Opinion ID: 852950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the Game Bird Habitat Act

Text: DNR's authority to purchase Brandt's property in Newton County is derived from the Game Bird Habitat Act. The County contends that the Act is unconstitutional, and therefore the purchase was unauthorized and void. The trial court agreed and set aside the sale on that ground, independent of its holding that the ordinances were valid. If the County's sole interest in the constitutionality of the Game Bird Habitat Act were its claim that DNR is not authorized to acquire land, the County's standing to raise the issue would, as the State argues, be at best highly questionable. But the County has a legitimate interest in upholding the challenged validity of its ordinances just as it does in seeking interpretation of statutes that affect its governance. Bd. of Comm'rs of the County of Howard v. Kokomo City Plan Comm'n., 263 Ind. 282, 296, 330 N.E.2d 92, 101 (1975). The most obvious flaw in the ordinances is their conflict with the Act. If the Act is invalid that conflict evaporates. Accordingly, the constitutionality of the Act is also relevant to the validity of the ordinances. The County therefore properly raises the issue of the constitutionality of the Game Bird Habitat Act. In order to constitute a valid delegation of authority to a state agency, legislation must provide sufficient standards to guide the agency in its exercise of that authority. Barco Beverage Corp. v. Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 595 N.E.2d 250, 253-54 (Ind.1992) (The only limitation on the delegation of authority to administrative bodies is that reasonable standards must be established to guide the administrative body. The standards, however, only need to be [as] specific as the circumstances permit, considering the purpose to be accomplished by the statute.) (citations omitted); cf., Ind. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 340 (Ind.1994) (standards that guide an administrative agency may be described in very broad and general terms.) (citations omitted). Newton County argues that the Act fails this test. First, the County contends the terms willing seller and game bird habitat lack sufficient definition. Second, the County points out that the terms have not been refined by any regulations. Third, the County points out that the legislature failed to provide any specific procedures for acquiring game bird habitats. We do not agree that the legislature must supply more specific definitions for the terms willing seller and game bird habitat to guide the agency. To be sure, statutory terms must be understandable, but they need not be rigorously precise. Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n. of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 245-46, 35 S.Ct. 387, 59 L.Ed. 552 (1915); Barco Beverage Corp., 595 N.E.2d at 254. Newton County sets out a parade of horribles that it contends may constitute examples of a willing seller under the statute. These for the most part are examples of how the State might seek to employ tactics to coerce an otherwise reluctant landowner to sell to the State. Newton County points to no evidence whatsoever that DNR has wasted public funds, purchased land for wrongful uses, or coerced residents into selling their land. More importantly, there is no such evidence as to the Brandt sale. To be sure, there may be litigable issues on the fringes of the term willing seller, but there is no doubt that Brandt is one. He approached DNR and proposed the sale. The term game bird is defined by statute to mean pheasant, quail, grouse, wild turkey, and Hungarian partridge. Ind.Code § 14-22-8-2 (1998). A particular bird is a game bird or it is not, and a potential habitat is a place where a game bird can live. We see no need to define the terms with any greater specificity. The birds are identified with precision. Habitat as we take it, means these creatures may reasonably be expected to occupy the site in the course of their natural activity. Game Bird Habitat may present some issues if, as the County posits, DNR attempts to use this statute to buy an asphalt parking lot. Courts can deal with these if they occur. The terms are sufficiently specific to have content. This regulatory framework may be less than wholly precise, but perfection has never been required of administrative bodies. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d at 340. We also find unpersuasive Newton County's argument that the terms willing seller and game bird habitat need definition by DNR regulations. Newton County cites the following passage in Indiana Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt.: Such terms get precision from the knowledge and experience of men whose duty it is to administer the Statutes, and then such Statutes become reasonably certain guides in carrying out the will and intent of the Legislature. 643 N.E.2d at 340. We do not take this to require DNR to promulgate rules or guidelines to interpret statutory terms. Rather it merely acknowledges that regulations may fulfill that purpose. If no ambiguity exists within the statute itself an agency may determine if facts or circumstances exist upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend so long as the agency does not make the law itself. State ex rel. Standard Oil v. Review Bd. of Employment Sec. Div., 230 Ind. 1, 8, 101 N.E.2d 60, 63 (1951). In this case, the statute confers the authority to determine whether or not a particular plot of land is a suitable habitat for the named species. Finally, there is no evidence that DNR interpreted these terms improperly with respect to the Brandt acquisition. The statute is not so unclear as to be void on its face, and there is no claim that its application here is outside the boundaries of game bird habitat or willing seller.