Opinion ID: 2812253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The State Court’s Ruling

Text: Judge Grossman correctly identified Giles as the governing standard, and in general terms stated that standard correctly—whether a witness is “kept away” by a defendant who “engaged in conduct designed to keep the witness from testifying.” It is not clear from the record precisely what conduct toward that end the court found Carlson to have committed. AEDPA, however, “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam). Because the CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 17 court could have reasonably inferred on the record before it that Carlson directly participated in securing Lena’s and Leif’s Jr.’s absence, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and because Supreme Court authority permits application of the forfeitureby-wrongdoing exception in such circumstances, admission of Lena and Leif Jr.’s statements was not an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Before proceeding to survey the evidence, we note that on several occasions, Judge Grossman appeared to state a weaker standard, characterizing what Carlson did as “acquiesc[ing]” in the wrongful procurement of Lena and Leif Jr.’s absence, and justifying his ruling by stating his conviction that Carlson was “involved” in or “acquiesced” in Lena and Leif Jr.’s absence, without specifying that Carlson had any responsibility for or meaningfully participated in securing the witnesses’ absence.6 As we have explained, 6 The only reference Giles made to “acquiescence” was in quoting the Federal Rule of Evidence codifying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule. That Rule states that forfeiture by wrongdoing occurs when the defendant has “engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” Giles, 554 U.S. at 367 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Johnson, 767 F.3d at 822. Giles was, at that juncture, summarizing Rule 804(b)(6), not independently construing it. Neither Giles nor Davis, which described Rule 804(b)(6) as “codif[ying] the forfeiture doctrine,” ever mentioned “acquiescence” other than in quoting the Rule, and both referred to the kind of act required only in active terms, as we have seen. Giles, 554 U.S. at 367 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 833). Further, “it is beyond doubt that evidentiary rules cannot abrogate constitutional rights.” Thus, to the extent that the Rule does “codify” the forfeiture doctrine, it must be read “to permit the admission of those 18 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. simple acquiescence in another’s decision not to appear or to cause someone else not to appear is insufficient to trigger the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause. Judge Grossman, however, also made other statements, using language drawn almost verbatim from Giles, indicating that he found that Carlson had engaged in active, culpable conduct, as Giles requires. The judge found, for example, that the witnesses were “kept away by means of the defendant or . . . the defendant’s procurement defined in Giles to contrive and effect.” At one point, he noted his conclusion that “the defendant has procured this development on his own.” It would not be unreasonable to conclude that Carlson engaged both in passive acquiescence and in more active involvement in the witnesses’ absence. So the dual articulation of standards cannot demonstrate the application of an erroneous constitutional template. Given that consideration as well as the judge’s correct statements of the applicable standard, AEDPA does not allow us to suppose that the trial judge applied a standard contrary to clearly hearsay statements that would be admissible under the constitutional doctrine of waiver by misconduct.” United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 816 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added); see also id. at 820 (concluding that “the following interpretation of the ‘acquiescence’ prong of Rule 804(b)(6) is consistent with the Confrontation Clause: . . . [the defendant] participated directly in planning or procuring the declarant’s unavailability through wrongdoing”). Indeed, the 2011 stylistic amendments to Rule 804(b)(6) make more clear that Rule applies where the defendant is responsible for the result—where he “wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) (2011) (emphasis added). CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 19 established Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24. Turning to the record before us, we cannot say that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), the trial court’s finding that Carlson himself actively procured the witnesses’ failure to appear was “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2).” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The evidence is, to be sure, essentially circumstantial. But the applicable trial court burden of proof in this instance was preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Zambrano, 41 Cal. 4th 1082, 1147 n.21 (2007), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390 (2009); see also Johnson, 767 F.3d at 822–23. The evidence upon which the judge could have relied was as follows: (1) Lena was distraught and may have had mental health issues. That evidence could support an inference that she would require emotional care and practical help. (2) Carlson was away from his own home on the nights during the trial when his wife and son were not there. That evidence suggests that he knew where they were and was with them while they were absent. (3) According to Christian, Carlson had instructed him and the other children not to call their mother. Also, Christian had been the family member who encouraged Lena’s 20 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. attendance on the first day of trial. That evidence could support both (i) an inference that Carlson wanted to keep his wife and son’s whereabouts secret so they would not be found and compelled to appear, and (ii) an inference that he wished to keep his wife away from any influence that might persuade her to reappear, with their son or without him. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court concluded that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine applied to a similar set of facts. 98 U.S. at 160. There, the defendant had told an officer looking for a witness that the witness was not home, when the facts suggested that she was, and informed the officer that the witness would “not appear in this case.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). The facts in Reynolds in some respects more strongly supported the inference of wrongful procurement—there, the defendant directly rebuffed law enforcement’s efforts to locate a witness, id., whereas here, Carlson suggested his knowledge of his wife’s whereabouts to his own family, not to the police. Also, Christian testified that Lena had her own aversions to testifying, and to allowing Leif Jr. to testify, while in Reynolds we learned nothing about the witness’s own motivation to avoid testifying, one way or the other. But the reason a defendant procures a witness’s absence is not pertinent to the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, once the court has rejected the witness’s protests and insisted that the witness appear.7 7 We recognize that requiring a young child to testify against his own father could well be traumatizing to the child. We note that the dilemma presented by this case perhaps could have been minimized by cooperation among the parties and the court. The fear of trauma to Leif Jr. might have CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 21 Also, in some other respects, the facts supporting a finding of wrongful procurement here are at least as strong as those in Reynolds. Carlson himself was not at home on the nights his wife and son were away, and he affirmatively sought to keep other family members from communicating with his wife or knowing where she was. Like the facts in Reynolds, those circumstances demonstrate both concealment of the witnesses’ whereabouts and insulation of the witnesses from the reach of either compulsion or persuasion regarding showing up at trial. They also indicate that Carlson had some involvement in assuring their wellbeing while they were evading process. Overall, then, the facts in this case are approximately as strong in suggesting active involvement in the witnesses’ nonappearance as those in Reynolds—or, at least, a reasonable jurist could so conclude. Under AEDPA’s “highly deferential” standard, Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24 (internal quotation mark omitted), we cannot say that it was objectively unreasonable for the court to make an inference with regard to Carlson’s conduct here similar to the one Reynolds sanctions. We therefore deny relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). III. CONCLUSION The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. been lessened, for example, had he been allowed to testify from a comfortable location remotely, via one-way, closed-circuit TV. See People v. Lujan, 211 Cal. App. 4th 1499, 1506 (2012), as modified on denial of reh’g (Jan. 15, 2013); see also United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Child Victims’ and Child Witnesses’ Rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3509, allowing victims of child abuse to testify via closed circuit television, does not violate a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights).