Opinion ID: 1294771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the judicial records

Text: The First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution implicitly guarantee the public a qualified right of access to a criminal trial. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2829, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) ( Richmond Newspapers I ). In Richmond Newspapers I, the United States Supreme Court, reviewing the history of criminal trials in England and colonial America, concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice. Id. at 573, 100 S.Ct. at 2825. The Court noted, however, that its holding does not mean that the First Amendment rights of the public and representatives of the press are absolute. Id. at 581 n. 18, 100 S.Ct. at 2829-30. In a later opinion written by the same author, the Court explained: The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 510, 104 S.Ct. 819, 824, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). We have adopted and applied the principles and standards articulated in Richmond Newspapers I. Eschewing a First Amendment analysis in Richmond Newspapers v. Comm., 222 Va. 574, 281 S.E.2d 915 (1981) ( Richmond Newspapers II ), we declared orders closing preliminary hearings in three criminal cases unconstitutional under Article I, Section 12, of the Virginia Constitution, and we held that intervention [by the public] is necessary to give substance to the qualified right of access. [1] Id. at 590, 281 S.E.2d at 923. Until now, we have not been asked to decide, and the United States Supreme Court never has decided expressly, whether the public has a constitutional right of access to judicial records in civil trials and, if so, whether that right is absolute or qualified. We find it unnecessary to conduct a constitutional analysis. Code § 17-43 provides in part: The records and papers of every court shall be open to inspection by any person and the clerk shall, when required, furnish copies thereof, except in cases in which it is otherwise specially provided. The broad sweep of this language is significant. It makes no distinction between criminal and civil proceedings. In legislative history, Code § 17-43 extends back to the Code of 1849 that references Acts of the Assembly 1820-21, p. 104, ch. 74, § 1. Construing the language of the statute as it has endured for more than a century, we conclude that the General Assembly intended to recognize the generally accepted common-law rule of openness and to declare its power to make statutory exceptions to the rule. Such a conclusion was implicit in our decision in Charlottesville Newspapers v. Berry, 215 Va. 116, 206 S.E.2d 267 (1974). There, a trial judge had closed the file in a civil proceeding, verbally instructed all involved not to disclose any matter which took place, and directed that the judicial records in all subsequent civil cases remain closed until 21 days have elapsed from the date of ... filing. Id. at 117, 206 S.E.2d at 267-68. Finding no statutory authority for the judge's action and nothing in the record justifying such actions under his inherent power, we ruled that the judge shall not ... deny public access to... pleadings, motions, and suit papers in... new civil actions. Id. at 118, 206 S.E.2d at 268. In light of the legislative history of Code § 17-43 and its common-law underpinnings, we are of opinion that, subject to statutory exceptions, a rebuttable presumption of public access applies in civil proceedings to judicial records as we have defined that term. We further believe that, to overcome that presumption, the moving party must bear the burden of establishing an interest so compelling that it cannot be protected reasonably by some measure other than a protective order, see Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2804-05, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976) (suggesting as possible alternatives, change of venue, postponement of trial, sequestration of jurors), and that any such order must be drafted in the manner least restrictive of the public's interest. We adopt the procedural guidelines announced in Richmond Newspapers II, 222 Va. at 590-91, 281 S.E.2d at 923-24, and those stated in Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. at 824 (quoted above). Although it appears that the procedures followed below did not comply fully with these guidelines, we note that, once advised of the media's interest in access, the trial court ordered that the media be notified of the entry of [the original sealing] order with opportunity to be heard; scheduled a special hearing for Shenandoah's benefit; permitted Shenandoah to intervene in the proceedings; and heard argument and considered adversary memoranda on the issue Shenandoah raised. We believe, however, that the trial court struck the wrong balance between the interests of the parties to the compromise settlement and the public's right of access to the judicial records in the proceedings approving that settlement. In its letter opinion, the trial court concluded that any common law right of access a newspaper might have ... in a civil suit should yield in this instance to the desire of all parties not to publicize the pleadings of an essentially private dispute between non-public figures with all the obvious risks of emotional damage to both parties and professional and financial harm to the defendants. The claims made in the pleadings, the trial court felt, probably would reflect adversely upon the professional reputations of the ... defendants, with financial and possible emotional consequences. On appeal, the parties agree that the desire of the litigants is not sufficient reason to override the presumption of openness. Nor do we believe that risks of damage to professional reputation, emotional damage, or financial harm, stated in the abstract, constitute sufficient reasons to seal judicial records. See Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. at 824 (quoted above); see also In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 392 (4th Cir.1986) (court may not base its decision on conclusory assertions alone, but must make specific factual findings). Here, the judicial records in issue were accumulated in a wrongful death action. In Virginia, settlements of wrongful death claims must be approved by the courts. Code § 8.01-55. The public has a societal interest in learning whether compromise settlements are equitable and whether the courts are administering properly the powers conferred upon them. [2] Moreover, the people have a vital interest, one of personal and familial as well as community concern, in cases involving claims of medical malpractice on the part of licensed practitioners and other health care providers. We hold, therefore, that the trial court erred in sealing that class of data we have denominated judicial records. We now consider the several protective orders insofar as they denied the public access to the pretrial documents.