Opinion ID: 2544406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issue of fact or law.

Text: The employer asserts that the Court of Appeals erred by directing the ALJ to apply KRS 342.140(1)(e) on remand because whether to apply KRS 342.140(1)(d) or (1)(e) is a choice dependent on findings of fact that are solely the province of the ALJ. We agree that factual findings are the ALJ's province, but we do not agree that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that KRS 342.140(1)(e) governs these facts. KRS 342.140(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The average weekly wage of the injured employee at the time of the injury or last injurious exposure shall be determined as follows: (1) If at the time of the injury which resulted in death or disability or the last date of injurious exposure preceding death or disability from an occupational disease: . . . . (d) The wages were fixed by the day, hour, or by the output of the employee, the average weekly wage shall be the wage most favorable to the employee computed by dividing by thirteen (13) the wages (not including overtime or premium pay) of said employee earned in the employ of the employer in the first, second, third, or fourth period of thirteen (13) consecutive calendar weeks in the fifty-two (52) weeks immediately preceding the injury. (e) The employee had been in the employ of the employer less than thirteen (13) calendar weeks immediately preceding the injury, his average weekly wage shall be computed under paragraph (d), taking the wages (not including overtime or premium pay) for that purpose to be the amount he would have earned had he been so employed by the employer the full thirteen (13) calendar weeks immediately preceding the injury and had worked, when work was available to other employees in a similar occupation. Although KRS 342.285 designates the ALJ as the finder of fact in workers' compensation claims, it charges the Board with determining whether the legal conclusions the ALJ draws from the facts conform to Chapter 342. KRS 342.290 charges the Court of Appeals with reviewing all matters subject to review by the Board as well as any legal errors that arise before the Board. The Board and the Court of Appeals acted within the scope of their authority when they determined that the claimant's average weekly wage must be calculated under KRS 342.140(1)(e) as construed in C & D Bulldozing v. Brock because Nesco had employed her for less than 13 weeks when her injury occurred. KRS 342.140(1)(d) clearly requires the employee to have worked for the employer for at least one 13-week period when injured. KRS 342.140(1)(e) clearly does not. The court determined in C & D Bulldozing v. Brock that KRS 342.140(1)(e) must be used to calculate the earning capacity of an employee who worked when work was available; received no wages when work was unavailable; agreed with his employer that he was not employed during those periods; and worked only seven weeks out of the 13 weeks immediately preceding his injury. As calculated under that section, the average weekly wage is based on evidence of what would have been earned if the worker was employed by the employer for the full 13-week period immediately preceding the injury and worked whenever work was available to other employees in a similar occupation. Applying KRS 342.140(1)(e) to the facts, the court noted the absence of any evidence that work was available at C & D to other employees in an occupation similar to Brock's. Moreover, evidence showed seven weeks of operating a bulldozer for C & D during a 13-week period to be a normal period of service. The court determined that the calculation must be based on Brock's actual earnings during the 13-week period immediately preceding his injury and acknowledged that the calculation yielded the same average weekly wage as under KRS 342.140(1)(d) on the facts that were present. Noting that no provision of KRS 342.140 was tailored narrowly to accommodate consistently intermittent employment that is not seasonal, the court concluded that KRS 342.140(1)(e) must be applied as best we can to the circumstances. [2] The ALJ found reasonably in the present case that the claimant's employment with Nesco was sporadic. The uncontradicted testimony of Nesco's own witness, Julie Gammon, belied its argument that KRS 342.140(1)(d) controls these facts. She stated that Nesco did not pay workers on availability call between assignments and nothing indicates that it provided any other benefits during such periods. Such evidence compelled a conclusion that each placement was a separate employment. KRS 342.140(1)(e) controls the average weekly wage calculation as a matter of law because the claimant's injury occurred three days after Nesco re-employed her and placed her at Star. Thus, she had been employed for less than 13 weeks when injured. KRS 342.140(1)(e) permits an ALJ to estimate what the worker would reasonably have expected to earn in the occupation in which the injury occurred by taking into account the availability of work to other employees in a similar occupation during the full 13-week period immediately preceding the injury. Huff v. Smith Trucking [3] and C & D Bulldozing Co. v. Brock [4] stand for the principle that the ALJ must consider the unique circumstances in a case involving an employment of less than 13 weeks and make a realistic estimate of what the individual probably would have earned in a normal 13-week period of employment.