Opinion ID: 2334072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Kohn

Text: We address, as a final point, Beverly's reliance on Kohn v. American Housing Foundation, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 536 (D.Colo. 1998), where a federal district court in Colorado ruled that certification was not warranted for a class of current and former residents of a nursing home who filed claims against the nursing home for violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, breach of a Medicaid contract, and negligence based on understaffing and environmental problems at the nursing home. The federal district court ruled that common questions of fact and law did not predominate over individualized issues. That court reasoned that class members were individuals who may or may not have been exposed to the unlawful conduct and that those who were exposed would not all be harmed in the same way. The court recognized that certification based solely on the issue of liability may be appropriate in some cases, but not where the class members are surrounded by differing circumstances. The Kohn case, though, is distinguishable from the instant case in that the federal district court used a rigorous analysis under Federal Rule 23 in determining whether the certification criteria had been met. Kohn, 178 F.R.D. at 539. This court does not require that the circuit court conduct a rigorous analysis under our Rule 23. Tay-Tay, Inc. v. Young, 349 Ark. 675, 683, 80 S.W.3d 365, 368 (2002). Furthermore, the plaintiffs in Kohn, supra , included a negligence claim where a finding of causation for each class member was necessary to establish liability. In the instant case, the circuit court specifically excluded claims for medical malpractice and personal injury. The case of Fleming v. Barnwell Nursing Home & Health Facilities, Inc., 309 A.D.2d 1132, 766 N.Y.S.2d 241 (2003), appears more persuasive to this court. In that case, a New York appellate court held that class certification was not proper for nursing-home residents who sought to file a negligence claim against a nursing home because individual questions involving causation and injury existed. However, the court further held that certification was warranted where the class members asserted claims pursuant to New York's Public Health Law § 2801-d, which allowed private causes of action against a nursing home to recover for the deprivation of certain rights. The court ruled that common questions regarding the nursing home's violation of the Public Health Law predominated over individual issues and stated that [t]he predominance requirement may be satisfied even if not all class members were subjected to all the improper conduct. Fleming, 309 A.D.2d at 1133-34, 766 N.Y.S.2d at 243. The class in the case at hand has been certified only for purposes of bringing statutory and contractual claims, not personal-injury claims. Furthermore, individual damages incurred by each class member will only be relevant during the second phase of this litigation, if necessary, and not during the liability phase. We conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting Thomas's motion for class certification. Affirmed.