Opinion ID: 1853034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the circuit court erred in allowing the State to strike African-American jurors off the venire panel.

Text: ¶ 8. The State exercised eleven, and Strickland exercised eight, peremptory challenges in selecting the twelve jurors and one alternate. The record reveals that seven of the State's peremptory challenges were exercised on African-Americans. Strickland's counsel then stated that [w]e're probably going to have to do a Batson [17] . The State responded by voluntarily offering to provide race-neutral reasons. The trial judge opined none were required, as Strickland made no motion. Strickland then moved ore tenus for a Batson hearing on six jurors. At that point, the court offered Strickland an opportunity to make a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent to comply with Batson. Strickland offered no evidence other than the number of African-Americans struck. Strickland freely acknowledged that he was Caucasian and that no racial issues were involved in the case. Considering the totality of relevant facts before the court, the trial judge found that Strickland failed to make a prima facie case that the State has exercised its peremptory challenges in a racial manner to exclude members of any particular class. ¶ 9. Strickland argues that the circuit court committed reversible error in failing to follow the proper procedures to insure the State was fairly presenting `race-neutral' reasons for striking the . . . jurors. The State responds that: the essence of [Strickland's] argument is that the court erred in failing to require the [S]tate to articulate racially neutral reasons for its strikes against black veniremen. This point begs the question inasmuch [as] it is the establishment of a prima facie case which triggers the requirement of such articulation. As such, the State counters that Strickland has plainly failed to sustain his burden of showing that the trial court's ruling on this issue was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous. ¶ 10. Criminal defendants have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to non-discriminatory criteria. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 1712. However: [t]he Batson doctrine is not concerned with racial, gender, or ethnic balance on petit juries, and it does not hold that a party is entitled to a jury composed of or including members of [a] cognizable group. Rather, it is concerned exclusively with discriminatory intent on the part of the lawyer against whose use of his peremptory strikes the objection is interposed. Ryals v. State, 794 So.2d 161, 164 (Miss. 2001). In meeting the evidentiary burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has been denied equal protection through the State's use of peremptory challenges[,] Batson, 476 U.S. at 82, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (emphasis added), this Court has noted that: 1. The party objecting to the peremptory challenge must first make a prima facie showing that race was the criteria for the exercise of the peremptory challenge. 2. If this initial showing is successful, the party desiring to exercise the challenge has the burden to offer a race-neutral explanation for striking the potential juror. 3. The trial court must then determine whether the objecting party has met their burden to prove there has been purposeful discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. [18] Carter v. State, 799 So.2d 40, 46 (Miss. 2001) (quoting Stewart v. State, 662 So.2d 552, 557-58 (Miss. 1995)) (emphasis added). See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (a criminal defendant may make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.). To establish the prima facie case, this Court has stated that a white defendant [19] must show that the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges on persons of race and that the [ facts and ] circumstances give rise to the inference that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenges in order to strike minorities. Bush v. State, 585 So.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Miss.1991) (emphasis added). See also Ryals, 794 So.2d at 166 (the  totality of the relevant facts  is to be considered in determining whether the inference of discriminatory purpose exists) (emphasis added); Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ([a]s in any equal protection case, the `burden is, of course,' on the defendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire `to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.' In deciding if the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake `a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.') (citations omitted) (emphasis added). ¶ 11. Regarding the review of Batson determinations, this Court has stated that: [a] reversal will only occur if the factual findings of the trial judge appear to be clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Tanner [ v. State ], 764 So.2d 385, 393 (Miss.2000). . . . On appellate review, the trial court's determinations under Batson . . . are accorded great deference because they are based, in a large part, on credibility. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 785 (Miss. 1997). . . . The term great deference has been defined in the Batson context as meaning an insulation from appellate reversal any trial findings which are not clearly erroneous. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d [1346,] 1349 (Miss.1987). Smith v. State, 835 So.2d 927, 940 (Miss. 2002) (emphasis added). This deferential standard of review reflects confidence that trial judges experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. ¶ 12. The circuit court found that no prima facie case giving rise to an inference of purposeful discrimination was established. This Court has scoured the record and has found no evidence indicating that the circuit court's finding was clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Smith, 835 So.2d at 940 (quoting Tanner, 764 So.2d at 393). The appellate record is devoid of facts revealing the racial composition of either the venire or the ultimately empaneled jury. [20] The lone circumstanc[e] giv[ing] rise to the inference that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenges in order to strike minorities[,] Bush, 585 So.2d at 1268, was that a larger number of African-Americans, compared to Caucasians, were peremptorily stricken by the State. However, this record does not reveal whether that number was disproportionate to the racial composition of the venire. [T]hough the sheer number of strikes exercised against a cognizable group of jurors is not itself dispositive of our analysis, `the relative strength of the prima facie case of purposeful discrimination will often influence this inquiry' into Batson challenges. Flowers v. State, 947 So.2d 910, 935 (Miss.2007) (quoting Sewell v. State, 721 So.2d 129, 136 (Miss.1998)). [21] However, in Ryals, this Court held that: [t]he totality of the relevant facts do not give an inference of discriminatory purpose. The trial judge was shown a single factor, that the State exercised 10 of its 12 peremptory strikes against women, to support an inference of discriminatory intent. This factor, in itself, under the facts of this case, was not compelling proof of discriminatory intent, given that women composed one-half, rather than a minority, of the venire, and given that the State tendered three women. Opposed to this one factor were the factors that nothing about the voir dire, nothing about the prosecutors' conduct, nothing about the habitual policies of these prosecutors or any stated policies of the district attorney's office, and nothing about the nature of the case support an inference of discriminatory intent. Ryals, 794 So.2d at 166. Similarly, this Court finds that exercising seven peremptory strikes against African-Americans, standing alone, absent any other facts or circumstances related to (1) racial composition of the venire, empaneled jury, or community, or other non-exclusive factors such as (2) the prosecutor's conduct, (3) the habitual policies of these prosecutors, (4) the stated policies of the district attorney's office, or (5) the nature of the case itself, see id., fails to establish a prima facie showing that race was the criteria for the exercise of the peremptory challenge. Carter, 799 So.2d at 46. As no evidence was offered to the trial court to support Strickland's claim of a Batson violation, this Court cannot conclude that the circuit court clearly erred in denying Strickland's request for a Batson hearing. ¶ 13. The dissent advances the proposition that this Court should rule in a factual vacuum, by elevating an inference of equivocal value to be the substantial equivalent of a prima facie case, without requiring Strickland to provide facts or circumstances to support his argument. This Court finds that such a holding would eradicate the requisite  evidentiary burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has been denied equal protection through the State's use of peremptory challenges[.] Batson, 476 U.S. at 82, 106 S.Ct. 1712. In the case sub judice, a prima facie case requires Strickland to produce sufficient evidence to permit the trial judge to infer purposeful discrimination. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 216 (1981) ([t]he phrase `prima facie case' . . . may be used by courts to describe the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue.). The exercise of seven peremptory strikes on African-Americans, standing alone, is insufficient for this Court to infer the fact at issue, i.e., purposeful discrimination. Moreover, it requires that this Court ignore the circuit court's determination and the great deference to which it is entitled. See Smith, 835 So.2d at 940; Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. We find insufficient evidence in the record to conclude the trial court's ruling was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous and, therefore, affirm the trial court as to this issue. Our ruling today does not alter or change the threshold for a party to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination; it only requires that the party put forth sufficient facts or circumstances to meet the threshold itself.