Opinion ID: 987122
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial ofDue Process

Text: Yates first argues that he lacked notice of the method by which this court conducts proportionality review and, therefore, was not accorded meaningful appellate review. Am. Pers. Restraint Pet. & Supporting Br. at 117; cf Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321, 111 S. Ct. 731, 112 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1991) (We have emphasized repeatedly the crucial role of meaningful appellate review in ensuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or irrationally.). This argument lacks merit. We have identified four nonexclusive factors that will always be considered as 62 In re Pers. Restraint of Yates No. 82101-1 part of proportionality review: (1) the nature of the crime, (2) the aggravating circumstances, (3) criminal history, and (4) personal history. Cross, 156 Wn.2d at 630-31. These factors were first articulated as a list in Brown, 132 Wn.2d at 555-56, long before Yates's direct appeal. Indeed, in State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 683, 904 P.2d 245 (1995), this court rejected a due process challenge to its proportionality review that it perceived to be based on vagueness, noting that the court had an explicit framework for analysis. Yates was not denied notice of the manner in which this court conducts proportionality review. 2. Failure To Include Life Cases or Mitigating Facts Yates next claims that this court's utterly perfunctory proportionality review results in the arbitrary or discriminatory imposition of death sentences in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. Am. Pers. Restraint Pet. & Supporting Br. at 140. Despite the broad language asserting facial unconstitutionality, this appears to be an as-applied challenge; the discussion of the defects is limited to defects that occurred in Yates's case. For similar reasons, Yates also argues he was deprived of a liberty interest, created by statute, without due process when the court failed to consider cases in which a death-eligible defendant received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The crux of Yates's argument with respect to both constitutional claims is that, for purposes of proportionality review, this court only compared Yates's case to other cases in which the death penalty had been applied 63 In re Pers. Restraint of Yates No. 82101-1 instead of also looking to cases resulting in a life sentence. Looking to life cases, Yates suggests that it appears that a confession coupled with a willingness to plead guilty constitutes mitigation of the most persuasive kind, specifically pointing to Gary Ridgway's life sentence and Yates's life sentence for the 13 murders adjudicated by plea agreement in Spokane County. Id. at 116. Yates's argument lacks merit for two reasons: (1) he is incorrect that the court failed to consider cases involving life sentences, and (2) he relies on an incorrect interpretation ofRCW 10.95.130(2)(b). First, Yates is simply incorrect that we failed to consider death-eligible cases in which the death penalty was not imposed. In fact, we addressed two cases upon which Yates now relies: Gary Ridgway's King County case and Yates's Spokane County case. Yates, 161 Wn.2d at 793. We addressed Yates's proportionality argument regarding the two cases by noting that a prosecutor's exercise of discretion in a similar or more egregious case does not necessarily render a given death sentence disproportionate. See id.; see also Cross, 156 Wn.2d at 634 (discussing effect of Ridgway's plea deal). It was not that this court failed to consider death-eligible cases resulting in a life sentence; it was that consideration of those cases did not compel a finding of disproportionality. Second, Yates misunderstands the concept of proportionality embodied in RCW 10.95.130(2)(b ). Yates appears to believe that if some capital defendant has received life without parole, sentencing a similarly situated capital defendant to death 64 In re Pers. Restraint of Yates No. 82101-1 violates RCW 10.95.130(2)(b). But this court has repeatedly rejected the notion that proportionality requires mathematical precision or that the cases 'be matched up like so many points on a graph.' Elmore II, 162 Wn.2d at 270 (quoting State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829, 910, 822 P.2d 177 (1991)). Instead, proportionality review involves merely ensuring that the death penalty is 'not imposed wantonly and freakishly.' State v. Elmore, 139 Wn.2d 250, 308, 985 P.2d 289 (1999) (Elmore I) (quoting Brown, 132 Wn.2d at 555); see Cross, 156 Wn.2d at 630. Thus, so long as the facts in a death penalty case are similar to some of the facts in other cases in which the death penalty was upheld, the sentence is proportionate. Elmore II, 162 Wn.2d at 269 (summarizing holding in Elmore I, 139 Wn.2d at 308); see, e.g., Cross, 156 Wn.2d at 632-34; State v. Elledge, 144 Wn.2d 62, 80-83, 26 P.3d 271 (2001). Still, the pool of similar cases to which a given case is compared includes both those in which the death penalty is imposed and those in which it is not. Elledge, 144 Wn.2d at 79 n.5. That reflects this court's current interpretation of the proportionality requirement of RCW 10.95.130(2)(b). See State v. Davis, 175 Wn.2d 287, 347-48, 290 P.3d 43 (2012). This is the manner in which the court conducted proportionality review on direct appeal of Yates's capital sentence. See Yates, 161 Wn.2d at 788-94. Yates has failed to show either a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of death sentences that are arbitrary or discriminatory or the deprivation of 65 In re Pers. Restraint of Yates No. 82101-1 a liberty interest (i.e., statutory proportionality review) without due process. Accordingly, his claims lack merit and is dismissed. K. Cumulative Error (Claim 22) Finally, Yates contends that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process under the cumulative error doctrine. The cumulative error doctrine applies where a combination of trial errors denies the accused a fair trial even where any one ofthe errors, taken individually, may not justify reversal. In re Det. ofCoe, 175 Wn.2d 482, 515, 286 P.3d 29 (2012). Yates relies both on the errors alleged in his personal restraint petition and those found on direct appeal. The only partially meritorious claim Yates raises is that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to investigate whether the victims' family members would testify during the penalty phase of the trial. However, that deficient performance was not prejudicial. On direct appeal, we found no errors by the trial court. We did note, however, that the prosecutor had made two improper remarks, but that neither remark was prejudicial. Yates, 161 Wn.2d at 776, 780-81. Yates fails to explain how the impact of the two improper remarks recognized on direct review, taken together with the impact flowing from trial counsel's failure to contact victims' family members about possible mitigation testimony was sufficient to deny him a constitutionally fair trial. Instead, Yates's arguments rely on the existence 66 In re Pers. Restraint of Yates No. 82101-1 of errors we have determined did not occur. Accordingly, Yates's cumulative error claim lacks merit and is dismissed.