Opinion ID: 3202928
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preferred Embodiments

Text: Stryker contends that the “essentially midway” language in the written description concerns a preferred embodiment or preferred embodiments and that we cannot so limit the claims. Stryker labels this as the “cardinal sin” of claim construction, based upon Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320, and DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., 537 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008). First, Stryker focuses on the sentences preceding each of the two written description passages set out above: “In the preferred embodiment, the shell member 22 and the sleeve 100 are constructed of commercially pure titanium and the angle A is about 6º.” ’243 patent at 7:5–8. “In the preferred embodiment, the shell member 212 and the sleeve 340 are constructed of commercially pure titanium and the angle 356 is about 60.” Id. at 11:25–27. 6 Stryker notes that each sentence starts with the phrase “In the preferred embodiment.” Stryker reasons that introductory clauses apply not only to the sentences in which they are located, but also to the entirety of the quoted passages. Stryker is mistaken. Both sentences discuss pre- ferred embodiments only with respect to the angle of the taper—not the relative locations of the recess and the taper. In other words, context reveals that such introduc- 6 It appears that the language may have been mis- takenly drafted as “angle 356 is about 60” instead of “angle 356 is about 6º.” 16 HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. tory clauses limit only the sentences in which they are located in this case. Second, Stryker argues that the “essentially midway” language in the written description concerns a preferred embodiment because of language near the beginning and end of the written description. Before the figures are described, the patent states: “The invention will be understood more fully . . . in the following detailed description of preferred embodiments of the invention.” Id. at 3:42– 45. Similarly, before reciting the claims: “It is to be understood that the above detailed description of preferred embodiments of the invention is provided by way of example only.” Id. at 12:54–56. However, if the general rule against limiting claims in this manner held, then Stryker’s proposed understanding would quite severely limit any understanding of the claims in light of the written description. Indeed, there would be some question as to whether there was the statutorily required written description—“[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the invention . . . in . . . full, clear, concise, and exact terms.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). We decline to read this written description in such a crabbed manner as Stryker suggests. Reading the patent in its entirety, it is clear that such generalized language concerning preferred embodiments, near the start and end of the written description, does not limit the entirety of the intervening section—3:42 to 12:54. In this case, such language merely reflects that this wide swath of the written description may contain descriptions of preferred embodiments, and this is true. Finally, Stryker argues that, even if we were to rely on the written description, it merely teaches that the length of the taper zone should be maximized—and that this can be accomplished by placing the groove midway along the taper, at an edge of the taper, or not in the HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 17 taper. However, this misconstrues the language of the written description, which clearly discusses maximizing each of the two separate segments of the taper created by placing the groove in the middle of the taper and thereby bisecting the taper. See ’243 patent at 7:8–23, 11:28–42.