Opinion ID: 4578648
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional delegation error

Text: Mr. Miller also claims the district court’s delegation to probation was unconstitutional. Specifically, he argues that because the authority to impose punishment resides in the judiciary, the district court violated Article III when it delegated to probation the authority to determine the upper limit of his drug testing. “Article III of the United States Constitution confers the authority to impose punishment on the judiciary, and the judiciary may not delegate that authority to a nonjudicial officer.” United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 687, 697 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). 24 In an improper-delegation challenge to a supervised-release condition, we distinguish between permissible delegations that merely task the probation officer with performing ministerial or support services related to the punishment imposed and impermissible delegations that allow the officer to decide the nature or extent of the defendant’s punishment. This inquiry turns on the liberty interest affected by the probation officer’s discretion. Thus, allowing a probation officer to make the decision to restrict a defendant’s significant liberty interest constitutes an improper delegation of the judicial authority to determine the nature and extent of a defendant’s punishment. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The question here is therefore whether determining the number of drug tests to which Mr. Miller must submit constitutes “ministerial or support services related to the punishment imposed” or instead constitutes a decision as to the “nature or extent” of his punishment, thereby impacting a significant liberty interest. Id. (quotation marks omitted). For the reasons explained herein, we hold that the district court’s delegation did not amount to constitutional error. In so holding, we are guided by our precedent which, although not including caselaw directly on point, makes clear that the special drug-testing condition imposed in this case does not rise to the level of implicating a significant liberty interest. We are also swayed by the decision of the First Circuit when presented with a virtually identical issue. In United States v. Begay, we held that polygraph testing did not involve a significant restriction on the defendant’s liberty interests where, regardless of whether the restriction was in place, he would be required to undergo sex offender treatment and meet with his probation officer. 631 F.3d 1168, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 2011). We noted that although the burden imposed by the polygraph testing “may be 25 invasive and anxiety-provoking,” it did not rise to the level of “infring[ing] upon fundamental liberty interests, such as familial association.” Id. at 1175. Similarly, in United States v. Bear, we held that a delegation did not implicate the defendant’s significant liberty interests, and therefore was not unconstitutional, where probation could not require the defendant to submit to “residential treatment, penile plethysmograph testing, or the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs.” 769 F.3d 1221, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 696 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that “any condition that affects a significant liberty interest, such as one requiring the defendant to participate in residential treatment, or undergo penile plethysmographic testing,” may not be delegated to probation (citations omitted)). Cf. Cabral, 926 F.3d at 698–99 (holding a delegation of decision-making authority to probation unconstitutional where the decision could “infringe on a wide variety of liberty interests,” such as the defendant’s “fundamental right of familial association,” or could impose “occupational restrictions,” which we have “repeatedly held . . . implicate liberty interests”). Here, the decision delegated to Mr. Miller’s probation officer—i.e., to determine the number of drug tests to which he must submit—does not restrict a significant liberty interest. No occupational right or right to familial association is burdened, for example, nor does probation have authority to determine whether Mr. Miller submits to residential treatment, penile plethysmograph testing, or the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs. Further, even without the drugtesting special condition, Mr. Miller would be required (under those conditions of his 26 supervised release to which he does not object) to refrain from alcohol and drug use and to submit to alcohol testing. See ROA Vol. I, at 61 (listing as mandatory conditions of supervised release that Mr. Miller “must not commit another federal, state, or local crime” and “must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance”); id. at 63 (imposing as a special condition of supervised release that Mr. Miller “must not use or possess alcohol”); Aplt. Br. at 14 (stating that Mr. Miller “challenges the special condition authorizing substance abuse testing with respect to drug testing that may be required by the probation officer, but does not challenge it insofar as it requires him to submit to alcohol testing” (emphasis added)). Although Mr. Miller correctly notes that his failure to comply with the drugtesting condition would lead to an additional term of imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(3) (“If the defendant . . . refuses to comply with drug testing imposed as a condition of supervised release . . . the court shall revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection (e)(3).”), the ultimate revocation determination, and the decision as to the length of the resulting imprisonment term, are not delegated to probation and instead remain with the district court. Moreover, while actual imprisonment would of course restrict Mr. Miller’s significant liberty interests, the drug-testing condition itself does not create such a restriction; rather, imprisonment is contingent on Mr. Miller’s refusal to comply with the condition. See id. 27 The decision of the First Circuit in Padilla, when confronted with the same challenge, is also instructive. There, the court noted that the requirement in § 3583(d) that an Article III judge decide the maximum number of drug tests is not a constitutional requirement. 415 F.3d at 222. More specifically, the Padilla court held that [t]he placement of authority to set the maximum number of drug tests in the hands of the judge is a statutory choice; it is neither a matter of constitutional necessity nor a condition essential to the fair administration of justice. Thus, Article III is implicated only by way of the statutorily prohibited delegation[.] Id. (footnote omitted).6 Mr. Miller cites no authority supporting his contrary position. Because we are persuaded by the reasoning of the First Circuit in Padilla, we hold that the delegation of authority to probation to determine the number of drug tests to which Mr. Miller must submit was not an unconstitutional delegation of the district court’s judicial authority. Put another way, the district court did not commit constitutional error. 6 In United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 878–82 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit also considered a constitutional-delegation challenge to a drug-testing condition similar to the one at issue here. But conflicting statements in the decision make it unhelpful to the instant analysis. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit suggested that “how many times” a defendant will be subjected to drug testing was a decision implicating constitutional delegation concerns under Article III. Id. at 880. It then appears to hold that “there was no delegation of Article III judicial power regarding the primary decision of whether [the defendant] would undergo treatment,” which the court stated left only the “subordinate, statutory issue[]”of whether the district court erred in failing to specify the maximum number of non-treatment-program drug tests to which the defendant would be required to submit. Id. at 882 (emphasis added). This inconsistency in the Stephens opinion makes its holding unclear. 28