Opinion ID: 2641524
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ohio’s Domestic Violence Statute and the ACCA

Text: We now turn to evaluating whether Defendant’s domestic violence convictions qualify as violent felonies. We hold that they do. The Ohio domestic violence statute at issue here criminalizes in relevant part the following conduct: 6 No. 12-4346 (A) “knowingly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause physical harm to a family or household member”; (B) “recklessly caus[ing] serious physical harm to a family or household member”; and (C) “by threat of force, . . . knowingly caus[ing] a family or household member to believe that the offender will cause imminent physical harm to the family or household member.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)-(C). While such conduct is generally a misdemeanor, see id. § 2919.25(D)(2), Ohio’s domestic violence statute has a recidivism provision through which a defendant who has been convicted of two or more domestic violence offenses (or other listed offenses), receives a third-degree felony conviction for a violation of subsection (A) or (B), see id. § 2919.25(D)(4). Under Ohio law, a third-degree felony conviction of this kind carries a maximum term of thirty-six months in prison. See id. § 2929.14(A)(3)(b). In the instant case, Defendant had four domestic violence convictions arising from different conduct on different dates: April 2002; June 2003; May 2006; and September 2007. Consequently, the May 2006 and September 2007 offenses were enhanced to third-degree felonies pursuant to Ohio’s recidivism provision. Looking first to the statutory elements under the categorical approach, see Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283, we agree with the district court that the statute could be violated in a way that satisfies the ACCA and in a way that does not. In order to satisfy clause (i) of the ACCA, the “physical force” threatened, attempted or actualized must be violent force; that is, “force capable of causing pain or injury to another person.” Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140. It is clear that Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A) and (C) meet this standard. While the statute does not expressly include 7 No. 12-4346 physical force as a stand-alone element, subsection (A) does require a defendant to “knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A). “Physical harm” means “any injury, illness or other physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration.” Id. § 2901.01(A)(3). We recently held in the context of Ohio’s aggravated assault statute, Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.12(A)(1)-(2), that the requirement of physical harm under Ohio law necessarily requires proof that the defendant used violent force. United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 399-401 (6th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases) (explaining that even deceit or fraud on the will of a victim, such as poisoning, is equivalent to the use of force); see also United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476, 485-86 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that second-degree-assault statute under Missouri law, which similarly requires only that a defendant “attempted to cause, or knowingly caused, physical injury to another person,” meets the “physical force” requirement of the parallel sentencing Guideline). The rule in Anderson compels the conclusion that § 2919.25(A) meets the “physical force” definition because the section’s requirement of a physiological impairment, or showing that such an injury was attempted, necessarily requires the showing of a force capable of causing pain or injury under Johnson. Section 2919.25(C) expressly requires a defendant to create a fear of “imminent physical harm” through the “threat of force.” Because “threat of force” means to threaten “violence, compulsion or constraint physically exerted by any means,” Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.01(A)(1), this inquiry is even more clear. We cannot conceive of a situation where the threat of physical injury by use of physical violence, compulsion or constraint would not meet the ACCA’s requirement of physical force under clause (i). Cf. United States v. Melchor-Meceno, 620 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 8 No. 12-4346 2010)1 (“One cannot knowingly place another in fear of being poisoned . . . without threatening to force the poison on the victim.”); United States v. Forrest, 611 F.3d 908, 911 (8th Cir. 2010) (“A threat that creates a fear ‘of imminent serious bodily injury’ is a threat of physical force.”). What prevents our inquiry from ending here is § 2919.25(B). Under subsection (B), Ohio law criminalizes reckless conduct that leads to physical harm, which would not qualify as an ACCA predicate offense. See United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367, 375 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e conclude that the ‘use of physical force’ clause of the ACCA, § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), requires more than reckless conduct.”) Accordingly, we must decide this case under the modified categorical approach. Upon review of the indictments in both the May 2006 and September 2007 offenses, we note that Defendant pleaded guilty to charges that he “knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to . . . a family or household member.” (R.30, PID# 159, 163.) These charges track the language of § 2919.25(A), which falls under clause (i) of the ACCA to qualify both domestic violence offense convictions as predicate offenses. Accordingly, we find that Defendant’s sentence was properly enhanced under the ACCA. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Defendant’s sentence. 1 Although United States v. Melchor-Meceno, 620 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2010) considered “crime of violence” in the context of the United States Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2, the Guidelines definition tracks in pertinent part that of a violent felony under the ACCA. See United States v. Rede-Mendez, 680 F.3d 552, 555 n.2 (6th Cir. 2012). 9 No. 12-4346 KAREN NELSON MOORE, concurring. I write separately because I do not believe that an individual necessarily uses physical force when causing a physical injury. See United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367, 374 n.6 (6th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, I subscribe to the analysis set forth