Opinion ID: 1434906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Errors Relating to the Instructions

Text: Appellants (defendants) maintain that it was error for the trial court to have given Instruction No. 7 [5] since it denied them constitutional due process, equal protection of the laws, and deprived them of a fair jury trial since the instruction as given, failed to define reasonable doubt. Although the Court, in view of its decision to reverse, deems it unnecessary to discuss the constitutional objections raised by the appellants, it is our opinion that a short discussion of whether or not the term reasonable doubt requires definition is appropriate. Idaho has had no requirement that the term reasonable doubt be defined when used in criminal instructions. Certain authorities [6] have stated that the term is self-explanatory but that proposition is unsound, the instant case being but one example of many where the expression reasonable doubt has been the subject of controversy. It is our opinion that when such term is used in an instruction, where the jurors are required to understand its meaning and apply it, the term should be defined more precisely so that there is no question in the jurors' minds with respect to the concept of reasonable doubt. By doing this the jury's deliberations will be facilitated, thus increasing the probability of reaching a correct result. The California jury instruction noted below [7] is clearer and more concise than the instruction which was given by the district court. Hereafter whenever the concept of reasonable doubt is at issue, i.e., in all criminal cases, the defendant is entitled to such instruction. Appellants next contend that it was error for the trial court not to have instructed the jury with respect to the defense of alibi. [8] It is the position of the appellants that once sufficient evidence has been presented to raise the issue of alibi, and defense counsel specifically requests that the trial court charge the jury on that issue, the failure of the trial court to do so, constitutes prejudicial and reversible error. The trial court, however, did give an instruction which, in fact, placed the issue of alibi before the jury. [9] As long as the jury was instructed as to this theory of the case complaint cannot be heard merely because appellants (defendants) preferred that the instruction be phrased in a particular way. The essense of the concept of alibi and its relationship to the case were made known to the jury and thus appellants' contention is without merit. Appellants next assert that the trial court erred by failing to give an instruction [10] relating to the intoxication of Mason (the alleged victim of the robbery) at the time of the robbery. It is their position that since Mason's testimony sharply conflicted with the testimony of the defendants (appellants), Mason's intoxication was extremely relevant to his ability to perceive and observe the events occurring that evening. [11] The Court is of the opinion that the defendants were prejudiced since the trial court did not, when giving the instruction regarding the credibility of witnesses, include for the jury's consideration the ability of the witnesses to observe and perceive. A witness's ability to perceive bears a direct relationship to the accuracy and truthfulness of his testimony. Any sensory defects or other factors which are related to the ability of the witness to perceive are questions of fact which are for the exclusive determination of the jury. [12] Thus, the trial court upon timely request, is required to give a general instruction relating to the witnesses' ability to perceive [13] and it is within the discretion of the trial court to give the jury a specific instruction relating to intoxication provided that the evidence adduced at trial warrants it. Therefore we find that the district court erred in failing to give the defendants' requested instruction on intoxication. In no case, however, should the trial court single out any particular witness and then instruct the jury with respect to his testimony. Instructions as to the credibility of a witness should be general and apply equally to all of the witnesses for the state and the defendant alike. State v. Rogers, 30 Idaho 259 at 272, 163 P. 912 at 916 (1917). By doing this the trial court refrains from expressing its opinion regarding the testimony given by certain witnesses. Cf., State v. Rogers, supra .