Opinion ID: 1869064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Given the deceitful conduct of Robb, the Complaint Tribunal erred in only issuing a public reprimand.

Text: The present case is replete with violations of Rule 8.4(c) by Robb. His first act of deceit was presenting an unapproved order to Chancellor Wise, which also violated Rules 8.4(a) and (d) of the M.R.C.P. Robb continued his acts of deceit by luring Benefield to his office to have him arrested. Robb was deceitful in his dealings with Prisock. As evidenced by Robb's letter to Prisock requesting deposition dates and the follow-up phone call discussing the deposition dates and a court reporter, Robb was deceitful and misrepresented his intentions. Robb was aware that Prisock had no knowledge of the contempt order and that Prisock and Benefield were acting on the good faith assumption that the parties were trying to reach a settlement. On July 31, 1991, when Robb notified the sheriff's department of Benefield's upcoming presence on August 17, 1991, he agreed to a code to let the deputy sheriff know of Benefield's presence. This was deceitful and indicates personal dishonesty and a lack of integrity. Misrepresentations by omission are as egregious as overt misrepresentations. In Mississippi Bar v. Mathis, 620 So.2d 1213, 1219 (Miss. 1993), the Court followed the rule that [t]his Court will not hesitate to impose substantial sanctions upon an attorney for any act which evinces want of personal honesty and integrity or renders such attorney unworthy of public confidence, quoting Foote v. Mississippi State Bar, 517 So.2d 561, 564 (Miss. 1987). In Mathis a civil action for bad faith denial of insurance was pending. Mathis was representing the family of the insured. He failed to disclose to the Court or opposing counsel that an autopsy had been performed. The Bar alleged that this conduct constituted a violation of DR1-102(A)(1), (4), (5), (6), of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 8.4(a), (c) and (d) of the M.R.C.P. 620 So.2d. at 1220. The Complaint Tribunal found that Mathis was guilty of violating Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (4) of the M.R.C.P. and the statutory oath of attorneys. A public reprimand was imposed. The Bar appealed on the grounds that a more severe penalty should be imposed. The Supreme Court conducted a de novo review and found that Mathis had violated Rules 8.4(a), (c) and (d) of the M.R.C.P. and DR1-102(A)(1), (4) and (6) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court imposed a one-year suspension from the practice of law. In determining whether the Complaint Tribunal had imposed the appropriate discipline, the Court stated that the purposes of punishment for ethical violations were (1) to punish the wrongdoer, (2) to deter further violations on the part of the offender and the general community of lawyers, and (3) to reinforce the confidence of the public in the ability of the legal profession to govern itself. The third purpose is important because the profession assumes the responsibility of governing its members. Therefore, the public's confidence and faith in the integrity of the entire Bar is dependent upon our willingness to impose appropriate sanctions on our members who have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (now Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct). Id. at 1222, quoting Pitts v. Mississippi State Bar Assoc., 462 So.2d 340, 343 (Miss. 1985). When imposing discipline, this Court considers several factors. They are: (1) Nature of the misconduct involved; (2) Need to deter similar misconduct; (3) Preservation of dignity and reputation of the legal profession; (4) Protection of the public; and (5) Sanctions imposed in similar cases. Mathis, 620 at 1222; Mississippi State Bar v. Blackmon, 600 So.2d 166, 173 (Miss. 1992), and Mississippi State Bar v. Smith, 577 So.2d 1249, 1251 (Miss. 1991). In reviewing Mathis' conduct and the sanction imposed, the Supreme Court found that the nature of Mathis' conduct was deceit. The need to deter such acts is clear and pressing. 620 So.2d at 1222. In the instant case, the Tribunal found that Robb had engaged in conduct involving deceit and misrepresentation, but only issued a public reprimand. Deceit, whether visited on a court or an attorney who is an officer of the court or a private citizen, should be dealt with in a firm manner. To allow an attorney to act in such a manner without imposing appropriate sanctions is tantamount to condoning acts of deceit. On many occasions, the Court has not hesitated to impose suspension in cases involving acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and/or misrepresentation. It has held that such acts are grounds for disbarment or suspension. See Clark v. Mississippi State Bar Assoc., 471 So.2d 352 (Miss. 1985) (disbarred for misappropriation of funds); Brumfield v. Mississippi State Bar Assoc., 497 So.2d 800 (Miss. 1986) (disbarred for defrauding family members); Culpepper v. Mississippi State Bar, 588 So.2d 413 (Miss. 1991) (disbarred for fraudulent acts). See also Underwood v. Mississippi Bar, 618 So.2d 64 (Miss. 1993) (one-year suspension for dishonesty and fraud; lying to client); Mathes v. Mississippi Bar, 637 So.2d 840 (Miss. 1994) (six-month suspension; failure to turn over funds to court); Mississippi Bar v. Mathis, 620 So.2d 1213 (Miss. 1993) (one-year suspension; deceit and fraud). C.