Opinion ID: 2194937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Finally, Taylor contends there was insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction. When reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995), reh'g denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the verdict. Id. The conviction will be affirmed if evidence of a probative value exists from which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Taylor alleges his conviction should be reversed because there was no direct evidence that he or Bowling discharged the gun. It is well settled that a conviction for murder may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone. Green v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1314, 1315 (Ind.1992). If a reasonable inference can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, the verdict will not be disturbed. Id. In this case, there was overwhelming evidence of Taylor's guilt. The victim, Anderson, allegedly owed money to Taylor and Taylor attempted to collect on several occasions. One witness, who accompanied Taylor to collect on one of those occasions, testified that Taylor stated, If [Anderson] don't have my money by twelve o'clock, I'm gonna kill `em. Sometime thereafter, Taylor borrowed a gun from Bowling and the two of them went to the Anderson's apartment, where Taylor demanded money from Anderson. Bowling testified that after he turned to leave the apartment, he heard two shots. Taylor and Bowling fled from the scene and met at Taylor's vehicle. According to Bowling's testimony, Taylor returned to the scene sometime thereafter to be sure that Anderson was dead. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Taylor murdered Anderson. Taylor further argues that the evidence was insufficient because seven jurors signed affidavits stating that Taylor did not commit the murder. However, in those affidavits, each of the seven jurors stated that he or she found Taylor guilty based upon the trial court's instructions regarding accomplice liability. Assuming arguendo that Taylor did not fire the fatal shot, the jury could nevertheless find Taylor guilty as an accomplice consistent with the trial court's instructions. An accomplice who acts in concert with another who actually committed the direct acts constituting the elements of the crime is equally as liable as a principal for all natural and probable consequences of the plan. Tynes v. State, 650 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ind.1995); see also IND.CODE § 35-41-2-4 (1993). The evidence noted above, along with other evidence in the record, clearly supports the jury's conclusion that Taylor was guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.