Opinion ID: 1310716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Incidents of the Proceeding.

Text: Leslie G. Wright, Supervisor of Records of the Virginia Department of Corrections, related Stamper's penal history. Stamper was sentenced in 1972 to serve 20 years for the 1971 armed robbery. He was also sentenced in 1972 to serve 12 months in jail for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and in 1974 was sentenced to six months in jail as an accessory after the fact to an escape from the penal system. He was released on parole in 1976. When Wright testified that Stamper had been convicted within the penal system of certain offenses, including stealing from the kitchen and committing a homosexual act, Stamper's counsel objected, moved that this evidence be stricken and, after ascertaining from Wright that the convictions had not been obtained in a court of record, moved for a mistrial. The trial court promptly sustained the objection when interposed, and directed the jury to disregard any evidence about Stamper's stealing or homosexual activity in the penal system. The motion for a mistrial was denied, but the trial court again admonished the jury to disregard any evidence as to Stamper's conduct within the penitentiary system. Although the trial court's action in denying the motion for a mistrial is the subject of an assignment of error, the issue has been neither briefed nor argued. If evidence as to acts committed by Stamper in prison was inadmissible, which we do not here decide, the trial court's prompt corrective action was sufficient to eliminate any prejudicial effect. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 80, 83, 175 S.E.2d 236, 238 (1970). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stamper's motion for a mistrial.
In two assignments of error, neither briefed nor argued, Stamper asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury in respect to parole and in permitting the question of the death penalty to go to the jury. The trial court gave to the jury a single instruction embodying the two alternative punishments, death or life imprisonment, authorized by the statutory language of Code § 19.2-264.2. There was evidence from which the jury could find that there was a probability that Stamper would commit criminal acts of violence that would make him a continuing menace to society. There was also evidence from which the jury could find that his conduct in committing the murders was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery beyond that necessary to accomplish an act of murder, as defined in Smith v. Commonwealth, supra, 219 Va. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149. There was evidence that Staples had been beaten and cut before he was killed, that he and Cooley were shot from a distance of a few inches, that Mrs. Hicks was shot twice, and that Stamper was a fellow employee of the three victims. After the case had been argued and the jury had retired, the jury returned to the courtroom to ask whether, if life imprisonment were imposed, Stamper would be eligible for parole, and, if so, after what period of time. The trial court, relying upon Hinton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 492, 247 S.E.2d 704 (1978), informed the jurors that it was their duty to fix the punishment and what might happen afterwards was of no concern to them. This action of the court was correct and proper under Hinton, and there is no merit in the assignment of error.
In another assignment of error, neither briefed nor argued, Stamper stated that the verdicts upon the capital murder indictments were unsupported by the evidence and were inconsistent in assigning different reasons for fixing his punishment at death. The verdict in the Staples capital murder was based upon both alternatives, the probability that Stamper would be a continuing threat to society, and his outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman conduct in committing the offense. The verdicts in the other capital murder cases were grounded solely upon the first alternative. All three verdicts were amply supported by the evidence, and the difference in the findings was justified. The jury obviously found aggravation in the killing of Staples but not in the other two murders. Indeed, there was no evidence that Cooley or Mrs. Hicks had been beaten or cut as had Staples.
Under Code § 19.2-264.5 the trial court was required, before imposing the death sentence fixed by a jury verdict, to direct a probation officer to report upon the history of the defendant and other relevant facts. Stamper maintains that he was denied the benefit of a thorough presentence report, and thereby denied due process and equal protection of the law, because the officer who prepared his report used information from a prior 1972 presentence report and failed to interview Stamper's parents or his wife. We do not agree. Code § 19.2-264.5 provides only that a thorough investigation be conducted; it does not specify that any particular procedure be used in compiling the report or that any particular information be included therein. Decisions concerning such matters must by necessity be left largely to the discretion of the trial court and the individual probation officer. The record reveals that John Bonanno, the probation officer who prepared Stamper's report, used information from a 1972 presentence report, but only after the accuracy of this information was confirmed in an interview with Stamper. Bonanno, who testified at the sentencing hearing, noted that Stamper was incarcerated from 1972 through 1976 and was on parole from 1976 until the time of his arrest in the present case. Bonanno obtained from Stamper's parole officer information concerning Stamper's activities from the time of his release from prison in 1976 until the time of his subsequent arrest. Given the 1972 report, his interview with Stamper and the information supplied by the parole officer, Bonanno did not feel that it was necessary to interview Stamper's relatives. Both Stamper's wife and his parents testified before the jury at the sentencing hearing. Moreover, Stamper was given the opportunity to cross-examine Bonanno thoroughly on the report and to introduce relevant evidence on his own behalf to supplement or contradict the report. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the court erred in admitting the report into evidence or that Stamper was denied any rights under § 19.2-264.5.
Reference was made in the presentence report to the conviction of Kearnard Tyrone Bowling for the murder of Mrs. Hicks. The trial court announced that on its own motion the transcript of Bowling's trial, over which another judge had presided, either would be made a part of the Stamper record or would be incorporated by reference if Bowling appealed his conviction to our Court, and this alternative provision was included in the final judgment order. We find no objection interposed by Stamper to this ruling of the trial court and the assignment of error thereto, which has been neither briefed nor argued, comes too late. Rule 5:21.
Stamper contends that the trial court violated Code § 19.2-298 [5] by failing to inquire whether he had any statement to make prior to his sentencing. It is true that the transcript fails to show that the right of allocution was extended to Stamper personally by the trial court, although it appears that opportunity was afforded him to speak if he so desired. However, the final judgment order entered by the trial court on February 9, 1979, contains this language:       Whereupon, the Court taking into consideration all of the evidence in the cases, the report of the Probation Officer, the matters brought out on cross-examination of the Probation Officer and such additional facts as were presented by the defendant, and it being demanded of the defendant if anything for himself he had or knew to say why judgment should not be pronounced against him according to law, and nothing being offered or alleged in delay of judgment, it is accordingly the judgment of this Court . . . (Emphasis added.)