Opinion ID: 1782673
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fraudulent Representation

Text: ¶ 17. Ray states that the first element of a claim of intentional fraud or fraudulent representation may consist of a representation of the speaker's future conduct when the representation is made with the present undisclosed intention not to undertake the conduct. Crystal Springs, 554 So.2d at 886. Ray misstated the actual wording in Crystal Springs. The following is the actual rule of law: [T]he rule is well settled that fraudulent representations upon which a party may predicate any demand for relief must relate to past or presently existing facts, as facts, and cannot consist of promises, except in some cases when a contractual promise is made with the present undisclosed intention of not performing it. Id. See also Spragins, 605 So.2d at 781. ¶ 18. Ray's claim for fraudulent representation has no merit since none of Boomtown's statements of intention to build the hotel were regarded as contractual promises. Ray does not contend that Boomtown orally promised that Boomtown would build a hotel. See Bank of Shaw, 573 So.2d at 1360. The contracts executed by Ray, Eric, and Boomtown all consisted of fully integrated, written contracts. ¶ 19. In Spragins, this Court explained that: The evidence on the record sub judice does not support a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation by clear and convincing evidence. Sunburst Bank allegedly made promises to buy Refuge Plantation. This is a promise of future conduct clearly excluded from recovery under an intentional misrepresentation claim. Spragins, 605 So.2d at 781. ¶ 20. Ray did not offer any evidence which would suggest that Boomtown had no intention of building a hotel and that it fraudulently represented that it intended to build a hotel to induce Ray to sign the partnership agreement. On the contrary, the record suggests that Eric was aware that Boomtown wanted to build a hotel. Nothing in the record suggests that Boomtown ever used the hotel to induce Eric and Ray to sign any of the previous agreements between the parties. That fact remains that it truly intended and wanted to build a hotel. The May 26, 1994, letter to the Mississippi Gaming Commission clearly evidences Boomtown's intent to build the hotel. Sumrall's video deposition testimony that there was insufficient funds at the time to construct a hotel is not relevant to a determination of Boomtown's future intent.
¶ 21. A decision of the trial court admitting or excluding evidence must be upheld unless there is an abuse of discretion. Walker v. Graham, 582 So.2d 431, 432 (Miss.1991). Ray offered into evidence an audiotape which contained portions of the public hearing before the Mississippi Gaming Commission. Boomtown objected to the tape on the bases that it was muffled, incomplete, cut out at times, contained inadmissible statements of gaming commissioners, and the declarant in the tape was available to testify. The trial judge listened to the tape and ruled that the tape would be inadmissible unless there was a contradiction of any statements in the tape. Three witness testified as to what was said in the audiotape. ¶ 22. Based on a review of the record, this Court holds that it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the audiotape. The record reflects that Parrott's testimony did not contradict his statements in the audiotape. Furthermore, Ray did not contend at trial that what Parrott said on audiotape was different or contradictory, and Ray does not now contend that what Parrott said on audiotape was contradictory. For these reasons, we find it was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court to exclude the audiotape.