Opinion ID: 1362793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Subsequent Legislative History

Text: Readers may recall that the excerpt above from the Attorney General's letter of March 14, 1979 recounts a view expressed subsequent to the passage of the legislation. Among many views like that one which might have affected our holding, most were expressed and commented upon during recent months โ on TV and radio, in dispatches, editorials, letters to the editor, in tavern and town. The politicization of this proceeding after the summer of 1978 became phantasmagoric. A shrill, clamorous campaign โ inspired and nurtured by experienced, well-financed, ambitious, and posse-like hard on crime advocates โ has had a still incalculable but dismal impact on the judicial process in California. As first presented to the Court of Appeal and then to us, this case might have been a useful vehicle for a much-needed examination of questions involving subsequent legislative history and its proper use by courts. In our letter of February 20, 1979 to counsel we sought comment on the advisability of utilizing post hoc legislative declarations in litigation generally. (See annex H, infra. ) Regrettably that needed examination will have to be postponed. Its essential focus has been caricatured, somewhat bizarrely, in several briefs and other statements made before, during, and after oral argument on rehearing here. Thus it is not timely yet for us to reweigh this oft-quoted dictum in Hilder v. Dexter (1902) A.C. 474, 477: My Lords, I have more than once had occasion to say that in construing a statute I believe the worst person to construe it is the person who is responsible for its drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of the language which in fact has been employed. [5] See part II of the State Public Defenders's amicus brief filed on March 2, 1979 (The statement in the Condit and Hanelt brief regarding legislative intent is unreliable and irrelevant to this case and should not be considered by this court); Final Report of the Subcommittee on Legislative Intent of the Assembly Committee on Rules (1963) seriatim ; Forsyth, Declaratory Legislation in California (1948) 36 Cal.L.Rev. 634; Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes (1975) page 181: [T]he court's general duty of deference to the legislature would in many cases be better served by acting consistently with the enacted will of the Legislature than by acting consistently with the unenacted later will, despite the fact that the unenacted expression of intent was the more recent legislative expression. Finally, because in years ahead the chroniclers of this rehearing and of the whole melancholy tale may lack awareness of pertinent events and diverse pressures that have become so tangled, I think that I should review briefly some of the November 1978 to June 1979 developments regarding ง 1203.06. The trial court's critical action here was during July 1976. On July 21, 1977, after the Court of Appeal had reversed that action, we granted a hearing; and oral argument was heard on February 6, 1978. Tutored and harsh comment began to appear at least as early as June 1978. (See Nicholson, People v. Tanner: An Update, L.A. Daily J. Rep. (Jan. 24, 1979) p. 4, at p. 6; cf. Nicholson & Condit, The Ultimate Human Right, Met. News (May 23, 1978) p. 2.) During 1977 and 1978 the Legislature could of course have amended the law. In ง 1203.06 the phrase Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203 could have been replaced by Notwithstanding any other provision of law, With no exceptions, or similar words. Except for a perplexing attack by the Republican gubernatorial candidate on October 10 and 11, 1978, however, the hullabaloo did not begin till November 1978. If the State Supreme Court throws out California's law mandating prison terms for criminals who use guns, Governor Brown said ... he will lead a fight to reinstate that law. `We will have mandatory prison sentences if I have to write the new law or a new amendment to the Constitution,' Brown said. (S.F. Chronicle, Nov. 9, 1978.) In early December, Attorney General-elect George Deukmejian pledged to lead the fight to reinstate mandatory prison sentencing laws if they are overturned by the state Supreme Court. (L.A. Daily J., Dec. 5, 1978.) A freshman Assemblyman ... proposed a constitutional amendment in anticipation of a controversial Supreme Court decision that may overturn a state sentencing law. (The Recorder, Dec. 13, 1978.) This court's initial opinions were filed on December 22. In Sacramento, Governor Brown reacted sharply.... [B]oth Brown and ... Deukmejian promised to push for reinstatement of the mandatory prison penalty for gun-wielding criminals.... (This World, Dec. 31, 1978.) The San Francisco Chronicle editorialized: This law ... must be re-enacted.... And it must be drawn in such a way that the California Supreme Court will have no leg to stand on if it should set out again to override the undoubted will of the people. (Sunday Punch, Dec. 31, 1978.) Sen. Jerry Smith ... said he saw no or little resistance to passage of the measure, since `all legislators feel strongly about this.' Also, [t]o help expedite matters Smith ... received permission by a unanimous vote of the upper house to hold a hearing on the measure ... next Tuesday [Jan. 9]. (S.F. Examiner, Jan. 3, 1979.) By that time the Governor seemingly had found that other matters were for him more pressing. The leadoff witness in favor of the measure was newly inaugurated Republican Atty. Gen. George Deukmejian, and the committee endorsed the bill unanimously. (L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 1979.) Two days later it passed the Senate unanimously. [6] Meanwhile, back at the Assembly committee where doubts had been expressed at a first meeting on January 8, the inquiry attracted notably fewer media people than did the Senate proceedings. Yet the questions raised there did seem more penetrating and perceptive, and several editorialists began to pronounce their second thoughts. See, e.g., page 6 of part II of the January 11th Los Angeles Times: Now that the controversy over the Supreme Court's decision has abated somewhat, the Legislature should take the time required to carefully debate a new statute. The ... law must be just, and must have some flexibility to provide for the `extraordinary cases' cited by Tobriner. Committee action eventually was postponed, and the prospect of new legislation is blurred. See the San Francisco Banner's Assembly to bypass all sentencing bills ..., May 4, 1979 (labeled a `death wish' by Michael Rushford, director of the California Chamber of Commerce Anti-Crime Department); also the related dispatch from Sacramento in The Recorder, May 10, 1979 (the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee yesterday approved two moderate measures on dangerous mentally ill offenders, but killed other, tougher sentencing proposals). Concerning the views of George Nicholson, a former Alameda County prosecutor who lobbies for the California District Attorneys Association, and Rod Blonien, chief legislative lobbyist for Attorney General George Deukmejian, the San Francisco Examiner had earlier reported (Feb. 7, p. 5) that their hope for an omnibus blanket for all mandatory terms is bogging down, as a legislative staff review of these laws begins to turn up inconsistencies and anomalies. [7] As noted above, all that seemed needed during the months that have followed December 22, 1978 was a simple amendment that replaced Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203 with Notwithstanding any other provision of law or an equivalent phrase. To date, the Assembly's representatives have chosen not to observe the many ex cathedra edicts typified by the quote on my preceeding pages 547-548 from the San Francisco Chronicle, as well as these words from the San Francisco Examiner (Dec. 27, 1978): The Legislature should make its intent so clear on this law that that issue never again could be raised by this court. And it should make achievement of the goal Act I as it assembles to face the tasks of the New Year.