Opinion ID: 2585470
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Symbolic Speech and Mid-Level Scrutiny

Text: ¶ 31 The United States Supreme Court has noted that certain sexually expressive items and conduct are entitled to some quantum of protection under the First Amendment. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 1388-89, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000). The items sold at Dr. John's, however, are at best symbolic speech, falling within the outer ambit of the protection and subject to evaluation under the O'Brien framework. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). [T]he sordid business of pandering is constitutionally unprotected... the sale of material solely to produce sexual arousal... does not escape regulation because the [material] has been dressed up as speech, or in other contexts might be recognized as speech. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26, 110 S.Ct. 596, 604-05, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (omission and second alteration in original). Thus, the district court was overly generous in applying mid-level scrutiny to the ordinance. ¶ 32 Under the four-part O'Brien content-neutral test used for analyzing symbolic speech, government regulation is sufficiently justified if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679. ¶ 33 The Midvale ordinance clearly passes constitutional muster because it is unrelated to expression and Dr. John's has failed to demonstrate any communication that it might actually suppress. Dr. John's residual claim that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to denote exactly what constitutes items of a sexual nature also fails. It is clear that the sexual novelties sold by Dr. John's represent items of a sexual nature. See IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 599 F.Supp. 1402, 1410-11 (D.Nev.1984) (holding any ambiguity in language classifying SOB and subsequent licensing requirements was not unconstitutionally vague where plaintiff's business was clearly an SOB). ¶ 34 That a city official may exercise discretion when classifying a business as an SOB is of no constitutional significance. Absent some type of different treatment, negative effect, or more onerous review process, city officials may classify a particular business any way they see fit. See FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 217, 110 S.Ct. at 604-05.