Opinion ID: 2585937
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Davis's ties with Bankston constitute evident partiality?

Text: Alaska Statute 09.43.120(a)(2), like the federal Uniform Arbitration Act, provides that a court must vacate an arbitration award if there was evident partiality by an arbitrator. [22] In determining whether evident partiality exists, federal courts have applied a similar analysis to the one called for by the AAA Rules. [23] As Justice White's concurrence in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. points out, this standard does not treat all connections between an arbitrator and a party as grounds for finding evident partiality. [24] Rather, it focuses on whether the relationship would cause a reasonable person to doubt the impartiality of the arbitrator, particularly on the grounds of some financial interest or other loyalty owed to one side of the dispute. [25] Federal courts, and state courts interpreting similar provisions, have articulated different versions of this standard, with some courts finding evident partiality where arbitrators fail to disclose relationships that would lead a reasonable person to believe that a conflict actually exists, [26] and others finding evident partiality where the information not disclosed by the arbitrator would lead a reasonable person to believe that a conflict could exist. [27] Other versions of this standard do not address the distinction between actual and potential conflicts at all. [28] Although we have previously decided an appeal alleging evident partiality, we have not specifically determined which version of the standard to adopt. [29] But we need not do so here, because the result will the be same under any version of the standard. Even if evident partiality is found whenever a reasonable person would have the impression that there could potentially be a conflicta standard coextensive with what AAA Rule 16 requires arbitrators to disclosethe ties between Davis and Bankston do not rise to the level of evident partiality. Kinn and Singletary have made no showing of any financial interest or other loyalty that would predispose Davis to rule in favor of Bankston. Indeed, Kinn's attorney clarified at oral argument that [w]e are not arguing that [Davis and Bankston] had a financial relationship. Without a showing of financial interest or a similar reason for loyalty to one side, Davis's having represented a different client in the same case as Bankston would be unlikely to constitute evident bias even in a large legal community, and it certainly does not constitute it in a legal community as small as Anchorage. [30] If the opposite were true, the most experienced members of the Anchorage bar would be effectively disqualified from acting as arbitrators, and it would be difficult to find any arbitrator at all for some disputes. [31] Similarly, the occasional referral of cases from Bankston's office to Davis's office, and vice versa, based on the specialties of the attorneys in those offices does not establish that Davis had reason to be partial. [32] Exclusive or frequent referrals, or referrals made for substantial consideration, could raise serious doubts as to an arbitrator's partiality, but the referrals here appear to have been infrequent and nonexclusive. [33] Moreover, Kinn and Singletary do not claim that the referrals created a financial interest on the part of Davis. Davis's participation in a bar event coordinated by Bankston is equally unpersuasive as evidence of partiality. As other states' courts have noted, participation or leadership in a professional organization's activities does not necessarily create an impression of bias. [34] Nor is participation in that organization's activities or leadership. [35] Furthermore, every practicing lawyer in this community is a member of one of the sponsors of the Masters in Trial programthe Alaska Bar Association. A holding that participation with a party's attorney in this organization's activities constituted evident bias would make it difficult for parties in Anchorage to find qualified arbitrators for their disputes and, for those lawyers interested in acting as arbitrators, would severely restrict the available range of professional enrichment activities. Finally, the overall context of Davis's alleged partiality includes not only his relationships with Bankston, but also his relationships with counsel for Kinn and Singletary. [36] Davis appears to have had a professional relationship with the spouse of Amodio, an attorney representing Kinn and Singletary, that was significantly closer than his dealings with Bankston. In contrast to his work representing a co-party in Veco and occasional referrals to and from Bankston, Davis maintains in his first letter to Reeves that Amodio's wife has performed substantial . . . legal work for me on and off for close to twenty years, and that his law firm's billing system has only recently been updated to take [her] name out of it. Davis also noted that he had referred and/or been referred by both Bankston and Amodio. The fact that Davis had similar, or even closer, ties with Amodio makes it even less likely that he was partial toward Bankston's client. Because Davis had professional contacts with both sides, none of which could reasonably create an impression of evident partiality, we affirm the superior court's holding on this issue.