Opinion ID: 1251117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence and Correct Standard of Proof

Text: A proceeding under the Adult Abuse statutes is labeled an action for a protection order. NDCC § 14-07.1-02(1). Section 32-01-02, NDCC defines action as a proceeding by which a party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right.... The burden of proof or persuasion as to an issue or an element of a party's cause of action generally rests on that party. Midland Oil & Royalty Co. v. Schuler, 126 N.W.2d 149 (N.D.1964). A domestic violence protection order under North Dakota's Adult Abuse statutes is a civil action primarily for injunctive relief. In civil actions, the party who has the burden of proof must establish the essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Bismarck Baptist Church v. Wiedemann Indus., Inc., 201 N.W.2d 434 (N.D.1972); Benzmiller v. Swanson, 117 N.W.2d 281 (N.D. 1962). See also Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Swanson, 231 Neb. 868, 438 N.W.2d 765 (1989) [a party seeking an injunction must do so by a preponderance of the evidence]; Brookings Mall, Inc. v. Cpt. Ahab's, Ltd., 300 N.W.2d 259 (S.D.1980) [an injunction will be granted if the elements thereof are proven by a preponderance of the evidence]. Therefore, Connie, as the party requesting the order, had the burden of proving a showing of actual or imminent domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence. NDCC § 14-07.1-02(4). Domestic violence as defined in section 14-07.1-01(2), NDCC includes physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, not committed in self-defense, on the complaining family or household members. Domestic violence must be shown as being actual or imminent. NDCC § 14-07.1-02(4). We have previously defined imminent as meaning [n]ear at hand; mediate rather than immediate; close rather than touching; impending; on the point of happening; threatening; menacing; perilous. State v. Kurle, 390 N.W.2d 48 (N.D.1986) citing Black's Law Dictionary 676 (5th ed.1976). We have also cited with approval a Tennessee Court of Appeals definition that [i]mminent means close in point of time, but closeness is likewise a term of many degrees, according to the circumstances. Kurle, supra, [citing State Dept. of Hum. Serv. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn.Ct.App.), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 U.S. 923, 98 S.Ct. 2816, 56 L.Ed.2d 767 (1978).] Actual has been defined as [r]eal; substantial; existing presently in fact; having a valid objective existence as opposed to that which is merely theoretical or possible. Black's Law Dictionary 34 (6th ed. (1990)). The New York courts have defined actual as something real as opposed to constructive or speculative: something existing in act, fact, or reality. Guarisco v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 167 Misc. 875, 4 N.Y.S.2d 788, 792 (N.Y.City Ct.1938). In showing by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of actual or imminent domestic violence, Connie submitted her application for the ex parte order which set forth an alleged incident of both physical and verbal abuse that occurred on October 31, 1991. Not only did this incident qualify as domestic abuse, as it was an assault and inflicted fear, NDCC § 14-07.1-01(2); but it was also actual, NDCC § 14-07.1-02(4), as it was real and substantial, Guarisco, supra . Bernard attempted to counter Connie's accusation by submitting an affidavit which implied that he was not the cause of the alleged incident. Although both parties waived their right to present testimony at the hearing, the judge considered the evidence presented and was able to weigh both parties' version of the incident. The trial court had before it the affidavits and applications of both parties on which to ground its order, and it made an informed decision and ruled upon the evidence presented. Bernard contends that the October 31, 1991 incident was too remote in time to justify Connie's petition on February 21, 1992. But in parental termination cases, we have held that a court need not await the happening of a tragic event before it takes action to terminate those parental rights. McBeth v. J.J.H., 343 N.W.2d 355 (N.D.1984). We have also cited with approval decisions holding that evidence of previous abuse and deprivation may be considered in determining whether deprivation is likely to continue and that the children will probably suffer therefrom. In Interest of J.A., 283 N.W.2d 83 (N.D. 1979). That rationale is applicable in cases alleging domestic violence as past actions act as relevant and pragmatic evidence in assisting the court's determination of whether domestic violence is actual or imminent. Where as here there exists a history of visitation violations and allegations of abuse, the court may consider what happened in October 1991 as relevant evidence of what might occur in the future. It need not await a more tragic event to take action. The remoteness of the October 1991 incident is a matter for the court to consider in weighing the evidence before it. The question of whether or not there was domestic violence directed against Connie is an issue of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. It is reviewable by this Court and will be overturned only if clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), NDRCivP; Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231 (N.D.1980). We are not left with the belief that the trial court's disposition was clearly erroneous.