Opinion ID: 1179958
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Heading: Right to Sue Under the Hawaii Constitution

Text: The State argues that, because the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Admission Act creates no private implied right of action, there can be no private right of action to enforce the terms of the § 5(f) trust under Hawaii law. See Keaukaha I, 588 F.2d 1216 (1978). We disagree. We have held, in a variety of contexts, that this court is not precluded from finding that the Hawaii Constitution affords greater protection than required by similar federal constitutional or statutory provisions. See, e.g., State v. Kam, 69 Haw. 483, 748 P.2d 372 (1988); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Lyman, 68 Haw. 55, 704 P.2d 888 (1985); State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985); and State v. Russo, 67 Haw. 126, 681 P.2d 553 (1984), appeal after remand, 69 Haw. 72, 734 P.2d 156 (1987). First, we review the grounds for the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Keaukaha I. In reaching its conclusion that the Admission Act does not imply a private cause of action, the court analyzed the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rail Passenger Service Act which permits suits by the United States Attorney General, or in some cases, railroad employees. Keaukaha I, 588 F.2d at 1220-21 (citing, inter alia, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974)). The Supreme Court held that because the Rail Act creates only a public cause of action and a narrow private cause of action, the legislature intended these to provide the exclusive remedies. Id. This presumption of an exclusive remedy, known as the expressio unius principle, yields to both legislative intent and the effectuation of the purposes of a statute. Id. at 1221 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit also applied the four factors articulated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), to the Admission Act. The first element, that plaintiff is a member of the `class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,' was met. Id. at 1223. The second element, an indication of explicit or implicit legislative intent, was found to be lacking  the court applied the expressio unius presumption [16] and noted the unusual use of a state's admission act to create a right to sue. Id. at 1223. The third element, consistency with the underlying statutory scheme, was thought to be a close question, but was found not to support a private cause of action because the court saw no federal purpose to be served by reading a private cause of action into the Admission Act. Id. at 1224. The fourth element, whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to the States, in an area basically the concern of the States, was easily concluded to militate against implying a private right to sue. Id. at 1222, 1224. As we noted earlier, the court found that action to be a matter of state concern and held it to be most appropriate for Hawaii's laws and judicial system to deal with it. Id. at 1224. We are of the view that, while these reasons were compelling in the context of the enforceability of a federal statute, they do not support a similar finding with respect to the enforcement of article XII, § 4 of the Hawaii Constitution. Cf. Huihui v. Shimoda, 64 Haw. 527, 531, 644 P.2d 968, 971 (1982) ([I]t is our obligation to interpret and enforce the state constitution as the highest court of this sovereign state `not in total disregard of federal interpretations..., but with reference to the wisdom of adopting these interpretations for our state.'). Article XII, § 4 was added to the Hawaii Constitution to expressly recognize the trust purposes and trust beneficiaries of the § 5(f) trust, clarifying that the State's trust obligations extend beyond the Hawaiian Homes Land Trust. See Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 59, Constitutional Convention of 1978, 2-3. And, despite the Ninth Circuit's findings that no purpose would be served by allowing private enforcement of the ceded land trust in federal court, we find that protecting the res of the public lands trust, thereby enforcing the mandates of our constitution, is appropriate in our state courts. This consideration undermines the argument that access to an enforcement remedy for breach of trust should be held exclusively by the United States Attorney General. We are also guided by our earlier decisions concerning lands held in public trust. In Kapiolani Park Preservation Society v. City & County of Honolulu, 69 Haw. 569, 751 P.2d 1022 (1989), we held that members of the public, as trust beneficiaries, could sue to prevent the trustee, a government agency, from disposing of trust lands through leases or deeds in contravention of the terms of a charitable trust. [17] In Kapiolani Park, the court found that: (1) a government agency (the City) was the trustee of a public charitable trust; (2) the trustee did not file periodic accountings; (3) the trustee would not seek instructions of the court as to its duties; (4) a genuine controversy existed as to the trustee's power to enter into the lease transaction; and (5) the attorney general, as parens patriae, chose to support the City's actions, abandoning the defense of the possible rights of the public. Id. at 572, 751 P.2d at 1025. Under those circumstances, we held that unless members of the public could bring the matter to the attention of the court, the citizens of this State would be left without protection, or a remedy ... [and] the City, with the concurrence of the attorney general, would be free to dispose, by lease or deed, of all, or part of, the trust comprising Kapiolani Park, as it chose, without the citizens of the City and State having any recourse to the courts. Id. Although the case before us involves the ceded lands trust, rather than a charitable trust, the parallels are unmistakable. [18] Here, we have a situation where the agency charged with the administration of a trust held for the benefit of native Hawaiians and members of the public has purportedly disposed of trust assets in violation of trust provisions and, if we were to adopt the position of the State, no one in the State of Hawaii would have the right to bring the matter before Hawaii's courts. As we said in Kapiolani Park, [s]uch a result is contrary to all principles of equity and shocking to the conscience of the court. Id. at 573, 751 P.2d at 1025. Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether we can now review the State's consummated acts, we are of the firm conviction that our courts must be available to the citizens of Hawaii to avert such a purported breach of public trust. We find that the actions of state officials, acting in their official capacities, should not be invulnerable to constitutional scrutiny. Article XII, § 4 imposes a fiduciary duty on Hawaii's officials to hold ceded lands in accordance with the § 5(f) trust provisions, and the citizens of the state must have a means to mandate compliance. This is not to say, however, that article XII, § 4 creates a waiver of sovereign immunity such that money damages are available. See Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 604 P.2d 1198 (1979) (although a constitutional provision establishes enforceable rights or duties, it does not necessarily create a waiver of sovereign immunity). Nevertheless, as discussed in the following section, sovereign immunity may not always provide a defense for state officials when their actions are attacked as being unconstitutional. See, e.g., W.H. Greenwell, Ltd. v. Department of Land and Natural Resources, 50 Haw. 207, 209, 436 P.2d 527 (1968). Thus, we hold that PDF, whose members are beneficiaries of the trust, may bring suit for the limited purpose of enjoining state officials' breach of trust by disposal of trust assets in violation of the Hawaii constitutional and statutory provisions governing the public lands trust.