Opinion ID: 1918053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application to Appellant's Claims

Text: Ms. Owens's claims for damages under the DCHRA are barred because she failed to provide timely notice of her alleged injury to the Mayor, as required by § 12-309. Although Ms. Owens completed the EEO form within six months of the most recent injury at issue (denial of her request for promotion), that administrative filing with the DMH did not satisfy the statutory requirement of notice to the Mayor. The only statutory exception to the requirement of formal notice to the Mayor is an MPD report, and we are not free to go beyond the express language of the statute and authorize any additional documents to meet its requirements. Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 697 A.2d 23, 28 (D.C.1997). Whether the District of Columbia had actual notice of a potential claim is not an appropriate consideration under section 12-309. Chidel v. Hubbard, 840 A.2d 689, 695 (D.C.2004) (rejecting contention that appellant substantially complied with the notice requirement because the District had actual notice of the injury). We therefore reject appellant's argument that substantial compliance with statutory notice requirements is sufficient. Even if Ms. Owens's July 19, 2006, letter addressed to the Mayor and served on the ORM was sufficient in substance (a question we need not decide), it was not timely. Although the content requirements of any notice under section 12-309 are to be interpreted liberally, and in close cases doubts are to be resolved in favor of compliance, Doe by Fein, 697 A.2d at 27, the requirement that the notice be given, and within the time specified, and to the proper officers is strictly construed. Wharton, 666 A.2d at 1230 (citing Washington v. District of Columbia, 429 A.2d 1362, 1365 n. 9 (D.C.1981)); see also DeKine v. District of Columbia, 422 A.2d 981, 985 (D.C.1980) (letter received one day late fails to satisfy § 12-309). In this case, Ms. Owens had six months from March 2, 2005, the date on which she was denied a promotion, to provide written notice to the Mayor, but she did not do so until almost sixteen months later. See Dunmore, 662 A.2d at 1359-60 (pursuant to § 12-309, the six-month clock begins to run from the moment the plaintiff sustains the injury). [3] Appellant contests this conclusion by arguing that her administrative complaint to the DMH tolled the time for giving notice under § 12-309. However, the DCHRA has no provision for tolling the time limits in § 12-309, and we have previously held that § 12-309 does not permit equitable tolling. Doe by Fein, 697 A.2d at 29-31. Unlike a statute of limitations, which can be tolled ..., § 12-309 starts the clock at the instant an injury or damage is sustained. Brown, 853 A.2d at 736-37. Section 12-309 was designed to avoid, as applied to the District, the pitfalls of [a] statute of limitations. Gwinn, 434 A.2d at 1378 (To permit the notice period to be tolled, ... would create a situation where prospective litigants could delay [perhaps for many] years before notifying the District of their claim. Such an interpretation would totally frustrate the legislative intent.). Ms. Owens misplaces her reliance on Pinkney v. District of Columbia, 439 F.Supp. 519 (D.D.C.1977), where the district court held that, if a plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a claim in court, the duty to furnish timely notice under § 12-309 is not triggered until a cause of action accrues, after the administrative proceeding ends. 439 F.Supp. at 525. Even if Pinkney were applicable to these circumstances, [4] it is not binding on this court, and we are not persuaded by its reasoning. Indeed, this court has disagreed with the type of analysis employed in Pinkney. See Dunmore, 662 A.2d at 1359 ([U]nder section 12-309, the six-month clock begins to run from the moment the plaintiff sustains the injury, not from the moment a cause of action accrues.). [5]