Opinion ID: 1485726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions for Change of Venue, Sequestration of Witnesses, New Trial and Jury Trial in Juvenile Proceedings.

Text: We treat these motions for change of venue, sequestration of witnesses, new trial and jury trial under one category in this opinion because the appellant, knowing full well that juvenile proceedings are of a special nature designed by statute to meet the problems peculiar to the adolescent, has through his spate of motions launched a frontal attack on the juvenile procedure followed in this State (Code (1966 Repl. Vol.) Art. 26, §§ 51-71). His thesis is that because these motions are not available to defendants in juvenile proceedings, the juvenile is deprived of the due process of law afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice Fortas in Gault, delivered a strong indictment against the juvenile proceedings as they exist today in most of the 50 states. We must say that this well documented opinion contained much to justify his criticism. However, the Supreme Court certainly stopped short of insisting that built-in protections afforded minors in juvenile proceedings be discarded and that they be tried in all cases like adults. It is evident that the Supreme Court believes that juveniles have in the past suffered the worst of both worlds and it is also evident that its objective is to obtain for the juvenile the best of both worlds. This goal is commendable. We think that it can be achieved within the framework of the juvenile process which we have in this State which, while showing proper respect for due process, does not subject juvenile hearings to all of the options identified with adversary criminal trials. In In Matter of Cromwell, 232 Md. 409, 194 A.2d 88 (1963) we said:     If, as some authorities suggest and our own Rules reflect, juvenile proceedings should be conducted without strict regard for the usual court rules, we think there is at least a minimum standard of fairness that must be observed.   . Id. 415. We think this is in accord with what Mr. Justice Fortas said in Gault:    Of course, it is not suggested that juvenile court judges should fail appropriately to take account, in their demeanor and conduct, of the emotional and psychological attitude of the juvenile with whom they are confronted. While due process requirements will, in some instances, introduce a degree of order and regularity to juvenile court proceedings to determine delinquency, and in contested cases will introduce some elements of the adversary system, nothing will require that the conception of the kindly juvenile judge be replaced by its opposite, nor do we here rule upon the question whether ordinary due process requirements must be observed with respect to hearings to determine the disposition of the delinquent child. (Emphasis supplied.) 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).