Opinion ID: 2704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Walczyk's Excessive Bail Claim

Text: Connecticut law allows state police to set temporary bail in certain cases. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 54-63 c(a). [23] The district court dismissed Walczyk's excessive bail claim as a matter of law, holding that when a police officer sets temporary bail pursuant to this statute, he performs a judicial function and hence has absolute immunity from suit. Walczyk v. Rio, 339 F.Supp.2d at 390. Other district courts in Connecticut have similarly ruled. See Sanchez v. Doyle, 254 F.Supp.2d 266, 269-73 (D.Conn.2003); accord Machuca v. Canning, No. 3:00-cv-1722, 2006 WL 2828160, at  (D.Conn. Sept. 29, 2006); Minney v. Kradas, No. 3:01-cv-1543, 2004 WL 725330, at -4, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5520, at -11 (D.Conn. Mar. 31, 2004); Bacciocchi v. Chapman, No. 3:02-cv-1403, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1077, at -20 (D.Conn. Jan. 26, 2004); Clynch v. Chapman, 285 F.Supp.2d at 219-23. Citing Sanchez and Clynch by analogy, this court recently concluded that absolute judicial immunity shielded a prosecutor who ordered a defendant's bond increased pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 54-63d because the prosecutor was performing a judicial function. See Root v. Liston, 444 F.3d at 132 (observing that courts apply functional approach to immunity questions). Following Root, we now hold what the citations to Sanchez and Clynch implied: police officers setting bail under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 54-63c(a) are engaged in a judicial function that affords them absolute immunity. It is . . . well established that officials acting in a judicial capacity are entitled to absolute immunity against § 1983 actions, and this immunity acts as a complete shield to claims for money damages. Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir.1999) (extending absolute immunity to parole board officials performing a quasi-judicial function in making parole decisions); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (granting absolute immunity to administrative hearing examiners performing adjudicatory functions within federal agencies). As the Supreme Court has explained, it is the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that inform[s] our immunity analysis. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (holding that judges do not enjoy absolute immunity when performing administrative, legislative, or executive functions). Following this functional approach to immunity questions, this court in Root v. Liston observed that [o]rdinarily, it is judges who set bail, and judges enjoy absolute immunity when they do so. 444 F.3d at 132 (internal citations omitted). In short, because the setting of bail is a judicial function, see Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 205, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985), absolute immunity extends to police officers when they perform that function pursuant to statute. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Walczyk's excessive bail claim.