Opinion ID: 1307549
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: springs' appeal

Text: The Court of Appeals held Camp's complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action for tortious interference with an existing contract based on the allegation that Springs interfered with Camp's contract to close a loan for Mrs. Johnson. Springs contends this was error. The elements of a cause of action for tortious interference with contract are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) the wrongdoer's knowledge thereof; (3) his intentional procurement of its breach; (4) the absence of justification; and (5) resulting damages. Todd v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472 (1985); DeBerry v. McCain, 275 S.C. 569, 274 S.E.2d 293 (1981). Springs contends Camp's complaint fails to allege facts showing an existing contract and an absence of justification. Where the allegations of the complaint give rise to competing inferences on a question of material fact, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, is not appropriate. Jensen v. South Carolina Dept. of Social Services, 297 S.C. 323, 377 S.E.2d 102 (Ct. App.1988). Camp's complaint alleges Mrs. Johnson had contracted his services for the loan closing and he had begun title investigation. We find these allegations sufficient to allege an existing contract. The complaint further alleges Camp attempted in good faith to resolve the prior dispute with Springs. From this allegation it may be inferred Springs' interference with the Johnson contract was without justification. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling finding the complaint sufficient to state a cause of action for tortious interference with an existing contract. Finally, Springs contends Camp's complaint fails to state a cause of action for SCUTPA violation. We agree. An action for damages may be brought under SCUTPA for unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 39-5-20(a) and -140(a) (1985). The conduct complained of here does not describe any action by Springs that was unfair or deceptive. The allegation that Springs told potential borrowers Camp was unacceptable fails to describe an unfair act in the conduct of trade or commerce. Camp's clients were free to choose a different lending institution if they wished to retain Camp as the closing attorney. Camp was not in competition with Springs nor did he have a right to represent its borrowers. Further, there is no deception alleged since Camp was told directly that Springs refused to deal with him on loan closings. We find Camp's complaint insufficient to state a SCUTPA violation because no unfair or deceptive act is alleged. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' ruling on this issue. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART. HARWELL, C.J., and CHANDLER, FINNEY and TOAL, JJ., concur.