Opinion ID: 2091620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: constitutional rights are personal only

Text: The second reason for rejecting defendant's rationale for suppression is that the automatic standing rule attempts to invoke the rule for suppression of illegal search or seizure evidence vicariously, although the art 1, § 11-Am IV right is personal. At the outset, we note that constitutional protections are generally personal. They cannot be asserted vicariously, but rather only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure. Simmons v United States, supra, p 389. This Court enunciated this principle as follows: The right to suppression is personal to the one whose right to privacy was violated. People v Warner, 401 Mich 186, 203; 258 NW2d 385 (1977) (opinion of WILLIAMS, J.). Stated differently, only an individual who belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection is given can seek to invoke its protection. New York ex rel Hatch v Reardon, 204 US 152, 160; 27 S Ct 188; 51 L Ed 415 (1907). See People v Warner, supra, pp 203, 209; People v Norwood, 312 Mich 266, 272; 20 NW2d 185 (1945), and cases cited therein; People v Oaks, 251 Mich 253, 255; 231 NW 557 (1930); People v Joshua, 32 Mich App 581, 585; 189 NW2d 105 (1971), lv den 386 Mich 758 (1971), cert den 409 US 853; 93 S Ct 183; 34 L Ed 2d 96 (1972); United States v Salvucci, supra, p 86; Rakas v Illinois, supra, pp 133-134; Brown v United States, supra, p 230; Alderman v United States, 394 US 165, 171-172, 174; 89 S Ct 961; 22 L Ed 2d 176 (1969); Simmons v United States, supra, p 389; Jones v United States, supra, p 261. In urging us to embrace the automatic standing rule, defendant is necessarily advocating a departure from the above well-settled principles because the automatic standing rule would provide a defendant with standing regardless of whether he was asserting his own rights or those of another. See Rakas v Illinois, supra, p 135, fn 4.