Opinion ID: 622222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Davenport's Standing to Challenge the POF

Text: Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to `cases' and `controversies.' Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir.2011) (quotation omitted). [T]here are three strands of justiciability doctrinestanding, ripeness, and mootnessthat go to the heart of the Article III case or controversy requirement. Id. (quotation omitted). Our jurisdiction is dependent on whether Davenport has standing to challenge the POF entered against Muckle. The issue of whether a former codefendant has standing to challenge a POF entered against another defendant is one of first impression in this Circuit. We review de novo questions about our subject matter jurisdiction, including standing. United States v. Cone, 627 F.3d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir.2010). Moreover, we review a district court's legal conclusions regarding third-party claims to criminally forfeited property de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Marion, 562 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir.2009). Initially, it is necessary to explain the difference between criminal and ancillary forfeiture proceedings. Criminal forfeiture proceedings are governed by 21 U.S.C. § 853 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. Pursuant to § 853, any person convicted of certain felony drug offenses must forfeit any property derived from the violation. [7] 21 U.S.C. § 853(a). If a defendant is convicted of any count upon which criminal forfeiture is sought, the court must, as soon as practical, determine whether the property is subject to forfeiture. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1). [8] Where the Government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must determine whether the Government established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense of conviction. Id. Once this determination has been made, the court must promptly enter a POF without regard to any third party's interest in the property. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(2). The entry of a POF authorizes the Attorney General to seize the specific property subject to forfeiture and to commence ancillary proceedings regarding third-party rights. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(3), (c); see also United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir.2002). After entering a POF, the court can determine whether any third parties have an interest in the forfeited property, but only if they file a timely petition in an ancillary proceeding. See Marion, 562 F.3d at 1336-37. At the conclusion of the ancillary proceeding, the court must enter a final order of forfeiture by amending the preliminary order as necessary to account for any third-party rights. Fed. R.Crim.P. 32.2(c)(2). If, however, no third party files a timely petition, the [POF] becomes the final order of forfeiture if the court finds that the defendant . . . had an interest in the property that is forfeitable under the applicable statute. Id. Once the final order of forfeiture has been entered, neither the defendant nor a third party may object on the ground that a codefendant or a third party had an interest in the property. Id. An ancillary proceeding constitutes the sole means by which a third-party claimant can establish entitlement to return of forfeited property. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2); Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 44, 116 S.Ct. 356, 365, 133 L.Ed.2d 271 (1995) ([T]hird-party claimants can establish their entitlement to return of the [forfeited] assets only by means of the hearing afforded under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n).). In fact, § 853 affirmatively bars third-party claimants from intervening in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving the forfeiture of the subject property, as well as commencing an action against the Government concerning the validity of an alleged interest in the property. 21 U.S.C. § 853(k). These provisions confer limited rights on third-party petitioners to participate only in the ancillary forfeiture proceeding, not in the criminal case. Cone, 627 F.3d at 1358. A codefendant in a criminal case is properly viewed as a third party with regard to another defendant's forfeiture of property. United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888, 910 n. 54 (11th Cir.2001), superseded on other grounds as recognized in Marion, 562 F.3d at 1341. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 adoption of Rule 32.2 state the ancillary proceeding for third-party claimants does not involve relitigation of the forfeitability of the property, which has already been ordered in the criminal case. The ancillary proceeding is only for the purpose of determining whether any third party has a legal interest in the forfeited property. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, advisory committee's note (2000 Adoption). [9] Consistent with the Advisory Committee Notes, at least three of our sister circuits have concluded that third parties, including former codefendants, cannot challenge or relitigate a preliminary order's finding of forfeitability. See United States v. Andrews, 530 F.3d 1232, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding the victims of a defendant's misconduct, as third parties, had no right to challenge a preliminary order's finding of forfeitability, but could only seek amendment of the order to exclude their interest in an ancillary proceeding); United States v. Porchay, 533 F.3d 704, 707, 710 (8th Cir.2008) (holding a former codefendant, as a third party, could not relitigate the validity of a forfeitability determination made against another defendant); DSI Assoc. LLC v. United States, 496 F.3d 175, 184-85 (2d Cir.2007) (holding a third party could not intervene by challenging the underlying validity of the forfeiture order rather than filing an ancillary proceeding). As the Tenth Circuit explained in Andrews, if the forfeited property really belongs to the third party, she can prevail and recover her property during the ancillary proceeding whether there were defects in the criminal trial or the forfeiture process or not; and if the property does not belong to the third party, such defects in the finding of forfeitability are no concern of [hers]. 530 F.3d at 1237 (quotation omitted). We conclude that Davenport lacked standing to challenge the validity of the POF's determination of forfeitability. Her sole mechanism for vindicating her purported interest in the forfeited currency was within the context of the ancillary proceeding prescribed by § 853(n) and Rule 32.2(c). Whether or not she availed herself of this opportunity by filing a timely third-party petition does not affect the conclusion that third parties, including codefendants, may not relitigate the merits of a forfeitability determination. The district court did not err in finding that Davenport lacked standing to challenge the validity of the POF. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction over this claim.