Opinion ID: 198977
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count III: Tortious Interference with Contract

Text: 68 Peters next argues that the district court erred in granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law on Count III, a claim for tortious interference with contract. The district court granted the motion, setting aside a jury verdict finding Considine and C & J liable. The issue of damages was not submitted to the jury.
69 We begin our discussion with a review of the treatment of the tortious interference claim in our previous opinion. In Ed Peters I, we reversed the previous district court's entry of a motion for judgment as a matter of law on the tortious interference count, holding instead that the count must be submitted to the jury. We laid out the elements, stating: the tortious interference claim required that Peters prove: (1) a sales-commission contract existed between Anson and Peters; (2) Fleet and Considine intentionally interfered with the sales-commission contract; and (3) their tortious actions damaged Peters. Ed Peters I, 124 F.3d at 275 (citations omitted). Considering these elements, we concluded that, there is no dispute that Fleet and Considine knew of Peters' contract to serve as Anson's sales representative to Tiffany's, or that Peters sustained damages due to the premature termination of its contract, without receiving payment for its outstanding commissions. Id. Our analysis then turned to the second and disputed element: whether Considine and C & J intentionally interfered with the sales-commission contract between Peters and Anson. See id. 70 Relying on Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1986), we held that, to prove intent, Peters need only establish that... Considine acted with legal malice - an intent to do harm without justification. Ed Peters I, 124 F.3d at 275. We pointed out that, [Considine] not only acted intentionally to evade Anson's obligation to Peters, but at the same time negotiated for himself a $200,000 consulting fee. Id. Thus, we held that the circumstantial evidence and the Considine memorandum to Fleet, 7 generated a trialworthy issue as to whether Considine acted with 'legal malice'. See id. 71 On remand, the jury returned a verdict against Considine and C & J on the count of tortious interference. The district court, however, on a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, reversed the jury's verdict.
72 The standard for review of a district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law after the jury has reached a verdict is a familiar one. As we stated in Alvarez v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1998): 73 [w]e review de novo a district court's decision to grant a motion under Rule 50 for judgment as a matter of law. When the court grants the motion and enters judgment for the movant notwithstanding the jury's verdict for the non-movant, we examine the evidence presented to the jury, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. In doing so, moreover, we may not take into consideration the credibility of the witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, or in any other manner weigh the evidence. We assume the veracity, however, of any admissions made and stipulations entered into by the party opposing the Rule 50 motion... as well as any evidence derived from disinterested witnesses that has not been contradicted or impeached. 74 (Internal citations omitted.) 75 With this standard in mind, we review the district court's entry of judgment.
76 We remanded on the question of intent. The district court overturned the jury's verdict because of lack of causation. See Ed Peters II, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 102. The district court considered the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Mesolella as having, expressly imposed upon the plaintiff the task of proving factual causation between the acts of the defendant and the damages suffered by the plaintiff. Id. The district court also held that, although causation is generally a matter left to the consideration of the jury, a court may properly intervene if the plaintiff fails to adduce more than a scintilla of evidence on this vital element of the cause of action. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Employing this standard, the district court went on to find that, EPJC's junior position among creditors and the impossibility... of any future recovery from Anson, doomed the causation element of Peters' claim. See id. This count fails as a matter of law because there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants' actions caused plaintiff any loss. Id. 77 It is a close question whether the rulings and findings of the district court violated the mandates of Ed Peters I. We need not and do not decide this question. It was neither C & J nor Considine that ended the commission contract. The contract terminated when Fleet foreclosed on the assets of Anson and left it an empty shell. Although Considine was privy to what was going on and took advantage of the foreclosure to jettison Anson and its liability to Peters, he did not tortiously interfere with the commission contract between Anson and Peters. Fleet's foreclosure ended the contract. In this sense, there was no causation.