Opinion ID: 710261
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Enhancement Based on Set Aside Conviction

Text: 125 Lipp contends that the district court erroneously enhanced his sentence on the basis of a 1972 drug conviction sustained under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA). The conviction was set aside in 1973 pursuant to the FYCA's provision granting a district court discretion to automatically set aside a conviction by unconditionally discharging a youth offender from probation prior to the expiration of the period fixed by the court. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5021(b) (repealed 1984). Lipp argues that a sentence that has been set aside under the FYCA has been expunged, and therefore may not be counted in determining his criminal history category under the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2(j) (Sentences for expunged convictions are not counted [in the criminal history calculation].). 21 126 The Sentencing Commission has recognized a distinction, for purposes of the Guidelines, between convictions that are set aside and those that are expunged. The comment to Section 4A1.2 provides, in part: 127 A number of jurisdictions have various procedures pursuant to which previous convictions may be set aside or the defendant may be pardoned for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law, e.g., in order to restore civil rights or to remove the stigma associated with a criminal conviction. Sentences resulting from such convictions are to be counted. However, expunged convictions are not counted.... 128 U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2, comment n. 10. A conviction that was set aside under the FYCA, we conclude, was set aside ... for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law and therefore was not expunged for purposes of the Guidelines. 129 The legislative history of the FYCA indicates that the purpose of allowing a conviction to be set aside was to offer the youthful offender  'a new start.'  United States v. Ashburn, 20 F.3d 1336, 1343 (5th Cir.) (quoting 107 Cong.Rec. 8709 (1961) (statement of Sen. Dodd)), reinstated in relevant part on reh'g en banc, 38 F.3d 803 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1969, 131 L.Ed.2d 858 (1995). However, we agree with the D.C. and Fifth Circuits that if a juvenile offender turns into a recidivist, the case for conferring the benefit dissipates, United States v. McDonald, 991 F.2d 866, 872 (D.C.Cir.1993) (quoting Barnes v. United States, 529 A.2d 284, 286-89 (D.C.1987)), and consideration of the conviction for sentencing purposes is appropriate, Ashburn, 20 F.3d at 1343. 130 The distinction between a conviction that is set aside under the FYCA and one that is expunged is further supported by this Circuit's established definition of the word expunged. We have explained that [w]ith respect to criminal records, expunction refers to the process of sealing or destroying the record of a criminal conviction after expiration of a certain time. United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1111 (10th Cir.1991). The majority of circuits addressing the issue have determined that the FYCA does not allow a court to authorize the actual physical obliteration of the record of conviction. Ashburn, 20 F.3d at 1341 (listing cases); see also United States v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 1391, 1399 (7th Cir.1988) (listing cases), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1023, 109 S.Ct. 1751, 104 L.Ed.2d 187 (1989). 131 Finally, we note that of the four circuits to consider the issue, see United States v. Ashburn, 20 F.3d 1336 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 1391 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. McDonald, 991 F.2d 866 (D.C.Cir.1993) (applying the reasoning of a D.C. Court of Appeals case interpreting the FYCA to a parallel district statute); and United States v. Kammerdiener, 945 F.2d 300 (9th Cir.1991), only the Ninth Circuit has held that a set aside under the FYCA is an expungement for purposes of section 4A1.2(j). See Kammerdiener, 945 F.2d at 301. The Ninth Circuit relied primarily on its interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Tuten v. United States, 460 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 1412, 75 L.Ed.2d 359 (1983), as precluding the use in sentencing of a conviction set aside under the FYCA. We do not find Tuten controlling here. In that case, decided before the Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated, the Court held that a defendant's conviction had not been set aside under the FYCA, and in dicta equated the term set aside with the term expunged. Id. at 665 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 1415 n. 9. We believe that the Sentencing Guidelines have since clarified that, at least for Guideline purposes, the two terms are not interchangeable. Because we find that the juvenile conviction was not expunged for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, we hold that it was properly considered by the district court in determining Lipp's criminal history.