Opinion ID: 2996625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Hard Look” at Environmental Consequences

Text: This court’s review of agency action under NEPA is governed by the APA. See Indiana Forest Alliance, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 325 F.3d 851, 858 (7th Cir. 2003). The APA instructs courts to set aside agency action only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Under this standard, our inquiry is “searching and careful” but “the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.” Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted). We only must 24 No. 03-2644 ask “whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” Id. “If an agency considers the proper factors and makes a factual determination on whether the environmental impacts are significant or not, that decision implicates substantial agency expertise and is entitled to deference.” Indiana Forest Alliance, 325 F.3d at 859. In the context of NEPA, arbitrary and capricious review prohibits a court from “substitut[ing] its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions.” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). In fact, “[t]he only role” for a court in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard in the NEPA context “is to insure that the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences.” Id. NEPA sets forth a broad national commitment to protecting and promoting the environment. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). Like the APA, NEPA “does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process. If the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs.” Id. (internal citations omitted). One process required under NEPA is that all federal agencies must prepare an “environmental impact statement” (“EIS”) for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see also Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 230 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 2000). This report is “a detailed analysis and study conducted to determine if, or the extent to which, a particular agency action will impact the environment.” Heartwood, 230 F.3d at 949. In evaluating whether an EIS is necessary, Council on No. 03-2644 25 Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) regulations instruct that the term “significantly” in the statute requires consideration of both “context” and “intensity.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a)-(b). Intensity in turn requires agencies to consider, among other factors, “the degree to which the proposed action affects public health and safety”; “the degree to which the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial”; and “the degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks.” Id. § 1508.27(b)(2), (4), (5). These considerations are often spelled out in the preliminary stages of a proposed project in an environmental assessment (“EA”). An EA is a shorter, rough-cut, lowbudget EIS which is mandated when, as here, proposed action is neither one normally requiring an EIS nor one categorically excluded from the EIS process. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9; 23 C.F.R. § 771.115(c); Indiana Forest Alliance, 325 F.3d at 856. Among other information, it “provide[s] evidence and analysis that establish[es] whether or not an EIS or a Finding of No Significant Impact (’FONSI’) should be prepared.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1); see also Rhodes v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1998). In this case, Citizens alleges that the defendants failed to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the Ackerville Bridge Project and that an EIS is required for the Project under NEPA and its implementing regulations. In assessing these contentions, we must, as a threshold matter, state with precision the question at issue. Both parties agree there are contaminants in the groundwater in the general vicinity of the Ackerville Bridge Project. They disagree as to the source of the contaminants and the extent of the threat posed by the contaminants. Citizens claims the source is the Waste Management landfill. The defendants are not sure 26 No. 03-2644 what the precise source is. Citizens claims the levels of contaminants are unsafe. The defendants believe they are not. Regardless of the source and extent of the contaminants, the key question is whether there is a nexus between the Ackerville Bridge Project, which the defendants are implementing and which NEPA and its regulations govern, and the preexisting contamination in the general vicinity, which, apart from the Project, NEPA and its regulations do not affect. In this action, the only possible mechanism by which Citizens claims the Project will exacerbate this preexisting condition is through the bridge pilings. In their view, when driven into the groundwater, the pilings will create a zone of permeability that will allow the contaminants to flow to the private drinking water of Ackerville citizens. Thus, the narrow question before us is whether the pilings needed for the bridge will advance or exacerbate the migration of contaminated water toward private wells in the Ackerville area.3 3 Citizens puts a great deal of emphasis in its argument on the allegation that the defendants did not adequately determine the source and extent of the contamination, especially the extent of arsenic, before proceeding with a finding of no significant impact and with construction. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 28, 31-32, 36-37. As a threshold matter, we note that the defendants did explore the levels of contamination both before and after the April 2000 EA/FONSI enough to determine that there was preexisting contamination, at least in small amounts, and to determine that the Project itself did not threaten to exacerbate the contamination without some mechanism to advance it toward the Ackerville drinking water. See R.38, Ex.1003, A.R. at 00002; R.38, Ex.1015, A.R. at 00714; R.38, Ex.1020, A.R. at 12295. Nevertheless, Citizens’ argument misses the point. Again, we emphasize that the (continued...) No. 03-2644 27 Citizens, through its expert, Mr. Thresher, claim that “the coarse grains along the boundaries of the driven pilings would rotate due to the shearing thereby increasing the porosity, and consequently the permeability, of the sands and gravels near the pilings.” Appellant’s Br. at 34. This is the principle of dilatancy, and in this case, it means the driving of pilings will create a zone of permeability (a space that chemicals can pass through) around the outside of the pilings that would allow contamination from lower levels to migrate upward and eventually into private drinking wells and water. Id. Defendants through their experts at the WDNR disagree and instead believe that the “relatively small increase in vertical groundwater movement which 3 (...continued) defendants’ liability under NEPA and its implementing regulations rests on a nexus between their Project and the preexisting contamination. If the Project has no significant effect on the contamination, the contamination is still a problem, but it is a problem that does not fall under the jurisdiction of the FHWA and WDOT. Rather, it falls under the U.S. EPA and WDNR which are charged with maintaining the quality of groundwater for our citizens. In fact, both in relation to and apart from this Project, the U.S. EPA and WDNR have been monitoring the contamination and its effect on the groundwater in Ackerville for some time. See R.38, Ex.1024, A.R. at 10164-10165; A.R. at 10476-10477. In sum, NEPA requires agencies to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of their projects. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). If an agency’s project does not itself “significantly” affect the environment, then neither NEPA nor its implementing regulations require an agency to perform an EIS or to remedy a preexisting environmental problem merely because the project happens to take place in the vicinity of that preexisting environmental problem. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1508 (discussing “effects” which “are caused by the action”) (emphasis added). 28 No. 03-2644 might be expected along open spaces surrounding even several dozen pilings is insignificant compared to the quantity of natural vertical movement.” R.38, Ex.1020, A.R. at 12295. Again, we emphasize that we do not approach this dispute as a panel of environmental experts attempting to decide which party is correct. We only review whether the agencies charged with carrying out this project took a “hard look” at the relevant information and consequences and made an informed judgment. The April 2000 EA/FONSI for the Ackerville Bridge Project does not contain a specific discussion of the effects of the pilings. Rather, it discusses the required excavation, noting it will not reach the groundwater, and concludes: “The Department has determined that the potential for encountering and impacting hazardous materials during construction of this project does not exist. Therefore, there is no purpose or need for preparation of an EIS.” R.38, Ex.1003, A.R. at 00005. Other contemporaneous documents do contain general conclusions that the pilings will have no effect on the contamination. For example, the Addendum to the Phase 1 Report, also released in April of 2000, states without elaboration that it is “unlikely the pilings for the structure supports . . . will cause an impact on plume movement or concentrations.” R.38, Ex.1015, A.R. at 00714. Likewise, Mr. Wade, a Hazardous Materials Engineer for WDOT, concluded in a March 14, 2000 letter that “it is also unlikely that project pilings or water detention/infiltration basins will cause an impact on plume movement or concentrations.” R.38, Ex.1009, A.R. at 00728. Although based on the evidence in the record, we believe the defendants knew the pilings would extend into the groundwater when No. 03-2644 29 the April 2000 EA/FONSI was issued,4 there is no “hard 4 The first, official, public acknowledgment that the pilings would extend into the groundwater was an EMCS report dated February 26, 2001. However, the defendants explain that they had assumed before the issuance of the April 2000 EA/FONSI that the pilings would extend below the groundwater, and though ambiguous, the most plausible inference from the record is that they in fact made that assumption. For example, the defendants asked the question in a “Fact Sheet/Topics of Concern” dated February 15, 2000: “If there is contamination in the shallow groundwater, couldn’t the structure pilings create a ‘channel’ to contaminate [sic] the deep groundwater where our drinking water comes from?” R.38, Ex.1008, A.R. at 00146. In a March 24, 2000 letter from Ken Wade of WDOT to EMCS, Mr. Wade stated: The water table for this region is approximately 30 feet below the ground surface. If construction plans for the footings require only 4 to 5 feet of excavation, it is very unlikely that contaminated groundwater will impact the project. It is also unlikely that project pilings . . . will cause an impact on plume movement or concentrations. R.38, Ex.1009, A.R. at 00728 (emphasis added). This language is mirrored in the April 2000 Addendum. R.38, Ex.1015, A.R. at 00714. Furthermore, just months after the issuance of the April 2000 EA/FONSI, Mr. Gonyo wrote a letter to the FHWA requesting reconsideration of the FONSI, and this letter stated: “[T]he pilings will have to be driven into and below the contaminated groundwater table.” R.38, Ex.1017 at 2. Finally, the WDNR was involved in this Project well before the issuance of the April 2000 EA/FONSI, see R.38, Ex.1003, A.R. at 00005 (Basic Sheet 2) (discussing “extensive coordination” with the WDNR in finding no significant impact), and Mr. Fauble of WDNR later noted in a correspondence: “When I first reviewed the environmental concerns regarding this project as part of the team here at DNR, I was aware that pilings would be driven below depths of 30 feet, (continued...) 30 No. 03-2644 look” analysis to support the conclusion reached by the defendants that the pilings would not have a significant effect. Indeed, the defendants appear to acknowledge there was not a “hard look” analysis of the effect of the pilings in April of 2000; instead, the defendants rely on the postEA/FONSI, August 22, 2000 memo of their experts at the WDNR as the basis for their “hard look.” See R.29 at 11 (defendants’ answers to district court’s questions) (“The specific question as to how the pilings would affect groundwater and more particularly, the movement of arsenic and TCE was fully addressed after the FONSI on a number of occasions by various persons.”) (emphasis added); Appellees’ Br. at 49 (stating that “the timing of the final determination of the depth that the pilings would extend into the ground is of little relevance based upon the findings the WDNR reached in its August 22, 2000, memorandum”). After the issuance of the final EA/FONSI, Mr. Gonyo requested reconsideration of the defendants’ decision in his July 7, 2000 letter to the FHWA. One concern specifically raised is that “the pilings will have to be driven into and below the contaminated groundwater table.” R.38, Ex.1017 at 2. The FHWA and WDOT were responsive to Mr. Gonyo’s request and solicited the help of the experts at the WDNR in reevaluating the Project’s impacts, including the effect of driving the pilings into the groundwater table, in order to respond to Mr. Gonyo. This exchange resulted in the August 22, 2000 WDNR memorandum authored by Mr. Czarkowski and Mr. Fauble, which states that “[d]riving pilings to depths greater than 30 feet could potentially encounter contaminated groundwater.” R.38, Ex.1020, A.R. 4 (...continued) which is where the groundwater occurs.” R.39, Ex.1031, A.R. at 13827. No. 03-2644 31 at 12296. However, the memo goes on to conclude that the “relatively small increase in vertical groundwater movement which might be expected along open spaces surrounding even several dozen pilings is insignificant compared to the quantity of natural vertical movement.” Id. at 12297. As required by NEPA, this conclusion was “based on a consideration of the relevant factors,” Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted), specifically, the makeup of the soil into which the pilings were to be driven, R.38, Ex.1020, A.R. at 12296. It also was not “clear error of judgment.” Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Finally, the conclusion was arrived at by the defendants’ experts, on which they were entitled to rely to the exclusion of Citizens’ expert. Id. (“When specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive.”). At this point, the defendants had taken a “hard look” and were in full compliance with NEPA and its regulations. Although we could stop here, we have gone to great lengths in reciting the facts to demonstrate that from August of 2000 to the beginning of the construction in May of 2002, the defendants did not ignore Citizens’ concerns. Rather, the defendants attended meetings with state legislators in which Citizens’ representatives expressed their concerns, responded to Citizens’ various requests for information and reconsideration, ultimately agreed to install private monitoring wells to study the contamination despite the belief the Project would have no significant impact on the contamination, and reviewed, and had the WDNR review, the results of the initial monitoring from the newly installed wells and any effects those results might have on the Project. In addressing Citizens’ concerns, the defendants 32 No. 03-2644 and WDNR also worked with other agencies including the U.S. EPA, Wisconsin OCR, and the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, all of which confirmed the defendants’ conclusion that the Project would not significantly affect the groundwater contamination. To be sure, the defendants did not change their position as result of Citizens’ requests and challenges, but they were not required to do so. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (stating that NEPA “simply prescribes the necessary process” but “itself does not mandate particular results” (citations omitted)). In taking a hard look at the environmental consequences, the the defendants also made a reasoned determination that an EIS was not required. As noted previously, an EIS is only required for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (emphasis added). According to CEQ regulations, “significantly” requires an agency to consider the “context” and “intensity” of a project’s environmental consequences. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a)-(b). Citizens claims the defendants failed to consider three factors that CEQ regulations instruct agencies to “consider[]” under the intensity prong. See id. § 1508.27(b). First, it claims the defendants failed to consider “the degree to which the proposed action affects public health and safety.” Id. § 1508.27(b)(2). The defendants, however, did consider this factor but found the Project, and specific to this litigation, the pilings, would have an insignificant effect. This factor must also be read in the context of the regulation’s instruction that agencies consider “[i]mpacts that may be both beneficial and adverse.” Id. § 1508.27(b)(1). The defendants found not only that the negative environmental impacts of the Project were insignificant, but also that the Ackerville Bridge Project was the best way to solve serious safety problems with the current roadway facility. No. 03-2644 33 The defendants also did not fail to consider “the degree to which the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial.” Id. § 1508.27(b)(4). Citizens has met its initial burden of establishing that the Project was highly controversial, as we recently defined that term in Indiana Forest Alliance, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 325 F.3d 851, 858 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]his factor considers whether there is a substantial dispute about the size, nature or effect of an action in the relevant community.”). However, that is only the first step in the analysis. As we further explained in Indiana Forest Alliance, if the plaintiff meets the initial burden, the agency must consider the dispute and address the concerns in its final decision. This two-step approach recognizes that as long as the agency has taken a “hard look” at the relevant issues involved in the preparation of an EIS and satisfactorily explained its subsequent decision, the agency decision should not be set aside. Id. at 858. In this case, the defendants did just that. See R.38, Ex.1020, A.R. at 12295-12296; R.38, Ex.1022, A.R. at 06225. The mere fact that there is still disagreement or that Citizens’ expert disagrees with the defendants’ experts does not render the defendants out of compliance under this factor. See Indiana Forest Alliance, 325 F.3d at 861 (citing multiple cases for the proposition that scientific dispute does not render an agency’s action arbitrary and capricious). Finally, the defendants considered “the degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5). Although they acknowledged uncertainty as to the source and extent of the threat of the contaminants to the Ackerville area, they found with certainty that the Project’s effects on the contamination and environment were insignificant. That conclusion was informed and reasoned, and thus 34 No. 03-2644 cannot be second-guessed. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378. In summary, we hold that the defendants took a “hard look” at the environmental consequences and in doing so, made an informed and reasoned determination that no EIS was required for the Project. Before moving on, we must address one last contention by Citizens. Citizens argues that this analysis is faulty because, temporally, our “hard look” analysis should extend only to April of 2000, when the defendants formally issued the EA/FONSI. The defendants did not stop with the issuance of the EA/FONSI, however, and we believe neither should our analysis. First, we do not believe this runs afoul of the administrative record requirement. “[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). The “hard look” inquiry is focused on “the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). Although the formal “decision” of no significant impact was made at the time of the April 2000 EA/FONSI in this case, the defendants reconsidered their position pursuant to the July 7, 2000 request of Mr. Gonyo. With the analysis of the experts at the WDNR, as memorialized in the August 22, 2000 memo, the defendants took a “hard look” at the consequences of the pilings and made a further “decision” that the EA/FONSI was valid and thus there was no need to withdraw the documents. Mr. Madrzak of the FHWA e- mailed Mr. Tufts of the FHWA, the addressee of Mr. Gonyo’s request, following completion of the August 22, 2000 memo: “The DNR note [August 22, 2000 memo] confirms the information contained in the revisions to the Environmental Assessment. The FONSI remains valid No. 03-2644 35 despite Mr. Gonyo’s objections. We will respond accordingly to his request for FHWA to withdraw approval of the FONSI.” R.11, Ex.5 (attached e-mail). The purpose of confining judicial review to the administrative record is to ensure that agencies adequately evaluate their proposed course of action before they act and do not simply attempt to justify rash, uniformed actions through “ ‘post hoc’ rationalizations” once they are aware they are being sued. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962)). The defendants in this case did not begin construction until May of 2002 and were not informed they were being sued until about the same time. See R.52 at 40-41. Therefore, the documents in the record that were developed in the months following the issuance of the April 2000 EA/FONSI, including the August 22, 2000 memo, were analyzed approximately a year and a half before the defendants even knew they were being sued and took the action, the construction, in dispute. These documents establish that in reconsidering the decision to release the EA/FONSI, the defendants did indeed take a “hard look” at the possibility of increased contamination caused by the pilings. This is not the kind of post-hoc rationalization the Supreme Court has counseled against through the administrative record requirement. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419 (discussing the invalidity of affidavits prepared for litigation). To now ignore the analysis in the months subsequent to the formal EA/FONSI would not only require us to elevate form over substance, but it would also require us to ignore the fundamental purpose of NEPA, to ensure that agencies consider the environmental consequences of their actions before they act, which was satisfied in this case. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 371. 36 No. 03-2644 Beyond the relevant administrative record, our position might be criticized for looking past the date on which the defendants officially stamped the EA/FONSI because these documents are intended to be the culmination of an agency’s environmental assessment. Cf. Southwest Williamson County Cmty. Ass’n v. Slater, 976 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (finding that the issuance of an EIS is a final agency action), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 173 F.3d 1033 (6th Cir. 1999). NEPA and its regulations require agencies to take a “hard look” at the “significance” of the consequences of their actions before issuing an EA/FONSI, see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), but also contemplate the reality that, after the formal issuance of an EIS or EA/FONSI, it is often the case that new information comes to light or the project changes. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 370-84 (discussing what is required of an agency under the regulations when a project changes or new information comes to light after the formal issuance of an EIS). Here, we have an analogous situation. A known issue came into sharper focus after the formal environmental documents were issued. The defendants apparently had considered the effect of driving the pilings into and below the groundwater table before the April 2000 EA/FONSI, and had concluded that the pilings would have no effect on the contamination. However, when Mr. Gonyo requested reconsideration of the FONSI, the full import of the issue became clear, and the defendants did a reevaluation, specifically analyzing the effect of the pilings. In this regard, the Supreme Court has instructed that “NEPA does require that agencies take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental effects of their planned action, even after a proposal has received initial approval.” See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 374. FHWA regulations implementing NEPA accordingly require that “[a]fter approval of the . . . FONSI . . ., the applicant shall consult with the Administration prior to requesting any major approvals or grants to establish No. 03-2644 37 whether or not the approved environmental document . . . remains valid for the requested Administration action.” 23 C.F.R. § 771.129(c). As our analysis above demonstrates, the defendants in this case took a “hard look” at the environmental effects of the Project, specifically, the pilings, in the months following the formal issuance of the EA/FONSI, and determined the previous EA/FONSI remained valid. This action put them in substantial compliance with NEPA. Not only are agencies required to reevaluate their original documents, but sometimes they are also required to supplement formally the prior environmental documents. NEPA itself does not expressly address post-decision supplements to an EA/FONSI, and neither do the implementing regulations. The regulations do discuss when an EIS must be formally supplemented, and the Supreme Court has elaborated on this requirement. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 370-84; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c); 23 C.F.R. § 771.130. Nevertheless, 23 C.F.R. § 771.129(c), quoted above, necessarily requires that an inadequate FONSI be formally supplemented if it no longer “remains valid.” Id. In this case, the defendants determined that the impacts of the pilings were insignificant and that the EA/FONSI remained valid; thus, no supplementation was required. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 385 (“[H]aving [taken a ‘hard look’ at the proffered evidence] and having determined based on careful scientific analysis that the new information was of exaggerated importance, the Corps acted within the dictates of NEPA in concluding that supplementation was unnecessary.”); Price Rd. Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Trans., 113 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding supplementation to the EA/FONSI unnecessary when the FHWA and Arizona Department of Transportation reevaluation revealed there were no “discernable” differences in environmental effects from the change in the project); Vine Street Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Dole, 630 F. Supp. 24, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“The 38 No. 03-2644 projected increase in the Expressway traffic is not quantitatively or qualitatively significantly different from what was considered in the FEIS”; therefore, no formal supplementation is required.). Furthermore, we agree with the district court that the defendants, in effect, created a de facto supplement to the EA, which was the basis of their “decision” that the FONSI was still valid. See Lake Region Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Slater, 986 F. Supp. 1169, 1196 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (finding that although a “formal ‘supplemental EA’ has not been prepared in this case,” “the administrative record indicates that the defendants have continued to review the impacts associated with changed conditions in the Highway 71 project”). Finally, we note that to remand with an order that the defendants formally supplement the EA and republish the FONSI at this late date, when NEPA’s letter and spirit have been complied with, when the pilings are in the ground, and when the bridge is up, would be futile. See Cronin v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that a court need not remand a case if doing so would be futile).