Opinion ID: 173410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdictional IssuesThe Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Text: Because it implicates our subject matter jurisdiction, we address the cross-appellants' claim that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this entire § 1983 suit before turning to the merits of the case. See Crutchfield v. Countrywide Home Loans, 389 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir.2004) (addressing Rooker-Feldman argument before considering the merits and explaining that the issue is integral to subject matter jurisdiction). Generally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts from effectively exercising appellate jurisdiction over claims actually decided by a state court and claims inextricably intertwined with a prior state-court judgment. Mo's Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court recently clarified the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, stating that it is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). In light of Exxon, we have concluded that the type of judicial action barred by Rooker-Feldman [] consists of a review of the proceedings already conducted by the `lower' tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in accordance with law. Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1143 (10th Cir.2006). In this way, we have explained that  Rooker-Feldman does not bar federal-court claims that would be identical even had there been no state-court judgment; that is, claims that do not rest on any allegation concerning the state-court proceedings or judgment. Id. at 1145. Additionally, our recent Rooker-Feldman jurisprudence has emphasized the relief sought by federal-court plaintiffs. See Mo's Express, LLC, 441 F.3d at 1237 ([W]e approach the [ Rooker-Feldman ] question by asking whether the state-court judgment caused, actually and proximately, the injury for which the federal-court plaintiff seeks redress. ). In Mo's Express, LLC, we concluded that federal-court plaintiffs who only sought prospective injunctive and declaratory relief were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because their federal suit would not reverse or otherwise `undo' the relief granted by the [state court].... Id. at 1238. Conversely, we recently held that a federal-court plaintiff's claims seeking monetary damages from government actors who complied with probate court orders unfavorable to the plaintiff were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because success on the claims would require the district court to review and reject [the probate court's] judgments. Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir.2007). Given this framework, we first identify the two state-court judgments adverse to the Jensens that neither the federal district court nor this court may review or undo in any way: (1) the juvenile court's August 8 order granting the state custody over P.J.; and (2) the state district court's October 2 order accepting the Jensens' guilty pleas for misdemeanor custodial interference. The district court concluded that none of the Jensens' claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the constitutional injury alleged by the Jensens is separate and independent from any orders of the state courts.... On appeal, the Jensens base their substantive and procedural due process claims on misrepresentations allegedly made by the defendants during the juvenile court proceedings and with respect to P.J.'s medical treatment, and on DCFS's alleged failure to conduct an independent investigation of P.J.'s case before filing the verified petition. Without addressing every underlying factual allegation against each defendant here, we agree with the district court that each of these claims seek[s] relief independent from any judgment rendered by the state courts. Although the alleged misrepresentations and failure to investigate are closely connected to the juvenile court proceedings and the Jensens' criminal prosecution, they are sufficiently extricable from any state-court judgment for Rooker-Feldman purposes. Indeed, the Jensens' substantive and procedural due process claims would be identical even if there were no state-court orders adverse to the Jensens. Therefore, these claims do not allege injuries caused by state-court judgments, Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, and thus are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Conversely, the Jensens' malicious prosecution claims necessarily invite federal-court undoing of the two adverse state-court orders. To succeed on their § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, the Jensens must prove: (1) the defendants caused their continued confinement or prosecution; (2) some original action terminated in favor of the Jensens; (3) no probable cause supported the Jensens' original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendants acted with malice; and (5) the Jensens sustained damages. Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir.2008). Accordingly, to satisfy the third element of their malicious prosecution claims, the Jensens must convince a lower federal court that there was no probable cause for the prosecution of either the juvenile court proceedings or the criminal proceedings. As discussed above, however, those state-court proceedings resulted in adverse judgments for the Jensens. Therefore, a lower federal court would necessarily have to review and reject those judgments in order for the Jensens to succeed on their malicious prosecution claims. Furthermore, [t]he Fourth Amendment in the context of a malicious prosecution claim deals with judicial determinations of probable cause.... Id. at 802. And, the Jensens may only show the existence of a Fourth Amendment violation if they can show that the legal process itself was wrongful. Id. at 798. We fail to see how a federal court could conclude that the juvenile proceedings or the Jensens' criminal prosecution themselves were wrongful without reviewing and, in essence, reversing the adverse state-court judgments that were the products of those proceedings. Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the Jensens' malicious prosecution claims.