Opinion ID: 1504564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Nature of Igoe's Claims

Text: When Igoe applied for these positions in 1997, he was one of 27 applicants. In 1999 there were over 50 applicants. Igoe met the minimum experience and training requirements  a law degree and admission to The Missouri Bar for at least two years  as did all of the applicants. The statutory duties of an administrative law judge include conducting hearings on workers' claims for compensation that result from injuries on the job. Section 287.610.5. The judge makes findings of facts and conclusions of law in decisions that are then reviewed by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. Once appointed, an administrative law judge serves until retirement, unless removed for cause. Section 287.610.1. Legal advisors are appointed to assist all parties in making sure their claims are presented and heard. Section 287.642. A legal advisor can also serve in the capacity of an associate administrative law judge. Section 287.616. These judge and legal advisor positions, the state points out, represent the governor's administration in dealing with the resolution of workers' compensation claims. The governor's staff told the director that the governor wanted candidates who would best represent his administration and emphasized a combination of skills and personal attributes that would best serve the public. As an elected official, the governor  not the department director  is held politically responsible for those who are chosen for these executive-branch administrative law judge positions. Further, an administrative law judge may be discharged or removed only by the governor. Section 287.610.1. The director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations reviewed applications for these positions and interviewed candidates. The governor's staff reviewed the applications and told the department director the names of the persons who were to be appointed. Under the constitutional and statutory scheme, the governor can tell the department director which candidates he wants selected. The governor appoints the director of the department. [3] The director serves at the governor's pleasure. Mo. Const. art. IV, sec. 17. Though a statute may assign the appointment authority to a department or division, the director serves at the pleasure of the governor and can be removed if he or she fails or refuses to carry out the governor's wishes. Mo. Const. art. IV, sec. 17. [4] The state contends that the judgment in this case violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The Missouri Constitution establishes three departments (commonly referred to as branches) of government  executive, legislative and judicial  and provides that no person ... charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others. Mo. Const. art. II, sec. 1. The courts have the duty and obligation to protect the right of the legislative... [or] ... the executive branch, the state argues, to exercise those powers specifically delegated to it in the same manner we would [protect against] a similar challenge to the powers of the judiciary. State on Information of Danforth v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Mo. banc 1970). Igoe's claims actually were started in the executive branch with the filing of his complaints with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, an executive branch agency. The filing of a complaint with the commission is a prerequisite to seeking judicial relief. Section 213.111. The commission had an opportunity to determine, in the first instance, the validity of Igoe's claims because the commission and its staff have the statutory authority to investigate, to determine whether there is probable cause to believe discrimination has occurred, and to hold a hearing. Section 213.075. The commission did not hold a hearing on Igoe's claims. No inference, however, can be drawn from the commission's inaction. The commission has very limited resources and must determine which few cases to investigate thoroughly in order to proceed with its own hearing and determination of the claims. The other option is for the claims to be litigated  as Igoe's were  after the commission has issued a letter giving notice of his right to sue. See Stuart v. General Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621 (8th Cir.2000). In this case the commission issued Igoe a letter giving notice of his right to sue; this action was commenced under section 213.111 within 90 days of the notice. [5]