Opinion ID: 2982658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Drug Premises Enhancement Challenge

Text: Wurzelbacher contends that the district court improperly imposed the drug premises enhancement because the enhancement went into effect November 1, 2010, and his conspiracy began before that date. Wurzelbacher argues that it is unclear whether he used the farmhouse at the time the enhancement went into effect because the district court made no such factual findings and the parties’ agreed Statement of Facts stipulates only that use occurred “[d]uring the conspiracy.” If use of the farmhouse for drug purposes ceased prior to the enhancement’s enactment, Wurzelbacher argues, imposing the enhancement would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2078 (2013) (holding that an Ex Post Facto Clause violation occurs “when a defendant is sentenced under Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides a higher applicable Guidelines -6- No. 13-4261 United States v. Wurzelbacher sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense”). This ambiguity about when his criminal use of the farmhouse ended, he insists, should be construed against the government, requiring a remand for additional fact finding. No such proceedings are required here. Even if Wurzelbacher had argued and proved that he ceased using the farmhouse in the conspiracy prior to November 1, 2010, the drug premises enhancement would still apply because the conspiracy itself was ongoing. We have held that applying the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing to a continuing offense, such as a conspiracy, “does not violate the ex post facto clause, even if the sentence potentially encompasses acts that occurred prior to [a] Guidelines change.” United States v. Sutton, 387 F. App’x 595, 604 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Buckner, 9 F.3d 452, 454 (6th Cir. 1993)). Moreover, the district court must apply the Guidelines Manual then in effect “in its entirety” unless doing so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a)–(b). The Guidelines do not permit the court, as Wurzelbacher hints, to apply one guideline section from one edition and another guideline section from another edition. Id. § 1B1.11(b)(2). Further, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(3) provides that “[i]f the defendant is convicted of two offenses, the first committed before, and the second after, a revised edition of the Guidelines Manual became effective, the revised edition of the Guidelines Manual is to be applied to both offenses.” See also United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying this provision). Because Wurzelbacher’s conspiracy began in June 2006 and ended in July 2012, the district court properly used the 2012 Guidelines to calculate his sentence.4 Thus, the district court did 4 U.S.S.G § 1B1.11(a)–(b)(1) provides that the court “shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced” unless doing so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Thus, the district court properly used the 2012 Guidelines, effective November 1, 2012, -7- No. 13-4261 United States v. Wurzelbacher not err in imposing the drug premises enhancement based on Wurzelbacher’s admission that he used the farmhouse for distribution purposes “during the conspiracy.”