Opinion ID: 2405298
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of UIFSA

Text: In this case, pursuant to UIFSA, New Hampshire had jurisdiction in 2003 to modify the parties' Massachusetts child support orders because the parents and their children no longer resided in Massachusetts and Wife, who sought modification, did not reside here, although Husband did. See RSA 546-B:49, I(a). New Hampshire modified the Massachusetts child support orders in 2003 when it increased the weekly amount of child support. Once this occurred, New Hampshire became the issuing state, assumed continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the child support order, and obtained the authority to apply its own substantive law to any provision of the child support order that could have been modified under Massachusetts law. Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb. 525, 600 N.W.2d 159, 168 (1999); see Unif. Interstate Family Support Act § 611 (amended 2008), 9-IB U.L.A. 255, 259 (2005); In re Marriage of Crosby & Grooms, 116 Cal.App.4th 201, 10 Cal. Rptr.3d 146, 151-52 (2004). Despite becoming the issuing state, New Hampshire could not modify those aspects of the Massachusetts orders that were not modifiable under Massachusetts law. In effect, Massachusetts law continues to govern any provision that could not be modified under Massachusetts law. See RSA 546-B:49, III; Symposium, supra at 136-37 (discussing 2001 amendments). In this case, Massachusetts law governs the duration of Husband's child support obligation because, under UIFSA, duration is a non-modifiable aspect of an issuing state's original child support order. See Unif. Interstate Family Support Act § 611 (amended 2008), 9-IB U.L.A. 446 (2005). For example, the official comments to the 1996 version of UIFSA explain that if the original child support order ordered child support through age twenty-one, and the law of the new state ends the support obligation at age eighteen, the new state may not modify the original order to terminate child support at age eighteen. See id. The 2001 amendments to UIFSA confirm that the duration of an obligor's child support obligation is non-modifiable. As the official comments to those amendments state, although the initial child support order may be modified and replaced by a new controlling order. . ., the duration of the child-support obligation remains constant, even though virtually every other aspect of the original order may be changed. Id. at 258-59 (emphasis added). As amended in 2001, this section of UIFSA now reads: (d) In a proceeding to modify a child-support order, the law of the State that is determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of the obligation of support. The obligor's fulfillment of the duty of support established by that order precludes imposition of a further obligation of support by a tribunal of this State. Id. at 255 (emphasis omitted). The official comment to this provision explains: From its original promulgation UIFSA determined that the duration of child-support obligation should be fixed by the controlling order. If the language was insufficiently specific before. . . 2001, the amendments should make this decision absolutely clear. The original time frame for support is not modifiable unless the law of the issuing State provides for modification of its duration. . . . In sum, absent tribunal error the first child support order issued under UIFSA will invariably be the initial controlling order. . . . Once a controlling order is identified . . ., the duration of the support obligation is fixed. Id. at 258. Although New Hampshire has not adopted the 2001 amendments, they provide insight into the intended meaning of New Hampshire's existing statute. See Spencer v. Spencer, 10 N.Y.3d 60, 853 N.Y.S.2d 274, 882 N.E.2d 886, 890 (2008). Because Massachusetts law governs the duration of Husband's child support obligation, and because under Massachusetts law, a divorced parent may be required to pay child support until the child graduates from college, the trial court erred by excusing Husband's failure to comply with its 2003 order regarding payment to the travel/college escrow account on the ground that Husband had paid child support he did not owe. Therefore, we vacate this portion of the trial court's decision and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.