Opinion ID: 712187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: State Criminal Proceedings--Second Trial

Text: 49 While the poll of the en banc court was proceeding, Petitioners' retrial began in state court on July 17. Prior to the second trial, the state judge who presided over the first trial and who is a named respondent in this litigation, sua sponte recused himself before the retrial began. During the course of the retrial, the photographs in Set 1 were offered into evidence by the defense. The prosecuting attorney objected to their admission on the ground that the photographs were cumulative and confusing. 9 The presiding state trial judge overruled the objection and admitted the photographs into evidence. On Thursday, July 20, upon learning that this court had stayed the state criminal proceedings, the state trial judge suspended the trial pending further notice.G. Federal Habeas--District Court on Remand 50 On July 21, immediately following our remand, the district court conducted a lengthy and thorough evidentiary hearing. Subsequently, it entered comprehensive findings of fact based upon the evidence and testimony presented and held that the retrial of Petitioners was, indeed, barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 51 The district court rejected the State's claim that manifest necessity for the mistrial existed because the jury's viewing the Set 1 photographs was unduly prejudicial, finding as a factual matter that the photographs in Set 1 had been authenticated by Officer Counts, were used by him to refresh his recollection as to whether there were blood stains on the ground, and were actually relied upon by him in fashioning a demonstrative exhibit showing the location of what appeared to him to be blood stains, tire tracks, and other evidentiary items. The court also found that because Officer Counts had already testified concerning the relative locations of the objects depicted in the Set 1 photographs, the disputed photographs were of no real significance to either party viewed in the context of the trial. 52 Further, the district court rejected the State's argument that the photographs would likely cause juror confusion because the location of the areas marked with yellow tape depicted in the photographs had not been explained sufficiently by Officer Counts and because the red spots that were more visible in the Set 1 photographs might lead the jury to conclude that the photographs showed Gilliam's blood. The court determined as a factual matter that during his testimony Officer Counts adequately identified the location of the three areas marked with yellow tape. In addition, the court concluded that the photographs did not present an undue risk of juror confusion concerning whether the red spots were blood because Officer Counts, the State's witness, and the investigating officer, had already testified that these areas were marked with yellow tape based on the investigators having discovered what appeared to be blood there, and the fact that a serologist had not tested the red spots would not have provided a basis for exclusion of the photographs, 10 nor was it necessary to lay a proper foundation for introduction of the photographs. 53 Additionally, the district court held that even assuming the photographs in Set 1 were somehow prejudicial, manifest necessity did not support the grant of the mistrial by the state trial judge because obvious and adequate alternatives to the mistrial were available. For example, allowing Officer Counts to be recalled to the witness stand would have resolved any possible problem. 54 Finally, the district court concluded that the state trial judge acted improvidently and precipitately in granting the mistrial. The district court based this conclusion on the facts that the state trial judge had failed to evince any concern for the possible double jeopardy ramifications of his actions, had failed to permit the parties an opportunity to fully explain their positions, and had declined to permit further inquiry into whether the photographs had been authenticated during Officer Counts' testimony. 55 Accordingly, the district court granted the writ of habeas corpus. By separate order, however, it declined to enlarge the Petitioners pending appeal. 11 56 From the order of the district court granting the writ of habeas corpus, the State appeals. 12 A majority of the members of the en banc court voted to grant en banc hearing of the State's appeal on an expedited basis.