Opinion ID: 2524595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Counsel's affirmative representations

Text: As discussed, petitioner testified that counsel told him that, if he pled guilty, he would have no problems with immigration except that he would not be able to become a United States citizen. Even among the federal and other courts cited by the Attorney General, the clear consensus is that an affirmative misstatement regarding deportation may constitute ineffective assistance. ( U.S. v. Mora-Gomez, supra, 875 F.Supp. at p. 1212.) [14] In the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General acknowledged that for trial counsel to have assured petitioner he would have no immigration problems if he pled guilty would have been irresponsible. More importantly, such advice would have been mistaken. Controlled substance violations are the most damning convictions in the Immigration and Nationality Act. There are very few situations where a plea to a narcotics violation would not have a fatal and permanent immigration consequence as an alien convicted of a crime 'relating to' controlled substances is deportable and excludable. (Brady et al, Cal.Criminal Law and Immigration (1997) Drug Convictions, Admissions, Trafficking, Addiction and Abuse, p. 3-1.) Owing to the enactment of IIRAIRA and AEDPA in 1996, petitioner became subject to expedited removal from the United States upon pleading guilty to the charges against him, both because they involved controlled substances and because drug trafficking is considered an aggravated felony. [15] The only contingency on which institution of actual removal proceedings at that point hung was that they be instituted upon the order of the [United States] Attorney General (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)), which indeed they were. The Attorney General suggests that petitioner's testimony about what his counsel told him was rebutted by counsel's declaration asserting it was his custom and practice to tell clients the government is always wanting to deport noncitizen felons. [16] Trial counsel does not recall what he actually told petitioner. Petitioner argues that, even if believed, counsel's declaration does not necessarily contradict his evidence that, at some point, counsel also told him specifically that a guilty plea would in fact generate no immigration problems. The Court of Appeal found counsel's characterization of his custom and habit unpersuasive. The Attorney General contends the Court of Appeal was insufficiently deferential to the trial court's stated conclusion that counsel's performance met an objective standard of reasonableness for Defense Counsel in this County. Although the Court of Appeal was not bound to accept the superior court's factual findings, those findings were, as previously noted, entitled to `great weight,' particularly where they involved assessment of witness credibility. ( People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 219, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) Having examined the record, we are not able to determine with certainty whether counsel conformed to his purported custom and habit or whether he supplemented any customary warning with a more specific, but incorrect, advisement. Ultimately, however, we need not resolve those factual questions. Even assuming that counsel affirmatively misadvised petitionerand that petitioner thus has satisfied the performance prong of his ineffective assistance claim ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052)petitioner to prevail must additionally demonstrate prejudice, and this, we conclude, he has failed to do.