Opinion ID: 200762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Seatbelt Law Citations

Text: 42 Finally, Hyundai challenges the district court's decision to exclude evidence that Mr. Cabrera had been cited on two previous occasions for driving his car without fastening Eduardo's seatbelt in violation of the New Hampshire seatbelt law. We review a district court's decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Nieves-Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir.1997). 43 Hyundai claims that evidence of the citations was relevant to whether Mr. Cabrera operated the Sonata in a reasonably foreseeable manner at the time of the accident. See Reid, 404 A.2d at 1099 (stating that to prove superseding cause defendant must show that third party used product in manner unforeseeable to manufacturer). The primary evidence on the foreseeability issue was the evidence of Mr. Cabrera's supposed misuse of the Sonata on the date of the accident ( i.e., operating the Sonata without fastening Eduardo's seatbelt). In addition, evidence showing that states have enacted mandatory seatbelt laws could be relevant to the foreseeability issue because the jury conceivably could factor the existence of this legal duty into its determination whether Hyundai could foresee a parent operating an automobile without fastening a child's seatbelt. 15 Cf. Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281, 286 (1972) (stating that existence of statute concerning appropriate use of product was relevant but not dispositive to whether use of product in violation of statute was reasonably foreseeable to manufacturer). 44 Hyundai, however, does not challenge the district court's refusal to admit the existence of state seatbelt laws. See supra, at p. 546 n. 15. Rather, it challenges the district court's refusal to admit evidence that Mr. Cabrera had received two citations for violating the seatbelt law. We fail to see how evidence of the citations could demonstrate that Mr. Cabrera's use of the Sonata on the date of the accident was unforeseeable to Hyundai. This information was not available to Hyundai when it sold the Sonata to the Cabreras. See 72 C.J.S. Supp., Prods. Liab. § 31 n. 93 (1975) (stating that only information available to the seller at the time of the sale is relevant in determining reasonably foreseeable uses of product). Evidence that Mr. Cabrera had been cited for failing to seatbelt Eduardo on two prior occasions suggests only that he likely failed to seatbelt Eduardo on the date of the accident. But use of Mr. Cabrera's prior acts for this purpose is prohibited by Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). See Lataille v. Ponte, 754 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir.1985) (It is well settled that prior acts may not be admitted to prove that a person acted in a similar fashion in the case at hand.). 16 45 Hyundai argues alternatively that even if the evidence of the citations was not admissible to show foreseeability, it was admissible to impeach Mr. Cabrera's trial testimony. On cross-examination, Mr. Cabrera testified that he did not remember a police officer advising him, for safety reasons, that Eduardo had to be wearing his seatbelt when the car was moving. In response to this answer, Hyundai sought to impeach Mr. Cabrera's testimony by questioning him about the two citations. The district court forbade Hyundai from questioning Mr. Cabrera about the citations but did permit it to impeach him with his deposition in which he acknowledged that a police officer had told him that his son had to be wearing a seatbelt while he was driving. 46 When a witness's credibility is at issue, the trial court may limit cross-examination as long as the court allows sufficient leeway to establish a reasonably complete picture of the witness's veracity, bias and motivation. United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the district court chose to permit Hyundai to impeach Mr. Cabrera by confronting him with a prior inconsistent statement from his deposition rather than by allowing it to inquire about the citations. Such a determination was well within the district court's considerable discretion to exclude evidence as overly prejudicial. See Ferrara & DiMercurio v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2001). The district court reasonably concluded that presenting the prior inconsistent statement sufficiently impeached Mr. Cabrera's veracity and that presenting the evidence concerning the citations would have been overly prejudicial to the estate's case. See Fed.R.Evid. 403.