Opinion ID: 656502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Calculation of Amount of Loss (U.S.S.G.s 2F1.1(b)(1))

Text: 34 Defendants argue that the district court erred in calculating the amount of loss attributable to each of them for purposes of increasing the base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1). Their arguments are two: First, that the district court erred in averaging the amount of loss to each victim and also in determining the average to be $2,750, and second, in determining the number of aliens for which each defendant was responsible for purposes of calculating the total amount of loss. 35 The district court expressly found that the average of the fees for each of the aliens was $2,750. The district court rejected the argument made here by the defendants that the testimony at trial and ledger cards kept by David Fuller refute the $2,750 figure. It found that $2,750 was the appropriate measure of the average intended loss based on what the aliens had agreed to pay. We review a factual finding of an amount of loss for clear error. United States v. West, No. 92-5450 (4th Cir. Aug. 19, 1993). We are of opinion that there was no error in this case. In calculating the amount of loss under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1), 36 the loss need not be determined with precision. The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information. This estimate, for example, may be based on the approximate number of victims and an estimate of the average loss to each victim.... 37 U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1), cmt., n.8 (1991). We think the method used by the district court, averaging the expected payments, was appropriate, and that its finding of $2,750 per alien was not clearly erroneous. 38 Having determined that the $2,750 figure is not clearly erroneous, we next turn to defendants' contention that the district court erred in calculating the number of victims attributable to each of the defendants. It determined that there were 80 fraudulent applications in all. The court further adopted the presentence reports' determinations that all of the applications were chargeable to Mrs. Fuller, 20 applications were chargeable to Mrs. Dureke, and 60 applications were chargeable to Mr. Fuller, 20 based on the testimony at trial of the time each coconspirator was actively involved in the conspiracy. We are of opinion that these findings are not clearly erroneous. 39 The factual predicates the district court used to determine the amount of loss were not clearly erroneous, and the district court correctly applied U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1) to increase each defendant's base offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1), cmt., n.8 (1991). We affirm those increases in sentences. III MRS. FULLER'S INDIVIDUAL ARGUMENTS 40 Mrs. Fuller raises two issues in addition to the joint arguments: (1) that the district court erred in imposing a sentence greater than the Guidelines range of 41-51 months; and (2) that she is entitled to a new trial because her trial counsel was ineffective within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A. Sentencing 41 The district court found that Mrs. Fuller had a base offense level of 20 and a Criminal History Category of III, which resulted in a Guidelines sentence of 41-51 months. After hearing argument, the district court determined that an upward departure for disruption of governmental function under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7 was warranted. In determining the 72 months' sentence imposed, the district court stated that it did not think that the Guidelines range without the enhancement was adequate to reflect the serious disruption of the INS and subversion of immigration policy that occurred in this case. The district court therefore imposed the 72 months' sentence and stated that 12 months of the sentence was imposed because of the subornation of perjury counts and that 60 months of the sentence was imposed for all of the other counts. Mrs. Fuller now asserts on appeal, without reference to the upward departure, that what the district court really did was to ungroup the offenses, as she puts it, in violation of U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1. 21 42 We are of opinion that the district court did not ungroup the offenses. It determined the offense level and applicable Guidelines range before it ruled on the departure. The sole basis for the upward departure was the explicit Guidelines factor of disruption of governmental function, which the district court found to be substantial enough to warrant departure. We are of opinion that the district court's finding of the factor warranting departure was not clearly erroneous, the finding that the conduct was sufficient to warrant departure was not an abuse of discretion, and the extent of the departure itself was not an abuse of discretion and was reasonable. See United States v. Hummer, 916 F.2d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3702 (U.S. 1991). The district court's explanation of its reasoning as to the amount of departure does not serve to convert a valid departure into a prohibited ungrouping. We therefore affirm Mrs. Fuller's sentence. B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 43 Mrs. Fuller's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is premature. The rule in this circuit is that a claim of ineffective assistance should be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court rather than on direct appeal, unless the record conclusively shows ineffective assistance. United States v. Williams, 977 F.2d 866, 871 (4th Cir. 1992). In this case there is no such conclusive evidence. Mrs. Fuller may pursue this claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 if she be so advised. IV MR. FULLER'S INDIVIDUAL ARGUMENTS 44 Mr. Fuller raises several issues in this appeal. He first argues that the district court improperly refused to issue a subpoena to an Assistant United States Attorney to secure her testimony at the suppression hearing. Fuller next takes issue with the district court's ruling on his motion to suppress. He also objects to limits the district court placed on his counsel's cross-examination of certain witnesses at trial. Finally, Fuller argues that the district court improperly sentenced him by applying enhancements for obstruction of justice and his role in the offense to increase his offense level. 45 A. Subpoena for an Assistant United States Attorney 46 Before the suppression hearing, Fuller's attorney apparently attempted to have the district court issue a subpoena to secure Assistant United States Attorney Renee Christina's testimony at the suppression hearing. Mr. Fuller's attorney sought her testimony to corroborate Mr. Fuller's contention that several statements the Government planned to use at trial had been made during the course of plea negotiations. The district court refused to issue the subpoena. The district court's refusal was discussed on the record at the suppression hearing, during which the district court informed counsel for Mr. Fuller that you can't just subpoena an assistant U.S. attorney. There's a federal reg. and you've got to go through a lot more than just a subpoena. The district court and counsel then turned to another subject. In this court Mr. Fuller argues that the denial amounted to a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, confrontation, and representation. 47 Section 16.23 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides: 48 § 16.23 General disclosure authority in Federal and State proceedings in which the United States is a party..... 49 (c) If oral testimony is sought by a demand in a case or matter in which the United States is a party, an affidavit, or, if that is not feasible, a statement by the party seeking the testimony or by the party's attorney setting forth a summary of the testimony sought must be furnished to the Department [of Justice] attorney handling the case or matter. 50 28 C.F.R. § 16.23(c). There is no evidence in the record that any affidavit or statement was ever furnished to the United States Attorney's Office in connection with the testimony of Assistant United States Attorney Christina. 51 Mr. Fuller argues that there is as much evidence that he did comply with the regulation as there is that he did not (i.e., none), and in any event, he faults the district court for not telling him what he must do to comply with the regulation. The fallacy of this argument is obvious. Because Fuller did not comply with the regulation, we find no error in the district court's refusal to issue the subpoena. United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 406 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977). We leave for another day the constitutional questions raised. See Allen, 554 F.2d at 407. See also United States v. Marino, 658 F.2d 1120, 1125 (6th Cir. 1981). B. Motion to Suppress 52 Fuller next assigns as error the district court's refusal to suppress certain statements 22 and tangible evidence he gave to Agent Jackson. Fuller persists in his contention that these statements were made during the course of plea negotiations, which the government denies. The district court heard testimony from Fuller, Agent Jackson, and Agent Glen Ferry of the Department of Health and Human Services. The district court made a credibility finding in favor of the government and against Fuller. After a review of the record, we find no basis on which to disturb the district court's ruling on the motion. Its findings are not clearly erroneous. C. Cross-Examination Limits 53 Fuller first claims that his rights under the Sixth Amendment were violated because the district court improperly curtailed his cross-examination of the government's witnesses. Without directing this court to any instance in which his cross-examination was so curtailed, Mr. Fuller argues that the district court curtailed his cross-examination because his was the fourth defense attorney to question each witness, and similar questions had been asked by the other three attorneys. In light of the district court's broad discretion to prevent repetitive cross-examination, 23 and Mr. Fuller's failure to point to any examples of prejudicial limits on his cross-examination, we are of opinion that no error occurred. 54 Fuller next argues that the district court improperly limited his cross-examination of Agent Jackson because of concerns that his cross-examination would elicit testimony about the other defendants in violation of the principles established in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Fuller contends that he had the right to cross-examine Agent Jackson about those portions of his confession that inculpated the other defendants. After his counsel made an attempt along these lines, the district court warned counsel and prohibited further cross-examination of Agent Jackson on those subjects until after Fuller had testified. The government made Agent Jackson available for further cross-examination after Fuller testified, but she was not recalled for cross-examination. 55 Fuller attempts to distinguish Bruton by relying his own right to cross-examine witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment. His argument ignores, however, the rights that Bruton protects, which are the rights of his co-defendants to confront witnesses against them. See United States v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 39, 43 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. 1991). If the district court had allowed Mr. Fuller's counsel to question Agent Jackson about Mr. Fuller's hearsay statements that inculpated the other defendants, the questioning would have run afoul of Bruton. Until Mr. Fuller actually took the stand later in the trial, there was no guarantee that the codefendants would have an opportunity to cross-examine him (the declarant) about those statements; his testimony could not, of course, be compelled. U.S. Const. amend. V. Agent Jackson was made available so that he could reopen cross-examination after he testified, if he so wished, which he did not. 56 Fuller would have us elevate his right to immediately cross-examine Agent Jackson over his co-defendants' rights to confront their accuser. This we decline to do. We are of opinion that the district court's careful handling of this manner was entirely proper. D. Sentencing Enhancements 57 Mr. Fuller contends that the enhancement of his base offense level for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 was improper because there was no specific fact-finding to support it, the reliability of the agent's statement on which the enhancement was based had not been proved; and the district court had refused to revoke Mr. Fuller's release bond despite the obstruction of justice evidence. None of these contentions have any merit. We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 1989). The district court expressly adopted paragraphs 19 and 20 of the presentence report, which detailed the obstruction activity. The facts recited in those paragraphs clearly establish obstruction of justice within the meaning of § 3C1.1. We find no error in the enhancement. 58 Next, we turn to Fuller's contention that the two-level enhancement of his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) was improper. A district court's determination that a defendant played an aggravating role in the offense is essentially a finding of fact that will not be disturbed on review unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Sheffer, 896 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 838, and cert. denied, 498 U.S. 968 (1990). Here, the district court found that the paragraph in the presentence report on which the enhancement was based (p 17) was correct. Further, the district court stated that assessing the defendant only a two-level increase was giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt for his participation as manager or supervisor. After a review of the record we conclude that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous, and the enhancement was proper. V MRS. DUREKE'S INDIVIDUAL ARGUMENTS 59 Mrs. Dureke makes two claims 24 : (1) that she was denied effective assistance of trial counsel; and (2) that the U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) enhancement of her base offense level was improper. A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 60 Mrs. Dureke has not shown conclusive evidence on the record that her trial counsel was ineffective. She may resort to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 if she be so advised. We will not entertain this claim on direct appeal. See supra part III.B. B. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) Enhancement 61 As we have stated above, a district court's determination that a defendant played an aggravating role in the offense is a finding of fact that will not be disturbed on review unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Sheffer, 896 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 838, and cert. denied, 498 U.S. 968 (1990). The presentence report had suggested an increase of three levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). At sentencing, the district court stated that he would give only a two-level increase under § 3B1.1(c) because of the relative culpability of the defendants and because he thought that Mrs. Dureke's conduct more closely fit that described in § 3B1.1(c). This finding is not clearly erroneous. Cf. United States v. Barsanti, 943 F.2d 428, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3646 (U.S.), and cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. (U.S.), and cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S. 1992) (affirming § 3B1.1(b) enhancement for person who introduced applicants to leaders in a fraudulent scheme). 62 The conviction and sentence of each of the defendants is 63 AFFIRMED.