Opinion ID: 2221418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Initially, we must consider a jurisdictional issue. IDOT questions the timeliness of Cripps' notice of appeal. That document was not filed within thirty days of the district court's decision but was filed within thirty days of that court's ruling on Cripps' postdecision motion labeled as a motion under rule 179(b) of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure. IDOT contends that the motion was in fact not a proper rule 179(b) motion and thus did not extend the time for the filing of a notice of appeal. Our resolution of this issue requires us to consider the nature of a rule 179(b) motion in judicial proceedings seeking a review of administrative action. Under our rules of civil procedure that were in effect prior to July 1, 1980, a motion under rule 179(b) was not available in a judicial review of an agency decision. Budde v. City Dev. Bd., 276 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Iowa 1979). The adoption of our present Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 333(c), effective on July 1, 1980, altered that limitation and thereafter motions under rule 179(b) could be filed and considered in proceedings for judicial review of agency action involving a contested case. See Kunau v. Miller, 328 N.W.2d 529, 530 (Iowa 1983) (discussing history of rule 179(b) in agency review). In its normal application to nonjury bench trials in which the court determines both the facts and the law, motions under rule 179(b) may be employed to seek enlargement or change of both the factual and the legal determinations of the court. Bellach v. IMT Ins. Co., 573 N.W.2d 903, 904-05 (Iowa 1998); Peoples Trust & Sav. Bank v. Baird, 346 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1984); Suckow v. Boone State Bank & Trust Co., 314 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Iowa 1982). The motion may also seek changes in the judgment consistent with the altered findings or conclusions. Because judicial review of agency findings in contested-case proceedings do not involve new findings made by the district court, rule 179(b) motions in that type of case will necessarily involve issues of law. Osborne v. Iowa Natural Resources Council, 336 N.W.2d 745, 747 (Iowa 1983). Based on the principles we have discussed, we are convinced that, if the result sought to be achieved by a postdecision motion in a review of an agency contested case is a change in the court's legal conclusions, its decision, or both its conclusions and decision, such a motion falls under the umbrella of rule 179(b) if the result sought is within the power of the court. Cripps' motion, labeled as a rule 179(b) motion, sought to have the district court remand the proceeding to the agency for further proceedings. A district court is empowered by Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) to remand a case to the agency for further proceedings. See Continental Tel. Co. v. Colton, 348 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Iowa 1984) (remand to the agency is a permissible disposition of judicial review proceedings in district court). Consequently, we believe that the challenged motion matches the profile of a rule 179(b) motion. IDOT urges that the purpose of the remand to the agency as requested by Cripps was to present additional evidence at the agency level. Such action, IDOT urges, is precluded by Iowa Code section 17A.19(7) because it was not requested prior to the hearing on judicial review. We disagree for two reasons. First, the fact that a request for an amended decision is lacking in legal merit does not in itself preclude such a request from being considered as a rule 179(b) motion if it requests a category of relief that the court is generally empowered to grant. Second, although section 17A.19(7) requires a request for the taking of additional evidence before the agency to precede the hearing on the petition for judicial review, we are not convinced that the court could not order that relief in the absence of a request prior to that time. Indeed, this court has done that in matters involving judicial review of agency action. See Murillo v. Blackhawk Foundry, 571 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Iowa 1997) (ordering remand to the agency for receipt of additional evidence when that relief had not been timely requested by appellant). For all of the reasons stated, we conclude that Cripps' notice of appeal was timely filed.