Opinion ID: 184206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize sanctions, including dismissal, for failing to appear at a pretrial or scheduling conference, see 2 The non-exhaustive list of factors is: “(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the other party; (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; (3) the litigant’s culpability; (4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal would be a likely sanction for noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions.” Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co., 497 F.3d 1135, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992)). -3- Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) and 37(b)(2)(C), and for failing to comply with court rules or any order of the court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).” Gripe v. City of Enid, 312 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002); accord Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 41(b) specifically authorizes a district court to dismiss an action for failing to comply with any aspect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). “We review dismissals under Rule 41(b) for abuse of discretion.” Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1161. “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court makes a clear error of judgment or exceeds the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co., 497 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2007) (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Employing this “deferential standard,” id., we affirm the district court’s order of dismissal with prejudice. We have reviewed the dismissal order, despite the cursory treatment given it in Mr. Fields’ appellate brief. Construing his pro se filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), we consider his claim that the district court failed to render a fair and just ruling without giving him a chance to be heard and present evidence. 3 We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the relevant factors to the circumstances of this case or in its ultimate determination that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate. We take this 3 We construe Mr. Fields’ appellate brief liberally to apply this argument to the dismissal order, although virtually all of his brief concerns the partial summary judgment order and the discovery disputes. -4- opportunity to again remind litigants that they must behave in a manner “that displays a basic understanding of and respect for the courts and the rule of law in this nation.” Kyler v. Everson, 442 F.3d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 2006). Turning to Mr. Fields’ claims of error in the grant of partial summary judgment and the discovery proceedings, we decline to address these claims, including his contention of error in the magistrate judge’s decision not to recuse, because they attempt to appeal interlocutory orders. See AdvantEdge Bus. Grp. v. Thomas E. Mestmaker & Assoc., Inc., 552 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2009) (announcing a “prudential rule allowing the appellate court to review an interlocutory order preceding a dismissal for failure to prosecute in that rare case when it makes sense to do so.”). We find no reason in the briefs or the record to allow appellate review of these matters. As a consequence, [Mr. Fields] is the unexceptional plaintiff to whom the following homily should apply: If a litigant could refuse to proceed whenever a trial judge ruled against him, wait for the court to enter a dismissal for failure to prosecute, and then obtain review of the judge’s interlocutory decision, the policy against piecemeal litigation and review would be severely weakened. This procedural technique would in effect provide a means to avoid the finality rule embodied in 28 [U.S.C.] § 1291. To review the [interlocutory order] is to invite the inundation of appellate dockets with requests for review of interlocutory orders and to undermine the ability of trial judges to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. -5- Id. (quoting Marshall v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917, 919 (3d Cir. 1974)). Finally, as to Mr. Fields’ claims that defense counsel tampered with evidence and harassed him, he has neither identified where in the record he raised these claims to the district court nor challenged Walgreens’ assertion that he did not. “Absent extraordinary circumstances, we will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal.” Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). Therefore, we do not address these claims.