Opinion ID: 515767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony Read to the Jury

Text: 4 One of the primary issues at trial was the knowledge and participation of Keskey in the insure-over scheme. To prove Keskey's knowledge and participation, the government elicited testimony from Ann Racynski Sardina regarding an indemnity agreement in which Huber agreed to indemnify ATIC to the extent of $4,557,450 for losses ATIC might suffer as a result of certain undisclosed mortgages. Sardina testified that Keskey had drafted the indemnity agreement and had given it to her to type. Sardina explained that she typed Keskey's name on the second page of the document in accordance with the standard office practice of typing the name of the person who had drafted a document under the line on which he was expected to sign. Sardina's testimony regarding the indemnification agreement was significant because if Keskey actually drafted the document, that would be strong evidence of his knowledge and acquiescence in the fraudulent insure-over scheme. 5 During deliberations, the jury asked to review Sardina's testimony concerning the indemnity document. The court properly recognized that whether to read back testimony to the jury is a matter purely within the court's discretion. United States v. Croft, 750 F.2d 1354, 1367 (7th Cir.1984). Accord United States v. Padin, 787 F.2d 1071, 1076 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823, 107 S.Ct. 93, 93 L.Ed.2d 45 (1986); United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 917 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Zarintash, 736 F.2d 66, 69-70 (3d Cir.1984). The court conferred with counsel, at which time Keskey's trial counsel, 1 Gary McCartan, strongly objected to the court reading any portion of the testimony to the jury. The court considered a number of factors, including the risk that reading a portion of the testimony to the jury would unduly emphasize that testimony. After carefully weighing the advantages and disadvantages, the court decided to have the court reporter read back the relevant testimony to the jury. Although courts sometimes refuse to read back testimony at the jury's request, 2 Keskey does not argue that the court's decision to allow testimony to be read back to the jury was an abuse of discretion. 6 Although the court reporter did read a portion of Sardina's testimony to the jury, no contemporaneous record was made of exactly what portion of the testimony she read. The record merely indicates that the appropriate portions of testimony was [sic] read to the jury. After filing his notice of appeal, Keskey filed a motion with the district court to reconstruct the record pursuant to Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 3 The court granted the motion and directed the parties to submit statements outlining which portions of Sardina's testimony were read to the jury. The district court then entered an order identifying which transcript pages of the Sardina testimony had been read to the jury, concluding that all testimony relating to the indemnity document had been read. 7 In their submissions to the district court, the parties disagreed as to which portions of Sardina's testimony were read to the jury. McCartan had taken notes while the court reporter was reading the testimony to the jury; those notes stop at page 497, line 5 of the transcript, including only seventeen lines of cross-examination. Keskey argued that only the testimony corresponding to McCartan's notes was read to the jury. 8 The government, however, argued that ninety-seven additional lines of cross-examination and re-cross-examination had been read to the jury. The Assistant United States Attorney did not take notes during the reading of testimony to the jury; instead, he followed the notes that he had taken during Sardina's testimony at trial. In his affidavit, the Assistant United States Attorney stated that everything in his notes relating to the indemnity document had been read to the jury. In addition, the Assistant United States Attorney recalled that, at one point during the reading, either he or McCartan stated that there was an additional portion of Sardina's testimony relating to the indemnity document that had not yet been read. According to the Assistant United States Attorney, the court reporter then located the additional testimony and read it to the jury. The government argued that this indicated that testimony beyond that reflected in McCartan's notes was read. Finally, the government pointed out that when the court reporter had finished reading, neither party objected to the accuracy of the testimony read, and both conceded its completeness. 4 9 The court agreed with the government and found that the additional ninety-seven lines of testimony had been read to the jury. We must accept the court's reconstruction of the record under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(c) unless it was intentionally falsified or plainly unreasonable. United States v. Mori, 444 F.2d 240, 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913, 92 S.Ct. 238, 30 L.Ed.2d 187 (1971); Belt v. Holton, 197 F.2d 579, 582 (D.C.Cir.1952); 9 J. Moore, B. Ward & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice p 210.08, at 10-48 (2d ed. 1987); see Buick v. United States, 396 F.2d 912, 913-14 n. 1 (9th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1068, 89 S.Ct. 724, 21 L.Ed.2d 711 (1969). 5 10 Keskey does not claim that the district court's reconstruction of the record was intentionally false. Keskey argues that McCartan's notes, which were the only notes taken of the exact testimony read to the jury, are the best evidence available for reconstructing the record. After reviewing the submissions of both parties, however, the court found that more testimony had been read to the jury than indicated by McCartan's notes. We do not believe that this conclusion was plainly unreasonable. The Assistant United States Attorney remembers that the court reporter skipped ahead a few pages and read additional testimony to the jury. The portion that Keskey claims was read to the jury, however, is contained in one continuous passage. In addition, the court relied on the Assistant United States Attorney's trial notes that he reviewed while the testimony was read to the jury. Therefore, the court's reconstruction of the record was not plainly unreasonable. 11 Keskey makes several other arguments in relation to the reading back of testimony to the jury. 6 Nevertheless, as Keskey's appellate counsel conceded at oral argument, if the district court's reconstruction efforts pursuant to Rule 10 resulted in a reliable record, Keskey must lose on his other arguments. Therefore, we affirm the district court's reconstruction of the record and find that the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the relevant portions of Sardina's testimony to be read to the jury. 12 Although we believe that the district court was able to reliably reconstruct the record, situations like this can be easily avoided. If the trial judge, in exercising his discretion, determines that it is appropriate to read back all or a portion of the testimony of a witness, it can be specifically stated on the record in advance where the reading is to begin and where it is to end. If a transcript is available, the portions that are read can be identified by page and line numbers. Another possible method would be to employ a tape recorder. Cf. United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 480 (7th Cir.1977) (although transcript was not available to the reviewing court, tape recording was adequate record), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820, 99 S.Ct. 83, 58 L.Ed.2d 110 (1978); United States v. Andiarena, 823 F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir.1987) (citing Craig ). 13