Opinion ID: 1825816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The trial court's order violates the Constitution of Alabama by impermissibly infringing on Laura's inalienable rights.

Text: As I state in Part I of this dissenting opinion, the only interest offered by the trial court to justify stripping Laura of her fundamental right to teach her child the worship of God is that doing so will prevent the daughter from feeling unnecessarily confuse[d] or pressurize[d] [sic] because of the differences in her parents' religious views and practices. I find such a rationale to be thoroughly unpersuasive. I can find no precedent in law and no foundation in reason to support the notion that an attempt to ensure the protection of a child from pressure and confusion resulting from differences of opinion between parents falls within the jurisdiction of the state. [16] Even if, through exceptional circumstances, the state could acquire such jurisdiction, preventing a child's unnecessary feelings of pressure or confusion would hardly rise to the level of a compelling [civil] government interest as required by the Alabama Constitution to justify state interference with the God-given religious freedom of its citizens. But even if, arguendo, one could contrive a compelling state interest in a child's not feeling unnecessarily pressured or confused  and justify the right of the civil government to enter the sphere of family government to ameliorate those feelings in a child  the means to that end as chosen by the trial court in the instant case is far from the least restrictive means required by the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment. In fact, the final part of paragraph 3(j) of the trial court's order constitutes nothing less than a blanket prohibition on Laura's right to speak to her child about certain core principles of her conservative Christian faith  including absolute standards of right and wrong and absolute beliefs about the afterlife  merely because her former husband does not share these core principles. The trial court's order even prevents Laura from answering theological questions posed by her daughter whenever Laura's honest answer would reveal conflicts with the views or practices of the father. Given the mutually exclusive viewpoints of Laura and her former husband, the trial court's order ultimately forces Laura to choose between forgoing her free-exercise and free-expression rights or forgoing her right to visitation with her child. Such a result is hardly the least restrictive means by which to meet the trial court's announced end. In addition, the trial court's use of the passive voice ([T]he religious training of the child ... shall be made by example....) makes the order so broad that it would apply to Laura's husband Brian (and anyone else visiting in the Snider home). This is highly troubling, because Brian was not a party to the case and his free-exercise and free-expression rights are also entitled to protection under the Alabama Constitution. This overly broad aspect of the trial court's order is yet another way in which it is not the least restrictive means to its announced end. It would not have been difficult for the trial court to modify its order slightly to come as close as possible to achieving its announced end without violating Laura's fundamental rights recognized by the Alabama Constitution. Instead of issuing a blanket gag order against Laura's uttering any religious teaching that might be contrary to William's religious views or practices, the trial court could have ordered Laura to qualify every such comment with a statement to the following effect: This is what Mommy believes from the Bible, but Daddy believes something different. Sometimes parents disagree. Such an order would acknowledge real differences of opinion between parents without favoring one denominational viewpoint over another. To be sure, the child would be left with some confusion as a result of the approach I propose. But whatever confusion this approach would cause is likely to be less than the confusion resulting from Laura's trying to explain why she is completely prohibited from answering many of her daughter's basic questions about God. If Laura were to respond to her daughter with, The judge may punish me if I answer you, or If I answer you, honey, you may not be able to see Mommy again, or some other, similar answer, the child would be more confused than if her mother could answer sincerely according to her beliefs and merely add the comment that some people, including Daddy, do not believe the same thing. Even if, upon further review, my suggested modification of the order is found wanting, I have no doubt that, upon this Court's direction, the trial court could easily identify other language that accomplishes the least restrictive means required under the Alabama Constitution. To view the issue from another perspective: If the Alabama Legislature had passed a bill restricting parental rights in the same manner as does the trial court's order, this Court would not hesitate to strike it down as unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and violative of fundamental rights. We should be no less vigilant to correct unconstitutional actions in our own branch of civil government. Consequently, rather than quashing the writ of certiorari, this Court should sustain the writ for the purpose of reversing the final part of paragraph 3(j) of the trial court's order and remand the case for the trial court to issue a new order consistent with the Alabama Constitution.