Opinion ID: 2994133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aggravating Roles

Text: The defendants do not challenge the court’s factual findings relating to their respective leadership and supervisory roles in the criminal violations; instead, they argue that their aggravating criminal conduct was double counted when it was used both to justify a sentencing adjustment and to attach criminal liability in the underlying conspiracy to violate the Clean Air Act. This presents a legal question regarding the meaning and application of the Guidelines and hence triggers de novo review. See United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 949 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1586 (1999); Castellanos, 165 F.3d at 1131. The bar on double counting comes into play only if the [underlying] offense itself necessarily includes the same conduct as the [adjustment]. See United States v. Senn, 129 F.3d 886, 897 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original). Liability under the Clean Air Act attaches to an owner or operator of pollution, defined as any person who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises the facility being demolished or renovated or any person who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises the demolition renovation operation. 40 C.F.R. sec. 61.141. Conversely, in order for one to be classified as a leader or supervisor for purposes of an aggravating role sentencing adjustment under U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1, a defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants. U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1, cmt. (n.2)./18 Application Note Four illustrates the type of leadership and supervision the adjustment addresses: In distinguishing a leadership and organizational role from one of mere management or supervision, titles such as kingpin or boss are not controlling. Factors the court should consider include the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. There can, of course, be more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer of a criminal association or conspiracy. This adjustment does not apply to a defendant who merely suggests committing the offense. U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1, cmt. (n.4). A plain reading of the regulations relating to criminal liability under the Clean Air Act and the aggravating role adjustment guideline reveals significant differences. The sentencing adjustment does not automatically attach upon a showing of Clean Air Act liability; hence, the adjustment disregards mere titles and attaches to conduct far more culpable than merely being an owner or operator. In other words, the aggravating role adjustment addresses a defendant’s actual level of management and responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization. U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1, cmt. (n.2). Moreover, the aggravating role adjustment considers a multitude of factors that are not contemplated by the defendants’ underlying conspiracy to violate the Clean Air Act, including the recruitment of accomplices, the degree of planning or organizing, the nature and scope of the crime and the degree of control and authority exercised by the defendants. See U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1, cmt. (n.4). Accordingly, an individual who may be criminally liable as an owner or operator of pollution under the Clean Air Act, is not necessarily subject to the aggravating role adjustment; the owner or operator must independently qualify for the adjustment with conduct that is more culpable and involves a greater exercise of management responsibility than is required for mere Clean Air Act liability. Thus, because an owner or operator’s criminal liability under the Clean Air Act would not necessarily result in a sentencing adjustment for his or her aggravating role, we reject the defendants’ double counting challenge and conclude that their sentences were properly enhanced for their respective leadership and supervisory roles in the conspiracy. See also United States v. Lanzotti, Nos. 98-2728, 98-2750, 2000 WL 157484, at -5 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 2000) (rejecting a challenge that the sentencing judge double counted when it used the same conduct to establish a conspiracy offense and to justify an obstruction of justice adjustment); Senn, 129 F.3d at 897 (rejecting a double counting challenge to the captain/navigator smuggler adjustment because the bar on double counting comes into play only if the offense itself necessarily includes the same conduct as the [adjustment] (emphasis in original)).