Opinion ID: 1060298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Delayed Appeal Legal Issues

Text: Having concluded that the defendant's delayed application for permission to appeal was properly filed in this Court, we will next consider the merits of his appeal. The defendant raises two issues in this Court.
The defendant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. The proper inquiry for an appellate court reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. R.App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn.1999). A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial court, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the prosecution's theory. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn.1997). Questions about the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact, and this Court does not re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence. Id. Nor may this Court substitute its inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence for those drawn by the trier of fact. See State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn.2000). A verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, and on appeal the defendant has the burden of illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict rendered by the jury. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d at 557-58; State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn.1982). In contrast, the State on appeal is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the trial evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. See Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d at 557-58; Hall, 8 S.W.3d at 599; Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. Considering the evidence in this record in accordance with these principles, we have no hesitation in holding that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of rape of a child and statutory rape. The December 9, 1997, opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals graphically describes the acts of the defendant, and the proof need not be restated in detail herein. Suffice it to say that both victims, ages twelve and fourteen, testified as to the defendant's unlawful sexual penetration. The defendant confessed to the crimes and stated that I had sex with [C.L.] and [L.M.], just like they said. [3] The Court of Criminal Appeals properly applied this Court's decision in State v. Phillips, 924 S.W.2d 662 (Tenn.1996), when evaluating the sufficiency of the proof to support the multiple convictions of rape of a child. The defendant raises other matters which involve the credibility of witnesses. The jury resolved these credibility issues in favor of the prosecution and against the defense. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. The evidence clearly is sufficient to support the convictions. This issue is without merit.
The defendant next contends that aggravated sexual battery is a lesser-included offense of rape of a child and that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on this lesser-included offense. While the State does not dispute that aggravated sexual battery is a lesser-included offense of rape of a child, the State asserts that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on aggravated sexual battery in this case because the proof clearly established sexual penetration and the record is devoid of any acts of mere sexual contact. Alternatively, the State argues that, if the trial court erred in failing to instruct aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under this Court's decision in State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181 (Tenn.2002). In State v. Elkins, 83 S.W.3d 706, 713 (Tenn.2002), this Court recognized that aggravated sexual battery is a lesser-included offense of rape of a child, and the State is not disputing that proposition in this case. Once a Court determines that an offense is lesser-included, the Court then must determine whether the evidence justifies a jury instruction on such lesser offense. State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 467 (Tenn.1999). The mere existence of a lesser offense to a charged offense is not sufficient alone to warrant a charge on that offense. Id. at 468. Having found that aggravated sexual battery is a lesser-included offense of rape of a child, we normally would proceed next to determine whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to justify a jury instruction on this lesser-included offense. In this case, however, such an analysis is unnecessary because we find that, even assuming that the evidence would support an aggravated sexual battery instruction, any error on the part of the trial court in failing to give such an instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for the reasons that follow. See State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 77 (Tenn.2001) (declining to determine whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to justify an instruction on sexual battery because, even if an instruction was warranted, any error in failing to instruct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Rape of a child is defined as the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim under thirteen years of age. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-522(a). Sexual penetration means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of the victim's, the defendant's, or any other person's body, but emission of semen is not required. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-501(7). By contrast, aggravated sexual battery requires unlawful sexual contact with a victim less than thirteen years of age. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-504(4). Unlawful sexual contact includes the intentional touching of the victim's, the defendant's, or any other person's intimate parts, or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's, the defendant's, or any other person's intimate parts, if that intentional touching can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-501(6). As stated in Allen, [a]n erroneous failure to give a lesser-included offense instruction will result in reversal unless a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial. 69 S.W.3d at 189. In making this determination, a reviewing court should conduct a thorough examination of the record, including the evidence presented at trial, the defendant's theory of defense, and the verdict returned by the jury. Allen, 69 S.W.3d at 191. In this case, the proof of penetration was overwhelming. Both victims testified as to the defendant's unlawful sexual penetration of C.L., the twelve-year-old victim, on May 3 and May 5, 1995. Furthermore, the defendant confessed to having sex with both victims, as they had stated. There was no evidence indicating that the conduct was limited to unlawful sexual contact rather than unlawful sexual penetration. In fact, the trial court acknowledged the overwhelming weight of the evidence when he denied the defendant's request for an instruction on aggravated sexual battery, explaining that [a]ll the proof as to each count was a sexual penetration. Therefore, even assuming the trial court erred in failing to instruct on aggravated sexual battery, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial.