Opinion ID: 160638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Plea and the Waiver

Text: 29 The plea agreement provides that Defendant knowingly and expressly waives the right to appeal [his] sentence on any ground, except to challenge an upward departure from the applicable guideline range as determined by the Court. R., Vol. 1, Doc. 4, Plea Agreement at 9. It also states that Defendant specifically waives any appeal rights conferred by 18 USC 3742, any post-conviction proceedings, and any habeas corpus proceedings, id., and that Defendant agrees not to contest such sentence in any post conviction proceeding. Id. at 10. Finally, the agreement provides that Defendant fully understand[s] [the plea agreement] and . . . voluntarily agree[s] to it without reservation. Id. at 12. 30 In determining whether to accept Defendant's plea, the district court specifically addressed the waiver issue in a colloquy with Defendant. The court described the terms of the waiver of appellate and postconviction relief, repeatedly asking Defendant if he understood the ramifications of waiving his right to appeal or to file any postconviction relief or habeas corpus proceedings. See id., Supp. Vol. I at 18-19. The court stated that [t]here could be a question as to whether you can actually waive all of these rights as provided for in paragraph 18, noting that it did not know the full and complete answer to that question. Id. at 19. But, the court instructed Defendant, it's very possible that if you wanted to appeal [or] to file a post-conviction [or] habeas corpus [proceeding], the Court could very well find that you have waived all of those rights and you would not be permitted to have the appeal or the post-conviction proceeding or the habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at 19-20. Defendant clearly and repeatedly stated that he understood that he was giving up these rights. 6 See id. at 20. 31 The record is full of similar representations with respect to the plea agreement as well. The court followed the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, explaining and determining if Defendant understood the nature of the charges; the possible penalties including supervised release and the court's role in sentencing and applying the sentencing guidelines; Defendant's right to plead not guilty and to be tried by a jury; the possibility that his answers to the court's questions could be used against him in a prosecution for perjury; and, as reviewed above, the terms and implications of the waiver provision. To all these inquiries, Defendant responded that he understood his rights and what he was giving up by way of his plea. When asked whether his guilty plea was made voluntarily and completely of [his] own free choice, Defendant answered, Yes, R., Supp. Vol. I at 13, and he testified that his plea was not obtained by any use of force or compulsion. The court also questioned whether Defendant understood the terms and conditions of the plea agreement, and Defendant stated that he did. In sum, the court determined that Defendant was mentally competent to understand the consequences of his plea and that the plea was made voluntarily and with [an] understanding of the nature of the charges . . . [and] the consequences of [the] plea. See id. at 34. 32 In light of these statements by the court and Mr. Cockerham, we hold that Defendant entered the plea and made the waiver knowingly and voluntarily. We therefore affirm the district court's decision enforcing the waiver and dismissing the 2255 motion as it relates to the sentencing for Defendant's drug convictions.