Opinion ID: 1712060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the hearing examiner applied the proper legal standard for spoliation of evidence.

Text: ¶ 36. The information contained in the CPU of slot machine 2947 would have conclusively established whether Thomas had in fact won any jackpots on the night in question, and how much time had elapsed since it occurred. Before the memory components of the machine were recycled, neither the Isle, nor CDS, nor the agent for the Gaming Commission ever tested the machine's memory to determine conclusively the elapsed time since a jackpot was won. The actions of the Isle and CDS in removing and recycling machine 2947 have caused the permanent and irretrievable loss of this information. ¶ 37. When evidence is lost or destroyed by one party (the spoliator), thus hindering the other party's ability to prove his case, a presumption is raised that the missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its loss. According to Wigmore: [S]poliation and all similar conduct is receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the cause's lack of truth and merit. The inference thus does not necessarily apply to any specific fact in the cause, but operates indefinitely though strongly against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting his cause. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 278, at 133 (J. Chadbourn rev.1979). Because the presumption of unfavorability is not solely confined to the specific issue of what information was contained in the missing evidence, the fact finder is free to draw a general negative inference from the act of spoliation, regardless of what the spoliator's rebuttal evidence shows. ¶ 38. The Isle and CDS argue that the negative presumption raised by spoliation may only be drawn when the destruction is unexplained or deliberate. However, the information contained in machine 2947 was not lost by act of God or in a fire, but was destroyed by the actions of Isle and CDS when at least one of them was aware of the pending dispute. ¶ 39. If not intentional, their actions were at least grossly negligent. The casino was under a statutory duty to contact the Commission when it became clear that the dispute had not been resolved to Thomas's satisfaction. Had the Isle done so, a more thorough investigation may have ensued, and the slot machine would have been preserved. Therefore, it cannot be said that the information contained in the CPU of machine 2947 was lost through no fault of the Isle or CDS. ¶ 40. Requiring an innocent litigant to prove fraudulent intent on the part of the spoliator would result in placing too onerous a burden on the aggrieved party. To hold otherwise would encourage parties with weak cases to inadvertently lose particularly damning evidence and then manufacture innocent explanations for the loss. In this way, the spoliator could essentially destroy evidence and then require the innocent party to prove fraudulent intent before the destruction of the evidence could be used against it. ¶ 41. Other jurisdictions have held that both intentional and negligent loss of evidence can constitute spoliation. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So.2d 596, 599 (Fla.1987). In Valcin, the Florida Supreme Court held that the negligent failure to maintain medical records pursuant to statutory duty gives rise to the negative inference that the records would be unfavorable to the spoliator. Id. The presumption remains in effect even after the party to whom it has been shifted introduces evidence tending to disprove the presumed fact. Id. at 600. Whether the negative inference has been overcome then becomes a question of fact. Id.See also Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246-47 (6th Cir.1988) (holding that the negligent loss or alteration of medical records gives rise to negative inference); Sweet v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, 895 P.2d 484, 492 (Alaska 1995) (holding that negative presumption is raised absent a finding of fact that the loss of a medical record is excused). ¶ 42. This Court adopted a similar rule in DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So.2d 818, 822 (Miss.1992). In DeLaughter, we held that where a (medical) record required by law to be kept is unavailable due to negligence, an inference arises that the record contained information unfavorable to the hospital, and the jury should be so instructed. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 43. The failure of the Casino to follow the dictates of the Gaming Control Act, and the Isle's and CDS's failure to preserve the slot machine therefore resulted in a presumption that the evidence contained in the CPU of machine 2947 was unfavorable to the those responsible for its destruction. In spite of this presumption, the hearing examiner, however, had ample secondary evidence on which to base his findings. ¶ 44. At the hearing, the records of both the CDS independent slot tracking system and the Isle independent slot tracking system were admitted in evidence. The examiner concluded that both were functioning properly at the relevant times and indicate that no jackpot was won. He also had experts to describe the function of the machine in jackpot mode and a surveillance tape, though of admittedly poor quality, for comparison. Though the numerous witnesses offered conflicting testimony, the hearing examiner, as the finder of fact, was responsible for judging their veracity. The decision was therefore based on evidence and does not meet the unsupported by any evidence standard to require a reversal.