Opinion ID: 1386258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Additional Guilt Phase Issues Raised by Engberg

Text: Engberg additionally leaves this court in this proceeding with a colloquy of evidentiary-procedural issues, most of which were raised at trial, none previously considered on initial appeal and all of which are now disregarded by the majority. In each case, Engberg's presentation is attacked by the attorney general's office as a constitutional forfeiture by procedural default defense. In overall evaluation, the disconsonance is presented that by ignoring presentation, the law student brief writers, as supervised however they may have been, were wiser in ignoring the issues than the experienced trial attorney or the present appellate counsel. I will avoid adding further disconsonance to this phalanx of issues except where present comment should provide assistance for future cases. Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 566 A.2d 111 (1989). Issues include evidence of guilt of the Casper homicide derived from obstreperousness at the Nevada arrest, subsequent refusal in the Nevada hospital to be photographed in a cap following hospitalization and surgery while still under medication, denied cross-examination of the photographer about his observations of the subject's physical condition and the use of an alias pre-homicide while living in Casper. Although evidence of attempted escape may be considered as a factor to establish guilt, 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 214 (13th ed. 1972), the contention of escape as that consciousness of guilt must relate to the offense charged. See Bedford, 566 A.2d 111, where evidence of walking away in the courthouse was admissible, but the evidence of possession of a sharpened wire was inadmissible and reversible error on introduction which caused reversal of the death penalty conviction. An issue of validity of extradition was presented in denied constitutional rights upon transfer from Nevada back to Casper for this trial. Further significant question is presented about warrantless search and seizure of the Casper apartment where the incriminating evidence of one unspent cartridge in a vest was discovered. Excluding extradition and legality of search and seizure, the category of arguments present questions of determined relevancy. What do they prove about consciousness of guilt and to what degree are they simply prejudicial background information relating to the character of the defendant? As presented on this record, much of the information seems to provide no evidence of probability that Engberg committed this robbery/murder in Casper. This record is unconvincing about connective proof even as a matter of discretion of the court to supply validity of probativeness which exceeds the prejudicial effect of disassociative bad character evidence, which in itself provides no evidence to verify guilt in fact. The test whether evidence is admissible is whether the evidence tends to prove the offense charged and whether it is relevant, i.e., whether it tends to make the question of guilt more or less probable. Evidence may be rejected as irrelevant and of little probable value if it is only remotely probative or would cause possible prejudice. The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on materiality and relevancy issues and its ruling will only be reversed upon abuse of discretion. Martin, 720 P.2d 894; Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., 664 P.2d 27 (Wyo. 1983); Barnard v. Wendling, 627 P.2d 603 (Wyo. 1981); People v. Castro, 190 Ill. App.3d 227, 137 Ill. Dec. 717, 546 N.E.2d 662 (1989). W.R.E. 401 provides: Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Evidence which may tend to affect the jury's decision may not necessarily be admissible as factually relevant. Velos v. State, 752 P.2d 411 (Wyo. 1988); Shields v. Carnahan, 744 P.2d 1115 (Wyo. 1987); Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1986). The weighing process envisioned by W.R.E. 401 for the determination of relevancy by the trial court within the concept of prejudice delineated by W.R.E. 403 is vested in the trial court's sound discretion. The preclusive question is how, if at all, does the proffered evidence tend to prove guilt and what extraneous injustice does it create? The central core of this case is opportunity, eyewitness identification and unexplained sudden wealth and accommodative departure from the scene of the murder along the route where evidence of the crime was later discovered. To the extent the basic items of proof are to be furnished by what may be perhaps extraneous evidence, the trial court is called to discretionally weigh relevance as a factor of probability with prejudice as a function of conviction by extraneousness. Probative facts and not bad character attribution is the historical touchstone and standard of this nation's criminal justice system and the substitution should not now be made to serve principally to convict by reputation for the expansion of penitentiary populations. Due process should be the guardian and not the victim of our system of criminal justice. Consequently, I would reverse for retrial of guilt as well as penalty. VI.