Opinion ID: 2634555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: retrospectivity and prospectivity of sentencing amendments

Text: Our holding is controlled by three of our prior decisions dealing with retrospectivity and prospectivity of sentencing amendments: Cruz, Smith, and Varga. We recently analyzed Cruz and Smith in Varga. All these cases required us to apply successive amendments to the SRA, which changed the basis for offender score calculations. Offender scores, of course, determine presumptive sentencing ranges. As we noted in Cruz, before the 1990 amendment to the SRA, a defendant who had 10 years in the community without a felony conviction was effectively entitled to have that conviction disappear from the calculation of his offender score. Cruz, 139 Wash.2d at 189, 985 P.2d 384; former RCW 9.94A.360 (1988 Supp.). Cruz was convicted of rape in 1975 and spent more than 10 years in the community without another felony conviction. Cruz, 139 Wash.2d at 188, 985 P.2d 384. His conviction had washed out. Id. at 189, 985 P.2d 384. In 1990, the legislature amended the statute by eliminating sex offenses from the wash out provision. LAWS OF 1990, ch. 3, § 706. In 1994, Cruz was charged and found guilty of the rape of a child in the first degree. Cruz, 139 Wash.2d at 187, 985 P.2d 384. His 1975 conviction was included in his offender score. Id. at 188, 985 P.2d 384. The issue before the court was whether by resurrecting Cruz's 1975 conviction the 1990 amendment to the SRA violated federal and state constitutional protections against ex post facto legislation. However, upon review, we found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues because we found no legislative intent to apply the legislation retroactively. The presumption against retroactive application of a statute is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law affords the individual citizen. That presumption `is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.' Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439, 117 S.Ct. 891, 895, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)). See also In re Personal Restraint of Shepard, 127 Wash.2d 185, 193, 898 P.2d 828 (1995) (court presumes newly enacted statutes operate prospectively). The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation is but a further manifestation of the repugnance with which such retroactive legislation is viewed. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266, [114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)]. Cruz, 139 Wash.2d at 190-91, 985 P.2d 384. In Cruz, we also observed that assuming constitutional concerns were satisfied, the SRA could be applied retroactively, but only if the legislative intent to do so is clearly found within the statute's language. Id. at 191, 985 P.2d 384. We determined that the legislature intended that the 1990 SRA amendments apply prospectively. Id. We reasoned that the 1990 amendments would have to be applied retroactively to require Cruz's sentencing court to include his previously washed out 1975 rape conviction when calculating Cruz's offender score because [t]he 1990 change to the SRA would not serve to change Cruz's existing criminal history (which did not include the 1975 rape as it had washed out in 1987) unless it was applied retroactively to revive the previously washed out offense. Id. at 193, 985 P.2d 384. The legislature responded with additional amendments to the SRA. Smith, 144 Wash.2d at 672, 30 P.3d 1245; LAWS OF 2000, ch. 26, § 2. The relevant 2000 SRA amendment stated: Any sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the current offense was committed. LAWS OF 2000, ch. 26, § 2. In a statutory note, the legislature explained: This act is intended to cure any ambiguity that might have led to the Washington supreme court's decision in State v. Cruz , Cause No. 67147-8 (October 7, 1999). A decision as to whether a prior conviction shall be included in an individual's offender score should be determined by the law in effect on the day the current offense was committed. This act is also intended to clarify the applicability of statutes creating new sentencing alternatives or modifying the availability of existing alternatives. LAWS OF 2000, ch. 26, § 1. In Smith, we again addressed the issue of the prospectivity or retroactivity of changes in criminal history. Smith, 144 Wash.2d at 672-75, 30 P.3d 1245. In Smith, we examined four consolidated cases, which we described as involving previously washed out criminal history. Id. at 668, 30 P.3d 1245. One of the cases, Lowe, involved facts legally indistinguishable from the cases now before us. Id. at 669, 30 P.3d 1245. Our opinion in Smith observed that the legislature had expressed discontent with our opinion in Cruz, and that the 2000 amendments contained no language showing the legislature intended the 1997 amendment to apply retroactively. Id. at 672-73, 30 P.3d 1245; accord Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 184-85, 86 P.3d 139. We concluded that the 1997 amendment was neither curative nor remedial and could not be applied retroactively to revive appellants' previously washed out convictions. Smith, 144 Wash.2d at 674, 30 P.3d 1245. Following our opinion in Smith, the legislature again responded with another SRA amendment. Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 183, 86 P.3d 139; LAWS OF 2002, ch. 107, § 1. Criminal history was redefined. [5] Additionally, the amendment provided: The fact that a prior conviction was not included in an offender's offender score or criminal history at a previous sentencing shall have no bearing on whether it is included in the criminal history or offender score for the current offense. Accordingly, prior convictions that were not counted in the offender score or included in criminal history under repealed or previous versions of the sentencing reform act shall be included in criminal history and shall count in the offender score if the current version of the sentencing reform act requires including or counting those convictions. LAWS OF 2002, ch. 107, § 3(18). Lastly, the legislature stated that the 2002 SRA amendment applies only to current offenses committed on or after the effective date of this act. No offender who committed his or her current offense prior to the effective date of this act may be subject to resentencing as a result of this act. LAWS OF 2002, ch. 107, § 4. The amendments went into effect on June 13, 2002. RCW 9.94A.525, .030. In Varga, we again agreed to examine the consolidated petitions of eight persons who were sentenced for offenses which occurred after the effective date of the 2002 amendment to the SRA. Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 187, 86 P.3d 139. Our task was to determine whether, following the 2002 amendment to the SRA, it was proper for the sentencing judges to include convictions which would have washed out based upon prior statutes and court opinions. Id. We interpreted the 2002 amendment to the SRA as a clear expression from the legislature within the statute itself to redefine criminal history to be applied prospectively rather than retrospectively. Id. at 191, 193, 86 P.3d 139. In Varga, we stated, [h]ere, the legislature clearly intended that the amendments apply prospectively at sentencing for crimes committed on or after June 13, 2002. Id. at 190-91, 86 P.3d 139. We further stated: These amendments explicitly state that a defendant's criminal history includes washed out convictions. LAWS OF 2002, ch. 107, § 2(13). Further, the legislature directed sentencing courts to consider these previously washed out convictions when calculating offender scores if the current version of the SRA requires consideration of that type of conviction. LAWS OF 2002, ch. 107, § 3(18). Id. at 191, 86 P.3d 139. To review, we have applied sentencing statutes prospectively and have thus declined to apply the definition of criminal history to retroactively revive previously washed out convictions. See Smith, 144 Wash.2d at 674-75, 30 P.3d 1245 (holding 1997 SRA amendment does not apply retroactively to revive appellants' previously washed out juvenile adjudications); see Cruz, 139 Wash.2d at 193, 985 P.2d 384 (holding 1990 SRA amendment does not apply retroactively to revive defendant's 1975 offense that washed out under former version of the SRA); see In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 111 Wash.2d 353, 361, 759 P.2d 436 (1988) (holding 1986 SRA amendment to wash out provision which took effect after defendant's sentencing not applicable); cf. State v. Dunaway, 109 Wash.2d 207, 216, 743 P.2d 1237, 749 P.2d 160 (1987) (holding 1987 SRA amendments to definition of `[s]ame criminal conduct' not applicable to defendants' 1984 and 1986 offenses). In Varga, we recognized a clearly stated legislative intent announced in the 2002 SRA amendment. Under the current SRA, no offender has a vested right in the definition of criminal history in effect when a previous crime was committed. The legislature has asserted the power to change the way offender scores are calculated. LAWS OF 2002, ch. 107, § 1. As we stated in Varga, [t]he legislature may prospectively amend the SRA to require that courts include previously `washed out' convictions when calculating offender scores and has done so by the plain language of the 2002 SRA amendments. Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 202, 86 P.3d 139. Courts are to apply the definition of criminal history in effect at the time the offense was committed to calculate the sentence for that offense. It is important that the law be clear, understandable, and predictable. Accordingly, we follow the doctrine of stare decisis and our analysis of the respective amendments to the SRA in Cruz, Smith, and Varga. The circumstances presented by LaChapelle and Westfall [6] are not precisely the same as those presented in Cruz. In Cruz, the appellant's 1975 conviction counted as criminal history but then washed out because he went 10 years after his release without a conviction. LaChapelle and Westfall's convictions for offenses before their 15th birthdays never counted as criminal history; so they technically never washed out because they never existed as criminal history under the SRA in effect at the time of their offense. Analytically, however, we see little difference between offenses that wash out by the passage of time and those that never counted as criminal history. The circumstances of defendant Michael Lowe in Smith are legally indistinguishable from those of LaChapelle and Westfall. Although Lowe's juvenile offenses never counted as part of his criminal history, we treated them as having been previously washed out because they occurred before he reached age 15. Smith, 144 Wash.2d at 669, 30 P.3d 1245. Whether criminal history is erased by time or simply did not exist because of statute is immaterial to our analysis of retroactive or prospective application. LaChapelle and Westfall committed their offenses before the 2002 amendment to the SRA, and therefore are controlled by our decision in Smith. Consequently, LaChapelle and Westfall's juvenile convictions committed before the age of 15 are not to be counted in calculating their offender scores for these offenses. [7]