Opinion ID: 574319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Delay in Imposing Sentence

Text: 33 We are to assess four factors in determining whether the constraints imposed by speedy trial and due process rights have been honored: (1) length of the delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 517-38, 92 S.Ct. at 2185-95. The district court's factfindings in the context of these factors are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Our review of the court's application of the law to these facts is plenary. 34 Although the Supreme Court has not precisely articulated a guideline for applying the factors to delays in the post-conviction context, a number of courts of appeals, see United States v. Reese, 568 F.2d 1246, 1253 (6th Cir.1977); United States v. Campbell, 531 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851, 98 S.Ct. 164, 54 L.Ed.2d 121 (1977); Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d at 254, including us, see United States v. Campisi, 583 F.2d 692, 694 (3d Cir.1978), and Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1220, have applied the four-part Barker v. Wingo standard of evaluation in such situations. 35 By way of general guidance, concerning the four-part test, the Court stated that: 36 We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. 37 Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. 38 With this concept of a fluid balancing test in mind, see Wells v. Petsock, 941 F.2d 253, 256 (3d Cir.1991), we review the facts concerning delay as found by the district court.
39 The mathematics involved in calculation of the delay in this case are undisputed--38 1/2 months passed from arrest to sentencing, 29 of these dating from the guilty verdict. 8 40 The district court did not render a specific legal conclusion concerning whether the 29-month delay was sufficient to invoke the presumption of a speedy trial violation. Because the court continued in its Barker v. Wingo analysis, however, we can presume that it concluded that Burkett satisfied this threshold requirement. 9 41 We agree that Burkett did satisfy the first prong, even though the delay he experienced was not as egregious as others reported, see, e.g., Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1210 (five and one-half years from conviction, Burkett not sentenced); United States v. Campbell, 531 F.2d at 1333 (six year delay); Juarez-Casares v. United States, 496 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir.1974) (prisoner discharged after 31 month delay); Hooper v. Cunningham, 1985 W.L. 390 at (Blair County prisoner unsentenced for 37 months discharged from custody). Despite the impossibility of imposing a bright line how long is too long standard, Barker, 407 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. at 2187, we are convinced that the delay of 29 months from conviction to sentence invites inquiry into the three remaining Barker v. Wingo factors.
42 In assessing the number two prong, the cause of the delay, the district court made reference to the congestion of the court calendar in the Blair County Court. While correctly noting that a crowded docket is not afforded substantial weight in considering speedy trial claims, the district court failed to implement the Supreme Court's directive in Barker that the ultimate responsibility of delay caused by overcrowded courts rests with the government. 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. We emphasized this responsibility in Burkett I: 43 The reason for the additional delay--crowded court calendars and the court reporter's delay in filing transcripts--must be weighed against the government rather than Burkett. 826 F.2d at 1223. 10 44 In addition to the general maxim that court congestion is the state's responsibility, the record evidence here affirmatively indicates that the failure to schedule a hearing on Burkett's post-trial motions was administrative in nature. At the evidentiary hearing, the Blair County Court Administrator testified that he had no explanation as to why a briefing schedule had not been established according to the procedure normally followed by the Blair County Court or a hearing set on Burkett's post-trial motions. 11 The Court Administrator further testified that during this time he was alphabetically updating criminal defendants' post-trial motions in preparation for implementation of a computer system. Although he represented that he was currently up to the letter D, he could not explain why Burkett's motions, beginning with the letter B, had yet to be scheduled. 45 Judge Peoples, the trial judge, also testified concerning the status of the court's calendar. In explaining the delay in processing Burkett's post-trial motions, Judge Peoples testified that he could not specifically recollect why Burkett's post-trial motions were delayed, but hypothesized that courtroom demands on his time might be the cause. 46 As this evidence indicates, the delay caused by the backlog of cases in Blair County cannot be classified as justifiable. While not the type of purposeful activity proscribed in Pollard, 352 U.S. at 361, 77 S.Ct. at 485, the delay attributable to the congested calendar falls into a non-intentional, but negligent area of administrative overload for which the government must assume responsibility. Thus the district court erred as a matter of law in not assessing the court's crowded dockets against the government. 47 It is true that Burkett himself added some volume to the dockets in the period between his conviction and sentence. In reviewing Burkett's post-conviction activity, the district court allocated to him a portion of responsibility for the delay: 48 Thus it becomes apparent that the great deal of delay in both the trial and the appellate court was occasioned by motions submitted by or on behalf of the petitioner which had to be directed to the court for disposition. These repeated motions added a considerable amount to the delay and disposition by both those courts. 49 Burkett v. Cunningham, No. 88-1397, Magistrate's Supplemental Report and Recommendation at 10; App. at 1578. Indeed, Burkett vigorously pursued his challenge to the jury's verdicts of guilty by filing a timely motion for a new trial and/or arrest of judgment. Then, 13 months later, on March 12, 1984, at Burkett's request, counsel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging Burkett's custody on the basis that his speedy trial and due process rights had been violated because of the delay in disposing of Burkett's post-trial motions and in the imposition of his sentence. After the filing of the petition, beginning on March 28, 1984 Burkett began correspondence with his attorney inquiring as to the status of the habeas petition. When Burkett perceived one response from his attorney as being sarcastic in nature, Burkett determined that his counsel was not taking the appropriate steps in his matters and requested him to withdraw. 50 In June of 1984 Burkett also initiated communication with Judge Peoples. Burkett complained of his counsel's lack of effectiveness and requested that the court appoint new counsel. Judge Peoples advised Burkett that he would discuss the matter of scheduling a hearing with the Court Administrator. He also suggested that Burkett present his complaints about his attorney to the judge presiding over the habeas hearing. Burkett again wrote to Judge Peoples on July 25, 1984 requesting appointment of new counsel to present Burkett's claims against his trial counsel at the habeas corpus hearing. It was then that counsel advised Burkett that he would likewise request that new counsel be appointed and filed a petition to withdraw as counsel. Judge Brumbaugh conducted a hearing on this motion on August 6, 1984 and denied the motion to withdraw pending disposition of the post-trial motions. Burkett continued correspondence with his attorney, the Court Administrator and the trial judge. Dissatisfied with the responses, Burkett then filed, on September 6, 1984, a pro se application for evidentiary hearing by alleging ineffectiveness of counsel and for appointment of new counsel. Judge Brumbaugh held a hearing on October 11, 1984, at the conclusion of which he indicated that a ruling would be forthcoming on the habeas corpus and bond reduction by the end of the week. 51 Burkett also requested that his attorney file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts. When counsel failed to do so, Burkett filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus in February of 1985 seeking to compel the court to direct his attorney to file for federal habeas relief. 52 A hearing was held by Judge Peoples on April 1, 1985, on Burkett's pro se motion for new counsel and for an evidentiary hearing concerning ineffectiveness. Burkett was denied appointment of new counsel on April 2, 1985. 53 Certainly Burkett's aggressive petitioning of the courts required additional paperwork, scheduling of hearings and courtroom time. Yet, by the filing and argument of these motions, which the district court weighed against him, Burkett sought merely to compel the Blair County Court to act upon his post-trial motions, or to obtain counsel who would either petition the court to act, to preserve his speedy trial rights, or to secure his appeal rights. It was not unreasonable for Burkett to move for new counsel in view of his perception that his counsel was not receptive to his pleas to have his post-trial motions heard. In addition, we are concerned that a hearing on Burkett's initial state habeas petition was not scheduled for almost seven months after its filing. Therefore, rather than the habeas filing demonstrating that Burkett contributed to the delay, we view Blair County's delay in handling this serious matter as indicative instead of the general inability of that county's court to process its criminal dockets in a timely fashion. Accordingly, the cause of the delay here, too, is weighed against the government.
54 The district court acknowledged that the petitioner urged the speedy disposition of his case. As the chronology stated above amply demonstrates, Burkett's tenacity in pursuing his claims heavily weighs this factor in his favor.
55 Unfortunately, the district court did not make any specific findings as to the prejudice which Burkett may have suffered because of the delay. Instead the court reasoned that because Burkett caused some of the delay in the state court's disposition of his case, any prejudice which Burkett may have experienced would not support the granting of relief. Since we have decided that the court's attribution of delay to Burkett was clearly erroneous, we also find that the court's failure to consider the prejudice factor wanting. Clearly, the testimony on behalf of Burkett was orchestrated to demonstrate that Burkett suffered prejudice while awaiting sentencing. We must exercise our power of plenary review to determine if the testimony establishes sufficient qualitative prejudice to weigh this factor in Burkett's favor. 56 In Burkett I we acknowledged that while all four Barker v. Wingo factors are to be balanced in light of the facts and circumstances of any case, the Barker prejudice factor did not run fully concurrently when examining delays in sentencing and delays in initiating appellate review. Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1222. 12 57 In Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 94 S.Ct. 188, 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973), the Supreme Court stated that the Barker v. Wingo factors assume a different (presumably lesser) stature where the defendant is incarcerated after conviction, but explicitly rejected the notion that prejudice is confined to possible impairment of the defense at trial. Instead the Court cautioned that the possible impact impending charges may have on prospects for parole and meaningful rehabilitation should not be overlooked. Moore, 414 U.S. at 27, 94 S.Ct. at 190. 58 The Supreme Court has discussed another specific incident which may invoke post-conviction prejudice. In Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973), quoting Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378, 89 S.Ct. 575, 577, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969), the Court stated: 59 [T]he possibility that a defendant already in prison might receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the one he is serving may be forever lost if trial of the pending charge is postponed. 60 Strunk, 412 U.S. at 437-38, 93 S.Ct. at 2262-63. 61 Relying on Moore, Strunk and Smith in applying the prejudice prong of the Barker v. Wingo analysis to post-conviction delays, our sister courts of appeals have identified three traditional interests protected by the speedy trial right: (1) prevention of oppressive incarceration; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limitation of the possibility that a defense might be impaired, Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, and have adapted them to the relevant timeframe, i.e., awaiting sentence or disposition on appeal. For example, oppressive pre-trial incarceration is not a concern, but instead, focus is directed towards the defendant's time awaiting sentence, the anxiety associated with not knowing the extent of time to be served, and the hindering of a defense on retrial. See Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d at 256-57. 62 The difficulty in establishing prejudice in the post-conviction setting was addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Perez. Although acknowledging the Supreme Court holding in Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26, 94 S.Ct. 188, 189, 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973), that demonstrating prejudice is not always a condition precedent to finding a Sixth Amendment violation, the court of appeals opined that, post-conviction: 63 [I]t might be said that once a defendant has been convicted it would be the rarest of circumstances in which a right to a speedy trial could be infringed without a showing of prejudice. Moreover, the necessity of showing substantial prejudice would dominate the four part balancing test. This is because of the traditional interest the speedy trial guarantee is designed to protect: (1) prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense would be impaired.... Most of these interests diminish or disappear altogether once there has been a conviction. 64 793 F.2d at 256. 13 Obviously, as noted in Perez, the change in the status from accused and presumed innocent to guilty and awaiting sentence is a significant alteration which must be taken into account in the balancing process. 793 F.2d at 254. As Judge Garth noted in his concurring opinion in Burkett I: Post-conviction there is less fear that an innocent individual is being improperly subjected to deprivation inherent in incarceration. In effect, post-conviction the individual knows that punishment is imminent, it is uncertain only as to degree. 826 F.2d at 1231 (Garth, J., concurring). Nonetheless, this does not diminish in any way the balancing test which must be employed in evaluating such claims. 65 With this standard in mind, we evaluate Burkett's allegations of prejudice, beginning with his claim of exposure to oppressive pre-sentence incarceration. First, Burkett complained that because he could not secure the onerous $100,000 bond set, he was denied the opportunity to demonstrate good behavior while released. We find that this allegation is too speculative for consideration. 66 Second, Burkett argued that the trial court's failure to sentence him impeded his ability to apply for commutation of sentence, governor's pardon, or reconsideration, since no commutation can be considered until all appeals have been exhausted. Though uncontradicted, these are not the quality of losses sufficiently substantial to justify relief from custody. 67 Third, Burkett contends that, in computing his sentence, Judge Peoples considered a subsequent arrest for perjury detailed in Burkett's presentence report. This averment, if proven, would suffice to show prejudice. See Juarez-Casares v. United States, 496 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir.1974) (prejudice demonstrated by sentencing court's considering subsequent conviction). It is impossible, however, to probe the truth of Burkett's accusation in this regard. Judge Peoples testified that he could not remember specifically whether or not the perjury charge was included in the pre-sentence report, but he stated that he would not consider an arrest, without a conviction, when imposing sentence. Therefore, without any direct evidence which counters Judge Peoples' testimony, we cannot credit Burkett's contention that his subsequent arrest impacted the sentence received. 68 Burkett next contends that he was unable to avail himself of institutional programs, critical to his rehabilitation, available through the state but not the county penal system, namely, alcohol and sex offender programs in which he was eventually able to participate when incarcerated in the state prison. Calculating from the date of his arrest, the three and one-half years of incarceration in the county system was characterized by Burkett as dead time. Burkett also referred to the loss of time in which he could have been afforded visiting privileges outside the walls of the prison. Such visitation rights are available through the state system to a particular classification of inmates. 69 We do find merit in Burkett's detailing of prejudice here. Although it is not the norm for a prisoner to advocate the advantages of the state penal system before us, we are willing to credit Burkett's assertions that access to rehabilitative programs and the opportunity for more liberal visitation privileges are an appealing and legitimately valid alternative to the limbo he experienced in the county system. 70 As to his concern that the certainty of a sentence imposed would minimize anxiety and distress, Burkett detailed his inability to eat and sleep and how, on occasion, he was reduced to tears by frustration caused by the delay in disposition of his post-trial motions and sentencing. He mentioned the loss of his fiancee who, he claimed, ended their relationship because of the uncertainty of the length of his incarceration. 71 Whether this imprisonment angst rises above the level of anxiety indigenous to any term of incarceration is difficult to discern. In some instances the distress associated with delay in criminal proceedings has been medically verified. In United States v. Dreyer, 533 F.2d 112 (3d Cir.1976), a defendant experienced a 29 month delay between indictment and trial. During this time she experienced a severe mental disturbance which, despite psychiatric treatment, culminated in a suicide attempt. In Dreyer, we found that the anxiety equated to sufficient prejudice to satisfy the fourth Barker v. Wingo factor. 72 In a later and less factually dramatic case, Government of the Virgin Islands v. Pemberton, 813 F.2d 626 (3d Cir.1987), we acknowledged that under Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. at 27, 94 S.Ct. at 190, quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 537, 92 S.Ct. at 2195 (White, J., concurring), the fact that there has been disruption to a defendant's employment, his financial resources affected and the general strain and anxiety put upon family and friends constituted prejudice which must be considered in ascertaining whether there has been a speedy trial violation. We balanced this, on the other hand, with the recognition that a certain amount of anxiety in the form of personal prejudice to the accused is inevitable in a criminal case. Pemberton, 813 F.2d at 629. Relying upon our decision in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Burmingham, 788 F.2d 933, 937 (3d Cir.1986), that an 18 month delay between indictment and sentencing did not, under Barker, require us to grant relief, we denied Pemberton's constitutional claim for failure to produce evidence of a specific psychological disorder resulting from the anxiety of incarceration. Pemberton, 813 F.2d at 629-30. 73 We recognize a marked difference in the Pemberton case and the one before us today. Although we compared the psychological distress in Pemberton unfavorably to the type of specific disorder which satisfied the prejudice factor in Dreyer, we faulted Pemberton because, despite his allegations of acute anxiety, he made no inquiry of the government or of the court as to the status of his criminal proceedings. We certainly cannot penalize Burkett, as we did the petitioner in Pemberton, for a lack of interest in inquiring as to the status of his case. 74 Likewise we recognize that Burkett's anxiety does not rise to the level of mental disorder detailed in Dreyer, but it is uncontested that Burkett suffered lack of sleep, loss of appetite, loss of companionship and emotional stress associated with his inability to determine the length of his incarceration. This uncontested evidence gives credence to Burkett's contention that the delay between conviction and sentencing caused him to suffer emotional distress, complete with physical manifestations. Although we hesitate to conclude that this evidence of anxiety in and of itself would support relief under Barker and its progeny, it does function to tip the scale slightly in Burkett's favor in evaluating his speedy trial claim. 75 Finally, regarding the possibility of an impaired defense on retrial, Burkett contends that the passage of time would make it more difficult for him to refresh the memory of witnesses or to elaborate upon exculpatory evidence in the event of a retrial. Certainly the possibility of the dulling of memories works against the government as well. As stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315, 106 S.Ct. 648, 656, 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986): 76 [D]elay is a two-edged sword. It is the Government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the Government to carry out this burden. 77 Id. at 315, 106 S.Ct. at 656. This is not critical here because in Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. at 26-27, 94 S.Ct. at 189-190, the Court explicitly rejected a reading of Barker to confine prejudice to impairment of the defense and, instead, recognized that an accused is also disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often hostility, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. 78 Although Burkett's status changed from accused to convicted, and his allegations of prejudice chiefly concern delays subsequent to conviction, we conclude that the speedy trial guarantee shield against personal prejudice, see Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. at 439, 93 S.Ct. at 2263, has been significantly damaged by the delay between Burkett's conviction and sentence. Nonetheless, we do not rest our decision to grant the writ solely on the demonstration of prejudice to this point. It is not until we detail the subsequent delay, between sentencing and appeal disposition, and evaluate its cumulative impact, that we conclude that Burkett has suffered the deprivation of a constitutional right.