Opinion ID: 453424
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Removal Jurisdiction Rests on a Federal Claim Stated in the Complaint

Text: 9 A suit can be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1441(a) only if it could have been brought there originally, that is, if  'a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States ... [is] an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action.'  Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir.1984) (quoting Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936) ). See Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir.1977). 2 In this case, the question is whether Harper's own complaint stated a federal cause of action under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a). 10 A claim cannot be removed to federal court if the federal claim is only a defense, because a federal defense would not be an element of plaintiff's cause of action. Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir.1985). Because preemption is ordinarily raised as a defense, preemption alone is an insufficient basis for removal. Guinasso v. Pacific First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 656 F.2d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1716, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982). Accord Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d at 639-40; Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1370 (9th Cir.1984) cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2319, 85 L.Ed.2d --- (1985). However, [r]emoval may be appropriate when federal law not only displaces state law but also confers a federal remedy on the plaintiffs or compels them to rely, explicitly or implicitly, on federal propositions. Guinasso, 656 F.2d at 1367 (footnote omitted). 11 Whether federal law confers a remedy in turn implicates the well-pleaded complaint rule. 12 A plaintiff may not, however, avoid federal jurisdiction simply by omitting from the complaint federal law essential to his claim, or by casting in state law terms a claim that can be made only under federal law. Jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the well-pleaded complaint. A complaint that is artfully pleaded to avoid federal jurisdiction may be recharacterized as one arising under federal law. 13 Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1472 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). See Hunter, 746 F.2d at 640-43. Claims fitting the artful pleading category, however, are the exception, and not the rule; plaintiff is generally free to be the master of his own complaint. Hunter, 746 F.2d at 640-41; Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Association, 731 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir.1984). The question we address, therefore, is whether Harper's claims not only arise under federal laws that displace state laws, but whether they also arise under federal laws that confer upon him a federal remedy. 14 B. The Causes of Action Against the Employer for Breach of Contract, Breach of Company Policy in Interpreting the Miss-out Provision of the Contract, and Against the Union for Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation Appear on the Face of the Complaint and State a Federal Claim; They Were Therefore Properly Removed. 15 Harper alleges outright that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by failing to follow the grievance and arbitration procedures of his collective bargaining agreement. The duty of fair representation is explicitly based on federal labor law, section 301 of the LMRA. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 909, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). 16 Harper also alleges outright that the Corporation breached the collective bargaining agreement and breached company policy in interpreting a provision of the collective bargaining agreement concerning miss-outs. Breach of a collective bargaining agreement--and breach of a provision of a collective bargaining agreement--also arise under section 301. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, --- U.S. ----, ----, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985); Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1474; Sheeran v. General Electric Co., 593 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868, 100 S.Ct. 143, 62 L.Ed.2d 93 (1979). 17 The breach of contract and breach of duty of fair representation claims which the complaint explicitly alleges (contra, e.g., Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1470 (complaint was carefully worded to avoid any direct reference to the collective bargaining agreement); Sheeran, 593 F.2d at 96 (appellants did not refer to the collective bargaining agreements in their complaint) ), are therefore preempted by federal law. There is no question of artful pleading or implying claims not apparent from the face of the complaint. Harper alleges these claims and it is apparent from the face of his complaint that they are federal claims. Therefore, they are removable. Hunter, 746 F.2d at 642; Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1370-71 & n. 5. 18 C. The Complaint Asserts, on its Face, that the Collective Bargaining Agreement Provides the Same Just Cause Protection Against Discharge as State Wrongful Termination Law Provides; It Therefore also States a Federal Claim and was Properly Removed. 19 In California, a tort claim may redress violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing's prohibition against wrongful termination. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal.App.3d 443, 168 Cal.Rptr. 722 (1980). Harper explicitly asserts that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of California's interest in an express or implied contract term that the employee was hired to serve so long as he or she performed to the satisfaction of the employer. Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1373 (describing the interest protected by Cleary). We must decide whether federal labor law leaves room, in this case, for California's tort action for breach of the duty of good faith by wrongful termination. 20 In Allis-Chalmers, the Supreme Court held that section 301 preempts the Wisconsin tort of breach of the duty of good faith in handling an insurance claim where the insurance coverage is incorporated by reference into the collective bargaining agreement. The Court described claims preempted by section 301: Thus, questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions are in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort. --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 1911. The Court described state claims that survive federal preemption: state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract. Id. And the Court used the following analysis to distinguish between claims that are preempted by and claims that survive federal labor law: 21 Therefore, state-law rights and obligations that do not exist independently of private agreements, and that as a result can be waived or altered by agreement of private parties, are preempted by those agreements.... Our analysis must focus, then, on whether the Wisconsin tort action for breach of the duty of good faith as applied here confers non-negotiable state law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract. 22 At ---- - ----, 105 S.Ct. at 1912 (citation and footnote omitted). 23 The law of our circuit is in accord with Allis-Chalmers. Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.1984), recognized that wrongful termination in violation of state public policy (in that case, firing the employee for whistle blowing about the employer's delivery of adulterated milk in violation of California state law) survives federal preemption. This tort clearly implicates proscribe[d] conduct, state-law rights and obligations, and non-negotiable state-law rights within the meaning of Allis-Chalmers. Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir.1980), held that wrongful discharge in violation of the collective bargaining agreement was preempted. Under Allis-Chalmers, that tort implicates issues inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract. Allis-Chalmers, --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 1912. See also Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (9th Cir.1984) (violation of implied contract term requiring just cause preempted); Taylor v. St. Regis Paper Co., 560 F.Supp. 546, 548-49 (C.D.Cal.1983). 24 In all the cases in our circuit in which preemption was found, however, the collective bargaining contract provided sufficient protection against wrongful termination. We have therefore never found the state tort protection waivable or negotiable. Garibaldi, for example, implied in dicta that California's tort of wrongful discharge in violation of the Cleary covenant might be preempted because [n]o such lack of job security exists for union employees. 726 F.2d at 1374-75 n. 11. Olguin, in holding a claim for wrongful discharge removable, stated: The [collective bargaining] agreement provides the same or greater protection of job security that state tort law seeks to provide for nonunionized employees; accordingly federal law preempts state law. 740 F.2d at 1474. The other decisions finding preemption and removal jurisdiction seem to assume that the collective bargaining agreement actually provided the protections that plaintiff sought. E.g., Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 702 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir.1983) ([s]uch topics are discussed in the collective bargaining agreement). 25 Harper alleges that his termination breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing in his labor contract. There is no indication that the good cause provision of his contract provided any less protection than California wrongful termination law. Thus, it is unnecessary to address whether state law confers nonnegotiable rights on employees. See Comment, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34 Hast.L.J. 635, 637-38 (1983) (California state law grants the employee a substantive right not to be discharged which is independent of the collective agreement and which his or her union arguably may not waive) (footnote omitted). They were not, in any event, negotiated away. 26 Harper's complaint alleges: At all times herein mentioned the [collective bargaining] agreement prohibited Defendant employer from discharging any employee covered by the agreement except for good cause after a proper hearing. Complaint p 6 (emphasis supplied). The collective bargaining agreement grants Harper the same job security of requiring just cause for dismissal that state law affords. Thus, federal preemption jeopardizes no independent state right here. Because this is apparent from Harper's complaint, and is not a defensive allegation, this claim too is based on federal law and was properly removed. If the complaint had not clearly pled violation of the just cause requirement of the collective bargaining agreement, the result might have been different. 27