Opinion ID: 835146
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: RPC 1.16(a)(1) and RPC 5.5

Text: The Bar alleged several causes of complaint based on what the Bar asserted was the accused's practice of law at a time when he was suspended. The trial panel found that the Bar had proved violations in each instance. In particular, the trial panel found that the accused violated RPC 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law) and RPC 1.16(a)(1) (failure to withdraw from representation when representation will result in violation of RPC or other law). Those charges are among the few that the accused disputes. In doing so, he does not dispute that he engaged in the actions and inactions found by the trial panel. Neither does he dispute that he did so on the dates identified in the trial panel's findings. Instead, he disputes only whether his conduct qualified as the practice of law. In particular (and, again, in his summary of facts and not in his substantive argument), the accused asserts summarily, The date something is filed has nothing to do with someone practicing law and [c]lerks file things, lawyers don't. He further asserts that the law is clear on that point[,] although he cites nothing in support of his proposition. The accused was suspended as of October 15, 2006. The trial panel found that the accused engaged in conduct that he was not authorized to engage in    on October 15, 2006. In particular, at the disciplinary hearing, the accused acknowledged that he prepared the various motions to postpone and abate in these matters on that same date (a Sunday). Consistently with that acknowledgment, the motions in fact were dated for that date and signed by the accused. They also were mailed that date, either by the accused or by someone acting at his direction. By preparing and mailing them, the accused performed all the acts necessary to cause the motions to be delivered to the court clerk, which is what constitutes filing. See ORCP 9 E (providing, in part, that the filing of pleadings and other documents with the court    shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court). There is no merit to the accused's argument that, by preparing, signing, and mailing the motions to the circuit courts in each of the matters on the first date of his suspension, he did not engage in the practice of law. Based on our review of the record and the trial panel's determination, we agree that the accused violated RPC 5.5. RPC 1.16(a)(1) requires a lawyer to withdraw from representation if the representation will result in a violation of the rules or other law. As noted, the accused was suspended as of October 15, 2006. Consequently, as the trial panel correctly observed, any efforts by the Accused to practice law on or after that date was in violation of the court's order. The trial panel found that the accused, although suspended from the practice of law on October 15, 2006, failed to withdraw from representing his clients in the Hernandez, Schauermann, Montalbano, and OSB matters other than Loucks. He instead continued representation of the clients in those matters, which constituted the unauthorized practice of law in violation of both the court's order and RPC 5.5. Accordingly, we conclude, as the trial panel did, that the accused's failure to withdraw from representation violated RPC 1.16(a)(1).