Opinion ID: 46218
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Senait's Claim

Text: 18 The BIA held that Senait was (1) a citizen of Eritrea, (2) firmly resettled in Eritrea, and (3) unable to show past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Eritrea. 19 Senait takes issue with this reasoning and would have us consider her a refugee from Ethiopia based on Ethiopia's forced deportation policy, which sent her to Eritrea. This claim falters under the facts and the plain language of the statute. As was just noted, aliens who seek asylum must meet the definition of a refugee. See 8 U.S.C. § 1208.13(a); see also Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 187 (5th Cir.2004). The statute defines a refugee as including: 20 any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 21 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). The statute thus permits an alien to seek asylum from only one test country: that of the alien's nationality, or, if the alien is stateless, that of the country where the alien last habitually resided. Cf. Wangchuck v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 529 (2d Cir.2006) (noting the error in the BIA's assumption that an alien could be eligible for asylum based on a well-founded fear of persecution in either of two countries). In Senait's case, the BIA adjudicated her asylum claim with reference to Eritrea. If the BIA's decision to use Eritrea as Senait's test country is supported by substantial evidence, any persecution that Senait allegedly faced in Ethiopia is irrelevant under the statute. 22 A national is a person owing permanent allegiance to a state. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21). Senait has never argued that she is still an Ethiopian national, as she was divested of Ethiopian citizenship. Moreover, in her asylum application, Senait filled in Eritrea as her Presented Nationality (Citizenship). Nationality is a status conferred by a state. Dhoumo v. BIA, 416 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir.2005); cf. Paripovic v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 240 (3d Cir.2005) (petitioner was rendered stateless by the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia). The BIA's implicit reliance on Senait's concession that she is not an Ethiopian national is hard to criticize. 8 23 The BIA found that Senait was a citizen of Eritrea and firmly resettled there. 9 Senait argues that she could not have been firmly resettled in Eritrea because, as an Ethiopian deportee, she was not granted the same rights as non-refugee Eritreans. Yet the only thing this argument can do is force Senait's asylum claim into the statelessness rubric: If Senait is a national of Eritrea, her asylum claim must be decided through Eritrea. If Senait is not a national of Eritrea, her asylum claims must be decided through the country where she last habitually resided. That country turns out also to be Eritrea. 24 By finding that Senait was firmly resettled in Eritrea, the BIA implicitly found that Senait's last habitual residency was Eritrea, or, in any event, not Ethiopia. Cf. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1294 (11th Cir.2001) (approving an implicit finding of last habitual residence). Substantial evidence supports such a finding under any plausible definition of last habitual residence. 10 25 The immigration law defines residence as the place of general abode, which is a person's principal, actual dwelling in fact, without regard to intent. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33). Senait has not lived in Ethiopia since June 2000, and she did not arrive in the United States until March 2004. For more than two years, she lived in Eritrea with her mother, some of her siblings, and, while he was alive, her father. She also was employed as a gas station cashier with Mobil Oil. After living in Eritrea, Senait lived briefly in South Africa with Dawit, but they chose to move away from there. 26 Significantly, Senait's asylum application indicates that she perceived Eritrea to be her test country. The form asks: Please list your last address where you lived before coming to the U.S. If this is not the country where you fear persecution, also list the last address in the country where you fear persecution.  (Emphasis added). Senait furnished addresses in South Africa and Eritrea; she omitted Ethiopia. Further, when asked if she feared harm if returned to her home country, she responded by invoking hardships in Eritrea, not Ethiopia. 27 These facts belie any notion that Ethiopia is Senait's last habitual residence; the BIA's determination to use Eritrea as her test country is supported by substantial evidence. 28 Senait next challenges the BIA's decision that she did not suffer past persecution and lacks a reasonable fear of future persecution in Eritrea. 11 Senait argues that (1) the Eritrean government regularly commits human rights violations; (2) the Eritrean government required Senait, unlike native Eritreans, to carry a card that identified her as an Ethiopian refugee; (3) she was denied an exit visa; (4) she has a vulnerable social status as an Ethiopian refugee; and (5) she was harassed and discriminated against by the Eritrean government. On these points, the BIA explained that Senait's only individualized complaint was that customers at the gas station where she worked made remarks threatening that those born in Ethiopia should be sent back there, and that [t]hese incidents and alleged discrimination against Eritreans from Ethiopia fall short of persecution. Further, the BIA noted that there was no evidence that Senait was treated differently than native-born Eritreans by the government. 29 The BIA's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Senait's fears fall far short of the required extreme conduct needed to establish persecution. Her only complaint of individualized harassment stemmed from a few incidents where she was taunted at work. Persecution cannot be based on mere denigration, harassment, and threats. Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir.2004); see also id. at 187 n. 4 (persecution requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation (quoting Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir.1998))). Petitioners also point to their expert's affidavit that Eritreans from Ethiopia are treated harshly, are unduly discriminated against, and are blamed for hardships. As the expert conceded, however, many Eritrean problems are undoubtedly effects of the economic hardships caused by the war overall. Eduard holds that [n]either discrimination nor harassment ordinarily amounts to persecution under the INA, even if the conduct amounts to `morally reprehensible' discrimination on the basis of race or religion. Id. at 188. Finally, the fact that Eritrea denied Senait an exit visa does not on this record establish persecution. 12 The totality of the evidence does not compel a conclusion contrary to that of the BIA.