Opinion ID: 1322624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Moral Turpitude Standard

Text: Petitioner argues that the trial judge erred by using the moral turpitude standard to determine that Petitioner's prior convictions were admissible. We agree, but the issue is not preserved for review. Under prior common law, moral turpitude was described as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the social duties which a man owes to his fellow man or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule or right and duty between man and man. State v. Harvey, 275 S.C. 225, 227, 268 S.E.2d 587, 588 (1980). But the common law rule was replaced when South Carolina adopted Rule 609(a), SCRE. Green v. State, 338 S.C. 428, 432, 527 S.E.2d 98, 100 (2000). Today, the South Carolina Rules of Evidence provide that if the witness has been convicted of a crime that is punishable by death or imprisonment of more than one year, and the probative value of the conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect, the conviction is admissible to attack the witness's credibility. Rule 609(a)(1), SCRE. In addition, if the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement the conviction is admissible to attack the witness's credibility. Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE. In the present case, Petitioner had prior convictions of burglary and grand larceny. To determine whether Petitioner's prior convictions were admissible, the judge applied the common law moral turpitude test. Because the prior convictions were crimes of moral turpitude, the judge ruled that Petitioner's convictions were admissible. Since the adoption of Rule 609, the moral turpitude standard is no longer the proper test for determining the admission of remote prior convictions. Therefore, the trial court erred in using the moral turpitude standard to determine the admissibility of Petitioner's prior convictions. Although we hold that the trial judge erred in applying the moral turpitude standard, we find that Petitioner did not preserve the issue for appellate review. To preserve an issue for review there must be a contemporaneous objection that is ruled upon by the trial court. State v. Johnson, 324 S.C. 38, 41, 476 S.E.2d 681, 682 (1996). The objection should be addressed to the trial court in a sufficiently specific manner that brings attention to the exact error. State v. Prioleau, 345 S.C. 404, 411, 548 S.E.2d 213, 216 (2001). If a party fails to properly object, the party is procedurally barred from raising the issue on appeal. State v. Pauling, 322 S.C. 95, 99, 470 S.E.2d 106, 109 (1996). In the present case, trial counsel did not specifically object to the application of the moral turpitude standard. Instead, trial counsel objected to the admissibility of Petitioner's prior convictions on the basis that the convictions were too remote. When objecting, counsel stated that it's now 14 years later. Because the objection was clearly based on remoteness and not the use of the moral turpitude standard, we hold that the issue regarding the use of the moral turpitude standard is not preserved for appellate review.