Opinion ID: 2823854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disqualification of Counsel and the Abuse of Discretion Standard

Text: Â¶46Â Â Â Â Â The Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to counsel of their choice is circumscribed in several important respects and must give way under certain circumstances. See People v. Frisco, 119 P.3d 1093, 1095 (Colo. 2005) (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)). Although a criminal defendantâs choice of a particular attorney is afforded great deference, People v. DeAtley, 2014 CO 45, Â¶15, the âessential aimâ of the Sixth Amendment âis to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendantâ within the adversarial processânot âto ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers,â Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. Â¶47Â Â Â Â Â A trial courtâs inherent power to disqualify attorneys from conflicted representation derives from its duty to ensure the integrity and fairness of the proceedings before it. In re Estate of Myers, 130 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Colo. 2006); see also Liebnow by & through Liebnow v. Boston Enters. Inc., 2013 CO 8, Â¶13 (noting that it is within the âexclusive provinceâ of the trial court to determine if disqualification is warranted). A trial court has âbroad discretionâ in deciding disqualification motions. People v. Harlan, 54 P.3d 871, 877 (Colo. 2002). Indeed, a trial court stands in the best position to make the fact-specific determination as to whether a particular conflict would compromise the integrity of the proceeding. See Frisco, 119 P.3d at 1096 (â[C]ourts clearly have the responsibility to ensure that a criminal defendant receives a fair trial (even where that requires disqualification of his counsel of choice), as well as the latitude to ensure the integrity, and appearance of integrity, of the process.â); see also Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163 (concluding that a trial court has âsubstantial latitudeâ in determining whether to disqualify an attorney in the face of actual or potential conflicts of interest). As such, we only overturn a trial courtâs decision on a disqualification motion if we find that the trial court abused its discretion. Liebnow, Â¶14. Â¶48Â Â Â Â Â The abuse of discretion standard isâby designâdeferential to the trial court. The standard is âvery highâ because âit recognizes the trial courtâs unique role and perspective in evaluating the demeanor and body language of live witnesses, and it serves to discourage an appellate court from second-guessing those judgments based on a cold record.â Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 485â86 (Colo. 1999) (describing the standard in the context of juror dismissal). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial courtâs decision must be âmanifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.â Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Bacheller, 2012 CO 68, Â¶42 (emphasis added). Significantly, in determining whether a trial courtâs decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, we ask whether the trial court âexceed[ed] the bounds of the rationally available choicesâânot whether we agree with that decision. Churchill v. Univ. of Colo., 2012 CO 54, Â¶74 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hall v. Moreno, 2012 CO 14, Â¶54). Â¶49Â Â Â Â Â We allow trial courts substantial latitude in determining whether disqualification is warranted for two reasons. First, conflicted representation undermines both the efficacy of an attorneyâs representation and the integrity of the legal system more generally. An attorney owes his or her client a duty of loyalty and a concomitant duty to avoid conflicts of interest; indeed, these are âperhaps the most basic of counselâs duties.â Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984); see also Colo. RPC 1.7 cmt. 1 (noting that loyalty is an essential element in the lawyerâs relationship to a client). The importance of these duties is only heightened where counsel is representing, or has represented, criminal co-defendants. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159 (noting the âspecialdangersâ posed by conflicts involving multiple representation of criminal coÂ­defendants). Â¶50Â Â Â Â Â Second, a trial courtâs decision about whether a conflict requires separate representation is made ânot with the wisdom of hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier pre-trial context when relationships between parties are seen through a glass, darkly.â Id. at 162. In Wheat, a case disqualifying counsel from representing multiple co-defendants in a marijuana-distribution conspiracy, the United States Supreme Court explained the complexity of the decision trial courts face in determining disqualification motions: The likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials. It is a rare attorney who will be fortunate enough to learn the entire truth from his own client, much less be fully apprised before trial of what each of the Governmentâs witnesses will say on the stand. A few bits of unforeseen testimony or a single previously unknown or unnoticed document may significantly shift the relationship between multiple defendants. Id. at 162â63. The broad discretion afforded to trial courts, then, is not only sensible, because trial courts are far closer to the witnesses and the evidence than are appellate courts; it is also necessary given the unavoidably difficult nature of any pretrial disqualification decision. Â¶51Â Â Â Â Â With the wide latitude afforded to trial courts in mind, I now turn to my analysis of the trial courtâs application of Rule 1.9(a) in this case.