Opinion ID: 807878
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trademark Protection of Single-Color Marks

Text: We begin by briefly recalling what trademark law is—and what it is not. The principal purpose of federal trademark law is to “secure the public’s interest in protection against deceit as to the sources of its purchases, [and] the businessman’s right to enjoy business earned through investment in the good will and reputation attached to a trade name.” Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation mark omitted) (alteration in the original). [T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, reduces the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163–64 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). In accordance with these purposes of the Lanham Act, the law provides the owner of a mark with the “enforceable right to exclude others from using [the mark].” La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1974). Nevertheless, trademark law is not intended to “protect[ ] innovation by giving the innovator a monopoly” over a useful product feature. Fabrication Enters., Inc., 64 F.3d at 59 n.4 (emphasis added); see Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., 269 F.3d 114, 120 n.4 (noting that trademark law should not be used to “inhibit[ ] legitimate competition by giving monopoly control to a producer over a useful product”). Such a monopoly is the realm of patent law or copyright law, which seek to encourage 10 innovation, and not of trademark law, which seeks to preserve a “vigorously competitive market” for the benefit of consumers.8 Yurman Design, Inc., 262 F.3d at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We analyze trademark infringement claims in two stages. “First, we look to see whether plaintiff’s mark merits protection.” Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2006). In order for a trademark to be protectable, the mark must be “distinctive” and not “generic.” Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1997). A mark is said to be “inherently” distinctive if “[its] intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).9 Even a mark that is not inherently distinctive may nonetheless “acquire” distinctiveness by developing “secondary meaning” in the public mind. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982). A mark has acquired “secondary meaning” when, “in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature . . . is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.” Id.10 8 See Fabrication Enters., Inc., 64 F.3d at 59 n.4 (“The Lanham Act is not concerned with protecting innovation by giving the innovator a monopoly, which is the function of patent law.”); cf. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 421 n.1 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“Any concern that copyright protection may accord a monopoly to advances in functional design is adequately met by confining the scope of copyright protection to the precise expression of the proprietor’s design.” (citation omitted)). 9 Although Two Pesos, and several of the other cases we rely upon, discuss unregistered trade dress rather than a registered trademark, the infringement analysis is the same. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210– 11 (2000) (noting with approval instances in which courts analyzed distinctiveness with regard to trade dress by analogy to the law of registered trademarks); Louis Vuitton Malletier, 454 F.3d at 115 (noting that the “same analysis [used in claims of trade dress infringement] applies to claims of trademark infringement under § 32”); Fabrication Enters., Inc., 64 F.3d at 57 n.2 (noting that the distinction between defendant’s counterclaims of trade dress and trademark infringement was “immaterial . . . because functionality . . . is a defense in both trademark and trade dress cases”). 10 “A certificate of registration with the PTO is prima facie evidence that the mark is registered and valid (i.e., protect[a]ble), that the registrant owns the mark, and that the registrant has the exclusive right to use the mark in commerce.” Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 1999). In order to rebut the presumption of validity, the allegedly infringing party must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, see id., that the mark is ineligible for protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (a party seeking to invalidate a registration must prove the existence of a 11 Second, if (and only if) the plaintiff’s trademark is “distinctive” within the meaning of trademark law and is therefore valid and protectable, we must then determine “whether [the] defendant’s use of a similar mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, 454 F.3d at 115. In this second stage, if a markholder has successfully demonstrated that its mark is valid and that the competitor’s mark is likely to cause confusion, “the competitor can [nevertheless] prevail . . . by showing that the [mark] is functional”―a traditional defense to the enforcement of a trademark. Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Stormy Clime”), disapproved on other grounds by Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773. The “functionality” of a mark can be demonstrated by, inter alia, showing that the mark has either traditional “utilitarian” functionality or “aesthetic” functionality. New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 195, 212 (D. Conn. 2004); see Section III, post. With this traditional (if somewhat mechanical) taxonomy in mind, we turn to the history of single-color trademarks.
Prior to the adoption of our modern statutory trademark scheme in the Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., the status of single-color trademarks rested on uncertain ground. See generally In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1118–19 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Owens-Corning”). Although as early as 1906 the Supreme Court had expressed a Delphic and suitably ambiguous skepticism that single-color marks could be registered as trademarks, see A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 171 (1906) (observing that “[w]hether mere color can constitute a valid trade-mark may admit of doubt”), other courts occasionally employed common law unfair competition “legal or equitable defense or defect . . . which might have been asserted if such mark had not been registered”). 12 principles to protect the use of color as a distinguishing product feature. See, e.g., Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 147 F.2d 407, 415 (6th Cir. 1945) (holding that the user of a mark was “entitled to protection in its long established use of the color yellow on its taxicabs . . . , inasmuch as it has acquired a good will by use of the yellow color scheme on taxicabs by virtue of appropriate application of the doctrine of secondary meaning”). Although courts did not go so far as to hold that single-color marks could merit trademark protection, the recognition by some courts that color standing alone can, in some circumstances, acquire secondary meaning was an important building block in the evolution of single-color marks. After the passage of the Lanham Act, which codified “in the broadest of terms” the “universe” of things eligible for trademark protection, Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162, courts “gradually . . . rejected the dictum [of earlier cases] . . . to the effect that color alone is not subject to trademark [protection],” Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122, and owners of color-related marks began to enjoy a degree of enforcement success. See, e.g., Application of Hehr Mfg. Co., 279 F.2d 526, 528 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (holding that a square red label intended for use on automobile trailer windows was eligible for trademark registration); Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co., 512 F. Supp. 1184, 1190 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (protecting plaintiff’s arbitrary color scheme for metal spacers). Nevertheless, the issue of single-color mark registration lay largely dormant until 1985, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided Owens-Corning. Faced with the question of whether a fiberglass manufacturer could trademark the pink color of its residential insulation material, the Federal Circuit in Owens-Corning began by recounting the evolution of color as a product-source designator. In language that continues to hold force today, the Court observed that jurisprudence under the Lanham Act had “developed in accordance with the statutory 13 principle that if a mark is capable of being or becoming distinctive of [the] applicant’s goods in commerce, then it is capable of serving as a trademark.” Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120. Noting that “[Owens-Corning’s] use of the color ‘pink’ performs no non-trademark function, and is consistent with the commercial and public purposes of trademarks,” the Court concluded that the use “serves the classical trademark function of indicating the origin of the goods, and thereby protects the public.” Id. at 1123. On that basis, the Court held that Owens-Corning was “entitled to register its mark.” Id. at 1128.
The question of whether a color can be protected as a trademark or trade dress was finally resolved in 1995 by the Supreme Court’s decision in Qualitex, which involved a claim for trade dress protection of the green-gold color of a dry cleaning press pad. The question presented was “whether the [Lanham Act] permits the registration of a trademark that consists, purely and simply, of a color.” Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 160–61 (citation omitted). Reversing a decision of the Ninth Circuit that had declared color per se ineligible for trademark protection, the Court observed that “it is difficult to find, in basic trademark objectives, a reason to disqualify absolutely the use of a color as a mark.” Id. at 164. The Court held, among other things, that it could find no “principled objection to the use of color as a mark in the important ‘functionality’ doctrine of trademark law.” Id. It concluded that “color alone, at least sometimes, can meet the basic legal requirements for use as a trademark. It can act as a symbol that distinguishes a firm’s goods and identifies their source, without serving any other significant function.” Id. at 166 (emphasis added). 14