Opinion ID: 1871970
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: did district court have jurisdiction under nccja?

Text: In her second assignment of error, Becky argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction over this custody dispute. We will analyze this issue by looking to the NCCJA, which provides in relevant part: A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination. . . if: (a) This state (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding [or] (b) It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his or her parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this state and (ii) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships; [or] . . . . (d)(i) It appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction. . . . § 43-1203(1). Home state is defined as the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his or her parents, a parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months. § 43-1202(5). The petition for modification was filed in the Platte County District Court on December 11, 2003. The record establishes that the children have lived with Verlyn in Nebraska since approximately February 28, 2003. Given that the children had lived in Nebraska for more than 6 months when Verlyn filed his petition for modification, it would appear, pursuant to §§ 43-1202(5) and 43-1203(1)(a)(i), that Nebraska was the children's home state. Despite these statutory provisions, Becky contends that even though the children had lived in Nebraska for more than 9 months as of the date Verlyn filed his motion on December 11, 2003, such residence was the result of an invalid order issued by the Kansas district court. Consequently, Becky argues this 9-month time period is not properly includable in the calculation of whether Nebraska has home state jurisdiction. In support of her argument, Becky cites to Luna v. Luna, 592 N.W.2d 557 (N.D.1999), and Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493 (Wyo.1998). Neither case, however, addresses the precise issue presented. Rather, both cases stand, in relevant part, for the proposition that a court's jurisdiction must exist at the time an action is filed and cannot be attained after such date regardless of the amount of time spent by the children in the state subsequent to the filing of a custody action. Given that no one contends that the 9-month time period during which the children lived with Verlyn in Nebraska and over which home state jurisdiction was based was subsequent to Verlyn's filing, we conclude that both cases are inapplicable. Becky also directs this court to In re Marriage of Hamilton, 120 Wash.App. 147, 84 P.3d 259 (2004), a case decided under Washington's version of the UCCJEA. Becky contends that In re Marriage of Hamilton holds that `significant contacts' generated without a valid court order may not be used to establish jurisdiction. Brief for appellant at 19. However, a review of In re Marriage of Hamilton does not support Becky's contention. To the contrary, the Washington Court of Appeals did consider the child's contacts with Washington in concluding that Washington had jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that the mother had moved from Texas to Washington without the father's knowledge. Despite those circumstances, the Washington court held that where a child had no home state, as was true in the situation presented, that child's significant contacts with a state could be considered in determining jurisdiction. We conclude that In re Marriage of Hamilton is not supportive of Becky's argument. We note that we are not faced with a situation like the one presented in Marriage of Ieronimakis, 66 Wash.App. 83, 831 P.2d 172 (1992), which was cited and distinguished in In re Marriage of Hamilton. In Marriage of Ieronimakis, a mother brought her children from Greece, where they had lived with the children's father, to Washington without the father's permission or knowledge. In concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the children, the court explained: To allow Washington courts to assert jurisdiction because [the mother] generated significant contacts with the state is in effect telling any abducting parent that if you can stay away from the home state long enough to generate new considerations and new evidence, that is a sufficient reason for the new state to assert a right to adjudicate the issue. Such a holding circumvents the intent of the jurisdiction laws. Marriage of Ieronimakis, 66 Wash.App. at 92, 831 P.2d at 177. See, also, Ortman v. Ortman, 670 N.E.2d 1317 (Ind.App.1996) (where mother unilaterally removed children from prior state of residence, allowing change in children's home state would contravene purposes of Indiana's version of NCCJA). See, generally, § 43-1208 (where one party without consent improperly removes child from party with right to custody, court should decline to exercise jurisdiction). On the record before us, it is undisputed that Verlyn did not abduct the children or otherwise improperly remove them from Becky's custody. On the contrary, Verlyn filed a petition for modification of custody in the Kansas district court. Following a trial, the Kansas court found a material change in circumstances and granted Verlyn custody of the children. It was only after that order was issued that Verlyn obtained custody of the children and moved them to Nebraska. Although the Kansas Court of Appeals later determined that the Kansas court was without jurisdiction to grant custody to Verlyn, that does not change the fact that Verlyn took custody of the children in accordance with what was believed to be a valid court order. Furthermore, the conclusion that the 9-month period from February to December 11, 2003, is properly considered in determining the children's home state does not, given this record, contravene the general purposes of the NCCJA. Section 43-1201 sets forth the general purposes of the NCCJA. Subsection (e) provides that one such purpose is to [d]eter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards, while subsection (g) provides that the NCCJA should [f]acilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states. Neither of these purposes is inconsistent with the view that Verlyn should be permitted to rely upon the Kansas order in establishing home state jurisdiction. The NCCJA is not concerned with the conduct of a custodial parent acting pursuant to what is believed to be a valid court order, but, rather, with the unilateral removal of a child from another jurisdiction. Nor would it facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees from other jurisdictions to hold that a party's good faith reliance upon such a decree is of no consequence if it is ultimately determined to have been erroneous. We conclude that upon this record, the time the children spent in Nebraska pursuant to the Kansas order is properly includable in calculating whether Nebraska had home state jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Platte County District Court had home state jurisdiction over the children. For the sake of completeness, we note that the district court concluded it possessed subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA as either the home state or the state having the most significant connection with the children. Having determined that the district court acquired home state jurisdiction under the NCCJA, we need not further address its alternative basis of jurisdiction. Becky's second assignment of error is without merit.