Opinion ID: 1439162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: authority and discretion of the district court to appoint a master

Text: The mutual agreement by the parties for the appointment of a master was recognized in oral argument and briefing, as well as by attachments to the contested judgment with a concurrent understanding from the litigants that payment for services would be made by the husband. It is also established that both litigants knew in advance of the district court designation that the proposed master, Sargent, in the presence of the husband, had engaged at the request of the wife in taking a video tape inventory of personal property at the parties' residence. Following district court conference (not reported), the parties' proposal to appoint Sargent as master to divide the personal property was accepted by the district judge. Thereafter, objection was not taken by either party to the deputation or performance until appellant objected in December 1988 following his receipt of the master's bill for fees. Any claim of abuse of discretion in assignment is foreclosed by failure to timely object or, as in this case, actual acceptance. If objection to the appointment is to be taken by a litigant, it must be made timely by filed objection and, if possible, before performance of the service as master is undertaken by the appointee. See B & W Cattle Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Hereford, 692 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App. 1985). United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 227 (W.D.Mo. 1985) states: Whether the combination of circumstances which prompted the appointment of a Special Master constitutes an exceptional condition justifying the reference is a procedural matter to which personal objection should be made, unless as a matter of law the trial court abused its discretion concerning the appointment.    In particular, the nature of an objection to the appointment of a Special Master should be specifically stated, and a party has no right to rely on the objection of another.    In general, objections must be sufficiently specific to bring into focus the precise nature of the alleged error. The failure to make timely objection, either at the time of the order of reference or promptly thereafter, constitutes a waiver of error. Charles A. Wright, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Co., 354 F.2d 710 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 384 U.S. 960, 86 S.Ct. 1586, 16 L.Ed.2d 673, reh'g denied 385 U.S. 890, 87 S.Ct. 14, 17 L.Ed.2d 122 (1966); McGraw-Edison Co. v. Central Transformer Corp., 308 F.2d 70 (8th Cir.1962); Fisher v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 61 F.R.D. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Parties should object to a reference to a magistrate or a special master at the time the reference is made or within a reasonable time thereafter. Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1036, 105 S.Ct. 511, 83 L.Ed.2d 401 (1984). A litigant cannot claim error in exercised discretion unless disapproval of a proposed decision is recorded. Sharp v. Sharp, 671 P.2d 317 (Wyo. 1983); Louth v. Kaser, 405 P.2d 276 (Wyo. 1965); Debruyn v. Golden Age Club of Cheyenne, 399 P.2d 390 (Wyo. 1965). A recent statement of the rule is that [a] party cannot appeal from a judgment or order to which the party has [substantively] consented. State v. Coheley, 549 So.2d 483, 483 (Ala. 1989). Disposing of abuse of discretion, there remains the appellant's denial of the district court's actual delegation authority. See B & W Cattle Co., 692 S.W.2d 946. Our decision in Cross v. Cross, 586 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1978) and W.R.C.P. 53 (similar to F.R.C.P. 53) is dispositive. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), cert. granted in part ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 863, 102 L.Ed.2d 987, aff'd ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2994, 106 L.Ed.2d 342, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 28, 106 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). The prerogative of the district court to appoint a master is not only established in general law, but is expressly provided by W.R.C.P. 53. On the comparable subject of receivership, appellant having invoked the jurisdiction of the court to appoint a receiver of [his] property (the court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter), [he] will not thereafter be permitted to question the validity of such appointment for the want of jurisdiction. Spence v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, 5 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. App. 1928). Appellant's abuse of discretion and authority arguments are unfounded.