Opinion ID: 181032
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Warshak's New Trial Motion: Brady

Text: The next issue is whether the district court erred in denying Warshak's motion for a new trial, which was based on the assertion that the government had suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady. This court reviews [the] denial of a motion for new trial based on Brady violations under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Jones, 399 F.3d 640, 647 (6th Cir.2005)). However, the district court's determination as to the existence of a Brady violation is reviewed de novo. Id. at 416-17 (citing United States v. Miller, 161 F.3d 977, 987 (6th Cir. 1998)). To establish a violation of Brady, the [defendant] has the burden of establishing that the prosecutor suppressed evidence; that such evidence was favorable to the defense; and that the suppressed evidence was material. Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir.2000). [E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (holding that the touchstone of materiality is a `reasonable probability' of a different result). Moreover, in determining whether undisclosed evidence is material, the suppressed evidence is considered collectively, rather than item-by-item, to determine if the `reasonable probability' test is met. Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1012 (6th Cir.1999). In this case, the information alleged to constitute Brady material was discovered post-trial while Warshak was defending himself in a civil action involving the FTC. During that litigation, Warshak deposed Sue and Greg Cossman, his sister and brother-in-law, whom the government had interviewed extensively in the run-up to Warshak's criminal trial. [37] In their depositions, the Cossmans spoke favorably of Berkeley and testified that government investigators were pushing a particular version of the facts. In addition to the depositions, Warshak's involvement in the FTC litigation led to the discovery of (1) several recordings of Berkeley sales calls during which disclosure of the auto-ship program was made and (2) several printouts of Berkeley's website on which disclosure of the auto-ship program could be seen. Warshak argues that this evidence was exculpatory and should have been turned over prior to trial. However, Warshak's argument fails because the evidence at issue was not material for Brady purposes. First of all, with respect to Sue Cossman's deposition testimony, it must be noted that, as Warshak's sister and a participant in the Berkeley fraud, she had plenty of incentive to stretch the truth in Warshak's favor. Furthermore, many of the favorable things she said in her deposition were echoed in the statements of trial witnesses, who stated that they did not realize what they were doing was wrong. Thus, the cumulative nature of her deposition testimony cuts against a finding of materiality. See Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir.1996) ([W]hen the undisclosed evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence, no Brady violation occurs.). Finally, her testimony would not have undermined confidence in the finding of fraud, as numerous witnesses and scores of emails confirmed that Berkeley executives were engaging in deliberately deceitful practices. See Jones, 399 F.3d at 648 (Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, a new trial under Brady was inappropriate.). Greg Cossman's deposition testimony is likewise immaterial. Critically, Greg Cossman took the stand at Warshak's trial, at which time he actually made most of the favorable remarks that later appeared in his post-trial deposition. [38] For example, Cossman testified at trial that, while [he] was participating at Berkeley, [he] had no suspicion of participating in a conspiracy doing anything that was criminal. Also, Cossman apparently testified that the government's investigators were calculating, ruthless, relentless and intimidating. In light of these statements, Greg Cossman's post-trial deposition testimony adds nothing new to the mix, and it therefore does not constitute Brady material. Nor can it be said that the tapes and printouts meet the materiality requirement. Though the recorded calls do contain disclosure of the auto-ship program, that fact is not particularly helpful to Warshak's case, given the testimony that the disclosures were designed to be ineffective. Similarly, the appearance of the disclosure on the company website at a given instant in time is also unhelpful; there was testimony that the disclosure on the website appeared, shifted, and disappeared like water in the vision of a desert traveler. As a consequence, these materials do not generate a reasonable probability of a different result. [39] Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that Warshak failed to demonstrate a Brady violation.