Opinion ID: 71242
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Harper class

Text: 33 We are even more certain that the Harper class is unsustainable under Rule 23(b)(3). As in Andrews, the plaintiffs attempt to frame the predominant issues broadly to compensate for variations in the class members' claims. But individual issues abound and are magnified by the necessity of applying diverse state laws to programs that in many cases have little in common beyond their use of 900 numbers. 34 Unlike Andrews, which alleges an activity--gambling--that, if proven, would be illegal in most jurisdictions regardless of a plaintiff's motivation for calling a 900 number, Harper attacks programs offering credit cards or information about credit availability, perfectly legal activities unless coupled with illegal means of solicitation, in this case mail or wire fraud. The 900-number programs at issue in Harper differ widely in terms of the advertising and solicitation used, the extent to which disclosures were made, and the existence and promotion of free means of participation, so each program must be assessed individually to determine whether fraudulent tactics were employed by the appellants. 35 Even if it could be shown that the appellants were engaged in a scheme to defraud and made misrepresentations to further that scheme, the plaintiffs would still have to show, on an individual basis, that they relied on the misrepresentations, suffered injury as a result, and incurred a demonstrable amount of damages. See Pelletier, 921 F.2d at 1498-1500 (discussing elements of mail and wire fraud; requiring individualized proof of reliance on deceptive conduct and injury); Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d at 327 (stating that class treatment in no way alters substantive proof required to succeed on claim for relief); see also Castano, 84 F.3d at 745 (stating that fraud class action cannot be certified when individual reliance will be an issue) (citing Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.1973)). As in Andrews, the problems with trying the individualized elements of the plaintiffs' claims, as well as handling the unique aspects of the 900-number programs, are compounded by the necessity of referencing fifty sets of credit card and consumer protection laws. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 741; Georgine, 83 F.3d at 627; Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1300. 36 The district court, recognizing the challenge of litigating these cases, assured the parties that it can and will assemble the resources that [management of these cases] requires. (R. 27-336 at 22; R. 38-210 at 22). But litigating the plaintiffs' claims as class actions no matter what the cost in terms of judicial economy, efficiency, and fairness runs counter to the policies underlying Rule 23(b)(3). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966 amendment) (stating that subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense). While we recognize that Rule 23 is to be applied flexibly, the manageability problems discussed above defeat the Rule's underlying purposes and render these claims inappropriate for class treatment. 6 Finally, although the district court stated that class treatment may be the only feasible method of adjudication, given the small size of each member's claims, (R. 27-336 at 30-31; R. 38-210 at 30-31), we note that even small individual claims under RICO can be feasible given the possibility of the award of treble damages and attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994); see also Castano, 84 F.3d at 749-50 (stating that individual trials in immature tort context may actually enhance long-term judicial efficiency by allowing plaintiffs to winnow claims to include only strongest causes of action, thereby simplifying choice of law and predominance inquiries for eventual class treatment).