Opinion ID: 443000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: 2 On August 4, 1984, not long after sundown, Texas law enforcement officials raided a small ranch in Dallas. The ranch belonged to members of Mojica's family. The officials arrested several persons, including Steve Mojica, and seized a number of vehicles. Among the vehicles was Mojica's white panel van. The officers also confiscated a tractor and semitrailer. The rig contained several thousand pounds of marihuana, which the government alleged the conspirators had transported from Mexico. 3 Testimony as to Mojica's awareness of the semi rig and its cargo conflicted at trial. Mojica stated that he finished work at 5:30 that afternoon and arrived at the ranch half an hour later. He expected a cookout and brought two cases of beer for consumption at the event. Upon reaching the property, he parked his white van, which he used in his work delivering magazines, near the only house on the ranch. At no time that day did he see the semi rig. Given his asserted parking location, the house obscured the tractor/trailer from his view. He denied knowing about the rig or its contents. 4 The testimony of a witness for the government contradicted parts of Mojica's story. Danny Lewis, an investigator with the Texas Department of Public Safety Narcotics Service, stated that he and other officers had staked out the premises for several hours immediately before the raid. He saw Mojica twice; one sighting occurred at 4:30 that afternoon, well before the time at which Mojica said he arrived. Lewis observed no indicia of a cookout in progress. He did not, however, testify specifically as to the location of Mojica's white van. 5 The government's testimonial evidence thus did not establish clearly Mojica's knowledge of the marihuana. We assume without deciding that without further admissible evidence of such knowledge the jury would have had insufficient evidence to convict Mojica of participating in the conspiracy. 3 Disposition of this appeal, therefore, turns on the admissibility of a photograph that depicts Mojica's white van beside the semi rig. 4 If admissible to show the juxtaposition of the van and rig, the photograph tends to destroy Mojica's claim that he knew nothing of the marihuana and thus did not join the conspiracy.
6 Texas Narcotics Investigator Lewis sponsored the photograph, which the government had marked as Exhibit Number 7. Lewis responded to the prosecutor's questions as follows: BY MR. RODRIGUEZ: 7 Q. Mr. Lewis, let me show you once more what has been marked Government's Exhibit No. 7 and No. 8 and ask if you can identify these two photographs. 8 A. Yes, sir, I can. 9 Q. What are those photographs of? 10 A. No. 7 is taken at the scene of the arrest. It shows the trailer that was there that night, that was loaded with marijuana. It shows a panel-type truck-- 11    12 In this picture, I'm familiar with the picture as a trailer, I see a panel truck and I see a brown van, that I drove to the D.P.S. [Department of Public Safety] Office, and I'm very familiar with that. This is Exhibit No. 7. 13    14 Q. Are those two photographs fair and accurate representations of what they show? 15
16 Another government witness identified the panel-type truck as Mojica's white van. Mojica admitted that the photograph depicted his van. 17 Mojica's counsel did not object to the photograph when it was received in evidence. He asked no questions regarding it. He did not request an instruction, pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 105, limiting the evidentiary use of the photograph. Counsel objected, however, when the prosecutor suggested to the jury that the photograph proved Mojica's knowledge of the tractor/trailer and its illicit cargo. THE ISSUES 18 Mojica's appeal presents two questions. The first involves whether the government properly authenticated the photograph so as to permit its use in showing the juxtaposition of Mojica's van and the semi rig. The second concerns whether the prosecutor's remarks to the jury constituted testimony as to facts outside the record. We address each issue in turn.A. Authentication 19 We note at the outset that Mojica's failure to object to receipt of the photograph as evidence or to request a limiting instruction casts upon him an onerous burden. We may overturn the district court's admission of the photograph only upon a showing of plain error. E.g., United States v. Gaspard, 744 F.2d 438, 442 n. 6 (5th Cir.1984). We find no such error. 20 Established principles guide our decision. As we said recently, [t]he Federal Rules of Evidence do not require absolute certainty in authentication, but rather 'evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.'  Mauldin v. Upjohn Co., 697 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir.1983) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 901(a)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 155, 78 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984). Moreover, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, we presume that the government did not deliberately alter the scene before photographing it to cause the photograph to misrepresent the facts. See United States v. Stearns, 550 F.2d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir.1977) (quoting United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir.1977)); cf. United States v. Johnson, 679 F.2d 54, 59 (5th Cir.1982) (presumption against prosecutorial vindictiveness). 21 In this case, Lewis testified that the photograph depicted the scene of the arrest and that after the raid he drove one of the vehicles from the ranch to the DPS Office. From this testimony it could be inferred that the photograph reflects the scene soon after the raid began. The prosecution thus established, to a reasonable degree, the time and place of the photograph. Such a showing discharges the prosecution's burden of authentication under Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). 22 Mojica did not offer proof to overcome the presumption that government officials acted properly in taking the photograph. We thus find no plain error and hold that the district court correctly admitted the photograph. 23
24 Our holding of proper authentication deprives Mojica's claim of prosecutorial misconduct of much of its force. No impropriety arose from the prosecutor's urging the jury to infer from the photograph that Mojica knew of the marihuana and thus intended to join in the conspiracy. 5 The government attorney merely stated his contention as to the conclusion that the jury should draw from the evidence. United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 390 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1419, 79 L.Ed.2d 744 (1984); see United States v. Dorr, 636 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir.1981). His closing remarks did not go beyond the evidence, mislead the jury, or inflame the jury to act as the conscience of the community. United States v. Ledezma-Hernandez, 729 F.2d 310, 314 (5th Cir.1984); see United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1030 (5th Cir.1981). The argument did not deny Mojica a fair trial. 25 Moreover, even assuming that the prosecutor's inferences went too far beyond the record evidence, we hold that the district court's prompt, curative instructions rendered harmless any misconduct. 6 Five times the trial judge warned the jurors that they need not accept the prosecutor's characterization of the evidence. He also instructed them that the government shouldered the burden of proof but had produced no specific evidence to support its theory. The thorough instructions cured any impropriety in the government attorney's closing remarks. See Ledezma-Hernandez, 729 F.2d at 314; United States v. Shackelford, 709 F.2d 911, 913-14 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 253, 78 L.Ed.2d 239 (1983). 26 AFFIRMED.