Opinion ID: 1034195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy—Count 1

Text: All defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to establish that they entered into a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of powder cocaine (Count 1). To prove conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must establish that: “(1) an agreement existed between two or more persons to violate federal narcotics law, (2) the defendant knew of the existence of the agreement, and (3) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.” United States v. Ochoa, 667 F.3d 643, 648 (5th Cir. 2012). However, “if the government seeks enhanced penalties based on the amount of drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), the [drug] quantity must be stated in the indictment and submitted to the [fact finder] for a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir. 2000). In the instant case, the Government sought enhanced penalties on the conspiracy charge under § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). In accordance with Doggett, the indictment alleged that the conspiracy involved at least five kilograms of cocaine. If an indictment alleges involvement in a conspiracy to distribute an 12 Case: 12-30413 Document: 00512310475 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/17/2013 No. 12-30413 amount of a controlled substance that triggers enhanced penalties under §§ 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), then Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), requires the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the quantity of the alleged drug as a fourth element of the offense. See United States v. Turner, 319 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 2003).15 In the case before us, the jury was instructed that it was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the scope of the conspiracy involved five kilograms or more of cocaine in order to convict the defendants on Count 1, and the jury so found. a. Furlow, Thomas, Tenisha, JeCarlos, and Mims’s Challenge to the Conspiracy Count Defendants Furlow, Thomas, Tenisha, JeCarlos, and Mims all argue that the verdict that the conspiracy involved five kilograms or more of powder cocaine was not supported by sufficient evidence. The thrust of defendants’ argument is that the Government’s evidence recovered far less than 5 kilograms of cocaine (having actually seized only 1.535 kilograms) and that the Government’s request that the jury infer that the conspiracy involved 5 kilograms was unsupported by the evidence. We agree that the evidence presented to the jury did not support a finding that the conspiracy involved five kilograms. While a conspiracy conviction is supported by mere proof of an agreement involving drugs, and does not require actual possession and seizure of the drugs, the Government must still prove the quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy. See United States v. Turner, 319 F.3d 716, 723-24 (5th Cir. 2003). The Government argued to the jury that the cocaine purchased and seized 15 See also Alleyne v. United States, No. 11-9335, slip op. at 7, 12 (U.S. June 17, 2013) (“Facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence are therefore elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”); (“[T]he core crime and the fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which must be submitted to the jury.”). 13 Case: 12-30413 Document: 00512310475 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/17/2013 No. 12-30413 was just “the tip of the iceberg” and that even though the Government only physically seized 1.535 kilograms of cocaine from Pugh, sellers other than Pugh were involved in the conspiracy, and the jury could infer that there were many other undocumented purchases throughout the life of the conspiracy. The Government made twelve controlled purchases of cocaine from Pugh between October of 2009 and July of 2010. In order to reach the threshold of five kilograms, the Government asked the jury to infer that, taking the ten most recent controlled purchases from Pugh: “[D]o a little bit of math. If you only consider the deliveries which correspond to the ten purchases, for assuming purposes here, that would be half a kilogram a delivery.” Thus, the Government told the jury that it should assume that each controlled purchase bought from Pugh was preceded by a delivery of half a kilogram of cocaine to Pugh and other sellers involved in the conspiracy. Such an assumption of half a kilogram a delivery preceding each sale of a controlled purchase is not confirmed by the record. It is not clear that each of these ten controlled purchases was immediately preceded by a separate delivery of cocaine. Furthermore, in many instances, Pugh testified that he was unsure about the total quantity of cocaine he received. Thus, the only evidence as to any quantity of cocaine obtained on several of these dates is the purchase made by the CI—and often times the CI bought quantities as small as one or two ounces per purchase.16 While there is evidence that there were sellers other than Pugh (including co-defendants Mims, Furlow, and Tenisha) and there were buyers other than the CI, without more evidence as to the quantity of these other sales, we are not persuaded that this 16 As depicted by Government Exhibit 215-001, the controlled purchases of cocaine obtained from Pugh were as follows: 10/19/09—1 ounce crack(28.7 grams); 12/05/10—1 ounce crack (28.8 grams); 1/24/10—1 ounce crack (29.5 grams); 2/10/10—3 ounces crack (80.0 grams); 2/12/10— 1 ounce crack (29.5 grams); 2/27/10—2 ounces crack (54.1 grams); 3/06/10—2 ounces crack (58.3 grams); 3/14/10—2 ounces crack (57.1 grams); 4/03/10—2 ounces crack (56.8 grams); 5/06/10—2 ounces crack (59.4 grams); 5/19/10—1.5 ounces crack (42.8 grams); 7/13/10—9 ounces powder (225.8 grams). 14 Case: 12-30413 Document: 00512310475 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/17/2013 No. 12-30413 supports an inference of “half a kilogram a delivery” to infer a total of five kilograms. Additionally, the Government alleges that “kilogram quantities of cocaine were acquired by JeCarlos from Mejorado and . . . those same kilograms were delivered by Thomas to various other persons, not only to Pugh, in the Shreveport area on at least a monthly basis for the life of the conspiracy.” Yet there is record evidence that JeCarlos had purchasers in Texas independent of the Shreveport operation. And there is nothing in the record that supports the conclusion that Thomas delivered full kilogram quantities of cocaine to Shreveport for JeCarlos. Furthermore, while the Government points to at least six instances where JeCarlos and Mejorado met (or at least had phone conversations suggesting planned meetings), the record is devoid of confirmation of the actual quantity obtained from many of these meetings. Thus, the only evidence the Government cites to surmise the quantity of the cocaine obtained are cryptic, vague phone calls between JeCarlos and Mejorado; in many instances there is no credible evidence to verify a transfer of drugs following each telephone conversation or the actual amount transferred.17 17 The Government’s Supplemental Brief argues that JeCarlos’s acquisitions of cocaine from Mejorado total six kilograms and suggests that each time JeCarlos and Mejorado met a kilogram of cocaine was exchanged. We are not so persuaded. For example, the Government suggests that JeCarlos obtained two kilograms of cocaine (one on June 5 and one on July 1) from Mejorado based in large part on JeCarlos’s conversation with Thomas in which he states, “I’m just waiting on my boy to call back and I’ll have that uh, other one.” And in a conversation JeCarlos has with an Unknown Male JeCarlos states “he just came through. It was, it was uh, what we always get,” and the Unknown Male states: “I got a [guy] want a, want a, want a wheel. You want to see a wheel off the deal too? . . . That’s twelve dollars, a whole one, two hot boys cuz.” We are not convinced that these references alone support the conclusion that Mejorado delivered two kilograms to JeCarlos. There is a conversation between JeCarlos and Mejorado on July 5 in which JeCarlos indicates he is “about a dub”—a term which, in this context, Officer Sarpy testified means $20,000 in cash and refers to a kilogram quantity of cocaine. However, even so, we are not convinced that the jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that each time JeCarlos and Mejorado met they always transacted in kilogram quantities. 15 Case: 12-30413 Document: 00512310475 Page: 16 Date Filed: 07/17/2013 No. 12-30413 In light of the above, we are not persuaded that the Government proved a conspiracy involving at least five kilograms of cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt. Although we conclude that the Government did not prove a quantity of five kilograms beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry does not end here; for the Government’s failure to prove the five kilogram quantity does not undermine the conviction. Rather, it only affects the sentence. United States v. Rolon-Ramos, 502 F.3d 750, 754-55 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine was not invalidated by the court’s conclusion that the evidence did not support the drug quantity determination); see also United States v. Gomez-Rosario, 418 F.3d 90, 104 (1st Cir. 2005) (“No specific drug quantity needs to be proven for a jury to convict a defendant of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.”). Thus, the “quantity and type” element is not necessary for a § 841(b) conviction, but is relevant only to determine the provision of § 841(b) under which defendants may be sentenced. Other circuits have explained why the failure to prove drug quantity or type does not undermine a defendant’s conviction. In United States v. Toliver, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the formal “elements” of offenses under § 841(a)(1) and § 846 from drug quantity and type, which it described as a “functional equivalent of an element” for Apprendi purposes. 351 F.3d 423, 43031 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). In Toliver, although the government “included drug quantity and type allegations in Count One . . . [yet] failed to prove any of the specific drug quantities or that cocaine base/crack was involved in the conspiracy,” the Ninth Circuit held that “the defendants were not entitled to a judgment of acquittal” because the “quantity and type” element was not a formal offense element. Id. at 431. Rather, as a consequence of failing to prove the drug 16 Case: 12-30413 Document: 00512310475 Page: 17 Date Filed: 07/17/2013 No. 12-30413 quantity and type, “the district court was restricted in the maximum sentence that it could impose.” Id. The Fourth Circuit has followed the same analysis, upholding a conviction for conspiracy to violate § 841(a) but overturning the defendant’s sentence due to improper determination of drug quantity. United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2005). In Collins, the Fourth Circuit determined that the district court had failed to issue “appropriate jury instructions concerning the facts necessary to determine [the defendant’s] sentence.” Id. at 314. However, it found that “[g]uilt of the substantive offense defined in § 841(a) is not dependent upon a determination of the amount or type of narcotics distributed” and that the defendant’s conviction was sound. Id. Therefore “remanding for a new trial [was] not the appropriate remedy.” Id; see also United States v. Kelly, 519 F.3d 355, 363 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he remedy for a failure of proof that a defendant possessed a particular amount or type of cocaine would not be to grant him a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, but rather to remand for re-sentencing . . . .”). Though we have not expressly stated the principle that failure to prove drug quantity or type does not undermine a conviction under § 841(a)(1) and § 846, our holding in United States v. Hayes reflects the view on “functional equivalents” espoused by our sister circuits. 342 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2003). The defendant in Hayes was indicted for and convicted of conspiracy to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine in violation of §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Id. at 386-87. The defendant sought to have his conviction vacated because the Government offered insufficient evidence as to drug quantity. Id. at 391. Although we found that the evidence did not support a finding of fifty grams of crack involved in the conspiracy, our remedy was to vacate the conviction and to remand for resentencing pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(B) for conspiracy to distribute more than five and less than fifty grams of crack cocaine. Id. at 391-92. Clearly 17 Case: 12-30413 Document: 00512310475 Page: 18 Date Filed: 07/17/2013 No. 12-30413 the basic conspiracy conviction remained intact. If alleging a specific drug quantity in an indictment created a fourth, formal element of the conspiracy offense alleged in Hayes, then the Government’s failure to prove the quantity alleged would have required us to vacate the defendant’s conviction on the relevant counts in toto. By remanding for resentencing, we tacitly acknowledged that the insufficiency of the evidence as to quantity was not fatal to the conviction. Thus, where a defendant may be subject to enhanced statutory penalties because of drug quantity or type, the requisite fourth “element” under Apprendi is not a formal element of the conspiracy offense. Hence, defendants’ challenges to the quantity of cocaine charged in Count 1 of the indictment does not go to the validity of their convictions, but rather to the sentence that the district court may impose. Although in Hayes and Toliver the jury was asked to first find whether a conspiracy had been established and then presented with a special verdict form to choose the quantity of cocaine involved in the conspiracy, we do not find that submission to the jury in this form is required, although it may well be preferable.18 It follows that neither the inclusion of “That the quantity of the substance was at least 5 kilograms or more” in the indictment and jury instruction, nor the failure to use a special verdict form undermines our conclusion that Hayes and Toliver control our decision on this issue. In sum, although the Government did not prove the five kilogram quantity alleged, this failure does not invalidate defendants’ conspiracy convictions; rather, it only affects the sentence. We are mindful of the Supreme Court’s 18 See FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 2.89 note (2012) (“If there is a fact dispute . . . as to whether the amount is above or below a particular baseline . . . the court may substitute for the fourth element a special interrogatory asking the jury to indicate the total amount of the controlled substance it believes was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 18 Case: 12-30413 Document: 00512310475 Page: 19 Date Filed: 07/17/2013 No. 12-30413 recent clarification in Alleyne v. United States that “[w]hen a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the jury.” No. 11-9335, slip op. at 14 (U.S. June 17, 2013). Here the five kilogram quantity of cocaine, which would have aggravated the punishment, was submitted to and found by the jury. As discussed above, we found the evidence insufficient to support the five kilogram finding. In remanding for resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), we acknowledge that the way the verdict form was structured, the jury did not have an opportunity to make an explicit finding that 500 grams or more of cocaine were involved in the conspiracy. Even so, we are confident that the jury’s finding that 5 kilograms of cocaine were involved also encompassed a jury finding that the lesser quantity of 500 grams or more was involved. Thus resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) is appropriate. Finally, the Government argues that the defendants’ stipulation that five kilograms were involved for sentencing purposes should bind them on the sufficiency question as well. We disagree. Defendants made clear that the stipulation was for sentencing purposes only. The district court noted that “all defendants reserved the right to contest the drug quantity as part of any appeal on a sufficiency of evidence basis.” We therefore decline to hold all defendants to a five kilogram stipulation for any purpose other than sentencing. Although the Government’s failure to prove the five kilogram quantity will require resentencing, we reject defendants’ argument that this failure will require vacating their convictions. b. Daniels’s Challenge to the Conspiracy Count Daniels asserts a different challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conspiracy conviction. He argues that the Government provided 19 Case: 12-30413 Document: 00512310475 Page: 20 Date Filed: 07/17/2013 No. 12-30413 no evidence that he had any connection to the powder cocaine conspiracy with which the other defendants were involved. We disagree. The Government offered the following evidence to support Daniels’s conviction on the conspiracy count: (i) in a series of calls with JeCarlos on July 13, 2010, Daniels discussed the quality of cocaine he acquired from Mims; (ii) in that same series of calls, JeCarlos told Daniels to retrieve the payment for some of the drugs retrieved, and Daniels informed JeCarlos that he still had possession of the drugs, which have been cooked from cocaine into crack; (iii) Pugh testified that he gave Daniels a ride to the Greyhound Bus station in Shreveport so that Daniels could bring cocaine money to JeCarlos in Dallas; (iv) the Government presented evidence of telephone communications between JeCarlos and Daniels in which JeCarlos told Daniels that he needs to grab some “paperwork,” a code word for “drug money”; (v) Pugh testified that Daniels was with JeCarlos on multiple occasions when JeCarlos engaged in drug-related transactions with Pugh, including on May 6, May 8, May 18, and July 2, as well as on July 20, 2010, when Daniels and JeCarlos were both arrested in a Home Depot parking lot. The Government did not have to show that Daniels entered into an express agreement to engage in the conspiracy alleged in Count 1: “[A] tacit, mutual agreement with common purpose, design, and understanding will suffice.” United States v. Zamora, 661 F.3d 200, 209 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, a defendant may be convicted of a conspiracy even if he only played a minor role in the conspiracy; and a defendant need not know all of the specific details of the conspiracy, need not know all of the other conspirators, and need not have ever physically touched any of the drugs involved in the conspiracy. See United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 20 Case: 12-30413 Document: 00512310475 Page: 21 Date Filed: 07/17/2013 No. 12-30413 858 (5th Cir. 1998).19 And even though “[t]he Government need not prove an overt act to show participation in a conspiracy,” Turner, 319 F.3d at 721, it provided evidence that Daniels delivered drug money to JeCarlos and that Daniels had acquired cocaine from Mims. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, we hold that a rational juror could have found Daniels guilty of conspiracy under § 846 beyond a reasonable doubt.