Opinion ID: 2980205
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gardner’s differing standards argument

Text: Gardner additionally argues that since the test for establishing insanity in civil cases in Tennessee differs from the test for proving insanity in federal criminal proceedings, the issue of insanity being litigated in this matter is unlike what was addressed in the prior proceedings and collateral estoppel would therefore not apply. The government argued before the district court that the test for insanity is the same in both the criminal and civil contexts. The district court found that Gardner pled guilty in his criminal case to aggravated assault under 18 U.S.C. §111, which is a general-intent crime that “requires only that a defendant intend to do the act that the law proscribes.” United States v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, 806 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Gardner acknowledged that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty and that he was “entering into this plea after being advised of and understanding the potential for raising defenses and seeking sentencing departures based upon mental health issues[.]” Tr. of Plea Hr’g Ex. 2, Dec. 10, 2004, at 14 (emphasis added). The district court found that “[b]ecause Plaintiff cannot relitigate the question of his intent, he cannot now assert that medical malpractice resulted in a complete mental breakdown– rendering him insane and therefore devoid of intention– at the time of the criminal acts.” Order and Mem. Granting Summ. J. at 5 (emphasis added). 10 No. 09-6308 United States v. Gardner We hold that the district court was correct that the issue of intent, for purposes of the instant action, was already determined by Gardner’s guilty plea in his criminal case. Gardner, by his plea, admitted he intended to do the act of aggravated assault. He cannot now deny that in this action.5 Under federal law, insanity is an affirmative defense that may be raised in a criminal case. 18 U.S.C. §17 states: “It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.” The defendant must prove this defense by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. Gardner waived this insanity defense in his criminal case and pled guilty, thus conceding that he was not insane under the federal standard at the time he committed his crime. Therefore, Gardner cannot now claim in his civil suit that, under the federal insanity standard, he actually was insane at the time he committed the act. Accordingly, if the Tennessee standard for establishing insanity in civil cases contained the same elements and required the same standard of proof as the federal standard, then collateral estoppel, as the district court found, would bar Gardner’s suit. On the other hand, if Gardner were correct that the elements and standard of proof for establishing insanity differ in the civil negligence context from the criminal context, his guilty plea would not foreclose his ability to raise issues in this action regarding his mental state under Tennessee law. A finding that he was insane under a state standard for insanity that differed from 5 Proof of his plea regarding his acts would be admissible in a trial in civil suit. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(22). 11 No. 09-6308 United States v. Gardner the federal standard (in that the elements differ and the standard of proof differ) would not conflict with a conclusion in the negligence action that he intended to commit the act of aggravated assault, which was necessary element. Such a finding would not negate his intent. See United States v. Allen, 449 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2006) (“insanity is, as the statute expressly says, an affirmative defense. The fundamental concept of an affirmative defense is that it does not negate an element of the adversary’s case.”); see also United States v. Vela, 624 F.3d 1148, 1156 n.11 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We are satisfied that a jury could reasonably find that an insane person had a specific intent to commit a crime and yet was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Gonyea, 140 F.3d 649, 651 (6th Cir. 1998) (“insanity is a defense to all crimes, regardless of whether they require general or specific intent”); United States v. Willis, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18298 at  (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (“We think it is important to distinguish between the use of psychological testimony to negate an element of the crime and the use of such testimony as an affirmative defense to the crime.”) It is ultimately unnecessary for this Court to resolve the parties’ dispute as to what the proper elements and standard of proof are under Tennessee law for establishing insanity in a Tennessee civil negligence action, as the district court’s ruling may be affirmed on grounds other than collateral estoppel. 12 No. 09-6308 United States v. Gardner