Opinion ID: 788559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Zappulla's Confession to the Police Was Obtained In Violation Of His Miranda Rights

Text: 45 The State argues that in the alternative this Court should find that Zappulla's confession was not coerced. The Appellate Division and the district court both held that the confession was obtained in violation of Zappulla's Miranda rights. This holding is undoubtedly correct. Zappulla was initially questioned upon arrest at the police stationhouse at 1:20 a.m. on March 17, 1998. At that time, the interrogating officers read him his Miranda rights and asked him whether he was willing to speak about the theft of his girlfriend's fur coat and jewelry. He refused to speak about that but spoke about other matters. Late in the afternoon on March 17th, Zappulla broke free from police custody and, as he was fleeing, was struck by a car. He was recaptured and taken to the hospital for examination. Following Zappulla's return to police custody, at 12:30 a.m. on March 18, he was again questioned, but this time without a statement of his Miranda rights and about the much more serious crime of murder. 46 The Appellate Division found that Zappulla's confession was not voluntary and should have been suppressed. People, 282 A.D.2d. at 697-98, 724 N.Y.S.2d 433. The Appellate Division relied on the fact that: (1) 24-hours had lapsed between the giving of Miranda warnings and the questioning of Zappulla about Jennifer's murder; (2) Zappulla was not in continuous police custody between the initial giving of Miranda warnings and the subsequent interrogation; and (3) the second interrogation concerned a crime unrelated to that for which he was initially arrested. On habeas review, the district court properly adopted these finding in affirming the Appellate Division's decision. Zappulla, 296 F.Supp.2d at 318. 47 Considering the totality of the circumstances, Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 286, 111 S.Ct. 1246, we conclude that the admission of Zappulla's confession constitutes a violation of Zappulla's due process rights. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Accordingly, we reject the State's alternative argument on appeal. 48 In conclusion, as Judge Richard S. Arnold reminded us: 49 A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down the rules for the conduct of authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced. 50 Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir.1983). With Zappulla's unconstitutionally obtained confession in mind, it may not be too difficult to look at other evidence and conclude that Zappulla would have been convicted in any event. The unlawfully obtained confession, however, was far and away the most convincing evidence of his guilt. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246. We conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the Appellate Division to decide beyond a reasonable doubt that [the trial court's wrongful introduction of the unlawfully obtained confession into evidence] did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 17-18, 124 S.Ct. 7 (emphasis added). We do not think it too much to require the State to return to the trial court and attempt to convict Zappulla without the unconstitutionally obtained confession. If the dissent's analysis is right, by following it, the State should not find it difficult to properly obtain a conviction. Requiring the State to try is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights.