Opinion ID: 62473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing Post-Gall

Text: After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Booker and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007), the district courts are still required to correctly 10 calculate the advisory guidelines range. See United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008). If the district court decides that a sentence outside of the guidelines is warranted, it “‘must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.’” Id. at 1190 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 597) (emphasis omitted). Gall emphasized that “while the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines range is surely relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. at 1189 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 591). Under Gall, we must engage in a two-step process of sentencing review. See id. at 1190. First, we must “‘ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.’” Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 597). 11 Second, we must consider the “‘substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, under an abuse-of-discretion standard,’” taking into account the “‘totality of the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 597). In considering the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we may “‘not apply a presumption of unreasonableness’” where a sentence is outside of the Guidelines range, and we “‘must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.’” Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 597). A sentence may be substantive unreasonable “‘when the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors [or] fails to consider pertinent section 3553(a) factors.’” Id. at 1192 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). If such an error exists, we will vacate the sentence and remand, unless the error was harmless. See United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court’s consideration of an impermissible factor at sentencing is harmless if the record as a whole shows the error did not substantially affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed. See United States v. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005). We now apply the two-step appellate review process outlined in Gall to the Puches’ sentences of time served. 12