Opinion ID: 510033
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Sever Decided Under 8(b)

Text: 23 Rule 8 does not explicitly provide a standard that governs when multiple offenses and multiple defendants are joined in one indictment. One logical approach would invoke Rule 8(a) when defendants seek severance of offenses, which is the case here, and Rule 8(b) when defendants seek severance of defendants, which is not this case. We have permitted multiple defendants facing multiple charges to move for either type of severance, but we invoke only Rule 8(b) to test the validity of joinder regardless of which type of severance is sought. As the district court recognized, our cases indicate that  'when a defendant in a multiple-defendant case challenges joinder of offenses, his motion is made under 8(b) rather than 8(a).'  652 F.Supp. at 710 (quoting United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950, 95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975)); see United States v. Turbide, 558 F.2d 1053, 1061 n. 7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934, 98 S.Ct. 421, 54 L.Ed.2d 293 (1977); 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 144, at 494 (2d ed. 1982). The effect of construing Rule 8 in this fashion is that multiple defendants cannot be tried together on two or more similar but unrelated acts or transactions; multiple defendants may be tried together only if the charged acts are part of a series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. See 1 C. Wright, supra, Sec. 144, at 508-09. 24 Sound policy reasons underlie this distinction. The use of Rule 8(a) to join offenses against a single defendant inevitably involves some danger of prejudice. See Werner, 620 F.2d at 929 (substantial prejudice must be shown before severing trials under Rule 14 because Rule 8 authorizes some prejudice). Despite this potential for unfairness, Congress has authorized consolidation in the belief that public considerations of economy and speed outweigh possible unfairness to the accused. United States v. Smith, 112 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir.1940) (commenting on former 18 U.S.C. Sec. 557, which is substantially restated by Rule 8(a)); see United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1106 (7th Cir.1974) (Obviously any adding of offenses to others is prejudicial to some extent.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964, 95 S.Ct. 1951, 44 L.Ed.2d 450 (1975). Rule 8(b) reflects a similar policy. Juxtaposing these two rules, the District of Columbia Circuit summarized them, stating 25 When similar but unrelated offenses are jointly charged to a single defendant, some prejudice almost necessarily results, and the same is true when several defendants are jointly charged with a single offense or related offenses. Rule 8(a) permits the first sort of prejudice and Rule 8(b) the second. But the Rules do not permit cumulation of prejudice by charging several defendants with similar but unrelated offenses. 26 Cupo v. United States, 359 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C.Cir.1966) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1013, 87 S.Ct. 723, 17 L.Ed.2d 549 (1967). Thus, multiple defendants may be charged with and tried for multiple offenses only if the offenses are related pursuant to the test set forth in Rule 8(b), that is, only if the charged acts are part of a series of acts or transactions constituting ... offenses.