Opinion ID: 1476998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misconduct Relative to Domestic Status.

Text: This contention presents the alleged misconduct of appellee and his counsel with reference to the appellee being married and the father of two children. In his opening statement counsel said that the appellee is married and has two children. There was an objection, whereupon counsel then stated, If the court please, I do not think that it is prejudicial in the slightest degree. I think a man has a right to show who he is and what he is. The ruling of the court was, Well, the record will show what the statement is, to which there was an exception. When the appellee was placed on the stand, this occurred: Q. Are you married or single? A. I am married and have two children. Mr. Rietz: Just a moment. We ask that that be stricken out, your Honor, as prejudicial. The Court: It may be stricken out. Mr. Rietz: I take an exception, your Honor, to the statement having gone before the jury. The Court: Of course, you are allowed an exception. In the examination of the wife of appellee, the following occurred: Q. Will you please state your full name? A. Alice M. Kelly. Q. You are the wife of Paul Kelly, the plaintiff? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you live with him and your children at Boone, Iowa? A. Yes, sir. Mr. Rietz: That is objected to as highly prejudicial, if Your Honor please. We have objected to that several times, and the Court has sustained the objection. Mr. Davis: Well, I would like to be heard on that, if there is any doubt about it. I think it is proper testimony, going to the extent of the damage. This man has a perfect right to show who he is, that he has children, and that he has to support his children, that he has to earn a livelihood. Mr. Rietz: If that is true, then I have the right to show that this man has collected $12,500.00 on his insurance for the leg. The Court: Well, gentlemen, this man  the objection is sustained. In the closing argument of counsel for appellee, the following occurred: Now, let us say that some of this jury will say: `Well, we will say that he could earn one-third of that,  we will say that he could earn one-third of that at some other work'. Before you take that away from Paul Kelly, I ask you, or any man or woman on this jury, to say, `What will he do? Where will he go in the economic world, where there are millions of men out of work? Where will he turn, a crippled man, to get work and earn a livelihood, and support his family?' The fact of the matter is that today,  Mr. Rietz: (interrupting) Just a minute. Mr. Davis: (continuing) They have taken away from him,  Mr. Rietz: (interrupting) Just a minute. We take an exception to counsel's reference to the family. The Court: An exception may be allowed. In the closing argument of counsel for appellee, we also find: I want to say to you that if the Northwestern Railroad Company would give that man back his leg, give him back his ability to work, give him back the capacity to go to his home, give him back the capacity to take care of his children, take away from him the horror and anxiety, the pain, the suffering and the deformity, that he would take every dollar of that thirty-four thousand dollars and hurl it back into the face of the Northwestern Railroad Company as a worthless rag. Now, you take this case and give this man what he is entitled to. I thank you. Mr. Rietz: I will note an exception, if Your Honor please, to Mr. Davis' remarks. The Court: An exception will be allowed. The court made no mention of the subject-matter of these objections in the charge to the jury. The admission of testimony showing family responsibilities usually has been held error. Pennsylvania Company v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, 459, 26 L. Ed. 141; Lacorazza v. Cantalupo (C. C. A.) 210 F. 875; Southern Pacific Company v. Ralston (C. C. A.) 67 F. (2d) 958; Bahr v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, 101 Minn. 314, 112 N. W. 267. Whether the admission of such testimony is reversible error largely depends on whether it has created passion and prejudice in the minds of the jury. Courts should exercise great caution in setting aside judgments because of inadvertent remarks made by litigants or counsel during a hotly contested trial, even though improper, unless it clearly appears that they aroused the sympathy or prejudice of the jury and influenced the verdict. In this case the testimony of the wife, to which there was no objection, properly revealed that appellee was married. Therefore, the objection to the statement that appellee had a wife is not open to attack. The question involved is the propriety and effect of the evidence and argument concerning the children. If the fact that appellee was the father of children had been inadvertently disclosed during the trial by a chance remark of counsel in his opening statement or in his closing argument, or by a voluntary remark of a witness, in such a manner as not to arouse the passion of the jury, it would not justify a reversal. The initial statement of counsel might be disregarded as inadvertent and particularly so if the court had ruled that the statement was improper and, if necessary, added a reprimand to counsel. The court virtually denied the objection to this remark in the opening statement of counsel which might have inspired the answer of the plaintiff that he had two children. However, after this answer of appellee had been ordered stricken by the court, counsel should have observed the ruling; but, with the very next witness counsel repeated the error by his question to the wife, You live with him and your children at Boone, Iowa? Obviously, the purpose of the question was to emphasize the existence of the children. When an objection was made, counsel further added emphasis by saying, I think it is proper testimony, going to the extent of the damage. This man has a perfect right to show who he is, that he has children, and that he has to support his children, that he has to earn a livelihood. The situation presents an aggravated instance of counsel proceeding in defiance of the rulings of the court. Furthermore, counsel in his closing argument twice referred to the matter. Almost the last thought he presented for the consideration of the jury was, Give him back the capacity to care for his children. The testimony in the case and statements of counsel in this connection cannot be approved. In the case of the Pennsylvania Company v. Roy, supra, the court said: There was, however, an error committed upon the trial, to which exception was duly taken, but which does not seem to have been remedied by any portion of the charge appearing in the bill of exceptions. The plaintiff was permitted, against the objection of the defendant, to give the number and ages of his children,  a son ten years of age, and three daughters of the ages, respectively, of fourteen, seventeen, and twenty-one. This evidence does not appear to have been withdrawn from the consideration of the jury. It certainly had no legitimate bearing upon any issue in the case. The manifest object of its introduction was to inform the jury that the plaintiff had infant children dependent upon him for support, and, consequently, that his injuries involved the comfort of his family. This proof, in connection with the impairment of his ability to earn money, was well calculated to arouse the sympathies of the jury, and to enhance the damages beyond the amount which the law permitted; that is, beyond what was, under all the circumstances, a fair and just compensation to the person suing for the injuries received by him. How far the assessment of damages was controlled by this evidence as to the plaintiff's family it is impossible to determine with absolute certainty; but the reasonable presumption is that it had some influence upon the verdict. A statement by counsel for appellant cannot be ignored. With equal disregard of proper conduct, and contrary to the ethics of his profession, counsel stated, If that is true, then I have the right to show that this man has collected $12,500.00 on his insurance for the leg. There was no excuse or justification for this highly improper remark, but it does not justify the court in sustaining a judgment that should be reversed because of testimony and remarks persistently made by counsel for appellee and calculated to influence the jury.