Opinion ID: 3010883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extent of the Search

Text: The second question before us is whether the agents acted lawfully in searching beyond the basement of the home. If they did, then they were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim as well because the appellees would not have alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 841 n.5, 118 S.Ct. at 1714 n.5. The warrant authorized a search of the property known as 3936 N. 5th Street, Philadelphia, PA. Although the probable cause affidavit stated that Nieves stored cocaine in five-gallon cans in the basement of the premises, the affidavit recited other items the location of which were not expressly limited to any particular portion of the building. The affidavit stated that [w]hile inside the premises with NIEVES in January, 1996 the confidential informant saw diluents [sic], a scale, a heat sealer for the packages of cocaine, and a vise which NIEVES used to crush the hardpacked cocaine. Furthermore, according to the affidavit, Nieves repeatedly told the confidential informant that he was continuing to use 3936 North Fifth Street to store and package cocaine, and the informant saw Nieves's truck parked outside the building on January 3, 1997, just a few weeks before the search warrant was executed. The Supreme Court has stated that [a] lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2170 (1982). In this regard, we point out that courts specifically have held that a warrant encompasses the authority to search the entire building if the person who is the target of the search has access to or control over the entire premises. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 71 F.3d 243, 249 (7th Cir. 1995) (where a building is being used as a single unit,a finding of probable cause as to a portion of the premises is 12 sufficient to support a search of the entire structure; a search of the entire premises is permitted where the target of the investigation exercised `dominion and control' over the entire building or had access to the entire structure) (citation omitted); United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983) ([A] warrant may authorize a search of an entire street address while reciting probable cause as to only a portion of the premises if they are occupied in common rather than individually, if a multiunit building is used as a single entity, if the [alleged wrongdoer] was in control of the whole premises, or if the entire premises are suspect.); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure S 4.5, at 41 (3d ed. Supp. 1999) (The obvious point is that when a resident apparently has the run of the premises, there is no reason to conclude that the warrant must be limited to the precise spot where the items sought happened to be when observed on a prior occasion.); cf. Jackson v. Byrd, 105 F.3d 145 (3d Cir.) (habeas corpus petition denied in controlled substance constructive possession case where lessee-petitioner had access and control over all areas of an apartment even though the substance was found in a bedroom occupied by petitioner's brother), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1268, 117 S.Ct. 2442 (1997). The building at 3936 North Fifth Street was not a multiunit premises with separate areas controlled by separate residents. Rather, it was a traditional two-story home with bedrooms upstairs, a dining room and kitchen downstairs, and a basement accessible through the dining room. Accordingly, the warrant authorized the search of the entire building and the appellees did not allege a violation of a constitutional right at all on the scope of the search claim. Therefore, the agents are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. In reaching our result, we recognize that the appellees' amended complaint with respect to the scope of the search is very general, as it merely alleges that the agents conducted an excessive and unreasonable search. Nevertheless, we are of the view that a plaintiff by a generalized pleading should not be deemed to have alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right so as to defeat a 13 claim of immunity when an inquiry into the undisputed facts demonstrates that there is no basis for the claim. After all, the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038-39 (1987), made it clear that when an officer claims immunity on the ground that he or she did not violate a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known the plaintiff 's claim must be considered in a specific context rather than in an abstract generalized sense. We think that the same standard must be applied in determining whether a plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right in the first place.