Opinion ID: 157110
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Simplicity of the case.

Text: 21 In the instant case, the district court offered several justifications for its reduction of the plaintiffs' fee request, but at oral argument on appeal the defendants were willing to stand behind only one of those rationales: that this case was simple. At the heart of the district court's downward adjustment lies the court's contention that [t]his was a fairly simple, straightforward lawsuit. The court concluded that nothing about the nature or history of the case could reasonably justify the number of hours expended by Plaintiffs' counsel because the case was virtually a single-issue one. 22 The court's characterization of this case as fairly simple seems to derive in large part from the fact that the plaintiffs' suit arose out of a single, easily observed and quickly understood fact--the city was displaying a religious symbol in its official seal. This single fact, however, generated reams of legal analysis in a case that highlighted an important circuit split and tempted three Supreme Court justices to grant certiorari to hear it. See City of Edmond v. Robinson, 517 U.S. 1201, 1201, 116 S.Ct. 1702, 134 L.Ed.2d 801 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). During the pre-trial phase of this case, there were three separate motions for summary judgment as well as a motion to dismiss, each with response briefing. There were amici briefs from two separate interest groups, the Christian Legal Society of Oklahoma and Citizens for Keeping the Cross. There were discovery battles that led to motions to compel production, to strike experts, and to limit testimony, with response briefing on each. There were depositions of all parties, including a two-day deposition of the lead plaintiff. And, the trial itself took two full days. After the initial trial, the plaintiffs had to defend against three separate applications for attorneys fees filed by the defendants, as well as an application to tax costs. On appeal, this case focused on a difficult circuit split between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits on the question of religious symbols in municipal seals. See Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir.1991); Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.1991). Furthermore, there were competing precedents on the issue within the Tenth Circuit itself. Compare Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1491 (10th Cir.1989) (holding that it was an open factual question, which couldn't be resolved on summary judgment, as to whether the illustration of the St. George LDS temple in the city's seal had the primary effect of endorsing the LDS Church) with Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 778, 781-82 (10th Cir.1985) (holding that the official seal of Bernalillo County, with a Latin cross and the Spanish motto CON ESTA VENCEMOS, violated the Establishment Clause). As noted above, the split between the circuits became part of the basis for a dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in this case. See Robinson, 517 U.S. at 1201, 1202-03, 116 S.Ct. 1702 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 23 This procedural history unequivocally demonstrates that this case was far from simple. It was a case in which thoughtful jurists strongly disagreed. Besides the central legal issues under the Establishment Clause--an area notorious for its difficult case law--the case also involved a host of ancillary issues: individual liability of municipal officials, qualified or absolute immunity for municipal legislators, standing under Article III for plaintiffs to raise Establishment Clause claims, scope of Free Exercise rights in the context of facially non-coercive municipal conduct, attorney-client confidentiality for engagement letters, and use of experts to gauge public perceptions of religious symbols. 24 In this context, the district court's findings--that the case was fairly simple and that it would have been unreasonable for plaintiffs sole counsel to have spent anything more than eleven weeks of his time on this case (at 50 hours a week) from start to finish--are clearly erroneous. Because these findings undergird the whole of the district court's decision to reduce the plaintiffs' fee request, the error on these findings requires us to reverse and remand the lower court's judgment. We next address briefly the court's other rationales for its downward adjustment. 25