Opinion ID: 2968444
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: has, as an element, the use or attempted use of

Text: physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim[.] Id. As is readily apparent, the MCDV Definition is structured as a statement of what is being defined, followed by a parallel list of two essential attributes. After identifying the term misdemeanor crime of UNITED STATES v. HAYES 7 domestic violence as the thing being defined, the MCDV Definition splits into two separate clauses. First, clause (i) provides that an MCDV must be a misdemeanor under Federal or State law. Id. § 921(a)(33)(A)(i). Next, clause (ii) of the MCDV Definition — the crux of the dispute here — provides that an MCDV must have as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim. Id. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). It is significant that a semicolon has been placed at the end of the MCDV Definition’s clause (i), indicating that the attribute contained therein is to be separate and distinct from the attribute contained in clause (ii). See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774 n.5 (1979) (recognizing that punctuation is not always decisive, but finding significant the use of separate numbers to introduce each subsection, and the fact that the phrase . . . was set off solely as part of [a separate] subsection). Of even greater significance, there is no corresponding semicolon in the structure or text of clause (ii), and thus no indication that the second of the two attributes in the MCDV Definition somehow terminates before the words committed by, or sets the committed by phrase apart from the have, as an element language, thereby creating a third statutory attribute. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). Rather, the structure of the MCDV Definition makes it clear that the committed by phrase is part of the second attribute, that is, clause (ii). See 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 143 ([T]he collocation of the words and phrases in a statute is sometimes an aid in the construction therein, and should not be arbitrarily disregarded [unless] the intention of the legislature requires it to be disregarded.). If Congress, in drafting the MCDV Definition, had seen fit to place the second half of clause (ii) — that is, the words committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim — in a separate clause, we might very well accept the Government’s contention. However, that is not the statutory provision we are called upon to assess. Here, the committed by phrase in clause (ii) was not set apart by Congress, and the MCDV Definition thus does not restrict the clause’s has, as an element language to only the first half thereof, that is, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon. 8 UNITED STATES v. HAYES