Opinion ID: 2636938
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of 1978 Mackey murder.

Text: As noted above, the People introduced evidence that defendant had engaged in violent criminal conduct other than the capital crimes, i.e., the murder of Mackey. (See Pen.Code, ง 190.3, factor (b) [defendant's other violent criminal activity as aggravating factor].) Defendant had never been charged with or convicted of killing Mackey. Hence, before allowing the jury to hear this evidence, the trial court ruled on its legal sufficiency, as requested by defendant. (See People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423, fn. 25 ( Phillips. )) For this purpose, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing outside the jury's presence. (See Evid.Code, ง 402.) The hearing, which took place over three court days, centered on the testimonial competence of Deborah Baros, who claimed she was an eyewitness to the Mackey murder and provided the sole evidence linking defendant to the crime. At the hearing, the court heard essentially the same witnesses and evidence on the Mackey incident as were later presented to the jury. As before the jury, defense counsel cross-examined Baros at length about her memory of the Mackey episode. The hearing also included a full examination of Baros's beliefs about Anthony, the accident, and the triplets, including her assertion that Anthony was actually present when Mackey was killed. Defendant presented extensive evidence, similar to that later heard by the jury, suggesting that Anthony and the triplets were imaginary. Baros also disclosed, as before the jury, that she remembered many events through dreams and believed defendant could communicate with her by telepathy. Finally, Baros revealed in the hearing that she had suffered emotional problems in 1987 and 1988, when her children Dawn and Alan were taken away because of alleged sexual abuse. Baros admitted that as a result of these problems, she had seen therapists, was diagnosed with emotional anguish, had taken prescription medications for the condition, and was still taking some medications (Premarin, Tylenol with codeine, and Fioricet) at the time of trial. [9] In ruling on the matter, the trial court explained it could exclude Baros's testimony as incompetent only if it found that mental derangement or defect had deprived Baros of the ability to accurately perceive, recollect, or recount the events to which she would testify, while the issue whether she did so perceive, recollect, or communicate was for the jury. The evidence adduced at the hearing satisfied the court that Anthony and the triplets had never existed. The court also perceived a need for great caution in qualifying a witness whose delusions bore a material connection to the subject of her testimony. Nonetheless, the court concluded, Baros had given a coherent account, many details of which were corroborated by independent evidence and would not likely be known by one who was not present. These included Baros's descriptions of the location from which Mackey was taken, the stolen cigarettes, the weapon used, the murder scene, and the multiple shots fired. Also significant was Baros's ability, after 11 years, to take investigators to the isolated site of the homicide. These factors, the court indicated, could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Baros must have witnessed the kidnapping and murder of Mackey. Accordingly, the court ruled, Baros would be allowed to testify, and her testimony was legally sufficient evidence that defendant murdered Mackey. Defendant raises numerous challenges regarding Baros's testimony.
Defendant first urges that because Baros's delusions invaded the particular events about which she was to testify (Baros insisted her imaginary son Anthony was present at the murder of Mackey), she lacked the capacity to perceive and recollect those events accurately, and was thus incompetent to testify. The trial court's erroneous decision to allow Baros's testimony, he asserts, violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination. Under pre-1965 statutes, all persons were qualified to testify who could perceive[] and ... make known their perceptions to others (Code Civ. Proc., former ง 1879, enacted 1872 and repealed by Stats.1965, ch. 299, ง 62, p. 1361), except that persons of unsound mind ( id., former ง 1880, subd. 1, enacted 1872 and repealed by Stats.1965, ch. 299, ง 63, p. 1361) and young children who appeared incapable of perceiving pertinent events justly or relating them truthfully ( id., former ง 1880, subd. 2, enacted 1872 and repealed by Stats.1965, ch. 299, ง 63, p. 1361) could not be witnesses. Under this scheme, both the ability to perceive and the ability to communicate understandably and truthfully were necessary attributes of a qualified witness. On the other hand, despite the statutory reference to persons of unsound mind (Code Civ. Proc., former ง 1880, subd. 1), insanity was not an absolute bar to testimonial qualification. In such cases, [t]he question to be determined [was] whether the proposed witness's mental derangement or defect [was] such that he was deprived of the ability to perceive the event about which he [was] to testify or [was] deprived of the ability to recollect and communicate with reference thereto. [Citations.] ... Whether he did perceive accurately, [did] recollect, or [was] communicating accurately and truthfully [were] questions of credibility to be resolved by the trier of fact. ( People v. McCaughan (1957) 49 Cal.2d 409, 420, 317 P.2d 974 ( McCaughan, ) italics added.) Under this system, a challenged witness's capacities to perceive, recollect, and communicate truthfully were all preliminary facts to be determined exclusively by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion. (See McCaughan, supra, 49 Cal.2d 409, 421, 317 P.2d 974.) It followed] that if the proposed witness was suffering from some insane delusion or other mental defect that deprived him of the ability to perceive the event about which it [was] proposed that he testify, he [was] incompetent to testify about that event. ( Ibid. ) Thus, while a committed mental patient was not necessarily disqualified from testifying about events inside the institution, sound discretion required the court to exercise ... great caution in qualifying as competent a witness who [had] a history of insane delusions relating to the very subject of inquiry in a case in which the question [was] not simply whether or not an act was done but, rather, the manner in which it was done and in which testimony as to details [might] mean the difference between conviction and acquittal. ( Ibid. ) The prior rules governing the determination of testimonial competence were modified by the Evidence Code, adopted in 1965. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. ง 701, p. 284.) The effect may [be to] permit ... persons suffering from mental impairment to testify in some instances where they [were previously] disqualified from testifying. ( Id., at pp. 284-285.) Under the current system, as before, every person is qualified to testify except as provided by statute. (Evid. Code, ง 700.) A person is disqualified as a witness only if he or she is [i]ncapable of expressing himself or herself [understandably] concerning the [testimonial] matter ( id., ง 701, subd. (a)(1), italics added), or is [i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth  ( id., ง 701, subd. (a)(2), italics added; Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foil. ง 701, p. 284; see People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 265, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3 ( Ayala) ; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 621-622, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635 ( Cudjo) ; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 444, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388). Capacity to communicate, or to understand the duty of truthful testimony, is a preliminary fact to be determined exclusively by the court, the burden of proof is on the party who objects to the proffered witness, and a trial court's determination will be upheld in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. (Evid.Code, ง 405, subd. (a); Assem. Com. on Judiciary, reprinted at 29B pt. 1 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foil. ง 405, p. 375; Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foil. ง 701, p. 284; see Cudjo, supra ; Mincey, supra; Adamson v. Department of Social Services (1988) 207 Cal.App.3d 14, 20, 254 Cal.Rptr. 667; People v. Blagg (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1039, 89 Cal.Rptr. 446 ( Blagg. )) Even if a witness is not entirely disqualified for incapacity to communicate or to understand the duty to testify truthfully, his or her testimony on a particular matter (other than expert opinion testimony) is inadmissible unless [the witness] has personal knowledge of the matter. Against the objection of a party, such personal knowledge must be shown before the witness may testify concerning the matter. (Evid.Code, ง 702, subd. (a), italics added.) The testimony must be excluded unless there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding  that the witness has such personal knowledge. ( Id., ง 403, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) Under the Evidence Code, the capacity to perceive and recollect particular events is subsumed within the issue of personal knowledge, and is thus determined in a different manner from the capacity to communicate or to understand the duty of truth. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foil. ง 701, p. 284; see People v. St. Andrew (1980) 101 Cal. App.3d 450, 458, fn. 3, 161 Cal.Rptr. 634.) Because a witness, qualified under [Evidence Code] [s]ection 701, must have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies ( [Evidence Code] [s]ection 702), he must, of course, have the capacity to perceive and to recollect those facts. But the court may exclude the testimony of a witness for lack of personal knowledge only if no jury could reasonably find that he has such knowledge. [Citation.] Thus, the Evidence Code has made a person's capacity to perceive and to recollect a condition for the admission of his testimony concerning a particular matter instead of a condition of his competency to be a witness. And, under the Evidence Code, if there is evidence that the witness has those capacities, the determination whether he in fact perceived and does recollect is left to the trier of fact. [Citation.] (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann.Evid. Code, supra, foil. ง 701 at p. 284, italics added; see Blagg, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1039, 89 Cal. Rptr. 446.) Here, there is no serious claim that Baros was disqualified under Evidence Code section 701 because she could not communicate her memories coherently or understand she must recount them truthfully. Nor is there significant evidence she lacked those abilities. Rather, defendant contends that Baros's testimony about specific events, the alleged 1978 robbery and murder of Mackey, must be excluded because Baros lacked the capacity to perceive and recollect them accurately. This incapacity, defendant asserts, is demonstrated by Baros's delusions, including her insistence that her imaginary son Anthony was actually present during the 1978 episode. As noted above, a witness must be allowed to testify unless he or she (1) cannot communicate intelligibly, (2) cannot understand the duty of truthful testimony, or (3) lacks personal knowledge of the events to be recounted. But while the first two questions are determined entirely by the court, its role with respect to the issue of personal knowledge is more limited. A witness challenged for lack of personal knowledge must nonetheless be allowed to testify if there is evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that the witness accurately perceived and recollected the testimonial events. Once that threshold is passed, it is for the jury to decide whether the witness's perceptions and recollections are credible. (See People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 525-526, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035 ( Dennis. )) Here the trial court noted the many indicia by which a rational trier of fact could conclude that Baros, despite her specific delusions, was actually present during the Mackey robbery and murder, and had accurately perceived and recollected those events. Aside from her insistence that her son Anthony was present, Baros presented a plausible account of the circumstances of Mackey's murder. (Cf. People v. Lyons (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 837, 842-844, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 112 [alleged rape victim's belief that defendant had penetrated a third orifice located between her vagina and her anus, and had murdered her two husbands, one by blowing up his airplane, demonstrated incompetent lack of ability to distinguish truth from fantasy].) Baros's description included many details, unlikely to be known by a person not present, that were corroborated by independent evidence. Moreover, as the trial court emphasized, Baros was able, after a long absence from Las Vegas, to direct authorities to the significant locations involved in the crime. Under these circumstances, the trial court correctly allowed Baros to testify, and to permit the jury to determine from all the relevant evidence whether her perceptions and memories were true. In her jury testimony, Baros described Anthony's presence during the Mackey murder, the traffic accident in which Anthony was killed, and the birth and death of the triplets. Extensive evidence that Anthony, the accident, and the triplets were imaginary was presented to the jury. The jury also heard Baros's disclosures that she relived events through dreams and believed defendant had telepathic powers. It therefore had ample basis upon which to judge the reliability of Baros's observations. No error occurred.
Defendant next contends that in view of Baros's delusional state, the trial court erred prejudicially by failing to require, sua sponte, that Baros undergo a psychiatric examination to assist the court's own evaluation of her testimonial competence. Defendant cites no authority, and we know of none, that imposes such a duty in the absence of request. As defendant notes, earlier cases indicated a trial court should grant a defense motion for a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a sex-crime case where psychiatric evidence appeared necessary to assist the trier of fact in assessing the witness's credibility. (E.g., People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187, 193, 70 Cal.Rptr. 210, 443 P.2d 794; Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 171-177, 49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838 ( Ballard ) [noting, however, the general rule against impeachment by psychiatric evidence]; People v. Duncan (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 418, 426-427, 171 Cal.Rptr. 406 [finding no abuse of discretion in denial of defense motion].) But the Legislature overruled this line of authority in 1980 by adopting Penal Code section 1112, which forbids courts from ordering psychiatric examinations of victims or complaining witnesses in sex-crime cases in order to assess their credibility. [10] We have recently reiterated that [t]he use of psychiatric testimony to impeach a witness is generally disfavored. ( People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 835, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280; see also Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th 225, 263, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 781, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192 ( Alcala ).) Defendant insists these principles do not preclude court-ordered psychiatric examinations to evaluate testimonial competency, a preliminary issue not determined by the trier of fact. (See, e.g., People v. Reber (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 534, 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 ( Reber ), disapproved on other grounds by People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1123, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986 ( Hammon ); People v. Armbruster (1985) 163 Cal. App.3d 660, 663 & fn. 1, 210 Cal.Rptr. 11.) But we see no convincing reason why a trial court must, on its own motion, order and consider the psychiatric evaluation of a potential witness whose testimonial competence is challenged on grounds of mental or emotional impairment. We recently intimated that trial courts have broad discretion to refuse requested examinations for this purpose ( Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th 225, 264-265, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3), and such a rule is well justified. At the outset, serious privacy interests, as well as the policy of encouraging witnesses to come forward and testify voluntarily, would be undermined if courts were compelled to order psychiatric evaluations of potential witnesses as a condition of their testimony. Moreover, Ballard itself noted the many dangers of using psychiatric evidence to impeach credibility; the psychiatrist's testimony may not be relevant; the techniques used and theories advanced may not be generally accepted; the psychiatrist may not be in any better position to evaluate credibility than the juror; difficulties may arise in communication between the psychiatrist and the jury; too much reliance may be placed upon the testimony of the psychiatrist; partisan psychiatrists may cloud rather than clarify issues; the testimony may be distracting, time-consuming and costly. ( Ballard, supra, 64 Cal.2d 159, 175, fn. 10, 49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838, citation omitted; see also Alcala, supra, 4 Cal.4th 742, 781, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192.) Many, if not all, of these concerns are also pertinent to a court determination of competence. (See Alcala, supra, at pp. 780-782, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192 [unavailability of witness on grounds of amnesia].) Finally, as noted above, the grounds upon which a trial court may disqualify a witness as incompetent, or exclude the witness's testimony for lack of personal knowledge, are exceptionally narrow. The witness must be allowed to testify unless he or she cannot communicate intelligibly or understand the duty to tell the truth, or unless no rational jury could believe the witness actually saw the events he or she claims to have seen. In many cases, psychiatric testimony, itself inherently [subject to] expert debate ( People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1247, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159), would be less useful on these issues than the court's own evaluation of the witness's demeanor and responses in light of all the evidence. (See, e.g., Alcala, supra, 4 Cal.4th 742, 781, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192.) Here, the extensive record of the competence hearing manifestly discloses that Baros was a coherent communicator, and her understanding of the specific duty to give truthful testimony was also not in serious dispute or doubt. Thus, there seems little basis on which a psychiatric evaluation could have affected a ruling on her qualifications as a competent court witness. (See Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th 225, 265, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3.) On the issue whether Baros's specific testimony would reflect her personal knowledge, the court was fully aware of Baros's delusions about Anthony and the triplets, and the relationship of these fantasies to the events about which she would testify. The court also knew Baros had undergone therapy and taken medications for emotional problems. Yet the court believed, with substantial reason, that Baros's account of the Mackey murder, corroborated in numerous details by independent evidence, could persuade a rational jury she must actually have perceived that event. Again, this was not a matter on which psychiatric evidence would be of particular help. The court committed no error by failing, sua sponte, to order a psychiatric evaluation of Baros's qualifications to testify. [11]
Defendant urges alternatively that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to request a psychiatric evaluation of Baros. However, given the considerations weighing against widespread use of court-ordered psychiatric examinations to determine testimonial qualifications (see text discussion, ante ), we cannot say on this record there was no reasonable basis for counsel's failure to request one. In any event, defendant fails to show prejudice from the omission. In the first place, the appellate record does not indicate whether a new psychiatric examination would have supported defendant's claim that Baros should not be allowed to testify about the murder of Mackey. (See, e.g., People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 773-774, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2 [appellate claim of ineffective assistance cannot be based on speculation about available evidence].) Moreover, for reasons already stated, it appears highly unlikely any psychiatric testimony would have altered the trial court's ruling on the narrow issues before it. As noted above, the court knew of Baros's delusions and emotional problems, but Baros communicated clearly and gave a plausible account of the murder, many details of which were corroborated by independent evidence. On that basis, the court deemed itself compelled to allow the jury to judge her credibility. The claim of ineffective assistance must therefore be rejected.
Defendant contends error occurred when, during the defense crossexamination of Baros before the jury, the court sustained the prosecutor's relevancy objection to counsel's question whether Baros had ever been in therapy. (See fn. 9, ante. ) By cutting off this line of inquiry, defendant insists, the court deprived the jury of crucial information about her mental condition as it bore on her credibility. According to defendant, this evidence included the information, disclosed by Baros in the competence hearing, that the authorities had recently taken away her children on suspicion of sexual abuse; that these events resulted in emotional problems, psychiatric therapy, and a diagnosis of mental anguish; and that she was taking medications for her emotional condition. Defendant asserts the court's ruling violated the requirement that all relevant evidence be admitted (Cal. Const., art. I, ง 28, subd. (d)) as well as his rights to due process, a fair trial, confrontation of witnesses, and a reliable penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant also claims his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue the matter after the initial objection was sustained. The contention lacks merit. Defendant fails to demonstrate the relevance of the excluded information to Baros's credibility about the Mackey murder. It is a fact of modern life that many people experience emotional problems, undergo therapy, and take medications for their conditions. A person's credibility is not in question merely because he or she is receiving treatment for a mental health problem. ( People v. Pack (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 679, 686, 248 Cal.Rptr. 240.) Even if examination of a witness about treatment for mental illness might sometimes be relevant, here evidence that Baros had received therapy would have added little to the specific evidence, largely undisputed, that she had significant fantasies. Defense counsel was allowed to cross-examine Baros fully about the specific delusions that might impair the accuracy of her testimony. Nothing more was necessary. Hence, the trial court acted properly in sustaining a relevancy objection when defense counsel asked Baros whether she had ever been in therapy. For similar reasons, counsel was not ineffective for dropping the matter after the initial objection was sustained.
On the morning of December 18, 1990, just before Deborah Baros (Deborah) was to testify concerning her qualifications as a witness to the Mackey murder, defense counsel suggested that Bruce Baros (Bruce), Deborah's current husband, should be excluded from the courtroom as a potential witness. Counsel explained that Bruce had been present when Deborah was interviewed by two defense investigators the previous year, and that, if given the opportunity, the defense may well call Bruce to impeach Deborah on details of the interview. Counsel disclosed that the idea of calling Bruce had arisen only because Bruce had come to the trial with Deborah from their New Hampshire home, and counsel conceded he could use the interviewing investigators themselves for impeachment. Over counsel's indignant disagreement, the prosecutor objected that counsel was claiming Bruce as a potential witness only to deny Deborah the supportive presence of Bruce during her testimony. Concerned about the marital privilege, and about the potential loss of courtroom support for Deborah, the court appointed counsel to confer with Bruce. The court then asked Bruce on voir dire whether he would invoke a spousal privilege if called to testify. Bruce replied that, based on his counsel's advice, he would do so, because he did not want to testify against his wife. After further argument, the trial court ruled in limine that if Bruce was called solely to impeach Deborah, and if Bruce invoked a marital privilege, the court would uphold the privilege under Evidence Code section 970. The court explained that this statute gives a witness the privilege not to testify against a spouse, that the policy is to avoid marital discord, that the privilege may be overcome by fair-trial concerns, but that the balance favors the privilege where the witness is called only to impeach the spouse, and other witnesses (here, the defense investigators) are available for that purpose. Accordingly, the court determined, Bruce would not be excluded from the courtroom as a potential witness. However, the court agreed that if the defense later decided to call Bruce, the court should be notified out of the jury's presence, whereupon, if Bruce claimed the privilege, counsel could preserve the record by obtaining a ruling and entering a formal objection at that time. The defense did not thereafter attempt to call Bruce. Defendant now argues the trial court's evidentiary ruling was error, because Evidence Code section 970 only gives a witness the privilege not to testify against his spouse in any proceeding. (Italics added.) Defendant urges that one does not testify against a spouse when called only to impeach the spouse in a proceeding where the spouse is not a party. If Evidence Code section 970 does apply in this situation, defendant insists, it violates his constitutional rights to due process of law, fair trial, confrontation and cross-examination and equal protection. However, we need not address the merits of these arguments, because defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal. In general, a judgment may not be reversed for the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless the substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other means. (Evid.Code, ง 354, subd. (a); see, e.g., People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 235, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 778, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297 ( Livaditis ); People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 648, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849 ( Whitt ); see also Staten, supra, 24 Cal.4th 434, 456, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968.) This rule is necessary because, among other things, the reviewing court must know the substance of the excluded evidence in order to assess prejudice. (See Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d 620, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849; cf. People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 383-385, 228 Cal.Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173 [defendant may not challenge ruling that prior crime will be admitted for impeachment unless he takes the stand and suffers the impeachment].) Here, counsel explained why Bruce might be called, i.e., to impeach Deborah concerning her interview with defense investigators, but counsel did not offer to show what material impeachment Bruce might provide. Counsel then dropped the matter and never actually called Bruce to the stand. This was insufficient. Even if an offer of proof was impractical in advance of Deborah's testimony, it could have been made after Deborah had testified. Nor would it have been futile for defendant to call Bruce and make an offer of proof. (Evid.Code, ง 354, subd. (b).) In its in limine ruling, the trial court acknowledged that fair-trial concerns might outweigh the privilege, and the court expressly agreed to a mechanism by which defendant could later call the witness, have the privilege invoked, and obtain a ruling. Under these circumstances, defendant failed to make a record that permits a finding he was prejudiced by the loss of Bruce's testimony. Indeed, such prejudice appears unlikely, because Francis Leaman and Charles Small, the defense investigators who interviewed Deborah in Bruce's presence, both testified about the interview at the hearing concerning Deborah's competence, and Leaman gave testimony on that subject before the jury. Defendant demonstrates no basis for reversal.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing both parties' request that the jury be instructed under CALJIC No. 2.01, discussing the treatment of circumstantial evidence. This standard instruction provides, among other things, that a finding of guilt as to any crime cannot be based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances both (1) are consistent with the defendant's guilt, and (2) cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion. ( Ibid. ) The instruction further states that if the circumstantial evidence permits two reasonable interpretations, one suggesting the defendant's innocence and the other his guilt, the jury must adopt the interpretation suggesting innocence. [12] Defendant insists the error affected the jury's consideration of the Mackey murder evidence, in violation of his rights to due process, equal protection, fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Of course, evidence of the Mackey murder was not introduced to prove defendant's guilt of a charged crime, but to demonstrate, as a circumstance in aggravation of the capital murders, that he had engaged in other violent criminal conduct. (ง 190.3, factor (b).) We may assume that similar restrictions on the use of circumstantial evidence apply in such a case. However, we have consistently held that CALJIC No. 2.01 is not necessary unless the prosecution substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to prove its case. (E.g., People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 577, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 822 P.2d 418; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 406, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221 ( Wright ); People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 174, 133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881; People v. Yrigoyen (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49, 286 P.2d 1.) Indeed, where circumstantial inference is not the primary means by which the prosecution seeks to establish that the defendant engaged in criminal conduct, the instruction may confuse and mislead, and thus should not be given. ( Wright, supra ; Wiley, supra; People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 629, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865.) Here, as the trial court noted, the People relied primarily upon direct evidence, i.e., the eyewitness testimony of Deborah Baros, to prove that defendant committed the Mackey murder. Defendant suggests that aside from Baros's testimony, all the Mackey evidence against [defendant] is circumstantial. But by introducing circumstantial evidence merely to corroborate an eyewitness, the prosecution did not substantially rely on such evidence. The court's refusal to give CALJIC No. 2.01 was correct.
The jury received a number of instructions about witness credibility, including CALJIC Nos. 2.13 (witness's prior consistent or inconsistent statement may be considered for both credibility and truth) and 2.21.2 (witness willfully false on material point should be distrusted on others) and a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.20. This latter instruction advised that when evaluating a witness's believability, the jury could consider anything with a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the witness's testimony, specifically including the witness's ability to perceive, remember, or communicate any testimonial event; the character and quality of the witness's testimony; the witness's demeanor; whether the witness had any bias, interest, or motive to lie; and any admission of untruthfulness by the witness. However, with the agreement of both counsel, the trial court omitted from CALJIC No. 2.20 any reference to [t]he character of the witness for honesty or truthfulness or their opposites. Neither party requested, and the court did not give, CALJIC No. 2.24, which provides that [e]vidence of the character of a witness for honesty or truthfulness may be considered in determining [his][her] believability. Defendant insists the trial court erred by failing to give CALJIC No. 2.24 sua sponte. This instruction was necessary, he urges, because of Deborah's mental instability, as well as her admission that she had given inaccurate details about the Mackey episode when first approached by investigators. Defendant also points to indications that Fred, the eyewitness to the capital crimes, had speech and hearing impediments and low intelligence, exhibited confusion and lack of comprehension on the witness stand, and harbored an obvious motive to protect himself and his sister Sheila. Defendant claims violations of his rights to due process, equal protection, fair trial, and sentence reliability under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. No error occurred because, as both counsel agreed in the trial court, no evidence was presented that either Deborah or Fred lacked the character traits of honesty or truthfulness. (Evid.Code, ง 780, subd. (e); see People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 213, fn. 15, 279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949.) Other issues related to the credibility of the testimony offered by Deborah and Fred were amply covered by instructions the court did give. As noted, these instructions pointed out that jurors could consider witnesses' demeanor; the plausibility of their testimony; their apparent ability to perceive and recollect; their inconsistencies and falsehoods; their bias, interest, or motive to lie; and any other matters with reasonable bearing on the believability of their testimony. Defendant's contention lacks merit.
Finally, because there was no error in allowing Deborah to testify as a competent witness, we must reject defendant's contention that the evidence he murdered Mackey was insufficient to permit the jury to consider this unadjudicated crime as an aggravating penalty factor. ( Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, fn. 25, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423.) Testifying as an eyewitness, Deborah identified defendant as Mackey's killer. She provided details about the murder that were corroborated by independent evidence, and she was able to direct authorities to the crime scene. There was clearly sufficient evidence to permit jury consideration of this unadjudicated offense.