Opinion ID: 2318562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Money Had and Received/Statutory Violation

Text: Huntington avers that the relevant statutory scheme installed by the General Assembly bestowed the MIA with primary jurisdiction over Carter's money had and received/statutory violation claim. In Zappone v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., 349 Md. 45, 706 A.2d 1060 (1998), we held that, where the Legislature provides [(1)] an administrative and judicial review remedy ... and [(2)] a possible alternative judicial remedy for a particular matter or matters, we must determine whether it intended the agency to have exclusive, primary, or concurrent jurisdiction. Zappone, 349 Md. at 60, 706 A.2d at 1067. [T]he administrative remedy may be exclusive, thus precluding any resort to an alternative remedy. Under this scenario, there simply is no alternative cause of action for matters covered by the statutory administrative remedy.    [T]he administrative remedy may be primary but not exclusive. In this situation, a claimant must invoke and exhaust the administrative remedy, and seek judicial review of an adverse administrative decision, before a court can properly adjudicate the merits of the alternative judicial remedy.    [T]he administrative remedy and the alternative judicial remedy may be fully concurrent, with neither remedy being primary, and the plaintiff at his or her option may pursue the judicial remedy without the necessity of invoking and exhausting the administrative remedy. Zappone, 349 Md. at 60-61, 706 A.2d at 1067-68 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). [I]n the absence of specific statutory language indicating otherwise, there is a rebuttable presumption that... an administrative remedy was intended to be primary. Bell Atlantic of Md., Inc. v. Intercom Sys. Corp., 366 Md. 1, 12, 782 A.2d 791, 797 (2001). In deciding whether this presumption prevails in a particular context, we weigh at least four germane factors, including: the comprehensiveness of the administrative remedy, the agency's view of its own jurisdiction, the claim's depeden[ce] upon the statutory scheme which also contains the administrative remedy, and the claim's dependen[ce] upon the agency's expertise. Zappone, 349 Md. at 64-66, 706 A.2d at 1070. Huntington asserts that [a]ll of the[se]... factors are met in this case. The Insurance Article prescribes a comprehensive administrative remedy, or so Huntington concludes §§ 4-113(b), (d)(1), and (d)(2) authoriz[e] the suspension of the certificate of authority, [the] imposi[tion of] penalties and [the] requir[ement of] restitution to any person who has suffered financial injury as a result of any violation[]. Moreover, the MIA views its jurisdiction as concurrent only where the plaintiff has a common law claim purely, which is not the case here. Huntington argues also that Carter's cause of action is wholly dependent on ... the Maryland Insurance [Article], a fact made explicit by Carter's repeated invocations of the Article in his complaint. But for the insurance statute, Huntington asseverates, Carter's claim would not exist. Lastly, Huntington declares that the proper analysis of the merits of Carter's cause of action would benefit from the application of the MIA's expertise. Huntington posits that such expertise is important in deciding whether there was a statutory violation[,] whether Carter is correctly interpreting the rate structure that was filed with the MIA[,] whether there was any [willful] intent to commit a statutory violation, as per § 27-216, and what should be the proper remedy if there was a statutory violation. At oral argument, we questioned whether the agency's expertise was an important factor in parsing Carter's claim because the Stewart Manual of Charges outlines straightforwardly, or so it seems, the criteria that dictate (1) whether a consumer qualifies for the reissue rate, and (2) consequently, whether Huntington violated the statute by charging the higher original rate. Huntington cautioned us at oral argument as follows: [Huntington]: There are numerous factors, starting with the language itself in the statute, that expertise [must] be applied to, [that] determine whether someone gets the discount rate. It is not automatic. It is not just a situation where if you had an original title insurance policy and you refinance in ten years, [you] automatically get the discount rate.... [The Court]: Can you show us the filing [with the Insurance Commissioner] where it makes it clear that it's not automatic.... [Huntington]: Well, the language of the statute ... talks about willfullness number one. That goes to intent.... [The Court]: Well, we're really not concerned with willfullness in a money had and received claim. [Huntington]: Well, let me continue.... There [are] multiple situations ... where one would not get the discount rate depending on intervening events. [The Court]: What I'm asking you is while you're arguing, it's nice if we could have before us what your basis is for saying that it's not cut and dry because it sure seems cut and dry.... [Huntington]: Well.... The good news is we won on a motion to dismiss. The bad news is there was no discovery, no record in this case that I could invite your Honor's attention to that has that data in it. For example, if someone where deposed in the case, they would say ... that if a husband and wife get married and they have a title insurance policy and they get divorced later on within five years and a new wife gets on the policy, that does not mean you get the automatic rate because the risk has changed.    [The Court]: But all that stuff is set up when you file your rates, is it not? [Huntington]: No. There is a Manual [of Charges], part of which is in the record, which talks about the various factors about whether you qualify. If one starts with the statute, it says if you qualify for this reduced rate, then you get it. The word qualification is a matter that is within the ken of the Maryland Insurance Administration because whether you qualify or not depends on whether there was a change in title during the ten years.    [Huntington]: [Y]ou have to have people that are identical owners, policy number one, and then ten years later, the same persons. In support of all of its contentions, Huntington relies heavily upon the reasoning of the federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals's opinion in Arthur v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. of Florida, 569 F.3d 154 (4th Cir.2009). Considering nearly identical alleged facts and legal issues as those in the present case, the Arthur Court determined that a consumer's money had and received/statutory violation claim: (1) could access the same remed[ies] before the [Maryland Insurance] Commissioner that they seek [in federal court], (2) explicitly depends on the statute that also [contains] administrative remedies, and (3) implicates the expertise of the Maryland Insurance Commissioner.... Arthur, 569 F.3d at 161-62. Huntington concludes, therefore, that Carter is obliged to engage first the agency adjudicatory apparatus.
Carter takes umbrage with Arthur's misapplication of Maryland law, as well as its deleterious effect on thousands of Maryland consumers harmed by title insurance overcharges. In his estimation, the exclusive/primary/concurrent jurisdiction paradigm is inapplicable because the Legislature gave the MIA no jurisdiction whatsoever over a claim such as his, however characterized. Carter argues that the Insurance Article authorizes the Commissioner, but not an aggrieved consumer, to file such a complaint against a title insurer. See Brief of Appellant at 22 (stating that Huntington presum[es], but never explain[s] how a person who believes an insurer has charged an excessive title insurance premium can file a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner); see Brief of Appellant at 22 n. 7 (stating that the Commissioner may hold a hearing only where the complainant has been aggrieved by an action of the Commissioner, not where, like here, the complainant has been aggrieved by an action of [a title insurer]). Arguing presumably in the alternative, Carter suggests that even if the Legislature granted the MIA administrative jurisdiction, it specified clearly in the statute that such jurisdiction is concurrent. To support his contention, Carter points to § 27-103(e) [8] and our interpretations of that section. Brief of Appellant at 14 (The [Insurance Article] is quite specific in granting consumers, like Mr. Carter, the right to judicially pursue the recovery of excessive premium charges.); See Brief of Appellant at 13 (quoting Mardirossian v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 376 Md. 640, 645, 831 A.2d 60, 64 (2003), for the proposition that the administrative remedy under §§ 27-103 through 27-105 is neither exclusive nor primary). Thus, Carter considers an analysis of the Zappone factors unnecessary. See Zappone, 349 Md. at 62, 706 A.2d at 1068 ([S]ometimes the Legislature will set forth its intent as to whether an administrative remedy is to be exclusive, or primary, or simply a fully concurrent option....). Then, presupposing that the Legislature was less than clear in the statute with regard to its jurisdictional assignment, Carter concludes that analysis of the Zappone factors bends in his favor and the presumption of primary jurisdiction is rebutted. Carter posits that, generally, the MIA is capable of providing only limited, as opposed to comprehensive, relief. [9] In this particular case, the remedies available to the MIA are especially meagerCarter is not alleging some isolated instance of a mere overpayment, but a practice of intentional and widespread deception ... for which [a] mere[ ] ... refund ... is clearly not an adequate remedy for the consumer harms alleged. (Emphasis added.) Carter emphasizes also that the MIA, on at least one other occasion, viewed its jurisdiction as concurrent in analogous circumstances. In its amicus brief filed in Zappone, the MIA argued that [w]here the conduct of a licensee is both prohibited by the Insurance [Article] and ... [the] common law ..., the Insurance Commissioner and the courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear the claim. Brief for Maryland Insurance Administration, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Zappone v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 349 Md. 45, 706 A.2d 1060 (1998) (No. 133), at 10. Carter presupposes, without more, that the factual differences between Zappone and this case present no obstacle to the continuing persuasiveness of the MIA's amicus brief. [10] Carters avers additionally that his causes of action stand separate and apart from the Insurance Article, even [though his] claim seeks to recover money paid in violation of a statute. Brief of Appellant at 17 (quoting Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370 Md. 604, 632 n. 11 805 A.2d 1061, 1077 n. 11 (2002) for the proposition that an action to recover excess interest, even when the applicable legal interest rate is set by statute, is a common law action). Lastly, Carter argues that [t]he enforcement of established rates requires no expertise of the Commissioner. The rate is the rate. It has already been reviewed and approved by the Commissioner. Mr. Carter has no grievance with the Commissioner or with the rate itself, a fact which constitutes a necessary predicate to even request [an administrative] ... hearing. But most assuredly, there is no expertise required of the Commissioner to confirm that Mr. Carter was charged a premium in excess of the approved rate any more than there would be for the Motor Vehicle Administration to confirm that a motorist exceeded the posted speed limit. B. The Negligent Misrepresentation Claim For reasons to be explained infra, we need not dwell on the parties' arguments concerning the negligent misrepresentation claim. Suffice it to say that Huntington insists Carter failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because he did not plead the knowing falsity of the relevant statements on the HUD-1 form. In Carter's eyes, it was enough that Huntington knew or should have known that he qualified for the reduced rate, but charged the higher rate nevertheless.