Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Definition of Marriage

Text: Because the present marriage statute is essentially the same as the 1901 statute, which was derived from even earlier legislation, see supra note 2, the initial question is: what did Congress intend by the word marriage when it enacted the marriage statute in 1901? [9] Citing our well-known interpretive criteria, appellants stress that we should focus, first, on the plain words of the statute. See Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C.1983) (en banc). They contend that since its inception the marriage statute, standing alone, has been essentially gender-neutral and, for that reason, has always authorized same-sex marriages. One provision of the present marriage statuteand only onehas always used genderspecific language. [10] The so-called consanguinity provision, D.C.Code § 30-101, refers to marriages of a man with a wife, and of a woman with a husband. [11] Appellants maintain that the policy underlying this provision is the prevention of genetic birth defects and mental retardation, a policy that necessarily would not apply to same-sex couples because they cannot produce children together. From this policy premise, appellants argue that this one statutory exception to gender neutrality in the marriage statute actually substantiates their argument that the right to marry extends to same-sex couples. According to appellants, because the only gender references are contained in a public health provision, relevant only to opposite-sex couples, it follows, perforce, that the omission of gender references in all other provisions of the marriage statute necessarily implies that same-sex marriages are permitted. See McCray v. McGee, 504 A.2d 1128, 1130 (D.C.1986) (basic rule of statutory construction is that when a legislature makes express mention of one thing, the exclusion of others is implied, because there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions). Appellants' argument, by its own terms, only has force if the consanguinity provision is limited to prohibitions against biological inbreeding. It is not. While that concern is obvious in the prohibition of a man's marrying his sister or a woman's marrying her father, there is no genetic danger in other prohibited situations; for example, the prohibitions against a man's marrying his son's wife or a woman's marrying her stepfather. See D.C.Code § 30-101(1) and (2), supra note 11. The consanguinity provision, therefore, reflects taboosindeed moral judgments about improper marriage relationshipsthat transcend genetic concerns. The use of gender-based terminology in § 30-101 to prohibit certain marriages, therefore, reflects a legislative understanding that marriage, as understood by Congress at the time of original enactment and thereafter, is inherently a male-female relationship. If that were not so, some of the statutory prohibitions not based on genetic reproductive concerns either would not be there or, to be consistent, would have been extended, for example, to prohibit a man's marrying his stepfather (just as a man cannot lawfully marry his stepmother) or to prevent a woman's marrying her wife's father (just as a woman cannot lawfully marry her husband's father). See D.C.Code § 30-101, supra note 11. If appellants were to prevail in their statutory interpretation, the law would permit same-sex couples to enter into some kinds of marriage relationships that the statute forbids for opposite-sex couples, even though such relationships would not be genetically dangerous for any kind of marriage. Indeed, if men could marry men, § 30-101 would not preclude a bi-sexual man who may have had a biological son from marrying that son, or from marrying his own father or brother. We do not believe that Congress, almost a century ago, envisioned such possibilities, given the consanguinity prohibitions imposed on opposite sex couples. See supra note 11. Nor is there any indication that more recent Congresses, or the Council in amending the marriage statute, ever modified the fundamental legislative understanding that marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples. Appellants' argument that § 30-101 reflects merely public health limitations, leaving room for all genetically safe marriages regardless of gender, accordingly fails. In sum, to conclude that Congress intended to permit same-sex marriages would mean that Congress in 1901 intended to permit various categories of genetically safe, same-sex marriages that were denied, though genetically safe, to opposite-sex couples. There is no evidence this was the case; the consanguinity provisions, far from supporting appellants' argument, actually reinforce the government's position that the legislature never had same-sex marriages in mind when adopting, codifying, or amending the marriage statute.