Opinion ID: 3013934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clemmons’ habeas petition as untimely

Text: and all other pending motions as moot. Appellant Charlie Clemmons’ There was no specific reference to conviction arose out of a 1980 incident of Clemmons’ request for counsel. “road rage,” in which Clemmons shot and killed another motorist following an Clemmons filed an application for altercation stemming from a traffic a Certificate of Appealability (COA) to incident. App. at 10. Clemmons was this court. We granted the COA directed convicted by a jury in the Court of to the following question: whether the Common Pleas of Dauphin County, district court judge was required to recuse Pennsylvania of first-degree murder. himself from hearing the federal habeas Then-state judge William W. Caldwell corpus proceedings attacking the trial and presided over the 1981 state court trial conviction over which he presided when and, following Clemmons’ conviction, he was a state court judge. The same day Judge Caldwell sentenced him to life we appointed counsel to represent imprisonment for first-degree murder. 18 Clemmons in this matter against Appellees Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 2502. Clemmons William J. Wolfe, District Attorney of the filed a series of four petitions in state court County of Dauphin, and Pennsylvania for collateral relief under the Post Attorney General Gerald J. Pappert. 1 Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Three months later we amended the COA Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541 et seq., and its to add the following issue: whether the predecessor statute. Each petition was district court judge abused his discretion denied, and the denials of the first three by deciding the merits of Appellant’s petitions were affirmed by the state petition for writ of habeas corpus without Superior Court. The fourth petition was first addressing Appellant’s request for dismissed. counsel. On February 7, 2002, Clemmons On appeal, Clemmons contends that filed a habeas corpus petition in federal Judge Caldwell was required to recuse court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His himself sua sponte in Clemmons’ 28 petition was eventually assigned to Judge U.S.C. § 2254 habeas action challenging Caldwell, who by then had been appointed the trial and conviction over which Judge to the United States District Court for the Caldwell formerly presided as a state court Middle District of Pennsylvania. On judge. Although Clemmons does not September 27, 2002, Clemmons applied explicitly so state, it appears he argues that for appointment of counsel. On November 27, 2002, Judge Caldwell issued an opinion in which he acknowledged that he 1 The list of Appellees was had “presided at petitioner’s trial” in state amended per Order of the Clerk of Court court. App. at 10. He then denied dated March 10, 2004. 2 this presents a legal question over which “error seriously affects the fairness, we would have plenary review. Second, integrity or public reputation of judicial Clemmons contends that the District Court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 abused its discretion by failing to address U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (internal quotation the merits of Clemmons’ application for marks and citations omitted). On its face, appointment of counsel before dismissing the error complained of in this case – a the motion as moot. federal judge sitting in review of the propriety of the state proceedings II. conducted by that judge – seriously affects the fairness and public reputation of the The relevant federal statute, 28 judicial proceedings, and thus we proceed U.S.C. § 455(a), provides that “[a]ny to consider whether the habeas judge justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the shou ld have sua sponte recused United States shall disqualify himself in notwithstanding Clemmons’ failure to any proceeding in which his impartiality raise the issue in the habeas proceeding. might reasonably be questioned.” 28 We have previously stated that the U.S.C. § 455(a).2 The Supreme Court has “public’s confidence in the judiciary . . . stated that the purpose of this provision is may be irreparably harmed if a case is “to promote public confidence in the allowed to proceed before a judge who integrity of the judicial process.” Liljeberg appears to be tainted.” In re Kensington v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 220 (3d Cir. U.S. 847, 860 (1988). 2003) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).