Opinion ID: 2470159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutionality of the Forfeiture

Text: Davis argues that Le Marché's forfeiture violated both the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We address those issues in turn, accepting the district court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous and reviewing de novo the application of those facts to the constitutional standard. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336 n. 10, 118 S.Ct. 2028.
The Eighth Amendment provides that [e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. A fine refers to a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989). As a result, only those forfeitures that may be characterized, at least in part, as punitive will ... be considered a fine for purposes of the [Eighth Amendment]. von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir.2007), citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-22, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993). In Platter of Gold, we determined that a civil forfeiture action brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 545 was remedial rather than punitive. See 184 F.3d at 139-40. Two factors were central to our determination. First, the forfeiture was not part of a criminal prosecution, but was rather a civil in rem proceeding. Id. at 139-40. Second, and [e]ven more important, the forfeiture proceeding was brought under a customs law, which are traditionally viewed as non-punitive. Id. at 140. As a result, the forfeiture was remedial and therefore outside the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. Those same factors apply with equal force in this case. As in Platter of Gold, the statutory authority to seize and forfeit Le Marché came from a customs statute, see 19 U.S.C. § 1595a, which weighs strongly in favor of characterizing the forfeiture as remedial. See Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d at 140. Furthermore, the government's customs claim is unconnected to any criminal prosecution, and Davis's culpability is irrelevant to its resolution. Cf. Austin, 509 U.S. at 619, 621-22, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (contrasting traditional forfeiture statutes, with drug-related forfeiture statutes that expressly provide an `innocent owner' defense and are punitive because they focus on the culpability of the owner). We therefore easily conclude that Le Marché's forfeiture was remedial, not punitive. Cf. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972) (noting that the forfeiture remedy provided under 19 U.S.C. § 1497another provision of the Tariff Act of 1930is a remedial rather than punitive remedy). As a result, Davis's claim under the Excessive Fines Clause must fail.
Davis is also not entitled to compensation under the Takings Clause. Although the Fifth Amendment states that no private property [shall] be taken for public use, without just compensation, U.S. Const. amend. V, the Supreme Court has made clear that [t]he government may not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain, Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452, 116 S.Ct. 994, citing United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492, 93 S.Ct. 801, 35 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). As a result, it has long been settled that if the government acts pursuant to a forfeiture statute, it may seize personal property without compensating the owner. Redford v. U.S. Dep't of Treas., 691 F.2d 471, 473 (10th Cir.1982). In this case, the United States acted pursuant to the forfeiture provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1595a, and was therefore entitled to seize Le Marché without compensating Davis.