Opinion ID: 2192460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: does the proof of adoption unsuitability establish otherwise without proper custody? (question 4)

Text: Before considering the question Does the proof of adoption unsuitability establish `otherwise without proper custody'?, it is essential to put this question into context with the general development of this case, or the question might seem somewhat irrelevant. The development of this case contains points of confusion and unexpectedness, because of a number of factors, including the apparent lack of appreciation by the probate judge of the parental right to place a child in the custody of another member of the family without the intervention of the court, the indecisive and perplexing action of the mother and sister in transferring custody of Taurus, the quick and ambiguous taking of custody of the child by the probate court, and the subsequent apparent assumption of that court that its duty was the proper placement of the child, although it had not established jurisdiction. This case is confused first because the mother, Deborah Finney, and her sister, Michelle Thomas, seemed to have had difficulty in agreeing on the exact conditions of the transfer of Deborah's child Taurus to Michelle. This prevented a speedy transfer between the sisters without court intervention before the probate court took custody of the child. We, of course, held that this transfer was their right in answering question 2. The indecisiveness of the attempted intrafamily transfer seemed to bother the probate court in determining whether it could grant custody to Michelle under the conditions the court believed she required. The probate court apparently never contemplated that the parent had the right to transfer custody to her sister without court intervention. The combination of the failure of the sisters to effectuate a prompt transfer of custody and the speedy, although ambiguous, taking of custody by the court created a new confusion. Physically the sisters were no longer able to exercise their right of transfer, and the probate court failed to understand that its first duty was to establish jurisdiction by determining that Taurus was otherwise without proper custody rather than to attempt to determine whether placement with Michelle was proper, either for temporary foster care or adoption. After all, such an inquiry would seem somewhat anomalous as Michelle had had custody of another child of Deborah's for several years. The nature of the probate court's confusion is illustrated in the following quotation from its findings of fact and explication of the court: Ms. Thomas was willing to say that she would take the child without adoption. Nevertheless,    she still expected a level of control and permanence which was inconsistent with foster care and which the court could not guarantee by any order other than adoption. To begin with, the real question should have been, Ms. Thomas, have you and your sister agreed on the transfer of the child? If they had agreed, then any further question would be superfluous because of the mother's right to give her sister custody unless the probate court was prepared to find that custody in Ms. Thomas' home was not proper under § 2(b). If that were the case, by the same logic they would have to review the possibility of removal of the three children already in Ms. Thomas' home, her own two and Taurus' sister Aleka. The judge, apparently not appreciating the right of intrafamily transfer of custody, was trying to be helpful according to the law as he understood it. On the one hand, he considered temporary foster care, but erroneously concluded Michelle's permanent custody condition precluded any custody except possibly adoption. The court later considered the adoption alternative, and the court was of the opinion that    it would not be appropriate to place    a four-month-old baby in the Thomas home. While kindly meant, neither the foster care inquiry nor the adoption inquiry, i.e., did Michelle qualify as a foster parent or as an adoptive parent, were pertinent, for two main reasons: The first reason is that Michelle was not a candidate for foster or adoptive parenthood. The second reason is that the court's first task was to establish its jurisdiction under § 2(b), by determining whether the child was otherwise without proper care, not to look for foster care or adoptive parents. This Court regrets that the unfortunate language of its order directing findings of fact concerning the propriety of a possible temporary    or permanent placement with the child's aunt may have misled the probate court into this erroneous analysis. This Court was considering placement by the mother and propriety in relation to proper care under § 2(b). See fn 7. This brings us to consideration of the question, Does the proof of unsuitability for adoption establish `otherwise without proper custody'? As we have already indicated, in this case the probate court has, aside from this question, not established jurisdiction and, as a consequence, is not in a position to establish suitability or unsuitability for adoption, or anything else. However, looking beyond whether the question of adoptability could have been considered, it is possible to consider the issue whether a criterion to establish otherwise without proper custody could be whether the custodian was unsuitable for adoption. So addressing ourselves to the question whether unsuitability for adoption can be a criterion to establish otherwise without proper custody, we find that there are two reasons otherwise without proper custody does not contemplate the test of unsuitability for adoption. First, it is not possible to believe that the Legislature would have intended the catch-all phrase otherwise without proper custody to include so important and well-articulated a concept as adoption without specifically saying so. Second, the criteria of § 2(b), child removal, and MCL 710.46; MSA 27.3178(555.46), child adoption, are completely different. Section 2(b) sets criteria for parents who fall so far below the level of proper care that they must be relieved of the custody of their children. On the other hand, MCL 710.46; MSA 27.3178(555.46) prescribes a triple-headed child adoption criterion relating first to the suitability of the child for adoption, second to the suitability of the parent for adoption, and third to the suitability of the two to each other. Among the factors establishing the suitability of the potential adoptive parent is the respective racial, religious and cultural backgrounds of the child and the potential adoptive parent. In short, MCL 712A.2(b); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b) and MCL 710.46; MSA 27.3178(555.46) have totally different objectives. A parent could avoid loss of a child under MCL 712A.2(b); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b) criteria, but still not be suitable as an adoptive parent for a particular child under MCL 710.46; MSA 27.3178(555.46). In view of these considerations, we hold that unsuitability for adoption is not a relevant criterion to establish otherwise without proper custody. VII. CONCLUSION We hold that the probate court acted improperly in terminating the parental rights of Deborah Finney because the department failed to establish jurisdiction in the probate court under the otherwise without proper custody criterion by showing affirmatively that Deborah and Michelle had failed to agree on a custody arrangement or that for purposes of MCL 712A.2(b); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b) Michelle was an improper custodian. If the mother and aunt can agree on the aunt taking custody of Taurus, and if the Department of Social Services does not disqualify the aunt under MCL 712A.2(b); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b) (the department has not done so so far), then there would appear to be no reason why the question of Taurus' custody could not be speedily resolved by allowing Deborah to provide custody for Taurus through Michelle Thomas. The situation becomes more complicated, however, if the mother, now released from prison, seeks custody for herself. First of all, the aunt can no longer supply the proper custody and thereby avoid probate court jurisdiction on that ground. The question then becomes whether the probate court has jurisdiction under § 2(b), subds (1) and (2) based on the mother's present possible disqualification for custody. The conclusory order and opinion of the probate court of August 24, 1978, stated [t]he court finds that the material allegations contained in the petition have been substantiated and further finds that the said child is within the jurisdiction of the court on the basis of § 2(b), subds (1) and (2) (emphasis added), which was conclusorily affirmed by the circuit court. When asked to explicate its order, the probate court referred to proper custody, presumably referring only to subsection (1) of § 2(b). The explication emphasized that the child was alleged to be otherwise without proper custody because her mother was incarcerated. Now that the mother is no longer in prison and disqualified from custody under subsection (1), and the probate court has seemingly retreated from subsection (2), it is necessary to have the Department of Social Services and the probate court evaluate the present situation if the mother seeks custody in herself rather than in the child's aunt. Fairness to all, especially considering that Taurus has been in foster care for four years, would dictate an effort to expedite the matter toward a final resolution of custody. As indicated, if the mother and aunt can agree on conditions of the aunt taking custody, the matter, it is hoped, could be quickly resolved by the following order: the Department of Social Services shall show cause in writing before the probate court within 20 days of the date of this opinion why the child Taurus should not be transferred to the custody of her aunt, Michelle Thomas. The mother, Deborah Finney, and the guardian ad litem shall have 15 days from the filing of the department's writing to respond. Thereafter the probate court shall make its determination and issue its order within 15 days after the last filing has been made. If the probate court finds that the Department of Social Services has not shown cause why custody of the child Taurus should not be transferred to the aunt, Michelle Thomas, then the probate court shall order the appropriate transfer. As indicated above, if the mother seeks custody, the matter is more complicated. However, every effort should be made to reach an early resolution. The department, if it wishes to further pursue this matter, shall file its petition within 20 days. The mother and guardian ad litem shall have 15 days from the filing of the department's petition to respond. The probate court shall, if a hearing is required, set it at the earliest possible date, not later than 30 days. Thereafter the probate court shall proceed with expedition and render its opinion and order within 120 days of the filing of the department's petition. This Court retains jurisdiction.