Opinion ID: 1607200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Disclosure of Inconsistent Testimony

Text: Smith asserts that the trial court erred in not conducting a Richardson [10] inquiry when State witness Carlos Walker testified inconsistently with his deposition. The State contends that the claim was not preserved for review; that Smith has not shown a discovery violation; and that if there was a discovery violation, the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed above, the State has a continuing obligation to disclose the statement of any person who has information that may be relevant to any offense charged or any defense thereto. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1). Carlos Walker was listed as a State witness and actually testified for the State during the guilt phase of trial. In his pretrial deposition by the defense, Walker stated that he never talked to Smith about the Johnson case. On direct examination by the State, Walker admitted that he lied in his deposition because he was afraid of retaliation by Smith. Walker stated that he saw Smith with Jackie Pope's deposition and looked what happened to him. Walker then testified that Smith told him that Cynthia Brown had been snitching on him about the Johnson murder and she got to come up dead for him to win trial. Walker also overheard Smith discussing Brown with Julius Stevens, Eric Stokes, and Latravis Gallashaw. In this conversation, Smith told the trio that he wanted Brown to come up dead in order for him to win the trial. Walker also testified about a meeting he observed between Smith and Chazre Davis at Smith's house regarding Brown. Smith stated that he wanted Brown to be smothered or strangled and that he did not want any bullets or shell casings or other evidence on the scene. Smith offered Davis nine ounces of powder cocaine to kill Brown. Walker also testified that Smith bragged about Brown's murder at a party celebrating the dismissal of the Johnson murder charges against him; Smith bragged that the State couldn't hold him and stated that Davis handled his business. The defense did not object to this testimony by Walker. Instead, the defense moved for a mistrial when the State's direct examination was finished. The defense argued that the State had called Walker to the stand without informing the defense that Walker had lied in his deposition. The State responded that the defense knew what the issues were and also had Walker's prior statement to the police that was consistent with his trial testimony. The court told the defense to impeach him while you can and denied the motion for a mistrial. Walker gave three statements prior to trial. In his initial statement to the police, he implicated Smith in the murders of Brown and Pope. In his deposition taken by the defense, Walker denied knowing about any involvement by Smith in the murders. Walker apparently made another statement to the State sometime before trial in which he told the prosecutor that he had lied in his deposition and would testify consistent with his initial statement. The State never disclosed this fact to the defense, a discovery violation under rule 3.220(1)(b), (j). When a discovery violation is brought to a trial court's attention, the court may conduct a Richardson hearing to inquire about the circumstances surrounding the State's violation of the discovery rules and examine the possible prejudice to the defendant. Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971). In the past, the court's failure to a conduct a Richardson hearing was per se reversible error. In State v. Schopp, 653 So.2d 1016, 1020 (Fla. 1995), this Court concluded that there are cases ... where a reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not prejudiced. When the reviewing court makes such a determination, then the discovery violation is deemed harmless and reversal is not warranted. Id. This Court recently clarified the nature of the harmless error inquiry when a discovery violation occurs. See Scipio v. State, 928 So.2d 1138 (Fla.2006). The inquiry is whether the violation materially hindered the defendant's trial preparation or strategy. Id. at 1150 (quoting Schopp, 653 So.2d at 1020). The analysis is not whether the jury's verdict would have been different, but rather whether the defense was procedurally prejudiced. Id. [O]nly if the appellate court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation can the error be considered harmless. Schopp, 653 So.2d at 1021. The State contends that this issue was not properly preserved by Smith at trial because defense counsel moved for a mistrial rather than objecting because of the discovery violation. However, Florida courts have concluded that a motion for a mistrial can preserve a discovery violation claim if the motion reasonably informs the court of the nature of the complaint. See Raffone v. State, 483 So.2d 761 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). There are no exact magic words or phrases which must be used by the defense in order to necessitate the inquiry; only the fact that a discovery request has not been met. Copeland v. State, 566 So.2d 856, 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); In re F.R., 539 So.2d 588, 589 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In support of the motion for a mistrial in the instant case, the defense argued that the State should have noticed in advance of the perjury so that we could at least find out what was going on. This was adequate to inform the court that a discovery violation had occurred and prompt an inquiry into the circumstances and whether the defense was prejudiced. Thus, we conclude that the claim was preserved below. Next, the State argues that no discovery violation occurred. We do not agree. When the defense moved for a mistrial, the State responded that the defense knew what the issues were and had possession of Walker's prior statement to the police that was consistent with his trial testimony. In its brief to this Court, the State notes that several pretrial statements by Walker were disclosed to the defense and the defense has not identified any statement by Walker that was not disclosed to the defense. However, the trial record clearly indicates that the State had prior knowledge that Walker intended to recant his deposition testimony (in which he disavowed any conversations with Smith about the Johnson case and any knowledge about Smith's involvement in Brown's murder). As soon as the prosecutor began questioning about the Johnson case, she asked Walker to explain his deposition testimony and why he had lied. The fact that Walker's recantation of his deposition testimony was not reduced to writing did not relieve the State of its continuing discovery obligation as to this witness. The State committed a discovery violation when it failed to disclose to [Smith] a material change in the State [witness's] deposition statement. Scipio, 928 So.2d at 1145. However, our examination of the record reveals that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by this discovery violation. The defense theory as to Brown's murder was that her death was not a homicide, but the result of either a heart attack or stroke caused by cocaine use or asphyxiation during sex. While Walker's testimony was antithetical to this theory, he was only one of many witnesses who testified about Smith's plans to have Brown murdered. Anthony Fail testified that he overheard Smith and his mother discussing various ways to kill Brown, including poison and strangling; that Smith offered him $50,000 to kill Brown and was emphatic that she not be shot and there not be any evidence that could lead back to Smith; and that Smith put aside $20,000 to pay Brown's boyfriend Davis after he killed her. Herbert Daniels testified that he heard Smith talk to Brown's boyfriend about the killing and the method. Tricia Geter testified that Smith asked her if she could acquire pure heroin to give Brown in order to make her heart stop and stated his intent to kill Brown. Julian Mitchell testified that after Brown was killed Smith stated that he had to have Brown killed. Even if the defense knew that Walker was not going to testify consistent with his deposition but in line with these witnesses, which is what Walker did, the defense would not have devised a different trial strategy. Thus, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation and the error was harmless. Schopp, 653 So.2d at 1021.