Opinion ID: 2628535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding costs to Lucerne?

Text: [¶ 58] W.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) provides that, in the absence of a statutory or rule-based exception, costs other than attorney's fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs[.] In turn, U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3) defines allowable costs in civil case. We review a district court's decision regarding the award of costs for abuse of discretion. Meyer v. Hatto, 2008 WY 153, ¶ 25, 198 P.3d 552, 557 (Wyo.2008). To prevail, the party contesting the district court's ruling must show that the court act[ed] in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Id. [¶ 59] The Wilsons' first disagreement with the district court's award of costs is the court's alleged failure to consider their objections thereto. Lucerne filed its certificate of costs on January 5, 2010. The Wilsons filed a response on January 18, 2010, objecting to the award of costs. U.R.D.C. 501(a)(2) requires the court to consider, with or without a hearing, any objections that have been filed. The order approving Lucerne's certificate of costs was filed on April 27, 2010, but it was signed by the district judge on January 6, 2010, the day after the certificate of costs was filed. The date of signing leads the Wilsons to conclude that the district court did not consider their objections, as mandated by U.R.D.C. 501(a)(2). [¶ 60] Without more shown in the record, we cannot conclude that the district court ignored its duty to consider the Wilsons' objections to an award of costs. To the contrary, the fact that the order was not filed until well after both the certificate and the objections were filed indicates that, if the district court inadvertently signed an order that was presented with the certificate, the order was withheld until the court had time to review both documents. The fact that a hearing was not held is neutral because no hearing is required by the rule. [¶ 61] U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(B)(ii) allows the taxation of costs for expert witnesses at the rate of $25.00 per day or such other amount as the court may allow according to the circumstances of the case. In their response filed in the district court, the Wilsons objected to the award of expert witness costs to Lucerne's surveyor at the rate of $80.00 per hour, and to the former State Engineer at the rate of $195.00 per hour. In their appellate brief, the Wilsons complain only about the latter. The gist of the Wilsons' complaint is that the State Engineer was a token expert witness and that [h]is testimony falls far short of being of the nature for which any expert witness fees should be awarded. To be blunt, we find no substance to these complaints. Rather than attack the hourly rates as being unreasonable, the Wilsons have chosen to attack the value of the testimony to the final outcome. We have reviewed the trial transcript and it is clear that Lucerne's position was presented largely through the testimony of these two witnesses. Furthermore, their testimony, and their areas of expertise, focused directly on the points at issue during the trial. The Wilsons have not shown that the district court abused its discretion in awarding these costs. [¶ 62] Next, the Wilsons challenge the award of $497.00 as costs for the taking of Mr. Wilson's deposition. The governing rule as to deposition costs is U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(D), which reads as follows: (D) Costs of depositions. (i) Costs of depositions are taxable if reasonably necessary for the preparation of the case for trial. A deposition is deemed reasonably necessary if: I. Read to the jury as provided in Rule 32(a)(3), W.R.C.P.; II. Used at trial for impeachment concerning a material line of testimony (impeachment on a collateral issue does not fall within the scope of this rule); III. Necessarily, and not merely conveniently, used to refresh the recollection of a witness while on the stand; or IV. Was taken at the request of a nonprevailing party. The foregoing are meant to provide guidelines, and are not exhaustive. The use of depositions for trial preparation alone does not justify the imposition of costs. [¶ 63] It is, perhaps, interesting that, under U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(D), the deposition of a party opponent is not automatically considered reasonably necessary for the preparation of the case. Consequently, as with any deposition, the burden must be upon the party seeking the award of costs to justify to the district court that those costs were reasonably necessary for the preparation of the case for trial. Cundy Asphalt Paving Constr. v. Angelo Materials Co., 915 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Wyo.1996) (quoting Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1373 (Wyo.1986)). In the instant case, the record does not reflect any justification for an award of costs for this deposition beyond the bald assertion in the certificate of costs that the deposition was used at trial and the costs were actually and necessarily incurred. Given this dearth of justification, we would be hard-pressed to find that the district court acted reasonably in awarding these costs. See Garrison v. CC Builders, Inc., 2008 WY 34, ¶ 49, 179 P.3d 867, 879-80 (Wyo.2008). [¶ 64] In its appellate brief, Lucerne attempts to justify the award of costs for Mr. Wilson's deposition because the deposition was used at trial to impeach Mr. Wilson on the following question and answer from the deposition: Q. Mr. Wilson, are you trying to require Lucerne to take legal and physical responsibility for the North Platte River as it flows through this area? A. Yes. Lucerne finds significance in this exchange because the district court, in its Order on Location of Easement, made the following finding of fact: 14. Thomas Wilson testified that his goal for a survey is to contain and restrict the area Lucerne can use to transport its water. The evidence showed that such a restriction would be contrary to Lucerne's historic use. [¶ 65] We find none of this persuasive in regard to the award of costs for Mr. Wilson's deposition. The question in the deposition is simply argumentative, and the district court's finding does little more than encapsulate the central trial issue. In short, there is nothing in the record supporting an award of costs to Lucerne for Mr. Wilson's deposition. That portion of the award will be reversed. [¶ 66] Finally, the Wilsons object to the award of costs to Lucerne in the amount of $67.43 for duplication and preparation costs and expenses for documents and exhibits admitted into evidence. The controlling law is found in U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(E), which includes in allowable costs [d]uplicating costs necessarily incurred for documents admitted into evidence. . . . While we are troubled somewhat by the lack of specificity as to this category of costs, by the fact that duplication and preparation costs and expenses may or may not equal duplicating costs, and by the fact that Lucerne apparently provided no further information to the district court upon which it could exercise its discretion, the certificate of costs was verified, and we have held that a verified bill of costs is prima facie evidence that the items listed were necessarily expended and are properly taxable as costs. Garrison, 2008 WY 34, ¶ 45, 179 P.3d at 879. Lucerne asserts in its appellate brief that these costs represent one copy of the exhibits introduced. Even that information supplied to the district court would have been helpful. In the end, however, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding duplication costs.