Opinion ID: 831187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: should the common law be changed?

Text: The Michigan Constitution provides that [t]he common law and the statute laws now in force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed. [35] Both this Court and the Legislature have authority to change the common law. [36] In this case, we are (impliedly) asked to alter a common law doctrine that has existed undisturbed for well over a century. There is no question that, if this Court were inclined to alter the common law, we would be creating public policy for this state. Just as legislative amendment of the common law is not lightly presumed, [37] this Court does not lightly exercise its authority to change the common law. [38] Indeed, this Court has acknowledged the prudential principle that we must exercise caution and ... defer to the Legislature when called upon to make a new and potentially societally dislocating change to the common law. [39] Whether to alter the common law is a matter of prudence and, because we share this authority with the Legislature, I believe we must consider whether the prudent course is to take action where the Legislature has not.
This Court has recognized that the Legislature is the superior institution for creating the public policy of this state: As a general rule, making social policy is a job for the Legislature, not the courts. See In re Kurzyniec Estate, 207 Mich.App. 531, 543, 526 N.W.2d 191 (1994). This is especially true when the determination or resolution requires placing a premium on one societal interest at the expense of another: `The responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as oursof identifying priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between competing alternativesis the Legislature's, not the judiciary's.' O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 404 Mich. 524, 542, 273 N.W.2d 829 (1979). [40] The superiority of the Legislature to address matters of public policy is positively correlated with the complexity of the government's role in our society. During the nineteenth century, courts exercising their authority to alter the common law did so within the context of a simpler, agrarian economy. The legislatures of that era exercised a more limited regulatory role. In contrast, today's modern legislatures exercise robust regulation of all facets of our modern, internationalized economy and the rights and responsibilities of citizens. The need for a judiciary responsive to perceived public policy needs of the state has been correspondingly reduced by the development of the Legislature as a full-time institution and its pervasive statutory regulation of our increasingly complex society. This case illustrates why this Court should frequently defer policy-based changes in the common law to the Legislature. When formulating public policy for this state, the Legislature possesses superior tools and means for gathering facts, data, and opinion and assessing the will of the public. [41] The Legislature can hold hearings, gather the opinions of experts, procure studies, and generally provide a forum for all societal factions to present their competing views on a particular question of public policy. The judiciary, by contrast, is designed to accomplish the discrete task of resolving disputes, typically between two parties, each in pursuit of the party's own narrow interests. We are `limited to one set of facts in each lawsuit, which is shaped and limited by arguments from opposing counsel who seek to advance purely private interests.' [42] We do not generally consider the views of nonparties on questions of policy, [43] and we are limited to the record developed by the parties. The reality of our judicial institutional limitations is a significant liability in regard to our ability to make informed decisions when we are asked to create public policy by changing the common law. This case demonstrates these institutional limitations. Defendant openly concedes that the principal impetus for seeking enforcement of parental preinjury waivers is the protection that waivers afford its business in the face of the increasingly litigious nature of society. But for the perceived increased likelihood of a lawsuit and accompanying litigation costs, businesses such as defendant would not need parental preinjury waivers. [44] Accordingly, in seeking to have its waiver enforced, defendant requires a modification of the common law rule and thus necessarily (but only impliedly) asserts that the societal benefits of enforcing the waiversaving defendant litigation costsoutweigh the societal costs of abrogating the common law. Defendant, however, has not provided this Court with anything beyond mere conjecture that this is true. [45] This is a purely policy-driven matter with numerous costs, benefits, and trade-offsnone of which defendant has bothered to raise, much less explicate. Certainly, enforcing the common law would protect minors' contractual and property rights and presumably encourage greater care in preventing negligent injuries to children. These are, without question, admirable societal goals with significant societal benefits that have a long provenance in this state's jurisprudence. Changing the common law would arguably save litigation costs for businesses offering recreational activities for children and concomitantly promote the availability of a wide range of activities for children. These too are admirable societal goals. [46] Of concern, however, are the potential hidden costs that might occur if the common law were changed. For example, if parental preinjury waivers were to be enforced, there would be a possibility that business owners will have diminished incentives to maintain their property appropriately, resulting in an increased number of injuries to children. Moreover, the enforcement of preinjury waivers might result in an increased burden on taxpayers for children whose parents waived their children's right to pursue a tort remedy but cannot afford their necessary medical care. [47] These are but two illustrations of possible unintended consequences that a change in the common law here might occasion. Undoubtedly, there are many others. How are we as jurists to determine whether enforcing or changing the common law rule will result in a net benefit to society? Here we would only be able to make an uneducated guess without even a substantial analysis from the party that requires (but has not asked for) changes in the common law. [48] When engaging in such rank guesswork, the weight of common law authority that has existed for more than a century must be preferred. In accord with Hippocrates' admonition, maintaining the status quo has the significant benefit of doing no greater harm. As stated previously, the Legislature is not similarly constrained to make policy on the basis of blind speculation. Thus, if changing the common law to permit a parent to bind his child to a preinjury waiver is deemed to result in a net societal benefit, the Legislature can determine that fact with reasonable assurance before subjecting the public to such a change. Illustratively, defendant's proffered rationale for a revision of what a majority of justices have concluded is the existing rule is the argument that a parent is presumed to act in his child's best interests and has a fundamental right ... to make decisions pertaining to the care, custody, and control of [that] minor child[ ]. [49] That rationale, however, is not discretely limited to preinjury waivers. Under defendant's proffered analysis, a parent would be able to bind the child in any contract, no matter how detrimental to the child. Thus, defendant's rationale would arguably completely abrogate the common law prohibition of guardians contractually binding their minor wards. As explained, the common law rules regarding minors and limitations on those who would contract on their behalf exist solely for the protection of the minors. [50] As unfortunate as it may be, a parent does not always act in his child's best interests. For example, in Wood v. Truax, [51] the defendant's guardian entered into a mortgage and bond when the defendant was a minor. After the mortgage went into foreclosure, the plaintiff procured a decree for the deficiency against the defendant. However, Wood applied the common law rules to invalidate a judgment against the defendant because the mortgage was entered into when she was a minor and she had done nothing to affirm the contract after reaching adulthood. [52] Similarly, in Tuer v. Niedoliwka, [53] the mother agreed on her infant child's behalf to release the father from all child support obligations in return for $2,000. However, the Court held that a child's right to support from a putative father cannot be contracted away by its mother, and that any release or compromise executed by the mother is invalid to the extent that it purports to affect the rights of the child. [54] Thus, as noted in our caselaw, there have been instances in which a parent did not act in his child's best interests, and it is certainly not unimaginable that such agreements could recur and be enforced in the absence of the common law rule that serves to protect the minor child. As occurred in oral argument on this case, those favoring the modification of the common law rule might reflexively respond to the fact that parents do not always act in the best interests of their children by adding a qualifier to the modification of the common law rule: a parental waiver is binding on the child only if the waiver is in the child's best interests. However, this effort to avoid eviscerating the protection of children now recognized in the common law rule would undoubtedly create as many problems as it would resolve. Certainly, such an approach would create ancillary litigation over whether the parental waiver was in the child's best interests. While society might generally benefit from allowance of parental waivers for minor children, it could reasonably be asked: Is any preinjury waiver that is later asserted against a particular minor ever in the best interests of the injured child? The existing common law is well established, clear, and easy to apply and consistently protects children; it must be preferred over a chaotic, ad hoc alternative.
For the reasons discussed in the preceding section, this Court must practice restraint when considering a change in the common law. I believe we must limit the exercise of our authority by creating public policy that is consistent with the existing public policy of this state. Doing so protects against unwarranted and unwanted societally dislocating change[s] to the public policy of this state. [55] We have previously defined the proper sources of public policy to guide our analysis: In identifying the boundaries of public policy, we believe that the focus of the judiciary must ultimately be upon the policies that, in fact, have been adopted by the public through our various legal processes, and are reflected in our state and federal constitutions, our statutes, and the common law. [56]
The preferred practice is to follow the lead of the institution best suited to make public policy for the state. Accordingly, I begin with the positive law enacted by the Legislature to determine whether public policy supports the change in the common law sought by defendant. The Legislature has affirmatively acted to protect and preserve minors' property interests. [57] With respect to a minor's cause of action, the Legislature has taken two significant steps. Pursuant to MCL 600.5851, the minority tolling provision, the period of limitations for a cause of action that accrued during minority is tolled. The minor is permitted to bring his cause of action within one year of reaching majority. [58] Thus, the Legislature has acted to preserve a minor's ability to pursue and control the minor's own claim. Furthermore, although a parent as next friend of his child may settle a claim with the approval of the court, [59] the parent's authority to receive settlement proceeds on the child's behalf is strictly limited. Under MCL 700.5102, a guardian or person with the care and custody of a minor may receive no more than $5,000 each year on that minor's behalf, [60] and an individual receiving money or property for a minor is obligated to apply the money to the minor's support and education, but shall not pay himself or herself except by way of reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses for goods and services necessary for the minor's support. An excess amount shall be preserved for the minor's future support and education. A balance not used for those purposes and property received for the minor shall be turned over to the minor when majority is attained. [61] Notably, the Court of Appeals has held that MCL 700.5102 does not authorize a parent to settle his child's tort claims. [62] Furthermore, in recognizing these legislative policy choices, this Court has provided by court rule that all settlements in favor of minors for payments of less than $5,000 in a single year are controlled by MCL 700.5102 and all greater settlements require the appointment of a conservator. [63] These statutes evince a public policy firmly at odds with the autonomous parental control over a minor's property rights that defendant asserts. The Legislature has consistently acted to preserve a minor's property interest in his tort claims, and nothing in Michigan's positive law indicates a legislative intent to abrogate the common law or extend a parent's authority. Accordingly, positive law does not provide an anchor for altering the common law rules.
The common law is also a valid source for identifying the public policy of this state. [64] If the change required by defendant in order to have the parental waiver upheld were consistent with other common law doctrines, this Court could consider creating consistent public policy. Here, however, the change necessitated to validate the parental waiver is at odds with other pertinent common law doctrines. Defendant, in seeking to enforce a parental right to bind his child by contract, requires the abrogation of not one, but two common law tenets. First, as stated, a minor lacks the capacity to contract: Their contracts are not void but voidable, and it is for the [minor] to avoid the contract or ratify it.... [65] Second, a guardian cannot contractually bind his minor ward. It should be noted that the modification defendant requires would not merely give a parent the same authority as the minor, given that a minor has no contractual authority and the minor's waiver would not bar this action. Rather, defendant requires a modification of the common law rule that would give the parent authority to contractually bind the minor superior to that the minor himself enjoys. In short, defendant requires that the common law be changed to permit a parent to do what a minor could not do on his own behalfenter into a contract that binds the minor. As we have previously stated, the rule that a minor lacks capacity to contract exists solely for the minor's protection. [66] The protection of infancy is a substantial one, and is not to be put aside and overcome by indirect methods. [67] The exception required by defendant does precisely that: it removes the protections of a minor's incapacity to contract by the indirect means of permitting the guardian to enter into a binding and enforceable contract for the minor. Moreover, under the common law, minors are generally protected by the placement of greater burdens and increased potential liability on those coming into contact with minors. Thus, permitting the waiver of liability for negligent harm done to a child is inconsistent with public policy broadly recognized in the common law. For example, a landowner is generally not liable for injuries suffered by a trespasser, [68] but the attractive nuisance doctrine imposes liability for injuries suffered by trespassing children. [69] Thus, the common law doctrine protects children by imposing greater liability on landowners when minors are involved. [70] Also, under the common law, a minor under seven years old was incapable of contributory negligence. [71] For minors older than seven, contributory negligence was based on whether the child had conducted himself as a child of his age, ability, intelligence and experience would reasonably have been expected to do under like circumstances. [72] Accordingly, the common law protects children by creating an incentive to exercise greater care for minors because it limits a defendant's ability to escape liability on the basis of the child's contributory negligence. [73] The public policy of this state reflected in these common law liability doctrines is to protect children by imposing greater liability on adults for conduct involving potential harm to children. It would therefore require an extremely compelling argument to change the common law and permit defendant to limit its liability involving children. [74] Defendant has offered none.