Opinion ID: 2642473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: based on the overwhelming evidence of mr.

Text: PEREA’S GUILT, WE HOLD THAT THE DISTRICT COURT’S ERRORS WERE HARMLESS AND THAT THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY ¶99 Even if the district court did err, we will not reverse if that error was harmless. See State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ¶ 48, 20 P.3d 271. “In order to show that the error is harmful, [Mr. Perea] must demonstrate that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [him], or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined.” State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, ¶ 18, 34 P.3d 187 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the doctrine of cumulative error is applicable “only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines . . . confidence that a fair trial was had.” State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, ¶ 39, 220 P.3d 136. It is a doctrine used when a single error may not constitute grounds for reversal, but many errors, when taken collectively, nonetheless undermine confidence in the fairness of a trial. A. Individually, the District Court’s Errors Are Harmless ¶100 We have concluded that the district erred when it limited the testimony of Mr. Gaskill and chose not to admit the proposed 30 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court testimony of Dr. Ofshe. But the potential harm of each error must be viewed against the backdrop of the entire body of evidence. And when so viewed, the errors were harmless. ¶101 There was significant testimony from witnesses both inside and outside of the SUV stating that Mr. Perea was the individual who fired shots into the crowd at Mr. Nava’s house. Angelo Gallegos and Elias Garcia, both passengers in the SUV and friends of Mr. Perea, testified that Mr. Perea fired shots from the SUV as it pulled away from the party. Similarly, Ms. Valencia, who was standing near the street and knew Mr. Perea, testified that as the SUV pulled away, “I seen [him] over the top, shooting.” Two other party guests, Richard Esquivel and Lacey Randall, testified that they saw someone from the passenger side of the SUV lean over the roof and fire towards Mr. Nava’s house. And Keri Garcia, who was standing in Mr. Nava’s driveway when the shots from the SUV were fired, testified that the shots came only from the direction of the road. ¶102 Additionally, during questioning, Mr. Perea volunteered that the gun he had used was .22 caliber, a fact that the police had not shared with the public. Although the murder weapon was not recovered, police investigators recovered ten expended .22 caliber shell casings in the street in front of Mr. Nava’s house, all fired from the same weapon. Likewise, the bullets from Ms. Prieto’s and Mr. Navarez’s bodies were .22 caliber. No other shell casings were found at the crime scene. 1. The District Court’s Exclusion of Mr. Gaskill’s Animations Was Harmless ¶103 While the district court excluded Mr. Gaskill’s computergenerated animations, it did not exclude his expert testimony on which the animations were based. It allowed him to opine as to his theory that there were multiple shooters and that the location of some of the injuries made it unlikely that Mr. Perea could have made the shots. He was allowed to refer to diagrams depicting the scene and demonstrate the bullet trajectories that gave him concern. And although Mr. Gaskill’s theories conflicted with the State’s theory and the testimony of many of the State’s witnesses, the district court appropriately allowed him to present his theory to the jury. ¶104 After having reviewed both the testimony provided by Mr. Gaskill and his proffered animations, we hold that the exclusion of the animations does not create the “reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant.” Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 31 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court 79, ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). The animations were short, provided nothing that Mr. Gaskill did not make clear in his testimony, and used a perspective that was unhelpful in putting Mr. Gaskill’s testimony in context. Because Mr. Gaskill was allowed to fully testify as to his multiple-shooter theory and cast doubt on the State’s single-shooter theory, the exclusion of the animations does not undermine our confidence in the verdict. 2. The District Court’s Exclusion of Dr. Ofshe’s Testimony Was Harmless ¶105 We next evaluate any prejudice arising from the erroneous exclusion of Dr. Ofshe’s testimony. We begin by noting that the district court did not err in admitting Mr. Perea’s confession. Even had the district court allowed Dr. Ofshe to testify, the jury would have been entitled to consider Mr. Perea’s confession. Nor did it err in ruling that Dr. Ofshe could not testify as to the veracity of Mr. Perea’s confession. Rather, its only error consisted in barring Dr. Ofshe’s proffered testimony about the factors that may contribute to false confessions. We find this error to be harmless because of the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Perea’s guilt. ¶106 Multiple individuals who knew Mr. Perea testified that he shot into the crowd. Indeed, the defense’s theory was not based on Mr. Perea’s exclusion from the crime but on a multiple-shooter theory. Thus, the exclusion of testimony that would have merely cast doubt on Mr. Perea’s confession does not undermine our confidence in the verdict. Had this been a case like Clopten, in which the evidence of guilt was circumstantial and there were significant issues with eyewitness identification, the exclusion of Dr. Ofshe’s testimony would be more concerning. In that case, the admission of an unrebutted confession would have the potential to overwhelm any other evidence of innocence. But here, where there was substantial, independent evidence of Mr. Perea’s guilt and his primary defense did not necessarily absolve him of the crime, the admission of Dr. Ofshe’s proposed testimony was unlikely to change the outcome of the trial. B. The District Court’s Errors Do Not Constitute Cumulative Error ¶107 Having concluded that the district court’s errors were harmless individually, we now evaluate their cumulative effect on our confidence in the verdict. Cumulative error is applicable in those instances where the district court’s collective errors rise to a level that undermine our confidence in the fairness of the proceed- 32 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court ings. But that analysis cannot be conducted in a vacuum, ignorant of the other evidence demonstrating guilt. ¶108 The body of evidence established that Mr. Perea was at the crime scene that evening. It left no doubt that he was in the vehicle from which a number of witnesses testified the shots came. Those witnesses, two of whom were present in the vehicle, testified that it was Mr. Perea who fired shots into the crowd at Mr. Nava’s house. The two witnesses who were in the SUV, and at least one of whom witnessed the shooting from Mr. Nava’s front yard, were personally familiar with Mr. Perea—he was not a nameless, faceless defendant to them. And, Mr. Perea’s knowledge of the type of weapon used in the shooting and the physical evidence at the crime scene provides further evidence that the jury could consider in evaluating his guilt. Finally, Mr. Perea’s confession was evidence that the jury was entitled to consider. ¶109 When viewed against the eyewitness testimony, the physical evidence, and Mr. Perea’s confession, we cannot say that the district court’s individual errors rise to the level of cumulative error. Where there is overwhelming evidence that Mr. Perea shot into the crowd, the exclusion of the expert testimony at issue does not undermine our confidence in the overall fairness of the proceedings or the jury’s verdict. VI. MR. PEREA’S SENTENCE OF LWOP IS CONSTITUTIONAL ¶110 Utah Code section 76-3-207.7 provides that “[a] person who has pled guilty to or been convicted of first degree felony aggravated murder . . . shall be sentenced by the court . . . [to] life in prison without parole or an indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be for life.” ¶111 Mr. Perea argues that section 76-3-207.7 violates the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution in a number of ways. First, he argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. He next argues that the statute violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Utah Constitution and the federal constitution and that it runs afoul of the uniform operation of laws provisions of the Utah Constitution. Finally, he argues that his sentence violates the unnecessary rigor provision of the Utah Constitution and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the federal constitution. We find these arguments unavailing and conclude that section 76-3-207.7 is constitutional on its face and as applied to Mr. Perea. 33 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court A. Utah Code Section 76-3-207.7 Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague ¶112 Because Utah Code section 76-3-207.7 does not list the factors a sentencing court must consider when deciding whether to impose a sentence of 25 years to life or LWOP, Mr. Perea argues that it is unconstitutionally vague. Unconstitutionally vague laws violate the due process prohibition that no one “may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a statute may be unconstitutionally vague if written in a way that “authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). ¶113 In arguing that section 76-3-207.7 is unconstitutionally vague, Mr. Perea cites primarily to cases where courts have overturned statutes that did not adequately explain the criminal act. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (holding that a city’s loitering statute was unconstitutionally vague because it gave officers unfettered discretion to criminalize otherwise lawful behavior). Although it is well settled that statutes must clearly articulate the behavior that they proscribe, there are far fewer cases in which vague sentencing guidelines have been overturned. Even so, the U. S. Supreme Court has made clear that “vague sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute.” Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123. ¶114 We conclude that Section 76-3-207.7 does not suffer from such an infirmity. It states clearly that a defendant convicted of noncapital first-degree felony aggravated murder may be incarcerated for a term up to and including the rest of his life. While it also holds out the possibility of a more lenient sentence of 25 years to life, the fact that the sentencing court may choose to impose the more lenient sentence does not render the statute unconstitutional. Sentencing courts have long been afforded broad discretion in sentencing. And when section 76-3-207.7 is read in the context of Utah’s sentencing scheme as a whole, we conclude that it provides sufficient guidance to withstand Mr. Perea’s facial vagueness challenge. We further conclude that it was not unconstitutionally applied to Mr. Perea. ¶115 District courts have historically been afforded broad discretion when it comes to sentencing. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated: [Although t]ribunals passing on the guilt of a defen34 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court dant always have been hedged in by strict evidentiary procedural limitations . . . both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949).19 ¶116 So long as a statute clearly specifies the maximum allowable penalty, it is not unconstitutional for sentencing judges to exercise their discretion in offering leniency. See State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986) (stating that this court will overturn a sentence that is within the statutorily prescribed range only for an abuse of discretion). For example, sentencing judges may choose to suspend all or part of a sentence. See UTAH CODE § 77-18-1(2)(a); Williams v. Harris, 149 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1944) (noting that “[t]he right to suspend imposition of sentence . . . is a discretionary right”). Even under Utah’s indeterminate sentencing scheme, where the actual time served by any particular defendant is determined by the Board of Pardons, sentencing judges are given discretion to sentence a defendant as if he had been convicted of the next lower degree of offense. UTAH CODE § 76-3-402(1).20 And we can find no authority 19 See also State v. Shuler, 780 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a sentencing court may consider a defendant’s “criminal character and history” despite the absence of prior convictions); State v. Huey, 505 A.2d 1242, 1245–46 (Conn. 1986) (finding that a sentencing court may consider prior indictments, uncharged allegations, dismissed counts, and acquittals); Smith v. State, 517 A.2d 1081, 1083 (Md. 1986) (holding that a sentencing judge may consider “the facts and circumstances of the crime itself and the background of the individual convicted of committing the crime”). 20 Utah Code section 76-3-402(1) provides that if “the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the defendant . . . concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute, the court may enter a judgment of conviction for (continued...) 35 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court to support the notion that a sentencing judge’s statutory authority to grant leniency renders a sentencing statute unconstitutional. ¶117 Mr. Perea argues that section 76-3-207.7 is impermissibly vague because it does not specify the particular items the sentencing court must consider in deciding which of the two possible sentences to impose. We are unpersuaded. Section 76-3-207.7 must be read in the context of Utah’s sentencing scheme as a whole. To give full effect to the Legislature’s intent, we construe statutes in harmony “with other statutes under the same and related chapters.” Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶ 17, 5 P.3d 616. And, when read in context, the statutory scheme provides adequate guidance to sentencing courts. Utah Code section 76-1-104 provides that “[t]he provisions of [the criminal] code shall be construed . . . [to p]revent arbitrary or oppressive treatment . . . [and to p]rescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition o[f] differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders.” Section 76-1-106 reinforces section 76-1-104 by providing that “[a]ll provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be construed . . . to effect the objects of the law and general purposes of [s]ection 76-1-104.” When read in harmony, these provisions make clear that a sentencing court is to consider all the evidence before it—the totality of the circumstances—in imposing a sentence that is proportionate to the crime and the culpability of the defendant. ¶ 118 The notion that a sentencing court consider the totality of the circumstances in determining a proportionate sentence is also supported by our evidentiary rules. Rule 1101(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that our evidentiary rules do not apply during sentencing, opening the door to the court’s evaluation of a variety of factors. See also State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986) (A sentencing court “must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably may bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant, given the crime committed.” (quoting Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984)). Because our rules do not constrain the introduction of any evidence tending to inform the court’s determination, it is not incumbent upon the statute to enumerate the factors the sentencing judge may or must consider. 20 (...continued) the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.” 36 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court ¶119 Indeed, it has only been in capital cases that we have required an explicit weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 130, 20 P.3d 342 (reiterating the district court’s obligation to weigh the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in a capital case); State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1027 (Utah 1989) (stating that the “first step” in a capital sentencing evaluation is “to determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah 1982) (holding that the capital sentencing standards “require that the sentencing body compare the totality of the mitigating against the totality of the aggravating factors”). Absent statutorily articulated aggravating and mitigating circumstances in noncapital cases, courts have historically based their sentencing decisions on the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ¶ 59, 191 P.3d 17 (stating that “courts must consider all legally relevant factors in making a sentencing decision”); State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980) (“A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which underlie the criminal justice system.”). ¶120 And that is exactly what the district court did here. Specifically, the district court found that Mr. Perea's relative youth, his poor educational background, and his borderline IQ/learning disability constituted mitigating factors. But the district court found that there were a wealth of aggravating factors to offset these considerations, including the multiple young victims, the fact that Mr. Perea fired ten shots into a large group of partygoers, and Mr. Perea’s lengthy prior criminal record. ¶121 Because district courts are “in the best position to ensure that justice is done and to determine whether any ‘[o]ne factor in mitigation or aggravation [should] weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale,’” they are “allowed a great deal of discretion in determining the relative weight of competing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, ¶ 9, 113 P.3d 992 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990)). And as here, where the district court considered the totality of the circumstances and explicitly weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors, we are not persuaded that it abused its discretion or applied the statute in an unconstitutional fashion. 37 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court B. Mr. Perea’s Argument That Utah Code Section 76-3-207.7 Violates the Due Process Protections of the Utah and United States Constitutions Is Inadequately Briefed ¶122 Mr. Perea next argues that section 76-3-207.7 violates the due process protections contained within the Utah and United States Constitutions. While he cites to relevant constitutional provisions, he provides absolutely no analysis as to how those provisions render his sentence unconstitutional. Because an issue is inadequately briefed “when it merely contains bald citation[s] to authority [without] development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority,” Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ¶ 46, 70 P.3d 904 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), we decline to address Mr. Perea’s assertion that section 76-3-207.7 violates his due process rights. C. Utah Code Section 76-3-207.7 Does Not Violate the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision ¶123 Mr. Perea argues that section 76-3-207.7 violates the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution. Article 1, section 24 of the Utah Constitution requires that “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.” Under the uniform operation of laws provision, a statute must be “uniform on its face.” State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995). Further, it “is critical that the operation of the [statute] be uniform,” such that similarly situated people are treated similarly under the statute. Id. (emphasis in original). ¶124 Our analysis under the uniform operation of laws provision requires that we first “determine what classifications, if any, are created by the statute.” Id. We must then analyze “whether different classes or subclasses are treated disparately. Finally, if any disparate treatment exists between classes or subclasses, we must determine whether the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.” Id. Mr. Perea asserts that section 76-3-207.7 divides the general class made up of those found guilty of aggravated murder into two subclasses based on the sentence imposed by the district court. He then asserts that the disparate treatment between those sentenced to 25 years to life and those sentenced to LWOP is not justified because the statute fails to provide guidance to the district court. ¶125 We disagree. Not all those found guilty of aggravated murder are similarly situated. While all are found guilty of the same crime, each case and each defendant presents a different set of facts 38 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court and a different combination of aggravating and mitigating factors. The discretion afforded to district courts furthers the legitimate legislative purpose of sentencing offenders based on the totality of the unique circumstances present in each case. District courts are authorized and empowered by the Legislature to review the totality of the circumstances before imposing a sentence. Therefore, because the discretion given to district courts therefore furthers the legitimate legislative purpose of sentencing offenders based on the severity of their particular circumstances, we hold that section 76-3- 207.7 does not violate our uniform operation of laws provision. D. Mr. Perea’s Sentence Does Not Violate the Unnecessary Rigor Provision of the Utah Constitution ¶126 Mr. Perea argues that his sentence of LWOP violates Utah Constitution’s unnecessary rigor provision because it fails to take into account his “age, mental disabilities and IQ.” But Mr. Perea misapprehends the application of the unnecessary rigor provision. That provision protects prisoners from “the imposition of circumstances . . . during their confinement that demand more of the prisoner than society is entitled to require.” Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 17, 184 P.3d 592. It therefore applies only to the conditions of one’s confinement and does not speak to the proportionality of the particular sentence imposed. The unnecessary rigor provision is therefore not implicated by the imposition of his sentence of LWOP. E. Mr. Perea’s Sentence Does Not Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the United States Constitution ¶127 Finally, Mr. Perea argues that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. He argues that his relatively young age, coupled with his low IQ, militates against a sentence of LWOP. In support of his argument, Mr. Perea cites to the Supreme Court’s holdings in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (holding that juveniles, those persons under eighteen years of age, cannot be sentenced to death); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, ___ (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of LWOP for juvenile non-homicide offenders); and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (holding that persons with an IQ below 70 cannot be executed because such individuals are too mentally impaired to “understand and process information, to communicate . . . to engage in logical reasoning, [and] to control impulses”). 39 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court ¶128 But the holdings of these cases are inapplicable to the present case. Roper does not control because Mr. Perea was neither sentenced to death21 nor a juvenile offender at the time of the shootings. It is uncontested that Mr. Perea was nineteen years old at the time of the shootings and he was sentenced only to LWOP. Similarly, the Court’s holding in Graham is inapplicable because Mr. Perea was not found guilty of a non-homicide crime, but was found guilty of aggravated murder arising from the death of two individuals. Finally, it is uncontested that although Mr. Perea has been diagnosed with a low IQ, his score of 77 puts him above the line drawn by the Supreme Court in Atkins. ¶129 In spite of the differences between Mr. Perea and the defendants sentenced in Roper, Graham, and Atkins, the district court was authorized to evaluate the totality of the circumstances and could have chosen to impose a less severe sentence. It did not, however, based on its weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in this case. And in the absence of a statutory mandate or compelling factual circumstances indicating the district court erred, we will not second-guess the district court, which is “in the best position to ensure that justice is done.” Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, ¶ 9. We therefore hold that Mr. Perea’s sentence is not unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the federal constitution.