Opinion ID: 2051749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: What property interests has Arneson alleged, and were those interests clearly established in 1990?

Text: ¶ 48. We note that the parties, and the courts below, did not coherently identify the precise property interest Arneson claimed. This interest must be clearly identified before we can engage in a consideration of the constitutional right Arneson claims has been violated. ¶ 49. Despite the defendants' arguments in both their briefs and at oral argument, we do not understand Arneson to be claiming any protected interest in his position as an MIS 4 supervisor. Instead, we find that the property interest which Arneson claims is constitutionally protected is related to his employment in the MIS 3 non-supervisor position he held prior to his promotion in January 1990. ¶ 50. At oral argument, Arneson admitted that he did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his MIS 4 supervisory position, which he conceded was a position in which he served as a probationary employee pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(a) and (am), and, therefore, a position in which he had no protection. We therefore direct our discussion to his argument that when he was promoted, he maintained his statutory rights to the position he held prior to the promotion, the non-supervisor MIS 3 position. ¶ 51. In Roth, 408 U.S. 564, the United States Supreme Court explained that property interests are not created by the Constitution, but rather, are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state lawrules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Id. at 577; see also, Vorvald, 167 Wis. 2d at 556 (in determining whether one has a property interest in a job, this court examines state law). Thus, the property interest Arneson had in his pre-promotion position, if any, is to be determined from an examination of the Wisconsin Statutes, and in particular Wis. Stat. Chapter 230, which governs State Employment Relations, as well as our case law interpreting the statutes. ¶ 52. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 230.34(1)(a), a person who has permanent status in class may be removed, suspended without pay, discharged, reduced in base pay or demoted only for just cause. Wis. Stat. § 230.34(1)(a). An employee who may be dismissed only for just cause has a property interest in continued employment which is protected by the due process clause of the federal constitution. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-41; see also State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council, 72 Wis. 2d 672, 678, 242 N.W.2d 689 (1976); Phares v. Gustafsson, 856 F.2d 1003, 1010 (7th Cir. 1988). The parties here do not dispute that as an MIS 3 employee just prior to his promotion, Arneson did have permanent status in class, and as such, a property interest in continued employment that was protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. ¶ 53. The parties are also in agreement that the property interest an employee has in his or her supervisory position as a probationary promotion employee is governed by Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(a) and (am) which together provide that an employee promoted to a supervisory position must serve a one-year probationary period, unless waived after six months, during which time, dismissal may be made at any time without cause. Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(a) and (am). [8] ¶ 54. The parties' point of dispute is the effect of the promotion, and the accompanying probationary period, on Arneson's property interests in his pre-promotion position, the only position for which Arneson is claiming constitutional protection. The defendants argue that when Arneson was promoted from his MIS 3 position to the MIS 4 supervisor position, he forfeited his permanent status that he held as an MIS 3 employee. That is, they argue that Arneson lost the protection of his permanent status with his promotion when he fell subject to the probationary period all promoted employees to supervisory positions are subject to under Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(a) and (am). In their view, any permanent employee could be terminated without cause upon that employee's acceptance of a promotion, regardless of that employee's length of service with the state. [5] ¶ 55. The defendants are in error, for they have not given appropriate weight to Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(d), which must be read in pari materia with § 230.28(1)(a) and (am). We consider the subsection here in determining the extent of Arneson's property interests in his employment: A promotion or other change in job status within an agency shall not affect the permanent status in class and rights, previously acquired by an employe within such agency. Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(d). ¶ 56. When Arneson was promoted within ADP, he had already acquired permanent status in class and rights as an MIS 3 employee and therefore he retained his permanent status pursuant to the dictates of Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(d). And as an employee with permanent status in class, the defendants were required to abide by Wis. Stat. § 230.34(1)(a) when they disciplined him, just as they would have been required to do when disciplining any other permanent status employee. ¶ 57. Despite the statute's unambiguous and express language, the defendants maintain that our decision in DHSS v. State Personnel Bd., 84 Wis. 2d 675, 267 N.W.2d 644 (1978), requires a different outcome. They argue that under DHSS, Arneson forfeited his property interest in permanent employment with the ADP when he was promoted because the case precludes any promoted state employee from carrying with him or her to his or her new position the previously acquired permanent status. ¶ 58. The defendants misread our decision in DHSS, which, in fact, supports Arneson. In DHSS, this court was presented with, among other issues, the question of whether the State Personnel Board had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's appeal alleging that his discharge from classified service within state employment was not for just cause. As here, the plaintiff in DHSS had acquired permanent status in class prior to accepting a promotion. While in the statutorily-defined probationary period governing the promoted position, the plaintiff was terminated. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal, requesting of the board consideration of whether his termination was with cause. ¶ 59. This court held that the board only had jurisdiction to hear appeals from employees with permanent status in class, DHSS, 84 Wis. 2d at 680, and that the plaintiff, due to his promotion, did not have such permanent status due to his inter-departmental promotion. Id. at 680-82. ¶ 60. In determining that the plaintiff did not have any permanent status, this court first turned to the predecessor of the current Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(a), Wis. Stat. § 16.22(1)(a) (1975), which provided that [a]ll original and all promotional appointments to permanent... positions in the classified service shall be for a probationary period of 6 months. . . .Dismissal may be made at any time during such periods. We then recognized that an exception to § 16.22(1)(a) appeared in § 16.22(1)(d) (1975), the equivalent of the current § 230.28(1)(d), which provided that [a] promotion or other change in job status within a department shall not affect the permanent status in class and rights, previously acquired by an employe within such department. Wis. Stat. § 16.22(1)(d) (1975). In considering how the two provisions worked with one another, we stated that [s]ec. 16.22(1)(a) and (d), Stats., requires that promotional appointments in the classified service are subject to a six month probationary period, and possible discharge from the classified service. If an employe is promoted within a department, he may be dismissed from the new position during the probationary period. If dismissal from the new position occurs, the employe must be reinstated to his former position or a similar position within that department. There is no effect on, '... permanent status in class and rights, previously acquired,' if the promotion is intra-departmental. DHSS, 84 Wis. 2d at 681 (emphasis supplied). We then held that the plaintiff in DHSS did not have permanent status in class because the plaintiff in DHSS was promoted inter -departmentally and therefore forfeited his permanent status previously attained. ¶ 61. Quite unlike the plaintiff in DHSS, Arneson was promoted within the same agency in which he first attained his rights in class. [9] Under the express language of the statute, and our interpretation of the statute in DHSS, it is clear that Arneson retained his permanent status in class and rights as an MIS 3 non-supervisor when he was promoted, within the same agency, from an MIS 3 non-supervisor position to an MIS 4 supervisor position. Because he retained this permanent status in class and rights, any discipline affecting his class and rights in his MIS 3 position could be maintained only for just cause in accord with Wis. Stat. § 230.34(1)(a). Therefore, Arneson had a property interest in his MIS 3 position that was clearly established in April 1990. ¶ 62. Our inquiry on qualified immunity must do more than reach this conclusion, however. As Arneson was not terminated from his job, he cannot be claiming a property interest in his continued employment, the property interest that is affected when an employee is terminated. Instead, we find the following: First, his allegation that he was demoted without due process of law is a claim that he has a property interest in the amount of wages commensurate with the MIS 3 position. Second, his allegation that he was suspended without pay without due process of law is a claim that he has a property interest in continuous employment. In other words, this latter claim is that he had a significant private interest in the uninterrupted receipt of his paycheck. See Ibarra v. Martin, 143 F.3d 286, 289 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997).