Opinion ID: 149141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Physical Restraints and the Right to a Fair Trial

Text: In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), the Supreme Court recognized that requiring a criminal defendant to appear in shackles before a jury may result in an unfair trial. As the Allen Court explained, [n]ot only is it possible that the sight of shackles ... might have a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant, but the use of th[e] technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold. Id. at 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057. Because shackling a defendant during trial is an inherently prejudicial practice, it should be permitted only where justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986); see also Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005) (noting that the appearance of a criminal defendant in shackles almost inevitably affects adversely the jury's perception of the character of the defendant). Several of our sister circuit courts have reasoned that the concerns expressed in Allen also apply in the context of civil trials. See Davidson v. Riley, 44 F.3d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir.1995) ([T]he concerns expressed in Allen are applicable to parties in civil suits as well.); Woods v. Thieret, 5 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir.1993) ([T]he principles from Allen ... extend[] to include not just criminal defendants, but inmates bringing civil actions and inmate-witnesses as well.); Holloway v. Alexander, 957 F.2d 529, 530 (8th Cir.1992) (In [prisoner civil rights] cases, the district court has a responsibility to ensure reasonable efforts are made to permit the inmate and the inmate's witnesses to appear without shackles during proceedings before the jury.); Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1284-85 (9th Cir.1983) (discussing Allen and reasoning that [t]he likelihood of prejudice inherent in exhibiting the subject of a civil commitment hearing to the jury while bound in physical restraints ... is simply too great to be countenanced without at least some prior showing of necessity). We agree with these courts, as fairness in a jury trial, whether criminal or civil in nature, is a vital constitutional right. Bailey v. Sys. Innovation, Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 98 (3d Cir.1988); see also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976) (The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.). Thus, we join them, and hold that requiring a party in a civil trial to appear in shackles may well deprive him of due process unless the restraints are necessary. Davidson, 44 F.3d at 1122. We reject the officers' argument that, because prisoner-plaintiffs have no absolute constitutional right to be present during a civil trial, they necessarily do not have a right to appear at such a trial without physical restraints. See Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 358 n. 3 (7th Cir.1993).