Opinion ID: 2222357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: STATEMENT TO THE POLICE AT HOSPITAL THE HARRIS vs. NEW YORK PROBLEM.

Text: 1. The judge quite properly suppressed all statements made to the police in the Massachusetts General Hospital on December 10 for purposes of the prosecution's case in chief. Police conduct at the hospital was clearly inconsistent with the standards for custodial interrogation established by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). It is true that an officer read the requisite Miranda warnings to the defendant and then requested that the defendant read the Miranda warning card. However, none of the officers apprised the defendant of his lawyer's efforts to speak to Gawlinski or informed the attorney that a custodial interrogation of his client was in progress. Gawlinski, who was most familiar with the case and who knew both that the defendant had had counsel for many months and that counsel wished urgently to contact a responsible police official, conspicuously absented himself from the interrogation. The judge stated that conduct on the part of prosecuting officers was at least heedless, if not deliberate, and I can conclude only that it was a course of conduct calculated to circumvent ... [the defendant's] constitutional rights to have the benefit, aid, and counsel of his attorney. The Miranda safeguards encompass more than a simple explanation to a suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel. The suspect must be afforded the opportunity to exercise these rights throughout the interrogation.... [H]e... [is] entitled to know of his counsel's availability and, with that knowledge, to make the choice [to forgo the benefits of counsel] with intelligence and understanding. Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 324 (1969). In previous cases, we have noted that police may not thwart counsel who seeks to confer with a client ( Commonwealth v. McKenna, supra, at 325-326) and have held inadmissible statements elicited by the police in the absence of counsel after an attorney has entered the case when no intentional and knowing waiver of the right to counsel was proved ( Commonwealth v. Murray, 359 Mass. 541, 544-546 [1971]). Cf. Commonwealth v. Cain, 361 Mass. 224, 227-229 (1972). Similarly, in the instant case, the defendant's statements in the hospital were inadmissible for the prosecution's case in chief. Nevertheless, we hold that the defendant's statements, if voluntary and trustworthy, [34] were available to impeach his testimony if he took the stand. [35] Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), are controlling. In Harris v. New York , the defendant took the stand and denied having sold heroin to an undercover officer. On cross-examination, he was asked whether he had made certain statements [36] to the police shortly after his arrest. The transcript of the interrogation showed that the police had not advised the defendant of his right to appointed counsel at the time. Despite this infringement of the Miranda safeguards ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 444), the Supreme Court held that the statements had been properly admitted to impeach the defendant's testimony. The court rejected the argument that under Miranda evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes. Harris v. New York, supra, at 224. In the court's view, a valid policy consideration, the possibility that the defendant might deliver perjurious testimony, outweighed the extra measure of deterrence to unconstitutional police action which might be achieved by total exclusion of such evidence. Mr. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the court: Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury.... The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. Id. at 225-226. The court noted, however, that there had been no claim that the statements made to police were coerced or involuntary and that the trustworthiness of the evidence [must] satisf[y] legal standards. Id. at 224. In Oregon v. Hass , the court again spoke to the issue whether evidence obtained by the police without strict compliance with Miranda standards was admissible for impeachment purposes. After his arrest for bicycle theft, Hass was given the Miranda warnings. He admitted that he had stolen two bicycles but was uncertain which one was the subject of the investigation. He and a police officer then departed for the place where he had left one of the stolen bicycles. On the way, Hass commented that he `was in a lot of trouble' and wanted to telephone his attorney. The police officer replied that Hass could use the telephone after they returned to the office. Thereafter, Hass guided the police officer to the bicycle and pointed out the locations of the houses from which he had stolen the two bicycles. At trial, Hass's statements to the police officer after his request for counsel were admitted only as to the credibility of his testimony. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed his subsequent conviction and the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the reversal. The United States Supreme Court, on the authority of Harris v. New York , reversed. The court reiterated its concern that exclusionary rules could free [the defendant] from the embarrassment of impeachment evidence from ... [his] own mouth ( Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 [1975]) and emphasized, as it had in Harris, the valuable aid which the defendant's statements would provide to the jury in assessing his credibility. Id. at 721. The court found no valid distinction between the situation in Harris, which involved defective Miranda warnings, a violation of a prophylactic rule, [37] and the situation in Hass, which involved the failure to afford a suspect his full constitutional right to counsel after his attempt to exercise that right. [38] The court added, however, that [i]f, in a given case, the officer's conduct amounts to abuse, that case, like those involving coercion or duress, may be taken care of when it arises measured by the traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness and trustworthiness. Id. at 723. We believe the Harris and Hass exception to the exclusionary rule of Miranda and like cases permits introduction of the defendant's statements (if they are voluntary and trustworthy) to impeach his direct testimony. Functionally, [39] the violation of the defendant's rights in the instant case is closely analogous to that in Harris and Hass. In each case, the deprivation of rights stems from the failure of police to provide a suspect with counsel to whom he was entitled. Just as Harris received no assistance from the appointed counsel to whom he was entitled and Hass did not have a timely opportunity to consult counsel whom he had requested, so the defendant here did not benefit from the assistance of counsel who urgently wished to reach him. We are not persuaded that factual distinctions between the instant case and Harris and Hass are sufficient to shift the balance struck in the two Supreme Court cases between impeachment of perjurious testimony and deterrence of improper police conduct. The exclusionary rules fashioned in Miranda and like cases [40] deter impermissible police conduct (see Harris v. New York, supra, at 225) by excluding from trial any evidence which was improperly obtained. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). Cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). An exception to the exclusionary rules in the instant case is no more an encouragement to such misconduct (or a slackening of the deterrent effects of the rules) than are the exceptions promulgated in Harris and Hass. Such encouragement may be thought to arise from the police officer's knowledge that a lawyer will likely advise his client to make no statement while in custody [41] and the further knowledge that a statement elicited in the absence of counsel will at least be available for impeachment of testimony. [42] Yet, in Hass, [43] where the suspect had actually requested counsel and, thus, the incentive for continuation of interrogation without adherence to constitutional requirements, if there were an impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule, would be at a maximum, the court held that the interest in deterring such police conduct was outweighed by the general interest in impeachment of perjurious testimony. In the instant case, by contrast, the police could not know that the defendant would ask to see his attorney. If he had been informed that his attorney wished to see him, the defendant might have chosen to proceed without counsel  to reject the offer. After all, the police had given the defendant his Miranda warnings. He was aware of the fact that his parents had engaged an attorney to represent him. It was open to him at any time to halt the inquiry and request the attorney. Instead, the defendant intermittently asked for his parents and continued to answer questions when they did not arrive. In view of the uncertainty in the defendant's response to the information that his attorney wished to see him, an exception to the exclusionary rule in the instant case presents lesser incentives to police misconduct than were present in Hass, and there is a correspondingly less substantial interest in an exclusionary rule for deterrence. Accordingly, we hold that, as in Hass, the interest in impeachment of perjurious testimony here outweighed the interest in deterrence of police misconduct and that those of the defendant's statements which were voluntary and trustworthy were properly available to impeach his testimony if he had taken the stand. 2. We think the judge was warranted in finding that the statements made by the defendant to the police at the hospital were voluntary. [44] Having concluded that the defendant's post-4:15 P.M. statements to his abductors were separated from his earlier statements to them by a break in the stream of events and that these later statements were not made because the cat was out of the bag, we believe that the statements in the hospital were also sufficiently separated from the coercive conditions which had extracted the statements in the cabin and were also not the product of the cat-out-of-the-bag effect. The statements in the hospital were elicited by different people, police officers uninvolved in the original abduction, in a different place. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602 (1944). Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 496 (1966). [45] By the time of his questioning in the hospital, the defendant had had an opportunity to consult his family (cf. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441 [1961]) and had been out of the control of his captors for quite some time (cf. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 38 [1967]; Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349 [1968]). It does not appear from the evidence that the statements in the cabin caused him to make admissions to the police. As noted above, the defendant did not believe his statements could be used against him. In the interrogation by police, he did not immediately confess, as might a man who felt he had nothing to lose. Rather, he maintained some control over the session and answered only selected questions. Further, we believe that the trial judge found correctly that the police interrogation, itself, did not overbear the defendant's will and did not extract an involuntary statement from him. The trial judge found the following significant subsidiary facts on ample evidence. The defendant is an intelligent and educated young man. See Commonwealth v. Pratt, 360 Mass. 708, 713-714 (1972); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 239-241 (1941). Cf., e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196 (1957); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958). At the time of his interrogation, he was neither dazed nor bewildered (cf. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 560 [1954]), nor drugged (cf. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 38 [1967]), nor too sick or weak to resist questioning (see Commonwealth v. Sousa, 350 Mass. 591, 598 [1966]; cf. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 443 [1961]; Beecher v. Alabama, supra ). He was physically and mentally alert. Aside from the injury to his eye, he showed no evidence of physical disability or impairment of physical or mental functions. Before questioning commenced, the officers informed the defendant of his Miranda rights. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966); Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 453 (1971). During the questioning, the police officers were courteous. They did not threaten the defendant (cf. Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 70 [1949] [threat to the defendant concerning his mother]; Beecher v. Alabama, supra, at 36) or attempt to induce admissions by deception (cf. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 [1959]). The questioning was not unduly lengthy or prolonged (cf. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-154 [1944]; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 [1949]; Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 709 [1967]) and, throughout the questioning, the defendant maintained the above mentioned control over the proceedings (see Commonwealth v. Cook, 351 Mass. 231, 235 [1966], cert. den. 385 U.S. 981 [1966]; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 186 [1953]). At his insistence, the stenographer was dismissed. He did not answer every question, but chose those to which he would reply. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the statements which finally emerged were involuntarily given. Accordingly, the statements were properly ruled available for impeachment of testimony under the rule of Harris and Hass.