Opinion ID: 673444
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to Define Reasonable Doubt

Text: 21 Lackey contends that the state court violated his constitutional rights by refusing to apply retroactively the principles of Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In Geesa, which was decided after Lackey's trial but before Lackey's conviction became final, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals announced a new rule requiring a definition of the term reasonable doubt in jury instructions in criminal trials. The state court also announced that the new rule would only apply to criminal cases where the trial occurred after Geesa. Appellant argues that Geesa is based on federal law, and therefore, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), requires that it be given retroactive treatment. 22 Contrary to Lackey's assertions, the rule announced in Geesa was not required by the federal constitution or law. See Victor v. Nebraska, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (stating that the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so); see also Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054, 1060-61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1035, 108 S.Ct. 5, 97 L.Ed.2d 794 (1987) (noting that attempts by trial courts to define 'reasonable doubt, have been disfavored by this Court). Thus, the federal retroactive principles discussed in Griffith have no bearing on the state's application of its new rule. See American Trucking Ass'ns Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2330, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). 23 Alternatively, Appellant argues that the state court's refusal to give retroactive application to Geesa violated his right to equal protection. Because Lackey has not made any attempt to show this Court that the state did not have a rational basis for its refusal to apply the rule of Geesa retroactively, we reject Lackey's claim. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363-65, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1625-26, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972).VIII. Cumulative Effect of Errors 24 Lackey contends that the cumulative effect of the foregoing alleged errors constituted an independent constitutional violation. Because Lackey has not shown any error, much less constitutional error, we must reject his contention.