Opinion ID: 2606799
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Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Additional Questions

Text: As to whether plaintiff-Arguello can be said to be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, or whether he assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law, counsel on both sides of the case have discussed the two matters together, and we shall do likewise. Distinctions between assumption of risk and contributory negligence have not been adopted in Wyoming. See Rocky Mountain Trucking Company v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 335 P.2d 448, 451; and Askin v. Dalgarno, 10 Cir., 293 F.2d 424, 426. We cannot say as a matter of law to what extent Peterson was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. We do know from his own admissions and from undisputed evidence that he drove at an excessive speed. This was sufficient to constitute contributory negligence on the part of Peterson and to bar him from a recovery against Ford. The trial judge therefore properly directed a verdict in favor of Ford, on a cross-complaint by Peterson. That did not, however, constitute a finding that Peterson's drinking was a proximate cause of the accident. Drinking on the part of Peterson is not denied, although the highway patrolman, a deputy sheriff and four other witnesses testified without direct contradiction that he was not drunk. In any event it cannot be said as a matter of law that such drinking was a proximate cause of the accident. As stated in Lindemann v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 5 Cal.2d 480, 55 P.2d 870, 874, it is for the jury to determine whether the intoxication of a driver proximately contributed to an accident, unless the court is compelled to say from the facts that reasonable men could draw no other inference. It necessarily follows in the instant case that if the drinking of Peterson cannot be said as a matter of law to be a proximate cause of the accident, then his guest cannot be said as a matter of law to be guilty of contributory negligence or assumption of risk. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the question of contributory negligence or assumption of risk is not one of law except in the clearest case. McDowall v. Walters, Wyo., 360 P.2d 165, 168, rehearing denied Wyo., 361 P.2d 528; Borzea v. Anselmi, 71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796, 800; Templar v. Tongate, 71 Wyo. 148, 255 P.2d 223, 231. The facts in this case do not indicate it to be such a case. Generally, the questions as to whether the intoxication or drinking of the operator of an automobile was the proximate cause of injuries received by his guest, and whether the guest knew or should have known the driver was intoxicated are problems for the determination of the jury; and a reviewing court may not interfere with its conclusions when there is substantial evidence to support the findings, as there is in this case. Kroplin v. Huston, 79 Cal. App.2d 332, 179 P.2d 575, 580; Davis v. Hollowell, 326 Mich. 673, 40 N.W. 2d 641, 15 A.L.R.2d 1160; Westergard v. Peterson, 117 Mont. 550, 159 P.2d 518, 520. See Annotation 15 A.L.R.2d 1165. Appellant-Ford claims counsel for plaintiff persisted throughout the course of the trial in conduct violative of well known standards of courtroom decorum. Instances complained of are itemized in appellant's statement of the case. To this accusation appellee counters by citing similar instances of alleged misconduct on the part of counsel for Ford. Our attention is not directed to any particular objections made during the course of trial where proper corrective measures were not immediately taken by the trial judge. In fact, appellant admits that perhaps no one of the matters referred to in this connection would be sufficient, standing alone, to warrant a reversal. As to whether all of them taken together, without a showing of failure on the part of the judge to correct when requested to do so, would be grounds for reversal, no authority is called to our attention. Here again counsel for appellant admit their research has discovered no case closely similar or analogous. Under these circumstances, we do not consider there would be sufficient justification for a new trial on account of the alleged misconduct of counsel. Finding no reversible errors in either the verdict of the jury or the judgment of the court we affirm the judgment entered. Affirmed.