Opinion ID: 1309329
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Request to Withdraw Stipulations

Text: (1) Before the review department, petitioner requested that he be allowed to withdraw the factual stipulations he had made, on the ground the bar examiner had withheld information from him. The review department did not address this issue, and petitioner now argues that its failure to grant his request denied him a fair hearing. This contention lacks merit. Petitioner fails to specify what stipulations he wished to withdraw. The only material stipulation in the record is the First Stipulation Re: Proof of Facts, and we assume he refers to this. [3] In this stipulation petitioner waived the personal appearance of the DeMerses and agreed that the allegation that no part of their $10,000 had been used for the intended purposes could be proved by declaration. Pursuant to the stipulation, the examiner submitted in evidence James DeMers's declaration, which stated that the DeMerses had sent the $10,000 check to Pollock for the express purposes of purchasing a bond to begin capitalization of the off-shore bank, and that the $10,000 was never used to purchase a bond, nor was it ever used in conjunction with an off-shore bank, nor was it ever used for any other purposes of ours whatever. Withdrawal of factual stipulations is generally not permitted. In disciplinary matters, we have held, Ordinarily ... the stipulated facts may not be contradicted; otherwise the stipulation procedure would serve little or no purpose, requiring a remand for further evidentiary hearings whenever the attorney deems it advisable to challenge the factual recitals. ( Inniss v. State Bar (1978) 20 Cal.3d 552, 555 [143 Cal. Rptr. 408, 573 P.2d 852].) In this case, however, petitioner argues that because he was not aware of certain evidence which he claims the examiner withheld from him at the time he made the stipulation, he was denied a fair hearing. He complains that the examiner withheld the DeMerses' application for client security fund reimbursement and did not introduce it into evidence until late in the hearing, and that therefore petitioner was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to utilize the newly discovered information contained therein. The new information to which petitioner refers is a statement in the application that Novo-Gradac had endorsed [the $10,000 check] over to [petitioner]. Petitioner's argument fails for several reasons. First, it is not clear that the examiner did in fact withhold evidence from petitioner. Petitioner had been aware of the DeMerses' application since at least April 1986, when he received notice of an order consolidating the disciplinary and client security fund matters, and there is no indication in the record that petitioner sought discovery of the application or any other documents or records. Petitioner states he did ask to see the application, and the examiner refused me access to the application. We see no evidence in the record, other than petitioner's own unsupported statement in his brief, either that he requested to see the document or that the examiner improperly refused him access to it. Second, at the hearing petitioner expressly stated that he did not object to the admission of the application. He simply pointed out to the panel a paragraph of the application stating that he had never admitted obligation to the DeMerses. Further, he failed to state at the hearing that he had not previously seen the application, and did not request a continuance to review it. In Walter v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 880, 890 [87 Cal. Rptr. 833, 471 P.2d 481], we held that an attorney who claimed he had no opportunity to examine documentary exhibits before the panel hearing failed to show a due process violation because [t]he record discloses that petitioner did not request a continuance of the proceedings in order to examine the exhibits, nor did he raise before the disciplinary board the point that he had not been allowed to examine them. Third, it is unclear how the information that Novo-Gradac indorsed the check is relevant to the stipulation. Before the review department, petitioner maintained that he entered into the factual stipulations believing that Pollock had forged the entirety of the endorsement on the back of the subject check. He argued that the fact that Novo-Gradac indorsed the check showed that Novo-Gradac had committed malpractice and fiduciary irresponsibility by giving the check to Pollock, and that therefore Pollock's forgery was not the sole cause of the injury to the DeMerses. Petitioner asserted that it was not foreseeable that Pollock would have obtained a check made out to another attorney's trust account, and that he entered into the stipulation without realizing the true facts of the case. We find the newly discovered information regarding the indorsement does not appear to alter the culpability of either petitioner or Pollock with respect to the DeMerses. Petitioner still admittedly opened the trust account for Pollock's use, and then failed to supervise the account, thereby allowing Pollock to deposit the DeMerses' check in that account and to use their money for purposes not authorized by the DeMerses, resulting in fraud against them. (2) Petitioner also argues that the examiner engaged in prejudicial misconduct by suppressing a letter from Marie DeMers addressed to petitioner in care of the examiner, in which she requested restitution from petitioner. The record reveals that, at worst, the examiner inadvertently neglected to forward the letter to petitioner. Although we disapprove of suppression of information by the State Bar, in this case it does not appear that petitioner was prejudiced if indeed the letter was improperly withheld from him. The DeMerses contacted petitioner directly numerous times in an attempt to recover their money, and although petitioner stated he was willing to make restitution, he paid them nothing. Further, petitioner informed the panel at the hearing that he had received the letter from the examiner only a week before, and the panel made a finding that he was unsure of his restitution obligations. (3) Finally, petitioner implies that because of the quasi-criminal nature of disciplinary proceedings, he is entitled to heightened procedural protections. The rules of criminal procedure, however, do not apply in State Bar disciplinary proceedings, and petitioner's only due process entitlement is a `fair hearing.' ( Rosenthal (J.B.) v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 612, 634 [238 Cal. Rptr. 377, 738 P.2d 723].) We conclude petitioner's right to a fair hearing was not violated here.