Opinion ID: 2622648
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: PIP Coverage

Text: Sentry argues that the insurance policy unambiguously denies coverage to a person occupying a vehicle that is not a car at the time of injury and thus denies coverage to the motorcyclist, a person not occupying a car, in this case. Before addressing the language of the contract, we first look to the mandates of the No Fault Act to determine the minimum PIP coverage required by statute. We hold that an insurance policy provision that conditions PIP coverage for the relative of a named insured on occupancy in a vehicle at the time of injury is void. Thus, it is unnecessary for us to address the issue of whether the Sentry policy is unambiguous because, irrespective of the provisions of the policy, our statutes mandate PIP coverage in this case. Familiar rules of statutory construction guide us to determine the scope of mandatory PIP coverage required by the No Fault Act. We interpret a statute in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning in order to give full effect to the intent of the legislature. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. McMichael, 906 P.2d 92, 97 (Colo.1995). If a statute is ambiguous, then we may look to other aids of statutory construction to determine legislative intent. Id. The No Fault Act requires that an insurance carrier provide PIP coverage to three classes of persons: (1) the named insured, (2) relatives of the named insured, and (3) any other person occupying a described motor vehicle with the consent of the insured. § 10-4-707(1). [5] As is pertinent to the facts of this case, PIP insurance applies to the relative of a named insured when injured in an accident involving any motor vehicle except where the relative is injured as a result of the use or operation of his own motor vehicle not actually covered under the terms of this part 7. § 10-4-707(1)(b) (requiring PIP coverage for relatives of a named insured under circumstances described in section 10-4-707(1)(a)); § 10-4-707(1)(a) (requiring coverage for named insureds when injured in an accident involving any motor vehicle) (emphasis added). Thus, under the plain language of the statute, subject to some statutory exclusions, PIP coverage for relatives of named insureds is mandatory irrespective of a person's occupancy in a vehicle, as long as any vehicle involved in the accident qualifies as a motor vehicle. [6] The court of appeals relied upon, and Sentry urges us to rely on, the case of Thompson v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 618 P.2d 736 (Colo.App.1980), to hold that PIP coverage is not required under the No Fault Act for persons riding a motorcycle at the time of injury because motorcycles are not within the class of motor vehicles required to have an automobile insurance policy that includes PIP coverage. Although the facts of Thompson are similar to this case, the court's reason for denying PIP coverage in that case does not apply here. The Thompson court denied coverage because the plaintiff fit a statutory exception to mandatory PIP coverage, an exception which Sentry has not argued applies in this case. See Thompson, 618 P.2d at 737 (rejecting PIP coverage because the plaintiff was riding a motor vehicle he owned, but which was uninsured). [7] Even though Thompson concerned a ground for exclusion of PIP coverage not argued here, we address the court of appeals' reliance upon Thompson. That court reasoned that since the No Fault Act does not require a motorcycle insurance policy to include PIP coverage, the statute does not mandate PIP insurance coverage for a person injured while riding a motorcycle. As explained earlier, mandatory PIP coverage applies to specified statutory classes of persons and not classes of vehicles. Thus, we hold that, subject to statutory exclusions, the plain language of the statute requires PIP coverage when the relative of a named insured is injured in an accident involving any motor vehicle, irrespective of that person's occupancy in a vehicle covered by a PIP insurance policy at the time of injury. Although the No Fault Act unambiguously requires that PIP coverage include a person in DeHerrera's circumstances, we find further support for our holding in the language of the No Fault Act regarding the specified third class of persons to whom mandatory PIP coverage applies. This class requires PIP coverage for any other person occupying the described motor vehicle . . . . § 10-4-707(1)(c). As to this third class of persons, the statutory requirement expressly excludes persons not occupying an insured vehicle from PIP coverage. Because the legislature failed to restrict, in a similar way, PIP coverage for relatives of named insureds based upon occupancy of an insured vehicle, we presume from the absence of this restriction that the legislature did not intend for it to apply. Lunsford v. Western States Life Ins., 908 P.2d 79, 84 (Colo.1995); see also Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1161 (10th Cir.2000) (Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.). An insurance contract that denies statutorily mandated coverage is void and unenforceable. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227, 231 (Colo.1984) (holding that policy language that limits coverage required under the No Fault Act is invalid). We hold that PIP coverage is mandatory when a relative of a named insured is injured in an accident with any motor vehicle, irrespective of the insured's occupancy in a particular vehicle at the time of injury, subject to statutory exclusions. Thus we conclude that even if we were to assume that the Sentry policy unambiguously denies coverage to DeHerrera in this case based on failure to occupy a car at the time of injury, that restriction would be void. We therefore decline to address this issue. Reading the mandatory requirements of the No Fault Act into the policy, we conclude that Sentry must provide PIP coverage to the plaintiff in this case if he was in an accident involving any motor vehicle and no statutory exclusions apply. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 906 P.2d at 101 (applying mandatory coverage requirements to an insurance policy that violated those requirements). In this case the relative of a named insured was injured in an accident involving a pickup truck, which is a motor vehicle under the applicable definition. See § 10-4-707(2) (defining motor vehicle as a vehicle required to be registered and licensed for operation on the public highways of this state). The parties have not argued that any statutory exclusions apply. Hence, we hold that the statute unambiguously requires that Sentry provide PIP coverage in this case.