Opinion ID: 2570148
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Evidence Regarding Arizona Plea Negotiations

Text: Defendant contends Julie H. was improperly allowed to testify that she opposed defendant's offer to plead guilty to all the Arizona charges except sexual assault. [20] During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Julie, It's my understanding from speaking with you previously . . . that the eighty-four years [defendant] received in Arizona was sufficient for you; is that correct? Julie replied, It is sufficient for my case. On redirect, the prosecutor asked Julie if she was aware that under Arizona law, defendant would serve 66 years of the 84-year sentence. She said, Yes, I am. The prosecutor subsequently asked whether Julie was told what defendant was trying to accomplish during the Arizona plea negotiations. She said, Yes. . . . I was told that he would strongly consider any plea agreement that took off the sexual assault charge. The prosecutor inquired, And what did you say about that? Julie replied, Absolutely not. Defendant objected that the testimony was hearsay and irrelevant. The trial court ruled the testimony was admissible to show Julie's state of mind to help explain the answer that was elicited on cross-examination. The court instructed the jury that the testimony was admitted for that limited purpose, and not to prove the conversations actually occurred. A stipulation specifying the Arizona crimes to which defendant pled guilty, including sexual assault, was subsequently read to the jury. (13) Defendant argues that Julie's testimony regarding the plea negotiations was irrelevant because it did not relate to any aggravating factor or disputed material fact. Defendant, however, opened the door to this evidence by asking Julie if she was satisfied with the term defendant received for his crimes. `It is settled that the trial court is given wide discretion in controlling the scope of relevant cross-examination.' ( People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 187 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988].) ( People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 102 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 608, 158 P.3d 157].) Defendant further contends that admitting evidence of the plea negotiations violated Evidence Code section 1153, which provides in relevant part: Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or of an offer to plead guilty to the crime charged or to any other crime, made by the defendant in a criminal action is inadmissible in any action or in any proceeding of any nature . . . . Defendant did not object on this ground below, and the claim is therefore forfeited. ( People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 745 [102 Cal.Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121], overruled on another point by Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 593, fn. 7 [150 Cal.Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916].) Further, it was defense counsel who first introduced evidence of the plea agreement. In any event, assuming that Julie's testimony on this topic was statutorily inadmissible, the error was clearly harmless under any standard. Defendant claims the testimony might have led the jury to speculate that he was trying to evade responsibility for his Arizona crimes or that he was not truly remorseful. However, such a conclusion on the jury's part was unlikely, given defendant's plea of guilty to sexual assault and numerous other charges, Julie's testimony that he had apologized to her both in person and in writing, and his profession of remorse to his cellmate.