Opinion ID: 799604
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Entanglement Factor

Text: The plaintiffs argue that the Kosher Act impermissibly entangles the State with religion because it requires goods sold as kosher to bear a kosher label. The plaintiffs assert that many food items are acceptably kosher to non-Orthodox Jews even if they do not bear a kosher label; conversely, Orthodox Jews will normally not purchase food without a kosher label. Thus, the plaintiffs claim that the Act adopts an Orthodox labeling requirement and thereby entangles the State in religion by favoring Orthodox Jews. The Kosher Act, however, does not adopt an Orthodox standard of kashrut, nor does it regulate what foods are acceptably kosher or take a position on what it means for a product to be considered kosher: each seller or producer of kosher goods has the ability to determine for itself what standard of kashrut they follow. The law only requires that if a product is to be held out to the public as kosher, the product must bear a label describing it as such, and information is to be provided to the purchaser as to the basis for that description. The presence of the label does not affect the seller's assessment of the kosher nature of a product and is not what makes a product kosher or not kosher. The label simply indicates to the consumers that the seller or producer, and its certifier, believe the food to be kosher under their own standards. The plaintiffs also argue that there is no religious requirement that all kosher products bear a label, and that they specifically do not want to label certain foods as kosher. As the district court noted, however, the Kosher Act does not enforce religious law or religious requirements. Commack, 800 F.Supp.2d at 416. The Kosher Act merely requires food products marketed as kosher to be labeled as kosher. Thus, the Kosher Act does not entangle the State with religion because it does not require the State to enforce laws based on religious doctrine or to inquire into the religious content or religious nature of the products sold. Cf. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 396, 110 S.Ct. 688, 107 L.Ed.2d 796 (1990) (From the State's point of view, the critical question is not whether the materials are religious, but whether there is a sale or a use, a question which involves only a secular determination.). The plaintiffs attempt to analogize the amended Kosher Act to the prior Act's labeling requirements. However, under the prior Act, the State required a seller to follow specific processes set forth in the Act that followed the Orthodox Jewish food preparation standards of kosher before a product could be marketed as kosher. Cf. Commack I, 294 F.3d at 426-27. The prior Act also gave the State the ability to delegate advisory power under the law to a board on the basis of religionindeed, all six rabbis on the board were of the Orthodox Jewish faith. Id. at 428-29. Neither situation is present here: the term kosher is not defined in the statute, no specific religious processes are detailed as required for kosher labeling, no particular religious viewpoint is referenced, and no particular religion or denomination is given preference. The plaintiffs also argue that § 201-c(5), authorizing the Department of Agriculture to inspect all food establishments selling kosher products to ensure the accuracy of any information supplied in accordance with § 201-a, -c, entangles the State with religion by granting inspectors the authority to verify whether or not a particular item labeled as kosher actually is kosher pursuant to Jewish law. [11] To analyze whether the plaintiffs' view of the statute is correct, we must first determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning. See Universal Church v. Geltzer, 463 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir.2006). In so doing, we consider the language in the specific context in which it is used, as well as in the broader context of the statute of the whole. In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 582 F.3d 422, 427 (2d Cir.2009); see also Universal Church, 463 F.3d at 223; People v. Ballman, 15 N.Y.3d 68, 72, 904 N.Y.S.2d 361, 930 N.E.2d 282 (2010) (When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, our primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The plaintiffs' challenge focuses on the meaning of the words any information in the statute, arguing that this phrase means that the inspectors act without restriction or limitation and can thereby ascertain whether the food [labeled as kosher] is actually kosher under Jewish religious dietary laws. The issue, however, is what information is supplied pursuant to the statutesnamely, whether this includes the assessment of whether the food product is kosher. Unlike the prior law, the Kosher Act contains no definition of or standard for kosher. As the plaintiffs concede, for the inspectors to verify whether a product is actually kosher, the Legislature would first need to adopt an official position as to what is or is not kosher. No such position has been adopted here. The plaintiffs' assertion that the KLED inspectors are not trained in Jewish law only further demonstrates that their interpretation of the law is incorrect. Indeed, unlike the prior Act, there is no advisory board to counsel or consult on matters of kosher enforcement. Therefore, § 201-c can only be interpreted as authorizing inspectors to assess compliance with and the accuracy of the information filed with the Department of Agriculture and the Commissioner, not to engage in a substantive evaluation of whether a food item is or is not kosher. [12] See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 667, 17 S.Ct. 677, 41 L.Ed. 1154 (1897) ([N]othing is better settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.). Such routine regulatory interactions between the State and sellers of kosher products, which involve no inquiries into religious doctrine, no delegation of state power to a religious body, and no detailed monitoring or close administrative contact between secular and religious bodies, do not violate the non-entanglement command of the First Amendment. See Hernandez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989). Thus, unlike the statute at issue in Commack I, the Kosher Act does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.