Opinion ID: 2314397
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Elements Comparison

Text: Consistent with our approach in Byrd, where we held that the legislature did not intend an individual to be convicted of and sentenced for violations of both receiving stolen property and theft when each arose from the same criminal act, but nevertheless examined Blockburger, Byrd, supra, 598 A.2d at 390-91, I turn to address the boiler-plate litany of Blockburger, i.e., the test of whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact the other does not. Applying that test as well, I would reach the same result. The logic of Blockburger has withstood the test of time. Not only has it resolved difficult questions arising in myriad cases and varying factual circumstances, but it has also made accommodations where there are indicia of legislative intent. See Woodward, supra, 469 U.S. at 108, 105 S.Ct. at 612. Thus, this has been true where two offenses are intimate and intertwined in the same act or course of conduct ( Byrd, supra, 598 A.2d at 391), where one [offense] is a lesser included offense of the other ( see Rutledge, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1245), or where due process rights are at issue ( see United States v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121 (10th Cir.1992)). [10] It is important to remember that what has been characterized as the elements-comparison of Blockburger arose not only in the context of a single sale made to a purchaser, but of separate violations requiring the government to prove the elements of distinct statutes  i.e., prohibitions against the (1) lifting of a narcotic drug from its original packing, and (2) transferring that drug without the existence of a purchase order. Each statute required proof of a fact which the other did not. See Blockburger, supra, 284 U.S. at 301-02, 52 S.Ct. at 181. In the instant case, we have no such requirement. Once the government proved the possession of a machine gun, prohibited under the two statutory provisions, no further proof was needed. Since a machine gun cannot be registered as a matter of law, no proof of nonregistration was required. My colleagues concede that the government is relieved of having to introduce a certificate of nonregistration. Presumably the court, with or without a request from counsel, could take judicial notice of the fact that a machine gun is unregisterable. See 2 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 335, at 413-14 (4th ed.1992). In any event, because only one of the elements of PPW is necessary to establish a violation of the UF statute, it is appropriate to characterize UF as a lesser included offense of PPW. Cf. Rutledge, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1250. I would hold that conviction and sentencing for the same act of possession is barred by the Double Jeopardy provision of the Constitution. I respectfully dissent. [11]