Opinion ID: 867235
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of Trifurcated Jury Proceeding

Text: ¶ 21 Prince challenges the trifurcation of his trial, in which separate juries tried the guilt, aggravation, and penalty phases. A defendant, however, is not entitled to have the same jury render verdicts in each phase of a capital trial. State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 348 ¶ 85, 111 P.3d 369, 390 (2005). Consequently, the use of different guilt and sentencing-phase juries does not violate a defendant's rights. Id. We extended Anderson in State v. Moore, upholding the use of different juries in the aggravation and penalty phases. 222 Ariz. 1, 17 ¶ 90, 213 P.3d 150, 166 (2009). [3] ¶ 22 Prince nonetheless argues that the final penalty-phase jury in a trifurcated proceeding might not have heard all of the relevant circumstances of the crime. He repeats his claim that § 13-752(K) does not adequately guide judges on the admissibility of aggravation-phase evidence during the second penalty phase. Additionally, even if the same witnesses testify in each proceeding, Prince contends a witness's demeanor and words might change, altering how each jury perceives the same testimony. ¶ 23 As explained earlier, however, § 13-752(G)'s general relevance standard governs the admissibility of evidence during a second penalty phase. If a defendant believes a trial judge incorrectly excluded admissible evidence or admitted excludable evidence at any phase, he has a remedy on appeal. And even if each jury in a trifurcated proceeding perceives the same testimony differently, that does not invariably disadvantage, and in some cases could greatly benefit, a defendant. ¶ 24 Most importantly, Prince does not point to any relevant evidence that was excluded from the second penalty jury's consideration because of the trifurcated proceeding. As in Moore, [s]ubstantially the same evidence was introduced at the second sentencing trial as at the . . . first sentencing trial. 222 Ariz. at 17 ¶ 90, 213 P.3d at 166; see Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 85, 111 P.3d at 390 (noting the aggravation and penalty phases were essentially a full-blown re-presentation of the entire case). ¶ 25 The federal constitution requires only that the jury render a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible defendant's record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 174, 126 S.Ct. 2516. As long as a state's procedures satisfy this requirement, the state enjoys a range of discretion in imposing the death penalty. Id. Nothing about a trifurcated proceeding under § 13-752(K) deprives a defendant of a fair trial or reliable sentencing determination. Thus, the trifurcated proceeding did not violate Prince's constitutional rights.