Opinion ID: 1223875
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Report of the National Ports Council

Text: A documentary report entitled Equipment Evaluation: The Operation of Clark Van Carriers (hereinafter, the NPCR) was published in February 1973 by an organization  based in London, England  denominated the National Ports Council. [30] The NPCR purported to be a study, conducted in the ports of Great Britain, of various operational, engineering, structural, and ergonomic characteristics (including driver visibility) of Clark's Series 512, 520, and 521 straddle carriers, the production of which postdated the Series 510 version at issue in this case and which were larger, taller, and otherwise differently configured than the Series 510. The plaintiffs attempted to introduce the NPCR as substantive evidence at trial on the basis that it was relevant to whether the Series 510 had been defectively designed and Clark had been placed on notice thereof. Clark sought to exclude any and all use of the NPCR at trial, contending that the report constituted inadmissible hearsay, did not involve the Series 510 straddle carrier, was not relevant to the issue of notice, and was untrustworthy on its face. The circuit court, in limine, disallowed the NPCR as substantive evidence pursuant to HRE 403, but ruled that, [t]o the extent that a proper foundation is laid by the proponent, experts may refer to the report in their testimony. On appeal, the plaintiffs urge that the [circuit] court's refusal to admit the NPCR [substantively] was a clear abuse of discretion. The report went to the basic issues of liability and also to the issue of punitive damages, and the low punitive damage award against Clark shows how extremely prejudiced the [p]laintiffs were by those decisions. . . . . The NPCR was relevant to issues of both notice and punitive damages. [31] ... . . . . Therefore, if either the abuse of discretion or the right/wrong standard is applied, the [circuit] court abused its discretion and made a wrong decision in refusing to admit this evidence. (Emphases omitted.) By contrast, Clark argues that [t]he [circuit] court erred by permitting [the plaintiffs] to utilize the [NPCR] for demonstrative purposes. The court permitted [the plaintiffs'] expert witness, Harold [sic] Josephs, to utilize the report without proper foundation and permitted him to read extensively to the jury from the [NPCR,] which contained hearsay expert opinions for which he served as a conduit under the guise that they supported his opinion. We disagree with the plaintiffs and agree with Clark.
We hold, for two reasons, that the circuit court did not err in excluding the NPCR as independent, substantive evidence that the Series 510 straddle carrier was defectively designed. First, the contents of the NPCR constituted inadmissible hearsay, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' attempt at trial to characterize the NPCR as being excepted from the hearsay rule under HRE 803(b)(8)(C) (1993) (the public records exception), 803(b)(18) (1993) (the learned treatise exception), and 803(b)(24) (1993) (the catchall exception). [32] By its express terms, the public records exception set forth in HRE 803(b)(8)(C), see supra note 32, applies only to an investigative record or report conducted by a public agency pursuant to authority granted by law [.] (Emphasis added.) [33] The most superficial examination reveals that the NPCR was not the product of any investigation. Its avowed purpose was to conduct a survey to assist in the evaluation of mechanical equipment used for container transportation. Accordingly, with regard to accidents involving various types of straddle carriers, the NPCR relied exclusively on preexisting reports (themselves constituting hearsay) of varying quality and reliability. In addition, the plaintiffs failed to make an adequate showing that the National Ports Council was a public agency. See supra note 30. Moreover, although the plaintiffs proffered the affidavit of David G. Curtis, Senior Executive Officer, Department of Transport, United Kingdom  in which Curtis swore that NPCR had been produced by the National Ports Council and was currently in the custody of the Department of Transport , the Curtis affidavit failed to attest that the NPCR was prepared pursuant to authority granted by law ( i.e., pursuant to any legal mandate), that the NPCR was being maintained by the Department of Transport as a public record, that the affiant had any personal knowledge concerning the NPCR's preparation, or that the NPCR was otherwise trustworthy. [34] Finally, the public records exception presupposes that the sources of information or other circumstances do not indicate lack of trustworthiness; in this connection, the NPCR expressly cautions that some of its data may, indeed, be untrustworthy. For this reason, and because it does not hold itself out as a learned treatise, the NPCR was not admissible pursuant to the learned treatise or catchall exceptions to the rule against hearsay either. See HRE 803(b)(18), 803(b)(24), and the commentary thereto, supra note 32. Second, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the NPCR were not based on a study of the Series 510 straddle carrier, such as that involved in the present accident; rather, as noted above, the subjects of the NPCR were larger, newer, and structurally different straddle carriers. Thus, the circuit court could rightly have refused to admit the NPCR substantively into evidence on relevance grounds, any references to prior accidents contained therein lacking substantial similarity. See supra section III.D.3. In any event, for the foregoing reasons, including the multiplicity of straddle carrier types subsumed within the survey (none of which included the Series 510), the acknowledged unreliability of some of the data cited, and the paucity of facts regarding the reported accidents, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing, pursuant to HRE 403, to admit the NPCR into evidence. See Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 11, 928 P.2d at 853; Walsh, 80 Hawai`i at 215, 908 P.2d at 1201; Sato, 79 Hawai`i at 19, 897 P.2d at 946.
Over Clark's repeated objections, [35] the circuit court did, however, allow reference to the contents of the NPCR by the plaintiffs' expert witness, Howard Josephs. HRE 703 (1993), entitled [b]ases of opinion testimony by experts, permits an expert to base an opinion or inference upon facts or data that need not be admissible in evidence, provided they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and do not otherwise indicate [a] lack of trustworthiness. See also commentary on HRE 703 (Rule 703 allows opinions based on data not admissible in evidence so long as `of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.'). [T]he trial court's decision whether to disallow expert testimony under HRE 703 involves a judgment call and is therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion. Aga, 78 Hawai`i at 238, 891 P.2d at 1030 (citations omitted). See also Samonte, 83 Hawai`i at 532-34, 928 P.2d at 26-28; Wallace, 80 Hawai`i at 406, 910 P.2d at 719; Maelega, 80 Hawai`i at 180, 907 P.2d at 766; Craft, 78 Hawai`i at 306-07, 893 P.2d at 157-58. HRE Rule 705 (1993), entitled [d]isclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion, allows an expert witness to testify in terms of opinion or inference and [to] give the expert's reasons therefor without disclosing the underlying facts or data if the underlying facts or data have been disclosed in discovery proceedings, subject to the proviso that [t]he expert may ... be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. See State v. Samuel, 74 Haw. 141, 158, 838 P.2d 1374, 1382-83 (1992). The intent of HRE 705 and its federal counterpart, Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) Rule 705, is to eliminate the burdensome and outmoded necessity of formulating a hypothetical question in every instance in which an expert bases his opinion upon other than firsthand knowledge, and to render prior disclosure of underlying data discretionary with the court except in those relatively rare instances where discovery proceedings have not yielded the underlying material. Commentary on HRE 705. HRE 705, however, is silent on its face regarding the question  which the appellate courts of this state have apparently never addressed  whether otherwise inadmissible evidence, on which an expert is relying in the formulation of an opinion, may be disclosed in the first instance on direct examination. On the other hand, federal authority establishes that the intent of FRE 705 was to permit an expert to allude to the underlying facts or data upon which he or she is relying prefatorily to rendering an opinion: While [FRE 705] allows counsel to make disclosure of the underlying facts or data as a preliminary to the giving of an expert opinion, if he chooses, the instances in which he is required to do so are reduced. This is true whether the expert bases his opinion on data furnished him at second hand or observed by him at firsthand. Federal Advisory Committee's note to FRE 705. Thus, it is not surprising that the case law of other jurisdictions is in general agreement that an expert may discuss the underlying facts and data upon which he or she is relying on direct examination, even though hearsay may be involved  at least for the limited purpose of disclosing the basis of his or her opinion. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 375 F.2d 310, 318 (D.C.Cir.1966) (In forming an expert opinion it may be necessary to rely upon information  hearsay though it be .... If information ... is not so liable to be untrustworthy as to require the court to rule that his opinion is unworthy of consideration by the jury[,] ... it was not error to permit [the expert] to state what it was.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 915, 87 S.Ct. 2133, 2134, 19 L.Ed.2d 1359 (1967); Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 74 (3d Cir.1985) (Although it is not required that the bases for experts' opinions be disclosed before an opinion is given, the bases of an opinion may be testified to on direct examination[.]); State v. Lundstrom, 161 Ariz. 141, 776 P.2d 1067, 1071-72 (1989) ([A]n expert witness on direct examination may disclose facts or data that have not been admitted in evidence  and that may not be admissible  if they form a basis for his opinion and if of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field. Once disclosed, the facts or data are not admitted as substantive evidence, but only for purposes of showing the basis of the expert's opinion. (Citations omitted.)); People v. Anderson, 113 Ill.2d 1, 99 Ill.Dec. 104, 495 N.E.2d 485, 488 (1986) (Rule 705 ... does not clearly answer whether [the] facts [upon which an expert opinion is based] may be brought out on direct examination.... However, in our judgment[,] the logic underlying Rule 703... compels the conclusion that an expert should be allowed to reveal the contents of materials upon which he reasonably relies in order to explain the basis of his opinion.); Brunner v. Brown, 480 N.W.2d 33, 34 (Iowa 1992) ([T]he [appellants'] sole complaint on appeal is that the [trial] court erred in refusing to allow their expert witness, during direct examination, to relate hearsay evidence that he had considered in forming his opinion.... We conclude that, while such evidence is admissible under Iowa Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, the [trial] court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting it under the facts of this case.). In our view, the reasoning of the foregoing authority is cogent and persuasive. Accordingly, we hold that HRE 703 and 705 do not foreclose an expert witness from revealing, in the course of direct examination, the contents of the materials upon which he or she has reasonably relied  hearsay though they may be  in order to explain the basis of his or her opinion, provided, of course, that (1) the expert has actually relied on the material as a basis of the opinion, (2) the materials are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, and (3) the materials do not otherwise indicate lack of trustworthiness. In the present case, however, we do not believe that Josephs's testimony satisfied the foregoing preconditions to disclosure of the contents of the NPCR within the context of explaining, on direct examination, the bases of his expert opinions. First, the record indicates that, in all likelihood, Josephs did not actually rely on the NPCR as a factual basis of his opinions. Prior to being offered as an expert in safety engineering, human factors, the design of the Series 510 straddle carrier, remedial measures, and related matters, the plaintiffs' counsel elicited an enumeration from Josephs of the factual bases of his opinions regarding what the cause of the accident was and whether remedial steps could have been taken to avoid it. Although he listed, among other things, (1) an examination of the straddle carrier involved in Tabieros's accident, (2) the deposition testimony of the eyewitnesses to the accident, (3) the deposition testimony of Clark's designer of the Series 510 straddle carrier, (4) the deposition testimony of the representative of Navigation, who promulgated the design specifications for the vehicle, (5) classification records relating to the history of the Series 510, (6) Matson's records regarding the particular straddle carrier at issue, (7) documents relating to other straddle carriers, and (8) applicable safety standards, Josephs made no allusion to the NPCR. On cross-examination by Clark's counsel, Josephs first testified that he could not presently recall where he had first obtained the NPCR; once his recollection was refreshed, however, he acknowledged that he had first received the report from Tabieros's counsel. Later in his testimony, when Tabieros's counsel inquired whether the NPCR was one of the bases of his expert opinion, Josephs answered in the affirmative. Nevertheless, he testified immediately thereafter only that the NPCR was relevant to his opinions, that it would be valuable and of interest to an engineer or manufacturer designing a straddle carrier, and that it supported his opinions. In the latter respect, Josephs read repeatedly from the NPCR and explicated its data and conclusions without ever indicating in what manner the reports' contents formed a basis of his opinions or in what way he otherwise relied on it. Second, even if Josephs actually relied in some way on the NPCR as a factual basis of his opinions, it was still necessary that the NPCR contain facts or data ... of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the [engineering] field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject of the Series 510 straddle carrier in order to satisfy the criteria prescribed in HRE 703. [36] In our view, the record is grossly deficient in this regard. On cross-examination by Clark's counsel, Josephs acknowledged that he had never studied or inspected the Series 512, 520, or 521 straddle carriers, which were the sole subjects of the NPCR. He did not know the relative heights of the various models as compared to the straddle carrier involved in Tabieros's accident. He was unaware of the means by which the data appearing in the NPCR was collected, the credentials or qualifications of whoever was doing the collecting, or the number or identity of the NPCR's authors. In fact, Josephs indicated that he had essentially accepted on blind faith that data collected by a quasi-governmental agency would be reliable. Such uncritical reliance is hardly a hallmark of the scientific method. It is patently obvious from a review of the trial transcript that Josephs's testimony regarding the NPCR served primarily as a conduit to publish its findings and conclusions, which had already been ruled inadmissible as substantive evidence pursuant to HRE 403, to the jury and to bolster the credibility of Josephs's opinions. [37] Many of the questions posed to Josephs regarding the NPCR by the plaintiffs' counsel, as well as his responses to them, had little or nothing to do with Josephs's area of expertise. For example, Josephs was questioned about (1) the cost of obtaining a copy of the NPCR and its availability to others, in an attempt to establish that Clark had, in fact, received notice of its existence and contents, (2) the NPCR's length and governmental authorship, (3) Clark's role in providing resources for the report, [38] and (4) Josephs's beliefs as to whether Clark had destroyed documents. Moreover, the plaintiffs' counsel prominently displayed the NPCR's principal findings and salient contents to the jury through blow-up exhibits mounted on eight story boards. In this connection, the plaintiffs' counsel expressed his belief that the portions of the NPCR that Josephs read to the jury could be used for any purpose. That the circuit court shared his view is reflected by the following exchange: [Clark's counsel]: I object to publication of the report. THE COURT: Any response? [Plaintiffs' counsel]: The response is that the publication of other material which the experts have relied on, but is not in evidence, has been allowed and these are  THE COURT: I will overrule and permit the demonstrative proof. [Clark's counsel]: This is improper use of a treatis [sic] in that Mr. Josephs is actually testifying to what the material contains. This goes far beyond what an expert is able to do with respect to references. THE COURT: Under 70  [Plaintiffs' counsel]: 703, a report replied [sic: actually relied] upon by an expert can be used in any fashion. THE COURT: I will overrule the objection and confirm my ruling. (Emphases added.) In light of our holding regarding the parameters of HRE 703 and 705, it is apparent that the circuit court's broad view of the permissible uses to which inadmissible evidence may be put by an expert witness was erroneous. While it is perfectly proper for experts to discuss the data upon which they have actually and reasonably relied in forming their opinions, a trial court does not have the unfettered discretion to allow testimony designed fully to disclose the contents of all inadmissible material. As we have indicated, the reason, pursuant to HRE 703 and 705, for allowing an expert witness to reveal the contents of otherwise inadmissible evidence during direct examination is not to admit the evidence for its substantive, probative value, but rather to permit the trier of fact to understand the basis of the expert's opinion in order to assess the weight and effect to be accorded that opinion. See Lundstrom, 776 P.2d at 1071-72; Anderson, 99 Ill.Dec. at 107, 495 N.E.2d at 488. The admissibility of such testimony, however, is limited by the mandate of HRE 703 that the underlying facts or data do not otherwise indicate lack of trustworthiness. Thus, expert testimony revealing inadmissible material for the purpose of either (1) injecting untrustworthy evidence into the trial in order to lend greater authority to the testifying expert's opinion or (2) indirectly placing before the jury the purportedly authoritative conclusions of others on the same subject  not otherwise admissible on some independent ground  is improper. The need for oversight by the trial court of expert testimony revealing otherwise inadmissible material is particularly acute when the underlying facts or data indicate lack of trustworthiness, HRE 703, or where the probative value of the testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, HRE 403. In this case, the NPCR was based on multiple hearsay, was of undetermined authorship, addressed hundreds of accidents that were substantially dissimilar to Tabieros's, and contained warnings within its four corners that flagged the questionable reliability of much of its data. Moreover, prior to Josephs's testimony, the circuit court had already disallowed the NPCR as substantive evidence, not only pursuant to Clark's motion in limine, [39] but also in accordance with HRE 403. Accordingly, because (1) it appears that Josephs did not, in fact, rely on the NPCR in forming his opinions, (2) even if Josephs did so rely, the record establishes that such reliance would have been scientifically unreasonable, and (3) the circuit court had already ruled as a matter of law that the NPCR was less probative than prejudicial, we hold that the circuit court abused its discretion when it permitted Josephs's testimony regarding the NPCR. Moreover, even had Josephs reasonably relied on it, we hold that the circuit court was obligated to exercise appropriate restrictive supervision over his testimony, so as to allow only that necessary to explain to the jury the manner in which the NPCR formed a part of the basis of his expert opinion.