Opinion ID: 848951
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Weems Formula is Inconsistent with the Formula Provided by the Plain Language of the Statute

Text: As we have indicated with great frequency, our duty is to apply the language of the statute as enacted, without addition, subtraction, or modification. See, e.g., Helder v. Sruba, 462 Mich. 92, 99, 611 N.W.2d 309 (2000); Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich. 439, 459, 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000). We may not read anything into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. Omne Financial, Inc. v. Shacks, Inc., 460 Mich. 305, 311, 596 N.W.2d 591 (1999). In other words, the role of the judiciary is not to engage in legislation. Tyler v. Livonia Public Schools, 459 Mich. 382, 392-393, n. 10, 590 N.W.2d 560 (1999). Interpreting the plain language of M.C.L. § 418.321 at the time of the work related death of the plaintiff's son in 1982, that statute provided that the weekly benefit to be paid to a partially dependent person (BPD) was calculated by multiplying the benefit that would be paid if the person were wholly dependent (BWD) by a percentage figure (the proportion). The benefit for a wholly dependent person (BWD) was eighty percent of the decedent's after-tax average weekly wage (WWAT). [6] The proportion (P) was calculated by dividing the amount the decedent contributed to the partial dependent (C) [7] by the decedent's annual earnings (AE). Thus: BPD = (Bwd)(P), where P = (C/AE), and Bwd = (.80)(WWAT). Accordingly, BPD = (C)(.80)(WWAT)/(AE), or Benefit = (decedent's contribution)(.80)(decedent's weekly wage after taxes) (decedent's annual earnings) This equation is the proper one; it is directly based on the plain language of M.C.L. § 418.321 as it was in force in 1982. [8] In our view, the statute on its face requires a factual determination of the amount contributed by the employee to the partial dependent, that is, the amount actually contributed by that deceased worker, in order to calculate the amount of benefits to which the partial dependent is entitled. However, in Weems, supra at 695-697, 533 N.W.2d 287, this Court created its own formula for determining benefits payable to a partial dependent under M.C.L. § 418.321, despite the plain language of the statute. [9] Rather than merely examining, as the statute directed, the amount contributed by the employee to the partial dependent, the Weems Court substituted other factors to determine the level of benefits. In particular, it concluded that the partial dependent would receive the amount obtained by dividing the deceased employee's annual after-tax earnings by the sum of those earnings and the partial dependent's regular and substantial annual income. [10] See Weems, supra at 696, 533 N.W.2d 287. The problem with this calculation is that it is not derived from the language of the statute. MCL 418.321 includes no mention of the income of a partial dependent as a factor in the calculation of the benefits due that partial dependent. [11] As explained by Justice CAVANAGH in his partial dissent in Weems, in order to determine the benefits due a partial dependent, a faithful application of M.C.L. § 418.321 would require a factual determination by the trier of fact to establish the amount contributed by the employee to the partial dependent. Id. at 709, 533 N.W.2d 287. We agree. This is necessary for the simple reason that the amount contributed by the deceased employee to the partial dependent will vary from case to case and cannot be determined by any blanket formula. The Weems majority rejected such a factual inquiry, apparently primarily on the basis of the view that such a factual determination would be unworkable: Such a determination is absolutely unworkable in practice. It would be impossible in most cases to even roughly estimate which portion of the decedent's income was used for the sole support of the dependent. [ Weems, supra at 698, 533 N.W.2d 287.] We acknowledge that, in many cases, the factfinder will be presented with a difficult task in determining what amount of money to consider as having been contributed by the deceased employee to the partial dependent. In large part, this is because household expenses are often paid in essentially a lump sum for items that benefit multiple members of the household. [12] Yet the difficulty of an administrative tribunal in making a factual determination called for by a statute is not a justification for ignoring the statute. The reason is that the Legislature, the policy-making arm of our government, in taking up this matter, is held to have considered this issue and settled on this approach. It is not within our authority to disregard that choice. See, e.g., Helder, supra at 99, 611 N.W.2d 309 (when a statute is clear on its face, the judicial role is to apply the statute in accord with its plain language, not to articulate its view of policy). Accordingly, we overrule Weems to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion. In particular, we overrule the Weems formula for calculating benefits due a partial dependent because it is inconsistent with the plain language of M.C.L. § 418.321. [13]