Opinion ID: 1904790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's Criminal Responsibility for the Murder of Brian Araujo

Text: In Johnson, 121 R.I. at 267, 399 A.2d at 476, this Court adopted the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code test for legal insanity. We held as follows: A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, his capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law is so substantially impaired that he cannot justly be held responsible. The terms `mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. [8] Johnson, 121 R.I. at 267, 399 A.2d at 476. This Court specifically chose to use the word wrongfulness over criminality in our definition of legal insanity because we believe that a person who, knowing an act to be criminal, committed it because of a delusion that the act was morally justified, should not be automatically foreclosed from raising the defense of lack of criminal responsibility. Johnson, 121 R.I. at 269, 399 A.2d at 477. Although the state bears the burden of proving all the elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant who raises the insanity defense bears the burden of proving his or her insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Smith, 512 A.2d 818, 822 (R.I.1986); State v. Capalbo, 433 A.2d 242, 245 (R.I.1981). [9] A defendant not only must prove that he suffered from this defect at the time of the offense, but also that he suffered from this defect to such a degree that he cannot justly be held responsible for the crime. State v. Gardner, 616 A.2d 1124, 1128-29 (R.I.1992) (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson, 121 R.I. at 270-71, 399 A.2d at 478). Furthermore, [t]he fact that a defendant engaged in unusual behavior or made bizarre or delusional statements does not compel a finding of insanity, and a defendant may suffer from a mental illness without being legally insane. Barrett, 768 A.2d at 938 (quoting People v. Gilmore, 273 Ill.App.3d 996, 210 Ill.Dec. 471, 653 N.E.2d 58, 61 (1995)). In evaluating a defendant's claim of insanity, the fact-finder considers expert testimony as well as the defendant's actions preceding, during, and after the crime. See Barrett, 768 A.2d at 936-37. We have distinguished the role of the expert psychiatrist from that of the factfinder in the legal insanity determination, explaining that: Ideally, psychiatristsmuch like experts in other fieldsshould provide grist for the legal mill, should furnish the raw data upon which the legal judgment is based. It is the psychiatrist who informs as to the mental state of the accusedhis characteristics, his potentialities, his capabilities. But once this information is disclosed, it is society as a whole, represented by judge or jury, which decides whether a [person] with the characteristics described should or should not be held accountable for his acts. Gardner, 616 A.2d at 1127 (quoting Johnson, 121 R.I. at 266-67, 399 A.2d at 476). There is no indication in the case at bar that the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence in finding defendant to be criminally responsible for Araujo's murder. As his written decision demonstrates, the trial justice considered each expert witness's testimony. He accepted Dr. Stewart's account of defendant's well-documented history of mental illness, and he noted Dr. Stewart's opinion that defendant had been incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct due to his belief that the murder was morally correct. He also noted what he considered to be Dr. Stewart's unsubstantiated testimony that a person can be in a psychotic state, yet still appear calm and lucid. The trial justice, however, found Dr. Cserr's testimony to be more reliable and credible than that of Dr. Stewart, [10] and accordingly afforded it more weight. He agreed with Dr. Cserr's assessment that the deliberateness with which defendant had obtained the murder weapon, along with defendant's clear recollection of the events of the day in question, and his calm and cooperative demeanor with the police following the murder, taken together, indicated that he had not killed Araujo in a psychotic delusion. Rather, the evidence showed a carefully orchestrated ambush in which defendant had lured Araujo to the park under the pretext of smoking marijuana. As the trial justice pointed out, his finding was consistent with our decision in Barrett, in which we upheld a fact-finder's rejection of a diminished-capacity defense based largely upon the methodical manner in which the defendant had cleaned the crime scene and had awaited the arrival of the police. See Barrett, 768 A.2d at 934, 937, 938 (where, after shooting his victim, the defendant discarded marijuana, unloaded his gun and placed it in a visible area, and removed his outer shirt so that police would not think he was armed). The trial justice further concurred with Dr. Cserr's opinion that defendant's wherewithal to concoct an alibi for the murder and his repeated denial of wrongdoing was evidence that he understood the wrongful nature of the act. To make the scene look like a botched robbery, defendant had removed Araujo's wallet from his person and had taken his ATM card for safekeeping. He also suggested that the blood on his clothes was the product of his attempt to save Araujo's life, further indicating that he had appreciated the difference between right and wrong. The trial justice emphasized that defendant did not confess until after detectives had confronted him with the overwhelming evidence of his involvement in the crime. Finally, as the trial justice explained, Dr. Cserr's testimony was consistent with the physical evidence, eyewitness testimony, and videotaped confession submitted at trial. In light of our considerable deference to the fact-finder, and because the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence, we conclude that he did not commit reversible error in finding that the defendant failed to prove his legal insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.