Opinion ID: 844216
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: People v. Superior Court (Sharkey)

Text: Sharkey was imprisoned for forcible rape [5] and assault with intent to commit rape. [6] His scheduled release date was November 24, 2008. On March 12, 2008, the Secretary of the DCR referred his case to the Board for further evaluation. This referral was timely. However, the matter was not acted upon for six months, largely because it was assigned to a part-time Board employee who was later laid off. On September 11, 2008, the Board notified the DMH that Sharkey met the initial screening criteria. On November 18, a DMH caseworker requested a 45-day hold so that Sharkey's full psychological evaluations could be completed. On November 20, the Board issued the hold to facilitate full SVP evaluations to be concluded by the DMH. By December 2, two psychologists concluded that Sharkey met the criteria for treatment under the sexually violent predator act. (§ 6600 et seq.; SVPA.) On December 10, the DMH recommended that the district attorney file a commitment petition. The petition was filed on December 23, 2008. Sharkey moved to dismiss the petition. He claimed he was not in lawful custody when the SVP petition was filed because no good cause showing was made to justify the 45-day hold. The trial court granted the motion, explaining, Under the definition of good cause in section 2600[.1] of the regulations, there is good cause. There was `some evidence' that Mr. Sharkey met both parts of the criteria listed in section 2600[.1]a qualifying offense and a [likelihood] of engaging in sexually violent predatory behavior .... [¶] However, the court finds that the good cause definition set out in section 2600[.1] of the CCR is clearly erroneous. It is not a definition of good causea reason why more time is needed. It simply declares that if the state of the underlying evidence is satisfactory under the `some evidence' standard, the deadline is not enforced. [¶] By analogy, a trial court can continue a felony criminal trial beyond the 60-day deadline upon a finding of good cause, i.e., a party giving a good reason why the trial cannot timely go forward. Good cause in that context is not established by showing that probable cause exists [to believe] that defendant committed the charged crime. That the evidence satisfies the probable cause standard does not release the parties from having to give a good reason why they cannot meet the statutory deadline. [¶] Similarly, because `some evidence' exists that an inmate meets the criteria as a SVP cannot establish good cause why the filing deadline cannot be met. In other words, the trial court held that the regulatory definition of good cause is invalid because it does not define what kind of showing would be sufficient to justify the requested delay. The regulation simply provides that inmates can be held beyond their scheduled release dates if there is some evidence they are likely to be found SVP's. The trial court further ruled that the Board's reliance on the regulation's definition of good cause could not be excused as a good faith mistake of law because the regulation eviscerates the common legal definition of good cause. The People sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal to overturn the dismissal and reinstate the SVP petition. The Court of Appeal issued the writ. It held the regulation's good cause definition is valid because it fell within the scope of the Board's authority and is reasonably necessary to effectuate both the purpose of section 6601.3 and the SVPA generally. In addition, the regulation was formally adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act (Gov. Code, § 11340 et seq.) and embodies a long-standing statutory interpretation. For these reasons the regulation was entitled to judicial deference. The Court of Appeal further held that even if the regulation is invalid, reliance on it was excusable as a good faith mistake of law. [T]he trial court should have recognized that absent a judicial determination of invalidity, the Board and the People were entitled to rely on the regulation .... The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its dismissal of the petition to commit Sharkey as an SVP, to enter a new order denying the dismissal motion, and to set the matter for SVPA proceedings. We granted Sharkey's petition for review.