Opinion ID: 445428
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of the Delay

Text: 15 CAB first began receiving applications for section 43 benefits in January 1979. 21 For several years, no direct action was taken on these applications. The Board did set out preliminary orders which interpreted section 43 and set guidelines for the Administrative Law Judges. 22 However, as of October 1983, the time of the filing of ALPA's complaint, no hearings had been held on any of the applications. 23 In May 1984 CAB scheduled evidentiary hearings, over five years after it first received applications. As of the time of oral arguments in this case, one of those hearings had been completed, with no disposition yet by the Board. 24 16 This Court has decided several cases involving claims of unreasonable delay. 25 5] None of these cases contains a generic test for determining whether agency action has been unreasonably delayed. That is a result of the necessary flexibility of the core concept--reasonableness. In most areas of the law, the question of reasonableness is closely tied to the particular facts of the case. 26 The same is true of any analysis of a claim of unreasonable delay. Each case must be analyzed according to its own unique circumstances. Some agency action will have a timetable mandated by statute. 27 Other action will take place under difficult circumstances for the agency. For example, in this case the question of reasonableness must be placed in the context of CAB's eminent demise on 31 December 1984, with the consequence that CAB's workforce has been steadily diminishing. 28 Each case will present its own slightly different set of factors to consider. 17 However, a five year delay in adjudicating claims for a form of unemployment assistance payments would be difficult under any set of circumstances. As we have explained elsewhere, delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake. 29 In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, we explained that many of the same considerations that impelled judicial protection of the right to a 'speedy trial' in criminal cases or implementation of civil decrees with all deliberate speed are not inapposite in agency deliberations. 30 In the MCI case, involving review of tariff revisions under 47 U.S.C. Sec. 204, we found a four year delay to be unreasonable. 31 The task before the agency in this case is no more complex than the task the FCC faced in MCI. Neither do any other of the relevant considerations in this case adequately excuse the agency. Viewing the five year delay in this case against the backdrop of all the relevant factual circumstances, we find that CAB has unreasonably delayed acting on the applications for section 43 determination. 18 Consistent with this holding, we have previously requested CAB to furnish us with the dates by which it intends to reach a decision on those applications received prior to 1 September 1983. CAB has responded, informing the Court that it will be unable to reach a final decision with respect to any of the pending applications before the Board goes out of existence on December 31, 1984. 32 It appears that even in the one hearing which has been completed, the administrative law judge will not reach his decision in time for CAB to act. All other applications have yet to pass through the hearing process before an Administrative Law Judge. CAB estimates that the time required for even an expedited hearing process would be several months. In addition, section 43 of the Air Line Deregulation Act has recently been declared unconstitutional by the District Court for the District of Columbia 33 because of the presence of a legislative veto provision. Several parties have proposed stays of their proceedings until the constitutionality of section 43 is resolved. The Board has granted some of those motions and is considering staying all such proceedings. 19 Given the unique circumstances of termination of the agency, together with the stays related to the legislative veto issue, this Court will not follow up its finding of unreasonable delay with any further order that CAB act before 31 December 1984. That would be the judicial equivalent of spurring a dead horse, or at least a dying one. Rather than require a specific date of disposition, this Court will retain jurisdiction over this case, and order CAB to give an accounting of its progress on the section 43 determinations every 30 days, beginning 30 days from the issuance of this opinion, through 31 December 1984. 20 On 1 January 1985 CAB will go out of existence, and its authority under section 43 will be transferred to the Department of Transportation. 34 However, we see no reason why that should return us to the days of Snyder v. Buck. 35 Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the automatic substitution of public officers upon their death or separation from office. 36 In ALPA's original complaint in federal district court, ALPA sued the Civil Aeronautics Board and the individual members by name. According to the terms of Rule 25(d), when a public officer ceases to hold office during the pendency of an action, the action does not abate and his successor is automatically substituted as a party. 37 In this case the successors will be the designated officials of the Department of Transportation. At this point in time, it is not possible to state with certainty who those officials will be in January of next year. That does not alter the fact that this substitution will occur automatically, by force of law. ALPA may make a motion for an order of substitution at that time, designating the proper officials. We stress once again that irrespective of any formal order, this substitution is automatic, with no lapse in jurisdiction. 21 Since the Rule makes substitution automatic, it does away with the former Rule's requirement of a showing of substantial need for continuing and maintaining the action. As the Advisory Committee Note to the 1963 amendment says, where the successor does not intend to pursue the policy of his predecessor which gave rise to the lawsuit, it will be open to him, after substitution ... to take ... appropriate steps to avert a judgment or decree. 38 The Department of Transportation will receive these cases under a holding that CAB, the predecessor-defendant, has unreasonably delayed agency action. We will expect that, following automatic substitution as a respondent on 1 January 1985, the Department of Transportation be prepared to inform this Court of the manner in which it intends to expedite resolution of these claims.