Opinion ID: 1451383
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Offer of Judgment

Text: The trial in this matter was scheduled to commence on September 16, 1991. On September 6, 1991, Greenspun made an offer of judgment to Schwartz for a total amount of $75,000, divided equally among the three plaintiffs. The offer was made pursuant to NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. Schwartz contends that the offer of judgment was untimely because it was not made more than ten days before trial began. Under NRCP 68, an offer of judgment can be made [a]t any time more than 10 days before the trial begins.... The ten-day period is determined in accordance with NRCP 6(a). [3] See Polk v. Montgomery County, 130 F.R.D. 40, 42 (D.Md.1990). Schwartz maintains that the trial began on September 16, 1991the first day of voir dire. Contrarily, Greenspun contends that for purposes of Rule 68, trial begins with the presentation of the case to the fact-finder, which in this case did not occur until September 19. In determining when trial commences for purposes of NRCP 68, it is necessary to consider the policy underlying the rule. With respect to NRCP 41(e), we have said that a case is brought to trial by, inter alia, examining jurors. See Smith v. Timm, 96 Nev. 197, 200, 606 P.2d 530, 531 (1980). For the purpose of determining double jeopardy, trial begins when the jury is impanelled and sworn. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 1062-63, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975). Regarding Rule 68, the infrequently encountered issue of when trial begins has been held to be when the trial judge calls the proceedings to order and actually commences to hear the case. Greenwood v. Stevenson, 88 F.R.D. 225, 229 (D.R.I.1980). In Greenwood, the jury was impanelled on April 2, 1980, but because of a pending criminal trial, the matter was not scheduled to proceed to trial until June 1st. In the interim, the defendants served an offer of judgment which they later desired to retract. The defendants argued that the offer was untimely because it was made after the jury was impanelled and thus after the trial had begun. The federal court in Greenwood noted that in several other contexts, jury selection seemed to mark the official beginning of trial. The court opined that selecting the impanelling of the jury as a measuring point reflected an accommodation of policy and practicality. 88 F.R.D. at 227. The court offered the following examples: In Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884), a criminal case, voir dire marked the beginning of trial to further a policy of allowing a criminal defendant to be present at a most crucial stage of the guilt-determining phase. In United States ex rel. Walker v. Gunn, 511 F.2d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 849, 96 S.Ct. 91, 46 L.Ed.2d 72 (1975), a civil removal action, trial was held to commence when the veniremen are called to be examined. The policy to be furthered in that case was minimization of federal interference with state proceedings. Greenwood, 88 F.R.D. at 228. In concluding that the impanelling of the jury did not mark the beginning of trial for purposes of Rule 68, the Greenwood court reasoned: In the context of Rule 68, there is no such compelling policy to mandate the choice of impanelling as the beginning of the trial. The purposes of the Rule are to encourage settlements, thereby avoiding the expense to the parties and the court of protracted litigation, and to protect a party who offers a good faith settlement proposal from liability for subsequently accrued costs (citations omitted).... Since a late settlement that avoids some of the trial costs would seem to be better than no settlement at all, the policy of the Rule would appear best served by selecting the last possible point in time for cutting off Rule 68 offers. 88 F.R.D. at 228. See also Cover v. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 136 F.2d 374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 749, 64 S.Ct. 53, 88 L.Ed. 445 (1943). The language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 concerning the time by which an offer of judgment must be served is identical to our Rule 68. The purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage the settlement of a suit before trial. Morgan v. Demille, 106 Nev. 671, 674, 799 P.2d 561, 563 (1990). We agree with the court in Greenwood that the policy behind Rule 68 is best served by interpreting the phrase before trial begins to refer to the point in trial when the actual presentation of evidence commences. In the instant case, the presentation of evidence began on September 19thmore than ten days after the offer of judgment was made. Accordingly, we hold that Greenspun's offer of judgment was timely.