Opinion ID: 1359705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Indictment Claims

Text: In addition to his motion-to-suppress claims, Buchanan raises several arguments related to his Indictment. He claims that the district court's jury instructions constructively amended the Indictment to include a charge of actual manufacturing of methamphetamine. He also claims there was an impermissible variance between the Indictment date and the proof established at trial. Finally, he claims the Indictment was insufficient because it did not cite the statute criminalizing attempt. We find Buchanan's claims unavailing.
Buchanan first claims that the district court's jury instructions constructively amended the Indictment. A constructive amendment occurs when the essential elements of the offense as charged in the indictment are altered in such a manner that ... the jury is allowed to convict the defendant of an offense different from or in addition to the offenses charged in the indictment. United States v. Whirlwind Soldier, 499 F.3d 862, 870 (8th Cir.2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1286, 170 L.Ed.2d 112 (2008); United States v. Bryant, 349 F.3d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir.2003). In order to determine whether an indictment was constructively amended, we consider whether the jury instructions, taken as a whole, created a substantial likelihood that the defendant was convicted of an uncharged offense. Whirlwind Soldier, 499 F.3d at 870 (quotation omitted). Here, the Indictment charged Buchanan with an attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. Buchanan argues that the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment because instruction six omitted the word attempt and instead read: The indictment charges the defendant with manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We disagree with Buchanan. The jury instructions repeatedly included references to the charge of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. Instruction five, for example, informed the jury that Buchanan was charged with knowingly and intentionally attempt[ing] to manufacture ... methamphetamine. Instruction eight stated: [t]he crime charged in the indictment is an attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. Additionally, although the district court inadvertently omitted the word attempt from the beginning section of instruction six, that instruction continued to inform jurors that 21 U.S.C. § 846 provides that [a]ny person who attempts ... to commit any offense defined in this subchapter [which includes 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)] shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense. More importantly, the court also instructed the jury of the elements of attempt to manufacture in instruction seven, and explained those elements in instruction eight. Given these instructions, we believe that the jury instructions clearly informed the jury of the essential elements of the crime of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine. See Whirlwind Soldier, 499 F.3d at 870. The Indictment was not constructively amended by a single reference to the crime of actual manufacture where there were repeated, specific instructions identifying the crime of attempt and the elements thereof. The repeated instructions of attempt insured that there was not a substantial likelihood that the jury could convict Buchanan of actual manufacture of methamphetamine. Therefore, we reject Buchanan's constructive-amendment claim.
Buchanan also argues that the evidence presented at trial constituted a variance of the Indictment. A variance arises when the evidence presented proves facts that are materially different from those alleged in the indictment. United States v. Begnaud, 783 F.2d 144, 147 n. 4 (8th Cir.1986). [A] variance in the evidence affects the defendant's right to adequate notice under the Sixth Amendment. Stuckey, 220 F.3d at 981. When a variance occurs, [t]he charging document does not change, only the evidence against which the defendant expected to defend varies. Id. Whether a variance exists, and, if so, whether that variance prejudiced [the defendant] are questions of law that we review de novo. Id. at 979. Where the indictment fully and fairly apprises the defendant of the allegations against which he must defend, prejudice is absent and any variance is harmless error. See Begnaud, 783 F.2d at 148; see also Stuckey, 220 F.3d at 982 (holding that any variance between the indictment date and proof at trial did not result in material prejudice where time was not a material element of the criminal offense). Here, the Indictment charged Buchanan with attempt to manufacture methamphetamine on or about February 2006. The offense of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine did not require the Government to prove the Indictment date as an element of the crime. Rather, the charge required the Government to prove that Buchanan carried out substantial steps toward the manufacture of methamphetamine. United States v. Beltz, 385 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir.2004). It is exactly those steps that the Government sought to prove in its presentation of evidence. While the evidence presented at trial extended as far back as the spring of 2005, that evidence was not materially different from the allegations of the Indictment, and the Indictment fully and fairly apprised Buchanan of the charge he faced at trial. We therefore conclude that any variance that existed as a result of the evidence proffered did not materially prejudice Buchanan.
Buchanan's final claim is that his Indictment failed to state an offense because it did not directly cite 21 U.S.C. § 846, which criminalizes attempt. Failure to raise a challenge to an indictment prior to trial generally constitutes a waiver. United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 674 (8th Cir.1996). A challenge that an indictment fails to state an offense, however, may be raised at any time while the case is pending. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(B); United States v. Rosnow, 9 F.3d 728, 729 (8th Cir.1993) (per curiam). While Buchanan did not challenge the sufficiency of the Indictment prior to trial, his claim that the Indictment failed to state an offense may be considered on appeal. An indictment that is challenged after jeopardy attaches, will be upheld unless [the indictment] is so defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to charge the offense. United States v. White, 241 F.3d 1015, 1021 (8th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted); Davis, 103 F.3d at 675 ([A]n indictment that is challenged after jeopardy has attached will be liberally construed in favor of sufficiency. (quotation omitted)). An indictment is sufficient if it fairly informs the accused of the charges against him and allows him to plead double jeopardy as a bar to a future prosecution. United States v. Mallen, 843 F.2d 1096, 1102 (8th Cir.1988). An indictment need not use the precise language in the statute as long as the Indictment, by fair implication, alleges an offense recognized by the law. Id. While Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1) generally requires an indictment to give the official citation of the statute or other provision of law that the defendant is alleged to have violated, Rule 7(c)(3) also states, Unless the defendant was misled and thereby prejudiced, neither an error in a citation nor a citation's omission is a ground to dismiss the indictment or information or to reverse a conviction. Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1), 7(c)(3); see also Tanksley v. United States, 321 F.2d 647, 649 (8th Cir.1963); United States v. Williams, 129 Fed.Appx. 332, 333 (8th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (An error in, or the omission of, a statute's citation in the body of an indictment is not grounds for a conviction's reversal unless the error or omission misleads the defendant to his prejudice.). Buchanan has not indicated how the omission of the statutory citation misled him. A reasonable construction of the Indictment indicates that it charged the offense of attempt to manufacture a controlled substance, and the words did knowingly and intentionally attempt to manufacture clearly set forth the elements of the intended charge of attempt. We therefore hold that the indictment fairly informed Buchanan of the charges against him and allows him to plead double jeopardy as a bar to a future prosecution for attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. The Indictment was therefore sufficient.