Opinion ID: 2716832
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Eller wholly owns both corporations and it was

Text: him with whom Edwards and Russell dealt. This contention is without merit. A corporation is an entity created by compliance with statutory requirements. A corporation has the right to sue 49 1110423 and be sued just like a natural person. Alabama Constitution, Article XII, § 240; Code 1975, § 10-2A-20(2). A corporation, just like an individual, must enforce its own rights and privileges. 408 So. 2d at 93. Here, it is clear, based upon the language of the 2004 settlement agreement, that the right to payment that was created under that agreement accrued to EAG, LLC, to whom the payment was explicitly due. After -- and only after -- payment had been made to EAG, LLC, did the agreement explain how it was to be divided among the members thereof. Thus the agreement evinces an intent only to directly benefit EAG, LLC, which is also the only party entitled to sue if the promised payment was not made. 18 Russell, supra. Consequently, only an indirect benefit was bestowed on Berks and Rowe pursuant to the agreement, solely in their capacity as principals of EAG, LLC. Therefore, the trial court also did not err in concluding that Berks lacked the ability to enforce the 2004 settlement agreement as a third-party beneficiary thereof. 3. Rowe's Intervention 18 Presumably, however, if EAG, LLC, had, in fact, received the funds and had failed to distribute them equally to both Rowe and Berks, Berks would have had a derivative claim against EAG, LLC. 50 1110423 Finally, the defendants contend that the trial court erred in granting Rowe's request to intervene on behalf of EAG, LLC, pursuant to Rule 24, Ala. R. Civ. P. More specifically, they assert that the grounds cited by Rowe in his intervention motion were insufficient to sustain the trial court's ruling in that Rowe's interests were purportedly adequately represented by the defendants' opposition to the plaintiffs' complaint and further that Rowe's postintervention position constituted a breach of the members' duties imposed on Rowe by § 10A-5-3.03, Ala. Code 1975. In sum, the defendants argue that by permitting Rowe's intervention on allegations including that EAG, LLC, constituted an ongoing entity, 19 but permitting Rowe to successfully represent, in subsequent pleadings, that EAG, LLC, had been dissolved in July 2006, the trial court erroneous[ly] refus[ed] to apply § 10A-5-3.03(f)(1-3), and the law on judicial estoppel. Defendants' brief, at p. 56. See, e.g., Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So. 2d 1236, 1241 (Ala. 2003) ('The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies to preclude a party 19 The plaintiffs explain that this initial position was taken by all parties based on the continued existence of EAG, LLC, in public records. 51 1110423 from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.' (quoting Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So. 2d 553, 555 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Selma Foundry & Supply Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 598 So. 2d 844, 846 (Ala. 1992))). This appears to be a nonissue. As set out in the facts above, Rowe's intervention was the result of a stipulation and agreement reached in open court, by all parties to the underlying proceeding, who apparently conceded that Rowe ... [should be] made a party ... and ... aligned as a Plaintiff.... It thus appears that the defendants' own claim that the intervention was improper would be precluded by the very judicial-estoppel principles they raise on appeal. First Alabama Bank, supra. Alternatively, the defendants, by their conduct below, invited the error of which they now complain. See Ex parte King, 643 So. 2d 1364, 1366 (Ala. 1993) ([The doctrine of invited error] provides that a party may not complain of error into which he has led the court. (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 272 Ala. 153, 157, 130 So. 2d 178, 182 (1961))). 52 1110423 In addition, to the extent that the defendants' claim represents a challenge to the trial court's failure to immediately grant the defendants' motion seeking to vacate the trial court's intervention order, I also fail to see any error in that regard. Not only was Rowe aligned as a plaintiff from the outset, as the plaintiffs note, but also, as both sets of parties represent in their respective briefs, the trial court did, in fact, subsequently vacate the order permitting Rowe's intervention. Thus, any potential relief from the trial court's order permitting the alleged erroneous intervention of Rowe has already been obtained, and the resulting challenge to the intervention order is moot. See Woods v. SunTrust Bank, 81 So. 3d 357, 363 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).