Opinion ID: 501677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Malicious Prosecution--Use of Criminal Prosecution as Coercion?

Text: 14 Plaintiff alleges that when Gary learned he was being sued for false arrest and malicious prosecution, he attempted to convince federal agents to use criminal prosecution of Hand as leverage in the civil suit. Had Plaintiff demonstrated that Gary succeeded, there is no doubt in our mind that he would have proved a constitutional violation. Unfortunately, his proof failed as a matter of law. 15 There is a constitutional right to be free of bad faith prosecution. Federal prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for acts taken to initiate prosecution. Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir.1987) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)). Bad faith prosecution has, however, been held repeatedly to cause sufficient irreparable harm to support federal injunction of a state prosecution. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 1122, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965); Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024, 93 S.Ct. 467, 34 L.Ed.2d 317 (1972). Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) (suits to enjoin bad faith prosecutions are an exception to the general rule against federal injunction of state court proceedings). In this Circuit bad faith prosecution has been held sufficient to support a damage judgment against state law enforcement officials under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, despite the immunity of the federal prosecutor. Wheeler v. Cosden Oil and Chemical Co., 734 F.2d at 254. 4 16 For the first time, we are called upon to examine a jury finding of liability for malicious prosecution under Sec. 1983. We may not reverse lightly. We may reverse a jury's finding of fact only if the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc). To engage in such an examination, it is necessary to look carefully at the factual settings that have been held sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss in Dombrowski, Shaw and Wheeler. 17 In Dombrowski, members of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. sought an injunction restraining the Governor, police and law enforcement officials of Louisiana from prosecuting them under the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law, and Communist Propaganda Control Law. Initially, plaintiffs were arrested. Later a state judge quashed the arrest warrants as not based on probable cause, and the court granted a motion to suppress evidence seized in an illegal raid of plaintiff's offices. A three judge court was convened to consider the constitutionality of the Louisiana statutes. Soon thereafter a state grand jury was convened. The three judge court issued a temporary restraining order against the prosecutions pending hearing. When the TRO was dissolved by the three judge court, the grand jury returned indictments against the individual appellants. The Supreme Court said, 18 [Plaintiffs] have attacked the good faith of the appellees in enforcing the statutes, claiming that they have invoked, and threaten to continue to invoke, criminal process without any hope of ultimate success, but only to discourage appellants' civil rights activities. If these allegations state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, as we believe they do ... the interpretation ultimately put on the statutes by the state courts is irrelevant. 19 380 U.S. at 490, 85 S.Ct. at 1123. The facts alleged were held sufficient to support a federal injunction of the state prosecution. Indeed, today, the constitutional right against bad faith criminal prosecution has been enshrined as one of the few exceptions to the general prohibition of federal injunctions against state court proceedings. Younger, 401 U.S. at 37, 91 S.Ct. at 746. 20 In Shaw, Jim Garrison, the District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana became fixated on the idea of solving the murder of John F. Kennedy. He became, through his own investigations, convinced that Clay Shaw had conspired with Lee Harvey Oswald to assassinate President Kennedy. Shaw was arrested, indicted, tried and acquitted of the conspiracy. During the course of the trial, Shaw took the stand in his own defense. The day after the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, Garrison signed an information charging Shaw with perjury. Shaw sought an injunction in federal court. The district court inferred bad faith from the following facts: the delay between Kennedy's assassination and Garrison's investigation; the lack of any basis for the initial investigation; the extreme methods used in extracting evidence from witnesses (sodium pentothal); Garrison's use of private funds to support the investigation; that the manner of Shaw's arrest was calculated to garner publicity for Garrison; and finally that Garrison had a significant financial interest in continued prosecution of Shaw because it produced publicity for a book written by Garrison about the Kennedy assassination. At the injunction hearing, Garrison offered no rebuttal to the evidence presented by Shaw. In approving the District Court's finding, Judge Wisdom quoted at length the district court's statements as to the burden of proof in malicious prosecution: 21 The burden of proof is, of course, upon the plaintiff Shaw to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of exceptional and unusual circumstances that would justify this court's intervention.... When the plaintiff's evidence constitutes a prima facie case, the burden is on the defendant of going forward with any evidence to rebut the plaintiff's case.... In this case the defendant Garrison offered no proof, apparently relying on the supposed inability of Shaw to sustain his burden and that even if Shaw did, he would not be entitled to any relief by this court. In those instances where the plaintiff proved certain facts by a preponderance of the credible evidence, and the defendant failed to rebut those facts either on cross-examination or by offering contrary evidence, this court has accepted those facts as true. 22 467 F.2d at 116 n. 3 (quoting Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F.Supp. 390, 395 (D.La.1971)). 23 Finally, in Wheeler, Wheeler was arrested, indicted and acquitted, apparently for attempted theft of oil. The arrest and indictment rested on information obtained from a drop meter that measured the amount of oil flowing off of the property in question. Wheeler alleged that the investigator, an agent of the Texas Railroad Commission, had intentionally tampered with the meter so as to under-record the amount of oil leaving the property, and to make it appear that Wheeler was either stealing oil elsewhere or falsifying his records. After determining that Shaw survived the Supreme Court case of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), the panel reversed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, holding that allegations of malicious prosecution would support an action for damages under Sec. 1983 against state actors who were not beneficiaries of prosecutorial immunity, stating: 24 If, then, the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty on state prosecutors to charge only upon ascertaining probable cause, it follows that one acting under color of state authority ... can be liable for subverting the performance of that duty, as by maliciously tendering false information to the prosecutor which leads him to believe that probable cause exists where there is none. Since this would violate federally guaranteed rights, it therefore can be grounds for a Sec. 1983 action. 25 734 F.2d at 260 (Gee, J.). 26 From these three cases four propositions emerge. First, from Dombrowski, we learn that bad faith prosecution violates constitutional rights. Second, from Shaw, we learn that when plaintiff raises a prima facie case of malicious prosecution, the burden shifts to defendant to show that his actions were not the product of improper motivation. Third, from Wheeler, we learn that state actors other than prosecutors may be liable for damages for bad faith prosecution, if they join in malicious prosecution by prosecutors, or if their malice results in an improperly motivated prosecution without probable cause. Finally, we learn from all of these cases, that simply obtaining an indictment is not enough to insulate state actors from an action for malicious prosecution under Sec. 1983. In all of these cases indictments were obtained, but the finding of probable cause remained tainted by the malicious actions of the government officials. 27 Applying these principles to the case at hand, we find that Plaintiff did allege a set of facts which if proved would support a finding of malicious prosecution. Plaintiff alleged that Gary and others had caused the third criminal indictment to issue simply to gain leverage in a civil suit for malicious prosecution. 28 The jury found that Gary acted maliciously. One equivocal piece of evidence supports this allegation, with respect to an action for malicious prosecution. Gary did call Agent Beck to check on the status of the case, and there is some evidence that they discussed the possibility of reindicting Hand. 5 Hand presented no further evidence of malicious action. No offers were made to drop the criminal case if the civil prosecution was terminated. The criminal case has long since terminated, and the civil case goes on. But, that one piece of evidence, Gary's call to Agent Beck, is sufficient to raise an inference of malice. 29 This cause of action fails, not because Hand presented no evidence of malice, but because the defense met their burden of rebutting that evidence. Evidence of malice may be rebutted either by showing that the mental state of defendant had no effect on the course of the prosecution, or by undercutting the inference of malice itself. Gary succeeded at rebutting Hand's evidence by showing a lack of causation. 30 In the fourth amendment context, evidence is not suppressed when proven malice has no effect on police behavior, where the activity taken is precisely the same as would have occured had that intent or motivation been entirely absent from the case. 1 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 1.4(e) at 92 (2d ed. 1970). We can see no reason why the same degree of protection should not be accorded to law enforcement officials where monetary damages are at stake under the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, where, as here, defendant can demonstrate that prior to bringing further charges, probable cause was reascertained, and that departmental procedures were followed in procuring an indictment, and no relevant information was withheld from the grand jury, then prosecutorial emotion cannot be deemed to have caused a constitutional deprivation. 31 The jury found that the actions of Gary were a proximate cause of damage to Hand. We must, however, reverse this finding. The testimony of Assistant U.S. Attorney McDonald demonstrated that he sought the third indictment only after further investigation led him to the conclusion that Hand's attorney had persuaded him to withdraw the superseding indictment by an incorrect representation--that Atkinson had title to the truck (R. Vol. III, pp. 77, 88). Furthermore, Gary demonstrated that no information was withheld from the federal agents. From the first meeting between Guest, Beck and Gary, Agent Beck was aware of the partial sale transaction between Atkinson and Guest. Beck's testimony that he testified truthfully to the grand jury on this point is uncontroverted. 32 The evidence adduced at trial shows that however angry Gary, Beck or McDonald might have been over Hand's suit it did not lead them to abuse their power as law enforcement officials.