Opinion ID: 1650645
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 176 Sufficiency of evidence at trial.

Text: On appeal, when the issue of sufficiency of evidence at the trial is raised, we deem it unnecessary to set forth the facts in detail when our independent examination of the record leads us to conclude that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Suffice it to say that in the instant case, there was a conflict in the testimony of the witnesses called by the state and those of the defendant. Also, there were inconsistencies in the testimony presented by various witnesses called in behalf of the defendant. The test for determining the sufficiency of evidence on appeal has recently been restated by this court in Bautista v. State (1971), 53 Wis. 2d 218, 223, 191 N. W. 2d 725: Several rules applied in appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases have been stated so frequently in our late cases that they need no citation of authority to support them. The burden of proof is upon the state to prove every essential element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. The test is not whether this court or any of the members thereof are convinced beyond reasonable doubt, but whether this court can conclude the trier of facts could, acting reasonably, be so convinced by evidence it had a right to believe and accept as true. A criminal conviction can stand based in whole or in part upon circumstantial evidence. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence is for the trier of fact. In reviewing the evidence to challenge a finding of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding. Reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence can support a finding of fact and, if more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, the inference which supports the finding is the one that must be adopted. Our review of the record in response to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is so limited by these rules.  Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was involved in the commission of the crime because there was no showing that he had knowledge of the crime, or that he performed any act in furtherance thereof, or that he was available to aid the commission of the crime if called upon to do so. Under the provisions of sec. 939.05, Stats., a person may be charged and convicted of a crime if he . . . (a) Directly commits the crime; or (b) Intentionally aids and abets the commission of it; or (c) Is a party to a conspiracy with another to commit it or advises, hires, counsels or otherwise procures another to commit it. . . . In the instant case the jury was given the standard instruction on aiding and abetting as found in Wis J I Criminal, Part I, 400. That instruction defines an aider and abettor as one who, with knowledge or belief that another intends to or is committing a crime knowingly either (a) renders aid to the person who commits the crime, or (b) is ready and willing to render aid, if needed, and the person who commits the crime knows of his willingness to aid him. In State v. Nutley (1964), 24 Wis. 2d 527, 554, 555, 129 N. W. 2d 155, this court stated: . . . Under the complicity theory of sec. 939.05 (2) (b), a person is liable for the substantive crime committed by another if (1) he undertakes conduct (either verbal or overt action) which as a matter of objective fact aids another person in the execution of a crime, and further if (2) he consciously desires, or `intends' that his conduct will yield such assistance. He must consciously direct his conduct toward the realization of the criminal objective. He must have a `stake in the outcome.' However, it is not necessary that the aider and abettor enter into an agreement with the perpetrator to assist him in consummation of the crime. Nor is it necessary that the perpetrator be aware of the accomplice's  efforts, in order to hold the accomplice liable for the substantive crime. . . . See also: Bautista v. State, supra, page 224; Bethards v. State (1970), 45 Wis. 2d 606, 619, 173 N. W. 2d 634. While aiding and abetting may include the performance of some act which constitutes an essential element of the offense, this is not a requirement in all cases. See Hawpetoss v. State (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 71, 187 N. W. 2d 823. In Carter v. State (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 451, 134 N. W. 2d 444, 136 N. W. 2d 561, a conviction of armed robbery was sustained where the defendant was the driver of the getaway car and shared in the proceeds. The court stated on page 455: . . . Like a drama on the stage, each party was engaged in the general scheme of the crime by performing his allotted part in the plot; but unlike a drama, all the actors, those who played the principal roles and those in the supporting roles, were guilty under the law as principals. . . . The court then referred to other cases which upheld convictions where the defendant acted as a lookout. Fifer v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 50, 206 N. W. 861; State v. Kuick (1948), 252 Wis. 595, 32 N. W. 2d 344. In these cases, credible testimony placed the defendants at the scene of the crime under circumstances from which it could be inferred that they had knowledge of the plan and the function they were to serve. In the instant case there is no dispute that Williams and Johnson directly committed the crime in which the defendant is alleged to have been involved. Defendant knew these two men and was a passenger in the automobile which dropped them off at the tavern and picked them up after the robbery. This, together with the short period of time involved appears to be inconsistent with the defendant's testimony that he was unaware of the  robbery. The automobile was observed behind the tavern in the alley with two men inside and the holdup men were observed to run from the tavern into the alley, get into the car and drive off. During the chase, the defendant had his head down because gunshots were being fired by the police; however, testimony was received that no shots were fired during the chase. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, there is sufficient evidence for the jury to form a reasonable conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew and was aware of the crime, acted as a lookout, aided in the getaway, and was ready and willing to render aid if needed. . . . The type of reasonable certitude required in criminal cases is moral certainty relating to the affairs of human conduct and grows out of informed experience with the common ways (mores) of man. It is based upon the certain constancy and uniformity in the free conduct of humans under given conditions or motives. Based upon long experience with the actions and motives of human nature, certain inferences of conduct may be drawn from various circumstances to a moral certainty. This is not to say that exceptions and possibilities may not exist but such possibilities in themselves do not prevent a person from forming a reasonable conviction beyond a reasonable doubt or to a moral certainty of the truth of a fact. This degree of certainty required to sustain a criminal conviction may be attained upon circumstantial evidence as well as upon direct evidence. State v. Johnson (1960), 11 Wis. 2d 130, 136, 104 N. W. 2d 379. Although the defendant and Eddie gave explanation for their conduct during and after the robbery, such testimony, because of inconsistencies and conflicts with other testimony, could reasonably have been considered by the jury as unworthy of belief. Williams' testimony contained many inconsistencies and was likewise subject to disbelief.  It is also argued that the circumstantial evidence is reasonably consistent with the defendant's innocence as well as guilt. Therefore, argues defendant, the jury was required to return a finding of not guilty. However, defendant has confused the standard to which a jury is bound by way of instructions from the trial court with the standard applicable in this court on appellate review. The jury is instructed that if alternative inferences arise, reasonably consistent with either the innocence or guilt of the defendant, they should return a finding of not guilty. See Wis J I Criminal, Part I, 140 and 170. This court's review of a jury determination is limited to determining whether the evidence adduced, believed and rationally considered by the jury, was sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Bautista v. State, supra, page 223. An analogous argument to the one made by the defendant was rejected in State v. Zdiarstek (1972), 53 Wis. 2d 776, 784, 785, 193 N. W. 2d 833: We are of the opinion that defense counsel has misinterpreted the test. In State v. Chacon (1971), 50 Wis. 2d 73, 76, 183 N. W. 2d 84, this court stated: `. . . It is quite true that if the testimony of the defendants were believed, a reasonable hypothesis consistent with their innocence would be established; but that is not the test. All the credible evidence must be reconciled or some testimony must be rejected as incredible. Here, the trial court rejected the defendants' evidence, which it had a right to do.' If defendant's suggested rule of law were correct, it would require the jury to believe all the testimony adduced at trial. Such a result would eliminate the main function of the juryto resolve conflicts in the testimony and to determine which evidence is credible or worthy of belief. Credibility of witnesses lies within the exclusive province of the trier of fact. Quinn v. State (1971), 50 Wis. 2d 96, 99, 183 N. W. 2d 61. It is only where the evidence on which the trier of fact has relied can  be held incredible as a matter of law that this court will overturn a jury determination. See Austin v. State (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 716, 190 N. W. 2d 887. . . . Similarly, a trier of fact may reject inferences arising from circumstantial evidence as incredible or unworthy of belief. By the Court. Judgment affirmed.