Opinion ID: 2317345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The J.P. Morgan Chase Card

Text: Before trial, the government moved in limine to admit evidence in its case-in-chief concerning a J.P. Morgan Chase credit card (the Chase Card). Bayard applied for the Chase Card in Shovan's name on June 23, 2008, when she was incapacitated, andas with the BofA Cardused it after her death. According to the government, that evidence was probative of Bayard's intent and absence of mistake concerning his use of the BofA Card. The district court denied the government's motion on the grounds that Bayard's conduct in connection with the Chase Card was propensity evidence, see Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), and that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice, see Fed.R.Evid. 403. [4] The court, however, left open the possibility that such evidence might be admissible later on for some other purpose. During trial, Bayard took the stand and testified that Shovan specifically authorized him to use her credit cards. On cross-examination, the government began to question Bayard about the Chase Card. That prompted Bayard's stand-by counsel, who by this time had stepped in, to request a sidebar conference. There he objected on Rule 404(b) grounds. The government responded that, although the court previously had denied its motion in limine on that basis, a limited line of questioning on cross-examination was permissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), because it sought only to impeach Bayard's credibility. The court agreed with the government, adding that in this context the value of the government's proposed inquiry outweighed any possible prejudice that might result. Bayard declined a limiting instruction and the sidebar concluded. The government then continued with cross-examination. On appeal, Bayard repeats his objection that any testimony about the Chase Card violated Rule 404(b). His refrain is misguided. By its very terms, Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of a prior bad act to prove the character of a person in order to show conformity therewith. See, e.g., United States v. Landry, 631 F.3d 597, 601 (1st Cir.2011) ([Rule 404(b)] prohibits the admission of prior bad acts to establish an individual's character or propensity to commit a crime.). But here the government sought to cross-examine Bayard for the limited purpose of attacking his character for truthfulness. That is a different purpose that invokes a different rule. Compare Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), with Fed.R.Evid. 608(b). See generally United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 22-24 (1st Cir.2001) (discussing interplay between Rules 404 and 608; explaining that the latter `is centrally concerned with character for veracity, a mode of accrediting or discrediting the witness that is based on the same propensity reasoning of Rule 404 but is subject to quite different rules.' (quoting United States v. Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992, 996 (1st Cir.1996) (internal brackets omitted))). Whether Bayard's actions in connection with the Chase Card were fair game under Rule 608(b) is a separate question. The government says that such questions are left to the discretion of the trial courta proposition that may be correct but not necessarily dispositive here. Bayard says nothing at all. Although the applicability of Rule 608(b) to this line of questioning is less than clear, Bayard's failure to brief the issue waives it. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990). That leaves us with Rule 403's balancing test, which Bayard does make some attempt to address in his brief. Rule 403 states that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury. We have characterized Rule 403 judgments as battlefield determinations subject to great deference. United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5, 17 (1st Cir.2008). Only rarelyand in extraordinarily compelling circumstanceswill we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect. Id. (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir.1988)). We discern no abuse of discretion here. Bayard does not adequately explain why his conduct surrounding the Chase Card was not probative of his credibility, so we assume without deciding that it was. He does argue that the risk of unfair prejudice was high, but we disagree. Our review of the government's cross-examination reveals that it was far from inflammatory. It was also quite short and limited in scope to what the government had proposed at the sidebar. And, as noted, Bayard declined the district court's offer to give a limiting instruction. See Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 17 (Furthermore, the court offered to give a limiting instruction; that the defendant eschewed this course does not minimize the value of the court's offer.). Given these circumstances, we are reluctant to second-guess the district court's judgment in allowing cross-examination to proceed.