Opinion ID: 4108971
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: is consistent with any pertinent policy

Text: statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a) . . . . The district judge has “wide discretion when imposing terms and conditions of supervised release” under section 3583(d) because he is in the best position to “measure[] the conditions imposed against the statutorily enumerated sentencing goals.” Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 895 (internal quotation omitted); see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (“The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes 15 credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record.”) (internal quotation omitted). We therefore review the substantive validity of the stay-away condition under an abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Burroughs, 613 F.3d 233, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 895. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, albeit implicitly, that the stay-away condition is tailored to Hunt’s criminal history, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), will deter him from criminal conduct, id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), and will protect the public from further crimes at his hands, id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Hunt’s primary contention to the contrary is that the condition does not prevent him from dealing drugs anywhere outside Potomac Gardens. Appellant’s Br. 20-21 (“[D]rug dealing is hardly a crime that knows geographical boundaries. . . . If a defendant is inclined to continue his criminal behavior while on supervised release, he certainly will find a suitable locale for his activities.”). We do not agree that Hunt’s potential recidivism renders the condition unreasonable. As defense counsel noted at sentencing, another condition of Hunt’s supervised release prohibits him from “commit[ting] another federal, state, or local crime.” Sent. Tr. 30. And it is a federal offense to deal or conspire to deal illegal drugs. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846. The stay-away condition dovetails with the general prohibition: the point is to make drug dealing more difficult for or less tempting to Hunt in case he decides to break the law again. The fact that he participated in so many deals at Potomac Gardens suggests he has established drug contacts there. If the stay-away condition does anything to dry up his sources of supply or his customer base, it can only help keep him out of trouble and thereby serve the purposes of sentencing. See United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Separating a convicted felon from negative influences in his 16 prior life is reasonably related to the permissible goals of deterrence and rehabilitation and is a common purpose of supervised release.”). Nor does the stay-away condition unduly restrict Hunt’s liberty. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). The Congress contemplated that a district court may require a defendant—as “a discretionary condition” of supervised release, id. § 3583(d)—to “refrain from frequenting specified kinds of places” and “from residing in a specified place or area,” id. § 3563(b)(6), (13). We reject Hunt’s contention that the district court went too far by “preclud[ing him] from entering a rather large section of the District of Columbia.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 6. For starters, “rather large” is a rather large overstatement. The condition keeps Hunt away from a single housing project, plus about an extra city block in each direction. Using a Google map to measure the metes and bounds the district court plotted, we take judicial notice that the restricted area covers about 50 acres. See United States v. Burroughs, 810 F.3d 833, 835 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (taking judicial notice of Google map whose “‘accuracy [could not] reasonably be questioned’” for relevant purpose) (quoting FED. R. EVID . 201(b)(2)). There are 640 acres in a square mile, see Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 686 n.23 (1979), which means the restricted area covers about 0.078 square miles. The District of Columbia encompasses about 68 square miles. See Jones v. D.C. Armory Bd., 438 F.2d 138, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam). In other words, the restricted area comprises just over one one-thousandth of the District. That is a minimal imposition, especially when compared to the city- and county-wide restrictions that our sister circuits have upheld in analogous cases. See, e.g., Watson, 582 F.3d at 977-78, 983-85 (gang member prohibited from entering San Francisco); United States v. Garrasteguy, 559 F.3d 34, 40-44 (1st Cir. 2009) (drug dealers prohibited 17 from entering Suffolk County, Massachusetts) (plain-error review); United States v. Sicher, 239 F.3d 289, 289-93 (3d Cir. 2000) (drug dealer prohibited from entering two Pennsylvania counties) (plain-error review); United States v. Cothran, 855 F.2d 749, 750-53 (11th Cir. 1988) (drug dealer prohibited from entering Fulton County, Georgia). Furthermore, like the conditions in some of the cases cited above, the stay-away condition here is not absolute. It forbids Hunt to enter Potomac Gardens and the immediate vicinity “without the prior approval of the U.S. Probation Office.” Sent. Tr. 31. If he has any legitimate cause to enter the complex—e.g., to visit family—he can prevail upon his probation officer, who we presume will act reasonably under the circumstances. See United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Hunt does not even allege that he resides or has family at Potomac Gardens. The closest he comes is his assertion that he lived there “at one point,” Sent. Tr. 24, and “has been a member of the Potomac Gardens community for much of his adult life,” Appellant’s Br. 20. He claims no specific hardship, however, and it is hard to see how he could. His counsel acknowledged at oral argument that he did not live there at the time of the offense. Oral Arg. Recording 8:18-10:00. And to the extent he has friends there who are not involved in the drug trade, Sent. Tr. 24, he can meet them anywhere he chooses outside the restricted boundaries, which are unmistakably defined. The district court did not plainly err in failing to explain the stay-away condition and did not abuse its discretion in imposing it. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s judgment. So ordered.