Opinion ID: 1974409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the propriety of the ruling by the motions judge

Text: We affirm the judgment of the motions judge on grounds different from those on which the motions judge relied. See Craig v. United States, 551 A.2d 440 & n. 4 (D.C.1988). Appellant's pro se motion should have been construed by the motions judge as a Rule 35(a) motion. See Byrd v. United States, 500 A.2d 1376, 1378-79 n. 5 (D.C.1985), adopted en banc, Byrd v. United States, 510 A.2d 1035 (D.C.1986) (Since we look to the substance of appellant's pro se request for collateral relief rather than its form, we will consider appellant's entitlement to relief under Super.Ct.Crim.R. 35(a).). See Robinson v. United States, 454 A.2d 810, 813 (D.C.1982). Pursuant to the plain language of Rule 35(a), a motion challenging a sentence imposed in an illegal manner may be made after an unsuccessful appeal. [8] The Rule 35(a) motion must be filed within the jurisdictional time limitation. Robinson, supra, 454 A.2d at 813; see also United States v. Ramsey, 210 U.S.App.D.C. 285, 288, 655 F.2d 398, 401 (1981). [9] In Robinson, we distinguished between motions brought pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110 and Rule 35(a) motions as follows: Although the general provisions of the statute authorizing collateral challenges to a sentence, D.C.Code 1981, § 23-110, could be construed to permit a motion for relief of any kind to be brought at any time, we conclude that Rule 35 imposes a rational complementing limitation on the court's jurisdiction to grant remedies for the different kinds of sentencing error.... [W]here a court of competent jurisdiction imposes a sentence within the limits authorized by the relevant statute, but commits a procedural error in doing so, it is not an abuse of discretion nor unreasonablewhen balancing concepts of fairness and finalityto characterize this sentence as one imposed in an illegal manner under Rule 35(a) and therefore subject to the 120-day jurisdictional limitation for challenge. Id. at 813. [10] Arguably, had the motions judge considered appellant's pro se motion as a motion to correct his sentence pursuant to Rule 35(a), the judge could have properly concluded that the cause and prejudice required for a § 23-110 motion was also required for a Rule 35(a) motion. See Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1282 (D.C.1987); Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985); cf. Frady, supra, 456 U.S. at 167-68, 102 S.Ct. at 1594. We need not reach this issue, however, because, in Part IV, infra, we affirm the judgment of the motions judge on the ground that appellant's sentence was not imposed in an illegal manner.