Opinion ID: 1187718
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court properly admitted evidence of thompson's prior conviction on the issue of credibility.

Text: Thompson argues that his prior felony conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct under I.C. § 18-1508A should not have been introduced to impeach his credibility at trial. Rule 609, of the Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.R.E.), provides, in pertinent part: (a) General rule. For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the nature of the felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record, but only if the court determines in a hearing outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant to the credibility of the witness and that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness. I.R.E. 609(a). Under this rule the trial court must apply a two-prong test to determine whether evidence of the prior conviction should be admitted: (1) the court must determine whether the fact or nature of the conviction is relevant to the witness' credibility; and (2) if so, the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 30, 951 P.2d 1249, 1257 (1997). In reviewing the trial court's decision as to the first prong concerning relevance, the standard of review is de novo. Id. (citing State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 766, 864 P.2d 596, 604 (1993)). In reviewing the trial court's decision as to the second prong concerning whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Id. at 31, 951 P.2d at 1258. When reviewing an exercise of discretion on appeal, this Court conducts the following inquiry: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer bounds of such discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
In State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 634 P.2d 435 (1981), the Court recognized that `different felonies have different degrees of probative value on the issue of credibility,' id. at 580, 634 P.2d at 442 (quoting People v. Rollo, 20 Cal.3d 109, 141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771, 775 (1977)), and identified three categories of felonies to determine whether a prior conviction could be used for impeachment. Category one involves crimes such as perjury which are intimately connected with the issue of credibility. Id. Category two involves crimes such as robbery or burglary which are somewhat less relevant to the issue of credibility. Id. Finally, category three involves `[a]cts of violence ... [which] generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity.' Id. at 581, 634 P.2d at 443 (quoting Rollo, 141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d at 775). With regard to category two crimes, the Ybarra court noted: On the other hand robbery, larceny, and burglary, while not showing a propensity to falsify, do disclose a disregard for the rights of others which might reasonably be expected to express itself in giving false testimony whenever it would be to the advantage of the witness. If the witness had no compunction against stealing another's property or taking it away from him by physical threat or force, it is hard to see why he would hesitate to obtain an advantage for himself or friend in a trial by giving false testimony. Furthermore, such criminal acts, although evidenced by a single conviction, may represent such a marked break from sanctioned conduct that it affords a reasonable basis of future prediction upon credibility .... Id. (quoting Ladd, Credibility TestCurrent Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 180 (1940)). In Bush this Court held that evidence of a prior Wyoming conviction for immoral acts with a child could be introduced for impeachment purposes under I.R.E. 609. 131 Idaho at 31, 951 P.2d at 1258. The Court stated that [t]he determination whether evidence of a particular felony conviction is relevant to credibility depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case and must therefore be decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. One of the important facts to consider, the Court noted, was the definition of the particular crime. Id. In concluding that Bush's Wyoming conviction was relevant to the issue of credibility, the Court stated: A sex crime against a minor does not specifically relate to honesty or veracity as does the crime of perjury, and therefore, does not fall within the first category described in Ybarra. Further, the sex crime involved here is not defined in Wyoming law as a violent felony, and therefore does not fall within the third category described in Ybarra. Thus, we conclude that under the specific facts of this case, the Wyoming crime falls within the middle category described in Ybarra, i.e., a crime which, while not directly showing a propensity to falsify, does disclose a disregard for the rights of others which one might reasonably expect to express itself in giving false testimony if such would be advantageous to the witness. Since Bush had no compunction against engaging in immoral acts with a minor, there is no reason to believe that he would hesitate to gain an advantage for himself in this case by giving false testimony. Committing an immoral act with a minor is the type of marked break from sanctioned conduct that [ ... ] affords a reasonable basis for predicting credibility. Id. (quoting Ybarra, 102 Idaho at 581, 634 P.2d at 443). Thompson argues that because his previous conviction of sexual battery, I.C. § 18-1508, is defined as a crime of violence by the legislature in I.C. § 19-5307, his prior conviction falls under Ybarra 's category three crimes which have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity. Idaho Code § 19-5307 enumerates I.C. § 18-1508 (dealing with lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen) under the heading of Fines in cases of crimes of violence. Section 19-5307 lists a number of crimes and sets forth the provisions for imposing fines which operate as a civil judgment. The question is whether this legislative classification moves Thompson's prior felony conviction into a category three crime under Ybarra as an act of violence which has little or no direct bearing on honesty or veracity. The Court believes it does not. It is clear that the legislature was not attempting to classify crimes for evidentiary purposes in § 19-5307. The legislature was addressing the unrelated issue of fines and the enforcement of those fines as civil judgments. Should the legislature's classification of § 18-1508 as a crime of violence be controlling, an anomaly would arise that the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes could turn on the state in which the act occurred. The Wyoming and Nevada statutes considered in Bush and State v. Muraco, 132 Idaho 130, 968 P.2d 225 (1998), were essentially the same as I.C. § 18-1508. This Court has approved the use of the convictions under the Wyoming and Nevada statutes for impeachment. Bush, 131 Idaho at 31, 951 P.2d at 1258; Muraco, 132 Idaho at 132-33, 968 P.2d at 227-28. [1] To say that the Idaho conviction for the same type of conduct could not be used because of I.C. § 19-5307 would lead to an inconsistent result that would not have a rational basis. The Court must look at the nature of the charge for evidentiary purposes, not the unrelated legislative classification dealing with fines and their enforcement. Thompson also argues that an act only falls under I.C. § 18-1508 if it is committed with the intent of gratifying lust, passions, or sexual desires and is, by definition, a crime of passion. Consequently, Thompson maintains that his prior conviction under this statute falls under category three and should not have been admitted. The Nevada statute analyzed by this Court in Muraco also criminalized certain conduct which was committed with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of that person or of that child. NEV.REV.STAT. § 201.230 (1987). As previously noted, this Court held that evidence of the defendant's prior conviction for lewdness under the Nevada statute was admissible for impeachment purposes under I.R.E. 609. Muraco, 132 Idaho at 133, 968 P.2d at 228. The Nevada statute considered in Muraco, the Wyoming statute considered in Bush and the Idaho statute considered in this case all criminalize similar conduct. Consistent with Bush and Muraco, the Court affirms the trial court's conclusion that Thompson's prior conviction under I.C. § 18-1508A was relevant for impeachment purposes under I.R.E. 609.
Thompson claims that the trial court erred by only engaging in the requisite balancing of probative value versus prejudicial impact with regard to the nature of his prior conviction, not with regard to the fact of his prior conviction. Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 allows evidence of a prior conviction only if the fact of the conviction or the nature of the conviction, or both, are relevant and if the probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. I.R.E. 609(a). The trial court commented with regard to the admissibility of Thompson's prior conviction under I.R.E. 609 as follows: [COURT]: ... Counsel has brought to the Court's attention that the defendant may take the stand but he would like to have an evidentiary ruling before he makes that decision. The evidentiary ruling is regarding his prior criminal record. Counsel for the defendant, Mr. Swafford, has informed the Court that the defendant has a prior felony conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct. The Court finds that that type of conviction does go to the believability, credibility of a witness. Lewd and lascivious conduct is a type of crime that is deceitful and it would have some probative value under Idaho Rule of Evidence ... [609] to credibility. The trial court read I.R.E. 609 verbatim and discussed the time limitations set forth under the rule. The court concluded that Thompson's prior conviction fell within the ten-year time limitation and then addressed the State's request to question Thompson about the nature of his prior conviction: COURT: Under 609 the Court does find involved in this caseand since the credibility of the witness is questioned by the examination as well as this Court observing her demeanor while on the stand I feel that the probative value of the lewd and lascivious conduct, nothing more being said to the jury than that, that it would not add to the attack for a felony conviction and its prejudicial value far outweighs any of its probative value with regard to the lewd and lascivious conduct action because even though he's not charged with a lewd and lascivious conduct criminal offense in this particular case, the only reason he is not is because the alleged victim was not under 16 years of age. So the Court will allow if you take the stand, Mr. Thompson, will allow the State to ask if you've been convicted of a felony offense. I've already instructed the jury that if they hear that they can take that and apply that to the credibility. That's whether they would believe you or not. The Court would rule that the nature of the offense, lewd and lascivious conduct, does not add sufficiently enough to the attack of your credibility to outweigh the prejudicial value, so (Court is reviewing.) COURT: Indicates that are relevant to his credibility and that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness. And the Court finds that the probative value does notor I should say does not outweigh the prejudicial effect so the Court's not allowing the nature of the offense. Thompson did not request any further clarification of the trial judge's analysis after the judge asked the parties if they would like him to restate his findings. In State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066, 812 P.2d 1227 (Ct.App.1990), the Court of Appeals affirmed the result and analysis employed by the district court when weighing the probative value of the defendant's prior conviction against its prejudicial impact. The district court in Rodgers considered several factors: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the remoteness of the prior conviction, (3) the witness' criminal history, (4) the similarity between the past crime and the crime charged, (5) the importance of the witness' testimony, (6) the centrality of the credibility issue, and (7) the nature and extent of the witness' criminal record as a whole. Id. at 1073, 812 P.2d at 1234. The district court concluded that the prior conviction was relevant to the defendant's credibility and that its probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. The court, therefore, allowed evidence of the fact of the conviction, but to minimize prejudice it did not allow evidence of the nature of the offense. The Court of Appeals held that the district court had not abused its discretion. This Court concurred in the analysis and disposition of this issue in its review of the Court of Appeals decision. State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1047, 1052, 812 P.2d 1208, 1213 (1991). The trial court in the present case considered many of the same factors considered in Rodgers, including the impeachment value of the prior crime, the remoteness of the prior conviction, the similarity between the past crime and the crime charged, and the centrality of the credibility issue. The trial court recognized that the issue of credibility was particularly central in this case because the evidence consisted of basically the victim's word against Thompson's word. To minimize prejudice the trial court initially ruled that evidence of the nature of Thompson's prior conviction should not be admitted into evidence. The trial court properly applied the two-prong test in determining whether to admit evidence of Thompson's prior conviction.