Opinion ID: 702303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the molding of the verdict

Text: 148 A week after the jury returned its damage award, the district court molded the verdict to reflect the fact that the jury found plaintiff to be sixty percent comparatively negligent on the Jones Act count. Aside from her evidentiary sufficiency argument, plaintiff agrees that on the Jones Act claim she is entitled to recover (from either or both defendants) at most 40% of her total damages, i.e., $218,000. There is also no dispute (aside from the evidentiary contentions we have rejected) that plaintiff is entitled to recover an additional $11,700 maintenance award. However, plaintiff appeals the court's subsequent grant of the defendants' post-trial motion to further modify the verdict. What the district court did was to apply the Jones Act comparative negligence percentage to reduce the damage award on plaintiff's general maritime law unseaworthiness claim. Plaintiff maintains that on the unseaworthiness claim, she is entitled to recover from Holiday Village the full $545,000 damages found by the jury. She also submits that the defendants' Jones Act liability must be joint and several, rather than several only as the district court's order might be read to suggest. We agree with both of these contentions. 149 It is no longer contested by the parties that notions of comparative causation apply to both Jones Act claims and unseaworthiness claims brought under the general maritime law. See, e.g., 1B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY Sec. 25 & cases cited therein (Whether an action is brought for Jones Act negligence or for unseaworthiness, the rule of comparative negligence applies.). Rather, the parties argue over whether the defendants ever raised or waived the defense of contributory causation as to the general maritime law claim, and whether, even if the defense was waived, the district court had independent authority to apply it.A. Waiver of Comparative Causation on the Unseaworthiness Claim 150 In each defendant's Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and in the Amended versions thereof, in addition to alleging that plaintiff's injuries were entirely caused through her own fault, defendants aver as their second affirmative defense that 151 [i]f Defendants are liable to Plaintiff, the same being specifically denied, any liability is reduced by the comparative negligence of the plaintiff. 37 152 The district court ruled that comparative causation was not a defense to the unseaworthiness claims. While this ruling was erroneous, we hold that the defendants, by not objecting to the ruling, or to the jury charges implementing it, have waived the defense of comparative causation on the unseaworthiness claims. 153 The defendants concede that separate special verdict questions about the allocation of responsibility could have been submitted for each claim. Br. of Appellees/Cross Appellants at 13. Indeed they acknowledge that they did not request that the jury be given a special verdict form concerning the question of the proper allocation of causative fault on the unseaworthiness claim. They nevertheless insist that they did not need to, and that they did not waive the defense by failing to do so. Id. at 13, 15. More precisely, they argue as follows: 154 The jury was charged on contributory negligence and the jury answered a special verdict question on contributory negligence. There was therefore never any need or occasion for defendants to raise objections to the charge or to the verdict form. 155 Id. at 15. 156 A careful reading of this argument reveals that the defendants avoid discussing the context in which the jury was charged and specially queried regarding contributory negligence. As plaintiff points out, the defendants do not deny that it was both sides' and the district court's intent not to present the jury with the question of comparative causation with respect to the unseaworthiness claim; nor do the defendants deny that they never objected to the verdict sheet or jury charge; nor did they request that the jury be asked any further clarifying questions after the verdict was returned. Reply Br. of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 1; Br. of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 12-13, 16-17. 38 157 In support of her waiver argument, Neely points out, and the defendants do not contest, that it is always the defense's burden to plead and prove a plaintiff's comparative fault under any theory of liability. Br. of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 18 (citing Benson v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 478 F.2d 152, 154 (3d Cir.1973)). Having failed to present this issue to the jury, the defendants failed to meet their burden. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that counsel approved the special interrogatory form in its entirety without requesting that the specific issue of comparative causation on the unseaworthiness claim be presented. 158 Finally, where a defendant fails to object to the form and language of special verdict forms or to the jury charges, before closing arguments or at the close of charging before the jury retires to deliberations, and the form had been submitted to counsel, objections are waived. See FED.R.CIV.P. 51; see also, e.g., Tose v. First Penn. Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 900 (3d Cir.1981); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 138-39 (3d Cir.1973); Callwood v. Callwood, 233 F.2d 784, 788 (3d Cir.1956); Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline, 742 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir.1984); Simien v. S.S. Kresge, Co., 566 F.2d 551, 555 (5th Cir.1978); Murphy v. Overlakes Freight Corp., 177 F.2d 342, 343 (2d Cir.1949). 39 Under these circumstances, we believe that the defendants have waived the defense of comparative causation as concerns the general maritime law unseaworthiness claim. 159 The defendants' response to plaintiff's waiver argument misses the mark. They concede that they did not and do not now object to the form or language of the special verdict questions, Br. of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 16, which were first drafted by defense counsel. Nor do they argue that there was [any] impropriety or error in the form. Id. Instead, they maintain that 160 there was, in fact, no need to give any additional charges or pose any other special verdict questions. A separate question on contributory negligence with respect to the General Maritime claim was not necessary because the special verdict interrogatories 5, 6 and 7 were not worded in a manner that in any way implied that they were limited to plaintiff's Jones Act claim. 161 Id. at 15. 162 Were defendants' description of the special verdict sheet accurate, we might be less quick to reject their contention that there was no waiver. However, as plaintiff quite persuasively argues in reply, [t]he location of those questions, the heading under which they are set, ... and the entire context of the discussion and the intent of all parties is totally to the contrary. Reply Br. of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 3; see also supra at 173-74 (discussing structure of verdict form). 163 Searching for something to support their contentions, the defendants call our attention to a remark that the trial judge made when discussing the charge with the parties after the verdict was returned: I told them quite specifically in the charge, when they got into the comparative negligence, dont worry about that, put the percentage down and we will figure it out. (App. at 475.) However, considering the relevant portions of the record, including the entire jury charge, we conclude that the trial judge's statement on which the defendants rely clearly meant that the court would reduce any award--under the Jones Act claim only--by the amount of comparative negligence. Indeed, the district court explained to counsel: 164 I put one damages question there obviously applying to both claims, and with the understanding that it would be molded according to the percentage, comparative percentage under the first [i.e., Jones Act] claim. Under the other [i.e., the unseaworthiness claim] it would stand tall on its own.... I think it was pretty clearly set forth to the jury, ... under strict liability there is no ... contrib [sic] reduction.... 165 App. at 473. Moreover, based on our review of the entire charge given, we believe that this is the understanding that the trial court conveyed to the jury. The jury simply was not asked to determine the allocation of responsibility with respect to the unseaworthiness cause of action. 166 The defendants seek to minimize the significance of the verdict form and jury charge. In their submission, [t]he common issue that led to molding the verdict was the degree to which plaintiff's negligence contributed to the accident. Reply & Principal Br. of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 13. This is so, they maintain, because in both the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness claims, the defense of comparative causation involves the degree to which plaintiff's own negligence contributed to the injury. Id. 167 This argument overlooks an important point. The plaintiff's share of causal responsibility compared only to the defendants allegedly negligent acts might be larger than the plaintiff's share compared only to the conditions that made the ship unseaworthy. The distinction stems in part from the different factual bases on which Jones Act and unseaworthiness liability were predicated at trial. 168 Plaintiff's Jones Act claims were largely predicated on alleged improper procedures followed by the defendants and negligent acts in signalling her to enter the water. She alleged that the defendants improperly failed to train their scuba diving employees and that they never properly instructed their employees in the operation of the scuba diving vessel. 169 Her general maritime law unseaworthiness claims, in contrast, were based upon many physical defects in the Long John. She alleged that the Long John lacked propeller guards and shrouds, that the vessels propeller blades extended too far below the bottom of the Long John, that the ship lacked a warning device to signal when it was being put into reverse, that it lacked a rear operating station, and that it was configured in a fashion that would not allow the captain to see the divemaster from the (forward) operating station. 170 Thus, the causal elements that the jury considered in assessing responsibility under the Jones Act claims were in many respects different from those the jury considered with respect to the unseaworthiness claims. Moreover, since the parties to whom the jury explicitly allocated liability on the Jones Act claim (i.e., Club Med Management, Holiday Village, and Neely) differ from the sole party that the jury explicitly found liable on the unseaworthiness claim (Holiday Village), we agree with plaintiff that the defendants would have needed to submit a separate jury interrogatory about the allocation of responsibility under the general maritime law claim if they wanted to use comparative causation as a defense thereto. Br. of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 27. Given this factor and the others already noted, combined with the fact that comparative causation is an affirmative defense, we conclude that the Jones Act comparative negligence percentage simply cannot apply directly to the unseaworthiness claim as a matter of law. 171 In sum, the defendants waived their comparative causation defense by not submitting it to the jury (and not objecting to the verdict sheet and charge, which both failed to present the defense to the jury). Therefore, we hold that the defendants were not entitled to assert this affirmative defense in a post-trial motion after the jury had been dismissed. B. Lack of Authority to Mold the Verdict 172 We must still consider whether, despite the waiver, the district court had authority to modify the verdict. The defendants argue that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) so authorizes the district court. They rely on Fontenot v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 714 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.1983), for the proposition that a district court may apply a single contributory fault finding to both negligence and unseaworthiness claims. In the alternative, they argue that Rule 49(a) provides the district court with the discretion to make a particularized finding of contributory negligence with respect to the general maritime claim. For this proposition they rely on Kinnel v. Mid-Atlantic Mausoleums, Inc., 850 F.2d 958, 965-66 (3d Cir.1988). We believe, however, that defendants' reliance on these cases is misplaced, and we hold that the district court possessed no such authority. 173 In Fontenot, the sole plaintiff had sued a single defendant, alleging both Jones Act negligence and general maritime unseaworthiness. The district court molded a verdict by applying Jones Act comparative negligence principles to the plaintiff's unseaworthiness claim, and the court of appeals affirmed. Although there was Fifth Circuit precedent stating that special interrogatories in cases alleging both Jones Act negligence and general maritime unseaworthiness should assign separate findings of contributory responsibility to the two causes of action, see Fontenot, 714 F.2d at 19 (citing Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., 702 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir.1983)), the court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to apply the single comparative negligence finding to both causes of action. 174 Whether or not we would accept the reasoning of Fontenot, the facts of that case are considerably different from the facts at bar. Fontenot involved a single set of liability allegations. See, e.g., id. at 20 (Neither party has made an effort on brief to distinguish the injury attributable to this accident from the injury attributable to the situation that gave rise to the accident.). And there was but one defendant, which was held liable on both legal theories (Jones Act negligence and general maritime law unseaworthiness). More significantly, in dramatic contrast to what transpired at trial here, in Fontenot [n]either the form of the interrogatories nor the court's accompanying instructions assign[ed] contributory negligence to one cause of action or the other, id. at 19, and it does not appear that the trial court in Fontenot had previously ruled that the defendant was not entitled to a contributory fault defense on the unseaworthiness claim. Accordingly, even if we were to follow Fontenot, it would not help the defendants. 175 Nor can the defendants take succor from Kinnel, which holds that Rule 49(a) only permits trial courts to supply an omitted subsidiary finding. 850 F.2d at 965. Here, however, the defendants urge the permissibility of a trial courts entering a consistent supplementary finding. Reply & Principal Br. of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 17. They maintain that Kinnel shows that Rule 49(a) allows the trial court to enter a consistent finding that Neely was sixty percent responsible for her injuries under the unseaworthiness claim. 176 However, we explained in Kinnel that Rule 49(a) ... was designed to have the [trial court] supply an omitted subsidiary finding which would complete the jury's determination or verdict. 850 F.2d at 965 (emphases supplied). Thus, Rule 49(a) might allow the district court to find the existence of an individual element of a misrepresentation claim where the properly charged jury had found the defendant guilty of misrepresentation, for such element was subsumed within that ultimate finding of liability. Id. Such elements would be necessary for, and therefore are subsumed within, a finding of liability. 177 Here, in contrast, a finding that the plaintiff was partially responsible on the unseaworthiness claim is in no way essential to complete the factual finding that Holiday Village had provided an unseaworthy vessel that was a substantial cause of plaintiff's injuries. A plaintiff's comparative causation is a discrete affirmative defense (not subsumed under a defendant's unseaworthiness liability), and one that these defendants did not present at trial. Rather, by determining Neely's share of causative fault and liability on the general maritime claim, the district court here, like the trial court we reversed in Kinnel, appears instead to have in the absence of a jury verdict[ ] determine[d] the ultimate liability of a party. Id. 40 This it may not do. 178 Defendant argues that the district court made no new findings, that it merely applied the jury's negligence allocations to the general maritime claim, and thus did not deprive plaintiff of the right to a jury trial on the issue of her comparative liability on the unseaworthiness claim. Reply & Principal Br. of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 17. But we have held that the defendants waived this defense to the unseaworthiness cause of action, and this argument is simply a reformulation of their claim that the same legal standards and factual findings govern both the negligence and the unseaworthiness claims. As we have explained, this supposition is mistaken under the circumstances of this case. See supra at 200-02. 41 179 In sum, we hold that the defendants waived the affirmative defense of comparative causation on the general maritime claim by not objecting to the district court's ruling on the defense, and by not objecting to the consequent special verdict form and charge. We further hold that the district court had no authority to determine for itself in this jury trial that Neely should be charged with any share of the liability under the unseaworthiness claim. C. Joint and Several Liability 180 Finally, we agree with plaintiff that the defendants' liability on the Jones Act and maintenance claims is joint and several. The district court's order might be misread as treating the Jones Act liability as strictly several, in which case Club Med Management would be required to pay at most $163,500 on the Jones Act claim, and Holiday Village no more than $54,500. 181 We believe that this allocation is incorrect. On the Jones Act and maintenance claims, Club Med Management and Holiday Village were joint tortfeasors. As such, their liability under well established principles of law is joint and several. See, e.g., Simeon v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1428-31 (5th Cir.1988) (Jones Act liability is joint and several; Jones Act liability is joint with maritime negligence liability); id. at 1428 (citing joint liability admiralty cases); Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540, 1545-48 (11th Cir.1987) (Jones Act tortfeasors jointly and severally liable); Joia v. Jo-Ja Service Corp., 817 F.2d 908, 915-18 (1st Cir.1987) (same); cf. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 261 n. 8, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 2756 n. 8, 61 L.Ed.2d 521 (1979) ([U]nder traditional tort law, a plaintiff obtaining a judgment against more than one concurrent tortfeasor may satisfy it against any one of them.) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Sec. 886). 42 182 Thus, the plaintiff may recover her total $218,000 award on the Jones Act claim--Club Med Management's thirty percent share of her $545,000 damages plus Holiday Village's ten percent share--from either defendant. On the general maritime law claim, she may recover her full $545,000 damages, unreduced, from Holiday Village. She may also recover her $11,700 maintenance award from either defendant. In any event, no double recovery is authorized: the maximum amount that she may recover is $556,700, the sum of her damages and her maintenance and cure award.