Opinion ID: 169447
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Function of Pretext under McDonnell Douglas

Text: The question of pretext arises only in the third and final step of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry, after the plaintiff has successfully established a prima facie case of discrimination and the employer has successfully articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. Young v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 468 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir.2006). At this point, the presumption of discrimination created by the plaintiff's prima facie case simply drops out of the picture, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), and [t]he plaintiff then carries the full burden of persuasion to show that the defendant discriminated on the illegal basis of . . . gender. Bryant, 432 F.3d at 1125. Since a plaintiff utilizing the McDonnell Douglas framework normally cannot provide direct evidence of discrimination, a pretext argument provides a method of satisfying this burden by allowing the factfinder to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). A plaintiff shows pretext by demonstrating such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted nondiscriminatory reasons. Plotke, 405 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)). One typical method for a plaintiff to prove pretext is by providing direct evidence that the defendant's stated reason for the adverse employment action was false. Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1230. Another common method is a differential treatment argument, in which the plaintiff demonstrates that the employer treated [the plaintiff] differently from other similarly-situated employees who violated work rules of comparable seriousness in order to show that the employer failed to follow typical company practice in its treatment of the plaintiff. Id. Evidence of pretext may also take a variety of other forms. [A plaintiff] may not be forced to pursue any particular means of demonstrating that [a defendant's] stated reasons are pretextual. Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-88, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989)). However the plaintiff may choose to demonstrate pretext, we have definitively rejected a pretext plus standard; in order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff generally need not provide affirmative evidence of discrimination beyond the prima facie case and evidence that the employer's proffered explanation is pretextual. Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep't, 427 F.3d 1303, 1312 (10th Cir.2005); see also Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1135-36 (10th Cir.2003) (The plaintiff need not show both that the defendant's reasons were a pretext and that the real reason was discrimination  the fact of pretext alone may allow the inference of discrimination.). We do not always require actual evidence of discrimination because, [i]n appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. . . . Moreover, once the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097. [9] However, it is not always permissible for the factfinder to infer discrimination from evidence that the employer's explanation is unworthy of belief. [I]f the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's [adverse employment] decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred, the fact that the employer's explanation was unworthy of belief would no longer be sufficient to create an inference of discrimination. Id. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The same reasoning applies to a plaintiff's attempts to show pretext through evidence of differential treatment; if the employer's differential treatment of similarly-situated employees is trivial or accidental or explained by a nondiscriminatory motive, such treatment is insufficient to create an inference of discrimination. Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1232. This exception to the general rule against pretext plus makes sense because the falsity of an employer's proffered explanation, or the existence of differential treatment, defeats summary judgment only if it could reasonably lead the trier of fact to infer a discriminatory motive; where the evidence of pretext supports only nondiscriminatory motives, such an inference is logically precluded and summary judgment for the employer is appropriate. See Miller v. Eby Realty Group LLC, 396 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir.2005) (In drawing such inference [of unlawful discrimination], the factfinder must be able to conclude, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that discrimination was a determinative factor in the employer's actions  simply disbelieving the employer is insufficient.). In determining whether a plaintiff's evidence of pretext is sufficient to permit an inference of discrimination and thereby avoid summary judgment, the Supreme Court has noted relevant factors includ[ing] the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097. In addition, this court has held that evidence foreclosing a rational factfinder from inferring a discriminatory motive may originate from either the plaintiff or the defendant. For example, we have held that when a plaintiff's evidence supports a nondiscriminatory motive for the employer's action and the plaintiff presents no evidence to undermine that motive, summary judgment for the employer is appropriate. Neal v. Roche, 349 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir.2003) ([I]t is enough [to grant summary judgment for the employer] if the plaintiff concedes a hidden motivation which the court concludes is nondiscriminatory. . . . (emphasis omitted)); Marx v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 76 F.3d 324, 328 (10th Cir.1996) ([I]f a civil rights plaintiff concedes that the real reason for the employer's action was a motive not prohibited under the civil rights laws, such a concession mandates granting of summary judgment to the employer. (citation omitted)); see also Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 n. 14 (10th Cir.1995) ([T]he plaintiff's concession of a lawful motive would take the issue of motive from the jury and preclude the inference of a discriminatory motive. . . .). We have also upheld summary judgment for the employer based on the employer's own alternative, nondiscriminatory explanations, so long as they remain unrebutted and the employer's credibility has not been so damaged as to render such explanations suspect. See Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1309-10 ([A]s a general rule, an employee must proffer evidence that shows each of the employer's justifications are pretexual.) (quoting Tyler v. Re/Max Mountain States, 232 F.3d 808, 814 (10th Cir.2000)). Thus, with these considerations in mind, we proceed to consider Swackhammer's evidence that Sprint's explanation for her termination was pretextual.