Opinion ID: 1742521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court committed error in denying appellant's motion for directed verdict because the prosecution failed to prove its case against the appellant; the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; and, the verdict evidences bias and prejudice against the appellant and was based solely upon suspicion and speculation.

Text: ¶ 10. Collier's discussion of the above assignment of error implicates both an argument concerning the legal sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Collier apparently does not understand the distinction between the two arguments, combining both arguments into a hodgepodge argument while asking for relief in the form of reversal and rendering at best, and reversal and remand at worst. This Court has stated that these arguments represent motions that are separate and distinct and perform different offices within our criminal procedural system... . May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 780 (Miss. 1985). ¶ 11. Our best statement of the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is as follows: Our concern here is whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to sustain a finding adverse to Wetz on each element of the offense of murder. In the present context we must, with respect to each element of the offense, consider all of the evidence  not just the evidence which supports the case for the prosecution  in the light most favorable to the verdict. The credible evidence which is consistent with the guilt must be accepted as true. The prosecution must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Matters regarding the weight and credibility to be accorded the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. We may reverse only where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 808 (Miss. 1987) (citations omitted). If the evidence is found to be legally insufficient, then discharge of the defendant is proper. May, 460 So.2d at 781. ¶ 12. Our standard of review for the determination of whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence is as follows: In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, this Court must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the circuit court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial. Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 957 (Miss. 1997); Jackson, 689 So.2d at 766. Only in those cases where the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice will this Court disturb it on appeal. Herring, 691 So.2d at 957; Benson v. State, 551 So.2d 188, 193 (Miss. 1989) ( citing McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 133-134 (Miss. 1987)). Pleasant v. State, 701 So.2d 799, 802 (Miss. 1997). As such, if the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, then a new trial is proper. May, 460 So.2d at 781-82. ¶ 13. In other words, Harrison's sufficiency of the evidence argument is a question of pure law and is directed to the trial court's denial of his post-trial motion for J.N.O.V., while his argument that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence is directed to the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial and addresses the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 780-81. As such, a greater quantum of evidence is necessary for the State to withstand a challenge that the verdict is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, as distinguished from the legal sufficiency of the evidence argument. Id. at 781. ¶ 14. The crux of Harrison's assignment of error is that the verdict and denial of his motion for J.N.O.V. or, alternatively, motion for a new trial, is based upon the unsubstantiated, uncorroborated, and contradictory testimony of a young child who has been drawing a mental disability check since the age of two. This evidence, he contends, is not sufficient, credible, or substantial. However, when the evidence is viewed in the light of the above stated standards of review, Harrison's argument fails completely. ¶ 15. First, as to Harrison's assertion that C.H.'s testimony was unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, our case law clearly holds that the unsupported word of the victim of a sex crime is sufficient to support a guilty verdict where that testimony is not discredited or contradicted by other credible evidence, especially if the conduct of the victim is consistent with the conduct of one who has been victimized by a sex crime. Christian v. State, 456 So.2d 729, 734 (Miss. 1984); McKinney v. State, 521 So.2d 898, 899 (Miss. 1988); Otis v. State, 418 So.2d 65, 66 (Miss. 1982) (Although she was not corroborated as to the actual rape itself, there were other facts surrounding the incident which had corroboration. It is conceded that a person may be found guilty of rape on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting witness) (citing Killingsworth v. State, 374 So.2d 221 (Miss. 1979) and Dubose v. State, 320 So.2d 773 (Miss. 1975)); Allman v. State, 571 So.2d 244, 250 (Miss. 1990); Goss v. State, 465 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Miss. 1985) (The victim's testimony alone is sufficient, although not corroborated, where it is consistent with the circumstances); Barker v. State, 463 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Miss. 1985); Blade v. State, 240 Miss. 183, 188, 126 So.2d 278, 280 (Miss. 1961); Clemons v. State, 460 So.2d 835, 838 (Miss. 1984). Beyond that, [t]his Court recognizes as corroborating evidence the victim's physical and mental condition after the incident, as well as the fact that she immediately reported the rape. Christian, 456 So.2d at 734; Inman v. State, 515 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Miss. 1987). ¶ 16. In the instant case, based on the plethora of case law cited, supra, C.H.'s testimony is sufficient to support Collier's conviction. C.H.'s mental state following Collier's fondling of her is consistent with the conduct of one who has been fondled. According to her mother's testimony, C.H. had a wild look about her when she returned from Collier's. She reported the incident immediately to her mother, who immediately called the police. The evidence presented in the case sub judice not only is indicative of the circumstances and conduct that would surround such an occurrence, but, according to Christian and Inman, supra, is corroboration of C.H.'s testimony. Collier's argument as to C.H.'s testimony being uncorroborated, and therefore insubstantial to support his conviction, is clearly without merit. ¶ 17. Secondly, Collier contends that C.H.'s testimony is inconsistent in that she told her mother and the jury that the incident occurred after Collier returned from asking his girlfriend about the gel, while telling Detective White that the fondling occurred before he went to the back of the house. This, Collier asserts, coupled with C.H.'s age and slight mental retardation, casts doubt upon the credibility of her testimony. ¶ 18. Our case law is axiomatic on the proposition that the jury is arbiter of the credibility of testimony. It is, of course, within the province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses... . Pleasant, 701 So.2d at 802 (citing Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300-01 (Miss. 1983)). The conflict between the testimony of the appellant and the prosecutrix was properly resolved by the jury. Christian, 456 So.2d at 734. We are asked to reverse this case on the grounds that there are inconsistencies and contradictions in her testimony. If this be true, it would still be a question for the jury. Blade, 240 Miss. at 188, 126 So.2d at 280; e.g., Allman, 571 So.2d at 253. In the instant case, any inconsistencies found in C.H.'s testimony go the weight and credibility of her testimony, clearly a jury question. In addition, C.H.'s testimony was not at all inconsistent on the issue at the heart of this matter  Collier's fondling of her. This contention is without merit. ¶ 19. Collier implicitly asserts that C.H. was an incompetent witness because of her age and slight mental retardation. This Court has stated that Mississippi courts generally allow children of tender years to testify if competent. Rule 601 of the Mississippi Rules of evidence provides that every person is competent to be a witness unless they are incompetent or otherwise restricted. It is in the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine the competency of a child witness. Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 431 (Miss. 1991). A study of C.H.'s testimony shows that her testimony throughout the trial was, on the whole, consistent, especially on the incident in question. She had the ability to understand and answer questions, and could remember events. The evidence in the record is clear that no one put her up to this. This argument has no merit.