Opinion ID: 2629561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Starks' Opinion Testimony

Text: ¶ 11 King argues that Starks opined he was guilty of reckless driving, and the Court of Appeals erred by ruling that such an opinion on guilt cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The relevant portion of the officer's testimony is as follows: [Prosecutor]: So based on your training, experience and observations of the Defendant's driving, did you form an opinion regarding his driving? [Officer Starks]: Yes, I did. [Prosecutor]: And what is that opinion? [Officer Starks]: I felt that the entire act of what he had done was reckless in my viewpoint. [Prosecutor]: Okay. And what ... have you been trained on reckless driving ... the elements of reckless driving? [Officer Starks]: Yes. [Prosecutor]: Okay. So you felt this was within those elements? [Officer Starks]: I did. [Prosecutor]: And did you issue him a criminal citation? [Officer Starks]: I did. [Prosecutor]: For reckless driving? [Officer Starks]: Yes I did. RP at 170-71. ¶ 12 Having presented no other evidence besides the officer's testimony, the prosecutor said in closing: [Describing King's driving] All of these things are reckless. Just one of these things could be considered reckless. All of these things, taken together, constitute reckless driving. Officer Starks wrote him a ticket. Officer Starks said here today[, `]I thought it was dangerous and I felt it was reckless to me.['] Therefore, I would just ask that you convict the defendant of reckless driving. Id. at 273. ¶ 13 Generally, no witness may offer testimony in the form of an opinion regarding the guilt or veracity of the defendant; such testimony is unfairly prejudicial to the defendant `because it invad[es] the exclusive province of the [jury].' State v. Demery, 144 Wash.2d 753, 759, 30 P.3d 1278 (2001) (alterations in original) (quoting City of Seattle v. Heatley, 70 Wash.App. 573, 577, 854 P.2d 658 (1993) (quoting State v. Black, 109 Wash.2d 336, 348, 745 P.2d 12 (1987))); see also ER 608 cmt. (noting, drafters of the Washington rule felt that impeachment by use of opinion is too prejudicial and on a practical level is not easily subject to testing by cross examination or contradiction). Thus, neither a lay nor an expert witness may testify to his opinion as to the guilt of a defendant, whether by direct statement or inference. Black, 109 Wash.2d at 348, 745 P.2d 12. A law enforcement officer's opinion testimony may be especially prejudicial because the officer's testimony often carries a special aura of reliability. Kirkman, 159 Wash.2d at 928, 155 P.3d 125. ¶ 14 The State conceded Officer Starks' opinion testimony was improper. As in Montgomery Officer Starks' testimony would be considered improper under current case law because it is an expression by a police officer that goes to the guilt of Defendant. Br. of Resp't at 12; see State v. Montgomery, 163 Wash.2d 577, 183 P.3d 267 (2008) (holding State's opinion testimony was improper, but finding that error harmless and concluding on other grounds that defendant had been prejudiced). But, the State argues, because the officer's testimony did not result in actual prejudice, it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal under RAP 2.5(a). Br. of Resp't at 12. ¶ 15 The commissioner's ruling did not reach the issue of whether the officer's testimony invaded the province of the jury and resulted in actual prejudice. That decision erred by foreclosing review simply because King's attorney did not object at trial and failing to mention, let alone engage in, a manifest constitutional error analysis. [A]s Heatley makes clear, a claim of improper opinion testimony cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Ruling Den. Review, supra, at 3 (citing Heatley, 70 Wash.App. at 583-86, 854 P.2d 658). The commissioner's reliance on Heatley was misplaced. First, Heatley rejected only the notion that improper opinion testimony necessarily constitutes manifest constitutional error that will be considered for the first time on appeal. 70 Wash.App. at 586, 854 P.2d 658. The case does not stand for the broad assertion that such opinion testimony on guilt can never be raised on appeal if there was no objection at trial. ¶ 16 Second, this court recently clarified the issue in Kirkman, providing an outline of the scope of RAP 2.5(a)(3) as applied to improper opinion evidence. Kirkman, 159 Wash.2d at 936, 155 P.3d 125. Admission of witness opinion testimony on an ultimate fact, without objection, is not automatically reviewable as a `manifest' constitutional error. Id. (emphasis added). But, an explicit or nearly explicit opinion on the defendant's guilt or a victim's credibility can constitute manifest error. Id. at 936, 155 P.3d 125 (noting, [r]equiring an explicit or almost explicit witness statement on an ultimate issue of fact is consistent with our precedent holding the manifest error exception is narrow). ¶ 17 To determine whether statements are impermissible opinion testimony, a court will consider the circumstances of a case, including, `(1) the type of witness involved, (2) the specific nature of the testimony, (3) the nature of the charges, (4) the type of defense, and (5) the other evidence before the trier of fact.' Id. at 928, 155 P.3d 125 (quoting Demery, 144 Wash.2d at 759, 30 P.3d 1278 (quoting Heatley, 70 Wash.App. at 579, 854 P.2d 658)). Here, the Court of Appeals failed to review King's claim of improper opinion testimony and engage in a manifest constitutional error analysis. [2] The court allowed the commissioner's ruling to stand, and that ruling relied on an overly broad reading of Heatley [3] and did not take into account our analysis in Kirkman. [4] ¶ 18 Nonetheless, we conclude that we can resolve this case solely on the issue of whether Officer Starks had jurisdiction to arrest King in the first place. Thus, we need not rule on whether the officer's opinion testimony-which the State concedes was improper-constituted a manifest error and was not harmless.