Opinion ID: 1745624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Section 804.20 to Chapter 321J.

Text: The State argues that since Didonato elected to take the test rather than to refuse to take it, the administrative penalty imposed is the most lenient he could have obtained. It contends that the limited statutory right to counsel granted by section 804.20 is not applicable in the context of this violation of chapter 321J. Our cases have held that there is a limited right to counsel pursuant to section 804.20 for persons confronting application of the implied consent provisions of chapter 321J. See, e.g., Vietor, 261 N.W.2d at 832. The State points out that many of these cases involve individuals who refused to take a chemical test after being denied counsel. See Ferguson v. State, Dep't of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 424 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 1988); Fuller v. Dep't of Transp., 275 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1979); State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1978). The State reasons that in those cases rescission of the revocation was proper because the individuals involved were prejudiced by the denial of counsel, since the administrative penalties for refusal are greater than those for failing the test. Iowa Code § 321J.9 (1987). The license revocation period is 240 days if a person refuses to submit to a chemical test, whereas the period is 180 days if the person submits to the test and the result shows an alcohol concentration of .10% or more. The advice of counsel, the State argues, may have resulted in a sounder decision with less harsh results. By way of contrast, the State contends, an individual who chooses to consent to chemical testing faces the lesser of the two administrative penalties, and as a result is not prejudiced by denial of his or her statutory right to counsel. This argument raises the question of whether violation of the limited statutory right to counsel requires exclusion of the evidence obtained within the context of a license revocation proceeding. In Manders v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 454 N.W.2d 364 (Iowa 1990), we recently decided that there are no provisions in the several statutes comprising the implied consent law itself that suggest any basis for imposition of a statutory exclusionary rule in the context of administrative proceedings absent adjudication in a related criminal proceeding. Id. at 366. The provisions of section 804.20, however, are broadly applicable, although not directly related to the license suspension provisions of chapter 321J. This court has ruled that section 804.20 grants a limited right to consult with counsel in a criminal context. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d at 832. We have also held that the limited right to counsel adopted by Vietor is applicable to department of transportation revocation proceedings. Ferguson, 424 N.W.2d at 466; Fuller, 275 N.W.2d at 411. Fuller establishes the principle that the exclusionary rule adopted in the context of criminal cases is fully applicable to license revocation proceedings based on a refusal to submit to a chemical test.