Opinion ID: 202865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reinstatement of the Jury Verdict

Text: Rodriguez-Garcia urges us to reinstate the jury's verdict against the municipality, arguing that the court erred when it found the verdict inconsistent with her theory of the case. The district court characterized Rodriguez-Garcia's case as depending on retaliation taken against her by Mayor Marin and Vice Mayor Puig, as parties with final authority to bind the municipality. Since the claim against the mayor had already been dismissed, the court viewed municipal liability as contingent upon Vice Mayor Puig's liability. Therefore, the jury's rejection of the claim against Vice Mayor Puig made municipal liability inconsistent with Rodriguez-Garcia's theory of the case. On appeal, Rodriguez-Garcia argues that the jury could have based municipal liability on the actions of a conspiracy of municipal workers, including but not limited to Vice Mayor Puig. Seen through the lens of this alternative theory, the jury's verdicts are not necessarily inconsistent, and the judgment against the municipality should be reinstated. [14] The municipality argues that Rodriguez-Garcia's failure to object to the judge's inconsistency determination before the jury was dismissed bars our review of this issue. We agree. We have followed an iron-clad rule that a party that fails to raise an objection based on verdict inconsistency before the jury is dismissed waives the issue. See Wennik v. Polygram Group Distribution, Inc., 304 F.3d 123, 130 (1st Cir.2002); Campos-Orrego v. Rivera, 175 F.3d 89, 98 (1st Cir.1999); Toucet v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 991 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1993) (collecting cases). Here we confront the opposite situation: Rodriguez-Garcia failed to specifically voice her opinion that the verdict was consistent before the jury was dismissed. In the typical case, it would be pointless to require a party to assert that a favorable verdict was consistent. However, this is not the typical case. Here, the district court had twice indicated that, if the jury found Vice Mayor Puig not liable and the municipality liable, it would enter judgment for the municipality as a matter of law. First, after the jury instructions were read, the defense noted that the instructions did not preclude the jury from finding in favor of Vice Mayor Puig but against the municipality. The court responded: If they don't find [Vice] Mayor Puig liable and for some reason they find the municipality liable . . . the municipality is not liable. Rodriguez-Garcia did not object to this statement at the time; she also failed to object to this statement shortly thereafter, when specifically asked if she had objections to preserve. Second, after closing arguments, the court gave the parties an opportunity to represerve their earlier objections. The defense again raised its concern that the jury instructions allowed for a mixed verdict. The court responded: Okay, but I told you that if for all purposes they find Mr. Puig not liable, as a matter of law I am going to have the municipality dismissed. So that is not going to be a problem. The defense then stated: I understand, Your Honor, and I think that we all agree with that matter, the parties agree, the plaintiff agreed also, so no problem. Rodriguez-Garcia again raised no objection on this point, though she preserved other objections. After the verdict was delivered and the jurors were duly polled, Rodriguez-Garcia again remained silent. The court discharged the jury and then declared that it would enter judgment for the municipality. Although Rodriguez-Garcia finally tried to argue that the jury verdict was consistent, it was too late. By failing to preserve an objection to the court's inconsistent verdict determination before the jury was discharged, Rodriguez-Garcia has waived her right to argue on appeal that the court erred in that determination. See Torres-Arroyo v. Rullan, 436 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding failure to object before the moment of jury discharge constituted a waiver); Correia v. Fitzgerald, 354 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that a failure to object to an alleged inconsistency while the jury is still empaneled constituted waiver).