Opinion ID: 1355273
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Specific Mitigators

Text: Next, Defendant Thomas complains that the trial court declined to instruct the jury as to the following non-statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) residual doubt as to the defendant's guilt; (2) the defendant was the product of a dysfunctional family subject to abuse; (3) the defendant had a history of family instability; (4) the defendant had a fundamental lack of a stable relationship with his parent or step-parent; (5) his parents were divorced; (6) any regret for his past acts; (7) his family could not feed itself on its own; and (8) any positive influence he may have had on others. A review of the charge submitted to the jury reveals that the trial court instructed the jury as to the following mitigating circumstances: (1) Whether he was the product of a dysfunctional family subject to abuse. (2) Any history of family instability. (3) Any proof of abandonment by a significant family member. (4) Any evidence to show that one [of] his parents was an abuser of drugs. (5) Any difficulty with parents' divorce or separation of parents. (6) Any active relationship that he may have with his child although in jail. (7) Any proof that shows that he has family members that will provide him with love and support while in prison. (8) Any proof that, although he is in jail, he provides love and support to other members of his family. (9) Any positive relationship that he had with other adults and children. (10) Any other mitigating factor which is raised by the evidence produced by either the prosecution or defense at either the guilt or sentencing hearing; that is, you shall consider any aspect of the defendant's character or record, or any aspect of the circumstances of the offense favorable to the defendant which is supported by the evidence. The charge reveals that five out of the eight requested instructions were provided to the jury. The factors not specifically included in the charge are: (1) residual doubt, (2) the family's inability to feed itself, and (3) the Defendant's regret for past acts. With respect to the first of these factors, the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not require a lingering or residual doubt instruction. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173-74, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2326-28, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988). In Franklin , the United States Supreme Court stated: Our decisions mandating jury consideration of mitigating circumstances provide no support for petitioner's claim because residual doubt about guilt is not a mitigating circumstance. We have defined mitigating circumstances as facts about the defendant's character or background, or the circumstances of the particular offense, that may call for a penalty less than death. Residual doubt is not a fact about the defendant or the circumstances of the crime. It is instead a lingering uncertainty about facts, a state of mind that exists somewhere between beyond a reasonable doubt and absolute certainty.... Nothing in our cases mandates the imposition of this heightened burden of proof at capital sentencing. Id. at 188, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See also State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 813 (Tenn.1994). Accordingly, the trial court did not commit a federal constitutional error in denying Defendant Thomas' request for an instruction on lingering or residual doubt. Defendant Thomas argues that the trial court was required to grant his request for this instruction under state law. Our supreme court has determined that residual doubt is a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. See State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 307 (Tenn.2002); State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 55-56 (Tenn.2001). Our criminal code provides, in relevant part, that The trial judge shall also include in the instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both, which shall include, but not be limited to, those circumstances set forth in subsection (j). Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(e)(1). [1] Thus, where the issue of residual doubt is raised by the evidence, a jury instruction is appropriate. See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 30 (Tenn.1996). Such evidence may consist of proof... that indicates the defendant did not commit the offense, notwithstanding the jury's verdict following the guilt phase. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d at 307. In this case, Defendant Thomas testified that he did not commit the murder of James Day. Therefore, the trial court should have provided the jury an instruction on residual doubt. Our supreme court has concluded that a convicted defendant's right to have the jury instructed on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances is statutory rather than constitutional in nature and thus, the failure to instruct the jury on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances when raised by the evidence is subject to harmless error analysis. See State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 351-52 (Tenn.), cert. den. 522 U.S. 999, 118 S.Ct. 567, 139 L.Ed.2d 407 (1997). A charge should be considered prejudicially erroneous if it fails to fairly submit the legal issues or if it misleads the jury as to the applicable law. Id. at 352. However, if by their breadth, the instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances encompassed all the evidence presented by the defense, the omission of an instruction on a specific mitigating circumstance is harmless. Id. at 356. Here, the trial court instructed the jury to consider any aspect of the circumstances of the offense favorable to the defendant which is supported by the evidence. This broad instruction encompassed Defendant Thomas' denial of guilt and served to give the jury the opportunity and duty to consider any residual doubts about his culpability. Accordingly, we are confident that the trial court's failure to give a specific instruction on residual doubt had no effect on the jury's verdict, and Defendant Thomas is therefore entitled to no relief on this claim. With regard to Defendant Thomas' regret for past acts and his family members' alleged inability to feed themselves, the trial court found that the testimony did not demonstrate regret for past acts. Rather, Defendant Thomas' mother testified that he had apologized for bringing his family down. Additionally, when asked whether Thomas had ever spoken of bringing down Faye Day's family, Ms. Barber responded, The only thing  he told me that he was charged with this armored driver and that a man died from it. The trial judge concluded, I don't even really remember any  any statements by the mother that he's shown any real regret for any past acts.... I didn't hear any inkling of remorse about any of those [prior aggravated robbery convictions]. Regarding the fact that his family members are unable to feed themselves, the trial court found there was no proof to support this instruction. Accordingly, these circumstances were not raised by the proof and the trial court did not err by failing to so instruct. Even assuming error, any such error was harmless given that the trial court did provide the jury with the catch-all instruction as to mitigating circumstances. It is clear that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury as to Defendant Thomas' alleged regret for past acts and his family members' alleged inability to feed themselves did not result in an instruction that failed to fairly submit the legal issues or misled the jury as to the applicable law. Defendant Thomas is not entitled to relief on this claim.