Opinion ID: 6358387
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kloiber charges

Text: Brown next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Kloiber charge with respect to Smith and Ellison. A Kloiber charge is appropriate when the accuracy of the testimony of an eyewitness' identification is so doubtful that the Court should warn the jury that the testimony as to identity must be received with caution. Commonwealth v. Kloiber , 378 Pa. 412 , 106 A.2d 820 , 826-27 (1954). A trial judge must provide the instruction where the eyewitness: (1) did not have an opportunity to clearly view the defendant; (2) equivocated on the identification of the defendant; or (3) had a problem making an identification in the past. Commonwealth v. Ali , 608 Pa. 71 , 10 A.3d 282 , 303 (2010). A Kloiber charge is not mandatory [w]here an eyewitness has had 'protracted and unobstructed views' of the defendant and consistently identified the defendant 'throughout the investigation and at trial.'  Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Dennis , 552 Pa. 331 , 715 A.2d 404 , 411 (1998) ). With respect to Smith, the trial court determined that no Kloiber instruction was necessary. Brown challenges the failure of trial counsel to object on two grounds. First, Brown asserts that the distance between Smith and the shooting (approximately forty feet, using Tressel's estimate) left her in a location where it was difficult to get a clear look at the shooter. Brown's Brief at 13. Second, he states that there were inconsistencies in her identification testimony over time. Id. at 13-14. In this regard, Brown asserts that Smith testified that Crawford was shot in the chest, but the medical examiner's testimony revealed that Crawford was shot in the back. Brown also argues that Smith stated at the preliminary hearing that she lost sight of the shooter, but at trial she said she never lost sight of him. Id. at 12. Finally, he contends that in her police statement, Smith stated that she heard four shots, but her testimony regarding the number of shots she heard varied at trial. Id. at 12. Neither argument is meritorious. With respect to the first argument, we have reviewed the apparent discrepancies regarding Smith's distance from the shooter. Smith's trial testimony was unequivocal - that she was four to five feet away from the shooter (close enough to see the blue light emitting from the silver handgun), and that at no time did anything obscure her unobstructed view of Brown's face. N.T., 5/25/2005, at 51. Because Smith had protracted and unobstructed views of the defendant and consistently identified the defendant throughout the investigation and at trial, there was no need for a  Kloiber instruction. See, e.g., Dennis , 715 A.2d at 411 . In support of his contrary assertion, Brown cites to two prior Superior Court decisions, Commonwealth v. Simmons , 436 Pa.Super. 203 , 647 A.2d 568 (1994), and Commonwealth v. McKnight , 307 Pa.Super. 213 , 453 A.2d 1 (1982). We agree with the Commonwealth that those cases have no application in the present circumstance, as they both involved situations where the evidence at trial established that the witnesses had only an obstructed view of the relevant events. See Simmons , 647 A.2d at 570 (There was testimony offered at trial that the shed door could not be seen at all from the location at which the witness claimed he was standing at the time of the crime, and there was evidence that a person leaving from the side door could not be clearly seen.); McKnight , 453 A.2d at 2 (he never saw more than a profile of any of the three). With respect to Brown's second argument, Brown has at best identified certain discrepancies in Smith's identification testimony over time This Court has never required a Kloiber charge, or found counsel ineffective for failing to request one, merely because a witness was uncertain about, or inconsistent with, certain details of the crime. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reid , 627 Pa. 78 , 99 A.3d 427 , 449 (2014) ([T]he need for a Kloiber charge focuses on the ability of a witness to identify the defendant.) (emphasis in original); Ali , 10 A.3d at 303 ; Commonwealth v. Paolello , 542 Pa. 47 , 665 A.2d 439 , 455 (1995) (no Kloiber charge required where inconsistencies in testimony go to witness credibility rather than physical ability to observe the incident). Smith testified that she had an unobstructed view of Brown's face at the time of the shooting, when he ran past, and when she identified him at the time of his arrest. She also never equivocated in her identification of Brown or failed to identify him on any occasion prior to trial. As none of the Kloiber factors are present with respect to Smith, Brown's claim of ineffectiveness on this ground is meritless. We agree with Brown that Ellison's inconsistency in her identification of him at trial, as detailed hereinabove, necessitated a Kloiber charge for this witness. No basis exists for an ineffectiveness claim, however, as the trial court in fact provided such a cautionary instruction to the jury: In her testimony Christina Ellison identified the defendant as the person who committed the crime. There could be a question in this case of whether this identification is accurate. A victim or other witness can sometimes make a mistake when trying to identify the criminal. If certain factors are present, the accuracy of identification testimony is so doubtful that a jury must receive it with caution. Identification testimony must be received with caution if the witness in her testimony is not positive as to identity or if the witness'[ ] positive testimony as to identity is weakened by not identifying the defendant when first asked if she saw in this courtroom the person whom she saw do the shooting. If you believe that either or both of these factors is present in this case, then you must consider with caution the testimony of Christina Ellison identifying the defendant as the person who committed the crime. If, however, you do not believe that either of these factors is present, then you need not receive the testimony from Christina Ellison with caution. You may treat it like ordinary testimony, as a statement of fact. You should consider all evidence relevant to the question of who committed the crime, including the testimony of Christina Ellison. You cannot find the defendant guilty unless you are satisfied,  beyond reasonable doubt, by all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, not only that the crime was committed, but that it was the defendant who committed it. N.T., 5/31/2005, at 196-98 (emphasis added). Brown contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the bolded portion of the instruction on the grounds that once it is determined that a Kloiber charge is necessary, the trial court has an obligation to instruct the jury that it must receive Ellison's identification testimony with caution, rather than leaving it up to the jury to consider how much weight the identification testimony deserves. Brown's Brief at 16 (citing Kloiber , 106 A.2d at 826-27 ). A review of the record, however, reveals that trial counsel did object: [Trial Counsel]: I believe when you were talking about the identification of Christina Ellison, that you - that you - what I wrote down that you said was [that if Ellison identified Brown]; you should believe the testimony of [Ellison]. I believe what you meant to say was that if you believe that she failed to identify him, you should treat the - the testimony of [Ellison] with caution. [the charge was read back by the court reporter] [Trial Counsel]: That's right, Judge. I kind of misheard. It sounded like the way I heard it, it was disjointed. But you did say it; there's no doubt about it. The Court: Okay. [Trial Counsel]: But I would like to say this, Judge: That I kind of think that charge, the way you gave it, you came out and said that [Ellison] identified [Brown] in court. The whole purpose of the charge is to emphasize that she failed to identify him in court. And I'm not too sure that the way that charge is read as a whole - The Court: Well, she didn't fail to identify him. [Trial Counsel]: Well, she did at first. The Court: Well, then she ended up identifying. That's how I gave it .... Your objection is noted. N.T., 5/31/2005, at 204-08. Accordingly, trial counsel did object to the trial court's instruction, arguing that the trial judge had wrongly advised the jury that it could ignore the Kloiber charge if it concluded that Ellison was positive in her identification of Brown and that her subsequent positive identification (on redirect examination) was not weakened by her prior failure to identify him when she was asked (on direct examination) if she saw the shooter in the courtroom. Accordingly, this claim of ineffectiveness is meritless. 18