Opinion ID: 2276756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Agency's Decision

Text: We will affirm the agency's conclusion that Giles' conduct amounts to gross misconduct under the statute if it flows reasonably from the agency's findings of fact and its regulations interpreting the unemployment compensation statute which it administers. [6] See The Washington Times, 724 A.2d at 1216. We conclude that we are unable to do so on the present record. In Long v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 570 A.2d 301, 302 (D.C.1990), this court noted that [p]aramount in any agency decision for purposes of appellate review is a clear exposition of the legal principle or principles underlying the agency decision. In Long, the Department of Employment Services' decision simply held that the employee was discharged for misconduct, and the court remanded for clarification, including a clear fact-finding concerning the employee's mental state, because it found itself unable to perform its appellate function. See id. at 303-05. More recently, we remanded a case because the agency failed even to mention the existence of two statutory levels of misconduct, and a reviewing court should not assume that the issue has been considered sub silentio when there is no discernible evidence that it has. The Washington Times, 724 A.2d at 1221. Here, both the claims examiner and the appeals examiner found Giles to have been terminated for gross misconduct, based on continued poor work performance after having been warned. Specifically, the claims examiner found that Giles' poor work was willful and deliberate. The Appeals Examiner, after crediting the supervisor's testimony that Giles was an excellent plumber, who was highly skilled at carrying out his job assignments, determined that Giles' failure to complete tasks and work orders as required, despite verbal and written warnings, constituted gross misconduct under the regulations. The Appeals Examiner does not explicitly find that Giles' actions were willful and deliberate, although the evidence of Giles' skills and failure to perform up to that standard would permit such an inference. The OAR's decision contains no independent analysis. Although the first two levels of the agency's decision reference the willful and deliberate language of the regulation, we note that there is no mention of poor work performance in the regulation defining gross misconduct. Rather, the regulation speaks of an act which deliberately or willfully violates the employer's rules, deliberately or willfully threatens or violates the employer's interests, shows a repeated disregard for the employee's obligation to the employer, or disregards standards of behavior which an employer has a right to expect of its employee. 7 DCMR § 312.3. The regulations do mention repeated disregard of reasonable orders as an example of gross misconduct, see 7 DCMR § 312.4(g), and it is perhaps possible to thereby understand the agency's finding. Compared to the other examples of gross misconduct in the regulation, however, it is less than clear whether the kind of disregard of orders in the routine performance of work evidenced in this case rises to the level of a violation of the employer's rules, interests or standards of behavior sufficient to constitute gross misconduct, in the context of a statutory scheme that differentiates between simple misconduct and gross misconduct. [7] [W]e cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Long, 570 A.2d at 302. Accordingly, it is necessary to remand for a clarification of the agency's decision. Remanded.