Opinion ID: 1879070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of purported flight.

Text: ¶ 23. Admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge. That discretion must be exercised within the scope of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, and reversal will only be had when an abuse of discretion results in prejudice to the accused. Parker v. State, 606 So.2d 1132, 1137-38 (Miss.1992). ¶ 24. Austin is correct in his assertion that a flight instruction should only be given in cases where the defendant's flight (1) is unexplained and (2) where the circumstance of that flight has considerable probative value. See Fuselier v. State, 702 So.2d 388, 390 (Miss.1997); Pharr v. State, 465 So.2d 294 (Miss.1984); Pannell v. State, 455 So.2d 785, 788 (Miss.1984). The record indicates that a flight instruction was neither requested nor granted. The issue now becomes whether that two-prong test must be met in order to introduce evidence of flight, even in cases where a flight instruction has not been requested. ¶ 25. This Court has answered that question in the affirmative. See Fuselier, 702 So.2d at 390; Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1309 (Miss.1995). In both Mack and Fuselier, the defendants argued that evidence of flight was inadmissible even though a flight instruction had never been requested. In Mack, this Court held flight evidence to be inadmissible because the defendant had two other reasons for fleeing. Mack, 650 So.2d at 1309. Mack extended that rule, based on the Court's prior holding in Fuselier, and held that not only flight instructions, but also evidence of flight is improper when independent explanations have been offered. The Mack Court reasoned that, [a]lthough this Court [in Fuselier ] did not explicitly state evidence of flight is inadmissible when independent reasons exist to explain the flight, it implicitly did so. Mack, 650 So.2d at 1309. The Court further stated that, [i]f a prosecutor cannot give a jury instruction on flight because evidence of flight is probative of things other than the defendant's guilt or guilty knowledge, it follows that the prosecutor should not be allowed to place the evidence before the jury. Id. at 1310. ¶ 26. Austin claims that once he put forth evidence to show a non-prejudicial reason for his departure, the burden of production shifted back to the prosecution to overcome this evidence. Austin claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his flight to Chicago since the prosecution never met their burden of overcoming his evidence. ¶ 27. In particular, Austin contests the admission of Veronica Stevenson's testimony. Stevenson's testimony indicated that she and Austin were both passengers on a bus to Chicago on August 29, 1997. Austin now argues that Stevenson's testimony should not have been admitted. This assignment of error fails for two reasons. ¶ 28. First, Austin never objected to Stevenson's testimony regarding the bus ride to Chicago. Consequently, this assignment of error is procedurally barred. Lester v. State, 692 So.2d 755, 773 (Miss. 1997); Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 853 (Miss.1995). ¶ 29. Alternatively, Austin's contention is without merit. Evidence of flight is admissible as proof of consciousness of guilt. Evidence of flight may be introduced, even where no flight instruction is sought, as long as such evidence is not probative of things other than guilt or guilty knowledge of the crime charged. Fuselier, 702 So.2d at 390; Mack, 650 So.2d at 1309. The State contends that since the evidence of Austin's flight was not probative of anything other than flight, and since it was unexplained, the evidence was therefore admissible. Austin argues that since his flight was explained, the second prong of the Pannell test was not satisfied. ¶ 30. The explanation to which Austin refers is the testimony of Robert Lee Holmes was called by the prosecution, not Austin. Austin claims that Holmes's testimony explains his flight so that as a result, the State has not met the second prong of the Pannell test. ¶ 31. Austin claims that Holmes's testimony proves that it was quite natural and not at all uncommon for him to go to Chicago, St. Louis, or New Orleans. On the contrary, Holmes testified that he talked with Austin on the day of the crime, after the murder but before Austin went to Chicago, and that Austin said he planned to go to Chicago in the future. Nothing was said about Austin routinely traveling to Chicago. Further, it should be noted that Austin was in Tunica, some fifty miles from Clarksdale, when he made the statement about going to Chicago. In other words, Austin's flight had already begun, and no explanation was ever offered for Austin's presence in Tunica at the time he spoke with Holmes. ¶ 32. Austin's statement to Holmes about going to Chicago does not qualify as an independent reason for leaving Clarksdale after the crime had been committed. This Court has previously held that the following explanations were substantial enough so that a flight instruction was not proper: defendant was an escapee, was driving a stolen car, was leaving based on threats from another person or from potential danger from victim himself. The common factor is that, in those circumstances, it would have been illogical for a defendant not to have run. Austin's vague, future plan to go to St. Louis or Chicago does not rise to the level of being an independent explanation for fleeing from the scene of the crime. Therefore, the first prong of the Pannell test is satisfied, as Austin's flight was unexplained. ¶ 33. In summary, there is no independent reason for Austin's journey to Tunica, or his subsequent trip to Memphis and then to Chicago. His presence in Tunica remained unexplained, and his comment about going to Chicago in the future did not indicate a reason for going there other than to escape. Accordingly, the State's evidence did not fail the first prong of the Pannell test as Austin's flight was not explained.