Opinion ID: 1849833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Briant's Loss of Ownership

Text: Nevertheless, we find that plaintiffs cannot prevail, for reasons not reached by the courts below. In 1873, the land in dispute was adjudicated to the state for failure to pay taxes. The name of L. P. Briant appears as the owner. In 1889 the land in dispute was again adjudicated to the state for failure to pay taxes. The name of James Owens appears as the owner. In 1891 the state conveyed the land to the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District. In 1896 the Levee District conveyed the land to Pierre Angelloz. Pierre Angelloz conveyed to Arthur Angelloz in 1899, who conveyed to James and Alcide Owens in 1902. Defendants claim through the Owens. Plaintiffs present two positions, arguing alternatively that the property either never left the patrimony of Briant or, if it did leave Briant's patrimony, that it was returned by operation of law. In arguing that the property never left Briant's patrimony, plaintiffs contend that because part of the land sold in the St. Martin parish tax adjudication is located in Iberia parish the tax adjudication of 1872 is an absolute nullity. This argument ignores Article 10, section 11 of the (See Art. 7, sec. 25(C) La.Const.1974) Constitution of 1921: No sale of property for taxes shall be set aside for any cause, except on proof of payment of the taxes for which the property was sold prior to the date of the sale, unless the proceeding to annul is instituted within six months from service of notice of sale, which notice shall not be served until the time of redemption shall have expired and within five years from the date of the recordation of the tax deed, if no notice is given. In King v. Moresi, 223 La. 54 (1953), 64 So.2d 841, we held: This constitutional peremption applies to all tax sales except those specifically excepted therein and those where the tax debtor remains in corporeal possession of the premises. The language used is very broad. This constitutional provision announces the public policy of this State to set at rest tax titles once and for all. 64 So.2d at 842. There is no evidence in the record before us to indicate that the taxes had been paid, nor did the tax debtor remain in corporeal possession of the property. The five year peremption period having long since passed, plaintiffs cannot now attack the validity of the tax adjudication on this basis. Plaintiffs' argument that the property never left Briant's patrimony is wholly without merit. In arguing alternatively that if the land left Briant's patrimony it was returned by operation of law, plaintiffs contend that, though the land was adjudicated from Briant to the state, it was returned by the operation of Article 10, section 20 of the Constitution of 1921: § 20. Tax Forfeitures prior to 1880; annulment Section 20. Whenever any immovable property shall have been forfeited or adjudicated to the State for the non-payment of taxes due prior to January 1st, 1880, and the State shall not have sold or disposed of same, nor dispossessed the tax debtor, or his heirs, successors or assigns, prior to the adoption of this Constitution, it shall be conclusively presumed, that such forfeiture or adjudication was irregular and null, or that the property has been redeemed; and the State, and its assigns subsequent hereto, shall forever be estopped from setting up any title to such property by virtue of such forfeiture or adjudication; provided, that for a period of three years from the adoption of this Constitution the State shall have the right to enforce the payment of any unpaid taxes for the non-payment of which the property was forfeited to the State. It is clear from this provision that in order to prevail plaintiffs must take the position that the state has not sold or disposed of the property. The record shows otherwise. Act 97 of 1890 conveyed the lands to the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District and directed the auditor and the registrar of lands to issue conveyances; this land was so conveyed (by the auditor) December 29, 1891. It is contended that the conveyance from the Levee Board to Pierre Angelloz was a mere quit-claim and that the Levee Board had no rights in the property. The act of transfer contains the words quitclaim in the heading; the language within the act is as follows: Be it Known: That for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred & Two Dollars and Ninety Nine Cents, ($102.99/100) lawful money of the United States of America paid, and receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Board of Commissioners for the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District acting through its President does by these presents transfer, convey and quit claim unto Pierre Angelloz all the rights, titles and privileges acquired by the said Board from the State of Louisiana. . . Even if this instrument is a quit-claim, we find that it effectively conveyed to Angelloz the ownership of the land, because the Levee Board was the owner. A quitclaim deed conveys whatever title the grantor owned. Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 35 So.2d 225 (1947). Plaintiffs take the position that, for two separate reasons, the Levee Board did not own the property conveyed to Pierre Angelloz. First, they argue that the donation from the state to the Levee Board transferred only rights obtained by the state in the 1889 tax adjudication, which plaintiffs contend is an absolute nullity, and not rights the state obtained in the 1873 tax adjudication. We need not decide whether the 1889 tax adjudication is a nullity because we find that the state conveyed to the Levee Basin all rights in the property regardless of how or when the state acquired them. By act 97 of 1890, the legislature provided for the donation of transfer to the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District all lands then belonging to the State within the limits of the Levee District. The conveyance by the auditor to the Levee District reads as follows: I, O. B. Steele, Auditor of Public Accounts, under and by virtue of the authority in me vested by Act 97 of 189-Section 11, do hereby transfer and convey to the Board of Commission of the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, all right, title and interest of the State of Louisiana, in and to the lands situated in the Parish of St. Martin and embraced within the limits of said Levee District which said lands have been adjudicated to the State for unpaid taxes of 1880 and subsequent years and not redeemed within the time prescribed by law. Said lands being more fully described in the list (attached hereto and made a part hereof. In evidence, whereof I have hereto set my signature and seal of office on the day and date first above written. Signed O. B. STEEL AUDITOR (SEAL) This language clearly transfers all right, title and interest of the State of Louisiana. The clause referring to the unpaid taxes of 1880 and subsequent years does not limit the conveyance to those lands the titles to which were acquired for taxes subsequent to 1880. Act 97 of 1890 did not limit the conveyance. As the deed expresses, the lands conveyed were more fully described in the attached list, which described the property involved here. The reference to lands described for taxes after 1880 might accurately describe some parcels, but did not limit the conveyance to certain titles of land described particularly in attached list. Thus the state transferred all of its rights regardless of when they were acquired; the state acquired ownership of this land in the tax adjudication of 1873. Next, plaintiffs argue that the conveyance to the levee district was invalid because the act authorizing such donations was violated. Section 11 of act 97 of 1890, argue plaintiffs, required conveyances to the levee district to be signed by both auditor and register of the state land office. Plaintiffs take the position that the conveyance here involved is invalid because it was signed only by the auditor. However, as defendants point out, this defect is cured by act 316 of 1926: Section 1. Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana, That all deeds of transfer heretofore made by either the Auditor or Register of the State Land Office of this State to the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, . . . . . . under the various Acts creating said Levee Districts, or other acts of the General Assembly of Louisiana, by which lands were granted to said districts, be and the same are hereby ratified, quieted and confirmed, the same as if all such deeds had been signed by both the Auditor and Register of the State Land Office of this State, provided this Act shall in no way affect the legal rights of persons claiming any parts of said lands under, and by virtue of Patents acquired from the State of Louisiana. Plaintiffs' only response is that act 237 of 1924 had the effect of repealing act 97 of 1890 and therefore that the 1926 act could no longer cure the failure to comply with act 97 of 1890. Plaintiffs cite State v. Grace, 187 La. 1028 (1936), 175 So. 656. Act 237 of 1924 had the effect of allowing public bidding on land forfeited to the state. The court in State v. Grace, supra , merely held that such land could no longer be directly donated to the Atchafalaya Basin Levee Board inasmuch as public bidding was required. The act did not purport to affect transactions completed previous to its effective date. This was recognized by the court in Grace: The Act of 1924 will not destroy rights which have accrued to persons under previous enactments nor will it have effect on land held by the State within the various Levee Districts. The only effect the Act of 1924 can possibly have would be the disposition of property owned by the State and not reserved to one of the various Levee Districts. Thus, plaintiffs' argument that the property returned by operation of law to Briant's patrimony is wholly without merit. Since they have no title, plaintiffs cannot prevail. The judgments of the court of appeal and district court are affirmed at plaintiffs' cost.