Opinion ID: 2328028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the delay issue

Text: The delay in the collateral litigation of this caseboth state and federalhas resulted from two causes. The first cause is the pendency of the Atkins petition, which we have already addressed. The second cause is the FCDO's litigation strategy in its pursuit of appellant's new Brady claim since 2006. This strategy is intertwined withindeed, is the source ofthe jurisdictional issue here, and has created state-federal gridlock. In a concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244 (Pa.2011), joined by Mr. Justice McCaffery, this author discussed the record in this case in the larger context of addressing a concern with the FCDO's accusation in a federal habeas pleading in Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 18 A.3d 1095 (Pa.2011). The Dougherty pleading alleged, among other things, that this Court was the primary cause of delays in Pennsylvania capital cases, indeed that this Court was indifferent to, and incapable of managing, its capital docket. The Spotz concurrence offered examples from capital cases, including many adverted to by the FCDO in its federal motion in Dougherty, where the FCDO's conduct was the primary cause of delay, a fact the FCDO had inexplicably failed to disclose in Dougherty. This case was one of the cases identified by the FCDO in the Dougherty motion. The record summarized in Part I of this Opinion details the strategy of delay employed by Attorney Nolas here. The Spotz concurrence described counsel's record argument as follows: Nolas's argument respecting the PCRA court's power to decide was straight out of Catch-22. [FN] He argued that the PCRA court: (a) could not dismiss the serial Brady claim (a new PCRA claim that led Nolas to secure a federal stay of the habeas appeals pending in the Third Circuit) without also ruling on the pending Atkins petition; and (b) could not rule on the Atkins claim, because the court somehow lacked authority to do so, and Nolas would have to object. So, according to Nolas, the PCRA court could act on neither claim, and counsel had already succeeded in having the federal habeas appeals held until the PCRA court acted on the Brady claim. Then, Nolas appealed the non-final order [non-final under Nolas's jurisdictional argument here]. This [FCDO] strategy assured a de facto, perpetual stay of execution. [FN]: See Joseph Heller, Catch-22 (1961). 18 A.3d at 347 & n. 9 (Castille, C.J., joined by McCaffery, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). But, this is not the last word on the circumstances relevant to the delay and gridlock created by the FCDO's pursuit of its Brady claim in this case. After this Court directed supplemental briefing on the jurisdictional issue, Attorney Nolas filed appellant's supplemental brief, dated November 12, 2010. The Commonwealth, in its own supplemental responsive brief, appended a status report that Attorney Nolas later filed in the Third Circuit on December 6, 2010. That federal status report reads, in relevant part, as follows: As stated in our prior reports, the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas summarily denied relief on Mr. Porter's claim arising from the recantation of witness Vincent Gentile, which includes arguments of constitutional error under Brady v. Maryland and its progeny. The Court of Common Pleas retained jurisdiction over our claim for relief under Atkins v. Virginia and is awaiting word on the appeal from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court before proceeding further. We have taken on Mr. Porter's behalf an appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from the denial of relief on the Brady claim, as the Court of Common Pleas indicated. We have filed our brief, the Commonwealth has now filed its responsive brief and we filed our reply brief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thereafter ordered supplemental briefing on procedural questions, and we recently filed this supplemental brief. It is our hope that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will correct what we believe were errors by the Court of Common Pleas and at least remand for an evidentiary hearing on the Brady claim. It is also our hope that the Court of Common Pleas will grant relief on the Atkins claim. We respectfully request that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit continue to keep this case in suspense/abeyance pending the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's resolution of Mr. Porter's Brady claim and, if relief is not granted on the Brady claim, pending Mr. Porter's Atkins claim in the Pennsylvania courts. We believe both claims are substantial. We will keep the Court of Appeals apprised of further developments. Thank you for your attention. Commonwealth's Supplemental Brief, Exhibit A, 1-2. Attorney Nolas later represented in his supplemental reply brief, filed in this Court on December 23, 2010, that [e]verything counsel stated in the federal court status report (appended to the Commonwealth's Supplemental brief) is accurate. Appellant's Supplemental Reply Brief at 3. The Commonwealth argues that the federal status report furthers a stalemate between the PCRA court and the federal court of appeals [that] has been manufactured by [appellant's] attorney, who for more than six years has filed motions and status reports asking the Third Circuit to hold [the federal appeals] in abeyance. The Commonwealth adds that, even after arguing to this Court that this appeal should be quashed for lack of jurisdiction, counsel continues to assure the Third Circuit that he expects this Court to rule in his favor, and that the Third Circuit should refrain from acting. Commonwealth's Supplemental Brief at 1 & n. 1. The federal status report is probative of counsel's overall strategy of delay, and is disturbing in two respects. First, the report shows that federal counsel's representations to both the PCRA court and the Third Circuit lacked candor. In the report to the Third Circuit, Attorney Nolas represented that appellant's Atkins claim was being held by the PCRA judge pending word on the Brady appeal to this Court, declared his hope that the Court of Common Pleas will grant relief on the Atkins claim, and then requested that the federal appeals be kept in abeyance, not just for the Brady decision, but also if relief is not granted on the Brady claim, pending Mr. Porter's Atkins claim in the Pennsylvania courts. But, counsel had taken a very different position before the PCRA courtsuccessfully so, and thereby inducing delayand the report to the Third Circuit misrepresents the state court proceedings concerning the Atkins issue. As reflected in Part I of this Opinion, counsel had represented to the PCRA court that the federal appeals were being held solely to allow for exhaustion of the Brady claim; that appellant's Atkins claim was being held in state court until after the federal appeals were decided; that there was no need to decide the Atkins claim before the federal appeals were decided; and indeed, that counsel would object if the PCRA court passed upon the Atkins claim. Counsel's status report to the Third Circuit failed to disclose the patently contrary argument he had made in state court, or the true status of appellant's Atkins claim with respect to both court systems. Second, the Commonwealth is correct that federal counsel's report to the Third Circuit did not disclose that the procedural questions upon which this Court directed supplemental briefing involved jurisdiction. Nor, did Attorney Nolas disclose that the supplemental brief he had already filed in this Court argued that he had appealed a non-final order, and that he was now requesting quashal of the appeal without prejudice, and doing so without suggestion of how the case could move forward. Instead, counsel gave the Third Circuit the impression that he was awaiting a merits resolution on appellant's Brady claim on appeal, and was hopeful he would succeed. Such representations were designed to secure further delay in the federal court, and apparently have succeeded. Counsel's representations in the report to the Third Circuit fully corroborate what was apparent from the record below: that Attorney Nolas's litigation strategy created the federal/state logjam in this case, Spotz, 18 A.3d at 346; and that the strategy was undertaken without any expression of concern for the delay the strategy ensured. To those concerns, the report to the Third Circuit adds the specter of federal counsel misleading both court systems concerning the status of this case, in order to perpetuate a de facto stay of execution.