Opinion ID: 65796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Date of Conviction

Text: Although Singh was convicted of an aggravated felony, to deny him naturalization on this ground, this conviction must have occurred on or after November 29, 1990. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(1)(ii). Singh argues that the date of his unlawful wounding conviction is October 29, 1987the date on which the jury found him guiltynot May 15, 1998 the date on which the Virginia court ultimately sentenced him. In Section 322(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Congress added a definition of conviction to the INA: The term conviction means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). Interpreting this statute, both the Second and Third Circuits have defined formal judgment of guilt by reference to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(k)(1), which provides that [i]n the judgment of conviction, the court must set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court's findings, the adjudication, and the sentence.  (emphasis added); see Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 329 (2d Cir.2007); Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 562 (3d Cir.2002). Accordingly, as the Perez court explained, for the purposes of the INA, a conviction occurs when either (1) a formal judgment of guilt of the alien [is] entered by a court, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), (and such a judgment must set forth the plea, verdict or finding, the adjudication, and the sentence, FED[.] R.CRIM. P. 32(d)(1)); or (2) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt and the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)(i) & (ii). 294 F.3d at 562. [5] Notably, such an understanding accords with the Supreme Court's pronouncement that `[f]inal judgment in a criminal case... means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.' Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169, 174, 84 S.Ct. 298, 11 L.Ed.2d 229 (1963) (quoting Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S.Ct. 164, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937)). It is also consistent with the requirement that a sentence must first be imposed in a criminal case to give rise to appellate jurisdiction under the final judgment rule. See Yeloushan v. United States, 313 F.2d 303, 304 (5th Cir.1963). Moreover, holding Singh's date of conviction to be the date on which he was sentenced is consistent with this court's non-precedential holding in Donaldson v. Acosta, 163 Fed.Appx. 261, 266 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished), that, at least in cases involving sentences of deferred adjudication probation, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) is not satisfied until a jury has found a person guilty and the court has sentenced him. Given this precedent, we conclude that, for purposes of the INA, Singh was officially convicted of unlawful wounding when he was sentenced on May 15, 1998. Accordingly, having been convicted of an aggravated felony on or after November 29, 1990, Singh cannot prove good moral character and is statutorily ineligible for citizenship.