Opinion ID: 1443903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of McCarthy's Insurance Coverage for His 1986 Accident

Text: While cross-examining McCarthy, Jaso's attorney inquired about correspondence between McCarthy and Allstate in November 1990 and January and February 1991, regarding Allstate's coverage of medical expenses resulting from McCarthy's 1986 accident. [4] Jaso attempted to show a relationship between the expiration of McCarthy's insurance coverage and McCarthy's claim that his pain and injuries were attributable to the April 1991 accident. McCarthy objected to the admission of evidence showing he had insurance. The trial court allowed the inquiry on the condition that Jaso make it clear McCarthy's coverage was for a prior injury. The court also stated that McCarthy could request a jury instruction at a later time. McCarthy argues that it was reversible error to admit this evidence. He asserts that evidence of insurance coverage for the 1986 accident, coupled with evidence that McCarthy had retained the insurance agent mentioned in conjunction with the coverage for the 1986 accident, allowed the jury to infer that McCarthy was insured for the medical expenses caused by the 1991 accident. To prevail on appeal, McCarthy bears the burden of showing that the admission was erroneous and that it had a substantial influence on the outcome of the case. See Myers v. Robertson, 891 P.2d 199, 208 (Alaska 1995) (citing Loof v. Sanders, 686 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Alaska 1984)). Alaska Civil Rule 61 dictates that an error in the admission of evidence is not grounds for reversal unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. [5] In Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1969), we articulated the harmless error standard as follows: The test is not whether, with the erroneous matter elided from the record, there would be enough evidence to support a conviction. It is not for us to speculate on the outcome at a retrial, absent the erroneous matter. The pivotal question is what the error might have meant to the jury. Our function is to consider not how the error would have affected us if we had tried the case, but how it may have affected a jury of reasonable laymen. It is the impact on their minds which is critical in determining whether an error impaired or affected the substantial interest of the defendant in having a fair trial. Id. at 630. [6] We do not resolve the question of whether the admission was erroneous because we hold that even if erroneous, it was harmless error. In allowing the evidence, the court required Jaso to make it clear in his questioning that the insurance coverage was for the earlier accident. McCarthy nonetheless argues that the jury inferred from this evidence that his accident with Jaso was covered by insurance and thus discounted its award. This argument is necessarily speculative and the record, with the putative erroneous admission elided, contains sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Therefore, we hold that at most the admission of evidence of McCarthy's insurance for an earlier accident was harmless error. McCarthy also argues that the court committed reversible error by failing to give a curative instruction. McCarthy asserts that the court said that it would give an instruction but never did. The transcript reveals that the trial court overruled McCarthy's objection and declined to give an immediate instruction but told McCarthy's counsel that if we need to address it in the form of a (indiscernible) instruction, we can do that. But let's argue about that (indiscernible) after 1:30 today. [7] Alaska Civil Rule 51(a) requires a specific objection if a party is to claim error for giving or failing to give a jury instruction. See also Conam Alaska v. Bell Lavalin, Inc., 842 P.2d 148, 153 n. 8 (Alaska 1992). The court's knowledge of a party's position with respect to an instruction is not sufficient; a specific request or objection is required. State v. Dupere, 709 P.2d 493, 498 n. 5 (Alaska 1985), modified on other grounds, 721 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1986). In Dupere, we stated: The fact that the trial court was aware of the State's position on the issue does not excuse the State's failure to object to the instructions when afforded the opportunity to do so. The purpose of this rule [Civil Rule 51(a)] is to enable the trial judge to avoid error by affording him an opportunity to correct his charge before it goes to the jury. The dictates of the rule are satisfied only if the judge is clearly made aware of the alleged error in or omission from the instructions. Counsel's objections must be specific enough to clearly bring into focus the precise nature of the asserted error. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Saxton v. Harris, 395 P.2d 71, 73 (Alaska 1964)). The court told McCarthy's counsel that it would give an instruction if one was necessary and that it would consider arguments on the issue at a later point. McCarthy failed to re-visit the issue, as invited by the court, and did not object to the court's failure to give an instruction on the issue before the jury retired to consider the verdict. Therefore, we review this issue only for plain error. Zok v. State, 903 P.2d 574, 577 (Alaska 1995) (citing Conam Alaska, 842 P.2d at 153). A plain error is an obvious mistake creating a high likelihood that the jury will follow an erroneous theory resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Conam Alaska, 842 P.2d at 153 (quoting Ollice v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 659 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Alaska 1983)). There is a heavy burden on the appellants to prove that an error was highly likely determinative. We have emphasized that we will not speculate on whether the error altered the result. Conam, 842 P.2d at 153. McCarthy argues that the evidence of his insurance prejudiced the jury, causing it to discount its verdict. [8] McCarthy contends that, given Jaso's liability, the jury's award can only be explained by concluding that the jury discounted the damages because it inferred that McCarthy had insurance. This argument relies on a number of assumptions, particularly, (1) the jury inferred that McCarthy had insurance for the 1991 accident; and (2) the jury discounted its award because of that inference. McCarthy asserts that even if the jury believed Jaso was not responsible for all the medical costs, a verdict in the $15,000 to 20,000 range on [the] total evidence of $31,000 seems to be a logical minimum, i.e., viewing evidence least favorably to [McCarthy]. The evidence permitted the jury to conclude that not all of McCarthy's medical expenses were attributable to the 1991 collision. McCarthy's argument relies on speculation and would require us to reweigh the evidence. McCarthy has not shown that the failure to give a curative instruction was plain error because he has not shown that the failure was highly likely determinative of the verdict. The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence. We do not consider whether it was error to fail to give a curative instruction because McCarthy did not request one as instructed by the court. The court's failure to give an instruction absent a request was not plain error.