Opinion ID: 223158
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: “We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard that governs the district court.” Lauck v. Campbell Cnty., 627 F.3d 805, 809 (10th Cir. 2010). We view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant.” Meiners v. Univ. of Kan., 359 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). I. Due Process Contrary to the district court’s conclusion Bunch contends she was entitled to a due-process hearing because she had a property interest in her employment. 5 3 Other former employees have appealed from the decisions in other cases arising from events during Prue’s 2008-2009 school year. See Cypert v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-050 (No. 10-5122); James v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-050 (No. 10-5124). 4 Bunch does not appeal from the dismissal of her state-law claims. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them after rejecting the federal claims. 5 Before the district court, Bunch alleged both procedural and substantive due process violations. The trial court decided the allegations did not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. Her brief mentions substantive due process only in passing. She has waived our review of that issue. See Therrien v. Target Corp., 617 F.3d 1242, 1253 (10th Cir. 2010). -5- Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 5-114 provides that a district treasurer serves at the pleasure of the Board of Education. Nevertheless, she claims a property right in her support-employee contract because it contains employment security provisions consistent with Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 6-101.40, which allows full-time school-district support employees to be discharged only for cause. But the district court concluded the Board did not have the power to waive or supercede § 5-114 by entering into a contract purporting to give Bunch expanded rights. We agree. More than ninety years ago, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a superintendent’s employment contract could not supercede a statute providing he served at the pleasure of the board. Farley v. Bd. of Educ., 162 P. 797, 799-801 (Okla. 1917); see also Adams v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 43, 964 P.2d 237, 238 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (holding a provision in a superintendent’s contract was void as contrary to statute). Accordingly, for substantially the reasons discussed in the district court’s order filed on August 20, 2010, Bunch had no property interest in her employment and was not entitled to a hearing before it was terminated. II. Free Speech Bunch next quarrels with the district court’s resolution of her retaliation claim, i.e., she was fired for exercising her First Amendment rights. We apply the five-step framework established by the Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), and Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968): -6- (1) whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee’s official duties; (2) whether the speech was on a matter of public concern; (3) whether the government’s interests, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff’s free speech interests; (4) whether the protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action; and (5) whether the defendant would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the protected conduct. Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 745 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). “The first three steps . . . are issues of law to be resolved by the district court, while the last two are ordinarily for the trier of fact.” Id. (quotation omitted). One basis for Bunch’s First Amendment claim was her signature on the petition for a state-court grand jury investigation. Another was her comments critical of the Board made to friends and to her father, who was also her pastor. The district court concluded her allegations were insufficient to show protected speech. The only evidence she offered of a specific public statement was her signature on the petition. With regard to that, the court decided she satisfied the first three Garcetti/Pickering steps but failed to establish her signature on the petition was a motivating factor behind the termination. Bunch tells us she “has produced sufficient evidence of statements and actions that she engaged in as [a] citizen[] relating to matters of public concern.” Aplt. Br. at 24. But the record contains only general allegations failing to identify with particularity statements or actions sufficient to satisfy her burden to -7- identify the specific instances of speech underlying her claim. See Craven v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing inadequate identification of speech in appellate argument). With regard to her alleged comments to friends and family, she did not establish the occurrence and/or the content of the speech sufficiently for the court to even begin the Garcetti/Pickering analysis. With respect to the grand jury petition, Bunch argues the fourth factor is ordinarily a jury question. She is generally correct, but summary judgment is appropriate when “there simply is no evidence in the record from which a trier of fact could reasonably conclude the [protected speech] was a motivating factor in [the plaintiff’s] termination.” Rohrbough, 596 F.3d at 750; see also Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1182, 1188-92 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming a grant of summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of causation). Bunch relies on temporal evidence – her termination followed the filing of the petition by only two months. For purposes of this decision, we assume a twomonth gap between protected activity and adverse conduct may establish a causal connection. See Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 371 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding a period of up to two to three months demonstrated causation for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case); Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (assuming a period of approximately nine weeks was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see -8- Meiners, 359 F.3d at 1231 (stating a gap of between nine weeks and three months is “probably too far apart . . . to establish causation by temporal proximity alone”). Even assuming a two-month period would be sufficient to establish the causal link, she failed to show any Board member was aware of her signature on the petition (one among more than 1,000). Because the record contains a copy of the petition, but not the signatures, it is impossible to determine whether Bunch’s signature is legible or illegible, obvious or obscured. Moreover, each of the individual defendants denied knowing that Bunch had signed it. And she admitted to never speaking to any Board member about the petition or making any other public statements critical of the Board. “[T]he proximity between a specific . . . activity and the alleged retaliatory act is meaningless unless those who caused the alleged retaliatory act to occur are shown to have been aware of the specific activity.” Hysten v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 296 F.3d 1177, 1184 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1203 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A plaintiff] must first come forward with evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that those who decided to fire him had knowledge of his protected activity.”); Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1189 (coupling “close temporal proximity” with “[a]n employer’s knowledge of the protected speech”). -9- Finally, “evidence of intervening events tend[s] to undermine any inference of retaliatory motive and weaken the causal link.” Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1189 (citation omitted). In this case, as the district court recognized, the financial investigation and the consultant’s resulting recommendation to terminate Bunch’s employment were such events. AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court Terrence L. O’Brien