Opinion ID: 1436568
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim of Discriminatory Failure to Promote on the Basis of Race and Gender in Combination

Text: In his reply brief, Mr. McFarland complains that [i]f the Office of Human Rights had conducted a thorough investigation, the agency would have realized that McFarland was the victim of discrimination as an African-American man, not just gender discrimination. At other points in the reply brief, and at oral argument, he emphasized that he is not just a man and not just an African-American, but an African-American man. He thus appears to suggest that he is a member of a distinct protected subgroup. See Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034 (5th Cir. 1980) (using the language distinct protected subgroup to describe a similar claim by an African-American woman). This is too little, too late. [7] A few courts have accepted this type of intersectional or combination claim in Title VII litigation. In Jefferies the Fifth Circuit held that black women are a distinct protected subgroup for purposes of the McDonnell Douglas test. 615 F.2d at 1034. Since then, courts in other jurisdictions have applied this holding to other Title VII cases. See, e.g., Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir.1994) (Asian women); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987) (black woman); Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F.Supp.2d 314, 327 (D.Md.2003) (black female plaintiff established a prima facie case of composite, race-and-gender discrimination); Judge v. Marsh, 649 F.Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C.1986) (cautioning that the Jefferies analysis is appropriately limited to employment decisions based on one protected, immutable trait or fundamental right, which are directed against individuals sharing a second protected, immutable characteristic). We have not found a federal case where the court has squarely held that black men are a distinct subgroup for purposes of applying the anti-discrimination principles of Title VII. See generally Sixth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 662-64 (2005). Appellant McFarland has not cited any of these cases, however, and he has made no attempt to brief this complex question. Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. Wagner v. Georgetown University Medical Center, 768 A.2d 546, 554 n. 9 (D.C.2001) (citation omitted). Accord, Bardoff v. United States, 628 A.2d 86, 90 n. 8 (D.C.1993) (questions raised but not argued in briefing are treated as abandoned); Carducci v. Regan, 230 U.S.App. D.C. 80, 86, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (1983) (declin[ing] to entertain appellant's asserted but unanalyzed constitutional claim). To the extent Mr. McFarland is attempting to argue that this court for the first time should recognize African-American men as a distinct protected subgroup for purposes of establishing a prima facie case under the DCHRA, the argument is most definitely undeveloped and perfunctory, and we deem it to have been waived. [8]