Opinion ID: 798000
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonableness of Jones's Sentence

Text: 18 Jones also argues through counsel that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. On appeal, we must determine whether a district court's sentencing determination was reasonable. United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir.2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1110, 163 L.Ed.2d 919 (2006). Reasonableness has both substantive and procedural components, and accordingly, we consider not only the length of the sentence but also the factors evaluated and the procedures employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determination. Id.; accord United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 505, 510 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 553-54 (6th Cir.2006).
19 A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if `the district judge fails to consider the applicable Guidelines range or neglects to consider the other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and instead simply selects what the judge deems an appropriate sentence without such required consideration.' United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 664 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Webb, 403 F.3d at 383). Furthermore, when a defendant raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant's argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it. Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554. 20 Jones asserts through counsel that the district court erred when it failed to consider certain mitigating factors for purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Appellant's Br. at 22. However, Jones does not actually identify any factors that the district court did not consider. Both the transcript of the sentencing hearing and the Rule 32(c)(1) Order reflect that the district court noted every one of the approximately twenty arguments that Jones made, either through counsel or pro se, in support of a sentence below the Guidelines range. The district court did not make specific determinations as to why each of the twenty arguments did not warrant a sentence below the Guidelines range, but generally relied on Jones's history of violence and threats of violence. 2 Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 192 (4/10/06 Sentencing Hr'g at 101); J.A. at 293-94 (Dist. Ct. Rule 32(c)(1) Order at 4-5). In its Rule 32(c)(1) Order, the district court explicitly linked this determination to a number of relevant § 3553(a) factors, noting that a sentence below the Guidelines range would not reflect the `history and characteristics' of the Defendant or `the seriousness of the offense'; provide `just punishment'; `afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct'; or `protect the public from further crimes of the Defendant.' J.A. at 294 (Dist. Ct. Rule 32(c)(1) Order at 5); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Moreover, the record reflects that the district court did take many of Jones's arguments into account in deciding to sentence him to a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range: 21 [I]n the opinion of the Court, I think Mr. Jones is a different man today than he was in 1995. I think he has undergone efforts towards rehabilitation. Seems to be turning his life around, and I am going to sentence Mr. Jones in the guideline range, but in the opinion of the Court, he should not be sentenced at the top of the range in that he is a different man than he was when he has been here twice before, and I am going to sentence him at the low end of the guideline range that I have determined that's applicable. 22 J.A. at 192-93 (4/10/06 Sentencing Hr'g at 101-02). The record reflects that the district court considered all of Jones's arguments, the applicable Guidelines range, and the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and we therefore conclude that Jones's sentence was procedurally reasonable.
23 The thrust of Jones's reasonableness argument appears to be that, although the district court considered the appropriate factors, the district court gave too little weight to certain mitigating factors and thus sentenced Jones to more time in prison than was warranted—that is, that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. [A] sentence may [be] substantively unreasonable where the district court `select[s] the sentence arbitrarily, bas[es] the sentence on impermissible factors, fail[s] to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or giv[es] an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.' 3 Ferguson, 456 F.3d at 664 (quoting Webb, 403 F.3d at 385) (third through sixth alterations in original). Because Jones was sentenced within the applicable Guidelines range, his sentence is credited with a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 06-5275 (July 11, 2006). 24 Jones argues that the district court erred by not giving sufficient weight to six mitigating factors: 1) that Jones was subjected to racially discriminatory conduct by the police, see Jones I, 159 F.3d at 975-76 (describing in detail the undeniably shameful conduct of the police); 2) that distribution or possession of a particular amount of cocaine base carries the same Guidelines range as distribution or possession of one hundred times that amount of powder cocaine (often referred to as the 100:1 crack to cocaine ratio); 3) that Jones had been incarcerated in local jails for much of his prison term; 4) that Jones had demonstrated significant post-sentencing rehabilitation; 5) that Jones had a mental condition that required treatment; and 6) that similarly situated defendants had received lesser sentences. At least two of these factors do not lend significant support for a reduced sentence. First, it is difficult to see how the conduct of the police, however unprofessional it was, justifies a reduced sentence under the § 3553(a) factors. Second, we have previously determined that applying the [100:1 crack to cocaine] ratio does not, ipso facto, make a sentence unreasonable under existing case law, United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 249 (6th Cir.2006), and, like the defendant in Caver, Jones has not demonstrated that the 100:1 ratio was unreasonable in his case, id. 25 The remaining factors do lend some support for a reduced sentence. Jones testified that his incarceration in local jails for much of his imprisonment thus far offered fewer services and was extremely more harsh than it would have been in federal prison, J.A. at 178-80 (4/10/06 Sentencing Hr'g at 46-48), indicating that a reduced sentence may provide just punishment, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Jones detailed his efforts at rehabilitation, indicating that a reduced sentence may be adequate to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C), and to provide the defendant with . . . other correctional treatment in the most effective manner, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). Jones described his mental condition and treatment, providing further support that a reduced sentence may provide him with the most appropriate correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). Finally, Jones presented the profiles of five defendants who pleaded guilty to similar charges and received sentences of less prison time, which may provide some support for the argument that a reduced sentenced may be appropriate to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). 26 The district court determined that Jones's history of violence and threats of violence counterbalanced Jones's mitigating evidence and militated in favor of a within-Guidelines sentence and that Jones's mitigating evidence justified a sentence at the bottom of the applicable Guideline range, but no lower. Although Jones's mitigating evidence might warrant a below-Guidelines sentence in some circumstances, we cannot say that the district court gave an unreasonably large amount of weight to Jones's significant history of violence or an unreasonably small amount of weight to Jones's mitigating arguments. Accordingly, we conclude that his sentence was substantively reasonable. 27