Opinion ID: 1925533
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: does batson apply to this civil case?

Text: Dedeaux contends that her Constitutional right to an impartial jury trial was denied. Case used its four (4) peremptory challenges to remove the only four (4) black members on the jury panels. Dedeaux, who is black, objected and moved the lower court to strike the jury panel. A discussion was held as to whether Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), applied in civil cases. Although Case's counsel was of the opinion that Batson did not apply in civil cases, he stated his reasons for challenging the jurors. The lower court overruled Dedeaux's objection and accepted the all-white jury panel. Subsequent to the trial and the briefing of this case, the United States Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether a private litigant in a civil case may use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based solely on their race. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991), the United States Supreme Court concluded that courts must entertain a challenge to a private litigant's racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in a civil trial. Id. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2088, 114 L.Ed.2d at 680. As a result, the question before this Court is whether Case violated the principles established in Batson and Edmonson. In order to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, one must show the following: (1) that he is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race; (3) that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 170 (Miss. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 797 (1990). See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88. Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. See also Davis, 551 So.2d at 170. The reasons, however, do not have to rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. A neutral explanation must be articulated which relates to the particular case being tried. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. The trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88-89. In Chavous v. Brown, 299 S.C. 398, 385 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 305 S.C. 387, 409 S.E.2d 356 (1991), the Court of Appeals of South Carolina was faced with a similar case. The court held that Batson was not limited to criminal cases. Chavous, 385 S.E.2d at 209. In addressing the peremptory strikes, the court noted the following: The respondents struck the two black males and the two black females. The appellants struck one white male and three white females. The seated jury consisted of eight white males and four white females. The respondents provided the following explanation for their challenges: [Two] of the strikes are of the female gender.... One of the strikes was unemployed and has never worked... . I was concerned about young jurors who would be more concerned about the scarring on a young fifteen or sixteen year old boy than would older jurors who have experienced more of life's bumps and falls and have seen scars as they developed... . From this explanation, the black women were struck because of their gender combined with their unemployment or youth... . ... . As to the black women, the explanation for striking them because of their possible reactions to facial scarring is not by itself a supportable racially neutral reason. The respondents chose not to exercise strikes against seven white women for the same reason. However, the respondents combined the gender concern with other factors. The factor as to one black woman was unemployment. Unemployment was deemed a racially neutral explanation by the South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Martinez. See State v. Martinez, 294 S.C. 72, 362 S.E.2d 641. The announced reason for excluding the other black woman was her youth. The record indicates this woman was thirty years old. Of the seven white females on the jury panel two were younger than this juror and one was thirty-two. Coincidentally, of the nine white males of the jury three were younger than the black female and one was thirty-one. We can only conclude that youth was not a concern of the respondents in the selection of white jurors. Thus, an originally neutral reason has been shown to be a pretext for exclusion based solely on race. State v. Oglesby, [298 S.C. 279] 379 S.E.2d 891. Chavous, 385 S.E.2d at 209-11 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). See also, Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898, 108 S.Ct. 233, 98 L.Ed.2d 191 (1987). The appellee, Case, peremptorily challenged the four black jurors and the trial judge required Case to articulate racially neutral reasons. The first black juror challenged by Case was Damian Nicholson. During voir dire, Nicholson informed the Court that he knew Mrs. Dedeaux and that they had worked at the same hospital for seven (7) years. Case's counsel challenged Nicholson on this basis and the court overruled Dedeaux's objection as to Nicholson. We hold that this was a sufficiently neutral reason for the challenge. Case also challenged Veronica K. Nance. The juror stated that she was to be a witness in Chancery Court that week. Although the judge noted that he could work around her scheduled testimony, Case challenged her on the basis that she would be distracted from the proceedings at hand. Case also noted that she was only 23 years old and unemployed. We hold that this was a sufficiently neutral reason. Case challenged Jeanette Hardy on the ground that she was employed as a maid and had no husband. Case further reasoned that the trial dealt with complicated designs, defects, warnings, and issues in the work place. Case was of the opinion that Hardy would not do a good job in handling the issues, even though she did have a high school education. Cathel Coleman was the fourth juror peremptorily challenged. She was unemployed, had no husband, and according to Case did not appear to have the background to consider the complicated issues involved. In support of his challenge of the four jurors, Case's attorney made the following statement: I believe in a products liability case, in fact, I believe in most of my cases as a defendant, that my defendant is better served with who I deem, through job or education or responses to questions or whatever we put into out [sic] minds to make judgments on, have the intellectual capacity to be the best 12 that I can put on my case... . I'm looking for people who will look at the facts and have the intellectual capacity to handle my issue. Dedeaux contends that the race neutral reasons offered for striking black jurors are merely pretextual. Dedeaux contends that three (3) potential jurors that made the final panel were less qualified on the basis of education and job experience: (1) Viola Johnson was a 66 year old housewife who only had a junior high education. (2) Barbara Welch was a 66 year old unemployed female who only had a high school education. (3) Sue White was a 52 year old housewife who only had a high school education. The record reflects that Johnson had been employed part-time at Gayfers for an eight month period and that Welch had been a sales clerk at Gayfers. There was no indication that White had ever been employed. According to Case, people with jobs such as sales clerks were more qualified to sit as jurors than those with jobs such as maids or janitors, like Jeanette Hardy. Case's attorney said: Had there been anybody on that jury with a job description that said janitor or maid as opposed to others who had job descriptions that indicated that they had been out in the business world dealing with people or as in the case of a couple of these sales clerks at Gayfers dealing with people, I would have seriously considered striking them and if I would have had enough challenges would have, your Honor. Furthermore, with respect to Sue White, Case maintained that it exhausted all of its challenges before getting to her. Even so, Case argued that she was more qualified to sit on the jury than Hardy and Coleman because her husband worked at D.I. Dupont for 30 years. In Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988), this Court held: [A] trial judge's factual findings relative to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges on minority persons are to be accorded great deference and will not be reversed unless they appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. at 1350. In denying Dedeaux's post-trial motion, the trial judge held and stated: [T]he Court noted no surprise or alarm to counsel for the Defendants when asked to respond to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Jury Panel. The Court also noted that counsel for the Defendants immediately responded to the Plaintiffs' motion when asked. Edmonson was decided June 3, 1991. The case presently before this Court was tried and concluded for a four day period beginning September 11, 1989. Without the benefit of Edmonson, counsel for the appellees stated the neutral reasons to the court for exercising peremptory challenges on the four black jurors. The trial judge, who saw the action and the expressions of Case's attorney and observed him while he was giving those neutral reasons stated: These observations, together with the reasons set forth by counsel for the Defendants, demonstrated to the Court that the defendants did not discriminatorily use their peremptory strikes. On this record, we cannot say that the trial judge committed error in allowing the peremptory challenges to the four jurors.