Opinion ID: 1752570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Public Policy and Good Faith in this Case

Text: In this case, too, we must balance competing interests: the societal benefits that unflinching law enforcement provides and the right of citizens to recover for injuries arising from unreasonable conduct. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656. But here, when a suspect is injured during an arrest, the same public-policy concerns that caused us to formulate the particularized need/risk analysis are not implicated. The inherent risk to the general public that high-speed driving causes is not an issue. Nor is there evidence that the circumstances surrounding Tennell's arrest created a risk to bystanders or the public in general. Thus, we are not presented with the same `countervailing public safety concerns' that we faced in Chambers, Wadewitz, and Clark. Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 581 (quoting Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467). While the public-safety concerns that underlie the need/risk analysis are not as substantial here as in the high-speed pursuit context, official immunity's underlying purpose to encourage energetic law enforcement is. This purpose is most salient in the context of street-level police work, which frequently requires quick and decisive action in the face of volatile and changing circumstances. Rowland, 41 F.3d at 172. During arrest situations, officers routinely are forced to make split-second judgments ... in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Arresting officers often confront at close range suspects whose violent intentions and capabilities may not be readily apparent. A high risk of liability in such a situation would likely compel arresting officers to act hesitantly when immediate action is required, subjecting themselves and the public to unnecessary risks, and seriously hamper[ing] their efforts to apprehend dangerous criminal suspects. United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1274 (10th Cir.1982). Based on these policy considerations, we hold that when an officer is engaged in an arrest that results in injury to the suspect, a particularized need/risk assessment is not compelled in light of official immunity's overriding purpose to reduce the threat that civil liability may deter arresting officers from acting with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656. We disapprove of other courts of appeals' decisions to the extent that they applied the particularized need/risk analysis to claims brought by suspects injured during an arrest. See Clement v. City of Plano, 26 S.W.3d 544, 551 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.); City of San Juan v. Gonzalez, 22 S.W.3d 69, 72 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); Bridges, 20 S.W.3d at 111-12; Geick, 978 S.W.2d at 265. Nevertheless, our holding does not relieve Officer Telthorster of the burden to establish that he acted in good faith for purposes of invoking official immunity's protection. In this case, we believe that the Chambers ' good-faith test, absent its need/risk component, strikes the appropriate balance. To establish good faith, Officer Telthorster must show that a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that his conduct was justified based on the information he possessed when the conduct occurred. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656-57. Officer Telthorster need not prove that it would have been unreasonable not to engage in the conduct, or that all reasonably prudent officers would have engaged in the same conduct. See id. at 657. Rather, he must prove only that a reasonably prudent officer, under similar circumstances, might have reached the same decision. See id. at 656-57. That Officer Telthorster was negligent will not defeat good faith; this test of good faith does not inquire into what a reasonable person would have done,  but into what a reasonable officer could have believed.  Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467 n. 1 (citing Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 661 n. 5). If Telthorster meets this burden, Tennell, to controvert, must do more than show that a reasonably prudent officer could have reached a different decision. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 657. Instead, Tennell must offer evidence that no reasonable officer in Telthorster's position could have believed that the facts were such that they justified his conduct. See id. [I]f officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, the officer acted in good faith as a matter of law. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Tennell suggests that this test allows officers free rein and leaves those injured during an arrest without a remedy. On the contrary, good faith is not a mechanical inquiry, but rather turns on the particular facts presented. When an officer exceeds the bounds of reasonableness, good faith cannot be shown, and the officer will not enjoy official immunity's protection. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656-57. Thus, the public interest in deterring abusive police conduct and in compensating victims remains protected by the objective test that we announce today. IV The Summary Judgment Evidence Applying the good-faith test that we have articulated, we must examine the summary judgment proof to determine whether Officer Telthorster conclusively established that a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that keeping his gun drawn while attempting to handcuff Tennell was justified based on the information he possessed. We conclude that Officer Telthorster met this burden.