Opinion ID: 745257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Sartor.

Text: 28 Miller contends that he had a Fourteenth Amendment property interest in remaining in his apartment, and that Officer Sartor should be liable for violating Miller's right to due process by summarily depriving Miller of that interest. We disagree. 29 In Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir.1994), we explained that the rationale for the qualified immunity doctrine 30 is to allow public officers to carry out their duties as they think right, rather than acting out of fear for their own personal fortunes. Toward this end, the rule has evolved that an official performing discretionary functions will generally be immune from liability unless a reasonable person in his position would have known that his actions violated clearly established law. 31 Id. at 1351 (citations omitted). Officer Sartor is therefore immune from Miller's suit unless, first, the law he violated was clearly established at the time of the violation, and second, the applicability of the law to his particular action was evident. Id. 32 When Officer Sartor entered Deneen's apartment, he had information that: (1) Deneen was the only person on the current lease; (2) Deneen wished Miller to leave; and (3) Deneen had accused Miller of prior serious physical abuse. For purposes of this summary judgment motion, we must assume that Officer Sartor did not politely request that Miller leave Deneen's apartment, but rather that Officer Sartor ordered Miller to leave under threat of arrest. 33 To the extent that Miller was merely a houseguest at Deneen's apartment, it is clear that Officer Sartor did not violate any of Miller's well-established rights by requesting Miller to leave the apartment. In Greiner, police officers encountered a loud party at a private home. The officers ordered houseguests, who had been invited to spend the night at the private home, to leave. See 27 F.3d at 1350. The houseguests brought suit against the officers, alleging that their rights were violated when the police told them to leave. Id. at 1352. This Court disagreed, stating: 34 We grant that police could not have interfered with the houseguest relation arbitrarily, without some valid governmental interest in doing so. However, the facts do not fairly present that situation. The record shows there were two complaints, that the police had already delivered a warning, that an outside party was going on around 2:00 a.m., and that it involved some level of noise (even granting a dispute about how much noise). These facts give rise to some governmental interest in dispersing the crowd in order to restore order and quiet during hours most citizens devote to sleep. We emphatically do not consider how we would resolve the relative interests of the city and the guests on the merits, if that issue were before us. We do, however, hold that plaintiffs have not shown that it was clearly established on the night of their party that their rights were paramount over the governmental interest in dispersing them. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. 35 Id. at 1352-53 (footnote omitted). 36 The facts presented in this case are far more compelling than those in Greiner, and demonstrate that Miller's interest in remaining in the apartment was far outweighed by the governmental interest in dispersing him. Id. at 1353. Here, Deneen, the sole holder of the current lease, wished Miller to leave. In addition, based on the alleged history of domestic violence between Deneen and Miller that had been recounted by Deneen, Officer Sartor had a reasonable concern for Deneen's safety if Miller were to stay in the apartment with her. See Dep. of Byron Sartor (June 2, 1995) at 8 (testifying that in my past experience, 13 years, going on 14 years, you get a man and wife or girlfriend, or something like that, and they start fighting like that, there's always that great possibility that maybe someone could get hurt real badly; maybe even possibly killed). 37 Miller contends that he was not a mere houseguest, but rather that he was a cotenant. As a cotenant, or even a hold-over tenant, Miller argues that he had the right to judicial process prior to his eviction. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Pine Bluff, 284 Ark. 551, 683 S.W.2d 923, 924-26 (1985) (holding that hold-over tenants are not trespassers under Arkansas law). Assuming that Miller is correct in his analysis, this does not answer whether Officer Sartor can be held liable for allegedly violating Miller's right to an eviction proceeding. 38 Under this Court's precedent, Officer Sartor can only be liable if a reasonable person in his position would have known that his actions violated clearly established law because the applicability of the law to his particular action was evident. Greiner, 27 F.3d at 1351. In this case, Miller's status as a tenant was anything but evident; indeed, a reasonable person would almost certainly have perceived Miller as a mere houseguest. Deneen had presented a signed lease, dated only a few days earlier, which showed that she was the sole tenant. Moore Realty, while sending confused messages to the police, had ultimately confirmed that the lease presented by Deneen was valid. The Union County Prosecutor's office had investigated the matter, and concluded that Deneen was the sole legal tenant of the apartment. In light of Deneen's proof that she had the sole right to occupy the apartment, as well as the potential danger that Officer Sartor believed was presented by the threat of domestic violence, we conclude that a reasonable officer would not have known that asking Miller to leave the apartment violated well-established law. Accordingly, Officer Sartor is entitled to qualified immunity for Miller's claims. 39