Opinion ID: 2976331
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ALJ’s weighing of the evidence

Text: Anthony further contends that the ALJ erred in determining that Anthony has the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light work. Specifically, he argues that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to (1) the opinion of his treating physician, and (2) his own testimony and that of his witnesses. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the ALJ reasonably resolved the conflicting medical and testimonial evidence.
Anthony argues that the ALJ erred in failing to (1) acknowledge that Dr. Pecar was the treating physician, (2) accord proper deference to Dr. Pecar’s opinion, and (3) provide “good reasons” for discounting the opinion. Under the treating-physician rule, the opinions of treating physicians are generally accorded greater weight than the opinions of other physicians. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 536 (6th Cir. 1981). When determining the particular weight to give - 11 - No. 07-3344 Anthony v. Comm Social Security a medical source, an ALJ should consider (1) the length of the treating relationship, (2) the nature and extent of the relationship, including any specialized knowledge the source may have, (3) the extent to which the opinion is supported by medical evidence, including medical signs and laboratory findings, (4) the extent to which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole, and (5) whether the opinion is from a specialist on issues relating to his or her specialty. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(6). An ALJ’s decision to deny benefits “must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the treating source’s medical opinion, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at  (1996)). Although the ALJ must give “good reasons” for discounting the weight given a treating source’s opinion, id., the ALJ “is not bound by the treating physician’s opinions,” and such opinions will “receive great weight only if they are supported by sufficient clinical findings and are consistent with the evidence.” Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1993); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529-31 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a treating physician’s relevant opinion will not be given controlling weight unless it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(6). Contrary to Anthony’s assertion, the ALJ acknowledged Dr. Pecar and gave good reasons for discounting the doctor’s opinion. The ALJ first found that Dr. Pecar’s opinion was not supported by objective findings or treatment notes. Dr. Pecar’s medical records do not provide evidence that Anthony’s seizures were problematic between 1999 and 2002, the time period relevant to this case. The - 12 - No. 07-3344 Anthony v. Comm Social Security determination by Dr. Pecar that Anthony was totally disabled was made in June of 2004. But the last time that Anthony had seen Dr. Pecar prior to June of 2004 was in 1998. There is no evidence that Dr. Pecar treated Anthony between 1999 and 2002. The ALJ therefore reasonably discounted Dr. Pecar’s opinion as to Anthony’s disability during the critical period of time. In addition, the ALJ found that Dr. Pecar’s conclusion that Anthony could not work was not supported by detailed clinical findings. Where a treating doctor makes broad “conclusory formulations, regarding the ultimate issue which must be decided by the Secretary, [those findings] are not determinative of the question of whether or not an individual is under a disability.” Kirk, 667 F.2d at 538; see also King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding as a valid reason not to accept the opinion of a treating physician the fact that the opinion was not supported by detailed clinical or diagnostic evidence). The ALJ also gave Dr. Pecar’s opinion limited weight because it was inconsistent with the substantial weight of the medical evidence in the record. This medical evidence belies Anthony’s reliance on the alleged severity of his seizures, the torn flexor tendon in his left hand, his problems with dizziness, balance, and coordination, the after-effects of his broken shoulder and leg fracture, his episodes of confusion and irritability, and his brain atrophy. In particular, the ALJ relied on the VA hospital reports between 1999 to 2002, which consistently state that Anthony had not had a serious seizure since 1997, that his seizure disorder was stable and controlled by medication, and that his other ailments were not disabling. Although there is evidence indicating that Anthony might have had some night seizures, that he experienced “spells,” and that his cognitive capacity diminished during the - 13 - No. 07-3344 Anthony v. Comm Social Security relevant time period, the weight of the medical evidence suggests that Anthony’s seizures were under control and that his other ailments did not prevent him from engaging in gainful activity. The ALJ also considered the full medical record and sufficiently accommodated all of Anthony’s limitations in determining his residual functional capacity. Because the VA hospital reports undermine Dr. Pecar’s opinion that Anthony could not work in any capacity, and because Dr. Pecar was the only physician to suggest that Anthony was “totally disabled,” the ALJ provided sufficient reasons for discounting Dr. Pecar’s testimony and determining that, based on the medical record as a whole, Anthony retained the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of light work.
Anthony further contends that the ALJ erred in finding that his testimony, as well as the verbal and written testimony of his sister, niece, and former employer, was not fully credible. Where the uncontroverted medical evidence in the record is entirely consistent with a witness’s testimony, an ALJ may not disregard that evidence by claiming that it is incredible. Harris ex rel Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431,436 (6th Cir. 1985). An ALJ faced with conflicting medical evidence, however, must necessarily make credibility determinations. King, 742 F.2d at 974. Where there are conflicts regarding the evidence, an ALJ’s findings of credibility are entitled to great deference. Id. at 974-75. In the present case, the conflicting evidence in the record required the ALJ to evaluate the credibility of Anthony and his witnesses. The ALJ found that the medical record contradicted the witnesses’ testimony that Anthony was totally disabled. He pointed out that although the VA hospital records reflect that Anthony had trouble focusing and staying on task, they also made clear that his seizures were largely under control and that he was able to perform most tasks with additional time. - 14 - No. 07-3344 Anthony v. Comm Social Security The ALJ also found that Anthony’s lifestyle and demeanor did not “match his allegations of disability.” He noted that although Anthony claimed to be totally disabled, he continued to drive more than 100 miles to church each week, lift dumbbells, socialize, walk long distances, and live on his own. The ALJ commented that this “does not create the image of a person incapable of work.” Because the ALJ considered the evidence in the record and provided specific reasons for his credibility findings, his decision is entitled to great deference and is supported by substantial evidence. See King, 742 F.2d at 974; Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that an ALJ’s credibility determinations must be upheld so long as they are in the zone of reasonable choices). 5. ALJ’s determination that Anthony could work in the national economy The ALJ determined that Anthony lacked the residual functional capacity to perform his past work as a truck driver. At step five of the analysis, however, the ALJ found that Anthony possessed the residual functional capacity to perform other jobs in the national economy. Anthony argues that this finding was in error. Specifically, he asserts that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to credit the portions of the VE’s testimony that were favorable to him, and (2) improperly applying the medical-vocational guidelines. In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ considered and accommodated all of Anthony’s limitations in setting his residual functional capacity, treated the medical-vocational guidelines as advisory, and properly relied upon the testimony of the VE in determining that Anthony could perform a sufficient number of jobs in the national economy during the relevant time period. The Commissioner carries the burden of proving that a claimant who cannot perform his past work has the residual functional capacity to perform other work in the national economy. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 925 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1990). To carry this burden, the Commissioner - 15 - No. 07-3344 Anthony v. Comm Social Security may rely either on the testimony of a VE who evaluates a claimant’s ability to perform work in light of the claimant’s limitations or the SSA’s medical-vocational guidelines. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In Anthony’s case, the ALJ did not err in applying the medical-vocational guidelines. The ALJ determined that Anthony had both exertional and nonexertional impairments that eroded his ability to perform the full range of light work. Where a claimant has nonexertional impairments, the Commissioner must treat the medical-vocational guidelines as only a framework for decisionmaking and must rely on other evidence to carry the burden of showing that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that a claimant can perform. Burton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d 821, 822 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment, the Commissioner may use the grid as a framework for decision, but must rely on other evidence to carry his burden); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 . Here, the ALJ specifically stated that, due to the nature of Anthony’s limitations, he was applying the guidelines only as a framework. He then relied on the testimony of the VE to conclude that Anthony could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. The Commissioner may carry his burden of proof by relying on a VE’s testimony if the testimony is “given in response to a hypothetical question that accurately describes the plaintiff in all significant, relevant respects.” Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1036 (6th Cir. 1994). At the hearing, the ALJ accurately listed Anthony’s traits and residual functional capacity and asked the VE what jobs Anthony could perform. The VE replied that an individual with Anthony’s limitations could perform jobs such as hand packer, laundry folder, sorter, grader, inspector, or checker. In response to an altered hypothetical posed by Anthony’s attorney, however, the VE testified that, if a hypothetical individual were “off-task” for more than 15 percent of the work day, he would have “a - 16 - No. 07-3344 Anthony v. Comm Social Security difficult time” working. But the VE’s response to the altered hypothetical provides no basis for us to overrule the ALJ’s determination that Anthony was qualified for a significant number of jobs in the national economy. See Felisky, 35 F.3d at 1035 (holding that an appellate court may not overrule an ALJ simply because that court might have reached a different conclusion based on the facts). Because the VE’s testimony in response to the valid hypothetical question posed by the ALJ was supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ did not err in relying on the VE’s opinion. 6. Anthony’s earlier request for remand Anthony argued before the district court that his case should be remanded to consider additional evidence from the VA hospital records. The district court denied his request, and Anthony does not dispute that decision here. Consequently, Anthony has waived this argument. See Spirko v. Mitchell, 368 F.3d 603, 612 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the failure to develop an argument constitutes a waiver).