Opinion ID: 2581989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to object to hearsay testimony and unduly prejudicial evidence

Text: [¶ 48] Duke faults counsel for not objecting to certain hearsay testimony, evidence of his brother's federal guilty plea and other unduly prejudicial evidence. Most of his claim appears to be a continuation of his condemnation of counsel's failure to prevent joinder of the criminal charges, which was addressed above. Duke contends that the admission of that testimony denied him a fair trial. In asserting error, however, he has failed to show that counsel's omissions amounted to prejudicially deficient assistance. [¶ 49] Duke first argues that various witnesses gave improper hearsay testimony to which counsel should have posed an objection. His argument, however, consists solely of a single paragraph of excerpts of the witnesses' trial testimony, placed in a footnote in his brief, with no analysis or citations to legal authorities. His argument also fails to explain how the admission of that minimal testimony prejudiced his defense. This Court has stated that it will not consider arguments that are not cogent or supported by citation to pertinent authority. Eustice v. State, 11 P.3d 897, 904 (Wyo.2000); Blumhagen v. State, 11 P.3d 889, 897 (Wyo.2000). We apply that rule here. [¶ 50] Duke next claims that counsel should have objected when the prosecutor elicited an admission from his brother and federal co-defendant, Mike Duke, that he had pleaded guilty in federal court to a charge related to the solicitation of their parents' murders. In its direct examination of Mike Duke, the prosecution extensively questioned him about his knowledge of, and his involvement in, Duke's solicitation of Brauberger to kill their parents. Throughout his direct testimony, Mike Duke downplayed the seriousness of the murder plot and testified that the plot was simply a practical joke Duke was playing on Brauberger. At the end of direct examination, the following occurred: [Prosecutor]. Although it was a joke, you ended up pleading guilty in federal court to this joke, didn't you? [Mike Duke]. Correct. [¶ 51] Duke asserts that evidence of Mike Duke's federal guilty plea was inadmissible under Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531 (Wyo. 2000), Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965 (Wyo.1996), and Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979). He insists that counsel's failure to object to that testimony deprived him of his right to have a trial on its own merits and constituted reversible error. [¶ 52] The State acknowledges that the testimony in question was probably inadmissible under existing Wyoming law. The State, however, disagrees, as do we, that Duke is entitled to reversal of his convictions based solely on the admission of that isolated question and answer. See Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶ 36, 46 P.3d 298, ¶ 36 (Wyo. 2002); Mazurek, 10 P.3d at 535 (when no objection is raised at trial, reversal is warranted only upon a finding of prejudicial plain error). [¶ 53] To succeed on his ineffectiveness claim, Duke must show both a deficiency in counsel's assistance and resulting prejudice. Asch, at ¶ 11. With respect to the second prong, he has not provided any insight into how the admission of that testimony adversely affected the outcome of his trial. Rather, he has offered nothing more than an unsupported assertion that prejudicial error occurred. At a minimum, he should have evaluated the prejudicial effect of that testimony under the factors set forth in Mazurek, 10 P.3d at 539. He, however, has neither mentioned nor applied those factors within the context of this case. In the absence of a clear showing of actual prejudice resulting from counsel's inactions that would be sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of his trial, Duke's ineffectiveness claim cannot be sustained. [¶ 54] Duke lastly faults counsel for not invoking some helpful rules of evidence to prevent other prejudicial evidence from being introduced at trial. Although not entirely clear, he seemingly faults counsel for not keeping from the jury evidence pertaining to his federal conviction and the tapes and transcripts of the telephone calls between himself and Brauberger upon which the solicitation charges concerning his parents were based. However, other than a generic reference to W.R.E. 403 and W.R.E. 404(b), he has provided no guidance on what helpful rules of evidence counsel could have invoked to accomplish the desired result under existing law and the facts of this case. His mere unparticularized speculation and conjecture on what counsel should have done, without more, is insufficient to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that counsel's performance was constitutionally ineffective.