Opinion ID: 656609
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Determination of Proximate Cause

Text: 19 The district court found that Budden's conduct constituted the sole proximate cause of the crash. Although the unique facts of this case make for a close call on proximate cause, the district court did not clearly err. 20 Budden's conduct meets all three prongs of the Nebraska proximate cause test: the accident would not have occurred but for his negligence; a disastrous accident could or should have been foreseen as a natural and probable result of failing to act immediately to get out of the bad weather; and no cause intervened between Budden's negligence and the accident. 21 Geranis' breach of duty meets the first two prongs of the proximate cause test, but not necessarily the third. First, we should assume that if Budden had received a complete weather briefing, he would not have attempted the flight. This result derives from the presumption that the negligence of a deceased person must be proved, and absent such proof, the deceased is assumed to have exercised due care. Neff v. United States, 420 F.2d 115, 117 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1969); Stauffer v. School Dist. of Tecumseh, 238 Neb. 594, 473 N.W.2d 392, 395 (1991). Second, although not probable in a statistical sense, a deadly crash is a foreseeable result of providing an inaccurate weather forecast. 22 The district court could find on this record, however, that Budden's subsequent negligent conduct constituted an intervening cause which rendered the negligent briefing a remote rather than proximate cause of the accident. While Geranis knew or should have known that the pilot would rely on the weather information in taking off on the flight, the briefer was not duty bound to anticipate that Budden would continue the mission despite weather conditions which mandated aborting the flight. Thus, the district court's proximate cause determination rests on the proposition that Budden's conduct broke the causal connection between Geranis' breach of duty and the crash. 23 Although the district court made no factual finding that the pilot would have initiated the flight or would not have done so with a full weather briefing, that observation does not amount to a crucial determination in the case. 9 The trial court's findings that the pilot's negligence constituted the accident's sole proximate cause stand independent of its comment relating to the pilot's decision as to whether or not to take off. 24 These are the crucial findings of the trial court: 25 I conclude that the negligence of Robert Geranis in failing to advise Budden of the area forecast of below-1,000-foot ceilings was not a proximate cause of the accident, that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Budden in continuing to fly into deteriorating weather conditions consisting of decreasing cloud ceilings and visibility for a substantial period of time after he was aware through personal observation of those weather conditions and failing to take reasonable preventive measures. 26 .... 27 The greater weight of the persuasive evidence is that visibility gradually decreased as the aircraft proceeded to the northwest. Scud clouds became more prevalent as the pilot proceeded along the traveled route during the last several miles. Precipitation was first encountered at about the Hutchinson ranch, approximately eight miles from the accident scene. The precipitation increased for the next several miles from a mist to a light drizzle. Cloud ceilings below 1,000 feet were also first encountered at about the Hutchinson ranch. Ceilings decreased to perhaps 300 or 400 feet by the time of the arrival at the accident site. Scud clouds, partially in the form of fog, were below the cloud ceiling. Rodgers' Helicopter Service operating procedures, which became part of the rules and regulations of the F.A.A., required that Budden have at least a 1,000-foot ceiling and visibility of three miles at night. Budden was in violation thereof for approximately the last eight miles of the flight. 28 Budden could have--and a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have--made a 180-degree turn to fly back toward the area from which he come [sic] or could have landed. Budden did neither. He, rather, continued to fly into worsening conditions at cruising speed. 29 That was negligence which constituted the sole proximate cause of [the] accident. 30 Additional Findings on Remand dated December 8, 1992. 31 In somewhat similar cases, courts have emphasized the pilot's duty to avoid weather hazards, and have held the failure to do so to be the sole proximate cause of the ensuing accident, notwithstanding the Government briefer's failure to provide full adverse weather information to the pilot. See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 919 F.2d 1079, 1088 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 276, 116 L.Ed.2d 228 (1991) (The court's finding that the crew's deliberate decision to land through a known thunderstorm located at the end of the runway, when they could easily have gone around, was the sole proximate cause of this disaster is not clearly erroneous[.]); Black v. United States, 441 F.2d 741 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913, 92 S.Ct. 233, 30 L.Ed.2d 186 (1971) (pilot error, not failure of attendant at flight service station to inquire of route and destination and furnish adverse weather warnings under government regulations, constituted sole proximate cause of aircraft crash). In Black, the court observed that: 32 Good, even fundamental, flying practice dictated the avoidance of the storm front that of a certainty loomed ahead of the pilot. He should have altered or reversed his course, or better still have landed at the nearest suitable airport. 33 Id. at 744. 34 Budden's actions are distinguishable from those of the pilot in Norwest Capital Management & Trust Co. v. United States, 828 F.2d 1330 (8th Cir.1987). There we set aside a trial court's determination of pilot error as sole proximate cause where the government's flight service specialists failed to warn the pilot of icing and other dangerous weather. In Norwest, the air crash occurred shortly after takeoff, only three miles from the airport, with the aircraft facing in the direction of the airport. The weight of the evidence suggested that the pilot sought to return to his base. The court commented: 35 [The pilot's] only prudent alternative upon encountering the icing would be to try to drop down under the clouds and turn around and head back to the Hot Springs airport. This is exactly what the evidence shows he attempted to do. 36 Id. at 1341. Here, the district court found that Budden, unlike the pilot in Norwest, failed to avail himself of prudent alternatives. 37 On this record, the district court made a close call on circumstantial evidence about the pilot's conduct in relation to the adverse weather which he confronted. The evidence presented by its very nature gives rise to varying conclusions. While another fact-finder might have reached a different conclusion on proximate cause and on the pilot's negligence, we cannot say that the district court's ultimate finding that the pilot's negligence solely caused the tragic air crash is clearly erroneous. 38 Accordingly, we affirm. 39