Opinion ID: 2329522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Adverse Inferences from Invocation Of Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

Text: At the July 29, 1985 hearing the County called appellant McCollum as its first witness. Upon being questioned by the County about certain facts surrounding the operation of the Photo Studio, McCollum invoked her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [12] A similar exchange took place with respect to McCollum and several other appellants at the hearing conducted on September 26, 1985. Upon the County's request, the trial judge agreed to draw an adverse inference from appellants' invocation of the fifth amendment privilege. Counsel for appellants contend that the trial court erred in taking a negative inference from appellants' invocation of that privilege. We disagree. Though by its terms applicable only in criminal proceedings, [13] the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination has long been held to extend to compelling answers by parties or witnesses in civil litigation. [The privilege] applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S.Ct. 16, 17, 69 L.Ed. 158 (1924). See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973). Thus, in a civil case the fifth amendment does not preclude from disclosure facts which would tend to establish civil liability, but rather protects a witness from being required to make disclosure, otherwise compellable in the trial court's contempt power, which could incriminate him in a later criminal prosecution. 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2254 (McNaughton rev. 1961) and discussion therein. When a witness in a civil proceeding refuses to answer a question on the ground that his answer might tend to incriminate him, the result sought to be achieved by invoking the privilege is accomplished. Such refusal cannot be used against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding. However, the trier of facts in a civil case is entitled to draw an inference from his refusal to so testify. See, e.g., Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wash.2d 449, 261 P.2d 684 (1953). Ikeda was a fraud case. The plaintiffs brought the action contending that, in the sale of a hotel to them, the defendant fraudulently concealed from plaintiffs the fact that the hotel had been used by the defendant as a house of prostitution. The Supreme Court of Washington, in holding that an adverse inference could be taken when a witness in a civil suit refuses to answer a question on the ground that his answer might tend to incriminate him, quoted: `... The privilege is not for the benefit of the guilty nor to enable the claimant to prevail in civil suits by means of it. The privilege is to be protected from compulsory disclosure of criminal liability or facts connecting the claimant with crime. See In re Berman, 105 Cal. App. 37, 287 P. [125] 126. To hold that no inference could be drawn from the refusal of these witnesses to explain their dealings, in the face of so many suspicious circumstances, would be an unjustifiable extension of the privilege for a purpose it was never intended to fulfill.' 261 P.2d at 690, quoting Fross v. Wotton, 3 Cal.2d 384, 44 P.2d 350, 354 (1935). Put yet another way, the privilege does not forbid the drawing of adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify. Our holding is in accord with the prevailing view, that the fifth amendment does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.  Wigmore § 2272, p. 439 (footnote omitted) (emphasis the author's); see also Baxter, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1558, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976); Olin Corp. v. Castells, 180 Conn. 49, 428 A.2d 319 (1980). Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (constitutional error under fifth amendment to instruct jury in a criminal case that it may draw inference of guilt from a defendant's failure to testify). After Baxter, there is no longer any doubt that at trial a civil defendant's silence may be used against him, even if that silence is an exercise of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 929. We note that appellants' refusal to testify, taken alone, would not justify a finding that the Photo Studio was being maintained and operated as a bawdyhouse. See Larsen v. Romeo, 254 Md. 220, 255 A.2d 387 (1969) (negative inference is not substantive evidence and does not relieve party of burden of proof). However, an adverse inference may be drawn from the refusal by appellants to so testify, which may be coupled and considered with proper and relevant evidence tending to prove such fact. Significantly, the record below provides no indication that appellants' invocation of the fifth amendment privilege resulted in an adverse judgment. Nowhere in the record is it clear that the trial court gained critical facts from or otherwise based its ruling on inferences drawn from appellants' invocation of their privilege. Indeed, counsel for appellants at argument conceded that Judge Bowen perhaps could have reached his conclusion wholly apart from drawing inferences from appellants' invocation of the privilege. Accordingly, we find no merit to appellant's contention.