Opinion ID: 2576001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does Appellate Counsel Have the Power to Seek Dismissal of an Appeal Based on a Child's Best Interests?

Text: The goal of dependency proceedings, both trial and appellate, is to safeguard the welfare of California's children. The objective of the dependency scheme is to protect abused or neglected children and those at substantial risk thereof and to provide permanent, stable homes if those children cannot be returned home within a prescribed period of time. ( In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 851 P.2d 826.) These proceedings are `designed not to prosecute a parent, but to protect the child.' ( In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 384, 272 Cal.Rptr. 787, 795 P.2d 1244.) The best interests of the child are paramount. (§ 202, subd. (d); In re Malinda S., at p. 384, 272 Cal.Rptr. 787, 795 P.2d 1244; In re Mary C. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 71, 77, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 346.) In deciding what services or placement are best for the child, time is of the essence. After reunification efforts have failed, it is not only important to seek an appropriate permanent solutionusually adoption when possibleit is also important to implement that solution reasonably promptly to minimize the time during which the child is in legal limbo. . . . Courts should strive to give the child [a] stable, permanent placement, and [a] full emotional commitment, as promptly as reasonably possible consistent with protecting the parties rights and making a reasoned decision. ( In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 71 P.3d 787; see also In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 993, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771, 920 P.2d 716 [state interest in expeditious resolution of dependency matters is strong indeed].) It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents. There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty over whether he is to remain in his current `home,' under the care of his parents or foster parents, especially when such uncertainty is prolonged. ( Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency (1982) 458 U.S. 502, 513-514, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928.) Thus, the priority in dependency proceedings is to identify and carry out the services and placement that best serve the child's interests as swiftly as possible. With these broad principles in mind, we consider whether appellate counsel has the power to file a motion to dismiss an appeal based on counsel's assessment of the child's best interests. First, appellate counsel generally has the power to move to dismiss an appeal. California Rules of Court, rules 20 and 30.3 authorize an appellant, through counsel, to seek dismissal of an appeal. In cases such as this one, where the record has been filed with the Court of Appeal, counsel must file a motion to dismiss with the appellate court, which has the discretion to grant or deny the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 20(c), 30.3(b)(2); DeGarmo v. Goldman (1942) 19 Cal.2d 755, 768, 123 P.2d 1 [An appellant may not dismiss his appeal as a matter of right; whether he will be permitted to do so is within the discretion of the court].) This procedure applies equally to dependency appeals. (See In re Karen G. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1389, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 301; Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 39(a).) [2] Second, the power to move to dismiss the appeal includes the power to do so based on the child's best interests. California Rules of Court, rules 20 and 30.3 contain no express exceptions. They reflect the usual rule that, in every case, an attorney has the power to seek dismissal of an appeal based on the attorneys and the clients evaluation of the clients best interests, as, for instance, when the client elects to settle in lieu of pursuing an appeal. The question then is whether anything in the dependency rules warrants a departure from this usual rule. We conclude not. In In re Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th 396, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 73 P.3d 541, we addressed whether appellate counsel has a statutory duty to independently investigate the current circumstances of the child's preadoptive placement, and to report any significant changes to the reviewing court so that the court can determine anew whether the trial courts judgment should be reversed.... ( Id. at p. 414, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 73 P.3d 541.) We concluded that although section 317 imposes investigatory duties on a child's counsel (§ 317, subd. (e)), [3] the statute by its terms applies only to trial counsel and thus imposes no similar duties on appellate counsel. ( In re Zeth S., at p. 415, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 73 P.3d 541.) But in deciding that section 317 did not require counsel to conduct an investigation, we did not hold that the statute would prevent counsel from doing so, or from bringing a motion to dismiss motivated by the child's best interests. Nor does any other dependency statute or regulation preclude such a motion. Indeed, the concerns motivating dependency law persuade us that such a motion will sometimes be the proper course. As we explained in the writ context: Sometimes the additional delay that seeking writ relief might cause could harm the children. An attorney for a child is charged in general with the representation of the child's interests (§ 317, subd. (e)) rather than always seeking a result that counsel thinks is legally correct regardless of whether that result is in the child's best interest. ( In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 60, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 71 P.3d 787.) If the delay from a writ proceeding can justify forgoing a potentially meritorious petition, then the typically far greater delay from an appeal can surely sometimes justify forgoing a potentially meritorious appeal. (See id. at p. 59, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 71 P.3d 787 [The delay an appellate reversal causes might be contrary to, rather than in, the child's best interests].) On appeal, as much as in writ proceedings or before the trial court, the clients best interests remain the lodestar for counsel. When the client is a child, the rule is no different. Thus, we reject the departments argument that appellate counsel has an ethical duty to pursue any nonfrivolous arguments on appeal, to the exclusion of a motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeal concluded that hearing a motion to dismiss the appeal based on appellate counsels best-interests assessment would violate the proscription against consideration of postjudgment evidence on appeal. (See In re Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 413, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 73 P.3d 541.) This conclusion reads too much into our holding in Zeth S. There, we held that for an appellate court routinely to solicit postjudgment evidence in order to reopen and reconsider trial court findings and reverse the trial courts judgment would violate both the generally applicable rules of appellate procedure, and the express provisions of section 366.26 which strictly circumscribe the timing and scope of review of termination orders, for the very purpose of expediting the proceedings and promoting the finality of the juvenile courts orders and judgment. ( In re Zeth S., at p. 413, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 73 P.3d 541.) For these reasons, an appellate court should not consider postjudgment evidence going to the merits of an appeal and introduced for the purposes of attacking the trial courts judgment. But these same concerns militate in favor of permitting motions to dismiss to be brought and heard, and distinguish this case from Zeth S. in three respects. First, the generally applicable appellate rules authorize such a motion, and appellate courts routinely consider limited postjudgment evidence in the context of such motions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 41(a)(2); see, e.g., TMS, Inc. v. Aihara (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 377, 378-379, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 834; In re Melissa S. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1053-1054, 225 Cal.Rptr. 195.) Second, the limited issue involved in a motion to dismiss, whether a child should be permitted to abandon a challenge to the trial court ruling, is distinct from the broader issues resolved by the trial court, and consideration of circumscribed evidence in this context does not give rise to the vice we condemned in Zeth S.  an appellate courts use of new evidence outside the record to second-guess the trial courts resolution of issues properly committed to it by the statutory scheme. (See In re Zeth S., at pp. 409-410, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 73 P.3d 541.) Third, the beneficial consequence of motions to dismiss, where granted, will be to expedit[e] the proceedings and promot[e] the finality of the juvenile courts orders and judgment ( id. at p. 413, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 73 P.3d 541)  precisely the policy advanced by our ruling in Zeth S. The Court of Appeal also expressed concern that allowing such a motion would leave appellate counsels clients with no recourse, their right of appeal having been abandoned. Not so. A motion to dismiss cannot be brought unilaterally, without client consent, as we discuss post. Nor is such a motion to be granted automatically; instead, as noted ante, motions to dismiss are directed to the sound discretion of the Court of Appeal. Thus, the right of appeal will be relinquished only with client consent and after the exercise of judicial oversight. In lieu of a motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeal suggested that appellate counsel who identifies no good faith argument for reversal can file a Sade C. brief. ( In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th 952, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771, 920 P.2d 716.) But appellate counsel properly can notify the court that she has found no arguable issues only when that is in fact the case. The appellate counsel who believes arguable issues exist, but that to pursue them would not be in the client's best interests, cannot properly file a Sade C. brief. Instead, counsel's proper course of action is to file an authorized motion to dismiss. In re Karen G., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 1384, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 301, presents an example of such a motion. After the juvenile court ordered a child returned to her mother, both the social services agency and the child's trial counsel filed notices of appeal, and appellate counsel was appointed for the child. The social services agency subsequently reversed its position and moved to dismiss its appeal based on changed circumstances. The Court of Appeal granted the social services agency's motion, whereupon the child's appellate counsel moved to dismiss the child's appeal based on the changed circumstances. Though framed in terms of mootness, the motion effectively asked for dismissal because opposing the child's placement with her mother was no longer in the child's best interests. (See id. at pp. 1389-1390, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 301.) The Court of Appeal took judicial notice of the juvenile court's six-month-review order, which reflected the social services agency's changed position and the mother's improved performance, and granted the motion to dismiss. ( Id. at pp. 1390-1391, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 301; see also In re Harry N. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1394, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 [motion by child's appellate counsel to dismiss appeal and remand for new best interests hearing].) As Karen G. demonstrates, a motion to dismiss can be an appropriate way to end dependency proceedings and bring closure for a child.