Opinion ID: 1148875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the chancellor was manifestly wrong in allowing the prior divorce decree to be modified with regard to payment of college expenses and the right to partition real property.

Text: ¶ 22. Findings in support of child support rulings are reviewed under the manifest error/substantial evidence rule. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 574 So.2d 1376, 1382 (Miss. 1991). This Court does not have authority to reverse a chancellor's findings or awards absent a clear abuse of judicial discretion. Johnson v. Johnson, 550 So.2d 416 (Miss. 1989). ¶ 23. Within the context of child care and maintenance orders, child support refers to the sums of money which a parent is ordered to pay for the child's basic living expenses, namely food, clothing, and shelter. Other sums which a parent may be ordered to pay are the expenses of a college, or other advanced education. Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So.2d 766, 769 (Miss. 1989). ¶ 24. The chancellor awarded Linda the sum of $87.50, representing one-half of the college expenses incurred by Troy during his first five semesters at Gulf Coast Community College. Linda contends the chancellor erred in assessing her only one-half of Troy's college expenses. Ronnie counter-complains that he should not be compelled to pay for any of Troy's college expenses, because of Troy's poor academic performance. ¶ 25. The final judgment of divorce entered on July 18, 1984, required Ronnie to pay all expenses in connection with the college education on behalf of [Troy], the minor child. Ronnie freely acknowledges that he did not pay the college expenses of his son. Troy admitted that, to a certain degree, he had not made satisfactory progress in school. Troy lived at home and worked part-time at various jobs while attending college in Gautier. After completion of nine semesters, the equivalent of four and one-half years, Troy had accumulated 40 hours which were transferable to a senior college. [1] ¶ 26. In the Ruling of the Court entered on September 5, 1991, the chancellor found as a fact that (1) Troy had been in Junior College for nine semesters, taking only minimal hours; (2) after registration, Troy would drop or withdraw significantly from the courses in which he had enrolled; and (3) Troy's grades, while acceptable, were not exceptional. Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances surrounding the issue of college expenses, the chancellor was constrained in equity and good conscience to find that Ronnie should only be responsible for five semesters for his share of Troy's college expenses, which represents a two-year program and one additional semester for any remedial or extra courses required to obtain his degree. ¶ 27. To justify changing or modifying the original decree, a chancellor must find there to be a material or substantial change in the after-arising circumstances of the parties. Shaeffer v. Shaeffer, 370 So.2d 240, 242 (Miss. 1979). In the case sub judice, the chancellor did not find a material or substantial change of circumstances to alter the decree, rather his decision was based largely upon Troy's academic progress in school. After reviewing the record in its entirety, it appears that the chancellor altered the decree without any showing by Ronnie that he was in a different position which rendered him unable to comply with the decree and pay his son's college expenses. ¶ 28. We find an abuse of discretion in the chancellor's assessment of $87.50 to each parent for Troy's educational expenses. In absence of findings of material or substantial change in circumstances which would have rendered Ronnie unable to pay the college expenses, the chancellor had no authority to modify or alter the decree. This issue is reversed and remanded for a determination of Troy's college expenses, which include not only the cost of tuition but also, books, lab fees and other related costs. On remand, Ronnie will tender an aggregate amount representing Troy's college expenses to Linda.