Opinion ID: 1158101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether a New Trial Should Be Granted

Text: On facts similar to the instant case, an Indiana case held that it was not reversible error for a prosecutor to prosecute his former client as long as he did not also prosecute, as enhancement, the prior convictions in which he had represented the defendant. See Garren v. State, 470 N.E.2d 719, 722-23 (Ind. 1984). Thus, Indiana follows an anomalous rule. Disqualification of the prosecutor is theoretically required at all phases of the trial, but failure to disqualify the prosecutor is reversible error only if the prosecutor prosecutes the prior convictions. Compare Tippecanoe County, 432 N.E.2d at 1378-79, with Garren, 470 N.E.2d at 722-23. Were we to agree with this rule, defendant's conviction would stand because Callahan did not personally prosecute the prior convictions. However, we believe Arizona law requires more. As our decision in Ockrassa suggests, our concern is not so much who is proving the prior convictions, but rather the potential danger of revealing confidential information. Cf. Corbin v. Broadman, 6 Ariz. App. 436, 433 P.2d 289 (1967) (quashing indictment when prosecutor who had personally worked for defendant attorney and for other defendants in case subsequently joined county attorney's office and presented matter to the grand jury). Furthermore, the prosecutor's actions in this case created an appearance of impropriety. Prior to the adoption of the current Rules of Professional Conduct (the Ethical Rules), the Code of Professional Responsibility governed attorney conduct. Canon 9 of the code stated that [a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Although the Ethical Rules do not retain the appearance of impropriety language found in Canon 9, the appearance of impropriety ... still has a definite place in the balancing test the trial court must apply in resolving the question of disqualification. Turbin v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 195, 199, 797 P.2d 734, 738 (App. 1990). A prosecutor, who himself has a conflict, does not alleviate the appearance of impropriety by merely assigning part of the case to another prosecutor; he is still the prosecutor handling the case and [p]ublic confidence in the criminal justice system ... is eroded when a prosecutor has a conflict or personal interest in the criminal case which he is handling. 165 Ariz. at 198, 797 P.2d at 737. We believe that to prevent the perception or actuality of a breach of confidentiality, ... reversal is necessary in cases of this type.... [A] conviction must be reversed if the trial court denies a pretrial defense motion to disqualify a prosecutor who previously has defended the defendant in any criminal matter that involved or likely involved confidential communications with the same client. Reaves, 574 So.2d at 107. Because the state has confessed error and has not claimed preclusion, we treat defendant's delayed argument as if it had been raised pretrial. A defendant should not be forced to attempt to prove that there was an actual indiscretion or impropriety. Evidence of such conduct, being under the control of the prosecution, would be well-nigh impossible for a defendant to bring forth. People v. Stevens, 642 P.2d 39, 41 (Colo. App. 1981). Additionally, if a defendant were required to show prejudice he might, in some cases, be forced to disclose a confidential communication he made to his former lawyer. Turbin, 165 Ariz. at 198, 797 P.2d at 737. The mere fact of confidential communications in the prior relationship is enough to presume prejudice to the defendant, because [j]ustice and the law must rest upon the complete confidence of the ... public and to do so they must avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Latigue, 108 Ariz. at 523, 502 P.2d at 1342. We conclude that, in this case, a new trial is the only plausible remedy. DISPOSITION We commend the state for its forthright confession of error and encourage trial and appellate courts to consider such confessions seriously. See also Winslow v. State, 37 Ariz. 405, 294 P. 1118 (1931); State v. Rogers, 2 Ariz. App. 232, 235, 407 P.2d 773, 776 (1965), overruled on other grounds, State v. Mallory, 19 Ariz. App. 15, 504 P.2d 556 (1973). The conviction is reversed, the court of appeals' memorandum decision is vacated, and the case is remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion. FELDMAN, C.J., and CORCORAN, ZLAKET and MARTONE, JJ., concur.