Opinion ID: 1774087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the most recent proceedings

Text: In 1994, Lightbourne filed his most recent rule 3.850 motion based upon the affidavits of Carson and Larry Emanuel, also incarcerated with Lightbourne prior to his trial, alleging that these affidavits established Brady, Henry and Giglio [10] violations or, in the alternative, constituted newly discovered evidence that would probably produce a different result on retrial. In his affidavit, Carson claimed that he had testified falsely in Lightbourne's trial under pressure from the State. This statement was consistent with Chavers' previous affidavit. To corroborate Carson's claims, Lightbourne also included an affidavit by Emanuel, who had not testified at Lightbourne's trial, but who had been incarcerated with Lightbourne at the same time as Carson and Chavers. Emanuel swore in his affidavit that he had been solicited by police to testify against Lightbourne and that the other guys in the cell were also promised leniency on their charges for testimony against Lightbourne. Emanuel stated in his affidavit that one of those guys was Uncle Nut Chavers, referring to Chavers. After finding Emanuel's testimony procedurally barred, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Carson's testimony. The State did not argue that Carson's testimony was procedurally barred. In fact, this Court had explicitly found in its prior opinion in its 1994 opinion that Carson could not be located despite a diligent search. Lightbourne, 644 So.2d at 56. At the hearing, Carson testified under oath that several individuals from the police or sheriff's department solicited his help in the Lightbourne case, fed him information that he was to try to get Lightbourne to admit, and then threatened and coerced him into lying against Lightbourne at trial. Carson testified that, in fact, Lightbourne had not admitted any involvement in the crime whatsoever and that he was motivated to testify falsely against Lightbourne because he was under charges for accessory to grand theft at the time and that the State had him in a do or die situation. Carson claimed that the officers told him that they would ensure that his sentence on the charge was max[ed] out if he did not cooperate, and if he did, he would receive a time served sentence. Carson claimed that his charges were dropped after he testified in the Lightbourne case and that the officers also agreed to help him on charges he was facing in Hillsborough County. Attempting to refute Carson's testimony, the investigators in the case, as well as the assistant state attorney prosecuting the case and Carson's defense attorney on the accessory to grand theft charges [11] all testified that, to their knowledge and recollection, there was no deal with the State in exchange for Carson's testimony. [12] Further, the trial court considered evidence from Carson's grand theft case that showed that Carson's case was settled before Lightbourne's trial and that the plea agreement itself contained no requirement that Carson testify in return for a time-served sentence, which was a little over three months of the one-year maximum sentence on the charge to which he pled guilty. However, the assistant state attorney did testify that after the case was over it was brought to his attention (presumably by Carson's letter) that Carson had charges pending in Hillsborough County, and he made a call to Hillsborough County on Carson's behalf. The trial court concluded that Carson's recanted testimony was not believable, based in large part on the testimony that there had been no deal. The trial court also concluded that Emanuel's testimony was procedurally barred because it could have been presented earlier and thus did not allow Emanuel to testify, nor did the court consider his affidavit. On appeal, Lightbourne alleges five errors: (1) the trial court denied Lightbourne a full and fair evidentiary hearing by refusing to consider the substance of Emanuel's testimony; (2) the State withheld exculpatory evidence and presented false testimony in violation of Lightbourne's constitutional rights; (3) newly discovered evidence establishes that Lightbourne is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding; (4) the trial court applied the wrong standard in reviewing Lightbourne's claims and failed to consider the cumulative effect of all the evidence discovered since Lightbourne's trial; and (5) Lightbourne's due process and equal protection rights were violated by the participation of an assistant state attorney who may have been a material witness. We reverse for a new evidentiary hearing because we conclude that Emanuel's testimony should have been considered and that the trial court should have conducted a cumulative analysis of the evidence presented in the postconviction proceedings in evaluating Lightbourne's claims.