Opinion ID: 606321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Simpson's Meritorious Claims

Text: 18 Simpson argues that the District Court erred by allowing the AUSA to cross-examine him regarding his prior possession of dilaudid. Specifically, Simpson objects to the following colloquy: 19 AUSA: Have you ever seen these yellow pills before? 20 Simpson: Yes. 21 AUSA: Did you have those on you that day? 22 Simpson: No. 23 AUSA: Do you know what they are? 24 Simpson: Yes, I'm familiar with them. 25 AUSA: What are they? 26 Simpson: They [sic] dilaudid, K-4. 27 AUSA: And you're saying that you didn't have any dilaudid on you that day? 28 Simpson: No, sir. 29 AUSA: Have you ever had it on you before? 30 Simpson: Yes, I have. 31 AUSA: And you know that ... that's a common way for packaging dilaudid, isn't it? 32 Simpson: I wouldn't know that much. 33 Tr. I at 49-50. 34 Following the foregoing exchange, the AUSA obtained permission to cross-examine Simpson about a prior arrest for possession of dilaudid in order to impeach his testimony that he did not know how the drug is commonly packaged. When asked, though, Simpson continued to deny knowledge of dilaudid packaging. Thus, after a second bench conference at which time defense counsel objected to any further inquiry into this matter, the AUSA asked: [s]o what you're saying is that you were not arrested on August 15, 1985, for possession of dilaudid in a similar vial to that one? Tr. I at 54. Simpson replied, I was arrested in '85, but I don't recall having no vial. Id. 35 Simpson's counsel did not object to the initial question ([h]ave you ever had it on you before?) and, therefore, Simpson may prevail on his challenge only if the trial court's decision to allow the inquiry amounted to plain error. See FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(b); United States v. Rhodes, 886 F.2d 375, 379 (D.C.Cir.1989). Under the plain error standard, reversal is mandated to correct particularly egregious errors that would otherwise deprive the defendant of a substantial right. United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1340-41 (D.C.Cir.1982). Thus, to achieve reversal under the plain error standard, the appellant must show that the complained of error was plain in the sense of being obvious, and that the error substantially undermined the fairness of the trial. See Rhodes, 886 F.2d at 380; Blackwell, 694 F.2d at 1341-42. 36 In this case, the AUSA's error during cross-examination should have been apparent. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 37 [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.... 38 [301 U.S.App.D.C. 208] FED.R.EVID. 404(b). During the cross-examination of Simpson, the AUSA made no attempt to characterize the prior bad acts evidence as relevant to any permissible purpose. Indeed, it would have been difficult to do so since the only issue before the jury was whether Simpson actually possessed dilaudid on the day of his arrest. Thus, the only purpose the initial question could have served was to demonstrate Simpson's criminal propensities. The rule against the admission of such evidence is so well established that a violation of it will nearly always qualify as an obvious error. See Rhodes, 886 F.2d at 380. 39 Furthermore, the right affected by the District Court's failure to intercede in this case was substantial. Where the improper admission of prior bad acts evidence is concerned, we measure the substantiality of the right affected by the degree of prejudice that attaches to the admission. See id. at 380. In this case, Simpson's defense was that he was not connected with drug trafficking, but was framed by Rose. In the minds of many jurors, this defense would appear implausible once Simpson was implicated in the possession of dilaudid on previous occasions, even though the prior possessions did not bear on any issue at trial. Thus, the fairness of the entire proceeding was called into question by the improper admission of this evidence. 40 In any event, we need not dwell long on our conclusion that the trial court committed plain error in failing to intervene when the AUSA asked the initial question regarding Simpson's prior possession of dilaudid; counsel for the Government all but conceded this point on appeal. The Government contends, though, that because it was able to impeach Simpson with his prior conviction for possession of dilaudid, effectively getting the same information to the jury, whatever error there was in the initial question was somehow rendered harmless. This argument is specious. 41 In the first place, the Government's logic is circular. The only reason the Government could impeach Simpson with the follow-up question ([s]o what you're saying is that you were not arrested on August 15, 1985, for possession of dilaudid in a similar vial to that one?) was because Simpson had denied knowledge of dilaudid packaging. However, we certainly cannot say that Simpson's testimony on that point was not tainted by, or a result of, his reaction to the first, impermissible inquiry. Indeed, this seems more likely than not. Second, the Government may not use impermissible means to elicit prejudicial testimony simply because the same testimony could have been, or subsequently was, permissibly elicited. The rules of evidence govern both the type of evidence that is to be allowed and the manner in which it is admitted. See United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 524 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1980) (courts should consider not only 404(b) evidence, but the manner in which it was presented to the jury). Thus, it is no answer that Simpson's prior conviction came in only for impeachment; at that point, the damage had already been done. Were this the only question before us, Simpson's conviction for possession of dilaudid would be reversed.
42 There is a second error, however, that requires reversal of Simpson's conviction on all counts. On the second, and final, day of trial, Simpson requested that the trial court issue bench warrants for three witnesses who had been subpoenaed but were not present in court to testify. In requesting the bench warrants, Simpson argued that one of the witnesses in particular, Melvin Dixon (Dixon), who was an eyewitness to his encounter with the police, would provide essential exculpatory testimony. Simpson maintained that Dixon would testify that nothing fell from Simpson's pocket during the frisk. The trial judge denied the request, stating: 43 if you had testimony that would be exculpatory, even if these folks had a legitimate reason for their not being here, I would be reluctant to give you one further opportunity to get them here. 44 But I just have trouble seeing how I can put the case in the deep freeze while we go out and try to find folks that are not going to contribute, to me, anything meaningful to this case; so your request is denied. 45 Tr. I at 32. Simpson now claims that the court's refusal to issue the bench warrant [301 U.S.App.D.C. 209] denied him his right to compulsory process. We agree. 46 Although a decision to issue a bench warrant to compel the appearance of a witness lies within the trial judge's discretion, that discretion is constrained by the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. See United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 704 (5th Cir.1980). This is not to say that there is no limit on a defendant's ability to delay trial; where a request is plainly frivolous, the court may refuse to invoke judicial process. See, id.; see also United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292, 1297 (D.C.Cir.) (court properly declined to subpoena witness who could only substantiate a defense that was not valid under the statute), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853, 103 S.Ct. 119, 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982). However, in assessing a request for compulsory process, a trial judge may not invade the province of the jury and independently weigh the probativeness of relevant evidence. Once the defendant has alleged facts that, if true, demonstrate the necessity of the witness' testimony, the court is obligated to lend its authority in compelling the sought-after witness' appearance. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 889 (D.C.Cir.1990) (reviewing court must ensure that defendant does not suffer actual prejudice because of inability to obtain compulsory process). 47 In this case, Simpson made the requisite showing that Dixon's testimony would be relevant to his defense. Simpson's counsel asserted that Dixon, who was allegedly standing about twenty-five feet from Rose and Simpson during the encounter, witnessed the frisk and did not see a bag, or any other object, fall out of Simpson's pocket. This testimony, if believed by the jury, could have substantially undercut the Government's case. In response, the AUSA argued that Dixon was significantly further than twenty-five feet away from the scene of the frisk, and that a small plastic bag could barely be seen at that distance. Accordingly, the AUSA argued that, even assuming that Dixon would be credible, the testimony he would give would not be significantly probative. This argument, though, goes to the weight to be ascribed to Dixon's testimony, not its legal relevance. Further, the dispute between the AUSA and Simpson's counsel concerning the distance between Dixon and the encounter itself highlights an evidentiary or credibility dispute for the jury to resolve. Thus, in accepting the AUSA's argument--finding Dixon's putative testimony not worth the delay--the trial judge improperly resolved a factual question that should have been left to the jury. 48 Finally, the record does not support a finding that the District Court denied Simpson's request because it was untimely. For one thing, Dixon had been subpoenaed to testify, so the request for his appearance was not an afterthought. In addition, the day when Dixon and the other witnesses failed to appear was the first day on which they were scheduled to testify. Tr. at 22-24. Until that time, there was no cause for Simpson to request judicial intervention. In any event, the trial judge did not rely on the untimeliness of the request as the basis for his decision. Under the circumstances, then, we have no difficulty in concluding that Simpson was denied his right to compulsory process.