Opinion ID: 2576153
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial court's failure to declare a doubt concerning defendant's competence to waive counsel

Text: Defendant contends that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the assistance of counsel and to due process and a fair trial, as well as his rights under state statutory law, were violated when, at two points in these proceedings, the trial court failed to declare a doubt concerning defendant's competence to waive his right to counsel and failed to conduct a hearing into defendant's competency. First, defendant contends that Judge Henry P. Nelson (who had presided over his trial in the attempted murder case, and who briefly presided during pretrial proceedings in the present case) should have declared a doubt concerning defendant's competence, based solely on knowledge about defendant that Judge Nelson had gained during the attempted murder trial. Second, defendant contends that the judge who presided at the trial under present review, Judge Jerold A. Krieger, should have declared a doubt when, during proceedings that occurred between the guilt and penalty phases, defendant's advisory counsel, Newman and Lucas, questioned defendant's competence. As we shall explain, we reject both contentions. Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and state law require a trial judge to suspend proceedings and conduct a competency hearing whenever the court is presented with substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant's competence to stand trial. (§§ 1367, 1368; Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 181, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103; Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 384-386, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 737-738, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) Failure to declare a doubt and to conduct a competency hearing when there is substantial evidence of incompetence requires reversal of the judgment. ( Ibid. ) Whether the question for the trial court is competence to stand trial or competence to waive counsel and represent oneself, the competence standard is the same: the defendant must have `a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding  and . . . a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' ( Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824; see also Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 399-400, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321; People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 513, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) The focus of the inquiry is the defendant's mental capacity to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or her. ( Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 401, fn. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2680; People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1069, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335.) The defendant's  `technical legal knowledge' is irrelevant. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1364, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259, quoting Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525.)
As mentioned above, defendant premises his first claim that the court erred in failing to declare a doubt about his competence to waive his right to counsel solely on knowledge concerning defendant that Judge Henry P. Nelson, who briefly presided over pretrial proceedings in this case long after defendant had been granted the right to represent himself, had gained during defendant's earlier trial on the attempted murder charges. [8] Judge Nelson presided over defendant's 1985 trial for the attempted murders of Green and Miller. After the jury found defendant guilty on both counts in that case, but before defendant's sentencing, Judge Nelson received and reviewed a probation report. [9] The report discussed defendant's employment history (none) and military service (he was discharged for being absent without leave (AWOL) on an excessive number of occasions), and noted that in 1972 in Riverside County defendant was arrested by the sheriff's office in regards to a `sanity hearing.' The probation report also stated: During that same year defendant was a patient at Atascadero State Hospital from March until July for 1026 Penal Code  Forgery  Steal car. [10] At the sentencing hearing on August 16, 1985, Judge Nelson remarked that he believed the maximum available sentence of 14 years and four months was too lenient for defendant's crimes. Judge Nelson explained: Apparently you are what is called in the trade a psychopath, Mr. Blair. In other words, you just don't have any kind of human feelings for anybody else. That's apparently your situation now. There's some indication that you've had some previous bouts with psychiatric disability, and that's not surprising. You're 45 years old, and by your own statement you've never held a permanent job in your life, and apparently you were fooling around doing some studying on student loans. Apparently did some flitting around at some school. Apparently the military, the Marine Corps discharged you, and according to you, for too many [AWOL's]. So maximum sentence in this case is not enough. [¶] . . . [¶] You, who ruined one woman's life, put her in a vegetative state, ruined another woman, the most you can get is 14 years and 4 months . . . . But all this is just a joke to you, and I can see that's true. Because, as I say, that's your problem. Judge Nelson then imposed the maximum sentence. Nearly two years later, as a result of defendant's statutory peremptory challenge (see Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6) to the judge then presiding, Judge Roger W. Boren, the present capital case was assigned to Judge Nelson for a brief period beginning on May 1, 1987. As described in the previous part, defendant had been representing himself since October 1986, having been questioned and admonished by various judges regarding his self-representation. In an answer to a challenge for cause filed against him by defendant, Judge Nelson acknowledged having expressed regret during the attempted murder sentencing that the sentence could not have been longer, since the evidence indicated a cold, calculated attempt to kill one woman, and almost causing the death of another woman through that attempt. The Defendant's actions, as well as his demeanor before me (he secreted an exhibit into the holding tank and flushed it down the drain), indicate a dangerous psychopath, and I did say so. Some time later that summer, Judge Nelson was reassigned to another department. During the brief period Judge Nelson presided over this case, the issue of defendant's competence to waive counsel or to represent himself never arose. Judge Nelson did not preside over any further proceedings in this case. Defendant contends that because Judge Nelson had presided over defendant's attempted murder trial in 1985, he was aware in 1987  when he was assigned to this capital case  of facts that should have raised a bona fide doubt in his mind whether defendant was competent to waive counsel and represent himself in the capital trial. Therefore, defendant claims, Judge Nelson erred in failing to declare a doubt concerning defendant's competence and to conduct a competency hearing in 1987. Defendant observes that Judge Nelson was aware, from the probation report in the attempted murder case, that defendant had been: (1) found insane in a criminal proceeding in 1972 and confined to Atascadero State Hospital for several months; (2) unable to hold a job during his adult life; and (3) discharged from the military for being AWOL on an excessive number of occasions. We disagree that the foregoing amounted to substantial evidence that defendant was incompetent to waive counsel at the time of the capital trial. Nothing about defendant's discharge from the military or his inability to hold a job indicated that he did not have the mental `capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him.' (See Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 401, fn. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2680; see also People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1068, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335 [evidence of defendant's inability to `function socially' was not substantial evidence of defendant's incompetence to stand trial, to waive counsel, or to represent himself].) Similarly, the evidence of defendant's possible mental instability did not amount to substantial evidence of incompetence to waive counsel at the time of the capital trial. Defendant's confinement at Atascadero State Hospital in 1972 suggested that he might have been suffering from a mental illness at that time, and Judge Nelson noted that defendant appeared to have had previous bouts with psychiatric disability. The Atascadero confinement was in 1972, however, 12 years before the present crimes took place, and there was nothing in the record of this case pertaining to the period between 1972 and 1987 to indicate that defendant might be mentally ill at the time of the capital trial. (See People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 516-517, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) Moreover, even a history of serious mental illness does not necessarily constitute substantial evidence of incompetence that would require a court to declare a doubt concerning a defendant's competence and to conduct a hearing on that issue. (See, e.g., People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 508, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478 [defendant must exhibit more than a preexisting psychiatric condition to be entitled to a competency hearing].) We have found that evidence of more serious mental disturbances than defendant displayed did not amount to substantial evidence of incompetence requiring a competency hearing. (See, e.g., People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 508-511, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478 [defendant's death wish, history of psychiatric treatment, planned suicide attempt, propensity for violence, and psychiatric testimony that defendant was physically abused as a child and suffered from a paranoid personality disorder did not constitute substantial evidence of incompetence requiring court to conduct a competency hearing].) Here, the circumstance that defendant had been found insane in a criminal proceeding and had been confined to a mental hospital for an unspecified period approximately 15 years prior to the present trial, without more, was insufficient to compel a doubt whether defendant had the mental capacity to understand the proceedings against him in the current prosecution. Nor did Judge Nelson's 1985 statement that defendant was a psychopath indicate that Judge Nelson entertained or should have entertained a doubt concerning defendant's competence in 1987. Defendant notes that one definition of psychopath is a mentally ill or unstable person. Thus, he contends, Judge Nelson must have recognized that defendant was mentally ill. We disagree. The term psychopath (or sociopath) commonly is used to describe individuals with antisocial personality disorder, defined as a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others. (See Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, (2000 4th rev. ed.) pp. 701-702.) It appears that Judge Nelson intended this meaning when he used the term psychopath, for he immediately explained: In other words, you just don't have any kind of human feelings for anybody else. He further explained that it was defendant's cold and calculated crime and his destruction of evidence in the attempted murder trial that had prompted him to label defendant a dangerous psychopath. Thus, Judge Nelson's use of the term psychopath in describing defendant apparently did not indicate a belief, even in 1985, that defendant was psychotic, out of touch with reality, or otherwise unable to understand the proceedings against him. [11] Defendant also contends that the following additional evidence should have raised a doubt in Judge Nelson's mind regarding defendant's competence: (1) at a time when Judge Stromwall was presiding over the attempted murder case, the Court of Appeal had issued a pretrial ruling finding good cause for a continuance to allow defendant's counsel to investigate the possibility of an insanity defense; (2) in the capital case, Judge Blackwell found that defendant could not read and understand simple English, and Judge Munoz assertedly found he could not understand the saying, a lawyer who tries his own case has a fool for a client; and (3) defendant told Judge Munoz that he was unable to get along with the attorneys appointed to represent him. Nothing in the record, however, indicates that Judge Nelson was or should have been aware of these facts at the time he presided over pretrial proceedings in the capital case in 1987. They therefore have no bearing on whether Judge Nelson should have declared a doubt regarding defendant's competence. (See People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1152, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757 [due process requires a competency hearing if defendant presents substantial evidence of incompetence]; People v. Castro (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1415, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 [due process requires competency hearing when trial court becomes aware of substantial evidence of incompetence].) We also note that defendant overstates what is reflected in the record. After fully exploring a possible insanity defense in the attempted murder case, defendant's counsel informed Judge Stromwall that the insanity issue is no longer involved in this matter and stated his belief that there was nothing that would impair defendant from representing himself. Further, although Judge Blackwell denied defendant's request for self-representation on the ground that defendant could not read or write simple English (because he did not follow all the instructions in filling out the pro. per. advisement form), that finding appears to be incorrect, in view of defendant's demonstrated ability, which we already have noted, in the preparation of numerous pro se filings. Moreover, Judge Munoz did not find that defendant could not understand the saying about a lawyer trying his own case being a fool. Accordingly, none of these asserted facts compelled the expression of a doubt concerning defendant's competence to waive counsel. Finally, we note that defendant's advisory counsel did not advise Judge Nelson that defendant's competence might be in issue. In sum, there was no substantial evidence of incompetence requiring Judge Nelson to declare a doubt concerning defendant's competence and to conduct a competency hearing at his capital trial. (See §§ 1367, 1368.)
Defendant's second claim of error is premised upon the failure of the trial judge, Judge Krieger, who had observed defendant's performance at the guilt phase, to declare a doubt concerning defendant's competence when defendant's advisory counsel raised the issue between the guilt and penalty phases. At an ex parte hearing on May 8, 1989, after the guilt verdict had been rendered but before the penalty phase began, defendant's additional advisory counsel, Lucas, informed the court that the defense was preparing to have a psychiatrist interview defendant. Lucas added that he believed defendant might not be competent to represent himself or to stand trial. The court disagreed: Having seen [defendant] in the past month and a half, I don't find that he's incapable of standing trial, at least from a judicial  a psychological lay person's point of view. [¶] He's a lot more competent than most pro. per.'s I've seen. The court refused to find that defendant's decision to represent himself was grounds per [se] . . . for some type of psychological finding. The next court day, May 10, 1989, Lucas again raised the issue of defendant's competence to represent himself. Lucas explained that, having observed defendant through the guilt phase, he did not believe that defendant was competent legally to undertake the representation he's done. When the court asked him to clarify this statement, Lucas replied: I'm talking about his legal competency . . . I'm not saying that he has a mental problem at this point, and I haven't raised that issue. Newman, however, added: I would be inclined to say that a lot of it is mental, too. I don't think [defendant]  though him and I disagree on that  is mentally competent to represent himself. The court again disagreed with both attorneys, finding defendant possessed a good grasp of a lot of legal issues and appeared mentally stable. Newman observed that there had been an incarceration of [defendant] at Atascadero State Hospital and asked the court, over defendant's objection, to declare a doubt as to defendant's competency. The court replied: I have no doubt as to his competency, his mental capacity and his sanity. Newman then said that over the years he had tried to persuade defendant to be examined by a psychiatrist, but defendant had refused. When the court asked defendant whether he was requesting the appointment of a psychiatrist, defendant stated: No. I made my position clear . . . to both advisory counsel, that I am not  I'm not raising an incompetency hearing nor an insanity  nor an insanity issue. Defendant reiterated that he wished to represent himself at the penalty phase as well, and that he understood the drawbacks of that course of action. Later that day, during an in camera hearing regarding defense strategy held in the prosecutor's absence, Newman stated for the record that he and Lucas had advised defendant to be examined by a psychiatrist, to consider calling family members or friends as penalty phase witnesses, and to consider introducing his Atascadero State Hospital records, but that defendant had refused to do so. Newman told the court that there were records from Atascadero State Hospital that I think would have a bearing  I think would have had a bearing also as far as the guilt phase and the penalty phase. Newman said he had long believed that Mr. Blair might have some mental deficiency that would have been to the benefit at least as to the guilt phase and definitely of some benefit as to the penalty phase. Lucas added that defendant had spent 95 percent of his time writing writs, writing and thinking writs. He has spent absolutely no significant time in preparation of this case. Defendant confirmed that he had instructed his advisory attorneys not to contact his family members or friends, that he did not want to introduce the Atascadero records, and that he did not want to put on, in his words, a diminished capacity or an insanity defense. When the court asked whether there would be any mitigating evidence, defendant stated: I am not sure. I have to do some research on that, just what is mitigating evidence. It may be my defense will be that the district attorney shouldn't be allowed to put on aggravating evidence. I'm not sure what mitigating evidence would be  there would be. I do know that the  the insanity or diminished capacity is out, and I do know that  that compelling my family members to  to attend is out. Defendant contends that Judge Krieger had before him substantial evidence that defendant was unable to consult with his lawyers or to rationally understand the nature of the proceedings. Defendant asserts that he did almost nothing to prepare for the guilt and penalty phases, prevented his advisory counsel from investigating and presenting mental health evidence, prevented advisory counsel from investigating any kind of mitigating evidence, and spent most of his time researching and writing writs instead of preparing for trial. Defendant contends that these actions were the product of his mental illness and should have alerted the trial court to his possible incompetence. But nothing concerning defendant's failure to prepare indicated that he did not understand the proceedings against him. Further, we have rejected the notion that a defendant's choice not to present a defense, even at the penalty phase, amounts to substantial evidence of incompetence. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1373, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259 [defendant's choice not to present a defense at the penalty phase did not compel a doubt as to his competence to stand trial and represent himself].) Defendant further claims the record demonstrates that he did not understand the nature of mitigating evidence. Defendant's technical legal knowledge, however, was irrelevant to the competency inquiry. (See People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1364, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259, citing Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) Defendant further contends there were other signs of mental illness, which included his hospitalization at Atascadero State Hospital, the irrational nature of the crime, and his insistence on self-representation in this capital case. But we have rejected the notion that the existence of Atascadero records raised a reasonable doubt as to defendant's competence. [12] Further, the circumstance that the crime itself was irrational does not raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant's competence; the same could be said of many murders. Moreover, we agree with the trial judge that the fact that a defendant represents himself or herself cannot be the basis, in itself, for some type of psychological finding, because such a rule would require a competency hearing in every case in which a defendant exercises his or her right of self-representation  a standard that neither the high court nor this court has adopted. Defendant further observes that his advisory counsel expressed doubts concerning defendant's competency. Lucas clarified, however, that he was questioning only defendant's legal competency, not any possible mental problem. Again, defendant's legal knowledge was irrelevant to the competency inquiry. (See People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1364, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259, citing Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) Further, Newman's general opinion that defendant might be incompetent, although relevant, did not compel the court to declare a doubt or to order a competency hearing. ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 738-739, fn. 7, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1112, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1164, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Newman did not explain the basis of any belief on his part in defendant's possible incompetence other than to highlight the Atascadero hospitalization, defendant's refusal to be examined by a psychiatrist, and defendant's insistence on remaining in propria persona and filing numerous motions and writs. As we have explained, those circumstances did not compel a doubt concerning defendant's competence. Further, the trial court had ample opportunity to observe defendant personally. (See People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 509, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478.) In sum, whether the facts outlined above are considered separately or cumulatively, the record in the present case does not indicate that a reasonable doubt existed [or should have existed] as to defendant's ability to understand the proceedings against him. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1373, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Defendant further contends that the court erred in allowing him to decide whether or not to request the appointment of a psychiatrist. Defendant, however, was acting as his own attorney. Because the court did not find reason to doubt defendant's competence, it properly deferred to defendant's wishes on that score. Defendant finally contends that the trial court utterly failed to follow the requirements of section 1368 when it failed to appoint counsel for him, to solicit counsel's opinion as to his competence, to order a competency hearing, and to appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to examine him. [13] Those statutory duties arise, however, only if the court entertains a doubt as to the defendant's competence. (§ 1368, subd. (a) [requiring the trial judge to declare a doubt concerning the defendant's competence, appoint counsel if the defendant is unrepresented, and solicit counsel's opinion as to competence [ i ] f, during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment, a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant,' italics added]; id., subd. (b) [requiring the trial judge to order a competency hearing [i]f counsel [appointed pursuant to subdivision (a)] informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent]; § 1369 [outlining the procedure for a hearing ordered under section 1368, including the appointment of a psychiatrist or psychologist to examine the defendant].) Because the court here never entertained or declared such a doubt, it was not obligated to appoint counsel or to take the other steps outlined in sections 1368 and 1369. [14]