Opinion ID: 1472683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judge Schwelb

Text: Judge Schwelb argues that the tenant-whom he characterizes as a purported victim of unlawful discrimination who wanted nothing at all to do with the case, and for whom the majority offers not a single word of criticism  was not entitled to a reasonable accommodation for a mental disability. He offers essentially four reasons: (1) the landlord had no obligation to engage in a dialogue with a tenant who the landlord believed was not suffering from a relevant `handicap' within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act and who, in any event  as a matter of law  was not a `qualified' handicapped person; (2) there was insufficient evidence that if the `eviction was delayed, [she] could conform [her] conduct to the terms of [her] lease'; (3) the case had gone on too long, to the great discomfort of other tenants; and (4) the tenant's defense must fail in any event because she was nowhere to be found. As to the first, the dissent premises the reasonableness of the landlord's belief that the tenant was not suffering from a relevant `handicap' on the trial court's finding that the tenant had not been shown to be suffering the kind of mental impairment which would prevent her from maintaining a sanitary apartment. We have rejected that finding, however, as too narrowly premised on the absence of a specific diagnosis of mental illness, rather than on the more general mental impairment discernible even by lay persons, such as Ms. Reid, the landlord's representative who referred the tenant to St. Elizabeth's hospital. [71] The dissent's other basis for concluding as a matter of law that the tenant was not a `qualified' handicapped person is the Andover Housing Authority [72] case. That decision defined qualified, however, by reference not to the nature of the illness but to whether more than reasonable modifications, i.e., an undue burden, would be imposed on the landlord in accommodating the tenant. [73] Plainly, no undue burden on the landlord is called for here; the only accommodation requested is a brief continuance of the eviction proceeding to test whether the tenant can follow through successfully with a government subsidized program to clean the apartment and keep it clean, failing which the tenant concededly would have to leave. The dissent's second concern  that the evidence was insufficient to show that the tenant could conform her conduct to the terms of the lease  is, we believe, premature. Like our colleague, we have noted the tenant's failure to proffer the kinds of details that ordinarily would be required to convince a fact-finder that the tenant's proposal assuredly was reasonable. On the other hand, we believe that enough was proffered  namely, a request for stay of the proceeding for a period long enough for the D.C. government to clean the premises and demonstrate a commitment to keep it clean  that the landlord was required to open a dialogue with the tenant to fill in whatever details it believed were lacking. The evidence is sufficient for a finding that the landlord declined to do so. Accordingly, the tenant's proffer, without a timely, meaningful response by the landlord, could not simply be rejected out of hand. On remand, given a proper understanding of the law, the trial court will be in a position to determine whether a jury could reasonably find that the tenant's proffered request for accommodation was clear and coherent enough, in light of the landlord's indifference to a dialogue to elicit additional details, that the accommodation should be deemed reasonable. Furthermore, we have noted that a more detailed proffer at the time would have been fruitless in any event because the trial court ruled against the tenant on three alternative, legally erroneous grounds. In sum, the tenant should have an opportunity to complete her proffer before the trial court reaches a conclusive determination as to whether the jury should hear her reasonable accommodation defense. Third, as to delay, we have stressed that if the landlord had complied with the law by opening a dialogue with the tenant, through counsel, upon receipt of the February 20 letter, the entire matter might have been resolved much earlier than trial, eventually scheduled more than three months later in June. The tenant requested a reasonable accommodation for mental illness  an accommodation, according to counsel's letter, that would permit the District government's intervention to assist her with her problems. That request was clear enough to impose a legal duty on the landlord to respond promptly. The landlord failed to respond, however, for more than three months and, indeed, was never willing to permit the tenant to remain in her apartment even if the District government were to clean  and maintain  the premises. The trial court itself recognized, moreover, that once the landlord had taken action to evict, the District government had a sound, fiscal reason not to intervene unless the landlord gave assurance that the tenant could remain if the government kept her apartment clean. In sum, because the landlord defaulted on its obligation to open a dialogue with the tenant until two weeks before trial and, even then, indicated that no accommodation would be acceptable, the delay  with all the unfortunate burdens it imposed on other tenants  is primarily assignable to the landlord. Finally, Judge Schwelb's complaint that this tenant wanted nothing at all to do with the case and was nowhere to be found misconceives the record and is unfair to the tenant. In the first place, there is no record basis for finding that the tenant had ever been missing from her apartment until a few weeks before the pretrial conference on April 17, 2002. Significantly, moreover, the record shows that she had returned by June 5, 2002  twelve days before trial  for a meeting with the District government's representatives, Messrs. Sutton and Byrd. Furthermore, counsel represented that the tenant had not shown up for trial because she thought that the trial was another trick to commit her (she apparently had survived an actual effort to commit her two weeks earlier). The tenant may have been elusive, but one cannot say as a matter of law that she was missing  end of case. The tenant was not well; she had a mental illness that underlay the need for accommodation. In our view, therefore, she cannot be fairly charged under such circumstances with prejudicial indifference or deemed, definitively, a missing person. We cannot say as a matter of law that her lawyer, working with Messrs. Sutton and Byrd, was in no position to find her and convey hopeful news that would bring her to court. Judge Schwelb relies on two cases that, in our judgment, make clear how the reasonable accommodation requirement should be treated and why the result here should be as the en banc majority, not his dissent, analyzes the case. In Andover Housing Authority v. Shkolnik , [74] reasonable accommodation was sought for an ill tenant and spouse who made excessive noise. The housing authority responded immediately to the tenant's request for accommodation by investigating the feasibility of acoustical carpeting, a sound-absorbing drop ceiling, a room air conditioner so that the windows could remain closed during hot weather, and a stay of the eviction proceeding pending installation of an effective accommodation. The tenants, in the meantime, kept denying the noise and made no effort to engage in the interactive process, unlike the effort initiated by the tenant in this case. After a three-month stay of the eviction proceeding so the tenants could continue to work with the authority and with their neighbors in order reasonably to accommodate all residents' needs, [75] the process failed and the court entered judgment of possession for the housing authority. The housing authority thus made the kinds of efforts to accommodate that the law requires  efforts that contrast sharply with the landlord's failure in this case to join the interactive process required under the Fair Housing Act. In the other case on which our colleague relies, Arnold Murray Construction, L.L.C. v. Hicks , [76] the Supreme Court of South Dakota sustained a trial court judgment of possession, rejecting a reasonable accommodation defense proffered by a tenant who was accosting others in his building with emotional outbursts, verbal threats, nude appearance and other offensive conduct. [77] There, the court accepted the line of authority confirming that Congress intended for landlords to attempt reasonable accommodations, even when the tenant is a direct threat to the health and safety of other tenants, if those accommodations will eliminate or acceptably minimize the risks posed by that tenant. [78] But the court concluded that the accommodations requested by the tenant dealt only with parking and controlled access door issues, not at all with his threats and other offensive conduct [79]  a situation entirely different from the present case, in which the tenant's proffered accommodation, if successfully implemented, would eliminate the threat to health and safety from an unclean apartment. With all respect due, therefore, we cannot accept the portrayal of this case, factually and legally, presented in this dissent.