Opinion ID: 2617828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Trial Court's Decision to Add to the State's List of Aggravating Circumstances and to Deny Lankford's Motion For Continuance.

Text: Lankford claims that the trial court abused its discretion and interfered with his right to counsel when it denied his motion for a continuance to prepare for previously undisclosed aggravating factors which the trial court added to the prosecution's proposed list of factors. The two factors added were factors enumerated in I.C. § 19-2515(g)(2) (commission of multiple murders) and I.C. § 19-2515(g)(7) (felony murder accompanied with the specific intent to cause the death of a human being). While a decision to grant or deny a continuance generally rests within the discretion of the trial judge, the discretion is abused when it results in the abridgment of the accused's right to counsel. State v. Brown, 98 Idaho 209, 560 P.2d 880 (1977). In essence, Lankford's argument is that defense counsel had no prior notice that the trial court was going to add two aggravating factors to the list presented by the prosecutor and that lack of notice, combined with the trial court's denial of his motion for a continuance, effectively abridged Lankford's right to counsel, thereby violating his rights under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and his rights under art. I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Since the Idaho statute supplies the two subject aggravating factors, the district judge was required to give them consideration if circumstances were proven to support them. This Court has acknowledged that I.C. § 19-2515(f) (1987) gives fully sufficient notice of the circumstances under which the death penalty may be imposed and of the prerequisites governing such sentence. State v. Bryan Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 747 P.2d 710 (1987). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2961, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (wherein the court held that a statute gives fair warning of capital liability for an aider and abettor); and Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 298, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2300, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), wherein the court held that the existence [of a death penalty statute] on the statute books provides fair warning as to the degree of culpability which the state ascribes to the act of murder). In light of both Idaho and United States Supreme Court rulings, the fact that the aggravating circumstances are documented in I.C. § 19-2515(f) provided Lankford with the requisite notice. Not only do the statutes provide sufficient notice of aggravating circumstances, but Idaho's sentencing system provides that the judge, not the prosecuting attorney, is responsible for sentencing. State v. Bryan Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 747 P.2d 710, State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983) cert. den., 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1327, 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984). Because Idaho provides for judge sentencing, a prosecuting attorney's sentencing recommendations are to be viewed as just that, mere recommendations. The trial judge makes the final decision as to what will be and will not be considered in sentencing. Finally, I.C. § 19-2515(d) provides that [e]vidence admitted at trial shall be considered and need not be repeated at the sentencing hearing. Lankford had notice of all possible aggravating circumstances and that the judge could properly utilize any or all of them during sentencing. Thus, we find no error and affirm the trial court on this issue.