Opinion ID: 2809688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Independent Testing of the Firearm

Text: The government’s key witness testified that she saw appellant shoot Conrad multiple times in quick succession. At trial, appellant argued that this could not have happened with the handgun the police recovered because that weapon could not have fired .380 ammunition several times in a row. He now contends that he 5 was prevented from proving his theory because the government refused to allow his expert to independently test-fire the handgun, in violation of Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16. On February 12, 2012, appellant served a general discovery request on the prosecution for, among other things, the opportunity to inspect, copy, and test any guns material to his defense. He did not follow up on that request until April 18, 2013, five days before the trial began. On that day, appellant’s trial counsel served a formal Rule 16 request on the government, asking for access to the 9-millimeter handgun so that his expert, Dr. William Bruchey, could test its ability to fire .380 ammunition several times in quick succession. The parties appeared in court on April 18 to discuss pretrial matters, including the government’s motion to exclude Dr. Bruchey’s testimony because appellant had not disclosed the basis of his expert opinions. Dr. Bruchey was in the District that day to look at two bullets and bullet casings expended during the government’s test-firing of the weapon. He had already inspected the other ballistics evidence. The government explained that he was barred from using the laboratory’s equipment to examine the evidence, see D.C. Code § 5-1501.09 (2012 Repl.), but agreed to retrieve the evidence from the lab so that Dr. Bruchey could 6 examine it at the courthouse. Appellant’s counsel said that looking at the evidence in the courthouse might be problematic because Dr. Bruchey might need a microscope for a proper examination, but that she would work out that issue with him. The parties did not seriously discuss a plan for Dr. Bruchey to test-fire the handgun. On April 24, the day after jury selection, the parties informed the court that on April 18 Dr. Bruchey had been unable to properly examine the bullets and casings used in the government’s test-firing because he had not brought a microscope. After discussing some options, including mailing the evidence to Dr. Bruchey, the trial court asked defense counsel, “[D]o you want a continuance? We can let the jury go. I haven’t sworn them in. But if you want to proceed today, I’m going to swear them in and that’s going to be it. And you’re just going to have to deal with the evidence.” Appellant’s counsel asked for the court’s indulgence, had a discussion off the record, and then declined the offer of a continuance. She then said she would work on getting Dr. Bruchey access to the evidence “within the confines of the court.” She did not renew her request to test-fire the handgun. On April 26, mid-trial, defense counsel reported to the court that Dr. Bruchey could not bring his microscope from Maryland to the District of 7 Columbia to examine the evidence. The trial judge said that she could do nothing about that because they were now in the middle of trial. She suggested that Dr. Bruchey rent a microscope to examine the evidence. Defense counsel again did not renew her request for the opportunity to test-fire the handgun. Dr. Bruchey did not view the evidence used in the government’s test-fire, nor did he test-fire the weapon. The correct interpretation and application of Rule 16 is a legal question we review de novo. Jenkins v. United States, 75 A.3d 174, 195 (D.C. 2013). Section (a)(1)(C) of that rule requires the government to allow a defendant, upon request, to inspect any tangible object that is in the government’s possession if it is material to the preparation of the defense. If a party fails to comply with the discovery obligations of the rule, “the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection [of the evidence], grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other orders as it deems just under the circumstances.” Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16 (d)(2). The trial court’s decision whether to sanction a party for a Rule 16 violation, and its choice of a sanction, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Austin v. United States, 64 A.3d 413, 424 (D.C. 2013). 8 Even assuming, on this tangled record, that appellant preserved the discovery issue he raises on appeal, see Thorne v. United States, 582 A.2d 964, 965 (D.C. 1990) (“A party who neglects to seek a ruling on his motion fails to preserve the issue for appeal.”), we conclude that there was no Rule 16 violation. The government did not prevent Dr. Bruchey from examining the evidence. Once appellant requested access, the prosecution took reasonable steps to retrieve the evidence from the laboratory and make it available for viewing at the courthouse. Dr. Bruchey was unable, for whatever reason, to bring his own microscope or rent one, and was barred from using the government laboratory’s equipment by D.C. Code § 5-1501.09. Moreover, the court offered to continue the trial so the parties could develop a solution. Appellant’s counsel asked for the court’s indulgence, had a discussion off the record, and then refused that offer. Assuming for the sake of argument that the government did not fully comply with Rule 16, the court, when faced with these circumstances, did not abuse its discretion by failing to sanction the government.