Opinion ID: 4523131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adams’s Double Jeopardy Claim Has Been Waived

Text: With little elaboration, Adams perfunctorily contends that this Court “should vacate the sentences imposed on counts three and five” because “a conviction under Section 7206(1) for filing . . . false returns merges into a conviction under Section 7201 for the inclusive fraud of tax evasion.” Adams’s Br. at 38. We need not consider the merits of Adams’s claim because it is waived. A defendant generally may not raise a constitutional double jeopardy claim on appeal unless it was raised prior to his guilty plea. See United States v. Leyland, 277 F.3d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[t]o preserve his [double jeopardy] claims, [defendant] needed to raise his double jeopardy argument before pleading guilty”). Indeed, the law is clear that “[c]ourts will conclude that a defendant’s guilty plea waived his double jeopardy claims even if the defendant does not know about the claim at the time of the plea.” Id. “Conscious relinquishment of the 24 double jeopardy claim is not required because the guilty plea constitutes an admission sufficient to establish that [a] defendant committed a crime, not an ‘inquiry into a defendant’s subjective understanding of the range of potential defenses.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573–74 (1989)). There is, however, a limited exception to this bar “where on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence,” Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, such as where the statute under which the defendant was convicted is unconstitutional, Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 804–05 (2018). That was clearly not the case here. Consequently, because Adams had the opportunity to challenge the superseding indictment on double jeopardy grounds before pleading guilty but chose to forego that option, he has waived the claim for appellate review. VII. Adams Was Not Deprived of His Right to a Fair and Impartial Tribunal Adams maintains that the district court “violated [his] right to be sentenced by a fair and impartial tribunal” because it allegedly considered published news articles and reader comments on those articles that the government submitted as part of its sentencing memorandum. Adams’s Br. at 42. He accuses the district court of being “tainted by the government’s reliance on the views 25 of . . . anonymous bloggers,” and “requests that the case be remanded for sentencing before a [different] sentencing judge.” Id. at 44. Adams fails to establish that the district court abused its discretion in considering the government’s submission. Adams’s claim that he was deprived of a “fair and impartial tribunal” is a claim that the district court committed procedural error in its consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. We review procedural reasonableness and the district court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) factors for abuse of discretion. United States v. Desnoyers, 708 F.3d 378, 385 (2d Cir. 2013). “A district court commits procedural error where it fails to calculate the Guidelines range . . . , makes a mistake in its Guidelines calculation, or treats the Guidelines as mandatory.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). “It also errs procedurally if it does not consider the § 3553(a) factors, or rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the news articles and reader comments, since they were relevant to assessing various factors pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the need for a just punishment and the need to promote respect for the law. In its February 21, 2018 sentencing 26 memorandum, the government referred to online reader comments from published newspaper articles that reported on Adams’s trial and guilty plea. As part of its contention that a substantial sentence was necessary to promote respect for the law, the government cited comments from three readers, who opined: (1) “White collar crime is not prosecuted like other crimes. The courts will throw someone in jail for stealing food to eat but guys like this get four or five passes. After all it depends on who you are and know.” (2) “Adams subscribes to the same disregard for the rule of law and dishonesty, immorality and corruption of privileged entitlement that is rampant in DC. We have personally experienced his refusal to pay what he owes.” (3) “Here’s a prediction: They’ll settle with this crook for half of what he actually owes, put him on a payment plan (which he won’t pay), and give him 30 days [sic] house arrest in one of his lavish houses. He’ll save half of his tax obligation and be able to take a vacation. Smart business. Let’s see what happens.” Gov’t App’x at 474–75. With respect to the need for the sentence to reflect a just punishment, the government cited comments from two additional readers, who observed: (1) “The Day article might have been more informative if it had included a photo of the individual, as well as a photo of his magnificent estate and grand mansion at [REDACTED] Scott Road. The public would benefit from knowing more about this poor man who can’t pay his taxes, and his modus operandi.” 27 (2) “I have no doubt that he is a nice guy to his family and those in his personal circle. But the fact is that he chose not pay his taxes . . . . Some of us work hard and struggle to pay our taxes and follow the law and we do so on probably a quarter of his income, without multiple grand homes, car collections, vacations and all the bonuses of the wealthy life. I’m a really nice person, and I know a lot of really nice people, but we contribute by paying our fare [sic] share and being honest, helpful citizens. I am not about to assassinate Mr. Adams’ character here, and I hope this thread doesn’t go there, but what he DID was WRONG and this is not the first time he has worked the system to enhance his own wealth . . . .” Id. at 475–76. In denying Adams’s motion to strike the newspaper articles and reader comments from the government’s sentencing submission, the district court concluded that those materials “[we]re relevant to the subject matter for which they [we]re cited, specifically, the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law on the part of the general public.” Id. at 37. We cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to consider these comments in evaluating the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (“[T]he court . . . shall consider . . . the need for the sentence imposed . . . to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”). Finally, Adams asserts a host of ways in which the district court was allegedly hostile to him over the course of the proceedings. He complains that the 28 court was skeptical of or rejected certain contentions he made at sentencing, including that his criminal history had been overstated and that his conduct had not physically harmed anyone, and that the court would not hear from his relatives who had submitted letters on his behalf, though it did hear from Adams’s former accountant as a victim of Adams’s crimes. However, “claims of judicial bias must be based on extrajudicial matters, and adverse rulings, without more, will rarely suffice to provide a reasonable basis for questioning a judge’s impartiality.” Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218, 227 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Furthermore, the district court did allow Adams’s family members to give statements at sentencing. Consequently, Adams’s complaints are meritless.