Opinion ID: 715641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Events Subsequent to Sentencing

Text: 16 For approximately six weeks after he was sentenced, Doe was under the supervision of the Probation Office in the Eastern District of New York (EDNY). The EDNY Probation Office did not require Doe to notify his accounting clients of his conviction. However, since Doe resided within the Southern District of New York (SDNY), supervision was to be transferred to the SDNY Probation Office. The latter office raised a question as to whether Doe should be required to give such notification to his clients. By letter dated June 1, 1995, Hoffman wrote to the EDNY Probation Office to urge that the notification requirement not be imposed. Hoffman pointed out that, as the United States Attorney's Office was aware, Doe had commenced his own tax-preparation service in 1990, that he had been under the auspices of that Office for some 4 1/2 years, and that there had been no complaints about his conduct during that time. Hoffman stated that Doe's clientele had remained relatively static during that period and that the imposition of the client-notification requirement would result in the crippling, if not the total destruction, of his business. (Hoffman letter to EDNY Probation Office dated June 1, 1995 (Hoffman June 1 Letter), at 2.) 17 As a result of Hoffman's letter, the EDNY Probation Office sent a memorandum to the district judge, stating that the SDNY Probation Office had advised that they will accept supervision after the issue of third party risk has been resolved. (Memorandum from U.S. Probation Officer James M. Stein & Supervising U.S. Probation Officer Laurence Meyerson to the district judge dated June 9, 1995 (Probation Office June 9 Memorandum), at 1.) The memorandum enclosed the Hoffman June 1 Letter and agreed with it, stating, in part, that the EDNY Probation Office viewed it as unlikely that Mr. [Doe] will again involve himself in criminal activity, and that though third-party notification is often desirable, an exception should be made here (Probation Office June 9 Memorandum at 1): 18 The purpose of this memorandum is to request Your Honor's decision regarding Mr. [Doe's] continued employment as a public accountant since it can be construed as a third party risk due to his conviction in [sic ] the instant offense. It is noted that the offender is not a Certified Public Accountant and consequently he is not required to be licensed as a Public Accountant by the State of New York. In regard to the third party risk issue, the probationer's attorney ... has submitted a letter wherein he candidly outlines the reasons why the probationer should be permitted to continue to be employed as a public accountant and the adverse effects it would have if the probationer was [sic ] required to advise his clientele of his tax law conviction. 19 It is clear that Mr. [Doe's] employment as a public accountant represents a third party risk and the conditions of probation which were reviewed and signed by him on April 28, 1995, specifically states [sic ], ... as directed by the probation officer, you shall notify third-parties of risks that may be occasioned by your criminal record or personal history or characteristics, and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm your compliance with such notification requirement. 20 The Probation Department in the Eastern District of New York has carefully and thoroughly reviewed all factors in this case and is of the opinion that it is unlikely that Mr. [Doe] will again involve himself in criminal activity.... The issue of third party risk is considered an extremely important matter and its importance should never be undermined. However, in this instance, the undersigned officer believes and respectfully recommends that an exception to the third party risk issue be made and the probationer should be given the opportunity to continue employment as a public accountant and not advise his clients of his conviction on the instant offense for reasons outlined in Mr. Hoffman's recent correspondence. 21 (Probation Office June 9 Memorandum at 1-2 (emphasis added).) The memorandum stated that if the court concurred in the EDNY Probation Office's recommendation, Doe would provide a list of his clients to the SDNY Probation Office, which would monitor his employment conduct closely. 22 The last page of the memorandum contained two alternative signature lines for the court, one opposite the inscription, Notify Clients of Federal Tax Conviction and the other opposite the inscription, Not Necessary to Notify Clients of Federal Tax Conviction. On June 12, 1995, the district judge signed the line requiring notification. 23 By letter dated June 23, 1995, the SDNY Probation Office wrote to Doe, referring to [the district] Judge['s] order, dated June 12, 1995, directing you to notify all clients of your federal tax conviction, and instructing Doe that[u]ntil such time that there is any change or reversal of [the district] Judge['s] order, you are reminded of your obligation to comply with this notification requirement. 24 (Letter from Supervising U.S. Probation Officer Daniel J. Sheridan and U.S. Probation Officer Carol Dray to Doe dated June 23, 1995 (Probation Office June 23 Letter).) 25 On July 21, 1995, with the support of the government, Hoffman asked the court to reconsider its notification requirement, stating that that requirement was a severe occupational restriction: To require [Doe] to make his customers aware of his conviction will effectively put him out of business. His business is very competitive, and it is relatively simple for his clients to switch tax preparers. (Hoffman letter to the district judge dated July 21, 1995 (Hoffman July 21 Letter), at 2.) Such notification would effectively end Mr. [Doe's] business, resulting in economic disaster for himself, his wife and his two children. (Id. at 1.) 26 Hoffman pointed out that the Sentencing Guidelines state that the imposition of an occupational restriction should be  'for the minimum time and to the minimum extent necessary to protect the public'  from the continuation of unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted. (Id.) (quoting Guidelines § 5F1.5) (emphasis in letter). Hoffman quoted legislative history that stated that an occupational restriction  'should only be used as reasonably necessary to protect the public. It should not be used as a means of punishing the convicted person.'  (Hoffman July 21 Letter at 1 (quoting S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (emphasis in letter))). 27 Hoffman argued that because Doe had conducted himself properly for some four years, the notification condition was not necessary. As support for the lack of need, Hoffman cited the EDNY Probation Office's view, as set forth in its June 9 Memorandum, that the risk to third parties of any further impropriety on Doe's part was minimal. He also attached a copy of a July 20, 1995 letter from the government to the court, supporting Doe's request to be allowed not to notify his clients of his conviction. The July 20, 1995 letter from Assistant United States Attorney Gordon Mehler to the district judge (Government's July 20 Letter) endorsed the EDNY Probation Office's view that the risk to third parties was minimal, stating that the government believed Doe would not ... ever counsel another client to file a false tax return: 28 I write to inform the Court that the government has no objection to the Court granting the defendant's request to delete the requirement that he notify his accounting clients of his tax conviction and probationary status. In taking this position, I have consulted with [the] Assistant U.S. Attorney ... who handled the ... case. 29 Mr. [Doe] cooperated fully and seems to be genuinely remorseful. His cooperation continued for four years during which time he committed no further crimes. We do not believe he will ever counsel another client to provide false information on tax returns. Thus, we agree with the Probation Department that the risk to third parties is minimal. 30 (Government's July 20 Letter at 1 (emphasis added).) 31 In a July 27, 1995 endorsement (July 27 Order), the court rejected Doe's request: 32 Motion for reconsideration granted[.] On reconsideration the Court adheres to its provision that Mr. [Doe] notify his clients of his conviction so long as he engages in this position of a tax preparer. 33 July 27 Order. The EDNY Probation Office promptly informed Hoffman that after consideration ... the Court has decided to adhere to its provision that Mr. [Doe] notify his clients of his instant conviction so long as he engages in his tax preparation business. (Letter from Supervising U.S. Probation Officer Alfred R. D'Anca to Hoffman dated July 28, 1995, at 1 (Probation Office July 28 Letter).) 34 Doe continued to object to the requirement and retained new counsel, Vivian Shevitz. By letter dated August 3, 1995, Shevitz made another attempt to have the court eliminate the client-notification requirement, and requested, alternatively, that the court grant a stay pending appeal. Her letter argued not only that the occupational restriction was unnecessary for the reasons stated in the Probation Office's June 9 Memorandum and the Government's July 20 Letter, but also that because the court had not announced the client-notification condition at sentencing, the court's subsequent orders constituted either an impermissible imposition of more onerous sentencing terms or an impermissible delegation of power to the Probation Office. Shevitz's letter stated in part as follows: 35 I have just been retained by [John Doe] for the purposes of appealing Your Honor's order requiring that, as a condition of probation, Mr. [Doe] must notify his clients of his conviction so long as he engages in this position of a tax preparer. I write to respectfully ask Your Honor for a stay of this provision pending appeal, as required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 36 As I am sure you understand, the consequences to my client of complying with this directive are great: he stands to lose all of his business because of normal human reactions to such information. Before he is required to take the step that will have such a consequence, he should be able to obtain appellate review. 37 .... 38 Further as to the merits, I must add that I believe that there was no basis to impose a notification requirement that was not ordered at sentencing. Your Honor did not impose this condition of probation on the defendant at the sentencing. The law provides that an oral pronouncement of sentence cannot be modified by the later addition of more onerous terms. See United States v. Carbone, 739 F.2d 45,[ ]47 (2d Cir.1984). 39 While the probation notification states that at the direction of the probation officer, a condition of this nature may be imposed, the Court of Appeals has held it unlawful for a district judge to delegate to the probation department post-sentencing decisions, which then cannot be appealed and may be imposed without reason. See United States v. Porter, 41 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir.1994) (court cannot authorize a probation officer to make post-sentencing decisions about amount or scheduling of restitution payments). 40 The matter of notifying clients of a criminal conviction obviously has consequences as serious as those flowing from the payment of restitution. If an order to notify was to be made, the court was required to make it at the time of sentencing. 41 .... 42 With due respect, I believe that Your Honor's apparent directive to the probation officer upon inquiry about whether to impose this requirement was ill-considered. As the government agreed, there is, simply, no real need to require Mr. [Doe] to suffer the consequences of such an order--consequences that will reach far greater than a fine. If this court will not itself reconsider (on a renewed basis) and vacate your directive, I ask at least that Your Honor grant a stay pending appeal. 43 (Shevitz letter to the district judge dated August 3, 1995 (Shevitz Letter), at 1-3 (emphases in original).) Shevitz requested a prompt decision so that Doe could obtain appellate review before being required to take action that will irreparably harm his ability to continue his business. (Id. at 3.) 44 Following the Shevitz Letter, the EDNY Probation Office sent the court a memorandum dated August 11, 1995, to address[ ] the issue of third party risk, in terms of the degree of discretion afforded the probation department in requiring disclosure of information. (Memorandum from Supervising U.S. Probation Officer Alfred R. D'Anca to the district judge dated August 11, 1995 (Probation Office August 11 Memorandum), at 1.) After recapitulating the events, including the EDNY Probation Office's submission of its June 9 Memorandum, [i]n response [to which], Your Honor directed that the probationer must notify his clients of his instant tax conviction (Probation Office August 11 Memorandum at 1), the August 11 memorandum described the Probation Department's standard procedures as follows: 45 Based on their duty to protect the public, probation officers are instructed to warn third parties against whom there is a reasonable risk of harm from a person under supervision. (Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Vol. X[,] Chapter 4, Section 4302 (Probation Manual)) 46 In this regard, based on Policy Statement 5B1.4 and the policy of the U.S. Probation Department, the condition of supervision governing third party risk is a mandatory, standard condition of probation, stated in Probation Form 7A (Conditions of Probation and Supervised Release) as condition 13, which was signed by the probationer on April 28, 1995: 47 As directed by the probation officer, you shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by your criminal record as [sic ] personal history or characteristics, and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm your compliance with such notification requirement. 48 It should be noted that the Office of General Counsel has provided standards for disclosure of information concerning third party risk in probation cases. More specifically, the disclosure of information is selective, (i.e., warning is not required in every case, only where a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to a specific third party is believed to exist). Further, only when a probationer is unwilling to comply with the disclosure requirement, is it necessary for the Court to impose occupational restriction [sic ] or disclosure of information to an employer or specified third party as a formal special condition of supervision. (cf[.] Guide to Judiciary Polices and Procedure[s], supra ). 49 In summary, then, if the probation officer decides to preclude a probationer from a particular job or type of employment, and the probationer is unwilling to comply, the officer should request the Court to hold a hearing to determine whether disclosure of information is required in this case, and, if so, to modify the conditions of supervision, per Rule 32.1(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 50 Based on the foregoing, the memorandum previously submitted by the probation department, which addresses the issue of third party risk and was signed by Your Honor, is deemed to have served as clarification (rather than as an order) to reinforce the directive of the probation officer. [Sic.] 51 (Probation Office August 11 Memorandum at 2 (emphases in original).) 52 On August 17, 1995, after learning that the district judge was away and would not be able to rule on the August 3 stay motion for some time, Doe moved in this Court for a stay pending appeal. The stay was consented to by the government and was granted by this Court on September 5, 1995. 53 Three days later, in an Opinion dated September 8, 1995 (September 8 Opinion), the district court denied Doe any relief. The court took the position, inter alia, that Doe was required to notify his clients not because of any order of the court, but because the Probation Office had ordered him to do so (with the court's advice) and/or because Doe had agreed to that condition: 54 By letter dated August 3, 1995, new counsel for defendant (probationer) [John Doe], asks for a stay during the appeal of this Court's alleged order requiring, that as a condition of probation, Mr. [Doe] must notify his clients of his 'conviction so long as he engages in this position of a tax preparer' . 55 .... 56 At the time of his offense, the defendant was working for an accounting firm as an accountant/tax preparer, but he is not, and never has been, a certified public accountant nor has he been licensed as an accountant by the State of New York. He has been suspended from practicing law by the Appellate Division, Second Department. 57 Immediately following his sentence, defendant (a lawyer himself and presumably with the advice and consent of his then counsel) signed a condition of his probation which provided: 58 As directed by the probation officer, you shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by your criminal record as [sic ] personal history or characteristics, and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm your compliance with such notification requirement. (Condition of Probation Form 7A) 59 While a probation officer initially advised the Court on June 12 [sic ], 1995, that he recommended that an exception should be made in defendant's case with respect to the notification requirement, he at the same time stated: 60 It is clear that Mr. [Doe's] employment as a public accountant represents a third party risk ... 61 and sought this Court's decision on whether we agreed or disagreed with his recommendation. 62 More recently Supervising U.S. Probation Officer, for this District, Alfred R. D'Anca, in a memorandum dated August 11, 1995, advised that: 63 Based on the probation officer's duty to protect the public, probation officers are instructed to warn third parties against whom there is a reasonable risk of harm from a person under supervision (Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Vol. X, Chapter 4, Section 4302 (Probation Manual)). 64 On August 8th, 1995, defendant objected, when requested by a probation officer, to notify his clients of his instant conviction, and the defendant has continued to object to the obligation to notify his clients in this matter and the memorandum previously submitted by the Probation Department which addresses the issue of third party risk and was signed by Your Honor, is deemed to have served as clarification (rather than an order) to reinforce the directive of the Probation Office. [Sic.] 65 In short, it appears that the Probation Department in this District has changed its position from June 9th and now believes that it has a duty to protect the public by notification as set forth in the Guide and Probation Manual, supra, and in accordance with the defendant's written agreement which he now seeks to repudiate.... 66 Under the Sentencing Guidelines the U.S. Attorneys throughout the country have effectively usurped virtually all of the sentencing powers which traditionally were vested under the Constitution in the federal judiciary. They are given the power, for example, to reward and/or extract cooperation from defendants with a promise of obtaining downward departures from the Guidelines in exchange[ ] therefor. In this case, they appear to be attempting to extend that power into providing exceptions to the standard operating conditions of the Probation Department applicable to all defendants. 67 Defendants, such as the defendant in this case, never seem to appreciate the breaks that are given to them in terms of avoidance of incarceration, relatively short term [sic ] of probation, etc. and invariably start an assault on their lenient sentences requesting relief from fines, costs, restrictions on their travel for pleasure to Europe, Florida, etc. without first paying fines, and relief from other conditions such as the one in question here. 68 One of the reasons for the imposition of a jail sentence called for by this statute is to incapacitate a defendant from committing further crimes of the nature for which he was convicted, in order to protect the public. In order to enable the Court not to imprison a defendant for this purpose one of the standard conditions of probation is to obtain a defendant's agreement to protect the public from any possibility that they might be deceived by a defendant a second time. To this Court this seems to be a small price to pay to avoid a period of incarceration and a substantial benefit to the public to insure that it does not in [sic ] any further risk, at least, for the period of probation, which ... could have been as much as five years within the Guidelines. 69 Nonetheless, defense counsel argues that this Court has imposed a draconian condition as part of its sentence and that it is unlawful for the Court to modify its sentence after the event and to delegate to the Probation Department a post-sentence decision which may be imposed without reason. As indicated above, these charges are uncalled for, unwarranted, unseemly and almost contemptuous, particularly in the light of her lawyer[-]client's written agreement herein. On the basis thereof, defense counsel also asks for a stay pending an appeal from a non-existent order (as distinguished from advice given to the Probation Department) modifying the Court's sentence. 70 Defendant (heretofore noted to be a lawyer) has agreed in writing to obey the condition of probation; the Court expects him to live up to his agreement, and the Court will not give him any extension of time not to do so. 71 September 8 Opinion at 1-7. 72 The stay granted by this Court on September 5, 1995, remains in effect.