, 580 A.2d at 1024 (quoting Ashford v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 41 App. D.C. 395, 405 (1914)). Blodgett has failed to produce any evidence sufficient to meet this demanding standard. See Mosrie v. Trussell, 467 A.2d 475, 477 (D.C.1983) (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Holland, 367 A.2d 1311, 1314 (D.C.1977)); Columbia First Bank, 665 A.2d at 656. See also Moss, 580 A.2d at 1025 n. 27 (proof that the statement was in fact false is alone insufficient to show malice). The report certainly was not pure `rumor' or `gossip' or `scuttlebutt' conveyed as fact, without any disclaimer or explanation. Columbia First Bank, 665 A.2d at 656. Although Blodgett asserts in conclusory fashion that the investigation was conducted in bad faith, he has not proffered evidence to validate this claim. A substantial proffer would be required, because the mere existence of ill will on the part of the publisher toward the subject of the publication does not defeat the publisher's privilege if the privilege is otherwise established by the occasion and a proper purpose. Mosrie, 467 A.2d at 477. Even if Blodgett could prove that the defendants felt resentment and indignation towards [him], the privilege would not be forfeited since the primary purpose of sharing the report was to further the interest which is entitled to protection. Id. at 477-78. In sum, the privilege is . . . established by the occasion and a proper purpose, id., and Blodgett has not created a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the question of malice. [15] 2. Statements by Farrell Blodgett also claims that defendant Farrell told other Board members at a March meeting that supporters of Blodgett had threatened him with physical harm if the Board expelled Blodgett. (Farrell denied making the statement.) As the plaintiff, Blodgett has the burden of showing that Farrell made a defamatory statement concerning him. See Clawson v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, L.L.C., 906 A.2d 308, 312-13 (D.C.2006). However, he proffered no testimony that the statement, if made, was false. Moreover, Scanlon admitted that he could not remember the exact words that Farrell used at the meeting. Assuming that Farrell told other members of the Board that he had been threatened by two men on behalf of Blodgett, as Scanlon testified at one point in his deposition, that statement does not defame Blodgett. The two men could have been acting on their own. No one said that Farrell claimed Blodgett was present or had put the two men up to it. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Blodgett, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Farrell made a false statement defaming Blodgett. B. Breach of Contract/Lack of Fundamental Fairness Blodgett asserts that the Club breached its own by-laws when it temporarily suspended him pending its investigation. He also argues that the Board's investigation, hearing, and ultimate decision to expel deprived him of fundamental fairness. We begin by noting that, within the District of Columbia, `courts ordinarily will not interfere with the management and internal affairs of a voluntary association.' Levant v. Whitley, 755 A.2d 1036, 1043 (D.C.2000) (quoting Avin v. Verta, 106 A.2d 145, 147 (D.C.1954)). See also National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Golding, 342 Md. 663, 679 A.2d 554, 558 (1996) (as a general rule, courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a voluntary membership organization). [W]hen a party comes into court for relief it is incumbent upon him to show the existence of facts to justify the interference of the court. United States ex rel. de Yturbide v. Metropolitan Club, 11 App.D.C. 180, 201 (1897). [16] In Levant we assumed, without deciding, that intervention would be appropriate when an organization failed to follow its own rules. Id. at 1044. See id. at 1043-44 n. 11 (summarizing state of the law in the District of Columbia and elsewhere). The plaintiff in that case had received notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard, and the grievance committee had interviewed roughly two dozen persons. We concluded that the process was fundamentally fair and not in conflict with designated procedures, and tainted neither by fraud, nor bad faith, nor arbitrary action. . . . Id. at 1045. We therefore decided that judicial intervention was not appropriate. Id. at 1046. In the present case we similarly decline to intervene, but do not decide when, if ever, it would be appropriate to do so. 1. Did The Club Follow Its Own Rules? The Club's by-laws require that the Board give notice and an opportunity to be heard before a member may be reprimanded, suspended, or expelled for cause. . . . In this case both requirements were honored. Before any decision was made to charge him, Blodgett and his counsel spoke at length with the investigating committee. The investigators also heard from several persons who supported Blodgett. Following the investigation, the Board notified him of the specific charges in a letter dated February 11, 2000. That letter also informed Blodgett that the Board would hold a hearing on March 2 and that he could be heard and represented by another member of the Club. (Blodgett's counsel (a Club member) also addressed the Board on February 3 and February 28.) Finally, Blodgett and his counsel appeared at the March 2 hearing. Blodgett presented his defense by reading a prepared statement and he answered questions from Board members before his counsel made a closing statement. After discussion, the Board voted by a margin of 8-2 (a two-thirds majority of those present was required) to expel Blodgett if he declined an opportunity to resign. These procedures fully complied with the by-laws governing expulsion. Blodgett complains, nevertheless, that the Executive Committee violated the by-laws when it voted on January 14 to suspend him immediately, pending the outcome of an investigation. He asserts that this action was prejudicial because it denied him access to the Club, where he could most readily confer with sympathetic members and potential witnesses, and thus hampered the preparation of his defense. In order for the full Board of Governors to suspend a member, it would have to give written notice of the reason at least ten days before considering such action. Moreover, the member would be entitled to be heard at the meeting and to be represented by another member of the Club. But the by-laws specifically authorize the Executive Committee to suspend a member temporarily pending action by the [Board], and such suspension may be without notice to the member if, in the opinion of the Executive Committee, the exigencies of the case so require. Blodgett protests that the Executive Committee was simply a tool of the Board and that its vote was, in reality, an illegal attempt by the Board to suspend him without providing notice or a hearing. He also asserts that there was no exigency. To support his arguments, Blodgett points to the following undisputed sequence of events: (1) on January 14 the Board voted (9-1) to commence an immediate investigation of Blodgett's conduct coupled with immediate action by the Executive Committee to suspend Mr. Blodgett's membership pending the outcome of the Board action; (2) without asking the other Board members to leave the room, those comprising the Executive Committee voted unanimously to suspend Blodgett; and (3) immediately following that vote, the full Board went back into Executive Session, authorized the investigation, and gave President Beck authority to ask for Blodgett's resignation. Blodgett argues that the Executive Committee is allowed to act summarily only in those situations when it is not practical to convene a meeting of the full Board of Governors. Because the Board was in session on January 14, he asserts, there was no exigency allowing the Executive Committee to suspend him. However, according to the members of the Executive Committee, the exigencies were created by the volatile situation in the Club and complaints from members who threatened to resign unless some action was taken. The by-laws neither define an exigency nor forbid the action taken here. Indeed, they entrust assessment of the exigencies of the case to the opinion of the Executive Committee. It is not our role to second-guess the committee's appraisal of the situation. Nor has Blodgett convinced us that the Board usurped the power of the Executive Committee. The minutes reflect that all six members of the Executive Committee (all of whom were members of the Board) endorsed the plan of action outlined above. It therefore is not surprising that, when convened as a committee, they acted consistently with their previous votes. Indeed, it is odd to suggest that the other three members of the Board who favored this plan could overcome the will (and thus dictate the action) of the six-member committee. [17] In sum, Blodgett has not established that the Club violated its own rules. 2. Were The Procedures Fundamentally Fair? Some courts look beyond the organization's by-laws and consider whether the procedures followed satisfy the requirements of substantial fairness. See Levant, 755 A.2d at 1045-46; Golding, 679 A.2d at 561 (members in a private organization are entitled to at least rudimentary procedural protections, such as notice and an opportunity to be heard). However, a member facing discipline is not entitled to the same type of process afforded under our civil and criminal justice systems. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191, 109 S.Ct. 454, 102 L.Ed.2d 469 (1988) (Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment [18] jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under the Amendment's Due Process Clause, and private conduct, against which the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may be.). Instead, when courts do interfere, they look to common law concepts of fundamental fairness. See Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, 12 Cal.3d 541, 553, 116 Cal.Rptr. 245, 526 P.2d 253, 262 (1974). As we have discussed, the Board gave Blodgett written notice of the charges; it also provided him with a copy of the investigative report, which included a summary of interviews with staff and members of the Club and served as the basis for the charges against him. The Board also heard from Blodgett and his counsel. a. Allegations of Bias Nevertheless, Blodgett argues that he was denied fundamental fairness because the result of the investigation was pre-determined to result in his expulsion. He offers nothing but conclusory allegations to support this claim. The report of the investigation was not one-sided, as Blodgett suggests. The investigating committee heard from several persons who supported Blodgett, and twelve pages of the thirty-seven-page report were devoted to summarizing the committee's interview with Blodgett. Indeed, the thoroughness of the report, and its supporting documentation, demonstrate that the Club's decision was not arbitrary. [19] Blodgett also relies upon a conversation he had with the Club's President Scott Beck and its General Manager Albert Armstrong on January 14. The parties agree that Beck and Armstrong informed Blodgett that he had been temporarily suspended pending the outcome of an investigation. They then offered him an opportunity to resign and avoid a hearing. Being generally aware of previous complaints about Blodgett and knowing about the fervent reaction to the Post article, Armstrong urged Blodgett to resign, suggesting the investigation would not go well for him. This prediction in no way establishes that the outcome of any investigation was predetermined. Blodgett does not allege that the entire Board was biased against him. Indeed, two of its members voted against expulsion. This, by itself, is important evidence that the proceedings were not a fraud, or conducted in bad faith. (Previously, on February 3, 2000, another member of the Board had recused himself from participating in the disciplinary proceedings.) So far as Blodgett has demonstrated, he did not ask any other members of the Board to recuse themselves. In support of his motion for summary judgment, however, Blodgett offered evidence that defendant Farrell made his decision before the investigation began. [20] Even if this evidence were credited, and Farrell's vote were excluded for bias, there still would have been enough votes (seven in favor; two opposed) to satisfy the by-laws' requirement of a two-thirds majority. The same would be true if Spaulding's vote were discarded as well (six in favor, two opposed). Although Blodgett has asserted in conclusory fashion that others were biased, [t]he mere allegation of bias will not suffice to set aside the Club's decision. Caposella v. Pinto, 265 A.D.2d 362, 696 N.Y.S.2d 493, 495 (N.Y.App.Div.1999). Blodgett therefore has not made a factual demonstration to support the allegation of bias and proof that the outcome flowed from it. Id. Members of a voluntary association cannot always expect to find, and more importantly are not entitled to, the type of neutral and disinterested arbiters provided for in judicial proceedings. A requirement that any decision-maker with knowledge of the dispute or an interest in its outcome must recuse himself might well leave no members to resolve the matter. See Hall v. Morrin, 293 S.W. 435, 440 (Mo.Ct.App. 1927) (requiring complete impartiality would lead to the impermissible result that no tribunal could exist to consider charges against a member who insults or slanders the entire membership of the association). Thus, it is widely accepted that members of a board considering disciplinary charges may have prior involvement in the case. See Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 129 Ill.2d 497, 136 Ill. Dec. 47, 544 N.E.2d 733, 741 (1989) (Preknowledge of the facts associated with the proceeding before a committee . . . will not be enough to suggest actual unfairness sufficient to disqualify a committee or individual members of a committee.); Greene v. Board of Trade, 174 Ill. 585, 51 N.E. 599, 601 (1898) (The fact that the charges are preferred by a member of the board of directors which is to try the accused would not be cause for interference by a court of equity to prevent a trial.); Harris v. Aiken, 76 Kan. 516, 92 P. 537, 538 (1907) (fact that three members of the board started the investigation which resulted in the hearing and condemnation of Harris, did not incapacitate them from sitting in judgment upon him). See also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975) (The mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adversary hearing.). Indeed, without more, such as a finding of fraud or collusion, a finding of mere bias in the proceedings of a social organization is not sufficient to invoke an exception to the rule against judicial interference. Werst v. Three Fires Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 346 Ill.App.3d 706, 282 Ill.Dec. 90, 805 N.E.2d 709, 718 (2004) (judicial intervention not proper even where primary accuser was on the committee that decided to revoke individual's membership). See Rose v. Zurowski, 236 Ga.App. 157, 511 S.E.2d 265, 267-68 (1999) (hearing was not unfair, or lacking in good faith, although member did not have the right to disqualify members of the tribunal whose wives were witnesses at the hearing). But see Van Daele v. Vinci, 51 Ill.2d 389, 282 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1972) (an important economic interest was affected; there were too many factors indicating that the proceedings were in fact not good faith disciplinary hearings, including that seven members of an eleven member board were defendants in a pending derivative action brought by the members who were expelled by the board). Blodgett has failed to show that the procedures were tainted by fraud or bad faith. b. Withholding the Identity of Witnesses Blodgett also complains that the Board withheld the identities of the Club members and staff who spoke with the investigating committee. In this context, however, the right to know the identity of one's accusers, or to confront and cross-examine them, is not so well-established as to be a requirement of fundamental fairness. As we have seen, the courts of this jurisdiction ordinarily will not interfere with the management and internal affairs of a voluntary association. Levant, 755 A.2d at 1043. It therefore is no surprise that we have not established a right to know one's accusers or to confront and cross-examine witnesses in disciplinary hearings of this sort. Blodgett certainly has not cited any controlling precedent requiring such procedures. Our own research has disclosed cases from other jurisdictions taking both sides of the question. See, e.g., Kurz v. Federation of Petanque, U.S.A., 146 Cal.App.4th 136, 150, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 776, 787 (2006) (suspension of volunteer umpires; common law requirement of fair procedure did not require a full blown adversarial process with the right to counsel and cross-examination); Davenport v. Society of the Cincinnati, 46 Conn.Supp. 411, 754 A.2d 225, 241-42 (1999) (action to enjoin expulsion from private hereditary, military, and patriotic association; concluding that the procedures were fundamentally fair although member was not allowed to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him); Rose v. Zurowski, 236 Ga. App. 157, 511 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1999) (rejecting complaint that disciplinary hearing was conducted without Rose having the right to face or cross-examine his accusers); Lawrence v. Ridgewood Country Club, 635 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex.App. 1982) (six-month suspension; rejecting argument that member was entitled to a trial type hearing with an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses); but see Gibson v. Boy Scouts of America, 359 F.Supp.2d 469 (E.D.Va.2005) (removal of scoutmaster; ordering hearing at which scoutmaster would have, among other things, the right to cross-examine witnesses), aff'd on other grounds, 163 Fed. Appx. 206 (4th Cir.2006); Hackethal v. California Medical Assn., 138 Cal.App.3d 435, 442, 187 Cal.Rptr. 811, 815 (1982) (There must be an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the accusers and to examine and refute the evidence.). Ultimately, we are persuaded that [r]equiring procedures equivalent to those necessary for trials would convert expulsion hearings into full-fledged adversary proceedings interfering with a private society's fundamental right to manage its own affairs. Davenport, 754 A.2d at 241. The common law requirement of a fair procedure does not compel formal proceedings with all the embellishments of a court trial, nor adherence to a single mode of process. Pinsker, 12 Cal.3d at 555, 116 Cal.Rptr. 245, 526 P.2d at 263 (citation omitted). It may be satisfied by any one of a variety of procedures which afford a fair opportunity for [an individual] to present his position. Id. Accordingly, we will not attempt to fix a rigid procedure that must invariably be observed. Id. In some cases, for example, it may be adequate to provide an opportunity for a mere written response; in other circumstances, a personal appearance by the adversely affected individual and a more extensive hearing [may be] required. Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal.3d 267, 279, 142 Cal.Rptr. 418, 572 P.2d 32, 39 (1977). Although it might well have been helpful for Blodgett to know the names of those who had been interviewed by the committee, that is not a requirement of basic fairness. Here, it is important to reiterate, he had detailed summaries of the witnesses' statements, an advantage that is not required either in the Club's by-laws or by case law. In this case, as in Levant, the process was fundamentally fair and not in conflict with designated procedures, and tainted neither by fraud, nor bad faith, nor arbitrary action. . . . 755 A.2d at 1045. In sum, Blodgett has failed to present facts that would allow this court to intervene in the disciplinary decisions of the Club. C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct which intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress. McManus v. MCI Communications Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 958 (D.C.2000). Liability is imposed only for conduct `so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' Id. (quoting Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 818 (D.C.1998)). Blodgett contends that this test has been satisfied because the Club had knowledge of his emotional vulnerability. Prior to his expulsion, he provided the Board with a letter from his psychotherapist which stated that recent events have thrown [Blodgett] into a clear sense of despair, panic, and confusion. Dr. Weiner recommended that, if at all possible, the Club refrain from expelling Blodgett but instead place him on probation while he continued counseling. Blodgett relies on Anderson v. Prease, 445 A.2d 612, 613 (D.C.1982), which states that, [a]lthough the actor's conduct may generally not be considered extreme or outrageous, it may be characterized as such when the actor knows that the other person is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress. However, this case is not comparable to Anderson, where the physician-defendant, knowing of his patient's fragile nervous condition, cursed [her] and screamed at her to leave his office. Id. at 613. It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. . . . Homan, 711 A.2d at 818 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The trial court concluded that these circumstances did not permit recovery, and we agree. To accept Blodgett's argument on this record would effectively allow him to immunize himself from a normal disciplinary process, and we decline to extend the definition of extreme or outrageous conduct in this fashion.