Opinion ID: 1136091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Claim of Improper Argument

Text: I now address that portion of the majority opinion that holds that the comments made by the plaintiff's counsel in closing arguments to the jury were not prejudicial. I cannot agree with that conclusion. I set out the argument again, and the specific objection that was made at the time about the argument, to show why I believe the argument was highly improper: PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Now, you heard all these folks and stuff that come in, and you've got to ask yourself why would they come in and try to pretend this was an accident? Why would they, you know, why would they come in here and tell us that? Because traditionally, law enforcement against alaw enforcement works with law enforcement. Officers would go in there and tell them Kelvin would get up andtell them: `You make Kelvin look bad.' He said he was drinking beer and they will believe it, that is why theythey didn't care nothing about what he told you. Didn't think nothing about it. In the 50's, that would work. But this ain't the 50's. During your lifetime, a President of the United States has had to step down, so you know that Presidents are not above the law. That's why it won't work no more. Since the 50's, you have read the secret trials of J. Edgar Hoover, the former F.B.I. director. That's why it won't work no more. Since the 50's, you have seen State Trooper Duncan, who shot another state trooper right down the road, that's why. Since the 50's, you have seen state troopers beat folks on the head that's why it won't work any more. DEFENSE COUNSEL II: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that. It's not proper argument. COURT: Want to state your grounds? .... DEFENSE COUNSEL II: Judge, we object to bringing this argument. It's clearly to inject racial issues. The defendant is white and the plaintiff is black, and he has skirted around this in his argument and there has been no objection to it. I think now he has crossed the line, and I think it's an objectionable comment. COURT: Anything from you? PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: No sir, Judge. I think it's proper. COURT: Okay. Overrule your objection. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Since the 50's, you know about Rodney King . DEFENSE COUNSEL II: Your Honor, I object to that. It's totally irrelevant what happened in another case and the facts in this case. COURT: I'll sustain it. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Kelvin just didn't have no videotape  DEFENSE COUNSEL II: Your Honor, I object to that on the same grounds, what happened in some other case has nothing to do with this. COURT: I'll allow that comment, but I sustained the earlier objection. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: If Kelvin had a videotape, you would have seen it for yourself. And then, ladies and gentlemen, since the 50's, we have had a Governor had to step down, so it's still where law enforcement just comes in and tells the jury something, it's over. This jury needs to say: `This day in our community, law enforcement [will] not run roughshod over our citizens ...' (R. 259-62; emphasis added.) This case involves alleged interracial violence, and when a case involves interracial violence the risk of improper influence on the jury is great and the chance that comments will be eradicated from the minds of the jury is small. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986). Consequently, a trial judge in this kind of case should make every effort to ensure that comments like those presented in this case are not made. The remarks of counsel in this case were intended to evoke racial prejudice and never should have been allowed. I fully realize that the trial judge has discretion to determine whether a particular comment or remark is prejudicial; however, the appellate courts of this state scrutinize very carefully the injection of any issue, by argument or otherwise, that is calculated to create in the minds of the jury ineradicable bias or prejudice that factorially motivates a verdict. Donald v. Matheny, 276 Ala. 52, 57, 158 So.2d 909 (1963). Additionally, [t]his Court has frequently held [that] an appeal to race prejudice constitutes a most serious breach of the privilege of argument to the jury, and such appeals have met with frequent condemnation by this Court. Loeb v. Webster, 213 Ala. 99, 102, 104 So. 25, 27 (1925). See also, Stallworth v. Holt, 534 So.2d 1063 (Ala.1988) (remarks by counsel commenting on the wealth of the defendants held improper); McLemore v. International Union, etc., 264 Ala. 538, 88 So.2d 170 (1956) (counsel's remarks to the jury ruled to be grossly improper and beyond eradication by the trial court); Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers of America v. Trimm, 207 Ala. 587, 93 So. 533 (1922) (statement by counsel that defendant was a nonresident ruled highly improper); Thomas v. Posey, 15 Ala.App. 419, 73 So. 747 (1916) (comments to the jury by counsel concerning the race of the parties held highly improper); Davis v. Common Council of Alexander City, 137 Ala. 206, 33 So. 863 (1903) (argument of counsel ruled not in evidence and not legally competent or admissible as evidence). In fact, the law in the area of prejudicial remarks is that while there must normally be an objection by counsel or a motion to exclude and a ruling by the trial court in order to preserve an improper argument of counsel as a ground for new trial and for a review on appeal, there is an exception where it can be shown that counsel's remarks were so grossly improper and highly prejudicial as to be beyond corrective action by the trial court. Patrick v. Femco Southeast, Inc., 590 So.2d 259 (Ala.1991); Hill v. Sherwood, 488 So.2d 1357 (Ala.1986); Alabama Power Co. v. Henderson, 342 So.2d 323 (Ala.1977). Here, the trial judge's attention was sufficiently called to the improper argument; he understood the objection, and he overruled it. Although I realize that this is a civil case rather than a criminal action, I note that it is well established by the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice and by caselaw from other jurisdictions that a lawyer should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. Remarks that rely on racial, religious, or ethnic prejudice wrongfully introduce elements of irrelevance and irrationality into the trial and should never be made in a court of justice. Prosecutor's Appeal to Prejudice, 70 A.L.R. 4th 664, 670 (1989); Jackson v. Chicago Transit Authority, 133 Ill.App.2d 529, 273 N.E.2d 748 (1971); Kornegay v. State, 174 Ga.App. 279, 329 S.E.2d 601 (1985); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, § 3-5.8(c) (1982). I recognize, of course, that [t]here is no hard and fast rule as to when a remark made by counsel in closing argument is deemed to be so grossly improper and highly prejudicial as to be ineradicable from the minds of the jurors, notwithstanding a timely admonition from the trial judge, [4] and that [e]ach case must be decided in light of the peculiar facts and circumstances involved, and the atmosphere created, in the trial of each particular case. [5] The circumstances surrounding the trial of this case were such that an appeal to racial prejudice would have been especially prejudicial to the defendant. Therefore, I must dissent on the grounds that the comments made by the plaintiff's attorney in closing arguments were so grossly improper that they were beyond eradication by the trial judge. HOOPER, C.J., concurs.