Opinion ID: 62940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Daniel's Arguments

Text: In his argument against application of Ex parte Young in this case, Daniel asserts that the doctrine requires more than a simple request for prospective relief. Rather, relying on recent Supreme Court precedent, Daniel argues that a plaintiff must also allege a continuing or ongoing violation of federal law before the Ex parte Young exception can be met. In one of its most recent descriptions of the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Supreme Court said that a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added). Similarly, the Court has stated that  Young also held that the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent federal courts from granting prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law.  Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985) (emphasis added); see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) ([W]e have often found federal jurisdiction over a suit against a state official when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to `end a continuing violation of federal law.'). In light of these statements, Daniel asserts that Nelson's termination and UTD's refusal to reinstate him do not constitute a continuing violation sufficient to sustain a claim under Ex parte Young. In making this argument, Daniel relies upon Supreme Court precedent from employment discrimination cases which hold that termination is a discrete act. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 2169, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007) (listing termination and refusal to hire as discrete acts); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (same). A discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act `occurred' on the day that it `happened.' Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110, 122 S.Ct. 2061. From this, Daniel concludes that Nelson's termination was a discrete act that presents no continuing violation of federal law, meaning that Ex parte Young is not applicable. Daniel's position is not unreasonable, but we are confronted with years of caselaw to the contrary. All of the opinions cited above concerning reinstatement and Ex parte Young were issued after the Supreme Court began using the continuing violation language in its opinions. See Green, 474 U.S. at 68, 106 S.Ct. 423 (first use of continuing violation language by Supreme Court in 1985); see, e.g., Rowland, 494 F.3d at 98 (decided in 2007); Warnock, 88 F.3d at 343 (decided in 1996). Further, termination has long been considered a discrete act for employment discrimination purposes. Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (stating that termination is not a continuing violation for limitations purposes in an employment discrimination suit); Prophet v. Armco Steel, Inc., 575 F.2d 579, 580 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (same). Therefore, all of the precedent supporting Daniel's argument was in existence at the time that this court and the other circuits concluded that reinstatement may be pursued through Ex parte Young. Daniel argues that many of the circuits have simply failed to consider whether a request for reinstatement satisfies the continuing violation requirement. While Daniel is correct that this element is often not mentioned, several circuits have directly addressed the requirement and still concluded that reinstatement may be pursued through Ex parte Young. See Rowland, 494 F.3d at 96-98 (concluding that harm caused by elimination of position was ongoing for purposes of Ex parte Young ); Carten, 282 F.3d at 396 (deciding that reinstatement was prospective relief designed to end a continuing violation of federal law); Doe, 131 F.3d at 840-42 (same); Coakley, 877 F.2d at 307 n. 2 (same). [4] Further, regardless of whether this court explicitly considered the ongoing violation requirement in Warnock, we clearly held that Plaintiff's claim for ... []reinstatement[ ] ... is not barred by sovereign immunity. 88 F.3d at 343. Thus, Warnock is the law of this circuit on that issue and, absent a Supreme Court or en banc decision, we are bound by its holding. See Foster v. Quarterman, 466 F.3d 359, 367-68 (5th Cir.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2099, 167 L.Ed.2d 817 (2007). Daniel attempts to distinguish Warnock and some of the cases from other circuits by arguing that they concerned the violation of constitutional rights, as opposed to statutory rights like the FMLA, and that constitutional claims are construed more expansively. We consider this to be a distinction without significance. The Supreme Court has never restricted the application of Ex parte Young to cases involving constitutional law. See, e.g., Verizon Md., 535 U.S. at 645-48, 122 S.Ct. 1753 (allowing suit under Ex parte Young for alleged violation of Telecommunications Act). Indeed, the doctrine itself refers to violations of federal law, not constitutional law. See id. at 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753. We, therefore, see no reason to consider unconstitutional terminations differently than terminations in violation of the FMLA for purposes of Ex parte Young. In sum, we conclude that, based on our precedent and precedent from a majority of the circuits, a request for reinstatement is sufficient to bring a case within the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, as it is a claim for prospective relief designed to end a continuing violation of federal law. [5] Consequently, the district court should not have dismissed Nelson's claim for reinstatement, and we must reverse the district court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.