Opinion ID: 2424191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Term of Preliminary Agreement

Text: Finally, we reject the argument that Judge Braman clearly erred in finding that the parties agreed to extend the 10-day time frame for completion of the Definitive Agreement  an agreement that eventually took several months to negotiate. Judge Braman interpreted the Preliminary Agreement's language that negotiations would proceed with a view to signing a Definitive Agreement within ten (10) days and concluded that it was intended to be [a] goal[], not [a] procrustean deadline[]. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Braman noted the absence of time is of the essence language in the Preliminary Agreement, contrasting it with the Definitive Agreement and the Declaration, both of which included such provisions, as well as the conduct of the parties, who never acted as if they were under the pressure of a deadline. See Drazin, 395 A.2d at 35 (noting that when a date for performance is specified, but not made of the essence, a party may make performance essential on that date or subsequently, by giving reasonable notice to that effect). Moreover, Judge Braman found, any deadline was waived by Potomac Creek's conduct, pointing to its extensive post-time line performance, including continuing negotiations on the Definitive Agreement and Declaration, the exchange of multiple drafts of both instruments and the supplying of due diligence materials and Potomac Creek's accept[ance of] Stanford's post-time line performance. An appellate court will not reverse trial court findings unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the evidence. See D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2001); Independence Mgmt. Co., 874 A.2d at 867. Judge Braman's findings in this regard are logical, reasonable and amply supported by the evidence.