Opinion ID: 1998467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tlapechco's cross claims

Text: We now must consider Tlapechco's cross claims. [23] We first consider whether the trial judge erred by granting summary judgment to Handler on the recognized exceptions to the general rule that general contractors owe no duty to an independent contractor's employees. [24] We review motions for summary judgment under a de novo standard of review. [25] We review  de novo the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment both as to facts and law to determine whether or not the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. [26] Moreover, we also address Tlapechco's claim that the trial judge abused her discretion by failing to admit the fact that Handler had safety rails installed after the accident.
At the close of the evidence, the trial judge found as a matter of law that Handler did not retain active control over the manner in which the subcontractor's work was carried out and the methods used. Tlapechco now claims on appeal that the trial judge erred in so concluding. A general contractor has a duty to protect an independent contractor's employee when the general contractor retains active control over the manner and methods of performing the contract work. [27] While the concept of control is an elastic one, it is not inferred from mere retention by the owner or contractor of the right to inspect or to supervise the work for conformity with the contract. [28] Instead, the right to control must go directly to the manner or methods used by the independent contractor in his performance of the delegated tasks. [29] Moreover, in the absence of active control over the manner and method of the performance of the contract work, a general contractor may still be liable to some extent if he retained sufficient control over part of the work.  [30] The Restatement is consistent with Delaware law. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965), provides: One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care. (emphasis added) The comments to this section further elaborate on the control necessary to subject the general contractor to liability: In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the employer must have retained at least some degree of control over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. There must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way. [31] Tlapechco contends on appeal that even in the absence of active control over the manner and method of the painting work, Handler still owed Tlapechco a duty because Handler retained sufficient control over part of the work; in particular, Handler retained sufficient control over safety around the open walkway. Tlapechco suggests that there is overwhelming evidence that Handler controlled safety in the work area, and at a minimum, there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether Handler controlled safety in the work area. Handler contends that it did not control the manner or method of safety precautions around the open walkway and merely had a supervisor on site to coordinate and direct the subcontractors' work and to inspect the premises to ensure that contractual obligations were fulfilled. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to Tlapechco, we find no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and find, as a matter of law, that Handler is entitled to summary judgment on this issue because no evidence suggests that Handler controlled the manner and method of safety. Esperanza provided all of the equipment necessary for performance of the contract, controlled the assignment of workers, controlled the painting process, and paid Tlapechco. Nothing suggests that Handler retained a right of supervision that prohibited Esperanza from performing the work in its own way. Put simply, Esperanza was free to do the work any way it wanted. Tlapechco points to the following to suggest that Handler controlled safety: Handler had safety talk instructions discussing fall protection around open walkways, Handler contracted for the installation of the safety rail and provided lumber for the safety rail, and testimony of Handler's employees suggesting that it was a site supervisor's duty to see that the safety railing was installed. Tlapechco's argument is misplaced because none of the evidence suggests how Handler controlled the manner and method in which Esperanza worked. Rather, this evidence suggests that Handler may have voluntarily assumed a duty to install safety railings (an issue we discuss in more detail below). Therefore, because there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute about whether Handler actively controlled the manner and method of any of Esperanza's work, we affirm the trial judge's grant of summary judgment on this issue.
Tlapechco contends that the trial judge erred by finding, as a matter of law, that Handler did not voluntarily assume responsibility for workplace safety. Particularly, Handler contends that there was a genuine issue of material fact in dispute about whether Handler voluntarily assumed responsibility for safety around the open walkway. Under Delaware Law, those who have responsibility for workplace safety must take reasonable measures to ensure the safety of those at the worksite. [32] A duty to ensure workplace safety can be imposed upon a party who `[voluntarily], by agreement or otherwise, undertakes responsibility for implementing required safety measures.' [33] Where breach of the assumed duty causes injury to a worker, the responsible party can be held liable under the traditional principles of negligence law. [34] When she revisited her earlier decision granting Handler's motion for summary judgment, the trial judge stated: I conclude as a matter of law, considering the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, that at most, Handler assumed some responsibility for the safety of the subcontractor employees, but did not assume total responsibility. We understand this statement to reflect her belief that Handler was entitled to summary judgment unless it assumed sole responsibility for the safety for subcontractor employees. We disagree because if Handler assumed any responsibility for subcontractor employee safety, it had an obligation to fulfill that duty with care. The voluntary assumption of safety exception to the general rule that contractors are not liable to subcontractor employees was derived from the Restatement of Torts (Second) § 324A (1965). The Restatement provides: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking. Clearly this section provides for liability if one undertakes a duty and does not use reasonable care to carry out the assumed duty. Therefore, simply because Handler may have only assumed some responsibility for workplace safety does not relieve it of liability. Whatever duty Handler did assume, it had to carry out reasonably. If it did not carry out its duty reasonably, and the breach of the duty was the cause of Tlapechco's injuries, Handler would be liable. In any event, there is at least a genuine issue of material fact in dispute with respect to this issue. Handler contracted with Guzman to install a temporary safety railing and Handler provided the lumber for the railing. Two weeks before Tlapechco's fall, Paul Handler, Vice President of Handler, had a safety instruction talk with his employees, including Marty Dugan, [35] and discussed fall protection. The discussion included information in the National Association of Homebuilders Tool Box Safety Talks Section 3: Fall Protection worksheet. The worksheet provided: One problem with guardrail systems is with drywalling operations. Be sure the drywallers have not taken down the guardrails during their work. They can still protect themselves and you while doing their jobs. The easiest way to protect everyone is to install the upright away and detached from the wall, that way you can still get to the wall to do the drywalling. Moreover, Paul Handler acknowledged in his deposition that the site supervisor had a duty to correct any unsafe conditions regarding falls or guardrails and that he gave safety talks to ensure that his employees would recognize hazardous conditions when they see them. [36] Dugan [37] and a former Handler site supervisor [38] also both acknowledged a duty to maintain a safety railing. [39] Finally, Handler had a safety railing installed after Tlapechco's fall. [40] Conversely, the Handler-Esperanza contract provided that Esperanza was required to take reasonable safety precautions with respect to [its] performance [of the contract work] and comply with local, county, state, federal, and OSHA requirements ... and intend[ed] to comply with all safety requirements ... pertinent to [its] trade. Further, the contract required Esperanza to notify Handler if the conditions were inadequate. [41] Viewing all inferences in the light most favorable to Tlapechco, we find that a genuine issue of material fact is in dispute about whether Handler voluntarily assumed responsibility for safety around the open walkway because a reasonable jury could find that Handler assumed responsibility for safety around the open walkway based on the above facts. [42]