Opinion ID: 2636938
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determination of Baros's competence to testify.

Text: Defendant first urges that because Baros's delusions invaded the particular events about which she was to testify (Baros insisted her imaginary son Anthony was present at the murder of Mackey), she lacked the capacity to perceive and recollect those events accurately, and was thus incompetent to testify. The trial court's erroneous decision to allow Baros's testimony, he asserts, violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination. Under pre-1965 statutes, all persons were qualified to testify who could perceive[] and ... make known their perceptions to others (Code Civ. Proc., former ง 1879, enacted 1872 and repealed by Stats.1965, ch. 299, ง 62, p. 1361), except that persons of unsound mind ( id., former ง 1880, subd. 1, enacted 1872 and repealed by Stats.1965, ch. 299, ง 63, p. 1361) and young children who appeared incapable of perceiving pertinent events justly or relating them truthfully ( id., former ง 1880, subd. 2, enacted 1872 and repealed by Stats.1965, ch. 299, ง 63, p. 1361) could not be witnesses. Under this scheme, both the ability to perceive and the ability to communicate understandably and truthfully were necessary attributes of a qualified witness. On the other hand, despite the statutory reference to persons of unsound mind (Code Civ. Proc., former ง 1880, subd. 1), insanity was not an absolute bar to testimonial qualification. In such cases, [t]he question to be determined [was] whether the proposed witness's mental derangement or defect [was] such that he was deprived of the ability to perceive the event about which he [was] to testify or [was] deprived of the ability to recollect and communicate with reference thereto. [Citations.] ... Whether he did perceive accurately, [did] recollect, or [was] communicating accurately and truthfully [were] questions of credibility to be resolved by the trier of fact. ( People v. McCaughan (1957) 49 Cal.2d 409, 420, 317 P.2d 974 ( McCaughan, ) italics added.) Under this system, a challenged witness's capacities to perceive, recollect, and communicate truthfully were all preliminary facts to be determined exclusively by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion. (See McCaughan, supra, 49 Cal.2d 409, 421, 317 P.2d 974.) It followed] that if the proposed witness was suffering from some insane delusion or other mental defect that deprived him of the ability to perceive the event about which it [was] proposed that he testify, he [was] incompetent to testify about that event. ( Ibid. ) Thus, while a committed mental patient was not necessarily disqualified from testifying about events inside the institution, sound discretion required the court to exercise ... great caution in qualifying as competent a witness who [had] a history of insane delusions relating to the very subject of inquiry in a case in which the question [was] not simply whether or not an act was done but, rather, the manner in which it was done and in which testimony as to details [might] mean the difference between conviction and acquittal. ( Ibid. ) The prior rules governing the determination of testimonial competence were modified by the Evidence Code, adopted in 1965. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. ง 701, p. 284.) The effect may [be to] permit ... persons suffering from mental impairment to testify in some instances where they [were previously] disqualified from testifying. ( Id., at pp. 284-285.) Under the current system, as before, every person is qualified to testify except as provided by statute. (Evid. Code, ง 700.) A person is disqualified as a witness only if he or she is [i]ncapable of expressing himself or herself [understandably] concerning the [testimonial] matter ( id., ง 701, subd. (a)(1), italics added), or is [i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth  ( id., ง 701, subd. (a)(2), italics added; Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foil. ง 701, p. 284; see People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 265, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3 ( Ayala) ; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 621-622, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635 ( Cudjo) ; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 444, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388). Capacity to communicate, or to understand the duty of truthful testimony, is a preliminary fact to be determined exclusively by the court, the burden of proof is on the party who objects to the proffered witness, and a trial court's determination will be upheld in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. (Evid.Code, ง 405, subd. (a); Assem. Com. on Judiciary, reprinted at 29B pt. 1 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foil. ง 405, p. 375; Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foil. ง 701, p. 284; see Cudjo, supra ; Mincey, supra; Adamson v. Department of Social Services (1988) 207 Cal.App.3d 14, 20, 254 Cal.Rptr. 667; People v. Blagg (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1039, 89 Cal.Rptr. 446 ( Blagg. )) Even if a witness is not entirely disqualified for incapacity to communicate or to understand the duty to testify truthfully, his or her testimony on a particular matter (other than expert opinion testimony) is inadmissible unless [the witness] has personal knowledge of the matter. Against the objection of a party, such personal knowledge must be shown before the witness may testify concerning the matter. (Evid.Code, ง 702, subd. (a), italics added.) The testimony must be excluded unless there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding  that the witness has such personal knowledge. ( Id., ง 403, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) Under the Evidence Code, the capacity to perceive and recollect particular events is subsumed within the issue of personal knowledge, and is thus determined in a different manner from the capacity to communicate or to understand the duty of truth. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foil. ง 701, p. 284; see People v. St. Andrew (1980) 101 Cal. App.3d 450, 458, fn. 3, 161 Cal.Rptr. 634.) Because a witness, qualified under [Evidence Code] [s]ection 701, must have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies ( [Evidence Code] [s]ection 702), he must, of course, have the capacity to perceive and to recollect those facts. But the court may exclude the testimony of a witness for lack of personal knowledge only if no jury could reasonably find that he has such knowledge. [Citation.] Thus, the Evidence Code has made a person's capacity to perceive and to recollect a condition for the admission of his testimony concerning a particular matter instead of a condition of his competency to be a witness. And, under the Evidence Code, if there is evidence that the witness has those capacities, the determination whether he in fact perceived and does recollect is left to the trier of fact. [Citation.] (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann.Evid. Code, supra, foil. ง 701 at p. 284, italics added; see Blagg, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1039, 89 Cal. Rptr. 446.) Here, there is no serious claim that Baros was disqualified under Evidence Code section 701 because she could not communicate her memories coherently or understand she must recount them truthfully. Nor is there significant evidence she lacked those abilities. Rather, defendant contends that Baros's testimony about specific events, the alleged 1978 robbery and murder of Mackey, must be excluded because Baros lacked the capacity to perceive and recollect them accurately. This incapacity, defendant asserts, is demonstrated by Baros's delusions, including her insistence that her imaginary son Anthony was actually present during the 1978 episode. As noted above, a witness must be allowed to testify unless he or she (1) cannot communicate intelligibly, (2) cannot understand the duty of truthful testimony, or (3) lacks personal knowledge of the events to be recounted. But while the first two questions are determined entirely by the court, its role with respect to the issue of personal knowledge is more limited. A witness challenged for lack of personal knowledge must nonetheless be allowed to testify if there is evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that the witness accurately perceived and recollected the testimonial events. Once that threshold is passed, it is for the jury to decide whether the witness's perceptions and recollections are credible. (See People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 525-526, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035 ( Dennis. )) Here the trial court noted the many indicia by which a rational trier of fact could conclude that Baros, despite her specific delusions, was actually present during the Mackey robbery and murder, and had accurately perceived and recollected those events. Aside from her insistence that her son Anthony was present, Baros presented a plausible account of the circumstances of Mackey's murder. (Cf. People v. Lyons (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 837, 842-844, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 112 [alleged rape victim's belief that defendant had penetrated a third orifice located between her vagina and her anus, and had murdered her two husbands, one by blowing up his airplane, demonstrated incompetent lack of ability to distinguish truth from fantasy].) Baros's description included many details, unlikely to be known by a person not present, that were corroborated by independent evidence. Moreover, as the trial court emphasized, Baros was able, after a long absence from Las Vegas, to direct authorities to the significant locations involved in the crime. Under these circumstances, the trial court correctly allowed Baros to testify, and to permit the jury to determine from all the relevant evidence whether her perceptions and memories were true. In her jury testimony, Baros described Anthony's presence during the Mackey murder, the traffic accident in which Anthony was killed, and the birth and death of the triplets. Extensive evidence that Anthony, the accident, and the triplets were imaginary was presented to the jury. The jury also heard Baros's disclosures that she relived events through dreams and believed defendant had telepathic powers. It therefore had ample basis upon which to judge the reliability of Baros's observations. No error occurred.