Opinion ID: 2198073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Husband's Compensatory Time

Text: Husband next argues that the Family Court erred both as a matter of law and abused its discretion in dividing his compensatory time. This issue is also one of first impression before this Court. Under 13 Del. C. § 1513, all property acquired by either party subsequent to the marriage is marital property, unless it falls under one of four statutory exceptions (none of which are applicable here). [47] Because Husband may elect to convert to cash all his accumulated compensatory time, at any time during his employment, such compensatory time represents a vested property interest, and, having been acquired ... subsequent to the marriage, is therefore subject to division as a marital asset. [48] The question presented is whether the Family Court erred in the manner it chose for dividing that marital asset. Husband claims that the Family Court erred by not dividing the compensatory time on an if, as, and when basis. Specifically, Husband argues that only the hours, if any, that remain unutilized at the time he ceases employment with the WPD should be divided. [49] Husband's argument rests upon on an analogy between compensatory time and unused vacation and sick time. In Kerr v. Kerr, the Family Court held that both unused vacation and sick leave are deferred compensation, similar to a pension [and] are therefore [marital assets,] divisible to the extent that they were earned during the marriage. [50] The Family Court further held that in dividing such marital assets, the `if, when and as the benefits are paid' approach shall control. [51] Here, the record indicates that Husband accumulated his compensatory time by: (i) working overtime and taking additional assignments and (ii) by not taking vacation or sick time. In that sense, Husband's compensatory time is akin to vacation or sick leave time. But, the compensatory time at issue here is different from vacation and sick leave time in one significant respect. [52] Usually, vacation and sick leave time is convertible to cash only upon termination of employment. [53] Therefore, the receipt of the monetary benefit is contingent upon the spouse not using that accumulated vacation and sick time before the termination of employment, and the monetary value of the benefit is not known until that point. Here, in contrast, the compensatory time may be converted to a monetary benefit at any time during Husband's employment. Moreover, the monetary value of that compensatory time is readily ascertainable at any point in time. For these reasons, the Family Court correctly concluded that a division on an if, as, and when basis would be inappropriate. Had that approach been adopted, Wife could effectively be precluded from sharing in that marital asset, because Husband could cash in any remaining balance before terminating his employment, or could use that balance towards his early retirement. [54] Finally, Husband claims that the Family Court order improperly forces him to cash in a portion of his comp[ensatory] time to pay to [Wife]. This contention lacks merit, because the Family Court considered the possibility that Husband might want to preserve his compensatory time for vacation or retirement purposes, and gave Husband the option of deducting from his portion of the marital estatethe monetary value of Wife's entitlement to half of the compensatory time. [55] We conclude that the Family Court committed no legal error and did not abuse its discretion in dividing the monetary value of the compensatory time.