Opinion ID: 2463714
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: right to confront out-of-state witnesses

Text: Hicks moved the trial court to certify four Indiana residents as material witnesses pursuant to the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings (the Uniform Act), which is codified at KRS 421.230-270. The motion was granted, and the certification was forwarded to the appropriate court in Indiana. We note that the certification included the grounds upon which the Kentucky trial court found each witness to be material. Subsequently, three days before the trial was to begin, the Superior Court, Criminal Division of Marion County, Indiana, entered an order which found: (1) that two of the witnesses were not material; and (2) that ordering the two witnesses to attend the Kentucky trial would cause them undue hardship. Additionally, the order found that another witness had not been properly subpoenaed by the Commonwealth. It is not clear from the order what the Indiana court meant by this last finding. The order makes no mention of the fourth witness; however, that witness did testify at trial. The Uniform Act is a reciprocal statute that provides a mechanism for a party to a criminal proceeding to compel attendance of out-of-state witnesses. It has been adopted by all fifty states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The Uniform Act requires, as a first step, that a motion be made with the trial court to certify a witness as being material and necessary to the proceeding. KRS 421.250(1). The proponent of the witness has the burden of showing materiality. Mafnas v. State, 149 Ga.App. 286, 254 S.E.2d 409, 412 (1979). The certification should state the facts upon which the trial court found the witness to be material and/or a summary of the witness's anticipated testimony. See State v. Closterman, 687 S.W.2d 613, 621 (Mo.Ct.App.1985). If certified, the certification is forwarded to a court of record in which the witness is found. KRS 421.250(1). Once the certification is presented to a court of record in which the witness is found, that court shall fix a time and place for a hearing, and shall make an order directing the witness to appear at a time and place certain for the hearing. KRS 421.240(1). While the trial court in the requested state must make an independent determination as to whether the witnesses is material and as to whether compelling the witness to attend would cause undue hardship, [i]n any such hearing the certificate shall be prima facie evidence of all the facts stated therein. KRS 421.240(2). Hicks argues that the Indiana court failed to conduct a hearing as required by the Uniform Act, failed to make findings as required by the Act, and failed to treat the Kentucky trial court's certification of materiality as prima facie evidence of the witnesses' materiality. These errors, he argues, violated the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause. We cannot consider as error on appeal the actions of a court from a foreign jurisdiction. The Indiana court's findings of non-materiality and undue hardship are beyond our powers of review. Moreover, the breadth of a defendant's right to compulsory process is no wider than the jurisdictional reach of the sovereign in which the defendant is tried. The Commonwealth has no power to subpoena witnesses over which it has no jurisdiction. Hey v. Emerson, Ky., 142 Ky. 767, 135 S.W. 294 (1911). Further, this jurisdictional limitation on a state's ability to compel the attendance of witnesses in a criminal trial does not violate the right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Minder v. Georgia, 183 U.S. 559, 562, 22 S.Ct. 224, 225, 46 L.Ed. 328 (1902). The trial court certified the witnesses in question as being material and necessary to the criminal proceeding in the case at bar. Further, the trial court included with the certification a statement of facts supporting its conclusion that the witnesses were material. During the trial, Hicks never brought the Indiana court order to the attention of the trial court, nor did he inform the trial court that these witnesses were not present in court. There is no action or inaction by the trial court for us to review. There is simply nothing for us to consider. [1] There is no error.