Opinion ID: 3197061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Favorable Polygraph Examination

Text: Next, Acosta faults the BIA for summarily affirming the IJ's decision to disregard his favorable polygraph examination. Acosta's argument is without merit. The BIA provided a reasoned explanation for its determination that the IJ did not err in weighing the polygraph evidence, noting that the IJ was in the best position to observe the respondent and make determinations regarding his credibility. The BIA also explained that decisions as to the weight of the evidence fall well within the IJ's discretion. This reasoning is well-supported under our law. As the BIA noted, the IJ has broad discretion over the conduct of immigration court proceedings. Condo Cuatzo, 796 F.3d at 156. And while a due process violation may arise from an IJ's decision to exclude evidence, the trial judge must be accorded some flexibility in his efforts to ensure that speculation and surmise do not become proxies for probative evidence. Pulisir v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 302, 311 (1st Cir. 2008). Polygraph results have long been considered of dubious value, and the IJ did not err in declining to give Acosta's polygraph examination any significance in his weighing of the evidence. Cf. United States v. RodríguezBerríos, 573 F.3d 55, 73 (1st Cir. 2009) (Polygraph results are rarely admissible at trial.); deVries v. St. Paul Fire & Marine -14- Ins. Co., 716 F.2d 939, 944-45 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding that the district court did not err in granting motion to exclude evidence regarding the refusal to take a polygraph as polygraph evidence has long been considered of dubious scientific value).