Opinion ID: 1136922
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Allowing the following witnesses called by the Bar to testify to hearsay statements of Albert Fountain: Gwendolyn Catchings, Donald Bourgeois, Otis Kaufman, and Peter Quave.

Text: Subsections (B) and (C) shall be addressed together because they are essentially the same argument. Emil contends that it was error for the Tribunal to allow hearsay testimony about what Fountain said. The out-of-court statements of Fountain were introduced through the testimony of Catchings, Donald Bourgeois, Otis Kaufman, and Peter Quave. This issue is moot as to Catchings's testimony because we find it to be inadmissable. Emil asserts that none of these statements should have been allowed into evidence. The Tribunal ruled that the statements were admissible under rule 801(d)(2)(C) and (D) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence because the statements were made by a party opponent. Rule 801(d)(2)(C) and (D) reads in pertinent part as follows: (d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: (2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is ... (C) a statement made by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. M.R.E. Rule 801(d)(2)(C) and (D) (1995). The comment to Rule 801(d)(2)(C) and (D) read as follows: (C) The general principle survives that a statement by an agent authorized to speak by a party is tantamount to an admission by a party. The rule covers statements made by the agent to third persons as well as statements made by the agent to the principal. The essence of this is that a party's own records are admissible against him, even where there has been no intent to disclose the information therein to third persons. (D) The common law required that the agent's statement be uttered as part of his duties, i.e., within the scope of his agency. 801(d)(2)(D) regards this rigid requirement and admits a statement concerning a matter within the scope of his agency provided it was uttered during the existence of the employment relationship. Rule 801(d)(2) cmt. (1995) (emphasis in original). The rule and comment provide that the statements of an agent may be admitted under certain circumstances. However, the first question that must be answered is whether the Bar proved that Fountain was Emil's agent in order to have the statements admitted under a theory of agency. An agent is [a] person authorized by another (principal) to act for or in place of him; one intrusted with another's business... . A business representative, whose function is to bring about, modify, affect, accept performance of, or terminate contractual obligations between principal and third persons. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 63 (6th ed. 1990). [T]he burden of proving an agency relationship is upon the party asserting it. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Murphree, 653 So.2d 857, 872 (Miss. 1994) (citations omitted). Emil makes the blanket assertion that [t]he Bar totally failed to establish the relationship between Fountain and Emil necessary to constitute Fountain's alleged solicitation efforts an admissible admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(C) or (D), M.R.E.  The Bar counters that it proved agency through Fountain's own testimony. Emil did point to a few specific facts he believed supported the claim that Fountain was not an agent of Emil's. Emil contends that Fountain was not his agent and points to the following facts to support his contention: (1) Fountain was a self-employed investigator. (2) Fountain worked for a number of lawyers in 1984. (3) Fountain listed Emil's office number as his own for only a short time, and that was after the dates in the formal complaint except possibly count seven. (4) Moran first contacted Fountain, not vice versa. (5) Fountain never worked out of Emil's office building. (6) Bourgeois' mother asked Fountain's niece to ask him to go see Bourgeois. (7) Fountain did not tell Bourgeois that he was visiting him on behalf of any law firm. (8) Catchings instigated the contact between herself and Fountain. (9) Fountain was never employed as a regular employee for Emil, but worked on a case by case basis. (10) Emil knew nothing about Fountain's contacts with Bourgeois, and Catchings and Fountain never mentioned it to Emil until two years later. The Bar points to the following facts to support its assertion that Fountain was Emil's agent: (1) Fountain had no name for his investigative business. (2) He started his investigative business in the early 1980's. (3) He performed investigative work for various lawyers including Emil during 1984. (4) He used a business card for his investigative business that had Emil's office telephone number on it. (5) Fountain had a sign outside of Emil's office building that advertised Fountain's investigative services. (6) Fountain's relationship with Emil changed in 1988. (7) Fountain did investigate work for Emil in 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988. (8) Fountain received approximately $18,430.00 from Emil in 1988. (9) Fountain listed Emil's name and address on Schedule C of his 1988 income tax return as being his employer. (10) Fountain listed Emil's employer identification number as being his employer's identification number on Schedule C. (11) Fountain didn't know if he worked for any law firm other than Emil in 1988. (12) Fountain did not receive any Form 1099's from any law firm in 1987. (13) Fountain received $1,525.00 from Emil for working on the Rudy Moran case in 1984. (14) Fountain referred Rudy Moran's brother, Roland Moran, to Emil after the accident. (15) Fountain was compensated for the work he performed on the Moran case at a rate different than what he testified to. (16) Fountain investigated the Bourgeois cases on his own, but he tried to get Bourgeois to call Emil for Emil to represent him. (17) Fountain didn't know Bourgeois when he went to see him in the hospital. (18) Fountain denied that he recommended Emil to Bourgeois, but Bourgeois testified that he did. (19) Fountain had conversations with Ms. Catchings, whose interest were adverse to Don Bourgeois. (20) Emil asked Fountain to go see William Buckley in January of 1986. (21) Emil employed Fountain to render investigative services for all clients listed on Exhibit 15 except Moran. (22) Fountain told Quave that he made between $80,000.00 and $100,000.00 from working for Emil but said he was joking around and that such statement wasn't true. (23) Exhibit 14 reflects that Emil paid Fountain $1,525.00 in 1984, $500.00 in 1985, and $2,403.34 in 1987, and Exhibit 16 shows that in 1988, Emil paid Fountain $7,048.00 for work on twenty-three (23) cases. (Fountain's income tax return, Schedule C, for 1988 reflects that he received $18,430.00 from Emil instead of the aforesaid $7,048.00). Emil paid Fountain $4,920 in 1984, $963.00 in 1985, and $2,888 in 1987. (24) A significant portion of Fountain's income from 1984-1988 came from doing investigative work for Emil. Based upon the testimony of Fountain, the Tribunal held that a principal/agent relationship existed between Emil and Fountain. In First Jackson Securities Corp. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 253 Miss. 519, 176 So.2d 272 (1965), this Court held that: An agent is one who acts for or in the place of another by authority from him; one who undertakes to transact some business or manage some affairs for another by an authority and on account of the latter, and to render an account of it. He is a substitute, a deputy, appointed by the principal, with power to do the things which the principal may or can do. The most characteristic feature of an agent's employment, is that he is employed primarily to bring about business relations between his principal and third persons, and this power is perhaps the most distinctive mark on the agent as contrasted with others, not agents, who act in representative capacities. Id. 176 So.2d at 278 (quoting 2 C.J.S. Agency § 1 c., p. 1024 (1936))(emphasis added). It is a fact question as to whether the testimony showed that an agent/principal relationship existed between Emil and Fountain. There was ample testimony that Fountain had the characteristic feature of an agent. His job was to find prospective clients for Emil. The Bar called Fountain as its first witness and after establishing an agency relationship called further witnesses from whom it elicited testimony concerning Fountain's actions and statements pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(D). This is the proper procedure to be followed under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence in order to have the testimony admitted. There was no error by the Tribunal in allowing the introduction of Fountain's statements through the hearsay testimony of Donald Bourgeois, Otis Kaufman, and Peter Quave.