Opinion ID: 564961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Summary Judgment

Text: 10 The first summary judgment was based on the district court ruling that all appellants' claims were subject to the two-year statute of limitations, see 29 U.S.C. Sec. 255(a), applicable to nonwillful violations of the FLSA. 11 Plaintiffs herein have proffered no evidence indicating that Azucarera acted with knowledge or reckless disregard with respect to its obligations under FLSA. All plaintiffs have suggested is that on May 28, 1986 they informed defendant of their grievances and were denied. Nor have they given any convincing reason as to why the time period should be tolled. Therefore, in the first instance, the court holds that the two-year limitation term is applicable to this case. 12 The court concluded that all the overtime compensation claims of appellants Lopez and Pena were time-barred, whereas the less mature claims of the four remaining appellants escaped the two-year bar. 13 Our review of summary judgments is governed by familiar principles. Summary judgment is warranted where the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals that there is no genuine factual dispute and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Our review is plenary. Siegal v. American Honda, 921 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 14 We cannot conclude that the present summary judgment record, although viewed most favorably to appellants, raises any genuine issue of material fact concerning the willfulness of the FLSA violations alleged against Azucarera. A violation of the FLSA cannot be considered willful unless the employer acted not only unreasonably, but recklessly. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 135 n. 13, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 1682 n. 13, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988) (If an employer acts unreasonably, but not recklessly, in determining its legal obligation ... its action ... should not be ... considered [willful] under ... the ... standard we approve today.). 10 15 We might have had little difficulty concluding that a genuine issue of material fact was raised as to the willfulness issue if appellants had attested to the truth of their counsel's statement, albeit somewhat conclusory, that Azucarera forbade them from filling in the hours worked in their time cards, in order to exempt them from the benefits of the [FLSA]. The brief in opposition to the first motion for summary judgment argued that Azucarera turned the plaintiffs through flamboyant titles into administrative employees, set a fixed salary for them, and forbade them from filling in the hours worked in their time cards, in order to exempt them from the benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Appellants' affidavits neither attested to the truth of this statement, nor to any specific fact relevant to the willfulness issue. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (adverse party's response, by affidavits ..., must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.). 11 As appellants failed to make a competent demonstration that there was any trialworthy issue as to whether Azucarera either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute, McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 133, 108 S.Ct. at 1681, no genuine issue of material fact impeded summary judgment on the issue of the applicability of the two-year limitations period.