Opinion ID: 111430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Correctional Goals

Text: To restrict the right to call witnesses, the Court in Wolff also relied, although less centrally, on vaguely defined correctional goals that seemed to amount to the need for swift punishment. 418 U. S., at 566. Again today, the Court invokes the need to provide swift discipline in individual cases, ante, at 495, as a basis for refusing to require that prison officials provide a record statement of reasons for declining to hear requested witnesses. These statements provide unconvincing support for refusing to require a written explanation when witness requests are denied. If swift discipline is a legitimate overriding concern, then why hold hearings at all? And if the imperatives of swift discipline preclude the calling of witnesses in any particular case, stating that reason would suffice. More generally, the twinkling of an eye that it would take for a board to offer brief, contemporaneous reasons for refusing to hear witnesses would hardly interfere with any valid correctional goals. Indeed, the requirement of stated reasons for witness denials would be particularly easy to comply with at disciplinary hearings, for Wolff already requires provision of a  `written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the disciplinary action. 418 U. S., at 564 (citation omitted). To include in this statement a brief explanation of the reason for refusing to hear a witness, such as why proffered testimony is irrelevant or cumulative, could not credibly be said to burden disciplinary boards in any meaningful way in their task of completing disciplinary report forms. I have expressed previously my view that: [I]t is not burdensome to give reasons when reasons exist. . . . . . . As long as the government has a good reason for its actions it need not fear disclosure. It is only where the government acts improperly that procedural due process is truly burdensome. And that is precisely when it is most necessary. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 591 (1972) (dissenting). If ever that view is true, it is surely true here. See also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 495 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ([A] requirement of written reasons [for keeping inmates in segregation] would [not] impose an undue burden on prison officials). Ironically, the Court's shortsighted approach will likely do more to undermine other correctional goals with which the Court purports to be concerned than would respondent's approach. According to the Court, prison officials must come to court, many months or years after a disciplinary hearing, to state their reason for refusing to call witnesses. . . . Ante, at 492. The burdens of discovery and cross-examination could well be part of that litigation process. [18] In contrast, under respondent's approach, once a contemporaneous record was prepared, judicial review would normally be limited to review of that record. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947). Thus, whatever the proper bearing of other correctional goals on the inmate's constitutional right to call witnesses, reliance on those goals to hold that prison officials must explain their refusal to hear witnesses in court, rather than in the record, is simply misplaced.