Opinion ID: 324541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The 'Perjury' Element

Text: 43 The remaining prong of Anderson's attack on Betsey Norton's testimony is that it was tainted by perjury, a position Anderson derives from the following circumstances. Ms. Norton told the jury that Anderson arranged for her to travel to Kansas City to meet John Criswell so that she could identify him if asked to do so by the grand jury. 98 She further stated that she flew to Kansas City, observed him at an airport for a few minutes, and returned to Washington on the same day. 99 Anderson testified, however, that Ms. Norton was at the Muhlbach Hotel in Kansas City when he met Criswell at the airport, 100 and Criswell said that to the best of his recollection Anderson was alone at the time. 101 44 After the trial had ended, Anderson's counsel came into possession of a receipted bill indicating that Ms. Norton was a guest of the Muhlbach Hotel for the night preceding the day of the airport meeting. On the basis of this discovery, and within the period extended by the trial judge for the purpose, counsel moved for a new trial. 102 The judge denied the motion, and his action in doing so is assigned as error. The argument is that Ms. Norton's version of her part in the Kansas City incident was a deliberate falsehood vitiating the verdict of Anderson's guilt. 45 The knowing use of perjured testimony to secure a conviction is a denial of due process of law, 103 necessitating, of course, a new trial. 104 This is not to suggest that a new trial is in order only upon an occurrence of constitutional dimension. There is respectable authority for the proposition that a new-trial motion on the ground of false testimony, even without a claim that the prosecutor knew of the falsity, should under some conditions be granted. 105 Moreover, a new-trial motion based on newly discovered evidence made within the seven-day period following verdict--which in federal practice is allowed for such a motion irrespective of its grounds 106 --or, as here, within an extension of that period, is to be measured in terms of 'the interest of justice,' 107 and not by the stricter standard applicable to motions submitted outside that time frame. 108 With these principles in mind, we examine the situation before us. 46 The two critical events--an overnight stay at a Kansas City hotel and a brief meeting with Criswell at a Kansas City airport the next day--are not inherently inconsistent; put another way, it was easily possible for Ms. Norton to have engaged in each. It follows that the hotel bill had no overpowering tendency to prove that Ms. Norton did not see Criswell at the airport just as she said. 109 47 We are mindful of Ms. Norton's statement that she flew to Kansas City, met Criswell and returned to Washington on the same day. But the mere fact that witnesses give different testimony--and that is all we have here--is obviously insufficient to establish that either is a perjurer. That is the more so where, as here, almost two years elapsed between the airport episode and the testimony at Anderson's trial. Furthermore, as a constitutional claim Anderson's complaint fails additionally for the reason that there is not the slightest indication that the prosecutor knew that Ms. Norton testified falsely, if indeed she did. 110 48 We come, then, to the question whether, as a nonconstitutional matter, the unavailability of the hotel bill at trial called so imperatively for a grant of Anderson's motion 'in the interest of justice' that the trial judge's conclusion on that score should be overturned. 111 We answer that question in the negative. Failing as an instance of perjury, the inconsistencies to which Anderson adverts could only impinge upon Ms. Norton's credibility as a witness. 112 A review of the trial record discloses, however, that even without the hotel bill Anderson was able to mount a substantial challenge to her veracity. The jury knew that she was a reluctant and ambivalent witness, and that her grand jury presentation was much less expansive than her statement at trial; the jury saw the clash of her version with a considerable volume of testimony by other witnesses. Demonstration of an additional inconsistency, particularly one of such relatively small stature as the airport story, would not likely have changed the jury's verdict. By the same token, only dubiously could a new trial for Anderson have served the interest of justice. 49 It is well settled that disposition of a motion for a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and should be disturbed only for abuse or misapplication of the law. 113 The circumstances here do not persuade us that the able trial judge was misguided in his conclusion as to the direction in which the interest of justice lay. We accordingly sustain his ruling.