Opinion ID: 1352261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: aggravated robbery instruction

Text: K.S.A. 21-3427 provides: Aggravated robbery is a robbery committed by a person who is armed with a dangerous weapon or who inflicts bodily harm upon any person in the course of such robbery. The following jury instruction, based on PIK Crim.2d 56.31, was given as instruction No. 9: Douglas A. Sutherland is charged with the crime of aggravated robbery. Mr. Sutherland pleads not guilty. To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 1. That Douglas Sutherland intentionally took property, to-wit: U.S. monies from the person of or in the presence of another, to-wit: Sarah Lehman; 2. That the taking was by threat of bodily harm to Sarah Lehman; 3. That Mr. Sutherland was armed with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife; and 4. That this act occurred on or about the 5th day of October, 1988, in Sedgwick County Kansas. Sutherland argues that instruction No. 9 is erroneous because it instructs that the knife used was a deadly weapon, and the determination of whether it was a deadly weapon is a question of fact for the jury. Sutherland failed to object to this instruction at trial. His failure to object alters our standard of review of the instruction: A party may not assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless he objects to the instruction stating the specific grounds for the objection. Absent such objection, an appellate court may reverse only if the trial court's failure to give the instruction was clearly erroneous. [Citations omitted.] The failure to give an instruction is clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court reaches a firm conviction that if the trial error had not occurred there was a real possibility the jury would have returned a different verdict. State v. DeMoss, 244 Kan. 387, 391-92, 770 P.2d 441 (1989). In State v. Davis, 227 Kan. 174, Syl. ¶ 1, 605 P.2d 572 (1980), in determining whether a defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon during a robbery, this court said the victim's perception of the object used as a weapon is relevant: In an appeal from a conviction of aggravated robbery (K.S.A. 21-3427) the court holds a starter pistol is a dangerous weapon. Since robbery has always involved intimidation or fear, the circumstances of the robbery, including the weapon, are examined from the victim's point of view. An object can be a dangerous weapon if intended by the user to convince the victim that it is a dangerous weapon and the victim reasonably believes it is a dangerous weapon. See also State v. Bowers, 239 Kan. 417, 422, 721 P.2d 268 (1986) (holding that in determining whether a defendant charged with aggravated assault was armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon, the trier of fact must determine whether the victim reasonably believed the object was a deadly weapon). In State v. Colbert, 244 Kan. 422, 425, 769 P.2d 1168 (1989), the trial court instructed the jury that a firearm is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. The defendant failed to object to the instruction. The gun the defendant used was defective and inoperable and, on appeal, the defendant argued that whether it was a dangerous weapon was a question for the jury. In Colbert, this court held that, under the facts, the instruction in question was not clearly erroneous as to an aggravated robbery charge. 244 Kan. at 426, 769 P.2d 1168. During the robbery, the defendant had placed the barrel of the gun in the victim's mouth. The court said: Clearly, the robber herein intended the victims to believe the gun was a dangerous or deadly weapon, and the victims reasonably believed it to be such a weapon. As far as the aggravated robbery charges were concerned, the only real issue for the jury was whether or not the defendant was the perpetrator. 244 Kan. at 426, 769 P.2d 1168. The instruction in the present case differs from that in Colbert. There, the instruction expressly directed the jury that a gun was a deadly weapon. Here, the jury was instructed that an element of the crime the jury had to find was that Sutherland (or Baughman as an accomplice since PIK Crim.2d 54.05 was given) was armed with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife. This instruction places the burden on the State to prove the knife is a deadly weapon and does not instruct the jury that it is a deadly weapon. In the present case, the testimony unambiguously showed that Baughman wielded a knife during the robbery. (The jury was given PIK Crim.2d 54.05 on responsibility for crimes of another. Implicit in its findings are that Baughman was the armed party.) Sutherland makes much of the fact that the testimony as to the length of the knife varied somewhat. Lehman described it as six inches long. Fulps described it as six to eight inches long. Baughman testified that it was six inches long. These differences in testimony as to the length of the knife are irrelevant. It is undisputed that Baughman had a knife of at least six inches in length. He pointed the knife at Fulps during the robbery. Lehman testified that she assumed that Baughman would use the knife. The instruction given in this case is not erroneous and the record contains ample evidence from which a jury could conclude the knife was a deadly weapon.