Opinion ID: 1436640
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Rule 1.5(e)(2) requires that the client be notified in writing of: (1) the identity of any counsel from another firm who will participate in the client's representation and share the fee; (2) the contemplated division of responsibility between the attorneys; and (3) the effect the engagement of a lawyer from another firm will have on the client's fee. Rule 1.5(e) was designed to encourage lawyers to affiliate other counsel, who are better equipped by reason of experience or specialized background to serve the client's needs.... D.C.RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.5(e), Cmt. para. 10. Moreover, the Rule emphasizes joint responsibility but ensures flexibility by not requiring a co-counsel to perform any minimum portion of the total services rendered. Id., para. 12. Undoubtedly, to minimize controversy and protest from the client, Rule 1.5(e), unlike its counterpart in the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, requires that the client be notified of the joint responsibility, in writing. Furthermore, it clearly [requires] that the client be informed [in writing] of the identity of lawyers sharing the fee, their respective responsibilities in the representation, and the effect of the association of lawyers outside on the fee charged. Id., para. 14. [2] The Board found that respondent did not comply with the requirement of notice in writing, but did arrange to have the client meet and confer with co-counsel on two occasions; and that he orally informed the client that co-counsel's fee would come from respondent's share of any settlement, judgment or jury award. However, the Board determined that the client never gained an understanding of [what] each lawyer would do. Bar Counsel contends that the Board's findings of fact are supported by record evidence. We agree. Respondent argues that his retainer agreement with the client not only was in writing but met most of the requirements of Rule 1.5(e)(2). The retainer agreement signed by the client does mention the retention of co-counsel, but it does not identify the name of the co-counsel. Other than indicating that co-counsel will represent the client, the retainer agreement is silent as to the division of responsibilities between respondent and co-counsel. Furthermore, there is no language in the retainer agreement which speaks to the effect of lawyers outside the firm on the fee to be charged. We conclude that the retainer agreement does not satisfy Rule 1.5(e)(2)'s requirement of notification in writing. Respondent admits that he did not send a copy of his letter retaining co-counsel to the client; [3] and the record is devoid of any evidence that the client was notified of the division of responsibility between respondent and co-counsel. Accordingly, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's factual findings. Respondent asserts that the weight of the evidence reveals substantial compliance with Rule 1.5(e)(2). He cites no District law to support his theory of substantial compliance, but calls our attention to cases in Illinois, which has a rule similar to the District's. [4] We need not decide whether substantial compliance would be enough to resist even an informal admonition because neither the Board nor we have found substantial compliance here: The only document arguably embodying the requirements of the rule was never sent to the client. Accordingly, we conclude that the Board did not err in its interpretation of Rule 1.5(e)(2). The Board's interpretation comports with the plain words of the rule. We turn next to respondent's argument that no punishment should have been imposed on him, including the informal admonition. We are bound to accept the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted. D.C.Bar R. XI, § 9(g)(1). This case is the first to arise under Rule 1.5(e)(2). Hence, there is no other case with which to compare the punishment imposed on respondent. However, the Board did examine sanctions imposed with respect to Rule 1.5(b) regarding the basis or rate of the fee to be charged to the client. After doing so, the Board concluded that: Since the effective date of the Rules in 1991, Bar Counsel has issued numerous informal admonitions to attorneys who failed to supply newly engaged clients the written disclosure of the basis or rate of the fee required by Rule 1.5(b). Nonetheless, respondent maintains that punishment is unwarranted because: Identical sanctions for analogous violations reveals nothing about the existence, absence or character of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. But it is clear that the Board did examine the mitigating factors in respondent's case, including his full cooperation with the investigation, his payment of the client's legal fees necessary to defend co-counsel's lawsuit against her, and the absence of any prior disciplinary record. It concluded that some minimal sanction, namely admonition, should be imposed. We agree. As this court said in In re L.R., 640 A.2d 697, 701 (D.C.1994): [W]hether respondent's conduct was reckless or somewhat less blameworthy, it trenched upon the statutory ban in a manner that justifies the issuance of an informal admonition. Accordingly, we affirm the Board's order [directing] that Bar Counsel issue an informal admonition, and.... further [directing] that any informal admonition reiterate the many mitigating factors discussed in the Board's order. [5] So ordered.