Opinion ID: 2330890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Coherent mitigation case

Text: Appellant contends that his counsel were ineffective for failing to develop a coherent mitigation case based upon his alleged mental problems. Appellant states that it is unclear what counsels' strategy was in this regard, and that it is inappropriate for either the trial court or this Court to assign a strategy to defense counsel without further evidence and then pronounce that strategy to be sound. It should first be noted that appellant has failed to abstract any of the trial below, except for the pretrial motions filed by counsel, rulings on some of the motions, and a jury instruction. Therefore, we are unable to determine exactly what was presented during the trial or sentencing phase. In addition, appellant seems to overlook the fact that the trial court did not assign as trial strategy counsel's decision not to present mitigation evidence concerning his alleged mental problems. Instead, the trial court found that this claim was general, non-specific, and does not constitute a basis for postconviction relief. Furthermore, the trial court found that appellant's counsel sought funding for an independent mental evaluation, for investigation of mitigation evidence, and for hiring an investigator; thus, any claims to the contrary were conclusory. We agree. Appellant contends that the trial court's finding was erroneous because the court knew of his mental problems and because his counsel submitted jury instructions concerning his mental state at the time of the murder. Appellant has, however, failed to establish what mental problems he had that could have provided a basis for a coherent mitigation case. The trial court simply stated that it was aware of his purported past mental history and ordered a mental evaluation of him. This evaluation was to include a determination whether, on the date of the murder, appellant lacked the capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and whether he had the capacity to form the culpable mental state to commit the murder. The record does not reflect whether that evaluation occurred and, if so, what the results were. However, the absence of any evidence at trial concerning appellant's alleged mental problems, and more importantly, appellant's failure to present in his Rule 37 petition (and in this appeal) any evidence whatsoever to support this claim, augments the trial court's conclusion that this claim is conclusory. Furthermore, appellant's failure to bolster his claim with proof of his allegedmental problems renders his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel meritless; as such, appellant was not entitled to a hearing in this regard. As we stated in Whitmore v. State, 299 Ark. 55, 771 S.W.2d 266 (1989), the strong presumption in favor of counsel's effectiveness cannot be overcome by the mere claim that petitioner had relatives or other witnesses who might have had some mitigating evidence to present. In order to show that his counsel were ineffective, appellant must establish that their representation fell below an objectively reasonable standard and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Wainwright v. State, 307 Ark. 569, 823 S.W.2d 449 (1992). This reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Pruett v. State, 287 Ark. 124, 697 S.W.2d 872 (1985). The appellant has failed to offer any evidence that his counsel were ineffective for failing to develop a mitigation case based upon his alleged mental problems. Moreover, he has failed to establish that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different had his counsel pursued the alleged mitigation evidence. Therefore, appellant failed to meet his burden under Strickland, and the trial court properly denied relief on this claim without a hearing. See Scott v. State, 303 Ark. 197, 795 S.W.2d 353 (1990) (postconviction relief properly denied without a hearing regarding conclusory claim of failure to present witnesses where defendant failed to list witnesses not procured); Whitmore, 299 Ark. at 66, 771 S.W.2d at 271 (no hearing warranted based upon bald statements of history of psychiatric treatment, alcoholism, and dysfunctional family, where defendant offered no details of what witnesses could have testified to and how outcome would have been different); Rheuark v. State, 299 Ark. 243, 771 S.W.2d 777 (1989) (no hearing warranted where defendant failed to establish prejudice).