Opinion ID: 2600495
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Regulatory and Constitutional Objections

Text: General Motors argues that the Board's exclusion of some of its investment proceeds in this case constitutes a regulation subject to the requirements of California's Administrative Procedure Act. (See Gov.Code, § 11340 et seq.) An agency action is subject to that act, however, only if it adopts a rule applicable to a range of cases. ( Morning Star v. State Board of Equalization (2006) 38 Cal.4th 324, 333-334, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 47, 132 P.3d 249; Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557, 571, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296.) The Board's decision concerning how the tax laws should apply to General Motors' transactions is not such a rule. General Motors further argues that refusal to include the entire proceeds involved in repo transactions is unconstitutional, in violation of the due process and commerce clauses. [11] To establish this, it has the burden of showing `by clear and cogent evidence that the income attributed to [California] is in fact out of all appropriate proportions to the business transacted . . . in that State, [citation], or has led to a grossly distorted result, [citation].' ( Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1983) 463 U.S. 159, 170, 103 S.Ct. 2933, 77 L.Ed.2d 545.) It has not done so. General Motors' argument focuses instead on the effect exclusion of gross proceeds would have on the attribution of income to New York. As California's tax law is not being used to calculate tax on New York income, and as General Motors has failed to demonstrate any grossly disproportionate attribution of income to California, the argument fails.