Opinion ID: 2019723
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prosecution Comment on Defendant's Lack of Remorse

Text: Defendant next contends that the prosecutor, during the death sentencing hearing, made several comments on defendant's lack of remorse that violated defendant's constitutional right to remain silent. The State responds that the prosecutor's comments were proper references to defendant's lack of remorse and did not infringe upon his right to remain silent. A criminal defendant has a fifth amendment right not to testify as a witness in his or her own behalf, and the prosecutor is forbidden to make direct or indirect comment on the exercise of that right. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, 110 (1965); People v. Arman, 131 Ill.2d 115, 125-26, 137 Ill.Dec. 5, 545 N.E.2d 658 (1989) (collecting cases); 725 ILCS 5/115-16 (West 2006) (prohibiting comment on criminal defendant's failure to testify). The test for determining if improper comment has been made on a defendant's failure to take the witness stand and testify is whether the reference was intended or calculated to direct the jury's attention to the defendant's neglect to avail himself of his legal right to testify. In making this determination, a court should examine the challenged comments in the context of the entire proceeding. Arman, 131 Ill.2d at 126, 137 Ill.Dec. 5, 545 N.E.2d 658 (and cases cited therein). We earlier recounted that, at the second stage of the death sentencing hearing, defendant presented as mitigation evidence the testimony of his half-sister, Anita Henry. The prosecutor ended cross-examining Henry as follows: [Prosecutor]: Miss Henry, has the defendant ever told you that he is sorry for what happened on September 23, of 2000? [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge. THE COURT: I will sustain the objection. [Prosecutor]: Has he ever shown you any remorse? [Defense Counsel]: Objection. THE COURT: Objection sustained. [Prosecutor]: Nothing else, Judge. [Defense Counsel]: I have nothing further. Thank you, Miss Henry. THE COURT: Thank you. (Witness excused). During closing argument, the prosecutor remarked as follows: Look at his time when he's in custody. What does being in custody mean to Joseph Bannister because we got to look at it because that's one of the things you are going to consider. The death sentence is appropriate in light of all the aggravation you have before you, but if he doesn't get a death sentence, he's going to be in custody, so you might as well look at what life is going to be for Joseph Bannister[,] In custody, it's not too bad. He gets to talk to people, he gets mail, he gets to watch TV, and he gets to use gang paraphernalia, he gets to be respected by guards. He gets to beat up other prisoners and/or guards. He gets to hang with his fellow GD's, that's Joseph Bannister's life in prison, and he's not there contemplating the horror of what he did. He's not sitting there, `Say, you know what, I've done some wrong in my life,' have you heard that from Joseph Bannister? [Defense Counsel]: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. [Prosecutor]: `I'm sorry,' have you heard any remorse from Joseph Bannister? [Defense Counsel]: Objection. THE COURT: I will sustain the objection. Ask the jury to disregard. The prosecutor further remarked: When we were questioning you during jury selection, we told you that you would hear some bad things about Joseph Bannister and some good things about Joseph Bannister. I wantand you would hear some statutory factors.    Each of us gets to present any non-statutory factors we wish, and I'm going to tell you and you're going to even think of some more because there's a lot out there, you've listened to this evidence for a bit, some of the non-statutory aggravating factors that you can hold against Joseph Bannister when you make your determination that he is more than deserving of the death sentence.    Henrietta Banks was defenseless. She's defenseless, and he shoots her in the head at close range. Sharon was defenseless for that matter, and he shot her, put that down as another aggravating factor.       Ladies and gentlemen, [in] this country we only survive by obeying the laws. Put it down in bold letters in aggravation that he killed people that had been in court willing to testify against him earlier, that there had been an order of protection, a whole set of laws had been developed, to protect people when people are in their violent cycles or violent period, and he disobeyed it.    Put that down in aggravation.    [P]ut down that he killed a woman that he knew had two small children.    Put down the other children were present. Latoria, Cedrick [ sic ], you heard them. He couldn't have missed them being there, and they're screaming, and he killed Henrietta in front of small children, and them paying a price for that forever, and put that down in aggravation. And while you're at it, put down his flight, that from September 23, 2000 to February 11 of 2001, he's at large.    Can you imagine the horror and the fear that Sharon Banks felt every time she looked over her shoulder knowing that Joseph Bannister was out there?    Put that down in aggravation; caught with his false I.D., there's another one. And while you are at it, put down all the abuse he gave to Sharon all those years, off and on through those years, put that down. Disobeying the Court orders, the judge's order, bond, counseling, domestic violence, having a handgun    have that down.    Joseph Bannister doesn't care about us, he doesn't care about the court system, put that in aggravation, and no remorse, put that down. [Defense Counsel]: Objection. THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. Defendant now argues before this court: By arguing to the jury that it was a factor in aggravation that [defendant] had not taken the stand during his trial and expressed remorse for his actions, the prosecutor penalized [defendant] for exercising his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. (Emphasis added.) This contention lacks merit. The prosecutor did not say anything about defendant's failure to testify, and the above-quoted remarks plainly were not intended or calculated to draw attention thereto. Rather, the prosecutor's remarks were fair comments on defendant's lack of remorse. In determining the appropriate sentence, the sentencing body is to consider all matters that reflect upon the defendant's personality, propensities, purposes, tendencies, and every aspect of the defendant's life relevant to the sentencing decision. People v. Barrow, 133 Ill.2d 226, 281, 139 Ill.Dec. 728, 549 N.E.2d 240 (1989). `This court has consistently held that a convicted defendant's remorse or the absence of it is a proper subject for consideration at sentencing.' People v. Burgess, 176 Ill.2d 289, 317, 223 Ill.Dec. 624, 680 N.E.2d 357 (1997), quoting Barrow, 133 Ill.2d at 281, 139 Ill.Dec. 728, 549 N.E.2d 240. The challenged remarks did not derive from defendant's failure to incriminate himself, but rather from defendant's apparent lack of remorse for the shooting, which resulted in Henrietta's death, Sharon's severe injury, and the endangerment and traumatization of their mother and children. See, e.g., Burgess, 176 Ill.2d at 317, 223 Ill.Dec. 624, 680 N.E.2d 357; Barrow, 133 Ill.2d at 281, 139 Ill.Dec. 728, 549 N.E.2d 240. Further, any improper inferences from the prosecutor's comments were cured by the trial court sustaining defense counsel's objections and the court's instructions to the jury to disregard comments to which objections were sustained. People v. Neal, 111 Ill.2d 180, 196, 95 Ill.Dec. 283, 489 N.E.2d 845 (1985). Defendant argues that any cure was nullified where the prosecutor deliberately ignored the trial court's ruling and continued with the improper argument. Defendant cites People v. Weinstein, 35 Ill.2d 467, 220 N.E.2d 432 (1966), in which the prosecution represented to the jury that it was the defendant's burden to present evidence creating a reasonable doubt of guilt. After five or six such statements, defense counsel finally objected and the trial court sustained the objection. Undaunted by the court's ruling, the prosecutor then immediately continued   . Over all, it appears that some seventeen objections were made, and sustained, as the prosecutors argued to the jury. Weinstein, 35 Ill.2d at 469, 220 N.E.2d 432. This court observed: Such persistence eliminates the salutary effect of the court's ruling in sustaining objections to the argument. Weinstein, 35 Ill.2d at 471, 220 N.E.2d 432. However, unlike the obviously improper remarks in Weinstein, the challenged comments in this case pertain to defendant's lack of remorse, which is a proper subject for consideration at sentencing. See Barrow, 133 Ill.2d at 281, 139 Ill.Dec. 728, 549 N.E.2d 240. Further, unlike the persistent improper remarks in Weinstein, the challenged remarks in this case were few and fleeting in the context of the entire death sentencing hearing. The jury was instructed that closing arguments are not evidence and that the jury should disregard arguments not based on the evidence. The jury was also specifically instructed not to consider defendant's failure to testify in arriving at its verdict. Thus, any alleged error resulting from the challenged remarks was cured. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 171 Ill.2d 74, 105-06, 215 Ill.Dec. 75, 662 N.E.2d 1215 (1996); People v. Baptist, 76 Ill.2d 19, 30, 27 Ill.Dec. 792, 389 N.E.2d 1200 (1979).