Opinion ID: 2198259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Waiver of the Right to be Present

Text: A defendant may normally waive a right either personally or through his or her counsel. The common law exhibited a strong presumption against the waiver of the right to be present in criminal cases. [17] It was thought `contrary to the dictates of humanity to let a prisoner waive that advantage to which a view of his sad plight might give him by inclining the hearts of the jurors to listen to his defence with indulgence.' [18] Both the federal Rule 43 and its Delaware equivalent have, however, since modified this rule. We will first address whether Bradshaw waived his right to be present personally. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right [19] and it can either be express or implied. Rule 43(c)(2) addresses express waiver, and allows it if the consent is written and if the potential punishment does not exceed one year in prison. [20] There is no evidence here that Bradshaw expressly waived his right to be present. Rule 43(b) addresses implied waiver, providing, The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present ... [i]s voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced.... [21] Federal courts have interpreted the comparable federal rule to require both that a defendant's absence be voluntary and that it be significant enough to impede [t]he further progress of the trial.... [22] We cannot say on this record that Bradshaw's absence was voluntary in the sense that it constituted a knowing waiver of his right to be present at trial. In the Rule 43 scenario in which a defendant flees from a courtroom in the midst of a trial  where judge, jury, witnesses and lawyers are present and ready to continue  waiver is implied because a reasonable defendant would know that as a consequence the trial could continue in his absence. [23] Here, the trial judge waited fifteen minutes before proceeding. Furthermore, this was not the presentation stage of the trial  the jury had been deliberating uneventfully for almost the entire day. Finally, the record is not inconsistent with the supposition that Bradshaw was taking a long restroom break, or that he was getting food. There is no basis in this record to infer that Bradshaw would have known that his actions would constitute waiver of his right to be present. Furthermore, we cannot say that Bradshaw's absence prevented [t]he further progress of the trial.... [24] When a defendant is voluntarily absent, federal courts have considered a list of factors in determining whether the trial should proceed without a defendant, including the likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the defendant present; the difficulty of rescheduling; ... [and] the burden on the Government. [25] There was no evidence that the trial judge or counsel on either side even touched upon these commonsense considerations. Here, the jury had already been deliberating most of the day. The court could have waited longer for Bradshaw that afternoon, or it could have continued proceedings until the next day. Indeed, the jury deliberated into the following afternoon in any event. Then the proceedings could have taken place with Bradshaw, and both the burden on the State and the difficulties of rescheduling would have been minimal. Cases finding implied waiver upon voluntary absence usually involve absences of a whole day or more, [26] or where the defendant can be said to have fled. [27] Even extreme cases finding waiver are distinguishable. [28] We need not determine how long the trial judge should have waited. It is sufficient to say that she did not wait long enough in this case. Bradshaw's counsel affirmatively joined the State's request for an Allen charge. But he had no authority to do so. When counsel for a defendant expressly waives an objection, instead of merely not making one, this Court generally may not exercise review. [29] Action by a defendant's counsel, however, may not constitute waiver when a defendant must personally waive a right. [30] The general rule is that the right to be present is a right that is personal to a defendant, and may not be waived by that defendant's counsel. [31] Some courts hold that counsel may waive this right in misdemeanor cases, [32] while others hold that such waivers are effective only in misdemeanor cases that do not involve possible imprisonment. [33] All three of Bradshaw's charges were felonies. The State has not pointed out, and this Court has not discovered, any case that would permit counsel to waive a defendant's right to be present under the circumstances of this case. In Crosby v. United States, [34] the United States Supreme Court ruled that the federal version of Rule 43 contains an exclusive list of the ways in which the right to be present may be waived. [35] Delaware Rule 43 provides that a defendant's presence is required ... except as otherwise provided by this rule. [36] Although Rule 43 provides for a defendant's written waiver under certain circumstances, [37] it makes no provision for a waiver by counsel. The implication, at least, is that counsel cannot waive this right. The Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct also suggest that Bradshaw's counsel did not have the authority to waive this right. Rule 1.2(a) states, A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. [38] In a criminal case, Rule 1.2(a) states that a lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. [39] In distinguishing between objectives and means, the Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct distinguish between certain fundamental rights in a criminal case and decisions that involve tactics and trial strategy. [40] These fundamental rights may include the rights specified in Rule 1.2(a) as well as others, including the decision to forego other appeals and accept the death penalty, [41] whether to waive counsel, [42] and whether to appeal. [43] Given the strong common law presumption against waiver of the right to be present, it would seem that this is such a right as well. The decision to deny the jury a view of the defendant's sad plight, [44] or to choose to encourage this jury to come to a decision rather than to prefer a new trial, seems as fundamental as the decision whether to waive a jury trial. Moreover, a lawyer has a duty to reasonably consult with his or her client even as to trial tactics and strategy. [45] Here, the State conceded at oral argument in this Court that there was no valid reason why Bradshaw's counsel could not have waited to consult with his client before proceeding.