Opinion ID: 76988
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Interpretation Principles

Text: When Congress expressly codifies its preemptive intent in statutory form, our analysis “begins with the language of the statute.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 542, 121 S. Ct. 2404, 2415 (2001). Our task of statutory interpretation must also be guided by Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996), where the United States Supreme Court addressed a federal statute that “expressly pre-empts state law.” The Supreme Court noted that in such express-preemption situations “our interpretation of [the preemptive] language does not occur in a contextual vacuum. Rather, that interpretation is informed by two presumptions about the nature of pre-emption.” Id. at 485, 116 S. Ct. at 2250. “First, because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law . . . , particularly in those [areas] in which Congress has legislated in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.” Id. (internal quotation marks, punctuation, and citations omitted). In such situations, it is important to give the statute a 27 narrow construction in order to be consistent with both federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation. See id.; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518, 121 S. Ct. 2608, 2618 (1992). As noted earlier, states and state regulators have traditionally regulated state banks, and remain the primary regulatory authority. Second, the Supreme Court has instructed that in interpreting a federal statute, including one that expressly preempts state law, federal courts must consider Congressional intent and purpose, as these are the “touchstone in every pre-emption case.” Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S. Ct. at 2250 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest primarily on a fair understanding of congressional purpose. Congress’ intent, of course, primarily is discerned from the language of the pre-emption statute and the “statutory framework” surrounding it. Also relevant, however, is the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole, as revealed not only in the text, but through the reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law. Id. at 485-86, 116 S. Ct. at 2250-51 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has set out the governing framework courts should follow. 28 In these cases, our task is to identify the domain expressly pre-empted, because an express definition of the preemptive reach of a statute supports a reasonable inference that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters. . . . Because federal law is said to bar state action in a field of traditional state regulation. . . we work on the assumption that the historic police powers of the States are not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 541-42, 121 S. Ct. at 2414 (internal quotations, citations, and punctuation marks omitted). We now turn to the language of § 27(a).