Opinion ID: 852652
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: One or Many Class B Felony Arsons

Text: We now address the problem of multiple Class B felonies. Class B felony arson can be committed by property damage of $5,000, by endangering human life, or by damaging a dwelling or place of worship. There is no base crime of knowingly or intentionally destroying property by fire and more than one of the alternatives in section 1(a) can apply to the same act of destruction of a single property by fire. It can be arson if the property is owned by another and worth $250, or owned by anyone if the fire endangers human life, or damages a dwelling or place of worship. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that damage to a single property is only one arson, even if it fits under more than one subsection of section 1(a), or endangers more than one life.
The State first points to subsection (a)(2), which defines arson as a Class B felony if it involves circumstances which endanger human life. The State argues that this language makes the resulting endangerment an element of the crime, and thus, each endangered human life constitutes a separate crime. We agree that endangerment is an element of the crime, but endangerment of multiple persons without more, entails no additional consequences beyond endangerment of a single person. The legislature chose to use the phrase endanger human life and not endanger a person. Human life is endangered whether a single person or a group of people are endangered. In view of the well established principle that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly, we think that simply as a matter of syntax subsection (a)(2) makes endangerment of one life or many lives only one arson. Existing authority holds that one who destroys multiple properties with different owners is guilty of multiple counts of arson. See Williamson v. State, 798 N.E.2d 450, 451 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied. Based on this authority, the State argues that the legislature did not intend for a defendant who destroys properties with different owners to be guilty of multiple counts of arson, while the defendant who destroys a single property but injures multiple people commits only one arson. This argument relates to two different claims: that endangering two people is two Class B crimes under subsection (a)(2) and also to the issue discussed in Part I.C.whether injuring two people creates two Class A felonies under the last sentence of section 1(a). There is some appeal to the State's point, but the statute does not support it. The arson statute criminalizes damaging property (or a dwelling or a religious structure), not injuries to people. As a result, a single set of facts that satisfies more than one of the circumstances enumerated in section 1(a) (Dorsey burns the building causing $100,000 in property damage and also endangering human life) supports only one B felony as a violation of section 1(a) because only one property is damaged.
Dorsey was convicted of one count of Class B felony arson for knowingly setting fire to the Knot Here Lounge under circumstances that endangered human life, Indiana Code section 35-43-1-1(a)(2), and a separate count of Class B felony arson for knowingly setting fire to the lounge without the consent of its owner resulting in a pecuniary loss of at least $5,000, Indiana Code section 35-43-1-1(a)(3). Specifically, the two B felonies are based on damaging the bar valued at $100,000 and damaging the same bar under circumstances that endangered human life. Each of these has an element (endangering human life and pecuniary loss) not required by the other. The State concedes that the trial court erred in sentencing Dorsey to two consecutive twenty year terms for the two Class B felony arson convictions because under Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2, Dorsey's sentence for the two Class B felony arson convictions could be no more than the presumptive sentence for the next highest felony, which was thirty years for Class A felony arson. Thus, the State asks this Court to remand to the trial court to sentence Dorsey to 135 years imprisonment instead of 145 years executed. Dorsey responds that the two B felonies cannot stand and the Court of Appeals agreed, holding that Dorsey could not be convicted of two counts of Class B felony arson because the victim of the damage to property (the owner of the bar) was the same in both counts. The statute starts in section 1(a) by defining arson as a B felony if any one of four circumstances is found. We think as a matter of statutory construction this produces only one B felony arson whether one or more of the four alternatives in section 1(a) is established. Although damaging property is not sufficient to constitute arson, every form of arson requires it, and only damaging property is common to all. In that respect, damaging property is the central element of arson. The Court of Appeals in Montgomery v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1217, 1224-25 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied, focused on the number of victims of an arson as determinative of whether one or more than one Class B crime has been committed. Following this rationale, the Court of Appeals in this case held that Dorsey could be convicted of only one Class B arson because the victim of each of the two Class B felonies was the owner of the lounge. Mathews, 824 N.E.2d at 724. We agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals. However, the reason Dorsey committed only one Class B arson is that the number of arsons turns on the number of properties damaged under one or more of the qualifying circumstances (property damage of at least $5,000, endangering human life, dwelling, etc.). The structure of the arson statute dictates that damaging property owned by only one owner by the same use of fire, explosive, or destructive device is only one B felony arson, whether it falls under one or more than one of the alternatives in section 1(a). We reach this conclusion based on the structure of the B felony arson defined by section 1(a). It does not define different B felony crimes that might be called arson endangering life or arson causing pecuniary loss or arson of a dwelling. Although the statutory language could be clearer, it defines Class B felony arson as knowingly or intentionally damaging one person's property by fire with any one of the alternative criteria in subsections (a)(1)-(4). But, so long as only one person's property is damaged by fire, there is only one Class B arson even if more than one of the circumstances set forth in subsection (a)(1)-(4) are found.
A fire damaging properties owned by multiple persons can however produce multiple crimes. Thus, one who sets fire to a shop in a mall which spreads and destroys five other businesses in the mall commits five arsons. Williamson, 798 N.E.2d at 451. Because the arson statute defines the crime in terms of damage to property, not injury to people, the result in Williamson is correct. The person who knowingly or intentionally damages multiple properties, each in an amount in excess of $5,000, in a manner that is forbidden by the arson statute has committed multiple crimes. One who, with the requisite mens rea, shoots two people with the same shot commits two murders. This result is consistent with the holdings in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Orr, 149 Ill. App.3d 348, 102 Ill.Dec. 772, 500 N.E.2d 665, 678 (1986) (multiple arson convictions and sentences were appropriate for single act of setting fire to one residence which spread and damaged neighboring residences); People v. Barber, 255 Mich.App. 288, 659 N.W.2d 674, 679 (2003); State v. Jackson, 2003 Mich.App. LEXIS 2522, at  (Oct. 7, 2003) (defendant properly convicted of forty-one counts of arson based on a single fire that destroyed forty-one apartment units); State v. Brown, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5885, at -6 (Mar. 12, 1986) (defendant guilty of three arsons when she set fire to a bowling alley and the fire spread and ignited two adjacent buildings). Here, the enhancing factor is not damaging multiple properties, but damage to one property which also endangered human life.