Opinion ID: 1932784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Degree Murder While Armed

Text: Busey does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to prove that he murdered Dickens, but he does contest whether it sufficed to prove murder in the first degree. D.C.Code § 22-2401 provides, in pertinent part: Whoever, being of sound memory and discretion, kills another purposely, either of deliberate and premeditated malice or by means of poison... is guilty of murder in the first degree. [10] First degree murder is distinguished from second degree murder in that it requires premeditation and deliberation. See Mills v. United States, 599 A.2d 775, 781 (D.C.1991). To prove premeditation, the government must show that a defendant, before acting, gave thought to the idea of taking a human life and reached a definite decision to kill, while deliberation is proved by demonstrating that the accused acted with consideration and reflection upon the preconceived design to kill. McAdoo v. United States, 515 A.2d 412, 427 (D.C.1986). Although no specific amount of time is necessary to demonstrate premeditation and deliberation, the evidence must demonstrate that the accused did not kill impulsively, in the heat of passion, or in an orgy of frenzied activity. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 371 (D.C.1979). Premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances. McAdoo, 515 A.2d at 427. [I]ndeed, circumstantial evidence may be more compelling than direct testimony. Mills, 599 A.2d at 780. Busey contends that the government failed to prove that the murder of Dickens was premeditated. He argues that the only evidence is that witnesses heard a gun go off behind a closed bedroom door, discovered Dickens in that bedroom with a gunshot wound to his head, and placed Busey in the room with Dickens when they heard the shot. Busey emphasizes that no witnesses saw him with the murder weapon or testified that he brought a weapon to the scene and that the murder weapon itself was never recovered. No witness testified to hearing any argument between Busey and Dickens. Furthermore, Busey argues, there was insufficient evidence of a robbery, and thus the government never established a motive for the homicide. We agree with the government, however, that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable jury to infer premeditation. First, the circumstances surrounding the murder suggest that Busey reached a definite decision to kill, McAdoo, 515 A.2d at 427, and did not kill impulsively, in the heat of passion, or in an orgy of frenzied activity, Frendak, 408 A.2d at 371. As witnesses testified, before entering the bedroom Busey said he wanted to speak to Dickens alone. Busey then entered the bedroom and closed the door behind him. Witnesses heard no loud argument, nor anything to suggest that the murder was an unplanned act of anger precipitated by an unexpected dispute or provocation; rather, Jennifer Inman testified that she heard Busey ask Dickens how much money he usually brought with him into the area. Shortly after Busey went into the bedroom, the witnesses heard only one shot, and they found Dickens lying in his bed with a single bullet wound in his head. Busey walked out of the bedroom and the apartment, first making a deliberate threat to the individuals in the room. There is no indication that Busey appeared agitated or inflamed; to the contrary, David Robinson, who drove Busey away from the scene, testified that he appeared calm. The fact that Busey murdered Dickens with a gun is additional evidence that the homicide was premeditated and deliberated, because the jury reasonably could infer that Busey must have brought the weapon with him to Carletta Inman's apartment. Carrying a gun to the scene of the murder is highly probative of premeditation and deliberation because it suggests that the defendant arrived on the scene with a preconceived plan to kill. Frendak, 408 A.2d at 371; see also Hall v. United States, 454 A.2d 314, 318 (D.C. 1982) (defendant bringing murder weapon to scene permits inference he `arrived on the scene already possessed of a calmly planned and calculated intent to kill') (quoting Belton v. United States, 127 U.S.App. D.C. 201, 203, 382 F.2d 150, 153 (1967)); Mills, 599 A.2d at 782; McAdoo, 515 A.2d at 427. It is true, as Busey argues, that no witness actually saw him with the murder weapon in the apartment. But there was no evidence that Busey somehow might have happened to find the gun while he was inside the apartmentno testimony, for example, that there was a gun already in the bedroom where Dickens was murdered, or that anyone else who was present at the scene of the murder had a gun; and there was no testimony, nor any physical signs, suggesting a struggle in the bedroom between Busey and Dickens over the weapon. Significantly, however, there was evidencethe recovery of the .38 special cartridges from Busey's apartment and the testimony of DeAngela Jones and Pamela Jonestending to prove, as we discuss infra, that Busey himself contemporaneously possessed and displayed a gun that could have been the murder weapon. Moreover, as we discuss next, there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to conclude that Busey had a motive for planning to murder Dickens, namely robbery. Although proof of a motive to kill is not necessarily inconsistent with a sudden overpowering rage, Mills, 599 A.2d at 781, it does tend to suggest `a purposeful or reasoned killing,' id. (quoting Hall, 454 A.2d at 317). Here, there is no evidence that Busey executed his plan to rob and kill Dickens other than deliberately. Nor did the evidence intimate any plausible reason for the murder other than robbery. On the contrary, the proof established robbery as the motive for Busey's actions, and that proof corroborates the other evidence of premeditation that we have described. Taking all this evidence into account, we are satisfied that it was, in toto, sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict of guilty on the charge of murder in the first degree.