Opinion ID: 1110297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether there was any error reaching the abuse of discretion standard in the trial court and whether the arbitration was binding on wilson.

Text: ¶ 9. In Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Travis, 808 So.2d 928, 931 (Miss.2002), we stated: A circuit court judge sitting without a jury is accorded the same deference with regard to his findings as a chancellor, and his findings are safe on appeal where they are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence, see City of Jackson v. Perry, 764 So.2d 373, 376 (Miss.2000); Puckett v. Stuckey, 633 So.2d 978, 982 (Miss.1993); Sweet Home Water & Sewer Ass'n v. Lexington Estates, Ltd., 613 So.2d 864, 872 (Miss.1993); Allied Steel Corp. v. Cooper, 607 So.2d 113, 119 (Miss.1992). This Court will not disturb those findings unless they are manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Bell v. City of Bay St. Louis, 467 So.2d 657, 661 (Miss. 1985). Additionally, in arbitration cases, we have held that the scope of review is extremely limited. The scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is quite narrow, and `every reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of the validity of arbitration proceedings.' Craig v. Barber, 524 So.2d 974, 977 (Miss.1988) (quoting Hutto v. Jordan, 204 Miss. 30, 41, 36 So.2d 809, 811 (1948)). [A]ll persons ... may, by instrument of writing, submit to the decision of one or more arbitrators any controversy which may be existing between them, which might be the subject of an action.... Miss.Code Ann. § 11-15-1 (1972). A person shall not act as an arbitrator where he is interested in the subject matter in dispute.... Id. § 11-15-3. To entitle an award to be enforced... it must be made in writing, and be signed by the arbitrators.... Id. § 11-15-19. ¶ 10. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-15-23 is particularly applicable: Any party complaining of an award may move the court to vacate the same upon any of the following grounds: (a) That such award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (b) That there was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators, or any one of them; (c) That the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent or material to the controversy, or other misbehavior by which the rights of the party have been prejudiced; (d) That the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or that they so imperfectly executed them that a mutual final, and definite award on the subject matter was not made. ¶ 11. Case law describing our limited scope of review in arbitration awards upheld at the trial court level dates back over a century. It is not legitimate, therefore, in exceptions to the award, to inquire into the original merits in favor of one party or the other, or to show that in the evidence the award ought to have been different or that the law of the case was misconceived or misapplied, or that the decision, in view of all the facts and circumstances, was unjust. Hutto v. Jordan, 204 Miss. 30, 36, 36 So.2d 809, 811 (1948); Jenkins v. Meagher, 46 Miss. 84, 93 (1871). ¶ 12. In Hutto v. Jordan, 204 Miss. 30, 36, 36 So.2d 809, 811 (1948), we held that the only grounds for setting aside an arbitration award are prescribed by statute: Errors of law or fact, or an erroneous decision of matters submitted to the judgment of the arbitrators, are insufficient to invalidate an award fairly and honestly made. Nothing in the award relative to the merits of the controversy as submitted, however wrongly decided, is ground for setting aside an award in the absence of fraud, misconduct or other valid objections (other valid objections defined in the opinion by statutes.) ¶ 13. Although a case involving arbitration pursuant to a home renovation contract applying Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-15-101 et seq., one of our prior decisions offers guidance here. In Craig v. Barber, 524 So.2d 974, 977 (Miss.1988), we opined that [o]ur limited scope of review ... echoes our century old limitation upon judicial review of an arbitration award.... If anything, the scope of judicial review is much narrower. In Craig, we said the only bases for refusal to enforce an arbitration award are those found in Miss. Code Ann. § 11-15-133(1). The same reasoning applies to our application of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-15-23 in the case before us today. ¶ 14. Additionally, the articles of agreement to arbitrate, and awards thereon are to be liberally construed so as to encourage the settlement of disputes and the prevention of litigation, and every reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of the validity of arbitration proceedings. Hutto, 204 Miss. at 42, 36 So.2d 809. ¶ 15. A thorough review of the record before the Court reveals no error approaching abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Additionally, as we have held in prior case law, we indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the arbitration's validity. The validity of the arbitration in the case sub judice is unquestionable. The Circuit Court of Jackson County had personal and subject matter jurisdiction, as well as venue, as Wilson was domiciled in Jackson County and the accident giving rise to the claim occurred in Jackson County. Notwithstanding Wilson's testimony at the circuit court hearing to the contrary, the circuit judge was certainly justified in finding that based on the testimony of Nixon, Myers and arbitrator Clark, Wilson gave her chosen attorney express authority to enter into binding arbitration (Miss.Code Ann. § 11-15-1). There was no showing in the record of partiality by the attorney arbitrator, as would be required by Miss.Code Ann. § 11-15-23 to invalidate an arbitration award. The arbitration award was reduced to writing, in a very thorough opinion by Wynn Clark, which went beyond what was statutorily necessary (Miss.Code Ann. § 11-15-19). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wilson's proposed record corrections. Wilson did not comply with the requirements of M.R.A.P. 10(a), nor were the proposed record changes properly before the court as part of the original record. Judge Harkey, in his opinion denying the record changes stated, Since Plaintiff's changes deal with factual disputes and quibbles rather than matters of record, nor were the proposed additions properly designated, same are improper subjects to be included in the appeal of this case. The comment to M.R.A.P. 10 states The purpose of the Rule is to permit and encourage parties to include in the record on appeal only those matters material to issues on appeal. We see nothing in the record that points to Judge Harkey's findings regarding this issue rising to abuse of discretion. ¶ 16. Finally, there is absolutely no showing of corruption, fraud, or undue means, (Miss.Code Ann. § 11-15-23). As we held in Hutto and Craig, an arbitration award may be overturned by the reviewing trial court only if the elements of the applicable statute are present. In the case sub judice, the record is totally devoid of any evidence which would cause the arbitration award to be vacated pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-15-23(a)-(d). Additionally, our standard of review in such cases is extremely narrow. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.