Opinion ID: 1959182
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors Based on Race and Gender

Text: Defendant also argues that the State systematically excluded from the jury minorities and women (the defendant did not raise the gender-related claim below). The prosecutor used eleven peremptory challenges to exclude one Latino and ten African-American venirepersons. Ten of those venirepersons were women. In State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A. 2d 1150 (1986), we held that the New Jersey Constitution guarantees the right to an impartial jury. We there discussed the procedure and burden of proof triggered by the allegation of improper use of peremptory challenges. First, a defendant must object prior to the swearing in of the jury to the State's use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors because of their race, ethnic background, or sex. Defendant must then make a prima facie showing that the objection has merit: [T]he party may show that [the State] has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group. He may also demonstrate that the jurors in question share only this one characteristic  their membership in the group  and that in all other respects they are as heterogenous as the community as a whole ... [T]he defendant need not be a member of the excluded group... yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court's attention. [ Id. at 536, 511 A. 2d 1150 (quoting People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276, 583 P. 2d 748, 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 906 (Cal. 1978).] Next, a defendant must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group that represents a cross-section of the community. Finally, the defendant must make a strong showing that the State was motivated by bias against the challenged group rather than by the juror's personal views. Ibid.; State v. Watkins, 114 N.J. 259, 553 A. 2d 1344 (1989). If defendant succeeds in making a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the State to demonstrate it did not base its peremptory challenges on group bias. The State needs to show a genuine and reasonable ground for believing that a prospective juror might have an individual or personal bias that would make excusing him or her rational and desirable. Where the State does undertake to justify its exercise of peremptory challenges, the trial court must determine whether the explanations proffered by the State are genuine and must weigh those explanations against the showing made by defendant. On that weighing the trial court must then determine whether defendant has rebutted, by the preponderance of the evidence, the presumption of constitutional exercise of the peremptory challenges. Id. at 538, 511 A. 2d 1150. Defendant objected to the State's use of eleven of twelve peremptory challenges to excuse ten African-Americans and one Latino. The State, in turn, argues that because the percentage of African-American jurors in the sworn jury, five or six out of sixteen (or 31% to 37%) equals or exceeds the African-American population in Essex County of 37.5%, the defense has failed to establish that the State has disportionately challenged minority groups. The fact that African-Americans actually served on this jury is not dispositive of whether there was racial discrimination and does not relieve the trial court of the responsibility to ascertain if any prospective juror was peremptorily challenged on a discriminatory basis. It appears that the State did challenge members of racial minorities disproportionately. Indeed, when it turned to the State for an explanation, the trial court implicitly acknowledged that defendant had made a prima facie case. The State first explained that there was no racial issue in this case and that it had excused the jurors because each of them had expressed hesitation about imposing the death penalty. The trial court accepted that rationale, as do we. We find no error in the trial court's decision because the State is allowed to exercise peremptory challenges based on the jurors' personal biases. A juror who expresses qualms about imposing the death penalty possesses an individual view that the State may find antagonistic to its goals at trial. A review of the State's participation in voir dire does not indicate any differentiation from the norm when the excused jurors were questioned. The voir dire indicates that the State was most interested in exploring all the jurors' views on the death penalty. That exploration is appropriate and nondiscriminatory in a capital case. Moreover, our review of voir dire shows that nine of the eleven jurors did express some hesitancy or reluctance to participate in a death case. With respect to another of the challenged jurors, repeated requests were made to her to speak up. She acknowledged that the whole process frightened her and she was uncomfortable. Thus, we find that even if the State used a significant number of challenges to exclude minority jurors, there is no indication that the reasons the State proffered for the exclusion were pretextual or betrayed subtle or unconscious racism. The charge that the State also used its peremptory charges discriminatorily to excuse women from the jury was not filed below, as mandated by Gilmore. Yet, even if we were to consider the issue, defendant does not advance any convincing evidence that women were excluded from the jury on the basis of their sex. Hence, we conclude that the State did not exercise its peremptory challenges systematically to exclude racial minorities and women from the jury.