Opinion ID: 3000549
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant Officer DeCianni

Text: Gonzalo also alleged an excessive force claim against Officer DeCianni. As to this claim, the district court noted that “Gonzalo alleged that DeCianni beat and choked him in the attempt to subdue and arrest him.” District Court Opinion at 88. The district court then concluded that Gonzalo Duran had an evidentiary basis for his excessive force claim against Officer DeCianni. On appeal, Officer DeCianni claims that he was entitled to qualified immunity on Gonzalo Duran’s excessive force claim. However, in its order denying Officer DeCianni summary judgment, the district court stated that “DeCianni argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on these [excessive force] claims (except as to the claims of Ruben Pineda and Gonzalo Duran.)” District Court Opinion at 90. From this passage, it appears that Officer DeCianni did not argue qualified immunity on the excessive force claim Gonzalo presented. A claim not raised before the district court is waived on appeal.11 See United States v. Hawk, 434 F.3d 959, 961-62 (7th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer DeCianni on Gonzalo’s excessive force claim. C. Other Claims In addition to the above claims, several individual plaintiffs sued for alleged constitutional violations, and individual defendants sought qualified immunity on 10 (...continued) analogous case law would in any event entitled Officer Peslak qualified immunity. 11 The defendants acknowledge as much as the claims against another defendant, Officer Lewandowski, noting that because they mistakenly failed to argue qualified immunity, they cannot ask this court to reverse the district court on that basis. See Appellant Brief at 37 n.6. The defendants do not acknowledge the same failure with respect to Officer DeCianni; but they also do not challenge the district court’s conclusion that Officer DeCianni did not argue that he was entitled to qualified immunity as to the excessive force claim Gonzalo Duran brought. Accordingly, we take as undisputed the district court’s statement that Officer DeCianni did not argue that he was entitled to qualified immunity on Gonclaim of excessive force. Nos. 05-4278 & 05-4590 Page 21 those claims. Again, select defendants appeal from the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. We consider each of these individual claims in turn. 1. Claims by Amada Duran, Concepcion Duran, Jaime Duran, Kevin Duran, and Alondra Paredes against Officers Krummick and/or Officer DeCianni Amada Duran, Concepcion Duran, Jaime Duran, and Kevin Duran sued Sergeant Krummick and Officer DeCianni alleging that the defendants violated their constitutional rights by spraying them with pepper spray. In addition, Alondra Paredes sued Officer DeCianni, claiming that he also sprayed her with pepper spray in violation of her constitutional rights. In considering Sergeant Krummick and Officer DeCianni’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the district court relied on an affidavit Amada Duran filed with the court. In her affidavit, Amada stated, “I was sprayed in the neck with pepper spray by Thomas Krummick, then by Robert DeCianni,” and that “[m]y children, Jaime, Kevin, and Concepcion, and my niece, Alondra Paredes, were with me and holding on to me when I was sprayed and they were sprayed as well and were crying.” Based on this affidavit, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts that “shocked the conscience” of the court so as to support a jury finding of a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.12 On appeal, Sergeant Krummick and Officer DeCianni first argue that the district court erred in considering Amada Duran’s affidavit, claiming that Amada’s affidavit contracted her prior sworn interrogatory answers. However, as explained above, see supra at 5-6, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the challenge to Amada Duran’s affidavit, as such a challenge is, in effect, an attack on the district court’s conclusion as to whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a “genuine” issue of fact for trial. McKinney, 463 F.3d at 690. 12 Given Amada Duran’s affidavit, it is unclear why Alondra Paredes only alleged an excessive force claim against Officer DeCianni. However, the district court’s opinion clearly states that only select plaintiffs asserted excessive force claims against Sergeant Krummick, and then lists those plaintiffs. Absent from that list is Alondra Paredes. Moreover, in its analysis of Sergeant Krummick’s motion for summary judgment, the district court only analyzes Sergeant Krummick’s alleged pepper spraying of Amada Duran and her children, and not Alondra Paredes. Conversely, the district court listed Alondra Paredes as one of the plaintiffs suing Officer DeCianni for excessive force based on his alleged pepper spraying of her. Nos. 05-4278 & 05-4590 Page 22 Sergeant Krummick and Officer DeCianni argue alternatively “that even if the affidavit is considered the plaintiffs have not shown a Fourteenth Amendment violation.” Appellant Brief at 35. This court has jurisdiction to consider this purely legal question of whether the facts, as set forth by the district court, could be sufficient to establish a violation of clearly established constitutional law. See Leaf, 400 F.3d at 1077-78. Initially, we note that unlike the plaintiffs inside the house, these plaintiffs were not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, their claim is analyzed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Conduct that violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process must be so arbitrary that it “shocks the conscience.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998). Substantive due process is a most amorphous doctrine that is a “difficult concept to pin down,” Tun v. Whitticker, 398 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2005), but only “conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest” shocks the conscience. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849. In this case, the facts as set forth by the district court were that Sergeant Krummick and Officer DeCianni sprayed pepper spray at Amada Duran and her children, and Officer DeCianni also used excessive force by spraying Amada’s niece, all while they were standing in the back yard. The district court did not find any evidence that these plaintiffs were refusing to follow a police order or were resisting arrest in any way. Nor did the district court conclude that the record evidence indicated that the officers were spraying pepper spray more broadly to disperse the crowd. Given these limited facts, we agree with the district court that a reasonable officer would know that spraying individuals (who allegedly were not resisting arrest, refusing to obey a lawful order to disperse, or otherwise interfering with official business) with pepper spray without justification could support a jury verdict based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s “shocks the conscience” standard, as it could be found to be “conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 840. Accordingly, based on the facts set forth by the district court, we conclude that at this stage Sergeant Krummick and Officer DeCianni were not entitled to qualified immunity on these claims. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment to defendants Sergeant Krummick and Officer DeCianni on these claims. 2. Claims by Joel Rico Duran and Jesus Rico Duran against Officers Cruz and DeCianni Plaintiffs Joel Rico Duran and his two-year-old son, Jesus Rico Duran, sued Officers Cruz and DeCianni, claiming those officers sprayed them with pepper Nos. 05-4278 & 05-4590 Page 23 spray. Officers Cruz and DeCianni argued before the district court that they were entitled to qualified immunity on these claims. Because Joel Rico Duran and Jesus Rico Duran were not seized at the time the officers allegedly sprayed them with pepper spray, the district court analyzed their claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s “shocks the conscience” standard. Applying this standard, the district court denied Officers Cruz and DeCianni qualified immunity, concluding that “[a] jury could reasonably find on the facts that Cruz’s [and DeCianni’s] spraying of plaintiffs was done to cause harm.” District Court Opinion at 62, 90. On appeal, Officers Cruz and DeCianni first argue that the district court erred in considering an affidavit Joel Rico Duran filed identifying Officers Cruz and DeCianni as the officers who sprayed him and his son. Officers Cruz and DeCianni claim that this later-filed affidavit contradicted and changed the testimony Joel Rico Duran had provided in his earlier answers to interrogatories. As noted above, we lack jurisdiction to consider this challenge on interlocutory appeal. See infra at 5-6. Alternatively, Officers Cruz and DeCianni claim that Joel Rico Duran and Jesus Rico Duran did not present sufficient evidence to overcome the defendants’ claim of qualified immunity. Jurisdiction exists to consider this legal question, but in doing so we must accept the facts as set forth by the district court. See supra at 4. The facts as summarized by the district court are that Officers Cruz and DeCianni sprayed Joel Rico Duran and his two-year-old son, Jesus Rico Duran, with pepper spray. Again, there was no finding of fact that Joel Rico Duran was resisting arrest, disobeying a lawful order, or interfering with the police officers’ performance of their duties. Given these limited facts, we agree with the district court that a reasonable officer would know that spraying individuals (who were not resisting arrest, refusing to obey a lawful order, or otherwise interfering with official business) with pepper spray and without justification “shocks the conscience” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849. Accordingly, based on the facts set forth by the district court, we must conclude at this stage that Officers Cruz and DeCianni are not entitled to qualified immunity on Joel Rico Duran’s and Jesus Rico Duran’s claims and we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment. 3. Claims by Raquel Uribe, Florina Pindea, and Manuel Uribe Palacios against Officer Vitalo Plaintiffs Raquel Uribe, Florina Pindea, and Manuel Uribe Palacios sued Officers Lewandowski and Vitalo, alleging that these defendants violated their constitutional rights by spraying them with pepper spray. Officer Vitalo sought Nos. 05-4278 & 05-4590 Page 24 summary judgment based on qualified immunity.13 In considering Officers Vitalo’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the district court relied on an affidavit Rachel Uribe filed, stating that Vitalo entered the house and “sprayed me, my mother, Florina Pineda, my father, Manuel Uribe, Sr., with pepper spray.” District Court Opinion at 42 (quoting Affidavit of Raquel Uribe, Ex. 156). The district court concluded that Uribe’s affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Vitalo violated the constitutional rights of Raquel Uribe, Florina Pindea and Manuel Uribe Palacios by spraying them with pepper spray while they were inside the house. District Court Opinion at 43. On appeal, Officer Vitalo first argues that the district court erred in considering Raquel Uribe’s affidavit, claiming that her affidavit contradicted her prior, sworn interrogatory answers. However, as explained above, see supra at 5-6, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the challenge to Raquel Uribe’s affidavit, as such a challenge is, in effect, an attack on the district court’s conclusion as to whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a “genuine” issue of fact for trial. McKinney, 463 F.3d at 690. Officer Vitalo argues alternatively that even considering the affidavit, he is entitled to qualified immunity because these plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence of a constitutional violation. This court has jurisdiction to consider the purely legal question of whether the facts, as set forth by the district court, could be sufficient to establish a violation of clearly established constitutional law. See supra 4. In this case, the facts set forth by the district court were that Officer Vitalo entered the house and sprayed Raquel Uribe and her parents. The district court did not find any evidence that these plaintiffs were refusing to follow a lawful order, were resisting arrest in any way, or were attempting to leave the house. Given these limited facts, we agree with the district court that a reasonable officer would know that spraying pepper spray at individuals who were safely detained within a house constitutes excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See supra 9-10; see also Clash, 77 F.3d at 1048 (“[P]olice officers do not have the right to shove, push, or otherwise assault innocent citizens without any provocation whatsoever.”). Alternatively, such conduct could also “shock the conscience” in 13 On appeal, the defendants admit that they “failed to argue qualified immunity for Lewandowski . . . [and] [c]onsequently, they can only ask that the judge be reversed with respect to Vitalo.” Appellant Brief at 37 n.6. Nos. 05-4278 & 05-4590 Page 25 violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.14 Accordingly, based on the facts as set forth by the district court, we conclude that at this stage of litigation, Officer Vitalo is not entitled to qualified immunity and we affirm the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment. 4. Claims by Graciela and Kassandra Torres against Officer McMahon Graciela Torres and her daughter, Kassandra Torres, sued Officer McMahon, claiming that he used force against them without provocation. The district court summarized the factual claims as follows: “Graciela Torres alleges that McMahon pushed her into a fence, causing a bruise. Kassandra Torres, who was seven years old at the time of the events, alleges that McMahon pushed her to the ground, causing a scratch on her arm.” District Court Opinion at 78. Officer McMahon sought qualified immunity on these claims, but the district court denied his motion, holding: Even considering that the higher Fourteenth Amendment standard applies to the qualified immunity analysis for these plaintiffs, we believe that a jury could reasonably find from the evidence that McMahon’s alleged conduct shocked the conscience because McMahon either intended to cause them harm or was deliberatively indifferent to the risk of causing them harm. District Court Opinion at 79. On appeal, Officer McMahon first claims that the district court erred in considering the affidavit Graciela filed that identified him as the officer who had pushed Graciela and Kassandra. Officer McMahon contends that that affidavit constituted a change in testimony from the answers Graciela made in her interrogatory answers. Again, we lack jurisdiction to consider that question. See supra 5-6. 14 Because these plaintiffs were inside the house, it would appear that they were seized along with the other individuals who were ordered to remain in the house. However, we need not conclusively rule on this question because even under the higher Fourteenth Amendment standard, Officer Vitalo’s claim of qualified immunity fails. We also note that the parties did not explore the question of the appropriate standard and the district court ruled alternatively, holding that Officer Vitalo was not entitled to qualified immunity “[e]ven considering that the higher Fourteenth Amendment standard applies . . . .” District Court Opinion at 72. Nos. 05-4278 & 05-4590 Page 26 Alternatively, Officer McMahon argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity even accepting the facts set forth in the affidavit and relied upon by the district court. Those facts, however, are extremely limited and merely portray Officer McMahon as pushing Graciela into a fence and Kassandra to the ground for no reason. There is no evidence noted in the district court’s opinion showing any justification whatsoever for Officer McMahon pushing Graciela and Kassandra. Under these circumstances, a reasonable officer would know that his conduct violated clearly established constitutional norms. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.15 Accordingly, at this stage, we must affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Officer McMahon. 5. Claims by Gonzalo Duran Jr. and Julia de la Cruz against Officer Cruz Gonzalo Duran Jr. and Julia de la Cruz claimed that Officer Cruz sprayed them with pepper spray in violation of their constitutional rights. Officer Cruz sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied that motion, concluding that “[a] jury could reasonably find on the facts that Cruz’s spraying of plaintiffs was done to cause harm.” District Court Opinion at 62. On appeal, Officer Cruz first argues that the district court erred in relying on Gonzalo Duran Jr.’s affidavit, in which he claimed that Officer Cruz “sprayed mace which hit Julia de la Cruz and me in the face.” Officer Cruz claims that this testimony contradicted Gonzalo Duran Jr.’s prior sworn testimony and thus should not have been considered. Again, we lack jurisdiction to consider that question on interlocutory appeal. See supra at 5-6. Alternatively, Officer Cruz contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because Gonzalo Duran Jr.’s affidavit requires this court to speculate that Gonzalo and Julia had done nothing and that Officer Cruz just walked up and sprayed them without any provocation. Unlike the affidavits of the other plaintiffs addressed above, which state that the defendants intentionally sprayed them with pepper spray, Gonzalo Duran Jr.’s affidavit is more carefully crafted, stating 15 Of course, the facts may show the officers merely pushed these individuals (and other plaintiffs presenting similar claims) as necessary to assist other officers or to gain control of the situation. Such conduct, while possibly the “careless or unwise excess of zeal,” would not violate the Due Process Clause. See Cummings v. McIntire, 271 F.3d 341, 346 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). But here we have no justification whatsoever presented. Nos. 05-4278 & 05-4590 Page 27 that Officer Cruz “sprayed mace which hit Julia de la Cruz and me in the face.” See Appellant Brief at 39 (quoting affidavits). It very well could be that Officer Cruz had a legitimate reason to discharge the pepper spray at Gonzalo Duran Jr. and Julia de la Cruz, or that he sprayed other partygoers who were resisting arrest and the spray lofted over to Gonzalo Duran Jr., and Julia de la Cruz. Under either of those circumstances, Officer Cruz would be entitled to qualified immunity. However, our review on interlocutory appeal is limited to the facts as set forth by the district court and under the district court’s version of the facts, there was no stated justification for Officer Cruz spraying the pepper spray that struck Gonzalo, Duran, Jr., and Julia de la Cruz. Accordingly, at this stage, we must deny Officer Cruz qualified immunity, as it is clearly established that “conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest,” shock the conscience. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Officer Cruz on these claims. 6. Claims by Jose Manuel Uribe and Jose Manuel Uribe Jr. against Officer Cruz. Jose Manuel Uribe and Jose Manuel Uribe Jr. sued Officer Cruz, claiming that he sprayed them with pepper spray. Officer Cruz moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied Officer Cruz’s motion, concluding that “a jury could reasonably find on the facts that Cruz’s spraying of plaintiffs was done to cause harm.” District Court Opinion at 62. Officer Cruz responds with the same two arguments made and rejected above, namely that the district court erred in considering the affidavit Jose Manuel Uribe filed because his affidavit conflicted with his earlier interrogatory answers, and that using pepper spray on individuals does not violate clearly established constitutional norms. We again reject those arguments, the first because we lack jurisdiction, see supra at 12-16, and the second because it is clearly established that assaulting individuals without provocation is unconstitutional. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Officer Cruz on these claims. 7. Claims by Lisbeth Moreno and Diego Torres against Officer DeCianni. Lisbeth Moreno and Diego Torres sued Officer DeCianni, claiming Officer DeCianni sprayed them with pepper spray. The district court summarized the allegations as follows: Lisbeth Moreno alleged that Officer DeCianni sprayed her, and Diego Torres alleged that Officer DeCianni sprayed him and told him to “move the f[–] out of the way, you little brat.” District Court Opinion at 88. Officer DeCianni moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the Nos. 05-4278 & 05-4590 Page 28 district court denied that motion, concluding “that a jury could reasonably find from the evidence that DeCianni’s alleged conduct shocked the conscience because DeCianni either intended to cause these plaintiffs harm or was deliberately indifferent to the risk of causing them harm.” District Court Opinion at 90. On appeal, Officer DeCianni incorporates the same arguments for reversal as considered and rejected above. And we too incorporate our above analysis and hold that we lack jurisdiction to consider whether the district court erred in considering later-filed affidavits and that qualified immunity based on the sparse facts undisputedly known at this time is inappropriate. See supra at 12-16; 70-71. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Officer DeCianni on these claims. 8. Claim by Ismael Torres against Officer Peslak. Ismael Torres sued Officer Peslak, claiming that Officer Peslak sprayed him with pepper spray in his eyes. Officer Peslak sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity on this claim, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that “a jury could reasonably find from the evidence that Peslak’s alleged conduct shocked the conscience because Peslak either intended to cause [Ismael Torres] harm or was deliberately indifferent to the risk of causing [him] harm.” District Court Opinion at 85. On appeal, Officer Peslak also duplicates the arguments made and rejected above. For the same reasons, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider whether the district court improperly considered Ismael Torres’ later-filed (and allegedly contradictory) affidavit. See supra at 12-16. And based on the facts as set forth by the district court, Officer Peslak is not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer would know that it is unconstitutional to spray someone with pepper spray, without any justification. See supra at 70-71. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on Ismael Torres’s claim against Officer Peslak. 9. Jesus Uribe’s Claim against Sergeant Krummick. Jesus Uribe alleged that Sergeant Krummick used excessive force by pushing him inside the Duran house. Uribe also claimed that while inside the house he saw pepper spray come from underneath the door, but Uribe did not claim any injury from the pepper spray, and he does not point to any evidence that Sergeant Krummick discharged the pepper spray. Thus, Uribe’s sole claim of excessive force against Sergeant Krummick is based on the officer’s push. Sergeant Krummick argued that he is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim, but the district court denied Sergeant Krummick’s motion, concluding that Nos. 05-4278 & 05-4590 Page 29 “it was clearly established that ‘police officers do not have the right to shove, push, or otherwise assault innocent citizens without any provocation whatsoever.” District Court Opinion at 67 (quoting Clash, 77 F.3d at 1048). The district court further concluded that under Uribe’s version of the facts, “there was no reason for Sergeant Krummick to believe that pushing Jesus Uribe into the house was justified.” District Court Opinion at 67. We disagree. Unlike the claims made by Graciela and Kassandra Torres that they were pushed into a fence or to the ground, under the facts as found to exist by the district court, Sergeant Krummick pushed Jesus Uribe into the house. Under the circumstances of this case, an officer could reasonably believe that pushing an individual into a house was justified by the need to disperse and control a large, unruly gathering, in which partygoers outnumbered officers. Significantly, we judge reasonableness from the officers’ perspective at the time and not with twenty- twenty hindsight. In this case, as the district court set forth, Sergeant Krummick was one of the later officers to arrive on the scene, and he arrived on the scene only after back-up officers radioed the dispatcher to send a supervisor and additional officers because people were “getting unruly.” District Court Opinion at 3. By the time Sergeant Krummick arrived there were approximately eighty to ninety people at the party, and there were several verbal confrontations occurring between officers and party guests. District Court Opinion at 3. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for an officer to attempt to expeditiously corral the crowd by pushing members of the crowd into the house. Or at a minimum, given the lack of analogous case law, it was not clearly established that pushing an individual under the circumstances known at the time to Sergeant Krummick violated clearly established constitutional norms. Accordingly, Officer Krummick was entitled to summary judgment on Jesus Uribe’s excessive force claim and we reverse the district court. 10. Graciela Pineda’s claim against Officer Gross. Plaintiff Graciela Pineda sued Officer Gross claiming that she violated her constitutional rights by spraying her with pepper spray without justification. Unlike the plaintiffs inside the house, Pineda was not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and thus her claim is analyzed under the “shocks the conscience” standard of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-47. Applying that standard, the district court denied Officer Gross qualified immunity, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that she had sprayed Pineda in order to cause harm. Nos. 05-4278 & 05-4590 Page 30 On appeal, Officer Gross’s sole contention is that Graciela Pineda “has not cited to any case that would show that spraying pepper spray in and of itself constitutes excessive force.” Appellant Brief at 42. However, as this court has explained before, “[i]t would create perverse incentives indeed if a qualified immunity defense could succeed against those types of claims that have not previously arisen because the behavior alleged is so egregious that no like case is on the books. . . . The easiest cases don’t even arise.” McDonald by McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, defendants cannot claim qualified immunity merely because another case is not on all fours with their situation. Rather, the question is whether the law provided the defendant with fair notice that the conduct was unconstitutional. Coady v. Steil, 187 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 1999). Lewis provided just such warning, informing officers that “conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest” shocks the conscience. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849. While it may well be that the facts that come out later show some justification for Officer Gross’s alleged spraying of Graciela Pineda, the facts as set forth by the district court do not support such a claim by Officer Gross. See e.g. Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 652-53 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that use of pepper spray was reasonable given individual’s active interference with officers); Wagner v. Bay City, Texas, 227 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that use of pepper spray was reasonable where individual was resisting arrest); Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1104-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that use of pepper spray was reasonable where officer warned that he would discharge it if the individual did not cooperate). Accordingly, at this stage we conclude that Officer Gross was not entitled to qualified immunity and we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on this claim against Officer Gross. 11. Maria Alicia Moreno’s claim against Officer Gross. Plaintiff Moreno also sued Officer Gross, arguing that Officer Gross violated her constitutional rights by indirectly spraying her with pepper spray.16 Moreno 16 The district court noted that “[i]n her answer to interrogatories, Maria Alicia Moreno identified Officers Peslak and Gross as having sprayed her with pepper spray. However, in her affidavit, Moreno identifies only Peslak as having sprayed her directly, and states that in the yard, she was not sprayed directly but merely felt the effects of pepper spray indirectly. It does not appear that when deposed, Moreno identified Gross as having sprayed her directly. Accordingly, we will consider Moreno’s prior allegation that Gross sprayed her directly as having (continued...) Nos. 05-4278 & 05-4590 Page 31 further alleged that when she attempted to enter the garage, Officer Gross pulled her away, ordering Moreno to remain in the backyard. As with Pineda’s claim against Officer Gross, Moreno’s claim based on the pepper spraying is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s “shocks the conscience” standard. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-47. Applying that standard, the district court concluded that “a jury could reasonably find on these facts that Gross’s conduct was done to cause harm.” District Court Opinion at 60. We disagree. As the district court explained, Moreno’s claim was that she felt the ill effects of pepper spray indirectly. Thus, there is no evidence that Officer Gross intended to cause harm to Moreno, and thus no evidence that Officer Gross’ conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment. As to the claim that Officer Gross “pulled” Moreno when she attempted to enter the garage, that conduct was justified under the facts as set forth by the district court, namely, the officers were faced with an escalating situation in which partygoers outnumbered officers. It was reasonable for an officer under these circumstances to believe it was necessary to pull someone in the crowd so as to prevent them from entering a garage, which could have tools or other items that could be used as weapons. Accordingly, Officer Gross did not violate Moreno’s constitutional rights. Alternatively, Officer Gross was entitled to qualified immunity on Moreno’s claims. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment to defendant Officer Gross on Maria Alicia Moreno’s claim. 12. Adolfo Duran’s claim against Officer McMahon. Adolfo Duran sued Officer McMahon, claiming Officer McMahon sprayed him with pepper spray. The district court noted that Officer McMahon admits that he sprayed Adolfo Duran and that the allegations were thus sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact on Adolfo’s excessive force claim. Accordingly, the district court denied Officer McMahon qualified immunity. On appeal, Officer McMahon argues that it is not even clear that he sprayed Adolfo Duran, but that if he did, he did so because Adolfo Duran was pushing him. Officer McMahon then argues that “[s]praying pepper spray at someone who is pushing him is not in and of itself a malicious act and there is no evidence McMahon intended to hurt Adolfo Duran.” Appellant Brief at 43. Although we would agree that an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if the claim is that he 16 (...continued) been abandoned.” District Court Opinion at 59. Nos. 05-4278 & 05-4590 Page 32 pepper-sprayed an individual who pushed him in the midst of the officer attempting to control a large crowd, the problem for Officer McMahon is that our review is limited on interlocutory appeal. In this case, the district court noted only that Officer McMahon admitted to spraying Adolfo Duran and did not set forth any facts indicating that Adolfo Duran pushed Officer McMahon. Given our limited review, we must affirm then the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity because under the district court’s version of the facts, Officer McMahon sprayed Adolfo Duran with pepper spray without justification. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.