Opinion ID: 2778011
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionally Protected Expression

Text: Alangcas contends that HRS § 707-756 affects the first amendment right to freedom of expression. - 25 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER The First Amendment and article I, § 4 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution prohibit the enactment of any law that abridges freedom of speech.17 However, when the scienter requirement of a statute sufficiently limits criminal culpability to reach only conduct outside the protection of the First Amendment, legitimate speech is not endangered. United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, criminal sexual conduct, such as when the prosecution can prove that “one of the parties . . . intended to target a minor for criminal sexual activity,” “does not enjoy First Amendment protection.” United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 722 (9th Cir. 2004). In Dhingra and Meek, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed 18 USC § 2422(b),18 a federal anti-enticement 17 The U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. U.S. Const. amend. I. The Hawaiʻi Constitution provides as follows: No law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Haw. Const. art. I, § 4. 18 The federal law provides, Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (continued. . .) - 26 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER provision similar to HRS § 707-756. The Ninth Circuit held that “no . . . legitimate speech [is] jeopardized by § 2422 because the statute only criminalizes conduct, i.e. the targeted inducement of minors for illegal sexual activity.” Meek, 366 F.3d at 721; see also Dhingra, 371 F.3d at 561. The court noted that speech is not protected when it is “merely the vehicle through which a pedophile ensnares the victim.” Meek, 366 F.3d at 721 (citing United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275, 1278 (2d Cir. 1990)). “Because persuading [a minor] to engage in . . . sexual acts for which a person could be charged with a criminal offense comes closer to incitement than it does to general advocacy, the statute does not run afoul of the First Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “inducement of minors to engage in illegal sexual activity enjoys no First Amendment protection.”19 Id. (. . .continued) knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006). 19 See also United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he statute punishes the act of enticing or attempting to entice a minor when it is knowingly done; it does not implicate speech.”); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 473 (3d Cir. 2006) (“There is no First Amendment right to persuade minors to engage in illegal sex acts.”); United States v. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Defendant simply does not have a First Amendment right to attempt to persuade minors to engage in illegal sexual acts.”); United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, (continued. . .) - 27 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Meek also noted, “The potential for unconstitutional chilling of legitimate speech disappears because § 2422(b) requires the prosecution to prove that a defendant actually knows or believes that the specific target of the inducement is a minor.” Id. at 722. The statute required “the defendant to know or believe that the person whom he seeks to induce into sexual activity is a minor, § 2422(b) does not infringe on legitimate speech between adults.” Id.; see also United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 2422(b) “only affects those who intend to target minors”). State courts have come to the same conclusion that comparable electronic enticement statutes do not implicate freedom of expression because the laws only criminalize speech that is intended to entice a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.20 (. . .continued) 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Speech attempting to arrange the sexual abuse of children is no more constitutionally protected than speech attempting to arrange any other type of crime.”); United States v. Hite, 896 F. Supp. 2d 17, 22 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Section 2422(b) does not criminalize protected speech as a means to prohibit certain conduct, it directly prohibits certain conduct.”). 20 See, e.g., Moore v. State, 298 P.3d 209, 215 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013) (“In the present case, the online enticement statute is primarily focused on speech that is intended to induce a minor to engage in otherwise prohibited sexual activities.”); People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 194 (Ct. App. 2000) (upholding a prohibition of enticement of minors, and stating, “The only chilling effect of the statute is on the conduct of those who would use otherwise protected speech to seduce minors.”); Lopez v. State, 757 S.E.2d 436, 441 (Ga. 2014), cert. denied (Sept. 22, 2014) (holding that a communication for the purpose of seducing or enticing a child so that the defendant can commit an act of child molestation is not unconstitutional); State v. Blankenship, 415 S.W.3d 116, 121 (Mo. 2013) (holding that (continued. . .) - 28 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER In this case, HRS § 707-756 requires proof of three conduct elements: (1) a communication with the Minor through the use of a computer or other electronic device, (2) an agreement to meet the Minor, and (3) traveling to the agreed place at the agreed time. Additionally, HRS § 707-756 contains a clear scienter requirement; in order to commit the offense, the agreement to meet must be made with the “intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony.” HRS § 707-756(1)(b). The “felonious intent ensures that the defendant has a culpable state of mind at the time [the defendant] entices the child into meeting; and requiring that the defendant travel to an agreedupon meeting place at an agreed-upon meeting time ensures that an individual is prosecuted only in situations where [the defendant’s] behavior poses an actual physical threat to the child.” McKnight, 131 Hawaiʻi at 389, 319 P.3d at 308. Thus, HRS § 707-756 solely affects conduct in which a person has a felonious intent at the time a meeting is arranged with the Minor and thereafter the person travels to the meeting (. . .continued) defendant’s speech was an integral part of his attempt to induce a child for the purpose of engaging in a sexual performance and was not constitutionally protected); State v. Rung, 774 N.W.2d 621, 630 (Neb. 2009) (holding that the state law “targets only speech used for the purpose of enticing a child to engage in illegal sexual conduct, and . . . such speech is not protected by the First Amendment”); Arganbright v. State, 328 P.3d 1212, 1220-21 (Okla. 2014) (upholding a prohibition on communications with minors that are likely to result in sexual exploitation or sexual abuse as a permissible restriction on speech). - 29 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER place at the agreed upon meeting time. The statute only criminalizes speech when it is employed to arrange a meeting with a Minor with the intent to promote or facilitate commission of a felony. Since HRS § 707-756 does not implicate the freedoms of expression guaranteed under the First Amendment or article I, § 4 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution, Alangcas’ overbreadth challenge on that basis fails.