Opinion ID: 1834220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Statute, the Conflict, the Resolution

Text: Following Succession of Jenkins the legislature in its next regular session enacted La.R.S. 9:2448. [3] La.R.S. 9:2448 is a legislative act that purports to regulate an important aspect of the practice of law because it provides for a method by which an attorney may be engaged to handle the legal affairs of a succession in a legally binding relationship with the executor, heirs and legatees of a succession and further provides the exclusive method by which the executor or others may discharge or remove him. The statute is a general law and in a universal manner makes itself applicable to any case in which a testator has designated an attorney to represent the executor or the succession. The central, foundational part of the statute is La.R.S. 9:2448(B)(2), which provides that an attorney designated by a testator in his will may be removed as such only for just cause. Because this is the heart of the statute that gives it force, effect and definitive meaning, the remainder must be considered to have been auxillary, inseparable and not meriting enactment without the main part. This core element of the statute is in direct, irreconcilable conflict with Rule 1.16(a)(3), the disciplinary rule of this court providing that an attorney is required to withdraw from employment if he is discharged by his client with or without cause. Rule 1.16(a)(3) is an important element of the Code of Professional Responsibility giving the client the absoute right to fire a lawyer in whom he has lost faith or confidence. Consequently, we cannot ratify La. R.S. 9:2448 as being helpful or beneficial to the exercise of our inherent judicial power and responsibility. Instead of aiding our efforts to define and regulate the practice of law and the client-attorney relationship by adopting and enforcing Rule 1.16(a)(3), the statute tends to obstruct, impede and defeat our progress. Furthermore, to acknowledge the disciplinary rule, the constitutional power of this court to enact it and yet permit the legislative act to supplant the rule, would degrade this court, weaken the profession and impede the administration of justice. Accordingly, we refuse to approve La.R.S. 9:2448 and will strike it as being null and void.