Opinion ID: 2994717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Supervisor Harassment and Shands’ Excluded

Text: Testimony Mason also argues that Shands’ excluded testimony is relevant to his claim of a supervisor-created hostile work environment to show the pervasiveness of the environment or to show Kammerer’s real motives for her ostensibly race-neutral treatment of him. In some supervisor cases, evidence of coworker behavior might be relevant to show pervasiveness or motive. But Mason did not make these arguments until his reply brief, so they are waived. And even if he had preserved them, in this case, as we shall see, these arguments are re-packaged attempts to use incidents of coworker behavior to establish a claim that is based on supervisor harassment. Furthermore, neither Mason nor Kammerer were even present for the alleged incidents of coworker harassment that Shands’ testimony would purportedly expose. Thus, Mason is trying to hold SIU strictly liable (by nominally proceeding under a claim of supervisor harassment) by using evidence of coworker harassment of which neither he nor the supervisor in question were even aware. Mason cannot bootstrap coworker behavior onto his claim of supervisor harassment. As to pervasiveness, Mason argued to the district court that the conduct of his coworkers is relevant to some sort of derivative supervisor harassment theory under which Kammerer, through racist behavior, sets the tone of the department, signaling to subordinates that it is okay if they harass Mason, their coworker. Cf. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting possibility of a Title VII retaliation theory where a supervisor permits a plaintiff’s fellow employees to punish her for invoking her rights under Title VII). As we understand Mason’s theory of supervisor harassment, the actions of the coworkers are deemed to be the actions of the supervisor for which the company is then (strictly) liable. This appears to be another bootstrapping effort, but since Mason has failed to pursue this argument on appeal, we need not wrestle with it. Whatever supervisor-based theory Mason might wish to employ to establish pervasiveness, there is a clear problem with using Shands’ excluded evidence of coworker comments: Mason never knew of these comments. Mean-spirited or derogatory behavior of which a plaintiff is unaware, and thus never experiences, is not harassment of the plaintiff (severe, pervasive, or other). Thus, for alleged incidents of racism to be relevant to showing the severity or pervasiveness of the plaintiff’s hostile work environment, the plaintiff must know of them. See Ngeunjuntr v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 146 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998) (racial comments made outside employee’s presence did not show hostile environment); Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 938 & n.8 (7th Cir. 1996) (harassing conduct must be directed at employee in order to show racially hostile environment); see also Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 981 (6th Cir. 2000) (hostile actions of which plaintiff was unaware were not relevant to her claim of a hostile work environment); Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 701 n.7 (8th Cir. 1999) (Plaintiff knew of graffiti during the time in which she experienced harassment. It is thus relevant on whether a hostile work environment existed . . . .); cf. Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 167 F.3d 340, 347 (7th Cir. 1999) (doubting the admissibility of odious statements plaintiff never heard to show racial motive)./8 Here, it is undisputed that no one ever made such comments to Mason or in his presence, and in his offer of proof, Mason’s attorney did not advise the court that Shands would testify that she had ever told Mason about his coworkers’ alleged use of racial epithets. Nor is it otherwise apparent from the record that Shands told Mason about them (or that he otherwise knew of them)./9 Mason’s offer of proof thus failed to advise the district court of how Shands’ testimony would be of significance in terms of establishing pervasiveness. United States v. Peak, 856 F.2d 825, 832 (7th Cir. 1988) (the adequacy of [an offer of proof] is an essential prerequisite to a finding of error). As we have said, it is up to the party challenging exclusion to formulate an offer which satisfies all needs. One of the needs in this case was some indication that, at a minimum, Mason was aware of these epithets. United States ex rel. Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642, 648 (7th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. King, 75 F.3d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring specificity in offer of proof and rejecting blanket offers). Mason acknowledged at oral argument that his counsel had an opportunity to make a full and complete offer of proof. United States v. Schroeder, 902 F.2d 1469, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990). There is no reason why he could not have offered to have Shands prove that she told Mason about the racial epithets his coworkers allegedly used when he wasn’t around. Because we do not know whether Shands was in fact prepared to so testify, we cannot assess whether the exclusion was prejudiciously erroneous. See Cleggett, 179 F.3d at 1055; King, 75 F.3d at 1223; United States v. Alden, 476 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1973). Mason also argues that the excluded evidence of coworker comments is relevant to show that Kammerer’s racially neutral but negative treatment of him was based on his race. See Carter, 173 F.3d at 701. More specifically, it would show that Kammerer did not put a stop to Mason’s coworkers’ alleged racist comments because of her own racial animus. We disagree with the relevance of such evidence here. The district court allowed into evidence anything racial that Kammerer allegedly said (even when Mason was not around), as well as anything racial that coworkers allegedly said in Kammerer’s presence (again, even when Mason was not there). What Mason seeks to admit to establish Kammerer’s motives are statements that coworkers allegedly made when she was not there. While evidence of coworker behavior of which the supervisor was aware might be relevant to show the supervisor’s motives, Carter, supra, there has to be proof that she was aware of or that she at least had some connection to the behavior. Because Kammerer was not present on those occasions when coworkers allegedly made the comments in question, the alleged comments are not relevant to showing her motives. Cf. Hunt v. City of Markham, Ill., 219 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (the fact that someone who is not involved in the employment decision of which the plaintiff complains expressed discriminatory feelings is not evidence that the decision[maker] had a discriminatory motivation); Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2000). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence.