Opinion ID: 422034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alternative Substantial Gainful Activity

Text: 20 To rebut a prima facie case of disability, the Secretary must prove the existence of alternative substantial gainful activity in the national economy which the claimant is capable of performing. Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231 (2d Cir.1980). The Secretary's burden is twofold. First, he must show that the claimant's impairment is of a kind that still permits certain types of activity, such as lifting or walking, necessary for other occupations, and that the claimant's experience involves skills transferable to other work. Decker v. Harris, 647 F.2d 291, 294 (2d Cir.1981); see Ghazibayat v. Schweiker, 554 F.Supp. 1005, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.1983). Thus, the Secretary must establish that the claimant has both the physical and the vocational capability to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546 & .1561 (1982). The regulations define physical ability in terms of residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (1982). Vocational capability is assessed in light of the claimant's age, education and work experience, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1561 (1982), and involves an evaluation of the physical exertion the claimant is capable of and the vocational skills he possesses, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567-.1568 (1982). The Secretary must then prove the existence in the national economy of jobs suited to the claimant's physical and vocational capabilities. Decker v. Harris, 647 F.2d at 294. On this issue, the Secretary will usually rely on the testimony of a vocational expert. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e) (1982). 21 Dumas contends there is no substantial competent evidence to support the Secretary's finding that he retains despite his impairments the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work. In his view, the Secretary ignored his psychiatric problems and his testimony of the severe pain he continually suffers. We disagree. 22 The medical record substantially supports the Secretary's findings. Sedentary work 23 involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. 24 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (1982). The conditions that Dumas suffers are not in themselves disabling. He admittedly can perform the minimal motor functions necessary for sedentary work. He can sit, walk and stand, even if for only a limited span of time before the pain sets in, and he can apparently lift up to ten pounds. Cf. Ghazibayat v. Schweiker, 554 F.Supp. 1005, 1010 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (claimant could not sit for over five minutes and could not work on small objects on a table before him). Each of the three physicians who offered an opinion in this case concluded only that Dumas was unable to return to his prior employment with the Town of Brasher Falls. The evidence is that cold weather triggers the symptoms Dumas most often complains of--severe pain in the hands and feet--and contributes significantly to his anxiety. On the basis of the medical record, it is apparent that Dumas is capable of work not involving prolonged standing or walking or exposure to cold weather. Cf. Carroll v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 705 F.2d 638, 640, 643 (2d Cir.1983) (Secretary offered no evidence to rebut physician's conclusion that claimant had only a limited ability to stand or walk for any period of time). 25 Yet Dumas maintains that persistent severe pain renders him incapable of performing any substantial gainful employment and he complains that the Secretary's findings to the contrary are not supported by substantial evidence. Dumas undoubtedly lives with pain. The medical record is replete with references to his complaints of headaches due to hypertension. [S]ubjective pain may serve as the basis for establishing disability, even if such pain is unaccompanied by positive clinical findings or other 'objective' medical evidence, Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 107, 111-12 (2d Cir.1981) (quoting Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir.1979)); see Meyer v. Schweiker, 549 F.Supp. 1242, 1246 (W.D.N.Y.1982), as long as the pain results from a physical or mental impairment as defined by section 223(d)(3) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (1976); see Gallagher v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 82, 84-85 (2d Cir.1983). 3 But, disability requires more than mere inability to work without pain. To be disabling, pain must be so severe, by itself or in conjunction with other impairments, as to preclude any substantial gainful employment. Otherwise, eligibility for disability benefits would take on new meaning. The severity of pain is a subjective measure--difficult to prove, yet equally difficult to disprove. We must not constrain the Secretary's ability to evaluate the credibility of subjective complaints of pain, particularly where, as here, those complaints were not part of claimant's prima facie case. Cf. Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d at 110-11 (physician's conclusion as to disability rested in part upon pain resulting from severe back injury). There is abundant evidence in the record that Dumas suffered headaches. Yet, despite intensive medical surveillance over the past six years, there is no mention in the record of disabling headaches. Although Dumas now testifies to severe debilitating pain, the Secretary found that his complaints were not sufficiently credible alone or in conjunction with other evidence to support a finding of disability. Thus, the question is whether the Secretary's findings with respect to subjective complaints of pain are supported by substantial evidence. 26 Dumas was hospitalized in 1976 complaining of severe headaches and was diagnosed as suffering from severe hypertension. When admitted, his blood pressure measured 240/140. Since his hospitalization, however, his blood pressure has not reached such astronomical levels. In June 1979, Dr. Hehir of the Veterans Administration noted that Dumas' hypertension and diabetes have been fairly well controlled. Although Dumas now complains of severe debilitating headaches, headaches did not factor significantly into any of the medical opinions concluding that Dumas was unable to return to his prior employment, including the opinion of Dr. Benardot who had treated Dumas for almost fourteen years. 27 Veterans Administration records of periodic examinations of Dumas during the years 1977 through 1981 suggest that his present complaints of pain are exaggerated. Although Dumas complained of headaches during every examination, he was usually more concerned about his other symptoms: on November 9, 1978, his prime concern was his hands and feet; on May 10, 1979, he only verbalize[d] concern for hands and feet; on June 21, 1979, his prime concern [was] burning in hands and feet; on April 2, 1980, his major complaint was burning and numbness hands to wrists and feet; and, again on April 2, the examiner noted that Dumas' major concern [was] that [Social Security] Disability doesnot [sic] agree with his personal evaluation of work incapacity. At no point in the medical record are his headaches described in such severe terms as he now employs. Indeed, he twice described his headaches as only infrequent. Supp. Administrative Tr. at 286, 295. Moreover, there is evidence in the record that Bufferin helped to relieve the pain. Supp. Administrative Tr. at 293-94. 28 The medical record reflects great concern among examining physicians over Dumas' hypertension and diabetes which they felt could cause major complications. However, the physicians were frustrated by Dumas' unwillingness to help himself. Of course, a remediable impairment is not disabling. Ghazibayat v. Schweiker, 554 F.Supp. 1005, 1011 (S.D.N.Y.1983); cf. Coleman v. Califano, 462 F.Supp. 77, 81 (N.D.N.Y.1978) (failure to heed doctor's diet recommendation); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530 (1982). A consistent concern of the physicians was that obesity aggravated all of the symptoms reported by Dumas. On many occasions, the physicians noted that diet would help Dumas' hypertension and, as a result, his headaches. See, e.g., Supp. Administrative Tr. at 293 (June 2, 1977), 294 (June 9, 1977), 295 (August 18, 1977), 286 (February 2, 1978), 283 (March 16, 1978), 279 (November 9, 1978), 275 (April 2, 1980). When examined on May 13, 1981, his weight remained the same as it had been when measured on June 9, 1977, that is, 220 pounds. Administrative Tr. at 90, Supp. Administrative Tr. at 253. 29 The question for our review is not whether the evidence preponderates in the Secretary's favor. Congress has instructed us that the factual findings of the Secretary, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir.1982). In this case the Secretary's findings are well supported. The Recommended Decision of the ALJ, as adopted by the Secretary, reflects a complete and detailed recitation of the medical records and reports spanning the years 1976 through 1981; absent from the record is any indication of the severity of Dumas' pain. See id. at 63 (report contained no objective findings to explain the headaches or to justify a claim of disability resulting from them); Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir.1981). The Secretary is entitled to rely not only on what the record says, but also on what it does not say. Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d at 63; Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir.1982) (per curiam). What the record does say is that severe medically determinable problems prevent Dumas from work that involves prolonged standing or walking or prolonged exposure to cold weather. Conspicuously absent from the record is any indication that Dumas continually suffered, prior to now, from headaches so devastating as to render him unable to work. The Secretary is entitled to rely on the medical record and his evaluation of claimant's credibility in determining whether claimant suffers from disabling pain. Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d at 63; Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir.1979). Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Dumas retains the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work. See Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d at 469; Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d at 124. 30 Dumas also contends that the Secretary failed to sustain his burden of proving the existence of alternative jobs in the national economy that Dumas is capable of performing. At the third hearing before the ALJ, a vocational expert testified that Dumas had acquired skills in his prior employment that were transferable to the job of time clerk, a sedentary position which exists in great numbers in the national economy. He responded affirmatively to the ALJ's question whether [a]n individual with Mr. Dumas's vocational background, and considering his age and his education, and assume that he could only do sedentary work, could he do those jobs[?] Supp. Administrative Tr. at 213. 31 Dumas attacks the hypothetical posed by the ALJ because the vocational expert was asked to assume that Dumas was capable of sedentary work. He relies on Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.1981), to support his argument that a vocational expert's testimony is only useful if it addresses whether the particular claimant, with his limitations and capabilities, can realistically perform a particular job. Id. at 114. His reliance is misplaced. Aubeuf and other decisions critical of hypotheticals that ask a vocational expert to assume a particular physical capability on the part of the claimant all address situations where there was no evidence to support the assumption underlying the hypothetical. See Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d at 114 (The hypothetical question ... incorporated the ALJ's conclusion with respect to pain which we have found to be based on an erroneous standard, and did not adequately account for Mr. Aubeuf's actual limitations.); Gilliam v. Califano, 620 F.2d 691, 693 (8th Cir.1980) (The only evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that Gilliam could engage in substantial gainful activity is the testimony of the vocational expert.); Meyer v. Schweiker, 549 F.Supp. 1242, 1248 (W.D.N.Y.1982) (response to hypothetical which assumed that claimant's impairments were not severe is irrelevant where vocational expert had testified that someone with [claimant's] impairments could not perform any alternate work); Brittingham v. Weinberger, 408 F.Supp. 606, 614 (E.D.Pa.1976) (vocational expert's opinion meaningless [u]nless there is record evidence to adequately support ... assumption upon which opinion is based). As discussed earlier, there is substantial record evidence to support the assumption upon which the vocational expert based his opinion. 4 Consequently, his opinion that Dumas had acquired skills in prior work that were transferable to sedentary jobs abundant in the national economy satisfied the Secretary's burden of showing the existence of alternative substantial gainful employment suited to Dumas' physical and vocational capabilities. 32 Affirmed.