Opinion ID: 2785613
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Absence of Claims under Florida Law

Text: The panel's award of damages based on Florida law, despite its denial of Fenyk's request to amend his Statement of Claim to include a claim under the FCRA, troubled the district court. We understand its discomfort. Yet we cannot conclude, in period, but applies generally to bar civil action[s] or proceeding[s] commenced outside of particular statutory limits. 8 Unlike § 95.011, § 760.11 does not expressly equate proceedings and actions. Nor is it a general limitations provision. Rather, it sets out a detailed scheme of administrative and court procedures available to individuals claiming civil rights violations. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.11(1) (stating that [a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of [the Act] may file a complaint with the commission within 365 days of the alleged violation); id. § 760.11(7) (In the event the final order issued by the commission determines that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, the aggrieved person may bring, within 1 year of the date of the final order, a civil action . . . .). -15- the particular circumstances of this case, that the arbitrators' decision to impose liability on RJFS under Florida law willfully flouted the governing law or otherwise exceeded the bounds of the arbitrators' authority to resolve the parties' dispute. StoltNielsen, 559 U.S. at 672 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted). The reliance on Florida law would be a different matter if the pertinent statutes in Florida and Vermont materially diverged. RJFS acknowledged in its post-hearing brief, however, that the two states' anti-discrimination laws are substantially equivalent in covering disability discrimination. See Johnson v. Great Expressions Dental Ctrs. of Fla., P.A., 132 So. 3d 1174, 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that the FCRA is patterned after Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that we look to federal case law as well as Florida decisions to interpret the statute); Payne v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 987 A.2d 944, 948 (Vt. 2009) (stating that the VFEPA, which is patterned on Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act protecting against employment discrimination . . . , is often guided by the federal courts' interpretations of Title VII). Moreover, not knowing how the arbitrators would treat Fenyk's inappropriate Vermont claims, the company prudently explained in its pre-hearing brief the reasons why it believed Fenyk's claims failed under both Florida and Vermont law. RJFS also noted in that filing the similarities between the two laws and their mutual reliance on federal -16- precedents. See, e.g., RJFS Pre-Hearing Brief at 14 (We may therefore look to federal caselaw for the appropriate standards and burdens to establish a discrimination claim under either Vermont or Florida law.). To the extent there are differences in the two states' laws, the arbitrators' decision to apply Florida law -- the approach RJFS has demanded throughout the proceedings -- protects the company from obligations at odds with those encompassed by the arbitral agreement. See RJFS Post-Hearing Brief at 13 (The justified expectations of the parties were that the relationship would be governed under Florida law.). Although a shorter statute of limitations in Florida was a potentially crucial difference from Vermont law that favored RJFS, the panel applied the law that RJFS insisted be used and still made a determination adverse to the company. We already have explained why we may not dislodge that determination.9 Briefly stated, the arbitrators were empowered to resolve claims of employment discrimination against RJFS under Florida law, and that is what they did. Cf. Kashner Davidson, 531 F.3d at 77 (citing George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany and Co., 248 9 Given the high hurdle for finding reversible error by the arbitrators, we also cannot disturb two other implicit subsidiary judgments criticized by RJFS: (1) treating Fenyk as an employee protected by the Florida statute rather than as an independent contractor, and (2) concluding that he adequately alleged a cause of action for disability discrimination related to his termination, despite framing his claims in terms of retaliation. Indeed, RJFS does not argue on appeal that the arbitration award is unsustainable because of either of those asserted errors. -17- F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001), parenthetically noting the court's hypothesis that an arbitration award based on state law different from the state law specified in an arbitration agreement could be deemed a 'manifest disregard of the law' or, alternatively, as exceeding the arbitrator's powers). One might reasonably argue that the panel's decision to grant Fenyk a remedy under Florida law is incompatible with its denial of Fenyk's request to amend his arbitration complaint to include claims under the FCRA and, for that reason, was improper. In effect, the panel did what it told Fenyk it would not do: view his allegations of discrimination through the lens of Florida statutory law. Though the panel's unexplained reliance on the FCRA leaves us perplexed, and may have been erroneous, it does not render the award unsustainable. Importantly, the panel had the authority to allow the addition of Florida claims. See FINRA Rule 13309(b) (stating panel's authority to grant a motion to amend). As the principles governing arbitration awards recited above make clear, the question before us is not whether the arbitrators made the correct decision when they gave Fenyk a remedy under Florida law, but whether their decision was authorized by the parties' agreement. In the final analysis, the panel apparently decided that Fenyk's mistake in labeling his claims did not justify denying him relief. Where the arbitrators applied the substantive law that RJFS agreed would govern its conduct, that choice to apply Florida -18- law falls within the category of judgments -- even if erroneous -- that we may not disturb.