Opinion ID: 442874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Harboring Conviction Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1071

Text: 37 Conviction under the harboring statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1071, requires proof of four essential elements. First, proof that a federal warrant had been issued for the fugitive's arrest. Second, that the Appellant had knowledge that a warrant had been issued for Lewis's arrest. Third, that the Appellant actually harbored or concealed Lewis. Finally, that Appellant intended to prevent Lewis's discovery or arrest. Appellant claims that the government failed to satisfy three of these required elements. 38 Appellant correctly points out in his brief that the government must prove the issuance of a warrant as an essential element of its case under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1071. Appellant claims that the government established the issuance of the warrant through inadmissible hearsay and therefore failed to establish an essential element of its case against him. We find this contention to be without merit. While the warrant itself was not introduced into evidence, Agent Calhoon testified that as a result of his own investigation he determined that Lewis had escaped from death row of the Florida State Penitentiary and was wanted for unlawful flight to avoid confinement for the crime of murder. While it certainly would have been desirable to have introduced the warrant itself into evidence, we find that the existence of the warrant was properly placed before the jury. 39 Turning next to the requirement of knowledge of a federal warrant, it is well established that the government may prove knowledge of a warrant by inference. See United States v. Hogg, 670 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (4th Cir.1982); United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073, 97 S.Ct. 810, 50 L.Ed.2d 790 (1977); United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83, 84 (2d Cir.1961). It is equally well established that in considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we are bound to view it in the light most favorable to the government. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Sherman, 421 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 914, 90 S.Ct. 1717, 26 L.Ed.2d 78 (1970). 40 Cases considering the knowledge requirement have fallen into three categories. In the first, there has been direct evidence that the defendant was aware that a warrant had been issued for the capture of the fugitive. See, e.g., United States v. Hash, 688 F.2d 49, 52 (8th Cir.1982); United States v. Arguelles, 594 F.2d 109, 111 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 860, 100 S.Ct. 124, 62 L.Ed.2d 81 (1979). The second category has inferred knowledge from the very act of harboring itself. See, e.g., United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83, 84-85 (2d Cir.1961). In the final category, the actions of the defendant have been found insufficient to impute the knowledge of a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Hogg, 670 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (4th Cir.1982). 41 This case falls in the middle group. There was sufficient evidence before the jury for them to infer that Silva was aware that a warrant had been issued for Lewis's arrest. Mrs. Steinhorst testified that shortly after Lewis's escape she, the fugitive, and Silva sat and watched a news report detailing Lewis's escape. Thus, Silva was certainly aware that Lewis had recently escaped from prison. As someone who had served time himself, we find no injustice in inferring that Silva was aware that warrants generally issue for the recapture of escaped prisoners. While Silva's conduct at this stage cannot be considered violative of the statute, since no warrant had yet issued, it is certainly relevant regarding his state of mind. 42 Conduct after the issuance of the warrant establishes an inference that Silva knew a warrant had been issued. For no apparent reason, Silva traveled from Jacksonville to Santee, crossing two state lines, and then felt it necessary to check into a motel under an assumed name. Silva then used a pay telephone to call the house where Lewis was hiding, shortly after which Lewis appeared at the motel. Upon Lewis's arrival at the motel Lewis told Silva, They are looking for me with a description of clean shaven. I'm trying to grow a beard. (emphasis added). Silva was already well prepared to aid Lewis in his efforts to evade them. The Appellant was found in possession of wigs and other materials for making a disguise, as well as two handguns. The jury could reasonably infer that these materials were for Lewis's benefit, for the fugitive inquired what Silva had brought him. These statements were overheard by the FBI agents in the next room. Silva was clearly aware that someone was pursuing Lewis, and we find a strong inference that he knew this was the law. See United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir.1976) (harboring conviction affirmed where third party told fugitive, in defendant's presence, I don't think they are going to be looking for you, because everybody is looking for Hearst.). Silva's covert actions are certainly not the acts of one trying to help an innocent friend. They reek of an attempt to deceive the law. We accordingly find that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Silva possessed the requisite knowledge that a federal warrant had been issued for Lewis's arrest. 43 The next question raised on appeal is whether Silva actually harbored and concealed Lewis as those terms have been defined under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1071. Congress's use of these terms is indicative that it did not intend to proscribe all forms of aid to a fugitive. United States v. Foy, 416 F.2d 940, 941 (7th Cir.1969); United States v. Shapiro, 113 F.2d 891, 892-93 (2d Cir.1940) (predecessor statute). Supplying financial assistance to the fugitive has been held not to rise to the level of harboring or concealing. Id. Nor has the failure to disclose the fugitive's location been so construed. United States v. Foy, supra. False statements to law enforcement officers regarding contact with the fugitive have also been found to lie without the scope of the statute. United States v. Magness, 456 F.2d 976, 978 (9th Cir.1972). What is generally required to make out a violation of the statute is any physical act of providing assistance, including food, shelter, and other assistance to aid the prisoner in avoiding detection and apprehension. United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073, 97 S.Ct. 810, 50 L.Ed.2d 790 (1977) (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1072 case). 44 Here we find the sort of active conduct which will make out a violation of the harboring statute. Silva had rented a motel room under an assumed name, at which the fugitive appeared with his possessions after being telephoned by Silva. From this evidence the jury was certainly entitled to draw an inference that the fugitive was to stay with Silva. This is the type of active conduct which indicates concealment. See United States v. Whitman, 480 F.2d 1028, 1030 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026, 94 S.Ct. 453, 38 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973); United States v. Thornton, 178 F.Supp. 42, 43 (E.D.N.Y.1959). Silva was also in possession of guns and disguises which the jury might have inferred were for the fugitive's benefit. This is clearly the type of assistance which would aid a fugitive in avoiding detection and apprehension. 45 Appellant makes much of the fact that he and the fugitive were together in the motel room for only five minutes before the FBI entered. His contention appears to be that this is insufficient time for one to engage in the acts of harboring or concealing proscribed by the statute. But Appellant's conduct in this case had been well planned over the space of several days. He had been with the escapee on the day of the escape, and there was evidence that Lewis had attempted to contact him during his flight from the law. It was certainly not mere happenstance that the two met again. This time the fugitive had been furtively deposited at the motel, after a telephone call by Appellant. Lewis knew exactly which room to go to and inquired what did you bring me? The meeting was the end product of a well thought out plan to elude the FBI agents pursuing the fugitive. That they spent only a few moments in each other's presence is irrelevant. Had the FBI waited several hours to establish the contact between Appellant and the fugitive which Appellant claims is necessary, they would have risked their escape.