Opinion ID: 2066513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Decisions of This Court and the Appellate Court

Text: This court never has considered whether classifications that discriminate against gay persons are subject to heightened scrutiny under the equal protection provisions of the state constitution. The Appellate Court recently addressed the issue, [62] however, in State v. John M., 94 Conn. App. 667, 894 A.2d 376 (2006), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v. John F.M., 285 Conn. 528, 940 A.2d 755 (2008), and concluded that such classifications are entitled only to rational basis review on the basis of its reading of federal and sister state precedent. Id., at 678-85, 894 A.2d 376. For several reasons, we are not persuaded by the Appellate Court's analysis in John M. First, the Appellate Court decided the issue under the federal constitution, not the state constitution. See id., at 678-79 n. 10, 894 A.2d 376. Second, the Appellate Court did not apply the four-pronged test for determining whether a group is entitled to heightened protection but, rather, relied solely on case law from other jurisdictions. See id., at 679-85, 894 A.2d 376. Third, for the reasons set forth in parts VI C and D of this opinion, the cases on which the Appellate Court did rely are not persuasive because those cases either failed to address the issue of whether gay persons comprise a suspect or quasi-suspect class; see Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817-18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 988, 126 S.Ct. 575, 163 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 206 Ariz. 276, 283-85, 77 P.3d 451 (App.2003), review denied sub nom. Standhardt v. MCSC, Docket No. CV-03-0422-PR, 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 62 (Ariz. May 25, 2004); People v. Downin, 357 Ill.App.3d 193, 199-200, 293 Ill.Dec. 371, 828 N.E.2d 341, appeal denied, 216 Ill.2d 703, 298 Ill.Dec. 382, 839 N.E.2d 1029 (2005); failed to engage in any analysis of that issue, relying instead on the fact that, to date, the United States Supreme Court has not held that sexual orientation constitutes a suspect or quasi-suspect classification; see Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir.2004); State v. Limon, 280 Kan. 275, 286, 122 P.3d 22 (2005); or were predicated on precedent that has been overruled. See Lofton v. Secretary of the Dept. of Children & Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 818 & n. 16 (11th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081, 125 S.Ct. 869, 160 L.Ed.2d 825 (2005). Because the analysis in John M. is not persuasive, it provides no support for the defendants' claim that gay persons are not entitled to recognition as a quasi-suspect class. C