Opinion ID: 2637139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jeff Mathson's testimony

Text: [¶16] Jeff Mathson testified in Mr. Lawrence's case-in-chief. On direct examination, defense counsel questioned Mr. Mathson regarding his knowledge of Ms. Pauly's drug use. Mr. Mathson testified he did not have any direct knowledge of whether Ms. Pauly was into methamphetamine in December of 2005. He also testified he had not personally observed Ms. Pauly using methamphetamine during the three months preceding December 2005 or since that time. With respect to his own drug use, Mr. Mathson declared that he was not a drug user and had not used methamphetamine in September, October, November, or December of 2005 or since then. Direct examination then moved to foundational questions similar to those that had been asked earlier of Ms. Pauly and, likewise, Mr. Mathson admitted he was friends with Mr. Lawrence but stated that he would not lie for him and had not coordinated his testimony with other witnesses. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked a single question of Mr. Mathson regarding his drug use: Now, I noticed that you were kind of asked to count back a few months if you've had any use of meth. Isn't it true that you've admitted using meth up to at least six months before  [?] Mr. Lawrence's counsel interrupted with a relevance objection which the trial judge overruled, saying, It was raised. It was raised for his credibility purpose. Overruled. The prosecutor repeated the question and Jeff Mathson answered, Yes. [¶17] Mr. Lawrence's appellate argument challenging the trial judge's relevance ruling is that Jeff Mathson's drug use up to at least six months before was irrelevant to proving whether Mr. Lawrence attempted to deliver a controlled substance to Ms. Marchant on December 15, 2005; W.R.E. 402 provides that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible; therefore, the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting that evidence. The State's rebuttal to this challenge is two-fold. First, the State asserts that Mr. Lawrence's counsel opened the door to this evidence by eliciting the witness's testimony that he had not used drugs for a three-month period before December 15, 2005. Second, the State points out that it served to counter the inference raised during the witness's direct examination that he was an impartial witness who had no connection with the drug culture. The State correctly refers this Court to this passage: A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is affected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony. 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 940, p. 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). We have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Greene v. McElroy 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S. ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959). Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 16, 84 P.3d 320, 329-30 (Wyo. 2004)(quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317-18, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)); see also State v. Slane, 48 Wyo. 1, 13, 41 P.2d 269, 273 (1935) (interest, relationship, bias, and corrupt testimonial intent may always be shown either on cross-examination or by extrinsic testimony). [¶18] We agree with the State's arguments on this issue and hold that the trial judge's relevancy ruling was correct. That does not end the matter, however, because Mr. Lawrence challenges the admissibility of Mr. Mathson's prior drug use on an evidentiary ground not raised at trial, namely, W.R.E. 608(b). This Court has closely read Mr. Lawrence's appellate brief to identify a specific plain error analysis of this specific ground as applied to this specific evidence. It is not to be found. Invoking W.R.E. 608(b), without quoting the rule's text, and Blumhagen, Mr. Lawrence concludes that the prosecutor's cross-examination question about Jeff Mathson's drug use at least six months before had only the purpose to portray Mr. Mathson as an unbelievable reprobate and to imply that he was not credible in his testimony. [¶19] In response to Mr. Lawrence's argument, the State, after quoting the text of W.R.E. 608(b), notes that the purpose of the rule is to prevent improper witness impeachment through extrinsic evidence of that witness's specific conduct, citing Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 37 (Wyo. 1999). The State correctly observes that the prosecutor elicited the testimony through cross-examination of the very witness whose impartiality was in question, not through the extrinsic evidence of another witness whose testimony was attacking the credibility of an opposing witness whose impartiality was in question. In Blumhagen, a confidential informant testified in the prosecution's case-in-chief about the accused's delivery of drugs, but was not examined, either on direct or cross-examination, about her own drug use. 11 P.3d at 892. After the prosecution rested, the accused's counsel wanted to call a witness to testify about the confidential informant's prior drug use; to this end, the accused's counsel called this witness to testify in an offer of proof on that matter. The trial court refused to allow that witness to testify before the jury. Id. at 893. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's refusal, holding that such testimony amounted to extrinsic evidence concerning a specific instance of the confidential informant's conduct and was not, therefore, admissible to attack her credibility. Id. The State correctly distinguishes the instant case from Blumhagen ; Jeff Mathson's testimony about his own drug use was not extrinsic evidence; rather, it was direct evidence elicited by permissible cross-examination following up evidence revealed on the direct examination by the accused's counsel. [¶20] We agree with the State that there is a distinction between evidence that impeaches by proof of a witness's character or disposition for veracity, or the lack thereof, and evidence which establishes a lack of credibility through a showing of such things as bias or undue influence. Gist v. State, 766 P.2d 1149, 1151-52 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting 3 D. Louisell and C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 307, pp. 127-28 (1988 supp.)). The admission of evidence for the latter purpose is not controlled by W.R.E. 608(b). Hall v. State, 2005 WY 35, ¶¶ 8-9, 14, 109 P.3d 499, 503-04, 506 (Wyo. 2005) (where the defendant had been charged with running a clandestine drug lab, this Court held that it was error for the district court, pursuant to W.R.E. 608(b), to deny admission of extrinsic evidence that a co-conspirator had made false accusations of drug offenses against other people in the past, as such was evidence that the co-conspirator had a motive or self-interest to slant her testimony). Moreover, as the State points out, the advisory committee's note to F.R.E. 608, which is substantively identical to the Wyoming provision, states that evidence of bias or interest is not an attack on the witness's character for truthfulness and, thus, the admission of such evidence is not governed by F.R.E. 608. F.R.E. 608 advisory committee's note (evidence of bias governed by Rules 402 and 403); United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1984). We agree with that note. [¶21] Clearly, witness bias is a proper subject for impeachment, both at common law and after adoption of the rules of evidence. Hall, ¶ 10, 109 P.3d at 504 (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51-52, 105 S.Ct. 465, 468-69, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984)); see also United States v. Calle, 822 F.2d 1016, 1020-1021 (11th Cir. 1987); Ray, 731 F.2d at 1363-65; 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 842 (2004) (the rule encompasses all facts and circumstances which, when tested by human experience, tend to show that a witness may shade his or her testimony for the purpose of helping to establish only one side of the cause). [¶22] We agree with the State's observation that the thrust of Mr. Lawrence's direct examination of Jeff Mathson was that he had no bias or interest in the case and was an impartial witness as he was not a drug user and had no connection with the drug culture. The prosecutor's cross-examination question and Mr. Mathson's answer revealed evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that he was not an impartial witness. Evidence of a witness's partiality is always relevant. Hannon, ¶ 16, 84 P.3d at 329-30. We hold that the admission of Jeff Mathson's prior drug use was not plain error.