Opinion ID: 2633719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Statute Tightly Constrains the Trial Court's Discretion

Text: In resolving the statutory ambiguity, we now look to the statutory setting. Section 18-1.3-204, C.R.S. (2007), governs the conditions of probation generally, and specifically references the conditions of probation when a person is sentenced pursuant to section 16-11.7-105. Section 18-1.3-204(1) states, in relevant part: The conditions of probation shall be such as the court in its discretion deems reasonably necessary to ensure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life and to assist the, defendant in doing so. The court shall provide as explicit conditions of every sentence to probation . . . that the defendant comply with any court orders regarding the treatment of sex offenders issued pursuant to article 11.7 of title 16, C.R.S. (Emphasis added). There is no question that the General Assembly was aware of the broad discretion generally granted to courts to determine whether to grant probation and determine the conditions attending such a grant, and, therefore, chose to limit that discretion by requiring sex offender treatment as a condition of probation. This explains the adoption of section 16-11.7-105 and section 18-1.3-204 in tandem. [5] But, neither section addresses whether sex offender treatment is always required whenever a sex offender commits a subsequent offense of any kind. Often the best guide to determining legislative intent is the General Assembly's declaration accompanying the statute. Section 16-11.7-105 is one of several provisions of title 16, article 11.7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is entitled Standardized Treatment Program for Sex Offenders. The legislative declaration of article 11.7 states that the article's purpose is to create a program which standardizes the evaluation, identification, treatment, and continued monitoring of sex offenders at each stage of the criminal justice system in order to curtail recidivism among sex offenders and protect victims and potential victims. § 16-11.7-101, C.R.S. (2007). The legislative declaration further states that, in creating a standardized program for identifying, evaluating and treating sex offenders, the General Assembly recognizes that some sex offenders cannot or will not respond to treatment. Id. While helpful in understanding the general goals of the act, the legislative declaration is likewise inconclusive as to whether sex offender treatment is always mandatory. Thus, we turn to the legislative history of the statute, which demonstrates that the General Assembly intended to accord sentencing courts tightly constrained discretion in sentencing prior sex offenders to probation when they commit a subsequent offense of any type. Section 16-11.7-105 was proposed in H.B. 92-1021. The bill's sponsor, Representative Marlene Fish, presented H.B. 92-1021 to the House Judiciary Committee, stating that the findings of a Criminal Justice Commission task force revealed that there was no uniform system of management for sex offenders in the criminal justice system. See Hearing on H.B, 92-1021 Before H. Judiciary Comm., 58th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo., Jan. 14, 1992 and Jan. 16, 1992) [hereinafter, H. Judiciary Comm. Hearing ] (statement of Rep. Fish). She went on to state that the overall purpose of H.B. 92-1021 was to standardize the identification, evaluation, treatment and tracking of sex offenders. See id. After Representative Fish read through the provisions of the bill, various supporters of the bill presented testimony in its favor. The Director of the Division of Criminal Justice emphasized the importance of reevaluating sex offenders who return to the criminal justice system upon the commission of any offense, in order to determine their risk of re-offending and their need for treatment. See id. (statement of Bill Woodard, Director of the Division of Criminal Justice). As introduced, section 16-11.7-105, read: Each sex offender sentenced by the court for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1993, shall be required, as part of any sentence to probation, community corrections, or incarceration with the department of corrections to undergo treatment which is appropriate to such, person based upon the recommendations of the evaluation and identification made pursuant to section 16-11.7-104, or based upon any subsequent recommendation. . . . H.B. 1021, 58th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo.1992) (emphasis added). One Judiciary Committee member expressed concern about the shall be required language of the section. Noting that the term sex offender was applicable to a large class of people, and the bill required sex offenders to undergo treatment upon conviction for any offense, this member questioned whether the proposed language of section 16-11.7-105 was too broad. H. Judiciary Comm. Hearing (statement of Rep. Knox). In response, the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice testified that the proposed language of section 16-11.7-105 was pretty broad and should perhaps be changed to reflect the notion that treatment should be utilized to the extent appropriate to that offender and that the extent appropriate to some offenders is not at all. Id. (statement of Bill Woodard, Director of the Division of Criminal Justice). As the committee discussed the, bill and possible changes to the proposed language, committee members continued to question the shall be required language. One member questioned whether it was appropriate to require treatment for every individual or whether there are some individuals [for whom] it simply doesn't make sense, either because treatment is unlikely to work, due to the nature of the offender and the offense, or because an offender has undergone some treatment and there really isn't a lot of purpose to additional treatment beyond that. Id. (statement of Rep. Knox). This member suggested that the bill's language be tailored to include flexibility to meet individual situations. See id. In response to these concerns, Representative Fish stated that the bill was meant to include flexibility, stating that the bill only required treatment based on the assessment. In other words, [the] assessment may show that treatment will not work, but if it does, if there is a feeling that [the offender] can be rehabilitated, then based on that assessment, it shall be required. Id. (statement of Rep. Fish). Committee members suggested that the language of section 16-11.7-105 be altered to include clarifying language. See id. (statement of Rep. Knox). As a result, the which is appropriate to such person language was removed, and was replaced by the to the extent appropriate to such offender language. This change was made to clarify that persons will undergo treatment only if it is appropriate to the person, and only to the extent appropriate to the person. Id. (statement of David Bergin, Attorney, Office of Legislative Legal Counsel). This legislative history underscores the General Assembly's determinationas the statutory language itself statesthat the trial court's sentence must address the assessment contained in the evaluation report and order treatment to the extent appropriate to such offender based upon the recommendations of the evaluation. Indeed, the legislature's debate resulted in this clarifying adjustment to the bill as introduced. Therefore, the General Assembly anticipated cases in which section 16-11.7-105 is applied that do not require that a defendant undergo sex offender treatment. Nevertheless, this is not one of those cases. The assessment contained in the evaluation report set forth facts, recommendations and two options for treatment: (1) sentence Hernandez to the Department of Corrections, where he could undergo sex offender treatment when he appeared to be more amenable to it, or; (2) place Hernandez on probation with a condition that he undergo sex offender treatment. The evaluator recommended against the latter, but also set forth facts supporting the need for treatment and, further, recommended treatment-specific conditions of probation should the court place Hernandez on probation. The plea agreement did not and could not dispense with the evaluation requirement. Section 16-11.7-104 requires a person convicted of a prior sex offense to submit to an evaluation for treatment, an evaluation for risk, procedures required for monitoring of behavior to protect victims and potential victims, and an identification of a person as a sex offender. § 16-11.7-104(1), C.R.S. (2007). The identification of a person as a sex offender is made pursuant to section 16-11.7-103(4)(a), which addresses development of standardized procedures for evaluating and identifying sex offenders. § 16-11.7-103(4)(a), C.R.S. (2007). The General Assembly intended these provisions, along with section 16-11.7-105, to require treatment to the extent appropriate to an offender, based on the recommendations of the evaluation. We conclude that the trial court's discretion is tightly constrained when considering a prior sex offender's request not to have sex offender treatment imposed as a condition of probation when he or she commits a subsequent offense of any kind. In adopting the Standardized Treatment Program for Sex Offenders statutory scheme, the General Assembly created a sex offender management board and charged it with the responsibility of developing standardized assessment procedures, which the board must review and analyze for effectiveness, in order to assist the sentencing court in determining the likelihood that an offender would commit (a sex offense). § 16-11.7-103(4)(a), (c.5), (d)(I). One of these standardized assessments is the evaluation that all sex offenders are required to undergo if they are to be considered for probation by a sentencing court. § 16-11.7-104(1). In this case, the evaluation contains the social, sexual, mental health, and criminal histories of Hernandez, the results from several psychological tests and evaluation instruments, and most significantly, a risk assessment evaluating Hernandez's risk to reoffend based on numerous factors. The evaluation concludes with recommendations concerning the specific manner in which treatment should be imposed. The General Assembly intended that the standardized treatment program for sex offenders be implemented based upon the knowledge that sex offenders are extremely habituated and that there is no known cure for the propensity to commit sex abuse. § 16-11.7-103(4)(a). Furthermore, the General Assembly mandated that the program utilize methods of intervention for sex offenders which have as a priority the physical and psychological safety of victims and potential victims and which are appropriate to the offender, so long as there is no reduction of the safety of victims and potential victims. Id. The trial court must be guided by the statutory scheme's legislative intent to curtail recidivistic behavior and enhance victim safety, with the recognition that sex offenders are extremely habituated. See § 16-11.7-101. The statutory scheme favors imposition of sex offender treatment as a condition of probation. Here, the sentencing court imposed sex offender treatment as a condition of Hernandez's probation. That sentence is supported by the sex offender evaluation report and recommendations as well as the facts of this case, in accordance with section 16-11.7-105(1). We reject Hernandez's contention that the trial court had authority not to impose sex offender treatment as a condition of his probation, given the evaluation report and the facts of this case. To the extent that the court of appeals concluded that the trial court never has discretion to dispense with sex offender treatment when the defendant commits a subsequent offense of any kind, we disapprove of this construction of the statute. We nevertheless affirm the court of appeals' judgment upholding the sentence the trial court imposed on. Hernandez.