Opinion ID: 2630185
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant contends the jury's finding on the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation violates his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because insufficient evidence supported it. Specifically, he contends there was no support in the record for the first two elements of a robbery, namely, that at the time of the shooting Gitmed was in possession of any personal property and that defendant or Mercurio took any property from him. Defendant further contends there was no substantial evidence of defendant's conduct or mental state as an aider and abettor or of a relationship between the murder and the robbery. As defendant acknowledges, these contentions are identical to those discussed above, about the asserted insufficiency of the evidence to support a theory of felony murder based on robbery, and we reject them for the same reasons discussed there. In this part, we discuss and reject defendant's contentions based on the statutory language of the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation. (16) Section 190.2, subdivision (d) provides that, for the purposes of those special circumstances based on the enumerated felonies in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a), which includes robbery, an aider and abettor must have been a major participant and have acted with reckless indifference to human life. [15] (ง 190.2, subd. (d); 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Introduction to Crimes, ง 110, p. 167; see 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra, Punishment, ง 460, pp. 613-614.) Repeating his earlier argument, defendant contends the split verdict means the jury found he was not the actual killer, and it therefore must have found the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation true based on his aider and abettor liability. Defendant contends the record contains insufficient evidence to support his liability as an aider and abettor under section 190.2, subdivision (d). For the reasons previously discussed, we reject defendant's contention that the split verdict means the jury convicted him on an aider and abettor theory. But even assuming the jury found the special circumstance allegation true on that theory, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that defendant was an aider and abettor who, at the least, was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. As discussed, the evidence supports the conclusion that, after defendant brought Gitmed to the compound, defendant and Mercurio jointly maneuvered to bring Gitmed to an isolated spot at Canyon Lake where both participated in the robbery and murder. The evidence of defendant's actions both before and after the murder supports the conclusion defendant intended to obtain Gitmed's possessions by killing him or having Mercurio kill him. Defendant points to the requirement of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) that the murder must have been committed during the commission of the underlying felony, which we have interpreted to mean that, when the underlying felony is only incidental to the murder, the murder cannot be said to have been committed in the commission of the related offense. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 927 [245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395].) Defendant contends it is at least reasonably probable that items were taken from Gitmed to prevent identification of his body, and therefore the robbery was only incidental to the murder. But as discussed above, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Gitmed had been robbed and that defendant had planned to rob him as part of a larger plan to obtain his possessions after killing him. When the evidence supports the jury's findings, a reviewing court may not reverse the judgment because the evidence might also support a contrary finding. ( People v. Ceja, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1139.) Defendant's claim therefore fails.