Opinion ID: 1982561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: cases in other jurisdictions

Text: The issue here, as we have seen, is what effect does a rescission, repudiation or breach by the State of a plea agreement, after a statement is obtained thereunder from the defendant, have on the admissibility of the statement in the State's case in chief at trial on the merits. We have not uncovered a case in another jurisdiction which persuades us that the view we adopted in Wright is not the proper one in the light of our declared policy to encourage plea bargaining. We discovered in deciding Wright that cases in other jurisdictions are distinguishable from Coley's case and provide but slight, if any, guidance. We have looked again for guidance without success. The federal cases, for the most part, were decided in the light of a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. Rule 11(e)(6)(D) as it now stands, declares that, except for two exceptions not here relevant, evidence of any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the government which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions. [2] See, for example, United States v. Washington, 614 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.Pa. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 923 (3rd Cir.1986); United States v. Mannino, 551 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). There is no provision comparable to FRCP 11(e)(6)(D) or its companion provision in FRE 410(4) in the Maryland Rules. [3] Cases in other states afford little assistance. Some states have a rule comparable to the federal rules or the ABA Standard, and the question of the admissibility of statements obtained under the color of a plea bargain agreement is determined under their rule. See, for example, Williams v. State, 491 A.2d 1129, 1132 (Del.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 78, 88 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985); Gillum v. State, 681 P.2d 87, 88 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058, 1062 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228, 103 S.Ct. 1236, 75 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983); State v. Jackson, 325 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Minn. 1982); State v. Trujillo, 93 N.M. 724, 725, 605 P.2d 232 (1980). States, like Maryland, which have not adopted a rule as to the admissibility of statements relating to plea bargain agreements, or which have a rule which they deem to be inapplicable in the circumstances of a particular case, turn to the voluntariness vel non of the challenged statement. Some of the states declare the statements to be inadmissible per se if induced by a plea bargain. See, for example, State v. Hoopes, 534 S.W.2d 26, 35-37 (Mo. 1976) (en banc). Other states look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the statement is admissible. See, for example, People v. Overturf, 67 Ill. App.3d 741, 744, 24 Ill.Dec. 399, 400, 385 N.E.2d 166, 167 (1979); State v. Hutson, 537 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Ky. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 837, 92 S.Ct. 126, 30 L.Ed.2d 70 (1971). In People v. Jones, 416 Mich. 354, 359-363, 331 N.W.2d 406 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084, 103 S.Ct. 1775, 76 L.Ed.2d 347 (1983), a six-judge court agreed that the challenged statement was inadmissible. However, three judges thought that it was per se inadmissible as the product of a plea bargain. The other three opted for a rule which determined admissibility on the totality of the circumstances. We observe that we were aware when we decided Wright that we were going further in carving out an exception to the inducement doctrine than have other jurisdictions. Our present review of the cases indicates that other jurisdictions, federal and state, have, in the main, adhered to the inducement doctrine by rule or judicial decision and have not adopted an exception as we did in the light of our Rule 4-243. In any event, the circumstances in the case before us do not lend themselves to an application of the Coley exception in Wright, nor do they warrant an extension of that exception, even if we were of a mind to broaden it under more compelling circumstances.