Opinion ID: 2630446
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Front Pay Awards

Text: ¶ 40 Lastly, Fluor argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a new trial or amendment of judgment. The motion, pursuant to CR 59(a), alleged that (1) the jury's awards of front pay were so excessive as to unmistakably indicate that the amount must have resulted from the jury's passion or prejudice, (2) no evidence or no reasonable inference from the evidence justifie[d] the verdict, and (3) substantial justice has not been done. Appellant's Opening Br. at 68 (citing CR 59(a)(5), (7), (9)). Fluor takes issue with some of the pipe fitters' awards individually (Pedro Nicacio, Hodgin, and Charles Cable), and with all of the awards as a group. ¶ 41 Standard of Review. This court employs an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing denial of motions for new trial, Aluminum Co. of America v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 140 Wash.2d 517, 537, 998 P.2d 856 (2000), and motions for amended judgment, see Bunch v. King County Department of Youth Services, 155 Wash.2d 165, 175-76, 116 P.3d 381 (2005). A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to grant a new trial or amend a judgment where the damage award is contrary to the evidence. Locke v. City of Seattle, 162 Wash.2d 474, 486, 172 P.3d 705 (2007). The court examines the record to determine whether the award is contrary to the evidence. Palmer v. Jensen, 132 Wash.2d 193, 197, 937 P.2d 597 (1997). Where an award is not contrary to the evidence, this court will not find it to be the result of passion or prejudice based solely on the award amount. As this court said in James v. Robeck, 79 Wash.2d 864, 870-71, 490 P.2d 878 (1971), where it can be said that the jury ... could believe or disbelieve some of [the evidence] and weigh all of it and remain within the range of the evidence in returning the challenged verdict, then it cannot be found as a matter of law that the verdict was unmistakably so excessive or inadequate as to show that the jury had been motivated by passion or prejudice solely because of the amount. We keep in mind that courts are reluctant to interfere with a jury's damage award when fairly made because determination of damages is the duty of the jury. Palmer, 132 Wash.2d at 197, 937 P.2d 597. ¶ 42 The trial court instructed the jury that it should calculate front pay from the day of its decision until the time the plaintiff may reasonably be expected to retire or fully recover from the continuing effects of the wrongful discharge. CP at 530. There was apparently no objection to this instruction, and Fluor does not argue that it is an inaccurate statement of Washington law. ¶ 43 Nicacio's Award. Nicacio unequivocally stated that he was not making any claim for damages from 2001 forward, but the jury awarded him front pay. Nicacio then filed a notice of partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of his front pay award. The issue of whether his award was supported by the evidence is moot. ¶ 44 Hodgin's Award. The jury awarded Hodgin front pay, and Fluor argues that the award was improper because Hodgin would have retired by the time of the 2005 trial. Hodgin testified, Who knows how many years I would have worked [at Fluor]? 11 VRP (Aug. 1, 2005) at 1498. He later testified, If I would have stayed at Hanford, no telling how long I would have stayed working. That was a very nice, easy job for an old man like me. Id. at 1537. He then stated that he thought he would have worked until 2003 or 2004 if his wife had also stayed on at Fluor. Id. The jury could have reasonably inferred that Hodgin might work beyond his 2004 estimate. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fluor's CR 59 motion with regard to Hodgin. ¶ 45 Cable's Award. The jury awarded Cable $230,000 in front pay. Fluor contends that Cable is entitled to only one year of front pay, the value of which the pipe fitters' expert calculated at $76,665. Cable was retired at the time of trial, but he testified that he would have continued to work at Hanford until at least [age] 62. 12 VRP (Aug. 2, 2005) at 1675. In quick succession, Cable answered the question, So you would have gone through 2006? by saying, The end of 2006. Id. The jury could have reasonably believed that the end of 2006 referred to the time he would turn 62, but that it was still modified by at least from his first answer. The jury's award was equivalent to three years' salary and more than $100,000 less than the pipe fitters' expert's figure. It was within the range of the evidence under this interpretation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the CR 59 motion with regard to Cable. ¶ 46 All Pipe Fitters' Front Pay Awards. Fluor argues that all of the pipe fitters' front pay awards were contrary to the evidence because (1) all of the pipe fitters obtained comparable employment or retired before trial, and (2) Fluor showed that due to layoffs the pipe fitters' positions would have been eliminated in any event. ¶ 47 Fluor points to evidence that after the layoffs, all of the plaintiffs secured employment as pipe fitters with comparable wages. While that was the case, it is irrelevant because the front pay awards were supported by other evidence in the record. Each pipe fitter testified that she or he took a number of jobs with varying salaries after she or he was laid off and that those jobs were often accompanied by travel expenses. The pipe fitters' expert economist, Robert Moss, testified that he calculated future losses for each pipe fitter based on average lost wages, in addition to lost benefits and travel expenses. With the exception of Nicacio's and Hodgin's awards, all of the awards were substantially smaller than those recommended by Moss. The evidence supporting the front pay awards is not negated by the pipe fitters' procurement of comparable employment. ¶ 48 As to the argument that the pipe fitters' jobs would have been eliminated in any case, we first note that `courts will presume for the purposes of awarding relief that an illegally discharged employee would have continued working for the employer until he or she reache[d] normal retirement age, unless the employer provides evidence to the contrary.' Xieng v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash., 120 Wash.2d 512, 531, 844 P.2d 389 (1993) (first alteration in original) (quoting MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1060 (8th Cir.1988)). The employer bears the burden of showing that the employee would not have been retained. Id. at 532, 844 P.2d 389. ¶ 49 The record does not support Fluor's assertion that it provided ... evidence that only six pipefitters could have retained their jobs and thus that at least five of the pipe fitters were not entitled to front pay. Appellant's Opening Br. at 76-77. Fluor points to the pipe fitters' chart at SCP at 9632 as evidence that there were only six pipe fitters who worked for Fluor from 1997 through the time of trial. However, the list does not purport to be comprehensive. Additionally, the idea that all 11 pipe fitter respondents could not have retained their jobs is belied by Fluor's evidence showing that 27 pipe fitters were still employed at Fluor in August 2005. CP at 447. Fluor has not met its burden of showing that the pipe fitters would have not been retained, and thus front pay is not precluded on that account. ¶ 50 Lastly, Fluor argues that the jury's award of front pay to Nicacio, who did not make a claim for front pay, indicates that the jury was motivated by passion or prejudice, which tainted all of the front pay awards. For a court to find passion or prejudice, it must be of such manifest clarity as to make it unmistakable. James, 79 Wash.2d at 870, 490 P.2d 878. When one part of a jury award is inhered with passion or prejudice, retrial is required on all issues that are inseparably connected to the tainted issue. Myers v. Smith, 51 Wash.2d 700, 705-07, 321 P.2d 551 (1958). Thus, unmistakable passion or prejudice transfers to other issues when they are inseparably connected to the issue in question. ¶ 51 Here, the front pay awards for the other pipe fitters are not unmistakably the product of passion or prejudice. Under CR 59(a)(5), damage awards must be excessive in order to be proof of passion or prejudice, but the awards in question were supported by the evidence, as discussed above. Additionally, even if Nicacio's award were the product of passion, it is not inseparably connected to the other front pay awards. The jury may simply have been motivated by its particular liking of Nicacio himself or his nobility in refusing to claim front pay. The jury would not necessarily have had similar sympathies toward the other plaintiffs. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fluor's CR 59 motion for a new trial or amended judgment.