Opinion ID: 195622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Photocopy.

Text: 49 In respect to the photocopy, we treat appellant's authentication and hearsay challenges separately. 50 1. Authentication. Exhibit 17A purported to be a photocopy of a bank check in the amount of $2500, drawn on the Bank of China at Hong Kong, bearing a date of December 20, 1988, and made payable to appellant. To authenticate the proffer, Dennis Kelly, a Customs agent, testified that Wong provided him, via air courier from Hong Kong, with both the photocopy and a three-page invoice in appellant's handwriting. This document, admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit 17, described, among other things, a $2500 credit in Wong's favor. 13 51 Appellant argues that the proof failed to eliminate a googol of possibilities concerning the photocopy, e.g., that it was a fake, or that the check was made at some time other than the stated date, or that it was never delivered to appellant, or, if delivered, that it was never negotiated. Additionally, appellant argues that a finding of authenticity could not readily be based on material emanating from Wong because Wong had soured on him and was, therefore, a biased source. 52 It cannot be gainsaid that documentary evidence must be authentic. The test of authenticity is straightforward: The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Fed.R.Evid. 901(a); see also United States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Arboleda, 929 F.2d 858, 869 (1st Cir.1991). 53 There is no single way to authenticate evidence. In particular, the direct testimony of a custodian or a percipient witness is not a sine qua non to the authentication of a writing. See Paulino, 13 F.3d at 23. Thus, a document's [a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances, can, in cumulation, even without direct testimony, provide sufficient indicia of reliability to permit a finding that it is authentic. Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(4); see also Paulino, 13 F.3d at 23; United States v. Newton, 891 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir.1989). 54 Issues of authentication are almost always fact-sensitive. Consequently, when such issues arise, the trial court must act as a gatekeeper. See United States v. Ladd, 885 F.2d 954, 956 (1st Cir.1989); see generally Fed.R.Evid. 104(a). If the court discerns enough support in the record to warrant a reasonable person in determining that the evidence is what it purports to be, then Rule 901(a) is satisfied and the weight to be given to the evidence is left to the jury. Paulino, 13 F.3d at 23. And since rulings of this nature often depend on the trial judge's intimate knowledge of the case and the protagonists, we review rulings accepting or rejecting claims of authenticity only for mistake of law or abuse of discretion. See Paulino, 13 F.3d at 23; United States v. McMahon, 938 F.2d 1501, 1508 (1st Cir.1991). 55 Here, the district court noted that the purported bank check was dated Dec. 20, 1988; that it was payable to Steve Holmquist; and that it was for $2500. The court also determined that Exhibit 17 (the three-page invoice in appellant's handwriting) strongly corroborated Exhibit 17A; after all, agent Kelly received the invoice in the very same package as the photocopy of the check, and the invoice mentioned a $2500 credit to Wong, thereby lending considerable credence to the proposition that Holmquist received a payment (the bank check), acknowledged its receipt, and credited Wong's account in the amount of the payment. 14 Given the totality of the circumstances, especially the ties binding Wong to Holmquist, we agree with the lower court that a jury could draw reasonable inferences connecting the photocopy of the bank check to the invoice. 56 To be sure, appellant's objections are not entirely without force. It is possible that the photocopy had been doctored, or constituted an instrument through which Wong, for whatever reason, aspired to carry out an elaborately staged hoax. But the burden of authentication does not require the proponent of the evidence to rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity, or to prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be. Rather, the standard for authentication, and hence for admissibility, is one of reasonable likelihood. See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 328-29 (3d Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1388, 122 L.Ed.2d 763 (1993); United States v. Collado, 957 F.2d 38, 39 (1st Cir.1992); see also 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 901(a), at 901-19 (1994) (explaining that the trial court should admit evidence as authentic if sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity). 57 Here, mindful of the deference accorded to the trial court's exercise of its discretion, we cannot say that the court erred in declaring the photocopy of the bank check to be sufficiently authenticated, or in admitting it into evidence. 58 2. Hearsay. Appellant also suggests that, because the photocopy was introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it was hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible unless it fell within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. We need not probe this point too deeply, for close perlustration of the record makes it plain that appellant never advanced this objection below. 59 During the trial, appellant made a cluster of objections with regard to the photocopy of the bank check. However, these objections focused on authentication, and contained no developed argumentation in regard to hearsay principles. To be sure, defense counsel at one point called the photographs totem pole hearsay, and, in a later colloquy, applied the same epithet to the photocopy. But we think that this elliptical reference carries little weight. Under prevailing federal practice, objections to evidentiary proffers must be reasonably specific in order to preserve a right to appellate review. See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 904 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir.1990); see also Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). In other words, a litigant is obliged to call [his specific objection] to the attention of the trial judge, so as to alert [the judge] to the proper course of action. United States v. Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 759 (1st Cir.1989) (quoting Notes of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rule 103(a)). A lack of specificity bars the party aggrieved by the admission of the evidence from raising more particularized points for the first time on appeal. See Walters, 904 F.2d at 769; Piva, 870 F.2d at 759. 60 The rule is not a mere technicality, but is solidly grounded in considerations of fairness and judicial economy. As we said in Walters, 904 F.2d at 769: The reason for such a requirement is to alert the trial court and the other party to the grounds of the objection so that it may be addressed or cured. Applying these precepts, appellant's hearsay argument is by the boards. 15 61