Opinion ID: 1119024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Waiver Of Speedy Trial Right Under CrR 3.3

Text: Petitioner also contends he was not obligated to object to the trial date of July 20, 1992 because it was within the sixty days required under CrR 3.3(d)(3). CrR 3.3(f)(2) provides in pertinent part that: A party who objects to the date set upon the ground that it is not within the time limits prescribed by this rule must, within 10 days after the notice is mailed or otherwise given, move that the court set a trial within those time limits. Failure of a party, for any reason, to make such a motion shall be a waiver of the objection that a trial commenced on such date, or on an extension of such date properly granted pursuant to this rule, is not within the time limits prescribed by this rule. (Emphasis added.) CrR 3.3(f) only imposes a duty upon a party to object to a trial date set beyond the time limits of CrR 3.3. In this case, the initial trial date of July 20, 1992 was set within the sixty days required by CrR 3.3. Petitioner Carson is correct in contending he had no duty to object to that initial trial date of July 20, 1992 under CrR 3.3(f)(1). However, several Court of Appeals decisions have held that defendants effectively waive their right to speedy trial under CrR 3.3 if they do not raise the issue when action could still be taken to avoid a speedy trial violation. [59] Defense counsel has some responsibility for timely asserting a client's speedy trial rights under CrR 3.3. In this case, defense counsel was aware of the speedy trial expiration date. When Petitioner Carson's case did not begin on July 20, 1992 as scheduled and the Smith case began on July 21, 1992, defense counsel, who was also defense counsel in the Smith case, knew Petitioner Carson's case would not be reset within the speedy trial period. Defense counsel did not call attention of the court to the speedy trial violation until thirteen days after the speedy trial expiration date. Defense counsel asserted Petitioner Carson's speedy trial rights under CrR 3.3 only when he knew the trial court could not take action to avoid violation of the rule. Under the facts in this case, Petitioner Carson waived his speedy trial right under CrR 3.3 by not objecting when his trial did not begin on the scheduled trial date and the speedy trial period expired before another trial date was set.