Opinion ID: 2353423
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: counsel and expert fees

Text: In determining whether to award counsel fees the trial court must consider the total financial resources of the parties in light of the statutory criteria. General Statutes §§ 46b-62 and 46b-82; Devino v. Devino, 190 Conn. 36, 458 A.2d 692 (1983); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 190 Conn. 26, 459 A.2d 498 (1983); Venuti v. Venuti, 185 Conn. 156, 440 A.2d 878 (1981). In Koizim v. Koizim, supra, 501, we stated three broad principles by which these statutory criteria are to be applied. First, such awards should not be made merely because the obligor has demonstrated an ability to pay. Second, where both parties are financially able to pay their own fees and expenses, they should be permitted to do so. Third, where, because of other orders, the potential obligee has ample liquid funds, an allowance of counsel fees is not justified. In Arrigoni v. Arrigoni, 184 Conn. 513, 519, 440 A.2d 206 (1981), we refined Koizim by pointing out that ample liquid funds did not mean sufficient cash to pay the attorney's bill, observing that counsel fees could be awarded in situations where apparently substantial funds were practically, if not legally, obligated to meet the continuing cost of medical care due to the spouse's permanent physical disability. In Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 190 Conn. 26, 459 A.2d 498 (1983), we further refined Koizim by setting forth guidelines to aid the trial court in making its determination. We there stated (p. 34) if, based on the total financial resources of the parties, the trial court concludes that denying an award of counsel fees would not undermine its purpose in making its prior financial orders, the court should allow each party to pay his or her own counsel fees. If, on the other hand, the trial court concludes, based on the total financial resources of the parties, that denying an award of counsel fees would undermine its prior financial orders, then it may award counsel fees to the requesting party. In sum, three categories of cases should be noted, namely, (1) those in which an award of counsel fees and expenses is not only justified but the denial of such award would be an abuse of discretion because it would substantially undermine the other awards; (2) the broad spectrum of cases in which the granting or denial of counsel fees is within the court's discretion and therefore will rarely be disturbed and (3) those cases in which for the reasons stated above the award of counsel fees would constitute an abuse of discretion. This case factually falls into the third category. The assignment of property and alimony awards in the aggregate are generous. The liquid assets being made available are ample. The defendant, on the basis of a gross weekly salary of $750 and of other monetary benefits the total amount of which the trial referee did not determine, was ordered to pay the plaintiff $40,000 in cash in one year and $100,000 in cash, over a period of seven years, $20,000 of which was to be paid the first year and the balance in a descending order of payments over the remaining period. The plaintiff, for her part, had had some business training background and has indicated a desire to engage in business activity. The trial referee found her to be resourceful, energetic and in good health and concluded that she should obtain employment for which she is fitted. Taking into account all of the foregoing circumstances, the additional award of counsel and expert fees is not justified.