Opinion ID: 755346
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Procedural Violations of the ESA

Text: 29 Before initiating any agency action in an area that contains threatened or endangered species or a critical habitat, the agency must (1) make an independent determination of whether its action may affect a protected species or habitat, or (2) initiate a formal consultation with the agency that has jurisdiction over the species. See generally Peterson, 753 F.2d at 763. If an agency determines that an action may affect critical species or habitats, formal consultation is mandated. Id.; 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). Formal consultation is excused only where (1) an agency determines that its action is unlikely to adversely affect the protected species or habitat, and (2) the relevant Service (FWS or NMFS) concurs with that determination. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(b); see Pacific Rivers, 30 F.3d at 1054, n. 8. 30 The NMFS has jurisdiction over the winter-run chinook salmon, which was listed as a threatened species prior to execution of all but one of the water contracts. The Bureau independently determined that the renewal contracts and recommitment of all the Friant dam's water were not likely adversely to affect the salmon. The Bureau then sought the NMFS' concurrence with that assessment. On November 1, 1991, the Director of the NMFS refused to concur in the Bureau's opinion that the salmon would not be adversely affected. However, the NMFS also stated that formal consultation was not required. The Director wrote:While we disagree with the Bureau's determination that renewal of the Friant contracts are not likely to affect the winter-run [chinook salmon] adversely ... we do not believe that a formal consultation on the Friant contract renewals is necessary.... [T]he issue of delta exports is being addressed in our ongoing consultation on the CVP ... and we believe this will allow us to address the adverse impacts from the activities interrelated to the renewal of the Friant contracts. 31 The Bureau then proceeded to execute the water contracts without requesting a formal consultation with the NMFS. The Bureau argued that it reasonably relied on the NMFS' determination that a formal consultation was unnecessary. 32 The Non-federal Defendants cite Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir.1984), and Pyramid Lake, 898 F.2d 1410, to support their argument that the Bureau's reliance on the NMFS opinion was not arbitrary and capricious. These cases, however, do not support the Non-federal Defendants' position. Unlike both Stop H-3 and Pyramid Lake, the issue in this case is not whether the Bureau was arbitrary and capricious in relying on a properly issued Biological Opinion. Instead, the issue is whether the Bureau was arbitrary and capricious when it relied on the NMFS' view that a consultation was not necessary, despite NMFS' refusal to provide the required concurrence. By relying on the NMFS in this case, the Bureau did not meet its independent responsibilities under the ESA. 33 The Bureau had an affirmative duty to ensure that its actions did not jeopardize endangered species, and the NMFS letter clearly disagreed with the agency's determination of no adverse impact. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14. Under those circumstances, regardless of the NMFS position that a formal consultation was unnecessary, the Bureau had a clear legal obligation to at least request a formal consultation. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.13, 402.14. The reason that the NMFS gave for stating that a consultation was unnecessary was not supported by statute or regulation and had no rational relationship to the Bureau's independent obligations to ensure that its proposed actions were not likely adversely to affect the salmon. The district court did not err in concluding that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Bureau to forgo a formal consultation with the NMFS where the NMFS specifically refused to provide the required concurrence of no adverse impact. Where the Bureau executed these 40-year contracts without first obtaining either the required concurrence from NMFS that the proposed action was not likely to affect a threatened species or a properly issued NMFS no jeopardy Biological Opinion, the Bureau acted arbitrarily and capriciously and not in accordance with the law. Therefore, all of these contracts were subject to rescission.
34 In addition to failing to request and follow through with a required consultation with NMFS, the Bureau also failed to follow its obligations under law with respect to its consultation with the FWS. The FWS has jurisdiction over several protected species in the Friant area, and the Bureau informally consulted with the FWS during 1990 and 1991. Formal consultation was requested on May 22, 1991. The FWS issued a no jeopardy Biological Opinion on October 15, 1991. Ten of the Friant contracts had already been executed by that time. The contracts contained Article 14, which allowed some contract modification pursuant to environmental review, and all but one of the contracts contained a provision modifying the terms dependent on the outcome of this litigation. 4 Section 7(d) of the ESA provides: 35 After initiation of consultation required under subsection (a)(2) of this section, the Federal agency and the permit or license applicant shall not make any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources with respect to the agency action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative measures which would not violate subsection (a)(2) of this section. 36 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d); see 50 C.F.R. § 402.09. The district court concluded that the 40-year water contracts constituted an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources and that the Bureau was not permitted to proceed until FWS found that the contracts were not likely to affect a protected species. 5 See Pacific Rivers, 30 F.3d at 1056 (following discussion of § 7(a)(2) and § 7(d), court concluded that timber sales constitute per se irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources); Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 295 (9th Cir.1992). 37 The Non-federal Defendants insist that even if the water contracts are an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources, Article 14 prevented the foreclosure of reasonable and prudent alternatives and, therefore, § 7(d) was not violated. We do not think that an agency should be permitted to skirt the procedural requirements of § 7(d) by including such a catchall savings clause in illegally executed contracts. However, even if such a clause could preserve the contracts, Article 14 is inadequate to serve that purpose here because it limits conservation-based modifications to minor adjustments and prohibits an adjustment in the amount of water delivered. Because Article 14 does not permit a reduction in the quantity of water delivered, the reasonable and prudent alternative of reallocating contracted water from irrigation to conservation is foreclosed. The district court did not err in concluding that the Bureau violated § 7(d) when it executed the contracts prior to completing the formal consultation process with the FWS, and the contracts executed prior to the issuance of the FWS Biological Opinion are subject to rescission. 6
38 The Non-federal Defendants argue that if the Bureau violated the ESA by executing the water contracts prior to the issuance of the FWS Biological Opinion, this claim became moot once a no jeopardy biological Opinion was issued on October 15, 1991. 7 In the May 31, 1991, Order, the district court concluded that the Biological Opinion did not moot the procedural ESA violations because the issuance of the Biological Opinion did not provide all the relief that could have been granted. The district court concluded that an appropriate remedy was still available--contract rescission--which would place the Plaintiffs in the position they would have been had the ESA been complied with before execution of the contracts. 39 Mootness is a question of law reviewed de novo. Native Village v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1509 (9th Cir.1994). The Non-federal Defendants rely on Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724 (10th Cir.1997), as persuasive authority that the ESA claim was mooted. In Southern Utah an informal consultation completed after the agency action mooted the ESA claim. However, Southern Utah is distinguishable because (1) there was no irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources, and (2) the only relief requested was the completed consultation. 40 Procedural violations of the ESA are not necessarily mooted by a finding by the FWS that a substantive violation of the ESA had not occurred. The process, which was not observed here, itself offers valuable protections against the risk of a substantive violation and ensures that environmental concerns will be properly factored into the decision-making process as intended by Congress. Also, due to the procedural violations here, the Plaintiffs' ability to enjoin the agency action while they challenged the validity of the Biological Opinion was negated. 8 41 Here, if the Biological Opinion had been rendered before the contracts were executed, the FWS would have had more flexibility to make, and the Bureau to implement, suggested modifications to the proposed contracts. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(6), (j) (Service's responsibilities include formulating discretionary conservation recommendations, if any, which will assist ... agency in reducing or eliminating the impacts it may have on listed species or critical habitats). Even where there is a no jeopardy Biological Opinion, the Service may make non-binding conservation recommendations. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(6), (j). The failure to respect the process mandated by law cannot be corrected with post-hoc assessments of a done deal.