Opinion ID: 2629666
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State's tort reform objectives are legitimate.

Text: The next step in our equal protection analysis focuses on the adequacy of the State's objectives underlying the regulation. Since we have determined that the plaintiffs' interests in unlimited damages are merely economic, the State's objectives need only be legitimatenot compellingto justify the State's action. [37] The superior court held that the legislature's stated goals underlying the damages caps are plainly legitimate. The plaintiffs claim that the State's objectives in enacting the damages caps were not legitimate, because chapter 26, SLA 1997 as a whole was enacted to deal with problems that do not actually exist: a dramatic increase in personal injury and malpractice cases, runaway juries, and out-of-control damages awards. The legislative goals underlying the damages caps, as well as the rest of chapter 26, SLA 1997, are explicitly stated in chapter 26, section 1, SLA 1997. Specifically, section 1 states that the legislation was intended to (1) discourage frivolous litigation and decrease the costs of litigation; [38] (2) stop excessive punitive damages awards in order to foster a positive business environment; [39] (3) control the increase of liability insurance rates; [40] (4) encourage self-reliance and independence by underscoring the need for personal responsibility; [41] and (5) reduce the cost of malpractice insurance for professionals. [42] In our past decisions, we have accepted as legitimate very similar legislative goals. In McConkey v. Hart, we considered the constitutionality of a statute that limited the accrual of prejudgment interest for victims of particular torts, including the medical malpractice plaintiff in that case. [43] The purposes of the statute in McConkey were very similar to those expressed by the legislature here, and we noted the legitimacy of such tort reform objectives: Reducing health care costs and encouraging the provision of health care services are legitimate goals which can reasonably be thought to be furthered by lowering the amount of medical malpractice judgments. [44] Similarly, in Reid v. Williams , we noted that the stated purpose of alleviat[ing] the medical malpractice insurance crisis was a legitimate legislative goal. [45] We decline the plaintiffs' invitation to second-guess the legislature's factual findings. After examining various evidence and testimony, the legislature found that there were problems with tort litigation that needed to be solved, including frivolous litigation, excessive damages awards, and increased costs for malpractice and other liability insurance. [46] The plaintiffs, pointing to other contrary evidence, ask us to independently review this conclusion and find that the evidence instead showed that these problems did not really exist. The plaintiffs ask us to delve into questions of policy formulation that are best left to the legislature. As we have noted previously, [i]t is not a court's role to decide whether a particular statute or ordinance is a wise one; the choice between competing notions of public policy is to be made by elected representatives of the people. [47]