Opinion ID: 419603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Materials Seized in the Course of the Illegal Search on January 9, 1980

Text: 10 In arguing against suppression of the materials unlawfully seized at Rocca's house on January 9, 1980, the government relies primarily upon our opinions in the related cases of Lord v. Kelley, 334 F.2d 742 (1st Cir.1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961, 85 S.Ct. 650, 13 L.Ed.2d 556 (1965); McGarry's, Inc. v. Rose, 344 F.2d 416 (1st Cir.1965), and McGarry v. United States, 388 F.2d 862 (1st Cir.1967), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921, 89 S.Ct. 1178, 22 L.Ed.2d 455 (1969). In those cases, an IRS agent had signed an administrative summons ordering an accountant, Lord, to hand over some of his clients' tax records. Without serving the summons or obtaining any judicial authorization, the agent went to Lord and coerced him into turning over the records. Lord and his clients, including McGarry, then brought an action for the return of the documents and an order for their suppression in any future proceedings that might be brought. The district court ordered the return of the documents but refused to order their suppression, holding the petitioners had no right to be better off than they would have been had the IRS agent not acted unlawfully. Lord v. Kelley, 223 F.Supp. 684 (D.Mass.1963). The petitioners appealed, and we dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 334 F.2d 742 (1st Cir.1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961, 85 S.Ct. 650, 13 L.Ed.2d 556 (1965). 11 The government then served McGarry with a summons for the documents. He moved to quash it. In an opinion affirming the district court's denial of relief, we noted that the court's original refusal to suppress the documents was based on a finding that the agent knew of the documents' existence and had already drafted a summons for them prior to the illegal seizure. Id. at 418. Since the summons had not been sought as a result of the illegal search, there was no reason to immunize the documents against summonsing. 344 F.2d at 419, citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). That holding was reaffirmed when McGarry appealed his criminal conviction on the basis of the admission of the once seized documents. 388 F.2d at 862. 12 The McGarry cases do not dictate reversal of the suppression order here. An important factor in them was the district court's finding that the IRS knew of the records independently of the illegal search and was in the process of lawfully obtaining the documents at the time of the agent's illegal seizure. The return of the documents thus restored the status quo ante, the ultimate result being no different than had the illegal search never taken place. 13 Here the record did not require the court to find, and it did not find, that the government would inevitably have come to these records apart from the illegal search. While Houle had unearthed much information, it is not clear he had encountered, or necessarily would have encountered, much of the material found at Rocca's house, including the damning registry stamps and the documents linking Auto Alley to the three Vermont dealers. 3 14 Furthermore, unlike the situation in McGarry, the government did not regain possession of the documents by a means wholly independent of the illegal activity. The documents eventually came back to the government as the result of Ralph Alley's plea bargain--and this was the product of a criminal prosecution reinforced by the illegally seized evidence. The district court could conclude that the government regained the evidence through exploitation of the fourth amendment violation. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 15 The government argues that the grand jury could have subpoenaed the same documents originally. But the exclusionary rule is not aborted whenever the government can show that illegally obtained evidence could have been lawfully obtained. See United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.1980). The rule is aimed more at the unlawful conduct than at the lawful availability or unavailability of the evidence. See United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.1981); 634 F.2d at 1182. 16 The decision in McGarry rested upon the fact that the government not only could have summonsed the documents but was actually in the process of so doing before the illegal seizure took place. See United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.1982) (exclusionary rule does not apply where lawful search underway prior to illegal search would have discovered evidence). Thus in McGarry the court believed that lawful efforts, begun prior to the illegal seizure, would inevitably have come up with the same documents. See United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910 (1st Cir.1980). While the government argues that would have happened here also, the lower court was not compelled to agree with that proposition. See LaFave, Search and Seizure Sec. 11.4 (1978) (inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule should only be applied where it is in fact certain that evidence would have been lawfully obtained had it not been for illegal search).