Opinion ID: 4556240
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Immediacy of the Threat

Text: With respect to whether Kapuscinski posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, the district court held that Kapuscinski presented a threat to Mitchell’s physical safety because both officers testified that Kapuscinski “looked crazed and dangerous and appeared ready to attack them.” R. 34, Dist. Ct. Order, PageID # 751. Additionally, after taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and assuming that all of Robinson’s taser discharges were successful, the court acknowledged that because those discharges failed to stop Kapuscinski, “Mitchell still saw an active and energetic threat.” Id. In the district court’s view, Mitchell’s statement to Robinson during the incident that “you’ve only got one barb in him” further showed that a reasonable officer would have felt Kapuscinski remained a serious threat to his safety and that his taser discharge was justified. Id. On appeal, Plaintiff argues first that because both officers were at least fifty pounds heavier than Kapuscinski, “[n]othing prevented either officer from taking him down with a tackle maneuver if they truly felt threatened. They knew he was unarmed – he was naked.” Appellant’s Br. at 26–27. Plaintiff also emphasizes that Kapuscinski was lying on his back and “did not swing at or charge at the officers.” Id. at 27. While Plaintiff does concede that while Kapuscinski “may have been obstinate (or rendered insensate and unable to comply),” he argues that Kapuscinski’s -9- Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. body position and lack of weapons meant that he was no threat to the officers “towering above” him. Id. In response, Mitchell reported that despite being on his back and on the ground, “Kapuscinski was still kicking, being very aggressive . . . attempting to get up to come after us.” Appellee Mitchell’s Br. at 21. And as noted previously, the officers stated in their depositions in the present case that Kapuscinski moved into a kneeling or crouching position and appeared to be attempting to stand up, all while disobeying Robinson’s verbal commands to roll over. This Court has held tasing to be a reasonable response to a threat of immediate harm when a suspect disobeys police orders and may be armed, see, e.g., Watson v. City of Marysville, 518 F. App’x 390, 393 (6th Cir. 2013), or when a suspect is “particularly violent or physically resistant, so as to endanger responders,” Kent v. Oakland County, 810 F.3d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 2016). For example, in Hagans v. Franklin County Sheriff’s Office, 695 F.3d 505, 511 (6th Cir. 2012), we found that the tasing of a suspect was justified because he was “out of control and continued forcefully to resist arrest.” Hagans repeatedly refused to be handcuffed, wrestled with officers who sought to subdue him, attempted to flee, and even tried to grab an officer’s taser while being stunned. Id. at 507. Conversely, in Kijowski v. City of Niles, 372 F. App’x 595, 600 (6th Cir. 2010), we held that “[a]bsent some compelling justification—such as the potential escape of a dangerous criminal or the threat of immediate harm—the use of [a taser] on a non-resistant person is unreasonable.” In outlining the contours of this rule, we favorably cited a decision from the Tenth Circuit approving of the use of a taser on a man who initiated a fight with police and was kicking and biting the officers who were wrestling him to the ground in an effort to subdue him. Id. (citing Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007)). We then held that the officer in Kijowski was not objectively reasonable in tasing the plaintiff twice, because the plaintiff - 10 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. was in no way resisting arrest and “a reasonable officer on the scene would not have perceived [the plaintiff] as presenting a risk of harm.” Id. Moreover, in Kent, we held that an individual did not pose an “immediate threat” to the safety of officers and paramedics on the scene because he was unarmed and there was no evidence that he “was violently thrashing about in an effort to avoid handcuffing or to flee police, such that he might have harmed the deputies and EMTs in the bedroom” or that he “attempted to hit officers or make a display of force.” 810 F.3d at 391. At the most, Kent was using “agitated hand gestures” towards the officers. Id. We contrasted the facts of the case with those in cases such as Watson and Hagans to hold that “Kent’s actions do not . . . amount to the same immediate threat to safety found to justify tasing under our case law.” Id. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable officer in Mitchell’s position would have been justified in perceiving that Kapuscinski posed a serious threat to the officers’ physical safety. Although the record indicates that Kapuscinski neither successfully stood up nor assaulted the officers, he refused to comply with their repeated verbal instructions throughout the incident and he behaved in an objectively threatening manner. Rather than obey Robinson’s order to roll over so he could be arrested, Kapuscinski kicked towards the officers and began to attempt to stand up in the small bedroom. It is impossible to say conclusively what Kapuscinski would have done had he completely stood up. However, “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, it was reasonable for Mitchell to perceive Kapuscinski’s actions as a physical threat. The officers had just seen him violently assault and threaten to kill Christina and he was refusing to comply with their instructions to roll over so that he could be safely apprehended. - 11 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. This conclusion becomes clear after taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and assuming that Robinson’s multiple taser discharges were successful in shocking Kapuscinski.3 That these discharges failed to immobilize Kapuscinski made it reasonable for officers to believe Kapuscinski was “out of control.” Hagans, 695 F.3d at 511. Unlike the suspect in Kijowski, who was peacefully sitting in his vehicle when officers seized him and tased him, 372 F. App’x at 599–600, Kapuscinski prompted the officers’ intervention in the present case by assaulting Christina and continuing to act in an aggressive manner towards the officers. Moreover, unlike the actions of the plaintiff in Kent, Kapuscinski was “violently thrashing about . . . such that he might have harmed the deputies,” and his kicking combined with his sustained disobedience constituted “a display of force.” 810 F.3d at 391. Finally, Kapuscinski did not have “his hands up and his back against the bedroom wall when he was tased.” Id. (“We have held that an individual poses little threat of harm when her hands are in the air indicating submission.”). Quite the opposite: Kapuscinski remained in an aggressive posture until Mitchell’s taser discharge incapacitated him. Therefore, from the perspective of a reasonable officer, the threat posed by Kapuscinski was sufficiently great that Mitchell’s defensive use of a taser was justified.