Opinion ID: 2189585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment in Favor of the Baileys

Text: Similarly, we affirm the trial court's ruling that the Baileys were entitled to summary judgment. We agree with the trial court that there was no genuine issue of material fact relevant to Bembery's claim for relief against the Baileys. [3] Bembery contends that the District destroyed records which may have shown earlier notice to the record owner. Citing D.C.Code § 2-1706 (2001), [4] Bembery argues that the District must not destroy records it creates or receives in the course of business. Bembery submitted an affidavit by a co-trustee of JayTee Realty Trust, in which she stated that she was told by employees of the Department of Tax and Revenue that letters giving notice of the expiration of the redemption period went out in December 1998 (reportedly to the wrong address) and again in March 1999. This affidavit was unsigned when initially filed; it was later resubmitted signed. The trial judge noted that its filing was untimely and ruled that it was, in any event, hearsay. Bembery points out that Ms. Sheila Jones of the Office of Tax and Revenue, stated at her deposition that [o]nce a refund is completed, all we keep is the refund voucher.... [W]e no longer need [documents in the file] once the refund has been approved and given to the buyer. This statement notwithstanding, Ms. Connice Hogue, a tax sale manager for the Office of Tax and Revenue, subsequently produced at her deposition a substantial file of documents including the May 13, 1999, notice letter, which was the earliest redemption letter in the file. While this demonstrates that there is some confusion regarding record-keeping procedures, it does not lend credence to the proposition that relevant documents were destroyed. Rather, the fact that the refund has not been fully completed because Bembery has not negotiated his refund check and thereby accepted the refund may well account for Ms. Hogue's production of a substantial file of documents relating to this tax sale in a way that is consistent with the practice described by Ms. Jones of destroying the file other than the refund voucher when the refund has been given (as she put it) to the buyer. In any event, it is clear that such purging of the file did not take place in this case. Because Bembery has not offered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue as to whether relevant records were destroyed, the trial court properly rejected his claim that a genuine issue of material fact is in dispute. Accordingly, the earliest letter in the record is the May letter that should have been, but was not, directed to the owners of record, the Baileys. [5] Bembery contends that the District's error in failing to send the notice of expiration letter to the Baileys, despite the fact that their deed was duly recorded on April 16, 1999, does not affect his right to the property. Rather, he argues, the District's notice to the Sewells on May 13, 1999, served as sufficient notice to the Baileys. In effect, Bembery would have the District, and this court, deem the former owner the agent of the new owner for receipt of notice. Bembery furnishes no support for this theory. It is the District's obligation to send the record owner a notice of expiration. Therefore, the District must consult its records of ownership prior to sending out a notice of expiration letter. The District's notice letter on May 13, 1999, to the Sewells was not notice to the Baileys. The District is required to provide notice that complies strictly with the requirements of applicable statutes and regulations, Boddie, supra, 430 A.2d at 522, and that comports with the due process requirement that it be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the imminent prospect of their loss of valuable property rights. In the matter before us, we conclude that this means notice to the current actual record holders of title to the property, even if that should be persons who obtained their interest after the tax sale. The Baileys bought the property from the Sewells on April 15, 1999, and recorded the deed the next day. The May redemption letter was not sent to and did not reach the Baileys, who were the record owners as of the date it was sent. The first letter to reach the Baileys and give them the prescribed statutory notice was the September 1999 letter. The Baileys made timely payment of the taxes due and satisfactorily redeemed the property prior to the extended expiration date. The Baileys properly effected redemption. Therefore, the order granting summary judgment in their favor is affirmed. So ordered.