Opinion ID: 2463751
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Violation of the right to privacy

Text: ¶ 24 Appellants argue that even if we hold that Officer Cain has a right to privacy in his identity in connection to the unsubstantiated allegation of sexual misconduct, that right to privacy is not violated by production of the PCIR or the MIIIR with Officer Cain's name redacted. A person's `right to privacy' ... is invaded or violated only if disclosure of information about the person: (1) Would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public. RCW 42.56.050.
¶ 25 Appellants argue that production of Officer Cain's identity in connection with the unsubstantiated accusation of sexual misconduct is not highly offensive to a reasonable person. [T]he offensive nature of disclosure does not vary depending on whether the allegation is substantiated or unsubstantiated, but is implicit in the nature of an allegation of sexual misconduct. Bellevue John Does, 164 Wash.2d at 216 n. 18, 189 P.3d 139. In Bellevue John Does, we held that it was highly offensive to reveal a teacher's identity in connection with an accusation of sexual misconduct. Id. at 216, 189 P.3d 139. For the purposes of determining whether the production is highly offensive, there is no reason to distinguish an allegation of sexual misconduct against a police officer from an allegation of sexual misconduct against a teacher. We hold that revealing Officer Cain's identity in connection with Koenig's unsubstantiated allegation of sexual misconduct is highly offensive to a reasonable person.
¶ 26 Appellants argue that the trial court's withholding of the entire PCIR and MIIIR unlawfully denied access to a matter of legitimate public concern: an agency's response to an allegation of sexual misconduct. In Bellevue John Does, we held that the public has no legitimate interest in finding out the identity of someone accused of an unsubstantiated allegation of sexual misconduct. Id. at 221, 189 P.3d 139. Because the public records request in this case was specific to the PCIR and the MIIIR involving Officer Cain and Koenig, the trial courts found that any production of the PCIR or the MIIIR in connection with this specific request would necessarily reveal Officer Cain's identity in connection with the unsubstantiated allegation. However, we have recognized when allegations of sexual misconduct are unsubstantiated, the public may have a legitimate concern in the nature of the allegation and response of the school system to the allegation. Id. at 217 n. 19, 189 P.3d 139. [11] ¶ 27 Although lacking a legitimate interest in the name of a police officer who is the subject of an unsubstantiated allegation of sexual misconduct, the public does have a legitimate interest in how a police department responds to and investigates such an allegation against an officer. The reports in this case not only identify Officer Cain, they reveal the nature of the Mercer Island and Puyallup Police Departments' investigations of this allegation. Under RCW 42.56.050, the trial court erred by exempting the entire PCIR and MIIIR, rather than producing the report with only Officer Cain's identity redacted. ¶ 28 We have previously permitted production of a similarly redacted report even though redaction of only the person's name was insufficient to protect the person's identity. See Koenig v. City of Des Moines, 158 Wash.2d 173, 142 P.3d 162 (2006). In Koenig the public records exemption at issue, former RCW 42.17.31901 (1992), specifically exempted `[i]nformation revealing the identity of child victims of sexual assault.' 158 Wash.2d at 181, 142 P.3d 162. However, unlike former RCW 42.56.230(2), former RCW 42.17.31901 went on to define [i]dentifying information as the child victim's name, address, location, photograph, and in cases in which the child victim is a relative or stepchild of the alleged perpetrator, identification of the relationship between the child and the alleged perpetrator. In Koenig, the requestor had submitted a public records request specific to Jane Doe, a child victim of sexual assault. 158 Wash.2d at 178, 142 P.3d 162. Just like our current case, any production of the records of the assault whatsoever would identify Jane Doe as a child victim of sexual assault, even if her name were redacted. Relying on the express language of the statute, the court held that the provision exempted only the enumerated pieces of identifying information and not the entire report. Id. at 182, 142 P.3d 162. The majority noted the dissent's concern that the result would encourage `fishing expedition[s]' and speculation about victims' identities in filing public records requests. Id. at 184, 142 P.3d 162. However, the majority held that it was bound by the unambiguous text of former RCW 42.17.31901, and ordered the records production with only the enumerated identifying information redacted. ¶ 29 Although former RCW 42.56.230(2) does not enumerate specific types of identifying information that must be redacted, we are placed in the same position of being unable to completely protect the identity of an individual in a public record. Under RCW 42.56.050, a person's `right to privacy'... is invaded or violated only if disclosure of information about the person: (1) Would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not [a matter] of legitimate concern. (Emphasis added.) The PCIR and MIIIR include matters of legitimate public concern because they include information regarding police departments' investigations of an allegation of sexual misconduct. Because the nature of the investigations is a matter of legitimate public concern, disclosure of that information is not a violation of a person's right to privacy. [12] Because it is not a violation of a person's right to privacy, it does not fall into the category of personal information exempt under former RCW 42.56.230(2). We recognize that appellants' request under these circumstances may result in others figuring out Officer Cain's identity. However, it is unlikely that these are the only circumstances in which the previously existing knowledge of a third party, paired with the information in a public records request, reveals more than either source would reveal alone. We hold that while Officer Cain's identity is exempt from production under former RCW 42.56.230(2), the remainder of the PCIR and the MIIIR is nonexempt. [13] ¶ 30 The dissent asserts our holding today is inconsistent with this court's decision in Bellevue John Does, or that we are somehow treating the privacy rights of [police] officers differently from the privacy rights of teachers. Dissent at 206. This is simply inaccurate. Here, we exempt from production Officer's Cain name and identifying information while disclosing the remainder of the report dealing with the departments' investigations into the allegation. In Bellevue John Does, we exempted the name and identifying information of the teachers from production, while permitting disclosure of portions of the documents related to the allegations and investigations (subject to redactions), thus maintaining the citizens' ability to inform themselves about school district operations. 164 Wash.2d at 222, 189 P.3d 139. Our analysis here is consistent with the analysis in Bellevue John Does.