Opinion ID: 1602881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether defense counsel's assistance was ineffective in failing to object to jury instruction.

Text: ¶ 11. Nix argues that his conviction should be reversed and remanded for a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Nix asserts that trial counsel should have objected to jury instruction S-1 offered by the prosecution. According to Nix, the jury instruction contained language that differed from the language of the indictment. Nix claims that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object and was convicted under a lesser burden of proof than required by the indictment. ¶ 12. The United States Supreme Court has held that the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [3] To determine whether counsel's conduct undermined the fairness of the proceedings, the defendant must show that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance deprived him of a fair trial. Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 476 (Miss.1984). If the defendant is not able to make both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. ¶ 13. Deficiency of the conduct and any resulting prejudicial effect are assessed by looking at the totality of the circumstances. Hiter v. State, 660 So.2d 961, 965 (Miss.1995) (citing Carney v. State, 525 So.2d 776, 780 (Miss.1988)). The right to effective counsel entitles a defendant to competent counsel, not perfect counsel. Davis v. State, 897 So.2d 960, 966 (Miss.2004). A strong but rebuttable presumption exists that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Hiter, 660 So.2d at 965. The failure of counsel to make certain objections may fall within the ambit of trial strategy, and therefore may not give rise to a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Bell v. State, 879 So.2d 423, 440 (Miss.2004), Cole v. State, 666 So.2d 767, 777 (Miss.1995). ¶ 14. Count I of the grand jury indictment (Touching of a Child for Lustful Purposes) stated that Nix ... did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously handle, touch or rub with his hands, the vagina of [Jane].... (Emphasis added). The jury instruction offered by the State, however, differed by stating that Nix ... did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously handle, touch or rub with his hands, the body of [Jane].... (Emphasis added). ¶ 15. Nix argues that trial counsel should have objected to the jury instruction because it differed from the language of the indictment. The jury instruction, however, followed the language of the Mississippi statute under which Nix was charged, which requires that there be a handling, touching, or rubbing of a child for the purpose of gratifying lust or indulging depraved licentious sexual desires, regardless of which part of the child's body is handled, touched, or rubbed. See Miss. Code. Ann. § 97-5-23(1) (Rev.2006). ¶ 16. The first prong of the Strickland test requires counsel's conduct to be deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If the jury instruction offered by the State was not error, then counsel's failure to object could not rise to the level of deficient conduct. The purpose of the indictment is to give the defendant fair notice of the crime charged. Bell v. State, 360 So.2d 1206, 1208-1209 (Miss. 1978). This Court has held that, although jury instructions generally should track the language of indictments, an instruction is not necessarily fatally defective for failure to do so, so long as the instruction accurately follow[s] the requisite elements of the crime. Duplantis v. State, 708 So.2d 1327, 1343-1344 (Miss.1998). A jury instruction's variance from the language of the indictment must be material to accurately categorize an instruction as error. Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 806 (Miss.1984). ¶ 17. In Williams, the indictment charged the defendant with taking a money box, a billfold, and some money. Id. The instruction, however, directed the jury to determine whether the defendant took the money box, billfold, or anything of value. Id. This Court found that the jury instruction, although a variance from the indictment, did not constitute error. Id. In support of its finding, this Court noted that the instruction did not: materially vary from the charge alleged in the indictment, accuse the defendant of a crime separate and distinct from that of the indictment, or refer to alleged facts of which the defendant had no notice. Id. ¶ 18. Applying these factors to the instant case, the differing language of the instruction should not be characterized as material, since it follows the language of the statute under which Nix was charged. The instruction did not accuse Nix of any other separate or distinct crime other than that of the indictment, nor did it refer to facts of which Nix had no notice. Although the language of the instruction varied from that of the indictment, it was not a material variance and therefore did not constitute error. As allowing the instruction was not error, it cannot be said that trial counsel's conduct was deficient based on a failure to object on that basis. ¶ 19. Even if counsel's conduct can be viewed as deficient, Nix has not satisfied the second prong, that the conduct deprived him of a fair trial. ¶ 20. Nix argues that the language of the jury instruction effectively amended the indictment, and that he was prejudiced by such amendment. In support of this contention, Nix cites Quick v. State, 569 So.2d 1197 (Miss.1990). In that case, this Court reversed and remanded the conviction, holding that the jury instructions contained additional language that amounted to an amendment of the substance of the indictment. Id. at 1200. In Quick, the defendant was charged in the indictment with wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, purposely and knowingly committing aggravated assault. Id. at 1198. The jury instruction added language that provided for a guilty verdict if the jury found that the assault was committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value to human life. Id. ¶ 21. Quick, however, is easily distinguished from the instant case. In Quick, this Court held that though the defendant may have defended against the elements of purposely and knowingly, he was caught off guard by not having been put on notice that he must also defend against the element of recklessness. Id. at 1200. Nix's defense presented at trial was that he was not present when the incident occurred and therefore could not have committed the crime. His defense, if found credible, would have been a complete defense, whether he was charged with touching the body or touching the vagina. His defense was not affected by the change in language in the jury instruction, and therefore, Nix is unable to show prejudice that deprived him of a fair trial. ¶ 22. To pass the Strickland test, Nix must demonstrate that, but for the errors of trial counsel, there is a reasonable probability that he would have received a different outcome in the trial. Nicolaou v. State, 612 So.2d 1080, 1086 (Miss.1992). Nix has not satisfied either prong of the Strickland test, and therefore, this argument is without merit.