Opinion ID: 2679907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony Regarding Pre-Arrest Silence

Text: [¶17] Lovejoy argues that the prosecutor violated the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution by eliciting testimony that Lovejoy did not return phone calls from police and by arguing to the jury that his failure to explain what happened demonstrated consciousness of guilt. Lovejoy contends that he was deprived of a fair trial and that the prosecution improperly suggested that he had some obligation to negate the victim’s testimony. [¶18] Pursuant to the United States Constitution, “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Maine Constitution contains a similar provision: “The accused shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself or herself . . . .” Me. Const. art. I, § 6. We interpret the Maine Constitution to be coextensive with the United States Constitution in this context. See, e.g., State v. Millay, 2001 ME 177, ¶¶ 14-20, 787 A.2d 129. [¶19] Because Lovejoy did not explicitly object to the testimony and the prosecutor’s comments concerning his pre-arrest silence, the trial court did not address the application of the constitutions in this context, and we review for 10 obvious error. See U.C.D.R.P.-Cumberland County 52(b); M.R. Crim. P. 52(b); State v. Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 18, 28 A.3d 1147. For us to vacate a conviction based on the obvious error standard of review, there must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If these conditions are met, we will exercise our discretion to notice an unpreserved error only if we also conclude that (4) the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 29, 28 A.3d 1147. An error is plain if it is so clear under current law that the trial court can be expected to address it, even absent the defendant’s timely objection to it. State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 36, 58 A.3d 1032. An error affects the defendant’s substantial rights “if the error was sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. ¶ 37 (quotation marks omitted). [¶20] Measures that protect the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent exist in multiple contexts and, in most contexts, include a prohibition against the prosecution’s reliance on that silence as evidence of guilt. 6 For example, there can be no question that the Fifth Amendment “prevents the prosecution or the court from commenting on a defendant’s decision not to testify at his criminal trial.” 6 Nontestimonial actions such as flight, hiding, or resisting arrest may be admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt. See United States v. Francois, 715 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing cases); see also Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 207 (1988) (stating that the Fifth Amendment protects a person from being incriminated by his or her own compelled testimonial communications); cf. State v. Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶¶ 20-27, 82 A.3d 86 (upholding the admission of evidence related to a police standoff as evidence of consciousness of guilt). 11 State v. Patton, 2012 ME 101, ¶ 15, 50 A.3d 544 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)). Similarly, a defendant’s post-arrest, in-custody, unambiguous assertion of a decision not to speak to law enforcement must be scrupulously honored and cannot be used against the defendant at trial. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-19 (1976); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966); State v. Grant, 2008 ME 14, ¶¶ 20, 38, 939 A.2d 93. [¶21] Whether those same Fifth Amendment protections “extend to prevent the introduction in evidence of a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in the State’s case-in-chief,” Patton, 2012 ME 101, ¶ 15, 50 A.3d 544, has not yet been decided by the United States Supreme Court, see Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. ---, 186 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2013).7 The federal circuits are divided on the question of whether the Fifth Amendment prevents the prosecution from using a defendant’s noncustodial, pre-arrest silence in its case-in-chief.8 Compare Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that evidence of pre-arrest silence may not be admitted in a criminal trial as evidence of the defendant’s guilt); United 7 In Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. ---, 186 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2013), the United States Supreme Court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue that we address today. There, the plurality reasoned that the evidence of silence could be admitted as evidence of guilt because Salinas did not explicitly invoke his privilege against self-incrimination when he ceased answering questions posed by police. Id. at 383-89 (plurality opinion). The concurring opinion condoned the State’s use of the evidence because it reasoned that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply when a defendant is not in custody and is therefore not compelled to incriminate himself or herself. Id. at 389-90 (Thomas, J., concurring). 8 The Supreme Court has held that “the use of prearrest silence to impeach a defendant’s credibility does not violate the Constitution.” Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1980) (emphasis added). Here, Lovejoy did not testify, and we do not address how the holding of Jenkins might be applied in different circumstances. 12 States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1991) (same), with United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Contreras, 593 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996) (same). [¶22] On this question, we have concluded that individuals are endowed with the Fifth Amendment’s protections against compelled self-incrimination both before and after arrest. See State v. Diaz, 681 A.2d 466, 468 (Me. 1996). We reached this holding in a case in which the defendant’s pre-arrest, noncustodial statement refusing to answer a state trooper’s question was admitted in evidence, and the prosecution referred to the defendant’s refusal to speak in its closing and rebuttal argument. Id. at 468-69. We held that the Fifth Amendment “right to remain silent, unlike the right to counsel, attaches before the institution of formal adversary proceedings” and that the Constitution “clearly requires the exclusion of evidence of the defendant’s failure to answer [the state trooper’s] question.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶23] In another recent case, the State offered evidence in its case-in-chief that a suspect stated, before arrest and without having received Miranda warnings, that he needed to speak with counsel and, after making that statement, remained 13 silent. Patton, 2012 ME 101, ¶¶ 12, 15-16, 50 A.3d 544. The State conceded error, and we reviewed the error to determine whether it was harmless. Id. ¶ 16. In that review, we concluded that the error was harmless because the evidence presented at trial was strong and “the State did not seek to capitalize on . . . testimony” that the defendant told police he needed to talk to his lawyer. Id. ¶ 18. Apart from the admitted testimony, the State did not refer to the defendant’s expressed desire to speak with his attorney in any other way, “either through its questioning of witnesses or in closing argument.” Id. “[I]t was never suggested to the jury that [the defendant’s] statement to the officer should be viewed as evidence of his guilt.” Id. We explicitly distinguished Diaz, noting that in that case, “the State encouraged the jury to infer guilt from the defendant’s silence because the State referred to the defendant’s failure to answer an officer’s questions both in its closing argument and in rebuttal.” Id. ¶ 18 n.2 (emphasis added).9 9 As is clear from these two cases, the enterprise of determining whether the fact of the person’s silence is admissible in a criminal trial as evidence of guilt differs from the consideration of whether a confession is admissible when it was obtained through police questioning after an individual has attempted to invoke the right to remain silent or has ambiguously referred to that right. See, e.g., State v. King, 1998 ME 60, ¶¶ 7, 9, 708 A.2d 1014. Specifically, we are determining not whether the police violated a constitutional right by continuing questioning but rather whether the prosecutor violated a constitutional right by offering a person’s silence as evidence of his guilt. Also inapplicable when assessing the admissibility of pre-arrest silence is the bright line drawn at the point of custody. Courts determine the moment at which custody began for purposes of identifying the point after which law enforcement had the responsibility to advise the individual of his or her rights. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The point at which a person is in custody should not, however, be confused with the point at which the right to remain silent attaches. Cf. Salinas, 570 U.S. ---, 186 L. Ed. 2d at 14 [¶24] We distinguish the factual context before us from that which arises when, as in Salinas, 570 U.S. ---, 186 L. Ed. 2d 376, a defendant is voluntarily speaking with law enforcement officers and then simply ceases speaking without any clear indication of an intention to exercise the right not to be a witness against himself. See id. at 383-89 (plurality opinion) (reasoning that an express invocation of the right to remain silent is necessary in such circumstances). In contrast to those facts, Lovejoy specifically terminated communication by first telling the investigating detective during a telephone conversation that he wanted to speak with a lawyer and then remaining silent by not returning the detective’s telephone calls. See Patton, 2012 ME 101, ¶ 15, 50 A.3d 544. [¶25] Although Lovejoy did not explicitly state that he was also exercising his right against compelled self-incrimination, we have never required the use of any specific words for a person to enjoy constitutional protection for his or her silence. See id.; see also, e.g., Diaz, 681 A.2d at 467-69 (holding that the defendant exercised the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when he said that he did not think he should answer a police officer’s questions). “[N]o ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the privilege.” Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955). We do, however, require that the record 389-90 (Thomas, J., concurring) (reasoning that without custody, there is no governmental compulsion to speak). As we have held, an individual may exercise the right to remain silent before any charges are pending. See State v. Diaz, 681 A.2d 466, 468-69 (Me. 1996). 15 demonstrate the defendant’s intention to exercise the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination. See Diaz, 681 A.2d at 467-69. Thus, in many contexts, a defendant is not deemed to have exercised the constitutionally protected right against compelled self-incrimination by virtue of silence alone. See Salinas, 570 U.S. at ---, 186 L. Ed. 2d at 386 (plurality opinion) (“A witness does not expressly invoke the privilege by standing mute.”). [¶26] To determine whether a defendant did express the intention to exercise this Fifth Amendment right, a court must consider the specific circumstances in which a defendant was questioned and the defendant’s response to that questioning. Here, Lovejoy terminated a telephone conversation with the investigating detective upon stating that he wanted to speak with a lawyer10 and then did not return the detective’s subsequent telephone calls. These facts provide sufficient information to demonstrate Lovejoy’s invocation of his right against self-incrimination for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution. See United States v. Okatan, 728 F.3d 111, 115, 119 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding, after Salinas was decided, that a request for a lawyer in response to noncustodial questioning constitutes an invocation of the privilege 10 The record here contains no admitted evidence regarding the content of Lovejoy’s statement to the detective. Rather, because the State and Lovejoy agreed that that statement was inadmissible, the record contains only the uncontested assertion by Lovejoy’s counsel at sidebar that Lovejoy had stated to the detective that he wanted to talk to a lawyer. Because the State does not challenge the factual representation made by Lovejoy’s counsel, we accept as fact that Lovejoy made this statement to the detective. 16 against self-incrimination); Patton, 2012 ME 101, ¶ 15, 50 A.3d 544 (holding, before Salinas was decided, that a noncustodial request to speak with counsel, before Miranda warnings were given, constituted an assertion of the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination). [¶27] Although, by agreement, the prosecutor avoided eliciting testimony about Lovejoy’s statement that he wanted to speak with an attorney, she did elicit testimony that Lovejoy did not return the detective’s calls. She also argued in her closing argument that this silence evidenced consciousness of guilt. Because the prosecutor, as in Diaz, sought to capitalize on the improperly admitted testimony of Lovejoy’s failure to respond to the police detective by arguing that it demonstrated Lovejoy’s consciousness of guilt, the testimony and argument constituted a violation of the Fifth Amendment and article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution. See Patton, 2012 ME 101, ¶ 18 n.2, 50 A.3d 544; Diaz, 681 A.2d at 468-69; see also State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49, ¶ 11, --- A.3d --- (noting that the “probative value of a defendant’s exercise of a constitutional right is minimal at best”). [¶28] In reviewing the admission of the testimony in the context of this trial for obvious error, see Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 18, 28 A.3d 1147, we conclude that there is “(1) an error, (2) that is plain,” id. ¶ 29, given our holding in Diaz, 681 A.2d at 468-69. See also Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 36, 58 A.3d 1032. We further 17 conclude that the error (3) “affects substantial rights,” Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 29, 28 A.3d 1147, because the evidence not only was offered at trial but also was emphasized in closing arguments in a case in which there was no physical evidence linking Lovejoy to the crime and the verdict turned entirely on the credibility of the witnesses. In such circumstances, the error was sufficiently prejudicial that it could have affected the outcome of the proceeding. Cf. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 53, 58 A.3d 1032. [¶29] Finally, because of the improperly admitted evidence and the subsequent argument that Lovejoy declined to speak with police, we conclude that “(4) the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 29, 28 A.3d 1147; see also id. ¶ 27 (explaining that if a defendant claims a constitutional error, the appellate discretion afforded by the fourth criterion of obvious error review—whether the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings—“is considerably reduced”). We reach this conclusion because the prosecutor argued to the jury that Lovejoy’s silence should be considered as substantive evidence of his guilt, and although the court instructed that the jury should not hold against Lovejoy his decision not to testify, it made no similar instruction regarding his pre-arrest silence. See Diaz, 681 A.2d at 469. We cannot affirm a conviction that so evidently depended on the jury’s determinations of 18 credibility when the prosecution offered evidence and argument that the defendant’s decision not to speak to the police constituted evidence of his guilt.