Opinion ID: 2971965
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim

Text: Figel also alleged that the confiscation under Directive 05.03.118 of texts sent to him by the PCG violates his rights under the RLUIPA. In relevant part, the RLUIPA prohibits the imposition by any government of a “substantial burden on the religious exercise” of a prisoner, unless the government can show that such imposition is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a). In addition to citing this statutory language, Figel alleged that Incredible Human Potential, The Missing Dimension in Sex, and Mystery of the Ages are all religious books sent to him by the PCG and confiscated by prison authorities. He further asserted that the confiscation of those books interfered with his practice of his religion. The district court dismissed this claim on the ground that Figel “failed to allege any facts showing that a ‘substantial burden’ has been placed on his ability to exercise his religious beliefs. 2 We note that while the burden is on the prisoner to disprove the validity of the regulation at issue, Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003), Defendants must still articulate their interest in the regulation. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. In Overton, for example, the Michigan Department of Corrections expressed several interests in the challenged regulations. Overton, 539 U.S. at 133. Otherwise, a prisoner would be forced to hypothesize any number of potential legitimate penological interests and then disprove a reasonable relationship between each and the regulation at issue. 7 No. 04-1038 The fact that he was unable to obtain certain books sent by the PCG does not by itself constitute such a showing.” Dist. Ct. Opinion at 6. In light of the very liberal pleading rules that should be applied to a pro se plaintiff facing dismissal for failure to state a claim, we disagree. Figel’s complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appeared “beyond doubt that [he] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Haines, 404 U.S. at 521, quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-6. Figel alleged that the confiscation of specific religious texts substantially burdened his right to practice his religion; if he can prove a set of facts to support this claim, he may be entitled to relief under the RLUIPA. We cannot say that Figel is undoubtedly unable to establish that the confiscation of the books at issue imposed a substantial burden on his religious rights. It is true that Figel did not precisely explain how his inability to obtain the books burdened the exercise of his religion. However, he was not required to do so. The presentation of even “inferential allegations” respecting the material elements of a claim suffices to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir.1988). The district court could have dismissed the case under other grounds, specifically our precedent in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003). In Cutter, we held that §2000c-1 violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment “because it favors religious rights over other fundamental rights without any showing that religious rights are at any greater risk of deprivation.” Id. at 262. This holding clearly precludes Figel from relief under the RLUIPA. However, since the issuance of the district court’s opinion, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari 8 No. 04-1038 in Cutter to review the question of the RLUIPA’s constitutionality. 73 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2004)(No. 03-9877). It would therefore be inappropriate to dispose of Figel’s claim based on our holding in Cutter. We remand this claim with instructions that the district court vacate its previous decision on this claim, and hold the claim in abeyance for re-consideration pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Cutter. Should the Supreme Court reverse Cutter and uphold the constitutionality of §2000c-1, the district court should reconsider whether Figel has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.