Opinion ID: 1209311
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Harold A. Campbell, Elizabeth Z. Sloan, Louise L. Williams, Ann Campbell and Jack Campbell

Text: These persons are children of Mr. and Mrs. W.A. Campbell. During the course of the reference it was agreed by all parties that Mr. and Mrs. Campbell should be counted as freeholders and they are listed in appellant's brief as Nos. 426 and 427. After the testimony was closed and the case set down for argument, appellants' counsel stated that he had recently learned that W.A. Campbell had died, leaving a will naming the children above mentioned among his devisees, and asked that the case be reopened so as to permit them to introduce the probate record pertaining to the estate of W.A. Campbell. The Master refused to do so, stating that Mr. and Mrs. Campbell had previously been agreed upon as constituting the freeholders representing this property and as the reference had been closed, he did not think it proper under all the circumstances to allow this additional testimony. We think the Campbell children must be excluded for two reasons. (1) There is no exception to the refusal of the Master to reopen the case and admit the probate record. (2) The question of whether the case should be reopened was addressed to the sound discretion of the Master. City Council of Greenville v. Earle , 80 S.C. 321, 60 S.E. 1117. We find no abuse of discretion. We entertain considerable doubt as to whether certain other persons named on appellants' list are freeholders but it is unnecessary to pursue this list further. We have found that a total of 13 names must be stricken from the 736 listed in appellants' brief as constituting the freeholders in the area proposed to be annexed, which leaves the number of freeholders as 723. As previously pointed out, it must be assumed on this appeal that the petition for annexation was signed by 364 freeholders, which under the facts found are two more than necessary. In concluding our discussion of this phase of the case, we desire to say that even if our calculation had shown that the petition was a little short of the required number, we would hesitate under the circumstances of this case to set aside the finding of the City Council, which is prima facie correct. Rawl v. McCown , 97 S.C. 1, 81 S. E. 958, 959. The possibility of a slight mistake on our part is too great. Probably no two persons would reach the identical result. As pointed out in the Rawl case , mathematical precision is improbable, if not impossible, in a case of this kind. It is next contended by appellants that they were denied the right to be fully heard in argument. The case was argued before the Circuit Judge on January 18, 1956. Counsel for appellants asked that each side be allowed three hours in oral argument and two weeks in which to file a brief. The Court permitted only one hour to the side in oral argument with the right to file briefs within a week, which were to be exchanged, and each side allowed a further period of three days to reply to the brief of the other. These matters were addressed to the sound discretion of the Circuit Judge. There was clearly no abuse of discretion. While the Court had the merits of the case under advisement, counsel for appellants moved on February 13th to recommit it to the Master to clarify and correct the record and to take further testimony as to the status of certain persons claimed to be freeholders. The Circuit Judge denied this motion. It was addressed to his discretion. Halk v. Stoddard , 62 S.C. 564, 40 S.E. 957; Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Southern Granite Co. , 96 S.C. 106, 79 S.E. 985. We think the motion was properly refused. All exceptions are overruled and judgment affirmed. STUKES, C.J., TAYLOR, J., and E.H. HENDERSON, Acting Associate Justice, concur. LEGGE and MOSS, JJ., not participating.