Opinion ID: 2228954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Home Depot v Dunn

Text: In February 1996, Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., a home improvement retailer, obtained site plan approval from the Village of Port Chester to develop an 8.33 acre site for a retail establishment of approximately 101,467 square feet, with an 18,000 square foot outdoor garden center and 537 parking spaces in Port Chester, at the border between Port Chester and the City of Rye. [2] The facility opened in February 2000, after long wrangling with defendants, the City of Rye, its Mayor and City Council members (collectively Rye). As an Interested Agency in the environmental review process led by Port Chester, Rye demanded that four traffic-mitigating measures be imposed, among them the widening of Midland Avenue in Ryeand Port Chester made that demand a condition for its approval of the project. [3] Because Midland Avenue is a county road within the City of Rye, the plans also required the County's approval, which in turn required the City's approval. Thus, without Rye's go-ahead, Home Depot could not proceed. Beginning in fall 1996 with a Home Depot letter threatening damages actions unless Rye signed the county permit, tension mounted. After several executive sessions of the Rye City Council, and negotiations with Home Depot, the parties reached tentative settlement in February 1997, with Rye exacting a promise of a $200,000 payment by Home Depot and additional traffic-mitigation measures, and agreeing not to appeal an adverse decision in its second article 78 proceeding against Port Chester. In March 1997, however, after community opposition, the City Council rejected the settlement and refused consent to the permit. In April 1997, Home Depot commenced two suitsan article 78 proceeding to compel Rye to sign (and the County of Westchester to issue) the permit, and a civil rights action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 against the Mayor and the City Council members (both personally and officially) seeking $50 million in compensatory damages and unspecified punitive damages, for delaying construction by more than two years. As a July 1997 Home Depot interoffice memorandum reflects, Home Depot saw the real value of the section 1983 action as leverage for settlement. On January 30, 1998, in Home Depot's article 78 proceeding, Supreme Courtwhile recognizing that the actions Home Depot sought to compel were of a discretionary nature [4] held that Rye's insistence on additional mitigation measures and its refusal to approve the permit were arbitrary and capricious. The court annulled Rye's denial of the road-widening permit, and the Appellate Division affirmed (259 AD2d 547 [2d Dept 1999]). At about that time, however, Home Depot's site plan approval from Port Chester expired, which necessitated a third environmental review. Port Chester issued a new site plan approval, which did not require the widening of Midland Avenue or Rye's consent. Construction began almost immediately and the facility opened in February 2000. Meanwhile, discovery proceeded in the section 1983 action, after which Home Depot sought summary judgment and Rye cross-moved for dismissal of the complaint. [5] Supreme Court granted Home Depot's motion for summary judgment with respect to liability on its substantive due process claim, holding that Home Depot had a clear entitlement to defendants' approval of the permit because defendants' refusal to sign off on the permit lacked a rational basis, and that defendants' conduct was a gross abuse of governmental authority. The court denied Home Depot's motion for summary judgment on the equal protection claim, finding a triable issue with respect to the similarities of other permit applications to Home Depot's; the court further denied both sides summary judgment with respect to the takings claim, and denied defendants' claim of immunity. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Home Depot had failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to a due process violation and that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, rendering the remaining contentions academic (305 AD2d 459 [2d Dept 2003]). We now affirm as to the lack of a constitutional violation, and thus need not reach the immunity issue.