Opinion ID: 1309488
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: It is Time to Reverse State v. Williams

Text: The petitioner contended that this Court misapprehended legislative intent in deciding State v. Williams , in which it was held that a felony conviction resulting from one or more enhanced misdemeanor convictions could be used to form the basis for sentence enhancement under the terms of the recidivist statute. I am not convinced that this issue was ripe for decision at this juncture and should have been thus decided. [4] However, the majority chose instead to summarily conclude that reconsideration of Williams was not in order because the Legislature has not chosen to amend the recidivist statute since Williams was decided. My initial reaction to this declaration of presumptive knowledge of legislative intent is that it overlooks the fact that the decision in Williams was reached without reliance on any relevant statutory change, but nonetheless overturned a seventy-year-old precedent established in State v. Brown, 91 W.Va. 187, 112 S.E. 408 (1922). I am even more concerned that by providing such cursory consideration of the proportionality argument the majority failed to recognize that our decision in Williams has broader implications than convictions under the DUI statute. A number of offenses can be construed to fall within the Williams classification for purposes of imposing a recidivist sentence, many of which have no general association with violence or threats of violence. See, e.g., W.Va.Code §§ 17A-8-4 (1999) (joyriding); 17B-4-3 (1999) (driving while license suspended or revoked for driving under the influence); 60-6-9(i) (1999)(offering alcohol to another in a public place; possessing alcohol in excess of 10 gallons without obtaining proper stamps or seals) 61-3A-3 (1994) (shoplifting); 61-11-20 (1923) (petit larceny). In my estimation, a proportionality argument in this context remains to be decided by this Court. This Court has recognized that since the recidivist statutes are in derogation of the common law they are generally held to require a strict construction in favor of the prisoner. State ex rel. Ringer v. Boles, 151 W.Va. 864, 871, 157 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1967). We relied on this proposition in Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W.Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205 (1981), when we noted that this Court has historically adopted a rather strict and narrow construction of the recidivist statute. The discussion thereafter in Wanstreet related various instances wherein this narrow construction occurred with specific reference to our decision in State v. Brown, 91 W.Va. 187, 112 S.E. 408 (1922): In Brown, we explained that the felonies within the scope of the recidivist statute must be those that are felonies because of the character of the offense, rather than those that are felonies because of the character of the accused. Wanstreet at 526, 276 S.E.2d at 208 (citation omitted.). Although our decision in Williams overruled Brown by placing felony convictions based on predicate misdemeanor offenses within the ambit of the recidivist statute, this statement with regard to the character of the offense subject to the provisions of the recidivist statute retains its vitality. The Wanstreet discussion concerning the narrow construction of the recidivist statute concluded by saying that it is apparent that we have consistently viewed the West Virginia recidivist statute in a restrictive fashion in order to mitigate its harshness. Wanstreet at 528, 276 S.E.2d at 209. Trial courts are well-advised to continue to adhere to these principles as standards against which proportionality issues are decided in recidivist proceedings. As summarized in syllabus point five of Wanstreet, determination of whether a given sentence violates the proportionality principle found in Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution, consideration is given to the nature of the offense, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, a comparison of the punishment with what would be inflicted in other jurisdictions, and a comparison with other offenses within the same jurisdiction. 166 W.Va. at 523-24, 276 S.E.2d at 207. [5] It seems to me far wiser to humbly admit the error in foresight and correct it, especially when constitutional rights are inadvertently trampled upon. The principle of stare decisis is not intended to perpetuate such errors. As we related in State v. Nichols , `Remaining true to an intrinsically sounder doctrine ... better serves the values of stare decisis.... In such a situation special justification exists to depart from the recently decided case.' Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2115, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). Nichols at 445, 541 S.E.2d at 323 (1999). For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion in this case. Regardless of whether this Court might choose to address its earlier decisions in State v. Williams and State v. Brown , I believe the petitioner is entitled to the writ prayed for in light of the interplay of State v. Nichols and the petitioner's entitlement to be duly cautioned under West Virginia Code § 61-11-19. Consequently, a writ of prohibition, moulded to address either or both issues raised in this dissent, should have been granted. I am authorized to state that Justice STARCHER joins in this separate opinion.