Opinion ID: 2049757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of Dr. MacMahon

Text: The defendant contends Dr. MacMahon, the pediatrician who examined Christina Hebert in September, 1980, should not have been allowed to testify to a statement Christina made to him during the course of the examination, or to express his opinion that Christina had engaged in sexual activity.
During direct examination, Dr. MacMahon testified Christina Hebert told him that there had been sexual activity with an adult. For this statement to be admissible in evidence, it must fall within the exception to the hearsay rule in M.R. Evid. 803(4) (1984), which states: (4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment [are not excluded by the hearsay rule]. The defendant argues that because Christina underwent the examination for a legal purposeto gather evidence for use in a criminal prosecutionthe statement was not one made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. We disagree. The mere fact that the examination was potentially helpful to the prosecution's case does not detract from its medical nature. As Dr. MacMahon testified, the examination was conducted to see if there was any scarring, damage, or evidence of past sexual activity or abuse, or any obvious abnormality in the child's pelvic area. The purpose of the examination was clearly to allow medical diagnosis, and Christina's statement was pertinent thereto. [9] Cf. State v. True, 438 A.2d at 467 (statement that it was intercourse occurring the previous evening that caused victim to consult a doctor fell within 803(4) exception to exclusion of hearsay); State v. Lee, 404 A.2d 983, 984 n.1 (Me.1979) (chart entry by nurse who took victim's history that victim was assaulted, stepped on in stomach, and hit with iron pipe was admissible). We reject the defendant's contention that admission of Christina's statement to Dr. MacMahon was contrary to the rationale behind the statements pertinent to medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule. See M.R.Evid. 803(4) adviser's note (rationale for exception is inherent reliability of statements to doctor pertinent to diagnosis); see also State v. Howard, 405 A.2d 206, 209 (Me.1979). Dr. MacMahon clearly understood he was conducting the examination for the purpose of medical diagnosis. The statement made for purposes of the diagnosis did not lose its inherently trustworthy nature merely because the declarant might have been aware criminal proceedings might be instituted. [10]
The defendant contends Dr. MacMahon should not have been allowed to express his opinion that the ragged edges of Christina's hymen and the enlarged opening of the introitus were consistent with tearing causing bleeding and with past sexual activity. The defendant reasons that since Christina's medical condition was no less consistent with sexual inactivity as with attempted or actual penetration of the vagina, it did not assist the trier of fact in determining the crucial issue in the case and was thus not admissible under Maine Rule of Evidence 702. [11] We disagree. It is well-established that an expert need not be able to state his opinion with any special degree of certainty. The degree of certainty goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Woodbury, 403 A.2d 1166, 1170 (Me.1979); State v. Mitchell, 390 A.2d 495, 501 (Me.1978). We perceive no abuse of discretion in the presiding justice's determination that the opinion testimony of Dr. MacMahon could be helpful to the jury.