Opinion ID: 1898380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Did the death-qualification voir dire accord defendant a fair opportunity to identify automatic death-penalty proponents or did it in any way deny defendant his rights to due process and an impartial jury?

Text: Defendant challenges four aspects of the jury selection: (1) that the refusal to permit a more probing death-qualification voir dire denied defendant a fair opportunity to identify automatic death-penalty proponents; (2) that the trial court improperly limited voir dire on prejudice; (3) that the exclusion of five potential jurors because of their reservations about the death penalty was improper absent unambiguous statements of their inability to follow their oaths; and, finally, (4) that the process of death qualification excluded a disproportionate number of women from the jury. Preliminarily, we note that we have consistently reiterated our concern that in capital cases court-conducted voir dire is not an end in itself but merely an efficient means to select an impartial jury. We have encouraged the trial courts in capital cases to be sensitive to permitting attorneys to conduct some voir dire.  State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 30, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987). The general tenor of court-conducted voir dire in this case was that the court, in consultation with counsel, first prepared a questionnaire, which it submitted to all the jurors. That submission of the questionnaire followed a general briefing of jurors in which the court outlined the contours of the case. Defendant claims that the court gave the jurors an easy way out by suggesting to them that they would be disqualified only if [your views] cause you to vote automatically one way or the other without regard to the evidence. But this sentence had been preceded by a balanced discussion about the differing views that jurors might have about the death penalty, the only qualification being that they could follow the court's instructions. The voir dire made it clear that the court applied this test in accordance with correct standards of law. As the jurors were called individually, the court addressed general questions to them concerning their ability to follow the death-penalty law and specific questions with respect to any points highlighted in the questionnaire. The questionnaire itself, which has been provided to us, briefly covered issues of racial bias. During the course of the questioning, several jurors candidly admitted that they possessed such latent traits. No specific instance has been shown in which counsel was denied the opportunity to question individual jurors. As a matter of fact, the trial court sought guidance from counsel about the way in which voir dire would be conducted. At one point in the initial voir dire (before the superseding indictment) the judge discussed the process with counsel and asked them, Is this the way to go? He himself preferred to be more specific in his questioning but acceded to the prosecutor's request not to expand the questioning with specific details of this case lest each side try the case on the voir dire. In the initial voir dire, the court expressed the belief that the system might have worked as well by putting fourteen people in the box without the death-qualification of each person individually. When the court renewed voir dire after the superseding indictment, it acknowledged the prosecutor's suggestion, based on the earlier jury selection, that it was most effective last time by letting the juror, to some degree, lead you to where you want to go  in other words, there should be a flexible approach to the questioning rather than a reading of a set formula. The court used familiar examples for evaluating jurors, such as that one would not evaluate the jurors' attitudes in the same way as when they were mouthing off in John's bar after a softball game. Rather, it would consider whether, having undertaken the solemn obligation to sit, they could justly and impartially administer the death penalty in accordance with law. Moreover, just before the jury was finally seated, the court responded to objections about the voir dire by saying, I hope that the people who take this case on appeal are the same people who are here and not somebody who is not here so that the true facts and the true flavor of the proceedings will be considered by the reviewers. The court stated: This proceeding has not been done by [rote]. If you [defense counsel] have any objection to a specific procedure and make a request to change it, I will act on that. The court explained that it had given the jurors the questionnaire explaining the death penalty in general terms to avoid a reading of it to them in a flat monotone. The court explained that after it had reviewed the questionnaire, I have made a conscious effort to relax them and to draw them out, asking them personal questions about where they had gone to college and so forth. This trial court did not insist on putting all questions to the jurors but said: [M]y practice has been, and I want it clear, my practice has been to turn to counsel in each and every instance and say `open season, go at it.' Now I don't know what else to do. I don't know what else to do. The court referred to one occasion on which it had to stop counsel from what it considered an extensive line of questioning, but on the whole it was tolerant of questioning. Indeed, it said that when it detected that attorneys were getting onto a sensitive line of questioning with a few jurors, I try to pick it up and ask it so that it doesn't look partisan. I also know that    what I mean, you don't want them to get irritated at you. I try to pick up on the line of questioning that you've asked even to the point of throwing in this idea you have asked   . To try to give it a balance and even-handedness. In short, this trial court was quite open to considering the requests of counsel and indeed permitting them to examine witnesses themselves. Defendant raises objections concerning qualification of five jurors. We are satisfied that in each of the instances cited the court concluded, using the Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581 (1980), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed. 2d 841 (1985), test that we have adopted, see Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255-56, 524 A. 2d 188, that the jurors' views on the death penalty would have substantially interfered with the performance of their duty. For example, juror Mary G. had had a very disturbing experience sitting on a jury before in a case in which a man fled from the courtroom following a guilty verdict and drowned, in the juror's eyes, as a suicide victim. As she explained to the court, I would try to be fair but still that would be on my mind. The court concluded, It is quite obvious she doesn't want on her conscience the fact that she had anything to do, even tangentially, with anything that results in the death of another person and I will disqualify her. Another juror was asked by the court, You don't think you could vote for the death penalty? His answer was, No, I don't think so. Other jurors expressed reservations that would have substantially interfered with their duty to administer the capital-punishment law. We have no doubt that the court was fair in its evaluation of jurors. An example was a juror who was scrupled against the death penalty and told the court, I just don't feel right about it, you know. When asked whether he could nonetheless follow his oath, the juror replied, I know what you're trying to say, but just saying a flat yes or no, I just can't give a definite answer. He repeated: I don't know, being in a situation, being able to give a clear answer. I wouldn't want to be in violation of the court. When the prosecutor attempted to disqualify him, the court refused. It answered: That is not the way he feels [unalterably opposed to the death penalty]. I read him right. Anything else? The court found this juror qualified. We agree that court or counsel could have asked additional open-ended questions directed to specific feelings that jurors may have had about capital sentencing or racial bias in the type of case before the court. See State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988) (expressing preference that jurors be questioned about bias in concrete context of case). On balance, however, our review of the record reveals that the overall scope and quality of the voir dire was sufficiently thorough and probing to assure the selection of an impartial jury. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 29, 524 A. 2d 130. Nothing in the process disproportionately excluded women as a class. See State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A. 2d 188.