Opinion ID: 2356925
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Consent Instruction Was Erroneous

Text: ¶ 23 We first address Jeffs' claim that the jury instruction regarding consent was erroneous. Jeffs argues that the instruction erroneously focused the jury on Jeffs' actions and position of special trust, rather than on Steed's, for the purpose of determining whether Wall consented to sexual intercourse. We agree that the consent instruction was erroneous. ¶ 24 As previously indicated, the State identified three different sections of the consent statute pursuant to which it argued that the sexual intercourse between Wall and Steed was without Wall's consent. First, under subsection (1) of the consent statute, the State argued that Wall showed express[] lack of consent through words or conduct. Id. § 76-5-406(1). As evidence of this lack of consent, the State relied on Wall's pleas to Jeffs not to make her marry Steed, her repeated refusal during the marriage ceremony to answer I do, her reluctance to kiss Steed, and her running from the room and locking herself in the bathroom after the ceremony. The State additionally argued that Wall continued to show an express lack of consent after the ceremony by attempting to avoid physical contact with Steed, crying, and begging Steed not to have sexual intercourse with her. ¶ 25 Second, under subsection (10), the State argued that Wall was under eighteen years of age and that Jeffs was in a position of special trust in relation to Wall. Id. § 76-5-406(10). As used in subsection (10), `position of special trust' means [a] position occupied by a person in a position of authority, who, by reason of that position is able to exercise undue influence over the victim, and includes, but is not limited to, a ... religious leader.... Id. § 76-5-404.1(4)(h). At trial, the State argued that Jeffs occupied a position of special trust in relation to Wall because he was her religious leader, and as such had near absolute control over her, her family, and her entire community. Further, he used his position as a religious leader to put Wall in a circumstance where she had no choice but to submit to unwanted sexual intercourse. ¶ 26 Third, under subsection (11), the State argued that Wall was over fourteen years of age but under eighteen years of age, that Jeffs was more than three years her senior, and that Jeffs used psychological and religious manipulation to entice Wall to submit to unwanted sexual intercourse. See id. § 76-5-406(11). To support this theory, the State cited Jeffs' actions of convincing Wall to enter into the marriage, his direction during the wedding ceremony that Wall and Steed multiply and replenish the earth, and his later refusal to release her from the marriage coupled with his counsel that she go home and give [her]self to [Steed] ... mind, body and soul. ¶ 27 The instruction given to the jury reflected the State's three theories. It stated the following: An act of sexual intercourse is without consent of a person under any, all, or a combination of the following circumstances: 1. The person expresses lack of consent through words or conduct; or 2. The person was 14 years of age or older, but younger than 18 years of age, and the actor was more than three years older than the person and enticed the person to submit or participate; or 3. The person was younger than 18 years of age and at the time of the offense the actor occupied a position of special trust in relation to the person. ¶ 28 In order to clarify the State's second and third theories, the court also gave the following instructions: In order to find the victim's lack of consent because the victim is younger than 18 years of age and at the time of the offense that the Defendant occupied a position of special trust in relation to Elis[s]a Wall you must be convinced that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed by a person who occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim. ... In order to find that Elissa Wall was enticed the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant lured or induced a person to submit to or to participate in an act of sexual intercourse. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 29 Jeffs argues that it was impermissible for the court to focus the jury on his own position of special trust and on his own enticing actions in determining whether the intercourse between Steed and Wall was consensual. Rather, Jeffs contends that the jury should have been asked to consider whether Steed was in a position of special trust and whether Steed enticed Wall. We agree with Jeffs. ¶ 30 While the jury instruction appears to track the statutory language, the instruction erroneously interprets the statute's use of the term actor, as used in Utah Code sections 76-5-406(10) and (11), to refer to the defendant, Jeffs, rather than to Steed. Those sections provide that the intercourse will be deemed to be nonconsensual if the victim is younger than 18 years of age and at the time of the offense the actor ... occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim, or if the victim is 14 years of age or older, but younger than 18 years of age, and the actor is more than three years older than the victim and entices or coerces the victim to submit or participate.... Id. § 76-5-406(10)-(11) (emphases added). As evidenced by the additional clarifying instruction, the State interprets the term actor to mean the defendant. ¶ 31 We conclude that the State's interpretation is erroneous. In interpreting a statute, we look to its plain language. Dale T. Smith & Sons v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2009 UT 19, ¶ 7, 208 P.3d 533. We read statutory provisions literally, unless such a reading would result in an unreasonable or inoperable result. State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, ¶ 7, 217 P.3d 265. And `we assume the legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning.' Id. (quoting State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ¶ 8, 52 P.3d 1276). `[E]ach part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.' State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, ¶ 10, 203 P.3d 1000 (quoting Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ¶ 7, 162 P.3d 1099). ¶ 32 Actor is defined by statute as a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(2). The person whose criminal responsibility is at issue in a criminal action will usually be the defendant. For example, under the rape statute, [a] person commits rape when the actor has sexual intercourse with another person without the victim's consent. Id. § 76-5-402(1). Under the rape statute, therefore, the actor must be the person who has nonconsensual sexual intercourse with the victim or, in other words, the defendant who is being prosecuted for an act of rape. ¶ 33 But section 76-1-601 also provides that its definition of actor does not apply to those statutes that provide otherwise. And we conclude that the consent statute provides otherwise. The opening words of section 76-5-406 specifically indicate that the section discusses the act of sexual intercourse and the circumstances under which that act occurs without consent. Id. § 76-5-406. Because the act at issue is the act of sexual intercourse, the term actor as used in subsections (10) and (11) must necessarily relate back to the underlying act of sexual intercourse. And the term actor must refer to the person who engages in the act at issue. Therefore, the actor is the person who engages in sexual intercourse. To read the statute otherwise would require us to sever the term actor from the context of the surrounding provisions. Because Jeffs did not engage in sexual intercourse with Wall, it was erroneous for the jury instructions to equate the term actor with the term defendant in instructing the jury as to whether the State had met its burden of proving that the sexual intercourse between Steed and Wall was nonconsensual. ¶ 34 Our conclusion that the term actor refers to the individual engaging in the act of intercourse is consistent with the principle that, in order for accomplice liability to arise, there must be an underlying offense. Only after there is a determination that an offense has been committed can the law impose liability on another party who solicit[ed], request[ed], command[ed], encourag[ed], or intentionally aid[ed] in the commission of that offense. Id. § 76-2-202. To determine whether a rape has occurred, section 76-5-406 is applied and a determination is made of whether there was sexual intercourse without consent. The question of accomplice liability cannot enter the equation until after a determination has been made that a crime has been committed. As a result, the use of the term actor under the consent statute can refer only to the person engaging in the act of intercourse. ¶ 35 To construe the statute otherwise would lead to absurd results. For example, if the term actor as used in subsection (10) of the consent statute is deemed to refer to the defendant in an accomplice-liability case, a parent who encourages his pregnant minor daughter to marry the adult father of her unborn baby would satisfy the requirements of that subsection, thereby rendering any further intercourse between the couple nonconsensual and the parent guilty of a first degree felony as an accomplice to rape. ¶ 36 In summary, we hold that the term actor as used in subsections (10) and (11) of Utah Code section 76-5-406 refers to the person who engaged in the act of sexual intercourse. As a result, those subsections could not be applied to Jeffs. Only Steed's position of special trust or Steed's efforts of enticement were relevant in determining whether Wall consented to sexual intercourse. Because the consent instructions told the jury that defendant Jeffs' position of special trust and defendant Jeffs' enticement of Wall could give rise to a lack of consent, they were erroneous. ¶ 37 Having concluded that the jury instructions on consent were erroneous, we must consider whether they require reversal of Jeffs' convictions. [T]o reverse a trial verdict, [we] must find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result. Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ¶ 20, 993 P.2d 191 (quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993)). We find such a likelihood here. ¶ 38 The consent instruction given to the jury stated: An act of sexual intercourse is without consent of a person under any, all, or a combination of the following circumstances.... (emphasis added). It then listed the State's three theories of non consent, two of which we have held to be erroneous. Because no special verdict form was employed at trial, the jury was not required to indicate the basis for its finding that the intercourse between Steed and Wall was nonconsensual. We therefore cannot determine with certainty whether Jeffs was convicted on the basis of the one valid theory, the two erroneous theories, or on some combination of the three. And because there was no real dispute at trial that Jeffs was in a position of special trust with respect to Wall, a theory we have held to be erroneous, it is highly likely that Jeffs was convicted on the basis of an erroneous theory. Such a likelihood requires reversal of his convictions and a remand for a new trial.