Opinion ID: 1382539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Protected Status under West Virginia Law

Text: The Hospital claims that Mr. Stone could not invoke the protection of our Human Rights Act's prohibition against disability discrimination because he did not provide evidence that would allow a jury to conclude that he fit within the statute's threshold protected person definitional requirement  of being a person with a disability. In Syllabus Point 2 of Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 198 W.Va. 51, 479 S.E.2d 561 (1996), we stated: To state a claim for breach of the duty of reasonable accommodation under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va.Code, 5-11-9 (1992), a plaintiff must allege the following elements: (1) The plaintiff is a qualified person with a disability; (2) the employer was aware of the plaintiff's disability; (3) the plaintiff required an accommodation in order to perform the essential functions of a job; (4) a reasonable accommodation existed that met the plaintiff's needs; (5) the employer knew or should have known of the plaintiff's need and of the accommodation; and (6) the employer failed to provide the accommodation. (Emphasis added.) Thus, to have the status of being a protected person who can assert a claim for disability discrimination, a person must show that he is a disabled person [or person with a disability] within the meaning of the law. Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Company, 198 W.Va. 51, 71 n. 22, 479 S.E.2d 561, 581 n. 22 (1996). Prior to 1989, our Human Rights Act statute prohibited employment discrimination against an individual [who] is handicapped; handicap was defined as any physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities. W.Va.Code, 5-11-3 and -9 [1981]. [12] Based on this definitional language, in Chico Dairy Co. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 181 W.Va. 238, 382 S.E.2d 75 (1989), we held that the Human Rights Commission did not have statutory authority to issue regulations that would give protected person status to bring a disability discrimination claim  not only to persons with actual substantially limiting impairments (actual disability claims) [13]  but also to persons who did not actually have significantly limiting impairments, but who were regarded, perceived, or treated as having a disability (regarded-as claims). In 1989, the definition of disability was amended by our Legislature to expand protected status to make a disability discrimination claim under our Human Rights Act to include not only persons who actually have substantially limiting impairments, but also to persons who have a record of such impairments or who are regarded as having such impairments. W.Va.Code, 5-11-3(m) [1998]. [14] The regulations implementing the Human Rights Act, W.Va.Code of State Regulations 77-1-2.8 [1994] further delineate the definition of regarded as having an impairment as meaning: 1. Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by another as being such a limitation; 2. Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities, only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or, 3. Has none of the impairments defined above but is treated by another as having such an impairment. (Emphasis added.) This new statutory and regulatory language provides a broader definition  defining who may have protected status as a person with a disability within the meaning of the law who can assert a disability discrimination claim  than the pre-1989 law did, including for the first time explicit protection for persons with regarded-as disabilities. See Fourco Glass Co. v. W.Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 181 W.Va. 432, 383 S.E.2d 64 (1989). Since 1989, then, under our Human Rights Act, W.Va.Code, 5-11-1 et seq., a person with a disability within the meaning of the law is a person who has one or more physical or mental impairments that substantially limits one or more major life activities; a person who has one or more physical or mental impairments that does not substantially limit one or more major life activities, but that is treated by others as being such a limitation; a person who has one or more physical or mental impairments that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; and a person who has no such impairments, but who is treated by others as having such impairments. W.Va.C.S.R. 77-1-2.8 [1994]. Applying the broader post-1989 definition, in St. Peter v. Ampak-Division of Gatewood Products, Inc., 199 W.Va. 365, 484 S.E.2d 481 (1997) ( per curiam ), we rejected the argument that an employee who had injured his shoulder and needed to work a limited schedule because he would need physical therapy was not a protected person under the Human Rights Act, because he was allegedly not actually limited in a major life activity. Noting that the 1989 statute was meant to change the law, we held that the employee, who was fired after his employer said that he was half a man, could invoke the protection of the Human Rights Act with a regarded as disabled claim, without proving that he actually had a substantially limiting impairment. 199 W.Va. at 370, 484 S.E.2d at 486. Thus, West Virginia law, in terms of whether a person is a person with a disability within the meaning of the law, Skaggs, supra, 198 W.Va. at 71 n. 22, 479 S.E.2d at 581 n. 22, who has standing to assert a claim under the protection of our disability discrimination law, has gone from a narrower definition to a broader definition. And under both definitions, whether a person is a person with a disability within the meaning of the law is ordinarily an issue of fact for a properly instructed jury or other fact-finder applying the appropriate definitional test set forth in the statute and implementing regulations. Strawderman v. Creative Label Co., Inc., 203 W.Va. 428, 508 S.E.2d 365 (1998) ( per curiam ) (under post-1989 law whether a person with a migraine had an impairment that qualifies as an actual disability was to be determined by the trier of fact); Teets v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., Federal No. 2, 187 W.Va. 663, 421 S.E.2d 46 (1992) ( per curiam ) (under pre-1989-law it was a jury question whether a woman's impairments substantially limited her in her employment.) See also cases cited supra at note 13. 2.