Opinion ID: 766915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 11 The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Sabharis' challenge to the BIA's order. When a district court so finds, we make our review de novo. See Schneider v. United States, 27 F.3d 1327, 1331 (8 th Cir. 1994). 12 In this case, when considering the parameters of its jurisdiction, the district court's task was complicated by the fact that the Sabharis offered a litany of ostensibly relevant jurisdictional theories. 5 Many of these theories were summarily dispatched by the court because they were inapplicable. 6 The only jurisdictional theory raised by the Sabharis to which the court gave meaningful treatment was 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (Supp. III 1997). 13 Historically, § 1329 provided the federal district courts with an explicit jurisdictional grant to review discretionary decisions of the INS. Indeed, prior to 1996, it provided that, [t]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of the provisions of this subchapter. However, § 381(a) of the IIRIRA amended 8 U.S.C. § 1329. With these new and significant additions, the present version of § 1329 now states in relevant part: 14 The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, brought by the United States that arise under the provisions of this subschapter. . . . Nothing in this section shall be construed as providing jurisdiction for suits against the United States or its agencies or officers. 15 Emphasis added. The district court found that this language affords the Sabharis no avenue of relief because § 1329 no longer provides a basis for jurisdiction over actions, such as the present, instituted against officers of the United States. See Slip Op. at 5. 16 We agree. But as other courts have noted, although the new language inserted into 8 U.S.C. § 1329 by the IIRIRA divests the district courts of some of the jurisdiction they once enjoyed, the new incarnation of § 1329 nevertheless fails to expressly preclude litigants from successfully invoking other, alternative bases for subject matter jurisdiction. See Shanti, Inc. v. Reno, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1159 (D. Minn. 1999). Indeed, use of the phrase nothing in this section implies that other sections remain viable jurisdictional alternatives because that phrase contrasts so sharply with other, more strongly worded, jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the IIRIRA. See id. (contrasting § 1329 with 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) and § 1252(g) --both of which employ the more forceful phrase not withstanding any other provision of law). 17 In short, although we agree with the district court that § 1329 does not provide a grant of jurisdiction that may be employed in these circumstances, it is clear that § 1329 does nothing to foreclose any other jurisdictional mechanism, presuming of course that the predicates for such other mechanism are duly established. We emphasize that the phrase nothing in this section shall be construed [to provide] jurisdiction does not preclude jurisdiction under other provisions of law. Id. 18 The INS argues that, even if we are correct in our analysis of § 1329, a second provision added to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by the IIRIRA strips the district court of jurisdiction in any event. That provision is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (Supp. III 1997). The district court apparently agreed, insofar as it noted that Congress has expressly limited judicial review of immigration cases to the procedures contained in § 1252. Slip Op. at 6. 19 Section 1252(g), titled Exclusive jurisdiction, states: 20 Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter. 21 While this language might have been thought to cut quite a broad swath, the Supreme Court held to the contrary in Reno v. Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936 (1999). Instead, this section is to be read narrowly and precisely. See id. at 943 (holding that § 1252(g) eliminates judicial review only for three discrete actions of the Attorney General undertaken during the deportation process). See also Shah v. Reno, 184 F.3d 719, 722 (8 th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that, after Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Comm., § 1252(g) does not proscribe review over even the generality of deportation matters). Thus, because Sabhari's petition for adjustment of status is separate and distinct from any matter related to an order of deportation, § 1252(g) has nothing to do with the present case, . . . . Shah, 184 F.3d at 722. 22 Having now held that the changes wrought by IIRIRA do not foreclose all possible review of INS administrative actions in the district court -- at least when those actions do not implicate the deportation process -- we must briefly consider the alternative jurisdictional grounds which were summarily rejected by the district court. We need not go far, however, because there is precedent, under similar circumstances, to support the invocation of jurisdiction through the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). See Abboud v. INS, 140 F.3d 843, 846-47 (9 th Cir. 1998) (jurisdiction to consider denial of visa petition established under APA); Shanti, Inc. v. Reno, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1159-61 (D. Minn. 1999) (same); Burger v. McElroy, 1999 WL 203353 (S.D.N.Y.) (jurisdiction to consider denial of visa petition established under 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 23 Section 1331 is familiar, of course, as the general grant of civil federal question jurisdiction to the district courts for actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Nevertheless, § 1331 does not, in and of itself, create substantive rights in suits brought against the United States. See Hagemeier v. Block, 806 F.2d 197, 202-03 (8 th Cir. 1986). 7 Thus, if § 1331 is to be used to secure relief against the United States, it must be tied to some additional authority which waives the government's sovereign immunity. Such a waiver may be found in the Administrative Procedure Act. 24 Under the APA, [a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. 5 U.S.C. § 702. In addition, the APA also provides that final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 704. 25 The issue of jurisdiction in this case is a difficult one of statutory interpretation. We hold that the district court did have jurisdiction to decide the merits of the Sabharis' petitions. See Abboud, 140 F.3d at 846-47; Shanti, 36 F. Supp. 2d. at 1159-61.