Opinion ID: 867208
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Garner Evidence

Text: ¶ 8 We begin by addressing what has become known as  Garner evidence. See Garner, 116 Ariz. at 447, 569 P.2d at 1345. The defendant in Garner was charged with sexually assaulting his minor son. Id. at 445, 569 P.2d at 1343. To prove the defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime, the prosecutor offered evidence that, on two occasions more than a year before the charged act, the defendant had oral sex with the boy. Id. at 445-46, 569 P.2d at 1343-44. On review, this Court stated that, [i]n a case involving a sex offense committed against a child, evidence of a prior similar sex offense committed against the same child is admissible to show the defendant's lewd disposition or unnatural attitude toward the particular victim. Id. at 447, 569 P.2d at 1345 (citing People v. Sylvia, 54 Cal.2d 115, 4 Cal.Rptr. 509, 351 P.2d 781, 785 (1960)). ¶ 9 Some courts have read Garner as creating an exception to the common law rule now codified in Rule 404(b)barring admission of other acts to prove a defendant's propensity to act in a certain way. [2] See, e.g., State v. Alatorre, 191 Ariz. 208, 213, 953 P.2d 1261, 1266 (App.1998); State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 534, 539, 937 P.2d 1182, 1187 (App. 1996). These courts have interpreted Garner as always allowing the admission of evidence of prior sexual acts with the same child victim, even if offered to prove the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act. ¶ 10 Twenty years after Garner, however, this Court promulgated Rule 404(c). See Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c), cmt. to 1997 amd. The court of appeals subsequently recognized that automatic admission of Garner evidence in cases involving sexual offenses conflicts with 404(c), which permits use of evidence of other acts to show the defendant's aberrant sexual propensity to commit the crime charged only if certain criteria are met. State v. Garcia, 200 Ariz. 471, 476 ¶ 31, 28 P.3d 327, 332 (App.2001). Thus, Garcia held that Garner evidence, which it viewed as necessarily offered to prove the defendant's propensity to act in a certain way, is subject to Rule 404(c) screening. Id. The decision below followed Garcia. See Ferrero, 2011 WL 1326208, at  ¶ 15. ¶ 11 We agree with Garcia and the court of appeals in this case that when the prosecution offers Garner evidence to prove the defendant's propensity to commit the charged sexual offense, the evidence must be screened under Rule 404(c). That rule supplants Garner 's potential exception to the propensity rule. We therefore relegate the term  Garner evidence to shorthand for the type of evidence at issue in that caseevidence of a prior similar sex offense committed against the same child. Garner, 116 Ariz. at 447, 569 P.2d at 1345. ¶ 12 But we disagree with the court of appeals that  Garner evidence is always subject to Rule 404(c) screening. Rule 404(b) and (c) create a framework for admitting evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts that depends in part upon the purpose for which the evidence is offered. As in Garner, the State offered other-act evidence here to prove Ferrero's propensity (and the jury was so instructed), but that will not always be the case. Garner evidence might also be relevant for non-propensity purposes, such as showing motive, intent, identity, or opportunity. If the evidence is offered for a non-propensity purpose, it may be admissible under Rule 404(b), subject to Rule 402's general relevance test, Rule 403's balancing test, and Rule 105's requirement for limiting instructions in appropriate circumstances. But if evidence of other sex acts is offered in a sexual misconduct case to show a defendant's aberrant propensity to commit the charged act, as it was here, Rule 404(c) applies. ¶ 13 Rules 404(b) and (c), however, apply only to evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. The admissibility of Garner evidence therefore depends on a second questionthat is, whether the evidence is so intrinsic to the charged act as not to constitute an other act.