Opinion ID: 2974239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hall

Text: Hall contends his sentence was procedurally unreasonable and should be vacated because the -20- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. district court did not adequately address the mitigating factors he submitted in requesting a belowGuidelines sentence. At sentencing, Hall argued the criminal history category assigned to him overrepresented the seriousness of his record and likelihood of future offenses, as well as that he had given the Government valuable assistance, and the district court “did not respond to these arguments,” therefore an error was committed. Hall also argues his sentence was not reasonable, because it is greater than necessary to comply with relevant sentencing purposes under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Hall did not raise this argument at sentencing before the district court, therefore it is reviewed for plain error. Mahon, 444 F.3d at 532.
The Government asserts this argument was waived by Hall’s failure to object to the sentence before the district court when it indicated what sentence would be imposed, therefore the appeals court cannot review it even for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993). However, the United States Supreme Court in Olano distinguished between waiver, or “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,” and forfeiture, “the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.” Id. at 733 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938)). The Government does not give any support for its argument Defendant’s failure to raise this argument at sentencing was a waiver, with the consequence that the appeals court cannot even review it for plain error, rather than a forfeiture, with a less drastic consequence. Upon our review of the record, it appears Hall merely failed to raise this issue at sentencing rather than in any way -21- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. intentionally relinquished it. That constitutes forfeiture, rather than waiver, therefore the appeals court may review this claim for plain error. See United States v. Osborne, 402 F.3d 626, 630 (6th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing forfeiture from waiver; evaluating defendant’s actions as waiver rather than forfeiture where issue was raised in district court and defendant executed a document purporting to waive constitutional right at issue).

Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, district judges have been afforded considerable discretion in determining the sentence of a criminal defendant. In Booker, the Supreme Court made the Guidelines advisory by excising 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), the provision of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the Guidelines mandatory. 543 U.S. at 258- 65. However, the Supreme Court also held “the district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” Id. at 264. Now, sentencing judges must determine the sentence by application of the factors set forth 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) but must also give consideration to the Guidelines (including the Guidelines sentencing range). Id. at 244-45, 258. Further, section 3553(a) contains a “parsimony” provision that commands sentencing judges to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2),” which provides sentencing judges a list of goals or factors they must consider in -22- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. imposing a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).5 “[W]hen a defendant challenges a district court’s sentencing determination, [this Court is] instructed to determine ‘whether [the] sentence is unreasonable.’” United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 126 S. Ct. 1110, 163 L. Ed. 2d 919 (2006) (quoting 5 Section 3553(a) reads, in its entirety, (a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-- (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed-- (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for-- (A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines-- (i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and (ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g) [18 USCS § 3742(g)], are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or (B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); (5) any pertinent policy statement-- (A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such policy statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and (B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g) [18 USCS § 3742(g)], is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced. (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. -23- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261) (third alteration in original). Hall makes no objection to the district court’s resolution of his objections to or the calculation of his Guidelines range. However, Hall takes the district court to task for “perform[ing] little analysis beyond the advisory Guideline calculations” and failing to “explain why a 360 month sentence was not greater than necessary to fulfill the sentencing factors” or respond to each and every argument in his sentencing memo (Hall’s Brief at 30). Thus, he challenges the procedural reasonableness, rather than the substantive reasonableness, of his sentence. See United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 475 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006) (reasonableness review entails both substantive and procedural elements) (citing Webb, 403 F.3d at 383-85 (procedural reasonableness review requires consideration of “. . . the procedures employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determination.”)). A sentence within the applicable advisory Guidelines range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We now join several sister circuits in crediting sentences properly calculated under the Guidelines with a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.”). As Hall was sentenced at the bottom of the Guidelines range, which neither party now asserts was improperly calculated, his sentence is entitled to this presumption of reasonableness. Id. However, the court’s inquiry does not end there; it must still evaluate the district court’s sentencing procedure for reasonableness. McBride, 434 F.3d at 475 n. 3; see also United States v. Jones, 445 F.3d 865, 869 (6th Cir. 2006) (even where district court properly calculated and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence, its “consideration and analysis of the factors listed in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)” must be reviewed for reasonableness). -24- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. A district court must articulate sufficient reasoning for its sentence in order for the appeals court to give it meaningful review, even where the sentence is within the applicable Guidelines range. United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2006). The rebuttable presumption of reasonableness does not relieve the district court of its obligation to consider the § 3553(a) factors and comply with the parsimony provision in § 3553(a)(2). Foreman, 436 F.3d at 644. But the Sixth Circuit has noted “‘although explicit mention of [the § 3553(a) factors] may facilitate review, this court has never required the “ritual incantation” of the factors to affirm a sentence.’” Williams, 436 F.3d at 709 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 816 (6th Cir. 2005)); accord, e.g., United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The court need not recite these factors but must articulate its reasoning in deciding to impose a sentence in order to allow for reasonable appellate review.”); United States v. McClellan, 164 F.3d 308, 310 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting there is no “requirement that a district court make specific findings relating to each of the factors considered”); see also United States v. Harness, – F.3d –, 2006 WL 1976040 at  (6th Cir. 2006) (finding sentence reasonable where district court noted it had received a psychological report and letters from the defendants’ family members, stated it considered two specific § 3553(a) factors as well as all the others, and sentenced the defendant to the middle of the Guidelines range). A district court must consider, on the record, any “particular argument” a defendant raises for a lower sentence, and “explain the basis for rejecting it.” Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554. However, the presumption of reasonableness is not lost “whenever a district judge does not explicitly address every defense argument for a below-Guidelines sentence. Otherwise, the procedural reasonableness -25- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. review will become appellate micromanaging of the sentencing process.” Jones, 445 F.3d at 871. Where the district court considers the applicable Guidelines range and § 3553(a) factors, and articulates its reasons for the sentence imposed, the sentence will be found reasonable. Id. (quoting Webb, 403 F.3d at 385).
As outlined in detail above, after entertaining extensive argument from both Hall and the Government, the district court fully laid out the basis for its rulings on each of Hall’s objections. The district court also showed its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors in outlining the basis for his sentence. Although it did not explicitly refer to its reasons for the sentence imposed as §3553(a) factors, it did point to the nature of the type of drug trafficking at issue in this case and its effect on society, Hall’s enticement or manipulation of two women to take part in the conspiracy, protection of society by a long sentence that would effectively incapacitate Hall from drug dealing when he is released, the danger created by Hall’s absconsion to North Carolina after indictment and evasion of arrest, and Hall’s possession of firearms during the offense. This shows clear consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. The district court did acknowledge “there are some redeeming qualities in the defendant” but ultimately found a sentence within the Guidelines was appropriate due to Hall’s manipulation of weak persons to participate in the conspiracy (JA at 479). The district court’s ruling more than complies with the requirement a district court articulate its reasoning in order to allow for meaningful appellate review. See Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554 (“The sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the district court articulated and explained its reasons for sentencing [defendant] to a term at the higher end of the Guidelines range.”). Further, the district -26- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. court met its burden of addressing the defendant’s “particular argument[s]” for a lower sentence, and “explain[ed] the basis for rejecting [them] . . .” when it thoroughly discussed his objections and acknowledged it had considered the mitigating evidence he presented.6 Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554. To require more of sentencing courts than this court did would violate the principle set out in Jones, that a district court need not “explicitly address every defense argument for a below-Guidelines sentence.” 445 F.3d at 871. Therefore, we hold the district court’s sentence imposed on Hall was reasonable. Webb, 403 F.3d at 383. Hall has not shown the district court made any error in his sentencing such that it committed a plain error. Mahon, 444 F.3d at 532.