Opinion ID: 2581010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Proof of defendant's status as a felon

Text: Count 4 of the information charged defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021), specifically identifying the applicable prior felony convictions as attempted robbery, automobile theft, receiving stolen property, forgery, and possession of a firearm by a felon. [26] In response to defendant's objections to the court's plan to read to the jury the multiple prior felony convictions alleged in count 4, and defendant's offer to stipulate to a conviction of receiving stolen property, the prosecution at first argued that it should be permitted to offer evidence of all prior felony convictions incurred by defendant, in order to guard against the possibility that the jury might find that one or more of these convictions were not properly proved. Ultimately, however, the prosecution offered to stipulate that (i) on July 4, 1989, defendant was a convicted felon, or that (ii) defendant had previously been convicted of a felony, as of July 4, 1989. Defense counsel rejected both proposed stipulations and stated that, rather than leaving the jury with the impression that defendant previously had been convicted of an [e]gregious felony or an unspecified felony without explanation, counsel would prefer that the jury hear that defendant previously had been convicted of the specific felonies listed in count 4. The prosecution responded that it intended to introduce several letters that defendant had written to his mother while he was in prison in order to show defendant's motive for killing his mother and Ardell, and noted that these letters referred to defendant's having been sent to prison for a theft-related offense and for having been a felon in possession of a firearm; hence, the prosecution asserted, much of the information identifying defendant's prior conviction properly would come to the jury's attention in any event. In the absence of a stipulation, the trial court ruled that count 4 would be read to the jury, listing the five felonies, and the court thereafter read that count to the jury. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence, contained in two abstracts of judgment, of defendant's conviction of three nonviolent felonies alleged in count 4. The abstracts showed that defendant was sentenced to prison for receiving stolen property, fraudulent use of a credit card (forgery), and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant objected to introduction of the abstracts and a related packet of certified prison documents (a fingerprint card, a mug shot, and a chronological history), asserting that these latter documents contained irrelevant and unduly prejudicial information. Overruling the objections, the court admitted the two abstracts of judgment and the challenged certified prison records. On appeal, defendant initially asserts that the trial court erred in two respects: (1) by failing to force the prosecution to accept defense counsel's offer to stipulate that defendant had been convicted of the prior felony of receiving stolen property, thereby obviating the need for proof of the prior felony element of the charged offense of being a felon felon in possession of a firearm, and (2) by failing to confine the evidence of defendant's prior felony status to only one of the prior felonies listed in count 4. Defendant concedes that under California Constitution article I, section 28 and People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173, 228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913, a jury must be advised of a defendant's felon status when that status is (as under section 12021) an element of the current charge. We noted in Valentine that when a defendant stipulates to his or her felon status, evidence of the nature of his prior convictions ... may and should be withheld from the jury because such evidence is irrelevant to the issue of one's status as a felon. (42 Cal.3d at p. 173, 228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913; accord, Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 [defendant's offer to stipulate to felon status in prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm must be accepted by trial court].) Here, however, defense counsel refused to stipulate generally to his client's felon status, out of concern that the jury might assume that the unspecified felony was considerably more egregious than the convictions that defendant actually had suffered. For this reason, the present case is distinguishable from both Valentine and Old Chief. Indeed, counsel went so far as to state that instead of stipulating to unspecified felon status, he would prefer that the jury hear the actual list of all prior felonies alleged in count 4which is exactly what ultimately occurred in this case. On this record, we do not perceive any error on the part of the trial court. Even if we were to assume that the trial court did err, however, any such error was plainly nonprejudicial. As the prosecutor noted early in the hearing on defendant's motion, some of the circumstances related to defendant's prior felony convictions  specifically, the fact that defendant had been imprisoned for a theft-related offense (involving coins and a gun belonging to Ardell) and for being a felon in possession of a firearm  would have been disclosed to the jury in any event, through other evidence (namely, defendant's letters to his mother, introduced to establish motive, and defendant's admission to Mary Perron that he had been caught with a gun, a violation of his probation). Most of the felonies listed in count 4 were nonviolent crimes (as noted, all three of the proved prior felony convictions were nonviolent)  and all paled in comparison with the crimes and facts underlying the charges in the present case. Finally, a limiting instruction (CALJIC No. 2.50) cautioned the jury not to consider the other-crimes evidence except as that evidence related to intent, identity, and motive  an admonition that the prosecution underscored at closing argument. Viewing the record as a whole, no reasonable probability exists that the verdict would have been different had the jury not been informed, as a basis for making its finding on the section 12021 charge, that defendant had suffered the felony convictions listed in count 4. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to limit the prosecution's proof of his felony status to the abstracts of judgment, and in instead allowing introduction of defendant's mug shot, fingerprint card, and chronological history contained in his state prison file. The People assert, reasonably, that this information was relevant to establish defendant's identity as the same Richard Bert Stewart who had suffered the prior felony convictions described in the two abstracts of judgment. The chronological history set out in the prison documents was relevant to corroborate evidence contained in the letters sent by defendant from prison to his mother, by placing in perspective the timing of the letters and corroborating defendant's statements to the Pillows' neighbors (Perron and Powell) concerning defendant's motives for committing the crimes. In any event, for the reasons set out above, any error in this regard was nonprejudicial. Finally, defendant asserts that his trial counsel performed in a constitutionally deficient manner by failing to reconsider and accept the prosecutor's proposed stipulation (that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony, as of July 4, 1989) after defense counsel's own proposed stipulation (that defendant had been convicted of the felony of receiving stolen property) was rejected. The record makes it clear that in trial counsel's judgment there was a risk that the jury, if told only that defendant had suffered an unspecified prior felony conviction, might speculate that the prior felony was substantially more serious than the five felonies listed in count 4, three of which  all nonviolent  the prosecutor eventually established through the two abstracts of judgment. Because the record on appeal does not preclude a satisfactory explanation for defense counsel's actions ( Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134), we cannot conclude he made an unreasonable tactical choice and we shall not second-guess his decision. ( Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859.) Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) In any event, for the reasons set out above, defendant also has failed to establish prejudice, that is, a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of counsel's assertedly deficient performance. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 691-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.)