Opinion ID: 2778011
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: “Communicates”

Text: Alangcas suggests that the word “communicates” in HRS § 707-756(1)(a) is vague because it is undefined;32 he argues that this vagueness invites arbitrary enforcement by police. However, the “likelihood that anyone would not understand any of those common words seems quite remote” when a statute includes a scienter element requiring a felonious intent. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). Thus, when read with the rest of the statute, it is unlikely that the public will misunderstand “communicates” because of the clear requirements of the statute defining the prohibited communication. First, the communication must be made intentionally or knowingly. Second, the communication must be with a Minor; thus, at a minimum the person must consciously disregard a substantial risk that the other person is less than eighteen years of age. Third, the communication itself is not sufficient; it must be made in conjunction with an agreement to meet the Minor, with the intent to promote or facilitate a felony. Delimited by these three requirements, the general public is clearly informed of the nature of the “communication” 32 The subsection defines the prohibited conduct, in part as, “[a]ny person who, using a computer or any other electronic device[] [i]ntentionally or knowingly communicates . . . with a minor.” HRS § 707-756(1). - 48 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER that is prohibited. Consequently, there is nothing internally inconsistent about the reference to “communicates.” Further, as the communication and agreement elements must then be consummated with an intentional or knowing travel to the agreed upon place at the agreed upon time, there is little risk that police will enforce HRS § 707-756 in an arbitrary, ad hoc, or subjective manner. The term “communicates” is accordingly not vague. Thus, as the Catch-all Clauses, the Conviction Clauses, and the term “communicates” provide citizens of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited and provides explicit standards for those who apply the statute to do so in a consistent and nondiscriminatory manner, HRS § 707-756 is not unconstitutionally vague on these bases.33 Accordingly, we do not consider whether the statute is vague as applied to the specific conduct charged to Alangcas.