Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the trial court prohibited evans from questioning the venire panel about their ability to follow the law governing the death penalty.

Text: ś 118. Evans argues that defense counsel was denied the opportunity to question jurors about their ability to follow the law governing the imposition of the death penalty. Voir dire was conducted pursuant to Rule 5.02 of the Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct. P.(1993), which provides: In the voir dire examination of jurors, the attorney shall direct to the entire venire questions only on matters not inquired into by the court. Individual jurors may be examined only when proper to inquire as to answers given or for other good cause allowed by the court. No hypothetical questions requiring any juror to pledge a particular verdict will be asked. ś 119. In Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643, 651-52 (Miss.1996), this Court set forth the following guidelines when reviewing challenges to voir dire proceedings: [T]he trial court has broad discretion in passing on the extent and propriety of questions that are addressed to the venire. Jones v. State, 381 So.2d 983 (Miss.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1003, 101 S.Ct. 543, 66 L.Ed.2d 300 (1980). Abuse of discretion will only be found where Davis shows clear prejudice resulting from undue lack of constraint on the prosecution or undue constraint on the defense. Id. See also, Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 784 (Miss. 1987)([T]his court will take note of abuse on appeal where prejudice to the accused is present.); Leverett v. State, 112 Miss. 394, 73 So. 273, 274 (1916)(reversing where whole trend of voir dire intended to impress jury with idea that their duty was to convict.) ś 120. Evans first argues he was prohibited from asking jurors whether they would consider mitigating circumstances such as child abuse, substance abuse, and mental illness. The record below belies this argument. Evans refers to several instances in the record wherein the trial judge allegedly prevented questioning about mitigating factors. When the entire record is examined it is clear that the trial judge was concerned that defense counsel was attempting to use hypothetical questions in order to secure a commitment from the jurors that they would render a particular verdict. ś 121. In West v. State, 553 So.2d 8, 22 (Miss.1989), this Court stated: Our law allows an attorney for either side to probe the prejudices of the prospective jurors to the end that all will understand the jurors' thoughts on matters directly related to be tried. What is impermissible is for an attorney to attempt to secure from the juror a pledge that, if a certain set of facts occur or are presented, the juror will vote a certain way. We take this view because there may well be other facts which would require a conscientious juror to do otherwise even though the assumed hypothetical fact comes to pass. Furthermore, in the course of deliberation a juror should be encumbered by her oath, the evidence and the instructions from the trial court-and nothing more. ś 122. Once defense counsel agreed to rephrase his questions, the trial court allowed this line of inquiry. Far from preventing defense counsel from questioning the venire about mitigating factors, the record reveals that the trial judge assured defense counsel that he had no problem with the questions as rephrased. Defense counsel then explained to the venire that the function of mitigating circumstances is to mitigate punishment, not to excuse the crime. Counsel discussed both statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors. For example, counsel inquired whether jurors would consider mitigating circumstances such as child abuse, mental illness, substance abuse, and the influence of alcohol during the commission of the crime. Counsel also inquired whether the venire would weigh mitigating circumstances against aggravating circumstances in order to determine the appropriate sentence. Evans was clearly afforded the opportunity to fully explore whether jurors would consider mitigating circumstances. ś 123. Evans next argues that defense counsel was prohibited from questioning venire members as to whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty. In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that a trial court may not refuse inquiry into whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction of the defendant. In Morgan, the Court held: [T]he belief that death should be imposed ipso facto upon conviction of a capital offense reflects directly on that individual's inability to follow the law. Any juror who would impose death regardless of the facts and circumstances of conviction cannot follow the dictates of the law. It may be that a juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintaining such dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would prevent him or her from doing so. A defendant on trial for his life must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective jurors function under such misconception. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735-36, 112 S.Ct. at 2233. (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court noted that a juror who would automatically impose the death penalty obviously deem[s] mitigating evidence to be irrelevant to their decision to impose the death penalty: They not only refuse to give such evidence any weight but are also plainly saying that mitigating evidence is not worth their consideration and that they will not consider it. Id. ś 124. Contrary to Evans' assertions, defense counsel questioned the jury as to whether they would automatically impose the death penalty. Moreover, jurors were asked whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty where the victim was a child. Jurors who answered affirmatively were questioned further by defense counsel. ś 125. However, when counsel attempted to question jurors regarding their verdict given the specific facts of this case, the trial court, relying on Rule 5.02, did not allow the questions. For example, the trial court would not allow defense counsel to ask whether jurors would vote for the death penalty when a person, previously convicted of felony, is convicted of capital murder with an underlying felony of kidnapping or sexual battery. The trial judge stated, when you asked them what penalty would be appropriate under the hypothetical set of facts that you asked, you're asking for their decision as to the verdict at the sentencing phase and noted that the questions as propounded did not incorporate all the elements concerning the issue which would be submitted to the jury. ś 126. Unlike Morgan, this venire was questioned about the automatic imposition of the death penalty and the consideration of mitigating circumstances. The trial court correctly refused to allow defense counsel to ask hypothetical questions and inquire as to the juror's conclusions or the verdict they would reach and simply directed that the questions asked by defense counsel accurately set forth the law. Unif. R.Crim. Ct. Prac. 5.02; Simon v. State, 688 So.2d 791 (Miss. 1997); Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 785 (Miss.1987); West v. State, 553 So.2d 8 (Miss. 1989). Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992) does not require otherwise. ś 127. Here, the venire was questioned as to whether they would listen to the evidence and require the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, during voir dire, jurors were questioned as to whether they would listen the evidence about aggravating and mitigating circumstances, weigh this evidence and then make a decision regarding punishment. ś 128. This Court has stated that [t]rial courts have a responsibility to control voir dire but in doing so they must take care not to hinder a full exploration of a juror's predispositions, by hypothetical or otherwise. Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1305 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 880, 116 S.Ct. 214, 133 L.Ed.2d 146 (1995)( citing Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171-72, 70 S.Ct. 519, 523-24, 94 L.Ed. 734 (1950)). However, [t]he line between a proper and improper question is not always easily drawn; it is manifestly a process in which the trial judge must be given a considerable discretion. Simon v. State, 688 So.2d at 799. Finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court, this issue is without merit.