Opinion ID: 255137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of 28 U.S.C. 2112.

Text: 16 On June 8, 1960, the first of the instant petitions to review the Board's 21 order were filed in this court. On the same date a similar petition was filed by States Marine Lines in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Two days later another petition was filed in the Second Circuit by Kerr S.S.Co. 17 A certified index of the record was filed in this court on October 3, 1960. This is equivalent to filing of the record itself, under 28 U.S.C. 2112(a). We are advised that neither the record nor any index of the record was at any time filed in the Second Circuit. On October 31, 1960, the Second Circuit upheld the Board's order Second Circuit upheld the Board's S.S.Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 61. The question initially presented is whether in light of the applicable statutory provisions the Second Circuit's action precludes our review. 18 Section 1036 of Title 5 U.S.C.A., provides in part: 19 '   the agency shall file in the office of the clark of the court of appeals in which the proceeding is pending the record on review, as provided in section 2112 of Title 28.' 20 Section 2112(a) of Title 28 provides in part: 21 '   If proceedings have been instituted in two or more courts of appeals with respect to the same order the agency    concerned shall file the record in that one of such courts in which a proceeding with respect to such order was first instituted. The other courts in which such proceedings are pending shall thereupon transfer them to the court of appeals in which the record has been filed. For the convenience of the parties in the interest of justice such court may thereafter transfer all the proceedings with respect to such order to any other court of appeals.' 22 It is clear, in light of these statutory provisions that we have jurisdiction. The mere fact that petitions for review of the same order were filed in the Second Circuit and that that court has already upheld the order does not oust this court of jurisdiction. The question whether the Second Circuit had jurisdiction to decide Kerr in light of 28 U.S.C. 2112(a) and 5 U.S.C.A. 1039(a), 4 is not before us. 23 B Timeliness of Certain Petitions to Review. 24 Section 4 of the Review Act, 5 U.S.C.A. 1034, provides in part: 25 'Any party aggrieved by a final order reviewable under this chapter may, within sixth days after entry of such order, file in the court of appeals    a petition to review such order.' 26 Eleven of the petitioners 5 sought judicial review of the order of April 11 more than sixty days after the order was served, but within sixty days after the Board acted upon their motions for reconsideration of that order. The Maritime Board asserts that these petitions to review are untimely and seeks their dismissal. We think it clear, however, that the petitions in question were timely filed under our decision in Outland v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 1960, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 90, 284 F.2d 224, 227, where we held that the statutory sixty-day period for seeking judicial review of Civil Aeronautics Board orders did not commence until the Board acted upon Outland's motion for rehearing. 6 27 The Maritime Board urges, however, that Outland is inapplicable since none of the motions for reconsideration we discuss were filed with the Board within the thirty-day period provided by Rule 16 of its Rules of Practice and Procedure. But we agree with petitioners that the Board's consideration of these motions on their merits constituted a waiver of the Board's own limitation period. Cf. Bowman v. Loperena, 1940, 311 U.S. 262, 61 S.Ct. 201, 85 L.Ed. 177; City of Pittsburgh v. Federal Power Comm., 1956, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 237 F.2d 741. Although a court's or agency's consideration of an untimely motion for rehearing or reconsideration may not constitute a waiver of a limitation period fixed by Congress, 7 we think the rule is otherwise when the limitation period is imposed by the agency. 28 C. Intervention. 29 Section 8 of the Review Act, 5 U.S.C.A. 1038, provides in part: 30 '   any party or parties in interest in the proceeding before the agency whose interests will be affected if an order of the agency is or is not enjoined, set aside, or suspended, may appear as parties thereto of their own motion and as of right, and be represented by counsel in any proceeding to review such order. Communities, associations, corporations, firms, and individuals, whose interests are affected by the agency's order, may intervene in any proceeding to review such order.' 31 A number of the carriers subject to the Board's order filed notices of intention to intervene 8 or motions for leave to intervene in the instant review proceedings. Most of them also filed petitions to review which we hold above to be timely. 9 But four of the carriers seeking intervention did not file petitions to review. 10 32 Assuming arguendo that these four are not 'parties in interest in the proceeding before the agency' as is required for intervention as a matter of right, it is clear that they are parties 'whose interests are affected by the agency's order' and we have discretion under the statute to permit intervention. Allowing these carriers to intervene would not in any appreciable way further complicate this litigation. The Board has not shown that it will be prejudiced by intervention, and the questions raised by the intervenors are identical to those raised in the cases in which intervention is sought. The motions for leave to intervene will, therefore, be granted. 33