Opinion ID: 777147
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Certain Tort Claims by Orr Are Barred by Nevada's Statute of Limitations.

Text: 59 Orr contends the district court erred in finding that the statute of limitations governing her tort claims began to run in September 1995 when she was told by Bourdeau that BOA had submitted negative information about her to the FDIC. 60 Whether a claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is reviewed de novo. See Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir.2000). When the statute of limitations begins to run is a question of law also reviewed de novo. See Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir.2000); In re DeLaurentiis Entm't Group, Inc., 87 F.3d 1061, 1062 (9th Cir.1996). 61 A. Orr Discovered or Should Have Discovered the Necessary Facts Supporting Her Tort Claims by September 1995. 62 Under Nevada law, which governs Orr's tort claims, the statute of limitations begins to run when the wrong occurs and a party sustains injuries for which relief could be sought. Petersen v. Bruen, 106 Nev. 271, 274, 792 P.2d 18 (1990). However, when a plaintiff has not discovered her injury or cause of injury at the time of its occurrence, the statute of limitations is tolled until the injured party discovers or reasonably should have discovered facts supporting a cause of action. Id.; see Siragusa v. Brown, 114 Nev. 1384, 1393, 971 P.2d 801 (1998); Sorenson v. Pavlikowski, 94 Nev. 440, 443-44, 581 P.2d 851 (1978). 63 Whether a plaintiff has discovered or should have discovered the cause of her injury is ordinarily a question of fact. See Siragusa, 114 Nev. at 1400, 971 P.2d 801. However, when uncontroverted evidence proves that the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the facts giving rise to the claim, such a determination can be made as a matter of law. Id. at 1401, 971 P.2d 801. 64 Orr contends she did not discover the cause of her injury until 1997 when she came across documentary evidence (Exhibit C) in Bourdeau's trial indicating that the FDIC had received an FBI report suspecting her of criminal conduct at BOA. Orr, however, testified in her deposition that by September 1995, Bourdeau told her that BOA had made negative comments about her to the FDIC and that she didn't have any reason to doubt that. 28 Despite her absence of doubt, she failed to investigate this matter. This is evident from her deposition testimony: I wanted it to go away. I was just wanting to move on with my life. Orr failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to discover the cause of her injury. This bars her from asserting a discovery rule tolling defense to Nevada's statute of limitations. See Siragusa, 114 Nev. at 1394, 971 P.2d 801. Thus, we conclude that Orr discovered or should have reasonably discovered the necessary facts supporting her tort claims by September 1995 and that the statute of limitations for these claims began to run at that time. 65 B. Nevada's Limitations Period Bars Some of Orr's Tort Claims. 66 Orr's Complaint contains tort claims for (1) intentional interference with existing contractual relations, (2) intentional interference with prospective business relations, (3) business disparagement, (4) slander, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Under Nevada's applicable statute of limitations, Orr had two years from September 1995 to file her third, fourth and fifth tort claims. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(c) (2001) (providing a two-year limitations period for [a]n action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or seduction); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e) (2001) (providing a two-year limitations period for an action to recover damages for injuries to a person ... caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another). 29 67 Orr filed her Complaint against BOA on August 24, 1998. The two-year statute of limitations on her claims for business disparagement, slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress began to run in September 1995 and expired in September 1997. Accordingly, these tort claims are time-barred. 68 However, Orr's claims for (1) intentional interference with existing contractual relations and (2) intentional interference with prospective business relations are subject to Nevada's four-year limitations period and are thus not time-barred. 30 See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(2)(c); Sorenson, 94 Nev. at 444, 581 P.2d 851. The district court's contrary finding was erroneous. 69