Opinion ID: 1835988
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: value of the work

Text: In rejecting as a constitutional standard the previous obscenity test of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975, 16 L.Ed.2d 1 (1966), the Supreme Court has lessened the burden of the State as to the value of the work element of the obscenity test and at the same time has required that obscenity statutes meet a more rigorous test of specificity than was previously imposed. With respect to the question as to whether Ch. 73-120 still requires a showing that the offending material is utterly without redeeming social value or merely that it is without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value (the value of the work test set forth in Miller ), we hold that the statute must be followed until changed, and it requires a showing that the work is utterly without redeeming social value. As the State wisely and forth-rightly concedes, the Supreme Court in Miller did not find that test to be unconstitutional, but rather found that a less stringent (from the viewpoint of the prosecution) test was constitutionally permissible. The value of the work test of Miller is merely a minimal guideline; that is, the offending material must be without serious literary, etc., value before it can be deemed obscene, but the states may require that the work be shown to have even less value than this before it can be deemed obscene. This is precisely what the statute in question does. Even though Florida could enact a statute embodying the serious literary, etc., value test of Miller , it may go beyond this minimal guideline and embody a requirement that the offending material be utterly without redeeming social value in order to be deemed obscene; Ch. 73-120 does so, and the specific statutory requirements in this area, not being unconstitutional, remain the applicable test under Ch. 73-120. Accordingly, we answer the questions certified to us as follows: A. The definition of what material is obscene found in § 1(2) of Ch. 73-120, Laws of Florida, 1973, is sufficient in its terms, to meet the First Amendment standards set forth in Miller v. California, supra , and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra , as to specifically defining sexual conduct. B. Ch. 73-120 requires the State of Florida, when employing this alternative statute, to prove that the offending material is utterly without redeeming social value regardless of the decisions in Miller and Paris Adult Theatre, since this is the express provision of the statute, until amended. C. Ch. 73-120 does set forth what specifically defined sexual conduct is embodied within its prohibitory provisions on its face; further, such defined conduct as now herein authoritatively construed will hereafter additionally support the requirement of defined conduct as to future offenses, in accordance with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra . Thus F.S. Ch. 73-120 does not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The certified questions having been answered, the stay of the prosecution entered by the trial judge should be dissolved and the cause proceed in accordance herewith. It is so ordered. ROBERTS, BOYD, McCAIN and CARLTON (Retired), JJ., concur. ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion in which ADKINS, C.J., concurs.