Opinion ID: 6500458
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inadequate evidence of routine

Text: Lama first contends, as he did below, that this evidence was inadmissible as habit or routine-practice evidence under Rule 406. Rule 406 provides that [e]vidence of a person's habit or an organization's routine practice may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or organization acted in accordance with the habit or routine practice. Fed. R. Evid. 406. The reasoning is that habits (as opposed to character evidence) reflect the person's [or organization's] regular practice of responding to a particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct. McCormick on Evidence § 195 (8th ed. 2020). That specificity renders habit evidence of greater probative value than . . . evidence of general traits of character. Id.; see also 2 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 406.02 (2021) (Habit evidence is more probative than character evidence because an individual's habitual behavior is more consistent than behavior based on character.). Although there are no 'precise standards' for determining whether a behavior pattern has matured into a habit, two factors are considered controlling as a rule: 'adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response.' United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 668 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 406, advisory committee's notes). We apply that standard because [t]h[o]se factors focus on whether the behavior at issue 'occurred - 22 - with sufficient regularity making it more probable than not that it would be carried out in every instance or in most instances.' Id. (quoting Weil v. Seltzer, 873 F.2d 1453, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Thus, [i]t is essential, we have said, that the regularity of the conduct alleged to be habitual rest on an analysis of instances 'numerous enough to support an inference of systematic conduct and to establish one's regular response to a repeated specific situation.' Id. (cleaned up with new alteration added) (quoting Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 511 (4th Cir. 1977)). It is the party seeking to admit the routinepractice or habit evidence that bears the burden of demonstrating its sufficiency. Id. And our appellate review is again only for abuse of discretion. Id. Lama's objections under Rule 406 to Gyatso's testimony and the pocket calendar are twofold. First, according to Lama, Gyatso did not testify about any of Lama's business practices or patterns since Gyatso testified only as to his own work experience with Lama. Thus, there was no evidence of sampling or uniformity to qualify as routine-practice evidence under Rule 406. Second, Lama protests that the pocket calendar could not be evidence of a routine during the limitations period since Gyatso testified that his use of the calendar changed in 2013. We begin with his first contention. At trial, Lama protested that Gyatso's testimony of his own experience was not - 23 - relevant . . . to testify as to the payment practices of the employer.10 To the extent that objection raised an issue with the adequacy of the sampling or uniformity of response, we nonetheless still find Lama's appellate arguments without merit.11 The district court rejected Lama's inadmissibility argument, telling Lama that Gyatso's testimony goes to establishing the business practice. And Lama had no response then, and again has none now, as to why Gyatso's testimony could not be at least a building block of Rule 406 evidence. Indeed, though not entirely precise, Gyatso's testimony can be reasonably understood as describing Lama's business practice concerning the pocket-calendar recording and submission of time worked from his employees: [W]e record when we started and when we left. And 10 We note also that Lama was not clear on any distinctions he drew between the various aspects of Gyatso's testimony or the pocket calendar in lodging his objections at trial. Instead, Lama moved at trial to exclude the entirety of Gyatso's testimony, and he employs the same wholesale-exclusion tactic on appeal. 11 We caution counsel that objections to evidence in the district courts must be specific in order to preserve them, as we have made it clear that a general objection to testimony is insufficient to preserve more specific ones. See United States v. Young, 105 F.3d 1, 9 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 759–60 (1st Cir. 1989) (Although he contended that the evidence was hearsay and that it was being improperly used to rehabilitate Pacheco's testimony, counsel did not argue at trial that the evidence was inadmissible because it was made after the declarant had acquired a motive to fabricate. This lack of specificity, after the judge believed she had resolved the objection, precludes appellant from raising this issue for the first time before us.). - 24 - the method of keeping track of work hours in this way was corroborated by both Gonpo as well as another employee called to the stand by Lama -- meaning there was testimony from 3 employees in a company of less than 15 employees. Similarly, both Gonpo and Gyatso testified to working approximately 57-hour weeks -- meaning again that 2 out of less than 15 employees testified to their repeated work schedule. And the same goes for Gonpo's and Gyatso's testimonies that Lama routinely did not pay employees the full amount they worked or at an overtime rate, but instead carried forward a balance of excess hours and wages from week to week which were never compensated. Lama makes no effort on appeal to explain why testimony from those proportions of a small company's employees as to their weekly schedule, their practice for recording and submitting their time, and Lama's pay practices -- practices conducted week after week for at least two years -- is insufficient under Rule 406. Instead, focusing only on Gyatso, he simply ignores the entirety of the evidence admitted to establish the business practice and contends there was no evidence of other employees' experiences or practices. And he cites to dissimilar cases involving either the experiences of one or two individuals in relation to thousands of other potential experiences, see G.M. Brod & Co. v. U.S. Home Corp., 759 F.2d 1526, 1533 (11th Cir. 1985) (one person's experience insufficient when considered in the light of Home's - 25 - contractual dealings with thousands of small subcontractors), or in two isolated events occurring three years apart, see Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2000).12 Finally, although Lama may believe that other employees' testimonies showed that Gonpo's and Gyatso's sizings up of the business routines were not accurate, which testimony to believe was a credibility call left to either the judge or the jury to determine. See 23 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur B. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 5277 (2d ed. 2022) (noting the unsettled question of when an issue as to the sufficiency of the habitual or routine conduct is raised, whether the judge should make a preliminary determination of admissibility, or if it should be left for the jury to weigh). In all, Lama fails to offer a developed or coherent argument why -- based on the facts actually revealed at trial -- the district court abused its discretion in finding Rule 406's sampling-and-uniformity test satisfied here to establish Lama's routine practices. See Rodríguez v. Mun. of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2011). His second argument merits little ink. Though Lama claims (as he did below) that Gyatso testified that the business 12To make crystal clear, our conclusion is limited to deciding that, on the facts of this case (considering especially the small size of the business at issue), Lama has shown no abuse of discretion. - 26 - routine changed in 2013, the only change Gyatso testified to was that Lama kept the pocket calendar instead of returning it. The district court rejected this as being a salient difference below, and Lama had no responsive argument then, nor has he come up with a cohesive one now, as to why the district court's analysis on that piece was off-base.13