Opinion ID: 3068429
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Peralta

Text: Peralta challenges the district court’s imposition of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. He argues that the facts presented at trial do not support the district court’s finding that Peralta suborned perjury by presenting the testimony of his wife. Peralta asserts that his wife did not present an alibi, excuse, or material fact. Section 3C1.1 provides for a two-level increase in the offense level if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction” and this conduct relates to “the defendant’s offense of conviction.” The commentary to the guidelines specifically 3 The dissent would find the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. Dissent at 12-16. But the rationale and arguments advanced in the dissent to support such a view are not advanced in Ceballos’s brief on appeal and therefore are not properly before us. As we view Ceballos’s brief, he is raising one argument—that the Supreme Court wrongly decided Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, in order to preserve it for further review. Specifically, Ceballos’s brief provides that: “With due respect to the Supreme Court and the precedent established by Dunnigan, the undersigned feels morally obliged to once again raise this issue due to its continuing Constitutional implications.” Blue brief at 28. Accordingly, we address the only claim that Ceballos makes with respect to his obstruction of justice enhancement. 15 Case: 10-50940 Document: 00511825406 Page: 16 Date Filed: 04/17/2012 No. 10-50940 lists suborning perjury as an example of conduct to which the enhancement applies. § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(b)). Perjury is giving “false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94. “[A] district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition.” Id. at 95. Although it is preferable for the court to address each element of perjury in a separate and clear finding, it is sufficient if the court makes a finding of obstruction “that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury.” Id. Testimony is material if it was designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case. United States v. Como, 53 F.3d 87, 90 (5th Cir. 1995). Subornation occurs whenever the defendant “procures another to commit any perjury.” 18 U.S.C. § 1622. Credibility determinations are within the province of the district court. United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 799 (5th Cir. 1996). The district court’s determination that a defendant obstructed justice under § 3C1.1 is a factual finding that we review for clear error. United States v. Juarez-Duarte, 513 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2008). After Peralta objected to the obstruction-of-justice enhancement in the PSR, the probation officer responded that Peralta’s wife, Mabel, provided an alibi as to why Peralta was in Mexico at the time of the April 9, 2009 offense. At sentencing, the Government argued that Mabel testified Peralta was in Mexico for a family event and that he crossed the river with Pinedo to report something stolen. Peralta correctly notes that the Government mischaracterized Mabel’s testimony. At trial, Mabel did not testify that Peralta was in Mexico at a family event in April 2009. Mabel did testify that they moved from Odessa to Mexico in June of 2009, but that does not provide an alibi for the April 2009 offense. Mabel 16 Case: 10-50940 Document: 00511825406 Page: 17 Date Filed: 04/17/2012 No. 10-50940 testified that in January 2010, she and Peralta moved back to Odessa. On January 29, 2010, the night Peralta was arrested, she had been at their daughter’s birthday party at a Mr. Gatti’s in Odessa. She further testified that after the party Peralta and Ceballos went to Wal-Mart for “milk and stuff” for the children. However, this testimony clearly did not provide an alibi for the April 9, 2009 offense in Mexico. Nor did it provide an alibi for the January 29, 2010, offense in Odessa because Peralta was arrested at the scene of the offense and admitted that he knew drugs were in the truck. At Peralta’s sentencing hearing, the prosecutor, referring to Peralta’s crossing the border in April of 2009, asserted that he had asked Mabel the following question on cross examination: “[w]ell, why didn’t you travel with your husband at that time?” He further asserted that she had responded that “‘the boys traveled with the boys, and the girls traveled with the girls,’ or something to that effect.” Because Mabel allegedly lied about the reason Peralta was in Ojinaga, the prosecutor argued that the enhancement should apply. The prosecutor was mistaken. Actually, it was Ceballos who testified that he was in Ojinaga with family on April 9, 2009. It was Ceballos who testified that the men and women drove back to Odessa separately. Ceballos testified that he had his wife ride back from Mexico with her sister because he did not want his wife riding with the two other men, Abraham and Pinedo. He testified that the reason he crossed the border with Peralta, Pinedo, and Abraham was to report Pinedo’s vehicle stolen. Ceballos’s testimony, however, was not the basis for Peralta’s obstruction enhancement. Nonetheless, the district court applied the obstruction enhancement, expressly finding that Peralta “allow[ed] his wife to testify and to provide an alibi as to why the Defendant was in Mexico on or about April 9, 2009, which is Count Two of the indictment.” As set forth above, Mabel gave no testimony regarding Peralta’s presence in Mexico on April 9, 2009. 17 Case: 10-50940 Document: 00511825406 Page: 18 Date Filed: 04/17/2012 No. 10-50940 Thus, the district court’s factual finding in support of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement is clearly erroneous. Moreover, there is no indication that Mabel’s testimony was deliberately false or material. It is unclear how Mabel’s testimony concerning Peralta’s whereabouts prior to his arrest on the night of January 29, 2010, would assist Peralta’s defense because he was arrested at the scene of the offense, and it is undisputed that he admitted to knowledge of drugs in the truck. The district court erred in applying this enhancement. The Government argues that even if the court erred in applying the enhancement, any error would be harmless because Peralta’s sentencing range would be 97-121 months, and his sentence of 121 months falls within that range. His sentence would be presumed reasonable, and Peralta fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness. But for the error, Peralta’s guidelines range would have been 97-121 months with a total offense level of 30 and a Category I criminal history score. If a district court committed a procedural error, the appellate court must remand unless the error was harmless. United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 2009). “A procedural error during sentencing is harmless if the error did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The proponent of the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the error was harmless and “must point to evidence in the record that will convince [the reviewing court] that the district court had a particular sentence in mind and would have imposed it, notwithstanding the error made in arriving at the defendant’s guideline range.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In United States v. Ibarra-Luna, 628 F.3d 712, 713-14 (5th Cir. 2010), this Court recognized that an error can be harmless even if the district court did not consider the correct guidelines range in its analysis. However, such an error is 18 Case: 10-50940 Document: 00511825406 Page: 19 Date Filed: 04/17/2012 No. 10-50940 harmless only if two requirements are met. Id. at 717-19. First, the Government must “convincingly demonstrate that the court actually would have followed the very same reasoning absent the error.” Id. at 717. Second, the Government “must show that the . . . sentence the district court imposed was not influenced in any way by the erroneous Guidelines calculation.” Id. at 719. Here, the district court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the higher, incorrect guidelines range and stated that the guidelines range was “fair and reasonable.” We see nothing in the record to indicate that the district court’s reasoning in choosing a sentence would have been the same had it been confronted with a guidelines range of 97-121 months. The Government has not shown that Peralta’s sentence was not influenced by an erroneous calculation. See Ibarra-Luna, 628 F.3d at 717-19.