Opinion ID: 63596
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Opposition Requirement

Text: Grambling argues that Tureaud’s retaliatory discharge claim fails as a matter of law because he did not engage in protected activity. “To establish a Title VII retaliation case, [Tureaud] was required to prove that he engaged in protected activity; he suffered from an adverse employment action; and there was a causal connection between the activity and the adverse employment decision.” Adams v. Groesbeck Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.3d 688, 690-91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 109 (2007). “Post-trial, the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), framework becomes moot, and the question is whether legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding in [Tureaud’s] favor.” Id. at 691. “An employee has engaged in activity protected by Title VII 8 Nos. 06-31311 & 07-30436 if he has either (1) ‘opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice’ by Title VII or (2) ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’ under Title VII.” Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)); see also Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1135 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (noting distinction between opposition clause and participation clause). It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 n.5 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing this unlawful employment practice in the context of a Title VII retaliation claim). Tureaud argues that he opposed Grambling’s refusal to hire Harris as Assistant Police Chief because he was white. The opposition clause, not the participation clause, is relevant to this case. See Payne, 654 F.2d at 1135. “To satisfy th[e] opposition requirement, [Tureaud] need only show that []he had a reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). The district court properly instructed the jury regarding the reasonable belief standard, and the jury unanimously concluded that Tureaud had a reasonable belief that Grambling discriminated against Harris because of his race. Grambling does not contest the jury’s finding in this regard. Rather, Grambling argues that Tureaud did not engage in protected activity because he did not “oppose” any unlawful employment practice. Tureaud does not argue that he opposed an unlawful employment practice directed against him. Instead, Tureaud claims that he opposed an unlawful employment practice direct against Harris, a job applicant. We have previously stated that “employee opposition to discriminatory employment practices 9 Nos. 06-31311 & 07-30436 directed against a fellow employee may constitute activity protected under § 704(a) [the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII].” Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 727 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging same principle in the context of an ADEA retaliation claim). For purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim, we can discern no appreciable difference between employee opposition to discriminatory employment practices directed against a fellow employee and those directed against a job applicant. The plain language of Title VII states that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire “any individual” because of such individual’s race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The term “any individual” easily encompasses job applicants and prospective employees. Thus, Tureaud’s opposition to Grambling’s refusal to hire Harris because of his race may constitute protected activity under Title VII. To establish a “causal link” because the protected activity and the adverse employment decision, the evidence must demonstrate that the decision maker had knowledge of the protected activity. See Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 1999). Tureaud was not required to submit a formal charge of discrimination to the EEOC or a formal complaint to the EEO office of Grambling before being discharged in order to satisfy the opposition requirement. An informal complaint to a supervisor regarding an unlawful employment practice may satisfy the opposition requirement of a Title VII retaliation claim.2 See Jeffries v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Hertz v. Luzenac Am., Inc., 370 F.3d 1014, 2 Other circuits have broadly construed the scope of the opposition clause. See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 579 (6th Cir. 2000); Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990). We need not decide the outer limit of protected activity under the opposition clause in order to resolve this case. 10 Nos. 06-31311 & 07-30436 1015 (10th Cir. 2004) (same); Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2002) (same). Based on the facts of this case, we conclude that there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find that Tureaud satisfied the opposition requirement of his Title VII retaliation claim. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1); see also Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 896 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the opposition inquiry requires a factual determination that is entitled to deference on appeal). The decision makers regarding Tureaud’s employment were Higgins, the Vice President who refused to process Harris’s PAF and who recommended that Tureaud be discharged, and Warner, the President who approved Tureaud’s discharge. During direct-examination, Tureaud testified that he spoke with several Grambling officials regarding Higgins’s refusal to process Harris’s PAF, including (1) Warner, the President; (2) Weaver, the Executive Assistant to the President; (3) Higgins, the Vice President for Student Affairs, and (4) Billy Owens, the Vice President of Finance.3 Tureaud testified that during his conversation with Weaver, which occurred before he was discharged, she stated that “I should hire a black man and train him.” The jury could reasonably infer that Warner had knowledge of Tureaud’s conversation with Weaver, her executive assistant.4 Furthermore, Tureaud persisted in submitting Harris’s PAF to Higgins after it was initially rejected and met with Higgins to discuss Harris’s application. The jury was entitled to credit Tureaud’s testimony regarding his opposition to the unlawful 3 During cross-examination, Grambling did not question Tureaud regarding his conversations with Warner or Owens. Thus, the jury heard uncontradicted testimony from Tureaud that he spoke with Warner, the ultimate decision maker, “[i]n [his] efforts to recruit assistance in having [Harris’s] Personnel Application Form processed.” 4 Warner did not testify at trial. Weaver did testify, but she did not indicate whether she communicated the substance of her conversation with Tureaud to Warner. Considering her position as Executive Assistant to the President, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that she did. 11 Nos. 06-31311 & 07-30436 employment practice.5 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not