Opinion ID: 2275333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Voir Dire /Racial Prejudice

Text: Pursuant to provisions of Del.Super. Ct. Cr. R. 24(a), Filmore's counsel filed a written motion for five special voir dire questions. Before jury selection on the first day of trial, the trial judge conducted a hearing to consider the motion. The State objected to question number five on the basis that the question was covered by a standard bias inquiry. Filmore's proposed question five read as follows: [t]he alleged victims of this offense are White Females. The Defendant is a Black Male. Do you have any prejudice, however slight, against the Defendant which may [affect] your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict? In response to the State's objection to the proposed voir dire question, the trial judge stated: [t]he standard question is do you have any bias or prejudice for or against the State or the defendant? The trial prosecutor argued against the inclusion of Filmore's proposed question five as follows: The State would ask that the question not be asked. They're already asked if, for any reason, they cannot be fair, and it's going to be obvious to the jury that the defendant is a black male. Injecting  making race an issue by means of this question, the State submits, is not fair. It's not relevant. Nobody is going to make race an issue in this trial. The State is not. Hopefully, the defense will not, although this question seems to be an attempt to do that. I mean, one would hope that the jury is going to be color blind in the sense that they're not going to focus on the race of the witnesses or the race of the defendant, they're not going to let that affect their thinking, and certainly the State would hope that that's the case and we're not going to try inject that as an issue. So, why this has to be brought up, I really don't have any idea, but they're going to be asked whether there's any reason they would be partial to one side or the other and I think this makes  it sort of tries to create a racial issue where there is none. [3] In response to the State's opposition, Filmore's trial counsel argued: Your Honor, the reason why it's important is because the case law says that where this is, in fact, the circumstance, it is proper. It is based on the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment was passed 125 or some-odd years ago basically to benefit individuals of the black race that they would not be discriminated against, and because of that, this question basically has been accepted for years and years. It is the proper way to be done. I would also like to assume that individuals are not prejudiced, but I'm also old enough to know that things don't always turn out the way they should in theory. If someone has a particular problem with this defendant for some reason and if they come forward and tell the Court, they should be excused, but it's an appropriate question, [] is a question which is routinely asked, and we'd ask the Court to give it. [4] The State further replied: Your Honor, I have not seen it routinely asked and I'd ask Mr. Swierzbinski to cite the case law he's referring to because I'm not familiar with it. It may be something that I just don't know, which is certainly possible, but I'm not familiar with it. [5] After hearing further comments from the trial prosecutor, the trial judge denied the request and stated: I don't recall ever giving this instruction. I don't see a need for it at the present time for the reasons that I think [the State] has stated on the record, so I'm not going to give it. [6] Filmore alleges the trial judge committed reversible error when he denied Filmore's proposed voir dire question concerning racial bias. Specifically, Filmore alleges the trial judge's failure to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice violated his rights under the federal Constitution and the Constitution of this State. We review claims of constitutional violations de novo. [7] With respect to any inquiry into possible racial prejudice, the trial judge retains discretion as to the form and number of questions on the subject. [8] The United States Supreme Court has held that the United States Constitution does not require a question about juror racial bias unless there are special circumstances in the case. [9] Special circumstances exist if racial issues are inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial. [10] The Court, nevertheless, set forth a more stringent rule for federal trial courts. The Ristaino holding is not an interpretation of the United States Constitution (and therefore neither binding on state courts nor a limitation on state courts' policy to employ more stringent cautions to explore and rule out racial bias), but stems from the Court's supervisory capacity over the federal courts. [11] In the federal system when racial issues are inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial, a voir dire question is mandatory when requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant and the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups. [12] In Feddiman v. State , this Court discussed the foregoing precedent and held [t]he same higher standard is applicable in the courts of this State by virtue of Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution. [13] A jury convicted Feddiman of knocking a victim off of her bicycle, and taking her away in his automobile to two separate locations. During the course of transporting the victim, and at each location, Feddiman forced the victim to engage in various acts of sexual intercourse. [14] Feddiman's defense counsel submitted a written request for the trial judge to ask a voir dire question concerning possible racial prejudice. The question submitted by defense counsel and later asked by the trial judge was: The victim in this case is a white person. The defendant is black. Do you have any prejudice, however slight, against black people which would [a]ffect you in any[]way in deciding this case regarding their sexual proclivities? [15] In Feddiman, we held that Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution required the trial judge to question prospective jurors about racial prejudice and that the above question met that requirement. [16] If for some reason our holding in Feddiman seems unclear, we announce the following bright line rule: Our view that Article I Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution calls for the essential demands of fairness requires that the trial judge question prospective jurors about racial prejudice when: (1) the defendant stands accused of a violent crime; (2) the defendant and victim are members of different racial groups; and (3) the defense attorney specifically requests the trial court to question the jurors during voir dire concerning potential racial prejudice. This case, like Feddiman, involves an accusation of violent crime, an African-American defendant, a Caucasian victim, and a specific request by defense counsel for the trial court to question the jurors during voir dire concerning the possibility of racial prejudice. In fact, the very question proposed by Filmore's defense counsel parallels the question asked in Feddiman. Our jurisprudence mandates strict adherence to the more sensitive approach for ferreting out racial prejudice set forth in Feddiman and reiterated in our holding today. The trial judge should have followed Feddiman and the now well established practice in our courts to ask the venire a question on voir dire directly addressing the issue of possible racial prejudice. Race was injected into this case by its factual circumstances and not, as the State argued, by a sensitive question during voir dire seeking to expose bigotry. A broad antiseptic question seeking to explore bias for or against the defendant or the state as an institutional entity falls woefully short of a fair and adequate inquiry into the onerous potential taint of racial bigotry present in every case where an alleged victim of a violent crime is a member of another race than that of the accused. Accordingly, the trial judge erred by not making a fair inquiry into the potential of racial prejudice among the prospective jurors consistent with the demands of essential fairness mandated by our Constitution. [17]