Opinion ID: 2123921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: in court

Text: The trial court's decisions involved the review of administrative orders pursuant to the specific provision of I.C. § 4-21.5-5-1 et seq. Upon judicial review of an agency order, a trial court is limited, by statute, to determining whether the agency action is: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; or (5) unsupported by substantial evidence. I.C. § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (West 1990); see also St. Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jewell Grain Co. (1990), Ind., 556 N.E.2d 920, 921 (when reviewing an administrative decision, a court is limited to determining whether the agency possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter, and whether the agency's decision was made pursuant to proper procedures, was based upon substantial evidence, was not arbitrary or capricious, and was not in violation of any constitutional, statutory or legal principle). The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the party to the judicial review proceeding who is asserting invalidity. When a trial court is engaged in the process of determining whether an agency has violated the statute, the trial court does not conduct another trial. I.C. § 4-21.5-5-11 (West 1990). The trial court proceeding is not intended to be a trial de novo, but rather a process in which the record as a whole is analyzed to determine whether the administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence. Board of Trustees of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Fund of Ind. v. Miller (1988), Ind., 519 N.E.2d 732, 733. The trial court, in reviewing the administrative action, has no right to weigh conflicting evidence and choose that which it sees fit to rely upon; the statute gives the fact-finding function to the administrative body. Id. Courts will not reverse or modify final administrative determinations unless contrary to law and unsupported by the evidence. Indiana Dep't of Public Welfare v. Chair Lance Service, Inc. (1988), Ind., 523 N.E.2d 1373. The trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative board, absent error of law. Town of Beverly Shores v. Bagnall (1992), Ind., 590 N.E.2d 1059. However, deference is not granted to an agency's legal conclusions. Law is the province of both the agency and the judiciary. Our constitutional system empowers the courts to draw legal conclusions. Recognizing this authority, the statute declares that a reviewing court may set aside agency action `not in accordance with law'... . Miller, 519 N.E.2d at 733 (citations omitted). When a party seeks judicial review of an agency action, the trial court's decision is appealable. I.C. § 4-21.5-5-16 (West 1990). The rules governing civil appeals from trial courts apply to appeals from judicial reviews of agency actions. Id. Before this Court, the DNR and Jarrett are in the position of parties appealing a trial court civil case holding. We review the trial court decisions to determine whether the trial court followed the law. The issue before the trial court and now before this Court in this consolidated case is the specific question of whether the DNR possessed the statutory authority, pursuant to I-SMCRA, to place restrictions upon mining companies when pumping ground water from beneath property in which those companies have property rights. In the AMAX case, the trial court declared that the NRC did not have the authority to impose Condition 12, which precluded AMAX from activating additional wells to dewater the strip mines until sufficient detail is added to the statement of probable hydrological consequences to determine the effects that the dewatering may have on potential subsidences both within the permit and adjacent off-site areas. The trial court reversed the final order of the NRC, and remanded to the agency for corrective action. In the B & LS case, the trial court enjoined the DNR from enforcing an order that limited B & LS's water pumping, again holding that the DNR did not have the statutory authority to interfere with water use rights. In the B & LS case, the trial court also noted that any interference with water rights would comprise an unconstitutional taking. Clearly a state may, in the exercise of its police powers, impose restrictions upon certain types of land use. The United States Supreme Court has held restrictions on land use are constitutional, when the regulation find[s] ... justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118, 71 L.Ed. 303, 310 (1926). The validity of I-SMCRA is not in question. Rather, the appellees contend (and the trial court agreed) that I-SMCRA does not convey to the DNR the authority to regulate ground water use.