Opinion ID: 754070
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nichols' proximity to the border supports reasonable suspicion

Text: 43 The district court properly found that the location of the stop in this case was relatively close to the Mexican border. This Court has noted that [w]e have at times focused our inquiry initially on the question of whether arresting agents could reasonably conclude a particular vehicle originated its journey at the border. Id. at 980. As stated, where the agents do not have reason to believe that the vehicle has come from the border, the remaining reasonable suspicion factors must be examined charily. Pallares-Pallares, 784 F.2d at 1233. Consideration solely of distance may show that a vehicle is not likely to have come from the border. See Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722 n. 7 (noting that [v]ehicles traveling more than fifty miles from the border are usually a 'substantial' distance from the border); United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir.1984) (When the stop occurs a substantial distance from the border, we have found this element missing.). When finding that a vehicle did come from the border, however, the court should consider additional factors. See Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722 n. 6 (noting that this issue is resolved by an analysis of the road the vehicle was traveling on, the number of towns along the road, the number of intersecting roads and, finally, the number of miles the vehicle was actually from the border at the point of the stop). 44 In Cardona, under circumstances similar to this case, this Court held that Border Patrol agents had a reasonable suspicion to conclude the vehicle had originated its journey at the border. 955 F.2d at 980. In Cardona, the vehicle, a mid-size passenger car, was between 40 and 50 miles from the border and was uncharacteristic of normal traffic for that road, which consisted mainly of ranch trucks and hunting jeeps. Id. Finally, the vehicle in Cardona was traveling in an easterly direction, and the towns serviced by the western direction of the road were all on or very near the border. Id. 45 In light of Cardona, and common sense, the Border Patrol agents in this case clearly had reason to believe that Nichols was coming from the border. Nichols was only about 30 miles from the border, while Cardona, and other cases have considered proximity to the border to be a factor contributing to reasonable suspicion when the stop occurred up to 50 miles from the border. See id.; see also Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722 n. 7. Here, the agents testified that the only development within 20 miles of the intersection consisted of ranches which, due to the agents' past experience, the cleanliness of Nichols' vehicle, and the lack of a company logo, the officers considered unlikely points of origin for Nichols' truck. In other words, here, as in Cardona, the agents reasonably noticed that the vehicle in question was uncharacteristic of normal traffic for the particular road involved. 46 Furthermore, as in Cardona, the existence of some towns between the border and the intersection at issue does not defeat a determination of reasonable suspicion. In Cardona, we engaged in the following analysis: 47 Here, the vehicle was between 40 and 50 miles from the border. The road is a rural, two-lane highway with approximately 90% of its traffic consisting of ranch trucks and hunting jeeps. The vehicle, a mid-size passenger car, was traveling in an easterly direction, and the towns serviced by the western direction of the road are all on or very near the border. We hold that under these facts the agents had a reasonable suspicion to conclude the vehicle had originated its journey at the border. 48 Cardona, 955 F.2d at 980 (emphasis added). At the suppression hearing in this case, Judge Kazen, one of our most able trial judges, specifically pointed out, in relation to the Border Patrol agent's testimony: 49 If you look at the map and the familiarity that we all have with that area, I mean, we're taking about a kind of nowhere land. 649 really comes from nowhere in particular. It's just a little ranch road that ... a south Texas ranch road that, generally, a Houston utility vehicle, at 5:00 o'clock in the morning, has noting to do there at all unless it's ... unless it's the typical type of vehicle that is there ... stationed there from these oil companies, working the ranches there, and I take it what the gentleman is saying is that those trucks they know because they generally have all of their logos and insignias about what oil company they are and what they're doing there. So here comes a whistle clean, white Houston utility truck at five something in the morning, coming north on 649, which is, as I say, coming essentially from nowhere and going essentially nowhere, and then has this sort of odd conduct at the intersection. 50 (emphasis added). Later in the hearing, while admitting the Border Patrol agent's hand-drawn diagram of the area in question, Judge Kazen continued: 51 For the record, I always keep it here on the bench, 'cause I've done some [sic ] many of these. I keep a state map of this whole area ... and, you know, a map is a map and you sort of take judicial notice of what all those intersections are. 52 As the Supreme Court recently pointed out, in Ornelas v. United States: 53 [A]s a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Having said this, we hasten to point out that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. 54 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 55 In light of this standard, our holding in Cardona, and Judge Kazen's noted consideration of his own knowledge of the area and the Border Patrol agent's experience, as well as his consultation of a map of south Texas, we find that Judge Kazen did not err by finding that the factor of proximity to the border contributed to reasonableness of the Border Patrol agents' suspicion. Although a reasonable conclusion of proximity to the border does not alone constitute reasonable suspicion for a Border Patrol stop that is not at the border or its functional equivalent, this vital element contributes significantly to the reasonableness of the Border Patrol agents' suspicion. See Pallares-Pallares, 784 F.2d at 1233 (holding that, where agents do not have reason to believe that vehicle came from border, the remaining factors must be examined charily); see also, e.g., Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722 n. 6 (This Court considers the fact that a vehicle may have recently crossed the border as a vital element in making an investigatory stop.); Cardona, 955 F.2d at 980 (We have at times focused our inquiry initially on the question of whether arresting agents could reasonably conclude a particular vehicle originated its journey at the border.); United States v. Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.1980) (finding no reasonable suspicion where it was pure speculation on part of agents to opine that defendant's journey originated at border). 56