Opinion ID: 1268390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court's denial of Zambrana's motion to sever

Text: We first address the district court's denial of Zambrana's motion to sever the homicide counts from the drug-conspiracy counts, a decision that we review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Rice, 520 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir.2008). Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a), an indictment may charge a defendant with two or more offenses in separate counts if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. Fed.R.Crim.P. 14(a), however, states that if the joinder of offenses appears to prejudice a defendant, then the district court may order separate trials for the different offenses. The potential sources of prejudice are many. For instance, the joinder might impermissibly coerce a defendant into testifying on a count upon which he wishes to remain silent. United States v. Archer, 843 F.2d 1019, 1022 (7th Cir.1988); see also United States v. Nettles, 476 F.3d 508, 516-17 (7th Cir.2007). Likewise, the joinder may prejudice the defendant by creating a spill-over effectthat is, that the jury relies on evidence presented on one set of counts when reaching a conclusion on the other set. See United States v. Dixon, 184 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir.1999); United States v. Freland, 141 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (7th Cir.1998). But whatever the source of the purported prejudice, the defendant bears a heavy burden on appeal when arguing that the prejudice warranted severance. It is not enough for the defendant to show that separate trials for the charges `may have provided him with a better opportunity for acquittal.' Dixon, 184 F.3d at 645 (quoting United States v. Alexander, 135 F.3d 470, 477 (7th Cir.1998)). Instead, the defendant must establish that the denial of severance actually prejudiced him by preventing the jury from arriving at a reliable judgment as to guilt or innocence. See id.; Alexander, 135 F.3d at 477; United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1282 (7th Cir. 1990). Here, Zambrana argues that he was unfairly and materially prejudiced by the joinder of the [h]omicide [c]harges to the [d]rug[conspiracy] [c]harges. Zambrana explains that the joinder prevented him from testifying in his defense against the homicide allegations. Specifically, Zambrana continues, but for the joinder of the homicide and drug-conspiracy counts, he would have testified that on the night of Hurtado's and Nevarez's murders he was gambling on riverboats, nowhere near the two men. But because the indictment alleged that he had gambled on riverboats to launder his drug money, Zambrana posits that, had he opted to testify as to his alibi, he would have necessarily implicated himself on the money-laundering counts. Zambrana further contends that the district court was aware that he wished to testify as to his alibi. As he points out, he filed a notice of an affirmative defense, in which he stated that during the period of time that the government had alleged that Hurtado and Nevarez were murdered, he was gambling on the casino boats. Thus, Zambrana argues, the district court incorrectly concluded that he failed to support his motion to sever by not producing the specific testimony he intend[ed] to give regarding the homicide counts. Zambrana's argument is meritless. When seeking to sever charges on the ground that he wishes to testify to some charges but not to others, a defendant must offer `a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and [the] strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.' Archer, 843 F.2d at 1022 (quoting Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 977 (D.C.Cir. 1968)); see also Alexander, 135 F.3d at 477. A defendant's general assertions about the testimony he seeks to offer will not suffice; he must proffer specific examples of the exculpatory testimony that he would give but for the joinder of the counts. Alexander, 135 F.3d at 477; see also Balzano, 916 F.2d at 1283. But in his motion to sever, Zambrana provided no such pointed examples of the exculpatory testimony he wished to provide; he merely stated that he wish[ed] to testify in his own defense against the homicide counts, but [t]hat combining all the counts at one trial would prevent him from doing so. And the fact that Zambrana submitted a notice to present an alibi defense does not mitigate his vague proffered justification for severance. Nowhere in the notice did Zambrana state that he wished to testify that he was gambling when Hurtado and Nevarez were murdered. In fact, Zambrana expressly stated that he would rely on records provided by the [g]overnment to establish his alibi, and not on his own testimony. In all, Zambrana presented nothing more than general assertions that, absent the severance, he would not be able to testify as to the homicide chargesa showing that was insufficient to show that severance was necessary. See Alexander, 135 F.3d at 477; Balzano, 916 F.2d at 1283. Zambrana also contends that severance was necessary to avoid a prejudicial spill-over effect from the drug-conspiracy counts to the homicide counts. According to Zambrana, the government's case against him on the homicide counts was weak, and the joinder of the homicide counts with the drug-conspiracy counts caused him to suffer a spill-over effect of the stronger evidence of the [d]rug[conspiracy] [c]harges onto the more circumstantial and flimsy evidence supporting the [h]omicide [c]harges. Thus, Zambrana argues, [a]llowing the same jury to hear all of the evidence and decide all of the charges together ... created an unreasonable risk that the jury decided the [h]omicide [c]harges based on the stronger evidence presented in support of the [d]rug [conspiracy] [c]harges. But Zambrana ignores that the district court instructed the jury to consider each count and its related evidence separately. Specifically, the court instructed the jury to consider each count and the evidence relating to it separate and apart from every other count. We presume a jury `attend[s] closely [to] the particular language of the trial court's instructions in a criminal case,' including when the jury is `instructed to consider each count and the relating evidence separately.' United States v. Stokes, 211 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Coleman, 22 F.3d 126, 135 (7th Cir.1994), and United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 426 (7th Cir.1998)). We find nothing in the record that would make us `suppose that [the jury] would disregard' the district court's instructions in this case, and Zambrana points to no evidence that reveals that the jury ignored the court's instructions. Id. (quoting Coleman, 22 F.3d at 135); see also United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Boykins, 9 F.3d 1278, 1289 (7th Cir.1993). And because the district court's instructions provided `an adequate safeguard' against `evidentiary spillover and cumulation of evidence,' Balzano, 916 F.2d at 1282 (quoting United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 768 (7th Cir.1988)), we cannot say that Zambrana was prejudiced by the district court's denial of his motion to sever, see United States v. Moore, 363 F.3d 631, 642 (7th Cir.2004) (stating that limiting instruction adequately handled any risk of prejudice to defendant), vacated in part by Young v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100, 125 S.Ct. 1019, 160 L.Ed.2d 1001 (2005), and Jackson v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100, 125 S.Ct. 1019, 160 L.Ed.2d 1001 (2005), in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).