Opinion ID: 1935582
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Unconstitutionality of the Enabling Act

Text: Rooted in every contention made by plaintiffs is the proposition that the showing of motion pictures is cloaked with the constitutional guarantees of the right of free speech and press mandated by article I of amendments to the Constitution of the United States. In Burstyn, supra, the United States Supreme Court, expressly departing from the principles enunciated in Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387, 59 L.Ed. 552, held that expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guarantee of the first and fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution. Consequently, in Burstyn, the court struck down as being violative of the first amendment guarantee, a New York statute which, authorizing the licensing of motion pictures also provided for the denial of a license when, in the opinion of the designated censor, a particular motion picture for the showing of which a license is sought is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime   . McKinney's N.Y. Laws, 1947, Education Law, § 122. The basis for the action of the censor in the Burstyn case was that the picture was sacrilegious and the court, in addition to holding that the exhibition of motion pictures was a liberty protected by the first amendment and applicable to the states through the fourteenth, faulted the statute on the specific ground that sacrilegious not otherwise defined was an imprecise constitutional standard. The court saw no necessity to pass on the question of whether prior restraint would be valid if exercised by the licensing authority pursuant to constitutionally permissible control. Indeed, in Burstyn, the court was careful to point out that the case did not stand for the proposition that the states could not censor motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films. (Emphasis ours.) Specifically, it held that under the first and fourteenth amendments a state may not ban a film on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it is sacrilegious. The instant plaintiffs argue that § 5-22-5, as amended, is similarly unconstitutional on its face in that the standard of Obscene, on which the Providence Bureau of Licenses purports to exercise prior restraint, lacks constitutional sanction. In this they equate the undefined sacrilegious standard of the New York act with the undefined standard of obscene as set forth in the Rhode Island enabling act. If the instant proceedings were addressed to a review of the Licensing Bureau's banning of a given motion picture on the ground that in the unstandardized opinion of the Bureau the picture in question was obscene, we would have no alternative but to hold such banning was a violation of the freedom of speech and press guarantees. This, however, is not the case. We agree that in exercising its delegated legislative power to withhold a license for the reason that the motion picture proposed to be shown is obscene, the Bureau of Licenses is bound to make that determination in accordance with constitutionally valid standards of obscenity. Consequently, although § 5-22-5, as amended, may purport to be a valid exercise of the police power, in failing to set forth acceptable obscenity standards, it is susceptible to an unconstitutional application of the police power when, in a given case, it appears that the licensing authority, acting pursuant to the authority conferred by the section is demonstrably motivated by applying standards which constitute a denial of due process. See State ex rel. v. Lombardi, 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625. Inevitably, this brings us to a consideration of what is the obscenity standard binding on the licensing authority in exercising the power delegated under § 5-22-5, as amended. It is the unequivocal and uncontradicted testimony of the chairman of the Bureau of Licenses that in passing on an application for a motion picture license, the members of the Bureau adhere to the standard set forth in the applicable Providence ordinance, namely sec. 4 of chap. 1883 (appendix IV). At the time this standard was incorporated in the amended ordinance, it had the approval of a majority of the United States Supreme Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498. However, since the holding in Roth, the Court has further restricted a censor's area of prior restraint. In Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975, 16 L.Ed.2d 1, a majority of the Court held that material was obscene in a constitutional sense only if three elements coalesce. These are:     (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value. Subsequently in Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 87 S.Ct. 1414, 18 L.Ed.2d 515, the Court referring specifically to the divergent views of the individual justices, made clear that the test enunciated in Memoirs represents the outside limits of constitutionally sanctioned prior restraint. [2] It is our judgment therefore, that the withholding of a motion picture license and the referring of the question to the Superior Court as authorized by § 5-22-5, as amended, has validity only when the licensing authority's determination conforms to the standards set forth in Memoirs. The plaintiffs further contend, however, that § 5-22-5, as amended, is also unconstitutional in that it purports to authorize prior restraint contrary to the holding in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649. In making this contention, they have regard to those provisions of said section which authorize the licensing authority to take up to 48 hours in either granting the license, or denying it on obscenity grounds and referring it to the Superior Court for judicial determination (paragraph 2 of appendix I). In Freedman, the Court expressly held that, to be free of constitutional prohibitions, a state statute must conform to certain specified minimum requirements. These are, in essence, that the burden of proving obscenity is statutorily placed on the censor; that the finality of the obscenity controversy may not rest with the censoring licensing authority but rather in a judicial determination, adversary in nature, and that the statute under which prior restraint is authorized must expressly provide for a prompt submission of the controversy to the courts as well as an expeditious final adjudication thereof. We are unable to agree with plaintiffs' contention that § 5-22-5, as amended (appendix I), falls short or otherwise fails to conform with the minimum procedural protection laid down in Freedman. An examination of the act in question discloses that the appropriate agency must within 48 hours either grant the license applied for or initiate proceedings in the Superior Court for a judicial determination of the agency's concern regarding obscenity and that the burden of proving obscenity rests with the licensing agency. The statute further provides that should the licensing authority file a complaint in lieu of issuing a license, the applicant for said license shall be informed thereof forthwith and the case heard the day following the filing of pleadings by defendant and the judgment of the court rendered within 48 hours of the conclusion of said hearing. Moreover, the statute expressly provides that should either the complaining agency or the court fail to strictly comply with the provisions designed to assure the defendant-applicant of a prompt judicial determination, the license applied for shall be issued forthwith. Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue, Super.R.Civ.P. may be invoked to prolong the judicial proceedings substantially beyond the few days provided for in the statute. On this point, we think it sufficient to observe that, as to the commencement of the judicial hearing, the statute leaves to defendant-applicant the decision as to when the hearing shall commence. In all other respects, the statute contemplates that delay attributable to the complaining agency or the court would result in the granting of the license by way of mandamus, absent some mitigating circumstance as might appear in an appropriate case. It seems to us that if the formula enunciated in Freedman v. Maryland, supra , has any realistic value, the General Assembly of this state in adopting P.L. 1966, chap. 260, sec. 1, now § 5-22-5, as amended, pragmatically safeguarded the right of a motion picture exhibitor against unwarranted prior restraint. Continuing their assaults on the General Assembly's asserted right to regulate the showing of motion pictures, plaintiffs next argue that § 5-22-8, as amended by P.L. 1964, chap. 182, sec. 1, is unconstitutional on its face. This section provides:  Performances and movies after 1 p.m. on Sunday.  The bureau of licenses of the city of Providence, the police commissioners of the city of Woonsocket, the town council of the town of Burrillville, the town council of the town of West Warwick and the city council or other licensing board of the cities of Central Falls, Cranston, Pawtucket and Newport, may authorize the performance for pay or profit of vocal, instrumental or orchestral entertainments and lectures of an instructive character, plays or legitimate theater performances, and vaudeville performances of juggling and stage dancing having the approval of the licensing body of the city where such performances are given, and moving picture exhibitions, consisting of such pictures as have the approval of the national board of review and the licensing body of the city where such pictures are to be shown, on the first day of the week after the hour of 1 p.m. but no such license shall authorize the vending or serving of any foods or refreshments of any kind or nature on the first day of the week. In essence, they challenge the validity of the foregoing section on two grounds. First, they contend that by purporting to authorize the requirement of separate licenses for secular days and Sunday, the General Assembly has exceeded whatever authority it may have with regard to prior restraint in that whatever constitutes a guaranteed expression of free speech on weekdays is equally applicable to Sundays, citing Brattle Films, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 333 Mass. 58, 127 N.E.2d 891. There the Massachusetts court struck down a Sunday licensing statute on the ground that the act in question, Mass. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 136, § 4, as amended, permitted the showing on Sunday of only such pictures as the Commissioner of Public Safety approved as being in keeping with the character of the day and not inconsistent with its due observance. Such censorship, the court held, in essence, constituted an unwarranted prior restraint on the freedom of speech and press, citing Burstyn v. Wilson, supra. Similarly here, the requirement of § 5-22-8, as amended, that only such motion pictures as meet with the approval of the National Board of Review, is without constitutional sanction. The standard binding on the licensing authority when purporting to exercise prior restraint is no different with regard to the issuance of a Sunday license than that for secular days, namely, the three elements and coalescence thereof enunciated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts. To the extent then that § 5-22-8, as amended, seems to call for separate licenses vis-a-vis Sundays and secular days, § 5-22-8, as amended, is defective. However, we read the section as authorizing the licensing of motion pictures along with other stated exhibitions on Sundays as well as secular days, restricting the commencement thereof to 1 p.m. The plaintiffs argue, however, and the evidence adduced in the Superior Court tends to support them, that, if an exhibitor applying for a license for a period of several days or weeks, within which a Sunday or Sundays are included, separate applications must be made therefor. If such be the case, support for such practice lacks constitutional validity. In short, if an exhibitor is interested in only showing on a Sunday, the licensing authority is authorized by § 5-22-8, as amended, to issue the license requested and under § 5-22-5, as amended, may deny such license only on the ground that the picture sought to be shown is obscene in a constitutional sense. If, however, a license is sought for a specified number of days or weeks which encompasses a Sunday or Sundays, there can be but a single exercise of prior restraint in the determination of whether the license requested for the time involved may be constitutionally denied. In the latter instance, we assume that the license sought is for the same motion picture and in both instances, we assume that the place where the film is to be exhibited has been approved as required by § 5-22-13. [3] Finally, as to the alleged unconstitutionality of the enabling act, plaintiffs argue that § 5-22-12 is similarly invalid on its face in that it purports through the authorization of license fees, to impose a tax on the exercise of free speech and press, contrary to the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292. Said § 12 is entitled License fees  Revocation of license. and provides: Said town council, bureau of licenses or board of police commissioners, shall demand and receive of every person to whom a license shall be granted under this chapter such sum not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) for any single performance, show, exhibition, concert, entertainment, moving picture exhibition, dance or ball, as they may deem proper; provided, that performances and entertainments given by religious and charitable societies and volunteer fire-fighting companies duly organized and incorporated for the purpose of furthering their religious, benevolent or fire-fighting work are hereby excepted from the provisions of this chapter as to fees; and provided, further, that any license granted under the authority of §§ 5-22-5 to 5-22-12, inclusive, may be revoked at the pleasure of said town council, bureau of licenses or board of police commissioners. In Murdock a local ordinance provided for a graduated license fee chargeable to all persons engaged in door-to-door soliciting. The local licensing authority interpreted the ordinance as being applicable to members of a religious sect, Jehovah's Witnesses, who, in the exercise of their religion, went door to door distributing literature and soliciting people to purchase certain religious books and pamphlets. The Court held that there being no relationship between the fee charged and the application of the revenue thus received to the protection of the public against the abuses of solicitors, the fee charged constituted a tax on the freedom of press and a restraint on the free exercise of religion. The Court was careful, however, to preserve the governmental right to impose license fees as a regulatory measure where the purpose of charging such fees was to defray the expense of policing the activity so licensed, citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61, S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049. Here, § 5-22-12, authorizes the local licensing agency to charge such fee as is proper. Moreover, the activities encompassed range from exhibitions where policing would be nominal to circuses and large sporting events. Thus, the General Assembly contemplated the fixing of fees by a local licensing agency ranging from nominal to the substantial limit of $100, leaving it for said local agency to fix a fee commensurate with the expense of policing a given exhibition. Hence, we cannot agree that, as to the provisions relating to licensing fees, § 5-22-12 is patently defective. There is, however, the question of whether the licensing fees charged by defendant Bureau are merely a regulatory measure and valid, or from the evidence, can the fees charged be said to constitute a prohibited tax. Turning to an examination of the evidence on this point, we find that the total revenue from the licensing of motion picture films in 1967, the last full year, was $9,724, while the cost of operating the Bureau as the same related to the licensing of motion pictures consumed approximately one-fourth of the Bureau's time and efforts. The total appropriation for the Bureau being $48,150.33, it is readily apparent that the fees charged for the licensing of motion pictures are nominal and amounting to something less than the revenue required to enforce the licensing procedures. On the state of the record therefore, it seems clear that the licensing charge is a permissible regulatory measure. The further provision of said § 12, that the local licensing authority may revoke a license already granted at its pleasure, however, constitutes a denial of procedural due process on its face, at least when, as here, this provision of the section is considered in connection with the licensing of motion pictures. Again, though the record before us does not disclose any instance where the faulted standard was resorted to as against the instant plaintiffs, the record does disclose that defendant Bureau refused to renew a license for the showing of the picture I A Woman, after that picture had been exhibited for some six weeks pursuant to licenses granted for that period. The record further establishes that with the denial of a renewal of the license previously granted, defendant Bureau initiated judicial review in accordance with the requirements of both the enabling act and the ordinance. Parenthetically, it was the judgment of the Superior Court that the picture in question was not obscene within the meaning of constitutional standards and a license for the showing thereof was again granted by defendant Bureau. However, the record does not indicate the basis for the Bureau's refusal to renew. If such denial was predicated on the Bureau's purported authority to revoke at its pleasure as set forth in § 5-22-12, the Bureau's action was invalid since that provision of the enabling act is clearly violative of due process. Obviously, the granting of a license carries the implication that the picture for which the license was issued is not obscene. This is not to say, however, that a licensing authority lacks power to suspend a license when there comes to the authority's attention the fact that an altered version of the picture has been substituted for that which was approved and said altered version, tested by constitutional standards, raises an obscenity controversy. In such case the licensing authority has such jurisdiction as it would have if the substituted version were that for which a license was applied in the first instance. With regard to that provision of § 5-22-12 which purports to authorize the revocation of licenses at pleasure, we hold such provision is without constitutional sanction and that a license once issued may not be revoked, suspended, or renewal thereof denied, absent an abusive use of said license as heretofore indicated.