Opinion ID: 3014881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court’s Refusal to Consider

Text: Extrinsic Evidence Was Error. For the same reason, we reject Fire & Casualty’s contention that the District Court erred by refusing to consider extrinsic evidence that establishes that Atlantic Express intended to limit UM coverage to $35,000. According to Fire & Casualty, Pennsylvania law supports the use of extrinsic evidence to clarify the intentions of the parties to a contract where a term of the contract is ambiguous. Fire & Casualty thus argues that the verifications of Lull and Schlenker, and the “writings” referred to above, “overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the parties 13 desired, requested and received $35,000 in UM coverage.” Fire & Casualty’s Br. at 31. This is really merely a restatement of the argument we have rejected above. 13 The “parties” to whom Fire & Casualty refers are Atlantic Express and Fire & Casualty. 15 Under Pennsylvania law, “[a]n ambiguity exists when the questionable term or language, viewed in the context of the entire policy, is reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense.” J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co. v. Pilosi, 393 F.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotations omitted). However, the policy is not ambiguous. Again, the issue is whether Atlantic Express complied with the statutory requirements of § 1734 of the MVFRL to reduce UM coverage to an amount less than the policy’s bodily injury liability limits. Atlantic Express’s efforts to get us to focus on its intent require us to close our eyes to the statutorily prescribed method for expressing that intent. We obviously can not do that. Thus, extrinsic evidence of Atlantic Express’s intent is irrelevant.