Opinion ID: 2508188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: failure to voir dire jury on race

Text: ISSUE (2). Whether defense counsel's decision not to question prospective jurors about racial bias on voir dire violated Petitioner's right to counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Petitioner contends his trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective because they did not question prospective jurors about racial bias during voir dire examination. Petitioner, an African American, was accused of killing Ms. Yoshiko Couch, an Asian/Japanese American. There were no African Americans on the jury. [156] On the first day of voir dire, which extended over nine days and began with a panel of 120 prospective jurors, the trial court instructed the jury venire that the purpose of voir dire examination was to select an `impartial jury' which would decide the case solely `upon the law and facts,' and one that is `unbiased and without preconceived ideas which might affect the case.' [157] The court also distributed to the panel a juror questionnaire which indicated the African American race of Petitioner and his codefendant. [158] The trial court allowed both parties to question prospective jurors. [159] The questioning dealt primarily with their willingness to impose the death penalty, but each juror was questioned about other matters as well, particularly if the juror responded affirmatively to any of the questions on the jury questionnaire. [160] Ms. Couch's race was not indicated on the questionnaire. [161] The subject of race was mentioned by the prosecuting attorneys 13 times during voir dire. [162] Of the prospective jurors questioned about race, four were selected to serve. [163] No prospective jurors indicated they had racial bias or prejudice that would impair their ability to render a decision in the case based solely upon the law and the evidence. [164] Defense counsel did not ask prospective jurors any questions relating to racial prejudice. [165] However, there were many questions relating to general bias. At the end of voir dire, [a]ll jurors selected were Caucasian. [166] The attorneys on neither side raised the issue of race during the remainder of the trial. [167] During trial, the prosecution introduced forensic evidence that hairs with Negroid characteristics recovered from the crime scene belonged to Petitioner. The State also presented evidence that the Couch family kept to themselves and had no African American friends who visited their home. Petitioner's lead defense counsel, Lloyde Alton, in his declaration submitted with this petition, stated: There were only two African-Americans in the jury venire, one man and one woman. We wanted to seat African-American jurors on the jury if we could. However, after reviewing the jury questionnaire and voir dire, we determined that he would not make a good juror. We very much liked the female African-American juror and we desperately wanted her on the jury. However, her juror number was too high and we never reached her before all challenges for cause and peremptories had been exercised.[ [168] ] Petitioner's other defense counsel, Ms. Julia Lindstrom, submitted a declaration in which she notes that: To the best of my recollection, we asked questions about race and racial prejudice during voir dire and jury selection. I also believe the State asked similar questions. If the record does not reflect these questions were asked, I have no recollection of a reason why. I do not recall the racial composition of the jury.[ [169] ] Declarations from the 12 seated jurors indicate that none of them recall discussing the race of either Petitioner, his codefendant, or Ms. Couch. [170] On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in not sua sponte questioning prospective jurors concerning racial bias during voir dire. Relying on Turner v. Murray, [171] which holds that a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias, [172] we rejected Petitioner's argument [173] and placed the burden on defense counsel to voir dire on the subject of racial prejudice. In response to Petitioner's argument, we stated that [t]he decision whether to raise the issue of race, considering the effect such questioning may have in unnecessarily bringing it to the attention of the jurors, is best left to defense counsel. [174] Petitioner now claims that because the crime in this case was interracial, his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not taking advantage of Turner and not asking specific race-related questions of prospective jurors to identify any racial bias. Turner does not support Petitioner's claim. In that case, the trial court declined to allow questioning on racial bias after defense counsel requested it. The United States Supreme Court indicated that a trial court in a capital case is not required to raise the question of racial bias sua sponte and that the appropriateness of such questioning is within the discretion of counsel. [175] Turner does not support a conclusion that a defense lawyer's failure to have jurors informed of the victim's race and questioned concerning their feelings about interracial crime is of itself proof of deficient performance. [176] Simply because this could be characterized as an interracial crime because it involved an African American male and an Asian/Japanese American female does not mean that trial counsel was deficient in not questioning prospective jurors about possible racial prejudice. Contrary to Petitioner's suggestions, this case was not fraught with racial tensions. Neither of Petitioner's counsel considered the killing of Ms. Couch racial in nature. [177] In our prior decision on direct review we found [t]here is no evidence in the record to suggest that [Petitioner] was singled out because of his race. [178] Under the circumstances, defense counsel acted within the range of reasonable and competent assistance of counsel. Both lawyers asked general questions about bias, a technique which was perhaps tactically sound. [179] Petitioner has not established the absence of a legitimate strategic or tactical reason for his counsel not to question prospective jurors about race. Even though we need not determine whether counsel's decision not to inquire into racial bias of prospective jurors on voir dire amounted to deficient performance, we need not at any rate decide the question because Petitioner has not established prejudice under the second element of the Strickland test. He cannot show that his counsel's approach during voir dire prejudiced him. He merely points out that he was tried by a jury with no African American members. He has not established that racial bias played any part in his conviction. In our decision on Petitioner's direct appeal, we noted that there was substantial evidence to support a finding of guilt in this case. There is nothing in the record to suggest the jury improperly considered race in reaching its verdict. Petitioner cannot demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [180]