Opinion ID: 2238604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: In determining whether a search and seizure is reasonable, courts must undertake a dual inquiry: whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place ( Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 [1968]; see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 215 [1976]). Where a police encounter is not justified in its inception, it cannot be validated by a subsequently acquired suspicion ( see People v McIntosh, 96 NY2d 521, 527 [2001]; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d at 215-216). As already noted, the People in each of these cases concede that the police intrusions were justifiable in their inception only if the facts known by the police at the time supported a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion is that `quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand' ( People v Martinez, 80 NY2d 444, 448 [1992] [quoting People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 112-113 (1975)]). The facts in both these cases resemble Florida v J.L. (529 US 266 [2000]), an anonymous tipster case that is particularly instructive here. In J.L., Miami-Dade police officers stopped and frisked the defendant after receiving an anonymous tip that a young black male was standing at a particular bus stop, wearing a plaid shirt and carrying a gun. While the defendant matched the general description provided in the tip, the officers had no additional reason to suspect him or his companions of illegal activity. The state contended that the tip was reliable and provided reasonable suspicion because the defendant matched the detailed description of the subject's visible attributes. The United States Supreme Court held, however, that the tipster's reliability would be demonstrated only if the suspect subsequently engaged in actions, preferably suggestive of concealed criminal activity, which the anonymous tip predicted in detail ( see id. at 271-272). The Court explained that reasonable suspicion requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person ( id. at 272). Inasmuch as the police frisked the defendant based only on the anonymous tip, the Court held that evidence to support reasonable suspicion was lacking ( see id. at 271). Under the requirements of Florida v J.L ., the police did not have reasonable suspicion to subject William II to a Terry stop and frisk. The police approached and frisked his companion, Cruz, based only on the anonymous tip describing Cruz's readily observable characteristics and indicating that he was involved in a recent crime. The tip not only lacked predictive information that would permit the police to test the caller's knowledge, but was also rendered suspect when directly contradicted by the police officer's observation that Cruz was not dressed in a manner that would permit him to conceal a weapon on his person. Further, the anonymous tip did not identify defendant, nor did it provide any relevant information to suggest that he possessed a weapon or that he had engaged in any criminal activity. Critically, County Court found that the police had no reason to believe that Cruz, the subject of the tip, had handed defendant the weapon. Accordingly, evidence to support reasonable suspicion for attempting to frisk defendant was lacking. Similarly, in Rodriguez, the only basis for reasonable suspicion advanced before the suppression court for stopping the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger was that he matched the physical description provided by an anonymous tipster. [] Without more, the tip could not provide reasonable suspicion to stop the car. Moreover, there is evidence in the record to support the Appellate Division's determination that the gun cannot be deemed to have been abandoned ( see People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 110 [1996]; People v Boodle, 47 NY2d 398, 403-405, cert denied 444 US 969 [1979]). Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed in People v William II, defendant's guilty plea vacated, the motion to suppress granted and the indictment dismissed; in People v Rodriguez, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. In People v William II: Order reversed, defendant's motion to suppress granted and indictment dismissed. In People v Rodriguez: On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), order affirmed.