Opinion ID: 2996764
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Huebner asserts that the lower court improperly relied on incredible testimony of the government’s witnesses in order to find probable cause. He points to the inconsistencies in the officers’ account of events leading up to his arrest to support his assertion, including Harris’s and Yoshimura’s discrepant testimony before the magistrate regarding Cardella’s location on June 20, as well as Yoshimura’s and No. 02-3504 9 Maher’s conflicting testimony presented to the district judge concerning which officer confirmed the information provided by Cardella. Huebner further argues that the officers’ credibility was undermined by the fact that none of them could recall the phone number the informant called to set up the controlled buy, nor was that number ever recorded or independently verified as belonging to the defendant. The district court found the officers’ testimony to be credible and concluded that the inconsistencies in their testimony were immaterial to the issue of whether there was probable cause to stop, arrest, and search the defendant and his vehicle. We review for clear error a trial judge’s credibility deter- mination based upon testimony presented during a suppression hearing. United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 2002). Under the clear error standard of review, “a district judge’s credibility determination will not be dis- turbed unless it is completely without foundation.” United States v. Salyers, 160 F.3d 1152, 1162 (7th Cir. 1998). We afford this deference to the trial judge insofar as he “has the best ‘opportunity to observe the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the subject’s reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements,’ as well as confused or nervous speech patterns in contrast with merely looking at the cold pages of an appellate record.” United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1497 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1124 (7th Cir. 1992)); accord United States v. Quintanilla, 218 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2000). After reviewing the record, we refuse to disturb the district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress because there were myriad reasons to accept the officers’ testimony as credible, including their consistent testimony regarding the following: the drug transaction set to occur at 10 No. 02-3504 the Brat Stop; the confidential informant’s prediction of Huebner’s activities on the day of his arrest; and the independently corroborated background information furnished by Cardella. Moreover, although the defendant nitpicks the record and points out minor inconsistencies amidst the officers’ otherwise consistent testimony, we have previously warned litigants challenging credibility determinations that “[t]estimony is not incredible as a matter of law . . . only because the witness may have been impeached by certain discrepancies in his story, by prior inconsistent statements, or by the existence of a motive to provide evidence favorable to the government.” United States v. Scott, 145 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). Rather, this Court must accept testimony deemed credible “ ‘unless it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it.’ ” United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Yusuff, 96 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1996)). Thus, particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence discussed infra that Huebner was engaged in illicit activity, we refuse to second guess the lower court’s credibility determination and we are confident that the court’s credibility judgment was not clearly erroneous.
Huebner next argues that law enforcement officers lacked probable cause to arrest and search him and his vehicle. This Court “review[s] the probable cause determination involved in the district court’s denial of [Huebner’s] motion to suppress de novo.” United States v. Mounts, 248 F.3d 712, 714-15 (7th Cir. 2001). In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the task of determining the existence of probable cause “is simply to make a No. 02-3504 11 practical, common-sense decision whether, given all of the circumstances set forth . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”2 Id. at 238; accord Driebel v. City of Milwaukee, 298 F.3d 622, 643 (7th Cir. 2002). In Gates, the Supreme Court held that a highly detailed tip from an anonymous informant that was corroborated by independent police work established probable cause. 462 U.S. at 246; see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (stating that if “an informant is shown to be right about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity”). In White, the Court then set forth the proper approach for analyzing whether an informant’s tip establishes probable cause: “if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable.” 496 U.S. at 330-31. Thus, a court must “consider the informant’s information—in amount and in degree of reliability—and the degree of corroboration of that information by the officers.” United States v. Navarro, 90 F.3d 1245, 1253 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Gilbert, 45 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[r]eliability may be shown by the informant’s past record of reliability, [and/or] through independent confirmation or personal observation by the police”). With these principles in mind, we analyze the information possessed by members of the task force when they stopped and searched Huebner’s black Jeep Cherokee. 2 The defendant does not dispute the well-established rule that a warrantless search of an automobile is permissible under the Fourth Amendment when a law enforcement officer has “probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes [contains] contraband.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). 12 No. 02-3504 On three consecutive days, Cardella, the confidential informant, met with police officers concerning Huebner’s illicit activities. On June 19, Cardella provided Chicago police officers—during a live, in-person interview—with detailed information pertaining to his previous drug transactions with the defendant. During the same interview, the informant further revealed that Huebner had recently received 20 kilograms of cocaine. On June 20, he directed the officers to Huebner’s Chicago condominium and place of business. And on June 21, Cardella set up the controlled buy that resulted in Huebner’s arrest. Furthermore, the informant provided the authorities with detailed background information concerning the defendant—including Huebner’s name and physical description; the location of his Chicago condominium, Lake Geneva residence, and Chicago place of business; and a description of his vehicles—which police officers extensively corroborated through independent investigation. The information Cardella furnished was consistent with tips from other confidential informants, who had previously disclosed to Chicago police officers that an owner of a Webster Avenue art gallery named “Andy” dealt cocaine. The informant also knew that Huebner would be at his Lake Geneva house on the day of his arrest and he further predicted the locations at which Huebner would agree to conduct the drug transactions, including the Deerfield, Illinois, health club and the Kenosha, Wisconsin, Brat Stop. Additionally, prior to arresting Huebner, the agents conducted surveillance of the defendant that, when considered in conjunction with the information the officers had received from Cardella, was clearly sufficient to warrant a law enforcement officer of “reasonable prudence” to believe that Huebner was engaged in illicit, drug dealing activity. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996); United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1996). No. 02-3504 13 Consistent with the informant’s predictions, on the day of the controlled buy, agents observed Huebner leaving his residence and stopping at another location very close to his home. Insofar as Huebner’s actions mirrored Cardella’s prediction of this event, it became clear that Cardella indeed possessed “inside information,” further establishing his reliability. See Navarro, 90 F.3d at 1253. Officers next observed the defendant at the storage facility for five minutes.3 In light of Cardella’s tip that Huebner stored cocaine near his Lake Geneva residence, this “seemingly innocent activity” was properly deemed suspicious by the observing officers. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts.”); United States v. McClinton, 135 F.3d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir. 1998); Navarro, 90 F.3d at 1253. At 3:00 p.m., officers witnessed the defendant as he began to drive out of the storage facility. The Brat Stop was about 30 minutes away and the controlled buy was scheduled for 3:30 p.m. Thus, Huebner was on schedule to arrive at the controlled buy at the appointed time. When considered along with the totality of the circumstances known to the task force at the time, Huebner’s activities that afternoon 3 Although the task force did not observe Huebner place narcotics in his Jeep Cherokee, we stated in Navarro that this was of no consequence: “The fact that agents did not see the cocaine placed in the [vehicle] does not diminish the significance of the [confidential informant’s] detailed information . . . . When we consider the detail of the [confidential informant’s information] in the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ taking into account the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge, we readily conclude that the informant proved himself to be reliable about the facts that were corroborated and ‘more probably right about other facts.’ ” 90 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 244). 14 No. 02-3504 “warrant[ed] a well-trained law enforcement officer, exercising reasonable judgment, to believe that a narcotics crime was being [or was about to be] committed.” United States v. Marin, 761 F.2d 426, 432 (7th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, Huebner claims that the informant’s prediction of his future activities lacked the necessary detail, precision, or corroboration by law enforcement officers to constitute probable cause. Huebner’s argument, however, fails in light of this Court’s ruling in Navarro. In Navarro, we applied Fourth Amendment principles to facts similar to the facts in the instant case and held that probable cause existed to stop the defendant’s vehicle based on information, received from a confidential informant, that law enforcement officers had corroborated by observing the defendant’s activities. Navarro, 90 F.3d at 1254-55. In that case, the known confidential informant predicted that Navarro’s codefendant would leave his home in Waukegan, Illinois, and drive to Navarro’s farm in Kenosha County, Wisconsin, to retrieve cocaine before continuing on to Milwaukee. Id. at 1249. The informant identified the co-defendant’s residence and Navarro’s farm. Two other informants provided corroborating information about the co-defendant’s drug dealing activities. Shortly after the informant informed DEA agents that the defendants would soon be involved in a narcotics transaction, agents observed the co-defendant driving from his home to Navarro’s farm, and then stopping at Navarro’s farm before continuing on, with Navarro, toward Milwaukee. The agents stopped the defendants’ vehicle as it neared Milwaukee and a subsequent search of the vehicle yielded three kilograms of cocaine. Prior to trial, Navarro moved to suppress the evidence from the stop and search, arguing that the authorities had acted without probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband, but there, as here, the district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation to deny the No. 02-3504 15 motion. On appeal, we affirmed, holding that “the [informant’s] highly detailed tip, highly reliable in its own right and thoroughly verified by independent police work, provided probable cause for the police to stop the vehicle and to search it for contraband.” Id. at 1254. Huebner attempts to distinguish the instant case from Navarro arguing that probable cause existed in Navarro only because (1) the informant had assisted the police in other cases; (2) the informant knew the location where the cocaine was stored; and (3) the defendant was driving towards Milwaukee, as the informant had predicted, at the time his vehicle was stopped and searched. In contrast, Huebner points out that Cardella was a first-time informant who did not know precisely where the defendant stored his cocaine. In addition, the defendant argues that the task force did not corroborate the informant’s prediction that Huebner was on his way to conduct a drug sale at the Brat Stop because the authorities stopped Huebner before he left the main drive of the mini-storage warehouse. We are unconvinced. Aside from failing to pay heed to the Supreme Court’s repeated warnings that probable cause is not a “finely tuned standard,” Gates, 462 U.S. at 235, but rather a “fluid concept” that takes its “substantive content from the particular context[ ] in which [it is] being assessed,” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, the defendant also ignores that in the present case, just as in Navarro,the informant’s reliability was clearly demonstrated through the highly detailed and extensively corroborated (by police investigation and other informants) information he provided to the authorities, such as his prediction of Huebner’s actions prior to the arrest and his description of the defendant’s homes, business, and vehicles. Thus, Cardella’s allegation, that Huebner dealt illicit drugs, was reasonably trustworthy. See United States v. Ganser, 315 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 2003) (“If an informant is shown to be right about some things, he is probably right about other 16 No. 02-3504 facts that he has alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity.” (internal quotations omitted)). Like Navarro, the trustworthy information in the instant case was “sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Gilbert, 45 F.3d at 1166 (internal quotations omitted); see also Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 1999); Navarro, 90 F.3d at 1254 (“[B]ecause the surveillance preceding the stop corroborated the information from the informant, the law enforcement officers had probable cause for both arrest and search.”). Given the highly detailed and thoroughly corroborated information pertaining to Huebner’s illicit drug dealing activities that law enforcement officers acquired from Cardella—a known, confidential informant—the task force reasonably concluded that there was a “fair probability” that narcotics would be found in the defendant’s Jeep Cherokee at the time he was stopped. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; United States v. Rosario, 234 F.3d 347, 350-51 (7th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we hold that the arresting officers possessed probable cause to stop, arrest, and search the defendant and his vehicle. AFFIRMED. No. 02-3504 17 A true Copy: Teste: ________________________________ Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit USCA-02-C-0072—2-2-04