Opinion ID: 4195259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive Force Claims Against Officer Lee

Text: Finally, we turn to the third question in our analysis: Did police use excessive force against Hall, or was their use of force justified by resistance on Hall’s part? Hall’s complaint alleged three counts that hinge on this question: Count I’s section 1983 excessive force claim, Count II’s common law assault claim, and Count III’s common law battery claim. 2 The district court 2 The district court dismissed the entirety of Count I on the pleadings based on its conclusion that the officers acted with probable cause to arrest Hall, seemingly confining its analysis to a section 1983 false arrest claim. Hall, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 120-21. It is not apparent why the court did not read Count I to assert a section 1983 excessive force 28 dismissed the excessive force and assault claims on the pleadings, and granted summary judgment against Hall on the battery claim. We review both types of disposition de novo and draw all inferences in Hall’s favor. For the former, we look only to the facts as pleaded; for the latter, we have the benefit of evidence produced during discovery. See Mpoy, 758 F.3d at 287; Robinson, 818 F.3d at 8.
Unconstitutional Excessive Force and Common Law Assault As pleaded, the facts relevant to Lee’s use of force are as follows: Hall was in the bathroom of the bar across the street from Cities when there was a knock at the door, to which Hall responded, “Someone’s in here.” Compl. ¶ 21. Then came a louder knock and the statement, “It’s the police.” Id. “Immediately thereafter,” without awaiting a response, Lee and her partner “broke down” the bathroom door, “threw [Hall] up against the bathroom wall,” and handcuffed her. Id. ¶ 22. Lee then “dragged” Hall out of the restaurant. Id. ¶ 24. Outside the restaurant, Lee “continued to tighten the handcuffs on [Hall’s] wrists to the point that [Hall] lost feeling in her thumb and hand and told [Lee] that she was hurting [Hall], but [Lee] still retained a firm grip on [Hall’s] upper right arm, enough to leave a full handprint bruise.” Id. ¶ 26. Lee then “dragged” Hall to a police cruiser and “threw” Hall in the back seat. Id. ¶ 28. claim as well. The complaint spells out that “Defendants Lee and John Doe substantially and meaningfully deprived Plaintiff of her right to be secure in her person under the Fourth Amendment, subjected Plaintiff to objectively excessive and excessive use of force which were unreasonable and constitute[d] an unlawful seizure.” Compl. ¶ 45. 29
We analyze a section 1983 claim of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under the constitutional “objective reasonableness” standard. Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001)); accord Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). We assess whether the use of force was reasonable by balancing the “nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1865 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). We pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of [the] particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether [s]he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Johnson v. District of Columbia, 528 F.3d 969, 974 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (first alteration in original) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). “An officer’s act of violence violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures if it furthers no governmental interest, such as apprehending a suspect or protecting an officer or the public.” Id. at 976. Because Officer Lee raised a defense of qualified immunity, we analyze the excessive force claim with an additional layer of protection for the officer, asking whether the violated right was clearly established. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-02. The complaint alleges that Officer Lee “threw Plaintiff up against the bathroom wall,” “dragged Plaintiff out of the [bar],” “tighten[ed] the handcuffs on Plaintiff’s wrists to the point that Plaintiff lost feeling in her thumb and hand,” “dragged Plaintiff to an empty parked police cruiser . . . and threw Plaintiff in the 30 back seat.” Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24, 26, 28. It further alleges that Officer Lee thereby injured Hall’s wrist. Id. ¶ 32. The complaint contains no indication that Hall posed any threat to Lee or others, or that Hall had committed a serious crime. On the facts as the complaint describes them, Lee’s force was without justification, and the excessive force claim should not have been dismissed on the pleadings. We vacate the dismissal and remand the claim for further proceedings.
The same allegations that support the claim of excessive force against Lee also require reversal and remand of the district court dismissal of the assault claim. “An assault is an intentional and unlawful attempt or threat, either by words or by acts, to do physical harm to the victim.” Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 930, 937 (D.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court held that the complaint fails to allege “that the officers made any threats of harm which were objectively unreasonable.” Hall, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 121. We read the complaint to allege a course of conduct that conveyed a threat to Hall, reasonably causing her to fear for her safety. Officers broke down the bathroom door, threw Hall up against a wall, dragged Hall around, and tightened her cuffs when she protested that she was in pain. The officers did so abruptly and without warning, ignored her queries and objections, and refused to identify themselves or explain what was going on. Those allegations are fairly read to claim not only excessive use of force, but also a threatening message of more brutality in store for Hall if she questioned the officers’ actions. 31
the Battery Claim Against Officer Lee Hall’s testimony corroborated and added detail to the complaint’s allegations; nothing in discovery indisputably defeated any material aspect of the allegations that stated the excessive force claims. For instance, Hall testified that, after police knocked on the single-occupancy bathroom door and yelled, “Open up, it’s the police,” Hall let out a “small giggle,” but before she “even ha[d] time to think about opening the door,” the officers broke it down and slammed Hall against the wall. Hall Dep., 47:15-48:6. Hall testified that when she complained to Officer Lee “that the handcuffs were too tight,” Lee told Hall to “shut up” and then Officer Lee “pushed the sides to tighten” the cuffs. Id. at 51:20-52:6. When Hall complained again and stated that her thumb was going numb, Lee told her to “[s]hut up” and “stop resisting.” Id. at 54:7-11. Officer Lee twice tightened Hall’s handcuffs in response to Hall’s complaints. Id. at 73:10-18. Officer Lee forced Hall down on her knees on the concrete, scraping and bruising her. Id. at 80:19-22. Lee held Hall there with her knee in Hall’s back. Id. at 58:17-19. When Hall attempted to stand up with her hands cuffed behind her, Officer Lee grabbed Hall by her elbows behind her back and “yanked” her up. Id. at 54:22. Eventually, Lee “drag[ged]” Hall to a police cruiser and threw her in the backseat. Id. at 63:12-13. Two of Hall’s friends who witnessed the scene corroborated her testimony. Kay Vollans, who was with Hall in the bathroom of the bar, testified that police kicked in the door and that Lee dragged Hall out of the bar. Vollans Dep., 23:15-23:17; 25:22-26:11, Mar. 19, 2015. Once outside, Vollans testified, Lee forced Hall to her knees on the concrete sidewalk, and lifted Hall’s hands behind her back and pointed them to the sky while Hall was handcuffed. Id. at 29:17-20; 32 34:4-10. Hall’s complaints of pain throughout the interaction were met with commands to shut up. Id. at 37:4-17. Gary Jones also testified that Lee dragged Hall out of the bar and that when Hall was on the ground, Lee put her knee in Hall’s back while pulling Hall’s arms up behind her by the cuffs. Jones Dep., 27:3-28:21; 36:16-18, Mar. 19, 2015. Officer Lee’s testimony characterized the interaction differently. She testified that her partner, a male officer, was the one who “grabbed” Hall in the bathroom and handcuffed her. Lee Dep., 25:1-8. Officer Lee testified that police handcuffed Hall because she fit the description of a black female wearing a yellow sundress who had reportedly committed “theft one of services,” a felony. Id. at 25:14-18. According to Lee, Hall was considered a flight risk because she had left Cities. Id. at 26:4-16. Lee testified that she “placed” Hall down on the sidewalk; she later testified that she did so for fear that Hall might “stumble and fall,” given her high heels. Id. at 65:18-66:2. And Lee testified that Hall was “screaming, and shouting, and fighting, and pulling away,” and was generally “not compliant.” Id. at 28:10, 65:15. Finally, the parties devote multiple pages in their appellate briefs to arguing over the severity of Hall’s wrist injury and its relevance to the analysis. See Appellant Br. 13 (arguing that Hall was diagnosed with and treated for a broken wrist); Appellee Br. 31-33 (arguing the “undisputed medical records show that Ms. Hall did not fracture her wrist”). The record shows that Hall was initially diagnosed with a potential wrist fracture, but that follow-up with a radiologist called that diagnosis into question. In any event, a reasonable jury could conclude on the summary judgment record that Hall experienced pain, numbness, limited mobility in her wrist and hand, and scrapes and bruises. The particular medical diagnosis of Hall’s wrist injury is not determinative of whether 33 Officer Lee used excessive force. With the record evidence in mind, we move to the battery claim, dismissed by the district court at summary judgment. Discovery corroborated Hall’s allegations that Lee used force against her without justification, creating a jury issue on the battery claim. A police officer is liable for battery when she commits an “intentional act that causes harmful or offensive bodily contact” and when the officer’s use of such force was “in excess of [that] which the actor reasonably believes to be necessary.” District of Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701, 705-06 (D.C. 2003) (quoting Holder v. District of Columbia, 700 A.2d 738, 741 (D.C. 1997)). “[T]he officer must subjectively believe that he or she used no more force than necessary, but the officer’s judgment is [also] compared to that of a hypothetical reasonable police officer placed in the same situation.” Scales v. District of Columbia, 973 A.2d 722, 730 (D.C. 2009). The district court granted summary judgment to Officer Lee on the battery claim, reasoning that Hall’s own testimony put beyond dispute that she was resisting arrest sufficiently to justify Lee’s use of force. In our view, however, a reasonable jury could reject Officer Lee’s contention that, starting when Hall did not immediately open the bathroom door in response to the police directive to “[o]pen up,” Hall resisted the officers and thereby justified their use of force. See Hall, 2016 WL 1452325, at . The record could support a jury determination that the officers did not give Hall an opportunity to comply with their command to open the bathroom door before “bust[ing]” through the door. See Hall Dep., 48:3. The district court also concluded that the record placed beyond dispute that Hall resisted arrest after she was handcuffed on the ground because, as the district court put it, 34 she “moved and behaved in ways that a police officer could reasonably conclude were meant to defy arrest.” Hall, 2016 WL 1452325, at . The court recounted that Hall’s testimony showed that she “tried to stand after Lee had forced her to kneel, and moved abruptly, even ‘swing[ing] around,’ during the arrest.” Id. Reasonable jurors could disagree, however, whether Hall’s movements were resistant, and whether Officer Lee’s use of force was an appropriate response. Hall testified that she complained about her handcuffs being too tight, and that Lee responded by tightening the handcuffs. Hall Dep., 51:20-52:6. Hall tried to stand up because her knees were cut from being forced to kneel on concrete, in response to which Lee “grabbed [Hall by her] elbows and yank[ed her] up.” Id. at 54:17-22. Hall’s friends both corroborated Hall’s testimony. And, given Officer Lee’s failure to explain to Hall that she was under arrest or to articulate why Hall was being detained— beyond saying “theft of services,” which Hall apparently heard as “[t]hat’s the services,” id. at 50:2-4—a jury could determine that Hall’s attempts to view Lee’s badge number were appropriate, non-resistant conduct. Most importantly, a reasonable jury could find on these facts that Officer Lee should have perceived that she could resolve the situation without physical force. At summary judgment, when we are required to view the record in the light most favorable to Hall, we cannot say that a reasonable jury would be required to find that, given Hall’s conduct, Officer Lee’s force was justified.