Opinion ID: 887356
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Good Cause: The Huttinger Test

Text: ¶ 11 At any time before or after judgment, the court may, for good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty or nolo contendere to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. Section 46-16-105(2), MCA (2001). Historically, this Court has balanced three factors in determining whether good cause under § 46-16-105(2), MCA, exists to permit withdrawal of a plea: (1) whether the district court adequately interrogated the defendant to determine his understanding of his plea; (2) whether the defendant promptly filed his motion to withdraw the prior plea; and (3) whether the defendant's plea was the result of a plea bargain in which the prosecutor dismissed another charge. Martin, ¶ 13. ¶ 12 This Court created its current good cause test in State v. Huttinger (1979), 182 Mont. 50, 54, 595 P.2d 363, 366. The Huttinger test requires only the above three factors. Curiously, none of those factors requires that the court consider the voluntariness, knowledge, or intelligence of the defendant's plea. Nevertheless, a district court will permit a defendant to withdraw his plea if the defendant can demonstrate that he entered his plea unknowingly or involuntarily. State v. Miller (1991), 248 Mont. 194, 197, 810 P.2d 308, 310. ¶ 13 The United States Supreme Court acknowledges that [a] plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent it is `voluntary' and `intelligent.' Bousley v. United States (1998), 523 U.S. 614, 618, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 140 L.Ed.2d 828, 837. Although we have adopted this requirement in our cases, we have never specifically articulated it as part of the good cause test. State v. Morgan, 2003 MT 193, ¶ 18, 316 Mont. 509, ¶ 18, 74 P.3d 1047, ¶ 18. After exhaustive review, this Court has been unable to find a case in which we have allowed a defendant to withdraw his plea for good cause other than voluntariness. ¶ 14 The ultimate test for withdrawal of a plea is voluntariness. Although the three-part Huttinger test has two factors that bear on voluntariness, it neither lists all the factors, nor are all the factors it lists necessary. Whether a district court adequately interrogated the defendant to determine whether the defendant understood his plea bears on voluntariness because it tends to show that he had all the information necessary to make an informed decision. ¶ 15 Whether the defendant promptly filed his motion to withdraw the prior plea does not, however, bear on voluntariness. For example, the passage of fifteen years will neither make an involuntary plea more voluntary nor a voluntary plea more involuntary. But see State v. Haynie (1980), 186 Mont. 374, 380-81, 607 P.2d 1128, 1131-32 (concluding that, in waiting five and one-half years to seek withdrawal of a plea, the defendant had waited too long despite the District Court's violation of § 46-16-105(1)(b), MCA (1979), by failing to inform Haynie of the maximum possible term of his sentence). ¶ 16 Whether the defendant's plea was the result of a plea bargain in which the prosecutor exchanged the plea for dismissal of another charge bears on voluntariness because it tends to show the defendant made an intelligent and calculated decision. This factor, however, is not dispositive. Over time, this Court has, in practice, equated good cause under § 46-16-105, MCA, with the constitutional test of voluntariness. See Miller, 248 Mont. at 197, 810 P.2d at 310. The time has now come to reevaluate the meaning of good cause and determine whether it allows withdrawal of a plea for additional reasons, other than involuntariness.
¶ 17 The ambiguity inherent in the phrase good cause makes a review of the legislative history of this statute appropriate in determining the scope of the phrase. In 1967, the Legislature gave district courts permission to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea for good cause. Act Approved Feb. 28, 1967, ch. 196, 1967 Mont. Laws 353, 412 (codified at § 46-15-105(2), MCA (2001)). Good cause must include the constitutional requirements such as voluntariness, for it cannot exclude them, but the dearth of legislative history and the broad wording implies that good cause could include more than the minimal constitutional requirements. See Minutes of S. Jud. Comm. 40th Leg. (Mont.1967); Minutes of H. Jud. Comm. 40th Leg. (Mont.1967). ¶ 18 We presume in 1967 the Legislature was aware of the constitutional requirement that pleas must be voluntary. Ross v. City of Great Falls, 1998 MT 276, ¶ 17, 291 Mont. 377, ¶ 17, 967 P.2d 1103, ¶ 17 (recognizing that this Court presumes the Legislature acts with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on a subject....). The United States Supreme Court recognized the requirement as early as 1927 in Kercheval v. United States (1927), 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009, 1012 (Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences.), and this Court recognized it in State v. Casaras (1937), 104 Mont. 404, 413, 66 P.2d 774, 778 (A plea of guilty should be entirely voluntary by one competent to know the consequences, and should not be induced by fear, persuasion, promise, or ignorance.). Despite this pre-existing and clear constitutional standard of voluntariness, the Legislature adopted a standard using the phrase good cause. ¶ 19 If the Legislature had wanted to conform its standard to the minimal constitutional requirements, it could have done so; however, in adopting a good cause standard, it suggested the possibility of criteria in addition to voluntariness. Involuntariness and discovery of new exculpatory evidence constitute good causes for withdrawal of a plea under § 46-16-105(2), MCA (2001), but others may exist. See, e.g., United States v. Turner (9th Cir.1990), 898 F.2d 705, 713 (determining that, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(e), fair and just reasons for withdrawal of guilty pleas include an inadequate colloquy, `newly discovered evidence, intervening circumstances or any other reason for withdrawing his guilty plea that did not exist when he pleaded guilty.') (quoting United States v. Rios-Ortiz (9th Cir.1987), 830 F.2d 1067, 1069).
¶ 20 While this Court's interpretation of the Montana Constitution need not march lock-step with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution, this Court has a coordinate responsibility to guarantee the rights enshrined in the United States Constitution. This Court cannot adopt a lower standard to protect any right in the United States Constitution than the United States Supreme Court has recognized. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby....). ¶ 21 The United States Supreme Court considers a defendant's plea voluntary only when the defendant is fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel.... Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 760 (quoting Shelton v. United States (5th Cir.1957), 246 F.2d 571, 572 n. 2 (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S.Ct. 563, 2 L.Ed.2d 579 (1958)) (quotations omitted). If the court, the prosecutor, his own counsel, or some other party, induced the plea, however slightly, by threats or promises; misrepresentation, including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises; or promises ... having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes), that evidence indicates involuntariness. Brady, 397 U.S. at 753, 755, 90 S.Ct. at 1471-72, 25 L.Ed.2d at 759-60 (quoting Shelton, 246 F.2d at 572 n. 2) (quotations omitted). Further, the defendant must be mentally competent to enter a plea and any medication he is taking must not make him mentally incompetent to plead. See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran (1993), 509 U.S. 389, 394 n. 3, 396 n. 6, 398-99, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2684 n. 3, 2685 n. 6, 2686, 125 L.Ed.2d 321, 329 n. 3, 330 n. 6, 331-32 (equating the mental competency for entering a voluntary plea with the mental competency for standing trial, but recognizing that some state courts have held that different standards apply); Godinez, 509 U.S. at 410-12, 416-17, 113 S.Ct. at 2692-93, 2695-96, 125 L.Ed.2d at 339-40, 343-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (recognizing that medication can affect one's mental competence and disagreeing with the majority both on the standard and whether the medication made Moran mentally incompetent). ¶ 22 We have held a plea of guilty will be deemed involuntary where it appears that the defendant was laboring under such a strong inducement, fundamental mistake, or serious mental condition that the possibility exists he may have pled guilty to a crime of which he is innocent. Miller, 248 Mont. at 197, 810 P.2d at 310. Requiring a strong inducement before allowing a defendant to withdraw his plea is less protective of individual rights than requiring any inducement, however slight, as a sufficient basis for withdrawal of a plea. Since the Miller standard is less protective of individual rights than the federal standard, we overrule it and enforce the aforementioned federal standard for voluntariness. ¶ 23 Although two of the criteria from the Huttinger test (the adequacy of colloquy and the existence of plea bargain) bear on the question of voluntariness, numerous other case-specific considerations may also bear on that question. Because the voluntariness test subsumes the relevant elements of the Huttinger test, we relegate that test to history.