Opinion ID: 2074633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant Hartridge's Speedy Trial Claim

Text: Mr. Hartridge's chief claim ... is that the trial judge erred in denying him a speedy trial in conformance with the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We begin with the factual context for Mr. Hartridge's claim. Less than one month after the murder of Mr. Wynn, on December 3, 1993, Mr. Hartridge was presented to the court and ordered to be held without bond. On April 12, 1994, Mr. Hartridge was arraigned and demanded a speedy trial. Counsel for Mr. Hartridge requested a severance in order to expedite his trial date, but the trial court scheduled trial for Mr. Ford and Mr. Hartridge for August 22, 1994. [8] At a status hearing on July 19, 1994, Mr. Ford and Mr. Cullison requested a continuance; Mr. Hartridge objected, but the government did not. The trial court granted the request for a continuance, and a new trial date was set for November 14, 1994. [9] During an apparent status conference on October 6, 1994, counsel for Mr. Hartridge expressed concern that the new trial date not be altered. And, the trial court mentioned counsel's assertion that his client... [was being] depriv[ed] of his right to a speedy trial. ... On November 14, 1994, the trial judge had to postpone the trial until November 15. But on November 15, Mr. Ford's counsel asked for a thirty-day continuance, which the government and Mr. Hartridge opposed. Without ruling on the motion, the trial court reconvened the following day for a motions hearing. On that day, the trial court indicated that it would hear the motions, but would anticipate a new trial date in December. Eventually, due to scheduling conflicts, the new trial date was set for April 10, 1995. By January 1995, a new trial judge and a new prosecutor had been assigned to the case. A new trial date of May 31, 1995 was set at a January 27, 1995 status conference. Counsel for Mr. Ford had scheduled leave from January 15, 1995, to March 15, and would be unavailable for trial beginning on March 4. The parties and the trial judge met on April 14, 1995. The necessity of moving the May 31 trial date was discussed. Mr. Hartridge again sought a severance so that he could proceed to trial on May 31; his request was denied. A new trial could not be scheduled before October 16, 1995, due again to scheduling conflicts. Approximately one month after the April 14th conference, Mr. Hartridge filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, requesting a dismissal of the indictment against him, or in the alternative, a severance and trial on the scheduled May 31 date. He provided a partial chronology of events and pointed out, in part, that he had been continuously incarcerated since his arrest, had never requested a continuance in his trial, and was scheduled for trial nearly 22.5 months after his arrest. [10] The government opposed the motion on June 19, 1995, emphasizing that [j]oinder of cases is favored, and that [a] period of institutional delay caused by the necessity of a large number of attorneys to coordinate their schedules with a busy trial judge should not be weighed heavily in a case as complex as this one. On June 23, 1995, counsel for Mr. Hartridge reminded the trial court about his speedy trial motion, and the alternative motion for a severance. The court observed that trial was scheduled to go forward on October 16, and inquired whether counsel was sure [his] severance motion ha[d] significant merit. Counsel responded that he was requesting a severance not because of independent basis for a severance ..., but ... so that [his] client, who has objected to the continuances, could go forward ahead. The trial judge acknowledged that he had not formally definitively ruled, but [that he was] not too apprehensive about the speedy trial issue, because he had cases with higher priority. At a status hearing on September 12, 1995, counsel for Mr. Ford and Mr. Cullison announced that they no longer would represent their respective clients. [11] Counsel for Mr. Hartridge asserted that his client want[ed] to go to trial on the 16th of October and had lodged a motion to dismiss. The trial court acknowledged his position saying, you don't want to be dragged along and be denied speedy trial rights. Mr. Hartridge personally addressed the court, stating: I would like to go to trial. I've been waiting on a trial date. I've had numerous ... trial dates set. I haven't yet been to trial.... By September 29, 1995, it was obvious that further delay would occur because neither counsel for Mr. Ford nor Mr. Cullison could be ready by the October trial date; nor by the date of November 13, 1995, which the trial court suggested. At the court's request, counsel for Mr. Hartridge voiced the prejudice he believed Mr. Hartridge would suffer in the event of further delay. The trial court was unpersuaded that delay would prejudice Mr. Hartridge, and announced a new trial date of January 29, 1996, but backed off of that date somewhat when counsel for Mr. Ford expressed uncertainty about his ability to be ready by that date. On January 25, 1996, the trial court confirmed that the trial could not commence on January 29, 1996, both because of the unreadiness of Mr. Ford's counsel, and the probability that the trial judge would not be through with another trial by that time. Counsel for Mr. Hartridge renewed his request for a severance, to permit his trial to go forward on January 29, 1996. The government expressed strong opposition to a continuance, as well as a severance. [12] The trial judge picked a new trial date of March 1, 1996. Proceedings in preparation for trial took place on March 7, 1996, and extended hearings on motions began on March 12 and did not end until June 7; jury selection began three days later. It is axiomatic that `the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental constitutional right.' Hammond v. United States, 880 A.2d 1066, 1079 (D.C.2005) (quoting Cates v. United States, 379 A.2d 968, 970 (D.C.1977)) (footnote omitted). This court's approach to a speedy trial claim was delineated in its en banc decision in Graves v. United States, 490 A.2d 1086 (D.C.1984). We generally follow the framework . . . established by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Id. at 1090. Barker identified four factors which are to be examined: the `[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.' Graves, 490 A.2d at 1090-91 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182). The Barker factors are related and must be considered together with other relevant circumstances in `a difficult and sensitive balancing process.' Graves at 1091 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182). Moreover, any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182. In that regard, `[t]he right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice.' Id. (quoting Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87, 25 S.Ct. 573, 49 L.Ed. 950 (1905)). In reviewing the trial court's findings and conclusions, we are bound by its findings of fact unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them, but [w]e may reverse ... for errors of law. Graves, supra, 490 A.2d at 1091 (citing D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1981)) (other citations omitted).