Opinion ID: 1681690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: determining adaptive functioning

Text: Jones first argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his expert's opinion that the second prong of the mental retardation definition requires a retrospective determination of his adaptive functioning before age 18, instead of an assessment of Jones's adaptive functioning as an adult. He also contends that the trial court erred in finding that Jones did not meet this prong of the definition. We disagree. The Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional to execute a person with mental retardation; however, it left to the States the task of defining that term. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Florida defines mental retardation in pertinent part as follows: (1) As used in this section, the term mental retardation means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18. The term significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, for the purpose of this section, means performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the Department of Children and Family Services. The term adaptive behavior, for the purpose of this definition, means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community. § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added); accord Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(b) (containing the same definition). Thus, we have stated that diagnosis of mental retardation requires three findings: (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) onset of the condition before age 18. See Burns v. State, 944 So.2d 234, 245 (Fla.2006). At the hearing in this case, both Drs. Eisenstein and Suarez agreed that these three prongs must be met. Dr. Eisenstein testified, however, that the third prong  onset before age 18limits the inquiry into the second  deficient adaptive functioning. He stated that in determining whether a person experiences deficits in adaptive functioning, only the person's childhood behavior is considered. [3] To the extent that Jones argues that the statute and our rule require only a determination of a person's adaptive skills before age 18, we review the issue de novo. See Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Fla.2006) (The interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de novo standard of review.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1268, 167 L.Ed.2d 92 (2007); Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d 598, 599 (Fla.2006) (The certified conflict issue involves the interpretation of the Court's rules and is a question of law subject to de novo review.). As explained below, we find that the plain language of the statute precludes the defense expert's interpretation. The first step in determining the meaning of a statute is to examine its plain language. Koile v. State, 934 So.2d 1226, 1230 (Fla.2006). When the language is clear and unambiguous, as it is here, we have no need to resort to rules of statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent. Id. at 1230-31(citing Lee County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Jacobs, 820 So.2d 297, 303 (Fla.2002)). Further, words must be given their plain meaning and statutes should be construed to give them their full effect. Id. Both Florida law and our rule state that the exception to the death penalty applies to a defendant who is mentally retarded or has mental retardation. § 921.137(2), Fla. Stat. (stating no person may be sentenced to death if it is determined in accordance with this section that the defendant has mental retardation); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(e) (providing for an evidentiary hearing to consider the issue of whether the defendant is mentally retarded). Thus, the question is whether a defendant is mentally retarded, not whether he was. Both the statute and our rule define mental retardation as significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18. § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(b). Jones does not dispute that the intellectual functioning component must be based on current testing. Moreover, his own expert based his determination of this prong largely on testing administered between 1991 and 2005, from the time Jones was 29 to the time of the rule 3.203 hearing. What Jones argues is that the second prong is concerned solely with an individual's adaptive behavior as a child under age 18. The legal definition, however, states that the intellectual functioning component must exist[] concurrently with the deficient adaptive behavior. The word concurrent means operating or occurring at the same time. Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 239 (10th ed.2001). Jones's analysis would require us to ignore the plain meaning of the phrase existing concurrently with that links the first two components of the definition. The third prongand manifested during the period from conception to age 18  specifies that the present condition of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning and concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior must have first become evident during childhood. Further, as Jones admits, Florida's definition of mental retardation is consistent with the definition of the American Psychiatric Association, which provides the following diagnostic criteria for mental retardation: A. Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning: an IQ of approximately 70 or below on an individually administered IQ test (for infants, a clinical judgment of significantly subaverage intellectual functioning). B. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e., the person's effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or her cultural group) in at least two of the following areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety. C. The onset is before age 18 years. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 49 (4th ed. 2000) (DSM-IV). Thus, to the extent that Jones argues that the issue is not one of statutory construction but of an expert's interpretation of the DSM-IV, the argument fails as well. The DSM-IV states that the second criterion for mental retardation is  [c]oncurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning. (Emphasis added.) Dr. Eisenstein's testimony that in this phrase the word present actually refers to past, or childhood, adaptive functioning would impose an Alice-in-Wonderland definition of the word present. See Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (1872) (When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to meanneither more nor less.), quoted in Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest v. Minagorri, 675 So.2d 142, 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). First, we note that the circuit court's task in this case was to apply the law, which is contained in the statute and rule cited above. With regard to expert opinion, however, the court has discretion to accept or reject such testimony. See Evans v. State, 800 So.2d 182, 188 (Fla. 2001) (applying an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's determination of competency made after hearing conflicting expert testimony). The court rejected Dr. Eisenstein's testimony and accepted Dr. Suarez's testimony that the word present means now. Dr. Suarez testified that the second prong of Florida's definition of mental retardation and the second criterion of the DSM-IV mean the same thing. As we explained above, we agree. Further, on cross-examination Jones asked the State's expert to explain the following passage from the DSM-IV: Mental Retardation is not necessarily a lifelong disorder. Individuals who had Mild Mental Retardation earlier in their lives manifested by failure in academic learning tasks may, with appropriate training and opportunities, develop good adaptive skills in other domains and may no longer have the level of impairment required for a diagnosis of Mental Retardation. DSM-IV at 47. Dr. Suarez explained that this statement illustrates that, because mental retardation is lifelong, a child may meet the criteria for the diagnosis because of developmental delays without being mentally retarded. Unless the person also meets the criteria as an adult, the individual is not mentally retarded. Thus, diagnosis of mental retardation in an adult must be based on present or current intellectual functioning and adaptive skills and information that the condition also existed in childhood. Accordingly, the trial court accepted Dr. Suarez's interpretation of the DSM-IV, which was consistent with Florida law, and did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Dr. Eisenstein's contrary opinion. Next, Jones argues that Atkins essentially prohibits a determination of an individual's current adaptive skills if that person, like Jones, is in prison. He claims that adaptive functioning has to be determined from an individual's adaptive functioning in the outside world. To the contrary, as we stated above, the Court in Atkins left the definition and determination of mental retardation to the States. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)). Moreover, the State's expert did not base his opinion solely on his interviews with prison guards. In determining that Jones was not deficient in adaptive behavior, Dr. Suarez relied on his interview with and testing of Jones, his examination of records regarding Jones's life from his childhood to the time of the rule 3.203 hearing, and interviews and testing of DOC staffers who observed Smith on a regular basis. Thus, as Dr. Suarez admitted, while the adaptive skills test administered to DOC staff regarding Jones's adaptive functioning is not ideally suited to a prison environment, the test was not his sole source of information. Further, the evidence demonstrates that both in and out of prison, Jones understands and manages his own life. In prison, Jones follows a daily exercise regimen of his own devising and uses improvised equipment to gain, according to Jones, the benefits of health and stress relief. He understands his various medical problems, the related medication, and self-administers it on schedule. He writes requests to see doctors, specifically defining his medical problems, and suggests changes in diet or medication. He manages the finances of his inmate account, including obtaining appropriate documentation, following up on money transfers from foreign countries, and filing grievances when he finds a discrepancy in the account. He keeps himself and his cell clean and orderly and visits the prison library twice a week. His language skills in writing, speaking, and other intellectual skills are strong in light of his dropping out of school at an early age. In addition, in the outside world as a young adult from age 18 to 29 (before he committed the murders), Jones traveled alone, lived in several states, and supported himself through various jobs. He had girlfriends at various times and for several years lived with a common law wife, as he correctly termed her. Jones insists that the statements his relatives gave Dr. Eisenstein about his childhood are the only valid evidence regarding his adaptive functioning. First, as we explained above, the adaptive functioning criterion is not limited to childhood, and, second, the validity of his relatives' statements is questionable. The statements Jones's Aunt Laura apparently gave Dr. Eisenstein directly contradicted her prior testimony at Jones's penalty phase, and the court in Jones's prior postconviction hearing found his sister Pamela's and his cousin Carl's testimony not credible. Further, these statements by relatives are contradicted by the record. For example, Jones's relatives said he was a slow learner who was placed in special classes. However, his elementary school teacher testified previously that Jones was a good student, who was in regular classes and earned good grades. Jones's school records support her statement. The record shows that Jones's failing grades in junior high coincide with his disciplinary problems and lack of effort. In addition, Jones's own detailed statements about his childhood contradict his relatives' statements. Finally, Jones argues that the circuit court erred in finding that Jones does not suffer from deficiencies in adaptive functioning. As illustrated by the foregoing discussion, competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination. See Trotter v. State, 932 So.2d 1045, 1049 (Fla.2006) (finding that competent, substantial evidence support[ed] circuit court's determination that Trotter was not mentally retarded).