Opinion ID: 2200498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ii, iii, iv.

Text: The next three issues defendant raises all arise from the same circumstances and will be dealt with together. Three days before his trial and after he had rejected a proposed plea agreement, defendant informed his counsel that he no longer wanted his assistance. Defense counsel then filed a motion to withdraw and a hearing on the motion was held two days before trial. At that time, the only reason defendant gave for wanting a different attorney was the fact that the court-appointed public defender once had been a prosecutor. When asked what he wanted to do if the motion to withdraw was granted, defendant replied that he was unsure. Defendant did indicate that if the public defender was going to continue as defense attorney, defendant would not appear at trial. At the pretrial hearing the day of trial, the judge denied the motion to withdraw and defendant's oral motion for a continuance in order to obtain a new attorney. In denying the request for a continuance, the judge noted that defendant had made no showing that his position had changed since he had been found to be indigent and in need of a pauper attorney. The trial judge also found that defendant had made no real effort to obtain new counsel and that the request for a continuance was merely a delay tactic. Defendant then indicated that he wished to remain in his cell and not attend the trial. The trial judge granted that request after questioning defendant at length to determine if he was knowingly and voluntarily excusing himself from the trial. Finally, defendant moved to proceed pro se with the assistance of Richard Lee Owen, an inmate at Indiana State Prison. This motion was denied because Owen was not licensed to practice law in Indiana. Defendant was then given the option of proceeding pro se with the public defender as standby counsel. Defendant stated he preferred to remain in his cell. Defendant now alleges that he was denied his right to self-representation, that the public defender's motion to withdraw should have been granted, and that he did not voluntarily waive his right to be present at trial. He contends that because the trial judge would not allow him to proceed pro se without the public defender's assistance, and because he thought his attorney was ineffective, defendant was coerced into waiving his right to be present at trial. We find that defendant's claims are without merit and that, throughout the trial and all procedures leading up to it, defendant's actions appear to be an attempt to create confusion in the record. A trial court may refuse to allow a defendant to replace counsel during or immediately prior to trial. German v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 67, 373 N.E.2d 880; Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 618, 335 N.E.2d 811. Given defendant's one stated reason for wanting new counsel, the lack of evidence that defendant could obtain new counsel, and the lateness of the request, the judge was justified in denying defendant's motion. The denial of an untimely request for change of counsel is not error absent a showing that defendant was prejudiced. Vacendak v. State, (1982) Ind., 431 N.E.2d 100. There was no prejudice here. At the hearing on the motion to correct errors defendant alleged ineffective counsel for the first time and testified that he could have obtained new counsel with money from Owen. Defendant admitted that he concealed the information about Owen from the judge. Defendant should not profit now from his own false testimony. Moreover, as discussed above, there is no evidence of ineffective counsel. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to withdraw or the motion for a continuance. Neither was defendant denied his right to self-representation. The record shows that the trial court gave defendant the option of proceeding pro se with the public defender as standby counsel. The appointment of standby counsel is clearly the recommended procedure to preserve defendant's rights when he elects to represent himself. German v. State, 268 Ind. at 73, 373 N.E.2d at 883. See United States v. Dougherty, (1972 D.C. Cir.) 473 F.2d 1113. Also defendant never moved to represent himself without standby counsel. Rather, he moved to proceed pro se with the assistance of Owen, which, as the trial court noted, was impossible. See Fair v. Given, (N.D.Ind. 1981) 509 F. Supp. 1086. Finally, the record does not support defendant's allegation that he was coerced into waiving his right to be present at trial. The trial judge exhaustively advised defendant of his right to be present at trial and the disadvantages of his absence. The judge questioned defendant at length to determine if he knew what he was doing and allowed defendant to change his mind at any time and appear at trial. The judge also explained that the public defender's prior role as a prosecutor would have no negative effect on his representation of defendant and that the prior experience could add to the defense attorney's competency. Defendant indicated he understood all of the judge's statements but preferred to return to his cell rather than appear in court with the public defender. Defendant's decision was made knowingly and voluntarily.