Opinion ID: 1391736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Request for Appointment of Additional Counsel

Text: (1a) Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his trial counsel's pretrial motion for the appointment of an additional attorney to assist in arguing the case. As previously indicated, prior to trial defense counsel made a series of motions concerning the procedure to be followed at trial, including a motion under section 1095 for the appointment of additional counsel to argue the case. In support of the motion, counsel asserted that in view of the circumstances surrounding the case ... without going into detail, I submit to this Court that such an appointment at this particular stage of an assistant to argue the death penalty phase of this particular case ... would tend to follow the meaning and intent of the Legislature, pursuant to that section [1095], in a case such as this. Without submitting further argument in support of the motion, defense counsel urged that such additional counsel be appointed to sit during the entire trial, in order to become familiar with the case. The court denied the motion. Defendant now contends that (1) section 1095 imposes upon the court a mandatory duty to appoint, on demand, additional counsel to argue the issues of a capital case, and (2) even if section 1095 is deemed discretionary rather than mandatory, the trial court under the circumstances here abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion. Neither contention has merit. Section 1095, enacted in 1872, provides that If the offense charged is punishable with death, two counsel on each side may argue the cause. In any other case, the court may, in its discretion, restrict the argument to one counsel on each side. It is readily apparent from the language of the section that it does not purport to authorize or mandate the appointment of additional counsel at public expense, but only to permit the argument of the case by two counsel. In referring to section 1095 the appellate court in People v. Natale (1962) 199 Cal. App.2d 153, 157 [18 Cal. Rptr. 491], observed, The right guaranteed by this section is applicable only to a defendant who has retained more than one attorney as counsel in the case. It does not give the defendant in a capital case the right to have more than one counsel appointed to represent him, but merely allows a defendant who has retained multiple counsel the right to have at least two of them argue the case. The correctness of the Natale holding is further confirmed by the fact that the subject of appointment of counsel appears in a separate title of the Penal Code, entitled Pleadings and Proceedings Before Trial. (Italics added.) These sections (§§ 987-987.9) explain in detail the nature and extent of a defendant's right to appointed counsel, investigators and experts at public expense. It is significant that section 1095, on the other hand, is included within a subsequent title of the code denominated Proceedings After the Commencement of the Trial and Before Judgment (italics added) under a chapter designated The Trial, which title deals with such matters as challenges to the jury (§ 1055 et seq.), the order of trial and instructions (§ 1093 et seq.) and similar procedural matters. (2a) Defendant contends, however, that regardless of legislative intent, equal protection principles compel an interpretation of section 1095 which will assure to every indigent defendant the absolute right to the appointment of an additional attorney to argue on his behalf at the penalty phase of a capital case. Underlying defendant's argument is the unsupported assumption that any advantage which is available to the wealthy defendant must, of constitutional necessity, be extended to an impecunious one, thus assuring equality of treatment. Equal protection principles, however, do not demand such practical parity. (3) As we noted in In re Antazo (1970) 3 Cal.3d 100 [89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 473 P.2d 999], the equal protection clause does not require `Absolute equality' [citation], is not `a demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons' [citation] and permits a state to `provide for differences so long as the result does not amount to... an invidious discrimination.' [Citation.] (P. 110.) (2b) The assistance of additional legal representation at the penalty phase argument is not a fundamental procedural right akin to the basic right to counsel (see Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 340 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 802-803, 83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733]) or the right to a trial transcript (see Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 19 [100 L.Ed. 891, 899, 76 S.Ct. 585, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055]). Accordingly, equal protection demands are satisfied by permitting the trial court, in its discretion, to appoint additional counsel at public expense if the circumstances in a particular case appear to require such an appointment. (See § 987.9, authorizing payment for investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the defense.) (1b) Defendant alternatively contends, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in summarily denying his motion for additional counsel. He suggests that the trial court should have held a further hearing to determine whether or not the appointment of additional counsel would have been appropriate to assure defendant a fair trial. We cannot agree. Defendant had ample opportunity to explain to the court any additional factors which supported his motion, but he failed to furnish any specific, compelling reasons in that regard. As explained above, counsel, without going into any detail, merely relied upon the circumstances surrounding the case. In an analogous situation involving a defendant's request to participate personally in arguments to the jury, we held that a defendant is required to make a substantial showing that, among other things, the cause of justice will thereby be served. ( People v. Hill (1969) 70 Cal.2d 678, 692-693 [76 Cal. Rptr. 225, 452 P.2d 329]; see also People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44] [right to discharge counsel is not absolute but requires a sufficient showing of substantial impairment of the right to counsel].) Because defense counsel made no factual assertions which might have called for an additional hearing, the trial court was fully authorized to rule on the question based on counsel's argument alone. The case is thus distinguished from Marsden, wherein the trial court failed to afford defendant a fair opportunity to explain the factual basis for his claim of inadequate representation. (See also People v. Lewis (1978) 20 Cal.3d 496 [143 Cal. Rptr. 138, 573 P.2d 40]; cf., Pierce v. United States (D.C.App. 1979) 402 A.2d 1237.) Pierce, supra, relied on by defendant, is similarly inapposite for in that case defense counsel candidly admitted that his lack of prior litigation experience might render his services inadequate and might necessitate additional legal assistance. In the present case, not only was no such admission made, but the trial court had full opportunity to observe counsel in the course of extensive argument on pretrial matters prior to its ruling upon the present motion, and accordingly was well positioned to evaluate counsel's ability. It should be noted that neither the facts nor the legal issues underlying the present case appear to have been so complex as to require the assistance of additional counsel as a matter of law. We conclude, accordingly, that the trial court acted properly and within its sound discretion in denying defendant's motion under section 1095.