Opinion ID: 3037189
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: as a result of any other charge for which the

Text: defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Section 3585 substitutes “official detention” for “custody,” and it enlarges the class of persons who receive pre-sentence credit, but is otherwise quite similar to § 3568. See, e.g., Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334 (holding that “the Attorney General must continue to compute the credit under § 3585(b) as he did under the former § 3568”). The second statute governs the treatment of juveniles. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (“FJDA”) was first passed in 1938 to remedy “the unsatisfactory existing law” that required “juveniles to be treated and prosecuted in the same manner as adults.” S. Rep. No. 75-1989, at 1 (1938). The statute furthers rehabilitative goals by “removing juveniles from the ordinary criminal justice system and by providing a separate system of ‘treatment’ for them.” United States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1980). As originally enacted, the FJDA provided, in pertinent part: In the event that the court finds [a] juvenile guilty of juvenile delinquency . . . it may commit the delin- quent to the custody of the Attorney General for a period not exceeding his minority, but in no event exceeding the term for which the juvenile could have 4986 JONAH R. v. CARMONA been sentenced if he had been tried and convicted of the offense which he had committed. Act of June 16, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-666, 52 Stat. 764, 765. Congress revised the FJDA in 1974 in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (“JJDPA”), Pub. L. No. 93415, 88 Stat. 1109 (1974). The JJDPA amended the provision governing juvenile sentencing to state: [C]ommitment . . . shall not extend beyond the juvenile’s twenty-first birthday or the maximum term which could have been imposed on an adult con- victed of the same offense, whichever is sooner, unless the juvenile has attained his nineteenth birthday at the time of disposition, in which case . . . commitment . . . shall not exceed the lesser of two years or the maximum term which could have been imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense. Id. § 507, 88 Stat. 1136 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 5037(b)). This provision was substantially revised in 1984, when Congress redrafted it to read as follows: The term for which official detention may be ordered for a juvenile found to be a juvenile delinquent may not extend — (1) in the case of a juvenile who is less than eighteen years old, beyond the lesser of — (A) the date when the juvenile becomes twenty-one years old; or (B) the maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized by section 3581(b) if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult; or JONAH R. v. CARMONA 4987 (2) in the case of a juvenile who is between eighteen and twenty-one years old — (A) who if convicted as an adult would be convicted of a Class A, B, or C felony, beyond five years; or (B) in any other case beyond the lesser of —

that would be authorized by section 3581(b) if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 214, 98 Stat. 1987, 2013 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)). Finally, the Youth Corrections Act (“YCA”) was passed in 1950 “to make available for the discretionary use of the Federal judges a system for the sentencing and treatment of per- sons under the age of 22 years who have been convicted of crime . . . that will promote the rehabilitation of those who . . . show promise of becoming useful citizens . . . .” H.R. Rep. No. 81-2979 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.S. 3983, 3983. The YCA shared the FJDA’s emphasis on rehabilitation. Compare Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 (1974) (observing that the YCA “focused primarily on correction and rehabilitation”), with United States v. Juvenile, 347 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the FJDA’s rehabilitative purpose). If a court determined that a person under age 22 should be classified as a “youth offender,” the YCA authorized the court, “in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law, [to] sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision . . . .” Act of Sept. 30, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-865, § 5010, reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.S. 1079, 1080.1 The Sentencing 1 The FJDA and the YCA addressed different populations. The FJDA applies to individuals under age 18, while the YCA applied to individuals 4988 JONAH R. v. CARMONA Reform Act of 1984, which also revised the FJDA, repealed the YCA. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a), 98 Stat. 1987, 2027 (1984).