Opinion ID: 170955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petition of Mr. Vicente-Elias

Text: Mr. Vicente-Elias argues (1) that the IJ used an incorrect legal standard for economic persecution in his case, and (2) that under any standard, even the one used by the IJ, the facts in his case demonstrate persecution. Before getting into more specific points, we note that Mr. Vicente-Elias did not argue on appeal to the BIA that the IJ had used an incorrect legal standard in assessing his claim of economic persecution. Indeed, at that time Mr. Vicente-Elias himself invoked various formulations of that standard without voicing any objection regarding their variability. See Admin. R. at 7-13. In any event, even if his appeal of the IJ's findings on persecution were deemed sufficient to preserve a tacit objection to the underlying standard, that would not avail him here. The IJ clearly applied the Acosta test, see id. at 41, [4] which was consistent with In re T-Z- under the circumstances (detailed below) involving general economic disadvantage but no seizure or loss of property, assets, or professional occupation/status that would implicate the Kovac test. Indeed, the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ's decision shortly after issuing its opinion in In re T-Z-. We turn, then, to the application of the Acosta test to the facts in evidence. Mr. Vicente-Elias testified that he left Guatemala to escape extreme poverty. Admin. R. at 56. Employment opportunities for Quiche speakers were minimal. Id. at 57. Work could sometimes be found within the (poor) indigenous community, id. at 60-61, as his father's experience showed, id. 63-64, but he explained that farther away the (wealthier) Spanish-speaking population d[id] not allow us to work because they prefer to work with people who speak Spanish. Id. at 57-58; see id. at 74 ([T]he first thing they ask you is if you speak Spanish, and if you say no, then they tell you that there is no work for you.). School was not free, so this cycle of linguistic limitation and economic disadvantage perpetuated itself: his Quiche-speaking father could not afford to send him to school and, as a result, he failed to learn the Spanish necessary to gain a foothold in the workplace as well. See id. at 57-58. He was able to find work in his teens when a labor recruiter, who spoke Quiche, would come through his village in a truck and drive men to the coast to clean up and cultivate the land. Id. at 65-66. But pay was less than a dollar a day. Id. at 73-74. Like others in the community, his family also grew some crops, including corn, potatoes, and wheat, id. at 69, and raising animals such as sheep, cows, and chickens brought money for clothes, id. at 70. There were, however, times when there was not enough to eat, id. at 56, or money for clothing, id. at 59, and his family had to rely on home herbal remedies for medical care, id. at 59-60. There was little testimony about discrimination against indigenous people distinct from the employment problems related to the Quiche-Spanish language barrier. Mr. Vicente-Elias stated that Spanish-speaking people don't treat [indigenous people] right and don't like us, id. at 61, but he did not flesh out these vague generalities with any specific incidents of ill treatment. Indeed, at other points he specifically denied that he had ever been harmed or threatened while living in Guatemala. Id. at 57, 70. The 2004 State Department country report for Guatemala submitted to the IJ was consistent with the thrust of Mr. Vicente-Elias' testimony about adverse conditions for indigenous people, but did not add much to it. As for the economy in general, the report noted there was a marked disparity in income distribution, and poverty was pervasive.... Approximately 57 percent of the total population and 71 percent of persons in rural areas lived in poverty; 22 percent of the population lived in extreme poverty. Id. at 84. This disproportionately affected indigenous people: 76 percent of the indigenous population lived in poverty, in comparison with 41 percent of the non-indigenous population. Id. at 98. Rural indigenous people had limited educational opportunities and fewer employment opportunities.... Many indigenous people were illiterate, and approximately a third did not speak Spanish[.] Id. at 99. The IJ found Mr. Vicente-Elias a very credible witness, id. at 39, and, based on his testimony and the country report, found that there remains racial discrimination and discrimination due to language ability with the result that the [i]ndigenous people of Guatemala do not have equal access to employment opportunities or educational opportunities. Id. at 40. Applying the standard for economic deprivation discussed earlier, however, the IJ found the economic and employment discrimination faced by [Mr. Vicente-Elias] does not reach the level of hardship which would qualify ... as persecution. Id. at 41. The IJ also cited this court's observation that, while deplorable in any free society, `[e]mployment discrimination ... does not without more constitute persecution' for purposes of asylum. Id. (quoting Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir.2003)). Accordingly, the IJ concluded that neither asylum nor restriction on removal could be granted. Id. at 41-42. While we review the IJ's legal conclusions de novo, we review matters of fact using a deferential substantial-evidence standard under which the IJ's findings `are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.' Tulengkey v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). In this circuit, the ultimate determination whether an alien has demonstrated persecution is a question of fact, even if the underlying factual circumstances are not in dispute and the only issue is whether those circumstances qualify as persecution. Nazaraghaie v. INS, 102 F.3d 460, 463 n. 2 (10th Cir.1996) (holding precedent forecloses any argument that the application of a correct legal definition [for persecution] to the facts of a specific case is a mixed question of law and fact, to be reviewed under some standard less deferential than substantial evidence). [5] Accordingly, we must affirm the IJ's determination that a given set of circumstances does not constitute persecution unless [w]e can[] conclude that every reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to find persecution based on [those circumstances]. Tulengkey, 425 F.3d at 1281. Mr. Vicente-Elias comes from a family of five children. There is no evidence that their lives, or those of any others in the larger Mayan community, are or have been threatened by economic circumstances. Nor is there evidence that they face a potential loss of freedom through some form of confinement, enforced servitude, or the like. Paying work has been available at times, animal husbandry supplements income, and farming provides food. The community has an exchange economy that its members use in the absence of money. We do not minimize the real poverty faced by Mr. Vicente-Elias and other indigenous people in Guatemala. But, applying the appropriate standard from Acosta to the economic evidence, as the IJ did, we cannot say every reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to disagree with the IJ and find the economic disadvantages shown here to be so severe as to threaten life or freedom. Mr. Vicente-Elias broadly objects that the IJ considered the economic deprivation in isolation from other disadvantages faced by the indigenous people of Guatemala. [6] There is no merit to this objection. In addition to specifically economic/employment-related problems, the IJ noted the limited educational opportunities for indigenous people, as well as the general social discrimination that Mr. Vicente-Elias himself had referred to in only vague terms. The IJ then applied both the Acosta standard and the general principle that discrimination is not the equivalent of persecution, Vatulev, 354 F.3d at 1210, to conclude that [i]n sum, ... the situation faced by [Mr. Vicente-Elias] in Guatemala, although reprehensible is not sufficiently severe to amount to persecution. Admin. R. at 41. In a similar vein, Mr. Vicente-Elias insists that the IJ did not adequately consider the pattern or practice of persecution against Mayans. This argument is also unavailing. The point of such evidence is to provide a broader basis for an objective fear of future persecution: an alien may establish a well-founded fear of persecution by demonstrating his membership in a group ... subject to a pattern or practice of persecution. In other words, an applicant is permitted to show that a person in his position, as opposed to himself specifically, could be subject to persecution. Wiransane, 366 F.3d at 893-94 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Yet what Mr. Vicente-Elias discusses in this connection are long-ago atrocities of the Guatemalan civil war rather than practices that might have a bearing on the treatment a person of his ethnic/linguistic group could expect if now returned to Guatemala. Insofar as his argument does rely on more relevant recent conditions, it does not address the basic deficiency in his case recognized by the IJ: those conditions, though indicative of social discrimination and economic disadvantage, do not constitute persecution. In addition to asylum based on future persecutionestablished directly or through reliance on a presumption of future persecution raised by past persecution that the government has not rebuttedan alien may seek humanitarian asylum based exclusively on past persecution so severe that it demonstrates `compelling reasons for being unwilling to return.' Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1232-33 (10th Cir.2004) (quoting earlier version of 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A), which now refers to compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return). We have characterized this level of past persecution as that [which] would so sear a person with distressing associations with his native country that it would be inhumane to force him to return there, even though he is in no danger of future persecution. Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1280 (10th Cir.2002) (internal quotation omitted). Examples falling within this extraordinary category include survivors of the holocaust and the Khmer Rouge genocide. Id. Mr. Vicente-Elias contends he is entitled to asylum on this basis in light of the atrocities of the Guatemalan civil war, which ravaged the country for more than three decades until 1996. But he did not testify or offer any evidence that remotely suggested that the war had any direct effect on him, his family, or even anyone in his community. And, as we have seen, those conditions that he did relate in his testimony did not constitute persecution, much less rise to the level of persecution necessary to warrant humanitarian asylum. Finally, Mr. Vicente-Elias complains at some length and with considerable indignation about historical U.S. involvement in the Guatemalan civil war. This is simply not relevant to the question of persecution that controls the disposition of his claims for asylum and restriction on removal. For the above reasons, we discern no error in the IJ's determination that Mr. Vicente-Elias did not suffer persecution in the past and does not have a well-founded fear of persecution upon his return to Guatemala. He was therefore properly found unqualified for asylum and (a fortiori) for restriction on removal. Solomon v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir.2006). Accordingly, we deny his petition for review.