Opinion ID: 1147525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Reading Trial Testimony During Deliberations

Text: The jury sent a note to the court during deliberations requesting a reading of the trial testimony of defendant, the autopsy surgeon, a firearms expert, and a defense witness who testified to defendant's stated intention to hitchhike to Santa Monica. The court discussed this request with counsel in defendant's absence. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel waived their right to be present during the reading, defense counsel also waiving defendant's right of presence. The public was excluded from the reading of the testimony; the reading was not reported and took place in the absence of the court and counsel. Defendant now contends this procedure denied him his rights to personal presence at trial, public trial, and effective assistance of counsel. In People v. Bloyd, supra, 43 Cal.3d 333, on virtually identical facts, we found no violation of the rights of personal presence at trial or effective assistance of counsel. We noted it was inconceivable that the defendant would not have jumped at a chance to have his version of the events presented once more to the jury ( id. at p. 360, italics in original) and stated there was no authority indicating counsel could not consent to a reading of testimony outside the presence of both counsel and defendant ( id. at p. 361). Defendant maintains that Bloyd is not dispositive, primarily because no issue was raised in that case regarding denial of the right to a public trial. (17) The right to public trial may be waived ( People v. Cash (1959) 52 Cal.2d 841, 846 [345 P.2d 462]), the waiver may be implied from failure to object ( ibid.; People v. Hines (1964) 61 Cal.2d 164, 172 [37 Cal. Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398], disapproved on another point in People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 775, fn. 40 [175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446]; People v. Blanco (1959) 170 Cal. App.2d 758, 760-761 [339 P.2d 906]; People v. Tugwell (1917) 32 Cal. App. 520, 525 [163 P. 508]), and the waiver may be made by defense counsel on defendant's behalf ( People v. Moreland (1970) 5 Cal. App.3d 588, 596 [85 Cal. Rptr. 215]; see People v. Moore (1983) 140 Cal. App.3d 508, 513 [189 Cal. Rptr. 487] [defense counsel has right to control court proceedings and make decisions involving the defendant's constitutional rights]; People v. Boyd (1978) 64 A.D.2d 668 [407 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240]; Annot., Exclusion of Public During Criminal Trial (1956) 48 A.L.R.2d 1436, 1452). Assuming the right to public trial extends to the reading of testimony during jury deliberations, the right was effectively waived by defense counsel.
Before trial commenced on the capital charge, the court granted defendant's motion to sever from the other charges the count of the information charging defendant with being a convicted felon in possession of a concealable firearm. After the guilt and penalty phase verdicts were returned, the court proceeded to consider the severed charge. From statements in the record it is apparent that both the court and counsel believed there had already been a waiver of jury trial. The charge was tried to the court and defendant was found guilty. Defendant now contends that the conviction on this charge must be set aside as he never expressly waived his right to jury trial. The Attorney General effectively concedes the validity of defendant's argument. Having independently reviewed the record without finding an express waiver by defendant of his constitutional right to jury trial, we will set aside the conviction on this count.
(18) Defendant contends that the felony-murder special circumstance must be construed as applying only to willful, deliberate and premeditated murders. We have previously rejected this contention. ( People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 794-795 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310].) Defendant provides no persuasive reason to reconsider our conclusion.