Opinion ID: 1728307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: assignments of error number nine and fourteen

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in restricting his voir dire questioning and allowing the state extraneous voir dire examination. Defendant claims the state was given greater latitude than the defense in its Witherspoon questioning. Defendant contends he was prejudiced and was unable to choose a fair and impartial jury and to properly build challenges for cause. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) the United States Supreme Court held that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. On the other hand, the court found no constitutional bar to excluding jurors who stated in advance of trial that they could not even consider returning a verdict of death. In response to Witherspoon, LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 798 was amended and now provides in pertinent part: It is good cause for challenge on the part of the state, but not on the part of the defendant, that:       (2) The juror tendered in a capital case who has conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital punishment and makes it unmistakably clear (a) that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before him, ... In viewing the voir dire examination in its entirety, no prejudice to defendant is shown. At defendant's request, much of the voir dire was conducted individually. Defendant conducted extensive voir dire and was able to intelligently exercise his right to challenge prospective jurors for cause. During questioning of Ms. Bessie Moore, she indicated in response to court questioning that she would automatically vote against the death penalty under all circumstances. Defense counsel, in attempting to rehabilitate her, asked if she could listen to the evidence before making a decision and she said she could. Because of her contradictory responses, the judge asked her directly if she could ever vote for the death penalty. She responded in the negative. Defense counsel objected arguing that the exact language of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 798 must be employed to properly comply with Witherspoon. In overruling the objection, the court noted that the prospective juror had given a negative answer to a question posed in the specific language of Article 798. During defense questioning of Ms. Bellaire, the trial court interjected to comment that a defense question was misleading because counsel implied that the juror was being asked how she would vote. Defendant objected arguing that such judicial comment could be viewed as commenting on the evidence. Objections, he argued, should come from the state or not at all. The defense is entitled to wide latitude in examining prospective jurors. This right must be exercised within the court's discretion, which determines the scope of the examination under the prevailing facts and circumstances. State v. James, 431 So.2d 399 (La., 1983); State v. Robinson, 404 So.2d 907 (La., 1981). Here, the trial court did not curtail defense questioning but interjected a comment about the misleading nature of a question. The argument that only the state is capable of objecting to defense voir dire questioning is meritless. When both sides had concluded their questioning of prospective juror Hebert, the trial court asked one more question to ascertain the juror's position: If it is established that Kathy Newman was murdered, that she was raped twice and that she was also robbed, could you consider imposing the death penalty? (Tr., Vol III, p. 457) Ms. Hebert answered, I can't be sure of that. After the court explained that she was not asking how Ms. Hebert would vote, but rather whether she could consider the death penalty, Ms. Hebert stated: I don't think I could. The state moved to excuse Ms. Hebert for cause and the defense objected, arguing that this juror had never said that she would automatically vote against the death penalty. [3] In allowing the state challenge for cause, the trial court held that Ms. Hebert's unwillingness to consider imposition of the death penalty was firm, relying on Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir., 1982). The Fifth Circuit in Williams declared:  Witherspoon and its progeny do not mandate that a prospective juror aver that she would refuse to consider the death penalty in every case that could possible (sic) arise. If she knows enough about the case to know that she could not consider imposition of the death penalty regardless of what evidence might be presented, she must be excused. Ms. Brou's responses demonstrate that she would be unwilling to consider the death penalty where the crime charged was murder committed during a robbery. She does leave open the possibility that she would consider this penalty in a more `hideous' case. Her unwillingness to do so here, however, is firm. 679 F.2d at 385-386. The rationale of Williams had previously been adopted by this court. State v. LaFleur, 398 So.2d 1074 (La., 1981) involved the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed in an atrocious, cruel or heinous manner. During voir dire, prospective jurors were asked whether they could return the death penalty if they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed in such a manner. LaFleur held: This is a legitimate question inasmuch as a juror who could not recommend the death penalty under such circumstances is subject to a challenge for cause by the state. 398 So.2d at 1078. This assignment of error lacks merit.