Opinion ID: 2552553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claims Regarding Defendant's Statements to His Grandmother

Text: Defendant claims that violations of his constitutional rights and Evidence Code section 352 occurred when the state arranged a conversation between him and his grandmother, Lois Thornton, at the police station following his extradition from Nevada but before he was charged with crimes against O'Sullivan, Stephanie C, and Stephanie's mother. Defendant contends additional such violations occurred when the trial court denied his motions to exclude the dialogue from evidence. We disagree. [6] On pretrial motions dated July 22, 1994, and October 13, 1994, defendant sought to exclude from evidence the tape and transcript of the conversation. In the first motion, he argued that his statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, the Sixth Amendment's guaranty of counsel, and the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of due process. In the second, he argued that introducing the material into evidence would violate Evidence Code section 352, which requires excluding evidence that is substantially more prejudicial than probative. The trial court denied each motion following hearings. The hearing on the first motion produced the following evidence: As early as September 17, 1993, law enforcement suspected defendant of involvement in the disappearance of O'Sullivan and the kidnapping of Stephanie C. The principal investigator, Ventura County Sheriffs Department Sergeant Michael D. Barnes, initiated wide-ranging attempt-to-locate requests on September 18, 1993. On September 19, 1993, Sergeant Barnes and another detective drove to Lois Thornton's house in Oceano, California, to interview her. Lois Thornton agreed to help them find defendant. On September 20, 1993, Sergeant Barnes learned that defendant had been arrested, Stephanie C. recovered, and O'Sullivan's vehicle found, all in Reno, and that defendant had been apprehended while possessing a gun. Sergeant Barnes flew to Reno and interviewed defendant for more than three hours. Defendant admitted stealing O'Sullivan's vehicle and kidnapping Stephanie C, but denied killing O'Sullivan. He admitted brandishing a gun when he kidnapped Stephanie C, but denied firing it, and also denied aiming it anywhere but at the sky. Sergeant Barnes returned to Ventura County on September 21,1993, without defendant. On September 22, 1993, counsel representing defendant, who remained in Nevada, told the Washoe County Justice Court that defendant, who was present in court, was invoking his rights to counsel and to remain silent as to this case â which was then an extradition proceeding â and any other matter or cases or charges that are filed or pending or yet to be filed or pending as provided for under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona and McNeil v. Wisconsin [(1991), 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158]. At the same time, defendant's counsel instructed defendant on the record not to speak with anybody in Nevada or California except in counsel's presence, and defendant said he would follow that instruction. On September 26, 1993, Sergeant Barnes flew back to Reno to escort defendant back to Ventura County. On that same day, searchers located O'Sullivan's decomposed body in a remote section of Mulholland Drive in Los Angeles County. Also on that day, before leaving for Reno, and before learning of the searchers' discovery, Sergeant Barnes arranged for Lois Thornton to speak with defendant at the Ventura police station in a coordinated encounter soon after defendant's planned arrival time there in hopes of obtaining incriminating statements from him. Sergeant Barnes had made these arrangements because, despite not yet having found a body, his office continued to believe that defendant had killed O'Sullivan. Thus, on September 26, 1993, Ventura County Sheriffs Deputy Susan Creede drove unannounced to Lois Thornton's house and offered to drive her to the station to meet with defendant, and Lois Thornton agreed. The police recorded and transcribed the conversation after advising Lois Thornton, but not defendant, that they would be monitoring their dialogue. According to their testimony, neither Sergeant Barnes nor Deputy Creede asked Lois Thornton to ask questions for them or otherwise act on their behalf. Barnes testified he never told Lois Thornton what to ask defendant, never made or tried to make an agreement regarding what he wanted her to do, and did not consider her a law enforcement agent. Lois Thornton, however, testified she believed Sergeant Barnes allowed her the special benefit of a contact visit with defendant because he wanted, through her efforts, to get information from defendant, and that her conversation with defendant was implemented by suggestions from the officers. As Lois Thornton was speaking with defendant, the police interrupted and told her out of defendant's hearing that a body had been located that appeared to be O'Sullivan's. This was information they had learned earlier that day, but they withheld it from Lois Thornton until it appeared that mentioning it to her might cause her to elicit more information from defendant. The police mentioned the possibility that the body might contains bullets fired from defendant's gun. Lois Thornton testified that the police asked her to discuss the new information with defendant. From the time of the police's initial contact with Lois Thornton that day, she was eager to learn as much as she could about the accusations against defendant. As she was being driven home after speaking with defendant, she said that if he was guilty of murder, she wanted the police to let her know. In addition, Sergeant Barnes testified that defendant thanked him for arranging his grandmother's visit. The trial court denied the first motion, finding no constitutional violation by this obvious ploy of setting up the interview between the Defendant and his grandmother.... The court also denied the second motion, ruling that the evidence had probative value regarding defendant's state of mind and was relevant as to deliberation and intent. As noted, during the conversation with Lois Thornton, defendant denied the murder, even as he commented to her, regarding O'Sullivan, I don't care about her, I'm just tired. He also made a number of comments that showed consciousness of guilt of serious crimes, including fears of never leaving prison. Arguing that Lois Thornton was manipulated into speaking with him, defendant contends the court erred in admitting the evidence. He focuses on the harm assertedly caused by introducing into evidence his extrajudicial statement referring to the murder victim: I don't care about her, I'm just tired. He argues that during guilt phase closing argument the prosecution referred to this sentence to impugn him as a calculating killer, and returned to his statement during the penalty phase in support of a death sentence. We find no Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendment violation in the procedure by which the police obtained defendant's extrajudicial statements. As is well-known, Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 and its progeny apply to exclude certain evidence obtained during custodial interrogation. ( Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 297, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297.) Innis explained that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term `interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. ( Id. at pp. 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682.) Interrogation thus refers to questioning initiated by the police or its functional equivalent, not voluntary conversation. ( Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, at pp. 298-300, 100 S.Ct. 1682.) `Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment....' ( Id. at p. 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) The functional equivalent to express questioning involves police-initiated deceptive techniques designed to persuade or coerce a criminal defendant into making inculpatory statements. ( Innis, supra, at p. 299, 100 S.Ct. 1682.) The determination of whether an action is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response focuses primarily on the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. ( Id. at p. 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682.) In People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th 668, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485, the defendant argued that the conduct of [a detective] in placing [the defendant's father] in the interview room alone with defendant was itself a form of custodial interrogation because it was conduct that was `reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' [citation] from defendant. ( Id. at p. 758, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) We rejected the argument `because it is clear that defendant's conversations with his own visitors are not the constitutional equivalent of police interrogation.' [Citations.] ( Ibid. ) Defendant here raises the same claim, asserting that the police conduct violated Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, and Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378. We reject it for the same reason. We acknowledge certain factual distinctions between Mayfield and this case. In Mayfield we emphasized the defendant had specifically and repeatedly asked to be allowed to speak with his father, whereas here the officers took the initiative in offering to bring, and bringing, Lois Thornton to talk with defendant. ( People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 758, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) In both cases, however, the defendants voluntarily engaged in conversation with close relatives. Here, moreover, Lois Thornton testified that she hoped her conversation with defendant would yield evidence to exculpate, not incriminate, him, and that her main purpose in visiting him was to provide emotional support. Defendant thanked Sergeant Barnes for arranging the encounter. The factual difference between the ways in which the conversations in Mayfield and this case were arranged do not compel a different conclusion in this case. There was no improper persuasion or coercion. Our determination that the conversation between defendant and Lois Thornton did not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent disposes of defendant's Fifth Amendment claim and obviates the need to address his related contention that Lois Thornton was acting as an unwitting or implied police agent. Defendant's Sixth Amendment claim â that his right to counsel was violated when the police to arranged to let his grandmother speak with him and thereby obtain inculpatory statements â also lacks merit. To be sure, In Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, the high court held that once a judicial proceeding has been initiated against an accused and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, any statement the government deliberately elicits from the accused in the absence of counsel is inadmissible at trial against the defendant. ( People v. Coffman & Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 66-67, 17 Cal. Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30; see Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 205-207, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246; United States v. Gouveia (1984) 467 U.S. 180, 187, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146.) The Massiah right, however, is offense-specific; that is, it applies only to `offenses as to which adversary judicial criminal proceedings have been initiated' ( People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1079, 112 Cal. Rptr.2d 561, 32 P.3d 1073), such proceedings including `formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' ( Texas v. Cobb (2002) 532 U.S. 162, 167-168, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321.) Because defendant had not been charged with any crimes stemming from his murder-kidnapping-assault crime spree at the time of the conversation, he cannot successfully invoke the Sixth Amendment guaranty. ( Id. at p. 168, 121 S.Ct. 1335.) Next, defendant urges that permitting the introduction of his I don't care about her statement, referring to the murder victim, rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. We perceive no such unfairness. (See People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 554, fn. 35, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 974-975, fn. 11, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.) We also see no abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in admitting the evidence. ( People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th 916, 955, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277.) The trial court reasonably found that the statement was probative as tending to show defendant's deliberation and intent in committing the murder, and that its probative value substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect.