Opinion ID: 2802804
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Sixth Amendment Right to Present a Defense

Text: Miller also claims that the “trial court’s erroneous exclusion of defense evidence constitutes a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.” “Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to offer testimony of witnesses in his favor.” Feaster v. United States, 631 A.2d 400, 405 (D.C. 1993); see also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (“The Framers of the Constitution did not intend [in the Sixth Amendment] to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use.”) “[T]he Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to 4 Although the trial court appears to have based its ruling primarily on the timing of the Rule 16 response, we need not decide whether that alone would suffice to sustain the ruling. Here, the content of the Rule 16 disclosure is inadequate as a matter of law. Thus, we need not consider remanding on that point. Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361-67 (D.C. 1979). 11 promote.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 325-26 (2006) (the constitutional right to “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense . . . is abridged by evidence rules that . . . are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.”). Rule 16 serves a “legitimate purpose,” and the exclusion of defense evidence in this case was not “disproportionate to the ends that [Rule 16 is] asserted to promote.” Id. Certainly the absence of visible injury, if such would exist that long afterwards if she in fact suffered the trauma she described, would have helped to establish Miller’s innocence. However, due to the nature of the notice given, we cannot discern what Dr. Rotolo would have testified, and whether that evidence would have been of meaningful significance. The discovery and trial preparation process in Miller’s case had dragged on and on. J.G. had been forced to come to court on multiple occasions, and then been sent home each time without testifying. Not only was the notice deficient in its content, its timing also posed an impermissible burden on the government. Finally, defense counsel all but conceded in closing arguments that if J.G. had been raped as she alleged, two years earlier, forensic investigation would not have been able to verify her story. In light of these 12 facts, we cannot say that enforcing Rule 16 to bar Dr. Rotolo’s testimony was “arbitrary,” or “disproportionate to the ends that [Rule 16 is] asserted to promote.” Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to exclude Dr. Rotolo’s testimony did not violate the Sixth Amendment. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).