Opinion ID: 2627219
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The May Endanger Element of Public Intoxication Requires a Reasonable Likelihood of Harm Based on the Circumstances

Text: ¶ 26 The district court concluded that the may endanger element of the public intoxication standard could be satisfied by showing a speculative possibility of harm without requiring any circumstantial evidence of endangerment. We hold that the may endanger element of the intoxication standard requires proof of a reasonable likelihood of harm based on the circumstances; a speculative possibility of harm is not sufficient. Our interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent, as indicated by the plain language of the statute. It is also consistent with our own case law as well as case law from other states. ¶ 27 The argument that evidence of endangerment may be satisfied by a speculative possibility of harm conflicts with our principle of statutory interpretation that requires us to avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative. [20] Requiring only a speculative possibility of harm would effectively eviscerate the endangerment requirement in the public intoxication statute for two reasons. First, an officer could always conceive of some speculative source of endangerment. This is apparent in the district court's findings of fact regarding the SIP operation. The court's endangerment finding for each patron contained some variant of the stock conclusion that the patron posed a risk of endangerment from his unsteadiness, from falling, or from exercising diminished judgment due to the alcohol or that the patron could endanger himself or another if he were to drive a motor vehicle. This stock conclusion was applied to every patron regardless of his particular circumstances. Moreover, it could be applied to all persons exhibiting signs of intoxication regardless of whether they actually posed a risk of endangerment. Thus, accepting a speculative possibility of harm would effectively eliminate the endangerment requirement from the public intoxication standard. ¶ 28 Second, an endangerment test based upon the speculative possibility of harm, rather than on the individual circumstances actually presented, necessarily conflates public intoxication with any blood alcohol content over the legal limit for driving. [21] This is so because any individual with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit would necessarily endanger others should he decide to get behind the wheel. This conflation is evidenced by the hearing officer's report in this case, in which he concluded that a person may endanger himself or another if there are indications that the person obviously is, or appears to be impaired to the degree that he or she cannot operate a motor vehicle without regard to whether the person intends to do so. (Emphasis added.) Under this interpretation, every person with a .08 blood alcohol level poses a speculative possibility of harm and satisfies the public intoxication standard. But this is not what the legislature intended. Had the legislature intended for the public intoxication standard and the DUI standard to be equivalent, it would have defined intoxication in section 32A-12-216 by referring to the DUI statute, not to the public intoxication statute. By referring to the public intoxication statute rather than the DUI statute, the legislature evinced an intent to require both intoxication and endangerment for a violation of section 32A-12-216. Thus, in order for the endangerment requirement to have any meaning, there must be a reasonable likelihood of endangerment based on the particular circumstances, rather than a speculative possibility of endangerment. ¶ 29 Requiring a circumstantial analysis of endangerment is consistent with the approach taken by states with similar statutes. For example, the Texas public intoxication statute employs the same may endanger requirement as Utah's public intoxication statute. [22] In applying the endangerment requirement, the Texas Court of Appeals stated that physical manifestations of alcoholic consumption, such as slurred speech, blood shot eyes, and a smell of alcohol on the breath are not sufficient to constitute public intoxication. [23] Rather, the State must demonstrate proof of potential danger either to the appellant himself or to others. [24] The proof of potential danger requirement has been met in cases where the individual was walking down the middle of a street, [25] buying tire chains and indicating an intent to drive, [26] arguing in the middle of the street and resisting arrest, [27] and sleeping in a car in front of a lounge, presenting the likelihood that the individual would wake up and drive home. [28] But it was not met where the individual was in a private driveway leaning on the back of a vehicle. [29] ¶ 30 Requiring circumstantial evidence of danger is also consistent with our past case law. In State v. Trane, we evaluated whether officers had probable cause to arrest Trane for public intoxication without a warrant. [30] In that case, two officers responded to a disturbance complaint and found Trane outside a convenience store in the middle of the night. They immediately noticed that he had slurred speech, that he appeared unsteady, and that he smelled of alcohol. [31] We rejected Trane's argument that there was no evidence of endangerment under the public intoxication statute because when the officers approached Trane, he puffed his chest out [and] took a defensive posture similar to a boxer. [32] This aggressive behavior made the officers fear[ ] for their safety. [33] Thus, in determining whether there was probable cause to believe that Trane was violating the public intoxication statute, we looked for actual evidence of endangerment based on the circumstances. ¶ 31 In summary, we hold that in order to satisfy the may endanger element of the public intoxication statute, an officer must be able to articulate objective facts indicating a reasonable likelihood of endangerment based on the particular circumstances. Because this was not the standard applied by the district court, we remand this case for application of the proper standard.