Opinion ID: 2509064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Request to Present Additional Mitigating Evidence

Text: Prior to the hearing on the modification application, defendant requested the opportunity to present additional evidence in mitigation in part because his original defense counsel, Ron Slick, had allegedly failed to present a full picture of defendant's background. The trial court denied the request as beyond the scope of the proceedings contemplated by this court's opinion in Lewis I. The court correctly understood that we remanded the matter solely for a rehearing on the modification application. (See Lewis I, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 292, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) It is well established under our construction of section 190.4, subdivision (e)including our decision in Lewis I that the court may review only evidence that was presented to the jury. ( People v. Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 337, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 862 P.2d 710; see People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1183-1184, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) Since it would have been improper to consider additional evidence, the court did not err in precluding defendant from presenting such evidence in the first instance. Defendant responds that the court's ruling denied him the heightened reliability constitutionally mandated for imposition of the death penalty by foreclosing consideration of any aspect of a defendant's character or record . . . that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. ( Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973; see also, e.g., Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367, 373, 387, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, 398-399, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347.) This argument mischaracterizes the purpose and function of a modification application. (See People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 847, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) Defendant was never denied the opportunity to present mitigating evidence, including family background and his maturation in prison, at the statutorily designated timethe penalty phaseand placebefore the jury. The modification application serves as a procedural mechanism for reweighing the determination made at that time and place, not as a substantive reevaluation. (See People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1105, 1107, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) Even if, as defendant contends, his original trial was a mockery because [t]his was a Ron Slick case, that fact does not establish any constitutional deficiency in the statutorily regulated procedures of a capital trial. Nor does it excuse enforcement of those procedures. If Attorney Slick rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present additional mitigating evidence, defendant may seek relief on habeas corpus. His remedy is not by challenge to the trial court's proper discharge of its obligation pursuant to section 190.4, subdivision (e). Defendant's reliance on Creech v. Arave (9th Cir.1991) 947 F.2d 873 does not alter this conclusion. In Creech, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the defendant's original death sentence because the trial judge failed to pronounce the sentence in the presence of the defendant as required by Idaho law. ( Id. at p. 881.) At resentencing, the trial court refused to permit him the opportunity to introduce mitigating testimony relating to his conduct during the fourteen months between his sentencing and resentencing hearings. ( Ibid. ) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the second death sentence on the grounds that in an earlier decision, the state high court had held that evidence of a defendant's good behavior and peaceful adjustment while in prison was mitigation evidence, [citation] and that the principles of Lockett v. Ohio [, supra, ] 438 U.S. 586 [98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973] . . ., Eddings v. Oklahoma [(1982)] 455 U.S. 104 [102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1] . . ., and Skipper v. South Carolina [(1986)] 476 U.S. 1 [106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1] . . ., required that a defendant be allowed to offer such mitigating evidence at resentencing. [Citation.] ( Creech, at p. 881; see Sivak v. State (1986) 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192, 197.) The present case differs materially with respect to both the nature of the remand and California's statutory and decisional law. Following Lewis I, the matter was remanded solely for rehearing on the automatic modification application. Pursuant to section 190.4, subdivision (e), the trial court does not resentence the defendant but rather considers whether to modify the death verdict. (See People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 830, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204.) The express language of the statute provides that the court does so by review[ing] the evidence to determine whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. Thus, the court may not take into consideration any evidence not before the jury that returned the death verdict. ( Lewis I, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 286, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) Defendant offers no constitutional basis for disregarding this procedural limitation when the modification application is heard on remand rather than following the penalty verdict. Defendant also asserts our determination denies him equal protection because noncapital defendants are entitled to have their probation reports updated prior to resentencing on remand (see People v. Rojas (1962) 57 Cal.2d 676, 682, 21 Cal.Rptr. 564, 371 P.2d 300), which may include favorable information regarding their conduct in prison. This argument fails at its premise: capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated for purposes of sentencing. Unlike those convicted of noncapital crimes, the choice of a capital defendant's penalty is tried to a jury under a separately prescribed statutory schemeof which section 190.4, subdivision (e), is a unique and integral part. Proceedings under section 190.4, subdivision (e), are not a resentencing but an application for modification of the death verdict as contrary to the law or the evidence presented. Given this distinct purpose, defendant is properly restricted to the terms of the statutory scheme without violating his right to equal protection.