Opinion ID: 1387354
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consolidation of the Cases

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court should not have consolidated the armed robbery/attempted murder case with the murder case. Rule 13.3(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, allows joinder of offenses in an indictment, information, or complaint if they: (1) are of the same or similar character; (2) are based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their commission; or (3) are alleged to have been a part of a common scheme or plan. If the offenses fit into one or more of these categories, Rule 13.3(c) authorizes consolidation of separately charged cases in whole or in part provided that the ends of justice will not be defeated thereby. State v. Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. 441, 445, 702 P.2d 670, 674, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 975, 106 S.Ct. 339, 88 L.Ed.2d 324 (1985). We hold that the cases were properly consolidated as otherwise connected together in their commission within the meaning of Rule 13.3(a)(2). Offenses may be joined as otherwise connected in their commission where, among other things, most of the evidence admissible in proof of one offense is also admissible in proof of the other. Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. at 446, 702 P.2d at 675. In this case, most of the evidence was admissible to prove either crime. With regard to the murder case, evidence of the armed robbery/attempted murder was relevant and admissible for two purposes. First, it was relevant to show defendant's consciousness of guilt and thus his identity as Rita's killer. Evidence that a criminal defendant sought to suppress evidence adversely affecting him is relevant to show a consciousness of guilt. State v. Settle, 111 Ariz. 394, 396, 531 P.2d 151, 153 (1975); see also State v. Haymon, 616 S.W.2d 805, 806-07 (Mo.) (holding that defendant's attempt to shoot a witness is relevant to show consciousness of guilt or desire to conceal the crime), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 972, 102 S.Ct. 521, 70 L.Ed.2d 391 (1981); cf. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 592, 858 P.2d 1152, 1195 (1993) (Evidence of flight from, or concealment of, a crime usually constitutes an admission by conduct.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1578, 128 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994). According to defendant's own statement, he shot Norma at least in part because he believed she was implicating him in Rita's murder. From this the jury reasonably could infer that defendant shot Norma to attempt to silence her, thus making evidence of the shooting legally relevant to the murder. See Settle, 111 Ariz. at 396, 531 P.2d at 153 (holding that evidence that the defendant sought to silence a witness was relevant to show consciousness of guilt). We recognize that there are other possible reasons why defendant might have shot Norma, e.g., to further the robbery or simply to silence false rumors. The possible alternative explanations for the shooting, however, go to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility. State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 415, 661 P.2d 1105, 1116 (holding evidence of an attempted pretrial escape from jail relevant to show consciousness of guilt, even though there were other explanations for the escape), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 199, 78 L.Ed.2d 174 (1983). Second, evidence of the armed robbery was admissible to support the credibility of one of the state's witnesses, Michelle. Evidence which tests, sustains, or impeaches the credibility or character of a witness is generally admissible, even if it refers to a defendant's prior bad acts. Id. at 417, 661 P.2d at 1118. When the police first interviewed Michelle, she told them that defendant was home with her at the time of the murder. It was not until after Norma's shooting that she told police that defendant had admitted to her that he had killed Rita. To explain her inconsistent statements, Michelle testified that she initially lied on defendant's behalf because she was afraid of defendant and because defendant had threatened her. She implicated defendant after his arrest for Norma's shooting because she feared that if defendant was released from jail, he would try to kill her next. Evidence of defendant's threats and the event that finally motivated Michelle to implicate him  the attempt to kill Norma  tended to explain Michelle's behavior and the change in her story. Because evidence of the attempted murder supports Michelle's credibility as a witness, it was relevant to the murder case. Conversely, although no separate challenge is made on the noncapital counts, we note that evidence of Rita's murder was also relevant to show defendant's motive for shooting Norma. Although motive is not an element of a crime, a trial court may admit evidence of a defendant's other misconduct if the misconduct furnished or supplied the motive for the charged crime. Ariz.R.Evid. 404(b) (allowing other acts evidence to show motive); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence §§ 3:15-3:16 (1984 & Supp. 1995); see Douglass v. State, 44 Ariz. 84, 88-89, 33 P.2d 985, 987 (1934) (holding that evidence of a prior murder was relevant to show a motive of concealment in the charged murder). For example, in United States v. Benton, there was evidence that the defendant feared that a former associate would implicate him in several murders. 637 F.2d 1052, 1055 (5th Cir.1981). When the defendant was tried for murdering the former associate, the court properly admitted evidence of the prior murders to show that defendant's motive in the charged murder was to silence the victim. Id. at 1056-57. Here there is evidence, in the form of defendant's own statement made in the course of the attempted murder, that defendant believed Norma had implicated him in Rita's murder. Like Benton, proof of the murder tended to prove that a desire to silence Norma motivated defendant to shoot her. Offered for this purpose, evidence of Rita's murder was admissible in the attempted murder case. Because of the link between these two crimes, evidence admissible to prove one was also admissible to prove the other. Defendant argues, nonetheless, that the cases still should not have been consolidated because the overlap in evidence would have been minimal. We disagree. In order for the attempted murder of Norma to be relevant to defendant's murder case, the state had to introduce evidence sufficient to show that it was defendant who shot Norma. Similarly, for the murder of Rita to be relevant to the robbery and attempted murder of Norma, the state had to show it was defendant who murdered Rita. See State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 51-52, 859 P.2d 156, 161-62 (for evidence of a separate robbery to be admissible to prove murder, evidence must be sufficient to find that a robbery took place and that defendant committed it), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 640, 126 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). Given the required showing, the bulk of the state's case on either crime was necessarily admissible in the case on the other. Thus, most of the evidence was admissible to prove both cases. Consolidation is typically appropriate under these circumstances. E.g., Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. at 445-46, 702 P.2d at 674-75 (holding that separate burglary and murder cases were properly consolidated for trial where evidence of the burglary was also admissible in the murder case); State v. Bravo, 171 Ariz. 132, 139, 829 P.2d 322, 329 (App. 1991) (holding that separate murder and robbery cases were properly consolidated where the bulk of the evidence of the murder was also admissible in the robbery case); see also Commonwealth v. Jervis, 368 Mass. 638, 335 N.E.2d 356, 361 (1975) (holding that automobile theft and attempted murder cases were properly consolidated where evidence of the theft was also admissible in the attempted murder case). Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that it should decide each count separately and that the state had to prove every element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 613, 832 P.2d 593, 630 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084, 113 S.Ct. 1058, 122 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993). Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in consolidating these two cases for trial.