Opinion ID: 1544179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: and XI

Text: The appellant offered into evidence an ordinance of Baltimore City (Baltimore City Code, 1950, Art. 29, sec. 21): When approaching and crossing any intersecting public or private street, the person operating a street car must have the same under control and must regulate the speed of said car according to what is reasonable and proper in view of the circumstances, surroundings and location; provided, however, that in crossing any such street or intersecting public highway or private street in the thickly congested or business parts of the city, such street car shall not be operated at a rate of speed exceeding fifteen miles an hour. She maintains that the undisputed evidence disclosed that the collision occurred in a thickly congested part of the city, and, therefore, it was reversible error for the court to refuse to specifically instruct the jury with reference to the duties and obligations of the operator of the street-car created by said ordinance. As the latter part of the ordinance regulates the permissible speed at intersections in the thickly congested parts of the city, it is important to determine whether the collision happened at such a place. The only evidence relative thereto is the testimony of Mrs. Fleischer and several pictures taken at the scene. Mrs. Fleischer, when asked if it were not pretty thickly populated at that particular location, answered: That's an opinion, I don't know if it is very largely populated. She further testified there were row houses within the block on one side of the street. The pictures disclose the row houses that are set well back from the street on a terrace, and a general residential neighborhood. Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary (1952 Ed.) defines congested as follows: encumbered or obstructed by accumulated mass or numbers; overcrowded. We do not feel called upon at this time to set forth a definition of thickly congested that would be applicable to all locations, but we are unable to conclude that the evidence established that the situs of the collision in this case was in a thickly congested part of the city. This being so, the latter part of the ordinance has no application to this case. This Court, speaking through Judge Henderson in Crawford v. Baltimore Tr. Co., 190 Md. 381, 386, 58 A.2d 680, said: In its present form the ordinance (the one under consideration when it was not applicable to a thickly congested or business part of the city) adds nothing to the reciprocal duty of due care imposed upon both parties.    While the scene of the accident    was not in the open country, the type of track construction both east and west of the crossing, and its location off the travelled portion of the highway (as in the case at bar), both permit greater speed between crossings and afford notice of danger to the travelling public. See also Gross v. Balto. Transit Co., 192 Md. 278, 64 A.2d 147. The appellant, however, further contends that she was entitled as a matter of right to have the jury instructed as to every detail of the duties of the operator of the motor-car, such as his duty to keep a proper lookout, to have the car under proper control and to regulate the speed of his car according to what is reasonable and proper in view of the circumstances, etc. While there is no objection to the trial court's pointing out any and all of the reciprocal duties and obligations of the respective parties in minute detail, there is no obligation that it do so, provided the subject is fully and comprehensively covered in the charge to the jury. Gen. Rules of Prac. and Proc., Part Three, III, Trials, Rule 6 (b) (1). New rule 554 b 1. Singleton v. Roman, 195 Md. 241, 248, 72 A.2d 705. The adoption of the principle suggested by the appellant could lead to requests for myriad infinitesimal elaborations, better calculated to confuse than to clarify. In the instant case, the ordinance had been admitted into evidence. Appellant's counsel had a perfect right to argue any and all of its pertinent provisions that were within the instructions of the trial court. Her counsel, likewise, could have argued any legal duty or obligation on the part of the operator of the street-car that did not contravene the instructions of the court. We think the trial judge, in his charge, fully and properly informed the jury concerning the duties of the defendant below, The Baltimore Transit Co., and that it was not incumbent upon, but discretionary with, him as to whether or not each detailed duty or obligation should have been mentioned in his charge.