Opinion ID: 2169632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Motive and Intent

Text: The district court found, and instructed the jury, that evidence of the 1982 sexual assaults was admissible to show Burdette's motive and intent in committing the charged crimes. We have held that other crimes evidence may be offered for the purpose of proving intent where intent is an element of the charged offense. See, e.g., State v. Styskal, 242 Neb. 26, 493 N.W.2d 313 (1992). Motive is defined as that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge in a criminal act. State v. Sanchez, supra . Even when proof of motive is not an element of a crime, motive for the crime charged is relevant to the State's proof of the intent element. See, State v. McBride, 250 Neb. 636, 550 N.W.2d 659 (1996); State v. Bronson, 242 Neb. 931, 496 N.W.2d 882 (1993). Therefore, to the extent intent is an element of the current crimes charged against Burdette and to the extent evidence of the 1982 sexual assaults is relevant to show Burdette's motive and intent in committing the current crimes charged, evidence of the prior crimes to prove motive and intent is admissible under rule 404(2). Although specific intent need not be proved with respect to the first degree sexual assault charge, the State was required to prove specific intent with respect to the four remaining substantive charges. First degree sexual assault under § 28-319(1)(a) is a general intent crime. The burden on the prosecution in order to establish the general criminal intent required for first degree sexual assault is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused subjected another person to sexual penetration and overcame the victim by force, threat of force, coercion, or deception. State v. Koperski, 254 Neb. 624, 578 N.W.2d 837 (1998). Intent was therefore not an issue in regard to the charge of first degree sexual assault of A.B. However, Burdette was also charged with committing robbery in violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-324 (Reissue 1995). Section 28-324 provides that [a] person commits robbery if, with the intent to steal, he forcibly and by violence, or by putting in fear, takes from the person of another any money or personal property of any value whatever. (Emphasis supplied.) Burdette was further charged with two counts of burglary in violation of Neb. Rev.Stat. § 28-507 (Reissue 1995). Section 28-507 provides that [a] person commits burglary if such person willfully, maliciously, and forcibly breaks and enters any real estate or any improvements erected thereon with intent to commit any felony or with intent to steal property of any value. (Emphasis supplied.) Finally, Burdette was charged with the attempted first degree sexual assault of S.H. pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-201 (Cum.Supp.1998) and § 28-319(1)(a). Section 28-201(1) provides that [a] person shall be guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he ... [ i ] ntentionally engages in conduct which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of the crime.  (Emphasis supplied.) The State was required to prove Burdette's specific intent with regard to four charges. On the robbery charge, the State was required to prove that Burdette intended to steal when he took the money and the gun from A.B. On the two burglary charges, the State was required to prove that Burdette intended to commit a felony or to steal property when he broke into the homes of both A.B. and S.H. On the attempted first degree sexual assault charge, the State was required to prove that Burdette's breaking into S.H.'s home on November 29, 1998, was conduct intended to culminate in the commission of first degree sexual assault upon S.H. Evidence of the 1982 sexual assaults was relevant to prove Burdette's intent and motive in connection with each of these four charges. Burdette's prior pattern of selecting victims from an article which identified them as women likely to be living alone and then breaking into their homes to commit sexual assaults and to steal was highly probative of his motive and intent in breaking into A.B.'s and S.H.'s houses. Because intent was an element of four of the charged crimes and evidence of the 1982 sexual assaults was probative of Burdette's motive and intent in connection with those charges, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting such evidence for these purposes.