Opinion ID: 547209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant-appellant Mason

Text: 9 Defendant-appellant Mason claims that the district court erred by failing to provide the jury with a missing witness charge. She contends that a missing witness charge was required because, while numerous law enforcement agents were involved in the August 1988 search of her home, only the search team's leader testified at trial. According to Mason, Agent Gardner was not present at the initial entry of her home and only the non-testifying agents could have revealed the exact location of the seized narcotics upon the agents' initial entry. Mason did not propose any specific language for the charge and rejected the uncalled witness charge initially offered by Judge Korman. She now claims that the Judge's eventual refusal to provide any missing witness charge was reversible error. We disagree. 10 A missing witness charge permitting the jury to infer that the testimony of an unproduced witness would have favored one party is appropriate if production of the witness is peculiarly within [the] power of the other party. United States v. Torres, 845 F.2d 1165, 1169 (2d Cir.1988) (quoting Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121, 14 S.Ct. 40, 41, 37 L.Ed. 1021 (1893)). However, if the unproduced witness is equally available to both sides, 'the failure to produce is open to an inference against both parties.'  Id. (quoting 2 Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 288, at 208 (Chadbourn rev.1979) (emphasis in original)). Should a witness that is equally available to both parties not be called to testify, the district court may, as it initially offered in this case, provide a charge which permits unfavorable inferences against either party. See United States v. Carr, 584 F.2d 612, 618 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935, 99 S.Ct. 1280, 59 L.Ed.2d 494 (1979); United States v. Erb, 543 F.2d 438, 444-45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 981, 97 S.Ct. 493, 50 L.Ed.2d 590 (1976); L. Sand, J. Siffert, W. Loughlin, & S. Reiss, Modern Federal Jury Instructions p 6.04, at 6-22 (1990). However, whether to provide the jury with a missing witness charge is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Torres, 845 F.2d at 1170-71; United States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319, 1330-31 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 821, 97 S.Ct. 69, 50 L.Ed.2d 82 (1976). 11 Mason contends that production of the agents who participated in the search of her home was in the peculiar control of the government and that their testimony was practically unavailable to her. We recognize that there exists a close relationship between law enforcement agents and prosecutors. However, the availability of a witness ... depend[s] ... on all the facts and circumstances bearing upon the witness's relation to the parties. Torres, 845 F.2d at 1170 (citation omitted). In this case, there is no evidence that the testimony of the search team agents was unavailable to Mason. Prior to trial, the names of the search team agents were provided to Mason in a report prepared by Agent Gardner. In fact, the prosecutor expressly offered to make the agents available to testify as defense witnesses. Despite the availability of the agents, Mason made no effort to call them as witnesses. Under these circumstances, it appears that the agents' testimony was equally available to Mason and the government. Accordingly, no missing witness charge was required. See id. at 1169; Erb, 543 F.2d at 445; United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1394 (2d Cir.1976). 12 Defendant-appellant Mason also contends that the search warrant authorizing a search of her apartment and safe deposit box was not supported by adequate probable cause. In particular, Mason argues that the confidential informant's affidavit supporting the warrant was not clearly reliable because the affidavit and complaint contained inconsistent references to the informant's gender and that the allegations contained in the affidavit were uncorroborated. Mason also argues that, based on these deficiencies in the warrant application, the searching agents could not possibly have acted in good faith reliance on the warrant. Accordingly, she claims that the evidence seized from her home and safe deposit box should have been suppressed by the district court. Again, we disagree. 13 A magistrate's finding of probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be found on a defendant's premises is entitled to substantial deference on appeal. United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir.1983). In the instant case, the magistrate was presented with sufficient information to determine that probable cause for the search existed. Contrary to Mason's suggestion, the confidential informant had proved to be a reliable source of government information on previous occasions. Moreover, wiretap evidence corroborated the informant's statements regarding Mason's ongoing involvement in narcotics activity. The government's inconsistent references to the informant's gender are not material to the issue of probable cause. See United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032, 106 S.Ct. 592, 88 L.Ed.2d 572 (1985). Moreover, the inconsistent references do not appear to have been made intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth. Id. (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676-77, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978)). Finally, even if the inconsistent gender references were considered fatal to the informant's affidavit, the government's wiretap evidence provided independent and lawful information sufficient to support probable cause. Id. at 849 (citing United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 48-49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854, 103 S.Ct. 121, 74 L.Ed.2d 106 (1982)). 14 Mason's final contention is that, by depositing the cash seized from her safe deposit box without recording the currency's serial numbers, the government failed to preserve exculpatory evidence for her defense. Mason apparently claims that the $19,800 discovered in her safe deposit box was a legitimate cash hoard accumulated from $250 per month rental income, jai alai gambling winnings, and social security payments. Accordingly, she challenges the district court's failure to declare a mistrial or to provide the jury with a charge permitting a negative inference against the government for failure to preserve the cash. 15 The district court's refusal to declare a mistrial was proper. [U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). In the present case, Mason has offered no reason to believe that preservation of the cash would have yielded exculpatory evidence. It is difficult to imagine how recording the currency's serial numbers could have assisted Mason's defense unless she herself had recorded such information for her legitimately earned funds. Even if the government had preserved the cash or recorded the serial numbers, Mason has presented no reason to believe she could have connected those funds to the legitimate sources she alleges. Mason has not established a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Elusma, 849 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S.----, 109 S.Ct. 1570, 103 L.Ed.2d 936 (1989) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383-84, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). In fact, the exculpatory effect of such evidence is so far-fetched that we decline to find any bad faith on the part of the officers who, in accordance with standard procedure, deposited the funds without recording the serial numbers. 16 Moreover, it was not error for the district court to refuse to charge the jury that it could draw an inference against the government from its failure to preserve or record the serial numbers of the seized cash. As in the instance of a missing witness charge, whether to instruct the jury on the permissibility of such an inference is committed to the discretion of the district court. In the present case, the court requested that Mason submit an affidavit stating that the money was a cash hoard derived from legitimate sources before he would provide the requested instruction. Mason declined to submit such an affidavit, and the charge was not provided. Under these circumstances, and considering the far-fetched nature of Mason's cash hoard theory, the district court's refusal to provide the requested instruction was not an abuse of discretion.