Opinion ID: 2212544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion for Separate Trials

Text: The defendant was tried on seven separate counts. Counts I through III stemmed from acts the defendant committed on July 1, and counts IV through VII were based on acts committed on July 2. The defendant alleges that the crimes he was charged with committing on July 1 should have been tried separately from the crimes which he was charged with committing on July 2. Citing Indiana Code § 35-34-1-11(a), [1] the defendant argues that the charges had only been consolidated because the acts were of the same or a similar nature  both involved residential break-ins  and that he is therefore entitled to severance. The State concedes that when offenses are joined due to similarity, a defendant is entitled to separate trials, but it argues that in cases where the joinder is not solely on the grounds of similarity of the offenses, the trial judge has discretion to determine whether severance would promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt. We agree. The charges were not joined because of any perceived similarities in the nature of the crimes but because all crimes occurred during the course of a two-day crime spree. In fact, the diverse number of crimes charged included kidnapping, robbery, burglary, and reckless endangerment  each perpetrated in a distinct way and similar only with respect to their proximity in time. These crimes varied in the elements required and the nature of the offenses and were apparently joined based on grounds other than similarity. Severance is therefore not mandated by Indiana Code § 35-34-1-11. We will only reverse the judgment and order new, separate trials if the defendant can show that in light of what actually occurred at trial, the denial of a separate trial subjected him to such prejudice that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant his motion for severance. Hunt v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 307, 312. In the present case, the defendant broke into Jerry Johnson's home; and, when Mr. Johnson discovered the crime in progress, the defendant fired on him in furtherance of his escape. At this point, the defendant was a fugitive, and the police learned of his identity soon thereafter. In order to avoid capture, the defendant broke into and entered Sally Shultz's home. Armed with a handgun, he confronted Shultz and her father, Dale Pugh, demanded and obtained Pugh's handgun, and forced Shultz and Pugh to drive him to a place where he might evade capture. These acts constituted an uninterrupted transaction and as such would be admissible under the rule of res gestae at both trials if separate trials had been held. See Lannan v. State (1992), 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1339. Accordingly, this Court finds no prejudice or error in the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion.