Opinion ID: 182907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search of Defendant's person

Text: Polly first argues that the search of his person was unreasonable, both because the traffic stop was unjustified and because the resulting detention exceeded the scope of the stop. For Fourth Amendment purposes, the legality of a traffic stop is assessed pursuant to the framework established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2881, 174 L.Ed.2d 591 (2009). Accordingly, we proceed in two steps. First, we question whether the traffic stop was `justified at its inception.' Id. (quoting United States v. Valenzuela, 494 F.3d 886, 888 (10th Cir.2007)). Second, if the stop was justified, we determine whether `the resulting detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place.' Id. at 1134 (quoting Valenzuela, 494 F.3d at 888). Polly argues that the traffic stop was not justified at the outset because it was just a ruse so that Officer Cortez could further his drug-trafficking investigation. A traffic stop is justified at its inception if an officer has (1) probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred, or (2) a reasonable articulable suspicion that a particular motorist has violated any of the traffic or equipment regulations of the jurisdiction. Id. at 1134. Even if Polly is correct that the traffic stop was simply a ruse, that fact is legally irrelevant. In determining whether a traffic stop is constitutional, the officer's subjective intent or good faith do[es] not affect the reasonableness of the stop. Orduna-Martinez, 561 F.3d at 1137 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)); see also Winder, 557 F.3d at 1134 (noting that an officer's actual motivations or subjective beliefs and intentions are, quite simply, irrelevant (internal quotations omitted)). Accordingly, an officer's motive will not invalidate[ ] objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (emphasis added). There can be little doubt that the traffic stop here was objectively justifiable based on the traffic violations that Cortez observed. The district court found that Polly committed traffic violations both by crossing the centerline and by speeding. Although Polly disputes whether he was speeding, he has not shown that the district court clearly erred in determining that Cortez observed him speeding. Polly also claims that he did not commit a traffic violation by crossing the centerline because he was merely making a left turn and then changed his mind and proceeded, which is not, according to Polly, a traffic violation. However, the Oklahoma statute he cites in support of this proposition states only that one can cross the centerline when making a left turn, not that someone can cross the centerline in the process of an aborted left turn and come back over the centerline. 47 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 11-301(C). Therefore, Polly has not established that the district court clearly erred in finding that Officer Cortez observed Polly commit two traffic violations, and so the traffic stop was justified at its inception. We turn now to considering whether the scope of the traffic stop was reasonably related to the circumstances which justified [the stop] in the first place. Eckhart, 569 F.3d at 1273. In conducting this inquiry, we focus on the reasonableness of the traffic stop in light of both the length of the detention and the manner in which it was carried out. Valenzuela, 494 F.3d at 890. Accordingly, officers may ask questions outside the scope of the traffic stop so long as the questions do not appreciably prolong the length of the stop. Id. The detention of Polly was reasonable with regard to both the length of the detention and the manner in which the police proceeded. First, Officer Blosser asked Polly for his license and registration, which the police are unquestionably permitted to do in the course of a traffic stop. See United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir.1993) (During a routine traffic stop, the detaining officer may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check on the car and driver, and issue a citation.). Cortez then asked Polly to step out of the vehicle, which is also permissible during a routine traffic stop for purposes of officer safety; here, where Cortez knew of Polly's violent past and Polly was seated about two feet above the officers in his truck, the officer safety concern was clearly met. See United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir.1994) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam)). Next, Cortez asked Polly if he had any guns, knives, drugs, or other illegal items on his person or in his vehicle, a question which we have previously upheld as permissible. See Valenzuela, 494 F.3d at 890. At this point, Cortez asked Polly if he could be searched so that he could be placed in Blosser's patrol car while the officers wrote him two traffic citations, and Polly said I don't mind. Since Polly's commission of two traffic offenses constituted the original justification for the stop, this question was reasonably related to the circumstances which justified [the stop] in the first place. Eckhart, 569 F.3d at 1273. The district court upheld the legality of the ensuing search as a warrantless search authorized by valid consent. See Eidson v. Owens, 515 F.3d 1139, 1145-46 (10th Cir.2008) (recognizing valid consent as an exception to the general prohibition against warrantless searches). Polly first argues that, as a factual matter, his statement was not a consent to search. Although Cortez testified that Polly said I don't mind when asked whether Blosser could search him, Polly testified that he said I don't care. Polly claims that I don't care does not show consent, but rather shows that Polly thought he was going to be searched regardless of how he responded. First, we note that the district court relied on Cortez's testimony that Polly said I don't mind, and Polly has not shown that reliance to be clearly erroneous. Even if we considered the possibility that Polly actually said I don't care, we cannot agree with the fine parsing of the language that he suggests. While Polly does not cite to any authority supporting his linguistic interpretation, some courts have found that I don't care does indicate consent to search. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 403 F.3d 533, 537 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that defendant consented by stating `I don't care' and then opening the door of his vehicle); United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480, 483 (5th Cir.1994) (failing to note any distinction between I don't care, I don't mind, and go ahead). As a factual matter, then, Polly stated his consent to the pat-down search. Polly next argues that his consent was legally invalid because it was coerced. Whether a party freely and voluntarily gave his consent to a search is a question of fact and is determined from the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Sanchez, 608 F.3d 685, 689 (10th Cir.2010) (quotations, alterations omitted), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 5, 2010) (No. 10-6895). The district court found, based on the totality of the circumstances, that consent was voluntary because [t]he officers did not have their weapons drawn, they used a conversational tone in their dealings with defendant, the defendant was in a public place, and only two officers were present. (Doc. 29 at 6.) This determination was not clearly erroneous. Polly claims that Cortez said he would call a drug-sniffing dog if Polly did not consent, but Cortez denied it, and the district court credited Cortez's testimony over Polly's. Even if Cortez had stated he would bring in a drug-sniffing dog, the mere fact that a suspect has to choose between two lawful, albeit distasteful, options does not render that choice coerced. See United States v. Butler, 966 F.2d 559, 563 (10th Cir.1992) (finding consent to search voluntary where a joint resident of an apartment told the defendant that if they did not consent to search, the police would get a warrant anyway); see also United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir.1992) (When the expressed intention [of a police officer] to obtain a warrant is genuine . . . it does not vitiate consent.). The stop of Polly's truck was justified at the outset by his commission of two traffic offenses, and the scope of the stop was reasonable. As Polly consented to the search of his person, the drugs that were found in his pockets were obtained without violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.