Opinion ID: 768193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Calculation of tolling period

Text: 4 Petitioner-appellant presents a question of first impression in this circuit, namely whether the one-year limitations period in the AEDPA began on the date he exhausted state collateral review or merely tolled while his state application was pending. Specifically, Smith contends that the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim presented in his state coram nobis and federal habeas corpus petitions did not accrue until the state court denied relief on November 17, 1997. Smith therefore argues that the one-year period in which he had to file his federal habeas petition began on November 17, 1997, and his February 12, 1998, federal petition was timely. The district court correctly rejected Smith's effort to reset the one-year limitations period. In affirming the decision of the district court, we align ourselves with our sister circuits that have addressed this issue. 5 In general, the AEDPA restricts the ability of prisoners to seek federal review of their state criminal convictions. Section 2244(d) created a new one-year statute of limitations in which state prisoners could file applications for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The one-year period most generally runs from the date on which the state criminal judgment became final. See 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). Prisoners like Smith, whose convictions became final prior to the AEDPA's effective date of April 24, 1996, have a one-year grace period in which to file their habeas corpus petitions, or until April 24, 1997. See Ross, 150 F.3d at 102-03. Section 2244 also has a tolling provision that applies to both the statute of limitations and the one-year grace period. See Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that AEDPA's pending-state-petition tolling provision does apply to a petition challenging a pre-AEDPA conviction), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Jan. 24, 2000) (No. 99-1238). Section 2244(d)(2) states: The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). 6 Smith's appeal concerns the proper application of the tolling provision and calculation of the one-year grace period. There is no dispute that because Smith's conviction became final in July 1991, before the effective date of the AEDPA, he obtained the benefit of the one-year grace period and had until April 24, 1997, to file a federal habeas corpus petition. There also is no dispute that his state coram nobis petition, if pending within that one-year grace period, would trigger Section 2244(d)(2)'s tolling allowance. 2 For the purposes of this appeal, we assume that Smith filed his coram nobis petition in time to trigger Section 2244(d)(2)'s tolling provision. The primary issue before us, therefore, is the proper calculation of tolling. Smith contends that he should receive one year from the date on which the state court denied his coram nobis petition. Respondent advocates a different calculation: (1) the one-year grace period ran for 364 days, until Smith filed the coram nobis petition; (2) the approximately 208-day period during which the coram nobis petition was pending is excluded; (3) the one-year grace period resumed running on November 17, 1997, when the state court denied Smith's petition; (4) Smith therefore had one day remaining in his grace period in which to file the federal habeas petition, or until November 18, 1997. Under this calculation, Smith's February 12, 1998, federal habeas petition was approximately 86 days late. 7 Other circuit courts of appeals considering this issue uniformly have adopted the interpretation that respondent advocates. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003,1006-07 (9th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1999) (No. 99-899); Gaskins v. Duval, 183 F.3d 8, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1999); Haney v. Addison, 175 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 1999); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 712 (5th Cir. 1999); Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 811 (2000). The case upon which Smith relies, Lovasz v. Vaughn, is consistent with this precedent because it concerns a prisoner who filed state collateral review papers before the grace period even had begun to run, tolling the one-year statute of limitations while the petition was pending rather than resetting the limitations period. See Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1998). The Southern District of New York case that Smith claims supports his interpretation issued before our decision in Ross v. Artuz clarified calculation of the statute of limitations period for prisoners whose convictions became final before the AEDPA became effective. See Valentine v. Senkowski, 966 F. Supp. 239, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In any event, even though the opinion itself contains broad language favoring Smith's position, the prisoner's habeas petition in Valentine would have been timely pursuant to the calculation respondent advocates. See id. at 240-41. District courts in this circuit routinely have adopted respondent's interpretation of tolling calculation. See Torres v. Miller, 1999 WL 714349 -4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1999); Lucidore v. New York State Div. of Parole, 1999 WL 566362  (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1999); Irving v. Artuz, 1999 WL 592665  (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 1999). We find unpersuasive Smith's argument that respondent's interpretation would result in premature state applications for relief. The AEDPA takes into consideration circumstances, such as the discovery of new facts, that reset the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). 8 We therefore hold that proper calculation of Section 2244(d)(2)'s tolling provision excludes time during which properly filed state relief applications are pending but does not reset the date from which the one-year statute of limitations begins to run. Not only is this interpretation uniformly followed in other circuits, but it also comports with the goal of the AEDPA to prevent undue delays in federal habeas review. If the one-year period began anew when the state court denied collateral relief, then state prisoners could extend or manipulate the deadline for federal habeas review by filing additional petitions in state court. The district court therefore correctly dismissed Smith's habeas petition.