Opinion ID: 2320313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The motion to strike and counsel's closing arguments.

Text: The following morning, relying on Henderson v. United States, 632 A.2d 419 (D.C.1993), Benn's attorney acknowledged that he should have objected earlier, but asked the court to strike the questions and answers dealing with whether, after the appointment of counsel, Benn had discussed the case with his mother. Defense counsel relied on Henderson's holding that it was improper to imply, in questions to the defendant and in argument, that the defendant's failure to proclaim his innocence to, or otherwise to discuss the case with, his father or roommates after counsel had been appointed, was evidence of guilt. Counsel argued that the questioning in Henderson was analogous to the interrogation of Benn in this case regarding Benn's claim that he did not discuss the alibi with Mrs. Thomas. The trial judge ruled that Henderson was distinguishable because, in the judge's view, the questions asked by the prosecutor in the Henderson case differed in a dispositive respect from those propounded to Benn in the present case. The judge characterized the inquiry in Henderson as If you are innocent, why didn't you tell anyone about it? He described the questioning in the present case, on the other hand, as If you knew you had the alibi, you certainly were going to check with the alibi witness to make sure she remembered it the same way you did, particularly since the alibi [witness] was your own mother. The judge was of the opinion that competent defense counsel would typically instruct a client not to discuss the case, just as the defendant in Henderson had been instructed. The judge believed, on the other hand, that Benn's case presented a unique circumstance in which, as the judge saw it, a competent attorney would provide different advice: I think most people would agree that a competent attorney would not prohibit the client from talking to his own mother about the fact that he was with his mother at the time the crime occurred, both because it would result in some benefit to the client, and because it would be a natural obvious thing to do; where that same attorney might say, Don't talk to anybody else about this crime or where you were on the night it occurred. So, I don't think this case is like Henderson at all. I don't think the examination by [the prosecutor] was in any way impermissible. Benn's attorney made a motion for a mistrial. In the alternative, he requested the court to instruct the jury that a competent attorney would instruct his client to talk to nobody except counsel about the offense. Counsel stated that I disagree completely with the court about even [whether] competent counsel would allow a client to talk to [his] mother. The U.S. Attorney's office regularly calls family members to the grand jury. As the court knows, it would be tactically unsound for a defendant to talk to anybody who could be called to the grand jury. . . . The judge denied the defense request for a mistrial and for an instruction, and he repeated that it would be perfectly proper for the prosecutor to argue that Benn's responses to the questions posed on cross-examination seemed improbable. In his initial closing, the prosecutor attacked Benn's alibi defense as unworthy of belief. He then suggested that Benn had surely discussed this matter with [his] mother. Clearly, she was able to recollect for [Benn], `Son, don't worry. Remember, you were at home with me. . . .' The prosecutor returned to the theme later in the closing, characterizing as implausible and unbelievable Benn's testimony that he never discussed the alibi with his mother. In response, defense counsel interposed an element of sarcasm: So, he didn't talk with [his mother] after I told him to talk with nobody about anything. Find him guilty because his lawyer gave him advice that he followed. Subsequently, in rebuttal, the prosecutor argued: Mr. Benn gets on the stand and says I never talked about this case with my mother. Never talked about this case with my mother. And [Benn's attorney] tells you the reason because of that, ladies and gentlemen, is because I told him not to. [Benn's attorney] said, The reason that Mr. Benn did not talk to his mother about the case is because I. . . told my client not to talk to anyone about the case. And, of course, that belies logic too. For [if] your relative, be it son or daughter, father, mother, or cousin, got into any trouble that you were concerned about; but, more importantly, allegedly knew about since it was your birthday, you would have talked about that case up and down, up and down. Mr. Benn, Raymond, son, honey. Look, I will go down there. You were with me on my birthday. Remember the teddy bear? Remember 9:00? Remember you were with me. That is only logical and natural.