Opinion ID: 1995436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Corrective Instruction

Text: Owens also argues that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to provide a corrective instruction after Howard DeShields, a government witness, accused Owens' counsel of identifying him as a government witness to other inmates during a visit to the jail. On cross-examination, the following exchange between DeShields and Owens' counsel took place: Counsel: Now, you and I actually saw each other on Friday; correct? . . . DeShields: You know it. You were trying to provoke something, but you weren't going get it. [sic] . . . DeShields: Tell the whole story. For one, you was in the office with [Cunningham] pointing through a glass window at me. Counsel: I was pointing at you? DeShields: Yeah. You all was  You stayed on purpose so he can pick me out to show me to you. . . . Counsel: Why do you think [Cunningham] was pointing me out to you? DeShields: Who knows? The dude done done all type of stuff. The dude done threatened my life, the dude done told dudes to kill me. Who knows, man? You know what I'm saying? Who knows? You standing here trying to cross me up on all this and that, but it ain't going [to] change the fact that your man done beat this young dude to death, beat that gay dude to death. See what I'm saying? So you can cross me up all you want. Owens argues that the trial court erred by not giving a corrective instruction stating that DeShields' accusations were irrelevant and should be disregarded. Although Owens' counsel drafted a proposed instruction, the trial court failed to give it. But neither at that point nor when the trial court gave its final instructions did Owens object. Accordingly, we review his claim only for plain error. After DeShields initially accused defense counsel of pointing him out, counsel continued to engage DeShields in a lengthy cross-examination with many follow-up questions about his thoughts about their encounter on the previous Friday. By doing so, Owens' counsel invited much of the troublesome testimony. Courts are especially reluctant to reverse for plain error when it is `invited.' Cowan v. United States, 629 A.2d 496, 503 (D.C.1993) (citation omitted). We dealt with a somewhat similar situation in Gatlin v. United States, 925 A.2d 594 (D.C.2007), in which a government witness accused defense counsel of trying to get him to commit perjury on a previous occasion. In that case, the prosecutor had heard the witness make the accusation previously, but did not think he would do so in open court. Id. at 602. Defense counsel wanted to go on the stand to testify that the witness' accusation was false, but the trial court instead opted to permit defense counsel to conduct additional cross-examination of the witness. Id. at 603. We concluded that the defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of defense counsel's testimony or `flat contradiction' of [the witness'] accusation; reasonable jurors could infer that [the] accusation was false. Id. at 604. We examined the importance of [the challenged] testimony, the extent to which [the witness'] credibility was impeached, and the independent evidence of [the appellant's] guilt and concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the accusation could have affected the jury's verdict. Id. (citation omitted). The government witness was the key government witness, but not the only one. Additionally, a fair and reasonable reading of the record reveal[ed] that [the witness'] credibility as to the accusation against defense counsel was grievously impeached. Id. at 605. As in Gatlin, DeShields was the key government witness, but he was not the only government witness who testified that Owens beat Short. Additionally, the trial court told Owens' counsel that I thought from your pursuit of the matter on cross everyone on the jury understood that you were in disagreement with [DeShields'] characterization of it. Unlike in Gatlin, we review here only for plain error. [2] We cannot conclude that the trial court's failure to issue a corrective instruction after DeShields' testimony constituted plain error given that Owens' counsel invited much of the testimony of which he now complains, that it was clear from the cross-examination that defense counsel disagreed with DeShields' characterization of events, and that there was other independent evidence that Owens committed second-degree murder.