Opinion ID: 1662548
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Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Justifying Removal.

Text: Lanelle challenges the removal of the children from the home and the transfer of their custody resulting from the dispositional orders. She contends the evidence was not sufficient to justify such removal and not sufficient to justify depriving her of their legal custody for temporary placement. Iowa Code section 232.102 controls the transfer of legal custody after a dispositional hearing. Section 232.102(1) pertinently provides: 1. After a dispositional hearing the court may enter an order transferring the legal custody of the child to one of the following for purposes of placement: . . . . c. The department of human services. Section 232.102(3) pertinently provides: Whenever possible the court should permit the child to remain at home with the child's parent.... Custody of the child should not be transferred unless the court finds there is clear and convincing evidence that: . . . . b. The child cannot be protected from some harm which would justify the adjudication of the child as a child in need of assistance and an adequate placement is available. The order shall, in addition, contain a statement that removal from the home is the result of a determination that continuation therein would be contrary to the welfare of the child, and that reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the child's home. CHINA actions are special proceedings requiring de novo review. In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Iowa 1984). Though not bound by the juvenile court's fact findings, we give them weight, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses whom the court heard and observed firsthand. In re I.L.G.R., 433 N.W. 2d 681, 690 (Iowa 1988). The paramount consideration in CHINA proceedings is the best interests of the child. The presumption that a child's best interests will be served by leaving the child with the child's parent, now codified in section 232.1, is not conclusive. It is the duty of the State, as parens patriae, to see that every child within its borders receives proper care and treatment. In re Welcher, 243 N.W.2d 841, 843-44 (Iowa 1976). With these principles in mind, we now determine whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the pertinent requirements of section 232.102(3) as set out above. The juvenile court placed custody with the department of human services, thereby meeting the requirement of section 232.102(1)(c). Such action also satisfied the availability of an adequate placement requirement in section 232.102(3)(b). Left for our determination is whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence (1) that the children could not be protected from some harm that would justify the adjudication of the children as children in need of assistance, (2) that the presence of the children in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the children, and (3) that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the children from the home. A. The two oldest daughters. As we noted earlier, CHINA petitions were filed alleging that Diana and Dawn were children in need of assistance within the meaning of Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(d). Section 232.2(6)(d) defines a child in need of assistance as one who has been sexually abused by the child's parent. At the subsequent adjudicatory hearing on these petitions, Lanelle conceded both daughters met the definition. Daniel, the father, admitted his sexual molestation of the two children to a psychologist who treated him. The evidence is uncontroverted that on several occasions Daniel, in violation of the no contact order, was in the home and in the presence of both daughters. Not only did Lanelle not protest his presence, she actively sought it. She aided and abetted violation of the order. Her feeble attempt to justify her husband's actions leaves no doubt in our minds that she considered the molestations insignificant. More ominous is Lanelle's notion that somehow these two children were responsible for what happened. At the March 19 dispositional hearing regarding Diana and Dawn, their juvenile court officer recommended that the no contact order continue. The officer's recommendation was based on the father's violation of the no contact order coupled with his lack of sexual abuse treatment. Because of these reasons, the officer felt that the children were at risk of further sexual abuse. A psychological evaluation of the father, completed several months after the molestations, tends to support the officer's concerns. We quote several excerpts from that evaluation: Both psychological and psychosexual immaturity is suggested. Patient appears more likely to attempt to have his needs satisfied by his family as opposed to looking outward to his environment.... Patient may have some problems controlling his impulses.... He has many needs that have gone unmet. He appears to relate better to children than to adults. This may in part explain his having sexually abused his daughters.... Patient would benefit from the [Intra Family Sexual Abuse Program] in that it will help him gain insight into his sexual molestation of his children, which he does not appear to be taking total responsibility for (i.e., tends to see this as a way to get back at his wife, rather than as a direct expression of his own sexual needs). We think the evidence is clear and convincing that Diana and Dawn could not be protected from further sexual abuse except by their removal from the home. We base this conclusion on Lanelle's attitude regarding the sexual molestations, the repeated violations of the no contact order and Lanelle's active participation in those violations, and the father's untreated psychosexual immaturity. Lanelle's tolerance of the father's presence must be considered against her. See In re W.G., 349 N.W.2d 487, 492 (Iowa 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1222, 105 S.Ct. 1212, 84 L.Ed.2d 353 (1985). What we have said also supports the juvenile court's finding that the return of the two daughters to the home would be contrary to their welfare. See Iowa Code § 232.102(3)(b). Finally, the juvenile court's no contact order and the juvenile authorities' insistence on therapy for the family constituted reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the necessity for the removal of the two children from the home. See id. The parents' violation of the order and lack of interest in therapy left the authorities no choice but to seek the children's removal from the home. Like our statutory termination provisions, we think our temporary removal provisions in CHINA proceedings are designed to prevent probable harm to a child and do not require delay until after the harm is done. Moreover, as in termination proceedings, we think it is appropriate to gauge from the parent's past performance what might happen if a child is returned rather than temporarily removed. Cf. In re I.L. G.R., 433 N.W.2d at 690. B. The other children. As we also noted earlier, CHINA petitions were filed on behalf of David, DeAnna, Michael, and Darrell on December 1, 1986. On March 16, 1987, a similar petition was filed on behalf of Alicia. The petitions were based on alleged violations of Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (g). Section 232.2(6) pertinently provides: 6. Child in need of assistance means an unmarried child: . . . . c. Who has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effects as a result of: . . . . (2) The failure of the child's parent ... to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child. g. Whose parent ... fails to exercise a minimal degree of care in supplying the child with adequate food ... or shelter and refuses other means made available to provide such essentials. Proof by clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be protected from harm under either section 232.2(6)(c)(2) or section 232.2(6)(g) would suffice to support their removal from the home. We think, based on our following review of the evidence, that the State met its burden under both sections. Apart from the head lice experienced by the children, there was no direct proof that any of them suffered harmful effects because of the wretched living conditions in the home. There was, however, abundant evidence of an imminent likelihood that they would. One need not have gone to medical school to know that the birth of a child amid squalid conditions, eating garbage, playing in raw sewage, and going barefoot in water surrounding electrical appliances are dangerous and unhealthy. The community's collective concern for the health of these children is persuasive evidence that they were in danger. That concern was so overwhelming that on one occasion the community took it upon itself to clean the home. On another, it installed elevated road bumps to give some measure of protection to these children, who constantly played unsupervised in the street. Overshadowing all of this evidence of deficient parenting skills is Lanelle's lackadaisical attitude toward her husband's sexual abuse of the two daughters. We agree with the following appraisal of the consequences of sexual abuse in the family: Termination [of parental rights] is frequently justifiable in cases of physical or sexual abuse. The consequences of physical or sexual abuse are immediately devastating to the child. Courts should therefore consider the likelihood that the child will be a victim of physical or sexual abuse if returned to the family home. Comment, Minnesota Adopts a Best Interests Standard in Parental Rights Termination Proceedings: In re J.J.B., 71 Minn. L.Rev. 1263, 1289 (1987). Yet, despite the obvious harm the father inflicted on the two daughters, Lanelle not only permitted but encouraged violation of the court's no contact order. She put not only the two victims at risk, but also the other children. Clearly, returning the children to the home following the June 29 dispositional hearing would have been contrary to the welfare of these children. See Iowa Code § 232.102(3)(b). For over a year, the juvenile authorities and the department of human services workers constantly strove to improve the conditions in the home, protect the children, and improve Lanelle's parenting skills. These were reasonable efforts in our view to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the children from their home. See id. Lanelle's resistance to these efforts was just as constant. Her resistance reached a zenith when, at the June 29 dispositional hearing, she would not agree to allow any of these people into her home without the presence of her attorney. Such resistance is abundant proof that she refused other means made available to provide adequate food and shelter for these children. See id. at § 232.2(6)(g).