Opinion ID: 4465387
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing Phase and Direct Appeal

Text: In the trial court and in the Arizona Supreme Court on direct de novo review, there were two statutory aggravators and one non-statutory mitigator. No mitigating factor—either statutory or non-statutory—was found based on mental impairment. Given the meager evidence presented at sentencing, we held that the Arizona Supreme Court had “made a reasonable determination of the facts in concluding that Kayer suffered from no mental impairment.” Kayer, 923 F.3d at 702. The first statutory aggravator was a prior conviction for a “serious offense.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F)(2). Kayer’s prior conviction was for first degree burglary. This conviction is the least serious of the “serious offenses” under the aggravator. Serious offenses range from burglary to first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault resulting in serious physical injury, sexual assault, and any dangerous crime against children. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(H)(1)–(6). The second statutory aggravator was commission of a crime for “pecuniary gain.” See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F)(5). The gain in Kayer’s case was relatively modest: avoiding repayment of a $100 loan from Haas, and stealing money and jewelry from Haas’s person and personal property from his house. Neither the sentencing judge nor the Arizona Supreme Court found the proposed statutory aggravator of killing in “an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13703(F)(6). The one non-statutory mitigator was Kayer’s importance in the life of his son. KAYER V. RYAN 11