Opinion ID: 2966797
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the term crime of violence means--

Text: (A) an act or series of acts that would con- stitute a felony against the person or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of Title 18, whether or not those acts have actually resulted in crimi- 24 nal charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States; and (B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in sub- paragraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes such action and the individual against whom such action is taken. 42 U.S.C. § 13981. Thus, to state a claim under § 13981(c) a plaintiff victim must allege a crime of violence motivated by gender. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c). Morrison and Crawford do not argue that Brzonkala's allegation of gang rape fails to satisfy § 13981(d)(2)'s definition of a crime of violence. However, they do briefly assert that Brzonkala has failed to allege a crime of violence motivated by gender. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (emphasis added). A crime of violence motivated by gender is defined as a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1). Congress has indicated that [p]roof of `gender motivation' under Title III of VAWA is to proceed in the same ways proof of race or sex discrimination proceeds under other civil rights laws. Judges and juries will determine`motivation' from the `totality of the circumstances' surrounding the event. S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 52; see also S. Rep. No. 102-197, at 50 (1991). The statute does not outlaw [r]andom acts of violence unrelated to gender. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1). However, bias can be proven by circumstantial as well as indirect evidence. S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 52. Generally accepted guidelines for identifying hate crimes may also be useful in determining whether a crime is gender-motivated, such as: language used by the perpetrator; the severity of the attack (including mutilation); the lack of provocation; previous history of 25 similar incidents; absence of any other apparent motive (battery without robbery, for example); common sense. Id. at 52 n.61. With these standards in mind, we examine Brzonkala's complaint. Brzonkala alleges that two virtual strangers, Morrison and Crawford, brutally raped her three times within minutes after first meeting her. Although Brzonkala does not allege mutilation or other severe injury, the brutal and unprotected gang rape itself constitutes an attack of significant severity. Id. Moreover, Brzonkala alleges that the rapes were completely without provocation. Id. One of her assailants conceded during the college disciplinary hearing that Brzonkala twice told him, No before he initially raped her. Further, there is an absence of any apparent motive for the rapes other than gender bias. Id. For example, no robbery or other theft accompanied the rapes. Finally, Brzonkala alleges that when Morrison had finished raping her for the second time he told her, You better not have any fucking diseases. She also alleges that Morrison later announced to the college dining room, I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them. Verbal expression of bias by an attacker is certainly not mandatory to prove gender bias, Brzonkala II, 935 F. Supp. at 785 (The purpose of the statute would be eviscerated if, to state a claim, a plaintiff had to allege, for example, that the defendant raped her and stated, `I hate women.'), but it is helpful. See S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 51. As the district court noted, Morrison's statement reflects that he has a history of taking pleasure from having intercourse with women without their sober consent and that [t]his statement indicates disrespect for women in general and connects this gender disrespect to sexual intercourse. Brzonkala II , 935 F. Supp. at 785. In addition, since Brzonkala alleged that Morrison and Crawford engaged in a conspiracy to rape her, Morrison's comments are also relevant in assessing Crawford's liability. See Loughman v. ConsolPennsylvania Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 103 (3rd Cir. 1993) (concluding that in a civil conspiracy every conspirator is jointly and severally liable for all acts of co-conspirators taken in furtherance of the conspiracy); United States v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824, 828 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that acts and statements in furtherance of the conspiracy may be attributed to a co-conspirator and citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946)); United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 111 (4th Cir. 1990) (same). 26 In sum, Brzonkala has clearly alleged violations of VAWA. Virtually all of the earmarks of hate crimes are asserted here: an unprovoked, severe attack, triggered by no other motive, and accompanied by language clearly stating bias. The district court correctly concluded that Brzonkala alleged a VAWA claim.