Opinion ID: 3048686
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hoang’s Possessory Interest

Text: [2] We have characterized the possessory interest in a mailed package as being solely in the package’s timely delivery. England, 971 F.2d at 420-21. “In other words, an addressee’s possessory interest is in the timely delivery of a package, not in ‘having his package routed on a particular 1 We note that Otto’s alert to the package created probable cause to believe that the package contained illicit drugs. United States v. Hillison, 733 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1984). Probable cause is sufficient to support the subsequent detention of the package. See, e.g., Hernandez, 313 F.3d at 1213. 5674 UNITED STATES v. HOANG conveyor belt, sorted in a particular area, or stored in any particular sorting bin for a particular amount of time.’ ” Hernandez, 313 F.3d at 1210 (quoting United States v. Demoss, 279 F.3d 632, 639 (8th Cir. 2002) (Hansen J., concurring)). In Hernandez, the package was delayed past its normal delivery time, but we found that the delay was supported by “ ‘a reasonable and articulable suspicion’ that it contain[ed] contraband or evidence of illegal activity.” Id. at 1210 (quoting United States v. Aldaz, 921 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1990)). See also United States v. Gill, 280 F.3d 923, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2002) (Gould, J., concurring) (“Investigators may inspect mail as they wish without any Fourth Amendment curtailment, so long as the inspection does not amount to a ‘search,’ and so long as it is conducted quickly enough so that it does not become a seizure by significantly delaying the date of delivery.”). Notwithstanding the clear language in England and Hernandez, Hoang argues that the momentary diversion of the package without reasonable suspicion violated his Fourth Amendment rights, relying upon some of our earlier cases suggesting that any detention of mail may require a showing of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See Aldaz, 921 F.2d at 229-30 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dass, 849 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1988). Neither the Aldaz nor the Dass panel discussed which, if any, Fourth Amendment interest was implicated by the detention of Aldaz’s express delivery package or the seizure of Dass’s suspicious packages. Both cases, however, went on to examine the reasonableness of the detention under the Fourth Amendment. Aldaz, 921 F.3d at 231 (“Under the facts before us, the detention and delay of Aldaz’s packages were not unreasonable.”); Dass, 849 F.2d at 415 (holding detentions ranging between seven days and three weeks were unreasonable). In England, we distinguished Aldaz because it never squarely addressed the seizure issue in isolation, instead finding no Fourth Amendment violation because reasonable suspicion supported the detention of the package. 971 F.2d at 421. Other circuits have hinted at a reaUNITED STATES v. HOANG 5675 sonable suspicion requirement for the detention of mail. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 869-70 (6th Cir. 2004) (“More specifically, this and many other courts have found that only reasonable suspicion, and not probable cause, is necessary in order to briefly detain a package for further investigation, such as examination by a drug-sniffing dog.”); United States v. Ramirez, 342 F.3d 1210, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003) (“However, certain packages may be detained for investigative purposes when the authorities have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”) (citing United States v. Lux, 905 F.2d 1379, 1382 (10th Cir. 1990)). The leading Supreme Court case addressing the possessory interest potentially implicated by detention of mail, United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), is equivocal. In Van Leeuwen, two packages were mailed from Washington under suspicious circumstances and were diverted by customs officials from the stream of the mail. Id. at 249-50. Customs officials discovered that each of the addressees was under investigation for dealing in illicit gold coins. Id. at 250. At that point, probable cause was established, a warrant issued and the packages were opened by authorities. Id. Probable cause was established after less than two hours for the first package, and after slightly more than twenty-six hours for the second package. Id. at 252-53. The Court held that “[n]o interest protected by the Fourth Amendment was invaded by forwarding the packages the following day rather than the day when they were deposited.” Id. at 253. It also explained that “[t]heoretically—and it is theory only that respondent has on his side—detention of mail could at some point become an unreasonable seizure . . . within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 252. In a retreat from this strong rhetoric, however, the closing paragraph in Van Leeuwen purports to limit its holding to the facts of the case: We only hold that on the facts of this case—the nature of the mailings, their suspicious character, the fact that there were two packages going to separate 5676 UNITED STATES v. HOANG destinations, the unavoidable delay in contacting the more distant of the two destinations, the distance between Mt. Vernon and Seattle—a 29-hour delay between the mailings and the service of the warrant cannot be said to be ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 253. In England, two packages of cocaine were sent by the defendant from California to Alabama. 971 F.2d at 420. The first package aroused the suspicions of a postal clerk and was subjected to a dog sniff at the post office. The dog alerted, but the package was placed on the regularly scheduled flight to Alabama, “the same flight it would have been on had no detention occurred.” Id. A warrant was obtained and the package was opened on its arrival in Alabama. The second package was mailed ten months later, and from a different post office. It was transported to a local police station, subjected to a sniff test and subsequently opened pursuant to a warrant. “It [was] not disputed that had the sniff test been negative, the package could easily have been returned to the postal station and put on its regularly scheduled flight to Birmingham.” Id. We held that there had been no seizure of England’s packages because it was undisputed that the packages were not delayed by their detention. [3] We distinguished Van Leeuwen because, [u]nlike the present case, the delivery of Van Leeuwen’s packages was substantially delayed by their detention. As a result, the primary issue before the Court was not whether the detention of Van Leeu- wen’s packages interfered with his interest in them, but whether this interference was justified despite the lack of probable cause. UNITED STATES v. HOANG 5677 Id. at 421. Nevertheless, Van Leeuwen supports our conclusion in England that any possessory interest in packages placed in the United States mail is attenuated. At least two other circuit courts have similarly interpreted the limits of the Fourth Amendment possessory interest. See United States v. Zacher, 465 F.3d 336, 338-39 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that police taking a package and placing it on the floor of a FedEx facility for a dog sniff was not a seizure) (citing United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc)); United States v. LaFrance, 879 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1989) (“On this record, the only possessory interest at stake before Thursday noon was the contract-based expectancy that the package would be delivered [on time]. . . . Thus, detention of the parcel did not, indeed could not on these facts, intrude on appellees’ possessory interest until the appointed hour, noon, had come and gone.”) (citation omitted). But see Robinson, 390 F.3d at 869-70; Ramirez, 342 F.3d at 1212; United States v. Banks, 3 F.3d 399, 401 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The Supreme Court has held that no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in firstclass mail is invaded by detaining such mail based on facts that create reasonable suspicion until a search warrant can be obtained.”); United States v. Mayomi, 873 F.2d 1049, 1053-54 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that two day detention of two letters was acceptable because it was supported by probable cause).2 [4] Under England, as subsequently interpreted in Her-