Opinion ID: 2317061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Credibility of Evans's Recantation

Text: This Court will not disturb a trial justice's factual findings made on an application for post-conviction relief absent clear error or a showing that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence in arriving at those findings. Young v. State, 877 A.2d 625, 628 (R.I.2005) (quoting Bustamante v. Wall, 866 A.2d 516, 522 (R.I.2005)); see also Hampton v. State, 786 A.2d 375, 379 (R.I.2001). Alleged constitutional violations, however, must be reviewed de novo.  Hampton, 786 A.2d at 379; see also Carillo v. State, 773 A.2d 248, 252 (R.I.2001). Therefore, while we afford great deference to findings of historical fact by the hearing justice, Hampton, 786 A.2d at 379 (quoting Carillo, 773 A.2d at 252), we review de novo any post-conviction relief decision involving questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant's constitutional rights. Young, 877 A.2d at 628 (quoting Bustamante, 866 A.2d at 522). [A]pplication[s] for postconviction relief [are] civil in nature. Ouimette v. Moran, 541 A.2d 855, 856 (R.I. 1988); see also § 10-9.1-7 ([a]ll rules and statutes applicable in civil proceedings shall apply). The trial court applies a two-pronged test to determine whether to grant post-conviction relief based upon newly discovered evidence, Fontaine v. State, 602 A.2d 521, 524 (R.I.1992); State v. Lanoue, 117 R.I. 342, 346, 366 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1976); we have affirmed the use of this test when the purported new evidence is a recantation by a material witness. See Fontaine, 602 A.2d at 524. The first prong has four parts: `[T]he evidence [must] be (1) newly discovered since trial, (2) not discoverable prior to trial with the exercise of due diligence, (3) not merely cumulative or impeaching but rather material to the issue upon which it is admissible, [and] (4) of the type which would probably change the verdict at trial.' State v. Luanglath, 863 A.2d 631, 639 (R.I.2005); see also Fontaine, 602 A.2d at 524. If this `threshold test' is satisfied, the second prong requires that the trial justice determine whether the evidence presented is credible enough to warrant relief, a determination made by his [or her] accepting or rejecting conflicting testimony by exercising his or her `independent judgment.' Fontaine, 602 A.2d at 524 (quoting State v. Brown, 528 A.2d 1098, 1104 (R.I.1987)); see also Luanglath, 863 A.2d at 639. It is this second prong upon which the state's argument is premised. Courts properly view recanting affidavits and testimony with great suspicion. See United States v. Ogle, 425 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. Adi, 759 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. DiCarlo, 575 F.2d 952, 961 (1st Cir.1978) (noting the `considerable skepticism'    which attends recantation); People v. Schneider, 25 P.3d 755, 763 (Colo.2001); People v. Morgan, 212 Ill.2d 148, 288 Ill.Dec. 166, 817 N.E.2d 524, 528 (2004); Yarborough v. State, 514 So.2d 1215, 1220 (Miss.1987); see also Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1233-34, 105 S.Ct. 34, 82 L.Ed.2d 925 (1984) (mem.) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (denying a petition for writ of certiorari). Sworn recantations upset society's interest in the finality of convictions, and are very often unreliable and given for suspect motives   . Dobbert, 468 U.S. at 1233-34, 105 S.Ct. 34. While all recantations are viewed with some degree of skepticism, unsworn recantations deserve increased suspicion. A sworn affidavit at least carries with it certain inherent indicia of reliability. Our legal system treats with great seriousness a statement that has been sworn to before a notary public. Scarborough v. Wright, 871 A.2d 937, 939 n. 4 (R.I.2005). Because [an] affidavit [is] sworn to before a notary public, the statements asserted therein [are] regarded as truthful and the document is therefore available as evidence of the facts stated. In re Testa, 489 A.2d 331, 335 (R.I.1985). It follows, therefore, that an unsworn, out-of-court recantation must be viewed with a markedly heightened mistrust. [3] Undoubtedly, it is precisely this unreliability inherent in an unsworn recantation that has led other courts to conclude that recantations not made under oath or in court do not constitute adequate bases to support post-conviction relief. E.g., United States v. Baxter, 733 F.2d 1443, 1445-46 (11th Cir.1984); Sims v. State, 195 Ga.App. 631, 394 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1990). In affirming a lower court denial of post-conviction relief, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has held that the trial justice's finding a recantation incredible was reasonable, especially since the alleged recantation was not made either under oath at the hearing    or in an affidavit. Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 232 Pa.Super. 19, 332 A.2d 819, 821 (1974). And the Washington courts have concluded that an unsworn out-of-court statement is not the equivalent of an in-court recantation, and that such a statement does not trigger the new trial requirements of [Washington case law], even where the testimony of the person making the statement was the sole basis for the defendant's conviction. State v. Landon, 69 Wash.App. 83, 848 P.2d 724, 729 (1993). This same court noted that other states agree with the Washington courts' practice of approving the denial of a new trial when a witness has `recanted' by means of an unsworn out-of-court statement. Id. (quoting State v. Southerland, 45 Wash.App. 885, 728 P.2d 1079 (1986), aff'd in part, 109 Wash.2d 389, 745 P.2d 33 (1987)) Certainly the most compelling panacea for the questionable reliability of any witness statement is cross-examination. Cross-examination has been described as the `greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.' State v. Brown, 709 A.2d 465, 486 (R.I. 1998) (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 at 32 (Chadbourn rev.1974)). Indeed, illustrative of this point is the procedural guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, which commands    not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990) (The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (The right to cross-examination    thus is essentially a `functional' right designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial.). Given the greatly increased skepticism with which a court must view an unsworn, out-of-court recantation, coupled with society's strong interest in the finality of convictions, assessments based upon amorphous notions of `reliability,' or credibility, absent cross-examination, are intrinsically suspect. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Likewise, this Court has commented approvingly on the value of cross-examination when a recantation is presented as newly discovered evidence in a post-conviction relief proceeding. In remanding a post-conviction relief denial for an evidentiary hearing in State v. Fontaine, 559 A.2d 622 (R.I.1989), we instructed that: At such an evidentiary hearing the trial justice may consider the proposed recanted accusation of the complaining witnesses and may assess the credibility thereof. The trial justice may further weigh the credibility of these statements in light of the defendant's admissions in open court or by affidavit of the factual basis for his plea. We do not believe that this process may be carried out without taking the testimony of witnesses at an evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 625 (emphasis added). On appeal after remand, we affirmed the hearing justice's denial of the defendant's post-conviction relief application. Fontaine, 602 A.2d at 527-28. Significantly, we accorded the hearing justice's findings the deference owed them because he now had sufficient evidence before him to properly adjudge the credibility of the two recanting witnesses: namely, the firsthand observation of both recanting witnesses who testified under oath and under the pressure of cross-examination. Id. at 524-27. The lack of opportunity to cross-examine a recanting witness at a post-conviction relief hearing has prompted other jurisdictions to hold that a defendant is not entitled to relief if the recanting witness invokes his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [4] The federal courts are unanimous that if a recanting witness claims his [or her] privilege against self-incrimination when he [or she] is put on the stand at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the motion will be denied. 3 Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King, Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 3d § 557.1 at 578-79 (2004); accord United States v. Stewart, 445 F.2d 897, 900 (8th Cir.1971) (recognizing the fact of recantation by a witness is immaterial if the recanter refuses to testify, claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); see also United States v. Lawrenson, 315 F.2d 612, 613 (4th Cir.1963); Newman v. United States, 238 F.2d 861, 862-63 (5th Cir.1956). Our sister states have expressed a similar weariness. E.g., Dunbar v. State, 555 P.2d 548, 551-52 (Alaska 1976) (holding that the trial justice did not err in finding that no credible evidence was adduced at the post-conviction hearing when the recanting witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment privileges); Callier v. Warden, 111 Nev. 976, 901 P.2d 619, 628 (1995) (The district court appropriately considered [the] witnesses' refusal to testify under oath and subject themselves to cross-examination in concluding that their recantations were not credible.). In fact, defendant can point this Court to no decision holding that post-conviction relief must be granted on the basis of an unsworn, out-of-court recantation in which the recanting witness refuses to testify at the hearing, opting instead to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [5] The defendant cites State v. Waters, 706 A.2d 1342 (R.I.1998) (mem.), and State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038 (R.I.2000), as well as a plethora of out-of-state decisions, to support his argument that no one attendant circumstance to a recantation  that is, that it is either unsworn and/or out of court, or that the recanter invokes his or her Fifth Amendment privilege at a hearing  ever has been held dispositive of a recantation's credibility. Instead, he insists, the credibility determinations in all these cases were borne from careful consideration of the totality of facts. We do not disagree with defendant that the hearing justice's charge upon an application for post-conviction relief is to adjudge credibility based upon the totality of evidence presented. The defendant's argument, however, ignores the threshold requirement that a sustainable credibility determination is conditioned upon competent evidence, regardless of the necessity to view it in its entirety. We hold that the hearing justice in this case was presented with insufficient evidence to properly determine the credibility of Evans's recantation. The statement was videotaped out of court, and was not given under oath. Evans could have cured these difficulties by testifying at defendant's post-conviction relief hearing; instead, he chose to plead the Fifth Amendment. Under the factual circumstances of this case, we hold the hearing justice committed clear error in finding this recantation credible, effectively disregarding Evans's sworn testimony at defendant's criminal trial, where his version of events was subjected to dogged cross-examination. The mere fact that Evans's recantation aligned with his initial report to police that he could not identify Carpenter's killers is insufficient by itself to warrant crediting the videotaped statement by the hearing justice. Furthermore, because there was no finding that either the authenticating testimony of attorney Smith or the corroborating testimony of Campbell would, by themselves, have warranted post-conviction relief, the hearing justice's conclusion that they were credible witnesses is irrelevant to our decision. Because we agree with the state on this point, we do not address its other factual arguments. 2