Opinion ID: 1894248
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying father's request for attorney fees and costs.

Text: Father claims, by notice of review, that the trial court erred in denying his request for attorney fees. Additionally, father has filed a separate motion for attorney fees, taxes and costs incurred by this appeal. SDCL 15-17-7 provides that attorney fees in cases of domestic relations and paternity actions are allowable. Furthermore, we have held in the past that we will not consider a request for attorney fees on appeal in domestic relations cases unless there is submitted a separate motion, accompanied by counsel's verified itemized statement of costs incurred and legal services rendered. Cole v. Cole, 384 N.W.2d 312 (S.D.1986); Malcolm v. Malcolm, 365 N.W.2d 863 (S.D.1985). The allowance of attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the court. The trial court found that this entire action had been brought and prosecuted by both parties in good faith, and even though it placed a financial burden and obligation upon each of the parties to pay their own respective legal fees, the parties were to be accountable for their own attorney fees. Father claims, however, that mother's petition for change of custody was based solely upon her having failed in her attempt to afford her minor child the advantage of being raised in a two-parent family, rather than her earnest and sincere desire to raise her own child. Father claims therefore that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the father his reasonable attorney fees and costs as requested. We have held in the past that the trial court's duties with regards to attorney fees is two-part. First, it must consider what constitutes reasonable attorney fees and, secondly, it must then make a decision of what portion of such fee, if any, should be allowed as costs and paid by the opposing party in the action. This decision is to be based upon the consideration of the property owned by each party, the relative income of the parties, whether the property of the parties is in liquid or fixed assets, and whether the actions of either party increased unreasonably the time spent on the case. Prentice v. Prentice, 322 N.W. 2d 880 (S.D.1982); Lien v. Lien, 278 N.W. 2d 436 (S.D.1979). It is unclear whether the trial court applied all the factors enumerated in the above cases in denying father's request for attorney fees. Impliedly, the trial court did consider the income of the parties, as it specifically noted that paying their own attorney fees would be a burden to each. Therefore, the question becomes whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying attorney fees below. We conclude, under the totality of the circumstances, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Similarly, we have concluded to deny attorney fees here. Affirmed.