Opinion ID: 6335029
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hill’s Counterarguments

Text: Hill cites three cases that she contends lend support to her position but that are not enough to render unreasonable Walmart’s belief that Hill was a contractor. The first case is Zaremba v. Miller, which involved facts that are similar to those here: Plaintiff, a model, sued defendant, a photographer, for damages pursuant to Labor Code section 203 for failure to timely pay his wages. Plaintiff used an agent (Dennis) to find work for him. The agent also billed for plaintiff’s services, collected the payments, deducted his fee, and sent the balance to plaintiff. Dennis secured the present job for plaintiff with defendant. Plaintiff called defendant and was told where and when to appear and what to wear. On arrival, plaintiff was told to wear a butcher’s apron that was provided and where to stand and what to do. Testimony was introduced that the model had to follow the directions of the photographer or he would be fired. 113 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 4 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1980). The court held that the “plaintiff was an employee” entitled to waiting time penalties because of the degree of control the photographer exercised over him. Id. at 5. 20 HILL V. WALMART However, this case does not help Hill as much as she might like. First, Zaremba involved a direct working relationship between the putative employer and putative employee. Here, in contrast, Hill has failed to show that Walmart exercised the same level of direct control over her activities. Walmart has provided an unrebutted declaration stating that the producer and others involved in the photo shoots were generally freelancers, not Walmart employees. This suggests that even if Walmart had general oversight over Hill’s activities and control over the outcome of her photo shoots, it was relying on outside contractors to handle the details of Hill’s work. Hill argues that Walmart’s declaration is deficient because it states that Walmart “generally” used freelancers that were “typically” provided by outside agencies, but does not adequately provide details about Hill’s specific shoots. Hill, however, has put forward no evidence that would be admissible at trial and that could establish that Walmart deviated meaningfully from its usual practice. 6 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) & (e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (“[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” (citations omitted)); Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A trial court can only consider admissible 6 In her deposition, Hill testified that she believed these personnel were Walmart employees because the photo shoots took place on Walmart’s premises and because a photographer, stylist, and producer told her that they worked for Walmart. Both in the district court and on appeal, Walmart has objected to the admissibility of the statements made to Hill on the basis that they are hearsay and speculation. Hill does not dispute that this testimony is inadmissible in her briefs. HILL V. WALMART 21 evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”); see also C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480–81 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding plaintiff failed to raise “a genuine issue for trial” because it did not counter evidence supporting a defense to its claims). The fact that other participants in the photo shoot worked on Walmart’s premises is equally consistent with either employee or freelancer status. Second, Zaremba contained stronger indicators of an employment relationship in respects other than control over work. Hill was paid a daily flat rate, was not directly engaged in Walmart’s retail business, and was paid indirectly through Scout. Conversely, the plaintiff in Zaremba was engaged in the photographer’s primary business (photography), was paid at an hourly rate, and received payment directly. See 113 Cal. App. 3d. Supp. at 4. Finally, even if we were to minimize the importance of these distinctions, Zaremba is not a sufficiently authoritative statement of California law to foreclose the possibility that Hill was a contractor. It was decided by the appellate department of the Los Angeles Superior Court, not by the California Court of Appeal or Supreme Court. This means that it is binding at most only on the Los Angeles Superior Court, and not in San Francisco where the events in this case took place. See, e.g., People v. Corners, 176 Cal. App. 3d 139, 146 (1985) (“[A] decision of the Appellate Department of the San Francisco Superior Court is not binding upon the Butte County Superior Court nor upon this court . . . .”). While Zaremba may still be cited for its persuasive value, our court has indicated that individual appellate department opinions are not authoritative. See Edgerly v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 713 F.3d 976, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2013). Consequently, Zaremba is not a definitive statement of 22 HILL V. WALMART California employment law as it applies to models (at least outside of Los Angeles). 7 The second case cited by Hill—L’Oreal, supra, 137 P.3d 218, decided by the California Supreme Court—involved a model that was hired for a one-day job, and cited Zaremba approvingly for the general proposition that control is the most important factor in the employment test. See 137 P.3d at 222–23. But L’Oreal did not hold the models are employees as a matter of law; it held only that an employee is “discharged” for purposes of § 203’s waiting time penalty provisions either when the employee is fired or “when an employer releases an employee after completion of a specific job assignment or time duration for which the employee was hired.” Id. at 220. The employer had moved for summary judgment only on the grounds that no “discharge” had occurred, and “[f]or purposes of its motion, . . . conceded plaintiff was its employee and not an independent contractor.” Id. As a result, the question of the model’s employment status was never before the court. Finally, in the district court, Hill relied on Tieberg v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 471 P.2d 975 (Cal. 1970), which held that certain television writers were employees. As here, there was some evidence that the 7 We also note that Zaremba is a very old case, predating Borello by almost a decade and the events at issue here by more than thirty years. Hill says Zaremba was a “seminal case” proving that “professional models render their services as employees” as a matter of law, but she identifies no more recent case holding that that is true, and we have not found one. Our independent research indicates that Zaremba has only been cited by ten other cases in over forty years (including in the district court’s order here). None of those cases cite it for the proposition that “models render their services as employees” as a matter of law. These facts further undermine Zaremba’s value as an authority. HILL V. WALMART 23 writers were independent contractors, including the facts that they were “engaged in a distinct occupation, that their work involves skill, that they do not work on [the employer’s] premises, that they [were] employed only to write a particular play, and that they [were] paid by the job rather than by the hour.” Id. at 982 (cleaned up). Nonetheless, this was all overridden by “ample independent evidence that the employer ha[d] the right to control the actual details of the writers’ work and that it exercise[d] this right.” Id. However, a “significant factor” in Tieberg was that “there [was] an agreement between the purported employer and employee setting forth the details of their relationship.” Id. at 981 (distinguishing two other cases on this ground). Beyond the fact that the agreement gave the employer significant control over the writers’ activities, the “agreement referred to the writers as employees throughout and contained other provisions, such as those relating to [a] pension plan, which would be appropriate only if the writers were employees.” Id. This was a “strong” indicator of an employment relationship. Id. A similar employment agreement is not involved in this case. 8 Indeed, Walmart’s agreement with Scout says the opposite. Ultimately, while these cases may cast doubt on the strength of Walmart’s independent contractor defense, they are not similar or (for Zaremba) authoritative enough to 8 It is also worth noting that one of Tieberg’s main holdings was that the trial court erred in treating control as “the sole factor” relevant to determining employment status. Id. at 979. “[T]he right to control and direct the individual who performs services as to the details and means by which the result is accomplished is the most important consideration but not the only element in determining whether an employment relationship has been created.” Id. at 980. 24 HILL V. WALMART render that defense unreasonable. Consequently, they do not defeat Walmart’s good-faith argument.