Opinion ID: 736848
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The March 15 Order Was Clear and Reasonably Specific

Text: 16 First, despite appellant's claims to the contrary, the record shows that she had sufficient notice of the illegality of her conduct in retaliating against Brown for her testimony in the Bessye Neal case. In determining whether an order is sufficiently clear and specific to justify a contempt conviction, we apply an objective standard that takes into account both the language of the order and the objective circumstances surrounding the issuance of the order:  'Whether an order is [323 U.S.App.D.C. 275] clear enough depends on the context in which it is issued and the audience to which it is addressed.'  In re Levine, 27 F.3d 594, 596 (D.C.Cir.1994) (quoting in rE holloway, 995 F.2d 1080, 1082 (D.C.cir.1993)). 17 The record shows that this order was sufficiently clear. For one thing, appellant's contention that she believed the order applied only to supervisors and not to a nonsupervisory employee like herself is implausible. The March 15 order was directed to all employees of the Department of Corrections. The order enjoined the Department of Corrections, together with all of [its] agents and employees, ... from taking any retaliatory action, or making any threats of retaliatory action against any protected witness. App. A1. Appellant, like all other employees, was required to sign a form (and did so on March 17, 1995) indicating that she had personally received and read the March 15 order which prohibit[s] retaliation against all witnesses who may be called to testify in the sexual harassment lawsuit, and that she underst[ood] that [she was] bound by the Court's March 15, 1995 Order and previous orders of the Court ..., and that any violation of these orders may subject [her] to sanctions for criminal contempt including fines and/or imprisonment. App. A11. Additionally, the context in which the order was issued to DOC employees further demonstrates its intended coverage of nonsupervisors; indeed, the record shows that other employees understood that the order so applied to nonsupervisory employees. Aside from the fact that each employee had to sign a form expressing his or her understanding of the order, DOC distributed a supplementary memorandum (addressed to ALL EMPLOYEES) explaining that [a]nyone who violate[d] the order was subject to discipline, and two different co-workers specifically told appellant she should leave Brown alone because of the court's order. 7 18 Similarly implausible is appellant's claim that she did not understand that her hostile words and behavior toward Brown constituted retaliatory action within the meaning of the order. Officer Larry Wellington, a friend of Young's, testified at the bench trial that he, Young, and other employees didn't have an understanding of what retaliation was, and that the order was never explained to us in detail on what it meant. The district court rejected these assertions, find[ing] that any common sense understanding would lead any person to know that you cannot treat a person differently because of their testimony here in court. 8 Wherever the outside parameters of contempt for treating a person differently might be, we agree with the district court that on the facts of this case, a high school educated individual should have had a common sense understanding that acts of the sort committed by Young against Brown were retaliatory in [323 U.S.App.D.C. 276] nature and therefore forbidden by the March 15 order. 9 Indeed, as the government persuasively argued, the key terms in the order (all ... agents and employees and any retaliatory action) are not complex legal terms but rather are readily understandable to a high school graduate, such as appellant, who has also taken college level courses. Brief for the United States, at 17. In sum, the aggregate acts at issue here--overt threats and insults, use of profanity, and hostile actions such as throwing live ammunition near Brown, conduct all of which commenced after, and inferentially as pay back for, 10 Brown's testimony against Gerald--clearly constituted retaliatory action within any common-sense definition of that term.