Opinion ID: 1788426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Majority's Definition of Municipal Purpose

Text: It would also appear that the majority opinion is engaging in a flawed analysis by using the terms basic, necessary, or indispensable to now radically limit the scope of municipal purpose. The majority's reliance on State ex rel. Harper v. McDavid, 145 Fla. 605, 200 So. 100 (1941), to support this definition is especially troubling. In McDavid, this Court did conclude that a municipal purpose may now comprehend all activities essential to the health, morals, protection, and welfare of the municipality. Id. at 102. But we used the phrase to encompass a broad meaning of municipal purpose. The majority's attempt to use McDavid as precedent for limiting the scope of municipal purpose is simply inconsistent with the actual broad construction and analysis we utilized in that case. In McDavid, for example, we cited to City of Tallahassee and mentioned golf courses, among other items, as endeavors that fall under the very much expanded definition of municipal purpose. McDavid, 200 So. at 102. Moreover, we stated, The time was when a municipal purpose was restricted to police protection or such enterprises as were strictly governmental but that concept has been very much expanded.... Id. Of course, McDavid recognized and endorsed this broad expansion. In other words, it is virtually impossible to use our opinion in McDavid as the basis for narrowly construing the term municipal purpose when the opinion explicitly utilizes and approves a broad definition of the term.