Opinion ID: 203879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Identicality and Solidarity

Text: Suzuki argues that whatever tolling effect the filing of the 2002 Action may have had, it does not save the instant action against Suzuki, because this action is not identical to the 2002 Action. Suzuki is correct that § 5303 does not toll the statute of limitations `for all claims arising out of the same facts.' Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 97 (quoting Fernández v. Chardón, 681 F.2d 42, 49 (1st Cir.1982)). Rather, instituting an action before the courts pursuant to § 5303 only tolls the statute of limitations with respect to identical subsequent actions. See id. (citing Cintrón v. Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 127 D.P.R. 582, 1990 WL 658719 (1990)); see also Del Valle v. Vornado Realty Trust, 515 F.Supp.2d 222, 226 (D.P.R.2007) (explaining that in order for a prior judicial action to toll the statute of limitations as to a later filed complaint, it is necessary that the second complaint assert a cause of action identical to the one asserted in the first action). This rule is known as the identicality requirement. Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 97. We have held that, in order to be identical under § 5303, the claims asserted in the subsequent action (1) must seek the same form of relief as the first action; (2) must be based on the same substantive claims; and (3) provided that other Puerto Rico tolling statutes do not rescue the claims on other grounds ... must be asserted against the same defendants in the same capacities; new defendants should not be added. Id. at 98. This identicality requirement serves to prevent[] plaintiffs from circumventing the notice function of the statute of limitations by asserting different claims in belated federal court complaints. Id. at 97. Suzuki relies on the identicality requirement to argue, as the district court held, that the 2002 Action did not toll or reset the statute of limitations as it pertains to the claims against Suzuki because there was no identicality of parties between the 2002 Action and the subsequent suits. Specifically, Suzuki argues that because Rodríguez never sued Suzuki in the 2002 Action and never sued Rainbow or Panorama in the 2004 Action, the 2004 Action was not identical to the 2002 Action, and therefore the 2002 Action did not toll the statute of limitations with respect to Suzuki. Because the 2004 Action was untimely, Suzuki reasons, it could not serve to toll the statute of limitations with respect to the instant action against Suzuki, which was not filed until 2006, and therefore, this action was properly dismissed. We disagree. As noted above, identicality has been read to include, inter alia, a requirement that for a prior suit to have a tolling effect upon a subsequent suit, it must be asserted against the same defendants, but only  provided that other Puerto Rico tolling statutes do not rescue the claims on other grounds. Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 98 (emphasis added). In this case, we find that another provision of Puerto Rico law known as the solidarity doctrine rescues this claim. The solidarity doctrine, rooted in Article 1874 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code is based on the theory that there is one obligation, shared by several debtors. Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at 6. [6] In such situations, the interruption of prescription against one defendant also interrupts the prescription of claims against any other defendants who are solidarily liable with the first. Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at 4 (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5304 and Arroyo v. Hosp. La Concepción, 130 P.R. Dec. 596, 606 (P.R. June 5, 1992)); see also P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5304 (Interruption of prescription of actions in joint obligations equally benefits or injures all the creditors or debtors.). Thus, in situations where various defendants are held to be solidarily liable with each other, this doctrine has been interpreted to allow for the timely inclusion of a solidary tortfeasor not originally included in an action. See Arroyo, 130 P.R. Dec. at 607-08 (quoting official translation). The theory is that [t]he interruption of the prescription of the cause of action based on [a] unitary obligation ... need only be performed once. Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at 6. Relying on the solidarity doctrine, Rodríguez argues that Suzuki, the manufacturer of the motorcycle, is solidarily liable with Rainbow, the retailer, and Panorama, the distributor, and that therefore, by filing the 2002 action against Rainbow and Panorama, Rodríguez tolled the statute of limitations against all joint tortfeasors including [Suzuki]. The threshold question is whether there is in fact solidarity between Rainbow or Panorama and Suzuki such that the interruption of the statute of limitations as to the former prejudiced the latter. Solidarity exists under Puerto Rico law when several people take part or cooperate in causing a wrong. Arroyo, 130 P.R. Dec. at 604. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has held that joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable. Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at 6 (citing Arroyo, 130 P.R. Dec. at 603); see also id. at 6-7 ([A]rticle 1874 of the Civil Code applies to joint tortfeasors, so that the timely filing of a suit against one joint tortfeasor had interrupted the prescription of the suit against the other tortfeasors.). Under article 1802, when the negligent acts of more than one person have adequately caused a harm, each such person is a joint tortfeasor who is liable in full to the plaintiff for the harm caused. Id. at 6. The district court found it clear that solidarity exists in this case between Panorama, Rainbow and Suzuki. We agree. As the district court explained: Plaintiff alleges that [Suzuki], Rainbow and Panorama sold a motorcycle that was amongst other things, negligently designed, tested, assembled, packaged, marketed, advertised and sold. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff seeks compensation for pain and suffering, as well as the cost of the Motorcycle. Since [Suzuki] was the manufacturer of the Motorcycle, and Plaintiff's claim is one for product liability, it is clear that solidarity amongst the defendants exists. Rodríguez, at -9. The district court's finding of solidarity is further bolstered by Puerto Rico's adherence to the theory of strict tort liability in cases involving products liability. Aponte Rivera v. Sears Roebuck de P.R., Inc., 144 D.P.R. 830, 838-39 (1998) (official translation); see also Del Rosario-Ortega v. Star-Kist Caribe, Inc., 130 F.Supp.2d 277, 284 (D.P.R.2001) (noting that [in] a cause of action in products liability, ... as a matter of public policy, each and every entity involved in the chain of distribution is strictly liable to the consumer) (citing Ferrer Delgado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 100 D.P.R. 246, 257-58 (1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005)). Thus, under Puerto Rico law, all those who take part in the manufacturing and distribution chain of a product are solidarily liable, along with the manufacturer, to the injured party. Aponte Rivera, 144 D.P.R. at 838 n. 6. Concluding that Panorama, Rainbow and Suzuki are in fact solidarily liable, we must now address Rodríguez's argument that his 2002 Action, filed against parties solidarily liable with Suzuki, effectively tolled the statute as to his subsequent actions against Suzuki. Though no single case is entirely controlling, this argument has substantial support in the case law. For example, in Tokyo Marine, plaintiff, the subrogee for an imported automobile dealer (Mitsubishi), brought a tort action under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code against Pérez y Cía., the owner of a storage facility where plaintiff's automobiles were stored, for property damage to Mitsubishi's vehicles resulting from their storage in Pérez y Cía.'s facility. See 142 F.3d at 2-3. The cause of action, which was filed more than one year after it had accrued, had been dismissed by the district court on grounds that it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 3. The issue before us was whether the plaintiff interposed an `extrajudicial claim' ... that successfully interrupted the prescription of the cause of action before the original one-year term expired. Id. at 4. We held that it did. Id. at 4-5. We reasoned that Tokyo Marine effectively tolled the statute of limitations pursuant to Article 1873 by filing, within the limitations period, an extrajudicial claim letter against Pérez y Cía.'s liability insurer, UAC. Id. We further reasoned that because Pérez y Cía. was solidarily liable with its insurer, under Article 1874, the timely interruption of prescription as to UAC had a like effect as to its insured. Id. at 10. Thus, we reversed the district court's conclusion that the challenged claim was time barred, and amended the judgment accordingly. Id. at 10-11. A similar result was reached by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in Sánchez Montalvo, 153 D.P.R. 559. In that case, the plaintiff, who was injured in an airport terminal, filed an extrajudicial claim letter against the Port Authority on the day of the accident. Id. at 562-63. No extrajudicial letter or other tolling mechanism, however, was timely filed against American Airlines, which controlled the area where the accident took place, even though plaintiff was on notice that American could be liable. Id. at 572-73. Two years later plaintiff filed an action under article 1802 against the Port Authority and American Airlines. Id. The trial court dismissed the action against American as time-barred, reasoning that plaintiff failed to interrupt the statute of limitations as to American. Id. at 574. Nevertheless, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court reversed the dismissal. Id. The supreme court held that [t]he cause of action in regards to [the Port Authority] not being time barred, and joint liability between [the Port Authority] and American having been alleged, the interruption of the prescriptive term with regards to [the Port Authority] interrupted the term equally for American. Id. (citing Martínez Díaz v. E.L.A., 132 D.P.R. 200 (1992)); see also García Colón v. García Rinaldi, 340 F.Supp.2d 113, 126 (D.P.R.2004) (holding that by sending extrajudicial claim letter to one physician, malpractice plaintiff effectively tolled the statute of limitations as to the other joint tortfeasors including another physician and the hospital, thereby rendering suit against the others, outside the one-year limitations period, timely). Suzuki acknowledges that these cases support the proposition that the filing of an extrajudicial claim letter toll[s] the running of the statute of limitations, even against those parties to whom a tolling letter had not been sent, but attempts to distinguish them on the ground that Rodríguez did not file an extrajudicial claim, but rather, instituted a judicial action. We find this distinction unpersuasive. As noted above, Article 1873 provides three mechanisms which can be employed to toll the statute of limitations, and these include, inter alia, filing an extrajudicial claim and instituti[ng] [an action] before the courts. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5303. Neither the statute nor the case law provide a basis for differentiating among these mechanisms with respect to the consequences of solidarity upon their operation, nor does Suzuki provide us such a basis. In fact, the case law suggests the contrary. For example, in Tokyo Marine, when discussing the § 5303 tolling mechanism in the context of the solidarity doctrine, we stated as follows: [T]he interruption of prescription against one defendant also tolls the statute against any other defendants who are solidarily liable with the first. Regardless of the method used, when the prescriptive period is successfully interrupted, the full period begins to run again. 142 F.3d at 4 (emphasis added and footnote and citation omitted). Although in Tokyo Marine the statute of limitations was tolled via the filing of an extrajudicial claim letter, we stated that the result would be no different in the event of a prior suit tolling the statute of limitations for a subsequent suit. See id. at 7 (noting that the interruption of prescription as to one solidary debtor affects the other solidary debtors, so that a suit against one joint tortfeasor may be filed up to one year after judgment is entered in a suit against another joint tortfeasor (citation omitted)); see also García Pérez, 2008 WL 2717833, at  (noting that filing a judicial or extrajudicial claim against a tortfeasor interrupts the prescription period in question as to the rest of the solidary tortfeasors). This reading is also the one most consistent with other provisions of Puerto Rico law, including Article 1097 of the Civil Code, which provides that [a] creditor may sue any of the joint debtors or all of them simultaneously and that [t]he actions instituted against one shall not be an obstacle for those that may be brought subsequently against the others, as long as it does not appear that the debt has been collected in full. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3108 (emphasis added). Moreover, there are other cases on point in which the timely filing of a judicial action has been found to toll the statute of limitations as to new defendants who are solidarily liable with those against whom the action was initially filed. For example, in García Molina v. Gobierno De La Capital, the plaintiff sued the Municipality of San Juan and its insurer for injuries sustained in a car accident while plaintiff was a passenger, but failed to sue either the owner or the driver of the vehicle. 72 D.P.R. 138, 141 (1951) (official translation); see also Hernández Moreno v. Serrano Marrero, 719 F.Supp. 70 (D.P.R.1989) (discussing García Molina ). Codefendants, the municipality and its insurer, then moved to file a third-party complaint against the owner of the vehicle outside the limitations period. García Molina, 72 D.P.R. at 141-42. Addressing the timeliness issue, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court noted, citing sections 1094 and 1874 of the Civil Code, that actions instituted against any one of the joint debtors shall prejudice all of them and that [i]nterruption of prescription of actions in joint obligations equally benefits or injures all the creditors or debtors Id. at 148. Applying the solidarity doctrine, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court thus concluded that [t]he original complaint against the third-party plaintiffs [the municipality and its insurer] having been filed within one year, prescription against the third-party defendants [the owner and driver of the vehicle] had been interrupted and the third-party complaint was therefore timely filed. Id. at 148-49. Similarly, in Torres Vázquez v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., longshoreman brought a tort action under Puerto Rico law against a marine terminal, but did not file a complaint against the marine terminal's liability insurer until four years after the incident. 367 F.Supp.2d 231, 234-35 (D.P.R. 2005). The insurer sought to dismiss the complaint as barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations, but the district court denied the motion. Id. at 239-40. The court, relying on our interpretation of Puerto Rico law in Tokyo Marine, held that because the original complaint against the marine terminal had been filed in a timely fashion, there is no doubt that the statute of limitations for all tortfeasors jointly liable, as is [the insurer], was stalled for the interruption against one tortfeasor benefits all others. 367 F.Supp.2d at 240. Thus, the amended complaint adding the marine terminal's insurer as a defendant four years after the incident was held to be timely. Id. Suzuki attempts to distinguish this line of cases on the ground that in these cases the plaintiffs took advantage of the tolling effect of the previously filed judicial complaint to file a complaint against additional solidarily liable tortfeasors in the same action rather than in a subsequent suit. In contrast, Rodríguez seeks to rely on the tolling effect of the 2002 Action in a subsequent action against the alleged joint tortfeasor. However, we see no basis for regarding this distinction as dispositive. If initiating a judicial action against a tortfeasor tolls the statute of limitations as to all other tortfeasors jointly and severally liable with the first, as the solidarity doctrine provides, and that action is dismissed without prejudice thereby permitting its re-institution before the courts, there is no basis for concluding that the tolling effect of the initial action somehow ceases as a result of the dismissal, especially given that Puerto Rico provides for the reset of the statute of limitations upon dismissal. To be sure, we are not holding that identicality is inapplicable when tolling the statute of limitations in suits involving solidarily liable tortfeasors. Rather, for a prior judicial or extra-judicial claim to toll the limitations period for a later-filed suit against a solidary tortfeasor, the later suit must nevertheless contain the same substantive claims and seek the same relief. As we stated in Rodríguez Narvaez, tolling the statute as to one jointly and severally liable defendant tolls it as to all, but the tolling is effective with regard only to identical causes of action. 895 F.2d at 43 (citation omitted). In this case, we conclude that the causes of action stated in the 2002, 2004 and 2006 Actions were identical, in that each was a products liability action seeking damages resulting from the same alleged defects in Rodríguez's Suzuki motorcycle. The requirement of identicality of parties, however, cannot apply where the parties against whom the statute of limitations was tolled and those parties ultimately sued are solidarily liable for the same obligation. We find this interpretation to be the clearest way of reconciling the identicality requirement with the solidarity doctrine as those concepts are applied in Puerto Rico law. To hold otherwise and allow the identicality requirement to preclude additional defendants from being later sued, where the prescription period has been effectively tolled against other defendants solidarily liable with those defendants, would directly violate the principle that the interruption of prescription of actions in joint obligations equally benefits or injures all the creditors or debtors. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5304. In other words, mandating identicality of parties between a prior and subsequent suit as a prerequisite to tolling, where the solidarity doctrine allows a prior suit against one solidary tortfeasor to toll the statute of limitations with respect to a subsequent lawsuit against other tortfeasors solidarily liable with the first, would render the solidarity doctrine meaningless. Thus we read the solidarity doctrine as requiring that, with respect to identical causes of action, the filing of a judicial action against one solidarily liable defendant tolls the statute as to all defendants solidarily liable with the first. This is the case regardless of whether the later-sued tortfeasors are brought into the initial action that created the tolling effect or they are sued in a subsequent action. These principles compel a result in Rodríguez's favor. Accordingly, we conclude that Rodríguez effectively tolled the statute of limitations as to his later-filed actions against Suzuki, pursuant to sections 5303 and 5304 of title 31 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, by timely bringing before the court an identical cause of action against parties solidarily liable with Suzuki. The instant action having been filed within the limitations period, which reset after the dismissal of those prior actions, the district court erred in holding Rodríguez's claims to be time-barred.