Opinion ID: 425977
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Organized Crime

Text: 62 The district court stated that application of RICO should be restricted sharply to organized crime and the enterprises on which its talons have fastened. Thus, courts in the Southern District and elsewhere have held that RICO claims for damages could be maintained only if there was a tie to organized crime. 553 F.Supp. at 1361 (citing Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F.Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y.1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 112-13 (S.D.N.Y.1975); and Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 256, 260 (E.D.La.1981)); accord Wagner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [current] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) p 99,032 (N.D.Ill.1982); City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) p 64,527 (N.D.Ga.1982). 63 It is true that RICO's legislative history states that it was enacted to provide enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1073; see United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 62 (2d Cir.1983). The language of the statute, however, does not premise a RICO violation on proof or allegations of any connection with organized crime. 17