Opinion ID: 1651956
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Develop Expert Witness Testimony

Text: Echols argues that trial counsel was deficient in failing to select and use appropriate experts. He contends that counsel should have attempted to secure the following experts: (1) a criminal profiler; (2) a forensic odontologist; (3) a forensic entomologist; and (4) a forensic pathologist. The trial record reflects that defense counsel had the benefit of assistance from an experienced criminal investigator, an occult expert, a psychologist, and a jury consultant. [6] The trial court found that defense counsel was not ineffective for choosing not to call other expert witnesses, as the decision regarding which witnesses to call is largely a matter of professional judgment. Moreover, the trial court found that the explanations offered by trial counsel during the Rule 37 proceedings were sound. Finally, the trial court concluded that Echols had failed to meet his burden of proof, because the experts proffered at the Rule 37 hearing were largely discredited by the State. The trial court found: Expert swearing matches that the petitioner lost at the hearing do not support a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had his counsel attempted the same thing there. We cannot say that these findings are clearly erroneous. Generally, the decision whether to call a witness is a matter of trial strategy that is outside the purview of Rule 37. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) ( per curiam ); Coulter, 343 Ark. 22, 31 S.W.3d 826. This applies to expert witnesses. See Helton v. State, 325 Ark. 140, 924 S.W.2d 239 (1996). When assessing an attorney's decision not to call a particular witness, it must be taken into account that the decision is largely a matter of professional judgment that experienced advocates could endlessly debate, and the fact that there was a witness or witnesses who could have offered testimony beneficial to the defense is not in itself proof of counsel's ineffectiveness. Nelson, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791; Johnson v. State, 325 Ark. 44, 924 S.W.2d 233 (1996). Nonetheless, such strategic decisions must still be supported by reasonable professional judgment, pursuant to the standards set forth in Strickland . Id. Judicial review of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a fair assessment of counsel's performance under Strickland requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Thomas v. State, 330 Ark. 442, 447, 954 S.W.2d 255, 257 (1997) (citing Missildine v. State, 314 Ark. 500, 863 S.W.2d 813 (1993)). Price testified that he used an experienced criminal investigator, Ron Lax, in formulating defense strategy, including the use of experts. Price testified that he contacted a forensic pathologist, who reviewed the evidence for anything that might be helpful to the defense; however, Price did not call the pathologist at trial because he could not offer anything beneficial. Price also indicated that he chose not to call a criminologist regarding the State's only trace evidence, a red cotton fiber, because he was able to adequately challenge the evidence on cross-examination. Indeed, the trial record reflects that the State's witness conceded that the fiber was a very common one, without any unusual characteristics. Price testified that he did not seek a forensic odontologist to examine an alleged bite mark on one of the victim's face, because he did not even recall such evidence. He said that he never saw any evidence that one or more of the victims were bitten in connection with dying. His testimony was supported by the fact that even the experts who testified at the Rule 37 hearing could not agree that the mark was in fact a bite mark. Indeed, as the trial court found, the testimony given by Echols's experts during the postconviction proceedings was greatly discredited by the State. As such, it is unknown how such testimony would have been beneficial to Echols at trial. In sum, Echols has failed to demonstrate that counsel's decision not to call additional experts was error. To the contrary, we agree with the trial court that the record shows that counsel's decisions regarding the use of experts was based on reasonable professional judgment. More significantly, even if counsel's decisions could be viewed as erroneous, Echols has failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. We thus affirm the trial court's ruling on this point.