Opinion ID: 894934
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Their Testimony Was Sufficiently Reliable

Text: An expert's testimony, to be admissible, must possess a reliable foundation. [3] Admission of expert testimony that does not meet the reliability requirement is an abuse of discretion. [4] Expert testimony is unreliable if it is based on unreliable data, or if the expert draws conclusions from his underlying data based on flawed methodology. [5] Expert testimony is also unreliable if there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered. [6] In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1995) we set out six factors courts may consider in deciding whether expert testimony is reliable: 1. the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; 2 the extent to which the technique relies on the subjective interpretation of the expert; 3. whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; 4 the technique's potential rate of error; 5. whether the underlying theory, or technique generally has been accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and 6 the nonjudicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique. [7] We have recognized that the Robinson factors are nonexclusive [8] and have specifically noted that the Robinson factors are not always useful in evaluating expert testimony in automobile accident cases. [9] As in Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc ., another automobile accident case, the Robinson factors do not readily lend themselves to a review of the expert testimony in the pending case, [10] but there must be some basis for the opinion offered to show its reliability. [11] And as in Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Ramirez, yet another automobile accident case, [a]n expert's bare opinion will not suffice and is unreliable if based solely upon his subjective interpretation of the facts. [12] We need not assess the reliability of Hall's testimony, because we hold that Aerts's testimony was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission and is some evidence that a manufacturing defect caused the accident. Ford never challenged Aerts's credentials. His testimony offered, a plausible theory of how the accident occurred. Aerts based his testimony on deviations between Ford's own specifications as to torque, alignment of the flattened portion of the u-bolt, and the tolerance for the difference in u-bolt leg lengths. He relied on observations and measurements of tangible truck components, which were documented with photographs and a videotape of his initial examination of the truck. The u-bolts and rear-axle assembly were admitted into evidence. The jury was free to examine this, evidence and the Ford specifications that were also admitted into evidence. To a significant extent, deciding whether the truck lost its drive shaft before striking the Firebird, or instead the drive shaft dislodged after striking the parked cars and the street curb, turned on whether the jury believed Ledesma or Plyant. Ledesma insisted he was driving carefully when suddenly he lost control of the truck and veered into the Firebird. He claims that the truck started lurching before the impact, consistent with a truck malfunction that caused the drive shaft to drop to the street. Pylant's testimony was inconsistent with the investigating police officer's report and testimony, which indicated that Plyant talked to the officer but did not claim to have, witnessed the accident. Ledesma likewise observed no witnesses to the accident, claiming instead that Plyant and others came outside after hearing the accident. The jury was of course entitled to weigh the credibility of these lay witnesses and apparently believed Ledesma's account. The jury was also entitled to take into account that Ford's expert May had worked for Ford for decades and had never found a defect in a Ford product. We also conclude that Ford overstates the effectiveness of its cross-examination of Aerts. While May explained that Ford's tightening equipment provided sockets easily deep enough to tighten the uneven legs of the u-bolt, Aerts claimed that the uneven legs might still cause the equipment to slip off the shorter leg, or under-tighten the shorter leg if the equipment lacked the flexibility to properly tighten uneven legs, although May contended that each socket was on the same head but driven independently. Aerts conceded that the u-bolt could have been stretched in the accident, perhaps accounting for the inadequate torques he measured, but he also found that the overall length of the allegedly defective u-bolt was the same length as exemplar u-bolts provided by Ford and was within one millimeter of the length of another u-bolt from the truck. He conceded that he had no photographic proof of indentation of the axle caused by the asymmetrical flat portion of the u-bolt and that I never came back here to check that, but he opined that the asymmetrical manufacture, regardless of indentation of the axle housing, reduced the area of contact between the u-bolt and axle. The jury could infer that Ford would not have specified flattening of the curved end of the u-bolt?; which indisputably required an extra manufacturing step, unless Ford thought that procedure was needed. Aerts also testified that regardless of the shape of the u-bolt, Ford might have failed to tighten the u-bolt nuts to Ford's own torque specification because the air pressure on the tightening equipment was incorrect or for some other reason, thus explaining the inadequate torque and vibration damage he observed. His review of the accident scene photographs further persuaded him that the accident did not cause the u-bolt slippage and to opine that I don't think [the u-bolt] should have come loose with what I saw happen there on that street, Ford presented a strong defense, but ultimately the jury rejected it. Aerts's testimony does not present a case where there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered, [13] or where the expert's testimony amounted to nothing more than a recitation of his credentials and a subjective opinion. [14] We conclude that Ford's complaints about Aerts's testimony go to its weight, not its admissibility. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting Aerts's testimony.