Opinion ID: 860511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: wilful contempt

Text: Rather next contends that the chancellor erred in finding him in wilful contempt when the matter before the court was strictly on the issue of whether child support should be modified or suspended. Rather argues that the chancellor did not have the authority to find him in contempt when the chancellor did not have access to the record in the previous hearing adjudging Rather in arrears. The DHS argues that the first order which was entered on September 14, 1994, was not a final judgment; therefore, it was subject to revision at any time before entry of the final judgment. This Court has held that a final judgment of the circuit court is a judgment adjudicating the merits of the controversy. Roach v. Black Creek Drainage Dist. 41 So. 2d 5, 5 (Miss. 1949); see Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-3 (Supp. 1995). Clearly, the judgment entered on September 14, 1994 was not a final judgment. The document states on its face This action is continued until November 10, 1994 at 9:00 a.m. on all remaining issues. The issues before the court were: (1) whether Rather was in wilful contempt, and, on counterclaim (2) whether Rather should be entitled to a modification or suspension of child support due to a material change in circumstances. The preliminary finding by the chancellor on September 14, 1994, only established the amount Rather was in arrearage. The issue as to whether Rather was in wilful contempt, or whether he was entitled to a modification was not addressed at the time. Therefore, it did not adjudicate the merits of the controversy before the court, nor was there an expressed direction for the entry of judgment; hence, it was not a final judgment. Pursuant to Rule 54 (b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, that decision was subject to revision at any time before entry of the final judgment. M.R.C.P. 54 (b). Contempt matters are left to the substantial discretion of the trial court. Varner v. Varner, 666 So. 2d 493, 496 (Miss. 1995) A defendant may avoid a judgment of contempt by showing that is without the present ability to discharge his obligations. Varner , 666 So. 2d at 495 (Miss. 1995). If the contemnor raises his inability to pay as a defense, he has the burden to show this with particularity, not just in general terms. Id. In the present case, Rather carries this burden. In other words, the lower court may find Rather in contempt if the Chancellor makes the specific findings that Rather has failed to carry his burden of proof in showing his inability to pay.