Opinion ID: 4148521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Government’s Fallback Arguments

Text: The government argues that even if there was not reasonable suspicion justifying the continued detention, the evidence should not be suppressed. It has separate arguments relating to Adrienne and Angela.3
The government argues that the evidence is admissible against Adrienne because the discovery of the methamphetamine was not the fruit of her unlawful detention. It relies on our opinion in United States v. DeLuca, 269 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2001). In that case the police seized drugs from the trunk of a car that had been unlawfully detained after an initial lawful stop. See id. at 1130–31. Mr. DeLuca was in the car but was neither the driver nor the owner. See id. at 1130. We said that Mr. DeLuca ordinarily would not have standing to challenge the search of the car because he did not have a possessory or ownership interest in it, but that he could have the evidence suppressed if it had been found as the fruit of his own unlawful detention. See id. at 1133. To prevail, he needed to show that the drugs “would never have been found but for his, and only his, unlawful detention.” Id. We concluded, however, that there was not a sufficient factual nexus between Mr. DeLuca’s detention and the discovery of the drugs. See id. at 1135. In the circumstances of that case, the only possible way for him to show such a nexus was by providing evidence that he would have been permitted to leave the scene in the 3 Although the district court did not reach these arguments, the government preserved them by raising them below. 12 detained car if he had asked to do so. See id. at 1133. He made no such showing, so the evidence was admissible against him. Not so with Adrienne. DeLuca’s requirements were satisfied here. When the drug dog arrived and sniffed around the car’s exterior, it jumped through the open front passenger window and alerted on Adrienne’s purse under the front seat. Adrienne then admitted having some marijuana in her purse. Krause seized the marijuana and proceeded to search the rest of the car, discovering the methamphetamine in the cooler on the backseat. Thus, it was the detention of Adrienne’s personal property, her purse, that led to the search of the car and the discovery of the methamphetamine. We hold that this was a sufficient nexus to give her standing to challenge the admission into evidence of the drugs.
The government’s argument regarding Angela would sustain the admission of the evidence against both Angela and Adrienne. It contends that even absent reasonable suspicion, the detention was lawful because there was probable cause to arrest Angela for driving while not in possession of her driver’s license. See K.S.A. § 8-244. We agree that if there was probable cause to arrest for a crime, it does not matter whether the officer subjectively detained the person for that crime. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (constitutional reasonableness does not depend on actual motivations of individual officers involved). The problem for the government is that there was not probable cause to arrest Angela. 13 To begin with, we question whether the document Angela gave to Krause—the receipt from the California Department of Motor Vehicles—would not be a “driver’s license” under the Kansas statute. (It apparently sufficed for the rental company to let her take the car.) But even if it was not the requisite license, Krause did not have probable cause to arrest her when the detention was continued to await the drug dog. To be sure, the Kansas statute requires every licensee to “have his or her driver’s license in his or her immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle.” K.S.A. § 8-244. It goes on to say, however, that “no person charged with violating this section shall be convicted if such person produces in court or the office of the arresting officer a driver’s license theretofore issued to such person and valid at the time of arrest.” Id. Upon learning from the dispatcher that Angela had a valid driver’s license in California, Krause had enough information to know that Angela could not be convicted for this offense. An officer does not have probable cause to arrest a person for a crime when he knows she could not be convicted. See Brown v. Fisher, 251 F. App’x 527, 534 (10th Cir. 2007) (expressing doubt that officer could arrest driver for violation of this very statute when officer knew that driver was licensed); see also United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633, 640 (10th Cir. 2001) (“If the police learn information that destroys their probable cause to arrest a defendant, the arrest may become illegal.”)