Opinion ID: 2192843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Prostitution

Text: Defendants also maintain that the trial court denied their Sixth Amendment rights by foreclosing inquiry into evidence of the complainant's prostitution. Defendants' argument in this regard is basically that evidence of complainant's prostitution is supportive of defendants' account of their group sexual encounters as consensual, although there is little or no evidence they were undertaken for pay. Again, defendants do not clearly state exactly why they consider such evidence probative of consent. It seems that part of the claimed relevance is based on the defendants' belief that the complainant, to quote defendant Williams' brief, in furtherance of this pattern of prostitution, willingly engaged in sexual relations with him [defendant Williams] in the past, and on the night in question. However, the record is virtually devoid of any suggestion that the complainant was engaging in sexual intercourse with the four defendants on the night in question for money. Defendant Williams, the only defendant to testify, stated on direct examination that while in the Moon Glow bar he simply asked the complainant to have sex with him. Q. [By Mr. Brown, counsel for defendant Williams]: Okay, and what did you say indicating that something was going to take place at your cousin's house? A. Well, I asked her [the complainant] did she, you know, want to engage in sex. Q. What was her response? A. She said, `yes.' There is not the slightest hint here in defendant Williams' version of the events that the complainant expected financial recompense for any sexual services. Nor is any such expectation present in defendant Williams' account on direct examination of his solicitation of the complainant to have intercourse with the other defendants. Q. Okay. You had this conversation with the individuals you spoke of [defendants Respress and Anderson asked defendant Williams to ask the complainant if she would have intercourse with all four of them] in the kitchen and did you do anything as a result of that conversation? A. Yes, I went and sat down with Peaches [the complainant] and I asked her how she felt about having sex with all four of us. Q. You asked Peaches whether or not she would be willing to have sex with all four of you? A. Right. Q. What was her response? A. She said it was okay, that she'd done it before. In fact, according to defendant Williams, the only talk of money between the complainant and any of the defendants occurred after the acts of sexual intercourse which form the subject matter of this case, as defendants Anderson and Williams were letting her out of the car after having taken her back to the City of Detroit. According to defendant Williams, as the complainant was leaving the car she asked for $15 or $20. However, defendant Williams admitted, on cross-examination, that that was the first time complainant had asked for any money. Q. [By Mr. Hutting, Assistant Prosecutor]: When you dropped her off at Selden and Second, when she got out of the car, that is the first time she asked for money, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. And she asked for $15 or $20, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. It is evident that defendants did not seek to establish at trial that the complainant consented to sexual intercourse with all four defendants as an act of prostitution. Thus we need not decide whether upon a proper record supporting the defense of financially induced consent, a trial court could constitutionally exclude evidence of prior or past prostitution based on § 520j(2). Defendants' argument that evidence of prostitution has probative value on the issue of consent depends on whether the bare fact that a complainant has engaged in intercourse for money has any tendency to make it more probable that such a complainant would consent to intercourse without financial arrangements. We believe that any proffered evidence of complainant's reputation for, or specific acts of, prostitution, on the record made below, was not sufficiently probative to have been admitted. Other courts have been faced with this same type of issue and have held as we do now. The reasoning for this ruling is coherently expressed in the following excerpt from an opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court. The key to assessing the probative value of the excluded evidence is its relevancy to the matters as proof of which it is offered. Appellants contend that evidence of complainant's reputation as a prostitute is relevant to the issue of consent, which was Ogletree's defense to the rape charge. The supposed relevancy here rests on an assumption that prior unchastity with other individuals indicates a likelihood of consent to the act in question with the defendant. While this premise may have had some validity in an earlier time, it seems quite unpersuasive in today's era of more fluid morals.    Assuming that instances might exist where prior sexual activity by the complainant with third parties is relevant, we are not presented with such a situation in the present application of [Ohio Rev Code Ann §] 2907.02(D) [Ohio's rape shield law]. Evidence that complainant had a reputation as a prostitute is not sufficiently probative of consent to outweigh the state's legitimate interests in excluding the testimony, at least where there is no suggestion in the record that financial arrangements were entered into for sexual activities in this instance. State v Gardner, 59 Ohio St 2d 14, 18; 391 NE2d 337, 340-341 (1979) (emphasis supplied). Accord, Commonwealth v Joyce, ___ Mass ___, ___; 415 NE2d 181, 187 (1981); State v Quinn, 121 Ariz 582, 585; 592 P2d 778, 781 (Ariz App, 1978) (ruling that evidence of victim's prior acts of prostitution is not admissible where defendant does not claim the defense of consent to an act of prostitution). In fact, if anything, evidence that a complainant was a prostitute would seem more probative of the fact that she would be reluctant to provide sexual services to four men gratis. Accordingly, we find no denial of defendants' right of confrontation and cross-examination in foreclosing this proposed inquiry into irrelevant evidence. [4]
Finally, defendants assert that the trial court denied their constitutional right to confront the complainant by not permitting them to impeach her credibility through evidence of her prostitution. This claim is of minimal merit and need not detain us long. Initially, we note that even had the complainant been convicted of the charge of accosting and soliciting at the time this case went to trial  of which there is no record support  defendants could not have impeached her credibility due to this fact alone under MRE 609 since accosting and soliciting is a misdemeanor, MCL 750.448; MSA 28.703, and it cannot seriously be contended that accosting and soliciting involves theft, dishonesty or false statement. See Committee Note on MRE 609. [5] As to defendants' endeavor to impeach the complainant's credibility through her alleged reputation as a prostitute, we stress again this Court's requirement that the impeaching evidence be related to the character trait of truthfulness or untruthfulness. As with prior sexual conduct evidence, we see no logical relation between a complainant's reputation for prostitution and the character trait of truthfulness or untruthfulness. The law should not recognize any necessary connection between a witness's veracity and her sexual immorality. State ex rel Pope v Mohave Superior Court, 113 Ariz 22, 26; 545 P2d 946, 950 (1976). We agree fully with the following observation from Joyce, supra, 415 NE2d 185. Nor is the fact that a woman engages in sex for hire relevant to the issue of her credibility. `The rule is well established that the fact that a female witness is a prostitute or keeps a house of ill fame is not admissible to impeach her.' Commonwealth v Vandenhecke, 248 Mass 403, 404; 143 NE 337 (1924). The defendants were not denied any right of confrontation in being foreclosed from attempting to impeach the credibility of the complainant due to her specific acts of, or reputation for, prostitution.