Opinion ID: 870930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Requiring the trial court to instruct as to every possible defense, regardless of how weak, would burden the trial court and override the defense counsel's role in creating defense strategy.

Text: As previously stated and worth repeating again, when requested by a defendant, a defense instruction is required to be given if the evidence fairly raises the issue, regardless of how weak, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive the evidence may be. State v. Irvin, 53 Haw. 119, 120, 488 P.2d 327, 328 (1971) (quoting Territory v. Alcantara, 24 Haw. 197, 208 (1918)) (holding that the trial court's refusal of the defendant-requested self-defense instruction was reversible error, even where this contradicted his theory of defense at trial). Because of the low standard governing defense instructions, it would be extremely problematic to require a court to instruct the jury sua sponte as to all defense instructions that may possibly be implicated by the facts. This requirement would (1) burden the trial court with the duty to examine every possible theory that may fit the entire body of evidence before the court, (2) restructure the adversary system contrary to the interests of both the prosecution and defendant, and (3) create incentives for a defendant not to request a defense instruction. First, inasmuch as the defendant need not assert the theory of defense in order to be entitled to the defense instruction, it will not always be readily apparent to a trial court which defenses are minimally supported by evidence. See Auld, 114 Hawai`i at 148-149, 157 P.3d at 587-88 (Nakamura, J., concurring and dissenting) (It is not always apparent that sufficient evidence for a self-defense instruction has been introduced, especially where self-defense is not asserted as a theory of defense.); Barton, 12 Cal.4th at 197, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d at 574, 906 P.2d at 536 ([T]o require trial courts to ferret out all defenses that might possibly be shown by the evidence, even when inconsistent with the defendant's theory at trial, would not only place an undue burden on the trial courts but would also create a potential of prejudice to the defendant.). If the trial court was required sua sponte to instruct the jury on every defense or theory that is possibly applicable to the defendant's case, particularly, one that is merely supported by weak evidence, it would be burdened with reviewing the entire body of evidence and considering every defense that may be applicable to the facts. See Barton, 12 Cal.4th at 197, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d at 574, 906 P.2d at 536 (`Appellate insistence upon sua sponte instructions which are inconsistent with defense trial theory or not clearly demanded by the evidence would hamper defense attorneys and put trial judges under pressure to glean legal theories and winnow the evidence for remotely tenable and sophistical instructions.') (quoting People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal.3d 703, 716-17, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 10, 518 P.2d 913, 921-22 (1974)). The California courts have ruled, in recognition of this burden, that `[a] legal concept that has been referred to only infrequently, and then with inadequate elucidation, cannot be considered a general principle of law such that a trial court must include it within jury instructions in the absence of a request.' People v. Watie, 100 Cal.App.4th 866, 882, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 269 (2002) (quoting People v. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal.4th 103, 126, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 345, 820 P.2d 559, 569 (1991)). In other words, the trial court [is] under no obligation to sift through the evidence to identify [a defense] that conceivably could have been, but was not, raised by the parties, and to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on that issue. People v. Montoya, 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1050, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 142, 874 P.2d 903, 917 (1994). Instead, in California, [a] trial court's duty to instruct, sua sponte, on particular defenses arises `only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.' [5] People v. Maury, 30 Cal.4th 342, 424, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 631, 68 P.3d 1, 60 (2003) (citations omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted); see also Montoya, 7 Cal.4th at 1047, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d at 140, 874 P.2d at 915 (It is settled that, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law that are commonly or closely and openly connected to the facts before the court and that are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case.) (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeal of California reasoned in reviewing the trial court's failure to instruct sua sponte as to a lesser included offense, [T]he trial court cannot be required to anticipate every possible theory that may fit the facts of the case before it and instruct the jury accordingly. The judge need not fill in every time a litigant or his counsel fails to discover an abstruse but possible theory of the facts .... [The defendant's] theory ... was not one that the evidence would strongly illuminate and place before the trial court. On the contrary, it was so far under the surface of the facts and theories apparently involved as to remain hidden from even the defendant until the case reached this court on appeal. The trial court need not, therefore, have recognized it and instructed the jury in accordance with it. Omniscience is not required of our trial courts. People v. Wade, 53 Cal.2d 322, 334-35, 1 Cal.Rptr. 683, 692, 348 P.2d 116, 125 (1959), overruled on other grounds in People v. Carpenter, 15 Cal.4th 312, 381, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 40, 935 P.2d 708, 747 (1997) (brackets and ellipses added) (emphases added). By holding that the trial court is required to instruct as to every defense sua sponte with even the slightest support in the evidence, trial courts would be required to be omniscien[t] and recognize every hidden defense available to the defense. See Wade, 53 Cal.2d at 334-35, 1 Cal.Rptr. at 692, 348 P.2d at 125. It would be dangerously harmful to trial courts and judicial efficiency if trial courts were to be required to instruct as to every defense sua sponte. The trial court is not responsible to create or implement a defense strategythis role is reserved for the defense counsel. See Shells v. State, 642 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (To find fundamental error in this case[, where a trial court failed to sua sponte give a self-defense instruction,] would place an unrealistic burden on the trial judge concerning trial tactics and strategy that should be left to defense counsel.  (citing State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 310 (Fla.1990)) (emphasis added)). It is obvious that the trial court should not step into the role of advocate for the defendant over the entire course of the proceedings by considering and creating defenses and issuing defense instructions that are weakly suggested by the evidence, because this would contravene the essence of our adversarial system. As this court has stated, [t]he very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free. State v. Yamada, 108 Hawai`i 474, 484, 122 P.3d 254, 264 (2005) (quoting State v. Vliet, 91 Hawai`i 288, 295, 983 P.2d 189, 196 (1999) (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975))). Inflicting defense instructions that were not requested would violate these established principles. Moreover, because the trial court would essentially serve as a quasi-agent for the defense counsel when it implements a defense through the issuance of a defense instruction, it would be grossly unfair to the prosecution. In addition, increasing the trial court's duties as to defense instructions would restrict the defendant's ability to successfully present his or her strategic defense. Auld, 114 Hawai`i at 148, 157 P.3d at 587 (Nakamura, J., concurring and dissenting) (Forcing an unwanted self-defense instruction on a defendant would take control of the defense away from the defendant and impair the defendant's ability to present his or her defense.). The defense counsel may have valid strategic (though unobvious) reasons not to request a particular defense instruction. Yet, if this court were to hold that a trial court is required sua sponte to issue every defense instruction warranted by any support in the evidence, these reasons would be trumped by the court's unwarranted duties. As the New York's Supreme Court, Appellate Division stated: [A] defendant is entitled to establish his own defense, and it is impermissible for the trial court to foist upon him an affirmative defense which, while arguably supportable by the prosecution's case, is in direct conflict with the course he has charted. People v. Maldonado, 175 A.D.2d 698, 699, 573 N.Y.S.2d 662, 664 (N.Y.App.Div.1991). The issuance of a sua sponte defense instruction, therefore, can prejudice the defendant and constitute error. See People v. Jackson, 77 Mich.App. 392, 258 N.W.2d 89, 91 (1977) (holding that the trial court's failure to sua sponte instruct on a defense was not plain error, where, among other things, the defense instruction would have contradicted the defendant's main defense). Further, this court has held in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that matters presumably within the judgment of counsel, like trial strategy, will rarely be second-guessed by judicial hindsight. State v. Richie, 88 Hawai`i 19, 39-40, 960 P.2d 1227, 1247-48 (1998) (quoting State v. Smith, 68 Haw. 304, 311, 712 P.2d 496, 501 (1986)) (ellipses added, internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, [s]pecific actions or omissions alleged to be error but which had an obvious tactical basis for benefitting the defendant's case will not be subject to further scrutiny. State v. De Guair, 108 Hawai`i 179, 187, 118 P.3d 662, 670 (2005) (quoting Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442, 462-63, 848 P.2d 966, 976 (1993) (emphases in original)). Other courts have similarly held that counsel's strategic choice to pursue one line [of defense] to the exclusion of others is rarely second-guessed on appeal. United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1294 (7th Cir.1990) (citations omitted, formatting altered, brackets added); United States v. Adamo, 882 F.2d 1218, 1227 (7th Cir.1989); Quilling v. United States, 243 F.Supp.2d 872, 884 (S.D.Ill.2002). Requiring the trial court sua sponte to instruct the jury on every defense will result in that court actively second-guessing the defendant's strategies. Finally, demanding that a trial court issue every defense instruction whenever slight evidence warrants it would encourage defense counsel not to request defense instructions, in order to receive an automatic retrial. Auld, 114 Hawai`i at 149, 157 P.3d at 588 (Nakamura, J., concurring and dissenting). Because the standard for a defense instruction is set so low, the defendant can easily argue on appeal that the circuit court committed reversible error in failing sua sponte to issue every defense instruction regardless of how weak. Moreover, in order to prevent the defendant from profiting from his or her own counsel's decision not to request a defense instruction, the prosecution would then be coerced to request the court to instruct the jury as to a defense. If the defense is truly a part of defense strategy, it should be requested by defense counsel. It is not the responsibility of the prosecution or the trial court to ensure that the jury is instructed as to every possible defense. With all due respect, in my view this court should overturn Auld and hold that the right to the mistake of fact instruction accrues after the defendant or prosecution requests the defense instruction, and therefore, a trial court is not required sua sponte to instruct the jury as to this defense. Moreover, for the reasons expressed above, a trial court should not be required sua sponte to issue every defense instruction that is merely supported by weak evidence. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, I cannot conclude that the circuit court committed prejudicial error when it failed to instruct the jury on the defense of mistake of fact sua sponte.