Opinion ID: 1444402
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count Eleven C: Tippets Matter

Text: On September 14, 1993, Deborah Tippets appeared before petitioner on a charge of shoplifting four packages of developed film. Her attorney, Kimberly Fletcher, suggested a disposition of informal diversion. After some discussion of the facts of the case and Tippets's explanation, petitioner suggested a one-year dispo and have her do some things. Fletcher indicated that the proposal was acceptable. The district attorney then suggested payment of $150 in court costs as well. Tippets indicated she could not afford that amount. Petitioner responded: Well, one minute you tell us you're wealthy and can pay for stuff, and the next minute, you say ... you can't pay $150.00 fine. After Tippets explained that she had just moved, petitioner abruptly declared: All right. Let's set it for trial, then. Tippets and Fletcher then attempted to explain Tippets's financial situation. Petitioner seemed to ignore these comments, responding by simply asking: When do you want to try it? After petitioner immediately repeated this question, Fletcher stated: I'm going to have to [disqualify] you, your Honor. I think there's some animosity here. Fletcher later explained to the Commission that she based her action on her perception that petitioner had gotten angered by [Tippets's] comments... that she couldn't even afford $150, and lost patience. [Fletcher] was concerned it would be difficult at this time for [petitioner] to be impartial, given the long conversation with [Tippets] at that point. Fletcher was also acting on what [she] perceived [were petitioner's] feelings about single women with kids out of wedlock [and] interracial [children]. Petitioner replied: There's no animosity. I'm trying to settle the case. Fletcher started to reply, when petitioner interjected: [I]f you don't want me to get involved in settling cases, then I won't. But you get me involved. And then as soon as I get involved in it, then you say, `Oh, we're going to have to [disqualify] you' because I'm trying to encourage settlement. According to the court reporter's notation in the hearing transcript, petitioner was yelling at this point. The reporter testified before the special masters that her practice was to indicate in the transcript the demeanor of the person speakinghere that petitioner was yelling [w]hen it was so out of the ordinary. In his testimony, petitioner confirmed that he probably was yelling when he made this statement. Petitioner also testified that, in his view, he had been trying to help Fletcher persuade Tippets to take the plea offer, and that he was shocked that Fletcher suddenly turned against him by mentioning disqualification. After petitioner and Fletcher discussed Tippets's comments regarding her ability to pay for the allegedly stolen film and her inability to pay the suggested fine, petitioner asked whether Tippets had made a statement to the store security guard. The district attorney replied she had told the security guard she put the film under [a] blanket because [her] baby's bottle was leaking, and she didn't want the liquid on the photographs. As Tippets attempted to speak, petitioner interrupted and exclaimed: Inconsistent. Inconsistent. Contrary to petitioner's exclamation, Tippets's statement to the security guard was consistent with the explanation she gave petitioner earlier in the hearing. [17] Fletcher apparently tried to explain this fact, and to suggest that petitioner's comment supported her concern that petitioner felt animosity toward Tippets. Nevertheless, petitioner continued: I've been in this job for 35 years. I can tell when people have a little bit of shaky background as far as their position. And if ... they're changing statements and changing reasons why they did something, then it gives you an indication that maybe there was an intent there. According to petitioner, he was expressing his view that neither he nor a jury would believe Tippets's explanation and that she would be convicted. As Fletcher attempted to respond, petitioner continued: But if you don't want me to get involved in trial settlements anymore, then I won't. [¶] But I try to settle cases to save taxpayers' money and to save her a possibility of going to jail and being convicted of a serious crime. [¶] But if you don't want me to do that, I won't do that anymore. [¶] I won't give you an indicated sentence. [¶] And you can just do your thing. The transcript then shows the following exchange as petitioner and Fletcher argued with each other: MS. FLETCHER: Well, I THE COURT: (Yelling) but I'm getting sick and tired of you ... threatening me with [disqualification]. [para;] And I'm not going to have it anymore. MS. FLETCHER: Then, Your Honor, a simple solution would be not to make these prejudicial statements and THE COURT: (Yelling) then don't get me involved in trial settlements. MS. FLETCHER: misstating her statements. THE COURT: (Yelling even louder) but if you ever threaten a judge in Fresno on a [disqualification], you'll be held in contempt. I guarantee you. MS. FLETCHER: And I can guarantee you that threatening counsel because you have been [disqualified] will get you in trouble with Judicial Council. And that is not contempt. THE COURT: I haven't beenI haven't been [disqualified]. MS. FLETCHER: Well, all we have to do is read this record back. [1] I just moved to do it. THE COURT: Fine. [para;] Oh, you just moved to disqualify me? MS. FLETCHER: Yes. THE COURT: Oh, okay. MS. FLETCHER: Let's set it for trial. And I'm moving THE COURT: I can't set it for trial. Petitioner then set the case for trial before a different judge. Petitioner denied that he was yelling during this exchange. However, the court reporter testified that he was speaking in a [l]oud voice, was rising up or raising forward, and was very angry. In his answer to the Commission charges, petitioner explained: [I] admit[], in retrospect, that [I] was a little too pushy, probably because of [my] lack of confidence in Ms. Fletcher, in convicting [ sic ] her client that the offer was in her best interest. At the time there was not sufficient funds in the county there was a hiring freeze [ sic ], the court was short two clerks out of five authorized, and the need to save money was paramount at the time. With the trial date that week, it was imperative that we reach a settlement on the day in question. On this record, we agree with the Commission's conclusion (by a vote of nine to one) that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct in his handling of the Tippets case. At the time of the Tippets matter, former California Code of Judicial Conduct, canon 3B(4), effective October 5, 1992, provided that [a] judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.... (See now Cal.Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3B(4), as adopted eff. Apr. 15, 1996 [currently imposing same duty].) Petitioner's conduct during the Tippets hearing fell far short of this standard, bringing the judicial office into disrepute. (See Kloepfer, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 857-858, 264 Cal.Rptr. 100, 782 P.2d 239; In re Rasmussen, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 538, 236 Cal.Rptr. 152, 734 P.2d 988; McCartney, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 531-532, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 526 P.2d 268 .) In reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of Attorney Kimberly Fletcher's conduct. We also recognize that [a] court has authority to control courtroom conduct of an attorney that is in flagrant disregard of elementary standards of proper conduct and to temper [counsel's] speech in order `to insure that courts of law accomplish that for which they were createddispensing justice in a reasonable, efficient and fair manner.' [Citation.] ( Hawk v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 108, 123, 116 Cal.Rptr. 713.) Indeed, in 1993, during the Tippets matter, former California Code of Judicial Conduct, canon 3B(4), effective October 5, 1992, also directed a judge to require lawyers to be patient, dignified, and courteous in their courtroom behavior. (See now Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3B(4), as adopted eff. Apr. 15, 1996 [currently imposing same duty].) In performing this duty, `trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant [attorneys] must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case.' ( In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 253-254, fn. 21, 110 Cal.Rptr. 121, 514 P.2d 1201.) However, the record here shows that petitioner responded angrily the very first time Fletcher, understandably concerned that petitioner had become impatient with Tippets, mentioned disqualification. He immediately began yelling at Fletcher about her use of the disqualification procedure. After expressing his view that Tippets's explanation was not credible, petitioner returned to the disqualification issue, again yelling at Fletcher that he was sick and tired of her disqualification threats and was not going to have it anymore. [18] The situation then escalated, with Fletcher asserting that petitioner could avoid being disqualified by refraining from making prejudicial and inaccurate statements, petitioner yelling in reply that Fletcher should not get him involved in settlements and that another court would treat her disqualification threat as contempt, and Fletcher answering that threatening counsel in response to a disqualification motion would get [petitioner] in trouble with Judicial Council. Although we do not condone Fletcher's conduct, viewing the incident in its entirety, we conclude that petitioner's behavior in response to the disqualification attempt constituted prejudicial misconduct. (See Dodds, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 176, 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 906 P.2d 1260 [judge committed prejudicial misconduct by interrupting and yelling loudly and angrily at counsel and a litigant]; Wenger, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 629, 175 Cal.Rptr. 420, 630 P.2d 954 [judge entitled to take remedial steps in response to counsel's intemperate language committed willful misconduct by misusing contempt power]; Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 14 Cal.3d 678, 706, 122 Cal.Rptr. 778, 537 P.2d 898 [judge improperly used punitive action as first, rather than last, means of controlling proceedings].)