Opinion ID: 745382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rational Relationship Test Today

Text: 16 Supreme Court jurisprudence now informs us that when reviewing challenged social legislation, a court must look for plausible reasons for legislative action, whether or not such reasons underlay the legislature's action. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 461, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980). To uphold the legislative choice, a court need only find some reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the legislative action. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2100, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). In other words, to escape invalidation by being declared irrational, the legislation under scrutiny merely must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the law. Heller, 509 U.S. at 321, 113 S.Ct. at 2643. 17 Thus, it may be seen that today it is very difficult to overcome the strong presumption of rationality that attaches to a statute. We will not strike down a law as irrational simply because it may not succeed in bringing about the result it seeks to accomplish, Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 50, 86 S.Ct. 1254, 1263, 16 L.Ed.2d 336 (1966), because the problem could have been better addressed in some other way, Mourning, 411 U.S. at 378, 93 S.Ct. at 1665 or because the statute's classifications lack razor-sharp precision, Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485, 90 S.Ct. at 1161. Nor will a statute be overturned on the basis that no empirical evidence supports the assumptions underlying the legislative choice. Vance, 440 U.S. at 110-11, 99 S.Ct. at 949-50. To succeed on a claim such as this, those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker. Id. at 111, 99 S.Ct. at 949. 18 So long as they do not burden fundamental rights or single out suspect classifications, lawmakers are free to engage in rational speculation unsupported by evidence. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315, 113 S.Ct. at 2102. With these principles in mind, we turn to the propriety of the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint. II Application of Test to Instant Case 19 In the case at hand, the City moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had not established that it was irrational for the City to limit cigar smoking. In support of its motion, it submitted an affidavit from Richard M. Weinberg, Esq., General Counsel to the New York City Council. In his affidavit, Mr. Weinberg identifies various materials on the basis of which it might reasonably be thought that both cigars and cigarettes are harmful and that placing limits on cigar smoking would protect the health of nonsmokers. Among other materials, the affidavit points to (i) studies on the dangers of ETS exposure that group all tobacco products together and indicate that cigars and cigarettes are equally harmful, see, e.g., EPA Report, supra; (ii) studies showing that the chemical composition of cigar smoke is similar to that of cigarette smoke and that both contain carcinogens, see, e.g., U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking: 25 Years of Progress (1989); and (iii) studies suggesting that cigar smoke may be more dangerous than cigarette smoke, see, e.g., C. Claiborne Ray, Q & A: Pipes and Cigars, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1993, at C6 (one cigar produces more particle emissions than three cigarettes, and 30 times the carbon monoxide emissions of a single cigarette); Elizabeth T.H. Frontam et al., Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Lung Cancer in Nonsmoking Women: A Multicenter Study, 271 JAMA 1752 (1994) (among nonsmoking women those whose spouses smoked cigars rather than cigarettes had higher risk of lung cancer). 20 Plaintiff responds that genuine issues of material fact exist because the parties disagree on whether the studies cited in the counsel's affidavit provide a reliable basis for concluding that cigar smoke is harmful to nonsmokers. For example, plaintiff has submitted affidavits from experts who opine that no reliable evidence links cigar smoking and health risks and that studies on the negative effects of cigarette smoke do not necessarily apply to cigar smoke. Plaintiff also submits scientific studies indicating, among other things, that inhalation of certain kinds of cigar smoke does less harm to rats than cigarette smoke. See T.E. Betts, J.P. O'Sullivan & L.A. Elson, Comparative Lung Pathology of Rats After Exposure to Cigarette and Cigar Smoke, 62 Br. J. Exp. Path 62 (1981). Although plaintiff does not deny that the studies cited by the defendants actually exist, he questions their persuasive weight. 21 The facts plaintiff points to are insufficient to bar summary judgment. At best, plaintiff's evidence suggests a lack of direct empirical support for the assumption that cigar smoke is as harmful as cigarette smoke or his evidence might demonstrate the existence of a scientific dispute over the risks in question. But no matter how plaintiff's proof is viewed it will not serve to rebut the presumption that the statute has a rational basis. In light of lawmakers' freedom to engage in rational speculation unsupported by evidence, Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315, 113 S.Ct. at 2102 it cannot be said to be irrational for the New York City Council to conclude that cigar smoke might be harmful. And that is all the Constitution demands. Contrary to plaintiff's arguments, due process does not require a legislative body to await concrete proof of reasonable but unproven assumptions before acting to safeguard the health of its citizens. Thus, although the parties dispute the existence of and weight of direct scientific proof of cigar smoke's dangers, that dispute is not a material issue of fact in considering whether to grant summary judgment. 22 Moreover, to succeed on a substantive due process challenge, a plaintiff must do more than show that the legislature's stated assumptions are irrational--he must discredit any conceivable basis which could be advanced to support the challenged provision, regardless of whether that basis has a foundation in the record, Heller, 509 U.S. at 320-21, 113 S.Ct. at 2642-43 or actually motivated the legislature, Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315, 113 S.Ct. at 2102. Otherwise stated, once the legislature's action has been shown to have some plausible rationale, a court's inquiry is at an end. United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 449 U.S. at 179, 101 S.Ct. at 461.