Opinion ID: 1736847
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Incomplete Record / Challenge for Cause

Text: In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues that the incomplete appellate record is insufficient to enable appellate counsel and this court to review the proceedings for error. The defendant complains that approximately fifty-seven bench conferences took place off the record, many of which allegedly addressed matters critical to an adequate review of the proceedings below. The defendant contends that the deficiencies in the record of voir dire most clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of the record as a whole. Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have made clear that a criminal defendant has a right to a complete transcript of the trial proceedings, particularly, where as here, appellate counsel was not counsel at trial. See Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 84 S.Ct. 424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331 (1964); State v. Robinson, 387 So.2d 1143 (La.1980). Further, in Louisiana, a defendant is constitutionally guaranteed the right of appeal based upon a complete record of all the evidence upon which the judgment is based. La. Const. art. I, § 19. Thus, material omissions from the transcript of the proceedings at trial bearing on the merits of an appeal will require reversal. See State v. Landry, 97-0499 (La.6/29/99), 751 So.2d 214 (finding appellate record so deficient that the court could not properly review the case for error); Robinson, supra (holding that reversal required when record failed to contain the testimony of a state and defense expert witness); State v. Ford, 338 So.2d 107 (La.1976) (determining that reversal required when record was missing the testimony of four state witnesses and the voir dire of prospective jurors). On the other hand, inconsequential omissions or slight inaccuracies do not require reversal, as an incomplete record may nonetheless be adequate for appellate review. See State v. Castleberry, 98-1388, p. 29 (La.4/13/99), 758 So.2d 749, 773; State v. Hawkins, 96-0766, p. 8 (La.1/14/97), 688 So.2d 473, 480; State v. Allen, 95-1754, p. 11 (La.9/5/96), 682 So.2d 713, 722. Finally, a defendant is not entitled to relief because of an incomplete record absent a showing of prejudice based on the missing portions of the transcripts. Castleberry, supra (holding that the defendant failed to show any prejudice resulting from bench conferences not being transcribed and, therefore, there was no reversible error); Allen, supra (finding that defendant was not prejudiced by failure of court reporter to record attorney's arguments concerning some of their peremptory challenges which were made during bench conferences). In the instant case, the defendant complains primarily of the transcription of voir dire proceedings. Specifically, the defendant complains that the court reporter did not identify prospective jurors by name as they responded to questions during voir dire and further failed to record bench conferences in which peremptory strikes and challenges for cause were made by the prosecutor and defense counsel. As an initial matter, we note that during the death qualification process, the trial court did identify each juror by name. However, during the general voir dire examination, the court reporter designated each venire person by the term PROSPECTIVE JUROR, instead of by each individual's name. Even so, a review of the transcript reveals that the court reporter's omission does not render it impossible to determine the identity of the juror speaking, given that the attorneys referred to most of the prospective jurors by name during their questioning. While it is true that there is no record of the bench conferences during which the prosecutor and defense made their peremptory and cause challenges, the defendant only points to one potential juror whom he believes should have been struck for cause. The defendant asserts that it is likely that the trial court erroneously denied a challenge for cause of prospective juror, Gerard Kreider, who was employed as a New Orleans Police Lieutenant at the time. The jury strike sheet indicates that the defense exercised its fifth peremptory challenge against Mr. Kreider, but does not indicate whether a challenge for cause was made first. Arguably, defense counsel may have unsuccessfully challenged Mr. Kreider for cause and then been forced to exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse him. In support of this claim, appellate counsel attaches an affidavit to her brief signed by Robert Jenkins, lead trial counsel for the defense, stating that, it is [his] uniform practice to seek removal for cause of any actively employed law enforcement officer. However, Mr. Jenkins conceded that he has no specific recollection as to whether he challenged Mr. Kreider for cause in this case. Even assuming the defense unsuccessfully challenged Mr. Kreider for cause, the trial court's denial of that challenge would not have constituted reversible error. In State v. Ballard, 98-2198 (La.10/19/99), 747 So.2d 1077, this court overruled State v. Simmons, 390 So.2d 1317 (La.1980), and held that Louisiana courts should no longer presume that police officers actively engaged in law enforcement are incompetent criminal jurors. Further, a trial court's refusal to excuse a prospective juror for cause is not an abuse of discretion if the juror demonstrates that he or she is willing and able to decide the case impartially and according to the law. State v. Cross, 93-1189, p. 8 (La.6/30/95), 658 So.2d 683, 687; State v. Robertson, 92-2660, p. 4 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1278, 1281. The following portion of voir dire involving Mr. Kreider demonstrates that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, if he, in fact, determined that Mr. Kreider was able to act impartially as a juror on this case: STATE: And would the fact that your are a police officer ... cause you to lean towards the State in this case? JUROR: Absolutely not.     STATE: Okay. The fact that you know these officers, would that cause you to give them any more credibility than any other witness when they take they stand? JUROR: No.     DEFENSE: Do you think or do you believe that just because a police officer is going to sit here, he's going to tell the truth? JUROR: No. DEFENSE: And you are familiar with Detective Marco Demma; is that correct? JUROR: I know him. I wouldn't say friends but I know him from being on the job. DEFENSE: Okay. And what about Richard Leblanc? JUROR: No. I know him. DEFENSE: Gerald Kuhn. Do you know those JUROR: I know the names. DEFENSE: All right. And let's say that you came back and you sat on this jury and there was a not guilty verdict. Would you have any problems with that or going back to work as a police officer? JUROR: No. DEFENSE: And you can be fair and impartial? JUROR: Absolutely. Additionally, Mr. Kreider indicated that he could consider mitigating evidence at the penalty phase and that, with respect to the elements needed for an identification, he would have to consider the witnesses' description of the perpetrator's clothing, height, weight, and the time frame in which the witnesses viewed the perpetrator. If anything, voir dire reveals that Mr. Kreider most likely could have acted as an impartial and well-informed juror. We also note that another prospective juror, Mr. Flot, was excused for cause based on his employment as a New Orleans Police Officer, thereby indicating that the trial court was willing to excuse police officers for cause when it was necessary in order to empanel a fair jury. Regarding the defendant's argument that the record is insufficient for this court to make a meaningful review because the bench conferences were not transcribed, upon a review of the record, we find this claim likewise to be without merit. Louisiana Code Crim. Proc. art. 843 provides: In felony cases, and on motion of the court, the State, or the defendant in misdemeanor cases tried in a district, parish, or city court, the clerk or court stenographer shall record all of the proceedings, including the examination of prospective jurors, the testimony of witnesses, statements, rulings, orders, and charges by the court, and objections, questions, statements, and arguments of counsel. This court has never articulated a per se rule either requiring the recording of bench conferences or exempting them from the scope of La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 843. State v. Hoffman, 98-3118, p. (La.4/11/00), 768 So.2d 542, 586. However, in Hoffman, we interpreted Article 843's requirement that objections and arguments be recorded as normally applying only to objections made in open court and the arguments of counsel in closing, because only these objections and arguments rise to a level of materiality sufficient to invoke Article 843. Id. We further determined in that case that, similarly, Art. I., § 19's mandate that evidence be recorded does not encompass bench conferences; at least, not ones that do not satisfy the materiality requirements of La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 843. Id. at 587. While the defendant points to several different bench conferences that occurred off-the-record, primarily involving evidentiary matters, we first note that many of those matters were preserved for review, because defense counsel lodged objections on the record at trial, and have been raised on appeal. As for the remainder of the unrecorded bench conferences, the defendant has not demonstrated any specific prejudice which he suffered as a result of those conferences not being transcribed; nor does anything in the record suggest that the conferences had a discernible impact on the proceedings. See Hoffman, 768 So.2d at 587 (finding that where defendant could point to no specific prejudice, the failure to record bench conferences did not constitute reversible error); Castleberry, 758 So.2d at 772-73 (stating that absence from the record of four unrecorded bench conferences did not deny defendant effective appellate review); State v. Brumfield, 96-2667, pp. 14-16 (La.10/28/98), 737 So.2d 660, 669-670 (holding that the trial court's failure to have each bench conference and ruling properly transcribed was not reversible error when the defendant failed to show that he was prevented from presenting any relevant evidence and failed to establish that any prejudice resulted from the absence in the record.) [5]