Opinion ID: 1673753
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Heading: Validity of Joslyn's sentence under section 706.4, The Code 1979.

Text: Joslyn appears to argue she was improperly sentenced under section 706.4, The Code 1979. Because she must be retried on the same charges, we address the question we were not required to answer in State v. Moritz, 293 N.W.2d 235, 242-43 (Iowa 1980). Section 706.4 provides: A conspiracy to commit a public offense is an offense separate and distinct from any public offense which might be committed pursuant to such conspiracy. A person may not be convicted and sentenced for both the conspiracy and for the public offense. (Emphasis supplied.) The jury found Joslyn guilty of both conspiracy to commit murder and murder. We cannot determine whether she asserts she should have been sentenced only for conspiracy, or not at all. Trial court submitted both counts to the jury, proceeding on the theory one commentator has articulated: Because the statutory language says that a person may not be convicted and sentenced for both [offenses], both offenses may still be prosecuted by including them in multiple counts of the indictment [or] trial information. Under Iowa law, a person is not convicted until entry of judgment by the court. Accordingly, it appears that the trier of fact could be given verdict forms as to both offenses, with the prosecution then being required to elect before entry of judgment which conviction it wants recorded. Dunahoo, The New Iowa Criminal Code, 29 Drake L.Rev. 237, 344 (1980). An alternative interpretation of section 706.4 that we find more logical avoids the necessity to make any choice. This is to view the last sentence as merely creating a merger of the conspiracy and the substantive offense where the defendant has been found guilty of both offenses. Thus the defendant should be sentenced solely on the substantive offense. Conspiracy has been treated as a separate offense for two principal reasons: first, the potential for more effectiveness in group activity aimed at a criminal purpose is a greater threat to society; and second, the criminal law ought to intervene against those disposed to commit crime before their plans reach fruition. W. LaFave and A. Scott, Jr., Handbook on Criminal Law § 61, at 459 (1972). Of course this rationale is less compelling after the goal of the conspiracy has been realized. Early intervention has lost its purpose. The logical focus then is not on punishing the conspiracy agreement, but on punishing the accomplishment of the agreed purpose. Thus we hold Joslyn was sentenced properly under section 706.4, but we set the judgment aside and reverse for new trial for the reasons stated in division II. One-half the costs are taxed to the State and one-half to Waterbury. AFFIRMED AS TO WATERBURY; REVERSED AND REMANDED AS TO JOSLYN.