Opinion ID: 3014022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sarkis Ohannessian

Text: On appeal, petitioner Sarkis Ohannessian raises several arguments. First, Sarkis argues that the IJ erred by not finding that Sarkis had suffered past persecution based on political opinion. This is a factual determination made by the IJ, which we will sustain unless the evidence on the record compels the opposite conclusion. See Abdille, 242 F.3d at 438. As mentioned above, the strength of Sarkis’ claim rested mostly on his own testimony, which the IJ found to be not credible. The IJ listed several reasons for reaching this conclusion. Most importantly, the IJ found inconsistencies between Sarkis’ testimony and the supporting documents he had submitted as corroborative evidence. Sarkis testified that in August of 2000 he was detained and beaten by Syrian officials and that afterward he sought medical treatment for his injuries. To corroborate his injuries, Sarkis submitted a letter from the doctor who treated him, Dr. Aziz Kerba. The letter, however, states that the doctor examined Sarkis in June, not August. The letter also says that Sarkis was treated in the doctor’s office and then sent home for bed rest, while Sarkis testified that he was treated by the doctor in his own home. The IJ noted a second inconsistency between Sarkis’ testimony at the hearing and answers that he had given in the credible fear interview. Unlike the testimony he gave in court, in the credible fear interview, Sarkis said he had never 9 been arrested and that he had been detained and released several times but did not mention being beaten. No explanation was given for these discrepancies. Next, the IJ noted that while Sarkis testified to being beaten and severely injured on several occasions prior to 2000, he apparently did not seek any type of medical treatment for those injuries nor could he provide any type of evidence to corroborate those injuries. Third, the IJ concluded that Sarkis had not established a clear link between his activities with the Lebanese Forces as a young teenager and the incidents of persecution that occurred between 1996 and 2000. Aside from professing his belief that his name was on a Syrian “blacklist,” Sarkis did not provide any other evidence that would link his activities with the Lebanese Forces to the events which occurred in 1996 until 2000. Finally, the IJ observed that Sarkis’ parents were present at the hearing. There was no indication in the record that they have ever been persecuted, detained, or beaten while in Lebanon and they were able to travel freely between Lebanon, Syria, and the United States. As we noted in Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, a credibility determination made by an IJ “will be afforded substantial deference where it is grounded in evidence in the record and where the IJ provides specific cogent reasons for her determination.” 330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d cir. 2003). Here, the IJ has done so. We do not find that the 10 evidence on the record is strong enough to compel us to reach the opposite determination in this case. We agree that the inconsistencies in testimony and the omission of medical information for all instances except one, in light of the seriousness of the injuries alleged, certainly harm Sarkis’s credibility. We also find that it was not unreasonable for the IJ to infer that Sarkis’s participation with the Lebanese Forces at age 16, cleaning offices and tending to wounded members, was unlikely to make him a target of persecution approximately ten years later. Sarkis objects to this interpretation, claiming that his role as the designer of communications paraphernalia was significant participation. However, there is no evidence in the record which corroborates Sarkis’s testimony. Considering that Sarkis was particularly young at the time and that the alleged incidents did not occur until many years later, this information is not substantial enough to disturb the IJ’s conclusion that Sarkis had not established a link between his participation in the Lebanese Forces and the incidents of persecution he experienced. Without credible testimony or other corroborating evidence, Sarkis’s claim fails. See Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I & N Dec. at 443. Thus, we conclude that the IJ did not err by not finding Sarkis had suffered past persecution. Secondly, Sarkis argues that the IJ erred by not finding a well-founded fear of future persecution. To demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution, 11 Sarkis has to show that he has a genuine fear of persecution and that such fear is reasonably based on objective evidence. See Chang, 119 F.3d at 1065. In finding that Sarkis had not made this showing, the IJ noted that the background material on Lebanon showed that while “there’s quite a bit of fighting and tension between the two groups” the situation “appears to be substantially better and less volatile than it was some years ago.” A.R. 53. Based on this information, the IJ could not conclude that Sarkis had shown he would be subjected to persecution if he returned to Lebanon. We view this finding by the IJ as consistent with 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A), which requires an IJ to deny an applicant’s asylum request based on past persecution if a preponderance of the evidence shows that “there has been a fundamental change in circumstances [in the country] such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution.” Therefore, we find that the IJ did not err by not finding that Sarkis had a well-founded fear of future persecution. Sarkis’ last arguments on appeal may be dealt with briefly. First, he argues that the IJ erred by denying his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Because the IJ correctly found that Sarkis did not meet his burdens of proof or persuasion to establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, it was not error to deny his application for asylum. Furthermore, because the standard for granting withholding of removal is higher than the 12 standard for granting asylum, the IJ also correctly denied the application for withholding of removal. See Chang, 119 F.3d at 1059. Finally, Sarkis appeals the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s decision without opinion, arguing that the BIA abused its discretion by doing so. We cannot agree. As we held in Dia v. Ashcroft, the use of the streamlining procedure of affirmance without opinion used by the BIA is a constitutionally valid procedure. 353 F.3d 228, 237-45 (3d Cir. 2003). Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion.