Opinion ID: 2994396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reliability of Expert Testimony

Text: In the recent and well-recognized Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993), the Supreme Court held that Fed. R. Evid. 702 imposes on the trial court the obligation, when dealing with expert witnesses, to ensure that scientific testimony is not only relevant but reliable./8 In Kumho, the Supreme Court clarified its decision in Daubert and held that this basic gatekeeping obligation applies to all expert testimony. 526 U.S. at 147. Thus, the trial judge must determine whether Pacheco’s opinion was grounded in the methods and procedures of science, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, and whether such testimony had sufficient factual underpinnings, Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, as the Supreme Court elaborated: The objective of [Daubert’s gatekeeping] requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152. Also, [i]t is axiomatic that proffered expert testimony must be ’derived by the scientific method[.]’ Clark, 192 F.3d at 756 (citations and internal quotations omitted). In this case, the plaintiffs’ expert surmised and claimed that an alternative design should have been implemented for the TSP, and if it had, neither of the plaintiffs would have been injured. However, when questioned by Crown’s counsel, Pacheco admitted that he had not done any scientific testing to support his alternative design theory. In his deposition, Pacheco stated: Q. Have you done any type of engineering testing to verify if your alternative design that you just described for us would eliminate the hazards that you claim exist? A. I haven’t done any testing, no. . . . Q. Have you attempted to replicate the application of the TSP with this alternative design that you advocate? Have you done any studies to show that you could perform these applications with a barrier guard in front as you just described? A. I haven’t done any studies./9 Also in his deposition, Pacheco admitted that he has not prepared detailed design or calculations, performed an economic feasibility study, prepared preliminary design drawings, or performed any risk utility type testing. The district judge stated that without such work or testing, [t]he court can only conclude that Mr. Pacheco’s opinions about an unreasonably dangerous condition in the TSP fall into the category of subjective belief or unsupported speculation./10 Cf. Clark, 192 F.3d at 759 (Where the proffered expert offers nothing more than a ’bottom line’ conclusion, he does not assist the trier of fact. (citing Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1996))). On appeal, Wendling and Bourelle contend that the district judge failed to be flexible in determining the reliability of Pacheco’s opinion. They argue that [a]lthough Pacheco may not have satisfied the specific factors delineated in Daubert, he did meet enough reliability factors to render his opinion admissible. That is, although Wendling and Bourelle concede that Pacheco has failed to perform any studies or testing of his proposed design and further acknowledge that their proposed expert never observed the TSP forklift in question (much less saw a loaded TSP operate in the narrow aisles of a warehouse), they contend that [t]he necessity for testing is diminished because Pacheco is relying on the testing already performed by Crown./11 However, the appellants ignore the fact that Pacheco never: 1) saw or inspected the vehicle itself (only pictures and videotape); 2) never observed the vehicle loaded and operating within the narrow confines of the warehouse; 3) prepared any drawings in relation to his alternative design theory; 4) conducted any computer analysis; 5) submitted his alternative design theories to the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), despite the fact that he was aware of the organization; nor 6) had any recognized scientific approval of his alternative design theories. Furthermore, as the appellants admit, Pacheco did not satisfy the specific factors delineated in Daubert. And, although courts should be flexible in their application of Daubert, there is no requirement that judges apply only those criteria that the plaintiffs believe are important. See Ancho, 157 F.3d at 515./12 In this case, the trial judge focused on the lack of testing performed by the plaintiffs’ expert and concluded that without such testing, Pacheco’s opinions were nothing more than speculation and were thus unreliable. Recognizing that [t]he trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable, Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152, and that testing is important in alternative design cases such as this, see Cummins, 93 F.3d at 368, we are of the opinion that the judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding Pacheco’s testimony as unreliable. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Pacheco’s opinion is also unreliable under the other factors delineated in Daubert: no lab or organization has tested his theories; no other manufacturer incorporates his proposed design; and he has not seen any industry studies regarding accident experience with the TSP. See generally General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ([N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.).