Opinion ID: 2087611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Accessory Liability at Common Law

Text: The common law created two categories of criminal offenders: principals and accessories. Principals were those perpetrators who were found to be present at the time of the criminal act. This category was further split into two subgroups. An offender was a principal in the first degree if he was the absolute perpetrator of the crime. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries . A principal in the second degree was an offender who was either actively or constructively present, aiding, and abetting the act to be done. Id. The second group of offenders, called accessories, were those who were neither the chief actors in the offense nor present at its performance, but were in some way concerned therein, either before or after the offense committed. Id. at . Just as the category of principals was split in two groups, so too was the category of accessories. An accessory before the fact was one who being absent at the time of the crime committed, doth yet procure, counsel, or command another to commit a crime. Herein absence is necessary to make him an accessory; for if such procurer, or the like, be present, he is guilty of the crime as principal. Blackstone at . On the other hand, an accessory after the fact was a person who knowing a felony to have been committed, receives, relieves, confronts, or assists the felon. Id. at  (emphasis added). See also Annotation, Acquittal of PrincipalTrial of Accessory, 9 ALR 4th 972 (1981). Although the accessory was not found to be present during the criminal act, his participation required him to suffer the same punishment as a principal whether the accessory's participation occurred before or after the alleged crime. Principals and accessories were not accorded the same treatment in all respects, however. For instance, absent waiver, no man could be tried as an accessory till after the principal was convicted, or, at least, he must have been tried at the same time with him; though that law is now much altered.... Blackstone at . Like the current Assisting a Criminal statute, the criminal liability of the accessory was linked to that of his principal at common law. The jurist writes further that a fear of inconsistent verdicts inspired this rule: [I]f the principal had never been indicted at all, had stood mute, had challenged ... jurors peremptorily, had claimed the benefit of clergy, had obtained a pardon, or had died before the attainder; the accessory in any of these cases could not be arraigned; for non constitit whether any felony was committed or no, till the principal had been attainted; and it might so happen that the accessory should be convicted one day, and the principal acquitted the next, which would be absurd. Blackstone at . In the present case, appellant faces a similar absurdity. Appellant stands convicted of assisting a criminal that a separate jury had acquitted before appellant's conviction. Logic alone seems enough to bar appellant's conviction. Although the Legislature has modified the common law rule against trying accessories before the fact before the principal, it has yet to similarly modify the language of the Assisting a Criminal statute.