Opinion ID: 1130069
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Morgan's preference

Text: The superior court is required to consider the child's preference if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a preference. AS 25.24.150(c)(3). In the present case, the superior court disregarded Morgan's stated preference that he alternate years between his parents. The superior court reasoned that Morgan has made it clear that he does not want to have to make a choice and any expressed wish for equal time with his parents most likely arises out of his desire to be extremely fair to both of them. Virginia argues that Morgan did make a choice: he chose not to choose between his parents, but instead to live with both of them. She contends that in light of the GAL's findings that Morgan is an extremely bright and capable ten year old, the record shows he had the capacity to express his preference. Therefore, she concludes that it was error for the superior court to disregard Morgan's expressed preference to alternate years with each parent. The statutory standard is meant to give weight to the child's wishes. Thus, where a child wishes to divide his time between his parents because he desires to, that preference should be given weight. However, where a stated preference results entirely from the child's desire to satisfy his parent's wishes  or because he does not wish to offend either of them  such a preference does not fall within the statutory ambit. The superior court's finding on this issue amounts to a conclusion that Morgan's stated preference was unreliable in light of his desire not to hurt either of his parents. We conclude that this finding was not clearly erroneous. The GAL testified that Morgan sees things in equals. She also told the superior court judge that he should not discuss the issue with Morgan because he might simply tell the judge what he thought the judge wanted to hear. This suggests that throughout the proceeding Morgan had sought to satisfy others rather than his own desires. Based on this evidence it was reasonable for the superior court to conclude that Morgan was unable to articulate a preference and chose the alternating years schedule because he perceived it as the only way to satisfy both his parents. We therefore conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a custody arrangement contrary to Morgan's stated preference.