Opinion ID: 1376079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: statements made in conjunction with polygraph

Text: In this case, defendant argued that statements made before, during, or after his polygraph examination could not be redacted adequately to exclude references to the examination. The trial court agreed, concluding that [s]anitizing defendant's statements would alter their meaning and excluded them on that additional ground. [6] The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that all of the statements could be edited. State v. Harberts, supra, 109 Or.App. at 539-40, 820 P.2d 1366. We decline to hold that all of the statements can be adequately redacted [7] and remand instead for the trial court to make that determination in the light of this opinion. Decisions by this court have developed a rule that the state, when introducing statements made by a defendant in conjunction with a polygraph examination, may not introduce evidence that the statements were made in the context of a polygraph examination or details of the polygraph examination, except where the evidence about the polygraph examination is relevant to rebut a defendant's argument that the statements were not voluntary. This court first stated that rule in State v. Green, 271 Or. 153, 170-71, 531 P.2d 245 (1975): [W]e agree with the rule as stated by Reid & Inbau, Truth & Deception: The Polygraph (`Lie-Detector') Technique 254 (1966), as follows: `In laying the legal foundation for the admissibility of a confession obtained before, during, or after a Polygraph examination, a prosecuting attorney is confronted with a task requiring considerable caution. He must seek to avoid any reference by prosecuting witnesses to the results of the Polygraph examination or even to the fact of the examination itself.    The choice, therefore, will rest with the defense attorney as to whether or not he wants to inject the Polygraph issue into the case for the purpose of attempting to show that it or the technique was a coercive factor which compelled the defendant to confess.' (Emphasis added.)      It follows, in our opinion, that when the state undertakes to lay the foundation for the introduction into evidence of a confession at the trial of a criminal case by offering evidence to establish that the confession was given voluntarily, it may not at that time offer evidence of the fact, results or details of a previous polygraph examination. If, however, when the confession is offered in evidence, the defendant then objects to the confession upon the ground that the confession was not voluntary because of a preceding polygraph examination, the state may then offer in evidence not only the fact that the confession was given following a polygraph examination, but also such details of the polygraph examination, including evidence which may reveal the results of the examination, as may be relevant upon the question whether the confession was given voluntarily. In the later cases of State v. Lyon, 304 Or. 221, 233-34, 744 P.2d 231 (1987), and State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 438-42, 687 P.2d 751 (1984), this court prohibited the admission of polygraph evidence. However, as this court recently explained in Fromdahl and Fromdahl, 314 Or. 496, 507, 840 P.2d 683 (1992), both State v. Brown and State v. Lyon addressed the question whether polygraph evidence may be admitted in a jury trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted ( i.e., as proof of the truth of what the polygraph evidence indicated). When the polygraph examiner's report or knowledge of its conclusions is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the evidence may be admissible under certain circumstances. Fromdahl and Fromdahl, supra, 314 Or. at 508, 840 P.2d 683. The rule of State v. Green , quoted supra, explains one of those circumstances: [U]nder [ State v. ] Green , if a defendant chooses to object to the admission in evidence of a confession or his out-of-court statements upon the ground that the statements were not voluntary because of a polygraph examination, the state in rebuttal is not precluded from offering the statements or [from showing] that they originated in a polygraph examination. As stated in [ State v. ] Green , `the choice whether evidence relating to a    polygraph examination is to be received is ordinarily a choice to be made by the defendant.' 271 Or. at 173, 531 P.2d 245. State v. Hart, supra, 309 Or. at 650, 791 P.2d 125. That is, the state may introduce only redacted statements that exclude any reference to polygraphy, polygraph examinations, or results, id. at 651, 791 P.2d 125, and then any attempt by defendant to explain the circumstances of the statements must be undertaken at defendant's risk, id. at 652, 791 P.2d 125. Some statements that contain the word polygraph may have meaning independent of the polygraph examination and, conversely, some statements that do not contain the word polygraph may not have meaning independent of the polygraph examination. The goal of redacting a statement made by the defendant to an officer in the context of a polygraph examination [8] is to exclude any reference to the polygraph examination and context without significantly altering the meaning of the statement. [9] Where the state seeks to introduce a statement made in the context of a polygraph examination, the trial judge's role is, first, to determine whether a defendant's statement expresses the defendant's belief or recollection as to an independently relevant fact (for example, as to the circumstances of the crime) or supports an inference as to such a belief or recollection. If the statement does not express the defendant's belief or recollection as to an independently relevant fact [10] and does not support an inference as to such a belief or recollection, it is not admissible and cannot be redacted to make it admissible. [11] If a defendant's statement may be properly found to express a defendant's belief or recollection as to an independently relevant fact or to support an inference as to such a belief or recollection, then the trial judge must determine whether the statement can be redacted to exclude any reference to the polygraph examination without significantly altering the meaning of the original statement in the context in which it was made. In some situations, the independently relevant fact may be so inextricably connected to the information from or about the polygraph examination that the statement cannot be redacted without significantly altering the meaning of the original statement in the context in which it was made. An attempt to redact a statement that significantly alters the meaning of the statement so that the statement no longer conveys what the defendant said may make the altered statement irrelevant under OEC 401 and, therefore, inadmissible under OEC 402. Moreover, if whatever probative value the statement retains is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury caused by the alteration, the statement would be subject to exclusion under OEC 403. The fact that information from or about a polygraph examination causes a defendant to say something that he or she otherwise would not have said does not necessarily prevent the meaning of the statement from being conveyed without reference to the information from or about the polygraph examination. In State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177, 179, 531 P.2d 256 (1975), for example, the defendant was confronted by officers who told him that the polygraph examination had shown that he had been deceptive. [D]efendant then broke down and cried and confessed to the killing, saying that he went to rob the motel and killed an innocent person. Id. Being confronted with the information from or about the polygraph examination precipitated the defendant's confession. That is, the polygraph context explains why he made the statement, but deleting reference to the polygraph examination or context does not change the meaning of what he said, which was a confession to the crime. Because there was substantial evidence in State v. Clifton to support the trial court's conclusion that the confession was voluntary, admitting the confession, without reference to the polygraph examination or context, was not error. Id. at 182, 531 P.2d 256. There may be some statements, however, that cannot be redacted, because deleting references to the polygraph examination would significantly alter their meaning. For example, when confronted with information about the polygraph examination indicating deception, two different defendants might react by making the following statements: (1) I knew I shouldn't have agreed to take this polygraph test; I guess I can't trick that machine after all; I committed the crime. (2) I still can't remember a thing, but I know that polygraph examinations are never wrong; this polygraph examination showed that I was deceptive when I denied committing the crime; therefore, even though I don't remember, I suppose I committed the crime. While the last four words of both statements are identical (I committed the crime), the meaning of those four words is different and is determined by the context. Before attempting to redact each statement, it must be determined whether the statement may be properly found to express a defendant's belief or recollection as to an independently relevant fact or to support an inference as to such a belief or recollection. The first response is a confession; the second is, instead, a statement of a belief in the general accuracy of polygraph examinations and, implicitly, a repetition of the information from or about the polygraph examination. The second response says nothing independent of its major premise (polygraph information is always accurate) [12] about whether the defendant committed the crime. The meaning of the first response is still conveyed when references to information from or about the polygraph examination are omitted; the meaning of the second is not. The meaning of the second statement is so inextricably tied to the fact of, or information from or about, the polygraph examination that the meaning cannot be retained when the context and explicit reference to the polygraph are excluded. The fact that the defendant is permitted under our precedents to explain that information from or about the polygraph examination motivated him or her to make the statements does not dilute the requirement that redacting a statement must not alter significantly the meaning of the defendant's actual statement in order to be introduced over an objection based on OEC 402 or OEC 403. In this case, defendant seeks to suppress statements that explicitly refer to the polygraph examination, e.g., if the polygraph indicated [that I] was involved, then [I] must have been, and statements that do not explicitly refer to the polygraph examination, e.g., I can't believe it, and then, in response to an officer's inquiry, what?, defendant said, killed my best friend's daughter. If the statements are to be introduced, the trial court must determine on remand, in the light of this opinion, whether each of defendant's statements can be redacted.