Opinion ID: 1919200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Boca Burger's defense of the order

Text: We now examine counsel's actions in this case. A lower court's decision to impose sanctions is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Harless v. Kuhn, 403 So.2d 423, 425 (Fla.1981) (noting that [i]n the absence of an abuse of discretion the sanctions imposed by [a] judge should stand). As explained above, an appellate court only has authority to impose sanctions under section 57.105 for conduct occurring in the appellate court. Conversely, the trial court should determine any sanctions for conduct occurring in that court. Therefore, we quash that part of the district court's decision that imposes sanctions for conduct that occurred in the trial court. The district court is free to remand the issue of trial court sanctions to the circuit court for consideration. We are perplexed by the dissent's accusation that we have overlooked or failed to consider the trial transcript record as it relates to this issue. Dissenting op. at 27. We have, of course, thoroughly examined that record. But our disposition of this issue quashing the district court's order insofar as it imposes sanctions for counsel's trial court conductrenders moot any discussion of counsel's conduct in that court. The dissent may well be correct that such sanctions would be inappropriate. As we have explained, however, that determination must first be made by the trial court. [7] We must now determine whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions for conduct that occurred on appeal. We have encountered difficulty in doing so, however. The vast majority of the district court's opinion discusses counsel's representations in the trial court, not on appeal; it appears that the district court imposed sanctions primarily for conduct that occurred in the trial court. Therefore, we cannot determine whether the district court intended to impose sanctions for any conduct that occurred on appeal. We therefore remand to the district court for it to reconsider its order imposing sanctions, addressing only conduct on appeal. In so doing, we neither approve nor disapprove the imposition of sanctions. The dissent protests that the district court should not be allowed to impose sanctions for the conduct on appeal, because it was incorrect on multiple important legal issues it has addressed. Dissenting op. at 29. But whether the district court may impose sanctions depends not on its decision, which we have before us and have reviewed, but rather on counsel's conduct. The dissent suggests that counsel did have a good-faith basis for each representation it made on appeal. We have not asserted otherwise. Our remand to the district court merely recognizes that the issue should be decided by the court before which relevant conduct occurred.