Opinion ID: 2831302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: “Deference” and “Neutral Principles”

Text: In Masterson we addressed the deference and neutral principles methodologies for deciding property issues when religious organizations split. ___ S.W.3d at ___. Without repeating that discussion in full, suffice it to say that generally courts applying the deference approach to church property disputes utilize neutral principles of law to determine where the religious organization has placed authority to make decisions about church property. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603-04 (1979). Once a court has made this determination, it defers to and enforces the decision of the religious authority if the dispute has been decided within that authority structure. Id. But courts applying the neutral principles methodology defer to religious entities’ decisions on ecclesiastical and church polity issues such as who may be members of the entities and whether to remove a bishop or pastor, while they decide non-ecclesiastical issues such as property ownership and whether trusts exist based on the same neutral principles of secular law that apply to other entities. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09 (1976). We concluded in Masterson that the neutral principles methodology was the substantive basis of our decision in Brown v. Clark, 116 S.W. 360 (Tex. 1909), and that Texas courts should utilize that methodology in determining which faction of a religious organization is entitled to the property when the organization splits. ___ S.W.3d at ___. We also concluded that even though both the deference and neutral principles 7 methodologies are constitutionally permissible, Texas courts should use only the neutral principles methodology in order to avoid confusion in deciding this type of controversy. Id.