Opinion ID: 152605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pregnancy-discrimination claim based on Spees's transfer to the tool room

Text: Spees first claims that JMI discriminated against her by transferring her to a tool-room position once it learned of her pregnancy. The district court granted JMI's motion for summary judgment on this claim, finding that the transfer did not constitute an adverse employment action.
An adverse employment action has been defined as a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of [a plaintiff's] employment. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir.2004) (en banc) (citation omitted). A bruised ego or a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities is not sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. Id. at 797. Adverse employment actions are typically marked by a significant change in employment status, including hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Id. at 798 (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)). Reassignments and position transfers can qualify as adverse employment actions, particularly where they are accompanied by salary or work hour changes. See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885-86 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that a job transfer was not an adverse employment action because the plaintiff enjoyed the same ... rate of pay and benefits, and her duties were not materially modified). And even if a reassignment is not paired with a salary or work-hour change, it can nonetheless be considered an adverse employment action where there is evidence that the employee received a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation. Id. at 886 (citation omitted). Upon learning that Spees was pregnant, JMI transferred her from a daytime welding position to a daytime position in the tool room, where she worked for approximately one week before being transferred to a nighttime shift in order to keep her job. Some evidence indicates that the transfer was not a materially adverse change in her employment. For instance, Spees received the same salary while working in the tool room and did not lose any of her benefits. And, as JMI points out in its brief, the working conditions in the tool room were in some ways better than those while welding. JMI contends, for example, that the summer heat was more tolerable in the tool room because Spees could wear two fewer pieces of gear than when welding, and JMI provided a small fan for Spees's personal use. Spees was also not subject to the toxic fumes from welding while working in the tool room. But the record contains other evidence to suggest that Spees's transfer was a materially adverse change. In many ways, the tool-room transfer can be seen as a demotion. Spees was required to complete a 30-day training course to become a welder, but there is no evidence that a tool-room position required any specific training or skill. In addition, Spees appears to have felt unchallenged by her tool-room position, testifying that she found it to be more boring than welding. This contrast weighs in favor of finding the change in job assignments to be materially adverse. See White v. Burlington N., 364 F.3d at 803 (concluding that an employee's transfer from a forklift operator to a standard railroad track laborer job was an adverse employment action because, in part, the forklift operator position required more qualifications, which is an indication of prestige). Moreover, Spees was soon assigned to the night shift, which adversely affected her ability to raise her daughter as a single mother. An inconvenience resulting from a less favorable schedule can render an employment action `adverse' even if the employee's responsibilities and wages are left unchanged. Ginger v. District of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1344 (D.C.Cir.2008) (holding that switching police officers to a rotating morning/afternoon/night shift from a permanent night shift was an adverse employment action because it severely affected their sleep schedules and made it more difficult for them to work overtime and part-time day jobs). Although Spees did not describe in detail how the schedule change affected her, she did state that she wasn't happy about transferring to nights because she was a single mother. And the fact that Spees requested the night-shift position does not diminish JMI's responsibility for the schedule change because Spees was constructively forced to work nights. Both Milam and Spees testified that Milam told her to pursue the night-shift because it was the only option available that would allow her to retain her employment with JMI. This evidence supports the conclusion that she suffered an adverse employment action. Nor does the evidence conclusively indicate that the tool-room position was a more pleasant working environment. Spees testified that working in the tool room was just as hot and as physically demanding as welding, the only difference being that she did not need to do any overhead handling of the welding equipment. And although Spees was not exposed to toxic fumes while working in the tool room, she could have avoided such fumes by wearing a respirator while welding, as first recommended by Dr. Cardenas. On balance, Spees's transfer to the tool room resulted in her working a more inconvenient shift in a position that was less challenging and that required fewer qualifications. Viewing this evidence collectively in Spees's favor, a reasonable jury could find that her transfer to the tool room constituted an adverse employment action.
We must next determine whether Spees presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that her pregnancy was a motivating factor in transferring her to the tool room. In International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), the Supreme Court set forth the parameters regarding the acceptable treatment of female employees with childbearing capacity. Johnson Controls had barred all fertile females from its lead-battery plant out of concern for the health of the fetuses that the women might conceive. Id. at 191-92, 111 S.Ct. 1196. The Court struck down the company's policy as violating Title VII because the policy discriminated against female employees based on their capacity to become pregnant, even though the employees' reproductive potential did not prevent them from being able to perform their jobs. Id. at 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196. It added that an employer's safety concerns were a permissible ground for restricting a female employee's job opportunities only where a pregnancy actually interfere[d] with the employee's ability to perform the job. Id. at 204, 111 S.Ct. 1196. The Court concluded that Congress made clear that the decision to become pregnant or to work while being ... pregnant ... was reserved for each individual woman to make for herself. Id. at 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196. In the present case, Spees presented considerable evidence demonstrating that her pregnancy was at least a motivating factor, if not the motivating factor, in JMI's decision to transfer her to the tool room. Milam testified that when he first learned of Spees's pregnancy, he had concerns that she would not be able to weld. When Spees read him Dr. Cardenas's first note clearing her to return to welding, Milam said that there was some question about her being pregnant and being able to safely perform the job that she was required to do. He based these concerns on his perception of common sense. And according to Spees, Milam told her to obtain a second note from Dr. Cardenas limiting her to light duty and instructing her to avoid toxic fumes. JMI then relied on this note in transferring Spees to the tool room. Other JMI employees superior to Spees exhibited a similar attitude. Tom Freeman, the head of JMI's Safety Department, told Spees that this is a man's world and that the notes from Dr. Cardenas were not acceptable. Freeman's statement that he didn't know what he was going to do with Spees could be construed as further questioning her ability to weld while pregnant. Gunder, the night foreman and Spees's brother, also partook in the decision to transfer Spees. He stated in his deposition that he did not want Spees welding because she was carrying my niece. Gunder and Milam discussed where Spees should be working, and they just decided that it wouldn't be a good idea for her to [weld]. In contrast, Spees never told her supervisors at JMI that she was unable to weld. She instead believed that she could weld, with only minimal restrictions, up until the full term of her pregnancy. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that Spees requested a transfer to the tool room. Milam, on the other hand, knew that there was a night-shift opening in the tool room and recommended that Spees seek a transfer. He and other managers made the decision to move Spees to the tool room, allegedly telling her we don't know what to do with you. In addition, Milam later indicated to Spees that JMI management had taken unilateral action. According to Spees, Milam informed her that I have already been told by [Colbert] that you are not going to weld no matter what your doctor is going to do. JMI defends its decision to transfer Spees by relying on Dr. Cardenas's second note that restricts Spees to light duty and indicates that she should avoid toxic fumes. The company also points to Dr. Cardenas's testimony in which he states that his recommendations were independent of any motivations that JMI may have had. But this evidence does not shield JMI's transfer decision in light of Milam's apparent opinion that Spees should be transferred even before Dr. Cardenas had written the light-duty note. Furthermore, Spees testified that Milam instructed her to obtain the note so limiting her. Dr. Cardenas's statement that he was not influenced by JMI when writing the second note is similarly inconclusive because Spees might have chosen not to inform him (or forgotten to inform him) that she was seeking that note at JMI's request. In sum, evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that JMI had decided that Spees was unable to weld due to her pregnancy and had instructed her to get a doctor's note to that effect. JMI also argues that it would have been subject to a tort claim for negligence if it had permitted Spees to continue welding contrary to the orders contained in Dr. Cardenas's second note. But this argument again overlooks the evidence that Milam told Spees to obtain the restrictive note in the first place. Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Johnson Controls, JMI's risk of tort liability in this situation would be remote if it fully inform[ed] Spees of the risk inherent to welding while pregnant and did not otherwise act negligently. See id. at 208, 111 S.Ct. 1196. Summary judgment is accordingly inappropriate on this ground. As a whole, the evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether JMI management, rather than undertaking an objective evaluation to determine whether Spees could perform her welding job while pregnant, instead subjectively viewed Spees's pregnancy as rendering her unable to weld. This would allow a reasonable jury to find that JMI's decision to transfer Spees was made out of concern for her pregnancy and the well-being of her unborn child rather than because Spees was unable to perform her job as a welder. Such concerns, though laudatory, do not justify an adverse employment action. See id. at 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196. The district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment in favor of JMI on Spees's transfer claim.