Opinion ID: 4693763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Violation under Dunn

Text: “To uphold a conviction on a charge that was neither alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial offends the most basic notions of due process.” Dunn, 442 U.S. at 106. Ford contends that he was found guilty on a charge of aiding and abetting even though no such charge was made in the indictment, and no such argument was made to the jury. In support of his contention, Ford points to the apparent inconsistency in the jury’s decision: On the one hand, the jury convicted Ford of first degree murder in the shooting of Martinez. On the other hand, the jury hung on the three firearm enhancements, unable to decide whether Ford had used a firearm in committing the murder. We are willing to assume that on the evidence presented Ford could have been convicted of an aiding and abetting crime. But that is not enough to show a violation of due process, for Ford could equally have been (and was) FORD V. PEERY 25 convicted of first-degree murder. The apparent inconsistency between the jury’s guilty verdict on the murder charge and its inability to decide on the firearm enhancements is not a reason to set aside its guilty verdict. There is no “rule that would allow criminal defendants to challenge inconsistent verdicts on the ground that in their case the verdict was not the product of lenity, but of some error that worked against them.” United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66, 67 (1984) (noting also that “a criminal defendant already is afforded protection against jury irrationality or error by the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts.”); see also Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 345 (1981) (“Inconsistency in a [jury’s] verdict is not a sufficient reason for setting it aside.”). Under Powell, the Court of Appeal did not err, much less unreasonably apply clearly established federal law, by denying his claim under Dunn.