Opinion ID: 2208459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Claim of Double Jeopardy

Text: The defendant argued to the trial justice that the adjudication of civil contempt by the Chief Judge of the Family Court on June 27, 1994, constituted a criminal penalty and therefore precluded his being tried for the charge of criminal contempt pursuant to a later complaint brought by the state. This requires a determination concerning whether the adjudication of civil contempt by the Chief Judge of the Family Court was in fact a criminal rather than a civil determination. There is no question that the line is often blurred between civil and criminal contempt. Generally, an important distinction between civil and criminal contempt is that the purpose of criminal contempt is punitive and designed to vindicate the dignity of the court, while civil contempt is not punitive but coercive and designed to bring about compliance with an order of the court. It is very clear from the terms of the adjudication in civil contempt by the Chief Judge of the Family Court that he was attempting to use the contempt power to coerce the defendant into participating in and cooperating with the psychological and evaluation treatment program. Although he imposed a sentence of one year, he left the key to the jail in defendant's pocket by allowing him to purge himself of this civil contempt at any time by participating and cooperating in the psychiatric review process. Consequently, the adjudication by the Chief Judge of the Family Court was a classic example of civil contempt. Not only was it designated by the Chief Judge of the Family Court as civil contempt, but it conformed with all the attributes of civil contempt as opposed to criminal contempt. See International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827-28, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2557, 129 L.Ed.2d 642, 651-52 (1994) (characterizing civil contempt as coercive and avoidable through obedience andgiving paradigmatic examples); see also Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498, 55 L.Ed. 797, 806 (1911), and 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law, § 604 at 338-42 (1996). The ban on double jeopardy as set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not preclude imposing a criminal penalty after a civil penalty has been imposed. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that imposing a civil sanction does not preclude imposing a criminal penalty for the same act. In United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), the Court held that imposing property forfeiture sanctions did not constitute a bar to criminal proceedings. The forfeiture proceedings were held to be remedial and not punitive. The Court reversed holdings by both the Ninth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal that held to the contrary. The Court commented that [i]t is well settled that `Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission.' Id. at 292, 116 S.Ct. at 2149, 135 L.Ed.2d at 571. See also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972) (per curiam). The trial justice did not err in rejecting the motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.