Opinion ID: 742674
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the state statutory construction and interpretation issues

Text: 16 First, Blue Cross contends that the Alabama Provider Acts do not apply to it, because two Alabama statutes purport to exempt Blue Cross from otherwise applicable regulation under Alabama's Insurance Code, Title 27 of the Code of Alabama. In 1939, the Alabama Legislature enacted what is now section 10-4-115 of the Alabama Code, which presently provides that: 17 [n]o statute of this state applying to insurance companies shall be applicable to any corporation organized under the provisions of this article [tit. 10, ch. 4, art. 6] and amendments thereto or to any contract made by such corporation unless expressly mentioned in this article and made applicable; except, that such corporation shall be subject to the provisions regarding annual premium tax to be paid by insurers on insurance premiums. 18 Ala.Code § 10-4-115 (1975). 4 Blue Cross is organized pursuant to Alabama Code §§ 104-100 to -115. Thus, the language of § 10-4-115 appears to exempt Blue Cross from insurance regulatory laws enacted after 1939, except where the Alabama Legislature has expressly amended §§ 10-4-100 to -115 to make such laws applicable to Blue Cross. 19 In addition, since 1971 the Insurance Code (Title 27), which now includes the Alabama Provider Acts, has contained a provision specifying that that entire title shall not apply to: 20 (2) Non-profit corporations for establishment of hospitalization plan under § 10-4-100, et seq., except to the extent now or hereafter provided in such laws.... 21 Ala.Code § 27-1-4 (1975). 5 Because Blue Cross is a § 10-4-100 corporation, the language of § 27-1-4, too, seems to preclude the Alabama Provider Acts from applying to Blue Cross unless the Legislature amends §§ 10-4-100 to -115 to specify that they do apply. None of the Alabama Provider Acts expressly amended those sections. 22 Faced with § 10-4-115 and § 27-1-4 (hereinafter, the exempting statutes) the providers offer several principles of statutory interpretation that, they claim, cause the Alabama Provider Acts to trump the previously enacted exempting statutes. First, the providers argue that courts must give effect to legislative intent as expressed in the plain language of the Alabama Provider Acts. The providers note that the Assignment Act purports to cover non-profit health service organizations, see Ala.Code § 27-1-19(a) (Supp.1996), while the Dental Act and the Pharmacy Act purport to apply to all employee benefit plans and health insurance polic[ies], see Ala.Code §§ 27-19A-2(3), 27-45-3 (Supp.1996). That plain albeit generic language in the Alabama Provider Acts clearly covers Blue Cross and its health plans, the providers argue, and that manifest legislative intent must be given effect, notwithstanding any indication to the contrary in the exempting statutes. 23 The providers also contend that, if read literally, § 10-4-115 would lead to an absurd result. The result would be absurd, they say, because that exempting statute purports to reach all legislation applying to insurance companies, not just insurance regulatory legislation. The providers claim that the Alabama Legislature could not have intended to provide Blue Cross with such sweeping exemptions from otherwise applicable law. Because the plain language of § 10-4-115 would lead to an absurd result, the providers suggest that the statute should be read narrowly, citing Abramson v. Hard, 229 Ala. 2, 155 So. 590, 593 (1934) (holding that courts should look beyond plain meaning of statute when such a construction of the statute would lead to absurd results). However, the providers do not make a parallel argument that a literal interpretation of § 27-1-4 would lead to absurd results. 24 Next, the providers contend that the latest expression of legislative will governs the interpretation of conflicting statutes. See, e.g., State v. Crenshaw, 287 Ala. 139, 249 So.2d 622, 624 (1971) (holding that where two provisions in a statute are in irreconcilable conflict, the latest expression of legislative will controls). The providers maintain that the Alabama Provider Acts are in direct conflict with the exempting statutes regarding the applicability to Blue Cross of the Alabama Provider Acts. Because all of those acts were enacted after the exempting statutes, they are the more recent expression of legislative will and therefore prevail over the conflicting language of the previously enacted exempting statutes, it is argued. 25 Winding up their statutory construction arguments, the providers urge us to treat the exempting statutes as rules of statutory construction that merely prevent insurance laws from unintentionally covering Blue Cross. They win under such an approach, they say, because the Alabama Provider Acts demonstrate clear legislative intent to cover Blue Cross. In other words, the providers claim that the Alabama Provider Acts' intentional coverage of Blue Cross overcomes what are merely codified rules of statutory construction contained in the exempting statutes. 26 Not surprisingly, Blue Cross cites several different statutory construction principles in its arguments against the applicability of the Alabama Provider Acts. According to Blue Cross, we should begin our analysis with the principle that lawmakers are presumed to know the existing law when they act. See, e.g., Ex Parte Louisville & N.R. Co., 398 So.2d 291, 296 (Ala.1981) (presuming state legislature knew, when it enacted taxing statute, that state was precluded by the Commerce Clause from taxing certain transactions covered by the statute). In accordance with that principle, Blue Cross contends that we should assume that the Alabama Legislature was aware of the explicit amendment requirement in the exempting statutes when it enacted the Alabama Acts. Blue Cross further argues that application of this principle of Alabama statutory construction law is supported by the history of the exempting statutes. In compliance with the exempting statutes, the relevant article (Title 10, Chapter 4, Article 6) of the Alabama Code has been amended twice to make insurance regulation expressly applicable to corporations organized under that chapter. See 1993 Ala.Acts 679; 1969 Ala.Acts 27. Blue Cross claims that those amendments demonstrate that the Alabama Legislature knows how to amend the Code in compliance with the exempting statutes when it intends for new laws to apply to Blue Cross. The Legislature did not do so when it enacted the Alabama Provider Acts, and that failure is telling, Blue Cross says. 27 According to Blue Cross, in deciding whether it is exempt from the application of the Alabama Provider Acts, we should not apply the principle that the later expression of legislative intent controls. That principle applies only when statutes are inescapably repugnant to each other, see, e.g., Ex parte Jones, 212 Ala. 259, 102 So. 234, 235 (1924), and the exempting statutes and the Alabama Provider Acts are not inescapably repugnant, the argument runs, but may instead be read to be consistent with each other. 28 Escape from any apparent conflict between the exempting statutes and the Alabama Provider Acts is possible, Blue Cross suggests, if we give the more specific enactments greater weight than the general ones. By specific, we understand Blue Cross to mean specifically applicable. Blue Cross claims that the exempting statutes apply only to it and a narrow class of not-for-profit corporations. By contrast, the Alabama Provider Acts apply to all health insurance companies, providers of benefit plans, and so forth. Because the exempting statutes are more specifically applicable to Blue Cross, it claims that those statutes provide the most reliable indication of the Alabama Legislature's intent regarding regulation of Blue Cross. 29 Blue Cross also points out that implied repeals are disfavored under Alabama law, and that a later statute does not impliedly repeal an earlier one unless the later statute demonstrates an unambiguous legislative intent to do so. See Shepherd v. Clements, 224 Ala. 1, 141 So. 255, 256 (1931) (recognizing presumption that general law does not impliedly repeal local statute). According to Blue Cross, the Alabama Legislature did not clearly demonstrate through use of generic phrases such as non-profit health service organizations, health plans, or otherwise that it intended to make the Alabama Provider Acts applicable to Blue Cross.