Opinion ID: 2449866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Valid Investigatory Detention

Text: Similar to our recent holdings in Thomas and McGinnis, the present case concerns an officer's questioning and eventual arrest of a pedestrian. We established our analytical framework in McGinnis: The United States Supreme Court has developed a `totality of the circumstances' test to determine if there is a seizure, or instead a consensual encounter. See State v. Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, 775, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007). `[U]nder the test, law enforcement interaction with a person is consensual, not a seizure if, under the totality of the circumstances, the law enforcement officer's conduct conveys to a reasonable person that he or she was free to refuse the requests or otherwise end the encounter.' 284 Kan. at 775 [166 P.3d 1015]. Stated another way, `[s]o long as a reasonable person would feel free to `disregard the police and go about his business,' [citation omitted], the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.' State v. Reason, 263 Kan. 405, 410, 951 P.2d 538 (1997) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 [1991]). Consequently, in Reason we held that only if ``the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a seizure has occurred.'' 263 Kan. at 410-11 [951 P.2d 538]. . . . . We begin our analysis by acknowledging that a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions: '[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen. ... [Citations omitted.] Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification. [Citation omitted.] The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. [Citations omitted.]' Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).' See Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, Syl. ¶ 17 [166 P.3d 1015] (`Law enforcement questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation. Unless the surrounding conditions are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to disregard the questions, there has been no intrusion upon the detained person's liberty or privacy that would implicate the Fourth Amendment.'). Accordingly, over the years we have recognized several objective factors to help determine whether a law enforcement-citizen encounter is voluntary or an investigatory detention. This nonexhaustive and nonexclusive list includes: the presence of more than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical contact by the officer, use of a commanding tone of voice, activation of sirens or flashers, a command to halt or to approach, and an attempt to control the ability to flee. See State v. Lee, 283 Kan. 771, 775, 156 P.3d 1284 (2007); State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, 19-20, 72 P.3d 570 (2003); State v. Gross, 39 Kan.App.2d 788, 798-800, 184 P.3d 978 (2008). There is no rigid application of these factors; instead, we analyze the facts of each case independently. We have held that `[i]n applying the totality of the circumstances test in a Fourth Amendment context, no one factor is legally determinative, dispositive, or paramount. The outcome does not turn on the presence or absence of a single controlling or infallible touchstone and requires careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances.' Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, Syl. ¶ 20 [166 P.3d 1015]. On the other hand, `we do not expect courts to merely count the number of factors weighing on one side of the determination or the other. In the totality of the circumstances, a factor may be more indicative of a coercive atmosphere in one case than in another. [Citations omitted.]' 284 Kan. at 804 [166 P.3d 1015]. McGinnis, 290 Kan. at 552-53, 233 P.3d 246. Walker contends that a reasonable person would not have felt free to refuse the requests or otherwise end the encounter under the totality of the circumstances. This specific subset of suppression determinationsthe trial court's determination of whether the encounter is consensual or a seizureis also a mixed question of fact and law. McGinnis, 290 Kan. at 552, 233 P.3d 246. We agree with Walker that the encounter was a seizure. In McGinnis, an officer approached the defendant and asked if he had knowledge or information about a partially submerged vehicle nearby. The officer did not initially suspect the defendant of criminal activity and did not mention to him that the submerged vehicle was allegedly stolen. We determined the officer's question was innocuous and that under all the circumstances, the encounter was voluntary. We reiterated that a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter `to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter.' (Emphasis added.) 290 Kan. at 556, 233 P.3d 246 (quoting State v. Reason, 263 Kan. at 411, 951 P.2d 538). Here, by contrast, Pittman approached Walker to confirm or dispel Pittman's belief that Walker might be the person who broke into Torono's truck. Pittman also immediately conveyed his intentions to Walker: Pittman told Walker he was talking to Walker because he fit the suspect's description in a nearby criminal incident and immediately asked for Walker's ID. Consequently, unlike the officer in McGinnis, Pittman's statement and accompanying question were not innocuous. Under these circumstances, we conclude that a reasonable person in Walker's position would not feel free to refuse Pittman's request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Cf. State v. Thompson, 284 Kan. at 804, 166 P.3d 1015 ([W]e do not expect courts to merely count the number of factors weighing on one side of the determination or the other. In the totality of circumstances, a factor may be more indicative of a coercive atmosphere in one case than in another.). Nevertheless, investigatory detentions are generally permitted under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and K.S.A. 22-2402 if `an objective officer would have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the detainee committed, is about to commit, or is committing a crime.' State v. Thomas, 291 Kan. 676, 677, 246 P.3d 678 (2011) (citing State v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 881, 889, 190 P.3d 234 [2008]). The district court essentially held that reasonable suspicion existed: [T]he officer had a legal justification to inquire of a possible suspect who matched the description of the perpetrator of a crime only minutes before. We recently discussed considerations for how reasonable suspicion is evaluated in Thomas, 291 Kan. at 687-88, 246 P.3d 678, where we stated: ``What is reasonable is based on the totality of the circumstances and is viewed in terms as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.' [quoting State v. Toney, 253 Kan. 651, 656, 862 P.2d 350 (1993)]. ... `[W]e judge the officer's conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human experience. [Citation omitted.] Our task ... is not to pigeonhole each purported fact as either consistent with innocen[ce] ... or manifestly suspicious, [citation omitted], but to determine whether the totality of the circumstances justify the detention. [Citation omitted.] We make our determination with deference to a trained law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious circumstances, [citation omitted], remembering that reasonable suspicion represents a minimum level of objective justification which is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.' 263 Kan. at 734-35 [952 P.2d 1276] (quoting United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1431 [10th Cir. 1997]; citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 [1989]).' Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has stated: While `reasonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.... [Citation omitted.] The officer must be able to articulate more than an `inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch' of criminal activity. [Citation omitted.] Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000).' [ State v. ] Moore, 283 Kan. [344] at 354-55 [154 P.3d 1 (2007)]. Whether reasonable suspicion exists is a question of law. We use a mixed question standard of review, determining whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court's findings, while the legal conclusion is reviewed de novo. Moore, 283 Kan. at 350 [154 P.3d 1] (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 [1996]). In support of Walker's position that the district court erred and that Pittman did not possess reasonable suspicion, Walker cites State v. Anguiano, 37 Kan.App.2d 202, 151 P.3d 857 (2007). There, an officer was on patrol on St. Patrick's Day when he noticed a pedestrian that semifit the description of a wanted man. The description included only that the [wanted] man was Hispanic and wearing a coat and `dark-type green colored pants.' 37 Kan.App.2d at 203, 151 P.3d 857. The pedestrian, Anguiano, was wearing dark-colored, grayish-green pants and a coat. The officer stopped his patrol car by the pedestrian and asked for his name and origin of travel. The officer thought Anguiano's direction of travel was inconsistent with his answer given. As a result, the officer asked for identification and ran the information through dispatch for aliases or outstanding warrants. The opinion does not indicate the response, if any, dispatch provided to the alias and warrants check. But Anguiano consented to a search of his person, which produced cocaine. 37 Kan.App.2d at 203-04, 151 P.3d 857. The Anguiano court held that the encounter was not only an investigatory detention, but also that Anguiano's semifit of the description provided was insufficient to form reasonable suspicion. The court opined: [T]he description is so nonspecific or generic in nature as to defy reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Not only did the officer admit that Anguiano's pants were `grayish-green' rather than `dark-type green,' merely being Hispanic and wearing a coat with green pants may have described much of the population of Seward County on St. Patrick's Day. 37 Kan. App.2d at 207, 151 P.3d 857. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals panel distinguished Anguiano, writing: [T]he sole basis for [Anguiano's] detention was a `semifit' general description. Here, the victim gave Officer Pittman the direction the suspect was last seen traveling. The crime occurred only a few minutes prior to Officer Pittman's arrival. And unlike in Anguiano, September 16 is not traditionally a day when individuals dress similarly by wearing dark-colored clothes. 41 Kan.App.2d at 341-42, 202 P.3d 685. For the reasons given by the panel, we agree that Anguiano is distinguishable from the present case. We further note that pedestrian Walker was located in the direction the suspect had been said to flee on foot, within 5 minutes and two blocks of the reported crime. Accordingly, we find better guidance in State v. Baker, 239 Kan. 403, 720 P.2d 1112 (1986), and State v. Glass, 40 Kan. App.2d 379, 192 P.3d 651 (2008). In Baker, while the armed robbers of a gas station fled, the clerk called the police. Dispatch informed officers of an armed robbery by two black men in black jackets and blue jeans. Two officers, located 16 blocks from the reported robbery, then drove toward the robbery on separate side streets they believed could be used for a getaway. One officer saw no traffic until he observed a white automobile with three black males in dark clothes approaching from the direction of the robbery. He decided to check the vehicle and its occupants further. The officer followed the automobile to the next intersection, where it was parked at the curb with the lights out. As the officer approached, the lights on the automobile turned on in preparation for leaving. He activated his emergency lights and ordered the occupants out. All were in dark clothing: at least two were in black jackets and blue jeans. The Baker court held that although the report was of two robbers and there was no indication of how they made their getaway, it was not unreasonable for the officers to anticipate the robbers fled in a waiting vehicle with a third person acting as the wheelman. In light of all the information available to the officer, when coupled with the officer's background, training, and experience, we determined that he possessed reasonable suspicion to make the stop. In Glass, police dispatch described two suspects, within 30 seconds of a reported liquor store robbery, as black males wearing white t-shirts and black hooded zip-up jackets, who left westbound on foot around the building. 40 Kan.App.2d at 380, 192 P.3d 651. A few blocks from the liquor store and within 1 minute of receiving the dispatch, an officer noticed a lone vehicle traveling away from the crime scene. The officer drove past the vehicle, shone a light inside, and noticed two black males in the front seat. One was wearing a white t-shirt and the other was wearing a black outfit. The officer stopped the car, and eventually arrested the occupants after finding one was stuffing something between seat and console and another had a large sum of money fall out of his lap. 40 Kan.App.2d at 380-81, 192 P.3d 651. The Glass panel rejected the defendant's motion to suppress and determined that the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on five factors. First, as in Baker, the information given to police was reputable and from an identified citizen. Second, similar to Baker, the officer observed the suspect vehicle traveling away from the crime scene using a known back way. Third, mirroring the facts in Baker,  the officer located the vehicle within 1 minute of the reported robbery and only a few blocks from the crime scene. Indeed, it was the only vehicle in the area observed by the officer. Fourth, unlike Baker, the officer noticed two black males inside the vehicle identical to [the citizen's] description of the number, race, and sex of the robbers. Fifth, akin to Baker, one of the occupants was wearing dark clothing, consistent with the suspect's description. 40 Kan.App.2d at 385-86, 192 P.3d 651. In considering the facts, rationale, and holdings of Baker and Glass, and viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude as a matter of law Pittman possessed reasonable suspicion to detain Walker. Moore, 283 Kan. at 350, 154 P.3d 1. First, Pittman received information from an identified citizen, Torono. Second, although Walker was not found while traveling away from the crime scene, he was found sitting at a bus stop east of the crimethe direction Torono told Pittman the suspect had fled on foot. Third, Walker was located within 5 minutes and within two blocks of the reported crime. Fourth, Walker was found sitting alone: identical to Torono's description of the race, gender, and number of the suspects, i.e., one black male. Fifth, Walker was dressed in dark shorts and t-shirt, consistent with the description provided. Walker primarily argues that Torono's description was overbroad and that Walker did not match it. More particularly, he contends his shirt's color was midnight blue and featured Mickey Mouse on its front. However, we hold it is possible that someone could identify the shirt as black and similarly fail to mention Mr. Mouse if the shirt had been viewed from behind. Indeed, when Torono saw Walker at the scene and Pittman later spotted Walker at the bus stop, they each described the clothes as black shirt and black shorts. We observe that other jurisdictions have found reasonable suspicion based on similar descriptions of the suspect's clothing, in light of the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 930 N.E.2d 707 (2010) (suspect was wearing blue jacket with white markings and fled toward waterfront); People v. Ross, 317 Ill.App.3d 26, 28, 250 Ill.Dec. 589, 739 N.E.2d 50 (2000) (suspect described as black man wearing blue shirt and pants was found one half-block away from reported crime scene); State v. Taylor, 965 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Mo.Ct. App.1998) (suspect described as black male wearing a black skullcap, a full length black coat, and having his right hand in his front coat pocket was found three blocks from reported crime within minutes of report).