Opinion ID: 1201607
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absence of Physical Injury

Text: Amici curiae argue that no recovery for emotional distress arising from fear of cancer should be allowed in any case unless the plaintiff can establish a present physical injury such as a clinically verifiable cancerous or precancerous condition. Amici curiae advance several legal and policy arguments to support this position. None is persuasive. Amici curiae first assert that, under California case law, the existence of a physical injury is a predicate to recovering damages for emotional distress in a negligence action unless the action involves bystander recovery (e.g., Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814] [hereafter Thing ]), or there is a preexisting relationship between the plaintiff and defendant (e.g., Marlene F., supra, 48 Cal.3d 583) which creates a duty to the plaintiff, neither of which is implicated here. This assertion is plainly without merit. (4a) Significantly, we recently reaffirmed the principle that, in California, damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress may be recovered in the absence of physical injury or impact.... ( Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1074.) We held that physical injury is not a prerequisite for recovering damages for serious emotional distress, especially where there exists a `guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case.' [Citation.] ( Id., at p. 1079.) Contrary to amici curiae's assertions, this principle has never been restricted to cases involving bystanders or preexisting relationships. Notably, amici curiae cite no authority even suggesting such a limitation. [10] (3b) Nor is there any question but that Firestone had a duty to any person who might foreseeably come in contact with its hazardous waste to use care in the disposal of that material, care which includes compliance with all government regulations governing the location and manner of disposal. In this court Firestone has abandoned any claim that it was not negligent or that plaintiffs were not foreseeable victims of its negligence. [11] Amici curiae next contend that substantial policy reasons nevertheless support a physical injury requirement for recovery of fear of cancer damages where no preexisting relationship exists. They suggest that allowing recovery in the absence of a physical injury would create limitless liability and would result in a flood of litigation which thereby would impose onerous burdens on courts, corporations, insurers and society in general. Allowing such recovery would promote fraud and artful pleading, and would also encourage plaintiffs to seek damages based on a subjective fear of cancer. In amici curiae's view, a physical injury requirement is thus essential to provide meaningful limits on the class of potential plaintiffs and clear guidelines for resolving disputes over liability without the necessity for trial. This argument overlooks the reasons for our decision to discard the requirement of physical injury. As we observed more than a decade ago, [t]he primary justification for the requirement of physical injury appears to be that it serves as a screening device to minimize a presumed risk of feigned injuries and false claims. [Citations.] ( Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 925-926 [167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813, 16 A.L.R.4th 518] [hereafter Molien ], disapproved on other grounds, Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1074.) Such harm was believed to be susceptible of objective ascertainment and hence to corroborate the authenticity of the claim. ( Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 926.) In Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916, we perceived two significant difficulties with the physical injury requirement. First, the classification is both overinclusive and underinclusive when viewed in the light of its purported purpose of screening false claims. (27 Cal.3d at p. 928.) It is overinclusive in that it permits recovery whenever the suffering accompanies or results in physical injury, no matter how trivial ( ibid. ), yet underinclusive in that it mechanically denies court access to potentially valid claims that could be proved if the plaintiffs were permitted to go to trial ( id., at p. 929). Second, we observed that the physical injury requirement encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony. ( Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 929.) We concluded that the retention of the requirement ought to be reconsidered because of the tendency of victims to exaggerate sick headaches, nausea, insomnia and other symptoms in order to make out a technical basis of bodily injury upon which to predicate a parasitic recovery for the more grievous disturbance, consisting of the mental and emotional distress endured. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, rather than adhere to what we perceived as an artificial and often arbitrary means of guarding against fraudulent claims, we acknowledged that [t]he essential question is one of proof[.] ( Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 929-930.) (4b) Thus, `[i]n cases other than where proof of mental distress is of a medically significant nature, [citations] the general standard of proof required to support a claim of mental distress is some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case. [Citation.]' ( Id., at p. 930, citing Rodrigues v. State (1970) 52 Hawaii 156, 173 [472 P.2d 509, 520] [hereafter Rodrigues ].) (3c) Our reasons for discarding the physical injury requirement in Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916, remain valid today and are equally applicable in a toxic exposure case. That is, the physical injury requirement is a hopelessly imprecise screening device  it would allow recovery for fear of cancer whenever such distress accompanies or results in any physical injury, no matter how trivial, yet would disallow recovery in all cases where the fear is both serious and genuine but no physical injury has yet manifested itself. While we agree with amici curiae that meaningful limits on the class of potential plaintiffs and clear guidelines for resolving disputes in advance of trial are necessary, imposing a physical injury requirement represents an inherently flawed and inferior means of attempting to achieve these goals.