Opinion ID: 222293
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jaso’s Copyright Infringement Claim

Text: Jaso contends that the district court’s refusal to allow him to amend his complaint was in error—and that his complaint should not have been dismissed—because his proposed second amended complaint alleged that 7 Case: 10-20786 Document: 00511557863 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/01/2011 No. 10-20786 Defendants continue to infringe his copyright in “El Juego” to the present day. Defendants respond that Jaso’s proposed second amended complaint was futile because it did not allege any acts of infringement within the statutory period and because Defendants ceased using “Always” to market Coca Cola in 2000. The parties do not dispute that Jaso’s proposed second amended complaint alleges that he holds a copyright in “El Juego.”4 As a copyright holder in “El Juego,” Jaso has the exclusive right, subject to certain limitations, to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies of the work, and perform the work publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(6). “Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). A civil action for copyright infringement must be commenced “within three years after the claim has accrued.” 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). In this circuit, each act of infringement gives rise to an independent claim, and the defendant “is only liable for his acts of infringement committed within three years prior to [p]laintiff’s lawsuit.” Makedwde Publ’g Co. v. Johnson, 37 F.3d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis removed) (citing Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2nd Cir. 1992)); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.05[B][1][c], at 12-150.4 (2011) (“If infringement occurred within three years prior to filing, the action will not be barred even if prior infringements . . . occurred more than three years previously.”). Therefore, the district court’s decision to disallow Jaso’s proposed second amended complaint 4 Jaso may be relying, in part, on his Mexican copyright and the Berne Convention. See 17 U.S.C. 104(b); see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.07[B], at 5-68 (2011) (“[P]ublished works authored by Berne nationals and domiciliaries are protected under U.S. copyright law.”). 8 Case: 10-20786 Document: 00511557863 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/01/2011 No. 10-20786 was proper if it is evident from the proposed second amended complaint that no acts of infringement occurred within the limitations period. Jaso’s first amended complaint stated that the suit was brought to redress “Defendants’ unlawful production, offering, distribution and sale of commercial novelt[y] items including but not limited to: calculators, telephones, musical toys and the like, as well as causing the music to be performed on the internet.” Jaso also alleged in the first amended complaint that “Defendants produce and sell commercials and other advertising products containing ‘Always Coca Cola,’ an unauthorized derivative of [‘El Juego’].” In his proposed amendment, Jaso added the allegation that from “[1]994 to present . . . Coca Cola America copyrighted an unauthorized derivative of El Juego,” that Coca Cola and Export “distributed the music internationally,” and that McCann “created unauthorized derivatives for Coca Cola America in America that were distributed internationally.” Jaso’s proposed second amended complaint further alleged that Coca Cola sold commercials using the infringing music through Export to international distributors and received royalties for the use of “Always.” The proposed second amended complaint also alleged that McCann distributed the infringing commercial advertisements in Mexico. We make no finding regarding whether Jaso’s allegations of infringement from 1994 to present are sufficient to state a claim under ordinary pleading standards governing a complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. —, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (requiring complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, we focus on the district court’s stated reason for disallowing Jaso’s proposed amendment to his copyright 9 Case: 10-20786 Document: 00511557863 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/01/2011 No. 10-20786 infringement claim: that Jaso did not point to “an act by [Defendants] . . . within the limitations period.” We conclude that Jaso’s statement in the second amended complaint describing Defendants’ conduct “in [1]994 to present” alleges, albeit barely, that Defendants committed some acts of copyright infringement within three years of filing the complaint. Thus, Jaso’s potential response to the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations—that specific acts of infringement occurred within the limitations period—is not “foreclosed by the allegations in the complaint.” See Goodman, 494 F.3d at 466; cf. EPCO Carbon Dioxide Prods., Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 467 F.3d 466, 471 (5th Cir. 2006) (dismissal at the 12(b)(6) stage due to statute of frauds defense was improper because proof of a written contract was not “foreclosed by the face of [Plaintiff’s] pleadings”). Defendants argue that Jaso’s allegations of infringement are nevertheless facially barred by the statute of limitations because the “Always” advertising campaign ended in 2000, as proven by the Highlights Exhibit. Thus, according to Defendants, any alleged act of infringement occurred at least ten years before Jaso filed his complaint, and the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. This fact does not appear on the face of Jaso’s proposed second amended complaint. To the extent that the district court relied on the Highlights Exhibit or Defendants’ assertion that the “Always” advertising campaign ended in 2000, its acceptance of such a pivotal fact was, to say the very least, flawed.5 See 5 Counsel for McCann urges that this court can take judicial notice of the facts stated in the Highlights Exhibit. McCann also claims that the facts stated in the Highlights Exhibit should be accepted because, in its briefing below, McCann asked the district court to take judicial notice of the Highlights Exhibit, and Jaso did not object. We accept neither proposition advanced by McCann. First, it is not at all clear from the record that the district court took judicial notice of the Highlights Exhibit. In deciding that Defendants had ceased 10 Case: 10-20786 Document: 00511557863 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/01/2011 No. 10-20786 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may only “consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine . . . , in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice”); see also Sw. Bell Tel. LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen deciding, under Rule 12(b)(6), whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court considers, of course, only the allegations in the complaint.”). Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that Jaso’s second amended complaint, on its face, alleged only infringing conduct outside of the limitations period.6 Defendants raise several other arguments regarding whether Jaso’s second amended complaint otherwise fails to state a claim for copyright infringement. We express no opinion on the validity of those arguments, which the district court should examine on remand. using “Always” in advertising, the district court made no reference to the Highlights Exhibit, but, apparently, relied on the flat assertion by counsel for Coca Cola to establish this fact. Second, although this court has, in the past, taken judicial notice of information posted on a government website, see, e.g., Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao, 418 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 2005), the Highlights Exhibit—an unattributed, uncited overview of Coca Cola’s television advertising history—is not a “source[] whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” FED. R. EVID. § 201(b). Third, the Highlights Exhibit describes only Coca Cola’s television advertising history. By contrast, Jaso’s second amended complaint describes a far broader spectrum of marketing activity by Defendants, so the Highlights Exhibit does not preclude all of Jaso’s allegations of copyright infringement. 6 For identical reasons, we conclude that the district court should have allowed Jaso to amend his complaint because his contributory infringement claim against Coca Cola was not facially barred by the statute of limitations. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 790 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A party is liable for contributory infringement when it, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to infringing conduct of another.”) There is no dispute in this case that the statute of limitations for contributory copyright infringement is the same as for ordinary copyright infringement, and Jaso’s claims of contributory copyright infringement are not facially outside of the limitations period. 11 Case: 10-20786 Document: 00511557863 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/01/2011 No. 10-20786