Opinion ID: 2525464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Failing to uncover exculpatory information allegedly withheld by the State

Text: Evans asserts that the State had a variety of exculpatory information which it did not disclose to him in violation of Brady v. Maryland. [21] Alternatively, he argues his counsel were ineffective in not uncovering this information independently. Brady and its progeny require a prosecutor to disclose material evidence favorable to the defense; evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if it had been disclosed. [22] Such a reasonable probability is shown when the nondisclosure undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. [23] Evans first complains that the State withheld information that Joseph Salley testified for the State in return for witness protection benefits. This court considered this claim in dismissing Evans's appeal in 1997. The doctrine of the law of the case precludes reconsidering it. [24] Next, Evans complains that the State provided no information on an investigation of Ventura and her possible involvement in these murders or the continued investigation of Flowers. These claims fall short of alleging specifically that the State had exculpatory information. Evans speculates that material exculpatory information exists, but he does not describe it. The evidence at trial showed that Evans and at least one other person committed the crimes. The State did not conceal that it also suspected Everett Flowers and Richard Powell of the murders, and Evans presented evidence and argument at trial that Flowers had a violent relationship with and, not long before the murders, had threatened to kill one of the victimshis girlfriend, Lisa Boyer. Thus, to undermine confidence in the trial's outcome, Evans would have to allege the nondisclosure of specific information that not only linked Flowers, or Ventura, to the crimes but also indicated that Evans was not involved. He has not done so. Evans also speculates that the State had information that Scotti was an informant in other cases but did not disclose it to the defense. He argues such information would have shown that other people had a motive to kill her. During post-conviction proceedings, the district court ordered discovery on this issue. In denying the habeas petition, the court concluded that the State did not have a list of such cases and did not have a duty to create exculpatory information for the defense where none existed. We accept the court's finding that the State did not have the information sought by Evans. In this claim, Evans has described a line of inquiry possibly helpful to the defense. To prepare his defense, he had a right to pursue this inquiry by means of discovery and obtain any information the State might have had on Scotti's other informant activities. But information that Scotti had acted as an informant in other cases, without at least some evidence that this activity had generated actual threats against her, would not implicate the State's affirmative duty to disclose potentially exculpatory information to the defense because such information must be material. [25] Scotti's mere acting as an informant in other cases does not reach this level. Evans seems to assume that the State has a duty to compile information or pursue an investigative lead simply because it could conceivably develop evidence helpful to the defense, but he offers no authority for this proposition, and we reject it. [26] Next, Evans claims that the State failed to inform him of statements made by several witnesses before trial which varied from their trial testimony. This claim is belied by the record for the most part, and Evans's general allegations fail to identify any significant inconsistencies. Evans's claims of Brady violations did not warrant an evidentiary hearing, and his alternative claims of ineffective assistance of counsel similarly fail to sufficiently allege either deficient performance or prejudice.