Opinion ID: 776953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis of the California Courts of Appeal Decisions

Text: 75 In order to merit habeas relief, the California Courts of Appeal decisions 18 must be either contrary to or involve an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. Andrade concluded that the United States Supreme Court law governing the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was clearly established at the time of the California Court of Appeal decision in that case, that is on May 13, 1997. See 270 F.3d at 766; see also Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114, 119 S.Ct. 890 (Stevens. J., memorandum opinion respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari) (stating that petitioner sentenced to 25 years to life for petty theft could seek federal habeas relief, because he was asking the Supreme Court to apply a settled rule of Eighth Amendment law). Bray's court of appeal decision was filed on May 21, 1997. Although the court of appeal issued Brown's decision in 1996, Andrade did not rely on any Supreme Court cases issued after 1991. Therefore, under Andrade, the relevant Supreme Court cases were clearly established law by the time of the California Courts of Appeal decisions in these cases. 76 If we focus particularly on the fact that Bray and Brown had violent prior convictions, that conclusion does not change. Several Supreme Court cases decided before the California decisions in these cases stated that using sentencing enhancements as an additional penalty for the earlier crimes as opposed to a stiffened penalty for the latest crime could violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Witte, 515 U.S. at 400, 115 S.Ct. 2199; see also Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 3001; Gryger, 334 U.S. at 732, 68 S.Ct. 1256; Moore, 159 U.S. at 677, 16 S.Ct. 179; Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173. Thus, the principles that we apply in analyzing the California Courts of Appeal decisions have been clearly established by the United States Supreme Court.
77 Bray explicitly raised the argument that his sentence violated the United States Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The California Court of Appeal opinion in his case, however, referred exclusively to California law and failed to mention any of the three critical Supreme Court cases. More significantly, the court refused to give any weight to the relatively minor nature of his current offense. After reviewing Bray's criminal history, the court stated that, [q]uite clearly, Bray's sentence is the result of his recidivist behavior and it is that behavior that justifies the 25 years to life term. 19 78 In Andrade, we held that upholding an indeterminate life sentence for a petty theft offense which is normally a misdemeanor constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law governing the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 270 F.3d at 766. Because, as we have shown, Bray's case is materially indistinguishable from Andrade, had the state court conducted an analysis under the controlling precedents, it would have been unreasonable for it not to conclude under the Solem test that Bray's sentence was grossly disproportionate to his petty theft offense, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, the Bray court's decision that the statute, as applied, was constitutional is clearly erroneous, and Bray would be entitled to relief under the unreasonable application clause of AEDPA had the state court applied the relevant Supreme Court precedent. Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1153-54. 20 Having determined that there was clear error sufficient to satisfy the unreasonable application clause, we hold that a fortiori the state court decision was erroneous and merits habeas relief under the contrary to clause. See Packer, 277 F.3d at 1102 & n. 12 (holding that, when a state court decision fails to apply controlling Supreme Court precedent, the fact that the result is erroneous is sufficient, so long as the Brecht standard is met). Therefore, Bray is entitled to habeas relief.
79 The California Court of Appeal's opinion in Brown, like the opinion in Bray, focused primarily on state law and concluded that Brown's sentence was not disproportionate to the petty theft offense within the meaning of the California Constitution. Although the Brown court did refer to the Supreme Court's decision in Harmelin, the court did not apply the controlling Supreme Court test for determining whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. Rather than considering whether Brown's sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime of petty theft for which he was convicted, as Solem and Harmelin require, the Brown court compared Brown's sentence to his entire criminal history, noting that, if life without parole for one drug offense in Harmelin was not disproportionate, then  a fortiori a term of 25 years to life for a person with [Brown's] record cannot be considered disproportional. See People v. Brown, C023139, at 3 (Cal.Ct.App.1997) (second emphasis added). Because the addition, deletion, or alteration of a factor in a test established by the Supreme Court constitutes a failure to apply controlling Supreme Court law, Brown's habeas petition, like Bray's, is properly resolved under the contrary to clause of AEDPA. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Packer, 277 F.3d at 1100-01. 80 In any event, because we hold that Brown's case, like Bray's, is materially indistinguishable from Andrade, the Brown court's decision that the statute was constitutional as applied was clearly erroneous and would merit habeas relief under the unreasonable application clause of AEDPA, had the Brown court applied the relevant Supreme Court precedent. See Andrade, 270 F.3d at 766 (holding that the state court's disregard for Harmelin 's distinguishing of the severity of the defendant's crime in that case from the relatively minor nature of the offenses in Solem resulted in an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law). The California Court of Appeal itself characterized Brown's petty theft as a fairly nonserious offense, so the court's application of Harmelin to the facts in Brown was objectively unreasonable. See id. As we explained in our analysis of the state court decision in Bray, the clear error required to satisfy the unreasonable application clause of AEDPA a fortiori satisfies the lesser requirement of error under the contrary to clause. See Packer, 277 F.3d at 1102 & n. 12. Therefore, Brown, like Bray, is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 21