Opinion ID: 2273678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District's Refusal to Bargain Collectively

Text: Appellants' first claim is that the district violated article I, section 29 of Missouri's Constitution by refusing to bargain collectively with the representatives of the employee associations. There is no dispute that the district refused to bargain collectively with its employees. Despite the plain language of the constitutional provision, which states that employees shall have the right to bargain collectively, this Court held in City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542 (1947), that article I, section 29 does not apply to public employees. If the guarantee applies to public employees, this Court said, the legislative powers of the public entity would be unconstitutionally delegated to nongovernmental entities through the collective bargaining process. Id. Clouse recognizes that all employees have the right to join unions and to bring their views and desires to any public officer or legislative body, but distinguishes this from the right to bargain collectively. Id. This distinction is based on the now largely defunct nondelegation doctrine, which holds that it is unconstitutional for the legislature to delegate its rule-making authority to another body. Clouse cites A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935), which has been abandoned in subsequent decisions. Schechter Poultry has been called aberrational because it is one of very few cases that were departure[s] from a generous recognition of congressional power to delegate rulemaking authority[.] United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1010 (3rd Cir.1988). Since 1935, the United States Supreme Court has generally upheld delegations of congressional authority. Id.; see, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694 (1948) (delegation of authority to determine excessive profits); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 64 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333 (1944) (delegation to determine reasonable rates); Nat'l Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943) (delegation to regulate broadcast licensing). Similarly, the nondelegation doctrine has been largely abandoned in Missouri. See Menorah Medical Center v. Health and Educational Facilities Authority, 584 S.W.2d 73, 83-84 (Mo. banc 1979) (recognizing modern tendency towards liberal interpretation of delegation authority); Murray v. Mo. Highway and Transportation Commission, 37 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Mo. banc 2001) (statute requiring the commission to submit disputes to arbitration panel is not an unconstitutional delegation). The nondelegation dictum in Clouse and public employee cases that follow Clouse has rightly been called an anachronism. James E. Westbrook, The Use of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Public Sector Labor Law: Lessons From Cases That Have Perpetuated an Anachronism, 30 St. Louis Univ. L.J. 331 (1986). Clouse disapproves of including public employees in the right to bargain collectively because decisions relating to public employment are legislative. 206 S.W.2d at 544-545. As applied to the municipal employees in Clouse , qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions of public officers and employees are wholly matters of lawmaking and cannot be the subject of bargaining or contract. Id. at 545. For this reason, Clouse found that article I, section 29 did not apply to public employees because the right to bargain collectively in the public sector could amount to no more than giving expression to desires for the lawmaker's consideration and guidance. Id. In 1965, the legislature passed the public sector labor law, which authorized most public employees to form and join labor organizations and to present proposals to any public body relative to salaries and other conditions of employment through the representatives of their own choosing. . . . Section 105.510. The public sector labor law excludes all teachers of all Missouri schools. Id. [2] After the law went into effect, many public employees  including the custodial, transportation, and paraprofessional employees represented by the associations in this case  had a recognized right to bargain collectively, despite this Court's language in Clouse that public employment can never be the subject of bargaining or contract. To be consistent with article I, section 29, the statute's exclusion of teachers cannot be read to preclude teachers from bargaining collectively. Rather, the public sector labor law is read to provide procedures for the exercise of this right for those occupations included, but not to preclude omitted occupational groups from the exercise of the right to bargain collectively, because all employees have that right under article I, section 29. Instead of invalidating the public sector labor law to the extent that it excludes teachers, this Court's reading of the statute recognizes the role of the general assembly, or in this case, the school district  in the absence of a statute covering teachers  to set the framework for these public employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. In this regard, it is noteworthy that prior to this controversy, the district in effect recognized the teachers' right to bargain collectively through its discussion procedure. There is nothing in the law, as it has developed, that requires a public entity to agree to a proposal by its employee unions or organizations. In fact, this Court has repeatedly recognized that the public sector labor law allows employers to reject all employee proposals, as long as the employer has met and conferred with employee representatives. State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 41 (Mo.1969); State ex rel. O'Leary v. Missouri State Board of Mediation, 509 S.W.2d 84, 88-89 (Mo. banc 1974); Curators of the University of Missouri v. Public Service Employees Local No. 45, 520 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Mo. banc 1975); Larry Reichert, et al. v. The Board of Education of the City of St. Louis, 217 S.W.3d 301 (Mo. banc 2007). Under this interpretation, what legislative power or prerogative is being delegated? The answer today, of course, is none. If the public employer is free to reject any proposals of employee organizations, and thus to use its governing authority to prescribe wages and working conditions, none of the public entity's legislative or governing authority is being delegated. Missey, 441 S.W.2d at 41.
Both sides of this controversy cite the debates of the constitutional convention to support their respective positions as to whether the constitutional convention delegates did or did not intend that public employees be included in article I, section 29. [3] Section 29 is part of Missouri's current Constitution, which was the product of a constitutional convention in 1943 and 1944 and was adopted by the voters in 1945. While the debates of the convention are interesting, they neither add to nor subtract from the plain meaning of the constitution's words. Missouri's voters did not vote on the words used in the deliberations of the constitutional convention. The voters voted on the words in the Constitution, which says employees shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively. . . . Employees plainly means employees. There is no adjective; there are no words that limit employees to private sector employees. The meaning of section 29 is clear and there is, accordingly, no authority for this Court to read into the Constitution words that are not there. Kearney Special Road Dist. v. County of Clay, 863 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Mo. banc 1993). [4] The doctrine of stare decisis promotes security in the law by encouraging adherence to previously decided cases. Medicine Shoppe Int'l, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 156 S.W.3d 333, 334-35 (Mo. banc 2005). Stare decisis, however, is not absolute, and the passage of time and the experience of enforcing a purportedly incorrect precedent may demonstrate a compelling case for changing course. Id. at 335. This is such a case. Clouse contradicts the plain meaning of article I, section 29, which states simply that employees, without qualification, have the right to collective bargaining. Deviations from clear constitutional commands  although longstanding  do not promote respect for the rule of law. If the people want to change the language of the constitution, the means are available to do so. Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 50. This Court will not change the language the people have adopted. Clouse is overruled. In addition to being consistent with the plain meaning of article I, section 29, this decision does not violate the nondelegation doctrine, to whatever extent the doctrine still exists. To allow employees to bargain collectively does not require the employer to agree to any terms with the represented groups. The employer is free to reject any and all proposals made by the employees. The employer is therefore not delegating or bargaining away any of its legislative power. Missey, 441 S.W.2d at 41. The nondelegation doctrine is no impediment to applying the plain meaning of this explicit constitutional command.
This Court in Sumpter v. City of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. banc 1982), held  following Clouse  that a city was free to disregard agreements made with employee associations or unions. The starting point was this Court's statement in Clouse that the qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions of public officers and employees are wholly matters of lawmaking and cannot be the subject of bargaining or contract.  206 S.W.2d at 545. (Emphasis added.) If that statement is true  that such matters cannot be the subject of bargaining  then the public sector labor law must be held to be invalid. The title of section 105.510 states certain employees may join labor unions and bargain collectively.  [5] (Emphasis added). This law, however, was upheld in Missey, 441 S.W.2d at 41, which affirmed the viability of Clouse at the same time as it undercut it by ignoring its broad proscription of bargaining by employees in the public sector. The public sector labor law upheld in Missey does not define what is meant by the right to bargain collectively, [6] but describes the actions allowed under the statute: employees are granted the right to present proposals, through their representatives, to the employer; the employer is required to meet, confer, and discuss such proposals; and the results of this discussion are to be put in writing and presented to the appropriate administrative, legislative or other governing body in the form of an ordinance, resolution, bill or other form required for adoption, modification or rejection. Id. at 40-41; section 105.520. The law makes clear that a public employer is not required to agree to anything. Section 105.520; Missey, 441 S.W.2d at 41; O' Leary, 509 S.W.2d at 88-89; Curators, 520 S.W.2d at 57. The point of bargaining, of course, is to reach agreement. Public employers routinely engage in bargaining for employees. A school district that wishes to hire a superintendent may negotiate and reach an agreement that then becomes the subject of a contract. Sections 168.191; 168.201; 168.211. Nothing obligates the school district to agree to the superintendent's proposal  the school district can set the salary and other terms of employment and the superintendent can take them or leave them. How does individual negotiation differ from bargaining that occurs with groups of employees? Conceptually it would appear to be the same process: proposals are made and either accepted or rejected. There hardly is any need, of course, to spell out that individuals have the right to negotiate and enter agreements as a simple matter of the right of contract. See American Law Institute, Restatement of Contracts 2d § 12 (1981). By contrast, it has been necessary to give legal recognition to the right of employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. section 157. Before the right to bargain collectively was statutorily authorized, such collective or concerted action would be considered unlawful. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 250-51, 38 S.Ct. 65, 62 L.Ed. 260 (1917). Federal law, through the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. section 151 et seq, regulates labor relations between employers and employees. That law, however, does not apply to employees of any State or political subdivision thereof. 29 U.S.C. section 152(2). The federal statute protects the right of the employees it covers to engage in collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. section 157. This provision was part of the federal statute when article I, section 29 was drafted and adopted as part of Missouri's Constitution in 1945. The question, then, is why is article I, section 29 in the Missouri Constitution if private employees already had that right to bargain collectively under federal law? One reason is that Article I, section 29, which has no exclusions, is broader than the federal statute, which does have exclusions  most notably for employees of the state or its subdivisions. Another reason is that the Missouri Constitution protects the right to bargain collectively regardless of whether protections under federal law continue to exist. In any event, article I, section 29 applies to employees, regardless of whether they are in the private or public sector, and nothing in this constitutional provision requires public employers to reach agreements with their employee associations.