Opinion ID: 611949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Count Eleven.

Text: 40 Campbell admits that, at trial, Johnson denied providing Campbell with the false information contained in the [schedule] presented to Quigley, but insists that his conviction should be overturned because a reasonable jury finding would have been that the information was provided by Johnson and that Campbell did not know it was false. Blue Brief at 20-21. He also argues that the government did not show materiality because it did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [schedule] had the propensity or capacity to influence Quigley's actions. Id. at 26-27. 41 A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if,  'after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 829 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We assign all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the evidence to the government. United States v. Johnson, 804 F.2d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir.1986). 42 The government correctly notes that Campbell's argument that his conduct was not proven to be knowledgeable and willful is nothing more than an attack on Johnson's credibility. Credibility determinations are ill-suited for appellate review. It is the jury's exclusive province ... to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts. United States v. Boise, 916 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2057 (1991). On appeal, this court  'assum[es] that the jury resolved all such matters in a manner which supports the verdict.'  United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Goode, 814 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir.1987)). Here, the jury's guilty verdict as to Count Eleven indicates that it found Johnson to be a credible witness. 43 As for the claim that the schedule was not material, it is not necessary that a statement actually influence an agency. United States v. Facchini, 874 F.2d 638, 643 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc). A statement is  'material if it has the propensity to influence agency action.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485, 1490 (9th Cir.1986)). A statement must have some non-trivial effect, which we measure by consider[ing] whether a statement could, under some set of circumstances, significantly affect an action by a federal department or agency. Id. It is sufficient that, if believed, the schedule could have caused the IRS to accept Johnson's dependent exemptions even though she was not entitled to them. In other words, under some set of circumstances, id., the IRS's audit function could have been significantly impaired or perverted by Campbell's deception. United States v. Fern, 696 F.2d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir.1983). This is enough to satisfy § 1001's materiality requirement. 44 AFFIRMED.