Opinion ID: 1766664
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common Law Right of Access

Text: Having found that there is no constitutional right of access to discovery material, we now turn to Appellant's contention that a right of access to this material is rooted in the common law. Beyond establishing a general presumption that criminal and civil actions should be conducted publicly, the common law right of access includes the right to inspect and copy public records and documents. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). Documents accessible under this common law right may, however, be sealed if the right to access is outweighed by the interests favoring non-disclosure. Noble, 92 S.W.3d at 731 (internal citations omitted). A court must balance its own inherent right to control access with the public's right of access, and this balancing is left to the discretion of the court. Id. This Court, in Noble , outlined a sliding-scale approach to determine how much weight to give the presumption of access to court documents and records. Documents and records that play a great role in determining the substantive rights of parties are afforded the greatest weight, and only compelling reasons can deny access to the public. Id. at 732. Those that play only a minor or negligible role in adjudicating the rights of the litigants are accordingly offered little weight. Id. Noble relied heavily on the decision in United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044 (2nd Cir.1995), in establishing the sliding-scale approach. In Amodeo , the court clearly stated where discovery documents fall on the scale: Documents that play no role in the performance of Article III functions, such as those passed between the parties in discovery, lie entirely beyond the presumption's reach, (citation omitted), and stand[ ] on a different footing than ... a motion filed by a party seeking action by the court, (citation omitted), or, indeed, than any other document which is presented to the court to invoke its powers or affect its decisions. Id. at 1050. (Emphasis added.) This view is widely shared among the federal courts as well. See F.T.C. v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408-09 & n. 5 (1st Cir.1987); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir.1986); In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation, 820 F.2d 352 (11th Cir. 1987); Hawley v. Hall, 131 F.R.D. 578 (D.Nev.1990); Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d 157 (3d Cir.1993); Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893 (7th Cir.1994); In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1340-42 & n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1985) (Scalia, J., writing for the District of Columbia Circuit, and Wright, J., dissenting, agree that the common law presumption does not go beyond evidentiary materials used in determining the litigants' substantive rights.). However, even if a common law right of access to discovery material exists, the trial court still has supervisory power over its own records and files, and deference must be given to the trial court's determination after consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598-99, 98 S.Ct. 1306. In the instant case, we cannot say that the trial court's determination was erroneous, or that it will cause Appellant to suffer great and irreparable injury if the petition is not granted. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d at 10. This Court has noted that the right to a neutral jury is a sufficiently important interest to outweigh the public and press's right of access. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., Inc. v. Meigs, 660 S.W.2d 658, 663 (Ky.1983). This interest is even more important in this case, as New faces the potential penalty of death. Indeed, [o]ur criminal justice system permits, and even encourages, trial judges to be over-cautious in ensuring that a defendant will receive a fair trial. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 379 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 2898. As both the trial court and Court of Appeals noted, this case has already received, and likely will continue to receive, widespread publicity. At the present time, no determination has been made as to what portions of the discovery material will be admissible at trial, and the public does not currently know the contents of the discovery material. We agree with both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that sealing the discovery material in this instance is necessary to ensure inflammatory, graphic, and possibly irrelevant material [is kept] out of public view until a jury is seated. Publicity concerning the discovery material in issue could influence public opinion against New based on information found to be wholly inadmissible at trial. See Noble, 92 S.W.3d at 732. We believe a situation such as this is one of those limited circumstances in which the right of the accused to a fair trial might be undermined by publicity. Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 9, 106 S.Ct. 2735. See also Ashland Pub. Co. v. Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Ky.App. 1980) (The danger to a fair trial from pretrial publicity becomes acute only in those cases which excite widespread public attention, or are very likely to do so, and it is these cases which present the problem to the courts.). In addition, the trial court's order is narrowly tailored to balance the interests between the press's right of access and New's right to a fair trial. The order explicitly states that [a]ny item of discovery introduced at a pretrial hearing will not be sealed unless specifically ordered at that time. Once a jury is seated in this case, the discovery will no longer be sealed. Thus, the public's acquisition of information is delayed but not frustrated. Id. at 753. As to the trial court's conclusions that there are no less restrictive alternatives, such as voir dire, limiting instructions, or jury sequestration, we must defer to that court's discretion and its closer familiarity with the nature of the publicity involved. The Court of Appeals has broad discretion in the issuance of writs of prohibition, and each case must be considered on its own merits. Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 5. See also Chamblee v. Rose, 249 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Ky.1952). In this case, we do not believe that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in denying Appellant's petition. We, therefore, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. All sitting. All concur.