Opinion ID: 206451
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Voluntary-Dismissal Exception

Text: Systems Painters first argues that Powers 's voluntary-dismissal exception to the time-of-filing rule applies in this case. The district court rejected this argument, finding that Long's dismissal was undoubtedly involuntary as to Knudson. While Systems Painters concedes that the dismissal of Long was initially involuntary, it argues that Knudson transformed this dismissal into a voluntary one by not seeking, inter alia, a writ of mandumus or a certification of the order for interlocutory appeal. Generally, courts have suggested that a dismissal is voluntary as to a plaintiff only if the plaintiff initiated the dismissal. Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 72 n. 3 (7th Cir.1992) (citing Self v. Gen. Motors Corp., 588 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that pursuant to Powers and Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U.S. 635, 20 S.Ct. 248, 44 L.Ed. 303 (1900), only a voluntary act of the plaintiff could bring about removal to federal court)). When the diversity-destroying defendant initiates its own dismissal, and when the court's order is against the will of the plaintiff, the dismissal is not voluntary. Whitcomb, 175 U.S. at 637, 20 S.Ct. 248. In this case, Long filed a motion to be dismissed from the case, and Knudson filed a memorandum in opposition to Long's motion. Thus, the court's order dismissing Long was initiated by Long, and it was entered against Knudson's will. Therefore, the court's dismissal of Long was involuntaryat least initiallyas to Knudson. The Second Circuit has held that a plaintiff's post-dismissal action (or inaction) can transform an initially involuntary dismissal into a voluntary one. In Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., the court held that a plaintiff's failure to appeal a state court's order dismissing diversity-destroying defendants upon the diversity-destroying defendants' motion could transform an involuntary dismissal into a voluntary one. 616 F.2d 38, 40 n. 2 (2d Cir.1980). Contra Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249, 252 (11th Cir.1988) (rejecting Quinn 's holding that a plaintiff's failure to timely appeal a dismissal order makes an initially involuntary dismissal a voluntary one). However, it is unclear whether the plaintiff in Quinn took steps to oppose the diversity-destroying defendants' motion prior to the state court's order, as Knudson did. Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in Quinn, Knudson filed a timely appeal of the order dismissing Long, although the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as interlocutory. [6] Thus, since this case is distinguishable from Quinn, and since Systems Painters cites no other authority for the proposition that a plaintiff's actions can transform an involuntary dismissal into a voluntary one, Systems Painters has failed to prove that Knudson voluntarily dismissed Long for purposes of the Powers exception.