Opinion ID: 318460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: governmental interest in restricting content of speech by employees

Text: 31 As Judge Gesell noted in his opinion, 'The Government's right to protect the efficiency of its service has frequently been recognized. Goldwasser v. Brown, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 222, 417 F.2d 1169 (1969).' This rule, recognized in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), must be applied to the specific facts of this case. Two considerations require discussion. 32 First, since the Bureau had for some time allowed the words 'Pigs Off Census' on signs carried in the course of demonstrations at the back of the lunchroom, the government cannot assert that the mere use of such words impair efficiency. 33 Second, this case is considerably different from others where governmental interests have been asserted. It is unlike Meehan v. Macy, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 217, 392 F.2d 822 (1968) (en banc), where there was both a special relationship (the policemen protecting the Governor) and a challenge to the superior (Governor) on an issue of international relations-- in a situation fraught with threat of rioting by Panamanians over American occupation of the Canal Zone. It is also to be distinguished from Goldwasser, where there was disregard of assigned employment duties, with the court noting that an altogether different question would be presented by speech off-hours outside the classroom, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 230, 417 F.2d at 1177. Unlike Goldwasser, this case does not involve 'the kind of close working relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper functioning', Pickering, supra, 391 U.S. at 570, 88 S.Ct. at 1735, since appellants had no contact in their work with the two women supervisors. 34 The asserted governmental interest here is a tranquil environment for government employees during their lunch hour, so that work might be more efficiently performed after the completion of lunch. Thus, the government points to the fact that the spectators, as well as the women supervisors, were upset by the events in question. We think that such a broad asserted interest could rule out any form of protest disturbing to employees in the lunchroom, or for that matter, on their way into work in the morning, if the protest took place outside the Bureau. The difficulty is that a man's right of free speech comprehends the possibility that persons may be upset by what he says. The permission for demonstrations in the lunchroom cannot be made to turn on refinements as to whether particular slogans are upsetting to some government personnel, particularly when what is at issue is the speaker's expression of his conviction that their activities are wrong and should be discontinued. What makes this case different is the issue of discomfort to the two supervisors due to the physical proximity of the two appellants at their table. 35 In our view, the disciplinary sanction meted out to appellants cannot be sustained if it was predicated, as a crucial ground of decision, whether sole, alternative or concurrent, on the mere content of the sign they displayed as part of their demonstration. Government employees have protection of First Amendment freedoms even when their speech is critical of or embarrassing to their superiors, albeit this doctrine is subject to certain limitations. Pickering, supra; Meehan v. Macy, supra. As already noted, the 'fighting words' concept is an exception to protected speech, but we do not think the present record established a predicate for that exception. This is so even though the immunity of government employees from sanction is not necessarily co-extensive with the immunity of citizens from prosecution for speech on the public way. 36 On the other hand, there is no doubt that disciplinary sanction could rightly be applied to appellants' activity at the table, whether it is regarded as conduct or non-protected speech. While we have hitherto focused on the intimidation aspect of this activity, we note also that the government's interest in efficiency is interlocked with the government employees' reasonable right of privacy, which other employees of their department may not invade as of right. The issue is not the same as that faced when government officials seek to elevate personal privacy over freedom of comment by the outside press. The scope of reasonable expectation of privacy of a government employee awaits line-drawing and definition. It suffices here to say that while personal privacy may have little weight when asserted at the entrance to the cafeteria, a public place where demonstrations and messages are part of the basic pattern of life, it claims appropriate protection at the luncheon table where the employee sits down, alone or with friends. 37 The present case is one where the state of the record leaves us to grapple with a sanction imposed on the conjunction of message and conduct. Here we face an intermediate problem of some complexity. This combination would preclude a criminal conviction under Street v. New York,supra, although the Supreme Court may have contemplated that words could be made part of the operative acts if they related solely to the intent of the action, 394 U.S. at 590, 89 S.Ct. 1354. But the criminal analogy is not decisive. While we have no exact guidelines in Supreme Court jurisprudence, we think the basic needs of government may permit sanctions in cases of mixed conduct and speech where the speech, or written message, is of such character as to be a significant factor in the total effect of the conduct, and it is clear that the sanction is addressed to the effect of the conduct and not to content of the speech. It may well be that this is the situation before us, as viewed by the Census Bureau, but its analysis was not refined in this manner. We do not say that disciplinary action would necessarily be inappropriate under the facts of this case. But in our view the appropriate disposition is a remand, without a vacating of the order, to give the agency an opportunity to tailor its treatment of these employees to the particular activity which exceeds the bounds of First Amendment protection-- the activity at the table. This would avoid the deterrence of legitimate speech. While the problem of overbreadth in the public employment sphere can raise First Amendment questions, see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960), it does not necessarily require the same remedy as overbreadth in criminal statutes; specifically, it does not require either a prohibition of any and all penalties, or striking down the regulation, since in matters pertaining to 'efficiency of the service' it may be impossible to avoid a broadly-worded regulation. Deterrence of legitimate speech must be minimized by proper application of the prohibition to activity not protected by the First Amendment. 38 We are fortified in our view that a remand is the proper disposition by considerations of fairness and notice to the employees, that the conduct at the table was prohibited. This leads us to appellants' 'vagueness' challenge. 39