Opinion ID: 2973933
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Underlying Constitutional Violation

Text: Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Pendergrass, we assume that she suffered a constitutional injury and would therefore survive judgment as a matter of law on the first step of a municipal liability claim under § 1983. To succeed on her municipal liability claim, Pendergrass must demonstrate both: (1) the deprivation of a constitutional right, and (2) the School District is responsible for that violation. Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 505-06 (6th Cir. 1996). To demonstrate that her punishment violated her substantive due process rights, Pendergrass must prove that “the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience.” Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987) We assume that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Pendergrass, Gibbs’s actions met this standard. According to Pendergrass, because she forgot to bring a pencil to class, Gibbs grabbed her and slammed her head against the blackboard. Gibbs then threw her on the ground and choked her for approximately one minute. As a result, Pendergrass suffered petechia and contusions No. 05-3192 Ellis v. Cleveland Municipal School District Page 8 on her neck. Later, Pendergrass also exhibited symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder. See id. at 1154, 1158-59 (holding that a high school principal’s actions, in breaking down a student’s door, throwing the student against a wall, and slapping the student, were shocking to the conscience). 3. Custom or Policy of Failure to Train or Supervise Pendergrass’s claim of failure to train or supervise nonetheless fails because no reasonable jury could find that the School District was deliberately indifferent to complaints of abuse by substitute teachers. A plaintiff who sues a municipality for a constitutional violation under § 1983 must prove that the municipality’s policy or custom caused the alleged injury. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). One way to prove an unlawful policy or custom is to show a policy of inadequate training or supervision. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). To succeed on a failure to train or supervise claim, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury. See Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1046 (6th Cir. 1992). We assume for the purpose of argument that a reasonable jury could find that Cleveland’s training and supervision of substitute teachers was inadequate, such that the first prong is met for purposes of judgment as a matter of law. Pendergrass’s claim fails under the second prong, however, because she did not present sufficient evidence that the School District was deliberately indifferent to the danger of substituteteacher abuse. This court has identified two situations justifying a conclusion of deliberate indifference in claims of failure to train or supervise. “One is failure to provide adequate training in light of foreseeable consequences that could result from a lack of instruction.” Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 931 (6th Cir. 1999). In City of Canton, for example, the Supreme Court indicated that a city could be deliberately indifferent by failing to train its police officers in the use of deadly force because it is obvious that the officers will need to use such force when they are armed with guns and required to arrest fleeing felons. 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. In this case, Pendergrass does not argue that it was inherently foreseeable that teachers would assault students if not trained or supervised properly. Instead, Pendergrass argues a different type of deliberate indifference. “A second type of . . . deliberate indifference is where the city fails to act in response to repeated complaints of constitutional violations by its officers.” Brown, 172 F.3d at 931. According to Pendergrass, the ten incident reports of prior abuse put the School District on notice that it had a problem with substitute-teacher abuse. These ten reports were not sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that the School District had been deliberately indifferent. While all of the reports document incidents of corporal punishment, only two arguably rise to the level of Pendergrass’s alleged abuse. See J.A. 560-69 (pushing student’s face into chalkboard and making student hold arms stretched out); J.A. 570-74 (kicking and choking student). The other eight reports document more mild punishment. See, e.g., J.A. at 630-36 (grabbing student by arm and smashing his brother’s crayon box). Thus, the School District had notice of only two incidents of possible constitutional violations. Pendergrass has not shown how two incidents, over a two-year period, could put the School District on notice of a problem when the School District operated 127 schools with over 69,000 students. To establish deliberate indifference through these reports, Pendergrass would have had to allege and put on some evidence that two incidents of abuse over two years is an excessive number.4 4 Pendergrass attempts to establish the School District’s deliberate indifference also through the testimony of Dr. Barbara Byrd-Bennett, the Chief Executive Officer of the School District, that Bennett typically received 60 to 70 letters a week from the Division of Children and Family Services regarding child abuse of her students. However, neither Byrd-Bennet’s testimony nor Pendergrass indicates whether the letters related to abuse by substitute teachers, No. 05-3192 Ellis v. Cleveland Municipal School District Page 9 Such a conclusion is compelled by our decision in Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir. 2005). In Thomas, the plaintiff introduced evidence of forty-five suits of excessive force against the Chattanooga Police Department to establish that the department had a custom of condoning excessive force by its officers. Id. at 430. This court held that such evidence was “conclusory” because the plaintiff “did not produce any data showing what a ‘normal’ number of excessive force complaints would be.” Id. at 431. Similarly, because Pendergrass has not presented any evidence that two incidents of substitute-teacher abuse is more than what the normal number of incidents would be, she cannot show that the School District had notice of a problem requiring additional training or supervision. Thus, as a matter of law, her claim of failure to train or supervise fails because a reasonable jury could not find the School District deliberately indifferent.5