Opinion ID: 695252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guardian Ad Litem Fees

Text: 9 The government has brought its own appeal challenging the district court's decision to award the guardian ad litem her fees as costs chargeable against the government pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d), rather than as attorney's fees deducted from the judgment and subject to the limits set forth in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2678. In Hull I, we remanded for the district court to examine the guardian ad litem's fee application and properly to characterize the fees consistent with our discussion therein. 971 F.2d at 1509-10. On remand, the district court reviewed the records and determined that the guardian ad litem's services, in accord with the sole purpose of her appointment, involved looking after the interests of Lee Hull as an officer of the court rather than as an attorney, and that her fees were therefore taxable to the government as costs. See Third Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Appellee's Br. at 4a. Because the court's determination does not represent an abuse of discretion, we affirm. See Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 853 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 1622, 71 L.Ed.2d 855 (1982). 10 In Hull I, we explained that proper characterization of a guardian ad litem's fees depends upon the role that the guardian ad litem plays. 971 F.2d at 1510 (emphasis added). To the extent the guardian ad litem acts as an officer of the court, looking after the interests of the minor, compensation is taxable as costs. To the extent the guardian ad litem performs legal services as an attorney, compensation should be deducted as attorney's fees. Id. (emphasis added). While some of the tasks that the guardian ad litem performed on Lee's behalf were indisputably legal in nature, see Appellee's Br. at 28a-40a, we agree with the district court that none were performed in the role as an attorney for Lee. See Schneider, 658 F.2d at 855 (holding that where the guardian ad litem's responsibilities to the court reasonably included legal research and analysis, those expenses were properly taxed as costs). 11 Attorney Wolfe has at all times appeared as Lee's only attorney of record. The guardian ad litem never held herself out as Lee's legal counsel in these proceedings. The plaintiffs, government, and district court consistently treated Wolfe as Lee's attorney. See e.g., Conference of March 31, 1993, Appellant's App. at 74. Although Wolfe was originally hired by Lee's parents on Lee's behalf, and was never formally retained by the guardian ad litem upon her appointment, the guardian's failure to object to Wolfe's continued legal representation of Lee until he sought to bring this appeal causes us to conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Wolfe, rather than the guardian, was acting as Lee's attorney at the trial court level. Because the record thus supports the district court's finding that Wolfe was rendering legal services in the role of Lee's attorney, while the guardian ad litem was rendering services solely as an officer of the court and as the legally designated representative of Lee's interests, we affirm the court's decision to award the guardian ad litem's fees as costs against the government. Cf. Kollsman v. Cohen, 996 F.2d 702, 706-08 (4th Cir.1993) (distinguishing between a guardian ad litem who serves essentially as an officer of the court, and an attorney ad litem who provides the ordinary services of an attorney, and requiring the district court to separate the costs of the former from the attorney's fees of the latter when the same person performs both roles); duPont, III v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 771 F.2d 874, 881-83 & n. 7 (5th Cir.1985) (distinguishing between a guardian ad litem who acts as an officer of the court and an attorney ad litem who acts as legal counsel, and requiring the district court to differentiate between the costs of the former and the attorney's fees of the latter when the same person is appointed in both capacities), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085, 106 S.Ct. 1467, 89 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986); Franz v. Buder, 38 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1930) (holding that [w]here the services as guardian ad litem and as an attorney are rendered by the same person, a separate allowance should be made for each service, with the former taxed as costs and the latter assessed as attorney's fees).