Opinion ID: 2791460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Initial Stop and Subsequent Search

Text: This Court reviews the facts supporting a district court's denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and reviews its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Clark, 409 F.3d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 2005). i. The Terry stop was supported by reasonable suspicion Assuming, without deciding, that Cotton was subject to a Terry stop, we agree with the district court that the officers had reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop. The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion . . . will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these . . . facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). Cotton's presence in an area known for violence and drugs; the unidentified male's failure to comply with the command to not pick up the keys; that man's evasive flight after grabbing the keys (but before Officer Suchta yelled stop); Cotton's location in relation to the other man and the keys; and the violation of the apartment's rules, together, provided reasonable suspicion to justify the Terry stop of Cotton. See United States v. Barker, 437 F.3d 787, 790 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that -5- a series of innocent actions, when viewed together, can lead an officer to formulate reasonable suspicion). Cotton argues that the unidentified male was not his companion. The relevant inquiry is not whether Cotton and the unidentified male were actually companions; rather, it is whether they appeared to be companions from the perspective of a reasonable officer based on the totality of the circumstances. Further, assuming it was a mistake for the officers to assume Cotton and the unidentified individual were companions, an officer's reasonable mistake can still give rise to reasonable suspicion. United States v. Johnson, 326 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that a reasonable but mistaken belief may justify an investigative stop). Cotton and the unidentified male appeared to be the recipients of the thrown keys based on their location below the balcony. While all of the events leading up to the Terry stop could have an innocuous explanation, the Supreme Court has specifically stated [e]ven in Terry, the conduct justifying the stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people. Id. at 126. Even though Cotton remained still and complied with the direction not to take the keys, the evasive behavior of his apparent companion, when viewed in combination with the apartment's security policy and its location in a violent area, rose to the level of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Therefore, the Terry stop was justified. ii. The Terry frisk was supported by reasonable suspicion Cotton next asserts that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him for a Terry frisk. After Officer Suchta yelled stop, he walked quickly towards Cotton, who had a nervous look on his face. Officer Suchta testified that as he approached [Cotton] made a motion with his hands to his front waistband. Officer Suchta's first thought was [Cotton] is reaching for a weapon. Only then did Officer Suchta grab Cotton's arms and handcuff him. -6- A protective frisk is only warranted if specific articulable facts taken together with rational inferences support the reasonable suspicion that a party was potentially armed and dangerous. United States v. Ellis, 501 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the events leading up to the Terry frisk, including Cotton's actions as Officer Suchta approached, we find the officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and that Cotton was potentially armed and dangerous. See United States v. Davis, 202 F.3d 1060, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding a protective frisk based, in part, on the defendant's nervous movements and adjustment of his jacket in a high-crime area). This encounter occurred in a violent area, Cotton reached for his waistband as the officers were approaching, and he had a nervous look on his face.5 Because the officers had reasonable suspicion that Cotton was armed and dangerous, it was proper for the officers to detain Cotton for a limited period of time to conduct the Terry frisk. Therefore, the Terry frisk was justified.