Opinion ID: 2967814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Continuance claim

Text: Hill asserts in his Petition that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to present his defense to the indictment in refusing HILL v. OZMINT 9 to grant a continuance from Saturday evening until Monday morning so that he could introduce Dr. Cain’s testimony and an enhanced version of Guerry’s final radio transmission.5 The Supreme Court of South Carolina summarily denied the Continuance claim, and the district court ruled that the claim had been procedurally defaulted. We have issued a COA on this claim. Although we agree with Hill’s contention that he has preserved his right to assert the Continuance claim, the state court’s resolution of it was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and we therefore decline to award habeas corpus relief on this claim.
As background, we review the factual predicate for this claim. At 5:40 p.m. on Friday, October 27, 1994 — the fifth trial day — the State informed the court that it had exhausted its available witnesses. Because its final four witnesses would not be available until Saturday morning, the State sought an overnight recess. The court granted the continuance, and the trial was recessed until 9:00 a.m. on Saturday morning. In moving for a continuance, the prosecution stated that it was likely to rest its case on Saturday morning. Hill’s lawyers, however, had anticipated that the State’s case-in-chief would last at least through Saturday. Accordingly, they had planned to begin Hill’s defense no earlier than Monday of the following week. On Friday, after receiving notice that the prosecution would probably rest its case the next day, Hill’s lawyers altered their plans and prepared to present defense witnesses on Saturday afternoon. As discussed above, Hill asserted that Cribb had also been in the Honda at the time of the incident and that Cribb had shot Major Guerry. In support of this assertion, the defense contends that, in the 5 The Sixth Amendment provides that an accused has the right to a speedy and public trial[;] to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor[;] and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Pursuant to this provision of the Constitution, an accused has a fundamental right to present a defense to a criminal charge. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 856-57 (1975). 10 HILL v. OZMINT garbled post-shooting radio transmission to headquarters, Guerry actually said they shot me rather than -eh shot me. The defense had retained Dr. Cain, a forensic tape analyst from Wisconsin, to enhance the recording of Guerry’s final transmission. Dr. Cain’s expert testimony was to establish the foundation for admission of the enhanced recording, which Hill hoped would convince the jury that Guerry had said they shot me. On Friday, October 27th, the defense contacted Dr. Cain, who was in Nevada attending a conference with an assistant. Dr. Cain advised Hill’s lawyers that he would complete his business in Nevada and fly to Georgetown either that evening or Saturday morning. After Dr. Cain purchased his airline ticket for Georgetown, however, his assistant became violently ill, collapsed, and was rushed to a hospital. As a result, Dr. Cain was unable to leave Nevada, and he thus informed the defense late on Friday evening that he could not be in Georgetown to testify on Saturday.6 When the trial court convened on Saturday morning, Hill’s lawyers informed the judge that they would be unable to present Dr. Cain’s testimony until Monday, and they thus moved for the trial to be continued until Monday morning. The court reserved ruling on the continuance motion in order to see how the trial progressed. After presenting its final witness, the State rested its case at about noon on Saturday. By 4:40 p.m. that afternoon, Hill’s lawyers had exhausted their available witnesses, and the defense team had been unable to secure Dr. Cain’s presence. Thus, the defense renewed its motion for a continuance, seeking to have the trial continued until Monday morning when Dr. Cain would be available to testify. The court denied the one-day continuance, stating that it: simply cannot wait until Monday morning. It is Saturday. According to my [watch] it is approximately twenty-two [until] five, and the court declines to recess the trial until Monday morning. Hill’s defense thus rested its case without presenting Dr. Cain’s testimony or introducing the enhanced tape of Guerry’s final radio transmission. 6 On Saturday morning, Dr. Cain advised Hill’s lawyers that his assistant’s condition had improved, and that he could testify on Monday. HILL v. OZMINT 11
In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Hill maintained that, in denying his continuance motion, the trial court contravened his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. The court summarily rejected that claim, relying on State v. Babb, 385 S.E.2d 827 (S.C. 1989), for the proposition that the denial of a motion for a trial continuance will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice. Hill, 501 S.E.2d at 128. In his Petition, Hill again contends that the trial judge violated the Sixth Amendment in denying his continuance motion. The district court rejected the Continuance claim on the basis that, because the Supreme Court of South Carolina’s ruling rested on state law, the claim had been procedurally defaulted and could not be raised in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.7 Order at 8-10. We have issued a COA on this claim. Hill raises several subissues with respect to his Continuance claim. First, he asserts that the district court erred in deciding that the claim had been procedurally defaulted. Second, he maintains that there was no state court adjudication on the merits, and that we should therefore review the Continuance claim de novo. Finally, Hill contends that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court’s ruling contravened his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. We examine each of these subissues in turn.
First, we agree with Hill that the district court erred in ruling that the Continuance claim was procedurally defaulted. It is true, of course, that when a state court has declined to consider [a claim’s] merits on the basis of an adequate and independent state procedural rule, Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 183 (4th Cir. 2000), federal habeas corpus review of that claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice, or otherwise show that the failure 7 For purposes of the Continuance claim and the Holbrook claim, we use the term state court to refer to the Supreme Court of South Carolina. With respect to Hill’s final claim, i.e., the IAC claim, our use of state court refers to the PCR Court. 12 HILL v. OZMINT to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). In this instance, however, the state court did not dispose of the Continuance claim on the basis of a state procedural rule. Rather, it considered the merits of the claim, ruling that, under South Carolina law, the denial of [a] motion for continuance will not be disturbed absent clear abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice. Hill, 501 S.E.2d at 128. Applying this standard to the Continuance claim, the court found no reversible error. In short, the state court did not determine that Hill had procedurally defaulted his Continuance claim; it rejected the claim on its merits.
Hill next asserts that, even though the state court rejected the Continuance claim, we should nevertheless review the claim de novo because the state court failed to address and rely on the relevant Supreme Court precedents. In other words, Hill contends that, because the state court referenced only state law in resolving this claim, it failed to adjudicate it on the merits. Contrary to this assertion, a state court may adjudicate a claim on the merits without relying on or citing relevant Supreme Court precedents. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S. Ct. 362, 365 (2002) (applying AEDPA deference to claim that state court disposed of without citing controlling Supreme Court precedent; thus implicitly concluding that claim was adjudicated on merits); see also Cook v. McCune, 323 F.3d 825, 830-31 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that, under Early, state court decision was entitled to deference under AEDPA even though Sixth Amendment claim was reviewed under state law rather than relevant Supreme Court authority). In this situation, the state court, in rejecting Hill’s claim, adjudicated it on the merits, regardless of whether it referenced relevant federal law. We must therefore apply AEDPA’s deferential standard of review in our assessment of this claim. That is, we limit our review to deciding whether the state court’s adjudication was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
In assessing the Continuance claim, we must first identify the legal standards applicable to a defendant’s contention that a trial court vioHILL v. OZMINT 13 lated the Constitution in refusing to grant a continuance. A defendant must satisfy two elements in order to secure relief on such a claim. First, he must establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his continuance motion. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588-89 (1986); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1964). Although a matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, a trial court is not entitled to deny a continuance because of a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589. Second, to be entitled to relief, the defendant must establish that the trial court’s erroneous ruling prejudiced his defense. United States v. Colon, 975 F.2d 128, 13031 (4th Cir. 1992). In its resolution of Hill’s direct appeal, the state court failed to provide the rationale for its decision to deny relief, and we are unable to ascertain whether its ruling was premised on the abuse of discretion issue or on the prejudice issue. Accordingly, we are obliged to independently review the record and decide whether the state court’s rejection of the Continuance claim was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.’ Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 157-58 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254). In this situation, we are necessarily troubled by the trial court’s refusal to continue Hill’s murder trial from Saturday evening to Monday morning. That said, Hill is unable to demonstrate that he was prejudiced thereby. Thus, the state court’s decision in rejecting the Continuance claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. At the time they sought a continuance, Hill’s lawyers provided a credible and compelling justification for the need to delay the trial. They gave the court a reasonable explanation for Dr. Cain’s unavailability; they summarized Dr. Cain’s anticipated testimony and its relevance; and they informed the court that Dr. Cain would be available to testify on Monday morning. The trial court’s refusal to grant Hill’s continuance request also evinces an apparent inequity in the court’s treatment of the parties. Where the prosecution asked for a continuance, it was granted, but when Hill requested one, it was denied. Finally, the trial court’s refusal to grant Hill a continuance appears to have been made arbitrarily. In rejecting the continuance motion, the court merely stated that it simply [could not] wait until Monday 14 HILL v. OZMINT morning. In these circumstances, the denial of Hill’s continuance request seems to have resulted from what the Supreme Court has characterized as a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589. Nevertheless, Hill cannot show that he suffered any prejudice from the trial court’s ruling. To be sure, Hill was precluded from introducing Dr. Cain’s testimony and the enhanced tape, but as Dr. Cain acknowledged during the PCR proceedings, the enhanced tape would not have aided the jury in deciphering Guerry’s garbled transmission. In fact, both the original tape and the enhanced tape were, as the PCR Court found, indecipherable. PCR Order at 8.8 We thus conclude that neither Dr. Cain’s testimony nor the introduction of the enhanced tape would have aided Hill’s defense. See Gardner v. Barnett, 199 F.3d 915, 920 (7th Cir. 1999) (refusing to award relief because denial of continuance did not affect verdict when excluded witness’s testimony would not have aided defense). Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of the Continuance claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.