Opinion ID: 555060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Introduction of Evidence of Petitioner's Arrest

Text: 27 Petitioner's second claim is that he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor willfully disregarded an adverse court ruling and attempted to draw the jury's attention to inadmissible and prejudicial evidence regarding the circumstances of petitioner's arrest. 28 During a pre-trial hearing, Officer Philip Smith testified that he initially arrested the petitioner for reckless endangerment, possession of a loaded firearm and criminal possession of stolen property after petitioner's car had sideswiped Officer Smith's unmarked police car while the latter was investigating an armed robbery. Officer Smith turned petitioner over to the detective investigating the Bowen murder. Petitioner was re-arrested in connection with that crime. The court ruled Officer Smith's testimony as to the initial arrest inadmissible on the ground that its limited probative value was outweighed by the potential prejudice to the petitioner of this other crimes evidence. Nonetheless, at trial the prosecution announced its intention to call Officer Smith as a witness. The court at first sustained the defendant's objection to this testimony but then permitted the prosecution to elicit on direct examination that on August 17, 1979, Smith was working in plainclothes and investigating an armed robbery. When the prosecutor asked, On that date did you have occasion to arrest the defendant Donovan Blissett? the court sustained the defense objection. The prosecution asked for an understanding of your Honor's ruling of the last question, leading to the following colloquy: 29 The Court: Mr. Johnston, I have sustained the objection and stricken the answer. Your next question. 30 Mr. Johnston [prosecutor]: You have stricken that answer that he arrested this defendant then I have no further questions. 31 The Court: [Do y]ou [defense counsel] have any questions? 32 Mr. Dudley [defense counsel]: I'd object to the comments of the District Attorney to your Honor's ruling repeating the statement which your Honor has stricken. 33 The Court: The jury again is asked to disregard the answer. Do you have any questions? 34 Mr. Dudley: No your Honor. 35 Defendant contends that the prosecutor's reiteration of petitioner's arrest by Officer Smith, notwithstanding the court's striking of the question, was misconduct sufficient to warrant habeas relief. 36 The appropriate standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in a petition for habeas corpus is whether the prosecutor engaged in  'egregious misconduct ... amount[ing] to a denial of constitutional due process.'  Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 353 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647-48, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1873-74, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). Prosecutorial misconduct denies a defendant due process only when it is  'of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.'  Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). In evaluating whether a prosecutor's question deprived petitioner of a fundamentally fair trial, it is important to  'place th[e] remar[k] in context.'  Id. 483 U.S. at 766, 107 S.Ct. at 3109 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2470, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)); see United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir.1990). The severity of the misconduct, curative measures, and the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct are all relevant to the inquiry. Friedman, 909 F.2d at 709; see also United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 514 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827, 107 S.Ct. 104, 93 L.Ed.2d 54 (1986). 37 Here, the prosecutor's attempt to emphasize the petitioner's other crimes in the face of the court's prior ruling was improper misconduct. See United States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285, 290-92 (10th Cir.1978), cited in United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 777 (2d Cir.1980). We can discern no motive in the prosecution's placing Officer Smith on the stand other than an attempt to place before the jury other crimes evidence previously ruled inadmissible. Detective Rosenthal had re-arrested petitioner for the Bowen murder, not Officer Smith, and by the time the latter was sworn in, the court had ruled off-limits the circumstances surrounding Smith's arrest of petitioner. 38 Nonetheless, we conclude that the misconduct did not deny petitioner a fundamentally fair trial. First, there is no claim that this prosecutorial misconduct was either pervasive or part of a persistent trial strategy, United States v. Weiss, 914 F.2d 1514, 1524 (2d Cir.1990); Floyd, 907 F.2d at 355 (pattern of misconduct); United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1136 (2d Cir.1989) (minimal risk of influencing jury through one inappropriate remark); Biasucci, 786 F.2d at 514 (isolated and infrequent outbursts not prejudicial). Petitioner points only to this single incident. Second, the trial judge responded promptly to the objections, twice instructing the jury to disregard the offending testimony. This was sufficient to eliminate any possible prejudice from the prosecutor's remarks. Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1137. Finally, the jury convicted petitioner of murder after hearing Ashman's eyewitness testimony and Brownie's testimony regarding petitioner's admission. Under the circumstances, it is highly improbable that the brief stricken testimony relating to a possible arrest for robbery led to a murder conviction that otherwise would not have occurred, had the prosecutor respected the evidentiary parameters set forth by the pre-trial ruling. 39