Opinion ID: 2520047
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: March 9, 1992 Faretta Request

Text: On March 9, 1992, after the trial court denied defendant's motion to sever the escape charge from the murder charge, the court informed counsel, I understand that we have approximately 100 jurors who are rapidly approaching the door. He asked if there were additional matters that needed to be addressed, at which point defendant stated to the court: I have asked for a change of counsel and I understand that I can go pro per on this case. Because I feel that I could do a much better job if I investigate other things that I need to investigate. I feel that I have some investigating to take. And that's one of the reasons that I'd like to go pro per on this case. The court asked if defendant would be prepared to proceed to trial that day. Defendant replied that he would not. After the court inquired into defendant's Marsden motions and his self-representation in another pending case, the court denied the request, stating: The Court: So you're very familiar with the procedure to go pro. per. You're also a [ sic ] very familiar with the fact that this is a case that's been pending now and you have been in custody on for almost 12 months. The motion is certainly untimely. [¶] The matter has been here ready to proceed to trial. And any granting of your right to go pro. per. would require the court to continue this case. [¶] And the court finds that this request at this late hour is not done in good faith by the defendant, but merely for the purposes of obtaining a continuance. The request is denied. The Defendant: I do have a constitutional right to go pro. per. under Faretta.  The court acknowledged that defendant had the right to represent himself, but reiterated that the request would not be granted because it was made in order to delay the trial. The court then informed defendant: If you wish to proceed to trial today in pro. per., representing yourself, you have an absolute right and the court will permit you to do so. I will have [defense counsel] stand by as counsel, so that during the course of the trial if for some reason you realize how mistaken you are to do this, [defense counsel] would be able to take over on the defense. Defendant retorted: Well, in other words, what I got do is give up my rights. [¶] To get one right I have to give up a right. That's what you're making me do. Defendant argues that this Faretta motion was timely because this was the first available opportunity he had for making such a motion in front of Judge Nuss, the trial judge. He argues that the pretrial judge, Judge Piatt, had improperly denied his Faretta motion of February 10, so any further Faretta requests in front of that judge would have been futile, and that this second Faretta motion was made as soon as defendant was transferred to Judge Nuss for trial. We conclude that defendant's motion was untimely. Defendant asserted his right to self-representation moments before jury selection was set to begin. As we stated in Windham, a defendant should not be permitted to wait until the day preceding trial before he moves to represent himself and requests a continuance in order to prepare for trial without some showing of reasonable cause for the lateness of the request. In such a case the motion for self-representation is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.... ( Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128, fn. 5, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187.) Instead, [i]n order to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation, a defendant must assert that right within a reasonable time prior to trial. The latter requirement serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice. [Citation.] If the motion is untimely  i.e., not asserted within a reasonable time prior to trial  the defendant has the burden of justifying the delay. ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1110, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478.) Moreover, we have found that defendant never made an unequivocal Faretta motion in front of Judge Piatt. And contrary to defendant's assertions, defendant did have a previous opportunity to request the right to represent himself in front of Judge Nuss. As detailed above, on February 26, defendant appeared before Judge Nuss in connection with a Marsden motion. Subsequently, defendant appeared again before Judge Nuss for several matters, including the beginning of jury selection on March 2. Therefore, defendant's March 9 Faretta motion was not made at the earliest available opportunity. To the contrary, the trial judge properly concluded that the motion was untimely. Defendant argues that even if this request was untimely, the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry and abused its discretion in denying defendant's request. Defendant concedes that the trial court did conduct an inquiry, but alleges that it was limited and failed to satisfy the requirements set forth in Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187. `When a motion for self-representation is not made in a timely fashion prior to trial, self-representation no longer is a matter of right but is subject to the trial court's discretion.' [Citation.] In exercising this discretion, the trial court should consider factors such as `the quality of counsel's representation of the defendant, the defendant's prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion.' ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 959, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044, quoting Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187.) The trial court found the Faretta motion was not made in good faith, but made merely for the purposes of obtaining a continuance and denied the motion. It is clear from the record that the trial court made an appropriate inquiry, and based on that inquiry denied defendant's Faretta motion. But in response to defendant's insistence that he had a constitutional right to proceed in propria persona, the court indicated that it would allow defendant to represent himself if he was able to proceed with the trial without delay. It did not, however, actually grant the Faretta motion. Although a necessary continuance must be granted if a motion for self-representation is granted, it is also established that a midtrial Faretta motion may be denied on the ground that delay or a continuance would be required. ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 110, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561.) Thus, the court acted within its discretion in concluding that defendant could represent himself only if he was ready to proceed to trial without delay. ( See People v. Douglas (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1681, 1689, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 129; see also United States v. Flewitt (9th Cir.1989) 874 F.2d 669, 674-675 [if the court determines the defendant's request is merely a tactic designed to delay the trial, the court has the discretion to deny the continuance and require the defendant to proceed to trial as scheduled either with his counsel or in propria persona].)