Opinion ID: 2508462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The appropriate definition of in a reckless manner

Text: Roggenkamp and Clark each assert that the trial court applied an erroneous definition of in a reckless manner as that term is used in the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes. They would have us hold that the term is defined by the willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property language that appears in the reckless driving statute, RCW 46.61.500(1). We review a question of statutory construction de novo. State v. Votava, 149 Wash.2d 178, 183, 66 P.3d 1050 (2003). Statutory construction begins by reading the text of the statute or statutes involved. If the language is unambiguous, a reviewing court is to rely solely on the statutory language. State v. Avery, 103 Wash.App. 527, 532, 13 P.3d 226 (2000). Where statutory language is amenable to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is deemed to be ambiguous. State v. Keller, 143 Wash.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001). Legislative history, principles of statutory construction, and relevant case law may provide guidance in construing the meaning of an ambiguous statute. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash.2d 224, 243, 59 P.3d 655 (2002).
The term in a reckless manner is not defined in either the vehicular homicide statute, RCW 46.61.520, or the vehicular assault statute, RCW 46.61.522. Nor is the term defined elsewhere in the Motor Vehicle Code. However, through a series of decisions by this court, a definition of the term in a reckless manner for purposes of the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes has evolved and is now well settled. This evolution culminated in our decision in State v. Bowman, 57 Wash.2d 266, 270, 271, 356 P.2d 999 (1960), in which we indicated that driving in a reckless manner means driving in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences. (Emphasis omitted.) Roggenkamp and Clark each assert that the Court of Appeals has wavered in its application of the definition of in a reckless manner. In support of this assertion, they call to our attention three cases in which divisions of that court have applied the willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property language of the reckless driving statute to vehicular assault or vehicular homicide cases. See State v. Hursh, 77 Wash.App. 242, 248, 890 P.2d 1066 (1995) (Division One) (vehicular assault); State v. Miller, 60 Wash.App. 767, 773, 807 P.2d 893 (1991) (Division Three) (vehicular homicide); and State v. McAllister, 60 Wash.App. 654, 658-59, 806 P.2d 772 (1991) (Division Three) (vehicular homicide). We view the McAllister, Miller, and Hursh decisions as aberrations in the long string of cases, stretching back to 1938, that have rejected defining the term in a reckless manner in vehicular homicide and vehicular assault cases as willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. This position finds support in the fact that Division Three of the Court of Appeals implicitly declined to follow its holdings in Miller and McAllister in a later case in which it explicitly rejected a defendant's contention that the `reckless manner' element of vehicular assault is the same as the `willful or wanton disregard' element of reckless driving. State v. Thompson, 90 Wash.App. 41, 47-48, 950 P.2d 977 (1998). In that case, the court held that driving in a `reckless manner' ... means to drive in a rash or heedless manner, with indifference to the consequences. Id. at 48, 950 P.2d 977.
The interpretation of driving in a reckless manner that petitioners advocate would require us to dismember both the term in a reckless manner, as used in the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes, and the term reckless driving, as used in the reckless driving statute. We say that because in order to hold that reckless in the term in a reckless manner has the same meaning as reckless in the term reckless driving, we would have to sever the word reckless in each of these statutes from the surrounding context and read the word as if it stood alone. We are not inclined to do that because in doing so we would violate fundamental principles of statutory construction. A principle consistent with this view is that of noscitur a sociis, which provides that a single word in a statute should not be read in isolation, and that `the meaning of words may be indicated or controlled by those with which they are associated.' State v. Jackson, 137 Wash.2d 712, 729, 976 P.2d 1229 (1999) (quoting Ball v. Stokely Foods, Inc., 37 Wash.2d 79, 87-88, 221 P.2d 832 (1950)). In Jackson, we applied this principle and held that the word shelter in the phrase food, water, shelter, clothing, and medically necessary health care, as used in RCW 9A.42.010(1), should not be isolated and analyzed apart from the words surrounding it. Id. In interpreting statutory terms, a court should `take into consideration the meaning naturally attaching to them from the context, and [ ] adopt the sense of the words which best harmonizes with the context.' Id. (quoting McDermott v. Kaczmarek, 2 Wash.App. 643, 648, 469 P.2d 191 (1970) (quoting 50 AM.JUR. Statute s § 247 (1944))). In the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes, the word reckless is plainly part of the term in a reckless manner. By the same token, the word reckless as it appears in the reckless driving statute is part of the term reckless driving. The terms reckless manner and reckless driving both function as single units of meaning in their respective statutes. In each, reckless functions as an adjective. In the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes, reckless modifies manner. In the reckless driving statute, on the other hand, reckless modifies driving. Furthermore, reckless manner and reckless driving are each terms of art unique to the state's motor vehicle laws that have long been employed by the legislature to describe driving offenses. See, e.g., LAWS of 1923, ch. 122, § 2. To carve up the phrases reckless manner and reckless driving by severing reckless from each phrase in order to read it in isolation would clearly violate the dictates of the aforementioned doctrine of noscitur a sociis. [3] Another well-settled principle of statutory construction is that each word of a statute is to be accorded meaning. State ex rel. Schillberg v. Barnett, 79 Wash.2d 578, 584, 488 P.2d 255 (1971). `[T]he drafters of legislation... are presumed to have used no superfluous words and we must accord meaning, if possible, to every word in a statute.' In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wash.2d 756, 767, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000) (quoting Greenwood v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 13 Wash.App. 624, 628, 536 P.2d 644 (1975)). [W]e may not delete language from an unambiguous statute:' Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.' State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) (quoting Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999) (quoting Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996))). Petitioners' reading of in a reckless manner runs afoul of the aforementioned principle because it would render some words in the statute to be without meaning or purpose. Isolating reckless from the phrase in a reckless manner, as petitioners advocate, would render the word manner meaningless and superfluous. Petitioners, in short, would rewrite the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes by stripping out the word manner so that an element of vehicular homicide or vehicular assault is driving recklessly. We should resist doing that because when interpreting a statute, `this court is required to assume the Legislature meant exactly what it said and apply the statute as written.' Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wash.2d at 767, 10 P.3d 1034 (quoting In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 8, 969 P.2d 21 (1998)). In the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes, the legislature said that operating or driving a vehicle in a reckless manner,  not driving recklessly, was an element of the crime. We must assume that the legislature meant precisely what it said and apply the statute as written. Another fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the legislature is deemed to intend a different meaning when it uses different terms. State v. Beaver, 148 Wash.2d 338, 343, 60 P.3d 586 (2002) ([w]hen the legislature uses different words within the same statute, we recognize that a different meaning is intended.); Simpson Inv. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 141 Wash.2d 139, 160, 3 P.3d 741 (2000) (it is well established that when `different words are used in the same statute, it is presumed that a different meaning was intended to attach to each word.' (quoting State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Rains, 87 Wash.2d 626, 634, 555 P.2d 1368 (1976))). [4] Here, the legislature chose to use the term in a reckless manner in the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes and to use the term reckless driving in another. [5] Because the legislature chose different terms, we must recognize that a different meaning was intended by each term. [6] The structure of the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes further dictates that in a reckless manner not be defined as willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, [t]here are three alternative means of committing both vehicular homicide and vehicular assault. Roggenkamp, 115 Wash.App. at 935, 64 P.3d 92 (footnote omitted). These offenses can be committed in three alternative ways: by operating a motor vehicle either while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, [i]n a reckless manner, or [w]ith disregard for the safety of others. RCW 46.61.520, .522. If in a reckless manner is defined as driving with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others, the in a reckless manner alternative of committing vehicular homicide or vehicular assault would be completely swallowed up and thus rendered meaningless and superfluous. Both the driving in a reckless manner alternative and the driving with disregard for the safety of others alternative would apply to the same act, but the in a reckless manner alternative would require proof that the defendant acted with willfulness or wantonness. The in a reckless manner alternative would be effectively written out of the statute as prosecutors, seeking to avoid having to prove the higher mental state, stopped charging defendants under the in a reckless manner alternative. We must assume that when the legislature created three alternative ways of committing vehicular homicide and vehicular assault, it meant for each alternative to be distinct.