Opinion ID: 1390193
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The jury instruction on accomplice liability

Text: There is yet one more issue on this appeal. The Supreme Court in Schlup stated that the actual innocence standard requires the court to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329, 115 S.Ct. at 868 (emphasis added). In this regard, Goldblum asserts in his habeas corpus petition that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the jury charge on accomplice liability. While, as we already have explained, we do not make an ultimate determination of the merits of the case, we must evaluate the instruction to decide if it was erroneous, and assuming it to have been incorrect, if its correction, in conjunction with the allegedly new evidence, would change the jurors' minds as to Goldblum's guilt. The trial court judge gave the following instruction concerning accomplice liability: Now running through this case is the legal question of an accomplice. A person may be guilty of a crime although he did not commit the specific offense. This occurs when he acts as an accomplice of the one who commits the crime. A person is an accomplice or legally accountable for the conduct of another when he: 1. With intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of a crime he aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing the crime or he solicits such other person to commit the crime. Now, in order to find a person guilty as an accomplice, the evidence must be established beyond a reasonable doubt of a shared criminal intent with the other person. That is, both persons must intend that the criminal act occur. Now, what does that mean? By 'shared criminal intent' we mean that both men, to be found guilty, even though only one committed the act, both intended that the specific crime, which was completed, was intended. An example follows: If two men specifically agree that they are going to kill another man, and one man holds him and the other man shoots him, they are both guilty of first degree murder because one was an accomplice in the holding and the man who fired the shot, of course, is guilty of first degree murder because he inflicted the wound. Another example of accomplice, in the law, is this: If two men agree to rob a bank and one man stands outside as the lookout and another man goes in, and the man who is inside the bank shoots and kills a teller, they are both guilty of first degree murder, including the man standing out front, because he was an accomplice who was actively aiding the man who was inside the bank performing the robbery and both men should be guilty of first degree murder because of a shared criminal intent to commit that specific crime. Now, an accomplice is one who knowingly and voluntarily cooperates or aids another in committing a crime. He is not merely a passive bystander who happens to observe an illegal act and does not participate in it. Nor is he someone who sees a crime being committed and fails to report it to the police. Instead, an accomplice is someone who knowingly, voluntarily and purposely joins with someone else in the performance of that specific crime. Now, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania contends that the defendant, Charles Goldblum, either killed George Wilhelm himself or was an accomplice with Clarence Miller in that killing. Most significantly the judge later instructed the jury on application of accomplice liability to the specific facts of the case: In addition, if you find that evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Charles Goldblum was an accomplice with Clarence Miller in the intentional killing of George Wilhelm, you may find the defendant guilty of first degree murder. In that event, you have to conclude that both Goldblum and Miller intended to kill George Wilhelm when they took him up there [to the parking garage] and that Goldblum was an accomplice with Miller in the killing of Mr. Wilhelm. So, in that event, if you find that the defendant intentionally killed George Wilhelm, you may find him guilty of first degree murder. If you find that he was an accomplice in such a killing, as I have defined that, you may also. On the other hand, if you find that the evidence has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that George Wilhelm on the night in question, or failed to establish that Charles Goldblum was an accomplice with Clarence Miller in the intentional killing of George Wilhelm, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder. (Emphasis added.) Goldblum believes the instruction was plainly erroneous as it did not require the Commonwealth to prove that Goldblum had the specific intent to kill, which is an element of first-degree murder under Pennsylvania law. Appellant's br. at 31-32. Specifically, he takes issue with (1) the shared intent language in the first instruction which he contends misled the jury into believing that he need not have his own specific intent to kill, i.e., the flaw in the robbery example, and (2) the suggestion in the second instruction that a finding that he is an accomplice compels the jury to conclude that he had the specific intent to kill, which he argues places the proverbial cart before the horse. Id. at 33-35. The Commonwealth believes that, overall, the instruction was accurate and that any error in it was overcome by the charge as a whole. In this regard, the Commonwealth argues that the instruction, when read in its entirety, made it clear that the jury needed to find that Goldblum possessed the intent to murder Wilhelm in order to find him liable as an accomplice. Laying aside the fact that Goldblum does not contend that his trial attorney objected to this aspect of the charge at the trial, and the inference that we can draw from the absence of an objection that he saw no prejudice from the charge, we independently agree with the Commonwealth. It is well-settled that under Pennsylvania law a defendant cannot be convicted of first-degree murder as an accomplice unless the Commonwealth proves that he harbored the specific intent to kill. Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 410 (3d Cir.1997). The Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant actually performed the killing, but it must prove he intended for the killing to occur. Id. (internal citations omitted). In considering whether the jury instruction in this case adequately convey[s] this critical feature of Pennsylvania homicide law, we focus initially on the language that is claimed to be erroneous, but we must review this portion of the instructions in the context of the charge as a whole. Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 710 (3d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1208, 126 S.Ct. 1320, 164 L.Ed.2d 115 (2006). The proper inquiry is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instructions in a way that violates the Constitution. Id. Thus, here we must determine when reviewing the challenged portion of the instructions in the context of the charge as a whole, whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted Goldblum of first-degree murder without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended the killing of Wilhelm. Goldblum directs us to two cases: Smith, 120 F.3d 400, and Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419 (3d Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1146, 126 S.Ct. 1143, 163 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2006), both arising from state court convictions. We decided in both cases that the jury charge on accomplice liability lacked the critical instruction that the jury must find that the defendant had the specific intent to kill. Those cases, however, are clearly distinguishable from the one before us. In Smith, Smith and another individual, Alston, entered a pharmacy with the intention of robbing it, and in the course of the robbery, a fatal gunshot wound was inflicted to the head of a person named Sharp. Smith, 120 F.3d at 404. Smith was tried on the homicide charge. Id. The jury instructions on homicide included the following language: [I]f . . . you find that Smith and Alston were accomplices of each other, then it is not important for you to determine which one actually pulled the trigger that brought about the killing of Richard Sharp, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the two did so and were [sic] acting as the accomplice of each other at the time. In order, however, to find Clifford Smith to be guilty, you need not conclude, as I said, that he was the actor; that is, if I can use the word `shooter,' but he was, nevertheless, acting as an accomplice of Alston and it was his intent of promoting or facilitating that act and the killing was done in furtherance of the robberies, if you so find, then he would be guilty as though he were the actual perpetrator. . . . Id. at 405 (emphasis added). The court continued: If, and I emphasize this, you find that one was the accomplice of the other and that one of the two actually performed the killing, you, the jurors, need not agree on the role or roles played by the respective parties; that is, by this defendant and his accomplice, if you find that that was the position of both, provided that each of you is satisfied that the crime was actually perpetrated by the defendant or by the accomplice of the defendant. Id. (emphasis added). The court then instructed the jury on first-degree murder: [T]he elements of first degree murder are the unlawful killing of anther person done intentionally . . . plus malice. . . . If these elements have been established beyond a reasonable doubt, you may, on the theory that one was the perpetrator and the other the accomplice, find Clifford Smith guilty of murder in the first degree. . . . Id. Relying on these instructions, the jury convicted Smith of the first-degree murder charge. Id. at 406. The case came before us on an appeal after the district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. Smith argued that the jury was incorrectly instructed that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the men had the specific intent to kill, and that Smith intended to commit the robbery that resulted in the killing, this would be sufficient to convict Smith of first-degree murder. Id. at 409. We agreed with Smith, finding that [a] fair reading of the jury instructions . . . permitted the jury to convict Smith of murder in the first degree without first finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith intended that Sharp be killed. Id. at 411. Specifically, we were concerned with the fact that the charge repeatedly used the word accomplice in isolation, without indicating whether the trial court was using the word in reference to the robbery, the killing, or both. Id. at 411-12. The charge thus blurred the distinction between `accomplice in the robbery' and `accomplice in the killing,' leading the jury to believe that an accomplice for one purpose is an accomplice for all purposes . . . [and] allowed Smith to be convicted of first-degree murder if the jury found that either he or his accomplice in the robbery intended to kill Sharp. Id. at 412. Likewise, in Laird, Laird and a co-defendant met a third man at a bar, following which the three men left together shortly after the bar closed. Laird, 414 F.3d at 421. The third man was found dead the following evening. Id. Laird and the co-defendant jointly were tried for the murder, as well as related charges including kidnaping, aggravated assault, unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime. Id. at 422. While both admitted to their participation in the kidnaping and being present when the victim was killed, they pointed their fingers at each other claiming that the other defendant inflicted the fatal wounds. Id. at 422, 426. At trial, the court gave an instruction on accomplice liability which included the charge that a defendant is an accomplice . . . if with the intent of promotion or facilitating commission of a crime he solicits, or commands or encourages or requests the other person to commit it or if he aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning the crime or committing the crime. . . . You may find the defendant guilty of a particular crime on the theory that he was an accomplice so long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and the defendant was an accomplice of the person who committed it. Id. at 426. The court then gave the following instruction on first-degree murder: You may find a defendant guilty of first degree murder if you are satisfied that the following four elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that Anthony Milano is dead. Second, that a defendant or an accomplice of the defendant killed him. Third, that the killing was with specific intent to kill. And, fourth, that the killing was with malice as I have defined that term for you. A killing is with specific intent to kill if it is willful, deliberate, and premeditated; that is, if it is committed by a person who has a fully informed intent to kill and is conscious of his own intent. Id. Because both Laird and the co-defendant admitted to participating in the kidnaping but denied having the intent to kill the victim or helping the other kill him, Laird argued in his habeas corpus petition that the instruction on accomplice liability, which consistently referred only to an accomplice of a crime, allowed the jury to convict him of first-degree murder even though he did not possess an intent to kill. Id. We found the case indistinguishable from Smith, concluding that [g]iven the court's instruction on accomplice liability, the jury could easily have convicted Laird of first degree murder based on his conspiring with [the co-defendant] to kidnap or assault [the victim] even if jurors were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Laird intended to kill him. Id. at 427. The facts before us and the instruction on accomplice liability are clearly distinguishable from both those in Smith and Laird. In those cases, we found the instructions on accomplice liability constitutionally inadequate because they allowed the jury to conclude that, as we put it in Smith, 120 F.3d at 412, an accomplice for one purpose is an accomplice for all purposes. Such an inference in those cases was quite misleading because the defendants either admitted or the evidence was strong that they participated in a related crime that immediately preceded the killings, i.e., Smith in the robbery and Laird in the kidnaping and assault. Thus, we were concerned that the failure of the court to refer specifically to the killing when discussing accomplice liability allowed the jury to conclude that a finding of accomplice liability on the related crime compelled a finding of accomplice liability on the killing. Such a conclusion would not have been correct for a conviction for first-degree murder as an accomplice requires the Commonwealth to prove that a defendant harbored the specific intent to kill. Smith, 120 F.3d at 410. This appeal does not present a similar problem. It is clear here that the trial court's instruction on accomplice liability refers only to the killing of Wilhelm and not to a related crime. This conclusion is inescapable for two reasons. First, the Commonwealth did not allege that Goldblum committed a crime immediately before the killing, such as robbery or kidnaping, although it did charge that he committed crimes much earlier. Thus, the jury could not have drawn a reasonable inference allowing it to tag Goldblum as an accomplice in a related crime and then improperly extended that finding to Wilhelm's killing. Second, contrary to the instructions in Smith and Laird, the instruction here on accomplice liability specifically stated that Goldblum was charged as an accomplice to the murder and did not use the word accomplice in isolation. For instance, after the state court gave the general instruction on accomplice liability it stated, Now, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania contends that the defendant, Charles Goldblum, either killed George Wilhelm himself or was an accomplice with Clarence Miller in that killing. Likewise, as we already have indicated, the judge later instructed the jury on application of accomplice liability to the specific facts of the case, as follows: In addition, if you find that evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Charles Goldblum was an accomplice with Clarence Miller in the intentional killing of George Wilhelm, you may find the defendant guilty of first degree murder. In that event, you have to conclude that both Goldblum and Miller intended to kill George Wilhelm when they took him up there [to (the parking garage] ) and that Goldblum was an accomplice with Miller in the killing of Mr. Wilhelm. So, in that event, if you find that the defendant intentionally killed George Wilhelm, you may find him guilty of first degree murder. If you find that he was an accomplice in such a killing, as I have defined that, you may also. On the other hand, if you find that the evidence has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that George Wilhelm on the night in question, or failed to establish that Charles Goldblum was an accomplice with Clarence Miller in the intentional killing of George Wilhelm, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder. (Emphasis added.) It is difficult to understand how the court could have made the charge clearer on the required intent element of the case and, in the circumstances, we have no doubt that a reasonable juror would understand that he must find that Goldblum intended for the killing to occur, as opposed merely to finding that Goldblum had an intent to commit some related crime, in order to find Goldblum liable as an accomplice to the murder. In the end, we find in considering the charge as whole as, of course, we should do, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted Goldblum of first-degree murder without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended that Wilhelm be killed. While the robbery example in the charge was incorrect, we conclude that the remainder of the charge was entirely accurate and sufficiently explained to the jury that it had to find that Goldblum intended the killing to find him liable under the theory of accomplice liability. The robbery example could not mislead the jury because, as explained above, the case had nothing to do with a robbery or any other related crime that immediately proceeded the killing. We recognize that if the facts in this case were akin to those in Smith and Laird, we might have reached a different result based on this instruction. But we are obligated to decide the case based on the facts before us. We emphasize that the trial court repeatedly told the jury that it needed to find that Goldblum intended to kill Wilhelm if it was to find him liable as an accomplice. For these reasons, we do not conclude that Goldblum's argument-that the instructions put the cart before the horse-is convincing. In reviewing the charge as a whole, we conclude that there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted Goldblum as an accomplice without first finding that he had a specific intent to kill. Lastly, Goldblum takes issue with the shared intent language which he contends misled the jury into believing that he need not have his own specific intent to kill. Goldblum asserts that shared intent suggests that intent of one actor may be attributed to another. Such an interpretation contradicts the reasonable understanding of that phrase, as well as the court's specific instructions informing the jury otherwise. The court could not have made it any more obvious that a shared criminal intent with the other person means that both persons must intend that the criminal act occur and that both men, to be found guilty, even though only one committed the act, both intended that the specific crime, which was completed, was intended. Additionally, we on several occasions have held that a properly formulated shared intent charge accurately stresses the need to find a specific intent for the purposes of accomplice liability, see Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 711-12; Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 513 (3d Cir.2002), as has the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cox, 581 Pa. 107, 863 A.2d 536, 550-51 (2004); Commonwealth v. Rife, 454 Pa. 506, 312 A.2d 406, 408-09 (1973); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 449 Pa. 235, 296 A.2d 719, 721 (1972). In sum, based on this record, we cannot conclude that no reasonable juror would not have voted to convict Goldblum of first-degree murder in light of the new evidence, even if the instructions on accomplice liability had been completely accurate. Plainly put, there is just too much evidence here establishing Goldblum's guilt and, overall, the charge was not misleading. In particular, there is convincing evidence that Goldblum and Miller orchestrated a plan to lure Wilhelm to the parking garage. Goldblum admitted to being at the crime scene. He had a motive to kill Wilhelm inasmuch as Wilhelm knew of Goldblum's involvement in the land fraud scheme and the arson, and demanded payment of his debt. Moreover, after the assault Goldblum and Miller agreed to lie to the police in order to provide each with an alibi. They then left the scene together. After being taken into custody, Goldblum sought to hire an assassin to kill Miller, the Commonwealth's chief witness. In light of this evidence, we simply cannot conclude that the new evidence would have led any juror not to vote to convict Goldblum. For this reason, Goldblum has not established his actual innocence and the district court correctly denied his second application for a writ of habeas corpus.