Opinion ID: 6348962
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Direct Participation

Text: Plaintiffs next contend that each official should be liable for directly participating in the violation of their rights. A supervisory official may be held liable if he “affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation.” 39 A plaintiff must show the defendant’s deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional rights. This requires evidence that an official “disregarded a known or obvious consequence of [their] action[s].” 40 Although Plaintiffs brought direct participation claims against all three DPSC officials, only Griffin and Stagg have moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on these claims.
36 Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Detention of a prisoner thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.”). 37 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 38 See Porter, 659 F.3d at 446. 39 Porter, 659 F.3d at 446. 40 Porter, 659 F.3d at 446–47, quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. 14 Case: 20-30304 Document: 00516352631 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 No. 20-30304 Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ direct participation claims because once they became aware of a risk that these five Plaintiffs were being overdetained, they took prompt action, and therefore, they did not disregard a known risk. As to Plaintiffs Dominick, Copelin, and Guidry, this argument is well taken, as we will explain. First, there is no evidence that Defendants were ever specifically aware of the risk that Dominick was being overdetained, as he was released before Defendants discovered the “River Bend Fiasco” and there is no evidence of any inquiries directed to DPSC about his release date prior to his actual release. Thus, Dominick was released before his overdetention was a known risk. Second, as to Plaintiffs Copelin and Guidry, Defendants only became aware of the risk that they were being overdetained in the wake of the “River Bend Fiasco.” Copelin’s name appeared on the original spreadsheet from River Bend listing prisoners that were not in CAJUN. Guidry’s name only appeared on a later spreadsheet that River Bend sent to DPSC on December 27, 2016. The district court found that once Defendants became aware of the “River Bend Fiasco,” they appropriately responded as “the record demonstrates that after they became aware of the issue, Defendants communicated with the relevant parties to obtain the necessary paperwork, calculate a release date, and release the Plaintiffs.” 41 Therefore, because Defendants promptly contacted Orleans after learning of the risk of 41 Although not explicit, this finding likely relied on evidence of Defendants’ communication with Orleans’s Classification Manager Amacker in the wake of the River Bend Fiasco. 15 Case: 20-30304 Document: 00516352631 Page: 16 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 No. 20-30304 overdetention to Plaintiffs Copelin and Guidry, their conduct as to these Plaintiffs does not support a finding of deliberate indifference. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, neither Griffin nor Stagg acted promptly in responding to the risk of overdetaining Plaintiffs Crittindon and Burse. On November 21, Griffin and Stagg were notified that Crittindon’s mother called about her son, who was detained in River Bend. The next day, they were notified that Burse’s mother called about her son, who was also detained in River Bend. Both mothers complained that their sons were sentenced in August and that nearly three months later they still did not have release dates. Both Crittindon and Burse were entitled to immediate release upon their sentencing, due to time served in pre-trial detention. There is evidence that Griffin and Stagg discussed this amongst themselves, but there is no evidence that they took any further action until 17 days later, on December 8, when they finally e- mailed River Bend, asking if it was housing any persons without release dates. A reasonable factfinder could find that their conduct sums to deliberate indifference to Crittindon and Burse’s overdetention. With regards to Dominick, Copelin, and Guidry, Defendants did not disregard any known risk and cannot be found to have acted with deliberate indifference. With regards to Crittindon and Burse, a jury could reasonably conclude that Defendants disregarded a known risk and could be found to be deliberately indifferent to this risk.
We next ask whether Defendants’ inaction, with regards to Crittindon and Burse, was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. As we have explained, there is a clearly established right to a timely release from prison, which “establishes that a jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are 16 Case: 20-30304 Document: 00516352631 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 No. 20-30304 timely released from prison.” 42 Due to the mothers’ phone calls, Defendants knew that Crittindon and Burse were at risk of overdetention. Nonetheless, despite their knowledge that the two had been illegally held for three months, for 17 days they failed to address this risk. 43 They had “fair warning” that their failure to address this delay would result in the illegal detention of Crittindon and Burse. 44 Because a factfinder may find that Defendants’ inaction in response to the risk of overdetention was objectively unreasonable in light of this clearly established law, Defendants have failed to show they are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims. 45