Opinion ID: 176677
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search of Garcia’s Vehicle and Trailer

Text: A party seeking to challenge a search on Fourth Amendment grounds must establish that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched area. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430-31, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 11 (1978). “A person has a legitimate expectation of privacy if (1) he has a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) society is prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable.” United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 569 (2008). “[A] passenger[] in a private car, . . . who has no possessory interest in the automobile, does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of the automobile because he does not have the right to exclude others from the car.” United States v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859, 864 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 2392 (2010) (quotation omitted). The district court correctly held that Ubaldo-Viezca lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle and trailer. Because Ubaldo-Viezca was merely a passenger and did not own or rent the vehicle, he could not raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search of the vehicle. See Lee, 586 F.3d at 864. Furthermore, since Ubaldo-Viezca did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle in which he was riding, it follows that he also did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the trailer, owned by Garcia, that was being pulled behind that vehicle. See id.; Harris, 526 F.3d at 1338. Although Ubaldo-Viezca appears to argue that the Supreme Court, in Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007), held that passengers have standing to challenge vehicle searches, Brendlin addressed a passenger’s standing 12 to challenge the constitutionality of the initial traffic stop, rather than the search of the vehicle in which he is riding. See Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254, 256-58, 127 S.Ct. at 2405-07. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that Ubaldo-Viezca lacked standing to challenge the search of the Expedition and trailer. ii. Incriminating Statements Made Prior to Miranda Warnings To comport with the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against compelled self-incrimination, a person taken into custody must be advised of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel prior to an interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. Miranda only applies where “a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda, unless the stopped motorist is subjected to treatment during the traffic stop that amounts to a restriction of freedom to a degree associated with a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). In determining whether a defendant’s freedom was curtailed “to a degree associated with formal arrest,” we consider the totality of the circumstances, including whether the officers brandished weapons or touched the defendant, 13 whether the officers used a language or tone indicating that compliance with their orders could be compelled, and the location and length of the detention. United States v. Luna-Encincas, 603 F.3d 876, 881 (11th Cir. 2010). The “functional equivalent” of interrogation refers “to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90. “Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by [the holding in Miranda].” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. The district court correctly found that Ubaldo-Viezca’s initial statement to Barnes, at the scene of the traffic stop, was admissible, because it was made spontaneously. Ubaldo-Viezca summoned Barnes, stating that he needed to speak with him, and voluntarily informed him that he was working as an agent for the DEA. Thus, Miranda warnings were not required. See id. With respect to Ubaldo-Viezca’s statements to Barnes at the trooper shop, his initial statement that he was currently working undercover for the DEA was admissible, because it was also made voluntarily. See id. The record reflects that Ubaldo-Viezca summoned Barnes and voluntarily made this statement. However, 14 after Ubaldo-Viezca made this statement, Barnes stated “let me guess. There’s dope in the axles.” Barnes also asked a follow-up question concerning the amount of cocaine in the trailer. These statements are the “functional equivalent of interrogation,” because they are “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90. Nevertheless, for Miranda to apply, Ubaldo-Viezca must have been “in custody” at the time that he made the statements. Id. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. at 1689. The totality of the circumstances indicate that Ubaldo-Viezca was not “in custody” when he made the statements to Barnes at the trooper shop, because his freedom was not restricted to a degree associated with a formal arrest. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440, 104 S.Ct. at 3150; Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 881. First, although the traffic stop had lasted for over an hour by the time Ubaldo-Viezca made the statement, the stop had been extended based on Garcia’s consent to search the vehicle. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Ubaldo-Viezca objected to the length of the stop or indicated that he wished to leave. In fact, he voluntarily complied with Barnes’s request for him to drive the Expedition to the trooper shop. In addition, although Ubaldo-Viezca made his statements about the cocaine in response to Barnes’s remarks and questions, Ubaldo-Viezca initiated the conversation by asking to speak with Barnes. The nature of Barnes’s 15 comment—“let me guess. There’s dope in the axles”—also indicates that the tone and nature of the interaction was casual, rather than serious. See Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 881. Finally, there is no evidence that Barnes brandished a weapon, touched Ubaldo-Viezca, or otherwise restricted Ubaldo-Viezca’s freedom of movement at the time that he made the statements. See id. Accordingly, because Ubaldo-Viezca was not “in custody” at the time that he made the incriminating statements to Barnes at the trooper shop, the district court did not err in admitting the statements. iii. Duration of the Stop Generally, a traffic stop “must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999). “[P]olice officers conducting a traffic stop may prolong the detention to investigate the driver’s license and the vehicle registration, and may do so by requesting a computer check.” United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1106 (11th Cir. 2003). An officer also may lengthen a stop for “further questioning beyond that related to the initial stop” in two circumstances. Pruitt, 174 F.3d at 1220. “First, the officer may detain the driver for questioning unrelated to the initial stop if he has an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion [that] illegal activity has occurred or is occurring.” Id. “Second, further questioning unrelated to the 16 initial stop is permissible if the initial detention has become a consensual encounter.” Id. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that, after obtaining Garcia’s and Ubaldo-Viezca’s driver’s licenses and determining that Garcia had no valid registration for the vehicle, Barnes called BLOC to verify the information he was provided. Although it took 20 to 25 minutes for this information to be verified through BLOC, Barnes was permitted to prolong the detention during this time, because he was investigating the driver’s license and vehicle registration. See Boyce, 351 F.3d at 1106. Furthermore, by the time Barnes had completed the BLOC check, he had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that illegal activity was occurring, based on (1) Ubaldo-Viezca’s attempt to “take over” the traffic stop and speak for Garcia, who was the driver, (2) Garcia’s conflicting statements as to whether she purchased the Expedition or was given the Expedition as payment for a debt, (3) Garcia’s and Ubaldo-Viezca’s conflicting statements regarding their destination, (4) Garcia’s and Ubaldo-Viezca’s conflicting statements regarding how they would pay for the vehicles they intended to purchase, (5) Garcia’s statement that she sometimes still smuggled people into the United States, (6) Garcia’s statement that Ubaldo-Viezca was her boyfriend and business partner, even though she did not know his name, 17 (7) Garcia’s inconsistent statements regarding who owned the trailer, and (8) the fact that Ubaldo-Viezca was a suspect in an ongoing narcotics investigation. See Pruitt, 174 F.3d at 1220 (“A variety of factors may contribute to the formation of an objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Among those factors . . . are having no proof of ownership of the vehicle, having no proof of authority to operate the vehicle, and inconsistent statements about destination”). In addition to the reasonable suspicion justification, Barnes was permitted to prolong the stop because it had become a consensual encounter. See id. While Barnes was waiting to hear from BLOC, he gave Garcia the warnings he had issued, and returned the vehicle title and Ubaldo-Viezca’s and Garcia’s licenses. After hearing from BLOC, Barnes asked Garcia for consent to search her vehicle, which Garcia granted. At this point, the stop transformed into a consensual encounter. See id. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the duration of the stop was constitutionally permissible. iv. District Court’s Failure to Hold a Hearing Ubaldo-Viezca asserts in his appellate brief that the district court erred by “failing to conduct an independent hearing” in connection with his motion to suppress. However, he cites no case law and makes no arguments in support of this claim. Accordingly, we do not address this issue, because Ubaldo-Viezca has 18 abandoned it on appeal. See United States v. Cunningham, 161 F.3d 1343, 1344 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that a defendant abandons an issue for which no argument is offered on appeal).