Opinion ID: 694171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Temporal Limitation for Unjust Enrichment Claim

Text: 40 Trans-Rim asserts that the jury instructions that defined the elements of a contract implied in law, and the portion of the instruction summarizing Trans-Rim's implied in law contract claim improperly precluded the jury from considering the benefits Coors realized after May 2, 1989. According to Trans-Rim, this rendered the claim unprovable, because the value of the benefit Trans-Rim conferred on Coors was not established until after May 2, 1989. 41 Instruction Numbers 7, 8, and 19, respectively, provide as follows: Instruction No. 7 42 Contract implied in law is a legal doctrine that is designed to prevent unjust enrichment of one person at the expense of another. 43 The doctrine applies when one person confers a benefit on another, the other appreciates the value of the benefit and accepts and retains it, and the circumstances are such that it would be unfair for the person retaining the benefit to do so without paying its reasonable value. In such circumstances the law treats the party who has retained the benefit as having contracted to pay the other party the reasonable value of the benefit. The law does so even though the parties may not have formally and expressly contracted with regard to payment or compensation, and even though they may not agree on the value of the benefit to the party who has retained it. 44 The word benefit denotes any form of advantage. One person or company confers a benefit upon another by giving the other possession of property or by saving the other from expense or loss. Instruction No. 8 45 In order for Trans-Rim to recover from the Defendants on its claim of contract implied in law between October 10, 1988 and May 2, 1989, you must find that each of the following propositions has been proved: 46 (1) That Trans-Rim conferred upon any one or more of the defendants information of value to the defendant and thereby benefitted the defendant; 47 (2) That the defendant appreciated, accepted, and retained the benefit for its own use; and 48 (3) That the defendant did so under circumstances that make it unfair for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying Trans-Rim its reasonable value. 49 If you find that each of these propositions has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for Trans-Rim on its claim of contract implied in law. 50 On the other hand, if you find that any one or more of these propositions has not been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for the defendants on this claim. Instruction No. 19 51 The plaintiff, Trans-Rim Enterprises, has sued the defendants for the same damages or recovery under different claims for relief. The claims for relief on which Trans-Rim has sued and on which you have been instructed are: 52 (1) Contract implied in law between October 10, 1988 and May 2, 1989 to prevent unjust enrichment; 53 (2) Breach of a contract made in May 1989 which obligated each defendant to keep confidential information strictly confidential, to disclose that information only to its employees, representatives and agents, and to use the confidential information solely for the purpose of evaluating the proposed recycle mill project called Project Alaska; 54 (3) Breach of fiduciary duty; and 55 (4) Misappropriation of Trade Secrets owned by Trans-Rim. 56 If you find for Trans-Rim on more than one of its claims for relief, you may award Trans-Rim damages only once for the same losses and only once for the same unjust enrichment. 57 Trans-Rim did not object to Instruction Numbers 7, 8, and 19 at trial and therefore waived any objections to these instructions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. Accordingly, we review Trans-Rim's contention of instructional error on appeal under the plain error standard. Gilbert v. Cosco Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 404 (10th Cir.1993). The plain error standard requires us to find a  'fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done.'  Id. (citation omitted). 58 The temporal limitation on Trans-Rim's implied contract claim was not error. An implied in law contract is imposed by a court for reasons of justice and does not require a meeting of the minds between the parties. See First Interstate Bank v. Tanktech, Inc., 864 P.2d 116, 120 n. 6 (Colo.1993); 1 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts Sec. 1:6 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990). Once the parties expressly agreed to the terms of their relationship, it was no longer necessary, or possible, to imply a contract. The district court properly instructed the jury that the implied in law contract claim could provide a potential basis for recovery only until May 2, 1989, when the parties exhibited a meeting of the minds by entering into the written Confidentiality Agreement. Accordingly, the jury instructions restricting recovery on the implied in law contract theory until May 2, 1989 were legally correct. 59 AFFIRMED.