Opinion ID: 2074042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of portions of Pastore's testimony

Text: The defendant also argues that the trial justice erred when he excluded portions of Pastore's testimony because of Rule 16 discovery violations. [10] It is defendant's position that the trial justice failed to weigh the appropriate factors before he ruled that certain portions of Pastore's testimony would not be allowed. We disagree. In determining the appropriate sanction to apply for a discovery violation, the trial justice and the Supreme Court on appeal take four factors into account: (1) the reason for nondisclosure, (2) the extent of prejudice to the opposing party, (3) the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and (4) any other relevant factors. State v. Coelho, 454 A.2d 241, 245 (R.I.1982). We have noted that the sanction of excluding testimony is an extreme and drastic remedy which should be exercised with caution and restraint. State v. Ramos, 553 A.2d 1059, 1067 (R.I. 1989). Nevertheless, we have acknowledged that the trial justice is in the best position to fashion a proper remedy for noncompliance with the discovery rule. Id. at 1068. This [C]ourt therefore will overturn a trial justice's ruling only upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Id. (citing State v. Darcy, 442 A.2d 900 (R.I.1982)). Although we caution that, for the purposes of effective appellate review, trial justices should clearly enunciate the Coelho factors when determining the appropriate sanction for a discovery violation, the mere failure to precisely delineate the enumerated factors does not, by itself, constitute reversible error. When, as in this case, a trial justice clearly sets forth his reasoning for a particular sanction for a discovery violation even without specifically articulating the Coelho factors, and this Court is able to ascertain from that reasoning that, despite his failure to say so, the trial justice did consider the import of those factors, we will affirm as long as the sanction did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Ramos, 553 A.2d at 1068. The first Coelho factor requires the trial justice to consider the reason for the nondisclosure. Our precedent reveals that this factor requires the trial justice to determine whether the nondisclosure was deliberate or inadvertent. See Ramos, 553 A.2d at 1068; State v. Concannon, 457 A.2d 1350, 1353 (R.I.1983). We have held that when nondisclosure is deliberate, prejudice to the other party may be presumed, see State v. Morejon, 603 A.2d 730, 735 (R.I.1992) ([W]e have held that in situations in which the record indicates a deliberate nondisclosure, a new trial will be granted without inquiring into the degree of harm caused by the misconduct.); Ramos, 553 A.2d at 1068 (holding that because there was no evidence of deliberate nondisclosure by the defendant, prejudice to the state would not be presumed); State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, 910 (R.I. 1986) (When the failure to disclose is deliberate, this court will not concern itself with the degree of harm caused to the defendant by the prosecution's misconduct; we shall simply grant the defendant a new trial.); State v. Verlaque, 465 A.2d 207, 214 (R.I.1983) (Because we conclude that the prosecutor deliberately failed to comply with Rule 16, it is unnecessary to consider whether or not Verlaque suffered procedural prejudice as a result of the noncompliance.), and exclusion of the challenged testimony may be appropriate without considering the other factors. See State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 319 (R.I. 1997) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness was not excessive as a sanction for deliberate nondisclosure). Here, although the trial justice did not explicitly accuse defendant of deliberately withholding information, he certainly considered the culpability of, and reason for, defendant's nondisclosure and he was not impressed with defendant's representation that the nondisclosure was accidental or that the differences between the discovery responses and proffered testimony was not material. At trial, defendant essentially argued that his nondisclosure was inadvertent because his reason for not supplementing his discovery as required by Rule 16(h) was that he did not believe that the new information was contradictory. This was so, he contended, because the no-contact language of the discovery response was meant to convey only that Pastore would testify that he did not see any contact in the manner alleged by the state and, thus, his testimony with regard to the leg-grabbing incident was not a material departure from the discovery response. The trial justice found this argument unpersuasive. He noted that the defendant's discovery responses unambiguously indicated that Pastore would testify that he observed no contact between defendant and Frazer in the bathroom and not no contact as alleged by the state. Thus, the trial justice reasoned that Pastore's testimony that he observed Frazer grab defendant's leg directly contradicted those responses. Further, in response to defense counsel's statement that [this was] a search for the truth, not to bolster one side or the other[,] the trial justice replied: [i]f that's the case, then the search for the truth would have been better served by full disclosure of what this witness was expected to testify to. In our opinion, the trial justice considered the nondisclosure to be knowing and intentional based on the fact that counsel had the information prior to trial and chose not to disclose it in either his discovery responses or any supplement or amendment to those responses, but rather waited to reveal this information until after the state had rested after presenting its case. We cannot say that this determination was clearly erroneous. We previously have held that the purpose of Rule 16 `is to ferret out procedural, rather than substantive prejudice,'    prejudice that would make it difficult for a party to prepare properly for trial. Gomes, 690 A.2d at 319 (quoting Coelho, 454 A.2d at 245). Here, there can be no question that the defendant had information that contradicted the language of his discovery response, and he did not reveal that information until the state already had presented its case-in-chief. Prejudice may be presumed from the deliberateness of nondisclosure. See Morejon, 603 A.2d at 735; Ramos, 553 A.2d at 1068; Wyche, 518 A.2d at 910; Verlaque, 465 A.2d at 214. The trial justice also explicitly noted that the challenged testimony was prejudicial to the state's case in that it suggested a defense  that Frazer's injury occurred as a result of an accident  for which the state could not have prepared as a result of the discovery violation. Given these considerations, we hold that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he excluded the challenged portions of Pastore's testimony.