Opinion ID: 2805448
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Actions

Text: Informal immunity agreements, such as proffer agreements, 'are shaped . . . by the language of the contract conferring the immunity.' United States v. Melvin, 730 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hogan, 862 F.2d 386, 388 (1st Cir. 1988)). Accordingly, the meaning of the proffer agreement, and whether it was violated, are reviewed de novo. Id. In conducting this review, we are primarily guided by contract-law principles, including the familiar tenets that contracts should be construed to give effect to every word, clause, and phrase, and that when a term is ambiguous, it is to be construed against the drafter -- in this case the government. Id. We say primarily guided, though, because the agreement is made in the course of a criminal proceeding. To that end, [p]roffer agreements are sui generis, and the contract-law principles that courts use in construing them are glossed with a concern that the defendant's consent to appear at a proffer session should not become a lever that can be used to uproot his right to fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 39; see also United States v. $87,118.00 in U.S. Currency, 95 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1996) ([S]uch agreements are unique contracts and the ordinary contract principles are supplemented with a concern that the -17- bargaining process not violate the defendant's rights to fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause. (internal quotation marks omitted)). As a result, a violation of an immunity agreement is a due process violation. Melvin, 730 F.3d at 39. Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure set the background rule: subject to certain non-applicable exceptions, statements made in the course of plea negotiations . . . are inadmissible. This background rule, though, may be waived. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 197, 210 (1995). Here, the parties agreed to a waiver that stated as follows: So long as [Jiménez] provides complete and truthful information in the written proffer, he shall have the protection afforded by direct use immunity; that is, the United States agrees that no statements contained in the written proffer will be used against him directly in any criminal case in the District of Puerto Rico. However, the United States may make derivative use of and may pursue any investigative leads suggested by any statements or information provided, including use in any criminal case against [Jiménez]. That is, the United States remains free to investigate any leads derived from information provided by [Jiménez], and to use any evidence gained as a result of such investigation in any subsequent prosecution of [Jiménez]. Further, should [Jiménez] subsequently testify in a manner inconsistent with any information provided in the written proffer, he may and will be cross-examined, confronted and impeached by these statements. Nothing in this language even remotely granted the government the right to use the proffered admission in cross-examining Jiménez's -18- witnesses. The omission is especially telling when this agreement is compared to others used both in this Circuit and throughout the country which grant the government permission to use the proffer to rebut contrary evidence elicited from other defense witnesses. Cf., e.g., Melvin, 730 F.3d at 36 (No statements made or other information provided . . . will be used by the United States Attorney directly against him, except for purposes of crossexamination and/or impeachment . . . . (second alteration in original)); United States v. Chiu, 109 F.3d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1997) ([T]he government may use . . . statements made by you or your client at the meeting and all evidence obtained directly or indirectly from those statements for the purpose of crossexamination should your client testify, or to rebut any evidence, argument or representation offered by or on behalf of your client in connection with the trial . . . .). It is clear, therefore, that the government could not use the proffer to cross-examine or otherwise impugn the expert. As the district court itself noted, the proffer language does not include the possibilit[y] of opening the door through the presentation of evidence. It has to be if the defendant testifies. Yet this is more or less what the district court itself did, treating the proposed expert testimony as a justification for the court's use of the proffer. Indeed, it went further, first using the proffer to find as a fact that Jiménez was -19- the shooter, and then announcing that the expert would either come to that conclusion when shown the proffer, or not be allowed to testify. This is, in no uncertain terms, a violation of Jiménez's right to due process of law. See Melvin, 730 F.3d at 39. The government makes a number of arguments in an attempt to overcome this obvious violation. We find none persuasive. First, it suggests that the district court's order allowing the proffer to be used against Jiménez was a derivative, not direct, use of the proffer. However, derivative means [s]omething derived; a thing flowing, proceeding, or originating from another. United States v. Scott, 12 F. Supp. 3d 298, 304 (D. Mass. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 641 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, by contrast, the district court would not have used any information derived or flowing from the proffer after subsequent investigation; it would have used the proffer itself. See Melvin, 730 F.3d at 38 (holding that an officer's voice identification of the defendant, made after hearing the defendant during a proffer session, was a direct use of the proffer); United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 710 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining direct use immunity to mean that the government may not use [the information or statements] as evidence to obtain an indictment or guilty verdict). In this manner, the district court itself treated the proffer as irrefutably establishing a fact (that Jiménez was the -20- shooter) and then used that fact as a basis for precluding the expert from giving expert testimony that refuted it. As noted, the district court did not claim that the proffer allowed the government to use it to knock out Jiménez's expert witness. Rather, the court asserted its own independent authority as a gatekeeper of expert testimony under Rule 702, to use the proffer in this manner. In so proceeding, the district court clearly erred. To begin, we see little advantage and much unfairness in allowing a district court to use a defendant's proffer against the defendant in a manner not allowed by the proffer. If a proffer allows only uses A and B, but the government can give the proffer to the court, which then uses it to do C at trial, proffers -- a valuable tool for both law enforcement and defendants facing severe sentences -- will be rendered unpredictable in their enforcement, and thus less likely to be made. The aim of an agreement not to use a proffer at trial against a non-testifying defendant is not to keep the government from using the evidence, it is to keep the judge and jury from using the evidence. Second, the district court was simply wrong to treat the proffer as establishing a fact, much less the fact of guilt. There are many possible reasons why a defendant seeking to avoid the death penalty might conditionally admit to a false fact to see if -21- a sentence can be avoided.5 He might so fear death over a long sentence that a trade-off is seen as reasonable; he might be protecting another person; he might be of impaired capacity; or he might be deluded. A proffer, much less an unaccepted proffer, is simply not the same thing as a guilty plea or conviction. Yet, the district court treated it as such in order to eliminate an important defense witness. A simplified example highlights the error here. Imagine the defense found a high-resolution video of the shooting, clearly showing that the shooter was someone other than Jiménez, and Jiménez wanted to use an expert to authenticate the video. Under the district court's reasoning, such a piece of evidence would have been automatically excluded as not realistic or true because it contradicted the statement in the proffer. This makes no sense.6 5 In no way are we suggesting that a defendant's proffer and admission of guilt should be taken with a grain of salt. In the run-of-the-mill case, it is in a defendant's best interest to tell the truth, and he or she often has little incentive to lie. However, as the Supreme Court has stated for over forty years, death is different. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06 (2002); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 526 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). A defendant facing the death penalty has a strong incentive to say whatever is needed to eliminate a potential death sentence and preserve his life. Indeed, when we asked learned counsel at oral argument whether he believes defendants sometimes admit guilt in a proffer in order to avoid a severe sentence even though they are not guilty, learned counsel unequivocally and succinctly stated, Yes. 6 To the extent one tries to distinguish this example by arguing that the expert testimony here is less compelling, we note that such an argument would hinge on a judgment about the persuasiveness -22- Finally, the government argues that it was acceptable for the district court to require the proffer be disclosed because allowing Stokes to testify without knowledge of the proffer would have created an ethical violation since Jiménez's counsel would be allowing the presentation of false testimony. We disagree. Attorneys practicing before the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico are bound by the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. D.P.R. R. 83E(a). Rule 3.3(a) of these Rules requires a lawyer to not knowingly . . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(3). The comment to this Rule elaborates that the prohibition only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false and that a lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. Id. cmt. 8. Here, Jiménez's counsel had reason to be skeptical of the admission and thus did not know that Stokes's expert opinion was false. First, when Jiménez was initially arrested, he denied involvement, instead stating that the shooter was his brother Raymond. Second, as discussed above, the two eye-witnesses -- Pérez and Albino -- were not the most credible of witnesses: they provided the police with changing stories, they withheld information regarding who they were in contact with the day of of that testimony -- a judgment which would go well beyond any gate-keeping role. -23- Sánchez's murder, they had relationships with two other likely suspects, and their testimony was part of a plea and cooperation agreement. Third, Stokes -- a former FBI agent with over twentyfive years experience who was trained in examining photographic and video evidence -- opined that the shooter was too tall to be Jiménez. Fourth, Jiménez was desperate to avoid the death penalty and the government was adamant that it would not consider any plea agreement unless Jiménez admitted to all of the charges. Given all of this, Jiménez's counsel could reasonably conclude that Jiménez's admission might have been false and that he was simply stating whatever he had to in order to avoid the death penalty. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that Stokes believed his testimony was false. This is no different than an alibi witness believing, though possibly mistakenly, that he or she saw a defendant at one location despite a defendant's proffer to the contrary. Under the district court's and the government's rationale, the alibi witness would be unable to testify. This is not what our justice system requires.7 See, e.g., Mich. Op. CI- 7 We also take issue with the district court's comment that it ha[s] an obligation to make certain that the facts that come out are as truthful as possible to the reality of the case. I cannot close my eyes to that reality. It would be improper, wrong for me to do that, and I will not allow that. District courts close their eyes to pertinent evidence all the time. For example, that is the whole point of motions to suppress; if evidence or statements are suppressed, courts and parties pretend that the evidence does not exist. Similarly, if evidence is excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, pertinent and relevant evidence is ignored by the court and the parties because of a -24- 1164 (Jan. 23, 1987) (finding no ethical violation in presenting an alibi witness who truthfully believes that the defendant was somewhere else at the time of the offense even though the client had revealed to counsel that he committed the crime). The government points to two district court cases which contrarily hold that a defense attorney is ethically bound from presenting evidence which conflicts with statements made during his client's proffer, even if that proffer is subject to direct-use immunity. See United States v. Burnett, Criminal Action No. 08201-03, 2009 WL 2180373, at  (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2009) (Absent a good-faith basis, within the operation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, [defendant's] counsel may not present evidence or arguments on [defendant's] behalf that directly contradict the admissions made by [defendant] during his proffer sessions.); United States v. Lauersen, No. 98CR1134 (WHP), 2000 WL 1693538, at  (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000) (This Court finds that [defendant's] waiver of rights is invalid to the extent that the Government seeks to use her statements for purposes other than to impeach [defendant] if she were to testify. However, absent a good-faith basis, [defendant's] counsel may not present evidence or arguments on [defendant's] behalf that directly contradict specific belief that it is unduly prejudicial. This is no different. Jiménez's proffer, for all intents and purposes, did not exist unless he testified. Just like excluded evidence, the district court had an obligation to close [its] eye to that reality unless Jiménez took the stand. -25- factual assertions summarized in the Form FD-302 prepared by the Government.). Both cases, however, carve out an exception for evidence presented with a good-faith basis. Burnett, 2009 WL 2180373, at ; Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at . We believe that the situation presented here, for the reasons discussed above, would qualify as a good-faith basis for presenting Stokes's expert opinion even though it is contrary to the proffer. But to the extent that it would not, we simply note that these cases are not binding on us, and we believe them to be incorrect.