Opinion ID: 78558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Plaintiff Claims Class Action Waiver Is Void

Text: Plaintiff's final argument is that the class action waiver is void because it frustrates the remedial purposes of the FDUTPA. See Fonte, 903 So.2d at 1023 (indicating there are two distinct frameworks for determining whether an arbitration clause is unenforceable: (1) whether the arbitration clause is void as a matter of law because it defeats the remedial purpose of the applicable statute, or (2) whether the arbitration clause is unconscionable); see also Hialeah, 22 So.3d at 589, 2009 WL 187584, at  (involving automobile purchase contract and quoting same language from Fonte ). [25] In Fonte, Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal examined AT&T's terms and conditions that came with its mobile phones and applied to its wireless services. The Florida court in Fonte concluded that although the FDUTPA permits class action claims, the arbitration clause's bar on class representation does not defeat any of the remedial purposes of the FDUTPA. Fonte, 903 So.2d at 1024. The Fonte court reasoned that neither the text nor our review of the legislative history of FDUTPA suggests that the legislature intended to confer a non-waivable right to class representation. Id. at 1025. [26] In Fonte, the Florida court emphasized there are numerous enforcement mechanisms which can protect consumers other than class actions, such as small claims court or administrative enforcement through the State Attorney's Office or the Department of Legal Affairs. Id. Although the Fonte court upheld the arbitration clause's class action waiver, it concluded the arbitration clause's bar on an award of attorney's fees defeats a remedial purpose of FDUTPA. Fonte, 903 So.2d at 1024. After noting one remedial purpose of the FDUTPA was to provide for the possibility of an attorney's fee award in Fla. Stat. § 501.2105, the Florida court severed the arbitration clause's bar on attorney's fees, while upholding the arbitration clause's class action waiver. In contrast to Fonte, Florida's First District Court of Appeal concluded in S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski, 976 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct.App.2007), that a class action bar contained in automobile lease agreements was void because it effectively prevents consumers with small, individual claims based upon motor vehicle dealers' violations of section 501.976, Florida Statutes (2005), from vindicating their statutory rights under FDUTPA. Id. at 608. The S.D.S. Autos court specifically noted that an individual asserting a successful FDUTPA claim arising out of a motor vehicle dealer's violation of the statute could recover only the attorney's fees that were reasonable in light of the individual's actual damages. Id. at 606 (citing the attorney's fees provision in Fla. Stat. § 501.976). Because individual claimants were likely to have very small recoveries, the S.D.S. Autos court reasoned, any attorney's fee award would be similarly small, effectively preventing individuals from bringing expensive cases with low actual damages. Id. at 607-08. This case does not have that concern. The regular attorney's fees provision of the FDUTPA, Fla. Stat. § 501.2105, applies, which permits recovery of attorney's fees and costs of any reasonable amount. [27] Sprint's arbitration clause does not bar attorney's fees but provides that the Plaintiff may recover in arbitration to the extent he could in court. Thus Fonte arguably is more on point for this case. Nonetheless, given the unsettled state of Florida law, we do not decide the issue of whether Sprint's class action waiver is void for any other reason and include this issue, too, in our certification to the Florida Supreme Court.