Opinion ID: 855855
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compensation or Damages

Text: Respondents contend that notwithstanding the analysis above, the contempt was civil in nature because the circuit court specified that “[t]he fifty dollar per day sanction was properly ordered to be paid to Frieda [Q.], through her conservator, the KCSD, as a 29 form of compensation or damages, inasmuch as Frieda [Q.] was the party aggrieved by the contemptuous conduct.” It was established in Robertson and affirmed in all of our cases thereafter with the exception of Gant, discussed infra, that a sanction for civil contempt may take the form of “an order requiring the payment of a fine in the nature of compensation or damages to the party aggrieved by the failure of the contemner to comply with the [underlying] order.” Robertson, 166 W. Va. at 670, 276 S.E.2d at 818. In this case, however, notwithstanding the circuit court’s dutiful recitation of the words “compensation or damages,” the sanction was not related in any way to actual injury or harm caused to the respondents.19 Rather, the amount was calculated by multiplying the per diem fine, $50.00, by the number of days that had elapsed since the date on which the mental hygiene commissioner orally found Cordelia to be in contempt. In short, the “compensation or damages” award was simply the per diem fine, thinly disguised. Thus, as was the situation in Vincent, our review of the appendix record demonstrates that “the predominant purpose of the monetary sanctions imposed by the trial court was to punish the appellant for [her] disrespect for the court’s authority . . . ,” and the 19 If there was any evidence presented to the circuit court as to injury or harm, it is not included in the appendix record and, therefore, cannot be considered by this Court on appeal. 30 contempt was therefore criminal at least in part. Vincent, 175 W. Va. at 802, 338 S.E.2d at 403. The petitioner contends, in cursory fashion, that imposition of the sanction under these facts and circumstances violated her right to due process of law. We note at the outset that both West Virginia’s contempt statute and this Court’s precedents have been limited to a consideration of certain procedural due process rights which are not at issue in this case. “No court shall impose a fine for contempt, unless the defendant be present in court, or shall have been served with a rule of the court to show cause, on some certain day, and shall have failed to appear and show cause.” W. Va. Code § 61-5-26 (2010). Although a jury trial is not required in a civil contempt case, “certain procedural safeguards must be present. The accused must have notice, the right to counsel, and the right to present evidence and argue his case.” Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunningham, 200 W. Va. 339, 341 & n.4, 489 S.E.2d 496, 498 & n.4 (1997) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Faerber, 179 W. Va. 73, 76 n.3, 365 S.E.2d 353, 356 n.3 (1986)). Cordelia Q. enjoyed all of these procedural protections during the course of the contempt proceedings below. Nonetheless, we find that the monetary sanction imposed upon Cordelia violated her due process rights under the West Virginia Constitution, article III, section 10, because the sanction was neither a prospective per diem fine nor “compensation or damages” for the party aggrieved. Rather, it was arbitrarily imposed and was punitive in nature. 31 In all of our precedents, the monetary sanctions imposed for contempt have ranged from nominal ($10.00) to modest, albeit attention-getting ($500.00). In contrast, the monetary sanction imposed on Cordelia was $47,800.00, with post-judgment interest until paid. Under the facts of this case, this extraordinary sanction cannot be upheld. Although designated as “compensation or damages” for Frieda, it bore no relationship whatsoever to any injury or harm sustained by Frieda (or her conservator acting on her behalf); no evidence was presented from which an award of “compensation and damages” could have been rationally determined. Rather, as noted earlier, the circuit court simply multiplied the per diem fine, $50.00, by the number of days that had elapsed from October 28, 2008, the date on which the mental hygiene commissioner recommended that Cordelia be held in contempt, to July 11, 1011, the date on which Frieda died. The court then labeled the result “compensation or damages” in an apparent attempt to bring the fine within the language of Robinson and its progeny. While we are sympathetic to the circuit court’s understandable frustration with Cordelia, who shamefully neglected her aged mother, systematically converted her assets, and then stonewalled any attempts to require an accounting, the words of Robinson at issue here, “compensation or damages,” have meaning. Robinson, 166 W. Va. at 670, 276 S.E.2d at 818. In this regard, we hold that a monetary civil contempt sanction for 32 compensation or damages must be based upon competent evidence of actual injury or harm to the aggrieved party resulting from the contemner’s refusal to follow an order of the circuit court. The sanction must be remedial, not punitive. See N.L.R.B. v. Monfort, Inc., 29 F.3d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1994) (“The sanction of civil contempt serves two remedial purposes: (1) to enforce compliance with an order of the court, and (2) to compensate for losses caused by the noncompliance. The sanctions imposed are to be remedial or coercive, but not penal[.]”) (emphasis supplied and internal citations omitted); Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 311 F. Supp. 447, 449 (D. Conn. 1970) (“While the court has wide latitude in the assessment of damages, damages cannot be arrived at by conjecture.”) (internal citations omitted); Nelson v. Progressive Realty Corp., 104 A.2d 241, 243 (R.I. 1954) (contempt sanctions must be based upon competent evidence, as sanctions are “remedial and designed to reimburse complainants for the wrong done as a result of the noncompliance with a valid order of the court[.]”). In this case, where the appendix record contains no evidence showing the actual harm, if any, resulting from Cordelia’s contumacious conduct – and where the indisputable fact is that the amount of the sanction was based on a per diem fine, not on any injury or harm to the respondents – the sanction imposed by the circuit court cannot stand. 33