Opinion ID: 1444402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Count Twelve: Inappropriate Handling of the Toschi Matter

Text: In January 1989, the Madera County District Attorney charged Michael Toschi with the misdemeanors of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with an excessive blood-alcohol concentration and alleged that he had suffered one prior conviction for the former offense. On May 10, as part of a plea bargain involving a separate felony charge of assault with a deadly weapon, the district attorney moved to dismiss the drunk driving case. The original plea bargain did not expressly encompass the drunk driving charges because counsel were unaware of them when they reached the bargain. The district attorney sought dismissal after concluding that the plea bargain would have included these charges had counsel known of them. Petitioner, who was then assigned to the Madera Justice Court, denied the motion, stating that the state Department of Motor Vehicles desired certain actions be taken against Toschi. Toschi's counsel interpreted petitioner's comments as a statement of his own desires and an indication that he had already concluded Toschi was guilty. After denying the motion, petitioner ordered the district attorney to file an amended complaint adding a second alleged prior drunk driving conviction. The district attorney complied with petitioner's order on May 16, 1989. During pretrial proceedings on May 17, the district attorney informed petitioner that he was going to move the Court to strike the amended complaint and make a motion to dismiss. Without waiting for the motion to be made and without argument, petitioner immediately responded: Motion denied. The district attorney then asked whether petitioner had any knowledge of the facts in this case. Petitioner replied that he did not, but that he knew from the printout that Toschi had two prior convictions. Petitioner then explained that, despite his lack of knowledge about the facts of the case, he was denying the dismissal motion because he thought in the interest of justice, a man with a drunk driving and two priors should go to trial. The district attorney responded that petitioner could not know Toschi was a drunk driver unless [petitioner] ha[d] knowledge of the facts of the case, and that petitioner was not required to assume the truth of the complaint without such knowledge. Regarding the latter statement, petitioner replied: All right. Well, the Court does. Petitioner and the district attorney continued to argue about whether it was proper for petitioner to deny the dismissal motion without knowledge of the facts of the case. Petitioner then explained his understanding that the district attorney's motion was [b]ased on a plea bargain, not based on the evidence, and that the plea bargain was an inadequate basis for dismissing the case, given the danger that a recidivist drunk driver posed to the community. Unsatisfied with petitioner's explanation, the district attorney demand[ed] immediate trial and ask[ed] [petitioner] to disqualify [him]self on the grounds that [he] ha[d] ... apparent knowledge of the facts in this case. The district attorney asserted that, given petitioner's apparent knowledge of the facts in this case, [he] would be prejudiced. Petitioner denied the motion and set the case for trial before him. After the hearing, and without the request or knowledge of either party, petitioner ordered the court clerk to review the police reports in the case file and issue subpoenas to all witnesses. According to petitioner, he took this action because the district attorney had said he would not subpoena the witnesses. At the time, petitioner believed he had authority to order witnesses where the District Attorney was going to not act in his official capacity to do that. At petitioner's direction, the clerk later spoke by telephone directly with a subpoenaed witness from the police department and determined that the witness was not available for the scheduled trial date. Petitioner then contacted defense counsel, informed her of this problem, and asked her to agree to a continuance. Counsel refused and later corrected petitioner when he indicated that she had agreed to the continuance. Based on these contacts and some information that [petitioner] ha[d] also talked to some other potential witnesses in the case, counsel concluded that petitioner himself [was] desirous of trying the case.... Counsel felt that petitioner had overstepped [his] bounds and become a prosecutor instead of an impartial magistrate, and that [Toschi] wasn't going to get a fair trial. On May 31, counsel therefore made a formal motion to disqualify petitioner, asserting that his actions and his statements during the prior hearing showed that he had prejudged the case. Over petitioner's opposition, the motion was granted. Throughout the Commission's disciplinary proceedings, petitioner maintained that his actions in the Toschi matter resulted from his personal concerns about the district attorney, Paul Avent. Avent had unsuccessfully run against petitioner in a 1988 judicial election and, according to petitioner, was very bitter about the election, had accused [petitioner] of stealing his votes and cheating to get his judges [sic] job, and had expressed that he would never forgive [petitioner] for stealing his job. Petitioner believed that Avent had tried to pull[] things in the courts of other judges he had unsuccessfully opposed and then reported them in the paper. According to petitioner, he was warned... by [his] bailiff [that Avent was] going to try to pull something on [petitioner], to get [petitioner] in trouble.... When Avent appeared in the Toschi matter, petitioner realized for the first time that this was the case that Mr. Avent was going to pull something. Petitioner explained: I thought that I outwitted [Avent] by telling him that the motion was decided and not in the interest of justice and ... Mothers Against Drunk Drivers [ sic ] was pretty heavy. All the publicity going on. I could see my name in the paper, `Judge Fletcher dismisses drunk driving with two priors without cause.' [para;] So I denied the motion, and Mr. Avent challenged me in court that he could go ahead and set the jury trial. He wasn't going to call any witnesses. I had two options. I had an option to recuse him and appoint the attorney general to ... prosecute Mr. Toschi, which would [have] disqualified me from sitting in Madera from then on, because the Madera D.A.'s office do [ sic ] not take those things lightly and have blanketed other judges that stand up to him. [¶] And I felt the only option I had was to bluff him into thinking that the court was going to subpoena witnesses. Before the special masters, petitioner conceded that, having ordered the district attorney to allege additional charges and the clerk to subpoena witnesses, he probably should have disqualified himself. Similarly, in his answer to the Commission, petitioner stated: In hind sight [ sic ] and now with six years of experience, I only had 5 month [ sic ] at the time, I would have disqualified myself for the Jury trial. Even though I was not prejudiced or bias [ sic, ] or knew anything about the case, it might have had the appearance that I was in some was [ sic ] bias [ sic. ] It is easy to see that now, back then I was bound and determine [ sic ] to prove that I was not bias [sic] .... On this record, we agree with the Commission's unanimous conclusion that petitioner committed willful misconduct in handling the Toschi matter. We reached a similar conclusion on analogous facts in Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1988) 45 Cal.3d 518, 247 Cal.Rptr. 378, 754 P.2d 724. There, after learning that the district attorney intended to prosecute a sodomy charge as a misdemeanor, the judge contacted the district attorney ex parte and urged him to pursue the matter as a felony. ( Id. at p. 535, 247 Cal.Rptr. 378, 754 P.2d 724.) Although the judge's action did not prejudice the defendant (because the district attorney did not follow the suggestion), we nevertheless found that the judge committed willful misconduct. We explained: Judge Ryan attempted to intrude into the charging authority of the administrative branch of government. Moreover, he deprived the defendant of an impartial magistrate by advocating a harsher charge. ( Ibid. ) Here, petitioner also attempted to intrude on the district attorney's authority, but not by simply suggesting a course of action; petitioner, by having his clerk review the file and subpoena all prosecution witnesses, took it upon himself to do the district attorney's job. He thus deprived Toschi of an impartial judge. Indeed, as petitioner conceded during the special masters' hearing, he probably should have disqualified himself as a result of his actions. Petitioner's order that the witnesses be subpoenaed was particularly destructive of the image of the court as an impartial forum for the determination of truth. ( McCartney, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 533, 116 Cal.Rptr. 260, 526 P.2d 268.) As we recently explained in Broadman, there is a compelling public interest in maintaining a judicial system that both is in fact and is publicly perceived as being fair, impartial, and efficient. ( Broadman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1103, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 959 P.2d 715.) Thus, [j]udges ... cannot be advocates for the interests of any parties; they must be, and be perceived to be, neutral arbiters of both fact and law [citation] who apply the law uniformly and consistently. ( Id. at p. 1100, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 959 P.2d 715.) Petitioner's action in directing the clerk to subpoena witnesses create[d] the public impression that [he] ha[d] abandoned the judicial role to become an advocate for [his] own ruling in denying the prosecution's motion to dismiss the charges against Toschi. ( Id. at p. 1101, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 959 P.2d 715; see also Wenger, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 632, 175 Cal.Rptr. 420, 630 P.2d 954 [judge who inject[ed] himself into a proceeding by undertaking a collateral investigation without consulting the parties committed prejudicial misconduct].) Moreover, petitioner took this action because of a personal conflict with a political rival. According to petitioner, he considered two options to address his concern that Avent was trying to damage him politically: recuse [Avent] and appoint the attorney general to ... prosecute Mr. Toschi, or bluff [Avent] into thinking that the court was going to subpoena witnesses. Petitioner chose the latter option because of his concern that the former would result in his own disqualification in all future proceedings involving the Madera District Attorney. In choosing the latter option for personal reasons and, as the Commission found, to [b]luff[] and battl[e] with political opponents, petitioner committed a judicial act for a purpose other than the faithful discharge of his judicial duties. (See In re Rasmussen, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 538, 236 Cal.Rptr. 152, 734 P.2d 988 [misconduct to initiate probation revocation proceedings for personal reasons other than the faithful discharge of [judicial] duties]; Wenger, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 652, 175 Cal.Rptr. 420, 630 P.2d 954 [judge committed willful misconduct in taking judicial action motivated by personal animosity].) He thus committed willful misconduct. [19]