Opinion ID: 784599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: 10 Lombardo contends that because the First Amendment prohibits laws that favor commercial over non-commercial speech he should be permitted to display a billboard reading For Peace in the Gulf because while the OMIA permits commercial establishments to display billboards advertising activities conducted on the premises, the OMIA prohibits him from freely expressing his own political beliefs outside his own home. 3 We have rejected this same argument on at least two previous occasions. Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813-14 (9th Cir. 2003); Outdoor Sys., Inc., v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 609-612 (9th Cir.1993). We do so again here.
11 In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981), the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a billboard ordinance that prohibited offsite signs but permitted onsite signs for commercial purposes. Writing for the plurality, Justice White set forth two standards by which to examine billboard regulations. Under the Metromedia standards, an ordinance is invalid if it [1] imposes greater restrictions on non-commercial than on commercial billboards or [2] regulates non-commercial billboards based on their content. Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513, 516, 101 S.Ct. 2882). 12 We have addressed the onsite/offsite distinction in a number of cases since Metromedia. 4 We recently summarized this case law in Clear Channel, stating that the distinction between onsite and offsite signs contravenes Metromedia if the statute prevent[s] the erection of onsite non-commercial signs. 340 F.3d at 814 (citing Ackerley Communications of the Northwest, Inc. v. Krochalis, 108 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir.1997), and Outdoor Sys., 997 F.2d 604). The Clear Channel court relied on Outdoor Systems in stating that the key consideration is whether a sign ordinance is neutral with respect to non-commercial messages. Id. We stated that neutrality is maintained if the regulation allows non-commercial messages on either onsite or offsite signs. Id. We also reiterated the rule first expressed in Outdoor Systems that even if billboard regulations have a greater negative impact on non-commercial than commercial messages, the regulation does not have the effect of preferring commercial speech, in violation of Metromedia, as long as non-commercial messages may be displayed on both onsite or offsite signs. Id. (citing Outdoor Sys., 997 F.2d at 612). 13 After summarizing the case law that has emerged since Metromedia, Clear Channel held that the billboard provisions in the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC), did not violate plaintiff's free speech rights because the LAMC's distinction between offsite and onsite signs permitted both commercial and non-commercial messages. The LAMC (like the OMIA) defines an offsite sign in terms of a sign which displays any message directing attention to a business, product, ... or any other commercial [or non-commercial] message, which is generally conducted, sold, manufactured, produced, offered or occurs elsewhere than on the premises where such sign is located. Id. at 812 (emphasis added) (quoting LAMC § 91.6203). 5 The LAMC also provides the same exemption for onsite signs, requiring the billboard to display a message, commercial or non-commercial, that relates to conduct on the premises. Id. 14 Clear Channel is controlling. The primary argument raised by Lombardo is that the billboard law negatively affects non-commercial speech because fewer residents will be able to display signs that relate to activity conducted on the premises, whereas commercial establishments will be able to display their signs advertising their activity with relative ease. This argument fails under our precedent. In Outdoor Systems, we addressed the same contention, and stated that [e]ven were the number of non-commercial signs to decrease disproportionately, the statute would not be invalid on that basis because the decrease would be the result of decisions made by individual sign owners. 997 F.2d at 612. Clear Channel reaffirmed this holding. 340 F.3d at 814. The OMIA defines on premises signs with respect to location alone, not content. Or. Rev.Stat. § 377.710(22). The key consideration is whether the sign relates to activity conducted on the premises. Although commercial billboards may prevail under the OMIA's legislative scheme, neutrality is nonetheless maintained because the regulation allows non-commercial messages on either onsite or offsite signs. Id. We follow Clear Channel and hold that the OMIA is a content neutral time, place, and manner restriction.
15 Lombardo also contends that the OMIA unconstitutionally gives the Director unbridled discretion to grant permit applications. This argument fails. Licensing procedures are invalid if the government official authorizing such permits is given unbridled discretion in deciding whether to deny or permit the expressive activity at issue. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). The danger is that absent standards controlling the exercise of discretion, government officials may determine who may speak and who may not based upon the content of the speech or viewpoint of the speaker. Id. at 763-64, 108 S.Ct. 2138. The OMIA does not pose the danger identified in Lakewood. First, the OMIA expressly precludes content-based decisions by prohibiting officials from consider[ing] the content of the signs in deciding whether to allow a variance. Or.Rev.Stat. § 377.735(2). Second, as in other cases considering this issue, judicial precedent provides adequate guidelines to state officials interpreting billboard codes. See Clear Channel, 340 F.3d at 816; Outdoor Sys., 997 F.2d at 613. 6