Opinion ID: 1772284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: SUBCLAIM (c): OTHER EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE

Text: In his third subclaim, Trepal asserts that other exculpatory evidence existed that should have been presented to the jury to establish reasonable doubt. He contends inter alia that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate other suspects. [15] The circuit court heard testimony relating to this subclaim at the first evidentiary hearing and concluded as follows: One portion of Claim # 3 alleged that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present evidence of the other suspects to the jury. The focus of this portion of Claim # 3 is that the jury should have known that Pye Carr (husband of the victim) and Diana Carr (wife of the defendant) were both suspects in the murder. Wofford Stidham testified that the defense team wanted to show the jury that Pye Carr could have committed this crime. However, the lawyers were concerned because they did not have any substantive evidence that suggested Pye Carr was the poisoner. Wofford Stidham further testified that in order to point the finger at the man whose wife had just been poisoned and died, they needed stronger evidence than they did have. Additionally, many of Judge Mahoney's rulings, which were affirmed on appeal, precluded counsel from presenting much of the evidence they believed to be favorable to Mr. Trepal, and inculpatory of Pye Carr. Jonathan Stidham testified that a tactical decision was made that it would be better strategy for the defense to argue that the state could not prove its case, rather than saying Pye Carr committed the crime. Jonathan Stidham stated that he believed that if the defense tried to allege Pye committed the crime, the jury would undertake a Pye versus Trepal analysis, and in such an analysis, Jonathan Stidham believed that Mr. Trepal lost that race every time. The defense theory that developed was to raise reasonable doubt without actually pointing the finger at specific suspects. As to Diana Carr, trial counsel testified that the defendant gave them specific instructions not to attempt to implicate his wife in any manner. This testimony was not contradicted by any witness. Therefore, it is undisputed that trial counsel were restricted by the express instructions of their client. Jonathan Stidham testified that the attorneys decided to try to raise the question of Diana Carr as a suspect in the closing argument of the guilt phase (R. 4246). Jonathan Stidham stated that Mr. Trepal did not know about this strategy and after the arguments were completed, Mr. Trepal was very upset. Further, counsel felt that to try to implicate Diana Carr would have given credibility to the state's case. In order to argue the circumstantial evidence pointed to Diana Carr, the defense would necessarily have to argue that the circumstantial evidence was in fact evidence that the jury should consider, when the defense theory was to attempt to discredit the state's entire circumstantial evidence case. Another concern was that more of the circumstantial evidence pointed to the defendant rather than to Diana Carr. A sub-issue as to Diana Carr has to do with the fact that defense counsel did not elicit the fact that she was testifying under immunity. Jonathan Stidham testified that he felt that Diana Carr's testimony was not helpful to the state so he saw no need to attempt to impeach her. This was clearly a tactical decision, which when considered along with the desires of Mr. Trepal not to implicate his wife, was reasonable and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant also claims that Carolyn Dixon (sister of Pye Carr) was a suspect and this information should have been presented to the jury. A specific claim raised in paragraph # 58, page 56 of the 3.850 motion concerned the court. The defendant claims that Carolyn Dixon told Laura Ervins that Peggy Carr had been poisoned with thallium some three days before the hospital knew thallium was involved. Testimony at the evidentiary hearing indicates that Carolyn Dixon did not know what the poison was prior to the announcement by the hospital. It does appears that there is some confusion over the actual date of the conversation between Carolyn Dixon and Laura Ervins. However, Jonathan Stidham testified that he knew about the conversation and wanted to raise the same argument that collateral counsel raised in the rule 3.850 motion. Jonathan Stidham testified that after investigating the issue, the dates did not check out and that he abandoned the issue. The defendant has failed to establish deficient performance or any prejudice regarding this issue. Applying the Stephens standard of review, set forth above, to the circuit court's ruling on this subclaim, we conclude that the court's factual findings are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record, and the court properly concluded based on those findingsthat counsel was not ineffective under the Sixth Amendment. We find no error.