Opinion ID: 1110277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mandatory v. Directory

Text: The Legislature's interest in imposing rigid time constraints is expressly reflected in the language of section 394.916(1), which specifically states that the court shall conduct a trial within thirty days after the determination of probable cause. See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat (1999). We have previously stated that [a]lthough there is no fixed construction of the word `shall,' it is normally meant to be mandatory in nature. See S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977). However, we have also noted that its interpretation depends upon the context in which it is found and upon the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute. Id. For example, courts have held that the term shall should be construed as mandatory where it refers to some action preceding the possible deprivation of a substantive right. See id.; Neal v. Bryant, 149 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla.1962); Allied Fid. Ins. Co. v. State, 415 So.2d 109, 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see also Kinder v. State, 779 So.2d 512, 514 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (stating that [g]enerally, `shall' is interpreted to be mandatory where it refers to some action preceding the possible deprivation of a substantive right and directory where it relates to some immaterial matter in which compliance is a matter of convenience), approved, 830 So.2d 832 (Fla.2002). Consistent with those decisions, and because there are significant and substantial liberty interests involved with the involuntary and indefinite detentions provided for under the Ryce Act, we conclude that the Legislature used the word shall to convey that the thirty-day time limit was mandatory, although not jurisdictional. Several district courts have examined the language of the Ryce Act to determine whether the thirty-day time limit in section 394.916(1) should be construed as mandatory or directory. See Kinder v. State, 779 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (mandatory); State v. Osborne, 781 So.2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (directory); State v. Reese, 773 So.2d 655, 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (directory). For example, we find the reasoning in the Second District's opinion in Kinder on this issue to be on point and compelling: Under the Act, once a commitment petition is filed and probable cause is found to exist, the detainee is required to be held without possibility of release until he or she is brought to trial. See § 394.915(5), Fla. Stat. (1999). The only limit placed upon this detention is the statutory provision providing that a detainee be brought to trial within thirty days of his or her initial detention. Moreover, although section 394.916, Florida Statutes (1999), allows for the thirty-day period to be continued, it also provides that such continuance may only be granted when the detainee will not be substantially prejudiced by it. See § 394.916(2). We conclude that the intent of the legislature in enacting the thirty-day time limit was to ensure that detainees be brought to trial without undue delay. Therefore, we also conclude that the thirty-day time limit is mandatory. Kinder, 779 So.2d at 514-15 (emphasis added). We agree with this reasoning and conclusion. On the other hand, in Osborne, the Fifth District Court determined that because there is no language in the Ryce Act to indicate that the Legislature contemplated a consequence for failure to bring a respondent to trial within thirty days, the mandated thirty-day trial requirement is merely directory. Osborne, 781 So.2d at 1139. The absence of explicit language detailing a consequence for not holding trial, however, does not allow us to ignore the plain mandatory language the Legislature has provided based upon similar provisions in the Kansas act. Furthermore, the Fifth District in Osborne failed to recognize the principle that the word shall should ordinarily be construed as mandatory according to its plain meaning, especially when it refers to an action preceding the denial of a substantive right. To support its finding that the Ryce Act's language is directory, the Fifth District relied on two opinions where this Court held that the word shall could, under special circumstances, be viewed as directory. See Belcher Oil Co. v. Dade County, 271 So.2d 118, 121 (Fla.1972) (noting in a case involving the right of a municipality to levy taxes on public utility services that [a]lthough the term `shall' normally has a mandatory connotation, in proper cases and particularly so where required to conform to constitutional requirements, it may be construed as permissive only); Schneider v. Gustafson Indus., Inc., 139 So.2d 423, 424 (Fla.1962) (holding in a worker's compensation case that the Industrial Commission's rule language stating that the appellant shall file transcripts within forty-five days was directory). Importantly, neither of these cases involved the significant deprivation of an individual's liberty rights. Rather, they are examples of cases where we have found that statutory language was directory either because it was related to some immaterial matter in which compliance was a matter of convenience, or because constitutional requirements required such an interpretation. In addition to the statute's plain language, a basic rule of statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless. See Unruh v. State, 669 So.2d 242, 245 (Fla.1996); Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.1992). If the thirty-day time period in section 394.916(1) were held to be merely directory and could be routinely ignored without consequence, the limitations on continuances listed in section 394.916(2) would essentially be rendered meaningless. As noted above, section 394.916(2), allows for a continuance, upon a showing of good cause by one of the parties or by the court's own motion, only where the detainee will not be substantially prejudiced. [6] Clearly, the fact that the Legislature felt it was necessary to include a provision for continuance and limit the occasions on which a continuance should be granted indicates that the Legislature contemplated and intended that commitment proceedings would occur in a prompt and timely manner.