Opinion ID: 2397396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Review of the Legislature's Impeachment Authority

Text: The defendant claims that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because, pursuant to our decision in Kinsella v. Jaekle, supra, 192 Conn. at 723, 475 A.2d 243, judicial review of controversies arising out of impeachment proceedings is limited to instances in which the legislature's action is clearly outside the confines of its constitutional jurisdiction to impeach any executive or judicial officer ... or egregious and otherwise irreparable violations of state or federal constitutional guarantees are being or have been committed by such proceedings. (Citation omitted.) In the defendant's view, its issuance of the subpoena to the governor, occurring in the course of a duly constituted investigative inquiry into whether impeachment proceedings against the governor should be commenced, does not fall within either of these bases authorizing judicial review of legislative conduct related to impeachments. Because Kinsella involved facts and claims markedly different from the present case, we conclude that the legislature's jurisdiction over impeachments does not preclude judicial review of this matter. We are mindful that this court's decision in Kinsella represents, prior to today, the only time that we have had occasion to interpret the impeachment provisions of our state constitution; Conn. Const., art. IX, §§ 1 through 3; as they relate to our subject matter jurisdiction over controversies arising out of impeachment proceedings. Thus, the teachings of Kinsella inform our analysis of the issues presented in this appeal. In Kinsella v. Jaekle, supra, 192 Conn. at 707-708, 475 A.2d 243, the council on probate judicial conduct, following a statutorily authorized investigation, issued its recommendation that the plaintiff, James H. Kinsella, the elected judge of the Hartford Probate Court, be censured publicly for his conduct in connection with certain matters over which he had presided. Despite the council's decision not to recommend impeachment to the House of Representatives, the House nonetheless created a select committee (Kinsella committee) for the purpose of considering whether impeachment proceedings against Judge Kinsella should be undertaken. Id., at 708, 475 A.2d 243. As the Kinsella committee began its work, Judge Kinsella commenced an action in the Superior Court, seeking to enjoin its activities on the ground that the proceedings violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law. Id. In connection with that litigation, Judge Kinsella issued subpoenas to the defendants, two cochairmen of the Kinsella committee (cochairmen). Id. The cochairmen moved to quash the subpoenas, claiming that the legislature had been conferred with exclusive authority over impeachment proceedings and that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy and, further, that they enjoyed immunity from compulsory testimony pursuant to the speech or debate clause of the state constitution. Id., at 708-709, 475 A.2d 243. After the trial court rejected the cochairmen's claims of jurisdictional infirmity, they appealed to this court and we consolidated that appeal with our consideration of certain other questions of law regarding the ongoing litigation that had been reserved for the advice of this court by the trial court. Id., at 709-11, 475 A.2d 243. On appeal, this court concluded that the trial court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Judge Kinsella's complaint because our state constitution had provided the legislature with exclusive jurisdiction over certain aspects of impeachment proceedings and Judge Kinsella's challenge was directed toward legislative conduct within the exclusive jurisdiction of that body. Id., at 711, 475 A.2d 243. In reaching that decision, this court recognized two instances in which judicial review of controversies arising out of impeachment proceedings would be appropriate: (1) the legislative action was clearly outside the confines of its constitutional impeachment authority; and (2) egregious and otherwise irreparable violations of state or federal constitutional guarantees were being or had been committed. Id., at 723, 475 A.2d 243. We then rejected Judge Kinsella's contention that jurisdiction existed pursuant to the first basis authorizing judicial review because the legislative conduct at issuean investigative inquiry into whether impeachment proceedings should be commencedwas within [the legislature's] constitutional jurisdiction under the impeachment [provisions]. Id., at 726, 475 A.2d 243. We further concluded that Judge Kinsella's claim failed as to the second basis authorizing judicial review because he had not been, nor was he being, subjected to egregious and otherwise irreparable violations of state or federal constitutional guarantees. Id. Rather, we determined that Judge Kinsella's allegations, namely, that the Kinsella committee's failure to define impeachable conduct and its failure to articulate a set of governing procedures for the impeachment proceedings deprived Judge Kinsella of due process of law, were entirely speculative. Id., at 731, 475 A.2d 243. Specifically, we concluded that Judge Kinsella would suffer a violation of his due process rights only if he is impeached and convicted of any charges and then only if the Senate had failed to define properly the scope of conduct that the constitution warrants as impeachable or had failed to provide procedures that ensure a fair determination of that question commensurate with the constitutionally protected interests at stake. Id. We refused to speculate that the legislature would conduct itself in a manner inconsistent with constitutional precepts, instead presuming that the legislature would exercise its impeachment authority with due respect for our constitution. Id., at 729, 475 A.2d 243. Although we concluded that judicial review was unauthorized in Kinsella, the standard that we announced recognized that the legislative impeachment authority coexists with the principle of judicial review, and that our constitutional framework legitimates judicial review of impeachment proceedings in certain scenarios. In fact, we expressly rejected the extreme position advanced by the cochairmen that the legislature's impeachment authority should be construed to mean that it could take any action no matter how outrageous, abusive, or illegal... without even the possibility of judicial review. Id., at 726, 475 A.2d 243. The legislative impeachment authority instead remains bridled by our constitution, we explained, and [i]f the legislature [should] attempt to encroach upon constitutional restrictions, it will become the solemn duty of the court to declare such an attempt illegal and the act void. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 727, 475 A.2d 243. Turning to the present appeal, we now are called upon to consider a set of circumstances markedly different from the factual and legal focuses of Kinsella. Accordingly, although we reaffirm Kinsella within its analytical context, we recast, for application in the present case, the standard by which we consider the extent to which judicial review of impeachment proceedings against a sitting governor is authorized by our constitutional structure. More particularly, two factors compel our reformulation of the Kinsella standard: (1) the status of the party challenging the legislature's exercise of its impeachment authority; and (2) the nature of the constitutional challenge being raised. With regard to the first factor, our state constitution confers upon the legislature the impeachment authority over [t]he governor, and all other executive and judicial officers .... Conn. Const., art. IX, § 3. Although the legislative impeachment authority therefore extends by its plain terms to all executive and judicial officials, our constitution treats the exercise of the impeachment authority, as against the governor, uniquely. Specifically, the constitution of Connecticut, article fourth, § 18(b), as amended by article twenty-two of the amendments, provides that, upon presentment of articles of impeachment by the House of Representatives, the lieutenant-governor shall exercise the powers and authority and perform the duties appertaining to the office of governor until ... the governor ... is acquitted by the Senate. Should the governor be convicted by the Senate, our constitution provides that the lieutenant governor thereafter shall take the oath of office of the governor and shall be governor of the state until another is chosen at the next regular election for governor and is duly qualified. Conn. Const., amend. XXII (a). Further distinguishing impeachment of the governor, the constitution of Connecticut, article ninth, § 2, provides in relevant part: When the governor is impeached, the chief justice shall preside. Under our constitutional scheme, the governor is the only official removed, albeit temporarily, upon the presentment of articles of impeachment by the House of Representatives and during the pendency of the Senate trial. For all other officials, removal from office takes place only after a trial in the Senate and conviction by that body. This distinction means that the initial impairment of the capacity to execute the duties of the office of governor takes place in the impeachment process one critical step before the point at which all other executive and judicial officials are impaired in the performance of their duties by means of removal from office, namely, at the point of formal accusation by the House, as opposed to the point of conviction by the Senate. Although impairment does remain contingent upon presentment of articles of impeachment by the House of Representatives, the proximity and severity of this harm as compared to the potential impairment for all other executive and judicial officials suggests that, in order to be afforded a meaningful opportunity to challenge legislative conduct related to gubernatorial impeachment proceedings, the office of a sitting governor should be allowed to raise its constitutional challenge under a somewhat more lenient standard than might apply to other officers who are subject to impeachment. Affording the office of a sitting governor the opportunity to bring a meaningful challenge to impeachment proceedings is especially critical because the presentment of articles of impeachment to the Senate has the immediate, and irreparable, effect of removing a duly elected official from office and depriving the people of the state, for a time, of the services of the governor whom they chose to fill that high office in the previous election. These consequences demonstrate the necessity that the plaintiff be afforded a reasonable opportunity to raise a meaningful constitutional challenge while the matter is before the defendant, whose task is vital to the ultimate decision as to whether articles of impeachment will be presented. With regard to the second factor in Kinsella, we are mindful that, in that case, Judge Kinsella's constitutional challenge to the legislative conduct was based on the procedural components of the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. As we indicated in that case, such a claim, by its very nature, could have passed from the realm of speculation to tangible harm only upon Judge Kinsella's conviction in the Senate following a procedurally infirm trial, and we were unwilling to assume that either the House or the Senate would comport itself in that manner. Kinsella v. Jaekle, supra, 192 Conn. at 731, 475 A.2d 243. By contrast, the plaintiff in the present case has advanced a constitutional challenge based upon the separation of powers. We long have recognized that the separation of powers is one of the fundamental principles of the American and Connecticut constitutional systems. Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 598, 402 A.2d 763 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Stolberg v. Davidson, 454 U.S. 958, 102 S.Ct. 496, 70 L.Ed.2d 374 (1981); see also Conn. Const., amend. XVIII ([t]he powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another). As expressed by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his concurring opinion, [t]he essential purpose of the separation of powers is to allow for independent functioning of each coequal branch of government within its assigned sphere of responsibility, free from risk of control, interference, or intimidation by other branches. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 760-61, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982). Unlike many other constitutional guarantees, violations of which require a showing of harm in order to entitle the victim of the violation to relief, a breach of the separation of powers principle is, contemporaneously, a constitutional violation and a tangible harm. In other words, action by one branch of government that violates the separation of powers is, in and of itself, a harm, in that the branch whose sphere of authority has been encroached upon has remained neither independent nor free from the risk of control, interference or intimidation by other branches. Id. In the present case, that violation occurred, if at all, when the defendant sought to require the governor to provide testimony, by its issuance of the subpoena in connection with its stated intent to recommend an article of impeachment or the drawing of adverse inferences, or both, upon the governor's failure to comply therewith. It was at that time that, if the subpoena had been so issued in violation of the constitution, the plaintiff's independent function within the executive branch was compromised. In sum, taking into account the impeachment authority that has been constitutionally conferred upon the legislature, the historical development discussed in Kinsella v. Jaekle, supra, 192 Conn. at 714-21, 475 A.2d 243, the vital principle of judicial review and with due regard for the principle of the separation of powers, we conclude that the appropriate standard by which to determine whether judicial review of the legislative exercise of the impeachment authority in connection with a sitting governor is warranted is whether the plaintiff has asserted, in good faith, a colorable claim of a constitutional violation. The striking of this balance, expresses due regard for both the legislative impeachment authority and the plaintiff's interest in raising a meaningful challenge to impeachment proceedings prior to the point of irreparability, that is, upon the presentment of articles of impeachment to the Senate. Applying this standard, we conclude that the plaintiff has asserted, in good faith, a colorable claim of a constitutional violation and that we, as did the trial court, have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter with regard to: (1) the plaintiff's claim that, by seeking to compel the governor's testimony, the defendant compromised the independent function of the executive branch; and (2) the defendant's claim of exclusive legislative jurisdiction over its issuance of the subpoena to the governor. 2