Opinion ID: 173641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Counts Two, Three and Four

Text: These counts charge the Agosto and Agosto Motors with aiding and abetting each other, and others, with specific illegal discharges that took place in October 2004 (Count Two) and January 2005 (Count Three). See 18 U.S.C. § 2. Agosto was charged with aiding and abetting an additional discharge occurring in March 2005 (Count Four). Provided the government establishes the facts required to meet the elements of the crime charged by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Appellants may be held indirectly responsible as aiders and abettors if they associate[d] [themselves] with the venture, [] participate[d] in it as something that [they] want[ed] to bring about, [or] [sought] by [their] actions to make the venture succeed. United States v. Lugo Guerrero, 524 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir.2008). It is settled that a culpable aider and abettor need not perform the substantive offense, be present when it is performed, or be aware of the details of its execution. United States v. Colón-Muñoz, 192 F.3d 210, 223 (1st Cir.1999). Further, we are required to consider all of the evidence in the light of the cases that have established, for some time, that a person who creates the conditions for, and has the ultimate responsibility for, a discharge, may be held liable for the discharge. See Sierra Club v. Abston Const. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir.1980) (coal mine operators who built sediment basin held liable for discharge from basin's overflow because basin was reasonably likely to be the means by which pollutants are ultimately deposited into a navigable body of water); United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1420 (10th Cir.1991) (a person whose specific conduct . . . allowed the discharge to occur is liable for CWA violation); United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (10th Cir.2006) (defendants who directed others to perform the illegal discharge liable for the discharge under CWA). Appellants do not really challenge that the specific discharges listed in the indictment occurred; rather, they focus their attack on the sufficiency of the evidence of Appellants' actual knowledge of, and/or role in, the discharges. [4] However, as we have already discussed, a reasonable jury could have found that Agosto had the requisite knowledge of the illegal discharges into the Creek by his agents and employees. A jury could have found that Agosto carried out these actions at least in part to benefit his enterprises, including Agosto Motors. The evidence is that Agosto, through his corporations, initially hired third parties to dispose of the pollutants, but then switched to doing this work with his own equipment and employees, who did so in violation of the CWA. To Agosto's overall activities and interventions can be added his orders to place trenches in the Mansiones project which a jury could have found were designed to channel raw sewage away from the sidewalks and streets and towards the Creek's basin, as charged in Count 4 of the Indictment. The jury could properly infer that these things were done to save Agosto money and to allow him to continue selling properties in the Mansiones development. We also find that the evidence was more than sufficient to support the conviction of Agosto Motors on Counts 2 and 3. [A] corporation may be held liable for the criminal acts of its agents so long as those agents are acting within the scope of employment. United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir.2006); accord United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 42 (1st Cir.1991). Typically, [t]he test is whether the agent is `performing acts of the kind which he is authorized to perform,' and those acts are `motivatedat least in partby an intent to benefit the corporation.' Potter, 463 F.3d at 25 (quoting United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir.1982)). Agosto Motors contends that the government presented insufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Agosto or anyone else acted to benefit Agosto Motorsas opposed to Mansionesin connection with the illegal discharges. We disagree. Agosto Motors and Mansiones were closely-held, family-run companies operating out of the same location, namely, the Agosto Motors dealership. Both companies used the same telephone and fax numbers. They had overlapping employees as well as officers. As to both entities, Agosto was the de facto chief executive. Significantly, the truck used to carry out the illegal discharges alleged in the indictment was registered to Agosto Motors and Agosto Motors paid its annual registration fees. [5] Agosto's son, Miguel, had purchased the truck in 2002 in connection with another business venture. Miguel was a Mansiones employee who was active in trying to sell homes in the development, and was well-aware of, and had some responsibilities related to, the septic tank problem. By November 2004, about a month after the illegal discharges began, Miguel was also a salaried employee of Agosto Motors. At a minimum, this evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably infer that the truck's commercial registration was made available to Mansiones by employees of Agosto Motors for the purpose of carrying out the illegal discharges. The jury could also have concluded that this would not have taken place without the knowledge of Agosto, and was therefore within the scope of employment at Agosto Motors (i.e., per the orders of the boss, Agosto). In any event, the jury could have inferred that the illegal discharges were undertaken at least in part to benefit Agosto Motors, even if they also benefitted Mansiones; the jury was not required to turn a blind eye to the inextricable relationship between the entities. On these facts, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Agosto Motors aided and abetted the CWA violations charged in the indictment by providing the means by which those discharges were carried out. As a matter of law the government presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellants were aiders and abettors in the charged violations of the CWA.