Opinion ID: 2715920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of an Upward Variance

Text: Finally, Silvestro challenges the reasonableness of his sentence, drawing our attention to the fact that it falls two years above his guideline range. However, under the totality of the circumstances, we are not “left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the [sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)” and “arriv[ed] at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of th[is] case.” See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Accordingly, we cannot vacate Silvestro’s sentence. Id. While we take note of the fact that Silvestro’s sentence was above his guideline range, “[s]entences outside the guidelines are not presumed to be unreasonable.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009). In this case, the variance the district court imposed served to alleviate potential sentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6) with respect to Silvestro’s coconspirators, in comparison to whom the district court observed Silvestro received only a “modest” increase. Moreover, the drug conspiracy to which Silvestro pleaded guilty involved a kidnapping and a killing, bearing on the seriousness of the offense under § 3553(a)(2)(B). The district court was not unreasonable in 4 Case: 13-12533 Date Filed: 08/07/2014 Page: 5 of 5 concluding that the statutory minimum of ten years did not adequately take into account Silvestro’s uncharged participation in the kidnapping. Finally, although Silvestro’s sentence was above his guideline range, it fell well below the statutory maximum of life imprisonment, which is an indication of reasonableness. See United States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 751-52 (11th Cir. 2006). Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence.