Opinion ID: 2584175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence on Aggravated Burglary

Text: When the sufficiency of evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Morton, 283 Kan. 464, 474, 153 P.3d 532 (2007) (quoting State v. Kesselring, 279 Kan. 671, 679, 112 P.3d 175 [2005]; State v. Beach, 275 Kan. 603, Syl. ¶ 2, 67 P.3d 121 [2003]). Aggravated burglary is defined in K.S.A. 21-3716 as knowingly and without authority entering into or remaining within any building . . . in which there is a human being, with intent to commit a felony . . . therein. Defendant insists that any intent to commit the felony of attempted voluntary manslaughter was not concurrent with either unauthorized entry into Luz' apartment or unauthorized refusal to leave it. Rather, the heat of passion or sudden quarrel motivating defendant's throttling of Luz arose later in time. This argument requires three logical components. Defendant first asserts that the phrases entering into and remaining within refer to legally distinct factual situations. He is at least partially correct on this specific point. See State v. Mogenson, 10 Kan.App.2d 470, 701 P.2d 1339, rev. denied 238 Kan. 878 (1985); State v. Brown, 6 Kan. App.2d 556, Syl. ¶ 4, 630 P.2d 731 (1981). The entering into element of a burglary or aggravated burglary is satisfied when the evidence shows that a defendant crossed the plane of a building's exterior wall. Remaining within refers to a defendant's presence in the building's interior after any entering into, authorized or unauthorized, has been accomplished. Defendant is incorrect, however, on the two other components of his argument. First, he also asserts that entering into and remaining within are inevitably mutually exclusive, i.e., that both cannot be present in a single case, because remaining within requires initial entry to be authorized. This is not so. The paradigmatic example of remaining within may occur when (a) a defendant's initial entry into a building was authorized; (b) authority is later withdrawn; and (c) defendant nevertheless stays inside the building. But such a fact pattern is not essential. A defendant who is unauthorized to enter into a building may continue to be unauthorized while he or she remains within, unless the person or entity empowered to grant permission has decided upon a change in defendant's status. It also is conceivable that a defendant who is unauthorized to enter into a building may be granted permission to remain within and then be subject to later revocation of that permission. Defendant also is incorrect in insisting that either entering into or remaining within must necessarily be instantaneous. In fact, both entering into and remaining within may take longer than a mere moment. Certainly, remaining within connotes at least briefly continuous behavior. The facts of this case are very similar to those that faced the Court of Appeals in Mogenson, 10 Kan.App.2d at 470, 701 P.2d 1339. Paul Mogenson was charged with, inter alia, aggravated burglary based on an aggravated battery of the victim. There was a dispute about whether Mogenson's initial entry was authorized. The victim testified that she did not give him permission to come in. Mogenson and the victim's son said the son had unlocked the door for Mogenson, and then the victim had demanded that Mogenson leave. Instead, an argument and the battery ensued. On appeal, Mogenson challenged the district judge's decision to instruct the jury on both entering into and remaining within. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that an instruction in the alternative was proper on this evidence. 10 Kan.App.2d at 473, 701 P.2d 1339. It also discussed the timing of intent formation, approving the district judge's statement to the jury that intent must exist at the time the defendant entered the house or at the time he remained in the house in the course of the argument. 10 Kan.App.2d at 475-76, 701 P.2d 1339. The panel stated: [T]he [defendant's] formation of intent to commit aggravated battery [on his wife] must have existed at the time his authority to be in the house was terminated or after he remained in the house without authorization. Because the evidentiary record conclusively establishe[d] that the argument ensued after defendant was ordered out of the house . . . the requisite intent was present during the course of argument, a time when defendant's authority had terminated. 10 Kan.App.2d at 476, 701 P.2d 1339. We have previously favorably discussed and consistently applied the holding of Mogenson. See, e.g., State v. Bowen, 262 Kan. 705, 709, 942 P.2d 7 (1997) (analogizing to Mogenson to hold intent, absence of authority must be concurrent); State v. Skelton, 247 Kan. 34, 49, 795 P.2d 349 (1990) ([t]he intent to commit a felony therein may be formulated after a defendant is within a structure, but the unlawful act of remaining without authority must concur with the criminal intent to commit a felony or theft to satisfy the statute's elements). To support a conviction for aggravated burglary, the intent to commit a felony and the unauthorized entering into or remaining within must at some point in time coexist. Bowen, 262 Kan. at 709, 942 P.2d 7 (citing Mogenson, 10 Kan. App.2d at 472-76, 701 P.2d 1339). It is not necessary, however, to prove remaining within burglary or aggravated burglary to show that the intent to commit a felony was precisely contemporaneous with any withdrawal of a defendant's authority to be inside the building. Here, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, although a rational factfinder may not have been able to conclude defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated burglary based on evidence of unauthorized entry contemporaneous with the heat of passion or sudden quarrel necessary for voluntary manslaughter, the evidence was adequate to support defendant's formation of the necessary intent while he remained in Luz' apartment without authority. Once she told him to leave, an expression of sentiment defendant admits occurred, his presence was unauthorized even if previously permitted. Evidence of development of defendant's intent to commit a felony at any point between Luz' expression that he was unwelcome and his departure from the apartment was legally sufficient to support the aggravated burglary conviction.