Opinion ID: 2822014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sixth amendment and sentencing

Text: The Sixth Amendment requires “a jury determination that [a defendant] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 510. In defining the protections afforded by this right, the United States Supreme Court has held that any fact that constitutes an “element” of the crime must be determined by the jury, not by the court, beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 494; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000). The breadth of this right therefore depends on “the proper designation of the facts that are elements of the crime.” Alleyne, 570 US at ___; 133 S Ct at 2156. To ensure that the right to a jury trial is properly safeguarded, the United States Supreme Court has set out to explain what exactly constitutes an “element” of a crime for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, so that the necessary elements will be submitted to the jury for its consideration and determination. 4 In its efforts to explain what constitutes an “element” of a crime, the Supreme Court has identified several sentencing practices that operated in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court first addressed the Sixth Amendment implications that arise when judicially ascertained facts are used to enhance a criminal defendant’s sentence in 4 At the same time, the Supreme Court has held that mere “sentencing factors” may be ascertained by a judge using a preponderance of the evidence standard, as these factors are not subject to the Constitution’s indictment, jury, and proof requirements. Jones v United States, 526 US 227, 232; 119 S Ct 1215; 143 L Ed 2d 311 (1999) (“Much turns on the determination that a fact is an element of an offense rather than a sentencing consideration, given that elements must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 6 McMillan v Pennsylvania, 477 US 79; 106 S Ct 2411; 91 L Ed 2d 67 (1986). McMillan involved a Pennsylvania statute that imposed a five year “mandatory minimum” sentence when the trial court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant “visibly possessed a firearm” during the course of committing an enumerated felony. Id. at 81. In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the Pennsylvania statute, concluding that it neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm. [Id. at 87-88.] Because the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence had not altered the maximum penalty authorized by the jury’s verdict, the Court sustained the statute, rejecting a Sixth Amendment challenge. While McMillan sanctioned the use of judicial fact-finding to establish a mandatory minimum sentence, a decade later in Jones v United States, 526 US 227, 239; 119 S Ct 1215; 143 L Ed 2d 311 (1999), the Supreme Court cautioned that the use of such facts to increase the maximum sentence presented “grave and doubtful constitutional questions.” (Quotation marks and citation omitted.) In Jones, the defendant was convicted of violating a carjacking statute, which called for a 15-year maximum sentence. 18 USC 2119. This sentence, however, could be increased to 25 years if the judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim had suffered serious bodily injury, or to life in prison if the victim had died. 18 USC 924(c). Three tiers of sentencing were provided under the statute. The trial court imposed the 25-year sentence after it found that the victim had suffered serious bodily injury. Jones, 526 US at 231. 7 The Supreme Court, however, vacated the sentence in a 5-4 decision, holding that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated because the judge had determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim suffered “serious bodily injury,” rather than the jury’s having determined the same question beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 252. In Jones, the jury found all the elements necessary to incarcerate the defendant for 15 years and that finding conferred on him not only the legal obligation of potentially having to serve a sentence of that length, but also a concomitant legal right to a sentence not exceeding that length. 5 By its finding of facts that resulted in an increase in this level of punishment by 10 years, the trial court deprived the defendant of his legal right to a sentence that did not exceed 15 years, i.e., his legal right to a sentence that did not exceed the maximum term allowed by the jury’s verdict. The Court held that this type of judicial fact-finding violated the Sixth Amendment. The following term in Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, the Supreme Court elaborated on its analysis in Jones. In Apprendi, the defendant pleaded guilty to one 5 Although I describe this right throughout as a “legal” right, it would be equally accurate to describe it as a “constitutional” right. I characterize it as the former only to render our description consistent with that in Blakely Washington, 542 US 296, 309; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), in which it was asserted that the Sixth Amendment prohibits a judge from depriving a criminal defendant of his or her “legal right to a lesser sentence.” The specific “legal right” that is the subject of this opinion is variously described, as the context requires, as “the legal right to a sentence not to exceed that determined by the jury”; “the legal right to a lesser sentence”; “the legal right to freedom from incarceration”; and “the legal right to freedom from incarceration after having served the maximum sentence.” Each of these is intended generally to describe the Sixth Amendment right identified in the Supreme Court decisions of Apprendi and Alleyne. 8 count of possessing a weapon for an unlawful purpose, which was punishable by a term of imprisonment between 5 and 10 years. Id. at 468-469. New Jersey, however, had a statutory “hate crime” law that provided for an extended term of imprisonment between 10 and 20 years when the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had acted with “racial bias.” The trial court in Apprendi found the requisite “racial bias” by a preponderance of the evidence and consequently sentenced the defendant to an enhanced 12-year term. Id. at 471. In yet another 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that New Jersey’s practice of enhancing a criminal defendant’s sentence on the basis of judicial fact-finding was unconstitutional. Id. at 490. The Court held: “[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. . . . [S]uch facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Id., quoting Jones, 526 US at 252-253 (first alteration in original).] Stated another way, judicially ascertained facts were used by the trial court to deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to a criminal sentence not exceeding that authorized by the jury’s verdict. The Court was not persuaded by the statute’s characterization of a “biased purpose” as a mere “sentencing enhancement” because the Court believed instead that this “biased purpose” constituted an element of the crime. Apprendi, 530 US at 495496. The Court again stated: “[The Constitution requires that] any fact (other than a prior correction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must . . . be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Id. at 476, quoting Jones, 526 US at 243 n 6.] 9 Accordingly, any fact that “expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict,” constitutes an “element” of the crime that must be presented to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 Apprendi, 530 US at 494. After Apprendi, which addressed the constitutional implications of judicially ascertained facts used to increase statutory maximum sentences, the United States Supreme Court addressed the Sixth Amendment implications of judicially ascertained facts used to increase “mandatory minimum” sentences. Harris v United States, 536 US 545; 122 S Ct 2406; 153 L Ed 2d 524 (2002), overruled by Alleyne, 570 US at ___; 133 S Ct at 2155. In Harris, the defendant was found guilty of violating various federal drug and firearms laws after he sold illegal narcotics out of his pawnshop while in possession 6