Opinion ID: 147192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Oaks's Right to Self-Representation

Text: Oaks next claims the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation when it appointed substitute counsel. The appointment of substitute counsel is within the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Mentzos, 462 F.3d 830, 839 (8th Cir.2006). While the Sixth Amendment does not explicitly guarantee the right of self-representation, such a right is necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In order to represent himself, a defendant must knowingly and intelligently forgo the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. While the defendant is not required to have the skill and expertise of a lawyer to represent himself, he should know the dangers of self-representation, so the record must establish he made an informed choice. Id. The right to self-representation is not absolute. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). A defendant who wishes to waive his right to counsel, and thereby proceed pro se, must do so clearly and unequivocally. United States v. Washington, 596 F.3d 926, 939 (8th Cir. 2010). The defendant must first make his request to proceed pro se in a timely manner, after which the district court retains the ability to terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct. United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 808 (8th Cir.2006) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525). The district court also has the authority to refuse to allow a defendant to represent himself when the defendant is unable to `knowingly and intelligently' forgo the `traditional benefits associated with right to counsel.' Id. (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525). Oaks's claimed Sixth Amendment violation is without basis in fact. The record demonstrates Oaks expressed displeasure with his appointed attorney, forcing the attorney to move to withdraw. At the motion hearing, Oaks unequivocally stated, I ask that I have better counsel, that I have a lawyer who will represent me. Motions Tr. at 3. Oaks indicated he would not proceed with his current appointed counsel. The court advised him it would not appoint substitute counsel and Oaks would be forced to represent himself if the motion was granted. Oaks then agreed to represent himself, but expressed concern over his ability to properly prepare. See id. at 9 (Can I ÔÇö I mean, if I'm not allowed to go to the law library, I find it impossible to try to even start to fight for myself.). Within days after refusing the request for substitute counsel, the district court reversed itself and appointed a new attorney. The court recognized the obstacles Oaks faced in accessing legal materials due to his heightened custody status, as voiced by Oaks during the motions hearing. The district court believed these obstacles ultimately impacted Oaks's ability to competently represent himself, and accordingly it appointed substitute counsel in line with his original request. Under these circumstances, the factual predicate for Oaks's current claim is based on a misrepresentation of the record and his allegation of error is rejected. The district court acted within its discretion in appointing Oaks substitute counsel.