Opinion ID: 427194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Summary Witness

Text: 53 Toward the end of its case-in-chief the government requested that the court allow James Kasper, an FBI agent and certified public accountant, to summarize the evidence about the complex cash flow through offshore companies that the government had introduced via direct examination of its witnesses. Kasper used four summary charts to re-examine this evidence in a more organized fashion. He relied on numerous letters, invoices and bank drafts, as well as the testimony of numerous witnesses already in evidence to present his summary. Kasper prefaced each piece of his testimony by identifying the document in evidence from which he obtained the information. The defendants objected to Kasper's testimony on the grounds that he was an improper witness under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and his testimony would unfairly prejudice their defense. The district court held a full voir dire examination before ruling that Kasper would be allowed to testify, subject to limiting instructions that his testimony was explanatory and was not itself substantive evidence. The defendants renew on appeal objections rejected by the district court. 54 They argue that a non-expert summary witness is improper under Federal Rule of Evidence 602. Rule 602 requires that non-experts testify only as to matters of which they have personal knowledge; 30 its purpose is to assure reliability. See Fed.R.Evid. 602 advisory committee note. In this case, neither Rule 602's literal language nor its overriding purpose was violated. Kasper did not testify about any of the events underlying the trial: he only summarized evidence about cash flows that several prior witnesses had already offered. As to that evidence, he testified from his personal knowledge of the transcripts and exhibits. Hence Rule 602 does not bar his testimony. 55 This court has not previously ruled on the admissibility of one witness's summary of evidence already presented by prior witnesses. Other courts, however, have recently confronted the question and permitted such summaries under Rule 1006, allowing for admission into evidence of summaries of documents too voluminous to be conveniently examined in court. See, e.g., United States v. Atchley, 699 F.2d 1055 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 2168, 60 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1979); United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870, 99 S.Ct. 200, 58 L.Ed.2d 182 (1978); United States v. Nathan, 536 F.2d 988, 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 337, 50 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). The defendants argue that Rule 1006 was meant to be restricted to summaries of writings not feasible for direct admission into evidence. See Reply Brief for Appellants at 24. The language of Rule 1006, however, supports a broader interpretation that would allow summaries of documents already in evidence. 31 The mere fact that the documents at issue are already in evidence assures neither that they can be conveniently examined in court nor that they have been examined in court. In this case, Judge Johnson explicitly noted that she was unable to permit in court examination of each [document] by the jury. Tr. at 2016. In any case, we note that Rule 1006 was designed primarily as an exception to the best evidence rule, see United States v. Johnson, 594 F.2d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964, 100 S.Ct. 451, 62 L.Ed.2d 376 (1979), and since the evidence itself here was already before the court, there is no issue of inadmissibility under Rule 1002 as a replacement for the best evidence. See S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 751 (3d ed. 1982). Hence, [e]ntirely aside from Rule 1006, there would still be ample authority for the admission of [summary testimony] into evidence.... There is an established tradition that permits a summary of evidence to be put before the jury with proper limiting instructions. Scales, 594 F.2d at 563; see, e.g., United States v. Esser, 520 F.2d 213, 218 (7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 3166, 49 L.Ed.2d 1184 (1976); Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828, 92 S.Ct. 139, 30 L.Ed.2d 56 (1971). Thus, we conclude that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not bar use of non-expert summary testimony such as is presented in this case. 56 The contention that Kasper's testimony unfairly prejudiced the defendants raises more troubling concerns, heightened by the fact acknowledged by Judge Johnson that the non-expert summary evidence was cumulative, and hence subject to challenge under Rule 403. See Tr. at 1930; S. Saltzburg & K. Reddon,supra, at 751 (summaries of documents introduced in evidence ... are better handled under Rule 403 than under Rule 1006); cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., 505 F.Supp. 1313, 1334 (E.D.Pa.1980) (as amended 1981) (expert opinions that merely rehash evidence inadmissible because unhelpful). Since the summary testimony is relevant, under Rule 403 it is admissible unless the dangers of unfair prejudice it creates outweigh its probative value. See United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966, 99 S.Ct. 1516, 59 L.Ed.2d 782 (1979); United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861 (D.C.Cir.1978). Unlike the probative value of expert testimony, which can instruct the court in the ways of [the expert's] work, Zenith Radio, 505 F.Supp. at 1334, the value of a summary witness is more subtle. But, just as an expert can assist a jury by imparting special knowledge that helps the jury to understand technical evidence, a non-expert summary witness can help the jury organize and evaluate evidence which is factually complex and fragmentally revealed in the testimony of a multitude of witnesses throughout the trial. See Scales, 594 F.2d at 563 (purpose of summary witness is simply to aid the jury in examination of evidence already admitted). 57 Nonetheless, there are obvious dangers posed by summarization of evidence. United States v. Apodaca, 666 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 53, 74 L.Ed.2d 58 (1982). Although we usually defer to the district court's assessment of whether the probative value of evidence outweighs the possibility of prejudice, see United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C.Cir.1973) (standard of review is abuse of discretion); United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782 (8th Cir.1980), the pervasiveness of these dangers requires that we review the use of a summary witness closely. 58 One danger is that a jury will treat the summary as additional evidence or as corroborative of the truth of the underlying testimony. This danger has led to the requirement of 'guarding instructions' to the effect that the [summary] is not itself evidence but is only an aid in evaluating evidence. Even with such instructions, a summary may be considered too conclusory, or as emphasizing too much certain portions of the Government's case, or as presenting incompetent facts. Scales, 594 F.2d at 564. In this case, however, we think the dangers are shadow, not substance. The trial judge gave the requisite guarding instructions 32 and, through voir dire examination, allowed the defense to object to any portions of the summary testimony before the jury heard them. This device minimized substantially the danger that the jury might treat the summary as substantive evidence. See Scales, 594 F.2d at 563-64; Gordon, 438 F.2d at 877; see also Esser, 520 F.2d at 218 ([s]ummary testimony does not allow witness to invade the province of the jury). 59 The defendants also had full opportunity to cross-examine Kasper, further alleviating any danger of inaccuracy or unfair characterization. See United States v. King, 616 F.2d 1034, 1041 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969, 100 S.Ct. 2950, 64 L.Ed.2d 829 (1980); Gordon, 438 F.2d at 876-77. They argue nonetheless that by restricting his summary to testimony given during direct (rather than cross) examination of government witnesses, Kasper undermined their ability to cross-examine him. However, they point to no instance where the cross-examination of a witness whose direct testimony was summarized would have changed the summary. Defendants cite Flemister v. United States, 260 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.1958), for the proposition that a summary witness must present a full and even handed summary. Reply Brief for Appellants at 52. But Flemister clearly declares: A summary, to be admissible, we think need not give effect to the contentions of the accused. Id. at 517. Flemister only required that the summary be what it purports to be. Id. Since Kasper never purported to do more than summarize the government's evidence on cash flows, his testimony was in accord with Flemister. The defense specifically points to the trial judge's refusal to allow cross-examination about Interconex's cost of shipping as indicative of unfairly circumscribed cross-examination. Brief for Appellants at 54. But that question was outside the scope of the witness's direct testimony, which dealt only with cash flows, and would have required the witness to refer to statements not in evidence. Tr. at 2053-54. The cross-examination at voir dire, where the defense repeatedly questioned the accuracy of the summary and convinced the trial judge to bar testimony based on one of the four summary charts the government hoped to introduce, further indicates that the cross-examination was not unfairly circumscribed. Tr. at 2002-03. 60 True, Kasper did not prepare the summary charts himself. Cf. Gordon, 438 F.2d at 877 (noting with approval that agent who prepared the chart was available for cross-examination). Kasper, however, had carefully reviewed the charts and ensured that they reflected information contained in documents already in evidence. He was able to identify the source of all the information on the chart and to explain how all the dollar figures were derived. The defense counsel also made the jury well aware that Kasper had not prepared the charts. Tr. at 2036-37. Although we believe the better practice is to require that summary charts be prepared by the witness, in this case the fact that Kasper did not prepare the charts in no way hampered the defendants' ability to cross-examine him, and therefore did not prejudice the defense. 61 A second danger posed by summarized evidence is the subtle introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence. Rule 1006 was not meant to relieve the government of its obligation to lay a sufficient foundation for any evidence it expects the jury to consider. Requiring the proponent [of a summary] to show the admissibility of the underlying materials is necessary to protect the integrity of the Federal Rules [of Evidence]. Johnson, 594 F.2d at 1255; see also United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d at 1344 n. 5; King, 616 F.2d at 1041. The defendants contend that some of Kasper's testimony was inadmissible because he based it on material not in evidence. Although Kasper relied on out-of-court statements for his understanding of some of the financial transactions, he did not testify about anything other than what was already in evidence. 33 Hence, the defendants' contentions that Kasper introduced otherwise inadmissible evidence are unfounded. 62 A third danger posed by summaries of evidence is that they provide an extra summation for the government that comes from the witness stand rather than the counsel's lecturn. The distinction between valid summary testimony and argument is not a bright line. The task of organizing testimony can quickly turn into the marshalling of facts to support a particular position. But the word argument connotes a taking of sides in a controversy. 34 Thus, a summary should not draw controversial inferences or pronounced judgment; these functions are best left to the closing argument of counsel. Here, however, the summary involved only routine computations and culling through of documents to eliminate confusing and extraneous evidence. Consequently we find no force to the argument that Kasper's testimony provided an unwarranted second closing for the government. 63 We have reviewed in detail the summary of evidence provided by Kasper and we find that the summary did not stray from evidence already presented. The district court carefully considered the need for a summary after hearing all the government's witnesses testify, and felt that the jury would benefit from the summary testimony. Thus, allowing Kasper to testify was no abuse of discretion by the district court.