Opinion ID: 68932
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Joint Employer” Status

Text: Jones challenges the test the district court used to address her claim that Norfolk was her joint employer together with TVM. Norfolk argues that Jones invited this error, if any, by directly encouraging the district court to apply the legal test she now claims was inappropriate. In Munoz v. State Farm Lloyds, 522 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2008), we held that “[t]he invited error doctrine provides that ‘a party may not complain on appeal of errors that he himself invited or provoked the court . . . to commit.’” Id. at 573 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 996 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1993)). Invited error will only be reviewed for manifest injustice. United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 452 (5th Cir. 2002). Though usually applied to evidentiary errors, the doctrine may apply in other contexts where a party affirmatively encourages the court to undertake an act that the party later claims was error. See, e.g., Flores v. Cameron County, 92 F.3d 258, 270 n.9 (5th Cir. 1996) (barring appeal of jury instruction where appellant submitted the complained of jury instruction); Fitch 4 No. 08-60984 v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 261 F. App’x 788, 794 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (applying doctrine to prevent appeal of a damages formula proffered by appellant in an earlier proceeding). Because Jones argued for application of this test in the district court, Norfolk argues that Jones’s appeal of the court’s use of the test set forth in North American Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379, 1381-83 (5th Cir. 1980), and Clinton’s Ditch Cooperative Co. v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 132, 138-40 (2d Cir. 1985), for assessing “joint employer” status is waived. We need not rest our opinion on the doctrine of invited error. Even if we now applied the Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 403-404 (5th Cir. 1983), test advanced by appellant on appeal, it would not change the outcome. We conclude that Jones has not shown sufficient connection between Norfolk and TVM to meet either test’s requirements.2 Norfolk’s “power” over TVM employees was limited to barring TVM employees from the Norfolk facility. This “power” is insufficient to transform Norfolk into Jones’s employer for Title VII purposes. Accordingly, the summary judgment on her Title VII claim was proper.