Opinion ID: 1546019
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Joinder of Separate Counts in Indictment.

Text: The next contention of appellant is that there was but one crime charged and that the prosecution should have put all the questions and answers assigned as perjury into one count, and proof of one or more would have been sufficient, although proof as to others might have been insufficient or entirely lacking. This contention is not well grounded. The matters covered by the indictment related to various alleged false statements in answer to questions concerning different matters. The first count referred to statements that appellant made concerning his contact with the primary campaign and having conferences concerning such campaign. The second count covered statements that he knew of money being available for use in the campaign only from the newspapers, that he had spent no money in that connection, and that no money or credits had been placed at his disposal for such use. The third count concerned statements that he had no knowledge of contributions for or against any candidate. The fourth count concerned statements that he had had no part in encouraging the candidacy of George W. Norris of Broken Bow. The sixth count concerned statements that he had taken no part in any conferences relating to any political situation in Nebraska involving the candidates for Senator. In only one particular (having conferences concerning the primary), which appears both in counts 1 and 6, was there any duplication of subject-matter and, as to that, the government was compelled to elect the count upon which it would rely, and selected count six. Thus it appears that the statements covered by the several counts referred to different matters of inquiry. Neither the circumstances that all referred to the same general subject of inquiry or that all were made at the same hearing prevents each from being a separate and distinct crime punishable as such. The commission of perjury as to one matter does not absolve the witness or afford him immunity as to all other matters covered by his testimony at the same hearing. The obligation to testify truly and the penalty for false swearing is present as to every material answer given by him. While there is a sound discretion as to such matters in the trial court [Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396, 14 S. Ct. 410, 38 L. Ed. 208; Morris v. United States, 161 F. 672 (C. C. A. 8)], it would seem there would have been more ground for attacking the indictment as duplicitous had all of these matters been joined in one count than there is to attack the statement in separate counts. Another reason why this contention is unavailing is that there was but one sentence which was within what might have been imposed upon any one of the five counts upon which there was conviction. Powers v. United States, 223 U. S. 303, 312, 32 S. Ct. 281, 56 L. Ed. 448. The only prejudice alleged was in giving the jury the impression that he was charged with six separate perjuries, when in fact he had committed, if any, only one. Actually, each count presented the charge of a separate perjury so that the jury received no false impression. If such impression had been erroneous, all possible harmful effect upon appellant was nullified by the sentence imposed.