Opinion ID: 1952455
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Place Restrictions

Text: Paragraph one of the trial court injunction prohibits defendants from invading or trespassing upon the property of the [Center]   . Paragraph two of the injunction prohibits defendants from intentionally interfering with the flow of traffic into and out of [the] Center's premises by blocking and/or obstructing ingress into or egress from same. Those restrictions are sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interests of preservation of health and the safety of medical procedures, protection of private property, and public safety. Courts of other jurisdictions that have considered similar restrictions against protestors outside abortion clinics have upheld them. See, e.g., Northern Va. Women's Medical Ctr. v. Balch, 617 F. 2d 1045, 1048 (4th Cir.1980) (upholding injunction preventing various persons from trespassing on the property of [abortion and family-planning clinic] or interfering with its operations); Operation Rescue, supra, 550 N.E. 2d at 1364 n. 5, 1371 (finding `narrow, carefully tailored, and reasonably specific' injunction that prohibits trespassing on, blocking, or in any way obstructing access (either ingress or egress) to [abortion and family-planning clinic]) (quoting Appeals Court); O.B.G.Y.N. Ass'ns v. Birthright of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 64 A.D. 2d 894, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 903, 905-06 (App.Div. 1978) (modifying injunction to restrict protestors from barring persons from entering or exiting medical clinic); Project Jericho, supra, 556 N.E. 2d at 162 (upholding against First Amendment challenge restriction on blocking the driveway, entrances or exits from the [family-planning] clinic or the public walkway in front of it). We agree with the courts referred to above that restrictions prohibiting trespass on and prohibiting blocking or obstructing access to abortion or family-planning clinics are narrowly tailored to meet significant government interests: they do no more than restrain unlawful activity. The more difficult issue is whether the place restriction in paragraph three of the injunction, restricting the activity of the demonstrators    to the sidewalk    opposite [the Center]   , is narrowly tailored. The paragraph-three restriction effectively creates a speech-free or buffer zone around the Center: defendants may not engage in expressive activity in front of the Center because they must remain across the street. We do not perceive the circumstances as requiring such a broad restriction. Again turning to other jurisdictions, we note that courts have upheld injunctive restrictions creating entirely speech-free zones in certain circumstances. For example, in Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr., supra, 859 F. 2d at 686, the Ninth Circuit determined that a speech-free zone was necessary to combat the protestors' history of threats, intimidation, and assault of clinic personnel and clients   . Ibid. The record in the case before us contains no similar history. Moreover, even in cases involving violent conduct, most courts have imposed on clinic protestors injunctions less restrictive than those the trial court imposed here. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., supra, 939 F. 2d at 65 (upholding general 500-foot buffer zone around clinic, but allowing two people to sit behind table on sidewalk alongside clinic, distributing literature to and counselling in non-threatening manner anyone who approaches table voluntarily, and allowing six peaceful picketers within 500-foot zone); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women, supra, 886 F. 2d at 1362-64 (prohibiting trespassing on, blocking, and obstructing access to clinic, and prohibiting abusing persons physically, but allowing quiet sidewalk counselling of non-threatening nature); Pro-Choice Network, supra, 799 F. Supp. at 1433-37 (requiring dual speech-free zones of fifteen feet around entrances, people, and vehicles, but allowing two sidewalk counselors who must stop counselling when targeted person indicates desire to be left alone); Holy Angels Catholic Church, supra, 765 F. Supp. at 619-20 (exempting peaceful picketers affiliated with church from twenty-five foot bubble zone around clinic). The facts of our case lend themselves to a more permissive restriction than the one the trial court imposed. The trial court did not find that the sidewalk counselors and protestors had assaulted any patients, nor did the Center, its staff, or its patients report any violence or threats. No one filed a complaint with the police. The primary difficulties that defendants caused related to their large numbers and solid mass directly in front of the Center and to the volume of their expressive activities. Thus, we determine that rather than prohibiting all expressional activities on the sidewalk directly in front of the Center, the injunction should have allowed a limited, controlled form of expression near the entrance while restraining the troublesome mass of protestors to a location across the street. Because the crafting of an injunctive order imposing place restrictions in this case is peculiarly fact sensitive, we remand to the trial court to fashion an injunction that permits some form of expression by defendants near the Center. We recognize the trial court's greater familiarity with the locale and with the contesting participants; and that circumstance, together with the court's demonstrated sensitivity to the competing interests, reassures us that those interests will be accommodated better at the trial level rather than by this Court. More specifically, although we have no doubt that a place restriction imposing a general buffer zone (requiring the bulk of the demonstrators to remain across the street) is appropriate in this case, we cannot say precisely what limited form of expression in front of the center would be feasible. The injunction should give consideration to the right of the protestors to make their presence known and to the role of sidewalk counselling in that process, while at the same time protecting against any harassment of the patients or others who wish to enter the clinic. In crafting its restrictions the trial court may find guidance in the decisions of other jurisdictions that have imposed on clinic protestors injunctions less restrictive than those that the trial court initially imposed here. See supra at 151-53, 638 A. 2d at 1272-73.