Opinion ID: 2980755
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Polygraph Exam

Text: Howell argues that cancelling her polygraph must be investigatory because the decision “whether to give or not to give someone a polygraph exam . . . cannot rationally be argued to be anything other than ordinary police work.” Appellant Br. at 33. Conducting a polygraph may indeed be investigatory, depending on context. See Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261, 1267 (8th Cir.) (holding prosecutor’s review of polygraph results provided by defendant not investigative work, even if similar to an act sometimes performed by police), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 867 (1996). But the fact that prosecutors often engage in work that resembles traditional police activities does not remove such acts from the protections of absolute immunity if they were done during the course of preparing for trial. “[I]n determining immunity, we examine the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Prosecutors executing their duties must be given immunity in the “professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to seek an indictment has been made.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. Consistent with this principle, the “[p]reparation of witnesses for trial is protected by absolute immunity.” Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus the same act of interviewing witnesses is protected when done to evaluate evidence and prepare for trial, but not when done at the earlier stage of “searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested . . . .” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. Sanders does not attempt to explain why his decisions with respect to the polygraph were in relation to trial preparation, despite having the burden to do so. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 486. Nor does it seem likely that the decision with respect to the polygraph related to preparing for trial. However, the decision does seem integrally related to the initiation of the criminal proceedings against Howell in the same way No. 10-5797 Howell v. Sanders Page 9 ordering her arrest was. At most, the facts suggest that Sanders stopped a polygraph5 in order to initiate Howell’s prosecution, which was well within his role as an advocate for the state of Kentucky. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33; Ireland, 113 F.3d at 1446 (“[T]he integrity of the judicial system depends in large part upon a prosecutor’s ability to exercise independent judgment in deciding whether and against whom to bring criminal charges.”). Thus even if there is some dispute over what happened regarding the polygraph situation, the dispute does not preclude summary judgment on this issue as it does not relate to a material fact.6 Howell attempts to paint Sanders as interfering in the fact-gathering portion of the investigation, essentially asking the court to ignore that the police had already gone to a judge with sufficient facts to obtain an arrest warrant based on probable cause. The record does suggest that the police were still willing to conduct a polygraph at this point, with consultation from Stefanie Kaster. Even under Howell’s version of the facts, however, at most Rob Sanders disagreed with the decision to delay initiating her prosecution to accommodate a polygraph and instructed the officers to proceed with the execution of the arrest warrant. None of these facts alter the conclusion that Rob Sanders was acting in his capacity as an advocate and not engaging in an investigatory function; he is entitled to absolute immunity.