Opinion ID: 754754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the District Court's Award of Attorney's Fees

Text: Constituted an Abuse of Discretion 116 The County contends that the district court erred in awarding the attorneys who represented the Plaintiffs a total of $751,370.75 in attorney's fees in connection with this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In this regard, the County contends that the Plaintiffs' request for fees contained vague, conglomerated, and duplicative billing entries. The County also contends that the district court erred in allowing the Plaintiffs to recover fees in connection with Molina's interlocutory appeal because the Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Molina prior to resolution of that appeal by this court en banc. 14 117 We review a district court's award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion, see Riley v. City of Jackson, 99 F.3d 757, 759 (5th Cir.1996), and we accept the factual findings upon which the district court bases its award of attorney's fees, including the determination of the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, unless they are clearly erroneous, see Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir.1995). We conclude that the district court's award of attorney's fees in this case does not constitute an abuse of discretion. 118 With respect to the specificity with which a party seeking attorney's fees must itemize the services for which it seeks recovery, the Supreme Court has stated that counsel, of course, is not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended. But at least counsel should identify the general subject matter of his time expenditures. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The Plaintiffs' bill of costs contains daily entries of time expended on the case that adequately describe the activity upon which the time was expended. Moreover, the record in this case reflects that the district court personally conducted an exhaustive line-by-line analysis of the bill of costs submitted by the Plaintiffs in support of their request for attorney's fees and that the court ordered the Plaintiffs' counsel to submit two amended bills of costs providing more detailed itemizations of certain categories of expenses for which they sought reimbursement. The district court also entered a detailed order explaining its reasons for denying certain categories of costs as unnecessary or duplicative. [G]iven the district court's familiarity with this case, including the quality of the attorneys' work over a period of several years, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in refusing to [further] reduce the hours in question for vagueness or in concluding that the fees that it awarded did not include recovery for duplicative charges. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 327; see also Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir.1993) (Due to the district court's superior knowledge of the facts ..., the district court has broad discretion in setting the appropriate award of attorneys' fees.). 119 Furthermore, the County's claim that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the Plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees incurred during Molina's interlocutory appeal also lacks merit. In Cobb v. Miller, 818 F.2d 1227 (1987), we adopted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.1983), where that court held that 120 all time spent in pursuit of relief for the same illegal conduct should be considered in awarding attorney's fees once the relief sought is obtained, regardless whether the plaintiff has succeeded in obtaining the relief from only some and not all of the defendants named in connection with the conduct. 121 Cobb, 818 F.2d at 1233 (quoting Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1281). We went on to state that, so long as the defendants from whom the plaintiff did not obtain relief were not named frivolously, the total time expended on the claim should be counted in computing an attorney's fee award. Id.; see also Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 327 (A prevailing litigant may not recover for hours devoted solely to claims against other parties. But when claims against multiple parties share a common core of facts or related legal theories, a fee applicant may claim all hours reasonably necessary to litigate those issues. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 122 With the exception of their claim for punitive damages, 15 the Plaintiffs asserted the same claims against Molina that they asserted against the County. To the extent that the County's liability in this case is based entirely upon Molina's actions, the Plaintiffs' claims against the County rest on a factual basis identical to the one on which their claims against Molina rested. Given that a panel of this circuit unanimously concluded that Molina was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for the Plaintiffs' claims, see Brady, 58 F.3d at 176, it can hardly be said that the Plaintiffs' joinder of Molina in his individual capacity as a party defendant was frivolous. 123 We find the County's contention that the Plaintiffs should not be able to recover attorney's fees for the interlocutory appeal because they dismissed Molina voluntarily prior to our consideration of the appeal en banc unpersuasive. As noted above, the time spent by the Plaintiffs' counsel on the interlocutory appeal constitutes time spent seeking recovery for the same illegal conduct for which the jury found the County liable. Our precedent therefore indicates that the district court could have properly allowed the Plaintiffs to recover for the fees incurred during the interlocutory appeal even if this court had concluded en banc that Molina was entitled to qualified immunity, thereby precluding recovery against him in his individual capacity. See Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 327; Cobb, 818 F.2d at 1227. Given that the Plaintiffs could have recovered these fees even if they had lost the interlocutory appeal, we see no reason why they should be precluded from such recovery merely because they dismissed Molina voluntarily. 16 We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees for fees incurred during the interlocutory appeal. 124