Opinion ID: 772699
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Smith's Responsibility for Additional 5.5 Grams of Crack Cocaine

Text: 29 When reviewing a district court's sentencing decision, this court will disturb theunderlying factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1481 (6th Cir. 1996)(citing 18 U.S.C. §3742(e)); United States v. Hamilton, 929 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir. 1991)); see United States v. Meacham, 27 F.3d 214, 216 (6th Cir. 1994) (reviewing a district court's factual findings regarding the amount of narcotics attributable to a defendant for clear error)). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when 'although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' United States v. Gort-Di-Donato, 109 F.3d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Perez, 871 F.2d 45, 48 (6th Cir. 1989)). 30 In order to calculate a base offense level using the sentencing guidelines, the sentencing court must consider those quantities of drugs not specified in the counts of conviction which were part of the same course of conduct or common plan or scheme. See Meacham, 27 F.3d at 216 (citing USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2); United States v. Zimmer, 14 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 1994)). Where the amount is uncertain, the court is urged to err on the side of caution and only hold the defendant responsible for the quantity of drugs for which the defendant is more likely than not actually responsible. Id. (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). The sentencing court's relevant conduct approximation must be based on reliable information and supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing USSG § 6A1.3(a)). 31 The district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 5.5 grams of cocaine recovered from the November 9, 1998 drug transaction was attributable to Defendant Smith. The court's determination was based upon the testimony of Officer Watts, an officer who worked with the MET. Officer Watts testified that he was personally familiar with Defendant Smith and Cornelius Ogletree. Officer Watts knew that Defendant Smith lived at 608 Walnut Street. Watts had used binoculars to observe the November 9, 1998 encounter with Defendant Smith at 608 Walnut. Officer Watts also heard the informant and Defendant Smith arrange the purchase of one-half ounce of crack cocaine for $500 through an audio recording device. The informant was told to return to 608 Walnut in appropriately thirty minutes, however, Officer Watts was unable to observe the interaction because he was unable to position himself at the surveillance point. Although he was unable to see the transaction, Officer Watts was able to hear the conversation between the informant and Defendant Smith through the audio recording device. Officer Watts testified that he heard the voices of the informant, Defendant Smith and Carter as they attempted to weigh the cocaine. Officer Watts also heard another co-defendant Joe Oglesby. The testimony of Officer Watts, the videotape and the audiotape of the November 9, 1998, were played for the district court at sentencing. 32 The district court found that the record showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant Smith was involved in the November 9, 1998 transaction. The district court stated: 33 I am satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Smith was involved in this transaction. I have to concede, along with Mr. Hudson, that neither the video nor the audiotapes are a model of clarity. However, I certainly could make out the name Michael, from Mr. Oglesby, in response to the question who is up there, from the confidential informant. 34 The officer who testified, Agent Watts, indicated that he knew MichaelSmith, knew his voice, saw him through a pair of binoculars, which gave him a better view of the person in the window with the distinctive yellow hat, and also recognized his voice. 35 The quality of the tape is poor, and the speed varies so that at times the voice sounds more like Mickey Mouse than it does anybody else than any of us, think, know in real life. But I still believe that the agent's testimony was credible in that he said he recognized Michael both visually and on the tape. He also indicated that he does know the so-called fat-man, Cornelius Ogletree, both by sight, and would recognize his voice, and that he did not see him or hear him in the course of this transaction. 36 And Mr. Smith has not adduced any testimony or evidence to contradict Agent Watts. And while Mr. Hudson [defense attorney] has made an heroic attempt to attack Agent Watts's credibility or observations, nevertheless, I think without success. 37 I am satisfied at least by a preponderance of the evidence, and actually probably more than that, that Mr. Smith was involved in this transaction. 38 (J.A. at 100-01.) 39 On appeal, Defendant Smith argues, that the district court should not have relied upon the audiotape. Defendant Smith contends that because the quality of the audiotape is poor the name Mike or Michael is hard to discern from the tape. Defendant Smith asserts that there is nothing to show that Defendant Smith is the Mike in question. It is Defendant Smith's position that the word fat which can be heard on the tape indicates that the person present at the transaction was the Fatman (Cornelius Ogletree). Defendant Smith contends that if the audio tape is not considered, the district court is left with nothing but Officer Watts' testimony to support its conclusion that Defendant Smith was present at the time of the November 9, 1998 drug transaction. Defendant Smith contends that the district court erred in solely relying upon the testimony of one officer in finding that Defendant Smith was present at the time of the drug transaction. Defendant Smith relies upon Meacham. 40 Meacham held that the district court had clearly erred in relying upon the testimony from a single officer in determining the amount of drugs attributable to the defendants for sentencing purposes. However, Meacham did not base its holding solely on this premise. The Meacham court was most troubled by the district court's failure to make an individualized inquiry into the nature of the defendants' involvement in the conspiracy when the court determined the amount of drugs attributable to defendants. See 27 F.3d at 217. The court stated specifically that: 41 While troubled by the somewhat speculative nature of the court's quantity calculation, we are most disturbed by the fact that the district court failed to make individualized findings regarding the scope of the conspiracy and the duration and nature of each defendant's participation in the scheme. The court held a single hearing at which a lone government witness testified, then indiscriminately imported its factual findings concerning the amount of narcotics for which Jones was responsible into the Meacham and Botello sentencing calculus. Apparently, the district court simply assumed that Meacham and Botello were to be held accountable for all narcotics channeled through the conspiracy. In doing so, the court erred. Id. 42 It was the failure of the district court to differentiate between co-conspirators, not the reliance upon the government'ssingle witness that this Court found clearly erroneous. 43 In the case at bar, the district court did not engage in speculation when calculating the amount of drugs attributable to Defendant Smith. The court made the individualized inquiry into Smith's involvement in the November 9, 1998 drug transaction that we found lacking in Meacham. The district court viewed all the available evidence. The court viewed the videotape, listened to the audiotape, and heard testimony from Officer Watts (who was familiar with Defendant Smith) that he heard Defendant Smith's voice on the audiotape. The district court's findings are distinguishable from the assumptions made by the district court in Meacham. Given the entire record, the district court clearly did not err in attributing the 5.5 grams of crack cocaine to Defendant Smith for sentencing purposes. The findings of the district court as to the amount of drugs attributable to Defendant Smith for sentencing purposes were not clearly erroneous.