Opinion ID: 1088560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the jury selection process under section 97-3-19 (capital murder statute) and section 99-19-101 (separate sentencing proceeding in capital cases) is unconstitutional.

Text: Appellant complains that the same jury heard both the guilt and sentencing phases of this trial, and that this jury was death qualified. Appellant did not raise this objection in the trial court and has waived his right to object on appeal, notwithstanding the constitutional nature of the claim. Stringer v. State, 279 So.2d 156, 159 (Miss. 1973). In Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-34, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1574, 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 804 (1982), the United States Supreme Court stated, We have long recognized, however, that the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim. Notwithstanding this waiver, under heightened review we will address the merits of this assignment. The practice of impaneling only one jury for both phases if practical was mandated by Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242, 1256 (Miss. 1976). See also, Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981), and Bell v. Watkins, 381 So.2d 118, 119, 133 (Miss. 1980). The same argument was presented to this Court in Culberson v. State, 379 So.2d 499 (Miss. 1979), and there we held that the trial court's retention of the same jury to try both the guilt and the sentence phase was preferred as well as permissible, and said further, However, we do note that a challenge for cause may be properly sustained when a prospective juror indicates that he will automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 592-93 (5th Cir.1978). Conversely, he may be accepted as a juror if in spite of his nonbelief in capital punishment he can put such belief aside and follow the law and evidence in accord with his oath to render a true verdict. Id. at 508. Unlike Culberson, supra, here we have a lengthy transcript of the voir dire. We reaffirm our previous decisions that the jury selection process under Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-19 (Supp. 1983) and § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1983), are constitutional. This assignment of error is without merit.