Opinion ID: 2671262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Roy D. Wasson

Text: The state court appointed registry attorney Roy D. Wasson on January 16, 2004. Wasson did not file a state postconviction motion on Lugo’s behalf under Rule 3.851 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure until October 18, 2004. 3 Lugo argued in the district court that he was not given timely notice of CCRC-Middle Region’s motion to withdraw and was not present at the proceedings removing CCRC-Middle Region as counsel. He does acknowledge that CCRC-Middle Region advised him that a conflict existed related to the investigation. Lugo says that had he been timely served with notice of CCRC-Middle Region’s motion to withdraw, he would have objected and waived any alleged conflict. 5 Case: 11-13439 Date Filed: 04/24/2014 Page: 6 of 53 There is more to say about Wasson’s conduct, as well as Lugo’s diligence, between the time of Wasson’s appointment and his filing of Lugo’s Rule 3.851 motion. While these facts are relevant to an equitable tolling analysis, many of them were not before the district court when it initially dismissed Lugo’s § 2254 petition. Sorting out when Lugo brought facts to the district court’s attention is important in our review of the two different district court orders, each with its own analytical framework and standard of review. 4 At the time it dismissed the § 2254 petition, the district court had before it only the procedural history of the case and some conclusory allegations by Lugo concerning Wasson. It was not until after that dismissal and when the Rule 60(b) motion was filed that the most egregious facts regarding Lugo’s representation were presented to the district court. Because we consider each appeal in light of what was before the district court when it issued the relevant decision, we limit our background discussion here to those facts which were brought to the district court’s attention by Lugo or the State before the court dismissed the § 2254 petition. The Rule 3.851 motion filed by Wasson raised various substantive claims on Lugo’s behalf and alleged that he was not competent to participate in postconviction proceedings. After Lugo was evaluated and determined to be 4 The district court’s decision on equitable tolling is reviewed de novo, San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2011), but its decision denying the Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion, Howell v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 730 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2013). 6 Case: 11-13439 Date Filed: 04/24/2014 Page: 7 of 53 competent by two state doctors, Lugo filed pro se motions objecting to a competency hearing and requesting the removal of Wasson as counsel. The parties later stipulated that Lugo was competent to proceed and he withdrew his motion to discharge Wasson. After holding an evidentiary hearing in 2006, the state postconviction court denied Lugo’s Rule 3.851 motion. On behalf of Lugo, Wasson appealed that denial to the Florida Supreme Court but did not file a state habeas petition in that court because he did not find any meritorious issues to raise. 5 Lugo attempted to file a pro se amended notice of appeal and state habeas petition. He also filed a motion to remove Wasson as counsel as well as a supplement to that motion. On February 1, 2008, the Florida Supreme Court denied Lugo’s motion to remove Wasson as counsel and struck all of Lugo’s pro se pleadings as unauthorized. On October 8, 2008, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief. Lugo v. State (Lugo II), 2 So. 3d 1, 21 (Fla. 2008). Fourteen days later Lugo filed pro se motions for rehearing and to hold the rehearing in abeyance pending resolution of bar complaints he had filed against both Wasson 5 Under Florida law, a capital habeas petitioner may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court, but such a petition must be filed at the same time as the initial brief is filed in an appeal of a state circuit court’s order on a Rule 3.851 motion. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(3). In Florida, a state habeas petition is the proper procedural vehicle for bringing claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, for example, but not for raising claims that should have been brought on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion. See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000). 7 Case: 11-13439 Date Filed: 04/24/2014 Page: 8 of 53 and the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. The Florida Supreme Court denied Lugo’s abeyance motion on November 4, 2008. On November 10, 2008, Wasson moved to withdraw from his obligation to represent Lugo in state and federal postconviction proceedings pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 27.711. In support of that motion, Wasson stated that he had previously advised Lugo that he was “unwilling” to represent him beyond challenging the denial of postconviction relief in state court, and so the Florida Supreme Court’s affirmance of the trial court’s denial of the Rule 3.851 motion marked the completion of “all of the work that [he was] willing and able to do on behalf of [Lugo].” Beyond that, Wasson alleged that an actual conflict of interest between himself and Lugo existed because Lugo had filed a bar grievance against him accusing him of misconduct. The State opposed Wasson’s motion to withdraw and argued that under Fla. Stat. § 27.711 Wasson’s appointment required him to represent Lugo “throughout all postconviction capital collateral proceedings, including federal habeas corpus proceedings until the capital defendant’s sentence is reversed, reduced, or carried out, and the attorney is permitted to withdraw from such representation by a court of competent jurisdiction.” See Fla. Stat. § 27.711(2), (8). On January 22, 2009, the Florida Supreme Court denied Wasson’s motion to withdraw and denied Lugo’s pro se motion for rehearing. 8 Case: 11-13439 Date Filed: 04/24/2014 Page: 9 of 53 The Florida Supreme Court issued its mandate on February 10, 2009. The issuance of the mandate ended any statutory tolling period. See Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding that a state postconviction motion remains pending until the mandate issues in the appeal). On March 9, 2009, in the Florida Supreme Court, Wasson renewed his motion to withdraw, stating that no federal habeas petition had been filed because the relationship between Lugo and Wasson was “so bad” that Lugo refused to cooperate. Wasson re-alleged the existence of an actual conflict based on Lugo’s pending bar grievance against him. The Florida Supreme Court denied Wasson’s renewed motion to withdraw on April 17, 2009. On June 20, 2009, Lugo filed a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court seeking review of the Florida Supreme Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief. On October 5, 2009, the Supreme Court denied that petition. Lugo v. Florida, 558 U.S. 867, 130 S.Ct. 182 (2009). On January 5, 2010, Lugo filed a pro se § 2254 petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, raising four grounds for relief. He also filed an appendix in support of his petition and a motion to hold the proceedings in abeyance. The petition asserted it was timely filed because it was filed within one year of February 10, 2009, the date the Florida Supreme Court’s mandate had issued in the decision affirming the denial of postconviction relief. 9 Case: 11-13439 Date Filed: 04/24/2014 Page: 10 of 53 Lugo’s abeyance motion specifically relied on Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, as one of the reasons his petition should be held in abeyance. It argued: [T]he U.S. Supreme Court’s certiorari review of Holland v. State of Florida is likely to impact this case as to the failure of postconviction counsel to present issues and make filings within the time periods provided by law so as to preserve a capital defendant’s right to federal review of habeas corpus claims. There is a high likelihood that Mr. Lugo must have a viable federal petition pending to avail himself of any benefit from Holland. The matter was referred to a magistrate judge who issued an order on January 19, 2010, informing Lugo that his “petition may be barred from consideration” unless he demonstrated that it was filed within one year from one of the four triggering events identified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). On the same date, the magistrate judge issued an order for the State to show cause why the petition should not be granted, specifically directing the State to address, among other things, “the issue of whether the limitations period established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) has expired.” Lugo’s pro se response to the magistrate judge’s order argued that his petition was timely filed for the reason he gave in his § 2254 petition, namely, that it was filed within one year of the issuance of the Florida Supreme Court’s mandate in Lugo II. Alternatively, Lugo asserted that “‘U.S.-State impediments’ prevent[ed] [him] from timely filing a federal habeas corpus petition,” justifying consideration of his petition in light of § 2244(d)(1)(B). As an example of “U.S.- 10 Case: 11-13439 Date Filed: 04/24/2014 Page: 11 of 53 State impediments,” Lugo’s response identified, without meaningful explanation, “Federalized Anarchy in, so near, and thereafter Mr. Lugo’s direct appeal.” On March 5, 2010, the State filed a 78-page response to the order to show cause which included a detailed procedural history of the case. 6 The State’s response contained several arguments why Lugo’s petition should be dismissed, including that it was time-barred by the statute of limitations. Specifically, the State argued that because Lugo did not file his Rule 3.851 motion until October 18, 2004, after the one-year statute of limitations had already expired, his state postconviction proceedings did not toll the federal statute of limitations. Asserting that more than one year of untolled time had passed before Lugo filed his § 2254 petition, the State argued that Lugo’s petition be dismissed. The State countered Lugo’s argument that he had one year from February 10, 2009 — the date the Florida Supreme Court issued its mandate in Lugo II — by pointing out the United States Supreme Court’s holding that the judgment mentioned in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) refers to a state court conviction and sentence. See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156–57, 127 S.Ct. 793, 798–99 (2007). Lugo, again acting pro se, filed a reply on April 5, 2010, to the State’s response to the order to show cause. In a section labeled “Statute of Limitations,” 6 On March 8, 2010, the State filed a notice of conventional filing of the state court record, which consisted of 167 volumes of state court records and pleadings. The State also filed the record electronically in 474 separate appendices. 11 Case: 11-13439 Date Filed: 04/24/2014 Page: 12 of 53 Lugo requested an evidentiary hearing to prove “U.S.-State impediments” justifying consideration of his petition despite the filing delay. Lugo also alleged that Wasson had retaliated against him for failing to give Wasson large sums of money. The retaliation, according to Lugo, consisted of alleged perjury and fraud in the reasons Wasson gave for not filing a state habeas petition on Lugo’s behalf.