Opinion ID: 1760583
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: since the henry case

Text: There are many interesting articles written by law professors, law editors, and students, upon the rule in the Henry case. A few of them are listed below: The Inadequate State Ground by Alfred Hill, Professor of Law, Columbia University, Columbia L.Rev., Vol. 65:943, No. 6 (June 1965); (This is a very comprehensive article.) The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, by Paul J. Mishkin, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Constitutional Law, Adequate State Ground, Contemporaneous Objection Rule, Harvard L.Rev., Vol. 79:56, at p. 117. Federal Jurisdiction  Non-Federal Ground Rule, North Carolina L.Rev., Vol. 43, at p. 988, by Ronald W. Howell (1965). Federal Court Procedure, Texas L.Rev., Vol. 987 (1965), by Darryl M. Springs. Search and Seizure    Waiver (Supreme Court decisions), American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 51, at p. 375 (1965). It is respectfully suggested that the rule in the Henry case is more stringent than the rule in the Federal Courts over which the Supreme Court of the United States has supervisory jurisdiction. Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the defendant to make a motion for the return of illegally seized evidence prior to the trial, but it is said: (T)he court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing. (p. 213) Note 104, Title 18, United States Code Annotated (1961) at page 273, cited under this Rule, sets out many cases wherein it is recognized that timely objection to evidence obtained by an unlawful search must be made by the defendant prior to the trial where he had ample opportunity to do so. There are many cases holding that the filing of a motion on the first day of the trial was untimely. See Supplementary Note 113 at page 111. United States v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697, cert. den. 84 S.Ct. 337, 375 U.S. 933, 11 L.Ed.2d 265 (U.S.Ct. App.2nd Cir.), (N.Y. 1963). In an effort to coordinate our procedure with that of the Federal Court on a method of securing to the defendant an adequate hearing as to the exclusion of tainted evidence, we adopted a rule similar to Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Procedure. Henry v. State, 253 Miss. 263, 174 So.2d 348, 351 (1965). Many state courts across the Nation have reexamined their rules of procedure since the Henry case, and have retained the requirement that a contemporaneous objection be made to the tainted evidence. In the case of In Re Sterling, 63 A.C. 509, 47 Cal. Rptr. 205, 208, 407 P.2d 5, 8 (1965), Chief Justice Roger Traynor points out that California has adequate procedural rules to meet the requirement of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), and states: Failure to exercise these readily available remedies will ordinarily constitute such a deliberate bypassing of orderly state procedures as to justify denial of federal as well as state collateral relief. In the case of Nelson v. People of State of California, Cal., 346 F.2d 73 (1965), (218 Cal. App.2d 359, 32 Cal. Rptr. 675  1963), the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit delivered a comprehensive opinion analyzing, expanding and elucidating upon the rule in the Henry case. The Court pointed out in the Nelson case that although the search of the defendant's apartment was made without a search warrant, Nelson was represented by a Deputy Public Defender of Los Angeles County, and this counsel objected to the testimony on the ground that it was immaterial. The objection was sustained and was not further explored. There was no objection made at any time during the trial to the effect that the evidence was obtained by an illegal search in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. The Court pointed out that unless the objection is raised in the trial court under the law of California, it cannot be raised on appeal. The defendant contended upon appeal that the trial court erred because it did not conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not the search was illegal. The appellate court pointed out that the Federal Court was required to make an independent investigation of constitutional issues of fact, and that the District Court had concluded that the defendant had deliberately bypassed the right to make an objection. The Court then analyzed Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965), and compared it with Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), and concluded in Nelson : We think that Henry limits Fay v. Noia at least to this extent  that it stands for the proposition that counsel's decision, although made `without prior consultation with an accused,' to by-pass the contemporaneous-objection rule as part of trial strategy, will nevertheless `preclude the accused from asserting constitutional claims.' 346 F.2d at 81. Many state and federal cases have cited the Henry case and pointed out that under the same or similar facts and circumstances set out therein, the attorney for the defendant waived and bypassed the right to object to the evidence of an alleged violation of a known constitutional right. See: Commonwealth ex rel. Mullenaux v. Myers, 421 Pa. 61, 217 A.2d 730 (1966), (failure to object to confession); State v. Tahash, 141 N.W.2d 3 (1966), (Minn. 1965); Commonwealth v. Kulik, 420 Pa. 111, 216 A.2d 73 (1966), (dissenting opinion); Commonwealth ex rel. Adderley v. Myers, 418 Pa. 366, 211 A.2d 481 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 207 A.2d 810 (1965), (failure to object to confession). In the case of Jones v. State, 388 S.W.2d 429, 430 (1965), (Texas Ct. of Crim.App.), the Court said: This Court has consistently held that in the absence of a timely objection, complaint as to the receipt of evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained is waived. See the many opinions written prior to the Henry case collected under 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1060 b., Note 46 at page 8 (1961); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1678(4) p. 1194 (1961); 53 Am.Jur. Trial 117 § 134 (Time of Objection) (1945). I am therefore of the opinion that the defendant and his attorneys did not object to the tainted evidence during the original hearing, and that this failure was a deliberate bypass. I am fortified in this conclusion because of the efforts made by the attorneys for the defendant on the rehearing to prevent the court from determining whether or not the defendant intended to object to the tainted evidence. Moreover, the great weight of authority requires a contemporaneous objection to evidence sought to be excluded.