Opinion ID: 2996239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Confidentiality Agreement

Text: The Act requires an employer provide the union with all requested information that is relevant to a union’s discharge of its statutory obligations as representative of bargaining unit employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956); Naperville, 242 F.3d at 756: NLRB v. Pfizer, Inc., 763 F.2d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 1985). We apply a broad “discovery-type” standard to determine relevance, and have held that unions should receive a broad range of potentially useful information to fulfill these obligations. Mary Thompson Hosp., 943 F.2d at 745 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-37 (1967); Gen’l Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 916 F.2d 1163, 1168 (7th Cir. 1990). An employer may be required to provide information that was requested by a union if the Board determines that there is “ ‘a probability that the information is relevant and that it will be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties.’ ” NLRB v. Ill.-Am. Water Co. S. Div., 933 F.2d 1368, 1378 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Pfizer, 763 F.2d at 889). The union generally bears the burden of demonstrating that the information it has requested is relevant to its performance of its statutory obligations. Acme Indus., 385 U.S. at 437 n. 6; Naperville, 242 F.3d at 756. But its legitimate interest in relevant information does not invariably predominate over the employer’s legitimate interests, and in certain situations an employer’s confidentiality interests may justify the non-disclosure of certain information. 10 Nos. 01-3798, 01-4149 Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314 (1979). The Board is therefore required to balance a union’s need for relevant but assertedly confidential information against an employer’s legitimate and substantial need for confidentiality. That notwithstanding, an employer cannot prevent production of this information simply by asserting that it is “confidential.” Pfizer, 763 F.2d at 891. Rather, it must bargain toward an accommodation between the union’s information needs and the employer’s justified interests. U.S. Testing Co. v. NLRB, 160 F.3d 14, 20-21 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (employer “must offer to accommodate both its concerns and its bargaining obligations, as is often done by making an offer to release information conditionally or by placing restrictions on the use of that information”). In this case, National Steel flatly rejected the union’s request for information about the hidden surveillance cameras, stating that it “[did] not believe that the union [was] entitled to this information” and that this information is not relevant to the union’s fulfillment of its duty as bargaining representative. However, because the installation and use of hidden cameras is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, it necessarily follows that the information regarding hidden cameras is relevant to the union’s discharge of its statutory duties and responsibilities. Acme Indus., 385 U.S. at 435-36, Naperville, 242 F.3d at 756; see also NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 924 F.2d 518, 523 (4th Cir. 1991). National Steel is incorrect that the locations of hidden cameras is the only relevant information requested by the union. In fact, the union requested “all information’ concerning existing hidden cameras,” which could include a variety of information other than location (such as whether and how many cameras were currently being used, the types of cameras involved, etc.). While National Steel has legitimate confidentiality interests in the information about hidden cameras (e.g., that the disclosure of location might compromise their efficacy), these concerns are susceptible Nos. 01-3798, 01-4149 11 to accommodation, and the Board properly required National Steel to bargain collectively with the union “for a mutually satisfactory confidentiality agreement, protective order or other procedure,” and then to act in accordance with the agreement reached. U.S. Testing, 160 F.3d at 2021. Again, as in Colgate-Palmolive, the Board’s order only requires National Steel to “bargain over the specificity of the information to be divulged,” it does not mandate what information must be disclosed or what outcome must be reached.