Opinion ID: 1925667
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is the Johnston School Committee a Department of the Town?

Text: Despite the legislative validation of sec. 6-4, the school committee maintains that this provision of the town charter does not affect its right to retain independent legal counsel because it is not a department of the town. Conversely, the town argues that although the charter does not explicitly refer to it as such, the school committee nevertheless is a department of the town government that is encompassed within the ambit of sec. 6-4. To support this position, the town notes that in Cummings v. Godin, 119 R.I. 325, 330, 377 A.2d 1071, 1073 (1977), we held that although school committees act as agents of the state, they are not state agencies but municipal bodies. In Cummings, a school teacher argued that a home rule provision prohibiting city employees from holding any elective office did not preclude his candidacy for state senate. The teacher maintained that he was not an employee of the city, but rather an agent of the state, because the state constitution mandates that education is a matter of state responsibility. We disagreed, and held that school committees, although exercising a portion of the state's power over education, are, nonetheless, municipal bodies, and their employees    are municipal employees. Cummings, 119 R.I. at 330, 377 A.2d at 1073. We noted that the teacher [was] employed by a department of the city which is supported by the taxpayers of that city, and he receives his paycheck from the city. Id. at 331, 377 A.2d at 1074. [5] (Emphasis added.) After Cummings, this Court again had occasion to consider the effect of a home rule charter on the rights of a school committee. See Coventry School Committee v. Richtarik, 122 R.I. 707, 411 A.2d 912 (1980). Like the case before us now, the charter provision in Richtarik set forth the town solicitor's responsibilities as legal representative of the town. It stated in pertinent part: (1) `The town solicitor shall serve as chief legal advisor to the council and to the town manager; (2) `[t]he town solicitor shall appear for and protect the rights of the town in all actions, suits, or proceedings, civil or criminal, in law or equity, brought by or against it, or for or against any of its departments, offices or agencies, including the council, the manager and the school committee; (3) `[t]he town solicitor shall also perform such other duties, appropriate to his office, as the council and the manager may require; (4) `[t]he town solicitor shall examine and approve the form of all ordinances and resolutions, of all invitations to bid, contracts, and other legal documents issued by any department, office or agency of the town; (5) `[a]ll written opinions of the town solicitor furnished to the council, the manager, and all departments, offices and agencies of the town shall be filed with the town clerk and shall become a public record.' Id. at 711-12, 411 A.2d at 914 (quoting relevant portion of Coventry Town Charter). We interpreted the charter provision in Richtarik, which had been legislatively ratified, to require that the town solicitor serve as the school committee's sole source of legal representation. The defendants attempt to distinguish Richtarik from the present case by noting that the Coventry charter provision made explicit reference to the school committee. A closer reading of Richtarik reveals, however, that this distinction was not critical to our holding in that case. Citing subsection (2) of the applicable charter provision, the trial justice ruled that the Coventry solicitor was responsible for representing the school committee in litigation, but that the committee was free to seek legal advice elsewhere with respect to non-litigation matters because the other subsections of the charter provision were silent on the subject. On appeal, this Court disagreed with the trial justice's reasoning and interpretation of the charter provisions. We explained that the limited advisory role given the solicitor by the trial justice is completely at odds with and effectively nullifies the mandate concerning the solicitor's written opinions, which are to be given to all `departments, offices, and agencies of the town.' [6] In addition, subsection (2) of the charter provision specifically referred to the school committee as a town department. When we decided Richtarik, we reiterated our reasoning in Cummings, that school committees are not `state agencies' because they act only on matters of local concern; and    although the committees exercise a portion of the state's power in the field of education, they are nonetheless `municipal bodies' and their employees `municipal employees.' Richtarik, 122 R.I. at 714, 411 A.2d at 915. We also held that even though the portion of the town charter that delineated the solicitor's advisory role did not refer explicitly to the school committee, the document was to be interpreted so that the solicitor's office would serve as the sole source of legal assistance for all the various municipal boards, departments, and agencies, including the school committee. Thus, the Coventry School Committee lacked the authority to retain its own counsel. We fail to see any meaningful distinction between the charter provision in Richtarik and the one at issue here. Like the Coventry Town Charter, sec. 6-4 of the Johnston Town Charter has been ratified by the Legislature and requires the town solicitor to provide legal services to all    departments, offices and agencies of the town. We interpreted this language in Richtarik as requiring that the school committee be represented by the town solicitor. Moreover, it is clear from our analysis in Richtarik that we relied heavily on this Court's rationale in Cummings, in which we defined school departments as municipal bodies. We see no reason to depart from this reasoning. We therefore are not persuaded by the defendants' attempt to distinguish Richtarik from the case before us on the ground that the Coventry Town Charter referred explicitly to the school committee while the Johnston Town Charter does not. We hold that sec. 6-4 of the Johnston Town Charter, which requires the town solicitor to represent all    departments, offices and agencies of the town, applies to the school committee and prohibits it from retaining independent legal counsel, unless, as will be described below, the town solicitor is unable to represent the school committee because of ethical considerations.