Opinion ID: 509534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Gratuity Charges

Text: 34 Section 201 of 18 U.S.C., entitled Bribery of public officials and witnesses, contained various provisions outlawing the giving or receipt of anything of value in exchange for, inter alia, a federal official's performance of official acts. The section defined official act to mean 35 any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or profit. 36 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201(a) (1982) (since amended by Pub.L. No. 99-646, Sec. 46(a), 100 Stat. 3592, 3601 (1986)). The subsections dealing with unlawful gratuities provided as follows: 37 (f) Whoever, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public official ... for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official ...; or 38 (g) Whoever, being a public official ... otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by him ... 39 .... 40 Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. 41 18 U.S.C. Secs. 201(f) and (g) (1982). 42 Defendants contend that the acts performed by Biaggi on behalf of Coastal were not official act[s] within the meaning of Sec. 201 because they were not legislative acts and because they were directed principally toward municipal, not federal, agencies. In addition, defendants contend that there was insufficient evidence to show that the vacations were offered or accepted for or because of Biaggi's acts. We reject both contentions.
43 Biaggi's suggestion that a congressman's only official act[s] within the meaning of Sec. 201 are acts in the legislative process itself is untenable. The language of the section does not mention legislative acts, and courts have read the section and its predecessors sufficiently broadly to encompass all of the acts normally thought to constitute a congressman's legitimate use of his office. 44 The earliest pertinent interpretation is found in United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223, 231, 34 S.Ct. 512, 514, 58 L.Ed. 930 (1914), in which the Supreme Court upheld convictions in connection with bribes given to employees of the Department of the Interior to induce them to recommend lenient sentencing for certain persons convicted of selling liquor to Indians. The statutes at issue made it unlawful to give a bribe to a federal officer with the intent to influence him to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty, and unlawful for the officer to accept money with the intent to have his decision or action influenced on any question, matter, cause, or proceeding which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before him in his official capacity. Criminal Code Secs. 39, 117, 35 Stat. 1088, 1096, 1109 (1909). In determining whether recommendations by the federal employees were part of their official duties, the Court noted that conduct could constitute official action even though it was not prescribed by statute or written rule or regulation. The scope of official conduct may be found, in addition, in established usage, for [i]n numerous instances, duties not completely defined by written rules are clearly established by settled practice, and action taken in the course of their performance must be regarded as within the provisions of the above-mentioned statutes against bribery. 233 U.S. at 231, 34 S.Ct. at 514-515. 45 In the context of a prosecution of a former United States Senator for alleged bribery, the Supreme Court has noted that the realities of the American political system are that many non-legislative activities are an established and accepted part of the role of a Member of Congress. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 2543, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972). Thus, this Court has recognized that a congressional aide's use of his congressman's official position to help private individuals constitutes an official act by the aide within the meaning of Sec. 201(a). United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 268, 34 L.Ed.2d 219 (1972). In Carson, we upheld the bribery conviction of a United States Senator's administrative assistant, noting that the defendant, as a part of his job and under the applicable 'procedure that goes on at Capitol Hill,' ... would exert influence on various agencies and branches of the Government.... Id. at 434. We noted that even if the aide's intervention in a certain criminal prosecution were a  'personal frolic of his own,'  it would nonetheless constitute an official act, the determinative factor [being] that the primary source of any conceivable influence ... was the official position held by [the aide], enhanced as it was by the status of his employer's membership in the Senate Judiciary Committee. Id. A congressman's own invocation of his position and of congressional interest in his intercession with others on behalf of a constituent can hardly be considered less of an official act. 46 Consistent with the judicial recognition of the realities of the scope of a congressman's job, defendants' attorneys, in cross-examining Senator D'Amato at trial, brought out the fact that the duties of senators and representatives routinely include interceding with various agencies on behalf of their constituents. For example: 47 Q [by Esposito's attorney] ... 48 Senator D'Amato, as part of your responsibilities and endeavors as a senator, do you and your staff get involved with the problems of people in New York, business people, who are looking for your help? 49 A Certainly. 50 Q And would you say that that's done on a daily basis, isn't that correct? 51 A Absolutely. 52 As an illustration, Esposito's counsel elicited the fact that in 1982, both of New York's senators and at least four of its representatives, including Biaggi, had collaborated on an effort to have Coastal awarded a contract to repair the Navy ship IOWA. 53 Biaggi's counsel's questioning of the Senator proceeded along the same lines: 54 Q [by Biaggi's counsel] Your office is open to anyone that would either call or write with a problem, with a question, with a need or desire, is that correct? 55 A That is correct. 56 Q That's part of being a United States Senator or a Congressman? 57 A I think so. 58 With respect to the December 3, 1985 meeting among Biaggi, Senator D'Amato, and Vincent Montanti, during which the Senator attempted to call the Secretary of the Navy, Biaggi's attorney asked, 59 Q So that's what you and Congressman Biaggi were doing on December 3, 1985? You were stepping up to the plate and you were at bat doing your jobs, is that correct? 60 A Yes, that's correct. 61 Certainly the manner in which Biaggi went about seeking to help Coastal suggested that his conduct was to be considered official. For example, he wrote letters on behalf of Coastal using his congressional stationery, or using the stationery of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and signing as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine. He opened an office file on Coastal and had the matter handled by his administrative assistant, the top manager of his congressional office. He told Esposito he planned to introduce a bill in Congress that could provide work for Coastal. In one of his letters to Mayor Koch, Biaggi offered to attend meetings between the City and the Navy with respect to Coastal if the Mayor thought that might be helpful in demonstrating Congressional interest. We know of nothing in the law that precluded the jury from considering Biaggi's intercessions as official acts, and the evidence plainly supported the inference that they were official acts. 62 We also reject Biaggi's contention that the gratuity provisions did not apply to his acts because they were directed at City officials rather than federal officials. No such limitation appears on the face of Sec. 201, which refers to any action taken on a matter brought before the public official in his official capacity. The breadth of Sec. 201 is highlighted by the narrower thrust of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 203 (1982) (since amended by Pub.L. No. 99-646, Sec. 47(a), 100 Stat. 3592, 3604 (1986)), a conflict-of-interest statute enacted contemporaneously with the pertinent version of Sec. 201. Section 203 prohibits an official from accepting payment in relation to matters pending before specific federal forums. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 203(a); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 855 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961, 103 S.Ct. 2437, 77 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1983). We assume that Congress's failure similarly to limit Sec. 201's definition of official act reflects an intention that Sec. 201 not be restricted to acts directed at federal agencies. 63 Nor does the legislative history of Sec. 201 provide a basis for reading the section more narrowly than it was drafted. The section's immediate predecessor with respect to the legislative branch, while referring specifically to matters pending in Congress, also made it unlawful for a member of Congress to receive payment with the intent to have his action ... influenced on any question, matter [or] cause ... which by law may be brought before him in his capacity as such Member. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 205 (1958). The legislative history of Sec. 201 noted that the new Sec. 201, which used substantially the same language, made no significant changes of substance. S.Rep. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1962 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News (USCCAN) 3852, 3853; 1962 USCCAN at 3856 (The term 'official act' is defined to include any decision or action taken by a public official in his capacity as such.). 64 In sum, we see no basis for ruling that a congressman's official acts--especially those demonstrating Congressional interest--may not include efforts that are directed toward local rather than federal officials. We note that both of the deputy mayors approached by Biaggi testified at trial that it was not unusual for a congressman to intercede for a constituent on city matters; Biaggi easily gained their attention precisely because he was a congressman. 65 Finally, the evidence revealed that Biaggi's efforts were directed toward federal officials as well as City officials. He urged Senator D'Amato to call the Secretary of the Navy, and he repeatedly called the Senator to inquire as to what progress had been made. He himself called the Commandant of the Coast Guard. 66 The trial court read the jury the statutory definition of official act[s] and properly instructed it that [o]fficial acts are not limited to those set forth in a written job description, but may include as well those duties and activities customarily associated with a particular position. The evidence was ample to permit the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts performed by Biaggi on behalf of Coastal were among those customarily associated with a congressman's job. 67 2. The Sufficiency of the Evidence that the Vacations Were in Return for the Official Acts 68 In arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show that Esposito provided Biaggi with vacations for or because of Biaggi's official acts on behalf of Coastal, defendants bear a heavy burden. United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1125, 102 S.Ct. 2945, 73 L.Ed.2d 1341 (1982). In reviewing this contention, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government's favor, United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, 104 S.Ct. 133, 78 L.Ed.2d 128 (1983), and we must affirm the convictions so long as, from the inferences reasonably drawn, the jury might fairly have found the requisite connection beyond a reasonable doubt, United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 245 (2d Cir.1972). Defendants have not carried their burden. 69 The evidence at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the government, including the nature and sequences of events, certain explicit statements, and the suggestions of cover-up, provided an ample basis for the jury rationally to infer that the vacations were given and accepted in exchange for Biaggi's efforts on behalf of Coastal. The jury could reasonably have inferred, for example, from the very substantial cost of the Florida vacations--several thousands of dollars in each year--that the vacations were not intended simply as kindness-of-the-heart gifts from Esposito or his companies. Further, Esposito's arrangements for the Florida vacations were solicited by Biaggi; the jury was free to infer that Biaggi was not requesting gifts of thousands of dollars without offering something more than his friendship in return. 70 The sequences themselves lent further support to the jury's rejection of any inference that Biaggi offered nothing and Esposito expected nothing in return for the vacations. For example, after BNYDC drew a hard line with Coastal in late 1983, Biaggi was given a vacation in St. Maarten in early 1984, in the company of, inter alios, SVR partners whose commissions were jeopardized by Coastal's problems with BNYDC. Some weeks thereafter, Biaggi called Deputy Mayor Lipper, and later followed up with a letter to Mayor Koch, to seek relief for Coastal. In mid-1984, Barlow began urging Biaggi to take her to the Fort Lauderdale spa for the Christmas holidays. During the latter half of 1984, Biaggi, inter alia, wrote another letter to Mayor Koch and offered to meet with Coastal and the Navy to show congressional concern. By Christmas 1984, Esposito had made the necessary arrangements for Biaggi and Barlow to use the spa. Throughout 1985, Barlow pressed Biaggi for a return to the spa the following Christmas season. From mid-1985 to the end of the year, Biaggi bird-dogg[ed] Coastal's problems, repeatedly calling Deputy Mayor Townsend with regard to BNYDC charges, securing payment by the Navy of some of Coastal's closely scrutinized claims, and calling on Senator D'Amato to seek help from the Secretary of the Navy. In the fall of 1985, Biaggi called Esposito and told him that Biaggi and Barlow wanted to return to the spa. Esposito said he would make the arrangements and immediately asked what progress Biaggi was making for Coastal; the tape of this conversation, quoted in part in Part I.A. above, suggests that both Biaggi and Esposito viewed the two matters as related. The jury was surely free to infer that defendants' implicit understanding was that the thousands of dollars committed by Esposito for Biaggi's vacations were a quid pro quo for Biaggi's Coastal efforts. Indeed, when Esposito told his SVR partner Martuscello that he had provided the two Florida vacations for Biaggi, Esposito himself characterized it as good money invested. 71 Finally, support for the inference that the vacations were provided in exchange for Biaggi's efforts on behalf of Coastal is found in Biaggi's telephone call to Esposito, suggesting various fabrications, immediately after Biaggi had been questioned by the FBI. As set forth in greater detail in Part II.E. below, he coached Esposito, inter alia, to characterize the vacations as manifestations of simple concern for Biaggi's health; to lie about the timing of Esposito's request that Biaggi intercede for Coastal, placing that request after the last vacation; and to conceal the St. Maarten vacation entirely. In short, Biaggi told Esposito, We say you haven't done anything for me and I haven't done anything for you. 72 We conclude that the evidence was ample to permit a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Esposito provided the vacations for or because of Biaggi's official acts on behalf of Coastal.