Opinion ID: 2316708
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Express or Implied Authority

Text: There was evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to Stanbury, from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Littman was acting within the scope of his employment. The essence of scope of employment is the agent's authority from the employer to act as alleged. See Presley v. Commercial Credit Corp., 177 A.2d 916, 918 (D.C.1962). Authority can be proved in several ways. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26 (1958). Most directly, Stanbury could have shown that Sigal expressly authorized Littman to provide employment references for former employees. There is little if any record evidence to support express authorization. [23] A showing of express authority, however, is only one method of proving conduct within the scope of employment. See Presley, 177 A.2d at 918. Stanbury also could do so by proving implied authority. [24] Implied authority is actual authority inferred from the circumstances, such as the relationship between the parties and conduct of the principal toward the agent manifesting the principal's consent to have the agent act for him. Lewis v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 463 A.2d 666, 669 (D.C.1983) (quoting W. SEAVEY, AGENCY, § 8, at 11-13 (1964)). Implied authority, therefore, exists when the act of the servant or agent is incidental to authorized conduct and furthers the master's business. A servant or agent is authorized to do anything which is reasonably regarded as incidental to the work specifically directed or which is usually done in connection with such work. Presley, 177 A.2d at 918 (emphasis added). Accordingly, there is no difference in legal effect between express and implied authority. W. SEAVEY, § 8, at 12. To prove express authority, Stanbury would have had to show that Sigal provided Littman with specific authorization (you may give employment references); to demonstrate implied authority, Stanbury would have had to prove that Littman was entitled to draw an inference from his particular employer-employee relationship (project executive responsibilities implicitly included providing employment references). See W. SEAVEY, § 8, at 12. In either case, the employee can be said to have actual authority. The evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable jury finding that Littman had implied authority to give employment references and was acting within the scope of his employment. Janes testified that a former Sigal project executive, David Orr, had suggested he call Littman, a current Sigal project executive, for Stanbury's employment reference. Orr's suggestion, coming as it did from a former Sigal employee who had held the same position as Littman, indicates, circumstantially, that Orr believed it proper for Sigal project executives to provide employment references for former employees. Moreover, Littman himself testified that I felt my duties as a construction manager in the Washington marketplace might have me give job reference[s]. He added that when it is time to hire an employee, I think it's other managers' responsibility when they can  I thought at the time anyway  that they should respond freely when called.... Littman believed that, as a project executive, he was in a position to provide employment references: [I]t had been my experience in the industry that you gave references when you could, when people called. Contrary to Sigal's argument to this court, Littman testified that at no time had anyone at Sigal instructed or advised him not to provide references for former employees. See supra note 23. Indeed, the facts presented at trial seem to fit squarely within the definition of implied authority in the seminal treatise: Where a person is appointed to a recognized position such as the president or manager of a corporation, or the cashier of a bank, or is given a specific authority in general terms ... he [or she] is thereby given authority to do the various matters which by business custom such persons normally have.... W. SEAVEY, § 8, at 12-13. In sum, as the trial court properly held, the jury reasonably could find that Littman's reference was foreseeable as being within the range of responsibilities entrusted to the employee, Johnson v. Weinberg, 434 A.2d at 408, and that his actions therefore come within Sigal's scope of employment.