Opinion ID: 166151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Third Degree Assault in Colorado

Text: 14 We must therefore turn to the plain language of the Colorado statute itself to determine if, standing alone, it would support the crime of violence enhancement. We start with the Guidelines' definition of a crime of violence. A crime of violence is: 15 any offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. 16 USSG § 2L1.2, Application Note 1(B)(iii) (emphasis added). The Guidelines, however, provide no additional explanation of the critical phrase—the use of physical force. 17 Moving from the Guidelines to the Colorado statutes, third degree assault occurs when the defendant 18 knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another person or with criminal negligence he causes bodily injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon. 19 C.R.S. § 18-3-204 (emphasis added). The statute goes on to define bodily injury as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or mental condition. C.R.S. § 18-1-901(3)(c). 20 Using the statutory definitions as a backdrop, Perez-Vargas argues that third degree assault in Colorado is not necessarily a crime of violence as defined by the Guidelines because the Guidelines focus on the means by which an injury occurs (the use of physical force). Colorado's third degree assault statute, on the other hand, focuses on the result of a defendant's conduct, i.e., bodily injury. In other words, Colorado's statute looks to the consequences of the conduct, however applied, whereas the Guidelines look to the type of conduct that causes the injury. The government counters that third degree assault necessarily requires the use of force in order to cause bodily injury. Both Perez-Vargas and the government thus focus their arguments on the question of whether one must use or threaten the use of physical force in order to commit third degree assault in Colorado. 21 Turning first to the language of the Colorado statute that defines third degree assault, we note that while it is likely most third degree assaults will involve the use or threatened use of physical force, thus qualifying the crime as a violent one under the Guidelines, the language of the statute allows for other possibilities. Indeed, at oral argument, Perez-Vargas's counsel provided several examples of third degree assault that would not use or threaten the use of physical force: recklessly shooting a gun in the air to celebrate, intentionally placing a barrier in front of a car causing an accident, or intentionally exposing someone to hazardous chemicals. One can imagine a number of other hypotheticals. 22 Since the language of the statute is broad, we turn to Colorado courts for interpretive assistance. Unfortunately, we have found no Colorado case law definitively holding that the third degree assault statute necessarily requires the application of force. While several cases in this context describe the use of force, they do not categorically imply one must always use force to violate the statute. See, e.g., People v. Moore, No. 01-CA-1760, 2005 WL 1412181 (Colo.Ct.App. Jun. 16, 2005); People v. Goldfuss, 98 P.3d 935 (Colo.Ct.App.2004); People v. Howard, 89 P.3d 441 (Colo.Ct.App.2003). 23 Turning to circuit precedent for help, one recent case is illustrative. 2 In United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir.2003), we had to determine whether violating Texas's drunk driving statute was a crime of violence. We found there must be a distinction between crimes that potentially involve violent conduct and crimes that merely involve the possibility of resulting harm. Id. Thus, we found that not every sufficiently dangerous activity . . . qualif[ies] as a crime of violence. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Torres-Ruiz, 387 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir.2004), we concluded that a drunk driving conviction does not necessarily include the intent element required by USSG § 2L1.2. Such is the case here. 24 Other circuits have also addressed similar statutes. In Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir.2003), for example, the Second Circuit considered whether the defendant, an immigrant, was removable after he violated Connecticut's third degree assault statute. 3 The court found in Chrzanoski that [u]nder the plain language of [18 U.S.C.] § 16(a), use of force must be an element of the offense for that offense to be a crime of violence under § 16(a). Chrzanoski, 327 F.3d at 191. The court concluded that nothing in the Connecticut third degree assault statute require[d] the government to prove that force was used in causing the injury. Id. at 193. Therefore, because an individual could be convicted of intentional assault in the third degree for injury caused not by physical force, but by guile, deception, or even deliberate omission, one who violates Connecticut's third degree assault statute does not necessarily commit a crime of violence. Id. at 195. 25 The Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. Gracia-Cantu, 302 F.3d 308 (5th Cir.2002). The court had to determine if Gracia-Cantu's prior conviction in Texas for injury to a child constituted a crime of violence. Id. at 311. Looking to operative language that prohibited causing bodily injury to a child, the court applied a categorical approach and found that the statute criminalizing injury to a child, does not require that the perpetrator actually use, attempt to use, or threaten to use physical force against a child. Id. (emphasis added). The court cited to examples of when the statute could be violated without the use of force: leaving a child unattended near a pool, failing to aid children during a kidnapping, failing to remove a child from an abusive caretaker, or failing to provide proper medical care to a child. Id. at 312-13. The court ultimately concluded Gracia-Cantu's prior conviction for injury to a child was not a crime of violence. See id. 26 Colorado's third degree assault statute suffers from the same infirmities. Applying Taylor and Shepard, we conclude the statutory language of Colorado's third degree assault statute does not necessarily include the use or threatened use of physical force as required by the Guidelines. A prior conviction for third degree assault in Colorado, therefore, is not categorically a crime of violence under USSG § 2L1.2. Since we have an inadequate record of the facts supporting the prior conviction, our analysis is constrained by the language of the relevant statutes and Guidelines. And, as described above, we cannot say Perez-Vargas's prior conviction for third degree assault was a crime of violence.