Opinion ID: 4024341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FIRREA applies to statutes of repose.

Text: We join all appellate courts to have considered the question of whether an extender statute like the one in FIRREA applies to both statutes of limitations and to statutes of repose and find that it does.2 Indeed, the Extender Statute 2 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held, as we do, that the Extender Statute supplanted § 13’s statute of repose. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 727 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2013) cert. granted, judgment vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2818 (2014). It affirmed its holding on remand. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. (Nomura II), 764 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(12), the analogous extender statute for actions by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, displaces § 13’s statute of repose. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas Inc., 712 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2013). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Nevada Supreme Court each held that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14), the analogous extender statute for actions by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation supplants all other time limits. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. RBS Sec. Inc., 798 F.3d 244 (5th NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN 9 establishes a universal time limit for all actions by the NCUA as conservator or liquidating agent. Both textual and contextual analyses of the statute confirm this conclusion, and the Supreme Court’s decision in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014) does not support Appellees’ arguments to the contrary.
displaces all other time limitations. The “first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). In this case, it does. And that plain and unambiguous meaning demonstrates that the Extender Statute applies not only to the 1933 Act’s statute of limitations, but also to its statute of repose. The Extender Statute provides: (A) In general Notwithstanding any provision of any contract, the applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action brought by the [NCUA] as conservator or liquidating agent shall be–
longer of– Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1492 (2016); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Rhodes, 336 P.3d 961 (Nev. 2014). 10 NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN (I) the 6-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or
law; and (ii) in the case of any tort claim, the longer of– (I) the 3-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law. (B) Determination of the date on which a claim accrues For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run on any claim described in such subparagraph shall be the later of– (i) the date of the appointment of the [NCUA] as conservator or liquidating agent; or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14). The Extender Statute begins by setting forth “the applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action brought by the [NCUA] as conservator or liquidating agent.” Id. § 1784(b)(14)(A) (emphasis added). NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN 11 It further provides that the limitations period “shall be” six years for contract cases, three years for tort cases, or in either case, the respective applicable period under State law if that period is longer. Id. By expressly stating that “the” statute of limitations for “any action” brought by the NCUA as conservator or liquidating agent “shall be” as specified, Congress made clear that no other limitations period applies to the NCUA’s claims. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 764 F.3d 1199, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014) (Nomura II); Fed. Housing Finance Agency v. UBS Americas Inc., 712 F.3d 136, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2013). It is clear to us that the Extender Statute’s plain meaning “indicates that it . . . supplants all other time limits.” Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1226; see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. RBS Securities Inc., 798 F.3d 244, 254 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Interpreting the statute as excluding repose periods from its ambit would circumvent that mandatory language by providing the FDIC with less than three years from the date of its appointment as receiver to bring claims.”).
further support our determination that the Extender Statute displaces the 1933 Act’s statute of repose. Numerous tools of statutory construction confirm our conclusion. The statutory context and FIRREA’s legislative history clearly indicate that the Extender Statute displaces the 1933 Act’s statute of repose. First, when viewed in the context of FIRREA as a whole, it is apparent that the Extender Statute displaces the 1933 12 NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN Act’s statute of repose. Specifically, FIRREA refers to “statute of limitations” or “statute of limitation” in six provisions including the Extender Statute. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1787(b)(5)(F)(i), (b)(6)(B), (b)(8)(D), (b)(8)(E), (b)(14), (d)(4). Tellingly, three of the six uses refer to limitations periods better characterized as statutes of repose. Those three provisions, which set deadlines for appealing NCUA’s denial of a claim, employ the term “statutes of limitations” but they do not provide for tolling—the hallmark of statutes of repose. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1787(b)(6)(B) (“the claimant shall have no further rights or remedies” after 60 days), (b)(8)(D) (“the claimant shall have no further rights or remedies” after 30 days), (d)(4) (establishing a fixed time limit for appeal that begins to run on the date of the decision being challenged). This suggests that FIRREA uses the term “statutes of limitations” broadly, to include what are technically statutes of repose. See Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1230–31 (explaining that the absence of a provision for accrual or tolling in these three sections suggests that FIRREA uses “statute of limitations” broadly). It follows that the term should be given the same broad meaning when it is used in other places in FIRREA, including in the Extender Statute. And giving the term this broad meaning makes it clear that the Extender Statute displaces any preexisting time limitation in any action by the NCUA as conservator or liquidating agent. FIRREA’s legislative history also supports our conclusion. When submitting FIRREA’s conference report to the Senate, FIRREA’s sponsor stated that the Extender Statute should be “construed to maximize potential recoveries by the Federal Government by preserving to the greatest extent permissible by law claims that would otherwise have been lost due to the expiration of hitherto applicable limitations period.” 135 Cong. Rec. S10205 (Daily Ed. Aug. NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN 13 4, 1989) (statement of Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr., thenChairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and sponsor of FIRREA in the Senate). Indeed, FIRREA’s stated purposes were to “strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal regulators of depository institutions,” FIRREA, Pub.L. No. 101–73, 103 Stat. 183 § 101(9), and to “strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for defrauding or otherwise damaging depository institutions and their depositors,” id. § 101(10). We have recognized FIRREA reflects a “policy of protecting the government’s right to recovery.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 486–87 (9th Cir. 1991). This policy is best advanced by interpreting the Extender Statute to supplant the 1933 Act’s statute of repose. Thus, we agree with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that the legislative history clearly “demonstrates Congress meant any ambiguity in the term ‘statute of limitations’ to be construed broadly.” Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1217 (noting also that “[i]t strains common sense to think Congress would have saddled the NCUA with having to comply with multiple federal and state statutes of repose”). Arguing otherwise, Appellees point to the Extender Statute’s instruction to begin the limitations period on the date of a claim’s “accrual” as a sign that the new limitations period must not displace statutes of repose. This is so, according to Appellees, because the concept of “accrual” is irrelevant to a statute of repose, which is generally triggered by the defendant’s act. Appellees’ argument confuses the statute’s use of accrual. The references to accrual simply reflect that the new timeframe for the NCUA to assert claims begins only after a claim accrues. RBS Securities Inc., 798 F.3d at 254; Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1229. Those references do not define the type of limitations period that the 14 NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN Extender Statute replaces. They pertain only to the limitation period that the Extender Statute creates. Thus, the use of this term has no bearing on whether the Extender Statute supplants the 1933 Act’s statute of repose.
v. Waldburger does not support Appellees’ arguments. Appellees’ heavy reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014) is misplaced. The statute at issue in CTS fundamentally differs from the Extender Statute in numerous ways. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s analysis of that statute does not compel a contrary conclusion to the one we reach here. In CTS Corp., the Supreme Court considered the effect of 42 U.S.C. § 9658, an amended provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), that by its terms preempted “State statutes of limitations.” The Court concluded that the statute preempted only statutes of limitations, not statutes of repose.3 134 S. Ct. at 2180. In reaching this conclusion, the Court 3 CERCLA § 9658 reads in pertinent part as follows: (a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous substance cases
In the case of any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN 15 exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute.
Except as provided in paragraph (1), the statute of limitations established under State law shall apply in all actions brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility. ... (b) Definitions ... (2) Applicable limitations period The term “applicable limitations period” means the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be brought.
The term “commencement date” means the date specified in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the applicable limitations period. 16 NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN first discussed the differences between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, noting that a “statute of limitations creates ‘a time limit for suing in a civil case based on the date when the claim accrued.’” Id. at 2182 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009)). In contrast, a statute of
(A) In general Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the te r m “f e d e r a l l y r e q u i r e d commencement date” means the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned. (B) Special rules In the case of a minor or incompetent plaintiff, the term “federally required commencement date” means the later of the date referred to in subparagraph (A) or the following:
which the minor reaches the age of majority, as determined by State law, or has a legal representative appointed.
individual, the date on which such individual becomes competent or has had a legal representative appointed. NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN 17 repose, “puts an outer limit on the right to bring a civil action.” Id. The Court explained that a statute of limitation therefore encourages plaintiffs to pursue their known claims diligently whereas a statute of repose reflects a legislative judgment that defendants should be free from any liability after the passage of a certain amount of time. Id. at 2183. In determining that § 9658 did not apply to statutes of repose, the Court pointed to several things. First, it noted that § 9658 provides only a limited exception to state statutes of limitations. This exception concerns only the commencement date of the limitations period. Id. at 2185. The state statutes continue to provide the limitations period itself. “Under this structure,” the Court stated, “state law is not pre-empted unless it fits into the precise terms of the exception.” Id. Second, the Court identified a 1982 Study Group Report recommending that in the same discovery rule later embodied in § 9658, Congress repeal state statutes of limitations as well as state statutes of repose. Id. at 2186. The Court reasoned that if Congress decided not to mention statutes of repose despite this clear indication that it considered doing so, then Congress must have intended to omit statutes of repose from § 9658’s scope. Id. The Court then noted the text of the statute “describing the covered [limitations] period in the singular[,]” which the Court explained “would be an awkward way to mandate the pre-emption of two different time periods with two different purposes.” Id. at 2186–87. FIRREA’s Extender Statute is “fundamentally different” from § 9658. Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1208.4 Whereas the 4 We note that in light of its holding in CTS Corp., the Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit’s original holding that the NCUA’s extender 18 NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN Extender Statute sets entirely new time limits for claims brought by the NCUA, § 9658 establishes only a new commencement date for the limitations period set by state law. CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2185. Thus, while § 9658 is properly characterized as a limited exception to the otherwise applicable state law, the Extender Statute provides the exclusive limitations framework for any action by the NCUA as conservator or liquidating agent, leaving no room for any state limitations period that might otherwise apply. Moreover, unlike in CTS, there is no evidence in this case that Congress considered separately addressing statutes of repose, and then declined to do so. In contrast to the enactment of § 9658, where the existence of the 1982 Study Group Report reflected that Congress intentionally limited the scope of preemption to state statutes of limitations, there is “no evidence Congress distinguished between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose” when it enacted FIRREA. Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1215. Absent such evidence, the “limitations period,” viewed in isolation, provides little insight into Congress’s intent. Indeed, it is well understood that “the term ‘statutes of limitations’ is sometimes used in a less formal way . . . [to] refer to any provision restricting the time in which a plaintiff must bring suit,” and that “Congress has used the term ‘statute of limitations’ when enacting statutes of repose.” CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2185 (citing statute displaced the 1933 Act’s statute of repose. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 134 S. Ct. 2818 (2014). On remand, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its conclusion, finding little difficulty distinguishing § 9658 from the NCUA’s extender statute. Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1208. The Supreme Court denied certiorari when the case returned from the Tenth Circuit. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015). NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN 19 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii)(I)(aa) (2012 ed.) (placing a statute of repose in a section entitled “Statute of limitations”)). Finally, unlike § 9658, the Extender Statute uses the singular word “period” not to refer to the state law timeframe(s) being replaced, but rather to refer to the new timeframe being established. That new exclusive timeframe adopts “the period applicable under State law” only when that period is longer than the period otherwise prescribed. Thus, the Extender Statute’s use of the word “period” by no means operates to exclude statutes of repose from its scope. In sum, we reject Appellees’ arguments that the Supreme Court’s holding in CTS Corp. requires a contrary conclusion to the one we reach here. We hold that in actions by the NCUA as conservator or liquidating agent, the Extender Statute displaces all preexisting time limitations, including the 1933 Act’s statute of repose.