Opinion ID: 1159631
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim of Privilege

Text: Johnson claims the DA did not bargain for the disclosure of privileged information and Johnson never consented to waive the work product and attorney-client privileges as part of his agreement. The DA does not dispute the privileged nature of the prior polygraphs, and the trial court upheld applicability of the privilege to them. Accordingly, for purposes of this case, we assume that the information the DA's polygraphist requested was privileged. In considering Johnson's privilege claims, we are mindful that the standards for interpreting plea agreements require us to consider constitutional safeguards and the defendant's right to be treated fairly by the government. Craig, 986 P.2d at 961. Although the attorney-client privilege is not itself a constitutional doctrine, in the criminal context preservation of the privilege may implicate a defendant's Sixth-Amendment right to counsel. See Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 882 (Colo.1987). We therefore agree with the trial court that it could not, under the circumstances, order Johnson to surrender the requested material to the DA's polygraphist. Nevertheless, under the sentence reduction provision of the agreement, Johnson must accept the DA polygraphist's opinion that he cannot reliably and accurately determine Johnson's success without the requested information. Johnson cannot assert the privilege and, at the same time, successfully contend that he has qualified for the sentence reduction. Contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion, we do not view this dilemma as a Hobson's choice foisted upon Johnson in violation of his expectations, or fundamental fairness, thereby requiring imposition of the sentence reduction. Rather, this dilemma flowed from Johnson's bargain; he agreed to stand for examination by the DA's polygraphist. Only a statement of successful passage from the polygraphist would trigger the resentencing provision of the plea agreement. Thus, if Johnson wished to invoke the resentencing feature of the agreedupon disposition, he had to satisfy the polygraphist's good-faith request for information needed to accurately test Johnson's contention that he was not involved in Charbonneau's murder. The essence of a plea agreement is the waiver of important rightsoften including constitutional rightsin exchange for an agreed upon disposition. See People v. Kyler, 991 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo.1999). We conclude that, although Johnson was under no obligation to provide the DA's polygraphist privileged information, he cannot assert the privilege to defeat the essence of the resentencing bargainthat he pass the test to the DA polygraphist's satisfaction. [10]