Opinion ID: 1129433
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: This consolidated proceeding involves a direct appeal after a resentencing and two Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceedings. In 1981, a jury convicted Edward Lonzo McCall (defendant) of two counts of first degree murder and nine other felonies. [1] Defendant was sentenced to death on the two murder counts and to terms of years on the other counts. On appeal, this court affirmed all the convictions and sentences. State v. McCall, 139 Ariz. 147, 677 P.2d 920 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 2670, 81 L.Ed.2d 375 (1984) (hereafter McCall I ). Later, by order of June 12, 1985, we denied review of defendant's first petition for post-conviction relief. Defendant filed a second petition for post-conviction relief claiming: (1) a denial of equal protection predicated on the court's denial of a severance from his co-defendant Robert Cruz; (2) application of the wrong standard of proof as to aggravating circumstances; and (3) ineffectiveness of counsel at sentencing and during the pendency of his first petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court denied the first two claims but granted relief on the third, as a result of which a resentencing was ordered. The trial court's denial of relief on the equal protection claim is now before us for review. At the resentencing, defendant was again sentenced to death on the murder charges and to terms of years on the other charges. The propriety of these sentences is before us on defendant's direct appeal following resentencing. Following resentencing and the death of the trial judge, defendant filed a third petition for post-conviction relief requesting discovery and an evidentiary hearing to inquire into the trial judge's mental competence at the time of the resentencing. Denial of relief on that third petition for post-conviction relief is also before us for review. Following oral argument in these consolidated matters, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), which held the Oklahoma statutory aggravating circumstance, especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, to be unconstitutional as there applied. Because of Maynard, we requested supplemental briefing in this case to assist us in determining what effect, if any, Maynard has on this case. The last supplemental brief was filed December 21, 1988. We have jurisdiction under Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3), A.R.S. § 13-4031, and Ariz.R. Crim.P. 32.9(c), 17 A.R.S. ISSUES PRESENTED 1. Was defendant denied equal protection of the laws by not being granted a trial separate from his co-defendant, Robert Cruz? 2. Did the trial court improperly consider defendant's failure to testify at trial or at resentencing? 3. Was the trial court justified in finding that two statutory aggravating circumstances existed? 4. What is the effect of Maynard v. Cartwright , if any, on the death penalty imposed in this case? 5. Did the trial court err by finding no mitigating factors? 6. Does the record support the factual findings necessary to death-qualify the defendant under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987)? 7. Was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel at his resentencing? 8. Did the trial court err by imposing aggravated, consecutive sentences on some of the non-murder counts? 9. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by dismissing defendant's third petition for post-conviction relief without permitting discovery and without holding an evidentiary hearing concerning the sentencing judge's mental competence? 10. Does our independent review of the evidence and our proportionality review of the sentence support imposition of the death penalty? We acknowledge that defendant has also again challenged the constitutionality of Arizona's death penalty statute. His challenge is twofold: first, he contends the statute denies him the right to trial by jury; second, he contends the statute is unconstitutional because it gives no guidance as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance and lacks standards for balancing aggravating and mitigating factors. These constitutional issues were resolved against defendant in McCall I. Defendant's challenge has been refined from the time of his first appeal by the additional argument that the Arizona Constitution's right of trial by jury is more extensive than that of the United States Constitution. We addressed this issue in State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 226, 700 P.2d 1312, 1326 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094, 105 S.Ct. 2169, 85 L.Ed.2d 525 (1985), and need not revisit it here. With respect to the jury trial issue, we acknowledge that the majority of the Ninth Circuit reached a result contrary to ours in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.1988). To apply Adamson would run counter not only to our cases, but also, we feel, to United States Supreme Court cases. Accordingly, as we recently noted, we decline to follow Adamson at this time but will, of course, follow and apply it if it is upheld by the United States Supreme Court. See State v. Vickers, 159 Ariz. 532, 543 n. 2, 768 P.2d 1177, 1188 n. 2 (Ariz.Sup.Ct. 1989).