Opinion ID: 267171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH-- 8(a)(5) and (1)

Text: 10
11 In this court the Board argues that the long delays between bargaining sessions and cancellation of scheduled meetings were due to the employer's dilatory tactics. The Examiner and the Board both rejected the employer's defense that delay in arranging bargaining sessions was brought about by its difficulties in retaining a bargaining representative, and further difficulties in thereafter securing his services as often as required. 12 Southland acknowledges that it was dilatory. It makes the novel contention, however, that the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement is the union's function and not the company's business. The company's brief declares: 13 'The Board appears to overlook one obvious fact in cases of this nature: The Companies involved are not in business to negotiate Union contracts as is the Union. The demands on Respondent's time to operate its business were very great. Business was down. Profits were low. It could not therefore spend full time securing the services of a labor consultant. It had to do this when time was available from the business. It would not help the employees or the Union if Respondent stopped running the business merely to negotiate, for soon there would be no jobs or dues. The Trial Examiner (supported by the Board) is punishing Respondent because its labor consultant was busy and not at home or in his office when the Union called.' 14 In short, Southland claims that its failure to obtain the services of a negotiator readily available to confer with the union at reasonable times and intervals was excusable because of its preoccupation with normal business operations. Southland would have us rule that its conduct was therefore not an unfair labor practice. 15 We cannot accept this argument. The record shows that the union's repeated attempts to bargain were thwarted by the employer. On September 25, 1962, Damon Radford, the union's business representative, sent to H. Rives King, Southland's president, a copy of a proposed contract along with a letter expressing the union's willingness to meet on short notice and to negotiate 'so that we may consummate an agreement at the earliest possible time.' After acknowledging this letter on October 2 and after further exchange of correspondence, King sent a letter to the union on October 22, stating that because the company was operating below capacity, its 'entire efforts should be devoted in attempting to alleviate our present position.' For that reason, the company said, it could not agree to meet before Monday, November 26. Radford replied that: 16 'the essence of good faith collective bargaining is promptness in meeting for negotiations. Employees represented by us will not continue to work while our certification is caused to expire by delaying tactics. Respectfully request meeting on November 5.' 17 King demurred, and the union, in the interest of 'good will and co-operation,' agreed to the November 26 date. 18 The first meeting was held on November 26. At the end of the second meeting, on December 12, Murphy asked that a date be set for another session. George Gardner, the company's attorney, indicated that because of his involvement in other matters he could not set a date at that time. 19 Thereafter, the union's attempts to arrange another meeting proved unsuccessful until after it had filed unfair labor practice charges on April 8, 1963. Six meetings were then held after the filing of unfair labor practice charges by the union, but then on July 19, 1963, the company altered its position: King, its vice president, informed Radford, the union representative, that 'a meeting with you (the union) would serve no useful purpose until the charges filed with the National Labor Relations Board have been resolved.' 20 There is thus ample support for the finding that the company failed to exercise that degree of diligence required to comply with its statutory duty to bargain in good faith. See Solo Cup Company v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 447, 448 (4th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. M. & M. Bakeries, Inc,. 271 F.2d 602, 603 (1st Cir. 1959). Furthermore, Southland's defense fails to recognize that the Act imposes an affirmative duty of good faith bargaining on both the employer, 8(a)(5), and the union, 8(b)(3). 21 There is no merit in Southland's facile assertion that the 'entire allegation of refusal to bargain stems from one simple fact: the Union did not get what it wanted from the Company.' 22
23 At the first negotiating session, held on November 26, the employer's position was that it was unable to agree to a wage increase or to any greater monetary benefits because of the insufficiency of its earnings. The Union accepted the company's offer to prove financial inability, and said that it would arrange to have the union's auditor go over the company's books. 24 At the second meeting, on December 12, the employer repeated that it did not have the money to grant wage increases. Union negotiator Murphy pointed out that, if the claim was made in good faith, the company should permit the union to examine its books to enable it to decide whether or not to drop the wage demands. The company, however, refused to permit such examination on the ground that it 'was involved in a program in which it was seeking capital investment.' 25 The company persisted in its refusal to allow inspection of its books until after the union filed unfair labor practice charges. Thereafter inspection was allowed. 26 The Board deemed the evidence sufficient to show that the refusal to furnish financial information constituted a lack of good faith bargaining, relying on the well settled rule that, when an employer claims financial inability to grant a demanded wage increase, he must, upon the union's request, furnish financial data to substantiate his claim. National Labor Relations Board v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 76 S.Ct. 753, 100 L.Ed. 1027 (1956). 27 The employer now asserts that during the negotiations it resisted a wage increase not on the basis of financial inability but as a matter of sound business judgment. Therefore, it maintains, the Truitt rule is inapplicable. 28 It would be difficult to reconcile the shifting positions taken by the company. If it asserts inability to meet the union's demands and offers to establish the fact, it cannot avoid its duty to afford substantiation by then drawing a subtle distinction between inability to pay and refusal to pay as a matter of 'sound business practice.' Whatever basis there might be in other circumstances for such a distinction, we have no occasion to deal with it here, since the Trial Examiner's conclusion, adopted by the Board, was supported by substantial evidence that it was not until the union filed charges that the company took the position that it was not 'pleading poverty.' 29
30 Although the Board had certified the union as bargaining representative for all production and maintenance employees, the company admittedly insisted that the recognition clause be restricted to 'permanent' employees, which it defined as those employed continuously for 180 and later 120 days. In attempting to change the unit for which the union was certified, Southland violated section 8(a)(5), since the Act required it to accord recognition to the union as representative of all employees in the unit. McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co., v. National Labor R. Board, 116 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 565, 61 S.Ct. 843, 85 L.Ed. 1524 (1941). 31 Southland seeks to justify its conduct on the theory that the union also attempted to change the unit by seeking to represent union members only. The Trial Examiner, however, found that there was a lack of proof that the union had taken such a course of action. Moreover, even had the union made such an attempt, and thereby subjected itself to a charge of unfair labor practice, its conduct would be no defense to the charge against Southland. 32
33 It is unchallenged that after June 13, 1963, Southland flatly refused to meet with the union because of the pending unfair labor practice charges. The filing of charges with the Board does not relieve the parties of the duty to bargain in good faith. Thus Southland's conduct was a clear violation of the Act. Solo Cup Company v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 447, 448-449 (4th Cir. 1964); Hartsell Mills Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 111 F.2d 291, 292 (4th Cir. 1940). 34