Opinion ID: 2619620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: II-The Substantive Trial

Text: During the course of the trial on defendant's plea of not guilty to the charge of aggravated robbery, the defendant claims that the trial court committed three errors which were prejudicial to him, and therefore, constitute grounds for reversal. First, defendant complains of the admission into evidence of testimony by two witnesses concerning a fingerprint found at the scene of the crime. Both witnesses testified that the fingerprint was too incomplete to be of any value, and that it was impossible to attribute it to any individual. At the conclusion of the People's case, defendant moved the court to strike the testimony, and the motion was granted. The trial court gave an immediate cautionary instruction to the jury to disregard all of the fingerprint testimony, because the witnesses did not connect the print with defendant. Later, as part of his general charge in Instruction 14, the trial court instructed the jury that they were not to consider testimony or exhibits which were ordered stricken. In the light of these circumstances, we do not agree with the defendant's contention that the jury could have been misled to defendant's prejudice by the fingerprint testimony. Coy v. People, 158 Colo. 437, 407 P.2d 345, Eachus v. People, 124 Colo. 454, 238 P.2d 885, appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 938, 72 S.Ct. 562, 96 L.Ed. 698, Schreiner v. People, 95 Colo. 392, 36 P.2d 764, Andreen v. People, 91 Colo. 341, 14 P.2d 695, Goldberger v. People, 45 Colo. 327, 101 P. 407. We fail to perceive how the fingerprint testimony could have been prejudicial to defendant; and indeed its effect, if any, was beneficial to defendant. Second, defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting an extra judicial statement made by defendant. The events surrounding the statement are determinative of our conclusion. According to defendant's own testimony, given in camera while the trial court was determining the admissibility of his several extra judicial statements, he asked the police to go to a certain address to get his coat. The officers took defendant to this address, an apartment, where they came upon four acquaintenances of the defendant, including a Mr. Jones. Certain conversations ensued between the police and the four occupants, in the course of which the defendant made certain statements to these occupants. The only statement made by defendant while at the apartment which the court ruled to be admissible was made in answer to a question from his friend, Mr. Jones. The total testimony thus admitted is set forth verbatim: Mr. Jones (to defendant): What happened? Defendant (to Mr. Jones): That Burger Bar, I stuck up and shot some guy. We are aware of no rule, nor does defendant's counsel cite us to any authority, which would bar the admissibility of defendant's voluntary incriminating statement as here made in answer to a question from his friend. Nothing in either Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed. 2d 977, or Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 interdicts such an extra judicial statement. We have previously declined to extend the doctrine of these cases to include an accused's utterance directed to his friend under comparable circumstances. See Washington v. People, 158 Colo. 115, 405 P.2d 735, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 953, 86 S.Ct. 1217, 16 L.Ed. 2d 215. There is nothing in this record to indicate even to the slightest degree that this statement was made in response to any process of interrogation initiated by the police. Third, defendant assigns as error that portion of the People's voir dire in which the prosecutor queried the prospective jurors concerning their respective experience with psychology and psychiatry. Defendant's motion for mistrial on this ground was overruled by the trial court. Defendant here contends that this line of interrogation may have given the jury the impression that during the trial the defendant would present medical evidence of his inability to formulate the specific intent required to establish the crime of aggravated robbery. It is on this highly speculative premise that defendant asserts that his constitutional right of not having to establish his innocence was violated. This argument, in our view, has no merit. It is so tenuous that it lacks any validity. The propriety of voir dire examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of showing an abuse of that discretion, a trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial on this ground will not be disturbed on review. Raullerson v. People, 157 Colo. 462, 404 P.2d 149, Routa v. People, 117 Colo. 564, 192 P.2d 436. We accordingly hold that the defendant's assignments of error relating to the substantive portion of the trial are without merit. Because of the reversible error in the trial of the sanity issue, the jury's verdict which found the defendant sane at the time of the commission of the crime is ordered vacated, the judgment is suspended, and the cause is remanded for a new trial on that issue only. Upon retrial of that issue, if the jury's verdict is that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the crime, then the judgment shall be reinstated. If on retrial of the sanity issue the jury's verdict is not guilty by reason of insanity, the existing verdict of guilty of the substantive charge shall be vacated and the court shall make disposition of this cause as provided by law. McWILLIAMS, C. J., specially concurring. DAY, J., not participating.