Opinion ID: 2982964
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wrongful Forfeiture

Text: When counsel asked Officer Jones whether it “[w]as [] standard procedure to issue a notice of seizure with intent to forfeit [under the CSA] whenever you were made aware an arrestee had cash on them,” Officer Jones responded: “I wouldn’t say it was standard procedure. We commonly did that, but there was no procedure set in place.” When pressed to state when a notice of forfeiture would not be issued, Jones replied “if [the arrestee] had a small amount of cash, $40 or something like that in the pocket with them, I doubt we’re serving them on $40.” When asked again whether “any time anybody had an amount of money that was substantial -- more than $40, you’d issue a notice of seizure with intent to forfeit under the Controlled Substances Act to that person?” Jones responded “[i]t’s what we do. We don’t have -- there was nothing written saying we had to do it, but that’s, generally, what we’d do.” Despite this testimony, Redford argues that such forfeitures were not routine because only a special unit of the police force, the Special Investigations Bureau, was authorized to issue notices of forfeitures. He further maintains that the uncorroborated testimony of Officer Jones is not sufficient to establish a custom and that Langston did not demonstrate that Officer Jones was vested with policymaking authority. However, policymaking authority is not required to demonstrate the existence of a custom. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. Redford claims that this case is like Van Huss v. Shoffner, 81 F. App’x 17, 22 (6th Cir. 2003), where this court found that -19- No. 14-1664, Langston v. Charter Township of Redford, et al. the testimony of a newly-elected sheriff on department “tradition” was insufficient to establish custom. The instant circumstances are distinct from Van Huss because there is no indication that Officer Jones is new to the Redford Police Department and therefore unfamiliar with its policy and customs. Officer Jones’s testimony is troubling, and municipalities should take care to operate within the confines of the law so as not to abuse their power, especially when acting under provisions as draconian as administrative forfeiture. However, the Michigan statute does not establish a federal constitutional right and Langston could have challenged the lack of connection to narcotics activity postdeprivation had he filed a claim in accordance with the statute. Thus, assuming an adequate showing of municipal responsibility, Langston has not shown that the alleged policy of ignoring the CSA’s requirement that the property sought to be forfeited be connected to a controlled substance violates a federal constitutional right.