Opinion ID: 1907308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of Tedder Standard

Text: In the final claim of his habeas petition, Marshall alleges that Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla.1975), which allows the trial judge to override a jury recommendation in capital cases, was arbitrarily applied in this case based on language found in Keen v. State, 775 So.2d 263 (Fla.2000). In Tedder, this Court held that [i]n order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. Tedder, 322 So.2d at 910. More recently, this Court in Keen reiterated the proper analysis for a Tedder inquiry: The singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is `a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's recommendation of life,' rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death recommendation. Keen, 775 So.2d at 283-84 (citation omitted). The Court further explained that the jury's life recommendation changes the analytical dynamic and magnifies the ultimate effect of mitigation on the defendant's sentence. Id. at 285. In Mills v. Moore, 786 So.2d 532 (Fla. 2001), this Court rejected an argument similar to the one currently raised by Marshall. In so doing, this Court stated: While conceding that Keen is not new law, Mills nonetheless argues that Keen's application of Tedder constitutes a new standard by which jury override cases are reviewed. Keen is not a major constitutional change or jurisprudential upheaval of the law as it was espoused in Tedder. Keen offers no new or different standard for considering jury overrides on appeal. Thus, we disagree with Mills' contention that Keen offers a new standard of law and we reject the contention that Keen was anything more than an application of our long-standing Tedder analysis. Tedder is the seminal case in Florida on jury overrides and remains so after Keen. Tedder was applied to this case. Keen provides no basis for our reconsideration of this issue. Id. at 539-40. In the instant case, we reviewed the propriety of the trial court's override on direct appeal under the standard set forth in Tedder. In particular, this Court explained: Marshall next alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Marshall to death where the jury had made a recommendation of life imprisonment. It is well settled in Florida that a judge imposing sentence in a capital case must accord the jury recommendation great weight. E.g., Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975). Where a jury has recommended a life sentence, the court must follow that recommendation unless the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. Id. Where the record contains no evidence supporting a life recommendation, the trial court does not err in declining to follow that recommendation. In this case, the record contains insufficient evidence to reasonably support the jury's recommendation of life. Marshall's father was unable to attend the trial, but the defense and prosecution stipulated that he would have testified that Marshall did well in school until his early teens when his older brother influenced him to run the streets and break the law; that Marshall's mother did not discipline Marshall and allowed him to believe there would be no consequences for his behavior; and that Marshall's father loved him and requested a life sentence for his son. The trial court determined these facts were not mitigating, but did find Marshall's behavior at trial as well as his entering prison at a young age to be mitigating. We find no error in the court's assessment of this mitigation and conclude that it does not provide a reasonable basis for the jury's recommendation of life in this case. Even viewing this mitigation in the light most favorable to Marshall, it pales in significance when weighed against the four statutory aggravating circumstances, including Marshall's record of violent felonies consisting of kidnapping, sexual battery, and seven armed robberies. Furthermore, defense counsel's argument composed largely of a negative characterization of the victim does not provide a reasonable basis for the jury's life recommendation. Moreover, contrary to Marshall's assertion, the facts surrounding the murder do not suggest that the murder was committed in self defense or in a fit of rage. The witnesses heard muffled screams and moans emanating from the victim's cell and observed Marshall leaving the cell with what appeared to be blood on his chest and arms. Within a few minutes, Marshall reentered the cell and similar noises were again heard. The victim was found lying face down with his hands bound behind his back and his ankles were restrained. The victim received no less than twenty-five separate wounds and blood was sprayed and splattered about the cell. Death was caused by blows to the back of his head. Nothing in these facts supports the notion that Marshall acted in self defense or that he simply killed the victim in the heat of a fight. We thus conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the facts supporting the death sentence to be so clear and convincing that no reasonable person could differ. See Tedder, 322 So.2d at 910. Marshall, 604 So.2d at 805-06. Accordingly, as in Mills, this claim provides no basis for relief.