Opinion ID: 2635512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to Jessica's Law

Text: Ordinarily, constitutional challenges to a statute raise questions of law subject to unlimited appellate review. State v. Allen, 283 Kan. 372, 374, 153 P.3d 488 (2007). But two preliminary questions require attention before the merits can be reached here. The first is whether Seward and his counsel preserved these questions for appeal. The second is whether the factual record before this court is adequate to support any legal ruling by us. In Ortega-Cadelan, we reinvigorated the rule that a constitutional issue generally cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal, specifically examining the justification for an exception to that rule when the issue was a similar challenge to Jessica's Law. The defendant conceded that he had not raised the issue in the district court. We determined that no exception applied and refused to consider the issue. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161, 194 P.3d 1195; see also State v. Spotts, 288 Kan. 650, Syl. 1, 206 P.3d 510 (2009) (constitutional challenge to Jessica's Law not properly before this court when raised for first time on appeal). This case is different. Seward's federal and state constitutional challenges to Jessica's Law are no surprise to the State. They evidently were mentioned during plea negotiations, included in his written motion for downward durational departure, and restated on the record at his sentencing hearing. He and his counsel cannot be faulted for failure to call the district judge's attention to these issues. Lack of preservation through objection in the district court is no bar to appellate consideration. The second question, however, poses a more significant obstacle to any decision we might make on the merits. Seward and his counsel stopped short of moving under Rule 165 to prompt the district judge to place specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the constitutional challenges in the record. In Ortega-Cadelan, we recognized that the analysis of whether a sentence qualifies as cruel or unusual includes both factual and legal questions and listed the three relevant factors from our decision in Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367, 574 P.2d 950: `(1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be examined with particular regard to the degree of danger present to society; relevant to this inquiry are the facts of the crime, the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the extent of culpability for the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the prescribed punishment; '(2) A comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed in this jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and if among them are found more serious crimes punished less severely than the offense in question the challenged penalty is to that extent suspect; and `(3) A comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the same offense.' 287 Kan. at 160-61, 194 P.3d 1195. We then observed that the first of the three factors was inherently factual, requiring examination of the facts of the crime and the particular characteristics of the defendant. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161, 194 P.3d 1195. In Ortega-Cadelan, because the issue had never been raised before the district court, neither party had presented relevant evidence or arguments on this factor. Although we acknowledged that the two other Freeman factors depended on legal determinations, we stated: [O]ne consideration is not necessarily controlling over the other considerations; in fact, in Freeman the three considerations were referred to as `the three pronged test.' [Citation omitted.] Ultimately, one consideration may weigh so heavily that it directs the final conclusion. Before that conclusion is reached, however, consideration should be given to each prong of the test. Particularly where arguments focus upon proportionality, . . . the factual aspects of the test are a necessary part of the overall analysis. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161, 194 P.3d 1195. In Thomas, as in Ortega-Cadelan, we ruled that the defendant had not adequately addressed his constitutional challenge to Jessica's Law before the district court. In addition, in response to the defendant's argument that the appellate record was nevertheless sufficient for this court to rule on the merits, we said: This argument ignores the role of this court: Appellate courts do not make factual findings but review those made by district courts. [Citation omitted.] Here, no factual findings were made upon which this court can base an analysis of whether the sentence is cruel or unusual. Thomas, 288 Kan. at 161, 199 P.3d 1265. The same is true here. There are no district court findings and conclusions on the Freeman factors. Although rejection of Seward's constitutional challenges to Jessica's Law may be implied by the district judge's silence, such silence cannot supply a sound foundation for our appellate review. See Thomas, 288 Kan. at 161, 199 P.3d 1265; see also State v. Easterling, 289 Kan. ___, ___, 213 P.3d 418 (2009) (although district court's detailed recitation in ruling on departure motion included certain factual findings, findings cut against rather than supported defendant's position on first factor from Freeman; no argument made on third Freeman factor; issue not before court in a posture to be effectively decided). In this case, the district judge and Seward and his counsel share responsibility for the absence of adequate findings and conclusions in the record. Our Rule 165 places the primary duty for arriving at such findings and conclusions on the district judge. It states simply that [i]n all contested matters submitted to a judge without a jury . . ., the judge shall state the controlling facts required by K.S.A. 60-252, and the legal principles controlling the decision. Rule 165. Numerous past decisions of this court and the Court of Appeals have characterized this duty as mandatory. See, e.g., Hanks v. Riffe Constr. Co., 232 Kan. 800, 802, 658 P.2d 1030 (1983); State v. Carver, 32 Kan.App.2d 1070, 1078, 95 P.3d 104 (2004); University of Kansas Mem. Corp. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 31 Kan.App.2d 177, 181, 61 P.3d 741 (2003); Jack v. City of Wichita, 23 Kan.App.2d 606, 610, 933 P.2d 787 (1997); In re Marriage of Case, 18 Kan.App.2d 457, 464, 856 P.2d 169 (1993); Dillon's Food Stores, Inc. v. Brosseau, 17 Kan.App.2d 657, 659, 842 P.2d 319 (1992); Elite Professionals, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 16 Kan.App.2d 625, 629, 827 P.2d 1195 (1992); Pottratz v. Firkins, 4 Kan.App.2d 469, 470, 609 P.2d 185 (1980). Yet we have also held that a litigant who fails to object to inadequate Rule 165 findings and conclusions in the district court is foreclosed from making an appellate argument that would depend upon what is missing. See Blair Constr., Inc. v. McBeth, 273 Kan. 679, 688, 44 P.3d 1244 (2002); Tucker v. Hugoton Energy Corp., 253 Kan. 373, 378, 855 P.2d 929 (1993). In view of the tension produced by these authorities, the newness of the constitutional issues raised by Jessica's Law, and our recognition that the efforts made by Seward and his counsel to keep the issues alive beyond sentencing substantially outstripped those of defendants and counsel in Ortega-Cadelan, Thomas, Spotts, and Easterling, we are willing to remand this case to the district court for entry of sufficient factual findings and conclusions of law. On remand, the district judge shall also be empowered to decide, in her discretion, whether she requires any further hearing, evidentiary or otherwise, to enable her to discharge her Rule 165 duty. We emphasize that we believe this case to be exceptional. In the future, a defendant who wishes to appeal on the basis of a constitutional challenge to a sentencing statute must ensure the findings and conclusions by the district judge are sufficient to support appellate argument, by filing of a motion invoking the judge's duty under Rule 165, if necessary.