Opinion ID: 443222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Principles of Res Judicata

Text: 33 The affirmative defense of res judicata 4 , see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c), requires that the party asserting such a bar bear the burden of showing that it applies. Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166 (3d Cir.1982) (in banc), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014, 103 S.Ct. 1256, 75 L.Ed.2d 484 (1983). Application of the claim preclusive aspect of the res judicata doctrine requires a showing by Athlone that there has been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same causes of action. I.A.M. National Pension Fund v. Industrial Gear Manufacturing Co., 723 F.2d 944, 946-947 (D.C.Cir.1983) citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). 34 The United States argues that the district court erred in applying claim preclusion in this matter because the Commission's imminent hazard action under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2061 and the civil penalty suit brought on the Commission's behalf by the United Sates under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2069 did not involve the same cause of action. 5 We agree. 35 This court has on more than one occasion grappled with the difficult question of identity of causes of action for purposes of claim preclusion, see, e.g., Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d at 171-72; Donegal Steel Foundry Co. v. Accurate Products Co., 516 F.2d 583, 587-88 (3d Cir.1975), and it bears repeating that the term  '[c]ause of action' cannot be precisely defined, nor can a simple test be cited for use in determining what constitutes a cause of action for res judicata purposes. Id. at 588, n. 10. As we more recently noted in Davis, the term has been given varied treatment depending upon the facts in each case and the inquiry is often fraught with conceptual difficulties: 36 More difficult is the question of identity of the causes of action. A single cause of action may comprise claims under a number of different statutory and common law grounds.... Rather than resting on the specific legal theory invoked, res judicata generally is thought to turn on the essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims, although a clear definition of that requisite similarity has proven elusive.... 37 Whatever the conceptual difficulties inherent in any definition of a cause of action, often the presence of a single cause of action is clear. 38 Davis, 688 F.2d at 171 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 39 Although we declined to adopt one specific legal theory in Davis, we indicated a predisposition towards taking a broad view of what constitutes identity of causes of action--an essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims. We therefore do not adhere to any mechanical application of a single test but instead focus on the central purpose of the doctrine of res judicata. We are thus in keeping with [t]he present trend ... in the direction of requiring that a plaintiff present in one suit all the claims for relief that he may have arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. 1B J. Moore & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice p 0.410, at 359 (2d ed. 1983). 40 In Davis, despite the fact that we espoused no precise definition of a cause of action and did not adopt one magic formula or test, we did state that often the presence of a single cause of action is clear. Relying on Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir.1950), as one such clear example of a single cause of action, we found that 41 the acts complained of and the demand for recovery are the same. The only thing that is different is the theory of recovery. The same witnesses and documents will be necessary in the trial in both cases. No material fact is alleged in [the second action] that was not alleged in [the first].... Everything plaintiff was entitled to ask for from defendant was included in [the first action]. 42 Davis, 688 F.2d at 171 (quoting Williamson, 286 F.2d at 470). 43 As Davis illustrates, this court has previously articulated various factors to determine when suits involve the same cause of action. These factors are the components of an essential similarity of the underlying events, and provide sufficient guidance for assessing when there is not a single cause of action. 44 We will therefore consider, in the instant case, (1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same (that is, whether the wrong for which redress is sought is the same in both actions) Gissen v. Tackman, 401 F.Supp. 310, 312 (D.N.J.1975); (2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) whether the witnesses and documents necessary at trial are the same (that is, whether the same evidence necessary to maintain the second action would have been sufficient to support the first) O'Shea v. Chrysler Corporation, 206 F.Supp. 601, 605 (D.N.J.1962); and (4) whether the material facts alleged are the same. 45 To begin with, we recognize that merely because the United States relied on different statutes in each action does not, in and of itself, render its claims different causes of action for res judicata purposes. Davis, 688 F.2d at 171; Antonioli v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 451 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906, 92 S.Ct. 1608, 31 L.Ed.2d 816 (1972). Nor is it dispositive that the United States asserts a different theory of recovery or seeks different relief in the two actions. Clemens v. Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, 399 F.2d 825, 828 (3d Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023, 89 S.Ct. 633, 21 L.Ed.2d 567 (1969). Thus, the focal points of our analysis are whether the acts complained of were the same, whether the material facts alleged in each suit were the same and whether the witnesses and documentation required to prove such allegations were the same. 46 The district court reasoned that the civil penalty suit was the same cause of action as the imminent hazard action because: 47 the government ... based its legal claim on the same underlying factual events and the same wrong; namely, defendants' distribution of hazardous baseball pitching machines.... 48 Moreover, the same evidence which supports a finding of imminent hazard in the District of Columbia case ... [supports] a finding of knowledge of the product's defect in this case. 49 J.A. at 184 (emphasis added). 50 First, we believe that the acts complained of and the demand for recovery are not the same in each suit. There were material facts alleged in the second action which were not alleged in the first. The district court found it significant that the underlying facts set forth in the government's complaints in the two suits were virtually identical. J.A. at 183. Nevertheless, we find that the district court erroneously defined the acts complained of as the defect in the pitching machines. The government has argued persuasively that Athlone's knowledge of the defect and its failure to report information regarding the defect to the Commission is the gravamen of the complaint. The imminent hazard action focused on the fact that the defective products were in commerce and on the defendants' failure or refusal to cease the manufacture, sale and distribution of hazardous machines. 51 Second, the district court also concluded that the wrong for which redress is sought is the same in both cases, i.e., the distribution of hazardous baseball pitching machines. We disagree. In the imminent hazard case, the wrong for which the Commission sought redress was Athlone's distribution of baseball pitching machines which presented an imminent hazard to the public, while in this civil penalty suit, the wrong for which it seeks redress is not the distribution of the dangerous machines, but Athlone's failure to report certain information to the Commission--the breach of a statutory obligation to provide timely information. 6 52 We find the reasoning of the Minnesota district court, which decided this precise issue in the companion case, to be persuasive: 53 In the first [suit], the Government, proceeding under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2061(a), sought a finding that the pitching machines constituted an imminent hazard and an order requiring certain remedial relief. The critical issue was whether the pitching machines were an imminently hazardous consumer product. 54 This action, in contrast, seeks the assessment of a civil penalty for the violation of 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2064(b) by the defendant's failure to report to the Commission when it allegedly obtained information which reasonably supported the conclusion that its product contained a defect which could create a substantial product hazard.... 55 ... There, the wrong for which redress was sought was the manufacture and distribution of an imminently hazardous product. Here, the alleged wrong is the defendant's failure to report a substantially hazardous product to the Commission. 56 United States v. Advance Machine, 547 F.Supp. at 1092 (emphasis added). 57 Finally, the district court, in the instant case, further concluded that the same evidence which supports a finding of imminent hazard in the District of Columbia case [supports] ... a finding of knowledge of the product's defect in this case. J.A. at 183-184 (emphasis added). Again, we disagree. 58 Athlone argues that the Commission had sufficient facts prior to the conclusion of its injunction suit to amend the complaint and seek civil penalties. Athlone maintains that there is nothing in the record showing activity after the entry of the decree in the imminent hazard suit and prior to the filing of the civil penalty suit. Moreover, Athlone alleges a similarity between the materials appended to the United States' administrative civil penalty complaint and those appended to the motion for summary judgment in the injunction suit. 59 We, however, agree with the Commission's position that the attaching of similar documents does not make all the facts that were relevant in the civil penalty case the same as the facts that were relevant in the imminent hazard suit. 60 With an abundance of caution and easy access to the Xerox machine, lawyers have a tendency to blitzkrieg a judge with a plethora of documents--documents that have critical facts, documents that have tangential facts and most often, documents that are inundated with irrelevant facts. Hopefully, judges are wise enough to sift the wheat from the chaff and consider only those facts that are truly relevant to the issue in his or her immediate adjudication. Thus, the overlap of irrelevant facts and probably even tangential facts constitutes nothing more than surplusage. In the imminent hazard case there were facts included in some documents, which for the imminent hazard case, were pure chaff or surplusage. But later in the civil penalty case, the same data that was previously surplusage, became part of the sine qua non of the government's proof. 61 As the Commission points out, the imminent hazard case turned on technical information supporting an imminent hazard whereas the witnesses and documents needed to establish the United States' civil penalty case include evidence of Athlone's receipt of certain information at certain times, the nature of the information received, evidence as to when that information was sufficient to give rise to a duty to report and evidence relating to the degree of culpability to assist a court in making a determination of an appropriate penalty. None of these matters were relevant in the imminent hazard suit. By its very nature, the imminent hazard suit is an emergency mechanism, and the evidence gathered for that suit, while it may have included proof that the defect in the product created a substantial product hazard, would not have been enough to bring the civil penalty action. 62 Since an imminent hazard case is not per se a civil penalty case, the Commission should have additional time to reflect on and review the investigation done for the imminent hazard case to thereby determine at a later date whether a civil penalty suit should be filed. There is no reason, based on either policy or law, that requires the Commission to prematurely start or simultaneously file a civil penalty suit whenever it attempts to take a dangerous product out of the stream of commerce.