Opinion ID: 766203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of ADA Title II

Text: 11 Analyzing whether California's $6 placard fee violates the ADA requires three inquiries. First, what obligations does Title II impose upon states regarding fees for measures under the ADA? Second, does Public Law 100-641, 23 U.S.C.S 402 (West Supp. 1999), which contemplates a fee for disabled parking placards as part of a uniform system for disabled parking, limit states' Title II obligations? Third, are these obligations violated by California's $6 fee for parking placards? As explained below, we conclude that the $6 fee constitutes a surcharge for required measures in violation of the ADA and its implementing regulations.
12 In order to evaluate whether a fee constitutes a surcharge that violates Title II of the ADA, we conduct a two-part inquiry. First, as a threshold matter, we consider whether the measure for which California levies the fee is required to provide that individual or group nondiscriminatory treatment as mandated by the ADA. 28 C.F.R. S 35.130(f). If California charges for a measure not required under the ADA, the inquiry ends; 28 C.F.R. S 35.130(f) only forbids surcharges for required measures. 13 Second, we evaluate whether the fee for the measure is a surcharge; in other words, we consider whether it constitutes a charge that nondisabled people would not incur. If nondisabled people pay the same fee for an equivalent service, the charge to disabled people would not constitute a surcharge on a required measure. Thus, for example, a state can charge a fee for disabled license plates so long as it charges the same fee for nondisabled license plates. 14 Because surcharges against disabled people constitute facial discrimination, the meaningful access test formulated by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), does not apply. Under this test, a court considers whether the allegedly discriminatory measure prevents meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers. Id. at 301. The Ninth Circuit has applied this test in the ADA context to evaluating whether facially neutral laws violate S 12132. See Hunsaker v. Contra Costa County, 149 F.3d 1041, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1998); Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1996). 15 Using this standard in the context of facially discriminatory laws, however, would ignore the clear language of Title II. Cf. Bay Area Addiction Research & Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 733-35 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the reasonable modifications test does not apply to facially discriminatory laws because they present per seS 12132 violations). S 12132 covers not only exclusion from participation in or [denial of] benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, but also being subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. S 12132. By reviewing all S 12132 claims under a meaningful access test, this Circuit would focus only on exclusions and denials, and ignore completely the discrimination clause, not to mention the explicitlanguage of the ADA regulation at issue here. Other courts evaluating fees similar to the one at issue here have read the statute and ADA regulation together rather than applying a meaningful access test. See Thompson v. Colorado, 29 F. Supp.2d 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 1998); Thrope v. State of Ohio, 19 F. Supp.2d 816, 824 (S.D. Ohio 1998); McGarry v. Director, Dept. of Revenue, 7 F. Supp.2d 1022, 1028 (W.D. Mo. 1998). We thus follow their approach and do the same; we hold that when states apply charges to required measures, we consider whether these fees constitute a surcharge forbidden under the ADA.
16 The government urges us to view Public Law 100-641 and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it as justifying the placards surcharge. On November 9, 1988, prior to the passage of the ADA, Congress enacted Public Law 100-641, 23 U.S.C. S 402. This law indicates that the Secretary of Transportation shall issue regulations which: (1) establish a uniform system for handicapped parking designed to enhance the safety of handicapped individuals and (2) encourage adoption of such system by all the states. See id. 17 Pursuant to Public Law 100-641, the Department of Transportation (DOT) promulgated regulations in March 1991, eight months after Congress enacted the ADA. The DOT regulations provide in pertinent part that: 18 Special license plates, removable windshield placards, or temporary removable windshield placards displaying the International Symbol of Access shall be the only recognized means of identifying vehicles permitted to utilize parking spaces reserved for persons with disabilities which limit or impair the ability to walk. 19 23 C.F.R. S 1235.6 (1998). DOT regulations further provide that each state shall issue special license plates upon the application of a person with a disability that impairs the ability to walk and that [t]he fee for the issuance of a special license plate shall not exceed the fee charged for a similar license plate for the same class vehicle. Id.S 1235.3. In contrast to the provisions concerning license plate fees, neither Public Law 100-641 nor the regulations prohibit the imposition of placard fees. 20 The government's argument fails, however, because Public Law 100-641 is purely hortatory. See McGarry, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1026. Congress enacted Public Law 100-641 two years before the ADA and has no enforcement mechanism. Even California concedes that in recognizing principles of federalism and state sovereignty, Congress rendered state compliance with Public Law 100-641 completely voluntary. 21 In contrast, the ADA expressly applies to the states through Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers, as discussed in more detail in Part II. Regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA bind states so long as the regulations are not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the ADA. See Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 1996). As discussed below, 28 C.F.R. S 35.130(f) meets that standard. We thus evaluate California's surcharge based on the requirements of Title II and 28 C.F.R. S 35.130(f). Public Law 100-641 does not impact our analysis.
22 Applying this approach to the California fee at issue, we find the fee to be a surcharge for a required measure in violation of the ADA. The ADA requires special parking arrangements such as handicapped parking spaces. These spaces allow disabled people equal access to public buildings in which California provides services, programs, and activities. Because California polices handicapped parking spaces, disabled people need placards or license plates to use them. California thus meets the ADA's requirement for nondiscriminatory access to public buildings by providing disabled people with placards and license plates. 23 Furthermore, California's provision of license plates alone would not be sufficient to give individuals nondiscriminatory access to public places. In addition to the fact that many disabled people may not own cars or have someone who drives them 51% of the time, even those who do may sometimes have to use other vehicles as passengers or as drivers. They may rent cars or wish to drive with another person. To require disabled people to use only a designated car for which they have a license plate restricts them far more in accessing public places than people who lack their disabilities. This reasoning comports with cases by other courts that have struck down fees like the one in California. See Thompson, 29 F. Supp.2d at 1231-32; Thrope, 19 F. Supp.2d at 825; McGarry, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1028. 24 Because providing the placards is a required measure under California's current program of providing access to handicapped parking spaces, we turn to the question of whether charging the fee for them constitutes a forbidden surcharge. This issue hinges on whether California provides the same fee for an equivalent service for nondisabled people. In support of such equivalence, the appellees argue that the placard fee is comparable to, and probably less than, charges nondisabled people accrue at parking meters. California thus claims that if the $6 fee is viewed as a partial payment of waived meter fees, then disabled people are not being charged more than other people. 25 California's argument fails, however, because many public places do not have parking meters and people who lack disabilities face no fees in parking at those places. Such a distinction is unacceptable. Charging disabled people for parking that would otherwise be free constitutes discrimination in the provision of access to public buildings, a measure required under the ADA. We thus affirm the district court on this issue and hold that California's fee for handicapped parking placards violates the ADA.