Opinion ID: 1907719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: ms. park's extra year

Text: The majority also upholds against constitutional challenge the five-year mandatory minimum sentence which Jae Hoa Park received for possession of 13 grams of powdered cocaine with intent to distribute it (PWID). If the contraband in question had been crack cocaine (cocaine base), a far more addictive and dangerous substance, then Ms. Park's minimum sentence would have been only four years. In my opinion, the imposition of the fifth year of Ms. Park's mandatory minimum sentence deprives her of liberty without due process of law. I can find no rational basis whatever for requiring her to serve a mandatory additional year in prison. An examination of the Omnibus Narcotic and Abusive Drug Interdiction Amendment Act of 1990 (ONADIAA), [21] and of its legislative history, [22] persuades me that, in all probability, the five-year mandatory minimum for minor dealers in powdered cocaine was included in the statute unintentionally, perhaps as a result of administrative error. If the extra year was intended, it is unconstitutional.
The government cannot and does not dispute the proposition that crack cocaine is a great deal more dangerous than the powdered form of the drug. Crack is far more addictive than cocaine. It is far more accessible due to its relatively low cost. And it has experienced an explosion of popularity. United States v. Cyrus, 281 U.S.App.D.C. 440, 443, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (1989). The United States Sentencing Guidelines treat distribution of one gram of crack as being equivalent, for purposes of sentencing, to the distribution of 100 grams of powdered cocaine. See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 754 (7th Cir.1991). The validity of such dramatically disparate treatment has been consistently sustained by the courts, for Members of Congress considered cocaine base to be more dangerous to society than cocaine because of crack's potency, its highly addictive nature, its affordability, and its increasing prevalence. Senator D'Amato addressed specifically the reasoning underlying the `100 to 1 ratio': `Because crack is so potent, drug dealers need to carry much smaller quantities of crack than of cocaine power. By treating 1,000 grams of freebase cocaine no more seriously than 1,000 grams of cocaine power, which is far less powerful than freebase, current law provides a loophole that actually encourages drug dealers to sell the more deadly and addictive substance, and lets them sell thousands of doses without facing the maximum penalty possible.' 132 Cong.Rec. S8092 (daily ed. June 20, 1986). United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 978-79 (8th Cir.1990) (footnote omitted); see also id. n. 9; accord, Lawrence, supra, 951 F.2d at 754. In enacting the ONADIAA, the Council of the District of Columbia likewise recognized that crack is more dangerous than powdered cocaine. Under that legislation, a defendant who distributes 50 or more grams of crack is a major dealer. By contrast, a trafficker who sells less than 500 grams of powdered cocaine is treated as a minor dealer. See D.C.Code § 33-541(c)(1)(A-2)(ii). There is only one explanation for this ten-to-one ratio; the Council knew that a small amount of crack can do a great deal more harm than a like amount of cocaine powder.
The ONADIAA was enacted in substantial part in order to provide penalties for major drug traffickers which are more severe than those imposed upon minor dealers. In addressing the background and need for the proposed legislation, the Judiciary Committee stated: One problem with the original mandatory minimum initiative (D.C.Law 4-166) was that it treated all drug traffickers the same, regardless of the amount of drugs involved. ONADIAA REPORT at 2. The bill therefore establishe[d] a new tiered structure by distinguishing between a major and a minor dealer for drug distribution convictions. Id. at 3.
In order to explain the logical and constitutional problems presented by Ms. Park's sentence, I now reproduce the table which Judge Ferren has helpfully included in the opinion of the court. See maj. op. at 88. CRACK COCAINE OTHER COCAINE POWDER NARCOTICS Major Dealer Major Dealer Major Dealer (50 + grams) (500 + grams) (500 + grams) 1st 5 years 5 years 5 years offense 2nd or 10 years 10 years 10 years subsequent offense CRACK COCAINE OTHER COCAINE POWDER NARCOTICS Minor Dealer Minor Dealer Minor Dealer (Less than (Less than (Less than 50 grams) 500 grams) 500 grams) 1st 4 years 5 years 4 years offense 2nd 7 years 8 years 7 years offense 3rd or 10 years 10 years 10 years subsequent offense The careful reader will discern that the penalties reflected in this table are, for the most part, logical and consistent with one another. Major dealers are punished more severely than minor dealers, and a recidivist will receive more time for repeating his nefarious misdeeds. The one glaring exception is the penalty for distribution of cocaine powder. For a first offense, a major dealer in cocaine powder receives a mandatory minimum sentence of five years. Remarkably, however, a first-time minor dealer receives exactly the same minimum sentence. Compare this treatment with the provisions for major and minor dealers in other drugs. A major dealer in crack cocaine, or in other narcotics, receives a five year mandatory minimum. His or her minor dealer counterpart, however, receives only four years. With respect to crack cocaine and other narcotics, Judge Ferren's table confirms the sentencing scheme as described by the Judiciary Committee. Major dealers receive an extra year in prison. With respect to powdered cocaine, on the other hand, the distinction between major and minor dealers  the raison d' tre of the ONADIAA  has been abandoned or ignored. Everyone who distributes powdered cocaine receives the same mandatory minimum, regardless of the amount distributed. With respect to this single drug, the conditions that caused the Council to enact the ONADIAA continue unabated  identical sentences remain for major and minor dealers, contrary to the stated legislative design. The second incongruity of the sentencing scheme for cocaine powder is that the minor dealer in that particular drug receives a more severe mandatory minimum sentence than his counterpart who sells far more addictive and far more dangerous crack cocaine. The Judiciary Committee Report contains no explanation for this unexpected result, which translates into an odd proposition: the more dangerous the contraband, the lighter the penalty. I know of no rational explanation for such a rule. Human beings are finite creatures. They make mistakes. I believe that this is what happened here. [23] I consider it highly improbable that the Councilmembers intentionally ignored the difference between major and minor dealers in powdered cocaine. I likewise do not believe that they really meant to impose a more severe mandatory minimum sentence on the seller of a less dangerous drug than on the distribution of a more dangerous one. Rather, I suspect that the wrong number may have been written into the statute as a result of somebody's error. [24] If the Council did intend the anomalous results which the statutory numbers suggest, then in my view the Constitution has been transgressed.
In this jurisdiction, as in others, legislative enactments are protected by a presumption of constitutionality. Hornstein, supra, 560 A.2d at 533. The question is whether Ms. Park has overcome that presumption by showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, id., that her sentence violates the Fifth Amendment. Ms. Park's burden is a formidable one, but I am satisfied that she has met it. Ms. Park contends in essence that the sentence imposed upon her has deprived her of liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. [25] The guaranty of due process demands only that a law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained. Lapides v. Clark, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 101, 102, 176 F.2d 619, 620, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860, 70 S.Ct. 101, 94 L.Ed. 527 (1949); see also Gibson v. United States, 602 A.2d 117, 119-20 (D.C. 1992) (applying rational basis test to allegation that defendant's sentence violated equal protection principles). The test, then, is one of rationality. [O]ur determination of the existence of a rational basis for the distinction contained in the statute is limited to whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it. Gibson, supra, 602 A.2d at 120 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The legislature is not required to articulate its reasons for enacting the challenged provision; if the reasons for the legislative action are plausible, judicial inquiry is at an end. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 461-62, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980); Backman v. United States, 516 A.2d 923, 928 (D.C.1986) (per curiam) (Ferren, J., concurring in the result). Conversely, if the reasons for the Council's actions are not plausible  if the legislation lacks a rational basis  then it does not pass constitutional muster.
The ONADIAA contains no explanation of the extra year for powdered cocaine. In its brief, however, the government hypothesizes that the Council rationally could have believed that small dealers in cocaine powder are less likely than small dealers in cocaine base to be addicts who sell simply to support their habits. Thus, the Council could conclude, low-level dealers in cocaine base generally do not deserve the more severe punishment due low-level dealers in cocaine powder. Converting understatement into an art form, my colleagues in the majority say that the government's argument seems strained. Maj. op. at 89. I would have used a more emphatic adjective. The government's position is based on the notion that the Council decided, in the ONADIAA, to treat the distribution of small quantities of a less addictive substance more severely than the distribution of more dangerous ones. Such a legislative design would represent a dramatic departure from this jurisdiction's controlled substances laws, which have always been predicated on the theory that the more dangerous the drug, the more severe the penalty. In the District, the distribution of marijuana  probably the least addictive and harmful of the drugs which have been in vogue in recent years  is a misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum of a year in prison. See D.C.Code §§ 33-541(a)(2)(D), -522. Trafficking in addictive hard drugs, on the other hand, e.g. heroin, PCP, and crack cocaine, is a felony punishable by incarceration for thirty years, id. § 33-541(a)(2)(A), and was subject to a mandatory minimum until the enactment of the MMSAA. Moreover, as I have noted, both Congress and the Council were aware that crack is more addictive and more dangerous than powdered cocaine. If the Council had really intended to punish the sale of powdered cocaine more severely, then some mention of such a radical change of direction would surely have found its way into the Judiciary Committee Report. See NOW v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 274, 276 (D.C. 1987). It did not. [26] The government theorizes that the Council may have believed that sellers of crack cocaine are more likely than distributors of powdered cocaine, and that they should therefore be punished less severely. The addict exception, however, was already a part of the law of the District of Columbia before the ONADIAA was enacted. See D.C.Code § 33-541(c)(2). Sellers of crack cocaine who qualified for the addict exception were not subject to mandatory minimum sentencing at all. Accordingly, it would make no sense to enact a lower mandatory minimum for a distributor of crack than for a seller of powdered cocaine on the theory that the former is more likely to be an addict. The qualifying addict who sold crack would not be affected by the mandatory minimum, however high or low it may be set. In my opinion, there is nothing even approaching rationality in the government's imaginative hypothesized rational basis for the incongruous treatment of crack and powdered cocaine. If, as I suspect, the Council made an administrative error, then such an error surely cannot provide the rational basis which the Constitution requires before a defendant can be arbitrarily compelled to serve an additional year in prison. If the Council did it on purpose  and I simply cannot believe that this is what occurred  then the extra year must fall anyway, for the only proffered explanation of it is contrary to reason. We are dealing here with a year of Ms. Park's life. Before she can be lawfully incarcerated for so much additional time for dealing in a less dangerous drug, some plausible reason must exist for such treatment. Plausibility cannot be manufactured by resort to imaginative hypotheses. The government's argument fails.
Counsel for Ms. Park asks us, in the event of a determination of unconstitutionality, to strike down in its entirety the mandatory minimum sentence for small dealers in powdered cocaine. The government persuasively argues that such a remedy is unnecessarily drastic, and that the proper remedy, in the event we find a constitutional violation, is to reduce Ms. Park's mandatory minimum sentence to four years. [27] On this limited issue, I agree with the government's argument, subject of course to my view, set forth in Part I of this opinion, that no mandatory minimum sentence at all can lawfully be imposed on Ms. Park.