Opinion ID: 2507854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges to the Admissibility of Evidence

Text: Defendant challenges the admission of certain evidence as violative of his state and federal rights to due process, a fair trial, a fair and reliable penalty determination, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Factor (b) of section 190.3 directs the trier of fact to consider [t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. Factor (b) encompasses only those threats of violence that are directed against persons, not property. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1016, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) Invoking Kirkpatrick and Boyd, defendant claims that the admission of evidence concerning the vandalism of the Marshalls' van on May 27, 1990, was outside the scope of factor (b) and, because it deprived him of a state-created liberty interest, also violated the federal Constitution. He is mistaken. Claudia Jones-Marshall testified that in the early morning hours of May 27, 1990  a couple of days after defendant marked her sidewalk with graffiti, insulted and assaulted her husband, and was arrested  she was awakened by a noise. She looked out the window and saw people hitting her van with a cement block. Defendant was scratching WSA, the initials of his gang, on the side of the van. As the prosecution's gang expert, Alfonso Valdez, explained, the vandalism was a warning to the Marshalls not to mess with the gang. The purpose of the act was to instill fear. Thus, the act of vandalism unquestionably qualified as an express or implied threat to use force or violence against the Marshalls under factor (b). Defendant then argues that even if the act could have been viewed as a threat against the Marshalls, the instructions permitted the jury to consider it as an aggravating factor even if it believed only that the vandalism was a crime against property. He relies on the jury instruction that defined a threat of force or violence under section 140: Every person who willfully threatens to use force or violence upon the person of a witness to, or victim of, a crime or any other person, or to take, damage, or destroy any property of any witness, victim, or any other person, because the witness, victim, or informant has provided any assistance or information to a law enforcement officer or to a public prosecutor in a criminal proceeding or juvenile court proceeding, is guilty of the crime of threat of force or violence because of assistance in prosecution under Penal Code Section 140. Defendant reasons that, under this instruction, the jury could have believed he committed the crime of threat of force or violence if he merely acted to take, damage, or destroy any property of any witness, victim, or any other person without any finding that such conduct constituted a threat against a person. Defendant, however, fails to consider the further limitation contained in CALJIC No. 8.87 which, as modified for this trial, instructed the jury that it may consider the implied threat of force or violence against Calvin and Claudia Marshall ... on May 27, 1990 only under specified conditions: You may not consider crimes against property as an act of violence in and of itself, but may only consider such evidence if you determine it to be directly related to a threat of violence upon another. If you do not so find, a crime against property is not a crime of violence to be considered as an [aggravating] factor. In other words, even if the jury believed the act of vandalism did not constitute a threat against the Marshalls but was merely vandalism against property, they would have understood from the other instructions that a crime against property could not be considered as an aggravating factor. Hence, it is not reasonably likely the jury would have interpreted the instructions in the way defendant suggests. We therefore reject his state claim of error as well as the federal constitutional claim on which it depends.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his membership in the West Side Anaheim gang as well as evidence of the gang's activities and the motivations of gang members to participate in criminal activities. In his view, this evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. We disagree. Defendant argues first that the trial court erred in permitting Officer Floyd Smith, who testified about defendant's involvement in the November 30, 1989, assault near Anaheim High School, to testify also that defendant was a hardcore gang member, that the assault was preceded by mad dogging (a slang term referring to the practice of staring down the other gang when the two are too far apart to communicate), and that aggressiveness and violence earn a gang member respect from other gang members. Inasmuch as both defendant and the victim of the assault admitted to Smith that they were members of rival gangs, defendant contends that the remainder of Smith's testimony was irrelevant. But the point of Smith's testimony was not merely to show, as defendant assumes, that defendant had committed an act of violence in fighting with the other young man. The prosecution sought to demonstrate instead that defendant had led a group of West Side Anaheim gang members to a confrontation with a rival gang, that the confrontation was deliberately planned, and that defendant had been the aggressor in the assault on the rival gang. Evidence concerning defendant's role in the gang as well as the motivations and common practices of gang members tended to corroborate Smith's eyewitness account and aided the jury in understanding what might have otherwise seemed like a personal grievance or random attack. ( People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 654, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 588, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) Likewise, evidence concerning Smith's training and experiences with the West Side Anaheim gang aided the jury in understanding the bases for Smith's opinions. (See People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 92, 211 Cal.Rptr. 102, 695 P.2d 189.) Defendant's claim that this evidence was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352 is fatally undermined by his failure to recognize its relevance. Defendant challenges next the testimony of prosecution gang expert Alfonso Valdez concerning the vandalism of the Marshalls' van. As discussed in the preceding section, Valdez opined that the motivation for vandalizing the vehicle was to intimidate the Marshalls. To explain why defendant and the other gang members would leave identifying gang markings on the vandalized van, Valdez explained that defendant and the others were unconcerned about being identified because gangs operate on fear and use that fear to dissuade witnesses from testifying. Valdez also testified that gangs are highly territorial, as evidenced by the O.C. tattoo (referring to Orange County) on defendant's arm, and that gang members are fiercely loyal to the gang, as evidenced by another tattoo of a happy face and a sad face (signifying have fun now cry later). This evidence helped explain why defendant committed the assault on a member of a rival gang and vandalized the Marshalls' van and why defendant committed these crimes without fear of being identified. ( People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 588, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142; People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 175, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) Defendant contends that even if this evidence was relevant, it was cumulative and extremely prejudicial, given that the trial court believed the vandalism itself (without the assistance of any expert testimony) to be so obviously an attempt ... [to] intimidat[e] people. That the trial court believed the vandalism was clearly an implied threat against the Marshalls without the assistance of an expert, however, did not mean that it was equally evident to a lay jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert testimony to explain the significance of the vandalism, especially since defendant's cross-examination of Claudia Marshall, by focusing on the absence of a verbal threat during the incident, put in issue whether a threat was intended. Defendant also challenges Valdez's testimony concerning his Puro tattoo. Valdez testified that this tattoo was almost racist. Based on defendant's comments to other Hispanic males at the Circle K, Valdez further concluded that defendant basically does not like other ethnic people. People from other ethnic origins. This evidence was relevant to show a motivation for  and the circumstances of  the murder of Singh (and perhaps Patel) and thus was relevant under factor (a) of section 190.3. With little direct evidence as to why defendant singled out Singh to murder, he can hardly complain that the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect. Finally, we reject defendant's claim that admission of the gang evidence violated the First Amendment and various other constitutional provisions. Because he failed to object on this ground below, he has forfeited the claim. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 250, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) Even if it had been preserved, the relevance of the challenged evidence defeats his constitutional objection. ( Dawson v. Delaware (1992) 503 U.S. 159, 164, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309; accord, State v. Fanus (2003) 336 Or. 63, 79 P.3d 847, 863-864.)
Defendant was convicted of fighting in public arising from the assault on a rival gang member near Anaheim High School in November 1989 and was convicted of battery and vandalism arising from the attack on Calvin Marshall and the damage to Marshalls' van in May 1990. The facts and circumstances underlying those convictions were offered as factors in aggravation at the penalty trial. (See parts III.B.1, III.B.2, ante. ) He contends the court erred in admitting the facts and circumstances underlying those convictions to the extent those facts tended to show that his conduct was more egregious than is revealed by the bare fact of conviction. In his view, reliance on facts and circumstances beyond the conviction itself or those minimally necessary to establish a conviction of those crimes violated the provisions listed above as well as the federal constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. As he concedes, however, we have repeatedly rejected this claim (e.g., People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 641-642, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 710-711, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640), and do so again here. The facts presented to the jury, in each instance, constituted merely the circumstances of the crime of which defendant was convicted. ( People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 71, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1241-1242, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1.)
Section 190.3 renders inadmissible at the penalty trial criminal activity which did not involve the use or attempted use of force or violence or which did not involve the express or implied threat to use force or violence. The trial court nonetheless allowed the prosecution to elicit from defendant on cross-examination particulars of his misdemeanor criminal history, some of it nonviolent. Although this was error, it was not prejudicial. On direct examination, as part of an effort to detail his turbulent background, defendant admitted that he had spent his 20th birthday in jail for vandalism and a probation violation and added that he did not feel very good about himself. On cross-examination, the district attorney attempted to impeach defendant by demonstrating that defendant in fact had been in jail on his birthday for a number of probation violations. When defendant claimed not to remember the particular violations, the district attorney elicited from defendant the circumstances of the vandalism charge  that he became claustrophobic in a room at the police department and had thrown a chair  and reviewed a portion of defendant's criminal record: the theft of a Toyota 4Runner in 1990, for which he was placed on probation; the burglary of a Dodge van, for which he was placed on probation; the battery and vandalism arising from the Marshall incident, for which he was placed on probation; the burglary of David Hall's vehicle in October 1990, for which he was placed on probation; and a petty theft at a Circle K in 1989, for which he was placed on probation and ordered to stay away from Circle K stores. When the district attorney alluded to other cases in which defendant had received probation, defendant replied that he was unsure but believed there was one additional case. Because defense counsel objected only to the questions concerning the Circle K theft charge, defendant has forfeited his claim of error as to the remaining offenses. ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 702, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278.) Even if he had preserved the issue, we can perceive no possibility of a different result if this evidence had been omitted. The jury had already heard the details of the assault and vandalism charges involving the Marshalls as well as the burglary of David Hall's vehicle. The fact that defendant had been convicted of those offenses and placed on probation could not have affected the verdict. Given the circumstances of the two murders and the other aggravating factors, one more charge of burglary and vandalism, together with a petty theft, [7] could not have figured significantly in the jury's decision. ( Kaurish, supra, at p. 702, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1233-1234, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) Indeed, the jury was plainly instructed not to consider any criminal acts or activity beyond the seven acts properly enumerated in the instructions as aggravating factors and was also instructed in particular that a crime against property in itself is not a crime of violence to be considered as an aggravating factor.
On May 30, 1993, while in custody at the Orange County jail, defendant complained that he was not provided a lunch tray. When his cell door was opened, however, he came out with a tray in his hands. Deputy Crisp, who supervised the distribution of lunch trays, refused to provide defendant with another tray. In response, defendant flew into an [a]bsolute rage, shook the cell door, and screamed repeatedly that he was going to kill Deputy Crisp with a shank the next chance he got. Deputy Crisp took the threat very seriously. Defendant claims that the foregoing did not establish a criminal offense. We disagree. Threatening to kill a sheriff's deputy for the performance of his duty would appear to violate section 71, which provides that [e]very person who, with intent to cause, attempts to cause, or causes, ... any public officer or employee to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his duties, by means of a threat, directly communicated to such person, to inflict an unlawful injury upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient of the threat that such threat could be carried out, is guilty of a public offense.... (See People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 777, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) This was not a random outburst uttered while officers patrolled outside (cf. People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 590, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142); rather, defendant's threat was plainly uttered in response to the deputy's proper execution of his duties. ( People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1153, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572 [to the extent his official duties included overseeing the custody and control of defendant and his fellow inmates, a threat to kill a deputy constituted an attempt to deter or prevent Deputy Shafia from performing his official duties].) Nor did Crisp believe the threat was an idle one (cf. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 590, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142 [the recipients of these threats indicated they did not actually fear for their safety]), since inmates had been able to manufacture shanks and other weapons despite the jail's best efforts to prevent it and defendant's rage was unmistakable. (See People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1060, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Thus, this incident was properly admitted as an aggravating factor. We also reject defendant's claim that his threats against Deputy Crisp were protected speech under the First Amendment. `As long as the threat reasonably appears to be a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm [citation] and its circumstances are such that there is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out,' a statute proscribing such threats `is not unconstitutional for lacking a requirement of immediacy or imminence.' ( People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1061, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388, quoting In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 714, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365.)
Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of two acts of violence  attacking Deputy Blakely and other deputies in January 1992 and threatening Deputy Crisp in May 1993  that had never been adjudicated. We have previously held, however, that section 190.3, factor (b), which authorizes the jury to consider unadjudicated criminal activity, does not violate either the state or federal Constitution. ( People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 570-571, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137; People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 312, 70 Cal. Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890; People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1244, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1.) Defendant offers no basis to question our earlier rulings.
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning the assault and battery against David Hall and the implied threat against the Marshalls arising from the vandalism of their van on the ground that each of those acts was the subject of misdemeanor charges that were subsequently dismissed under section 1385. He claims that the admission of these incidents violated section 190.3, which bars the admission of evidence at the penalty phase of prior criminal activity for which the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted. We find no error. We have strictly construed the limitation in section 190.3 concerning criminal activity for which the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted to refer only to a determination of the merits. ( People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 390, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009.) Thus, a charge that was dismissed under section 995, which is not a determination on the merits, is admissible at the penalty phase. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 774, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) Similarly, a charge that is dismissed under section 1385 remains admissible unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court applied the substantial evidence standard. ( People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 273, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165.) Defendant argues that the bar to refiling of a dismissed misdemeanor under section 1387, subdivision (a) resulted in the functional equivalent of an acquittal. He is mistaken. An acquittal requires more than a bar to further proceedings; it requires `a disposition based upon a determination of the merits. ' ( People v. Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 267, fn. 3, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165, italics added.) Inasmuch as defendant does not contend that either disposition was based on the merits, neither incident was barred under section 190.3. ( People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 193, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629 [a dismissal not based on any judicial determination with respect to the truth or falsity of the charge is not an acquittal under section 190.3].) In any event, neither misdemeanor could have appreciably prejudiced the jury's consideration of the appropriate penalty. Finally, we have previously rejected arguments that double jeopardy and speedy trial principles apply to the admission of evidence in aggravation presented at the penalty phase. ( People v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 641, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.)
On cross-examination, the prosecution attempted to elicit the arrest records of three defense witnesses who testified at the penalty phase  Renae Alvarez, who testified about the Marshall assault on May 25, 1990; Jose Guillen, who testified about the incident in the Orange County jail on January 1, 1992; and Robert Laimbeer, who testified about the incident involving Deputy Crisp on May 30, 1993. Although this was error, defendant was not prejudiced. Since the prosecution properly used prior felony convictions to impeach Guillen (one) and Laimbeer (at least five), the jury would not have needed to rely on mere arrests in evaluating the credibility of those witnesses. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 769, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Although Alvarez did not have a felony conviction, her bias was amply established by evidence of her boyfriend's membership in defendant's gang, her conviction for vandalizing the Marshalls' van, and her obligation to pay restitution to the Marshalls. We also note that the jury was instructed that misdemeanor convictions, misdemeanor arrests or any reference thereto, should not be considered should they involve crimes against property, assaultive-type conduct, including but not limited to conduct such as discharging a firearm. These crimes do not reflect on a person's honesty and veracity and you are admonished to disregard any such evidence which has not previously been excluded or an objection sustained [thereto]. Again, you may only consider felony convictions or misdemeanor conduct which bears on a witness's veracity or truthfulness as I have previously indicated unless directed otherwise. As defendant points out, this instruction was internally inconsistent: on the one hand, it correctly told the jury to consider only felony convictions or misdemeanor conduct that bore on the witness's veracity or truthfulness, yet, on the other hand, it might have suggested (erroneously) that misdemeanor arrests for offenses that bore on a witness's veracity (and thus did not involve crimes against property or assaultive-type conduct) could also be considered. The prosecution established that Alvarez  but not Guillen or Laimbeer  had arrests of this type. Even assuming the instruction was error as to Alvarez, however, we nonetheless find it harmless, for the reasons stated above.