Opinion ID: 1868710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: dixie is entitled to a new trial or substantial remittitur.

Text: Dixie alternatively argues that the punitive award was so excessive as to merit a new trial on damages or substantial remittitur. No hard and fast rule exists for establishing the maximum amount of punitive damages awardable in any given case. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172 (Miss. 1990); Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So.2d 254 (Miss. 1985). Instead, the amount must be considered in light of several factors. First, the amount awarded should serve to punish the insurer and to deter it from committing similar offenses in the future. Second, the amount should serve as an example set to deter others from committing similar offenses. Third, the amount awarded should account for the insurer's pecuniary ability and financial worth. And fourth, the amount constitutes compensation for the plaintiff for his or her public service in bringing the action. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172. On appeal, an award will be disturbed only where it is so excessive that it evinces passion, bias and prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the conscience of the court. Williams, 566 So.2d at 1190; Crenshaw, 483 So.2d at 278. Valley Forge Ins. Co./CNA Ins. Co. v. Strickland, 620 So.2d 535, 540-41 (Miss. 1993). Dixie maintains when the $542 in actual damages is compared with the $1,000,000 punitive verdict, the contrast is abundant evidence of bias, passion or prejudice on the jury's part. Dixie also argues the trial court did not use the appropriate standard to review the punitive award and deny the motion for remittitur. Dixie contends that the fact the jury saw the altered scratch without an explanation as to when and how it was altered combined with the evidence of their confusion by asking for an explanation is evidence that the jury was prejudiced. Dixie goes on to complain that the jury was prejudiced by several remarks made by the trial judge. Only one of the comments complained of by Dixie was made in front of the jury and Dixie made no objection to this statement at the time it was made. [I]n order to obtain a review of the question of propriety of remarks or conduct of the trial judge during a trial, the remarks must be especially called to the attention of the trial judge when made, and a correction requested or a proper objection made at the time. Wirtz v. Switzer, 586 So.2d 775, 782 (Miss. 1991), quoting Tippit v. Hunter, 205 So.2d 267, 271 (Miss. 1967). In Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So.2d 254, 278 (Miss. 1985), this Court said the shock must be experienced by the judicial conscience, not the actual conscience of the members of this Court... . We are not authorized to disturb a jury verdict regarding amount of damages because it `seems too high' or `seems too low'. In Williams, 566 So.2d at 1191, this Court held that a $200,000.00 punitive award for bad faith refusal to pay a life insurance claim was not excessive even though it amounted to 5 1/4% of the insurance companies' net worth because the record showed: (1) egregious breach by both Andrew Jackson and its agents of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) attempted use of Willie's financial dire straits, lack of sophistication, and inferior bargaining position as a settlement leverage; (3) acts of fraud; and (4) general cavalier treatment of Willie. 566 So.2d at 1190. In Valley Forge, we upheld a $1,000,000.00 punitive award which amounted to 1.5% of the company's net worth stating that [g]iven the egregiousness of Valley Forge's conduct in holding up Tina's recovery for her injuries, as well as the serious actual damages suffered, it cannot be said that this award was so excessive as to evidence passion, bias, or prejudice on the part of the chancellor. 620 So.2d at 541. In Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Peavy, 528 So.2d 1112 (Miss. 1988), this Court upheld a $250,000.00 punitive award where the actual damages amounted to only $412.20 because of the insurer's wrongful denial of waiver of life insurance premium benefits. The award was less than two tenths of one percent of Independent Life's net worth and the court stated the award was not excessive in light of the such factors as 1) the amount necessary to punish and deter the wrongdoer, 2) the amount necessary to deter others, and 3) Independent Life's financial worth. In Mutual Life Ins. v. Estate of Wesson, 517 So.2d 521 (Miss. 1987), a case heavily relied upon by Dixie, the net assets of the insurer were $8 billion; however, this court reduced an $8,000,000.00 punitive award to $1,500,000.00. The Court stated there were no terrible personal injuries sustained by the victims, rather that this was a bad faith claim with no personal injuries or actual damages other than the policy limits of $87,000.00. The punitive damages award was ninety-two (92) times the amount of actual damages. The Court held, after examining other bad faith claims cases and applying the appropriate standards, that the award was excessive and a remittitur was warranted. In the case sub judice there were no personal injuries whatsoever. At least up until the scratch sheet with 69 Dodge wrecker was found during the discovery process, Dixie had an arguable reason to deny the claim. The only detriment that the Mooneyhans suffered was that Mooneyhan, a mechanic, had to repair the truck himself. Although Dixie filed a counter claim against the Mooneyhans there was never any attempt to use the Mooneyhans' lesser bargaining power to try and settle the case. Mooneyhan testified that after turning the case over to his attorneys he let them handle it. The $1,000,000.00 punitive damages award was 1.675% of Dixie's net assets in 1990 and 1,875 times actual damages. The punitive damages awarded in this case were excessive and we refuse to enforce the award. Instead of imposing a remittitur in this case we remand for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages only. We do this because of the possibility of substantial prejudice to the jury as a result of their receiving the altered scratch sheet attached to exhibit P-3.