Opinion ID: 1521506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements at Police Headquarters and Consent to Search the Cab

Text: Since we perceive a significant difference between interviewing appellee at the scene, and transporting him to police headquarters for questioning, we affirm the ruling that statements made at headquarters cannot be used against appellee at trial and that the consent he gave to search his cab was unlawfully obtained. The initial inquiry that we must undertake is whether appellee was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the police transported him to headquarters and detained him there for four hours. This is a question of law, which we must answer based on our own evaluation of the record. Cf. Giles v. United States, D.C.App., 400 A.2d 1051, 1054 (1979) (determination of when arrest occurred is question of law). In answering that question, we look for guidance not only to Dunaway v. New York, supra , in which the Supreme Court held, on the basis of facts very similar to those here, that the defendant was seized, but also to Terry v. Ohio, supra , in which the Court stated, Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves `seizures' of persons. Only when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a `seizure' has occurred. Id., 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n.16. Though appellee was not formally arrested before he was taken to the police station, he nevertheless was told, you have to come to homicide with us. (Emphasis added.) Whether he would have appeared voluntarily at the police station, given the choice, is entirely speculativehe had no choice. In many respects, appellee was treated more like a suspect than a mere witness. He was frisked before he was placed in the police car, and from the moment he arrived at headquarters, he was constantly guarded. He was not even allowed to go to the bathroom alone. Furthermore, his hands were tested to determine if he had fired a gun. In our view, although appellee's conduct at the station could otherwise be characterized as cooperative, these precautions are not consistent with the government's hypothesis that his acquiescence in accompanying the police was wholly voluntary. [7] The conduct of the police amounted to a show of authority sufficient to restrain appellee's liberty. Id. The fact that appellee never specifically expressed a desire to leave is not dispositive. As in Dunaway v. New York, supra , he was never informed that he was free to go, and indeed, Detective Donald testified that appellee would not have been permitted to leave had he requested or attempted to do so. See id. 442 U.S. at 203-12, 99 S.Ct. at 2251-2256. The police were determined not to let him out of their sight until they were certain that he was no more than an innocent bystander in the Bruce Griffith affair. Thus, although appellee was not formally arrested and booked until the end of his four-hour detention at police headquarters, the circumstances render his detention at police headquarters, in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. Id. at 212, 99 S.Ct. at 2256. Given the factual similarities between Dunaway v. New York and the instant case, Dunaway permits but one conclusion: appellee was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when he was transported to police headquarters and detained and interrogated [8] there for four hours. Id. at 207, 99 S.Ct. at 2253. Furthermore, since the police lacked probable cause, which the government does not dispute, that seizure was unlawful. Id., at 216, 99 S.Ct. at 2258. The consent to search the cab, and appellee's subsequent statement regarding the gun, were both direct products of that unlawful detention. Indeed, the government does not contend otherwise. Appellant was in continuous police custody for over four hours, and the record reveals no intervening events of significance whatsoever. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), quoted in Dunaway v. New York, supra 442 U.S. at 218, 99 S.Ct. at 2259. Nor is the Fourth Amendment violation cured by the fact that appellee was warned of his Miranda rights approximately one hour before he signed the consent form. If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest,... the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted. Dunaway v. New York, supra at 217, 99 S.Ct. at 2259 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, supra 422 U.S. at 602, 95 S.Ct. at 2261). When there is a close causal connection between the illegal seizure and the confession, not only is exclusion of the evidence more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future, but use of the evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity of the courts.       To admit [the disputed evidence] in such a case would allow law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity, safe in the knowledge that they could wash their hands in the `procedural safeguards' of the Fifth. [ Id. at 218-19 (quoting Comment, 25 EMORY L.J. 227, 238 (1976)).] We thus affirm the trial court's ruling that the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of appellee's statements made at police headquarters and of the evidence seized from the cab pursuant to the unlawfully obtained consent.