Opinion ID: 780450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Habeas Relief under AEDPA

Text: 37 Having concluded that Bradley's due process rights were violated, we turn to the issue whether he has fulfilled the requirements of AEDPA. As previously discussed, the California Court of Appeal's decision that Bradley was not entitled to an entrapment instruction involved an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). However, it is the due process violation, not the state law error, that triggers our habeas relief. 38 Because the California Court of Appeal did not address Bradley's due process claim, we must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court's resolution of the case constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001) (as amended) (quoting Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.2000)). 39 We have held that a state court decision must be reversed as involving an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when we have a firm conviction that the state court erred. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153-54 (9th Cir.2000) (adopting a clear error standard for habeas review under AEDPA), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944, 121 S.Ct. 340, 148 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we accept the principles mandated by the Supreme Court in Woodford v. Visciotti, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279, 2002 WL 31444314 (2002) (per curiam) and Early v. Packer, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263, 2002 WL 31444316 (2002) (per curiam), requiring that the state court decision reflect an objectively unreasonable application of federal law. However, the record is clear that the California Court of Appeal's decision was an objectively unreasonably application of federal law. The Court of Appeal failed to recognize Bradley's right to present a complete and meaningful defense to the jury under the principles set out in Mathews and Trombetta. It failed to consider the facts relevant to the due process prejudice prong, including the undisputed evidence that jurors in the second trial would not have convicted the defendant if the entrapment instruction had been given. It failed to explain why the second judge could unilaterally ignore the first trial judge's findings of fact and conclusion of law regarding the entrapment instructions and not compose even a single sentence to explain away the law of the case doctrine. It is clear that the California Court of Appeal's failure to address these issues constituted an objectively unreasonable determination of both the law and the facts. 40 The dissent would dismiss Bradley's habeas petition on the basis that he has cited no United States Supreme Court case ... that would require the giving of an entrapment instruction in a state-criminal trial when there is insufficient evidence to support such an instruction under state law. Dissent at 27 (citing Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir.1993)). However, no such case need be cited here. As shown above, Bradley more than sufficiently supported his defense theory of entrapment, and the fact that the entrapment instruction was given in his first trial is further proof of this. 41 The dissent misconstrues the nature of our inquiry under AEDPA. Bradley need not produce a spotted calf on the precise issue at hand to warrant habeas relief. See Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1154 & n. 16 (AEDPA does not require an on-point Supreme Court case for us to reverse....). Rather, it is sufficient that the due process violation involved here offends the principles previously enunciated by Supreme Court precedent and reaffirmed by our case law. See id.; see also Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 852 (6th Cir.2002) (The [Supreme] Court has made clear that its relevant precedents include not only bright-line rules but also the legal principles and standards flowing from precedent.) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). 42 The District Court was correct to grant habeas relief. 43 Affirmed.