Opinion ID: 2344491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: The Energy Policy Act of 1992

Text: Protect next argues that even greater support for its claim of exemption from Commerce Clause scrutiny is found in recent federal legislation, suggesting there can now be no real debate about the persuasiveness of its position. It argues: Moreover, more recent legislation makes it clear that although the federal government now regulates such things as maximum emissions levels and rates, supervises interstate activity, and oversees other public safety standards, the siting of specific power facilities is left at the state level.  (Emphasis added.) In support of Protect's argument, it points out that the Energy Policy Act of 1992 provides: Nothing in this title or in any amendment made by this title shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect, or in any way to interfere with, the authority of any State or local government relating to environmental protection or the siting of facilities.  (Emphasis added.) Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-486, § 731, 106 Stat. 2776, 2921 (1992). Among other things, Protect also relies upon Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So.2d 428, 436 (Fla.2000). There, based upon this statutory language (§ 731), the Florida Supreme Court rejected appellee's arguments that the state statute on siting of generating plants violated the dormant Commerce Clause and was preempted by the Energy Policy Act of 1992. The court concluded that power-plant siting and need determination are areas that Congress has expressly left to the states. 767 So.2d at 436. We begin our analysis of this argument by repeating the standards of review described above: Congress' language authorizing states to engage in activities that would otherwise be forbidden by the Commerce Clause must be unmistakably clear, and Congress must manifest its unambiguous intent to do so. As a result, it makes sense that we first look for guidance in a Supreme Court decision involving statutory language very similar to the language Protect cites from the Energy Policy Act: Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 3456. In Sporhase, the Supreme Court considered whether a Nebraska state water law impermissibly interfered with interstate commerce. Nebraska argued that Congress had authorized the States to impose otherwise impermissible burdens on interstate commerce in ground water. 458 U.S. at 958, 102 S.Ct. 3456. In support of its argument, Nebraska cited to 37 statutes in which Congress deferred to state water law, as well as to a number of interstate compacts dealing with water rights that received congressional approval. The Court determined that the statute discussed by Nebraska, Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 390, was typical of the 37 statutes. Section 8 of the Act contains language quite similar to the statute, § 731, upon which Protect relies: `[N]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation.' 458 U.S. at 959, 102 S.Ct. 3456. In comparison, § 731 of the Energy Policy Act cited by Protect provides: Nothing in this title or in any amendment made by this title shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect, or in any way to interfere with, the authority of any State or local government relating to environmental protection or the siting of facilities. The Sporhase Court first held that the cited language defines the extent of the federal legislation's pre-emptive effect on state law. (Emphasis added.) 458 U.S. at 959, 102 S.Ct. 3456 (citing New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 341, 102 S.Ct. 1096; Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. at 49, 100 S.Ct. 2009). It then quickly rejected Nebraska's contention:  Although the 37 statutes and the interstate compacts demonstrate Congress' deference to state water law, they do not indicate that Congress wished to remove federal constitutional constraints on such state laws. The negative implications of the Commerce Clause, like the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment, are ingredients of the valid state law to which Congress has deferred. Neither the fact that Congress has chosen not to create a federal water law to govern water rights involved in federal projects, nor the fact that Congress has been willing to let the States settle their differences over water rights through mutual agreement, constitutes persuasive evidence that Congress consented to the unilateral imposition of unreasonable burdens on commerce. In the instances in which we have found such consent, Congress' `intent and policy to sustain state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause' was expressly stated.' (Emphasis added.) 458 U.S. at 959-60, 102 S.Ct. 3456. Just as the Sporhase Court rejected Nebraska's argument, we reject for the same reasons the same argument by Protect based upon virtually the same language. The case of Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 100 S.Ct. 2009, cited in Sporhase, provides additional support. There, the state of Florida argued that the federal Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 permitted the state to pass legislation that might otherwise violate the Commerce Clause, i.e., prohibiting out of state banks from owning or controlling businesses within the state that provided investment advisory services. Section 7 of the Act (12 U.S.C. § 1846) stated: `The enactment by the Congress of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 shall not be construed as preventing any State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof.' 70 Stat. 138.  (Emphasis added.) 447 U.S. at 45-46 n. 12, 100 S.Ct. 2009. The Lewis Court held the legislation was an invalid restriction on interstate commerce. It first acknowledged that § 7 does reserve to the States a general power to enact regulations applicable to bank holding companies. This section was intended to preserve existing state regulations of bank holding companies, even if they were more restrictive than federal law. 447 U.S. at 48-49, 100 S.Ct. 2009. However, the Court held § 7 was not intended to extend to the states new powers to regulate banking that they would not have possessed absent the federal legislation. Rather, it appears that Congress' concern was to define the extent of the federal legislation's pre-emptive effect on state law. 447 U.S. at 49. The Court concluded that § 7 applied only to state legislation that operates within the boundaries marked by the Commerce Clause. 447 U.S. at 49, 100 S.Ct. 2009. Finally, we observe that while the commentary is limited regarding the case upon which Protect relies, Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia , it has been unanimously negative. See Ramsey, Power Plant Siting in a Deregulated Electric Energy Industry; Discerning the Constitutionality of Siting Statutes under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 21 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 91 (Fall 2005); Note, Federalism, Electric Industry Restructuring, and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia and State Restrictions on the Development of Merchant Power Plants, 43 Nat. Resources J. 615 (Spring 2003); Fels & Lindh, Lessons from the California Apocalypse: Jurisdiction over Electric Utilities, 22 Energy L.J. 1 (2001). As the authors wrote in Lessons from the California Apocalypse,  22 Energy L.J. at 30: We believe that the Florida court's reliance on Section 731 of the Energy Policy Act was misplaced ... United States Supreme Court precedent requires an `unambiguous' expression of congressional intent in order to shield protectionist state regulation from invalidation under the Commerce Clause. By its terms, section 731 does no more than leave unaffected whatever authority the states had, prior to enactment of the Energy Policy Act, to regulate siting decisions; certainly nothing in section 731 can be read as an affirmative grant of authority to the states to discriminate in favor of their own residents against interstate commerce.  (Emphasis added.) CONCLUSION 1. We affirm the district court's disposition of (a) the claim under the Takings Clause; (b) the related takings-based claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (c) the inverse condemnation claim. 2. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the dormant Commerce Clause claim alleging discrimination against interstate commerce. 3. We reverse the district court's apparent dismissal of the Commerce Clause claim alleging the Board's decision to amend the zoning regulations placed incidental burdens on interstate commerce that outweighed the benefits. As a result, the court's dismissal of the related burden-based claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is also reversed. See United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management, 550 U.S. 330, 337, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim included allegation that counties' ordinances violated the Commerce Clause by placing an incidental burden on interstate commerce that outweighed the ordinances' benefits). 4. We remand to the district court with instructions to allow discovery on the Commerce Clause burden-based claim, to conduct the Pike balancing test, and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on that claim and any other issues that may remain.