Opinion ID: 284904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Testimony of Frances Wieseltier

Text: 12 Appellant contends that the testimony of his mistress, Frances Wieseltier, was offered by the Government because he had a meretricious relationship with her and 'for the sole purpose' of disparaging his character at a time when his character was not in issue. However, the Government asserts that this contention is frivolous because her 'testimony was highly probative corroboration of Betancourt's story that (appellant) had told (him) to contact him by means of the 'DA 8' number.' According to Wieseltier's testimony, the 'DA 8' number belonged to her mother with whom she and appellant visited frequently in 1964. 13 The importance of this telephone number was underscored when on cross-examination appellant admitted receiving telephone messages at the 'DA 8' number during 1964. Yet appellant denied ever having purchased anything from Betancourt or ever having given him the 'DA 8' number to call when he had goods to sell. The probative value of the Wieseltier testimony, therefore, far outweighed the possible prejudice to appellant which might arise as to the nature of his relationship with the witness. United States v. Kompinski, 373 F.2d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 1967). Moreover, no objection was made at trial and appellant is precluded from raising it on appeal. United States v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 907, 86 S.Ct. 887, 15 L.Ed.2d 663 (1966). 14 III, Introduction of a Conversation Antedating the Conspiracies 15 Appellant asserts that it was prejudicial error to admit testimony of the conversation between Betancourt and appellant which occurred in late 1963 when he was alleged to have given the 'DA 8' number to Betancourt. Appellant claims that such conversation took place before the conspiracies charged in the indictment and 'was far too remote in time.' While it may have been better had the indictment charged a single conspiracy beginning in late 1963, the conversation was nonetheless admissible because it was relevant to show the beginning of appellant's involvement in the criminal enterprise and his state of mind at the time. United States v. Compagna,146 F.2d 524, 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 324 U.S. 867, 65 S.Ct. 912, 89 L.Ed. 1422 (1944), reh. denied 325 U.S. 892, 65 S.Ct. 1084, 89 L.Ed. 2004 (1945); cf. United States v. Kennedy, 291 F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir. 1961). Moreover, the conversation in 1963 was relevant to the 1964 conspiracies because of the reference to the 'DA 8' telephone number, as an explanation of the number's origin and significance. 16 IV. Introduction by the Government of Testimony by Co-conspirators That They Had Pleaded Guilty to the Conspiracy Charge 17 The appellant contends, without citing authority, that the Government's eliciting from Betancourt and one of his accomplices that they had already pleaded guilty to the conspiracy counts on which appellant was being tried, and that they were then awaiting sentence, denied him due process of law. Betancourt testified that he had pleaded guilty to Counts 19 and 24 and his accomplice, Pizzaro, testified that he had also pleaded guilty, but only to Count 19. In addition, each disclosed that they were presently awaiting sentence. 18 We have held, however, that the Government on direct examination may bring out information damaging to its witnesses' credibility, including evidence of their criminal records, provided the jury is cautioned that the testimony is not evidence of the defendant's guilt. United States v. Graziane, 376 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. den. 375 U.S. 958, 84 S.Ct. 448, 11 L.Ed.2d 316 (1963). This is to prevent the defense from creating a misleading impression, or the jurors from thinking, that the Government is seeking to keep something from the jury. In the instant case, there were two limiting instructions given by the trial court, and we hold that these adequately prevented any possible prejudice to the defendant. 19