Opinion ID: 1504641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Warranties by the Assured.

Text: The assured's occupation or business, where the subject of this insurance is used in connection therewith, the description of the automobile insured, the facts with respect to the purchase of same, the uses to which it is and will be put, and the place where it is usually kept, as set forth and contained in this policy, are statements of facts known to and warranted by the assured to be true, and this policy is issued by the company relying upon the truth thereof. Among the warranties of the assured was the following statement: Actual cost to assured, including equipment, $2,800. The actual cost of the insured automobile was not $2,800. On the contrary, plaintiff had acquired the automobiles for the transfer of its entire capital stock. Counsel for the plaintiff admitted that the statement as to actual cost was a warranty, and that the statement of $2,800 as the actual cost was untrue. Plaintiff's reliance is on waiver and estoppel of the defendant, in that Barnes & Barnard, agents of the insurance company, knew that the consideration given for the automobile was corporate stock, and not $2,800, and themselves wrote into the policy $2,800 as the actual cost of the car. Barnes & Barnard were agents of the insurance company, authorized to solicit insurance, receive premiums, and countersign and issue policies. There is nothing, however, in the record to indicate that they had authority to waive any of the terms of the policy, except by a writing attached to it as required by the provisions of the policy above quoted. The rule adopted in many states is that an insurance company cannot avail itself of provisions in its policy that it should be void if certain facts therein mentioned as essential to the insurance should be found not to exist when the policy was issued through its agent, and that the existence of such facts and the knowledge of the agent may be proved by parol. But the contrary rule laid down by the Supreme Court is that it is not competent to show by parol evidence that a condition stated in an insurance policy as essential to its validity was known by the issuing agent not to exist at the time the policy was issued, when the policy provided that no officer or agent should have power to waive any of the terms of the policy, except by indorsement written thereon or attached thereto. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, 531, 6 S. Ct. 837, 29 L. Ed. 934; Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Building Ass'n, 183 U. S. 308, 22 S. Ct. 133, 46 L. Ed. 213; Lumber Underwriters of New York v. Rife, 237 U. S. 605, 35 S. Ct. 717, 59 L. Ed. 1140. These decisions are controlling. Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222, 20 L. Ed. 617, and Insurance Co. v. Mahone, 21 Wall. 152, 22 L. Ed. 593, relied on by plaintiff, have no application, because the policy contained no limitation of the authority of the agent to waive conditions. We are unable to escape the conclusion that there was no authorized waiver of the untrue statement as to the actual cost of the insured property, and that therefore all of the policies are invalid. The jury should have been instructed to find a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount of the premiums paid, with interest from date of payment and no more. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, 6 S. Ct. 837, 29 L. Ed. 934. Reversed.