Opinion ID: 1711020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Conveying Dominant Tenement

Text: Clearly, the district court reached its conclusion based on its belief that in order for an implied easement to remain in existence upon a subsequent conveyance, the elements necessary for the creation of an implied easement must be met at the time of each conveyance in the chain of title. However, when an easement, although not originally belonging to an estate, has become appurtenant to it either by grant or prescription, a conveyance of that estate will carry with it such easement whether mentioned in the deed or not, although it may not be necessary to the enjoyment of the estate by the grantee. Cole v. Bradbury, 86 Me. 380, 384, 29 A. 1097, 1098 (1894). See, also, 7 Thompson on Real Property § 60.07(b)(1) (Thomas ed. 1994); Smith v. Garbe, 86 Neb. 91, 98, 124 N.W. 921, 924 (1910) (`[a]n easement appurtenant to land will pass by a conveyance, although the words with the appurtenances are not used ...'); Vanderwerff v. Consumers Gas Co., 166 Pa.Super. 358, 362, 71 A.2d 809, 811 (1950) ([e]asements by implication require no deed or writing to support them and they pass by a conveyance of the estates to which they are appurtenant.... But under all of the authorities an implied easement can arise only where the servitude is of a permanent nature, continuous, and sufficiently apparent to give notice of its existence (emphasis supplied) (emphasis omitted)); Broadhead v. Terpening, 611 So.2d 949, 954 (Miss.1992) (`[e]asements by necessity and by implication are appurtenant to the dominant estate and run with land'). In other words, once it is determined that the elements required for the creation of an implied easement existed at the time of the conveyance subdividing the property, the easement becomes appurtenant to the property and the elements for creation are no longer relevant to a determination of the continued existence of that easement upon a subsequent conveyance. U.S. Cold cites Agnew v. City of Pawnee City, 79 Neb. 603, 113 N.W. 236 (1907), in support of the district court's determination that the elements necessary for creation of an implied easement must exist at the time of each conveyance in the chain of title. In that case, a building was constructed along the outer boundary of a lot bordering a public street. A stairway rising to the second floor of the building was constructed on the street. Under the applicable law of that time period, the court determined that the building owner had acquired an easement by adverse possession in the portion of the street occupied by the stairway. The stairway was subsequently removed. Four years after the removal, the building was sold to Agnew, who reconstructed the stairway. The city sought to remove the stairway, arguing essentially that the easement did not exist at the time Agnew purchased the property because its use was not continuous, obvious, and necessary at that time. The court held, This rule seems to apply more particularly to the creation of easements by implied grant upon the severance of the estate; but, conceding its applicability to the case in hand, we think the easement in question was apparent to an ordinary observer and naturally and necessarily belonged to the premises. 79 Neb. at 607, 113 N.W. at 237. We conclude the court was correct in stating that the application of these elements seems to apply more particularly to the creation of easements by implied grant upon the severance of the estate, and that it was incorrect in applying these elements at the time of the conveyance to Agnew. Thus, to the extent that Agnew v. City of Pawnee City stands for the proposition that the elements required to create an implied easement must exist at the time of a subsequent conveyance in order for the easement to survive the conveyance, it is overruled. Once an implied easement is created, it becomes appurtenant to the dominant tenement and remains in existence upon a subsequent conveyance unless and until it is somehow terminated. See Beloit Foundry Co. v. Ryan, 28 Ill.2d 379, 388, 192 N.E.2d 384, 390 (1963) ([a]n easement appurtenant passes by conveyance of the land to which it is annexed, even without being expressly mentioned, and the servient estate continues to be subject thereto until such right is terminated or abandoned). See, also, 7 Thompson on Real Property § 60.07(b)(1) (Thomas ed. 1994). The only theory pled by U.S. Cold that the easement in the instant case was terminated is that it was abandoned. Thus, in order to determine whether the implied easement existed at the time Fuller transferred parcel C to Hillary, we must determine whether Stewart Seed or Fuller abandoned the easement.