Opinion ID: 4556842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The government may garnish the Account.

Text: Because Mr. Swenson has a state-law property interest in the Account, the government has a broad right to garnish the Account. See Novak, 476 F.3d at 1063 (stating that “the government’s right is to step into the defendant’s shoes” when executing a garnishment order). Indeed, the majority agrees that none of the statutory exceptions to the MVRA’s broad rights of garnishment apply in the present situation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a). 10 The majority claims that it does not impermissibly bypass state law “any more than the Idaho court in Sherry did.” Maj. Op. 15 n.6. But this is flatly untrue. The Sherry court understood and acknowledged that Idaho law presumes that all property obtained during marriage is community property. Then, operating from that baseline, it conducted the relevant preemption analysis. All I ask is that the majority conduct the same analysis: first acknowledging what Idaho law requires, then analyzing whether federal law preempts Idaho law in this specific context. The majority errs because it does not conduct this analysis; it simply assumes preemption in this case without carrying out the relevant context-specific examination. UNITED STATES V. SWENSON 31 Section 207 of the Social Security Act—the provision requiring preemption of Idaho’s community property regime in Sherry—would ordinarily preempt Idaho’s community property law, thereby rendering Idaho law unenforceable and barring the government from garnishing Mrs. Swenson’s Social Security benefits. See Sherry, 701 P.2d at 270; see also Maj. Op. 17 (noting that, were it not for the restitution order, “Mr. Swenson would have no right to Mrs. Swenson’s Social Security benefits because the [Social Security Act] preempts application of Idaho law community property principles”). However, in the current context, Congress has expressly removed this conflict. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (“Notwithstanding any other Federal law (including section 207 of the Social Security Act), a judgment imposing a fine may be enforced against all property or rights to property of the person fined . . . .”); Novak, 476 F.3d at 1048 (“[B]y making clear that the ‘notwithstanding’ clause ‘includes’ the one federal antialienation provision that demands explicit statutory override [42 U.S.C. § 407(a)], Congress manifested that § 3613(a) means what it says—that it reaches ‘all property or rights to property’ not excepted including property otherwise covered by federally mandated anti-alienation provisions.” (citation omitted)). Thus, unlike in Sherry, there is no conflict between the Social Security Act’s anti-alienation provision and Idaho community property law. Idaho’s community property regime should therefore be enforced in this case, because: (1) the MVRA does not provide an exception from garnishment for this property, see § 3613(a); and (2) unlike in Sherry, there is no conflict between state and federal law and is thus no barrier to the government stepping into Mr. Swenson’s shoes and garnishing the Account, see Close, 909 F.3d at 1209–10. 32 UNITED STATES V. SWENSON This reading of the statute may lead to what some may consider inequitable results. Indeed, it certainly is true that this approach would allow the government “to garnish assets that the defendant”—pursuant to federal law—“would otherwise have no right to” in divorce proceedings. Maj. Op. 16. However, the very purpose of the MVRA was to expand the pool of property available to the government’s reach beyond what it would be in other contexts. 11 See Novak, 476 F.3d at 1046 (“By its use of the ‘all property or rights to property’ language, Congress has made quite clear that the totality of defendants’ assets will be subject to restitution orders. The Supreme Court emphasized the breadth of the ‘all property or rights to property’ phrase in the context of tax collection statutes: ‘The statutory language all property and rights to property, . . . is broad and reveals on its face that Congress meant to reach every interest in property . . . .” (quoting Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 719–20 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, through the implementation of the MVRA, “Congress has specifically subordinated the goals of economic rehabilitation and equitable distribution of assets to the states’ interest in prosecuting criminals.” In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 11 The majority claims that this assertion “conflat[es] the MVRA’s intent to reach all of a defendant’s assets in garnishment proceedings, with a permission for the government to ‘expand the pool’ of a defendant’s property beyond that which the defendant would have a right to [in] any other legal proceeding.” Maj. Op. 16 n.7. However, the majority misconstrues my statement. I do not suggest that the MVRA somehow expands the pool of the defendant’s property. It does not. However, it does undeniably expand the pool of property within the government’s reach by sweeping aside federal laws that would otherwise limit that reach. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a). UNITED STATES V. SWENSON 33 I certainly sympathize with the innocent wife’s situation and would take no pleasure in allowing the government to garnish her Social Security benefits. To be sure, Mrs. Swenson has not been convicted of any wrongdoing. 12 But, as the author of today’s majority opinion once stated, “for better or worse, it has long been true in community property jurisdictions that both spouses assume the risks—and benefits—of the legal system. The case books are replete with examples of seeming injustices to innocent spouses where community property laws are applied.” See United States v. Berger, 574 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2009). Idaho’s community property regime gives Mr. Swenson a property interest in the Account, regardless of the fact that the account solely consists of Mrs. Swenson’s Social Security benefits. Therefore, the government can reach it under the MVRA. 12 The majority makes much of the fact that Mrs. Swenson is not the subject of the criminal proceedings or the garnishment order. See Maj. Op. 11 (noting that the MVRA was enacted to “ensure that the offender be held accountable” for their actions (alterations adopted) (quoting Novak, 476 F.3d at 1043)); id. at 12 (recognizing “Congress’s intent to broaden the government’s collection powers to reach all of a defendant’s assets”). However, this consideration is irrelevant. Indeed, as the majority has recognized, see Maj. Op. 13, the only relevant questions is not who holds title to the property, but whether the criminal defendant— here Mr. Swenson—has “rights to” the property. See § 3613(a). And in this case, because Mr. Swenson has rights to the property at issue through Idaho’s community property law, it doesn’t matter whether Mrs. Swenson is innocent or guilty as sin; Mrs. Swenson’s Account consisting solely of moneys stemming from her Social Security benefits can be garnished by the government.