Opinion ID: 2076061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The nature of the father's participation in the proceedings.

Text: On August 24, 1987, following the filing of the petition in which the mother and stepfather were charged with neglect, Judge Truman Morrison appointed counsel for the mother, father [16] and stepfather. At the initial hearing, the father who is a member of the armed forces and who lives in Norfolk, Virginia, was not present, for he had received notice of the proceeding only on the preceding evening. His counsel stated, however, that the father would eventually like S.G. to come to live with him in Norfolk, but was not ready to take her immediately, since he was about to get married. At trial, S.G.'s father supported the government's position on the merits against both the mother and the stepfather. Although the father did not introduce any evidence, his attorney cross-examined defense witnesses and attempted to bolster the government's case. During closing argument, counsel for the father urged the court to rule that both the mother and the stepfather had neglected S.G. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge initially stated that since S.G. was in her mother's custody (although physically residing with her grandmother), he would simply set appropriate restrictions on the stepfather's contact with S.G. Citing the mother's cocaine addiction, however, the social worker recommended that all four children be placed with the grandmother. The father objected to this proposed placement of S.G. because he was ready, willing, and able to care for her. He maintained through counsel that the court had improperly denied him custody of his own child during the pendency of the case by ordering that S.G. be placed with the grandmother in the absence of any allegation that he (the father) had acted wrongfully toward S.G. Counsel argued that the court had no authority to remove S.G. from the custody of her natural parents when neither parent had abused the child. She suggested that custody issues be resolved by the Domestic Relations Branch [of the Family Division], but acknowledged that the father had not filed a petition for custody in that Branch. The judge ordered that the children remain with the grandmother pending disposition, but indicated that this interim placement was without prejudice to any application by the father which his counsel deemed appropriate. The father did not personally appear at the disposition hearing. His attorney, however, made the following request to the court: I do not know if Your Honor is inclined to make a placement decision with regard to S.G. If your Honor is so inclined, I would ask for sort of an unusual order, in that [the court] allow [the father] to maintain some type of custody. [The father] called me last night and requested, for example, that there be some sort of joint custody [of] the child, who resides at the grandmother's. And the reason for this is, at least [the father's] understanding is, if he does not have some sort of joint custody, S.G. will lose all of her military benefits. The father's counsel maintained that, if her client were denied custody, S.G. would no longer be eligible to shop at the PX or to obtain free medical care at area army bases, and that she would lose her entitlement to receive health benefits pursuant to the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). See 32 C.F.R. § 199.1(a) (1989). Counsel continued as follows: I would also just point out that the home study has yet to be done on [the father], although we are at this point trying to work out some amenable resolution of all of this. But if the Court is inclined to place the child with [the grandmother], if there could be some sort offor example, the previous order had the child in [the mother's] custody, but residing at [the grandmother's]. I don't know if the Court could issue a joint custody [order] between [the grandmother] and [the father] or not. But that would be my request. In response to these representations, the mother's attorney advised the court that the father had voluntarily relinquished custody of S.G. to the mother several years earlier. Counsel produced an agreement, signed in the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, on August 22, 1983, which provided that [[t]he mother and the father], parents of [S.G.], met in the mediation program, and agreed that it is in her best interest for custody to be granted to [the mother] with liberal rights of visitation to [the father] [17] After hearing from counsel, the judge held that it was in the best interest of all four children to continue to reside with their maternal grandmother. He stated that he would not award any form of custody, individual or joint, to the father in the absence of a home study, but that the court's disposition would be without prejudice to a request for modification following the completion of such a study. The court authorized liberal visitation between the father and his daughter. The father's counsel again objected, citing D.C.Code § 16-2320(a)(3)(C) (1989), [18] and asserted that the court had denied the father his right to custody of his child, emphasizing that the father had not consented to the placement of S.G. outside her parents' home. The judge correctly explained, however, that the father was in no position to interpose an objection based on this provision because his Norfolk residence was not S.G.'s home. Following the disposition hearing, the father filed a timely motion for reconsideration. He contended that, as a result of the court's order, S.G. had lost her eligibility for the military benefits to which she was previously entitled as a dependent of her father. He claimed that there was no legal basis for granting custody to the grandmother rather than to him, because there had been no finding that he, or indeed either parent, had neglected S.G. He contended that he had been denied his rights as a father without due process of law. On April 18, 1988, the judge entered a comprehensive written order denying the father's motion. In re S.G., 116 Daily Wash.L. Rptr. 1149 (Super.Ct.D.C.1988).