Opinion ID: 351592
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Little's Separate Claims of Error.

Text: 10 In addition to contending that a continuance should have been granted, Little has raised five other claims of error, 1 of which two merit discussion in this opinion. 11 Ironically, one of these two claims is that the conviction must be reversed for failure to grant a speedy trial. In support of his argument, Little cites both the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. (Supp. V 1975), and the sixth amendment guarantee of a speedy trial. 12 Because Little failed to move for dismissal prior to trial, he waived any right to the sanction of dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975). We also find that he waived his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. While the record is somewhat confused, it does indicate that both he and Vaughn expressly waived their right to a speedy trial while the case remained pending in Texas. Subsequent to the transfer to the Western District of Arkansas, both Little and Vaughn sought and were granted a continuance. They then sought another continuance just prior to the beginning of their trial, which was denied. 13 During this period both Little and Vaughn were free on bond. At no point did either defendant press for trial. Although defendants are not required to demand a speedy trial, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), they cannot, after acting to delay their trial, have their case dismissed for lack of a speedy trial. 14 Little also protests the district court's decision to overrule his motion in limine that sought to exclude a prior conviction on April 19, 1963, for fraud in the sale of oil and gas leases. The Government apparently planned to use the conviction to impeach Little if he took the stand to testify on his own behalf, and gave him notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b) of its intention. 2 Little contends that the prejudicial effect of the fourteen-year-old conviction outweighed its probative value and that it precluded him from testifying on his own behalf. 15 Under the literal language of Rule 609(b), 3 the prior conviction was not admissible because Little had completed his sentence more than ten years earlier 4 unless the district court determined that its probative worth outweighed its prejudicial value and written, timely notice was given to the defendant of the Government's intentions to use the conviction as evidence. 16 In this case, both requirements were met. As noted earlier, the Government gave proper notice. The court then held a hearing on the defendant's motion in limine and after considering the arguments on both sides determined to admit the prior conviction. We cannot say that it erred in its determination. The district court was best situated to determine the interests of justice. See Fed.R.Evid. 609(b). The prior conviction of a crime relating to fraud could be said to be relevant for impeachment with respect to Little's alleged check kiting. 17