Opinion ID: 3009632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: San Filippo's first amendment claim

Text: San Filippo first contends that the district court erred in denying his r made pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,0 that the dist court delay its ruling on Rutgers' summary judgment motion until after he had time conduct further discovery. San Filippo made various discovery requests on Septembe 1989; Rutgers asked to have until November 7 to respond. On November 24, San Filip wrote a 20-page letter to Rutgers pointing out inadequacies in Rutgers' response. November 29, Rutgers moved for summary judgment and the requested information was n supplied. San Filippo submitted a Rule 56(f) affidavit in support of its oppositio Rutgers' motion for summary judgment. The magistrate judge recommended that the ru the summary judgment motion be deferred until after San Filippo had an opportunity additional discovery. 0 The text of this rule is quoted at note 8, supra. 14 The district court rejected the magistrate judge's conclusion that summar judgment should not be granted until San Filippo had an opportunity to discover add information. The court explained that San Filippo argued that he must see the reco other faculty persons similarly situated (i.e., persons who have been known to comm were accused of committing, similar offenses, but against whom no sanctions, or not severe a sanction was imposed). Opinion at 42 (internal quotation omitted). The rejected San Filippo's argument for two reasons. First, the court concluded that  members 'similarly situated' to plaintiff are those faculty members against whom fo charges have been filed as to conduct which could lead to dismissal under the Unive regulations. Opinion at 42-43. The court explained that San Filippo received all information on June 9, 1989, pursuant to Rutgers' compliance with section I.1 of a Stipulation dated May 19, 1989. Second, the court concluded: These [nine] charges together caused plaintiff's dismissal and it is only tenured faculty member who had been known to commit or was accused of committing offenses of the kind, number, and scope taken together with w plaintiff is truly similarly situated. No one suggests that such a per exists. Opinion at 44-45 (emphasis in original). For these two reasons, the court conclude San Filippo had received all of the discovery to which he was entitled. See Opinio 46. San Filippo, with support from the Rutgers AAUP, argues that the district abused its discretion in denying San Filippo's request for a Rule 56(f) continuance Under Contractors Assoc. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1991), whe Rule 56(f) motion should be granted depends, in part, on 'what particular informat sought; how, if uncovered, it would preclude summary judgment; and why it has not b previously obtained.' Id. at 1266 (quoting Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, Cir. 1989)). A district court has discretion in acting on Rule 56(f) motions. See 15 1267. However, where relevant information sought is in the hands of the moving par district court should grant a Rule 56(f) motion almost as a matter of course unless information is otherwise available to the non-movant. Id. In Contractors Assoc., the district court granted Contractors Association Eastern Philadelphia and other trade associations summary judgment on their claim t Philadelphia's public contract minority set-aside law violated the equal protection of the fourteenth amendment. On appeal, United Minority Associates Enterprises arg that the district court --to which Minority Associates had submitted a Rule 56(f) affidavit along with their opposition to summary judgment -- erred by granting the judgment motion without giving Minority Associates an opportunity to pursue discove the existence of discrimination in the Philadelphia construction market that could various set-asides. We held that the district court abused its discretion by not g a continuance before ruling on the summary judgment motion. See Contractors Assoc. F.2d at 1268. In addressing the first part of the Contractors Assoc. test -- what infor is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment -- San Filippo and the Rutgers argue that the district court's definition of similarly situated was too narrow. agree. Among other things, San Filippo argues that, but for his protected activity would not have been charged at all. To limit his discovery to individuals who were fact brought up on similar charges is, therefore, not adequately responsive to San Filippo's needs. Nor should San Filippo be limited to discovery of individuals who committed nine charges of comparable seriousness yet were not disciplined. The Sup Court explained in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.11 ( [P]recise equivalence in culpability between employees is not the questio we indicated in [McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (197 allegation that other employees involved in acts against [the employer] comparable seriousness . . . were nevertheless retained . . . is adequat 16 plead an inferential case that the employer's reliance on his discharged employee's misconduct as grounds for terminating him was merely a pretext Santa Fe, 427 U.S. at 283 n.11 (emphasis and omissions in Santa Fe). In analogous fashion, this court, in Bennun v. Rutgers State University, F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1991), rejected a contention that the district court had erred in comparing the defendant University's decision not to tenure the plaintiff professor the University's decision to tenure another professor who had higher ratings than t plaintiff in two categories -- teaching effectiveness and general usefulness. See 178. We reasoned that to preclude such a comparison would change 'similarly situa 'identically situated.' Id. Although [t]he propriety of such a comparison is cas specific, there is a broad sweep of relevancy. Id. Admittedly, the district cou and should impose limits on discovery that is calculated to lead to the unearthing marginally relevant evidence. Nonetheless, the limits imposed here were too severe The Board indicated in its opinion that it viewed charges 1(a), 1(d) and the most serious charges against San Filippo, meriting his dismissal even if the ot charges were not sustained. San Filippo accordingly should be permitted to discove whether the University knew of other employees who committed one or more offenses o comparable or greater seriousness yet did not discipline these employees, or impose sanctions far less severe than dismissal. Although the district court's suggestion San Filippo was disciplined because of a combination of misdeeds rather than for an single misdeed is plausible, this type of evaluation is one that should generally b to the fact-finder. Because the information San Filippo sought in discovery was of sort that might prevent the entry of summary judgment and was under the control of Rutgers, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to deny San Filippo's Rule 17 motion. Accordingly, we will vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment Filippo's first amendment claim and remand for further discovery.0 Even without further discovery, there is sufficient evidence in the recor which a fact-finder could conclude that, in the absence of his protected activities Filippo would not have been dismissed based on the conduct described in the charges against him. First, Dean Edelstein was interviewed by the local New Brunswick news The Home News, shortly after San Filippo was dismissed. The paper reported: 'If Filippo] had behaved better earlier in terms of his relations with his colleagues,' Tilden Edelstein, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, San Filippo might have treated differently. . . . 'But San Filippo persisted in being Joe the Warrior,' Edelstein said. (A.606). A fact-finder could reasonably infer that the war to w Dean Edelstein referred encompassed the protected complaints San Filippo had made o years. In addition, Walter Wechsler, the member of the Board of Governors who diss from the decision to dismiss San Filippo, stated that the punishment is clearly ou proportion to his alleged wrongdoing, and quite possibly tainted by a long history animus. (A.322). San Filippo also has presented evidence that other faculty members had co infractions of comparable seriousness yet had not been punished. For example, Prof Richard Hartwick of the chemistry department testified before the Senate Panel that had two students pitch hay for him on his farm. Another professor, George Muha, te that, as a student, he had helped his faculty advisor move from one place to anothe Professor Muha also testified that he had some of his own students work with him in photography lab, and that foreign students he had invited to his house at Thanksgiv 0 With respect to the second part of the Contractors Assoc. test -- why the informat not previously obtained --Rutgers argues that the May 19, 1989 Stipulation preclude further discovery. This argument is unpersuasive. We agree with the district cour conclusion that the Stipulation did not necessarily foreclose additional discovery. 18 domestic chores including yard work for him. Based on this evidence, a fact-finder reasonably find that San Filippo would not have been dismissed in the absence of hi protected activities. Accordingly, even if the denial of the Rule 56(f) motion wer erroneous, we would vacate the grant of summary judgment. In light of our decision to vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment on San Filippo's first amendment claim, we need to address certain other i that are relevant to the course of proceedings on remand.
As explained above, one who alleges retaliatory discharge from government employment must establish that the conduct which triggered the discharge was protec under the first amendment. Where the alleged retaliation is based on expressive co constituting speech, a court must first determine whether or not the speech can be characterized as addressing a matter of public concern, for a governmental employ makes public complaints about problems not of public concern has no first amendme immunity against employer discipline. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).0 San Filippo's expressive conduct was not limited to speech. It included the filing of lawsuits, and also of grievances under a collective bargaining agreement, agains 0 A public employer is not precluded altogether from dismissing an employer for spee addressing a matter of public concern. Rather, a public employer may dismiss an em for speech addressing a matter of public concern if the state's interest, as an emp in promoting the efficiency of its operations outweighs the employee's interest, as citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 142. balancing test comes into play only if the public employer concedes that it dismiss employee because of the employee's protected speech but contends that it was justif doing so. Rutgers denies that it dismissed San Filippo for his protected activitie accordingly, the balancing test has no application in the case at bar. The court decides, as a matter of law, whether the speech at issue addres matter of public concern and whether the state's interest in efficiency outweighed employee's interest in commenting on matters of public concern. See Holder v. City Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 195 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993). 19 University and University officials -- activities that implicate the petition claus rather than the free speech clause, of the first amendment.0 The magistrate judge concluded that San Filippo's activities implicating petition clause were protected by the first amendment regardless of whether the pe at issue addressed a matter of public concern. The district court disagreed, and h that, to qualify for first amendment protection, San Filippo's petition activitie meet the Connick public concern threshold. Although the district court concluded some of San Filippo's speech addressed matters of public concern,0 the court conclu that his lawsuits and grievances did not meet that threshold. On appeal, San Filippo and the Rutgers AAUP recognize that the right to petition, like freedom of speech, is not absolute. They argue that San Filippo's l and grievances were protected first amendment activities, regardless of content, un they were baseless. Rutgers contends that the district court correctly held that S Filippo's lawsuits and grievances were protected under the petition clause only if addressed matters of public concern.0 0 The first amendment states in relevant part: Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of t press, or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petiti Government for a redress of grievances. United States Constitution, Amend. 1. 0 The district court concluded that the following items of speech addressed matters public concern: (1) San Filippo's 1979 statement in a school newspaper criticizing Rutgers for inadequate ventilation in the chemistry labs; (2) San Filippo's testimo 1977 and 1978, before a grand jury, regarding an investigation into the manufacture illegal drugs in Rutgers' laboratories; (3) San Filippo's criticisms, in 1983-84, o faculty peers' attempt to secure funding for a mass spectrometer by deceiving feder funding agencies; and (4) San Filippo's disputes between 1979 and 1986 with senior of his department over their efforts to obtain inappropriate percentages of his f grants. 0 The district court's conclusion that San Filippo engaged in some protected activit not make this dispute academic. San Filippo wants, (a) the fact-finder to be instr that dismissal in retaliation for any or all of his lawsuits and grievances constit first amendment violation, and (b) to argue to the fact-finder that the close proxi 20 In Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064 (3d Cir. 1990), we expressly declined to reach the question whether a public employee is protected und petition clause against retaliation for having filed a petition addressing solely a of private concern. See id. at 1076. We now will address that question. Although the Supreme Court has not discussed the scope of the constitutio right to petition in the context of an allegedly retaliatory discharge of a public employee, the Court has had occasion to consider the scope of that right in other contexts. In Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U (1961), the Court addressed the question whether a publicity campaign by railroads intended to encourage legislation and law enforcement practices disadvantageous to trucking industry violated the Sherman Act. First, the Court took note of the esta principle that, if a restraint of trade is caused by otherwise valid governmental a there is no Sherman Act violation. See id. at 135-36. Then, the Court went on to that the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from working together in attempt to persuade the government to take a particular action that would restrain See id. at 136. The Court based its decision upon two grounds. First, the Court r that nothing in the legislative history of the Sherman Act indicated an intent to r political activity by narrowing the channels through which citizens communicate wit governing officials. See id. at 137. The Court then added: Secondly, and of at least equal significance, such a construction of the Act would raise important constitutional questions. The right of petitio one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of co lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms. time between his 1985 lawsuits and the decision to file formal charges against him supports an inference of retaliation. 21 Id. at 138. Moreover, the Court rejected the contention that there was a Sherman A violation because the railroads' purpose was to destroy the truckers as competitors There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directe toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is a nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act woul justified. But this is certainly not the case here. No one denied that railroads were making a genuine effort to influence legislation and law enforcement practices. Id. at 144. Accord, United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).0 In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (19 the Court developed the mere sham exception to petition clause protection suggest the Noerr dictum. Competitors of highway carriers regularly brought administrative judicial proceedings to challenge the carriers' applications for operating rights. highway carriers filed a complaint alleging that their competitors conspired to mon trade by instituting actions before administrative agencies and courts to defeat th carriers' applications to acquire operating rights. See id. at 509. The complaint further alleged that the competitors instituted the proceedings to oppose the carri applications without regard to the merits of the cases, in an effort to prevent the carriers from having meaningful access to the agencies and courts. See id. at 511. Supreme Court held that the district court improperly dismissed the complaint for f to state a claim under the antitrust laws. The Court first reiterated the holding Noerr that no cause of action [is] alleged insofar as it [is] predicated upon mere attempts to influence the Legislative Branch for the passage of laws or the Executi Branch for their enforcement. Id. at 510. The Court further stated: 0 In Pennington, coal operators and a labor union had approached the Secretary of La the Tennessee Valley Association regarding the minimum wage for contractors selling to the TVA. The Court reaffirmed the holding of Noerr that [j]oint efforts to inf public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminat competition. 381 U.S. at 670. 22 The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. The rig access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition. We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association an petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without viola the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view respectin resolution of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their compe Id. at 510-11 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the Court held that the conduct de in the carriers' complaint fell within the sham litigation exception described in and thus stated a claim under the antitrust laws. The unprotected status of sham litigation was again recognized in Bill Johnson's Restaurants Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), in which the Court announc baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition. I 743. In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, a waitress who was fired filed an unfair labor practice charge. She and other waitresses also picketed the restaurant, which in tu filed a complaint in state court seeking both damages and an injunction against the picketing. The waitress then filed a second charge with the Board, alleging that t restaurant had filed the state action in retaliation for her exercise of rights und National Labor Relations Act and seeking to have the restaurant's state action enjo The Board issued a cease-and-desist order to halt the allegedly retaliatory state c lawsuit, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether, under section 8 of the NL Board may issue a cease-and-desist order to halt a state court suit solely upon a s that the suit was filed for a retaliatory purpose, or whether the suit must also la merit. The Court recognized that the Board's position -- that the suit need only b for a retaliatory purpose -- found support in the broad remedial provisions of the However, the Court concluded: 23 There are weighty countervailing considerations . . . that militate again allowing the Board to condemn the filing of a suit as an unfair labor pra and to enjoin its prosecution. In California Motor Transport, we recogni that the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendmen to petition the Government for redress of grievances. Accordingly, we co the antitrust laws as not prohibiting the filing of a lawsuit, regardless plaintiff's anticompetitive intent or purpose in doing so, unless the sui mere sham filed for harassment purposes. We should be sensitive to the First Amendment values in construing the NLRA in the present context. Id. at 741 (citations omitted). The Court held that suits lacking a reasonable bas not fall within the scope of first amendment protection. The Court explained: The first amendment interests involved in private litigation -- compensat violated rights and interests, the psychological benefits of vindication, airing of disputed facts -- are not advanced when the litigation is based intentional falsehoods or on knowingly frivolous claims. Furthermore, si sham litigation by definition does not involve a bona fide grievance, it not come within the first amendment right to petition. Id. at 743 (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, the Court concluded that it enjoinable labor practice under §8 of the NLRA to file a baseless lawsuit with the of retaliating against an employee for the exercise of rights protected by the NLRA id.0 In both Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463 (1979) (p curiam) and Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 284 (198 Court held that the petition clause does not require the government to respond to e communication that the communicator may denominate a petition. In Smith, the Arkan State Highway Commission refused to consider grievances filed by a union on behalf employees, and would respond only to grievances filed by individual employees thems 0 Following Bill Johnson's Restaurants in Hoeber on behalf of the NLRB v. Local 30, F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1991), this court held that the district court properly denied th NLRB's request that the court enjoin a pending lawsuit brought by a labor union for of contract. We explained that two factors must be present before an injunction ag civil lawsuit may issue: the plaintiff must have an improper motive for bringing th and the suit must have no reasonable basis. See Hoeber, 939 F.2d at 126. 24 In Knight, a state statute required public employers to respond to union representa but not to individual employees. In both cases, the Court held that there was no p clause violation. The Knight Court, which described the challenged conduct as the converse of conduct challenged in Smith, rejected the employees' claim that they h right to force officers of the State acting in an official policy-making capacity t listen to them in a particular formal setting. Knight, 465 U.S. at 282. Most recently, in McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985), the Court addre the question whether the petition clause provides absolute immunity to a defendant with defaming the plaintiff in a letter about the plaintiff written to the Presiden the United States. Smith, an unsuccessful aspirant for appointment as United State Attorney, brought a libel suit against McDonald, alleging that McDonald had written letters to Ronald Reagan -- the first when Mr. Reagan was President-elect, the seco month after his inauguration --accusing Smith of, among other things, fraud, extort and civil rights violations. The Court held that the petition clause does not prov absolute immunity in that context; rather, a petitioner whose communications are defamatory may be answerable in libel if he is shown to have acted with malice, as in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In reaching this conclusio Court observed: The right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees First] Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expressi . . To accept petitioner's claim of absolute immunity would elevate the Petit Clause to special First Amendment status. The Petition Clause, however, inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the fre to speak, publish, and assemble. These First Amendment rights are insepa and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protectio statements made in a petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482, 485 (citations omitted). 25 As the arguments advanced in the briefs in the case at bar make clear, th Supreme Court cases we have just canvassed, while long on nuance, do not yield an e identified single common denominator. San Filippo and the Rutgers AAUP would have us regard San Filippo's petit activities protected under the first amendment unless those petitions were mere sh baseless litigation. They stress that none of the very narrow limitations the Su Court has placed on the right to petition involves an examination of the content of petition. They also argue that the petitions at issue in Noerr and Pennington did address matters of public concern, and therefore those cases implicitly rejected th proposition that petitioning is protected under the first amendment only if the pet addresses a matter of public concern. The Rutgers AAUP contends that there is eve reason that the lines drawn around the right to petition in public employment be th as those drawn for selfish petitioners everywhere. That is, the Rutgers AAUP woul us define the contours of the right to petition without consideration of the contex which that right is exercised. In contrast, Rutgers argues -- we think persuasively --that [t]he nature limitation upon the petition right depends upon context. Rutgers contends that th Supreme Court cases analyzing the extent of the petition right in the antitrust, la and libel contexts are not necessarily instructive in the case at bar, which concer ability of a government employer to dismiss an employee for filing lawsuits and gri against the employer. This argument that the scope of the petition right depends u context in which the right is exercised is particularly persuasive because the scop the free speech right -- a right that, like the petition right, is stated in unqual terms in the first amendment --depends on the context in which that right is exerci 0 San Filippo and the Rutgers AAUP rely upon cases from contexts other than public employment/retaliatory discharge in support of the argument that a lawsuit is prote regardless of content -- unless it is baseless. Most significantly, San Filippo co that our decision in Hoeber on behalf of the NLRB v. Local 30, 939 F.2d 118 (3d Cir 26 That the scope of the right to petition depends upon context does not, ho mandate the further conclusion that the public concern threshold of Connick shoul the right to petition in the context of a government employer's ability to discipli public employee. The general question posed by the case at bar is whether -- notwithstanding the dicta from McDonald quoted above -- there are contexts in which petition clause protects values additional to those protected by the speech clause. McDonald is a case in which the petition clause protects no value that is protected by the speech clause. The petition at issue in McDonald was a letter to t President. Smith and Knight instruct that not every communication which the writer denominates a petition imposes on the government agency or official addressed an obligation to respond. See Knight, 465 U.S. at 285; Smith, 441 U.S. at 465. Accor it is difficult to distinguish in any meaningful way between words contained in a l to the President and words contained in, for example, an advertisement appearing in New York Times. This difficulty presumably was the underpinning of the McDonald Court's holding tha McDonald's words about a public figure should not be immunized simply because they appeared in a letter characterized as a petition. Moreover, the reasons for hold forecloses Rutgers' position. As explained in note 16, supra, in Hoeber we held, following Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), that a cou not enjoin a pending lawsuit as an unfair labor practice unless the plaintiff had a improper motive for bringing the suit and the suit had no reasonable basis. See Ho 939 F.2d at 126. San Filippo argues that, because the breach of contract lawsuit a in Hoeber appeared to address only matters of private concern, the case supports hi argument that his lawsuits and grievances addressing only matters of private concer protected under the petition clause. We disagree. Because this case does not aris the public employment/retaliatory discharge context, it is not on point. Many other cases cited by San Filippo and the AAUP are similarly inapposi because they arise in other contexts. See, e.g., Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1981) (disciplinary proceedings allegedly brought against a prisoner in retaliation for having filed a civil rights lawsuit); Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 7 Cir. 1993) (same); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Wright Newsome, 795 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); Duvall v. Sharp, 905 F.2d 1188 (8th 1990) (arrest allegedly made in retaliation for filing a civil rights lawsuit). 27 that the first amendment does not immunize maliciously defamatory falsehoods contai a newspaper advertisement equally justify holding that the first amendment does not immunize maliciously defamatory falsehoods contained in a letter to the President. is no value in a petition that seeks to influence the President by means of false statements. As in the context of speech, the additional requirement that malice be before liability may be imposed avoids overdeterrence. The same difficulty in drawing a meaningful distinction between the speec in the petition at issue in Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) and other employee speech underlies the holding of that case. Schalk, a ho employee, had hand-delivered to the hospital board members a four-page letter descr her concerns about various management practices at the hospital. Schalk was formal reprimanded for complaining about matters unrelated to her area of responsibility. reprimand indicated that Schalk would be discharged if she made further complaints nature. After Schalk told a board member that she wanted to meet with the board to discuss concerns akin to those described in her letter, she was terminated. Schalk filed a lawsuit alleging that she was fired for writing a letter to, and later spea with, board members about management practices, in violation of her first amendment and petition rights. The Tenth Circuit first held that Schalk's letter and her comments to the member addressed a matter of public concern. Id. at 496. In a brief analysis of S petition clause claim, the court stated: In the instant case, Schalk's right to p is inseparable from her right to speak. As such, we see no reason to subject this to a different sort of analysis. Id. at 498 (citing McDonald). As in McDonald, b the petition at issue was simply a letter imposing on the government no obligatio respond, it was properly analyzable under the conventional Connick rubric applicabl speech. 28 The case at bar is unlike Schalk in the sense that what San Filippo characterizes as petitions are not letters to the government-employer, but lawsui grievances directed at the government-employer or its officials. Submissions of th purport to invoke formal mechanisms for the redress of grievances.0 Notwithstandin distinction, each circuit court to consider the issue has held that a public employ alleges that he or she was disciplined in retaliation for having filed a lawsuit ag his or her employer does not state a claim under §1983 unless the lawsuit addressed matter of public concern.0 Recognizing that the question is a difficult one, we fi ourselves unable to subscribe to the reasoning of our sister circuits. Of these circuits, the Seventh Circuit has addressed the issue in the mos detail. In Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), decided be McDonald, the Seventh Circuit held that a police officer who alleged that he was reassigned, denied overtime opportunities and otherwise harassed in retaliation for a lawsuit against his employer addressing matters of private concern did not state under §1983. The court explained: Several Supreme Court cases indicate that the first amendment protects a person's right to seek judicial redress of grievances. See NAACP v. Butt U.S. 415, 429. A close reading of these cases clearly shows that the Cou 0 Lawsuits, grievances, workers compensation claims, etc. share this feature of invo formal mechanism for redress of grievances against the government. We occasionally the term lawsuit to encompass any device invoking a mechanism for redress of grie against the government. 0 See White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049, 1059 (2d Cir. 1993); Da South Park Independent Sch. Dist., 768 F.2d 696, 703 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, U.S. 1101 (1986); Rathjen v. Litchfield, 878 F.2d 836, 842 (5th Cir. 1989); Rice v. Ohio Dep't of Transportation, 887 F.2d 716, 720-21 (6th Cir. 1989), vacated other grounds, 497 U.S. 1001 (1990); Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240, 1244 n.10 (7th 1984) (per curiam); Belk v. Town of Minocqua, 858 F.2d 1258, 1261-62 (7th Cir. 1988 Gearhart v. Thorne, 768 F.2d 1072, 1073 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick, 722 F.2d 714, 715 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984). Cf. Boyle v. Burke, 925 F.2d 497, 505-06 (1st Cir. 1991) (dicta). But see Fuchilla v. Prockop, 682 F. Supp. 247, 262 (D.N.J. 1987), (reading California Motor Transport to support the holding that a public employee may not be retaliated again filing a lawsuit regardless of whether the lawsuit addressed a matter of public con 29 concerned about political expression and not the general right to bring s a federal court of law. See, e.g., Button, 371 U.S. at 429. (In the con NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means of achieving the lawful objectives of equality treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of Negro community in this county. It is thus a form of political expression This formulation dovetails with the Connick rule that limits the first am protection given public employees to pronouncements on public issues. Th private office dispute cannot be constitutionalized merely by filing a le action. Id. at 1244 n.10 (some citations omitted).0 That is, the Seventh Circuit explicitl rejected the proposition that the petition clause protects access to the courts for reason other than that the courts may serve as fora for expression. In Belk v. Tow Minocqua, 858 F.2d 1258, 1261-62 (7th Cir. 1988), the Seventh Circuit relied on McD as further support for its holding that a public employee may be terminated in reta 0 The Seventh Circuit reiterated this sentiment in Yatvin v. Madison Metropolitan Sc Dist., 840 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988): The contention that every act of retaliation against a person who files c of wrongdoing with a public agency denies freedom of speech or the right petition for redress of grievances rests on the following syllogism: lit is a method recognized by the Supreme Court, as in NAACP v. Button, 371 U 415, 429-31 (1963), for advancing ideas and seeking redress of grievances retaliation against one who institutes litigation (or its condition prece Title VII litigation, the lodging of charges with civil rights agencies) discourages litigation; therefore such retaliation invades a First Amendm right. The weakness is the first premise, which is stated too broadly. litigation seeks to advance political or other ideas; litigation by the N seeking to eliminate public school segregation is an example. And even w litigation has private rather than public objectives, communications desi acquaint individuals with their legal rights are within the scope of the Amendment. But not every legal gesture -- not every legal pleading -- is protected by the First Amendment. Remedies against baseless litigation d violate the First Amendment's right to petition; nor do laws aimed at det 'far out' suits by requiring the loser to pay the winner's legal fees. Id. at 419 (citations omitted). Because the court concluded that Yatvin's sex discrimination claim against her employer had purely private objectives, the court rejected Yatvin's claim that her employer's retaliation violated the petition claus at 419-20. This conclusion may, however, be regarded as dictum because the court a held that Yatvin's first amendment claim was foreclosed by her failure to raise the below with sufficient particularity. See id. at 420. 30 for filing a grievance unless the grievance addressed a matter of public concern. Belk court stated: Notwithstanding the central importance Connick attaches to the content of public employee's speech, Belk asks us to accord absolute first amendment protection, without regard to content, to any grievance a public employee or threatens to file. Not only is there no legal or historical precedent such a stratification of first amendment freedoms, as McDonald suggests, such special treatment of the right to petition would unjustly favor thos through foresight or mere fortuity present their speech as a grievance ra than in some other form. Id. at 1262 (emphasis in original). Again, affording special treatment to speech f a grievance is unjust only if no independent reason exists for affording special protection to a mechanism for redress of grievances against the government. There is an additional argument for testing a public employee's lawsuits his or her employer by the Connick public concern threshold not made in the Seventh Circuit cases: namely, that the governmental interests which led the Court to impos public concern threshold on employee speech would appear to justify imposing a simi threshold on employee lawsuits and grievances. Under Connick, employers are able t discipline their employees for speech unless the speech addresses a matter of publi concern. The rationale for this distinction is that it represents an effort to see balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon m of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Connick, 461 at 142. The Supreme Court recently elaborated on the basis for authorizing the gov as employer to exercise broader power in regulating the speech of its employees tha government as sovereign may exercise in regulating the speech of the general public [T]he extra power the government has in this area comes from the nat the government's mission as employer. Government agencies are charged by with doing particular tasks. Agencies hire employees to help do those ta effectively and efficiently as possible. When someone who is paid a sala 31 that she will contribute to an agency's effective operation begins to say things that detract from the agency's effective operation, the government employer must have some power to restrain her. The reason the government in the example given above, fire the [high-ranking] deputy [who criticize state governor's legislative program] is not that this dismissal would so be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. It is that the governor and the governor's staff have a job to do, and the governor just feels that a quieter subordinate would allow them to do this job more efficiently. The key to First Amendment analysis of government employment decisio then, is this: The government's interest in achieving its goals as effec and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate int when it acts as sovereign to a relatively significant one when it acts as employer. The government cannot restrict speech of the public at large ju the name of efficiency. But where the government is employing someone fo very purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may we appropriate. Waters v. Churchill, 62 U.S.L.W. 4397, 4401 (May 31, 1994). We recognize that employee lawsuits and grievances against a public emplo can, on occasion, be divisive in much the same way that employee speech can be. Nonetheless, we believe that there is an independent reason -- a reason of constitu dimension -- to protect an employee lawsuit or grievance if it is of the sort that constitutes a petition within the meaning of the first amendment. The first amendment's petition clause imposes on the United States an obl to have at least some channel open for those who seek redress for perceived grievan Through its incorporation of the first amendment, the fourteenth amendment's guaran liberty imposes the same obligation on the states. Smith and Knight stand only fo proposition that neither the United States nor the several states are required to recognize as a petition whatever particular communication is so characterized by chooses to protest governmental acts or omissions. But when government -- federal state -- formally adopts a mechanism for redress of those grievances for which gove is allegedly accountable, it would seem to undermine the Constitution's vital purpo hold that one who in good faith files an arguably meritorious petition invoking t 32 mechanism may be disciplined for such invocation by the very government that in com with the petition clause has given the particular mechanism its constitutional impr We do not share the Seventh Circuit's apprehension that not applying the Connick p concern standard to retaliatory dismissal of a public employee who files a petiti would constitute special treatment of the right to petition [that] would unjustly those who through foresight or mere fortuity present their speech as a grievance ra than in some other form. Balk, 858 F.2d at 1262. As applied to communications th not petitions, the Connick rule means that a public employee who goes public -- e.g writing to The New York Times -- with an employment dispute that is not of public concern runs the risk of being disciplined by her public employer for undertaking public attention to a private dispute. But when one files a petition one is not appealing over government's head to the general citizenry: when one files a petit one is addressing government and asking government to fix what, allegedly, governme broken or has failed in its duty to repair.0 0 Like the Seventh Circuit in Belk, our dissenting colleague draws comfort from the Court's observation in McDonald that the first amendment right to petition and the amendment freedoms to speak, publish and assemble . . . are inseparable and hence is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions. 472 U.S. at 485 it is important to note that the Court's language in McDonald was addressed to a qu very different from the question presented in Belk and the case at bar. In McDonal question was whether one who was defamed in a letter was disabled from suing the le writer by virtue of the fact that the letter was written to the President and thus be characterized as a petition within the meaning of the first amendment. In hol that the letter-writer was amenable to suit at the hands of the person defamed, und same state law standards, compatible with New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 that would have applied had the letter been written to a newspaper, the Court was n called upon the consider the question presented in the case at bar -- namely, wheth addressee of a petition (in McDonald, the President) could sanction the letter-wr for pursuing a constitutionally charted pathway of communication with government. It is also worthy of note that the letter-writer in McDonald apparently did not the audience for his defamatory efforts to President Reagan. The letter-writer all also saw fit to send copies of one or both of the letters to Senator Jesse Helms, t members of the House of Representatives, and the then Director of the Federal Burea Investigation, William Webster, as well as then Presidential Adviser Edwin Meese. U.S. at 481. 33 One example of formal governmental adoption of a mechanism for redress of grievances is entry into a collective bargaining agreement that provides for a grie procedure. Another example of formal government adoption of such a mechanism is wai sovereign immunity from suit in the courts of that sovereign. If government could, employer, freely discharge an employee for the reason that the employee, in order t present a non-sham claim against the government-employer, invoked such a mechanism, petition clause of the first amendment would, for public employees seeking to vindi their employee interests, be a trap for the unwary -- and a dead letter. The petition clause of the first amendment was not intended to be a dead -- or a graceful but redundant appendage of the clauses guaranteeing freedom of spe press. To be sure, the right to petition, as the Court noted in McDonald, is cu the same cloth as the other guarantees of that Amendment. . . . 472 U.S. at 482. the Court in McDonald also stressed that the right to petition is an assurance of particular freedom of expression. Ibid. More to the point, the right to petition pedigree independent of --and substantially more ancient -- than the freedoms of sp and press. The Court pointed out in McDonald that [T]he historical roots of the P Clause long antedate the Constitution. In 1689, the Bill of Rights exacted of Will Mary stated: '[I]t is the Right of the Subjects to petition the King.' 1 Wm. & Mar 0 Sess. 2, ch. 2. Ibid. But of particular moment for the issue before us is that 0 The remote antecedents of the right of petition trace back to Magna Carta, chapte which provides: . . . if we or our justiciar, or our bailiffs, or any of our servants shall have done wrong in any way toward any one, or shall have transgressed any of the articles of peace or security; and the wrong shall have been shown to four barons of the aforesaid twenty-five barons, let those four barons come to us or to our justiciar, if we are out of the kingdom, laying before us the transgression, and let them ask that we cause that transgression to be corrected without delay. 34 Parliament, in the Bill of Rights, not only declared the right of subjects to peti the King, but went on to provide that all committments [sic] and prosecutions for petitioning are illegal. 1 W. & M., 2d Sess., c. 2, § 5, 16 Dec. 1689. The right petition and its attendant, and indispensable, immunity from committments and prosecutions0 were, in the Court's felicitous phrase, exacted of William and Mary McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482, in 1689. That was precisely one hundred years before the But of course the right lukewarmly acknowledged by King John was exercisable only b barons. 0 The critical importance of Parliament's declaration that it was illegal to penal subject for such petitioning was made plain by Blackstone in his celebrated Commentaries, the series of law books best known to American lawyers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: If there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringement of the rights before mentioned, which the ordinary course of law is too defective to reach, there still remains a fourth subordinate right, appertaining to every individual, namely, the right of petitioning the king, or either house of parliament, for the redress of grievances. In Russia we are told that the czar Peter established a law, that no subject might petition the throne till he had first petitioned two different ministers of state. In case he obtained justice from neither, he might then present a third petition to the prince; but upon pain of death, if found to be in the wrong: the consequence of which was, that no one dared to offer such third petition; and grievances seldom falling under the notice of the sovereign, he had little opportunity to redress them. The restrictions, for some there are, which are laid upon petitioning in England, are of a nature extremely different; and, while they promote the spirit of peace, they are no check upon that of liberty. Care only must be taken, lest, under the pretence of petitioning, the subject be guilty of any riot or tumult, as happened in the opening of the memorable parliament in 1640: and, to prevent this, it is provided by the statute 13 Car. II. st. I, C. 5, that no petition to the king, or either house of parliament, for any alteration in church or state, shall be signed by above twenty persons, unless the matter thereof be approved by three justices of the peace, or the major part of the grand jury in the country; and in London by the lord mayor, aldermen, and common council: nor shall any petition be presented by more than ten persons at a time. But, under these regulations, it is declared by the statute I W. and M. st. 2, c. 2, that the subject hath a right to petition; and that all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries . 35 Congress charged with implementing America's new Constitution submitted to the stat ratification, proposed amendments to that Constitution permanently establishing in American law the right of petition and other fundamental rights. There is no persu reason for the right of petition to mean less today than it was intended to mean in England three centuries ago. On remand, the district court should consider which, if any, of San Filip grievances and lawsuits constituted a petition, and whether any such petition w sham. The mere act of filing a non-sham petition is not a constitutionally permiss ground for discharge of a public employee.
Our decision to vacate the grant of summary judgment on San Filippo's fir amendment claim also requires us to consider Rutgers' argument that, contrary to th district court's conclusion, it was entitled to summary judgment because San Filipp cannot show that his protected conduct was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action. Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 1983). The district court explained that courts have drawn an inference of retal based on the nearness in time between the protected activity and a discharge. Alth the district court believed that no fact-finder could reasonably infer that San Fil protected activities in 1977-1979 and 1983-84 were a substantial factor motivating dismissal, the court concluded that San Filippo was brought up on charges and dismi 36 sufficiently soon after he made protected statements in or around 19860 to raise an inference of retaliation.0 At the outset, we disagree with the district court's view that San Filipp protected activities in 1977-79 and 1983-84 were too far removed in time to support inference of retaliation. Although a dismissal that occurs years after protected a might not ordinarily support an inference of retaliation, where, as here, a plainti engages in subsequent protected activity and the plaintiff is dismissed shortly aft final episode of such protected activity, a fact-finder may reasonably infer that i the aggregate of the protected activities that led to retaliatory dismissal. This inference would be particularly strong if the plaintiff can show that the decisionm lacked a pretext on which to dismiss the plaintiff until shortly before the time of dismissal. Rutgers argues that the temporal proximity between San Filippo's protecte activities and the disciplinary proceedings against him cannot, by itself, support inference that the protected activity was a substantial factor in the alleged retal action. We need not address this argument, however, because San Filippo has additi evidence to support his allegation that he was dismissed in retaliation for his pro activity. The evidence described above as support for San Filippo's position that would not have been dismissed absent his protected activities -- the statements of Edelstein and Board of Governors member Wechsler and the evidence that other facult members committed infractions of comparable seriousness yet went unpunished -- equa support his position that his protected conduct was a substantial factor motivating 0 The court presumably was referring to San Filippo's disputes with senior members o department over their efforts to obtain inappropriate percentages of his federal and particularly his complaint to the University in October, 1985 about the chemist department's attempts to divert funds improperly from his federal grants under the of a shop-user's fee. See page 5, supra. San Filippo was orally informed of the charges against him in November, 1985. 0 The activities found by the district court to address matters of public concern ar described briefly at note 13, supra. 37 dismissal. On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that a fact-finder could rea find that San Filippo's protected conduct was a substantial factor motivating his dismissal. Rutgers next argues that San Filippo is inappropriately seeking to impute to the members of the Board of Governors the improper motives of responsible for bringing charges against him. Rutgers contends that, under Monell Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 112, 123 (1988), the University can only be held liable if the Board members person determined to dismiss San Filippo on the basis of his first amendment activities or knowingly acquiesced in the decision to do so by approving both the decision and th allegedly improper basis for it. But this, according to San Filippo, is too narrow standard of liability: in San Filippo's view, the University should be held liable fact-finder concludes that (a) the charges against San Filippo were initiated in retaliation for the exercise of his first amendment rights and (b) the Board member deliberately indifferent to that fact. In Monell, the Supreme Court held that, although municipalities and other governing bodies can be sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983, liability cannot be imposed on entity on a theory of vicarious liability for the torts of the entity's employees. Rather, a local governing body can be held liable only for an official policy or cu See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. A single decision by a final policy-maker, as defined state law, may constitute official policy. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 469, 480-81 (1986). Rutgers argues that the Board of Governors is the only final p maker in this case, and that the Board did not have a retaliatory motive when it vo dismiss San Filippo. San Filippo contends that he need only show that the Board members were deliberately indifferent to the fact that he had been brought up on charges in retaliation for the exercise of his first amendment rights. He relies on City of C 38 Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), in which the Supreme Court held that Canton's to train police officers to give medical attention could be a basis for imposing §1 liability if the failure to train amount[ed] to deliberate indifference to the rig persons with whom the police [came] into contact. Id. at 388. The Canton Court explained that the use of the deliberate indifference standard was most consistent the Court's admonition in Monell that a municipality can be liable under §1983 onl its policies are the 'moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.' Id. at (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit extended Canton to a situation analogous to the case at Ware v. Unified School Dist. No. 492, 902 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1990). The plaintiff Ware served as clerk to a school board and secretary to the superintendent of the s district. She alleged that her superintendent had recommended to the board that sh dismissed in retaliation for her protected speech, and that the board had acted wit deliberate indifference to her first amendment rights in approving the termination. Ware court rejected the board's argument that Canton be limited to its facts, and h There is evidence in the record to support Ware's claim that the Boa acted with deliberate indifference to her First Amendment rights in appro her termination. . . . The record contains evidence that board members k about Ware's public stand on the bond issue and were informed of her beli her termination was in retaliation for that stand. . . . Notwithstanding above indications that the board knew [the superintendent's] recommendati in retaliation for Ware's position on the bond issue, the board made no independent investigation, asked [the superintendent] no questions about reasons for his decision. . . . The evidence is sufficient to create a j question on whether the board acted with deliberate indifference to Ware' Amendment rights in approving [the superintendent's] recommendation. Id. at 819-20. We agree with the Tenth Circuit that its application of the deliberate indifference standard of Canton is most consistent with the 'admonition in Monell municipality can be liable under §1983 only where its policies are the moving force 39 [behind] the constitutional violation.' Ware, 902 F.2d at 819 (quoting Canton, 48 at 388-89) (citations omitted). Nor is this use of the deliberate indifference sta inconsistent with City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) (plural opinion). Praprotnik recognized that final decision-making power may be delegated, that a local governing body may be held liable based upon the exercise of this dele power. See id. at 124. But the Court added: Simply going along with discretionary decisions made by one's subordinate however, is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy. It equally consistent with a presumption that the subordinates are faithfull attempting to comply with the policies that are supposed to guide them. would be a different matter if a particular decision by a subordinate was in the form of a policy statement and expressly approved by the supervisi policymaker. It would also be a different matter if a series of decision subordinate official manifested a custom or usage of which the supervis have been aware. . . . But the mere failure to investigate the basis of subordinate's discretionary decisions does not amount to a delegation of policymaking authority, especially where (as here) the wrongfulness of th subordinate's decision arises from a retaliatory motive or other unstated rationale. Id. at 130. In addition to holding that the mere failure to investigate the basis subordinate's discretionary decisions does not make the subordinate a final policy the Praprotnik Court also implicitly held that the local governing body is not liable f mere failure to investigate by the final policy-maker. Our use of a deliberate indifference standard does not make the Univers liable for the Board's mere failure to investigate -- that is, the University would liable if, oblivious to the motivation behind the decision to charge San Filippo an initiate dismissal proceedings, the Board had decided to dismiss San Filippo for wh legitimate reasons. Such a scenario would not amount to deliberate indifference of Board to San Filippo's first amendment rights. The scenario described by San Filip however, goes beyond that of an oblivious Board failing to investigate. 40 San Filippo presented to the district court evidence that the Board had r to suspect that San Filippo's prior protected activities had been a substantial mot factor in the decision to initiate dismissal proceedings. As the magistrate judge the record is replete with evidence which indicates that the information regarding Filippo's protected activities was well known to the individual members of the Boar (A.2152 n.15). Moreover, Wechsler's dissenting opinion discloses awareness at the of the Board of San Filippo's contention before the Senate Panel that other faculty members had had students perform uncompensated work for them, yet were not discipli (A.325). Finally, the Board's opinion recognizes that San Filippo's attorney, Ira Goldberg, had argued that the charges brought against Professor San Filippo were fabrications based on a personal 'vendetta' against him by members of his Departmen (A.304). As in Ware, this evidence suffices to create a question for the fact-find regarding whether the ultimate decision-maker acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff's first amendment rights by approving the recommendation that the plainti dismissed.0 0 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Waters v. Churchill, 62 U.S.L.W. 4397 (May 1994) provides additional support for our use of the Canton deliberate indifferenc standard in the case at bar. In Waters, the Court addressed the question whether t Connick test should be applied to what the government employer thought the employee or to what the fact-finder ultimately determines was said. The Court took an inter position, holding that a court should accept the employer's factual conclusions, bu if the employer was reasonable in arriving at those conclusions. Id. at 4401-02. elaborating on what would constitute reasonable conduct by an employer, the Court explained: If an employment action is based upon what an employee supposedly sa a reasonable supervisor would recognize that there is a substantial likel that what was actually said was protected, the manager must tread with a amount of care. This need not be the care with which trials, with their of evidence and procedure, are conducted. It should, however, be the car a reasonable manager would use before making an employment decision -- discharge, suspension, reprimand, or whatever else -- of the sort involve the particular case. Justice Scalia correctly points out that such care normally constitutionally required unless the employee has a protected pr interest in her job, but we believe that the possibility of inadvertently 41