Opinion ID: 2292069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: GMR, Ltd.

Text: There is likewise no evidentiary basis for INA's contract claim against GMR. INA does not cite any contractual provision which GMR might have breached, nor does it invite our attention to any testimony supporting its claim. In fact, Mr. Conrad testified that, like Wrecking Corporation, GMR had performed its contractual duties completely. In the absence of any proof of a breach of contract by GMR, the trial court was entirely correct in directing a verdict in its favor on this claim. We reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to the negligence claim against GMR. The question before us here is not the usual one presented in an appeal from a directed verdict for a defendant. In this case the trial court ruled, and GMR does not contest its ruling, that INA made a prima facie showing of negligence. Rather, we must decide whether, as a matter of law, INA's subrogor H&L was contributorily negligent and assumed the risk of GMR's negligence. That a court may direct a verdict on this ground is implicit in several decisions of this court. See, e.g., Phillips v. D.C. Transit System, Inc., 198 A.2d 740 (D.C.1964) (affirming a directed verdict based on evidence of plaintiff's contributory negligence). But see Marshall v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 1374, 1379 (D.C.1978) (contrasting Rule 41 (b) motion to dismiss with Rule 50 motion for directed verdict). Crucial to the trial court's ruling was the testimony of Michael Johns, the engineer hired by INA. Johns testified as an expert that H&L's personnel were not qualified to determine whether shoring and bracing were necessary, but that H&L, as a general contractor, was expected to be familiar with local building and safety codes, including the shoring and bracing regulations. H&L was, according to Johns, derelict in not making sure that the demolition was lawful, and its failure to exercise prudent care was a significant cause of the collapse. From this damaging testimony, a reasonable jury might conclude that H&L failed to exercise the degree of care normally expected of a general contractor, and that its failure was the proximate cause of the building's collapse. A reasonable jury might also find from all the evidence that H&L knowingly assumed the risk of not shoring or bracing, having foregone such safety measures in earlier projects. Then again, a reasonable jury might reject Mr. Johns' expert opinion and find in favor of INA. Neither the trial court nor this court may presume that the jury would have accepted Johns' testimony. No rule of law compels the trier of facts to be bound by the opinion of an expert and he need not surrender his own judgment unless from all the evidence he finds the expert opinion to be correct. Mann v. Robert C. Marshall, Ltd., 227 A.2d 769, 771 (D.C.1967); accord, e.g., Rock Creek Plaza-Woodner Limited Partnership v. District of Columbia, 466 A.2d 857, 859 (D.C.1983) (even when uncontradicted, an expert's testimony is not binding on the court); Hughes v. Pender, 391 A.2d 259, 263-264 (D.C.1978). In directing a verdict for GMR on the negligence claim, the trial court improperly assumed the jury's role as finder of fact. We must therefore reverse for a new trial on the negligence claim against GMR. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the cases in which this court has upheld a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. based on an affirmative defense. In Phillips v. D.C. Transit System, Inc., supra , we affirmed a directed verdict based on the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law. The plaintiff had testified that before entering the intersection where the accident occurred, she stopped and looked both ways; seeing no traffic approaching from either direction, she proceeded into the intersection, where she was hit by a bus. Another witness, however, had testified that at the time the plaintiff stopped, the bus was 250 to 300 feet from the intersection. This court held that the plaintiff had the last clear chance to avoid the collision: there can be no doubt from all the testimony, that had appellant looked effectively . . . she would have been the bus coming toward her. 198 A.2d at 741. While we took note of the testimony of the independent eyewitness, the plaintiff's own testimony was the key to the case. The damaging effect of the plaintiff's testimony was clearer still in Singer v. Doyle, 236 A.2d 436 (D.C.1967). In that case we reversed the trial court's refusal to grant a judgment n.o.v., holding that the plaintiff's testimony proved contributory negligence as a matter of law. As in Phillips, the plaintiff testified that she entered an intersection and failed to see an oncoming car. The only conclusion that may be drawn from appellee's own testimony, we held, is that . . . she failed either to look at all or to look observantly and see what should have been plainly visible. 236 A.2d at 438. In each of these cases, the plaintiff's own testimony did her in; a reasonable jury could hardly disregard the plaintiff's own self-inculpating evidence. See also Young v. Vincent, 310 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir.1962) (It is fundamental that it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict when plaintiff's own testimony undisputably establishes contributory negligence as a matter of law). Here, on the other hand, the evidence supporting the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, while persuasive, was not so conclusive as to compel a verdict for the defendant GMR. We therefore reverse the judgment as to this one claim and remand for a new trial. In all other respects we affirm the judgment below. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.