Opinion ID: 497997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of the October 22, 1986 Confession

Text: 34 The government contends that the district court erred in concluding that the confession obtained on October 22, 1986 was inadmissible because it was tainted by the earlier statement. The government asserts that the record shows that the confession was sufficiently attenuated from the statement made on the previous day because of (1) the Miranda warning and Lewis' written waiver of her right to counsel and to remain silent, (2) the twenty-four hour interval between the two statements, and (3) the fact that the agents did not refer to the fact that she had previously admitted committing three bank robberies. 35 The government concedes that the October 21, 1986 statement is inadmissible against Lewis because the agents failed to warn Lewis of her right to counsel and the right to remain silent during police questioning. The fact that the admission obtained on October 21, 1986 was not preceded by a Miranda warning does not compel exclusion of the confession obtained the following day. 36 In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), the Supreme Court declined to treat the failure to admonish a defendant of his right to counsel during interrogation and his right to remain silent as the equivalent of actual coercion which would taint and render inadmissible a subsequent voluntary statement made after a proper warning and waiver. Id. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1298. In Elstad, the Court instructed that the need to deter unreasonable searches under the fourth amendment, which mandates the suppression of evidence no matter how probative their fruits, is inapplicable to a procedural Miranda violation. Id. at 306, 105 S.Ct. at 1292. The court summarized its conclusion in Elstad as follows: We hold today that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings. Id. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1298. 37 We discussed a trial court's responsibilities in applying the Elstad rule in United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir.1985). 38 Under the Supreme Court's analysis in Elstad, in determining the admissibility of a defendant's statement given after the Miranda warning, the court should look first to determine whether the statement made by a defendant before the Miranda warning was actually coerced in violation of the fifth amendment. If it was, then the court must suppress the evidence unless the violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit the use of the evidence under the standards announced in Brown [v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ]. If, on the other hand, the prior statement was voluntary in the sense that it was not coerced in violation of the fifth amendment, though obtained in technical violation of the Miranda requirements, the court should suppress the statement given after the Miranda warning only if the court finds that the subsequent statement was not voluntarily made. This decision would take into consideration the surrounding circumstances, the combined effect of the entire course of the officer's conduct upon the defendant, including the effect of his previously having made a confession, and the manner in which the officers utilized this prior confession in obtaining a second confession. 39 Id. at 1440. 40 In applying Elstad to these facts, the district court in the matter before this court stated as follows: 41 Elstad says whether the effect of the first statement, assuming it is voluntary--I will assume it is for the moment--assuming the first statement is voluntary that doesn't preclude a valid Miranda waiver later, assuming that the effect of the first statement is sufficiently attenuated so that the court no longer has to assume that the defendant felt that she had already sold herself down the river and, therefore, was in effect compelled to make the second statement. 42 The trial court's reading of Elstad is contrary to our interpretation in Wauneka. Elstad requires a consideration of attenuation only if the first statement was actually coerced in violation of the sixth amendment. Wauneka, 770 F.2d at 1440. The trial court's error in construing Elstad is not dispositive, however, because it concluded that the second statement was inadmissible on the ground that it was not sufficiently attenuated from the effect of non-coercive but abusive and clearly improper procedures used in obtaining the admissions the previous day. 43 In Wauneka, we also set forth the duty of a trial judge who has concluded that the initial oral statement is the product of coercive law enforcement tactics. 44 In evaluating whether the subsequent confession is sufficiently attenuated from the previous illegal interrogation, the trial court will be guided by the three factors delineated in Brown: (1) the temporal proximity of the statements and the unconstitutional activity; (2) the presence of any intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 45 Id. at 1441 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62). The district court concluded in the matter sub judice that there was not sufficient attenuation to admit the second statement based on the following factors: 46 First, there was no significant change in the circumstances under which it was given. She was still in the same hospital room. The same agents appeared, and they came within 24 hours. She had no opportunity to talk to anybody else in the interim. And in effect, since she was still emerging from the combination of her drug and anesthetic stupor, it was a continuation of what went on the day before. 47 The district court failed to consider facts in the record that demonstrated attenuation and instead relied on matters not supported by the evidence. Twenty-four hours elapsed between the time of the first conversation and Lewis' confession on October 22, 1986. The agents had no contact with Lewis during this time. The evidence does not show that the interview on the second day was a continuation of what had occurred on the previous day. The agents did not refer to the fact that she had made a statement the previous day. 48 There is no evidence to support the trial court's oral finding that Lewis had no opportunity to talk to anyone else prior to the second conversation. Contrary to the court's finding that she was emerging from the effects of heroin and an anesthetic on October 22, 1986, Degnan stated in his declaration that the hall nurse told him that Lewis was alert and not on any medication which would affect her ability to be interviewed. Degnan also alleged that Lewis looked alert and much better than she did the day before. She told Degnan that she was feeling O.K. As set forth above, when Lewis was advised of her constitutional rights, signed a waiver form which stated that no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me. 49 The evidence shows that she had prior experience with law enforcement and was aware of the procedure for waiving of her constitutional rights. On July 7, 1983, she refused to sign a waiver of rights form. On July 8, 1983 and August 1, 1983, she signed waivers of her constitutional rights. 50 The record shows that the agents neither exploited the fact that she earlier had made an admission nor engaged in conduct that was flagrant or designed to pressure the appellant into giving an unfair confession. See United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908, 912 (9th Cir.1983) (overnight delay between illegal arrest and confession was a considerable period of time sufficient to show attenuation). There is no evidence in the record of actual coercion during either interview. 51 The totality of the facts and circumstances properly before the district court demonstrate that there was sufficient attenuation from any alleged illegality in the prior interview. It is also clear from the facts presented in the limited record before us that Lewis' October 22, 1986 confession was voluntary and admissible because she was advised of her constitutional rights and freely and knowingly waived them at a time when she was alert and not under the influence of any medication.