Opinion ID: 2524548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: conclusion

Text: A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent Sullivan has not met his burden of establishing that RCW 9.12.010 is unconstitutionally vague. RCW 9.12.010 is not unconstitutionally vague simply because the term judicial process is not defined. Its meaning need not achieve mathematical certainty, but is measured against the purpose of RCW 9.12.010 to proscribe the use of any paper or document purporting to be or resembling judicial process. The term judicial process lends itself to either a broad or narrow construction. There are no reasons in this case to justify a broad construction of the term. The question arises whether any construction of judicial process would include documents such as Respondent Sullivan's Demand for Particulars, which he purported to serve upon the law enforcement officers who cited him for traffic infractions. It does not. We adapt from Black's Law Dictionary the definition of judicial process as all acts of a court from the beginning to the end of its proceedings in a given cause-the writ, summons, mandate or other process used to inform parties of institution of court proceedings and notices to compel appearance and participation in civil or criminal cases under applicable statutes and rules of court. Respondent's Demand for Particulars did not constitute judicial process under the statute. The documents contained questionable and irrelevant citations of statutes and court rules, inartfully stated questions, were issued and signed by him and not by a judge, and requested responses direct to him. Acting pro se, Respondent imitated documents he perceived to be documents or pleadings that would be issued by a lawyer. He did not represent them as documents issued by a court or subject to judicial action. In bombarding the citing officers with documents demanding responses, Respondent ignored or disregarded the IRLJ which exclusively governs procedures applicable to his traffic infraction citations. He cannot excuse his noncompliance with the rules by claiming ignorance of them, nor by the fact he was acting pro se without the assistance of a lawyer. However much we may disapprove of Respondent's conduct in his traffic infraction cases, his crude and inept attempt to demand a bill of particulars nevertheless does not rise to the level of the criminal offense of barratry under RCW 9.12.010. The State of Washington necessarily must find some other method of addressing such uncontrolled and harassing behavior by parties charged with traffic infractions under the IRLJ. In this case, the trial court correctly determined that, as a matter of law, Respondent Sullivan's Demand for Particulars did not purport to be or resemble judicial process. The trial court correctly dismissed with prejudice the charge of barratry against Respondent. We affirm the decision of the Kitsap County Superior Court which upheld the order of the Kitsap County District Court dismissing with prejudice the criminal charge of barratry against Respondent Kelly Russell Sullivan, a/k/a Kelly Russell., Sullivan. ALEXANDER, C.J., JOHNSON, MADSEN, SANDERS, IRELAND, BRIDGE, JJ., and GUY, J.P.T., concur. TALMADGE, J. [] (concurring). While I agree with the majority's disposition of this case, I write separately because we should adopt a narrower and clearer formulation of what constitutes judicial process for purposes of RCW 9.12.010. [1] Moreover, the State had other remedies than those set forth in RCW 9.12.010 to deal with Kelly Sullivan's blatant misuse of the legal process. The majority opinion accurately conveys Sullivan's misuse of the legal process. Sullivan sent lengthy documents described as Demand[s] for a Bill of Particulars to the police officers who had issued him traffic infractions for no other reason than to harass. In our courts, bills of particulars may be sought from opposing counsel in criminal matters. See CrR 2.1(c); (authorizing a court to direct the filing of a bill of particulars); CrRLJ 2.4(e) (same); see, e.g., State v. Brett, 126 Wash.2d 136, 156, 892 P.2d 29 (1995). Further, this type of pleading may only be filed pursuant to court rule in a criminal matter and is not allowed pursuant to the Infraction Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction. Specifically, even in a criminal case (which this was not), such a document may not be directed to police officers. It may not masquerade as a set of extra-judicial interrogatories to the officers issuing traffic infractions. Rather than being merely inartful, Sullivan, in the service of his particular political bent, was intent on causing as much trouble to the traditional legal system as he could. Whether described as Freemen, Militia, Constitutionalists, Patriots, or the like, these individuals hope to do all they can to disrupt our justice system in the hopes its collapse will presage a utopia. See Edward F. Shea, Common-law Courts? 50 Wash. St. Bar News 18-19 (May 1996). Sullivan was acting pro se, but that is no excuse for his conduct. Individuals purporting to represent themselves must be held to the same standards governing all who appear before a court. State v. Smith, 104 Wash.2d 497, 508, 707 P.2d 1306 (1985) (pro se defendant must comply with procedural rules) State v. Bebb, 44 Wash.App. 803, 806, 813, 723 P.2d 512 (self-representation is not a license to avoid compliance with court rules), aff'd, 108 Wash.2d 515, 740 P.2d 829 (1987). This extends to pretrial proceedings. While Sullivan's conduct was a misuse of the legal process, I agree with the majority he did not commit the crime of barratry. The majority correctly finds RCW 9.12.010, Washington's barratry law, constitutional. It is not vague. See State v. Knowles, 91 Wash.App. 367, 957 P.2d 797 (1998) (threats to judge not constitutionally protected speech). The statute deals with serious misbehavior; people may not knowingly cause others to instigate frivolous legal actions or utilize sham judicial documents. But the majority defines judicial process for purposes of the latter portion of RCW 9.12.010 as `all acts of a court from the beginning to the end of its proceedings in a given causethe writ, summons, mandate or other process used to inform parties of institution of court proceedings and notices to compel appearance and participation in civil or criminal cases under applicable statutes and rules of court.' Majority at 1025 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY). Under this broad definition, Sullivan plainly served documents that resembled judicial process on the officers, despite the fact that only a judge can authorize such bills of particulars. See CrR 2.1(c); CrRLJ 2.4(e). Using the majority's broad definitional approach, the demands for bills of particulars could purportedly be judicial process; in fact, they are not. By the majority's own definition of judicial process, Sullivan could be arguably guilty of barratry. The better approach to the definition of the term judicial process is to define it as those documents actually executed by a judge or by the court itself. If an individual attempts to serve what appears to be a court order, but it is instead a false document, or issues a false letter purporting to be a letter from the court clerk or commissioner, that individual may be prosecuted for barratry. By contrast, legal process would include documents or pleadings not executed by a judge or the court. [2] Even with this narrower definition, the State is not without tools to deter the misuse of the justice system by people like Sullivan. The documents here could readily have been quashed. Sanctions may, and indeed ought to, be imposed against persons like Sullivan for filing groundless documents. See CR 81 (civil rules for superior court supplement existing rules); CR 11; CRLJ 11. Indeed, numerous other statutory tools may be used. See, e.g., RCW 4.84.185 (sanctions for frivolous action) or RCW 4.24.350 (counterclaim for malicious prosecution). Sullivan harassed the officers in this case to further his peculiar brand of politics. He should have been sanctioned for such misuse of the legal system. The crime of barratry, however, as presently defined in RCW 9.12.010, is reserved for the filing of sham court orders or other court-generated pleadings, orders, or writings.