Opinion ID: 2001769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Findings of Fact/Evidence

Text: After reviewing all the evidence in this case, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made by the trial court. The findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. The determination of fair market value must be affirmed. SDCL 15-6-52(a); Proceedings for Dep. in Court of Monies, 417 N.W.2d 187 (S.D.1987); Wiggins v. Shewmake, 374 N.W.2d 111 (S.D.1985). We find no need to address the issues presented by Miller's notice of review given the disposition of the foregoing issues. MILLER, C.J., and SABERS and KONENKAMP, JJ., concur in result. TIMM, Circuit Judge, for AMUNDSON, J., disqualified. GILBERTSON, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this case was submitted, did not participate. MILLER, Chief Justice, writing the majority opinion with respect to the issue of the correct standard of review. We agree that the trial court's findings should be affirmed. We write separately because the minority attempts to adopt the wrong standard of review in arriving at this result. The minority would hold the clearly erroneous standard applies to our review of a trial court's findings of fact regardless of the type of evidence presented at trial. This would conflict with our well-settled law. For purposes of appellate review, we have repeatedly distinguished between live testimony and evidence presented in document form. Under our long-standing rule, when reviewing findings based on documentary evidence we do not apply the clearly erroneous rule set forth in SDCL 15-6-52(a), but review the matter de novo. Pankratz v. Miller, 401 N.W.2d 543, 548 (S.D.1987); In re Investigation of the Highway Construction Industry, 396 N.W.2d 757, 758 (S.D.1986); Leslie v. City of Bonesteel, 303 N.W.2d 117 (S.D.1981); Pearson v. Franklin Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133, 140-41 (S.D.1977); Ayres v. Junek, 247 N.W.2d 488, 490 (S.D.1976); Geo. A. Clark & Son, Inc. v. Nold, 85 S.D. 468, 185 N.W.2d 677, 680 (1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 833, 92 S.Ct. 82, 30 L.Ed.2d 63 (1971). For application of the same rule to factual findings by administrative agencies, see Hendrix v. Graham Tire Co., 520 N.W.2d 876 (S.D.1994); Foltz v. Warner Transp., 516 N.W.2d 338 (S.D.1994); Zacher v. Homestake Mining Co., 514 N.W.2d 394 (S.D.1994); Guthmiller v. South Dakota Dept. of Transp., 502 N.W.2d 586, 588 (S.D.1993); Day v. John Morrell and Co., 490 N.W.2d 720 (S.D.1992); Caldwell v. John Morrell & Co., 489 N.W.2d 353 (S.D.1992); Lien v. Miracle Span Corp., 456 N.W.2d 563 (S.D.1990); Lawler v. Windmill Restaurant, 435 N.W.2d 708, 711 (S.D.1989); Wold v. Meilman Food Indus., Inc., 269 N.W.2d 112 (S.D.1978). As support for blanket application of the clearly erroneous test, the minority relies on a decision by the United States Supreme Court, Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Interpreting a federal rule identical to SDCL 15-6-52(a), the Anderson Court required clearly erroneous review regardless of the form of the evidence presented. Id. In so holding, the Court deferred to the trial judge's expertise in determining issues of fact. Id. We are not convinced by the reasoning of Anderson. First, a federal court's reading of a federal rule has no binding force on this Court's interpretation of a state statute. Second, when evidence is presented via deposition, affidavit or exhibit, we are as capable of reviewing the record as the trial court. Foltz, 516 N.W.2d at 340-41; State Auto Casualty Underwriters v. Ruotsalainen, 81 S.D. 472, 479, 136 N.W.2d 884, 888 (1965). A trial judge's superior fact-finding abilities relate to his opportunity to observe and evaluate live testimony; when physical or documentary evidence is offered, the trial court is in no better position to intelligently weigh the evidence than the appellate court. Id. Despite the high-powered arguments to the contrary, we decline to depart from our settled authority. In accordance with our well-established precedent, our Court will continue to apply the de novo standard of review to findings that are based on documentary evidence. SABERS and KONENKAMP, JJ., concur. TIMM, Circuit Judge, dissents.