Opinion ID: 3036801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The BIA’s February 26, 2007 Order

Text: The petitioners seek review of the BIA’s order affirming the IJ’s denial of their claims for asylum, relief under the CAT, and withholding of removal. Because the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision “to the extent” that the IJ determined that the petitioners did not establish that they suffered past persecution or have a well-founded 5 fear of future persecution, but also discussed the bases for the IJ’s decision, we review the decisions of both the BIA and IJ. Chen v Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). The factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and the legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Briseno-Flores v. Attorney Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, the BIA’s and IJ’s conclusions concerning the petitioners’ failure to meet their burden of proof regarding past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution are supported by substantial evidence. See Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003). The IJ concluded that the boys were apprehended through apparent sweeps on days of increased violence and instability, and acknowledged that the boys were mistreated to the “extent that they were perhaps verbally abused, slapped and had minimal physical interaction with the police.” The IJ also found that the police inappropriately used the boys’ detentions as an “opportunity to extort or shakedown families for money.” The BIA agreed that the “three brief detentions of the . . . minor children by the police, in which the children were verbally abused, pushed and slapped, do not rise to the level of past persecution.” Although the police detentions were undoubtedly traumatic for the entire family, and especially the children, we agree that three very brief detentions over the course of three years fail to rise to the level of persecution. See Kibinda v. Attorney Gen., 477 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that five-day detention of a 16-year-old boy by Angolan 6 army did not rise to the level of past persecution, as the conduct complained of was not “extreme”); cf. Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that multiple severe beatings and intimidation tactics rose to the level of persecution). Moreover, neither the threats at the police station nor the phone calls demanding information about the family’s and others’ political affiliation amount to past persecution, whether considered on their own or in conjunction with the police detentions. See Li v. Attorney Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Threats standing alone . . . constitute persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.”) (internal citations omitted). Although threatening to take the boys away if they were picked up again could be considered a threat of “a highly imminent and menacing nature,” its import is diminished because the family was able to remain at home without trouble from the police until they left for the United States six months later. Id. at 164-65. With regard to future harm, the BIA agreed with the IJ that while the petitioners “honestly and subjectively present[ed] genuine anxieties about living in Pakistan,” they did not establish a likelihood of future persecution on the basis of their imputed political opinion or status as Mohajirs. Although Pakistan may be a generally dangerous place to live, the petitioners did not provide specific, detailed facts showing that they had good reason to fear that they would be singled out for persecution, nor did they demonstrate that a pattern or practice of persecution exists against Mohajirs or MQM members. 7 Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 2003); Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005). The IJ found that the country condition reports showed that although politically active Mohajirs and MQM members could be at risk, the petitioners—who were not politically active—did not introduce “adequate objective evidence” that would establish a likelihood of their future persecution. This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. The petitioners also argue that the IJ and BIA did not consider a psychologist’s report diagnosing the boys with post-traumatic stress syndrome. However, the BIA specifically found that the IJ considered the report and noted that the IJ referenced the report in his decision. This determination is supported by substantial evidence. It is true that the IJ did not specifically discuss the diagnoses in making his decision, but the transcript demonstrates that the psychologist’s report was discussed and introduced, and the IJ’s oral opinion specifically states that the court accepted the report. Moreover, the IJ noted that it was “the Court’s position and the Government didn’t have any objection to accepting [the] psychological evaluation . . . along with the psychological assessment and the results of the exam.” As the BIA determined, there is no indication that the IJ ignored this evidence, and the record shows that the IJ “reviewed the record and grasped the movants[’] claims,” which is all it is required to do. Shardar v. Attorney Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 317 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002)). 8 Thus, the petitioners have not demonstrated that the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions were not supported by substantial evidence.