Opinion ID: 2487581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Admissibility of Evidence of J.W.'s Pregnancy

Text: In Lee, Bowden, and Anonymous, supra , this Court considered the admissibility of evidence showing that the defendant had raped the victim's sister and that the victim's sister had become pregnant as a result. In each case, the Court held that these issues were to be determined by applying certain general rules of evidence to the unique facts of each case. We reiterate those rules of evidence before applying them to the particular facts of this case. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or that of the State of Alabama, by statute, by these rules, or by other rules applicable in the courts of this State. Rule 402, Ala. R. Evid. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid. See Lee, 246 Ala. at 72, 18 So.2d at 708. Further, [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.... Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid. See Anonymous, 507 So.2d at 973 (In a prosecution for one offense, evidence of collateral crimes or acts is generally inadmissible to prove the guilt of the accused.(footnote omitted)); id. at 974 (Although evidence of collateral crimes and acts may not be admitted to prove the accused's bad character, it has been held admissible to prove such things as the accused's criminal intent, his motive, or his identity, or to prove that the now-charged crime and another crime were committed pursuant to a single plan, design, scheme, or system.); see also Bowden, 538 So.2d at 1233 (The same factors for determining the admissibility of collateral acts of misconduct by the accused in other types of prosecutions are to be applied in determining the admissibility of collateral acts of sexual misconduct in the prosecution of sex crimes .). To be admissible for a purpose other than to prove that the accused acted in conformity with bad character traits, evidence of other crimes or wrongs must be relevant to some issue that is material to the case. Anonymous, 507 So.2d at 974; See also Bowden, 538 So.2d at 1233 ([P]rovided the test for materiality is met, evidence of collateral crimes or misconduct may be admitted.). In this case, in addition to W.M.'s testimony, Dr. Bernard's testimony regarding W.M.'s injuries and the fact that she suffered from a sexually transmitted disease establishes that someone raped W.M. Williams does not dispute that W.M. was raped or sexually abused; rather, he contends that he was not the person who raped W.M. Thus, contrary to the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals, the identity of W.M.'s rapist is a material issue in this case. Cf. Bowden, 538 So.2d at 1234 (holding that there was a real and open issue as to the rapist's identity because the defendant contended that the victim was raped by someone other than himself). The State argues that, under the facts of this case, evidence indicating that Williams had a sexual relationship with J.W. and that he fathered a child by her is relevant to prove the identity of W.M.'s rapist. According to Dr. Bernard, W.M. contracted chlamydia through sexual contact. Evidence was presented at trial indicating that Williams tested positive for chlamydia, although Williams elicited testimony to suggest that another inmate could have been the source of the positive chlamydia test administered by the jail staff. However, J.W. also tested positive for chlamydia. The fact that J.W. had a sexual relationship with Williams is established by her testimony and by Williams's admissions that he fathered J.W.'s baby. [6] Dr. Bernard testified: Chlamydia is a very rare disease in children. And we know that [it] is only passed by sexual contact in that age child. So to have two children in the same house with it, and to have an older person with chlamydia in the same home, you wonder about the fact that chlamydia could have been transmitted within the home via sexual contact. As Dr. Bernard suggested in his testimony, the fact of J.W.'s sexual relationship with Williams and her positive chlamydia test are relevant to show Williams's identity as the rapist who gave W.M. chlamydia. Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that evidence of Williams's wrongful acts with J.W. was immaterial to the issue of the identity of W.M.'s rapist. See Bowden, 538 So.2d at 1233 ([P]rovided the test for materiality is met, evidence of collateral crimes or misconduct may be admitted.). Williams concedes that he is in fact the father of J.W.'s baby, and there is no question as to the baby's paternity. Even if J.W.'s testimony regarding the fact of Williams's sexual relationship with her would have alone been sufficient to establish the identity of the person who raped W.M., the fact that a pregnancy was the natural result of Williams's sexual relationship with J.W. tends to confirm the existence of that sexual relationship and sheds light on a material issue. See Bowden, 538 So.2d at 1230 ( ` We know as a scientific fact that when a child has been born there has been an act of sexual intercourse....' (quoting Watson, 538 So.2d at 1220)); Rule 404, Ala. R. Evid. (Evidence of other ... acts is admissible for purposes other than to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.). Under the unique facts of this case, although relevant to Williams's identity as W.M.'s chlamydiapositive rapist, the fact that Williams fathered a child by J.W. does not unduly confuse or compound the issues. Cf. Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid. (Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of ... confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury ....); Lee, 246 Ala. at 72, 18 So.2d at 708 ( `[U]ndue multiplication of the issues is to be steadily guarded against, as tending to divert the minds of jurors from the main issue.' (quoting Mattison, 55 Ala. at 232)). Moreover, fathering a child, in and of itself, is not a wrongful act. The circumstances surrounding the conception of the baby in this case i.e., Williams's sexual relationship with J.W. when she was 12 years oldconstitute the wrongful act in question. Under the circumstances of this case, evidence that a baby resulted from Williams's sexual activities with J.W. does not significantly add to the prejudice Williams would have suffered if the trial court had merely allowed J.W. to testify that Williams had sex with her when she was 12. See Lee, 246 Ala. at 72, 18 So.2d at 708 ( `Whatever tends to shed light on the main inquiry, and does not withdraw attention from such main inquiry, ... is, as a general rule, admissible evidence.' (quoting Mattison, 55 Ala. at 232)). Cf. Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid. (Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice....). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not exceed its discretion by admitting evidence that Williams was the father of J.W.'s baby. The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing Williams's conviction and sentence. We now reverse its judgment and remand this case to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. [] WOODALL, STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, MURDOCK, and SHAW, JJ., concur. MAIN and WISE, JJ., recuse themselves. []