Opinion ID: 2561793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: In this adverse possession case, we review the court of appeals' opinion in Matoush v. Lovingood, 159 P.3d 741 (Colo.App. 2006). [1] There, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard to a claim to terminate an easement by adverse possession. [2] The easement at issue here creates a right-of-way across Respondents David and Debra Lovingood's property for access between Petitioner Carol Matoush's property and an alley adjacent to Lovingoods' property. The Lovingoods allege that they have adversely possessed Matoush's right to use the easement as a right-of-way by openly preventing access between Matoush's property and the alley by building and maintaining fences perpendicular to the easement area for the statutorily-mandated period of time for adverse possession. [3] Matoush claims that the statutorily-mandated period of time for adverse possession of an easement that was expressly created but never used, such as the easement in this case, is not triggered until a need for the easement arises, and that, in this case, no need for the easement arose until she tried to sell her property in 2003. An easement is terminated by adverse possession upon a showing that use of the easement area was: (1) adverse to the easement holder's use of the easement; (2) open or notorious; and (3) continuous, without effective interruption, for the statutorily-mandated period of time for adverse possession. To be adverse, use of the easement area must be incompatible or irreconcilable with the easement holder's right to use the easement. Following precedent in other jurisdictions, we hold that whether use of the easement area is an incompatible or irreconcilable use sufficiently adverse to trigger the statutorily-mandated period of time for adverse possession of the easement depends upon whether the easement was expressly created and whether the easement has ever been used by the easement holder. When an easement is expressly created but never used, we hold that use of the easement area is not adverse and will not trigger the statutorily-mandated period of time for adverse possession until the easement holder needs to use the easement, demands to use it, and is denied the right to use it. In this case, the trial court's findings of fact state that the easement was expressly created by warranty deed in 1901 and that there was no evidence presented at trial regarding whether the easement was used as a right-of-way in 1901. It is undisputed that the easement has never been used as a right-of-way since 1969. Our review of the record reveals that there was no evidence presented at trial regarding whether the easement was ever used as a right-of-way between 1901 and 1969. For these reasons, we conclude and hold that the Lovingoods' use of the easement area was not adverse to Matoush's right to use the easement as a right-of-way until Matoush needed to use it for that purpose in 2003. Hence, we reverse the court of appeals' decision and affirm the trial court's ruling that Matoush retains her right to use the easement as a right-of-way for access between her property and the alley. We return this case to the court of appeals to be returned to the trial court for an entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.