Opinion ID: 1558724
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Concession Act

Text: The Concession Act authorizes the Department to enter into contracts with persons, firms or corporations to maintain and operate concessions within the state park areas for the welfare of the general public in the use and enjoyment of the state park system. § 9-14-20. However, the Department's authority to enter into contracts is not unlimited. Instead, the Concession Act prescribes a competitive-bid procedure. See §§ 9-14-21 to -25, Ala.Code 1975. Further, § 9-14-24(b) provides, in pertinent part, that [a]ll concession contracts of whatever nature or form shall provide for the reasonableness of the concessionaire's rates and charges to the public .... Finally, § 9-14-27 limits the length of the term of a concession contract: No concession contract shall be granted, the term of which exceeds six years, unless the concessionaire is required by the terms of the contract to expend major monetary sums for the purpose of improving, furnishing, equipping or enlarging existing facilities or constructing and/or furnishing additional facilities on the concession premises. In the event such major expenditures are made by a concessionaire, the term of his concession contract may be extended, but in no event exceed 12 years. The trial court held that the transactions contemplated by the memorandum of understanding between the Department and the University would violate these statutory requirements. We agree. The defendants do not argue that a contract for the construction and operation of a lodging-and-meeting facility within a State park is not a concession contract. Also, they do not contend that the proposed transactions would comply with the requirements of the Concession Act. Instead, they argue that the proposed lease and sublease are not subject to the Concession Act. The defendants offer several reasons in support of this argument, all of which are without merit. The Concession Act prescribes the requirements for contracts regarding concessions within the state park areas for the welfare of the general public in the use and enjoyment of the state park system.  § 9-14-20 (emphasis added). The defendants point out that the commissioner has the authority to lease a portion of the park. See § 9-2-3, Ala.Code 1975. See also Cotton Bayou Ass'n v. Department of Conservation, 622 So.2d 924 (Ala.1993). They then argue, citing no authority, that the proposed lease of a portion of the park would remove the leased portion from the park and the State-park system, thereby taking the proposed lease ... outside the scope of the Concession Act. Defendants' brief, at 25. However, as the AEA argues, leasing the land at issue would not magically remove the land from the state park. AEA's brief, at 13. Indeed, the Concession Act itself specifically contemplates that a concession contract may be in the form of a lease. See, e.g., § 9-14-21(c) (All concessionaires shall be fully responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the state facility leased.  (emphasis added)). Section 9-2-3, Ala.Code 1975, in pertinent part, gives the Department full power and authority to ... lease lands under its jurisdiction when in its judgment it is advantageous to the state to do so in the orderly development and management of state parks and parkways. This general language in no way compels the conclusion that a lease of State-park property for use as a hotel and coastal resort, a use complementary to the recreational purpose of the park, would somehow cause the leased property to cease to be a part of the park. Cotton Bayou provides no support for the defendants' argument. That case present[ed] the single issue of whether a State of Alabama agency has the authority to negotiate for the lease of real property or must lease real property pursuant to the competitive bid law, Ala.Code 1975, § 41-16-1 et. seq. 622 So.2d at 924-25. This Court simply held in Cotton Bayou that the competitive-bid law did not apply and that, therefore, the Department could lease the real estate in question by a negotiated lease. There is no indication in Cotton Bayou that the lease at issue there involved a concession within a State-park area. As previously discussed, the proposed lease and sublease are not subject to the competitive-bid requirements of the Sales Act because the Sales Act exempts transfers between State agencies and leases by institutions of higher education for institution-related purposes. The defendants argue, as a matter of statutory construction, that the Concession Act cannot be construed to apply to the proposed project. They state, without citing authority, that, in light of the Sales Act, it is an implausible construction of [the Concession Act] to apply its restrictions to an institution of higher education administering one of its programs. Defendants' brief, at 26. They support this conclusion with a preceding paragraph: Moreover, the application of the Concession Act to the [memorandum of understanding] leases would provide the kind of restrictions on the lease which are specifically exempted by the ... Sales Act. The ... leases are exempted from competitive auction and sealed bids by Ala.Code [1975,] § 9-15-82[,] because of its educational purpose. To require compliance with the Concession Act would render the ... Sales Act, and its application to the ... leases, irrelevant. The ... Sales Act has its own bidding requirements, and educational purpose ground leases are plainly exempted. Defendants' brief, at 25-26. As previously noted, the Sales Act exempts the transfer from the Department to the University from competitive bidding. The Concession Act is phrased in terms that contemplate regulation of transactions between the Department and the private sector. This Court set forth rules of statutory construction germane to the issue here presented in Weill v. State ex rel. Gaillard, 250 Ala. 328, 334, 34 So.2d 132, 137 (1948): A statute often speaks as plainly by inference as in any other manner, and it is a general rule that that which is clearly implied from the express terms of a statute is as much a part thereof, and is as effectual as that which is expressed. This rule applies to provisos, and under it an act which, although neither expressly forbidden nor authorized, is contrary to the plain implication of a statute, is unlawful.  Another rule which we think has application here is that construction should be avoided which affords an opportunity to evade the act, and one favored which would defeat subterfuges, expediencies or evasions employed to continue the mischief sought to be remedied by the statute, or to defeat compliance with the terms, or any attempt to accomplish by indirection what the statute forbids.  (Emphasis added.) The transaction proposed by the memorandum of understanding is an attempt to circumvent legislative intent by having the Department carry out through an intermediary acts prohibited by the legislature in the Concession Act. Although the Concession Act does not expressly prohibit the Department from contracting with another State agency to accomplish what it could not do if it acted without an intermediary, such conduct constitutes activity which, although neither expressly forbidden nor authorized, is contrary to the plain implication of [the] statute. Likewise, such activity is [an] attempt to accomplish by indirection what the statute forbids. Based on the rules expressed in Weill v. State ex rel. Gaillard , we reject the defendants' contention that it is implausible to construe the Concession Act so as to apply it to the transaction between the University and the sublessee. Finally, the defendants argue that the Sales Act, enacted in 1995, repealed by implication the aforementioned requirements of the Concession Act, enacted in 1971. Citing only Kimbrell v. State, 272 Ala. 419, 425, 132 So.2d 132, 137 (1961), for the general proposition of law that the particular will govern the general, the defendants argue: [T]he specificity of the 1995 statute ... implies that the more general 1971 statute is not meant to control. Section 9-15-82 is part of a 1995 statute specifically addressing educational-purpose ground leases. There is nothing specific in the 1971 Concessions Act about educational-purpose leases related to park land. Therefore, the 1971 act does not apply to educational-purpose ground leases as it is repealed impliedly. Defendants' brief, at 26. The AEA responds that there is no basis on which to find an implied repeal, as is evidenced by a straightforward application of the law of implied repeals. AEA's brief, at 17. We agree with the AEA. It is well established that repeal by implication is not favored. See, e.g., Willis v. Kincaid, 983 So.2d 1100, 1106 (Ala.2007). More specifically, this Court has recognized [t]he rule that implied repeal is disfavored when the earlier act is specific and the subsequent act is general. Marks v. Tenbrunsel, 910 So.2d 1255, 1262 (Ala.2005). The application of the Concession Act is specifically limited to the Department's contracts with persons, firms or corporations to maintain and operate concessions within the state park areas .... § 9-14-20, Ala.Code 1975. On the other hand, the Sales Act applies to all real property and interests therein owned by the State of Alabama and the departments, boards, bureaus, commissions, institutions, corporations, and agencies of the state with the exception of [certain] sales, transfers, and reversions set out in Section 9-15-82. § 9-15-70, Ala.Code 1975. The defendants argue that the Sales Act is, by reason of its exemption of leases by institutions of higher education for institution-related purposes, the more specific of the two acts. However, looking at the subject matters of the two acts, it is clear that the Sales Act is the more general act, because an act relating to a broad range of lease or sales transactions made by any State entity is far more general than the Concession Act, which covers only concession contracts entered into by the Department involving State-park land. The defendants cite no authority for the proposition that the subject matter of an act is determined by its exceptions and not by the general scope of the act. Further, it would be illogical to conclude that the legislature, by granting the University authority to enter into certain leases, intended to remove the limitations on the Department's authority to enter into concession contracts. Indeed, such a conclusion would allow the Department, by first leasing the property to the University, to do indirectly what it may not do directly, namely, to enter into a contract for the operation of a concession within the park without first complying with the Concession Act. [The Department] may not do indirectly what the Legislature prohibits [it] from doing directly. Richardson v. Stanford Props., LLC, 897 So.2d 1052, 1059 (Ala.2004). The defendants have not demonstrated any error in the trial court's holding that the proposed transactions would violate the Concession Act. Therefore, to the extent of that holding, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.