Opinion ID: 4544958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶20 Our starting block is section 18-1-405, Colorado’s speedy trial statute. Section 18-1-405 guarantees defendants in criminal cases “the right to a speedy trial.” People v. McMurtry, 122 P.3d 237, 240 (Colo. 2005). Subsection (1) of that statute provides, in pertinent part, that when a defendant “is not brought to trial . . . within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty, . . . the pending charges shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall not again” be charged 10 “for the same offense, or for another offense based upon the same act or series of acts arising out of the same criminal episode.” § 18-1-405(1). The protective cloak of this statutory provision “is meant to give effect to the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” McMurtry, 122 P.3d at 240. Hence, the statute doesn’t actually create any rights; it simply functions as a vessel for securing the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Id. at 241. ¶21 The burden of compliance with section 18-1-405(1) lies with the trial court and the prosecution. People v. DeGreat, 2020 CO 25, ¶ 17, 461 P.3d 11, 15. To satisfy its burden, the trial court must make “a record sufficient for an appellate court to determine statutory compliance.” Marquez v. Dist. Court, 613 P.2d 1302, 1303–04 (Colo. 1980). ¶22 Subsections (3), (3.5), (4), and (5.1) of the speedy trial statute set forth circumstances when the period within which the trial must be held may be extended. For example, subsection (3) states that where, as in Lucy’s case, the trial date has been fixed and the defendant thereafter requests and receives a continuance, “the period within which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month period from the date upon which the continuance was granted.” § 18-1-405(3). ¶23 Subsection (6) is a first cousin of subsections (3), (3.5), (4), and (5.1). Whereas the latter subsections authorize the six-month speedy trial period in subsection (1) 11 to be extended under some circumstances, subsection (6) identifies the “periods of time” that must be excluded in computing the time within which a defendant must be brought to trial under subsection (1). § 18-1-405(6). Stated differently, in certain situations, subsection (6) tolls the six-month speedy trial period. As relevant here, it reads as follows: (6) In computing the time within which a defendant shall be brought to trial as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the following periods of time shall be excluded: .... (g) The period of delay not exceeding six months resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, without the consent of the defendant, if: (I) The continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the state’s case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that this evidence will be available at the later date . . . . Id. ¶24 But does the type of “continuance” contemplated by subsection (6)(g)(I) include a continuance justified by a public health crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic? Today we conclude that it does, so long as the prosecution establishes that: (a) as a result of the public health crisis, evidence material to its case is unavailable; (b) it has exercised due diligence to obtain that evidence; and (c) there 12 are reasonable grounds to believe that the unavailable evidence will be available on the new trial date.3 ¶25 The prosecution may satisfy the first of these three requirements through a variety of proffers. By way of example, it may do so if the presence of witnesses in general cannot be safely compelled due to a public health crisis. Evidence material to the prosecution’s case would obviously be unavailable as a result of a public health crisis in that situation. Similarly, the prosecution may establish the first requirement if evidence material to its case is to be presented by a particular witness whose presence cannot be safely compelled due to a public health crisis. Such a witness could be someone whose age or health condition places her in the COVID-19 vulnerable population. ¶26 As it relates to the second requirement, the prosecution must show that material evidence is unavailable despite the exercise of due diligence. If the 3 Motivated by the challenges inherent in the COVID-19 pandemic, we recently amended two of our rules of criminal procedure, Rules 24 and 43, to address “a public health crisis.” We amended Rule 24, “Trial Jurors,” by adding paragraph (c)(4), which allows trial courts to declare a mistrial at any time before trial on the ground that “a public health crisis” prevents the safe assembly of a fair jury pool. See Crim. P. 24(c)(4). And we amended Rule 43, “Presence of the Defendant,” by adding paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2), which authorize trial courts, in the event that “a public health crisis” exists and certain circumstances are present, to hold most proceedings by contemporaneous audio communication and/or interactive audiovisual device. See Crim. P. 43(f). 13 prosecution’s lack of due diligence is to blame for the unavailability of evidence material to its case, subsection (6)(g)(I) cannot toll the speedy trial period. In other words, the prosecution cannot use a public health crisis as an excuse for its lack of due diligence. ¶27 Finally, with regard to the third requirement, the prosecution must demonstrate that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the unavailable material evidence is only temporarily unavailable and will be available on the next trial date. This requirement cannot be met if the evidence is permanently unavailable or if it is unreasonable to think that the evidence will be available on the new trial date. While there is some guarded optimism that the COVID-19 pandemic will subside in the not-too-distant future, we recognize that the road to recovery is laden with uncertainty. But subsection (6)(g)(I) doesn’t demand infallible projections or clairvoyant forecasts. It requires “reasonable grounds” to believe that the evidence will be available on the next trial date. ¶28 The three-pronged showing under subsection (6)(g)(I) and the trial court’s corresponding determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. Upon the filing of a subsection (6)(g)(I) motion, the prosecution must be afforded an opportunity to make the requisite showing and the trial court must ensure that there is an adequate record that includes a final ruling supported by findings. 14 ¶29 In our view, the interpretation of subsection (6)(g)(I) we adopt today effectuates the legislature’s intent by giving the language of the statutory provision its plain and ordinary meaning. Our primary purpose in construing a statute “is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 15, 459 P.3d 516, 519. We look first and foremost at “the language the legislature has actually chosen to express itself.” In re People in Interest of A.A., 2013 CO 65, ¶ 10, 312 P.3d 1170, 1172. We must give the statutory words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. Cali, ¶ 15, 459 P.3d at 519. And we are required to read those words and phrases in context and construe them based on the rules of grammar and common usage. Id. ¶30 We acknowledge that subsection (6)(g)(I) does not mention a continuance justified by a public health crisis. But it doesn’t exclude such a continuance either. In fact, it contains no specifics vis-à-vis the reason that evidence material to the prosecution’s case is unavailable. To rule that subsection (6)(g)(I) prohibits a continuance triggered by a public health crisis would force us to add words to that provision or to otherwise change the words in that provision. We may partake in neither of these acts. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue v. Creager Mercantile Co., 2017 CO 41M, ¶ 25, 395 P.3d 741, 745 (“We will not substitute or add words to statutes.”). Had the legislature intended to except from subsection (6)(g)(I) continuances based on a public health crisis, it presumably would have said so. Instead, what the 15 legislature said is that when the prosecution establishes the “unavailability” of evidence material to its case—regardless of the reason for such unavailability—it may be entitled to a continuance with a tolling of the speedy trial period for up to six months. ¶31 Because the word “unavailability” is not defined in section 18-1-405, we may discern its plain and ordinary meaning by consulting a recognized dictionary. Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 14, 431 P.3d 215, 218–19. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “unavailable” as “not possible to get or use.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unavailable; [https: //perma.cc/U7PF-P2QS]. Thus, if the prosecution cannot get or use evidence material to its case—including, for instance, because a public health crisis prevents it from safely compelling the presence of witnesses in general or a specific witness in particular—then that evidence is unavailable for purposes of subsection (6)(g)(I). ¶32 Here, in each case, the prosecution cited the COVID-19 public health crisis in moving for a continuance with a tolling of the speedy trial period pursuant to subsection (6)(g)(I). Without affording the prosecution a suitable opportunity to be heard and without making an adequate record or issuing a final ruling, the county court continued each trial beyond the speedy trial deadline. Though we appreciate the extraordinary situation the county court confronted and fully 16 understand that its actions were sparked by an administrative order from the Chief Judge, this was nevertheless error. ¶33 On remand, the county court must give the prosecution an opportunity in each case to make the showing required under subsection (6)(g)(I). The court must then rule on each motion and make findings with respect to the speedy trial period. We note that “[t]he period of delay caused by [this] interlocutory appeal” must be excluded from the computation of time within which Lucy and Meresa must be brought to trial. § 18-1-405(6)(b); see also Crim. P. 48(b)(6)(II) (indicating that “[t]he period of delay caused by an interlocutory appeal, . . . or after issuance of a rule to show cause in an original action” must be excluded from the computation of time within which a defendant must be brought to trial).