Opinion ID: 1145134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: validity of the jury instruction

Text: Viveros was convicted of armed robbery under AS 11.15.240 and AS 11.15.295. [3] The judge instructed the jury as follows: Instruction 15 In order for the defendant to be found guilty of violating Sections 11.15.240 and 11.15.295 of the Alaska Statutes as just read, the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following: 1) That on or about the 7th day of November, 1977, at or near Anchorage, Alaska, 2) The defendant George E. Viveros took United States currency from the person of Joyce M. Johnson; 3) That said taking was accomplished by force and violence or by putting Joyce M. Johnson in fear with a handgun; and 4) At the time of said taking, the defendant intended then and there to deprive said Joyce M. Johnson of said property. Viveros objects to subparagraph 3 in the instruction because, in his view, the disjunctive or would leave the jury free to find that the taking occurred either by force and violence, or by putting Mrs. Johnson in fear with a handgun. Timely objection was made at trial. He argues that some members of the jury might have convicted on the grounds that there was no handgun employed, but that Viveros used force and violence alone. In the latter case, the evidence would only sustain a conviction for simple robbery under AS 11.15.240 without the enhancement provision of AS 11.15.295 for armed robbery. In Nickerson v. State, 492 P.2d 118 (Alaska 1971), a defendant was charged with both possession and sale of narcotics. In examining a possibly ambiguous jury instruction, we concluded that there was no real possibility that the defendant was convicted of possession alone where a review of the evidence showed convincingly that the defendant was on trial for a drug sale and not just for possession. Id. at 121 n. 10. Here the evidence was not so convincing that Viveros was on trial for armed robbery alone. Mrs. Johnson never saw the robber actually produce a weapon. Her testimony was that she saw the handle of a gun. A jury was entitled to evaluate her powers of observation and also to determine whether the handle was in fact attached to a firearm. Some jurors could have believed that Viveros did not have a firearm. It is clear, however, that all jurors found that all elements of robbery were proved. Whether they believed that Viveros stole by force and violence or by putting Mrs. Johnson in fear by use of a firearm, he was guilty of robbery. To vote that he had put her in fear by use of a firearm requires a finding that he stole by force and violence. Therefore, while the disjunctive instruction could have resulted in a nonunanimous verdict as to Viveros' use of a firearm, it is clear that the jury must have found all the elements of robbery. Consequently, it is not necessary to reverse a conviction for robbery once the enhancement provision of AS 11.15.295 is removed. It is necessary, however, to reverse the conviction for violation of AS 11.15.295. Upon remand the state may either dismiss the count for violation of AS 11.15.295, or retry Viveros. In the event that the state choses to dismiss the section 295 charge, it will be necessary for the trial court to resentence Viveros. [4] The maximum sentence for robbery under AS 11.15.240 is fifteen years. Under the enhanced sentence provision of AS 11.15.295, for use of a firearm during a robbery a judge is required to impose a minimum sentence of ten years for a defendant's first offense under the statute. Viveros' fifteen-year sentence does not exceed the permissible sentence for robbery. In our view, however, the maximum sentence for robbery may have resulted because of the trial judge's belief that he was required to enhance Viveros' sentence under AS 11.15.295. In the event of resentencing, the trial judge should not consider the enhancement provisions of AS 11.15.295, nor the minimum sentence imposed by that section. [5] Given our view of the case it is unnecessary to consider Viveros' alternative argument, that a lesser included offense instruction on plain robbery should have been given. This case is reversed and remanded for resentencing or retrial in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. REVERSED and REMANDED.