Opinion ID: 1434591
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The State PSR

Text: As discussed, the State PSR prepared following Rosa's 1991 conviction cited conflicting evidence about the nature of the object used during the robbery. It contained a victim's statement that during the robbery the victim felt and observed a black handgun pressed into his stomach, and a witness's statement that one of the perpetrators was holding what appeared to be a black automatic handgun. But it also contained a statement by Rosa that Rosa's co-defendant apparently had in his possession a BB gun  which is not a firearm under the ACCA. The State PSR itself, then, seems to reflect a disputed issue of fact as to the nature of the object used during the robbery. We have not yet addressed whether, in light of Shepard, a district court may look to facts about the nature of the offense presented in a state presentence report in determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA. The fact that the State PSR quotes the victim or a witness making references to a handgun does not establish, the government agrees, that Rosa necessarily pleaded to an offense involving a firearm, as Shepard requires. [12] This is especially so where, as here, the State PSR also describes a statement disputing the victim's assertions. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 21, 125 S.Ct. 1254; see also United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 603 (3d Cir.2007) (en banc) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (I submit that after Shepard, a presentence report without more cannot be the basis for a finding of an offense that is the predicate for a sentence enhancement.). The government relies on the State PSR, instead, to prove those facts described in the State PSR that were explicitly adopted by the trial judge to which Rosa assented. Gov't Br. at 29. As we discuss in the next section, however, we disagree with the government's view that the relevant facts in the State PSR were explicitly adopted by the trial judge or assented to by Rosa. [13] The State PSR here does not provide a basis for determining the nature of the defendant's conduct any better than does a police report, which, the Shepard Court ruled, do[es] not define the conduct to which a defendant eventually pleads guilty. United States v. Green, 480 F.3d 627, 632 (2d Cir.2007) (applying Shepard ). To begin with, it appears that the State PSR drew its descriptions of statements by the victim and bus-driver witness directly from the police reports rather than an independent investigation. See State PSR at 2 (noting dependence of descriptions on City of New Rochelle Police Department records). Like the police reports in Shepard, neither the police reports from which the State PSR drew support nor the accounts of the nature of the object used in the offense were mentioned at [Rosa's] pleas or read by the judge to [Rosa] during the plea colloquy. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 18, 125 S.Ct. 1254. Rosa was never asked if the information contained in the [PSR] w[as] true. Id. (first brackets added); see id. (Shepard . . . stated `that none of the details in th[e police] reports w[as] ever mentioned at his pleas,' that `the reports themselves were never read by the judge to him during the plea colloquy,' and that at no time `was he ever asked if the information contained in the . . . [police] [r]eports w[as] true.' (third brackets added; citation to district court opinion omitted)). To the extent that the district court relied on the State PSR itself to support its conclusion that a firearm was used in the 1991 robbery, such reliance was misplaced.