Opinion ID: 553904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Weaver's Title VII Promotion Claims

Text: 14 Weaver might have characterized his case as one presenting direct evidence of discrimination, thereby triggering the analysis articulated by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 22 but both he and the district court regarded his case as one squarely invoking the presumption approach of McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green. 23 Although the distinctions, if any, between a direct-evidence case 24 and a circumstantial-evidence case 25 are in doubt, Weaver's consistent preference for the McDonnell Douglas characterization leads us to examine his case in that fashion. 26 15 Under McDonnell Douglas and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 27 a plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Once established, this raises a presumption that the defendant racially discriminated against the plaintiff. [T]he burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption by producing sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff ... articulating a 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for its actions against the plaintiff, a reason which is 'clear and worthy of credence.'  This is but a burden of production, and the employer need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the reason advanced. Once the defendant satisfies this burden of production, the plaintiff then has the burden of persuading a court that the proffered reason for the employment decision is a pretext for discrimination. 28 16 To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. 29 We examine Weaver's prima facie case and any subsequent burdens in the context of each employment decision, reviewing only for clear error the district court's determination that Gallardo intentionally discriminated against Weaver. 30 We may reverse that determination only if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that an error has been made. 31 17 1. The Geiger Promotion. Weaver first asserts that Casa Gallardo practiced racial discrimination in promoting Ted Geiger in preference to him in November, 1982. 18 Citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 32 Casa Gallardo suggests that the Geiger promotion claim is timebarred under Title VII because the relevant charge was not filed with the EEOC until more than 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act. 33 Zipes, however, holds that the time limitation for EEOC charges is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a Title VII suit. 34 The decision therefore tends to undercut Casa Gallardo's argument, which is raised for the first time on appeal. Zipes treated the filing requirement as subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling, 35 and we have recognized that the failure to comply with this exhaustion requirement may be waived if not raised. 36 By extension, we are required to regard the issue as waived if it is first raised on appeal, as it is here. 37 Weaver's argument that he is entitled to recover even if this claim was not timely filed does not constitute a waiver of his rights as Casa Gallardo contends, a distortion of Weaver's argument. We therefore proceed to the merits of the district court's findings. 19 Weaver plainly satisfied his burden of offering a prima facie case relative to the Geiger promotion. He established without contradiction that he belonged to a racial minority and that he applied for the position eventually awarded Geiger, a white man. Casa Gallardo concedes that Weaver applied and was considered for the position before Geiger was selected, and does not contend that the deficiencies in Weaver's performance that it stresses in rebuttal rendered him unqualified for purposes of establishing his prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. 38 20 Casa Gallardo, in turn, discharged its burden of rebutting the presumption of discrimination by articulating some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision not to promote Weaver. 39 Weaver, like other managers employed by Casa Gallardo, was evaluated by his supervisor at frequent intervals ranging from once every three months during the first year after his promotion to Area Supervisor to twice a year for the remainder of his employment. Evaluations in each of twelve to fourteen areas and in overall rating could vary from unsatisfactory to unusually well done. Geiger's evaluations might well have been considered superior to Weaver's in job performance, entitling him to preference for promotion. In sum, Casa Gallardo's objective and subjective performance reviews, combined with the testimony of its managerial employees, are sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Casa Gallardo discriminated against Weaver in the Geiger promotion. 40 21 To prevail, therefore, Weaver must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the victim of intentional racial discrimination, either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 41 22 The evidence that race was a significant factor in the defendant's decision 42 was not strong, but we cannot say that the district court committed clear error in determining that Casa Gallardo's recited reasons were pretextual. Weaver presented five types of evidence of racial incidents relating to his promotion and termination claims. First, Weaver testified that Tom Greene, Gallardo's Vice President of Operations, routinely called him black knight and midnight cowboy, sometimes in the presence of other employees and fellow executives, including both Geiger and Bunting. Raymond Johnson, a former Casa Gallardo employee, testified that one General Manager informed him that Weaver was no longer with Casa Gallardo because he had been considered a midnight cowboy, but his informant refused to explain. Weaver also testified that at a cocktail party in December, 1982, in front of Bunting, Greene asked Weaver if he knew what we call [brazil nuts] back home. Weaver later learned from a friend that brazil nuts were sometimes referred to as nigger toes. 23 Second, Weaver testified that at his first meeting with Wayne Jones, President of Casa Gallardo, on July 18, 1983, Jones commented that, because of his rearing, he had to be careful in the presence of articulate black men. Weaver testified that he found the comment shocking and demoralizing. 24 Third, Weaver testified that he was excluded from social functions because of his race and that these functions were critical to advancement. Weaver's testimony suggests that Geiger and Bunting interacted socially; Geiger once stayed at Greene's home for two weeks; Weaver was not invited to play racquetball with other managers, to certain parties, or to the homes of others; and that his social relations with management were limited to post-meeting dinners. 25 Fourth, Weaver presented evidence suggesting that Geiger was a racist. Weaver testified that Geiger, after inquiring about an employee's progress and being assured that the employee's performance was acceptable, stated, Well good, because we have had so much trouble with our Hispanic employees. Weaver also reported that he had heard of another employee calling Geiger a racist upon being terminated. Raymond Johnson testified that his supervisor had told him jokingly that Geiger would not promote Johnson because Johnson was black and Geiger was a racist, and that this supervisor routinely hinted that Geiger was racist. Johnson also testified that his observation of his own career and those of other blacks at Casa Gallardo indicated to him that Geiger was racist. 26 Fifth, Weaver and others suggested that certain incidents demonstrated racism among lower management at Casa Gallardo, citing an incident at a Charlotte restaurant when a manager destroyed a black's application for a position at Casa Gallardo and threw it into the garbage. 27 Casa Gallardo presented evidence to contradict the occurrence of some of these events and the interpretation placed by Weaver on others. The district court simply did not accept this rebuttal. While Weaver's evidence was hardly overwhelming, the case was tried by an experienced and able trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and appraise the credibility of the claims that Weaver was not as well qualified as Geiger. The record before us is but typed words. The trial judge may well have concluded that the testimony of Casa Gallardo's witnesses, however plausible when read, was designed to protect the employer and to mask the truth. We cannot, therefore, say that we are left with the firm conviction that the district court erred in finding that Weaver had demonstrated that race was a significant factor in Casa Gallardo's denying him the promotion awarded Geiger. 28 Casa Gallardo contends that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard by finding only that race was a factor, not a significant one. The court correctly stated the legal standard and its opinion as a whole reflects application of the significant-factor test. Its failure on every occasion to add the adjective significant does not portend legal error. 29 2. The Matseas Promotion. With regard to the Matseas promotion, Weaver's prima facie case, Casa Gallardo's rebuttal, and Weaver's attempt to demonstrate pretext take much the same form as they did with the Geiger promotion. Although Casa Gallardo certainly articulated a legitimate reason for promoting Matseas to rebut Weaver's McDonnell Douglas presumption, the evidence of Matseas's superiority is less compelling than the evidence with regard to Geiger, indicating a greater possibility that illegitimate considerations played a significant part in Matseas's promotion. 30 The second Operations Manager position was created and filled in August, 1983. Subsequent to the decision to promote Geiger, Weaver had received one performance review, rating him overall as needs improvement/satisfactory. Matseas had only recently become one of Weaver's peers, having been promoted by Weaver to Assistant Manager, Manager, and General Manager. As General Manager, Matseas received two above average ratings from Weaver, and was then promoted to Area Supervisor in November, 1982. Matseas assumed what had been Weaver's area of supervision, a development that Weaver regarded as a demotion. Geiger's first and only review of Matseas in that capacity appears to give him a rating of satisfactory or needs improvement/satisfactory. 31 Moreover, Matseas appears to have been a problematic Area Supervisor during his short tenure. Two deposition witnesses for Weaver, Raymond Johnson and Richard Starr, were extremely critical of Matseas's management style, stressing his confrontational and intimidating manner. Both Johnson and Starr praised Weaver's relationship with employees, though, as Casa Gallardo observes, neither witness would have reason to be aware of some of Weaver's cited inadequacies, such as recordkeeping, failure to communicate with superiors, and insubordination. Nevertheless, Geiger, who was responsible for Weaver's review in March, 1983, testified that despite these difficulties, Weaver's performance had improved and he was expected to progress at the time immediately before the Matseas promotion. 32 While it is possible that the decision to promote Matseas instead of Weaver was based on a legitimate assessment of their relative abilities or commitment to excellence, given the evidence of their rough comparability as Area Supervisors, coupled with indirect evidence of possible racist contamination of the decision-making process, we cannot fault the district court for arriving at the conclusion that racial discrimination was a significant factor in the decision not to promote Weaver.