Opinion ID: 884001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the District Court err in awarding attorney's fees to the Respondents?

Text: In addition to granting a mandatory injunction, the District Court awarded the Respondents attorney's fees and costs. The general rule for awarding attorney's fees is that, absent statutory or contractual authorization, attorney's fees will not be awarded. Greenwood v. Steve Nelson Trucking (1995), 270 Mont. 216, 221, 890 P.2d 765, 768. However, a successful applicant for a writ of mandate may recover reasonable attorney's fees. See Kadillak v. Montana Dep't of State Lands (1982), 198 Mont. 70, 643 P.2d 1178. Respondents argue that under the court's equitable powers to grant a mandatory injunction the court has the power to grant attorney's fees because the remedy of mandatory injunction is identical to the remedy of mandamus. Alternatively, they argue that, as a matter of equity, courts can award attorney's fees to make an injured party whole. Greenwood, 890 P.2d at 768; Goodover v. Lindey's (1992), 255 Mont. 430, 446, 843 P.2d 765, 774-75. This Court has distinguished a mandatory injunction from mandamus as follows: Another material distinction between the two remedies is found in the relief which they are designed to afford. Injunction is a remedy to restrain the doing of injurious acts or, in its mandatory form, to require the undoing of injurious acts and restoration of the status quo, while mandamus commands the performance of a particular duty which rests upon the defendant, or respondent, because of his official status or by operation of law.... In re the A Family (1979), 184 Mont. 145, 153, 602 P.2d 157, 162 (quoting 42 Am.Jur.2d 750 Injunctions § 19). In A Family, we held that because the district court order commanded the school district to perform a clear legal duty, the true nature of the order was that of mandamus and not that of a mandatory permanent injunction. 602 P.2d at 162. The same cannot be said of the instant case because the requirements for a writ of mandate were not met. Pursuant to § 27-26-102, MCA, a two-part standard applies to the issuance of a writ of mandate. Franchi v. County of Jefferson (1995), 274 Mont. 272, ___, 908 P.2d 210, 212; Becky v. Butte-Silver Bow Sch. Dist. 1 (1995), 274 Mont. 131, ___, 906 P.2d 193, 212; State ex rel. Chisholm v. District Court (1986), 224 Mont. 441, 443, 731 P.2d 324, 325. First, the writ is available when the party requesting it is entitled to the performance of a clear legal duty by the party against whom the writ is sought. Becky, 906 P.2d at 195. Second, if there is a clear legal duty, the district court must grant the writ if there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Section 27-26-102(2), MCA; Franchi, 908 P.2d at 212. In Chisholm, we clarified the inquiry as follows: A negative answer to the first question bars the issuance of the writ, and, irrespective of the answer to that question, an affirmative answer to the second, divests the court of authority to issue it. Chisholm, 731 P.2d at 325. The cases Respondents cite in support of the proposition that a mandatory injunction can fill the role of a writ of mandamus, involve the duties of governmental agencies. See Bissey v. City of Marion (1919), 104 Kan. 311, 178 P. 611; State v. Board of County Comm'rs (1940), 188 Okla. 184, 107 P.2d 542. These decisions are further support for the proposition that mandamus is the appropriate vehicle to compel the performance of a particular duty which rests upon the defendant, or respondent, because of his official status or by operation of law.  A Family, 602 P.2d at 162. Here, the restrictive covenant did not impose a legal duty upon the Wittmers because of their official status; they had none. Nor did it impose a duty by operation of law. Thus, the claim fails the first prong of the two part test and the resulting judgment cannot be considered a writ of mandamus. We decline to equate a mandatory injunction with a writ of mandamus for purposes of awarding attorney's fees. Additionally, we reject the invitation to award attorney's fees on the basis of equitable principles. We have applied the equitable exception to the general rule only in those unique situations in which a party is forced into a frivolous lawsuit and must incur attorney's fees to dismiss the claim. In such cases, equity requires an award of attorney fees to `make the party whole.' Goodover, 843 P.2d at 775. We have affirmed the grant of attorney's fees to defendants in cases where there were no reasons or justifications for the suit, and where a party had to defend against a frivolous action through no fault of her own. See Stickney v. State (1981), 195 Mont. 415, 636 P.2d 860; Holmstrom Land Co. v. Hunter (1979), 182 Mont. 43, 595 P.2d 360; Foy v. Anderson (1978), 176 Mont. 507, 580 P.2d 114. We have also held that where a plaintiff, or as in the instant case a petitioner, chooses to institute a suit against others, an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff will normally be precluded. Goodover, 843 P.2d at 776. Here, Respondents were not forced to defend a wholly frivolous litigation, rather they initiated this suit. Respondents' suit was both reasonable and justifiable, it does not present one of the rare cases in which a district court could use its equitable powers to award such fees. We hold that the District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the Respondents. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. TURNAGE, TRIEWEILER, ERDMANN, NELSON, GRAY and HUNT, JJ., concur.