Opinion ID: 2584198
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the plaintiffs' alternative argument

Text: Notwithstanding the foregoing, the plaintiffs maintain that: At the time [they] responded to DuPont's discovery, and submitted their final expert reports for trial, [[16]] they believed (and still believe) that Hawai`i law allowed for recovery of the losses they sustained naturally and proximately from DuPont's misrepresentations, without limitation. Their trial preparation reflected this expectation of the availability of general damages for fraud. . . . [T]he possibility of the [c]ircuit [c]ourt imposing a limited settlement fraud remedy was unknown to the parties and was not foreseeable under Hawaii law at the time [the p]laintiffs obtained their reports, and answered discovery[.] Consequently, the plaintiffs request that, [s]hould this [c]ourt ultimately adopt the settlement differential as the prevailing measure of damages, i.e., the fair compromise value absent the fraud, they should be given the opportunity (on remand) to make an appropriate record for such purpose. Stated differently, the plaintiffs believe that, because it was unknown and not foreseeable that the circuit court would adopt the fair compromise value as the measure of damages in settlement fraud actions, their case should be remanded to allow their legal experts an opportunity to present their opinions regarding the fair compromise value of the case absent the fraud. In the instant case, DuPont filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs' damages were limited to the fair compromise value of their released tort claims at the time of settlement. In opposition thereto, the plaintiffs maintained  as they had up to the time DuPont filed the subject motion for summary judgment  that their damages should not be so restricted and should be extended to the judgment value of their released claims. In giving the benefit of the doubt to the plaintiffs, we presume that DuPont's theory of damages was either first raised, or only became clear, upon the filing of its motion for summary judgment. Therefore, it can hardly be said, as the plaintiffs contend, that it was not foreseeable for the circuit court to conclude that the measure of damages would be the fair compromise value, especially in light of the arguments advanced by DuPont in its motion for summary judgment. [17] Clearly, this is not a case where the circuit court sua sponte rendered an outcome that could not have been expected by the parties. More importantly, the opportunity the plaintiffs now seek, i.e., to allow their experts the opportunity to opine regarding the fair compromise value of the case absent the fraud, was available to them, via HRCP Rule 56(f) (2007), at the time the circuit court was considering DuPont's motion for summary judgment. HRCP Rule 56(f) states that: Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. (Emphases added.) Rule 56(f)  like its federal counterpart, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 56(f),  provides a mechanism for litigants to seek a continuance or avoid summary judgment when they need[ ] to discover essential facts to justify their opposition. Hall v. State of Hawai`i, 791 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir.1986) (stating that FRCP Rule 56(f) empowers the court to continue or deny a motion for summary judgment if the opposing party needs to discover essential facts to justify the opposition) (citation omitted); see also Stallard v. Consol. Maui, Inc., 103 Hawai`i 468, 475, 83 P.3d 731, 738 (2004) (As the [FRCP] are substantially similar to the HRCP, we look to federal case law for guidance.). The purpose of Rule 56(f) is to provide an additional safeguard against an improvident or premature grant of summary judgment. Price v. Gen. Motors Corp., 931 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, [t]he rule should be applied with a spirit of liberality. Although discovery need not be complete before a case is dismissed, summary judgment is proper only if the nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery. To this end, Rule 56(f) allows a party to request a delay in granting summary judgment if the party can make a good faith showing that postponement of the ruling would enable it to discover additional evidence which might rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The party is required to show what specific facts further discovery might unveil. McCabe v. Macaulay, 450 F.Supp.2d 928, 933 (N.D.Iowa 2006) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks, citations, original brackets omitted) (format altered); Acoba v. General Tire, Inc., 92 Hawai`i 1, 11-12, 986 P.2d 288, 298-99 (1999) (an HRCP Rule 56(f) affidavit must provide valid reasons why a continuance is necessary and demonstrate specifically how postponement would enable rebuttal); Josue v. Isuzu Motors Am., Inc., 87 Hawai`i 413, 416, 958 P.2d 535, 538 (1998) (same). In sum, the circuit court has the discretion to deny the motion for summary judgment, order a continuance for additional discovery or make `such other order as is just.' Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 998 F.2d 1550, 1554 (10th Cir.1993) (footnote omitted); see also Josue, 87 Hawai`i at 416, 958 P.2d at 538 (A [circuit] court's decision to deny a request for continuance pursuant to HRCP Rule 56(f) will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. (Citation omitted.)). Here, rather than request a continuance of the hearing to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or . . . [to seek] such other order as is just, HRCP Rule 56(f), the plaintiffs continued to assert their contrary position on damages, disregarding DuPont's position and the fact that the circuit court might be persuaded to adopt DuPont's view of the measure of damages. Having failed to request a Rule 56(f) continuance, the plaintiffs cannot now complain that the circuit court  based on the submissions by the plaintiffs  granted summary judgment in favor of DuPont. [18] Weinberg v. Whatcom County, 241 F.3d 746, 751 (9th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks, citation, and original brackets omitted) (interpreting FRCP Rule 56(f) and holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants when the plaintiff never moved the court under Rule 56(f) for additional time to obtain expert testimony necessary to substantiate his allegations of damages); see also Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 832-33 (10th Cir.1986) (where a party opposing summary judgment and seeking a continuance pending completion of discovery fails to take advantage of the shelter provided by Rule 56(f) . . ., there is no abuse of discretion in granting summary judgment). [19] To permit the plaintiffs to now establish another record relating to the proof of damages, after unsuccessfully maintaining their position and failing to take advantage of the Rule 56(f) remedy available to them, would entitle them to two bites of the apple. [20] Daiichi Hawai`i Real Estate Corp. v. Lichter, 103 Hawai`i 325, 348, 82 P.3d 411, 434 (2003) (in an action seeking to vacate the arbitration decision, this court stated that it cannot accept that parties have a right to keep two strings to their bow  to seek victory before the tribunal and then, having lost, seek to overturn it for bias never before claimed). Accordingly, in our view, the plaintiffs waived their opportunity to secure further opinions from their experts to submit to the circuit court and cannot now raise it on appeal. See generally Chung v. McCabe Hamilton & Renny Co., 109 Hawai`i 520, 537, 128 P.3d 833, 850 (2006) (the failure to properly raise an issue at the [circuit] level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Avila v. Travelers Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 658, 660 (9th Cir.1981) (stating that [a] contention by an opposing party that he had insufficient time in which to present specific facts in opposition to the motion [for summary judgment] normally cannot be successfully raised for the first time on appeal) (citation omitted). [21]