Opinion ID: 1816807
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Co-Employee Claim

Text: Johnson also sued three co-employees alleging negligent or wanton failure to provide a safe workplace. We note that Code 1975, § 25-5-11 now bars co-employee suits based on negligent or wanton failure to provide a safe workplace. However, the bar of § 25-5-11 is not applicable to Johnson's cause of action because the incident he complains of occurred prior to the effective date of this statute. The co-employees' motion for summary judgment stated only one ground: contributory negligence. We believe summary judgment is improper as to these defendants. We note at the outset that the question of contributory negligence is generally a question of fact for the jury. Sun Gas, Inc. v. Perry, 450 So.2d 1085 (Ala.1984). However, the conduct of the plaintiff in certain cases may be so lacking in reasonable care for his own safety that reasonable minds may not differ on the issue of the plaintiff's own negligence; in such a case the question becomes one of law. Elba Wood Products, Inc. v. Brackin, 356 So.2d 119, 124 (Ala.1978). Moreover, if there is a scintilla of evidence to the contrary, the question of contributory negligence must go to the jury. Id. See also, Central Alabama Elec. Co-op v. Tapley, 546 So.2d 371 (Ala.1989) (finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law requires that plaintiff put himself in danger and appreciate the danger consciously at the time he does so); Terry v. Life Insurance Co. of Georgia, 551 So.2d 385 (Ala.1989). The case of Wallace v. Doege, 484 So.2d 404 (Ala.1986), describes the defendant's burden in proving contributory negligence: In order to prove contributory negligence, the defendant must show that the party charged: (1) had knowledge of the condition; (2) had an appreciation of the danger under the surrounding circumstances; and (3) failed to exercise reasonable care, by placing himself in the way of danger. Hatton v. Chem-Haulers, Inc., 393 So.2d 950 (Ala.1980); Baptist Medical Center v. Byars, 289 Ala. 713, 271 So.2d 847 (1972). Doege, 484 So.2d at 406. In that case we held that the plaintiff Doege had been contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The evidence showed that the plaintiff had 25 years' experience in handling saws, that she had been instructed as to the proper method of cleaning the saw that injured her, that she was aware that no more than two persons had inspected the saw for safety, if it had been inspected at all, and that Doege knew she could be injured if she tried to clean the saw blade without stopping the saw. Consequently, we stated that the only conclusion to be reached was that Doege knew of the danger, appreciated it, and then put herself in danger by trying to clean the blade without turning the saw off. Id. See also Fenley v. Rouselle Corp., 531 So.2d 304 (Ala.1988) (plaintiff had been press operator for 10 years and was thoroughly familiar with operations of the press and the surrounding circumstances and knew that company policy required him to stop all power before attempting die change). The record does not compel a finding of contributory negligence in the case at bar. There was evidence that Johnson had only a few months' experience in working at the press that injured him; that the only guard at the nip point of the press was easily detached, and that this guard did not reach all areas of the nip point; that the nip point could be entered from other unguarded directions; that a warning label at the control station had been covered over; and that Johnson had not been trained to use handtools and was encouraged by management to operate the press as fast as he could. This evidence suggested that he used the press on a continuous cycle and often had to use his bare hand rather than a tool to remove scrap. There was also evidence to indicate that up until the day of the accident safety rules were not enforced, and that other operators of presses did not use handtools and were not injured. See, Evans v. Tanner, 286 Ala. 651, 244 So.2d 782 (1971) (plaintiff is not contributorily negligent if he merely does what other prudent people do without injury). Johnson's deposition testimony states that he was never reprimanded for failure to use handtools to remove scrap; the evidence also indicates that other operators were not reprimanded either, although the practice allegedly was common. Moreover, Johnson's testimony shows that he asked for a copy of the press operator's manual but that none was ever supplied to him. Testimony also indicates that at safety meetings supervisory personnel stressed high production and gave little, if any, attention to safety matters. However, testimony does indicate that a safety meeting was held on the night of Johnson's accident and that at that meeting the proper use of handtools was stressed, although allegedly the rule regarding their use was not enforced. Evidence also indicated that before he reached into the nip point Johnson pressed the stop button in order to stop the press's cycle. After considering all of these factors, we find that there is at least a scintilla of evidence to show that Johnson was not contributorily negligent. Johnson may have been heedless of the danger presented by the press, but this does not rise to the level of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Decatur Light, P. & F. Co. v. Newsom, 179 Ala. 127, 59 So. 615 (1912). Therefore, summary judgment in reliance on a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law was improper; whether Johnson was contributorily negligent was a question for the jury. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment as to the AEMLD claims, and we reverse the summary judgment as to the co-employee defendants and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. JONES, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. MADDOX, ADAMS, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.