Opinion ID: 6110206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 323II References to Victims

Text: Next, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion in limine seeking to preclude reference to the prosecuting witnesses as victims. Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to preclude the State or its witnesses from referring to A.H. and A.T. as victims. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied the motion and ruled as follows: THE COURT : Are any of your cases newer than 2008? [ DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: I do not believe they are, Your Honor. THE COURT : Because I remember when I was the prosecutor this issue came up numerous times. And the case law that I remember seemed to indicate that it'd be preferable not to, but it's not reversible error and the Supreme Court did not direct the Court or the prosecutor to refer to the individuals or alleged victims as victims. So I'm going to deny your motion at this time. Appellant argues on appeal that this ruling constituted an abuse of discretion and alleges that the trial court and the State repeatedly referred to the alleged victims as 'victims' during voir dire. Appellant also states that the State's witnesses also referred to both alleged victims as 'victims' several times during the State's case-in-chief. He argues that the use of that term eroded his fundamental right to be presumed innocent and improperly shifted the State's burden of proof to him, requiring him to prove that a crime had not been committed. The cases cited by appellant for his argument on this point are distinguishable. In Sharp v. State , 51 Ark. 147 , 10 S.W. 228 (1889), the appellant was granted a new trial based on statements by the trial judge that could have intimated an opinion in the case and improperly influenced the jury. Similarly, in Bateman v. State , 2 Ark. App. 339 , 621 S.W.2d 232 (1981), the court of appeals addressed the trial judge's use of the word victim during voir dire. The court affirmed the denial of Bateman's motion for mistrial: In this case, the trial court should not have referred to the prosecuting witness as the victim, but from a review of the record it is clear that the court was simply attempting to identify her for purposes of questioning the jury panel as to whether or not they were acquainted with her. Certainly, the court could have referred to her as the alleged victim and that would not have been error. Under all the circumstances, we do not view that comment by the trial court as prejudicial even though the term should not have been used. 2 Ark. App. at 340 , 621 S.W.2d at 233-34 . Here, the only instance in which appellant identifies the trial court's use of the term victim was during a bench conference with a single potential juror who was ultimately released. Therefore, the trial court did not improperly influence the jury by using the term victim to refer to the complaining witnesses, and the only authority appellant cites is distinguishable. Regarding appellant's objection to the use of the word victim by the prosecution and law-enforcement witnesses, it was readily apparent to the jury that in the prosecution's theory of the case, A.T. and A.H. were, in fact, victims. And the law-enforcement officers' references to A.T. and A.H. as victims were in the officers' testimony recounting their role in the investigation. There is no prejudicial error under these circumstances, and we affirm on this point.