Opinion ID: 2528005
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sanction

Text: ¶ 25 The Administrator has also challenged the recommended sanction for respondent's conduct, arguing that respondent's misconduct warrants a three-year suspension from the practice of law. Respondent urges us to adopt the Hearing Board's recommended sanctions. The Hearing Board recommended a three-month suspension and attendance of a seminar on professionalism and office management and the Review Board recommended a six-month suspension. These recommendations are merely advisory, however, and we retain the ultimate responsibility for imposing discipline on attorneys. Cutright, 233 Ill.2d at 490-91, 331 Ill.Dec. 172, 910 N.E.2d 581. While each case must be decided on its unique facts, we strive for consistency and predictability in the imposition of sanctions. Id. at 491, 331 Ill.Dec. 172, 910 N.E.2d 581. In determining the proper sanction, we consider evidence in mitigation and aggravation. Id. ¶ 26 As this court has emphasized before, ignorance of the responsibilities imposed upon attorneys by the Code of Professional Responsibility does not excuse respondent's misconduct. In re Cheronis, 114 Ill.2d 527, 535, 104 Ill.Dec. 225, 502 N.E.2d 722 (1986). It is a paramount obligation of each member of the bar to study the Code of Professional Responsibility and abide by its terms and principles. This court has stated repeatedly that commingling or conversion of clients' funds will not be countenanced. Id. (collecting cases). However, our primary goal in imposing sanctions is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public and maintain the integrity of the legal profession. Cutright, 233 Ill.2d at 491, 331 Ill. Dec. 172, 910 N.E.2d 581. ¶ 27 In arriving at its recommendation, the Hearing Board compared respondent's case to the situation in In re Cheronis. In that case, the attorney had never had a separate escrow account for client funds, commingled client funds with his own, and did not immediately tender all of the funds to the client when they were requested, but repaid the client in installments over a period of months. Cheronis, 114 Ill.2d at 536, 104 Ill.Dec. 225, 502 N.E.2d 722. The Hearing and Review Boards found no dishonest motive behind the conversions, and Cheronis cooperated fully with the Administrator and the Hearing Board, expressed remorse, and took corrective measures by opening a client trust account. Id. at 537, 104 Ill.Dec. 225, 502 N.E.2d 722. Other mitigating factors included the fact that Cheronis made full restitution to the client, had performed substantial pro bono legal work, and had a good reputation in the community. Id. This court found that these mitigating factors, combined with the aggravating factor of Cheronis's near-bankruptcy and the resulting risk to his clients, warranted a three-month suspension from the practice of law. Id. at 536-37, 104 Ill.Dec. 225, 502 N.E.2d 722. ¶ 28 The Hearing Board in this case noted that respondent admitted wrongdoing, expressed remorse, and cooperated throughout the proceedings. He had not been previously disciplined and he offered several character witnesses who testified to his excellent reputation for honesty. Respondent spends large amounts of time providing pro bono services to members of his community and he had made full restitution to Julie. The Hearing Board also considered the large sum that respondent converted and Julie's testimony regarding the financial hardship she suffered while waiting for the disbursement of the funds. Drawing close parallels with Cheronis, the Hearing Board recommended a three-month suspension and attendance of a seminar on professionalism and office management as an appropriate sanction for respondent's conduct. ¶ 29 The Review Board compared the facts in respondent's case to two different cases where discipline was imposed on consent, and concluded that, in line with those cases, a six-month suspension was warranted. The Board also found that probation was not a useful tool in this case, as respondent had already corrected the problems in his banking practices. ¶ 30 In In re Young, the respondent deposited $3,209.04 in escrow funds into an account that he used for personal business and was found to have converted those funds. In re Young, 111 Ill.2d 98, 101, 94 Ill.Dec. 767, 488 N.E.2d 1014 (1986). The clients contacted Young several times over an eight-month period concerning the money and respondent refused to return the escrow funds from their former residence until the title company waived the title exception, per the escrow agreement. Id. Five days after the title company waived the title exception, Young tendered a cashier's check to the clients for the full sum of the amount held in escrow, including interest and attorney fees. Id. at 102, 94 Ill.Dec. 767, 488 N.E.2d 1014. The Hearing Board in that case concluded that Young did not have a dishonest motive, there was a bona fide title problem which justified his retention of the clients' money, and that Young had sufficient assets to repay the money to the clients. Id. at 104-05, 94 Ill.Dec. 767, 488 N.E.2d 1014. Young was cooperative with the Hearing Board and repentant for the conversion, had no prior discipline, had a good reputation in the community, and engaged in community activities and pro bono work. Id. at 105, 94 Ill.Dec. 767, 488 N.E.2d 1014. Further, Young no longer actively maintained a legal practice, only conducting a small amount of legal work in connection with his other business dealings. Id. Given these considerations, this court found that censure was the appropriate sanction. Id. ¶ 31 We find that the current case closely parallels Young and Cheronis. Though respondent maintained an IOLTA account, he used the account as he would any other business account, commingling client funds with his operating funds and resulting in conversion. This practice violated respondent's professional duty to maintain a client funds in a separate account and put client funds at risk. These practices will not be countenanced. However, as in Young and Cheronis, the Hearing Board in this case found that there was no dishonest intent behind the conversion and we have concluded that this finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent made full restitution to Julie, admitted wrongdoing, expressed remorse, and otherwise cooperated fully with the Hearing Board. The Board also accepted respondent's testimony that the delay in delivering Julie's funds to her resulted from respondent's genuine belief that the funds were not due until after all appeals had been resolved. Respondent performs substantial pro bono work, participates in other charitable activities, and has never before been disciplined in more than 20 years of legal practice. Multiple witnesses testified to respondent's excellent reputation for honesty and trustworthiness. In aggravation, we note that respondent converted a large sum, more than $100,000, and his lack of care with respect to his banking practices put the money at risk. Though Julie testified to financial hardship she suffered due to the delay in receiving her funds, we note that this hardship was not caused by respondent's conversion, but by his misunderstanding that the funds were not to be disbursed until appellate proceedings were completed. We therefore do not consider this an aggravating factor. ¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Hearing Board recommended an appropriate discipline. Accordingly, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for three months and ordered to attend a seminar on professionalism and office management prior to the conclusion of his suspension. ¶ 33 Respondent suspended.