Opinion ID: 2827591
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: mr. rasabout was properly convicted of twelve

Text: COUNTS OF UNLAWFUL DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM BECAUSE HE FIRED TWELVE DISCRETE SHOTS ¶7 At the heart of this case is a single question: What is the allowable unit of prosecution for the crime of unlawful discharge of a firearm? The answer to that question determines whether Mr. Rasabout was permissibly convicted of twelve counts. The court of appeals concluded that “the unit of prosecution under the firearm discharge statute is each discrete shot.”4 Mr. Rasabout argues that this conclusion was in error. He points instead to the intent required by the enhancement provision and argues that the allowable unit of prosecution is the continuous intent that motivates one or more shots. He reasons that he violated the statute only once because a single continuous intent motivated him to fire all twelve shots. The State disagrees, arguing that the Legislature criminalized each discrete shot. We agree with the State and therefore affirm the court of appeals. A. Identifying the Allowable Unit of Prosecution for an Offense ¶8 The allowable unit of prosecution for an offense determines whether a perpetrator’s conduct constitutes one or more violations of that offense. Take the example of child pornography. It is a crime to “intentionally . . . view[] child pornography.”5 If a perpetrator views multiple images of multiple victims over a period of time, how many times has he committed the offense? Perhaps there is one violation for each viewing session, regardless of the number of images or victims. Or maybe there is one violation for each victim or one for each image. The allowable unit of prosecution provided by the offense resolves this question. In the case of child pornography, the Legislature has provided that “[i]t is a separate offense under this section: (a) for each minor depicted in the child pornography; and (b) for each time the same minor is depicted in different child pornography.”6 ¶9 But not all statutes explicitly define the allowable unit of prosecution. State v. Morrison, which dealt with a prior version of the child-pornography statute, illustrates the appropriate analysis when 4 State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, ¶ 33, 299 P.3d 625. 5 UTAH CODE § 76-5b-201(1)(a)(ii). 6 Id. § 76-5b-201(3). 4 Cite as: 2015 UT 72 Opinion of the Court the statute at issue is not so explicit.7 In that case, the defendant contended that he violated the child-pornography statute only once even though he possessed multiple visual representations of child pornography.8 Although the statute did not explicitly define the allowable unit of prosecution, we nevertheless focused on the statutory language that defined the offense as “‘knowingly . . . possess[ing] . . . material . . . depicting’” child pornography and defined “material” as “‘any visual representation.’”9 We reasoned that “[t]he clearest reading of the statute is that each individual ‘visual representation’ of child pornography that is knowingly possessed by a defendant constitutes the basis for a separate offense.”10 Accordingly, on the basis of the statutory language, we held that the allowable unit of prosecution for child pornography is each visual representation.11 ¶10 In short, identifying the allowable unit of prosecution for an offense is a question of statutory construction.12 And when construing a statute, we seek to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.13 Indeed, this has been our practice from the time of statehood until now.14 To ascertain that intent, we look first to the 7 2001 UT 73, ¶¶ 24–26, 31 P.3d 547. 8 Id. ¶ 24. 9 Id. ¶ 25 (alterations in original). 10 Id. ¶ 26. 11 Id. 12 Id. ¶¶ 25–26; see also Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 81 (1955) (When determining how many times a federal offense has been committed, courts must determine “[w]hat Congress has made the allowable unit of prosecution.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indictments and Informations § 205 (2015) (“[W]hen the same statutory violation is charged twice, the question is whether [the Legislature] has intended the facts underlying each count to make up a separate unit of prosecution.”); 42 C.J.S. Indictments § 213 (2015) (A court must “consider[] whether the legislature intended the facts underlying each count to make up a separate unit of prosecution.”). 13 LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 11, 215 P.3d 135. 14 See, e.g, Delta Canal Co. v. Frank Vincent Family Ranch, LC, 2013 UT 69, ¶ 16, __ P.3d __; Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., (continued...) 5 STATE v. RASABOUT Opinion of the Court text of the statute within its context.15 And while the ordinary meaning of a word is powerful evidence in understanding statutory text, it is not the only consideration because it is simply inconclusive as to the meaning intended in a particular context.16 Even if a word bears one meaning in the majority of cases where that word is used proximate to another, that does not foreclose the possibility that the Legislature intended a less-preferred meaning in a particular context. We therefore begin with the plain language of the provision at issue in our broader effort to ascertain the intent of the Legislature disclosed by the language of the act as a whole, the act’s operation, and its purpose. B. The Allowable Unit of Prosecution for Unlawful Discharge of a Firearm is Each Discrete Shot ¶11 The unlawful-discharge-of-a-firearm statute provides that “[a] person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or 14 (...continued) 2004 UT 57, ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 903; Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 811 P.2d 664, 671 (Utah 1991); Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 626 P.2d 450, 451 (Utah 1981); Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Granite Sch. Dist., 568 P.2d 746, 747–48 (Utah 1977); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 390 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1964); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d 177, 183 (Utah 1954); Norville v. State Tax Comm’n, 97 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1940); Moormeister v. Dep’t of Registration of State, 288 P. 900, 903 (Utah 1930); Roberts v. Lynch, 190 P. 930, 932 (Utah 1920); Hayes v. Ross, 127 P. 340, 343 (Utah 1912); Armstrong v. Johnson (In re Owens’ Estate), 85 P. 277, 279 (Utah 1906); Pratt v. Bd. of Police & Fire Comm’rs, 49 P. 747, 749 (Utah 1897). 15 LPI Servs., 2009 UT 41, ¶ 11. 16 While some of our cases focus on ordinary meaning, they should not be read to suggest that ordinary meaning is the exclusive tool available to us in our effort to effectuate legislative intent when a statutory term is not expressly defined or does not appear to be a technical term of art. E.g., Barneck v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2015 UT 50, ¶ 28, __ P.3d __; State v. Bagnes, 2014 UT 4, ¶ 13, 322 P.3d 719; Hi-Country Prop. Rights Grp. v. Emmer, 2013 UT 33, ¶ 18, 304 P.3d 851; State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ¶¶ 10–27 & n.6, 308 P.3d 517; Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 9, 248 P.3d 465. 6 Cite as: 2015 UT 72 Opinion of the Court firearm” in certain dangerous conditions.17 The allowable unit of prosecution turns on the meaning of the term “discharge” in the context of a “dangerous weapon or firearm.” ¶12 The word discharge is made up of two parts: a prefix and the root word. Adding the prefix dis provides the negative or opposite meaning of the root word.18 The root word charge includes the verb meaning “to place a charge (as of powder) in” and the noun meaning “the quantity of explosive used in a single discharge.”19 And the dictionary entry of the word discharge includes the meaning “to release from confinement” or simply to shoot.20 The definition of shoot confirms its synonymous meaning in the firearm context; it means “to eject or impel . . . by a sudden release of tension” or “to drive forth . . . by an explosion (as of a powder charge in a firearm . . . ).”21 Under these dictionary entries, the clearest reading of the statute is that discharging a weapon or firearm means shooting a weapon or firearm. ¶13 This understanding is confirmed by the statutory definition applicable to this offense. It defines a firearm as “any device . . . from which is expelled a projectile by action of an explosive.”22 In other words, it contemplates the expulsion of a single projectile with a single explosion. Similarly, that section defines a handgun as a “firearm of any description . . . from which any shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged, the length of which . . . does not exceed 12 inches.”23 This definition also contemplates a single “shot, bullet, or 17 UTAH CODE § 76-10-508(1)(a) (2007) (emphasis added). 18 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 354 (11th ed. 2012). 19 Id. at 208. 20 Id. at 356 (equating discharge with shoot as in “[discharge] an arrow”); see also id. at 471 (defining firearm as “a weapon from which a shot is discharged by gunpowder”); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 514 (5th ed. 2011) (“The musket discharged loudly.” (emphasis omitted)). 21 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra, at 1151; AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra, at 1620 (defining shoot as “[t]o fire or let fly (a missile) from a weapon” or “[t]o discharge (a weapon)”). 22 UTAH CODE § 76-10-501(9) (2007) (emphasis added). 23 Id. § 76-10-501(12). 7 STATE v. RASABOUT Opinion of the Court other missile” that “can be discharged.”24 These definitions thus confirm that the term discharge contemplates a discrete shot or explosion.25 ¶14 Additionally, it was reasonable for the Legislature to criminalize each shot fired because each shot carries an independent harm. Otherwise, an individual shooting once would have no punitive deterrent from continuing to shoot as many times as possible—essentially a buy one, harm as much as you like discount. Thus, convicting Mr. Rasabout of a separate offense for each shot fired creates an independent punitive deterrent for each pull of the trigger. ¶15 In urging his position that the allowable unit of prosecution is not each shot fired, Mr. Rasabout points to the “intent to intimidate” language in subsection (2) of the statute. He argues that this language suggests that the Legislature defined the allowable unit of prosecution for this offense based on the singular intent of the perpetrator, no matter haw many shots are actually fired. We are unpersuaded by Mr. Rasabout’s argument for two reasons. First, the “intent to intimidate” language is not part of the provision defining the crime. Rather, it is located in the enhancement provision. Because we presume that the Legislature used the term discharge consistently throughout the statute, it must mean the same thing whether or not the offense is enhanced. Because the word discharge means shoot in the provision defining the crime, it must mean the same thing when the perpetrator discharges a firearm with an “intent to intimidate.” Second, there is nothing about an “intent to intimidate” as an enhancement that suggests that the intimidation 24 Id. 25 Mr. Rasabout points out that a shotgun expels multiple pellets with a single explosion. But we are not persuaded that this is a distinction with a meaningful difference. The statutory definition of firearm equates a shotgun with a pistol and a rifle, all of which use a single explosion to expel a projectile. Id. § 76-10-501(9). The fact that a cartridge of ammunition includes multiple pellets does not change the fact that it is a single shot. Mr. Rasabout also points to the case of an automatic weapon. But a fully automatic weapon is a “firearm which fires . . . automatically more than one shot without manual reloading by a single function of the trigger.” Id. § 76-10-501(11). Even though there is only “a single function of the trigger,” there are still multiple shots. 8 Cite as: 2015 UT 72 Opinion of the Court supercedes the flying bullet as the principal harm that the Legislature sought to criminalize. Just as each flying bullet is dangerous, so too is each flying bullet that was fired with the intent to intimidate. Accordingly, the allowable unit of prosecution for the unlawful-discharge-of-a-firearm statute under which Mr. Rasabout was convicted is each discrete shot, whether or not the shot is fired with a mens rea that enhances the classification of the offense. C. Sua Sponte Corpus Linguistics Research is Not Appropriate ¶16 Justice Lee charges the court with coming to this conclusion by plucking a definition from a dictionary on the basis of cloaked intuition.26 Instead, he advances what he deems a “more transparent” interpretation methodology that utilizes corpus linguistics research.27 We decline to adopt his approach because, among other reasons, it is unfair to the parties and it attempts scientific research that is not subject to scientific review. ¶17 To begin, Justice Lee argues that we should decide this case against Mr. Rasabout on the basis of the corpus linguistics research he has conducted sua sponte. But because his rationale is so different in kind from any argument made by the parties, Mr. Rasabout has never had a reasonable opportunity to present a different perspective. This violates the very notion of our adversary system, which “assures fairness by exempting a party from the inequity of [losing] on appeal on a ground that [he] had no opportunity to address.”28 “[W]e should not dilute [the protections of our adversary system] by stretching their standards to justify our consideration of [an argument] we find interesting or important.”29 Moreover, deciding this case on the basis of an argument not subjected to adversarial briefing is a recipe for making bad law.30 26 Infra ¶ 53. 27 Infra ¶ 55. 28 R.C.S. v. A.O.L. (In re Baby Girl T.), 2012 UT 78, ¶ 42, 298 P.3d 1251 (Lee, J., dissenting). 29 Id. ¶ 56. 30 See, e.g., St. Jeor v. Kerr Corp., 2015 UT 49, ¶ 14, __ P.3d __ (noting that “we would be ill-advised to reach a decision regarding unsettled law without the benefit of adversarial briefing” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, ¶ 21, 173 P.3d 848 (overruling the last paragraph of a previous opinion (continued...) 9 STATE v. RASABOUT Opinion of the Court ¶18 Additionally, it would be entirely inappropriate for this court to conduct the independent scientific research that serves as the basis for Justice Lee’s approach. Justice Lee admits that he is not an expert in this field and does not completely understand its methodologies, but asserts that we must “try.”31 Linguistics is a scientific field of study that uses empirical research to draw findings.32 And just as with other fields of scientific study, simply trying harder will not lead us to a better answer. The knowledge and expertise required to conduct scientific research are “usually not within the common knowledge” of judges, so “testimony from relevant experts is generally required in order to ensure that [judges] have adequate knowledge upon which to base their decisions.”33 We regularly refuse to conduct legal research, a field in which we are experts.34 We should similarly refuse our inclination to contrive of interesting research projects that require expertise in fields in which we have no training. ¶19 Moreover, as Justice Lee points out, “[m]ost judges are generalists.”35 Indeed, we are aware of almost no one sitting on the bench or practicing law in this state who has the kind of scientific 30 (...continued) because in deciding that issue “we were not able to benefit from any adversarial briefing”). 31 See infra ¶¶ 107, 113, 116 (internal quotation marks omitted). 32 See infra ¶ 58 (citing TONY MCENERY & ANDREW HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: METHOD, THEORY AND PRACTICE (2012), which notes that “the combination of falsifiability and replication can make us increasingly confident in the validity of corpus linguistics as an empirical, scientific enterprise,” id. at 16); infra ¶¶ 114–15 (noting that coprus linguistics “is not rocket science,” but is instead “like math”); What is Linguistics?, LINGUISTIC SOCIETY OF AMERICA, http://www.linguisticsociety.org/what-linguistics (last visited July 10, 2015) (“Linguistics, in a nutshell, is the scientific study of language.”); Linguistics MA, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, http://linguistics.byu.edu/linguistics/ma/ (last visited July 10, 2015) (defining linguistics as “the scientific study of language”). 33 Bowman v. Kalm, 2008 UT 9, ¶ 7, 179 P.3d 754. 34 See, e.g., Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, L.L.C., 2012 UT 6, ¶ 20 n.9, 270 P.3d 456. 35 Infra ¶¶ 107, 113. 10 Cite as: 2015 UT 72 Opinion of the Court expertise required to reliably conduct the research Justice Lee requires. And issues of statutory construction where “both sides are able to marshal dictionary definitions in support of their view” permeate the majority of cases in this state.36 But in every such case, Justice Lee would require ad hoc linguistics research that could only be reliably conducted by dueling linguistics experts. Imposing such a significant financial burden on so many of the litigants coming through the doors of our courts would be tantamount to locking those doors for all but the most affluent. Moreover, it would place an unbearable burden upon our already thinly stretched district judges. That is simply unacceptable. ¶20 Justice Lee’s appeal to linguistics research would not be so disquieting if he were not conducting the research himself, but merely citing findings that have been advanced by the parties, published in a scholarly journal, or authored by a respected source. Such sources include the reports of expert witnesses, published academic articles, and widely available dictionaries. In those cases, findings are subject to review by the relevant field of study or the opposing party’s expert before we rely upon them. But if we conduct our own research, the parties are bound by our decision even if our methods or findings are subsequently found to be flawed. Accordingly, it is unfair, and indeed unwise, for us to decide a case on the basis of scientific research that is subject to neither prior review by the relevant field of study or adversarial briefing. ¶21 We are not experts in this field and accordingly have no intention of meeting Justice Lee on the merits of his research. But there are at least a few questions that are immediately apparent with regard to his methodology. To begin, of the eighty-six “hits” Justice Lee found with his search, he simply ignores thirty-six as having “insufficient detail to indicate whether the discharge at issue had reference to a single shot or the emptying of a magazine.”37 And thirty-one of the remaining hits required an interpretive assumption or were “a bit more ambiguous.”38 So many apparently neutral or questionable data points raise the question of whether the trend that Justice Lee draws from the data is statistically insignificant—“the figures extracted from the data are simply the result of random 36 Infra ¶ 70. 37 Infra ¶ 90. 38 Infra ¶ 89. 11 STATE v. RASABOUT Opinion of the Court chance, and do not indicate what they seem to indicate.”39 It certainly calls into question his claim that “discharge of a weapon is used overwhelmingly in the single shot sense.”40 Additionally, the data set on which Justice Lee relies “‘contains more than 410 million words of text and is equally divided among spoken, fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, and academic texts.’”41 The point of a large data set is to avoid “‘basing conclusions on a few speakers’ idiosyncrasies.’”42 But the “idiosyncrasies” of the Utah Legislature constitute the rule of law in this state. And the only way to identify those idiosyncrasies is through the text of the Utah Code, which is wholly absent from Justice Lee’s data set. Apparently, there is no statutory or legal text of any kind in the data set. Accordingly, in an attempt to eschew the influence of any one speaker, Justice Lee’s data set ignores the only speaker that matters. These are just two of the many questions raised by Justice Lee’s methodology. And we have no doubt that more would surface if his methodology were subject to adversarial briefing or review by an expert in this field. D. The Rule of Lenity Does Not Apply Because the Statute Is Not Ambiguous ¶22 Mr. Rasabout argues that we should use the rule of lenity to find in his favor. The rule of lenity requires that we interpret an ambiguous statute in favor of lenity toward the person charged with criminal wrongdoing.43 Thus, in the context of determining the 39 MCENERY & HARDIE, supra, at 251 (defining “statistical significance,” noting that “statistical procedures [are] used to test statistical significance,” and also defining a “significance test” as “[a] mathematical procedure to determine whether a result is statistically significant” (first and second emphasis added)); DOUGLAS BIBER ET AL., CORPUS LINGUISTICS: INVESTIGATION LANGUAGE STRUCTURE AND USE 275 (2004) (discussing “[s]ignificance tests and the reporting of statistics”). 40 Infra ¶ 92. 41 Infra ¶ 84. 42 Infra ¶ 54 n.10 (quoting BIBER ET AL., supra, at 3). 43 State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 38 n.3, 309 P.3d 209 (“The rule of lenity applies when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute and prescribes the narrow construction of ambiguous penal laws against the state.” (continued...) 12 Cite as: 2015 UT 72 Opinion of the Court allowable unit of prosecution under an ambiguous criminal statute, “doubt [must] be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.”44 But as both parties agree, the rule of lenity is not implicated unless a statute is ambiguous. A statute is ambiguous when ”its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain language analysis.”45 In this case, we have conducted a plain language analysis and concluded that there is only one reasonable interpretation of the statute at issue. Accordingly, the rule of lenity is not implicated here. ¶23 Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to vacate the erroneous conclusion of the court of appeals with respect to the rule of lenity. The court of appeals held that the rule of lenity has been abrogated by the strict construction statute, Utah Code section 76-1- 106.46 It reasoned that the statute may permissibly abrogate the rule of lenity because “the rule is one of statutory construction, not constitutional law.”47 The State defends this reasoning on appeal. Mr. Rasabout argues that the rule of lenity cannot be abrogated by statute because it is based in due process. We agree. ¶24 The United States Supreme Court has held that the rule of lenity “is rooted in fundamental principles of due process which mandate that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is prohibited.”48 The reasoning 43 (...continued) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 44 Bell, 349 U.S. at 84; 42 C.J.S. Indictments § 213 (2015) (“Any doubt as to [the intended unit of prosecution] is resolved in favor of lenity for the defendant.”). 45 Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 24. 46 Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, ¶¶ 29–32; UTAH CODE § 76-1-106 (“The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state. All provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104.”). 47 Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, ¶ 30. 48 Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (“[T]he canon of strict (continued...) 13 STATE v. RASABOUT Opinion of the Court behind the Court’s holding is simple. An ambiguous statute violates the notice requirement of due process because it “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.”49 The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution provides an alternative basis for the same protection.50 That provision “do[es] not permit enforcement of a statute that forbids an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the statute’s] meaning and differ as to its application.”51 Thus, the rule of lenity is dictated by the notice protection afforded by both federal and state due process. Accordingly, insofar as the strict construction statute purports to abolish the rule of lenity, we hold that it does not. E. Mr. Rasabout’s Twelve Convictions Do Not Violate the Rule Against Multiplicity Under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution ¶25 Mr. Rasabout contends he committed only one offense and accordingly the State cannot punish him for twelve counts without violating the rule against multiplicity, which arises from the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.52 We disagree. ¶26 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant from 48 (...continued) construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning[, as required by due process,] by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered.”). 49 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). 50 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 7. 51 State v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49, ¶ 17, 98 P.3d 420 (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 52 Mr. Rasabout also asserts a double jeopardy claim under the Utah Constitution, but we decline to reach it because he failed to adequately differentiate this claim from its federal counterpart. We will not reach a state constitutional argument unless it is distinctly raised and adequately briefed. State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶¶ 32–38, 162 P.3d 1106. There is no “formula . . . for adequate framing and briefing of state constitutional issues,” but a clearly raised and differentiated argument will likely include a separate section of analysis that begins with the text of the state constitutional provision. Id. ¶ 37. 14 Cite as: 2015 UT 72 Opinion of the Court “be[ing] twice put in jeopardy” “for the same offence.”53 From this protection springs the rule against multiplicity, which prohibits “‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’”54 The rule against multiplicity is violated if the State punishes a defendant for more counts of an offense than are allowed by the intended unit of prosecution for that offense.55 But it is not implicated in determining the allowable unit of prosecution for an offense or when the state charges a defendant with multiple violations consistent with the statutorily defined unit of prosecution. ¶27 In this case, Mr. Rasabout was convicted of twelve separate counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm on the basis of twelve discrete shots. Because the allowable unit of prosecution for that offense is each discrete shot, the State may charge and punish Mr. Rasabout for twelve counts without implicating Mr. Rasabout’s Fifth Amendment rights.