Opinion ID: 2345721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: The Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim's Connection To The DNA Evidence

Text: Arrington also argues that he was entitled to bring in new evidence to assist the fact finder in evaluating the significance of the DNA evidence. Given that the Circuit Court stated that part of Arrington's burden was to prove his actual innocence, Arrington should have been permitted to introduce evidence on that element. This contention again brings into play our retroactive application of CP Section 8-201. In Thompson we held that CP Section 8-201 applied retroactively, rendering the actual innocence standard of Maryland Rule 4-331 inappropriate. We determined, instead, that CP Section 8-201's substantial possibility standard was the appropriate measure of Thompson's right to a new trial. Unlike the Thompson postconviction court, which reached its decision solely based on the actual innocence standard, the postconviction court here denied Arrington's motion for a new trial on two independent grounds: (1) that Arrington was not actually innocent based on Maryland Rule 4-331 and (2) that there was no substantial possibility that DNA evidence would have changed the verdict. Because we have rejected the actual innocence standard, we only review the validity of the postconviction court's alternate holding based on the substantial possibility standard. This approach forecloses Arrington's argument that Maryland Rule 4-331 requires admission of additional non-DNA evidence of his actual innocence that he offers post-trial. Since he need not establish actual innocence, there is no need to consider that evidence in applying the substantial possibility standard.