Opinion ID: 1198908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: TH's Attorney's Fees

Text: The trial court has broad discretion in awarding attorney's fees; we will not find an abuse of that discretion absent a showing that the award was arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or ... stem[med] from an improper motive. Bohna, 828 P.2d at 766-67 (quoting Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P.2d 873, 878 (Alaska 1979)); see also Van Dort v. Culliton, 797 P.2d 642, 644 (Alaska 1990).
As we have already discussed, the trial court awarded TH 30% of the attorney's fees incurred by defendants after their February 4, 1994, offer of judgment. The award adopted the percentage set out in former Civil Rule 82(b)(2) for prevailing parties who recover no money in cases that go to trial. [38] Relying on the factors listed in Rule 82(b)(3), TH requested an award exceeding the 30% guideline. The trial court denied the request, specifically finding that in light of all the facts before it no adjustment was called for. TH argues that the trial court erred in failing to award enhanced fees. According to TH, the circumstances of this case are exactly what the provisions of former Rule 82(b)(3) were designed to address. PCI refutes the assertion, and the parties engage in an intense debate over the listed factors. We have never vacated a trial court's decision refusing to enhance fees under former Rule 82(b)(3). See, e.g., Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Lakeview Enters., Inc., 897 P.2d 47, 61-62 (Alaska 1995); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Marion Equip. Co., 894 P.2d 664, 671-72 (Alaska 1995) (declining to find an abuse of discretion where trial court awarded 20% fees to prevailing party and refused to enhance the award where party cited no authority for enhanced fee award); cf. Municipality of Anchorage v. Gentile, 922 P.2d 248, 264 (Alaska 1996) (discussing attorney's fees in class actions, where enhanced fees are permitted under Rule 82 and favored under Rule 23). TH has not persuaded us that the circumstances here are exceptional, and our review of the record convinces us that the trial court's fee decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly unreasonable. See Bohna, 828 P.2d at 766-67. It must therefore stand.