Opinion ID: 1277449
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: location of plaintiff at the time of the accident

Text: The location of the plaintiff at the time of the accident has been identified by courts as another essential element of the plaintiff test. See, e.g., Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d at 1302; Versland v. Caron Transport, 206 Mont. 313, 671 P.2d 583, 586 (1983); James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d at 115-16; Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d at 307-08. [12] See generally P.G. Guthrie, Annotation, Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury to Another, or Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 § 6.5 (Supp.1992). In fact, the physical location of the plaintiff at the time of the accident has been deliberated by the Supreme Court of California in two precedential decisions, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) and Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814 (1989). The case of Dillon v. Legg [13] involved an action for emotional distress brought by a mother who witnessed a driver of a vehicle strike and kill her infant daughter. The Supreme Court of California, in reversing the lower court's order granting summary judgment against the mother, adopted a three-factor test for determining foreseeability: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who is far away; (2) whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observation of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence; and (3) whether the plaintiff and victim were closely related. 69 Cal.Rptr. at 80, 441 P.2d at 920. The Court explained the importance of the plaintiff's location at the time of the accident with respect to the issue of foreseeability: [O]bviously defendant is more likely to foresee that a mother who observes an accident affecting her child will suffer harm than to foretell that a stranger witness will do so. Similarly, the degree of foreseeability of the third person's injury is far greater in the case of his contemporaneous observance of the accident than that in which he subsequently learns of it. The defendant is more likely to foresee that shock to the nearby, witnessing mother will cause physical harm than to anticipate that someone distant from the accident will suffer more than a temporary emotional reaction. 69 Cal.Rptr. at 81, 441 P.2d at 921. The Dillon court anticipated that the limits of negligent infliction of emotional distress actions would be further defined in later cases. The Dillon court, however, did not anticipate the uncertainty that was created by later decisions, especially with respect to the issue of the location of the plaintiff at the time of the accident. Later decisions expanded the Dillon guidelines, for example, by not requiring the plaintiff to visually perceive the accident. Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal.App.3d 553, 145 Cal.Rptr. 657 (1978); Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal.3d 59, 137 Cal.Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 1022 (1977); Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal.App.2d 253, 79 Cal.Rptr. 723 (1969). The uncertainty created by these later cases prompted the Supreme Court of California to clarify the rights to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814 (1989). The Thing court reevaluated the concept of contemporaneous observance of the accident, and adopted the requirement that the plaintiff be present at the scene of the accident and aware that it is causing injury to the victim. The Court gave the following explanation for this modification: The impact of personally observing the injury-producing event in most, although concededly not all, cases distinguishes the plaintiff's resultant emotional distress from the emotion felt when one learns of the injury or death of a loved one from another, or observes pain and suffering but not the traumatic cause of the injury. Greater certainty and a more reasonable limit on the exposure to liability for negligent conduct is possible by limiting the right to recover for negligently caused emotional distress to plaintiffs who personally and contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event and its traumatic consequences. 257 Cal.Rptr. at 879, 771 P.2d at 828. The Thing court then held that the plaintiff in the case, whose child was injured by an automobile, could not recover damages for emotional distress from the driver of the vehicle which struck the child because she was not present at the scene of the accident and was not aware that her son was being injured. Having the benefit of the Thing court's hindsight, we too adopt the requirement that a plaintiff in a negligent infliction of emotional distress action is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is aware that it is causing injury to the victim.