Opinion ID: 4522726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Massiah Challenge

Text: Siri-Reynoso also argues that the District Court erred in admitting the testimony of Heriberto Martinez, a cooperating witness who was housed with Siri-Reynoso during pretrial detention. Specifically, Siri-Reynoso argues that the admission of Martinez’s testimony resulted in a violation of his right to counsel under the rule set forth in Massiah. Massiah makes clear that “once the right to counsel has attached, the Sixth Amendment imposes on the government an affirmative obligation not to solicit incriminating statements from the defendant in the absence of his counsel.” United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206; Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171 (1985)). “[T]hat obligation,” however, “is not breached unless the government has taken some action ‘that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.’” Id. (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986)). We review the District Court’s application of constitutional standards de novo. See United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 649 (2d Cir. 2001). Here, there was no Massiah violation. We are not aware of anything in the record suggesting that the Government took any action that was designed deliberately to elicit any testimony by SiriReynoso. And, to be sure, Siri-Reynoso does not point to anything in the record either. Placing Martinez in the same facility as Siri-Reynoso, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate a constitutional violation. See United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that 4 the “primary concern” under Massiah “is to avoid secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation,” and that “[t]he Sixth Amendment rights of a talkative inmate are not violated when a jailmate acts in an entrepreneurial way to seek information of potential value, without having been deputized by the government to question that defendant” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Far from violating Siri-Reynoso’s right to counsel, prosecutors unassociated with the instant case instructed Martinez not to solicit information from inmates at the jail. More critically, Martinez did not know, among other things, who Siri-Reynoso was, anything relating to his case, why he was in jail, or who were the prosecutors involved in the case. Cf. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 268– 71 (1980) (concluding that there was a constitutional violation where the Government provided an informant with specific information about who the defendant was, the charges against the defendant, and the Government’s interest in the defendant). Unlike the circumstances in Henry, SiriReynoso failed to demonstrate that Martinez was a government informant “deputized by the government to question” Siri-Reynoso, or that Martinez’s conversation with Siri-Reynoso was “the equivalent of [a] direct police interrogation.” Birbal, 113 F.3d at 346. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in admitting the testimony of Martinez.