Opinion ID: 1182285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: A tenant may raise a landlord's breach of an implied warranty of habitability as a defense in an unlawful detainer proceeding.

Text: (4a) The landlord in a companion case (see fn. 2) contends, however, that even if we should uphold such a warranty, we could never permit a tenant to raise a landlord's breach of it in an unlawful detainer action. Relying initially on the fact that the Hinson decision itself involved a declaratory judgment action and not an unlawful detainer action, the landlord maintains that the trial court's refusal to permit the defense of a warranty of habitability in the instant case fully conforms with Hinson. We cannot agree. In the first place, nothing in the Hinson decision supports such a distinction. Although the issue in Hinson arose in a declaratory judgment context, as we discuss below the decision itself endorses procedural protections which were specifically designed for unlawful detainer proceedings. (See infra, at pp. 636-637.) Moreover, a number of the out-of-state decisions on which the Hinson court based its opinion explicitly applied this warranty of habitability doctrine in an unlawful detainer context. (See Marini v. Ireland (1970) 56 N.J. 130 [265 A.2d 526, 40 A.L.R.3d 1356]; Javins v. First National Realty Corporation (1970) 428 F.2d 1071 [138 App. D.C. 369]; see also Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little (1972) 50 Ill.2d 351 [280 N.E.2d 208]; Rome v. Walker (1972) 38 Mich. App. 458 [196 N.W.2d 850].) Second, and more fundamentally, we have concluded that even apart from the Hinson decision, no legal doctrine bars a tenant from raising such a critical defense in an unlawful detainer action. We note initially that absolutely nothing in the statutory provisions governing unlawful detainer proceedings prohibits the assertion of any defense. [16] The landlord contends, however, that to preserve the summary nature of the procedure, California courts have in the past limited the matters which may be raised by a defendant in an unlawful detainer action, and that these judicially created limits foreclose the tenant from utilizing a breach of warranty defense. The doctrine invoked by the landlord was most recently analyzed by our court in Knowles v. Robinson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 620, 625 [36 Cal. Rptr. 33, 387 P.2d 833]. In Knowles we explained: [W]here an objection is interposed in an action for unlawful detainer, no cross-complaint or counterclaim may survive. The remedy of unlawful detainer is designed to provide means by which the timely possession of premises which are wrongfully withheld may be secured to the person entitled thereto. The summary character of the action would be defeated if, by cross-complaint or counterclaim, issues irrelevant to the right of immediate possession could be introduced. (Italics added.) The court in Lakeside Park Assn. v. Keithly (1941) 43 Cal. App.2d 418, 422 [110 P.2d 1055], similarly observed that: The reason for this rule is that the statute provides for the action of unlawful detainer as a summary proceeding, ... and that the injecting of other issues extrinsic to the right of possession may defeat the very purpose of the statute. (Italics added.) (5) The basic teaching of Knowles, Lakeside, and the entire line of cases these decisions reflect, [17] is that a defense normally permitted because it arises out of the subject matter of the original suit is generally excluded in an unlawful detainer action if such defense is extrinsic to the narrow issue of possession, which the unlawful detainer procedure seeks speedily to resolve. [18] Neither Knowles, Lakeside nor any other California decision, however, prohibits a tenant from interposing a defense which does directly relate to the issue of possession and which, if established, would result in the tenant's retention of the premises. [19] The thrust of the Knowles' line of cases is basically to prevent tenants from frustrating the summary statutory remedy through introduction of extraneous matter; the decisions accomplish this objective by confining the unlawful detainer action to issues directly relevant to the ultimate question of possession. (4b) The crucial issue in this case thus becomes whether a landlord's breach of a warranty of habitability directly relates to the issue of possession. Holding that such breach was irrelevant to the question of possession, early California cases refused to permit a defense that the landlord had breached a covenant to repair premises. (See, e.g., Arnold v. Krigbaum (1915) 169 Cal. 143, 145 [146 P. 423]; Frasier v. Witt (1923) 62 Cal. App. 309, 315 [217 P. 114].) These decisions, however, rested primarily upon the ancient property doctrine of independent covenants, under which a tenant's obligation to pay rent was viewed as a continuing obligation which was not excused by the landlord's failure to fulfill any covenant of repair he may have assumed. As indicated earlier in this opinion, the entire foundation of the independent covenants doctrine rested on the central role played by land in the lease transaction of the Middle Ages; the doctrine simply reflected the fact that in those early times covenants regarding the maintenance of buildings were generally incidental to the furnishing of land, and did not go to the root of the consideration for the lease. In that setting, a landlord's breach of such an incidental covenant to repair was reasonably considered insufficient to justify the tenant's refusal to pay rent, the tenant's main obligation under the lease. [20] The transformation which the residential lease has undergone since the Middle Ages, however, has completely eroded the underpinnings of the independent covenant rule. Today the habitability of the dwelling unit has become the very essence of the residential lease; the landlord can as materially frustrate the purpose of such a lease by permitting the premises to become uninhabitable as by withdrawing the use of a portion of the premises. (See fn. 20, supra. ) Thus, in keeping with the contemporary trend to analyze urban residential leases under modern contractual principles, we now conclude that the tenant's duty to pay rent is mutually dependent upon the landlord's fulfillment of his implied warranty of habitability. (See Medico-Dental etc. Co. v. Horton & Converse (1942) 21 Cal.2d 411, 419-421 [132 P.2d 457].) [21] Such was essentially the holding of the Court of Appeal in Hinson v. Delis (26 Cal. App.3d at p. 71) as well as a number of the out-of-state cases which have recently adopted the implied warranty of habitability rule. (See pp. 631, 632, ante. ) As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated most recently: The old common law treatment of the lease as a property conveyance and the independent covenants rule which stems from this treatment have outlived their usefulness. ( Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway (1973) ___ Mass. ___ [293 N.E.2d 831, 841].) Once we recognize that the tenant's obligation to pay rent and the landlord's warranty of habitability are mutually dependent, it becomes clear that the landlord's breach of such warranty may be directly relevant to the issue of possession. If the tenant can prove such a breach by the landlord, he may demonstrate that his nonpayment of rent was justified and that no rent is in fact due and owing to the landlord. Under such circumstances, of course, the landlord would not be entitled to possession of the premises. (See Skaggs v. Emerson (1875) 50 Cal. 3, 6; Giraud v. Milovich (1938) 29 Cal. App.2d 543, 547-549 [85 P.2d 182].) The landlord contends, however, that the recognition of such a defense will completely undermine the speedy procedure contemplated for unlawful detainer actions. In the first place, however, while the state does have a significant interest in preserving a speedy repossession remedy, that interest cannot justify the exclusion of matters which are essential to a just resolution of the question of possession at issue. As the Court of Appeal observed in Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson (1962) 204 Cal. App.2d 242, 249 [22 Cal. Rptr. 309]: Certainly the interest in preserving the summary nature of an action cannot outweigh the interest of doing substantial justice. To hold the preservation of the summary proceeding of paramount importance would be analogous to the `tail wagging the dog.' Second, we believe the landlord's contention greatly exaggerates the detrimental effect of the recognition of this defense on the summary unlawful detainer procedure. As illustrated by the numerous California precedents cited and discussed above (see fn. 19), defendants in unlawful detainer actions have long been permitted to raise those affirmative defenses  both legal and equitable  that are directly relevant to the issue of possession; over the years, the unlawful detainer action has remained an efficient, summary procedure. We see no reason why the availability of a warranty of habitability defense should frustrate the summary procedure when the availability of these other defenses has not. Indeed, the landlord's dire forecast fades in the light of the host of recent out-of-state decisions which, in adopting a warranty of habitability, have explicitly permitted the issue to be raised in summary dispossession proceedings. (See p. 631, ante. ) In addition, several model landlord-tenant codes, recently drafted under the auspices of highly regarded legal bodies, have also recommended the recognition of this defense in such summary actions. (See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (1972) § 4.105; American Bar Foundation, Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code (Tent. Draft 1970) §§ 2-203(1), 3-210.) As these authorities recognize, this development accords with [t]he salutary trend toward determination of the rights and liabilities of litigants in one, rather than multiple proceedings.... ( Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little (1972) 50 Ill.2d 351 [280 N.E.2d 208, 213].) Moreover, as the Hinson court indicated, sound procedural safeguards suffice to protect the landlord's economic interests without depriving the tenant of a meaningful opportunity to raise the breach of warranty issue. The Hinson court, elaborating on a procedural mechanism suggested by the Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia in the Javins opinion (428 F.2d at p. 1083, fn. 67), stated: If the tenant claims that all or a part of rent is not due because of defects in the premises, the trial court may, during the pendency of the action and at the request of either party, require the tenant to make the rental payments at the contract rate into court as they become due for as long as the tenant remains in possession. At the trial of the action the court can then determine how the rent paid into court should be distributed. (26 Cal. App.3d at p. 71.) Such a procedure can serve as a fair means of protection of landlords from potential abuses of the proposed warranty of habitability defense. (See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (1972) § 4.105.)