Opinion ID: 2171181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Pleading Extrinsic Facts

Text: Demurrant urges also that inasmuch as the instrument purported to be a contract between the owner and contractor was, by its terms, not binding upon contractor until accepted by the contractor and the space for such acceptance was not executed, there was no contract, that no one was or could be prejudiced by any terms of the instrument, false or otherwise, and, therefore, the offense of forgery was not pleaded; that to found a charge of forgery upon the reference instrument required the declaration of other facts to reveal how some one's rights could be or were prejudiced, and if falsely altering be the basis of the charge, that the genuine instrument should be pleaded together with the alleged alteration. These contentions have limited applicability. The charge is not based upon an act of forging or falsely altering, but knowingly uttering (offering as good, Wharton's Criminal Law 12th Ed. § 910) a forged instrument with intent to defraud. The elements are (a) a forged or falsely altered instrument within a category covered by the statute, (b) known by the utterer to be forged or falsely altered, and (c) utterance of the same with intent to defraud. 23 Am.Jur., Forgery § 5; Clark v. State, 114 So.2d 197, 200 [2], 80 A.L.R.2d 261 (Fla. App.1959) on a statute materially the same as ours. The extent to which the contentions recited above are appropriately examined in the present case goes only to the question of whether the document here allegedly forged or falsely altered is an instrument falling within our statute, whereon a charge of uttering may be founded. Is it a written instrument of another or purporting to be such by which any pecuniary obligation is or purports to be created? The terms of the instrument do not require that acceptance by the Modernizing Company be entered in the space provided on the document. The Modernizing Company may have accepted the proposed contract orally or by other writing, in which event pecuniary obligations are created on the part of the contracting parties. If proof discloses no acceptance by the Modernizing Company, we are left with the question of whether this instrument is one, or purports to be one, by which any pecuniary obligation purports to be created. In such event the document may validly be considered an offer on the part of the person represented by the other signatory to the paper to become bound to the terms of the contract which the paper represents, which offer would remain in effect until terminated by revocation, death, rejection or by lapse of time. Such offer until terminated purports (intends, is designed, means, if genuine) to create a contract and establish a pecuniary obligation. The reference instrument is within the meaning of our statute and an instrument upon which a charge of uttering may be based. To constitute the offense of uttering, it is in no case requisite to show that the accused had been implicated in the (act of) forgery. Wharton, supra § 919; Levy v. State, 225 Md. 201, 170 A.2d 216, 218 [2-6] (1961) certiorari denied 368 U.S. 865, 82 S.Ct. 113, 7 L.Ed.2d 62. The offenses of forging and uttering a forged instrument are distinct. State v. Blodgett, 143 Iowa 578, 121 N.W. 685, 688 (1909); Commonwealth v. Miller, 115 S.W. 234, 236 (Ky.1909). The fact that the indictment does not allege, in detail, the manner of forgery is not fatal, for the means adopted to produce the instrument are not material. Hazen v. Mayo, 90 So.2d 123, 124 [1, 2] (Fla.1956). Criticisms 3 and 4 in support of respondent's exceptions, except as discussed above, have no application. Exceptions sustained. Demurrer sustained. Indictment quashed.