Opinion ID: 3012034
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Suicide Attempt

Text: As noted above, after his wife’s death, with the pressures of the investigation mounting and his relationship with 79 Kraushaar at an end, Marshall checked into the Best Western room where he and Kraushaar used to meet, and prepared tapes and a suicide drink, which he did not consume. At trial, the State intimated that the suicide attempt was staged, not genuine. Counsel did not present evidence to refute these allegations, except to elicit testimony from Marshall that the suicide attempt was genuine. App. Br. at 111-13. Although counsel had arranged for a psychologist, Dr. Atkins, to assess Marshall’s condition, the report was not obtained until mid-trial, and was not used. Nor was Dr. Atkins called as an expert. Id. at 112. Marshall contends that the psychological testimony is critical, because it would establish that the tape-- discussed above as reflecting Marshall’s despair over his finances -- was the result of a major depressive episode. Id. Marshall alleges that the New Jersey Supreme Court did not address these arguments in affirming the denial of post-conviction relief, even though he raised them, and that, as a consequence, we should not apply AEDPA deference.39 In response, the State contends that the court did address Marshall’s contention, albeit generally, and thus argues that Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2001), is inapplicable. See Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 73. Given the posture of Marshall’s claim, we do not need to address the level of deference owed, because Marshall has stated that the purpose for which the report would have been used is to demonstrate that Marshall was depressed when he produced the tape, which in turn would impact the reliability of the financial data. Those issues, as discussed above, were adjudicated on the merits by the New Jersey Supreme Court. We have already indicated that Marshall has misapprehended the New Jersey Supreme Court’s view of the significance of the tape: it is not that it reflects Marshall’s true financial status, but that it reflects Marshall’s reaction to and perception of his financial _________________________________________________________________ 39. As noted above, see supra note 18, where the state court does not adjudicate a federal claim on its merits, we will apply pre-AEDPA deference. Here the parties both discuss Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (2001). Everett v. Beard, cited above, is equally apt here. 80 status, and, indeed, his state of mind. Thus, adducing testimony to demonstrate that the finances and other stressors in Marshall’s life had caused him to enter a major depressive episode and attempt suicide could only bolster the image of Marshall’s finances as sufficiently worrisome to provoke Marshall to commit desperate acts. The information therefore could not have a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome. Further, courts are to be especially deferential to reasoned decisions by counsel. The fact that Marshall’s counsel was the one who arranged for the psychological examination indicates that he was sensitive to the possibility that the information may be valuable for trial, and that he asked for it, received it, and did not use it places his decision squarely in the realm of the myriad tactical decisions counsel must make during a trial, and which courts, with the benefit of hindsight, should not second-guess.