Opinion ID: 783116
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fourth Amendment Claims Against the City and Police Department

Text: 103 In addition to suing Officer Brosseau, Haugen also sued the City of Puyallup and the Puyallup Police Department. Municipalities are persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Municipalities cannot be held liable under a traditional respondeat superior theory. Rather, they may be held liable only when action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort. Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. 104 Haugen's complaint did not allege, and he has not argued to us on appeal, that Brosseau was acting pursuant to any preexisting policy when she shot him. Rather, he contends that the city and the police department are at fault because they failed to discipline Brosseau after the shooting. Haugen cannot, of course, argue that the municipality's later action (or inaction) caused the earlier shooting. Haugen argues instead that the city and police department should be held liable 10615 because they ratified Brosseau's decision to use deadly force. 105 The ratification, doctrine, asserted as a basis for municipal liability, originated in St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). There, a plurality of the Supreme Court stated that [i]f the authorized policymaker, approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final. Id. at 127, 108 S.Ct. 915. But the sentence from Praprotnik must be read in context. The Court held in Praprotnik that to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must prove[ ] the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy. Id. at 128, 108 S.Ct. 915. A single decision by a municipal policymaker may be sufficient to trigger section 1983 liability under Monell, even though the decision is not intended to govern future situations, Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)), but the plaintiff must show that the triggering decision was the product of a conscious, affirmative choice to ratify the conduct in question. Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1347. In the present case, Haugen has made no such showing. 106 Although some municipal pronouncements ratifying a subordinate's action could be tantamount to the announcement or confirmation of a policy for purposes of Monell, here there are no facts in the record that suggest that the single failure to discipline Haugen rises to the level of such a ratification. See, e.g., Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 382 (1st Cir.1989) (refusing to hold that the failure of a police department to discipline in a specific instance is an adequate basis for municipal liability under Monell ). The City of Puyallup and the Puyallup Police Department are therefore entitled to summary judgment.