Opinion ID: 2974500
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment for the Reds

Text: Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by entering summary judgment for the Reds on Plaintiffs' § 1981, civil conspiracy and § 1985 conspiracy, promissory estoppel, and tortious interference claims. This court reviews de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Peltier v. United States, 388 F.3d 984, 987 (6th Cir. 2004).
Claims of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are analyzed using the familiar burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Page 13 of 25 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989). Under McDonnell Douglas, if a plaintiff sustains his or her burden of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. If the defendant sustains this extremely light burden of production, Frazier v. Ford Motor Co., 109 Fed. Appx. 718, 721 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished decision), the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); see also Aquino v. Honda of Am., Inc., 158 Fed. Appx. 667, 675-76 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished decision) (holding that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), did not modify the McDonnell Douglas framework for assessing circumstantial employment discrimination suits under § 1981). To prove pretext, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence from which the jury could 'reasonably reject [the defendants'] explanation' and infer that the defendants 'intentionally discriminated' against her. Balmer v. HCA, Inc., 423 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Woythal v. Tex-Tenn Corp., 112 F.3d 243, 246-47 (6th Cir. 1997)). As explained by the court in Balmer: The plaintiff must submit evidence demonstrating that the employer did not 'honestly believe' in the proffered non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Smith v. Chrysler, 155 F.3d 799, 806-07 (6th Cir. 1998)). To inquire into the defendant's honest belief, the court looks to whether the employer can establish reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before the employer when the decision was made. Smith, 155 F.3d at 807 ([T]he key inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse employment action.). . . . If there is no reasonable dispute that the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision that demonstrates an honest belief in the proffered reason for the adverse employment action, the case should be dismissed since no Page 14 of 25 reasonable juror could find that the employer's adverse employment action was pretextual. See Braithwaite, 258 F.3d at 494. Balmer, 423 F.3d at 614. Here, through the affidavits of Allen, the Reds explained that a conditional waiver was granted to the DDP-backed Dickson/Myers group because, in Allen's mind, (1) the DDP-backed group was the choice of the Dayton community; (2) the DDP-backed group would provide more long-term stability; and (3) the DDP-backed group had a more realistic and achievable stadium financing plan. Plaintiffs do not appear to challenge the district court's conclusion that the Reds met their burden of production by articulating non-discriminatory reasons for its waiver decision. Instead, Plaintiffs appear to challenge the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate pretext. The record, however, more than adequately supports that district court's decision in this regard. The evidence demonstrates, for example, that the DDP is comprised of Dayton's business and civic leaders, including the City's mayor; that the DDP's Baseball Task Force led the effort to bring a minor league team to downtown Dayton; that the DDP selected the Dickson/Myers group over Plaintiffs as its partner in bringing baseball to downtown Dayton; that the DDP selected the Dickson/Myers group following an extensive review of several groups, including Plaintiffs; and that community leaders expressed their enthusiasm to Allen about the DDP's plan to bring baseball to Dayton through a partnership with Dickson and Myers. Plaintiffs produced little if anything to challenge Allen's quite understandable desire to work with an ownership group that had the support of the DDP and its membership of business and community leaders. In addition, Plaintiffs offered no evidence to refute Allen's belief that ownership stability could become an issue with SSI, based on SSI's history of buying and selling minor league Page 15 of 25 franchises. To be sure, Plaintiffs may be correct in saying that, based on its history, SSI had more baseball experience than either Dickson or Myers. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that Allen was less interested in the relative inexperience of Dickson and Myers and more interested in the fact that–unlike SSI's Perry–Dickson and Myers were not team brokers.2 The record is clear that the Reds wanted franchise stability, and Plaintiffs presented nothing to undermine the legitimacy of Allen's belief that the DDP-backed group was a safer bet for achieving that stability. Plaintiffs, moreover, failed to refute Allen's belief that the stadium financing plan proposed by Dickson and Myers, a plan that then included both actual and near commitments of significant public funds, was more realistic and achievable than SSI's largely vague and speculative financing plan. Taking issue with Allen's belief in this regard, Plaintiffs point to the Executive Summary that they submitted to the Reds, a plan–they say–that set out in detail the funding sources, local municipalities and possibly private funding and [sic] the State of Ohio, for the construction of a $20 million stadium at Hara. Pl.'s Br. at 34. The Executive Summary, however, provided no information about funding commitments. Instead, it described Plaintiffs' financing plan in terms of possibilities. For example, it was stated in the Executive Summary that [i]t is possible that the State of Ohio might contribute capital funds; J.A. at 749; [o]ther private funding sources may also become available; id.; Trotwood, Harrison Township and perhaps other communities in the area . . . will agree to lend their credit to support bonds or certificates of participation . . . in the approximate amount of $20 million; id. at 748; [i]t is anticipated that bonds will be issued taxfree; id.; and [d]ebt service guarantees will be issued by the member municipalities in accordance 2 As he explained during his deposition, Perry was in the business of buying and selling teams and doing consulting. J.A. at 1309. Over time, Perry assisted in the purchase and/or sale of six teams, including two hockey franchises. Id. at 1311. Page 16 of 25 with the contract [to be] entered into at the time of the formation of the [entity that will take title to the new ballpark]. Id. Such possibilities do little to undermine the Reds' assertion that Allen had an honest belief and made a reasonably informed and considered decision that the DDP-backed groups had a more realistic and achievable stadium financing plan. Finally, of particular relevance to their claim of race discrimination, Plaintiffs failed to controvert the Reds' evidence that diversity in team ownership was significant to the Reds' organization; that the Reds expected every group interested in locating a minor league team in Dayton, including the DDP-backed group, to include African Americans in the team's ownership, employment and other matters; that the DDP acknowledged and addressed the Reds' interest in diversity by seeking the financial participation of African Americans;3 and that African Americans (Archie Griffin and Magic Johnson) are, in fact, part owners of the Reds minor league team that ultimately settled in Dayton. Such evidence greatly undermines Plaintiffs' claim that the Reds discriminated against them on the basis of race. 2. Civil Conspiracy and Section 1985 Conspiracy Claims In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that the Reds conspired with the DDP and others to prevent the Plaintiffs from owning and relocating the Michigan Battle Cats to the Dayton Area by hamper[ing], impair[ing] and imped[ing] the [AFR] filed by BAT, Rock Newman, Inc. 3 In a letter to Allen dated April 22, 1997, the DDP assured Allen that African-American ownership of the minor league team by our local African-American leaders can be obtained. J.A. at 724. The DDP also informed Allen that it had had discussions with representatives of the African-American CEO's organization which has already pledged $50,000 in financial support to our endeavor. Id. Similarly, in a letter dated May 16, 1997, the DDP informed Allen that it had worked to satisfy the conditions we discussed: . . . [including] Identification of local, African American business people who are ready and willing to financially participate in minor league baseball in our downtown, including Mervyn Alphonso, Dayton President, Key Bank, as well as numerous other local African-American CEOs. J.A. at 731. Page 17 of 25 and the Michigan Battle Cats for the reason that Defendants . . . DDP, Myers, DPBC, Dickson, The Reds [and others] prefer a white citizen-owned Minor League Baseball franchise. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 140, 164; J.A. at 107, 112. Before the district court, Plaintiffs argued that the Reds conspired with at least the DDP to issue the conditional waiver contract the Reds had promised to SSI to the DDP instead with the intention of interfering with the Plaintiffs' ability to enter into business relationships by filing Applications with the Midwest League and the NAPBL. . . . J.A. at 316. To prove a civil conspiracy under Ohio law, a plaintiff must prove a malicious combination of two or more persons to injure another in person or property, in a way not competent for one alone, resulting in actual damages. Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 868 (Ohio 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To prove a conspiracy under section 1985, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendants conspired together for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; (2) the defendants committed an act in furtherance of the conspiracy which caused injury to person or property or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States; and (3) the conspiracy was motivated by racial, or other class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1050 (6th Cir. 1999). Here, the district court disposed of Plaintiffs' conspiracy claims in the following words: [A]s they have done throughout their various opposition briefs, the Plaintiffs confuse business agreements with conspiracies. The two are clearly not the same. The fact that an agreement between two parties has a negative effect on a third party does not transform that agreement into a conspiracy. Anyone is allowed to compete with anyone else, within the bounds of the law, for the benefit of a bargain. There is no evidence that the DDP was aware that the protected territory waiver had been promised to SSI, such that it could enter into an agreement with the Reds to interfere with the execution of that promise. More importantly, there are not facts from which one could Page 18 of 25 draw a reasonable inference that the Reds and the DDP agreed to maliciously injure SSI. J.A. at 572-73. On appeal, based on evidence showing that Allen issued the waiver to DDP after he learned that an African-American was the majority owner of Plaintiffs' Battle Cats team, Plaintiffs do little more than suggest that it is reasonable to infer that Allen never intended to consider any minority ownership in a Dayton team. Pl.'s Br. at 43. While they assert–without citing to record evidence–that Allen and the DDP knew that if Allen issued the waiver to DDP, which had already selected Dickson/Myers, a non-protected group, that a protected group would be prevented from attaining a much-coveted business deal in Dayton, id., such assertion, even if true, does not provide a basis for a conspiracy claim. Because Plaintiffs offer neither evidentiary support nor developed argumentation regarding their conspiracy claims, and because they make no attempt to address the deficiencies in proof found by the district court, we find no basis for disturbing the district court's decision as to Plaintiffs' conspiracy claims. See United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996) (explaining that it is a 'settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived') (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). 3. Promissory Estoppel Claim Plaintiffs claim that, in January 1997, Allen promised that, if the Reds agreed to grant a territorial waiver, the waiver would be granted in favor of SSI. In March 1997, allegedly in reliance on Allen's promise, Plaintiffs entered into both an MOU with Hara regarding a stadium project as well as an asset purchase agreement with the then-owners of the Michigan Battle Cats, paying $495,000 as a non-refundable earnest money deposit for the latter. Plaintiffs claim that when Allen Page 19 of 25 failed to grant them a territorial waiver, Plaintiffs were damaged by the loss of their earnest money deposit. They seek relief based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In Ohio, the elements necessary to establish a claim for promissory estoppel are: (1) a clear and unambiguous promise; (2) reliance upon the promise by the promisee; (3) reliance by the promisee that is both reasonable and foreseeable; and, (4) injury to the promisee as a result of the reliance. Weiper v. W.A. Hill & Assocs., 661 N.E.2d 796, 803 (Oh. Ct. App. 1995). The district court in this case assumed–for purposes of the Reds' motion for summary judgment–that Allen did promise that, if the Reds granted a territorial waiver, it would be granted to SSI. The district court nonetheless entered summary judgment in the Reds' favor on Plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim. Among other things, the district court noted that (1) Plaintiffs acquired an option on the Battle Cats before Allen made any alleged promises to SSI, albeit their nonrefundable deposit was paid after Allen made his alleged promise; (2) Allen made it perfectly clear to Plaintiffs–and Plaintiffs conceded–that the Reds had not decided (both when Allen made his alleged promise to SSI and when SSI entered into contracts with the owners of the Battle Cats and Hara) whether a waiver would be granted to anyone, SSI included; (3) SSI ultimately received a conditional waiver from the Reds; and (4) there was no evidence in the record to suggest that, when the Reds granted a conditional waiver to SSI, SSI's investments–including its earnest money deposit and its agreement with Hara–no longer retained their value. Under the circumstances, the district court found it illogical to find that Plaintiffs either reasonably relied on or were harmed by Allen's alleged promise. On appeal, Plaintiffs baldly state that they relied on Allen's promise, but they utterly fail to explain why this court should fault the district court either for concluding that it would be illogical Page 20 of 25 to find SSI's financial outlays were in reliance on Allen's conditional promise to grant it the waiver or for finding that [t]he Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence that they suffered injury, pecuniary or otherwise, because of the six months or so lapse of time between the time they expected to receive the waiver and the time they actually received it. J.A. at 571-72. Lacking detail, citation to facts in the record, and cogent argument, Plaintiffs' brief provides no basis for reversing the district court. 4. Tortious Interference Claim Plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that the Reds tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs' existing and prospective contractual and business relationships. Specifically, they alleged that, by issuing a protected territory waiver to the DDP in May 1997, the Reds tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs' contract to purchase the Battle Cats and Plaintiffs' MOU with Hara regarding the Hara Arena. In addition, they alleged that the Reds exerted influence on the Midwest League and/or NAPBLI, causing those organizations to refuse to review Plaintiffs' CIT and AFR applications. Finding no record support for either allegation, the district court granted summary judgment to the Reds on Plaintiffs' tortious interference claim. The district court did not err in this regard. Under Ohio law, tortious interference with a business relationship and/or a contract occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not to enter into or continue a business relation with another, or not to perform a contract with another. A & B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 651 N.E.2d 1283, 1294 (Ohio 1995); Wright v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 58 F.3d 1130, 1138 (6th Cir. 1995). Here, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that Allen or anyone else with the Reds contacted, much less exerted influence on, either the Midwest League or NAPBLI with regard to their review Page 21 of 25 of Plaintiffs' CIT and AFR applications. Based on this record, we can only speculate about why the League and NAPBLI failed to review Plaintiffs' applications. We can also only speculate about whether the League and NAPBLI would have granted the applications even if Plaintiffs had been granted a waiver by the Reds. Such speculation does not support a claim of tortious interference. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the Battle Cats and/or Hara breached their contracts, or ended their relationships, with Plaintiffs because of anything the Reds did or did not do. When Plaintiffs entered into their respective business relationships/contracts with Hara and the Battle Cats, they gambled that the Reds would grant them a territorial waiver. As explained by SSI principal Perry during his deposition: [Allen] had indicated to us that it was going to be his decision. Not that he would waive it or not, but that it's [Allen's] decision and he's considering very favorably waiving the territory. .... . . . We knew the Reds' decision could be no, we're not waiving the territory but we felt strong enough that things were looking positive that we went ahead and put money in place [for the Battle Cats and Hara Arena]. J.A. at 1319-20, 1321-22. Plaintiffs lost their gamble, but their loss was not the result of tortious interference by the Reds.