Opinion ID: 1152997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the trial court erred in awarding the appellee a judgment for $750.00 for attorney's fees incurred by the appellee in the proceedings before the lower court.

Text: In George's answer and counterclaim, he demanded a judgment against Denson for, inter alia, damages ... and also an amount to be set by this Court for reasonable attorney fees. George alleged that Denson's actions constituted an abuse of process and were instigated by Denson in an attempt to harass, scare and dictate to and make the defendant/counter-plaintiff succumb to the wishes and desires of the plaintiff/counter-defendant in his effort to stop ... any type of construction or improvement... . The chancellor dismissed Denson's complaint but granted him equitable relief. However, the chancellor also assessed Denson with the payment of George's attorney's fees without making a finding regarding frivolity of Denson's complaint or any other justification for payment of attorney's fees. Moreover, since the chancellor afforded Denson equitable relief, it is difficult to conclude that Denson's complaint, as a whole, was frivolous. The issue of attorney's fees as an award of damages is not new to this Court. In one case, the general rule was reiterated as follows: Regarding attorneys' fees, this Court has held that in the absence of contractual provisions or statutory authority, attorneys' fees may not be awarded as damages in a case unless punitive damages are also proper. Grisham v. Hinton, 490 So.2d 1201, 1205 (Miss. 1986); Gardner v. Jones, 464 So.2d 1144, 1150 (Miss. 1985); Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Steele, 373 So.2d 797, 801 (Miss. 1979). Central Bank of Mississippi v. Butler, 517 So.2d 507, 512 (Miss. 1987). In the case sub judice, there was no evidence of a contractual provision which provided for the payment of attorney's fees by Denson. Also, there was no award of punitive damages and the chancellor made no finding of conduct which would warrant assessment of such punitive damages. Therefore, the only remaining basis for finding authority to assess Denson with attorney's fees lies in our statutes. George argues that Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-53-27 and 11-53-35 (1972), which were in effect at the time of the trial and which provided for the payment of costs by an unsuccessful plaintiff, are statutory authority for the imposition of attorney's fees against Denson. Additionally, George submits that Rule 65, M.R.C.P., and Miss. Code Ann. § 11-13-1 (1972), et seq., provide for security to be given by an applicant seeking injunctive relief, the security to cover the costs, damages, and reasonable attorney's fees as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. M.R.C.P. 65(c). But, in the case sub judice, no injunction was ever issued and no security was pledged by Denson, as contemplated by Rule 65(c), M.R.C.P. As a consequence, George was precluded from making a motion for dissolution of an injunction, as anticipated by Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-13-31, 11-13-35 (1991). Also, a fair reading of Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-53-1 through 11-53-79 (1972), indicates that the term costs does not include attorney's fees. Specifically, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-53-63 and 11-53-65 (1972), speak to costs as being taxed by the clerk of the court. As a practical matter, the clerk's bill for costs of a case does not normally include attorney's fees. Regarding the payment of security costs pledged by one seeking an injunction, George admits that no such costs were pledged, yet he seeks to characterize the award of attorney's fees as payment of pledged security costs under Rule 65, M.R.C.P. That contention is facially defective and specious at best. Rule 65 does not grant authority to re-characterize an award of attorney's fees as an award of security costs for seeking an allegedly improper injunction which was never issued. George's argument that Miss. Code Ann. § 11-13-1 (1972), et seq., is instructive on this issue is also not well-founded. The aforementioned statutes of Chapter 13 of Title 11 require a dissolution of an injunction before any payment would be required to be made to the party enjoined. However, as mentioned earlier, no injunction was ever issued in the case sub judice, a fortiori, no injunction could be dissolved. No basis for assessing the payment of attorney's fees exists in the record. Therefore, we reverse that portion of the chancellor's opinion which ordered Denson to pay George's attorney's fees.