Opinion ID: 1218510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether dhec has statutory authority under the pollution control act to administratively determine and assess damages against a violator of the pollution control act

Text: The Pollution Control Act provides DHEC with broad authority and power to regulate persons [1] who may pollute the environment of the State of South Carolina and to abate, control, and prevent such pollution. For example, DHEC may make, revoke, or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of the discharge of sewage or other wastes and may also issue, deny, revoke, suspend, or modify permits for the discharge of such wastes. See, S.C. Code Ann. § 48-1-50(3) and (5) (1987). The Pollution Control Act also provides for damages to be recovered from those who violate the provisions of that chapter. S.C. Code Ann. § 48-1-90(b) (1987) specifically provides that any person who discharges organic or inorganic waste into the environment thereby damaging or destroying fish, shellfish, aquatic animals, wildlife, or plant life indigenuous to or dependent upon the receiving water or any property, shall be liable to the State for damage as may be proven. Section 48-1-90(b) also states that such action for damages shall be brought in the name of either the State or DHEC. While the Pollution Control Act does not specifically set forth the forum in which such damages are to be pursued, our review of the various provisions of the Act, reveals that the Act implies that DHEC not only has the authority to administratively assess penalties, but damages as well. As creatures of statute, regulatory bodies such as DHEC possess only those powers which are specifically delineated. City of Columbia v. Board of Health and Environmental Control , 292 S.C. 199, 355 S.E. (2d) 536 (1987). By necessity however, a regulatory body possesses not only the powers expressly conferred on it but also those which must be inferred or implied to effectively carry out the duties for which it is charged. Id. Also, where an administrative agency such as DHEC is acting for the protection of the health of the environment, the delegation of authority to that agency should be construed liberally. Id. Under the Pollution Control Act, DHEC is charged with the responsibility of insuring that the waters of the State are as free of pollutants as possible. To achieve this end, DHEC has been granted broad authority. Implicit in this authority is the power to administratively assess damages which may occur from violations of the Pollution Control Act. The City argues that Section 48-1-90(b) which states in pertinent part that [t]he action [for damages] shall be brought by the State in its own name or in the name of the Department, means that damages may only be pursued in a judicial proceeding in circuit court. The City's interpretation of this section is strained and cannot stand. To accept the City's construction would force DHEC, in a contested case, to first hold an administrative hearing to determine liability for failure to comply with a permit, administer penalties, obtain compliance with a permit, abate a source of pollution and then, institute a judicial proceeding in circuit court to determine liability and damages to be imposed on a person who has violated his permit. The City's construction of Section 48-1-90(b) would not only violate the purpose and the statutory intent of the Pollution Control Act, but would violate common sense and the tenets of judicial economy. The City also misinterprets Section 48-1-50(4) which grants DHEC the authority to institute in a court of competent jurisdiction, legal proceedings, to mean that an action for damages must be maintained in a circuit court. We interpret this section to merely provide DHEC with a judicial forum in which to enforce and compel compliance with previously made determinations of DHEC. Although the City insinuates that a judicial forum is the only forum in which a fair and impartial hearing may be held, there is no basis in law or fact to establish this. See, Babcock Center, Inc. v. Office of Audits , 286 S.C. 398, 334 S.E. (2d) 112 (1985). Further, [t]here is no constitutional objection to [the] legislature giving authorization to an administrative agency to award, as incidental relief in connection with [a] subject delegable to it, money damages where judicial review is available. 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 33 (1983). Here, there can be no valid constitutional objection to DHEC's assessment of damages which is implicitly authorized by the Pollution Control Act when there exists fair and reasonable fact finding procedures in 25 S.C. Code Ann. Reg. 61-72 (1976) and the Administrative Procedures Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310, et seq. (1986), and judicial review is available.