Opinion ID: 1969648
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court erred by dismissing the indictment on the ground of a violation of the right to a speedy trial.

Text: The Constitution of the United States provides in part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ... U.S. CONST. Amend. VI. Similarly, under the South Dakota Constitution, the accused shall have the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7. We have adopted the four-factor balancing test set forth by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether an accused's right to a speedy trial has been violated. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2184, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 117 (1972); State v. Traversie, 387 N.W.2d 2, 5 (S.D.1986). The approach we accept is a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.... Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: 1) length of delay; 2) the reason for the delay, 3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and 4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92, 33 L.Ed.2d at 116-17.
Goodroad argues that the delay of some twenty-seven months, from his incarceration in October, 1990, until arraignment in January, 1993, was presumptively prejudicial under the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). In Doggett, the Court separated the length of delay inquiry, into two steps. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2690, 120 L.Ed.2d at 528. It explained: Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from `presumptively prejudicial' delay[.] Id. The Court went on to clarify the meaning of the phrase presumptive prejudice in the context of speedy trials: [A]s the term is used in this threshold context, `presumptive prejudice' does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker inquiry.  Id. at ___ n. 1, 112 S.Ct. at 2690 n. 1, 120 L.Ed.2d at 528 n. 1 (emphasis added). The Court noted a delay of approximately one year to be presumptively prejudicial. Id. Therefore, a delay of twenty-seven months meets the threshold test and triggers a Barker inquiry. If this threshold step is satisfied, the second step of the analysis requires a court to consider the extent to which delay exceeds the threshold, weighing the degree of diligence by the government in pursuing the defendant against acquiescence by the defendant to determine whether sufficient prejudice exists to warrant relief. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2693-94, 120 L.Ed.2d at 531-32.
To determine the reason for the delay it is helpful to remember that we are actually viewing three segments of time. The first portion is the time Goodroad spent incarcerated in Minnesota. The second segment runs from the time Goodroad was extradited from Minnesota until he was arraigned on the Butte County charges. The third portion encompasses the time from the date of the arraignment until the trial court's dismissal of the indictment. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA) has been adopted by the federal government, by South Dakota, and by almost every state. 18 U.S.C. App. § 2 (1985); SDCL ch. 23-24A. Its purpose is [to] implement the right to a speedy trial and to minimize the interference with a prisoner's treatment and rehabilitation[.] State v. Looze, 273 N.W.2d 177, 178 (S.D.1979). Goodroad alleges that the first segment of time, from indictment to extradition, should be weighed against the government as it violated the IADA and was responsible for his twenty-two-month delay in asserting his speedy trial rights. Goodroad admits that approximately a week after he was incarcerated in the Redwood County Jail he was shown a copy of the Butte County indictment. He testified as follows at the hearing on his motion to dismiss for prosecutorial delay: Q Did anyone in the Redwood Falls, Minnesota correctional system show you anything regarding Butte County warrants [sic] in October of 1990? A Yes sir. Q What happened? A I was showed [sic] a copy of a grand jury indictment in October, approximately a week after my initial arrest in Redwood Falls. However, the trial court determined the IADA was not triggered as the State never gave Defendant required notice of the pending indictment. In light of Goodroad's admission he was shown a copy of the Butte County Indictment, this determination was in error. The trial court also found that Butte County, prior to December 11, 1992, did not attempt to initiate prosecution of Defendant beyond securing the Indictment. Because a detainer, based on the indictment had obviously been filed with Minnesota, that finding of fact was clearly erroneous. The court also found that Defendant had never been adequately informed of the Butte County Indictment such that he could make a demand for action thereon. The question of whether Goodroad was adequately informed of the indictment and his speedy trial rights rests on his own testimony at the hearing: Q During the time that you were in Minnesota did you attempt to invoke any speedy trial rights concerning the Butte County charge? A Yes, in Redwood Falls, Minnesota. Q What did you do? A I asked the corrections officer at the facility I was incarcerated at whether or not I would be gettinggiven speedy trial paperwork for IADA. Q And were you given any speedy trial paperwork? A No sir, he said I would have to wait until Minnesota was completely finished with me. Q An IADA is what? A Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. Goodroad was informed of the source and contents of the indictment against him approximately a week after he was incarcerated in Redwood Falls. As shown by his own testimony, he knew what the IADA was, knew he had a right to a speedy trial and knew he needed to file paperwork to assert that right. Yet, he did not request a speedy trial, choosing either to sit on his rights or to rely on the alleged assertion of an unnamed correctional officer that Minnesota would be disposing of its charges first. It is clear from the numerous articulate motions and demands in this record that Goodroad has personally drafted and had served upon officials and attorneys, that he is exceptionally familiar with the legal system and capable of drafting and serving a demand for a speedy trial. [3] In fact, within a week after he discovered Butte County intended to bring him to trial on the forgery charge, he served a demand for a speedy trial on the Clerk of the Eighth Circuit Court and another demand on the Presiding Judge of the Eighth Circuit Court, the Butte County State's Attorney, the Warden of the South Dakota Penitentiary and the Butte County Clerk of Courts. The fact that Goodroad testified he was familiar with the IADA and its provisions at the time he was first incarcerated in Minnesota seriously undermines his assertion that he relied on the alleged advice of a Minnesota correctional officer that he would have to wait until Minnesota was done with him to assert his rights. Moreover, the record reveals Goodroad had access to counsel while he was incarcerated in Redwood Falls. The cases relied on by the trial court to find a violation of Goodroad's speedy trial rights are inapplicable. Goodroad does not claim that a deputy incorrectly completed a request form as in United States v. Reed, 910 F.2d 621 (9th Cir.1990); nor does he claim he was shuttled from jurisdiction to jurisdiction to prevent him from asserting his speedy trial rights as in United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341 (6th Cir.1979). Nor is this case similar to People v. Office, 126 Mich.App. 597, 337 N.W.2d 592 (1983), where no formal charges had been filed on which to base a detainer and the prisoner did not know he had the right to request a speedy trial. Additionally, under the IADA, when an accused requests disposition of a charge pending in another state, such request is deemed to be a waiver of extradition. SDCL 23-24A-8. If the IADA had been activated, it would not have been necessary for Goodroad to formally waive extradition to South Dakota on May 14, 1992. The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the State failed to comply with the IADA. The reason for the twenty-month delay from indictment until extradition from Minnesota is attributable either to Goodroad's flight from this jurisdiction to avoid prosecution or his failure to demand disposition of the charges against him. The second time period is the eight months from May, 1992, when Goodroad waived extradition and was brought back to South Dakota, to his arraignment in January, 1993. Butte County's only explanation for its delay in arraigning Goodroad during this time is that it was not informed by Pennington County authorities when Goodroad was transported to the penitentiary. Those eight months weigh against the prosecution for delay or inaction. The third segment of time, the six months from arraignment to dismissal is due to Goodroad's twice changing counsel, his demand to recuse the judge, and various other motions filed by the defense. As noted in the public defender's motion to withdraw, Mr Goodroad's intentional actions has (sic) caused significant impediment to expediently and effectively representing him. Those six months weigh against Goodroad.
In Barker, the Supreme Court emphasized: The defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. at 2192-93, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117-18. The third factor places the burden on the defendant to alert the government of his grievances. Robinson v. Whitley, 2 F.3d 562, 569 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1197, 127 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994). In this case, Goodroad did not assert his right to a speedy trial until he was informed that Butte County had placed an administrative hold against him at the South Dakota Penitentiary in December, 1992. He asserts his waiver of extradition to South Dakota served as an assertion of that right, but presents no relevant authority to support that contention. Moreover, his testimony at the hearing shows that at the time he pled guilty in Pennington County, he thought Butte County would not prosecute its charge. [I]t was just Mr. Wurm's [Goodroad's counsel in the Pennington County action] opinion that none of the other charges that have been outstanding since October of 1990, [the charge in Butte Co. and three forgery counts in Davison Co.] would be prosecuted under his opinion that the amount of time that I received in Pennington County in June of `92 would satisfy the other jurisdictions probably, seeings how it was a non-violent crime. Therefore, it may have been a prudent strategy for Goodroad not to assert a demand for a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 535 n. 39, 92 S.Ct. at 2194 n. 39, 33 L.Ed.2d at 120 n. 39. Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. Id. at 521, 92 S.Ct. at 2187, 33 L.Ed.2d at 111. We agree with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals when it stated: We are unimpressed by a defendant who moves for dismissal on speedy trial grounds when his other conduct indicates a contrary desire. Th[is] defendant[ ] did not want a speedy trial; [he was] only interested in delaying trial or avoiding it altogether. United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422, 1429 (10th Cir.1990) (citations omitted) aff'd, 968 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir.1992); Barker, 407 U.S. at 535, 92 S.Ct. at 2194, 33 L.Ed.2d at 119 ([T]he record strongly suggests that while he hoped to take advantage of the delay in which he had acquiesced, and thereby obtain a dismissal of the charges, he definitely did not want to be tried.); The Speedy Trial Clause primarily protects those who assert their rights, not those who acquiesce in the delayperhaps hoping the government will change its mind or lose critical evidence. United States v. Aguirre, 994 F.2d 1454, 1457 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 645, 126 L.Ed.2d 603 (1993). The third factor, assertion of the right to a speedy trial, weighs heavily against Goodroad.
The trial court's conclusion of law stated that Goodroad had been significantly prejudiced by the passage of time. Among his potential alibi witnesses, one has died and others' memories have faded or failed. [4] First, [p]rejudice occurs only when ` defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past.' Tranakos, 911 F.2d at 1429 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118). If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be weakened. Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. at 2187). The faded memories of the named defense witnesses do not support Goodroad's claim he has been prejudiced by the passage of time. Testimony by the defense investigator who interviewed the witnesses reveals that none of the defense witnesses could recall the exact date of the party Goodroad alleges he attended. However, several of the witnesses recall there was a good deal of coming and going at the party. Therefore, even if the witnesses could establish the party was held on August 2, 1990, and that Goodroad attended the party, the most they could testify to is that they recalled seeing him there in varying degrees. The same is true of the alleged alibi witness, the deceased Keith Verdi. Goodroad claims to have been with Verdi only on the morning of August 2, 1990. There is no evidence whether the forged money order was passed in the morning, in the afternoon or at night. Therefore, Verdi is not an alibi witness in the true sense of the word. `Alibi evidence must show that the accused could not have committed the alleged crime, because at the time of its commission he was at a place other than where such offense was committed.' State v. Cochrun, 434 N.W.2d 370, 373 (S.D.1989) (quoting State v. Nelson, 310 N.W.2d 777, 779-80 (S.D.1981)).  An alibi `to be successful must cover the entire time when [appellant's] presence was required for accomplishment of the crime.... [A] purported alibi that leaves it possible for the accused to be the guilty person is no alibi at all. ' Floody, 481 N.W.2d at 248 (emphasis added) (quoting Nelson, 310 N.W.2d at 780 (citations omitted)). Moreover, there was absolutely no showing as to what testimony Mr. Verdi would have given had he lived. State v. Krana, 272 N.W.2d 75, 78 (S.D.1978) (no showing has been made that this deceased witness had testimony that was important to the case or what that testimony would have been. The mere allegation that a deceased person would have been a witness is not sufficient to show prejudice demanding a dismissalthere must be a showing of what the deceased witness knew and would have testified to); accord, Robinson, 2 F.3d at 571 (Even assuming [absent witnesses] could have and would have provided exculpatory testimony, either [defendant] or his attorney should have taken adequate steps to preserve their testimony for trial.). Further, Goodroad pled guilty to passing a forged instrument at the Pamida Store in Sturgis, South Dakota on August 2, 1990, the same day he is alleged to have passed a forged instrument approximately twenty-six miles away in Belle Fourche. [5] The fact that Goodroad was without an alibi long enough to engage in illegal activity in Sturgis shows that his purported alibi witnesses could not cover the entire time when his presence was required for accomplishment of either crime. See Floody, 481 N.W.2d at 248. Therefore, Goodroad's purported alibi still leaves it possible for him to be the guilty person and is, in reality, no alibi at all. The trial court erred in concluding that Goodroad had suffered significant prejudice due to the passage of time.