Opinion ID: 2600184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State v. Cruz and State v. Smith

Text: The legislature amended the SRA in 1990 to require sentencing courts to include washed out juvenile sex convictions when calculating defendants' offender scores. Laws of 1990, ch. 3, § 706. Before 1990, removal of a `washed out' conviction from the offender score was automatic and not subject to judicial discretion. Cruz, 139 Wash.2d at 189, 985 P.2d 384 (citing DAVID BOERNER, SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON § 5.6[d] (1985)). Consequently, the 1990 SRA amendments served to increase defendants' offender scores. In Cruz, we considered whether these amendments could require a sentencing court to include a previously washed out juvenile sex conviction in the defendant's offender score. 139 Wash.2d at 189, 985 P.2d 384. Cruz's 1975 juvenile sex conviction washed out in 1987. Id. at 188-89, 985 P.2d 384. Former RCW 9.94A.360 (Supp.1988). We determined that the legislature intended that the 1990 SRA amendments apply prospectively to sentencing for crimes committed after the amendments' effective date. Id. at 191, 985 P.2d 384. However, we reasoned that the 1990 amendments would have to be applied retroactively to require Cruz's sentencing court to include his previously washed out juvenile sex conviction when calculating Cruz's offender score because [t]he 1990 change to the SRA would not serve to change Cruz's existing criminal history (which did not include the 1975 rape as it had washed out in 1987) unless it was applied retroactively. [2] Id. at 193, 985 P.2d 384. Thus, since the 1990 SRA amendments were unequivocally prospective, we held that Cruz's sentencing court could not include his washed out 1975 conviction when calculating his offender score because Cruz's criminal history no longer included that conviction. Id. We vacated Cruz's sentence and remanded to the trial court for sentencing using a calculation of an offender score that did not include the washed out conviction. Id. Similarly, in Smith, we considered whether amendments to the SRA in 1997 and 2000 could require sentencing courts to include Smith's previously washed out juvenile felony conviction when calculating his offender score. [3] 144 Wash.2d at 668-69, 30 P.3d 1245. Smith's five juvenile felony convictions washed out in 1991. Id.; former RCW 9.94A.030(12)(b) (1996). However, the 1997 SRA amendment modified the SRA to presumably permit use of Smith's washed out convictions when calculating his offender score at sentencing for his 1999 offense. Laws of 1997, ch. 338, § 2; Smith, 144 Wash.2d at 669-70, 30 P.3d 1245. After our 1999 decision in Cruz, the legislature feared that the 1997 amendment might face the same fate as the 1990 amendment and responded in 2000 with additional amendments to the SRA. Id. at 672, 30 P.3d 1245; Laws of 2000, ch. 26, § 2. The 2000 SRA amendment stated, Any sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the current offense was committed. Laws of 2000, ch. 26, § 2. In a statutory note, the legislature also stated, RCW 9.94A.345 is intended to cure any ambiguity that might have led to the Washington supreme court's decision in State v. Cruz , Cause No. 67147-8 [139 Wash.2d 186, 985 P.2d 384] (October 7, 1999). A decision as to whether a prior conviction shall be included in an individual's offender score should be determined by the law in effect on the day the current offense was committed. RCW 9.94A.345 is also intended to clarify the applicability of statutes creating new sentencing alternatives or modifying the availability of existing alternatives. RCW 9.94A.345 Intent2000 c 26. In Smith, the State argued that the 2000 SRA amendment evidenced the legislature's intent that sentencing courts must include Smith's previously washed out 1975 juvenile felony conviction when calculating his offender score. 144 Wash.2d at 671-72, 30 P.3d 1245. But relying on Cruz, we rejected this argument holding that [a]lthough this statement perhaps indicates a general legislative discontent with our holding in Cruz, there is nothing demonstrating an intent for the retroactive application of the 1997 amendment, because the 2000 SRA amendment [did] not contain an explicit legislative command that the 1997 amendment applies retroactively. Id. at 672, 30 P.3d 1245 (emphasis added). We also held that the 1997 amendment was not retroactive because, like the 1990 amendment in Cruz, it contained no language showing the Legislature intended the 1997 amendment to apply retroactively. [4] Id. at 673, 30 P.3d 1245 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268-69, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)). Because the 1997 and 2000 SRA amendments failed to meet the retroactive intent requirement we articulated in Cruz, we vacated Smith's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for sentencing using an offender score that did not include his previously washed out juvenile felony conviction. Id. at 674-75, 30 P.3d 1245.