Opinion ID: 170235
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conditions on Release

Text: The district court found that the Commission’s evaluation of the risk Mr. Alexander posed to the public was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to take into consideration conditions the Commission could impose on release that would alleviate that risk. Because the Commission was free to impose conditions, such as daily reporting and required employment, the Commission’s calculus of the risk was flawed and incomplete. The Commission argues that it is not required to consider conditional release in its evaluation. We agree with the district court that, under the circumstances of this case, the Commission was required to consider conditions when evaluating Mr. Alexander’s risk to the public. When conducting its parole decision, the Commission must consider the seriousness of Mr. Alexander’s offense and the risk he poses to the public, 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a)(1)-(2) (repealed 1984), as well as his demonstrated rehabilitation. Watts, 651 F.2d at 1380. In the 2003 hearing, the examiner -13- focused primarily on the risk Mr. Alexander posed to society in denying parole, stating: Subject had no history of violence or drug abuse. There is no history of any mental health problems prior to the current offense. The only explanation is that subject was unable to handle the everyday stresses of life as a teenager. The question at this point is whether or not he has developed the mechanisms to handle stresses of every day life should he be returned to the community. Clearly for having been in custody for well over 20 years the stresses associated with transition are extremely high. This examiner has some concerns as to whether or not the subject has the ability to make that transition without aggressive acting out as demonstrated in the current offense. R. at 144. The National Appeals Board, affirming the denial, relied on the same factor, holding that there continues to be a significant doubt that your response to these treatment programs has reduced the risk that you pose to the community if released on parole at this time. The Commission is not convinced given your statements during your hearing that you have acknowledged the full extent of your crime and are remorseful. R. at 152. The Commissioner and the National Appeals Board did acknowledge Mr. Alexander’s continued participation in treatment programs and positive response to treatment. It also found that release would diminish the seriousness of his offense given the nature of his crime. Under 18 U.S.C. § 5017(a)-(b), there is no unconditional release for youth offenders until at least one year subsequent to parole. See also id. § 5010(a) (repealed 1984). Additionally, the Commission has full discretion to impose conditions until five years after release. If at any point Mr. Alexander were to -14- violate those conditions, the Commission could immediately return him to custody. Id. § 5020 (repealed 1984). After five years of parole, the Commission must grant unconditional release unless there is a “likelihood that the parolee will engage in conduct violating any criminal law.” Id. § 4211(c)(1) (repealed 1984). These conditions that the Commission can place on parole are commonly relevant to the potential risk the inmate poses to society. The conditions of parole serve a dual purpose; they prohibit, either absolutely or conditionally, behavior that is deemed dangerous to the restoration of the individual into normal society. And through the requirement of reporting to the parole officer and seeking guidance and permission before doing many things, the officer is provided with information about the parolee and an opportunity to advise him. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972). See also Housler v. Nelson, 453 F.Supp. 874, 877 (D.C. Conn. 1978) (parole conditions are designed to “further [reintegration of convicted criminals into society as constructive components] . . .” while ensuring that “reintegration is accomplished effectively and with a minimal risk to the public welfare.”). Typical conditions include mandatory drug testing, curfews or home monitoring systems, employment requirements, and approved residence requirements. 18 U.S.C. § 4209 (repealed 1984); 28 C.F.R. § 2.33. These ameliorate the risk the inmate poses to the public as they make his transition less drastic by providing structure and supervision in his daily life. Additionally, if the parolee fails to meet one of the conditions, the supervisor is -15- immediately alerted to the problem and can add to or modify the requirements. 18 U.S.C. § 4209(d)(1) (repealed 1984). While § 4206 on its face requires the Commission only to determine whether release would jeopardize the public welfare, that analysis cannot be done in a vacuum. It must include a realistic and complete evaluation of what Mr. Alexander’s release might look like. This includes a determination of how potential conditions would affect that risk to the public, which, in some cases, may be dramatic. For example, in 2003, the hearing examiner stated that “[t]he question at this point is whether [Mr. Alexander] has developed the mechanisms to handle stresses of every day life should he be returned to the community. . . This examiner has some concerns as to whether or not the subject has the ability to make that transition.” R at 144. Conditions, such as daily reporting or electronic home monitoring, are precisely what might assist Mr. Alexander in this transition, preventing him from “acting out” and providing him structure. Id. Similarly, a continuation of daily therapy on an out-patient basis may help Mr. Alexander cope with the new “stresses” identified by the hearing examiner. Indeed, by the Commission’s own analysis, the longer it waits to grant release, the greater Mr. Alexander’s threat to society becomes: if the stress after “having been in custody for well over 20 years,” id., is sufficiently high that the transition into society is too risky to allow release, an additional ten years in prison will likely do little to ameliorate the problem. Because consideration of conditions -16- might well alter the Commission’s calculus under § 4206(a)(2), the district court was correct in ordering the Commission to consider them. We are aware that, as the appellant notes, the district court was wrong to say that Mr. Alexander would “never be subject to unconditional discharge.” R. at 220. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4211(c), Mr. Alexander must receive unconditional release after five years of parole unless the Commission can show that there is a “likelihood that the parolee will engage in conduct violating any criminal law.” There is some possibility, then, that Mr. Alexander would eventually be free from the Commission’s supervision. This, however, does not change our analysis. The Commission can certainly consider the impact of § 4211(c) on the efficacy of its proposed conditions, but this does not render consideration of those conditions any less important to an analysis of Mr. Alexander’s danger to the public. Additionally, we note that if Mr. Alexander continues to struggle in his transition into society within his first five years of parole, this will likely serve as grounds for the continuation of supervision under § 4211(c). Finally, we note that the Commission must consider conditions on release only when it conducts a § 4206(a)(2) analysis. The Commission may not always reach this factor. There may be times when release would so depreciate the seriousness of the offense, § 4206(a)(1), that denial is appropriate regardless of the defendant’s demonstrated rehabilitation. In that case, the Commission need not consider conditions on parole, as the risk the inmate poses to the public does -17- not factor into the Commission’s decision to deny parole. However, this was not the case here, as the Commission conducted the § 4206(a)(2) evaluation.