Opinion ID: 2041799
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Binding effect of court-approved agreement.

Text: The defendants, James Scout Veitch, claims that he is not bound to the agreement, now that he has reached majority, by the order of the Walworth county court which approved the agreement while he was a minor under the guardianship of his mother.  Sec. 296.15, Stats., which has remained unchanged since the date that the agreement was approved, provides: 296.15 Realty of wards, validity of the conveyance. Every deed, mortgage, lease or other conveyance made in good faith by the guardian of a minor . . . pursuant to any order or judgment of the county or circuit court or the presiding judge of either, made under the provisions of this chapter, shall be as valid and effectual as if made by such minor when of full age . . . . (Emphasis supplied.) The defendants acknowledge that previous decisions of this court have held that a guardian acting pursuant to court order can bind his ward to a conveyance of the ward's real property even beyond the time when the ward will reach majority. See, e.g., Haas v. Welch (1932), 207 Wis. 84, 240 N. W. 789; Schafer by Guardian ad Litem v. Luke (1881), 51 Wis. 669, 8 N. W. 857; In re Haney (1861), 14 Wis. 452 (). Defendants contend, however, that an option agreement is not a conveyance and thus the statute and the cases are inapplicable. The defendant relies primarily on the view that an option conveys no title, legal or equitable, to the property, and thus that it does not pass an interest in land and is not a conveyance. See, e.g., 8A Thompson, supra, pp. 264, 265, sec. 4444. Former sec. 235.50, Stats. 1969, defined a conveyance as embracing every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in real estate is created, aliened, mortgaged or assigned or by which the title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity, . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Sec. 235.50 was repealed and replaced by sec. 706.01, which defines conveyance in terms of the transactions covered by ch. 706. The wording of secs. 235.50, Stats. 1969, and 706.01, is virtually identical. The view of an option agreement, as set forth in 8A Thompson, supra, pp. 265, 266, sec. 4444, and espoused by  the defendant, recognizes that an option confers the right to specific performance and thus gives rise to an inchoate interest that equity will protect. Thus, even under the defendants' view of the rights created, an option agreement is a conveyance within the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions as it creates an interest by which the title to real estate may be affected in equity. More importantly, this court has held that an option to purchase real estate is an interest in lands within the meaning of secs. 240.06 and 240.08, Stats. 1969, the former statute of frauds sections governing real estate conveyances. Bratt v. Peterson, supra, page 452. This view is supported in the statutory definition of grantor under sec. 706.01 (5), which provides in relevant part: `Grantor' means the person from whom an interest in lands passes by conveyance and includes, without limitation, . . . optionors, . . . (Emphasis supplied.) We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Clear View Estates, Inc., had not forfeited its rights under the contract by not purchasing four acres on or before June 12, 1970; that the option agreement was a conveyance within the meaning of sec. 296.15, Stats.; and that the order of the Walworth county court approving the option agreement bound the defendant, James Scout Veitch, to its terms after he reached the age of majority. The trial court appropriately entered judgment for specific performance. By the Court. Judgment affirmed.