Opinion ID: 2811947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: claim of ineffective assistance of

Text: APPELLATE COUNSEL Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, as Hayward has done in this case. See Jackson v. State, 127 So. 3d 447, 476 (Fla. 2013). The alleged error must first be - 79 - of “such magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable performance” and, second, the deficiency in performance must have “compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the result.” Id. (quoting Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986)). Further, “appellate counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a claim that is without merit.” Id. (citing Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1070 (Fla. 2000)). Hayward contends that appellate counsel was deficient in failing to raise a fundamental error claim on direct appeal asserting that Hayward was denied due process by the admission of the testimony of Roosevelt McDowell, who Hayward contends was not qualified to be a witness in the case. For the reasons we discuss below, we find no merit in this claim. A witness is incompetent to testify if the witness is unable to communicate to the jury, unable to understand the duty to tell the truth, or is unable to perceive and remember events. Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 646. If the issue is not preserved by trial counsel, appellate counsel is only deficient in failing to assert it on appeal if it is fundamental error; and fundamental error is error that “reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have - 80 - been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.” Id. (quoting Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 418 n.8 (Fla. 1998)). A witness is presumed competent to testify until the contrary is established. Hawk v. State, 718 So. 2d 159, 162 (Fla. 1998); see also § 90.601, Fla. Stat. (2007). Section 90.603, Florida Statutes (2007), provides that a person is disqualified as a witness if the person is incapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter or is incapable of understanding the duty to tell the truth. Section 90.604, Florida Statutes (2007), provides that a witness may not testify to a matter unless sufficient evidence, which can include the witness’s own testimony, is introduced to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. We explained in Kennard v. State, 28 So. 858 (Fla. 1900), “Where, however, a witness has knowledge of the facts, and speaks from a recollection of the facts as they actually appeared to him, though his impression may not amount to positive assurance, it is competent to be considered by the jury.” Id. at 859. Hayward has cited no authority for the proposition that lack of clear memory on every aspect of the incident, for example by McDowell’s conflicting accounts of whether the assailant wore a hat or not and whether the witness was heading to the bathroom or had already been when shots were heard, is sufficient lack of recollection to entirely disqualify a witness. Other aspects of McDowell’s - 81 - testimony were firmly recalled and recounted for the jury, and in some instances corroborated by other evidence. McDowell was an older man with health problems who, in the middle of the night, heard gunshots and looked out his door. He heard the victim make the statement, “I don’t have no more.” McDowell exhibited some uncertainty or confusion about whether he was on his way to the bathroom or had already been, and about whether the shots had minutes between them or just seconds. He gave differing accounts of whether the assailant had on a hat or a mask. Even so, his testimony never wavered that he heard the victim say several times, “I don’t have no more.” He never wavered that the assailant went into the car and also went under a streetlight and appeared to examine his hand. He was not confused about which direction the assailant took when he left the scene, and that the victim also left the scene. Other evidence confirmed that the victim shot at the assailant and that the victim left the scene before dying, and that the assailant’s blood was found on a post behind McDowell’s apartment house, in the direction that McDowell testified the assailant fled. Other evidence also confirmed that Hayward’s blood was found in the victim’s pockets and on the car. The discrepancies in McDowell’s testimony did not prove that he failed to observe or could not recall the most important points about which he testified. Hayward is correct that the trial court relied on McDowell’s testimony that - 82 - Destefano said “I don’t have no more” in finding that the murder occurred during a robbery for pecuniary gain. However, that aspect of McDowell’s testimony never wavered. Although McDowell was older, in poor health, and possibly confused about some aspects of the event he witnessed, that does not provide a basis to disqualify him. See, e.g., Belcher v. Johnson, 834 So. 2d 422, 422-23 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that an elderly woman with dementia is not disqualified as a witness simply for those reasons). Even insanity of a witness has been found to affect only the witness’s credibility, not their competence to testify, if the witness can otherwise observe, recall, and relate what they have seen, and if they know the meaning of the oath to tell the truth. See, e.g., Zabrani v. Riveron, 495 So. 2d 1195, 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). As noted above, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise nonmeritorious claims on appeal. Even if error had been shown in the admission of testimony of McDowell, such error does not “reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.” Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 576 (Fla. 2008). Thus, appellate counsel had no obligation to raise a claim that was unpreserved and did not constitute fundamental error. Accordingly, the writ is denied. - 83 -