Opinion ID: 1059631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Suppression of Bailey's Statements to Police

Text: In his thirteenth assignment of error, Bailey contends that the trial court should have suppressed all statements made by him to the police because his initial confession was made before he received Miranda warnings. He further contends that his detailed confession was the result of police coercion. We disagree with both of these contentions. Bailey premises his argument that his initial statements were inadmissible and, thus, taint his subsequent full confession, given after he received Miranda warnings, on the ground that he had not waived his rights against self-incrimination and to the benefit of counsel during in-custody questioning. The difficulty with this argument is that it fails to address the trial court's finding that prior to Bailey's making his initial confession he was not in custody. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that, before an individual may be questioned by police, he must be warned of his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney only when that individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The Supreme Court subsequently explained in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977), that Miranda warnings are implicated only during a custodial interrogation: Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him in custody. It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited. Id. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711. We have also observed that Miranda warnings are not required in every instance when a suspect is interrogated at a police station. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 47, 307 S.E.2d 864, 872 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109, 104 S.Ct. 1617, 80 L.Ed.2d 145 (1984). We have stated that [i]t is the custodial nature rather than the location of the interrogation that triggers the necessity for giving Miranda warnings. Id. at 47, 307 S.E.2d at 872; accord Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 605, 450 S.E.2d 124, 129 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1053, 115 S.Ct. 1433, 131 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995). Bailey clearly was not in custody such as is contemplated by Miranda at the time he made his initial confession. The record shows that he voluntarily accompanied police to the police station in an effort to continue the ruse that his wife had received threatening telephone calls and notes. His interaction with police throughout the morning and into the early afternoon was entirely voluntary and Bailey was made aware on more than one occasion that he was free to leave, if he so desired. Accordingly, we find no merit to Bailey's contention that any statements he made prior to being given the Miranda warnings were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Thus, Bailey's initial confession was admissible and did not taint his subsequent confession. Bailey nonetheless contends that the detailed confession, obtained after he had been taken into custody and was given the Miranda warnings, was not voluntary. He contends that [t]he interrogators effectively tricked, coerced and cajoled [him] into making incriminating statements and, thus, that his will was overborne by the interrogators. We disagree. When determining whether a defendant's will has been overborne, the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's experience and background as well as the conduct of the police, must be examined. Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 324, 356 S.E.2d 157, 163, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987). While the question whether a statement is voluntary is ultimately a legal rather than a factual one, subsidiary factual determinations made by the trial court are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Thus, the trial court's finding that Bailey's will was not overborne is a factual finding, entitled on appeal to the same weight as a finding by a jury, and will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong. Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 674-75, 212 S.E.2d 293, 297 (1975). The evidence summarized above is fully sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Bailey knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights when he gave his detailed confession to the police. Thus, the trial court's denial of Bailey's suppression motion was not error.