Opinion ID: 1452978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: offers of consideration

Text: Petitioners' contention that the election must be voided because of offers of consideration is based upon Elections Code section 20021, subdivision (c), which permits contests when the defendant has given to any elector ... any bribe or reward, or has offered any bribe or reward for the purpose of procuring his election, or has committed any other offense against the elective franchise defined in Chapter 3 (commencing at Section 12000) of Division 8 or Division 15, of this code. In relevant part, the penal provisions referred to in section 20021 proscribe bribery for the purpose of influencing any voter in casting his vote (Elec. Code, §§ 29130, 12003), offers of employment designed to induce a voter to vote or refrain from voting ( id., § 12004), and the making of any gift, loan, promise, offer, procurement, or agreement to, for, or with any person, in order to induce that person to procure or endeavor to procure the ... vote of any voter at any election. ( Id., § 12005.) Respondents' contention that offers of consideration cannot be the ground of an election contest must be rejected. (7) Section 20021 permits an elector to challenge any election held in his political subdivision for any of the [enumerated] causes. And, although some of the language of subdivision (c) implies a candidate election (his election), section 20089 provides that this and certain other provisions of the code shall also apply to the recount of votes cast on a ballot measure, insofar as they can be made applicable. It is clear that a recount of votes cast is not limited to the mechanical process of counting ballots, but embraces at least the adjudication of whether a vote is illegal by reason of the nonresidence of the voter. ( Singletary v. Kelley, supra, 242 Cal. App.2d 611.) (8) Thus subdivision (d) of section 20021, which permits contests based on illegal votes, can be the basis of a ballot measure election contest, and no reason appears why subdivision (c) should not also apply to such elections. (9) A contestant must establish that the outcome of the election was determined by virtue of the defect of which he complains if the contest is based upon illegal votes. (Elec. Code, § 20024.) No such statutory requirement exists when a candidate election is contested on the basis of that candidate's offer of bribes to secure his election. Whatever should be the result when a candidate commits such acts, [5] a ballot measure is not rendered unworthy of passage by the misdeeds of its proponents. (10) Illegal offers of consideration should not void an election unless it is shown that the result would have been different without their influence  i.e., if they prevented the expression of the majority will. By requiring a contestant of a ballot measure election who relies upon subdivision (c) to show that a defendant who offered valuable consideration thereby affected the outcome of the election, [6] subdivision (c) can be made applicable to the recount of votes cast on a ballot measure, as can subdivision (d), within the meaning of section 20089. (Cf. Williams v. Venneman, 42 Cal. App.2d 618, 620-621 [109 P.2d 757].) Moreover, it is settled that a qualified voter has a constitutional right to vote in elections without having his vote wrongfully denied, debased or diluted.... ( Hadley v. Junior College Dist. (1970) 397 U.S. 50, 52 [25 L.Ed.2d 45, 49, 90 S.Ct. 791], and cases cited), that ballot box stuffing may deprive a voter of this fundamental right ( Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 554-555 [12 L.Ed.2d 506, 522-523, 84 S.Ct. 1362]; Baker v. Carr (1962) 369 U.S. 186, 208 [7 L.Ed.2d 663, 680, 82 S.Ct. 691]), and that these principles apply with full force to exercises of state power through political subdivisions such as cities ( Avery v. Midland County (1968) 390 U.S. 474, 481 [20 L.Ed.2d 45, 51, 88 S.Ct. 1114]). There is no logical basis on which to distinguish issue elections from candidate elections in regard to the right to an equal vote (cf. Cipriano v. City of Houma (1969) 395 U.S. 701 [23 L.Ed.2d 647, 89 S.Ct. 1897]), and it would appear that a citizen's vote may be as unconstitutionally debased by inducing votes with bribes as by stuffing ballot boxes with illegal votes. If the result of an election is determined by either of these unlawful means, it is self-evident that at least those who voted for the losing side have been deprived of their constitutional right to an equal vote. (11) Accordingly, construing section 20021 to permit ballot measure election contests grounded on bribes designed to influence voting is essential if the judiciary is to remain available for the vindication of the fundamental rights at stake here. (12) A countervailing limitation to the grounds upon which any election  candidate or issue  may be challenged is that fundamental First Amendment interests in full and free discussion may take precedence whenever they conflict with provisions of the Elections Code. Election-oriented debates are, of course, designed to influence voting, and a campaign speech generally promising an increase in the number of government jobs arguably conflicts with provisions proscribing offering employment to influence voters. But First Amendment interests undoubtedly immunize election speeches which fall short of promises of employment conditioned on a certain vote. (Cf., e.g., Fort v. Civil Service Commission, 61 Cal.2d 331 [38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385].) Viewed in this light, most of petitioners' objections to San Jose's promises must be rejected. Petitioners do not contend that the participation of San Jose city officials in a consolidation campaign in which that city is interested is per se improper, and city officials and other proponents must be able to argue the merits of consolidation. (13) Accordingly, the fact that San Jose promised recreational and other municipal improvements, and great caution in the enforcement of its building code, cannot affect the validity of the election, as purported advantages of consolidation such as these went to the heart of any meaningful debate on this issue. (14) Likewise, the fate of employees of a consolidated city is certainly of interest to those employees, and the fact that the consolidating city's officials took steps to minimize losses of employment, and to communicate their view of the relevant considerations, does not affect the validity of the election  at least where, as in this case, it is not shown that job guarantees were conditioned upon the employee's favorable vote. (15) Article XI, section 1106 of the San Jose City Charter provides that employees of consolidated cities shall be deemed to have their names upon eligible lists for respective types of positions held by them, and to be qualified for appointment to such respective positions. The San Jose City Manager's letters, giving his personal assurance that the recipient employees of Alviso would in fact be hired if consolidation carried, went beyond the charter provision only to the extent of indicating, in essence, that all eligible applicants would find openings. A competent estimate of the practical effect of the charter provision, in light of San Jose's employment situation, would clearly be of interest to Alviso employees, and there is no impropriety in furnishing that estimate to the interested persons. It would be shirking reality to deny that the San Jose City Manager, who clearly favored consolidation, hoped that ensuring employment for Alviso's city employees would further the chances of consolidation at the polls, or that this hope was at least one motivating factor behind his letters and appearances. Such offers might be deemed improper in a candidate election ( Bush v. Head, 154 Cal. 277, 283 [97 P. 512]), but the balance between First Amendment interests in full discussion and Fourteenth Amendment interests in equal voting rights demands a different result here. Whatever the appropriate result when, for example, a candidate promises to retain his predecessor's staff if elected, the fate of employees of a consolidated city is too close to the merits of the issue before the electors to permit chilling relevant discussion by voiding elections because of that discussion  especially when the purity of the promisor's motives is at most indirectly relevant to the merits of the measure voted upon. Moreover, petitioners presented no evidence that any of the six or eight employees who received the city manager's letters  or anyone else  was influenced thereby, and this ground of contest must therefore fail for lack of a showing that job offers affected the result of the election. The promises of jobs to volunteer firemen was apparently a matter of some controversy within the San Jose City Council, but a majority of that body determined in good faith that the charter provision should be applicable to unpaid firemen who are interested in paying positions upon consolidation. (16) On the other hand, conditioning eligibility upon not being outspoken in opposition to consolidation is clearly improper. (E.g., Fort v. Civil Service Commission, supra, 61 Cal.2d 331.) Petitioners made no showing, however, that any of the volunteer firemen who heard this condition were thereby deterred from opposing consolidation, or that this impropriety contributed in any way to the result of the election. (17) Finally, the testimony of one Alviso resident that he was offered $100 to get the people together and push for consolidation was directly contradicted by the purported offeror, the administrative assistant to the San Jose City Manager, and the trial court's finding that no agent of San Jose offered valuable consideration to induce ... any other person to procure or endeavor to procure a favorable vote on consolidation must be deemed conclusive on this point. Dr. Galarza's testimony that the administrative assistant asked him to encourage Alvisan Mexican-Americans to vote for consolidation, and at the same time asked him if he would be interested in a job with the City of San Jose, was uncontradicted. We need not decide, however, whether this constituted as a matter of law an illegal attempt to induce Dr. Galarza to endeavor to procure a favorable vote (Elec. Code, § 12005; cf. Bush v. Head, supra, 154 Cal. at p. 283; Bradley v. Clark, 133 Cal. 196, 203-208 [65 P. 395]), as no alleged offer was accepted, and petitioners made no showing that any such offer contributed to the result of the election.