Opinion ID: 1615376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: ¶ 12. As a side argument, CMI generally raised the issue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, since the parties had two appeals pending with this Court at the time the special chancellor entered the 2008 judgment. CMI contends that the 2008 judgment erroneously modified, altered, amended, and broadened the second amended final judgment without jurisdiction. This issue is without merit. ¶ 13. Filing a notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction from the trial court to an appellate court, thereby removing the trial court's authority to amend, modify, or reconsider its judgment. McNeil v. Hester, 753 So.2d 1057, 1075 (Miss.2000); Bert Allen Toyota, Inc. v. Grasz, 947 So.2d 358, 362-63 (Miss.Ct.App.2007). In other words, the appeal removes the case ipso facto to the appellate courts. Id. When an appeal has no supersedeas bond, a party may execute on the judgment. McNeil, 753 So.2d at 1076. However, the lower court cannot broaden, amend, modify, vacate, clarify, or rehear the decree. Id. On the other hand, when an appeal has a supersedeas bond it effectively suspends the judgment. Matter of Estate of Moreland, 537 So.2d 1345, 1348 (Miss.1989). Therefore, enforcement of the rights declared by the decree are suspended until the appeal is determined. Id. When a trial court's order broadens, amends, modifies, vacates, clarifies, or rehears a decree, it must be vacated as null and void because it exceeds the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower court. Id. ¶ 14. Here, the record reveals no supersedeas bond, nor does CMI claim that one exists. The trial court explicitly retained jurisdiction in the second amended final judgment and in the December 13, 2007, contempt order for the purpose of enforcing its judgments. Further, the special chancellor's 2008 judgment merely enforced provisions of the second amended final judgment and did not broaden, amend, modify, vacate, clarify, or rehear the second amended final judgment. In the 2008 judgment, the trial court determined [t]hat Greene County timely and substantially complied with the requirements of Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Second Amended Final Judgment and the statutory requirements of Miss.Code Ann. § 41-13-15(7), in offering the GRHC facility for lease. On the issue of contempt, the 2008 judgment stated: That CMI shall be and hereby is found to be in contempt for its failure to comply with paragraphs 11(3) of the Court's Final Judgment, and that as a result thereof Greene County is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $7,500.00. Said amount shall be paid to Greene County, through its attorney on or before July 31, 2008. [4] ¶ 15. The rest of the 2008 judgment provides for the actions required to transfer management of the GRHC facility to George Regional and for continued documentation of financial statements from CMI for the period after December 31, 2007. By its terms, the 2008 judgment provides only for resolution for ongoing issues of moving the management and lease process forward for the parties. We find that this issue is without merit.