Opinion ID: 1406839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The contract between defendant and the union imposed upon defendant responsibility for continuation of previous safety practices, within the terms of the Employers' Liability Act.

Text: The unique feature of this case is that it is not a case in which plaintiff rests her claim that defendant was in charge or of responsible for this work upon a provision in the contract between defendant and an independent contractor, but upon a provision in a labor contract between defendant and a union and one which not only reserved to defendant a right, but imposed a duty, to require its contractors to maintain previous working conditions relating to safety. At the time that contract was negotiated, defendant desired to subcontract its falling and bucking operations. The union opposed the subcontracting of such work, in accordance with the traditional positions of unions on that subject. This difference in position was then the subject of collective bargaining which resulted in a compromise under which, in effect, the union agreed not to object (as by strike) to the subcontracting of the falling and bucking provided that the defendant undertook the duty to require its contractors to maintain the same standards of wages and working conditions, including previously existing safety practices. As stated by the majority, it appears from the record in this case that although it was contended at the time of trial that this contract provision was ambiguous, in the legal sense, resulting in a question of fact as to the intention of the parties in the use of those terms, the trial judge considered the interpretation of this provision to be a question to be decided by the court and the parties then submitted that question to him for decision, rather than to the jury. [1] The majority says that the trial court interpreted this contract provision to mean that defendant could only require its contractors and subcontractors  to maintain and continue these previous safety practices, but that such control over working conditions could only be exercised upon, and not apart from, its contractor. In Harvey v. Corbett, 77 Or. 51, 59-60, 150 P. 263, 266 (1915), this court quoted with approval the following rule of law for application in such cases as stated in 1 Labatt, Master and Servant 126 (1913): `A provision in an agreement which confers upon the superior employer the right of controlling the contractor himself in respect to the details of the work must necessarily imply that he is to retain the right of controlling to the same extent the servants, who are the instruments through [whom] the contractor performs the work; otherwise such a provision would be meaningless and ineffectual.' It may be seriously questioned whether, in view of this rule, as adopted by this court, it was proper for the trial court to hold that although the contract between the company and union provided that the company would  require  its contractors to maintain previous safety practices, the company could exercise the power conferred by that contract provision only upon, and not apart from its contractor. But even if the trial court was correct in that interpretation of the contract, it still does not follow that the duty imposed by this contract upon the company to require its contractors to maintain previous safety conditions did not result in the company being responsible for this work within the intended meaning of the Employers' Liability Act. In Thomas v. Foglio, 225 Or. 540, 546-47, 358 P.2d 1066, 1069 (1961), with reference to both ORS 654.305 (the Employers' Liability Act) and 656.154 (re joint supervision and control):    We do not pass upon the question of whether the control required under each of these statutes is the same, but both statutes have been liberally construed to cover situations in which the defendant did not have actual control over the specific activity which was the immediate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Defendant's participation has been considered sufficient where it amounted to co-operative conduct in accomplishing a task in which both the defendant and plaintiff's employer were interested.    (Emphasis added) In my opinion, it follows from the applications of the rule of Thomas v. Foglio, supra , to the facts of this case, including this contract provision requiring defendant to require its contractors to maintain previous working conditions relating to falling and bucking work, that defendant had such control or responsibility over such work as to be subject to the provisions of the Employers' Liability Act. It must again be kept in mind that ORS 654.305, by its broad terms, imposes the duty to comply with the strict standards provided by the Employers' Liability Act not only upon owners who have charge of work involving risk hazard or danger, but also upon owners who are responsible for such work and that these provisions must be liberally construed to provide maximum protection to persons engaged in such work. Even if, as held by the majority, defendant is limited in the discharge of the duty imposed upon it by its labor agreement with the union to the exercise of that duty only upon the contractor, that provision imposes upon the defendant the responsibility to insist, through the contractor, that previous safety practices be continued and to require its contractor to do so. To hold to the contrary, in disregard of the plain terms of the Act imposing liability upon those responsible for dangerous work would, in my judgment, be contrary to our professed purpose to construe this statute liberally so as to provide maximum protection to those engaged in dangerous work. The widow of this workman is entitled to no less. As stated in Harvey v. Corbett, supra, 77 Or. at 58, 150 P. at 265:    We have only to apply the plain provisions of the statute.