Opinion ID: 423901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 45 Both Ringland and Arruda challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions. Ringland objects only to his conviction on the Travel Act count, while Arruda challenges both his Travel Act and conspiracy convictions. In addressing these issues 46 we regard the evidence, including all inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Fortes, 619 F.2d 108, 122 (1st Cir.1980). We must determine whether a reasonable jury, so viewing the evidence, could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 259 (1st Cir.1982), cert. denied [--- U.S. ----] 103 S.Ct. 738 [74 L.Ed.2d 960] (1983), and if it can support varying reasonable interpretations, the jury is entitled to choose among them, United States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296, 302 (1st Cir.1975). 47 United States v. Quejada-Zurique, 708 F.2d 857 at 859 (1st Cir.1983). 48 To establish a violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, the government must prove: (1) interstate travel or the use of an interstate facility; (2) with the intent to distribute the proceeds of or otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate an unlawful activity; (3) followed by performance, or attempted performance of acts in furtherance of the unlawful activity. Id.; see United States v. Coran, 589 F.2d 70, 72 (1st Cir.1978). 49 Bribery in violation of state law is an unlawful activity within the meaning of the Travel Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(2), and the Massachusetts bribery statute, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 268A, § 2, is thus a sufficient predicate crime under the Travel Act. See United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 398 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819, 97 S.Ct. 64, 50 L.Ed.2d 79 (1976). Section 2(b) of the Massachusetts law prohibits any state, county or municipal employee from engaging in bribery to influence performance of an official act. Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 268A, § 2(b); see Hathaway, 534 F.2d at 399. To obtain a conviction under this section the government must show a corrupt intent on the part of the defendant to be influenced in his future performance of an official act. Commonwealth v. Dutney, 4 Mass.App. 363, 348 N.E.2d 812, 821 (1976). 50 The Travel Act count against Ringland charged him with causing Olshever to travel interstate for the purpose of delivering $5,000 to Ringland as part of an illegal bribery scheme. He challenges his conviction on this count on three grounds: (1) that the government failed to show that he violated the Massachusetts statute; (2) that any travel was incidental to the commission of the bribery; and (3) that he performed no overt act in furtherance of the unlawful activity after the traveling occurred. We reject all three arguments. 51 As to the bribery claim, Ringland argues that he was not influenced in the performance of any official duty and, at most, he extorted money from Olshever. He claims that he solicited $25,000 from Olshever in return for approval of Parkway I's substitute window. And since Parkway I backed out of the contract, no window was ever submitted for him to approve. This contention founders on the evidence and the law. 52 Ringland ignores the fact that his conviction is based on the $5,000 he received from Olshever on November 22, 1978, in return for Ringland's assurance that Parkway II's phony bid and bond documents would pass smoothly through the DCA's review process. Olshever testified that Ringland accepted $5,000 for this purpose. The additional testimony by Ringland's supervisor, that Parkway II's review was completed in record time, indicates that Ringland made good on his promise. 53 Nor are we persuaded that Olshever's travel from New York to Boston in connection with the $5,000 bribe was incidental. There is 'no requirement that the use of the interstate facilities be essential to the scheme: it is enough that the interstate travel or the use of interstate facilities makes easier or facilities the unlawful activity.'  United States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1256 (3d Cir.1979) (quoting United States v. Perrin, 580 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir.1978)). Travel is not incidental if it is an important link in the interchange among defendants. Hathaway, 534 F.2d at 398. The evidence presented warranted a jury finding that travel between New York and Boston was an important link in the payment of kickbacks by Olshever to Ringland. Hammond Associates, Olshever's company, was a New York business, and any money flowing to Ringland through Hammond would have to originate in New York. Olshever's testimony that he told Ringland that the $5,000 would have to be part of the $25,000 upon which the two had previously agreed indicates that Ringland contemplated payment to him of $25,000 cleared through Hammond in New York. This is sufficient to show that Ringland caused interstate travel within the meaning of the Travel Act. 54 Finally, there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find that Ringland performed an act in furtherance of the bribery after Olshever's interstate travel. As explained above the evidence showed that Ringland fulfilled his part of the bargain by facilitating the smooth passage of Parkway II's contract documents through the DCA's review process. Furthermore, it seems obvious that Ringland's mere acceptance of the money was a sufficient overt act following the travel; acceptance is an act taken in furtherance of the distribution of the proceeds of an unlawful bribery scheme. 55 Arruda, too, challenges his Travel Act conviction. The count against Arruda alleged that he caused Sceviour to travel interstate for the purpose of delivering $1,000 to Arruda as part of an illegal bribery scheme. Arruda's arguments, similar to those raised by Ringland, are as follows: (1) that the government did not prove bribery under Massachusetts law; (2) that Sceviour's travel was incidental; and (3) that he did not cause Sceviour to travel. 56 Arruda's first argument is entirely devoid of merit. He contends that even if he received $1,000 from Sceviour, a fact that is sufficiently supported by the record, there was no bribe since he did not do a corrupt or illegal act in return for the $1,000; he did nothing except perform his normal lawful duties. Arruda overlooks that this is exactly what a bribery scheme under Massachusetts law involves; a corrupt intent to accept money in return for the performance of an official act. The bargained for action is not supposed to be corrupt or illegal; the corrupt acceptance of money in return for that which is a public official's duty is the forbidden action. 57 The evidence amply supported the jury's conclusion that Arruda, with a corrupt intent, accepted $1,000 in exchange for approving a change order for Parkway windows. Sceviour testified about the agreement to kickback $1,000 apiece to Arruda, DiSanti, and Harrington in return for a change order. Arruda signed the change order on June 20, 1979, and Sceviour testified that he thereafter traveled from New York to Fall River with money to pay off the bribes. Sceviour stated that when he went to Arruda's office at FRHA Arruda asked, Did you bring my money for me? Sceviour said that he responded, Yes, I brought a thousand dollars for you, and Arruda took the money from him. The jury could conclude that Arruda corruptly intended to perform his official duties, the signing of a change order, in return for $1,000. 58 We also cannot accept Arruda's claims that the travel was incidental and that he did not cause the travel. Our disposition with regard to Ringland's similar claims applies with full force here. The evidence showed that Arruda solicited kickbacks from a company with its main operations in New York, and the jury could find that Arruda knew that money flowing to him would originate in Parkway II's New York office. 59 Arruda challenges his conspiracy count conviction on the ground that the government did not prove that he was a member of the conspiracy. We disagree. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Arruda was a participant in a scheme to obtain kickbacks through the award of FRHA contracts. 60 As recounted above, Sceviour testified that Arruda participated in a scheme to obtain $3,000 in return for a change order. Anderson, Sceviour, and Olshever each implicated Arruda in the scheme to make Anderson (Plumb House) more cooperative by offering to give him an inflated change order. The evidence placed Arruda at a meeting at which the scheme was devised and at a luncheon where he and the others tried to ensure that Anderson would agree to the change order. 61 Arruda claims that the government failed to penetrate his defense that he stood on the sidelines at FRHA without knowledge of the illegal activity while DiSanti took the reins of power from him. The evidence indicated that Arruda was indeed a figurehead and did not play a significant role at FRHA. But the evidence also warranted a jury conclusion that Arruda intentionally kept his involvement at a minimum with the full expectation that he would get his cut of the deal. 62 Olshever testified that at a luncheon meeting with Arruda on November 8, 1979, Arruda told him that some of the people he [Arruda] worked with used to take him as a fool because he kept quiet about a lot of things, but he knew exactly what was going on. According to Olshever, Arruda told him that he was concerned because he did not think he was getting his fair share from DiSanti. Arruda and DiSanti had numerous deals that were in progress, but Arruda felt he was being cut out by Joe. This evidence provides ample basis for a jury determination that Arruda conspired with the other named coconspirators to violate the Travel Act. 63