Opinion ID: 2516487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: florence haneberg briney issue

Text: Florence argues that the district court erred in determining that the devise to her lapsed upon the death of Francis Haneberg Ervin. An appellate court's review of the construction of a will and codicil entered on undisputed facts is unlimited. An appellate court is not bound by the determination of the trial court. In re Estate of Sanders, 261 Kan. 176, 181, 929 P.2d 153 (1996); In re Estate of Cline, 258 Kan. 196, 199, 898 P.2d 643 (1995). In considering a will, a court cannot begin by inferring a testator's intention and then construe the will to give effect to such intention, however probable it may be, nor can it rewrite the will in whole or in part to conform to such presumed intention. It is the duty of a court to construe, not to construct, a will. Sanders, 261 Kan. at 182. Where a court is called upon to determine the force and effect to be given terms of a will, the court's first duty is to survey the instrument in its entirety and ascertain whether its language is so indefinite and uncertain as to require employment of rules of judicial construction to determine its force and effect. In re Estate of Wernet, 226 Kan. 97, Syl. ¶ 1, 596 P.2d 137 (1979); In re Estate of Mildrexter, 25 Kan. App.2d 834, 836, 971 P.2d 758 (1999). Where the language of a will is clear, definite, and unambiguous, the court should not consider rules of judicial construction to determine the intent of the testator. Sanders, 261 Kan. at 182; Wernet, 226 Kan. 97, Syl. ¶ 2. The critical test in determining whether a will is ambiguous is whether the intention of the testator can be gathered from the four corners of the instrument itself. If so, ambiguity does not exist. If the testator's intent can be ascertained, neither rules of construction nor extrinsic evidence should be allowed to vary the clear intent expressed on the face of the instrument. Mildrexter, 25 Kan. App.2d at 836. In the interpretation of wills, the primary function of the court is to ascertain the testator's intent from the four corners of the will and to carry out that intent if possible and if not contrary to law or public policy. Wernet, 226 Kan. 97, Syl. ¶ 3; In re Estate of Hauck, 170 Kan. 116, 120, 223 P.2d 707 (1950). Florence argues that the gift in paragraph THIRD was a devise to a class and, as such, the gift could not lapse and should not pass by intestacy to the heirs of Marie. The gift of real estate in paragraph THIRD was intended to go to Florence Haneberg-Briney, and Francis Haneberg-Ervin absolutely, but the codicil states [s]hould any of the above named persons be not living at the time of Marie's death, the real estate should go to the residue of my estate. Francis predeceased Marie. As previously noted, the will and codicil did not contain a residuary clause. In In re Estate of Stroble, 6 Kan. App.2d 955, 961, 636 P.2d 236 (1981) rev. denied 230 Kan. 818 (1982), the Court of Appeals discussed what happens when a gift lapses, stating: (5) Where a bequest lapses because of the death of the beneficiary prior to that of the testator, the lapsed devise falls into the residuum and will be disposed of by the residuary clause, if one has been provided for in the will. [Citations omitted.] (6) Where a bequest lapses because of the death of the beneficiary prior to that of the testator, and there is no residuary clause in the will, the property subject to the lapsed bequest passes under the law of descent and distribution as intestate property. [Citations omitted.] A gift to a class is one made to a group capable of future change in number and is not a gift to the group as specific individuals but to them as members of a fluctuating group. In re Estate of Hannah, 215 Kan. 892, 897, 529 P.2d 154 (1974). In Hannah, this court discussed the factors to be evaluated when considering whether a gift is to a class: In the cases that we have examined certain features of each instrument under consideration seem to bear special significance in resolving the question. The designation of beneficiaries by name militates against a gift to a class [citations omitted] while designation by a degree of blood relationship may indicated a gift to a class [citation omitted]. The transfer of interests or shares of a set percentage or dollar amount militates against a gift to a class [citation omitted] while a transfer of a share to a group capable of future change in number with a corresponding change in the amount of the respective shares or interests may strongly indicate a gift to a class. [Citation omitted.] ... Additional indicators of an intention to make a gift to a class may be found by looking at the general scheme of disposition, at matters of personal relationship such as intimacy or hostility toward the beneficiaries, at the expressed purpose of excluding or limiting participation to those named, at the presence or absence of a natural class, at the presence or absence of a gift over, and at a recognition in the particular jurisdiction of a general presumption against a construction which would result in partial intestacy. [Citations omitted.] 215 Kan. at 898. See also Bradley v. Estate of Jackson, 1 Kan. App.2d 695, 697-98, 573 P.2d 628 (1977) (noting that when the testator designates the beneficiaries by name, the evidence is persuasive that the testator intended a gift to the individuals and not as a class gift). In the present case, Marie left real estate to Florence and Francis absolutely. The gift to the two sisters-in-law was a gift to them as individuals and not as a class. The codicil is not ambiguous, and there is no evidence that the gift was intended to be a class gift. Marie's will specifically mentions Florence and Francis by name. The gift of real estate to Florence and Francis is for a fixed portion of real estate which will not change. The general scheme of the dispositions in paragraph THIRD indicates that the bequests are to go to individuals and are not class gifts. Florence and Francis, by themselves, do not constitute a natural class. This is not a situation like the one in In re Estate of Randall, 185 Kan. 92, 340 P.2d 885 (1959), where there was evidence in the will itself that the testator intended the gift to the named beneficiaries to be a class gift. Nor is this a case like the one in In re Estate of Hannah, 215 Kan. 892, where the will specifically allowed for a future increase in the number of beneficiaries. The district court did not err in finding that the gift to Florence and Francis was a gift to them as individuals as tenants in common and that the gift to Francis lapsed upon her death. The anti-lapse statute found at K.S.A. 59-615 does not apply. The gift to Francis passes by intestacy.