Opinion ID: 198097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Patricia Cunan

Text: A. The Brady Violation 8 The first argument in Patricia's arsenal involves an alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In Brady, the Court held that, 9 suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 10 Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. 11 Patricia's assertion of error is based on the following facts: Prior to trial, the government indicated that it would call one Fred Proulx as a witness for the prosecution. His testimony would be that he also laundered considerable sums through State Scale by way of a fake job. Proulx would state that although he was listed on the State Scale payroll, he did not do work for State Scale, but instead received paychecks in exchange for cash. Specifically, Proulx would testify that on several occasions, he had personally handed Patricia envelopes containing cash. The government possessed documentary and other testimonial evidence to substantiate Proulx's purported testimony. 12 Proulx did not testify at trial, and the government provided no explanation at the time for its decision not to use him as a witness. Patricia was, however, cross-examined by means of pointed and leading questions on whether Proulx had been a legitimate employee, or instead a money launderer. This cross-examination was done on the basis of Patricia's direct testimony that she was unaware of any criminal activity at State Scale involving DeCato or other individuals. The government also introduced documentary evidence, which tended to disprove Patricia's denials. The government introduced some of the paychecks that Proulx had received from State Scale for cash. They were significant because they were deposited in groups of five to ten checks. The government argued that this was evidence that Proulx was not, in fact, a regular employee, because such deposits were inconsistent with the actions of a regular working-person, who would be more apt to deposit paychecks promptly and singly. The government also introduced Proulx's federal W-2 form, which fraudulently listed the State Scale business address as his home. The Proulx evidence was referred to in the government's closing argument. 13 After trial, as part of the negotiations concerning the recommendations the government would make at sentencing, the government asked the Cunans if they had any information which would explain why Proulx had claimed a memory loss so that he was unable to testify that he had handed Patricia envelopes of cash. There is no evidence, however, that Proulx, either then or at any other time, recanted his story that he had laundered money through State Scale. 2 14 Throughout the relevant pre-trial period, the Cunans made specific and general requests for Brady materials, and renewed these requests one week before trial. On the basis of the government's knowledge of Proulx's memory loss, the Cunans filed a motion for a new trial, based on Brady, which was denied. 15 Patricia's Brady argument has two components. First, she alleges a straightforward violation of the government's duty to disclose potentially exculpable evidence. The second prong of her Brady argument is more nuanced. Patricia contends that, had she been aware of Proulx's memory loss, her objections to the government's cross-examination and closing argument would have been successful because she would have been in a better position to convince the district court that the government possessed no good-faith basis for probing the Proulx transactions on cross-examination. Thus, Patricia asserts, her inability to prevent the Proulx cross-examination questions was a direct result of the alleged Brady violation. This, she contends, undermines confidence in the verdict to such an extent that a new trial is warranted. 16 The district court ruled that Proulx's memory loss was not material for Brady purposes because it was not exculpatory, and there was no means by which the defense could have used it. We accord this determination as to the materiality of new evidence ... deference. United States v. Perkins, 926 F.2d 1271, 1276 (1st Cir.1991). The district court also determined that, on the evidence of record, the government had a sound basis for the cross-examination and reference to it in closing argument. This evidentiary determination must also be accorded deference. See United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1296 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 614, 139 L.Ed.2d 500 (1997). We affirm the district court's findings and rulings. 17 As the Supreme Court's most recent exposition on the subject states, [t]he prosecution's affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant can trace its origins to early 20th-century strictures against misrepresentation. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The duty, however, is not absolute. We do not ... automatically require a new trial whenever 'a combing of the prosecutors' files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict....'  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (quoting United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir.1968)). Instead, [a] finding of materiality of the evidence is required under Brady. Id. 18 In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), the Court elaborated a test for determining when undisclosed evidence is material for purposes of a Brady inquiry. The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 685, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-435, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (endorsing Bagley test as the proper measure of materiality). This does not mean that a defendant must convince the court of the certainty of a different outcome. Instead, one proves a Brady violation by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. 19 We agree with the district court that the withheld information in this case was not material for Brady purposes. The information was simply that Proulx decided that his memory was insufficient concerning one part of his proposed testimony--that he handed Patricia envelopes containing cash in exchange for checks. He did not retract his statements that he had laundered money through State Scale by posing as an employee. Thus, the most that the Cunans could have made of the information was exactly that--Proulx had forgotten one aspect of his proposed testimony. While impeachment evidence is certainly subject to Brady disclosure, see Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, this impeachment evidence would only have been valuable if Proulx had actually been called as a witness. In the alternative, Patricia suggests that the Cunans could have called Proulx themselves. Judge Young aptly stated the limited value of that course of action. [A]s a practical matter, it would be suicidal to call a witness possessed of relevant inculpatory evidence even though you can impeach your own witnesses under [Fed.R.Evid.] 607 and say, well, you were going to say this, but you've forgotten that, haven't you? Thank you very much. No defense lawyer would do that. 20 With regard to Patricia's second claim of Brady error--that revelation of the memory loss would have permitted her to block the cross-examination foray into the Proulx issue--we also agree with the district court. There was a sufficient basis for the government to ask the questions it posed. Patricia had testified that she knew of no illegal activity at State Scale, and the government was in possession of documentary evidence which suggested otherwise. Proulx had not withdrawn his statements concerning money laundering, and the documentary evidence supported his story. This is not, therefore, the situation alleged in Patricia's brief, that the government had specific information that Proulx's earlier allegations were not true. Patricia's Br. at 44. There was therefore no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to permit the cross-examination, and we agree with the district court that the memory loss evidence does not alter the government's good-faith basis to pursue that questioning. In the final analysis, our confidence in the verdict is not undermined by Proulx's memory loss. 21 Related to this issue, Patricia argues that the cross-examination questions were so pointed, and so leading, as to run afoul of due process. We disagree. Although the questions were leading, 3 we do not think they were beyond the bounds of cross-examination. See Fed.R.Evid. 611(c) (allowing leading questions on cross-examination). We must note here that the district court interjected jury instructions during the cross-examination which explained that the government's questions were not evidence. Compare United States v. Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992, 999 (1st Cir.1996) (noting distinction between providing such instructions contemporaneously as opposed to after the fact). 22 Nor do we think it was error for the government to hark back to the Proulx transactions during its closing argument. The prosecution argued in closing, 23 Ask yourself if Proulx was in fact a full-time working man that she testified he was. Depositing six, eight ten checks, weekly paychecks, depositing six, eight, ten at a time. Or if Proulx was in fact a clear example of the same no-show employee status that DeCato enjoyed with Patricia Cunan's full knowledge and participation. 24 Defense counsel objected, and the district court declined to issue any corrective instruction. We detect no error. This was a permissible recapping of the testimony and evidence on the Proulx transactions, with the government suggesting the inferences to be drawn. 25 Finally, we note that Patricia argues in her brief that because the government's case against her was so weak, compared to the case against her husband, her allegations of Brady error should be given more weight. We are unpersuaded. There was considerable documentary and testimonial evidence implicating Patricia in the scheme beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 B. Erroneous Exclusion of Tax Returns 26 Patricia next argues that she was denied the opportunity to present a viable defense when the district court excluded certain tax returns from two other businesses operated by Patrick. She states that these returns would have bolstered her argument that she was unaware that the money used for the transactions at issue was coming from an illegitimate source, because the tax returns reflected other business income that could have funded Patrick's real estate purchases. In the absence of the documentary evidence to support her assertions, she argues, the jury was left only with her statements, and nothing else to support her version of events. 27 The record does not support her contention. At the close of Patricia's case, her attorney attempted to enter into evidence tax returns from two businesses, Prestige Realty Trust and P.R. Realty and Development Corporation. Her counsel conceded at the time that these documents would go to the same point as the land deeds, that being that there were other corporations that produced business income. The district court excluded the returns on the basis that they were cumulative of other evidence already in the record, and that the returns were overly speculative, not linked up with anything. 5 We review this application of an evidentiary rule to particular facts ' ... by an abuse of discretion standard, which favors the prevailing party.'  Barone, 114 F.3d at 1296 (quoting United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 522 (1st Cir.1997)). 28 A district court has considerable latitude to restrict cumulative evidence. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. We do not think the district court abused its discretion in this instance. As Patricia's counsel admitted at the time, other documentary evidence supported Patricia's testimony that Patrick was involved in legitimate businesses which could have generated the cash flow at issue. So too, there was testimony from witnesses to support Patricia's defense. For example, Mrs. Geneva Adams, Patrick's mother, testified to the existence of P.R. Realty and Development Corporation. Patricia's contention, that the exclusion of the tax returns left nothing to corroborate her version of events, rings hollow. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (The District Court retains considerable latitude even with admittedly relevant evidence in rejecting that which is cumulative, and in requiring that which is to be brought to the jury's attention to be done so in a manner least likely to confuse that body.). We are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the tax returns. C. The Fine 29 Patricia's final argument concerns the fine imposed upon her by the district court. Patrick joins in this assertion of error. Prior to sentencing, the Cunans filed a joint motion to waive fines. The motion was based upon the self-reported financial disclosure statements provided to the probation department. In those statements, the Cunans contend that they have precious little funds, and are in possession of only their marital home. 30 The government introduced evidence to support the request for substantial fines. Specifically, the government produced a summary of the Cunans' personal income tax returns. This summary indicated that the Cunans' interest income had been $116,000 in 1988, and $98,000 in 1989. These were the years just prior to the scheme's collapse. There was evidence at trial that the Cunans had lent money to friends and business acquaintances over the years, with principal amounts outstanding in excess of $1 million. Evidence was also before the court which indicated significant land holdings on the part of the Cunans, above and beyond the land the government sought forfeited. 6 31 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, [t]he court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he [or she] is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2. The district court imposed a fine of $750,000.00 on Patricia, and $2,500,000.00 on Patrick. We review the imposition of a fine for abuse of discretion. United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 620 (1st Cir.1993). We detect no abuse here. 32 The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that his [or her] case warrants an exception to the rule that a fine be imposed. United States v. Peppe, 80 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.1996). Here the defendants based their entire request for waiver of fines on self-reported financial disclosure statements. Beyond this, no attempt was made to rebut the government's compelling evidence that they had sufficient resources to pay a fine. Because neither Patrick nor Patricia establishe[d] that he [or she] is unable to pay, U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2, the district court acted well within its discretion in imposing the fines.