Opinion ID: 2788747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Signed Agreement

Text: Pisarz next argues that the settlement agreement is invalid because its enforceability was conditioned upon his signature, which he refused to provide. He is wrong. “An agreement to settle a lawsuit, voluntarily entered into, is binding upon the 7 parties, whether or not made in the presence of the Court, and even in the absence of a writing.” Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 726 F.2d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pennsylvania law provides that, when the parties have agreed on the essential terms of a contract, the fact that they intend to formalize their agreement in writing but have not yet done so does not prevent enforcement. E.g., Channel Home Ctrs., Div. of Grace Retail Corp. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 298 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying Pennsylvania law). Even the inability of the parties to reduce their agreement to writing after several attempts does not necessarily preclude a finding that their oral agreement was enforceable. Mazzella v. Koken, 739 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. 1999). Here, the parties agreed that PPL would make a $145,000 payment to Pisarz in exchange for, inter alia, his releasing PPL from further liability. The parties confirmed the terms of the settlement in an email exchange between Kolman and PPL’s attorney. The language of the email between counsel, while not necessary to our holding that a valid, binding settlement agreement existed, makes unambiguously clear that Kolman, acting on Pisarz’s behalf, accepted PPL’s offer to settle the case on a set of enumerated and definite terms and that there was valid consideration. Grossman, 795 F.2d at 299 (“Applying Pennsylvania law, then, we must ask (1) whether both parties manifested an intention to be bound by the agreement; (2) whether the terms of the agreement are sufficiently definite to be enforced; and (3) whether there was consideration.”). Nothing in the record or in the exchanges between the parties suggests that Pisarz’s signing of the agreement was a condition precedent to the agreement. See Wineburgh v. Wineburgh, 816 A.2d 1105, 1109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (“While the parties to a contract need not 8 utilize any particular words to create a condition precedent, an act or event designated in a contract will not be construed as constituting one unless that clearly appears to have been the parties’ intention.” (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted)). The settlement documents rather were to memorialize the terms of an already-reached agreement, and Pisarz’s obligation to sign the release was part of what he had agreed to do.