Opinion ID: 2159654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of the Credit Union Record

Text: [¶ 13] In Northeast Bank & Trust Co. v. Soley, 481 A.2d 1123, 1126-27 (Me. 1984), we held that a rate schedule the bank used to determine the proper amount of interest owed on a loan was properly admitted into evidence as a business record pursuant to M.R. Evid. 803(6). Northeast Bank based its rate schedules upon information obtained from First National Bank of Boston. Id. at 1125. Before upholding the admissibility of the schedule, we noted that the original source of information, First National Bank, was a separate entity from the business that maintained the proposed record. Id. at 1125-26. We determined, however, that First National Bank reported the information in the regular course of its business, that Northeast received the information daily, and that it was common for banks to rely on this information. Id. at 1126. We concluded that the indicia of reliability that form the basis of the business records exception are present, even though the information was originally reported by an employee not within the plaintiff's organization. Id. at 1127 (footnote omitted). [¶ 14] A proper foundation for the admission of documents pursuant to the business records exception requires the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness to show that: (1) the record was made at or near the time of the events reflected in the record by, or from information transmitted by, a person with personal knowledge of the events recorded therein; (2) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted business; (3) it was the regular practice of the business to make records of the type involved; and (4) no lack of trustworthiness is indicated from the source of information from which the record was made or the method or circumstances under which the record was prepared. N.E. Bank & Trust Co., 481 A.2d at 1125-26 (paraphrasing M.R. Evid. 803(6) (references omitted)). [¶ 15] We conclude, first, that Jane Brown, the Credit Union's share draft manager, did not qualify as a custodian or other qualified witness to testify about the ECH reports for the purposes of Rule 803(6). See N.E. Bank & Trust Co., 481 A.2d at 1125-26. The ECH reports were created by another entity, not the Credit Union, in an unknown location by an unknown person or persons. Brown is neither employed by the ECH nor in any way involved with creating, maintaining, or transmitting the reports, and therefore does not qualify as the custodian or other qualified witness. In fact, Brown could testify only as to the Credit Union's reliance on the ECH reports. The State did not offer the testimony of any other witness who would qualify as the custodian of the ECH reports. Thus, we conclude that the State did not offer the requisite testimony of a custodian or other qualified witness for admission of the ECH reports pursuant to Rule 803(6). [¶ 16] The record is also devoid of evidence regarding whether the ECH reports were created at or near the time of the unauthorized transfer, whether they were generated by someone with personal knowledge of the unauthorized transfer recorded in the report, whether it was ECH's regular practice to generate the records, or whether any lack of trustworthiness was indicated in the creation or preparation of the reports. Indeed, Brown conceded that she had no knowledge of the source of ECH's information or of how the reports were created, that the Credit Union received the information from ECH only through another intermediary entity, and that she could assume only that ECH maintained its information by computer. To permit the State to proffer the records of ECH through the testimony of a witness employed by an entirely different organization, simply because her employer relied on that organization's records in its own business dealings, is wholly unsupported by rule or law. Thus, the State did not establish a sufficient foundation for admission of the ECH reports pursuant to the business records exception. [¶ 17] We have not adopted the catch-all exception to hearsay found in Federal Rule of Evidence 807, [1] and we should not read one into the Maine Rules of Evidence where none exists. Because the State laid an inadequate foundation for the admission of the ECH reports as business records, and because the Maine Rules of Evidence contain no catch-all rule for the admission of reliable hearsay, the court's admission of the ECH reports was error. [2] [¶ 18] Furthermore, admission of the ECH reports cannot be said to have been harmless error. To prove the commission of theft, the State must show that the defendant: (1) obtained or exercised unauthorized control over (2) the property of another (3) with the intent to deprive the owner of that property. State v. Nelson, 1998 ME 183, ¶ 5, 714 A.2d 832, 833 (citation omitted); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 353(1) (1964). The elements of misuse of identification are: (1) to obtain confidential information, property or services, (2) the defendant intentionally or knowingly presents or uses a credit card or debit card, and (3) the debit or credit card is stolen, forged, canceled or obtained as a result of fraud or deception. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 905-A(1)(A) (Supp.2001). [¶ 19] The ECH reports constituted the only evidence the State offered to prove the first element of the theft charge  that Radley obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the $219.95 transferred from the Boisverts' account. The ECH reports also constituted the only evidence the State offered regarding the misuse of identification charge to prove that Radley intentionally or knowingly used the Boisverts' credit card. Thus, without the admission of the ECH reports, insufficient evidence exists to support Radley's convictions based on the transfer from the Boisverts' account. We therefore vacate the convictions for theft and misuse of identification that related to the unauthorized $219.95 transfer from the Boisverts' account.