Opinion ID: 195633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the district court improperly limit

Text: 17 CROSS-EXAMINATION? 18 Rivera contends that the district court improperly limited his counsel's cross-examination of two government witnesses, and that this denied Rivera his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused in a criminal proceeding the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1434, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); United States v. Alvarez, 987 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 147, 126 L.Ed.2d 109 (1993). The Confrontation Clause secures an accused the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses in order to test the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony. United States v. Carty, 993 F.2d 1005, 1009 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)); Alvarez, 987 F.2d at 82 (citations omitted). The right to cross-examine an adverse witness, however, is not unlimited. United States v. Corgain, 5 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1993); Carty, 993 F.2d at 1009; Alvarez, 987 F.2d at 82. 19 [T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. 20 Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435; see also Carty, 993 F.2d at 1010; Alvarez, 987 F.2d at 82; United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 913 (1st Cir.1991). 21 We review a trial court's decision to limit cross-examination under an abuse of discretion standard. Carty, 993 F.2d at 1011; United States v. Twomey, 806 F.2d 1136, 1140 (1st Cir.1986). 22 In order to establish that the trial judge abused his discretion in limiting cross-examination, the defendant must show that the restrictions imposed were clearly prejudicial.... An abuse of discretion has occurred only if the jury is left without sufficient information concerning formative events to make a 'discriminating appraisal' of a witness's motives and bias. 23 Twomey, 806 F.2d at 1140 (quoting United States v. Campbell, 426 F.2d 547, 550 (2d Cir.1970)) (internal citations omitted). Rivera has made no such showing. 24 Rivera contends that his right to cross-examine adverse witnesses was unfairly restricted on four occasions. First, Rivera argues that he was not fully permitted to cross-examine the confidential informant, Linder, regarding whether Linder had ever been a member of Hitler's Youth League, or a member of the French Foreign Legion, an organization known for being soldiers of fortune. Rivera claims that this testimony was relevant in order to show that Linder was familiar with guns, and that Linder was a mercenary willing to do anything for money. 25 With respect to Linder's alleged membership in Hitler's Youth League, Rivera's counsel failed to establish any foundation showing how this line of questioning would establish that Linder was familiar with guns. The record indicates that after the trial judge very patiently informed counsel that he needed to establish the relevance of this question, and that he needed to lay some sort of foundation for this question, Rivera's counsel did not pursue this specific line of questioning. Thus, counsel, and not the court, effectively cut off his own cross-examination. Moreover, the fact that Linder may have been a member of Hitler's Youth League when he was 9 years old was of virtually no relevance to this case, and the trial judge would have acted well within his discretion in not permitting this line of questioning. With respect to Linder's membership in the French Foreign Legion, the record shows that Rivera's counsel was able to cross-examine Linder adequately, and that Linder admitted that he learned about guns while in the French Foreign Legion, and that he was paid for serving in this organization. 1 26 Second, Rivera contends that the court improperly limited his cross-examination of Monteagudo with respect to his attempts to cast doubt on Monteagudo's veracity and objectivity. Rivera's counsel asked Monteagudo about the true name of Queque, the man who had accompanied Monteagudo when he attempted to smuggle the eleven bales of cocaine into Puerto Rico on December 11, 2 and the true name of Monteagudo's wife, in an attempt to show that Queque and his wife were cousins, and that Monteagudo had a reason to steal part of the shipment of cocaine with Queque. 27 Defense Counsel: Okay, So you were traveling with this fellow Queque and he's Dominican like you; yes or no? 28 Monteagudo: Yes, sir. 29 Defense Counsel: And who is a friend of yours? 30 Monteagudo: Yes, sir. 31 Defense Counsel: And whose real name is Nelson Mota; yes or no? 32 Monteagudo: I don't know his true name. 33 Defense Counsel: Your wife's name is Iris Mota; isn't it? 34 Prosecutor: We have an objection. 35 A lengthy sidebar conference was then held, and the district court stated that defense counsel could ask Monteagudo if he knew what Queque's true name was, but that counsel could not interject Nelson Mota's name into the question unless he had some good faith basis to show that Queque's true name was in fact Nelson Mota. Defense counsel stated that his investigation showed that Queque's true name was Nelson Mota, but counsel was not able to point to any specific fact, or to specifically identify any potential witness who would be able to support the conclusion of his supposed investigation. The district court then refused to permit Rivera's counsel to pursue the line of questioning which expressly linked the name of Nelson Mota to Queque. 36 The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Rivera's counsel had failed to establish a good faith basis to warrant further inquiry regarding the true name of Queque. See, e.g., Carty, 993 F.2d at 1010; Rivera-Santiago, 872 F.2d at 1085. While the purpose of cross-examination is to impeach the credibility of a witness, the basis for the impeachment cannot be speculation and innuendo with no evidentiary foundation. Rivera-Santiago, 872 F.2d at 1085. There was simply no evidentiary basis for defense counsel's theory that Queque and Monteagudo's wife, Iris Mota, were related. Nor was there any substantiated basis showing that, based on this alleged relationship, Monteagudo and Queque collaborated to steal some of the cocaine. 37 The third alleged instance of the court improperly curtailing cross-examination involved defense counsel's questioning of Monteagudo regarding the terms of his plea agreement with the government. Specifically, Rivera's counsel asked Monteagudo if when he entered into the plea agreement, the government told him that if he cooperated there was the possibility that he could go free without serving any jail time at all. Monteagudo replied no. Rivera's counsel then asked him if he otherwise knew that there was a possibility he could go free if he entered into a plea agreement. The government objected, and the court sustained the objection, stating that Monteagudo had just testified that he had not been told that. 38 A review of the record makes it clear that the jury was well aware of the fact that Monteagudo had entered into a plea agreement with the government, and that he would receive favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony. On direct examination, Monteagudo stated that he had entered into a plea agreement with the government, and the agreement was admitted into evidence. The jury could therefore see precisely what benefits Monteagudo was given in exchange for his cooperation. On cross-examination, Monteagudo also stated that he knew he was facing a sentence of 15 years to life when he decided to cooperate with the government. This evidence provided the jury with sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of Monteagudo's motives and biases. 3 See, e.g., Twomey, 806 F.2d at 1139-40. 39 As a fourth ground, Rivera claims that the court improperly cut off his cross-examination of Monteagudo regarding his understanding of his oath to tell the truth. The court sustained an objection by the prosecutor regarding whether Monteagudo knew that he was suppose to tell the truth. The record shows that Rivera's counsel had previously made several references to the fact that Monteagudo was under oath and that he had an obligation to tell the truth. On the occasion that the court sustained the objection, it acted well within its discretion by cutting off repetitive questioning. 40 As a final matter, we have reviewed the entire cross-examination of both Linder and Monteagudo. The cross-examination of each witness was thorough, and we believe that the jury had sufficient information regarding the witnesses' motives and biases to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the truthfulness of their testimony. 41