Opinion ID: 1111580
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The State's Burden in Proving Accessory Liability.

Text: {15} Baca's guilt as an accessory arises not only from his own actions but also from those actions that he helped, encouraged or caused. See UJI 14-2822(3) NMRA 1997 (Aiding or abetting; accessory to crime other than attempt and felony murder.). The State must produce evidence that would satisfy a rational fact-finder that Baca shared Eccleston's purpose and design. See State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7, 17, 419 P.2d 219, 227 (1966) (holding there must be a community of purpose and partnership in the unlawful undertaking); State v. Luna, 92 N.M. 680, 683, 594 P.2d 340, 343 (Ct.App.1979). In this case, the State was required to show, either through direct or circumstantial evidence, that Eccleston committed an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others indicating a depraved mind without regard for human life, see UJI 14-203 NMRA 1997, and also that Baca helped, encouraged or caused Eccleston's act, intending that the crime occur. See UJI 14-2822(3). {16} In Brown, 1996 NMSC 073, ¶ 14, 122 N.M. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72, we indicated that one factor in identifying depraved-mind murder is the number of persons subjected to the risk of death. We also said that [b]ecause the legislature has deemed that a killing performed with a depraved mind is an especially serious homicide, deserving of punishment equal to that imposed for other forms of first-degree murder, we conclude that the legislature intended the offense of depraved mind murder to encompass an intensified malice or evil intent. Id. ¶ 15, 122 N.M. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72. There must be proof that the defendant had `subjective knowledge' that his or her act was extremely dangerous to the lives of others. Id. ¶ 16, 122 N.M. at 728, 931 P.2d at 73 (quoting Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 278, 694 P.2d at 926). The required mens rea element of `subjective knowledge' serves as proof that the defendant acted with a `depraved mind' or `wicked or malignant heart' and with utter disregard for human life. Id. (quoting Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 278, 694 P.2d at 926, and Hernandez, 1994 NMSC 043, 117 N.M. at 499, 873 P.2d at 245). {17} Based on the evidence summarized below, we conclude that the State carried its evidentiary burden. There is sufficient evidence to support findings that (1) Eccleston committed an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, (2) knowing that the act created a risk of death or great bodily harm, which indicated a depraved mind, regardless of the lives of others, and (3) that Baca helped him commit that act. We also conclude that the State carried its burden of showing that (4) Baca shared Eccleston's purpose or design.