Opinion ID: 2103784
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mandatory Waiting Period Requirement

Text: We further conclude that the two-day waiting period requirement contained in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-15-202(d)(1) fails to pass constitutional muster. The State appears to argue that the waiting period requirement furthers its interest in potential life and explicitly argues that this provision protects maternal health by ensuring that the woman has adequate time to reflect on her decision after hearing the statutorily prescribed information. The State has not argued that the waiting period provision is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest, but instead points to evidence that while the waiting period was in effect, the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee made a finding of fact that over 3,000 abortions were performed during the year preceding the hearing in the case, see Planned Parenthood of Memphis v. Alexander, No. 78-2310 (W.D.Tenn. March 23, 1981), p. 7, and that, consequently, this requirement does not create an undue burden. [12] In Akron , the United States Supreme Court struck down a twenty-four hour waiting period, reasoning that careful consideration of the abortion decision by the woman `is beyond the state's power to require.' 462 U.S. at 450, 103 S.Ct. at 2503 (citation omitted). The Court characterized the twenty-four hour waiting period as arbitrary and inflexible and reasoned that the city had failed to show that the requirement increased the safety of abortion or otherwise furthered a legitimate state interest. Id. The Court concluded: The decision whether to proceed with an abortion is one as to which it is important to affor[d] the physician adequate discretion in the exercise of his medical judgment. In accordance with the ethical standards of the profession, a physician will advise the patient to defer the abortion when he thinks this will be beneficial to her. But if a woman, after appropriate counseling, is prepared to give her written informed consent and proceed with the abortion, a State may not demand that she delay the effectuation of that decision. Id. at 450-51, 103 S.Ct. at 2503 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). Although later the authors of the Casey opinion determined that a 24-hour waiting period did not violate the undue burden standard, 505 U.S. at 887, 112 S.Ct. at 2826, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Akron is equally applicable to the challenge made here under the Tennessee Constitution. As the trial court stated, a woman contemplating an abortion should be allowed sufficient time for reflection before she makes an informed decision. However, a sufficient amount of time varies with each individual woman, and the inflexibility of a two-day waiting period as it applies to every woman except in a medical emergency situation requires its invalidation. The majority of the expert testimony seemed to acquiesce in the fact that most women have seriously contemplated their decision before making their appointment ...; several of the witnesses testified that many of the patients at Planned Parenthood were referred by other private physicians, indicating that the woman already has at the very least a basic understanding of her situation and the decisions now before her. To mandate that she wait even longer insults the intelligence and decision-making capabilities of a woman.... Evidence in the record indicates that patient mortality rates for abortions increase as the length of pregnancy increases. Studies also suggest that a large majority of women who have endured waiting periods prior to obtaining an abortion have suffered increased stress, nausea and physical discomfort, but very few have reported any benefit from having to wait. Moreover, evidence in the record indicates that the waiting period increases a woman's financial and psychological burdens, since many women must travel long distances and be absent from work to obtain an abortion. Planned Parenthood presents a compelling argument that, because the waiting period requires a woman to make two trips to the physician, the waiting period is especially problematic for women who suffer from poverty or abusive relationships. The States reliance on a district court's finding of fact, that the waiting period failed to decrease abortions, is misplaced. The finding was made over twenty years ago without any apparent consideration of the actual number of abortions sought in each year. Further, the State has simply failed to carry its burden to show that the two-day waiting period requirement, mandating the longest waiting period in the country, is narrowly tailored to further its compelling interest in maternal health. The two-day waiting period therefore is unconstitutional. We likewise conclude that the two-day waiting period has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, and therefore fails to pass muster under an undue burden analysis. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878, 112 S.Ct. at 2821. While the statute refers to a two-day waiting period, the waiting period is actually a three-day waiting period because the patient may not sign the consent form until the third day following the day [the required] information was given. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-15-202(d)(1). This extremely long waiting period, the longest in the nation, suggests that the waiting period requirement is not intended as an opportunity for reflection, but is actually intended as an obstacle to abortion.