Opinion ID: 6332191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 2013 Cocaine Conviction

Text: As to whether his 2013 cocaine conviction is a qualifying prior controlled substance offense, House raises two arguments: (1) “the plain language of the § 4B1.2 guideline and commentary definition of a controlled substance offense does not include offers to engage in prohibited conduct,” while Montana’s accountability statutes do, rendering the latter categorically overbroad (“accountability overbreadth”); and (2) Montana’s drug statute is categorically overbroad because its definition of cocaine includes substances that are either not set forth in the federal definition and/or are specifically excluded (“cocaine overbreadth”). 16 UNITED STATES V. HOUSE 1) Accountablity Overbreadth House points out that the conduct specifically delineated in USSG § 4B1.2(b) covers only “the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance” or the possession thereof with such intent; whereas the Montana statutes (i.e., sections 45-2-302 and 45-9-101) include a person who “sells, barters, exchanges, gives away, or offers to sell, barter, exchange, or give away any dangerous drug.” House argues that Application Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2 improperly expands the prohibited conduct to “include the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.” But as House recognized in both his sentencing memorandum to the district court and in his opening brief here, in Crum: (1) we “acknowledged that the commentary to § 4B1.2 does not mention solicitation, even though it expands the definition of ‘controlled substance offense’ to include aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such an offense,” and held that “the definition of ‘controlled substance offense’ in § 4B1.2 [nevertheless] encompasses solicitation offenses,” 934 F.3d at 965; and (2) we declined to reconsider our holding in Vea-Gonzales that Application Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2 is “perfectly consistent” with the text of § 4B1.2(b), Crum, 934 F.3d at 966. Because we are bound by Crum, we hold that although Montana’s accountability statutes include offers to engage in prohibited conduct, they are not rendered categorically overbroad with respect to USSG §§ 4B1.2(b) and 2K2.1(a). UNITED STATES V. HOUSE 17 2) Cocaine Overbreadth As to House’s cocaine overbreadth contention, he raises new arguments on appeal that he did not present to the district court. In his opening brief, House asserts that “[t]he federal statutory definition of cocaine and the State of Montana statutory definition of cocaine differ, and the State of Montana’s definition is broader.” 5 But in his sentencing memorandum to the district court, House made different and more limited arguments. Because House did not raise his current arguments at sentencing, we review the district court’s sentencing calculation for plain error as to those contentions. See United States v. Wijegoonaratna, 922 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2019). The first two elements under that analysis are: (1) “an error that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned,” and (2) the error is plain—“that is to say, clear or obvious.” 6 Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 5 Montana Code Annotated section 50-32-224(1)(d) defines cocaine as including derivatives of cocaine. The CSA’s definition of cocaine at 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) Schedule II(a)(4) excludes derivatives. The applicable federal regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4), includes derivatives but excludes [123I]ioflupane, which is a cocaine derivative. Thus, the Montana statutory definition of cocaine is broader than both the CSA definition and the federal regulatory definition. 6 The third element of plain error review requires a showing that the error affects substantial rights of the defendant, which ordinarily means establishing “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 194 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In most cases a defendant who has shown that the district court mistakenly deemed applicable an incorrect, higher Guidelines range has demonstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome.” Id. at 200. 18 UNITED STATES V. HOUSE 1897, 1904 (2018) (quoting Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at 194). “An error cannot be plain where there is no controlling authority on point and where the most closely analogous precedent leads to conflicting results.” Wijegoonaratna, 922 F.3d at 991 (quoting United States v. De La Fuente, 353 F.3d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 2003)). The question is whether the district court plainly erred when it held that House’s 2013 cocaine conviction pursuant to Montana Code Annotated sections 45-9-101 and 50-32224(1)(d) was a controlled substance offense as set forth in USSG § 4B1.2(b). We conclude that it did not. First, applying the categorical approach, the court must determine whether the Montana statutory definition of cocaine is a match with federal law. As we have explained, under federal law, cocaine is defined by both statute and regulation, and the Montana definition is broader than either federal definition. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) Schedule II(a)(4) does not expressly include cocaine derivatives within its definition (although it does expressly reference ecgonine derivatives). See footnote 5, supra. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4) expressly includes cocaine (and ecgonine) derivatives, but also expressly excludes [123I]ioflupane. Montana Code Annotated section 50-32-224(1)(d) expressly includes cocaine derivatives but does not expressly exclude or mention [123I]ioflupane. When the district court reached its decision that a cocaine conviction under Montana Code Annotated sections 45-9-101 and 50-32-224(1)(d) could constitute a controlled substance offense under § 4B1.2(b), there was no (and there still is no) binding precedent to the contrary. 7 House was 7 Holliday II—which held that the Montana schedules as to cocaine “are facially overbroad when compared with both the federal statutory UNITED STATES V. HOUSE 19 sentenced on August 5, 2020. At that time, the only case to have considered the issue was the unpublished decision in United States v. Lasalle, 758 F. App’x 410 (9th Cir. 2019), which held that it was not plain error for a court to look to the federal regulatory definition of cocaine (which during the relevant period was purportedly a categorical match with the Montana statute) and concluded that the defendant’s prior conviction under Montana Code Annotated sections 45-9- 101 and 50-32-224(1)(d) fell within § 4B1.2(b). See id. at 411–12. Second, certain of the grounds for the district court’s rulings were not rejected in binding precedent until after its sentencing decision. For example, the district court had (as had many other federal courts) compared the elements of the state conviction with the federal law that existed at the time of the state sentencing, rather than the federal statutes and guidelines that existed at the time of the federal sentencing. See, e.g., Martinez v. Attorney General, 906 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that, although 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4) currently expressly exempts [123I]ioflupane from the list of schedule II substances, the court uses the list at the time of the defendant’s prior state conviction, which had not yet added that exclusion). Bautista overturned that approach and held, “In imposing a sentence, the district court must consider the sentencing guidelines range ‘that . . . [is] in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.’ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii).” 989 F.3d at 703 (alterations in original). schedules and the federal regulatory schedules” and, thus, the cocaine conviction therein was not a controlled substance offense—was issued on March 3, 2021 and was unpublished. 853 F. App’x at 54 n.1. 20 UNITED STATES V. HOUSE Accordingly, the district court did not commit plain error with respect to the cocaine overbreadth issue when it held that House’s 2013 cocaine conviction was a controlled substance offense as set forth in USSG § 4B1.2(b). IV. CONCLUSION We reverse the district court’s sentencing enhancement insofar as it rested on House’s 2007 marijuana conviction and remand for resentencing. But the district court’s determination that House’s 2013 cocaine conviction was a qualifying prior controlled substance offense for purposes of the § 4B1.2(b) sentencing enhancement was not plainly erroneous. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.