Opinion ID: 1743484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Brady Issue Raised by Lykens' Motion for New Trial Should Be Analyzed Under the Bagley Standard.

Text: We recently observed in Shipps, supra, that the State's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In Shipps, we referred to Brady and stated that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or the bad faith of the prosecution. 265 Neb. at 352, 656 N.W.2d 622. Accord Castor, supra . We note that although Brady spoke of the suppression of evidence upon request, the Court in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), made clear that the prosecution's duty under Brady to disclose evidence which is material covers the `no request,' `general request,' and `specific request' cases of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused. See, also, Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (duty to disclose material evidence applicable even though there has been no request by accused and duty may be violated where evidence has been suppressed either willfully or inadvertently). In Bagley, the U.S. Supreme Court considered what evidence is material such that its nondisclosure was prejudicial to the defendant. The standard for materiality set forth in Bagley formed the basis for the  Bagley standard, which standard we have adopted and set forth in cases such as State v. Shipps, 265 Neb. 342, 656 N.W.2d 622 (2003), and State v. Castor, 257 Neb. 572, 599 N.W.2d 201 (1999). In Shipps, we stated: Favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the State, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.... A reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown when the State's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Shipps, 265 Neb. at 352, 656 N.W.2d at 631-32 (citing Castor, supra ). Accord, State v. Faust, 269 Neb. 749, 696 N.W.2d 420 (2005); State v. Van, 268 Neb. 814, 688 N.W.2d 600 (2004); State v. Strohl, 255 Neb. 918, 587 N.W.2d 675 (1999); State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998); State v. Boppre, 234 Neb. 922, 453 N.W.2d 406 (1990); State v. Jackson, 231 Neb. 207, 435 N.W.2d 893 (1989). Notwithstanding our adoption and consistent application of the Bagley standard, the Court of Appeals focused upon incidental language in State v. Atwater, 245 Neb. 746, 752, 515 N.W.2d 431, 435 (1994), which referred to United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), which language stated that when the evidence has been withheld by the prosecutor, the proper standard is that a constitutional error has been committed if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt of guilt that otherwise did not exist. Utilizing this language in Atwater, the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that in cases when the evidence alleged to be newly discovered was withheld by the State, a defendant is entitled to a new trial if the omitted evidence could have created a reasonable doubt that he or she committed the alleged crime or crimes. State v. Lykens, 13 Neb.App. 849, 861, 703 N.W.2d 159, 168 (2005). The reasonable doubt standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Agurs and mentioned in Atwater was superseded in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). We must therefore disapprove Atwater to the extent it can be read to indicate that the reasonable doubt standard of Agurs rather than the Bagley standard is the proper standard to analyze whether evidence was wrongfully withheld by the prosecution. Similarly, we disapprove of the could have created a reasonable doubt language in the Court of Appeals' opinion in Lykens, and reiterate that the Bagley standard is the appropriate framework under which to analyze a Brady issue raised in a motion for new trial.