Opinion ID: 662156
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: constitutionality of prior convictions

Text: 7 [T]he Constitution requires that defendants be given the opportunity to collaterally attack prior convictions which will be used against them at sentencing. United States v. Vea-Gonzales, 999 F.2d 1326, 1333 (9th Cir.1993). The government bears the burden of showing the fact of a prior conviction, and then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. United States v. Newman, 912 F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.1990). 8 The voluntariness of a guilty plea is a question of law reviewed de novo. Newman, 912 F.2d at 1123 (citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431 (1983)). However, factual matters concerning the prior conviction are reviewed for clear error. Newman, 912 F.2d at 1123 (citing United States v. Gross, 897 F.2d 414, 416 (9th Cir.1990)). 9 A plea of guilty involves the intelligent and voluntary waiver of three rights: 1) the privilege against self incrimination; 2) the right to trial by jury; and 3) the right to confront one's accusers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-3 (1968). In order for a guilty plea to be voluntary, a defendant is also entitled to receive[ ] 'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him....'  Marshall, 459 U.S. at 436 (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)). Our review of the transcripts of defendant's change of plea in the 1980 grand theft auto conviction and in the 1987 assault conviction clearly shows that the defendant was advised of his Boykin rights, was given notice of the charge, and stipulated to a factual basis. The state court explicitly found that the waivers of those rights were voluntary. 10 The defendant now argues that the prior convictions violated his due process rights because the state courts accepted his guilty pleas without holding a competency hearing when the state courts had reason to doubt his competency. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2688 n. 13 (1993). We disagree. The mere fact that the defendant is of low moderate intelligence and has had some psychiatric treatment in the past does not automatically require a court to conduct a competency hearing. Only when the trial court has sufficient doubt of his competence is further inquiry necessary. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. Here, unlike the cases relied upon by the defendant, there is no evidence that Bocage acted irrationally or did anything which would lead the state court to believe that the defendant was not competent. 11 The trial court did not clearly err when it denied defendant a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility and the defendant's convictions in 1980 and 1987 were properly included in his criminal history calculation. 12 AFFIRMED.