Opinion ID: 1301855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vicarious liability claim

Text: ¶ 32 The second claim we consider is Behrendt's claim of vicarious liability against Silvan. As we noted above, we review the grant of summary judgment de novo, and summary judgment can be appropriate for a claim of vicarious liability if the conduct is clearly outside the scope of employment. Vicarious liability can be ruled out as a matter of law if the evidence presented supports only the conclusion that the conduct is outside the scope of employment. Block, 201 Wis.2d at 805, 549 N.W.2d 783. We hold that summary judgment was proper as to this claim. We agree with the court of appeals' application of Block to the evidence presented here. ¶ 33 Behrendt alleged in the complaint that Fisher performed negligent acts while in the scope of his employment and Silvan, as his employer is therefore vicariously liable for any damages caused by his negligence. In his brief to this court, Behrendt argued that issues of fact exist as to whether Silvan is vicariously liable for the acts of Fisher or Sommers. Behrendt's arguments on vicarious liability that depend on the acts of the co-worker, Sommers, are unavailing because they are irrelevant. The court of appeals correctly noted in a footnote that arguments about vicarious liability are only relevant as to Fisher's conduct because allegations of vicarious liability are related to Behrendt's claim against Fisher. No claim was brought by Behrendt against Sommers. We thus turn to the basis for the vicarious liability claim: whether the acts by Fisher that are allegedly negligent were within the scope of his employment at Silvan. ¶ 34 We have explained that a vicarious liability claim arises where an employer is alleged to be vicariously liable for a negligent act or omission committed by its employee in the scope of employment. Thus, vicarious liability is based solely on the agency relationship of a master and servant. L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis.2d 674, 698 n. 21, 563 N.W.2d 434 (1997) (citing Shannon v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis.2d 364, 370, 289 N.W.2d 564 (1980); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(1) (1957)) (distinguishing between vicarious liability and negligent supervision). In other words, vicarious liability, premised on the negligent act committed by an employee, does not exist absent a finding that an employee was negligent. ¶ 35 The question as to vicarious liability is whether at the time of the act alleged, the employee's conduct was within the scope of his employment, which we have defined as conduct that is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. Olson v. Connerly, 156 Wis.2d 488, 500, 457 N.W.2d 479 (1990). The question on summary judgment is whether there is any genuine issue of material fact about that. ¶ 36 Behrendt argued that the act of building the tank was actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer because it was done under the umbrella of Silvan's policy of letting employees do these side jobs, and that policy had the purpose of serving Silvan because it increased employee morale. ¶ 37 Silvan argued that the party whose acts are in question is Fisher and that there is no evidence put forward that Fisher thought his acts were serving Silvan. Silvan additionally argued that the question is not whether the policy permitting side jobs benefited Silvan, but rather whether the employee himself or herself was at least partly actuated by the purpose of serving the employer. ¶ 38 Behrendt's assertion that the policy of allowing the side jobs provided the benefit to Silvan of improved employee morale, even if it is true, does not mean that the worker who fabricated the tank was actuated by a purpose to serve the employer. The question is whether in making the tank Fisher (against whom negligence is alleged) was actuated by a purpose to serve the employer. ¶ 39 Block focuses on the employee's intended purpose. Block, 201 Wis.2d at 806, 549 N.W.2d 783. The evidence in the record indicates that the tank, like the other side jobs, was built as a personal benefit to the employee. Fisher enlisted a co-worker to help fabricate the tank. Silvan was never paid for the tank or the materials or the labor. There is nothing in the record that shows any purpose to benefit the employer or any resulting benefit to the employer, either. ¶ 40 The court of appeals observed that these side projects were solely for employees' personal benefit and that no evidence was introduced that would lead it to conclude otherwise. Behrendt, unpublished slip op., ¶ 9. It therefore held that summary judgment in Silvan's favor was proper on the question of vicarious liability. For the same reasons, we agree.