Opinion ID: 790836
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proceedings Before the District Court and on Direct Appeal

Text: 11 A grand jury returned a twenty-one count indictment against Prevatte and Mr. Soy. Relevant to the issues currently before this court, Count 1 charged Mr. Soy with engaging in a conspiracy to maliciously damage or destroy property by means of an explosive in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i); the overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were each of the bombings set forth above. Count 2 charged Mr. Soy with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) with respect to the bombing of Emily Antkowicz's home. 1 Counts 6, 10, 14 and 18 each charged a violation of § 844(i) based on the other bombings. 2 A jury convicted Mr. Soy on all of these counts. The district court sentenced Mr. Soy to life imprisonment. Specifically, the district court determined, in accordance with the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines), that Mr. Soy should be sentenced to life imprisonment on Count 2. According to the Guidelines, the sentences on the remainder of the counts were to run concurrently with the sentence on Count 2 because the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum [wa]s adequate to achieve the total punishment. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2. 3 12 Mr. Soy and the other defendants appealed their convictions and sentences. With respect to his sentence, Mr. Soy argued that the district court erred when it cross-referenced the first degree murder guideline with respect to Count 2—the bombing that resulted in the death of Emily Antkowicz. We rejected this argument and held that the bombing at issue [wa]s sufficiently similar to arson to apply the first degree murder guideline on this basis. Prevatte I, 16 F.3d at 780. We explained: 13 [Section] 2A1.1. is the most analogous guideline when death results from a violation of § 844(i) from use of fire. Furthermore, on the basis of our reading of the legislative history, we do not believe the fact that death results from an explosion, and not a fire, alters the outcome. As we have noted, Congress intended that fire and explosive be equivalents for purposes of § 844(i).... Congress understandably equated the killing of a human being by burning and the killing of a human being by explosion. Thus, we conclude that the court correctly applied the first degree murder guideline. 14 Id. at 782 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Although this court agreed with the district court's application of the first degree murder guideline, we could not uphold the district court's imposition of a life sentence. We explained that 18 U.S.C. § 34 prevents a district court from imposing a life sentence without a jury recommendation. Consequently, we remanded for resentencing. 15 On remand, the district court imposed a sentence of 636 months. Mr. Soy again appealed his sentence. One of the issues raised on appeal was whether the district court complied with this court's mandate in resentencing the defendants. We held that the district court had done so. We stated that 16 [i]n our earlier appeal, we ... directed the district court to consider the applicability of application note 1 to § 2A1.1 of the Guidelines.... [T]hat note provides that, when the conviction of first degree murder is predicated on a theory other than premeditated killing, life imprisonment is not necessarily the appropriate sentence and that, in such circumstances, a downward departure may be warranted. Our direction to the district court, therefore, was to consider whether, on the facts of this case, a downward departure was warranted.... [T]he district court effectively carried out this court's order by departing to an extent based upon the defendants' state of mind (recklessness or negligence), the degree of risk inherent in the conduct, and the nature of the underlying offense conduct. U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, comment. (n.1). 17 Prevatte II, 66 F.3d at 844. However, Mr. Soy argued that, once the district court made the decision to depart, it was obliged to impose a sentence that would have been imposed for second degree murder. Id. According to Mr. Soy, because the district court found that the placement and detonation of the bomb amounted to `recklessness and reckless state of mind and behavior,' his conduct could be equated only with second degree murder. Id. We, again, rejected this argument: 18 We do not read application note 1 as cabining the discretion of the district court to that degree. The application note quite explicitly suggests that a departure below that prescribed for second degree murder or for the underlying offense is not likely to be appropriate. This notation is hardly a directive to the district court that any departure must, as a matter of law, reduce the sentence to the level of second degree murder. To hold that a departure must correspond to the base offense level stipulated in § 2A1.2, Second Degree Murder, every time the court finds that a defendant's mental state was less than intentionally or knowingly, cf. U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, comment. (n. 1), would negate the congressional determination that death resulting from certain felonies, such as arson, should be punished, not as second degree murder, but as first degree murder.... Indeed, the district court's redetermination of the sentence in this case demonstrates the need for the flexibility that the application note gives to a sentencing court. The district court commented quite extensively on the mental state of the defendants at the time of the crime.... This analysis can be read as a determination by the district court that the defendants engaged in conduct that, although not premeditated, involved a high degree of recklessness and warranted punishment between the level that would be employed for premeditated murder and the level that would be employed for a murder committed recklessly but not in the aggravated manner exhibited here. Such a determination is clearly permissible under the congressional determination concerning the punishment of murder committed in the course of arson. The sentence corresponds to an offense level of 42, which provides that an individual be sentenced to 360 [months]-life. 19 Id. at 844-45. Although the district court fully complied with this court's mandate, we remanded so that the district court could adjust the sentence to ensure that the life expectancy of each of the defendants had been appropriately considered as required by intervening case law—specifically United States v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir.1995). Prevatte II, 66 F.3d at 846. 20 On remand, the district court imposed a sentence of 528 months' imprisonment. Specifically, the court ordered Mr. Soy committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 528 months on Count 2; and a term of 60 months on Count 1; and terms of 120 months on each of Counts 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20, all to be served concurrently. Tr.XII at 19-20. Again, the court's sentencing order followed the Guidelines' directive that lesser sentences be served concurrently [i]f the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum [wa]s adequate to achieve the total punishment. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(c) (1995). Mr. Soy did not appeal this sentence.