Opinion ID: 1920879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Single Advisory Sentence

Text: While substantial evidence supports Snelgrove's conviction in the guilt phase, we find that the single, undifferentiated death recommendation in this case warrants a new penalty-phase proceeding. In Pangburn v. State, 661 So.2d 1182, 1188 (Fla.1995), we held that Florida's death penalty scheme requires a separate jury recommendation for each count of first-degree murder. Contrary to the State's arguments, the harmless-error rule does not apply. [18] Since Snelgrove received a single, undifferentiated death recommendation for two counts of first-degree murder, we reverse and remand for a new penalty-phase proceeding. In Pangburn, 661 So.2d at 1190, we reversed the defendant's death sentence and remanded for a new penalty-phase proceeding because the jury rendered a single, undifferentiated death recommendation in a case where the defendant had been convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. [19] We noted that Florida's capital-sentencing statute clearly addresses [the jury's] advisory sentence as it pertains to a single murder, and that juries frequently render different recommendations for different counts. Id. at 1188 (citing § 921.141(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (1991)). While we did not directly address the State's argument that the harmless-error rule should apply, the language of the opinion suggests that it does not. Pangburn speaks in absolute terms, holding that it would undermine our sentencing procedure to allow a jury to render a single recommendation in a case like this. Pangburn, 661 So.2d at 1188. The potential for unreliability in the imposition of the death penalty is too great to subject general jury recommendations of death to harmless-error analysis. This is true for several reasons. First, as we explained in Pangburn, aggravating and mitigating circumstances that apply to one count may not apply to another, leading jurors on occasion to recommend death for one murder and life for another. See id. Second, in Florida, the judge and jury are considered cosentencers, see Kormondy v. State, 845 So.2d 41, 54 (Fla.2003), and a recommendation of life must be accorded great weight by the sentencing judge. See Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975). Third, general sentences that do not distinguish between individual counts are prohibited in Florida. See Dorfman v. State, 351 So.2d 954, 957 (Fla.1977). General sentences create uncertainty because it cannot be determined that the same sentence would have been imposed if one of the crimes had not been committed. Therefore, if one conviction that is part of a general sentence is reversed, the entire sentence must be vacated. See id. This is a particularly trenchant concern in capital cases, in which a new penalty phase can be expensive and time-consuming. With an individual recommendation on each count, one death sentence may be affirmed even if another is reversed. See, e.g., Buckner v. State, 714 So.2d 384, 386 (Fla.1998) (affirming death sentence on one count and reversing death sentence on second count). Lastly, juries sometimes recommend the death penalty for multiple murders by a different vote on each count. The vote breakdown can be a useful consideration in determining whether error during the penalty phase is harmful and therefore reversible. See Mahn v. State, 714 So.2d 391, 398 (Fla.1998) (noting that death recommendation was by eight-to-four vote in holding error in finding cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator was not harmless); Preston v. State, 564 So.2d 120, 123 (Fla. 1990) (observing that jury recommended death by one-vote margin in reversing death sentence after prior conviction relied upon for aggravating factor was vacated). With no count-by-count vote breakdown, this aspect of our analysis is impossible. Because the potential for unreliability is so great in general recommendations for the imposition of the death penalty, we hold that a Pangburn violation is not subject to a harmless-error test. Rather, such an error requires per se reversal. Therefore, Snelgrove is entitled to a new penalty-phase proceeding at which the jury must make individualized recommendations on each capital count for which he is to be sentenced.