Opinion ID: 2087560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extrinsic evidence of prior drug use

Text: Grayton also challenges the trial court's restrictions on his attempts to introduce extrinsic evidence of Ms. Jenkins' drug use. First, he argues that, under the Sixth Amendment, this evidence should have been admitted to support his theory that Jenkins was biased. In addition, he contends that the exclusion of this evidence violated his due process right to present exculpatory evidence of a third-party perpetrator. Because the same standard governs the admissibility of such evidence for either purpose, we shall address these arguments together. Defense counsel called Robin Anderson as a witness and sought to ask her about Ms. Jenkins' prior drug use. When the government objected, the trial judge ruled that the questions were irrelevant and limited defense counsel to asking whether Jenkins smoked crack cocaine in the apartment on the night in question, in the hours immediately preceding the fire. Counsel elected not to pursue his line of inquiry under these restrictions. Later, just before the testimony of Mr. May, the defense expert on fires, the judge asked defense counsel, You're not going to ask him questions predicated on crack cocaine, are you? Counsel replied, No, I'm not. The judge then cautioned defense counsel, I would hope the words `crack cocaine' don't come out of your mouth ... because you're flirting with contempt, as it is. Counsel never attempted to ask Mr. May any questions relating to crack cocaine, but he was able to elicit a statement that smoking could not be ruled out as a cause of the fire. Grayton certainly had the right to challenge the credibility of Ms. Jenkins by offering extrinsic evidence to show bias. Bassil v. United States, 517 A.2d 714, 716-717 (D.C.1986); In re C.B.N., 499 A.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C.1985); ( Irving) Johnson, 418 A.2d at 140; see United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52-55, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). Additionally, a defendant's constitutional right to present exculpatory evidence in his own defense includes the right to present evidence that someone else committed the offense for which the defendant is on trial. Elliott, 633 A.2d at 32. These rights, however, are subject to the trial court's discretion to exclude evidence for lack of relevance. Winfield, 676 A.2d at 4; Gibson, 536 A.2d at 81. Relevant evidence is that which tends to make the existence or nonexistence of a fact more or less probable than would be the case without that evidence. Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955, 98 S.Ct. 1586, 55 L.Ed.2d 806 (1978). In the present context, this requires proof of facts or circumstances which tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other than the defendant committed the charged offense. ( Woredell) Johnson v. United States, 552 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C.1989), adopted en banc in Winfield, 676 A.2d at 4. The `focus' of the standard is not on the third party's guilt or innocence, but on `the effect the evidence has upon the defendant's culpability,' and in this regard it `need only tend to create a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense.' Winfield, 676 A.2d at 4 (quoting ( Woredell) Johnson, 552 A.2d at 517 (emphasis in Johnson )). The proposed evidence of Ms. Jenkins' prior use of cocaine does not even meet this relatively low threshold. A trial judge should exclude evidence that `is too remote in time and place, completely unrelated or irrelevant to the offense charged, or too speculative with respect to the third party's guilt.' Winfield, 676 A.2d at 5 (quoting ( Woredell) Johnson, 552 A.2d at 516). In Robinson v. United States, 642 A.2d 1306, 1310 (D.C.1994), this court held that evidence of a witness' use of alcohol several years earlier was plainly irrelevant and collateral to the question of whether she might have been intoxicated on the night of the crime. In this case the same is true of the proposed evidence of Jenkins' past use of crack cocaine. There was no evidence whatever that Ms. Jenkins was using cocaine on the night of the fire; thus the proposed questioning about her past drug use was at least as irrelevant as the corresponding questions in Robinson. Even if we were to assume that evidence of Jenkins' past behavior made it more likely that she smoked crack that night, the defense could still offer nothing beyond mere speculation that such smoking was the cause of the fire. Given the testimony of the fire investigators that no matches, lighters, drug paraphernalia, or ashtrays were found in Jenkins' bedroom after the fire, there was no corroborative evidence to support the defense theory. Moreover, this court has repeatedly emphasized [that] the determination that evidence is relevant does not exhaust the trial judge's responsibility in deciding whether to admit it. The judge must also balance the probative value of the evidence `against the risk of prejudicial impact.' Winfield, 676 A.2d at 5 (citation omitted). The trial judge thus retains discretion to exclude marginally relevant evidence creating the danger that ... [it] will distract the jury from the issue in this case. Id. On this record we discern no abuse of that discretion. For all of these reasons, we find no basis for reversal in the trial court's refusal to allow the defense to present extrinsic evidence of Ms. Jenkins' prior drug use.