Opinion ID: 787063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scenes a Faire Analysis

Text: 22 The district court erred in finding the first and fifth measures of One to be unprotectable by reason of the scenes a faire doctrine. 17 Scenes a faire analysis requires the court to examine whether motive 18 similarities that plaintiffs attribute to copying could actually be explained by the common-place presence of the same or similar motives within the relevant field. See Smith, 84 F.3d at 1219. Under the scenes a faire doctrine, when certain commonplace expressions are indispensable and naturally associated with the treatment of a given idea, those expressions are treated like ideas and therefore not protected by copyright. See Rice I, 330 F.3d at 1175. The district court held that the first and fifth measures of One were not protected by copyright because Dr. Walser admitted in his deposition that the pitch sequence of the first measure of One' s chorus was more similar to the pitch sequence in the first measure of the folk song For He's a Jolly Good Fellow ( Jolly Good ) than to the pitch sequence in the first measure of Thank God' s chorus. 19 23 The evidence does not support the district court's ruling that the first measure of One is a scene a faire as a matter of law. The songs One and Jolly Good are not in the same relevant field of music; One is in the hip-hop/R & B genre and Jolly Good is in the folk music genre. Thus, comparing the first measure of One' s chorus to the first measure of Jolly Good does not tell the court whether the first measure of One' s chorus is an indispensable idea within the field of hip-hop/R & B. Further, even if One and Jolly Good were in the same genre of music, a musical measure cannot be common-place by definition if it is shared by only two songs. 20 One and Jolly Good are also written in different time signatures; One is in 4/4 while Jolly Good is in 6/8. Their chord progressions also differ (B-flat to B-flat(sus4) to B-flat in One and G in Jolly Good ). This difference further undermines Carey's argument that the two measures are the same as a matter of law. 24 The district court also erred in finding the fifth measure of One to be a scene a faire as a matter of law. Carey introduced no independent evidence showing that measure five of One was more similar to Jolly Good than Thank God; she relied exclusively on Dr. Walser's opinion that measure five was almost identical to measure one of One. As we have already pointed out, on summary judgment, almost identical and identical are not equivalents, especially in light of Dr. Walser's transcriptions showing that measure five of One is different in pitch sequence from measure one of One. It is inappropriate to grant summary judgment on the basis of scenes a faire without independent evidence, unless the allegation of scenes a faire is uncontested. See Smith, 84 F.3d at 1220. It was contested here. Other Claims of Lack of Copyright Protection 25 Because we may affirm the grant of summary judgment on any basis supported by the record, see Newton, 349 F.3d at 594, Carey offers two additional arguments, not reached by the district court, why the summary judgment should be affirmed. Carey first argues that, wholly apart from the scenes a faire doctrine, the first measure of One' s chorus is not protectable because it lacks originality as a matter of law. Because One has a valid certificate of registration with the copyright office, however, Swirsky is entitled to a presumption of originality. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2003) (citing that presumption of originality extends for five years from date of copyright registration); 21 Three Boys, 212 F.3d at 488-89. Carey can overcome this presumption only by demonstrating that Swirsky's chorus is not original. See id. 26 In this circuit, the definition of originality is broad, and originality means little more than a prohibition of actual copying. Three Boys, 212 F.3d at 489(quoting North Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1033(9th Cir.1992)). All that is needed to satisfy originality is for the author to contribute something more than a `merely trivial' variation. Id. ; see also ETS-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc. , 225 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir.2000)(referring to the low threshold for originality under the Copyright Act). Carey argues that the first measure of One 's chorus is not original because it is substantially similar to the first measure of Jolly Good . 22 See North Coast , 972 F.2d at 1033-34. The two measures may share the same pitch sequence, but they are not identical in meter, tempo, or key. There is, therefore, a triable issue whether there are more than merely trivial differences between the two works. Carey's contention that the first measure of Swirsky's chorus is not original as a matter of law accordingly fails. 27 Although the first measure of One' s chorus and the first measure of Jolly Good may share the same pitch sequence, they are not identical in meter, tempo, or key. There is, therefore, a triable issue whether there are more than merely trivial differences between the two works. Carey's contention that the first measure of Swirsky's chorus is not original as a matter of law fails. 28 Carey next argues that the first measure of One is a mere musical idea, not protectable under the Copyright Act. Carey relies on Dr. Walser's testimony that the first measure of One was a short musical idea. Carey's reasoning is fallacious for a number of reasons, the most basic being that a musicologist is not an expert on what the term idea means under the copyright laws. Labeling something as a musical idea does not necessarily bear on whether it is also an idea under the copyright laws and unprotectable for that reason. 29 No federal court has stated that a musical motive is not protectable because it is an idea. Nor does the musical idea of the first measure of Swirsky's chorus lack protection because of its brevity. Although it is true that a single musical note would be too small a unit to attract copyright protection (one would not want to give the first author a monopoly over the note of B-flat for example), an arrangement of a limited number of notes can garner copyright protection. See Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 482 F.Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (finding that four notes were substantial enough to be protected by copyright); Santrayll v. Burrell, 1996 WL 134803, at  (S.D.N.Y. Mar.25, 1996) (mem.order) (finding that the repetition of the word uh-oh four times in a distinctive rhythm for one measure is sufficiently original to render it protectable under the copyright laws). This Court has stated that [e]ven if a copied portion be relatively small in proportion to the entire work, if qualitatively important, the finder of fact may properly find substantial similarity. Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425(9th Cir.1987). The melodic line in the first measure of One is seven notes long. It cannot be said as a matter of law that seven notes is too short a length to garner copyright protection. We therefore reject this challenge to the protection of the first measure of One's chorus. Evidentiary Arguments 30 Swirsky challenges two evidentiary rulings of the district court, which we address because the issues may arise again in further proceedings on remand. We review for abuse of discretion the district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence. See Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 800 (9th Cir.1992). A. The Work Session Tape 31 The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit a tape of Carey's work session that Swirsky offered as evidence of direct copying. Although there is no explicit ruling by the district court on Swirsky's offer to introduce the tape other than a passing reference in the minute order denying Swirsky's motion for reconsideration, that omission is not in and of itself an abuse of discretion. See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1209-1210 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that a district court's silence in regard to a ruling is not abuse of discretion if the record supports the court's decision). 32 The work session tape that Swirsky sought to introduce demonstrated only that Carey came into the studio with the melody to the chorus of Thank God in her head. The fact that a composer or singer has a melody in her head does not necessarily demonstrate direct copying; the melody could easily be the product of her own creative processes, conscious or subconscious. It was thus not a clear error of judgment for the district court to refuse to admit the work session tape. B. The Bassline Transcriptions 33 The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting defense expert Anthony Ricigliano's bassline transcriptions of One and Thank God. Swirsky objected to the admission of Ricigliano's transcriptions on the grounds of lack of personal knowledge or foundation, hearsay, lack of authentication, and relevance. Ricigliano's transcriptions, however, appear to have been admitted for the limited purpose of showing what the two choruses' basslines looked like before being reduced by Dr. Walser. 23 In his deposition, Dr. Walser testified that Ricigliano's bassline transcriptions were accurate. Whether Dr. Walser's methodology was complete and accurate in comparing the two songs' choruses is obviously relevant. Further, Ricigliano's transcriptions were not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but simply to give the court a complete transcription of the basslines. The transcriptions are therefore not hearsay. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). Finally, because Swirsky's own expert, Dr. Walser, admitted the accuracy of Ricigliano's transcriptions, there was no foundation or authentication problem. See Fed.R.Evid. 901(a) and (b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). We therefore reject Swirsky's evidentiary challenges.