Opinion ID: 4510144
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Gula’s Testimony

Text: Diaz next challenges the testimony of DEA Task Force Officer Gula. Because defense counsel did not object to this testimony at trial, we will reverse only for plain error. United States v. Jackson, 849 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 2017). Diaz contends that the District Court plainly erred by allowing, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 701, Gula’s testimony (1) drawing the legal conclusion that Diaz was a conspirator who bagged and distributed drugs and (2) interpreting noncoded conversations in which Diaz was involved. Federal Rule of Evidence 701 permits certain lay opinion testimony that “has the effect of describing something that the jurors could not otherwise experience for themselves” to offer the trier of fact a more “accurate reproduction of the event.” Jackson, 849 F.3d at 553 (quoting United States v. Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 291 (3d Cir. 2016)). To achieve this purpose, Rule 701 requires that lay opinion testimony be (a) “rationally based on the witness’s perception,” (b) helpful, 3 Our conclusion that the Court did not abuse its discretion should not be confused with an endorsement of its approach to the situation. As we have noted, the District Court did not follow up on its order that Kalinowski respond, nor did it seek an explanation from Kalinowski about his lack of responsiveness or bring Diaz and Kalinowski into court to ask about the apparent breakdown in communication. Simple steps such as these would have been appropriate and advisable. 11 and (c) “not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. The proponent of the lay opinion testimony bears the burden of demonstrating an adequate foundation. Fulton, 837 F.3d at 291. Here, Diaz argues that Gula’s testimony failed to satisfy the foundation requirements of both 701(a) and 701(b) when he testified as to Diaz’s role in the conspiracy and interpreted clear conversations. We need not consider the 701(a) objections because these aspects of Gula’s testimony clearly violated 701(b).
We turn first to Gula’s testimony about Diaz’s role in the conspiracy. Diaz contends that, when Gula summarized Diaz’s role, he improperly and unhelpfully offered his opinion on the ultimate issue at trial: Diaz’s involvement in the conspiracy. We agree. The District Court allowed Gula to opine that Diaz worked as “a subordinate of Jeffrey Guzman, working at the direction of Jeffrey Guzman” to bag and distribute drugs. App. at 256. This conclusory statement was obviously unhelpful, and the Court should have excluded it under 701(b). The “purpose of the foundation requirements” of Rule 701 “is to ensure that such testimony does not . . . usurp the fact-finding function of the jury.” Fulton, 837 F.3d at 291–92 (citation omitted). Therefore, the helpfulness requirement in 701(b) requires courts to exclude “testimony where the witness is no better suited than the jury to make the judgment at issue.” Jackson, 849 F.3d at 554 (quoting Fulton, 837 F.3d at 293). Here, the jury was perfectly well suited to determine, based on the evidence before them, whether Diaz worked as a part of Guzman’s conspiracy. Indeed, that was the primary question 12 facing them. Gula’s comments articulated precisely the conclusion the government asked the jury to infer from the evidence presented at trial, removing the jury’s need to personally review the evidence. See United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 2004). Rather than offering insight the jury could not itself have gleaned from the evidence, Gula’s testimony served to provide the conclusion the government wanted the jury to reach. Such conclusory testimony undermines the goal of Rule 701 “to exclude lay opinion testimony that ‘amounts to little more than choosing up sides, or that merely tells the jury what result to reach.’” Fulton, 837 F.3d at 291 (quoting United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 262 (3d Cir. 2010)). That is just what Gula did when he told the jury Diaz worked as Guzman’s subordinate, bagging and distributing drugs. By admitting such testimony, the District Court allowed precisely the sort of testimony Rule 701 is designed to exclude.
Diaz next challenges Gula’s testimony interpreting a number of non-coded statements. We find this testimony quite problematic and have no trouble concluding that the District Court should have excluded it. We have repeatedly held that a lay witness may not interpret clear statements understandable to a jury without violating Rule 701(b)’s helpfulness requirement. Jackson, 849 F.3d at 554; United States v. Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir. 1988). Certainly, lay witnesses may offer opinions about the meaning of recorded conversations if the witness’s opinions are helpful in determining a relevant fact and, to an 13 “uninitiated listener,” the speaker “speaks as if he were using code.” United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 977 (3d Cir. 1985). But even then, the trial court bears the responsibility of “vigorously polic[ing] the government’s examination” to ensure the witness is “not asked to interpret relatively clear statements.” Id. at 978; Jackson, 849 F.3d at 553–54. Such policing is necessary because, when officers interpret clear, non-coded statements, they are “no better suited than the jury to make the judgment at issue,” and the testimony is therefore unhelpful. Jackson, 849 F.3d at 554 (quoting Fulton, 837 F.3d at 293). In Jackson, we found lay testimony about a recorded call unhelpful under Rule 701(b) because the call contained “seemingly no mention of code words,” although the meaning of the call was unclear. Id. Vagueness or lack of clarity alone does not render a conversation coded so as to permit lay opinion testimony about its meaning. If a jury could independently understand the meaning based on the conversation itself and other evidence in the case, Rule 701(b)’s helpfulness requirement bars any additional lay witness “interpretation.” Here, the District Court permitted Gula to opine, unhelpfully, about his understanding of numerous calls the jury could have interpreted for themselves, sometimes actually misinterpreting them but giving the impression that his interpretation was authoritative. Gula interpreted a call from Diaz to Guzman in which Diaz stated, “[y]o you know this bags are different sizes right?” App. at 470. Gula stated that, “based on the investigation, my training and experience, he’s talking about the bags he was utilizing to bag up narcotics at the direction of Jeffrey Guzman, and he’s telling Guzman that the bags are all different sizes.” App. at 261. Gula also interpreted 14 a text from Louis Bracey to Diaz that read, “u got me waitin,” App. at 732, to mean “Louis Bracey is waiting on Gito for a quantity of narcotics.” App. at 287. These statements contained no coded terminology requiring interpretation. Gula simply repeated the language used in the conversations and then added his own conclusion that the statements referred to narcotics activity. We criticized this type of testimony in Jackson, where we noted that the translation of “you can go ahead and send him” to mean “it is okay now to send [a coconspirator] to purchase cocaine in Dallas” presented a particularly egregious violation of 701(b). 849 F.3d at 554. Gula repeatedly offered such egregious testimony, advising the jury that clear statements described narcotics activity. The government contends that many of the communications did include code words. For instance, the government points to conversations using the term “barbershop,” which it argues served as a code word for a meeting place for drug purchases. But “barbershop” was not a code word. It referred to an actual barbershop—albeit one where the evidence showed that the co-conspirators also distributed drugs. Nonetheless, Gula purported to “interpret” a text message from Diaz, in which he said, “[c]ome on the guy is at the barbershop waiting for me.” App. at 472. Gula commented, “[t]his is significant, because during the course of investigation, we identified the location of Ramirez Barbershop, which is approximately one block away from Jeffrey Guzman’s residence. Jeffrey Guzman and Evans Santos were regularly going over to the barbershop to distribute narcotics to customers.” App. at 262. None of this testimony offers an interpretation of a coded statement. 15 This commentary about Diaz’s reference to the barbershop did not amount to proper lay opinion testimony. Although evidence of drug activity at Ramirez Barbershop was certainly relevant evidence to put before the jury, it was not necessary to understand the meaning of Diaz’s text message. Rather, linking Diaz’s statement to the evidence about Ramirez Barbershop, as Gula did in his testimony, constituted argument about the significance of Diaz’s statement. Although it is “perfectly appropriate for the prosecutor to argue in summation” that relevant evidence supports a particular inference from communications, a “case agent’s testimony may not ‘simply dress[ ] up argument as evidence.’” Jackson, 849 F.3d at 554 (alteration in original) (quoting Fulton, 837 F.3d at 293). The government would have been well within its rights to argue in summation that, based on the other evidence about Ramirez Barbershop, the use of “barbershop” in the coconspirators’ communications referred to drug transactions at Ramirez Barbershop. But to present that argument by way of lay opinion testimony interpreting a coded statement violated Rule 701(b). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court improperly admitted Gula’s conclusory testimony about Diaz’s role in the conspiracy as well as the testimony about his impressions of the communications in violation of Rule 701(b).
Nonetheless, the plain error standard of review prevents reversal. Under that standard, the error must be “clear under current law” and impact substantial rights, having prejudiced the defendant by affecting the trial’s outcome. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Moreover, we will not 16 reverse unless the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 732 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The improper testimony did not prejudice Diaz so as to affect his substantial rights. Aside from Gula’s testimony, the prosecution introduced considerable evidence of Diaz’s involvement in the conspiracy, including the testimony of two co-defendants, the testimony of additional investigators, and numerous calls and text messages. Further, with respect to Gula’s testimony about the communications, Kalinowski effectively demonstrated on cross-examination that Gula had relied on experience unrelated to the investigation and that his testimony reflected only his impression of the conversations. These factors significantly “mitigate[ ] the likelihood that [the improper] testimony affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Fulton, 837 F.3d at 295. The error also did not impact the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings because the prosecutor did not rely on any of Gula’s improper testimony in summation. When “urging a guilty verdict, the prosecution focused the jury’s attention only on the extensive admissible evidence supporting that result.” Id. (quoting Garcia, 413 F.3d at 217). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the error “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. 17