Opinion ID: 4289070
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Observations of Thomas

Text: As noted above, officers observed Thomas “walk away from the area” of the Residence and leave in a vehicle on the day that the search warrant was issued. They followed Thomas and stopped him after an unknown period of time for a driving infraction. During the stop, the officers found approximately 20 grams of heroin in Thomas’s vehicle. Crucially, the affidavit does not state that the officers saw Thomas entering or leaving the Residence, even though their surveillance was targeted specifically at that property. Nor does it say that Thomas was seen with Christian. In fact, the affidavit does not assert that there is any connection at all between Thomas and Christian. No. 17-1799 United States v. Christian Page 7 True enough, the affidavit states that, during the traffic stop, “Rueben Thomas admitted that he had recently been at an address on Grandville Avenue in the City of Grand Rapids but denied being at 618 Grandville, contrary to observations of the law enforcement officers.” But we decline to interpret this “contrary to observations” statement as an indication that officers saw Thomas actually entering or leaving the Residence itself. Officer Bush was undoubtedly aware that any evidence of Thomas being at the Residence would be highly relevant to the probablecause determination, but chose instead to state simply that Thomas was seen “in the area”—a vague description that does not place Thomas at the Residence. Absent a direct statement that Thomas was seen entering or leaving the Residence, or even at the Residence in any sense, we are unwilling to read such a factual assertion into the affidavit. The dissent, on the other hand, contends that the affidavit’s lack of a direct statement that Thomas was at the Residence is attributable to the “haste of a criminal investigation,” and that we are in effect requiring the affidavit to include “magic words,” contrary to precedent from the Supreme Court. Dissent Op. 34 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983)). But the affidavit’s inclusion of the specific, nontechnical language “in the area” appears to us more consistent with an honest acknowledgement that the officers did not observe Thomas on the property itself. In fact, the common-sense meaning of the language “in the area” suggests that Thomas was near but not at the Residence when observed. The dissent also notes that the affidavit “need only have alleged ‘facts that create a reasonable possibility’” that “Thomas was seen leaving 618 Grandville.” Dissent Op. 35. This statement reflects a subtle but crucial error. The affidavit must contain facts that establish probable cause that evidence of drug activity would be present in the Residence at the time of the search. Stated differently, probable cause must be established in relation to whether there is evidence of drug activity in the Residence, not in relation to whether Thomas was seen leaving the Residence. See United States v. Brooks, 594 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2010) (“To establish probable cause adequate to justify issuance of a search warrant, the governmental entity or agent seeking the warrant must submit to the magistrate an affidavit that establishes ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” (quoting United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir. 2009))). No. 17-1799 United States v. Christian Page 8 So even if the affidavit had stated that Thomas was seen on the lawn or in the driveway of the Residence, we would still have to speculate that Thomas was at one point inside the Residence and, taking the speculation one step further, that he engaged in drug activity while inside. Such an inference is made even more tenuous by the fact that there is nothing in the affidavit to suggest that the heroin later recovered during the traffic stop was on Thomas’s person, rather than simply in the car, when Thomas was observed walking in the area of the Residence by the officers. This leaves us to consider the significance of the following: A single individual with no known connection to Christian was seen walking away from the area of the Residence and then leaving that area in a car. He was followed by officers to a subsequent location where a traffic stop was conducted, during which heroin was found in the vehicle. If this provides any nexus at all between evidence of drug trafficking and the Residence, that nexus is so speculative and attenuated that it cannot, without more, support a finding of probable cause. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (noting that a hunch is insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, and that the reasonable-suspicion standard is easier to satisfy than the probable-cause standard). To conclude otherwise would allow officers seeking a warrant to rely on speculation that drug activity near a residence is related to that residence, significantly lowering the burden for the government to show probable cause in communities where drugs are prevalent. Because the government cites no case that would support such a proximity test for establishing probable cause, we find that the officers’ observations of Thomas have little value on their own. But that does not end our inquiry. We must consider, as we do below, whether other evidence in the record bolsters or corroborates a connection between Thomas’s alleged drug activity and the Residence, such that the magistrate could have found a fair probability that evidence of drug trafficking would be found at the Residence at the time of the search. No. 17-1799 United States v. Christian Page 9