Opinion ID: 441742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: unedited indictment

Text: 67 Appellant Satterfield contends that the district court should have granted a mistrial because it read to the jury venire an unedited indictment despite the magistrate's granting of Satterfield's motion to strike references to his nickname Pig. Satterfield filed a pretrial motion to strike the alias language also known as 'Pig' Satterfield, which appeared three times in the indictment. The motion was made on grounds that the language was surplusage in that all witnesses will identify said defendant under the one name of Edward Eugene 'Eddie' Satterfield, and that the alias was immaterial, irrelevant and prejudicial. Following an unrecorded hearing, the magistrate granted the motion. 68 After the prospective jurors were sworn, the court mistakenly read the original, unedited version of the indictment without deleting the three references to Satterfield's nickname. Satterfield's counsel did not object until the judge had finished reading the indictment, at which time he informed the court that the magistrate had deleted the references. He then moved for a mistrial, arguing that the venire would be prejudiced by the negative connotations associated with the name Pig. 69 Following a period of discussion with Satterfield's counsel and the prosecutor, the court denied the motion for a mistrial and, without again mentioning Pig, instructed the jury that the alias had previously been ordered stricken from the indictment and that they should disregard it. At the same time, the judge asked the veniremen whether anyone felt he or she would be influenced in any degree by the reference to a nickname of one of the defendants. All responded in the negative. Before opening statements, the court read the edited indictment to the empaneled jury, making no mention of the alias or the previous incident. 70 The decision to grant a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge since he is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial effect of a statement or evidence on the jury. United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 733, 739-40 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 952, 95 S.Ct. 1336, 43 L.Ed.2d 430 (1975). We agree with the district court that the prejudice to Satterfield resulting from the mistaken reading of the unedited indictment was minimal. It is permissible to include an alias in an indictment if the Government plans to introduce evidence of the alias as an identifying characteristic of the defendant. United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1156 n. 6 (5th Cir.1981). In response to appellant's motion for a mistrial, the prosecutor informed the court that he intended to present witnesses identifying Satterfield as Pig, and in his opening statement he conveyed a similar intention to the jury. Indeed, during the course of the trial, at least six witnesses, including two defense witnesses, either verified Satterfield's nickname or stated that one of the kidnappers had been called Pig during the perpetration of the crime. Because the Government's evidence established that Satterfield and one of the abductors were referred to as Pig, the nickname was material, and the magistrate need not have ordered its deletion in the first place. Although it was error to read the unedited version because the magistrate had deleted the words, the prejudice resulting therefrom was insignificant in light of the multiple references to Satterfield as Pig throughout the course of the trial. 71 The slight prejudice that may have resulted from reading the stricken words was adequately remedied by the district court's cautionary instruction to the jury and reading of the corrected version before opening statements. When an indictment improperly includes a reference to an alias, an appropriate jury instruction can cure possible prejudice. Doelle v. United States, 309 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.1962). Shortly after the error, the district court instructed the jury that it should disregard any reference to an alias made during the court's reading of the indictment. During the cautionary instruction, the court was careful not to mention the name again and asked the veniremen whether they would be influenced in any way by their knowledge that one of the defendants had been known by a nickname. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.