Opinion ID: 2604674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Punitive civil sanction cases

Text: Kurth Ranch addressed the double jeopardy question directly in the context of a nonforfeiture Montana tax on illicit drugs. It is the seminal case because it is the United States Supreme Court's last word on the subject at hand. The issue in Kurth was whether or not the tax has punitive characteristics that subject it to the constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Kurth, 511 U.S. at 778-79, 114 S.Ct. at 1945 (emphasis added). The Court found it did and applied double jeopardy to bar the parallel criminal charges. As in Kurth, the like question here is whether this probationary license status has any punitive characteristics. If so it is punishment for double jeopardy purposes, and the DUI charges must be dismissed. See also United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536 (10th Cir.1994). [6] Both the concurrence to the majority and the concurrence to this dissent argue an inconsistency between the Supreme Court's analysis in Ursery and the Supreme Court's analysis in Halper and Kurth, and thus claim the Ursery analysis should be followed in the case at bar because Ursery is the most recent of the three. Citing language in Ursery to the effect that an excessive fines clause analysis in the Austin forfeiture case should not be imported into double jeopardy cases not involving forfeiture or excessive fines, Concurrence at 1344 n. 1 (citing Ursery, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2147), the concurrence suggests the dissenting opinion does not follow Ursery because the dissent evidently believes the Supreme Court is wrong [in Ursery ].... This misses the point. Whether or not the Supreme Court dropped the ball in Ursery (and there is substantial scholarly comment to that effect) [7] is not material to the resolution of this case because Ursery was a forfeiture case decided under the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment whereas the case at bar must be decided under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, as construed by Halper and Kurth Ranch. As stated in Gustafson, 668 N.E.2d at 442 n. 2 (relied upon by the concurrence at 1346): Ursery does not control disposition of these [licensing] causes before us, which do not involve interim forfeitures.... State cases on double jeopardy State v. Clark, 124 Wash.2d 90, 98, 100, 875 P.2d 613 (1994) applied a double jeopardy standard to forfeiture facts. The question there was whether or not a civil forfeiture statute in combination with criminal sanctions violated state or federal prohibitions against the imposition of double jeopardy. A unanimous court held, [A] forfeiture statute must be solely remedial to escape characterization as `punishment' under the federal double jeopardy clause. Clark, 124 Wash.2d at 98, 875 P.2d 613. Clark construed Austin to hold [i]f the civil forfeiture statute is at all punitive, it is to be deemed `punishment.' Clark, 124 Wash.2d at 100, 875 P.2d 613. A majority of this court arguably reached the same result in State v. Cole, 128 Wash.2d 262, 295, 297, 300, 906 P.2d 925 (1995) wherein it construed Austin and Clark to require a double jeopardy analysis unless the sanction serves solely a remedial purpose. Cole, 128 Wash.2d at 295, 906 P.2d 925 (Johnson, J., dissenting). [8] Whether Clark and Cole are consistent with Ursery's federal (not state) forfeiture analysis remains to be seen; however, clearly these cases facially define the punishment standard for double jeopardy purposes which is the issue presented by this case. I conclude that this probationary license is wholly punitive, and nothing else. It does not revoke or limit the licensed driver's privilege to drive but is there to deter a subsequent DUI by enhancing the applicable mandatory minimum jail time. If that isn't punishment, what is? Even if there were also nonpunitive aspects, double jeopardy would still bar the criminal prosecution. I dissent.