Opinion ID: 1740082
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Heading: Recovery by Person Having a Derivative or Remote Injury.

Text: Iowa law bars recovery of derivative and remote injuries in a variety of situations. See, e.g., Philip Morris Inc., 577 N.W.2d at 406-07 (suit by State against tobacco manufacturers for State's payment of medical expenses for citizens' tobacco-related illnesses); Anderson Plasterers v. Meinecke, 543 N.W.2d 612, 613 (Iowa 1996) (suit by employer for its losses due to third-party's negligent injury of employee). As we explained in Philip Morris Inc., The remoteness doctrine `is not based upon a factual inquiry to determine whether the damages claimed were foreseeable or whether they were a proximate cause; rather, it is a legal doctrine incorporating public policy considerations.' 577 N.W.2d at 406 (quoting Kraft Chem. Co. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 240 Ill.App.3d 192, 181 Ill.Dec. 170, 608 N.E.2d 243, 245 (1993)). In determining whether this doctrine precludes the plaintiffs' antitrust claims, we first examine whether recovery for derivative or remote injuries is permitted under Iowa's competition law. As we noted in Comes, the Iowa statute authorizes recovery by a very broad category of persons: [A] person who is injured . . . by conduct prohibited under this chapter may bring suit to: . . . [r]ecover actual damages resulting from conduct prohibited under this chapter. 646 N.W.2d at 443 (quoting Iowa Code § 533.12(2)). In part due to the broad language of the statute, this court in Comes rejected application of the federal rule barring suits by indirect purchasers. Id. at 445. Our decision was also based on the fact that although Iowa's competition law took its cues from federal law, the indirect-purchaser rule was not a part of federal antitrust law at the time the Iowa general assembly enacted its statute. Id. at 447 (noting six of the seven federal courts of appeals that considered this issue [had] held indirect purchasers could recover damages for antitrust violations). We concluded, therefore, that it was impossible for the legislature to have adopted a judicial construction which did not exist at that time. Id. Obviously, in considering the application of the remoteness doctrine in the present case, we are dealing with the same broad statutory language interpreted in Comes. The history of federal antitrust law is, however, quite different with respect to the remoteness doctrine than it was with respect to the indirect-purchaser rule. Prior to the enactment of the Iowa competition law in 1976, see 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1224, the United States Supreme Court observed, The lower courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 n. 14, 92 S.Ct. 885, 892 n. 14, 31 L.Ed.2d 184, 193 n. 14 (1972). As we determined in Comes, the interpretation given to the federal antitrust law at the time the Iowa competition law was adopted informs our search for legislative intent. Therefore, we conclude the Iowa legislature did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by a violation of the statute to have a remedy in damages. This conclusion leads us to consider whether the plaintiffs' injuries are too remote to be recoverable under chapter 553.