Opinion ID: 163868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statute of Limitations and the Pretrial Order

Text: 14 We review the denial of a motion for a directed verdict de novo, applying the same standards used by the district court. Bielicki v. Terminix Int'l Co., 225 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir.2000). A directed verdict is only appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the non-moving party. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because we are reviewing a federal court's adjudication of an ancillary state law claim, Utah law controls the substantive analysis of the Whistleblower Act claim — even though federal law controls the ultimate procedural question of whether a directed verdict was warranted. See Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 792 (10th Cir.1997). 15 The Whistleblower Act sets forth the applicable statute of limitations: [A]n employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both, within 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter. Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-4(2). The parties agree that the statutory filing period started to run on March 12, 1998, when Ms. Youren received notification by letter that she would be terminated. The parties also agree that Ms. Youren's Notice of Claim was filed on July 23, 1998, less than 180 days after the March 12 letter; and that the October 5 filing date of the actual Complaint is more than 180 days after the limitations period began to run. 16 The district court rejected the defendants' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that Ms. Youren's timely filing of her Notice of Claim was sufficient to serve the purposes of the statute's prompt notification requirements. Aplts' App. at 122 (Post-Trial Order, filed Apr. 4, 2001). The defendants assert that the 180-day time limit cannot be met by merely filing a Notice of Claim, but rather that the claim itself must be filed within 180 days. Ms. Youren argues that the defendants waived the statute of limitations issue and, in the alternative, that the district court correctly held that Ms. Youren satisfied the statute of limitations by filing her Notice of Claim well before the statutory deadline. 17 We need only address the merits of the defendants' argument if we determine that they preserved the statute of limitations issue. We therefore address the question of waiver, which in turn involves two inquiries: first, whether the statute of limitations can be waived at all, and if so, was it waived here? 18
19 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), a defense is waivable if it is an affirmative defense. See Bentley v. Cleveland County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 41 F.3d 600, 604 (10th Cir.1994) (Failure to plead an affirmative defense results in a waiver of that defense.) (citing Fed R. Civ.P. 8(c) and 2A James W. Moore, et al., Moore's Fed. Prac. ¶ 8.27(3) (2d ed.1994)). Rule 8(c) of both the federal and the Utah rules of civil procedure states: Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, ... statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. Fed R.Civ.P. 8(c); Utah R.Civ.P. 8(c) (emphasis added). Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are `substantially similar' to the federal rules. Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 53 P.3d 947, 949 n. 2 (Utah 2002). 20 Although we hold on independent grounds that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, it is noteworthy that the defendants themselves initially treated it as such. See Aplts' App. at 12 (Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed Jan. 19, 1999) (FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: Some of Plaintiff's claims are barred by the relevant statute of limitations) (capitalization in original). The defendants nevertheless argued to the district court that the statute of limitations is an element of Ms. Youren's case and not an affirmative defense. Aplts' App. at 66-67 (Proposition of Law Memorandum re: It is an Element of Plaintiffs' Case to Show She Filed Her Whistleblower Action Timely, filed Mar. 23, 2001). The parties renew that argument here. 21 Several of our sister circuits have indeed created an exception to Rule 8(c), holding that there are situations in which a statute of limitations acts as a condition precedent to the suit rather than as a classic affirmative defense. See Ford Motor Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 795 F.2d 538, 547 (6th Cir.1986); Emmons v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 701 F.2d 1112, 1117-18 (5th Cir.1983). Because Rule 8(c) explicitly lists the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, we are hesitant to carve out an exception absent strong reason to do so. 22 The exceptions noted by the defendants are tied to unique features of the specific statutes at issue in those cases. In Ford Motor, for example, the Sixth Circuit noted that [t]he nine month filing provision of the Uniform Bill of Straight Lading at issue emanates from 49 U.S.C. § 11707(e)(1982), which provides that `[a] carrier may not provide by rule, contract, or otherwise, a period of less than 9 months for filing a claim ....' 795 F.2d at 547. The court ruled that this makes the statute of limitations an element of the cause of action. Id. 23 Similarly, in Emmons, the Fifth Circuit held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., imposed a burden on the plaintiff to file a claim within the three-year statute of limitations, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued.). The court construed that language to mean that [f]ailure to timely bring suit not only bars the claimant's remedy, but it also destroys the employer's liability. 701 F.2d at 1117. Both circuits relied upon Goodwin v. Townsend, 197 F.2d 970, 971 (3d Cir.1952), which states that when a statute of limitations is thus made a limitation upon the continued existence of the right, rather than a mere bar to suit upon it, it is not an affirmative defense and cannot be waived. 24 The Whistleblower Act phrases its statute of limitations permissively, specifying that an employee may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both, within 180 days. Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-4(2). This language indicates that the existence of the public employee's right (the right, that is, not to suffer adverse action for reporting legal violations) is not predicated on the filing of suit within the limitations period, but simply that the right may not be vindicated if suit is not timely filed. Thus, the limitations period here is a mere bar to suit upon Ms. Youren's rights. Goodwin, 197 F.2d at 971. The statute of limitations defense is thus a classic affirmative defense and not a condition precedent to the suit. 25 Accordingly, the statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense and is subject to waiver. See Bentley, 41 F.3d at 604. 26
27 Having determined that the statute of limitations defense is a waivable affirmative defense, we must determine whether the defendants, in fact, waived it in this case. It is true that the defendants here initially pled the statute of limitations defense, at least in general terms. See Aplts' App. at 12. The defendants also filed a motion during the course of the trial, again raising the statute of limitations issue. Aplts' App. at 55 (Motion for Directed Verdict, filed Mar. 23, 2001) (The undisputed facts developed at trial show that plaintiff failed to timely file her claims). Neither of these facts, however, overcomes the Pretrial Order Rule, embodied in Rule 16(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 28 After any conference held pursuant to this rule, an order shall be entered reciting the action taken. This order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified by a subsequent order. The order following a final pretrial conference shall be modified only to prevent manifest injustice. An order entered pursuant to Rule 16(e) supersedes the pleadings and controls the subsequent course of litigation. 29 The resulting pretrial order measures the dimensions of the lawsuit, both in the trial court and on appeal. Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 118 F.3d 1400, 1403 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Since the whole purpose of Rule 16 is to clarify the real nature of the dispute at issue, attorneys at a pre-trial conference must make a full and fair disclosure of their views as to what the real issues of the trial will be. Rios v. Bigler, 67 F.3d 1543, 1549 (10th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing whether an issue was preserved where it was omitted from a pretrial order, we have held that because a party did not include this issue in the pre-trial report, ... it was not part of the case before the district court. Gowan v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 148 F.3d 1182, 1192 (10th Cir. 1998). 30 Although the defendants included the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in their answer to the complaint, they did not identify the statute of limitations issue in the pretrial order. Notably, there is a section of the pretrial order with the heading CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW, under which the defendants listed three purely legal questions — but the statute of limitations issue was conspicuously not among them. Aplts' App. at 48 (capitalization in original). Even more notably, the pretrial order was evidently prepared exclusively by the defendants. See Aplts' Reply Br. at 3 n. 1 (No joint pretrial order was prepared in this matter.); Aplts' App. at 53 (pretrial order with the signatures of Tintic's counsel and the judge, but not that of Ms. Youren's counsel). 31 In McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., 918 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir.1990), the Eleventh Circuit considered facts similar to those present here, where a party raised an issue in its first responsive pleading but then omitted reference to the issue in the pretrial order. The court ruled: [I]n the pretrial order, which supersedes the pleadings..., [the defendant] abandoned its `failure to state a claim' defense.... Thus, the issue was not preserved in the district court. Id. at 1494. 32 The defendants point to Calderon v. Witvoet, 999 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.1993), for the proposition that a statute of limitations defense is not waived by failure to include it in the pretrial order. Calderon does, indeed, conclude that a statute of limitations defense was not waived by failure to include it in a pretrial order, 999 F.2d at 1108, but it does so on the basis that the district court in that case had already ruled against the defendants on that issue. The Seventh Circuit thus concluded: Nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure tells counsel that to preserve issues for appeal they must insert into the pretrial order contentions that have already been rejected by the judge. Id. As the defendants themselves note here, the district court did not rule on the statute of limitations issue until after trial. Hence, the statute of limitations was a live issue when the pretrial order was drafted before trial, and Calderon is thus not applicable. 33 The statute of limitations issue, therefore, was not part of the case before the district court. Gowan, 148 F.3d at 1192. We thus hold that the defendants waived their statute of limitations affirmative defense by omitting the issue from the pretrial order, and we decline to reach the merits of the defendants' argument on this issue. 34