Opinion ID: 1254437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Wanton and Reckless Question

Text: The circuit court's second certified question asks: May a political subdivision be held liable although the plaintiff's claim is covered by workers' compensation and would otherwise be barred by W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) (1986), where the plaintiff alleges that the employees of the political subdivision acted in a wanton or reckless manner under W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(b)(2) (1986)? The circuit court answered this question yesbased on the court's determination that language in W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986] bars all suits against political subdivision employees who are acting within the scope of their employmentand that therefore the plaintiff's claims based upon allegations of reckless or wanton conduct by City employees acting within the scope of their employment must be brought against the City itself, despite the immunity of the City that is otherwise conferred by W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) [1986]. See note 3, supra. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the Act permits the naming of both political subdivisions and employees of political subdivisions as defendants in civil actions, under certain defined circumstances. [9] As to when employees of political subdivisions may be named as defendants, in Syllabus Point 1 of Beckley v. Crabtree, 189 W.Va. 94, 428 S.E.2d 317 (1993), we stated: West Virginia Code Sec. 29-12A-5(b) provides that employees[ [10] ] of political subdivisions are immune from personal tort liability unless (1) [h]is or her acts or omissions were manifestly[ [11] ] outside the scope of employment or official responsibilities; (2)[h]is or her acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; or (3)[l]iability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a provision of this code. Thus, W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(b) [1986] establishes three statutory exceptions to an employee's immunity ..., Mallamo v. Town of Rivesville, 197 W.Va. 616, 621, 477 S.E.2d 525, 530 (1996). See note 4 supra for the full text of W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5 [1986]. One of those exceptions includes when an employee's conduct was in a wanton or reckless manner ..., W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(b)(2) [1986] (in part). Holsten v. Massey, 200 W.Va. 775, 787-789, 490 S.E.2d 864, 876-878 (1997) (discussing what constitutes wanton or reckless conduct under this exception). However, as the circuit court noted in the instant case, there is language in W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986] that, read literally and in isolation, appears to in certain circumstances contradict the Act's grant of authority to sue employees of political subdivisions when the wanton or reckless exception to employee immunity is present. Specifically, W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986] states (in part): In no instance may an employee of a political subdivision acting within the scope of his employment be named as defendant. (Emphasis added.) [12] In the instant case, the plaintiff has alleged that the City's sanitation workers, acting within the scope of their employment, ran a jackhammer and a drill near the trench where Mr. Brooks was workingin reckless disregard of the fact that the City employees' activity might cause the trench to collapse. Under these alleged facts, W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(b)(2) [1986], authorizes suit against the City employees, if it is proved that their acts or omissions were ... in a wanton or reckless manner.... Id. However, the above-quoted language from W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986], taken alone and read literally, would appear to bar naming the City employees as defendants, because these allegedly reckless employees were acting (at least arguably) within the scope of their employment. In addition to this apparent statutory conflict arising from the allegations in the instant case, we observe that there is a second, more general apparent statutory conflict that arises, if the language in question from W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986] is read literally as completely prohibiting suits against political subdivision employees for conduct which is alleged to be within the scope of their employment. This second conflict occurs because such a literal construction and application of the language in question from W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986] seems to make entirely superfluous the provisions of W.Va.Code, 29-12A-11 [1986], which provides for the defense and indemnification of precisely those political subdivision employees who are sued as a result of conduct that is allegedly within the scope of their employment. [13] It would be difficult to support a construction of W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986] that would make the significant and substantial indemnification and defense provisions of W.Va.Code, 29-12A-11 [1986] into a superfluous nullity. It is always presumed that the legislature will not enact a meaningless or useless statute. Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. Hardesty v. Aracoma-Chief Logan No. 4523, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, 147 W.Va. 645, 129 S.E.2d 921 (1963). Because of these apparent statutory conflicts, we must question whether a literal reading and application should or can reasonably be given to the language in question from W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986], so as to completely prohibit the naming of employees of political subdivisions as defendants for conduct which is alleged to be within the scope of their employment, when one of the enumerated exceptions to employee immunity is alleged. However, such a literal reading and application of the language in question from W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986] was in fact the basis of the circuit court's April 25, 1997 order in the instant case, denying summary judgment on behalf of the City ( see note 3, supra ). Moreover, such a literal reading and application was also the premise underlying the circuit court's answer to its second certified question, supra, which allows the plaintiff to sue the City directly when wanton and reckless misconduct by a subdivision employee is alleged, even though the statutory worker's compensation immunity conferred upon the City by W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) [1986] would otherwise prohibit such a suit. [14] Thus, in addressing the second certified question and the circuit court's answer to that question, we must endeavor to resolve, in a reasonable fashion, the apparent statutory conflict that is created by a literal reading and application of the language in question from W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986]. Where two statutes are in apparent conflict, the Court must, if reasonably possible, construe such statutes so as to give effect to each. Syllabus Point 5 (in part), Lawson v. County Com'n of Mercer County, 199 W.Va. 77, 483 S.E.2d 77 (1996). The City suggests that we need not follow the circuit court's approach of reading the language in question from W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986] as literally prohibiting in all instances the naming of a political subdivision employee acting within the scope of their employment as a defendant. Rather, the City suggests that if the language in question from W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986] is taken and read together with the previous sentence in that subsection, to-wit: Suits instituted pursuant to the provisions of this article shall name as defendant the political subdivision against which liability is sought to be established. In no instance may an employee of a political subdivision acting within the scope of his employment be named as defendant[,] this statutory subsection may be read as a whole, and as prohibiting only the naming of an employee of a political subdivision acting within the scope of employment as a defendant, in order to establish the direct liability of the political subdivision. Under this construction of the statutory language, naming an employee of a political subdivision as a defendant for purposes of establishing the employee's liabilityas opposed to the subdivision's liabilitywould not be barred, if one of the statutory exceptions to employee immunity in W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(b) [1986] is present. We find that this narrower construction of the language of W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986], taken in its entirety, is grammatically and logically plausible. It is not strained and it is reasonable. Substantively, this construction resolves the apparent statutory conflict, apparently without creating any conflicts with other portions of the Act. This construction is also (with a minor exception [15] ) consistent with our prior cases in this area recognizing the Act's grant of authority to name employees of political subdivisions as defendants under certain defined circumstances. We therefore adopt this approach. [16] Consequently, we hold that W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986] prohibits the naming of an employee of a political subdivision acting within the scope of employment as a defendant for the purpose of directly establishing the liability of a political subdivision. However, W.Va.Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986] does not prohibit the naming of an employee of a political subdivision acting within the scope of employment as a defendant for purposes of establishing the employee's liability, when one or more of the statutory exceptions in W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(b) [1986] to employee immunity is present. Because of this holding, the premise of the circuit court's answer to its second certified questionthat there is in all instances an absolute bar to naming an employee of a political subdivision acting within the scope of employment as a defendantis erroneous. Therefore, we reword the circuit court's second certified question in the following fashion: [17] May a political subdivision be directly sued and named as a defendant, although the plaintiff's claim against the subdivision is covered by workers' compensation and would otherwise be barred by W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) (1986), where the plaintiff alleges that the employees of the political subdivision acted in a wanton or reckless manner under W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(b)(2) (1986)? And we answer this question in the negative.