Opinion ID: 1122968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: requested jury instructions relating to lesser-included offense

Text: Defendant also assigns error to the trial court's denial of his requested jury instructions that explained that the affirmative defense of EED, if proved by a preponderance of the evidence, would have a mitigating effect upon the charges of aggravated murder alleged in the indictment. Defendant contends upon review that the trial court should have submitted his requested instructions with respect to the two charges of aggravated murder under ORS 163.095(1)(d) (murdering more than one victim in the same criminal episode). [12] He essentially argues that EED, as set forth in ORS 163.135(1), provides an affirmative defense to the crimes of both murder and aggravated murder and that the jury should have been so instructed. We disagree. ORS 163.135(1) provides, in part: It is an affirmative defense to murder for purposes of ORS 163.115(1)(a) [intentional murder] that the homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance when such disturbance is not the result of the person's own intentional, knowing, reckless or criminally negligent act, and for which disturbance there is a reasonable explanation.    Extreme emotional disturbance does not constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.  (Emphasis added.) The meaning of ORS 163.135(1) is clear from its text and context. According to its text, EED is an affirmative defense only to the crime of murder, as that crime is defined by ORS 163.115(1)(a), that is, criminal homicide committed intentionally. EED does not apply to felony murder, defined by ORS 163.115(1)(b), or murder by abuse, defined by ORS 163.115(1)(c). Likewise, under the wording of ORS 163.135(1), it also does not apply to any other crime. Consequently, EED is not an affirmative defense to aggravated murder under ORS 163.095(1)(d). Prior case law interpreting ORS 163.135(1) supports our conclusion. For the purpose of that statute, this court previously has held that aggravated felony murder, defined by ORS 163.095(2)(d), is a different crime from intentional murder, defined by ORS 163.115(1)(a). State v. Wille, 317 Or. 487, 492, 858 P.2d 128 (1993). Defendant argues that Wille is distinguishable, because that case involved aggravated felony murder, while this case concerns aggravated murder involving more than one victim as part of the same criminal episode. Defendant theorizes that, had he killed two victims not as part of the same criminal episode, the state would have charged him with two counts of intentional murder under ORS 163.115(1)(a) and, consequently, that the affirmative defense of EED would have been available to him. It follows, defendant argues, that he should not be precluded from asserting EED simply because the victims' deaths occurred during the same criminal episode. We reject that argument. Aggravated murder, whatever its form, is a different crime from intentional murder, as defined by ORS 163.115(1)(a). Accordingly, under the clear text of ORS 163.135(1), EED is not an affirmative defense to aggravated murder. A related statute further supports our conclusion. ORS 163.115(1) provides, in part: [C]riminal homicide constitutes murder: (a) When it is committed intentionally, except that it is an affirmative defense that, at the time of the homicide, the defendant was under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance [.] (Emphasis added.) ORS 163.115(1)(a) clearly states that EED may serve as an affirmative defense to the crime of intentional murder. The aggravated murder statute, ORS 163.095, contains no such description of EED. In short, the legislature clearly has stated that it intended EED to serve as an affirmative defense only to the crime of intentional murder, as defined by ORS 163.115(1)(a). Defendant's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Having rejected all defendant's assignments of error relating to the guilt phase of his trial, we affirm all seven of defendant's convictions. We now turn to defendant's assignments of error relating to the penalty phase of his trial.