Opinion ID: 1846577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying denton a divorce on the ground of adultery.

Text: ¶ 39. Finally, Denton argues that he proved that Michelle committed adultery and he should have been granted a divorce on that ground because it was the adultery that was the true cause of the marriage ending. ¶ 40. In Sproles v. Sproles, 782 So.2d 742, 746 (Miss.2001), this Court was presented with a similar issue. There, the chancellor granted the wife a divorce on the grounds of habitual drunkenness and habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment instead of granting the husband a divorce on the ground of adultery even though he proved that ground. The Court specifically found that [t]here is ample proof that it was Thomas's conduct that caused the dissolution of the marriage and that Teresa was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment and habitual drunkenness. Id. at 747. ¶ 41. The chancellor followed this theory of law as reflected in his opinion citing Garriga v. Garriga, 770 So.2d 978 (Miss.Ct.App.2000)(holding that there can only be one divorce granted and the chancellor must determine which of the parties will be granted the divorce by determining which party's conduct was the cause of the deterioration of the marital relationship). The chancellor went on to find that both parties had proved a ground for divorce, but that Denton's prescription drug problem and resulting behavior is what led to the decline of the marriage, not Michelle's adultery which occurred after the separation. ¶ 42. On this record, we find that the chancellor did not commit reversible error in granting Michelle a divorce on the ground of habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment.