Opinion ID: 40560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Counts Three and Four of the Indictment

Text: 13 Gonzales contends that the district court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss count three of the indictment, concerning his deliberate indifference to Carrera's serious medical needs, for failure to state an offense. Reyna makes the same contention respecting count four, the comparable count naming him. 14 We review the sufficiency of an indictment de novo. United States v. Fitzgerald, 89 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir.1996). 15 Rule 7(c) provides that an indictment must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. . . . Fed. R.Crim. P. 7(c). An indictment's sufficiency is determined by an examination of its specific language, taking account of the indictment as a whole in the context of its statutory background. United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 1788, 60 L.Ed.2d 240 (1979). The test for sufficiency is not whether the indictment could have been better drafted, but whether it conforms to minimal constitutional standards. Haas, 583 F.2d at 219. These minimum constitutional standards are met where the indictment alleges every element of the crime charged and in such a way `as to enable the accused to prepare his defense and to allow the accused to invoke the double jeopardy clause in any subsequent proceeding.' United States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 285 (5th Cir.2002)(quoting United States v. Webb, 747 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir.1984)). 16 The indictment alleges that defendants were at all relevant times INS officers and the challenged counts (counts three and four) charge that the particular defendant: 17 while acting under color of law, did act with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of Serafin Carrera by denying him medical care and treatment, resulting in bodily injury to Serafin Carrera, and did thereby willfully deprive Serafin Carrera of the right secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, which includes the right to be free from harm while in official custody. In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 242. 18 The defendants argue that the statutory element willfully, the mental state expressly required by section 242, 4 was not properly charged in the indictment because it was confusingly equated with deliberate indifference, the mental state associated with the underlying due-process deprivation. 5 19 The indictment, in detailing the statutory elements of the crime charged, alleged two potentially different mental states: willfully and deliberate indifference. Further, the thereby language in the indictment can arguably be read as wrongfully equating these two mental states. However, deliberate indifference and willfulness are not necessarily inconsistent with each other. And, the validity of an indictment is determined by reading it as a whole and by practical, not technical considerations. United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041, 97 S.Ct. 739, 50 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). This indictment, as a whole, meets the minimum constitutional standards set out above. It includes every statutory element of a section 242 violation; it provides enough factual detail to enable the accused to prepare his defense; and it is specific enough to allow the accused to invoke double jeopardy in any subsequent proceedings. Accordingly, we reject these challenges to the indictment.