Opinion ID: 873387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: hubbard’s pregnancy discrimination claims

Text: On appeal, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff Hubbard met the first three prongs of her prima facia case—that is, as a pregnant woman, Hubbard was a member of a protected group, she was qualified for her sales associate job at Defendant Meritage, and she suffered an adverse employment action when she was terminated. The parties disagree, however, as to whether Hubbard satisfied the fourth prong—that she was treated differently than other non-pregnant employees. Hubbard contends that she presented evidence of two other sales associates, Candace Roberts and Thomas Temmel, who were not pregnant and were treated more favorably. However, it is undisputed that neither of these sales associates engaged in the misconduct for which Hubbard was terminated. After receiving instructions, both Roberts and Temmel understood what they needed to do and promptly called their buyers and informed them of the problems with their sales 10 Case: 12-15172 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 11 of 13 contracts. Both had resolved the problem with their buyers and had notified their supervisor of this fact by December 1. In contrast, it is undisputed that Hubbard did not call her buyer, Patel. Patel then showed up at the design center on December 2, where he learned of the problem for the first time and one of Meritage’s vice presidents had to intervene to try to save the sale. In other words, neither Roberts nor Temmel was similarly situated to Hubbard and thus is not a sufficient comparator. Therefore, Hubbard cannot make out the fourth prong of a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination using the McDonnell Douglas approach. Hubbard argues that she presented other evidence that she was treated differently after announcing she was “pregnant or potentially pregnant” but before she was terminated, which constituted circumstantial evidence that her pregnancy played a significant role in her termination. For example, Hubbard claims that she, unlike Candace Roberts, was not told her assignment at Live Oak was temporary. However, the record shows that neither Hubbard nor Roberts was told anything about the duration of their assignments at Live Oak. Indeed, Roberts testified that it was the nature of the home sales business to be moved as new communities and new selling opportunities opened up. Hubbard also did not present any evidence that non-pregnant employees were moved around less frequently than Hubbard was. To the contrary, Temmel 11 Case: 12-15172 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 12 of 13 was transferred from Live Oak after only a few weeks, and Roberts stayed for only three months before being transferred to another Meritage community and being replaced at Live Oak by another sales associate. Hubbard contends that Temmel, but not Hubbard, was allowed to sell in more than one community in violation of company policy. However, the record does not support this proposition. Rather, both Temmel and Hubbard were allowed to continue pursuing leads for Live Oak after they had been transferred. In fact, Hubbard was still working on the Patel sales contract in Live Oak in November 2009, long after she was transferred to Indian Lakes in late August. Hubbard also points to the higher quota she was required to meet to win a Las Vegas trip. However, it is undisputed that, at the time, Hubbard was assigned to Meritage’s highest selling community. Both Kittle and Roberts testified that quotas were set based on the particular community the sales associate was assigned to. Specifically, the baseline of two sales per month was adjusted based on the sales volume of the community. Hubbard presented no evidence that Meritage unequally applied this method of establishing the sales quotas. Finally, Hubbard notes that although Bagley gave her some instructions, they were not the same clear instructions given to Roberts and Temmel about how to handle the problem with Patel’s sales contract. While this fact must be accepted as true, it does not present “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that 12 Case: 12-15172 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 13 of 13 would allow a jury to infer” that Meritage engaged in intentional pregnancy discrimination. See Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328 (quotation marks omitted). For all these reasons, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Hubbard’s pregnancy discrimination claims. AFFIRMED. 13