Opinion ID: 1908964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Appellee was entitled to summary judgment at the circuit court level and more specifically, whether appellee was entitled to summary judgement under the theories of equitable estoppel, election of remedies and/or judicial estoppel.

Text: ¶ 8. This Court's standard of review of dismissals on summary judgment is de novo. Cities of Oxford v. Northeast Mississippi Electric Power Ass'n, 704 So.2d 59, 64 (Miss.1997). As provided by Miss. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is only appropriate: (I)f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists, this Court will view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358 (Miss.1983). ¶ 9. The trial judge dismissed Dr. Beyer's lawsuit against Easterling based on the election of remedies doctrine. The doctrine of election of remedies serves to prevent a litigant from presenting inconsistent causes of action and/or testimony before the court. Under the election of remedies doctrine, a plaintiff's action is barred if: (1) There exist two or more remedies; (2) The remedies are inconsistent, and (3) The plaintiff has previously made a choice of one of them. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Berry, 669 So.2d 56, 72 (Miss.1996). In Coral Drilling, Inc. v. Bishop, 260 So.2d 463, 465-66 (Miss. 1972), this Court explained the policy considerations underlying the election of remedies doctrine: Courts will not permit litigants to solemnly affirm that a given state of facts exists from which they are entitled to a particular relief, and then afterwards affirm, or assume, that a contrary state of facts exists from which they are entitled to inconsistent relief. ¶ 10. In dismissing Dr. Beyer's lawsuit, the trial judge was concerned with the fact that, both in the federal lawsuit against SEC and in the early stages of this lawsuit against Easterling, Dr. Beyer had repeatedly contended that the signature on the Agreement was not his own. The trial judge wrote in his ruling that: It was not until Dr. Beyer's October 24, 1997 state court deposition herein that Dr. Beyer changed his position ... and testified under oath (A) that the handwriting expert said he (Dr. Beyer) had signed the December 28, 1990, Agreement Concerning Withdrawal; (B) that Dr. Beyer accepts as a fact that he (Dr. Beyer) had signed this agreement, (C) that Dr. Beyer now contends that he had no recollection of signing this Agreement; (D) and that he would not have signed this Agreement on December 28, 1990 if he were lucid and in his right mind.... The sworn position taken by Dr. Beyer as of October 24, 1997, as to his signature being on the December 28, 1990 Agreement is completely contrary to the forged signature sworn positions Dr. Beyer had taken on at least three occasions. ¶ 11. In response to the trial judge's findings, Dr. Beyer submits that he did not deny in his federal lawsuit that he had signed the Agreement. Dr. Beyer submits that, instead, he merely stated that he had not knowingly signed the agreement, and that his causes of action and testimony are accordingly not inconsistent. The record, however, does not support Dr. Beyer's assertions. Dr. Beyer did not merely deny that he had knowingly signed the Agreement; to the contrary, he specifically denied that he had signed the agreement at all. Dr. Beyer testified in his 1992 deposition in the federal lawsuit as follows: Q: If you would, look on the last page. What is the date, please? I'm calling your attention to Exhibit 7, I believe. Dr. Beyer: That's correct. Page 9, December 28th, 1990. Q: Does it or not appear to have your signature? Dr. Beyer: No sir. Q: You deny that being your signature? Dr. Beyer: Yes, sir. Q: Do you deny having ever signed the original or any copies of that document? Dr. Beyer: Yes, sir. In a March 21, 1996 affidavit, Dr. Beyer stated once again that: 2. I did not sign, nor have I ever stated that I signed, the Agreement Concerning Withdrawal from my opthamalic surgery practice at Southern Eye Center, Hattiesburg, Mississippi. It is thus apparent that Dr. Beyer did in fact state under oath that he had not signed the Agreement, and the trial judge was correct in so finding. ¶ 12. At the same time, however, this Court does not consider the present case to be a proper one for the application of the doctrine of election of remedies. On motion for summary judgment, we must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The facts of the case, considered in such a light, support a conclusion that Dr. Beyer truly believed that he had not signed the Agreement Concerning Withdrawal, and this belief on his part would explain his actions in filing suit against SEC and in testifying that he had not signed the Agreement. As will be seen, the doctrine of election of remedies is in disfavor nationwide, and the doctrine is generally applied with caution and only in cases where the equities so dictate. [1] ¶ 13. Dr. Beyer hired Easterling to assist in negotiations in large part due to the presence of the disability provision, which all parties understood to be the key point of contention in Dr. Beyer's withdrawal. Dr. Beyer had a contractual right to the equivalent of a year's income (or $ 1.65 million dollars) in disability payments, and the record indicates that he was keenly interested in securing this amount. In a letter to Easterling written on November 28, 1990, Dr. Beyer stated that: The most important issue, as you are aware from 1986, is my severance.... I've already told you the sum involved 1.65 millionand you know the clause in my contract which covers this. I don't need to tell you that McMahan will not like paying this, though I don't believe he will balk at the end. You need to stand firm. We fought for this in 1986 for just this reason. Given that Dr. Beyer was very interested in securing the full $ 1.65 million dollars in disability payments, it would be very surprising if he had, one month after writing the above letter, knowingly signed an agreement which provided for no disability payments whatsoever. It is noteworthy that there were one original and two duplicates of the Agreement, but only the original copy was allegedly signed by Dr. Beyer. [2] ¶ 14. The fact that only the original of the Agreement was signed, when considered in the light most favorable to Dr. Beyer, might tend to strengthen the suspicion that the Agreement was not knowingly signed by Dr. Beyer. Also relevant in this context is the fact that Dr. Beyer was withdrawing from his practice on the recommendation of his psychologist, due to mental disability. As such, Dr. Beyer's testimony in which he denied having signed the Agreement could be attributed, in part, to his lack of mental acuity at the time the Agreement was signed. ¶ 15. When considered in the light most favorable to Dr. Beyer, the facts support a conclusion that Dr. Beyer may well have testified inaccurately when he stated that he did not sign the Agreement Concerning Withdrawal, but that he was, nevertheless, dealing in a good faith manner with the facts as he understood them. The doctrine of election of remedies is generally not applicable to lawsuits which were filed with incomplete or inaccurate knowledge of the underlying facts. The Supreme Court of Texas held in Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.1980) that the extent of a plaintiffs knowledge is a significant factor in determining whether the doctrine of election of remedies should apply. The Court held that: There is no election, that is, no inconsistency in choices, when one first unsuccessfully pursues a right or remedy which proved unfounded and then pursues one that is allowed.... One's choice between inconsistent remedies, rights or states of facts does not amount to an election which will bar further action unless the choice is made with full and clear understanding of the problem, facts, and remedies essential to the exercise of an intelligent choice. Bocanegra, 605 S.W.2d at 852. Likewise, 25 Am.Jur.2d Election of Remedies § 10, at 771 (1996) notes that (i)f a litigant selects a remedy that was not available because either the facts or the law applicable to the facts was different than as supposed, the litigant has not made an election such that would preclude the litigant from choosing another proper, although inconsistent, remedy. (Footnote omitted). ¶ 16. In O'Briant v. Hull, 208 So.2d 784, 786 (Miss.1968), this Court noted that the doctrine of election of remedies is to be applied with caution, stating that (t)he authorities are uniform in their holdings that the doctrine is a harsh one, that it is disfavored in equity, and that it should not be unduly extended. See also Berry, 669 So.2d at 72, citing O'Briant. This Court concludes that the equities of the present case do not support the dismissal of Dr. Beyer's lawsuit against Easterling based on his earlier statements under oath. Considerations of fairness and equity do not support the dismissal of a possibly meritorious lawsuit based on an earlier lawsuit which may have been filed based on a misunderstanding of the applicable facts. The trial judge's dismissal based on the election of remedies doctrine is accordingly reversed. ¶ 17. In addition to finding that Dr. Beyer's lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of election of remedies, the trial judge also found that the suit was barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. In Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218 (Miss.1994), this Court noted that (j)udicial estoppel arises from the taking of a position by a party to a suit that is inconsistent with the position previously asserted in prior litigation. Ivy, 644 So.2d at 1222. (quoting Daughtrey v. Daughtrey, 474 So.2d 598, 602 (Miss.1985)). ¶ 18. One treatise notes that, as with the election of remedies doctrine, the doctrine of judicial estoppel generally does not apply to false statements which were made without full knowledge of the applicable facts: Clearly, testimony given in a prior action does not estop the witness from testifying to the contrary in a subsequent action against one not a party to the prior action, where the former testimony was given by mistake or inadvertence or without full knowledge of the facts and is so explained by the witness in a subsequent action. In other words, the oath, to be binding as an estoppel, must be willfully false, or must have the effect of misleading the other party to his injury.... 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 71, at 702 (1996)(footnotes omitted). The facts of the present case support a conclusion that Dr. Beyer's earlier denial of having signed the Agreement, if false, was not willfully false. It is true that Dr. Beyer denied having signed the Agreement both in his original suit and in his suit against Easterling, but this Court concludes that, for the reasons discussed earlier, the equities of the present case do not warrant a dismissal of the lawsuit based on these earlier statements. The trial court's ruling is reversed, and this case is remanded for trial. [3]