Opinion ID: 621963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “flexible pad”

Text: As an initial matter, Sony argues that our case law precludes us from deciding claim construction issues that are not implicated by the district court’s judgment. Appellee’s Br. 25 (citing Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software (MIT), 462 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In MIT, there was a stipulation of noninfringement. Despite its success below, the accused infringer asked us to construe a number of terms outside the stipulation on appeal and this court declined to do so. Id. As an initial matter, in this case, in contrast to MIT, the losing party has asked us to review the claim construction. In MIT, it was the prevailing party that made the request. As the court in MIT recognized, the court has discretion to determine the issues necessary for resolution of the appeal. Here the term “flexible” was fully briefed and argued below, decided by the district court and fully briefed and argued to us on appeal. Moreover its claim construction is a question of law properly before this court. We conclude that it would waste judicial resources to refuse to decide this issue on appeal. Appellants argue that the term “flexible” simply means “capable of being flexed” and that the district court erred by requiring “capable of being noticeably flexed with ease.” They note that the specification only uses the term “flexible pad” when referring to a “semi-rigid” structure and that a “semi-rigid” structure would certainly not be “noticeably flexed with ease.” Appellant’s Br. 15-16 (citing ’941 patent col.37 ll.6-7, 24, 49). THORNER v. SONY COMPUTER 12 Sony responds that although the specification uses the term to refer to a “semi-rigid” structure, that structure is made out of foam in every embodiment. It argues that foam is capable of being noticeably flexed with ease and thus a rigid, barely bendable material should not be considered “flexible.” Sony also points to portions of the Markman hearing where the district court judge in- spected one of the accused hard plastic controllers. The judge noted that the controller was rigid and “[i]f I try to flex this thing, I think that you’re going to see it snap.” J.A. 523-24. We agree with the appellants that the district court improperly limited the term. Neither the claims nor the specification requires the “flexible pad” to be noticeably flexed with ease. The specification says only that the flexible pad must be a semi-rigid structure. The task of determining the degree of flexibility, the degree of rigidity that amounts to “semi-rigid,” is part of the infringement analysis, not part of the claim construction. The district court is of course free on summary judgment to decide that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the accused products in this case do not meet the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “flexible.” We do not mean to suggest that summary judgment is improper in this case, only that claim construction is the wrong venue for this determination. VACATED and REMANDED