Opinion ID: 213387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment/Qualified Immunity

Text: Generally, we review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007). -9- Summary judgment is appropriate “if the Movant shows that there is not genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). However, review of summary judgment orders in the context of qualified immunity is slightly different. Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2009). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009). An assertion of qualified immunity at summary judgment shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established. Thompson, 584 F.3d at 1312 (quotations omitted). We construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party to determine whether he has met his burden of establishing a clearly established constitutional violation. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 380 (2007). Even so, “because at summary judgment we are beyond the pleading phase of the litigation, a plaintiff’s version of the facts must find support in the record . . . .” Thomson, 584 F.3d at 1312. The First Amendment protects a prisoner’s right to receive mail. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989). Prison officials may regulate that right, however, as long as the regulation is “‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Id. at 409 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). The Turner test requires a court to weigh four factors: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2) - 10 - “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates”; (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) the “absence of ready alternatives” to the regulation. 482 U.S. at 89-90 (quotations omitted). Courts must conduct this analysis giving “substantial deference” to prison authorities. Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (10th Cir. 1991). In addition to the four-part test, Turner clearly establishes that “restrictive prison regulations [including restrictions on First Amendment rights] are permissible if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and are not an exaggerated response to such objectives.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006) (citation and quotations omitted). Frazier argued A/R 300-26 was unconstitutionally vague on its face and, asapplied to him, it was an exaggerated response to the prison officials’ legitimate penological concerns. After a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s recommendation and Frazier’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s analysis of the Turner factors as they relate to A/R 300-26. Frazier’s facial challenge to the regulation failed because: (1) the CDOC’s valid penological interest in rehabilitation bears a rational connection to individualized rehabilitative plans for inmates; (2) inmates retain access to all publications which are not contrary to their rehabilitation goals; (3) unrestricted access to sexually explicit material would threaten the safety of the general prison population; and (4) Frazier had not suggested any alternative which would further the rehabilitative interest at issue. Frazier’s as-applied challenge was unsuccessful because he failed to - 11 - offer any confiscated material that did not reasonably fall within his individualized restrictions. On appeal, Frazier states: In response to said ‘Recommendations’ . . . the plaintiff tendered a set of ‘Objections’ . . . which rebutted the Magistrate’s opinions on each of the ‘Turner’ factors with absolute precision and finality (in some of the best work the plaintiff feels he’s done in nearly six years of litigation) and yet they seem to have garnered virtually no consideration by the District Judge at all in her final ruling on this matter. (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 12.) He devotes a considerable portion of his brief castigating both the magistrate judge and the district court for their actions in this litigation. As a result, he leaves little room for argument on the issues. Basically, he reiterates his belief that “(1) the ‘individualized restrictions’ placed upon [his] reading materials were far too stringent with regard to the actual facts of his prison conviction [burglary/theft] and (2) the Defendants nevertheless abused their discretion in going far beyond their own guidelines in censoring [his] publications because said restrictions were facially vague so as to elicit subjective interpretation and arbitrary (and, hence, unconstitutional) enforcement.” (Id. at 12.) In the end, he merely refers us to paragraph 48 in his proposed amended complaint, pages 5-7 in his summary judgment pleadings and pages 1-8 in his objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendations “for virtually everything that needs to be argued concerning this appeal issue.” (Id.) Solicitously reviewing these materials, as we must for a pro se appellant, Frazier’s arguments are unpersuasive. As we perceive it, Frazier is challenging the constitutionality of the prison’s regulation as it was individualized to his situation—an as- - 12 - applied challenge. He insists his individualized plan “was based upon irrelevant, misleading, and/or patently false information” and thus does not serve a valid penological interest. (R. Vol. I at 412.) But as the district court advised, Frazier’s denial of the facts in the presentence report is not at issue here. The CDOC was not arbitrary in accepting these facts as the basis for Frazier’s rehabilitation plan. Frazier also argues his individualized plan does not meet the second Turner factor because he has no alternative means “to keep in touch with the music scene.” (Id. at 415.) However, it is uncontested that only a few magazines were confiscated. Frazier received others in their entirety or with only a few pages removed. Frazier also contends his individualized plan is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define with particularity the age of the “young women and girls in underwear or swimsuits” which are prohibited and the plan’s “[a]djectives such as ‘erotic,’ ‘sexually oriented,’ and ‘sexually stimulating’ are just too abstract to be interpreted the same way consistently from person to person.” (Id. at 413-14.) He alleges LCF’s actions are an “exaggerated response” because it is the only facility (out of six where he has been incarcerated) that confiscated these materials. We disagree. The magistrate judge and the district court considered the pages restricted by the LCF reading committee in a confiscated Rolling Stone magazine and correctly concluded the material was clearly subject to the valid restrictions in Frazier’s individualized plan.3 3 For example, one of the restricted pages contained a photograph of a musician in a very slight bikini with the editorial note: “Stone a Bone[.] Hellooo, Joss Stone! The soul singer traded in her Joplin-esque duds for something sexier on the Barbados’ beaches.” (R. Vol. I at 279.) - 13 - Finally, Frazier claims the CDOC’s failure to provide him all the restricted materials in response to his discovery requests made it impossible for the district court to determine whether all the publications were reasonably confiscated.4 Although Frazier repeatedly moved the district court to compel production of the publications, he concomitantly alleged the CDOC had destroyed the confiscated publications. Therefore, his publications were no longer in CDOC’s possession. The CDOC also responded that “[b]ecause the threshold issue involved in this case is whether Plaintiff is allowed to possess these items, censored portions of the publication cannot be produced to the Plaintiff.” (R. Vol. I at 379 n.4.) Indeed, “all inmates could then obtain copies of prohibited material merely by initiating litigation.” (Id.) The solution, of course, was for Frazier to file a motion or an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(d) to allow the judge to conduct an in camera production and inspection of the restricted materials. He did not do so. The district court did not err in holding Frazier to his Rule 56 burden. Frazier has not presented a material issue of fact demonstrating the CDOC defendants violated his First or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Therefore, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment in their favor was warranted.5 4 The magazines were destroyed at the time they were denied to Frazier or thrown out when Frazier was transferred to another facility. Frazier submitted five pages from one confiscated magazine which he procured himself. 5 Given this conclusion, we need not address Frazier’s damages claim. - 14 - AFFIRMED. Frazier’s request to proceed ifp is GRANTED. Entered by the Court: Terrence L. O’Brien