Opinion ID: 2802763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The FOIA’s Internal Memoranda Exemption

Text: The principal statutory provision at issue in this case, West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(8) provides: “[i]nternal memoranda or letters received or prepared by any public body” are specifically exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. Through the development of case law, this FOIA exemption is commonly referred to as the “deliberative process” exemption and we use the terms interchangeably. The precise question presented here is an issue of first impression for this Court: whether a state 9 We promptly dispose of Highland’s assignment of error that the circuit court failed to impose the burden of proof on WVU to establish the applicability of the FOIA exemptions it asserted. The appendix record reveals the circuit court properly held WVU to its burden: WVU produced multiple, detailed Vaughn indices (e.g., the index attached to the fourth production of documents was fifty-two pages); filed numerous briefs on the merits of its claimed exemptions; participated in oral arguments; and submitted documents for the circuit court’s in camera review. 10 In Highland’s brief to this Court, it argues that WVU either waived its reliance on the “trade secret” exemption under FOIA or failed to establish it. Because WVU does not argue how the “trade secret” exemption may apply to any documents withheld in this case, we agree. See generally Addair v. Bryant, 168 W.Va. 306, 316, 284 S.E.2d 374, 382 (1981) (holding this Court may deem as waived any issue not argued in party’s appellate brief). 12 university may invoke the “internal memoranda” exemption with respect to documents related to its professor’s scientific/academic research. The parties do not cite any precedent interpreting other states’ FOIAs directly on point. We begin our analysis with our leading case on this issue, Daily Gazette I. A newspaper made FOIA requests to the West Virginia Development Office seeking information involving the Development Office’s deliberations about whether to support a proposed industrial plant in Mason County, West Virginia. In response, the Development Office released certain documents but withheld others on the ground they were “internal memoranda” exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. 198 W.V. at 567, 482 S.E.2d at 566. We set forth the criteria courts must apply when addressing the FOIA’s “internal memoranda” exemption in syllabus point four of Daily Gazette I: W.Va.Code, [§ 29B-1-4(a)(8)],11 which exempts from disclosure “internal memoranda or letters received or prepared by any public body” specifically exempts from disclosure only those written internal government communications consisting of advice, opinions and recommendations which reflect a public body’s deliberative, decision-making process; written advice, opinions and recommendations from one public body to another; and written advice, opinions and recommendations to a public body from outside consultants or experts obtained during the public body’s deliberative, decision-making process. W.Va. Code, [§ 29B-1-4(a)(8)] does not exempt from disclosure written communications between a public body and private persons or entities where such communications do not consist of advice, opinions or recommendations to the public body 11 The syllabus point cites West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(8) (1977), which contains the same language as West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(8) (2012). 13 from outside consultants or experts obtained during the public body’s deliberative, decision-making process. 198 W.Va. at 575, 482 S.E.2d at 192 (footnote added). In Daily Gazette I, we recognized the relationship between West Virginia’s FOIA “internal memoranda” exemption and the federal FOIA counterpart, which exempts from public disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994). 198 W.Va. at 571, 482 S.E.2d 188. This federal FOIA exemption “preserves to government agencies ‘such recognized evidentiary privileges as the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product privilege, and the executive “deliberative process” privilege.’ Schell [v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice], 843 F.2d [933] at 939 [(6th Cir. 1988)] (citing Parke, Davis & Co. v. Califano, 623 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1980)).” Daily Gazette I, 198 W.Va. at 571, 482 S.E.2d at 188. We acknowledged the “deliberative process” privilege wording of the federal FOIA differs from that of West Virginia’s FOIA. Id. Nevertheless, we found federal precedent useful in construing our FOIA. In Daily Gazette I, we cited a seminal decision from the United States Supreme Court on the “deliberative process” privilege, N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975): 14 [t]he cases uniformly rest the [deliberative process] privilege on the policy of protecting the “decision making processes of government agencies,” . . . and focus on documents “reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” . . . The point, plainly made in [S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965)], is that the “frank discussion of legal or policy matters” in writing might be inhibited if the discussion were made public; and that the “decisions” and “policies formulated” would be the poorer as a result. Daily Gazette I, 198 W.Va. at 572, 482 S.E.2d at 189 (quoting Sears Roebuck, 421 U.S. at 150). The “deliberative process” privilege is designed to protect the quality of government decision-making by ensuring that it is not done “in a fishbowl.” EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87 (1973), superceded by statute, Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2002). This FOIA exemption encourages free discussion of alternatives, and “insulates against the chilling effect likely were officials to be judged not on the basis of their final decisions, but ‘for matters they considered before making up their minds.’” City of Virginia Beach, Va. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 995 F.2d 1247, 1253 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 772-73 (D.C. Cir. 1978), overruled in part on other grounds, Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). “While transparency in government is an important democratic value, our society has often recognized that many important governmental functions operate best removed from the public glare.” Michael N. 15 Kennedy, Escaping the Fishbowl: A Proposal to Fortify the Deliberative Process Privilege, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1769, 1770 (2005). Nevertheless, because of the FOIA’s strong policy favoring disclosure, this exemption should be construed “as narrowly as consistent with efficient Government operation.” Mink, 410 U.S. at 87 (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965)).12 We are mindful that the “deliberative process” FOIA exemption benefits the public and not the officials who assert it. See Kaiser Aluminum and Chem. Corp. v. U.S., 157 F.Supp. 939, 944 (Ct.Cl. 1958). To invoke the “internal memoranda” exemption successfully, the public body must meet two prerequisites: in “the context in which the materials are used,” the documents must be both predecisional and deliberative. Virginia Beach, 995 F.2d at 1253 (quoting Wolfe v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C.Cir.1988)). Predecisional documents are “prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision.” Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975). Deliberative material “reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process,” by revealing the manner in which the agency evaluates possible alternative policies or outcomes. Virginia Beach, 995 F.2d at 1253 (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C.Cir. 1980)). 12 Evidence of government misconduct, crime, and fraud bars the application of the “deliberative process” exemption. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 738 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (“[W]here there is reason to believe the documents sought may shed light on government misconduct, the privilege is routinely denied, on the grounds that shielding internal government deliberations in this context does not serve the public’s interest in honest, effective government.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 16 WVU argues the FOIA’s “internal memoranda” exemption justifies its decision to withhold 760 documents. A research scientist at a public college or university is subject to FOIA because he or she is employed by a public body. Therefore, WVU maintains he or she must be equally and congruently entitled to the protection of this FOIA exemption. For these public body employees, the public function they are hired to perform is the research and publication of scholarly articles. WVU contends the “deliberations” they undertake and the “decisions” the professors make include the final publication of their research efforts. A public university or college’s “policy” is to nurture, support, and publish academic research on areas of public concern; its mission is fulfilled when the article is published. Therefore, WVU maintains that if the deliberative processes of its researchers are open for public inspection, WVU will be unable to fulfill its mission. In opposition, Highland argues this FOIA exemption does not apply because Professor Hendryx was not engaged in policy making on behalf of WVU when preparing the subject articles. In fact, WVU has expressly disclaimed the notion that any research paper published by a WVU professor represents WVU’s position or policy.13 Furthermore, Highland argues the publication of the articles at issue did not involve policy making or a deliberative process within the meaning of this FOIA exemption. 13 In 2011, WVU released the following position statement: “The findings of any particular research project do not reflect, nor should they, any particular opinion or position of the University itself.” 17 Highland relies on a narrow reading of Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 25 F.3d 1241 (4th Cir. 1994), wherein the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held the “deliberative process” exemption only allows for the withholding of documents that “bear on the formulation or exercise of policy-oriented judgment.” Id. at 1248 (emphasis added), see also Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 866 (declaring federal FOIA “deliberative process” privilege protects “premature disclosure of proposed policies”) (emphasis added). Ultimately, Highland maintains WVU can never avail itself of the “internal memoranda” FOIA exemption because neither the WVU School of Medicine nor its Rural Health Research Center is a state agency; they do not regulate any activity, promulgate rules or policies that govern any entity’s conduct, or engage in any other type of governmental function. Highland acknowledges, however, that Professor Hendryx may have sought to influence the development of policy by federal and state agencies responsible for regulating surface coal mining, but he had no authority to directly develop or impose any such policies. We agree with Highland’s factual assessment that while WVU is a public body, it is not a state agency engaged in policy making. We further agree that Professor Hendryx did not formulate policy on behalf of WVU when he published the research articles. Nevertheless, we emphatically reject Highland’s legal argument that WVU may not invoke the “internal memoranda” exemption because that exemption covers only 18 documents reflecting agency policy making communications. There is a bulk of case law applying the federal FOIA’s “deliberative process” exemption in the context of administrative agency policy/decision making.14 At the same time, however, a plethora of federal FOIA cases also extend this exemption to public bodies engaged in activities other than agency policy making. “In its relatively short life, the deliberative process privilege has become one of the most predominate privileges exercised by the government and is now routinely asserted in a wide array of litigation challenging government decisionmaking.” Michael Ray Harris, Standing in the Way of Judicial Review: Assertion of the Deliberative Process Privilege in APA Cases, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. 349, 350 (2009). 14 The root of this trend may be explained by the fact the federal FOIA represented the culmination of years of congressional effort to amend the public information provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. The FOIA replaced Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, which ostensibly served as a public information provision to permit the public to gain access to federal records. However, the law was filled with loopholes that the government routinely exploited to withhold records. The main obstacle to public access under the APA was a requirement that record requesters demonstrate that the solicited information pertain directly to them. This restriction prevented journalists, writers, historians, lawyers, and others from gaining access to information held by the federal government. Martin E. Halstuk, When Is An Invasion of Privacy Unwarranted Under the FOIA? An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s “Sufficient Reason” and “Presumption of Legitimacy” Standards, 16 U.Fla.J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 361, 367 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 19 Having considered all of these competing arguments, we reject Highland’s contention that the “internal memoranda” exemption applies only to administrative agency policy making. A plain reading of our FOIA confirms that WVU has the stronger argument. In West Virginia, administrative agencies are not the only public bodies subject to the FOIA and its accompanying exemptions. West Virginia Code § 29B-1­ 4(a)(8) exempts from disclosure “internal memoranda or letters received or prepared by any public body.” Id. (emphasis added). And the definition of “public body” under our FOIA is extensive: “Public body” means every state officer, agency, department, including the executive, legislative and judicial departments, division, bureau, board and commission; every county and city governing body, school district, special district, municipal corporation, and any board, department, commission, council or agency thereof; and any other body which is created by state or local authority or which is primarily funded by the state or local authority. Id. § 29B-1-2(3).15 The public body entities and their employees set forth above engage in an immensely diverse range of endeavors related to government service. Therefore, we expect their internal deliberations will necessarily address a variety of matters related to their state and/or local governmental responsibilities. 15 The federal FOIA uses the term “agency,” not “public body.” See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Dep’t of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 668 F.2d 537, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“For purposes of the Freedom of Information Act the statute provides that ‘the term “agency” as defined in section 551(1) . . . includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency.’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1976).”). 20 Consequently, in Daily Gazette I, we did not confine the “internal memoranda” exemption to deliberations preceding agency policy making. Instead, we held a public body may exempt from disclosure documents which reflect its “deliberative decision-making process.” 198 W.Va. at 575, 482 S.E.2d at 192 (emphasis added). We explained that courts must evaluate the “function and significance of the documents” to the public body’s decision-making process, including an explanation of “the nature of the decision-making authority vested in the office or person issuing the disputed documents[.]” Id.16 We hereby announce that West Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act, West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(8) (2012), exempts from disclosure “internal memoranda or letters received or prepared by any public body” as defined by West Virginia Code § 29B-1-2(3) (2012). The FOIA reflects our Legislature’s recognition that disclosure of public body communications reflecting deliberative processes on any 16 Similarly, other state courts have applied their respective FOIA’s “deliberative process” exemption to decisions unrelated to agency policy making. For instance, documents generated by public employees charged with hiring decisions may be exempt from disclosure when they are both predecisional and deliberative. See Wilson v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1136, 1143 (Calif. Ct. of App. 2nd Dist. 1997) (applying California state’s FOIA, documents held exempt when their sole purpose was to aid Governor in selecting gubernatorial appointees, process which depends upon confidential, candid discussion of candidates’ professional competence, political views and private conduct). Other state courts have also applied this FOIA exemption to documents reflecting decision-making activities of judicial branch employees unrelated to agency policy making. See Commonwealth v. Vartan, 733 A.2d 1258, 1266 (Pa. 1999) (holding “deliberative process” privilege protected deliberations by members of Pennsylvania Supreme Court regarding decision to build new courthouse). 21 subject could have a chilling effect on future communications. Confidentiality of certain documents connected with a public body’s decision-making process ensures frank and open discussion among its employees, which in turn enhances the quality of their decisions. Considering the strong policy favoring disclosure of public documents, courts must construe this exemption narrowly as consistent with efficient state and local government operations. The key question in every case is whether the disclosure of documents would expose a public body’s decision-making process so as to discourage candid discussion and thereby undermine the public body’s ability to perform its functions. See Times Mirror Co. v. Super. Ct., 813 P.2d 240, 250 (Cal. 1991) (“In short, the courts’ focus . . . is less on the nature of the records sought and more on the effect of the records’ release.”). Having determined that WVU, as a public body, may assert the “internal memoranda” exemption, we now turn to the pivotal question of whether the withheld documents fall within this exemption. As discussed above, to invoke the “internal memoranda” exemption set forth in West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(8) (2012) successfully, the public body must show that in the context in which the materials are prepared or considered, the documents are both predecisional and deliberative to its decision-making process. Predecisional documents are prepared in order to assist a public body decisionmaker in arriving at his or her decision. Deliberative material reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process, by revealing the manner in which the public body evaluates possible alternatives relevant to the decisional process. 22 The relevant public body decision for purposes of applying the “deliberative process” exemption to these public records is not whether WVU adopted a position or policy regarding mountaintop coal removal’s health effects on state residents. Rather, when a FOIA requester seeks records surrounding or leading up to an agency publication, the relevant agency decision for purposes of applying the “deliberative process” exemption is the development and ultimate publication of the article. See United Am. Fin., Inc. v. Potter, 531 F.Supp.2d 29, 44 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that relevant agency decision was agency’s publication of article where plaintiff’s FOIA request sought all supporting documents and drafts of documents relating to article), accord, Hooker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 887 F.Supp.2d 40, 57 (D.D.C. 2012). In Hooker, a parent of an autistic child filed a federal FOIA action against the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and the Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”), seeking disclosure of information, including all correspondence among researchers, regarding the publication of studies relating to a possible connection between a mercury-based compound used in vaccines and autism. Id. at 45. Like Highland sought in the instant case, Mr. Hooker wanted access to this information to refute the conclusions reached in the articles. Mr. Hooker contended the HHS and CDC consistently denied a relationship between the mercury-based compound and autism, “in the face of ‘a mounting body of compelling scientific literature’ that support[ed] the existence of such a relationship.” Id. The court rejected Mr. Hooker’s arguments and found the HHS and CDC properly applied the federal FOIA “deliberative process” 23 exemption to material that was deliberative in nature when withholding internal communications revealing the analysis underlying the draft manuscripts. Id. at 58. We find the court’s analysis in Hooker instructive. Thus, we limit our inquiry to whether a requested document, regardless of its nature, (1) was generated before the publication of the research article to which it relates, and if so, (2) whether it reflects Professor Hendryx’s deliberative, decision-making or thought process employed to arrive at the article’s conclusions and ultimate publication. “[T]he deliberative process exemption protects ‘recommendations, draft documents, proposals, suggestions, and other subjective documents which reflect the personal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the agency.’” Virginia Beach, 995 F.2d at 1253 (quoting Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 866). “Draft documents, by their very nature, are typically predecisional and deliberative.” Keeper of the Mountains Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 514 F.Supp. 2d 837, 854 (S.D. W.Va. 2007) (citations omitted). In Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 600 F.Supp. 114 (D.D.C. 1984), the district court addressed this same issue and found documents qualified under the federal FOIA “deliberative process” exemption because they detailed an exchange of ideas among scientists regarding the agency’s study of a chemical used in the manufacture of toys. Id. at 119. The court ruled these scientific deliberations were part of the agency’s “give-and-take” and that disclosure of such deliberations would discourage open discussion among the agency scientists. Id. 24 Specifically, the court held that “scientists should be able to withhold nascent thoughts where disclosure would discourage the intellectual risk-taking so essential to technical progress.” 600 F.Supp. at 118. Not only is the parallel to the concerns raised in Hooker and Chemical Manufacturers evident, but Highland’s attempt to invade Professor Hendryx’s deliberative process is patent. First, considering the context in which the materials were used, WVU has shown that any document which reveals the analysis underlying Professor Hendryx’s articles is predecisional. In the state higher education academic setting, documents generated before the final publication of a scientific research article – all documents related to the initiation, preparation and publication of the articles – are by their very nature predecisional. Second, WVU has shown that any document, regardless of its nature, that exposes the give-and-take of the scientific research consultative process, by revealing the manner in which the researchers evaluate possible alternative outcomes, is deliberative. Because these drafts, data compilations 17 and analyses, 17 Nearly all Professor Hendryx’s articles that were the subject of Highland’s FOIA requests were based on studies using secondary data only. However, the SelfReported Cancer Rates Study did involve the use of personal surveys of residents living in areas where mountaintop coal removal took place. We find WVU may withhold documents generated in data compilation because these documents could reveal the deliberative process. See Hooker, 887 F.Supp.2d at 58 (“‘The choice of what factual material . . . to include or remove during the drafting process is itself often part of the deliberative process, and thus is properly exempt under [the federal FOIA “deliberative process” exemption].’” (quoting ViroPharma, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.Supp.2d 184 193 (D.D.C. 2012)); Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 67-70 (1974) (holding “deliberative process” privilege applied to summaries (continued . . .) 25 proposed edits, e-mails and other communications, and peer review comments and responses relate to the planning, preparation and editing necessary to produce a final published article, they are exempt from disclosure. We therefore find that, on the evidence before the circuit court at the summary judgment hearing,18 WVU successfully carried its burden of proving certain documents fell under the “internal memoranda” umbrella of the FOIA. Our review of the appendix record, however, reveals that WVU improperly claimed the “deliberative process” exemption to some documents that are post-decisional and/or non-deliberative.19 As the Supreme Court recognized in Sears, the purpose of the containing only factual material because documents revealed author’s evaluative judgment as to relative significance of facts and what facts he considered to be important or unimportant); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 250-251 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“[T]he judgmental element arises through the necessity to select and emphasize certain facts at the expense of others.”); Farmworkers Legal Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 639 F.Supp. 1368, 1373 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (“Because the list sought here is composed of selective fact, it . . . could reveal the deliberative process.”). 18 This Court reviewed the same evidence. The parties submitted a Joint Appendix that contained five DVDs of the documents provided by WVU in response to Highland’s FOIA requests. WVU also submitted to this Court, under seal, the documents it submitted to the circuit court for in camera review. 19 For instance, Document No. 03-0217 in the sample Vaughn index consists of an e-mail dated July 28, 2011, regarding a potential speaking engagement pertaining to the various articles at issue. We find WVU’s argument unconvincing that this e-mail should be protected from disclosure because it “reflect[s] these individuals’ thought processes and analyses that ultimately resulted in the final decision on how such matters concerning publicity should be handled on behalf of [WVU.]” To accept WVU’s argument here, we would be allowing the exception to swallow the rule. 26 deliberative process privilege is to protect the quality of an agency’s decision; revealing “communications made after the decision and designed to explain it” do not affect a decision’s quality. 421 U.S. at 152. Our holding today comports with American Tradition Institute v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 756 S.E.2d 435 (Va. 2014) (“UVA”), where the Virginia Supreme Court was faced with facts analogous to the instant case. In UVA, a requester brought suit under Virginia’s FOIA against the University of Virginia seeking disclosure of documents produced or received by a former professor while working at the university. Id. at 437. The professor was a climate scientist and former professor whose scholarly work had “generated much scientific and political interest.” Id. Applying a FOIA exemption,20 the court upheld the university’s exclusion of the documents from production. Id. at 442. In UVA, “many noted scholars and academic administrators submitted affidavits attesting to the harmful impact disclosure would have in these circumstances.” Id. The court quoted an affidavit from John Simon, Vice President and 20 Virginia Code § 2.2-3705.4(4) (West 2014) provides: Data, records or information of a proprietary nature produced or collected by or for faculty or staff of public institutions of higher education, other than the institutions’ financial or administrative records, in the conduct of or as a result of study or research on medical, scientific, technical or scholarly issues, whether sponsored by the institution alone or in conjunction with a governmental body or a private concern, where such data, records or information has not been publicly released, published, copyrighted or patented. 27 Provost of the university and former Vice-Provost of Duke University, addressing the concerns relevant to academia: If U.S. scientists at public institutions lose the ability to protect their communications with faculty at other institutions, their ability to collaborate will be gravely harmed. The result will be a loss of scientific and creative opportunities for faculty at institutions in states which have not established protections under state FOIAs for such communications. . . . For faculty at public institutions such as the University of Virginia, compelled disclosure of their unpublished thoughts, data, and personal scholarly communications would mean a fundamental disruption of the norms and expectations which have enabled research to flourish at the great public institutions for over a century. ... I can state unequivocally that recruitment of faculty to an institution like the University of Virginia will be deeply harmed if such faculty must fear that their unpublished communications with the scientific collaborators and scholarly colleagues are subject to involuntary public disclosure. Id. at 442. The same reasoning applies with equal force here.21 When we focus on the resulting effect of the documents’ release, the resolution of this case is decidedly clear. 21 The UVA case best illuminates the public policy facet of the issue before us. If West Virginia State colleges and universities cannot retain their researchers and scientists because the FOIA exposes them to an unfair intrusion into the scientific process, then the problem of operating in a “fishbowl” pales in comparison to the challenge of attracting and retaining highly qualified faculty. See generally Dianna G. Goldenson, FOIA Exemption Five: Will it Protect Government Scientists From Unfair Intrusion?, 29 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 311 (2002) (arguing federal FOIA “deliberative process” exemption should be recognized by courts as mode of protecting government scientists from unfair intrusion into scientific research). 28 The involuntary public disclosure of Professor Hendryx’s research documents would expose the decision-making process in such a way as to hinder candid discussion of WVU’s faculty and undermine WVU’s ability to perform its operations. We acknowledge that West Virginia’s FOIA does not have an exemption specifically applicable to state institutions of higher education like Virginia does. Nevertheless, we find that documents generated during higher education academic research may be legally protected from disclosure under West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(8), when the public body demonstrates the criteria outlined above are satisfied. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court insofar as it found WVU properly invoked the FOIA “internal memoranda” exemption to withhold certain documents.