Opinion ID: 3047663
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Probable cause to arrest Lopez as accessory

Text: Our conclusion that, at the time Lopez was questioned at the police station, the police did not have probable cause to regard Lopez as the attempted shooter does not, however, end our inquiry. The government’s brief on appeal suggests that, even if there was an insufficient basis from which to infer that Lopez was the person responsible for the earlier attempted shooting, there was still probable cause to arrest him as an accessory after the fact under 18 U.S.C. § 3. This basis for probable cause was not argued to the District Court, nor was its Oregon state law counterpart, Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.325 (2003) (“Hindering prosecution”). However, as noted above, we can affirm on any basis evident in the record. Ruiz, 428 F.3d at 880. information, and that it matched or was “similar” to the eyewitness description of the attempted-shooting suspect as “taller” or “tall.” Detective Schuster also testified that he would not describe Lopez, who “was 5′6″ based on his DMV information,” as “taller.” 2930 UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ [10] Under 18 U.S.C. § 3, “Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.” 18 U.S.C. § 3. In addition to the actus reus of receiving, relieving, comforting or assisting the offender, we have interpreted this statutory language to require (1) specific intent to frustrate law enforcement, see United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 737 (9th Cir. 2002); (2) “commission of the underlying offense” by the principal, see United States v. Innie, 7 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 1993); and (3) actual, specific knowledge of the underlying crime on the part of the accessory, see United States v. Graves, 143 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998) (as amended); cf. United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1051 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that such knowledge “may be shown entirely through circumstantial evidence”). [11] The elements of the analogous Oregon crime of hindering prosecution are essentially the same—the commission of the underlying crime, acts aiding the perpetrator of that crime in escaping justice, and the intent to frustrate law enforcement—with the important exception that knowledge of the underlying crime is not required. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.325;9 State v. Allred, 995 P.2d 1210, 1213-14 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (noting 1971 legislative amendment “deleting the 9 A person commits the crime of hindering prosecution if, with intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of a person who has committed a crime punishable as a felony . . . the person: . . . (c) Provides or aids in providing such person with money, transportation, weapon, disguise or other means of avoiding discovery or apprehension; or . . . (e) Suppresses by any act of concealment, alteration or destruction physical evidence which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person . . . . Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.325(1). UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ 2931 requirement that a defendant know that the person he or she aided in fact had committed a felony”). [12] The extent to which Lopez fit the general physical description of the attempted shooter is obviously not relevant to an assessment of probable cause to arrest as an accessory under 18 U.S.C. § 3 or Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.325. The relevant inquiry is whether the police had information that would reasonably lead to the conclusion, by a fair probability, that Lopez knew that the attempted shooter had committed an offense against the United States10 (or, as to Oregon law, that the attempted shooter was being sought by law enforcement), and that Lopez was acting to assist the attempted shooter in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension. We undertake this inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances. See supra Part IV.A. However, because 18 U.S.C. § 3 and Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.325 define specific-intent crimes, we are also called upon to determine whether the police had probable cause to believe Lopez was acting with the specific intent to frustrate law enforcement. See supra Part IV.A (citing Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1428). [13] Although we find a dearth of specifically applicable precedent,11 we are satisfied that the facts known to the police in 10 The arresting officers were state officers. Our review of Oregon statutory and case law leaves us unsure whether, in Oregon, state law enforcement officers have authority to arrest for violations of federal law. Under some circumstances this could be of import, because whether an arrest is valid under state law can be relevant to deciding whether that arrest is valid for Fourth Amendment purposes. See United States v. MirandaGuerena, 445 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 2006) (McKeown, J., concurring); United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Mota, 982 F.2d 1384, 1387-89 (9th Cir. 1993). We need not decide if such circumstances are present here, however, because we conclude that the officers had probable cause to believe Lopez had violated not only federal law, but Oregon law as well. See text infra. 11 We do not find United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2002)— the sole case cited by the government to support probable cause to arrest 2932 UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ this case provided probable cause under the standard discussed in Part IV.A and the previous paragraph. The Ford Focus had been used as a getaway car,12 and presumably then abandoned, by a man who tried to use a firearm in an attempt to escape the scrutiny of narcotics investigators. The police could reasonably infer that this man, who was apparently ready to gun down a law enforcement officer, was involved in additional criminal activity—specifically, narcotics activity —and that he was also likely to have criminal associates. It was also logical to assume that the attempted shooter would be afraid to return and retrieve the car himself, and, moreover, that he might turn to a trusted associate for help. The background facts available to the police thus supported the inference of a fair probability that Lopez knew the Ford Focus was connected to a federal or Oregon crime. Lopez as an accessory—to be helpful. The Hill court, in the course of weighing a privacy-based, constitutional claim (not a Fourth Amendment issue), found that the defendant had “self-evidently intended” to frustrate law enforcement where she had “attempted to orchestrate . . . delivery” of possessions to her husband—while also providing him with “shelter, employment, money, food and other material support.” Id. at 737. The government seeks to draw a parallel between these facts and Lopez’s alleged attempt to “orchestrate . . . delivery” of the attempted shooter’s car. As we have just noted, however, Hill listed an attempt to deliver possessions to a fugitive as a cumulative fact pointing to accessory liability in a case involving extensive additional evidence. Hill illustrates that picking up or taking possession of a fugitive’s possessions can—under some circumstances—constitute evidence that one is acting as an accessory to that fugitive’s crime. But because the scope and content of the assistance rendered by the defendant to the fugitive was much broader and better developed in Hill than in the case before us, Hill provides little help in deciding whether Lopez’s actions in helping to recover the Ford Focus— presented in the much sparser evidentiary context of our case—were sufficient to justify arrest in what, we find, is “a close case.” Cf. Hill, 279 F.3d at 737 (noting that “this is not a close case” as to criminal intent). 12 In Oregon, a getaway car is considered an instrumentality of the crime. See State v. Walden, 515 P.2d 407, 409 (Or. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Keith, 465 P.2d 724, 726 (Or. Ct. App. 1970). UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ 2933 Set against this background, Lopez’s actions in helping to rescue the Ford Focus provided further reason to believe that he was acting to assist the attempted shooter and to hinder the latter’s apprehension and prosecution. Lopez arrived at the Fred Meyer parking lot and drove directly to the Focus. He dropped off an associate who had the keys to the Ford Focus —suggesting a personal link to the car’s earlier driver, the attempted shooter. As Lopez’s associate departed from the parking lot’s west exit in the Ford Focus, Lopez guided his Ford Taurus out of the lot through the southeast exit—but soon doubled back and rejoined the Ford Focus, trailing about four hundred yards behind while traveling in the same direction. Even in the face of this suspicious behavior, there is, of course, a possibility that Lopez was an unwitting acquaintance of Ms. Polish’s, who simply drove her to the parking lot, with no guilty knowledge or illicit motive. However, the police were not required to believe to an absolute certainty, or by clear and convincing evidence, or even by a preponderance of the available evidence, that Lopez had committed a crime —what was required was a fair probability, given the totality of the circumstances. The police had good reason to suspect that a criminal enterprise (the recovery of the Ford Focus, with the intent to impede the identification of the vehicle’s owner, the attempted shooter) was afoot, and that Lopez was playing a key role in that enterprise. Lopez was connected to the Ford Focus—an instrumentality of the underlying crime— and he appeared to be taking steps to avoid detection. Upon being stopped, Lopez apparently offered no explanation for his actions.13 A plausible, innocent explanation for his conduct 13 Apart from disclosing one’s identity, see Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 187-89 (2004), a person detained by police has no general obligation to answer questions or volunteer information. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969); Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 842 n.18 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part by Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177. 2934 UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ might have dissipated the effect of the incriminating facts canvassed above; without such an explanation, Lopez’s connection to the Ford Focus might well have seemed to a reasonable police officer to be of real significance. [14] We think that Lopez’s role in bringing a driver to rescue the Ford Focus, taken in conjunction with his apparent effort to follow the Ford Focus out of the parking lot, could properly have been perceived by a police officer as suspicious activity. While not of overwhelming evidentiary weight, this activity could have been regarded by a reasonable police officer as grounding an inference that Lopez was assisting a federal offender—the attempted shooter—with the intent to hinder or prevent his apprehension. We therefore find that the police had probable cause to believe Lopez was an accessory after the fact, under 18 U.S.C. § 3, to the attempted shooter’s crime, and that the police did not act unreasonably in holding him under arrest without a warrant while they investigated further. Since Oregon’s “hindering prosecution” statute does not require as extensive a showing as its federal counterpart, see supra text at note 10, our finding of probable cause under 18 U.S.C. § 3 applies a fortiori to Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.325.