Opinion ID: 199361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Claims under Section 1983

Text: 16 To sustain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Collins must show both: (i) that the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and (ii) that this conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1987). It is undisputed that the first prong is met in this case. The real work for Collins is to demonstrate that the Board's denial of his license application deprived him of his constitutional rights. That in turn depends on the standards required to make out his particular claims of constitutional right. 17
18 In cases of denial of a local license or permit, the standard for determining whether government conduct constitutes either a substantive due process or an equal protection violation is so similar as to compress the inquiries into one. Baker v. Coxe, 230 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 2000). We analyze those claims together. 19 To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate an abuse of government power that shocks the conscience or action that is legally irrational in that it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests. PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1991). Where a license or permit denial is involved, the class of cases which meets the constitutional threshold is narrowly limited. See Baker, 230 F.3d at 474; PFZ Properties, 928 F.2d at 31-32. In Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992), this court held that the denial of a land use permit, even if arbitrary, did not constitute a substantive due process violation unless it was a truly horrendous situation[]. Id. at 45. Similarly, we rejected a plaintiff's substantive due process claim where a regulatory board revoked his surveyor's license, allegedly due to the chairman's animus toward him, finding that the plaintiff failed to show that the treatment was shocking or violative of universal standards of decency. Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 757 (1st Cir. 1990). This unforgiving standard guards against insinuat[ing] the oversight and discretion of federal judges into areas traditionally reserved for state and local tribunals. Nestor Colon, 964 F.2d at 45. 20 Collins's statements that Ravanesi's animus drove the Board to deny Collins a license fall far short of establishing the type of horrendous situation for which Nestor Colon left the door to federal relief slightly ajar. Id. While the record certainly establishes that Collins's relationship with the Board, and especially with Ravanesi, was contentious, the record also shows that Collins repeatedly violated the fifteen car limit imposed by his license, starting in the first year it issued. That alone means the Board's action is far from legally irrational. 21 Moreover, there is no evidence that the rest of the Board shared Ravanesi's alleged animus or was motivated by it. Of the seven members, four were silent on the issue of Collins's license application; two others made a few bland references to the situation. Even if Ravanesi were ill-motivated, one member's bad motive is not imputed to a legislative body for § 1983 liability unless plaintiff shows both (a) bad motive on the part of at least a significant bloc of legislators, and (b) circumstances suggesting the probable complicity of others. Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, 134 F.3d 427, 438 (1st Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998). Collins has shown neither. 22 Thus, Collins has failed to show that the Board's denial of his license involved any misconduct, let alone the kind of conscience-shocking abuse of governmental power required for showing a substantive due process violation. PFZ Properties, 928 F.2d at 31-32. 23 Nor has Collins shown any denial of equal protection. An equal protection claim is found only upon a showing of a gross abuse of power, invidious discrimination, or fundamentally unfair procedures or some sort of unjustified disparate treatment with respect to similarly situated applicants. Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 n.9 (1st Cir. 1982). Indeed, we have warned that [i]f disgruntled permit applicants could create constitutional claims merely by alleging that they were treated differently from a similarly situated applicant, the correctness of virtually any state permit denial would become subject to litigation in federal court. Nestor Colon, 964 F.2d at 44-45. 24 Collins's assertion that he was treated differently than the successor to his license, John's Auto Sales, is flawed not only because the alleged differential treatment is not nearly grave enough to trigger constitutional concern, but also because Collins has not demonstrated that John's was similarly situated to his own business. It is true that John's received a license allowing it to sell up to eighteen used cars, a three car increase from Collins's fifteen car limit. But there is no evidence that the new license recipient had engaged in four years of license violations, as Collins undisputably did, and so Collins cannot say that he and the new licensee were so similarly situated that giving them different limits violated Collins's equal protection rights.
25 Collins also claims that the Board denied his 1996 license application in retaliation for exercising his right to appeal from the Board's 1992 decision not to renew his license. 2 Collins must show that the Board's intent to retaliate against him for exercising his constitutionally protected rights was a substantial factor motivating the Board's adverse decision. See Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 115 (1st Cir. 1991). There is no evidence of retaliation. The statements attributed to Ravanesi were in 1991, before Collins filed a lawsuit. The city officials expressed irritation over being sued. That is not enough to show retaliation. The Board in 1996 gave eleven reasons why it would not renew Collins's license, all legitimate on their face. 26 But even if Collins could show that his appeal provided the impetus for the Board's decision (a dubious proposition), his claim of unconstitutional retaliation still fails if the Board demonstrates that it would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the protected conduct. Wytrwal v. Saco Sch. Bd., 70 F.3d 165, 170 (1st Cir. 1995), quoting Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). There is no evidence from which to conclude that the Board would have reached a different decision. 27 Collins argues that the district court should have allowed a jury to decide whether his license violations were a pretext for the real motive -- retaliation -- behind the Board's denial of his license. He relies on Putnam Resources v. Pateman, 958 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1992), for the proposition that causation writ large is normally a question reserved for the fact-finder. From that, Collins argues that the district court improperly resolved the question whether Ravanesi's conduct was the proximate cause for the denial of Collins's license application. But these arguments suffer serious flaws. On summary judgment, Collins does not have enough evidence to get to a jury on retaliation, much less to overcome the Board's defense that it would have reached the same conclusion regardless. The arguments are simply an end-run around the rule just stated, that the Board still prevails by showing that it would have reached the same decision in the absence of the protected conduct. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593 (1998). Despite Collins's efforts to minimize them, the documented incidents of his license violations are legion, and provide ample basis for the Board's denial of his license. 28 In a final effort, Collins makes much of the fact that the district court found that Collins was barred from seeking a license in 1996 under the Board's and the City's procedural rules, and this was an independent reason to deny the license. Those rules impose waiting periods that prohibit an applicant denied a license from reapplying for the same license for at least one year. The district court found the SJC's 1996 ruling on the 1992 license denial by the Board to be the triggering date of denial. Collins argues that the denial did not take place in 1996, but in 1992, when his renewal license was first denied by the Board, and so the procedural bar was not a legitimate ground for denying his license application in 1996. But the district court's conclusion that the denial occurred in 1996, for the purpose of measuring the waiting period, is an eminently reasonable construction of the rules, providing another ground for rejecting Collins's retaliation claim. 3