Opinion ID: 1912119
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Criminal Damage to Property

Text: To prove criminal damage to property, the State had to show that Simion intentionally caused damage to PLI's property without PLI's consent to the damage. Minn.Stat. 609.595. The State claims that because the property Simion damaged belonged to PLI, a Minnesota business located in Hennepin County, and because PLI withheld its consent within Minnesota, jurisdiction exists under paragraph 1 of section 609.025. But the crime of damage to property was complete when Simion acted in Wisconsin. PLI's reaction to the damage, its physical presence in Minnesota, and the fact that PLI experienced economic harm within Minnesota are not relevant considerations as to the determination of jurisdiction under paragraph 1 of section 609.025. Paragraph 1 requires that the defendant commit at least some part of the offense in Minnesota. Minn.Stat. § 609.025(1). There is no evidence in the record showing that Simion committed any of the damage to the truck in Minnesota. Accordingly, we hold that jurisdiction did not exist over the criminal damage to property charge under paragraph 1 of section 609.025. The State also argues that jurisdiction exists under paragraph 3 of section 609.025 because Simion caused a result  economic loss to a Minnesota resident-within Minnesota. The court of appeals seems to have agreed, concluding as follows: The truck belonged to PLI, which was headquartered in Minnesota, and PLI did not consent to appellant causing damage to the truck. Additionally, appellant drove the truck back to Minnesota where it was repaired. Therefore, appellant caused damage to PLI's truck while in Wisconsin, but the act caused a result in Minnesota and jurisdiction was proper. Simion, 2007 WL 1412764, at . This conclusion of the court of appeals requires that we consider whether jurisdiction existed in this case under paragraph 3 of section 609.025 because the corporate victim resides, and therefore suffered injury, in Minnesota. To consider this question, we begin with the Minnesota Constitution. Pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution, a criminal defendant has a right to a trial by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the crime shall have been committed. See also U.S. Const. amend VI (providing that a defendant shall enjoy the right to a trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.). Consistent with the constitutional provision, some operative event or part of the crime charged must be `committed' within Minnesota in order for Minnesota courts to have jurisdiction. Smith, 421 N.W.2d at 319. For example, in Smith we held that the Minnesota court did not have jurisdiction over a prosecution of a defendant for murder when all available evidence indicated that the crime had been committed outside of Minnesota. We noted that the location of the victim's body in Minnesota did not provide a sufficient connection to Minnesota to support jurisdiction over the murder charge. Id. at 320. The constitutionally-based nexus principle we applied in Smith is further illustrated by our analysis in State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn.1978). In McCormick, the defendant and his wife divorced in California and the wife, having been granted custody of the couple's children, moved with them to Minnesota. Id. at 625. Later, she obtained an order from a Minnesota district court restraining the defendant from visiting the children. Id. The defendant thereafter removed the children to California. Id. The defendant was charged under a Minnesota statute that made it a crime to intentionally detain [] [one's] own child    outside the state of Minnesota, with intent to deny another's rights under an existing court order. Id. (citing Minn.Stat. 609.26 (1978)). Based on these facts, the State argued that jurisdiction existed in Minnesota because the defendant's actions cause[d] a result within the state that is detrimental to protectible interests of the state and its citizens. Id. Notwithstanding the fact that his former wife undoubtedly suffered injury in Minnesota due to the defendant's actions in removing the children from Minnesota, we held that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 628. We reached this conclusion because the statute purported to allow prosecution in Minnesota for criminal conduct that occurred entirely outside the State of Minnesota. Id. at 625; see also id. at 628 (Defendant constitutionally and historically can only be tried in the district where the crime occurred, a right which experience demonstrates is designed to further the ends of justice.). The analysis in McCormick supports the conclusion that, as a matter of constitutional law, causing injury to a Minnesota resident through acts committed entirely outside Minnesota is not enough, by itself, to support criminal jurisdiction in Minnesota. See Smith, 421 N.W.2d at 320 (noting that in McCormick we struck down a statute that made totally extraterritorial activity a crime in Minnesota). The test that emerges from our precedent to determine whether the district court had jurisdiction asks whether some operative event, a triggering event, for the crime occurred in Minnesota. Id. at 319. We said in Smith that [t]he event needed, as required by the Minnesota and United States Constitutions, is that some part of the crime charged must be `committed' within the jurisdiction. Id. The result of the criminal behavior caused in Minnesota by acts committed outside Minnesota, as set forth in paragraph 3 of Minn.Stat. § 609.025, could satisfy the test if the result is part of the crime or related to an element of the crime. Several states have recognized this rule. See Cousins v. State, 202 Ark. 500, 151 S.W.2d 658, 660 (1941) (concluding that the overdraft statute was not violated by drawing funds from a bank outside the state, even though the act resulted in defrauding a resident of the state in whose favor the draft was drawn); State v. Cain, 360 Md. 205, 757 A.2d 142, 145 n. 2 (2000) (citing Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727, 521 A.2d 1216, 1219 (1987)) (noting that the intended result or effect can be the basis of territorial jurisdiction only if the definition of the crime includes such a result); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 360 Mass. 580, 276 N.E.2d 705, 709 (1971) ([W]e have held that the crime of larceny, which includes the element of asportation, may be punished in Massachusetts if the thief brings the stolen goods into this State after acquiring them outside the jurisdiction.). The language of our statute also supports this rule because it provides that jurisdiction exists if the result is prohibited by the criminal laws of this state. Minn. Stat. § 609.025(3). When we apply the operative event test to the criminal damage to property charge it is clear that jurisdiction did not exist in Minnesota. Simion committed no criminal behavior relevant to the damage to property charge in Minnesota. As noted above, the crime was complete in Wisconsin when Simion damaged the truck while it was at his residence, and the victim's economic loss in Minnesota is neither part of the crime nor related to an element thereof. See Sykes v. State, 578 N.W.2d 807, 811, 812 (Minn.App.1998), rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 1998) (noting that a Minnesota victim's reaction to the threat is circumstantial evidence relevant to the element of intent and holding that jurisdiction existed under Minn.Stat. § 609.025(3) for a terroristic threats charge because the crime of making terroristic threats was complete when [the defendant's] threats were received by the victims in Minnesota). The court of appeals therefore erred in concluding that jurisdiction existed over the damage to property charge based only on the fact that the alleged victim was located here and therefore felt the effects of the crime in Minnesota. Because no operative event occurred within Minnesota, we hold that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the damage to property charge and we reverse Simion's conviction of that charge.