Opinion ID: 2190203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Jacobsohn

Text: As a preliminary matter we reject the Superior Court's holding, upon which the court premised its entry of summary judgment for Dr. Jacobsohn, that plaintiff's suit against him was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Dr. Jacobsohn signed the order terminating Darling's involuntary status at AMHI on October 21, 1981. Plaintiff did not add Dr. Jacobsohn to the complaint for his allegedly negligent decision until January 13, 1984, more than two years after any cause of action against him accrued and therefore beyond the two-year limitations period relied on by the Superior Court. 14 M.R.S.A. § 8110. Plaintiff argues, however, that under the Maine Health Security Act, 24 M.R.S.A. § 2903 (Supp.1984), she tolled the running of the limitations period for 90 days by notifying Dr. Jacobsohn of her claim within the two-year period. Since that notice was in fact given on October 19, 1983, plaintiff continues, the limitations period was tolled and her complaint against Dr. Jacobsohn was timely filed. Defendant counters, and the Superior Court agreed, that plaintiff failed to serve the notice of a claim in the manner prescribed by the Health Security Act, making that notice invalid and thereby preventing any tolling of the statute of limitations. We reject defendant's counterargument because plaintiff did give proper notice to Dr. Jacobsohn under 24 M.R.S. A. § 2903 and therefore did toll the limitations period. Section 2903 of the Maine Health Security Act provides: No action for death or injuries to the person arising from any medical, surgical or dental treatment, omission or operation shall be commenced until at least 90 days after written notice of claim setting forth under oath the nature and circumstances of the injuries and damages alleged is served personally or by registered or certified mail upon the person or persons accused of wrongdoing. Any applicable statute of limitations shall be tolled for a period of 90 days from service of notice. 24 M.R.S.A. § 2903. On October 19, 1983, plaintiff by certified mail sent to Dr. Jacobsohn a notice fully stating her claim that he had acted negligently by terminating Darling's involuntary status at AMHI. Defendant contends, however, that plaintiff did not meet the requirement that notice be served personally or by registered or certified mail upon the person or persons accused of wrongdoing, id., because Dr. Jacobsohn did not personally sign the certified mail receipt. We disagree. Plaintiff did send notice to Dr. Jacobsohn by certified mail as required by statute, and in any event, even if a technical violation of section 2903 did occur, it in no way prejudiced the doctor, who by regular operating procedures in fact received the notice within hours of its receipt at AMHI, his place of business. Cf. Michaud v. Northern Maine Medical Center, 436 A.2d 398, 402 (Me. 1981) (after balancing the equities, court disregarded nonprejudicial failure to comply strictly with notice requirements of section 2903). Thus the Superior Court's rationale for entry of summary judgment for Dr. Jacobsohn does not survive appellate review. Nevertheless, we affirm the Superior Court's summary judgment order for another reason: Dr. Jacobsohn's decision not to maintain Darling's involuntary status at AMHI constitutes a discretionary function, immune from suit under the Tort Claims Act. Whether the allegedly wrongful conduct was a discretionary function depends upon the actual conduct at issue and its relationship to the performance of some legislatively imposed duty. Here, because Dr. Jacobsohn was fulfilling his statutory responsibility of determining Darling's status at AMHI, and because that determination itself plays a central role in the State's involuntary commitment procedures, Dr. Jacobsohn's conduct was the kind that the Tort Claims Act insulates from suit through the discretionary function immunity. Although the complaint alleges not only that Dr. Jacobsohn negligently diagnosed but also that he negligently treated Darling, the doctor's affidavits as well as the statutes under which he was acting in regard to Darling make clear that during the relevant time Dr. Jacobsohn and the AMHI team assisting him were engaged solely in diagnosing Darling to decide whether under the controlling statute he should be kept at AMHI involuntarily. Therefore we are not presented with a question whether negligent medical treatment by a state employee falls within the discretionary function immunity. Cf. Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d at 480-81 (distinguishing under discretionary function immunity a negligent decision to release from negligent medical treatment); Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d at 283 (distinguishing decision to release psychiatric patient from duty to monitor prescribed treatment). When he examined Darling shortly after admission at AMHI, Dr. Jacobsohn was performing a statutory duty set out in 34 M.R.S.A. § 2372 (1978): Medical examination of new patients Every patient admitted to a hospital shall be examined as soon as practicable after his admission. The head of the hospital shall arrange for examination by a staff physician or clinical psychologist of every patient hospitalized pursuant to section 2333.... If such an examination is not held within 24 hours after the time of admission, or if a staff physician or clinical psychologist fails or refuses after such examination to certify that in his opinion the patient is a mentally ill individual and due to his mental illness poses a likelihood of serious harm ..., the patient shall be immediately discharged. Since Dr. Jacobsohn in the exercise of his professional judgment rejected the conclusion that Darling was a mentally ill individual and due to his mental illness [he] pose[d] a likelihood of serious harm, Darling's initial involuntary status ended and he chose to return to the Cumberland County jail. The discretionary nature of Dr. Jacobsohn's section 2372 determination is demonstrated by its critical position in the statutorily prescribed process for involuntary commitment of mental patients. [7] A person can be admitted to a state mental hospital on an emergency basis when a health or police officer together with a licensed physician or psychologist certified that the individual was mentally ill and posed a likelihood of serious harm to himself or the community, and a judge or complaint justice endorsed that certification. 34 M.R.S. A. § 2333(1) (1978). Once a person was involuntarily admitted, section 2372 required within 24 hours certification by a physician or psychologist at the hospital that the person was mentally ill and posed a threat to himself or the community. Id. § 2372. The latter step was the one performed by Dr. Jacobsohn relative to Darling. If within 5 days after the initial admission the head of the hospital believed further hospitalization was needed, he would have to petition the District Court for a commitment order. Id. § 2333(2)(B). The court would then order additional examinations by two physicians or psychologists who both would have to determine for commitment to continue that the patient was mentally ill and a threat to the community. Id. § 2334(3)(A)-(C). If they should make that determination the court would then hold a hearing and could issue an involuntary commitment order only if it found by clear and convincing evidence that the patient was mentally ill, a threat to himself and the community, and that in-patient hospitalization and the individual treatment plan offered by the hospital would be the best available treatment for the individual. Id. § 2334(5)(A). Thus Dr. Jacobsohn's determination whether Darling was mentally ill and posed a likelihood of serious harm was the critical threshold step in the governmental decision whether Darling continued in involuntary commitment at AMHI. Exercising a professional judgment upon that initial commitment question, central to effecting the State's important responsibilities of protecting the public and treating the mentally ill, is a discretionary function and Dr. Jacobsohn is immune from suit under the Tort Claims Act for any alleged negligence in carrying it out. Other courts have reached results similar to ours today. See Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d at 480-81 (decision by parole board to grant or deny parole is discretionary function immune under federal tort claims act); Reddish v. Smith, 468 So.2d 929, 931 (Fla.1985) (decision to alter prisoner from medium to minimum custody status is a discretionary function protected by state's sovereign immunity doctrine); Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Minn. 1982) (decision to release inmate from state mental facility is a discretionary function for which state and state employees cannot be sued); Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661, 664-65 (Mo.1983) (duty of state physicians to determine detention and temporary or permanent release of patients is discretionary activity and should be unencumbered and unfettered, at least as against negligence claims); Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d at 282 (decision to release, parole, or put on probation criminal defendants, juvenile delinquents, or mental patients is a decision of a judgment, planning, or policy nature). The Minnesota Supreme Court stated the rationale supporting application of the discretionary immunity of its tort claims act in the circumstances we face in the case at bar: If release decisions were exposed to the threat of liability those individuals charged with rendering those decisions would likely become unduly responsive to one considerationthe cost of liability. Moreover, the threat of liability would undermine a statewide policy favoring open door treatment rather than custodial detention of the state's mentally ill. Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d at 23 n. 3. Cf. Sukeforth v. Thegen, 256 A.2d 162, 164-65 (Me.1969) (physician certifying patients for emergency admittance to mental hospital acts in quasi-judicial capacity and enjoys a qualified immunity). The purpose of the discretionary function immunity is to protect from personal liability the conduct of a government employee that requires an exercise of judgment entrusted to him by statute and that is central to establishing or carrying out governmental policy, such as Maine's statutory commitment process in this case. See Trianon Park Condominium Assoc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d at 918; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D comment b. For this reason, rather than that relied upon by the Superior Court, we affirm the summary judgment entered in favor of Dr. Jacobsohn.