Opinion ID: 844204
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant fails to show prejudice from joinder

Text: Defendant does not dispute that the restaurant murder and robbery charges and the Ricky Byrd murder charge were properly joined under section 954, which permits the joinder of “two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses.” (See also People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 771 (Soper).) The law favors the joinder of counts because such a course of action promotes efficiency. (Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1220.) A trial court has discretion to order that properly joined charges be tried separately (§ 954), but there must be a “clear showing of prejudice to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant‟s severance motion.” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 160.) In assessing a claimed abuse of discretion, we assess the trial court‟s ruling by considering the record then before the court. (Soper, supra, at p. 774; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 575.) If the evidence underlying each of the joined charges would have been crossadmissible under Evidence Code section 110110 had they been prosecuted in separate trials, “that factor alone is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of prejudice and to justify a trial court‟s refusal to sever properly joined charges.” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 775; see also People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 10 Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) states, “Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.” 22 830, 855.) We doubt, however, that the evidence regarding these two separate incidents was sufficiently similar to support an inference of intent, motive, or any other fact in issue that would render the evidence cross-admissible, and respondent does not argue otherwise. (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402-403.) As defendant observes, the intent and motive behind the restaurant incident was robbery while the Ricky Byrd shooting may have been motivated by a drug debt or some sort of personal vendetta against “Smoke.” We need not affirmatively decide, however, whether the evidence would have been cross-admissible in separate trials because, as defendant acknowledges, lack of cross-admissibility is not dispositive of whether the court abused its discretion in denying severance. (§ 954.1; People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 350 [“When two crimes of the same class are joined, cross-admissibility is not required”].) To resolve the question of abuse of discretion, we must further inquire “whether the benefits of joinder were sufficiently substantial to outweigh the possible „spill-over‟ effect of the „other-crimes‟ evidence on the jury in its consideration of the evidence of defendant‟s guilt of each set of offenses.” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 938; see People v. Thomas, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 350.) To make that determination “[w]e consider [1] whether some of the charges are likely to unusually inflame the jury against the defendant; [2] whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the total evidence may alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and [3] whether one of the charges is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case.‟ [Citation.]” (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 798-799.) “ „We then balance the potential for prejudice to the defendant from a joint trial against the countervailing benefits to the state.‟ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 23 None of these considerations point to a potential for prejudice that outweighed the benefits of joint trial in this case. As previously noted, at defendant‟s request, the trial court ordered the guilt phase of trial bifurcated so that the jury heard evidence and reached its verdicts in the restaurant case before considering the evidence regarding the Ricky Byrd homicide. In the trial court‟s view, such a procedure both prevented the potential for prejudice and avoided the inefficiency of conducting separate trials. We agree. As the court observed in denying defendant‟s final severance motion before commencement of the Ricky Byrd homicide case, the jury heard evidence and decided the potentially weaker of the two cases without exposure to the evidence relating to the stronger murder charge. As a result of this procedure, the risk of potential prejudice from joinder was small and it certainly was outweighed by the benefits of trial on all counts before a single jury. Defendant argues nonetheless that the evidence relating to the restaurant crimes was likely to inflame the jurors against him because the homicide victim in that case was a retired police officer who was killed while attempting to protect his wife. We have recognized some potential for prejudice when the murder victims are police officers killed in the line of duty. (See Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 942 [“[c]ommunities undoubtedly have special hostility toward „cop killers‟ ”].) The same concerns are not implicated here, however. Moreover, we observe that the callous, cold-blooded killing of Ricky Byrd, who was shot down in front of his friends after innocently responding to defendant‟s request to “give Smoke a message,” was no less inflammatory than the events that unfolded at the restaurant. Any potential for prejudice from evidence regarding the restaurant murder was lessened, furthermore, because the evidence of defendant‟s guilt of the Ricky Byrd murder was strong. 24 Noting that the Ricky Byrd homicide case, standing alone, did not involve a special circumstance, defendant asserts further that the court‟s refusal to sever counts converted that matter into a capital case. There is no potential for prejudice under this factor, however. As we recently explained in People v. Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 799-800, “[o]ur concern in such situations is whether joinder „would tend to produce a conviction when one might not be obtainable on the evidence at separate trials. Clearly, joinder should never be a vehicle for bolstering either one or two weak cases against one defendant, particularly where conviction in both will give rise to a possible death sentence.‟ [Citation.]” In the present case, the evidence supporting each of the murder cases was not weak and neither case posed the risk of an unjustifiable conviction. As defendant correctly points out, even when a trial court‟s denial of severance was not an abuse of discretion at the time it was made, we must reverse the judgment on a showing that joinder actually resulted in “ „ “gross unfairness” ‟ ” amounting to a denial of fair trial or due process. (People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 162.) However, he fails to make such a showing here. Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, the restaurant homicide and robberies were no more “emotionally charged” and “inflammatory” than the Ricky Byrd murder charge, as previously discussed. Nor does defendant explain why the trial court‟s instruction to jurors to decide the Ricky Byrd homicide case “separately and independently” from the counts at the earlier phase was insufficient to prevent a grossly unfair trial. Given the bifurcation of trial of the two separate incidents, there was minimal risk, even absent such an instruction, that the jury would have considered the restaurant crimes as evidence supporting conviction in the Ricky Byrd case. (See People v. Mendoza, supra, at p. 163 [rejecting the defendant‟s argument that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury not to consider evidence of one of the joined crimes as evidence of another offense].) 25 Defendant‟s claim that the denial of severance rendered his trial grossly unfair does not succeed.