Opinion ID: 1506658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 41

Heading: Standard for Admission of Expert Testimony

Text: New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702, which is virtually identical to former Evid. R. 56(2), governs the admission of expert testimony. The rule provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. In effect, this rule imposes three basic requirements on the admission of expert testimony: (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the subject of the testimony must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to explain the intended testimony. [ State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208, 478 A. 2d 364 (1984); N.J.R.E. 702, 1991 Supreme Court Committee Comment.] Defendant does not contest that DNA testing is beyond the ken of the average juror. Likewise, the defense does not dispute the qualifications of Ms. Cooper or Dr. Word as experts in the field of DNA testing. The sole issue is whether the scientific community sufficiently accepted the DNA tests to justify admission of the testimony of the State's experts. In criminal cases we continue to apply the general acceptance or Frye test for determining the scientific reliability of expert testimony. In Frye, supra, the court wrote: [W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. [293 F. at 1013-14 (emphasis added).] In 1993, the United States Supreme Court abandoned Frye 's general-acceptance standard as the exclusive test for admitting scientific testimony in favor of the more relaxed standards of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Daubert, supra, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed. 2d 469. Even before the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert, this Court had relaxed the test for admissibility of scientific evidence in toxic-tort cases. Landrigan, supra, 127 N.J. at 404, 605 A. 2d 1079; Rubanick, supra, 125 N.J. at 421, 593 A. 2d 733. We have been cautious in expanding the more relaxed standard to other contexts. State v. Fertig, 143 N.J. 115, 126, 668 A. 2d 1076 (1996); State v. Spann, 130 N.J. 484, 509-10, 617 A. 2d 247 (1993); State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 572-73, 617 A. 2d 1196 (1993). Thus, the test in criminal cases remains whether the scientific community generally accepts the evidence. Spann, supra, 130 N.J. at 509, 617 A. 2d 247; Windmere, supra, 105 N.J. at 386, 522 A. 2d 405. A proponent of a newly-devised scientific technology can prove its general acceptance in three ways: (1) by expert testimony as to the general acceptance, among those in the profession, of the premises on which the proffered expert witness based his or her analysis; (2) by authoritative scientific and legal writings indicating that the scientific community accepts the premises underlying the proffered testimony; and (3) by judicial opinions that indicate the expert's premises have gained general acceptance. [ Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 210, 478 A. 2d 364 (citing State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 521, 443 A. 2d 1020 (1982)).] The burden to clearly establish each of these methods is on the proponent. Williams, supra, 252 N.J. Super. at 376, 599 A. 2d 960. Courts have applied this test in various contexts to evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence. See, e.g., Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 209, 478 A. 2d 364 (admitting expert testimony relating to battered woman's syndrome); State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 412-13, 548 A. 2d 1022 (1988) (admitting expert testimony that modified-chemical test detected presence of saliva on victim), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S.Ct. 1146, 103 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1989); Windmere, supra, 105 N.J. at 373, 522 A. 2d 405 (concluding that voice-print evidence does not derive from reasonably reliable scientific method); Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 82, 474 A. 2d 1 (1984) (holding breathalyzer scientifically reliable); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A. 2d 86 (1981) (admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony when subjected to strict safeguards ensuring reliability of hypnotic procedure); State v. King, 215 N.J. Super. 504, 518-20, 522 A. 2d 455 (App.Div. 1987) (finding isoenzyme test, which detects presence in blood of six distinct enzyme systems, held scientifically reliable); Williams, supra, 252 N.J. Super. at 378-83, 599 A. 2d 960 (holding PCR/DQ Alpha test and Gm/Km blood tests sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial).