Opinion ID: 2975781
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence regarding the 2003 incident

Text: -9- Nos. 06-5810, 06-5811 United States v. Lofton and Black It was also proper for the district court to allow Officer Fegan’s testimony about a prior incident under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). In 2003, Officer Fegan arrested Black after finding a cigar box, near where Black had been standing, that contained five baggies of cocaine and a bag of marijuana. Black eventually pled guilty to a charge of cocaine possession arising from the incident. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of a defendant’s “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” may be admitted to establish, inter alia, intent or knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see also United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that Rule 404(b) “is actually a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion, since only one use is forbidden and several permissible uses of such evidence are identified”). To be admissible as other-acts evidence under Rules 404(b) and 403, the evidence must be probative of a material issue other than character, and the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 596 (6th Cir. 2003). Evidence of the 2003 incident was probative of Black’s intent and knowledge in the instant case. This court “review[s] de novo whether the district court correctly determined that the evidence was admissible for a legitimate purpose.” United States v. Comer, 93 F.3d 1271, 1277 (6th Cir. 1991). Although Black argues that the Government should not have been allowed to introduce evidence of the 2003 incident because knowledge and intent were not at issue, this court has held that “[w]here the crime charged is one requiring specific intent, the prosecutor may use 404(b) evidence to prove that the defendant acted with the specific intent notwithstanding any defense the defendant might raise.” United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1994). - 10 - Nos. 06-5810, 06-5811 United States v. Lofton and Black Additionally, the 2003 incident was both sufficiently similar and reasonably near in time to the specific-intent offense at issue in the instant case. To be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence of defendant’s prior bad acts must be substantially similar and reasonably near in time to the charged offense. United States v. Wynn, 987 F.2d 354, 357 (6th Cir. 1993). At the time of the 2003 incident, Black only possessed 3 grams of cocaine. Importantly, those 3 grams were separated and packaged into several individual baggies, indicating that he intended to distribute them. Although that amount is consistent with personal use and is significantly less than the amount he is charged with possessing and intending to distribute in the instant offense, the facts surrounding the 2003 incident are sufficiently similar to the charges underlying the instant case. We held in United States v. Jones, Nos. 91-6005, 91-6032, 1993 WL 11832, at  (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 1993) (unpublished), that the defendant's separation of 4.1 grams of crack cocaine into a number of smaller, precisely weighed allotments allowed the jury to infer the defendant's intent to distribute. And our opinion in United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 722 (6th Cir. 2002), suggests that where the Government seeks to introduce evidence of past possession of a small quantity of drugs in a case involving charges of possession with intent to distribute, the substantial-similarity test turns on whether the defendant intended to distribute the small quantity of drugs in the earlier incident. Nor does the 29-month gap between the prior incident and the events underlying the present offense render the 404(b) evidence inadmissible. This court has held that there is “no absolute maximum number of years that may separate a prior act and the offense charged[,]” United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1260 (6th Cir. 1985), and has allowed 404(b) evidence dating back many - 11 - Nos. 06-5810, 06-5811 United States v. Lofton and Black more than 29 months. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, No. 90-6400, 1993 WL 15102, at -4 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 1993) (unpublished) (3-4 years); Ismail, 756 F.3d at 1260 (up to 4 years). Finally, the probative value of the 2003 incident was not outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. This court “review[s] for abuse of discretion the district court’s determination that the ‘other acts’ evidence is more probative than prejudicial under Rule 403.” Comer, 93 F.3d at 1277. Although Black correctly argues that the availability of other evidence is a factor in Rule 403's balancing analysis, the testimony of Agent Price regarding quantities indicative of distribution was the only other evidence of intent in the present case. “The district court has broad discretion in balancing probative value against potential prejudicial impact.” Ismail, 756 F.2d at 1259. Black has not established that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the probative value of the 2003 incident was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Moreover, the district court properly instructed the jury regarding the use of such evidence, mitigating any potential prejudice. See United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1997). Consequently, Black’s 403 argument also fails.