Opinion ID: 2155542
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Massaro Case

Text: After this case was submitted, appellant filed a pro se memorandum asserting that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003), is highly relevant to this appeal. We then requested the government to file a supplemental memorandum discussing (1) the effect of Massaro, if any, on this case; and (2) how the conflict, if any, between Massaro and our decision in Shepard should be resolved. Appellant, with leave of court, filed a response to the government's memorandum. In Massaro, after the petitioner's conviction on federal racketeering charges had been affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a motion to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the federal counterpart of D.C.Code § 23-110), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. In affirming the District Court's denial of Massaro's motion, the Second Circuit concluded that he was procedurally barred from bringing the ineffectiveness claim in a collateral proceeding. In a previous case, Billy-Eko v. United States, 8 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir.1993), the Second Circuit acknowledged that in most cases a petitioner should not be barred from raising an ineffectiveness claim on collateral attack if that claim was not presented on direct appeal. The court further held, however: If the defendant has new appellate counsel on direct appeal, and the record is fully developed on the ineffective assistance issue, there is little reason to extend the defendant an unlimited opportunity to delay bringing the claim. Thus, in this narrow category of cases, but only in these cases, the petitioner must still show cause for not bringing the ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, and prejudice resulting therefrom. Id. at 115. The Second Circuit reiterated this holding in the Massaro case, stating that, [a]s a general matter, a federal prisoner cannot employ § 2255 to litigate issues that could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 27 Fed. Appx. 26, 29 (2d Cir.2001) (citation omitted). Observing that Massaro was represented by new counsel on his direct appeal, that the supposed ineffectiveness was evident from the record, and that he failed to show cause for not raising the issue on direct appeal, the court held that he was procedurally barred from bringing the ineffective assistance claim on collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Supreme Court reversed, and held that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal. Massaro, 123 S.Ct. at 1694. Acknowledging that the procedural default rule of Frady and other cases was designed to conserve judicial resources and to respect the law's important interest in the finality of judgments, id. at 1693, the Court nevertheless concluded that requiring a defendant to bring an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal does not promote these objectives, since it would creat[e] the risk that defendants would feel compelled to raise the issue before there has been an opportunity fully to develop the factual predicate for the claim. Id. at 1693-1694. Moreover, the issue would be raised the first time in a forum not best suited to assess those facts, id. at 1694, and appellate courts would waste time and resources attempting to address some claims that were meritless and other claims that, though colorable, would be handled more efficiently if addressed in the first instance by the district court on collateral review. Id. at 1695 (citation omitted). Because appellant's case is in a completely different procedural posture from Massaro, we are satisfied that the Massaro decision has no impact on the matter before us. The trial court denied appellant's most recent motionwhich is the subject of this appealnot because appellant failed to raise his ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal, as the District Court ruled in Massaro, but because he had already asserted a different ineffective assistance claim in an earlier collateral attack. Nothing in Massaro undermines the well-settled principle in this court, [11] and in the federal courts generally, [12] that a claim not raised in a previous collateral attack is procedurally defaulted. Furthermore, we also hold that Massaro in no way conflicts with this court's decision in Shepard. The main concern of the Supreme Court in Massaro was that inefficiencies and delays would occur if a defendant were required to present an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal before the issue could be considered, and an adequate record made, by the trial court. Massaro, 123 S.Ct. at 1694-1695. The procedure required under Shepard for bringing an ineffectiveness claim under section 23-110 is significantly different from that articulated in Billy-Eko (and ultimately overturned in Massaro ). In fact, the procedure prescribed in Shepard is the opposite of, and implicitly counsels against, the Second Circuit's approach. Under section 23-110, there is no requirement that a convicted defendant initiate an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal under the circumstances articulated in Billy-Eko, or any other circumstances for that matter. On the contrary, the defendant must file a § 23-110 motion with the trial court during the pendency of the direct appeal if he is aware of the grounds for an ineffectiveness claim. [13] [T]hat motion can furnish appellant a means of making a record regarding matters relevant to the ineffectiveness claim that do not appear in the record of the case on direct appeal. Shepard, 533 A.2d at 1280 (citations omitted). Indeed, that is the principal reason for the Shepard rule. See Williams v. United States, 783 A.2d 598, 602 (D.C.2001) (en banc) (ineffectiveness claim, far more probably than [other claims], will require amplification through evidence not present, and findings not possible, within the four corners of the trial record). While the § 23-110 motion is pending in the trial court, this court will usually order that the direct appeal be stayed. See id. at 600 (our usual practice has been to stay the direct appeal); Shepard, 533 A.2d at 1280 (this court has routinely granted requests for stay). [14] Then, if the motion is denied, any appeal from that denial is consolidated with the direct appeal, and the two appeals are considered together. This procedure makes it possible for the motion to be ruled upon first by the trial judge, who would already be familiar with the trial record [15] and who could, if necessary, hold an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance claim. Thus the procedure set forth in Shepard actually alleviates the concerns articulated in Massaro, enabling this court to conserve its time and effort by deciding the entire case in a single proceeding. [16]