Opinion ID: 1891351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statement of Justin Pratt

Text: Subsequent to the discovery of the victims, investigators spoke with Danielle Privett, the oldest daughter of Danny Ray Privett and Robin Razor, who informed the authorities that her parents had been having problems with Justin Pratt with regard to asserted unpaid rent owed by the family to Pratt. As a result of this discussion with Danielle, Deputy Ray Parker interviewed Pratt on July 23, 1998, in connection with his investigation of the crimes. During trial, Reynolds attempted to secure the testimony of Pratt, who was in Oklahoma, in an effort to demonstrate the animosity existing between Pratt and the victims, but the defense investigator was unable to obtain his attendance for trial. Due to this inability, Reynolds' trial counsel attempted to place into evidence at trial the transcript of Pratt's July 23 interview with law enforcement officers based on an argument that the interview fell within the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule. After consideration of arguments from both sides regarding the admissibility of the statement from the interview, the trial judge ruled that Pratt was unavailable and that limited portions of the interview were admissible under the statement against interest exception rule of evidence, while the remainder of the interview was inadmissible hearsay. Florida law defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003). Hearsay is inadmissible at trial except as specifically provide by statute. See § 90.802, Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 90.804 of the Florida Statutes (2003) provides an exception to the hearsay rule of inadmissibility for out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted made by an unavailable witness if the statement qualifies as a statement against interest. See § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003). The definition of that which qualifies as a statement against interest in its entirety provides: A statement which, at the time of its making, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or tended to subject the declarant to liability or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, so that a person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement. Id. Reynolds contends (a) that the trial court erred when it found that the excluded portions of Justin Pratt's interview with investigators were hearsay, and (b) even if the excluded portions were properly considered hearsay, the trial court erred by finding that they did not come within the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule of inadmissibility. As to the first assertionthat the statements were not hearsayReynolds contends that Pratt's interview statements regarding the manner in which the victims were killed and the statements regarding Pratt's location at the time of the crimes were not being offered for their truth. Initially, we note that the only portion of Pratt's statement that Reynolds asserted was not hearsay were the statements that Danny Ray Privett himself stabbed Robin and Christina. Reynolds' contention that the statements regarding the location of Pratt at the time of the crime were not hearsay was not presented to the trial court, and, therefore, this issue has not been properly preserved for review by this Court. See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982) ([I]n order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.). During the discussion of these location statements at trial, Reynolds' trial counsel specifically stated to the trial judge that he wanted those statements admitted because they were directed to [the defense] position ... that [Pratt] had motive, opportunity and time to commit these crimes and that ... this is the other person that we're going to allege that he committed it with.... [H]e is telling that, in fact, he, in fact, met this person on the night of the killings and what time he met them. Based on these arguments advanced by Reynolds' trial counsel, it is clear that the statements regarding the location of Pratt at the time of the crime were in fact being offered by Reynolds for their truth and nothing to the contrary was argued by the defense at trial. Therefore, the trial court properly found these statements to be hearsay subject to the rule of inadmissibility, see § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003), and any claim by Reynolds that these statements were not being offered for their truth and, therefore, were not hearsay has not been properly preserved for our review. See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982). As to the statements by Pratt regarding the manner of death, Reynolds asserts that these statements were not being admitted for their truth but, rather, the defense sought to admit them to demonstrate that Pratt knew the manner in which the victims were killed, a fact that Reynolds claims had not been released to the public at the time of Pratt's interview. Initially, we note that these statements, offered without explanation, undoubtedly constitute hearsay. In fact, these statements, which involve Pratt relaying to law enforcement officers what another individual told him, qualify as inadmissible hearsay within hearsay. However, notwithstanding the foregoing, a close review of the trial transcript reveals that these statements may in fact have been incorrectly determined to be hearsay by the trial court. During the discussions of these particular statements, Reynolds' trial counsel stated, [W]e're not trying to prove that that statement is, in fact, true.... As a matter of fact, that particular statement.... We know that not to be true. It's not a true statement nor are we offering it for the truth of the matter asserted. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the statements were not being offered to establish their truth, and, therefore, we conclude that the trial court improperly concluded that they were subject to the hearsay rule of inadmissibility. See Foster v. State, 778 So.2d 906, 914-15 (Fla. 2000) (A statement may . . . be offered to prove a variety of things besides its truth. A statement may be offered, for instance, to show motive, knowledge, or identity.) (citations omitted). However, given this conclusion, we must still determine whether this error requires reversal of Reynolds' convictions or merely constitutes harmless error. Error is considered harmless only when there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986). Based on the analysis outlined below, we conclude that the trial court's ruling that these statements were inadmissible hearsay was harmless error, and, therefore, this determination does not require reversal of the convictions. The material excluded portions of Pratt's interview in this claim reveal: Pratt, J: ... Debbie [Pretena] came in and told me that ... what she had heard and she heard about the, what I was telling you earlier, about the. . . Parker, R: Debbie is Nicole's friend? Pratt, J: Yeah. .... Parker, R: What did she say? Pratt, J: She said that Danny had cut, stabbed or whatever, Robin and Chris.... .... Herron, L: But she said specifically that Nicole had told her that Danny had cut... Pratt, J: That's what she thought, yeah. That's what.... Reynolds asserts that because these statements establish Pratt's involvement in the crimes due to his knowledge of the manner of death, a fact that had not been released to the public at the time of the interview, the statements went to the heart of his defensethat Pratt committed the crimesand, therefore, the error was not harmless. Although the trial court did rule that the statements were inadmissible, the defense was permitted to place into evidence portions of Pratt's interview in which he discussed an argument between himself and the victim Danny Privett, along with admissions by Pratt that he had left a note at the victims' residence declaring war against the family. Therefore, there was evidence offered by Reynolds at trial that was intended to establish the defense that it was Pratt who had committed these crimes. Moreover, Pratt's statements that were allowed into evidence by the trial judge were much more beneficial to Reynolds' theory of the crimes than the statements at issue in this claim regarding the manner of death. Even with this evidence before them, the jury rejected Reynolds' assertion that Pratt committed these crimes and found Reynolds guilty of the murders of the three victims. In addition, the evidence at trial connecting Reynolds to these murders was substantial. DNA analysis revealed that his blood was scattered throughout the interior of the victims' trailer, contrary to his statement to authorities that he had never been in the trailer before. Testimony established that a car similar to that of Reynolds was seen at the scene of the crime the night before the victims were discovered. Direct evidence established a heated argument between Reynolds and the victim Danny Privett, and testimony at trial also established that obvious injuries on Reynolds appeared to have been from a knife blade inconsistent with his version of how they occurred. With the substantial evidence produced at trial by the State connecting Reynolds in these crimes, along with the clear insignificance of the statements of Pratt with regard to what he had been told about the manner of death of the victims as compared to the portions of the interview that were admitted into evidence, we conclude that any error in excluding these portions of Pratt's interview was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1135. Next we must determine whether the portions of Pratt's statements that where properly found to be hearsay should have been before the jury as statements falling with the statements against interest exception to the hearsay rule of inadmissibility. Initially, the State asserts that this issue need not be addressed because the trial court erred in finding that Pratt was unavailable and, therefore, the statement against interest exception is totally inapplicable. Florida law requires that for the statement against interest exception to apply, the declarant must first be determined be unavailable for trial. See § 90.804, Fla. Stat. (2003). Unavailability is defined as meaning that the declarant: (a) Is exempted by a ruling of a court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; (b) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; (c) Has suffered a lack of memory of the subject matter of his or her statement so as to destroy the declarant's effectiveness as a witness during the trial; (d) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or because of then-existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or (e) Is absent from the hearing, and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance or testimony by process or other reasonable means. § 90.804(1)(a)-(e), Fla. Stat. (2003). After a hearing on the issue of availability, the trial court determined that the defense had made reasonable efforts, albeit unsuccessful efforts, to secure Pratt's attendance at trial and, because he refused to attend, Pratt was unavailable for purposes of application of this rule. A trial court's determination on the issue of availability will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion clearly appears. Jackson v. State, 575 So.2d 181, 187 (Fla.1991) (quoting Outlaw v. State, 269 So.2d 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)). The State relies upon Lawrence v. State, 691 So.2d 1068 (Fla.1997), as support for its assertion that the trial court abused its discretion when it found Pratt to be unavailable. However, the facts of Lawrence are distinguishable from the instant matter. In Lawrence, the investigator charged with locating the particular witness neglected to obtain directions to the witness's location when they were offered by the witness's boyfriend. Further, he never returned a phone call from the witness's boyfriend as he had promised prior to the proceeding for which the witness's testimony was needed. The record in the instant matter demonstrates that unlike the investigator in Lawrence, the investigator here used significant efforts to obtain Pratt's attendance at trial. The investigator in this case left no leads neglected and, in fact, was able to locate Pratt in Oklahoma and made arrangement to bring him back to Florida to testify at trial. The investigator's efforts were thwarted just a week prior to trial when Pratt violently erupted at the airport prior to boarding a plane to return to Florida with the investigator. Even after this failed attempt to secure Pratt's attendance, the investigator continued his efforts to contact Pratt through relatives but was unable to locate him. The trial court afforded full and fair consideration of the efforts made on the part of the defense in attempting to secure Pratt's attendance at trial, and we conclude that the trial court's finding that Pratt was unavailable for trial was not an abuse of discretion but was in fact the correct conclusion based on the evidence presented. See Trease v. State, 768 So.2d 1050, 1053 n. 2 (Fla.2000) (Discretion is abused only when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court) (quoting Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Fla.1990)). Reynolds contends that, even if the trial court correctly found that these portions of Pratt's interview were hearsay, the statements should have been admitted under the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule of inadmissibility. As noted above, this exception applies to [a] statement which, at the time of its making,... tended to subject the declarant to liability ..., so that a person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be true. § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003). Moreover, [a] statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement. Id. Based on this statutory definition, we conclude that the trial court correctly found these statements did not qualify under this hearsay exception and were therefore properly determined to be inadmissible at trial. Initially, we note that the statements at issue were not actually against Pratt's interest. The statement by Pratt that he was with his girlfriend during the early morning hours on the day the bodies were discovered, contrary to Reynolds' assertion, does not qualify as a statement against interest. Reynolds contends that this statement by Pratt tends to expose him to liability and exculpate the defendant. This contention by Reynolds is without merit. Pratt's statement discloses that he was with his girlfriend at his residence during the time frame in which the crimes at issue where estimated to have occurred. Clearly, a statement such as this would tend to exculpate Pratt as opposed to inculpating him, and, therefore, the trial court properly determined that the statement regarding Pratt's location did not come within the definition of that which constitutes a statement against interest. Similarly, the trial court also properly concluded that Pratt's statement that another individual informed him that Danny Privett had stabbed Robin and Christina also fails to come within the exception. If anything, this statement operates to the opposite of the predicate required to invoke the exceptionthe statement at issue here tends to exculpate Pratt rather than inculpate him in these crimes. The disclosure that Pratt, a neighbor and apparently a close acquaintance of the victims, stated that he had heard from another individual, Debbie Pretena, that Robin and Christina had been stabbed, purportedly prior to the release of this information, does not bring this statement within this exception to the hearsay rule of inadmissibility. Reynolds also asserts that his constitutional right to a fair trial was denied by excluding portions of Pratt's statement even if the trial court properly applied the rules of evidence. However, we note that this particular claim was not presented at the trial court level, and, therefore, the claim has not been properly preserved for review. See Steinhorst, 412 So.2d at 338. Notwithstanding trial counsel's failure to preserve this issue, the claim lacks merit. Reynolds relies on Curtis v. State, 876 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), as support for his assertion. Contrary to Reynolds' assertion, the facts of Curtis are distinguishable from the instant matter, and, therefore, the rule of law discussed therein is inapplicable. In Curtis, the district court held that the trial court erred in excluding an out-of-court confession even though it did not satisfy the statement against interest exception. See id. at 15-16. Crucial to the district court's decision in Curtis was that the statement excluded was more than just an out-of-court statementit was a confession by another individual to the crime with which Curtis had been charged. See id. at 16. The district court stressed this fact when it noted that the general principle that state evidence rules must, in some instances, yield to greater principles established by the Constitution has been applied specifically to require the admission of a confession by a third party. Id. at 19 (emphasis supplied). Pratt's statement in the instant matter is not even similar to the confession that the trial court erroneously excluded in Curtis. Pratt never confessed to the crimes during his interview, so the constitutional concerns driving the district court's decision in Curtis simply are not present in the instant matter and, therefore, Curtis is inapplicable here. [2] In addition to Curtis, Reynolds also relies upon Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), as support for his claim. As with Curtis, Chambers is also inapplicable to the instant matter. Similar to Curtis, the High Court in Chambers assessed whether the defendant's due process rights required the admission of an out-of-court confession by a third party to the crime with which Chambers had been charged, notwithstanding the state hearsay rules which required its exclusion. See id. at 298-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038. In holding that the Constitution required admission of the confession despite the state hearsay law, the High Court noted circumstances surrounding the confession that provided assurance as to its reliability. See id. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. 1038. As the district court noted in Curtis, important factors to the High Court in Chambers included: (1) the confession was made spontaneously shortly after the crime; (2) the confession was corroborated; (3) the confession was truly against the declarant's penal interest; and (4) the declarant was available to testify and be cross-examined. See Curtis, 876 So.2d at 20 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. 1038). The facts surrounding Pratt's interview in the instant matter clearly do not satisfy any of these circumstances. Although the facts may support a finding that Pratt's statements were spontaneous and not coerced, the remaining indicia of reliability discussed in Chambers are not present here. The portion of Pratt's statement regarding information relayed by Debbie Pretena to Pratt about the manner of death was not corroborated. When asked if Pretena was going to be produced at trial to corroborate these statements, trial counsel responded: Well we're working on that. The defense never produced Pretena to corroborate Pratt's statements at trial. Moreover, as discussed in more detail above, none of Pratt's statements at issue here were actually against his interest. Unlike the statement at issue in Chambers, Pratt's interview with the authorities did not contain a confession to the crimes for which Reynolds was convicted. Lastly, contrary to the circumstances present in Chambers, the trial court here found Pratt to be unavailable for trial. Therefore, Chambers does not support Reynolds' assertions that the Constitution requires the admission of Pratt's entire statement at trial. Based on the analysis set forth above, we hold that the trial court properly found the statements by Pratt regarding his location during the timeframe when these crimes were committed to be inadmissible hearsay and not within the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule of inadmissibility. In addition, although we conclude that the trial court erred in finding the statements regarding the manner of death to be inadmissible hearsay, we hold, based on our analysis above, that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1135.