Opinion ID: 2257541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

Text: The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, renders conclusive in the same or a subsequent action determination of an issue of fact or law when (1) the issue is actually litigated and (2) determined by a valid, final judgment on the merits; (3) after a full and fair opportunity for litigation by the parties or their privies; (4) under circumstances where the determination was essential to the judgment, and not merely dictum. Davis v. Davis, 663 A.2d 499, 501 (D.C. 1995) (quoting Washington Med. Ctr. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1283 (D.C.1990)). Whether the foundational requirements for applying this doctrine have been met presents a legal issue which we decide de novo. Davis, 663 A.2d at 501. Collateral estoppel may be used offensively or defensively. Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant from relitigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action against the same or a different party. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984). When one who was not a party to the original suit invokes collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of an issue by a party to the original suit or his privy, [3] application of the doctrine is called non-mutual. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971) (overruling a prior decision requiring mutuality of parties in order to apply doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel). In some cases, such as this one, the doctrine is used both offensively and non-mutuallynon-mutual offensive collateral estoppel. In this brand of estoppel, a plaintiff seeks to estop a defendant from relitigating the issues which the defendant previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff. Ali Baba Co. v. WILCO, Inc., 482 A.2d 418, 421-22 (D.C. 1984). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (approving the offensive use of issue preclusion by a non-party to a prior lawsuit conditioned on a showing of fairness); 18 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 132.04[2][c][iii] at p. 132-162 (3rd ed.2006) (using the term non-mutual offensive issue preclusion to describe the doctrine approved in the Parklane Hosiery decision). Proper application of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel requires a two-step inquiry. In the first step, the trial court must determine whether a case meets the traditional requirements for invoking collateral estoppel. As noted, this is a decision we review de novo. See Davis, 663 A.2d at 501. However, we apply non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel with some caution, Newell v. District of Columbia, 741 A.2d 28, 36 (D.C. 1999), because use of the doctrine in this manner presents additional issues relating to the potential unfairness to a defendant. . . . Ali Baba Co., 482 A.2d at 422. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 329-31, 99 S.Ct. 645 (citing as examples of potential unfairness cases where plaintiffs adopt a piecemeal litigation strategy, cases where a defendant has little incentive to defend the first action, situations where there are inconsistent judgments, and situations where the defendant has procedural protections available in the second case that were not available in the original action). To guard against unfairness in this special context, the trial court adds a second step to its inquiry and considers the fairness of applying collateral estoppel to the facts of the case. See Ali Baba Co., 482 A.2d at 423. We review the resolution of this second inquiry under an abuse of discretion standard so as to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when [collateral estoppel] should be applied. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331, 99 S.Ct. 645; see Ali Baba, 482 A.2d at 422 (endorsing the Parklane approach of granting trial courts broad discretion). Using this two-tiered approach in Udebiuwa v. District of Columbia Bd. of Med., 818 A.2d 160 (D.C.2003), we first concluded that the issue in question was actually litigated in a previous action, that it was determined by a valid and final judgment, and that it was essential to that judgment. Id. at 163. We then considered whether the other conditions outlined in Parklane Hosiery had been met and concluded that there had been no abuse of discretion in applying non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel. Id. at 163-64. See also In re Yanke, 225 B.R. 428, 435-36 (Bankr. D.Minn.1998) (applying Minnesota collateral estoppel law and requiring both the basic elements of collateral estoppel and a fairness inquiry); Preferred Am. Ins. v. Dulceak, 302 Ill.App.3d 990, 235 Ill.Dec. 974, 706 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1999) (inquiring whether the minimum elements of the doctrine are satisfied and it is clear that no unfairness will result to the party being estopped (emphasis supplied)); DeLisle v. Avallone, 117 N.M. 602, 874 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App.1994) (When the movant has made a prima facie showing [establishing the foundational requirements for applying collateral estoppel], the trial court must consider the countervailing equities including, but not limited to, prior incentive for vigorous defense, inconsistencies, procedural opportunities, and inconvenience of forum . . . . (quoting Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380, 384 (1987), and citing Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 329-30, 99 S.Ct. 645)).