Opinion ID: 2518363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the questions and comment on dixon's contacting counsel constitute prosecutorial misconduct?

Text: The prosecutor asked four witnesses about Dixon's telephone calls to and a meeting with his attorney shortly after the explosion and weeks before Dixon was charged and arrested. The timing of the contacts is significant to defendant's complaint because it implies the question of why someone who was not guilty would contact his or her attorney before being arrested or questioned or even contacted by police. The evidence was elicited as follows: Jerry Hall testified that after he, Dixon, Griffin, and Hayes returned to Topeka the morning of July 29, Hayes and he went to his apartment. Later in the day, Dixon returned to Hall's place. Dixon was nervous and agitated. He called someone trying to find out what was on the Internet about news in Emporia. The prosecutor asked: Who else did he call? Hall testified that Dixon called his attorney. The prosecutor asked the attorney's name, and Hall answered that it was Joe Johnson. The following questions and answers occurred: Q. Let's talk a little bit about  you said the defendant called his attorney? A. Yes. Q. Was it your attorney? A. No. Q. Okay. Did the defendant ask you to go anywhere with him  A. Yes, he did. Q.  after, the next day? A. Yes, he did. Q. Where was that? A. To his  to his attorney's office. Q. That would be Joe Johnson? A. Yes. Q. Is that an attorney here in Topeka? A. In Topeka. Q. Did you go to the office with the defendant? A. Yes. Q. How did you get there? A. Wallace [Dixon] came, picked me up. Q. And why did he say he needed to go talk to this attorney? A. He never really gave a reason, he just  he just said, let's go. will you go with me to talk to my lawyer? Me, him, and Ethan Griffin went. Q. Let's talk about when you arrived at the lawyer's office. The defendant drove you there? A. Yes. Q. Did you meet Ethan Griffin there? A. Yes. Q. The three of you, did you go in to talk to the lawyer? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Did you ever  did you ever retain that lawyer, hire him? A. No, I didn't. Q. Okay. You walked into where? His conference room? His front room? His office? A. His office. Q. His personal office? A. Yes. Q. Did the three of you go in together? A. Yes. Q. And did you discuss the explosion and fire that had destroyed Alicia Shaw's apartment? A. He really didn't come right out and say what he did. He had just said that he did something bad, he think he screwed up this time real bad. And he  his lawyer chewed him out and asked if he was willing to take a lie detector test. And the  the lie detector, everyone said yes except for Ethan. Q. Did you  or did he tell the lawyer the truth of what had gone on the night before? A. I don't believe so. Q. What do you mean by that? A. I don't believe he told it because I don't  I don't believe he did. Q. Did he lie to his own lawyer at that point? A. Yes, because he didn't tell about the fourth person going down. Q. Left Rodney out? A. Yes. Q. Can you tell the jury what the story was that he related to the attorney? A. The story was  I gave him a story to tell because he was  he was  his lawyer advised him to talk to the police. So, I gave him a story to tell but I can't remember what it was. Q. You were helping him with the story? A. Yes, I was. Defense counsel did not object to this line of questioning. Kansas Bureau of Investigation Agent William Halvorsen testified as a State's witness about the billing records for the cellular telephone that Dixon carried on July 28 and the next few days. Halvorsen testified about tracking a number of calls made by Dixon, including the following: Q. Did you  did you call any other numbers that you tracked? A. Yes. Q. What was the next number? A. Joe Johnson, an attorney in Topeka. Joe Johnson's home, and Joe Johnson's office. Q. Okay. The first call to  or the first to Joe Johnson's home? [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I'm going to object on relevance grounds. THE COURT: Overruled. A. The first call to Joe Johnson's home was at 8:48 p.m. on the 29th, and the last call was at 9:09 p.m. on the 1st of August. There were five calls to Mr. Johnson's home, one of which was at 1:19 a.m. in the morning on July the 31st. Q. To his home? A. To his home, that's correct. Q. And what about to Mr. Johnson's office? A. Mr. Johnson's office, the first call was at 3:04 p.m. on the 30th of July, the last was at 5:18 p.m. on August the 1st, including five phone calls. Defense counsel objected, as noted, on the ground of relevance. The prosecutor asked Dixon's mother, Gwen Rios, about going to Johnson's office. Defense counsel objected, and the trial court overruled the objection. Here is the exchange: Q. After a couple of days later did you ever have an occasion to go to attorney Joe Johnson's office in Topeka  A. Yes. Q.  with your son, the defendant, and others? A. I went to Joe  [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, we would object to any attempt to secure legal counsel as evidence of guilt. [Prosecutor]: Jerry Hall talked about it, Judge. THE COURT: I'll allow the question. Q. Who was there? A. I was there. Well, not till later. My son was there, Jerry Hall, and a third guy, which later I found out was Griffin. Q. Ethan Griffin? . . . . A. Yes. Q. And you went in to see Mr. Johnson? A. Not  later when they called me in there. Q. But you didn't initially talk or go in with your son, the defendant, Jerry Hall, and Ethan Griffin to talk to Mr. Johnson? A. No. Ethan Griffin testified that he went to work early on the morning of July 29. Then he was asked and answered the following questions by the prosecutor: Q. Was there an occasion after that that you next saw the defendant? A. Probably a day or  probably a day or two later I received a phone call from Wallace Dixon, and he was like, I'm in trouble, I'm in some serious stuff. And he said, I'm going to see my lawyer, would you come with me to see my lawyer? And I said I had to wait on my girlfriend to come over, because we were going to go eat somewhere, I believe. So, I told him yes, I'll go up there, but I rode with my girlfriend. Q. Did you go up to his lawyer's? [Defense counsel]: I would object. Comment on the right to counsel. THE COURT: I don't think that's a problem here. You can proceed. Q. Did you go to the lawyer's office? A. Yes, I did. Q. Who was the lawyer? A. Johnson. Q. Joe Johnson? A. I'm not familiar with his first name. I remember Johnson. Q. Okay. Who also was there? A. Wallace  it was Jerry Hall, Wallace Dixon, Johnson, and myself, his mother, Wallace Dixon's mother. In closing argument, the prosecutor commented on Dixon's contacting his attorney: Who else did he call that morning? Called his  after he got back to Topeka, he called his attorney beginning at 8:48 p.m., 7/29. He called him 10 times, including one call at 1:19 a.m. at his home phone number. In the final portion of his closing argument, the prosecutor directed the jury's attention to a number of Dixon's acts that, according to the prosecutor, showed defendant's consciousness of guilt. The prosecutor did not include Dixon's contacting his attorney among the actions that purportedly showed consciousness of guilt. On appeal, Dixon argues that in eliciting testimony about his telephone calls and visit to his attorney, the prosecutor was improperly implying that defendant's contacting his attorney showed that defendant was guilty. He relies primarily on cases from other jurisdictions for the principle that a defendant's guilt may not be implied by showing that he sought the assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 620 F.2d 559, 564 (5th Cir. 1980) (It is impermissible to attempt to prove a defendant's guilt by pointing ominously to the fact that he has sought the assistance of counsel.). The State questions whether the issue was preserved for appeal. As we have seen, no objection was made when the prosecutor questioned Hall. A relevance objection was made when the prosecutor questioned Agent Halvorsen. The State contends that the objective of the examination was to refute defendant's alibi, and the State asserts that testimony concerning defendant's visit to Johnson entirely contradicted his alibi. The State's point is not well taken for several reasons. First, the objection was to questions that elicited Halvorsen's testimony about defendant's telephone calls to his attorney, not the visit to Johnson. In addition, defendant's alibi was an account of where he was during July 28-29, not of his visit to his attorney's office several days later. Having failed with a relevance objection, defense counsel objected to questions to Rios and Griffin on the ground that it was improper for the prosecutor to attempt to elicit information about defendant's contacts with his attorney. On appeal, Dixon frames the issue as one of prosecutorial misconduct. Pointing out that an objection must be timely and specific in order to preserve an issue for appeal, see State v. Diggs, 272 Kan. 349, 365, 34 P.3d 63 (2001), the State argues that the only effective objections were made to the prosecutor's questioning of Rios and Griffin, who did not testify that defendant had an attorney-client relationship with Johnson. Although the jury reasonably could have inferred from Rios' testimony about her presence at the meeting at Johnson's office that Johnson was her son's attorney, the questions asked of Rios did not expressly identify Johnson as the defendant's lawyer or ask Rios to so identify Johnson. But Griffin was asked and testified about Johnson being defendant's lawyer. Thus, the jury heard during the questioning of Griffin that he viewed Johnson as Dixon's attorney. More importantly, the establishment of an attorney-client relationship is not an aspect of the issue before us, which is whether the prosecutor's questioning of witnesses about Dixon's contacting an attorney shortly after the incident improperly implied defendant's guilt. It does not matter whether the objection was to the lack of relevance or otherwise because the rule followed by this court for issues of prosecutorial misconduct maintains the same standard of review whether or not an objection was made at trial. See State v. Davis, 275 Kan. 107, 122, 61 P.3d 701 (2003). The parties cite no Kansas cases involving a prosecutor's questioning witnesses in order to elicit information about a defendant's contacting his or her attorney. Foreign cases cited by Dixon include the following: United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613, 615 (3d Cir. 1973); McDonald, 620 F.2d at 564; Zemina v. Solem, 438 F. Supp. 455, 466 (S.D. 1977); People v. Schindler, 114 Cal. App. 3d 178, 189, 170 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1981); Riddley v. State, 777 So. 2d 31, 34-35 (Miss. 2001). The standard of review generally applied in the foreign cases cited by Dixon is that for constitutional error. In such a review an appellate court considers whether improper references to a defendant's contacting his or her counsel were harmless when measured by a harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967). The standard of Chapman has long been the standard applied by Kansas appellate courts for constitutional error. See State v. Faidley, 202 Kan. 517, 522, 450 P.2d 20 (1969). There is a current statement of that standard in State v. Thompkins, 271 Kan. 324, 335, 21 P.3d 997 (2001): An error of constitutional magnitude is serious and may not be held to be harmless unless the appellate court is willing to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, before we may declare the error harmless, we must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. [Citation omitted.] The State bears the burden of proving that a constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1084, 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002). Framing the issue as suggested by Dixon as a matter of alleged prosecutorial misconduct rather than strictly as constitutional error, however, would comport with Kansas precedent in which prosecutorial misconduct must involve a constitutional violation. In State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 504, 996 P.2d 321 (2000), the court stated that [r]eversible error predicated on prosecutorial misconduct must be of such a magnitude as to deny a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. As in Pabst, the claimed error may implicate a defendant's right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment. In other cases, other constitutional rights are implicated. For example, in State v. Higgenbotham, 264 Kan. 593, 600-03, 957 P.2d 416 (1998), the court analyzed a prosecutor's statement that defendant claimed was a comment on his failure to testify. And in State v. Williams, 268 Kan. 1, 6-7, 988 P.2d 722 (1999), the question was whether the prosecutor subverted the defendant's protection against double jeopardy. As we have seen, for issues of prosecutorial misconduct, this court's standard of review is whether the error denied the defendant his or her constitutional right to a fair trial, and the court's review is the same whether an objection was or was not made at trial. Davis, 275 Kan. at 121-22. The right to a fair trial is a fundamental constitutional right which the trial court has a duty to protect regardless of a defendant's failure to contemporaneously object. State v. Sperry, 267 Kan. 287, 308, 978 P.2d 933 (1999). Dixon cites Schindler for its explanation of the harm caused by the introduction of evidence about a defendant's consulting with counsel. In Schindler, the defendant's conviction of killing her husband was reversed due to the prosecutor's attempt to rebut the defense of diminished capacity, i.e., a state of panic, by eliciting testimony of defendant's lucidity during an in-custody interview a few hours after the shooting. 114 Cal. App. 3d at 185-90. The evidence included the officer's statements that defendant declined to make any statement until talking with an attorney and that he overheard defendant ask her friend who had come to the police station to see if she could get Mr. Geragos for her defense attorney. 114 Cal. App. 3d at 183. In argument, the prosecutor stressed defendant's invocation of her rights and her saying she wanted a lawyer as counter-indications of a panic state. In addition, the prosecutor made an issue of the particular lawyer defendant wanted. First, the prosecutor told the jurors that defendant wanted Geragos because he had prosecuted the deceased when the deceased had been charged with killing his former wife. Then the prosecutor suggested that defendant's naming Geragos rebutted her defense and undermined the credibility of her stating that she knew little about the death of the former wife. Defendant was represented by Geragos, and his motion for a mistrial on her behalf was denied. In final summation, the prosecutor stated to the jury: `The reason for bringing that statement in about Mr. Geragos is twofold: One, here is a woman that said she didn't know any of the circumstances about the death of Lou Schindler's previous wife, who just got smatters and pieces from people as she went along and who evidently somewhere along the line picked up the idea that Paul Geragos was the prosecuting attorney against Mr. Lou Schindler. Here is a woman who is in a panic state and within this panic state, she has a miraculous ability, this selective amnesia, to turn it off, reach down to the depths of her mind and pull out one attorney and of all of the attorneys in the world she felt could best give her representation that nightwe are talking about the night of the killingand that is Mr. Geragos. Where do you think she pulled that name from? Out of a hat? `. . . And this was a few hours after the commission of the act, the act for which she was in a panic state.' 114 Cal. App. 3d at 184-85. The California appellate court summarized its ruling as follows: Defendant's constitutional rights to due process and against self-incrimination were violated by the admission in evidence (and use in argument) of her responses asserting her Miranda rights for the purpose of rebutting her diminished capacity defense. Further, exploitation of her choice of counsel for impeachment and rebuttal of her defense impaired her constitutional right to counsel and constituted prosecutorial misconduct. These errors were prejudicial. Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment. However, since the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, defendant can be retried for second degree murder. 114 Cal. App. 3d at 185. For its decision on right to counsel, the California court cited Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965), which held that a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's failure to testify violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by making exercise of the right costly, as being equally applicable to the constitutional right to counsel. 114 Cal. App. 3d at 188. The California court also discussed its agreement with several cases from lower federal and state courts: We agree with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States ex rel. Macon v. Yeager (3d Cir. 1973) 476 F.2d 613, 615, which stated: `For the purpose of the penalty analysis, . . . we perceive little, if any, valid distinction between the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. It can be argued, with equal vigor and logical support, as to either . . . situation . . . that a prosecutor's comment seeking to raise in the jurors' minds an inference of guilt from the defendant's constitutionally protected conduct constitutes a penalty on the free exercise of a constitutional right. [Fn. omitted.]' In Macon, the prosecutor in his summation to the jury commented upon the fact that the defendant called an attorney the morning after the alleged crime and argued that this action cast doubt on the defendant's claim that the shooting was an accident. The Macon court held this to be reversible constitutional error, interpreting Griffin as an absolute prohibition against the imposition of any penalty for the exercise of a constitutional right in a criminal law context. ( Id., at pp. 615-616.) Several states have also generally held that a prosecutor cannot properly imply guilt from a defendant's request for counsel. (See, e.g., People v. Kennedy (1975) 33 Ill. App. 3d 857 [338 N.E.2d 414, 417-418]; State v. Kyseth (Iowa 1976) [240 N.W.2d 671, 674]; Mays v. State (Tenn. Crim. 1972) 495 S.W.2d 833, 836.) In United States v. Williams (D.C. Cir. 1977) 556 F.2d 65, 67, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia pointed out that `[t]estimony about the desire or request for a lawyer is impermissible.' The court noted that a prosecutor is constitutionally precluded from eliciting testimony of a defendant's action in hiring an attorney in view of the tendency of such testimony to serve as the base for an inference of guilt based on such an act. Earlier, in United States v. Liddy (D.C. Cir. 1974) 509 F.2d 428, that same court indicated that the Griffin principle prohibits drawing adverse inferences from not only the fact of hiring an attorney but also the time and circumstances of retaining an attorney. The court specifically warned of the `mischief of the approach' that allows time and circumstances to be taken into account because it `raises problems that hobble the right to seek counsel,' inviting `probing of the very process of selection of counsel-who, why, when and where. . . .' ( Id . at p. 444.) As the Liddy court observed ( ibid .): `It would be a rare case indeed where the prosecutor could not point out that the incriminating feature of the employment of counsel . . . rests not in the employment as such but in the time and circumstances surrounding that event, and inferences therefrom that reflect adversely on the defendant. [Fn. omitted.]' Recently, in United States v. Gold (N.D. Ill. 1979) 470 F. Supp. 1336, the federal district court held that it was improper for prosecutors by questions and comments to draw adverse and incriminatory inferences from a corporation's employment during administrative proceedings and investigation of a particular law firm which had a nationwide reputation as criminal defense lawyers. The court stated ( id. , at p. 1352): `It is not to be doubted that [the corporation] had the constitutional right to employ counsel of its choice in the administrative proceedings, and certainly to be advised with regard to the criminal investigation. . . . It is improper, where a right is constitutional, for a prosecutor either to question or comment on its exercise. [Citation.] To do so is to make assertion of the right costly. [Citations.] For this reason, in a criminal law context, it is basically unfair for a prosecutor to urge against a person the time and circumstances of his retention of an attorney.' 114 Cal. App. 3d at 188-89. The California court reversed Schindler's murder conviction because it concluded that the errors were prejudicial: The improper exploitation of defendant's exercise of her constitutional rights to remain silent and to retain the counsel of her choice cannot be deemed harmless error under either the standard stated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal. 2d 818 [299 P.2d 243], or the higher standard specified in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]. The only issue at trial was defendant's intent and mental capacity at the time of the commission of the offense. The defense evidence was substantial. The rebuttal evidence directly attacked her defense, and the prosecutor's argument that the evidence showed she was fabricating her `panic' state was most prejudicial. Furthermore, the fact that the jury deliberated 22 hours before reaching a verdict underscores the closeness of the case and the crucial nature of the constitutional violations. (See People v. Rucker, supra., 26 Cal. 3d at p. 391.) The judgment of conviction, therefore, must be reversed. 114 Cal. App. 3d at 190. In McDonald, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found merit in a defendant's claim that the prosecutor transgressed his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by eliciting testimony that his lawyer was present when Secret Service agents executed a search warrant at his home and by commenting on that fact during closing arguments. McDonald's convictions of dealing in counterfeit currency and conspiring to deal in counterfeit currency were overturned. 620 F.2d at 560, 566. When agents entered McDonald's house to execute a search warrant approximately 4 hours after prior surveillance of an incident at the house, McDonald's lawyer was there with him. The search produced no evidence. Although he admitted knowing of the counterfeiting scheme of Head and Burns, McDonald denied having any part in it. At trial the prosecutor elicited testimony about McDonald's lawyer being present during the search. In closing argument, after discussing evidence of activity around the house that would have indicated to McDonald that a search of his house was impending, the prosecutor described the agents' entry into the house: `And who was there? The defendant's attorney. ' 620 F.2d at 562. The prosecutor continued: 'I suggest to you if Jimmy McDonald knew all this was going on, and had his lawyer out there three hours later, I believe that would be sufficient time to dispose of any ashes or any evidence, if you were so inclined.' 620 F.2d at 562. The government denied trying to impute guilt by referring to the lawyer's presence and argued that it showed McDonald had time to destroy evidence because he had time to summon his lawyer. Noting other evidence of time to destroy evidence, the court conclude[d] that the real purpose of the reference to the attorney's presence was to cause the jury to infer that McDonald was guilty. The reference therefore penalized McDonald for exercising his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 620 F.2d at 564. The court added: It is impermissible to attempt to prove a defendant's guilt by pointing ominously to the fact that he has sought the assistance of counsel. 620 F.2d at 564. With regard to the government's contention that the infringement of McDonald's right to counsel was harmless error, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the constitutional right was so basic to a fair trial that the infraction could not be considered harmless error. 620 F.2d at 564. The court continued: Comments that penalize a defendant for the exercise of his right to counsel and that also strike at the core of his defense cannot be considered harmless error. The right to counsel is so basic to all other rights that it must be accorded very careful treatment. Obvious and insidious attacks on the exercise of this constitutional right are antithetical to the concept of a fair trial and are reversible error. (Emphasis added.) 620 F.2d at 564. The italicized portion of the quote at the end of the preceding paragraph shows that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals will reverse a conviction on account of a prosecutor's questioning and comments only where they are directed at the defendant's essential story concerning the crime for which he or she is charged. Because the implication of the prosecutor's references to McDonald's attorney was that McDonald had destroyed incriminating evidence and that implication struck at the jugular of the exculpatory story, the essence of which was that there was no evidence to destroy, the Fifth Circuit's second requirement for reversal was satisfied. See 620 F.2d at 563. In United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, the defendant was convicted on charges relating to the burglary and wiretapping of offices of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in the Watergate complex in the early morning hours of Saturday, June 17, 1972. Liddy was not among the men who were apprehended in the offices, but he was seen outside the building with Howard Hunt shortly after police arrived on the scene. At about 3 a.m. Hunt called an attorney, Caddy, and then went to see him. Caddy testified that Hunt arrived at Caddy's apartment at approximately 3:40 a.m. and arranged with him to secure experienced criminal counsel for the five men arrested in the DNC offices. About an hour later, Hunt called Liddy. Hunt and Caddy explained to Liddy what they had done to retain an attorney for the burglars. During this conversation, Liddy indicated that he desired to have Caddy represent him in this matter. 509 F.2d at 443. In closing arguments, the government emphasized the unusual hour at which Liddy retained counsel. The trial court instructed the jury that it could draw no adverse inferences from the fact that Liddy retained counsel but could `consider the time and other surrounding circumstances at which Mr. Liddy retained Mr. Caddy with respect to the state of mind of Mr. Liddy only.' 509 F.2d at 443. Basing his allegation of error on Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, Liddy argued on appeal that allowing the jury to draw inferences of guilty knowledge from his efforts to obtain counsel imposes a penalty on the exercise of his Sixth Amendment rights. 509 F.2d at 443. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals approved the first part of the instruction that prohibited drawing adverse inferences from Liddy's retaining counsel. 509 F.2d at 443-44. The court stated: To the extent that an inference of criminality is operative, it invites probing of the very process of selection of counselwho, why, when and whereand pressing the defendant to come forward with evidence concerning this process. The mischief of the approach is underlined by its semantic subtleties, which opens the door to maneuver and misunderstanding. It would be a rare case indeed where the prosecutor could not point out that the incriminating feature of the employment of counselin the absence of explanationrests not in the employment as such but in the time and circumstances surrounding that event, and inferences therefrom that reflect adversely on the defendant. 509 F.2d at 444. In the circumstances of the Liddy case, however, the Court of Appeals concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned that the effect of the error was mitigated by the fact that evidence of part of Liddy's 5:00 a.m. conversation with Caddy was clearly admissible to show Liddy's involvement in his action of retaining counsel for those arrested during the break-in. His assertion of a right to Sixth Amendment protection against any use of his statements to obtain counsel for himself certainly does not prohibit inquiry into portions of his conversation with Caddy relating to his action in obtaining counsel for others. This evidence of Liddy's efforts on behalf of the five defendants only a few hours after their arrest was probative of his involvement in their venture. 509 F.2d at 445. In Hunter v. State, 82 Md. App. 679, 573 A.2d 85 (1990), defendant Hunter, after causing a fatal vehicle accident, went to a nearby house to call 911. He also contacted his attorney. In a nonresponsive answer to defense counsel's questioning, a state trooper mentioned that defendant called his attorney. When defendant testified, the prosecutor referred back to the officer's testimony and asked Hunter if he had called his lawyer and then asked him why he called his lawyer. Defense counsel's objection was overruled, and Hunter answered, 'To see if he would defend me.' 82 Md. App. at 684. The prosecutor followed up with this question, 'And the reason you called your lawyer to see if he would defend you is because you were riding down the road with at least a .15 percent ethyl alcohol percentage weight in your blood stream, and you weren't paying attention to your driving, isn't that correct?' Hunter answered, `No.' 82 Md. App. at 684. The prosecutor concluded his closing argument as follows: `I suggest to you Mr. Hunter was drunk and his negligence caused this accident by his inability to react properly, by his own admission, and lastly, you have Mr. Hunter who talks to his attorney and the last thing he says is I wanted to talk to my attorney to see if he would defend me. A guilty mind. Thank you.' 82 Md. App. at 685. Although agreeing with the outcome of Macon and a number of cases that followed it, see 82 Md. App. at 689, the Maryland court disapproved the premise on which thoses cases rest, i.e., the exercise of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel: This raises the question whether the obtention or attempted obtention of a lawyer or legal advice prior to that point can properly be regarded as the exercise of a right under the Sixth Amendment for purposes of a Griffin analysis. The harm, of course, occurs at trial, when the evidence is elicited or the comment is made, and surely at that point, the Sixth Amendment right has attached. But as the harm consists of penalizing the earlier exercise of a Constitutional right, one must look back to the event purporting to constitute the exercise of that right. If in fact, or in law, it does not constitute the exercise of a Constitutional right, the whole `penalty' analysis collapses. 82 Md. App. at 690. Having rejected the Griffin analysis but being convinced that evidence of or comment on an early contact with counsel was impermissible, the Maryland court turned its attention to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the rules of evidence: The right of a person to seek the advice and assistance of counsel is not, of course, restricted to the specific right afforded by the Sixth Amendment or its State counterpart. [Citation omitted.] A person has an independent right, protected we think by the general due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its State counterpart [citation omitted] to seek legal advice or representation at any time, on any matter, and for any reason. This is especially so when the person perceives that civil or criminal litigation against him may be in the offing, as was surely the case here. . . . The exercise of this right does not imply a consciousness of guilt. In seeking legal advice or representation, the person may well believe himself culpable of some tortious or criminal conduct. But he may just as well believe himself entirely innocent or only partly culpable, or he simply may not know whether his acts or omissions are in violation of law. And if he has some pre-formed belief as to his culpability or innocence, that belief may turn out to be unfounded. Indeed, common human experience would suggest that, absent some special circumstance not evident here, the most likely purpose for seeking legal advice or representation is to find out what one's status and exposure may be. If there is a rational inference to be drawn from the seeking of such advice or representation therefore, it cannot be more than thatan uncertainty. To draw an inference of consciousness of guilt from the seeking of such advice, then, is both illogical and unwarranted; the fact to be inferredthe consciousness of guiltis not made more probable (or less probable) from the mere seeking of legal advice or representation, and so evidence of the predicate fact is simply irrelevant. On pure evidentiary grounds, it is inadmissible. 82 Md. App. at 690-91. Concluding that it could not say that the error was harmless, the Maryland court reversed the convictions. 82 Md. App. at 691. In the present case, the State contends that Dixon's right to counsel had not attached when he telephoned and met with Johnson in the days immediately after the explosion and before criminal proceedings had been initiated. The State cites Liddy and Riddley as making attachment of the right to counsel the threshold requirement. The Liddy court, contrary to the State's assertion, did not conclude that the initiation of criminal proceedings was relevant to the analysis. Instead, it concluded that cases involving a prosecutor's commenting on a defendant's request for counsel upon arrest were not useful, based on Griffin, where the defendant's claim that the jury should not have been permitted to consider when and in what circumstances he contacted an attorney: Those cases, though containing language referring generally to the right to counsel, appear to be bottomed on considerations involving the rights of an accused facing police interrogationa context in which the right to counsel is intimately bound up with the privilege against self-incrimination. They are thus of marginal value in ascertaining the applicability of Griffin to the Sixth Amendment claim raised in the present case. 509 F.2d at 443. The Riddley court was evenly split between justices who concluded that Riddley's contact with his counsel was not constitutionally protected because it was made before the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached and justices who believed that Riddley's contact with counsel was protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 777 So. 2d at 34-36 (majority), 36-39 (dissent). In State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 996 P.2d 321 (2000), the court prescribed a two-step analysis for alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. This test was refined in State v. Tosh 278 Kan. 83, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004). First, an appellate court decides whether the complained-of conduct was outside the considerable latitude given a prosecutor in discussing the evidence. Second, the court decides whether the remarks constitute plain error, that is, whether the statements prejudiced the jury against the defendant and denied him or her a fair trial. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, Syl. ¶ 1. The standard of review discussed and applied in Pabst also applies when the complaint is about a prosecutor's cross-examining a defendant. See Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, Syl. ¶ 1; State v. Dean, 272 Kan. 429, 439, 33 P.3d 225 (2001). No reason appears why the Pabst analysis should not also apply when the complaint is of a prosecutor's examining other witnesses and then commenting on their testimonies. In the context of the present case, the two-step analysis would be: First, the court decides whether the complained-of conduct was outside the considerable latitude given a prosecutor in eliciting testimony and commenting on it, and, second, the court decides whether the conduct was so gross and flagrant as to prejudice the jury against the accused and deny him a fair trial. In this case of first impression for Kansas courts, defendant has relied on cases from other jurisdictions. Of those brought to the court's attention by Dixon and independent research, all but one concluded that eliciting testimony and commenting on a defendant's contacting counsel are beyond the latitude afforded the prosecution. Only the Mississippi court in Riddley concluded otherwise, and that court affirmed the defendant's conviction on an even split, with those favoring affirmance rejecting a Sixth Amendment claim and declining to consider the issue as a matter of fundamental fairness. All the other courts reasoned that a prosecutor is constitutionally precluded from eliciting testimony of a defendant's contacting an attorney and commenting on it on account of the potent tendency of the evidence and comment to serve improperly as the basis for an inference of guilt. We conclude that it was improper for the prosecutor by questions and comments to draw incriminatory inferences from defendant's constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment to employ counsel as an element of the right to a fair trial. We further agree with the Maryland court that such evidence of obtention or attempted obtention of a lawyer or legal advise is irrelevant and inadmissible. The remaining question is whether the conduct prejudiced the jury against the accused and denied him a fair trial. This step requires a particularized harmlessness inquiry for prosecutorial misconduct cases, as stated in Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, Syl. ¶ 1. We consider three factors: (1) Whether the misconduct is gross and flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct shows ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (3) whether the evidence is of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have little weight in the minds of jurors. None of these factors is individually controlling. Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to say that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967), have been met. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, Syl. ¶ 2. Viewing the prosecutor's conduct in light of the trial record as a whole, as required, we find that the prosecutor's eliciting testimony from multiple witnesses and then commenting on it in closing argument improperly highlighted defendant's conduct for the jury on five separate occasions. The prosecutor's repeated references to defendant's contacting counsel certainly appears to have been intended to imply that only guilty people contact their attorneys and to cause the jurors to infer guilt on that basis. In these circumstances, the prosecutor's conduct amounted to a flagrant violation of Dixon's right to a fair trial in that the conduct penalized him for exercising his right. The jury could have found, based on other evidence, that Dixon was guilty. The jurors, however, also might have decided Dixon was guilty because the prosecutor implied that defendant must be guilty by repeatedly eliciting testimony and commenting on defendant's contacting counsel. Under such circumstances we cannot conclude that such error was harmless.