Opinion ID: 1560205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interference with Parent-Child Relations

Text: This case presents issues regarding whether the tort of interference with custody and visitation rights exists, and whether a parent, who has both legal custody and visitation rights under court order at the time of the abduction and harboring of minor children, has to plead and prove that he or she has suffered an economic loss as a result of the abduction and harboring. As we have stated, [t]he viability of a legal cause of action is clearly a question of law which, as with all questions of law, this Court shall review de novo. Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 48, 803 A.2d 482, 487 (2002). In the present case, as in any other, when `considering the legal sufficiency of [a] complaint to allege a cause of action for tortious interference, we must assume the truth of all relevant and material facts that are well pleaded and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn from those pleadings.' Lloyd v. General Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108, 121, 916 A.2d 257, 264 (2007) (alteration in original); Sharrow v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 Md. 754, 768, 511 A.2d 492, 499-500 (1986). Mere conclusory charges that are not factual allegations may not be considered. Lloyd, 397 Md. at 121, 916 A.2d at 264-65, citing Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 531, 667 A.2d 624, 631 (1995); Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 443, 620 A.2d 327, 331 (1993). Moreover, in determining whether a petitioner has alleged claims upon which relief can be granted, `[t]here is . . . a big difference between that which is necessary to prove the [commission of a tort] and that which is necessary merely to allege [its commission],' and, when that is the issue, the court's decision does not pass on the merits of the claims; it merely determines the plaintiff's right to bring the action. Lloyd, 397 Md. at 121-22, 916 A.2d at 265 (alterations in original), quoting Sharrow, 306 Md. at 770, 511 A.2d at 500. Furthermore, the court must view all well-pleaded facts and the inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 122, 916 A.2d at 265, citing Board of Education v. Browning, 333 Md. 281, 286, 635 A.2d 373, 376 (1994). This Court apparently first explicitly recognized the torts of abduction of a child from a parent and harboring in Baumgartner v. Eigenbrot, 100 Md. 508, 60 A. 601 (1905). In Baumgartner, an aunt, who had legal guardianship over a teenage girl, sued a husband and wife with whom the girl had chosen to live, alleging that they had abducted the child and harbored her after she had been so abducted. The complaint specifically alleged that defendants abducted and knowingly deprived the aunt of the young woman, that the aunt became greatly attached to her, and that the aunt derived great comfort from [the child's] society as she grew to be larger, thereby incurring non-economic losses. Id. at 509, 60 A. at 601. The trial judge had directed a verdict because of insufficiency of the evidence, and we affirmed, opining that the evidence was not sufficient to meet the elements of abduction and harboring, which we declared were tortious acts: Abduction, in its broadest legal sense, signifies the act of taking and carrying away by force, which may be by fraud, persuasion, or open violence, a child, ward, wife, etc. In its more restricted sense it is confined to the taking of females for the purpose of marriage, concubinage, or prostitution. Id. at 513, 60 A. at 603, quoting 1 Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure 141 (1901), as well as: Abduction is the unlawful taking or detention by force, fraud, or persuasion of a person, as a wife, a child or a ward, from the possession, custody, or control of the person legally entitled thereto. Id., quoting 1 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 163 (2d ed. 1896), and finally: [6] In the law of torts, to harbor is to receive, clandestinely or without [legal] authority, a person for the purpose of so concealing him, that another having the right to the [legal] custody of such persons shall be deprived thereof; . . . or, in a less technical sense, it is a reception of persons improperly. Id. (alteration in original), quoting 15 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 285 (2d ed.1900). After iterating the rule for abduction, we determined that the evidence was insufficient to meet the elements of abduction and harboring: Now, in all this there is not an element of abduction as it has been defined in the authorities cited in an earlier part of this opinion. Confessedly there was no force used. There was no fraud. There was no open violence and there is no evidence to indicate that there was persuasion of any kind. It would be going a long distance beyond what any case has held to say that the facts we have heretofore given in detail fasten upon the defendants or either of them the charge of abduction. And as to the second count of the declaration there is not any evidence whatever to show that Matilda was received clandestinely for the purpose of concealing her from the plaintiff nor is there anything to indicate that her reception by the defendants was in any sense improper. We conclude, then, from this review of the evidence in the record that the court below was entirely right in declining to permit this case to go to the jury. As we find no error in any of its rulings the judgment which was rendered in favor of the defendants will be affirmed with costs. Id. at 516, 60 A. at 604. By doing so, we held that a cause of action was viable against one who abducted a child from a custodian and harbored her. Clearly, the definitions of the torts and our acknowledgment of their existence were pivotal and necessary premises upon which our ultimate conclusion was based, and thus, were holdings in the case. See Black's Law Dictionary 749 (8th ed. 2004) (A holding is a court's determination of a matter of law pivotal to its decision or a ruling on evidence or other question presented at trial.). See also Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 78 S.E. 222, 224 (1913) ( Baumgartner held that if the child was kept in defendant's custody in a clandestine manner an action would lie). Our acknowledgment of the torts of abduction and of harboring in Baumgartner, furthermore, was consistent with substantial authority from many of our sister states, who also were original American colonies, facing the same question. In what appears to be the earliest known and most frequently cited American case on abduction, the South Carolina Court of Law in Kirkpatrick v. Lockhart, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 276 (1809), although primarily concerned with whether it was appropriate to plead abduction in trespass vi et armis or in trespass on the case, relied primarily on the English case, decided in 1600, Barham v. Dennis, 78 Eng. Rep. 1001, and held that a father could sustain an abduction action not only for his son and heir, but for the abduction of any one of his children: It has been decided, that a father may maintain an action of trespass vi et armis, for entering his house, assaulting his daughter, and getting her with child, per quod, 3 Wils. 18. So, an action on the case lies for debauching his daughter, per quod servitium amisit, though she be above the age of twenty-one years, where acts of service are proved. 2 D. and E. 166 and seq. It was always held to lie where the daughter is under twenty-one, though no acts of service are proved, 2 D. and E. 4, 5; and other evidence, besides what applies to loss of service, is admissible. 3 Esp. R. 119. 8 D. and E. 534. I mention these cases, to exhibit the true foundation of these kinds of actions. . . .    The true ground of action cannot be the loss of service, for a child may be of an age so tender, or of a constitution so delicate, as to be incapable of rendering any service. The true ground of action is the outrage, and deprivation; the injury the father sustains in the loss of his child. . . . Years later, in Howell, 78 S.E. at 222, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, when presented with facts remarkably similar to the instant case, also recognized the tort of abduction. In Howell, a father and mother entered into a contract prior to divorce, under which their daughter would remain in the mother's custody until the age of six, at which time the father would become the custodian. Shortly before the child attained the age of six, the mother and her partner abducted the child, and the father sued for damages. In reversing the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Supreme Court of North Carolina discussed at considerable length the history of the tort of abduction in English common law, including Barham, and held that the torts of abduction and harboring were recognized and that a father could bring the cause of action for any of his children: At the common law, abduction of a child was not an offense. State v. Rice, 76 N.C. 194. But Blackstone, 3 Com. 140, holds that a civil action lay therefor, and that a father could recover damages, though he says it was a doubtful question, on which the authorities were divided, whether a father could recover for the abduction of any other child than the oldest son and heir. In Barham v. Dennis, Cro. Eliz. 770, it was held that he could not. But later cases held that an action would lie for taking away any of the children because the parent had an interest in them all. It is interesting to quote the reasoning of the courts at common law as given in Barham v. Dennis, supra. Anderson, Walmsley, and Kingsmil, JJ., said: The father should not have an action for the taking of any of his children, which is not his heir; and that is by reason the marriage of his heir belongs to the father, but not of any other his sons or daughters; and by reason of this loss only, the action is given unto him; the writ in the Register is for the son and heir, or daughter and heir only; which proves that the law has always been taken, that the action lies not for any other son or daughter. And although it hath been said that a writ of trespass lies for divers things whereof none of them are in the Register; and it hath been adjudged that it lies for a parrot, a popinjay, a thrush, and as in 14 Henry VIII for a dog; the reason thereof is, because the law imputes that the owner hath a property in them. . . . But for the taking of a son or daughter not heir, it is not upon the same reason, and therefore not alike. Here the father hath not any property or interest in the daughter which the law accounts may be taken from him. Glanville, J., dissenting, said: The father hath an interest in every of his children to educate them, and to provide for them, and he hath his comfort by them; wherefore it is not reasonable that any should take them from him, and to do him such an injury, but that he should have his remedy to punish it. The majority of the court are sustained by the form of the writ as preserved in Fitz-Herbert's Natura Brevium 90 H., which was of date 12 Hen. IV, 16. But Judge Glanville based his dissent upon reason and justice and has been sustained by subsequent cases. Id. at 223-24 (ellipsis in original). Similarly, the Court of Appeals of New York conducted an extensive analysis of American and English common law in Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650, 651 (1930): An action of trespass for the abduction of a child was originally maintainable by a father where the child abducted was the son and heir and not otherwise. Barham v. Dennis, 2 Cro. Eliz. 770. This was by reason the marriage of his heir belongs to the father, but not of any other his sons or daughters; and, although it had been adjudged that the writ of trespass lay for a parrot, a popinjay, a thrush, and, as 14 Hen. 8 is, for a dog; the reason thereof is, because the law imputes that the owner hath a property in them, whereas the father hath not any property or interest in the daughter, which the law accounts may be taken from him. Later it was held that an action of trespass was maintainable by a father per quod servitium amisit where a child old enough to do him service, other than the heir, was abducted. For the abduction of any other child the action did not lie. Gray v. Jefferies, 1 Cro. Eliz. 55; Hall v. Hollander, 4 B. & C. 660. In the latter case it was said: It is clear that in cases of taking away a son or daughter, except for taking a son and heir, no action lies, unless a loss of service is sustained, Gray v. Jefferies, supra; Barham v. Dennis, supra. The mere relationship of the parties is not sufficient to constitute a loss of service. In the case of an injury inflicted upon a child so immature that it was incapable of rendering service, the parent might have no remedy against the person inflicting the injury. Hall v. Hollander, supra. The principle that the abduction of a child, not the heir, or not capable of rendering service, was a wrong for which the law furnished no civil remedy, was not adopted without protest, nor has it received unqualified approval. Thus in Barham v. Dennis, supra, Glanville uttered a strong dissent, saying: For the father hath an interest in every of his children to educate them, and to provide for them; and he hath his comfort by them; wherefore it is not reasonable that any should take them from him, and to do him such an injury, but that he should have his remedy to punish it. Blackstone was of the opinion that for the abduction of a child, other than the heir, a father might maintain an action, stating that such a wrong was remediable by writ of ravishment or action of trespass vi et armis, de filio, vel filia, rapto vel abducto; in the same manner as the husband may have it on account of the abduction of his wife. Bl. Comm. 140. Based on this, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the cause of action for abduction and harboring existed irrespective of loss of services: In the absence of any New York authority upon the subject [of abduction and harboring] . . . we are disposed to hold broadly, as have courts of North and South Carolina, that in actions for the abduction of immature children from the custody of their lawful custodians, parents, or foster parents, no loss of service need be alleged or proven; that for the direct injury done, a direct recovery may be had without resort to the fiction that a loss of service has been occasioned. Id. at 653. In a more recent case, Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 409 Mass. 842, 571 N.E.2d 340 (1991), which cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 700, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the torts of abduction, harboring and enticement also were recognized causes of action under Massachusetts law and explained how these common law torts formed the basis for the single contemporary tort of interference with parent-child relations: [7] The common law has traditionally recognized a parent's interest in freedom from tortious conduct harming his relationship with his child, and the parent may be compensated therefor when there is interference with the normal parent-child relationship. The tortious conduct referred to [in previous Massachusetts cases] includes the abduction, enticement, and harboring and secreting of minor children from their parents, or in other words, the intentional interference with parental interests or rights. The elements of these causes of action are well established. Abduction is the physical taking of a minor child from the parent having legal custody. An action for enticement will lie where one, through an active and wrongful effort and knowing that the parent does not consent, induces a child to leave the parent's home. One harbors a minor child by inducing or encouraging a child, who is away from the parent without the parent's consent, to remain away from the parent.    We therefore acknowledge the tort of intentional interference with the parent child relationship as a contemporary expression encompassing actions for abduction, enticement, harboring, and secreting of a minor child from the parent having legal custody. Id. at 351, 352 (citations omitted). In total, the torts of abduction and harboring have been recognized in at least eight of the other original American colonies. See, e.g., Selman v. Barnett, 4 Ga. App. 375, 61 S.E. 501, 502 (1908) (holding that one standing in loco parentis can seek general and punitive damages for the abduction and harboring of her child); Plante v. Engel, 124 N.H. 213, 469 A.2d 1299, 1301-02 (1983) (referencing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 700 through common law torts of abduction and harboring); Magee v. Holland, 27 N.J.L. 86 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1858) (holding that a father could recover for the emotional harm caused by the abduction of his child); Moritz v. Garnhart, 7 Watts 302 (Pa.1838) (holding that one standing in loco parentis may maintain an action for the abduction of his daughter's illegitimate offspring). What we glean from these cases, and in particular those cases discussing the English common law, is that the torts of abduction and harboring existed in England prior to 1776, and that, therefore, we adopted them as part of our common law under Article V of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which states in pertinent part that the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England . . . according to the course of that Law, and to the benefit of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six. Nevertheless, this Court was not called upon to address whether abduction and harboring could be the basis of a cause of action for interference with parent-child relations until Hixon v. Buchberger, 306 Md. 72, 507 A.2d 607 (1986), when asked to confront the question of whether, under the common law of Maryland, a cause of action exists, or ought to be recognized, for money damages resulting from the intentional tortious interference by a non-custodial third-party with the visitation rights of a parent. Hixon was the noncustodial parent of a child born out of wedlock who complained of interference with his relationship with the child by the mother's fiancé, Buchberger, who allegedly made belligerent statements to him in the child's presence, made it physically difficult at times for Hixon to take the child with him, and intended to supplant Hixon in the child's mind as the child's father; id. at 74, 75, 507 A.2d at 608; Hixon never alleged that he was physically prevented from taking the child. Based on these allegations, the trial judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In responding to the question posed to this Court by Hixon, Judge Lawrence F. Rodowsky, writing for this Court, analyzed the various causes of action that could have been implicated by the factual averments and concluded that Hixon's allegations were insufficient to sustain a cause of action for assault, battery or the intentional infliction of emotional distress: While Hixon's point is that Buchberger's conduct is a tort for which money damages will lie, Hixon does not allege that the interference constituted an assault or a battery. The complaint does not undertake to describe conduct which is `so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,' Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 567, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment d (1965)), and Hixon does not argue that Buchberger committed an intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 77, 507 A.2d at 609. Judge Rodowsky immediately then opined that [o]ur decisions involving interference with the relationship between parent and child do not assist Hixon's position, and recognized that abduction and enticement were the precursor causes of action for interference with parent-child relations. Id. at 77, 507 A.2d at 609, citing Kenney v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 101 Md. 490, 61 A. 581 (1905) (suit dismissed for insufficient evidence of enticement or service), Baumgartner, 100 Md. 508, 60 A. 601, and Loomis v. Deets, 30 A. 612 (Md.1894) (insufficient evidence of enticement or harboring). He then quoted with approval from the Restatement (Second) of Torts in which the elements of the tort are elucidated: [O]ne who, with knowledge that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to the parent. Id. at 78, 507 A.2d at 610. He continued the discussion with citation to the primary cases upon which Hixon relied, one being Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F.Supp. 706 (W.D.Mo.1984), in which a mother sued the government for tortious interference with the parent-child relationship when the government suddenly removed her child with his father and placed both in the Witness Protection Program in violation of her ongoing visitation rights. The mother alleged that she had habitually seen her child after school each day, that on the day of removal her child simply disappeared, and that she lost all contact with the child for nearly four years. Over the government's contentions that Missouri did not recognize a tort for interference with a parent's visitation rights, the United States District Court Judge determined that under state law a parent with either custody or visitation rights could pursue a cause of action for interference with the parent-child relationship. Id. at 713. See also Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.1985), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a money judgment in favor of a non-custodial father for the intentional infliction of emotional distress when the child's mother moved from New York to Virginia with the child, and the father did not discover the child's whereabouts for over four years; L.S.J. v. E.B., 672 S.W.2d 937 (Ky.Ct.App.1984), permitting a non-custodial mother to counterclaim for damages for tortious interference when a child's foster parents brought an action to terminate the mother's parental rights in violation of the foster parent's agreement with the governing state agency; Bartanus v. Lis, 332 Pa.Super. 48, 480 A.2d 1178 (1984), allowing damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on wrongful enticement and harboring of a child away from the parent. After elucidating the possible causes of action and discussing these cases, we concluded that Hixon failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Hixon's factual allegations were insufficient, when juxtaposed against those allegations determined to be sufficient in other cases involving the tort of interference with parent-child relations: It is apparent from the foregoing review that the interference alleged here falls short, by a considerable distance, of the more substantial interferences presented in many of the cases relied upon by Hixon. The belligerent words described by Hixon are a relatively minor interference. Indeed, the nature of the interference alleged here is so minor that it is doubtful whether most courts would recognize it as mounting up to a tortious interference with custody rights, remediable by damages, were the same verbal exchange to have taken place when a custodial parent might be picking up a child at the end of a visit with a noncustodial parent. Consequently we need not decide in this case whether, or, if so, under what circumstances a damage action might lie for interference with visitation rights. We hold simply that a parent or that parent's ally who, without committing any tort presently recognized in Maryland, speaks hostilely to the other parent about that parent's exercise of custody or visitation rights does not thereby become liable in damages. Id. at 83, 507 A.2d at 612. In concluding that Hixon's allegations were insufficient when compared to the more substantial interferences presented in many of the cases relied upon by Hixon, we not only recognized that the tort of interference with parent-child relations was extant, but also defined the elements and applied them to the factual allegations. [8] Id. In the present case, Shannon's Complaint is sufficient to have survived a motion to dismiss. He alleged that the Appellants abducted and harbored his children in knowing interference with his custody right, when to obtain his consent they led him to believe that they were taking the boys to New York to visit relatives and would return them on Sunday, August 26, 2001, but in reality, they intentionally and calculatedly had planned to, and did, abduct the boys and harbor them in Egypt. Shannon also averred that he was entitled to custody of the boys at the time when they were abducted and harbored because he had been granted legal custody of Adam and because with respect to Jason, he had a specific visitation planned for the night of August 26, 2001, and a right to ongoing visitation with him thereafter. Assuming the truth of all well-pleaded, relevant, and material facts in the complaint and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, we conclude that Shannon sufficiently alleged the elements of the tort of interference with parent-child relations and that the trial court did not err when denying the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.