Opinion ID: 219991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Second Statement

Text: We proceed to the second statement: There's been no suggestion that Mr. Salley didn't know it was there. This statement is more problematic and requires a deeper delving. We do so by addressing the arguments raised by Salley, which mirror the district court's concerns: (1) the statement shifts the burden of proof and (2) the statement comments on Salley's failure to testify. [6] With respect to Salley's first argument, we have held that as to comments that shift the burden ... `a prosecutor may cross the line [into impermissibility] by arguing to the jury that the defendant is obligated to present evidence of his innocence.' Glover, 558 F.3d at 77 (internal citation omitted). We do not believe that line was crossed here. In particular, the prosecutor did not argue that Salley had the burden to prove another set of facts. Wilkerson, 411 F.3d at 8. Rather, the prosecutor's statement drew attention to the lack of evidence that Salley was unaware of the gun's presence in his home. Such a statement is distinguishable from those we have previously found to be improper burden shifting comments. See United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1015 (1st Cir.1997) (prosecutor remarked that when a defendant does `go forward' to offer evidence, `the defendant has the same responsibility [as the government] and that is to present a compelling case'); United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 769 (1st Cir.1996) (prosecutor stated if [defense counsel] can stand up and explain away that conversation to you, then you should [acquit] ... There's just no other explanation except the one that's been provided... by the government.). In these cases, the prosecutor specifically said that the defense had a burden to present evidence. That is not so with the comment at issue. Salley's burden shifting claim is without traction. Salley's second argument  that the prosecutor impermissibly commented on his failure to testify  presents us with a closer question. To determine whether a comment trod on a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination, this court ask[s] whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. Glover, 558 F.3d at 77. Here it is undisputed that the prosecutor did not intend to comment on Salley's failure to testify. Therefore our focus is on how the jury may have perceived the comment. Undoubtedly the prosecutor's statement is not a barefaced reference to Salley's choice not to take the stand. Cf. United States v. Skandier, 758 F.2d 43, 45 (1st Cir.1985) (prosecutor asked the jury to see if [defense counsel] can explain the story any differently than the prosecutor had); United States v. Cox, 752 F.2d 741, 745 (1st Cir.1985) (prosecutor stated how does [defendant] explain certain evidence). However, because only Skyla and Salley lived in their home  and Skyla testified that Salley knew the gun was in the home  it can be argued that Salley was the only other person who could have testified as to his knowledge of the gun's locale. Thus the jury may have perceived the statement as commentary on Salley not testifying. At the same time, it is conceivable that the statement (albeit clumsily) highlighted for the jury the absence of any testimony from defense witness Rebecca Hughes that she put the gun in the closet and that, to her knowledge, Salley was not aware of its presence. This second interpretation finds favor in the principle that courts should not lightly infer ... that a jury, sitting through a lengthy exhortation, will draw [the most damaging] meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations. United States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d 300, 307 (1st Cir.1992). Further, we are especially reluctant to `fish in the pool of ambiguity' when, as now, the complaining party failed to bring a dubious comment, easily corrected on proper notice, to the immediate attention of the trial court. Taylor, 54 F.3d at 979 (internal citation omitted). Ultimately we need not grapple with this issue further. Although the prosecutor's statement debatably could be perceived as a reference to Salley's failure to testify, the statement is not grounds for reversal because there was no prejudice. This court will not reverse unless the prosecutor's remarks so poisoned the well that the trial's outcome was likely affected. United States v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Factors to be considered are: (1) the severity of the misconduct, (2) whether it was deliberate or inadvertent, (3) the context in which it occurred, (4) the likely effect of any curative instructions, and (5) the strength of the government's evidence of guilt. Id. at 44. Assuming the prosecutor's statement was misconduct, it was not severe but rather a limited (though admittedly inaccurate) reference to the evidence. Further there is zero indication that the prosecutor's comment was a deliberate reference to Salley's failure to testify. The statement was made only once during closing arguments and not elaborated on. In fact, the prosecutor herself contradicted the statement (correctly stating the evidence) earlier in her closing. [7] Defense counsel did the same during his closing. [8] To boot, defense counsel's failure to object to the comment increases the likelihood that the effect on the jury was likewise fleeting and evanescent. Shoup, 476 F.3d at 44. And although the lack of an objection means there was no specific curative instruction, the court did instruct the jury in both its preliminary and final jury instructions that the lawyers' comments and closing arguments were not evidence and that the jury's memory of the evidence controlled. The court also drew attention to Salley's constitutional right not to testify and cautioned the jury that it should not draw a negative inference from this choice. We assume the jury to have followed these instructions. See Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27, 34-35 (1st Cir.2010). Last but not least, the evidence linking Salley to the gun was tremendous: (1) the Uncle Henry ad, (2) phone records, (3) Skyla's testimony (including an in-court identification of the seized gun as Salley's), (4) Steinhagen's testimony (including an in-court identification of the seized gun as the one he traded), (5) David Smith's testimony (including an in-court identification of the seized gun as the one he shot with Salley), and (6) James Smith's testimony. And despite Salley's contention to the contrary, it is not a foregone conclusion that Skyla's testimony should be discounted as unreliable. The defense theory that Skyla entered into a year long conspiracy with some unknown accomplice to frame Salley is entirely unsupported by the evidence. The statement at issue was not significant enough to affect Salley's rights or seriously impair his trial. See Landry, 631 F.3d at 606. Salley has not surmounted the high hurdle of the plain error standard. See Ortiz, 447 F.3d at 36.