Opinion ID: 2081827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prior identification exception.

Text: The government argues that the evidence it introduced under an excited utterance rubric could and should have been admitted as a prior identification. Even if there were potential substantive merit to this theory, which there is not, we entertain some doubt as to whether it would be procedurally fair to the appellants to decide the issue on the present record. The law is clear that the [prosecutor] and the trial court, not the . . . appellant[s], had the legal responsibility to clarify the basis for admitting testimony, over objection, that otherwise was inadmissible hearsay. In re Ty.B., 878 A.2d 1255, 1264-65 (D.C.2005) (quoting Patton v. United States, 633 A.2d 800, 809 (D.C. 1993) (per curiam)). Had this ground for admission been asserted by the prosecution in the trial court, the defense attorneys could have, and surely would have, refocused their questioning of the witness and their arguments to the trial court accordingly. Moreover, in cases involving alleged prior identifications, as in other cases, decisions as to the admissibility of evidence generally are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 402 (D.C. 2000). Here, the trial judge had no opportunity to exercise his discretion on this issue, for the point was not presented to him. In any event, the prior identification exception cannot apply because the challenged testimony contained no identification. The purported identification, in its entirety, was as follows: Q: Did Mr. Holmes tell you who it was he saw do this to Carlos? A: HeI said, Greenwood [Mr. Holmes' nickname] do you know who the guys were[?] He said I've never seen them before but he was lying. . . . THE WITNESS: I said did you know them [the kidnappers][?] THE COURT: Did you know them[?] THE WITNESS: He said no, he never seen them before. In Ms. Sudler's testimony regarding Mr. Holmes' account, the abductors were never described as anything other than two dudes or guys. Holmes provided no information regarding their race, color, height, weight, physical characteristics, or clothing, and he claimed not to know their names. As counsel for Stewart argue in their reply brief, Mr. Holmes' statement would more accurately be characterized as a statement of `non-identification.' [16] We recently observed that the prior identification exception applies to statements of identification, but not to detailed accounts of the actual crime. Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 89 (D.C.2004). The statement here at issue presents the precise converse of what is permitted under Brown; it provides details of the crime, but no identification of the culprits. The judge could not reasonably have concluded that Holmes' statement to Ms. Sudler was one of prior identification. A fortiori, it would not have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to decline to admit the statement on that ground.