Opinion ID: 867276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support (F)(6) Aggravator

Text: ¶ 13 Gunches argues that the State failed to prove the (F)(6) aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Price's murder occurred after August 1, 2002, we do not independently review the jury's finding of this aggravator, but instead consider whether the jury abused its discretion. See A.R.S. § 13-756(A) (2010). ¶ 14 In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim under the abuse of discretion standard, we review[ ] the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury's finding, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict. State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 218 ¶ 93, 141 P.3d 368, 393 (2006). Substantial evidence is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of [the] defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 15 Under A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(6), a first degree murder is aggravated when [t]he defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. The jury here did not find the murder especially cruel, but did find it especially heinous or depraved. Heinousness and depravity go to a defendant's mental state as reflected in his words and actions at or near the time of the offense. State v. Johnson, 212 Ariz. 425, 439 ¶ 55, 133 P.3d 735, 749 (2006). Five factors are generally relevant in determining whether a killing was especially heinous or depraved: (1) relishing the murder, (2) infliction of gratuitous violence, (3) needless mutilation of the victim, (4) senselessness of the crime, and (5) helplessness of the victim. State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, 493 ¶ 83, 189 P.3d 403, 420 (2008) (citing State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 51-52, 659 P.2d 1, 10-11 (1983)). ¶ 16 The State alleged three factors: (1) Gunches inflicted gratuitous violence beyond that necessary to kill; (2) Price's murder was senseless; and (3) Price was helpless. Gunches does not seriously contest the jury's findings of senselessness or helplessness. However, senselessness and helplessness, without more, generally do not render a killing especially heinous or depraved. State v. Wallace, 219 Ariz. 1, 6 ¶ 25, 191 P.3d 164, 169 (2008). Thus, the State here must also prove gratuitous violence. To do so, the State must establish that the defendant (1) inflicted more violence than that necessary to kill, and (2) continued to inflict violence after he knew or should have known that a fatal action had occurred.  Bocharski, 218 Ariz. at 494 ¶¶ 86-87, 189 P.3d at 421. ¶ 17 The record contains substantial evidence that Gunches inflicted more violence than was necessary to kill. The medical examiner testified that Price was shot four times, suffering three gunshot wounds to the chest and one to the back of the head. Each wound, the examiner concluded, ultimately would have been fatal. ¶ 18 The record, however, does not support the jury's finding that Gunches acted with the necessary vile state of mind. Id. at 494 ¶ 85, 189 P.3d at 421. Garcia testified that on the night of the murder, she heard three popping sounds before seeing Price fall to the ground, and then heard a fourth popping sound and saw Gunches standing by Price's body. She said that these events happened... fast. Garcia also testified that the murder occurred after dark, that she had turned off the car's headlights, and that she could [b]arely [see] at all. ¶ 19 Detectives found Price laying on his right side, and photographs taken of Price's body suggest that the draping of his left arm may have obscured the gunshot wounds to his chest. The medical examiner testified that there was no evidence of gunpowder, stippling or soot deposit on Price's body to suggest close-range firing, and concluded that the shots came from a distance of at least two feet. Garcia testified that Gunches was even further away from Price when the first three shots occurred. ¶ 20 Given these circumstances, there is insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Gunches knew or should have known that he had fired a fatal shot and yet continued to inflict violence. Instead, the more plausible inference is that after firing three shots in quick succession from a distance of several feet, Gunches was unable, given Price's body position and the darkness of the night, to discern whether Price was dead or dying before he shortly thereafter fired the final shot to Price's head. ¶ 21 Indeed, Garcia testified that she heard Price breathing after he fell to the ground, and the investigating detective found evidence of aspiration around Price's mouth, suggesting that he continued to breathe a couple of times while on the ground. The medical examiner also testified that he found a liter of blood inside Price's chest and abdominal cavities, indicating that his heart continued [to beat] for a while after the shooting. ¶ 22 Even when viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, the evidence suggests that Price's final shot came in an attempt ... to kill the victim, not to engage in violence beyond that necessary to kill. Wallace, 219 Ariz. at 8 ¶ 37, 191 P.3d at 171 (quoting State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 355 ¶ 123, 111 P.3d 369, 397 (2005)); see, e.g., State v. Cañez, 202 Ariz. 133, 161-62 ¶ 106, 42 P.3d 564, 592-93 (2002) (finding no gratuitous violence because defendant merely escalated his attacks until he succeeded in killing [victim]). ¶ 23 The jury's verdict on the (F)(6) aggravator was therefore in error. The State, however, argues that any error was harmless because Gunches stipulated that he had previously been convicted of a serious offense under A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(2) and he presented virtually no mitigation in the penalty phase. ¶ 24 We disagree. For an error to be harmless, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict. The inquiry ... is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. State v. Anthony, 218 Ariz. 439, 446 ¶ 39, 189 P.3d 366, 373 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 25 The State cannot discharge its burden here. In its penalty phase opening statement and closing argument, the State reminded the jury of its aggravation phase verdict that Price's murder was heinous or depraved and called attention to the fact that the jury had previously found gratuitous violence. It further emphasized that in some cases, the aggravating circumstances ... are so heinous and so outrageous that the ultimate penalty is warranted, and argued that [t]his case is one of them. Thus, even with the (F)(2) aggravator, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's flawed (F)(6) finding did not contribute to or affect its ultimate conclusion that Gunches deserved death. Accordingly, we vacate Gunches's death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase proceeding. See A.R.S. § 13-756(B) (requiring remand for resentencing when an error is made in capital sentencing proceedings [i]f the supreme court cannot determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).