Opinion ID: 1150904
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Should the judge have recused himself after reading the presentence report?

Text: Defendant argues that the trial judge could not impartially sentence defendant because he read the presentence report, which defendant states is misleading and prejudicial. Further, defendant argues that it is unrealistic to think that the trial judge could read the presentence report, refer to it only during the sentencing phase for the non-murder convictions, and not consider it for sentencing on the murder convictions. Therefore, the trial judge should have recused himself or been removed for cause. [2] We do not agree. Defendant filed a rule 10.1 motion for a change of judge for cause prior to the sentencing hearing. See 17 A.R.S.Ariz. R.Crim.P., rule 10.1. Judge Jack Arnold heard arguments from both sides concerning whether another judge should be appointed for sentencing because Judge Scholl read the presentence report and presided over the separate trials of defendant and codefendant. In making his ruling, Judge Arnold stated: One of the duties of a judge and one of the responsibilities of a judge is to sort out relevant and irrelevant things, things that are probative and non-probative and make a fair decision. And I believe that when it is called to Judge Scholl's attention that he can address the problem in a judicial manner and make a fair and unbiased decision; if he can't do so, knowing Judge Scholl, he will announce that fact. R.T. 5-19-89 at 13. This court has held that a judge shall not be removed absent a showing of bias or prejudice. State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 548, 804 P.2d 72, 81 (1990) (defendant did not present evidence of bias or prejudice due to trial judge's reading the presentence report prior to sentencing); State v. McCall, 160 Ariz. 119, 129-30, 770 P.2d 1165, 1175-76 (1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3289, 111 L.Ed.2d 798 (1990) (trial judge is presumed to be free of bias or prejudice); State v. McMurtrey, 151 Ariz. 105, 108, 726 P.2d 202, 205 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911, 107 S.Ct. 1359, 94 L.Ed.2d 530 (1987) (judge not subject to removal by reason of having previously sentenced defendant, absent a showing of bias or prejudice); State v. Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312, 317, 666 P.2d 57, 62, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986, 104 S.Ct. 435, 78 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983) (defendant is entitled to impartial judge but not one totally ignorant of previous proceedings). Moreover, there is no per se disqualification of a sentencing trial judge who presides over a codefendant's trial. State v. Thompson, 150 Ariz. 554, 557, 724 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Ct.App. 1986). It is generally conceded that the bias and prejudice necessary to disqualify a judge must arise from an extra-judicial source and not from what the judge has done in his participation in the case. Smith v. Smith, 115 Ariz. 299, 303, 564 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App. 1977) (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966)). The party seeking a judge's recusal must prove that the trial judge was biased or prejudiced by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Perkins, 141 Ariz. 278, 286, 686 P.2d 1248, 1256 (1984). Reviewing the record in its entirety, we do not find that defendant proved bias or prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence. We find no error in Judge Scholl's refusal to recuse himself or in Judge Arnold's refusal to disqualify Judge Scholl from sentencing defendant. Defendant further claims that the trial judge stated he was considering everything in the presentence report. Therefore, defendant argues that the trial judge considered victim impact statements, which the United States Supreme Court held inadmissible at capital sentencing hearings. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987). The United States Supreme Court, however, recently overruled Booth's holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the use and admission of victim impact statements at a capital sentencing hearing. Payne v. Tennessee, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). The Court stated: [I]f the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar. A state may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. There is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence is treated. Payne, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d at 736. Booth dealt with jury sentencing, whereas in Arizona the trial judge determines whether the penalty shall be life imprisonment or death. Beaty, 158 Ariz. at 244, 762 P.2d at 531. A.R.S. § 13-703. Booth is, therefore, inapplicable in Arizona because a trial judge can set aside irrelevant, inflammatory and emotional factors. Defendant asks that we reconsider and overrule Beaty as it refers to the Booth rationale. We decline to do so. Judge Scholl specifically stated that he was considering the factors presented at the aggravation-mitigation hearing only as to counts one and two, the murder convictions. He further stated that as far as aggravating factors as to the other counts, the court is considering everything that was in the presentence report. We find that Judge Scholl, for purposes of aggravation, properly considered the presentence report as to all counts except for the murder counts and, as A.R.S. § 13-702(F) and (G) allow, he validly considered the victim impact statements in the presentence report when he sentenced defendant on the other counts. [3]