Opinion ID: 200991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The FBI Agent's Testimony

Text: 41 At trial, Special Agent Dominic Barbara of the FBI testified — without relevant objection — as follows: (1) that, on August 9, 2000, he and an agent from the Internal Revenue Service went to the horse farm to speak with McCann and serve him with a grand-jury subpoena; (2) that the meeting occurred outside, in a gazebo area on the 100-acre farm; and (3) that, during the interview, McCann answered several questions (including questions about the $2 million check) but refused to provide the agents with his true name when asked. 10 42 McCann now contends that it was plain error affecting substantial rights for [Special Agent Barbara] to testify that [McCann] refused to answer their questions. Specifically, McCann argues (with very little elaboration) that (1) his refusal to answer the agent's what-is-your-real-name question was a valid exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights, and (2) the agent's testimony to this effect was plain error affecting substantial rights because it involved the presentation to the jury of the defendant's claim of Fifth Amendment rights and served no other purpose but to tarnish his image by imply[ing] that [he] ha[d] something to hide. To prevail on this claim, McCann must demonstrate (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected [his] substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.2001) (citations omitted); Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 43 Here, whether an error occurred — let alone a clear or obvious one — is far from certain. In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of pre-arrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility. In so holding, the Court expressly refused to consider whether or under what circumstances pre-arrest silence may be protected by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 236 n. 2, 100 S.Ct. 2124. We have stated that application of the privilege is not limited to persons in custody or charged with a crime; it may also be asserted by a suspect who is questioned during the investigation of a crime. Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1565 (1st Cir.1989). But we never have addressed the precise question presented in this case: whether the privilege against self-incrimination is implicated when, in the context of a non-custodial interrogation, a suspect selectively refuses to answer a what-is-your-real-name question despite having volunteered answers to other questions that he perhaps believes are less likely to induce an incriminating response. 11 Moreover, the other courts of appeal are split on the question whether, under some circumstances, the Fifth-Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prevents the government from using a suspect's pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt. Compare Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) ([T]he use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.), United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir.1987) (The right to remain silent, unlike the right to counsel, attaches before the institution of formal adversary proceedings.), 12 and United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir.1991) (holding that, under the circumstances, the court erred in admitting an IRS agent's testimony regarding defendant's refusal to answer any questions during a non-custodial interrogation), with United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir.1998) ([W]e respectfully disagree with the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, which have all held that pre-arrest silence comes within the proscription against commenting on a defendant's privilege against self incrimination[;][i]n our view, the position those courts have endorsed is simply contrary to the unambiguous text of the Fifth Amendment.... (internal citations omitted)), and United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (The government may comment on a defendant's silence if it occurred prior to the time he was arrested and given his Miranda [ v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)] warnings.). 13 44 In any event, McCann's claim must fail for a more obvious reason: any error did not affect his substantial rights. See United States v. Bradstreet, 135 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1998) (defining an error that affects substantial rights as, in most cases, one that affect[s] the outcome of the district court proceedings) (citation omitted). Here, as discussed above, there was a wealth of evidence regarding McCann's skillful participation in various schemes to defraud. This evidence included, inter alia, (1) in-court identification testimony from several witnesses who testified that, over the course of the charged activities, they had known the defendant not as McCann but rather as Danny Combs or D. Dacques Sonner, and (2) documents central to the schemes bearing the signatures of either Danny Combs or D. Dacques Sonner coupled with testimony that the man now identified as McCann had signed those documents. In short, the evidence connecting McCann to the crimes overwhelmingly suggested that McCann ha[d] something to hide, and it would be unreasonable to conclude that Special Agent Barbara's testimony provided anything save additional corroboration.