Opinion ID: 1537069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Most of Appellant's Reasonable Accommodation Claim Is Barred by the Statute of Limitations

Text: In her July 16, 2005, complaint, appellant alleges that [b]eginning on or around April 2003 and continuing until August 2004, [appellee] denied [her] a reasonable accommodation.... Ms. Barrett points to several incidents in support of her claim that Covington failed to reasonably accommodate her disability, including: a March 2003 denial of her request to work on a part-time basis and/or telecommute for part of the week; delay in providing her with a zero gravity chair and modified desk from March 2003 through June 2003; a denial of her June 2003 request that she be allowed to bring her own ergonomic equipment into the office; failure to allow her to work from home in June 2003; the denial of repeated requests between April 2003 and February 2004 for permission to telecommute and/or work on a modified schedule; and a July 2004 conversation and an August 23, 2004, letter in which Covington allegedly refused to reasonably accommodate her disability. Appellant encourages us to consider her allegations as a whole, arguing that we should transplant the continuing violation doctrine applied to hostile work environment claims into the context of failure to accommodate claims. Unlike a hostile work environment claim, however, a reasonable accommodation claim is based on discrete acts, not on prolonged or repeated conduct. Consequently, we reject appellant's invitation to treat failure to accommodate claims in the same way as hostile work environment claims, and instead adopt the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), and applied to the context of reasonable accommodations by the First Circuit in Tobin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 553 F.3d 121 (1st Cir.2009), and by the United States District Court in Long v. Howard University, 512 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.2007), aff'd, Long v. Howard University, 384 U.S.App. D.C. 21, 550 F.3d 21 (2008). In Morgan, the Court considered a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII and held that discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges.... 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061; see id. (The existence of past acts and the employee's prior knowledge of their occurrence, however, does not bar employees from filing charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed. ) (emphasis added). Relying upon Morgan, the First Circuit concluded that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to reasonable accommodation claims. See Tobin, 553 F.3d at 130-31. The Tobin court held that: the denial of a disabled employee's request for accommodation starts the clock running on the day it occurs.... [S]uch a denial is a discrete discriminatory act that, like a termination, a refusal to transfer, or a failure to promote, does not require repeated conduct to establish an actionable claim. Consequently, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to this case, and the timeliness of [a plaintiff's] claim turns solely on whether an actionable denial of his request for accommodations occurred during the limitations periods. Id. (footnote omitted). In Long v. Howard University, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that there is no principled basis for declining to apply Morgan to denials of requests for reasonable accommodation under the ... [Americans with Disabilities Act]. 512 F.Supp.2d at 16 (noting that many courts have held that an alleged failure to provide a requested accommodation under the ... ADA is also a `discrete act' under Morgan and thus cannot rest on a continuing violation theory to make it timely (footnote omitted)). We adopt the rationale of Morgan, Tobin, and Long, and hold that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to reasonable accommodation claims. See also Davidson v. America Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir.2003) (applying Morgan to reasonable accommodation claims and holding that plaintiffs are now expressly precluded from establishing a continuing violation exception for alleged discrete acts of discrimination occurring prior to the limitations period, even if sufficiently related to those acts occurring within the limitations period); Elmenayer v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 318 F.3d 130, 134-35 (2d Cir.2003) (The rejection of a proposed accommodation is a single completed action when taken and the continuing violation doctrine is therefore inapplicable.); Isse v. American University, 540 F.Supp.2d 9, 28 (D.D.C.2008) (deciding that with respect to discrimination based on religion, a rejection of a request for an accommodation is a `discrete act of discrimination'... and not a `continuing violation'); Blanchet v. Chevron/Texaco Corp., 368 F.Supp.2d 589, 598 (E.D.Tex. 2004) (In contrast to a claim alleging a hostile work environment, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to a claim based on discrete discriminatory acts.). [3] Because the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to reasonable accommodation claims, a plaintiff cannot reach back and base a claim on otherwise time-barred incidents merely because they are connected to events which occurred within the limitations period. A one-year statute of limitations applies to claims alleging discrimination in violation of the DCHRA. See D.C.Code § 2-1403.16(a) (2001) (A private cause of action pursuant to this chapter shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction within one year of the unlawful discriminatory act....). Consequently, the statute of limitations bars any claim for relief based on denials of accommodation that occurred more than one year prior to the filing of appellant's complaint. According to appellant's own pleading, the alleged discrimination did not extend beyond August 2004, and the vast majority of the actions Ms. Barrett complains of occurred more than one year before she filed her complaint. Appellant points to only two events that took place within the twelve months prior to appellant's July 16, 2005, complaint: appellant's July 23, 2004, conversation with Mary Ellen Carter (the content of which was described in a July 23 e-mail from Ms. Carter to Jeffrey Huvelle); and Mr. Huvelle's August 23, 2004, letter. The parties hotly dispute whether, during July and August, Ms. Barrett requested a new accommodation, sought to resume her old 30-hour work schedule, or renewed a request previously denied. These distinctions are critical. A plaintiff cannot extend the limitations period by reiterating an identical request that was previously denied. See Long, 512 F.Supp.2d at 17 (It is well-settled that `[m]ere requests to reconsider ... cannot extend the limitations periods....') (citation omitted), aff'd, 384 U.S.App. D.C. at 26, 550 F.3d at 26 ([T]o the extent that [the] actions were merely a re-affirmation of any University action denying Long's requests ... the District Court properly explained that such claims were barred.) (emphasis in original); Tobin, 553 F.3d at 131 (It is settled that an employee may not extend or circumvent the limitations period by requesting modification or reversal of an employer's prior action. (citation omitted)). On the other hand, the revocation of a previously authorized accommodation is actionable. See Woodruff v. Peters, 375 U.S.App. D.C. 429, 436, 482 F.3d 521, 528 (2007) (holding that summary judgment was precluded where an employer's communication indicated that the employee could no longer count on the accommodations the [employer] had de facto afforded even where it is far from clear such accommodations are reasonable); Alston v. District of Columbia, 561 F.Supp.2d 29, 43 (D.D.C.2008) ([T]he revocation of one's accommodations qualifies as an adverse action.) (citation omitted). Similarly, a claim based on the denial of a new request, made in light of changed circumstances, would not be time-barred. In either case, Ms. Barrett's request, and Covington's denial, would have to be evaluated on the merits. In order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the DCHRA, a plaintiff must demonstrate, among other things, that she is an individual with a disability, and that she can perform the essential functions of her position with or without a reasonable accommodation. See Miller v. American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, Inc., 485 A.2d 186, 190-91 (D.C.1984); see also Carr v. Reno, 306 U.S.App. D.C. 217, 221, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (1994) ([A]n individual with handicaps is `qualified' if she can perform the essential functions of her position with reasonable accommodation.). If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the employer must demonstrate that it reasonably accommodated the plaintiff's disability. In order to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested accommodation, one must understand the essential functions of the job. Although it concluded that appellant's claims were time-barred, the trial court held in the alternative that: Covington has provided reasonable accommodations to appellant; Ms. Barrett failed to prove that the essential functions of her job could have been performed even with the accommodations; appellant was not capable of working ... even if the accommodations had been made; and appellant's August 11, 2004, letter made requests for reasonable accommodations, which ... had been previously made. Based on the record before us, and the briefs filed by the parties, we are not convinced there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the merits of Ms. Barrett's claims based on events that occurred in July and August of 2004. Although it appears uncontested that appellant had a disability, the parties debate whether she was capable of performing the job even with a reasonable accommodation. We agree with appellant that this issue must be evaluated by focusing on her medical condition during those two months not at some earlier or later time. Further inquiry into the essential functions of the job is also required. We therefore remand for further consideration of whether those discrete acts constituted a failure to grant a reasonable accommodation in violation of the DCHRA. [4] The parties and the trial court should focus anew on whether, during July and August, appellant was seeking a new accommodation or merely trying to revive a time-barred claim; whether appellant was a qualified individual under the DCHRA; whether Covington unreasonably revoked an accommodation previously granted; and whether Covington failed to reasonably accommodate Ms. Barrett's disability.