Opinion ID: 2448475
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: cross-examination of maria evans

Text: Whitfield points out five instances in which he contends his counsel ineffectively cross-examined prosecution witness Maria Evans: (1) mishandling the impeachment of Evans by asking her if she had stated to Officer Preston Moore that she had heard Whitfield say no when Bolden told him to shoot Chester, because in fact she had made the statement to Officer Kerry Alexander instead of Officer Moore; (2) failing to impeach Evans with her statement to Officer Alexander that she had her eyes closed at the time of the shooting, and failing to obtain the audiotape of this statement; (3) failing to elicit from Evans a statement that the rear window of Chester's car was down at the time of the shooting; (4) failing to elicit from Evans the positions of Chester's head and the gun in Whitfield's hand at the time of the shooting; and (5) failing to elicit from Evans a statement that the rear driver's side door of Chester's car was open at the time of the shooting. Whitfield cites State v. Parker for the proposition that a claimant can establish ineffective assistance of counsel based only on a showing either that a reasonable counsel would have cross-examined differently or that a different cross-examination would have changed the result of the trial. 886 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. banc 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1827, 131 L.Ed.2d 748 (1995). Parker says no such thing. In Parker, we responded to Parker's complaint of ineffective cross-examination by stating that Parker had failed to show how a reasonable counsel would have cross-examined the witnesses or that a different cross-examination would have changed the result. Id. at 931. This statement merely says that Parker had failed to satisfy either prong of Strickland ; it does not mean that if he had satisfied one prong his job would have been completed. It would not have been, for a claimant must show both performance deficiency and resulting prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Generally, the subjects covered during cross-examination and the extent of cross-examination are matters of trial strategy that must be left to the judgment of counsel. State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 335 (Mo. banc 1996). In this case, however, trial counsel testified during postconviction proceedings that she had no trial strategy in several of the omissions identified by Whitfield. But her postconviction testimony is not conclusive of whether the alleged omissions in cross-examination were, in fact, trial strategy, although her post-trial statements will certainly be helpful in making these determinations. State v. Light, 835 S.W.2d 933, 940 (Mo.App.1992). Instead, a reviewing court undertakes an independent assessment of whether a particular action was truly trial strategy, recognizing that overzealous counsel seeking to gain a new trial for their client may downplay their performance at trial. The motion court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that none of the omissions during trial counsel's cross-examination of Evans amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. The extensiveness of the cross-examination alonea cross-examination that covered over fifty pages of typed transcriptis a strong indication that the omissions cannot be said to be ineffective assistance. See O'Neal v. State, 766 S.W.2d 91, 98 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 206, 107 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989). Trial counsel did ask Evans about Officer Moore instead of Officer Alexander, but we cannot conclude that counsel's credibility was so destroyed in the eyes of the jury that there arises a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been differenti.e., that Whitfield would have been acquitted instead of convicted. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Even if the question had been properly put to Evans and she had responded that Whitfield said no when Bolden allegedly told him to shoot Chester, there is still no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Evans testified repeatedly that she saw Whitfield do the actual shooting. Nor does trial counsel's failure to impeach Evans with an audiotaped statement that she had her eyes closed at the time of the shooting undermine our confidence in the outcome of the case. In fact, Evans specifically stated during cross-examination that she heard the shots while she closed her eyes and pretended that she was dead; thus, the information on the tape would have been cumulative. Likewise, trial counsel's other alleged omissions also fail to raise a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had counsel proceeded as Whitfield now desires. In fact, the alleged omissions internally conflict; for instance, if the rear left window was down, it would not matter that the rear left door was open, and vice versa. Furthermore, Whitfield's theory that Bolden did the shooting from outside the car was presented through other evidence. The point is denied.