Opinion ID: 1094104
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Lambert

Text: In Lambert, the Supreme Court held that a Los Angeles municipal ordinance similar to the statute in the instant case was unconstitutional because it violated the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 227, 78 S.Ct. 240. The Los Angeles ordinance required people previously convicted of a felony to register with the chief of police. Id. If the person remained in Los Angeles for more than five days without registering, the person was deemed to have violated the registration law and was subject to criminal penalties. Id. at 227, 78 S.Ct. 240. The defendant in the case had lived in Los Angeles for seven years and the Court assume[d] that [she] had no actual knowledge of the requirement that she register under this ordinance, as she offered proof of this defense which was refused. Id. The Court recognized that lawmakers had wide latitude ... to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition. Id. at 228, 78 S.Ct. 240. Although the Court recognized the legal maxim that ignorance of the law will not excuse, it also stressed that due process places limits on the exercise of this maxim. Id. The Court distinguished the registration statute because it dealt with conduct that is wholly passivemere failure to register. Id. The Court noted that in such circumstances notice of the requirements to register was essential to the concept of due process. Id. (Notice is required in a myriad of situations where a penalty or forfeiture might be suffered for mere failure to act.). Ultimately, the Court held that where there is no notice of the duty to register, due process does not allow a conviction for failing to register: We believe that actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply are necessary before a conviction under the ordinance can stand. As Holmes wrote in The Common Law, A law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for that community to bear. Id., at 50. Its severity lies in the absence of an opportunity either to avoid the consequences of the law or to defend any prosecution brought under it. Where a person did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process. Were it otherwise, the evil would be as great as it is when the law is written in print too fine to read or in a language foreign to the community. Id. at 229-30, 78 S.Ct. 240. Like the U.S. Supreme Court and the Fourth District, we reach a similar conclusion here.