Opinion ID: 2161455
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right to Injunctive Relief.

Text: Mr. Hutt acknowledged that his damages could be calculated in money. Based thereon, the appellant argues that the respondents have an adequate remedy at law which should bar injunctive relief. In our view, this admission by Mr. Hutt should not preclude the court from exercising its discretion to grant injunctive relief. In a broad, philosophical sense, money is a common denominator which, in the absence of a better measure, may be used to evaluate every conceivable loss. Thus, such items as pain, the alienation of affections, and a wrongful death are held to be translatable into money. Money may be a poor substitute in such cases, but it is utilized because it is often the only means of compensation. In the case at bar, the award of money is not the only feasible means of resolving the wrong to the plaintiffs. They did not seek money damages. They sought to have the nuisance abated, and, in our opinion, the nuisance is of a continuing type which the trial court had a right, in its discretion, to abate by the injunctive process under its equitable powers. It is always term time in the court of conscience, says the seventeenth century proverb attributed to Thomas Fuller. It is to be noted that this court has approved judgments which provide for both the award of money damages and the abatement of a nuisance. Kamke v. Clark, supra ; Karns v. Allen (1908), 135 Wis. 48, 115 N. W. 357. In granting an injunction, the trial court may also have considered the difficulty in computing the plaintiffs' damages in a case such as that here presented. To calculate the loss to the Hutts for an injury to business arising from this continuing nuisance might have required an element of speculation. See Vetter v. Rein (1931), 203 Wis. 499, 503, 234 N. W. 712. By the Court. Judgment affirmed.