Opinion ID: 2586077
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of the Protective Order

Text: Hora's petition for a protective order was based on the allegation that Cooper had committed the crime of violating a protective order. Hora alleged that Cooper violated the order (1) at the bar convention, (2) at the Dimond Mall, (3) outside the barber shop, and (4) by pacing her on I Street. Judge Gleason applied Judge Suddock's previous rulings clarifying the November 28, 2003 order to Hora's first allegation. Hora claimed that Cooper had committed the crime of violating a protective order based on two theories. First, because his conduct amounted to stalking and stalking is prohibited by the protective order. Second, because his conduct amounted to contacting, which is also prohibited by the protective order. Judge Gleason concluded that the facts did not support entering a protective order under either theory. As to stalking, Judge Gleason recognized that the placing-in-fear element required objective fear and concluded that the proof did not satisfy that standard. As to the no-contacting order, Judge Gleason found that there had been no violation either at the bar convention or in the other instances alleged by Hora. In so ruling, Judge Gleason accepted Judge Suddock's ruling that merely being in the presence of another party at a public place was not prohibited contacting. She also found that conclusion to be consistent with the statutory language since the applicable statute, AS 18.66.100(c)(2), does not list precluding a respondent from being in the presence of the other party. As to each of the incidents described by Hora, at the bar convention and elsewhere, Judge Gleason found that they at most involved one to two second unplanned eye contact which did not constitute a violation of the protective order. She concluded: [B]ased on the testimony I've heard, I find by a preponderance of the evidence that those were not intentional acts by Mr. Cooper to place himself in a situation where he would be having eye contact with . . . Ms. Cooper. Judge Gleason also gave an example to illustrate her conclusion: Say he's at the barbershop, he's half shaved . . ., and all of a sudden Ms. Cooper walks in. Does he need to say then oops, sorry, got to go, and his physical countenance left in disarray? No, I don't see it that way. But does that mean that he can turn his chair and stare at Ms. Cooper? No. So that's how I would interpret the order as it was then, in a manner that is consistent with the statute. Hora argues that Judge Gleason applied an incorrect placing-in-fear standard with respect to stalking, and incorrectly interpreted the elements of the crime of violating a protective order with respect to the no-contacting order.
Alaska Statute 18.66.100(b) gives the superior court the authority to issue a protective order if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has committed a crime involving domestic violence against the petitioner. [6] Under AS 18.66.990, crimes involving domestic violence include stalking and violating a domestic violence order under AS 11.56.740. [7] The crime of violating a protective order is defined by AS 11.56.740(a): A person commits the crime of violating a protective order if the person is subject to a protective order (1) issued or filed under AS 18.66 and containing a provision listed in AS 18.66.100(c)(1)-(7) and knowingly commits or attempts to commit an act with reckless disregard that the act violates or would violate a provision of the protective order[.] Stalking is conduct that is listed in AS 18.66.100(c)(1) and therefore when it occurs and is prohibited by a protective order, it also may be a crime of violating a protective order under AS 11.56.740(a). We understand Hora's position to be that Cooper's alleged stalking conduct is a crime involving domestic violence (justifying a new protective order under AS 18.66.100(b)) because such conduct directly violated the criminal stalking statutes and because it amounted to the crime of violating a protective order under AS 11.56.740(a). The relevant mental states referred to in AS 11.56.740(a) and in Judge Gleason's decision are defined in AS 11.81.900. [8]
No argument is made that stalking as used in the protective order, and in AS 18.66.100(c)(1), has a different meaning than stalking under the statute making it an independent crime. Under the latter, [a] person commits the crime of stalking . . . if the person knowingly engages in a course of conduct that recklessly places another person in fear of death or physical injury. . . . [9] To be a course of conduct there must be repeated acts of nonconsensual contact. [10] Under the stalking statute, nonconsensual contact specifically includes following or appearing within the sight of [the] person. [11] The court of appeals stated in Kenison v. State [12] that AS 11.41.270 is not referring to the victim's subjective feelings of fright or intimidation. Rather, the statute requires proof that the victim reasonably perceived or apprehended the threat of death or physical injury. [13] This objective standard is individualized, and focuses on a whether a reasonable person in the same situation would also experience fear under the same circumstances. The court of appeals applied an individualized objective standard in Kenison by allowing the jury to consider evidence of the past relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. [14] Hora argues that Judge Gleason did not apply an individualized objective standard and erred in finding that Cooper had not committed stalking. We conclude Judge Gleason did not err in finding that the evidence of stalking was insufficient to support the issuance of a protective order. Cooper's mere presence in Hora's line of vision, if sufficiently repeated, could be nonconsensual contact for purposes of the course-of-conduct element of stalking. But Judge Gleason relied on the insufficiency of evidence satisfying the placing-in-fear element, not the course-of-conduct element, in reaching her decision. Judge Gleason found that Cooper did not threaten, approach, or engage with Hora in any manner except to make momentary unplanned eye contact with her. Judge Gleason was fully aware of the parties' history and there is no indication that she did not apply an individualized objective standard with respect to the placing-in-fear element. We are unable to say that it was clearly erroneous for Judge Gleason to conclude that the requisite placing-in-fear element had not been met.
The protective order of November 28, 2003, directed that Cooper not be in the physical presence of Hora, and that he refrain from contacting or otherwise communicating with her either directly or indirectly. Under AS 11.56.740(a)(1) in order to commit the crime of violating a protective order the protective order must contain a provision listed in AS 18.66.100(c)(1)-(7). Although this statute read literally only requires a violation of a provision of the protective order without specifying that the provision must be one listed in AS 18.66.100(c)(1)-(7), the section implies that only a violation of a provision listed in subsection .100(c)(1)-(7) may constitute the crime of violating a protective order. [15] Otherwise, there would be no reason to specify, as subsection .740(a)(1) does, particular provisions of subsection .100(c) that the protective order must contain. [16] This is significant in this case because the prohibition that Cooper not be in the physical presence of Hora is not a provision listed in subsection .100(c)(1)-(7). This does not mean that the in-the-presence prohibition is unauthorized. Under AS 18.66.100(c)(16) a court in framing a protective order may order other relief the court determines necessary to protect the petitioner or any household member. An order issued under AS 18.66.100(c)(16) may be enforceable by contempt, and possibly other means, but violation of such an order does not amount to the crime of violating a protective order as that crime is defined in AS 11.56.740(a)(1). The protective order's prohibition on Cooper contacting or otherwise communicating with Hora is a provision listed in AS 18.66.100(c)(2). Thus if Cooper contacted Hora with the requisite mental state he committed the crime of violating a protective order. This crime, as we have seen, is a crime involving domestic violence. As such, it would have been grounds for granting the petition for a long-term protective order under AS 18.66.100(b). Hora takes issue with Judge Gleason's conclusion that Cooper did not violate the no-contacting order in two respects. She contends first that contacting as used in AS 18.66.100(c)(2) should be construed to encompass appearing within the sight of the protected person. Second, she contends that Judge Gleason erroneously found that Cooper had to intentionally place himself where he could be seen by Hora, and that only knowing behavior is required by AS 11.56.740(a)(1). We reject Hora's first point. As to the second point, we agree that only knowing contacting is required but conclude that the error was harmless because there was no conduct that amounted to contacting within the meaning of AS 18.66.100(c)(2).
Hora's argument is that the statute defining the crime of stalking defines nonconsensual contact as including appearing within the sight of a protected person. She contends that this definition of contact should apply to the contacting prohibition listed in AS 18.66.100(c)(2). Although this is not an implausible argument, we reject it for the following reasons. Contacting, as a verb, means in common usage physically touching or communicating. [17] The stalking statute's use of the term, in conjunction with nonconsensual, to include merely appearing within the sight of another person goes beyond the meaning of contact in normal usage. Words in statutes are to be construed in accordance with their normal usage unless there is some indication that a special meaning is intended. [18] In the present case the context in which contacting is used in AS 18.66.100(c)(2) argues in favor of adhering to the normal meaning. The statute's inclusion of the phrase or otherwise communicating immediately after contacting strongly suggests that nonphysical contact must involve some element of direct or indirect communication and does not merely mean coming within view. Further, the special and considerably broader meaning of nonconsensual contact in the stalking statute is not, as there used, all that is needed for a crime to take place. The contact must also be repeated, so that it is a course of conduct, and it must place the protected person in fear. The need for these additional requirements to make stalking a crime argues against a construction that makes merely appearing in the sight of a protected person, without more, a crime. [19]
As noted, Hora takes issue with Judge Gleason's conclusion that Cooper's conduct had to be intentional, rather than merely knowing. The difference between the two concepts is that a person acts `intentionally' with respect to a result . . . when the person's conscious objective is to cause that result. . . . [20] By contrast, a person acts knowingly when he knows that a particular result will occur even if his objective is not to cause that result. [21] Hora's argument on this point is that [t]he plain language of the statute requires proof of the following elements: (1) the perpetrator acted knowingly with respect to his conduct; (2) the perpetrator knew of the existence of the protective order; and (3) the perpetrator recklessly disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct was prohibited by the order. Since the word intentionally does not appear in AS 11.56.740, there is no requirement that the perpetrator act intentionally. We agree with this formulation. But our rejection of Hora's argument that an act of contacting within the meaning of AS 18.66.100(c)(2) occurred means that this point is moot. Cooper's mental state would only be relevant if conduct amounting to contacting occurred. There is no evidence that the momentary eye contact that Judge Gleason found to have occurred had communicative content. Thus, contacting did not take place. [22]