Opinion ID: 1122588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: equal protection and the right of franchise

Text: Acevedo's third argument is that section 2.3 violates the Alaska Constitution. He argues that section 2.3 singles out City employees for a deprivation of fundamental political rights by requiring them to resign their employment prior to assuming a seat on the City Council, in violation of the Alaska equal protection clause. Alaska Const. art. I, § 1. He also argues that section 2.3, by placing a burden on City employees who seek election to the City Council, unduly restricts the rights of franchise of the citizens of North Pole, which rights are guaranteed by Alaska Const. art. V, § 1. [6] The City, on the other hand, argues that section 2.3 is a valid condition of municipal employment, and that the rights asserted by Acevedo are subject to reasonable restriction. To select the appropriate standard of review, we must consider the importance of the rights asserted by Acevedo and the extent to which they are burdened. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2844, 73 L.Ed.2d 508, 516 (1982) (plurality opinion); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 856, 31 L.Ed.2d 92, 99-100 (1972); State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192 (Alaska, 1983); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Alaska 1978); Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1982). Candidacy has been characterized by this court as one of the ultimate forms of political expression: Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms. Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d at 3 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32, 89 S.Ct. 5, 11, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 32 (1968)). And concerning the right to vote, we have stated that [n]o right is more precious in a free country... . Id. It is thus abundantly clear that Acevedo has asserted rights of paramount importance under the Alaska Constitution. However, the extent to which these rights are burdened by section 2.3 is less clear. The provision leaves many of the City's employees' political rights relatively unaffected. It does not hinder their rights to take active roles in political campaigns, other than as candidates, or to make public statements concerning political issues. Compare Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). Nor does section 2.3 require City employees to resign-to-run; that is, an employee is not required to balance his or her secure job working for the City against a complete leap into the dark as a candidate for the City Council. See Morial v. Judiciary Commission of the State of Louisiana, 565 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013, 98 S.Ct. 1887, 56 L.Ed.2d 395 (1978). Further, unlike the provisions reviewed in Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1982), and Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974), section 2.3 does not stand as a flat prohibition against an employee's candidacy due to the absence of factors more or less beyond the employee's control. Rather, employees are free to place their names on the ballot, campaign, and even be elected to the City Council. At that point, the choice between the Council seat and City employment is entirely up to the employee. Likewise, the impact of section 2.3 on the rights of North Pole voters is not as substantial as restrictions which exclude candidates of an identifiable viewpoint, e.g., the poor, Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974), or minority parties and candidates, Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1982); Vogler v. Miller, 660 P.2d 1192 (Alaska 1983). See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 965, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2844, 73 L.Ed.2d 508, 517 (1982) (plurality opinion); Morial v. Judiciary Commission, 565 F.2d at 301-02. On the other hand, because section 2.3 puts City of North Pole employees to the onerous choice between their source of livelihood and their political ambitions, it certainly deters their candidacies, and this deterrence also impinges on the franchise rights of North Pole voters, whose selection of candidates may therefore be substantially restricted. For this reason, and due to the importance of these political rights, we conclude that we should select a strict standard of review. Thus, we require that section 2.3 serve compelling governmental interests and that the means-ends relationship between section 2.3 and those interests be correspondingly close. [7] We previously noted that dual position-holding prohibitions are designed to serve the following governmental interests: (1) preventing public servants from accumulating many positions, resulting in a pyramid of power; (2) avoiding direct or indirect pecuniary conflicts; (3) preventing employees from asserting control over their supervisors through their elected positions; and (4) assuring that public servants exercise their duties with undivided loyalty. See section II supra. We view these governmental interests as sufficiently important to justify the restrictions imposed by section 2.3. Further, we conclude that the means-ends relationship between section 2.3 and these interests is sufficiently close to avoid invalidation. Acevedo's point that the avoidance of pecuniary conflicts is already served by section 3.6(1) of the City of North Pole Home Rule Charter is well taken. Thus, section 2.3 is unnecessary to that interest. However, the remaining interests are well served by the provision at issue, and we are convinced that a less restrictive alternative would not serve them well enough. While Acevedo could merely have been prohibited from taking part in decisions which affected him as a City employee, such a prohibition would have denied the Council input from one of its seven members in all decisions concerning police matters and all decisions concerning employee relations. Moreover, considerable possibilities of political bargaining would nonetheless remain. See Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063, 98 S.Ct. 1236, 55 L.Ed.2d 763 (1978). Our decision finds support in the common law tradition prohibiting dual position-holding, see section II supra, and in a large body of case law subjecting provisions such as section 2.3 to constitutional scrutiny. [8] Our decision also finds support in other provisions of the Alaska Constitution. Alaska Const. art. II, § 5 serves the same purposes as section 2.3. See Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, 548 P.2d 384, 387-88 (Alaska 1976); Begich v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27, 31 (Alaska 1968). Thus, the framers of our constitution indicated their view that, with respect to the state legislature, dual position-holding may be prohibited without violating equal protection or unduly impinging upon the right of franchise. The same may be said of Alaska Const. art. III, § 6 with respect to the executive branch, and of Alaska Const. art. IV, §§ 8 and 14 with respect to the judiciary. [9] We hold that a home rule city may likewise prohibit dual position-holding consistent with equal protection and the right of franchise when, as here, the prohibition is narrowly drawn to serve compelling governmental interests. [10]