Opinion ID: 2634701
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applying the second part of the Frank test here

Text: The defendants' appellate brief does not directly discuss how the second part of the Frank test applies here. [38] But their analysis of the third and fourth Turner factors impact of accommodation and availability of ready alternativesconvincingly addresses the values that underlie the second part of the Frank test. Superintendent Armstrong's affidavit provides evidence that the contact visitation accommodations Larson seeks (and that other prisoners would also then predictably claim) would require significant resource outlays to mitigate against the resulting increased risk of contraband smuggling. These outlays would result from increased searches, monitoring, or both. [39] Armstrong's affidavit states that budgetary constraints would prevent Spring Creek from implementing the security measures Larson proposes without jeopardizing other areas of Spring Creek. Larson's claim that an accommodation would be virtually without cost does not create genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment for the defendants. [40] The record in this case establishes beyond dispute that Larson's recommendation that he and his wife be strip-searched, or that he be placed in a dry cell in connection with each religious visit, would be resource-intensive; the cost would be multiplied by the accommodations needed to satisfy other prisoners who would inevitably claim similar privileges. [41] Likewise, we are unpersuaded by Larson's claim that, because the religious visits would take place in a room currently designated for attorney-client visits, increased monitoring would not be necessary. Larson asserts that the room has large one-way observation mirrors that permit officers in or around the shift supervisor's office across the hallway to monitor visits while going about their other tasks; no additional prison resources would have to be dedicated to the monitoring effort. As a matter of law, this proposed accommodation raises no genuine factual dispute. Monitoring contact visits is an important security function that cannot be informally satisfied by random observations by officers who happen to be going past the observation mirrors. [42] Spring Creek placed additional limits on contact visits in 1999, but did not prohibit them entirely. The defendants argue that the new rules are a proportionate response to the risks posed by contact visits: the new rules limit the opportunities to smuggle contraband while affording some opportunity to engage in the natural desire to be physically affectionate with friends and loved ones. Courts are generally ill-positioned to second-guess prison administrators' judgment that hand-holding between visitors and maximum security prisoners would jeopardize the state's compelling interest in security. In any event, we conclude that Larson has not demonstrated that any genuine, material factual disputes precluded summary judgment for defendants on Larson's state free exercise claim.