Opinion ID: 1290325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis of jurisdictional issue

Text: We begin our analysis of the jurisdictional issue by recalling that where a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dispute, determination of the issue is a matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent from that of the inferior court, Wagner v. Unicord Corp., 247 Neb. 217, 526 N.W.2d 74 (1995); however, where such a question rests on factual findings, a trial court's decision on the issue will be upheld unless the factual findings concerning jurisdiction are clearly wrong, State ex rel. Grape v. Zach, 247 Neb. 29, 524 N.W.2d 788 (1994). With that in mind, we direct our attention to the relevant statute, § 43-247, which provides: The juvenile court in each county as herein provided shall have jurisdiction of ... (3) Any juvenile (a) who is homeless or destitute, or without proper support through no fault of his or her parent, guardian, or custodian.... The statutes do not define homeless, destitute, or without proper support as used in § 43-247(3)(a), nor have we heretofore specifically articulated what type of evidence is necessary to establish that one is a juvenile coming within the ambit of § 43-247(3)(a) because the juvenile is, through no fault of the parent, guardian, or custodian, homeless, destitute, or without proper support. However, other courts have dealt with similar questions. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has interpreted language defining a dependent child as one who is `without proper parental care or control ...' to encompass two discrete questions: Is the child at this moment without proper parental care or control, and if so, is such care and control immediately available? In re Interest of Justin S., 375 Pa.Super. 88, 96, 543 A.2d 1192, 1196 (1988). The Arizona Supreme Court has held that the dependency provisions of its state's statutes do not proscribe any parental conduct or omission, but, rather, are concerned only with the welfare of children and whether their essential needs are being met. In a dependency action, the only inquiry is whether a child is in need of care which for any reason is not being provided. Matter of Depend. Nos. JD-89-006 & JD-89-007, 167 Ariz. 98, 804 P.2d 827 (App.1990); Matter of Daniel, Deborah and Leslie H., 591 P.2d 1175 (Okla.1979). See In re Appeal in Maricopa Cty., Juv. Action No. J-75482, 111 Ariz. 588, 536 P.2d 197 (1975). The only issue before the court in In re Bishop, 36 Ohio App.3d 123, 521 N.E.2d 838 (1987), was whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in adjudicating the minor child to be a dependent. The court noted that the focus of a charge that a child is dependent is on the child and his conditions and not on the fault of the parents. The court stated that a finding of dependency must be rooted in the question of whether the child is receiving proper care. See, also, In re Campbell, 13 Ohio App.3d 34, 468 N.E.2d 93 (1983); In re Bibb, 70 Ohio App.2d 117, 435 N.E.2d 96 (1980). Cf. In re East, 32 Ohio Misc. 65, 67, 288 N.E.2d 343, 345 (1972) ([c]ertainly, the faults and failures of parents may be contributing factors creating a condition or environment such as to warrant the state to intercede in the child's behalf). In determining that the county court failed to acquire jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals relied upon In re Interest of D.M.B., 240 Neb. 349, 481 N.W.2d 905 (1992). Therein, the State alleged that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over the minor because she lacked proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of her mother in that the mother had sexually abused the minor. Later, the State amended its petition by removing the sexual abuse claim and asserting instead that the mother had been involved with the juvenile court for 2 years in an effort to resolve her poor parenting skills with reference to the minor's three siblings, with the result that the mother's rights in and to the siblings had been terminated. Notwithstanding the lack of any allegation that the mother's poor parenting of the siblings had any effect upon the minor then at issue or that the mother's poor parenting of the siblings placed the minor then in question at risk, the juvenile court, unbothered by the fact that the minor had not even been born when it took jurisdiction over the siblings, concluded it needed no factual basis to assume jurisdiction over the minor because it was well aware of its previous dealings with the mother concerning the other siblings. Under those circumstances, we ruled that the juvenile court had acquired no jurisdiction over the minor. But the situation in In re Interest of D.M.B. is hardly the situation here. Not only did jurisdiction in In re Interest of D.M.B. depend upon establishing lack of parental care by reason of the fault or habits of the mother, there were no allegations, let alone proof, that the mother's fault or habits in any way injured or put the minor at risk of harm. In contrast, we are not here concerned with anyone's faults or habits; we are concerned only with the conditions in which the infant found herself. While the Court of Appeals correctly noted that the affidavit providing the only evidence at the adjudication hearing recited little about the father, it does reveal that the infant failed to gain weight while she was in the joint physical care of both her mother and father. That is not an insignificant fact. The dual purpose of proceedings brought under § 43-247(3)(a) on the ground that a juvenile is homeless, destitute, or without proper support through no fault of the parents, guardian, or custodian is to protect the welfare of the minor and to safeguard the parents' right to properly raise their own child; a petition thereunder is brought on behalf of the child, not to punish the parents. See, Matter of La Shonda B., 95 Cal.App.3d 593, 157 Cal.Rptr. 280 (1979); Collins v. Superior Court in and for County of Los Angeles, 74 Cal.App.3d 47, 141 Cal.Rptr. 273 (1977). The father, after having been afforded his due process rights, including the appointment of counsel, chose not to contest the State's allegations, and the record made at the adjudication hearing supports the county court's finding that, at the very least, the infant, through no fault of the parents, was destitute and without proper support. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the county court had not acquired the requisite jurisdiction. The county court had acquired jurisdiction over the infant and thereby had jurisdiction to make orders in the infant's best interests, consistent with the father's rights.