Opinion ID: 2442854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Miles Point Property and the Talbot County Board of Appeals

Text: The Talbot County Board of Appeals's review authority over the Council's decisions, if it exists, must derive from the General Assembly's grant of power contained within the Express Powers Act, because Talbot County has elected a charter form of local government. See Md.Code (1957, 2005 Repl.Vol.), Art. 25A, § 5 (Express Powers Act or the Act). Maryland Constitution Article XI-A, Section 2, provides that [t]he General Assembly shall by public general law provide a grant of express powers for such County or Counties as may thereafter form a charter under the provisions of this Article. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 2. The Express Powers Act is the General Assembly's fulfillment of this constitutional command. See Anne Arundel County v. Bowen, 258 Md. 713, 715, 267 A.2d 168, 169 (1970) (explaining that the statute was enacted [i]n obedience to [Article XI-A's] mandate....); see also County Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 418, 312 A.2d 225, 233 (1973) (holding that the purpose of the Act is to share with the counties, within well-delineated limits, the legislative powers formerly reserved to the General Assembly.). The Express Powers Act confers a number of enumerated express powers upon charter counties, including Talbot County. Express Powers Act, §§ (A)-(FF). Among these enumerated powers is the ability to create a County Board of Appeals, codified in Paragraph (U) of the Act. Specifically, that paragraph permits a charter county to enact local laws providing ... for the establishment of a county board of appeals whose members shall be appointed by the county council.... See Express Powers Act, § (U). Although the Act grants no direct authority to a board of appeal, as this must be implemented by the charter county, it limits which matters counties may authorize their boards to review: [T]he decision by the board on petition by any interested person and after notice and opportunity for hearing and on the basis of the record before the board, of such of the following matters arising (either originally or on review of the action of an administrative officer or agency) under any law, ordinance, or regulation of, or subject to amendment or repeal by, the county council, as shall be specified from time to time by such local laws enacted under this subsection: [a]n application for a zoning variation or exception or amendment of a zoning ordinance map; the issuance, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, or modification of any license, permit, approval, exemption, waiver, certificate, registration, or other form of permission or of any adjudicatory order .... See Express Powers Act, § (U) (emphasis added). We shall refer to the italicized language as the Limiting Clause of the Act. The question of the Board's jurisdiction, as Talbot County argues in its brief, is thus predicated on the language of the Express Powers Act. The critical issue is whether an appeal from a denial of an amendment to the Plan can be read, in the words of Miles Point, as being consistent with one of the spheres of jurisdiction enumerated in the Limiting Clause of the Act. In other words, does the Express Powers Act even permit a county to authorize its Board of Appeals to review the council's denial of this type of decision? [7] The Talbot County Board of Appeals, in considering its jurisdiction over Miles Point's appeal, did not expressly find that review of a proposed amendment to the Plan fairly fit within the enumerated list of subject matters set forth in the Limiting Clause of the Express Powers Act; the Board found that even if such an appeal were permissible under the Limiting Clause, the Council had not authorized the Board to hear such an appeal through the enactment of a local law. Miles Point argues that the Limiting Clause allows its appeal, pointing to the general category of jurisdiction permitting a county to delegate review authority over the denial ... of any adjudicatory order to its Board of Appeals. [8] Express Powers Act, § (U). Talbot County argues that the Council's action was legislative in nature, and therefore lacked the quasi-judicial quality that is characteristic of an adjudicatory order. [9] In determining whether the Council's action was adjudicatory or legislative in nature, we are informed by our analysis of zoning decisions in Bucktail, LLC v. County Council of Talbot County, 352 Md. 530, 723 A.2d 440 (1999). In Bucktail, we held: The determination of whether a local zoning authority is acting in an adjudicative or legislative manner is dependent upon the nature of the particular act in which it is engaged. This determination is not based on whether the zoning decision adversely affects an individual piece of property but whether the decision itself is made on individual or general grounds. Id. at 545, 723 A.2d at 447 (quotation marks and citation omitted). It is thus not a hearing's mere focus on one parcel that is dispositive of [the hearing's] quasi-judicial nature, but rather that the matter taken up at the hearing is disposed of based on the unique characteristics of the property at issue. Md. Overpak Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 395 Md. 16, 39, 909 A.2d 235, 248-49 (2006). In other words, the greater a decisionmaker's reliance on general, legislative facts, the more likely it is that an action is legislative in nature. Likewise, the greater a decision-maker's reliance on property-specific, adjudicative facts, the more reasonable it is to term the action adjudicatory in nature. Although we have recognized that [t]he difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is not easily drawn[,] Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 711-12, 376 A.2d 483, 497 (1977), the proper classification of the Council's hearings in these cases is quite straightforward. Generally, adjudicative facts concern questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, [and] with what motive or intent, while legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion. Id. ( quoting 1 Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7:02 (1958)). While the Council's review of the Plan was spurred by Miles Point's request for reclassification, few of the facts discussed by the Council address unique characteristics of the Miles Point property itself. As stated above, the Council does iterate the particulars of Miles Point's application, and identify the property in question, but only at the outset of its findings. The balance of the Council's findings address broad-based facts relating to Talbot County infrastructure, the capacity and history of the Region II Wastewater Treatment Plant, and policy issues. Specifically, the Council discussed a number of problems with existing sewage treatment procedures. The Council found that the Plant had experienced a steady increase in wastewater inflow between 2002 and 2005, and a corresponding decrease in available capacity for additional treatment. The Council also noted that peak flows into the Plant could reach 2,000,000 GPDtwice the Plant's design capacity and approximately four times its total functional capacity. The findings of fact addressed the sewage overflow issues that the Plant had experienced, and the litany of problems that had been revealed by an inspection of the Plant's function. The Council also discussed Talbot County's agreement with the Martingham Utilities Cooperative, a private sewage treatment facility located north of the Town of St. Michaels. The County had previously agreed that the Plant would accept an additional 19,000 GPD of effluent from the Martingham facility to assist that facility in meeting its MDE permit requirements. In addition to these findings, the Council addressed policy matters. The Council discussed the County's plan to expand Plant capacity, and noted that in spite of the County's intentions, the expansion had not yet been authorized by the MDE, [n]o bid [had] been approved[,] ... and no construction contract [had] been executed. The Council addressed the history of sewer allocation policy in Talbot County, including the County's larger water and sewer planning scheme in relation to the Plant's historical capacity, and found that granting Miles Point's application would be incompatible with the overall scheme as organized by the County as early as 1987. [10] The Council's findings of fact also acknowledge that the Talbot County Planning Commission, the Public Works Advisory Board, and the County Engineer recommended that the resolution be rejected; both the Planning Commission and the Public Works Advisory Board were unanimous in their recommendations. Finally, the Council discussed the requirements of state law, specifically the requirements of the Maryland Code's Environment Article. Among other items, the Council referred to Section 9-505(a)(4)(i) of the Environment Article, which requires that each county provide [f]or sewage treatment facilities that are adequate to prevent the discharge of any inadequately treated sewage or other liquid waste into any waters.... [11] Md.Code (1982, 2007 Repl.Vol.) § 9-505(a)(4)(i) of the Environment Article. The Council found that [a]mending the Plan to allow additional hook-ups when the Plant does not have sufficient capacity to accept and adequately treat existing flows without discharge... is inconsistent with the requirements of [the Environment Article]. [12] The Council later stated that granting such an approval would be inimical to the public health, safety, and welfare. [13] All of the above facts relied upon by the Council were legislative in nature, as not one of the Council's grounds for decision was specifically rooted in the unique characteristics of the Miles Point property or the associated development proposal. Throughout its findings of fact, the Council invariably chose not to focus on the merits and flaws of reclassifying Miles Point's specific property, but rather on how that reclassification would fit into Talbot County's overall policy on wastewater treatment. At no point did the Council indicate that there was a particular feature of the Miles Point property, or its development proposal, that made reclassification untenable; the Council's rationale could easily have applied to any property classified as S-2 under the Plan. To be sure, the ultimate decision reached by the Council specifically affected the Miles Point property. But this does not transform the Council's decision into adjudicatory action. We have held in other contexts that a single decision-making process may require both legislative and adjudicative roles for the hearing body. See Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. 572, 584-85, 705 A.2d 301, 306-07 (1998) (holding that the process of enacting a special assessment may include both legislative and adjudicative aspects). Applying these criteria, we have no doubt that the Council relied primarily upon legislative fact-finding in making its decision on the Miles Point property, and that its action was therefore legislative in nature. [14] Again, we must focus on whether the Council's decision itself was made on individual grounds or general grounds. See Bucktail, 352 Md. at 545, 723 A.2d at 447. In this case, the Council's decision was clearly based on general grounds. As such, it was not an adjudicatory action and, under the Limiting Clause of the Express Powers Act, Talbot County may not confer appellate jurisdiction over the Council's decision on the Talbot County Board of Appeals. The Board thus correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Miles Point's administrative appeal from the Council's decision, and the Circuit Court for Talbot County erred in its judgment remanding Miles Point's appeal to the Board.