Opinion ID: 2517596
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Prosecution's Examination of Defense Expert Witnesses

Text: Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine two defense expert witnesses based on the rough notes and data prepared by a third expert, and by allowing the prosecutor to call that third expert, a defense consulting psychologist, to testify as a rebuttal witness. We find no error. At the penalty phase retrial, defense counsel called expert witnesses Dr. Armando Morales and Dr. Consuelo Edwards, who testified regarding defendant's sociological and psychiatric condition at the time of the offenses and at the time of trial. Both experts testified that they had been provided raw data and rough notes prepared by psychologist Martha Rogers, reflecting her administration of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) to defendant. [18] Dr. Rogers did not prepare a report analyzing the MMPI data and was not called as a defense witness at trial, but furnished her raw data and notes to defense counsel, who then provided the data and notes to Morales and Edwards. On one page of the report, Rogers had written the phrase probable fake bad. Dr. Morales, in response to questions on cross-examination regarding Dr. Rogers's notes, testified that the MMPI notes containing raw data made no sense to him because he was not a licensed psychologist. In response to questioning regarding the meaning of the phrase probable fake bad, Morales testified that he was not familiar with the term and that he had not contacted Rogers to inquire into its meaning. Similarly, during cross-examination, the prosecution asked Dr. Edwards whether she had examined Rogers's MMPI data and notes. Edwards testified that she reviewed the psychological reports only long enough to ascertain that the reports were raw data, and that she does not rely on another professional's raw data when making evaluations if no report analyzing that data has been prepared. In response to the prosecution's inquiry regarding the meaning of the phrase probable fake bad, Edwards testified that the phrase had multiple meanings, and that malingering was not the only possibility. Edwards also testified that she did not attempt to contact Rogers. After the defense rested, the prosecution called Dr. Rogers to testify as a rebuttal witness and questioned her regarding the meaning of the phrase probable fake bad. Rogers testified that her assistant had administered an MMPI to defendant in October 1990, and that Rogers had reviewed the test and made some notations, including writing the term probable fake bad. Rogers explained that the term may mean one of several things. What it always means is that probably the person has over responded in some way. There may have been some exaggeration or overstatement of whatever this person's current psychiatric condition is. Rogers also testified that the term would be one thing you would consider when considering the possibility of malingering. Defense counsel did not cross-examine Rogers. In closing argument, the prosecution emphasized Rogers's notation, observed that the defense experts had not wanted to consider the data, and stated with reference to this information that defendant controls the defense and chooses to fabricate, fake, embellish and create. Defendant asserts the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine Drs. Morales and Edwards regarding the probable fake bad notation, because both experts testified they had not relied upon the MMPI data in forming their conclusions, and their testimony regarding the raw data therefore was irrelevant. Defendant further contends that Dr. Rogers's preliminary test scores and notations constituted inadmissible hearsay. Defendant urges that the prejudicial nature of the data and the notation outweighs their probative value as a basis for expert opinion, and accordingly the evidence should have been excluded altogether. The Attorney General contends that defendant has forfeited the issue, because defense counsel failed to object to each prosecutorial question regarding the MMPI. We find no forfeiture. Defense counsel repeatedly objected to the prosecution's questions regarding the MMPI and the probable fake bad notation during the questioning of both Dr. Morales and Dr. Edwards, variously contending that the questioning was irrelevant, argumentative, and beyond the scope of the direct examination. The trial court overruled all those objections. The issue was not forfeited by counsel's failure to object to each and every question posed on the issue of the MMPI, because it is clear that further objections would have been unsuccessful. On the merits of the claim, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine Dr. Morales and Dr. Edwards regarding their evaluation of the MMPI raw data and Dr. Rogers's notations, including the term probable fake bad. First, the line of questioning was not irrelevant. Although both experts testified they had not utilized the MMPI results in evaluating defendant's sociological and psychological state of mind, both acknowledged having reviewed the raw data and notations before concluding the information was of no use to them. A party `may cross-examine an expert witness more extensively and searchingly than a lay witness, and the prosecution was entitled to attempt to discredit the expert's opinion. [Citation.] In cross-examining a psychiatric expert witness, the prosecutor's good faith questions are proper even when they are, of necessity, based on facts not in evidence. [Citation.]' ( People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 358, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758, quoting People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 519, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) Here, the trial court properly allowed the prosecutor to inquire as to both experts' reasons for disregarding the MMPI data as well as Rogers's probable fake bad notation. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to call Dr. Rogers in rebuttal and to question her regarding the meaning of the phrase probable fake bad. Both Dr. Morales and Dr. Edwards testified that they reviewed the raw data and rough notes prepared by Rogers, but that they either did not understand the data and notes, in the case of Morales, or understood but disregarded them as meaningless, in the case of Edwards. Because the defense expert witnesses questioned the relevance and usefulness of the psychological testing notes they reviewed, the prosecution was entitled to question Rogers concerning the circumstances surrounding the testing, including the various meanings of the term probable fake bad. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 824, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) Even if the court had erred in allowing the prosecution to present evidence of the probable fake bad notation for the truth of the matter asserted (that is, to establish that defendant was malingering), any such error would not have been prejudicial. The court stated on three occasions that the evidence was being received only for the purpose of indicating the basis for the witness's opinion. Moreover, the testimony regarding the MMPI was relatively brief, as was the prosecution's mention of the issue during closing argument. Dr. Morales testified he did not understand the data and was not qualified to interpret MMPI tests. Nothing in his testimony would lead the jury to find that Dr. Rogers's notation was conclusive evidence of defendant's malingering. Similarly, although Dr. Edwards testified regarding her understanding of the meaning of probable fake bad and acknowledged that in some circumstances the phrase could indicate malingering, she also testified that there were many other meanings for the phrase, and that it was meaningless to her and of no use in her evaluation because the notation was raw data and was unaccompanied by a psychologist's report. In addition, Rogers testified that the phrase probable fake bad had multiple meanings other than that defendant was malingering. Moreover, in closing argument, defense counsel again told the jury that the term probable fake bad was meaningless because it was being discussed out of context and should be disregarded. Additionally, the jury was given a limiting instructionprior to Dr. Morales's testimony, again during his testimony, and a third time in the final instructionsinforming them that the statements made by an expert in the course of examining defendant could be considered only for the limited purpose of disclosing the information upon which the expert based his or her opinion, and that such statements were not to be considered as evidence of the truth of the facts related in the expert's testimony. We presume the jury followed these instructions, and defendant has not rebutted this presumption. ( People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 453, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) We also reject defendant's assertion that it was error to admit testimony concerning the probable fake bad notation because this evidence was more prejudicial than probative. All three defense experts testified that the phrase probable fake bad had multiple meanings aside from a conclusion that a defendant was malingering. Additionally, as noted, the jury was instructed that this testimony should not be considered as evidence of the truth of the facts discussed in the expert's testimony. In view of the inconclusive nature of the expert's testimony regarding the meaning of the phrase, and the limiting instruction given to the jury, this testimony, even if it had been admitted in error, would not have been prejudicial. There is no reasonable likelihood that the testimony in question influenced the jury's verdict or that the outcome of the case would have been different had the court limited the scope of Dr. Rogers's testimony or Drs. Morales's and Edwards's cross-examination. ( Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 448, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135.)