Opinion ID: 78594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Instructions on Voluntary Intoxication

Text: Williams argues that counsel were ineffective for failure to object to the instruction that voluntary intoxication cannot negate intent unless it amounts to insanity. Appellant Br. 56-57. Williams argues that because the defense of voluntary intoxication requires such a high degree of intoxication, the jury instructions ultimately required that he prove that he is insane in order to negate intent. Therefore, Williams argues that because asserting the defense of voluntary intoxication requires a showing that he is insane, the defense acts as a mechanism that requires him to rebut the presumption of sanity. He argues that this amounts to an unconstitutional burden-shift. After careful review of the jury instructions on voluntary intoxication and insanity, we find no merit to Williams' contention. Therefore, counsel were not deficient for failing to object. Concerning counsel's argument on voluntary intoxication, the trial judge stated: This contention is separate from the defendant's plea that he is not guilty by reason of a mental disease or defect. In thethe situation concerning voluntary intoxication deals with the contention that the defendant could not form an intent to commit murder or an intent to engage in a course of conduct on account of his alleged voluntary intoxication. This differs from the defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect .... To expand on that somewhat, I charge you that insanity is a complete defense to a crime. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense, but may in extreme cases negate the requisite intent to commit a specific crime and therefore reduce the grade of the offense. Vol. II, Tab P-1 at R-595-96 (emphasis added). The trial court went on to explain that [t]he degree of intoxication necessary to negate specific intent[,] and thus reduce the charge must amount to insanity. Vol. II, Tab P-1 at R-597. The trial court further emphasized that intoxication must be so excessive as to paralyze the mental facilities and render the accused incapable of forming or entertaining the required intent. Vol. II, Tab P-1 at R-599. We agree with the State court that the jury instructions were not improper because they are a correct statement of Alabama law. Although Williams asks us to read all of the burdens together in an amalgamated manner, the jury instructions do not translate to a shift of the burden to prove intent. As mentioned before, the burden to prove intent for capital murder rests with the State and does not change throughout the course of the trial. As the State court rightly concluded, insanity is an affirmative defense that must be proven by the defendant. Vol. VIII, Tab P-1, at R-27-28; see Ala.Code § 13A-3-1(c). Indeed, asserting a defense such as voluntary intoxication is an opportunity for the defendant to counter the prosecution's case that he intended to commit the crime of murder. The defense of voluntary intoxication, is therefore, available to the defendant to negate intent and does not act as a rebuttal to the presumption of sanity. The defense creates a favorable circumstance for the defendant to explain to the judge and jury that his voluntary intoxication, whether through drugs or alcohol, became so great that it rendered him mentally incapable to form an intent to commit murder. Thus, like the affirmative defense of insanity, voluntary intoxication does not shift the burden to prove intent from the State to the defendant, as Williams' conflated argument suggests. The State court therefore, correctly found that counsel were not ineffective. Affording deference to the State on this issue, we find no contrary or unreasonable application of federal law.