Opinion ID: 2827101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denial of Lanier’s Motion to Suppress

Text: Lanier argues that his convictions must be vacated because the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained after his detention, including his confession. Specifically, Lanier argues that he was detained without reasonable suspicion. In reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress, “[w]e consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed at the district court and review factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Young, 707 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). A factual finding is clearly erroneous only where “although there may be evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2010)). We review legal determinations de novo. United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). At a hearing on Lanier’s motion, Officer Joshua Baker testified that he was responding to a report of a speeding car when he encountered Lanier on March 10, 2011. Baker approached Lanier without lights, sirens, or backup, asked for Lanier’s identification, and asked whether Lanier had seen a speeding vehicle in the area. Lanier provided false identifying information to the officer and was arrested for doing so. Lanier presented an alternative account of events, but the district court did not credit his testimony. The district court reasoned as follows: - 21 - No. 13-5703, USA v. Lanier Based on proof, the Court finds that the Defendant was not subject to a Terry stop. Here, Baker was in the area to investigate a speeding vehicle. The Defendant conceded that vehicles drive through yards on this street to connect to another street. When Officer Baker first approached the Defendant, Baker was on the street inquiring whether Defendant observed the speeding vehicle. While on the street, Baker inquired about the Defendant’s identity. Given the high crime area, Baker’s inquiry about the Defendant’s identity was reasonable, as conceded by Hempel, the defense investigator. Baker approached and arrested the Defendant only after the Defendant provided Baker a false name and social security number of a female. The Defendant testified that he provided false information to Baker about his identity. Officer Baker determined that the Defendant had committed criminal impersonation. At that point, Baker had probable cause to arrest the Defendant, prohibit the Defendant leaving the area, and approach the Defendant to place him under arrest. . . . The Court evaluates Officer Baker’s objective behavior upon approaching the Defendant. Here, Officer Baker was alone and had not asked for back-up; did not activate his emergency lights or siren; did not draw his weapon, did not use mandatory language to suggest that the Defendant was compelled to provide identifying information; did not require the Defendant to exit his vehicle or remain present; and did not ask the Defendant to accompany him anywhere for further questioning. Thus, as in Campbell, the Defendant could have refused to provide the information and could have returned to his residence or departed. The district court found that Baker merely inquired into Lanier’s identity and did not issue any commands to Lanier or require him to remain present. Lanier does not explain how these factual findings are clearly erroneous. We have held that “law enforcement officers may approach an individual and ask general questions without having any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, so long as the officers refrain from the type of intimidating behavior that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the person was not free to leave.” United States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 603 (6th Cir. 2000). Lanier notes that the vehicle in which he was sitting was parked in his own driveway and that the car did not match the description of the car Baker was looking for. However, Baker’s testimony demonstrates that his initial - 22 - No. 13-5703, USA v. Lanier encounter with Lanier was non-confrontational, uncoerced, and consensual. As such, Baker’s initial approach and question regarding whether Lanier had seen the speeding vehicle was within the ambit of consensual encounters that may be initiated without reasonable suspicion. Baker’s actions, including his request for Lanier’s identification, did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002) (holding that bus passengers were not seized when, as part of a drug and weapons interdiction effort, plain-clothes police officers boarded the bus and began asking passengers questions). For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying Lanier’s motion to suppress.