Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Marlow's 1980 Statement Concerning Three Robberies

Text: During the penalty phase, Supervising Probation Officer Evelyn Frantz read into the record a statement that defendant Marlow had made to a probation officer in connection with his 1980 guilty plea to three counts of robbery. In the statement, Marlow described the robberies he had committed in an apartment complex in Upland, a leather goods store in Upland, and a methadone clinic in Ontario, all in November 1979. Marlow now contends admission of his statement was error under the rules of Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 210 Cal.Rptr. 204, 693 P.2d 789, In re Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, 156 Cal.Rptr. 344, 596 P.2d 1, People v. Hicks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 757, 94 Cal.Rptr. 393, 484 P.2d 65 and People v. Harrington (1970) 2 Cal.3d 991, 88 Cal. Rptr. 161, 471 P.2d 961. Marlow failed to preserve this issue for appellate review by making contemporaneous objection at trial, but he contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in this regard. In any event, the claim lacks merit. A line of California authorities, beginning with People v. Quinn (1964) 61 Cal.2d 551, 39 Cal.Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705, held that statements made under certain circumstances by criminal defendants to probation officers in the course of the preparation of a probation report were inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings. In Quinn, for example, the probation officer told the defendant he would not recommend probation if the defendant failed to tell the truth; this court held that the [d]efendant's admissions following this threat or implied promise of leniency were . . . involuntary, and their introduction into evidence required reversal. ( Id. at p. 554, 39 Cal.Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705; see also People v. Harrington, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 999, 88 Cal.Rptr. 161, 471 P.2d 961 [statements made to probation officer in the hope that candor would persuade the officer to make a favorable report to the court were held inadmissible either as substantive evidence or for impeachment]; but see People v. Alesi (1967) 67 Cal.2d 856, 861, 64 Cal.Rptr. 104, 434 P.2d 360 [statements made by the defendant on advice of counsel, with no assertion of privilege at the time the statements were made, were admissible at a later trial].) In People v. Hicks, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pages 761-763, 94 Cal.Rptr. 393, 484 P.2d 65, emphasizing the paramount nature of the policy of encouraging free and unfettered communication between a defendant and his or her probation officer, this court held it was error to admit a defendant's statement made, on the advice of a probation officer, to a judge in a related case. Similar rules were adopted in the context of juvenile proceedings. (E.g., Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 807-810, 210 Cal.Rptr. 204, 693 P.2d 789 [Cal. Const. precludes use of minor's testimony at fitness hearing in juvenile court in later adult criminal trial]; In re Wayne H., supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 598-601, 156 Cal.Rptr. 344, 596 P.2d 1 [statements made by juvenile to probation officer held inadmissible in any subsequent proceeding as substantive evidence or for impeachment].) In Minnesota v. Murphy (1984) 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409, however, the high court held that the federal Constitution does not compel exclusion from criminal proceedings of a defendant's statement to a probation officer. The court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing, but must be affirmatively asserted, except in limited situations involving inherently compelling pressure to speak (e.g., when the declarant is undergoing custodial interrogation), the threat of a penalty for exercising the privilege, or, related to the latter, a gambler's failure to file a gambling tax return. ( Id. at pp. 429-430, 434, 439, 104 S.Ct. 1136.) Although the defendant in Minnesota v. Murphy was required to speak â and speak truthfully â with his probation officer, he was not precluded from asserting the privilege and was not shown to have been subject to any penalty for doing so. Consequently, the high court held, his statements were voluntary and thus admissible. ( Id. at pp. 436-439, 104 S.Ct. 1136.) Following Minnesota v. Murphy , and in light of article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, [42] the Court of Appeal in People v. Goodner (1992) 7 Cal. App.4th 1324, 1330-1332, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, held that statements made by a defendant to a probation officer during a presentence investigation interview could be used against him, at least in the absence of any evidence that the probation officer had threatened the defendant with an unfavorable recommendation if he refused to give a statement. (Accord, People v. Pacchioli (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1340, 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 156.) Thus, the Goodner court recognized, our decision in People v. Hicks, supra, 4 Cal.3d 757, 94 Cal.Rptr. 393, 484 P.2d 65, did not survive Proposition 8. [43] Marlow's claims, therefore, must fail.