Opinion ID: 2995418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wis. Stat. sec. 114.14

Text: Wis. Stat. sec. 114.14 provides that [t]he governing body of a city, village, town or county may adopt regulations, and establish fees or charges for the use of [an] airport or landing field . . . . Miller alleges that the County violated sec. 114.14 by charging [it] unreasonable rental fees. There is nothing in the text of sec. 114.14, however, explicitly providing for a private right of action to challenge any fees or charges established by municipalities pursuant to this statute. Therefore, Miller’s claim under sec. 114.14 is viable only if the statute contains an implied private right of action. Under Wisconsin law, [a] determination of whether a statute creates a private right of action is dependent on whether there is a clear indication of the legislature’s intent to create such a right. Grube v. Daun, 563 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Wis. 1997). The legislative intent to grant or withhold a private right of action for the violation of a statute, or the failure to perform a statutory duty, is determined primarily from the form or language of the statute. Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, [t]he nature of the evil sought to be remedied, and the purpose it was intended to accomplish, may also be taken into consideration. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the general rule is that a statute which does not purport to establish a civil liability, but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, is not subject to a construction establishing a civil liability. Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, an implied private right of action does not arise under Wisconsin law unless (1) the language or the form of the statute evinces the legislature’s intent to create a private right of action, and (2) the statute establishes private civil liability rather than merely providing for protection of the public. Id. The language and form of sec. 114.14 do not suggest that the Wisconsin legislature intended to create a private right of action, but instead illustrate that the statute was designed to outline the manner in which municipalities are to manage their airports and landing fields, and to provide general protection to the public regarding same./14 Miller’s failure to cite any such text on appeal, or in its trial briefs below, only reinforces our conclusion that this is indeed the case. Miller argues that the County violated sec. 114.14 by violating sec. 40116(e)(2)’s requirement that a State or political subdivision of a State may [only] levy or collect . . . reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges from aircraft operators for using airport facilities of an airport owned or operated by that State or subdivision. There is no textual basis in sec. 114.14 for such an assertion, as the statute neither refers to, nor incorporates by reference, 49 U.S.C. sec. 40116./15 As such, we conclude that sec. 114.14 does not provide for an implied private right of action upon which relief could be granted to Miller.