Opinion ID: 2089253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The automobile transactions

Text: Maine imposes a tax on the storage, use or other consumption in this State of tangible personal property ... the sale of which would be subject to tax under section 1764 or 1811 [the sales tax]. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1861. Use is defined thus: `Use' includes the exercise in this State of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to its ownership when purchased by the user at retail sale, including the derivation of income, whether received in money or in the form of other benefits, by a lessor from the rental of tangible personal property located in this State. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(21) (1990) (emphasis added). Retail sale, in turn, is defined as any sale of tangible personal property in the ordinary course of business for any purpose other than for resale, except resale as a casual sale, in the form of tangible personal property. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(11) (Supp.1995). The definition of business includes any activity engaged in by any person or caused to be engaged in by [that person] with the object of gain, benefit or advantage, either direct or indirect. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(1-C) (1990). Apex contends that the use tax imposed by the Assessor was improper because Apex cannot legitimately be considered a user of the vehicles in question. This contention hinges on Apex's subsidiary argument that because Autohaus did not profit from the sales, Autohaus did not sell the vehicles to Apex in the ordinary course of its business and therefore Apex did not purchase the vehicles from Autohaus at retail sale. Apex nevertheless concedes that Autohaus benefitted from the sales by gaining access to Apex's line of credit. Citing this benefit, the Assessor contends that the sales took place within the ordinary course of business of Autohaus, and hence were retail sales subject to a use tax pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. § 1861. The plain language of the statute supports the Assessor. Autohaus derived a benefit from the sale of the vehicles to Apex. Thus the transactions fall within the definition of business as set forth in 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(1-C), and hence the sales were in the ordinary course of business as required by the definition of retail sale. The definition of use, in turn, includes the purchase of tangible personal property at retail sale. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(21). For a use tax to apply to a transaction, there must be a use and a purchase by the taxpayer. Trimount Coin Machine Co. v. Johnson, 152 Me. 109, 112, 124 A.2d 753, 755 (1956). The term purchase is not defined in the Maine Sales and Use Tax provisions. See 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752. Apex contends that the vehicle transactions are, in substance, financing transactions that cannot and should not be equated to purchases at retail sale. We disagree. In construing a statutory term that is undefined in the statute itself, our primary obligation is to determine its plain meaning. Mullen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 589 A.2d 1275, 1276-77 (Me.1991). We often rely on the definitions provided in dictionaries in making this determination. Id. at 1277. See also Town of Madison v. Town of Norridgewock, 544 A.2d 317, 319 (Me.1988). The dictionary defines a purchase as [t]o obtain in exchange for money or its equivalent. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY at 1005 (2d ed. 1982). Apex obtained the vehicles from Autohaus in exchange for money. The statutory definitions for imposition of a use tax are satisfied and the Assessor was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the vehicle transactions. [6]