Opinion ID: 2801047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board Applied the Incorrect Legal Standard

Text: A generic term “is the common descriptive name of a class of goods or services.” H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Because generic terms “are by definition incapable of indicating a particular source of the goods or services,” they cannot be registered as trademarks. Dial-A- Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1344. “The critical issue in genericness cases is whether members of the relevant public primarily use or understand the term sought to be protected to refer to the genus of goods or services in question.” Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d at 989-90. We have said that determining a mark’s genericness requires “a two-step inquiry: First, what is the genus of goods or services at issue? Second, is the term sought to be registered or retained on the register understood by the relevant public primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services?” Id. at 990. Evidence of the public’s understanding of the mark may be obtained from “any competent source, such as consumer surveys, dictionaries, newspapers and other publications.” In re Northland Aluminum Prods., Inc., 777 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In an opposition or cancellation proceeding, the opposer or petitioner bears the burden of proving genericness by a preponderance of the evidence. See Magic 8 PRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC v. FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 641-42 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 2 Applying the first prong of the Marvin Ginn test, the Board defined the genus of goods at issue as “pretzel crackers.” Board Decision, 109 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1952. Turning to the second prong, the Board identified the relevant public as “ordinary consumers who purchase and eat pretzel crackers.” Id. Neither party disputes these findings on appeal. 2 Although the parties agree that the relevant standard is preponderance of the evidence, Frito-Lay notes that they disputed who bore the burden of proof on the issue of genericness at trial. Appellee Br. 20 n.5. Frito-Lay argued to the Board that Princeton Vanguard should bear the burden to show that its mark is not generic because its registration on the Supplemental Register is not prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark. The parties did not brief this issue on appeal. Indeed, Frito-Lay states that we “need not consider this issue at this juncture,” but concedes that it would become “relevant in the event of a remand.” Id. We agree with the Board that the burden was on FritoLay to prove genericness by a preponderance of the evidence. See Am. Med. Rehab. Providers Ass’n. v. UB Found. Activities, Inc., Opp. No. 91158512, Canc’n No. 92043381, 2008 WL 4674613, at  (T.T.A.B. Sept. 23, 2008) (“In an opposition/cancellation, the opposer/petitioner has the burden of proving genericness by a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’”); Racine Indus., Inc. v. Bane-Clene Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1832, 1838 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (“Opposer, as the party contending that the designation ‘PCA’ is a generic term for applicant’s professional carpet cleaners’ association, bears the burden of proof thereof.”). PRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC v. 9 FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. The Board began its discussion of the public’s perception of the mark by stating that it “first must decide how to analyze the term.” Id. Although the Board acknowledged that the ultimate inquiry is whether the mark as a whole is generic, it then cited In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1987), for the proposition that, “in cases where the proposed mark is a compound term (in other words a combination of two or more terms in ordinary grammatical construction), genericness may be established with evidence of the meaning of the constituent words.” Id. (citing Gould, 834 F.2d at 1019). The Board indicated that, “[b]y contrast, ‘where the proposed mark is a phrase . . . the board cannot simply cite definitions and generic uses of the constituent terms of a mark; it must conduct an inquiry into the meaning of the disputed phrase as a whole.’” Id. (quoting Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1345 (citing In re Am. Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). The Board appears to believe that there is a dichotomy in the standard applicable to a particular mark depending on whether it is a compound term or a phrase. According to the Board, if the mark is a compound term, then Gould applies, and it can focus on the individual words, but if it is a phrase, American Fertility requires that the Board consider the mark in its entirety. Id. at 1953. Because the Board found “no additional meaning added to ‘PRETZEL CRISPS’ in relation to ‘pretzel crackers,’ when the individual terms are combined,” the Board analyzed it as a compound term. Id. The Board then considered the terms individually and concluded that “pretzel” is generic for pretzels and pretzel snacks, and “crisps” is generic for crackers. Id. The problem with the Board’s analysis is that there is only one legal standard for genericness: the two-part test set forth in Marvin Ginn. Am. Fertility, 188 F.3d at 1348. As noted, to determine whether a mark is generic under that test, the Board must first identify the genus of goods 10 PRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC v. FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. or services at issue, and then assess whether the public understands the mark, as a whole, to refer to that genus. Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d at 990. On appeal, Frito-Lay cites our decisions in Gould and American Fertility to suggest that the Board can somehow short-cut its analysis of the public’s perception where “the purported mark is a compound term consisting merely of two generic words.” Appellee Br. 21. As discussed below, however, there is no such short-cut, and the test for genericness is the same, regardless of whether the mark is a compound term or a phrase. Neither Gould nor American Fertility hold otherwise. The applicant in Gould sought to register the mark SCREENWIPE for goods identified as “pre-moistened, anti-static cloth for cleaning computer and television screens.” 834 F.2d at 1017. While the Board looked to the individual definitions of “screen” and “wipe,” we found that “Gould’s own submissions provided the most damaging evidence that its alleged mark is generic and would be perceived by the purchasing public as merely a common name for its goods rather than a mark identifying the good’s source.” Id. at 1018-19. Indeed, Gould described its own product as “a . . . wipe . . . for . . . screens.” Id. at 1019. Given this admission, we noted that the “compound immediately and unequivocally describes the purpose, function and nature of the goods as Gould itself tells us.” Id. (“Gould has simply joined the two most pertinent and individually generic terms applicable to its product, and then attempts to appropriate the ordinary compound thus created as its trademark.”). In that context, where the mark in its entirety has exactly the same meaning as the individual words, we stated that “the PTO has satisfied its evidentiary burden if, as it did in this case, it produces evidence . . . that the separate words joined to form a compound have a meaning identical to the meaning common usage would ascribe to those words as a com- pound.” Id. at 1018. Because “the terms remain as PRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC v. 11 FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. generic in the compound as individually,” we concluded that the compound itself was generic. Id. at 1019. In American Fertility, we explained that: (1) Gould did not alter the legal standard for genericness; and (2) the correct legal test “is set forth in Marvin Ginn and is to be applied to a mark . . . as a whole, for the whole may be greater than the sum of its parts.” Am. Fertility, 188 F.3d at 1348. In that case, the Board held that the proposed mark—SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE—was generic based on evidence of record relating solely to the individual terms. Id. at 1344 (“Despite the lack of evidence of the public’s understanding of the phrase as a whole, the Board held that the ‘combination of the terms ‘society’ and ‘reproductive medicine’ results in a designation, SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, which is also generic.’”) (citation omitted). We vacated the Board’s decision on appeal, finding that it applied the incorrect legal standard when it “assumed the genericness of a phrase as a whole based solely on proof of the genericness of its individual terms.” Id. at 1342. In reaching this conclusion in American Fertility, we clarified that the Gould decision “did not purport to modify Marvin Ginn . . . and seemingly sought to follow” it by focusing on Gould’s generic use in its entirety. Id. at 1347. We reiterated that Marvin Ginn requires evidence of the “genus of goods or services at issue” and the “understanding by the general public that the mark refers primarily to ‘that genus of goods or services.’” Id. “Properly interpreted, Gould does not justify a short-cut around this test, but rather found that the evidence presented met this burden.” Id. at 1348. We further indicated that the Board “cannot simply cite definitions and generic uses of the constituent terms of a mark . . . in lieu of conducting an inquiry into the meaning of the disputed phrase as a whole to hold a mark . . . generic.” Id. at 1347. Accordingly, we remanded the case for the 12 PRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC v. FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. Board to apply the Marvin Ginn test to the mark as a whole. Id. at 1349. In subsequent decisions, this court has reiterated that, “[a]n inquiry into the public’s understanding of a mark requires consideration of the mark as a whole. Even if each of the constituent words in a combination mark is generic, the combination is not generic unless the entire formulation does not add any meaning to the otherwise generic mark.” In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In Steelbuilding, the applicant sought to register the mark STEELBUILDING.COM in connection with “computerized on-line retail services in the field of pre-engineered metal buildings and roofing systems.” Id. at 1296. The Board found that the mark was either generic or highly descriptive, and that there was insufficient evidence of acquired distinctiveness. Id. On appeal, we found that the record did not contain substantial evidence that “STEELBUILDING,” “in common usage, is a compound word used to mean either ‘steel building’ or ‘steel buildings.’” Id. at 1298 (citing Gould, 834 F.2d at 1018). In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that Gould required consideration of the mark in its entirety, and that the applicant in Gould “admitted that ‘screen wipe’ denoted a ‘screen wipe.’” Id. at 1298. In other words, the combined term at issue in Gould—SCREENWIPE—itself described the genus of goods at issue. In contrast, the applicant denied that “STEELBUILDING” describes merely “steel buildings.” Id. Although the Board cited evidence showing that “steel building” was generic, that evidence did not “address directly the composite term STEELBUILDING.” Id. at 1299. We concluded, therefore, that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to PRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC v. 13 FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. support the Board’s finding that STEELBUILDING.COM was generic for the applicant’s services. Id. 3 On appeal, Frito-Lay argues that American Fertility is distinguishable from this case because it involved a phrase, not a compound term. According to Frito-Lay, the applicable legal standard depends on an initial “factual determination of whether the purported mark is a compound term or a phrase.” Appellee Br. 36-37. 4 We disa- 3 Other decisions have likewise emphasized that the Board must consider the mark in its entirety. See Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1346 (“Analyzing the ‘1-888- M-A-T-R-E-S-S’ mark as a whole, substantial evidence does not support the conclusion that the mark is generic. There is no record evidence that the relevant public refers to the class of shop-at-home telephone mattress retailers as ‘1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S.’”). 4 Frito-Lay cites Cummins Engine Co., Inc. v. Con- tinental Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 892 (CCPA 1966), for the proposition that analyzing compound terms individually “has been a part of this Court’s trademark precedent for nearly fifty years, if not longer.” Appellee Br. 23. In Cummins, however, our predecessor court found that “the definitions alone indicate that ‘turbodiesel’ is a word which by its nature will convey a specific and correct meaning which is such that it cannot become a trademark as a result even of origination and first use.” Cummins, 359 F.2d at 894. The record also contained a “Flight” magazine article which was published prior to the applicant’s use of the term TURBODIESEL and referred to “turbo-diesel” as an engine name. Id. at 894-95. Given the evidence of record, the court concluded that the term “turbodiesel” “would be recognized as a natural composite term for designating such engines.” Id. at 895. Despite Frito-Lay’s suggestion to the contrary, the court in Cum14 PRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC v. FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. gree. Regardless of whether the mark is a compound term or a phrase, the applicable test is the same and the Board must consider the record evidence of the public’s understanding of the mark as a whole. Am. Fertility, 188 F.3d at 1348-49. Our decision in Gould merely provides additional assistance in assessing the genericness of compound terms where it can be shown that “the public understands the individual terms to be generic,” and the joining of those terms into one compound word provides no additional meaning. Id. It is not a short-cut and does not supplant the two-part test set forth in Marvin Ginn. Even in cases where we have recognized that Gould provides an evidentiary standard applicable to compound terms, we have nonetheless emphasized that the Board must consider the mark in its entirety. See Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1304-06 (citing Gould and concluding that “the Board satisfied its evidentiary burden, by demonstrating that the separate terms ‘hotel’ and ‘.com’ in combination have a meaning identical to the common meaning of the separate components”); see also In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In 1800Mattress.com, for example, the Board initially considered the terms “mattress” and “.com” individually and determined that they were both generic. 586 F.3d at 1363. We explained that the Board “then considered the mark as a whole and determined that the combination added no new meaning, relying on the prevalence of the term ‘mattress.com’ in the website addresses of several online mattress retailers that provide the same services as Dial-A-Mattress.” Id. In affirming the Board’s decision, we indicated that the Board “properly determined” that “the correct inquiry is whether the relevant public mins looked to the public’s understanding of the mark as a whole. PRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC v. 15 FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. would understand, when hearing the term ‘mattress.com,’ that it refers to online mattress stores.” Id. at 1364. Accordingly, even in circumstances where the Board finds it useful to consider the public’s understanding of the individual words in a compound term as a first step in its analysis, the Board must then consider available record evidence of the public’s understanding of whether joining those individual words into one lends additional meaning to the mark as a whole. See id. at 1363-64; see Ho- tels.com, 573 F.3d at 1304-06. As noted, here, the Board determined that PRETZEL CRISPS is a compound term, not a phrase, and evaluated the terms individually under Gould. Board Decision, 109 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1953. The Board concluded that the “commonly understood meaning of the words ‘pretzel’ and ‘crisps,’ demonstrates that purchasers understand that ‘PRETZEL CRISPS’ identifies ‘pretzel crackers.’” Id. at 1959. Where, as here, the record is replete with evidence of the public’s perception of the term PRETZEL CRISPS as a whole, it is unclear why the Board would resort to analyzing the terms individually or why it would believe doing so would aid its analysis. In any event, as we have explained, the appropriate legal standard set forth in Marvin Ginn requires consideration of the mark as a whole. At the end of its decision, the Board stated in passing that, although it analyzed the term PRETZEL CRISPS as a compound term, “were we to analyze it as a phrase, on this record, our conclusion would be the same, as the words strung together as a unified phrase also create a meaning that we find to be understood by the relevant public as generic for ‘pretzel crackers.’” Board Decision, 109 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1960. But the Board’s decision lacks any indicia that it actually engaged in such an analysis. Specifically, as explained below, there is no evidence that the Board conducted the necessary step of comparing its findings with respect to the individual words to the record 16 PRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC v. FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. evidence demonstrating the public’s understanding of the combined term: PRETZEL CRISPS. By failing to do so, the Board took the type of short-cut analysis we have said is prohibited and ignored evidence that might compel a contrary conclusion. See Am. Fertility, 188 F.3d at 1348 (stating that “Gould does not justify a short-cut around” the test articulated in Marvin Ginn). We conclude, therefore, that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard in its genericness determination. On remand, the Board must consider evidence of the relevant public’s understanding of the term PRETZEL CRISPS in its entirety.