Opinion ID: 2604379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Was There a Taking?

Text: The facts of this case establish the claim of condemnation of the crops and livestock killed sufficiently to establish the claim on that theory. Restatement of Property (second), section 8.1, comment (d) at 263 (1977) in part provides: Inverse condemnation is the name given to a cause of action against a governmental agency to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental agency, even though there has been no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain. Successful litigation against the governmental agency is a factual determination that there has been a `taking' and in effect forces the governmental agency to purchase the interest taken. The `taking' in that case relates back to the date of the beginning of the governmental conduct that is determined to be a `taking.' Our cases support application of that statement to the facts of this case. Personal property, such as the livestock and crops at issue here, can be taken; there is no requirement that the realty on which the personal property is located must be taken, too. See Coos Bay Oyster Co-op. v. Highway Com., 219 Or. 588, 348 P.2d 39 (1959) (oysters are personal property, and allegations that oysters were taken will support inverse condemnation action). However, property is not taken if it is simply damaged. In Moeller v. Multnomah County, 218 Or. 413, 425-27, 345 P.2d 813 (1959), this court pointed out that Oregon's takings clause in Article I, section 18 of the Oregon constitution, does not include the word damage as well as the word taken, as do many other jurisdictions where the constitutions provide for more liberal compensation. The court then approved as a definition of taking that required destruction, restriction or interruption of the necessary use and enjoyment of [the] property of a person for a public purpose. Id. at 431, 345 P.2d 813 (approving definition in Morrison v. Clackamas County, 141 Or. 564, 568, 18 P.2d 814 (1933)). Most cases boil this definition down to a test of whether there has been a substantial interference with property rights. See Lincoln Loan v. State Hwy. Comm., 274 Or. 49, 57, 545 P.2d 105 (1976) (facts showing a substantial interference by the state with the use and enjoyment of    property state takings claim); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 192, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) (a taking occurs when the government acts in such a way as substantially to deprive an owner of the useful possession of that which he owns); Moeller v. Multnomah County, supra, 218 Or. at 427, 345 P.2d 813 (Oregon cases on inverse condemnation involve substantial taking or destroying, or deprivation of a substantial part of property). Defendant relies on Barnes v. United States, 538 F.2d 865, 210 Ct.Cl. 467 (1976), for the proposition that a single flooding of land, that does not threaten to recur, is not sufficient to state a real property taking claim. [5] However, in Oregon the test for inverse condemnation is not a counting of the number of interfering floods, but application of the substantial interference test, that is, whether there has been flooding that destroys or materially decreases the value of private property. Cereghino v. State Highway Com., 230 Or. 439, 443, 370 P.2d 694 (1962); Tomasek v. Oregon Highway Com'n, 196 Or. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952). It is true that a single flood that does not permanently damage the land, or threaten to recur on a regular basis, will often not be a substantial enough interference with property rights to constitute a taking of the land. However, no stretch of the Oregon definition of taking is required to hold that one flood can substantially lessen the value of or destroy personal property, such as the livestock and crops in this case. In arguing that the livestock and cattle in this case were not taken, defendant relies primarily on State ex rel Dept. of Trans. v. Glenn, 288 Or. 17, 602 P.2d 253 (1979). In Glenn, the state condemned land where the private landowner wintered his cattle. The cattle had to be moved in short order. Some cattle died during and after removal to other, less salubrious quarters. Damages for these losses were denied in the condemnation. The court in Glenn stated: If, in removing his personal property, the condemnee sustains removal costs or damages to his personal property, such expenses or losses are not recoverable from the condemnor. The rule is stated in 1 Orgel on Valuation Under the Law of Eminent Domain 306, § 69 (1953): `The weight of authority is in support of the ruling which denies compensation to the owner for removal costs and breakages or other injury to personal property.   '      We hold that any damages for loss of cattle in this case do not fall within the category of property `taken' for public use under the provisions of Article I, Section 18, of our Constitution. (Footnote omitted.) (Emphasis added.) 288 Or. at 20-21, 602 P.2d 253. It is clear that Glenn focused on whether to compensate in condemnation for the costs of removal of personalty where underlying realty is taken and compensated. The necessity to remove personal property from condemned realty is not a substantial interference with the owner's rights in the personal property, i.e., personal property is not taken simply because it needs to be moved. [6] Thus, Glenn is distinguishable. The plaintiffs' allegations and evidence concerning destroyed crops and livestock support an award of condemnation damages here. Livestock killed and crops destroyed by a governmentally instituted action are permanently taken.