Opinion ID: 1646714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the claims against Columbia, Eastern, and MacMillan are barred by the statute of limitations.

Text: Plaintiffs commenced the original suit against Columbia after the one-year statute of limitations for negligence actions had expired. Therefore, in order for Plaintiffs' claims against this defendant not to be time barred, the substitution of Columbia for fictitious party No. 1 must relate back under ARCP 9(h), pursuant to ARCP 15(c). Several recent cases of the Court control the disposition of this issue: Threadgill v. Birmingham Board of Education, 407 So.2d 129 (Ala.1981); Walden v. Mineral Equipment Company, 406 So.2d 385 (Ala.1981); Minton v. Whisenant, 402 So.2d 971 (Ala.1981); and Fowlkes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 392 So.2d 803 (Ala.1980). These cases collectively stand for the proposition that a plaintiff, in order to invoke the relation back principles of Rules 9(h) and 15(c), must meet the following criteria: 1) Plaintiff must state a cause of action against the fictitious party in the body of the original complaint; and 2) plaintiff must be ignorant of the identity of the fictitious party, in the sense of having no knowledge at the time of the filing that the later named party was in fact the party intended to be sued. Study of these cases shows that Rule 9(h) is not intended to give plaintiffs additional time beyond the statutorily prescribed period within which to formulate causes of action. Instead, the principal reason for the rule is to toll the statute of limitations in emergency cases where plaintiff knows he has been injured and has a cause of action against some person or entity, but has been unable to ascertain through due diligence the name of that responsible person or entity. Browning v. City of Gadsden, 359 So.2d 361 (Ala.1978). A contrary rule would emasculate the statute of limitations, which sets the time period a plaintiff has in which to determine who has hurt him and how. Indeed, such an interpretation would amount to nothing less than the creation of a discovery exception to the statute of limitations. Additionally, the argument in favor of such an interpretation would support a tolling of the statute until discovery of the cause of action, rather than the classical tolling until discovery of injury which is generally contemplated by our discovery statutes. Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish factually the Fowlkes line of cases, and contend that the requirements of those cases are met. In support of this distinction, Plaintiffs point out that in Fowlkes, the fictitious parties were described as persons, partnerships or corporations, whose names, identities, and places of business are unknown to the plaintiff, whereas in the instant case, fictitious party No. 1 was described with more particularity, and the activity material to the Defendant's liabilitythe engineering workwas stated. We find no merit in this distinction. The proper scope of comparison is whether there was a cause of action stated in the body of the complaint, not on the degree of particularity with which the fictitious defendant is described. Nowhere in the complaint is there a description of any wrongdoing on the part of Columbia or fictitious defendant No. 1. Plaintiffs argue further that a cause of action has been stated against the fictitious parties because, unlike in Fowlkes, they specifically stated in the body of their original complaints that the aforesaid wrongful conduct of each of the defendants combined and concurred, and plaintiff avers that as a direct result of this combined and concurring wrongful conduct of said defendants, plaintiffs were injured and damaged as follows. Plaintiffs incorrectly conclude that this language refers to all defendants, and thereby draws the description of fictitious party No. 1, which appeared in the summonses, into the complaints. Here, again, Plaintiffs fail to address the real question whether there was any allegation of wrongful conduct by the fictitious party sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Even if the description of fictitious party No. 1 had appeared in the complaints, it would still be insufficient to state a cause of action, because there was no allegation of what the engineering company did wrong. Plaintiffs inconsistently argue later in their brief, in response to Columbia's argument that Columbia was not timely substituted after its identity became known, that Plaintiffs had no facts which would have indicated a probable cause of action against Columbia until about a month prior to the amendment substituting Columbia in September, 1980. This concession reinforces our holding that no cause of action was stated against Columbia sufficient to invoke the relation back principles of Alabama's fictitious party practice. It is evident from the briefs in this case that there is still confusion about the current status of our fictitious party practice. Indeed, many of the arguments made as to the proper interpretation of our fictitious party practice are addressed to the unreasonableness of the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury negligence actions. The problem, however, cannot be judicially remedied by giving Rule 9(h) an unintended meaning. The remedy, if any, is one of policy that can only be addressed by a legislative extension of the statute of limitations. To be sure, while one year is a relatively short period of limitations, our fictitious party rule is a liberal one. Any count in a complaint which would state a cause of action under our liberal notice pleading rules would also state a cause of action against a fictitious party. One need not state with more particularity a cause of action against an unknown party as compared to a named partythe test is the same. We should re-emphasize, however, that Rule 9(h) was not meant to excuse ignorance of the identity of a cause of action, but only ignorance of the name of the party against whom a cause of action is stated. Resolution of the previous issue would foreclose further discussion concerning Columbia were it not for this additional argument: Even if the amendment did not relate back, Columbia is nevertheless precluded from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense because it failed to plead this defense in its answer to Plaintiffs' complaints, thereby violating ARCP 8(c). Plaintiffs base their waiver argument upon two Alabama cases Robinson v. Morse, 352 So.2d 1355 (Ala.1977), and Magic Tunnel Car Wash Equipment Co., Inc. v. Brush King Franchises, Inc., 53 Ala.App. 345, 300 So.2d 116 (Ala.Civ.App.1974). In addition, it is argued that because Columbia waited almost a year before raising this issue, Plaintiffs were unduly prejudiced by engaging in extensive discovery. Therefore, Plaintiffs say, this delay should also constitute waiver. In Robinson, the Court was confronted with a situation where the statute of limitations defense was raised after the appellant's motion for a new trial was denied. The Court addressed the issue thusly: Rule 8(c), A.R.C.P. requires that the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations be affirmatively set forth. See Blackmon v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 294 Ala. 426, 318 So.2d 286 (1975). Where, however, a party fails to plead an affirmative defense, it is generally deemed to have been waived. 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1278, pp. 339-52. Thus, it has been held in a number of cases that parties have waived their defense of the statute of limitations by failing to plead it. E.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir.1976); Jakobsen v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 520 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1975). Of course, there are exceptions to this rule. `Of course, the waiver rule is not automatically applied and as a practical matter there are numerous exceptions to it. Thus, as discussed in the preceding section, the substance of many unpleaded affirmative defenses may be asserted by pretrial motions. Moreover, even if defendant does not assert an affirmative defense in his answer, he may amend his pleading under Rule 15(a) without leave of the court within 20 days after it has been served if plaintiff is not permitted to interpose a responsive pleading. When this provision is unavailing, he may amend his pleading to assert an omitted affirmative defense on the written consent of the adverse party or by leave of the court, which shall be freely given when justice so requires. Even as late as trial, if evidence relating to an unpleaded defense is introduced without objection, Rule 15(b) requires the pleadings to be treated as if they actually had raised the issue. However, if the record indicates that the unpleaded affirmative defense has not been tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, the pleadings will not be treated as if they actually had raised the defense, and the court may decide not to permit the issue to be litigated.' (Footnotes omitted.) 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1278 (citations omitted.) In this case, however, none of the exceptions apply. Not only was the statute of limitations issue raised for the first times six days after trial, but it was also not tried with the `implied or express consent of the parties.' 352 So.2d at 1356-57. In Magic Tunnel, a buyer brought an action against the seller of certain equipment to recover the down payment allegedly procured by fraud. The Court of Civil Appeals held that waiver results when the party raising the statute of limitations defense waits until oral argument on a motion for new trial before apprising the trial court of its reliance on such defense. The Court stated: In the instant case we believe that defendant should have informed the trial court prior to or at the time of the request for the affirmative charge that it considered the complaint barred by the appropriate statute of limitations. It is obvious from reading the record in this case that the trial was not conducted on the theory that the statute of limitations was a defense. The trial court instructed the jury on the law of fraud and, after concluding its charge on the law of the case, asked counsel if they were satisfied with the charge, and defendant's counsel answered that it was so satisfied. Furthermore, the written charges requested by defendant were directed to a finding for defendant on the failure of the evidence to prove that at the time the promises were made there was an intent not to comply with them. Such requests could have caused the trial judge to assume that the sole defense being relied on by defendant was the general issue, thereby obscuring the possible defense of the statute of limitations. Magic Tunnel Car Wash Equipment Co., Inc. v. Brush King Franchises, Inc., 300 So.2d at 119. Columbia, in opposition to Plaintiffs' waiver contention, argues that its amended answer under ARCP 15(c) related back to the time of the original answer. Columbia, in addition to distinguishing the cases relied on by Plaintiffs, cites Pierce v. Webb, 398 So.2d 271 (Ala.1981). In Pierce, the sole issue was whether the amended answer pleading the defense of statute of limitations at the close of the case should have been permitted by the trial court. 398 So.2d at 271. This Court, affirming the trial court, held that ARCP 15(b) permits a trial judge within his discretion to allow amended pleadings, and that the amendment fell within the exception to the general rule enumerated in Robinson that failure to plead such defense constitutes waiver. Turning to the case at bar, we find the trial court allowed Columbia's amendment to its original answer, as in Pierce, and Plaintiffs made no motion to strike the amendment. Thus, the case having been tried upon the amended answer, the stated reasons for waiver in Robinson and Magic Tunnel are not controlling here. See Zeigler v. Baker, 344 So.2d 761 (Ala.1977). We hold, therefore, that because Plaintiffs' amendment adding Columbia did not relate back prior to the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations, and because Columbia did not waive this defense, the judgment against Columbia is due to be reversed, and judgment rendered in favor of Columbia.
Eastern was not brought into the lawsuit until August, 1977, over two years after the one-year statute of limitations for personal injuries had expired. It was also substituted for fictitious party No. 1. For the same reasons discussed under the previous subsection, we find that no cause of action was stated in the body of the original complaint, and consequently the amendment substituting Eastern did not relate back. Therefore, the statute of limitations is a valid defense. Because this defense was raised in Eastern's original answer, no waiver question is presented. It follows that the judgment against Eastern likewise is due to be reversed, and judgment rendered in its favor.
MacMillan was brought back into the lawsuit shortly before trial by substitution for fictitious defendant No. 3. Under the above-stated principles, it seems on first blush that MacMillan should also prevail on its statute of limitations defense, because no cause of action was stated against fictitious party No. 3. Here, however, because MacMillan was named as an original defendant before the substitution of Particle Board, a different analysis is warranted. We must ascertain, therefore, whether MacMillan was validly in the lawsuit on some basis other than through substitution as a fictitious party. MacMillan cites Eason v. Middleton, 398 So.2d 245 (Ala.1981), for this proposition: Once a defendant is identified, properly before the court, and thereafter dismissed, the plaintiff cannot take advantage of the fictitious party rule to bring the dismissed party back in after the statute of limitations has run, because the identity of the party is known at the inception of the suit. We agree; but, as the Eason court pointed out, its holding is premised upon the utilization of the fictitious party rule: Although it is not clear under which theory the plaintiff sought to add Wanda Middleton as a defendant, we assume that she was being added by the fictitious party provision of Rule 9(h), ARCP.... 398 So.2d at 247. Plaintiffs contend, however, that they are not relying on the fictitious party provision as regards MacMillan. Their argument is this: 1) MacMillan was properly and timely served originally; 2) the order of dismissal was not made final pursuant to ARCP 54(b); and, therefore, the action was not terminated as to MacMillan; and 3) the amended complaint, filed when MacMillan was added, related back to the time of the filing of the original complaints pursuant to ARCP 15(c), because the claim arose out of the conduct set forth in the original pleading. This Court in Eason did not address the situation where a nonfinal judgment was involved; nor did the Court address the effect of the first sentence of ARCP 15(c) on facts as here presented. Had the final judgment been entered and the lawsuit terminated as to MacMillan, then its argument would not concern the statute of limitations. Rather, its argument would be that it had a final judgment, the time for appeal had run, and the subsequent amendment was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. We find Plaintiffs' argument convincing, and hold the statute of limitations did not bar an action against MacMillan.