Opinion ID: 777473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Habeas Corpus and Section 1983

Text: 18 Although both § 1983 and habeas corpus allow prisoners to challenge unconstitutional conduct by state officers, the two are not coextensive either in purpose or effect. Habeas relief is clearly quite limited: The underlying purpose of proceedings under the `Great Writ' of habeas corpus has traditionally been to `inquire into the legality of the detention, and the only judicial relief authorized was the discharge of the prisoner or his admission to bail, and that only if his detention were found to be unlawful.' Powers of Congress and the Court Regarding the Availability and Scope of Review, 114 Harv. L.Rev. 1551, 1553 (2001). Section 1983, in contrast, provides for liability on the part of any state actor who subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It has been described as a species of tort liability. Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 111 (3d Cir.1996)(discussing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994)). There is only a narrow subset of actions that arguably might properly be brought as either, that is, where the deprivation of rights is such that it necessarily impacts the fact or length of detention. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has made it clear that for those cases, the narrower remedy, the habeas petition, is the only available avenue of relief. Balisok was one of these decisions. 6 In it, the Court clarified that a plaintiff cannot circumvent the overlap between habeas and § 1983 by raising an issue as an attack upon procedure rather than substance, when resolution of the issue in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the sentence — the fact or duration of detention. The Court noted that proper judicial response to such procedural defects is to invalidate the flawed decision that impacted the sentence, by reinstating the removed good time credits — the same remedy that would attach if the substance were attacked. 520 U.S. at 646-47, 117 S.Ct. 1584. Because the remedy therefore is, in actuality, a habeas remedy, the plaintiff must proceed by way of a habeas petition. 19 As noted above, Balisok was not decided in a vacuum. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) the Court had granted certiorari specifically to consider whether state prisoners may use § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of acts that deprived them of good-time credits where the remedy would be restoration of their credits and a shortening of their sentence. 411 U.S. at 482, 93 S.Ct. 1827. In holding that the action was only appropriate under habeas, the Court looked to the purpose of the habeas statute — to secure release from illegal custody. Id. at 487-88, 93 S.Ct. 1827. It then determined that the exhaustion requirements of the more specific habeas statute should be satisfied when the remedy sought is a habeas remedy Id. at 492, 93 S.Ct. 1827. Preiser's holding was specifically limited to persons seeking equitable relief and not damages. Id. at 494, 93 S.Ct. 1827. In distinguishing the cases where the Court had upheld the use of § 1983 to challenge the conditions of their confinement, the Court noted: 20 But none of the state prisoners in those cases was challenging the fact or duration of his physical confinement itself, and none was seeking immediate release or a speedier release from that confinement-the heart of habeas corpus. 21 ... 22 It is clear, then, that in all those cases, the prisoners' claims related solely to the States' alleged unconstitutional treatment of them while in confinement. None sought, as did the respondents here, to challenge the very fact or duration of the confinement itself. Those cases, therefore, merely establish that a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody. 23 Id. at 498-99, 93 S.Ct. 1827. (Emphasis added). Heck v. Humphrey resolved one of the questions explicitly left unresolved in Preiser : where the challenge is to the legality of the prisoner's confinement, it is not sufficient for the prisoner to raise the claim solely as a damages action and thus avoid the exhaustion requirement of habeas. 512 U.S. at 481-82, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Instead, if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence it is not appropriately brought under § 1983. Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Conversely, if the success of the plaintiff's § 1983 action will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit. Id. (emphasis in original). Balisok then addressed another question left open in Preiser : may the plaintiff raise an issue as an attack only upon procedure rather than substance? Again, the Court found that a plaintiff could not mask a claim that really required habeas relief as a § 1983 claim. 520 U.S. at 646-47, 117 S.Ct. 1584. Most recently, in Spencer v. Kemna, the Court addressed a contention that a habeas action brought subsequent to the expiration of the prisoner's sentence should not be viewed as moot, because the plaintiff would have been foreclosed from bringing an action under § 1983 unless he could establish the invalidity of his parole revocation. The Court stressed that § 1983 damages need not always and everywhere be available, and noted that recovery under § 1983 would not be foreclosed if his challenge were to procedures and not the result, as long as the procedural defect did not `necessarily imply the invalidity of' the revocation. 523 U.S. at 17, 118 S.Ct. 978. 24 When read together, there is a logical and coherent progression of Supreme Court jurisprudence clarifying when § 1983 is unavailable: whenever the challenge ultimately attacks the `core of habeas' — the validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the sentence — a challenge, however denominated and regardless of the relief sought, must be brought by way of a habeas corpus petition. Conversely, when the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, an action under § 1983 is appropriate. 25 Here, the District Court's reasoning regarding Balisok was somewhat cryptic. On the one hand, the Court stated that Leamer had failed to allege a violation of the Due Process clause because this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the discipline imposed. The Court found Balisok factually similar to the Plaintiff's claims, noting that Leamer alleges that certain of the defendants conspired to wrongfully place and maintain Plaintiff on RAP status through prejudice, deceit and arbitrariness, and that Plaintiff's allegations would imply the invalidity of his restrictive status. Therefore, as in Balisok, Plaintiff has not stated a valid claim under § 1983. On the other hand, the Court concluded that the denial of therapy and the inability to gain release from RAP status prevented him from getting paroled, possibly resulting in a longer sentence for him. 26 The District Court appears to have gone astray in two ways: one in its reading of Balisok, and the other in its reading of Leamer's complaint. By implying that Balisok extends the rule of Preiser and its progeny to any disciplinary proceeding — regardless of whether the outcome necessarily impacts the duration of the sentence — the District Court unnecessarily invalidated claims that are not truly within the overlap between habeas and § 1983. Leamer could not have brought this claim as a habeas claim; he did not and could not seek earlier release based on the adjudication of his constitutional claims. 7 The Court also erred in concluding that the possibility that parole would be delayed if he remained on RAP status would be sufficient to trigger a Balisok analysis. 27 We are bolstered in our conclusion by the analysis undertaken by other Courts of Appeals. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently engaged in a thorough review of each of the Preiser-Spencer decisions, including the concurrences and dissents, and concluded that nothing in Supreme Court precedent requires that the Heck rule be applied to a challenge by a prisoner to a term of disciplinary segregation. Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir.1999). Accordingly, it held that a § 1983 suit that challenges the validity of a disciplinary or administrative sanction that does not affect the overall length of the prisoner's confinement is not barred by Heck and Edwards. Id.; see also Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163 (D.C.Cir.1997). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in choosing to follow Jenkins (overruling its earlier, broader reading; see Stone-Bey v. Barnes, 120 F.3d 718 (7th Cir.1997)), noted the inapplicability of habeas to the facts of the prisoner's claim before it: Unlike the plaintiffs in Preiser, Heck, and Edwards, Mr. DeWalt's case does not `lie at the intersection' of sections 2254 and 1983. Mr. DeWalt does not challenge the fact or duration of his confinement, but only a condition of his confinement-the loss of his prison job. Consequently, under our precedent, Mr. DeWalt may not pursue a habeas action. DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir.2000). 28 Here, as in DeWalt, the challenge by Leamer is aimed at a condition of his confinement, and is a challenge properly brought under § 1983. Whether the RAP status is invalidated is immaterial to the propriety of the § 1983 claim. The operative test under Preiser and its progeny is not whether Leamer would, if successful, be able to appear before the Parole Board. It is whether a favorable determination of Leamer's challenge would necessarily imply that he would serve a shorter sentence, which, as the District Court recognized, would not be the case. In fact, elsewhere in its opinion, the District Court noted: the situation of inmates incarcerated at ADTC is unique in that their eligibility for parole is directly linked to their progression in therapy. Unless an inmate/patient is `cured' he will serve the maximum sentence. 29 The District Court concluded that this characteristic is what brought Leamer's case squarely within Balisok ; actually, as we see it, this is what squarely distinguishes it from Balisok. Whatever the decision on the § 1983 claim, Leamer's release date will not change; it is precisely because he does not earn credits to which he can claim entitlement that his RAP status does not determine the date of release. In considering a challenge to Hawaii's sex offender program, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote: 30 The only benefit that a victory in this case would provide Neal and Martinez, besides the possibility of monetary damages, is a ticket to get in the door of the parole board, thus only making them eligible for parole consideration according to the terms of their sentences. If Neal and Martinez win, it will in no way guarantee parole or necessarily shorten their prison sentences by a single day. The parole board will still have the authority to deny the inmates' requests for parole on the basis of any of the grounds presently available to it in evaluating such a request. A victory in this case would not alter the calculus for the review of parole requests in any way. Because the inmates' challenge in this case does not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or continuing confinement, it is properly brought under § 1983. 31 Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir.1997). This reasoning conforms with the way we have previously viewed § 1983 relief in this context. In 1985, with only Preiser as guidance, we stated that the fact that a prisoner's success in the litigation might increase the chance for early release does not, in itself, transform the action into one for habeas corpus. Georgevich does not ask for release on parole, but merely seeks uniform application of due process procedures to all members of the class. Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078, 1087 (3d Cir.1985). Following the Supreme Court's decision in Heck, in Smith v. Holtz, we again clarified that the critical initial question in determining whether habeas or § 1983 is appropriate is whether the claim truly lies at the intersection. It does if — but only if — the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction. 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir.1996) (applying Heck to bar a § 1983 challenge to a pending criminal charge). 32 As we clarify today, the propositions in these cases are unchanged. When examining whether Preiser and its progeny require a claim to be brought under habeas, unless the claim would fall within the core of habeas and require sooner release if resolved in the plaintiff's favor, a prison confinement action such as this is properly brought under § 1983. Leamer's claim not only does not fall within the core of habeas; it would not be properly brought under habeas at all. Conversely, it was properly brought under § 1983.