Opinion ID: 2640468
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction Under C.A.R. 21

Text: The Colorado Constitution vests the Colorado Supreme Court with jurisdiction to issue writs in the nature of quo warranto: The supreme court shall have power to issue writs of ... quo warranto. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3. A proceeding in quo warranto lies to determine whether a person is illegally holding a public office or to test the validity of the legal existence of a governmental body. Leonard P. Plank & Anne Whalen Gill, Colorado Appellate Law and Practice § 15.9, at 224 (1999). The writ protects the interest of the public, but does not promote private rights. Id. We will issue quo warranto writs only rarely because of the availability of relief in the district courts under C.R.C.P. 106. Id.; see also William H. ReMine, Original Proceedings in the Colorado Supreme Court, 12 The Colorado Lawyer 413, 418 (March 1983). Rule 21 sets forth procedures for the exercise of our original jurisdiction. C.A.R. 21. It encompasses all forms of writs cognizable under the common law, including quo warranto. C.A.R. 21(a)(2). Relief under this rule is extraordinary in nature and is a matter wholly within our discretion. C.A.R. 21(a)(1). We do not grant this relief except in important circumstances when no other adequate remedy exists. Id. A person whose official duties under law include appointments to a public office has standing to petition for C.A.R 21 relief in the nature of quo warranto. People ex rel. Lamm v. Banta, 189 Colo. 474, 542 P.2d 377, 378 (1975) (recognizing that the Governor of the State of Colorado, as appointing authority for members of the Colorado Highway Commission, has standing to bring C.A.R. 21 petition in quo warranto). The issue in Banta was whether the persons the Governor appointed to the office of highway commissioner were entitled to take their seats in place of certain incumbent commissioners. Id. After their terms had expired, those incumbent commissioners were continuing to act in office pursuant to provisions of the Colorado Constitution that require office holders to exercise their official duties until their successors become qualified to hold office. Id. at 379. The relevant provision of the Colorado Constitution states that [e]very person holding any civil office under the state ... shall, unless removed according to law, exercise the duties of such office until his successor is duly qualified. Colo. Const. art. XII, § 1. Like Banta, the case before us involves conflicting appointments made by appointing authorities to the same Commission seats. By virtue of their offices, Romanoff, as Speaker of the Colorado House of Representatives, and Fitz-Gerald, as President of the Senate, hold the authority under section 13-5.5-102(1)(a) to appoint members of the State Commission on Judicial Performance when a vacancy in that office exists. By means of affidavits of Jane Howell, Staff Director of the Commission, and Jean Dubofsky, current member of the Commission, attached to the C.A.R. 21 petition, the Commission informs that: (1) it is unable to determine who of these four persons validly holds the two seats on the Commission; and (2) the Commission's statutory duties to evaluate the performance of appellate judges and to supervise the operation of the twenty-two district commissions require the immediate resolution of this controversy in this election year. The dispute involving which two of these four respondents hold the office of commissioner is a matter of immediate and important public concern. The work of the Commission is critical to the operation of the retention systemespecially now, at the onset of an election year. To fulfill its statutory duties, the Commission needs ten working members. [5] If the Commission does not operate with its ten lawful commissioners, then its operation will be ineffective at best, paralyzed at worst. Necessity calls for us to resolve this controversy as quickly as possible. We find there is no other adequate remedy available here because relief under C.R.C.P. 106 would not be timely and our resolution of this controversy involves no factual disputes. Validly seated members of the Commission have critical statutory responsibilities to discharge in a timely manner during this general election year of 2006, and accordingly, we find it proper for two of the appointing authorities to the Commission to request the supreme court to address this issue under the auspices of a writ in the nature of quo warranto under C.A.R. 21. We therefore proceed to determine which of the conflicting appointments made by two successive holders of the office of Speaker of the House of Representatives and two successive holders of the office of President of the Senate are legally valid.