Opinion ID: 1561088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Legality of the agency shop provision under the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law

Text: The determinative issue which must be resolved in this case is: Does the agency shop provision of the agreement violate the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law, 26 M.R.S.A., §§ 961-972? We answer in the affirmative. Except as may be authorized by statute, public employees have no right to bargain collectively with the employing agency. Without common law collective bargaining rights, public employees enjoy only those rights specifically granted by statute. City of Hayward v. United Public Employees, Local 390, etc., 1976, 54 Cal. App.3d 761, 126 Cal.Rptr. 710. See City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 1973, Me., 304 A.2d 387, 393. The explicit purpose of the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law (26 M.R.S.A., § 961), expressly declared to be the public policy of the State of Maine, is to promote the improvement of the relationship between public employers and their employees by providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public employees to join labor organizations of their own choosing and to be represented by such organizations in collective bargaining for terms and conditions of employment. From the Legislature's own delineation of purpose, we can readily see as composite parts of the legislative intent, 1) the promotion of the employer-employee relationship in the public sector, 2) through uniform legislation, 3) permitting public employees to join labor organizations of their own choosing, 4) for collective bargaining respecting terms and conditions of employment. Nothing therein even suggests any legislative concern for union security which an agency shop clause would provide. On the other hand, the Legislature erected special safeguards around public employees' right to the free exercise of the collective bargaining privileges in the following sections of the Act. In 26 M.R.S.A., § 963, it is provided that [n]o one shall directly or indirectly interfere with, intimidate, restrain, coerce or discriminate against public employees or a group of public employees in the free exercise of their rights, hereby given, voluntarily to join, form and participate in the activities of organizations of their own choosing for the purposes of representation and collective bargaining, or in the free exercise of any other right under this chapter. The free exercise of any other right under this chapter surely would include the right not to join the bargaining agency selected by the majority of the bargaining unit, in the absence of any express provision to the contrary. The Legislature further protected public employees' free exercise of the collective bargaining privileges by prohibiting conduct conflicting with the employees' freedom of action. Section 964 of chapter 26 provides in pertinent part: 1. Public employer prohibitions. Public employers, their representatives and their agents are prohibited from: A. Interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 963; B. Encouraging or discouraging membership in any employee organization by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment;       2. Public employee prohibitions. Public employees, public employee organizations, their agents, members and bargaining agents are prohibited from: A. Interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 963 or a public employer in the selection of his representative for purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances;   . In our interpretation of the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law we must consider two long established principles of statutory construction: 1) The general rule is that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed and not extended by implication. Stanton v. Trustees of St. Joseph's College, supra, at page 722; Depositors Trust Company of Augusta v. Johnson, 1966, Me., 222 A.2d 49; 2) public bodies or officers [4] may exercise only that power which is conferred upon them by law. The source of that authority must be found in the enabling statute either expressly or by necessary inference as an incidence essential to the full exercise of the powers specifically granted. State v. Fin & Feather Club, 1974, Me., 316 A.2d 351, 355; Town of Windham v. LaPointe, 1973, Me., 308 A.2d 286, 290. The agency shop provision in the instant case is strictly a union security clause designed to induce union membership on the part of unwilling employees. While increased membership in labor organizations and greater participation in their activities is a legitimate goal of unions and the elimination of the free rider would be helpful in attaining such objective, the forced payment of dues or their equivalent under an agency shop clause is tantamount to coercion toward membership or, at the very least, toward participation in a labor organization expressly forbidden by statute. Absent express authorization by the Legislature, an agency shop provision in a collective bargaining agreement between public employees and their public employer, which exacts from non-members as a condition of continued employment in the bargaining unit in the guise of an equitable proportion of the cost of representation by the bargaining agent fees equal to but not in excess of the equivalent of dues to belong to the employee organization, is unlawful as violative of the statute protecting the right of public employees  voluntarily to join, form and participate in the activities of organizations of their own choosing. Such a provision contravenes the legislative policy contained in 26 M.R. S.A., § 964(1)(A) prohibiting coercion of employees in the exercise of their right of free choice to join and participate in the activities of labor organizations. [5] Authorities in support of our position: Smigel v. Southgate Community School District, 1972, 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305; New Jersey Turnpike Employees' Union, Local 194 etc. v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 1973, 123 N.J.Super. 461, 303 A.2d 599; New Jersey Turnpike Employees' Union, Local 194 v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 1971, 117 N.J.Super. 349, 284 A.2d 566, affirmed with modification, 1974, 64 N.J. 579, 319 A.2d 224; Farrigan v. Helsby, 1971, 68 Misc.2d 952, 327 N.Y.S.2d 909, aff'd 1973, 42 A.D.2d 265, 346 N.Y.S.2d 39; see also State Employees' Ass'n of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Mills, 1975, 115 N.H. 473, 344 A.2d 6; Town of North Kingstown v. North Kingstown Teachers Ass'n, 1972, 110 R.I. 698, 297 A.2d 342. In Lewiston Firefighters Association, supra, we said at page 164: In the absence of controlling language in our own statute, we find the federal experience persuasive. In the federal legislation enacted in 1935 and 1947, Congress specifically excepted union shop agreements (this includes agency shop agreements since the agency shop is the practical equivalent of the union shop) from an otherwise absolute right of employees to join, form, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing in collective bargaining or to refrain from any or all of such activities, and from conduct constituting unfair labor practices. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) and 158(a)(3). [6] It is reasonable to believe that in 1969, when it enacted the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law, the Maine Legislature was cognizant of these provisory exception clauses which legalized union security arrangements in the federal sphere, notwithstanding that the federal act contained analogous provisions as our sections 963 and 964 of chapter 26. The omission of any such provisos in our legislation is a sure indicator, absent any legislative history to the contrary, that our Legislators chose not to permit the agency shop in public employment in Maine. City of Hayward v. United Public Employees, Local 390, etc., 1976, 54 Cal.App.3d 761, 126 Cal. Rptr. 710. We hold that the agency shop provision of the instant collective bargaining agreement between the public employer District and the municipal public employees thereof is repugnant to sections 963 and 964 of the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law and, therefore, null and void. [7] Thus, the Board's failure to discharge the recalcitrant non-member teachers could not be the basis of a grievance within the scope of the agreement.