Opinion ID: 1136816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severance for Confrontation

Text: Wall contends that his right to confrontation was violated because Laschober's statement that Hawley's drugs were fronted to him was admitted without providing Wall an opportunity to cross-examine Laschober. Similarly, Hawley contends that his right to confrontation was violated because Laschober's statement that Tim [19] was her source was admitted without providing him an opportunity to cross-examine Laschober. As discussed above, these statements may be admissible despite the hearsay rule because they are statements made by a co-defendant during the course of and in furtherance of a joint undertaking. [20] Nevertheless, we must decide whether the introduction of these statements violated the appellants' right to confrontation. The right to confrontation in all criminal matters is guaranteed to the accused by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. [21] This right is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, [22] and is also guaranteed by article I, section 11, of the Alaska Constitution. [23] The right to confrontation generally serves to give a defendant charged with crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him [24] and to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that `the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.' [25] Commentators have described the right as beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. [26] In Amidon v. State, 565 P.2d 1248 (Alaska 1977), there is some indication that if a statement falls within the exception to the hearsay rule, a defendant's right to confrontation is automatically satisfied. Under the facts presented in Amidon, where the out-of-court statement of the co-defendant was obviously false, there could not have been a violation of the right to confrontation, therefore it was unnecessary to explore the issue in depth. We believe that Amidon should be clarified, however, and hold today that evidence admissible under the joint undertaking exception to the hearsay rule does not automatically satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause. To satisfy the right to confrontation, a statement must have sufficient indicia of reliability. We adopt the test articulated by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 734-36 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090, 96 S.Ct. 883, 47 L.Ed.2d 101 (1976). Under the Snow test, the statements must bear an indicia of reliability such that the unavailability of the declarant for cross-examination [did not deprive] the jury of a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the extrajudicial declarations. Id. at 734. The Snow court, relying upon Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89, 91 S.Ct. 210, 219, 27 L.Ed.2d 213, 227 (1970) (plurality opinion), [27] set forth a number of factors which are indicative of reliability: (1) the declaration contained no assertion of a past fact, ... (2) the declarant had personal knowledge of the identity and role of participants in the crime; (3) the possibility that the declarant was relying upon faulty recollection was remote; and (4) the circumstances under which the statements were made did not provide reason to believe that the declarant had misrepresented the defendant's involvement in the crime. [28] Snow, 521 F.2d at 734 (footnote added). All four factors are applicable to this case. The two statements made by Laschober which the appellants contend violated their right to confrontation were: (1) Hawley's drugs were fronted to him, and (2) Tim was her source. Regarding the first factor, both these statements contained no express assertion of a past fact. Regarding the second factor, Laschober's personal knowledge of the identity and role of Poirier and Hawley is established by her actions in concert with them. Although she may not have known his identity, she knew Hawley's role and his necessity to the plan. Regarding the third factor, the possibility that Laschober was relying upon a faulty recollection was extremely remote since the statements concerned the sellers in the present transaction. Regarding the fourth factor, Laschober believed that the officers were potential customers, and she would have had little motivation to lie to them. [29] In short, we conclude that the statements were sufficiently reliable to satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause.