Opinion ID: 1840075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Were out-of-court statements by the victim improperly admitted?

Text: Next on Richards' list of errors is the admission of several hearsay statements of the victim May Wilson. Six statements are at issue. The trial court held a hearing to consider the admissibility of these statements and issued a memorandum decision that each of the six was admissible. The disputed statements are: 1) Wilson's deposition testimony in 1979 relating to an insurance matter; 2) Wilson's statements to Andrea Gelb, a social worker working with Wilson's mother. Wilson told Gelb that she was concerned about Richards' handling of her money and that she was unaware how much money she had; 3) Wilson's statements to Virginia Osberg, in which she said, while hospitalized, that she would not be returning to live with Richards; 4) Wilson's statements to Joyce Rude, whom Wilson told she was afraid of Richards and that he would not let her handle her own financial affairs; 5) Wilson's statements to June Rankila, whom she told she was planning to go to Richards' house to try on clothes, to go to the V.A. hospital, and to go see her lawyer; and 6) Wilson's statements to Judith Eckstrom, a counselor at the Parkview Treatment Center. Wilson told Eckstrom she was afraid of Richards, wanted to end her relationship with him, and that he beat her. Evidentiary decisions, generally, are left to the sound discretion of the trial court. We have held previously that appellate courts should not lightly overturn trial court evidentiary rulings. State v. Kelly, 435 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Minn.1989). The trial court heard argument for and against the admission of Wilson's statements and then made separate determinations whether or not to admit the evidence. With regard to Wilson's deposition testimony, it held that the deposition setting satisfied the need for reliability and admitted these statements under the catchall exception to the hearsay rule, Minn. R.Evid. 804(b)(5). The court reviewed Wilson's statements to Gelb and Osberg and, noting that these statements were corroborated by the deposition testimony, also admitted these statements under the catch-all exception. The trial court characterized Wilson's statements to Rude as indicative of fear. This court articulated a test for the admission of statements of fear: the trial court must consider, first, whether the victim's state of mind is relevant and, second, whether the probative value of the statement outweighs its possible prejudicial effect. State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427, 432 (Minn.1982). If the statement is admitted, the court must give the jury a limiting instruction. Because Richards raised accident and/or suicide as a defense to a homicide charge, the trial court found the victim's state of mind was relevant. See id. The trial court also determined that the statements were more probative than prejudicial and, therefore, admitted the evidence and gave the jury the necessary instruction. The trial court admitted Wilson's statements to Rankila as indicative of her then-present state of mind. See Minn. R.Evid. 803(3) (1994). And, lastly, the trial court determined that Wilson's statements to Eckstrom were admissible under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule. See Minn.R.Evid. 803(4). In short, each of these decisions was reasoned and had a solid legal basis. We see no reason to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Richards' allegations that the trial court erred in its conclusions regarding the indicia of reliability of these statements do not rise to the level necessary to overturn the exercise of that discretion.