Opinion ID: 2614536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bryon Cruz and Cruz Enterprises Against Harold Nelson and Empire

Text: We begin our analysis with an examination of whether the petitioners who were not parties to the first actionBryon Cruz and Cruz Enterprisesare barred from seeking recovery from Harold Nelson and Empire, the defendants in the first action, as a result of a privity relationship with Dorothy Cruz. The Uniform Partnership Law, sections 7-60-101 to -153, 2 C.R.S. (1998) (UPL), governs this analysis. Notably, section 7-60-109(1) of the UPL provides that [e]very partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and the act of every partner ... binds the partnership. Moreover, the UPL provides that all partners are liable ... [j]ointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership and jointly and severally for all other... obligations of the partnership. § 7-60-115(1)(a) & (b), 2 C.R.S. (1998). In analyzing whether the requisite privity existed between Dorothy Cruz and the other respondents, the court of appeals focused upon several references in the complaint filed in conjunction with the first action, which noted that Dorothy Cruz was doing business as Cruz Enterprises. Relying upon these statements and the agency relationship between members of a partnership, which is recognized by the aforementioned section 7-60-109 of the UPL, the court of appeals found that Dorothy Cruz had represented Cruz Enterprises in the first action, and that she had settled on behalf of the partnership, which included Bryon Cruz's interests. To this end, the court of appeals held: We agree with the trial court that, under the doctrine of res judicata, the judgment in the prior case binds plaintiff Dorothy Cruz and her partners in privity with her, Cruz Enterprises and Bryon Cruz, because she clearly sued in both her individual and representative capacities on behalf of the partnership. Proceeding from this presumption that Cruz Enterprises was a party to the first action, the court of appeals held that the agency relationship between the partners under section 7-60-109 of the UPL established the requisite privity for claim preclusion purposes between Dorothy Cruz, as the plaintiff in the first action, and respondents Bryon Cruz and Cruz Enterprises. We agree with the court of appeals insofar as it held that the partners of Cruz Enterprises were in privity with one another for purposes of claim preclusion. Pursuant to sections 7-60-109(1) and 7-60-115(1)(a) and (b) of the UPL, we hold that the relationship between the petitioners, as partners in a general partnership, was a working or functional relationship featuring such substantial[ly] identi[cal] ... interests so as to ensure that the interests of Bryon Cruz and Cruz Enterprises were presented and protected by Dorothy Cruz in the first action. S.O.V., 914 P.2d at 360. As such, we find that Dorothy Cruz, the plaintiff to the first action, and Bryon Cruz and Cruz Enterprises, were in privity with one another and that this relationship triggers the application of claim preclusion, which bars Bryon Cruz and Cruz Enterprises from suing Harold Nelson and Empire in the instant action. For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the court of appeals' holding insofar as it determined that claim preclusion bars petitioners Bryon Cruz and Cruz Enterprises from bringing suit against the respondents Harold Nelson and Empire, who were parties to the first action.