Opinion ID: 2817769
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exacting Scrutiny

Text: Acknowledging the interest in one’s privacy of association, the Supreme Court in Buckley announced that campaign finance disclosure requirements are reviewed under “exacting scrutiny.” 424 U.S. at 64–68. This is a heightened level of scrutiny, which accounts for the general interest in associational privacy by requiring a “‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66).4 DSF acknowledges that Delaware’s interest in an informed electorate is a sufficiently important governmental interest. Appellee Br. at 50. “[D]isclosure provides the electorate with information ‘as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate’ in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek [] office.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–67. The Supreme Court endorsed this interest in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81 (stating “disclosure helps voters to define more of the candidates’ constituencies”), and has reiterated its importance, see 4 Exacting scrutiny differs from “strict scrutiny” — the most demanding level of scrutiny applied in the First Amendment context — in that it does not engage in a “leastrestrictive-alternative analysis.” See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 n.6 (1989). Strict scrutiny is reserved for restrictions on speech that are content or viewpoint based. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014). 10 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (countenancing the government’s informational interest and rejecting a challenge to BCRA’s disclosure provisions); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371 (stating that “disclosure permits citizens . . . . to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages”); see also Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Providing information to the electorate is vital to the efficient functioning of the marketplace of ideas, and thus to advancing the democratic objectives underlying the First Amendment.”). Therefore, we find that Delaware’s interest in an informed electorate is sufficiently important. We now turn to the specific sections of the Act that DSF alleged in its Complaint were impermissibly broad5 and 5 For the first time on appeal, DSF argued that the Act’s “election period” is impermissibly long. The election period is essentially a “look back” period, requiring disclosure of donors who made donations during this defined time. In keeping with the “general rule,” we will “not consider an issue not passed upon below.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976). Even were we to reach this argument, it would not alter our conclusion. It is true that the Act’s election period will generally be longer than BCRA’s. Compare 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(2)(F) (defining the election period as “beginning on the first day of the preceding calendar year and ending on the disclosure date”), with 15 Del. C. § 8002(11)(3) (stating that “the election period shall begin and end at the same time as that of the candidate identified in such advertisement”). We do not, however, find material to our analysis the difference between the Act’s 11 therefore did not bear a substantial relation to the Act’s disclosure requirements, to wit: the monetary threshold and the type of media covered. As noted above, the Supreme Court’s guidance in upholding BCRA’s disclosure provision under exacting scrutiny is particularly applicable to this case. The Act’s disclosure requirements are similar in structure and language to those of the analogous federal law. Thus, in applying exacting scrutiny to the Act’s disclosure requirements, we will examine similar aspects of BCRA that the Court has upheld and consider whether the Act’s deviations from BCRA change the exacting scrutiny analysis.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court stated that deciding where to locate a monetary threshold “is necessarily a judgmental decision, best left . . . to congressional discretion” and determined that the thresholds presented were not “wholly without rationality.” 424 U.S. at 83 (discussing thresholds for direct contributor disclosure). Thus, even though election disclosure laws are analyzed under exacting scrutiny, we apply less searching review to monetary thresholds — asking whether they are “rationally related” to the State’s interest. Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 60 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Buckely and stating that “judicial deference [is granted] to plausible legislative judgments as to the appropriate location of a reporting threshold . . . unless they are wholly without rationality”) (quotation marks and internal citation omitted); Worley v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1251–52 (9th Cir. 2013) potential four year look-back and BCRA’s potential two year look-back period. 12 (same analysis of monetary thresholds in the political action committee context); Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 811 (4th Cir. 2012) (same). Under BCRA,6 groups that spend in excess of $10,000 annually must report individual contributors of $1,000 or more. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1), (2)(F). Under the Act, groups that spend more than $500 annually must report individual contributors of $100 or more. 15 Del. C. § 8031(a)(3). It is unsurprising that Delaware’s thresholds are lower than those for national elections. Delaware is a small state where direct mail makes up 80% of campaign expenditures. J.A. 135. “[F]or less than $500 a campaign can place enough pre-recorded ‘robo-calls’ to reach every household in a Delaware House district. If a hyper-targeted recipient list is used, as is common in campaigns, $150 would suffice.” J.A. 137. The expenditure thresholds are supported by the record and are rationally related to Delaware’s unique election landscape.
BCRA defines “electioneering communication” as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication,” 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A)(i), except the following: “a communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political 6 As of September 1, 2014, the relevant provisions of BCRA were transferred from 2 U.S.C. § 437 to 52 U.S.C. § 30104. We use the updated citations, but note, in the interest of clarity, that the District Court opinion and other disclosure-related opinions employ the old citations. 13 party, political committee, or candidate”; “a communication which constitutes an expenditure or an independent expenditure under this Act”; and “a communication which constitutes a candidate debate or forum.” Id. § 30104(f)(3)(B)(i–iii). The Act is broader, defining “communications media” as “television, radio, newspaper or other periodical, sign, Internet, mail or telephone.” 15 Del. C. § 8002(7). Excluded from the Act’s definition of “electioneering communication” are the following: “membership communication”; “communication appearing in a news article, editorial, opinion, or commentary, provided that such communication is not distributed via any communications media owned or controlled by any candidate, political committee or the person purchasing such communication”; and “communication made in any candidate debate or forum.” Id. § 8002(10)(b)(2–4). Though the Act reaches non-broadcast media (by including direct mail and the internet), it is not unique in this regard. Many other state statutes also include non-broadcast media.7 Furthermore, the media covered by the Act reflects the media actually used by candidates for office in Delaware, and thus it bears a substantial relation to Delaware’s interest 7 Nine other state statutes include direct mail. See Col. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(7)(a); AS § 15.13.400(3); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-601b(a)(2)(B); Idaho Code Ann. § 67-6602(f)(1); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 55, § 1; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.6(8j); 17 V.S.A. § 2901(11); RCW § 42.17A.005(19)(a); W. Va. Code § 3-8-1a(12)(A). Three state statutes include internet communications. See AS § 15.13.400(3); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-601b(a)(2)(B); 17 V.S.A. § 2901(11). 14 in an informed electorate. Delaware does not have its own major-network television station and campaign television advertisements on nearby Pennsylvania and Maryland stations are both expensive and “generally a poor investment, given that they reach primarily non-Delaware voters.” J.A. 134. Statewide campaigns use radio advertising, but this “is typically too expensive for most legislative or local races.” J.A. 135. Had the legislature limited “electioneering communication” to media not actually utilized in Delaware elections, the disclosure requirements would fail to serve the State’s interest in a well-informed electorate thereby resulting in a weaker fit between the two. Accordingly, we find that the media covered by the Act is sufficiently tailored to Delaware’s interest.