Opinion ID: 1494066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: separation of powers issues

Text: Putting aside the flawed assumptions underlying the majority's decision, I also believe the Chief Justice's actions cannot be upheld within the structure of this Court's jurisprudence on separation of powers. This structure is based on Ky. Const. §§ 27 and 28, which provide: 27. The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another. 28. No person or collection of persons, being of one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted. Because of these provisions, we must evaluate the permissibility of the Family Court appointments not simply in terms of whether a constitutional actor has exercised his powers properly, or has abused his discretion, as the majority contends. Instead, because these actions potentially invaded the powers assigned by the Kentucky Constitution exclusively to the General Assembly, we should strictly construe the Chief Justice's authority and uphold his conduct only if it survives this heightened scrutiny. The majority's error is perfectly illustrated by comparing this case to Diemer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 786 S.W.2d 861 (1990). There, the Court was faced with a challenge to two provisions of the 1976 Kentucky Billboard Act. One provision prohibited signs that were legible and/or identifiable from a federal highway. The Court interpreted this provision to be sufficiently definite to withstand constitutional scrutiny after noting that [i]t is our responsibility to read the statutes of the General Assembly so as to save their constitutionality whenever such can be done consistent with reason and common sense, although we cannot go so far as to add additional words to give constitutionally permissible meaning where none would otherwise exist. Diemer v. Commonwealth, supra, 786 S.W.2d at 863-64. This is comparable to the deferential approach the majority now takes to the Chief Justice's actions, see supra, at 684 (We must pause to consider the status of the actions of the Chief Justice. We find them to be acts of discretion that are not an abuse of that discretion.). This approach may be appropriate for routine budgetary and administrative actions taken by the Chief Justice as executive head of the Court of Justice, Ky. Const. § 110(5)(b). However, this approach is erroneous where the Chief Justice's actions threaten to invade the proper exercise of powers by separate branches of government, as Diemer further illustrates. After accepting the first provision of the Billboard Act, the Diemer court invalidated the second provision of the Act prohibiting certain signs outside of an urban area. The Court characterized this to be a term of infinite variety depending upon the viewpoint of the person applying it, id., at 864, and held that the legislature had improperly delegated the task of defining the term by administrative regulation to the Secretary of Transportation. The Court explained: The requirements of the Kentucky constitutional principle of separation of powers, Kentucky Constitution Sections 27 and 28, are the same. The duty to define general terms cannot be delegated by the legislative branch to the executive branch. Kentucky is a strict adherent to the separation of powers doctrine. As we stated in Sibert v. Garrett, 197 Ky. 17, 246 S.W. 455, 457 (1922): Perhaps no state forming a part of the national government of the United States has a constitution whose language more emphatically separates and perpetuates what might be termed the American tripod form of government than does. . . [the Kentucky] Constitution . . . . Diemer, 786 S.W.2d at 864-65. Diemer thus illustrates that although a constitutional actor's conduct might ordinarily be accorded deference because of concerns for comity between branches of government, that presumption of legitimacy evaporates in disputes involving separation of powers issues. In such cases, a constitutional actor's conduct instead is subject to heightened scrutiny and a strict construction of those time-tested provisions of §§ 27 and 28 of Kentucky's Constitution. LRC v. Brown, supra, 664 S.W.2d at 914; Kentucky Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Musselman, Ky., 817 S.W.2d 213, 216 (1991). Of course, I assume that just as the Court has imposed heightened scrutiny on legislative actions that raise separation of powers concerns, so also the Court would impose heightened scrutiny on actions by executive and judicial officers raising separation of powers concerns. Ky. Const. §§ 27 and 28 contain no suggestion that the different branches of government should be treated any differently in separation of powers disputes. Indeed, the judiciary should be particularly vigilant to restrain its own exercise of power, because of its unique position as the final and unchecked arbiter of constitutional disputes. Otherwise, of course, if the judiciary fails to restrain itself, other constitutional actors will eventually be unwilling to submit to a different standard and allow courts to judge their conduct. In the present case, the Chief Justice's Family Court assignments explicitly altered the subject matter jurisdiction of certain Jefferson County district and circuit courts, despite the General Assembly's otherwise exclusive constitutional authority to determine the subject matter jurisdiction of all district and circuit courts in the state. Ky. Const. §§ 112(3) and 113(3). In my view, and seemingly in the majority's view as well, the Chief Justice was only allowed to make these assignments with the clearly-stated and well-founded intention of promoting the prompt disposition of causes. ( See Maj. op., supra, at 683: Such an extraordinary action must be rooted in fact and the reason for the temporary appointment should be noted in the order of appointment.) But neither of these conditions was met. In addition, the Chief Justice was also required to make these assignments for a finite term, or to address a finite amount of litigation, in order for them to be considered temporary. For all practical purposes, however, the very opposite occurred here, where the Chief Justice's March 20, 1991 Order stated that his appointments shall remain in effect until further order of this Court. But the most troublesome part of the majority's entire analysis is that it attempts to resolve the thorny separation of powers problems by declaring that the Chief Justice's actions are simply part of an acceptable joint research project with the legislature. See Maj. op., at 685: The Court of Appeals properly determined that the Jefferson Family Court project is a temporary `joint research project' of the judiciary and General Assembly and is structured in a constitutionally permissible manner. The casual tone of this statement should not be misleading. What the majority is sanctioning is a completely unprecedented and truly alarming suspension of the Constitution in the guise of a temporary research project. The appellant's criticism of this point seems to me well-founded. [W]here in the constitution is there any power to experiment with the basic foundations of the three branches of government? Can we experiment by eliminating the state senate? How about eliminating the office of Governor?. . . If you follow the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, it[']s allowable as long as it is not permanent. Brief of Appellant, at 18. As the appellant demonstrates, there are vast problems with the idea that we can suspend the Constitution's clear separation of powers for the purposes of a research project. In LRC v. Brown, supra , this Court firmly rejected the suggestion that constitutional powers can be reassigned, or delegated from one branch to another, simply because that might improve governmental functions. Yet that is exactly what the majority appears to embrace here. See Maj. op., at 686: The final form, if any, of the Family Court will need to be detailed in legislation. That does not mean that one branch of government cannot assist another branch of government in analyzing the methods to make a system of government including the administration of judicial matters more effective. In conclusion, I would reverse the decision below and issue the writ requested by the appellant. Out of concern for the orderly administration of cases that have been filed since 1991, I would apply this holding prospectively. See Fischer v. State Board of Elections, Ky., 879 S.W.2d 475, 480-81 (1994); Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., Ky., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (1989); see also Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2880, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (declaring Bankruptcy Court unconstitutional but applying holding prospectively and staying judgment until Congress would have an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication without impairing the interim administration of the bankruptcy laws). In Justice Frankfurter's phrase, Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late. Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600, 69 S.Ct. 290, 293, 93 L.Ed. 259 (1949) (dissenting opinion).