Opinion ID: 766185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Absolute Immunity for the Nevada Board of Medical Examiners

Text: 37 Even if the Board Members generally function in capacities comparable to those of judges and prosecutors, the protections of absolute immunity reach only those actions that are judicial or closely associated with the judicial process. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (A prosecutor's administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity.); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (holding that a judge was not entitled to absolute immunity for firing an employee). 38 There is no question that acts occurring during the disciplinary hearing process fall within the scope of absolute immunity; holding hearings, taking evidence, and adjudicating are functions that are inherently judicial in nature. However, Mishler asserts that two acts of the Nevada Board are neither judicial nor closely associated with the judicial process: the failure to respond to the Ohio Board's inquiry and Dr. Clift's swearing to the truth of facts in the disciplinary complaint. 7 39
40 The act of responding to the Ohio Board inquiry is not entitled to absolute immunity. This court has already held a claim based on the response to the Ohio Board should not be dismissed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage on the basis of qualified immunity because it was alleged to be a ministerial act. See Mishler II, 990 F.2d 1259. This act of responding to inquiries from other medical boards would seem to be, at its essence, an administrative function entailing examination of records and sending of correspondence. This act is not closely associated with the judicial process and thus falls outside the protections of absolute immunity. 41
42 Dr. Clift's act of signing the disciplinary complaint under penalty of perjury is entitled to absolute immunity. Filing charges and initiating prosecution are functions that are integral to a prosecutor's work. Because [e]xposing the prosecutor to liability for the initial phase of his prosecutorial work could interfere with his exercise of independentjudgment, absolute immunity protects these acts. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 118 S. Ct. 502, 509 (1997) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). However, a prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity for personally attesting to the truth of the facts in a certification for determination of probable cause under penalty of perjury. See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 509-10; see also Morley, 175 F.3d at 760. In Kalina, the Supreme Court noted that the law did not require the prosecutor to make a certification and that[t]estifying about the facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer. 118 S. Ct. at 509-10. 43 Here, at the end of the disciplinary complaint, Dr. Clift personally swore to the following statement: Under penalty of perjury, the undersigned declares that he is the Secretary of the Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners, the complainant named in the foregoing Complaint; that he knows the contents thereof; that the pleading is true of his own knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information and belief, and that as to those matters, he believes them to be true. 44 According to the body of the complaint, those matters stated on information and belief are all of the acts alleged to constitute malpractice, professional incompetence, or violations of the Board's regulations. Prior to the listing of Mishler's alleged wrongful acts, the disciplinary complaint states [t]hat the Secretary of the Board [Dr. Clift] is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief, charges and alleges that Respondent committed the following described acts. 45 Thus, Dr. Clift's act is distinguishable from the prosecutor's personal swearing to the truth of the facts in Kalina. Dr. Clift's statements are made only upon his information and belief. Moreover, these statements are made as a part of the actual disciplinary complaint against Mishler, not in a separate document to establish probable cause. Rather, the initiation of the disciplinary complaint arose from the statutorily required notification from the Washoe Medical Center that Mishler's hospital privileges had been terminated. Dr. Clift's statements, made upon his information and belief, as a part of the disciplinary complaint -which was forwarded to the Board Members for their determination of whether to proceed with a disciplinary hearing -is the equivalent of a prosecutor's initiation of charges. Cf. Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1999) ([A] physician requested by the Board to conduct a peer review performs a function analogous to a prosecutor reviewing evidence to determine whether charges should be brought.). The mere use of the terms under penalty of perjury in the disciplinary complaint does not turn Dr. Clift into a complaining witness. Dr. Clift's exercise of his independent judgment as to whether to initiatecharges against Mishler is entitled to the protection of absolute immunity.