Opinion ID: 2536526
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Presumption of Prospective Application

Text: Because our review of H.B. 02-1396's legislative history fails to reveal the legislative intent behind the bill, we turn to other aids of statutory construction. See Tacorante, 624 P.2d at 1330 (The general canons of statutory construction may be applied to determine the correct effective date of a statute.). One such aid in Colorado is the presumption that statutes apply prospectively. § 2-4-202, C.R.S. (2008). The General Assembly may override this presumption by clearly expressing a contrary intent. Riley v. People, 828 P.2d 254, 257 (Colo.1992). While there is no requirement that express language of retroactive application be used to convey that intent, Ficarra v. Dep't of Regulatory Agencies, Div. of Ins., 849 P.2d 6, 14 (Colo.1993), the first place we look in determining the legislature's intent is the language used in the statute. See Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 162 (Colo.2005). The presumption of prospective application is only strengthened by the insertion of an effective date clause that explicitly mandates prospective application. It is well established in Colorado that when the General Assembly indicates in an effective date clause that a statute shall apply prospectively, courts are bound by that language. See People v. McCoy, 764 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Colo. 1988) (applying statute prospectively where effective date clause stated that amendments shall apply to acts committed on or after its effective date of July 1, 1985); People v. Macias, 631 P.2d 584, 587 (Colo.1981) (applying statute prospectively where effective date clause read, This Act shall take effect July 1, 1979, and shall apply to offenses committed on or after said date); People v. Patnode, 126 P.3d 249, 258 (Colo.App.2005) (applying statute prospectively where effective date clause said the amendment shall take effect July 1, 1999, and shall apply to offenses committed on or after said date.). The cases cited above are not directly analogous to this case, as none of the statutes at issue in those cases involved substantive language that conflicted with the prospective effective date clause. Nonetheless, while we cannot ignore the clear legislative determination that the . . . amendments were intended. . . to have prospective effect only, as expressed in the effective date clause, Riley, 828 P.2d at 257, we are not free to simply disregard the conflicting language in section 2 of the statute. The language of that section appears to indicate an intent to rebut the presumption of prospective application, using explicitly retroactive language. However, the simultaneous use of a prospective effective date clause weakens that rebuttal considerably. As a result of these conflicting provisions, we are unable to use the presumption of prospective application to discern the legislative intent behind the statute.