Opinion ID: 1506787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Federal Statutory and Constitutional Claims

Text: Having considered the state law grounds advanced by the depositors, we now reach their federal statutory and constitutional claims. Each will be addressed in turn. However, we must first address a threshold issue in respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Governor asserts that he is not amenable to suit in his official capacity because he is not a person within the contemplation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [19] In this contention the Governor is correct. In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), Justice White, writing for five members of the Court, reasoned that because Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity and so to alter the federal-state balance    we cannot accept [the] argument that Congress intended nevertheless to create a cause of action against States to be brought in state courts, which are precisely the courts Congress sought to allow civil rights claimants to avoid through § 1983. 491 U.S. at 66, 109 S.Ct. at 2310, 105 L.Ed.2d at 55. The Court therefore held that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are `persons' under § 1983. 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d at 58. We are bound by Will 's authoritative construction of § 1983. Since the depositors have sued the Governor in his official capacity that portion of the depositors' complaint based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was properly denied by summary judgment. A