Opinion ID: 2092998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal and State Decisions

Text: The majority examines the line of Federal and State decisions involving police searches of students at school and concludes that the reasonable suspicion standard applies to Ruettiger's action here. This conclusion, however, is based on a misreading of two decisions. Every Federal and State decision on this matter has rejected the majority's view. All Federal and State decisions reviewed indicate that police officers, including police liaison officers, are required to have probable cause to search a student if they are significantly involved in the search. This was the law prior to T.L.O. (see Picha v. Wielgos (N.D.Ill.1976), 410 F.Supp. 1214, 1219 (cited by the United States Supreme Court in T.L.O. in declining to address whether the reasonable suspicion standard applies to school searches involving police); M.J. v. State (Fla.App.1981), 399 So.2d 996, 998; M. v. Board of Education Ball-Chatham Community Unit School District No. 5 (S.D.Ill.1977), 429 F.Supp. 288, 292; State v. Young (1975), 234 Ga. 488, 499-500, 216 S.E.2d 586, 594), and has also been the law after T.L.O. As Professor LaFave has noted: Lower courts have held or suggested that the usual probable cause test obtains if the police are involved in the search in a significant way. (4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 10.11(b) (3d ed. 1996) (hereinafter LaFave).) (See A.J.M. v. State (Fla.App.1993), 617 So.2d 1137; In re Devon T. (1991), 85 Md. App. 674, 701, 584 A.2d 1287, 1300; F.P. v. State (Fla.App.1988), 528 So.2d 1253.) This analysis applies to police liaison officers as well. See Coronado v. State (Tex.Ct.App. 1991), 806 S.W.2d 302, rev'd on other grounds (Tex.Crim.App.1992), 835 S.W.2d 636; Cason v. Cook (8th Cir.1987), 810 F.2d 188. Although several decisions have allowed student searches under the reasonable suspicion standard where police have participated in the search (see Martens v. District No. 220, Board of Education (N.D.Ill.1985), 620 F.Supp. 29; Cason v. Cook (8th Cir.1987), 810 F.2d 188), these decisions have stressed that police involvement in the searches was minimal. See also Coronado v. State (Tex. Ct.App.1991), 806 S.W.2d 302, rev'd on other grounds (Tex.Crim.App.1992), 835 S.W.2d 636; In re Alexander (1990), 220 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1577 n. 1, 270 Cal.Rptr. 342, 344 n. 1 (where courts held that the reasonable suspicion standard applies where school officials request police assistance in searching a student because the police are not the primary actors but are merely assisting school officials). The majority attempts to find support for its holding by stating that the reasonable suspicion standard applies in those cases involving school police or liaison officers. (169 Ill.2d at 207, 214 Ill.Dec. at 463, 661 N.E.2d at 317.) The two decisions on which the majority relies for this assertion, however, Wilcher v. State (Tex.Ct.App.1994), 876 S.W.2d 466, and In re S.F. (1992), 414 Pa.Super. 529, 607 A.2d 793, not only fail to address the issue of what fourth amendment standard applies, they do not involve police liaison officers. The two decisions involve school police, which differ from police liaison officers in several significant respects. First, school police are employed by a school district while police liaison officers are employed by the local police department. Thus, while a school police officer is employed by and is ultimately responsible to the school district, a police liaison officer, such as Ruettiger, is employed by and ultimately responsible to local law enforcement authorities. Obviously, school districts and local law enforcement authorities have different missions. Also, while Ruettiger is assigned to the school, he still operates out of the police station, as was seen in this case. Ruettiger arrested defendant, placed him in his squad car, brought him to the police station, and interrogated him there. School police also have duties that are significantly more limited than police liaison officers, such as Ruettiger, a point made clear in Wilcher. The Wilcher court noted that the duties of the school police officer there entailed quelling disturbances and generally carrying out the various school policies applicable to her job assignment. ( Wilcher, 876 S.W.2d at 467.) In fact, the Wilcher court specifically noted that the school police officer there did not arrest the defendant after he emptied his pockets and revealed contraband. Instead, the school police officer called the Houston police department to have a police officer sent to the school to take over the search and investigation. ( Cf. In re Frederick B. (1987), 192 Cal.App.3d 79, 88-89, 237 Cal.Rptr. 338, 344 (noting that school security guards, although peace officers for purposes of carrying out their duties, are of a special category, and are carefully limited in their powers and scope of operation).) In contrast to school police, Ruettiger's primary duty at the school was that of any police officer, to investigate and prevent criminal activity, arresting those he found violating the law. Unlike school police, Ruettiger's duties were not limited in any manner. Ruettiger not only instigated the seizure and search, he arrested defendant, handcuffed him, took him to the station, read him his Miranda rights, and interrogated him. The distinction between school police and police liaison officers is significant because every case involving police liaison officers has indicated that probable cause is required if the officer acts on his own initiative, as Ruettiger did here. (See Coronado v. State (Tex. Ct.App.1991), 806 S.W.2d 302; Cason v. Cook (8th Cir.1987), 810 F.2d 188.) As the Coronado court noted, citing Cason: This same standard [reasonableness] applies when school officials conduct the search in question in conjunction with, but not at the behest of, police officers who are assigned to the school. (Emphasis added.) ( Coronado, 806 S.W.2d at 303.) Surely, if the reasonable suspicion standard is not applicable to a police liaison officer directing a school official to conduct a search, it is not applicable where that same police liaison officer conducts a search on his own initiative, without the involvement of any school official, as was done here. The majority incorrectly assumes that I approve of the Wilcher and S.F. decisions that allow school police to search students on the basis of reasonable suspicion. I do not necessarily agree with those decisions, but instead analyze them only to (1) note that the issue of what standard to search applied was not raised or addressed in those cases, and (2) distinguish them from cases involving police liaison officers, such as Coronado and Cason, which require probable cause. The majority also attempts to find support for its conclusion in Boykin. However, Boykin provides the majority no support because it does not present the same facts as the instant case. As the majority acknowledges, the principal in Boykin wished to search a student and requested assistance from police assigned to the school. This court found the search reasonable. Thus, Boykin is similar to cases such as Coronado, which conclude that when police merely assist school officials in a search, the standard to search is reasonable suspicion. Those same cases note, however, that if a principal searches a student at the behest of law enforcement officials, probable cause is required. The same would certainly be true if the officer instigated and conducted the search on his own without the involvement of any school official. The majority also finds that Ruettiger initiated the search to further the school's attempt to maintain a proper educational environment. However, any police search at a school, or even of a schoolchild outside of school, can be said to have been performed to maintain a proper educational environment. This does not allow a police officer, whose primary duty is to investigate and prevent criminal activity, the right to search a student on mere whim and less than probable cause in direct contravention of a student's constitutional rights. In sum, not one case involving a police search of a student at school, including cases involving police liaison officers, supports the majority's conclusion. In fact, every authority available has rejected the majority's view. The majority finds support only by misreading the facts of Wilcher and S.F., decisions that involve school police rather than police liaison officers. The result is that this court has for the first time in a long line of cases departed from the overwhelming view that police officers, even liaison police officers, are required to have probable cause to search a student on school grounds when instigating and carrying out a search.