Opinion ID: 686771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Law of Entrapment by Estoppel

Text: 23 The Supreme Court established the foundation for the defense of entrapment by estoppel in Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965). There, the Court overturned the defendant's conviction for picketing near a courthouse where city officials had told him to confine his demonstration to the west sidewalk and he had done so. The Court explained: 24 [U]nder all the circumstances of this case, after the public officials acted as they did, to sustain appellant's later conviction for demonstrating where they told him he could would be to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State--convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to him. 25 Id. at 571, 85 S.Ct. at 484 (quoting Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 1260, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959)). The Court concluded that [t]he Due Process Clause does not permit convictions to be obtained under such circumstances. Cox, 379 U.S. at 571, 85 S.Ct. at 484. 26 This defense has been recognized in numerous lower court opinions. The Ninth Circuit, for example, defined the contours of the defense in United States v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225 (9th Cir.1970). The court held that, where a defendant asserts that his criminal conduct was the result of reliance on misleading information furnished by the government, a defense will lie if the defendant shows that his reliance was reasonable in that a person sincerely desirous of obeying the law would have accepted the information as true, and would not have been put on notice to make further inquiries. Id. at 227. See also United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 773-75 (9th Cir.1987) (reversing conviction of firearms possession by a convicted felon where defendant reasonably relied on assurances by a federally licensed firearms dealer that the purchase was lawful because the conviction had been subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor, on the theory that the licensed firearms dealer became an agent of the government by reason of the duties imposed on him by law); United States v. Timmins, 464 F.2d 385, 386-87 (9th Cir.1972) (defendant must show that government official provided false and misleading information on which defendant reasonably relied). 27 In United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 523, 130 L.Ed.2d 428 (1994), the Tenth Circuit explained that the defense is warranted where a government agent affirmatively misleads a defendant as to the lawfulness of his conduct and the defendant relies on the misrepresentation, provided the defendant's reliance is reasonable in light of the identity of the agent, the point of law misrepresented, and the substance of the misrepresentation. Id. (defense rejected in that case because the government agent had spoken ambiguously rather than inaccurately). 28 The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463 (6th Cir.1992), similarly held that entrapment by estoppel is a defense to criminal liability where a government agency announced that the charged criminal act was legal and the defendant reasonably relied on the government's announcement, with the consequence that the prosecution was deemed unfair. Id. at 468. See also United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 714 (1st Cir.1991) (defense applies when an official assures a defendant that certain conduct is legal, and the defendant reasonably relies on that advice and continues or initiates the conduct) (footnote omitted). 29 We conclude that the defense of entrapment by estoppel can arise in the circumstances testified to by the defendants. If a drug enforcement agent solicits a defendant to engage in otherwise criminal conduct as a cooperating informant, or effectively communicates an assurance that the defendant is acting under authorization, and the defendant, relying thereon, commits forbidden acts in the mistaken but reasonable, good faith belief that he has in fact been authorized to do so as an aid to law enforcement, then estoppel bars conviction. Needless to say, the defendant's conduct must remain within the general scope of the solicitation or assurance of authorization; this defense will not support a claim of an open-ended license to commit crimes in the expectation of receiving subsequent authorization. Furthermore, for a defendant's reliance to be reasonable, the jury must conclude that  'a person sincerely desirous of obeying the law would have accepted the information as true and would not have been put on notice to make further inquiries.'  United States v. Corso, 20 F.3d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523, 1534 (9th Cir.1993) (citations omitted)). A defendant has the burden of proving the estoppel. United States v. Austin, 915 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir.1990). 30 The government argues that the defendants were not entitled to an entrapment by estoppel defense because knowledge of illegality was not an element of the crime charged. In other words, according to the government's argument, it is irrelevant whether the Abcasises believed they were breaking the law so long as they knew they were importing narcotics. The government's position reflects a basic misunderstanding of the law of entrapment by estoppel. 31 The defense of entrapment by estoppel does not depend solely on absence of criminal intent. Nor is it limited to the circumstance of actual authorization. It focuses on the conduct of the government leading the defendant to believe reasonably that he was authorized to do the act forbidden by law. The doctrine depends on the unfairness of prosecuting one who has been led by the conduct of government agents to believe his acts were authorized. See United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 714 (1st Cir.1991).