Opinion ID: 223501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the majority adopts a new test for waiver of personal-jurisdiction defenses, but then applies the old one.

Text: Before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938, a defendant seeking to challenge the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction would make a limited, or special, appearance before the court to lodge the objection. See, e.g., Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 476, 478-79, 25 L.Ed. 237 (1878); see generally 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1344 (3d ed.2011). This special appearance was conceptually different from a general appearance, which was viewed as a sign that the defendant acknowledged the existence of personal jurisdiction and intended to defend the action on the merits. See Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521, 15 S.Ct. 559, 39 L.Ed. 517 (1895) (stating that personal jurisdiction can be acquired over the defendant by his waiver, by general appearance or otherwise). The term `general appearance' historically applied to the defendant's submission of pleadings or motions, not limited to jurisdictional questions, regardless of whether the defendant or the defendant's attorney is physically present in court. 16-108 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 108.53[2] (3d ed.2011). Rule 12 changed the practices surrounding challenges to personal jurisdiction, notably by ending reliance on the appearance doctrine. Rule 12 ... abolished for the federal courts the age-old distinction between general and special appearances. Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d 871, 874 (3d Cir.1944) (en banc). Acknowledging this, we have held that, In order to object to a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction, it is no longer necessary to enter a `special appearance.' Cty. Sec. Agency v. Ohio Dep't of Commerce, 296 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir.2002); see also Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 820 n. 4 (6th Cir.1981) (stating, with respect to challenges to service of process, that a `special appearance' to challenge [personal] jurisdiction is no longer necessary under the Federal Rules. A defendant must attack the validity of service of process pursuant to Rule 12(b).). On the other hand, the term general appearance still appears in some cases in the context of personal-jurisdiction challenges, although a precise definition of exactly what qualifies as a general appearance is not provided. See Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1120 (6th Cir.1994) (Under F.R.C.P. 12(h), a party waives the right to contest personal jurisdiction by failing to raise the issue when making a responsive pleading or a general appearance.); Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir.1978) (quoting Goldey, 156 U.S. at 521, 15 S.Ct. 559); see also 16-108 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 108.53[2] (The term [general appearance] is still widely used to describe acts by the defendant sufficient to support jurisdiction, even in discussions of jurisdiction in courts that have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide a waiver procedure instead of the appearance doctrine.) (internal citation omitted). Rule 12(h)(1) now sets out the circumstances in which a challenge to personal jurisdiction can be waived. According to the rule: A party waives any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) by: (B) failing to either: (i) make it by motion under this rule; or (ii) include it in a responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed by Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(h)(1)(B). Such an inquiry is easy in most cases. One can look at the defendant's answer or pre-answer motion; either personal jurisdiction is raised or it isn't. Yet cases like the present one, in which numerous other issues are raised from the outset of the case, can present a more difficult situation. Notwithstanding the absence of an answer or pre-answer motion, a defendant can still waive a personal-jurisdiction challenge by certain participation in the litigation. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982); Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Patel, 445 F.3d 899, 905 (6th Cir.2006). [1] To assess whether such a waiver through participation in the litigation has been made, several other circuits take a common-sense approach to determining whether a party has waived a personal-jurisdiction challenge. All of these attempt to ensure compliance with the spirit of Rule 12which is to expedite and simplify proceedings in the Federal Courts, Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 539 (8th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)when the letter of Rule 12 itself does not provide clear guidance. [2] Perhaps the best description of this approach comes from a Seventh Circuit case cited by the majority, Mobile Anesthesiologists: To waive or forfeit a personal jurisdiction defense, a defendant must give a plaintiff a reasonable expectation that it will defend the suit on the merits or must cause the court to go to some effort that would be wasted if personal jurisdiction is later found lacking. 623 F.3d at 443. The Seventh Circuit has also asked whether the defendants' actions manifest[] an intent to submit to the court's jurisdiction and whether they comply with the spirit of Rule 12(h) even where they already comply with the letter of the rule. Continental Bank, N.A. v. Meyer, 10 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir.1993). This straightforward description of the inquiry to be undertaken has the advantage of ensuring that cases with atypical preliminary pleading histories, such that the letter of Rule 12 is difficult to apply, are decided in a manner that comports with the policy behind Rule 12(h). It also parallels the inquiry undertaken in a related situation: determining whether a defendant's purposeful availment of a forum stateseparate and apart from participation in the litigation at issueresults in the existence of specific jurisdiction. [3] As the Supreme Court recently observed with respect to specific jurisdiction, The principal inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the defendant's activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2788, 180 L.Ed.2d 765 (2011). Unfortunately, although the majority states at the outset that it approves of this type of inquiry, it does not go further and undertake it. Instead, it engages in a two-step line of analysis that makes no mention of whether the defendants gave the plaintiffs a reasonable expectation that [they] will defend the suit on the merits or whether the defendants had cause[d] the court to go to some effort that would be wasted if personal jurisdiction is later found lacking. First, the majority relies on a case mentioning (but not explaining) the old (and abandoned) distinction between special and general appearances. See Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1120 (Under F.R.C.P. 12(h), a party waives the right to contest personal jurisdiction by failing to raise the issue when making a responsive pleading or a general appearance.). Then the majority states, without further explanation, that the defendants filed a document that constitutes a general appearance, thereby waiving any objections to personal jurisdiction. As explained below, this makes no sense.