Opinion ID: 1175813
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Analysis of Double Jeopardy

Text: Absent proof of a constitutional violation we will uphold a legislative imposition of punishment. We must, therefore, ascertain whether the legislature's actions are constitutionally permissible. In Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302 (Alaska 1970), we were required to define same offense for purposes of Alaska's double jeopardy clause. [15] There a jury convicted the defendant of robbery and of using a firearm during the commission of that robbery. The defendant was sentenced for both counts and argued on appeal that he was placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. We considered a number of tests formulated by other jurisdictions for defining the same offense and ultimately rejected them all. [16] 479 P.2d at 308-12. We found that all the tests failed to determine when separate statutory violations constitute the same offense. Id. at 312. Our test, ultimately, focused on the quality of any differences between the statutory violations and how those differences relate to the basic societal interests protected by the statutes. Id. We described the application of the standard: The trial judge first would compare the different statutes in question, as they apply to the facts of the case, to determine whether there were involved differences in intent or conduct. He would then judge any such differences he found in light of the basic interests of society to be vindicated or protected, and decide whether those differences were substantial or significant enough to warrant multiple punishments. The social interests to be considered would include the nature of personal, property or other rights sought to be protected, and the broad objectives of criminal law such as punishment of the criminal for his crime, rehabilitation of the criminal, and the prevention of future crimes. Id. If differences in intent or conduct exist as to the different statutes, and if those differences are significant or substantial in relation to the social interest involved, multiple sentences may be imposed and double jeopardy principles are not violated. Id. We concluded that robbery and use of a firearm were the same offense under this test and hence only one sentence could be imposed. Id. at 314. [17] Three years later we were presented with a very different double jeopardy issue in Thessen v. State, 508 P.2d 1192 (Alaska 1973). There a jury convicted the defendant of fourteen counts of manslaughter for setting fire to a hotel which killed fourteen occupants. [18] Thessen received three consecutive twenty-year sentences and eleven concurrent twenty-year terms. Id. at 1193. Thessen appealed the validity of the sentences. Relying on Whitton, we focused on the intent of the defendant and held that only one sentences was permissible under the Alaska double jeopardy clause. Thessen, 508 P.2d at 1197. The majority [19] looked first to Whitton for guidance in defining single offense. Id. at 1194. Since Thessen violated only one statute, albeit fourteen times, the majority compared one count with another (rather than one statute with another) and applied the Whitton test. The sole difference between each count was the name of the victim involved. Thessen's intent and conduct were identical as to each count. Since there is an absence of any difference in intent and conduct, we do not reach the other considerations set forth in Whitton  the judging of the differences in light of the basic interests of society to be vindicated or protected. The Whitton test for ascertainment of double jeopardy when applied to the multiple counts charged against Thessen dictates the conclusion that but one offense was committed. Id. at 1195 (footnotes omitted). After much thought, we conclude that in Thessen we erred in applying Whitton to multiple violations of a single statute. The Thessen reasoning is flawed. By focusing on the intent of the accused, Thessen ignores the gravamen of the offense of manslaughter and, by analogy, assault. The statute prohibits causing the death of another person. AS 11.41.120(a)(1). [20] When several deaths or injuries [21] occur in the course of a single incident, the offense prohibited by the statute has been violated several times over. The identity of the victim represents different conduct  it represents conduct directed at that victim. Instead of focusing on the accused's intent we must look at the consequences. Where an act of violence injures multiple victims, there are as many punishable offenses as there are victims. We look first at the offense prohibited by the statute. In cases of manslaughter or assault, the conduct prohibited is the killing or injuring of a person. Where more than one person is victimized, more than one offense occurs. Where multiple offenses occur, the double jeopardy provision does not apply. We consider the intent of the offender only when determining the appropriate crime to charge. Dunlop was convicted of manslaughter because he had no intent to kill but recklessly caused deaths; Thomas was convicted of third degree assault because he had no intent to harm his victims but recklessly injured them. Virtually every other state which has considered this issue has held that multiple punishments for multiple victims of single criminal acts do not violate state or federal double jeopardy provisions. [22] In 1980 the Supreme Court of Tennessee overruled its prior decisions barring multiple convictions where more than one death results from a single automobile accident. State v. Irvin, 603 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. 1980). The Tennessee court concluded that the majority view is more sound from the standpoint both of logic and of analysis. Id. It indicated that its [l]ater cases relied upon a fictional concept of a single criminal intent. Id. at 121-22. The case involved an intoxicated defendant who crossed the center line of a highway, hit an oncoming car, and killed the four people in that car and the passenger in his own car. A jury convicted the defendant of four counts of second degree murder and one of manslaughter. Id. at 122. He was separately sentenced for each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. Id. After discussing prior Tennessee law the court concluded that the foregoing analysis [criminal intent is the imputed disregard of the safety of all persons who might be injured by a drunk driver] improperly focuses upon the fictional intent of the accused rather than upon the elements of the criminal offense with which he is charged... . In our opinion, when more than one person is killed, there is more than one homicide  regardless of any fictional intent or whether the deaths result from a single act or a series of acts. It seems illogical to us, as a general proposition, to hold that when two persons have been killed by an accused, he has committed only one homicide. Id. at 123. The court explicitly stated that it was not adopting multiple consecutive sentences in every case. Id. It noted that the sentencing court must consider the appropriate sentence in light of the circumstances surrounding the offense. Id. Dunlop and Thomas argue that imposing multiple punishments for more than one count would not be based on their culpability. Implicit in their argument is the lack of foreseeable harm to multiple victims. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also recently rejected arguments similar to those of Dunlop and Thomas. That court found specious the argument that holding the defendant responsible for more than one killing would unjustly base the verdict on the fortuitous event that he happened to hit a car with multiple occupants. State v. Rabe, 96 Wis.2d 48, 291 N.W.2d 809, 822 (1980) (four people killed by defendant while driving intoxicated). The court stated: It is foreseeable that intoxicated use of a motor vehicle poses a substantial risk of causing multiple deaths. Id. 291 N.W.2d at 822. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has cogently presented the fallacy in defendants' argument: That appellant's conduct would have resulted in the tragedy which occurred was not fortuitous but, unhappily, was almost inevitable. The combination of an undue ingestion of alcohol and the resultant mishandling of automobiles causes awesome carnage on our highways daily. In fairness it can be said that appellant could hardly have chosen a means which would have been more likely to result in injury to many persons. Murray v. United States, 358 A.2d 314, 321-22 (D.C. 1976); see also State v. Myers, 298 S.E.2d 813, 815 (W. Va. 1982). We agree. We do not lightly overrule our past decisions. [23] In Souter we recognized that it is a salutory policy to follow past decisions. 606 P.2d at 400 (citation omitted). We still agree. However, where we are clearly convinced the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent, we will so depart. Id. (quoting 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice and Procedure ¶ 0.402 at 154-55 (1974) (other citations omitted)). We now recognize that Thessen was erroneously decided. Alaska's constitutional double jeopardy provision is not offended by such multiple punishments. The increased deterrence resulting from multiple punishments of drunk drivers will compliment the other measures undertaken to reduce the number of deaths on our highways. We, therefore, overrule Thessen. The sentence in Dunlop is AFFIRMED. In Thomas, we AFFIRM the trial court's ruling on the Thessen issue, and REMAND to the court of appeals for consideration of the other points raised in Thomas' appeal.