Opinion ID: 2613558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jury orientation

Text: At trial, Nash's defense attorney made an oral motion in limine to prevent either side from explaining what reasonable doubt is in voir dire. After discussing the motion with the parties, the court made the following disclosure: I must tell you and I should disclose this since the issue has been brought up. In my orientation that I usually do and that I did today but nobody was present, but they [the potential jurors] were all listening, I explained there were three that there were three levels of proof in legal cases and that I used an example of an intersection accident as a typical civil case and said the burden of proof on the plaintiff in that case was a preponderance of the evidence and that means more probably true than not true. I told them [that in] a parental rights termination case, the burden was higher. It was clear and convincing evidence. That in a criminal case it was the highest standard of all, beyond a reasonable doubt, but there wasthat in most legal propositions nothing could be proved to a one hundred percent scientific certainty. Now, I'm going to tell you that's essentially what I told them. If you want to make a motion for anything right now, you can do so. Nash's attorney made a motion to discharge the jury panel based on the court's reference to the numerical percentage of 100%. The defense counsel alleged that beyond a reasonable doubt means more than 50%. However, he contended, with the court's comments, the jury might think that it had to be above 80% to be beyond a reasonable doubt. The court denied the motion, stating: Well, I probably should have used the phrase absolute certainty rather than hundred percent certainty. I don't believe that this panel has been prejudiced by that number. At this time, Aikins joined Nash's motion, and the court again denied the motion to discharge the jury panel. Aikins appeals this ruling. At issue in this case is a jury orientation comment, not a jury instruction. These are not considered the same thing. See State v. Cook, 259 Kan. 370, 386, 913 P.2d 97 (1996); State v. Gibbons, 256 Kan. 951, 964-65, 889 P.2d 772 (1995). In State v. Gadelkarim, 256 Kan. 671, 887 P.2d 88 (1994), and State v. Nguyen, 251 Kan. 69, 833 P.2d 937 (1992), this court analyzed jury orientation comments and other similar statements under the judicial misconduct standard of review. Gadelkarim provides: Allegations of judicial misconduct during trial must be decided on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding such alleged misconduct. In order to warrant or require the granting of a new trial, it must affirmatively appear that the conduct was of such a nature that it prejudiced the substantial rights of the complaining party. A mere possibility of prejudice from a remark of the judge is not sufficient to overturn a verdict or judgment. If a proper and reasonable construction will render the remark unobjectionable, the remark is not prejudicial. State v. Nguyen, 251 Kan. 69, Syl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 833 P.2d 937 (1992). 256 Kan. at 677. Under this standard of review, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to discharge the jury panel based on the jury orientation comment at issue. In State v. Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 133 Pac. 878 (1913), the defendant moved to quash the venire based on jury orientation comments made by the trial court. This court found that the jury orientation comments did not require a new trial. In so holding, the court stated: Those who have had experience as trial judges know how much easier it is to criticize their conduct and rulings than to perform their arduous and perplexing duties free from error. The address in question contained many practical and commendable suggestions to the men about to enter upon duties new and in a degree mysterious to them, and while we think the concededly able and admirable trial judge crowded the danger line in some of the quoted remarks, which should have been omitted, we are not convinced that all of those made, taken together, precluded those to whom they were directed from heeding and following proper instructions in a criminal case tried two weeks later. 90 Kan. at 239. In Nguyen, 251 Kan. 69, the trial court made some comments to the jury after closing arguments, attempting to explain the process of jury questions and readbacks. In so doing, the trial court improperly mentioned that the defendant would have a right to appeal the case. This court denied the defendant's request for a new trial based on this comment, finding that the defendant only alleged the possibility of prejudice arising out of this comment, but did not prove that actual prejudice occurred. 251 Kan. at 78-80. In Gadelkarim, the defendant challenged several comments the judge made during the orientation of potential jurors. The trial judge referred to the defendant's right to appeal, and this court disapproved of the comment. Nevertheless, this court held that the defendant had the burden to prove his substantial rights were prejudiced by the comment so as to deprive him of a fair trial. Since the defendant only showed the mere possibility of prejudice and did not prove actual prejudice, this court did not find reversible error in the jury orientation comment. 256 Kan. at 680-81. Here, the questionable comment explaining reasonable doubt occurred during orientation of potential jurors. However, after all the evidence in the case was presented, the judge read the jury the jury instruction on reasonable doubt, PIK Crim.3d 52.02. The trial lasted almost 2 weeks. We find that the jury would have relied on the actual jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt, which was provided right before it went into deliberations, and not on a jury orientation comment regarding reasonable doubt which was made 2 weeks earlier when the jurors were not even sure they would be selected as jurors. Thus, under the facts and circumstances surrounding the jury orientation comment, we hold that the comment did not reasonably mislead the jury or actually prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. We do not find reversible error on this issue.