Opinion ID: 2599852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony Regarding Decedent's Intent to Divorce and Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Trial Court's Allocation

Text: As relevant here, the trial court explained its allocation decision as follows: Lisa Corder, Decedent's daughter, presented witnesses who testified that the Decedent intended to divorce his wife. According to them the Decedent felt that his marriage was a mistake because his wife had continued to work as a prostitute despite her promises to stop.... [¶] On the other hand, Shaoping Corder's witnesses indicated that the marriage was a good one and there was no intent manifested by the [Decedent] to divorce his wife.... [¶] Having considered the conflicting evidence presented ..., the Court finds most persuasive and credible the evidence that the marriage between Shaoping Corder and Decedent was on the verge of ending. While it is true that Decedent had not yet filed for divorce or contacted an attorney, the Court finds that had the Decedent lived the marriage would have lasted a relatively short period of time given Decedent's belief, expressed to several persons, that his wife was working as a prostitute against his wishes. (Capitalization of names omitted.) As these findings indicate, the trial court focused on the disputed evidence regarding Corder's state of mind and his intentions shortly before his death. The court did not consider any evidence purporting to show that Wife actually engaged in prostitution. In this court, Wife asserts the evidence at the apportionment proceeding, especially the testimony regarding Corder's alleged intent to divorce her, did not substantially support the trial court's allocation of only 10 percent of the settlement fund to her and the remaining 90 percent to Daughter. In this regard, Wife argues a surviving spouse's claim for future financial support cannot be reduced based on a decedent spouse's unacted-upon expressions of an intent to obtain a dissolution of the marriage at some point in the future. Before elaborating on Wife's contentions, we find it useful to review the rules governing the recovery available in wrongful death actions. As a general matter, damages for wrongful death `are measured by the financial benefits the heirs were receiving at the time of death, those reasonably to be expected in the future, and the monetary equivalent of loss of comfort, society and protection.' ( Benwell v. Dean (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 345, 349, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394 ( Benwell ).) Specifically, this means that [n]o damages can be given for the pain or anguish suffered by the person who is killed, the damages ... being limited to the pecuniary loss suffered by the person or persons for whose benefit the right of action is given by reason of the death of the victim. [Citation.] This pecuniary loss may be a loss arising from a deprivation of something to which the statutory beneficiary would have been legally entitled if the person had lived, or it may be a pecuniary loss arising from the deprivation of something which, from all the circumstances of the particular case, it could reasonably be expected such beneficiary would have received from the deceased had his life not been taken  even though the obligation resting on the deceased to bestow such benefit may have been but a moral obligation. [Citations.] Thus, there might be a reasonable expectation that if the life of a deceased had continued he might have accumulated a greater estate, and that the increased estate would have been inherited by the statutory beneficiaries as his heirs. Or, there might be a reasonable expectation that if the life of a deceased had not been taken the statutory beneficiaries, or some of them, would have continued to receive from the one who was killed financial assistance, or services having a financial value. These are illustrations of direct financial benefits for the loss of which damages may be awarded. ( Griffey v. Pacific Electric Railway Co. (1922) 58 Cal.App. 509, 516-517, 209 P. 45 ( Griffey ).) In addition to these types of direct financial benefits, there is that less tangible and not so immediate, but nevertheless real, pecuniary benefit which often may reasonably be expected from a continuance of the `society, comfort and protection' of the deceased. ( Griffey, supra, 58 Cal.App. at p. 517, 209 P. 45.) The pecuniary value of the society, comfort, and protection that is lost through the wrongful death of a spouse, parent, or child may be considerable in cases where, for instance, the decedent had demonstrated a kindly demeanor toward the statutory beneficiary and rendered assistance or kindly offices to that person. ( Beeson v. Green Mountain G.M. Co. (1880) 57 Cal. 20, 38, 1880 WL 2030 [opn. on rehg.].) In this regard, however, recovery is not available in wrongful death actions for the grief or sorrow attendant upon the death of a loved one. (See Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59, 69, 137 Cal.Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 1022.) Powers v. Sutherland Auto Stage Co. (1923) 190 Cal. 487, 213 P. 494 ( Powers ) illustrates the distinction between the tangible and intangible benefits of a marriage relationship, and the circumstances that are relevant in assessing the pecuniary value of their loss. In Powers, a husband and wife had been living separate and apart for over 13 years, although they had not legally separated or divorced. The wife had not received any significant or consistent support from the husband during that time, and did not know his whereabouts in the years before he died. In addition, the husband had been living in illicit relations with and supporting another woman for three or four years prior to his death. ( Id. at p. 489, 213 P. 494.) Despite these circumstances, Powers concluded the husband's death had caused the wife to suffer pecuniary loss of her legally enforceable right of support. As Powers explained, even though the husband had deserted the wife and for a long time contributed nothing to her support, and even though he may have intended never to return, yet so long as the marriage relation existed she was entitled to support from him in the absence of any evidence that she had forfeited the right by her own wrong. This was a right which she could at any time during his life have legally enforced. It was a right created by the marriage relation and would exist so long as the marriage relation itself existed. ( Powers, supra, 190 Cal. at pp. 489-490, 213 P. 494; but see Carr v. Pacific Tel. Co. (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 537, 544-545, 103 Cal.Rptr. 120 [indicating in dictum, and without reference to Powers, that evidence of husband's abandonment and nonsupport of family was relevant to issue of damages for loss of earnings].) While finding that an award of approximately $15 per month over the husband's estimated life expectancy was reasonable as compensation for the wife's loss of her right of support, Powers determined that a different conclusion was warranted regarding any claimed loss of the intangible benefits of the marriage: In view of the fact that the [wife] and deceased had been living apart, nothing could have been awarded to [her] for the loss of the society, comfort, and protection of the deceased. ( Powers, supra, 190 Cal. at p. 491, 213 P. 494.) This conclusion is consistent with other decisions recognizing that factors relevant in assessing a claimed loss of society, comfort, and protection may include the closeness of the family unit at issue, the warmth of feeling between the family members, and the character of the deceased as `kind and attentive' or `kind and loving.' ( Krouse v. Graham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 68, 137 Cal.Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 1022, and cases cited therein.) Here, Wife concedes the quality of her marriage and Corder's state of mind toward her may have some bearing on a claim for loss of society, comfort, and protection. Based on Powers and the case law above, we agree. (See also Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 349, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394 [evidence of the nature of the personal relationship that existed between the decedent and the beneficiaries of a wrongful death action has a bearing on the compensation for loss of society, comfort and protection, and is therefore ordinarily admissible in such an action]; id. at p. 350, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394 [if it is proper for the beneficiary to produce evidence of the attitude and affection on the part of the decedent for the beneficiaries ... then defendant should properly be able to rebut or negate such evidence].) Accordingly, evidence of a decedent's intent to seek a divorce, as well as other evidence reflecting a strained relationship, may not be categorically excluded from the determination of a surviving spouse's wrongful death damages. Nonetheless, Wife contends the evidence concerning Corder's intent to seek a divorce should not have been considered with respect to her claim for loss of the right of support. As in Powers, she argues, such support was a direct financial benefit to which she was legally entitled by virtue of her marital status at the time of Corder's death. Alternatively, she asserts, a decedent's expression of an intent to divorce a spouse deserves consideration only where there is evidence the decedent engaged in affirmative action that manifested such intent. In this case, she emphasizes, there was no evidence that Corder had initiated a marital dissolution or separation. We do not view Powers, supra, 190 Cal. 487, 213 P. 494, as compelling the conclusion that, so long as a marriage relationship remains legally intact at the time of the decedent's death, evidence of the decedent's declared intent to end the marriage deserves no consideration in evaluating the surviving spouse's claim for loss of future financial support. Nor do we adopt such a conclusion here. As the wrongful death statute expressly contemplates, damages must be assessed based on the totality of the circumstances in each case. (§ 377.61 [recoverable damages in a wrongful death action are those that, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just (italics added)].) Evidence that tends to show that a marriage is on the brink of being legally terminated appears to be material and to bear directly on the issue whether financial support is properly found a benefit `reasonably to be expected in the future' had the decedent lived. ( Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 349, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394.) At the same time, there is merit to the concern that evidence of a decedent's mere expression of a desire to divorce a spouse, when the decedent had taken no steps to effectuate a marital dissolution or legal separation, seems a speculative basis for finding that a marriage would have been short-lived had the decedent not died. As Wife points out, the reasons why couples stay married are complicated and personal, just as are the reasons why and when they get divorced. And as the dissenting justice below commented: No doubt there are some relationships where the spouses form an intention to divorce on a daily basis, and the intention evaporates just as quickly. Mere intentions can be wonderfully evanescent. Moreover, we are mindful that California has a public policy in favor of promoting marriage. Thus, even when spouses have formally commenced the process of legal separation or marriage dissolution, the governing law contemplates the possibility of reconciliation as `the important issue.' ( In re Marriage of McKim (1972) 6 Cal.3d 673, 679, 100 Cal.Rptr. 140, 493 P.2d 868; see 61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 36, 38 (1978) [California eliminated the concept of fault in marriage dissolutions in order to reduce the emotionally charged atmosphere and perhaps effect a reconciliation].) Emphasizing that one is legally entitled to support from one's spouse (see e.g. Fam.Code §§ 4300, 4301), the dissenting justice found that, at the time of a spouse's death, the surviving spouse would have every expectation of the pecuniarily measurable support embodied in the wrongful death award predicated on [the late spouse's] earnings. In concluding that evidence of a decedent's mere intent to divorce is too speculative to affect a surviving spouse's wrongful death recovery for the loss of such earnings, he urged adoption of the following restriction regarding such evidence: [U]nless legally cognizable, concrete steps are taken  either actual separation or filing for separation or dissolution  the existing legal rights and expectations between spouses remain intact, including expectations of continued support. California's family law takes no account of a mere unacted-upon intention to separate or divorce. Even taking the step of seeing a lawyer does nothing to alter legal rights already in place. For purposes of this case, we need not decide whether evidence of these identified legally cognizable, concrete steps is either necessary or sufficient to establish that a marriage would not have lasted had the decedent lived. [10] Here, the trial court found that Corder's marriage was on the verge of ending and would have lasted a relatively short period of time had Corder lived, based solely on testimony from Daughter's witnesses claiming that Corder said he felt his marriage was a mistake and he intended to divorce Wife. As we shall explain, that testimony was insufficient to sustain these findings. Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 345, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394, is instructive on this point.' Similar to the situation here, Benwell involved a wrongful death action in which a husband, shortly before his death, allegedly told a witness that he was getting ready to leave his wife (the plaintiff) and that he could not stand her behavior. ( Id. at p. 348, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394.) Yet the record disclosed that the husband did not leave plaintiff and that at the time of his death they were living together. ( Id. at p. 354, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394.) As pertinent here, Benwell concluded the decedent's statements to the witness regarding his attitude and feelings toward the plaintiff were relevant to and admissible on the issue of the plaintiffs loss of comfort and society, since such conversations were indicative of [the] deceased's feelings and attitude at the time they were uttered. ( Id. at p. 353, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394.) Nonetheless, Benwell noted such evidence could not be used to prove that [the] deceased was going to leave plaintiff as a matter of fact or to prove any acts of misconduct on the part of plaintiff. ( Id. at p. 350, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394 [relying in part on Evid.Code, § 1250, subd. (b)].) Ultimately, Benwell determined the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence of the decedent's alleged statements, because their true evidentiary bearing was at best slight and remote, yet of a nature as to make them very prejudicial against plaintiff. ( Benwell, supra, 249 Cal. App.2d at p. 354, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394.) That is, given the absence of any other evidence in the record showing the decedent contemplated leaving plaintiff, [t]he jury could draw inferences, which would be no more than conjecture or speculation, that decedent, had he lived, would have left plaintiff and that her behavior was less than exemplary. ( Ibid. ) [11] Daughter does not address Benwell's conclusions on these points. Instead, she relies on Foss v. Anthony Industries (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 794, 189 Cal.Rptr. 31 ( Foss ), which held a trial court committed reversible error in excluding evidence of a decedent's oral expression of intent on the issue of financial support damages in a wrongful death action. ( Id. at pp. 800-801, 189 Cal.Rptr. 31.) In Foss, the plaintiff sought to introduce testimony of a witness who said the decedent told him he intended to take a job after retiring from the Navy. Foss found this evidence relevant because it might have supported a significantly higher amount of financial support damages for the decedent's children than what the jury had awarded. ( Id at p. 801, 189 Cal.Rptr. 31.) Although the proffered witness testimony was hearsay, Foss held the decedent's statement of his intent to continue working should have been admitted under Evidence Code section 1250, which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for statements of intent. ( Foss, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 800-801, 189 Cal.Rptr. 31.) We do not read Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 345, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394, and Foss, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 794, 189 Cal. Rptr. 31, as presenting a conflict of authority. In Benwell, the court was unimpressed by the evidentiary bearing of the decedent's alleged statement because the record disclosed the decedent was living with his wife and had not left her at the time of his death; nor was there any other evidence that he contemplated leaving her. ( Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 354, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394.) Meanwhile, the court in Foss determined the evidence of the decedent's intent was relevant on the question of damages in light of testimony of an expert witness who said the deceased's children would have received over $100,000 more support from the deceased if he had taken the new job rather than completely retiring at the end of his naval career. ( Foss, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 800, 189 Cal.Rptr. 31, italics added; see also ibid. [the witness would have testified the deceased told him he intended to take the job following his retirement from the Navy (italics added) ].) This quoted passage indicates there was other evidence in the record of an identified job prospect that the decedent had been offered, but had not yet accepted, before his untimely death. Consistent with both Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 345, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394, and Foss, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 794, 189 Cal. Rptr. 31, we conclude that the statements of Daughter's witnesses, by themselves, do not support the trial court's factual finding that Corder's marriage would not have lasted for more than a short period of time had he lived. Although declarations of marital unhappiness and a desire to dissolve a marriage may be considered in corroboration of other evidence offered to prove a marriage is on the verge of ending, such declarations, standing alone, are insufficient to support a finding to that effect. [12] In this regard, we are mindful that Powers, supra, 190 Cal. 487, 213 P. 494, stands as a compelling illustration of the principle that, in assessing wrongful death damages, a surviving spouse has a legally enforceable right of support that is not easily defeated or diminished by evidence that the marital relationship was strained or disaffected. (See id. at pp. 489-490, 213 P. 494.) In the proceeding below, the Court of Appeal emphasized that the trial court found as a factual matter that the marriage was on the verge of ending. Given this factual finding, the Court of Appeal explained, substantial evidence supports the allocation of 90 percent of the settlement proceeds to Daughter and 10 percent to Wife. Along the same lines, the court concluded that if, as found by the trial court, Corder's eight-month marriage was about the end, that finding supported the amount of Wife's allocated share because it was significantly more than she was likely to receive with respect to her legal right of support had Corder not died. In light of our determination that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's findings, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal with respect to the allocation issue.