Opinion ID: 2655781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion to Suppress the Shotgun

Text: The petitioner argues that the shotgun taken from his residence should not have been admitted into evidence at his trial because he was subjected to an unlawful arrest and an unreasonable search and seizure. In support of his argument, the petitioner relies upon 4 this Court’s holdings in State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974). In syllabus point six of Thomas, this Court stated that “[e]vidence obtained as a result of a search incident to an unlawful arrest cannot be introduced against the accused upon his trial.” Id. at 641, 203 S.E.2d at 448. This Court further held in Thomas that “‘[e]xcept where authorized by law as incident to a lawful arrest, any search of a person or his dwelling on mere suspicion and the seizure of any article found as a result thereof, without an arrest warrant or a search warrant, is an unlawful search and seizure in violation of Section 6, Article 3 of the Constitution of West Virginia.’ Syllabus Point 1, State v. Smith, [156] W.Va. [385], 193 S.E.2d 550 (1972).” 157 W.Va. at 640-41, 203 S.E.2d at 448, syl. pt. 5. The petitioner maintains that he was under arrest the moment the deputies put him in handcuffs and that the deputies had no probable cause to believe that he had committed the alleged offense at that time because he was not identified by name as the perpetrator during the 911 call and there were at least three other houses in the vicinity of where the shooting occurred. Conversely, the State contends that the petitioner was not arrested until the shotgun was retrieved from his residence. The State says that given the nature of the alleged offense, the deputies detained the petitioner as a safety precaution and further conducted a search based on their belief that a dangerous weapon was present and posed a threat to themselves as well as anyone else who might have been in the area at that time. In other 5 words, the State argues that exigent circumstances, or more particularly, the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, applies in this instance. We agree. In syllabus point twenty of State v. Ladd, 210 W.Va. 413, 557 S.E.2d 820 (2001), this Court explained that “[s]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution–subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. The exceptions are jealously and carefully drawn, and there must be a showing by those who seek exemption that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.” Syllabus Point 1, State v. Moore, 165 W.Va. 837, 272 S.E.2d 804 (1980), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Julius, 185 W.Va. 422, 408 S.E.2d 1 (1991). We have noted that [e]xamples of recognized exceptions to the general warrant requirement include certain brief investigatory stops, searches incident to a valid arrest, seizures of items in plain view, searches and seizures justified by exigent circumstances, consensual searches, and searches in which the special needs of law enforcement make the probable cause and warrant requirements impracticable. State v. Farley, 230 W.Va. 193, 197, 737 S.E.2d 90, 94 (2012). We have also stated “‘[t]he circumstances that justify warrantless searches include those in which officers reasonably fear for their safety, where firearms are present, or where there is risk of a criminal suspect’s 6 escaping or fear of destruction of evidence.’” Lacy, 96 W.Va. at 113, 468 S.E.2d at 728 (quoting United States v. Mendoza-Burciaga, 981 F.2d 192, 196 (5th Cir.1992)). “[T]he emergency doctrine has been defined in various ways and must be considered upon a case by case basis.” State v. Cecil, 173 W.Va. 27, 32, 311 S.E.2d 144, 149 (1983). Generally, the emergency doctrine may be said to permit a limited, warrantless search or entry of an area by police officers where (1) there is an immediate need for their assistance in the protection of human life, (2) the search or entry by the officers is motivated by an emergency, rather than by an intent to arrest or secure evidence, and (3) there is a reasonable connection between the emergency and the area in question. Id. More simply stated, “‘[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.’” State v. Bookheimer, 221 W.Va. 720, 729, 656 S.E.2d 471, 480 (2007) (Maynard, J., dissenting) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 (1967)). Consequently, this Court held in syllabus point two of Cecil that [a]lthough a search and seizure by police officers must ordinarily be predicated upon a written search warrant, a warrantless entry by police officers of a mobile home was proper under the “emergency doctrine” exception to the warrant requirement, where the record indicated that, rather than being motivated by an intent to make an arrest or secure evidence, the police officers were attempting to locate an injured or deceased child, which child the officers had reason to believe was in the mobile home, because of information they received immediately prior to the entry. 7 173 W.Va. at 28, 311 S.E.2d at 146. In this case, the deputies went to the intersection of the roads where it was reported that the shooting took place. While there are other homes in the same general vicinity, only the petitioner’s residence is located at that intersection. The record indicates that the deputies approached the petitioner’s residence with their weapons drawn not only because of the nature of the reported crime, but because Deputy Wilson had previously investigated reports of the petitioner discharging firearms outside of his residence. Thus, in order to protect themselves, as well as any other person in the area, the deputies notified the petitioner of their presence and requested that he come outside of his home. For the same reasons, the deputies immediately detained the petitioner and conducted a search for the shotgun. Upon review, we find that these circumstances satisfied the emergency doctrine exception thereby allowing the deputies to conduct a warrantless search. Moreover, we further find that even absent the existence of exigent circumstances, the police officers were entitled to conduct a protective search. A protective search is defined as a quick and limited search of premises for weapons once an officer has individualized suspicion that a dangerous weapon is present and poses a threat to the well-being of himself and others. This cursory visual inspection is limited to the area where the 8 suspected weapon could be contained and must end once the weapon is found and secured. Lacy, 196 W.Va. at 107, 468 S.E.2d at 722, syl. pt. 8. This Court explained in Lacy that [n]either a showing of exigent circumstances nor probable cause is required to justify a protective sweep for weapons as long as a two-part test is satisfied: An officer must show there are specific articulable facts indicating danger and this suspicion of danger to the officer or others must be reasonable. If these two elements are satisfied, an officer is entitled to take protective precautions and search in a limited fashion for weapons. Id. at 107, 468 S.E.2d at 722, syl. pt. 6. We further held that [t]he existence of a reasonable belief should be analyzed from the perspective of the police officers at the scene; an inquiring court should not ask what the police could have done but whether they had, at the time, a reasonable belief that there was a need to act without a warrant. Id. at 107, 468 S.E.2d at 722, syl. pt. 7. While the petitioner was detained when Deputy Wilson conducted his search, at that juncture, the officers had no basis to know whether there was anyone else present, either inside or outside of the petitioner’s residence. Further, they were responding to reports of gunfire in that area. At the suppression hearing, Deputy Rhodes testified as follows in response to questioning by the State: Q: On [November 12, 2011], you had occasion to respond to a dispatch from a 911 center to Ashton Upland Road, Milton area, Mason County? A: Yes. 9 Q: What was your reason for responding to that lotion [sic]? A: Shots fired. Supposedly shots was [sic] fired at a person driving by in a vehicle. Q: Did they tell you where and give you any indication regarding the person suspect [sic] of doing that? A: They did. They said it was in the area of Curtis Kimble’s residence. . . . .... Q: What happened when you got there? A: Deputy Wilson actually ordered him out of the trailer onto the ground. Q: What do you mean ordered him out? A: Mr. Kimble was inside the trailer. Q: I understand that. What was said? A: Mr. Kimble, come out of the trailer, this is the sheriff’s department. Once he came out– Q: In response to Deputy Wilson asking– A: Mr. Kimble did come out. Q: –Mr. Kimble to come out, he came out? A: Yes. Q: What happened when Mr. Kimble exited the trailer? A: Deputy Wilson then ordered him to get on the ground, which he did and then after he did lay on the ground, I then cuffed him 10 just to secure the scene until we could figure out exactly what was going on. Deputy Rhodes’s testimony clearly satisfied the two-part test established in syllabus point six of Lacy. See 196 W.Va. at 107, 468 S.E.2d at 722. Accordingly, based on all the above, the circuit court did not err in refusing the petitioner’s motion to suppress the shotgun.