Opinion ID: 2164332
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The DCEPA.

Text: The FGCA, joined with respect to this issue by Common Cause/DC as amicus curiae, contends that the BZA violated the DCEPA, D.C.Code §§ 6-981 to -990 (1990 Supp.), by failing to conduct an environmental assessment to determine whether the University's Campus Plan was the kind of project which was likely to have an adverse impact on the environment, and whether an environmental impact statement was required under the Act. See §§ 6-981, -982(a), -983(a) and (c). The University contends, among other things, that the issue was not adequately raised before the Board. Under the rather unusual circumstances of this case, we agree with the University. The DCEPA, which became effective on October 18, 1989, contains a grandfather clause which exempts from its requirements any action for which ... entitlement or permission to act by a District government agency has been approved before December 31, 1989. D.C.Code § 6-986(a)(8) (1990 Supp.). In the present case, the BZA voted at a public meeting held on December 6, 1989 to approve the special exceptions. The Board did not issue its formal written decision until February 21, 1990. In a Memorandum in Lieu of Brief which he filed to address only the question of coverage under the DCEPA, the Corporation Counsel argues that [i]n these circumstances, the Board should be held to have approved the applications, within the meaning of § 6-986(a)(8), on December 6, 1989 and thus to have acted correctly in not commencing a new round of inquiries, determinations and proceedings under the DCEPA. The Corporation Counsel maintains that the BZA's deliberations had been concluded prior to the effective date of the Act and that the Board's written order simply effectuated what had been decided earlier. The purpose of § 6-986(a)(8), according to the Corporation Counsel, was clearly to permit agencies which had concluded their deliberations and come to a conclusion with respect to a project to avoid reopening the matter. The purpose is served by holding [that] the Board had approved the proposed actions here when it voted to approve them on December 6, 1989. We have no occasion to decide whether this court would adopt on its own initiative the construction of the DCEPA proposed to us by the District's chief legal officer. [11] We conclude, however, that the BZA was not obliged to adopt a different interpretation, in the absence of a contention by FGCA or by some other aggrieved party that this interpretation was not correct. [12] Neither the FGCA nor anyone else identified this problem to the Board or asked for a ruling on it. The BZA did not receive any submission relating to the DCEPA between January 1, 1990, when the Act became effective, and February 21, 1990, when the Board issued its written decision, nor did anyone anticipate the issue during 1989. In fact, the only reference by the FGCA to environmental issues in its proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was proposed Finding No. 33, in which the FGCA requested the Board to find that there has been no analysis of the environmental impact of the law school on site 4 conducted by an impartial expert and filed with the application. The FGCA proposed no Conclusion of Law on the subject, made no mention of the DCEPA, and never discussed the applicability of the grandfather clause. Essentially, the FGCA claims that the BZA erred by failing to hold, on its own initiative, and without any party having so contended in the proceedings before the agency, that although the DCEPA was not applicable when the BZA granted the special exceptions, it became applicable when 1990 dawned and the written decision had not yet been issued. According to the FGCA, the Board erred when it failed, sua sponte, to reopen a case which it had orally decided and which nobody had asked it to reopen. We do not agree with this position. As we have explained in an analogous judicial (rather than administrative) context, [q]uestions not properly raised and preserved during the proceedings under examination, and points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party's thesis, will normally be spurned on appeal. D.D. v. M.T., 550 A.2d 37, 48 (D.C.1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 369-70, 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967)). Environmental concerns are important, and we would be more reluctant to treat the point as having been waived if there were any appreciable danger that such a holding would contribute to the abdication of environmental values or to the pollution of the air or water or quality of life for the citizens of Fort Gaines or of the District. But there is no realistic threat of such baleful consequences in this case. Under proposed regulations promulgated on November 30, 1990 by the Mayor pursuant to the DCEPA, the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) is the lead agency responsible for overseeing the preparation of an environmental impact statement whenever a building permit is required. See 37 DCR 7588, 7593 (Nov. 30, 1990), to be codified in 20 DCMR § 7203.1(a). Moreover, we have been advised in a supplemental submission by the University, which the FGCA has not contradicted, that the DCRA has given the University a clean [environmental] bill of health in connection with the proposed site for the law school. [13] We are therefore confident that no injustice will flow from our invocation here of the general rule that arguments not presented to the agency will not be entertained by the court. [14]