Opinion ID: 1814405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Marx's Counterclaim Against Southland

Text: Southland (assignee) urges this Court to declare that the lease was terminated as of February 16, 1972, when Marx (lessor) wrote Southland declaring the lease in default and terminated, and that thereafter Southland was a tenant-at-will, liable only for actual use and occupation of the premises, which terminated in February 1973. The trial court found that, after the negotiations, Southland (assignee) agreed to pay $610 per month cash rental for the remainder of the lease term. On the basis of this finding, the trial court concluded that the lease was not terminated on February 16, 1972, but that it was modified, and that the modification affected only the rental provisions of the lease. The trial court's finding was based on the following evidence: a letter from Southland (assignee) to Hartzog (lessee) stating that it was going to pay Marx (lessor) $610 cash per month and was going to deduct $305 per month from its payments to Hartzog and that it hoped that a better arrangement could be worked out but it was about to be evicted; a letter from Marx (lessor) to Southland (assignee) acknowledging receipt of a copy of Southland's letter to Hartzog and stating that Marx agreed to accept $610 per month cash for the remainder of the term; testimony that Marx permitted Southland to continue to pay $305 for an additional month only because it expected Southland to remain for the entire term; and, Southland's payment of $610 per month through January 1973. Southland urges this Court to declare that any attempt to revive the original lease after its termination or to create a new lease at the increased cash rental was barred by the statute of frauds, since there was no writing signed by Southland, the party to be charged. Southland contends that the doctrine of part performance does not avoid the requirement of a writing in this case because its continued occupation of the premises was attributable to a tenancy by the month, not to a revival of the original lease. The heart of Southland's argument is that Marx's letter of February 26, 1972, terminated the lease as a matter of law and that consequently Southland's holding over must be attributed to a new agreement. We do not agree. Notice to vacate leasehold premises may be waived or revoked by the landlord with the consent of the tenant. Speer v. Smoot, 156 Ala. 456, 47 So. 256 (1908); Annot., 120 A.L.R. 557; 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 89(7). Cf. W. H. Kirkland Co. v. King, 248 Ala. 643, 29 So.2d 141 (1947). Therefore, such notice does not necessarily terminate a lease. In this case, the notice to vacate was never enforced by lessor Marx. To the contrary, Marx (lessor) accepted payments of rent subsequent to the date given in the notice for vacating the premises and stated in a letter to Southland (assignee) that it would accept $610 cash per month for the remainder of the term of the lease. Marx's actions constituted a waiver or revocation of its notice to vacate. Speer v. Smoot, supra. Furthermore, the trial court's finding that Southland agreed to pay $610 cash for the remainder of the term indicates that Southland consented to Marx's revocation or waiver of its notice to vacate. Although the issue as to whether Southland (assignee) did consent to a continuation of the lease or to a month-to-month tenancy is disputed, we cannot say that the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous. See Rule 52(a) ARCP. In fact, Southland's failure to disclaim any intention to stay for the remainder of the term upon receiving Marx's letter stating that Marx agreed to accept $610 cash per month for the remainder of the term is strong support for the trial court's finding. Modification of the terms of a lease upon the insistence of the landlord is not a repudiation of the lease by the landlord and thus does not prevent a waiver or revocation of notice to vacate. Vinyard v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 205 Ala. 269, 87 So. 552 (1921). Because Marx's notice to vacate was revoked or waived, the lease was not terminated. Consequently, there was no new agreement and no need for an additional writing to satisfy the statute of frauds. Further, there was no need for a writing evidencing the modification of the terms of the lease, because a lease may be modified by oral agreement. Rudder v. Trice, 236 Ala. 234, 182 So. 22 (1938); Messer v. Dupuy-Burke Realty Co., 226 Ala. 438, 147 So. 193 (1933).