Opinion ID: 2780822
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: defendant's profits, (2) any damages

Text: sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. The court shall assess such profits and damages or cause the same to be assessed under its direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant’s sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. . . . If the court 24 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find just, according to the circumstances of the case. Such sum . . . shall constitute compensation and not a penalty. An award of profits “is not automatic” upon a finding of infringement. Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43, 113 Stat. 218. Rather, profits “must be granted in light of equitable considerations.” Id. In seeking to achieve equity between the parties, the court must fashion a remedy wherein the defendant may “not retain the fruits, if any, of unauthorized trademark use or continue that use [and the] plaintiff is not . . . [given] a windfall.” Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 918 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Awarding profits “is proper only where the defendant is ‘attempting to gain the value of an established name of another.’” Lindy Pen Co., 982 F.2d at 1406 (quoting Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Co., 390 F.2d 117, 123 (9th Cir. 1968)). “Willful infringement carries a connotation of deliberate intent to deceive.” Id. Generally, “deliberate, false, misleading, or fraudulent . . . conduct . . . meets this standard.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Willfulness . . . ‘require[s] a connection between a defendant’s awareness of its competitors and its actions at those competitors’ expense.’” Id. (quoting ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 25 A. There was sufficient evidence to support the finding of willfulness as to Freeze. Freeze claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Freeze violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) willfully, requiring reversal of the district court’s order disgorging Freeze’s profits. Freeze is incorrect. At trial, Kim Cauley, vice president of licensing for Freeze, testified as follows: Before Freeze began selling Marley merchandise, Cauley received a phone call from Doreen Crujeiras, a licensing agent for Hope Road, who notified her that “Hope Road or the Marley family owned the rights in Bob Marley.” Crujeiras said that A.V.E.L.A. did not have the right to use Marley’s name and likeness. Cauley also knew that Zion had a license to sell Bob Marley merchandise, and this awareness predated Freeze’s first sales of Marley merchandise. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Cauley’s testimony demonstrates Freeze’s “awareness of its competitors and its actions at those competitors’ expense.” Lindy Pen Co., 982 F.2d at 1406 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 472, 475 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Use of an infringing mark, in the face of warnings about potential infringement, is strong evidence of willful infringement.”).