Opinion ID: 3150212
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Restrictions Short of Detention

Text: The government also argues that the district court erred in “determin[ing] that IJs are required to consider the use of alternatives to detention in making bond determinations.” As the district court’s order states, however, IJs “should already be considering restrictions short of incarceration.” Indeed, Rodriguez II affirmed a preliminary injunction that directed IJs to “release each Subclass member on reasonable conditions of supervision, including electronic monitoring if necessary, unless the government” satisfied its burden of justifying continued detention. 715 F.3d at 1131 (emphasis added). The government’s objections to this requirement are unpersuasive. First, the government relies on Demore for the proposition that the government is not required “to employ the least burdensome means” of securing immigration detainees. Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. But Demore applies only to “brief period[s]” of immigration detention. Id. at 513, 523. “When the period of detention becomes prolonged, ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action’ is more substantial; greater procedural safeguards are therefore required.” Diouf II, 634 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Mathews, 424 RODRIGUEZ V. ROBBINS 53 U.S. at 335). Further, the injunction does not require that IJs apply the least restrictive means of supervision; it merely directs them to “consider” restrictions short of detention. The IJ ultimately must decide whether any restrictions short of detention would further the government’s interest in continued detention. Second, the government argues that IJs are not empowered to impose conditions of release. However, federal regulations authorize IJs to “detain the alien in custody, release the alien, and determine the amount of bond, if any, under which the respondent may be released” and to “ameliorat[e] the conditions” of release imposed by DHS. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1). Accordingly, if DHS detains a noncitizen, an IJ is already empowered to “ameliorat[e] the conditions” by imposing a less restrictive means of supervision than detention.16 Finally, the government argues that IJs lack the resources to engage in continuous monitoring of released individuals. However, the government fails to cite any law or evidence indicating that IJs, rather than DHS or ICE agents, would be responsible for implementing the conditions of release. Moreover, the record indicates that Congress authorized and funded an ICE alternatives-to-detention program in 2002, and DHS has operated such a program, called the Intensive Supervision and Appearance Program, since 2004. It is 16 The authorities the government cites provide no support for this argument. One discusses DHS officers’ authority to impose conditions of release and allows IJs to “ameliorat[e] those conditions,” see 8 C.F.R. § 236.1; the other provides only that IJs may not grant relief from removal for the purpose of fulfilling the United States’ treaty obligations, see In re G-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 88, 93 (BIA 2013). 54 RODRIGUEZ V. ROBBINS abundantly clear that IJs can and do17 consider conditions of release on bond when determining whether the government’s interests can be served by detention only, and we conclude that DHS will administer any such conditions, regardless of whether they are imposed by DHS in the first instance or by an IJ upon later review.