Opinion ID: 2612723
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Heading: In Personam and Punitive Nature of Remedies

Text: The provisions of the act prescribe certain specific forms of relief not available under the general nuisance statutes, including temporary injunctions, removal and sale of fixtures, and closure of the premises for one year. ( People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater (1976) 17 Cal.3d 42, 60 [130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 550 P.2d 600], citing Pen. Code, §§ 11227, 11230.) Precedent establishes the in personam and punitive aspects of these remedies. In discussing the act, People v. Barbiere, supra, 33 Cal. App. 770, 778, declared: The action authorized by the statute is in rem, or against the property used in the maintenance of the nuisance, as well as in personam, or against the person maintaining it. (See also People v. Dillman (1918) 37 Cal. App. 415, 421 [174 P. 951].) This view more realistically recognizes the in personam consequences which the abatement remedy has on the property owner; those of deterrence and punishment. An examination of the prescribed remedies reveals that Barbiere's characterization of the act is accurate  i.e., injunctive relief is essentially in personam; conversely, the closure and sale remedies are primarily in rem, though, as will appear, their effect is unquestionably punitive. Injunctive relief need not detain us long. By definition, injunctions are directed at persons  the person is enjoined from committing certain acts. The majority concedes that the injunctive relief authorized in section 11226 of the act constitutes an in personam remedy. ( Ante, at p. 333, fn. 9.) The majority opinion, however, focuses on the admittedly in rem nature of the closure remedy. I am not persuaded though that the closure and sale remedies are purely in rem. Nor does the authority upon which the majority has grounded its holding support the view that the sole object of these remedies is to reform the property. Although the cases relied upon by the majority do state that the purpose of the act is to reform the premises ( People ex rel. Sorenson v. Randolph (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 183 [160 Cal. Rptr. 69]; People ex rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gals, supra, 42 Cal. App.3d 556), these cases merely reiterate the in rem aspect of the closure and sale remedies for the purpose of explicating holdings not here relevant. Sarong Gals and Randolph described the closure and sale remedies as in rem  though the term is not specifically used  for the purpose of rejecting constitutional challenges. In upholding a closure sanction, the court in Sarong Gals noted that proceedings under the act are directed against property; thus, it held that while appellants are arguably denied their right of First Amendment expression to some extent, they are denied such right only upon the specific property here involved and only for a limited period of time. (42 Cal. App.3d at p. 563.) Randolph, another appeal from an order of closure, cited Sarong Gals for the proposition that the purpose of the proceedings is the reformation of the property..., (99 Cal. App.3d at p. 188); the court then held that there is no right to a jury trial in such proceedings ( id., at p. 189). Because there is already authority for the rule that there is no right to a jury trial (see, e.g., People v. Peterson (1920) 45 Cal. App. 457, 461-462 [187 P. 1079]; People v. Barbiere, supra, 33 Cal. App. 770, 778), the Randolph court did not need to ground its holding on the presumed in rem nature of the remedies. ( Barbiere  which, as noted, did not characterize the act purely in rem  held that there is no right to jury trial because the act invokes the equity jurisdiction of the courts.) I am not persuaded by these authorities that the remedies provided in sections 11230 and 11231 of the act can be properly characterized as purely in rem. Moreover, these cases do not hold, as suggested by the majority, that the sole object of the act is to reform the property and not to punish for past acts. ( Ante, at p. 333.) In fact, the very cases relied upon by the majority ( Randolph and Sarong Gals ) upheld closures after the nuisance had been abated. Why impose a sanction when the property has already been reformed? It seems evident that the closure and sale remedies of the act are to a large degree punitive. Even though the closure-sale sanction is directed primarily at property, it cannot be reasonably disputed that it also has in personam consequences, i.e., it penalizes the owner by depriving him of the use of real property and subjecting him to the loss of personal property. Closure may be fairly characterized as an extreme form of injunction: it enjoins the owner and occupant from using or occupying the premises for any purpose for one year. Such a reformation of the property is both in rem and in personam. Case law acknowledges the penal and in personam nature of the closure and sale sanctions. As this court noted in Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, supra, 36 Cal.2d 671, 674: Proceedings under the [act] are somewhat in the nature of actions to recover penalties or forfeitures, for thereunder the fixtures and paraphernalia in the place abated are partially forfeited and the place may be closed to use for any purpose for a year. [Citation.] It is penal in nature.  (Italics added.) Similarly, the Court of Appeal has declared that under [the] act the personal property of the person ... may be confiscated and sold, and the right of the owner of the premises against which the action is directed (the action being one in rem as well as in personam ) to use the same for the period of one year may be foreclosed, thus depriving the owner of the income which may be derived from the property.  ( People v. Dillman, supra, 37 Cal. App. at p. 421; italics added.) As the majority notes, the proceeds from the sale of the owner's personal property are applied to the costs of the removal and sale, the cost of keeping the building closed, and the People's costs of litigation. (Pen. Code, § 11231.) Further, if the proceeds are insufficient to discharge these costs, the act provides for a most severe sanction to make up the deficiency  sale of the building itself. ( Ibid. ) Though the closure-sale sanction has been described as confiscatory (see, e.g., People v. Burch (1920) 46 Cal. App. 391, 401 [189 P. 716]), its constitutionality has nonetheless been upheld ( People ex rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gals, supra, 42 Cal. App.3d 556, 563). The harsh and confiscatory provisions of section 11231 would appear to be strong evidence of a legislative intent that the court should not consider itself limited only to abating the nuisance. I suggest that the intent of the Legislature was twofold: that the court use its equitable power (1) to ensure complete abatement of the nuisance by ordering closure of the building, and (2) to provide an additional deterrent by imposing penalties on the owner for engaging, or (if the nuisance has been abated) for having engaged in acts which, in addition to being indictable offenses, constitute a public nuisance. In this way the People are insured proper redress. Thus, while I agree with the majority that the primary object of the closure remedy is reformation of the property, I emphasize that this remedy inevitably also penalizes the owner (in personam). Because the court can order closure and sale even if the nuisance has been abated, [3] these additional sanctions are fairly clearly punitive. In this regard the People point out that a year's closure for all purposes is in the nature of a forfeiture (of the use, rents, profits, ...) and that it is no accident that the Act is found, not in the Civil Code (as are public nuisance laws), but the Penal Code. Similarly, a distinguished commentator has observed, referring inter alia to the act, that [a] proceeding to forfeit property used in illegal activity, pursuant to a statute authorizing such a step, is civil in nature, but quasi-criminal in effect. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Actions § 18, at p. 896, original italics; see also Simpson, supra, 36 Cal.2d 671, 674.) As the foregoing demonstrates, the penalties of sale and closure ( Simpson, supra ), the deprivation of income ( Dillman, supra, 37 Cal. App. 415), and the imposition of various costs (§ 11231) are more in the nature of punishment of the owner rather than reformation of the property. In the present case, the court could have ordered the premises closed though the nuisance had been abated by execution of the lease  which I emphasize occurred after the complaint was filed (see fn. 3, ante )  but it did not, because to do so would have penalized the innocent tenant, not the owner. Thus, defendants really have no ground for complaint since the premises could have been closed, their personal property sold, and costs imposed against them. [T]he result was really more favorable to [defendants] than [they] had the right to expect. ( People v. Gifford (1921) 54 Cal. App. 182, 184 [201 P. 469].) The monetary sanction imposed by the trial court  the only remedy possible under the circumstances of this case  would have required defendants to forego a year's profits derived from the offending premises and would have allowed the People to recover their costs (which are probably not insignificant after 10 years of litigation). [4] This result would have been obtained had the closure and sale remedy been used; a fortiori, the monetary sanction is consistent with the purposes of the act. In sum, I have used this section to emphasize that the remedies  more accurately, sanctions, as the majority seemingly concedes  provided by the act are both in personam and in rem in nature. I would not, however, employ either term to characterize the act. Such refinements are not only formalistic but unnecessary. [5] I respectfully point out that by characterizing the closure and sale remedies as purely in rem, the majority makes the property itself the nuisance. (See fn. 5, ante. ) While it has been held in other contexts that the primary purpose of the act is to reform the property in question, the act permits a court to impose sanctions which in essence penalize the owner. That the Legislature intended to provide punitive sanctions, which are harsh but within judicially established limitations, is understandable in view of the hybrid nature of the act  penal, civil, and equitable. Manifestly, the act punishes as well as reforms. Having concluded that the act permits a court to penalize the owner, the question remains whether it can impose a sanction not specifically authorized by the act. As will appear, I think the answer is, Yes!