Opinion ID: 1175246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the individual defendants are absolutely immune from suit

Text: We hold that the individual defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from suit on the ground that the acts complained of occurred in the course of judicial proceedings prescribed by statute. The gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint for negligence is that the defendants failed to inform the juvenile court of Lee Michael's criminal record, as a result of which the girls were placed in his home, where they suffered great harm. As the plaintiffs present the facts, the placement decision was made by DSHS with the juvenile court acting solely on the Department's recommendation, more or less as a rubber stamp. As the statement of facts above demonstrates, however, just the opposite is true. The decision to place the girls in the Michael home was not made by DSHS, but by the juvenile court. It would be manifestly unjust to hold the caseworkers liable for a decision of the court which was beyond their control. The plaintiffs contend that the mere fact that a judicial order intervened should not insulate the caseworkers and the State from liability for their omissions in the investigation of the Michaels. There are two reasons why this is not so. First, the report of DSHS, whatever its faults, was only one part of the body of evidence considered by the court in placing the girls with the Michaels and in permitting them to remain there over so many months. A large body of evidence was heard in the course of a number of separate hearings. It included the testimony of experts who had examined the girls as well as family members including Rudolph Babcock and Lee Michael himself. The court was willing from the first to return the Babcock girls to their father, but was unable to do so because it never received information sufficient under RCW 13.34.130 to permit it to do so. On the record we have, we can say as a matter of law that the report of the DSHS workers was not the proximate cause of the injury complained of. We need not even reach the proximate cause issue, however, because the caseworkers are absolutely immune from suit. Their immunity rests on their status as participants in the hearings conducted in this case as required under RCW 13.34.110. It is well established that the participants in adversarial judicial proceedings are entitled to absolute immunity as a safeguard on the integrity of such proceedings.
The caseworkers' role in this matter was established by the Legislature in setting up procedures to govern the disposition of dependent children. RCW 13.34.110 mandates a fact-finding hearing on the dependency petition to be followed by a separate hearing on the dependent child's disposition. The initial dependency hearing in this case took place in Louisiana. The disposition hearing was held, after two continuances, on August 26 and 27, 1982. The DSHS's role in the disposition hearing is specified in RCW 13.34.120: (1) To aid the court in its decision on disposition, a social study, consisting of a written evaluation of matters relevant to the disposition of the case, shall be made by the person or agency filing the petition. The study shall include all social records and may also include facts relating to the child's cultural heritage, and shall be made available to the court. The court shall consider the social file and social study at the disposition hearing in addition to evidence produced at the fact-finding hearing. At least ten working days before the disposition hearing, the department shall mail to the parent and his or her attorney a copy of the agency's social study and proposed service plan, which shall be in writing or in a form understandable to the parents or custodians. In addition, the department shall provide an opportunity for parents to review and comment on the plan at the community service office. If the parents disagree with the agency's plan or any part thereof, the parents shall submit to the court at least twenty-four hours before the hearing, in writing, or signed oral statement, an alternative plan to correct the problems which led to the finding of dependency. This section shall not interfere with the right of the parents or custodians to submit oral arguments regarding the disposition plan at the hearing. (2) In addition to the requirements set forth in subsection (1) of this section, a predisposition study to the court in cases of dependency alleged pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(2) (b) or (c) shall contain the following information: (a) A statement of the specific harm or harms to the child that intervention is designed to alleviate; (b) A description of the specific programs, for both the parents and child, that are needed in order to prevent serious harm to the child; the reasons why such programs are likely to be useful; the availability of any proposed services; and the agency's overall plan for ensuring that the services will be delivered; (c) If removal is recommended, a full description of the reasons why the child cannot be protected adequately in the home, including a description of any previous efforts to work with the parents and the child in the home; the in-home treatment programs which have been considered and rejected; and the parents' attitude toward placement of the child; (d) A statement of the likely harms the child will suffer as a result of removal. This section should include an exploration of the nature of the parent-child attachment and the meaning of separation and loss to both the parents and the child; (e) A description of the steps that will be taken to minimize harm to the child that may result if separation occurs; and (f) Behavior that will be expected before determination that supervision of the family or placement is no longer necessary. At the August hearing Mark Bronson testified for DSHS, based on the report prepared by Wanda Tyler. [1] The fact that the caseworkers acted as participants in an adversary hearing renders their actions immune under the common law doctrine of absolute immunity for participants in judicial proceedings. This immunity is well described by the United States Supreme Court in the cases Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 47 L.Ed.2d 128, 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976), Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 57 L.Ed.2d 895, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (1978) and Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 75 L.Ed.2d 96, 103 S.Ct. 1108 (1983). [2] The defendants contend that these cases establish two separate grounds of immunity. First, social services caseworkers are said to be entitled to quasi-prosecutorial immunity because a caseworker's role in dependency proceedings under RCW 13.34 is analogous to that of a prosecutor in criminal proceedings. Second, the defendants argue that the caseworkers are entitled to immunity as witnesses. The defendants are almost correct. The leading cases actually set forth a single theory of immunity: that participants in adversarial judicial proceedings are immune from suit as a safeguard on the integrity of the adversarial process itself. In Imbler, the plaintiff alleged that a state prosecuting attorney had knowingly used false evidence and had suppressed exonerating evidence at his trial for felony murder. The Court held the prosecutor immune from suit under section 1983 on the ground that prosecutorial immunity at common law was incorporated into the Civil Rights Act by Congress. [3] That common law immunity has several grounds. There is the effect on the prosecutor himself: civil suits would distract him from the business of his office. There is also a question of efficiency, in that the civil suit would require a virtual retrial of the criminal case. Above all, however, prosecutorial immunity is required to preserve the truth-finding function of the criminal trial. The threat of liability to suit would have a chilling effect on the initiation of criminal prosecutions and on the prosecutor's conduct at trial. The jury's function might be impaired by a prosecutor's decision to withhold evidence that is relevant but not ironclad. Finally, the judgment of those responsible for evaluating the fairness of the trial on appeal and collateral review might be biased by the knowledge that a favorable decision for the prisoner could subject the prosecutor to liability. The important thing to notice about the Imbler case is that it bases prosecutorial immunity on the nature of the criminal proceeding; not on the nature of the prosecutor's duties. The Court reinforced this point in its opinion recognizing quasi-prosecutorial immunity in Butz. The plaintiff in Butz sued officials of the Department of Agriculture for their initiation and conduct of an adversarial administrative hearing related to his status as a commodities broker. The Court held that the hearing examiner and administrative law judge were entitled to absolute immunity. [4] Butz 's grant of immunity to the two officials was based on the resemblance between the adversarial administrative hearing and a criminal trial. Butz, at 512-13. The hearing officer and administrative law judge in Butz were not held immune because of their resemblance to a prosecutor and trial judge. The critical fact was that they were participants in an adversarial proceeding in need of the same safeguards as a criminal trial. Justice White's opinion stresses that the prosecutorial immunity recognized in Imbler is based on the prosecutor's status as one of the various participants in judge-supervised trials, a group which includes judges, grand jurors, petit jurors and witnesses. Butz, at 509-12. He discusses the features of a criminal trial stressed in Imbler and also several others which justify immunity for the various participants in any adversarial proceeding. First, immunity serves the system's interest in finality. The cluster of immunities protecting the various participants in judge-supervised trials stems from the characteristics of the judicial process ... [C]ontroversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are not easily capped by a judicial decree. The loser in one forum will frequently seek another, charging the participants in the first with unconstitutional animus. Absolute immunity is thus necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation. (Citations omitted.) Butz, at 512. Second, a variety of features of adversary proceedings make civil suits based on their conduct unnecessary or redundant. [T]he safeguards built into the judicial process tend to reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct. The insulation of the judge from political influence, the importance of precedent in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process, and the correctability of error on appeal are just a few of the many checks on malicious action by judges. Advocates are restrained not only by their professional obligations, but by the knowledge that their assertions will be contested by their adversaries in open court. Jurors are carefully screened to remove all possibility of bias. Witnesses are, of course, subject to the rigors of cross-examination ... and the impartiality of the decisionmaking process, there is a less pressing need for individual suits to correct constitutional error. (Footnote omitted.) Butz, at 512. Since these considerations are equally present in criminal trials and administrative hearings, the Court recognized immunity for the hearing officer and administrative law judge. In Briscoe, the Court considered whether witnesses are entitled to immunity in section 1983 suits. Given the logic of Imbler and Butz, the Court had no difficulty in determining that they are. As the Court noted in discussing Imbler and Butz : The central focus of our analysis has been the nature of the judicial proceeding itself. Briscoe, at 334. Witnesses, the Court held, are entitled to immunity for the sake of the adversary process. In the words of one 19th-century court, in damages suits against witnesses, the claims of the individual must yield to the dictates of public policy, which requires that the paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unobstructed as possible. Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860). A witness' apprehension of subsequent damages liability might induce two forms of self-censorship. First, witnesses might be reluctant to come forward to testify. And once a witness is on the stand, his testimony might be distorted by the fear of subsequent liability. (Citations omitted.) Briscoe, at 332-33. Based on Imbler and progeny, a number of courts have recognized immunity for social services workers in cases similar to this one, based on their role in judicial proceedings. See Meyers v. Contra Costa Cy. Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir 1987); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456 (6th Cir.1984); Hennessey v. State, 627 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Wash. 1985); Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
[2] In deciding whether immunity is appropriate in this case, the question is whether the proceedings established for dependency cases by RCW 13.34 are adversarial proceedings in need of the same sort of protection recognized as a necessity in Imbler, Butz and Briscoe. It should be apparent from the proceedings actually conducted in this case that they are, particularly where the report and recommendation of DSHS is concerned. First, the report of DSHS cannot be received in a fact-finding or disposition hearing except as otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. RCW 13.34.110. Second, the Department is required to make its report and recommendation available to parents of dependent children, and the Legislature has stipulated that: This section [relating to the Department's report] shall not interfere with the right of the parents or custodians to submit oral arguments regarding the disposition plan at the hearing. RCW 13.34.120. In the August 1982 hearing, Rudolph Babcock was represented by counsel who vigorously cross-examined Mark Bronson, the DSHS witness who presented the report to the court. Babcock's counsel was given a full opportunity to argue that the court should disregard the DSHS report and recommendations and he did so. In all the hearings conducted in this matter, all parties had a full opportunity to offer evidence, cross-examine and argue to the court and those opportunities were fully exploited. The proceedings here were fully adversarial, as contemplated by the Legislature. Under the logic of Imbler and progeny, therefore, immunity for DSHS caseworkers acting in dependency proceedings is required. First, although it was not a consideration here, the threat of subsequent civil suits would surely cause Department employees to fail to initiate dependency proceedings in cases where they otherwise would do so. In this the caseworkers resemble prosecutors, but note that what matters is not the nature of the officials, but the nature of the proceedings. Without immunity for DSHS caseworkers, the adversarial character of dependency proceedings would suffer in the same way that criminal trials would suffer if prosecutors were threatened with liability: the cases would never be brought. Second, immunity is required to protect the caseworkers in their role as witnesses. This too bears on the adversarial nature of dependency proceedings. The Department is required to submit a broad range of information to the juvenile court under RCW 13.34.120. It does so in both written reports and in testimony before the court. Without immunity, caseworkers may well hold back critical information needed by the court in order to render a proper decision. In adversarial dependency proceedings, this might lead the court not to declare dependency where it would in fact be in the best interests of the child, because DSHS has not been able to do the vigorous job that RCW 13.34.120 contemplates. Third, the adversarial nature of dependency proceedings renders subsequent civil proceedings unnecessary as a check on the fairness or thoroughness of the dependency process or DSHS itself. Despite the tragic outcome in this case, the fact remains that, to the best of the judiciary's ability, the rights and interests of all participants were fully protected in the dependency proceedings. The Babcocks, as adversary parties, had every opportunity of notice, cross examination and argument to challenge the DSHS within the dependency proceeding and to expose the shortcomings of the Department's report. Permitting a second contest over the same matter would have no deterrent or encouraging effect on the Department not already provided by the adversarial nature of the dependency proceeding itself. Fourth, as a related matter, it is obvious that this dependency matter was fought out in repeated, and redundant, hearings over the course of many months. For the sake of finality of judicial decisions and for the sake of efficiency of the judicial process, the matter should rest there. The civil suit contemplated by the plaintiffs here is not barred by the strict rule of res judicata, but the redundancy and expense of such suits is certainly a significant factor favoring the grant of immunity to Department caseworkers. Therefore, we hold that caseworkers carrying out their statutory duties in connection with dependency proceedings under RCW 13.34 are entitled to immunity from subsequent suit, on the ground that such immunity is required to preserve the integrity of that adversarial process.
The scope of the caseworkers' immunity must extend to the full range of their duties under RCW 13.34. The aim of the entire process is to inform the court as to the course of action in the best interests of the child. The threat of liability is equally damaging to the adversarial process whether liability is imposed for preparing the report or for testifying on the basis of the report in court. In this case for example, Mark Bronson testified on the basis of a report prepared by Wanda Tyler. What would be the logic or justice in granting Bronson immunity, on the ground that he was an actual courtroom witness, while denying immunity to Tyler because she was not? If liability is imposed on either task, the court's supply of information in the dependency process will be diminished. The fact is that all the duties set forth in RCW 13.34.120 are directly related to the adversary proceedings mandated in RCW 13.34.110. Immunity must extend to all such functions, or it is meaningless. The dissent argues that certain courts have found child welfare agencies liable for negligent placement. Dissent, at 112. That argument has no weight here. First, applying those cases would require us to distinguish between the caseworker's actions in removing the child from the home and his actions in placing the child in dependent care. However, removal is not an issue in this case because the initial declaration that the girls were dependent and in need of care was made in Louisiana, on the recommendation of that state's DHHR. The question here is whether the caseworkers' role in the adversarial dependency proceedings conducted under RCW 13.34.110 entitles them to immunity. As to that, there is no basis for distinguishing between the removal and the placement of the child. Both decisions are in the hands of the court, first in the fact-finding hearing and then in the hearing on disposition. As to both removal and placement, the Department functions in the same advisory role, preparing a single report containing a single recommended plan of action. The need for immunity based on the integrity of the adversarial proceeding is the same in regard to both removal and placement. Second, the cases the dissent cites for its rule are irrelevant to its argument. Those cases concern the discretionary function exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity. That theory of immunity is not an issue here. See infra, at 105-06. The dissent's reliance on these cases indicates a failure to grasp the logic of that immunity as explained in Imbler, Butz and Briscoe. The immunity of the caseworkers must extend to the full range of their statutory duties.