Opinion ID: 1787012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was jury instruction C-6 erroneous?

Text: ¶ 10. Jury instruction C-6 applied only to count I of the indictment, the charge of murder in the death of Luciana Bunton. It stated the following: The Court instructs the jury that you are not to judge the actions of Defendant, Milton Evans, Jr., in the cool, calm light of after developed facts, but instead you are to judge the Defendant's actions in the light of the circumstances confronting the Defendant at the time, as you believe from the evidence that those circumstances reasonably appeared to the Defendant on that occasion, and if you believe that under those circumstances it reasonably appeared to Defendant at the instant, if any, that [any of the patrons] took up a weapon, that the Defendant there and then had reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of [any of the patrons] to kill the Defendant or do him some great personal injury, and that there reasonably appeared to the Defendant to be imminent danger of such designs being accomplished, then the Defendant, Milton Evans, Jr., was justified in anticipating an attack by [any of the patrons], and further if you believe from the evidence that Luciana Bunton died as a result of the discharge of a pistol which was, at the time of the fatal shot, in the possession of Defendant, but that the fatal shot was fired through accident and misfortune, at a time when Defendant, was lawfully acting in self-defense, then you must find Defendant not guilty in the death of Luciana Bunton. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-17(b), which provides a defense for an accidental killing, states that [t]he killing of any human being by the act, procurement, or omission of another shall be excusable [w]hen committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation ... Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-17(b) (1994). ¶ 11. In homicide cases, the trial court should instruct the jury about a defendant's theories of defense, justification, or excuse that are supported by the evidence, no matter how meager or unlikely. Manuel v. State, 667 So.2d 590, 593 (Miss. 1995). ¶ 12. Evans testified that he did not think that he shot Luciana Bunton, but if he did, he did not intend to do so, and it happened as he was preparing to fire his gun in the air to scare off the attacking patrons. In other words, Evans' theory as to the death of Luciana Bunton was that if he shot her, it was an accident which occurred as he was acting in lawful self defense. Evans was entitled to have this theory presented to the jury, and instruction C-6 did just that. The case sub judice is factually similar to Day v. State, 589 So.2d 637 (Miss.1991), where Day was convicted of murder in the shooting death of J.B. Johnson. In that case, Day testified that he saw Johnson running towards his car, at which time, Day grabbed his gun and got out of the car. Day further testified that he intended to fire a shot into the air in order to scare Johnson off, but while attempting to disengage the gun's safety, the weapon accidently fired in Johnson's direction, fatally striking him. Although the issue in Day was the exclusion of other evidence which sought to bolster Day's defense, this Court stated [t]he implicit assertion that the initial actions were in self defense supports Day's contention that the actual firing was accidental. Id at 642. ¶ 13. Jury instruction C-6 presented Evans' theory that if he caused the death of Luciana Bunton, it was an accident which happened while he was acting in lawful self defense. This Court has previously acknowledged that it may be appropriate for a defendant to raise such a defense in factual situations similar to the one presently before this Court. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err when it granted jury instruction C-6.