Opinion ID: 618586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Employer Directive to Violate the Law

Text: B. Braun argues that the district court erred in denying its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law with regard to B. Braun's claim that Morrison failed to prove that B. Braun directed her to violate the law. B. Braun argues that a claim of wrongful discharge requires proof of an employer directive to violate the law. We find that B. Braun's proposed definition of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is an inaccurate statement of the law. Michigan's general rule regarding termination of an at-will employee is that either party may terminate the employment contract at any time for any or no reason; however, courts recognize an exception to this rule when the grounds for termination violate public policy. See Suchodolski v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710, 711 (1982). The courts have implied a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of Michigan's public policy where the alleged reason for the discharge of the employee was the failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment. Id.; see also Humenny v. Genex Corp., 390 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir.2004) (An at-will employee's discharge violates public policy if the employee is discharged (1) in violation of an `explicit legislative statement [ ] prohibiting the discharge, discipline, or other adverse treatment of employees who act in accordance with a statutory right or duty,' (2) for `failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment,' or (3) for the `exercise of a right conferred by a well-established legislative enactment.') (quoting Suchodolski, 316 N.W.2d at 711-12); Pratt v. Brown Mach. Co., 855 F.2d 1225, 1236 (6th Cir.1988) (citing Suchodolski, 316 N.W.2d at 711). Courts applying Michigan law have consistently defined the wrongful discharge tort at issue here as an employer's termination of an employee because of the employee's failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment. Humenny, 390 F.3d at 907; Suchodolski, 316 N.W.2d at 711; Silberstein v. Pro-Golf of Am., Inc., 278 Mich.App. 446, 750 N.W.2d 615, 621 (2008). No Michigan court has defined this cause of action to require a plaintiff to show that the employer directed him or her to violate the law. B. Braun points to the decision in Pratt, where this Court found that a plaintiff's evidence of his refusal to comply with his employer's request that he drop a criminal investigation was sufficient to prove that he refused to violate the law. Pratt, 855 F.2d at 1237. The language in Pratt does not demonstrate the existence of an additional element of the wrongful discharge tort, but instead reflects that the plaintiff in Pratt presented evidence of his employer's request that he violate the law in order to prove his own refusal to do so. While this Court looked to the evidence of the employer's request in Pratt to determine that the plaintiff refused to violate the law, we agree with the district court that a wrongful discharge claim does not depend upon a showing of a directive or request by the employer. We affirm the district court's judgment with regard to this claim. B. Braun also argues that the district court erred in refusing to give B. Braun's requested jury instruction requiring Morrison to show that B. Braun directed her to violate the law. This Court reviews a district court's refusal to give a party's requested jury instructions under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Roth, 628 F.3d 827, 833 (6th Cir.2011). This Court may find that a district court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction was an abuse of discretion if: (1) the omitted instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2) the instruction is not substantially covered by other delivered charges; and (3) the failure to give the instruction impairs the requesting party's theory of the case. Tuttle v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 322 (6th Cir.2007) (citing Williams v. Eau Claire Pub. Sch., 397 F.3d 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005)). As determined above, B. Braun's requested jury instruction is not a correct statement of the law. Accordingly, we find that the district court's refusal to give B. Braun's jury instruction was not reversible error.