Opinion ID: 1218195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: conclusion

Text: The concurring opinion, like the majority, gives a twisted definition to malice, one that does not fit the statutory definition and does not meet any commonly accepted definition of the term. To pretend that the basis of the award is malice can only cause confusion. Writing more than 20 years ago, Justice Peters pointed out that for more than the preceding 20 years the established rule holds that drunk driving does not warrant punitive award, and that if radical change in policy is to be accomplished, it should be accomplished by the Legislature not by the courts. ( Gombos v. Ashe, supra, 158 Cal. App.2d at p. 528.) While fully cognizant of the grave problem of drunk driving, the Legislature has not accepted the court's invitation to change the law. The Legislature may choose to respond as it did in repudiating this court's last foray to enlarge liability for drunk driving. (Stats. 1978, ch. 929 amending Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25602 and repudiating Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144 [145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669].) I share the common frustration in society's inability to eliminate or reduce the incidence of drunk driving. But I cannot join the majority's experiment, which is contrary to settled principles of law, unjust and will ultimately prove ineffective. I would deny mandate. The petition of the real party in interest for a rehearing was denied September 20, 1979.