Opinion ID: 2446605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: does the general assembly have the power to prescribe the methods and appointing authority for inferior state offices?

Text: The next group of controverted statutes deals with the subject of appointments to various boards and commissions. For purposes of clarity and brevity, we divide these 1982 statutes into five categories. The first category empowers the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tem of the Senate to appoint one or more members of particular boards. [15] In the second category the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tem of the Senate are made ex officio members of certain existing boards and commissions. [16] The third category is that which confers on the LRC or a joint interim legislative committee the power to advise and consent to the Governor's appointments to boards or commissions. [17] Category four directs the Governor to make appointments solely from a list submitted to him by the LRC. [18] The fifth and final category permits the LRC or its chairmen to make appointments to certain boards and commissions. [19] The trial court struck down the provisions in the first and fifth categories, ruling that the power to appoint members of boards and agencies within the executive department of government is an essentially executive power which cannot be exercised by any member of the legislative department, including the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate. It declared that the second grouping of statutes permitting members of the legislature to sit as members of boards or agencies within the executive department was violative of Ky. Const. Sec. 28. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the statutes in the third category in which the General Assembly purported to grant the LRC the power to advise and consent to the Governor's appointments were improper delegations of power by the General Assembly. The trial court also declared the provisions in the fourth grouping requiring that the Governor make appointments to boards from lists of persons nominated by the LRC, to be an improper legislative designation of the appointee. After limiting the eligibility requirements for re-election to certain statewide offices and after declaring that office holders' duties shall be provided by law, Ky. Const. Sec. 93: Inferior State officers, not specifically provided for in this Constitution, may be appointed or elected, in such manner as may be prescribed by law, for a term not exceeding four years, and until their successors are appointed or elected and qualified. (Emphasis added.) From a reading of this section, it is evident that the General Assembly may, by law, create these various inferior state officers. It also appears, at first blush, that the General Assembly may provide the manner of appointment or election of these offices. In 1898, close in time to the adoption of the present Constitution, we decided Commission of Sinking Fund v. George, 104 Ky. 260, 47 S.W. 779 (1898), the first of many cases addressing the question of which branch of government has the constitutional authority to make appointments. The court reviewed an act of the General Assembly which created a Board of Penitentiary Commissioners to regulate the penal institutions of the Commonwealth. The act provided that three members of that commission were to be elected by the General Assembly. It was argued that this election of the commissioners was an executive function and not a legislative one and that, therefore, the election provision of the act violated the separation of powers doctrine. In rejecting this contention, we declared that there was no express or implied provision in the Kentucky Constitution which conferred the power to appoint such a commission upon the Governor. In upholding the General Assembly's right to elect the commissioners, this Court relied heavily on the specific wording in Section 93: Under Section 93 of the Constitution, the Legislature could not only provide for inferior state officers, but could designate how they should be appointed or elected. 47 S.W. at 781. (Emphasis added.) The Court specifically rejected the contention that the appointive authority being placed in the General Assembly violated the doctrine of separation of powers: The truth is that the power of appointing or electing to office does not necessarily and ordinarily belong to either the legislative, the executive or judicial departments. . . It is an executive function when the law has committed it to the executive . . . 47 S.W. at 781. The import of the decision in this case seems to be that the General Assembly has, under the wording of Ky. Const. Sec. 93, very broad powers in establishing boards and commissions and in determining how the membership thereof is chosen, even to the extent of selecting the membership itself. However, it was not long before this Court, when confronted with the same principle of law, veered sharply away from the holding in George . In Pratt v. Breckinridge, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1858, 112 Ky. 1, 65 S.W. 136 (1901), we determined an 1899 election contest for the office of Attorney General. An act of the General Assembly created a three-person state election commission which held the power to resolve election disputes and also had the power to appoint the members of every local election commission in the state. The members of the State Election Commission were to be appointed by the General Assembly. At the general election of 1899, Breckinridge polled fewer votes than his opponent, Pratt. Breckinridge filed an election contest with the State Election Commission, which declared him the winner, thus overturning the popular vote. Breckinridge filed suit for specific performance of the decision of the Election Commission. On appeal, this Court, in a decision that received much adverse notoriety from both contemporary and subsequent historians, declared that the appointment, by the General Assembly, of members of the Election Commission was violative of the separation of powers doctrine. Pratt, as appellant, relied on Commission of Sinking Fund v. George, 104 Ky. 260, 47 S.W. 779 (1898), and argued that Ky. Const. Sec. 93 meant that the Governor did not have the executive power of appointment and that the General Assembly was constitutionally authorized to exercise the power of appointment. The Court rejected this argument, overruled George and held that Section 93 does nothing more than permit the General Assembly to determine whether boards and commissions are to be popularly elected, or appointed. We said: The creation of an office is accomplished by the exercise of legislative power. It is done by the enactment of a law. The filling of it, when not exercised by the people, or in some manner directed or permitted by the constitution, is executive, and must be performed by an executive officer. 65 S.W. at 137. (Emphasis added.) Several years later, in a less volatile atmosphere in the Commonwealth than had existed in Pratt , [20] this Court made a veer back towards the holding in George . In Sewell v. Bennett, 187 Ky. 626, 220 S.W. 517 (1920), the General Assembly, in enacting the Workmen's Compensation Act, created a compensation board and provided that the Governor appoint the Board but omitted the requirement of legislative approval of such appointments. A separate, pre-existing statute provided that all persons to be appointed by the Governor were subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. We applied the separate statute and held that when the General Assembly created a legislative board it could make the appointments itself, it could delegate such power to the Governor or it could delegate it to any other person or body. The Court, indeed, seemed to retreat from Pratt and revitalize George . However, two years later, we decided the landmark case of Sibert v. Garrett, 197 Ky. 17, 246 S.W. 455 (1922). As we have previously said, [21] in Sibert , this court ruled on the validity of an act which re-created a State Highway Commission of four members and provided that the members should be elected by the General Assembly. In holding that the appointment powers were executive in nature, we explained: The appointment of officers is intrinsically an administrative or executive act, but this does not imply that no appointment can be made by any department of government other than the executive, for all the authorities agree that the courts and the legislature may appoint those public officers which are necessary to the exercise of their own function. 246 S.W. at 458. The Court specifically declined to follow George , saying it was short lived. 246 S.W. at 458. It further chose to follow Pratt , even though acknowledging that it was a decision with political overtones and ramifications. Addressing itself to the language in Ky. Const. Sec. 93, the Court said: So where the Constitution provides that all officers whose appointment is not otherwise provided for in the Constitution shall be chosen in such manner as may be prescribed by law, it is held that, while this provision authorizes the Legislature to provide by law for the appointment or election of such officers, it does not authorize the Legislature itself to make such appointment or election. 246 S.W. at 459. (Emphasis added). The Court used the separation of powers doctrine to bolster its view when it said: The logical result of the contention, [that the General Assembly, under Section 93, could make appointments] if adopted and followed, would empower the Legislature to appoint or elect the private secretary to the Governor; the Commissioner, sergeant at arms, tipstaff, and bailiff of the Court of Appeals . . . . . . . [S]uch power on the part of the Legislature, if a full exercise of it should be persisted in, would enable it to gradually absorb to itself the patronage and control of the greater part of the functioning agencies of the state and county governments, and thus endowed it would be little short of a legislative oligarchy. 246 S.W. at 460. It is our view that Sibert has been unchanged and is therefore dispositive of the central issue present in these contested statutes. Appellants urge that Craig v. O'Rear, 199 Ky. 553, 251 S.W. 828 (1923), decided two years after Sibert , constituted another veer by the court and is controlling. We do not agree. In that case, the Court ruled that the General Assembly could appoint temporary agents to perform a particular task, to serve without term and without pay and whose functions cease when the purpose of such appointment was accomplished. One other case merits discussion. In Rouse v. Johnson, 234 Ky. 473, 28 S.W.2d 745 (1930), a state highway commission was re-created by an act of the General Assembly. The power of appointment to that commission was removed from the Governor and lodged with an appointing board which consisted of the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor and the Attorney General. This act was held valid, as being consistent with Ky. Const. Sec. 93 and with Ky. Const. Secs. 27-28. It was claimed that the conferring of appointive power on the Lieutenant Governor was violative of Ky. Const. Secs. 27 and 28, because that office was said to be primarily a legislative one. That being true, it was argued, the delegation of appointive power (executive in nature), violated the separation of powers. We concluded that even though the Lieutenant Governor presides over the Senate and can vote in case of a tie, under our Constitution, the Lieutenant Governor is a member of the executive branch of government. This being true, the contention fell and it was declared that the power of appointment was indeed properly lodged in the commission, a part of the executive branch of government. We will now apply these principles to the contested statutes. The provisions in category number one, in which the Speaker and the President Pro Tem are authorized to make appointments, fly in the face of the principle which declares such appointments cannot be made by the General Assembly itself. Such statutes constitute an incursion by the General Assembly, or in this case, its designees, into the separation of powers doctrine. The fifth category of statutes, in which the LRC is empowered to make appointments, is invalid for the same reason. The statutes designated as category number four, which direct the Governor to make appointments from lists submitted to him by the LRC, are similarly invalid. The General Assembly has attempted to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. The provisions in category number three, which authorize the LRC or an interim legislative committee to advise and consent on certain appointments is invalid. The statutes contained in category number two, in which the Speaker and the President Pro Tem are made members of certain boards, are also invalid because such constitutes a legislative appointment which infringes on the right of the Governor to make such appointments. In those statutes where the General Assembly established boards, commissions, etc., and further provided that a member(s) of the General Assembly could actually make the appointment(s) thereto, we declare such appointive powers to be invalid. Therefore, any person(s) so appointed may not properly serve. However, since the General Assembly has properly created the boards and commissions in these situations, the governor should fill such vacancies. In those statutes involving boards, commissions, etc., where the General Assembly has provided for its members to serve ex officio, we declare that such action, while creating a proper category or classification of membership on the board or commission, also constitutes a legislative appointment thereto. Therefore, such ex officio appointment is invalid. This being true, it follows that there is no position on the board or commission to be filled.