Opinion ID: 203950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Handicapped

Text: Although the district court did not reach this issue, appellees argue that we can affirm summary judgment on the independent ground that Sensing cannot establish she suffers from a handicap within the meaning of Chapter 151B. [13] Not all physical or mental impairments constitute a handicap under the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute, but rather, as noted above, § 1(17)(a) defines handicap as a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 1(17)(a). Appellees emphasize that a medical diagnosis, without more, is insufficient to establish a handicap under Chapter 151B; rather, `the extent of the limitation ... in terms of [the plaintiff's] own experience' is determinative. City of New Bedford v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 440 Mass. 450, 799 N.E.2d 578, 589 (Mass.2003) (quoting Carroll, 294 F.3d at 238). Appellees argue that Sensing essentially conceded in her deposition testimony that her MS condition did not substantially limit one or more [of her] major life activities, by stating that with the exception of her one major flare-up, her MS had not restricted her in any meaningful way. Thus, appellees argue that Sensing has effectively forfeited the claim that she is handicapped within the meaning of the statute. We note that Sensing's position that she was only limited in major life activities during the flare-up periods of her episodic MS condition is not inconsistent with being handicapped within the meaning of Chapter 151B. See Cargill v. Harvard Univ., 60 Mass.App.Ct. 585, 804 N.E.2d 377, 380 & n. 3 (2004) (finding no dispute as to whether plaintiff with rheumatoid arthritis was handicapped within meaning of Chapter 151B although pain was intermittent and periods of remission or stabilization did occur). [14] Nonetheless, we need not decide this issue. Whether or not Sensing can establish that she is actually handicapped within the meaning of § 1(17)(a), Sensing argues, and we agree, that she may separately be found handicapped under § 1(17)(c) on account of being regarded [by her employer] as having such impairment. To satisfy the first prong on the basis of being regarded-as-disabled, Sensing must produce evidence that Outback/Kozmits regarded [her] as having an impairment which [she] did not have, or mistakenly perceived that a non-limiting impairment substantially limited [her] in a major life activity. Carroll, 294 F.3d at 238 n. 4; see also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521-22, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999) ([A] person is `regarded as' disabled within the meaning of the ADA if a covered entity mistakenly believes that the person's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.). Drawing all reasonable inferences in Sensing's favor, we conclude that Sensing has a reasonable expectation of proving that she was regarded-as handicapped. Based on the evidence in the summary judgment record, it would be reasonable to infer that Kozmits perceived Sensing as handicapped, i.e., as suffering from a physical impairment that substantially limited her in a major life activity. See City of New Bedford, 799 N.E.2d at 590. MS undoubtedly constitutes an impairment. See MCAD Guidelines II(A)(2) (defining impairment, inter alia, as a disorder affecting one or more of a number of body systems); Labonte, 678 N.E.2d at 859-60 (affirming liability in favor of plaintiff with MS on her claim under 151B that she was terminated because of her handicap); 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1) (including MS in representative list of disorders and conditions constituting physical impairments for purposes of the ADA). [15] It is undisputed that, at least by late fall 2004, Kozmits was aware of Sensing's diagnosis. Moreover, Chapter 151B defines the term major life activities as including such functions as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 1(20). Here, appellees include in the record affidavits from Sensing's coworkers, who express concern about Sensing's ability to perform her job quickly and safely, concerns which they allegedly brought to Kozmits' attention. The record also contains evidence that Kozmits was concerned about Sensing falling on the job as a result of her MS condition, a concern that he expressly articulated to Sensing as his reason for not allowing Sensing to return to work in the takeaway position. From the fact that Kozmits questioned Sensing's ability to perform her job without falling, it is reasonable to infer that Kozmits doubted not only Sensing's ability to work in her particular job, but also her ability to work in a broad class of jobs that would have required her to be on her feet. See Gelabert-Ladenheim v. American Airlines, Inc., 252 F.3d 54, 60 (1st Cir.2001) (describing requirement that a plaintiff must show significant restriction as to either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, and not impairment as to a single, specific job to establish impairment in major life activity of working). Moreover, these concerns suggest that Kozmits doubted Sensing's ability to carry out other major life activities, besides working, such as walking and performing manual tasks. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 1(20). On these facts, there is sufficient evidence that Kozmits regarded Sensing as suffering from an impairment that substantially limited major life activities. Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude that Sensing satisfied the first element of her prima facie discrimination claim.