Opinion ID: 2317015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Available Remedy Is A New Penalty Hearing Under The 2002 Death Penalty Statute

Text: Finally, we must determine the appropriate remedy, given the procedural flaw in the imposition of Capano's death sentence. Capano claims that the Double Jeopardy clauses in the United States and Delaware constitutions bar retrial of the penalty phase. [52] We conclude that neither constitution bars a new penalty hearing because the jury's penalty recommendation under the 1991 statute did not operate as an acquittal. Double jeopardy prevents the government from prosecuting an individual more than once for the same offense. [53] The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution mandates that no person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb... The underlying idea [of the Double Jeopardy Clause] is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. [54] Generally, double jeopardy principles do not apply to sentencing proceedings. [55] Capital sentencing proceedings provide an exception to the general rule, however, because the penalty phase of a capital trial resembles an ordinary trial proceeding; the sentencing authority chooses between two alternatives based upon standards to guide its decision, and the prosecution undertakes the burden of establishing facts beyond a reasonable doubt. [56] In other words, double jeopardy may apply to the penalty phase of a capital trial because the penalty phase proceeding is like a trial. [57] The United States Supreme Court has held that double jeopardy did not attach [in a case where the death penalty statute in effect at the time of the crime and trial was unconstitutional] because a statute, albeit unconstitutional, permitting capital punishment for first degree murder existed at the time of the crimes. [58] The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the Double Jeopardy clause imposes no absolute prohibition against the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial after a defendant has succeeded in having his original conviction set aside. [59] The Supreme Court of Arizona has reasoned that resentencing of a capital defendant does not implicate a defendant's protection against double jeopardy if the defendant has not been acquitted of the death sentence. [60] In deciding Ring on remand from the United States Supreme Court ( Ring II ), the highest court of Arizona set forth two reasons why double jeopardy does not bar resentencing a defendant for a capital charge where the original sentencing process was unconstitutional. [61] First, the resentencing does not increase the sentence. Second, the resentencing does not supplement the original jury verdict. Courts of other states, including the Idaho Supreme Court [62] and a Washington appeals court [63] have followed Arizona's holding. We agree, consistent with the reasoning of the Arizona Supreme Court in Ring II, that double jeopardy does not bar a new penalty hearing in this case. First, although a defendant can be resentenced following an appellate reversal of his or her original sentence, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits imposing any sentence of which the defendant was either actually or impliedly acquitted in the first instance. [64] A defendant cannot be sentenced to death at a subsequent sentencing proceeding if the sentencer or reviewing court has decided that the prosecution has failed to prove its case that the death penalty is appropriate. [65] Under double jeopardy principles, an acquittal on the merits by the sole decisionmaker in the proceeding is final and bars retrial on the same charge. [66] Where the defendant had originally received a capital sentence, however, the United States Supreme Court has not applied the bar of double jeopardy. In Poland v. Arizona , the Court held that capital defendants sentenced to death at their original sentencing proceeding and whose sentences were vacated on appeal can be resentenced to death on remand. [67] Because Capano has already been sentenced to death, a new penalty hearing does not subject Capano to a harsher sentence. Second, resentencing does not supplement the original jury verdict. Although completing a defendant's trial with the same judge or jurors is ideal, a defendant has no absolute right to such an arrangement: The double-jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment ... does not mean that every time a defendant is put to trial before a competent tribunal he is entitled to go free if the trial fails to end in a final judgment. Such a rule would create an insuperable obstacle to the administration of justice in many cases in which there is no semblance of the type of oppressive practices at which the double-jeopardy prohibition is aimed. [68] As we have explained, whether a new penalty hearing is barred by double jeopardy depends upon whether Capano was acquitted of capital murder. Here, the jury's recommendation and the judge's sentence of Capano to death cannot be characterized as an acquittal because at the time of sentencing (1) the intent of the General Assembly under the 1991 statute was that the jurors' vote served only as a nonbinding recommendation, (2) the trial judge did not enter a judgment of acquittal on capital murder, and (3) the trial judge convicted Capano of capital murder after the penalty hearing. We hold the imposition of the death penalty under the process of the 1991 statute was not an acquittal that bars a new penalty hearing. [69] At the time of Capano's trial, the General Assembly intended that the jury make a recommendation, and that the trial judge decide whether to impose a death sentence. [70] The statute expressly addresses the possibility of a non-unanimous recommendation. Section 4209(c)(3)b provided that [t]he jury shall report to the Court its final vote by the number of each affirmative and negative votes on each question. Given this legislative intent, we find Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania to be controlling precedent. [71] The United States Supreme Court held in Sattazahn that double jeopardy did not prevent Pennsylvania from retrying a death penalty case when the jury did not reach a unanimous verdict. [72] In Sattazahn, the jury completed the guilt phase of the trial but during the penalty phase could not reach a decision. Under Pennsylvania law Sattazahn moved that the jury be discharged and that the court enter a sentence of life imprisonment. The state statute required the judge to grant Sattazahn's motion. On appeal, the conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. On retrial, Sattazahn was convicted and sentenced to death. [73] The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Sattazahn's contention that double jeopardy protected him when the jury deadlocked at his first sentencing proceedings and the court was required to impose a sentence of life imprisonment under Pennsylvania law. The Court determined that under Pennsylvania law the automatic life sentence was not an acquittal, and there was no state court ruling to the contrary. [74] Under Delaware law, in contrast, a sentence following a penalty hearing involves a balancing process to determine if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances of the case. [75] Where a sentencing judge in Delaware performs the balancing required by statute and imposes a life sentence, that constitutes an acquittal on the merits of whether the death penalty is appropriate. Under the 1991 Statute, the Capano jury did not make the final determination for death penalty eligibility. [76] We note that a jury did do that before the 1991 Death Penalty Statute became effective [77] and a jury does that under the present statute. [78] Thus before and after the 1991 Statute, a non-unanimous vote on the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance would constitute an acquittal on that circumstance for purposes of double jeopardy. However, it was not the intent of the General Assembly for a non-unanimous jury vote to constitute an acquittal under the 1991 statute. [79] The sentencing judge in Capano's case did not view the jury's recommendation as an acquittal. Had the trial judge decided acquittal was the appropriate disposition of the alleged statutory aggravating circumstance, he would have said so and sentenced Capano to life imprisonment. Here, the trial judge found the statutory aggravating circumstance of substantial planning beyond a reasonable doubt. There has been no acquittal of that alleged statutory aggravating circumstance in this case. The Dissent has relied upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel to support its view that a new penalty hearing cannot proceed. Courts place the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding. [80] Even if Capano had sought protection under the collateral estoppel doctrine, we are not persuaded that collateral estoppel applies. Because the prior penalty hearing has been vacated and was not an acquittal, it cannot serve to determine an ultimate issue in the present case for the purposes of collateral estoppel. [81] Our decision today vacates Capano's death sentence because the procedure under the 1991 statute, as applied to him, was constitutionally flawed. The fact of substantial planning, or the lack thereof, has not been determined by a valid and final judgment. [82] Similarly, as explained above, there was no acquittal of capital murder under the 1991 statute. Therefore, neither common law principles of collateral estoppel nor any provision of the Delaware Code [83] prevents another penalty hearing where the issue of punishment will be decided under procedures that comply with the United States and Delaware Constitutions.