Opinion ID: 2005169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: the trial court's error in excluding claudia solis' testimony was harmless

Text: Cortney Barritt, Galindo's girl friend, testified at trial that she knew of the attempted bank robbery before it took place and, more specifically, that she knew Rodriguez was involved. Further, Barritt testified she had told her friend, Claudia Solis, about the planned robbery and had also told her that Rodriguez was involved. Rodriguez attempted to elicit testimony from Solis that Barritt had never mentioned Rodriguez' involvement to her. The record shows the following exchange occurred on redirect examination of Solis: [Defense counsel:] [D]id . . . Barritt ever tell you who he [Galindo] was supposed to do a bank robbery with? [Solis:] Later, yes. Not after the robberies. [Defense counsel:] Who? [State:] Objection, it's hearsay. He was here to testify. THE COURT: Sustained. [Defense counsel:] Did . . . Barritt ever mention to you that . . . Rodriguez was supposed to [Solis:] Never. [State:] Same objection, and move to strike, and move to strike the answer. I want to approach the bench. THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection and instruct the jury to disregard the answer that was given. Rodriguez argues that he intended to impeach Barritt through her prior inconsistent statement to Solis and that the trial court erred in sustaining the hearsay objection. Prior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible as impeachment evidence. See State v. Williams, 224 Neb. 114, 396 N.W.2d 114 (1986). The State contends that because Rodriguez did not make an offer of proof to show what the testimony would have been, he cannot raise the exclusion of the evidence as error. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-103(1)(b) (Reissue 1995) provides: (1) Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and: . . . . (b) In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the judge by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. See, also, Anderson/Couvillon v. Nebraska Dept. of Soc. Servs., 253 Neb. 813, 572 N.W.2d 362 (1998). Here, the exclusion of evidence did affect Rodriguez' substantial right because he was prevented from impeaching an adverse witness. Thus, we must consider whether an offer of proof was necessary to preserve the error or if the substance of the evidence was apparent to the court from the context of the question. In support of its argument that an offer was required, the State refers us to State v. Navrkal, 242 Neb. 861, 496 N.W.2d 532 (1993). There, while being questioned about the nature of a conversation, one of the defense witnesses testified, `Well, she said as far as she knew, it was not a faked burglary.' Id. at 866, 496 N.W.2d at 535. The trial court sustained the prosecution's hearsay objection. The defendant argued on appeal that the testimony was necessary to impeach another witness. We stated that the trial court was correct in sustaining the hearsay objection and pointed out that the defendant had not made an offer of proof to show that he offered the statement for impeachment purposes. Thus, we held that the defendant could not complain the trial court erred. Id. We do not find Navrkal controlling. Instead, we focus on the alternative in § 27-103(1)(b) which allows an appellate court to find error in an exclusionary ruling when the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context even without an offer of proof. Was it apparent to the trial judge that Rodriguez' question, Did . . . Barritt ever mention to you that . . . Rodriguez was supposed to and Solis' answer, Never, was an attempt to impeach Barritt? Although it is a close call, we believe it is apparent from the record that Rodriguez was attempting to impeach Barritt. The substance of Solis' testimony was apparent, because she answered defense counsel's question regarding Barritt's prior inconsistent statement. Compare State v. Cook, 266 Neb. 465, 667 N.W.2d 201 (2003). In addition, during Barritt's cross-examination, defense counsel laid the foundation for impeachment by asking her, And if [Solis] said you talked about [Sandoval, Vela, and Galindo's] committing this robbery and no mention of . . . Rodriguez, would she be wrong? to which Barritt responded, Yes, she would be. And when asked, She'd be lying? Barritt responded, Yes, because I mentioned [Rodriguez'] name too. We believe it is apparent that Rodriguez was attempting to use Solis' testimony for impeachment, and thus it was not hearsay. Obviously, when a trial court excludes evidence, the better trial practice is always to make an offer of proof. See Sherman County Bank v. Kallhoff, 205 Neb. 392, 288 N.W.2d 24 (1980). But because it was apparent that Rodriguez was attempting to impeach Barritt, an offer of proof was not required. And because the evidence was not hearsay, we hold that the trial court erred in excluding it. The error, however, is not fatal to the State's case because it was harmless. In a jury trial of a criminal case, harmless error exists when there is some incorrect conduct by the trial court which, on review of the entire record, did not materially influence the jury in reaching a verdict adverse to a substantial right of the defendant. State v. Robinson, 271 Neb. 698, 715 N.W.2d 531 (2006). Harmless error review looks to the basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict; the inquiry is not whether in a trial that occurred without the error a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but, rather, whether the actual guilty verdict rendered in the questioned trial was surely unattributable to the error. Id. Here, other evidence supported the jury's verdict. The bank's security cameras showed that Rodriguez was in the bank on the morning of September 26, 2002, just before the murders. Galindo testified that Rodriguez had participated in the planning and execution of the robbery. Garvin testified Rodriguez had admitted his involvement after the murders occurred. And Rodriguez' girl friend contradicted his explanation for being at the bank and testified he had lied to her about what he was doing that morning. We conclude that the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error.