Opinion ID: 57923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Armed Career Criminal Determination

Text: McCoy lastly argues that the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when it found that he was an armed career criminal and imposed a sentence beyond the 10-year statutory maximum based on the court’s determinations concerning his prior convictions.2 McCoy acknowledges that we rejected an argument similar to his in United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2006). He raises the argument, however, to preserve the issue in the event the Supreme Court overrules Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1998). We held in Greer that district judges may determine whether prior 2 In support of his argument, McCoy cites the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Cunningham v. California, — U.S. —, 127 S. Ct. 856, 166 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2007). In Cunningham, however, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that “the Federal Constitution’s jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant.” Id. at —, 127 S. Ct. at 860 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Cunningham does not affect the outcome here because it preserved the Supreme Court’s exception for prior convictions. 12 convictions qualify as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Greer, 440 F.3d at 1275. In Almendarez-Torres, moreover, the Supreme Court held that a prior conviction is not a fact that must be admitted by a defendant or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 258, 118 S. Ct. at 1238. Furthermore, McCoy actually admitted at the sentencing hearing to the convictions that qualified him as an armed career criminal. Accordingly, the district court did not err by classifying McCoy as an armed career criminal.