Opinion ID: 2570464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Acquittal of Aggravated Robbery

Text: Beach argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of felony murder based upon the underlying crime of aggravated robbery. Beach relies on the fact that the jury acquitted her of conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder and aggravated robbery. If the jury's acquittal of the crime of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and the crime of aggravated robbery is ignored for a moment, it is clear that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the finding that Beach committed the crime of aggravated robbery. Zugelder testified that 2 or 3 days before the shooting there was a meeting between Zugelder, Arevalo, and Beach in which Beach emphasized the importance of killing Grant. Further, Beach's comments in the presence of her jail cellmate further implicate Beach in the crime of aggravated robbery and the death of Grant, as well as the attempted murder of Thomas. In terms of a traditional sufficiency of the evidence analysis, this would be sufficient to conclude that a rational factfinder could have found Beach guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Jasper, 269 Kan. 649, 655, 8 P.3d 708 (2000) (When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.). However, the jury acquitted Beach of direct culpability for the crime of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and the crime of aggravated robbery. The question becomes whether this court must accept the jury's finding for purposes of analyzing the felony murder based upon the aggravated robbery. Beach cites no authority to support her position that this court is precluded on appeal from analyzing the felony murder conviction based upon a felony for which the defendant was absolved of direct responsibility. State v. Shultz, 225 Kan. 135, 142, 587 P.2d 901 (1978) (quoting State v. McCorgary, 218 Kan. 358, 543 P.2d 952 [1975], cert. denied 429 U.S. 867 [1976]), noted that reversal is not required in cases where two verdicts are irreconcilable. See State v. Meyer, 17 Kan. App. 2d 59, 65, 832 P.2d 357 (1992). State v. Wise, 237 Kan. 117, 122-23, 697 P.2d 1295 (1985), summarized a New York case, People v. Murray, 92 App. Div. 2d 617, 459 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1983), as follows: In the latter case, the court held that the completion of the underlying felony is not an essential element of felony murder, and that an acquittal of the underlying felony is not inconsistent with a conviction of felony murder. Wise also noted that [a]t any rate, consistency in a verdict is not necessary; a verdict, though inconsistent, is not erroneous so long as there is sufficient competent evidence to support it. Wise, 237 Kan. at 122-23. Wise also specifically held that a charge and conviction of the underlying felony is not necessary to sustain a conviction of felony murder: We hold that under our statute, K.S.A. 21-3401, an accused need not be prosecuted [for] or convicted of the underlying felony in order to be convicted of felony murder. Wise, 237 Kan. at 123; see State v. Antwine, 4 Kan. App. 2d 389, 396, 607 P.2d 519 (1980) (While the verdict may be somewhat inconsistent, substantial competent evidence exists to support it and we find no error. Our Supreme Court has recognized that a jury may sometimes reach its verdict partially out of clemency for the accused.). An inconsistent jury verdict is defined as follows: Where an accused is charged with separate and distinct crimes, although of a similar character, in two or more counts, a verdict of acquittal on one or more counts and of conviction on the others is not ordinarily or necessarily inconsistent, at least where each offense requires different evidence or involves factual variations. When accused is convicted on one count and is acquitted on another count, the test is whether the essential elements in the count wherein accused is acquitted are identical and necessary to proof of conviction on the guilty count. Hence, where the elements of the two offenses are identical, a verdict of not guilty on one count is inconsistent with a verdict of guilty on the other count. Also, a verdict which acquits accused of a crime which includes acts necessary to the commission of another crime for which he is found guilty is inconsistent. However, acquittal under a count charging a major offense is not inconsistent with a conviction under a count charging a lesser included offense. 23A C.J.S., Criminal Law § 1407, pp. 347-48. See State v. Meyer, 17 Kan. App. 2d at 66. The same issue we face in this case has been decided by the Georgia Supreme Court. Robinson v. State, 257 Ga. 194, 357 S.E.2d 74 (1987), involved a felony-murder conviction. The defendant was found not guilty of cruelty to children, which was the crime upon which the felony-murder theory rested. The Georgia court rejected the defendant's argument that his conviction of felony murder should be reversed based upon the acquittal of cruelty to children, the underlying felony: 3. In his third enumeration of error, appellant claims that since the jury did not convict him of the underlying felony of cruelty to children, he could not be guilty of felony murder. `We have held that if there is a single victim one may not be convicted both of the underlying felony and of felony murder.' [Citations omitted.] . . . There is no basis for a claim that the felony murder conviction must be set aside because a finding of not guilty of cruelty to children is inconsistent with a finding of guilty of felony murder when the underlying felony is cruelty to children. This is true because in Georgia we have abolished the inconsistent verdict rule. [Citation omitted.] See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461) (1984); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (52 S. Ct. 189. 76 L. Ed. 356) (1932), for the proposition that inconsistent verdicts need not be set aside but may be construed as an indication of leniency on the part of the jury even in the case of acquittal on the predicate felony and conviction on the compound felony. In the present case, there is no doubt that the evidence showed the elements of the underlying felony, cruelty to a child, and that the jury was authorized to find the appellant guilty of felony murder. 257 Ga. 195-96. The Michigan Supreme Court has likewise adopted a rule that verdicts are not required to be consistent. See People v. Vaughn, 409 Mich. 463, 465, 295 N.W.2d 354 (1980) (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 76 L. Ed. 356, 525 S. Ct. 189 [1932]); People v. Baynes, 2002 W.L. 1998569 (Mich. App. 2002) (unpublished opinion) (applying the rule in Vaughn to a felony-murder case in which the jury acquitted the defendant of the underlying felony). In State v. Wise, 237 Kan. 117, 697 P.2d 1295 (1985), this court, relying on a prior case of State v. Freeman, 198 Kan. 301, 304, 424 P.2d 261 (1967), concluded that an accused need not be prosecuted [for] or convicted of the underlying felony in order to be convicted of felony murder under K.S.A. 21-3401. 237 Kan. 117, Syl. ¶ 3. Consistent with Georgia and Michigan, this court in Wise relied on Dunn, 284 U.S. 390. In Dunn, the defendant was convicted by jury of maintaining a common nuisance by keeping for sale at a specified place intoxicating liquor but was acquitted of the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor and the unlawful sale of such liquor. On appeal, the defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, citing the inconsistency in the verdicts. The court rejected the defendant's argument: Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment. [Citation omitted.] If separate indictments had been presented against the defendant for possession and for maintenance of a nuisance, and had been separately tried, the same evidence being offered in support of each, an acquittal on one could not be pleaded as res judicata of the other. Where the offenses are separately charged in the counts of a single indictment the same rule must hold. As was said in Steckler v. United States, 7 F.(2d) 59, 60: `The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.' Compare Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 65 L. Ed. 185, 41 S. Ct. 53. That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters. 284 U.S. at 393-94. The United States Supreme Court reexamined the rule in Dunn in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461, 105 S.Ct. 471 (1984). The defendant in Powell appealed her conviction of three counts of using a telephone to commit certain drug crimes. On appeal, the defendant argued that these convictions should be reversed because each of them contained an element requiring the jury to find that she had either conspired to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute or had possessed cocaine offenses for which she had been acquitted of direct liability. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendant, finding that an acquittal on the predicate felony necessarily indicated that there was insufficient evidence to support the telephone facilitation conviction. 469 U.S. at 61. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Rehnquist reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and held that when there is jury inconsistency based on the conviction of a compound offense but acquittal on the predicate offense, there are no grounds for the defendant to attack the conviction. 469 U.S. at 69. Powell discussed the Dunn decision, concluding that [f]ifty-three years later most of what Justice Holmes so succinctly stated retains its force. 469 U.S. at 63. Powell cited a number of factors to support its conclusion including the Government's inability to invoke review, the general reluctance to inquire into the workings of the jury, and the possible exercise of lenity. 469 U.S. at 68-69. With regard to the Government's inability to invoke review, Powell said that the State is not permitted under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution to challenge an acquittal. 469 U.S. at 65. This fact, combined with the fact that it is not clear whether the State or the defendant benefitted from the inconsistency, would make it unfair to permit the defendant to challenge a conviction based upon an inconsistent verdict: Inconsistent verdicts therefore present a situation where `error,' in the sense that the jury has not followed the court's instructions, most certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose ox has been gored. Given this uncertainty, and the fact that the Government is precluded from challenging the acquittal, it is hardly satisfactory to allow the defendant to receive a new trial on the conviction as a matter of course. 469 U.S. at 65. With respect to the reluctance to inquire into the workings of the jury, Powell rejected the idea that reviewing courts should attempt to discover whether the inconsistency was the result of a mistake on the part of the jury: We also reject, as imprudent and unworkable, a rule that would allow criminal defendants to challenge inconsistent verdicts on the ground that in their case the verdict was not the product of lenity, but of some error that worked against them. Such an individualized assessment of the reason for the inconsistency would be based either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury's deliberations that courts generally will not undertake. Jurors, of course, take an oath to follow the law as charged, and they are expected to follow it. [Citation omitted.] To this end trials generally begin with voir dire, by judge or counsel, seeking to identify those jurors who for whatever reason may be unwilling or unable to follow the law and render an impartial verdict on the facts and the evidence. But with few exceptions, [citations omitted], once the jury has heard the evidence and the case has been submitted, the litigants must accept the jury's collective judgment. Courts have always resisted inquiring into a jury's thought processes [citations omitted]. 469 U.S. at 66-67. Powell addresses the possible exercise of lenity, concluding that leniency could explain a jury's inconsistent verdict. 469 U.S. at 69. Powell suggested that the power of leniency was part of the jury's historic function, in criminal trials, as a check against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the Executive Branch. 469 U.S. at 66. However, the court reiterated the point made in Dunn, 284 U.S. 390, that such jury acts of leniency are an `assumption of a power which [the jury has] no right to exercise,' but the illegality alone does not mean that such a judgment should be subject to review. Powell, 469 U.S. at 66. The Court implicitly found the jury's power of leniency was one worth protecting. Powell also noted that there is sufficient protection to the criminal defendant under the traditional review of the sufficiency of the evidence: Finally, we note that a criminal defendant already is afforded protection against jury irrationality or error by the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts. This review should not be confused with the problems caused by inconsistent verdicts. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves assessment by the courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any rational determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations omitted.] This review should be independent of the jury's determination that evidence on another count was insufficient. The Government must convince the jury with its proof, and must also satisfy the courts that given this proof the jury could rationally have reached a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not believe that further safeguards against jury irrationality are necessary. 469 U.S. at 67. Analysis of this issue is found at Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 771 (1998). Muller identifies two types of inconsistent verdicts: (1) multiple-count inconsistencies, and (2) multiple-defendant inconsistencies. There is a potential multiple-count inconsistency at play in Beach's case. Muller offers three explanations for the jury's inconsistent verdict: (1) mistake or confusion; (2) compromise; and (3) lenity. Muller then discusses the three rationales offered by Dunn and Powell, which Muller names as (1) the argument from uncertainty; (2) the argument from equity; and (3) the argument from remedy. Muller is critical of the three rationales provided in Powell, which he says are shallow and careless depictions of what is really at stake when a jury reaches an inconsistent verdict. 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 794. Muller cites Wise, 237 Kan. 117, and counts Kansas as among the states that do not demand consistency on multiple counts against a single defendant. 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 787 n. 80. People v. Klingenberg, 172 Ill.2d 270, 665 N.E.2d 1370 (1996), represents authority for the refusal to rely on the United States Supreme Court in Dunn and Powell. Klingenberg refused to follow the reasoning in Powell and rejected the leniency argument, finding that [a]ny attempt to reconcile verdicts such as those here, where the jury acquits the defendant of the predicate offense and convicts him of the compound offense, on the basis of jury lenity defies logic and common sense. 172 Ill.2d at 278. While Klingenberg might be correct that it would be more lenient to acquit the defendant of the compound offense and convict the defendant of the predicate offense, Klingenberg does not explain why it defies common sense to say a jury is not also being lenient by convicting a defendant of one offense instead of two. Klingenberg rejected the argument which Muller referred to as the argument from equity: We are not persuaded that the framers of the double jeopardy clause intended to achieve the symmetry between defendants and the prosecution that the Powell decision creates. 172 Ill. 2d at 279. As for remedy, Klingenberg suggested that the trial court should have required the jury to deliberate further. 172 Ill. 2d at 279. In responding to the prosecutor's argument that collateral estoppel principles under the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy analysis had no bearing on inconsistent verdicts rendered in a single proceeding, Klingenberg announced the court's fundamental basis for its holding: Our long-standing rule prohibiting legally inconsistent verdicts rendered in a single proceeding, however, need not rest upon collateral estoppel principles derived from provisions of the United States or Illinois Constitution. Rather, the rule is based on common sense and sound logic. Legally inconsistent verdicts cannot stand because they are unreliable. At a minimum, such verdicts suggest confusion or misunderstanding on the part of the jury. Legally inconsistent verdicts are particularly unreliable in cases such as this, where the jury acquits a defendant of a predicate offense and convicts of the compound offense. In such a case, the former verdict necessarily suggests that the evidence failed to establish an essential element of the compound offense. At the very least, the inconsistency constitutes evidence of arbitrariness that undermines confidence in the quality of the jury's conclusion. We can have no confidence in a judgment convicting the defendant of one crime when the jury, by its acquittal on another crime, has rejected an essential element needed to support the conviction. In such circumstances, the conviction, as a matter of law, cannot stand. We therefore hold, as did the appellate court, that the defendant's official misconduct conviction must be reversed. 172 Ill. 2d at 281-82. The dissent in Klingenberg called the majority's analysis unnecessary and outmoded. 172 Ill. 2d at 285. The dissent relied on Powell. 172 Ill. 2d at 285-89. Florida courts also reverse a felony-murder conviction when the jury acquits the defendant of liability for the underlying felony. See Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158, 1161 (Fla. 1979), Noel v. State, 705 So. 2d 648, 650 (Fla. App. 1998), and Pray v. State, 571 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. App. 1990). Mahaun cited prior Florida cases in addition to two United States Supreme Court cases, Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1054, 97 S. Ct. 2912 (1977), and Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187, 97 S. Ct. 2221 (1977), but failed to cite Dunn, 284 U.S. 390. Harris and Brown are double jeopardy cases. Muller counts Florida among the minority of states that demand consistency on multiple counts against a single defendant. 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 787 n. 79. Finally, the Corpus Juris Secundum legal encyclopedias suggests that this court's decision in Wise is consistent with the general rule: Although, according to some authorities a verdict on several counts must not be inconsistent, as a general rule, a verdict on several counts is not void although inconsistent, at least where several offenses are charged. Hence, a verdict of guilty on one count is valid although it is inconsistent with a verdict of acquittal on another count, provided there is sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict. The general rule is applicable where accused is acquitted of a predicate felony but the jury convicts on a compound felony. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1407, pp. 346-47. Cases discussing this topic are collected at Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 259. The question in this case, consistent with our standard of review set forth in Jasper, is whether after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the jury rationally could have found Beach participated in the underlying felony of aggravated robbery. That the jury acquitted Beach of aggravated robbery independent of the felony murder does not impair our conclusion.