Opinion ID: 867340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Armstrong's Allocution

Text: ¶ 54 Armstrong next contends that the trial court erred by unconstitutionally restricting his right to allocution. We review questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation de novo. Because Armstrong objected below, any error is subject to harmless error review. Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 18, 115 P.3d at 607. ¶ 55 Armstrong listed remorse among the mitigating circumstances he intended to prove during the penalty phase. The State subsequently gave notice that, as part of its mitigation rebuttal, it intended to present Armstrong's testimony at his first trial denying culpability for the killings. After the State gave this notice, Armstrong withdrew remorse as a mitigating circumstance, causing the State to withdraw Armstrong's prior testimony from its intended rebuttal. The trial court made clear, however, that if Armstrong expressed remorse during his allocution, the State would be permitted to reopen its rebuttal case and present Armstrong's prior testimony denying responsibility for the crime. ¶ 56 Before closing arguments, Armstrong allocuted but did not explicitly express remorse. He stated his love for his sister and his inability to understand how he could have killed her and Williams. He told the jury that he could not explain his actions, that it was a senseless act, and that what he did was beyond forgiveness. Finally, he asked the jury for mercy. The State did not ask the court to reopen the case for rebuttal. ¶ 57 Armstrong contends that these circumstances impermissibly limited his ability to express remorse in allocution. ¶ 58 In Arizona, a defendant has a right to allocute before he is sentenced. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 19.1(d)(7), 26.10(b)(1). This right, however, is not absolute. State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 350 ¶ 100, 111 P.3d 369, 392 (2005). ¶ 59 We agree that a defendant should be able to express remorse at a capital sentencing. In this case, however, that right was not denied. Armstrong remained free to express remorse, but he declined to do so. In effect, Armstrong argues that he should have been able to shift a mitigating circumstance from his mitigation case into his allocution and thereby insulate that mitigating circumstance from rebuttal evidence. If Armstrong had presented remorse as a mitigating circumstance as he originally intended, the State undoubtedly would have been able to present rebuttal evidence. See A.R.S. § 13-703.01(G). The judge acted within his discretion in ruling that Armstrong could not avoid mitigation rebuttal simply by making statements in allocution that he otherwise would have made as part of his mitigation case.