Opinion ID: 2672846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aider-and-Abettor Jury Instruction

Text: Because Mr. Davis did not timely and specifically object to the jury instruction below, we review his arguments only for plain error. United States v. Rosalez, 711 F.3d 1194, 1212 (10th Cir. 2013). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), “an appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the 6 We have considered Mr. Davis’s pro se communication received April 17, 2014. However, as he addresses only the district court’s independent-source finding, his arguments do not affect our determination that he lacks standing. - 10 - error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted). The district court first instructed jurors on the substantive offenses with which Mr. Davis was charged; this included § 924(c), which “makes it a crime to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (which includes robbery).” Doc. 142, at 16. The district court then gave a general instruction on aider-and-abettor liability (18 U.S.C. § 2). Id. at 20. The court instructed that “[e]ach count” of the indictment charged Mr. Davis as an aider and abettor, and to find Mr. Davis guilty under this theory, the jury must be convinced that: First: someone else committed the charged crime, and Second: defendant intentionally associated himself in some way with the crime and intentionally participated in it as he would in something he wished to bring about. This means that the government must prove the defendant consciously shared the other person’s knowledge of the underlying criminal act and intended to help him or her. Id. (emphasis added); see also 10th Cir. Crim. Pattern Jury Instruction 2.06 - 11 - (2011). The jury convicted Mr. Davis of violating § 924(c). I R. 91-92. The verdict form was general; it did not reveal whether the jury found that Mr. Davis used the gun or instead aided and abetted Mr. Baker’s use during the robbery. Id. Mr. Davis argues that this general aider-and-abettor instruction was plainly erroneous as it relates to § 924(c). Aplt. Br. 57. It was “so vague,” he argues, that jurors could have read “charged crime” and “underlying criminal act” to refer to the robbery itself, thus allowing jurors to convict him of aiding and abetting Mr. Baker’s use of a firearm even if he was not aware that Mr. Baker was armed. Id. at 57-58. Mr. Davis also argues that the instruction was erroneous because it did not include language that he must have “sought by his actions” to facilitate the § 924(c) offense. Id. at 59. The government concedes error based on subsequent authority—Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014). Oral Argument at 17:48, United States v. Davis, No. 13-3037 (March 20, 2014). Notwithstanding, it argues that Mr. Davis cannot establish that this error affected his substantial rights or the fairness of his trial. Id. at 18:32. It contends that, because jurors were instructed on the elements of § 924(c) and heard evidence that Mr. Davis was the one who entered the store with a gun, the jury could have convicted Mr. Davis as a principal without relying on the aider-and-abettor instruction. Aplee. Br. 52. If the principal theory were the only one submitted to the jury, then we would agree with the government that there was more-than-sufficient evidence to - 12 - convict Mr. Davis. See Aplee. Br. 52-53. However, we cannot affirm a general verdict based on the fact that there is sufficient evidence to convict on a properly instructed theory of conviction when jurors are also “improperly instructed on a legally inadequate theory.” United States v. Ayon Corrales, 608 F.3d 654, 658 (10th Cir. 2010). This is “because in such cases jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We, on the other hand, are equipped to make such determination. Regardless of the parties’ contentions on appeal, we always have a duty to examine whether the district court committed error, plain or otherwise, even when a party concedes it. See United States v. Hoyle, 697 F.3d 1158, 1167 n.4 (2012). Rosemond was an appeal from a decision of this court, 695 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), dealing with aider-andabettor liability for § 924(c). Following circuit precedent, we held that an instruction for aiding and abetting § 924(c) was sufficient if it instructed that jurors must find “‘(1) the defendant knew his cohort used a firearm in the drug trafficking crime, and (2) the defendant knowingly and actively participated in the drug trafficking crime.’” Id. at 1155. The Supreme Court disagreed. 134 S. Ct. at 1252. The Court noted that § 924(c) is a “double-barreled crime” that requires (1) using or carrying a firearm (2) when engaged in a predicate “crime of violence or - 13 - drug trafficking crime.” Id. at 1245. To aid and abet § 924(c), a defendant must intend to commit “the illegal scheme in its entirety—including its use of a firearm.” Id. at 1249. The Court held that the first half of the district court’s instruction—dealing with intent—was deficient because it “did not direct the jury to determine when Rosemond obtained the requisite knowledge” that a firearm would be used or carried. Id. at 1251-52. That knowledge, the Court said, “must be advance knowledge.” Id. at 1249. The Court rejected the government’s argument that the requisite knowledge was present “whenever the accomplice, having learned of the firearm, continues any act of assisting the [predicate crime of violence or drug trafficking crime].” Id. at 1250. To the contrary, “[i]n such a circumstance, a jury is entitled to find that the defendant intended only [the predicate crime]—that he never intended to facilitate, and so does not bear responsibility for, [that crime] carried out with a gun.” Id. at 1251 (emphasis added). Regarding the second half of the district court’s instruction—dealing with conduct facilitating the crime—the Court held that “active participation in [the predicate crime] is sufficient for § 924(c) liability (even if the conduct does not extend to the firearm).” Id. at 1251. Thus, actions furthering the use or carriage of the firearm are not required because a defendant’s “participation in the [predicate crime] satisfies the affirmative-act requirement for aiding and abetting a § 924(c) violation.” Id. at 1247. This forecloses Mr. Davis’s plain error - 14 - argument that he must have “sought by his actions” to facilitate the entire “§ 924(c) offense.” See Aplt. Br. 57, 59-60, 60 n.3. After Rosemond, a jury instruction on aiding and abetting § 924(c) should address the defendant’s advance knowledge of the gun. The aider-and-abettor instruction in this case did not highlight this point in relation to the § 924(c) offense. But the general aider-and-abettor instruction did require Mr. Davis to consciously share Mr. Baker’s knowledge of the § 924(c) offense and that is enough on a plain error challenge. Mr. Davis confessed to advance knowledge of the robbery and seeing the gun as Mr. Baker re-entered the car after exiting the RadioShack. Under Rosemond, Mr. Davis was required to have knowledge of the gun before the robbery. We do not require jury instructions to be perfect. Zierke v. Agri-Sys., 992 F.2d 276, 278 (10th Cir. 1993). Rather, instructions must merely be “adequate,” United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008), and, when reviewed for plain error, free of “clear or obvious” errors, Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262. The error addressed in Rosemond allowed the jury to convict based on after-acquired knowledge of a firearm, i.e., based on evidence that Mr. Rosemond “knew his cohort used a firearm.” Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1251 (emphasis added). Here, the district court did not use this language, but rather gave a general aider-and-abettor instruction, applying it to “[e]ach count of the indictment.” Doc. 142, at 20. Mr. Davis argues that this instruction was “so - 15 - vague” that the jury could not be expected to adequately relate it back to the § 924(c) count. Aplt. Br. 57-58. We are not persuaded and find that an unnatural reading of the instruction. Jurors are generally presumed to follow the judge’s instructions. United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1251 (10th Cir. 2000). In this case, the aider-andabettor instruction called for the jury to consider “[e]ach count of the indictment,” one of which was § 924(c). Doc. 142, at 20. It required the jury to find that someone committed the “charged crime,” id.; Mr. Baker and Mr. Davis were charged with § 924(c), id. at 13. Finally, it required the jury to find that Mr. Davis “shared [Mr. Baker]’s knowledge of the underlying criminal act,” id. at 20; one of the criminal acts at issue was § 924(c), which “makes it a crime to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (which includes robbery),” id. at 16. Thus, the instruction required the jury to determine whether Mr. Davis shared Mr. Baker’s knowledge about the § 924(c) violation, which necessarily encompasses the planned use of a firearm. Stated another way, if indeed the jury took the aiding-and-abetting route to conviction on the § 924(c) count, it implicitly found that Mr. Davis had advance knowledge of the firearm. AFFIRMED. 7 7 For the sake of preservation, Mr. Davis argues that the $270 taken from the RadioShack had a de minimis effect on interstate commerce and cannot support a Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951) conviction. Aplt. Br. 64. He acknowledges, and we agree, that circuit precedent forecloses this argument. Id. at 2. - 16 - 13-3037 – United States v. Davis