Opinion ID: 2676157
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Assessing the Motion to Quash

Text: Having determined that we have jurisdiction to reach the merits in the instant appeal, we turn to the parties‟ arguments with regard to the trial court‟s order denying the special motion to quash. Our review of this issue, a question of statutory interpretation, is de novo. See Hernandez v. Banks, 84 A.3d 543, 552 (D.C. 2014). 19
As noted above, to prevail on a special motion to quash, the moving party must first demonstrate that “the underlying claim arises from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy13 on issues of public interest.” D.C. Code § 16-5503 (b). An “issue of public interest” is defined positively and negatively in the AntiSLAPP statute. The statute positively defines it to “mean[] an issue related to health or safety; environmental, economic, or community well-being; the District government; a public figure; or a good, product, or service in the market place”; the statute then provides that it “shall not be construed to include private interests, 13 The statute defines “[a]ct in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest” as: (A) Any written or oral statement made: (i) In connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; or (ii) In a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; or (B) Any other expression or expressive conduct that involves petitioning the government or communicating views to members of the public in connection with an issue of public interest. D.C. Code § 16-5501 (1). The Superior Court made no specific finding on whether Zujua‟s Wikipedia edit was “an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy” but found that regardless of the “act” element, Zujua‟s speech was not on an “issue of public interest.” On appeal, Zujua asserts that his Wikipedia edit satisfied this criterion and Ms. Burke makes no argument disputing that assertion. 20 such as statements directed primarily toward protecting the speaker‟s commercial interests rather than toward commenting on or sharing information about a matter of public significance.” D.C. Code § 16-5501 (3). Here, the trial court found that Zujua failed to establish a prima facie case that his speech met this statutory definition both because (1) he did not establish that Ms. Burke was a public figure, and (2) he did not “provide[] prima faci[e] evidence that his comments were not commercially motivated.” To establish that his speech fell within the definition of “issue of public interest” Zujua argued at trial and reiterates on appeal that his Wikipedia edit was on an “issue related to . . . a public figure.” 14 D.C. Code § 16-5501 (3). Although the statute does not define “public figure,” we presume that the use of this term imports the definition of “public figure” used throughout defamation law. See 1618 Twenty-First St. Tenants’ Ass’n, Inc. v. The Phillips Collection, 829 A.2d 201, 203 (D.C. 2003) (explaining that as a general rule, we presume that where a 14 Zujua additionally argues that his Wikipedia edit related to an “issue of public interest” because it pertained to Ms. Burke‟s performance as an attorney and was thus “related to . . . a service in the market place.” D.C. Code § 16-5501 (3). The trial court did not address this argument, perhaps because it was raised only in Zujua‟s reply in support of his motion. We likewise do not address this argument as we find that Ms. Burke is a public figure. 21 legislature adopts a term of art, it “knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word”).15 Like the Supreme Court, this court has recognized two types of public figures in the context of defamation claims: general and limited purpose public figures. “[G]eneral purpose public figures . . . because of their „position of such pervasive power and influence . . . [,] are deemed public figures for all purposes.‟” Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1030 (D.C. 1990) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)). “[L]imited-purpose public figures,” that is, individuals “who assume roles „in the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved,‟ . . . are deemed public figures only for purposes of the controversy in which they are influential.” Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345). “[T]he touchstone remains whether the individual has assumed a role of special prominence in the affairs of society . . . that invites attention and comment.” Id. (quoting Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). While it is clear that Ms. Burke is not a 15 Federal courts that have examined the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act have done the same. See, e.g., Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, No. 12-1565, 2013 WL 5410410, at  (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2013); Boley v. Atl. Monthly Grp., 950 F. Supp. 2d 249, 260-62 (D.D.C. 2013). 22 general purpose public figure, such as a politician or celebrity, both Zujua and the amici argue that she is a limited-purpose public figure. The task of determining whether a defamation plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure is a difficult one, requiring a highly fact-intensive inquiry that one court has described as “trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.” Moss, 580 A.2d at 1030 (quoting Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff’d, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978)). To facilitate this determination, this court in Moss adopted a three-part inquiry articulated by the D.C. Circuit in Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, 627 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court must begin by determining “whether the controversy to which the defamation relates was the subject of public discussion prior to the defamation.” Moss, 580 A.2d at 1030. Next, the court must determine “whether „a reasonable person would have expected persons beyond the immediate participants in the dispute to feel the impact of its resolution.‟” Id. (quoting Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297). After identifying the existence and scope of the public controversy, the court will find that a defamation plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure with respect to that controversy if “[t]he plaintiff . . . achieved a special prominence in the debate, and either „must have been purposely trying to influence the outcome or could realistically have been expected, because of [her] position in the controversy, to 23 have an impact on its resolution.‟” Id. at 1031 (quoting Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297). Applying the Waldbaum framework, we hold that Ms. Burke is a public figure. First, the speech at issue here pertains to an obviously public controversy that existed before Ms. Burke‟s involvement. The 2007 Nisour Square shooting was a significant international event which implicated United States foreign policy and which raised questions about the appropriate use of private contractors in Iraq. Ms. Burke attempts to define the controversy narrowly by asserting that only the private interests of individual clients were at play. But every public controversy involves individuals when examined at some level of granularity, and Ms. Burke‟s narrow view of the controversy is not reflected in her own descriptions of the high stakes of this litigation in press releases and interviews, where Ms. Burke has said, for example, that the “litigation [would] prove that Blackwater‟s interests are contrary to the interests of the U.S. military, the State Department, and the nation of Iraq.” Press Release, Burke O‟Neil LLC, Blackwater Faces New Death and Injury Claims and Drug Allegations (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://burkepllc.com/category/press-releases. Furthermore, it cannot reasonably be disputed that the public “or some segment of it” would “feel the impact” of the 24 resolution of the controversy about Blackwater‟s presence in Iraq and its actions in Nisour Square. Finally, we are asked to examine in-depth Ms. Burke‟s role in this controversy to determine whether she “achieved a special prominence” such that she was “purposefully trying to influence” an outcome of the controversy. Ms. Burke warns against determining that an attorney is a public figure simply because of her performance of her job duties, namely, zealous advocacy for her clients. Courts in other jurisdictions have taken on the difficult task of determining when an attorney will become a public figure in her representation of clients, with many finding that attorneys whose cases address large-scale public issues or who represent prominent clients and seek extensive media attention will become limited-purpose public figures. See, e.g., Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1083-84 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that an attorney was a limited-purpose public figure where he “actively participate[d] in the public issue in a manner intended to obtain attention”); Partington v. Bugliosi, 825 F. Supp. 906, 917-18 (D. Haw. 1993) (explaining that an attorney who “voluntarily engaged in a course of action with respect to [his representation of his client] that was bound to invite attention and comment” was a limited-purpose public figure); Ratner v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386, 400 (D.V.I. 1979) (noting that attorneys were 25 limited-purpose public figures where they “voluntarily thrust themselves into the vortex of [a] case that had far-reaching and serious effect[s] on many people not connected with it.”). But see, e.g., Littlefield v. Fort Dodge Messenger, 614 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding that an attorney was not a limited-purpose public figure due simply to his practice of law in violation of bar discipline); Marchiondo v. Brown, 649 P.2d 462, 467-68 (N.M. 1982) (holding that an attorney was not a limited-purpose public figure despite being “well known” in the community). We agree that “[l]egal representation of a client, by itself, does not establish an individual as a public figure,” Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1085. In her litigation of high-profile cases like Abtan, however, Ms. Burke went above and beyond simple legal representation in court pleadings and appearances. She sought substantial publicity for this case by putting out press releases and giving interviews. (We note that her actions prompted the company formerly known as Blackwater to seek a gag order against her.) By no means do we seek to criticize or challenge her farreaching and assertive advocacy. We comment on her conduct only to explain how she “assumed the risk that in the course of reporting and commenting on a well known person or public controversy,” that public speakers, like Zujua, might “inadvertently make erroneous statements about” her. See Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1081. 26 Thus, Ms. Burke satisfies all three criteria from Waldbaum, and we are confident that she has “thrust [herself] to the forefront of . . . [this] public controvers[y],” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, and can be considered a limited-purpose public figure. The trial court‟s determination to the contrary was erroneous. We additionally find error in the trial court finding on Zujua‟s commercial motivation. It appears to have been the trial court‟s understanding that in order to establish “an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest,” the anonymous speaker must also disprove commercial motivation, even where such motivation is not apparent from the content of the speech. This apparent presumption of commercial interest has no foundation in the statute which merely states what an issue of public interest is and is not. Moreover, such a presumption is inappropriate in the context of a prima facie showing, for which we have held the burden of proof is “not onerous.” Little v. United States, 613 A.2d 880, 885 (D.C. 1992). We understand Ms. Burke suspected that Zujua was affiliated with Blackwater and thus had a commercial interest in defaming her.16 16 Amici emphasize—and both parties agree—that the fact that a speaker receives compensation for his speech, e.g. he is a paid journalist, does not mean that his statements are “directed primarily toward protecting the speaker‟s (continued…) 27 But her unsubstantiated suspicion did not increase Zujua‟s initial burden. Indeed, it would turn the statute on its head if a party seeking a special motion to quash had to reveal his professional affiliation or other identifying information to disprove a disqualifying commercial motivation not apparent from his speech alone. We conclude, then, that Zujua established a prima facie case that his speech was worthy of protection under the statute.
We next consider whether Ms. Burke is able to show that her “underlying claim” of defamation is likely to succeed on the merits such that the special motion to quash should nonetheless be denied. Without any discussion, the trial court determined that Ms. Burke could make such a showing. We conclude otherwise.17 (…continued) commercial interests.” Ms. Burke‟s argument on this point, however, is that Zujua was affiliated with Blackwater and thus shared its commercial interests. 17 In her complaint, Ms. Burke raised two additional claims: (1) Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Advantage, and (2) False Light Invasion of Privacy. In opposing Zujua‟s special motion to quash, however, Ms. Burke only argued that her defamation claim was likely to succeed on the merits, and she similarly does not address her other two tort claims in her argument before this court. Thus, she has waived any argument that she is likely to succeed on either of these two claims. 28 To establish liability for defamation, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3) that the defendant's fault in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence; and (4) either that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm. Rosen v. Am. Israel Pub. Affairs Comm., Inc., 41 A.3d 1250, 1256 (D.C. 2012) (quoting Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005)). If the plaintiff is a public figure, however, the fault component embodied in the third defamation element is heightened; the plaintiff must then show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant‟s defamatory statement was published with actual malice, i.e. either subjective knowledge of the statement‟s falsity or a reckless disregard for whether or not the statement was false. Moss, 580 A.2d at 1029. Zujua argues that the malice standard should apply here, and that Ms. Burke is unlikely to succeed on the merits of her defamation claim because Zujua did not publish his statements with malice. Zujua does not contest any of the other elements of the defamation claim, and in particular makes no argument that the Wikipedia edit is not a “false and defamatory statement.” 29 As a preliminary matter, it seems far from clear that Zujua‟s revisions to Ms. Burke‟s Wikipedia page even constitute a defamatory statement. We note that Zujua‟s edit introduced internal inconsistencies and, to anyone with a basic understanding of the distinction between a civil suit and a criminal prosecution, appears barely coherent. Thus, we query whether the edit amounts to a statement of fact capable of defamatory meaning, i.e. that “it tends to injure the plaintiff in [her] trade, profession or community standing, or lower [her] in the estimation of the community.” Moss, 580 A.2d at 1023. Without argument to the contrary from Zujua, however, we assume without deciding that this first element of defamation has been satisfied.18 Having already determined that Ms. Burke is a limited purpose public figure, see supra part IV. A., we agree with Zujua that she is required to show malice on Zujua‟s part in order to succeed on her defamation claim. We conclude that she is unlikely to be able to do so here. Although we have assumed that Zujua‟s edits would constitute a false and defamatory statement of fact, the lack of clarity of his 18 At oral argument, counsel for Zujua asserted that it had not conceded the information posted by his client was actually defamatory, but this court generally “decline[s] to consider contentions raised for the first time in oral argument, at least absent compelling reasons not apparent here.” Wagner v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., 768 A.2d 546, 554 n.8 (D.C. 2001). 30 revisions provides good evidence of Zujua‟s state of mind. Zujua‟s edits do not suggest knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for whether or not the statement was false. If anything, the edits seem to suggest confusion or honest mistake on Zujua‟s part. Again, the edited paragraph is internally contradictory and implies that Zujua probably did not understand that the private civil action in Abtan and the federal prosecution of the contractors arising out of the same incident were separate legal actions. Moreover, in contrast to the allegations Ms. Burke makes against John Doe No. 2 (CapBasics359), who apparently re-published similar information after she informed him that it was false, Ms. Burke admits that after she apprised Zujua of the problems with the paragraph, he apparently accepted the correction and did not seek to re-publish the information. This too demonstrates a lack of malice. Zujua‟s failure to inquire further and learn more about the subject and the federal case before he posted his edit might be evidence of negligence, but we do not believe it demonstrates clear and convincing evidence of the “intentional or reckless disregard for [the statement‟s] falsity.” Moss, 580 A.2d at 1029. To be sure, the task of demonstrating malice is difficult for a plaintiff who does not know the identity of the defamatory speaker and cannot argue malice based on the identity and motivations of her alleged defamer. It is not impossible, however, and the circumstances of the alleged defamation may well demonstrate 31 malice. Furthermore, the D.C. Council articulated a clear policy in favor of anonymous speech when it enacted the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act and created the special motion to quash. We will neither question this policy judgment nor the Supreme Court case law it builds upon. Like any public figure, Ms. Burke has exposed herself to comment and criticism by virtue of the prominent role she has assumed in this controversy. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. While that does not mean that she may be defamed freely, see id., it does mean that she must satisfy the test imposed by the Supreme Court in order to protect the “breathing space” of the constitutional freedom of expression. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964). Because she cannot do so, she is unlikely to succeed on the merits of her defamation claim.