Opinion ID: 172792
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invalidity of warrant due to Rector's acting outside his statutory jurisdiction

Text: At all times relevant to Bowling's claims against him, Rector was commissioned by the OSBI as a Special Officer known as a Ranger. (App. at 468, 469-71.) Pursuant to Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 150.13, this commission authorized Rector to enforce[]. . . the provisions of the Oklahoma Statutes relating to larceny of domestic animals, livestock or farm and ranch equipment or supplies. ( Id. at 468.) Oklahoma law provides that with respect to enforcement of those provisions of the Oklahoma Statutes, Special Rangers shall have the same authority as any other peace officer. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 150.13(A). In denying Rector's motion for qualified immunity on this claim, the district court assumed that Bowling's version of events was correct. Mindful that [i]t is not [our] job . . . to determine whether the record supports the district court's factual assumptions, Dixon, 553 F.3d at 1301, we ask, in our de novo review, simply whether Rector's alleged conduct in excess of his statutory authority violated Bowling's clearly established rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

We have made clear that [a] state-law violation does not . . . necessarily rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Gonzales, 535 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir.2008). Indeed, in our analysis of the constitutionality of Rector's alleged conduct, the question . . . is not whether the search was authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). Just as a search authorized by state law may be an unreasonable one under that amendment, so may a search not expressly authorized by state law be justified as a constitutionally reasonable one. Id. In short, while states may choose[] to protect individual privacy and dignity more than the Fourth Amendment requires, a state's restrictions on search and seizure do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections. Virginia v. Moore, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1606, 1607, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008); see also United States v. Sawyer, 441 F.3d 890, 899 (10th Cir.2006) (explaining that in the context of claims that violations of state law constitute violations of the Fourth Amendment, [t]he touchstone of our jurisprudence remains whether the conduct in question contravenes the federal constitution); United States v. Green, 178 F.3d 1099, 1105 (10th Cir.1999) (It is. . . well established in this circuit that . . . the test of reasonableness in relation to the Fourth Amendment . . . must be determined by Federal law even though the police actions are those of state police officers. (quotations omitted)). While state law thus is not determinative of the federal question of a Fourth Amendment violation, state law may or may not be relevant to the determination of the federal question. Sawyer, 441 F.3d at 899; see also United States v. Mikulski, 317 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir.2003) (`A police violation of state law does not establish a Fourth Amendment violation. However, the question of compliance with state law may well be relevant in determining whether police conduct was reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.') (quoting United States v. Baker, 16 F.3d 854, 856 n. 1 (8th Cir.1994) (in parenthetical)). We have explained that state law is most relevantand that it becomes highly determinative of Fourth Amendment questionsonly when the constitutional test [at issue] requires an examination of the [pertinent] state law or interests. Gonzales, 535 F.3d at 1182 (quotation omitted). Such constitutional tests include those for exigent circumstances justify[ing] a warrantless search and those for inventory searches, both of which involve a special incorporation of state law into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 1182-83 (quotation omitted). In this case, the federal test at issuethat for search and seizure pursuant to a warrantinvolves no such special incorporation of state law, id. at 1183, into the Fourth Amendment analysis. The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be issued only `upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Finding these words to be precise and clear, the Supreme Court has interpreted them to require only three things: First, warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested magistrates. Second, those seeking the warrant must demonstrate to the magistrate their probable cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction for a particular offense. Finally, warrants must particularly describe the things to be seized, as well as the place to be searched. Id. (citations, quotations omitted). We have explained that these requirements serve at least two distinct purposes: ensuring that no `intrusion in the way of search or seizure' occurs `without a careful prior determination of necessity,' and preventing the `specific evil [of] the general warrant abhorred by the colonists.' Cassady, 567 F.3d at 634-35 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). Because this constitutional test does not require[] an examination of . . . state law or interests, Gonzales, 535 F.3d at 1182, Rector's alleged violation of Oklahoma law is not, without more, significantly relevant to our Fourth Amendment analysis.
Bowling alleges that Rector exceeded his statutory authorityand thus acted outside his jurisdictionin seeking and executing the search warrant. We have not decided a Fourth Amendment case in which a limited-authority officer such as Rector acted outside his jurisdiction over particular subject matters under state law. However, we have held that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant obtained outside the requesting and executing officer's territorial jurisdiction does not constitute a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment. Green, 178 F.3d at 1106. Instead, we evaluate such a search by the well-established federal constitutional standards for evaluating the validity of search warrants. Id. We will conclude that Fourth Amendment requirements are satisfied where . . . officers obtain a warrant, grounded in probable cause and phrased with sufficient particularity, from a magistrate of the relevant jurisdiction authorizing them to search a particular location, even if those officers are acting outside their jurisdiction as defined by state law.  Id. (emphasis added, footnote omitted); see also Sawyer, 441 F.3d at 895 (applying federal test for determining validity of consent to search where Kansas police officers acted outside of their statutory jurisdiction and in violation of Oklahoma law in obtaining defendant's consent to search his business premises, and concluding that this inquiry [did] not require an analysis of the legal parameters of the Kansas Officers' jurisdictional authority under state law). The Supreme Court's recent decision in Virginia v. Moore reinforces this principle. In Moore, several Portsmouth, Virginia, police officers stopped and arrested David Lee Moore for the misdemeanor offense of driving with a suspended license. 128 S.Ct. at 1601. Under Virginia law, the officers were not authorized to arrest Moore for driving with a suspended license except under circumstances that did not apply in his case. Id. at 1602. State law dictated that the officers should have issued Moore a summons rather than arresting him. Id. When they searched Moore incident to this arrest made in excess of their statutory jurisdiction, the officers discovered crack cocaine and cash on his person, and he subsequently was charged with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Id. Reversing the Virginia Supreme Court, the Court held that regardless of the legality of the officers' conduct under state law, that conduct must be evaluated by Fourth Amendment standards for warrantless arrests and searches pursuant to such arrest. Id. at 1607-08. Because those standards dictate that warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and that officers may perform searches incident to constitutionally permissible arrests in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence, Moore's arrest in excess of the officers' statutory authority nonetheless passed Fourth Amendment muster. Id. at 1607. [T]he arrest rules that the officers violated were those of state law alone, and . . . it is not the province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law. Id. at 1608. While Green, Sawyer, and Moore are not precisely on point with the case before us, we think the principle articulated by those casesthat for Fourth Amendment purposes, the conduct of officers acting in excess of their statutory authority must be tested by traditional Fourth Amendment standardsapplies with equal force here. We thus agree with the approach of the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Freeman, 897 F.2d 346 (8th Cir.1990), a case with facts fairly similar to those alleged by Bowling. In Freeman, Thomas Ley, a special agent for the Missouri Department of Revenue, was authorized to investigate possible violations of state law related to automobile tampering, but was not statutorily designated a state peace officer. Id. at 346-47. Under the Missouri statutes, only peace officers and prosecuting attorneys may apply for search warrants. Id. at 347 n. 2 (citing Mo.Rev.Stat. § 542.276.1). Despite his lack of statutory authority to do so, Ley applied for a warrant to search certain premises, submitting a supporting affidavit establishing probable cause for the search. Id. The affidavit identified Ley as a special agent with the state Department of Revenue, but neither it nor the warrant application form informed the judge reviewing the application that Ley was not a peace officer empowered under state law to seek a search warrant. Id. On the basis of Ley's application and affidavit, the state judge issued a warrant directed to any peace officer in the state of Missouri. Id. With the assistance of a state police officer and a county deputy sheriff, Ley searched the named premises and seized evidence that he later identified on the official return and inventory he completed. Id. After a federal grand jury indicted Anthony Freeman based on the evidence seized in this search, Freeman moved to suppress on the ground that because Ley was not statutorily authorized to apply for or execute a search warrant, the search was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that the record as a whole demonstrates that no constitutional violation occurred [because] the affidavit supporting the search warrant provided probable cause to search and the search warrant described with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized. Id. at 350. The court characterized Ley's conduct in excess of his statutory jurisdiction as an example of procedural violations which do not implicate the constitutional values of probable cause or description with particularity of the place to be searched and items to be seized. Id. at 348. As the Supreme Court did in Moore and we did in Green and Sawyer, the Eighth Circuit thus tested by traditional Fourth Amendment standards the actions of an officer acting in excess of his statutory authority. Applying the reasoning of Moore, Green, Sawyer, and Freeman, we turn to an evaluation of Rector's conduct by well-established federal constitutional standards for evaluating the validity of search warrants, Green, 178 F.3d at 1106.
To be valid under the Fourth Amendment, the warrant to search Bowling's residence must meet three requirements: (1) it must have been issued by [a] neutral, disinterested magistrate[]; (2) those seeking the warrant must [have] demonstrate[d] to the magistrate their probable cause to believe that the evidence sought [would] aid in a particular apprehension or conviction for a particular offense; and (3) the warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized, as well as the place to be searched. Dalia, 441 U.S. at 255, 99 S.Ct. 1682 (citations, quotations omitted). As to the first requirement, the warrant was issued by Kay County, Oklahoma, district court judge D.W. Boyd. Nothing in the record indicates that Judge Boyd was other than a neutral and disinterested magistrate. As to the second requirement, Bowling argues that the warrant was invalid because Rector subjectively lacked probable cause to believe a crime had been committed that he could investigate. (App. at 207; see Aple. Br. at 17-20.) Yet the standard for probable cause is subjective only to the extent that the facts and circumstances within [the affiants'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (quotations omitted); see also Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404-05, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (quotation omitted). As specifically applied to searches, [p]robable cause exists when `there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.' United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95, 126 S.Ct. 1494, 164 L.Ed.2d 195 (2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). Here, Rector's affidavit included the following grounds for issuance of the Search Warrant: (1) His July 11, 2006, telephone call from Buss, in which Buss informed him that FEB customer Bowling had sold over 800 head of cattle that were valued at $750,000.00, and that the bank had a lien on those cattle but had not received any proceeds from their sale; (2) His review of FEB's documentation of its UCC and EFS filings establishing the bank's security interest in the cattle; (3) His conversation with Buss regarding FEB's inspections and inventories of Bowling's cattle, with those inspections and inventories showing that Bowling had owned 883 head of cattle in September of 2005 and that none of those remained in the fields where they previously had been pastured; (4) Buss's statement that during Bowling's deposition in the foreclosure litigation, Bowling had testified that he no longer had any of the cattle and he didn't have any of the proceeds from the sale of the cattle; and (5) Rector's examination of evidence showing that Bowling had, in 2004 and 2005, sold cattle in the names of his mother and his son, without remitting to FEB any of the proceeds from those sales. (6) Rector's experience in cattle theft cases leading him to believe that there would be large numbers of documents, large amounts of cash (or bank records showing large cash transactions), and computerized business records at Bowling's residence as a result of recent cattle sales. (App. at 149.) This information was sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a crime [5] had been committed, Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, and that there was a fair probability that evidence of that crime would be found in Bowling's residence, Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 95, 126 S.Ct. 1494. As to the third requirement, Bowling argues that the warrant was impermissibly overbroad in its description of what could be seized at his residence. We have held that the constitution compels the warrant's description of `the items to be seized with as much specificity as the government's knowledge and circumstances allow.' Cassady, 567 F.3d at 635 (quoting United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir.1988)). [W]arrants are conclusively invalidated by their substantial failure to specify as nearly as possible the distinguishing characteristics of the goods to be seized. Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the warrant specified that the executing peace officers had authority to seize [b]ank statements, bank records, drive in tickets and other documents related to the sale of cattle and cattle purchase/sale transactions, ledgers, and other records dealing with the purchase/sale of cattle. Computers, computer disks, computer hard drives and other related information storage devices. Receipts for the sale of cattle. Any papers, receipts, or other documents dealing with cattle. Large uncashed checks or large amounts of cash which could represent the proceeds from the sale of cattle Farmers Exchange Bank of Tonkawa had a lien on. (App. at 157.) The warrant further authorized a search for articles of personal property tending to establish the identity of the person or persons in control or possession of the place or vehicle at Bowling's residence. ( Id. ) That description satisfactorily identifies the distinguishing characteristics of the goods to be seized, Cassady, 567 F.3d at 635 (quotation omitted).
We conclude that the warrant was valid under the Fourth Amendment. Whether or not Rector's alleged conduct in seeking the warrant violated Oklahoma law, it did not violate Bowling's constitutional rights. Therefore, Bowling failed to meet the first part of the strict two-part test to overcome an assertion of qualified immunity, Cassady, 567 F.3d at 634, and Rector is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Consequently, as to Bowling's § 1983 claim that Rector violated his constitutional rights by obtaining a warrant outside the scope of Rector's lawful authority as a Special Ranger, we REVERSE the district court's denial of Rector's summary judgment motion.