Opinion ID: 4583224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: In-Court Demonstration

Text: [¶24] Williams first argues that the court abused its discretion in permitting the State to introduce an in-court physical reenactment of how the shooting may have occurred based on the testimony of Investigator Morrill. He contends that Morrill was not qualified as an expert to give an opinion on shooting reconstruction or bloodstain pattern analysis and that the opinion itself was not relevant. See M.R. Evid. 702, 401.
[¶25] We review “a court’s foundational finding that expert testimony is sufficiently reliable for clear error” and its ultimate decision on the admissibility of expert opinion testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. Maine, 2017 ME 25, ¶ 16, 155 A.3d 871 (quotation marks omitted). Maine Rule of Evidence 702 provides: “A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if such testimony will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” To be admissible under Rule 702, expert testimony must be relevant and must “assist the trier of fact in 11 understanding the evidence or determining a fact at issue.” State v. Burbank, 2019 ME 37, ¶ 8, 204 A.3d 851 (quotation marks omitted). [¶26] Expert testimony is relevant if the proponent, among other requirements, “has presented a sufficient demonstration of reliability.” Id. Common indicia of reliability include “whether an expert’s conclusion has been tailored to the facts of the case,” “whether any other experts attest to the reliability of the testimony,” and “the nature of the expert’s qualifications.” Maine, 2017 ME 25, ¶ 17, 155 A.3d 871. [¶27] Investigator Morrill testified in great detail about his specialized training and experience in shooting reconstruction, trajectory analysis, and bloodstain pattern analysis. He then testified as to his opinion of how the shooting may have occurred and thoroughly explained what he did at the scene and the basis for his opinion. His conclusions were drawn from the facts of this case, and his work was peer-reviewed by longstanding experts in the field. See id. On this record, we conclude that the court did not clearly err in finding that Investigator Morrill’s qualifications in shooting reconstruction were sufficient for him to testify on the matter and that his testimony was sufficiently reliable and would be helpful to the jury “to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” M.R. Evid. 702. Further, the court did not abuse its discretion in 12 admitting Investigator Morrill’s testimony after finding it reliable. See Maine, 2017 ME 25, ¶¶ 16-17, 155 A.3d 871. Finally, there can be no doubt that Investigator Morrill’s opinion was relevant. M.R. Evid. 401.
[¶28] Williams next argues that he was unfairly surprised, meaning prejudiced, by the in-court reenactment of the shooting because he was not shown the actual demonstration until the voir dire of Investigator Morrill during trial. See M.R. Evid. 403. And, in line with this argument, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial based on that unfair surprise. [¶29] We review a trial court’s admission of evidence over a Rule 403 objection for an abuse of discretion. State v. Michaud, 2017 ME 170, ¶ 8, 168 A.3d 802. Rule 403 provides that even relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” M.R. Evid. 403. [¶30] In-court demonstrative evidence is especially persuasive, and we have held that a trial court should “carefully” exercise its discretion before allowing such evidence because it “may convey an impression of objective 13 reality to the trier [of fact].” State v. Philbrick, 436 A.2d 844, 859-60 (Me. 1981). In Philbrick, we noted the dangers that demonstrative evidence, especially evidence that does not have a proper scientific foundation, may pose to a jury: Such experimental demonstrative evidence in the eyes of jurors, because of its asserted foundation in scientific principle or technique, carrie[s] such an inherent objective impact that it could unduly influence the jury in its findings of the underlying necessary facts at issue, without adequate basic facts to sustain a scientific conclusion . . . . Id. at 860. There, we concluded that the court erroneously admitted an alleged expert’s demonstration of the shooting because it had not been shown that the demonstration was substantially similar to the actual events of the shooting and it was based on unreliable scientific methods. Id. at 859-60. [¶31] Here, the court determined that the demonstration was not unfairly prejudicial and did not waste time or confuse the issues. M.R. Evid. 403. To the contrary, the court reasoned that Investigator Morrill’s testimony and the demonstration helped clarify and tie together the testimony of previous witnesses. The court also found that unlike in Philbrick, Investigator Morrill was qualified to present his opinion and the report he prepared that served as the basis for the demonstration was verifiable and scientifically accurate. [¶32] Most importantly, before allowing the demonstration to proceed, the court instructed the jury that it represented “only a re-creation of the State’s 14 version of the events” that “should in no way be viewed as an actual re-creation of the crime” and could “be accepted or rejected in whole or in [p]art.” In crafting this instruction, the court looked to language found in Harris v. State, 13 P.3d 489, 496 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000), which in turn, relied on a limiting instruction created in Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 537 (S.C. 2000). [¶33] We commend the court’s use of this language. With respect to demonstrative or reenactment evidence, the court’s limiting instruction addressed the major concern we expressed in Philbrick, namely that such evidence tends to be highly prejudicial to a jury by “convey[ing] an impression of objective reality to the trier [of fact].” 436 A.2d at 859. The court’s instruction alleviated this danger by making it clear that the demonstration only represented the State’s version of events and should not be seen as an actual re-creation of the crime as it occurred. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the demonstration to be presented to the jury over Williams’s Rule 403 objection.
[¶34] Next, Williams contends—also based on his claim that he was unfairly surprised by the State’s in-court demonstration because he had no notice, until the fourth day of trial, that the State would be re-creating the 15 shooting—that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial.5 We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion and “will overrule the denial of a mistrial only in the event of exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or prosecutorial bad faith.” State v. Logan, 2014 ME 92, ¶ 14, 97 A.3d 121 (quotation marks omitted). “A motion for a mistrial should be denied except in the rare circumstance that the trial is unable to continue with a fair result and only a new trial will satisfy the interests of justice.” State v. Poblete, 2010 ME 37, ¶ 26, 993 A.2d 1104 (quoting State v. Bridges, 2004 ME 102, ¶ 11, 854 A.2d 855). [¶35] Notwithstanding Williams’s contention, the record indicates that, although Williams saw the State’s physical demonstration of the shooting for the first time on the fourth day of the trial, he had received a copy of Investigator Morrill’s report approximately five months before trial. That report concluded that there were two possible scenarios or explanations for Corporal Cole’s positioning at the time he was shot, which was consistent with 5 Williams’s motion for a mistrial was prompted by an overnight conversation that Williams’s attorney had with an expert between the fourth and fifth days of trial. During that conversation, the expert purportedly said that he believed that the State’s demonstration was inaccurate. By that time, Williams had been in possession of Investigator Morrill’s report and conclusions for five months, and it is unclear why he waited until the middle of trial to consult with his expert. 16 Investigator Morrill’s testimony6 at trial and with the demonstration itself. The record also suggests that before trial, the State had informed Williams of its intent to present an in-court physical demonstration of Investigator Morrill’s conclusions regarding the positions of the shooter and the victim. [¶36] Further, if Williams wanted to offer expert testimony to challenge the accuracy of the State’s demonstration, the State offered to join with Williams in a request that the court hold the evidence open to allow Williams to retain the expert with whom he had consulted after the State’s demonstration. Williams declined this offer for strategic reasons, however, because although Williams’s expert apparently disagreed with portions of the in-court demonstration, the expert agreed with many of Investigator Morrill’s conclusions regarding the proximity of the gun to Corporal Cole’s neck and Corporal Cole’s position on the ground. [¶37] In short, on this record, there is no evidence of “exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or prosecutorial bad faith” that would provide grounds for overruling the court’s denial of Williams’s motion for a mistrial. In addition to being consistent with his pretrial report, Investigator Morrill’s testimony was 6 consistent with, and tied together, the already overwhelming evidence against Williams, including the physical evidence and Williams’s own confession. It is therefore unlikely that the verdict would have been different if the demonstration had been excluded. 17 Logan, 2014 ME 92, ¶ 14, 97 A.3d 121 (quotation marks omitted). Although Williams did not see the physical demonstration of the shooting until the fourth day of trial, the State had informed Williams of its intent to re-create the shooting during trial, and the demonstration itself closely tracked Investigator Morrill’s testimony as well as his report. [¶38] Under these circumstances, the State’s demonstration did not unduly prejudice Williams or prevent him from receiving a fair and just trial. See Bridges, 2004 ME 102, ¶ 10, 854 A.2d 855 (“The court's determination of whether exposure to potentially prejudicial extraneous evidence would incurably taint the jury verdict or whether a curative instruction would adequately protect against consideration of the matter stands unless clearly erroneous.” (quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. Frisbee, 2016 ME 83, ¶ 29, 140 A.3d 1230 (“Ultimately, the decision on whether to grant a defendant's motion for a mistrial comes back to the core principles of fairness and justice; the relevant question for the trial court is whether the trial court is confident that the trial can proceed to a fair and just verdict in the context of the proceedings before it.”). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motion for a mistrial. 18