Opinion ID: 2644969
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bonnie Hensley Cantrell’s Statement5

Text: For his third point on appeal, Billy asserts that the circuit court erred when it denied Billy’s motion for mistrial based on Bonnie Hensley Cantrell’s statement that she traded “sex for drugs” with Billy when she was fifteen years old. Billy contends that Bonnie’s statement was highly prejudicial and could not be cured by a limiting instruction, and the circuit court erred in not granting a mistrial. The State responds that Billy has failed to demonstrate unfair prejudice, and the instruction cured any error; it urges this court to affirm the circuit court. At issue is the following testimony from Bonnie on direct examination: PROSECUTOR: Approximately, how long have you known Billy Green? BONNIE: Since I was probably ten, twelve years old. 5 Bonnie Hensley Cantrell testified at the first trial as Bonnie Hensley. 23 Cite as 2013 Ark. 497 PROSECUTOR: So . . . BONNIE: Pretty much all of my life. PROSECUTOR: Okay. How old are you now? BONNIE: Forty-seven. PROSECUTOR: And how long have you know Chad Green? BONNIE: Pretty much all his life. PROSECUTOR: Now I’ve – I need for you to explain to the jury, how did you get to know Billy Green? BONNIE: I met him in a bar parking lot. PROSECUTOR: Would it be fair to say that at one point in time you were romantically involved with Billy Green? BONNIE: Not romantically. We traded sex for drugs. PROSECUTOR: Ah– and approximately how long ago was that? BONNIE: When I was about fifteen. PROSECUTOR: And in the course of knowing Billy Green, have you known him to be . . . DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Your Honor, may we approach? DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Your Honor, I move for a mistrial based on that last statement. She testified that she knew Billy by trading sex for drugs. Billy asserts that there is no remedy for curing Bonnie’s testimony, it was too prejudicial, and the circuit court erred by not granting a mistrial. We disagree. The record demonstrates that after the objection, the circuit court found that the statement was not elicited in bad faith, and denied the motion for mistrial. The circuit court admonished the 24 Cite as 2013 Ark. 497 jury that the statement was inadmissible and to disregard the statement. Further, the record demonstrates that after much debate and consideration, the circuit court sent the jury home at the end of the day, came back the following morning and made his ruling after the circuit court had time to review case law and think about its decision. The circuit court explained his ruling to the attorneys as follows: THE COURT: The Court is going to rule that this was not solicited in bad faith. That, while egregious, the Court is not going to declare a mistrial. And I will admonish the jury to the extent of saying that the last response by the witness was inadmissible as evidence and they are not to consider this evidence in their deliberations. Over Billy’s continued objections that an instruction would not cure the testimony, and that a mistrial should be granted, the circuit court then gave the following admonishment to the jury: Okay. We broke yesterday with Bonnie Hensley Cantrell on the witness stand. And her last response – I am limiting the jury. The last response by the witness – that response the Court has ruled that that is an inadmissible response or inadmissible testimony. Therefore, you are not to consider that in any way in your consideration of this case. Is that understood? Jurors nod I need everybody to nod. Is everybody with me? Does everybody know what I am talking about? All jurors nod and some respond verbally with yes. Turning to our law regarding mistrials, a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy to be resorted to only when there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served 25 Cite as 2013 Ark. 497 by continuing the trial. Russell v. State, 306 Ark. 436, 815 S.W.2d 929 (1991). The granting or denial of a motion for mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the exercise of that discretion should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion or manifest prejudice to the complaining party is shown. King v. State, 298 Ark. 476, 769 S.W.2d 407 (1989). Further, in dealing with issues relating to the admission of evidence pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b), a trial court’s ruling is entitled to great weight and this court will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. State, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333 (2004); Barnes v. State, 346 Ark. 91, 55 S.W.3d 271 (2001). In Hall v. State, 314 Ark. 402, 862 S.W.2d 268 (1993), we reviewed a challenge to the denial of a mistrial regarding a police officer’s comments about Hall’s previous illegal conduct. We explained: This Court has observed that there is always some prejudice that results from the mention of a prior bad act in front of the jury. Strawhacker v. State, 304 Ark. 726, 804 S.W.2d 720 (1991). In instances where the infraction creates minimal prejudice the proper remedy is an objection to the evidence and an admonition or instruction to the jury to disregard the remark. Salinger v. State, 310 Ark. 690, 840 S.W.2d 797 (1992). A motion for mistrial is only appropriate where the error is beyond repair and cannot be corrected by any curative relief. Id.; Enos v. State, 313 Ark. 683, 858 S.W.2d 72 (1993). The trial court has wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for mistrial, and the decision of the trial court will not be reversed except for abuse of discretion or manifest prejudice to the complaining party. Davasher v. State, 308 Ark. 154, 823 S.W.2d 863 (1992). Id. at 405-06, 862 S.W.2d at 270. In Strawhacker v. State, 304 Ark. 726, 804 S.W.2d 720 (1991), we addressed a police officer’s testimony about Strawhacker’s prior illegal conduct. The following testimony regarding Strawhacker was challenged: 26 Cite as 2013 Ark. 497 DETECTIVE: We began to research through our department files to see what information we might have on Mr. Strawhacker. The only thing that we could find there was that he had been involved in a fight in May of 1989. We didn’t have any current photographs of him on file, but we did have a misdemeanor arrest warrant for him for failure to answer a summons on a failure to pay fines and costs on an original charge of third degree battery. Id. at 728, 804 S.W.2d at 722. We affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Strawhacker’s motion for mistrial, and explained that there was no deliberateness on behalf of the prosecutor, and the prosecutor’s action was inadvertent and did not specifically elicit the response from the detective. We stated, “[a]ny prejudice . . . was sufficiently cured by the trial court’s admonishment, and the trial court was correct in denying the mistrial motion under these facts.” Id. at 728, 804 S.W.2d at 722. Finally, in Novak v. State, 287 Ark. 271, 698 S.W.2d 499 (1985), we discussed several cases dealing with testimony regarding the defendant’s previous illegal conduct and revisited our case law and explained, “We have said in a myriad of cases that mistrial is a drastic remedy and rests with the discretion of the trial judge. It should be granted only when the prejudice is so manifest that the trial cannot in justice continue.” Id. at 277, 698 S.W.2d at 503 (citing McFarland v. State, 284 Ark. 533, 684 S.W.2d 233 (1985)); see also Sanders v. State, 277 Ark. 159, 639 S.W.2d 733 (1982) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a mistrial motion in a rape trial where one police officer mentioned seeing what he believed to be controlled substances in the defendant’s bedroom and another officer said he remained in the house “collecting evidence on the other charge”); Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 85, 628 S.W.2d 284, 27 Cite as 2013 Ark. 497 291 (1982) (we affirmed a psychiatrist for the prosecution, testifying on the defendants sanity, when asked what he relied on for his opinion, mentioned certain test results and added, “I also had access to his prison records.”); Hogan v. State, 281 Ark. 250, 663 S.W.2d 726 (1984) (upholding the trial courts’ refusal to order a mistrial where a police officer, asked by the prosecutor if these fingerprints were the first taken of the defendant, answered, “No, sir, that’s all I took. We do have a prior arrest record on him, which we do have a fingerprint on.”); see Mitchael v. State, 309 Ark. 151, 155, 828 S.W.2d 351, 354 (1992) (denying mistrial after statement regarding previous arrest warrant for rape because the jury probably believed the warrant had been issued on the current rape charge). After a careful review of the testimony at issue, our case law, and with our standard of review in mind, we are not convinced that Bonnie’s testimony rises to the level of requiring the granting of a mistrial. Here, the jury already knew of Billy’s issues with drugs as it was referenced in opening statements without objection. The trading sex-for-drugs portion of Bonnie’s testimony was impermissible; however, the circuit court admonished the jury to disregard the statement. The judge was careful not to repeat Bonnie’s prejudicial remark in case the jurors did not hear it the first time. The trial court is in a better position to determine the effect of such remarks on the jury, and the judge concluded that Bonnie’s remarks about her relationship with Billy was insufficient to warrant a mistrial. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Billy’s motion for a mistrial. From a thorough review of this record, we are satisfied that Billy received a fair trial and affirm the circuit court on Billy’s third point on appeal. 28 Cite as 2013 Ark. 497