Opinion ID: 790335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Two Points for Burglary Conviction

Text: 13 Townsend next claims that, even assuming the burglary conviction was not expunged for purposes of the Guidelines, the district court erred in assigning the conviction two criminal history points. Because Townsend did not raise this issue before the district court, our review is for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Sykes, 356 F.3d 863, 864 (2004). We may notice a claimed error not raised below where the error is plain, affects the defendant's substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness or integrity of the proceedings. Sykes, 356 F.3d at 864. On plain-error review, Townsend bears the burden to prove prejudice. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). 14 Under the Guidelines, courts must add two criminal history points for every prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days but less than one year and one month, and one criminal history point for shorter sentences, up to a total of four points. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a)-(c). The term `prior sentence' means any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt ... for conduct not part of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). The Guidelines also provide, [i]n the case of a prior revocation of probation, parole, [or] supervised release, the court is to add the original term of imprisonment to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation. The resulting total is used to compute the criminal history points for § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c)[.] U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k)(1). 15 Townsend received a deferred judgment for the burglary conviction, but while he was on probation, he twice was [f]ound in contempt for probation violations and received thirty and forty-five days in jail, for a total of seventy-five jail days on the burglary count and subsequent probation violations. Townsend contends his probation was never revoked and was successfully discharged in 1999. Thus, Townsend argues, there were no probation revocations under section 4A1.2(k)(1), and the district court should not have added two criminal history points under section 4A1.1(b). 16 Like any other federal statute, the Guidelines must be interpreted in accordance with federal law, even when those Guidelines refer to some event occurring in state court. United States v. Reed, 94 F.3d 341, 344 (7th Cir.1996); see also Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119-120, 103 S.Ct. 986 (noting that, absent a plain indication to the contrary, it is assumed Congress does not intend application of federal statutes to be dependent on state law, because the application of federal legislation is nationwide and at times the federal program would be impaired if state law were to control). Nothing in section 4A1.2(k)(1) suggests that we should look to state law in determining what constitutes a `revocation of probation.' Reed, 94 F.3d at 344. In reviewing the district court's application of the Guidelines, we must look beyond the terminology the Iowa state court employed when it sentenced Townsend for his probation violations. 17 Section 4A1.2(k)(1) contemplates that, in calculating a defendant's total sentence of imprisonment for a particular offense, the district court will aggregate any term of imprisonment imposed because of a probation violation with the defendant's original sentence of imprisonment, if any, for that offense. United States v. Glover, 154 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir.1998). [W]hen a defendant has been given a suspended sentence of imprisonment and been placed on probation, and the court has thereafter, upon finding he violated probation, ordered him to serve a period of incarceration, we think it proper to view that order as at least a partial revocation of probation that falls within the scope of Guidelines § 4A1.2(k)(1). United States v. Glidden, 77 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam). 18 Similar to the situation in Reed, nothing in the PSR indicates Townsend's probation was revoked following his guilty plea to the burglary. See Reed, 94 F.3d at 344. The PSR does, however, indicate probation violations occurred, and Townsend received two jail terms for those violations. After reviewing the Guidelines, the Seventh Circuit in Reed reached the conclusion that the finding of a probation violation coupled with a time-served imprisonment sentence and a resentencing to probation constitutes a `revocation of probation' under section 4A1.2(k)(1). Id. at 345. In this case, Townsend was [f]ound in contempt for probation violations in Iowa state court, and the jail terms he received were imposed due to probation violations. That the incarcerations following Townsend's probation violations were not each labeled a revocation of probation is not controlling. Id. We do not look to state-law terminology in construing the Guidelines. See id. at 344. Therefore, we reject Townsend's argument that the thirty-day and forty-five-day jail terms imposed pursuant to the state trial court's findings of contempt for probation violations should not be counted in determining the total term of his prior sentence of imprisonment pursuant to section 4A1.2(k)(1). 19 Even assuming the sentences could not be considered revocations of probation, the seventy-five days Townsend spent in jail after being found in contempt for probation violations was countable under section 4A1.1(b), under which courts must add two criminal history points for every prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days. As noted, [t]he term `prior sentence' means any sentence previously imposed upon the adjudication of guilt ... for conduct not part of the instant offense. United States v. Copeland, 45 F.3d 254, 256 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1)). The prior sentence need only be imposed prior to sentencing on the instant offense. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n. 1. Because the sentences were imposed prior to sentencing on Townsend's instant offense, the two sentences were properly counted in calculating his criminal history. The district court did not plainly err.