Opinion ID: 1657407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Postconviction Review

Text: In December 2002, Blanche filed a petition for postconviction relief. He alleged racial discrimination because the state used a peremptory challenge to strike a veniremember who appeared to be Hispanic; Confrontation Clause violations through the admission of statements by his codefendant in their joint trial; improper joinder of his trial with the trial of his codefendant; prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective assistance of counsel; and erroneous sentencing. The same judge who presided at Blanche's trial heard the postconviction petition. The state argued to the postconviction court that Blanche's petition was barred because all the issues raised were available during the time frame for a direct appeal and that the state would be unduly prejudiced by the delay if a new trial were granted. The postconviction court, in an Order and Memorandum filed June 11, 2003, concluded that Blanche was entitled to have the issues he raised considered on postconviction review on the ground that a convicted defendant has the right to at least one substantive review. The court also concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, the delay between Blanche's conviction and any decision on postconviction relief was not excessive enough to entitle the state to an automatic dismissal of the petition based on prejudice. The postconviction court nevertheless denied and dismissed Blanche's petition without a hearing, concluding that Blanche was not entitled to relief. Blanche appealed and on December 3, 2003, we heard oral arguments. Following the hearing, on December 18, 2003, we remanded the issue of Blanche's ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the postconviction court to hold an evidentiary hearing. We also stayed Blanche's appeal and retained jurisdiction over the other issues. At a hearing held July 7, 2004, Blanche called only one witness, his trial counsel, Demetrius Clemons. The state did not call any witnesses. Clemons testified that he did not remember many of his actions or tactical decisions he had made during the trial. The state attempted to show that Clemons' representation had not been unreasonable. After the hearing, the postconviction court determined that Blanche failed to establish that his trial representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for trial counsel's errors, the outcome would have been different. On appeal, Blanche requests a new trial based on alleged errors committed by the district court during his trial. The state requests that the postconviction court's decision denying relief be affirmed. In the alternative, if we conclude that Blanche is entitled to a new trial based on the merits of the petition, the state requests we consider whether it would be unduly prejudiced by a new trial because of Blanche's delay in seeking review.
We first consider the district court's denial of Blanche's Batson motion. Blanche asserts that the state's peremptory challenge of veniremember # 4 was racially discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Batson, the United States Supreme Court established a three-step test to determine whether a peremptory challenge discriminates on the basis of race. 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. In Purkett v. Elem, the Court summarized the analysis as follows: once the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful discrimination. 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (citation omitted). [2] Here, the district court concluded that Blanche failed to establish a prima facie case because there was no inference of racial discrimination  step one of Batson. Because a district court is in a unique position to determine whether the circumstances of a peremptory challenge give rise to an inference of discrimination, we will reverse a district court's decision only if there was clear error. State v. White, 684 N.W.2d 500, 506-07 (Minn.2004). A prima facie case of racial discrimination in a peremptory challenge is established by showing (1) that a member of a protected racial group has been peremptorily excluded from the jury and (2) that circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race. State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 201 (2002). In Batson, the Supreme Court held that a trial court should consider all relevant circumstances in deciding whether an inference of discrimination might exist. 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (listing as examples: a pattern of strikes against racial-minority jurors, the prosecutor's questions, and statements made during voir dire examination). The mere fact that the veniremember is the first member of a racial minority to be considered is not enough by itself to raise an inference of racial discrimination. See State v. Bowers, 482 N.W.2d 774, 776-77 (Minn.1992). Further, an excluded veniremember and the defendant need not be of the same race in order to raise an inference that the peremptory strike was based on race. State v. Scott, 493 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Minn.1992) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991)). Blanche argues that the state's strike of veniremember # 4 gave rise to an inference that the veniremember's exclusion was based on race because: (1) the veniremember, who appeared to be Hispanic, was the first member of a racial minority to be considered, (2) the veniremember disclosed that his aunt was married to an African American male, and (3) the state's questioning of the venire-member showed that it was concerned with the veniremember's race. Blanche argues that the state asked the prospective juror broad, open-ended questions that were obviously intended to    provide a basis for a challenge for cause, or a supposedly race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike. Blanche claims that this veniremember's questions were different from the types of questions that the state had asked during its examination of other veniremembers. The postconviction court, which was the same court that presided at Blanche's trial, elaborated on its decision regarding the Batson motion and found that there was a lack of explicit racial overtones to the case. The court noted that both defendants, the victim, the intended victim, and most of the witnesses were African American. The court further observed that at the time the state questioned veniremember # 4, there were still three African American veniremembers to be evaluated. The court found that the state's strike of veniremember # 4 would make any other attempt to challenge minority veniremembers, especially the three African American veniremembers, significantly more suspect. The court then concluded that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the state's strike was racially motivated. Although the district court decided the Batson issue on the first step of the Batson test, the postconviction court also analyzed the second and third steps, apparently mindful of Hernandez v. New York, in which the Supreme Court held that if the striking party proceeds past the first step by offering a race-neutral reason without questioning the objecting party's prima facie showing, the outcome of step one is moot. 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991); see also State v. James, 520 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Minn.1994); Scott, 493 N.W.2d at 548. The court determined that the state's reasons for the peremptory challenge  that veniremember # 4 was evasive, unresponsive, inattentive, gave labored answers, and left the state concerned about his ability to make credibility assessments  were race-neutral. The court also determined that the state's questions were legitimate to juror evaluation. The postconviction court also noted as background that the district court had taken extreme measures in Blanche and Bernard's trial, which it had never before or since taken    to assure the racial diversity of a jury panel in any case it has tried. After reviewing the initial randomized ordering of over 100 veniremembers, the court noticed that there had been only three African Americans on the list. Of the three, one had been removed from the list after arriving late and the other two had been placed near the bottom of the list. The court ordered the previously removed veniremember to be reinstated and ordered that the randomized order be rerun. Ultimately, all three African Americans were impaneled on the jury. We have carefully reviewed the record and we conclude that the state's questioning of veniremember # 4 and the veniremembers before him does not reveal any material differences in the way questions were framed. We see no clear basis for an inference of racial discrimination. In questioning veniremembers, parties have considerable latitude in the types of questions that they may ask. See Bowers, 482 N.W.2d at 777. The state had asked each of the previous veniremembers how they evaluate credibility. Blanche's nonspecific assertions of a Batson violation are insufficient to demonstrate any impropriety in the questions asked. Moreover, we agree with the postconviction court that the state's use of a peremptory challenge on veniremember # 4 made any future peremptory challenge on a member of a racial minority more suspect. This circumstance made racial discrimination in the strike of this veniremember less likely. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court did not clearly err when it overruled Blanche's objection to the state's peremptory challenge because the circumstances of the state's strike of veniremember # 4 did not raise an inference that the veniremember's exclusion was based on race.
Next, we address Blanche's claim that the district court erred because it violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights under the rule in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Blanche asserts that the court erred when it admitted statements of codefendant Bernard through the testimony of Monta Davis, Detective Charles Kelly, and Duan Gaines, and a redacted videotape of Bernard's police interview. We review de novo whether admitted testimony violates a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. State v. King, 622 N.W.2d 800, 806 (Minn.2001). If evidence has been admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause, it is subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 809. Error is harmless if the verdict rendered was surely not attributable to the error. State v. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d 281, 295 (Minn.2002). Bruton established the rule that when two defendants are tried jointly, the pretrial confession of one, which implicates the other defendant, cannot be admitted against the other defendant unless the confessing codefendant testifies at trial. 391 U.S. 123, 135-37, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Admitting such a confession when the codefendant does not testify is a violation of the other defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. Id. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Furthermore, instructing the jury to consider the confession only against the confessing codefendant is an insufficient remedy because a confession that directly implicates the other defendant is so powerfully incriminating. Id. at 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Following Bruton, the Supreme Court has provided some parameters on how a codefendant's confession can be admitted into evidence in a joint trial. In Richardson v. Marsh, the Court stated that the protective rule of Bruton is a narrow exception to the general principle that jurors follow jury instructions. 481 U.S. 200, 207, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). In Marsh, the Court held that the admission of a codefendant's confession did not violate the other defendant's Confrontation Clause rights because the admitted version of the confession was redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence. Id. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702. The Court stated that the redaction, which did not expressly implicate the defendant, created an important distinction to Bruton because the confession became incriminating only when linked with other evidence introduced later at trial. Id. at 208, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702. The Court also held that the jury must be provided a proper limiting instruction that the codefendant's confession cannot be used against the other defendant. Id. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702. In Gray v. Maryland, the Supreme Court decided a question it had reserved ruling on in Marsh  whether replacing the defendant's name with an obvious indication of deletion, such as a blank space, the word `deleted,' or a similar symbol, is prohibited under Bruton's protective rule. 523 U.S. 185, 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998). Although the redaction in Gray was not incriminating on its face, the Court expressed its concern that jurors will often realize that [a confession such as this] refers specifically to the defendant and such an obvious deletion may well call the jurors' attention specially to the removed name. Id. at 193, 118 S.Ct. 1151. The Court elaborated: A juror who does not know the law and who therefore wonders to whom the blank might refer need only lift his eyes to [the defendant], sitting at counsel table, to find what will seem the obvious answer, at least if the juror hears the judge's instruction not to consider the confession as evidence against [the defendant], for that instruction will provide an obvious reason for the blank. A more sophisticated juror, wondering if the blank refers to someone else, might also wonder how, if it did, the prosecutor could argue the confession is reliable, for the prosecutor, after all, has been arguing that [the defendant], not someone else, helped [the codefendant] commit the crime. Id. Minn. R.Crim. P. 17.03, subd. 3(2)(b), follows the Bruton line of cases requiring that in a joint trial, a codefendant's confession can be received into evidence only after all references to the defendant have been deleted, if admission of the statement with the deletions will not prejudice the defendant. [3] The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also provided some analysis on what falls under Bruton's protective rule. In United States v. Logan, a detective testifying about a codefendant's confession replaced the name of the defendant in the confession with the words another individual. 210 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir.2000). The Eighth Circuit distinguished Gray, stating that the use of the words another individual in place of the defendant's name was not a redaction and did not draw attention to the change. Id. at 823. Noting that the detective's testimony was only oral and that the allegedly offending phrase occurred only once, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the inference was not the kind of statement that was so powerfully incriminating that required it to abandon the normal presumption that juries follow their instructions. Id. We interpret Logan to require a case-by-case analysis of the prejudice to the defendant resulting from an altered statement that is not a redaction of the type that was specifically found impermissible in Gray. Although we do not expressly adopt Logan, we agree with its apparent conclusion that the primary concern in Bruton is the prejudice the confessing codefendant's allegedly offending statement causes the other defendant. The Supreme Court stated its concern that redacted or altered statements should not, by themselves, draw attention to the other defendant. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 193, 118 S.Ct. 1151. In Marsh, the Court determined that the codefendant's confession was admissible because it only became incriminating when it was linked with evidence introduced later at trial and only because the appropriate limiting instruction had been provided. See Marsh, 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702. Blanche specifically argues that the admission of Davis's testimony, Detective Kelly's testimony repeating what Davis said, Duan Gaines's testimony, and the videotaped statement by Bernard all violated his rights under Bruton. We will separately analyze each of the allegedly offending statements.