Opinion ID: 1158362
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: agency's authority to effect a taking

Text: GTE argues that the PUC is without authority to engage in acts, including rulemaking, that effect a taking. GTE's argument is premised on the assertion that express eminent domain authority is required before a state agency may take property for a public purpose. GTE is correct. Eminent domain is the power inherent in a sovereign state of taking or of authorizing the taking of any property within its jurisdiction for a public use or benefit. Dept. of Trans. v. Lundberg, 312 Or. 568, 571 n. 1, 825 P.2d 641 (internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted), cert den ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 467, 121 L.Ed.2d 374 (1992). This court has repeatedly and consistently held that the right of eminent domain    can be exercised only by legislative authority. B.V.L. Co. v. Johnson, 30 Or. 205, 208, 46 P. 790 (1896). The legislature may delegate its power of eminent domain to an administrative agency, but it must do so expressly. Eminent domain is vested in the state. This power may be delegated by it to its subordinate agencies, but he who would exercise such sovereign right of taking another person's property    must be able to point out express statutory authority. It will not be implied [.] Smith v. Cameron et al., 123 Or. 501, 504, 262 P. 946 (1928) (emphasis added). See also Emerald PUD v. PP & L, 302 Or. 256, 263, 729 P.2d 552 (1986) (concluding that a state agency had the power to act in eminent domain when the statute clearly granted that power to the agency); Tomasek v. Oregon Highway Com'n, 196 Or. 120, 142, 248 P.2d 703 (1952) (Though the power of eminent domain is inherent in the state, it lies dormant until called into existence by express legislative authority. ) (emphasis added); State ex rel. Olcott v. Hawk et al., 105 Or. 319, 325, 327, 208 P. 709 (1922) (The power of eminent domain is inherent in the state, yet it lies dormant until called into exercise by express legislative authority [.]    [S]tatutes providing for condemnation should be strictly construed. (emphasis added)). The PUC does not disagree with the foregoing principle. Rather, the PUC argues for a limitation on its application: The requirement of eminent domain power exists to protect public funds from being used to buy property by agencies that have no authorization to purchase it. The PUC asserts that that policy concern is not invoked by the collocation rules, because under those rules there is no fiscal exposure to PUC, nor is there any other risk to public funds.    The regulatory structure    not only provides compensation, it provides for judicial review to determine whether that compensation is adequate and fair. In short, compensation for the collocation services that a[n] LEC may be required to provide is built into the rates paid by the collocators. (Citations omitted.) The PUC's argument is that, when a government agency acts in eminent domain and takes private property for public use, but when compensation for that taking does not come directly from the public treasury, the agency needs no specific grant of authority so to act. The PUC points to no cases from this jurisdiction, nor are we aware of any, that support that view. The PUC's argument reads into this court's prior cases a rationale and, thereby, a limitation, that those cases do not contain. The cases cited above establish a bright-line rule: that an agency may not act in eminent domain without an express grant of power from the legislature. It is up to the legislature, not the PUC or any other administrative agency, to determine how those powers should be exercised. The legislature's reasons for granting or refusing to grant an administrative agency the power to act in eminent domain may include a desire to refrain from depleting the public fisc. However, the legislature's decision may also be rooted in a number of other policy considerations. In the alternative, the PUC argues that the legislature has expressly given it the necessary eminent domain authority over telecommunications providers. It cites ORS 183.335, 756.060, and ORS chapter 759. ORS 183.335 concerns the notice that an agency must give prior to rulemaking. ORS 756.060 contains a general grant of rulemaking authority to the PUC. ORS chapter 759 delineates the authority and powers of the PUC. Although sections of that chapter do give the PUC broad regulatory and rulemaking authority, see, e.g., ORS 759.580 (authorizing the PUC to require telecommunications utilities to offer services to a locality not already served), no section of that chapter contains an express grant of authority to the PUC to act in eminent domain generally or in regard to an LEC's property. [5] In summary, the power of eminent domain may be exercised by an agency only if the agency has express statutory authority. The PUC does not have express statutory authority to promulgate rules that would effect a taking of an LEC's facilities. Accordingly, we next consider whether the challenged collocation rules do, in fact, effect a taking.