Opinion ID: 1118523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grounds for Grant of a New Trial

Text: In making its ruling, the trial court stated, There is no reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury's determination that the plaintiffs were entitled to the full fee for the duplicative schematic design work nor for the other additional services. Additional services, under the unambiguous language of the contract, were to be reimbursed on an hourly rate. Because of the errors in the jury's determination of damages, I find that the defendant is entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages. The errors in the damage computations are so substantial that the Court can only conclude that the jury was acting under the influence of prejudice. Moreover, there is no basis at all for an incentive bonus under the express terms of the contract. The language of the contract is clear that the bonus is based on the total cost of construction. The plaintiffs' attempts to skirt the language and avoid its limits are unavailing. Decision on Post-Trial Motions at 8. That discussion by the trial court gives no indication that the court considered separately each basis for the Authority's request for a new trial, thereby act[ing] within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., 119 Idaho at 94, 803 P.2d at 1000. It is impossible for us to glean from the court's ruling which of the Rule 59(a) [1] grounds enumerated by defendant were relied upon by the trial court in reaching its decision. This raises the same concern we had in Quick v. Crane , namely, how are we to determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion in granting a new trial if we are unable to ascertain upon which ground it relied for its ruling? Because the applicable standard for granting a new trial differs depending on which ground the trial court employs, we cannot, in any meaningful fashion, determine whether the court abused its discretion without first identifying which standard the court should have applied. In order that we preserve the exercise of sound judicial discretion at the trial court level, Quick, 111 Idaho at 773, 727 P.2d at 1201, we must consider not just the result of a discretionary decision below, but the process by which the trial judge reached that decision. Our Court of Appeals aptly summarized this principle: Appellate review of judicial discretion should not be result-oriented. An appellate court should not focus primarily upon the outcome of a discretionary decision below, but upon the process by which the trial judge reached his decision. In order for the appellate court to perform this function properly, it must be informed of the reasons for the court's decision. Unless those reasons are obvious from the record itself, they must be stated by the trial judge. Where the reasons are neither obvious nor stated, the appellate court is left to speculate about the trial court's perception of the law and knowledge of the facts. As a practical matter, the appellate court finds itself locked into a result-oriented view. Sheets, 104 Idaho at 888, 664 P.2d at 795. Because the specific ground or grounds for a new trial are not apparent from the record, and the trial court's discussion of the bases for its decision is ambiguous, we remand to the trial court for a clarification of the rationale utilized in granting a new trial on the issue of damages.