Opinion ID: 2320373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion to Dismiss the Information

Text: The state also argued that because the Family Court justice committed an error of law in finding that defendant's child support obligations ceased automatically upon the termination of his parental rights, the judgment dismissing the criminal information should be vacated, and the criminal information should be reinstated. In assessing the motion to dismiss, the Family Court justice was required to determine whether the information and exhibits appended to it    demonstrate[d] the existence of probable cause to believe that the offense charged ha[d] been committed [and] that the defendant committed it. Section 12-12-1.7; Super.R.Crim.P. 9.1. In this case, the criminal information charged defendant with violating § 11-2-1.1(b)(1), which provides that every person who is under court order to pay child support, who has incurred arrearage of past-due child support in the amount of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), and having the means to do so, who willfully fails to pay one or more installments of childsupport    is guilty of a felony. Here, the Family Court justice found that [a]t the time of the defendant's voluntary relinquishment of his parental rights, his outstanding child support arrearage was Nine Thousand Three Hundred and Three ($9,303.00) dollars. Because the justice determined that defendant's child support obligations ended when his parental rights were terminated in November 1994, the justice concluded that the Attorney General has failed to satisfy this court in establishing a prima facie case under R.I.Gen. Laws § 11-2-1.1, but the court made no findings on the remaining elements of the statute. Given our determination that defendant's child support obligations remained, notwithstanding the termination of his parental rights, it appears from the record that defendant's arrearage exceeded the statutory threshold of $30,000 at the time the Family Court dismissed the information. We therefore vacate the dismissal of the criminal information and remand this case to the Family Court for a hearing to determine, inter alia, whether the information and any attached exhibits demonstrated probable cause to believe that defendant, having the means to do so, willfully fail[ed] to make the court-ordered child support payments. Section 11-2-1.1(b)(1). In their briefs to this Court, both the defendant and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), as amicus curiae, noted that CSE has, in the past, discontinued child support arrearage and/or obligations upon termination of parental rights. The defendant and the ACLU contended that holding the defendant liable for support in this case, in light of CSE's past practice, would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendant also claimed that because of this practice, he could not possibly know or reasonably believe that his cessation of support payments aft er his parental rights were terminated was a crime. To support his position, the defendant cited State v. Fonseca, 670 A.2d 1237 (R.I.1996), in which this Court set forth the standard for determining whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague: The standard employed to gauge whether a particular statutory term reasonably informs an individual of the criminality of his conduct is whether the disputed verbiage provides adequate warning to a person of ordinary intelligence that his conduct is illegal by common understanding and practice. Id. at 1239 (quoting State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42, 45, 385 A.2d 642, 644 (1978)). Having rested his decision on a determination that a termination of parental rights under chapter 7 of title 15 automatically terminated the defendant's support obligations, the Family Court justice did not reach these issues. Because these questions involve inherently factual matters, we remand the case to the Family Court for a hearing to ascertain whether the action against the defendant represented a selective prosecution of his alleged violation of § 11-2-1.1(b)(1).