Opinion ID: 1560801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency and Independent Act Doctrine [7]

Text: During trial, the theory of defense was that Jackson participated in the robberies, but the subsequent kidnappings and murders were the independent and unforeseen acts of his codefendants. After presenting evidence to support this theory, Jackson requested and received the independent-act jury instruction which allowed the jury to determine whether the kidnappings and murders were caused, or materially contributed to, by any of Jackson's actions during the robbery, or were the result of the independent acts of his codefendants. The jury rejected the independent act defense and concluded that Jackson was guilty of the capital offenses; specifically, the jury found that the murders were premeditated and committed during the commission of a felony. The trial court denied both of Jackson's scant motions for judgment of acquittal. On appeal, Jackson asserts that the trial court erred in this determination because the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, with consideration for the type of evidence submitted. If the State presents direct evidence, which the State did here, the trial court's determination will be affirmed if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, contains competent, substantial evidence supporting each element of the offenses. See Walker v. State, 957 So.2d 560, 577 (Fla.2007) (quoting Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 943 (Fla.2003)). The trial court should not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal unless the evidence is such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite party can be sustained under the law. Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44, 45 (Fla.1974). Generally, felons are responsible for the acts of their co-felons. Lovette v. State, 636 So.2d 1304, 1306 (Fla.1994). As perpetrators of an underlying felony, co-felons are principals in any homicide committed to further ... the initial common criminal design. Id. A principal is defined as follows: Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state ... or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such, whether he or she is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense. § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2005). Whether a defendant knows of a criminal act ahead of time or physically participates in the crime, participation with another in a common criminal scheme renders the defendant guilty of all crimes committed in furtherance of that scheme. See Jacobs v. State, 396 So.2d 713, 716 (Fla.1981). However, an independent act of a codefendant occurs when a person other than the defendant commits a crime (1) which the defendant did not intend to occur, (2) in which the defendant did not participate, and (3) which was outside of, and not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of, the common design or unlawful act contemplated by the defendant. See Ray v. State, 755 So.2d 604, 609 (Fla.2000); see also Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6( l ). A defendant's absence when the crime occurred does not establish, in and of itself, that the crime was an independent act of another. See id. The purpose of this doctrine is to exonerate the nonparticipant from acts committed by a co-felon that are beyond the scope of the original plan. See Parker v. State, 458 So.2d 750, 752 (Fla.1984). The evidence supported the jury's conclusion that Jackson was guilty of the murders and that the murders were not the independent act of his codefendants. Foremost, Jackson admitted that he was a willing perpetrator of the underlying felony (i.e., the robbery of the Sumners) that set in motion the kidnapping and murders. As a principal in the robbery, Jackson is responsible for his codefendants binding the Sumners with duct tape, leading them from their home, placing them in the trunk of their vehicle, and then driving them to a remote area in Georgia where a prearranged grave awaited them. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the kidnapping terminated prior to the death of the Sumners because liberty was never restored to the victims and they were never in a place of safety once the robbery commenced. See Stephens v. State, 787 So.2d 747, 754 (Fla.2001). Accordingly, the kidnapping occurred during the course of the robbery and the murders were the culmination of the commission of the kidnapping. It is also important to note that there was evidence that Jackson planned the robbery and stated that he would murder the Sumners. The State presented surveillance footage of Jackson and his codefendants purchasing rubber gloves, and pieces of rubber gloves were found in the trunk of the recovered Lincoln. During police questioning, Jackson admitted that he knew the grave had been prepared before the robberies occurred. There was also evidence that Jackson carried a flashlight to the burial site and that Jackson watched as Nixon and Wade covered the victims with dirt. Jackson informed law enforcement during questioning that he saw the Sumners alive while they were in the hole and that he could hear the Sumners moaning and trying to get up from inside the hole. Jackson did not attempt to prevent Nixon and Wade from covering the Sumners with dirt, as Jackson admitted when he testified that he merely walked away from the grave. Although Jackson attempts to find comfort in the contention that walking away from the grave demonstrated that he did not participate in the murders, his presence at the gravesite and failure to summon help for the couple present a question within the province of the jury to decide whether he intended the murders. In addition, cellular phone records reflected that at the approximate date and time of the murders, a phone call was made from the cellular phone used by Jackson to the Sumners' bank. The call was routed through a cellular phone tower that was designated to address calls placed by mobile phones used in the area of the gravesite. After the murders, Jackson used the Sumner ATM card even though he knew that the Sumners were dead. He even contacted the JSO and the bank pretending to be James Sumner in an attempt to reactivate access to the account through the card. This provides further support for the conclusion that the murders were not the independent acts of the codefendants because they were a foreseeable consequence of the common design of this entire criminal episode. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the State presented competent, substantial evidence that Jackson was a principal in the robbery, which involved the kidnapping and murders, and that he fully participated in creating the circumstances that directly produced the victims' deaths. Thus, we deny relief on this issue because the evidence is sufficient to support both murder convictions on either theory of first-degree murder as well as each of his remaining felony convictions. In addition, our independent review of the record pursuant to our obligation to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to uphold the convictions supports the same conclusion. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.142(a)(6).