Opinion ID: 2265955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reopening the record

Text: Petitioners first contend that the hearing examiner's refusal to reopen the record in order to take additional testimony was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. D.C.Code § 1-1510(a)(3)(A) (1992). In particular, petitioners assert that they were surprised to learn at the administrative hearing of the specific nature of the vulgarities to which Ms. Petrie was subjected. In light of this unexpected discovery, petitioners argue that the examiner should have granted their motion to reopen the record. The District of Columbia workers' compensation statute provides, however, that no additional information may be submitted by the claimant or other interested parties after the date of hearing, except under unusual circumstances as determined by the Mayor. D.C.Code § 36-320(c) (1993); see Jones v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 584 A.2d 17, 18 (D.C.1990); King v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 560 A.2d 1067, 1071 (D.C.1989); Porter v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 518 A.2d 1020, 1023 (D.C.1986). Pursuant to the statute, DOES has promulgated regulations, one of which states in part: If the Hearing ... Examiner believes that there is relevant and material evidence available which has not been presented at the hearing, the hearing may be adjourned or, at any time prior to filing of the compensation order, the hearing may be reopened for the receipt of the evidence. 7 DCMR § 223.4 (1986). In Jones, supra, this court resolved apparent discrepancies between this regulation and the governing statute by holding that the reopening of evidentiary hearings is a two-step process. First, there must be the showing of unusual circumstances, and only then can the hearing be reopened for material and relevant evidence. 584 A.2d at 19. We observed that the purpose of the regulation is to prevent a hearing from being reopened simply for the purpose of introducing new or additional evidence when that evidence could have reasonably been presented at the hearing. Id. (citing J. STEIN, G. MITCHELL & B. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 30.01, at 30-11 (1990)). Given our decision in Jones, we hold in this case that petitioners have failed to demonstrate any unusual circumstances that would justify reopening the record. Contrary to their argument, any relevant and material evidence in their possession could have reasonably been presented at the hearing. The Director of DOES, in her remand order, properly rejected the employer's claim of surprise by noting that the employer had ample opportunity through preliminary discovery... to probe any unresolved or murky questions of fact it had with the case. The fact that Ms. Petrie did not particularize the abusive language and humiliating incidents in her deposition or in the course of her examination by Dr. Schulman does not permit a finding of unusual circumstances. [10] We agree with the Director's statement in the remand order that to reopen a hearing merely because one [party] failed to thoroughly investigate the circumstances, facts, and other pertinent information related thereto, is an insufficient basis for granting the request under the rubric of `unusual circumstances.' The record reveals no unusual circumstances, as required by the statute and the Jones case, and thus we hold that the examiner's refusal to reopen the record was neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor an abuse of discretion, nor contrary to law.