Opinion ID: 1145366
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nagle's Proposed Testimony

Text: Unlike the State's disclosure of Daily's identity, the State admits that it did not disclose Nagle's identity to Relish. Therefore, the second and third prongs of the Brady analysis must be explored. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), the United States Supreme Court refined the standard for determining when evidence, not disclosed by the prosecution, is sufficiently material to amount to constitutional error by stating: The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383; see also Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 77 (Wyo.1991). In addition, the Bagley Court held that this standard applies regardless of whether the defense had made no request, a general request, or a specific request for exculpatory evidence. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383; see also Bagley 473 U.S. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 3385 (Justice White concurring, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist concur as to the standard set by Justice Blackmun's lead opinion); Engberg, 820 P.2d at 77; see also Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal 2d § 557.2 (1993 Pocket Part). Nagle's affidavit offers little, if any, material evidence. Her affidavit states that she was travelling on I-80 sometime on November 5, 1991; that she saw what may have been the sedan off the road and what may have been Relish's semi parked on the side of the road; that she discussed these observations with the prosecutor on a couple of occasions; and that there were whiteout weather conditions near the scene. Even if Nagle could positively identify the two vehicles she observed, as the sedan and the semi, and she could testify to the precise time she was travelling on November 5, 1991, her testimony would only be cumulative. Evidence which is at best cumulative does not meet the Bagley materiality standard. United States v. Perkins, 926 F.2d 1271, 1275 (1st Cir.1991). Two eyewitnesses, Detgen and Relish, testified at trial to the weather conditions. Although Nagle states in her affidavit that she could corroborate Relish's testimony concerning the weather conditions at the site of impact, that would not help Relish because he admitted on cross-examination that the weather conditions were accurately described by Detgen during the State's case. In regard to Nagle's affidavit and her proposed testimony, the following statement is applicable: [T]he prosecution has no mandatory obligation to produce all witnesses conjecturally available to provide relevant testimony. The prosecution has no defined duty to try the case for the defendant, and consequently it is not an assumed responsibility to provide the defendant's evidence. The Brady obligation stops with hiding and non-disclosure of evidence and does not extend to affirmative compilation and production. [citations omitted and emphasis in original] Miller v. State, 830 P.2d 419, 426 (Wyo. 1992). Nagle's proposed testimony is clearly relevant, but it is far from being sufficiently material to warrant a conclusion that, with it, a reasonable probability exists that the jury would have reached a different verdict. We, therefore, reject Relish's claim that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. We do so because it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that Daily was disclosed to the defense and that Nagle would not have undermined the jury's verdict.