Opinion ID: 222859
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: DNA-IAC Claims

Text: The State argues that the factual and legal allegations underlying Woods's DNA-IAC claims were never presented to the state supreme court. Woods argues that he exhausted the DNA-IAC claims in state court or, in the alternative, that if his claims were not exhausted, that he established cause and prejudice for the procedural default. It is undisputed that Woods's federal habeas petition makes specific reference for the first time to defense counsel's failure to explore the possibility of DNA contamination or to present the testimony of a defense DNA expert. On the other hand, Woods presented several facts in his PRP that support these claims. Ultimately, we need not decide the question of whether Woods's claims are exhausted. If Woods exhausted his claims and the state supreme court adjudicated the claims on the merits, we conclude that the state court's decision was not unreasonable. If Woods's federal claims allege new facts and legal theories such that the claims are unexhausted, we conclude that Woods cannot show cause and prejudice for his failure to raise these claims with the state supreme court, and that his claims are therefore procedurally defaulted. In his PRP, Woods alleged that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in challenging the DNA evidence at trial and cited the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland in support of that claim. Woods alleged that special counsel Fred Leatherman, who was responsible for cross-examining the State's DNA expert, was unavailable and ineffective. Woods further alleged that his defense counsel, public defenders from Spokane County, lacked training and experience and were generally incapable of handling the DNA evidence in his case. To establish that trial counsel were ineffective, Woods alleged that Leatherman[, special counsel brought in for purposes of cross-examining the prosecution's DNA witness,] was based in Seattle ... [,] was himself trying another case in federal court in Seattle through the month of June, and was available to conduct his portion of the case, i.e., cross examining Dr. John Brown, the state's [DNA] expert, only on Mondays. Woods also stated in his PRP that Leatherman flew into town on the day of cross-examination and out the same day. Leatherman's only communication following cross-examination of DNA expert Dr. Brown, Woods alleged, was a fax to defense counsel with some points for closing argument. Woods further noted that communication between defense counsel and Leatherman was so poor that defense counsel confessed during closing argument to finding the DNA evidence confusing. Woods also presented facts that could support his claim that his trial counsel were incapable of interpreting the DNA evidence without an expert. Specifically, Woods alleged that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because [t]he attorneys from Spokane County Public Defender's Office did not feel capable of handling the DNA evidence in the case. Woods explained that in critical areas of investigation counsel did nothing, that counsel lacked training and experience and were overworked, and that counsel were unprepared and disorganized. Woods offered as support for this argument his attorney's statement to the jury during closing arguments and directly after the DNA cross-examination that the DNA evidence `was confusing to me.' Assuming that the facts Woods presented to the state court were specific enough to exhaust the DNA-IAC claims, our review of the state court's decision is limited to those facts. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Based on this record, and keeping in mind the double-deference due the state court's conclusion under section 2254(d)(1), see Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011), we cannot say that the Washington Supreme Court unreasonably denied Woods's claims because Woods did not establish prejudice under Strickland. Although Woods challenged the effectiveness of his trial counsel's treatment of the state's DNA analysis, he presented no facts to the state court that showed the analysis was or could be incorrect. Only in the course of federal habeas litigation did Woods present affidavits by DNA experts  evidence that we are precluded from considering under section 2254(d)(1) by Pinholster [15]  that Dr. Brown's testimony was misleading and scientifically questionable. Without such factual allegations, the state court could have reasonably concluded that even the most rigorous cross-examination coupled with the assistance and testimony of a qualified expert would not have allowed Woods's trial counsel to shed a different light on the DNA evidence. The fact that Woods's attorneys might have challenged the evidence more robustly does not create a substantial likelihood that the result of his trial would have been different but for their shortcomings. Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 792. We therefore conclude that, if Woods's DNA-IAC claims were exhausted, he is not entitled to habeas relief because the Washington Supreme Court's adjudication of his claim was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. We also conclude that if the claims were not exhausted, there is no cause to excuse the procedural default. Woods argues that any failure to present his claim to the Washington Supreme Court was due to ineffective representation by his state post-conviction counsel. The Supreme Court has unambiguously held, however, that ineffective representation is not cause for procedural default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-54, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); see also Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir.2000). [16] Thus, if Woods did not fairly present his claims to the state court, they are procedurally defaulted. In sum, we need not reach the question of whether Woods exhausted his state law remedies with regard to his DNA-IAC claims or instead raises new unexhausted claims. In either case, Woods is not entitled to habeas relief, and we affirm the district court's denial of these claims.