Opinion ID: 3047718
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Comer’s Treatment During

Text: Sentencing Comer contends that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when he was sentenced to death while nearly naked and barely conscious. While this is an issue of first impression for this Court, we agree with Comer that his treatment during sentencing “shocks the con- science” and warrants reversal of his sentence. “Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause ‘inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings (resulting in a conviction) in order to 3176 COMER v. SCHRIRO ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.’ ” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (citation omitted). Conduct of state officials that “shocks the conscience” will not be tolerated. Id. at 172. Subsequent decisions have given content to this broad protection. In particular, numerous courts have found that the routine and unjustified shackling of a defendant, at any stage of trial proceedings, violates due process. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) (holding that the visible shackling of a defendant before a jury during the guilt phase or penalty phase of a capital trial violates due process absent case-specific security justifications for the shackling); United States v. Howard, 429 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the shackling of pretrial detainees during their first appearance before a magistrate judge violates due process unless reasonably related to a legitimate goal); Duckett, 67 F.3d at 74650 (holding that the shackling of a defendant during the penalty phase of a capital trial is inherently prejudicial and may only occur if compelling circum- stances justify the need for shackling to maintain order in the courtroom). Five basic considerations have led courts to con- clude that unjustified shackling is a due process violation. First, shackling suggests to the trier of fact that the defendant is dangerous, which adversely and impermissibly affects perception of the defendant in a way that undermines the trier’s “ability to weigh accurately all relevant considerations — considerations that are often unquantifiable and elusive — when it determines whether a defendant deserves death.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 633; see also Duckett, 67 COMER v. SCHRIRO 3177 F.3d at 748. Thus, “shackles can be a thumb [on] death’s side of the scale.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 633 (internal quotations omitted). Second, shackling is an affront to the very “dig- nity and decorum of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 631-32; Howard, 429 F.3d at 851; Duckett, 67 F.3d at 747-48. As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he courtroom’s formal dignity, which includes the respectful treatment of defendants, reflects the importance of the matter at issue, . . . and the gravity with which Americans consider any deprivation of an individual’s liberty through criminal punishment.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 631. Depriving a court- room of such dignity undermines public confidence in judicial proceedings. Id. Third, shackles greatly reduce a defendant’s ability to communicate with counsel and participate in his own defense. Id. at 631; see also Howard, 429 F.3d at 851; Duckett, 67 F.3d at 747-48. Fourth, and related to the third concern, physical restraints may also confuse and embarrass the defendant, impairing his mental faculties. Howard, 429 F.3d at 851; Duckett, 67 F.3d at 747-48. And fifth, shackles may cause the defendant physical and emotional pain. Id. For these reasons, we and the Supreme Court have concluded that unjustified shackling substantially interferes with a defendant’s right to a fair and decent trial and sentencing proceeding. The foregoing reasons apply with even greater force to the circumstances of Comer’s sentencing. Comer was presented to the sentencing court not only in shackles, but nearly naked, with only a blanket covering his genitals, and slumped to one side in a wheelchair with blood oozing from his head wounds. His lack of clothing revealed to the court 3178 COMER v. SCHRIRO and the public his numerous and graphic tattoos, which cover most of his body. And the responses he mustered to the court’s questions were cursory at best. This presentation of Comer — shackled, beaten, and tattooed — certainly increased the perception of his dangerousness. If Comer had been sentenced before a jury, these circumstances would have given rise to insurmountable prejudice. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 633. Because Comer was sentenced by a judge, however, this Circuit has concluded that the risk of prejudice is lessened. See Howard, 429 F.3d at 850. Nonetheless, when a judge is asked to decide whether a defendant deserves to live or die, the judge, like any jury, must weigh those considerations that are “often unquantifiable and elusive.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 633. It is hard to believe that any human being, no matter how well-trained to be impartial, would be entirely unaffected by the dehumanizing impact of Comer’s appearance in the courtroom. This dehumanizing effect was compounded by the fact that the final sentencing hearing was one of the few times Comer had appeared before the judge. Comer did not attend the pre-sentencing hearing at which aggravating and mitigating evidence was presented. He only appeared briefly before the court at the beginning of the guilt phase of his trial, then waived his presence for the rest of the proceeding. Thus, Comer’s presence before the court during his final sentencing hearing was one of the few times the judge had to confront the individual over whom he held the power of life and death. Yet the circum- stances of this meeting, far from humanizing Comer, deprived him of his dignity. Furthermore, the appearance of this naked, bleed- ing, shackled man was a severe affront to the dignity COMER v. SCHRIRO 3179 and decorum of the judicial proceedings. We have never before read of a man being sentenced to death, or even presented to a court, under such circum- stances. Even inmates in solitary confinement have a dignitary interest in being clothed. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Mason, 668 F.2d 361, 363, 365 (8th Cir. 1981). If the court’s formal dignity is a reflection of the importance of the matter at issue, Deck, 544 U.S. at 631, then preservation of that dignity is most important when deciding whether a man lives or dies. The sentencing of Comer without such dignity or decorum is unacceptable. Comer’s condition during sentencing also dimin- ished his ability to communicate with his counsel. Not only were his hands bound, but as the jail psy- chiatrist later testified, Comer was exhausted, which had an unquantified effect on his mental processes. And just as shackles may confuse and embarrass a defendant, so too certainly does being wheeled into a courtroom while nearly naked and exhausted. Finally, with respect to the fifth consideration, Comer suffered physical pain from his visible lacerations. As the foregoing demonstrates, the due process considerations that militate against the routine use of shackles during the trial and sentencing of defendants apply with even greater force to the circum- stances under which Comer was sentenced. If those circumstances had been different — if Comer had been handcuffed, yet fully clothed and physically inviolate, when he attended the sentencing — then we would need to inquire further into the reasons for Comer’s condition because even shackling may be justified by special circumstances such as security concerns. Deck, 544 U.S. at 633; Howard, 429 F.3d at 851. We cannot conceive of any reasonable justifi3180 COMER v. SCHRIRO cation, however, for escorting a naked and bleeding defendant into a courtroom for a capital sentencing hearing. We hold that Comer’s due process rights were violated when he was sentenced while shack- led, nearly naked, bleeding, and exhausted. Additionally, the circumstances of Comer’s sen- tencing were so inherently prejudicial and their impact so difficult to divine from the trial transcript, that, as in the shackling cases, Comer “need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 635. When life and death are at stake, subjective considerations such as the humanity and dignity of a defendant will always influence the sentencing decision, whether it is made by judge or jury. The effect of Comer’s diminished ability to communicate with his counsel, and the mental impact of his nakedness, exhaustion, and shackling, are also difficult to measure. Thus, we cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the circumstances of Comer’s sentencing did not con- tribute to the sentence he received. For these reasons, Comer is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.