Opinion ID: 2750422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the people's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; cf. S.C. Const. art. I, § 10. At its core, the Fourth Amendment stands [for] the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). Accordingly, warrantless searches and seizures inside a man's home are presumptively unreasonable absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984); Wright, 391 S.C. at 442, 706 S.E.2d at 327.5 Likewise, the Fourth Amendment extends the same protection to a home's curtilage, including a porch. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–15 (characterizing the front porch as a classic exemplar of the curtilage); accord State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 209, 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009). However, the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). For this reason, mere visual observations from public thoroughfares do not constitute a search, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012), and police officers need not shield their eyes when passing by a home, California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). Rather, the Fourth Amendment is not triggered unless a person has an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy, Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring), or unless the government commits a common-law trespass for the purpose of obtaining information, Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. Moreover, 'Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.' Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)); accord State v. Hiott, 276 S.C. 72, 78, 276 S.E.2d 163, 166 (1981). Thus, while the Fourth Amendment protects people, and not places, the extent to which 5 Even searches conducted under facts unquestionably showing probable cause are unconstitutional absent a warrant, for the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer be interposed between the citizen and the police.' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (alteration in original) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963)). the Fourth Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134; Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171–72. This is not to say that a person cannot have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142–43. Rather, to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he had an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. Carter, 525 U.S. at 88 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143–44 & n.12); State v. McKnight, 291 S.C. 110, 115, 352 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1987); see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 136–39 (rejecting the target theory, in which anyone who was the target of an illegal search has an automatic right to challenge the search, regardless of where the search occurred). The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure by demonstrating he had an expectation of privacy in the area illegally searched. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130 n.1; accord Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–05 (1980); State v. Crane, 296 S.C. 336, 340–41, 372 S.E.2d 587, 589 (1988); see also In re Bazen, 275 S.C. 436, 437–38, 272 S.E.2d 178, 178 (1980) (If the officer was not to approach [an open garage where a disturbance was occurring] . . . , appellant had ample opportunity to in some manner demonstrate an expectation of privacy in the garage. Instead, he did nothing. (citing State v. Easterling, 257 S.C. 239, 185 S.E.2d 366 (1971)). In determining whether the criminal defendant met his burden, courts may consider factors such as: a. whether the defendant owned the home or had property rights to it;6 b. whether he was an overnight guest at the home;7 6 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980). 7 Carter, 525 U.S. at 90; Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 93, 96–97 & n.6 (1990); State v. Missouri, 361 S.C. 107, 110, 115, 603 S.E.2d 594, 595, 597 (2004); State v. Flowers, 360 S.C. 1, 6, 598 S.E.2d 725, 728 (Ct. App. 2004). c. whether he kept a change of clothes at the home;8 d. whether he had a key to the home;9 e. whether he had dominion and control over the home and could exclude others from the home;10 f. how long he had known the owner of the home;11 g. how long he had been at the home;12 h. whether he attempted to keep his activities in the home private;13 i. whether he engaged in typical domestic activities at the home, or whether he treated it as a commercial establishment;14 j. whether he alleged a proprietary or possessory interest in the premises and property seized (even if only at a motion to suppress, 8 Olson, 495 U.S. at 97 n.6; Missouri, 361 S.C. at 110, 115, 603 S.E.2d at 595, 597; Flowers, 360 S.C. at 6, 598 S.E.2d at 728. 9 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149 (discussing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled on other grounds by Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 85); Missouri, 361 S.C. at 110, 115, 603 S.E.2d at 595, 597. 10 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149 (discussing Jones, 362 U.S. at 257); Flowers, 360 S.C. at 6, 598 S.E.2d at 728. 11 Carter, 525 U.S. at 91; Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105; Missouri, 361 S.C. at 110, 115, 603 S.E.2d at 595, 597. 12 Carter, 525 U.S. at 90; Missouri, 361 S.C. at 110, 115, 603 S.E.2d at 595, 597. 13 Olson, 495 U.S. at 99; Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149 (discussing Katz, 389 U.S. at 352); Missouri, 361 S.C. at 110, 115, 603 S.E.2d at 595, 597; Bazen, 275 S.C. at 437–38, 272 S.E.2d at 178. 14 Carter, 525 U.S. at 90–91; Missouri, 361 S.C. at 110, 115, 603 S.E.2d at 595, 597. where that admission cannot be used against him to determine his guilt)15; and k. whether he paid rent at the home.16 As an initial matter, the parties dispute who had the burden of proving the alleged illegality of the police officers' actions here. Each party has the burden to prove separate things during the motion to suppress. The State bears the burden to demonstrate that it was entitled to conduct the search or seizure under an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. State v. Gamble, 405 S.C. 409, 416, 747 S.E.2d 784, 787 (2013). The State also bears the burden to show that the warrantless entry was limited in scope and duration in accordance with the exigent circumstances which required its presence. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion). However, the criminal defendant retains the burden to establish that he is asserting his own Fourth Amendment rights, rather than vicariously asserting the rights of others; therefore, the defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that he had an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy in the place illegally searched. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130 n.1. Here, assuming arguendo that the police officers committed a Fourth Amendment violation when they entered the porch of Apartment 122 without a warrant, the burden rests with Petitioner to establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the porch of Apartment 122. Petitioner failed to carry his burden, as he produced no testimony whatsoever that would implicate any of the factors set forth, supra, demonstrating that he had an expectation of privacy in the porch of Apartment 122. At no point did Petitioner claim to be the renter, an overnight guest, or have any other connection to Apartment 122. Thus, we find that Petitioner was merely present with the consent of the householder, and as such, did not have a reasonable 15 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148; Crane, 296 S.C. at 340–41, 372 S.E.2d at 589; Neeley, 271 S.C. at 43, 244 S.E.2d at 528 (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973)); but see Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 92 (We simply decline to use possession of a seized good as a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.). 16 Missouri, 361 S.C. at 110, 115, 603 S.E.2d at 595, 597; Flowers, 360 S.C. at 6, 598 S.E.2d at 728. expectation of privacy on the porch of Apartment 122. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 90; accord Robinson, 396 S.C. at 584, 722 S.E.2d at 823–24 (Furthermore, there is no evidence [Petitioner] was an overnight guest or otherwise had a connection to the premises or apartment lessee to give him a reasonable expectation of privacy. [Petitioner] failed to establish that he had an expectation of not being discovered on the porch, nor did he ask the police to leave.). Petitioner contends that our consideration of his expectation of privacy in the porch of Apartment 122 is both unnecessary and inappropriate. Citing United States v. Jones17 and Florida v. Jardines,18 Petitioner argues that any time the police commit an unauthorized trespass onto private property, the trespass is per se a violation of the Fourth Amendment, which anyone can assert; therefore, there is no need to engage in an expectation of privacy analysis. We disagree. In both Jones and Jardines, the Supreme Court found that the police officers who conducted warrantless searches of the defendants' property committed Fourth Amendment violations, solely because of the officers' unauthorized entry onto and use of the defendants' property. In so finding, the Supreme Court focused primarily on a common law trespass test, involving licenses to enter and use private property. See, e.g., Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415–17. Importantly, in both cases, the Supreme Court noted that the defendants were the owners of the property searched, or otherwise definitively had the right to assert any alleged Fourth Amendment violations.19 Thus, because the Government's trespasses violated the Jones and Jardines defendants' own Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court was not required to address the interplay between the trespass test and the defendants' reasonable expectations of privacy. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; cf. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133–34 ('Fourth 17 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 18 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 19 See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1413 (stating that the criminal defendant was the homeowner); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 n.2 (stating that the criminal defendant's wife owned the vehicle searched, that the criminal defendant was the exclusive driver of the vehicle, that the Government did not challenge the court of appeals' holding that the vehicle registration did not affect his ability to make a Fourth Amendment objection, and that the Supreme Court therefore refused to consider whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle). Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.' (quoting Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174)). As an example of this interplay, if the police commit a warrantless trespass on a homeowner's land, and search and seize the homeowner or his property, the homeowner clearly could assert a Fourth Amendment violation because he would be asserting his own right to be free of governmental searches and seizures on his own property. The homeowner would satisfy both Jones and Katz, because not only could he demonstrate an unauthorized trespass, but also that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home. In contrast, here we are presented the situation in which a casual guest wishes to assert an alleged trespass on another's property. Petitioner maintains that the officers' entry onto the curtilage of Apartment 122 satisfies Jones's trespass test, and that consideration of Petitioner's reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz is thus irrelevant. We cannot accept such a proposition, as it ignores the factual dissimilarities between his own case and the defendants in Jones and Jardines—particularly, the lack of any substantial connection to the property allegedly trespassed upon. Today we hold that, even if the ultimate Fourth Amendment violation a criminal defendant seeks to vindicate is a trespass under Jones, the defendant must demonstrate that he had an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy in the area upon which the police illegally trespassed. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130 n.1 (The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.). In doing so, we merely reaffirm the long-standing notion that a defendant must establish that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the illegal entry, rather than vicariously asserting the Fourth Amendment rights of the property owner. In other words, establishing that an illegal trespass occurred is not enough to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 960 (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 713 ([A]n actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.)); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 136–39 (finding targets of illegal searches do not have an automatic right to challenge the search, regardless of where the search occurred). Accordingly, because Petitioner made no showing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the porch of Apartment 122, he failed to establish that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. We find the court of appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's refusal to suppress the illegal drugs and gun.20