Opinion ID: 1942300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Riverside's Standing to Assert the Rights of Its Patients

Text: As a prudential matter, the Supreme Court generally has required a litigant to assert his own legal rights and interests; he cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-114, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). This general prohibition against third-party standing is intended to promote the fundamental purpose of the standing requirement by ensuring that courts hear only concrete disputes between interested litigants who will frame the issues properly. Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir.1994). Enforcement of the prohibition reduces the likelihood that courts will adjudicate [a third party's] rights unnecessarily, [when] it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not wish to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is successful or not. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113-114, 96 S.Ct. 2868. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized some instances in which the prohibition on the assertion of a third party's rights may be overlooked in certain situations, usually involving attorney-client, buyer-seller, or physician-patient relationships. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990) (an attorney may challenge a restriction on attorney's fees by' asserting the due process rights of his client); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (licensed beer vendor is entitled to assert the equal protection rights of a customer in challenging a statutory scheme which limits the sale of beer based on age and gender); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (Planned Parenthood official and physician may assert the constitutional rights of contraceptive users with whom they have a professional relationship). But these cases, we emphasize, are exceptions to the general rule. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), the Supreme Court outlined three criteria which must be satisfied before a litigant can bring an action on behalf of a third party: (1) [t]he litigant must have suffered an`injury in fact,' thus giving him or her a`sufficiently concrete interest' in the outcome of the issue in dispute; (2) the litigant must have a close relationship to the third party; and (3) the litigant must demonstrate some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests. Id. at 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (citing Singleton. ) [9] Thus third-party standing focuses not on the nature of the claim asserted, but rather on who is asserting the claim and why the holder of the asserted right is not before the court. American Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 339 U.S.App.D.C. 341, 346, 199 F.3d 1352, 1357 (2000). Riverside contends that it meets the requirements of third-party standing, thereby entitling it to assert the rights of the affected Medicaid recipients in this proceeding. Noting that once the coverage determinations became final and served as the basis for the recoupment notices sent by the Department, Riverside asserts that it has suffered an injury sufficient to establish a concrete interest in the outcome of the recipients' coverage determinations. Moreover, Riverside asserts that its relationship with the recipients  former patients of its hospital  suffices as a close relationship as that term is used in Powers. Riverside also maintains that it is better suited to spearhead this litigation because these former patients, as Medicaid recipients, suffer from inadequate financial resources and a potential lack of requisite training or education to protect their own interests. Finally, Riverside argues that the assignment-of-rights forms signed by the affected recipients create the necessary nexus between the hospital and its former patients. As this court observed a few years ago, `[w]hether a party is asserting its own rights, as opposed to seeking to vindicate the rights of a third party, is often a difficult question.' Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 730 (D.C.2000) (quoting Benjamin v. Aroostook Medical Center, Inc., 57 F.3d 101, 105 (1st Cir.1995)). For two reasons, however, we need not resolve all the potential difficulties in this case. First, Riverside's asserted injury  its potential debt to the District  has no relation to the supposed dispute between the Department and the affected Medicaid recipients. Second, although Riverside frames the issue as one involving thirdparty standing, in actuality Riverside makes no attempt to assert the rights of the affected beneficiaries because, as we shall show in a moment, their rights have not been infringed or even threatened. Accordingly, we hold that Riverside fails to satisfy the criteria (see note 9, supra ) for third-party standing. Riverside cannot demonstrate a concrete interest in the outcome of the dispute between the Department and the affected Medicaid recipients because, as the Director of the Department of Health pointed out, there is no dispute between the Department and those recipients. Neither District law nor federal law authorizes the Department to seek reimbursement for the treatment that has been rendered to those recipients, Riverside's former patients; on the contrary, a statute expressly forbids any such action by the District. [10] Consequently, Riverside cannot demonstrate a concrete interest in the outcome of a controversy adjudicated by the OFH because there is no such controversy. [11] This case presents the exact problem of which the Supreme Court warned in Singleton: courts should not indulge plaintiffs (or appellants) who seek to litigate the rights of third parties when those rights have not been diminished or otherwise threatened. See 428 U.S. at 113-116, 96 S.Ct. 2868. We therefore hold that Riverside has no standing to assert any rights (or putative rights) of its former patients who received Medicaid benefits.