Opinion ID: 2344381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial evidence other than evidence at the time of service to prove what was reasonably apparent to the server.

Text: {13} Although Meteor acknowledges that circumstantial evidence may support a finding under the reasonably-apparent prong, it contends that the circumstantial evidence must be from witnesses who were present at the time of service. Meteor does not cite case law to support this argument; instead it advances a policy argument that the use of circumstantial evidence could be stretched to the point that evidence that is remote in either time or place could be used to find a licensee liable. We disagree. Again, the Court of Appeals opinion in Plummer is instructive. In Plummer, the Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence to support a finding under the reasonably-apparent prong, despite the lack of evidence from witnesses who were present at the time the patron was served alcohol. 114 N.M. at 247, 836 P.2d at 1268. The evidence in Plummer consisted of testimony from the patron regarding the length of time he was present at the bar, the results of a Breathalyzer test, and expert testimony interpreting the results of the test. Id. {14} Other states with similar dram shop acts allow circumstantial evidence to be used to prove what the server should have known of the patron's intoxication. In Kish v. Farley, 24 A.D.3d 1198, 807 N.Y.S.2d 235 (N.Y.App.Div.2005), New York's intermediate appellate court explicitly addressed this issue. It stated that visible intoxication may be established by circumstantial evidence, id. at 1200, 807 N.Y.S.2d 235, and that no direct proof in the form of testimonial evidence from someone who actually observed the allegedly intoxicated person's demeanor at the time and place that the alcohol was served is required, id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Perseus, 995 S.W.2d at 206-07 (holding that proof that the server actually witnessed the drunken behavior was not required). {15} Applying this principle, in Cadillac Cowboy, Inc. v. Jackson, 347 Ark. 963, 69 S.W.3d 383, 389-90 (2002), the Arkansas Supreme Court found sufficient evidence that the patron was visibly intoxicated at the time of service, based on evidence that the patron consumed several beers before going to a club, followed by consuming at least one mixed drink at the club, combined with a police officer's testimony that the patron appeared intoxicated at the accident scene. Similarly, in Studer v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 3767, 185 Ohio App.3d 691, 925 N.E.2d 629, 637 (2009), the Ohio Court of Appeals found a genuine issue of material fact as to what was apparent to the server based on several pieces of circumstantial evidence: the patron had consumed four beers before arriving at the serving bar; he had then consumed nine beers at the bar; he was a regular at the bar in question; bar employees had many chances to observe the patron at the bar; he appeared drunk at the time of his arrest shortly after the car accident following service; and he had a blood alcohol content well over the legal limit. {16} In permitting the plaintiff to rely on circumstantial evidence that the patron's intoxication was obvious at the time of service, the Studer court reasoned: [I]t is logical to presume that a liquor permit holder, or its employee(s), may never make the admission that they continued to serve a person after that person exhibited signs of intoxication. For a liquor permit holder to make such an admission would be to concede liability on his behalf. Thus, the only way for a third party injured by an intoxicated person to substantiate his claim against the liquor permit holder would be by use of circumstantial evidence. Id. at 636-37 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In summary, because the reasonably-apparent prong in the Dram Shop Liability Act is based on an objective standard, and because circumstantial evidence at a time other than the time of service may be sufficient to prove what a server should have known regarding the level of the patron's intoxication at the time the patron was served, the identity of the server is not essential. We next turn to the evidence in this case to determine whether the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Meteor liable to Gutierrez under the Dram Shop Liability Act.