Opinion ID: 1149193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Improper Argument: Penalty Phase

Text: The defendant also claims the district attorney made several inappropriate arguments during his closing argument at the penalty phase. First, the defendant states the district attorney impermissibly interjected his personal opinion about the defendant's credibility after the defendant testified during the penalty phase regarding his encounter with Earl Maples. Specifically, the defendant claimed Maples had made unwanted homosexual advances after he agreed to give the defendant a ride in his truck. The prosecutor told the jury, [Defendant's] claiming some homosexual activity. But you did notice, and I don't believe that, I don't think that you should, based on the evidence, because he just showed you that he's a liar, and he'll lie under the circumstances. While a prosecutor may not give his personal opinion regarding the veracity of a witness, it is permissible for him to draw inferences about a witness's truthfulness from matters on the record. La.C.Cr.P. art. 774. Here, the only evidence presented suggesting Mr. Maples picked up the defendant hoping to engage in sexual activity was the defendant's own testimony during the penalty phase. Therefore, the district attorney's comments appear to be a fair comment on the evidence. Next, the defendant complains about the State's comments that the defendant's apologies means nothing [and h]is remorse means nothing. However the argument also appears to have been a fair comment upon the evidence, especially when considered in light of the fact that the defendant originally denied all involvement in the crime. In any event, the comment acknowledged that the defendant had, in fact, expressed remorse during his confession. Though a lack of remorse is a relevant factor for the sentencing jury's consideration, see State v. Summit, 454 So.2d 1100, 1108 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1038, 105 S.Ct. 1411, 84 L.Ed.2d 800 (1985), the district attorney's comment did not unfairly prejudice the defendant. The defendant also alleges the State improperly suggested to the jury that the standard to determine mitigation because of a mental condition was the defendant's ability to distinguish right from wrong. The prosecutor argued the defendant don't [sic] have any [other] mental conditions or problems that millions of people in a country with two hundred and fifty-one million people have. However, the defendant is merely speculating about what inferences the jury drew from the prosecutor's statements and failed to establish the jury did not take these statements at face value. As they appear, the prosecutor was not misstating the jury's duty in the penalty phase. Next, the defendant argues the district attorney should not have referred to facts and circumstances in his own life and compared himself to defendant who offered as mitigation evidence testimony demonstrating that he used to care for his deaf mute mother. The record shows that prosecutor told the jury: My own mother was handicapped. Got one of the first handicapped tags in the state of Louisiana. I lived with her and took care of her till she died. But having a nice mother, having a mother with an affliction, doesn't give you the right to cause the pain, misery, and suffering that he showed you that he has embarked on since he was thirteen years old. Finally, the defendant complains the State argued improperly that the jury should send a message to society by returning a death verdict in this case when the district attorney stated: ... you live in a state with a death penalty, and you say that you believed in it, and you say it's an appropriate penalty for first degree murder, then I say this is the case, this is the day where you give your answer to this. You say, no. You say I am not going to tolerate it. I am not going to find it mitigating. I am not going to excuse it. I am not going to do anything but give you a message, do not do this. We're not impotent. We're not helpless in a society. We do have it.... He says to show you that family. Look at this family. What's the justice to them? That's not vindictiveness, that's justice. ... This family will wait on your verdict. I will wait on your verdict. Prosecutors may not resort to personal experience or turn argument into a plebiscite on crime. State v. Eaton, 524 So.2d 1194, 1208 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 818, 102 L.Ed.2d 807 (1989); State v. Barrow, 410 So.2d 1070, 1075 (La.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 852, 103 S.Ct. 115, 74 L.Ed.2d 101 (1982); State v. Prestridge, 399 So.2d 564 (La.1981). However, before this court will reverse on the basis of improper argument it must be thoroughly convinced the jury was influenced by the remarks and such contributed to the verdict. Eaton, supra . In making this determination, the court gives credit to the good sense and fairmindedness of the jury. Eaton, 524 So.2d at 1208. See also Taylor, 93-2201 at p. 21, 669 So.2d at 375 Upon a review of the record and considering the good sensibility and fairmindedness of juries, it does not appear that the district attorney's comments necessarily contributed to the death verdict. The district attorney's brief reference to his own mother, while perhaps inappropriate, clearly did not contribute to the verdict. Additionally, the district attorney's comments did not degenerate into a plebiscite on crime. Accordingly, the defendant's claims about the State's comments are without merit.