Opinion ID: 175626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Lykkens' Unreasonable Search Claim

Text: The Lykkens assert the August 2004 search violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches. The district court held the search was unreasonable, but nevertheless granted appellees summary judgment because it held the right to be free from the type of unnecessary destruction at issue in the case was not clearly established at the time of the search. The district court found the manner of the search unreasonable because the appellees refused to allow: (1) the Lykkens to round up their cattle, (2) the Lykkens to care for their cattle during the four-day search, (3) Esther to turn off the stove, and (4) Esther to check on the pregnant cat and, later, the newborn kittens. The thrust of the district court's ruling is that these destructive acts were not necessary to execute the search and were therefore unreasonable. Courts may properly probe the manner in which law enforcement executes a warrant to ensure compliance with the Constitution. See Hummel-Jones v. Strope, 25 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir.1994) (The manner in which a warrant is executed is always subject to judicial review to ensure that it does not traverse the general Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonableness.). Although the Fourth Amendment protects against unnecessarily destructive searches and seizures, see Ginter v. Stallcup, 869 F.2d 384, 388 (8th Cir.1989) (per curiam), the execution of a search warrant does occasionally require damage to property, see Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979). We review appellees' conduct for objective reasonableness, ignoring appellees' subjective intent. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (applying objective standard to qualified immunity analysis). No constitutional violation is to be found with respect to the Lykkens' cattle. When the appellees appeared at the Lykken farm, the cattle were spooked, bolted, and broke through a fence. It was the arrival of the officers and initial detention of the Lykkens that caused the cattle to boltand we find it obvious that the officers' arrival at the scene was necessary in order to execute the search warrant. The district court conflates the appellees' necessary arrival with their later refusals to allow Kerwyn to round up the cattle that had run into the corn field. But as the Lykkens conceded at oral argument, The actual destruction occurred immediately. The Lykkens argue the enforced abandonment of their cattle in the corn field increased the amount of their damages, but they do not suggest the abandonment constitutes a distinct constitutional claim. [4] Because the damage was caused by the very arrival of the warrant executing officers, a manifestly necessary part of carrying out the search, there was no constitutional violation respecting the cattle. Similarly, denying Esther's entry into her house to turn off the stove and check on her cat would not appear unreasonable to an officer at the scene. While we sympathize with Esther's feelings about her cats, [5] we cannot agree with the district court that Brady and Devaney's refusal to allow Esther to enter the house for the amount of time it would have taken to turn off the stove and check on her cats was unnecessary and unreasonable. Perhaps denying Esther entry into her house could be considered unreasonable if the officers were searching only for large objects which could not be secreted within the house. But the search warrant demanded a search for more than just the missing vehicle. The warrant also identified small objects, such as a ring, a watch, photographs, and papers, which could potentially be removed, destroyed, or hidden. Moreover, in the circumstances of this case, the fact that probable cause existed for the search could lead a reasonable officer to suspect the occupants of the house might attempt to conceal the objects of the search if the Lykkens were allowed unfettered access to the house. Denying Esther access to her house during the pendency of the search was therefore not unreasonable. Because we conclude the appellees' search did not violate the Lykkens' constitutional rights, we do not reach the issue of whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the search.