Opinion ID: 213369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Examiner's Prima Facie Case

Text: Jung frames this appeal much as he framed the appeal to the Board, as a challenge only to the existence of a prima facie case of invalidity, as distinct from the ultimate conclusion of invalidity. Jung admitted at oral argument that if this court finds that the examiner properly made out a prima facie case, then the decision of the Board should be affirmed. Oral Arg. at 3:02-3:25, available at http:// oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/Audiomp 3/2010-1019_1142010.MP3. In other words, Jung does not challenge the substance of the prima facie rejection, but only the procedure. As this court has repeatedly noted, the prima facie case is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production. Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed.Cir. 2007) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed.Cir.1992)). See also In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed.Cir.1984). The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) satisfies its initial burden of production by adequately explain[ing] the shortcomings it perceives so that the applicant is properly notified and able to respond. Hyatt, 492 F.3d at 1370. In other words, the PTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132, in notify[ing] the applicant . . . [by] stating the reasons for [its] rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application. 35 U.S.C. § 132. That section is violated when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection. Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1990). Jung appears to argue that the prima facie case requirement is procedurally flawed unless the examiner provides an [o]n-the-record showing of a reasonable, broadest reasonable claim construction and . . . a record showing that there is evidence bridging the facial differences between that reasonable claim construction and the purported anticipatory reference which here was this Kalnitsky controller. Oral Arg. at 8:15-8:50. This court disagrees. Both the initial and final office actions specifically put Jung on notice that the examiner considered Jung's first well-charge-level controller to read on Kalnitsky's controller 340, citing the specific columns and lines in Kalnitsky that explained the functionality of controller 340. See Initial Office Action, at 3 (Kalnitsky et al. teach said first well-charge-well [ sic ] controller (340) operably coupled with said first charge pump (see Col. 5, lines 37-39 and Col. 6, lines 38-44, 64-66).)); Final Office Action, at 10-11 (Regarding Applicant's arguments on Claim 1, Applicant argues that Kalnitsky et al. do not teach the first well-charge-level controller as recited in the claim language. Examiner asserts that Kalintsky [ sic ] et al. teach a well-charge-level controller 340 as recited in the claim language, as the controller 340 controls the well-charge-level of the charge well (citing relevant parts of Kalnitsky)). The examiner clearly conveyed his understanding that Jung's well-charge-level controller was broad enough to encompass Kalnitsky's controller 340, and the specific column and line cites to the prior art reference would have put any reasonable applicant on notice of the examiner's rejection. Indeed, Jung's understanding of the examiner's rejection was manifested by his response to the office actions. Jung did not respond by asserting that there was no on-the-record claim construction, or that he did not understand the examiner's rejection. Instead, Jung first responded by arguing simply that his well-charge-level controller was different from the `controller 340' recitations of [Kalnitsky]. Initial Response at 13. Whether Jung's claims read on Kalnitsky is precisely the substantive basis upon which the examiner rejected Jung's claims. Moreover, Jung has failed to articulate what gaps, in fact, exist between his well-charge-level controller and the controller 340 in Kalnitsky that needed filling by examiner explanation. It is of course true that every element of the claim must be present, either explicitly or inherently, in a single prior art reference for that reference to anticipate. In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed.Cir.1999). But whether there are gaps between the prior art and the rejected claims is a substantive issue, and Jung's assertion that the examiner must bridg[e] the facial differences between the claims and the prior art begs the substantive question of whether there are facial differences to be bridged. Jung contends that establishing a prima facie case requires more than just notice under § 132, and that whatever else may be required is part of the examiner's burden in rejecting any claim. According to Jung, until that burden is met by the examiner, the rejection need not be challenged on the merits by the applicant. This court disagrees and sees no reason to impose a heightened burden on examiners beyond the notice requirement of § 132. Jung, without any basis, would have this court impose additional prima facie procedural requirements and give applicants the right first to procedurally challenge and appeal the prima facie procedural showing before having to substantively respond to the merits of the rejection. Such a process is both manifestly inefficient and entirely unnecessary. Indeed, Jung's arguments as to why the examiner failed to make out a prima facie rejection are the same arguments that would be made on the merits. There has never been a requirement for an examiner to make an on-the-record claim construction of every term in every rejected claim and to explain every possible difference between the prior art and the claimed invention in order to make out a prima facie rejection. This court declines to create such a burdensome and unnecessary requirement. [Section 132] does not mandate that in order to establish prima facie anticipation, the PTO must explicitly preempt every possible response to a section 102 rejection. Section 132 merely ensures that an applicant at least be informed of the broad statutory basis for the rejection of his claims, so that he may determine what the issues are on which he can or should produce evidence. Chester, 906 F.2d at 1578 (internal citation omitted). As discussed above, all that is required of the office to meet its prima facie burden of production is to set forth the statutory basis of the rejection and the reference or references relied upon in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of § 132. As the statute itself instructs, the examiner must notify the applicant, stating the reasons for such rejection, together with such information and references as may be useful in judging the propriety of continuing prosecution of his application. 35 U.S.C. § 132. Here, the examiner's discussion of the theory of invalidity (anticipation), the prior art basis for the rejection (Kalnitsky), and the identification of where each limitation of the rejected claims is shown in the prior art reference by specific column and line number was more than sufficient to meet this burden.