Opinion ID: 197072
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of the Departure Criteria

Text: 25 The guidelines prescribe two types of departure mechanisms. Section 4A1.3 focuses primarily on past criminal conduct, and permits an upward departure if the defendant's pre-departure CHC, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, does not adequately reflect the seriousness of [his] past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes. Id. § 4A1.3. Normally, these section 4A1.3 departures are guided and horizontal. That is, within the defendant's total offense level the court moves horizontally across the sentencing table through successively higher CHCs until it reaches an appropriate, or reflective sentencing range. Only in extreme cases--those involving egregious past criminal conduct--may a section 4A1.3 departure exceed the GSR prescribed under CHC VI. See United States v. Mendez-Colon, 15 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir.1994). 8 26 Section 5K2.0, on the other hand, permits an upward departure if the district court finds an aggravating ... circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). The section 5K2.0 departure mechanism focuses primarily on unusual attributes of the offense of conviction, rather than any underrepresentation of past criminal conduct in the defendant's CHC. Section 5K2.0 departures are unguided, and functionally vertical, meaning that the sentencing court need not restrict itself to considering successively higher CHC ranges along the horizontal axis in the sentencing table, but may select whatever sentence appropriately reflects the unusual circumstances in the case. See generally Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1, 39-40 (1991). 27 Hardy first argues that the district court committed an error of law by relying on the number and dangerousness of the weapons used by him and his two associates in the Lenox Street shooting spree as grounds for an upward departure. He points out that the November 1990 guidelines expressly constitute the number of firearms a specific offense characteristic under section 2K2.2 (Unlawful Trafficking), but not under section 2K2.1 (Unlawful Possession), thereby implicitly rejecting the number of firearms as a ground for departure under section 2K2.1. See United States v. Enriquez-Munoz, 906 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir.1990). But see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 (1994) (amended version, designating number of firearms as specific offense characteristic). Hardy also notes that section 2K2.1(a)(1) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861 already provide a twelve-level sentencing enhancement for the increased risk inherent in possessing some types of firearms (e.g., Hardy's sawed-off shotgun), see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a), thereby suggesting that the Commission meant to foreclose departures based on the dangerousness of all other weapon types (e.g., Hardy's semi-automatic pistol). 28 Notwithstanding the explicit consideration given to the number of firearms in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.2, a departure criterion cannot be deemed impermissible in all circumstances unless categorically foreclosed by the Commission. See Koon, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2051. The Commission d[id] not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case. U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. comment. (4)(b) (emphasis added). 29 Hardy pled guilty to certain firearm possession charges. The reference to the number of firearms was made by the district court in the context of its discussion of the heightened dangerousness associated with the manner in which Hardy and his cohorts not only possessed but used their firearms. See infra Section II.B.2(b); cf. Enriquez-Munoz, 906 F.2d at 1361 (rejecting departure based on number of weapons and defendant's intent to cause greater harm, where sentencing court made no finding of such intent, and purchase/sale of multiple weapons created no demonstrably greater harm). The use and/or indiscriminate disposal of multiple weapons which took place in this case surely elevated their dangerousness well above the level associated with the simple possession of a single firearm. 30 Moreover, rather than being categorically forbidden as a departure ground under section 2K2.1, the heightened dangerousness occasioned by the usage, and indiscriminate abandonment, of the firearms involved here is encouraged as a departure ground in appropriate circumstances: 31 If a weapon or dangerous instrumentality was used or possessed in the commission of the offense the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the dangerousness of the weapon, the manner in which it is used, and the extent to which it endangered others. The discharge of a firearm might warrant a substantial sentence increase. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.6 (emphasis added). 9 32 Finally, the fact that the Commission decided against making weapon type a specific offense characteristic under section 2K2.1 in no sense indicates that it intended to preclude a judicial determination that certain types of weapons are inherently more dangerous than others, but simply that possession of a particular type of weapon, in and of itself, is not invariably indicative of the defendant's intent. For example, the guidelines permit a downward adjustment for the illegal possession of a firearm intended for recreational use only. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment. (n.2) ([S]ome rifles or shotguns may be possessed for criminal purposes, while some handguns may be suitable for recreation. Therefore, the guideline is not based upon the type of weapon.); see also id. § 2K2.1(b)(1) (citing recreational intent as mitigating sentencing factor). 33 Thus, the omission of a specific offense characteristic relating to weapon type falls far short of a categorical prohibition. Accordingly, to the extent a sentencing court supportably finds that a defendant's choice of weapons, and the actual manner of its use, increased the danger to unusual levels, an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.6 would be permissible. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. comment. (4)(b); see also, e.g., United States v. Lebon, 800 F.Supp. 1012, 1017 (D.Mass.1992) (departure warranted for defendant's use of semiautomatic weapons).