Opinion ID: 1870584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: prospective application of act 431

Text: Prospective operation of statutes is a general rule and, as a general rule, it is respected by the courts. Dixon, Judicial Method in Interpretation of Law in Louisiana, 42 La.L.Rev. 1661, 1665 (1982). Planiol aptly articulates the rationale behind this general rule: a fact and an act are governed by the law under whose aegis they took place.... [T]he solution cannot change on account of the circumstance that when the court rules, the law governing such a fact or such an act is no longer the same. 1 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law,  243A (La.St.L.Inst.Trans.1959). This general rule against retroactive application of legislative enactments, and the exceptions thereto, is codified in LSA-C.C. Art. 6, which is the governing rule of statutory construction applicable in this case. In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretive laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary. LSA-C.C. Art. 6; See also LSA-R.S. 1:2 (stating that no statute may be applied retroactively unless it is expressly so stated). LSA-C.C. Art. 6 requires that we engage in a two-fold inquiry. First, we must ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application. If the legislature did so, our inquiry is at an end. If the legislature did not, we must classify the enactment as substantive, procedural or interpretive. See Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 182 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 920 F.2d 259 (5th Cir.1990), citing Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So.2d 1331, 1338-39 (La.1978). Generally, the determinative point in time separating prospective from retroactive application of an enactment is the date the cause of action accrues. [15] Once a party's cause of action accrues, it becomes a vested property right that may not constitutionally be divested. Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So.2d 305, 308 (La.1986); Faucheaux v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation Hospital and Clinic, 470 So.2d 878, 879 (La.1985); Lott v. Haley, 370 So.2d 521, 524 (La.1979); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage District No. 2, 366 So.2d 1381, 1387 (La.1978); Marcel v. Louisiana State Department of Public Health, 492 So.2d 103, 109-10 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 494 So.2d 334 (La.1986). Stated differently, statutes enacted after the acquisition of such a vested property right ... cannot be retroactively applied so as to divest the plaintiff of his vested right in his cause of action because such a retroactive application would contravene the due process guaranties. Faucheaux, 470 So.2d at 879. In resolving this issue, the Third Circuit reversed the two-part inquiry required by LSA-C.C. Art. 6, classifying the enactment as substantive, without first ascertaining the legislative intent: [c]omparative fault is a substantive right and it may not be applied retroactively. Jones v. Gateway Realty, Inc., 550 So.2d 388 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989), writ den., 556 So.2d 27, 30 (La. 1990). Cole, 588 So.2d at 384. Continuing, the Third Circuit identified the determinative point when plaintiffs' causes of action accrued, finding: [t]he record is replete with evidence that plaintiffs' causes of action accrued prior to the Louisiana Comparative Fault Law, effective in 1980. Cole, 588 So.2d at 384. [16] While we do not disagree with the Third Circuit's finding that Act 431 is substantive and that these plaintiffs' causes of action accrued before the Act's effective date, we opt not to hinge our decision on either the Act's classification, or the dates on which plaintiffs' causes of action accrued. [17] Instead, we find dispositive the first part of the LSA-C.C. Art. 6 inquiryÔÇöexpressed legislative intent. Act 431 contains a clear and unmistakable expression of legislative intent regarding prospective application, providing in Section 4 of the Act that [t]he provisions of this act shall not apply to claims [18] arising from events that occurred prior to the time this act becomes effective, and in Section 7 of the Act that [t]he provisions of this Act shall become effective on August 1, 1980. Indeed, the mere inclusion of this type of a provision in a legislative enactment evidences a clear legislative intent that the enactment be given prospective application. 1A Sutherland Stat. Const.  20.24 (4th Ed.1985). [19] Louisiana courts have repeatedly recognized the clarity of this statement of legislative intent contained in Act 431 in the context of traditional tort suits in which the tortious conduct and damages coincide. Smiley v. Sikes, 543 So.2d 1084 (La.App.2d Cir.), writ denied, 548 So.2d 326 (La.1989); McDermott v. Jester, 466 So.2d 795 (La. App.4th Cir.), writ denied, 468 So.2d 576 (La.1985); Hyde v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 697 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.1983); See Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 1438 (1971). In that context, Louisiana courts implicitly have equated the term events contained in Act 431 with the traditional tort concepts accident and injury, reasoning that when the accident and injury occurred before the Act's effective date, pre-Act law applies. See McDermott, supra . Consistent with that line of cases, a suggested approach is that we construe the term events in Act 431 as encompassing the requisites for asserting a cause of action, which are synonymous with the requisites for a cause of action accruing. [20] Simply put, the requisites for asserting a cause of action are a wrongful act and resulting damages. Crier, 496 So.2d at 308 (citing Rayne State Bank & Trust Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 483 So.2d 987, 995 (La.1986)); Lucas v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 198 So.2d 560, 564-65 (La.App. 1st Cir.1967). The problem with the suggested approach, however, is that the concepts upon which it is based were designed for handling traditional tort suits, and those concepts are inept for identifying the key events giving rise to a cause of action for long-term exposure to asbestos in the workplace. The uniqueness of asbestosis cases and the difficulties of trying to fit such cases within the framework of concepts designed to handle traditional torts has been recognized: `the factual predicate giving rise to potential liability from asbestos exposure is simply different from those that generated most tort doctrines ... [and thus such cases differ] in legally important aspects from those types of injuries that present tort doctrines were designed to accommodate.'  Ducre v. Mine Safety Appliances, 573 F.Supp. 388, 391 n. 1 (E.D.La. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 976 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, en banc, 758 F.2d 651 (5th Cir.1985) (quoting Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581, 583-84 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S.Ct. 1598, 80 L.Ed.2d 129 (1984) (Goldberg, J. dissenting) and noting that [o]ccupational diseases of the kind at hand are particularly difficult to classify pragmatically within the structured concepts of traditional tort law). The difficulties in asbestosis cases arise because, unlike in traditional personal injury cases in which the damage results from a single, identifiable act causing traumatic injury, in asbestosis cases the damage results from a continuous processÔÇöa slow development of this hidden disease over the years. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.1963). [21] Compounding the problem, asbestosis cases are characterized by a lengthy latency periodÔÇötypically ranging a decade or twoÔÇö and, consequently, a lengthy temporal separation between the tortious conduct and the appearance of injury. See Comment, Liability Insurance For Insidious Disease: Who Picks Up the Tab?, 48 Fordham L.Rev. 657, 665 n. 46 (1980). This lengthy latency period renders efforts to pinpoint the date on which the disease was contracted virtually impossible, medically and legally. Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1133 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109, 102 S.Ct. 686, 70 L.Ed.2d 650 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 1009, 102 S.Ct. 1649, 71 L.Ed.2d 878 (1982); Classen, An Investigation into the Statute of Limitations and Product Identification in Asbestos Litigation, 30 How.L.J. 1, 4 (1987). Further, this inability to pinpoint when injuries were sustained in asbestosis cases renders determining the date on which a plaintiff's cause of action accrued a herculean task. The issue we must address, therefore, is how to define the relevant events in long-latency occupational disease cases for purposes of determining whether pre-Act, or comparative fault, law applies. Turning to general rules of statutory construction, LSA-C.C. Art. 11 mandates that we give the words the legislature utilizes their generally prevailing meaning. The generally prevailing meaning of the term event is a significant happening or occurrence. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1990); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1978); Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979). Significantly, the term accident is synonymous with event, meaning a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening, an occurrence, event or happening, or an unexpected and undesirable event. Webster's, supra; American Heritage, supra; Black's, supra. While we apparently have never had an occasion to construe the meaning of the term event, we have had occasion to construe the meaning of the term accident. Carroll v. International Paper Co., 175 La. 315, 143 So. 275 (1932). In Carroll, supra, the issue before us was the effect of an amendment to a prescription provision of the compensation law changing the wording of the statute from within one year of the injury  to within one year of the accident.  (emphasis supplied). The amendment was prompted by previous cases in which the term injury had been construed broadly as encompassing the injurious results of an accident and in which it was thus found that an action was not barred provided it was brought within a year after the injury manifested itself. Construing the legislative intent in changing the word injury to accident, we held in Carroll, supra, that the legislature meant for prescription to reckon from the date of the physical accident, reasoning that the word accident does not mean the resulting personal injury, but means the occurrence itself, the happening of which causes the injury. 143 So. at 276. [22] We conclude that the key relevant events giving rise to a claim in long-latency occupational disease cases are the repeated tortious exposures resulting in continuous, on-going damages, although the disease may not be considered contracted or manifested until later. We further conclude that when the tortious exposures occurring before Act 431's effective date are significant and such exposures later result in the manifestation of damages, pre-Act law applies. Our reliance on significant, continuous pre-Act exposures as the key factor in determining the applicable law is supported by the empirical evidence. By the 1970's, it was widely known that prolonged inhalation of asbestos has a high probability of causing damages. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1045 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007, 102 S.Ct. 1644, 71 L.Ed.2d 875, reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 951, 102 S.Ct. 2023, 72 L.Ed.2d 476 (1982). Indeed, the Keene court notes that although asbestosis had been known by man since the early 1900's, it was not until the 1960's, or early 1970's, that the general danger of prolonged exposure to asbestos fibers was fully realized. This realization brought with it dramatic changes: in 1972, the federal government created the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA), and OSHA promulgated stringent guidelines in this area; [23] manufacturers stopped using asbestos in their products; [24] and insurance companies ceased issuing policies that adequately covered asbestos-related diseases. [25] Our reliance on significant, continuous pre-Act exposures is further buttressed by the holding in Koker v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 60 Wash.App. 466, 804 P.2d 659 (1991), petition for review denied, 117 Wash.2d 1006, 815 P.2d 265 (1991). In Koker, supra, the Washington appellate court, under very similar facts, relied upon the presence of significant, continuous exposures occurring before the enactment of a similar tort reform statute to reach the same result as we do. Koker, supra, was a suit by a worker for damages resulting from exposure to asbestos. The plaintiff, Koker, worked as a pipe fitter at a shipyard from 1969 to 1971 and from 1974 to 1986, during which time he was exposed to asbestos-containing products. In 1985, Koker commenced suit against the manufacturers of the asbestos-containing products to which he was exposed. In 1981, the Washington legislature had passed a Tort Reform Act. On appeal from a jury award in Koker's favor, the manufacturers contended that Koker's claim was a product's liability claim arising after the Act's effective date, and, as such, was governed by the Act's provisions. Conversely, Koker contended that his claim arose before the Act and, as such, was governed by pre-Act law. In addressing this issue, the Koker court looked to the Act's legislative history. The Washington Act, like Act 431, contained an express declaration of legislative intent regarding prospective application, declaring that the Act applies to all claims arising on or after July 26, 1981, the Act's effective date. The legislative history revealed that as originally drafted the Act employed the word accruing, which was later changed to arising. [26] The Koker court found a significant difference in meaning in this context between the terms arise and accrue, stating that a claim arises when the injury producing event takes place, not when the claim is filed. 804 P.2d at 663. In resolving the issue in the plaintiff's favor, the Koker court began by noting that [h]ere, the exposure to the asbestos was in the late 1960's, the 1970's, and 1980's, and in a footnote, noting that [a]ll parties agree that the degree of exposure was less in the later years with the advent of preventative and precautionary measures. 804 P.2d at 663 n. 4. Based on these findings, the Koker court concluded that pre-Act law applied, reasoning: [b]ecause the harm here results from exposure (continuous in nature), it appears that substantially all of the events which can be termed `injury producing' occurred prior to the adoption of the Act. 804 P.2d at 663-64. No one in the instant case contests that the degree of exposure was less in the later years [27] or that the damages in the instant case resulted from continuous exposures, caused by continuous tortious conduct. Indeed, in this case, such exposures commenced as early as the 1940's, and spanned through the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's. [28] In summary, we find that substantial injury producing exposures giving rise to plaintiffs' claims occurred before the August 1, 1980, effective date of Act 431, and, therefore, affirm the Third Circuit's holding that the provisions of the Louisiana Comparative Fault Law are inapplicable and that this case is governed by pre-Act lawÔÇöcontributory negligence [29] and virile share principles. [30]