Opinion ID: 2383883
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mandated Procedures

Text: We shall deal first with Horace Mann's second argument. Section 20-37(e) of the county code creates an interagency insurance panel to advise the agencies participating in the county self-insurance program and to prepare a budget for the program. The code does not give the panel any responsibility for evaluating or resolving claims. The Attachment to the Participating Agreement entered into by the board and the county imposed certain additional duties on the interagency panel, however, including duties relating to the evaluation and settlement of claims. Section 3.5 of that Attachment provided that there would be no coverage for (1) claims arising from actions falling outside the scope of employment, (2) cases of wanton or malicious wrongdoing, and (3) intentional torts. It stated that, in all cases involving those issues, the county attorney would evaluate whether the employee was entitled to coverage, defense, or indemnification based on the facts of the case and that, if the county attorney decided that coverage, defense, or indemnification should be denied, he/she would make such a recommendation to the panel. The panel would then meet, allow interested parties to be heard, and determine those issues. Horace Mann complained that the decision not to provide a defense to Ms. Robbins was made by the county attorney, on recommendation of the board, and that the matter was never submitted to the interagency panel, as required by the Attachment to the Participating Agency Agreement. That complaint was not addressed by the Circuit Court, however, in its granting of summary judgment and was therefore not a basis for the summary judgment. Citing its decision in Warner v. German, 100 Md.App. 512, 642 A.2d 239 (1994), which, in turn, relied on Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 315 Md. 761, 556 A.2d 1135 (1989) and Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 313 Md. 301, 545 A.2d 658 (1988), the Court of Special Appeals observed that, when a matter is resolved by the trial court on summary judgment, the appellate court ordinarily will not affirm on any ground not relied upon by the trial court in granting the motion. That principle is a correct one, see Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695, 785 A.2d 726, 729 (2001), Eid v. Duke, 373 Md. 2, 10, 816 A.2d 844, 849 (2003), but it is not entirely applicable here. It generally governs when the appellate court is unable to affirm on any ground relied upon by the trial court and, but for affirming on a ground not relied on by the lower court, would be required to reverse, vacate, or modify the judgment. Because, in Maryland, a trial court has some discretion to deny summary judgment even when it could grant that relief, we have been reluctant to permit such judgments to be affirmed on a ground not relied upon below and upon which, if no other ground for entering the judgment existed, the lower court could lawfully have denied summary judgment and permitted the case to proceed to trial. Here, of course, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the summary judgment on the ground relied upon by the Circuit Court, so there was no reason for it to address as well the additional ground raised by Horace Mann.