Opinion ID: 77059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assessing Compliance with the ICC Regulations

Text: 33 Having concluded that the minimum claim requirements in 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b) govern Siemens's claim, we must now determine whether the regulation requires that a written claim specify a precise dollar amount. Although, in Farmland Industries, we agreed with the district court that [o]ne of the principal functions of the notice requirement in the bill of lading is to allow the carrier to exactly compute its losses, 733 F.2d at 1510, we have never expressly ruled on this issue. 34 Federal `[s]tatutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.' United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534, 113 S.Ct. 1631, 1634, 123 L.Ed.2d 245 (1993) (citation omitted). As explained previously, longstanding federal common law established prior to the promulgation of the ICC regulations provided that the sufficiency of claims should be judged in a practical way in light of the claims' purpose: securing reasonable notice for the carrier so that it can conduct an independent investigation. See Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. at 198, 36 S.Ct. at 545; St. Louis, Iron Mountain, 243 U.S. at 605, 37 S.Ct. at 468. 35 We find no evidence that the ICC intended to serve a purpose radically different from this one in promulgating the regulations. See Pathway Bellows, 630 F.2d at 903 n. 5. To the contrary, portions of the regulations and their accompanying source material indicate that the ICC meant to encourage carriers to investigate claims independently. See 49 C.F.R. 1005.4(a); Ex Parte No. 263, 340 I.C.C. at 560. Further, as the Second Circuit reasoned, the ICC regulations do not seem aimed at affording carriers an unfair opportunity to escape liability for damages that occur during shipping. The minimum claim requirements appear to call for no more information than one ordinarily would expect a claim for damages to contain, and compliance with these requirements is neither onerous nor unreasonable. Pathway Bellows, 630 F.2d at 903 n. 5. Thus, because the purpose of the regulations is consistent with longstanding common law, we interpret the minimum claim requirements with a presumption in favor of the Blish Milling common law principles. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. at 534, 113 S.Ct. at 1634. 36 Read literally, as by the district court, § 1005.2(b) could be construed to invalidate written claims that provide an estimated damages range, with minimum and maximum values, on the grounds that such a range is not specified or determinable, 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b). See, e.g., Delphax Sys. v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 54 F.Supp.2d 60, 64 (D.Mass.1999) (holding that a range of $40,000 to $50,000 is not specified or determinable). Such a narrow construction, however, undercuts the regulation's purpose, which, as we have explained, is not to permit the carrier to escape liability but to insure that the carrier has enough information to begin processing the claim. Trepel, 194 F.3d at 713. `While it is true that the language of a statute should be interpreted according to its ordinary, contemporary and common meaning, this plain-meaning rule should not be applied to produce a result which is actually inconsistent with the policies underlying the statute.' Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1068 (11th Cir.2004) (citation omitted) (noting this rule and applying it to the interpretation of a regulation). We thus reject the district court's construction. 37 Keeping in mind the purpose of the ICC regulations and the Supreme Court's admonishment that we should interpret statutes and regulations in light of their common-law backdrop, we construe 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b) liberally and conclude that Siemens's notice of claim, which specified a damages range of $700,000 to $800,000, satisfies the minimum claim requirements. Siemens's letters constituted a written notice of damage with a clearly communicated intent to hold NSR liable. Additionally, the letters indicated that Siemens's claim would be significant and gave NSR more than enough information to begin an investigation, which NSR in fact did in sending its expert to inspect the transformer in Florida. Finally, the range specified by Siemens included a minimum and maximum amount, unlike $100 more or less, 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(d), and the actual amount of damages it claimed in court fell within that range. 38 We find unpersuasive all of NSR's arguments to the contrary. First, we reject NSR's contention that the majority of circuit courts to have addressed the issue have required actual compliance with the specified and determinable amount provision so as to bar Siemens's claim here, see Appellee's Brief at 13, 23. In all of the circuit court cases that NSR cites, our sister circuits have addressed situations in which the shipper provided the carrier with no damage amount at all. In Salzstein, the Fifth Circuit held that a notice which did not specify any damage amount did not suffice. 993 F.2d at 1189, 1190-91. In Nedlloyd Lines, the First Circuit ruled that letters that in [no] way specified the amount of money claimed fell short of 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b)'s requirements. 922 F.2d at 908. Similarly, in Pathway Bellows, the Second Circuit deemed insufficient a claim that did not include an amount of damages or assert that the carrier was liable. 630 F.2d at 901, 903, 904 (assessing a letter which stated [a]lthough we have contacted your company earlier, the purpose of this letter is to state, in writing, that we are in the process of filing a claim for freight damage of a shipment). Accordingly, these cases do not stand for the proposition that the shipper must strictly comply with the regulation by providing a single, certain damage amount. 39 On the other hand, two circuits have held that an estimate of damage was sufficient in part because the carriers had begun to investigate the claims. In Insurance Company of North America, the Ninth Circuit adopted a substantial compliance standard and held that a written notice of damage which clearly communicated intent to hold [the carrier] liable was sufficient under the regulations, even though it only estimated the amount of damages. 1 F.3d at 904, 907 & n. 3. In Trepel, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the purpose of the claim regulation is to insure that the carrier has enough information to begin processing the claim and found that a claim for an amount of damage `to be determined but not to exceed $150,000.00' substantially complied. 194 F.3d at 712, 713. Not only do we find this reasoning more compelling, we also believe that the factual circumstances at issue in these cases are more analogous here than those addressed in Salzstein, Nedlloyd, or Pathway Bellows. 9 40 Second, we do not read Farmland Industries to establish a rule that a claim is not valid unless it includes an exact amount of damages. We did not address in that case whether a claim is sufficient if it includes a damages range rather than a single amount. Instead, based on the particular factual circumstances presented, we declined to apply a rule that a shipper could be excused from filing a claim within the prescribed nine-month period if the carrier had obtained `actual knowledge' of all information that a claim would have provided. 733 F.2d at 1510. Moreover, our agreement with the district court that a principal function[ ] of the notice requirement in the bill of lading is to allow the carrier to exactly compute its losses, id., is consistent with our conclusion here. When a shipper provides a carrier with a relatively narrow range of damages, the carrier is afforded the opportunity to investigate the claim and may exactly compute a damages amount. As Siemens argues, any carrier faced with a large claim would be neglectful of its duties if it simply paid a large claim without making any independent efforts to verify the shipper's estimate. 41 Finally, we disagree with NSR's assertion that our decision to view § 1005.2(b) liberally in light of its purpose will allow shippers to bypass the mandated claims process by asking a court to determine whether a carrier should pay a claim that was not presented properly in the first place. As the Ninth Circuit explained, [w]e fail to see why shippers will be eager to circumvent the notice requirements, avoid voluntary settlement, and embark upon expensive, time-consuming litigation to recover their damages. Insurance Co. of N.A., 1 F.3d at 907 n. 4. 42 Because, in this case, Siemens indicated its intent to hold NSR liable, gave NSR multiple opportunities to inspect the transformer, and provided a damages range with a minimum and maximum amount in which its claim ultimately fell, we consider Siemens's claim sufficient under 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b) even though Siemens did not specify a single, certain damages amount. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.