Opinion ID: 2585200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial court's failure to terminate defendant's in propria persona status at penalty phase

Text: The jury returned its guilt phase verdicts on October 10, 1989. The trial court scheduled the commencement of the penalty phase for October 16, 1989. On the latter date, the court convened outside the presence of the jury, and Advisory Counsel Winston argued for continuance of the penalty phase for a significant period of time, a few weeks at the minimum, in order to prepare the defense case. Winston acknowledged defendant did not want a continuance of that length, and, after discussions concerning the prosecutor's upcoming trial obligations, including Seabourn's trial, the trial court scheduled the penalty phase to begin on October 23, 1989. On that date, just after the jury was called into the courtroom for the trial on penalty, defendant asked to speak with the trial court outside the jury's presence. After the jury was excused, defendant advised the court: I have at least a philosophical objection to begging these people for my life, and I am not going to do it, and as a result of that perhaps my attorney should, should do this phase of the trial. I am not going to. I am not going to do it. Winston told the court he had no prior knowledge of defendant's request and was not at that time prepared to proceed as counsel. The trial court stated: I look upon this request as nothing more than an attempt to delay the prosecution in this case. Mr. Lawley, you were properly advised ... at the time that you sought to represent yourself, number one. Number two, you knew two weeks ago, more than two weeks ago now, that we were headed into a penalty phase trial when the jury came back with a verdict of guilty of first degree murder and found the special circumstances to be true. You have delayed all of that time until this morning with the jury sitting in the jury box ready to begin presentation of evidence to inform the Court of your feeling. After putting on the record its observations of defendant's conduct of his case and good working relationship with advisory counsel, the trial court concluded: Having in mind the [ People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187] factors and having in mind the other cases that the Court has reviewed, I'm satisfied that your request is untimely. And it is, therefore, going to be denied. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187 ( Windham ), on which the trial court relied, addressed the situation in which a defendant who is represented by counsel during the first part of a trial invokes his or her right to self-representation midtrial. We held that in order to invoke the constitutionally mandated right of self-representation, a defendant in a criminal trial must unequivocally assert that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of the trial. Once a defendant has chosen to proceed to trial represented by counsel, his or her demand to discharge counsel and assume the defense shall be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. ( Id. at pp. 127-128,137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187.) Factors for the trial court to consider in assessing such a request made after the commencement of the trial include the quality of counsel's representation of the defendant, the defendant's prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay [that] might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion. ( Id. at p. 128, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187.) Defendant's case presents the reverse scenario, i.e., a self-represented defendant who, after commencement of the trial, seeks to relinquish responsibility for his own defense and obtain the appointment of counsel to represent him for the remainder of the trial. In this situation, we have indicated that the Windham factors apply and that the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances in exercising its discretion. ( People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 164, 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169.) Defendant fails to persuade us the trial court abused its discretion. Examining the Windham factors ( Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187), we first note that despite what defendant calls the mismatch between himself and the prosecutor, and despite the delusional themes defendant occasionally introduced into the trial, the quality of his self-representation did not compel the granting of his motion. As the Attorney General observes, defendant successfully interposed objections, cross-examined prosecution witnesses, and presented evidence in his own defense. Second, as to defendant's proclivity to substitute counsel, the Attorney General correctly observes that defendant had previously dismissed Ernest Kinney as his attorney over a disagreement concerning the conduct of the defense, and that he often did not follow Advisory Counsel Winston's suggestions. Defendant strenuously disagrees that these circumstances yield the inference he had such a proclivity to substitute counsel as to militate against Winston's appointment as counsel for the penalty phase. In our view, while the inference might not be compelling, this factor provides some support for the trial court's ruling. Third, as to the reasons for the request, the Attorney General argues that defendant's primary reason was his philosophical objection to begging [the jurors] for [his] life, while defendant contends the request was made out of a recognition of his incapacity to perform the task. In our view, the record does not support a conclusion defendant was incapable of presenting a penalty phase defense. [19] The final Windham factorsthe length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay occasioned by the requestclearly support the trial court's ruling. Significantly, defendant allowed two weeks to elapse, from the jury's guilt phase verdict to the very day set for the commencement of the penalty phase, without making his request for appointment of counsel or even mentioning his intention to advisory counsel. The timing of the request thus strongly suggests, as the trial court found, an attempt to delay the trial. And Winston's appointment as counsel indeed would have necessitated substantial delay, which in turn would have thrown into doubt the jury's continued availability. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for Winston's appointment as counsel at the penalty phase, and the record fails to establish a miscarriage of justice or violation of defendant's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [20]