Opinion ID: 1738770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: is the city of jackson immune from liability in this case under the mtca?

Text: ¶ 9. The MTCA provides the exclusive civil remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for acts or omissions which give rise to a suit. L.W. v. McComb Separate Mun. Sch. Dist., 754 So.2d 1136, 1138 (Miss.1999); see Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7(1)(Supp.2001). Any tort claim filed against a government entity or its employee shall be brought only under the MTCA. The MTCA waives sovereign immunity from claims for money damages arising out of the torts of governmental entities and their employees. However, certain circumstances are exempt from this waiver of immunity. L.W., 754 So.2d at 1139. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9 (Supp.2001). ¶ 10. Two such exemptions from waiver are germane to the case sub judice: (1) a governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment, or duties shall not be liable for any claim: . . . (b) Arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity exercising ordinary care in reliance upon, or in the execution or performance of, or in the failure to execute or perform, a statute, ordinance or regulation, whether or not the statute, ordinance or regulation be valid; . . . i.Based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused; Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9 (Supp.2001). ¶ 11. In Jones v. Mississippi Dep't of Transp., 744 So.2d 256, 260 (Miss.1999), this Court addressed the matter of discretionary functions as follows: The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the majority of acts in the day-to-day operations of governmental activities involve the exercise of some form of discretion, however, not all of these acts are protected under the exception. In determining the scope of the acts protected under the exception, the Supreme Court held that only those functions which by nature are policy decisions, whether made at the operational or planning level, are protected. `[T]he purpose of the exception is to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.' In discerning whether a function is afforded immunity under the discretionary function, it must first be determined whether the activity involved `an element of choice or judgment.' If so, it must then be determined `whether the choice involved social, economic or political policy.' Id. (emphasis added & citations omitted) (citing United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991)). In determining whether governmental conduct is discretionary so as to afford the governmental entity immunity, this Court adopted the public policy function test as set out in United States v. Gaubert.  Id. ¶ 12. However, this does not end the analysis. Even if the government entity and its employee can pass the public policy function test, and the act or omission is held to be discretionary, it does not absolve ... [the government entity and its employee] from using ordinary care in the exercise of their discretion. Leflore County, 754 So.2d at 1227, (citing Jones, 744 So.2d at 262-64). Where the state actor fails to use ordinary care there is no shield of immunity. Id. ¶ 13. The City of Jackson contends that if the act or omission is not statutorily imposed, it is discretionary, and as such not subject to the waiver of immunity. In support of this contention, the City cites L.W. and argues that this Court recognized the existence of a state or federal law obligating the conduct at issue, rendered it ministerial and not discretionary. Thus, the focus of the analysis was whether there was a state (or federal) law that created a legal obligation on the part of the governmental entity. There exists no such law in this case. The City further argues that Stewart failed to point to any state or federal law which obligates the City to insure that Stewart is attended at all times by a city employee while she enters the Adult Day Center, and therefore the actions of the City were clearly discretionary. However, the City of Jackson completely ignores this Court's subsequent decision in Jones, where we adopted the public policy function test requiring even discretionary acts to be in furtherance of public policy in order to be granted immunity. Further, the City completely ignores this Court's decision in Givens where we required that discretionary acts in furtherance of public policy must still be performed with due care.
¶ 14. Stewart argues that the City's abandonment an elderly and infirm patron to make her way alone from the City of Jackson's van up two (2) ramps and into the adult day care center was not discretionary conduct. In the analysis of whether an act of negligence alleged is ministerial or discretionary conduct, this Court has acknowledged that it is not always easy to determine whether a public official's conduct is ministerial or discretionary in any given case. T.M. v. Noblitt, 650 So.2d 1340, 1345 (Miss.1995). Since both statutory and common law immunity require a determination of discretion, prior case law can be used to define discretionary conduct. L.W., 754 So.2d at 1141. A duty is discretionary if it requires the official to use her own judgment and discretion in the performance thereof. Noblitt, 650 So.2d at 1343 (citing Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 158 So. 922, 923 (1935)). ¶ 15. In contrast, an act is ministerial (if) the duty is one which has been positively imposed by law and its performance required at a time and in a manner or under conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the conditions specified not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion. L.W., 754 So.2d at 1141. However, even if the court deems the act to be ministerial: [The governmental entity] and its employees are protected from liability while performing or failing to perform a statutory duty so long as ordinary care is exercised. However, when ordinary care is not exercised, neither ... [the governmental entity] nor its employees will be protected from liability for performing or failing to perform a statutorily imposed duty. Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland Sch. Dist., 764 So.2d 1234, 1240 (Miss.1999). ¶ 16. The duty to transport the Center's patrons, including Stewart, was a contractual obligation, not a statutorily imposed duty. Determining whether certain patrons needed assistance walking from the van to the Center clearly involved judgment and choice. As such, the decision to allow Stewart to walk unassisted was not ministerial, but instead discretionary. However, that merely satisfies the first prong of the three-prong analysis necessary to determine whether the City of Jackson and Spiller are covered by a grant of immunity.
¶ 17. Stewart agues that even if some element of choice or judgment was present in the abandonment of this elderly and infirm lady prior to her fall, this choice involved no social, economic or political policy. In adopting the public policy function test, we said, only those functions which by nature are policy decisions, whether made at the operational or planning level, are protected. Jones, 744 So.2d at 260. [T]his Court must distinguish between real policy decisions implicating governmental functions and simple acts of negligence which injure innocent citizens. Gale v. Thomas, 759 So.2d 1150, 1162 (Miss.1999). ¶ 18. We agree with Stewart that this case does not involve real policy decisions implicating governmental functions. Rather, it involves allegations of simple acts of negligence. As such, it fails the second prong of the public policy function test. Even though the acts or omissions of the City of Jackson and Spiller were indeed discretionary, they are not the type of discretionary acts or omissions contemplated as granting immunity by the MTCA. Therefore, they are discretionary acts or omissions that do not enjoy sovereign immunity.
¶ 19. Stewart contends that even if the City of Jackson and Spiller can survive the public policy function test as adopted by this Court in Jones, at the very least, a factual dispute exists as to whether the City of Jackson and Spiller used due care in the exercise of their discretion or if they failed to take reasonable steps to minimize the risk of personal injury, as required by the this Court in Givens. ¶ 20. As this Court has stated, even if the act or omission is deemed discretionary, [w]here the state actor fails to use ordinary care there is no shield of immunity. Givens, 754 So.2d at 1227. The issue of ordinary care is a fact question. L.W., 754 So.2d at 1142. The question of whether ordinary care was, in fact, exercised is for the trial court, sitting without a jury, to decide. Lang, 764 So.2d at 1240. We recently clarified this duty of ordinary care referred to in L.W. where we said: This Court held that public schools have a responsibility to provide a safe environment for students; therefore ordinary care and reasonable steps must be taken to minimize risk to students. In other words, ordinary care must have been used before a school can use the statutory shield of immunity. The issue of ordinary care is a fact question that should be decided in the trial court ... We do not find that the duty turns upon the issue of whether the function was discretionary or ministerial. Instead, L.W. stands for the proposition that the school district has a duty of ordinary care with respect to providing a safe environment for its patrons. Pearl Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Groner, 784 So.2d 911, 915 (Miss.2001) (citations omitted). In Groner, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for a factual determination on ordinary care because the trial judge made no reference to ordinary care in his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 916. ¶ 21. We agree with Stewart, that even if the City of Jackson and Spiller had passed the public policy function test, the fact that the trial court did not address the issue of ordinary care would be in itself grounds for reversal. ¶ 22. We hold that Stewart's first assignment of error is well taken.