Opinion ID: 2574374
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ICA Erroneously Analyzed the Issue of the District Court's Jurisdiction Because the Doctrine of Preemption Is Inapplicable.

Text: The ICA concluded that the district court had jurisdiction over Williams's petition based on the doctrine of preemption. Williams, 2008 WL 5182933, at -4. The ICA first discussed our decision in Santos requiring an exhaustion of contractual remedies under a CBA. However, the ICA then stated that preemption of state court jurisdiction is not unlimited under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or Hawai'i policy. In Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir.2001), the United State[s] Court of Appeal[s] for the Ninth Circuit held that certain actions under the NLRA were not preempted from state court jurisdiction. These actions included torts of threatened violence, traditionally held not to be preempted, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation, both of which the Supreme Court has held to be excepted from Garmon's[ [4] ] pre-emption rule even though they involve conduct arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. Radcliffe, 254 F.3d at 785 (citations omitted[)]. Id. at . The ICA then cited our decision in Briggs v. Hotel Corp. of Pac., 73 Haw. 276, 831 P.2d 1335 (1992) for the proposition that `outrageous conduct, threats, intimidation, and words' which cause the plaintiff to suffer `grievous mental and emotional distress as well as great physical damage' may also fall within an exception to the federal interest in the national labor policy and therefore permit state law recovery. Williams, 2008 WL 5182933, at  (quoting Briggs, 73 Haw. at 284, 831 P.2d at 1341). Finally, the ICA stated that [t]he State has a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the kind of abuse of which Williams complained. That interest is not diminished or preempted because it is related to matters contained in a CBA grievance process. Id. (emphasis added). Preemption is commonly defined as [t]he principle, (derived from the Supremacy Clause [of the United States Constitution]) that a federal law can supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation. Black's at 1217; see also id. at 303 (defining the term complete-preemption doctrine as [t]he rule that a federal statute's force may be so extraordinary and all encompassing that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule). In contrast to the doctrine of exhaustion's temporary divestment of jurisdiction, when a federal statute preempts a state law claim, preemption fully divests the state-law court of all subject-matter jurisdiction over a particular issue. As we have stated in the context of employment law: When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law. Briggs, 73 Haw. at 283, 831 P.2d at 1340 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959)). Thus, the preemption doctrine is triggered when a court is presented with conflicting state and federal statutes. [5] Here, the district court was not presented with conflicting state and federal statutes because the NLRA does not apply to the City and County. The NLRA only applies to employers, as defined by the NLRA. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (2000). Under the NLRA, the term employer  shall not include ... any State or political subdivision thereof [.] 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000) (emphasis added). Aona and Williams's employer is the City and County of Honolulu, a political subdivision of the state of Hawai'i. See Haw. Const. art. VIII, § 1. Therefore, the NLRA does not apply and the ICA's discussion of preemption was irrelevant. In sum, Aona is correct that the doctrine of preemption is inapplicable to the facts of this case. As a result, we hold that the ICA's application of preemption principles to conclude that Williams was not required to exhaust his contractual remedies was erroneous.