Opinion ID: 1292236
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Margin-of-Error and Legal-Drug Arguments.

Text: A. The margin-of-error argument. The parties signed a stipulation of facts that included a confirmatory laboratory report showing that Comried's blood contained 80 ng/ml of methamphetamine. This stipulation was not modified in any way by the claim Comried now asserts  that perhaps a margin of error had not first been deducted from the test. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(10) (requiring deduction for margin of error). If Comried had raised this issue at trial, the State would have had an opportunity to present evidence as to whether the lab complied with this statutory requirement. All we have before us, and all the district court had before it, is a laboratory report that shows the presence of methamphetamine. The defendant did not raise any argument based on section 321J.2(10) in his motion to adjudicate law points or at the hearing on it. Any objection to the validity of the laboratory report based on section 321J.2(10) has been waived. B. The legal-drug argument. Comried also contends it is necessary to establish an arbitrary cutoff to reduce the chance of being convicted for driving with legal drugs in his system. Comried did not raise this argument in his motion to adjudicate law points or in the stipulation of facts. In any event, it is not necessary for us to read into the statute an arbitrary cutoff test to ameliorate the consequences of legal drug ingestion because the legislature has already dealt with that contingency. Iowa Code section 321J.2(7)( b ) states: When charged with a violation of subsection 1, paragraph  c , a person may assert, as an affirmative defense, that the controlled substance present in the person's blood or urine was prescribed or dispensed for the person and was taken in accordance with the directions of a practitioner and the labeling directions of the pharmacy, as that person and place of business are defined in section 155A.3. Comried did not assert an affirmative defense on this basis. We conclude that the statute in question is clear and unambiguous and that any amount means any amount greater than zero. Other courts have reached this conclusion as well. See, e.g., Hammonds, 968 P.2d at 604 (flat ban on driving with a controlled substance in the body upheld); Kevinezz v. State, 265 Ga. 78, 454 S.E.2d 441, 442 (1995) (As `any amount' necessarily means any amount greater than zero, we hold that [the statute] provides adequate notice that a person who ingests marijuana or any other drug specified in [the statute] and then drives a motor vehicle does so at his or her own peril....); Bennett v. State, 801 N.E.2d 170, 176 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (flat-ban statute upheld on basis it is rational for the legislature to impose the flat ban with regard to controlled substances while not imposing the same ban with regard to alcohol). In analogous cases, statutory provisions against possession of any amount of drugs have been interpreted similarly. See State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 11-13 (Iowa 1998) (the any amount statute is violated by proof of defendant's possession of a detectable amount of cocaine); see also State v. Fletcher, 221 Neb. 562, 378 N.W.2d 859, 862-63 (1985) (reaffirming that statute prohibiting possession of drugs in any quantity banned possession of any identifiable amount); State v. Wood, 117 N.M. 682, 875 P.2d 1113, 1115-16 (Ct.App.1994) (any amount satisfied by showing any identifiable amount of drugs); State v. Henry, 116 Or.App. 138, 840 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Ct.App.1992) (possession-of-drug statute violated by possessing even a trace of methamphetamine). We agree with the district court that Comried operated a motor vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(1)( c ), and because it caused a death, he is guilty of violating section 707.6A(1) as well.