Opinion ID: 195990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the Evidence from the Fairlawn Estates Apartment

Text: 16 Powell's argument relating to the evidence from the Fairlawn Estates apartment is tripartite. First, Powell contends that the evidence is not relevant because the jury could not reasonably have concluded that he possessed the guns and ammunition discovered during the search. Second, Powell asserts that the court erred in admitting the evidence under Rule 404(b), even if the jury could have found that he possessed the guns and ammunition. Third, Powell insists that the court erred in deciding that the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, see Fed.R.Evid. 403, even if the evidence was otherwise admissible. In light of the deference we give to the challenged district court rulings, we discern no reversible error. 17 Because the court conditioned the jury's consideration of the evidence found in the Fairlawn Estates apartment upon its initially finding possession of this evidence by Powell, the first part of Powell's argument implicates Fed.R.Evid. 104(b). Rule 104(b) provides: When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition. Like other admissibility rulings, the decision whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition is committed to the trial judge's wide discretion. See Veranda Beach Club Ltd. Partnership v. Western Sur. Co., 936 F.2d 1364, 1371 (1st Cir.1991). 18 The Supreme Court has set forth the process by which the trial court should make this decision: 19 In determining whether the Government has introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence. The court simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact ... by a preponderance of the evidence. 20 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1501, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). We therefore ask only whether the district court abused its discretion in deciding that the jury could reasonably find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Powell possessed the Taurus and derringer. 21 Possession of firearms can be either actual or constructive. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 41 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1994). In Rogers, we approved a jury instruction which explained: 22 A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, or to exercise dominion or control over the area in which that thing is found, whether directly or through another person, is then in constructive possession of the thing. 23 Id. at 30 (emphases omitted). Thus, so long as one's dominion/control over the area containing the thing at the relevant time is established, one can possess an object while it is hidden at home in a bureau drawer, or while held by an agent, or even while it is secured in a safe deposit box at the bank and can be retrieved only when a bank official opens the vault. United States v. Zavala Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 7 (1st Cir.) (interpreting scope of a drug possession statute), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 451, 130 L.Ed.2d 360 (1994). 24 In view of this broad understanding of possession and the applicable preponderance standard, see Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690, 108 S.Ct. at 1501-02, we have little difficulty concluding that there was no abuse of discretion here. There was evidence that Powell was sharing the master bedroom of the Fairlawn Estates apartment at the time of the shooting; that he had signed a variety of forms relating to the apartment; that he had made a request for repairs to the apartment; that his name was on the mailbox; that he was one of only two persons with keys; and that the guns found there did not belong to the apartment's other primary adult resident--Boykins. This evidence was more than adequate for the court to have allowed the jury to consider whether Powell constructively possessed the Taurus and derringer that were hidden within the apartment. All the evidence tended to show Powell's dominion over the apartment in which the guns were found, and some of it--Boykins' testimony that the guns were not hers--tended to show that the guns were Powell's (although we acknowledge Boykins' further testimony that the guns were not Powell's). We therefore reject Powell's relevancy argument. 25 The second and third parts of Powell's argument against the admissibility of the evidence from the Fairlawn Estates apartment do not fare any better. In admitting this evidence, the district court employed the correct legal analysis. The court first determined that the evidence had special relevance to material issues raised by Powell's case--whether Powell possessed firearms in the months preceding the shoot-out, whether Powell had an opportunity to obtain firearms, whether Powell had knowledge of the availability of firearms, and whether Powell's possession of the .44 was a question of mere necessity--and that it was not being offered to show Powell's character or propensity for criminal conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Tuesta-Toro, 29 F.3d 771, 775 (1st Cir.1994) (explaining Rule 404(b) inquiry), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 947, 130 L.Ed.2d 890 (1995). 26 The court then decided that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See id. (citing Rule 403). Because legal error did not infect the trial court's analysis, we afford the court's conclusions considerable deference. See id.; see also United States v. Guyon, 27 F.3d 723, 729 (1st Cir.1994) (trial court's Rule 404(b) ruling reversible only if the court abused its discretion); Veranda Beach Club, 936 F.2d at 1372 (trial court's construction of Rule 403's probative value/unfair prejudice balance subject to substantial deference on appeal); United States v. Wood, 982 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1992) (decision whether to permit the introduction of rebuttal evidence is within sound discretion of the trial judge). 27 Again, we see no abuse of discretion. Although the court may have oversimplified a bit in asserting that defense counsel had asked Boykins whether she'd seen Powell with a weapon on occasion, we think the court permissibly admitted the challenged evidence to rebut the implication plainly inhering in Boykins's testimony regarding the futile police searches of Powell in the months preceding the shoot-out: that Powell was not a possessor of firearms at the time of the shooting. We think that the challenged evidence bore special relevance to whether Powell only came into the possession of the .44 as a matter of necessity, or whether he was armed at the time the shooting began. 28 As we have just stated, Powell attempted to bolster his necessity defense by introducing evidence--his and Boykins' testimony--suggesting that he was not a possessor of firearms at the time of the shoot-out. In other words, Powell introduced evidence that he did not commit other similar acts at the relevant point in time. While other-acts evidence is not generally admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, see Rule 404(b), it is admissible to rebut a defendant 's affirmative claim that s/he did not commit other similar acts at the relevant point in time. See, e.g., Wood, 982 F.2d at 4 (rebuttal evidence may be introduced to explain, repel, contradict or disprove an adversary's proof) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Zarnes, 33 F.3d 1454, 1470 (7th Cir.1994) (evidence of marijuana plants growing in defendant's vegetable garden admissible to rebut defendant's mother's testimony that there were no marijuana plants in the garden). The court therefore did not err in allowing the jury to consider whether Powell's contemporaneous constructive possession of the weapons in the Fairlawn Estates apartment tended to show that his possession of the .44 was not a question of mere necessity. 29 Finally, the court's careful and well-crafted limiting instruction--which told the jury that the evidence was not admissible to show that Powell was the kind of person who possessed firearms--largely dissipates any concern we might have had about the danger of unfair prejudice to Powell. Simply put, we see no reason why the jury could not have followed the court's instruction in this case. 30 We therefore reject Powell's argument that the admission of the evidence from the Fairlawn Estates apartment ran afoul of Rules 404(b) and 403. 31