Opinion ID: 4175415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Stanley's Sentence

Text: That brings us to the last claim on appeal--Stanley's argument that his Guidelines sentencing range was incorrectly calculated and so his sentence is procedurally unreasonable. As before, we begin by recounting the relevant facts in a balanced manner. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d at 99. 7 Stanley puzzlingly mentions that the jury was confused about his guilt because it wrote ? Were any guns seized? on the verdict form. The government doesn't have to introduce the actual gun into evidence to prove a § 924(c) charge--indeed, the jury's note doesn't relate to any element of the offense--so we do not see how this point helps Stanley. In any case, we don't have to parse it out any further because the argument is undeveloped, and undeveloped arguments are waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). - 33 - a) Background Stanley's pre-sentence investigation report (PSR) calculated Stanley's Guidelines sentencing range as life in prison, plus five years for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Stanley's criminal history score was twenty, which put him in criminal history category VI. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) Ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2014). The PSR calculated his total offense level as forty-six. The only component of that offense-level calculation relevant here is Stanley's base offense level, which is determined by the quantity of drugs attributable to Stanley and involved in the conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c). The sentencing court found Stanley's base offense level was thirty-six, which it calculated by dividing the jury's $3,552,203 forfeiture verdict (Stanley's share of the total gross proceeds of the oxycodone conspiracy) by $20 per pill (Stanley's average sale price when he sold thirtymilligram oxycodone pills to other dealers), and adding on the pills seized during the conspiracy. At sentencing, Stanley argued that his base offense level should have been even lower--thirty-four--because the drugquantity calculation was based on estimates, and so Stanley's drug quantity could not be established with certainty. But, Stanley's attorney said, I'm not sure it makes any difference . . . whether he was a 36 to start or a 34, I think the computation - 34 - probably is almost irrelevant as we go forward. Indeed, the parties and the court agreed at sentencing that life is not appropriate here. In their sentencing arguments, both Stanley and the government stressed how Stanley's role in the conspiracy compared to that of Joshua and Willis--both men were sentenced first, and both got twenty years in prison. When Stanley pointed out, all of the alleged kingpins, including Willis, got non-Guideline sentences, the sentencing court interrupted to say that Stanley is going to get a non-Guideline sentence. In sentencing Stanley to twenty years, plus five years for the § 924(c) charge, the court explained that Stanley was the organizer on Cape Cod, on top of, as far as I'm concerned, even [his] brother Josh. The judge stated that Stanley's twenty-five year sentence was appropriate and sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve a deterrent purpose, considering the gravity of the offense, giving [Stanley] a proportionate punishment to other people in similar situations in this conspiracy, and also essentially making sure that the deterrence goes out to the community that oxycodone is something that is harmful and that we take seriously. The judge reiterated, [e]ven if my criminal Guideline sentencing turns out to be incorrect in some [way], this is what I think is sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve the purposes of punishment. - 35 - Stanley appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court overestimated the quantity of drugs attributable to him so his base offense level was too high. The government disagrees, and contends that even if the court made some error in assessing Stanley's drug quantity, the error did not affect his substantial rights. b) Analysis Stanley did not object below on the grounds he raises on appeal, so we review his sentencing claim for plain error.8 That means Stanley must show (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear and obvious and which not only (3) affected the [his] substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Rìos-Hernandez, 645 F.3d 456, 462 (1st Cir. 2011); accord United States v. Goodhue, 486 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 2007). Under this standard, Stanley faces a steep uphill climb, and his arguments are not up to the challenge. As we explain, we agree with the government that even if a clear and obvious error occurred, Stanley's claim still fails because we cannot conclude 8 The parties squabble over whether some of Stanley's factspecific drug-quantity-calculation arguments are waived. We give him the benefit of the doubt and review them all for plain error. See United States v. Kinsella, 622 F.3d 75, 86 (1st Cir. 2010) (taking an analogous approach). - 36 - that the error affected [Stanley's] substantial rights. Goodhue, 486 F.3d at 55. On the third prong of plain error review, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood 'that, but for the error, the district court would have imposed a different, more favorable sentence.' United States v. Hudson, 823 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 620 (2017) (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 741 F.3d 288, 293-94 (1st Cir. 2014)). Though an incorrectly calculated Guidelines range is, in itself, often enough to meet this burden, the government may counter by demonstrating that the district court would have imposed the same sentence even without the error. United States v. Reed, 830 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4, 25 (1st Cir. 2013)); see United States v. Marchena-Silvestre, 802 F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 2015). Our approach has been to attempt to discern whether there exists 'a clear statement by the [sentencing] court that would be sufficient to diminish the potential of the [Guideline Sentencing Range] to influence the sentence actually imposed.' Hudson, 823 F.3d at 19 (quoting Marchena-Silvestre, 802 F.3d at 201). If so, we may affirm the defendant's sentence. Id. We think the sentencing court made such a clear statement here. First, Stanley proposed a lower drug-quantity calculation at sentencing. Aware of his argument, the court - 37 - explained that Stanley's alternative Guidelines calculation did not matter because Stanley is going to get a non-Guideline sentence. Then, instead of basing Stanley's sentence on his Guidelines range, the sentencing judge gave Stanley a proportionate punishment to that of his co-conspirators Willis and Joshua. Both of these men were sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment, and Stanley's sentence was the same--plus five years for his § 924(c) conviction (remember Joshua was acquitted of that charge, and as the parties discussed at the sentencing hearing, Willis was never charged under the statute). If more evidence of the sentencing judge's intent to give a non-Guidelines sentence were needed, she explained that even if the Guidelines range turns out to be incorrect, the sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve the purposes of punishment. So even if there were some error in the court's drug-quantity calculation and the resulting Guidelines range--which we doubt--we think these statements show that the court would have imposed the same sentence even under the correct range. That means that any error did not impact Stanley's substantial rights. See Reed, 830 F.3d at 8. - 38 -