Opinion ID: 2101371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: right to petition

Text: Conway's view of First Trust's right to petition the county court for payment of the claims submitted by Pearson, Caldis, and the Brady firm is based upon her peculiar interpretation of a judgment issued in June 1980 pursuant to order for judgment by Judge Smith, a district court judge. The judgment stated: 5. All attorney's fees, including attorney's fees incurred by the co-executrices, or either of them to date, in all the proceedings involving the Estate of Guy Kjorvestad, Sr., Deceased, and Selma Kjorvestad, Deceased, whether successful or not have been incurred in good faith, and Lorraine Parker and Eileen Conway each shall have, in connection with this order affecting their removal, the right to petition the County Court for the allowance of payment to said party of necessary expenses and reasonable attorney's fees. The allowance of attorney's fees in these removal proceedings shall extend to any proceedings for the review of this judgment. 6. Any additional attorney's fees incurred over and above those described in number 5 above will be payable out of the estate to the individual beneficiaries only in the event that a claimant beneficiary succeeds in that litigation. Judge Smith thus held that both Conway and Parker, as corepresentatives, could petition the court for reimbursement because they had met the requirements of Section 30.1-18-20 [U.P.C. 3-720], N.D.C.C., which provides: 30.1-18-20(3-720). Expenses in estate litigation. If any personal representative or person nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred. On appeal Conway argues that because First Trust's petition referred to the judgment, and the judgment referred only to petitions by Conway and Parker, the county court could not grant First Trust's petition. The petition did refer to the prior judgment, and it also mentioned a later order of a county court judge regarding the actions of First Trust as successor personal representative. This order stated, in part: 4. First Trust Company of North Dakota shall be authorized to pay, without order of County Court, routine administration expenses and fiduciary income taxes due and owing federal or state authorities. All other expenses, including fees of First Trust Company of North Dakota and its counsel and prior attorney fees, will be paid only upon approval of the County Court after proper notice to interested parties. [Emphasis supplied.] In challenging the procedure employed by First Trust Conway argued that the petition was based upon Judge Smith's judgment. She failed to consider the later order, which stated that First Trust also had the right to petition for expenses incurred and prior attorney fees. This declaration of rights is in harmony with the Uniform Probate Code. See Sections 30.1-18-03 [U.P.C. 3-703], N.D.C.C., and 30.1-18-15(27) [U.P.C. 3-715], N.D.C.C. Both the county court judge and Judge Smith recognized that the successor personal representative of the Kjorvestad estates, in order to act expeditiously and effectively, would need to be autonomous in determining the best interests of the estates, subject only to court approval. As a fiduciary First Trust was held to a high standard of care. In Kjorvestad I we discussed two methods for paying expenses and fees: A personal representative may be reimbursed for expenses that have been paid or, subject to approval of the probate court, payment may be made directly to the attorney out of the estate.  [Emphasis supplied.] 250 N.W.2d at 273. If First Trust had received or paid to agents excessive compensation, Conway could have invoked Section 30.1-18-21 [U.P.C. 3-721], N.D.C.C., to recover the excessive compensation. But in the present case the county court conducted a hearing at which Conway raised her objections. After listening to witnesses and receiving into evidence various bills, the county court determined the amount of compensation to be paid to the three creditors. We reject Conway's argument that the county court improperly interpreted Judge Smith's prior judgment.