Opinion ID: 1356205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Reimbursement of Fees

Text: Finally, James contends that plain error occurred when the district court ordered him to reimburse the state for the cost of his public defender in the amount of $2,975.00. James argues that the district court did not support its finding of an ability to pay with substantial evidence and the reimbursement order was improper. The State contends that, although the order is adequately supported by evidence in the record, the statute does not require any more than the district court finding that a defendant has or will have an ability to pay. The State further contends that the ability to pay is not limited to present ability, but includes a foreseeable ability to pay. The applicable statute is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-106 (Michie 1997). It was amended in 1996 to direct that, for the period beginning July 1, 1996, and ending June 30, 1998, the presiding court is to determine whether a defendant is able or unable to reimburse the state. If he is unable, the court is directed to enter that specific finding into the record along with the reasons for that determination. If he is found to be able to reimburse, the court is directed to enter an order of reimbursement to the state. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-106(c) states in pertinent part:    For the period beginning July 1, 1996, and ending June 30, 1998: (i) In every case in which a person has received services under W.S. 7-6-104, the presiding judge shall determine whether the person is able to provide any funds towards payment of part or all of the cost associated with such services. If the person is not able to provide any funds towards payment of such costs, the court shall enter a specific finding on the record. If the court determines the person is able to provide any amount as reimbursement, the court shall order the person to reimburse the state for the costs of the services provided or shall state on the record the reasons why an order for reimbursement was not entered[.] Because James was ordered to pay reimbursement for public defender services on April 9, 1997, the statute applies to the order. Our previous decision requiring the court to make specific findings on an ability to pay was based on a version of the statute that did not contain paragraph (i). Collier v. State, 920 P.2d 265, 267 (Wyo.1996). Then, the statutory language included only paragraph (c), which stated: (c) To the extent that a person receives the services set out in W.S. 7-6-104, and is able to provide some funds toward the costs associated with such services, the presiding court may order the person to reimburse the state for the cost of the services provided. In making such an order, the court shall consider the financial resources of the person and the expenses and services provided in light of the state public defender's standard fee schedule. Where a person is initially provided with counsel pursuant to W.S. 7-6-105(a), but subsequently retains private counsel, the court may order the person to reimburse the state for the services already provided. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-106(c) (Michie Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). Collier found that the emphasized language allowed the presiding court to set a reimbursement amount after evaluating these factors without necessarily concluding the defendant had an ability to pay. Collier, 920 P.2d at 267. In this case, the record does not show that the district court evaluated or discussed James' financial resources or other factors relating to his ability to pay. The district court ruled James had an ability to pay and set a reimbursement amount. We must examine whether the amended statute intended for the district court to have resolved the issue in this manner. Our statutory construction rules for amended statutes were summarized in Brown v. State, 590 P.2d 1312 (Wyo.1979): [When the legislature amends a statute,] we are then concerned with the intent of the legislature in making this amendment.... It is presumed that when such an amendment is enacted to an existing statute that some change in the existing state of the law was intended and that the court should endeavor to make such amendment effective. We must also presume that such amendment was enacted with full knowledge of existing decisions and of the statutes with respect to the matter. Under these rules we must then consider the law as it had existed and had been interpreted before the amendment and the effect and purpose of the amendment changing it, with the idea of reconciling both provisions if possible. If the conflict cannot be reconciled, the amendatory language must prevail since it is the latest decision of legislative will. Id. at 1314-15 (citations omitted). The plain language of paragraph (i) removes the presiding court's discretion in determining and ordering reimbursement, and it no longer uses the language which this Court had previously interpreted as requiring an evaluation of financial resources and other factors. Instead, it directs the presiding court to either order reimbursement in some amount or explain why the defendant cannot pay something. The resulting change in the court's emphasis requires that we infer that the legislature intended for a presiding court to presume that all defendants had either a present or future ability to pay unless proved otherwise. Given this change in the legislation, we agree with the State that it is reasonable for the district court to have ordered reimbursement based on James' future ability to pay, and we find no abuse of discretion. The order of judgment and sentence is affirmed.