Opinion ID: 1426933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Protection of Oklahoma's Free-Speech-and-Press Guarantee

Text: ¶ 13 Restraint upon free speech is prohibited by the terms of Art. 2 § 22, Okl. Const. [23] The State's free-speech-and-press guarantee protects the public by allowing issues to be freely and vigorously discussed. [24] There is a recognized need in a free, self-governing society for dissemination of information of fundamental importance to the people. [25] Without accurate media coverage and discussion of issues that are of governmental interest, it is doubtful that the general public would be able to make informed decisions and participate intelligently in their governance; nor would representatives of government be able to perform their assigned tasks effectively. [26] The protection of this activity is essential for an effective democracy. The fundamental law's free-speech-and-press components are intended to facilitate the functioning of a democratic government by protecting speech that relates to the self-governing process. ¶ 14 The phrase free speech is often equated with political speech. [27] The term political pertains to the policy or the administration of government or to the influence by which individuals of a state seek to determine or control its public policy. [28] Political speech is hence any expression concerning the ideas and art of governing. [29] Protected political speech is vital to self-government. It must be available without any governmental hindrance. There should be no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; nor should there be a threat of liability that causes self-censorship. [30] Protected speech not only encapsulates the rights of the speaker, but also those of the listener. [31] ¶ 15 The constitutional freedom of expression and discussion, if it is to fulfill its historic function, must embrace all issues about which information is needed (or appropriate) to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time. [32] Advocacy for or against a proposed law is the purest form of political speech. [33] The state cannot hence burden the free exchange of political ideas about the objective of an initiative proposal. [34] ¶ 16 The tension between the right to disseminate information to the public and the law of defamation is not new. It is mirrored in the eighteenth-century common law of England, [35] which developed the underpinnings for the constitutional immunity applied today. [36] Because the mere threat (or actual imposition) of liability may impair the unfettered exercise of free speech, [37] the constitution imposes stringent limitations upon its permissible scope. [38] The State can neither impede the exchange of ideas nor make that exchange costly through litigious action. Even the mere threat of unfounded liability would have a chilling effect on the discussion of public issues. [39] No less of a limitation is imposed when, as in this case, the action is taken by a private plaintiff under the aegis of state civil law. Civil actions by private parties will violate the free-speech guarantee when the discussion alleged to be defamatory concerns public issues and no unlawful activity occurs. [40] ¶ 17 The respondents argue that the speech in suit does not enjoy protected political speech status because there is no evidence that an initiative petition was actually being drafted. Their narrow approach is not the standard for gauging a publication's status as political speech. The speech complained of as libelous concerns the CALA group's interest in changing state tort law via the initiative method. The political process of popular lawmaking is clearly the subject of the petitioners' news articles and editorials. It is immaterial that an initiative petition had not been filed at the time of the CALA letter and of the articles' publication. This is so because advocacy that launches an initiative drive is an essential part of the political process designed ultimately to impact the government. If there is a rational connection between the communication or utterance complained of as defamatory and the author's quest for a political change, the communication should be viewed as protected political speech and a means of securing a change in the government's conduct of its business. While the so-called offending conduct may be injurious (or offensive) to the plaintiffs' interests, it nonetheless constitutes protected political speech which must be more jealously and intensely guarded than any other form of permissible expression. [41] [T]he public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers. [42] The law's protection of free expression recognizes no such thing as a false idea. [43] ¶ 18 Absent some element of clearly unlawful activity by the speaker, the State can neither punish political speech nor make its utterances costly by imposing civil liability. Under our system of government, no one can be made civilly responsible or accountable to the government for robustly pressing political views that others oppose with equal vigor. To allow a defamation action to continue once it has been determined that the speech concerned protected political ideas and did not incite lawless action is in itself a violation of the constitution. [44] ¶ 19 We recognize that the constitutional right to freedom of speech has never been considered absolute. [45] Federal and state defamation jurisprudence that implicates the freedom-of-speech protection recognizes exceptions to the constitutional guarantees. [46] The expression in contest here is not excluded from absolute protection by any exception to the time-honored fundamental-law principles. It is always a question for the court to determine as a matter of law whether a published statement is within the protected class of speech. [47] Courts must make an independent examination of the record to assure that their judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. [48] ¶ 20 A careful review of the publications in contest reveals constitutionally protected political speech. The respondents do not dispute that the two news reports [49] accurately reflect what was said by the persons quoted in the articles. In the news accounts no opinion is expressed about the topic of tort reform. Rather, what is given is a factual report of the proponents' and opponents' views of the initiative campaign to effect a change in the law. While the editorials certainly voice an opinion about the then-perceived legal system's tolerance for exaggerated damage claims, nothing in the writings targets (or is defamatory of) the plaintiffs or of the legal profession itself. ¶ 21 The petitioners here cannot be haled into court for utterances or written expressions that fall under the rubric of political speech. To impose civil liability for reporting and editorializing about a significant political movement advocating a change in the law would be a serious violation of the State's free-speech-and-press guarantee. [50] The constitutional safeguard operates to render the petitioners' pled conduct impervious to civil liability.