Opinion ID: 2543334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Telephone Line Transfer:

Text: With respect to the insubordination charge regarding the telephone line transfer, Whittier contends that the request to transfer the Section telephone lines to the CareLine telephone lines was impossible because historically, the lines were kept separate, Whittier's staff did not know how to transfer the lines, and it was unnecessary because another employee was going back to the Section and could answer the Section telephones. The fact Whittier failed to offer this reasoning to Smith at the time shows an intentional disregard of Smith's reasonable order. Simply because his supervisor was not aware of the circumstances prohibiting him from carrying out the order should not preclude his actions from constituting insubordination. Whittier should have communicated to Smith the obstacles preventing him from performing her order. Based on the foregoing, we hold the IPC's findings are based on substantial and competent evidence. Therefore, the decision to dismiss Whittier is affirmed. 2. The findings of fact upholding Whittier's termination support, as a matter of law, the decision to terminate. Idaho Code § 67-5309 affords the IPC broad deference in creating rules regarding the discipline and termination of employees. Idaho Code § 67-5309 provides: The administrator of the division of human resources shall have the power and authority to adopt, amend, or rescind such rules as may be necessary for proper administration of this chapter. Such rules shall include: . . . (n) A rule for the disciplinary dismissal, demotion, suspension or other discipline of employees only for cause with reasons given in writing. Such rule shall provide that any of the following reasons shall be proper cause for the disciplinary dismissal, demotion or suspension of any employee in the state classified service: . . . 2. Inefficiency, incompetency, or negligence in the performance of duties. . . . 4. Refusal to accept a reasonable and proper assignment from an authorized supervisor. 5. Insubordination or conduct unbecoming a state employee or conduct detrimental to good order and discipline in the employee's department. Pursuant to this statute, the IPC adopted IDAPA 15.04.01.190.01. (Formerly IDAPA 28.01.01.190.01). That regulation provides: Cause For Disciplinary Actions. Disciplinary actions, including dismissal, suspension, demotion, or reduction in pay, may be taken against any employee in the state classified service for any of the following causes which occur during the employee's employment: . . . b. Inefficiency, incompetency, or negligence in performing duties. . . . d. Refusal to accept a reasonable and proper assignment from an authorized supervisor. e. Insubordination or conduct unbecoming a state employee or conduct detrimental to good order and discipline in the department. This regulation clearly provides that insubordination is sufficient grounds for termination. However, the degree of insubordination required is not specified. Whittier contends that proper cause for discipline should be real, substantial and compelling, and that an unserious failure to explain or a trivial level of insubordination should not be sufficient as proper cause for termination purposes. In support of this contention, Whittier cites Folks v. Moscow Sch. Dist. No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 933 P.2d 642 (1997). Folks involved a teacher who was discharged for an argument that took place between her and the school principal, using a variety of profane language. The School District denied Folks unemployment compensation and she appealed to the Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission ruled the School District had not met its burden of establishing that Folks was discharged for employment-related misconduct, finding the argument to be an incident of comparatively nonserious disrespect that did not rise to the level of misconduct disqualifying her from the receipt of employment benefits. The Court in Folks noted that although an employer's expectation that an employee will not engage in protracted argument with his employer is objectively reasonable, a single incident of comparatively nonserious disrespect by complaining and arguing is not misconduct. Id. (citing Avery v. B & B Rental Toilets, 97 Idaho 611, 613-14, 549 P.2d 270, 272-73 (1976)). However, the Folks case involves the denial of unemployment benefits, not the termination of employment itself. The rules pertinent to the eligibility of unemployment benefits are different from those applicable to the instant case. The statute relevant to unemployment benefits, I.C. § 72-1366(e), provides that an employee who has been discharged is eligible for unemployment benefits so long as his discharge was not for misconduct in connection with his employment. Misconduct in connection with employment, defined at IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01 (formerly IDAPA 09.01.30.331.01-.03), is: 1) A willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; 2) A deliberate violation of the employer's reasonable rules; or 3) A disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his or her employees. Folks at 837, 933 P.2d at 646. The requirements of the two rules are slightly different. Nothing in IDAPA 15.04.01.190.01 requires more than a single incident of misconduct for dismissal. In fact, the plain meaning of IDAPA 15.04.01.190.01 provides an employee can be terminated for insubordination. On the other hand, IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01 states that an employee discharged for misconduct is ineligible for unemployment benefits compensation. According to Folks and IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01, insubordination in the unemployment context may or may not consist of misconduct in connection with [] employment, depending upon whether the insubordination at hand is found to fit within the definition of discharged for misconduct. Thus, the requirement in Folks requiring more than a single incident of misconduct for the denial of benefits in the unemployment compensation context, is distinguishable from the dismissal requirements in IDAPA 15.04.01.190.01. The DHW cites to two instances of insubordination by Whittier, both of which are based on substantial and competent evidence. Moreover, given the importance of the Section's responsibility to answer calls from members of the public, these are important, not trivial, incidents. 3. Whittier was not denied procedural due process. Public employees in Idaho who have a property interest in continued employment may not be deprived of this property interest without due process of law. Harkness v. City of Burley, 110 Idaho 353, 356, 715 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1986); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494, 501 (1985). Classified employees have a property interest in their continued employment. Fridenstine v. Idaho Dep't of Admin., 133 Idaho 188, 190, 983 P.2d 842, 844 (1999) (citations omitted). Whittier, as Health Policy Section Supervisor, was a classified employee of the State of Idaho. See generally Fridenstine at 190, 983 P.2d at 844. Thus, Whittier may not be deprived of this property interest without due process of law. Due process requires, at a minimum, notice of the contemplated action and the basis and evidence relied upon for the contemplated action, and an opportunity to respond. Arnzen v. State of Idaho, 123 Idaho 899, 904, 854 P.2d 242, 247 (1993); Loudermill at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d at 506. The first element of due process, notice, may be an oral or written notification of the charges against the employee and the basis and evidence supporting those charges. Id. Even though the DHW notified Whittier in writing of its intent to take disciplinary action against him, Whittier argues this is insufficient notice because the DHW's shotgun approach of listing 23 allegations of a violation of Rule 190 does not comply with the spirit of I.C. § 67-5-309(n), requiring notice to the employee of what specific actions support the cause for discipline. The fact that only four, then ultimately two of the charges were sustainable should not be sufficient to find he did not receive adequate notice of the reasons for discipline. The acts listed in the notice were sufficient to inform Whittier of the nature of the charges. Whittier also argues he was only provided with documentation after the Notice of Contemplated Dismissal was issued, specifically 59 documents were not produced by DHW until after the Notice, and 79 documents were produced only two weeks before the scheduled hearing. This argument is essentially the same argument this Court rejected in Fridenstine, 133 Idaho 188, 983 P.2d 842 (1999). In Fridenstine, the employee argued he should have been given all evidence supporting the allegations before the meeting. This Court found no support for this position because due process does not require the proffer of all evidence, but rather notice of the evidence. In support of this, this Court relied on language from Loudermill The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. To require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee. Fridenstine at 191, 983 P.2d at 845 (quoting Loudermill at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d at 506). The Notice of Contemplated Dismissal provided to Whittier contained a detailed account of the charges against him and the basis for those charges. This is sufficient to put him on notice of what he allegedly did wrong. Additionally, [t]he purpose of a pre-termination hearing is not to conclusively establish the propriety of the dismissal. It should be an initial check against mistaken decisionsessentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. Fridenstine at 192, 983 P.2d at 846 (quoting Loudermill at 545-46, 105 S.Ct. at 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d at 506). Basically, something less than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action. Id. Simply because Whittier did not have every piece of evidence he wanted in his possession at the time of his hearing does not mean he failed to have adequate notice. Thus, under the circumstances presented by this case, this Court finds that Whittier was provided sufficient notice of the allegations of misconduct and of the evidence against him to facilitate a meaningful response. The second element of due process, an opportunity to respond, is an opportunity by the employee, either in person or in writing, to present his or her reasons why proposed action should not be taken . . . . Arnzen at 904, 854 P.2d at 247; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d at 506. The opportunity to respond must take place before the administrative action occurs. Thus, Whittier must have been given an opportunity to respond to the charges against him before the State made the decision to terminate him from employment with the Department. We find Whittier did have the opportunity to respond. He did so informally, then with the representation of counsel. Whittier was placed on administrative leave with pay, pending an investigation prior to the decision to terminate him. Whittier argues he was denied a fair opportunity to respond because the DHW only was required to produce those documents that would be used against him, depriving him of other relevant documents or discovery that may have aided in his defense. However, there is no indication that Whittier ever requested any specific information that might have assisted in a defense. Whittier made no showing that further discovery would have assisted him in any way. The IPC found there was no showing that any discovery requested by Whittier would have been relevant to the issues upon which the IPC sustained the DHW's decision to terminate. Additionally, discovery in IPC cases is governed by IDAPA 15.04.01.201. This rule references the Idaho Attorney General's Model Rule of Administrative Procedure 521. Rule 521 provides that discovery is discretionary. Rule 521 provides: WHEN DISCOVERY AUTHORIZED. Parties may agree between or among themselves to provide for discovery without reference to an agency's statutes, rules of procedure, or orders. Otherwise no party before the agency is entitled to engage in discovery unless discovery is authorized before the agency, the party moves to compel discovery, and the agency issues an order directing that the discovery be answered. The presiding officer shall provide a schedule for discovery in the order compelling discovery, but the order compelling and scheduling discovery need not conform to the timetables of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The agency or agency staff may conduct statutory inspection, examination, investigation, etc., at any time without filing a motion to compel discovery. IDAPA Rule 01.11.01.521 (emphasis added). The IPC held the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion regarding discovery, and because there has been no showing otherwise, this Court affirms the hearing officer's decision relevant to discovery. Finally, Whittier claims his substantive due process rights were violated because the dismissal was arbitrary, capricious and pretextual. He argues the shotgun approach of the reasons for his dismissal is evidence of pretext, which can rarely be shown by direct evidence. While Whittier's assertion may be correct that pretext is difficult to prove by direct evidence, he offers no showing of any indirect evidence of pretext. Simply alleging pretext is not sufficient. The DHW argues that insofar as Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581, 726 P.2d 693 (1986) implies that substantive due process rights protect public employment rights, it should be reversed. There is no reason for this Court to decide whether to overrule Pace on these grounds. As noted above, Whittier has not even attempted to meet his burden of showing a substantive due process violation, and it is unnecessary for this Court to make a decision on whether substantive due process does or should protect public employment rights.