Opinion ID: 77585
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Faretta Inquiry

Text: 19 A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself when he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently elects to do so. Id. For a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to be valid, the defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert [his] right of self-representation. Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057, 1064 (11th Cir.1986). Before the court grants the defendant's request, the court must make the defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his decision is made with his eyes open. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 To determine whether Evans' waiver was knowing and intelligent, we look to the particular facts and circumstances of [his] case, including [his] background, experience, and conduct. Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1065. In Fitzpatrick, we identified various factors that aid us in our analysis of the validity of the defendant's Sixth Amendment waiver. 8 Id. at 1065-67. The government argues, and we agree, that the Fitzpatrick factors support the district court's finding that Evans validly waived his right to counsel at his sentencing hearing. The district court adequately warned Evans of the dangers of self-representation and reiterated that it would appoint a new attorney for sentencing purposes if Evans so desired. Evans unequivocally stated that he did not want an attorney to represent him at the hearing. The exchange between Evans and the district judge makes it clear that the court conducted a sufficient inquiry under Faretta to allow Evans to represent himself at sentencing. In sum, Evans made the decision to waive his right to counsel with his eyes open. See Faretta 806 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. Consequently, we affirm the district court on this issue.