Opinion ID: 660676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deference Principles

Text: 27 An agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency administers is entitled to considerable deference; a court may not substitute its own reading unless the agency's interpretation is unreasonable. Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 1107, 84 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). When an agency construes its own regulations, such deference is particularly appropriate, Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 2341, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872, 97 S.Ct. 2150, 2155, 53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965), and even more appropriate where, as here, we consider a small corner of a labyrinthine statute. See Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1220 (2d Cir.1992); DeJesus v. Perales, 770 F.2d 316, 327 (2d Cir.1985). In this case, the Secretary has advanced her interpretation of the Act and of the regulations that Congress has authorized her to promulgate. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1302. Therefore, our role is to determine, first, whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. If so, we must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. If, on the other hand, the statute is silent or ambiguous, we must defer to the agency's resolution of the matter if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute and is 'sufficiently reasonable.'  Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir.1990) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45, 104 S.Ct. at 2782-83). 28 The plaintiffs urge that deference is inappropriate in this case because the Secretary's interpretation is expressed in the context of litigation. In Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1220 (2d Cir.1992), we acknowledged that when an agency takes a position during litigation that is inconsistent with the agency's earlier position we may consider that as a factor in determining whether deference is appropriate. Here, however, the Secretary's position is neither tactical nor inconsistent. The Secretary is not a party to this action (although there is reason to think she should have been), she filed her brief at the court's request, and she has advanced a position that she has held and implemented consistently over time. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. Sec. 441.301(b)(6) (state's waiver request must be limited to one of the following target groups or any subgroup thereof that the State may define: (i) aged or disabled, or both.... (emphasis supplied)); 50 Fed.Reg. 10,013 (Mar. 13, 1985) (commentary to regulations explaining that a State can choose to provide home and community-based services to a limited group of eligibles....). The fact that the Secretary reiterates her position in an amicus brief does not render the deference principles of Chevron inapplicable.