Opinion ID: 1925098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Moersen's Role Solely as an Organist was Ministerial

Text: Even with the Court majority confining its consideration to Moersen's averment that he only played the organ, I nonetheless conclude that his position was a ministerial one. My opinion is compelled by nothing less than the simple reality that playing the organ for religious services at a Catholic church is an important facilitation of the liturgies in which Moersen participated, obviously an activity important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. Many jurisdictions have opined on the obvious sectarian significance of music as played during religious services. The Fourth Circuit, in Diocese of Raleigh, stated that it is an undeniable fact that music is a vital means of expressing and celebrating those beliefs which a religious community holds most sacred. 213 F.3d at 802; see also Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176 ([T]here is no dispute that religious music plays a highly important role in the spiritual mission of the church.); Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1041. There is also no shortage of facts adduced by the Archdiocese of Washington that music occupies a scared position in Catholic worship. In particular, the Archdiocese asserted that the pipe organ is to be held in high esteem, for it is the traditional musical instrument that adds a wonderful splendor to the Church's ceremonies and powerfully lifts up the spirit to God and to higher things. Constitution on the Liturgy, Sacrosanctum Councilium, 4 December 1963. Despite this convincing evidence, [1] both the Court of Special Appeals and the Majority in this Court downplay unsatisfactorily Moersen's role. The fact remains that because music inheres a vital liturgical significance, the performance of that music is equally as significant. Although Moersen contends that he is just an organ player, his apt performance of sacred and reverent music during worship services belies a secular characterization of his role. Moersen, as the organist, was an active participant in liturgies in a way that an organ manufacturer or a person who merely tunes the organ is not. See Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1041. Despite Moersen's arguments, I am persuaded that there is no such thing as just an organ player in religious rituals and ceremonies such as those in which Moersen performed. I am not alone in this view. In Tomic, Richard Tomic, a music director and organist, portrayed his involvement with his church employer in much the same manner as does Moersen here: [s]o far as his role as organist is concerned, his lawyer says that all Tomic did was play music. But there is no one way to play music. If Tomic played the organ with a rock and roll beat, or played excerpts from Jesus Christ Superstar, at an Easter Mass, he would be altering the religious experience of the parishioners. 442 F.3d at 1040. In view of this reality, the Seventh Circuit held that Tomic `performed tasks that were traditionally ecclesiastical or religious.' Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1041. In Diocese of Raleigh, the Fourth Circuit noted of a music director tasked with selecting and playing music for worship services that even when Austin did not select the music herself, the subtle judgments that accompany the presentation and interpretation of sacred music contribute to its spiritual effect. 213 F.3d at 803. The Diocese of Raleigh court then struck the same note as did the Tomic court in addressing the difficulty of accepting an argument such as Moersen's that simply playing the organ has no religious importance: Indeed, it is not easy to divorce even the more technical aspects of music from its significance in religious worship. Whether a selection is played adagio or andante can have a profound effect on the religious worship and vocal participation of the congregation. And different performances of the same musical piece can evoke different responses. 213 F.3d at 804. Even though Moersen did not also fulfill the role of music director, he nonetheless served, for all intents and purposes, as the primary human vessel through whom the church chose to spread its message in song. Id. The role of church organist almost certainly would be included at the epicenter of religious activity as described by Professor Bagni, whom the Fourth Circuit quoted in Rayburn in setting out the primary duties test. [2] G. Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government to Regulate Class Discrimination by Religious Entities: A Study in Conflicting Values, 43 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1210 (1994) (discussing Bagni, supra, 79 COLUM. L.REV. at 1539). Relatedly, I perceive that the Majority opinion makes too much of the leadership role and more extensive responsibilities of music directors and other ecclesiastical figures as contrasted to a mere organist in deciding whether either position is ministerial. As I have pointed out already, at least two federal appellate courts have noted that the manner in which religious music is played is, by itself, a matter of religious significance without regard to whether the performer selected that music. Further, the Diocese of Raleigh court opined that simply because an employee is answerable to a superior on spiritual matters, that fact does not de jure relegate that employee to any less of a religiously significant role; rather, it is just one factor to consider. 213 F.3d at 803. What is more important is whether the employee's primary duties consist of . . . participation in religious ritual and worship. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. It is telling that the primary duties inquiry was dispositive in one of the cases relied upon by the Majority opinion and the Court of Special Appeals. In Assemany, George Assemany served as music director and organist for Gesu Parish in the Detroit area. In finding that Assemany's position was ministerial, the Court of Appeals of Michigan held that he was more than just an organist. 434 N.W.2d at 238. The Majority opinion incorrectly seizes upon this language as proof positive that all church employees, including Moersen, who only play the organ, are not ministerial employees. To do so ignores the real test to be applied; the primary duties test, which was utilized in Assemany. In the paragraph preceding the more than just an organist language, the Assemany court found that the employee's primary responsibility was to enable and encourage the Gesu choir and congregation to participate in the Catholic liturgy through song. 434 N.W.2d at 238. Surely, this same evaluation must be made of Moersen in his role as the organist at St. Catherine Labouré Parish. Although he alleges that he did not select the music to be played at liturgy, he nonetheless enabled and encouraged both the choir and the congregation to worship through music. Again, Moersen did not have to be in a position of leadership to impact the Parish's liturgies through his exercise of his primary responsibilities. Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 803. For the reasons expressed above, I would hold that Moersen's role was ministerial, thus placing his employment discrimination claim outside of our secular jurisdiction. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals should be reversed and the matter remanded to that Court with directions to affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Judges RAKER and CATHELL authorized me to state that they join the views expressed in this dissent.