Opinion ID: 1530200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearsay exceptions.

Text: Although the judge was of the opinion that the mother's statements to the maternal aunts were not hearsay, she also ruled, in the alternative, that the statements were admissible under hearsay exceptions for state of mind, for excited utterances and for present sense impressions. In the written order in which she addressed evidentiary issues, the judge ruled, inter alia, 1. that [the mother's] state of mind regarding domestic disputes with [the father] [was] relevant to the underlying issue of whether respondents [were] neglected children under the statute; 2. that because the mother's discussions with the aunts of altercations with the father occurred shortly after those altercations, those statements [were] admissible as excited utterances or under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule; [16] 3. that the twins' statements regarding their parents' fighting or yelling and screaming fall under both the state of mind or spontaneous utterance exceptions to hearsay . . . . These rulings came after the evidence had been admitted on the theory that the mother's out-of-court statements were not hearsay at all, and the District never proffered the statements under any of these hearsay exceptions. No foundation was laid for the application of any of the exceptions, and the father never had the opportunity to contest their applicability. The law is clear that the [District] and the trial court, not the . . . appellant, had the legal responsibility to clarify the basis for admitting testimony, over objection, that otherwise was inadmissible hearsay. Patton v. United States, 633 A.2d 800, 809 (D.C.1993) (per curiam). Moreover, on proper objection it is clearly the burden of the party seeking its admission, to identify the appropriate exception and to demonstrate that the testimony fell within it. And it is the trial court's responsibility to examine the testimony and determine whether the proper foundation has been laid for the exercise of discretion as to its admission. Id. at 810 (emphasis in Patton ) (quoting In re M.L.H., 399 A.2d 556, 558 (D.C.1979)). In this case, as in M.L.H., [t]he [District] never identified a hearsay exception for the trial court to review. 399 A.2d at 558. Instead, the judge made the hearsay exception rulings after the fact, without a foundation having been laid, and without the father having had the opportunity to challenge any premise on which the admission of the statements under any hearsay exception may have been based. Further, on the merits, we do not agree that evidence that the father abused the mother could properly be admitted to show the mother's state of mind; the judge cited no authority for this proposition, and the District does not defend this aspect of the judge's ruling. Most of the mother's statements to and conversations with the maternal aunts regarding abuse by the father were not made contemporaneously with the events, and therefore were not admissible under the present sense impression exception. See Hallums v. United States, 841 A.2d 1270, 1277-78 (D.C.2004) ([T]he court must be assured that the statements sought to be admitted were made spontaneously and contemporaneously with the events described ) (emphasis added; citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [17] Although some of the out-of-court statements by the mother and by the children could conceivably have been admissible as excited utterances, see, e.g., Malloy v. United States, 797 A.2d 687, 690 (D.C.2002); Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 807-09 & n. 19 (D.C.2005), they were not offered as falling within that exception to the hearsay rule, and no foundation was laid. We therefore cannot agree with the judge's sweeping retroactive ruling that all of the out-of-court statements by the mother fell within this exception. Indeed, on the record as it stands, and without further elaboration, none of these statements could properly be admitted as an excited utterance. Insofar as the trial judge was relying on the testimony of Dr. X. for her conclusion that statements of the twins were admissible as excited utterances to show fighting between the parents and abuse by the father, the judge's reliance was misplaced. We recently stated in In re CA.S., 828 A.2d 184 (D.C.2003): Although the doctor was entitled to rely on the children's out-of-court statements about the beatings to form a basis for her opinion, the court could not consider those statements to prove the truth of what they asserted  i.e., that the children actually saw their father beating their mother. Id. at 191-92. The same reasoning applies here.