Opinion ID: 2533673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the MTCA precludes liability against a governmental entity where the employee's conduct constituted a criminal offense.

Text: ¶ 19. Immunity is a question of law[,] and this Court conducts a de novo review of the application of the MTCA. [6] Furthermore, [a] circuit court judge sitting without a trier of fact is given the same deference with regard to his fact finding as a chancellor, and his findings are safe on appeal when they are supported by substantial, credible, and reliable evidence. [7] ¶ 20. The City of Jackson argues that the MTCA waives immunity under certain limited circumstances, and that no waiver exists under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-7(2) for a criminal offense. It argues that an employee cannot be acting in the course and scope of employment when the employee's actions constitute culpable-negligence manslaughter. In support of its argument, the City of Jackson cites L. T. ex rel. Hollins v. City of Jackson [8] and City of Jackson v. Powell . [9] ¶ 21. In L.T. ex rel. Hollins, the district court held that the City of Jackson was not liable for the actions of an on-duty police officer who had sexually assaulted a young woman. [10] The court found that the officer's sexual misconduct was not in furtherance of the employer's business so as to be within the scope and course of employment. [11] Likewise, in Powell, this Court found the City of Jackson immune from liability where a police officer acted with malice by using excessive force on an arrestee. [12] The Court interpreted Mississippi Code Sections 11-46-5(2) and 11-46-7(2) and found that the employee had acted outside the scope and course of employment by acting with malice. [13] ¶ 22. Conversely, the Beneficiaries argue that L.T. ex rel. Hollins and Powell are distinguishable, because the governmental employees in those cases committed intentional torts, not traffic offenses. The Beneficiaries argue that the City of Jackson fails to cite Mississippi Code Section 11-46-5(2), which waives immunity for traffic violations that constitute criminal offenses. [14] The Beneficiaries further argue that the phrase culpable negligence is synonymous with reckless disregard under the MTCA. ¶ 23. Under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-7, the MTCA provides the exclusive civil remedy for tort actions against the state, its political subdivisions, and its employees. [15] Section 11-46-7 further provides that: For the purposes of this chapter, an employee shall not be considered as acting in the course and scope of his employment and a governmental entity shall not be liable or be considered to have waived immunity for any conduct of its employee if the employee's conduct constituted fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense. [16] However, Mississippi Code Section 11-46-5 provides that: For the purposes of this chapter an employee shall not be considered as acting within the course and scope his employment and a governmental entity shall not be liable or be considered to have waived immunity for any conduct of its employee if the employee's conduct constituted fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense other than traffic violations. [17] ¶ 24. We find that the City of Jackson is liable for Middleton's conduct under the plain language of Section 11-46-5(2). While Section 11-46-7(2) provides immunity for criminal offenses, Section 11-46-5(2) specifically excludes traffic offenses from this immunity. Middleton's guilty plea to culpable-negligence manslaughter does not change the fact that Middleton caused Harris's death by violating the traffic laws of this state. Middleton's conduct constituted speeding and running a red light, traffic offenses that are misdemeanors (and, as such, criminal offenses) under our Code. [18] Furthermore, [n]o driver of any authorized emergency vehicle shall assume any special privilege ... except when such vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call or in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law. [19] It is undisputed that Middleton was not operating his vehicle in response to any emergency or in pursuit of a suspect, but that he was traveling to the hospital to provide insurance information to an injured driver. ¶ 25. Furthermore, we agree with the Beneficiaries that L.T. ex rel. Hollins and Powell are distinguishable, as those cases do not involve any type of traffic violation. This Court has upheld governmental liability in cases where its officers have committed traffic offenses resulting in motor-vehicle accidents. [20] In these cases, the Court analyzed another provision of the MTCA, Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9, which specifically addresses police conduct and provides that: (1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim. ... . . . (c) Arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury. [21] The Court, in Turner v. City of Ruleville , announced the following definition of reckless disregard: While we agree that reckless disregard would encompass gross negligence, we hold that reckless disregard is a higher standard than gross negligence by which to judge the conduct of officers. Disregard of the safety of others is at least negligence if not gross negligence. Because reckless precedes disregard, the standard is elevated ... reckless, according to the circumstances, may mean desperately heedless, wanton or willful, or it may mean only careless, inattentive or negligence. [ Black's Law Dictionary 1270 (6th ed.1991)]. In the context of the statute, reckless must connote wanton or willful, because immunity lies for negligence. And this Court has held that wanton and reckless disregard are just a step below specific intent. See Evans v. Trader, 614 So.2d 955, 958 (Miss.1993). The Court held in Evans that in order to defeat an immunity defense under the common law, the plaintiff would have to show that the officer entertained a specific intent. It would suffice to show that [the officer] acted with wanton and reckless disregard for [the plaintiff's] safety. [22] ¶ 26. Notably, the term reckless disregard has a similar definition to culpable-negligence manslaughter. In Chandler v. State, this Court defined culpable-negligence manslaughter as: `[T]he conscious and wanton or reckless disregard of the probabilities of fatal consequences to others as a result of the wilful creation of an unreasonable risk thereof.' Evans v. State, 562 So.2d 91, 94 (Miss.1990) (citing Smith v. State, 197 Miss. 802, 20 So.2d 701, 701 (1945)). This Court more recently defined manslaughter by culpable negligence as such gross negligence ... as to evince a wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of human life, or such an indifference to the consequences of an act under the surrounding circumstances as to render such conduct tantamount to willfulness. Shumpert v. State, 935 So.2d 962, 967 (Miss.2006) (citing Evans v. State, 562 So.2d 91, 95 (Miss.1990)). [23] ¶ 27. We find that substantial evidence supports the trial judge's findings that Middleton was on duty and responding to a non-emergency call when he drove approximately 98 miles per hour through a red light as Harris was attempting to make a left-hand turn. Every witness (except Middleton) testified that Middleton had been driving at an excessive speed without his emergency lights or siren. Several witnesses saw the collision and testified that Middleton had disregarded a red light when he had proceeded through the intersection and collided with Harris. Furthermore, the City of Jackson did not argue at trial or on appeal that Harris was engaged in any criminal activity at the time of the accident. So we agree with the trial court that Middleton acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others under Section 11-46-9(1)(c). His actions fall within the definition of reckless disregard pronounced by this Court in the City of Ruleville. As such, the trial court was correct in holding the City of Jackson liable for Middleton's actions that occurred in the course and scope of his employment.