Opinion ID: 1468112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: On Petition for Reargument and for Issuance of Special Mandate

Text: Following the filing of the opinion in this cause, Y petitioned under Rule 13, Del.C. Ann., for reargument and for the issuance of a special mandate. At our request, X filed a short answer to the petition. The petition seeks reargument of the outright reversal of the portion of the order below appealed from, and requests the issuance of a special mandate preserving the jurisdiction of the Superior Court over the cause with instructions governing the conduct of future proceedings and the time within which they may be commenced. We deny the petition and take this means of stating our reasons briefly. The basis of Y's request to amend the outright reversal is that unless this is done the Superior Court will be deprived of jurisdiction. If this follows, it is argued, Y must start anew in the Family Court and would thus be subjected to the same unnecessarily duplicitious hearings this cause has already followed. The theory underlying the argument, we think, must be that exclusive jurisdiction over questions of custody of minor children has been conferred upon the Family Court. We think, however, this not to be the law. Exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions relating solely to custody of children is conferred upon the Family Court by 10 Del.C. § 951(11) only when the parents shall live in the state of separation without being divorced. Questions of custody and visitation, however, may arise in the Family Court in the exercise of its other original exclusive jurisdiction as incidental to the exercise of that jurisdiction, as seems to have happened in this cause. In other factual situations concurrent jurisdiction is granted by 10 Del.C. § 952(2) to the Family Court of writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of determining the question of custody of minor children. Obviously, therefore, Y could institute future petitions in either the Family Court or, at her option, in the Superior Court which has long exercised jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus to determine questions of custody of minor children. It is then argued that any remand should be with instructions that future hearings shall be confined to circumstances post-dating the original hearings since the past indiscretions of the parties have already been thoroughly explored. We think, however, that we are without power to do as Y requests. It is possible that further evidence of past conduct might come to light which would be pertinent in any future hearing. Furthermore, the trial judge in his discretion, it seems to us, could accept as evidence in a future hearing the transcript of the original hearing and, in his further discretion, could preclude the parties from duplicating the testimony contained in it. The conduct of future hearings, we think, must necessarily be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Next, Y urges us to set a future date upon which Y may be permitted to renew her application for visitation rights. This, we think, is impossible for us to do. In the first place, decisions on custody of minor children and of visitation with them are never matters of res judicata. They may be reopened at any time by the parties as a matter of right. We think we may not deprive Y of that right by fixing a time limitation. If the request of Y that we fix a date is an attempt by her to have us lay down as a matter of law that the leading by her of a stable moral life demonstrating an emotional maturity for a definite period of time will ipso facto give her the right of visitation, we refuse to do so. As we pointed out, the prime consideration in these matters is the welfare of the children. That is an ultimate fact to be determined by the trial judge from all the circumstances proved before him. We are without authority to take that function from him. In a future hearing Y must satisfy the trial judge that she at that time has reached an emotional maturity so that visitation with the children would not jeopardize their present well adjusted situation. When that time will come, it is impossible now to say. Its existence will be a matter of fact to be determined in a future hearing. Finally, Y moves to strike from X's answer to the petition a statement described as impertinent, malicious, irrelevant and a scandalous characterization of her petition for reargument. We think the statement uncalled for and unwarranted but decline to strike it. It falls considerably short of the scandalous.