Opinion ID: 305193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellants' Constitutional Argument

Text: 22 It must be owned that the statutory arguments made above may not be entirely free from doubt. Under the circumstances, we think it appropriate to add a few words about another principle which influences our opinion. It is, of course, elementary that courts, where possible, construe a statute so as to avoid the necessity of declaring it unconstitutional. See, e. g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770 (1953); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 577, 49 S.Ct. 426, 73 L.Ed. 851 (1929). Thus if a construction of the local statutes which authorized or required the Recorder to accept restrictive covenants would mandate state action denying black citizens equal protection of the laws, that construction should, if possible, be avoided.
23 Any discussion of state action and equal protection must begin with a delineation of the boundaries which have defined controversies like this since Reconstruction. On the one hand, Civil Rights Cases, supra, makes clear that [i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] amendment. 109 U.S. at 11, 3 S.Ct. at 21. At the other extreme, cases like Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 313, 318, 25 L.Ed. 667 (1880), teach that a State may act through different agencies,-either by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities; and the prohibitions of the [Fourteenth] amendment extend to all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by one of these agencies or by another. 24 Of course, it is no easy matter to determine where action of the State leaves off and [i]ndividual invasion of individual rights begins. As governmental responsibility for racism was more clearly perceived, the old state action formulation ceased to provide a bright-line test for the limits of constitutional equality. See, e. g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 89 S.Ct. 557, 21 L.Ed.2d 616 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966), affirmed after remand, sub nom. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 90 S.Ct. 628, 24 L.Ed.2d 634 (1970). Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has now conceded that to fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause is an 'impossible task' which 'This Court has never attempted.' Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). This difficulty in formulating precise, principled rules for the limits of state action 8 has led numerous commentators to suggest that the concept be jettisoned altogether, to be replaced by some test which balances individual interests in equality against competing interests in privacy. See, e. g., Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, Foreword: State Action, Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 69 (1967); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U.Pa.L.Rev. 473 (1962); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 Tex.L.Rev. 348 (1963). State action, these commentators argue, fails to dictate decisions in close cases. 25 Fortunately, it is unnecessary to mediate this scholarly dispute, since this is not a close case. Whatever the vagaries of state action at the margin, the core concepts remain clear. When the state acts directly and unambiguously in a discriminatory manner, it violates the basic command of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Brown, 3 Cir., 392 F.2d 120, 125, cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921, 88 S.Ct. 1811, 20 L.Ed.2d 657 (1968). We are not dealing here with a case where tangential state involvement is used to implicate otherwise private activity with state action. See, e. g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra; Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 4 Cir., 323 F.2d 959 (1963); Green v. Kennedy, D.D.C., 309 F.Supp. 1127, appeal dismissed, sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956, 90 S.Ct. 2169, 26 L.Ed.2d 539 (1970). Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172-177, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 1971-1974, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972). Nor is it even a situation in which a facially neutral government statute or policy has the effect in certain situations of denying racial justice. See Hunter v. Erickson, supra; Reitman v. Mulkey, supra. The Recorder of Deeds is a state official, and the activities of the Recorder's office are a state responsibility. The Recorder has made a policy decision to consider illegal, racist covenants as documents affecting the title or ownership of real estate. See 45 D.C.Code Sec. 701(a) (1). If the concept of state action has any meaning at all, then that decision is a state decision for which the state is fully responsible.
26 Of course, a mere showing of state action is insufficient to make out an equal protection clause claim. It must also be shown that the state action has the purpose and effect of discriminating against an identifiable class in an irrational or invidious manner. See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960). In cases involving economic or social regulation not approaching sensitive and fundamental personal rights, government traditionally need show only that the state action serves some rational or legitimate purpose in order to defeat a claim of discrimination. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). Compare Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 171, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1405, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972). But cases such as this one, involving alleged discrimination along racial lines, are treated differently. They are closely scrutinized, see, e. g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967), and this close scrutiny usually involves a careful balancing of a legitimate governmental purpose against the discriminatory effect of the state action. 27 Frequently this balancing is a difficult and delicate operation, trenching as it undeniably does upon the functions traditionally performed by legislatures. In this case, however, our scale need not be finely attuned, since there is nothing at all on one side of the balance. Simply put, there is no legitimate governmental interest which could possibly be served by accepting restrictive covenants for filing. These documents are analogous to forged instruments or correspondence containing threats for the purpose of extortion in that they are entirely outside the law. They are illegal to execute and illegal to enforce. Even if we assume that the Recorder's office serves as no more than a repository or storage facility, the state has no legitimate interest in protecting and preserving these malignant instruments of persecution. 9 28 But of course the Recorder's office is more than a repository. It is designed not so much to store deeds for posterity as to give them some legal effect. Such a purpose with respect to restrictive covenants is violative of both the Fair Housing Act 10 and the Fourteenth Amendment. 11 If the courts cannot enforce racial covenants in the exercise of their general common law powers, Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, then surely the Recorder cannot effectuate them by administrative fiat. 29 The best that can be said for the Recorder is that his approval of these racial classifications serves no purpose-that his actions are no more than a thoughtless, noninvidious consequence of bureaucratic inertia. But bureaucratic inertia is hardly a compelling justification for preservation of this relic from an age which should have been long dead. The racism which continues to haunt this country is perpetuated by those who do not care as well as by those who hate. It provides scant comfort to blacks trapped in the slums of our inner cities to know that their jailers are thoughtless rather than heartless. 12 30 The flimsy nature of the state's asserted interest in recording restrictive covenants means that even a marginal showing of discriminatory effect would be sufficient to tip the balance in appellants' favor. In truth, however, the discriminatory effect of the Recorder's practices is quite substantial. The fact that private individuals initiate the discriminatory conduct neither explains the Recorder's actions nor expiates his responsibility. Supreme Court cases make clear that the impetus for the forbidden discrimination need not originate with the State if it is state action that enforces privately originated discrimination. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra, 407 U.S. at 172, 92 S.Ct. at 1971. The Recorder's manifest encouragement of private discrimination is offensive to equal protection quite apart from the activity of private citizens who seize upon his actions to justify their illegal conduct. The state is not permitted to [furnish] a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against one group because of race and for another. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402, 84 S.Ct. 454, 456, 11 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964). By accepting restrictive covenants for official filing, the Recorder puts government's seal of approval on racist documents deeply offensive to black citizens and thereby affect[s] their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). Moreover, this court can take judicial notice of the fact that official recording of these documents is likely to give them a legitimacy and effectiveness in the eyes of laymen which they do not have in law. It is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility that a black person might be reluctant to buy a home in a white neighborhood when government itself implicitly recognizes racially restrictive covenants as affecting the title or ownership of real estate. Indeed, the white character of that part of the District where recorded racist covenants abound stands as mute testimony to their continued effectiveness. 31 Finally, even if the subtle but real damage described above is considered too remote or speculative to receive judicial recognition, it still cannot be said that appellants have failed to make out a constitutional claim. The vice lies not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice   . Anderson v. Martin, supra, 375 U.S. at 402, 84 S.Ct. at 456. Such classifications bear a heavy burden of justification, Loving v. Virginia, supra, 388 U.S. at 9, and it has never been thought necessary to prove that actual harm derives from them before they can be invalidated. See Bryant v. State Board of Assessment of N.C., E.D.N.C., 293 F.Supp. 1379 (1968); Hamm v. Virginia State Board of Elections, E.D.Va., 230 F.Supp. 156 (1964). Instead, the burden of proof is on government to demonstrate some strong reason which justifies the classification. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196, 85 S.Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964); Lee v. Nyquist, W.D.N.Y., 318 F.Supp. 710, 719 (1970). Yet, as demonstrated above, appellees here have not even begun to make such a demonstration. Unless we are prepared, at this late date, to give up the battle for racial justice in the name of blind obeisance to the doctrine of judicial restraint, the Recorder's practices cannot be permitted to continue.