Opinion ID: 1152592
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of right to impartial jury limitation on examination of Juror Bojorquez.

Text: The court conducted sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors, limiting its initial examination to death qualification, that is, a determination whether each prospective juror had such conscientious or religious scruples about capital punishment that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. ( Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45 [65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589, 100 S.Ct. 2521]; see also Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-852, 105 S.Ct. 844].) The court asked each prospective juror whether he or she believed the death penalty should be imposed automatically after conviction of the charged crimes. The court permitted counsel to conduct voir dire on these points, as well. (27) Defendant argues he was not afforded an adequate opportunity to examine Juror Bojorquez, in violation of the right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution to exercise his challenges for cause intelligently. ( Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 733-734 [119 L.Ed.2d 492, 505-506, 112 S.Ct. 2222].) The result, he claims, was that a juror biased in favor of imposing the death penalty sat on his jury. In a capital case, of course, the court must permit counsel to ask each juror whether he or she believes the death penalty should be imposed automatically upon conviction of a capital offense. ( Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 735-736 [119 L.Ed.2d at pp. 506-507].) As a general matter, however, as we have recently declared, `[T]he scope of the inquiry permitted during voir dire is committed to the discretion of the court.' ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908 [39 Cal. Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93], quoting People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 48 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388].) We recognize the `considerable discretion of the trial court to contain voir dire within reasonable limits.' ( People v. Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 253.) In this case, contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court did not prevent inquiry into the juror's beliefs regarding automatic imposition of the death penalty for capital crimes. The question was posed more than once. Nor did the court abuse its discretion by unduly restricting voir dire of Juror Bojorquez. (See People v. Chapman (1993) 15 Cal. App.4th 136, 141 [18 Cal. Rptr.2d 738] [abuse of discretion if questioning allowed is not reasonably sufficient to test the jury for bias or partiality]; People v. Chaney (1991) 234 Cal. App.3d 853, 861 [286 Cal. Rptr. 79] [same].) Defense counsel's questions of this juror regarding her attitudes toward the death penalty cover several pages of transcript. The prosecutor, too, covered some of the same ground, trying to establish the juror was committed to being fair to defendant and would listen to the evidence presented at the penalty trial before making a decision regarding penalty. When defense counsel then asked permission to ask one or two questions along the same lines, the court denied the request because the subject had been exhausted. We see no abuse of discretion. (28) Defendant argues that even if the court did not improperly limit voir dire, it erred in refusing to grant his challenge for cause as to Juror Bojorquez. The People correctly argue defendant waived the claim because he failed to exhaust his peremptory challenges. Defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury is not compromised as long has he could have secured the juror's removal through the exercise of a peremptory challenge. To preserve a claim of error in the denial of a challenge for cause, the defense must either exhaust its peremptory challenges and object to the jury as finally constituted or justify the failure to do so. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1005 [30 Cal. Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248]; see also People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) Defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges nor did he object to the jury as finally constituted. Nor does he justify his failure to do so. Accordingly, the point is waived and will not be considered on the merits. ( People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1005.) Defendant claims in the alternative that any failure to exhaust peremptory challenges was ineffective assistance of counsel. The claim is meritless; the decision whether to accept a jury as constituted is obviously tactical, and nothing on the appellate record demonstrates counsel's tactical choice here was either unreasonable or prejudicial. In fact, were we to reach the merits of the claim that the court should have granted defendant's motion to exclude Juror Bojorquez for cause, we would reject it. Although at one point the juror stated she thought she probably would vote for the death penalty for any multiple murder, she also protested that she could not say she would impose the death penalty in every such case, that she would have to listen to the to everything that went on, that she realized jurors have to listen to the circumstances, and that she would be willing to listen to evidence regarding the defendant's background and keep an open mind in making the penalty determination. She did not express views indicative of an unalterable preference in favor of the death penalty ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 123 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887]) such that her protestations that she would listen to all the evidence with an open mind and be fair to defendant could not rehabilitate her. ( Ibid., citing Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 734-735 [119 L.Ed.2d at pp. 506-507].) Resolving any ambiguity in the juror's responses in favor of the trial court's ruling below ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 456-457 [if juror's responses are conflicting or equivocal, trial court's determination binding on reviewing court]), we conclude the juror did not express views that would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412 at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852]; see also Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 45 [65 L.Ed.2d at pp. 589-590].) (29) Defendant also argues in conclusory terms that the trial court should have excused eight other jurors for cause on its own motion. He claims these jurors were biased in favor of the death penalty, because they responded in the affirmative to a questionnaire asking whether they thought the state should execute anyone convicted of an intentional murder during a burglary. As we have noted above, however, defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges or express dissatisfaction with the jury, and his claim may be rejected because he fails to demonstrate the court's inaction prejudiced him. ( People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1005; see also People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1087-1088.) Assuming arguendo the issue was preserved, we reject the claim on the merits. Defendant's claim of juror bias is so insubstantial that we need not determine the extent of the trial court's power or obligation to excuse jurors on its own motion. [13] The jurors of whose jury questionnaire responses defendant now complains all stated on voir dire that they would not automatically impose the death penalty. It is clear their initial statements in the juror questionnaire, suggesting they would automatically impose the death penalty for certain crimes, did not reflect the views they ultimately expressed during voir dire. None of these jurors stated such views regarding the death penalty during voir dire as would necessarily subject them to excusal for cause. That is, none expressed views that would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852].) Accordingly, the claim is rejected.