Opinion ID: 1381947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Lack of opportunity to confront Orthel Wilson

Text: Edwards' second point is that his right to confrontation was violated because he was not allowed to cross-examine Wilson. Wilson was not called as a witness, but police officers testified that Wilson led them to the murder weapon. The Confrontation Clause, found in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides that, [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. This clause is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial statements by a witness who does not testify at trial, unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The Court declined to decide specifically which statements are testimonial. Id. Edwards argues that Crawford , decided after his direct appeal, should be applied retroactively to him. Following Crawford , the Supreme Court in Davis v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), considered the definition of testimonial as it relates to statements made during police interrogations. Such statements are nontestimonial under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. Id. at 2273-74. Statements are testimonial if the circumstances objectively indicate no emergency and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Id at 2274. It is not necessary to determine whether Wilson's statements in this case would be testimonial under Davis , because none of Wilson's statements was put before the jury. The only statement that was repeated to the jury did not implicate Edwards in the crime and was not admitted for its truth. This case is unlike Crawford , where the witness' videotaped confession was played for the jury, and Hammon, the companion case to Davis , where police read the witness' written statement verbatim to the jury. Id. at 2272. On direct appeal, this Court held that testimony about Wilson's statements to the police could not be admitted for their truth, but were admissible for the limited purpose of explaining the officers' subsequent investigation. State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 532-33 (Mo. banc 2003). The Court found that the testimony had been carefully restricted so that no improper statements implicating Edwards were presented. Id. at 533. A careful review of the record reaffirms that conclusion. Although officers testified that Wilson was interviewed, no particular statement Wilson made during interrogation was discussed. Officers also testified that Wilson was arrested for first-degree murder based on Christopher Harrington's identification from a photographic lineup. Officers testified that Edwards wanted to revise his statement after hearing that the police had interviewed Wilson. The jury did not hear what Wilson told the police that made Edwards want to revise his statement. Officers testified that they informed Edwards that Wilson was in custody, that we had spoken with Wilson and that we had recovered a murder weapon. This was not a statement by Wilson. The only direct statement of Wilson's that was before the jury was in response to the question of why officers had gone to a particular building: Mr. Wilson told us that's where he hid the murder weapon. In addition to being admitted only for the limited purpose of demonstrating why the police went to that building, this statement did not implicate Edwards in the crime. The record shows, as this Court concluded on direct appeal, that all of the evidence was admitted for the limited  and proper  purpose of explaining subsequent police actions. See State v. Dunn, 817 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Mo. banc 1991) (statements explaining subsequent police conduct are admissible). The judge carefully controlled the evidence so that no witnesses were allowed to testify improperly about what Wilson had told them. Because none of Wilson's statements implicating Edwards was admitted for its truth, there was no testimonial evidence involved, and the Confrontation Clause was not implicated. Because the Confrontation Clause was not implicated, the subsequent decisions of Crawford and Davis do not change the conclusion of this Court on direct appeal that no improper hearsay was admitted. Edwards complains that, even if the statements were properly admitted to show the reasonableness of the officers' subsequent actions, the jury was free to consider the statements for their truth because the trial court refused to give a limiting instruction. Edwards raised this issue on direct appeal and provides no basis why this issue should be reconsidered here. Issues decided on direct appeal will not be reconsidered in post-conviction proceedings. Leisure v. State, 828 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Mo. banc 1992).