Opinion ID: 778334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The SPI

Text: 17
18 Betzold argues that because he was never served with process, the district court improperly subjected him to the terms of the SPI. It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam resulting from litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110, 112, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969) (holding that an injunction was improper because the defendant had not been served with process). In order to object to a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction, it is no longer necessary to enter a special appearance. Instead, [a] defendant must attack the validity of service of process pursuant to Rule 12(b). Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 820 n. 4 (6th Cir.1981). 19 Betzold attempted in his motion to intervene to reserve his right to object to the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. This attempt, however, was unsuccessful, because a motion to intervene is fundamentally incompatible with an objection to personal jurisdiction. United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1017 n. 18 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that [t]he court below gained personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] when it intervened as of right); City of Santa Clara v. Kleppe, 428 F.Supp. 315, 317 (N.D.Cal.1976) (holding that [b]y voluntarily intervening in this action under Rule 24, F.R.C.P., [the defendant] has submitted to the jurisdiction of this court). We therefore conclude that Betzold has waived his objections to the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. 20
21 Rule 65(d) provides that an injunction is binding only upon the parties to the action.... Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). Betzold became a party when the district court granted his motion to intervene on April 12, 2000, the same day that the SPI was issued. As a result, the district court's issuance of the SPI against Betzold did not contravene Rule 65(d). 22
23 Pursuant to Rule 65(a)(1), [n]o preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party. Fed. R.Civ.P. 65(a)(1). The type of notice required is not specified. In Betzold's motion to intervene, he objected to the district court's issuance of any orders that might adversely affect his interests. Betzold therefore demonstrated his actual notice of the fact that proceedings had been initiated that might result in a preliminary injunction against him. 24 But the notice requirement of Rule 65(a)(1) also implies a hearing in which the defendant is given a fair opportunity to oppose the application and to prepare for such opposition. Williams v. McKeithen, 939 F.2d 1100, 1105 (5th Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court has held that Rule 65 contemplates that the issuance of a preliminary injunction shall be upon notice to the adverse party and after a hearing.  Carpenters' Dist. Council v. Cicci, 261 F.2d 5, 8 (6th Cir.1958) (emphasis added). 25 The plaintiffs argue that a hearing was not required because Betzold did not contest the factual basis underlying the SPI. A hearing on whether a preliminary injunction should issue, however, embodies the right to be heard on the controverted facts, as well as upon the law.  Id. (emphasis added). In his motion to intervene, Betzold gave the court notice of his intention to challenge the legal basis for the issuance of any future injunction against him. He was therefore entitled to a hearing before the SPI issued. Id. 26 The district court, in denying Betzold's motion to dissolve the injunction, held that his motion to intervene constituted a hearing prior to the issuance of the SPI. We are of the opinion, however, that Betzold's motion to intervene cannot be so construed. Betzold's motion to intervene quite properly focused on establishing the requirements for intervention. He reserved his right to argue the merits of any injunction in the future, and accordingly did not set forth such arguments as part of his motion to intervene. The district court could not fairly expect Betzold to anticipate that his motion to intervene would constitute his only opportunity to be heard concerning the substantive basis for denying an injunction. His motion to intervene therefore did not constitute a hearing on the merits of the SPI. The district court thus failed to comply with Rule 65(a)(1) when it issued the SPI before Betzold had an opportunity to be heard. 27 Betzold, however, did eventually have a hearing. In his motion to dissolve the SPI, Betzold did not limit himself to arguing that the SPI was procedurally deficient. Instead, he set forth substantive arguments on the merits of the injunction, contending that it should not have issued because the ODC lawfully disclosed to him the registration materials that he had received, and because the injunction was a prior restraint that violated his First Amendment rights. These are essentially the same arguments he makes on appeal. We therefore conclude that the district court's consideration of Betzold's motion to dissolve constituted a hearing on whether an injunction should issue. Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that where legal, and not factual, issues are in dispute, the notice requirement of Rule 65(a)(1) does not require an oral hearing, and that the court's consideration of legal memoranda may constitute a hearing so long as both parties are given `ample opportunity to present their respective views of the legal issues involved') (citation omitted). As a result, the SPI ceased to suffer from procedural defects from the time of the district court's ruling on Betzold's motion in December of 2000. Banke v. Novadel-Agene Corp., 130 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir.1942) (holding that a rehearing on a motion to set aside a permanent injunction cured the lack of prior notice of the injunction). The SPI against Betzold is therefore procedurally sufficient.
28 In general, we will reverse the issuance of a preliminary injunction only if the district court abused its discretion. Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 653, 657 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction that prevented an employer from unilaterally changing the terms of its employee health insurance plan). When presented with a motion for a preliminary injunction, a district court considers four factors: (1) the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, (2) whether the plaintiffs could suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, (3) whether granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others, and (4) the impact of the injunction on the public interest. Id. at 653. None of these factors, standing alone, is a prerequisite to relief; rather, the court should balance them. Id. 29 As the district court recognized, however, [w]hen First Amendment rights are implicated, the factors for granting a preliminary injunction essentially collapse into a determination of whether restrictions on First Amendment rights are justified to protect competing constitutional rights. This court has noted that, in general, when a district court issues a TRO, it is to review factors such as the party's likelihood of success on the merits and the threat of irreparable injury, but [i]n the case of a prior restraint on pure speech, the hurdle is substantially higher: publication must threaten an interest more fundamental than the First Amendment itself. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 226-27 (6th Cir.1996). In reviewing a preliminary injunction with First Amendment implications, the standard of review is different. Id. at 227. We review First Amendment questions de novo. Id. 30 Betzold argues that the SPI is a prior restraint on speech that violates his rights under the First Amendment. One type of prior restraint is a judicial order forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur. Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions — i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities — are classic examples of prior restraints. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993) (emphasis and citations omitted). The SPI prevents Betzold from disclosing names and other information concerning security guards from the Department of Commerce. Because the SPI restrains Betzold's future speech, it is a prior restraint. 31 Any system of prior restraints of expression [bears] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, and a party who seeks to have such a restraint upheld thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (per curiam) (citations omitted). This burden, however, is not impossible to overcome. A prior restraint is permissible if the restrained speech poses a grave threat to a critical government interest or to a constitutional right. Procter & Gamble, 78 F.3d at 225, 227 (vacating two TROs and a permanent injunction prohibiting Business Week from publishing discovery materials that had been filed as confidential pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because the planned publication did not pose a threat sufficient to justify the injunctive orders). In such a situation, however, the restraint must be narrowly drawn and be the least restrictive means available. CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 236, 238, 239-40 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that an order prohibiting counsel, court personnel, parties, and parties' relatives, friends, and associates from discussing in any manner whatsoever the personal injury and wrongful death cases before the court was an invalid prior restraint because, among other reasons, of its vagueness and overbreadth). 32 The plaintiffs contend that the SPI is justified because the need to protect the security guards' constitutional right to personal safety and bodily integrity outweighs the harm done by any infringement of Betzold's First Amendment rights. In light of the ODC's current position against further disclosures of the guards' registration information to persons other than police officers, the plaintiffs emphasize that the registration records already obtained by Betzold contained the guards' names. If the guards' names are disclosed, the plaintiffs argue, then the guards' telephone numbers, addresses, and social security numbers would become discoverable from sources in the public domain. The plaintiffs, however, placed no proof in the record as to how this additional information could be discovered. 33 This court has described the right to personal security as follows: 34 As far back as 1891, the Supreme Court recognized that [n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded ... than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. 35 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1062 (6th Cir.1998) (enjoining the release of the personnel files containing the names and addresses of police officers who had testified against members of a violent gang, as well as the names and addresses of the officers' immediate family members, without providing prior notice to the officers) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891)). Given the violent history of the labor dispute and the fact that physical hostility has already been directed at the guards, the maintenance of the security guards' privacy is necessary to protect their constitutional right to personal security. We must thus ask whether the threat to the safety of the security guards posed by Betzold's potential dissemination of their names and other information contained in the documents is sufficiently grave so as to justify the SPI's restriction of Betzold's speech. 36 Great protection is afforded by the First Amendment to the press's freedom to publish information relating to matters of public concern. See, e.g., New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140 (holding that the federal government was not entitled to an injunction preventing the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the Pentagon Papers, which were classified at the time that they were obtained by the newspapers). Betzold's speech is entitled to this strong protection because he is a journalist who intends to write an article pertaining to a major labor dispute — a matter of public concern implicating the core purposes of the First Amendment. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001) (subjecting a wire-tap statute to heightened scrutiny when enforced against the publication of truthful information of public concern as opposed to the publication of private information). 37 There are two classes of information listed in the injunction: (1) the guards names, and (2) all other information concerning the guards. The other information, given that the ODC is no longer willing to make further disclosures, includes the security guards' application dates, dates of hire, registration status, and whether they came from out of state. This information is of public concern because it pertains to the actions of both the government and AK Steel with respect to the labor dispute. It poses no discernible security threat to the guards. Betzold's free speech interest in disclosing this other information therefore outweighs the guards' interest in their personal security. 38 The security guards' names, on the other hand, are not matters of public concern because, by Betzold's own admission, they have no news value. Thus, Betzold's right to disseminate the very pieces of information which are most likely to threaten the guards' personal security — their names — weighs least heavily in favor of Betzold's asserted interests. But the threat that the guards currently face from protesters at AK Steel's Mansfield facility is not likely to be enhanced to any appreciable degree if the protesters were to learn the guards' names, particularly given that such a disclosure would not couple names with faces. Even without any disclosure of their names, the guards already face the greater risk that someone might simply shadow them on their way home from work. 39 Moreover, the plaintiffs do not provide support for the assertion that the guards' addresses and social security numbers could be found in the public domain once their names are known. One's telephone number need not be listed in the telephone directory, and the plaintiffs do not explain the mechanism by which the guards' names could be used to discover their home addresses or social security numbers. The present case is therefore distinguishable from Kallstrom, in which the police officers' addresses and those of their immediate family members were at issue. Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1059. Because the record does not support the plaintiffs' claim that the guards' names would appreciably increase the security risk that the guards currently face, the plaintiffs have not carried the heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of the injunction as a prior restraint on Betzold's speech. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in issuing the SPI.