Opinion ID: 2371662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: RSA 674:41, I(c)

Text: Blagbrough's final assignment of error pertaining to the ZBA appeal is that both the ZBA and the trial court misinterpreted RSA 674:41, I(c). Blagbrough contends that RSA 674:41, I(c) does not authorize selectmen to issue building permits to individual landowners. RSA 674:41, I(c) provides, in pertinent part: [N]o building shall be erected on any lot within any part of the municipality nor shall a building permit be issued for the erection of a building unless the street giving access to the lot upon which such building is proposed to be placed: . . . (c) Is a class VI highway, provided that: (1) The local governing body after review and comment by the planning board has voted to authorize the issuance of building permits for the erection of buildings on said class VI highway or a portion thereof; and (2) The municipality neither assumes responsibility for maintenance of said class VI highway nor liability for any damages resulting from the use thereof; and (3) Prior to the issuance of a building permit, the applicant shall produce evidence that notice of the limits of municipal responsibility and liability has been recorded in the county registry of deeds. . . . In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. ___, ___, 911 A.2d 1 (2006). When examining the language of a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include. Id. We agree with the trial court's reasoning that there is no merit in Blagbrough's suggestion that RSA 674:41, I(c) does not permit the local governing body to grant building permits on an individual, case by case basis, for properties that fall within the purview of the statute. The mere fact that the statute uses the plural terms permits and buildings does not compel the conclusion that the selectmen must grant such approval en gross, i.e., either on a road-wide or municipality-wide basis. On the contrary, the statute specifically indicates that approvals can be granted for said class VI highway or a portion thereof. (Emphasis added.) These terms support the view that the statute contemplates a case by case determination by the selectmen as to whether to grant approval for building on a particular lot or lots. Blagbrough disputes the trial court's reasoning by citing RSA 674:41, II, which provides: Whenever the enforcement of the provisions of this section would entail practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, and when the circumstances of the case do not require the building, structure or part thereof to be related to existing or proposed streets, the applicant for such permit may appeal from the decision of the administrative officer having charge of the issuance of permits to the zoning board of adjustment in any municipality which has adopted zoning regulations. . . . Blagbrough argues that RSA 674:41, II requires individual lot owners to seek building permits from the local zoning board of adjustment. We do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to do so in harmony with the overall statutory scheme. Soraghan v. Mt. Cranmore Ski Resort, 152 N.H. 399, 405, 881 A.2d 693 (2005). When interpreting two statutes that deal with a similar subject matter, we construe them so that they do not contradict each other, and so that they will lead to reasonable results and effectuate the legislative purpose of the statutes. Id. RSA 674:41, II provides a method for an applicant suffering from practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship  the conditions needed to trigger that provision  to appeal a decision of a local administrative officer. RSA 674:41, I(c) does not conflict with RSA 674:41, II. Rather, it simply sets forth the procedure to be followed by those applicants who cannot, choose not, or need not, demonstrate a practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship. Accordingly, discerning no error, we uphold the trial court's interpretation of the statutory scheme.