Opinion ID: 2146621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Correction of Underpayments.

Text: The department argues that the plaintiffs are not entitled to a correction of underpayments under either 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (22) (1982) or 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 332.090. We agree that 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (22) does not provide the plaintiffs a remedy in this case. In 1981, Congress adopted this section to require States to correct overpayments and underpayments in all instances. S. Rep. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 441, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 396, 707 (S. Rep.). Under prior regulation, States [were] given the option of whether or not to recoup overpayments. However, if States recover[ed] overpayments they must also pay underpayments. Id. The regulation which implements and interprets 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (22) restricts its applicability to AFDC. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (a) (13) (1984). [10] Furthermore, the regulation restricts the applicability of this section to errors identified subsequent to September 30, 1981. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (a) (13) (iii). The error affecting the plaintiffs was identified by the Federal court's judgment in Ingerson, supra, on September 17, 1981. We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiffs are not entitled to correction of underpayments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (22). During all the time applicable to this action the department had in effect a regulation which required the correction of underpayments resulting from administrative error. 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 332.090(G) (1979). [11] The judge interpreted this regulation as requiring correction of the underpayments made to the plaintiffs. [12] The department contends that the judge misconstrued this regulation. The department would interpret this regulation as applicable only to clerical errors. We disagree. Ordinarily an agency's interpretation of its own rule is entitled to great weight.... However, this principle is one of deference, not abdication, and courts will not hesitate to overrule agency interpretations of rules when those interpretations are arbitrary, unreasonable or inconsistent with the plain terms of the rule itself. (Citations omitted.) Finkelstein v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 370 Mass. 476, 478 (1976). A general term of a statute may not be construed differently from its plain meaning, especially in the absence of any evidence of legislative or administrative intent so to construe it ... and we may apply that same principle to the regulation. Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 762, 782 (1980). The department, in its brief, recognizes that the plain meaning of administrative contemplates the department's promulgation and implementation of regulations. See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 28 (1964). [13] The department argues, however, that in the context of this regulation the term is limited. Otherwise, the department contends, the regulation establishes a remedy, subject to none of the conventional limits, for error, no matter how distant. This argument ignores the language of the regulation. It does not provide an open-ended remedy. Rather, the regulation only allows the correction of an error which occurred within twelve (12) months preceding the month in which the underpayment is discovered. 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 332.090 (G) (1). Furthermore, if the department intended so to limit this regulation it could have adopted clear language to achieve that result. Both Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (a), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) (1985), contain language which clearly limits the circumstances in which errors may be corrected. The department has failed to persuade us that the phrase administrative error was meant to have a more limited meaning in 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 332.090(G) than the plain meaning of that phrase. We conclude that the department's error in computing the plaintiffs' EA benefits pursuant to an invalid regulation was an administrative error subject to correction under 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 332.090(G). The department suggests that, even if 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 332.090(G) is applicable, the 1,296 notice plaintiffs are not entitled to correction of underpayments because their requests were not properly worded. This suggestion does not aid the department's cause. Subsequent to the Ingerson judgment, the department formulated a policy that required the denial of any requests for retroactive EA benefits. Prior to the receipt of the Notice of Appeal forms, the department had processed and denied several requests for a recalculation of EA benefits. These requests explicitly sought a correction of underpayments. The explicit requests and the Notice of Appeal forms were generated as a result of Ingerson from the same class of plaintiffs. The department knew or should have known that the 1,296 notice plaintiffs were requesting a correction of underpayments. Furthermore, the department's regulations are not clear as to whether the specificity in applications that is argued for in this instance is required. See 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 302.030 (1978) (only specific application for AFDC, otherwise any actual written request for assistance); 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 302.110 (1978) (no further application for EA, the EA request to be noted in the case record); 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 309.030 (1978) (no additional EA application for AFDC recipients but non-AFDC recipients must file AFDC application when requesting EA); 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 343.020(B) (no specificity required in a request for a fair hearing). In the circumstances of this case, we conclude that all of the plaintiffs' requests sufficiently informed the department of the relief sought. The plaintiffs are entitled to correction of underpayments pursuant to 106 Code Mass. Regs. § 332.090 (G). The issue of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys' fees and, if so, the amount of such fees is remanded to the Superior Court for determination. The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. So ordered.