Opinion ID: 2645047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prong Two: Purposeful Availment

Text: In intentional tort cases, there are two applicable tests for determining whether purposeful availment occurred. First, we may apply the “effects test,” which the Supreme Court articulated in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984) (involving libel claims). Under the “effects test,” a nonresident defendant’s single tortious act can establish purposeful availment, without regard to whether the defendant had any other contacts with the forum state. See Lovelady, 544 F.3d at 1285. This occurs when the tort: “(1) [was] intentional; (2) [was] aimed at the forum state; and (3) caused harm that the defendant should have anticipated would be suffered in the forum state.” Id. at 1285–86, 1287–88. In Lovelady, this Court concluded the defendant’s use of the Florida plaintiff’s 33 Case: 12-12501 Date Filed: 12/02/2013 Page: 34 of 39 trademarked name and picture on a website accessible in Florida “satisfied the Calder ‘effects test’ for personal jurisdiction—the commission of an intentional tort aimed at a specific individual in the forum whose effects were suffered in the forum.” Id. at 1288 (concluding due process was satisfied because the plaintiff was a Florida resident and the defendant directed his intentional actions towards the plaintiff in the forum state). We may also apply a traditional purposeful availment analysis. The same day that the Supreme Court issued its decision in Calder, it also issued an opinion in another intentional tort case (but not one brought by a resident of the forum state). See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984) (involving libel claims). In that intentional tort case, the Court applied the traditional minimum contacts test. Id. at 1478–79, 104 S. Ct. at 775–77. Circuit courts have applied the traditional minimum contacts test for purposeful availment analysis in lieu of, or in addition to, the “effects test” in cases involving trademarkrelated intentional torts. See, e.g., Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 172 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Because we have concluded that [the defendant] has purposefully availed himself of the New York forum, we need not decide whether [the defendant’s] act of shipping a counterfeit . . . bag represented conduct ‘expressly aimed at’ New York under the . . . effects test.”); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454–55 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2003) (analyzing personal 34 Case: 12-12501 Date Filed: 12/02/2013 Page: 35 of 39 jurisdiction under the traditional minimum contacts test and holding that, in the alternative, the alleged infringement did not satisfy the “effects test”). This Court has applied that test, too. See S.E.C. v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying the traditional minimum contacts test in a case involving intentional tort claims of securities fraud). The “effects test” provides an additional means, unavailable in contract cases, of determining the appropriateness of personal jurisdiction—one that is based on a plaintiff’s ties to the forum state and the harm suffered by the plaintiff. The “effects test,” however, does not supplant the traditional minimum contacts test for purposeful availment applicable in contract and tort cases alike. Because Louis Vuitton showed purposeful availment under that test, we need not analyze the “effects test” here. 11 Under the minimum contacts test for purposeful availment, we assess the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state and ask whether those contacts: (1) are related to the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) involve some act by which the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges of doing business within the forum; and (3) are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum. See Carrillo, 115 F.3d at 1542. In 11 Oldfield states in dicta in a footnote that the minimum contacts test applies in negligence cases and the “effects test” applies in intentional tort cases. See 558 F.3d at 1220 n.28. Oldfield, however, was a negligence case and did not state the “effects test” is the exclusive test for intentional tort cases. Rather, it stated the “effects test” applies only in intentional tort cases, a proposition with which we do not disagree. 35 Case: 12-12501 Date Filed: 12/02/2013 Page: 36 of 39 performing this analysis, we identify all contacts between a nonresident defendant and a forum state and ask whether, individually or collectively, those contacts satisfy these criteria. See King & Hatch, Inc. v. S. Pipe & Supply Co., 435 F.2d 43, 46 (5th Cir. 1970) (“Taken collectively, the contacts of [the nonresident defendant] with the State of Alabama far exceed those ‘minimum contacts’ which would allow Alabama to constitutionally compel [the defendant] to defend this suit in the forum state.”).12 Based upon the unrebutted allegations of the complaint, the investigators’ testimony, and the district court’s fact findings, we conclude that Mosseri purposefully availed himself of the Florida forum in such a way that he could reasonably foresee being haled into a Florida court. Mosseri purposefully solicited business from Florida residents through the use of at least one fully interactive, commercial website, “pendoza.com.” As a result of this Internet advertising, Mosseri received orders from multiple Florida residents to ship goods into Florida. At least one of those orders was from Holmes for a billfold and Mosseri shipped those goods, including the billfold, into Florida. These collective contacts establish that Mosseri purposefully availed himself of the privileges of doing business in south Florida. 12 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981. 36 Case: 12-12501 Date Filed: 12/02/2013 Page: 37 of 39 We are not saying that the mere operation of an interactive website alone gives rise to purposeful availment anywhere the website can be accessed. See Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 453–54; see also be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 558– 59 (7th Cir. 2011) (concluding that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant, operator of a dating website which made user accounts freely available, purposefully availed himself of doing business in Illinois); Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs, Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 400–01 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the Illinois defendant’s semi-interactive website alone did not create personal jurisdiction in Maryland because the overall content of the defendant’s website had a strongly local character emphasizing its “mission to assist Chicago-area women in pregnancy crises”). But we are saying purposeful availment for due process was shown here because, in addition to his fully interactive “pendoza.com” website accessible in Florida, Mosseri had other contacts with Florida—through selling and distributing infringing goods through his website to Florida consumers—and the cause of action here derives directly from those contacts. D. Prong Three: “Fair Play and Substantial Justice” The exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mosseri in Florida also comports with fair play and substantial justice. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320, 66 S. Ct. at 160. In this analysis, we consider these factors: (1) “the burden on the defendant”; 37 Case: 12-12501 Date Filed: 12/02/2013 Page: 38 of 39 (2) “the forum’s interest in adjudicating the dispute”; (3) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief”; and (4) “the judicial system’s interest in resolving the dispute.” Lovelady, 544 F.3d at 1288. Mosseri has not offered any evidence of his finances or any other limitations on him to show that he would be burdened by having to litigate the case in Florida. In light of Mosseri’s selling trademark infringing goods into Florida and Louis Vuitton’s having multiple stores in Florida, Florida had a strong interest in hearing the case and protecting consumers from confusion that results from trademark infringement. Moreover, Louis Vuitton, as a plaintiff with Florida stores, has an undeniable interest in litigating the case in its chosen forum. The judiciary has an interest in efficiently resolving the dispute in the forum where an extensive record was established and the case was long pending. It bears noting, too, that Louis Vuitton, while capable of litigating in New York or anywhere else, did not bring this lawsuit in Florida to draw Mosseri away from his home jurisdiction. When Louis Vuitton filed the lawsuit, it did not know who was behind the websites or where the person was. Requiring two lawsuits when one would do makes little sense. Mosseri can constitutionally be sued in Florida; that he could also be sued in New York is quite beside the point.