Opinion ID: 42668
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sister Circuits' Jurisprudence

Text: 25 We do not consider this question in a vacuum. The parties briefed the First Circuit's holding in Succar. Since the First Circuit first spoke, the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, two panels from the Eighth Circuit, and, most recently, the Eleventh Circuit have had occasion to address the question we consider. The five circuits to address the issue have reached dissimilar results with even more dissimilar reasoning. And while these well-reasoned opinions lack uniformity, they provide analysis and research which we carefully consider. 26
27 In Succar, the First Circuit, performing a Chevron step one analysis, considered the statutory text and the context of the statutory scheme to determine that Congress had spoken clearly to aliens' eligibility for status adjustment and that the regulation's additional limitation on the eligible class was inconsistent with that congressional determination. 394 F.3d at 29. The First Circuit later referred to the statute's legislative history to confirm its reading of the statute. Id. at 32. 28 In its plain-language review of the statute, the Succar panel found that Congress had defined certain categories of aliens who were eligible to apply for adjustment of status, . . . and refined the definition by specifically excluding certain aliens from eligibility. Id. at 24. Because of the express pronouncements in § 1255 regarding eligibility for status adjustment, the First Circuit held that Congress unambiguously reserved to itself the determination of who is eligible to apply for adjustment of status relief. Id. The regulation's limitation on parolees' eligibility conflicts with the statute's plain language, according to the Succar court. 29 When the First Circuit considered the context of the statutory scheme, it drew two conclusions. The Succar court first determined that the exclusion of parolees in removal proceedings renders ineligible most of the class that Congress rendered eligible by including parolees. Id. at 26. Second, the court stated that the congressional choice to delegate to the Attorney General some circumscribed discretion over the ultimate decision of who is granted adjustment of status is not authorization for discretion in other areas. Id. (footnote omitted). These conclusions compelled the court to deem the regulation invalid. 30 The first conclusion was based, in part, on the court's factual understanding that most arriving alien parolees are placed in removal proceedings. Id. at 18. This representation was made to the court and not disputed by the Attorney General. Id. at 21. Also, the court noted that an applicant for admission who cannot demonstrate admissibility clearly and beyond a doubt must be placed in removal proceedings. Id. at 27 (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). This view of the operation of the INA as a whole and of the practical effect of the regulation led the Succar court to find that the regulation's carve-out improperly subsumed the congressional grant of eligibility to the parolee class of aliens. 31 The First Circuit's second conclusion— addressing the Attorney General's discretion— was a response to the argument that the Attorney General may exercise his discretion by rulemaking rather than case-by-case adjudication pursuant to Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 121 S.Ct. 714, 148 L.Ed.2d 635 (2001). In Lopez, the Supreme Court upheld a regulation of the Bureau of Prisons (the Bureau) categorically denying early release for certain prisoners as an appropriate exercise of the Bureau's discretion. 531 U.S. at 233, 121 S.Ct. 714. The authorizing statute in question in Lopez eliminated a class of prisoners from eligibility for early release and left the release determination of other prisoners to the discretion of the Bureau. Id. at 238-41, 121 S.Ct. 714 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B)). The Court determined that, aside from excluding a class of prisoners from eligibility for the reduction in sentence, Congress ha[d] not identified any further circumstance in which the Bureau either must grant the reduction, or is forbidden to do so. Id. at 242, 121 S.Ct. 714. Because the Bureau ultimately was vested with discretion to decide on the prisoners' release, the Court held that the Bureau was within its authority to exclude categorically classes of prisoners by rule: The Bureau is not required continually to revisit `issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in a single rulemaking proceeding.' Id. at 244, 121 S.Ct. 714 (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983)). The First Circuit distinguished Lopez, asserting that, in the statute at issue in Lopez, Congress had been silent and that was not the case with respect to the INA. Succar, 394 F.3d at 29. Accordingly, the Succar, court deemed the Attorney General's resort to rulemaking contrary to the plain language of the statute. Id. 32 Having concluded that the text and statutory structure conflicted with the regulation, the Succar court reviewed the INA's legislative history. Congress, the First Circuit determined, intended to eliminate unnecessary trips out of the United States in order to be eligible to apply for admission. Id. at 33-34 (discussing S. REP. No. 86-1651 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3125). Based on this review of the legislative history, the First Circuit concluded that the regulation actually recreated a problem that Congress intended to eliminate when enacting the statute because, under the regulation, parolees subject to removal would have to leave the country to become eligible to adjust status. Id. at 34. As the legislative history confirmed its understanding of the statute's language and context, the First Circuit declared 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) invalid under Chevron step one and vacated the BIA's removal order. Id. at 34, 36. The Ninth Circuit, in Bona v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 663, 668 (9th Cir.2005), expressly adopted and followed Succar. 33
34 The Third Circuit also invalidated 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) but did so under Chevron step two. Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 120 (3d Cir.2005). The Third Circuit disagreed with the First Circuit's conclusion that Lopez did not govern the Chevron step one result. Id. at 116. The Zheng court, applying Lopez, stated that [t]he fact that Congress declared some categories of aliens ineligible for adjustment by statute does not in itself conclusively prove that the Attorney General cannot declare other categories ineligible by regulation. Id. 35 Moving to the second step of Chevron, the Zheng court noted that if the regulation was to survive, it would have to be both `reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design' and `based on a permissible construction of the statute.' Id. (quoting NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257, 115 S.Ct. 810, 130 L.Ed.2d 740 (1995), and Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778). Looking to the operation of the INA as a whole the Zheng court determined that virtually all parolees will be in removal proceedings. Id. at 117. In addition to considering Succar, the Zheng court found that the statutory structure was such that parolees will, by default, be in removal proceedings. Id. Based on this understanding of the INA's operation, the Third Circuit determined that Congress intended that the mere fact of removal proceedings would not render an alien ineligible to apply for adjustment of status. Id. at 118. 36 According to the Zheng court, 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) rendered most aliens paroled into the United States ineligible to apply for adjustment of status. Id. Although the Government contended that some aliens in removal proceedings might be eligible to adjust status, the Third Circuit deemed the exception too narrow to capture congressional intent that parolees be able to apply for status adjustment. Id. at 119. Ultimately, the Zheng court stated that [f]or all practical purposes,.. . 8 C.F.R. § [245.1(c)(8)] renders paroled aliens ineligible to apply for adjustment of status. Id. Based on its practical understanding of the statute's function and the effect of the regulation, the Zheng court concluded that [t]he conflict between regulation and statute is clear and unmistakable. Id. As such, the regulation, which, according to the Third Circuit, essentially reverses the eligibility structure set out by Congress, was held invalid under Chevron step two. Id. at 120. 37 Recently, the Eleventh Circuit, in Scheerer v. U.S. Attorney General, 445 F.3d 1311, ___, Nos. 04-16231 & 05-11303, 2006 WL 947680, at  (11th Cir. Apr.13, 2006), followed the Zheng court's reasoning and held 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) invalid. The Eleventh Circuit adhered to Lopez and held that the Attorney General may exercise his discretion by rulemaking in lieu of adjudication. Scheerer, ___ F.3d at ___, 2006 WL 947680, at . The Scheerer court, like Succar, Bona, and Zheng, based its conclusion on an understanding that [t]he vast majority of aliens paroled into the United States will ... be in removal proceedings by virtue of the statutory scheme. Id. at ___, 2006 WL 947680, at .
38 The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit court to deem 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) valid, and it has done so in a pair of opinions; each opinion drew a dissent arguing in favor of invalidating the regulation. See Mouelle v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 923, 930 (8th Cir.2005); Geach v. Chertoff, 444 F.3d 940, ___-___, No. 05-1405, 2006 WL 508101, at -3 (8th Cir. Mar.3, 2006) (following Mouelle ). The Mouelle court, like both Zheng and Scheerer, followed the Supreme Court's directive in Lopez and recognized that the Attorney General's use of rulemaking was not invalid as contrary to the statute. 416 F.3d at 930. 39 Having satisfied itself with the manner of regulation, the Mouelle court followed Lopez and inquired whether the gap-filling regulation was `reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design.' Id. (quoting Lopez, 531 U.S. at 242, 121 S.Ct. 714). At this point, the Eighth Circuit referred to the Attorney General's commentary in promulgating the regulation, which indicated that the regulation responded to congressional intent to expedite removal and avoid lengthening removal proceedings. Id. (citing Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed.Reg. 10,312, 10,312-13, 10,326-27 (Mar. 6, 1997) (interim rule with request for comments) (Interim Rule)). The Mouelle court noted the broad discretion granted the Attorney General in the statute and determined that the fact that an arriving alien is in a removal proceeding is a characteristic that is a reasonably sound basis for choosing not to grant relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1255[(a)]. Id. To the contention in Succar (and the same contention later in Zheng, Bona, and Scheerer ) that the regulation renders an entire class of aliens— intended by Congress to be eligible for status adjustment—ineligible for status adjustment, the Mouelle court responded: 40 The court in Succar opined that the relevant characteristic—placement in removal proceedings—effectively barred most aliens who had been paroled from adjusting status because most paroled aliens were in removal proceedings. Thus, the court concluded, the regulation was contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) because paroled aliens were among those eligible to adjust status under the statute. As an evidentiary matter, we cannot conclude that the regulation bars most paroled aliens from adjusting status. Unlike the court in Succar, we have not been informed, of that fact. And in this case the Attorney General cites DHS statistics suggesting that only about two to three percent of parolees who entered the United States in 2003 have been placed in removal proceedings. In fact, the INS did not initiate removal proceedings against the Mouelles until April 15, 1998, over ten months after the Mouelles were paroled into the United States. Moreover, even if we assumed that most aliens paroled into the United States were placed in removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 does not show a congressional intent to vest a few, most, or all paroled aliens with the right to adjust their status. Relief remains discretionary. 41 Id. at 930 n. 9 (internal citations omitted). Because the regulation was, according to the Eighth Circuit, a valid exercise of expressly-granted discretion, the court upheld 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8).