Opinion ID: 698175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conviction for Escape

Text: 7 Winn claims that we must reverse his conviction for escape because he was not in custody as required by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 751(a). We disagree. A federal prisoner in a halfway house program commits the offense of escape when he willfully violates the terms of his extended confinement. United States v. Jones, 569 F.2d 499, 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 908 (1978). 8 Winn's reliance on United States v. Baxley, 982 F.2d 1265, 1268 (9th Cir. 1992), is misplaced. In Baxley, we held that a person confined to a halfway house as a condition of bond prior to trial was not in custody for purposes of Sec. 751(a) and distinguished Jones because a person detained before trial pursuant to a bond was in the same position as a parolee who risked revocation of parole if he violated his parole terms. Id. at 1269 & n.8. Contrary to Winn's argument, Winn was not in the same position as a parolee simply because the Parole Commission had final say over his release. He was not yet on parole. He was still subject to incarceration in prison but had been placed in a halfway house to prepare him for reentry to society when released on parole. Our rationale in Baxley was that Congress did not intend Sec. 751(a) as a punishment for persons who violated conditions of parole or bail because the government already had authority to punish them by revoking their bail or parole. The government has no such authority over a halfway house resident who violates the terms of his confinement. 1 9 Winn argues, however, that even if he could be charged with escape under Sec. 751(a), his indictment was flawed because it failed to mention 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4082. Winn cites no authority for the proposition that an indictment for an escape from a halfway house under Sec. 751(a) must also mention Sec. 4082, and we do not impose such a requirement. Section 4082 clearly states that a person who escapes from extended confinement may be charged under the provisions of chapter 35, which includes Sec. 751(a). Therefore, there is no need to refer to Sec. 4082 in an indictment under Sec. 751(a). 10 We also reject Winn's argument that the district court abused its discretion in admitting two documents evidencing the parole violations for which Winn was incarcerated, because the documents were not properly authenticated. The district court permitted the government to introduce a certified copy of a Parole Commission Warrant dated May 8, 1990, and a Marshal's Return dated June 4, 1993, to establish a chain of custody linking Winn's escape to his 1986 alien smuggling conviction. The documents were accompanied by a certificate from Sandra Opeka of the Parole Commission, certifying that the warrant and return were copies of document[s] relating to Ronald Winn ... contained in his official file record at the Parole Commission. 11 Ms. Opeka's certificate was sufficient to authenticate the documents under Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67, 73 (9th Cir. 1967) (clerk's certificate provided adequate authentication even though clerk did not state that clerk had custody of original documents, but stated only that originals were on file in clerk's office). Winn claims that the certification was insufficient because it did not state that the official had custody of the original document. However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 44, applied to criminal cases through Fed. R. Crim. P. 27, states that an official record may be attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by the officer's deputy, and accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the custody. The rule does not mention the term original. Because the certification accompanying Winn's warrant and marshal's return states that the copy is of a document in his official file record, it is adequate under Rule 27 and Bayless. 12