Opinion ID: 1239050
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Program Benefits

Text: In comparing the settlement with the likely result of continued litigation, the trial court considered three primary benefits in addition to land and cash. These benefits, collectively referred to as the Program Benefits, include (a) the creation of the Trust Authority, (b) budgeting advantages for the mental health program, and (c) the management of trust land by a special unit within DNR. Weiss argues that the superior court overvalued each of these benefits.
The superior court found the Trust Authority to be a fundamental and significant part of the settlement agreement. Weiss argues that the benefit of the Trust Authority is largely illusory because its power to spend money from the trust income account without appropriation by the legislature is possibly unconstitutional. Weiss also contends that the power of the Trust Authority to oversee DNR's administration of trust lands is meaningless since DNR will have the final say. In granting both preliminary and final approval, the superior court recognized that the constitutionality of the Trust Authority's power to spend trust income without legislative appropriation was uncertain. Thus, contrary to Weiss's assertion, the superior court did not just close its eyes to this issue. Indeed, it would have been improper for the trial court to attempt to resolve this unsettled legal question. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. 993, 998 n. 14, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Furthermore, the court based its finding as to the significance of the Trust Authority on all its powers and its advocacy position, not solely on its spending power. [23] Thus the superior court, even while acknowledging Weiss's argument, came to a different conclusion as to the Trust Authority's value; this conclusion was not clearly erroneous. Weiss's second argument also fails. Again, the superior court recognized and accounted for the fact that, although the Trust Authority has the power to disapprove proposed land exchanges, DNR will ultimately decide how to manage trust land. See AS 37.14.009(a)(2). Moreover, the superior court responded to both of these arguments with the observation that, without the settlement there would be no Trust Authority. Instead, the likely result of litigation would be general directions to the State to manage the trust in the interests of the beneficiaries and under the Enabling Act. The superior court did not err in determining that management under the Trust Authority will probably be better than management with those directions.
The superior court found that the budgeting procedures in HB 201, set forth at AS 47.30.046 and AS 37.14.003-.005, may prove to be significant as the budget for the integrated comprehensive mental health program competes with other needs for general fund appropriations. The mental health budget is given an advantage for inclusion in the governor's budget over the budgets of other state agencies. The mental health budget is given an advantage before the legislature both from its separation from other appropriations and in the required legislative report. Clearly, there are no guarantees of adequate funding or expanded funding for necessary services, but these budget advantages may prove to be significant nonetheless. Weiss argues that the superior court erred in not quantifying the benefit of these budgeting advantages. It would make little sense, however, to require the trial court to quantify the value of such terms; as the court recognized, their significance remains to be seen. However, like the Trust Authority, the budgeting advantages would almost certainly not be established through continued litigation. Therefore, the superior court did not err in considering these procedures a benefit, albeit of unknown value, to the class.
Weiss makes several interrelated arguments with regard to the land management provisions of the settlement agreement. First, he contends that the management regime is illegal because it allegedly does not require trust lands to be managed solely in the best interest of the beneficiaries. Weiss also asserts that the court erred by considering the not very concrete benefit of management of trust land by a special DNR unit. [24] Weiss argues that the settlement's management scheme is illegal because it provides that DNR shall manage mental health trust land under those provisions of law applicable to other state land. AS 38.05.801(b)(1). This argument is unconvincing. HB 201 explicitly makes this provision subject to the overall requirement that the lands be managed consistent with the trust principles imposed by the AMHEA. AS 38.05.801(a). In light of this express language, the trial court reasonably concluded that the settlement's management standard conforms with the requirements of the trust. Weiss also argues that the management provisions are illegal because they require that DNR's regulations address ... management for multiple use of trust land. We agree with the superior court, however, that when viewed in its entirety, there is actually no conflict in the statute between the multiple-use subsection and the subsections requiring maintenance of the trust land base and management for the benefit of the trust and long-term sustained yield of products from the land. As the superior court noted, multiple use can refer to multiple types of development as well as to combining recreation or preservation with development. [25] Moreover, recognition of the unique scenic, paleontological, and archeological values of trust lands is not necessarily incompatible with trust principles, even under the stringent rules governing school trust lands. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 921 (Utah 1993). Weiss also takes issue with the superior court's appraisal of the value of the settlement's creation of a separate unit within DNR to manage trust lands. The superior court found the addition of a special unit to manage these lands to be an improvement over general management by DNR for several reasons. First, the land managers in the special unit will have a smaller amount of land per person to manage than those in DNR. This should allow managers to be proactive managers instead of passive managers. Second, the special unit members can be trained in the special rules applicable to trust management and will have to apply only those rules and those laws applicable to other state lands which do not conflict with trust management under the Enabling Act. Third, the individuals in the special unit may develop a sense of pride in their special charge. Even if, as Weiss asserts, the trial court's first point is not supported by evidence, the court's second and third points offer ample support for its conclusion that management by a specialized unit will probably be an improvement over the result of continued litigation. In summary, the program benefits at best offer a considerable advantage over continued litigation. At worst, they are as favorable as the likely product of continued litigation. Therefore, we hold that the superior court did not err in its appraisal of the settlement's provisions regarding the Trust Authority, the budgeting procedures, and land management. [26]