Opinion ID: 2066016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: prosecutorial remarks during closing argument

Text: Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the State's rebuttal argument stressed that he had no defense, thereby shifting the burden of proof from the State to the defendant. Generally, a prosecutor is granted considerable latitude during closing argument, and the trial court's determination with respect to the propriety of challenged comments is a matter within the court's sound discretion. ( People v. Johnson (1992), 149 Ill.2d 118, 145, 171 Ill.Dec. 401, 594 N.E.2d 253.) In reviewing a claim of reversible error in remarks made by the State during closing argument, the comments must be considered in the context of the entire closing statements of the parties. People v. Pasch (1992), 152 Ill.2d 133, 207, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294. According to the record, defense counsel indicated in his closing argument that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel pointed out that there were no fingerprints at the scene to link defendant to the murders. In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that the defendant's fingerprints were the bullets found in the victims, which corresponded with the bullet recovered from the store. The prosecutor then made the following remark during rebuttal closing argument: No fingerprints? That's ridiculous, absolutely ridiculous. What is the defense in this case, what in the world is the defense in this case, I was listening and I don't know, I don't know what the defense in this case   . Defense counsel interposed an objection to these statements. The trial court overruled the objection, noting that the State could argue reasonable inferences based on its theory of the case. Defendant claims that these remarks were calculated to inform the jury that defendant could not be acquitted if he had no defense, and thereby placed an improper burden on the defendant. The defendant stresses that the burden of proof never shifts to the accused, but remains the responsibility of the prosecution throughout trial, citing People v. Weinstein (1966), 35 Ill.2d 467, 220 N.E.2d 432. In our opinion, the comments of which defendant complains in the present case do not approach the objectionable remarks made by the State in Weinstein, 35 Ill.2d 467, 220 N.E.2d 432. In that case, the prosecutor repeatedly advised the jury that the defendant had the burden to produce evidence creating a reasonable doubt of her guilt. ( Weinstein, 35 Ill.2d at 469-70, 220 N.E.2d 432; see also People v. Leger (1992), 149 Ill.2d 355, 397-400, 173 Ill.Dec. 612, 597 N.E.2d 586.) In the case before us, the State commented on the weakness of the defendant's case, and offered the State's view that the defendant's defense was not believable. We find no reversible error in the remarks. (See People v. Phillips (1989), 127 Ill.2d 499, 527, 131 Ill.Dec. 125, 538 N.E.2d 500.) In the present case, the prosecution's statements questioning the soundness of the defendant's theory of defense did not amount to an improper shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant.