Opinion ID: 43676
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Inducement of Guilty Plea

Text: Brown asserts prosecutors are required to inform a defendant who is pleading guilty that he is eligible for sentencing as a career offender and may face a sentence higher than the defendant’s counsel predicted. He also argues the law of the case doctrine did not bar the district court from considering the issue, and, alternatively, the district court could have addressed the issue under the manifest injustice exception to the doctrine and its inherent supervisory authority over matters occurring before it. “A district court when acting under an appellate court’s mandate, cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than execution; or give any further relief; or review it, even for apparent error, upon a matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded.” United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotations and citation omitted). “Our settled circuit law obligates a district court to follow our mandates, and not to assert jurisdiction over matters outside the scope of a limited mandate, which constitutes abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal citation omitted). In our mandate, this Court specifically instructed the district court to sentence Brown as a career offender, indicating the applicable offense level, 5 criminal history category, and Guidelines range. The district court was obligated to address only the issue presented by this Court’s mandate, see id., and it did not err in determining that it did not have the authority to entertain Brown’s argument that the prosecutor induced him to plead guilty.