Opinion ID: 901628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Computers and Word Processors

Text: [¶ 13.] We do not reach the merits of Smith's claim concerning the loss of computers and word processors because his claim is barred by res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata serves as claim preclusion to prevent relitigation of an issue actually litigated or which could have been properly raised and determined in a prior action. Matter of Estate of Nelson, 330 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1983); Schmidt v. Zellmer, 298 N.W.2d 178 (S.D.1980); Gottschalk v. South Dakota State Real Estate Comm'n, 264 N.W.2d 905 (S.D.1978). . . . For the purposes of res judicata, a cause of action is comprised of the facts which give rise to, or establish, the right a party seeks to enforce. Carr v. Preslar, 73 S.D. 610, 47 N.W.2d 497 (1951); Jerome v. Rust, 23 S.D. 409, 122 N.W. 344 (1909). In Golden v. Oahe Enterprises, Inc., 90 S.D. 263, 240 N.W.2d 102 (1976), we approved of the test adopted in Hanson v. Hunt Oil Co., 505 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir.1974), for determining if both causes of action are the same. This test is a query into whether the wrong sought to be redressed is the same in both actions. Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Felco Jewel Industries, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 153, 157 (S.D.1983) (emphasis in original). If the wrong sought to be redressed is the same in both actions: A judgment which bars a second action upon the same claim extends not only to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but also to all other admissible matters which might have been offered for the same purpose. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876); Hanson v. Hunt Oil Company, 505 F.2d at 1239; Ramsey Tp., McCook County v. Lake, 68 S.D. 67, 298 N.W. 356 (1941); Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Gillis, 80 S.D. 617, 129 N.W.2d 532 (1964). If, however, the second action is based upon a different claim or demand, the prior judgment precludes further consideration only of those issues which were actually litigated and determined. . . . Golden, 90 S.D. at 276, 240 N.W.2d at 109. [¶ 14.] Smith was a member of another group of inmates who brought a prior action in federal court claiming that this policy change involving inmate ownership of computers and similar equipment violated South Dakota law and their constitutional right of access to the courts. The federal court dismissed that case for failure to state a claim. Waff v. South Dakota Dep't of Corr ., CIV 99-4045 (DSD 2001), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Waff v. South Dakota Dep't of Corr., 51 Fed.Appx. 615 (8th Cir.2002) (unpublished). The district court's order following the Eighth Circuit's decision noted that Smith had been dismissed from the suit and that he had not appealed that dismissal. [10] [¶ 15.] In this proceeding, Smith again alleges that the loss of his computer violated due process under the State Constitution. However, this claim either was or could have been asserted in the prior federal suit. [11] It is settled law in South Dakota that a judgment subject to res judicata constitute[s] an absolute bar against the prosecution, not only of every claim or demand therein in controversy, but also of all other admissible matters that might have been offered to sustain or defeat such claims or demands. Weddell v. Weber, 2000 SD 3, ¶ 39, 604 N.W.2d 274, 283-284 (quoting Cochrun v. Solem, 397 N.W.2d 94, 96 (S.D.1986)) (emphasis in original). Because Smith's current claim either was or could have been offered to sustain his claim in the federal suit, his current claim is barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. [12] See also Grand State Property, Inc. v. Woods, Fuller, Shultz, & Smith, P.C., 1996 SD 139, ¶ 12, 556 N.W.2d 84, 87 (listing the four factors of collateral estoppel).