Opinion ID: 1712849
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the penalty phase: comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument

Text: Brooks contends that the prosecutor made numerous improper comments during closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial, and, based on such comments, Brooks reasons that he is entitled to a new penalty phase hearing before a new jury. In making this argument, Brooks highlights that defense counsel contemporaneously objected to several of the prosecutor's allegedly improper comments, but he also candidly acknowledges that his trial counsel did not object to other such comments. As a general rule, this Court has determined that failing to raise a contemporaneous objection when improper closing argument comments are made waives any claim concerning such comments for appellate review. See, e.g., McDonald v. State, 743 So.2d 501, 505 (Fla.1999); Urbin v. State, 714 So.2d 411, 418 n. 8 (Fla.1998); Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 191 (Fla.1997); Kilgore v. State, 688 So.2d 895, 898 (Fla.1996). The sole exception to the general rule is where the unobjected-to comments rise to the level of fundamental error, which has been defined as error that reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. McDonald, 743 So.2d at 505 (quoting Urbin, 714 So.2d at 418 n. 8, which, in turn, quoted Kilgore, 688 So.2d at 898). After carefully reviewing the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument in this case, and considering the jury's close seven-to-five recommendation that Brooks be sentenced to death, we determine that the objected-to comments, when viewed in conjunction with the unobjected-to comments, deprived Brooks of a fair penalty phase hearing. Cf. Cochran v. State, 711 So.2d 1159, 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (Taken individually, in a different case, the prosecutor's comments may not have been so egregious as to warrant reversal. However, the remarks must be viewed cumulatively in light of the record in this case. Here, the improprieties in the prosecutor's closing argument reached the critical mass of fundamental error....). We discuss in detail the improper comments made by the prosecutor in this case so that, hopefully, similar comments will not be repeated in future cases. Initially, we note that the comments made by the prosecutor in this case are strikingly similar to comments made by the same prosecutor which were condemned in Urbin. [25] Indeed, as appellant notes in his brief, it appears that many of the comments in this case are the same as those made in Urbin, with only the names of the victims and the defendants changed. Appellant's Initial Brief at 70-71 n. 13. With this in mind, we now analyze the portions of the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument now challenged by Brooks in this Court. [26] At the beginning of closing argument, the prosecutor presented a narrative describing the death of Darryl Jenkins. During this narrative, the prosecutor made statements such as [Jenkins] did nothing, nothing to deserve being shot like a rabid dog on the driveway in front of his own home; [Jenkins] fell down to this cold cement, life flowed out of him; blood flowed onto that cold concrete; life flowed out of him, flowed out of him; and [Jenkins] died there on that cold slab of cement. Brooks argues that the prosecutor's comments were an improper emotional portrayal of the victim's agony, Appellant's Initial Brief at 76, and constituted a type of Golden Rule argument denounced by this Court in Urbin. While we agree with Brooks that the prosecutor's description of the death in this case was an emotional portrayal, we do not find that such description was improper, as was the description of the victim's death in Urbin, where the prosecutor went far beyond the evidence in emotionally creating an imaginary script that the victim was shot while `pleading for his life.' Urbin, 714 So.2d at 421. The prosecutor's description here had a slight emotional flow but was properly confined to inferences based on record evidence and was therefore proper. [27] Brooks next argues that the prosecutor impermissibly inflamed the passions and prejudices of the jury with elements of emotion and fear. [28] We agree. For example, in this case, the prosecutor used the word executed or executing at least six times; in Urbin, the prosecutor impermissibly used those terms at least nine times. See 714 So.2d at 420 n. 9. Additionally, in this case, the prosecutor characterized Brooks and Brown as persons of true deep-seated, violent character; people of longstanding violence; they commit violent, brutal crimes of violence; it's a character of violence; both of these defendants are men of longstanding violence, deep-seated violence, vicious violence, brutal violence, hard violence ... those defendants are violent to the core, violent in every atom of their body. In Urbin, the prosecutor cast the defendant as showing his true, violent, and brutal and vicious character, as a cold-blooded killer, a ruthless killer: exhibiting deepseeded [sic] violence. It's vicious violence. It's brutal violence; and that Urbin was violent to the core, violent in every atom of his body. 714 So.2d at 420 n. 9. Regarding the comments in Urbin, we stated, Plainly, these are not isolated comments of the type we have deemed harmless in other cases, but rather are akin to the dehumanizing comments we found improper in Bonifay v. State, 680 So.2d 413, 418 n. 10 (Fla.1996). 714 So.2d at 420 n. 9. Indeed, the almost verbatim incantation of these comments in both Urbin and this case is remarkable given this Court's unambiguous pronouncements over the last 50 years. See, e.g., Gore v. State, 719 So.2d 1197, 1201 (Fla.1998) (It is clearly improper for the prosecutor to engage in vituperative or pejorative characterizations of a defendant or witness.); King v. State, 623 So.2d 486, 488 (Fla.1993) (stating that closing argument must not be used to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant); Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353, 359 (Fla.1988) (When comments in closing argument are intended to and do inject elements of emotion and fear into the jury's deliberations, a prosecutor has ventured far outside the scope of proper argument.); Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130, 133 (Fla.1985) (stating that closing argument must not be used to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law); Adams v. State, 192 So.2d 762, 763 (Fla.1966) (quoting from Stewart v. State, 51 So.2d 494, 495 (Fla.1951): The trial of one charged with crime is the last place to parade prejudicial emotions or exhibit punitive or vindictive exhibitions of temperament.). [29] Similarly, the prosecutor's mercy argument in this case tracks almost word for word the argument in Urbin which was classified as blatantly impermissible by this Court. 714 So.2d at 421. In Urbin, the prosecutor concluded his argument by stating: If you are tempted to show this defendant mercy, if you are tempted to show him pity, I'm going to ask you to do this, to show him the same amount of mercy, the same amount of pity that he showed Jason Hicks on September 1, 1995, and that was none. Id. Here, the prosecutor concluded his argument as follows: I'm going to ask you not to show mercy or pity to these defendants. What mercy or pity did they show Darryl Jenkins that night? But if you are tempted to show the defendants mercy or pity, I'm going to ask you to show them the same mercy, the same pity that they showed Darryl Jenkins on August 28, 1996, and that is none. [30] Again, long before the issuance of Urbin, this precise line of argument was specifically denounced by this Court. See Richardson v. State, 604 So.2d 1107, 1109 (Fla.1992); Rhodes v. State, 547 So.2d 1201, 1206 (Fla.1989). Brooks also submits that the prosecutor impermissibly argued prosecutorial expertise. [31] The challenged comments began with the prosecutor's description of the mechanics of the penalty phase. The prosecutor then described the death penalty weighing test, stating, I would submit now that the State does not seek the death penalty in all first-degree murders because it's not always proper, not always appropriate. The prosecutor then posited facts of a first-degree murder involving a 16-year-old getaway driver and a 30-year-old, ex-convict triggerman, where it wouldn't be just, it wouldn't meet the law of Florida to impose the death penalty against the 16-year-old. The prosecutor then stated: Where, under the facts of the case in the law of Florida, that death penalty weighing test is met, it is proper to seek a death penalty. And I would submit to you, when you look at all the facts of this case and look at the law of Florida, it is clear that this is a case that demands the death penalty for both of those defendants for what they have done. Brooks argues that these and similar comments by the prosecutor undermine the jury's discretion in determining the proper punishment by implying he, or another authority, has already made the careful decision required. Appellant's Initial Brief at 70. As support, Brooks primarily relies on Pait v. State, 112 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1959). In Pait, a death penalty case, the prosecutor stated during closing argument: Before each murder trial that is prosecuted in this circuit, where I'm the State Attorney, a conference is held between me and my assistants to determine whether or not the facts in the case justify the State's giving maximum punishment under the law. I told you at the outset of this trial that if the facts in this case warranted this defendant being sent to the electric chair.... Id. at 383-84. On appeal, this Court found the error harmful, reasoning as follows: In his argument, [the prosecutor] conveyed to the jury the fact that he and his staff had considered the matter before trial and had concluded that the death penalty should be requested. It is certainly appropriate for the prosecuting attorney to urge the jury to prescribe the supreme penalty on the basis of the evidence which the jury hears. It is not appropriate to undertake to give the jury the benefit of the composite judgment of the State Attorney's staff allegedly reached on the basis of investigations and discussions taking place before the trial. Id. at 384-85. In this case, the prosecutor's comments clearly are not as blatant as those in Pait, as the prosecutor here was undoubtedly correct in stating that the State does not seek the death penalty in all first-degree murder cases. However, while that certainly is a true statement, it is also irrelevant and tends to cloak the State's case with legitimacy as a bona-fide death penalty prosecution, much like an improper vouching argument. See Gorby v. State, 630 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla.1993) (explaining that [i]t is improper to bolster a witness' testimony by vouching for his or her credibility). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling defense counsel's objection regarding this line of argument. [32] Brooks next argues that the prosecutor in this case, as in Urbin, see 714 So.2d at 421 n. 12, misstated the law regarding the jury's recommendation of a death sentence. Specifically, in this case, the prosecutor stated: And if sufficient aggravating factors are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you must recommend a death sentence, unless those aggravating circumstances are outweighed, outweighed by the mitigating circumstances. This was an improper statement by the prosecutor, as a jury is neither compelled nor required to recommend death where aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 249-50 (Fla.1996); cf. Garron, 528 So.2d at 359 & n. 7 (finding that it was a misstatement of the law to argue that when the aggravating factors outnumber the mitigating factors, then death is an appropriate penalty). Defense counsel objected to this misstatement, and in response the trial court correctly informed the jury concerning the law relating to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Thus, if the prosecutor's initial misstatement of the law were viewed in isolation, we would find that such misstatement was harmless error. See Henyard, 689 So.2d at 249. Brooks also argues that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the merged robbery and pecuniary gain aggravating circumstances. [33] We agree. After summarizing the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances of prior violent felony, armed robbery, and pecuniary gain, the prosecutor stated: Now the Judgethose are the three aggravating circumstances. And I submit to you, when you consider them togetherindividually they're all powerful aggravating circumstances that support a recommendation of death, but together, they present a powerful, overwhelming case for a recommendation of death. Two of those aggravators merge, number[s] two and three, felony murder, robbery and financial gain, merge under the law because they're involving the same aspects of the crime. But I submit to you that, because they merge, that makes them even more powerful, even more weighty, even more demanding. Demanding that the defendants be held fully accountable, to the full extent of the law. Transcript. at 1543-44. Unlike Jackson v. State, 704 So.2d 500, 507 (Fla.1997), where we held that the prosecutor's comments regarding merged aggravating circumstances were permissible, the prosecutor here clearly argued that because the armed robbery and pecuniary gain circumstances merged, that makes them even more powerful, even more weighty, even more demanding. This type of argument violates the principles set forth in Provence v. State, 337 So.2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976): The State argues the existence of two aggravating circumstances, that the murder occurred in the commission of the robbery (subsection (d)) and that the crime was committed for pecuniary gain (subsection (f)). While we would agree that in some cases, such as where a larceny is committed in the course of a rape-murder, subsections (d) and (f) refer to separate analytical concepts and can validly be considered to constitute two circumstances, here, as in all robbery-murders, both subsections refer to the same aspect of the defendant's crime. Consequently, one who commits a capital crime in the course of a robbery will always begin with two aggravating circumstances against him while those who commit such a crime in the course of any other enumerated felony will not be similarly disadvantaged. Mindful that our decision in death penalty cases must result from more than a simple summing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 10 (Fla.1973), we believe that Provence's pecuniary motive at the time of the murder constitutes only one factor which we must consider in this case. If we were to allow the type of argument made by the prosecutor here, then an individual who commits a capital crime in the course of robbery would always begin with a more weighty aggravating circumstance than those who commit a capital crime in the course of any other enumerated felony. The prosecutor's comments in this regard were improper. Next, we find that the prosecutor clearly overstepped the bounds of proper argument by stating: I'm concerned about the temptation some of you may have, and that is that you may want to take the easy way out and not weigh out all the aggravating circumstances, not analyze the law or the facts, take the easy way out and just quickly vote for life. I submit to you, don't do that; follow the law, do your duty. Weigh everything all out. When you do, you will see that the aggravating circumstances create a powerful case for a recommendation of life [sic]. They are not outweighed by those flimsy, I would submit to you, phantom, mitigating circumstances. Transcript at 1555. [34] Again, these comments are similar to comments made in Urbin: [M]y concern is that some of you may be tempted to take the easy way out, to not weigh the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances and not want to fully carry out your responsibility and just vote for life.... I'm going to ask you not be swayed by pity or sympathy.... I'm going to ask you to follow the law. I'm going to ask you to do your duty. 714 So.2d at 421; cf. Garron, 528 So.2d at 359 & n. 10 (determining prosecutor misstated law in arguing to jury it is your sworn duty as you come in and become jurors to come back with a determination that the defendant should die). These comments made by the prosecutor were egregiously improper. Further, the prosecutor's characterization of the mitigating circumstances as flimsy, phantom, and repeatedly characterizing such circumstances as excuses, was clearly an improper denigration of the case offered by Brooks and Brown in mitigation. [35] See Urbin, 714 So.2d at 422 n. 14. Finally, Brooks argues that the prosecutor's references to both Brooks' counsel and Brown's counsel constituted an attack on them personally and on their credibility, with the import of the comments being that criminal defense lawyers, and these lawyers in particular, are unworthy of belief. Brooks argues that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the defense objection that the prosecutor's statement was a personal attack. We agree. As a precursor to discussing the mitigating circumstances to be considered, the prosecutor stated the following: I'd like to make this comment to you: During opening statement of the guilt part of the trial, and during the closing arguments of the guilt part of the trial, about a week and a half ago, those two criminal defense lawyers got up here and they told you that the evidence would show you that the defendants were not guilty of murder and aggravated battery, and they looked you straight in the eye when they told you that. And I would submit to you that the evidence that came out during the trial proved to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty of first-degree murder and aggravated battery. The evidence produced at trial disproved what those two criminal defense lawyers argued to you. Transcript at 1544-45. Defense counsel objected to these comments, claiming that they constituted a personal attack on defense counsel. After admonishing defense counsel not to make speaking objections, the trial court overruled the objection, stating that the prosecutor's comments were not a personal attack, but merely a proper comment on the evidence. Thereafter, the prosecutor continued: I submit to you that the evidence that you heard during the guilt part of the trial did not support what the defense lawyers argued to you. They argued to you that the defendants were not guilty, and that's what the evidence, they claim, supported a verdict of. The evidence did not support what they argued to you, and I would submit to you that I expect them to get up here and argue to you that the law and the evidence that you've heard will support a recommendation of life. I'm going to submit to you that, if you look at all the evidence that's been presented to you in this case and you listen carefully to the law, that, once again, the evidence and the law will not support is not going to support what those two criminal defense lawyers are going to argue to you. Transcript at 1546-47. While certainly not as egregious as comments discussed in other appellate decisions, see, e.g., Del Rio v. State, 732 So.2d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (prosecutor stated, See this man here who claims to be a lawyer in good standing in Miami, Florida, and [t]hat is the same guy who is going to get up when I sit down and try to tell you what the evidence showed.); Redish v. State, 525 So.2d 928, 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (finding prosecutor's reference to defense counsel's alleged cheap tricks constituted an improper personal attack on defense counsel), we find that the prosecutor's references to defense counsel in this case transcended the bounds of legitimate comment on the evidence and implied that the jury could not believe defense counsel or the arguments asserted by them. See Fryer v. State, 693 So.2d 1046, 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (finding prosecutor's statement that he knows that his client is guilty, which was made shortly after defense counsel concluded arguing that the evidence had failed to prove his client guilty, constituted a direct attack on the defense attorney's character, essentially calling him a liar); cf. Lewis v. State, 711 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (finding prosecutor's statement that manner in which defense questioned the evidence was lame constituted an improper attack on defense counsel). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling defense counsel's objections to these improper comments. In recently reversing a first-degree murder conviction and vacating a death sentence, this Court concluded: The prosecutor in this case exceeded the bounds of proper conduct and professionalism and provided a textbook example of overzealous advocacy. This type of excess is especially egregious in this, a death case, where both the prosecutors and courts are charged with an extra obligation to ensure that the trial is fundamentally fair in all respects. Gore, 719 So.2d at 1202. Viewed in totality, we reach the same conclusion in this case, especially considering the seven-to-five jury recommendation for the death sentence. Moreover, in light of this prosecutor's track record, we must repeat the following observation made by this Court almost forty years ago: It should be noted that the remarks of the prosecutor were not provoked by irritations or proddings by the defense counsel. They were not mere casual innocuous observations made during an impassioned appeal. The record here suggests that the objectionable arguments were tendered calmly and in a fashion calculated to forestall a mercy recommendation. Pait, 112 So.2d at 385 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, after considering the cumulative effect of the numerous, overlapping improprieties in the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument, as well as the jury's seven-to-five vote for a death sentence, we vacate the sentence imposed upon Brooks and remand for a new penalty phase hearing before a new jury. [36]