Opinion ID: 730980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the applicability of the aedpa amendments to pending cases

Text: 11 In addition to briefing and arguing the issue we posed, Bailey and Hunter contend that the AEDPA amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b) are not applicable to their cases, because the proceedings, although not the appeals, were already pending on April 24, 1996, the AEDPA's effective date. In Bailey's case, his application for 28 U.S.C. § 2254 relief was filed before that effective date, but it was not denied and a notice of appeal filed, until after the effective date. In Hunter's case, his motion for 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief was filed before but denied on AEDPA's effective date, and his notice of appeal was filed after that date. 12 Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), provides the analytical framework for determining whether newly enacted statutory provisions are applicable to pending cases. A court's first, and sometimes last, task under Landgraf analysis is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. If Congress has done so, that is the end of the Landgraf analysis, and the court simply follows the evident intent of Congress. Id. However, where the congressional intent about applicability to pending cases is not evident, or is nonexistent, more is required. The more that is required is application of the judicial default rules specified in Landgraf, to which we will return later. 13 Taking the first Landgraf step, we look to see if Congress expressly prescribed whether the amendments to § 2253(c) and to Rule 22(b), which are contained in §§ 102 and 103 of the AEDPA, were applicable to pending cases. Congress said nothing one way or the other. Hunter and Bailey 2 do not dispute that there is no express congressional direction on the matter, but they do contend that the AEDPA implicitly indicates an intent not to apply these amendments to pending cases. They point to § 107(c) of the Act. Section 107 sets out special rules for capital cases in certain qualifying jurisdictions, and subsection (c) of it expressly provides that those new rules are applicable to pending cases. The argument is that since Congress expressly provided that § 107 was to apply to pending cases, but did not so provide for §§ 102 and 103, Congress must have intended for those two sections not to apply to pending cases. 14 We reject that argument. To begin with, we note that the argument assumes that evidence of legislative intent, short of an explicit statutory command about the provision in question, is enough to avoid application of the Landgraf judicial default rules. There appears to be a conflict among the circuits, and even within some circuits, about whether Landgraf 's first step can be satisfied by evidence of legislative intent other than in an express statutory command. Compare, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 538 (1st Cir.1995) (requiring clear statutory language demanding retroactivity), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1044, 134 L.Ed.2d 191 (1996) and Reyes-Hernandez v. INS, 89 F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir.1996) (presumption against retroactivity unless the statute provides explicitly for retroactive application; requires clear statement) and Chenault v. U.S. Postal Serv., 37 F.3d 535, 537 (9th Cir.1994) (presumption against retroactivity unless statute's language dictates retroactivity) with Green v. Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415, 419 (10th Cir.1996) (considering both language of act and legislative history in search of unambiguous directive) and Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Busey, 79 F.3d 1250, 1270 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that legislative history left no doubt that retroactivity was contemplated) and U.S. v. $814,254.76 in U.S. Currency, 51 F.3d 207, 212 (9th Cir.1995) (considering legislative history for evidence of clear congressional intent to apply statute retroactively). We need not resolve that question, because even assuming that clear legislative intent short of an express statutory command suffices to overcome any of Landgraf 's presumptions, there is no clear legislative intent about application of §§ 102-103 of the AEDPA to pending cases. 15 It is true that § 107(c) specifies that the changes contained in that particular section shall apply to pending cases. But it is equally true that a number of other AEDPA provisions specify that other changes made by the same act do not apply to pending cases. See, e.g., AEDPA § 211 (making changes in restitution law and procedures applicable only to sentencing proceedings in cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after the date of enactment); § 235(h) (provisions concerning closed circuit television of court proceedings apply only to cases filed after January 1, 1995); § 435 (provision expanding criteria for deporting aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude applicable to those against whom deportation proceedings are initiated after the date of enactment); § 441 (amendment limiting collateral attacks on deportation orders applicable only where criminal proceedings initiated after the date of enactment); § 903 (making changes in the rate of compensation of appointed counsel in certain capital cases apply only to cases commenced or appeals perfected on or after the date of the enactment). 16 The fairest inference from the variety of applicability provisions throughout the AEDPA is that Congress was quite capable of and willing to express its intent about prospective or retrospective application when it had such an intent. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1493-94. Where Congress was silent on the subject, as it was regarding the amendments made by §§ 102 and 103, courts must proceed as though Congress either had no intent or chose to refrain from expressing any intent it had. That brings us to Landgraf 's second step, application of its judicial default rules. 3 17 Under the Landgraf judicial default rules, a newly enacted statutory provision is to be applied to pending cases, including appeals, unless doing so would give the provisions retroactive effect. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. If applying the new provision to a pending case would have retroactive effect, then the presumption goes the other way; absent an express congressional command, statutory provisions are not to be given retroactive effect. Id. at ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1501, 1505. But retroactive effect for these purposes means more than simply the effect of applying a statute to a case that arose before the statute was enacted, and it means more than simply a reduced chance of prevailing in a pending case if the statute is applied. See id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1499 (A statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment or upsets expectations based in prior law.) (citation and footnote omitted); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 863 (7th Cir.1996) (en banc) (the possibility of an adverse effect is not the definition of retroactive effect). For purposes of the Landgraf judicial default rules presumption, applying a statute to a pending case has retroactive effect only when doing so produces a  'genuinely' retroactive effect and constitutes truly 'retrospective' application. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1503-04. 18 In other words, in Landgraf analysis, retroactive effect is a term of legal art, which does not describe all applications of a statute to preexisting causes of action or pending proceedings. The definition of retroactive effect in this context is more narrow than that, and it conveys less of a description of premises than an announcement of a conclusion, an end-of-the-analysis label. As the Supreme Court explained, The conclusion that a particular rule operates 'retroactively' comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1499. 19 Fortunately, the Landgraf opinion is more specific than that. It explains that for purposes of the judicial default presumption against retroactive application, a new statute would have a retroactive effect if applying it to a pending case would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. We now focus that definition upon the specific provisions of the AEDPA that are at issue in this case. 20 We realize that the changes involving appeal certificates made by §§ 102 and 103 of the AEDPA are greater as they affect federal inmate § 2255 movants than as they affect state inmate § 2254 applicants. The reason is that preexisting law already required unsuccessful § 2254 applicants to obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal as a prerequisite to appellate review of a district court judgment denying relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1995); Fed. R.App. P. 22(b) (1995). The most that §§ 102 and 103 of the AEDPA have done to § 2254 applicants is reduce the likelihood of them obtaining such a certificate, now called a certificate of appealability, and possibly narrow the scope of any appeal that is permitted. See § 2253(c)(3). 4 21 By contrast, unsuccessful § 2255 movants were not required by preexisting law to obtain a certificate as a prerequisite to an appeal. They could appeal without getting a judge to certify anything about the possible merit of their issues. Sections 102 and 103 of the AEDPA changed that, subjecting § 2255 movants to pre-appeal certification requirements (the same ones that apply to § 2254 applicants). However, because the same analysis applies in both types of cases, and produces the same result, our discussion will make no distinction between § 2254 applicants, such as Bailey, and § 2255 movants, such as Hunter. It is enough for present purposes to assume that the new act makes it materially more difficult for both state and federal inmates to appeal and thereby obtain an appellate review of district court judgments denying collateral relief. 22 With that assumption in mind, and turning to the definition of retroactive in Landgraf, it is obvious that applying these new certificate of appealability requirements to pending cases would not increase a party's liability for past conduct, nor would it impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. 511 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1505; see Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 766 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that a habeas applicant cannot argue that the new standards of review attach new legal consequences to [his criminal] conduct by increasing his liability for that conduct or by imposing new duties on him based on that conduct). 5 That leaves only the question of whether application of the new certificate of appealability requirements to pending cases would impair rights a party possessed when he acted. 511 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. The key word here, of course, is rights. If that term is broadly construed to include expectations under preexisting procedural rules, or under rules affecting access to and the propriety of review and remedies, then applying the new certificate of appealability rules to pending cases possibly would have a retroactive effect. But we know that the term rights as used in this context should not be construed broadly so as to sweep within its ambit mere expectation interests under procedural or remedy rules. 23 We know that about procedural rules, because the Supreme Court in Landgraf noted that procedural rules regulate secondary rather than primary conduct, so there are diminished reliance interests in matters of procedure. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1502. As a result, [c]hanges in procedural rules may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns about retroactivity. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1502. Often, usually, but not always. The two illustrative exceptions the Court gave are that a new procedural rule about the filing of complaints should not be applied to a case where the complaint already had been filed under the old regime, and new rules of evidence should not be applied to an already-tried case so as to require an appellate remand for a new trial. Id. at n. 29. Those exceptions reflect the common-sense notion that the applicability of such provisions ordinarily depends on the posture of the particular case. Id. 24 The posture of Bailey's case at the time the AEDPA went into effect is that he, as a § 2254 applicant, had not obtained a certificate of probable cause to appeal under preexisting law. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 863 (We take it that under Landgraf a certificate of probable cause to appeal issued before April 24, 1996, authorizes an appeal, although after April 24 appeal depends on a 'certificate of appealability' under § 102 of the 1996 Act.). The posture of Hunter's case at the time the AEDPA went into effect is that he, as a § 2255 movant, had not filed a notice of appeal under preexisting law. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 100 F.3d 113, 117 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that the certificate of appealability amendments to § 2253 do not apply to a § 2255 appeal in which the notice of appeal was filed before the AEDPA's effective date). Nor are the AEDPA amendments to § 2253(c) and Rule 22(b) changes in evidentiary rules the application of which would require a new trial in these cases. Therefore, viewing § 2253(c) and Rule 22(b) as procedural rules argues strongly for the conclusion that the AEDPA amendments to them should be applied to Bailey's and Hunter's cases. 25 Characterizing § 2253(c) and Rule 22(b) as remedial provisions does not result in a different conclusion. The Supreme Court in Landgraf also said: When the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief, application of the new provision is not retroactive. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1501. The Court gave as an example a prior decision holding that a change in a remedial statute was due to be applied to a case on appeal, even if the result was to deprive the plaintiff of relief granted to him under the law in effect at the time judgment was entered by the district court. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1501 (citing American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189 (1921)). 26 Moreover, the Landgraf Court recounted with approval that it had regularly applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1501. An example it gave was Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 116-17, 72 S.Ct. 581, 584-85, 96 L.Ed. 786 (1952), which ordered a case dismissed, though there was jurisdiction for it initially, because the statute upon which that jurisdiction was based had been repealed while the case was pending. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1501. The reason that [p]resent law normally governs in such situations [is] because jurisdictional statutes 'speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.'  Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1502 (quoting Republic National Bank of Miami v. U.S., 506 U.S. 80, 100, 113 S.Ct. 554, 565, 121 L.Ed.2d 474 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 27 In applying these principles, we readily conclude that §§ 102 and 103 of the AEDPA, the amendments relating to certificates of appealability, may be accurately characterized as rules of procedure. They might also be characterized as changes in the law affecting access to and the propriety of prospective relief. Applying such changes to pending cases is not giving them retroactive effect under the Landgraf judicial default rules. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 865 (The Supreme Court consistently applies statutory changes in the law of collateral attack to pending cases, and perforce to newly filed cases that seek relief from judgments entered before the statute's enactment.). Indeed, that conclusion follows even if the certificate of appealability changes are characterized as affecting the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. However the §§ 102 and 103 changes are characterized, applying them to pending cases does not give them retroactive effect as that term is used in Landgraf, so the presumption that present law applies to present cases governs. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 865 (To leave the ensuing judgment in force--and to leave all the rules governing primary conduct intact--is not 'retroactive' in the sense Landgraf uses that term....). 28 The same conclusion follows if we look beyond the categorical approach and seek to determine whether there is any significant degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event, as that language is used in Landgraf. See also id. at ---- n. 29, 114 S.Ct. at 1502 n. 29 ([W]e do not restrict the presumption against statutory retroactivity to cases involving 'vested rights'.... Nor do we suggest that concerns about retroactivity have no application to procedural rules.). Assuming the relevant past event is the commission of the original crime, there is no connection, in the Landgraf sense, between the certificate of appealability changes and the original crime. No § 2254 applicant or § 2255 movant could credibly argue that he would not have committed the crime if he had known it was going to be more difficult to appeal any denial of collateral relief after he was convicted and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 766 ([Applicant] obviously cannot argue that he relied on the existence of federal de novo review of claims adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings the night he killed his three victims.). 29 Assuming that the relevant past event is some point in the trial or in a prior proceeding attacking the judgment, the requisite connection is still missing. No § 2254 applicant or § 2255 movant could persuasively argue that during his trial or prior attacks on the judgment, he relied to his detriment upon the pre-amendment versions of § 2253 and Rule 22(b). Release from a conviction or sentence is better sooner rather than later, and acquittal at trial is better yet. It is unlikely that any applicant or movant would pull any punches at trial or in early attacks on the judgment based upon expectations about the prospects of success in later proceedings. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 866-67. 30 For these reasons, we hold that the AEDPA's certificate of appealability provisions, §§ 102 and 103 of the Act, apply to pending § 2254 cases, such as Bailey's, where no application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal was filed before the effective date of the Act, and to pending § 2255 cases, such as Hunter's, where no notice of appeal was filed before that effective date. 6 31 III. THE AUTHORITY OF DISTRICT JUDGES TO ISSUE CERTIFICATES OF APPEALABILITY 32 We turn now to the issue which prompted us to grant hearing en banc: whether 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), as amended by §§ 102 and 103 of the AEDPA, authorize district court judges to issue certificates of appealability, or instead vest that authority exclusively in circuit judges and justices.
33 In the Bailey case, which involves 28 U.S.C. § 2254 relief and state inmates, the parties have squared off in opposition over the question, with the State of Alabama vigorously contesting Bailey's position that district judges can issue certificates of appealability. However, in the Hunter case, which involves 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief and federal inmates, the United States has conceded that district judges can issue certificates of appealability in § 2255 motion proceedings. We do not rest our decision in even the Hunter case on the government's concession. There are two reasons we are unwilling to do so. 34 First, the issue of whether a district judge can certify appeals in § 2255 cases is materially identical to the issue of whether district judges can do so in § 2254 cases. See n. 8, infra. If we were to decide the § 2255 issue based upon the government's concession in the Hunter case, that would needlessly impede the State of Alabama's ability to have its arguments decided on the merits in the Bailey case. 35 Second, past experience has taught us that on occasion the government's position on criminal law issues is fluid. See, e.g., United States v. Oboh, 92 F.3d 1082, 1084 (11th Cir.1996). When we questioned the Department of Justice attorney at oral argument, he was unable to say that the concession he and the United States Attorney had made to us in the Hunter case was authorized by the Attorney General or the Solicitor General. In fact, he warned us that he could not bind the Solicitor General, who had not yet taken a position on the issue. Although the Department of Justice attorney did describe the concession as reflecting the position of the United States nationwide, he also cautioned that the government reserved the right to change its mind at any time. 36 For these reasons, we prefer to decide the certificate of appealability issues in both of these cases based upon our evaluation of the merits rather than rely upon the government's concession in the Hunter case. 37
38 We begin where courts interpreting statutory and rule provisions should, with the language of the provisions. Section 102 of the AEDPA amended § 2253, so that it now reads in pertinent part: 39 (c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from-- 40 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or 41 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255. 42 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 43 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2). 44 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). The crucial phrase is circuit justice or judge. Unfortunately, that phrase is ambiguous, because the adjective circuit can be read in either of two ways. On the one hand, circuit can be read to modify both justice and judge; if that is what Congress meant, district court judges are not authorized to issue certificates of appealability, because a district judge is neither a circuit justice nor a circuit judge. On the other hand, circuit can be read to modify only justice and not judge; if that is what Congress meant, district court judges are authorized to issue certificates of appealability, because a district judge is a judge. 45 The plain language of the statutory provision being interpreted is usually the best indication of legislative intent, but here the language is not plain. It is ambiguous. If all we had to consider was the language of § 2253(c), as amended, we might be hard put to choose between the two plausible interpretations of the circuit justice or judge language. But, there is more. 46 The same subject is also addressed in § 103 of the AEDPA, which amended Rule 22(b). As amended by § 103, Rule 22(b) now provides: 47 (b) Certificate of appealability. In a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court, an appeal by the applicant for the writ may not proceed unless a district or a circuit judge issues a certificate of appealability pursuant to section 2253(c) of title 28, United States Code. If an appeal is taken by the applicant, the district judge who rendered the judgment shall either issue a certificate of appealability or state the reasons why such a certificate should not issue. The certificate or the statement shall be forwarded to the court of appeals with the notice of appeal and the file of the proceedings in the district court. If the district judge has denied the certificate, the applicant for the writ may then request issuance of the certificate by a circuit judge. If such a request is addressed to the court of appeals, it shall be deemed addressed to the judges thereof and shall be considered by a circuit judge or judges as the court deems appropriate. If no express request for a certificate is filed, the notice of appeal shall be deemed to constitute a request addressed to the judges of the court of appeals. If an appeal is taken by a State or its representative, a certificate of appealability is not required. 48 Fed.R.Civ.P. 22(b). Plainly, the language of that provision authorizes district judges to issue certificates of appealability in § 2254 cases. 49 The State of Alabama 7 attempts to escape the force of the plain language of Rule 22(b) by focusing on the pursuant to § 2253(c) cross reference at the end of the first sentence of the rule. The State argues that when the rule says that a district or a circuit judge issues a certificate of appealability pursuant to section 2253(c), what it means is that a district judge cannot, because that is what § 2253(c) really means. Those four words, pursuant to section 2253(c), at the end of one of Rule 22(b)'s seven sentences will not bear the weight the State would have us put on them. We do not believe that Congress intended the cross reference to § 2253(c) to operate like a virus eating away the plain meaning of much of the language in the remainder of the rule, such as the very next sentence which says: If an appeal is taken by the applicant, the district judge who rendered the judgment shall either issue a certificate of appealability or state the reasons why such a certificate should not issue. Instead, we think that when Congress said in Rule 22(b) that issuance of certificates of appealability should be pursuant to § 2253(c), it was referring to the standard for issuing such certificates, which is prescribed in § 2253(c)(2), and to the requirement that the particular issues meeting that standard be specified, which is contained in § 2253(c)(3). 50 As far as Rule 22(b) is concerned, there is only one plausible interpretation of its language relating to the present issue. Not only does the rule make it clear that a district judge is authorized to issue a certificate of appealability, the plain language of the rule requires the judge whose denial of relief is subject to the attempted appeal either to issue a certificate, or to state why one should be denied. Only if the district judge who rendered the judgment has declined to issue the certificate does a circuit judge come into the picture. Under the plain language of the rule, an applicant for the writ gets two bites at the appeal certificate apple: one before the district judge, and if that one is unsuccessful, he gets a second one before a circuit judge. 8 51 To sum up what we have on the face of the provisions, § 102 of the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2253 so that it now contains language (circuit justice or judge) that is ambiguous insofar as the issue at hand is concerned. Yet, in the very next section of the AEDPA Congress focused on Rule 22(b), modified it somewhat, and left the plain language of that rule susceptible to but one meaning insofar as the same issue is concerned. 52 We have a choice. On the one hand, we could interpret the ambiguous phrase circuit justice or judge in § 2253(c) to mean circuit justice or circuit judge, which will conflict with and render meaningless much of the plain language of Rule 22(b). Indeed, at least some of the language in each of the first four sentences of the rule would be negated by such an interpretation of § 2253(c). On the other hand, we could interpret the ambiguous phrase in § 2253(c) to mean a circuit justice or a judge, which would include district judges as well as circuit judges. That interpretation would reconcile the statutory provision with the rule and give effect to each word of both provisions. The right choice seems clear, at least insofar as common sense is concerned. 53 In this instance, decisional law is consistent with the dictates of common sense. No canon of statutory construction is an infallible guide, but one of the most reliable is that the text of each provision of an act or statute should be read in a way that gives effect to all of its provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35-36, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1015, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992); Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249, 105 S.Ct. 2587, 2594, 86 L.Ed.2d 168 (1985). If we were to construe the phrase circuit justice or judge in § 2253(c), as amended by § 102 of the AEDPA, to exclude district judges, we would violate the Supreme Court's admonition that we not construe legislative enactments so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment, Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 877, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991), such as Rule 22(b), as amended by § 103 of the AEDPA. 9 54 As strongly as the reconciliation canon pushes us towards a decision, however, we do not end our inquiry with it. Before concluding this matter, we will address the State of Alabama's contention that the legislative history of the AEDPA amendments to § 2253 and Rule 22(b) supports the State's interpretation of those provisions. 55
56 The history of the effort to amend the appeal certificate provisions of § 2253 and Rule 22(b) extends back a quarter of a century. Over the years Congress repeatedly considered proposals to remove from district judges the authority to issue certificates permitting collateral review appeals. While those proposals enjoyed considerable support, there was also opposition to them, and Congress ultimately chose to leave district judges with the authority to issue such certificates.