Opinion ID: 628033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reviewability of the Guidelines

Text: 62 As we have already stated, supra page 1290, the PRA defines presidential records as 63 documentary materials ... created or received by the President, his immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the President whose function is to advise and assist the President, in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President. 64 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(2). In addition, Congress explicitly provided that presidential records do not include any documentary materials that are ... official records of an agency, as the term agency is defined in the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(f). 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(2)(B)(i). The legislative history explains this limitation on the definition of presidential records as follows: 65 The term presidential records is intended ... to encompass all White House and [EOP] records ... which ... fall outside the scope of the FOIA because they are not agency records. In other words, that which is now subject to FOIA would remain so and that which is [not] now subject to FOIA would be subject to the [PRA,] including those provisions of the [PRA] which in specified circumstances specially apply FOIA to these non-agency records after a President leaves office. 66 H.R.REP. No. 1487, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1978), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5732, 5742; see also id. at 3. 67 Thus, Congress perceived the potential definitional overlap between agency records under the FOIA and presidential records under the PRA, and explicitly provided that the PRA would apply only to records that fall outside the scope of FOIA because they are not agency records. Put another way, the PRA provides that the definition of agency records in the FOIA trumps the definition of presidential records in the PRA. Congress was keenly aware of the separation of powers concerns that were implicated by legislation regulating the conduct of the President's daily operations, and thus sought to minimize outside interference with the day-to-day operations of the President and his closest advisors and to ensure executive branch control over presidential records during the President's term of office. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290. At the same time, however, Congress sought to provide a clear limitation on just which materials the President could legitimately assert control over and to preserve the pre-existing body of FOIA law governing the disclosure of government agency records. 68 The PRA exclusion of records subject to the FOIA from the class of materials that may be treated as presidential records averts a clash in the role of judicial review under the two statutory schemes. Judicial review plays an indispensable role in ensuring proper government disclosure under the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(B); Truitt v. Department of State, 897 F.2d 540, 547 (D.C.Cir.1990); Senate of Puerto Rico v. U.S. Department of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 587 (D.C.Cir.1987); McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148 (D.C.Cir.1983); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1190-95 (D.C.Cir.1978). At the same time, judicial review of the President's management of admittedly presidential records is impliedly precluded by the PRA. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 289; see infra pages 1293-94. Congress preserved the critical role of judicial review under the FOIA, and avoided a conflict between the PRA and the FOIA, by explicitly exempting records subject to the FOIA from the scope of the PRA and allowing judicial review of guidelines defining presidential records under the rubric of substantive FOIA law. 69 This narrow, clearly defined limitation on the scope of the PRA is absolutely essential to preventing the PRA from becoming a potential presidential carte blanche to shield materials from the reach of the FOIA. Of [303 U.S.App.D.C. 126] course, we presume that executive officials will act in good faith. But if guidelines that purport to implement the PRA were not reviewable for compliance with the statute's definition of presidential records, non-presidential materials that would otherwise be immediately subject to the FOIA would be shielded from its provisions, whether wittingly or unwittingly, if they were managed as presidential records. See44 U.S.C. Sec. 2204(a), (b) (President may designate a period, not to exceed twelve years after the completion of his presidency, during which his presidential records shall not be accessible under the FOIA or otherwise); id. Sec. 2204(c)(1) (presidential records shall be administered under the FOIA after the expiration of any limitations on access imposed under subsections 2204(a) and (b)). Moreover, in light of the fact that disposal decisions under the PRA are unreviewable, Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290, a non-presidential document subject to the FOIA could be forever removed from that statute's provisions if it were improperly classified as a presidential record and destroyed. 70 For example, imagine a guideline defining presidential records as all records produced or received by, or in the possession or under the control of, any government agency or employee of the United States. This definition would sweep all, or virtually all, federal records--and many documentary materials that are neither federal nor presidential records--within the ambit of the PRA, and outside the scope of the FOIA. Reading the PRA to forbid judicial review of such a guideline for conformity with the PRA definition of presidential records would be tantamount to allowing the PRA to functionally render the FOIA a nullity. As we have already stated, supra pages 1292-93, Congress avoided this problem by excluding records subject to the FOIA from the scope of the PRA, thereby preserving FOIA law intact and maintaining the integral role of judicial review. 71 Our holding today is also consonant with the relationship between the FRA and the PRA. The FRA defines a class of materials that are federal records subject to its provisions, and the PRA describes another, mutually exclusive set of materials that are subject to a different and less rigorous regime. In other words, no individual record can be subject to both statutes because their provisions are inconsistent. If guidelines that purport to define presidential records were not reviewable, the cross-appellees could effectively shield all federal records not only from the FOIA, but also from the provisions of the FRA--thus evading this court's holding in Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 293, that the courts have jurisdiction to decide whether the NSC's recordkeeping guidelines adequately describe the material subject to the FRA. 72 We held in Armstrong I that the PRA precludes review of the President's recordkeeping practices and decisions. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 289. The cross-appellees urge the court to give this language the broadest possible reading, holding in effect that we may not review any guidelines that purport to implement the PRA or deal with asserted presidential records. Thus, argue the cross-appellees, the district court correctly held that the guidelines for determining which materials are presidential records are not subject to judicial review. We disagree. The Armstrong I opinion does not stand for the unequivocal proposition that all decisions made pursuant to the PRA are immune from judicial review. 73 The Armstrong I opinion addressed the question whether the courts could review the decision to erase materials designated by the government as presidential records within the meaning of the PRA. See id. at 284, 291. We held that judicial review was not available to monitor disposal and emphasized that Congress drafted the PRA in a manner that would ensure executive branch control over presidential records during the President's term of office. Id. at 290 (emphasis added). Thus, we held that those decisions that involve materials that are truly presidential records are immune from judicial review. We did not hold in Armstrong I that the President could designate any material he wishes as presidential records, and thereby exercise virtually complete control over it, id. at 290, notwithstanding the fact that the [303 U.S.App.D.C. 127] material does not meet the definition of presidential records in the PRA. 74 The cross-appellees point to individual phrases and sentences in our Armstrong I opinion which they contend dictate the broad result they urge upon this court. However, as we have just said, this language must be read in the context of the issue before the court in Armstrong I. In any case, the language seized upon by the cross-appellees is entirely consistent with the result we reach today. We stated in Armstrong I that the PRA require[s] the President to maintain records documenting the policies, activities, and decisions of his administration, but leav[es] the implementation of such a requirement in the President's hands. Id. However, the discussion that immediately follows this statement makes clear that the Armstrong I court was not addressing the initial classification of existing materials. The Armstrong I court discusses only the creation, management, and disposal decisions described in the provisions of 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2203. See id. at 290, 291. None of these decisions encompasses the initial classification of materials as presidential records. 75 A creation decision refers to the determination to make a record documenting presidential activities. See 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2203(a). Thus, the courts may not review any decisions regarding whether to create a documentary presidential record. Management decisions describes the day-to-day process by which presidential records are maintained. See id. Sec. 2204(a), (b). The courts may likewise not review these particulars of the presidential records management system. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290. Finally, disposal decisions describes the process outlined in 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2203(c)-(e) for disposing of presidential records. Judicial review of the President's action under these provisions is also unavailable. But guidelines describing which existing materials will be treated as presidential records in the first place are subject to judicial review. 76 Thus, although the PRA impliedly precludes judicial review of the President's decisions concerning the creation, management, and disposal of presidential records during his term of office, Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 291, the courts may review guidelines outlining what is, and what is not, a presidential record to ensure that materials that are not subject to the PRA are not treated as presidential records. We remand to the district court to conduct this inquiry. 77