Opinion ID: 677469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Co-defendant's Conviction

Text: 6 Upon learning that the Government intended to call co-defendant Brown as its last witness, DeLoach's counsel moved to exclude Brown's testimony or alternatively, to preclude the Government from eliciting Brown's earlier conviction. 2 The trial court denied the motion, but granted DeLoach's request for a cautionary instruction. 3 The court also granted DeLoach's request to admit evidence of Brown's earlier acquittal in Brown I. 7 The Government called Brown as its last witness. After establishing Brown's age and address, the prosecutor elicited from Brown that he had been convicted of conspiring to make false statements to savings and loans; of making false statements to savings and loans; and of using the mails in a scheme to defraud. The prosecutor then asked, who were you convicted of conspiring with, sir? DeLoach's counsel objected, and the court immediately instructed the jury that the conviction was being admitted solely to assess Brown's credibility and not as evidence of DeLoach's guilt. 4 8 On appeal, a district court's determination of admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing that the trial court abused its discretion. United States v. Griffin, 778 F.2d 707, 709 (11th Cir.1985). 9 DeLoach contends that the introduction of Brown's conviction was gravely prejudicial and constituted reversible error. DeLoach specifically argues that, because he did not intend to raise Brown's conviction on cross-examination, there was no proper purpose for the Government to question Brown about his conviction; that in questioning Brown and in closing argument the Government improperly used Brown's conviction as substantive evidence against DeLoach; and that the trial court's cautionary instruction was inadequate. We disagree. 10 A co-defendant's guilty plea or conviction may be brought out at trial provided that 1) the evidence serves a legitimate purpose and 2) the jury is properly instructed about the limited use they may make of it. United States v. King, 505 F.2d 602, 607 (5th Cir.1974); see also United States v. Countryman, 758 F.2d 574 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Melton, 739 F.2d 576, 578-79 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Edwards, 716 F.2d 822 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Borchardt, 698 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Jimenez-Diaz, 659 F.2d 562, 566 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Veltre, 591 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir.1979). 11 To use one person's guilty plea or conviction as substantive evidence of the guilt of another is improper. King, 505 F.2d at 607. Two examples of the proper evidentiary use of such pleas are: 1) to impeach trial testimony; and 2) to reflect on the witness' credibility. Id. We have said that when a co-defendant testifies, either the Government or the defense may elicit evidence of a guilty plea or conviction to aid the jury in assessing the co-defendant's credibility. United States v. Vigliatura, 878 F.2d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir.1989); see also Griffin, 778 F.2d at 710 n. 5. To blunt the impact of expected attacks on the witnesses' credibility, the Government may disclose guilty pleas of Government witnesses. Countryman, 758 F.2d at 577; Melton, 739 F.2d at 578-79; Veltre, 591 F.2d at 349. We have also permitted the admission of a guilty plea or conviction to prevent the jury from reaching the erroneous inference that a co-defendant whom the evidence shows was also culpable had escaped prosecution, see United States v. Jimenez-Diaz, 659 F.2d 562, 565-66 (5th Cir.1981), and to bolster the credibility of the witness, United States v. Hernandez, 921 F.2d 1569, 1583 (11th Cir.1991). 12 First, we note that the record does not fully support DeLoach's claim that he did not intend to raise Brown's conviction on cross-examination. DeLoach's counsel never unequivocally committed to refrain from eliciting Brown's prior conviction. One of DeLoach's lawyers told the district court that he did not intend to elicit Brown's conviction in this case. But, his next words were equivocal: I don't think we intend to elicit the fact of his conviction.... DeLoach's other lawyer indicated that because no one knew what Brown would say, it was possible that he would use the conviction. 5 Therefore, if defense counsel are to be believed, no one, not even defense counsel, knew, at the time the Government began its examination of Brown, whether or not the defense would elicit Brown's conviction on cross-examination. 13 Second, the defense invited the testimony about Brown's prior conviction. Beginning with its opening statement and throughout the Government's case, DeLoach sought to shift culpability to Brown and to portray him as the real culprit. For example during the opening statement, one of DeLoach's lawyers told the jury that the evidence would show which individuals had the motivation to mislead, who was it that wanted to get a loan, who was it that wanted to sell a project, whose misrepresentation did the bank rely on. Thus, the defense sought to portray Brown, the seller, as the one with the motive to lie. During the cross-examination of a mortgage broker, the defense sought to establish that Brown was more actively involved in the transactions than the typical condominium seller. Also, during cross-examination of one of the buyers, DeLoach sought to portray Brown as untrustworthy by stressing his involvement in the fraud and that he had misled the buyer into believing the creative financing scheme had been disclosed to the savings and loans. Had Brown's prior conviction not been brought to the jury's attention, the inference might have been that Brown was permitted by the Government to go unpunished. We conclude that the prosecution had a proper purpose to elicit Brown's conviction. 6 14 The trial court properly cautioned the jury that the conviction of co-defendant Brown could not be used to determine the guilt or innocence of DeLoach and could only be used to assess Brown's credibility. The law requires nothing more. E.g., Borchardt, 698 F.2d at 701 (jury must be given strong cautionary instruction that it may use guilty plea only to assess witnesses' credibility and not to create inference of guilt against accused). 15 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the Government to introduce Brown's earlier conviction. 16