Opinion ID: 771863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: (By Campbell) I experienced the tingling and some pain.

Text: 15 Q. How often would you experience tingling when you worked at Grand Trunk? 16 A. Working with power tools, it was daily. 17 Q. Is that the only time you experienced tingling is when you worked with the power tools? 18 A. Yes, daily. 19 Q. Would the tingling subside after you stopped using the power tools? 20 A. Yes, after a period it was. 21 Q. After about an hour or so? 22 A. Yes. . . . 23 Q. Can you give me the best estimate when that started? 24 A. Probably in - probably in the mid 90's, '93, '94. 25 Q. So in approximately the mid '90's, '93 or '94 is the first time that you'd go home from work and the tingling would start up again. Is that a fair statement? 26 A. I would call it more of a numbness. 27 Q. Has that numbness ever awakened you from your sleep? 28 A. Yes. 29 Q. When was the first time that you have been awakened from your sleep with numbness? 30 A. Oh, it would happen just periodically, maybe once a week or so in that time frame, in the mid '90's there, '94, '95. 31 Q. So in about 1994 or 1995, you'd be awakened out of your sleep about one time a week with numbness in your hands? 32 A. In my arms. They'd be asleep. 33 (Emphasis added.) The district court reasoned, from all the proof, including Campbell's testimony, that at least by 1994, Campbell knew that (1) he was experiencing tingling and numbness on a daily basis, and (2) the tingling and pain was caused by his working with power tools. The court concluded that [p]ossessing these facts, reasonable diligence on plaintiff's part would have led plaintiff to conclude that he had been injured as the result of using [Grand Trunk's] power tools. 34 The district court's emphasis on this testimony, Campbell argues, ignores the other evidence indicating that Campbell was not really sure when his tingling and numbness began. He cites to other parts of his own testimony where he stated that he had never undergone treatment for his nocturnal awakenings through 1998, and that he wasn't even sure at that point if he even had a problem. Also, Campbell stated that prior to March of 1998, any tingling in his arms or hands was inconsequential. At another point, Campbell was asked if he recalled when [he] first started to experience tingling when [he was] working with Grand Trunk, and he stated that he did not recall at all. When asked when he first suspected he might have CTS, he responded, In the '94 to '95 range. I wasn't sure. Campbell reasons that the evidence shows that his memory was foggy on the dates of his actual awareness of his injury, but that the 1995 date mentioned in his testimony might put his case within the statute of limitations. The district court erred, he argues, in focusing on the earlier dates because it must construe contradictory evidence in his favor. 35 Plaintiff saw a physician in 1998 when these same symptoms apparently worsened, and he received physical therapy. The doctor's report stated that his condition ha[d] been prolonged in nature and worsening through the years. In March or April of 1998, Campbell was diagnosed with CTS. We believe it was disingenuous to assert, as plaintiff did in his memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, that he had no idea what caused his tingling, numbness, pain and nocturnal awakenings up until 1998. 36 According to his own admissions, the plaintiff experienced the symptoms of his disorder on a daily basis for several years and reasonably must have recognized the connection with his operation of power tools and equipment furnished and used on his job with Grand Trunk. Unfortunately, he waited for approximately six months to sue after being diagnosed in 1998 with CTS. Both parties cite a somewhat comparable case, Aparicio v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 84 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1996), to support their arguments. Among other things, Aparicio teaches that if Campbell's condition after September4, 1995, was an aggravation of his illness prior to that time, his claim would be time-barred if he reasonably should have known that he was suffering from that condition due to his Grand Trunk work before the statute of limitations expired. 37 Rejecting the argument that any aggravation of an injury is a severable cause of action in a Federal Employers' Liability Act case, the district court ruled that if Plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome condition in 1992 was an aggravation of the condition in 1987, then the limitations period would bar the claim. In so holding, the district court rejected the position of the Third Circuit in Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a FederalEmployers' Liability Act plaintiff may recover for damages for aggravation of his original pulmonary disease/injury if he could prove that the railroad was negligent in permitting him to continue to be exposed to diesel fumes). We agree that an aggravation of an original injury that is claimed to have been caused by an employer's negligence is not a severable action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 38 Aparicio, 84 F.3d at 815. Campbell has the additional burden in this respect under Aparicio of proving that the railroad was negligent causing him independent and not aggravated injury after September 5, 1995. 39 The parties also cite Fries v. Northwestern Transp. Co., 909 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1990), which is quoted in Aparicio, 84 F.3d at 815: 40 In Fries, the Seventh Circuit observed that the fact that an injury has not reached its maximum severity . . . but continues to progress does not relieve the plaintiff of the duty to use reasonable diligence to discover the original injury and its cause. 909 F.2d at 1096. We also agree with this language in Fries: 41 The Seventh Circuit concluded that a cause of action accrues for [Federal Employers' Liability Act] statute of limitations purposes when a reasonable person knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of both the injury and its governing cause. 42 Fries, 909 F.2d at 1095-96, quoted in Aparicio, 84 F.3d at 814. 43 Campbell also appeals the denial of his Rule 56(f) motion for judgment. He concedes, however, that additional discovery probably would not have changed the court's opinion on the statue of limitations, the dispositive issue we have discussed. Campbell complains, nonetheless, that denial of Campbell's motion was prejudicial to his ability to prosecute his neck and back injury claims. We are not persuaded by Campbell's argument concerning additional discovery, and we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying this motion. 44 Having carefully examined the record, we are satisfied that the district court did not err in holding that Campbell's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. He had a duty to investigate his known physical problem while working for Grand Trunk and reasonably should have known the basis of his problem prior to September, 1998. See Fries, 909 F.2d at 1095-96; see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979). 45 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment for Grand Trunk.