Opinion ID: 1723925
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue: Whether the Prosecutor's Closing Comments Were Reversible Error?

Text: Randy contends through this issue that the prosecutor violated his constitutional rights when he uttered allegedly improper and prejudical closing comments. The first comment referred to the minimal amount of money which investigators found on or near the victim's body. The prosecutor seems to have been inferring that Randy may have murdered Neil Smith for money. What do we know? We know four young people went to Grenada and one of them had money. Neil had money. David Bryan said Neil had been paid that day, got $125.00... . Now, on the way home, who wanted money from Neil? ... [A]ll the evidence indicates that Randy wanted money from Neil [allegedly for gas]. And Randy gets mad [because Neil at first refuses]... . Neil [then] offers him $3.00 so we know Neil has at least $3.00. Randy wants $5.00. You can deduce from your own common sense that Randy knows that Neil has at least $5.00 because Randy wants it. The point being that Randy wants the money. That is the point. Exhibit No. 11 shows you the only money recovered at or near the body of Neil Smith  see these few coins there? That's all the money that was recovered from the body of Neil Smith. Rec. Vol. IV, at 413-14. Upon objection by Randy, the trial judge admonished the jury to disregard the comments. Later, the prosecutor again commented on the minimal amount of money found on or near the victim's body and the inference which one can deduce from such evidence: Common sense. A logical deductible inference from the facts in this case. Whoever killed Neil Smith, took those dollar bills. Randy again objected, and the judge again admonished the jury to disregard the comments. Finally, Randy objected to the prosecutor's comment that Randy washed his car shortly after Neil's death. The judge sustained the objection and admonished the jury to disregard the remark. Randy now contends that, despite the sustaining of the objections and admonishments to the jury to disregard same, the prejudice ... was insurmountable. Appellant's Brief at 5. The State of course disagrees and counters: (1) that the comments were not improper because they were based upon the evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom; and (2) that assuming the comments were improper, the judge's admonishments were wholly sufficient to cure any prejudicial effect.
Case law unequivocally holds that the trial judge is in the best position for determining the prejudicial effect of an objectionable comment. See, e.g., Alexander v. State, 520 So.2d 127, 131 (Miss. 1988). Thus, the judge is vested with discretion to determine whether the comment is so prejudicial that a mistrial should be declared. Edmond v. State, 312 So.2d 702, 708 (Miss. 1975). Where serious and irreparable damage has not resulted, the judge should cure or remedy the situation by admonish[ing] the jury then and there to disregard the improp[riety]. Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196, 210 (Miss. 1985). See also Gray v. State, 549 So.2d 1316, 1320 (Miss. 1989); Brown v. State, 534 So.2d 1019, 1024 (Miss. 1988); Estes v. State, 533 So.2d 437, 439 (Miss. 1988); Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 810 (Miss. 1987); May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 783 (Miss. 1984); Shelby v. State, 402 So.2d 338, 340 (Miss. 1981).
The comments were not improper. They were based upon evidence adduced at trial, and the inferences which one may deduce from such evidence are reasonable. For example, the comments regarding the minimal amount of money found on or near Neil's body suggests that robbery may have been a motive for the murder. The comment regarding the washed car suggests that Randy may have been trying to hide something ( i.e., evidence of a crime). Assuming arguendo the comments were improper, this Court concludes that the judge's admonishments cured any prejudicial effect and that the jurors disregarded the comments as instructed. Accord Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173, 1177-78 (Miss. 1990). As this Court has oft-stated: Our criminal justice system necessarily proceeds on the premise that jurors take their responsibilities quite seriously, and this Court presume[s] as a matter of institutional imperative that our jurors respect the law as they are instructed by the court. Middlebrook v. State, 555 So.2d 1009, 1013 (Miss. 1990); see also Shoemaker v. State, 502 So.2d 1193, 1195 (Miss. 1987); Gray v. State, 472 So.2d 409, 414 (Miss. 1985); Evans v. State, 422 So.2d 737, 744 (Miss. 1982); Clanton v. State, 279 So.2d 599, 602 (Miss. 1973). In sum, this Court affirms on this issue. Compare with Alexander, 520 So.2d at 131 (The impropriety of the following remark was deemed cured by the judge's admonishment: Thank God we didn't have a murder.); Crenshaw v. State, 520 So.2d 131, 134 (Miss. 1988) (The prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's closing remark through which he improperly delv[ed] into matters concerning other individuals was dissipated by the trial judge's admonishment that it be disregarded.); McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 135 (Miss. 1987) (The prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's opening and closing remarks  through which he referred to the defendant as animalistic and explained that the only thing that will put [the victim's] spirit to rest is to convict [the defendant]  was deemed sufficiently dissipated by the judge's admonishment that they be disregarded.); Carleton v. State, 425 So.2d 1036, 1039 (Miss. 1983) (District Attorney's remarks  that the defense was a flim-flam defense, that the conditions of the penitentiary are excellent with air-conditioned buildings, and that when you [the jury] go back [to deliberate]... you are going to find that this can be nothing but murder [for] which we have got to let people know what the people of Harrison County stand for  were deemed harmless in view of the judge's admonishment that they be disregarded.).