Opinion ID: 844210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wage Orders and the Labor Code

Text: We turn to the Court of Appeal's alternate basis for reversing class certificationthat if one considers the substance of the parties' various legal disputes and the elements of Hohnbaum's claims, one must conclude as a matter of law that common questions do not predominate. In assessing that conclusion, at the parties' request we examine the merits of their substantive legal disputes. (See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 443 [[W]e see nothing to prevent a court from considering the legal sufficiency of claims when ruling on certification where both sides jointly request such action.].) Because those disputes derive in part from conflicting visions of the respective roles statutes and wage orders play in establishing the state's wage and hour law, we begin by examining those roles. (13) Nearly a century ago, the Legislature responded to the problem of inadequate wages and poor working conditions by establishing the IWC and delegating to it the authority to investigate various industries and promulgate wage orders fixing for each industry minimum wages, maximum hours of work, and conditions of labor. ( Martinez v. Combs, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 52-55; see Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 1 [confirming the Legislature's authority to establish a commission and grant it legislative and other powers over such matters].) Pursuant to its broad statutory authority ( Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 690, 701 [166 Cal.Rptr. 331, 613 P.2d 579]), the IWC in 1916 began issuing industry- and occupation-wide wage orders specifying minimum requirements with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions ( id. at p. 700). In addition, the Legislature has from time to time enacted statutes to regulate wages, hours, and working conditions directly. Consequently, wage and hour claims are today governed by two complementary and occasionally overlapping sources of authority: the provisions of the Labor Code, enacted by the Legislature, and a series of 18 wage orders, adopted by the IWC. ( Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1084 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 483, 116 P.3d 1162]; see IWC wage orders Nos. 1-2001 to 17-2001 and MW-2007 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 11000-11170).) (14) We apply the usual rules of statutory interpretation to the Labor Code, beginning with and focusing on the text as the best indicator of legislative purpose. ( Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1103.) [I]n light of the remedial nature of the legislative enactments authorizing the regulation of wages, hours and working conditions for the protection and benefit of employees, the statutory provisions are to be liberally construed with an eye to promoting such protection. ( Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 702; see also Murphy, at p. 1103 [given the Legislature's remedial purpose, statutes governing conditions of employment are to be construed broadly in favor of protecting employees].) (15) In turn, the IWC's wage orders are entitled to extraordinary deference, both in upholding their validity and in enforcing their specific terms. ( Martinez v. Combs, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 61.) When a wage order's validity and application are conceded and the question is only one of interpretation, the usual rules of statutory interpretation apply. ( Collins v. Overnite Transportation Co. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 171, 178-179 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 254]; see Cal. Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark (1943) 22 Cal.2d 287, 292 [140 P.2d 657].) As with the Labor Code provisions at issue, the meal and rest period requirements we must construe have long been viewed as part of the remedial worker protection framework. ( Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1105.) Accordingly, the relevant wage order provisions must be interpreted in the manner that best effectuates that protective intent. ( Martinez, at pp. 61-62; see Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 724; Bono Enterprises, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 968, 974 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 549].) (16) The IWC's wage orders are to be accorded the same dignity as statutes. They are presumptively valid legislative regulations of the employment relationship ( Martinez v. Combs, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 65), regulations that must be given independent effect separate and apart from any statutory enactments ( id. at p. 68). To the extent a wage order and a statute overlap, we will seek to harmonize them, as we would with any two statutes. ( Cal. Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, supra, 22 Cal.2d at pp. 292-293.) Here, Wage Order No. 5, governing the public housekeeping industry, applies. [7] We consider in turn both the scope of the duties it and several related statutes (see §§ 226.7, 512, 516) impose on restaurant employers to afford rest and meal periods, and whether in light of those duties the Court of Appeal erred in reversing as an abuse of discretion the trial court's certification of three subclasses. [8]