Opinion ID: 1231372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the claimed jurisdictional flaw

Text: Appellee claims this appeal was not timely brought. For dismissal she relies on Minnesota and urges that under that decision any request for relief from a judgment  whatever its given name or title  if brought more than ten (10) days after judgment, [2] even though filed within thirty (30) days of its rendition, [3] is a belated new-trial motion [4] which does not extend the thirty-day limit for commencing an appeal in this court, [5] unless the ground specified in the delayed request for relief is one that (a) is authorized by § 1031 [6] and (b) could not have been invoked by a timely new-trial motion. When the May 27 judgment was rendered, the time allowed appellant for filing his brief below had not yet expired. While appellee concedes that premature rendition of judgment does constitute a valid vacation ground authorized by § 1031(3), [7] she urges that the irregularity charged here was in existence and known to appellant in time to move for a new trial under § 653. In short, appellee contends that because the June 12 motion was rested on a ground which should have been asserted earlier, it constituted a belated new-trial request that will not extend appeal time. According to appellee, the thirty-day time for commencement of an appeal began to run from May 27  the judgment date  and not from July 1 when reconsideration motion was denied. The tenor of appellee's argument for dismissal doubtless mirrors a widely-held belief among the trial bench and bar that Minnesota condemns  as belated and ineffective new-trial motions  all those term-time [8] attempts at judgment vacation which rest either on unspecified grounds or on those that were available for inclusion in a timely new-trial motion. My own view of Minnesota tends to be the same as that of the trial bench and bar. See footnote 3, Morgan, Delayed Attacks on Final Judgments, 33 Okla.L.Rev. 45 [1980]. IV.