Opinion ID: 1373232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the evidence of wanton and willful negligence by the southern pacific transportation company

Text: Two hundred feet north of the point of impact is the intersection of a road parallel to the tracks, called Railroad Street, and Maley Street. From Railroad Street almost to the tracks the vision of an approaching motorist is obstructed both to the right and left as the crossing is approached from the north. On the left of a motorist is a city park in which trees obstruct the view to the east. On the right between Railroad Street and the tracks is a depot. The depot obstructs the view of a motorist looking toward the railroad siding and switching area on the right, to the west. To the right at a distance of approximately one-fourth of a mile was a freight train at rest, waiting for the main line to clear. The work train which struck the deceased consisted of an engine and caboose. The engine was running backward, pulling the caboose although it could have been turned at Bowie, a town approximately 24 miles to the east of Willcox. It was the conductor's responsibility and decision as to how the engine should be run. Because the engine was running in a backing position, the engineer had to rely on the fireman for information as to conditions on the north side of the railroad right of way. The fireman saw the deceased's truck twenty seconds before the collision. He warned the engineer five times that he didn't think the deceased was going to stop, testifying: Q. Sir, how many times between the time you first told him, Mr. Rhoades [the engineer], you didn't think he was going to stop, and the time you actually told him to big-hole it; how many other times did you indicate that you didn't think he was going to stop? A. To my knowledge, twice and maybe three times. Q. So you indicated to him two to three times in addition to the first one that you didn't think Bill was going to stop; is that correct, sir? A. To my knowledge, yes. Q. And then at approximately the fifth time, you said he is not going to stop, big-hole it? A. (Affirmative nod) Q. And he did; is that correct, sir? A. Yes, sir. No effort was made by either the fireman, who also had emergency brake controls at the position where he sat, or the engineer to reduce the speed of the train until just before the impact. After striking the deceased's truck, the work train traveled between 2300 and 2500 feet before it came to a stop. Because the engine of the work train was running backward, the oscillating white light on the front of the engine was pointing to the rear and was turned off. The oscillating light is a warning light designed to give a different and greater warning than the usual headlight. The single non-oscillating backing light at the rear of the engine was on. The work train left Bowie going west from eight to ten minutes behind the Southern Pacific's Blue Streak Manifest which was traveling at the average speed of 60 miles per hour. At Willcox the work train had gained on the Blue Streak Manifest until it was between one and one-half to two minutes behind. The engineer is required by the Southern Pacific Company to proceed at maximum authorized speed, which was at the crossing 60 miles per hour. No allowance is made for lack of visibility. A brakeman, who was sitting in the caboose, testified that the railroad's system of block lights was on yellow. When the block lights are on yellow, the railroad's safety rules require a train to proceed at a speed not in excess of 40 miles per hour. The accident report filed by the engineer the day of the accident showed that the work train was traveling at a speed of 52 miles per hour. The plaintiff's reconstruction expert testified that in his opinion, because of the distance required to bring the work train to a stop and other factors, it was traveling at a speed of up to 70 miles per hour. If the work train had been traveling at 40 miles per hour, according to the same expert, there would have been no collision. Prior to 1965, a year before the accident, the speed limit for trains passing through the City of Willcox was fixed by the City Council at 30 miles per hour. Four years prior, the defendant railroad commenced negotiations with the City which culminated about a year before the accident with the Council raising the speed limit to 60 miles per hour on assurances from the railroad of the safety of the crossing. There had been four accidents at this crossing within the period from January 1963 to April 1966. The jury could conclude from the foregoing stated facts that the Southern Pacific Transportation Company was negligent in at least these particulars: 1. Since the speed limit for trains was fixed at 60 miles per hour through the City of Willcox and since the work train was running at the estimated speed of as high as 70 miles per hour, it could have concluded that the work train was being operated in violation of the speed law and that such constituted negligence per se. 2. Since by statute A.R.S. § 40-855 it is a criminal offense for an agent or servant of a railroad company to be guilty of any violation or omission of duty whereby human life or safety is endangered and by the company's rules, Rules 505, et seq., when an automatic block signal displays yellow a train must move at a speed not to exceed 40 miles per hour, the jury could conclude from the engineer's report alone that the work train was in violation of Arizona statute § 40-855 in that it was being operated in violation of law and that this constituted negligence per se. 3. Since by Rule 17-D of the company's rules and regulations the oscillating white light on an engine    must be operated approaching road crossings at grade both day and night under all conditions and the engine was running backward so that the oscillating white light was not visible to the front, and was, in fact, turned off, and the engine could have been turned at Bowie, the jury could believe that the failure to run the engine in the forward position endangered the lives of persons who might expect a through train moving on the main line at a high rate of speed to show the oscillating warning light. This violation of the company's safety rules is a violation of law and was negligence per se. As to these three points, A.R.S. § 40-423 is applicable. Subsection A thereof provides: If any public service corporation does or permits to be done anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful, or omits to do anything required to be done, by the constitution or laws of the state, or by orders of the commission, the corporation is liable to the persons affected thereby for all loss, damages or injury caused thereby or resulting therefrom. If the court finds that the act or omission was wilful, it may also award exemplary damages. 4. Since in traveling backward, the engineer had to look from the side window rather than through the front window and his view forward and to his right was impaired by the long end of the engine, the jury could conclude that this could result in the inability to control the train in an emergency and was a contributing cause to this accident. As the court said in Lester v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 275 F.2d 42, 45 (10th Cir.1960): If the jury should find that the choice of conduct of the train crew in running the train backward, knowing that the control and safety of the operation of the short and heavy train was thereby greatly impaired was wrongful to such an extent as to evince a reckless disregard for the rights of others, we believe a finding of gross negligence permissible under New Mexico law. 5. Since the fireman saw the deceased approaching the crossing approximately twenty seconds before the brakes were applied and told the engineer five times that he didn't think the deceased was going to stop, the jury could conclude wanton negligence from the deliberate maintenance of speed in disregard of observed danger. Western Constructors, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Company, 381 F.2d 573 (9th Cir.1967). Two further points should be made. They require enlargement on the facts related to this point. 6. Theodore H. Kruttschnitt, then Public Projects Engineer of Southern Pacific Company, testified concerning certain factors from which a conclusion could be drawn as to when a crossing is more than ordinarily dangerous: Q. Would you consider the location, say, within a quarter mile area of known switching operations and sidings is a factor that should be considered? A. Yes   .       Q. That kind of goes to the area of driver confusion or driver distraction, does it not, sir? The possibility that a driver may misinterpret signals as to whether or not another train is approaching on the main track or whether or not the signals may be activated by operations in a switching or siding area? A. Yes. He also testified: My experience as a commutor taught me that many of our very sad accidents were what I call the two-train type where a motorist will wait for a train coming in one direction which he sees and as soon as that train passes he starts up across the railroad in spite of the fact that the flashing lights are still working and gets hit by an unseen train going in the other direction on the other track. The jury could conclude that Kruttschnitt's observations as to driver confusion were also true when one train follows closely behind another and that consequently the Maley Street crossing presented an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others because of a high degree of probability that such harm would occur when the circumstances combined to confuse or mislead a motorist. 7. It is plaintiff's position that the Southern Pacific Transportation Company was in possession of information which would require that automatic gates be installed at the Maley Street crossing in order to adequately protect the public, but either through gross carelessness or deliberation the information was withheld from the City Council of Willcox at the time the defendant requested the Council to raise the speed limit from 30 to 60 miles per hour and, further, that this information was withheld from its division employees who were charged with the responsibility of evaluating the crossing and from the interested Arizona agencies. The plaintiff's case of willful negligence is based upon these facts. Both Kruttschnitt, now Assistant to the Chief Engineer, and Frank Lathrop, Public Projects Engineer for Southern Pacific Company whose area covers California, Arizona and New Mexico, testified to a 24-year study done by the defendant company, completed in 1961 under the supervision of Kruttschnitt, which revealed among other things that crossings protected by flashing red lights, including cantilevers, have more incidents of accidents than those protected by the customary crossbucks and highway markings. It also showed that automatic crossing gates reduce fatal accidents over any other type of protective device, including a crossing watchman, by 90%. Kruttschnitt also had knowledge of another study prepared by the California Public Utilities Commission which covered 168 crossings in California from the period of July 1, 1954 through July 30, 1964, conducted in basically the same manner as Kruttschnitt's study. The California Public Utilities Commission study concluded among other things: Stated another way it appears that if automatic crossing gates had not been installed at these 113 points there would be approximately 52 more accidents, ten more deaths, and 25 more injured persons at this group of crossings in each calendar year as shown in Line 5 of Table 3. In other words if the gates installed during the ten-year test period were in operation during the entire ten years there would have been 271 fewer accidents, 50 fewer fatalities and 131 fewer injuries. Neither the Kruttschnitt study nor the California Public Utilities Commission study was known to the employees of the Tucson Division of the Southern Pacific who were charged with the responsibility of evaluating crossings and recommending safety devices. R.O. Coltrin, Superintendent of the Tucson Division, charged with the ultimate evaluation of protective devices and recommendations for improvement, testified that he was not aware of the Kruttschnitt study. Deryl B. Zumwalt, Division Engineer for the Tucson Division, delegated the evaluation and recommendation for improvement to Assistant Engineer Cornelius Sullivan. Zumwalt's testimony was contradictory. He testified in this case that he did know of the Kruttschnitt study, but was impeached by a showing that he had testified in a case in Maricopa County, Arizona in 1969 that he never heard of any such study. He did acknowledge that he had not personally seen a copy of the study. Assistant Division Engineer Cornelius Sullivan had never seen the Kruttschnitt study until November 1969 and was not aware of its existence until that time. Sullivan also testified that if he had been aware of the conclusions of the study he probably would have recommended gates at the Maley Street crossing in 1963. Q.    Sir, with the knowledge of that study and the comparison of fixed signs as compared to automatic signals and the fact that the study indicated you could expect more accidents and more combined injuries and fatalities at automatic signals than fixed signs would that have had any bearing on your recommendations to the City of Willcox from '63 through '66 if you had had that information made available to you? A. It probably would have, yes. Q. Thank you, sir. And what you are saying is, with that kind of information you probably would have recommended gates; right, sir? A. Yes. Other interested persons were never informed of the Kruttschnitt study. William J. Whisnant, Director of the Tariff and Rate Division of the Arizona Corporation Commission, testified that he had never seen or heard of the Kruttschnitt study. So far as he was aware it had never been furnished to the Corporation Commission. Edward P. Brown, Supervisor of the Utility Railroad Engineering Division of the Arizona Highway Commission, testified that he had never seen a study of the Southern Pacific Company concerning the effectiveness of grade crossing warning devices. Kenneth P. Hamblin, an employee of the Arizona Highway Department since 1959, who had been Supervisor of the Traffic Study Section for three years and a field study supervisor for an additional three years, testified to a study he had made of the Maley Street crossing in May of 1966, six months before decedent's death, at the request of the City Manager of Willcox. He concluded that there should be crossing gates installed at Maley Street, testifying: It is a combination of conditions that existed at that time: One being that it was an urban crossing, a multi-lane highway, the daily vehicle count and a limited view of approaching trains; the fact that there were four tracks, switching operations, thirty-two trains daily, sixty mile per hour trains and the accident experience that had been there in the last couple of years, the couple of years prior to the study. That the Arizona Highway Department was studying the Maley Street crossing was conveyed to the Southern Pacific Company at least as early as April 19, 1966. This conclusion was reported to the City Manager of Willcox in July of 1966. Lathrop listed the factors to be considered in determining whether gates should be installed at crossings. They were: 1. Motor vehicle speed. 2. Visibility of the motor vehicle driver as he approaches the crossing. 3. Visibility of the train crew. 4. Parallel streets relatively close to the crossing. 5. Intersections near the crossing. 6. Speed of trains. 7. Switching activity in the vicinity of the crossing which periodically activates the signals at the crossing. 8. Number of trains per day. 9. The motor vehicle traffic count. 10. The accident history of the crossing. 11. The grade of approach. Lathrop's testimony on cross-examination was to the effect that all these factors were present at the Maley Street crossing except the grade approach. He also was examined extensively on his recommendation that gates be installed at certain California crossings based on the existence of some, but not all, of the hazardous factors which he listed as existing at the Maley Street crossing. Kruttschnitt listed three additional factors which should be taken into consideration: 1. Weather conditions. 2. Width of the highway; whether it was of two, four or six lanes, and 3. Whether the crossing was a single or multi-track crossing. Prince Pierson, City Manager of the City of Willcox at the time of the collision, testified that the City Council would have followed the recommendations of the Southern Pacific Company with regard to safety and would have directed the installation of gates at any time that the Southern Pacific had recommended it. He also testified that he was never told of the Kruttschnitt study, but had he known of the conclusions of the study he would have recommended the installation of gates to the City Council. The plaintiff submitted certain interrogatories to the Southern Pacific Transportation Company which included in part the following question: Are you aware of any studies, statistics, or research projects which have been performed by you or other organizations concerning the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of crossing gates in reducing crossing accidents and/or injuries? Thereafter, when plaintiff felt that the answer was not responsive to the question, she re-submitted the same interrogatory, which the attorneys for the Southern Pacific Transportation Company, under oath, answered, No. From the foregoing, the jury could conclude that the Southern Pacific Transportation Company was either willfully or wantonly negligent in failing to inform its agents and employees in its Arizona Division or other interested persons in Arizona of facts which, at the time of increasing the speed limit in 1965 from 30 to 60 miles per hour through the City of Willcox, would have required the installation of automatic crossing gates at Maley Street to ensure the safety of the public.