Opinion ID: 78253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Does the Complaint Allege a Violation of Constitutional Rights?

Text: The alleged violations of constitutional rights occurred when Amnesty was prevented from (1) distributing literature to people attending the various protests in the area, and (2) conducting a successful demonstration with an audience and media coverage. The Supreme Court has recognized that passing out leaflets is an activity protected by the First Amendment. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). This right, however  like nearly every other constitutional right  is not without limitation. In Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, the Supreme Court held that it was constitutionally permissible to restrict leafletting at a state fair to certain locations as part of a reasonable time, manner, and location restriction. 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). Defendants argue that in light of the high profile Free Trade Association meeting and the hundreds of people in the area, a police presence was objectively reasonable. A police presence, however, is not the action which interfered with Amnesty's ability to distribute leaflets. According to the complaint, Defendants ordered a police cordon to form around and 50 to 75 yards away from Amnesty's demonstration preventing Amnesty from leaving the Torch of Friendship area and passing out literature. We see nothing indicating that this extreme action constituted a reasonable time, manner, and location restriction. We will not assume from the mere presence of a large number of people in the area that a level of danger existed that justified the complete deprivation of Amnesty's right to pass out literature. See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir.2004)(noting that the constitution contains no exception to the personal rights of citizens for large gatherings of people). Thus, Amnesty's complaint alleges a violation of its right to pass out literature about its organization and its views. Amnesty also has a constitutional right to engage in peaceful protest on public land, such as in a city park. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988) (In ... quintessential public fora, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity.); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147, 162, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that the right to assemble peaceably to voice political protest is a basic right). Governments may not prevent protests, punish the exercise of the right to protest peacefully by arresting the demonstrators, nor unduly burden the right by forcing demonstrators to undergo excessive searches that violate the Fourth Amendment. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963); Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965); Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1324-25. This is not the end of our analysis, however, for Amnesty was not prevented from holding its demonstration or arrested for attempting to hold a protest rally. Rather, Amnesty alleges that its demonstration was rendered ineffective by Defendants' actions because no one could attend, see, or hear the demonstration. Our cases make clear [] that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions `are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.' Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984)). So the question before this court is, essentially, whether the police may restrict the right to conduct a peaceful protest rally so completely that they prevent the rally from being seen or heard. In Saia v. People of State of N.Y., the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance which gave the police unbridled discretion to ban the use of loud speakers. 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1948). The Court held that the First Amendment carried with it a right to be heard that should not be infringed upon by an ordinance in which no standards [were] prescribed for the exercise of [police] discretion. Id. at 560, 68 S.Ct. 1148. This court noted that a constitutional problem would arise were the government to deprive protestors of an audience by drowning-out those protestors with the government's own, louder communication. Warner Cable Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of Niceville, 911 F.2d 634, 638 (11th Cir.1990) (We agree that the government may not speak so loudly as to make it impossible for other speakers to be heard by their audience. The government would then be preventing the speakers' access to that audience, and first amendment concerns would arise.). In Ward v. Rock Against Racism , the Supreme Court reviewed a city's efforts to regulate the volume of amplified music at concerts held at an amphitheater in a public park. 491 U.S. at 784, 109 S.Ct. 2746. Although the Court upheld the city's limitations on volume, it did so only after noting that the limits left open ample alternative channels of communication and that concert organizers could still express themselves with their own decisions as to sound-mixing and sound volume within the limits imposed by the city. Id. at 800-02, 109 S.Ct. 2746. These cases establish a right to be heard inherent in the First Amendment. This right is obvious from the grant of the freedom of speech itself; the right to demonstrate would be meaningless if governments were entitled to isolate a demonstration so completely that no one could see or hear it. The Tenth Circuit faced a situation similar to this case wherein plaintiffs brought a § 1983 lawsuit contending that their First Amendment rights were violated when they were kept outside security zones near a NATO meeting in Colorado. Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, Colo., 477 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2007). In that case, the city created a secured zone around the conference center where the meeting was held into which protestors could not go. Id. at 1217. Protestors were allowed to congregate near one, but only one, of the entry checkpoints through which meeting attendees traveled. Id. Accredited media representatives were allowed into the secured zone and were separated from the protestors. Id. Plaintiffs brought a suit for nominal damages arguing that keeping them out of the security zone and therefore away from their intended audience and media representatives violated their constitutional rights to conduct a peaceful protest. Id. Although the court held that these restrictions were permissible in light of the significant government interest in preventing terrorist attacks at the NATO meeting, the court so concluded only after assuring itself that plaintiffs were not completely deprived of an audience for their message. Id. at 1226. The court noted that plaintiffs were seen by all conference delegates and media personnel entering the secured area, and that the plaintiffs were in fact interviewed by local media. Id. Thus, the court felt that the protestors' First Amendment rights were not violated because it was not a case where the citizens were wholly deprived of their ability to communicate effectively ... They were not wholly cut off from their intended audience, such that there were no ample alternatives to a protest within the security zone itself. Id. In this case, the restriction of Amnesty to a certain area away from its desired audience was similar to that in Citizens for Peace in Space, but the impact on the demonstration was far different. Here, according to the complaint, Amnesty was completely prevented from communicating its message to anyone because no one was allowed into the Torch of Friendship area to attend the rally, and no Amnesty speaker was allowed out to reach them through any other means, not even leafletting. Amnesty had a permit to hold a demonstration at the Torch of Friendship on November 20, 2003 and had previously held a similar protest in 1994 that occurred without any incidents of violence. And yet Defendants ordered the creation of a police cordon 50 to 75 yards away from Amnesty's demonstration, making it impossible for Amnesty's speakers to be seen or heard. This action is no different than if the City of Miami had given Amnesty a permit to hold a meeting in an auditorium and then barred the doors and windows such that no audience could enter and no sound could escape the building. Such action clearly fails to leave open ample alternative channels for communication. We recognize that police may properly limit the exercise of free speech where necessary for the safety and protection of protestors and the community. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) (Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.). But even permissible regulation must not unduly infringe the protected freedom. Id. The alleged action in this case was not constitutionally permissible without a greater justification than has been given. The presence of a large group of people, without more, is not sufficient to justify the extreme action taken here. Defendants have argued only vaguely that the police restrictions were essential in light of potentially violent protests in the area outside the Torch of Friendship and the large groups of people in the area. Defendants have not provided sufficient detail for us to analyze this asserted significant government interest and to judge whether the action taken was narrowly tailored to serve this interest. A potential for violence hardly justifies placing a cordon 50 to 75 yards  a significant distance  away from Amnesty's protest and preventing any and all communication from passing through the cordon. We are hard-pressed to see how a small cordon placed just 15 or 20 feet away from the speakers would not have been just as effective at preventing violence and protecting plaintiff's members without infringing on plaintiff's rights, if a cordon was indeed essential. [8] Without greater justification than has been presented, Defendants' creation of a police cordon at so great a distance that Amnesty could not be seen or heard and members could not pass through to distribute literature was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and did not leave open ample alternative channels of communication. We hold, therefore, that Amnesty alleged a violation of its constitutional rights.