Opinion ID: 2972059
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discretionary-Function Exception to the FTCA

Text: Before a suit may be maintained against the United States, the United States must consent to being sued. Montez v. United States, 359 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976)). Through its enactment of the FTCA, Congress has waived the United States’s immunity from suits: for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). This waiver of sovereign immunity is subject to a number of limitations, including the discretionary-function exception codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to “[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused”). If the discretionary-function exception applies and Congress has not otherwise waived the United States’s immunity, then we lack subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See Rich, 119 F.3d at 450. When determining whether the United States is immune from suit based on the discretionaryfunction exception, we engage in a two-step analysis. We first consider “whether the challenged act or omission violated a mandatory regulation or policy that allowed no judgment or choice. If so, the discretionary function exception does not apply” because “the employee had no rightful option but to adhere to the directive” and thus “there was no element of judgment or choice in the complained of conduct.” Rosebush v. United States, 119 F.3d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If the challenged action is deemed discretionary, we proceed to step two of the analysis, in which we determine “whether the conduct is ‘of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991)). In undertaking such an evaluation, we keep in mind that “the discretionary function exception was designed to prevent” courts from being required “to ‘second guess’ the political, social, and economic judgments of an agency exercising its regulatory function.” United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 820 (1984). Such judgments are not restricted to those made by an agency’s policymakers, for “it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case.” Id. at 813; see Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325 (concluding that day-to-day management of savings and loan by federal regulators fell within scope of discretionary-function exception, explaining that, “A discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment; there is nothing in that description that refers exclusively to policymaking or planning functions.”). We also consider the fact that “[w]hen established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that1 the agent’s acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324. 1 We note that there appears to be some debate as to the impact of this so-called Gaubert presumption on the question of which party bears the burden of proving the applicability (or inapplicability) of the discretionary-function exception. In Carlyle v. United States, Department of the Army, a case decided before the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Gaubert, we explained: Because § 2680 clearly limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a plaintiff can invoke jurisdiction only if the complaint is facially outside the exceptions of § 2680. . . . Only after a plaintiff has No. 03-2516 Sharp v. United States Page 4
Sharp’s first theory of liability is that the National Forest Service acted negligently in allowing Bull Gap to remain open during nighttime hours without providing better lighting conditions. According to Sharp, the National Forest Service’s decisions regarding Bull Gap’s hours of operation and lighting conditions do not come within the reach of the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA because the Forest Service Manual mandates the protection of visitors’ health and safety, and the National Forest Service acted negligently in effectuating this policy. At the heart of this claim is Title 6700 of the Forest Service Manual, which provides in part: 6702 - OBJECTIVE. The objective of the Forest Service safety and health program is to ensure adequate protection for Forest Service employees and property, Human Resource Program participants, and the visiting public. . . . 6703 - POLICY