Opinion ID: 1996136
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Decision to Impound

Text: As we have said, the threshold question in inventory cases is whether the impoundment itself was proper. Accord People v. Braasch, 122 Ill. App.3d 747, 78 Ill.Dec. 67, 461 N.E.2d 651 (1984); see also United States v. Young, 825 F.2d 60, 61 (5th Cir.1987) (finding inventory was reasonable presupposes that the police had the right to impound the vehicle), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 1483, 99 L.Ed.2d 711 (1988). Furthermore, where the circumstances show that the police had no authority to impound the vehicle, or that police custodial care of the vehicle was not necessary, the inventory search was unlawful. Annotation, Inventory Search of Impounded Vehicles, 48 A.L.R.3d 537, 544 (1973) quoted in State v. Jewell, 338 So.2d 633, 638 (La. 1976). Fair asks us to hold that police can properly impound a car only if their authority to do so is invoked by violation of a motor vehicle or forfeiture statute. In support of his argument, he observes that Indiana has numerous statutes authorizing the impoundment of motor vehicles. [2] While impoundment pursuant to such statutes is clearly proper, we agree with the Court of Appeals that statutory authority does not present the sole justification which courts will recognize, Fair, 615 N.E.2d at 491, inasmuch as impoundment is sometimes warranted by exigencies not cataloged in state statutes. The police are expected not only to enforce the criminal laws but also to aid those in distress, abate hazards, prevent potential hazards from materializing, and perform an infinite variety of other tasks calculated to enhance and maintain the safety of communities. The Supreme Court has recognized this multifaceted nature of policing and, in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) labeled it the community caretaking function[]. This rubric is a catchall for the wide range of responsibilities that police officers must discharge aside from their criminal enforcement activities. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 785. Discharging these duties often involves handling automobiles, which constitute one of the most pervasive and regulated fixtures of modern life. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. at 2528. Thus, in Opperman the Court observed that [i]n the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called `community caretaking functions,' ... automobiles are frequently taken into police custody. 428 U.S. at 368, 96 S.Ct. at 3097 (citation omitted). In the Cady case the Court found the towing from a rural stretch of road of a rental car disabled in an accident was consonant with the community caretaking function. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist defended the impoundment noting that there is no suggestion in the record that the officers' action in exercising control over [the car] by having it towed away was unwarranted either in terms of state law or sound police procedure.  413 U.S. at 447, 93 S.Ct. at 2531 (emphasis supplied). In Opperman, the vehicle at issue was impounded for multiple parking violations. As in Cady, the Court felt no need to cite any specific statute authorizing such a towing. Instead, it enumerated several scenarios illustrative of community caretaking, including the presence of disabled or damaged vehicles or vehicles which violate parking ordinances, and concluded that [t]he authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge. 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S.Ct. at 3097. From this we conclude that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the police may discharge their caretaking function whenever circumstances compel it. Accord United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1408 (10th Cir.1992) ( Opperman permits impoundment of cars which threaten public safety even where no statutory authorization exists); Riley v. State, 583 So.2d 1353, 1355 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (the police have an inherent authority to impound vehicles, aside from statutory authority based on what is called the community caretaking function.) (quoting Morton v. State, 452 So.2d 1361, 1365 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)); cf. State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987) ([T]he existence or absence of justification for the impoundment of an automobile may be determined from the surrounding circumstances.). An impoundment, then, will not be invalidated solely because it was not specifically authorized by statute so long as the State can demonstrate it was warranted in terms of the community caretaking function. When confronted with this question, many courts have seized on the Supreme Court's statement in Colorado v. Bertine that an officer's discretion to impound must be exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity. 479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 743, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987). This focus on standard criteria has a parallel in the more common scope-of-inventory challenges where reasonableness is usually determined by whether there was compliance with standard police procedures. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 372, 96 S.Ct. at 3098-99. Because compliance tends to indicate that the inventorying was limited to that necessary to carry out the caretaking function, where compliance exists searches are usually upheld. Cf. id. at 374-75, 96 S.Ct. at 3099-3100. By analogy, some courts have held that the reasonableness of an officer's conclusion that a vehicle posed a threat to the community hinges on whether that conclusion was reached in accordance with standard police department regulations. See, e.g., People v. Toohey, 438 Mich. 265, 475 N.W.2d 16, 23, 25 (1991). We note that the standard criteria passage quoted from Bertine, however, relates to police discretion in choosing between impounding a vehicle, parking and locking it in a public parking place, or allowing a third party to take custody. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375, 107 S.Ct. at 743, and 479 U.S. at 379-380, 107 S.Ct. at 745 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It does not address an officer's initial decision as to whether the vehicle needed to be dealt with at all. It is altogether reasonable to expect the mechanics of the several methods available for dealing with vehicles which constitute hazards to be set out in departmental regulations or routine. On the other hand, the myriad circumstances under which a vehicle is reasonably viewed as posing a hazard could not possibly be cataloged in advance or meaningfully summarized. See Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 787 (The police cannot sensibly be expected to have developed, in advance, standard protocols running the entire gamut of possible eventualities.). Notwithstanding this need for flexibility, it must also be said that when the impoundment is not specifically directed by state law, the risk increases that a decision to tow will be motivated solely by the desire to conduct an investigatory search. See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.5(e), at 142 (2d ed. 1987) ([T]he police might impound a car which they otherwise would not impound ... for the purpose of gaining an opportunity to look for evidence.). This potential is problematic given that the community caretaking function is totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. at 2528. Accordingly, a sound approach to evaluating police decisions to impound should both accommodate the multiformity of hazards with which they must deal and succeed in ferreting out those impoundments which are a mere pretext for other, improper objectives. In light of these considerations, we hold that to prevail on the question of whether an impoundment was warranted in terms of the community caretaking function, the prosecution must demonstrate: (1) that the belief that the vehicle posed some threat or harm to the community or was itself imperiled was consistent with objective standards of sound policing, Cady, 413 U.S. at 447, 93 S.Ct. at 2531; cf. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375, 96 S.Ct. at 3100, and (2) that the decision to combat that threat by impoundment was in keeping with established departmental routine or regulation. In administering this standard, courts should be mindful that the Fourth Amendment does not necessarily require police to utilize the least intrusive means to secure and protect an automobile. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373-374, 107 S.Ct. at 742; see also State v. Wells, 539 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1989), aff'd, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). The question, then, is not whether there was an absolute need to dispose of the vehicle but whether the decision to do so was reasonable in light of the applicable standard. See United States v. Brown, 787 F.2d 929 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 837, 107 S.Ct. 137, 93 L.Ed.2d 80 (1986); cf. State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 813 P.2d 888 (1991); Toohey, 475 N.W.2d at 23 (courts need not second-guess a police officer's exercise of professional judgment regarding impoundment of an automobile). In this case, the State has made no effort to demonstrate that any Indiana statute authorized Officer Wager's impoundment of Fair's vehicle. A much closer question is whether reasons of public safety dictated that the car be towed. With the advent of the inventory search, courts have had numerous opportunities to pass on which potential threats satisfy this requirement. The needs of the community have been held to be implicated where the arrest of the driver left his car unattended on a public highway, Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 785; United States v. Velarde, 903 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 830, 105 S.Ct. 117, 83 L.Ed.2d 60 (1984); where the ownership of the vehicle cannot be established, Young, 825 F.2d at 60; Madison v. United States, 512 A.2d 279 (D.C. 1986); and where the vehicle was on private property and the owner of the property requested removal, Fitzgerald v. State, 201 Ga. App. 361, 411 S.E.2d 102 (1991). The instant impoundment is of a different sort. Before us we have an undamaged vehicle neatly parked in a relatively secure private parking facility. There had been no complaint from the owners of the property, and there was no unqualified driver in whose possession the car would be left if the officer did not act. The driver's lawful possession of the vehicle was not in doubt. Instead, it was Officer Wager's testimony that the vehicle required police attention because, if left where it was, it might be damaged. R. at 112. This case, then, is typical of a distinct class of inventory cases in which the sole justification for impoundment is that the defendant's vehicle, left unattended on private property as a result of a custodial arrest, will be exposed to theft or vandalism or might otherwise become a nuisance. See, e.g., Delgado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). These cases have spawned diverse holdings [3] which reflect the difficulty inherent in any judicial effort to determine when the threat posed by or to a vehicle is so insignificant than an overly cautious officer's decision to seize it is simply not reasonable. The Attorney General rightly points out that we do not here write on a clean slate. We had before us a similar case in Johnson v. State (1990), Ind., 553 N.E.2d 477, where defendant's car was impounded from the parking lot of an apartment complex at which he did not reside. The facts and holding of Johnson point the way to the correct resolution of this case. In particular, we think Johnson stands for the proposition that two primary factors should be considered in determining whether the conclusion that vehicles such as Fair's constitute a hazard is reasonable in light of objective standards of sound policing. The first is the degree to which the property upon which the vehicle is situated was under the control of the defendant. See Johnson, 553 N.E.2d at 479. Clearly, for example, there is a difference between a vehicle left in the driveway of a defendant's parent's home and one left in a small lot intended for unloading air cargo. See People v. Krezen, 427 Mich. 681, 397 N.W.2d 803 (1986). Second, the length of time the impounding officer perceived the car would be unattended is important. It helps assess the reasonableness of the officer's conclusion that the vehicle, if left alone, would be exposed to an unacceptable risk of theft or vandalism. [4] With these understandings in place, we now turn to the ruling here at issue. It is well established in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that a trial court's factual findings will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. Guglielmo, 834 F.2d 866 (10th Cir.1987). The ultimate determination of reasonableness, however, is not a factual finding but a constitutional legal question meriting independent consideration. Ibarra, 955 F.2d at 1409; cf. Light v. State (1989), Ind., 547 N.E.2d 1073. In undertaking this consideration, we examine the evidence favorable to the trial court's decision, with all disputes resolved in favor of the ruling, as well as any uncontested evidence favorable to the appellant. Lance v. State (1981), Ind., 425 N.E.2d 77; Whitt v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 211, 361 N.E.2d 913. In this sense, the standard of review differs from the typical sufficiency of the evidence case where only evidence favorable to the verdict is considered. Light, 547 N.E.2d at 1076. In the Johnson case no link was established between the situs of the vehicle and the defendant. Johnson, 553 N.E.2d at 478. At the time that impoundment was ordered, the arresting officer knew the defendant would likely be charged with multiple, serious felonies. Id. In the instant case, it is undisputed that Fair's car was parked at an apartment complex where he was a tenant's invited guest. His car was parked between the lines and did not impede traffic. At the suppression hearing, the apartment complex manager testified that the area in which Fair was parked was reserved for guests of tenants. Moreover, he indicated that he would not seek to have even a non-guest's car towed from that area unless it was causing a disturbance or blocking an entrance or something. [5] R. at 72. Thus, while Fair's car was not located at his own home, the permissibility of it remaining at the complex was in the hands of his acquaintances. When Officer Wager resolved to impound Fair's car he knew only that Fair would be charged with public intoxication. Indiana Code Ann. § 12-23-15-1 (West Supp. 1993) specifies that when an individual is arrested for public intoxication and is not unmanageable or causing damage, the officer may simply issue a citation and take the individual to a responsible person or relative willing to provide care. This authorization reveals the likelihood that Fair would have been released on his own recognizance or on nominal bond within a very brief time and would then have been able to reclaim his car. See Manalansan, 415 A.2d at 311; cf. United States v. Kornegay, 885 F.2d 713, 716 (10th Cir.1989) ([The agents had every reason to believe that [the defendant] would not be returning anytime soon to the ... lot.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935, 110 S.Ct. 2179, 109 L.Ed.2d 508 (1990); United States v. Young, 825 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.1987) (same). In short, there is little in this record to establish that Fair's vehicle constituted a potential hazard with which Wager reasonably felt the need to deal. In making this statement, we do not mean to be understood as saying that it would never be reasonable to tow an arrestee's neatly parked vehicle from private property in the absence of a complaint from the owner. Rather, it is the case that on facts such as these, the State's burden is not met solely by the introduction of an officer's generalized assertion that he has a duty to safeguard the vehicles of those with whom he comes into contact. [6] We would probably indulge the reasonableness of this impoundment but for the indicia of pretext which litter the record of this inventorying and the absence of evidence about any departmental procedures against which we might evaluate their significance.