Opinion ID: 199695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proof of the Maine Human Rights Commission Charge

Text: 23 The cross-appeal is predicated on the contention that Nalco was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, on the MHRA age-discrimination claim brought by Walton, because Maine law allows neither damages nor attorney fees unless the plaintiff alleges and establishes that the MHRC has taken final action on the administrative charge or issued a right-to-sue letter. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4622 (1)(C); see also Gordan v. Cummings, 756 A.2d 942, 944-45 (Me. 2000). 9 The district court ruled that Nalco waived its contention by (i) failing to raise it, either in its answer or as an affirmative defense, and (ii) engaging in trial by ambush by withholding its objection until the close of Walton's evidence. 24 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has yet to determine the proper allocation of burdens of proof under section 4622. Consequently, we must make an informed prophecy of what the [SJC] would do in the same situation, seeking guidance in analogous state court decisions, persuasive adjudications by courts of sister states, learned treatises, and public policy considerations identified in state decisional law. Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996). We review statutory interpretations de novo. See Laaman v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 238 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2001). 25 Section 4622, by its plain language, precludes any characterization of the MHRC exhaustion issue as a mere affirmative defense, 10 since it explicitly states that the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, must plead[] the requisite MHRC filing. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 11 On the other hand, the section 4622 requirement, strictly speaking, is not an element of the statutory age-discrimination claim, since it does not preclude a jury finding of discrimination, but merely limits the types of recovery available to prevailing plaintiffs. 12 26 Since section 4622 more closely resembles a condition precedent, cf. Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 520 (1st Cir 1990) (noting that Title VII exhaustion requirement is condition precedent to suit); MHRC v. Local 1361, UPIU AFL-CIO, 383 A.2d 369, 375 (Me. 1978) (observing that Title VII case law may provide guidance in interpreting MHRA), it is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(c), see 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1302, (2d ed. 1987) ([Rule 9(c)] is applicable in all actions in the federal courts, even when the pleading practice in the state in which the court is sitting is different.). 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(c) provides as follows: 28 In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, but when so made the party pleading the performance or occurrence has the burden of proving it. 13 29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(c). Rule 9(c) has the effect of forcing defendant to raise the issue [of noncompliance with a condition precedent] whenever he believes there actually is a question about performance. 5 Wright & Miller § 1304; id. § 1302 (Rule 9(c) is designed to eliminate the detailed and largely unnecessary averments that resulted under common law procedure, and to prevent nonmeritorious dismissals for failure to plead the fulfillment of conditions precedent that are not at issue in the suit.). 30 As we have noted, supra, section 4622 explicitly requires that the plaintiff plead the requisite MHRC filing. Consequently, provided the complaint includes a general averment that all conditions precedent to suit or recovery have been met, and the defendant does not deny the satisfaction of the preconditions specifically and with particularity, then the plaintiff's allegations are assumed admitted, and the defendant cannot later assert that a condition precedent has not been met. Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1010 (11th Cir. 1982). 14 31 Accordingly, the appropriate inquiry in the present case is whether either the original or amended complaint included an adequate general averment that Walton had met all conditions precedent to the recovery of damages under the MHRA, even though neither complaint explicitly alleged that Walton had filed an MHRC charge. The original complaint alleged that Walton had satisfied all conditions precedent to jurisdiction under the ADEA, including the timely filing of a discrimination charge with the EEOC. Moreover, Count 1 -- the ADEA claim -- alleged damages, including, but not limited to loss of income, loss of benefits, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, costs, prejudgment interest, and declaratory and injunctive relief. Further, the prayer for relief in Count 1 demanded all available remedies under the Maine Human Rights Act including reinstatement, back pay and penal damages . . . [and] such other relief and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 32 Finally, the amended complaint made crystal clear that Count 1 of the original complaint had been brought under both the ADEA and the MHRA and that Walton was demanding damages, including, but not limited to, loss of income, loss of benefits, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, costs, prejudgment interest, and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Emphasis added.) Yet Nalco neither opposed the motion to amend the complaint, nor submitted an amended answer. 15 33 Under the liberal notice pleading standards, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1) & (f), these original and amended complaints met the general averment requirements prescribed by Rule 9(c). Although the complaints neither explicitly alleged compliance with all preconditions to recovery under the MHRA, nor with the requirement that an MHRC charge be filed, such compliance was plainly implicit. Cf., e.g., Kiernan v. Zurich Cos., 150 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding it sufficient to satisfy the loose guidelines of Rule 9(c) that plaintiff allege that insurance policy was in full force and effect, thus by implication that all conditions precedent to valid policy were met). 34 First, Walton alleged that he had filed an EEOC charge. Second, it is common practice to file simultaneous EEOC and MHRC charges. Furthermore, by explicitly demanding MHRA damages, both in the original and amended complaints, Walton plainly placed Nalco on reasonable notice that he was claiming compliance with section 4622. Indeed, at trial Nalco's counsel acknowledged: I'll be candid to say I did not have in mind this [affirmative defense] when I drafted the answer. 16 Consequently, the parties proceeded to trial with no hint whatsoever that section 4622 compliance was in dispute. Accordingly, the district court correctly rejected the motion for judgment as a matter of law on the MHRA claim. 1. The Age-Discrimination Claim Evidence 35 Nalco contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdicts on the ADEA and MHRA claims. We review these Rule 50 motions de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the prevailing party. See Negron v. Caleb Brett U.S.A., Inc., 212 F.3d 666, 668 (1st Cir. 2000). We must affirm unless the evidence was so strongly and overwhelmingly inconsistent with the verdicts that no reasonable jury could have returned them. See id. (citation omitted). This demanding standard was not met. 36 Nalco contends that Walton was discharged due to his refusal to sign the employment agreement tendered to him, and that his age was immaterial. The record evidence nonetheless reasonably permitted a contrary inference. Walton adduced competent evidence that Vice-President Yankowski, who attempted to intimidate Walton into accepting early retirement, had related several anecdotes regarding former employees of Walton's vintage who had been forced into early retirement by Nalco. More particularly, Yankowski stated to another Nalco employee: We can't have a man in his sixties [viz., Walton] sitting on his accounts coasting. We need to get a young rep in there selling business. Walton thus presented competent evidence of an age-based animus by a Nalco decision maker. See Kirk v. Hitchcock Clinic, 261 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that direct evidence of discriminatory animus may consist of 'statements by a decision maker that directly reflect the alleged animus and bear squarely on the contested employment decision') (citation omitted). 37 Moreover, Walton adduced evidence that Nalco maneuvered to establish a pretextual basis for discharging him. See Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that pretext may be established with evidence that nondiscriminatory reasons were after-the-fact justifications, provided subsequent to the beginning of legal action). After Nalco received a letter, from Walton's attorney, claiming age discrimination, Joseph Carney, Walton's direct supervisor, administered the so-called Personnel Regeneration Form to Walton at Yankowski's direction, which purported to show that Walton was not a competent salesman. At trial, however, Walton adduced compelling evidence of his competence as a salesman, evidence Nalco conveniently excluded from consideration in its final evaluation. For example, Nalco never received a client complaint regarding Walton's work performance. Moreover, Walton had long been the highest grossing salesman in his territory, and consistently enjoyed exceptional customer loyalty as evidenced by the fact that he had never lost a client in more than twenty years. Furthermore, his supervisor testified that Walton was outstanding at building relationships with his customers. Additionally, rather than demonstrating laxity in developing new business, the sales volume generated by Walton increased by 92% even as Nalco was transferring 20% of Walton's client accounts to Malbon, his designated replacement. Moreover, even though the performance evaluation prepared by Nalco assigned Walton a deficient rating in regard to producing a business plan, it omitted mention that Walton already had been excluded from Nalco meetings at which new sales prospects were divided amongst his fellow sales associates. In addition, though Walton was rated deficient in record keeping, Nalco adduced no sales reports supporting its assessment. 38 Finally, given the record evidence before it, the jury reasonably could have found that Nalco orchestrated the Personnel Regeneration Form as pretextual support for its age-based decision to discharge Walton. See Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 56 (noting that memo setting forth legitimate grounds for discharging employee, prepared after it became apparent that former employee was initiating litigation, could be considered pretextual post hoc justifications because [grounds] were only provided in anticipation of litigation). 39