Opinion ID: 835697
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The board's authority under ORS 221.420

Text: The legislature has provided for statewide regulation of utilities other than railroads since 1911. See Or. Laws 1911, ch. 279 (providing same). ORS 221.420 has its origins in that 1911 utility legislation and, although it has evolved over time, that statute consistently has conferred cities with affirmative statutory authority to regulate utilities within their boundaries. See Or. Laws 1911, ch. 279, § 61 (defining municipal regulatory powers over utilities). ORS 221.420(2)(a) provides: Every city may: Determine by contract or prescribe by ordinance or otherwise, the terms and conditions, including payment of charges and fees, upon which any public utility, electric cooperative, people's utility district or heating company may be permitted to occupy the streets, highways or other public property within such city and exclude or eject any public utility or heating company therefrom. (Emphasis added.) As the Court of Appeals pointed out below, Springfield Utility Board, 191 Or.App. at 543-44, 84 P.3d 167, ORS 221.420(2)(a) sets out two different powers that cities enjoy to regulate utilities within their boundaries, namely, the power to prescribe the conditions and terms for occupation of a city's streets and other public property, and the power to eject or exclude another from a city's streets or other public property. ORS 221.420(2)(a) authorizes cities to exercise that first power  that is, the power to prescribe the terms and conditions for occupation of a city's streets or other public property  against any public utility, electric cooperative, people's utility district or heating company. (Emphasis added.) By contrast, ORS 221.420(2)(a) authorizes cities to exercise that second power  that is, the power to exclude or eject  only against any public utility or heating company. (Emphasis added.) By expressly referring to PUDs in describing a city's power to prescribe the terms and conditions for occupation of the city's streets or other public property, but omitting any such reference in describing a city's exclusion and ejection power, the text of ORS 221.420(2)(a) appears to limit a city's statutory franchise authority over PUDs only to the authority to prescribe the terms and conditions for occupation of the city's streets and other public property. See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 611, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993) (in construing statutes, court generally presumes use of a term in one section and not in another section of the same statute indicates a purposeful omission). In advancing a contrary interpretation of ORS 221.420(2)(a), the board acknowledges that, if it has statutory authority to exclude Emerald, then Emerald must qualify as a public utility within the meaning of the second part of ORS 221.420(2)(a), notwithstanding the apparent distinction between a public utility and a people's utility district in the first part of that statute. For its part, Emerald disputes the notion that the term public utility in ORS 221.420(2)(a) includes PUDs. For the reasons explained below, we agree with Emerald. ORS 221.420 defines the term public utility by adopting the statutory definition of that term in ORS 757.005, which also applies to the statutes governing state regulation of utilities. See ORS 221.420(1)(a) (providing that term public utility in ORS 221.420 has the meaning for that term provided in ORS 757.005); see also ORS 756.010(6) (incorporating definition of public utility in ORS 757.005 for ORS chapters 756, 757, 758, and 759). As relevant in this context, ORS 757.005 defines a public utility as: Any corporation, company, individual, association of individuals, or its lessees, trustees or receivers, that owns, operates, manages or controls all or a part of any plant or equipment in this state for the production, transmission, delivery or furnishing of heat, light, water or power, directly or indirectly to or for the public, whether or not such plant or equipment or part thereof is wholly within any town or city. ORS 757.005(1)(a)(A). [10] That definition of a public utility is refined further by ORS 757.005(1)(b), which provides a list of entities that are excluded from that statutory term. One of the entities that ORS 757.005(1)(b) excludes from the statutory definition of public utility is [a]ny plant owned or operated by a municipality.  ORS 757.005(1)(b)(A) (emphasis added). Applying those statutory definitions here, both parties agree that, if a PUD qualifies as a municipality within the meaning of ORS 757.005(1)(b)(A), then Emerald is excluded from the statutory definition of the term public utility under ORS 757.005(1)(a)(A) and, consequently, also is excluded from that term and from the city's exclusion authority under ORS 221.420(2)(a). Thus, to decide whether ORS 221.420(2)(a) authorizes the board to exclude Emerald, we must decide whether a PUD qualifies as a municipality in this context. This court previously has observed that the terms `municipality' and `municipalities' have no fixed meanings and that their meanings depend upon the context in which they are used. Emerald PUD, 302 Or. at 265-66, 729 P.2d 552. Thus, in deciding whether PUDs are municipalities within the meaning of a particular statute, this court examines the specific statutory context at issue. In Emerald PUD, for example, this court concluded that PUDs do not qualify as municipalities within the meaning of ORS 543.610 because the legislature had enacted that statute together with Oregon Laws 1931, chapter 279, [11] which distinguished between municipalities and PUDs. 302 Or. at 266-68, 729 P.2d 552. In Wasco County P.U.D. v. Kelly, 171 Or. 691, 698-99, 137 P.2d 295 (1943), by contrast, this court concluded that PUDs were municipalities within the meaning of former Article IV, section la, of the Oregon Constitution, based upon the purposes and powers of such districts. See also Cent. Lincoln P.U.D. v. State Tax Com., 221 Or. 398, 408, 351 P.2d 694 (1960) (describing PUDs as quasi-municipal corporation[s]). The statutory definition of municipality set out in ORS 756.010(4) generally controls the meaning of that term in ORS 757.005(1)(b)(A). See ORS 756.010(4) (providing definition of term municipality for ORS chapters 756, 757, 758, and 759 except as otherwise specifically provided or unless the context requires otherwise). ORS 756.010(4) defines a municipality to include any city, municipal corporation or quasi-municipal corporation. According to Emerald, a PUD is a municipality under that definition and, thus, is excluded from the statutory term public utility under both ORS 757.005(1)(a)(A) and ORS 221.420(2)(a). As the Court of Appeals observed below, Springfield Utility Board, 191 Or.App. at 550, 84 P.3d 167, the relevant context for determining whether a PUD is municipality under ORS 756.010(4) is the statutory framework for state regulation of utilities set out in ORS chapters 756, 757, and 758. [12] Examining those statutes as a whole, the board acknowledges, and we agree, that a PUD clearly qualifies as a municipality that is excluded from the statutory term public utility in that context. ORS 758.505, for example, expressly distinguishes between public utilities, which are subject to the PUC's rate and service regulatory authority under ORS chapter 757, and PUDs, which have the authority to set their own rates and establish their own standards of service under ORS chapter 261. Compare ORS 758.505(7) (defining public utility as a utility regulated by the commission under ORS chapter 757) with ORS 758.505(6) (classifying PUDs as non-regulated utilit[ies]). Thus, if that same distinction also applies to ORS 221.420(2)(a), then the board lacks statutory authority to exclude Emerald from its allocated exclusive service territory. The board first seeks to avoid that result by arguing that, rather than applying the broad definition of municipality under ORS 756.010(4) to decide whether a PUD is excluded from the statutory term public utility, this court should apply the narrower definition of municipality that is contained in ORS 221.420 itself. ORS 221.420(1)(d) defines a municipality for purposes of that statute as any town, city or other municipal government wherein property of the public utility is located. Applying that definition to ORS 757.005(1)(b)(A), the board contends that Emerald is not a municipality that is excluded from the statutory term public utility as that term applies to ORS 221.420(2)(a). As did the Court of Appeals below, Springfield Utility Board, 191 Or.App. at 548, 84 P.3d 167, we reject the board's suggestion that we can import the definition of municipality from ORS 221.420(1)(d) to determine the meaning of public utility in ORS 757.005(1)(b)(A). As the Court of Appeals pointed out, the definition of municipality in ORS 221.420(1)(d) serves only to define what entities have authority to exercise the powers set out in that statute. In addition, by incorporating the definition of public utility in ORS 757.005 without any qualification, ORS 221.420(1)(a) directs us to give the term public utility in ORS 221.420 the same meaning that that term possesses under the statutes providing for state regulation of utilities. That direction is reinforced further by the fact that, as described above, the distinction between a public utility and a people's utility district in the text of ORS 221.420(2)(a) is consistent with the distinction also made between those entities by the statutes providing for state regulation of utilities. In arguing that the term public utility in ORS 221.420 includes PUDs, the board also relies upon ORS 221.415, the legislative policy statement that accompanied the addition of the words people's utility districts to various provisions in ORS chapter 221 in 1987. See Or. Laws 1987, ch. 245 (adding both provisions). ORS 221.415 provides: Recognizing the independent basis of legislative authority granted to cities in this state by municipal charters, the Legislative Assembly intends by ORS 221.415, 221.420, 221.450 and 261.305 to reaffirm the authority of cities to regulate use of municipally owned rights of way and to impose charges upon publicly owned suppliers of electrical energy, as well as privately owned suppliers for the use of such rights of way. (Emphasis added.) The board contends that the legislature's use of the word reaffirm in that statute reveals that cities already had the authority to exercise all the powers in ORS 221.420 against PUDs even before that statute had listed PUDs specifically. We think that the board reads too much into that word. In that regard, we point out that ORS 221.415 also reaffirm[ed] the city's authority under ORS 221.450 to collect privilege taxes from PUDs, despite the fact that ORS 221.450 previously had authorized cities to collect those taxes only from privately owned public utilit[ies]. See ORS 221.450 (1985) (so providing). In addition, ORS 221.415 says nothing about the authority of cities to exclude utility providers and, instead, is consistent with the addition of the words people's utility district only to the first part of ORS 221.420(2)(a). We conclude, therefore, that ORS 221.420(2)(a) does not provide the board with authority to exclude Emerald from the territory allocated to Emerald by the PUC.