Opinion ID: 2594572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denying Two Challenges for Cause by Defendant

Text: Defendant claims that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 15, 16, and 17 of the California Constitution were violated when the trial court denied his motions to excuse two prospective jurors for substantially impaired ability to follow the law regarding capital punishment. In response to initial questions by the court, Herman J. testified, without qualification or equivocation, that he would not automatically vote for the death penalty if the case reached that stage. Then defense counsel questioned him about his statement on his questionnaire that the death penalty should always be imposed for calculated, methodical murder. In response to leading questions, Herman J. testified, contrary to his response to the court's question, that he would always impose the death penalty for an intentional killing accompanied by a special circumstance, and in essence that he would not pay attention to the defense case in mitigation at the penalty phase. Asked by the prosecutor whether he could consider mitigating evidence at a penalty phase, Herman J. testified, I would want to consider the evidence and the additional information. [¶] Even though I felt, maybe, that he should get the death penalty, I would still be willing to consider any other ... additional evidence. The prosecutor asked: Are you of the frame of mind that any witness calledif any witness were called by the defense on the subject of mitigating evidence, that that witness would be absolutely wasting his time ... ? Herman J. responded, Well, I don't think it should be absolutely concrete. [¶] I would be willing to hear additional statements, or anything that ... might alter the situation, [¶] ... [¶] Even though I believe in the death penalty and all that, I'm not so set in my ways that I wouldn't listen to ... anything that might alter the decision.... He added that he would not always impose the death penalty regardless of the situation or regardless of additional information. He also testified that he could follow an instruction to return a verdict for death only if the aggravating evidence substantially outweighed the mitigating. Defense counsel then asked Herman J. to explain his inconsistent statements. The prospective juror testified that when I realized I answered your question by saying ... if found guilty without a shadow of a doubt I would want the death penalty, but I wasn't ... considering the fact that you have additional evidence that alters, possibly alters it. [¶] ... [¶] ... I'm just saying I would ... always be willing to listen to additional evidence ... and possibly change to a life sentence. In sum, Herman J. testified that he might be presented with evidence important enough to consider the life sentence rather than the death penalty, even though I lean towards the death penalty. But that mitigating evidence would have to be strong and meaningful to alter his predisposition to impose the death penalty. Defendant argued, without success, to the trial court that Herman J.'s final answer confirmed what many of his others had suggested: that he would impose the death penalty unless presented with mitigating evidence that substantially outweighed that in aggravation, and hence could not follow his oath. He renews that argument here. The trial court made no comment on its ruling beyond a statement that Herman J. was not substantially impaired. On this record, we cannot say that substantial evidence did not support the ruling. We believe that Herman J.'s testimony pointed to two views that did not conflict. He testified that his own predilection, unmoored by legal instruction, would be to impose death unless there was a substantial reason not to. But he also testified, not inconsistently, that he could and would follow an instruction that directed him not to follow his own predilection but instead the law. Substantial evidence supports the court's ruling. Patricia P.'s daughter was a San Diego County Sheriffs deputy, and her son was a police officer with the Chula Vista Police Department. He had previously been a San Diego police officer. Patricia P. testified that she thought the justice system was too lenient and that a criminal defendant should bear the burden of proving innocence. In her questionnaire, she stated that she favored increased use of the death penalty, and automatic imposition of a capital sentence for multiple murderone of the special circumstances charged here. But on voir dire examination by defense counsel, she stated that she would like to think that there would be other options than the death penalty even in a multiple-murder case. And she also testified that she could follow the law on the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt even if such tenets contradicted her beliefs, that she could consider evidence in mitigation even if defendant were convicted of multiple murders, and that she would follow an instruction that she could not vote for the death penalty unless the aggravating evidence substantially outweighed that in mitigation. Defendant challenged Patricia P. for cause on the ground that her views of the law substantially impaired her ability to follow her oath as a juror. The court disagreed, stating that clearly this [prospective] juror is not impaired. Substantial evidence supports that determination. As with Herman J., there was substantial evidence that she could separate her personal beliefs from her duties as a juror. In conclusion, we discern no violation of any constitutional provision.