Opinion ID: 716743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jane's right to bodily integrity

Text: 23 In this circuit, a supervisory school official can be held personally liable for a subordinate's violation of an elementary or secondary school student's constitutional right to bodily integrity in a physical sexual abuse case, when the official, by action or inaction, demonstrates a deliberate indifference to [a student's] constitutional rights that results in the molestation of school children. 26 In the complaint, Doe alleges two factually distinct but legally related claims under § 1983: First, Doe contends that the School Officials' inadequate hiring procedures--failing to check criminal histories of prospective Staff employees--led them to hire criminals, one of whom caused Jane's injuries. Second, Doe alleges the School Officials' failure to supervise the custodial staff--ignoring repeated reports that members of the Staff were sexually abusing school children--led to additional sexual abuse, specifically Jane's being raped by the Custodian. We will analyze the elements of each of these types of claims to determine whether, as a formal matter of pleading, Doe has alleged in his complaint facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 24
25 To prove that a hiring policy violated her rights under § 1983, Jane must show that (1) the hiring procedures were inadequate; (2) the school officials were deliberately indifferent in adopting the hiring policy; and (3) the inadequate hiring policy directly caused the plaintiff's injury. 27 With the awareness that stating a claim and proving it present substantially different tasks, we hold that Doe has stated a claim that the School Officials' hiring policies and procedures were inadequate and caused a violation of Doe's constitutional rights. 26 First, Doe's allegations that the School Officials failed to investigate the criminal records of prospective employees satisfies the inadequacy element. Common sense recommends--and state law demands--that, in the interest of the safety of school children, school officials investigate the criminal histories of prospective school employees. 28 The School Officials' total abdication of this responsibility constitutes a facially inadequate hiring process. 27 Second, the hiring inadequacies alleged here reveal a deliberate indifference to Doe's welfare. A hiring process demonstrates deliberate indifference, when it constitutes such recklessness or gross negligence as to amount to conscious indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 29 The School Officials cite two cases for the proposition that, at most, their hiring procedures represent merely negligent hiring practices. 30 The School Officials, however, disregard, or at least overlook, the following footnote in one of those cases: 28 [I]f a section 1983 claim may arise from egregious hiring practices ... we would ... require a plaintiff to establish actual knowledge of the seriously deficient character of an applicant or a persistent, widespread pattern of hiring policemen, for instance, with a background of unjustified violence. 31 29 Just as the histories of prospective police officers must be scrutinized routinely for violence or unlawful conduct in the interest of the public's safety, the criminal histories of prospective school employees must be scrutinized in the interest of students' safety. 30 Doe has alleged that one-third of the School's Staff in 1993 were convicted criminals, many of them violent criminals. Surely the District's hiring and giving the schoolhouse keys to even one convicted murderer constitutes the hiring of an applicant with seriously deficient character. When that is multiplied to the point that a significant fraction of the custodial staff--here, one-third--consists of convicted criminals, a persistent, widespread pattern of hiring school employees with a background of crime and violence is manifested. Doe has satisfied the second element of his hiring claim. 31 Third, a jury could reasonably conclude that when school officials hire a staff, one-third of whom are violent criminals, give those criminals the keys to the schoolhouse, and place them in constant contact with students, there is a real nexus between the hiring of these criminals-cum-custodians and the constitutional injuries suffered by victims like Jane. 32 We conclude that Doe has alleged a sufficient causal connection between the hiring process and Jane's injuries to defeat a motion to dismiss. 32 In sum, the egregious nature of the criminal records alleged, and the sheer number of Staff members alleged to have criminal records, move Jane's inadequate hiring claim beyond mere negligence and into the realm of a constitutional tort. Although surviving summary judgment, much less proving these allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, may be a daunting task, we cannot say that it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. 33 33
34 To plead a valid failure-to-supervise claim, Doe must allege facts sufficient to present the following elements: (1) the defendants learned of facts or a pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior by subordinates pointing plainly toward the conclusion that the subordinates were sexually abusing the students; (2) the defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference toward the constitutional rights of the student by failing to take action that was obviously needed to prevent or stop the abuse; and (3) such failure caused a constitutional injury to the student. 34 We conclude that Doe has alleged facts that, when accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Doe, satisfy these three elements. 35 First, Doe alleges that the School Officials received repeated reports that Staff members had sexually abused students. Although these reports do not appear to have identified individual employees or students by name, Doe's allegations that the School Officials responded to these reports with ostrich-like avoidance satisfies the first element. At this early pleading stage, it is unnecessary to produce specific names and exact dates. Doe has alleged that the School Officials received a number of reports plainly pointing to the inescapable conclusion that Staff members were sexually abusing students. These allegations are sufficient to merit at least limited discovery. After limited discovery, however, if the evidence cannot sustain the weight of these allegations, summary judgment presents an effective and efficient tool to terminate the inquiry and the case at a sufficiently early and minimally burdensome stage. Although Doe has not alleged that X School Official plainly knew that Y Staff member was sexually abusing Z student, we conclude that allegations that School Officials ignored repeated reports that Staff members sexually abused students are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 36 On the second deliberate indifference element, Doe alleges that the School Officials (1) knew or should have known that one-third of the Staff members had criminal records, (2) received reports that Staff members were sexually abusing students, and (3) did absolutely nothing about it. Such inaction rises to the level of total abdication of the duty to protect school children from sexual abuse by state actors, and, if proved, would demonstrate deliberate indifference to Jane's constitutional rights. Moreover, a jury could reasonably conclude that such deliberate indifference was the proximate cause of Jane's being raped. Accordingly, with respect to Jane's failure-to-supervise claim, we conclude that Doe's complaint sufficiently alleges that the School Officials caused a deprivation of Jane's constitutional rights under color of state law. 37
38 In the process of stating the above described deficient hiring and failure-to-supervise claims, Doe indiscriminately jumbles into the complaint the language and elements of two other § 1983 theories of liability: (1) the state-created danger doctrine and (2) the DeShaney 35 special-relationship doctrine. As both of these doctrines apply only when a third-party inflicts the harm, both of these theories are legal dead ends here. 39
40 Regarding the state-created danger theory, other circuits have held that when a state actor knowingly places a person in danger, the Due Process Clause of the Constitution renders such state actor accountable for the foreseeable injuries that result from his conduct, whether or not the victim was in formal custody. 36 In attempting to apply this doctrine to the instant case, we encounter two flaws: First, although at least once in the past we assumed arguendo that such a claim is recognized in this circuit, we have yet to recognize this theory of liability squarely. 37 Second, Jane's case does not arise under one of the factual situations in which other circuits have applied (and we have assumed) this doctrine. Generally, the state-created danger doctrine applies only when the state actor creates the dangerous situation in which a third-party causes the harm. 38 In the instant case the custodian who caused the harm was himself a state actor, not a third party, so even assuming arguendo that the state-created danger theory were recognized in this circuit, Doe's effort to employ the state-created danger doctrine would fail. 41
42 In like manner, a special-relationship claim under DeShaney 39 is applicable only to harm inflicted by third parties. In Leffall, we stated that [t]he special relationship doctrine is properly invoked in cases involving harms inflicted by third parties, and it is not applicable when it is the conduct of a state actor that has allegedly infringed on a person's constitutional rights. 40 Again, the Custodian was a state actor; consequently, the special relationship doctrine is unavailable to Doe.