Opinion ID: 2166865
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Commercial Union Policy

Text: It has long been the rule in Maine that insurance policies are to be liberally construed in favor of the insured and strictly construed against the insurer that drafted the policy. Bartlett v. Union Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 46 Me. 500, 502 (1859); see also Baybutt Construction Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 914, 921 (Me.1983). Any ambiguity in the contract is resolved against the insurer. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elwell, 513 A.2d 269, 271 (Me. 1986); Baybutt, 455 A.2d at 921. In applying these rules of construction to the instant case, the contract language is to be viewed from the perspective of an average person untrained in either the law or the insurance field in light of what a more than casual reading of the policy would reveal to an ordinarily intelligent insured. Id., quoting Brown v. City of Laconia, 118 N.H. 376, 386 A.2d 1276, 1277 (1978). The Commercial Union policy in the present case employs the word use in an ambiguous manner. The word use is a general catch-all term, encompassing all proper uses of a vehicle. See 6B Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice (Buckley ed.), § 4316 (1979). We have previously interpreted the use, as distinguished from the operation of a vehicle, in the context of an omnibus clause of an insurance contract, as contemplating a broad construction of that term: ... the words use and operation are not synonymous. The use of an automobile denotes its employment for some purpose of the user; the word operation denotes the manipulation of the car's controls in order to propel it as a vehicle. Use is thus broader than operation ... One who operates a car uses it, ... but one can use a car without operating it. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lyons, 400 A.2d 349, 352 (Me.1979), quoting Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. of New York, 33 N.J. 507, 166 A.2d 355, 358 (1960) (emphasis in original); see also Taylor v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 519 A.2d 182 (Me.1986). In determining whether a particular injury is within the meaning of the ownership, maintenance or use clause of an insurance policy, the cases are in general agreement that a causal relationship must exist between the accident or injury and the ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle. See Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance: What are Accidents or Injuries Arising out of Ownership, Maintenance, or Use of Insured Vehicle, 15 A.L.R. 4th 10 (1982). The causal relationship between the proper use of the vehicle and subsequent injury need not be the proximate cause of the injury; coverage will be extended if there is a reasonable causal connection between the use and the injury. Id. A determination of whether a causal relationship existed turns on the facts of each particular case. Our inquiry is therefore limited to whether under these facts, the negligent act on the part of the insured causing the accidental discharge of the firearm may be considered a reasonable incident of the use of the vehicle, leading to the reasonable expectation on the part of the insured that the resulting injury constituted a protected risk under the policy. The vehicle in the instant case was being used to transport the two men and their firearms for the purpose of hunting. The utilization of the vehicle for a hunting trip constitutes a proper use of the vehicle within the meaning of the Commercial Union policy. Incidental to that use, it was necessary, reasonable and foreseeable that the weapons would be placed into and removed from the vehicle at some point during the course of the expedition. The loading or unloading of a firearm into or from a vehicle is a reasonable and proper use of the vehicle in this context. [1] Because the injury occurred during the unloading of the gun from the vehicle, the requisite causal connection is present. This relationship was sufficient to afford coverage under the Commercial Union policy provision. [2]