Opinion ID: 1124484
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The principle of reasonable deterrence

Text: An appropriate place to begin an explanation for objective fault crimes [14] is with the objections of those who would abolish them altogether. In Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 Colo. L.Rev. 632 (1963), Professor Hall challenges the alleged utility of sanctions based on negligence and strict liability. He contends crimes that are not based on subjective awareness of wrongdoing are, by their terms, not addressed to the extremely important degree of individual freedom, autonomy, and awareness ... expressed in (voluntary) action by a normal adult. Id. at 637. Merely negligent harm doers, contends Professor Hall, have not in the least thought of their duty, their dangerous behavior, or any sanction. Id. at 641 (footnote omitted). The difficulty with this thesis is that it assumes legal regulations can operate only through the offender's conscious reason. A rebuttal is supplied by Professor Hart: the connexion between the threat of punishment and subsequent good behavior is not [always] of the rationalistic kind pictured in the guiding-type of case. The threat of punishment is something which causes [the offender] to exert his faculties, rather than something which enters as a reason for conforming to the law when he is deliberating whether to break it or not. It is perhaps more like a goad than a guide. But there seems to me to be nothing disreputable in allowing the law to function in this way, and it is arguable that it functions in this way rather than in the rationalistic way more frequently than is generally allowed. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 134 (1968). The law's goad, rather than its guide, is also emphasized by Professor LaFave. He asks whether more than civil negligence should be required for a criminal offense, and concludes that there is no need to choose one answer for all crimes. His primary focus is on deterrence: The principal policy question is whether the threat of punishment for objective fault will deter people from conducting themselves in such a way as to create risk to others. Though the matter is disputed, it would seem that some people can be made to think, before they act, about the possible consequences of acting, so that the existence of objective-fault crimes does tend to reduce risky conduct.... The point is that the legislature might, in the exercise of its police power, require subjective fault for some crimes and objective fault for other crimes. 1 LaFave at 337-38 (footnotes omitted). It is here, grounded in a theory of reasonable deterrence, that any explanation for objective fault crimes must have its origins. Despite Professor Hall's challenge, it cannot be disputed that the threat of punishment necessarily deters. Even when an offender does not of his own accord realize that his conduct is wrongful, he can in many cases be made to take care. Coercion that causes the offender to pay attention can serve important social aims that would not be achieved by proscriptions that only come into effect when the transgressor recognizes the harm in his or her behavior. The fulcrum for deciding what level of intent is the absolute minimum for a particular offense is a question of when an expectation of individual conformity is reasonable. Due process under Alaska's Constitution requires that social interests be weighed against those of the individual. While society's interest in obtaining compliance with its regulations is strong, it can never outweigh the individual's interest in freedom from substantial punishment for a violation he or she could not reasonably have been expected to avoid. The threshold question, then, is whether the defendant's conduct is something which society could reasonably expect to deter. The principle of reasonable deterrence allows the imposition of strict liability in some circumstances. Generally, a separate mental element need not be proved when the failure to abide by a rule is inherently unreasonable. This occurs, for instance, where a person's conduct is hedged in by regulation, such that one may readily assume his or her routine decisions are guided by rules. Thus, strict liability is permitted for heavily regulated industries. See Cole v. State, 828 P.2d 175, 178 (Alaska App. 1992). Persons operating in rule-laden environments, and whose actions have a substantial impact on public health, safety, or welfare, can reasonably be assumed aware of their governing codes. Another type of law whose violation is inherently unreasonable is the malum in se offense. As we explained in Hentzner, these are crimes which reasoning members of society regard as condemnable, such that awareness of the commission of the act necessarily carries with it an awareness of wrongdoing. 613 P.2d at 826. Finally, an exception exists for those regulations which call for only a modest fine. Generally, their underlying conduct is not so inherently unwholesome that it can be reasonably assumed the misdemeanant was aware of its wrongfulness. Indeed, these punishments usually aim to coerce the public at large, and are meant to influence behavior by their very infliction. There is no implied assumption that the transgressor reasonably should have been aware he or she had stepped outside the law. Broad strict liability of this sort normally would run afoul of due process, [15] but here it is allowed because the penalties are light. Reasonable deterrence, then, is the basic principle of the due process balance between individual and societal interests. The ultimate question is whether society can reasonably expect the individual to conform his or her conduct to the law. For the strict liability exceptions, a separate showing of a departure from social mores is unnecessary, as it can reasonably be presumed. [16] This notion of a duty of reasonable social conformity undergirds the entire law of mens rea. Within the confines of this understanding, we will defer to the legislature's directives. It appropriately decides what conduct is inherently wrongful to reasoning members of society and when the social interest requires enforcement without mens rea. However, for deference to be accorded, it must be reasonably apparent that the enactment was in exercise of such judgment. Strict liability cannot be applied simply to expedite punishment when there is no reasonable expectation of deterrence.