Opinion ID: 2982304
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Meaning of the Term “Accrues”

Text: Plaintiffs derive their third argument from the text of Ohio Rev. Code § 1303.16(G), which notes that claims for conversion of an instrument “shall be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues.” They claim that a cause of action for conversion of an instrument accrues when the would-be plaintiff obtains actual knowledge of a wrongdoing. But this is an old argument, wrapped in new packaging. To the extent that Plaintiffs base their reading of the word “accrues” on the statutory discovery rule, their argument fails, for the reasons addressed above. And, to the extent that they rely on the common-law discovery rule, this argument has been unambiguously rejected, by an Ohio appellate court in Mattlin and by this court in Matz and Bandy. “Absent legislative definition, it is left to the judiciary to determine when a cause [of action] ‘arose.’” O’Stricker, 447 N.E.2d at 730. The application notes to § 1303.16 direct us to “other sections of Article 3” of the UCC to determine when a cause of action accrues under the statute. Ohio Rev. Code § 1303.16 cmt. n.1. Plaintiffs have not pointed out any language in Article 3 establishing that a discovery rule tolls their conversion claim. Thus, we adopt the judicial interpretations of what “accrues” means in this context—as established by Mattlin, Metz, and Bandy—and find Plaintiffs’ argument lacking in merit. We conclude that the statutory discovery rule contained in § 2305.09 does not apply to a UCC claim for conversion of an instrument. In the absence of fraudulent concealment by the banks, then, Plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued when the banks engaged in the alleged conversion. See Mattlin, 937 N.E.2d at 1091. The last argument Plaintiffs raise is that their claim for UCC conversion was tolled during the pendency of the Metz litigation. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. - 14 - Case No. 13-3493 Pate et al. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, et al. 345, 353–54 (1983). They maintain that this period began in May 2005, when the case was filed, and ended when class certification was denied in March 2009. But their limitations period expired in 2003 at the latest, as this court has already concluded. Metz, 649 F.3d at 498. Because we hold that the limitations period had passed before Metz was filed, we do not find it necessary to consider this argument. We agree with the district court that Plaintiffs’ claim is untimely.