Opinion ID: 751803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Denial of the Defendant's Proffered Jury Instructions

Text: 53 The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give to the jury the defendant's tendered instructions: (1) regarding the use of the term knowledge in the ostrich instruction and grand jury proceedings; and (2) informing the jury that a unanimous verdict had to be reached regarding each of the defendant's statements in the indictment in order for Fawley to be found guilty of perjury. Our task in reviewing the propriety of jury instructions to which objections were properly raised during the trial court's proceedings is to determine from the charge as a whole, 'whether the jury was misled in any way and whether it had understanding of the issues and its duty to determine those issues ...'  United States v. Boykins, 9 F.3d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Trustees of Indiana Univ. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 920 F.2d 429, 437 (7th Cir.1990), overruled on other grounds by Watson v. Amedco Steel, Inc., 29 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir.1994)). Generally, instructions which are accurate statements of the law and are supported in the record will not be disturbed on appeal. Boykins, 9 F.3d at 1285. A court's failure to give a proffered instruction is considered relative to a different test: 54 A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a theory of defense [ ] if: (1) the instruction represents an accurate statement of the law; (2) the instruction reflects a theory that is supported by the evidence; (3) the instruction reflects a theory which is not already part of the charge; and (4) the failure to include the instruction would deny the appellant a fair trial. 55 United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir.1994) (emphasis added). If the trial court fails to give the jury a tendered instruction that satisfies all four criteria, the trial court's decision not to give the instruction will provide grounds for reversal. Id. at 645-46.1. Defendant's Knowledge Instruction 56 In the instant case, the Government proffered the following instruction concerning the use of the term knowingly: 57 When the word knowingly is used in these instructions, it means that the defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake, or accident. To act knowingly does not mean that a defendant had to realize he was violating the law. Knowledge may be proved by the defendant's conduct and by all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. 58 The court, in instructing the jury, immediately followed this statement of the law of the word knowledge with the ostrich instruction quoted above. The defendant asked the trial judge to also supply the jury with an instruction regarding Fawley's knowledge which provided: 59 You have been given the court's instruction on the definition of the word knowledge. This instruction is not to be used to determine the defendant's understanding of the word knowledge or know as used by the prosecutor in the grand jury proceeding. 60 In providing this instruction, the defendant raised the same argument that he used to attack the ostrich instruction: that the prosecutor's use of the term knowledge in Klehm's grand jury proceeding was ambiguous. Thus, we hold that this argument must be rejected here in the same way that it was rejected when we considered the propriety of the ostrich instruction. 61 The trial judge rejected Fawley's knowledge instruction and stated: Defendant's Instruction 5 is refused. It is a misstatement of the law, United States v. Watson ... It's an instruction to tell the jury to ignore the court's instructions on knowledge.... 62 The district court's ruling was based on a strikingly similar fact situation faced in United States v. Watson, 623 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir.1980). In Watson, the defendant was convicted of perjury pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The defendant appealed the district court's refusal to give the following instruction regarding knowledge: 63 To establish intent in the case the government must prove that the defendant deliberately and purposely violated his oath to tell the truth by testifying to the truth of a fact which defendant did not believe to be true. Such intent may be determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. An act is knowingly done, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason. 64 Id. at 1206. The district court's rejection was based on the fact that the jury had been instructed during trial on the definition of the term knowingly: 65 The term knowingly in these instructions, means to do an act voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason. 66 Id. This Court, in upholding the district court's ruling, held: 67 Obviously, the second paragraph of this requested instruction is repetitious of the court's charge on the definition of knowledge. To the extent that the first paragraph requires proof of a mental state different than that characterized by knowledge, we believe the request represents a misstatement of the law. 68 Id. 69 In evaluating the propriety of the district court's refusal to proffer the defendant's jury instruction regarding knowledge, we also consider the Edwards standards. We reject Fawley's knowledge instruction because it does not represent an accurate statement of the law. In Watson, this Court affirmed the district judge's jury instruction that defined knowingly to mean to do an act voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason. Id. This language is identical to the instruction given in the instant case. We likewise hold, in comport with the second Edwards element, that the defendant's knowledge instruction does not reflect a theory that is supported by the evidence. As addressed in our discussion of the ostrich instruction above, Fawley failed to adduce convincing evidence in support of his contention that either he or the jury would be confused by the use of the common term knowledge. We also hold, under the third and fourth Edwards criteria, that the defendant's knowledge instruction was part of a theory that was, in fact, already part of the charge, and that the denial of the instruction did not deny Fawley a fair trial. Fawley offers less than meritorious evidence to support either of these claims. 2. Defendant's Unanimity Instruction 70 The defendant also argues that the district court erred in failing to give the defendant's tendered instruction informing the jury that a unanimous verdict must be reached as to the truth of each of the defendant's statements contained in the indictment. As previously stated, the defendant's indictment charged him with giving two individual statements alleged to be false. To aid the jury in their determination of the truthfulness of the defendant's answers to the prosecutor's questions, the defendant offered the following instruction: 71 Count I contains answers given by the defendant reciting more than one fact. It is not necessary that the government prove that each of these factual statements is false. The government satisfies its burden of proving falsity if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the factual statements recited in Count I is false. However, and this is important, you must not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree, unanimously, that one particular answer is false. It is not enough that you all believe that some answer given by the defendant is false. That is, you cannot find the defendant guilty if some of you think that only answer A is false and the rest of you think that only answer B is false. There must be at least one specific answer that all of you believe is false in order to convict the defendant. 72 (emphasis added). The district court rejected Fawley's proffered instruction, and instead provided its own, to wit: 73 To prove the charge of false declarations before a United States grand jury as charged in the indictment, the government must prove each of the following propositions beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant while under oath testified falsely before a United States grand jury.... Note that with regard to the first proposition to convict you must unanimously agree that at least one of the answers given by the defendant as charged in the indictment was false. 74 The language set forth in the defendant's instruction is more clear and definitive in providing: [the jury] cannot find the defendant guilty if some of you think that only answer A is false and the rest of you think that only answer B is false. There must be at least one specific answer that all of you believe is false in order to convict the defendant. The Government's instruction, on the other hand, is confusing and might have allowed jurors to convict Fawley despite the fact that all 12 did not reach a unanimous verdict regarding which specific question Fawley answered falsely. In short, the wording of the given instruction was not clear and the jury should have been advised that in order to have convicted Fawley, they had to unanimously agree that a particular statement contained in the indictment was falsely made. As such, the trial court's jury instruction violates the defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict, pursuant to Rule 31(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which dictates that [t]he verdict shall be unanimous. This rule gives explicit recognition to a requirement that the Supreme Court has long assumed to inhere in a federal criminal defendant's due process right to a unanimous verdict. In Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748, 68 S.Ct. 880, 884, 92 L.Ed. 1055 (1948), the Court held that [u]nanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply.... A verdict embodies in a single finding the conclusions by the jury upon all the questions submitted to it. See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 23 S.Ct. 787, 47 L.Ed. 1016 (1903); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972). 75 The dictates of the Supreme Court's reasoning were recently applied in two cases with facts similar to those in the instant case. In United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 929 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 821, 114 S.Ct. 77, 126 L.Ed.2d 45 (1993), the Fifth Circuit held, as in the case under consideration, that the trial judge's failure to give a specific unanimity instruction was reversible error in a perjury prosecution which alleged multiple false statements. In so doing, the court noted: 76 [B]oth counts of [the defendant's] indictment allege multiple false statements. The government was required to prove dissimilar facts to show the knowing falsity of each statement.... The most reasonable interpretation of the court's instruction ... is that each juror was individually required to find at least one statement in each count to have been knowingly false in order to find Holley guilty. The instruction does not, however, require that all of the jurors concur in the knowing falsity of at least one particular statement. 77 Id. at 928-29; see also United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1110-13 (5th Cir.1988) (jury in tax case where defendants were charged with two false statements had to agree unanimously on the falsity of one of the statements because statements were conceptually distinct). 78 The line of reasoning set forth in Holley and its progeny was based on the Fifth Circuit's seminal opinion in United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.1977). In Gipson, the court held that an instruction that authorized the defendant's conviction if the jurors were satisfied that the defendant had performed any of six acts prohibited by a statute in question violated the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. The court stated: 79 The district court's challenged instruction authorized the jury to return a guilty verdict despite the fact that some jurors may have believed that Gipson engaged in conduct only characterizable as receiving, concealing, or storing while other jurors were convinced that he committed acts only constituting bartering, selling or disposing. Thus, under the instruction, the jury was permitted to convict Gipson even though there may have been significant disagreement among the jurors as to what he did. The instruction was therefore violative of Gipson's right to unanimous jury verdict. 80 Id. at 458-59. The court went on to note that such an instruction was not harmless error and reversed the district court. Id. at 459. 81 We agree with the conclusions reached in Holley and Gipson. In our case, the trial court's instruction left the jury free to render a guilty verdict in a perjury case without reaching a unanimous verdict. Interestingly, in considering the trial court's instruction, it is the Government who acknowledges the weakness of the trial court's language: 82 If the district court had not added the clarification beginning with Note, [in the jury instruction,] then Fawley's argument based upon Gipson would have merit. Without the clarification, Fawley could have been convicted of making a false declaration without the jury ever unanimously agreeing that one particular false statement was made. If 10 jurors thought Fawley's denial of any knowledge of the existence of illegal aliens was false, and two jurors believed that the statement concerning Fawley telling the Mexicans to leave the country was false, there would not be a unanimous verdict under the district court's instructions given in Fawley's case because the jurors did not unanimously agree that at least one of the answers was false. Under the given instruction, Fawley could only be convicted if all 12 jurors unanimously agreed that at least one of the statements was false. 83 The Government seems to have the right idea, but reaches the wrong conclusion, and ironically makes a strong argument against its own position. In our opinion, the trial court's instruction is not only ineffective because it did not require that all of the jurors unanimously concur in the knowing falsity of at least one particular statement made by Fawley, but it is also misleading, and in the process, eviscerates the defendant's due process right to a unanimous verdict. We are of the opinion that the given instruction was in error, and we hold that the error was compelling enough to warrant a reversal of the defendant's conviction. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 84 We next consider the defendant's proffered jury unanimity instruction, which we will once again examine in light of the Edwards standards. If a trial court fails to give a tendered instruction that satisfies the Edwards criteria, the court's decision not to give the instruction will provide grounds for reversal. Edwards, 36 F.3d at 645-46. We are of the opinion that Fawley's instruction was an accurate statement of the law. Fawley's instruction properly advised the jury that it must not find the defendant guilty unless each member of the jury agree[s], unanimously, that one particular answer is false. Such an instruction properly reflects the law as dictated by the Supreme Court in Andres, as well as in Rule 31(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 85 Secondly, we hold that Fawley's instruction reflects a theory that is supported in the evidence. Case law is clear that a unanimous jury verdict is essential for conviction in any criminal case, whether it be federal or state. 86 We are also of the opinion that Fawley's jury unanimity instruction was proper because it reflects a theory which is not already part of the charge. In order to find a given defendant guilty of perjury, the jury must unanimously agree that a particular material statement was false. Fawley's proposed unanimity instruction properly required that the 12 jurors unanimously concur that a particular material statement was falsely made. 87 Finally, we hold that the trial court denied Fawley a fair trial by violating his due process rights in giving an ambiguous and/or confusing jury instruction. As stated by the Supreme Court in Andres, the defendant had a right to a unanimous verdict, and that right was neglected here. In sum, we hold that the trial court committed reversible error in giving a jury instruction that was misleading, ineffective, and denied the defendant his due process rights. 88