Opinion ID: 586393
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Text and Legislative History of EPPA

Text: 16 Saari notes the statement of the Gilmer Court that ADEA's flexible approach to resolution of claims and the role of the EEOC under ADEA in informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion indicates that out-of-court dispute resolution, such as arbitration, is consistent with the statutory scheme established by Congress. Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. at 1654. Saari contends that the enforcement provisions of EPPA show no such flexibility. 17 Section 2002 of EPPA contains a broad general prohibition of employer use of lie detector tests. The prohibition is subject to exceptions listed in Sections 2006 and 2007 relating to governmental employers, national defense and security, F.B.I. contractors, certain private security firms, and a limited exemption for ongoing investigations. 2 The enforcement provisions in Section 2005 permit an assessment of a civil penalty by the Secretary of Labor in an amount not to exceed $10,000 and injunctive actions by the Secretary to restrain violations of the Act. The redress the Secretary may seek includes orders of employment, reinstatement, promotion, and payment of lost wages and benefits. The enforcement provisions also include a private civil action to be brought by the employee or prospective employee affected by such violation. See 29 U.S.C. § 2005(c). The available relief is identical to that available to the Secretary by injunctive action under Section 2005(b). The enforcement provisions also include a bar on the waiver of rights which provides: 18 The rights and procedures provided by this chapter may not be waived by contract or otherwise, unless such waiver is part of a written settlement agreed to and signed by the parties to the pending action or complaint under this Act. 19 29 U.S.C. § 2005(d). 20 Saari contends that unlike the Gilmer Court's finding of ADEA's flexible approach to the resolution of claims, EPPA relies on the judicial process for the resolution of claims. We think, however, that Saari's reliance on the flexibility comment by the Court in Gilmer is misplaced. The Court made it very clear in Gilmer that the fact that a particular statute embodies a judicial enforcement process does not exclude arbitration. The Supreme Court rejected Saari's argument when it was made by Gilmer: 21 Gilmer also argues that compulsory arbitration is improper because it deprives claimants of the judicial forum provided for by the ADEA. Congress, however, did not explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution of claims, even in its recent amendments to the ADEA. 22 Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. at 1653-54. 23 The Court went on to note that arbitration is consistent with Congress' grant of concurrent jurisdiction over ADEA claims to state and federal courts because arbitration agreements, like a provision for concurrent jurisdiction, allow claimants a broader right to select a particular forum for resolving disputes, rather than limiting them solely to a judicial forum. Id. at 1654. The provision of a judicial forum for resolution of disputes is not inconsistent with the provisions of the FAA providing for an enforceable right of the parties to contractually agree to resolve those same disputes in an arbitral forum. 24 In addition, it should be noted that EPPA is not completely inflexible in its approach to resolution of employee claims, since either the Secretary or the employee may seek judicial relief, and the Secretary's authority to seek relief on behalf of the employee is textually identical to the employee's right to seek relief directly. Furthermore, even if the violation did not result in harm compensable in money damages or job-related restitution, the Secretary is empowered to impose and collect civil penalties of up to $10,000. Thus, in the broader view of preventing abuse of polygraph testing in the employment arena, the Secretary has a broad arsenal of weapons with which to address problems. The lack of a specific commission, such as the EEOC, to which claims may be addressed in the first instance does not appear to be a compelling distinction between ADEA and EPPA. 25 Saari also argues that the anti-waiver provision of EPPA is different than the acts referred to in Gilmer in that the anti-waiver provision in EPPA provides that the rights and procedures provided by this chapter may not be waived by contract or otherwise.... 29 U.S.C. § 2005(d) (emphasis added). Saari contends that the and procedures language evidenced a legislative intent that the procedures under EPPA were not to be waived. Saari argues that the procedures available under EPPA are solely judicial and therefore arbitration cannot oust him from the judicial arena. 26 Saari's reliance on the and procedures language is unavailing. Saari is arguing that those words make the judicial forum provisions of EPPA exclusive of arbitration. This rationale does not stand in light of Gilmer. In Gilmer, the Court noted that the substantive rights enforced by arbitration are identical to those enforced in a judicial forum, the only difference being an agreement by the parties to submit the resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. at 1652. 27 The term procedures is too broad to relate solely to forum selection. In order for an employer to avail itself of the provisions relating to ongoing investigations in Section 2006(d), 3 it would be required to follow certain procedures. It is the type of procedure found in 2006(d) that an employer may attempt to have a prospective employee waive as a condition of employment, and that the anti-waiver provision would invalidate if extracted from the employee. 28 Furthermore, the and procedures language in EPPA is no stronger than the anti-waiver provisions found in the Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities Act of 1933, and RICO. Those acts provide either that the act's provisions may not be waived or that the district court shall have exclusive jurisdiction, which the Court noted in Gilmer has been held not to exclude arbitration. Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. at 1651-1652. 29 Equally unconvincing are Saari's arguments concerning the legislative history of EPPA. Rejection by Congress of an amendment to EPPA which would have exempted the banking and securities industry from the scope of EPPA does not indicate an intention to exclude arbitration as a possible forum.