Opinion ID: 2227047
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Are the Porter County and Starke County actions the same?

Text: Trial Rule 12(B)(8) provides a defense to an action if [t]he same action [is] pending in another state court of this state. Ind.Trial Rule 12(B)(8). If Appellants are correct that the Porter Superior Court properly has jurisdiction of their actions against NIPSCO and they are required to pursue the Starke County action nonetheless, they will have been required to pursue an action the results of which might be voidable. [3] Harp v. Indiana Dep't of Highways (1992), Ind. App., 585 N.E.2d 652, 659. Conversely, if NIPSCO is correct that the Starke Circuit Court first acquired jurisdiction over the case, judgments against NIPSCO in Porter County would be voidable, [4] Id., and NIPSCO will have been pointlessly compelled to defend the two Porter County actions. First we must decide if Appellants' actions in Porter County are the same case as the action in Starke County within the meaning of Trial Rule 12(B)(8). Two cases are the same if the parties, subject matter, and remedies sought are substantially the same in both suits. State ex rel. International Harvester Co. v. Allen Cir. Ct. (1976), 265 Ind. 175, 178, 352 N.E.2d 487, 489; Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. Terre Haute Indus. (1984), Ind. App., 467 N.E.2d 37, 40; Thrasher v. Van Buren Township of Monroe County (1979), 182 Ind. App. 121, 128, 394 N.E.2d 215, 219. In Porter County, Cauffman has sued NIPSCO for its alleged negligence in marking its pipeline and is seeking damages for his personal injuries proximately caused by that alleged negligence. Daniel and Edward Pivarnik have sued NIPSCO in Porter County for negligently marking its pipeline and are seeking damages for injury to their property. In Starke County, NIPSCO has claimed that Cauffman was negligent in his operation of the bulldozer while digging the pond, and it is seeking damages from Cauffman for injury to its pipeline. NIPSCO has also claimed in the Starke County action that Daniel and Edward Pivarnik trespassed on its easement and right of way for the pipeline and that they failed to provide notice of an intent to excavate as required by statute. Presumably NIPSCO would raise the same claims in Porter County if it should be required to defend Appellants' Porter County actions. It is apparent that no party to the Porter County actions would not also be a party in Starke County should the Starke County action be permitted to continue. The parties in the two arenas are therefore the same. It is also apparent that the subject matter of the Porter and Starke County actions are the same since every claim involves a factual determination of who is liable for the rupture of NIPSCO's pipeline. All parties are seeking money damages for their various injuries that resulted from the pipeline rupture. Therefore the remedies sought are the same. Because the parties, the subject matter, and the remedies sought are substantially the same in the Porter County actions and in the Starke County action, the cases are the same within the meaning of Trial Rule 12(B)(8).