Opinion ID: 444211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Validity of the Withdrawals

Text: 11 All of the wildlife refuges at issue in this case were created by Executive Orders. The plaintiffs contend that the Executive lacked authority to disturb their right to seek allotments by creating wildlife refuges. We disagree. The Pickett Act, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976), authorized the President to reserve public lands for public purposes. The lands in question were public lands within the meaning of the Pickett Act. See Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 431, 438, 48 S.Ct. 366, 368, 72 L.Ed. 640 (1928). While the plaintiffs argue that the settlement exception to the Pickett Act applies in this case, that exception requires the settler to maintain and perfect the settlement pursuant to law. Ch. 421, Sec. 2, 36 Stat. 848 (1910). Because the plaintiffs did not perfect their claim by seeking an allotment, we find that the settlement exception is inapplicable. But even if the Pickett Act did not authorize the creation of these wildlife refuges, we would uphold the withdrawals because Congress ratified the Executive Orders in section 305 of ANILCA, Pub.L. No. 96-487, Sec. 305, 94 Stat. 2395 (1980). 2 C. The Effect of the Withdrawals 12 The plaintiffs contend that the lands in question remained unreserved and unavailable for allotment notwithstanding their withdrawal for use as wildlife refuges. Initially, they argue that Congress acted to segregate lands used and occupied by Alaska Natives from the public domain until such time as they could secure title. In support of this argument, the plaintiffs cite a long string of statutes and treaties, beginning with Article III of the Treaty of Cession, 15 Stat. 539 (1867), and ending with section 4 of the Alaska Statehood Act, Pub.L. No. 85-508, Sec. 4, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) (amended 1959). The rights granted by these statutes and treaties, however, have never been held to rise to the level of enforceable ownership rights. See Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 338-39, 65 S.Ct. 690, 692-93, 89 L.Ed. 985 (1945); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 517, 525, 24 L.Ed. 440 (1877). See generally P. Maxfield, M. Dieterich & F. Trelease, Natural Resources Law on American Indian Lands, Secs. 4-3 to -6 (1977). In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, a group of Alaska Natives attempted to assert a compensable property right in the lands they occupied. The Supreme Court rejected their claim: 13 We have carefully examined these statutes and the pertinent legislative history and find nothing to indicate any intention by Congress to grant to the Indians any permanent rights in the lands of Alaska occupied by them by permission of Congress. Rather, it clearly appears that what was intended was merely to retain the status quo until further congressional or judicial action was taken. 14 348 U.S. at 278, 75 S.Ct. at 317. Congressional action has now been taken, eliminating the right of Alaska Natives to seek allotments. 15 The plaintiffs also contend that the withdrawals provide an express exception for their claims. Each withdrawal was made subject to valid existing rights. These exceptions, however, only apply to use and occupancy rights. Prior to receiving an allotment, an Alaska Native has no title to any of the lands subject to the Allotment Act. Cf. Nadeau v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 253 U.S. 442, 445-46, 40 S.Ct. 570, 571, 64 L.Ed. 1002 (1920) (interpreting the General Allotment Act, which applies to all Native Americans outside of Alaska). Moreover, none of the plaintiffs had valid existing rights in the land at the time that the wildlife refuges were withdrawn. As a result, the withdrawals eliminated their right to seek allotments. 16 D. The Clarence Rhode National Wildlife Range 17 Public Land Order 2213, which created the Clarence Rhode National Wildlife Range, 3 provided: 18 This order shall not be construed to abrogate or impair any legal or aboriginal claim of right of the natives to use the lands, if any, and they may hunt, fish, and trap in accordance with applicable law, and carry on any other lawful activities. 19 This statement was added to the formal withdrawal order in response to concerns raised during public comment on the original proposal. 20 The plaintiffs claim that the language of the order preserved their right to apply for an allotment within that wildlife refuge. First, they contend that the literal wording of the order preserved their legal right to apply for an allotment. We disagree. The rights preserved by the order were expressly limited to use, rather than ownership. Even though statutes and administrative orders concerning Native Americans are to be given a liberal construction, see Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d 135, 140 (9th Cir.1976), we find that the literal language of the order did not embrace the right to apply for an allotment. 21 Second, the plaintiffs argue that the administrative history of the order shows that it was intended to preserve their right to apply for allotments. A representative of the Department of the Interior told a group of Alaska Natives that it was his understanding that after-arising allotment rights would not be disturbed. He conditioned his remarks, however, by noting: 22 We merely stress these points which are a matter of good faith and which the Secretary who is the man who makes the decision (we are just merely gathering the testimony) will take these into consideration. We do not know what he will do with them. He may throw this whole thing out; he may accept it as it is; or he may modify it based on points raised by you men here tonight. 23 While it is true that he submitted a report to the Bureau of Land Management recommending protection of after-arising allotment rights, it appears that his recommendation was ignored. In any event, we must defer to the Department's interpretation of its administrative orders if that interpretation is not unreasonable [and] the language of the orders bears [that] construction. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 18, 85 S.Ct. 792, 802, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965). We cannot say that the Department's interpretation is unreasonable. III