Opinion ID: 691351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Blackwell's Appeal

Text: 4 Blackwell asserts that the district court erred (1) in allowing a document containing hearsay into evidence at the sentencing hearing, and (2) in calculating the amount of loss properly attributable to him. 5 Both claims may be dispatched easily. First, the challenged document was introduced in conjunction with the testimony of Postal Inspector Mike Cashmer. Entitled Request for Laboratory Examination, it contained handwritten circles around certain numbers on an itemized list. Cashmer stated that the items with circles, mostly checks or deposit slips, had been identified by the crime lab as containing Blackwell's fingerprints. 6 Blackwell's counsel objected to the document's admission, claiming that the government had presented no evidence that the document was reliable and, indeed, had not even identified the person who made the circles. The court nonetheless accepted the document into evidence, and implicitly relied upon it in determining that Blackwell's participation in the conspiracy was extensive. 7 We find no abuse of discretion in the court's action. As Blackwell recognizes, there is little limit on the type of information the district court can consider in sentencing, United States v. Marshall, 719 F.2d 887, 891 (7th Cir.1983). So long as a defendant has an opportunity to rebut evidence that he believes is erroneous, a district court generally is not precluded from relying on hearsay in sentencing. Id.; see also United States v. Helton, 975 F.2d 430, 434 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Cusenza, 749 F.2d 473, 478 (7th Cir.1984). 8 Defense counsel had the opportunity at the hearing to cross-examine Cashmer and thus to challenge the accuracy of the inspector's representation that the circles identified items containing Blackwell's fingerprints. Counsel made no effort to do this. We consequently cannot fault the district court's consideration of the document. 9 Blackwell's second contention is equally insubstantial. His presentence report contained attachments listing all fraudulent or non-sufficient funds checks identified by the government during the investigation. Blackwell did not object below to the total loss figure that was calculated based on these attachments, and he therefore may not now challenge the calculation. See United States v. Strauser, 21 F.3d 194, 197 (7th Cir.1994). 10 His effort to distance himself from some of the transactions, while preserved, fares no better. Guideline Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) directs the sentencing court to consider, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity. United States v. Colello, 16 F.3d 193, 197 (7th Cir.1994). The district court's factual finding that the total fraud amount was reasonably foreseeable must be upheld absent clear error. United States v. Rosa, 946 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir.1991). 11 We find no such error. Through the Request for Laboratory Examination, the government linked Blackwell to approximately $64,000 in losses--nearly one-third of the total amount attributed to the conspiracy. In addition, the court heard testimony from both the government and Blackwell about his efforts to assist others during the conspiracy, and his joint access to a box containing checks used by the conspirators. In these circumstances, the court properly concluded that Blackwell was aware of the broad scope of the check-kiting scheme, and reasonably should have anticipated losses resulting from the activities of other participants. He need not have had specific knowledge of each of the other transactions to be held responsible for them. See United States v. Flores, 5 F.3d 1070, 1083 (7th Cir.1993).