Opinion ID: 766472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Multiplicity/Duplicity of the Indictment

Text: 34 In a related claim, Walsh asserts that the Indictment was multiplicitous and/or duplicitous. Again, we find this claim without merit. 35 An indictment is multiplicitous when it charges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been committed. United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999). Conversely, [a]n indictment is duplicitous if it joins two or more distinct crimes in a single count. United States v. Aracri, 968 F.2d 1512, 1518 (2d Cir. 1992). 36 We may consider the record as a whole in determining whether an indictment is in fact multiplicitous or duplicitous. Cf. United States v. Stanfa, 685 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that a district court may wait until the close of the government's case before deciding whether counts fail the multiplicity test); United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 2d 415, 422-23 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding that where an indictment is not multiplicitous on its face, the court should await trial on the facts to make its determination) (citing United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224 (1952)). 37 Walsh contends that the Indictment was multiplicitous because Counts II and III required proof of precisely the same set of facts and so he cannot be sure that he was not punished more than once for the same offense. First, even on its face, the Indictment is not clearly multiplicitous. As explained above, Counts II and III are at least somewhat distinguished from one another by the body position of the victim, as well as by different, but overlapping time frames. 38 Moreover, the evidence presented at trial confirmed that: (1) the cells in Counts II and III were different; (2) the incident alleged in Count III occurred after June 5, 1992; and (3) Fowlks was standing during the incident alleged in Count II, while he was lying on the floor during the incident alleged in Count III. While Walsh is correct that the jury did not have access to some of the discovery provided by the government, it obviously had access to the evidence at trial which, if the jury chose to accept the government's case, ensured that it could differentiate the charges in the Indictment. 39 Walsh also contends that Count II of the Indictment was duplicitous because Sidari and Bourke, the witnesses offered by the government as to Count II, may have been testifying about two different events. Again, viewing the evidence in the record, it is clear that, although Sidari's and Bourke's testimony was not identical, they were testifying as to the same event. Both officers testified at trial that in 1992, they saw the defendant step on Fowlks's penis while Fowlks was standing in the ground-floor holding cell without a toilet-sink fixture. Sidari also recalled seeing Bourke just before and just after the incident he witnessed. The inconsistencies between their testimonies-such as whether it lasted one second or ten-are simply inconsistencies that occur in almost any trial testimony due to the limits of human observation or memory. 40 Walsh also argues that the jury may have improperly relied on the testimony of Dwayne Holloman, who the government offered as a witness to the events alleged in Count III, in convicting him of the charges in Count II, thereby rendering Count II duplicitous. Again, however, an examination of the testimony at trial reveals that Holloman clearly testified as to a different event than Sidari and Bourke. First, Holloman testified that the cell in which he saw Walsh assault Fowlks had a toilet-sink fixture, as opposed to the one described by Sidari and Bourke. Second, Holloman testified that Fowlks was lying on the ground during the assault, whereas Sidari and Bourke saw Fowlks standing. Finally, only Holloman observed a bandage on Fowlks's hand when the incident he witnessed occurred, and Fowlks had been to Erie County Medical Center on June 5, 1992 to have staples removed from a stab wound he suffered to his hand four weeks earlier. 41 Given these distinctions in the Indictment, as further clarified by the evidence at trial, the Indictment was neither multiplicitous nor duplicitous, and Walsh's conviction under the Indictment did not violate principles of double jeopardy. B. Bill of Particulars 42 A denial of a bill of particulars is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Barnes, 158 F.3d 662, 665-66 (2d Cir. 1998). We find the District Court did not exceed its allowable discretion in denying Walsh's request. 43 A bill of particulars is required only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused. United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990). As described above, the Indictment was satisfactory in this respect. 44 Furthermore, a bill of particulars is not necessary where the government has made sufficient disclosures concerning its evidence and witnesses by other means. See id. (denying a request for a bill of particulars in part because the defendants were provided with considerable evidentiary detail outside of the indictment); United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1141, 1148 (2d Cir. 1984). 45 As detailed above, at the time of the District Court's decision to deny the bill of particulars, the government had provided Walsh with details that allowed him to differentiate the charges sufficiently and, therefore, present his defense adequately, rendering a bill of particulars unnecessary. While it is true that the discovery provided did not limit the jury's consideration of the evidence as a bill of particulars would, cf. United States v. Glaze, 313 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1963), such a limitation was not necessary where the evidence presented in discovery adequately differentiated the charges and, therefore, the defendant has not demonstrated actual surprise resulting from the evidence that was presented at trial. Cf. Barnes, 158 F.3d at 665-66 (concluding that any error in the denial of a bill of particulars was harmless where the defendant could not demonstrate that he was taken by surprise by the evidence presented at trial and that such surprise prejudiced his defense).