Opinion ID: 2318171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consequences for Breach

Text: The final step in a Deberry evaluation requires a three-part analysis to determine the consequences that should follow from a breach of the duty to gather material evidence. The first factor is the degree of negligence or bad faith involved. [23] Johnson does not contend that the police department failed to gather the clothing in bad faith. Johnson does argue that the police were negligent. The State argues that the clothing from the car and the sweatpants from the bedroom were immaterial to the weapons charges. But, as already discussed, the ownership of the clothing that concealed each weapon was probative circumstantial evidence of constructive possession. The police recognized that the proximity between the weapons and other belongings was significant probative circumstantial evidence by gathering other belongings from the car and bedroom. It follows that, by not gathering the clothing that actually concealed the weapons in the car and the bedroom, the police were negligent. The second factor to be considered at this analytical juncture is the importance of the missing evidence and the reliability of the secondary or substitute evidence that remains available. [24] Johnson argues that the clothing from the car and the sweatpants from the bedroom were important because they would help establish that the guns were concealed in clothing that did not belong to him. With regard to the clothes in the car, the secondary evidence consisted of testimony from Lamar Reeves and Officer Matthews. Lamar Reeves testified that his brother had previously worked for Kent Landscaping and described his work clothes, which contained a patch over the pocket. Officer Matthews had described the clothes in the back of the Isuzu as work clothes and remembered there was a patch on one of the shirts. There was no secondary evidence with regard to the sweatpants, except for Bryan's general testimony that Reeves also slept in the same bedroom that had been used by Johnson. The final factor to be considered in a Deberry analysis in determining what consequences should flow from the State's failure to gather evidence is the sufficiency of the State's other evidence. Dover Police Detective Robbins testified that he decided to charge Johnson, rather than Reeves, with two counts each of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited and Possession of Firearm Ammunition by a Person Prohibited. Detective Robbins decided to do that because the twelve-gauge rounds found in the Isuzu matched the shotgun found in Johnson's bedroom, and the .25 caliber rounds found in Johnson's bedroom matched the .25 caliber handgun found in the Isuzu. With regard to the handgun and the ammunition in the car, Johnson's defense challenged the State's evidence (i) by establishing that the car was driven and owned by Reeves and (ii) by arguing that Reeves owned the clothing that concealed the handgun on the back seat of Reeves' car. With regard to the shotgun and the ammunition in the bedroom, Johnson established that Reeves also slept in that room and that Reeves' computer was in that bedroom at the time of the administrative search. Thus, the record reflects that the State's case against Johnson was based upon circumstantial evidence that connected Johnson to the weapons and the ammunition because he was in the car and used the bedroom. Conversely, Johnson's defense was to connect Reeves to the weapons and the ammunition because Reeves was operating a car that he owned and Reeves also used and slept in the same bedroom in the mobile home. The question that we next confront is what consequence should follow from the failure to gather the clothes from the car and the sweatpants from the bedroom. The failure to gather and/or preserve case dispositive evidence will completely preclude a prosecution. Even in the absence of the clothes from the car and the sweatpants from the bedroom, however, Johnson's prosecution on the weapons and ammunition charges should not be barred as a denial of due process because, although those items were material, they were not case dispositive. [25] Nevertheless, the State must bear responsibility for the failure to gather material evidence. In a prosecution for possessory weapons offenses based upon circumstantial evidence, due process required an appropriate instruction to the jury in the absence of the clothing from the car and the sweatpants from the bedroom or of any secondary evidence (such as photographs) having a significant probative value. [26] Johnson was entitled to the inference that the missing clothes from the car and the missing sweatpants from the bedroom would have been exculpatory. [27] Such an instruction was set forth by this Court in Lolly v. State . [28] In the Superior Court, Johnson requested an instruction to the jury, based upon this Court's holding in Lolly, that the missing clothing, if available, would be exculpatory in nature. In denying that motion, the Superior Court ruled: And I'm not willing to give a Lolly instruction on the clothing. There's nothing unique about this clothing. And there is abecause there's really been even no testimony concerningthere's an equal inference that it could be the codefendant's clothing as the defendant's clothing; and no, there's nothing unique about the clothing other than the fact that is was hiding weapons. Ironically, the Superior Court's adverse ruling underscores the merit of Johnson's request for a missing evidence instruction. The fact that the clothing and sweatpants were hiding the weapons made them unique circumstantial evidence of someone's constructive possession of those items. If the clothing in the car and the sweatpants from the bedroom could have belonged to either Johnson or Reeves, Johnson's ability to establish that those items did not belong to Johnson would have been material evidence for the jury to consider.