Opinion ID: 2353046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rhonda's Cross-Appeal

Text: [¶ 20] Rhonda argues that the court erred by determining that the $50,000 in equity given to Alan by his parents toward the purchase of the Heather Road property was a gift to Alan alone and, therefore, nonmarital property. Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 953(3) (2006), [a]ll property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage . . . is presumed to be marital property. That presumption, however, can be overcome by showing that the [p]roperty [was] acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent. 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)(A) (2006). The determination of whether the $50,000 that Alan did not pay toward the purchase of the home from his parents was a gift, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)(A), is a question of fact that we review for clear error. See Spooner v. Spooner, 2004 ME 69, ¶ 7, 850 A.2d 354, 358. [¶ 21] At trial, there was conflicting evidence as to the intention of Alan's father in having Alan pay only $150,000 toward the $200,000 purchase price of the Heather Road property, including several notations on Alan's loan application that the $50,000 down payment is a gift of equity. The court found that the property was a gift to Alan alone, as reflected in the mortgage documents, and that it therefore, remained Alan's nonmarital property. The court's finding that Alan overcame the presumption that the $50,000 had become marital property is supported by the evidence. See Spooner, 2004 ME 69, ¶ 7, 850 A.2d at 358.

[¶ 22] Although the court did grant Rhonda's post-trial motion in part, by continuing spousal support beyond her sixty-fifth birthday, Rhonda contends that the court erred by reducing the $1000 per week award of general spousal support to one dollar per year when Rhonda turns sixty-five. She argues that the court overly speculates that she would be receiving substantial retirement benefits at that time, including Social Security benefits. A trial court's determination of spousal support pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A (2006) is reviewed with deference. Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 2005 ME 14, ¶ 13, 866 A.2d 839, 843. Spousal support must be reasonable both in amount and in the method of payment giving regard to the situation, both at present and for the foreseeable future of both spouses. Klopp v. Klopp, 598 A.2d 462, 464 (Me.1991) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 23] One of the statutory factors that the court must consider in calculating an award of spousal support is [t]he provisions for retirement . . . benefits of each party. 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)(G). A limit on the duration of spousal support is clearly contemplated by 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A), which creates rebuttable presumptions regarding the number of years a court may order general spousal support based on the length of the marriage. Although neither rebuttable presumption is applicable in this case involving a thirty-one-year marriage, the court acted within its discretion when, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(3), it limited the duration and the amount of the spousal support. [¶ 24] Rhonda's argument that her future retirement benefits are too speculative to support a durational limitation on spousal support is unpersuasive. As well as her entitlement to Social Security benefits, [7] Rhonda is a member of the Maine State Retirement System, and the court awarded that entire benefit to her, the present value of which is more than $61,000. Rhonda also received a Pioneer Investments IRA in her name, with a value of nearly $25,000; the entirety of a Pioneer Investments IRA in Alan's name worth $84,600; and $54,500 from Alan's Commonwealth IRA. The court acted within its discretion when it ordered that Rhonda's award of spousal support be time-limited, based on her foreseeable, calculable, future receipt of retirement benefits.
[¶ 25] Rhonda also contends that the court abused its discretion by concluding that spousal support should terminate on the death of either party, and that such support need not be secured by life insurance in the event of Alan's death. Again, we review a trial court's determination of spousal support pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5) with great deference. Bradshaw, 2005 ME 14, ¶ 13, 866 A.2d at 843. [¶ 26] By statute, an award of spousal support is discretionary with the trial court, and it need not survive the death of either party. The statutory presumption is that spousal support will terminate upon the death of either party, unless the court's order awarding support provides otherwise. [8] 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(8). If the court does determine that the obligation survives the death of either party, then [t]he court may also order the obligated party to maintain life insurance or to otherwise provide security for the payment of spousal support. 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(7). That an award of spousal support may be secured by life insurance, does not mean that a court is required to order that life insurance secure such support. See Bryant v. Bryant, 411 A.2d 391, 395 (Me. 1980). Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that spousal support should terminate upon the death of either spouse, and that the obligation need not be guaranteed by life insurance.
[¶ 27] Rhonda's contentions as to arrearages she claims are owed to her by Alan, and that Alan has committed economic misconduct, are unpersuasive.