Opinion ID: 852396
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A City can be a Plaintiff under ELA.

Text: Cooper Industries contends that South Bend cannot bring an ELA claim because South Bend is not the state or a private person. (Appellant's Br. at 43-44.) South Bend argues that it is a person as that term is used in the section authorizing an ELA claim. (Appellees' Br. at 35-36.) The trial court agreed with South Bend. This debate focuses on the first two sections of Ind.Code § 13-30-9. Standing in juxtaposition, they do provide something of a conundrum. When South Bend filed its case, § 1 of the ELA Chapter began by saying: This chapter applies to actions brought by the state or a private person. [4] By contrast, § 2 said: A person may bring an environmental legal action.... [5] For most purposes of Indiana's environmental laws, the Code defines person very comprehensively, certainly in a way that includes South Bend: `Person' ... means ... a city, ... a town, ... political subdivision, ... or any other legal entity. Ind.Code § 13-11-2-158(a). It does not define private person. [6] When courts set out to construe a statute, the goal is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Sales v. State, 723 N.E.2d 416 (Ind. 2000). The first place courts look for evidence is the language of the statute itself, and courts strive to give the words their plain and ordinary meaning. We examine the statute as a whole and try to avoid excessive reliance on a strict literal meaning or the selective reading of individual words. We presume the legislature intended the language used in the statute to be applied logically, consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals, and not in a manner that would bring about an unjust or absurd result. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184 (Ind.2007); Sales, 723 N.E.2d at 420. We look to the underlying purpose of these provisions and to similar Code sections for guidance. First, it is clear from the plain language of Ind.Code ch. 13-30-9 that the legislature enacted the ELA statute to shift the financial burden of environmental remediation to the parties responsible for creating contaminations. In effect, this scheme creates an incentive for potential buyers of contaminated land who might be deterred by the substantial costs to clean up the land, thus preventing not only the cleanup but also redevelopment and economic renewal. The General Assembly enacted other incentives for potential brownfield redevelopers at the same time that it enacted ELA. [7] One of those, Ind.Code ch. 13-19-5, creates the Environmental Remediation Revolving Loan Program, and it explicitly contemplates that cities and other local government entities will be major actors in brownfield remediation and redevelopment. Indiana Code § 13-19-5-1 states the purpose of the Program: The environmental remediation revolving loan program is established to assist in the remediation of brownfields to encourage the rehabilitation, redevelopment, and reuse of real property by political subdivisions by providing loans or other financial assistance to political subdivisions to conduct any of the following activities: (1) Identification and acquisition of brownfields ... as suitable candidates for redevelopment following the completion of remediation activities. (2) Environmental assessment of identified brownfields.... (3) Remediation activities conducted on brownfields. (4) The clearance of real property ... in connection with remediation activities. (5) Other activities necessary or convenient to complete remediation activities on brownfields. Ind.Code § 13-19-5-1 (1999 suppl.), amended by 2007 Ind. Acts 221 § 7. If, as Cooper contends, cities like South Bend cannot bring ELA claims, it would mean that most nearly anyone but cities could purchase and rehabilitate contaminated land and consequently seek to recover remediation costs from the original contaminator. Cities, by contrast, would have to act solely at local taxpayer expense (though they could borrow money from the state to finance purchases and remediation). We cannot think of a reason why the 1997 brownfields scheme would have been crafted with this result in mind. In light of the overall objective of the 1997 bill and the apparent purpose of the ELA Chapter, we conclude that the term private person in Ind.Code § 13-30-9-1 should not be read any narrower than the more definite and generally applicable definition found in Ind.Code § 13-11-2-158(a). The trial court correctly held that South Bend could pursue an ELA claim.