Opinion ID: 2553189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admission of Co-Defendant Dubose's Statement

Text: Appellant claims that the trial court erred in admitting co-defendant Dubose's statement to Toyer. Toyer had asked Dubose how was two people been together and they left out the door at the same time but then only one person got shot? Toyer, adopting her grand jury testimony, responded [h]e said because the tattoo man ran, because the tattoo man got hit with a bat and ran down the bottom of our steps by going to the basement of our building. Toyer then asked Dubose how he knew what had happened, and Dubose responded [b]ecause I was in the building across the street looking. Appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting this hearsay statement as a statement against penal interest and because it clearly implicated Matthews in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). In Thomas v. United States, 978 A.2d 1211 (D.C.2009), we set out the proper inquiry for determining whether a co-defendant's out-of-court statement inculpating his co-defendants was properly admitted and, if so, whether the nondeclarant co-defendant's interests were adequately protected. First, we must determine whether the declarant co-defendant's statement was testimonial in nature, implicating the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 1225; see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). [I]f a defendant's extrajudicial statement inculpating a co-defendant is testimonial, Bruton requires that it be redacted for use in a joint trial to protect the co-defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. . . . Thomas, supra, 978 A.2d at 1224 (emphasis in original). If, however, the defendant's statement is not testimonial, Bruton does not apply. . . . Id. at 1225 (emphasis in original). Even if a statement is not testimonial, and therefore outside the Bruton rule, the trial judge is still bound by Criminal Rule 14 to take adequate steps to reduce or eliminate any prejudice arising from joinder. Carpenter v. United States, 430 A.2d 496, 503 (D.C.1981). Specifically, we held, `Rule 14 requires that the trial court take appropriate steps to minimize the prejudice inherent in codefendant confessions which are inadmissible against the nondeclarant defendant' even when the declarant is available for cross-examination. Thomas, supra, 978 A.2d at 1223-24 (quoting Carpenter, supra, 430 A.2d at 502). A defendant's non-testimonial out-of-court statement therefore remains a candidate for redaction (or other remedial measures) under Criminal Rule 14 unless it fits within a hearsay exception rendering it admissible against the nondeclarant co-defendant. Id. at 1225. In this case, however, we need not determine whether Dubose's statement was testimonial, or whether his statement satisfied the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest because we find that Dubose's statement did not implicate Matthews. Our case law concerning Confrontation Clause issues and Rule 14 prejudice issues assumes that a co-defendant's out-of-court statement implicates his other co-defendants. For example, our discussion in Thomas presupposed a defendant's extrajudicial statement inculpating a co-defendant. Id. at 1224 (emphasis added). Moreover, in Carpenter, analyzing a trial court's duties to prevent prejudice pursuant to our Rule 14, we stated, [t]he admission of those portions of a codefendant's statement that contain inadmissible, incriminating references to a nonconfessing defendant is properly disfavored. Carpenter, supra, 430 A.2d at 505 (emphasis added); see also Thomas, supra, 978 A.2d at 1225 (Whether or not it is testimonial, a defendant's extrajudicial statement directly implicating a co-defendant is equally susceptible to improper use by the jury against that co-defendant. (emphasis added)). Thus, our line of cases concerning potential prejudice from the admission of a co-defendant's out-of-court statement applies only when the co-defendant's statement somehow implicates his fellow co-defendants. That is not the case here. Appellant argues that the portion of Dubose's statement stating, the tattoo man got hit with a bat should have been excised from Toyer's testimony because [i]n context, Dubose [ sic ] statement could only refer to Matthews. This is exactly the kind of contextual approach rejected by the Supreme Court in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). As explained in Plater v. United States, Richardson rejected the `contextual implication' doctrine for determining whether the admission of a declarant co-defendant's statement implicates the nondeclarant co-defendant. [4] 745 A.2d 953, 960 (D.C.2000). [W]here a defendant's name and any reference to the defendant's existence are eliminated from the co-defendant's extrajudicial statement, the statement is properly admitted, with limiting instructions, regardless of any inference of the defendant's guilt that arises when the statement is linked with other evidence presented at trial. Id. As the Supreme Court reasoned, [w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence. Richardson, supra, 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702. [5] The trial court found that Dubose's statement was not in any way inculpatory with respect to Mr. Matthews, and we agree. There was no reference to Matthews in Dubose's statement. He did not name Matthews or refer to him by any nickname. Dubose's passive statement that he witnessed the tattoo man got hit with a bat does not identify any assailant at all, much less Matthews. There was simply nothing here to redact. Dubose's statement does not incriminate a nondeclarant co-defendant on its face, either explicitly or by direct and obvious implication. Thomas, supra, 978 A.2d at 1235 (emphasis omitted). Dubose's statement was clearly admissible against Dubose, the declarant, as an admission of a party opponent. See Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 115-16 (D.C.2003). Additionally, Dubose's statement was admitted only against Dubose. The trial court instructed the jury twice, once immediately after Toyer's testimony and once again after the close of trial, that the statement could be used only to assess Dubose's responsibility for the crime, not Matthews's. Thus, because Dubose's statement did not implicate Matthewsthereby allaying any confrontation or prejudice concernsand the trial court twice instructed the jury that Toyer's testimony about Dubose's statement could be used only in assessing Dubose's guilt or innocence, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting Dubose's statement to Toyer.