Opinion ID: 1679117
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the doctrine of sudden emergency in negligence cases is hereby abolished prospectively

Text: Over the years we have cautioned trial attorneys in a large number of cases regarding the danger of requesting and securing the so-called sudden emergency instruction. During the past twenty-five years, this Court has considered approximately twenty-seven cases on appeal involving the propriety of the instruction either in its language or applicability and out of those cases approximately twenty have been reversed because the instruction was erroneous in some manner. As was recently said in Gates Rubber Co. v. Duke, 367 So.2d 910 (Miss. 1979): Sudden emergency instructions have been granted frequently in automobile accident cases. In most situations they are doubtful when requested and dangerous to a party's cause when given. The hazard of relying on the doctrine of sudden emergency is the tendency to elevate its principles above what is required to be proven in a negligence action. Even the wording of a well-drawn instruction intimates that ordinary rules of negligence do not apply to the circumstances constituting the claimed sudden emergency. Also it tends to confuse the principle of comparative negligence that is well ingrained in the jurisprudence of this State. The fallacy is pointed out in the instruction itself when after seemingly commenting on the evidence, the court instructs that the defendant should have used the same degree of care that a reasonably prudent automobile driver would have used under the same or similar unusual circumstances. In this Court's opinion, the same rules of negligence should apply to all circumstances in a negligence action and these rules of procedure adequately provide for instructions on negligence. This Court indicated its disfavor of the sudden emergency doctrine as early as 1951 in the case of Jones v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 50 So.2d 902 (Miss. 1951), where it was said: The emergency rule is not an exception to the general rule requiring reasonable care. The existence of an emergency is simply one of the circumstances contemplated by the normal standard of care, in seeking to ascertain whether the defendant acted as an ordinarily prudent and careful person would have done under the same circumstances. 5 Am.Jur., Automobiles, Sec. 171. Where an actor is confronted with a sudden emergency, the law does not require of him more than it is reasonable to expect of him under the circumstances which confront him. Although the actor cannot be held to the same standard of conduct as one who has had an opportunity to reflect, this does not mean that any different standard is to be applied in an emergency. The conduct required is still that which is reasonable under the circumstances. The Supreme Court of Oregon has analyzed the fallacy of attempting to promulgate separate negligence principles under a circumstance called a sudden emergency in the case of Harkins v. Doyle, 271 Or. 664, 533 P.2d 785 (1975); Jones v. Mitchell Brothers Truck Line, 266 Ore. 513, 511 P.2d 347 (1973); and Evans v. General Telephone Co., 257 Ore. 460, 479 P.2d 747 (1971). In Jones, the Oregon Court said: In the Evans case we pointed out that the usual instructions on negligence sufficiently covered what a reasonably prudent person would do under all circumstances, including those of a sudden emergency. In a well written article appearing in the Mississippi Law Journal, Vol. 36 at page 392 (1965), by Virgil G. Gillespie, the principle we are discussing was set out as follows: The standard of care in actions based upon negligence is ordinarily measured in terms of the proverbial question: What would a reasonably prudent person have done under the same or similar circumstances? The emergency doctrine provides no exception to this general rule. The test is still the same. The existence of an emergency is simply one of the circumstances in the light of which the actor's conduct must be judged. The rule requiring reasonable care is sufficient to take into consideration the excitement and confusion which normally accompany the emergency situation. While it is said that one confronted with a sudden emergency is not held to the same degree of care as one who had an opportunity to deliberate, this does not mean that any different standard is to be applied than in negligence cases generally. Some courts have spoken in terms of the application of a lower or diminished standard of care in emergencies. However, it is clear that they are not referring to the standard itself, but rather to the amount of care required because of the unusual circumstances. We conclude, therefore, that the orderly disposal of negligence cases would be best served by applying uniform principles of negligence under all circumstances. The test is whether the actor being charged with negligence in any circumstance acted as a reasonable and prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances. We do not mean to imply that abstract instructions on negligence should be granted by the trial court. As in the negligence instructions in all cases, the alleged negligent act should be tied to the evidence presented on that particular issue or circumstance. This case was considered en banc and in the opinion of a majority of the judges, the act of abolishing the so-called doctrine of sudden emergency and its corresponding instruction on sudden emergency shall take effect and apply to all cases tried after the date this opinion is issued. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., and SUGG, BROOM and LEE, JJ., concur. SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and WALKER and COFER, JJ., dissent.