Opinion ID: 1642624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants' Duty

Text: The defendants have additionally argued that they were entitled to a JML because they acted in good faith under the Lifesaving Organ Procurement Act, Ala.Code 1975, §§ 22-19-140 to -144 (the LOPA), in arranging for the procurement of Steven's corneas. Cynthia and Andrews argue, however, that because they expressly withheld consent to the donation of Steven's corneas, it was not possible for the defendants to have acted in good faith. In 1986, the Legislature enacted the LOPA. There is no dispute that a cornea, being tissue, is included within the definition of an organ in the LOPA. Ala.Code 1975, § 22-19-141(1). Section 22-19-142(a) provides, in pertinent part: When death occurs in a hospital to a patient who has not made an anatomical gift to take effect upon death, the hospital administrator, or designated representative, shall request [either parent] ..., in the absence of actual notice of contrary indication by the decedent ..., to consent to the gift of organs of the decedent's body as an anatomical gift. (Emphasis added.) Subsections (c) and (d) of § 22-19-142 provide exceptions to the requirement that such a request be made. Although inapplicable here, these subsections relieve a hospital administrator or designated representative from the duty to request donation of an organ, either because no organ would be suitable for donation or because of other factors that lead the attending physician to conclude that no request for donation should be made. Section 22-19-143 provides: A person who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of this article or with the anatomical gift laws of this state, or another state, or a foreign country shall not be liable for damages in any civil action.... This Court has defined good faith as an `honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.' Andrews v. Alabama Eye Bank, 727 So.2d 62, 65 (Ala.1999)(quoting Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc., 136 Misc.2d 1065, 519 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup.Ct. 1987)). Presumably, the good-faith exception absolves hospital administrators or other designated representatives from liability for failing to request donation when they believe that one of the exceptions enumerated in § 22-19-142(c) or (d) applies. Ivey argues that § 22-19-143 offers him good-faith immunity because, he says, he acted on an honest belief that Cynthia had consented to donating Steven's corneas. We agree that Ivey complied with the LOPA, regardless of the good-faith-immunity provision. However, we reach that conclusion because we take a narrow view of the requirements of the LOPA. It is clear from looking to the statute in search of its plain meaning that the LOPA imposes only one duty upon a hospital administrator or its designated representative: the duty of inquiry. The LOPA imposes no duty upon the inquirer or the institution to actually follow through and implement the instructions of the parties from whom consent is requested. It is true that looking at a statute we might sometimes think that the ramifications of the words are inefficient or unusual. However, it is our job to say what the law is, not to say what it should be. DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 276 (Ala.1998). Consequently, once Ivey requested consent from Cynthia, he had technically fulfilled the mandate of the LOPA. This determination, however, does not end the inquiry. Ivey's complete fulfillment of the discrete duty imposed by the LOPA does not necessarily mean that he fulfilled all applicable duties of care. Under our standard of review of a ruling on a motion for a JML, we are compelled to view the facts in the light most favorable to Cynthia and Andrews, as the nonmovants, and to draw from those facts every reasonable inference. Carter v. Henderson, 598 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1992). Although the time frame of the events here is compatible with the testimony of both parties, so that either party's story is independently plausible, we must view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovants. We thus must conclude that the following events occurred in the following order. Andrews arrived at the hospital before the nurses telephoned Cynthia seeking her consent. When Ivey asked Andrews for consent to donate, Andrews told Ivey, No. After this encounter, Ivey and Strength telephoned Cynthia, who in response to their question as to whether she would consent to donate Steven's organs initially said that it did not matter, but who, when pressed for a more definite answer, replied that if Andrews refused to consent then she also refused to consent. Ultimately, we must view both Cynthia's and Andrews's acts as refusing consent to donate any of Steven's organs, including his corneas. After fulfilling his duty under the LOPA to request consent, Ivey voluntarily undertook to serve as an intermediary, attempting to obtain consent for the Eye Bank. Since at least 1911, Alabama has recognized a duty to `exercise the measure of care and skill appropriate' to all voluntary undertakings. Beasley v. MacDonald Eng'g Co., 287 Ala. 189, 193, 249 So.2d 844, 846 (1971)(quoting H.H. Parker & Bro. v. Hodgson, 172 Ala. 632, 635, 55 So. 818, 819 (1911)). This is the duty the defendants owed Cynthia and Andrews. The defendants' act of arranging for procurement went beyond the reach of the LOPA, and all other statutory guidelines, placing the defendants squarely within the realm of the common law. See Williams v. Hill, 658 So.2d 381, 383 (Ala.1995) (Because we find that there was no statutory cause of action, we now consider whether there could be an action under the common law....). Because we must treat both Cynthia and Andrews as having withheld consent to donate Steven's corneas, we hold that the defendants' actions in representing that Cynthia had consented and in allowing the Eye Bank to procure Steven's corneas was a breach of their duty. Thus Ivey, and derivatively, the hospital, have not shown that they are entitled to good-faith immunity. Given that the defendants essentially concede causation and some resulting damages, the trial court did not err in denying their renewed motion for a JML on this issue.