Opinion ID: 1223896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Right of Confrontation, the Trial Court's Exercise of Discretion, and the Admissibility of Prior Acts of Prostitution as Evidence of Motive to Fabricate

Text: 22. In Romero, the Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of evidence involving the victim's prior acts of prostitution, and held that, on the facts before it, such evidence was not admissible. 94 N.M. at 25, 606 P.2d at 1119. In dicta, the Court stated that information regarding prostitution might well be relevant if it were contended that the intercourse with the defendant was itself an act of prostitution. Id. at 26, 606 P.2d at 1120. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that Defendant's showing of relevance was sufficient; the Court of Appeals stated that cross-examination was vital in testing the credibility of both women, who claimed that they were not working as prostitutes when they were picked up by Defendant. Johnson, 121 N.M. at 82, 908 P.2d at 775. We agree that evidence of prior sexual conduct must be admitted if a defendant shows that evidence implicates his or her constitutional right of confrontation. See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (noting the importance of cross-examination in probing the credibility of a witness). We are not persuaded that Defendant's showing of relevance in this case implicated his right of confrontation.
23. Application of the rape shield statute and rule often implicates the opposing principles of the protection of victims of sexual crimes on one hand, and the right of the criminal defendant to cross-examine the witnesses against him on the other. Johnson, 102 N.M. at 116, 692 P.2d at 41. A defendant's right of confrontationwith its protection of the right to cross-examine, test credibility, detect bias, and otherwise challenge an opposing version of factsis a critical limitation on the trial court's discretion to exclude evidence a defendant wishes to admit. The category of rape-shield statute in which a jurisdiction falls is not relevant. See, e.g., Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d at 333; State v. Hudlow, 99 Wash.2d 1, 659 P.2d 514, 518 (1983); cf. Demers v. State, 209 Conn. 143, 547 A.2d 28, 35-36 (1988) (holding trial court did not err in holding evidence of prior arrest for prostitution would have been admissible, and thus should have been disclosed by prosecution as relevant to credibility and probative under the circumstances of this case to the substantive issue of consent.). 24. The United States Supreme Court has reversed a state court conviction on the ground that statutory protection of witnesses from suffering humiliation on the stand may not prevent introduction of evidence of bias. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 320, 94 S.Ct. at 1112. The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation guaranteed all defendants protects a defendant's right to show bias. The analogy between the statute analyzed in Davis, and rape shield legislation is not only plain, Winfield, 301 S.E.2d at 19, it is compelling. If application of the rape shield law or rule would conflict with the accused's confrontation right, if it operates to preclude the defendant from presenting a full and fair defense, the statute and rule must yield. We conclude that Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which specifically provides that evidence is admissible if its exclusion would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant, states expressly what our rule must be construed to require implicitly.
25. The balance that must be achieved in implementing the statute and rule and protecting the rights of a defendant is delicate. See Hudlow, 659 P.2d at 526 (Utter, J., dissenting) ([T]he statute requires a delicate balancing of society's interest in preventing a heinous crime and the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.). Notwithstanding the approach taken by a jurisdiction in enacting rape shield legislation, the trial court plays an important role in preserving the delicate balance to which Justice Utter refers. The trial court often plays that role following an in camera hearing. See generally Johnson v. State, 332 Md. 456, 632 A.2d 152, 160 (1993) (describing the responsibility for balancing as entrusted in the first instance to the trial court and suggesting the importance of showing special relevance, considering necessity and potential for prejudice). In that role, the court must consider probative value not only in order to identify a theory of relevance, but also in order to evaluate the consequences of either admitting the evidence or excluding it. The prejudice to which the rule speaks most directly is prejudice to the necessary fact-finding. [A]fter assessing the legitimate probative value of the evidence, the court should consider the effect of excluding such evidence on defendant's right to a fair trial and balance that effect against the potential prejudice to the truthfinding process itself ... to determine whether the introduction of the victim's past sexual conduct may confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or cause the jury to decide the case on an improper or emotional basis. Fishman, supra, at 726 (quoting Hudlow, 659 P.2d at 521). Notwithstanding the particular approach taken by a jurisdiction in enacting rape shield legislation, there are common concerns arising out of a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation that provide particular guidance to trial courts in discharging their responsibilities. See generally Herndon, 426 N.W.2d at 360 (describing a five-pronged federal test). 26. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has provided an extensive analysis of several states' approaches to rape shield laws and of the balance struck between the defendant's right to confront witnesses and the state's interests in its own evidentiary rules. Id. at 351-60. Wisconsin's rape shield law expressly prohibited the admission of prior sexual conduct evidence regardless of the purpose except in three carefully circumscribed situations: (1) [E]vidence of the complaining witness's past conduct with the defendant; (2) [E]vidence of specific instances of sexual conduct showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the degree of sexual assault or the extent of the injury suffered; (3) [E]vidence of prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault made by the complaining witness. Id. at 358-59 n. 85. If a defendant wished to introduce evidence falling into one of these exceptions, the statute mandated that the trial court conduct a hearing to assess whether the evidence was admissible under the exceptions and whether its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial nature, but the statute did not permit a hearing on the probative nature of the evidence unless it fell within one of the three exceptions. See id. 27. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that application of the balancing test solely to situations involving the three circumscribed exceptions contained in the statute was too restrictive and hence unconstitutional. Relying on Davis, the court expanded the scope and application of this test. Herndon, 426 N.W.2d at 362-63. The court noted that where the evidence to be admitted is probative of the complainant's bias or prejudice, shows that she has a motive to fabricate, or shows a continuing pattern of conduct, the trial court must balance the probativeness of the evidence against its prejudicial nature. Id. at 362. The court further articulated a six-pronged test trial courts must use to evaluate the admissibility of such evidence: (1) whether there is a clear showing that the complainant committed the prior acts; (2) whether the circumstances of the prior acts closely resemble those of the present case; (3) whether the prior acts are clearly relevant to a material issue, such as identity, intent, or bias; (4) whether the evidence is necessary to the defendant's case; (5) whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (6) whether the prior acts evince a pattern of conduct rather than a single past act. Id. at 360; see also id. at 363. 28. Two years after the Herndon decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled the holding in Herndon that Wisconsin's rape shield law is unconstitutional, but upheld the use of the five-pronged federal test in evaluating the admissibility of prior sexual conduct. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d at 333. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin identified the standard it would follow in resolving questions pitting a state's interest in its evidentiary rules against a defendant's constitutional right to present evidence and concluded that there must be compelling state interests to overcome the defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 334. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the first five of the six Herndon tests, the federal test, establish a constitutional right to present evidence otherwise excluded by a state evidentiary rule. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d at 334. We agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that a defendant's constitutional right to present evidence does not make our statute and rule unconstitutional. That right informs the trial court's exercise of discretion under the statute and rule. We also agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that a showing sufficient under the five-pronged federal test establishes a constitutional right to present evidence otherwise excluded by our statute. There may be other showings that are equally sufficient. We do not intend to limit the trial courts in the exercise of discretion under the rule and statute, but rather to suggest a possible framework for exercising that discretion.
29. In this case, Defendant sought to offer evidence of a prior act or acts in which the victims were alleged to have engaged with others who were not identified. This is not enough to implicate Defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. Motive to fabricate is a theory of relevance that does implicate the right of confrontation. A trial court would be entitled to determine that the prejudicial effect of prior sexual conduct evidence, such as evidence of prostitution, would not outweigh the probative value of evidence of a motive to fabricate. Nevertheless, evidence of prior acts of prostitution is not sufficient in itself to show a motive to fabricate. See Winfield, 301 S.E.2d at 21 (holding that [e]vidence of past sexual conduct, to be admissible under the `motive to fabricate' provisions ... must show a pattern of behavior which directly relates to the conduct charged against the complaining witness in the case on trial). 30. In Winfield, the defendant, who was convicted of sexual assault, appealed his conviction arguing that he was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling that evidence of the victim's acts of prostitution could not be admitted to show a motive to fabricate the charge. Id. at 19. The defendant claimed that the victim agreed to have consensual sex for which he would pay her $50.00. Id. at 18. When he did not give her the agreed upon amount, she became angry and accused him of rape to exact revenge. Id. The defendant wanted to prove that the victim had exchanged sex for money in the past, and that she had extorted money from a customer who had refused to pay her by threatening to tell his wife of their activities. Id. at 17. The defendant argued that the victim's actions displayed a pattern of retaliation against customers who refused to pay, which he claimed occurred in his case. Id. at 20. 31. The Virginia court reversed the convictions, remanding the cause to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. See id. at 17-21. The court noted that any evidence of prior sexual conduct by the complaining witness must comply with the usual rules of evidence as well as the requirements of the `rape shield law.' Id. at 21. The court distinguished the evidence showing a pattern of threatening to retaliate or actually retaliating, from evidence of prior acts of prostitution. The court held that the former should have been admitted into trial as part of the defendant's case. However, the court held that the latter evidence was not admissible, because a sufficient nexus did not exist between those activities and the motive to fabricate a charge. Id. 32. Both Wisconsin and Virginia appear to require a particularized showing of relevance. Herndon, 426 N.W.2d at 360; Winfield, 301 S.E.2d at 21. Other jurisdictions have reached comparable holdings. See generally People v. Williams, 416 Mich. 25, 330 N.W.2d 823, 829-831 (1982) (holding that evidence of reputation for, or specific instances of, prostitution is not admissible where the evidence has slight or little relevance to defendant's theory of the case); Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 866, 869 (holding trial court's exclusion of evidence of complainant's prior acts of prostitution proper where the relevance of such evidence was not shown); cf. Hudlow, 659 P.2d at 523-24 (holding evidence of general promiscuity inadmissible because there was no evidence of conduct comparable to defense theory). We also conclude that, in order to enable the trial court to perform its role in identifying a theory of relevance prior to balancing probative value against prejudice, a defendant must show sufficient facts to support a particular theory of relevance. 33. For these reasons, we hold that when a defendant characterizes an alleged rape or other criminal sexual contact as an act of prostitution, evidence of prior acts of prostitution is not necessarily material and probative. A defendant must specify the issue or issues the evidence is intended to address and demonstrate how the evidence is truly probative on those issues exclusive of the forbidden `yes/yes inference.' Fishman, supra, at 725. For example, a defendant may show that a victim has engaged in a distinctive pattern of past sexual conduct, involving the extortion of money by threat after acts of prostitution, of which her alleged conduct in [a particular case] is but an example. Winfield, 301 S.E.2d at 20. Simply showing that the victim engaged in an act or acts of prostitution is not sufficient to show a motive to fabricate. See id. 34. We are not certain that Romero is inconsistent with our holdings in this case. See generally id., 94 N.M. at 26, 606 P.2d at 1120 (holding that evidence victim was a prostitute not relevant to charge of rape, which victim said occurred at knifepoint, even though the defendant contended intercourse had been consensual). However, to the extent Romero suggests that evidence of prostitution is relevant whenever a defendant contends that the intercourse with the defendant was itself an act of prostitution, it is overruled. The evidence offered should be relevant to a defense theory other than a theory based on propensity, because the fact-finder should determine the defendant's guilt or innocence based on the particular encounter for which the defendant was charged. Cf. Rule 11-404(B) NMRA 1997 (making evidence of other crimes inadmissible to show action in conformity but permitting its use for other purposes, such as proof of motive or intent). Id.