Opinion ID: 1111426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Direct vs. Indirect Contempt

Text: In Anders, 64 Kan. at 746, we held that a witness' failure to appear at trial under a subpoena was in the nature of an indirect contempt, in that the disobedience to attend was not committed in the presence of the court. Johnson argues that his alleged conduct should be characterized as an indirect contempt, in that his absence and tardiness did not occur in the court's presence. Johnson also asserts that there was no need for immediate punishment or a summary disposition. Jurisdictions are divided as to the classification label to place on an attorney's absence or tardiness. Three contempt classifications have evolvedindirect, direct, and hybrid. The majority position seems to support indirect contempt. See, e.g., In re Davis, 77 Ohio App.3d 257, 265-67, 602 N.E.2d 270 (1991). The following authorities favor either direct or hybrid classifications: Direct Contempt: See, e.g., In re Contempt of Potter, 207 Neb. 769, 775, 301 N.W.2d 560 (1981) (Where the attorney, although notified by the court to appear at a specific time, fails to do so and does not offer an excuse, all matters relevant to the determination of contempt happen in court; contempt finding affirmed for attorney's tardiness and failure to explain.); Zeigler v. State, 806 P.2d 1131 (Okla. Crim. 1991) (attorney's failure to appear at first day of criminal trial due to alleged conflict with another case, coupled with his unsatisfactory explanation for his failure to proceed with trial after being ordered to, treated as a direct contempt). Hybrid Contempt: See, e.g., Matter of Williams, 120 Idaho 473, 478, 817 P.2d 139 (1991) (We find the hybrid form of direct contempt argument persuasive.); Curtis v. State, 625 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Ind. App. 1993) (We find the hybrid approach to be fair and sensible, and to comport with the requirements of due process.); In Re Yengo, 84 N.J. Ill, 417 A.2d 533 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1124 (1981); and Roselle v. State, 509 P.2d 486, 488 (Okla. Crim. 1973), overruled on other grounds Gilbert v. State, 648 P.2d 1226, 1231 (Okla. Crim. 1982). See also cases cited at 13 A.L.R.4th 122, §§ 9-11. Recent cases continue to show this split of authority. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 939 P.2d 479 (Colo. App. 1997) (reversal of summary punishment for direct contempt against attorney who telephoned judge long distance from Florida at time of scheduled court appearance after request for continuance was denied; attorney's conduct showed, at best, indirect contempt); In re Billy L. Spruell, 227 Ga. App. 324, 489 S.E.2d 48 (1997) (attorney who accepted DUI case 4 days before trial, but left on vacation to remote area before knowing whether request for continuance had been granted or denied, found guilty of indirect criminal contempt); Curtis, 625 N.E.2d at 498 (hybrid contempt case in which finding of direct contempt against prosecutor who failed to appear for scheduled trial date reversed; prosecutor's explanation that the trial did not appear on his calendar was not inadequate on its face, thus entitling him to indirect contempt proceeding procedural safeguards). We have reviewed the rationale for each of the three contempt concepts against the background of our own case law. We favor the hybrid contempt approach, which we adopt and apply here. Yengo, 84 N.J. Ill, discusses the three approaches and sets out the reasoning favoring the hybrid label. In Yengo, defense counsel Yengo failed to appear during a complex criminal conspiracy jury trial. Burns, an associate from Yengo's office who was unfamiliar with the case, appeared. The judge asked Burns about Yengo's absence. Burns said that Yengo was out of the country and had asked Burns to take his place while he was gone. The judge spoke with Yengo's daughter, who said that her father had taken a 4-day vacation in Bermuda. The judge sent Yengo a telegram directing him to appear on the next trial date after his expected return. Yengo appeared, explaining that he had been in Bermuda on business and had not told the court because he did not know he would be going until late on the day before departure. The judge cited Yengo for contempt in the presence of the court and later imposed a fine of $500. On appeal, Yengo argued that his offense should have been treated as an indirect contempt and he had the right to a jury trial before another judge. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, reasoning: We conclude that the mere unexplained absence of an attorney is a hybrid. [Citations omitted.] ... The characterization of the contempt as direct or indirect should be deferred until after the attorney has an opportunity to explain his absence. If there is an adequate explanation, the matter should proceed no further. However, if the attorney refuses to explain, the judge may treat the offense as a direct contempt. [Citation omitted.] Both the absence and the refusal are in the presence of the judge, who may determine the matter summarily. Similarly if the attorney offers an insulting, frivolous, or clearly inadequate explanation, both elements of the offense are in the presence of the judge, who may treat the matter as a direct contempt. [Citation omitted.] Of equal importance the refusal to explain or an offensive explanation creates the need in the court to deal immediately with the matter. [Citation omitted.] The need for immediate adjudication and punishment outweighs the procedural safeguards that would ensure from referring the matter to another judge. In both instances, the attorney has a right to a hearing, albeit before the offended judge. 84 N.J. at 126-27. Johnson's absence from Judge Buchele's courtroom from 10:30 a.m. to 1:50 p.m., and his late appearance occurred in the court's presence. Also, his failure to advise Judge Buchele of his whereabouts on July 2, 1996, and his unsatisfactory explanation for his absence and tardiness occurred in the court's presence. During the instanter contempt hearing, Johnson explained that he had scheduled the conflicting hearing before Judge Parrish because cases set for preliminary hearings were usually called late, after cases involving waivers or pleas were taken. Johnson apparently thought the hearing before Judge Parrish would conclude before the Jenkins preliminary hearing started. He admitted not informing Judge Buchele of either his conflicting hearing or departure for Lawrence. Both Johnson's absence and his explanation for his absence were facts that Judge Buchele had first-hand knowledge of at the time of the occurrence. Under the hybrid approach, Johnson's conduct is direct contempt. Johnson's only excuse for his actions was that he believed other attorneys had gotten away with being late under similar circumstances, and he felt he was being singled out unfairly. Johnson stated: I will ride you [Judge Buchele] like a horse to make sure everybody else gets the same treatment and I'll have my staff up here every day watching to see who is late and who has been sanctioned. (During our oral argument counsel for Johnson apologized for Johnson's remarks.) Johnson was challenging the district court's authority to sanction him. Immediate action was needed, particularly in view of Johnson's attitude toward the district court. Johnson needed to be made aware of the importance of prompt appearances at future hearings. Otherwise, there is an entire breakdown of the criminal justice process. See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319, 44 L. Ed.2d 186, 95 S. Ct. 1802 (1975).