Opinion ID: 1058965
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Conflict Between Sentencing Provisions

Text: Muhammad argues in assignment of error 27 that he may not be sentenced to death because of an absolute and un-rectifiable conflict between the capital murder statute (Code ง 18.2-31(13)), and the terrorism statute (Code ง 18.2-46.4, et seq.). Capital murder is a Class 1 felony punished by life imprisonment or death. The terrorism statute provides for a penalty as a Class 2 felony if the base offense of such act of terrorism may be punished by life imprisonment, or a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years. Code ง 18.2-46.5. Muhammad argues that there is no discernable distinction whatsoever between murder committed under the terrorism provision and murder committed under the capital murder provision. He maintains that he may not be subject to the greater punishment. The Supreme Court of the United States resolved this same issue in a case involving sentencing provisions under two statutes that encompassed the same criminal act. Holding that the prosecutor had discretion to choose which statute to base the prosecution upon, the Court stated: The provisions in issue here, however, unambiguously specify the activity proscribed and the penalties available upon conviction. That this particular conduct may violate both Titles does not detract from the notice afforded by each. Although the statutes create uncertainty as to which crime may be charged and therefore what penalties may be imposed, they do so to no greater extent than would a single statute authorizing various alternative punishments. So long as overlapping criminal provisions clearly define the conduct prohibited and the punishment authorized, the notice requirements of the Due Process Clause are satisfied. This Court has long recognized that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). Muhammad makes no constitutional argument in his brief on this issue. He merely recites that there is a conflict. He does not argue that there is ambiguity in either statute nor does he argue that application of the statute discriminates against any class of defendants. The trial court did not err in denying Muhammad's motion to preclude a death sentence on this basis.