Opinion ID: 1836521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Odd-Lot Amendment.

Text: [1 2] Under [the odd-lot] doctrine a worker becomes an odd-lot employee when an injury makes the worker incapable of obtaining employment in any well-known branch of the labor market. An odd-lot worker is thus totally disabled if the only services the worker can perform are so limited in quality, dependability, or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist. Guyton v. Irving Jensen Co., 373 N.W.2d 101, 105 (Iowa 1985) (quoting Lee v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 230 Minn. 315, 320, 41 N.W.2d 433, 436 (1950)). In adopting the doctrine, we noted that [b]efore today we were not required to decide whether a presumption exists that suitable work is available to an oddlot employee or whether evidence must be adduced on that subject. We adopt the burden of proof allocation enunciated in [a workers' compensation authority] statement of the general rule. We emphasize that this rule merely allocates the burden of production of evidence. It is triggered only when the worker makes a prima facie case for inclusion in the odd-lot category: It is normally incumbent upon an injured [worker], at a hearing to determine loss of earning capacity, to demonstrate a reasonable effort to secure employment in the area of ... residence. Where testimony discloses that a reasonable effort was made, the burden of going forward with evidence to show the availability of suitable employment is on the employer and carrier. Id. (quoting Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 25 Ariz.App. 117, 119, 541 P.2d 580, 582 (1975)). Guyton stated the rationale for this burden-shifting rule: [T]he employer ordinarily is in a better position than the worker to determine whether the labor market offers opportunities to persons in the odd-lot category. The overriding reason for requiring evidence of employment opportunities is because there is no presumption that merely because the worker is physically able to do certain work such work is available. 373 N.W.2d at 106 (citations omitted). The practical effect of this burden-shifting rule is that when a claimant is an odd-lot employee, we presume that no jobs are available unless the employer introduces evidence of such work. Nevertheless, the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of industrial disability always remains on the employee. Second Injury Fund v. Nelson, 544 N.W.2d 258, 267 (Iowa 1995) (citing Guyton, 373 N.W.2d at 105). The Idaho court explained the odd-lot doctrine by contrasting it with proof of industrial disability in other cases: There are two methods by which a claimant may establish a permanent disability. First, a claimant may prove a total and permanent disability if his or her medical impairment together with the nonmedical factors total 100%. If the Commission finds that a claimant has met his or her burden of proving 100% disability via the claimant's medical impairment and permanent nonmedical factors, there is no need for the Commission to continue. The total and permanent disability has been established at that stage. The second method by which a claimant may prove total and permanent disability is for the claimant to demonstrate that he fits within the definition of an odd-lot worker. The odd-lot doctrine comes into play when the claimant has proved something less than 100% disability. The odd-lot category exists for those persons who are so injured as to be unable to perform services other than those which are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist. Boley v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho 278, 281, 939 P.2d 854, 857 (1997) (quoting Dehlbom v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 129 Idaho 579, 582, 930 P.2d 1021, 1024 (1997)) (other citations omitted). Curtin argues that it did not matter that the deputy allowed the odd-lot amendment because his evidence established total and permanent disability with or without application of the odd-lot doctrine. While this argument might have merit if the arbitration decision were based on both theories, the fact is that it was not; the deputy based his ruling solely on the odd-lot doctrine. The deputy stated in his ruling: The claimant's undisputed impairment and work restrictions preclude him from returning to those jobs for which he is suited based upon his skills, education, and experience. The claimant's remaining physical abilities are limited to light duty to sedentary work. However, given his current level of education, it is unlikely that he will be able to find such a position without substantial training. Thus, the claimant has made a prima facie showing that he is in the odd-lot category. Defendants place emphasis on the claimant's success in community college; however, such emphasis is misplaced where that success was due at least in part to the assistance he received from Ms. Eberhart. There is no doubt that such assistance was critical to the claimant obtaining better than a C average given the claimant's learning disability, grades and test scores in high school. The defendants speculate that if claimant were to continue in community college with substantial assistance from the college or other sources, that the claimant would be able to complete that program and acquire skills that would make him employable again. Such speculation cannot be relied upon to meet the defendants' burden of showing that suitable employment exists that the claimant can do. (Emphasis added.) The emphasized language is clearly oddlot language, and it makes it clear this was the basis for the arbitration ruling. In fact, on the intra-agency appeal to the commissioner, the commissioner identified the disability issues as only (1) whether the claimant should have been allowed to amend his petition to assert the odd-lot doctrine and (2) whether the claimant is an odd-lot employee. (The commissioner noted a third issue, regarding the employer's right to subrogation, which we discuss later.) Curtin argues the amendment could not reasonably have been a surprise to the employer because the state of the prehearing record was such that the employer should have expected the odd-lot argument to be made, based on Curtin's poor performance in high school and his mental limitations. This, of course, is subject to some doubt because Curtin's performance in college was ostensibly good, and the employer relied on it. In any event, the odd-lot doctrine was not injected into the case until the evidence was closed. If the potential reliance on the odd-lot doctrine was apparent to the employer, as Curtin claims, it certainly should have been apparent to Curtin, who had the responsibility to raise it. The petition did not raise the odd-lot issue, and the prehearing conference report did not raise it. The hearing assignment order, which was entered prior to the hearing, specifically provided that the only issues to be considered at the hearing would be those identified in the prehearing conference report, which did not mention the odd-lot doctrine. The parties pursued mediation, but the theory was not mentioned. Under the odd-lot doctrine, once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of entitlement, the burden of going forward with evidence that jobs are available shifts to the employer. Guyton, 373 N.W.2d at 106. Here, Curtin faults the employer for not making such a showing, despite the fact the employer did not know it would be bound to carry the burden of production until after the record was closed. Weishaar v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 506 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa Ct.App.1993), is a very similar case. In that case, the claimant attempted to amend her petition to assert the odd-lot doctrine in her posthearing brief. The commissioner ruled the amendment was not timely, and the district court affirmed. The court of appeals stated: We find that the commissioner and the district court correctly concluded the odd-lot doctrine issue was not timely raised and therefore could not be considered on appeal. Weishaar raised the issue in her post-hearing brief to the deputy commissioner. This did not afford her employer a fair opportunity to meet and rebut any evidence Weishaar might have presented to the deputy on this issue. Weishaar, 506 N.W.2d at 790-91 (citations omitted). It is interesting that, even in the present case, the workers' compensation commissioner stated amendments at the time of the hearing are not condoned. (Emphasis added.) The commissioner justified the deputy's allowance of the amendment on the grounds that [the][d]efendants do not argue they were prejudiced by the addition of this [odd-lot] allegation, nor do they offer what other steps would have been taken in the case to prove that claimant was employable. The record does not support those conclusions. First, the employer claimed prejudice from the outset. It filed a resistance to the amendment on the ground it would be prejudiced by it. It also asserted a claim of prejudice in its brief to the commissioner in the intraagency appeal. As to the second ground, the commissioner gave for approving the late amendment, the employer did state what it would do to meet its burden of production under the odd-lot doctrine: it would conduct additional discovery to ameliorate the effect of Curtin's change of testimony. We need not speculate about what that evidence might be. We say only that basic fairness requires that the employer be given a chance to produce it. We conclude that the deputy abused his discretion in allowing the amendment under these circumstances and agree with the commissioner's observation that such amendments cannot be condoned. We therefore reverse the district court and the commissioner's ruling and remand for additional discovery, if necessary, a new hearing, and an opportunity for the employer to meet the odd-lot claim.