Opinion ID: 1170873
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preservation of the Evidence

Text: Investigators at the scene of the murder took several photographs of the ground outside the window that had been forced open. At trial, Department of Justice criminalist Faye Springer testified on the similarity between some of the footprints visible in the photographs and the imprint left by the shoes defendant was wearing at his arrest. Defendant sought to suppress this testimony both before and during the trial; neither motion was granted. Springer identified a number of the footprints as matching those of defendant. In other photographs, her identification was less definitive. She further testified that impressions on the periphery of several of the photographs were probably made by Huffman's shoes. Referring to the quality of the photography, she admitted that Huffman's prints had been treated as secondary in all the photographs. Located toward the edges of the photographs, his prints were less in focus and sometimes inadequately illuminated, making identification difficult. Springer stated that if she had been at the scene, she would have taken more pictures of each print and, in order to plot the entire scene, more overviews. (13a) Defendant claims that the prosecution failed to adequately preserve the footprint evidence. With better photographs of the footprints, he contends, it would have been possible to determine if Huffman's impressions were made after those of defendant, thereby exculpating defendant. In People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641, 649-650 [117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361], we held that due process required the People to preserve breathalyzer ampoules for later retesting by defendants charged with driving while intoxicated. This duty to preserve evidence applies whenever there is a reasonable probability that it might constitute favorable evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence. Hitch was later extended to require the preservation of a semen sample taken from a rape victim ( People v. Nation (1980) 26 Cal.3d 169, 177 [161 Cal. Rptr. 299, 604 P.2d 1051]) and a urine sample of a suspected narcotics user ( People v. Moore (1983) 34 Cal.3d 215, 221-222 [193 Cal. Rptr. 404, 666 P.2d 419]). For purposes of discussion, we shall assume that Hitch remains fully vital after the decision of the United States Supreme Court in California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 104 S.Ct. 2520]. (See generally People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011, 1020-1022 [251 Cal. Rptr. 643, 761 P.2d 103]; People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 774, fn. 18 [251 Cal. Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260].) Defendant does not dispute the identification of his footprints, but rather argues that the police should have taken more and better photographs. He believes this would have shown that Huffman was the last entrant into the apartment. His contention must fail, however, because due process does not require that the prosecution obtain any particular evidence or conduct specific tests. ( People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 851 [183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93].) The police cannot be expected to `gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense.' ( Ibid. ) Here, the police made a photographic record of the most prominent impressions outside the presumed point of entry, and the photographs are of reasonable quality. Defendant does not assert that this photographic evidence was not properly preserved, or that he was denied an opportunity to conduct his own analysis of it. Due process demands no more.