Opinion ID: 2500717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Meaning of the Word Timber

Text: 58. In these deeds, Union Pacific was reserving to itself those things that would be useful to maintain and operate a railroad. It was iron, coal and timber. It is not reasonable to conclude that Union Pacific was intent on picking huckleberries or pruning shrubs or saplings too small to use for building purposes. Timber in this case meant those trees that are suitable for use in the erection of buildings or in the manufacture of tools, utensils, furniture, carriages, fences, ships and the like. The word does not denote trees which are suitable only for firewood or cordwood. E.g. Lord v. Meader, 73 N.H. 185, 60 A.2d [A.] 434, 436 (N.H.1905). Here, it would mean trees suitable for railroad ties or mine tresses and timbers or lumber for building construction. What is Timber? 59. Case law in existence at the time the deeds in this case were executed defined timber similarly. See Keeton v. Audsley, 19 Mo. 362, 1854 WL 4569 (Mo. 1854) (The word `timber,' in common parlance, is applied to standing trees, and to the wood proper for buildings, utensils, furniture, ships, etc. Yet, in law, timber means certain trees useful for building, or the like.); Babka v. Eldred [47 Wis. 189], 2 N.W. 102 (Wis. 1879) ( [t]imber means the body, stem or trunk of a tree, or the larger pieces o[r] sticks of wood which enter the frame-work of a building or other structure. See Webster's Dic.); Bustamente v. U.S. [4 Ariz. 344], 42 Pac. 111 (Ariz.Terr.1985) [(Ariz.Terr.1895)] (As a generic term, [timber] properly signifies only such trees as are used in building ships or dwellings.); Lui [ Liu ] Kong v. Keahialoa [8 Haw. 511], 1892 WL 1096 (Hawaii 1892) (`Timber' trees are defined to be those which can be used for building purposes, furniture, etc.); Dickinson v. Jones [36 Ga. 97], 1867 WL 1475 (Ga.1867) (Timber is used technically to denote green wood of the age of twenty years or more, such as oak, ash, elm, beech, maple, and with us would include walnut, hickory, poplar, cypress, pine, gum and other forest trees.); Wilson v. State, [17 Tex.App. 393], 1885 WL 6725 (Tex.Ct.App.1885) (approving a jury instruction defining timber as that sort of wood which is proper for building, or for tools, utensils, furniture, carriages, fences, ships, and the like, usually said of fallen trees, but sometimes of those standing.); Lord v. Meader [73 N.H. 185], 60 Atl. [A.] 434 (N.H.1905) (In this country the term `timber,' when applied to standing trees, generally means such as are suitable for use in the erection of buildings or in the manufacture of tools, utensils, furniture, carriages, fences, ships, and the like. The court distinguished between timber and growth, the latter being plainly generic in meaning, and would include all wood upon the lot.) 60. Just as the foregoing cases establish the proposition that a reservation of timber applies only to trees in existence, further analysis reveals that trees must be of a certain size before they are considered timber. For instance, the New Dictionary of the English Language (1839) defined timber as Trees supplying wood for building; the thick stem or trunk. Similarly, the Exposition of the English Language (1819) defined timber as Wood fit for building; the main trunk of a tree   . Webster's American Dictionary of the English Language (1889) defined timber in relevant context as That sort of wood which is proper for buildings or for tools, utensils, furniture, carriages, fences, ships and the like; usually said of felled trees, but sometimes of those standing. 61. It is reasonable to conclude, thus, that in using the term timber, Union Pacific intended to reserve only those trees (1) in existence at the time of the grant and (2) of sufficient size to be suitable for use in construction. The testimony presented at trial was that in order to be considered merchantable, i.e., suitable for commercial use, at the time of the deeds in question, trees must have a diameter of at least nine inches. Union Pacific's reservation of timber was limited to trees at least nine inches in diameter. It did not include aspen, for which there was no commercial market at the time. 62. There was no evidence that the trees presently existing would have been of merchantable size on the dates of the deeds in question. In fact, Defendant's forestry expert did not find any trees that had even been sprouted on the dates of these deeds. Regardless if the reservation[s] in the deeds are interpreted to apply to all trees in existence on the date of the conveyances in question, or only to those of merchantable size, there are no trees fitting either definition in existence at present. 63. The cases cited by the Wyoming Supreme Court in support of the proposition that a timber interest that is not expressly limited in time continues in perpetuity, 158 P.3d at 691, do[] not alter the conclusion that Union Pacific's timber reservation applied only to trees in existence at the dates of the deeds. . . . Walters v. Sheffield, 75 Fla. 505, 78 So. 539 (1918); Butterfield Lumber Co. v. Guy, 92 Miss. 361, 46 So. 78 (1908); R.M. Cobban Realty Co. v. Donlan, 51 Mont. 58, 149 P. 484, 487 (1915); and Magnetic Ore Co. v. Marbury Lumber Co., 104 Ala. 465, 16 So. 632 (1894). None of these cases state that the perpetual right included cutting trees not yet in existence. The Walters, Magnetic Ore and R.M. Cobban Realty Co. cases were expressly limited to timber in existence at the time of the grant. [¶ 17] Based upon these findings, the district court rendered the following conclusions of law: 12. According to Thompson [on Real Property], Timber as used in timber deeds and contracts refers to standing trees. He later states Distinction is made between a conveyance of `timber' and of `timber rights.' All of the vendor's rights cease when the merchantable timber is removed. But `timber rights' permits the harvesting of successive crops of timber as they mature. Thompson on Real Property, § 99. 13. In this case [Ecosystem] reserved []timber[] and the right to cut and remove such in the Graham deed and the right to cut and remove timber in the Chesney and Heber deeds. Using Thompson's analysis, [t]imber meant the standing trees in 1906 through 1909 when the deeds were made. Those trees have long since died. By implication, [Ecosystem's] right to them died with them or would expire once the trees were harvested if still alive because timber rights were not reserved. [¶ 18] To reiterate, in Ecosystem I we directed that the district court consider relevant facts and circumstances evidence which could include case law interpreting timber reservations and/or conveyances from the same era as the Union Pacific deeds, the nature of the parties, the type of land covered by the deeds, the purposes of the conveyances and/or reservations, Union Pacific's use of timber in its business, and the consideration paid by the surface owners for the conveyances. Id., ¶¶ 34-36, 158 P.3d at 693-94. As the district court noted, the trial evidence established that Union Pacific had specific uses for wood products, including railroad ties, mine timbers and supports, building construction, railroad cars, trestles, charcoal and fuel. Union Pacific's purpose in reserving the timber, then, was to secure appropriate timber resources to meet those specific needs. [¶ 19] The trial evidence established that the principal species of trees suitable for commercial purposes on the Broadbent land is lodge pole pine. One of Ecosystem's expert witnesses, Wesley Rickard, who was a forestry consultant in forest management policy and economics, testified that merchantable timber in 1910 included only trees of at least nine inches in diameter. As such, Union Pacific intended to reserve trees of that size in order to meet its needs. [¶ 20] Also in accordance with our instructions on remand, the district court properly reviewed case law and reference materials of the same vintage as the deeds at issue here. Based upon its extensive review of source materials, the district court concluded that the term timber was widely used at the time of the deeds to mean currently existing trees of a particular size and did not typically include future growth. The district court appropriately considered Union Pacific's purposes in reserving the timber, the nature of the property and timber resource and contemporaneous definitions and case law in making its determination about what the parties meant by the term timber in the reservations. Its conclusion that Union Pacific intended to reserve then-existing trees of sufficient size on the property is clearly supported by the evidence. [¶ 21] Ecosystem criticizes the district court's ruling, stating that it conflicts with our decision in Ecosystem I, where we noted that mineral interests are perpetual in nature and stated that unless the facts and circumstances surrounding execution of the Union Pacific deeds suggest otherwise, there is no reason to treat timber interests differently than mineral interests. Ecosystem I, ¶ 26, 158 P.3d at 692. That statement was made in the context of the issue presented in the first appealwhether a judicially created rule of reasonable time limitation on timber interests should be imposed without distilling the parties' intent from the facts and circumstances surrounding execution of the deeds. The district court's ruling in this case does not contradict that holding. It considered the facts and circumstances, together with the prevailing definition of timber in deeds and reference books from the relevant time period, and concluded that Union Pacific intended only to reserve the then-existing timber which would suit its purposes. The district court did not, as Ecosystem asserts, impose a rule without giving due regard to the parties' intent. [¶ 22] In some cases, a determination that a deed reserved the then-existing timber would still require examination of the time for removal of the timber, i.e., whether the timber interest holder had an unlimited amount of time or only a reasonable time to remove the timber; however, that issue is not present here. Ecosystem's own expert, Mr. Rickard, testified that he had sampled trees on the Broadbent properties and did not discover any trees that would have been alive at the time the deeds were executed. He agreed that any merchantable timber in 1910 would have died by normal progression of the forest. Our agreement with the district court's determinations that Union Pacific only intended to reserve the then-existing timber and such timber no longer exists is dispositive of this appeal. [¶ 23] Nevertheless, the district court also ruled that, based upon the facts and circumstances surrounding execution of the deeds, it was clear the parties intended that Union Pacific only had a reasonable time to remove the timber, and a reasonable time had passed by any measure decades ago. The facts and circumstances examined by the district court in making that determination also confirm the district court's other holdingthat Union Pacific only intended to reserve the then-existing trees. [¶ 24] Ecosystem's experts opined that in the early 1900s there was a general fear about a possible timber famine and, consequently, Union Pacific adopted policies to assure its access to wood products as far into the future as it could. They claimed that Union Pacific adopted strict policies concerning reserving timber rights when it sold portions of its forested lands. The experts maintained that these policies clearly demonstrated Union Pacific's intent to reserve a perpetual interest in successive crops of timber. [4] [¶ 25] Broadbent presented evidence which contradicted the experts' opinions. Many of the properties sold by Union Pacific during the relevant period were sold pursuant to 10-year installment land contracts, and numerous such contracts were admitted into evidence at trial. The contracts contained provisions forbidding the buyers from removing timber from the properties during the pendency of the contracts. The relevant provisions stated: Third. That all timber growing upon the land shall be allowed to remain there and shall not be cut, removed or destroyed except so far as may be necessary for the construction of improvements upon said land . . . until final payment for said land[.] That provision indicates clearly that Union Pacific did not want any timber removed (except for the construction of improvements on the property) while the property was still under contract and the possibility of forfeiture existed. A few of the installment land contracts also included the following provision typed in the margin: It is also agreed that all timber upon said land shall remain the property of [Union Pacific], and [Union Pacific] shall have the exclusive right to cut and remove the same. As the district court noted, the vast majority of the contracts only limited the grantees' rights to the timber during the pendency of the contract. Thus, this evidence directly opposed Ecosystems' experts' opinions that Union Pacific adopted a strict policy of reserving the timber on properties it sold during the relevant time period. [¶ 26] The trial evidence also included documentation of two different transactions involving Union Pacific and grantees of the surface estate of former railroad lands. This evidence was gleaned from old court files and the records of attorney P.W. Spaulding which are part of the collection of the American Heritage Center at the University of Wyoming in Laramie. [¶ 27] One transaction involved a conflict which began in 1913 over the continued validity of a timber reservation by Union Pacific in a 1906 deed given to Taylorsville Livestock. The Taylorsville deed timber reservation was identical in all material respects to the reservations in deeds at issue here: Excepting and reserving to said Union Pacific Railroad Company, its successors and assigns . . . [t]he exclusive right to cut and remove timber from said land and the right of ingress, egress and regress upon said land and the right to use so much of the surface thereof as may be necessary for the proper conduct of said business thereon. [¶ 28] The internal correspondence between Union Pacific attorneys included the following statements: In the case of Taylorsville Company against Union Pacific, we submitted the law question to Mr. Loomis at Omaha, citing authorities. He agrees with me that our contract and deed do not reserve title to the timber, but only the right to enter the lands and cut the timber. This being true under the authorities cited to him, and under those you have, we would be obliged to cut the timber within a reasonable time or lose our rights. Mr. Loomis directs that we shall not incur the expense of a trial. A few days later, Union Pacific changed its litigation stance, which was noted in the following statement: I am in receipt of a telegram from Mr. Loomis directing us to proceed and try the case of Taylorsville Livestock Company v. Union Pacific. . . . The letter I wrote you on the 28th inst. you may disregard therefore, and we will get ready to try the case if it is not continued. There is no record of the outcome of any trial on the matter. [¶ 29] The Union Pacific attorney specifically stated that the contract and deed did not reserve the title to the timber, only the right to enter the lands and cut the timber, and that the timber had to be cut within a reasonable time. This correspondence is completely consistent with the notion that Union Pacific only reserved the then-existing timber. Had Union Pacific retained the timber in perpetuity, including future growth, it would have stated that it had title to the timber and would not have been concerned about the passage of time. As noted by the district court, the fact that Union Pacific changed its litigation strategy does not alter its original conclusion about the meaning of the reservation. It simply meant that it intended to try the case on the basis of whether or not a reasonable time had passed. [¶ 30] The other transaction involved Heber Livestock, although it did not pertain to the Heber deed specifically at issue in this case. Mr. Spaulding wrote to Union Pacific on behalf of Heber Livestock in 1907, seeking permission to use the timber located on two properties, which were still under contract and no deeds had issued, to construct improvements to the properties. [¶ 31] In response, the Union Pacific land commissioner referred to the contracts on each parcelone which involved the standard installment contract and one which reserved the exclusive right to cut and remove the timber from said land and stated that [t]he exceptions, reservations, covenants and conditions herein above written shall each be written into the conveyance of the said premises which may hereafter be made and shall run with the land. The land commissioner gave permission for Heber Land to cut timber on the land covered by the standard contract, but stated that the timber on the land covered by the contract with the exclusive right to the timber was absolutely reserved to Union Pacific and must not be cut either before or after the lands are deeded. [¶ 32] Ecosystem argues that the Heber/Union Pacific correspondence demonstrates that, when Union Pacific included a timber reservation in a deed, it intended an absolute reservation which, according to Ecosystem, meant more than the timber existing at the time of the contract. Like the district court, we disagree with Ecosystem's interpretation of these documents. The correspondence merely demonstrates the distinction between the typical installment contracts, which limited timber cutting until the contracts were fully paid, and contracts in which Union Pacific reserved an interest in the timber beyond the final payment of the contract. In addition, the contract with the exclusive right language also stated that the corresponding deed would include a provision making the timber reservation run with the land. The deeds in the present case do not contain any running with the land language. The Heber/Union Pacific correspondence does not support Ecosystem's argument that the deeds at issue here should be interpreted as reserving all timber and future growth, in perpetuity. [¶ 33] Consistent with our instructions in Ecosystem I, the district court also compared the consideration paid for properties with timber reservations and properties without such reservations and found: 17. The evidence at trial indicated that the price for the land sold by Union Pacific to the original purchasers, i.e., seventy-five cents ($.75) an acre for the Graham and Chesney tracts and fifty cents ($.50) for the Heber lands did not differ from the purchase price paid for other lands sold by Union Pacific during that period for grazing land when no timber rights were reserved. This finding is confirmed by the installment land contracts admitted into evidence at trial. As such, the consideration paid indicates that Union Pacific did not reserve an interest in the future growth of timber which would perpetually encumber the surface of the properties, making it less valuable to the surface land owners. [¶ 34] The district court properly considered the facts and circumstances surrounding execution of the deeds. Its determination that the evidence established that Union Pacific used the word timber in the reservations to mean the then-existing trees of sufficient size is not clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the law. Because the undisputed evidence established that such timber no longer exists on the property, we affirm the district court's order granting judgment in favor of the surface owner, Broadbent. [¶ 35] Our affirmance of the district court's ruling that timber did not include future growth is dispositive. Consequently, we do not need to address Ecosystem's other arguments, including the district court's rulings as to: Broadbent's adverse possession claim; whether the expert witnesses should have been allowed to testify on Union Pacific's intent with regard to a reasonable time limitation on the timber interests; whether the deeds were ambiguous concerning a reasonable time limitation; and whether it was appropriate to apply rules of construction. Affirmed.