Opinion ID: 150603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Prosecutor's Statements Regarding Digger

Text: Lee next argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on two instances of prosecutorial misconduct. First, he contends that, during the government's closing, the prosecutor improperly referred to evidence regarding the bloodhound, Digger, that had been excluded by the District Court. Second, he asserts that the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of Digger based on his own personal experience with hunting dogs. That misconduct, says Lee, deprived him of due process and a fair trial.
In a pre-trial motion, Lee sought to exclude the evidence of Digger's behavior as irrelevant, or, if relevant, inadmissible under Rule 403. Specifically, Lee argued that the evidence would make the jury believe that Digger actually identified the gun and the jacket when, in fact, that's not what happened. (App. at 226.) Lee also attacked the probative value of the evidence, arguing that the officers searching the area had contaminated the Jeep and the scene so that the dog could not have reliably tracked a scent. The Court held that the evidence of Digger's tracking was admissible, as it tends to prove that [Lee], who had occupied the front seat of the Jeep, had traveled along the pathway where the coat and rifle were found and then on to the apartment complex. This is circumstantial evidence that [Lee] possessed and removed the coat and rifle from the Jeep. ( Id. at 2.) The Court added, however, that the Government has agreed to eliminate any reference in the testimony that Digger paused at the coat and rifle, thus, further reducing any unfair prejudice to [Lee]. [27] ( Id. ) In light of the Court's pre-trial ruling, police officer Harkins, the dog handler, did not mention in his testimony that Digger paused at the coat and the rifle. Rather, he said that Digger went from the Jeep, down a flight of steps, through a very overgrown weeded asphalt parking lot ... slightly to the left angle of the fence. ( Id. at 458.) He added that Digger went down the fence line approximately 20, 25 feet ( id. ), and that he came within 10 to 15 inches of the rifle and the coat. ( Id. at 460.) Lee argues that, unlike Harkins, the prosecutor disregarded the Court's instructions and argued exactly what the Court had excluded, namely, that Digger paused at the coat and rifle. The prosecutor said the following: [W]hat Digger told us from Chief Harkins on the stand is that the person who was the driver of that car went straight down the steps, straight across the parking lot, deposited a gun, went through the fence ... and then ultimately escaped. ... What happened with Digger is that Digger came from the car, went down the steps, across the parking lot and to the gun. Digger did not go to the right where the first person to find this firearm went originally, Digger went in that exact path. Does this support Lieutenant Kraus or does it contradict him? ( Id. at 617; 619.) Lee did not object when those statements were made, but argues on appeal that in making those statements, the prosecutor was suggesting that Digger paused at the rifle, which was forbidden by the Court's earlier ruling. Lee contends that it is [] improper for a prosecutor, during closing arguments, to bring to the attention to the jury any purported facts that are not in evidence and are prejudicial. (Appellant's Op. Br. at 59 (citation omitted).) The second instance of alleged misconduct is what Lee calls the prosecutor's impermissible vouching for Digger, by assuring the jury of Digger's credibility based on [the prosecutor's] ... own personal experience hunting and tracking using dogs. ( Id. ) The specific statements Lee points to are as follows: I am a hunter. Some of you may be as well. As a hunter, I've had experience with dogs in the past. I've hunted with bird dogs and I've hunted with beagles for the majority of my life. It never ceased to amaze me when we were out with those dogs, their abilities. When I rabbit hunt with my brothers and my father, we would sometimes see a rabbit, we would jump a rabbit and it would be running out front. Our dog, being much smaller than us, he couldn't necessarily see the rabbit, so we had a signal that we would tell the dog where we saw and what we saw. We would say, here's the bunny. That meant to the dog, we saw the rabbit, here's where we think it was. And the dog would come there and start to circle and from just going to that location, smelling in one direction and then smelling in the other, that dog could tell which one of those two tracks was fresher and go in the direction that the rabbit went to rather than where the rabbit came from. That never ceased to amaze me. Or, when you hunted with bird dogs, that that bird dog would stop a foot and a half from this particular bird, a pheasant (App. at 615-16.) At that point, Lee's counsel objected, noting the personal nature of the testimony which doesn't have anything to do with the evidence. ( Id. ) The District Court sustained defense counsel's objection, stating that we should move from that. ( Id. ) The prosecutor complied and did not return to his reminiscing.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court's ruling on a contemporaneous objection. United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir.2003). However, any non-contemporaneous objections are reviewed for plain error. Id. While Lee objected to one portion of the prosecutor's closing argumentthe portion that Lee now claims was vouchinghe did not object to the part of the closing involving Digger's behavior near the rifle. It is only here on appeal that he asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by suggesting that Digger paused at the coat and rifle. [28] Thus, we review the ruling on alleged vouching for abuse of discretion, and we review the prosecutor's description of Digger's behavior near the rifle for plain error. A prosecutor's comments can create reversible error if they so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). [A] criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Moreover, we must examine the prosecutor's offensive actions in context and in light of the entire trial, assessing the severity of the conduct, the effect of the curative instructions, and the quantum of evidence against the defendant. Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir.2001). A finding of prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal unless the error is harmless. Brennan, 326 F.3d at 182. If the error is constitutional, we will affirm [only] if we determine that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 241 (3d Cir. 2000). If the error is non-constitutional, we will affirm when it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment. Id. (quotation omitted).
Though silent on the issue before, Lee now contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by alluding to excluded evidence in suggesting that Digger paused at the coat and rifle. (App. at 2.) Lee's previous silence is understandable, since the record does not actually support his argument. At no time did the prosecutor state that Digger paused or hesitated at the coat and the rifle. While the prosecutor did state that Digger came from the car, went down the stairs, across the parking lot and to the gun ( Id. at 619), and while that comment arguably comes close to what was prohibited by the District Court, there was no assertion that the dog paused or alerted at the gun. Instead, a fair interpretation of the prosecutor's argument is that Digger led the police away from the car, down a path, and to the area where the coat and rifle were located, before heading to the Apartments. Given Harkins's testimony that Digger traced a path from Lee's car to within inches of where the police discovered the coat and rifle, the District Court's allowing the prosecutor's argument was not plain error. We have repeatedly held that a prosecutor is entitled to considerable latitude in summation to argue the evidence and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. United States v. Werme, 939 F.2d 108, 117 (3d Cir.1991) (citation omitted). That latitude encompasses the argument that the path that Digger tracked was evidence that Lee had dropped the coat and rifle by the fence.
A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness based on the prosecutor's personal knowledge, experience, or opinions. See Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038. Vouching occurs when two criteria are met: (1) the prosecutor must assure the jury that testimony of a Government witness is credible; and (2) this assurance is based on either the prosecutor's personal knowledge, or other information not contained in the record. United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir.1998). While Lee says that the prosecutor vouched for the bloodhound evidence, the government argues that there was no vouching because the prosecutor merely told an anecdote about his own experience with Beagles and bird dogs. (Appellee's Ans. Br. at 64.) The government then argues that it is common knowledge that dogs have an ability much greater than humans to detect scent. ( Id. at 65 (quotation omitted).) Whether something is common knowledge to a group of people largely depends, of course, on the composition of the group. The amazing abilities of hunting dogs are not the common ken of all humanity. Perhaps the heightened ability of dogs to detect scent is well-known, but the prosecutor did not confine himself to that. Rather, he spoke from his own personal experience with dogs, dating back to his childhood, and reflected on the remarkable things he had witnessed. As a result, the jury may have been influenced by the prosecutor's experiences, thinking that the prosecutor's views bolstered the credibility of Kraus's and Harkins's testimony about Digger. [29] This is what the rule against vouching prohibits. However, even though the prosecutor did cross the line into improper vouching, a new trial is not warranted because it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to Lee's conviction, for several reasons. [30] Helbling, 209 F.3d at 241. First and most significantly, the prosecutor did not continue the vouching once an objection was raised and the District Court directed the prosecutor to move on. [31] See United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 633 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that, while prosecutor's statement concerning his personal opinion were improper, the statement did not warrant a reversal because the defendant objected at trial and the court sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to move on). Second, the acuteness of Digger's sense of smell was of record through Harkins's testimony. Third, the testimony about Digger's behavior required no vouching. The dog went within inches of the rifle on its way to the Apartments. That concrete and specific evidence, not general praise for the nose on man's best friend, is what in all likelihood left an impression on the jury, if anything about Digger did. Fourth, the Court specifically instructed the jury that what the lawyers said is not evidence and it's not binding on you. (App. at 589.) Thus, despite the wholly unnecessary vouching for the testimony about Digger and the gratuitous comments about a dog's ability to track a scent, a new trial is not warranted because it is highly probable that the misconduct did not contribute to the judgment. Lee challenges his sentence, arguing that the District Court erred in classifying his misdemeanor conviction for reckless endangerment as a crime of violence, thereby increasing his offense level under the career offender enhancement found in § 2K2.1(a)(2) and (a)(4) of the Sentencing Guidelines. [32] The government had argued to the District Court that Lee's conviction was a crime of violence under the Guidelines but, on appeal, concedes that reckless conduct, standing alone, is not the type of purposeful conduct that can constitute a crime of violence ... [and thus, Lee's] sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for the purposes of re-sentencing. (Appellee's Ans. Br. at 68 (citation omitted).) Lee and the government are correct in their agreement about the law. Following Lee's sentencing hearing, the Supreme Court decided Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), in which it effectively held that, to qualify as a crime of violence, the crime at issue must present a serious potential risk of physical injury and be one that typically involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. [33] Id. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581. The Court expressly distinguished crimes involving negligence or recklessness from those involving violence or aggression. Id. at 146, 128 S.Ct. 1581; see also United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir.2009). Thus, following Begay, a conviction for mere recklessness cannot constitute a crime of violence. [34] Lee's earlier-noted conviction for concededly reckless conduct, standing alone, does not qualify as a crime of violence. Accordingly, as the parties agree, Lee's sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for re-sentencing.