Opinion ID: 60360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Gracia contends that three instances of prosecutorial misconduct at trial constitute grounds for reversal: The prosecutor's (1) references to Valenzuela-Montoya's guilt; (2) comments on Gracia's silence in custody and decision not to testify; and (3) bolstering of the agents' testimony during rebuttal closing argument. For the reasons set forth below, we agree that the prosecutor's bolstering of the agents' testimony constituted reversible plain error. As we reverse and remand on this basis, we do not address whether the prosecutor's references to Valenzuela-Montoya's guilt and comments on Gracia's silence also constitute independent or cumulative grounds for reversal.
Gracia's trial counsel did not contemporaneously object to the prosecutor's comments regarding the agents' testimony, [1] so we apply the plain error standard of review. [2] To demonstrate reversible plain error, Gracia had to show that (1) there is error; (2) it is plain; and (3) it affected his substantial rights. [3] Even if he could meet that burden, we still would have discretion to decide whether to reverse, which we generally will not do unless the plain error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding. [4]
Gracia points to four remarks by the prosecutor that bolstered the credibility of the agents who interviewed him. First, the prosecutor expressed his opinion to the jury that the agents were very, very credible witnesses (Statement One). Second, the prosecutor asked the jurors rhetorically whether they thought that an agent who has worked as a law enforcement agent for many years, that is his career, that is his chosen life, a man from this area, a man with a family, do you think that he would throw all that away by taking this stand and taking an oath and lying to you to get Mr. Gracia; and whether the agents would put their careers and criminal prosecution on the line for committing the offense of aggravated perjury (Statement Two). Third, the prosecutor told the jury: I'm going to ask you to respect their efforts as law enforcement officials and to believe the testimony that they offered (Statement Three). Fourth, the prosecutor admonished the jurors that, to acquit Gracia, they would have to believe that the agents got out of bed on the day they arrested Gracia and decided that this was the day that [they] were going to start [a] conspiracy to wrongfully convict Mr. Gracia (Statement Four). Gracia insists that these remarks constituted reversible plain error. The government concedes that Statements One and Three may have been improper, but nevertheless contends that all four statements were harmless error.
We first turn to the question whether the statements at issue constituted error, defined as deviation from a legal rule. [5] When we do, we conclude that each remark highlighted by Gracia indisputably was an improper, or erroneous, deviation from a legal rule. The Supreme Court's decision in Berger v. United States makes clear that a personal assertion by a prosecutor of a government witness's credibility is impermissible. [6] The American Bar Association's standards for prosecutors echo this sentiment: The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant. [7] The government may not cloak a witness in its protective mantle. [8] A prosecutor may argue fair inferences from the evidence that a witness has no motive to lie, but cannot express a personal opinion on the credibility of witnesses. [9] As the government concedes, it is impermissible per se for a prosecutor to offer personal assurances to the jury that government witnesses are telling the truth, as in Statement One, [10] or to tell the jury that law enforcement witnesses should be believed simply because they were doing their job, as in Statement Three. [11] Although the government does not concede that Statements Two and Four were errors, we cannot meaningfully distinguish the prosecutor's admittedly improper remarks and those that the government does not concede were errors. All four statements urge conviction based not on the objective evidence before the jury or its independent judgment of the witnesses' credibility, but on something uniquely within the prosecutor's knowledge. We have held it improper for a prosecutor to ask a jury the rhetorical question whether federal agents would risk their careers to commit perjury, as in Statement Two. [12] We have deemed improper an unequivocal statement by a prosecutor that, for the jurors to believe the defense's account, they would have to believe in a government conspiracy, as in Statement Four. [13] The subject remarks of Gracia's prosecutor share the same basic flaw: A prosecutor's impermissible assertion of his own credibility, or that of the government, to bolster the credibility of a witness. As we held in United States v. Gallardo-Trapero , it is particularly improper, indeed, pernicious, for a prosecutor to seek to invoke his personal status as the government's attorney or the sanction of the government itself as a basis for convicting a criminal defendant. [14] As the power and force of the government tend to impart an implicit stamp of believability to what the prosecutor says, [15]  here, that the agents were credible witnesses  all four of the prosecutor's statements constituted error.
We next turn to the question whether the prosecutor's errors were plain, which we define as clear and obvious. [16] The government urges us to put the prosecutor's remarks in the context of counsel for Gracia's earlier innuendo that the agents were less than forthcoming. We agree that the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's remarks should not be weighed in a vacuum, and we recognize that the trial record contains statements by counsel for Gracia indirectly implying that the agents might not be altogether truthful. [17] Thus, the prosecutor's attempts to vouch for the agents' credibility should be seen as a response to Gracia's effort to discredit the agents. We weigh the magnitude of the prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's obviously improper statements in this context. Nevertheless, the context in which each of the prosecutor's improper remarks must be tested is also shaped by his other three improper remarks. Just as we must evaluate the prosecutor's statements in the context of Gracia's earlier attempts to suggest that the agents could be prevaricating, we cannot separately consider each of the prosecutor's erroneous remarks in a framework that excludes his other near-simultaneous, similar attempts to bolster the credibility of the agents. Although we recognize that, in assessing prejudice, occurrences of prosecutorial misconduct ordinarily must be viewed individually, [18] the four remarks about which Gracia cries foul occurred within minutes of each other during the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument. In this instance, the cumulative effect of these proximate comments was greater than the sum of its parts. The prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's statements thus must be weighed in pari materiae. Our analysis would be deficient if we were simply to assess the isolated prejudice resulting from each error standing alone, without temporally and substantively connecting each remark to the prosecutor's witness-bolstering efforts in his rebuttal closing argument. When we review the prosecutor's remarks within this context, we conclude that his errors were clear and obvious. The four at-issue statements were neither isolated nor limited, but were cumulative components of a single diatribe, indisputably geared toward bolstering the agents' testimony, and thus constituting plain error.
This case ultimately turns on the third step in our analysis  whether the prosecutor's improper statements affected Gracia's substantial rights. This step sets a high bar. [19] The determinative question is whether the prosecutor's remarks cast serious doubt on the correctness of the jury's verdict. [20] Gracia contends that the prosecutor's remarks did so by placing the government's weighty imprimatur on the only evidence linking him to a crime, i.e., the agents' testimony. The government counters that even if the prosecutor's statements were legally improper and thus erroneous, they were harmless, i.e., Gracia's substantial rights were not affected, thereby preventing the statements from rising to the level of reversible plain error. [21] To determine whether the prosecutor's errors affected Gracia's substantial rights, we first examine the effect of the court's cautionary instructions. The district court did help to mitigate the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's violations somewhat by generically instructing the jury that it was their duty to base [their] verdict solely upon the evidence without sympathy or prejudice, that they must consider only the evidence presented during the trial, to [r]emember that any statements, objections or arguments made by the lawyers are not evidence ..., and to remember that [w]hat the lawyers say is not binding.... We presume that such instructions are followed unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the instruction and there is a strong probability that the effect of the improper statement is devastating. [22] Gracia is correct, of course, that the court could have crafted more subjectively detailed instructions geared toward mitigating the prejudicial effect of these particular erroneous remarks, but we do not agree that it is invariably impossible to purge the taint of a prosecutor's prejudicial comments with merely generic cautionary instructions. The generalized instructions the court gave to the jury did serve, if only moderately, to reduce the degree of prejudice of the tainted remarks. This brings us to the next element of our consideration, i.e., the strength or weakness of the government's case against the defendant. Even crediting the district court's cautionary instructions, we are convinced that the prosecutor's statements, considered as a whole, prejudicially affected Gracia's substantial rights when viewed in comparison to the dearth of other evidence of Gracia's guilt. Simply put, other than the agents' testimony, there is none. Gracia's alleged confession was neither recorded nor transcribed. The sophisticated hidden compartment containing the drugs beneath the floor of the car would not have been apparent to an unknowing passenger. The $1,000 seized by the agents was taken from Valenzuela-Montoya, not from Gracia. Gracia's purported contact in Houston (Gerardo or Geraldo) was never located. Although Gracia did try to make himself gag by putting his fingers down his throat during the early stages of his detention at the B&M Bridge, guilty knowledge cannot be presumed, as the government urges, from such a tertiary circumstantial fact, especially given the fact of Gracia's serious health problems which require frequent dialysis treatments. Neither can guilty knowledge be inferred from the fact that Gracia did not appear surprised or upset when the agents told him that they had discovered drugs in the Impala. Indeed, if Gracia had appeared upset or surprised, the government would likely have urged us to infer guilty knowledge from that, too. [23] The simple reality of this case is that Gracia's conviction turned entirely on the jury's evaluation of the credibility of the agents who interviewed him at the B&M Bridge. Plainly put, absent the jury's crediting of the agents' testimony, Gracia could not have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the paucity of other evidence. The prosecutor's imprudent statements unacceptably placed the government's weighty stamp of approval on the only evidence indicating Gracia knew of the cocaine in the Impala's floor, viz., the agents' testimony. The cumulative prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's four erroneous statements in quick succession clears the high bar necessary to affect Gracia's substantial rights and thus to constitute reversible plain error when viewed in the context of the minor mitigating effect of the generic cautionary instructions and the dearth of evidence of guilt other than the bolstered testimony of the agents. The prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's comments seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of Gracia's judicial proceeding. The case law is replete with examples of improper witness bolstering by prosecutors found to be reversible plain error. In United States v. Garza , for example, we held that a prosecutor's repeated vouching for the credibility of witnesses constituted reversible plain error. [24] In United States v. Corona, we held that a prosecutor's statement that he was proud of one of the government's witnesses affected the defendant's substantial rights and constituted reversible plain error. [25] In addition to this court, other circuit courts have held similar instances of witness bolstering to be reversible plain error. [26] We acknowledge that, more often than not, we have held instances of witness bolstering by prosecutors to be error but have gone on to find such error harmless rather than reversing the jury conviction of a defendant. [27] The instant matter is distinguishable from the cases in which we have refused to reverse convictions, however, because of the degree of the prosecutor's violations in comparison to the dearth of evidence of Gracia's guilty knowledge. As Gracia could not have been convicted without the agents' testimony, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor's bolstering constituted an unprofessional but harmless attempt to right the scale and rebut defense counsel's earlier veiled innuendo that the agents might be less than fully truthful. In this case, the jury's determination of guilt or innocence hinged entirely on whether Gracia had knowledge of the hidden drugs and that, in turn, hinged entirely on the credibility of the agents. The relative strength of the government's case is telling. The prosecutor's plainly erroneous statements led the jury to substitute the government's credibility assessment of its own agents for the jurors' independent credibility call, thereby casting serious doubt on Gracia's guilty verdict. We are convinced that, under the discrete facts of this case, the prosecutor's remarks affected Gracia's substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of his trial.