Opinion ID: 200332
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ripeness: Constitutional and Prudential

Text: 15 In general, standing and ripeness inquiries overlap. See 13A Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3531.12, at 51 (The most direct connections [among justiciability doctrines] run between standing and ripeness.); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (The standing question thus bears close affinity to questions of ripeness — whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention....). The overlap is most apparent in cases that deny standing because an anticipated injury is too remote, for example. 13A Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3531.12, at 51. Ripeness, standing, and mootness 3 are closely linked: 16 Ripeness and mootness easily could be seen as the time dimensions of standing. Each assumes that an asserted injury would be adequate; ripeness then asks whether an injury that has not yet happened is sufficiently likely to happen, and mootness asks whether an injury that has happened is too far beyond a useful remedy. 17 Id. at 50. Ripeness, however, can be thought of as focusing on the when of litigation, as opposed to the who. See E. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.4.1, at 114 (3d ed. 1999). Even if plaintiffs were the appropriate who, the question of when remains. 18 The test to be applied in ripeness analysis is whether there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment. Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506, 92 S.Ct. 1749, 32 L.Ed.2d 257 (1972). The ripeness doctrine seeks to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). Determining ripeness involves a dual inquiry: evaluation of both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. Id. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507. Both prongs of the test must be satisfied, although a strong showing on one may compensate for a weak one on the other. See Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 535 (1st Cir.1995). Like standing, ripeness has both constitutional and prudential elements. See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 58 n. 18, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993); 13A Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3532.1, at 118. 19 In the fitness inquiry, both constitutional and prudential concerns operate, with prudential concerns focusing on the policy of judicial restraint from unnecessary decisions. The fitness inquiry typically involves subsidiary queries concerning finality, definiteness, and the extent to which resolution of the challenge depends on facts that may not yet be sufficiently developed. Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court, 214 F.3d 4, 10 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting Ernst & Young, 45 F.3d at 535). The critical question concerning fitness for review is whether the claim involves uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all. Ernst & Young, 45 F.3d at 536 (quoting Mass. Ass'n of Afro-Am. Police, Inc. v. Boston Police Dep't, 973 F.2d 18, 20 (1st Cir.1992)). The fact that an event has not occurred can be counterbalanced in this analysis by the fact that a case turns on legal issues not likely to be significantly affected by further factual development. Ernst & Young, 45 F.3d at 536. 20 The second prong — hardship — is entirely prudential. The hardship prong evaluates the extent to which withholding judgment will impose hardship — an inquiry that typically turns upon whether the challenged action creates a `direct and immediate' dilemma for the parties. Stern, 214 F.3d at 10 (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152, 87 S.Ct. 1507). The greater the hardship, the more likely a court will be to find ripeness. Ernst & Young, 45 F.3d at 536. This inquiry encompasses the question of whether plaintiff is suffering any present injury from a future contemplated event. See Reg'l Rail Reorganiz. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 n. 29, 95 S.Ct. 335, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974); 1 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-10, at 337 (3d ed. 2000); see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 242-43, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982) (assessing under standing both the injury to the church from compliance with a challenged registration statute and the burden on the state of demonstrating that the church is not a religious organization).