Opinion ID: 202423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proving and defending political discrimination claims

Text: 80 A government employee who does not occupy a policy-making position of confidence and trust, such as Plaintiffs here, is protected from adverse employment decisions based on the employee's political affiliation. See Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio, 221 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2000). A plaintiff bringing a political discrimination claim bears the burden of producing sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence from which a jury reasonably may infer that [his] constitutionally protected conduct—in this case, political affiliation . . . was a substantial or motivating factor behind [his] dismissal. Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). A plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on this issue throughout the case. 81 Proving that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor in an adverse employment decision requires more than [m]erely juxtaposing a protected characteristic—someone else's politics—with the fact that the plaintiff was treated unfairly. Padilla-García v. Guillermo Rodríguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted); see also Mercado-Alicea v. P.R. Tourism Co., 396 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2005) (Statements of political affiliation—unaccompanied by any specific factual information to support the claim and unrelated to any employment action taken by defendant against plaintiff are patently insufficient to establish an act of political discrimination.) (citing López-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 414 (1st Cir.2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has cautioned that the mere fact that an adverse action was taken after an employee exercises First Amendment rights is not enough by itself to establish a prima facie case. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 684-85, 116 S.Ct. 2342, 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996). 82 To meet this burden, political discrimination plaintiffs often present evidence of verbal or written statements of political or personal animus. See, e.g., Rodríguez-Marín v. Rivera-González, 438 F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir.2006) (witness testified that a defendant had made several comments to her to the effect that he was under political pressure for leaving too many NPP members in cushy positions); id. at 78 (witness testified that a defendant insisted that she use phraseology consistent with a particular political party); id. at 81 (witness testified that the defendants made statements to her indicating that her demotion was politically motivated). Plaintiffs who have lost their jobs also present evidence about the hiring practices of the defendant in the wake of an election generally—i.e., evidence that the defendants filled all, or most, recently vacated positions with supporters of their political affiliation—or, more specifically, evidence that the plaintiff's immediate successor had the same affiliation as the defendant. For example, in Acosta-Orozco v. Rodriguez-de-Rivera, 132 F.3d 97 (1st Cir.1997), where the plaintiffs were all members of the adverse party . . . their superiors knew this, and . . . their duties were given to active supporters of the party in power, we found there was ample evidence for the plaintiffs' case to avoid summary judgment. Id. at 101; see also Rodriguez-Rios v. Cordero, 138 F.3d 22, 24 ([O]ther evidence adduced by plaintiff established a prima facie case . . . . [P]laintiff adduced that every employment task for which she had been responsible prior to her demotion was performed thereafter by an NPP member and that at least three new recruits . . . were NPP members.). 83 A defendant, of course, can offer evidence challenging the claim that political affiliation played a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action. Additionally, even if a plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that political affiliation played a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action, a defendant can raise an affirmative defense specific to this type of case: that is, a defendant can attempt to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] plaintiff [ ] would have been dismissed regardless of [his] political affiliation. Acevedo-Diaz, 1 F.3d at 66; see also Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. 568; Sanchez-Lopez v. Fuentes-Pujols, 375 F.3d 121, 124 (1st Cir.2004). 84 In the language of burden-shifting, we have explained the Mt. Healthy affirmative defense as follows: 85 [w]e stress that under the Mt. Healthy burden shifting scheme, unlike Title VII cases, the burden of persuasion actually shifts to defendants after plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. Under Title VII, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer need only submit enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact—i.e., only the burden of production shifts to the employer. However, in a First Amendment political discrimination case, in which the Mt. Healthy scheme is applicable, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant, and the plaintiff-employee will prevail unless the fact finder concludes that the defendant has produced enough evidence to establish that the plaintiff's dismissal would have occurred in any event for nondiscriminatory reasons. 86 Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 133 n. 1 (1st Cir.2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 87