Opinion ID: 1597407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claim of Error in Judicial Assignment

Text: Muehleman next claims that the trial court erred in allowing the resentencing proceeding to be conducted by a circuit judge who did not hear the first penalty phase trial. Muehleman took the firm position in the trial court that Judge Brandt Downey, the judge who was assigned to handle criminal cases in the Sixth Judicial Circuit at the time of the resentencing, had no jurisdiction to preside over the resentencing proceeding because Judge Crockett Farnell presided over the first penalty phase proceeding and the postconviction proceedings. [11] Muehleman further refused, in large part, to participate in the proceedings below based on his erroneous belief that to do so would be waiving his jurisdictional claim. We disagree with Muehleman's contention and conclude that the issue of jurisdiction is not implicated. Further, no error has been shown in the court's refusal to reassign Judge Farnell to hear the case. First, as to Muehleman's jurisdictional claim, this Court explained in Rodriguez v. State, 919 So.2d 1252 (Fla.2005), that administrative orders of judicial assignment do not limit the lawful authority of any judge of the court, nor do they bestow rights on litigants. Id. at 1278 (quoting Kruckenberg v. Powell, 422 So.2d 994, 996 (Fla.5th DCA 1982)). At issue in Rodriguez was an internal court policy relating to judge assignments, while Muehleman complains here of an alleged violation of a rule promulgated by this Court, but the principle is the same. As a circuit judge, Judge Downey clearly had jurisdiction to preside over the case. Judicial assignment rules are designed to promote judicial efficiency, so courts have wide discretion in this field. Rodriguez, 919 So.2d at 1278-79 (citing Jonathan L. Entin, The Sign of The Four:. Judicial Assignment and the Rule of Law, 68 Miss. L.J. 369 (1998)). The Court further explained in Rodriguez that a litigant must establish prejudice from any improper judicial assignment. 919 So.2d at 1278. Muehleman has not identified any prejudice that flowed from the chief judge's refusal to reassign Judge Farnell to preside over the resentencing. Muehleman's suggestion that Judge Farnell's institutional knowledge of the case was lost in the resentencing does not support a claim of prejudice. Because resentencing occurred after a new penalty phase jury trial, the sentence could not be based on a judge's prior knowledge of the facts of the case or of the aggravating or mitigating factors. Muehleman also argues that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700 is mandatory and requires the assignment of Judge Farnell to preside at his resentencing unless a showing of necessity is made for assignment of any judge other than the judge who presided at the capital trial to preside at a sentencing proceeding. We disagree. Rule 3.700(c)(2) provides: (c) Sentencing Judge. .... (2) Capital Cases. In any capital case in which it is necessary that sentence be pronounced by a judge other than the judge who presided at the capital trial, the sentencing judge shall conduct a new sentencing proceeding before a jury prior to passing sentence. The rule simply requires that where a new judge is assigned to pronounce sentence in a capital case, there must be a new sentencing proceeding in front of a jury, which is exactly what occurred in this caseMuehleman was given a completely new sentencing proceeding in front of a jury. The rationale behind rule 3.700(c)(2) is that a substitute judge who does not hear the evidence presented during the penalty phase of the trial must conduct a new sentencing proceeding before a jury to assure that both the judge and jury hear the same evidence. Ferguson v. Singletary, 632 So.2d 53, 55 (Fla.1993). We earlier stated this same principle in Corbett v. State, 602 So.2d 1240, 1244 (Fla. 1992), where we recognized the unique responsibilities of the sentencing judge in a capital case and concluded that fairness in this difficult area of death penalty proceedings dictates that the judge imposing the sentence should be the same judge who presided over the penalty phase proceeding. Id. at 1244. Moreover, this Court has consistently applied the `clean slate' rule to resentencing proceedings... [and a] resentencing is to proceed in every respect as an entirely new proceeding. Merck v. State, 975 So.2d 1054, 1061 n. 4 (Fla.2007) (citation omitted) (citing Preston v. State, 607 So.2d 404, 408-09 (Fla.1992)). Muehleman's resentencing proceeded as an entirely new proceeding, before a jury, in which Judge Downey heard all the evidence as to the circumstances of the murder and sentenced Muehleman accordingly. Because Judge Downey had jurisdiction to preside over the resentencing, which was conducted as an entirely new proceeding in front of a jury, relief is denied on this claim.