Opinion ID: 1311766
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis of the Claim

Text: We begin by observing that the Church does not attempt to negate (1) its intention to cause, or its reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress, (2) plaintiffs' severe emotional suffering, or (3) its conduct's actual and proximate causation of that suffering. (18a) Because the Church must conclusively negate at least one necessary element of this cause of action to be entitled to summary judgment ( Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 417), the propriety of the summary judgment depends on whether the Church can establish as a matter of law that its conduct, even under Molko and Leal's theory, was not extreme and outrageous in the sense required to support an action for emotional distress. (19) Conduct is extreme and outrageous when it `exceeds all bounds [of decency] usually tolerated by a decent society, [and is] of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress....' ( Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 155, fn. 7.) Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. (Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. d.) `... Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress....' ( Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 155, fn. 7.) (18b) The Church offers two arguments why its conduct was not, as a matter of law, extreme and outrageous. First it contends its actions amounted to nothing more than intensive religious practice, and therefore were different only in degree, not in kind, from those of many other religious groups. We find this claim unconvincing. Although fasting, poverty, silence or cloistered living may constitute intensive religious practice, we have already determined that fraud, even though purported to be religiously motivated, is actionable conduct under the circumstances presented here. Second, as mentioned above, the Church argues that Leal's long hours of work were self-inflicted. It contends its encouragement for her to sell flowers and solicit money does not constitute outrageous conduct. But since the conduct that the Church relies on occurred after Leal had formally joined the Church, the argument has no bearing on whether its original fraudulent inducement into an atmosphere of coercive persuasion  the conduct at issue  is extreme and outrageous. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the Church's continued deceptions might well be seen as conduct breaching plaintiffs' trust in the integrity of those who were promising to make their lives more meaningful. So viewed, the Church's actions might well constitute an abuse of a relation or position which gives [the Church] power to damage the plaintiff's interest. ( Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 155, fn. 7.) `Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.' ( Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499 [86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216].) Since reasonable persons could differ here, a question of fact remains as to whether the Church's conduct was outrageous for purposes of this action. It follows that the Court of Appeal erred in affirming the summary judgment for the Church as to plaintiffs' actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress.