Opinion ID: 786509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 8 In order to establish a conspiracy under § 371, the government must prove: (1) an agreement to commit an illegal act; (2) the defendant's knowing and intentional participation in the agreement; and (3) an overt act committed in furtherance of the agreement. United States v. Gee, 226 F.3d 885, 893 (7th Cir.2000). The government may rely on circumstantial evidence to establish both the existence of a conspiracy and the defendant's involvement. United States v. Irorere, 228 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir.2000). But although a jury may infer facts from other facts derived by inference, `each link in the chain of inferences must be sufficiently strong to avoid a lapse into speculation.' United States v. Peters, 277 F.3d 963, 967 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting Piaskowski v. Bett, 256 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir.2001)); accord United States v. Cruz, 285 F.3d 692, 699 (8th Cir.2002); United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir.2000); United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1256 (2d Cir.1994). 9 In its brief, the government lists a sequence of events it says the jury could have found without drawing any inferences. The events are: Jones talked with Rock on the morning of June 20, 2001, and entered his car; Rock entered Westforth's with another man and made a $200 deposit on an SKS rifle; Jones and Rock later entered Westforth's together; Rock paid for the rifle and filled out the necessary paperwork, and Jones placed the rifle in Rock's trunk; three hours later Rock and Jones arrived at 2920 South State Street, and Jones entered the building; approximately a minute later Rock opened his trunk and started to remove the rifle; Rock was detained; and Jones exited the building by a side door with seven or eight men. The government says this sequence amply supports the jury's finding that Jones participated in the conspiracy. 10 The government overstates the strength of its evidence. This sequence of events establishes at most that Jones was present while Rock engaged in what Rock admitted was an illegal straw purchase of a firearm. But mere presence while a crime is being committed is insufficient to show that a defendant acted to further a conspiracy. Piaskowski, 256 F.3d at 692; United States v. Navarrete, 125 F.3d 559, 562 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Larkins, 83 F.3d 162, 167 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Knox, 68 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir.1995). Even if Jones knew of Rock's plan to resell the rifle, his knowledge or approval of the illegal scheme is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Knox, 68 F.3d at 995; United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir.1990). 11 The indictment charged that Jones conspired with Rock to make a false statement to a firearms dealer because Rock stated on the Form 4473 that he was purchasing the gun for himself when in reality he was purchasing it for Vino. Jones would not have known that Rock falsified the ATF form unless he knew of Rock's plan at that point. But the government's evidence at trial that Jones was connected with — or even aware of — Vino's and Rock's scheme to resell firearms in Chicago is nonexistent. There is no evidentiary support that shows either an agreement between Rock and Jones, or Jones's knowing participation in an agreement between Rock and Vino. Rock, not Jones, filled out the form and gave the money to the clerk. Moreover, Agent O'Malley even testified that he had no probable cause to make an arrest at the time Rock and Jones left Westforth's because Rock had a valid gun permit. The government's evidence does not even establish that Jones knew that Rock committed a crime at Westforth's, much less that he participated in it. 12 Likewise, the fact that Jones knew Rock bought the gun does not prove that he knew that Rock planned to sell it to a nonresident of Indiana or that he played any role in the scheme. The ATF agents could only speculate as to Jones's purpose for entering 2920 South State Street, because once they arrested Rock and Jones, they made no attempt to locate any potential buyer of the rifle or to identify any of the people who left the building with Jones. Rock did not testify at Jones's trial, so he could not establish the purpose for which Jones entered the building. Jones claimed he entered the building to purchase heroin from his regular drug supplier, and the government presented no evidence to the contrary. 13 To further support its case, the government lists several inferences it says the jury reasonably could have drawn from the evidence. First, it says the jury could have inferred that Rock enlisted Jones to help him sell the rifle in Chicago and that Jones agreed to participate to get money for drugs. Although surely the jury could have inferred both the existence of an agreement and Jones's knowing participation had there been evidence from which to reasonably draw those inferences, see Irorere, 228 F.3d at 818, there was not in this case even circumstantial evidence to support either inference. The government never explained at trial how Jones was to profit from this transaction if he was to profit at all; speculation is all that the government offers now. 14 Adding to its speculation, the government also says that the jury could have inferred that Jones told Rock that they could sell the gun to one of his heroin suppliers at 2920 South State Street. But the only basis for suspecting that Jones told Rock he knew of a buyer for the gun is a single sentence in Rock's post-arrest confession: My friend Duke, came with me to pickup the SKS, and that he (Duke) knew of someone in the city of Chicago that would purchase the SKS from me for a profit. The government argues that Duke is an alias for Dirk Jones. But the jury never saw this sentence because the parties agreed before trial that it was inadmissible. The government next argues that the jury could have inferred that Jones was the man who went into Westforth's with Rock when Rock made his down payment, that the two men left the store to finalize their plan, and that they returned to the store so Rock could complete the purchase. But these points all assume that Jones was the unidentified man who entered Westforth's with Rock the first time. This would be an important fact for the government because it would undermine Jones's assertion that he first met Rock on the street corner and would also suggest that he played a role in the transaction. But Jones claims he wasn't there, and the sales clerk was unable to identify Jones as Rock's original companion (even though he did identify him as Rock's companion the second time Rock was in the store). Furthermore, Westforth's has nine video surveillance cameras that record every angle both inside and outside the store. At trial the government played a tape of Jones's and Rock's entire visit to the store when they left with the SKS rifle. It seems that the government would also have presented a videotape of the earlier visit to the store if Jones was present, but it did not do so. As it was, the government offered no evidence that the man with Rock the first time was Jones. 15 Finally, the government says the jury could have inferred that Jones knew Rock was going to lie on the Form 4473 about being the actual purchaser, and that pursuant to their agreement Jones entered 2920 South State Street to look for a buyer. These arguments again assume that Jones was aware of a conspiracy and was a knowing participant in it. The government might have obtained support for the latter point if the ATF had further investigated after detaining Jones. But the ATF did not question any of the seven or eight people who left the building at the same time as Jones and made no attempt to locate the assumed buyer of the weapon. All the government brought to trial was its speculation about the stop at the housing project. 16 In short, the government's evidence establishes at most that Jones was present while Rock committed two federal firearms crimes: falsifying the ATF form and driving to Chicago for the purpose of selling the SKS rifle to an out-of-state resident. The government tries to infer from his presence that Jones both knew of and knowingly participated in a conspiracy to commit those offenses. But the government's case relies on speculation with scant evidentiary support. Even though a jury may infer facts, each link in the chain of inferences must be sufficiently strong to avoid a lapse into speculation. Piaskowski, 256 F.3d at 693. The government's evidence in this case required the jury to do just that. The government's case certainly casts suspicion upon Jones. But a strong suspicion that someone is involved in criminal activity is no substitute for proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 692. Even given the deferential standard of appellate review that applies here, we cannot say that the government met its burden.