Opinion ID: 1871446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine.

Text: Appellant bases his legal argument, in part, on Article I, Section I of the Mississippi Constitution which is as follows: The powers of the government of the state of Mississippi shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit: those which are legislative to one, those which are judicial to another, and those which are executive to another. He also bases his argument on Article 1, section 2 which reads in pertinent part: No person or collection of persons, being one or belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others.... Washington was indicted as an habitual offender under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81, as follows: Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall have been sentenced to separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, shall be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation. Following this statute and Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice 6.04(1), [1] the appellant contends that the function of sentencing has been transferred from the exclusive control of the judiciary to the office of the prosecuting attorney, an executive officer, violating the separation of the powers doctrine. This shift, claims the appellant, comes about by the use of the prosecutorial discretion in electing, or refusing, to indict as an habitual criminal. Analyzing this argument, this Court notes first that the fixing of punishment in criminal cases is a question of legislative policy. Gabriel v. Brame, 200 Miss. 767, 28 So.2d 581 (1947); Jordan v. State, 383 So.2d 495 (Miss. 1980); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1285, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958); 24B C.J.S. § 1975 Criminal Law, p. 539. In People v. Pettigrew, 123 Ill. App.3d 649, 78 Ill.Dec. 919, 462 N.E.2d 1273 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1984) the defendant argued that the authority of the state's attorney to invoke the habitual criminal statute was actually a sentencing power and under the state constitution such power belonged exclusively to the judicial branch. The Illinois Appellate Court responded, The power to petition the court to invoke the sanctions of the Act is not the power to sentence. Id. 78 Ill.Dec. at 921, 462 N.E.2d at 1275. The Court went on to uphold the constitutionality of the Act. In the similar Indiana case of Thomas v. State, 471 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. 1984), prosecutorial discretion, contended the defendant, improperly gave the executive branch the power to determine certain sentences. In response, the Indiana Supreme Court stated: We have repeatedly held adversely to defendant's position since it is clear that a prosecutor is always permitted some selectivity in every case as to whether or not to charge a violation of a criminal statute. The habitual offender statute does not contravene the constitutional provisions providing for separation of powers in the respective branches of our government. Id. at 683-684. Also, see Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770, 257 S.E.2d 182 (1979), State v. Badon, 338 So.2d 665 (La. 1976), Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (conscious selectivity in enforcement of a habitual criminal statute is not in itself a violation of the Federal constitution where the selection is not deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification). The argument in the case sub judice is almost identical to the arguments in Pettigrew and Thomas. It is this Court's opinion there is no merit to this argument.