Opinion ID: 1999699
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: County Immunity from Zoning Code

Text: Aside from its claim under the Home Rule Act, the County argues that its statutory authority to establish Community Correctional Centers prevails over the statutory authority of the City to regulate land use. While this Court has not encountered this dilemma before, courts in other jurisdictions have relied primarily on three different tests to resolve a conflict between a local zoning authority and an intruding government entity which seeks to avoid zoning regulation. First, the traditional governmental-proprietary test has been applied to give governmental entities pursuing government functions immunity from local zoning laws, while requiring compliance of those entities performing merely proprietary functions. Second, the superior sovereign rule recognizes immunity for those governmental entities with a superior position in the governmental hierarchy. Finally, the eminent domain test grants immunity to any government unit which has the power to take property by condemnation. 5 Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 35.05 (1987). These traditional tests have encountered a great deal of criticism. The application of the governmental-proprietary test has led to inconsistent results. Because the definitions of governmental and proprietary vary, the same function may be classified differently depending on the jurisdiction, or may vary even within the same jurisdiction. Blackstone Park v. State Board of Standards and Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233, 1238 (R.I. 1982); Note, Governmental Immunity from Land Zoning Ordinances, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 869, 870 (1971). The governmental-proprietary distinction arose in the context of governmental immunity from tort claims and is not related to the central question of land use control. City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694, 696 (N.D. 1977). The eminent domain test has likewise been developed for a different though related purpose, namely, deciding whether a public body may acquire ownership of private property. Cases which have applied this test generally take the position that where a political unit is authorized to condemn, it is automatically immune from local zoning regulations when it acts in furtherance of its designated public function. Yet, the power to condemn simply provides a method whereby property can be acquired. Such power has nothing to do with the use of the property. City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 322 So.2d 571, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The superior sovereign test presents the difficulty of attempting to establish a meaningful hierarchical ranking. Note, Governmental Immunity from Zoning, 22 B.C.L.Rev. 783, 790 (1981). Since a municipal corporation is an agent of the state whose zoning power is governed by the legislature, its interest in enforcing this power is equal to the state agency's interest in performing those functions for which it was formed. 8 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 25.15, at 20 (3d ed. rev'd. 1983). Attempting to label one government entity superior merely begs the question of which agent of the sovereign should prevail on the issue of land use. Note, Government Immunity from Land Zoning Ordinances, 84 Harv.L.Rev. at 877. Though we find the notion of sovereign immunity unhelpful in resolving disputes between local governments, a case in which the state government itself is involved might well be resolved on this basis. These traditional tests attempt to resolve zoning conflicts by applying labels which bear little, if any, relationship to the underlying concerns of land use control. More generally, all three traditional tests share a common flaw; they are overly simplistic and often lead to resolution of a multifaceted zoning-conflicts issue through the use of conclusive labels rather than through perceptive adjudication. Blackstone Park, 448 A.2d at 1238. Moreover, use of these three tests has invariably led to the same result: government entities are immune from zoning ordinances. Note, Government Immunity from Zoning, 22 B.C.L. Rev. at 785. We conclude that these tests do not provide a basis for determining that Lake County is immune from Crown Point's zoning ordinance. The modern trend in resolving governmental zoning conflicts is to apply the balancing of interests test. See 5 Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 35.05 (listing those jurisdictions which have adopted such a test). The balancing of interests has generally consisted of a two-tiered analysis. The first step is to determine of whether the intruding authority is immune from the local zoning authority. If the intruding entity is immune, it may make the initial land use decision without complying with local zoning. If not immune, the intruding entity must attempt compliance with local zoning, thus giving the local zoning authority the initial land use decision. The second tier of the balancing test requires a determination of the reasonableness of the initial land use decision. We note that courts in other jurisdictions have used three methods in conducting this balancing of interests analysis. The test originally evolved as a method for determining legislative intent. The rationale which runs through our cases and which we are convinced should furnish the true test of immunity in the first instance, albeit a somewhat nebulous one, is the legislative intent in this regard with respect to the particular agency or function involved. That intent, rarely specifically expressed, is to be divined from a consideration of many factors, with a value judgment reached on an overall evaluation. Rutgers, State University v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 152, 286 A.2d 697, 702 (1971) (footnote omitted). Thus, while acknowledging that legislative intent in this regard is rarely specifically expressed, the court in Rutgers answered the preliminary immunity question by examining considerations suggested by the legislation. These factors included the nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity, the kind of function or land use involved, the extent of the public interest to be served thereby, the effect local land use regulation would have upon the enterprise concerned and the impact upon legitimate local interests. Id. at 152, 286 A.2d at 702. In essence, the court attempted to determine what the legislature would have done had it considered the question. The Rutgers court addressed the reasonableness of the land use decision primarily in procedural terms: the instrumentality ought to consult with the local authorities and sympathetically listen and give every consideration to local objections, problems and suggestions in order to minimize the conflict as much as possible. Id. at 154, 286 A.2d at 703. Beyond this, the test is arbitrariness. Other courts have emphasized the reasonableness of the land use decision rather than a search for statutory guidance. There is danger in seeking legislative intent where none has been expressed. Where the legislature's words do not suggest an intent, courts have been reluctant to divine one. As it turns out, there is no legislative guidance [on the question of immunity]... . It is more likely that the legislature didn't express itself on the subject because it wasn't thinking about the problem. Temple Terrace, 322 So.2d at 578. The Temple Terrace court disallowed any claim of immunity absent express statutory authorization. The court did, however, indicate that the balancing of interests test would be applied to determine the reasonableness of the land use. Absent statutory immunity, the governmental unit seeking to use land contrary to applicable zoning regulations should have the burden of proving that the public interests favoring the proposed use outweigh those mitigating against a use not sanctioned by the zoning regulations of the host government. Id. at 579. However, because the intruding state agency in Temple Terrace had never applied to the city for a zoning variance, the court did not address the merits of the zoning issue. Yet a third method of balancing conflicting interests was adopted in City of Fargo, 256 N.W.2d 694. In that case, the court allowed the intruding city to assert a claim of immunity absent specific statutory immunity. In advancing such a claim, the burden was on the city seeking exemption from the zoning ordinance. The court considered factors surrounding the particular land use in question, such as the city's failure to study suitable alternate sites, the availability of equally suitable land, the adverse impact on the neighborhood, and the proposed site's unique suitability for its zoned use. The court concluded that the city had not born its burden to show sufficient necessity or adequate study of alternatives. The court indicated that it would have reviewed any appeal from a denial of a conditional use application on grounds of bias or arbitrariness, an approach similar to the one used in Rutgers. Because the pending appeal was from a determination of immunity, the court did not engage in this analysis. We summarize these three approaches to the balancing of interests test as follows. The Rutgers approach allows governmental immunity from local zoning if it appears from the evaluation of legislative factors that the legislature would have intended the government entity to be immune, while evaluating the reasonableness of the land use on a basis of arbitrariness. The City of Fargo test also allows for governmental immunity if the intruding entity can show necessity for the particular land use and also looks to the arbitrariness of the final decision to determine reasonableness. The Temple Terrace approach, on the other hand, allows immunity only if expressly authorized by statute, thus allowing the preliminary land use decision to be made by the local zoning authority and reviewing the reasonableness of that decision by balancing the public interests. We conclude that an intruding entity must be allowed to seek relief under some circumstances. It must, however, bear the burden to show that immunity is necessary to advance the governmental ends it seeks. The essential purpose of zoning, to rationally coordinate land-use planning to promote orderly development and preservation of property values, City of Fargo, 256 N.W.2d at 697, generally can best be furthered by local zoning authorities which have been established to accomplish that very purpose. Local zoning proceedings also provide for public public debate in an administrative hearing which can address the interests of all parties. However, there will be occasions when the land use plan of a community must fall before other critical government objectives. The decisions of local zoning boards in any context have been reviewed to determine if they are arbitrary, capricious or patently unreasonable. Ash v. Rush County Board of Zoning Appeals (1984), Ind. App., 464 N.E.2d 347. Local land use decisions must be evaluated not only in terms of local need and benefit, but in light of community, area or state-wide interests as well. When a zoning authority has denied an intruding government's request for approval of a given land use, an appeal can lie to the courts, which will balance the interests to determine which must prevail. Factors to be considered include the propriety of the land use, such as the economic and environmental impact on the area, the kind of function or land use involved, the availability of alternative locations, and any attempts to minimize detriments to adjacent landowners, as well as a consideration of competing interests, such as the nature and scope of the intruding government unit, the essential use to the local community and the broader community, the need for the specific site as compared to the adverse impact, the social utility of the proposed use, and the possible frustration of a government function. These are the sort of decisions assigned to local executive and legislative bodies. Where their determinations are irreconcilable, the legislature has provided for a review of the zoning decision by the judiciary. Here, the County never sought re-zoning or a special use permit and the litigation commenced as a request by Crown Point for an injunction. The trial court denied the injunction on the basis of the Home Rule Act. As we hold that the Home Rule Act does not bar an injunction, the trial court is ordered to vacate its denial of the City's petition. Whether injunctive relief is appropriate pending an application by Lake County for rezoning or a special use permit, we leave to the discretion of the trial court. The cause is remanded for that purpose. DeBRULER, GIVAN, PIVARNIK and DICKSON, JJ., concur.