Opinion ID: 1985054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admission of Documents for Handwriting Analysis

Text: In his final objection, defendant contended that the introduction of certain documents for the purpose of authenticating defendant's handwriting was error because they were prejudicial and irrelevant. It is well established that [d]eterminations of the relevancy of evidence offered at trial are within the sound discretion of the trial justice.    In addition, `[t]he ultimate determination [under Rule 403] of the effect of    evidence is within the trial justice's discretion.'    Rulings on the admissibility of evidence on relevance grounds will not be considered reversible error unless we find that the trial justice abused his discretion. State v. Marini, 638 A.2d 507, 516 (R.I.1994). The state offered several documents relating to the 1992 complaint as comparison handwriting samples, and defendant suggested that the samples embodied negative connotations    [that] outweighe[d] any probative value that would be helpful in analyzing the defendant's handwriting. Although it appears that defendant eventually acquiesced to the introduction of the 1992 complaint and fingerprint card given that these documents also informed the jury that two of the three charges had been resolved in his favor, we believe that the admission into evidence of these official documents, in addition to a vehicle release and a bail and recognizance form, was unnecessary and unfairly prejudicial to defendant. Numerous other handwriting comparison samples were available that did not reintroduce to the jury the fact of defendant's previous conviction. Although the trial justice gave a curative instruction at the time the evidence was presented  All of these documents    are relevant on the issue of the known signature of the defendant. That's the sole reason they have some relevance in this case  the probative value of these documents was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and they should not have been admitted. R.I. R. Evid. 403. [5] Nevertheless, [t]his Court has generally held that when objectionable evidence also has come before the jury through other avenues, the improper admission of the evidence was not prejudicial. Robertson, 740 A.2d at 336. See also State v. Dinagen, 639 A.2d 1353, 1358 (R.I.1994) (holding that mug shots that were impermissibly admitted did not prejudice the defendant because evidence of prior convictions came before the jury in other ways); State v. Carraturo, 112 R.I. 179, 189, 308 A.2d 828, 833 (1973) (concluding that certain questions were not prejudicial given that two witnesses earlier had testified about the same information); State v. Kennedy, 84 R.I. 107, 111, 121 A.2d 647, 650 (1956) (holding that cross-examination was not prejudicial when defendant himself had introduced evidence of past conduct). In the case before us, the jury had already been informed of the defendant's previous conviction and had been repeatedly cautioned to limit its consideration of that fact to determining the reasonableness of complainant's state of mind. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury would have reached the same verdict if the evidence had not been improperly admitted, State v. Burke, 427 A.2d 1302, 1304 (R.I.1981), and therefore, that the admission of the documents, although error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.