Opinion ID: 1315981
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vagueness as applied

Text: We examine as-applied vagueness claims in two steps: `a court must first determine whether the statute gives the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited and then consider whether the law provides explicit standards for those who apply it.' Id. at 486, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (quoting United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 550 (2d Cir.1993)). The main thrust of Rubin's vagueness challenge is that the public charge regulation gave him no opportunity to know his conduct was prohibited, because it is addressed exclusively to DSS, not to service providers like Allstate. The public charge regulation states that payments are made at the lower of the rate charged to the general public and a DSS-computed rate; it does not state that service providers themselves shall not bill DSS at a rate higher than that charged to the public. Thus, Rubin argues, the regulation is vague not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). As a result, he argues that his conviction on the grand larceny and false instrument counts must be overturned. The Court of Appealsto whose opinion we must defer unless it was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law disagreed. It wrote, [P]laintiffs were not subject to prosecution because they allegedly violated the public charge regulation. Rather, the intended charges were grand larceny and offering false instruments for filing. The alleged violation of the regulation was only an element of proof of these crimes and violation of the regulation alone, without a knowing attempt to deceive or defraud, could not support criminal liability. Ulster Home Care, 731 N.Y.S.2d 910, 757 N.E.2d at 767 (2001). [11] We agree. Rubin is right that he could not have been charged with violating the public charge regulation standing alone. But he was charged instead with grand larceny and offering a false instrument for filing. Second-degree grand larceny has only two elements: there must be proof that a person stole property, and the value of that property must exceed $50,000. In re Virag, 307 A.D.2d 34, 761 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (1st Dept.2003) (per curiam) (citation omitted). In turn, [a] person steals property and commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof. N.Y. Penal Law § 155.05(1). First-degree filing of a false instrument has three elements: (1) knowledge that the instrument is false, (2) intent to defraud the state or any of its subdivisions, and (3) presentation of the instrument for filing. Norman v. Hynes, 20 A.D.3d 125, 799 N.Y.S.2d 222, 227 (2nd Dept.2005) (per curiam); see N.Y. Penal Law§ 175.35. The public charge regulation is not a criminal statute that required Rubin to adhere to a specific standard of conduct; it was a factor that the jury considered in deciding whether Rubin took state property wrongfully (an element of the grand larceny count) and whether he knew that his certification of compliance with state regulations was false (an element of the false instrument counts). The public charge regulation helps establish the wrongfulness of Rubin's conduct even though its wording was not expressly directed to him: as the People proved at trial, Rubin knew that DSS was not supposed to reimburse Allstate at rates higher than those Allstate charged to the public, and because of that knowledge, intentionally manipulated the agency's rate sheets and cost reports to deceive DSS about Allstate's true rates. Similarly, Rubin's knowledge of the public charge regulation showed that his statement that Allstate's claims were in accordance with state regulations was false, because Rubin knew that his Medicaid reimbursement rate did not accord with DSS's calculation methods as stated in its regulations. Viewed in this context, Rubin's vagueness claim fails the test of common sense. It should have been apparent to anyone operating in the field of Medicaid that a service provider was not allowed to overcharge the state and conceal that he was doing so. The Due Process Clause requires only that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden, and thus not lull the potential defendant into a false sense of security, giving him no reason even to suspect that his conduct might be within its scope. United States v. Herrera, 584 F.2d 1137, 1149 (2d Cir.1978). Rubin unquestionably knew he was committing a wrongful act when he concealed from DSS his agency's true rate for services to the public. See United States v. Ingredient Tech. Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 96 (2d Cir.1983). This conclusion is not altered by Rubin's related argument that the public charge regulation was rendered vague by the existence of the unacceptable practices regulation. Rubin argues that even if the former regulation describes a standard of conduct for service providers, it is contradicted by the latter, which (1) bars service providers only from charging DSS substantially in excess of the general public's rates, and (2) refers to the customary charges or costs charged to the public, not the rate. N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 515.2(b)(1)(i)(d). The second variation is trivial. The first is not a conflicting command[], United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176, 73 S.Ct. 189, 97 L.Ed. 200 (1952), but a complementary one, which carries different sanctions. A service provider who bills DSS in excess of the rate charged the general public, but not substantially so, could not be charged with an outright violation of the public charge regulation, but his violation of that regulation might be an aspect of a willful scheme of larceny or fraud, as we have explained. A provider who bills DSS substantially in excess of the customary costs to the general public would be in breach of the unacceptable practices regulation even if he did so straightforwardly and without fraud. As for Rubin's remaining arguments, we agree fully with the Court of Appeals that [n]either the term `general public' nor `rate' as used in the regulation is so vague that it could not be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence or could be arbitrarily enforced. Ulster Home Care, 731 N.Y.S.2d 910, 757 N.E.2d at 767. And even if Rubin is correct that the public charge regulation is subject to unwritten exceptions for existing contracts and discounting for prompt payment, such exceptions do not render the regulation vague as applied to him in light of the evidence that all general public customers were charged at the $12 hourly rate, regardless of whether they had existing contracts or paid their bills on time. Turning to the second step of an as-applied vagueness challenge, see Nadi, 996 F.2d at 552, we find the public charge regulation is clear enough to prevent its arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. As we have explained, the regulation contains no criminal penalties itself, but was merely used to demonstrate the manner in which Rubin committed grand larceny and filing of a false instrumentfamiliar criminal statutes with clear guidelines for prosecutors. Nothing about the statutory and regulatory scheme here suggests that it impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294.