Opinion ID: 1257787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Disagreement Among Federal Circuit Courts

Text: While the law is settled as to the requirement of actual prejudice, the federal circuit courts do not agree on the test for determining whether preindictment delay resulted in a due process violation. Most of the circuits rely upon the standard that was seemingly adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Gouveia by requiring a demonstration of actual prejudice combined with a showing that the delay was a tactical device orchestrated to benefit the State. Two circuits-the Fourth and Ninth-have expressly departed from this approach. Rather than requiring that a defendant must prove tactical delay on the State's part, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits rely instead on a balancing test approach that weighs the actual prejudice demonstrated by a defendant against the government's reasons for the delay. See Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990); U.S. v. Ross, 123 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.1997); see also U.S. v. Sabath, 990 F.Supp. 1007, 1017-18 (N.D.Ill.1998) (adding Seventh Circuit to tally of circuits using balancing test rather than rigid standard of fault, based on careful reading of U.S. v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447 (7th Cir.1994)). [17] Before adopting its standard for analyzing preindictment delay in Howell, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the guidance offered by the United States Supreme Court. [I]n both Lovasco and Marion, the Supreme Court made it clear that the administration of justice, vis-a-vis a defendant's right to a fair trial, necessitated a case-by-case inquiry based on the circumstances of each case. Rather than establishing a black-letter test for determining unconstitutional preindictment delay, the Court examined the facts in conjunction with the basic due process inquiry: whether the action complained of ... violates those `fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions'... and which define `the community's sense of fair play and decency.' Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. at 2048 (citations omitted). Howell, 904 F.2d at 895. Reflecting on these laudatory principles, the Fourth Circuit opined in Howell: [W]e cannot agree with the position taken by the State of North Carolina and those other circuits which have held that a defendant, in addition to establishing prejudice, must also prove improper prosecutorial motive before securing a due process violation. Taking this position to its logical conclusion would mean that no matter how egregious the prejudice to a defendant, and no matter how long the preindictment delay, if a defendant cannot prove improper prosecutorial motive, then no due process violation has occurred. This conclusion, on its face, would violate fundamental conceptions of justice, as well as the community's sense of fair play. Moreover, this conclusion does not contemplate the difficulty defendants either have encountered or will encounter in attempting to prove improper prosecutorial motive. Id. at 895. Based on these considerations, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the approach it first announced in U.S. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir.1985), for analyzing whether preindictment delay results in a due process violation: The better position ... is to put the burden on the defendant to prove actual prejudice. Assuming the defendant can establish actual prejudice, then the court must balance the defendant's prejudice against the government's justification for delay. The basic inquiry then becomes whether the government's action in prosecuting after substantial delay violates `fundamental conceptions of justice' or `the community's sense of fair play and decency.' Howell, 904 F.2d at 895 (citations omitted). When asked by the prosecution in Jones to alter its approach, the Fourth Circuit remained firm in its decision to employ what it designated as the more lenient Howell standard applicable in this circuit. [18] 94 F.3d at 905. Not all courts view the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this area as requiring the interpretation accorded them by the majority of the federal circuit courts. The Fifth Circuit has expressly recognized that neither Marion nor Lovasco is crystal clear on this issue. U.S. v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1510 (5th Cir.1996). In a similar vein, the Fourth Circuit articulated that Gouveia is not clear precedent. [19] Howell, 904 F.2d at 894. Characterizing federal precedent in this area as unsettled, the New Hampshire Supreme Court recently adopted an approach that comports with the standard utilized by the Fourth Circuit in Howell and Jones: [T]he defendant must initially show that actual prejudice has resulted from a delay. Once such a showing has been made, the trial court must then balance the resulting prejudice against the reasonableness of the delay. As the trial court correctly ruled, whether the Government acted in bad faith in delaying indictment is [o]ne factor to consider in assessing the reasonableness of the delay. State v. Knickerbocker, 152 N.H. 467, 880 A.2d 419, 423 (2005) (citations omitted).