Opinion ID: 1201607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Oppressive, Fraudulent or Malicious Conduct

Text: (6a) Plaintiffs argue that if damages for fear of cancer in the absence of physical injury are limited to cases in which the cancer will more likely than not occur, the court should distinguish intentional conduct. We agree that certain aggravated conduct may warrant different treatment. In this part, we recognize an exception to the general rule set out above. Plaintiffs suggest that the more likely than not threshold should not be applied where a defendant intentionally violates a statute or regulation prohibiting the disposal of toxins. Plaintiffs are quick to point out that the policy concerns for limiting liability in ordinary negligence cases are not triggered in cases involving such defendants. Although an exception to the general rule appears appropriate, we do not believe it should focus on intentional violators of the law. For one thing, while a defendant may be aware that its conduct is wrong and potentially dangerous, it may not have knowledge of a particular statute or regulation proscribing it. There may be times where a defendant does not specifically intend to violate the law, yet the defendant proceeds to act egregiously in conscious disregard of others. With these considerations in mind, we conclude it preferable to recognize an exception that focuses on the totality of circumstances in evaluating a defendant's conduct. (7) Accordingly, we hold that a toxic exposure plaintiff need not meet the more likely than not threshold for fear of cancer recovery in a negligence action if the plaintiff pleads and proves that the defendant's conduct in causing the exposure amounts to oppression, fraud, or malice as defined in Civil Code section 3294, which authorizes the imposition of punitive damages. Thus, for instance, fear of cancer damages may be recovered without demonstrating that cancer is probable where it is shown that the defendant is guilty of despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1) [defining one type of malice].) A person acts with conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others when [he] [she] is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of [his] [her] conduct and willfully and deliberately fails to avoid those consequences. (BAJI No. 14.71 (1992 rev.) (7th ed. pocket pt.) [defining malice].) When a defendant acts with oppression, fraud or malice, no reason, policy or otherwise, justifies application of the more likely than not threshold. Any burden or consequence to society from imposing liability is offset by the deterrent impact of holding morally blameworthy defendants fully responsible for the damages they cause, including damage in the form of emotional distress suffered by victims of the misconduct who reasonably fear future cancer. Under such circumstances, the potential liability of a defendant is not disproportionate to culpability. While the imposition of liability for emotional distress resulting from negligent handling of toxic substances may result in costs out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent actor, this concern is diminished or nonexistent when the conduct is despicable and undertaken in conscious disregard of the danger to the health or interests of others. The significance of the size of the potential class of plaintiffs is similarly diminished and the moral blame heightened since the defendant is aware of the danger posed by its conduct and acts in conscious disregard of the known risk. (Cf. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 295, 315 [29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513], overruled on other grounds, Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 748 [69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316] [[T]he increased liability imposed on an intentional wrongdoer ... reflect[s] the psychological fact that solicitude for the interests of the actor weighs less in the balance as his moral guilt increases and the social utility of his conduct diminishes.].) For these reasons, the more likely than not threshold should not be available as a shield when the defendant acts with a sufficient degree of moral blameworthiness. (8) Once the plaintiff establishes that the defendant has acted with oppression, fraud or malice, the plaintiff must still demonstrate that his or her fear of cancer is reasonable, genuine and serious in order to recover damages. In determining what constitutes reasonable fear, we refer to our previous discussion at part II.A.2.c., ante, in which we observed that it is not enough for a plaintiff to show simply an ingestion of a carcinogen or a significant increase in the risk of cancer. In addition, the plaintiff must show that his or her actual risk of cancer is significant before recovery will be allowed. [19] Under this reasoning, a plaintiff's fear is not compensable when the risk of cancer is significantly increased, but remains a remote possibility. To reiterate, in the absence of a physical injury or illness, a plaintiff may recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress engendered by a fear of cancer without meeting the more likely than not threshold if the plaintiff pleads and proves that: (1) as a result of the defendant's negligent breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff, he or she is exposed to a toxic substance which threatens cancer; (2) the defendant, in breaching its duty to the plaintiff, acted with oppression, fraud or malice as defined in Civil Code section 3294; [20] and (3) the plaintiff's fear of cancer stems from a knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion, that the toxic exposure caused by the defendant's breach of duty has significantly increased the plaintiff's risk of cancer and has resulted in an actual risk of cancer that is significant. (6b) In our view, Firestone's conduct brings this case within the oppression, fraud or malice exception for recovery of fear of cancer damages. The trial court determined that in May of 1977, officials in key management positions at Firestone's Salinas plant had increased knowledge regarding the dangers involved with the careless disposal of hazardous wastes, and had a specific, written policy for hazardous waste disposal. However, these officials, while professing support for the policy in written distributions, in actuality largely ignored the policy. The court found especially reprehensible the fact that Firestone, through its plant production manager, actively discouraged compliance with its internal policies and California law solely for the sake of reducing corporate costs. Under these circumstances, we believe there are sufficient facts supporting the trial court's conclusion that such conduct displayed a conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others. [21]