Opinion ID: 171618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: .Application of the Enhancement Statute

Text: Mr. Hooks argues that the district court erred by applying the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) sentencing enhancement when nothing in the record showed he possessed the .38 revolver in connection with another felony offense. Mr. Hooks points out that the district court based its finding on facts i.e., the yellow envelope containing ecstacy pills found near the Uziset forth in the PSR but not presented at the suppression hearing or at trial. According to Mr. Hooks, the record does not include unproven facts merely mentioned in a PSR and does not support an inference that he possessed the .38 revolver in connection with a drug offense. The government, by contrast, contends that the record does support the district court's factual finding regarding the four-point enhancement. It asserts that Mr. Hooks' recorded statements about accountability for all that shit they find and the impending fat ass loss clearly references the economic loss Mr. Hooks faced as a result of the hasty disposal of the illegal product along the side of the road. Aple. Br. at 12. The government also points out that Mr. Hooks did not object to the accuracy or inclusion of the facts in the PSR, which the district court adopted as the basis for the enhancement. Thus, according to the government, the district court did not err in relying on this information. We review the factual findings underlying a district court's sentencing determination for clear error and review the underlying legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Swanson, 253 F.3d 1220, 1222 (10th Cir.2001). We give due deference to the district court's application of the [Sentencing] Guidelines to the facts. United States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir.2008). Factual findings must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Munoz-Tello, 531 F.3d 1174, 1181 n. 12 (10th Cir.2008). Clear error exists if a factual finding is wholly without factual support in the record, or after reviewing the evidence, we are definitively and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. United States v. Ivory, 532 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir.2008); see United States v. Cardenas-Alatorre, 485 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir.2007) ([A] finding must be more than possibly or even probably wrong; the error must be pellucid to any objective observer.). We are not persuaded by Mr. Hooks' argument that there was sentencing error. With few limitations, a court has almost unlimited discretion in determining what information it will hear and rely upon in imposing [a] sentence under the advisory sentencing guidelines. United States v. Graves, 785 F.2d 870, 872 (10th Cir.1986); see United States v. Todd, 515 F.3d 1128, 1137 (10th Cir.2008) (18 U.S.C. § 3661 specifies that no limitation should be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a defendant that a district court may consider in sentencing .... (internal quotation marks omitted)). A district court may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(A). While we have noted that [a] district court may not simply adopt the PSR as its findings when the defendant disputes the report[,] United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir.2006), we have never held that a factually undisputed PSR can not form the basis for factual findings. We see no reason why the record should not include the uncontroverted facts in [a] Presentence Report. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1056 (10th Cir.1994). If a defendant fails to specifically object to a fact in the PSR, the fact is deemed admitted by the defendant and the government need not produce additional evidence in support of the admitted fact. United States v. White, 447 F.3d 1029, 1032 (8th Cir.2006). Here, Mr. Hooks did not object to the accuracy or inclusion of the facts in the PSR. He never contended the envelope contained something other than ecstacy, and he never proffered mitigating exculpatory evidence. Mr. Hooks instead contended that the requested enhancement required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the firearm in connection with controlled dangerous substances. However, an objection based on the purported failure to satisfy a specified standard of proof is wholly distinguishable from an objection based on the alleged factual inaccuracy of a PSR. As long as Mr. Hooks did not contest the truthfulness of the PSR's description of the envelope's contents, the PSR remained undisputed and thus satisfied the preponderance of the evidence standard with respect to the existence of the drugs. The record also support's the district court's finding that Mr. Hooks possessed the .38 revolver in connection with the felony possession of drugs for sale. Mr. Hooks' recorded conversation about his potential legal and financial accountability for the drugs as well as the revolver the officers might find provides sufficient factual support for the four-point enhancement. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err. For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE Mr. Ferrell's conviction, and AFFIRM Mr. Hooks' conviction and sentencing.