Opinion ID: 888275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the District Court err in refusing to instruct the jury on the difference between civil and criminal negligence?

Text: ¶ 22 We review claims of instructional error in a criminal case to determine whether the jury instructions, as a whole, fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. State v. Swann, 2007 MT 126, ¶ 32, 337 Mont. 326, ¶ 32, 160 P.3d 511, ¶ 32 (citation omitted). ¶ 23 This issue relates to the negligent vehicular assault offense. Using an instruction based on Montana Criminal Jury Instruction 2-105, the District Court instructed the jury on the definition of negligence as follows: A person acts negligently when an act is done with a conscious disregard of the risk, or when the person should be aware of the risk. The risk must be of a nature and degree that to disregard it involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. Gross deviation means a deviation that is considerably greater than lack of ordinary care. Pol's counsel proposed an additional instruction on the difference between civil negligence and criminal negligence. The District Court refused the instruction. ¶ 24 On appeal, Pol claims that, in light of his argument that he was guilty, at most, of ordinary civil negligence and not criminal negligence, it also was necessary for the court to instruct the jury on the difference between the degree of negligence necessary to support a civil action and the degree of negligence necessary to support a criminal conviction. He does not contend, however, that the instruction given by the District Court inaccurately states the applicable law, nor does he advance any authority to support his claim that a criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on civil negligence. ¶ 25 Criminal negligence is statutorily defined in § 45-2-101(43), MCA. The instruction given in the present case is substantially similar to the statutory definition, and both the statute and the instruction given state [t]he risk must be of a nature and degree that to disregard it involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. Thus, in the instruction given it is clear criminal negligence is not the same as ordinary lack of care. Consequently, we conclude the jury instructions, as a whole, fully and fairly instructed the jury on the law applicable to the case. ¶ 26 We hold the District Court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the difference between civil and criminal negligence.