Opinion ID: 214126
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 217–18 (citations omitted) (IJ’s opinion).

Text: 2 To the extent that Lopez Perez argues a constitutional dimension for this claim, we will address it in subsection D, infra. See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen, 483 F.3d 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2007). 6 The record contains sufficient evidence to support this finding of fundamentally changed circumstances in Guatemala, thus rebutting a presumption of future persecution. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). The cessation of Guatemala’s civil war, examined in tandem with the details of Lopez Perez’s time with the guerillas—he never fought against the military, he did not wear a uniform, he was only with the group for two months, see A.210—suggests that his fear of future persecution is no longer objectively reasonable. To be sure, the same evidentiary record reveals that, to this day, Guatemala remains plagued by systemic social problems, such as lynchings attributable to the ―failure of the justice sector to guarantee security,‖ (A.440) but none compels the conclusion that Lopez Perez’s brief history with the guerillas would render him more likely than not to be persecuted upon his return.3 Cf. Bartolo-Diego v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1024, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007) (―Even though violence and criminality still plague Guatemala, nothing in the State Department reports indicate that those who supported the Guatemalan government before the end of the civil war are targets.‖). C) Convention Against Torture In order to obtain relief under the CAT, Lopez Perez was required to show that he would be ―more likely than not [to] be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal‖ at the ―instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 3 To the extent that Lopez Perez raised the issue of economic persecution below, see A.154–55, and it is now properly before this Court, the same evidence that fails to 7 other person acting in an official capacity.‖ 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(2), .18(a)(1); see also Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 187–88 (3d Cir. 2003). Lopez Perez argues that CAT relief should have been granted because ―more likely than not, [he] will be persecuted, tortured and killed if he is returned‖ to Guatemala. He does not support this prediction with evidence. The BIA concluded that Lopez Perez would not face ―other serious harm‖ from a return to Guatemala, see A.147, and such an assessment is adequate to support a denial of relief under the CAT. Moreover, the IJ found there to be ―no likelihood that the government of Guatemala would seek to torture the respondent because he was a member of some unidentified guerrilla group for a few months in 1992 to 1993.‖ A.218. Accordingly, Lopez Perez has not met his burden under CAT. D) Due Process Lopez Perez asserts that the IJ was biased against him, arguing that this bias violated his right to Due Process as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529, 539 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the actions of an IJ, which included ―de facto cross-examination‖ and imposing a ―strict time limit‖ on the petitioner, sufficed to deny due process). A due process violation would allow the investigation of claims otherwise forestalled by jurisdictional bars. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2007). But see compel a finding of future physical persecution is insufficient to support a determination of future economic persecution. 8 Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2010) (―If a claim is frivolous, however, we lack jurisdiction to review it, no matter its label. . . . [A] party may not dress up a claim with legal clothing to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.‖). The BIA concluded that Lopez Perez was afforded ―a full and fair opportunity to present his case.‖ A.148. We find ample record support for this determination. The hearing transcript reveals an IJ who was assertive and perhaps a bit prickly—especially towards counsel—but was altogether fair. We can see no indication, moreover, that Lopez Perez was kept from presenting evidence. And even assuming arguendo that the IJ’s conduct violated due process, Lopez Perez cannot show prejudice, as the sole decision attributable to ―bias‖—an adverse credibility finding—was rejected by the BIA on appeal. See Delgado-Sobalvarro v. Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 2010) (―To establish a violation of due process, the petitioners must show that substantial prejudice resulted from the alleged procedural errors.‖). Nor do we find support for Lopez Perez’s second constitutional claim: that the BIA failed to review ―his entire record.‖ Bare assertions of institutional ignorance to the contrary, ―a complete lack of knowledge of Guatemalan history in addition to a complete disregard for the current country conditions,‖ is not the ―only explanation‖ for the BIA’s decision, as he claims. 4 To cite one example: while the plight of the wife of Guatemala’s 4 Of course, a ―complete lack of knowledge‖ of relevant history may best be remedied by submissions to the tribunal. It was not the totality of Guatemalan history that was before the IJ and BIA, but merely selections presented to those tribunals via record evidence. If evidence suggesting a greater connection between current country 9 human-rights ombudsman may be both tragic and indicative of the oft-conceded challenges faced by Guatemala, it does not logically mandate finding that Lopez Perez, or similarly situated members of his cadre, would be persecuted or tortured in the country. He fails to point to any dispositive evidence ignored by the BIA that would indicate a constitutional violation or a conclusion based on an irrational and incomplete review of the record. Blanket assertions do not a due-process violation make. E) Motion for Reconsideration Based on the above, we find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s denial of the motion for reconsideration.