Opinion ID: 150548
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Employee-Indemnification Exclusion

Text: This exclusion precludes coverage for Texas Crewboats, but not for Sylvester.
The parties agree that the accident involved bodily injury to ... employee[s] of [Texas Crewboats] arising out of and in the course of employment by [Texas Crewboats].... Navigators, however, contends that the exclusion is inapplicable under the subsection of the exclusion that states, [t]his exclusion does not apply to bodily injury to domestic employees not entitled to workers compensation benefits.... According to Navigators, the term domestic employees does not refer to butlers and chambermaids, but rather to employees who work in the United States as opposed to those who work abroad. This interpretation is unreasonable, and therefore, does not defeat the otherwise applicable exclusion. Cf. Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. 1987) (citations omitted). Navigators admits that it was only able to locate one decision to support its interpretation, Carroll v. Castillo, No. 13-99-006-CV, 2000 WL 34592617, at  (Tex. App.Corpus Christi April 6, 2000, no pet. h.) (finding that the term domestic employee is ambiguous because it can refer to someone who works in the United States, and therefore, the term is incapable of precise determination for summary judgment purposes). Carroll was not designated for publication, which means that, under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.7, it has no precedential value. Furthermore, this court does not consider unpublished opinions when making an Erie guess. See Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 565 (5th Cir.2004). The Texas Supreme Court has not resolved this question. Nor does it appear that any Texas court has resolved this issue in a published opinion. Thus, we consult decisions from other jurisdictions and the majority rule in making this Erie guess. See SMI Owen Steel Co. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 520 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). Several courts have found that the term domestic employees, as used in an insurance exclusion, refers to household workers and not to those working in the United States. See, e.g., United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gravette, 182 F.3d 649, 655 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that domestic refers to a person who performs services in a private household); Dakota, Minn., & E. R.R. Corp. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 639 N.W.2d 513, 517 (S.D.2002) (holding that domestic servant means a person whose labor is directed to the construction, maintenance or repair of the master's private properties or care of the master's family (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Rosso, 521 A.2d 301, 304 (Me.1987) (holding that the phrase domestic employee, as found in an insurance exclusion, refers to one that works in a house or on household chores). We agree with the interpretation of these courts. This domestic-employee exception to the exclusion is inapplicable for another reasonit only applies to those domestic employees who are not entitled to workers'-compensation benefits. Clanton and Satterfield were entitled to such benefits because Texas Crewboats was a workers'-compensation subscriber. In sum, the employer-indemnification exception barred coverage for Texas Crewboats.
This exception does not apply to Sylvester because he was not Clanton or Satterfield's employer: This insurance does not apply to ... bodily injury to ... [a]n employee of the insured .... Sylvester is the insured. Clanton and Satterfield suffered bodily injuries. In order for this exclusion to apply, they must be employees of Sylvester. Neither party has claimed this, nor is there any basis in the record for this conclusion.