Opinion ID: 2584893
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assertedly Improper Exclusion of Jurors Who Were Biased Against Imposition of the Death Penalty

Text: Defendant contends the trial court improperly excused for cause two prospective jurors, F.G. and J.F., who expressed some reservations about their ability to impose the death penalty, because, he argues, these prospective jurors indicated they could follow the trial court's instructions and impose the death penalty in an appropriate case. We are not persuaded. F.G. stated in her juror questionnaire that she was strongly against the death penalty because GOD would do the punishing and I'm in agreement. Although she believed her church opposed the death penalty due to the commandment Thou shalt not kill, she did not feel obligated to accept the church's view. She stated, however, that she preferred not to serve as a juror in this case because she did not want anyone's blood on my hands when I die and have to answer to GOD, and would not be a fair and impartial juror because I'd not be good if it came to the penalty phase and death was the appropriate penalty. F.G. did not answer the question if you believe under the evidence presented and the legal standard you will be advised of that death is the appropriate penalty, you could return such a verdict, and wrote not sure when asked whether she could vote to impose the death penalty in a case involving a robbery special circumstance. She had earlier given conflicting answers to similar questions. Two of her answers indicated she would not always vote for or against the death penalty regardless of the evidence, and two others indicated she disagree[d] somewhat with the statements that someone who intentionally kills another person always or never should receive the death penalty. She answered yes when asked if in an appropriate case she could reject the death penalty and choose a life without parole sentence. Seemingly contradicting these answers, however, F.G. answered no when asked in the next question if she could reject a life without parole sentence and choose the death penalty in an appropriate case. During voir dire, F.G. told the trial court that her views about the death penalty had changed somewhat due to a discussion at her church Sunday school class in which the minister stated that one must follow the law of the land in situations where a person might be called upon to kill another person. She at first stated that she now was more confident that she could vote to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case and was only moderately opposed to the death penalty in general. F.G. said she now believed that by consulting with God through her prayers during the trial, she would not be going against Him if she voted for the death penalty. F.G. also said that she would pray for guidance because this is something that I don't want to be the only one making the decision. I want some kind of answer from Him. F.G., however, also stated she did not feel she should be the one to decide whether the death penalty should be imposed, and wouldn't want to be in the position to have to do it. After the trial court explained that the questions F.G. was being asked pertained to whether she could vote for the death penalty in a general sensenot whether she would actually vote for or against the death penalty in this casethe trial court finally asked her, if you go in and you say, well, considering all of the evidence in mitigation, all of the evidence in aggravation, we [the jury] believe that the appropriate penalty is death, then could you ... vote for that alternative. F.G. responded, I'll say, no. I'mI just really don't know. I'd rather say no than now say yes and get to that point and not be able to follow the law. The trial court granted the prosecution's motion to excuse F.G. for cause, noting that it found that she had tried to answer the questions truthfully, and the challenge was a real close call ... or at least was until her absolute last answer. The court found that this last answer, i.e., that F.G. did not think she could vote to impose the death penalty, in combination with F.G.'s stated desire not to be placed in the position of having to make that choice, indicated that her ability to be impartial would be substantially impaired. We cannot conclude the trial court erred by excusing F.G. for cause. Her voir dire answers indicated a continued strong aversion to being placed in the position of having to choose to impose the death penalty if that was the appropriate sentence, and her belief that, at best, she might be able to do so because she was required to follow the law of the land and would have guidance from God to help make her decision. As we have said before in similar circumstances, [t]he prospective juror's answers were equivocal and conflicting. Those answers, in combination with the trial court's firsthand observations, could give rise to a definite impression that [F.G.]'s views on the death penalty would substantially impair the performance of [her] duties. We therefore defer to the court's ruling. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1007 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775]; see also DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 22.) We reach a similar conclusion regarding the trial court's decision to excuse Prospective Juror J.F. His answers in the juror questionnaire also were conflicting: he answered that he was moderately in favor of the death penalty, that he would not automatically vote for or against the death penalty, and could return such a verdict in an appropriate case. He answered no, however, when asked whether he could vote to impose the death penalty in a case involving a robbery special circumstance, and no again when asked whether in an appropriate case he could reject a life without parole sentence and vote to impose the death penalty. [16] J.F. also stated that he believed a life sentence was a worse punishment than death because death was the fast way out. He explained that his view of the death penalty was based on his belief that God will do the punishing. When questioned during voir dire about his conflicting answers, J.F. stated that he did not believe in the death penalty because of his religious views, but he guess[ed] he might be able to bend to vote for the death penalty in a really terrible case or very extreme circumstances such as a serial murderer or the murder of a child. He also stated, however, that he would be uncomfortable having to make the penalty decision, and guessed he could not be a fair juror for the prosecution. The trial court ultimately asked J.F. whether, based upon the charges in this case of murder and a robbery-murder special circumstance, and realizing there might be aggravating and mitigating evidence presented at trial, he saw any possibility of your voting for the death penalty in this case. J.F. responded, No. The trial court noted for the record that J.F.'s answer was immediate and unequivocal, and J.F. concurred in that characterization. The court, citing our decision in People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1279-1281 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1], granted the prosecution's challenge for cause, finding that J.F.'s answers suggested that he would automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence in this case. To the extent that J.F.'s answers left any doubt about his inability to impartially determine the appropriate penalty in this case, [17] as with the decision to excuse F.G., we will defer to the trial court's resolution of that uncertainty, given that his answers were at the least conflicting and equivocal, and could be viewed as indicating he would be substantially impaired in discharging his duty as a juror. Accordingly, we find no violation of defendant's constitutional rights in the trial court's excusal of Prospective Jurors F.G. and J.F. for cause.