Opinion ID: 3011956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: under richmond newspapers, is there a

Text: FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO ATTEND DEPORTATION HEARINGS? Richmond Newspapers requires that when a court assesses a claimed First Amendment right of access, it must consider[ ] whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public . . . [and] whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. _________________________________________________________________ Newspapers to any administrative proceeding. It asserts that when we said [t]hese administrative proceedings . . . do not have a long history of openness, our emphasis was on proceedings. Such an emphasis would distinguish administrative proceedings from civil and criminal trials, and would imply that no administrative proceeding could make the historical showing necessary under Richmond Newspapers. But this interpretation is both incorrect and misplaced. It is incorrect because the prior sentence referred to the fundamentally different procedures of judicial disciplinary boards, id., so that when we said that [t]hese administrative proceedings lacked history, we clearly referred only to proceedings before judicial disciplinary boards and not to administrative proceedings generally. It is misplaced because even if the Government were correct that administrative proceedings generally lack history, that argument properly addresses the experience prong of the Richmond Newspapers test itself. Our immediate concern is the antecedent issue of whether to apply that test. 18 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. This language seems to place the burden of proof on the party alleging a First Amendment right. While we acknowledge a current presumption of openness in most deportation proceedings, we find that this presumption has neither the pedigree nor uniformity necessary to satisfy Richmond Newspapers’s first prong. We also conclude that under a logic inquiry properly acknowledging both community benefits and potential harms, public access does not serve a significant positive role in deportation hearings.

government proceedings generally? In Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575, the Supreme Court acknowledged the State’s argument that the Constitution nowhere explicitly guarantees the public’s right to attend criminal trials, but it found that right implicit because the Framers drafted the Constitution against a backdrop of longstanding popular access to criminal trials. Likewise, in Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1059, we found a First Amendment right of access to civil trials because at common law, such access had been beyond dispute. The history of access to political branch proceedings is quite different. The Government correctly notes that the Framers themselves rejected any unqualified right of access to the political branches for, as we explained in Capital Cities Media, 797 F.2d at 1168-1171, the evidence on this point is extensive and compelling. We need not rescribe it here, but a few snippets are instructive. At the Virginia ratification convention, Patrick Henry was a leading opponent of government secrecy. He said of the publication clause: [Congress] may carry on the most wicked and pernicious of schemes under the dark veil of secrecy. The liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure, when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them. 3 Elliot’s Debates at 169-70 (J. Elliot ed. 1881). Nevertheless, even Henry conceded that not all government activities should be publicized, particularly those related to military operations or affairs of great consequence. Id. at 19 170. Thomas Jefferson agreed, noting that [a]ll nations have found it necessary, that for the advantageous conduct of their affairs, some [executive] proceedings, at least, should remain known to their executive functionary only. Randall, 3 Life of Thomas Jefferson 211 (1858), reprinted in Wiggins, Freedom or Secrecy 67-68 (1964). Congressional practice confirms that there is no general right of public access to governmental proceedings or information. The members of the First Congress did not open their own proceedings to the public -- the Senate met behind closed doors until 1794, and the House did likewise until after the War of 1812.6See Watkins, Open Meetings under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 268, 271 & n.96. While both Houses thereafter opened floor deliberations, committee sessions remained closed and were not routinely opened to the public until the mid1970s. Id. at 272. Even today, the Senate operates under a resolution limiting public access to routine Senate records for 20 years after their creation and to sensitive records, such as investigative files for 50 years after their creation, and each Senate committee retains the right to extend that access period for its own records. S. Rep. 474, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess., 126 Cong. Rec. S15209-10 (daily ed., Dec. 1, 1980). See generally Capital Cities Media, 797 F.2d at 1170-71. This tradition of closing sensitive proceedings extends to many hearings before administrative agencies. For example, although hearings on Social Security disability claims profoundly affect hundreds of thousands of people annually, and have great impact on expenditure of government funds, they are open only to the parties and to other persons the administrative law judge considers necessary and proper. 20 C.F.R. 404.944. Likewise, administrative disbarment hearings are often presumptively closed. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. 19.199 (Office of Comptroller of Currency); 12 C.F.R. 263.97 (Federal Reserve Board of Governors). The Government lists more than a dozen other _________________________________________________________________ 6. Indeed, it is interesting to note that our democracy was created behind closed doors, as the delegates at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 excluded the public from their proceedings. 20 examples of mandatorily or presumptively closed administrative proceedings. For instance, hearings on charges of wrongdoing may often be closed at the administrator’s discretion for good cause, to protect the public interest, or under similar standards. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. 185.132(d) (Office of Personnel Management); 10 C.F.R. 13.30(d) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 13 C.F.R. 142.21(d) (Small Business Administration); 28 C.F.R. 68.39(a) (Department of Justice); 31 C.F.R. 500.713(a) (Office of Foreign Asset Control); 38 C.F.R. 42.30(d) (Office of Veterans Affairs). Hearings on adverse passport decisions by the Department of State shall be private. 22 C.F.R. 51.87. See also 5 C.F.R. 2638.505(e)(2) (hearings on ethics charges against government employees may be closedin the best interests of national security, the respondent employee, a witness, the public or other affected persons); 10 C.F.R. 1003.62(a) (hearings before Department of Energy Office of Hearings and Appeals may be closed at discretion of administrator). Faced with this litany of administrative hearings that are closed to the public, the Newspapers cannot claim a general First Amendment right of access to government proceedings without urging a judicially-imposed revolution in the administrative state. They wisely avoid that tactic, at least directly.7 Instead they submit that, despite frequent closures throughout the administrative realm, deportation proceedings in particular boast a history of openness sufficient to meet the Richmond Newspapers requirement. We now assess that claim, and find that we disagree. _________________________________________________________________ 7. Although the Newspapers do not argue directly for a general right of access to government proceedings, they maintain that FMC v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 122 S.Ct. 1864 (2002), compels us to recognize the procedural similarities between civil trials and deportation hearings and extend the same access rights to each. We find that this contention turns, at least in part, on whether there is a fundamental right of access to government proceedings comparable to nonconsenting states’ fundamental right to freedom from private suit. It is because we find no such comparable right that FMC does not bind us here. See discussion infra. 21
sufficient to satisfy the Richmond Newspapers experience prong? For a First Amendment right of access to vest under Richmond Newspapers, we must consider whetherthe place and process have historically been open to the press and general public, because such a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. Noting preliminarily that the question whether a proceeding has been historically open is only arguably an objective inquiry, we nonetheless find that based on both Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedents, the tradition of open deportation hearings is too recent and inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access. The strongest historical evidence of open deportation proceedings is that since the 1890s, when Congress first codified deportation procedures, [t]he governing statutes have always expressly closed exclusion hearings, but have never closed deportation hearings.8 (Newspapers’ Br. at 3031.) In 1893, the Executive promulgated the first set of immigration regulations, which expressly stated that exclusion proceedings shall be conducted separate from the public. See Treasury Dept., Immigration Laws and Regulations 4 (Washington D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1893). Congress codified those regulations in 1903 and, since that _________________________________________________________________ 8. Although both exclusion and deportation hearings are now formally styled removal hearings, see Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 394 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1999), significant differences exist between the two. Exclusion proceedings occur when an applicant seeks entry into the United States, whereas in deportation proceedings, the United States seeks to expel a person who has already gained such entry. The Supreme Court has consistently held that persons facing deportation possess far greater legal rights than those contesting exclusion. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ([While] it is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law, . . . [a]n alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing.). For clarity, we refer throughout this opinion to deportation and exclusion, rather than removal. 22 time, it has repeatedly reenacted provisions closing exclusion hearings.9 In contrast, although Congress codified the regulations governing deportation proceedings in 1904 and has reenacted them many times since, it has never authorized the general closure that has long existed in the exclusion context.10 The Newspapers submit that under the rule of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, _________________________________________________________________ 9. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1903 S 25 (Ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213); Act of February 20, 1907 S 25 (Ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898); 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, SS 236, 242 (same); Treasury Department, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1893); Treasury Department, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1895); Treasury Department, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1898); Treasury Department, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1900); Treasury Department, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1902); Treasury Department, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1903); Bureau of Immigration, Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3, 9 (1904); Bureau of Immigration, Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1906); Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration Laws and Regulations 34 (1907); Bureau of Immigration, Department of Labor, Immigration Laws; Rules of May 1, 1917, 33 (1919); 8 C.F.R. pts. 12 & 19 (1938); 8 C.F.R. pt. 150 (1941 Supp.); 12 Fed. Reg. 5108 (July 30, 1947); 8 C.F.R. pt. 130 (1949); 32 Fed. Reg. 9628 (1967) codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 236 (1968). 10. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1903 S 25 (Ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213); Act of February 20, 1907 S 25 (Ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898); Act of May 10, 1920 (Ch. 174, 41 Stat. 593); Act of May 26, 1924 (Ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153); 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163,S 242; Bureau of Immigration, Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3, 9 (1904); Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration Laws and Regulations 34 (1907); Bureau of Immigration, Department of Labor, Immigration laws; Rules of May 1, 1917, 33 (1919); 8 C.F.R. pt. 19 (1938); 8 C.F.R. pt. 150 (1941 Supp.); 9 Fed Reg. 11884 (Sept. 19, 1944) (amendment to INS regulations governing deportation hearings, codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 150 (1944 Supp.)); 10 Fed Reg. 8096 (Aug. 1, 1945) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 150 (1945 Supp)); 12 F3d Reg. 5114 (July 30, 1947) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 150 (1947 Supp.)); 8 C.F.R. pt. 150 (1949); 17 Fed. Reg. 11512 (Dec. 19, 1952) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242 (1952)); 22 Fed. Reg. 9795 (Dec. 6, 1957) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242 (1958)); 22 Fed. Reg. 9519 (Nov. 28, 1957) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242 (1958)). 23 Congress’s practice of closing exclusion proceedings while remaining silent on deportation proceedings creates a presumption that it intended deportation proceedings to be open. In support of this interpretation, they point out that the current Justice Department regulations provide explicitly that [a]ll hearings, other than exclusion hearings, shall be open to the public except that . . . [f]or the purpose of protecting . . . the public interest, the Immigration Judge may limit attendance or hold a closed hearing. 8 C.F.R. 3.27. From this they conclude that the regulations state explicitly what the statutes had long said implicitly, namely that deportation hearings are to be open unless an individualized case is made for closure. But there is also evidence that, in practice, deportation hearings have frequently been closed to the general public. From the early 1900s, the government has often conducted deportation hearings in prisons, hospitals, or private homes, places where there is no general right of public access.11 Even in recent times, the government has continued to hold thousands of deportation hearings each year in federal and state prisons. See H.R. Rep. No. 104469, pt. I, at 124 (1996). Moreover, hearings involving abused alien children are closed by regulation no matter where they are held, and those involving abused alien spouses are closed presumptively. See 8 C.F.R. 3.27(c). We ultimately do not believe that deportation hearings boast a tradition of openness sufficient to satisfy Richmond Newspapers. In Richmond Newspapers itself, the Court noted an unbroken, uncontradicted history of public _________________________________________________________________ 11. The Newspapers contend that there is no evidence that hearings conducted in hospitals, prisons, and private homes were closed to the public. The Sixth Circuit agreed, concluding that this evidence does not even hint that the public could not attend a hearing [in these places] . . . . Certainly, one could imagine family and friends being present. Detroit Free Press, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17646 at . While we agree it is possible that some select non-party individuals might have been present in such places, we are unwilling to assume that the general public enjoyed unfettered access, a clearly counter-intuitive suggestion, particularly since Richmond Newspapers, in asking whether the place and process have historically been open, seems to place the burden of proof on the party claiming openness. 24 access to criminal trials in Anglo American law running from before the Norman Conquest to the present, and it emphasized that it had not found a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this country. 448 U.S. at 565, 572, 573 & n.9. Likewise, in Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1059, we found that access to civil trials at common law was beyond dispute. The tradition of open deportation hearings is simply not comparable. While the expressio unius distinction between exclusion and deportation proceedings is a tempting road to travel, we are unwilling effectively to craft a constitutional right from mere Congressional silence, especially when faced with evidence that some deportation proceedings were, and are, explicitly closed to the public or conducted in places unlikely to allow general public access. Although the 1964 Department of Justice regulations did create a presumption of openness, a recent -- and rebuttable -- regulatory presumption is hardly the stuff of which Constitutional rights are forged. The Newspapers contend, quite correctly, that at least within the geographic confines of the Third Circuit, a showing of openness at common law is not required. See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding a right of access to pretrial hearings even though no right existed at common law); United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding a right although no history predated 1980); Whiteland Woods, 193 F.3d at 181, (finding a tradition of accessibility based on a recent statutory guarantee). We agree that under these decisions a 1000-year history is unnecessary, and that in some cases, largely limited to the criminal context, relatively little history is required. These cases do not, however, allow us to dispense with the Richmond Newspapers experience requirement where history is ambiguous or lacking, and to recognize a First Amendment right based solely on the logic inquiry. In Criden, 675 F.2d at 552, the defendant requested that the court conduct in camera his pretrial motion to suppress evidence, and the court acquiesced. A reporter filed suit alleging a First Amendment right to view those proceedings. 25 As Criden arose before Press-Enterprise II formalized the Richmond Newspapers test, we were not bound to apply it, and we stated that: We do not think that historical analysis is relevant in determining whether there is a first amendment right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings. We recognize that, at common law, the public apparently had no right to attend pretrial criminal proceedings. On the other hand, there was no counterpart at common law to the modern suppression hearing . . . . [W]e proceed to examine the current role of the first amendment and the societal interests in open pretrial criminal proceedings. 675 F.2d at 555. Although this language supports the Newspapers’ contention that we have overlooked the experience requirement in certain cases, it does not bind us here. Criden arose in the criminal context, where First Amendment rights of access had been found many times previously. More importantly, in Criden we were not bound to apply the Richmond Newspapers test because in Richmond Newspapers itself, no approach commanded a majority, and the Court had not yet decided Press- Enterprise II. We are now obligated to apply that test, and we have recognized that the role of history in the access determination is crucial. Capital Cities Media, 797 F.2d at 1174. The Newspapers’ reliance on our decision in Simone, 14 F.3d at 833, is similarly misplaced. The District Court believed that Simone allows us to find a First Amendment right based solely on the logic prong where there isneither a clear history of openness nor one of closure, North Jersey Media, 205 F.Supp. 2d at 300, but this greatly overstates our holding. In assessing whether there is a right of access to post-trial examinations of jury misconduct, we noted that the only available evidence postdated 1980. We recognized that evidence of such recent vintage[does] not establish a tradition of closure, Simone, 14 F.3d at 838, and concluded that the ‘experience’ prong of the ‘logic and experience’ test provides little guidance. Id. We then found a right while focusing mainly on the logic prong, but critical to that giant step was our reflection that [g]iven the 26 overwhelming historical support for access in other phases of the criminal process, we are reluctant to presume that the opposite rule applies in this case in the absence of a distinct tradition to the contrary. Id. (emphasis added). This logic effectively limits Simone’s scope to the criminal context, or at least to those areas with overwhelming historical support for access. As discussed supra, the tradition of public access in the administrative realm is inconsistent at best, so we must rigorously apply both prongs of the Richmond Newspapers test. Finally, despite our potentially misleading language in Whiteland Woods, 193 F.3d at 177, that case has no proper application here. Whiteland Woods, a real estate developer, was denied permission to videotape a Township Planning Commission meeting, and it sued for access. Although we recognized that [t]he primary issue on appeal is whether there is a federal constitutional right to videotape public meetings of a township planning commission, id. at 180 (emphasis added), we stated in passing that [w]e have no hesitation in holding Whiteland Woods had a constitutional right of access to the Planning Commission meeting. Id. at 180-81. As the Planning Commission never actually denied Whiteland Woods the access guaranteed by state law, however, our broad statement was dicta and we do not follow it here. Although we are confident that our precedents do not allow us to find a First Amendment right of access to deportation hearings absent strong historical evidence, the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in FMC v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 122 S.Ct. at 1864, gives us pause. In holding that state sovereign immunity bars an administrative agency from adjudicating a private party’s complaint against a nonconsenting state, the Supreme Court recognized that formalized administrative adjudications were all but unheard of  during the Framers’ time. Id. at 1872. It nevertheless found that because Federal Maritime Commission adjudications walk[ ], talk[ ], and squawk[ ] like a civil lawsuit, id. at 1873 (quoting the Court of Appeals decision), they are the type of proceedings from which the Framers would have thought the States possessed immunity when they agreed to enter the Union. 27 Id. at 1872. The Court therefore concluded that state sovereign immunity applies to administrative proceedings. Ports Authority had not been decided when the District Court heard this case, and the Newspapers now assert that it forces us to distinguish the procedures in deportation hearings from those in civil trials before finding that different rights exist in each context. Were this suggestion correct, we would indeed be hard pressed to find meaningful differences between the two types of proceedings. A deportation proceeding is commenced with a Notice to Appear, see 8 C.F.R. S 239.1, a document strongly resembling a civil complaint. In turn, a respondent may proffer affirmative defenses. See Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 904 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990). As in a civil trial, a respondent has the right to be represented by counsel of his choosing, see 8 C.F.R. S 240.3, and has the right to be present during his hearing. See 8 U.S.C.S 1229a(b)(4). He or she is also guaranteed an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence on his or her behalf. Id. While slight differences exist regarding such minor matters as the admissibility of hearsay evidence, we agree that on a procedural level, deportation hearings and civil trials are practically indistinguishable. Despite these undeniable similarities, however, we do not believe that the Supreme Court intended in Ports Authority to import the full panoply of constitutional rights to any administrative proceeding that resembles a civil trial. The Court’s reasoning was based fundamentally on its enduring presumption that the Constitution was not intended to ‘raise up’ any proceedings against the States that were ‘anomalous and unheard of when the Constitution was adopted.’  Ports Authority, 122 S.Ct. at 1872 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890)). Put slightly differently, the Court started from the premise that state sovereign immunity shields nonconsenting states from complaints brought by private persons, regardless of where private persons bring those complaints. It then concluded that since Federal Maritime Commission proceedings strongly resemble civil trials to which state sovereign immunity applies, the Framers would have intended the same right to freedom from private suit to apply in each context. 28 In contrast, there is no fundamental right to attend government proceedings underpinning the Newspapers’ alleged right to attend deportation proceedings. See discussion supra. This is not a situation where the Framers contemplated a perfectly transparent government, only to have deportation proceedings, which they did not foresee, jeopardize that intended scheme. This is also not a situation involving allegations that the government assigned to an administrative agency a function that courts historically performed in order to deprive the public of an access right it once possessed. And most importantly, this is not a situation that risks affront to states’residual and inviolable sovereignty, id. at 1870 (quoting The Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison)), the concern that motivated the Ports Authority Court. We therefore decline to loose the Ports Authority analysis from its Eleventh Amendment moorings. Instead of analogizing procedures, the proper approach is that developed in Richmond Newspapers, and as we have explained, under that test we find an insufficient tradition of openness to support the right.
requirement would lead to perverse consequences. As we have explained in detail supra, there is no fundamental right of access to administrative proceedings. Any such access, therefore, must initially be granted as a matter of executive grace.12 The Government contends that by relaxing the need for a 1000-year tradition of public access, (Gov’t Br. at 35), we would permanently constitutionalize a right of access whenever an executive agency does not consistently bar all public access to a particular proceeding. We do not adopt this reasoning in its _________________________________________________________________ 12. The Newspapers disagree, arguing that the constitutional right of access under the First Amendment does not, and could not, turn on whether the legislature has chosen to supply that right. We believe this reasoning to be precisely backwards, for Richmond Newspapers requires a tradition of access before recognizing a constitutional right to that access. Given that order of events, there must perforce be a period of time during which access to a particular proceeding is not constitutionally compelled, although during that period the executive could, of course, grant access as a matter of grace. 29 entirety, for as we have discussed supra, we have sometimes found a constitutional right of access to proceedings that did not exist at common law. See, e.g., Simone, 14 F.3d at 837-40 (finding a public access right to post-trial jury examinations). Nevertheless, we agree with the Government that a rigorous experience test is necessary to preserve the basic tenet of administrative law that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 544 (1978). Were we to adopt the Newspapers’ view that we can recognize a First Amendment right based solely on the logic prong if there is no history of closure, we would effectively compel the Executive to close its proceedings to the public ab initio or risk creating a constitutional right of access that would preclude it from closing them in the future. Under such a system, reserved powers of closure would be meaningless. It seems possible that, ironically, such a system would result in less public access than one in which a constitutional right of access is more difficult to create. At all events, we would find this outcome incredible in an area of traditional procedural flexibility, and we are unwilling to reach it when a reasonable alternative is present. By insisting on a strong tradition of public access in the Richmond Newspapers test, we preserve administrative flexibility and avoid constitutionalizing ambiguous, and potentially unconsidered, executive decisions.