Opinion ID: 423927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intervention of Louisiana Department of Agriculture.

Text: 153 Louisiana was represented as an intervenor in the proceedings below by its Department of Natural Resources. After final judgment was entered, the Department of Natural Resources sought and obtained an extension of the time for it to take an appeal. In the meantime, the State decided that it wanted to be represented on appeal by the Department of Agriculture, not the Department of Natural Resources. Therefore, on May 10, 1982, the Department of Agriculture moved to intervene as a substitute for the Department of Natural Resources in order to appeal the judgment. The Department of Natural Resources' appeal time had been extended until May 20, 1982, so the Department of Agriculture's motion was within the extended time for appeal (although not within the original time, which had expired on April 20, 1982). On the day the motion was made, the district court denied it on the ground that the Department of Natural Resources could adequately represent the interests of the State. The Department of Natural Resources never filed an appeal from the judgment below; the Department of Agriculture appealed both that judgment and the denial of its motion to intervene. 154 In reviewing the denial of the motion to intervene, we confront the initial question of the district court's jurisdiction to hear the motion. The first notice of appeal in this case was filed on April 5, 1982, more than a month before the Department of Agriculture's motion. This circuit follows the general rule that the filing of a valid notice of appeal from a final order of the district court divests that court of jurisdiction to act on the matters involved in the appeal, except to aid the appeal, correct clerical errors, or enforce its judgment so long as the judgment has not been stayed or superseded. Farmhand, Inc. v. Anel Engineering Industries, Inc., 693 F.2d 1140, 1145-46 (5th Cir.1982) (exception for enforcement of judgment); Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663, 667-68 (5th Cir.1981) (exception for matters not involved in appeal from interlocutory order); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 467 F.2d 1381, 1382 (5th Cir.1972) (general rule), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976); Silverthorne v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1175, 1178-79 (5th Cir.1972) (district court opinion explaining judgment, filed after taking of appeal from that judgment, within exception for matters in aid of appeal). See also 9 J. Moore & B. Ward, Moore's Federal Practice p 203.11 (1983). Several courts have held that the filing of a valid notice of appeal deprives the district court of jurisdiction to consider motions for intervention. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 327 (7th Cir.1979); SEC v. Investors Security Corp., 560 F.2d 561, 568 (3d Cir.1977); Rolle v. New York City Housing Authority, 294 F.Supp. 574, 576-77 (S.D.N.Y.1969); Hobson v. Hansen, 44 F.R.D. 18, 19 (D.D.C.1968) (Wright, J., sitting by designation as district judge) (stating that district court had jurisdiction only because court of appeals had remanded case to district court to hear motions). 155 The Third Circuit, however, has reconsidered the position it took in Investors Security Corp., supra. In Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 612 F.2d 131, 134 (3d Cir.1979) (en banc), the court reasoned that the Supreme Court decision in United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 53 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977), had tacitly rejected the Investors Security Corp. rule by approving the opinion in American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 3 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y.1942). Halderman, 612 F.2d at 134. 156 We are not persuaded by the Third Circuit's reading of McDonald. The reference to American Brake states simply that it is [a] case closely in point. McDonald, 432 U.S. at 395 n. 16, 97 S.Ct. at 2470 n. 16. In McDonald itself, the motion to intervene was made before any appeal was filed. Nevertheless, assuming that the Supreme Court intended to endorse American Brake, we do not believe that American Brake is contrary to the general rule. In that case, the party who had appealed settled his claim at or about the same time as he filed the notice of appeal, and before the motion for intervention. American Brake, 3 F.R.D. at 164. That settlement removed the circuit court's jurisdiction over the appeal, since it ended the case or controversy between the appellant and the appellees. See Bullard v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.1983). American Brake thus appears to be simply an example of the exception to the transfer-of-jurisdiction rule for invalid appeals. See United States v. Hitchmon, 602 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc) (appeal from unappealable order does not divest district court of jurisdiction during period that appeal is pending in circuit court); 9 J. Moore & B. Ward, Moore's Federal Practice p 203.11 (1983). 157 We have found only one case that follows Halderman. In Lane v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 93 F.R.D. 611, 612 n. 2 (D.Md.1982), the motion for intervention was filed at the same time as the would-be intervenors' appeal. The court held that, under Halderman, it had jurisdiction to hear the motion. In a very similar case, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction to hear a rule 60(b) motion filed on the same day as an appeal. Long v. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F.2d 1310, 1318-19 (9th Cir.) vacated on other grounds, 454 U.S. 934, 102 S.Ct. 468, 70 L.Ed.2d 242 (1981). The Ninth Circuit did not rely on any exception to the transfer-of-jurisdiction rule, but simply refused to apply the rule where the events occurred on the same day. Long may be distinguishable from Lane, though, because in Long the district court decided the rule 60(b) motion on the day that it and the appeal were filed; Lane does not indicate when the intervention motion was ruled on. To the extent that Lane is inconsistent with Long, we disagree with it for the same reasons that we disagree with Halderman. 158 Because we find Halderman's analysis of McDonald and American Brake unpersuasive, we adhere to the earlier rule that the filing of a valid appeal deprives the district court of jurisdiction to hear a motion to intervene. The district court was thus without jurisdiction to entertain the motion of the Department of Agriculture; we therefore affirm, although on different grounds, the district court's refusal to grant the motion. 159