Opinion ID: 197114
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Ultra Vires Claim

Text: 6 The district court concluded that the statutory interpretation adopted by the Department exceeded the scope of its delegated authority because it (i) results in an unauthorized retroactive application and (ii) would not be accorded deference by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. As the plain language of the statute demonstrates that the Department did not exceed its mandate, we demur. 7 Under Rhode Island law, it is well established ... that statutes and their amendments are presumed to apply prospectively. Hydro-Manufacturing v. Kayser-Roth, 640 A.2d 950, 954 (R.I.1994). See also VanMarter v. Royal Indem. Co., 556 A.2d 41, 44 (R.I.1989); Lawrence v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 523 A.2d 864, 869 (R.I.1987). It is only in the event that it appears by strong, clear language or necessary implication that the Legislature intended the statute or amendment to have a retroactive effect, id.; see also Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co., Inc., 637 A.2d 367, 371 (R.I.1994), that the new enactment will be interpreted to operate retrospectively. Avanzo v. Rhode Island Dept. of Human Servs., 625 A.2d 208, 211 (R.I.1993). 8 The statute itself explicitly states that the offender fee shall not be effective until the date the rules and regulations are filed. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-38. Thus, its plain language requires no interpretation, see Whitehouse v. Rumford Liability & Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 506, 508 (R.I.1995), as it mandates prospective application. See, e.g., Hydro-Manufacturing, 640 A.2d at 955 (statute which states that it shall take effect upon passage evinces plain legislative intent that it be given only prospective application); Avanzo, 625 A.2d at 211 (holding that phrase shall take effect indicates legislative intent that statute be given prospective effect). As the Rhode Island Legislature explicitly delegated to the Department the responsibility for promulgating and filing the required implementing rules and regulations with the Secretary of State before the offender fee program could take effect, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-38, and there is no claim that the Department failed to comply with the legislative mandate, its designation of a later (July 1, 1994) effective date could not render its interpretation either ultra vires or retroactive. 2