Opinion ID: 848887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inducing Criminal Conduct

Text: When examining whether governmental activity would impermissibly induce criminal conduct, several factors are considered: (1) whether there existed appeals to the defendant's sympathy as a friend, (2) whether the defendant had been known to commit the crime with which he was charged, (3) whether there were any long time lapses between the investigation and the arrest, (4) whether there existed any inducements that would make the commission of a crime unusually attractive to a hypothetical law-abiding citizen, (5) whether there were offers of excessive consideration or other enticement, (6) whether there was a guarantee that the acts alleged as crimes were not illegal, (7) whether, and to what extent, any government pressure existed, (8) whether there existed sexual favors, (9) whether there were any threats of arrest, (10) whether there existed any government procedures that tended to escalate the criminal culpability of the defendant, (11) whether there was police control over any informant, and (12) whether the investigation was targeted. Juillet, supra at 56-57, 475 N.W.2d 786. In holding that defendant was entrapped, the Court of Appeals found that defendant had not previously committed the possession with intent to deliver offenses charged, the procedures employed by the government escalated defendant's conduct to the charged offense, and the offer of consideration was excessive. On the basis of these three factors, it held that [b]ecause many of the factors indicative of entrapment existed, the defendant met his burden of proving that the police conduct would have induced an otherwise law-abiding person in similar circumstances as defendant to commit the offenses charged. Op. at 3. We respectfully disagree. First, while the Court of Appeals noted that defendant had merely owned a crack house and that no evidence existed that defendant was a drug dealer or even a drug user, it ignored ample evidence presented that defendant had in fact previously committed the offense of possession with intent to deliver. To be convicted of the charge of possession with intent to deliver, the defendant must have knowingly possessed a controlled substance, intended to deliver that substance to someone else, and the substance possessed must have actually been cocaine and defendant must have known it was cocaine. People v. Crawford, 458 Mich. 376, 389, 582 N.W.2d 785 (1998). Actual physical possession is unnecessary for a conviction of possession with intent to deliver; constructive possession will suffice. People v. Konrad, 449 Mich. 263, 271, 536 N.W.2d 517 (1995). Constructive possession exists when the totality of the circumstances indicates a sufficient nexus between defendant and the contraband. People v. Wolfe, 440 Mich. 508, 521, 489 N.W.2d 748 (1992). Possession is attributed not only to those who physically possess the drugs, but also to those who control its disposition. Konrad, supra at 271-272, 536 N.W.2d 517. In addition, possession may be either joint or exclusive. People v. Hill, 433 Mich. 464, 470, 446 N.W.2d 140 (1989). Defendant owned a home that he rented to tenants who operated it as a drug house. Despite being a police officer in the jurisdiction in which the house was located, defendant knew and consented to the house being used for drug sales. Further, defendant provided protection for the operation and received a portion of the profits from the drug sales, specifically $200 for each quarter ounce of drugs sold from the house. The dissent suggests that in determining that defendant had engaged in drug activities, our opinion strips the deference that is due credibility determinations made by lower courts.... Post at 493. The dissent is mistaken. Our conclusion that defendant previously possessed cocaine is one that we make as a matter of law. What the dissent concedes, that the record supports the Court of Appeals conclusion that defendant did nothing more than own a crack house and accept money to keep silent, is possession. Post at 491. Further, unlike the dissent, we do not limit our review of whether the lower courts clearly erred to the hearing testimony, but rather review the entire record. While the hearing testimony arguably lends itself to different conclusions, the audio tapes admitted into the record do not. While the dissent only cites an officer's hearing testimony regarding corroboration, the undercover audio recordings of defendant's conversation undisputedly establish that defendant played a role in the drug operation: [ Informant ]: So I can take the hundred and invest it or what? [ Defendant ]: Alright, man, I'm gonna give you one more shot. [ Informant ]: Okay, dig, the same arrangement, the two off every quarter? [ Defendant ]: Yeah. As far as corroboration of defendant's past participation in drug activities, this first taped telephone conversation between the informant and defendant is clear evidence that defendant previously received $200 for every quarter ounce of cocaine sold by the informant at the house and that defendant wished and agreed to continue this arrangement. Under these circumstances, it is clear these alleged previous actions by defendant could serve as the foundation for a conviction for possession with intent to deliver under a constructive possession theory. Defendant had a duty to arrest the informant, yet not only did he permit the informant to sell drugs, he accepted money to provide protection for the operation. Without such protection, drugs would not have been sold from the house. Accordingly, defendant controlled the disposition of drugs at the house he owned and shared in the profits in so doing. For these reasons, we find clear error in the lower court's deduction that there was insufficient evidence to surmise that defendant had not previously committed the offense of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. Further, we agree with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals that defendant's prior actions, at the very least, are sufficient to establish the charge of possession with intent to deliver cocaine as an aider and abettor. See People v. Sammons, 191 Mich.App. 351, 371-372, 478 N.W.2d 901 (1991). Second, contrary to the Court of Appeals majority, we are not convinced that the procedures employed by the police escalated defendant's criminal culpability. The Court of Appeals majority wrote: [T]he procedures employed by the police escalated defendant's conduct from merely owning a drug house to possession with intent to deliver cocaine. Sykes initially hired defendant to protect against arrest and theft and to inform Sykes of any potential drug raids. At the first staged drug buy, however, Sykes called defendant over and handed defendant the package of cocaine. It was only after the first transaction that defendant was informed that he was expected to handle the drugs, check them, and ensure that the package was right. This active involvement was not contemplated prior to the buy. Sykes' actions, therefore, served to escalate defendant's passive involvement in the enterprise to active participation beyond the scope of what defendant had agreed to beforehand and pressured defendant into complying with Sykes' requests in order to remain a part of the enterprise. [Op. at 3.] It is somewhat unclear whether the majority's escalation analysis was based on its assessment of defendant's prior drug activity at his rental home or its conclusions about defendant's expected role in the undercover operation. However, regardless of what the majority held was escalated, it clearly erred. As discussed above, defendant's previous actions concerning his drug house operation amounted to possession with intent to deliver. Both offenses charged as a result of the undercover operation were possession with intent to deliver. Therefore, no conduct by the state police in the undercover operation could serve to escalate defendant's prior criminal activity. Rather, the government simply provided defendant with an additional opportunity to commit a crime that he had previously committed. Presenting nothing more than an opportunity to commit the crime does not equate with entrapment. Butler, supra . Because defendant's previous drug activity amounted to possession with intent to deliver, the undercover activity at issue in this case did nothing more than present defendant with an opportunity to commit that crime. Accordingly, no escalation occurred. Similarly, defendant's culpability was not escalated at the scene of the first transaction in regard to the role defendant agreed to play in the undercover drug transaction. The touchstone of the Court of Appeals opinion in this regard was that placing the drugs in the hands of defendant at the scene of the first drug deal was a violation of what defendant had agreed to do. However, our review of the record leads us to conclude that touching the drugs should not have come as a surprise to defendant. [3] Although the taped recording of the first drug transaction suggests that defendant was unsure precisely what he was to do beyond providing protection, that confusion was not based on defendant's lack of agreement to do more. We disagree with the dissent's argument that the defendant's confusion about his role on the day of the first transaction was an absolute indication of defendant's agreed-upon role in the entire enterprise. Rather, the record clearly shows that defendant indicated many days before the first transaction that he was willing to handle the drugs. Indeed, defendant was hired by Sykes to protect and secure against arrests, police raids, and rip-offs. While the Court of Appeals construed rip-off as narrowly as possible by equating it with theft, protecting against a rip-off would seem to include ensuring that drug packages received at drug deals contain actual drugs in the negotiated quantity and quality, a task that necessarily requires taking possession of the drugs in order to properly inspect them. A recorded audiotape of defendant and Sykes discussing their arrangement before the first staged drug transaction demonstrates that Sykes informed defendant that he would have to handle the drugs on occasion: Sykes: ... And probably on occasion, I'm gonna need your expertise to accompany me to pick up a package or two, okay.... So if, you know, just run here, run there, pick up some, and we'll be straight, okay. That's, that's basically all that you got to do, I'll run the rest. Defendant: Okay. [4] In addition, defendant's willingness to participate in the crimes charged is evidenced by his agreement to participate in further transactions after he participated in the first transaction, which included his taking possession of the drugs. We further note that the second drug transaction between defendant and the undercover police officers exposes a consideration that the lower courts appear to have overlooked during their review. Initial entrapment does not immunize a defendant from criminal liability for subsequent transactions that he readily and willingly undertook. See People v. Crawford, 143 Mich.App. 348, 353, 372 N.W.2d 550 (1985); People v. Larcinese, 108 Mich.App. 511, 515, 310 N.W.2d 49 (1981). Accordingly, even if the Court of Appeals had been correct in concluding that defendant was entrapped during the first transaction, his willingness to participate in the second transaction, after his duties were more emphatically explained, would prohibit dismissal of the second charge. For these reasons, it is apparent that Sykes' handing the drugs to defendant for inspection during the first transaction failed to escalate defendant's criminal culpability. As a result, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in concluding otherwise. Finally, the Court of Appeals majority clearly erred in holding that the amount of money offered for defendant's services was excessive and unusually attractive. The majority held that defendant knew that he stood to earn up to $50,000 by participating in the enterprise. The prosecutor suggests that the record reflects that Sykes stated that Sykes stood to earn about $50,000. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the record does not firmly establish either interpretation. However, we conclude that, given defendant's understanding that he would receive $1000 for each transaction, the compensation was neither excessive or unusually attractive. Each transaction involved approximately ten ounces of cocaine, which had an estimated street value of $75,000. A $1,000 fee for a transaction involving almost $75,000, roughly one percent of the street value, is not excessive. This is especially evident given that defendant previously earned a $200 profit, or nearly thirty percent of the street value, for the sale of one quarter ounce of cocaine at his crack house, which the record reflects had a street value of approximately $700. Thus, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in ascertaining that defendant was impermissibly induced because the consideration for his illegal services was excessive or unusually attractive. In sum, we have concluded that the Court of Appeals clearly erred in regard to each of the three factors that persuaded that Court to conclude that the police engaged in conduct that would induce a law-abiding person to commit a crime in similar circumstances. Therefore, because none of the remaining Juillet factors are at issue, we hold that defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the police engaged in conduct that would induce a law-abiding person to commit a crime in similar circumstances.