Opinion ID: 2271465
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Parties' Arguments and the Trial Court's Rulings

Text: Scott moved to suppress the evidence seized from the Lexus on the grounds that the warrantless search of the vehicle was neither valid as a search incident to his arrest nor supported by probable cause. In its rejoinder, the government argued only that the officers had probable cause for the search. At the suppression hearing, following Officer Schagnon's testimony, the government additionally contended that the search of the car was authorized by the consent of its owner, and that Scott lacked standing to challenge the search because, as the prosecutor characterized it, he told the police, It's not my car. Scott disputed the latter newly-raised contentions in a supplemental, post-hearing memorandum. With respect to the cocaine seized from his person, Scott argued that the police had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting him to a highly intrusive and humiliating anal cavity search without having what the Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California [5] called a clear indication (amounting to probable cause) that it would reveal the desired evidence. The government countered that the strip search was lawful as part of the search incident to Scott's arrest because the police had a reasonable suspicion, based on the undercover officer's observations, that they would find contraband secreted in Scott's clothing or on his person. After taking the parties' arguments under advisement, the trial court granted Scott's suppression motion with respect to both searches. Announcing its rulings orally from the bench, the court preliminarily found that the police had probable cause to arrest Scott for drug distribution and that the field search of Scott in the convenience store was a lawful search incident to his arrest. Thus, the court upheld the seizure of the money and car keys found on Scott's person at that time. Turning next to the search of the Lexus, the court concluded that Scott had standing to object to the search even though he told the police the car belonged to his cousin. Under the Supreme Court's 1960 decision in Jones v. United States , [6] the court explained, Scott had standing to challenge the search because it was directed against him. Further, the court concluded, the search of the Lexus exceeded the bounds of a permissible search incident to Scott's arrest, inasmuch as the automobile was outside the area of Scott's immediate control when the police undertook to search it. Consequently, the court ruled, the vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment and its fruits had to be suppressed. In rendering its decision, the court did not mention the government's contentions that the warrantless search of the Lexus was justified by its owner's consent or by the existence of probable cause to believe the car contained contraband. The prosecutor did not request findings of fact or a specific ruling on those issues. Lastly, the court ruled that the strip search violated Scott's Fourth Amendment rights because the level of suspicion required to justify such a search was absent: Officer Schagnon's testimony that the undercover officer saw Scott pull a ziplock from his waistband was too vague, in the court's view, to support a finding of a clear indication that evidence would be found were a strip search to be conducted. In addition, the court implied, though it did not specifically hold, that Lieutenant Murphy's retrieval of the packet of cocaine from Scott's buttock amounted to a body cavity intrusion for which, in the absence of exigent circumstances, a search warrant was required.