Opinion ID: 793777
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Continued Vitality of the Feeney Amendment post-Booker

Text: 8 Mr. Grigg submits that the district court incorrectly interpreted the Feeney Amendment as cabining the court's discretion to impose a non-Guidelines sentence; to read the Feeney Amendment in such a way, according to Mr. Grigg, is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Booker. Because Mr. Grigg did not object to the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines at his hearing, however, we must review the district court's decision only for plain error. United States v. Lafuente, 426 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir.2005). We shall overturn the judgment of the district court if its error was plain, affected the defendant's substantial rights and rose to the level of a miscarriage of justice. Id. 9 In Booker, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge's mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines violates the Sixth Amendment when facts increasing the sentencing range have been found by the judge, rather than stipulated to by a defendant or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243-44, 125 S.Ct. 738. As a remedy, the Court severed and excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which mandated that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, the district court impose a sentence within the applicable guidelines range. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46, 125 S.Ct. 738. The Court, however, had no occasion to mention § 3553(b)(2)—the provision added to the statute by the Feeney Amendment, which governs the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to sexual offense crimes. See PROTECT Act, § 401(b), 117 Stat. at 668-69; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2). We now must confront the question of whether Booker's rationale for excising § 3553(b)(1) from the statute also extends to § 3553(b)(2). 10 Although this is a question of first impression for us, the Second and Tenth Circuits have determined that § 3553(b)(2) possesses the same Sixth Amendment defect as does § 3553(b)(1). See United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.2005) (There is no principled basis for distinguishing subsection 3553(b)(1) from 3553(b)(2) with respect to the rationale of Booker. ); United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d 1139, 1146 (10th Cir.2005) ([W]e hold that treating the Guidelines as mandatory—regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced under § 3553(b)(1) or § 3553(b)(2)—is error.); United States v. Sharpley, 399 F.3d 123, 127 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2005) ([W]e see no unique feature of Guidelines sentences for child crimes and sexual offenses that would prevent them from violating the Sixth Amendment in the same manner as Guidelines sentences for other crimes.). 11 We concur with our sister circuits. According to § 3553(b)(2), when sentencing defendants for crimes involving children and sexual offenses, the district court shall impose a sentence within the calculated guidelines range, unless it finds mitigating circumstances that have been affirmatively and specifically identified as a permissible ground of downward departure in the sentencing guidelines or policy statements issued under section 994(a) of title 28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(ii); see also id. § 3553(b)(2)(iii). This language mirrors that of § 3553(b)(1); the sole difference between the two subsections is that § 3553(b)(2) restricts stringently the mitigating circumstances that qualify for a downward departure, whereas § 3553(b)(1) defines those circumstances more broadly. Compare id. § 3553(b)(1) (Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) . . . .) (emphasis added), with id. § 3553(b)(2) (In determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission, together with any amendments thereto by act of Congress.) (emphasis added). 12 In reviewing § 3553(b)(2) in light of Booker, we conclude that it violates the Sixth Amendment by mandating a sentence within the range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines. It was precisely this requirement that the Supreme Court found constitutionally objectionable in Booker. Given the similarities between the two subsections, we believe the same objections voiced by that Court also apply to § 3553(b)(2). In reaching this conclusion, we join the Second and Tenth Circuits and hold that § 3553(b)(2) is subject to the same remedy that Booker imposes: excising and severing the mandatory language and replacing it with an advisory Guidelines regime under which sentences are reviewed for reasonableness. See Selioutsky, 409 F.3d at 117; Yazzie, 407 F.3d at 1145-46; Sharpley, 399 F.3d at 127 n. 3; see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-63, 125 S.Ct. 738. 13 We are mindful of Congress' view, expressed in the PROTECT Act, regarding prosecuting and sentencing child kidnappers and sexual offenders. Although we must hold today that § 3553(b)(2) cannot constrain the discretion of a district court to impose a sentence outside the range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, we nevertheless believe that district courts, in the course of selecting an appropriate sentence, ought to give respectful attention to Congress' view that crimes such as Mr. Grigg's are serious offenses deserving serious sanctions. 2 14