Opinion ID: 1601965
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on plaintiff's claim of negligence.

Text: ¶ 16. We afford trial courts considerable discretion regarding the form and substance of jury instructions. Splain v. Hines, 609 So.2d 1234, 1239 (Miss.1992). This Court does not look at jury instructions in isolationrather, we read them as a whole. Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Bolden, 854 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Miss.2003). While a party is entitled to have jury instructions submitted that represent his or her theory of the case, an instruction that `incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence' need not be submitted to the jury. Id. (quoting Humphrey v. State, 759 So.2d 368, 380 (Miss.2000)). If, after reading the instructions as a whole, we find that they fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, then we will not find reversible error. Bolden, 854 So.2d at 1054. ¶ 17. Plaintiff argues that she was deprived of a jury instruction on negligence. She contends that her complaint contained claims for negligent design and for simple negligence. Plaintiff maintains that although half of the trial was consumed with evidence regarding negligence and proximate cause, the trial court denied the proffered negligence instructions and submitted the case to the jury solely on the theory of strict liability. She asserts that RJR made the reasonableness of its conduct the theme of its defense; RJR was negligent in not removing the more dangerous higher tar brands from the product line, thereby forcing acceptance of the safer brand; and RJR was negligent for marketing the cigarettes when it knew the cigarettes were addictive and deadly. ¶ 18. First, we consider plaintiff's negligent design claim. Our holding in Estate of Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 729 So.2d 1264 (Miss.1999), is directly on point. In Hunter, the trial court refused to accept the plaintiff's requested negligence instruction. Instead, the court gave an instruction based on the risk-utility test set out in Prestage, just as the trial judge did here. In Hunter, we relied on United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.1947), for the proposition that [t]he risk-utility balancing test is merely a detailed version of Judge Learned Hand's negligence calculus. 729 So.2d at 1277. As a common-sense matter, the jury weighs competing factors presented in evidence and reaches a conclusion about the judgment or decision (i.e., conduct) of the manufacturer. The underlying negligence calculus is inescapable. Hunter, 729 So.2d at 1277. An examination of the riskutility [sic] test establishes that the test is essentially a negligence test, and [there was] .... no error in failing to grant a negligence instruction in addition to the risk-utility test. Id. at 1278. Because Hunter controls the case at hand, we find that the trial court did not err when it refused to submit a negligence instruction in addition to the Prestage -based instruction. ¶ 19. Next we consider plaintiff's claim that RJR was guilty of negligence in selling the cigarettes after RJR became aware that its cigarettes were addictive and could result in death. We find that this point is without merit because it is the same claim that plaintiff asserted in different wording through its defective design claim. ¶ 20. Third, plaintiff asserts that RJR was negligent in not removing the higher tar brands from the product line and forcing acceptance of the lower tar brands. This argument also mirrors the design defect claim since, in essence, it states that the levels of tar found in the cigarettes is a defect. Plaintiff failed to proffer any evidence that the proximate cause of Nunnally's death was RJR's failure to remove the higher tar brands from the market. Therefore, this point is without merit. ¶ 21. Next, plaintiff contends that RJR was negligent because it withheld from the governmental and scientific communities information concerning carcinogens found in cigarette smoke; maintained the appearance of a controversy over whether cigarettes caused lung cancer when no such controversy existed; and failed to encourage smokers to use a lower tar brand developed by RJR as their only brand. All three of these arguments are covered by plaintiff's claims of failure-towarn, misrepresentation, which were dismissed before trial began. Thus, we find that this point is likewise without merit. ¶ 22. Finally, plaintiff contends that RJR made its central issue the reasonableness of their actions, thereby making that the negligence instruction was an essential part of this trial. RJR asserts that plaintiff picks and chooses phrases from the transcript in order to make it seem like this was the case. In fact, all testimony that plaintiff refers to was given by David Townsend, an RJR expert. RJR asserted that Townsend is a design expert and the focus of his testimony was RJR's design efforts to make the safest, most desirable product possible. We find that this point is without merit. ¶ 23. We find that the trial court committed no error in refusing the proffered negligence instruction.