Opinion ID: 2974065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Creation of a Distinct Group

Text: Finally, Hibbler argues that even though the courts have uniformly held that parties are free to challenge jurors based solely on their age, one of the reasons for this holding is that a “young person” is not part of a “discrete and insular” group, which is required for protection under the Equal Protection Clause. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 352 (1987); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). As we noted in Maxwell, “young adults” do not “comprise a distinct group.” 160 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 682 (6th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hibbler argues here that by exercising a peremptory challenge to excuse a 23-yearold, but not exercising peremptory challenges to excuse two 24-year-olds, the government has created a distinct group comprising those 23 years old and younger. This, he claims, is different from a group consisting of all “young adults.” We need not address here the question of whether for purposes of an equal protection claim based on age a line can legitimately be drawn between young people who are 23 years old and young people who are 24 years old, because there is no evidence that in this case the government actually drew such a line or treated the two age groups differently. It was no more the government 11 than Hibbler that drew the line between 23-year-olds and 24-year-olds; it was Hibbler, after all, who exercised peremptory challenges to exclude Hall and Ray, the two 24-year-olds. Moreover, because there was only one juror in the venire within the 23-year-old and younger group, there could be no showing that the government followed a pattern of selecting jurors within the allegedly protected group for peremptory challenges, which would raise an inference of differing treatment. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. Finally, the government did not rely solely on Harris’s age in excusing her, but also relied on her lack of employment and life experience in general, and government counsel stated on the record that she would have challenged one of the 24-year-old jurors on similar grounds had counsel had enough peremptory challenges remaining. There is simply no evidence that the government purposely treated the 23-year-old juror differently from the 24-year-old jurors based on the one-year difference in their respective ages. See Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 2005); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (disparate impact on a group is not sufficient; where disparate impact is shown, the party must show that the government singled the group out for differing treatment because of, rather than in spite of, the disparate impact). Hibbler has not shown any error in the district court’s ruling.