Opinion ID: 1154523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: motions considered

Text: Bank's motion. Seattle-First requests the following: (1) dismissal of this appeal and unconditional termination of review of this matter as it pertains to the bank; (2) an affirmation of the trial court's removal of Holman; and (3) judgment against Holman for Seattle-First's costs and attorney's fees. While originally named as a defendant in this proceeding, Seattle-First settled with the plaintiffs before trial. The bank did appear at the removal hearing to argue for Holman's removal because his individual status as judgment debtor to the trust conflicted with his trustee's role as judgment creditor on behalf of the trust. On April 10, 1985, Holman filed an amended notice of appeal (not found in the record) naming Seattle-First as a party. Holman's brief filed December 12, 1985, raises no assignment of error or legal issue that involves the bank. Holman does not respond to this motion and there is no good reason to deny it. Holman gives no reason for having included the bank on appeal. His case appears frivolous with regard to the bank. Unable to discern any reason for Holman's having included the bank on appeal, the bank's theory seems credible that Holman is using the appeal process to delay execution on the judgments against him. We hold for the bank. Holman's motions to correct and supplement the record. Holman states that plaintiff's second supplemental answers to Holman's second set of interrogatories and requests for admissions formally discloses Osborn's identity as an expert witness and was filed on the day of trial. Beneficiaries did not oppose this motion, noting only that Holman was made aware of Osborn's expert testimony 3 days before trial in accord with the parties' agreement. The motion is granted and does not affect the outcome of the case. Holman also asks the court to accept a pleading filed May 9, 1986, in a separate, but related, case, Seattle-First National Bank v. General Accident Insurance Company and William & Emily Holman, King County cause XX-X-XXXXX-X. The pleading, plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, involves the plaintiffs' counsel's characterization of the trial court's findings in the present case. Reflecting plaintiffs' counsel's interest in recovering insurance proceeds to compensate for Holman's pending bankruptcy, the characterization is more gentle to Holman than is the one found in Beneficiaries' brief to this court. Beneficiaries request that the court deny this part of the motion. They point out that (1) the document is a pleading, not testimony or evidence; (2) that the document, by its nature, could not have been before the trial court when it made its decision; and (3) that it does not meet the requirements of RAP 9.11 which provides: (a) Remedy Limited. The appellate court may direct that additional evidence be taken before the decision of a case on review if: (1) additional proof of facts is needed to fairly resolve the issues on review, (2) the additional evidence would probably change the decision being reviewed, (3) it is equitable to excuse a party's failure to present the evidence to the trial court, (4) the remedy available to a party through postjudgment motions in the trial court is inadequate or unnecessarily expensive, (5) the appellate court remedy of granting a new trial is inadequate or unnecessarily expensive, and (6) it would be inequitable to decide the case solely on the evidence already taken in the trial court. (b) Where Taken. The appellate court will ordinarily direct the trial court to take additional evidence and find the facts based on that evidence. The remedy, RAP 9.11(b), underscores Beneficiaries' objection. If this court were to grant the motion, the trial court would be expected to reweigh all the testimony and evidence it had considered in light of a characterization of its original findings of fact. The motion is denied, any inconsistency between statements made in or about this case and the subsequent malpractice insurance case only raises collateral estoppel issues in the later case. We affirm the trial court. We also grant Seattle-First's motion and Holman's first motion to supplement the record with plaintiff's answers to defendant's interrogatories. We deny Holman's second motion to supplement the record with pleadings from the separate malpractice insurance case. PEARSON, C.J., BRACHTENBACH, ANDERSEN, GOODLOE, and DURHAM, JJ., and SKIMAS, J. Pro Tem., concur. DORE, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part) I agree with the majority that Holman's fees were excessive and that he should be removed as cotrustee of the Stuart trusts. I also agree that Holman should pay the attorney fees incurred by the plaintiffs and beneficiaries because of his breach of fiduciary duty to the trust. I believe that the majority errs, however, in granting the cotrustee, Seattle-First National Bank, its attorney fees on appeal. Majority, at 717-18. Seattle-First was originally a defendant in this case, but settled with the beneficiaries prior to trial and at trial testified on their behalf. A judgment against Holman was entered in favor of the trust (in the name of the cotrustees) and Holman was removed as a cotrustee. Holman appealed both the judgment and his removal, and Seattle-First argues that it should not have been named as a respondent. Moreover, Seattle-First argues that the sole purpose of its being named a party to this appeal was to delay execution of the judgment, and pursuant to RCW 4.84.185 it should receive its attorney fees for the costs of answering this appeal. The majority grants those fees, which I believe is error. RCW 4.84.185 sets forth the only grounds on which Seattle-First relies for this award: In any civil action, the court having jurisdiction may, upon final judgment and written findings by the trial judge that the action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause, require the nonprevailing party to pay the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred in opposing such action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense. This determination shall be made upon post-trial motion, and the trial judge shall consider the action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense as a whole. This statute does not authorize the granting of fees for appellate court decisions, and cannot be a justification for this court to award Seattle-First the costs of this appeal. Thus, the majority awards attorney fees to Seattle-First without authority. Furthermore, Seattle-First argues that the only purpose in its being named a party on appeal was to prevent it from executing its judgment (as cotrustee) against Holman. This is incorrect. RAP 8.1 states that a party may delay execution of judgment by filing of a supersedeas bond. Failure to file such a bond allows a successful party to execute on its judgment in all but a few cases not relevant here. Holman has not filed such a bond. Seattle-First was free at all times to execute on the original judgment. Therefore, I would not allow the bank to recover over $4,000 in attorney fees for the cost of this appeal. Seattle-First has not advanced any theory which would justify such an award, and has not presented any argument as to why Holman is using this appeal solely as a vehicle for delay. I would deny Seattle-First attorney fees for this appeal. HAMILTON, J. Pro Tem., concurs with DORE, J. Reconsideration denied May 19, 1987.