Opinion ID: 2546413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Response to Juror Question

Text: After the jury had been deliberating on the issue of penalty for a short time, it sent out a note to the judge, stating: We would like to have a copy of the four questions asked by the judge of each of the jurors during jury selection. In the presence of defendant, defense counsel, and the prosecutor, the court then read the questions to the jury. Defense counsel made no objection nor did he request the court to follow any other course of conduct. Defendant now contends that by acceding to a jury request to read the questions without inquiring more directly about the reason for the request, the court failed in its duty to oversee the jury's penalty-phase decision-making process and violated [his constitutional rights]. We conclude the issue was not preserved for presentation on appeal due to defense counsel's failure to object; in any event, the claim is meritless. Section 1138 provides: After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there be any disagreement between them as to the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the case, they must require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon being brought into court, the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney, and the defendant or his counsel, or after they have been called. When a trial court decides to respond to a jury's note, counsel's silence waives any objection under section 1138. ( People v. Kageler (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 738, 746, 108 Cal.Rptr. 235.) The failure of defendant's counsel to object or move for a mistrial upon the court frankly informing him of the court's action might also be construed to be a tacit approval. Approval of the court's action, even though it might have been a technical violation of section 1138 of the Penal Code, cures any possible error. ( People v. House (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 756, 765-766, 90 Cal.Rptr. 831, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 451-452, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1.) We reached a similar conclusion in the analogous situation in which the trial court declined to respond to a jury's note pursuant to section 1138. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 430, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) Defendant argues we may reach the issue, citing People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th 557, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224, and People v. Litteral (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 790, 145 Cal.Rptr. 186, but neither case is on point. In Gurule, the trial court declined a jury request for a readback of defense counsel's closing argument  after conferring with the parties.  ( People v. Gurule, supra, at pp. 648-649, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224, italics added.) Contrary to defendant's claim here, there is no indication the defense attorney in Gurule failed to object. We previously have observed that Litteral is of doubtful validity because it permitted a defendant to assert what is essentially the jury's right to a readback of testimony. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 505, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754.) In any event, the case is distinguishable, for there the trial court refused to read back portions of the trial, although the jury requested the readback. The jury was thus deprived of critical information it desired to make a decision. ( People v. Litteral, supra, at p. 796, 145 Cal.Rptr. 186.) By contrast, the trial court here reiterated for the jury, as requested, the information it desired. [35] Unlike in Litteral, the jury here was not deprived of any information. Nor is this the type of error an appellate court might reach in the absence of an objection. By declining to object, a defense attorney might believe the additional information is favorable to his or her client. Such is the case here, where the fourth question read to the jury asked whether a juror, regardless of the evidence, ... would automatically, and in every case, vote for a verdict of death and never vote for a verdict of life without the possibility of parole. A juror may have appeared to the others as voting for death without considering the evidence. That counsel, for a strategic reason, desired this question be read back to the jury is quite possible. There being the possibility counsel made a considered decision not to object, we should not now give defendant a second bite at the apple. Even assuming for argument we may overlook the absence of an objection, the claim is meritless. Although defendant speaks in terms of jury difficulties and disorientation, and argues the trial court has no duty to simply acquiesce to the jury's request, he does not explain what type of confusion he believes was evident in the jury's request, what type of probing the court should have done in response, or how the court erred by responding as it did. We have emphasized that interrogating jurors in the middle of their deliberations is a delicate business and courts should take care lest they inadvertently coerce a verdict. [N]ot every incident involving a juror's conduct requires or warrants further investigation. `The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconduct โ like the ultimate decision to retain or discharge a juror โ rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.' ( People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 478, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to further investigate the reason for the jury's request, nor in rereading for the jury the four questions from voir dire.