Opinion ID: 155223
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Punitive and Administrative Segregation

Text: Mr. Janke contends that he is entitled to relief for the imposition of punitive segregation and the resulting emotional distress he suffered as a result of the disciplinary hearing. It is clear that the imposition of fourteen days of punitive isolation in this case does not encroach upon a liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 22972301 (1995). Mr. Janke’s punishment of fourteen days of punitive isolation “did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 2301 (determining that thirty days punitive isolation is not an “atypical, significant deprivation”). Nor did his placement in punitive segregation “inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.” Id. at 2302. Accordingly, Mr. Janke was entitled to no procedural due process on these claims. Mr. Janke also alleges that his subsequent administrative segregation and transfer to a maximum security facility denied him an opportunity to accumulate good time credits, in violation of his due process rights. However, the due process clause does not “itself create a liberty interest in prisoners to be free from intrastate prison transfers.” Id. at 2297 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). The transfer to a maximum security facility is “within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.” Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225. 4