Opinion ID: 876909
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: subsequently seized evidence

Text: Defendant argues that the marijuana seized from Berger's car should have been suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, as having been discovered as a result of defendant's illegal arrest. The State answers this contention with two arguments. First, the State contends that defendant has not established that the search invaded defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Second, the State contends that the search of Berger's car was not the fruit of an illegal arrest within the meaning of Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441. The District Court made a specific conclusion of law with respect to this issue: 7. The search of the Berger car was legally made pursuant to the valid consent of the owner of the car. In any event, defendant is without standing to challenge that search. Addressing first the question of defendant's standing to challenge the search of Berger's car, we find that he was without standing to challenge the search. The State places great emphasis on a recent United States Supreme Court case in support of the position that defendant lacks standing to object to this search. In Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, the Supreme Court examined the rule of standing enunciated in Jones v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697: In Jones, the Court set forth two alternative holdings: it established a rule of `automatic' standing to contest an allegedly illegal search where the same possession needed to establish standing is an essential element of the offense charged; and second, it stated that `anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress.' 362 U.S. at 264, 267, 80 S.Ct. at 732, 734. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 135, 99 S.Ct. at 426, 58 L.Ed.2d at 395-96. Though the Court in Rakas apparently restricted the application of the second alternative holding in Jones, it went on to explain at Footnote No. 4 that: We have not yet had occasion to decide whether the automatic standing rule of Jones survives our decision in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228-229, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1568-1569, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973). Such a rule is, of course, one which may allow a defendant to assert the Fourth Amendment rights of another. In Brown, 411 U.S. at 228, 93 S.Ct. at 1569, 36 L.Ed.2d at 213, the Supreme Court had stated: ... under the Simmons doctrine the defendant is permitted to establish the requisite standing by claiming `possession' of incriminating evidence. If he is granted standing on the basis of such evidence, he may then nonetheless press for its exclusion; but, whether he succeeds or fails to suppress the evidence, his testimony on that score is not directly admissible against him in the trial. Thus, petitioners in this case could have asserted, at the pretrial suppression hearing, a possessory interest in the goods at Knuckle's store without any danger of incriminating themselves. They did not do so. But it is not necessary for us now to determine whether our decision in Simmons, supra, makes Jones' `automatic' standing unnecessary. We reserve that question for a case where possession at the time of the contested search and seizure is `an essential element of the offense ... charged.' We now determine whether the search of Berger's car, conducted pursuant to his consent, violated the Fourth Amendment as the fruit of the poisonous tree under Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441. In Wong Sun, the Supreme Court held the poisonous tree rule applicable to the evidentiary fruits of unconstitutional arrests. The Court went on, though, to indicate that the taint of initial illegality may be purged: We need not hold that all evidence is `fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is `whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. at 417. Thus, under Wong Sun, two questions must be answered: (1) Was the arrest a cause-in-fact of the later discovery of evidence; and (2) if so, was there an intervening cause or event sufficient to attenuate the taint of the illegal arrest? It is clear that a showing of voluntariness on Berger's part is not sufficient to attenuate the taint. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854. Rather, adopting the rationale of Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 598-99, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, the State must show that Berger's consent was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint. While this is an admittedly heavy burden, there is sufficient evidence in the record of the instant case to find that the State has met it. Berger, the party who gave consent, testified that his consent was voluntary and uncoerced. Moreover, Berger testified that he was unaware that any drugs were in the car and that he therefore had no reason to deny consent. He expected the search of his car to establish his innocence and gave his consent with that in mind. Finally, three factors combine in the instant case to establish that Berger's consent was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the taint. First, there is an absence of any evidence of any threats, promises, or coercion by police officers. Second, there is evidence that Berger's consent was knowing, in that he was advised of his right to refuse to give his consent. Third, Berger had thought he had everything to gain from the search of his car since to his knowledge the search would yield no drugs and thus advance his ultimate vindication.