Opinion ID: 1297463
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Copeland's Motion for a Mistrial

Text: Copeland next alleges that the closing argument of the solicitor was so prejudicial that it denied her a fair trial and, therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant her mistrial motion. We disagree. A solicitor's closing argument must not appeal to the personal biases of the jurors. In addition, the argument may not be calculated to arouse the jurors' passions or prejudices, and its content should stay within the record and reasonable inferences to it. State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981). The trial court has broad discretion when dealing with the propriety of the solicitor's argument, including the question of whether to grant a defendant's mistrial motion. Id.; State v. Dawkins, 297 S.C. 386, 377 S.E.2d 298 (1989). The trial court's discretion will not be overturned absent a showing of an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law that prejudices the defendant. State v. Washington, 315 S.C. 108, 432 S.E.2d 448 (1992); Dawkins, supra . On appeal, the appellate court will view the alleged impropriety of the solicitor's argument in the context of the entire record. The appellant has the burden of proving she did not receive a fair trial because of the alleged improper argument. Id. Copeland's first objection to the closing argument concerned the solicitor's references to the contents of conversations the police had with her husband and his employer. The trial court sustained Copeland's objection telling the solicitor that he could only refer to facts already in evidence. The second objection came when the solicitor speculated that Copeland was involved in an extortion plan whereby she demanded money from men whom she told were the father of her children. The trial court again sustained Copeland's objection stating, There is no evidence that that's what she was doing ... Stay away from it. Next, Copeland objected to the solicitor's speculation that the reason Copeland visited the Victim at work on March 22nd was to ascertain whether he would have money that night. The trial court denied Copeland's objection ruling that the solicitor was arguing a permissible inference from the record. Copeland's next objection came when the solicitor stated that Copeland told Carter that the Victim had plenty of money and carried two wallets. The trial court informed the solicitor that the evidence in the record did not support this comment and to stay away from it. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the solicitor's remark. The next objection came when the solicitor told the jury that Carter met with Copeland to divide the money taken from the Victim. The trial court sustained the objection ruling that the argument was not supported by the evidence and charged the following: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this is why I told you that you believe what you hear from the witness stand. These two attorneys, they're advocates. They're trying to express their positions in this case. They would not intentionally say something that they didn't think was in the record, but in their enthusiasm sometimes, that might happen. That's why you have to rely on your collective memories of what took place. The sixth objection came when the solicitor represented to the jury that Copeland obtained the Victim's wallets, and that when Carter ran from the crime scene, she called him to come back. The trial court overruled this objection stating that the solicitor was merely commenting on circumstantial evidence in the record. The final objection came when the solicitor argued that Copeland was the mastermind in the plan and, therefore, Carter was less culpable then she. In response to this objection, the trial court warned the solicitor that he was skating on thin ice. We take this opportunity to caution counsel to confine their comments to the facts presented and reasonable inferences from such facts. In this matter, Copeland's objections to the solicitor's comments were either properly overruled, or the objectionable portion was corrected by a curative charge. Based upon our review of the record as a whole, the solicitor's comments did not infect Copeland's trial with unfairness to the extent that her conviction was a denial of due process. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986); State v. Hawkins, 292 S.C. 418, 357 S.E.2d 10 (1987), overruled on other grounds, State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). Because Copeland has not established that she was deprived of a fair determination of her guilt or innocence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her mistrial motion.