Opinion ID: 2525568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant's Request for Cross-Relief

Text: ¶ 35 In her request for cross-relief, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the maximum 10-year extended-term sentence for intimidation. We disagree. ¶ 36 A reviewing court gives substantial deference to the trial court's sentencing decision because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, is in a much better position to consider factors such as the defendant's credibility, demeanor, moral character, mentality, environment, habits, and age. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill.2d 205, 212-13, 346 Ill. Dec. 458, 940 N.E.2d 1062 (2010). Therefore, a reviewing court may not modify a defendant's sentence absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 212, 346 Ill.Dec. 458, 940 N.E.2d 1062. An abuse of discretion will be found where the sentence is `greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law[ ] or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.' Id. (quoting People v. Stacey, 193 Ill.2d 203, 210, 250 Ill. Dec. 4, 737 N.E.2d 626 (2000)). ¶ 37 After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to the maximum 10-year extended-term sentence for intimidation. The record demonstrates that the court properly considered the presentence investigation report, defendant's statement in allocution, counsel's arguments, and the aggravating and mitigating factors. The aggravating factors included defendant's prior criminal history and the fact that she was on probation and MSR when she committed the present offenses. The court also emphasized the need to deter others. In mitigation, the court noted that defendant had a newborn child and that there was some culpability by King and Simmons. The court further found that defendant was a very dangerous person with serious mental and anger management issues that needed to be addressed. Given the significant aggravating factors in this case, we cannot say that the sentence of 10 years' imprisonment for intimidation is `greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law[ ] or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.' See Alexander, 239 Ill.2d at 212, 346 Ill.Dec. 458, 940 N.E.2d 1062.