Opinion ID: 2281884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court Lost Jurisdiction Over the Case

Text: Judgment I was entered January 22, 2008. Because it was a final judgment, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case 30 days after its entry. See Rules 75.01 and 81.05(a)(1); Sprung, 727 S.W.2d at 886. On February 25, 2008, the court had no authority to set aside Judgment I. Respondents argue that the Trustee's Motion, filed 16 days after Judgment I's entry, constituted an authorized after-trial motion, permitting the trial court to set aside Judgment I in excess of 30 days after its entry. Pursuant to Rule 81.05(a)(2), the timely filing of either a motion for a new trial or an `authorized after-trial motion' extends a trial court's jurisdiction for up to ninety days after the filing of the motion. Massman Const. Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 914 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Mo. banc 1996); accord Rule 81.05(a)(2). The provisions of Rule 81.05 are, however, expressly limited to parties. Rule 81.05 (If a party files an authorized-after trial motion ...); Cf. State ex rel. Wolfner v. Dalton, 955 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Mo. banc 1997). The trustee clearly was not a party to the lawsuit. Until the trustee's Motion was filed, neither the trustee's name nor any reference to him appeared in the petition or the pleadings. The Trustee's Motion itself acknowledges that the only defendant before the [c]ourt is the trust named by Plaintiff. Wolfner is analogous. 955 S.W.2d 928. In Wolfner, parties to a quiet title action commenced an original proceeding in prohibition to prevent enforcement of an order granting nonparties' Rule 74.06(b) motion to set aside the judgment. Id. Among other things, the nonparties claimed an interest in the property and alleged they had filed motions to intervene that had yet to be called for hearing. This Court held no relief could be afforded under Rule 74.06(b) because its provisions are limited to parties. Id. at 930. This Court went on to explain that the purported motions to intervene were not properly completed, nor called for hearing, until after the [judgment] had become final and the trial court had already lost jurisdiction of the case. Id. at 929-31. Specifically, this Court noted that: An individual cannot be divested of any interest in real property without having been a party to the litigation. This justifies adding such an individual to a lawsuit even after a decree has been entered. However, the power of the trial court to do anything in a lawsuit after all issues have been resolved is limited to thirty days, as set out in Rule 75.01. Id. at 931. Just as Wolfner interpreted Rule 74.06(b) to be limited to parties, it is equally clear that only a party may trigger the extension of the trial court's jurisdiction permitted under Rule 81.05(a)(2). Pursuant to Rule 81.05(a)(1), because no party filed an authorized post-trial motion, Judgment I became final and appealable after 30 days. Respondents' argument that the Trustee's Motion operated as a motion to intervene does not help. The Trustee's Motion was not ruled on until February 25, 2008, after the trial court lost jurisdiction. See Wolfner, 955 S.W.2d at 931. By February 25, 2008, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction in the case and lacked the authority to set aside Judgment I. The court cannot, by its subsequent action, divest a decree of its character of finality. Randall, 423 S.W.2d at 769. To the extent that Appellant raises issues relating to orders or judgments entered after Judgment I, the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter them and, therefore, those orders and judgments are void. See Id; Ravenhill, 776 S.W.2d at 20.