Opinion ID: 1804150
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the Judge Authorized to Enter the Default Judgment?

Text: Under rule 231(a) [i]f a party ... is in default under R.C.P. 230(a) [for failing to serve and file a motion or answer] ... the clerk shall enter that party's default in accordance with the procedures set forth below without any order of court. All other defaults shall be entered by the court. (Emphasis added.) Rule 231(b) provides in relevant part: If the certification [of mailing the ten-day notice] is filed, the clerk on request of the adverse party, must enter the default of record without any order of court. (Emphasis added.) In this case, the clerk did not enter the default; the judge did. Sullins contends the only authorization for a judge to enter a default is under the last sentence of rule 231(a), which states [a]ll other defaults shall be entered by the court. Sullins argues that, as this is not one of the other defaults, the court acted without authority. Some insight into the background of rule 231(a) may be found in a committee comment to an earlier version of the rule, explaining why the clerk is authorized to enter defaults: Only a few counties in this state have a judge of the District Court continuously present so that defaults can be promptly entered at all times. Therefore, it was necessary to provide some other method for entering defaults, in order that all counties might be adequately served. It was felt that the Clerk of Court was the logical and proper person to do this. Iowa R. Civ. P. Ann. 231 cmt., at 442 (3d ed.1970). The provision for entry of defaults by the clerk was obviously designed to expedite default-judgment entries, not to frustrate them. Construing rule 231 to prohibit judges from exercising concurrent authority to enter default judgments would frustrate the purpose of the rule. According to an attorney general's opinion, the act of entering defaults has always been one of the proper functions of the Court or Judge, and while this power has now been partially delegated to the Clerk of the District Court, in so doing, we do not believe that it was the intention of the Legislature to deprive the Court of its inherent power ... to also enter the default.... 1946 Op. Iowa Att'y Gen. 170, 171. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) similarly authorizes the clerk to enter a default. One authority has said [t]he fact that Rule 55(a) gives the clerk authority to enter a default is not a limitation on the power of the court to do so. 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2682, at 19 (1998); see also Downing v. O'Brien, 325 A.2d 526, 528 (Me.1974), overruled on other grounds by Architectural Woodcraft Co. v. Read, 464 A.2d 210, 212 & n. 5 (Me.1983); Rogers v. Lyle Adjustment Co., 70 N.M. 209, 372 P.2d 797, 798-99 (1962). The action of the clerk in entering a judgment under terms dictated by statute is merely ministerial. Downing, 325 A.2d at 527. In this case, the court as well as the clerk had authority to enter the default. We have considered the remaining issues raised by Sullins but find no merit in any of them and conclude they do not warrant discussion. We find no error in the proceeding of the district court and therefore affirm. AFFIRMED.