Opinion ID: 778006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Smith's Due Process Claim

Text: 47 In a separate opinion, the district court also held that Smith could not establish a due process claim under Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir.1997). See Smith I, 1998 WL 151803, at . The district court reasoned that Smith was subjected to seven months disciplinary time, a period of time half of that implicated in Griffin.  Id. The court reasoned that, even assuming that the misconduct reports were issued to cover up the use of excessive force, the disciplinary sanction still did not constitute a due process violation as it did not rise to the level of an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Id., quoting Griffin, 112 F.3d at 706. 48 Smith argues that the district court misinterpreted the basis of his due process claim. Smith does not claim that the seven months disciplinary sanction was a violation of a liberty interest and therefore a denial of due process. Rather, Smith claims that Mensinger issued a misconduct report to retaliate against Smith for his conduct toward Mensinger and to cover up a beating. Thus, Smith claims that the misconduct report was not intended to enforce prison regulations at all, and it was therefore improper to impose a disciplinary sanction. 9 However, even assuming that the district court did misconstrue the crux of Smith's due process claim, it is nevertheless evident that the court's rejection of that claim was correct. 49 In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), an inmate had been charged with multiple disciplinary infractions, but the inmate's request to produce certain witnesses at his hearing was refused by the hearing committee because the witnesses were unavailable. The committee found the inmate guilty of the charged misconduct and sentenced him to 30 days in segregated confinement. Thereafter, he brought a § 1983 suit claiming that the hearing did not satisfy the requirements of due process. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 475-76, 115 S.Ct. 2293. The Court disagreed. The Court held that confinement in administrative or punitive segregation will rarely be sufficient, without more, to establish the kind of atypical deprivation of prison life necessary to implicate a liberty interest. Therefore, the Court found that the inmate's segregated confinement was not a denial of due process. See id. at 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293. 50 Prison disciplinary proceedings may, however, constitute a denial of due process in the context of a civil rights action under § 1983 when they are instituted for the sole purpose of retaliating against an inmate for his/her exercise of a constitutional right. In Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220 (3d Cir.2000), we stated: 51 Sandin instructs that placement in administrative confinement will generally not create a liberty interest. Retaliation may be actionable, however, even when the retaliatory action does not involve a liberty interest. [G]overnment actions, which standing alone do not violate the Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right. 52 Seiverling, 229 F.3d at 224 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 53 We have previously held that falsifying misconduct reports in retaliation for an inmate's resort to legal process is a violation of the First Amendment guarantee of access to the courts. See Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir.1981). In Milhouse, the inmate alleged that prison officials retaliated against him by fabricating misconduct charges in response to his civil rights suit against the prison officials. We concluded that [s]uch allegations, if proven at trial, would establish an infringement of Milhouse's first amendment right of access to the courts. Milhouse, 652 F.2d at 374. 54 Although Milhouse also involved an allegation that prison officials fabricated misconduct charges, that case is distinguishable from Smith's because the conduct in Milhouse implicated a constitutional right — the First Amendment right to access to the courts. Smith's purported liberty deprivation, on the other hand, implicates no constitutional right and therefore can not overcome the hurdle erected by the holding in Sandin. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Under Sandin, an administrative sentence of disciplinary confinement, by itself, is not sufficient to create a liberty interest, and Smith does not claim that another constitutional right (such as access to the courts) was violated. Accordingly, we hold that the district court correctly dismissed Smith's due process claim. 55 In dismissing the claims, the district court correctly relied upon the analysis of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949 (2d Cir.1986). In Freeman, an inmate brought a due process claim against prison authorities under § 1983 alleging that the prison officials' use of falsified evidence and bogus misconduct reports resulted in his being unconstitutionally confined in punitive segregation for 30 days. See Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951. The plaintiff was awarded damages following a trial, but the award was reversed on appeal. The court of appeals concluded that, with respect to the misconduct hearing, due process is satisfied where an inmate is afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend against the allegedly falsified evidence and groundless misconduct reports. Thus, so long as certain procedural requirements are satisfied, mere allegations of falsified evidence or misconduct reports, without more, are not enough to state a due process claim. See id. at 953. 56 Smith argues that there is more to his claim However, he must clear two hurdles to overcome the district court's reliance on Freeman. First, it is now clear that the sanction Smith challenges (seven months disciplinary confinement) does not, on its own, violate a protected liberty interest as defined in Sandin. Therefore, he can not establish that the defendants' conduct denied him substantive due process by infringing upon a liberty interest. Second, he was afforded a hearing and therefore had the opportunity to confront and challenge the allegedly perjured testimony offered in support of the misconduct reports. Under Freeman, that is all he was entitled to. 57 Smith cites several cases in arguing that the district court erred in relying upon Freeman. However, the cases he cites are either distinguishable, or were decided before Sandin, and are therefore of little precedential value. 10 We therefore find that the district court did not err in dismissing Smith's due process claims.