Opinion ID: 2230069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: intrinsic value of '080 patent

Text: New Tek argues that even assuming it could not have prevailed in an infringement action, it was still damaged because it lost the intrinsic value of the '080 patent. New Tek claims that the '080 patent was personal property and, like other personal property, had monetary value. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). New Tek asserts that even in the absence of damages resulting from the loss of a potential infringement action, it was still entitled to recover for the loss of the cash value of the '080 patent. Thus, New Tek claims that summary judgment was improper. New Tek's argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, New Tek's petition fails to allege a theory of damages based on the intrinsic worth, if any, of the '080 patent. Under our former code pleading system, which was applicable in the present case, the purpose of pleadings was to frame the issues upon which a cause is to be tried, and the issues in a given case will be limited to those which are pled. See Kubik v. Kubik, 268 Neb. 337, 683 N.W.2d 330 (2004). New Tek specifically alleged damages for costs and attorney fees incurred in pursuing the revival of the '365 and '080 patents, and damages resulting from alleged infringement of the '080 patent. New Tek did not allege that the '080 patent had inherent property value, or plead any theory of damages on such a basis. Second, after summary judgment was granted with respect to damages resulting from third-party infringement, New Tek waived trial on the remaining damages. Any claims beyond damages for third-party infringement were voluntarily dismissed, with prejudice, in order to allow New Tek to appeal the issues relating to infringement. See, generally, Smith v. Lincoln Meadows Homeowners Assn., 267 Neb. 849, 678 N.W.2d 726 (2004). In other words, even if New Tek had properly presented a claim for the property value of the '080 patent, it necessarily waived that claim in order to secure a final, appealable judgment. New Tek also argues, in very general terms, that the district court should not have entered summary judgment on the issue of damages because New Tek alleged that it had been damaged. New Tek points out that an issue of fact arises upon a material allegation in a pleading that is denied by a responsive pleading. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1102 (Cum.Supp.2004). An issue of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money shall be tried by a jury. § 25-1104. New Tek concludes that because the issue of damages was pled and denied, the court was required to submit the issue to the jury. In addition, much of New Tek's brief is devoted to similar assertions that because a particular issue was an issue of fact, it could only be decided by a jury, and summary judgment was improper. New Tek's arguments in that regard lack merit. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1332 (Cum.Supp.2004) provides that after a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, [t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings and the evidence admitted at the hearing show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. New Tek fails to apprehend the distinction between an issue of fact within the meaning of § 25-1104, and a  genuine issue as to any material fact within the meaning of § 25-1332. (Emphasis supplied.) The primary purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the allegations made in the pleadings and show conclusively that the controlling facts are other than as pled. Richards v. Meeske, 268 Neb. 901, 689 N.W.2d 337 (2004). New Tek's argument that simply alleging an issue of fact is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment is contrary to the language and purpose of § 25-1332, and we need not consider it further.