Opinion ID: 2373536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Frendak Issue

Text: Whenever evidence suggests a substantial question of the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense, the trial judge must conduct an inquiry designed to assure that the defendant has been fully informed of the alternatives available, comprehends the consequences of failing to assert an insanity defense, and freely chooses to raise or waive the defense. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 380 (D.C.1979). Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by not engaging in a dialogue with him to ensure these requirements were met. In Frendak, evidence relating to an insanity defense was introduced during the competency proceedings. Reports indicated that at the time of the offense Frendak had been suffering from a mental illness which impaired her behavioral controls to such an extent that she could not appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct and could not conform her conduct to the requirements of the law. Frendak, supra, at 368. We held that since the trial judge failed to make a specific finding with regard to whether Frendak had made an intelligent and voluntary decision on whether to raise the defense a remand was necessary for a determination of whether appellant had intelligently and voluntarily waived the insanity defense. We find nothing in this record that would suggest to the trial court that there was a substantial question of appellant's sanity at the time of the offense. Indeed, all indications are to the contrary. During the various court proceedings, the trial judge engaged in several discussions with defense counsel regarding the possibility of an insanity defense. First, during the March 21, 1989 plea proceeding, Judge Wolf raised the Frendak issue and was assured by counsel that insanity at the time of the offense was not a consideration. At the May 23, 1989 proceeding, counsel elaborated by informing the court [7] that a Dr. Shapiro had examined appellant in this case for the purpose of determining whether an insanity defense could be raised. Dr. Shapiro was thoroughly familiar with appellant's history, having examined him in other cases. He concluded that a viable insanity defense was not present in this case. To this date appellant has presented no evidence, such as, for example, the testimony of a qualified expert, that casts any doubt upon that conclusion. Finally, at the January 11, 1990, hearing to withdraw the guilty plea, plea counsel testified that an insanity defense was not a realistic option. We conclude, therefore, that the record presented to the plea judge did not present a substantial question of appellant's insanity at the time the offense was committed. See Robinson v. United States, 565 A.2d 964, 967-68 (D.C.1989) (Frendak inquiry not required where psychiatric report indicated defendant not insane at the time of the offense). Therefore, the trial judge was not required to undertake an inquiry of appellant concerning the possible raising of an insanity defense. Accordingly, the order of the trial judge denying appellant's motion to withdraw guilty pleas is Affirmed.