Opinion ID: 2066860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Prima Facie Tort Claim and the Motion for Leave to Amend

Text: Mr. Taylor contends that the trial court erred by granting appellees' motion to dismiss Count IV of his complaint (prima facie tort) under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6), and abused its discretion by denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint to clarify his prima facie tort claim against WASA as one for breach of duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace. Our standard for reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is a familiar one: Dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is proper under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6) ... only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief; and we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff ... and take its allegations as true. [6] Under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a), a plaintiff's complaint must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the Court's jurisdiction depends, ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. [7] Since this is a notice pleading jurisdiction, [8] we only require that plaintiff's statement of a claim `give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds on which it rests.' [9] This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims. [10] We are satisfied that Count IV states a claim for an established cause of action, and should not have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). [11] The trial judge may have focused on the heading, prima facie tort, and properly concluded that we have not recognized this tort in the District. [12] However, the prima facie tort is an intentional one, [13] and the substantive paragraphs of Count IV gave the defendants fair notice that Mr. Taylor was asserting a common law claim against WASA for breach of its duty to provide a safe work place, rather than another intentional tort; indeed his complaint included other intentional act claimsbattery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We have recognized a safe work place claim, saying previously: It is well established in the District of Columbia that an employer owes a duty to provide all of its employees with a reasonably safe workplace. [14] In short, since Mr. Taylor's pleading was sufficient to satisfy our notice pleading standard, the trial court should not have dismissed Count IV pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). We turn now to Mr. Taylor's contention that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to amend his complaint. [15] Once a responsive pleading is served, a party may amend a prior pleading `only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.' [16] In determining whether `justice so requires' the grant of a motion to amend, [this court] take[s] note of five factors: (1) the number of requests to amend made by the movant; (2) the length of time the case has been pending; (3) bad faith or dilatory tactics on the part of the movant; (4) the merit of the proffered pleading; and (5) prejudice to the nonmoving party. [17] In considering these factors, we are mindful of what we said in Good Food Servs., Inc., supra note 17: [T]he discretion accorded the trial court in deciding a motion for leave to amend is to be considered together with the prevailing spirit of liberalism in allowing such amendments when justice will be so served. Although the decision is a matter of trial court discretion, there is a virtual presumption a court should grant leave to amend unless there is a good reason to the contrary. Thus, even lengthy delay, standing alone, is usually not a sufficient reason for the trial court to deny a motion to amend.[ [18] ] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing Mr. Taylor's request to amend his complaint to sue WASA for battery, and to add a new DCHRA discrimination cause of action. We need not determine whether the battery claim against WASA is precluded by the statute of limitations, as the trial court concluded, because we are persuaded by the trial court's second reason for denying the requestMr. Taylor stated in his August 26, 2005 opposition to the motion to dismiss that the battery count was lodged only against Mr. Shabelski: The battery claim [] is clearly against Mr. Shabelski, not the District of Columbia. Since he took this position, we see no trial court abuse of discretion in the denial of Mr. Taylor's request to amend Count I by adding WASA as a defendant. With respect to the request to add a DCHRA discrimination count based on race, the trial court believed that Mr. Taylor was attempting to litigate the same claim he is pursuing in federal court. Although the discrimination cause of action in our trial court is filed under the DCHRA, and the federal district court complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, we are unable to determine on the limited record before us, whether the proposed DCHRA claim actually mirrors, in substance, the Title VII disparate treatment and disparate impact claims pending in the federal court. Mr. Taylor attempts to distinguish his District and federal claims, in part, as follows: The discrimination claim in Mr. Taylor's proposed amended complaint claims disparate treatment. The gravamen of Mr. Taylor's discrimination claims in federal court is that he and Defendant WASA's other black employees are victims of promotion and compensation policies, procedures and practices that, while they are facially neutral, have a disparate impact on its black employees. The above statement appears to ignore the fact that Mr. Taylor's federal Title VII complaint embraces both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. The statement also seems to overlook his August 25, 2006, declaration filed in the federal district court relating to the March 25, 2004 incident with Mr. Shabelski; it appears that the March 25, 2004 incident may well be part of the federal Title VII lawsuit. At any rate, the record simply is insufficient for us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Taylor's motion for leave to amend his complaint to add a DCHRA discrimination complaint based on race. [19] Our conclusion is different regarding the trial court's denial of Mr. Taylor's motion to amend Count IV of his complaint, which would have changed the heading to read, Breach of Duty to Provide a Reasonably Safe Workplace. The proposed amendment set forth a detailed description of the claim and its elements, essentially by repeating and repositioning paragraphs that were in his original complaint. In examining the factors governing a decision to permit a plaintiff to amend his complaint, the trial court observed that Mr. Taylor had made no prior request to amend his complaint and no trial date had been set; and it could not say that tremendous prejudice would result if the amendment were allowed. Nevertheless, the trial court found significance in Mr. Taylor's failure to explain why he seeks to amend at this late date. Appellant's only request for amendment came in April 2006, about one year after his complaint was filed and approximately four months after the trial court had issued its order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. Yet, as Mr. Taylor stated in his motion for leave to amend, [a]lthough discovery requests have been exchanged, no discovery responses have been exchanged, and no depositions have been taken. And the trial court had granted the joint motion to extend discovery to July 9, 2006. While we understand the court's desire to move the case forward, as well as its concern that Mr. Taylor stated no reason for his delay in moving to amend, nevertheless, the delay was not protracted; the substance of the proposed amendment was not significantly different from the substance of Count IV in the original complaint; there is no indication of bad faith or dilatory behavior or motive on Mr. Taylor's part; and as the trial court acknowledged, the amendment of Count IV would not result in undue prejudice to the opposing party. [20] Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Taylor's motion to amend Count IV of his complaint.