Opinion ID: 1261352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: trial judge's instructions: unintentional shooting within the context of self-defense and possession of a weapon

Text: Throughout trial, appellant maintained that she got the gun from the bedroom in case she needed to use it to defend herself and her unborn child. She argued that her right to possess the gun in self-defense was distinct from the issue of whether she was entitled to use the gun in self-defense. Appellant claimed that she was lawfully entitled to arm herself in self-defense in case deadly force was necessary, but that the lethal charge was fired accidentally. Consistent with her theory that the shooting was accidental, appellant requested that the trial judge charge the jury that she was lawfully entitled to arm herself in self-defense to meet a potential threat and that he place such instruction in the context of her testimony that the shooting was accidental. The trial judge charged the jury as to what constitutes an accidental shooting and a shooting in self-defense. He also charged that one has the right to arm oneself in self-defense where the shooting occurs intentionally in self-defense, but he did not clarify that the same right exists where the shooting occurs accidentally. The trial judge's instructions focused on the use of the weapon in self-defense. In effect, the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that appellant had the right to have the gun in her possession to protect herself in the situation where the shooting occurred accidentally conveyed to the jury that her willful act of arming herself foreclosed the defense of an accidental shooting. Where a defendant claims that he armed himself in self-defense, while also claiming that the actual shooting was accidental, this combination of events can place the shooting in the context of self-defense. People v. Brooks , 130 Ill. App. (3d) 747, 751, 86 Ill. Dec. 90, 94, 474 N.E. (2d) 1287, 1290 (1985). [A] homicide is excused when caused by the discharge of a gun ... where the accused is lawfully acting in self-defense and the victim meets death by accident, through the unintentional discharge of a gun or the like ... On the other hand, a homicide is not excusable on the ground of accident or misadventure unless it appears that the act of the slayer was lawful ... 40 Am. Jur. (2d), Homicide , § 112 (1968) (emphasis added). Because, the defense of accident is not applicable unless the defendant was acting lawfully , it is necessary to instruct the jury as to what constitutes a lawful enterprise. The facts reveal that appellant had been slapped by Donna and shoved by Glenn immediately before she got the gun. Additionally, testimony revealed that Donna had great animosity towards appellant and had previously attacked her. The trial judge erred in failing to charge that appellant had a right to possess a weapon in her home. This instruction would have aided the jury in evaluating the lawfulness of appellant's actions. The trial judge also erred in failing to charge that if appellant lawfully armed herself in self-defense because of a threat to her safety created by the decedent, and the gun accidentally discharged, the jury would have to find her not guilty. The trial judge's traditional self-defense charge which focused only on the right to use the weapon in self-defense was inadequate. Braxton v. Commonwealth , 195 Va. 275, 77 S.E. (2d) 840 (1953). Accordingly, we reverse this case and remand for a new trial.