Opinion ID: 2637527
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Erica argues that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over Amy. Erica's argument is based on the following circumstances. On January 29, 1999, the superior court ordered Amy committed to the division's custody for two years. Because of multiple continuances requested by both parties, the termination trial did not begin until the day custody expiredJanuary 29, 2001. At the time, none of the parties realized that the division's custody over Amy had expired. But the division soon recognized the problem. On February 21, 2001, it filed an emergency petition to adjudicate Amy a child in need of aid, and on February 26, the superior court entered an order renewing the state's custody of Amy based on a renewed finding that Amy was a child in need of aid. Meanwhile, on February 22, Erica had signed a power of attorney purporting to give her mother authority over Amy's care custody and upbringing. Erica essentially reasons that because she gave legal custody of Amy to her mother during a lapse in the state's custody, the court lacked jurisdiction to reassume custody. But Erica's power of attorney was not an assignment of legal custody; it simply gave Erica's mother authority to act in her stead in matters concerning Amy's care, custody, and upbringing. Erica cites no authority for the proposition that the document had any effect on the court's jurisdiction. Under AS 47.10.080(c), the superior court has authority to extend a two-year child-in-need-of-aid commitment for an additional year upon a showing that the extension would be in the child's best interests. [15] Nothing in the statutory grant of authority precludes the extension from being implemented after the initial two-year commitment has technically expired. Erica's jurisdictional argument thus lacks merit.