Opinion ID: 2353264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kloiber Instruction

Text: Next, in a related issue, Appellant asserts that all prior counsel were ineffective for failing to object to or challenge the trial court's cautionary instruction concerning the identification testimony of Robles and Officer Smith. See Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 106 A.2d 820 (1954). Pursuant to Kloiber, where a witness was not in a position to observe the assailant clearly, or had previously failed to identify the defendant, upon defendant's request the court must instruct the jury to receive the witness' identification testimony with caution. Id. at 826-27; see Commonwealth v. Young, 561 Pa. 34, 748 A.2d 166, 181 (1999). Appellant asserts that he was entitled to a Kloiber instruction because Robles previously failed to identify Appellant at a line-up, and Officer Smith's identification was questionable because he was not in a position to see the perpetrator clearly. He argues that the trial court gave a watered-down version of the charge, stating that the testimony must be received with caution only if the jury believed the accuracy of the identification was doubtful. Without analysis, the PCRA court dismissed this claim, finding it waived, frivolous, without merit, and not prejudicial. Once again, Appellant fails to address this claim within the three prongs of the test for counsel's ineffectiveness. See ( Charles) Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973; Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Moreover, the underlying claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness lacks merit. When reviewing jury instructions for error, the charge must be read as a whole to determine whether it was fair or prejudicial. Commonwealth v. Prosdocimo, 525 Pa. 147, 578 A.2d 1273 (1990). The trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration. Id. at 1274 (citing Commonwealth v. Ohle, 503 Pa. 566, 470 A.2d 61, 70 (1983)). The trial court instructed the jury as follows: If you believe you heard testimony concerning eyewitnesses who believed they identified certain people, the law gives us some guidelines in that respect. It is called identification testimony. Where a witness has an opportunity to positively identify and the identification is that the witness is positive in his or her identification, and if you believe that the identification has not been weakened by any prior failure to identify but remains even after cross examination positive and unquavered, then the testimony as to identification need not be received with caution. Indeed, positive testimony as to identity may be treated as statement of a fact. On the other hand, where the witness is not in a position to clearly observe or if you believe that the lighting conditions were not good, or for some reason the witness could not be positive in identity, if that is weakened by either a prior failure to identify or appearance of a lineup where they weren't sure, then the accuracy of the identification made in court then may become so doubtful that the Jury has the ability to receive that testimony as to identity with caution. The law states that if there was a prior failure to identify or if you believe that the accuracy of the identification is doubtful, that testimony as to identity therefore must be received with caution. N.T. 10/11/1994, 18-19. This instruction is in accord with the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions (Crim) § 4.07, which itself derives from Kloiber. The court conveyed to the jury that it must receive with caution the testimony of any witness who had failed to identify the defendant or whose identification is of doubtful accuracy. We specifically approved this jury instruction in Commonwealth v. Henderson, 497 Pa. 23, 438 A.2d 951, 958 (1981), and again in Commonwealth v. Trivigno, 561 Pa. 232, 750 A.2d 243, 253 (2000). Thus, even if we were to determine that the instruction was improper, which we absolutely do not, the charge was appropriate at the time and counsel had a reasonable basis not to object to it. See Trivigno, 750 A.2d at 253. Appellant has not established that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this charge or to request a more appropriate charge.