Opinion ID: 1620610
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entitlement to Bail Under the Iowa Constitution.

Text: The certifying court in this case has concluded the denial of bail at the pre-trial stage did not violate the petitioners' substantive due process rights under the federal constitution. Atwood, 338 F.Supp.2d at 998. We are asked to decide the separate question whether petitioners are entitled to bail under the Due Process Clause in the Iowa constitution. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 9 (stating no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law). This court has traditionally considered the federal and state due process provisions to be equal in scope, import, and purpose. In re Det. of Garren, 620 N.W.2d at 284 (citing In re Interest of C.P., 569 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1997); Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 792 (Iowa 1994)). Although [w]e have an interest in harmonizing our constitutional decisions with those of the Supreme Court when reasonably possible, . . . we recognize and will jealously guard our right and duty to differ in appropriate cases. State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 219-20 (Iowa 1980). Substantive due process principles preclude the government from engaging in conduct that `shocks the conscience,' or interferes with rights `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2101, 95 L.Ed.2d 697, 708 (1987) (citations omitted). To assess the petitioners' substantive due process claim, we first define the nature of the involved right. In re Det. of Cubbage, 671 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Iowa 2003). [F]reedom from physical restraint `has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.' Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2079, 138 L.Ed.2d 501, 511-12 (1997) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1785, 118 L.Ed.2d 437, 448 (1992)). Although the liberty interest of an individual to be free from physical restraint has been described as a paradigmatic fundamental right, Knapp, 804 N.E.2d at 891, the Supreme Court has noted that the interest is not absolute. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356, 117 S.Ct. at 2079, 138 L.Ed.2d at 512. States, including Iowa, have in certain narrow circumstances provided for the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety. Id. at 357, 117 S.Ct. at 2079, 138 L.Ed.2d at 512. Involuntary civil commitment statutes have withstood due process challenges if they authorize detention pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards. Id. at 357, 117 S.Ct. at 2080, 138 L.Ed.2d at 512. Petitioners do not advance here the broad notion that they have a due process right not be involuntarily detained prior to the adjudication of their status under chapter 229A. They instead make the narrower claim that once detained, they have a due process right to bail at the pre-trial stage under the Iowa Constitution. The question whether the claimed right is fundamental is one of first impression for this court. In In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 2000), we did not decide whether a detainee's liberty interest is fundamental because we concluded chapter 229A passed muster even when judged under a strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 286. [7] We also rejected Garren's claim that substantive due process required placement of SVPs in the least restrictive placement. Id. at 285 (noting that even if such a right did exist, it is not a `fundamental right' (citation omitted)). As in Garren, we conclude it is unnecessary for us to resolve the question whether the petitioners' claimed interest is fundamental. Even under strict scrutiny analysis, chapter 229A comports with substantive due process standards. The state's interest in detaining persons during the interim between the district court's finding of probable cause and the trial of the SVP claim is compelling. It is an interest in protecting the public from a small but extremely dangerous group of persons who are highly likely to engage in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence if not detained. See Iowa Code § 229A.1; In re Det. of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 458 (Iowa 2001) (finding a compelling state interest in protecting society from a person prone to sexually assaulting children); In re Det. of Garren, 620 N.W.2d at 286 (finding the confinement of sexually violent predators in a secure facility served the compelling State interest in protection of the public). The restriction of liberty resulting from the denial of bail at the pre-trial stage in these cases is narrowly tailored. See City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 1989) (noting that a statute will survive strict scrutiny analysis only if it is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest). Pre-trial detention without access to bail is limited to a specific category of dangerous persons who have been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffer from a mental abnormality that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility. See Iowa Code § 229A.2(11). The significant procedural protections afforded detainees during the pre-trial stage in SVP cases strongly influence our determination that the statute is narrowly tailored. A person may not be detained under chapter 229A until after (1) the attorney general files a petition alleging that the person is a SVP and stating sufficient facts to support such an allegation (section 229A.4(1)), and (2) a district court has made a preliminary determination that the person named in the petition is a SVP (section 229A.5(1)). Once detained, the person is entitled to a hearing in the district court within seventy-two hours [8] to determine whether probable cause exists to believe the detained person is a SVP. See id. § 229A.5(2). At the probable cause hearing, the detainee has the right to appear in person with counsel, challenge the preliminary finding of probable cause by presenting evidence, cross-examine the state's witnesses, and access all petitions and reports in the possession of the court. See id. § 229A.5(2)( a )-( g ). If, after the hearing, the district court finds probable cause to believe the detainee is a SVP, the detainee is entitled to a timely trial to determine whether he is, in fact, a SVP. [9] Our decision today is consistent with a series of prior decisions upholding chapter 229A against substantive due process claims under the Iowa Constitution. We have repeatedly held that civil commitment of a SVP does not violate substantive due process. In re Det. of Darling, 712 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2006) (holding that civil commitment of a person with an untreatable condition was consistent with substantive due process under the Iowa Constitution); In re Det. of Betsworth, 711 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Iowa 2006) (same); In re Det. of Hodges, 689 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Iowa 2004) (holding that civil commitment on the basis of an antisocial personality disorder was consistent with substantive due process under the Iowa Constitution); In re Det. of Cubbage, 671 N.W.2d at 445-48 (Iowa 2003) (finding no fundamental right to be competent during SVP statute proceedings and, thus, that commitment of incompetent people is consistent with substantive due process under the Iowa Constitution).
Iowa's bail guarantee clause only applies to criminal cases. See Allen v. Wild, 249 Iowa 255, 259, 86 N.W.2d 839, 842 (1957) (finding that the bail guarantee clause does not guarantee bail in civil extradition proceedings because the clause only has reference to persons charged with offenses against the laws of the State of Iowa); Orr v. Jackson, 149 Iowa 641, 643-44, 128 N.W. 958, 960 (1910) (holding that the bail guarantee clause is not applicable in a habeas corpus proceeding because such proceedings are civil); cf. Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 987 P.2d 779, 788 (Ct.App.1999) (finding that the Arizona Constitution's bail guarantee only applies in the criminal context). Because petitioners are pre-trial detainees in civil commitment proceedings, not criminal proceedings, the bail guarantee clause does not entitle them to bail. [11]
Due to the similarity between the Federal and Iowa Excessive Bail Clauses, the Iowa Supreme Court `look[s] to the interpretations by the United States Supreme Court for guidance in interpreting [Iowa's] clause.' State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 584 (Iowa 2003) (citing State v. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541, 547 (Iowa 2000)). The Federal Constitution's Excessive Bail Clause only prohibits excessive bail in cases where it is proper to grant bail; it does not impliedly create a right to bail. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545, 72 S.Ct. 525, 537, 96 L.Ed. 547, 563 (1952). Because petitioners offer no reason for us to interpret the Iowa Constitution's Excessive Bail Clause differently, we conclude that it does not create a right to bail, but instead only ensures that properly granted bail is not excessive. Accordingly, petitioners' claim that the Iowa Excessive Bail Clause entitles them to bail must fail.
Iowa law is unclear regarding whether article I, section 8 applies in a civil context, such as commitment proceedings under chapter 229A. The Iowa Supreme Court generally interprets article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution to track federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Iowa 2003). The United States Supreme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment in both civil and criminal contexts. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49, 114 S.Ct. 492, 499, 126 L.Ed.2d 490, 500 (1993) (noting that the Fourth Amendment place[s] restrictions on seizures conducted for purposes of civil forfeiture); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 108 L.Ed.2d 222, 232 (1990) (observing that the Fourth Amendment . . . prohibits `unreasonable searches and seizures' whether or not the evidence is sought to be used in a criminal trial). We recognize that we may interpret the Iowa Constitution differently, but the parties suggest no reason for us to do so. We accordingly hold that article I, section 8 applies in a civil context. Petitioners thus fall within the ambit of protection afforded by the personal security guarantee of article I, section 8. We now turn to whether the seizure [14] of petitioners was reasonable under article I, section 8. To determine whether governmental action is reasonable under this constitutional provision, the Iowa Supreme Court balances an individual's interests with the State's interests. State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Iowa 2001). We find that the State's pre-trial seizure of petitioners is reasonable because the State's weighty interest in protecting the public from an extremely dangerous class of people outweighs an individual's interest in being free on bail for ninety days between a probable cause hearing and trial. See Iowa Code § 229A.1.
Article I, section 10 does not entitle petitioners to bail because this provision only applies to criminal proceedings. It protects only the rights of an accused, not the rights of an individual facing potential civil commitment pursuant to Iowa's SVP statute. In addition, even if this were a criminal proceeding, petitioners could not rely on article I, section 10. This provision does not include among its express protections a right to bail.
A bill of attainder is a legislative determination that metes out punishment to a particular individual or a designated group of persons without a judicial trial. State v. Phillips, 610 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Iowa 2000). Three elements comprise a bill of attainder: a specific legislative target, imposition of punishment, and absence of a judicial trial. Id. The determinative element in this case is imposition of punishment. To assess whether a law imposes punishment, we look to the intentions of the legislature. See State v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Iowa 1999) (noting that if a law is designed to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose [besides imposition of punishment] it should stand); Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 662 A.2d 367, 396 (1995) (What counts . . . is the purpose and design of the statutory provision, its remedial goal and purposes, and not the resulting consequential impact, the `sting of punishment,' that may inevitably, but incidentally, flow from it.). By enacting Iowa's SVP statute, the legislature did not intend to punish sexually violent predators. Rather, the stated purposes of the statute are to protect society and facilitate treatment of sexually violent predators. Iowa Code § 229A.1. Therefore, the SVP statute is not a bill of attainder that impermissibly denies petitioners the right to bail.
Petitioners' claims that Iowa Constitution article I, section 25, the unenumerated rights clause, and Iowa Constitution article I, section 1, the inalienable rights clause, entitle them to bail fail for essentially the same reason. Both the inalienable rights clause and the unenumerated rights clause secure to the people of Iowa common law rights that pre-existed Iowa's Constitution. See Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 176 (Iowa 2004) (citing May's Drug Stores v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Iowa 319, 329, 45 N.W.2d 245, 250 (1950)) (We have held [the inalienable rights clause] was intended to secure citizens' pre-existing common law rights (sometimes known as `natural rights') from unwarranted government restrictions.); State ex rel. Burlington & Mo. River R.R. v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388, 412 (1862) (concluding that the purpose of the unenumerated rights clause is to bring . . . unenumerated rights retained by the people, founded equally . . . upon natural justice and common reason . . . within the censorship of courts of justice . . . when . . . [the rights are] assailed). To resolve this case, however, we need not determine whether a common law right to bail in civil commitment proceedings pre-existed the Constitution, as the petitioners urge us to do. Even if the right to bail in civil commitment proceedings pre-existed the Constitution and consequently falls within the ambit of the protections afforded by the unenumerated rights and inalienable rights clauses, the SVP statute is reasonable and, thus, constitutional. It is well-established that the protections of Iowa's inalienable rights clause are not absolute. See Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 176. The clause does not prevent all legislative action taken pursuant to the police power that benefits the community and impacts an inalienable right (i.e. a common law or natural right). See id. Instead, it prevents only arbitrary, unreasonable legislative action that impacts an inalienable right. See id. (citing Gibb v. Hansen, 286 N.W.2d 180, 186 (Iowa 1979); May's Drug Stores, 242 Iowa at 329, 45 N.W.2d at 250; Benschoter v. Hakes, 232 Iowa 1354, 1361, 8 N.W.2d 481, 485 (1943); State v. Osborne, 171 Iowa 678, 693, 154 N.W. 294, 300 (1915)). We find that the unenumerated rights clause similarly prohibits not all legislative action, but instead only unreasonable action. The petitioners root their argument that the unenumerated rights clause entitles them to bail in the assumption that unenumerated rights are absolute and may not be the subject of legislative action, even if reasonable. This interpretation of the unenumerated rights clause would effectively disallow all legislative action as to all unenumerated rights. Such an interpretation of the unenumerated rights clause would substantially limit the power of the legislature to enact laws, such as the SVP statute, that protect the public. Moreover, we have previously recognized that the unenumerated rights clause limits, not eliminates, the State's power to legislatively impact unenumerated rights. In State ex rel. Burlington & Mo. River R.R. v. County of Wapello , we noted the theoretical inconsistency between two prevalent legal doctrines: the doctrine that the Constitution allows the legislature the use of every power which it does not positively prohibit, and the doctrine that the Constitution reserves to the people all rights secured under our plan of government. 13 Iowa at 413. An inconsistency arises in that a legislature with full and uncontrolled sway to act in all ways not specifically prohibited in the Constitution would inevitably infringe upon rights reserved to the people. Id. In Wapello, we concluded that while the legislature may take actions to benefit the community, the Iowa Constitution's reservation of unenumerated rights to the people limits an abuse of legislative power. Id. at 412-15. Having concluded that the legislature may take reasonable action that impacts rights protected by the inalienable rights and unenumerated rights clause, we turn to whether the SVP statute is reasonable. Because of the State's interests in rehabilitating sexually violent predators and protecting the public, we find that pre-trial detention under the SVP statute is a reasonable, and thus constitutional, exercise of legislative power.