Opinion ID: 2330598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Self-Representation Colloquy Inadequate

Text: After the prosecution finished the direct examination of its first witness, Paul Brown, and before cross-examination, defense counsel requested that the jury be excused. After the jury was excused, defense counsel addressed the trial judge, as follows: When I cross-examine this witness, your Honor, I want to nip this in the bud before it gets any further. Mr. Christopher is writing down to me or indicating that he wishes to cross-examine this witness. And I've been trying to tell him that you are not co-counsel. I am the attorney. I will represent him. I don't know how Mr. Christopher wants to proceed at this point, if he chooses to represent himself or wants me to represent him. I told him we are not co-counsel. I am the attorney. I would represent him. If he wishes to represent himself, he is free to do that and I would allow the [c]ourt to inquire about whether or not he wants to do that. After a brief discussion regarding the cause for Christopher's concerns, the following colloquy ensued: The [trial judge]: Mr. Christopher, it's your choice. If you want to reject [defense counsel's] services, I will then have to ask you some questions to see whether you are competent to represent yourself. And if I think you are, I'll let you ask the questions. Defendant: One question. Approximately how many hours [sic] you think you put into my case? The [trial judge]: Mr. Christopher, it has nothing to do with it. Now, the question I have for you is do you want to represent yourself? Defendant: This is my life, your honor. We're talking about my life here. The [trial judge]: I understand that, but I have a simple question. Defendant: I've got to ask my own questions, I believe. I think I need to dismiss [defense counsel]. The [trial judge]: Okay. Well, how much schooling do you have? Defendant: I've got a GED, but I finished 11th grade in high school. The [trial judge]: Okay. And your age is? Defendant: 48 years old. I was self-employed and owned my own business for most of my life. The [trial judge]: Okay. What sort of business was it? Defendant: It was a construction business, and then I was superintendent for a construction company. The [trial judge]: Okay. Have you ever been involved in a criminal case before? Defendant: Not really, no. The [trial judge]: Okay. So you've never been through a trial and have an idea of just where it's going? Defendant: I've got no idea. I've never seen none of this before. But I just know there's [sic] previous items that happened, not this night, that led up to this incident. The [trial judge]: I don't think it's in your interest to represent yourself. You're just going to get yourself into bigger trouble and make damaging admissions that are going to put a few more nails in. Your request is denied, and [defense counsel] will represent you. Defendant: All right, your Honor. Christopher contends that the Superior Court violated his right to self-representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitutions. [2] This Court recently addressed the issue of a defendant's pretrial waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and election of self-representation in Hartman v. State. [3] In Hartman, we held that before allowing a criminal defendant to proceed pro se, the court must `1) determine that the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to counsel; and 2) inform the defendant of the risks inherent in going forward in a criminal trial without the assistance of legal counsel.' [4] Moreover, the right to proceed pro se must be made in a timely fashion. Once a trial has begun, the right of self-representation may be curtailed, and the trial judge considering the motion must weigh the legitimate interests of the defendant against the prejudice that may result from the potential disruption of proceedings already in progress. [5] The record reflects that jury selection, opening statements by counsel, and the direct examination of the first prosecution witness had all occurred before Christopher first raised the idea of self-representation. The State's interest in ensuring integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer. [6] When performing this balancing test, the trial judge need not expressly mention the timeliness of the request to proceed pro se so long as the record reflect[s] clear findings and logical reasoning underlying the ruling denying the request. [7] Nevertheless, the record in this case does not reflect either the factual findings or the legal reasoning underlying the trial judge's denial of Christopher's mid-trial request to represent himself. The trial judge asked a series of questions relating to Christopher's education, work experience and familiarity with the trial process. The trial judge then denied the request to proceed pro se because he found that it was not in Christopher's interest to represent himself. Significantly, the trial judge did not address the validity of Christopher's waiver of his right to counsel. [8] Moreover, unlike Zuppo, the trial judge in this case did not determine that the potential mid-trial disruption of the proceedings outweighed Christopher's right to proceed without an attorney. The record reflects that the trial judge only explained he was asking Christopher questions to determine if he was competent to represent [himself]. This was an erroneous legal focus, as reflected by our recent analysis in Hartman. Given Christopher's mid-trial request to proceed pro se, the proper inquiry was two-fold: first, was there a valid waiver of the right to counsel, [9] and second, if the waiver was valid, whether the prejudice resulting from the potential disruption of the proceedings during trial outweighed Christopher's interests in proceeding pro se. [10]