Opinion ID: 3175254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the section 10(e) issue

Text: “[A] lockout unlawful at its inception retains its initial taint of illegality until it is terminated and the affected employees are made whole.” Movers & Warehousemen’s Ass’n of Metro. Wash., D.C., Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 356, 357 (1976), enforced 550 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1977). In other words, to cure a lockout, the employer must restore the status quo ante as well as end the lockout. See Greensburg CocaCola Bottling Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1029 (1993), enforcement denied on other grounds, 40 F.3d 669 (3d Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, “an employer can avoid further liability if it is able to show affirmatively that a failure to restore the status quo ante did not adversely affect subsequent bargaining.” Id. 13 Alden Leeds contends that the Board erred in refusing to permit the Company to litigate the scope of its backpay liability in a compliance proceeding. In particular, the Company argues that it should be afforded an opportunity to establish in a compliance proceeding that its backpay liability ended on November 9. We lack jurisdiction to consider this challenge, however, because Alden Leeds failed to raise this claim with the Board, as required by the Act. Section 10(e) of the NLRA provides that “[n]o objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). The Board’s regulation interpreting this provision requires parties to “set forth specifically the questions of procedure, fact, law, or policy to which exception is taken” and “concisely state the grounds for the exception.” 29 C.F.R. § 102.46(b)(1); see also id. § 102.46(b)(2) (“Any exception to a ruling, finding, conclusion, or recommendation which is not specifically urged shall be deemed to have been waived.”). “And it is long established that where a petitioner objects to a finding on an issue first raised in the Board’s decision, a petitioner must file for reconsideration to afford the Board an opportunity to correct the error, if any.” Nova Se. Univ. v. NLRB, 807 F.3d 308, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 666 (1982)). It is undisputed that Alden Leeds failed to raise its claim with the Board as required by Section 10(e) of the Act. Once the ALJ found that the Company’s November 9, 2009, offer did not cure the lockout, and instead found that the lockout retained its initial taint of illegality until the Company terminated the lockout and made its employees whole, Alden 14 Leeds was obligated to challenge that finding in its exceptions to the Board in order to preserve the issue for judicial review. See Nova Se. Univ., 807 F.3d at 313 (dismissing challenge under Section 10(e) where petitioner failed to file proper exception); Spectrum Health-Kent Cmty. Campus v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 341, 348-50 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same). But as the Board found and the Company concedes, Alden Leeds failed to raise and preserve its objection. See Alden Leeds, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 20, at 1 n.3; Br. of Petitioner at 50 (“The question of the scope of the Company’s backpay liability . . . was not the subject of a specific exception made to the NLRB below.”). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction under Section 10(e) to consider the Company’s challenge. In an attempt to escape this conclusion, Alden Leeds presses several arguments, none of which is persuasive. First, the Company contends that under Greensburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1993), cited by the dissenting Board member, the scope of the Company’s backpay liability should be reserved for the compliance stage of the Board’s proceedings, despite the fact that Alden Leeds did not raise this issue before the Board during the unfair labor practice proceedings. See Br. of Petitioner at 47-52. But as the majority of the Board correctly pointed out, Greensburg Coca-Cola does not support the Company’s position. In Greensburg Coca-Cola, the ALJ explicitly deferred the backpay issue of whether the lockout was cured or retained its initial taint of illegality to a future compliance proceeding, 311 N.L.R.B. at 1028-29, and neither party filed an exception to that portion of the ALJ’s decision. Thus, the jurisdictional bar of Section 10(e) was not at issue. In the present case, in contrast, the ALJ explicitly ruled that the lockout was not cured and retained its initial taint of illegality until the Union’s employees were made whole, but Alden Leeds never objected to this finding. Greensburg Coca-Cola 15 thus presents no justification to disturb the application of Section 10(e)’s jurisdictional bar in the present case. Second, relying on Trump Plaza Associates v. NLRB, 679 F.3d 822 (D.C. Cir. 2012), Alden Leeds argues that the jurisdictional bar of Section 10(e) does not apply in this case because the Board was “sufficiently appraised” of the issue that Alden Leeds now seeks to raise. Therefore, according to the Company, it would have been an “empty formality” to raise the matter with the Board in the first instance. Reply Br. of Petitioner at 22-24. We reject this argument. In Trump Plaza, the court found that the substance of the petitioner’s challenge was encompassed in its other exceptions filed with the Board. Therefore, the court determined that Section 10(e) was not a bar to the petitioner’s challenge, despite the petitioner’s failure to specifically object before the Board. Trump Plaza, 679 F.3d at 830. Unlike in Trump Plaza, Alden Leeds never put before the Board, in any manner, the argument that it now advances – that Alden Leeds should be able to contest the scope of its backpay liability at a compliance proceeding. Not only did Alden Leeds fail to make this argument in a specific exception filed before the Board, but none of the other exceptions filed by Alden Leeds encompassed the substance of this challenge. Indeed, Alden Leeds has never even argued that its other exceptions encompassed its backpay challenge. Trump Plaza therefore provides the Company with no relief. See id.; see also Parsippany Hotel Mgmt. Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 41718 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding vague exception insufficient to provide Board with required notice of ground for petitioner’s challenge). Finally, Alden Leeds argues that Section 10(e) should not apply in this case because the Board discussed the backpay 16 issue on its own initiative, the issue has been briefed by the parties, and the issue involves an undecided question of law. See Br. of Petitioner at 51-52. These points cannot carry the day. The Company attempts to frame these circumstances as “extraordinary,” sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court to address the issue. See Reply Br. at 24-28. The Company’s position, however, finds no support in the law. “[S]ection 10(e) bars review of any issue not presented to the Board, even where the Board has discussed and decided the issue.” HealthBridge Mgmt., LLC v. NLRB, 798 F.3d 1059, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Alwin Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, Section 10(e) applies “regardless of whether the questions raised be considered questions of law, questions of fact, or mixed questions of fact and law.” P.R. Drydock & Marine Terminals, Inc. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 212, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1960).