Opinion ID: 766961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reliance on the Absence of Additional Crimes

Text: 38 The district court also grounded its downward departure on the rationale that others who are convicted of possessing child pornography engage in additional wrongful conduct, while Defendant did not. Even assuming the factual accuracy of the premise about Defendant, 7 the district court's position is inconsistent with the statutory scheme. 39 Title 18 U.S.C. S 2252A(a)(5)(B) prohibits possession alone. Defendant knowingly possessed more than 350 images of child pornography. Whether that was the only crime that Defendant committed is immaterial to deciding whether his conduct fell within the heartland of the crime of possession. Unlike in Sanchez-Rodriguez, where the issue was the quantity of drugs involved, the issue here is whether the act of possession (regardless of quantity) is sufficient to put one within the heartland of offenders who are convicted of possessing child pornography. In essence, the district court held that possession alone was insufficient to place Defendant in the heartland of a possession offense. Possession, however, is what the statute proscribes. 40 The district court's holding, that a defendant who merely possesses child pornography is not within the heartland of offenders sentenced under U.S.S.G. S 2G2.4, also conflicts with persuasive holdings of our sister circuits. In United States v. Wind, 128 F.3d 1276, 1277 (8th Cir. 1997), the defendant sent to undercover agents computer images of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The defendant pleaded guilty to one count ofpossession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(4). The district court applied U.S.S.G. S 2G2.4 to determine the defendant's sentencing range, but concluded that the defendant's conduct fell outside the heartland of typical child pornography cases and departed downward pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0. Two factors that the district court cited in support of its downward departure were: (1) psychological, psychiatric, and other tests revealed that the defendant was not a typical child predator or pedophile; and (2) although the search warrant and supporting affidavit listed various items of child pornography that would be found at the defendant's residence, investigators found only computer files containing child pornography. See id. at 1277-78. 41 The Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that, because the Guidelines assign different offense levels to different offenses involving the sexual exploitation of children, the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure on the ground that he did not commit, or have the tendency to commit, a worse crime. Id. at 1278. It also rejected the district court's view that the defendant's mere possession of computer files containing child pornography, when the search warrant listed additional items that might be found in a search, justified a downward departure. The court held that the search warrant did not define the heartland of the crime of possession of child pornography and that the defendant possessed enough offending material that it could not be deemed atypical for cases to which section 2G2.4 applies. See id. 42 In United States v. Barton, 76 F.3d 499, 501 (2d Cir. 1996), the defendant was convicted of knowingly receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(2). 8 The PSR calculated the defendant's base offense level as 15 under U.S.S.G. S 2G2.2. The district court granted a downward departure, reasoning in part that the defendant was not involved in the commercial distribution or production of child pornography, and that there was no evidence that the defendant was a pedophile or had sexually abused children. See id. 43 The Second Circuit reversed. It held that, [i]n light of the specificity of the [statutes prohibiting child sexual abuse] and the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission intended S 2G2.2 to extend to one who merely receives child pornography, even if the person is not engaged commercially in its production or distribution. Id. at 503. 44 We agree with the reasoning of those cases. Defendant's failure to engage in additional conduct relating to the sexual abuse of children is an impermissible ground for granting a downward departure when sentencing for the crime of possessing child pornography. 45