Opinion ID: 570406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eleventh Amendment Limits on Class Definition and the Scope of Relief.

Text: 25 Both the plaintiff class and the state defendant are dissatisfied with the district court's definition of the class. Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in limiting the class to those families affected by the regulation as of the date of filing of the motion for class certification, September 6, 1988. The state defendant, on the other hand, argues that the class should be limited to families affected by the regulation as of the date judgment was entered, August 1, 1990. Put simply, there are three categories of families at issue: (1) families that were improperly denied gap payments prior to the commencement of the class action but who were no longer eligible for AFDC by the time the action was filed and class certification sought; (2) families affected by the regulation that were eligible for AFDC at or after the date of the commencement of the action 5 but who thereafter became ineligible during the pendency of the action; and (3) families affected by the regulation that continued to be eligible for AFDC assistance throughout the pendency of the action. 26 Neither side disputes, in respect to the class certification issue, that the third category of families, those affected by the regulation as of the date the district court's final order was entered, are entitled to whatever injunctive and notice relief 6 is appropriate in this case. They clearly belong to the class. 27 What is disputed is whether families in the first two categories properly belong to the class. This, in turn, depends upon whether the federal court has jurisdiction to grant any relief in respect to claims asserted by those families. Both the state and the plaintiffs agree that the Eleventh Amendment bars the award by a federal court of retroactive relief in the form of money damages payable from the state treasury, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). We must, therefore, consider whether, notwithstanding the limits imposed by the Eleventh Amendment, the federal court may properly grant relief to families who were adversely affected by the regulation but who were no longer eligible for AFDC as of the date of judgment. 28 As to the first category of families, those who were improperly denied gap payments in the past but who were no longer eligible for AFDC as of the date the suit was commenced, the only possible relief would be monetary damages for these past deprivations. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1982) (observing that '[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects') (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 676, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)). While acknowledging that the Eleventh Amendment bars the award of damages payable from the state treasury, plaintiffs nonetheless argue that the district court is not barred from ordering the state defendant to pay such damages to the extent the state would or could be partially reimbursed by the federal government. See Bennett v. White, 865 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920, 109 S.Ct. 3247, 106 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989); Fernandez v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42 (1st Cir.1982). 29 This seems a problematic argument given the delays and uncertainties likely in the reimbursement procedure and the fact that, in the meantime, the court's judgment would seemingly have to be satisfied from the state's fisc, thus violating the Eleventh Amendment. But we need not and do not finally resolve this question. 30 Whatever the conceivable merits of the plaintiffs' argument, it is not ripe for consideration on this appeal because the necessary underlying facts relating to the possibility and means of federal reimbursement in this situation were never developed in the record so as to allow meaningful appellate analysis. Despite the fact that in its answer the state defendant raised the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to the relief sought by the plaintiff class, the plaintiff first raised its argument relative to recovery from the federal fisc in its opposition to the state defendant's request for reconsideration. The practical underpinnings of the issue were never fleshed out nor offered to be proven by the plaintiffs. Whether retroactive relief limited to the federal portion of the AFDC benefits would be a feasible way around the Eleventh Amendment necessitates a fact-specific inquiry concerning the impact of such an order on the state fisc. See, e.g., Galecor, Inc. v. Institute of London Underwriters, 729 F.Supp. 1101 (E.D.Pa.1990) (requiring additional briefing as to the feasibility of the recapture of federal funds by the state); Temple University v. White, 732 F.Supp. 1327 (E.D.Pa.1990) (denying such relief where the state would be required to expend funds to effect recapture of federal funds). The plaintiffs made no offer of proof as to the feasibility of limiting relief to federal funds, and no factual findings were made by the district court. As the plaintiffs failed to raise and develop this argument in the district court so as to support this theory of limited recovery, we decline to speculate on the issue on appeal. 7 In the circumstances and on the showing made, the district court plainly did not err in excluding the first category of families from the class. 31 The state defendant challenges the district court's inclusion of the second category of families in its amended class definition, i.e. those adversely affected by the regulation and eligible for AFDC as of (or after) the date the action was commenced but who became ineligible for AFDC before final judgment was entered. Citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985), the state defendant contends that because such families could not themselves be entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief, the district court's grant to them of notice relief was improper. While the question is close, we agree. 32 At the outset, we note that it is irrelevant when, after the suit was brought, the district court actually certified the class. During the period between the commencement of a suit as a class action and the court's determination that it may be so maintained, the suit should be treated as a class action. See J. Moore, 3B Moore's Federal Practice p 23.50, 396-97 (2d ed. 1991) (and cases cited); C. Wright, A. Miller, M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1785, 106-07 (2d ed. 1986) (and cases cited). The issue is simply whether notice relief may be awarded to a class member who was wrongfully deprived of benefits at or after the commencement of the action but who, by the time of the judgment, had ceased to be affected by the invalid regulation. The Supreme Court has determined that notice relief is appropriate only when it is ancillary to some other form of relief properly granted by the district court. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 349, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1149, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1978) (affirming an order of notice relief informing members of the class of the availability of a state administrative procedures). In Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985), the Court ruled that notice relief was not available when no other relief, either damages, declaratory, or injunctive, could properly be granted. In Green, the Court noted that a request for a limited notice order will escape the Eleventh Amendment bar if the notice is ancillary to the grant of some other appropriate relief that can be 'noticed.'  474 U.S. at 71, 106 S.Ct. at 427. 33 As already indicated, damages payable from the state fisc would, of course, not be appropriate relief that could be noticed. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), permitting federal courts to grant injunctive relief against state officers for violations of federal law, did not extend to the award of money damages. In other words, injunctive relief that has the effect of ordering state officials to pay retroactive benefits from the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668-69, 94 S.Ct. at 1358-59. Thus, under Edelman, the district court could not have ordered the state to pay money damages for any denial of benefits by state officials prior to the entry of the court's order invalidating the regulation. 34 In Green v. Mansour, the Supreme Court held that declaratory relief, likewise, was not available when such relief related solely to past violations of federal law. 474 U.S. at 73, 106 S.Ct. at 428. Green involved two challenges to the administration of the state's AFDC program; however, during the pendency of the litigation, the state came into compliance with federal law. 474 U.S. at 66, 106 S.Ct. at 424. Thus, at the time of judgment, there was no ongoing violation of federal law as to which injunctive or declaratory relief could be ordered. Because declaratory relief would have related exclusively to the state's past practices, the Court held that it was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. To hold otherwise, the Court concluded, would permit an end-run around the Eleventh Amendment. Green, 474 U.S. at 73, 106 S.Ct. at 428. 35 Here, as in Green, there are no ongoing violations of federal law with respect to class members who are no longer eligible to receive AFDC (category two class members). We agree with defendant that relief granted to these class members relates to past violations of federal law and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Because there is no valid prospective relief to which notice relief can be ancillary, we hold that under Green notice relief cannot be granted to the category two claimants. 36 Plaintiffs argue that this outcome would make Quern v. Jordan a superfluous case. They note that in Quern the Supreme Court approved notice relief even though Congress had abolished the welfare program at issue five years before the decision. We agree with plaintiffs that aspects of Quern are problematic in light of the holding in Green. As the dissenters in Green pointed out, 37 [i]t is not enough to distinguish the cases to observe that the notice relief in Quern was 'ancillary' to a prospective injunction because the 'prospective' injunction had been moot for three years before the Court of Appeals fashioned the notice relief and for five years before this Court approved it--Congress abolished the federal program at issue in Quern in 1974. 38 Green, 474 U.S. at 76 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. at 430 n. 2 (Brennan J. dissenting). Quern is silent, moreover, on whether members of the class who were no longer eligible for AFDC at the time the district court granted injunctive relief were entitled to the notice relief approved in Quern. Nevertheless, the peculiar factual circumstances of Quern do not negate the fact that, consistent with Green, prospective relief was granted before the dissolution of the Federal welfare program. The notice relief approved in Quern was ancillary to the grant of this appropriate relief. 39 Green did not overrule Quern. Speaking for the Court in Green, Justice Rehnquist--who also wrote the opinion in Quern--stated that [o]ur review of the long, drawn-out Jordan litigation convinces us that neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court conceived of the requested notice allowed in that case to be an independent form of relief. Green, 474 U.S. at 71, 106 S.Ct. at 427. To the extent that Green is a clarification of Quern, any questions raised by Quern must be resolved by applying the analysis in Green. Green is the Court's last word. 40 We believe, therefore, that the district court's order declaring the challenged regulation invalid, and the notice relief granted ancillary to that order, were appropriate forms of relief for the category three class members but not for the category two class members. Under Green, notice relief cannot be granted to the category two complainants independent of an appropriate form of prospective relief. In this case, there is no form of prospective relief that can be granted to the category two complainants because, not being AFDC recipients any longer, their cases are moot.