Opinion ID: 1678707
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Judgment in the Conversion Action Was Based on a Misinterpretation of the Property Interests Granted Susan in the Dissolution Decree.

Text: The second issue presented is whether the district associate judge who tried the conversion action misinterpreted the dissolution decree which had been entered by the Iowa District Court for Keokuk County. The disputed items are those which the dissolution court had awarded to Susan as her personal effects. These items included a pair of chaps, a high school yearbook, a pistol, a string of rosary beads, a shadowbox picture, a sapphire and diamond ring, a wedding band, some recipe books, a horse stall, a colt feeder (for horses), three rubber buckets (for horses), and two rubber tubs (for horses), a pair of boots, a figurine, a candelabra, a sconce, a disc camera, an ice cream freezer, a mirror, an antique liquor bottle, a crystal candy dish, two bowls and servers, a plate collection, and a crystal relish dish. A dissolution of marriage decree is susceptible to interpretation on the same basis as other instruments, the determinative factor being the intent of the dissolution court as gathered from the language of the decree and the context in which it was rendered. Bowman v. Bennett, 250 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Iowa 1977). In Forsyth v. Forsyth, 210 N.W.2d 430, 431 (Iowa 1973), this court determined that a diamond ring was encompassed within the provision of a decree relating to personal effects. Other courts which have considered the meaning of personal effects have indicated that the phrase is not a term of art, has no fixed or settled meaning, and that its meaning must be ascertained within the context of the situation in which it is employed. See, e.g., Corcoran v. Gage, 289 Mass. 111, 113, 193 N.E. 575, 576 (1935); In re Estate of Michaelson, 194 Misc. 525, 526, 88 N.Y. S.2d 59, 60 (1949); In re Estate of Maurer, 192 Misc. 627, 628, 84 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (1948). Martin contends that the interpretation of the term personal effects in the trial of the conversion action was undertaken without any reason or rationale. We disagree. A comparison of that property found to be Susan's with that property which she claimed, but which was found not to belong to her, reveals the implicit reasoning behind the findings. It was the finding in the conversion action that Susan had been awarded by the dissolution court all those items which had a use unique to her, e.g., her clothing, jewelry, boots, and the equipment which had been used exclusively by her in her horse-raising hobby. For the most part, these were items which had a unique sentimental value to Susan. Moreover, the property found to belong to Susan consisted of items to which she would have had a strong claim in the dissolution action. We find little, if any, basis for the dissolution court having awarded those items to Martin. We do not articulate these conclusions as a means of superseding the dissolution decree, but merely as an aid to interpreting it. We have considered all statements and arguments of the parties and determine that the decision of the court of appeals and judgment of the district court should be affirmed. AFFIRMED.