Opinion ID: 1401436
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Child Support Enforcement Division v. Veltri

Text: Jeffrey Veltri and Valinda Steffl are the parents of Megan, who was born September 23, 1989. In November 1991, as part of ongoing child custody litigation, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. The court incorporated that agreement into its final judgment in February 1992. The court awarded primary physical custody to Valinda and ordered Jeffrey to pay child support of $228 per month. The State provided public assistance to Valinda for Megan beginning in 1989 and continuing intermittently during the following years. Because of this public assistance, the State through the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) sought a review of the child support order in November 1996. CSED moved to modify the child support order, requesting among other items a provision for post-majority support if Megan met the statutory conditions when she turned eighteen  namely, that she be unmarried, actively pursuing a high school diploma, and living as a dependent with a parent or guardian. Superior Court Judge Donald D. Hopwood refused to include a provision for post-majority support, explaining that no material change of circumstances justified the post-majority support order: CSED has not demonstrated a material change in circumstances related to extending the period of support. The child is now 8½ years old. CSED presents no evidence that justifies a modification of the support order for an event 9½ years in the future. CSED moved for reconsideration of the denial of a post-majority provision in the order. CSED argued that the change in law to allow post-majority support in child support orders qualified as a material change in circumstances, that the addition of post-majority support was in Megan's best interests, and that the requested provision was not premature because it remained contingent on satisfaction of the statutory conditions. The court denied the motion, again reasoning that the amendment to the statute did not qualify as a material change of circumstances: The change in AS 25.24.170 does not mandate a change in child support, and, therefore, does not constitute a change in circumstances. Unlike Civil Rule 90.3, which is mandatory, AS 25.24.170 is permissive. The burden remains on CSED here to show the change in circumstances sufficient to justify extending the period of the support obligation. CSED has failed to show, for example, that the parties did not know when the child would graduate from high school at the time the previous order entered, or that the parties did not negotiate the period of support. The State appeals.