Opinion ID: 1212835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the taylor case

Text: Minnie Marie Taylor was indicted by the grand jury during the August 1971 term of the Court of General Sessions for Richland County upon two bills of indictment charging her with the unlawful possession of heroin. On January 24, 1972, after those indictments had been transferred to the Richland County Court, she entered pleas of guilty to both charges and was sentenced by Judge Mason to serve two concurrent two-year terms of imprisonment. On July 24, 1972, Judge Mason amended her sentences to two concurrent one-year terms. We held in State v. Best , 257 S.C. 361, 186 S.E. (2d) 272 (1972), that a trial judge is without jurisdiction to alter, amend or modify sentences after the expiration of the term of court at which the sentence is imposed. There is no merit in the contention that the amended sentences were proper because the Richland County Court is always open by statute for nonjury matters. Section 15-765 of the South Carolina Code of Laws (1962), relating to the Richland County Court, provides in part, Each week which may be designated for jury trials shall be considered a term. Both Nelson and Taylor were sentenced at a term designated for jury trials, and the orders of Judge Mason attempting to amend the sentences after adjournment are void. In Nelson, supra , and Wyly, infra , sentences were amended without notice to the State. In State v. Best, supra , after holding that the orders of the trial judge attempting to amend sentences therein were void because issued after the adjournment of the court at which the prisoners involved were convicted and sentenced, we held that all orders were inprovidently granted without notice to the State and might have been set aside on that ground alone. It would have been improper for the solicitor to seek an order of the judge adversely affecting a prisoner without notice to him. Such would clearly deny the prisoner due process. By a similar token, it is improper for an attorney to seek an order contrary to the State's interest without notice. In Best , we held that it would have been proper for a member of this Court to issue a supersedeas when sentences are amended without authority of law. The same is true in these cases. In holding that sentences were improperly amended because the State was not given an opportunity to be heard, we do not intend to convey the thought that jurisdiction can be conferred by giving notice to the State, nor even by consent of the State. We point out that it is incorrect procedure to consider action without notice to the adversary.