Opinion ID: 152639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preemption and the Alleged Waiver of Efficacy Jurisdiction

Text: We first briefly address an overarching contention of Plaintiffs. They insist that there can be no FIFRA preemption of any form of crop damage claim because Congress granted the EPA authority to waive its jurisdiction over pesticide efficacy issues, [7] and the EPA has opted in favor of exercising that authority. It follows, in Plaintiffs' view, that there is no federal regulation of product efficacy and, accordingly, no preemption. We cannot agree for a number of reasons. First, this case does not involve the efficacy of AG600. Plaintiffs do not allege that it fails to perform in the manner intended with respect to targeted pests; rather, they complain about plant damage, which in FIFRA terminology is damage to the environment. 7 U.S.C. § 136(j) (The term `environment' includes ... all plants....); 40 C.F.R. § 158.130(e)(1) (The information required to assess hazards to nontarget organisms is derived from tests to determine pesticidal effects on ... plants.); Kuiper v. Am. Cyanamid, 131 F.3d 656, 664 (7th Cir.1997) (concluding that corn is a plant and falls within this definition); Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Serv., Inc., 22 Cal.4th 316, 93 Cal. Rptr.2d 36, 993 P.2d 366, 375 (2000) (stating that with regard to crop damage claims, the EPA's waiver of the submission of efficacy data is irrelevant, since plaintiffs complain of phytotoxicity, not inefficacy). Moreover, Congress did not authorize the EPA to waive its jurisdiction over efficacy issues, and the EPA has not done so. The authority referred to ( see footnote 7, supra ) is authority only to waive data requirements pertaining to efficacy when passing on an application for initial registration of a pesticide. If there is cause for concern about crop damage, initially or thereafter, the EPA will respond by requiring additional data and, if appropriate, changes in label warnings. [8] It is thus not the case that the EPA no longer regulates efficacy. Finally, we held when this case was first before us, based upon Bates, that Plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claim was preempted if it imposed a labeling requirement different from or in addition to the labeling requirement imposed by FIFRA. Plaintiffs' broad sweeping waiver of efficacy jurisdiction argument is inconsistent with that holding and, accordingly, with the law of the case.