Opinion ID: 1365332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Comments of the court on the evidence.

Text: Dr. Rymer, a psychiatrist from Denver was called as a witness by the contestants to answer hypothetical questions. He had not seen testatrix. After showing his qualifications he was asked a long hypothetical question based substantially on the facts outlined as stated by counsel for contestants. That question was not answered. Reference then was made to the death certificate showing that decedent died of auricular fibrillation  a flutter of the left side of the heart. The witness stated that condition is usually associated with other findings. One would expect an increase of blood pressure or hardening of the arteries, or rheumatic fever, or an increase in the function of the thyroid. The witness was then asked whether in a person 62 years of age hardening of the arteries would be likely. The answer was that it might occur in a person 55 to 65 years of age or earlier or later. Then the witness was asked how hardening of the arteries would affect the system. The answer was that it would be reflected in the increase of blood pressure  it might go to 200 in systolic and 120 diassolic. There might be a history of a stroke. One might find dizziness or spells of fainting; might find forgetfulness, changeability, irritability; the individual might suffer from error in judgment, the management of business might suffer; the person might lose the finer sensibilities; might not remember to take baths; there might be a tendency to hoard. The most important change is possibly a loss of critical control beyond what would be thought to be normal. A manifestation of an arteriosclerotic process would be a hemorrhage into the brain that might or might not result in a paralysis, and might be confined to the brain without affecting the other parts of the body. Q. One in which there is history of a stroke and auricular fibrillation, would it fall in either category? A. Well, it would seem to be that it is a generalized type which would include the brain tissue as well. The witness then stated the exact cause of hardening of the arteries is not known and launched into an extensive description of it. Q. What would stubbornness indicate (in the decedent)? A. I think that would simply be a part of the generalized picture of hardening of the arteries    Changeability would indicate inability to exercise a good control over their intellectual processes and possibly due to forgetfulness, which is a characteristic thing of the arteriosclerotic process.    Violent temper would indicate lack of control and exercise of critical judgment. Scheming is simply a matter of stubbornness. Penny pinching would indicate a tendency to hoard, or apprehension of being left without anything, not knowing perhaps her tangible resources. Lack of modesty and slovenliness might simply be due to forgetfulness. Q. Now, Doctor, are any of the things you have discussed, do they indicate any paranoia tendencies? A. Not anything other than  Here an objection was interposed, calling for an opinion not based on the evidence. No evidence of stroke. The Court: I think the objection is probably proper. The reference that's made by counsel is certainly not specific and the things that the Doctor has been talking about are things that he assumes might possibly have happened and there is no evidence of at all. Now, it seems to me that whenever we get down to asking opinions of this Doctor, they must be based upon what the evidence is, part of which has been given by counsel and no objection to it, part of which has been stated by the Doctor as possible and a great possibility. Now, these should be tied down. Now whatever they are you may proceed. An objection was made to these remarks. The court asked why. The answer was: The basis of prejudice. The court stated that was not specific. Then the following question was asked: Q. Doctor, considering the matters enumerated: Stubbornness, changeability, temper, scheming, feeling toward husband, lack of modesty, slovenliness, penny pinching, can you tell us what all those things put together in one individual, what type of person that would indicate? A. It would indicate to me that there are certain organic changes within the individual probably produced on the basis of hardening of the arteries. It is argued that the remarks of the court were prejudicial as being a comment on the evidence. We have given a condensed version of the testimony, so that the objection may be considered in that light. It is said in 32 C.J.S. 342 that the testimony of an expert must be based on facts in evidence or assumed to be true, but generally the scope and conduct of the examination is a matter of judicial discretion. In 32 C.J.S. 345, it is said that the questions should be complete and intelligible, should not be misleading, and should not be framed as to call for speculation or conjecture. In 58 Am. Jur. 482, it is stated that A hypothetical question should be properly framed, sufficiently specific, and clearly stated, so that the jury may know with certainty upon what state of assumed facts the expert bases his opinion. If the court attempts to exercise its discretion in connection with the conduct of the examination in such case, it is probably difficult to do so without giving the impression that it comments on the testimony, and we must bear that in mind in coming to our conclusion herein. The objection that the court commented on the testimony was not made at the trial of the case. The court stated that the objection actually made was not sufficiently specific. So it would seem that the objection now made should have been made at that time so the court would have had an opportunity of correcting any impression to that effect which the jury might have had. The question which led up to the statement of the court above set out was not sufficiently specific just as stated by the court. For instance the doctor had mentioned the fact that auricular fibrillation might indicate an increase in the function of the thyroid, when there was no evidence of any such condition. In fact, it would seem that all the testimony as to the effect of auricular fibrillation was altogether too speculative for the reason that there was no testimony as to how long before her death the testatrix had been so afflicted. If that affliction did not arise until after her will and codicil were executed, then clearly it could have had no possible bearing on the mental condition of the testatrix. In fact if that affliction had existed in any perceptible degree at the time the codicil was signed, the testatrix would probably have complained to Dr. McNamara who was one of the witnesses to the codicil. Again, part of Dr. Rymer's testimony, too appears to have been based on the fact that the decedent had a stroke. We agree with counsel for contestees that there is no substantial evidence that she had such stroke. The doctor stated that hardening of the arteries would be reflected in the increase of blood pressure, whereas Dr. Baker testified that the blood pressure of deceased was normal at the time of her death, which hardly harmonizes with the theory of Dr. Rymer so far as the testatrix is concerned. In view of these facts, the trial judge can hardly be criticized for referring to possibilities of which there was no evidence, and of wanting the testimony tied down. However, the statement and the things that the Doctor has been talking about are things that he assumes might possibly have happened and there is no evidence of at all was, it would seem, somewhat too sweeping. The doctor had talked of other things. He answered questions as to stubbornness, changeability, violent temper, scheming and penny pinching and these factors were shown in some of the testimony of the contestants. The effect of the doctor's testimony appears to be that these factors, or some of them, were due, or probably due, to hardening of the arteries. Even that testimony was not unmixed with mere possibilities and speculation, in view of the fact that the doctor stated that hardening of the arteries is apt to be one of the concomitants of auricular fibrillation, and we have already mentioned the value of such testimony. However in part, he seems to have based his testimony on the common experience of the existence of hardening of the arteries, and to that extent the testimony may be said to have been based on fact. As it seems to us, if we were to base a reversal of this case on account of the assignment of error here considered, it would have to be on account of the somewhat too sweeping nature of the foregoing statement. Would we be justified in doing so? The broadness of the statement was doubtless due to inadvertence. The rule is, as stated in 64 C.J. 95 et seq and 53 Am. Jur. 76 et seq, that the trial judge should be careful and cautious and not comment on the evidence, and in some cases the matter has given appellate courts much concern. So trial judges should bear that in mind, as they doubtless generally do. At the same time we are admonished by § 3-1705 Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1945, to disregard errors which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Of course, as to whether or not an error is of that nature is not always easily determined. Opinions might well differ. So the court, which has the last word, must weigh the matter with great care. We have attempted to do so. The present case is a civil case, and the rule as to comment on the evidence should, perhaps, be more strictly enforced in a criminal case than in a civil one. It is stated in 64 C.J. 97 that a comment by a judge in the jury's presence as to what a witness has said, or of what facts evidence is introduced is not objectionable when it is correct, and that even if incorrect it is not prejudicial if not such as is calculated to influence the jury. That is not unlike the situation in this case. The jury heard the doctor's evidence. They must have known that the judge's remark above mentioned applied only partially, and so no prejudice would have resulted. Stripping the doctor's testimony of its embellishments, its substance is, as he himself stated, that the peculiarities indicated that there were organic changes in testatrix probably produced on the basis of hardening of the arteries. So far as we can see that does not seem to be a vital factor herein. One would expect organic changes in every individual living to be 62 years of age. In fact the doctor admitted that to be true on cross-examination. The evidence does not go to the extent, specifically at least, that the decedent had a weakened mind. The most that may be said of it seems to be that the decedent became eccentric, but does not, necessarily at least, show a weakened mind. And if that is correct, as it seems to be, then the testimony of the witness was merely cumulative of the testimony of Ellen Kastner, Effie Balenovic and Mrs. Fred Potter, and we hardly think that we would be justified in considering errors in connection with such testimony with the same gravity as when that is not true. See 64 C.J. 139, 140. Furthermore, the testimony of the witness did not go to the fundamental question in this case, namely whether or not Elmer G. Peterson exercised undue influence over the testatrix, and in view of what we have said on that point, and in view of other matters above mentioned, we would not feel justified in reversing this case for the error here assigned. We think that whatever error there was, was not prejudicial. If not committed, the result herein would not, we think, have been any different, and a new trial would not, we are satisfied, bring about a different verdict. The judgment of the trial court is, accordingly, affirmed. Affirmed. RINER, J., and HARNSBERGER, J., concur.