Opinion ID: 3172155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discrimination Claim Based on Termination

Text: Ms. Bagwe first contends that Sedgwick terminated her on the basis of race and national origin. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 1981 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of race or national origin when “mak[ing] and enforc[ing] contracts.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The IHRA makes it unlawful “[f]or any employer…to act with respect to…privileges or conditions of employment on the basis of unlawful discrimination or citizenship status.” 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A). A plaintiff may prove discrimination under Title VII, Section 1981, and the IHRA either directly or indirectly. 39 A plaintiff proceeds under the direct method of proof by showing “either direct or circumstantial evidence of intentional racial 39 The analytical framework for all three statutes is “essentially identical,” and therefore we need not analyze them separately. Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1104 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing Title VII and § 1981); Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 545 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ill. 1989) (discussing Title VII and the IHRA). We therefore accept Ms. Bagwe’s contention that the claims should be assessed under the same framework. Appellant’s Br. 23–24; see also Moultrie v. Penn Aluminum Int’l, LLC, 766 F.3d 747, 754 (7th Cir. 2014) (resolving a Title VII and IHRA claim at the same time because the plaintiff “conceded that the merits of his state-law discrimination claim would rise or fall with the merits of the federal claim”). 16 No. 14-3201 discrimination.” Tank v. T-Mobile, USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2014). Direct evidence includes actual admission of discriminatory intent. Mullin v. Temco Mach., Inc., 732 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2013). Circumstantial evidence includes: (1) a mosaic of evidence which, taken together, would permit a jury to infer discriminatory in- tent; (2) comparative evidence showing that em- ployees similarly situated to the plaintiff other than in the protected characteristic received systematically better treatment; and (3) pretext evidence, where the plaintiff is qualified for and fails to receive the desired treatment, and the employer’s stated reason for the difference is unworthy of belief. Piraino v. Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520, 527 (7th Cir. 2008). We do not employ “some kind of esoteric ‘mosaic test’ or theory” under the direct method of proof. Morgan v. SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2013). The circumstantial evidence, taken together, “must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s action.” Adams v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2003). “[A]n overload of irrelevant or nonprobative facts,” will not “add up to relevant evidence of discriminatory intent. … [Z]ero plus zero is zero.” Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2001). Similarly, a single piece of circumstantial evidence, without more, will not support a case of illegal discrimination. Hobgood v. Illinois Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 644 (7th Cir. 2013). Under the indirect method of proof, a plaintiff employs the test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 No. 14-3201 17 U.S. 792 (1973). A plaintiff has the initial burden to show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class were treated more favorably. Andrews v. CBOCS W., Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 2014). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendants to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, at which point the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to submit evidence that the employer’s explanation is pretextual.” Id. Ms. Bagwe has not specified whether she is proceeding under the direct or indirect method of proof, but instead criticizes the entire framework as too rigid. We previously recognized that “serious questions” have been raised about this framework, but “[a]s long as the Supreme Court’s precedents in this area are still good law, we’re not authorized to abandon the established framework.” Smith v. Chicago Transit Auth., 806 F.3d 900, 905–06 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps., Inc., 780 F.3d 784, 789–90 (7th Cir. 2015)). We emphasize that “all relevant direct and circumstantial evidence is considered (in its ‘totality’) in both methods,” but that “we do indeed consider the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ methods separately when reviewing summary judgment.” Orton-Bell v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphases in original). When “a plaintiff eschews burden-shifting and presents direct and circumstantial evidence in opposition to an employer’s motion for summary judgment,” we typically use the direct method as the “default rule.” Morgan, 724 F.3d at 997. 18 No. 14-3201 Here, the district court elected to review the evidence under both methods of proof; therefore, for the sake of completeness, we also will evaluate the evidence under both the direct and indirect methods.
Ms. Bagwe submits that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to permit a jury to conclude reasonably that she was terminated on the basis of race and national origin. In her view, the record contains “pretext” evidence, comparative evidence, and evidence of remarks that suggest a discriminatory motive. We will consider each of these types of evidence in turn, and then determine whether the record, taken as a whole, “point[s] directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s action.” Adams, 324 F.3d at 939.
Ms. Bagwe first contends there is evidence which suggests that Sedgwick’s alleged rationale for termination—that Ms. Bagwe demonstrated poor leadership skills—is “unworthy of belief.” Piraino, 84 F.3d at 274. To meet this burden, Ms. Bagwe must “identify such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions” in Sedgwick’s rationale “that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy of credence.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 852 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007)). Ms. Bagwe has not met that burden here. By the time Ms. Bagwe was terminated, Sedgwick had received multiple No. 14-3201 19 complaints about her inability to work with others. Indeed, the company earlier had placed Ms. Bagwe on a PIP because of such concerns. Later, at Ms. Bagwe’s termination, Ms. Jackson explained that there was a “continuing lack of trust” and 40 noted particularly the “continuing excessive emails.” Ms. LeClaire observed that “morale was low in the office” as 41 a result of Ms. Bagwe’s leadership. Ms. Papaioannou noted the “[e]mail communication” and that “[p]ersonal relation42 ships with office colleagues are lacking.” Ms. Bagwe nevertheless argues that Sedgwick has given “shifting” explanations for her termination, which calls this rationale into question. Where decisionmakers’ stated rationales are “sufficiently inconsistent or otherwise suspect,” a summary judgment cannot stand. Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 2013). However, these “explanations must actually be shifting and inconsistent to permit an inference of mendacity.” Schuster v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 327 F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 2003); see also O’Connor v. DePaul Univ., 123 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a letter which described “insubordinate activities on your part which you were previously advised to cease” did not conflict with a letter which described “the continued harassment of an employee … after you were advised to cease”). Here, the decisionmakers’ explanations that Ms. Bagwe identifies are entirely consistent and supported by the record. Ms. Street and 40 R.163-66 at 2. 41 R.145-5 at 39 (204:4–5). 42 R.163-45 at 2. 20 No. 14-3201 Ms. Jackson told Ms. Bagwe that her termination had “nothing to do with performance,” 43 which is in keeping with Sedgwick’s assertions that Ms. Bagwe was fired for interpersonal reasons. Sedgwick stated in its EEOC statement that Ms. Bagwe “was interfering with everyone’s ability to do their job and service their clients satisfactorily,” 44 which is not inconsistent with Sedgwick’s admission that Ms. Bagwe never had an impact on the company’s bottom line. As Ms. LeClaire explained in her deposition, the “metrics ha[d] 45 been…met” under Ms. Bagwe’s leadership, but the company decided to terminate her because “morale was low in the office.” 46 Contrary to Ms. Bagwe’s suggestion, these semantic differences are not evidence of pretext. Ms. Bagwe may have met the company’s goals, but she had done so in a manner that jeopardized the ability of those around her to do their job. A company can certainly insist on a management style that ensures a smooth operating atmosphere. Ms. Bagwe also highlights the conflicting accounts from Sedgwick’s decisionmakers over how and when the termination decision was reached. However, we have held that where “there is no conflict in the evidence regarding the reasons for” an adverse employment action, “differing recollections” of the events surrounding that action “do not raise a reasonable inference of discrimination.” Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715, 724 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Schuster, 327 F.3d at 43 R.163-1 at 32 (713:10–24). 44 R.163-11 at 3. 45 R.145-5 at 33 (177:14–24). 46 Id. at 39 (204:3–6). No. 14-3201 21 579. Here, the decisionmakers at Sedgwick have provided a consistent rationale for Ms. Bagwe’s termination: she demonstrated ineffective leadership skills. Their differing recollections over exactly who spoke with whom do not call that rationale into question. Next, Ms. Bagwe points to a list of complaints a coworker provided to Ms. Papaioannou a few days after the decision to terminate was made. Ms. Papaioannou received this list in early August, a few days before Ms. Bagwe was actually terminated. She then emailed the list to Ms. Jackson. Ms. Bagwe contends that the list suggests that Ms. Papaioannou was trying to “dig up” reasons for her termination. When “evidence indicates an attempt to justify a discharge after the fact,” it can suggest a discriminatory motive. Futrell v. J.I. Case, 38 F.3d 342, 349 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding potential discrimination where a decisionmaker created a list of deficiencies after a termination and then made “it seem as if he kept the notes contemporaneously”). However, there is no evidence in the record showing that Ms. Papaioannou solicited this list. More importantly, Ms. Papaioannou never has intimated that she relied on the list when recommending Ms. Bagwe’s termination. This list, therefore, does not raise any inference of discrimination. Ms. Bagwe also suggests that Sedgwick deviated from its internal procedures when it terminated her. An employer’s departure from its own policies may be circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 727 (7th Cir. 2005). However, there must be evidence of a specific policy that is regularly enforced and followed in similar situations. Tank, 758 F.3d at 806 (holding that there was not circumstantial evidence where plaintiff did not offer 22 No. 14-3201 any corporate policy); Long v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of Illinois, 585 F.3d 344, 353 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding there was not circumstantial evidence where the “policy permits the employer to exercise discretion”). In this case, Ms. Bagwe fails to present any regularly enforced company policy that Sedgwick failed to follow. Ms. Bagwe contends that Ms. Browne was obligated to speak with all of Ms. Bagwe’s supervisors and review all documentation and that Ms. Papaioannou was obligated to attend her termination meeting. However, she does not point to any evidence of a company policy that imposed these obligations. Ms. Bagwe also contends that Sedgwick failed to complete the “Termination Checklist and Questionnaire” on the day of her termination and failed to follow the checklist’s recommendation to allow an employee to return to her office after being fired. However, the record indicates that when Ms. Jackson, the Senior Vice President of Human Resources, attends a termination meeting, the checklist is not employed. Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 695 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a deviation from company procedure was not suspicious because the company had explained that the procedure was not followed when a senior officer was involved). Ms. Bagwe also argues that the decisionmakers knew that she got along with others and that this shows that their rationale was pretextual. First, she points to Ms. Street’s testimony that she had attended meetings run by Ms. Bagwe and never had witnessed any communication issues. 47 However, Ms. Street was not a decisionmaker, and nothing in the record 47 R.163-8 at 18–19 (107:17–108:12). No. 14-3201 23 suggests that she conveyed that opinion to a decisionmaker. 48 Second, Ms. Bagwe claims that Ms. LeClaire was aware that she had handled appropriately her dispute with Ms. Warner. However, she does not provide any evidentiary support for that proposition. 49 Third, she points to Ms. Papaioannou’s comments that, in June, Ms. Bagwe’s relationships seemed to be improving and that she was satisfied with the way Ms. Bagwe handled the dispute with Ms. Warner. However, Ms. Papaioannou explained that her decision to terminate was based on the accusations of “email war debates” she 50 learned about in July. Finally, Ms. Bagwe contends that Ms. Simpson and Ms. LeClaire had “objective” evidence that she was a team player based on colleague survey results. 51 The survey results, however, only assessed management teams, not individual employees. 52 Sedgwick concluded, after receiving several emails and having numerous meetings with 48 Further, Ms. Street testified that she attended these meetings “[s]ometimes. Not—not all the time.” Id. at 18 (107:24). 49Ms. Bagwe relies on Ms. LeClaire’s deposition for this proposition. Appellant’s Br. 41 (quoting R.166 at 33). However, the material she cites has nothing to do with Ms. Warner. See R.166 at 33 (quoting R.163-2 at 3 (26:24–27:6)). 50 R.145-8 at 17 (185:21–186:11). 51 The Chicago AT&T management team, for which Ms. Bagwe was partially responsible, scored better than Sedgwick’s Atlanta Disability Bell South team in categories such as “[m]y immediate supervisor listens to me,” and “[i]n my department, communications are open and honest.” See R.163-13 at 35–44. However, the Chicago team performed worse than the average Sedgwick management team in these same categories. Id. 52 R.163-5 at 13 (84:17–21). 24 No. 14-3201 Ms. Bagwe, that her interpersonal issues were a problem for the company. The record does not suggest that Sedgwick’s rationale was insincere or pretextual, and we do not sit as a “superpersonnel department[]” that judges the wisdom of Sedg- wick’s decisions. Stockwell v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Lastly, Ms. Bagwe contends that Sedgwick called a potential employer, Matrix Absence Management, and told them 53 that she was “a problem.” Ms. Bagwe believes that this exchange proves that Sedgwick had an improper motive. However, she relies on the affidavit of a former Matrix employee, who heard the comment secondhand. “Where a plaintiff attempts to introduce the testimony of an individual who did not personally witness the alleged … statement but was later told by another that the statement was made, such testimony is rejected as hearsay” on summary judgment. Schindler v. Seiler, 474 F.3d 1008, 1011 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Malin v. Hos54 pira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 554–55 (7th Cir. 2014). Moreover, even 53 R.163-59 at 3–4. 54 Ms. Bagwe argues that the statement falls within the “present sense impression” exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 803(1). To fall within this exception: “(1) the statement must describe an event or condition without calculated narration; (2) the speaker must have personally perceived the event or condition described; and (3) the statement must have been made while the speaker was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.” United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2001). Ms. Bagwe provides no proof that Sedgwick’s comment was immediately conveyed. Instead, she relies on the Matrix employee’s assertion that her supervisor told her that the comment had “just” been made. That assertion also is based on hearsay, as it is using the supervisor’s statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, the statement cannot No. 14-3201 25 were we to consider the statement that was allegedly made in this phone call, Ms. Bagwe has not explained why the call would lead a jury to believe that Sedgwick had an ulterior motive. The statement does not mention race, retaliation, or anything improper. A Sedgwick employee could have made this statement for any variety of equally plausible reasons, including a legitimate concern about Ms. Bagwe’s inability to 55 get along with co-workers. No jury could infer discriminatory intent from this call, or any of the other supposed “pretext” evidence.
Ms. Bagwe also contends that she has “comparative evidence showing that employees similarly situated to [her] other than in the protected characteristic received systemati- fit the “present sense impression” exception to the hearsay rule. Schindler v. Seiler, 474 F.3d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 2007). 55 It is not clear that a Sedgwick employee even made the call. First, it is unclear from the affidavit whether the Matrix supervisor made the call to the “Sedgwick employee” or whether the “Sedgwick employee” called the Matrix supervisor. See R.163-59. The affidavit does not specify, and it is difficult to see how someone from Sedgwick would have known to call Matrix about Ms. Bagwe sua sponte. Second, the Matrix supervisor allegedly said that he had “spoken with someone he knew from working at Sedgwick.” Id. at 3. It is unclear whether that meant a current Sedgwick employee, a former Sedgwick employee, or someone who worked closely with Sedgwick employees. Third, this discussion assumes that the Matrix supervisor’s statement is true, but that statement is hearsay. Ms. Bagwe has not presented an affidavit or deposition from the supervisor, or demonstrated that she is otherwise prepared to submit non-hearsay evidence. 26 No. 14-3201 cally better treatment.” Piraino, 84 F.3d at 274. Although comparative evidence is traditionally assessed under the indirect method of proof, it can be relevant under the direct method as well. Tank, 758 F.3d at 808; Coleman, 667 F.3d at 861 n.9; Hasan, 552 F.3d at 529–30 n.4. To be similarly situated, an employee must be “directly comparable to [a plaintiff] in all material respects.” Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). Typically, we consider whether the employees “(i) held the same job description, (ii) were subject to the same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the same supervisor, and (iv) had comparable experience, education, and other qualifications—provided the employer considered these latter factors in making the personnel decision.” Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 532 (7th Cir. 2003). Ms. Bagwe first compares herself to her replacement, who was a white American that also had leadership problems during his employment at Sedgwick. Ms. Bagwe’s replacement also was terminated, which suggests he was not treated more favorably. However, Ms. Bagwe contends that he was fired for costing Sedgwick money. She believes that Sedgwick would have otherwise retained him, despite his leadership issues. Her belief is based entirely on speculation and does not constitute evidence of discrimination. Winsley v. Cook Cty., 563 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that an employee was not a valid comparator when she quit before any adverse action could be taken, and it was therefore “far from clear that [she] was treated more favorably”). Ms. Bagwe also contends that she was paid less than her colleagues who were white and American, which suggests that Sedgwick acted with a discriminatory motive. Her argument is primarily based on a chart comparing her salary to No. 14-3201 27 other Operations Managers III. However, Ms. Bagwe has provided no further information about these employees. She has not explained whether these employees were subject to the same standards, subordinate to the same supervisors, or had comparable experience and qualifications. Ms. Bagwe cannot simply rely on the fact that these employees held the same title. Tank, 758 F.3d at 810; Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 653 F.3d 582, 590 (7th Cir. 2011). On the subject of pay, Ms. Bagwe only identifies one employee with any specificity: her replacement. However, he had additional operations management experience when he was hired, and received a higher salary 56 based on that experience. Therefore, he is not similarly situated to her on the issue of compensation. Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 979 (7th Cir. 2004).
Finally, Ms. Bagwe contends that there is “evidence of discriminatory intent” that would lead a reasonable jury to find in her favor. Specifically, she points to Ms. LeClaire’s remark about her sister-in-law, Ms. LeClaire’s suggestion to get rid of Ms. Bagwe’s “old Indian husband,” and Ms. Papaioannou’s comment referring to Ms. Bagwe as an “Indian bitch.” Remarks can raise an inference of discrimination when they are “(1) made by the decision-maker, 57 (2) around the time of the decision, and (3) in reference to the adverse employment action.” Egonmwan v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 56 R.170 at 2 (104:12–19). 57 The parties agree that Ms. Papaioannou and Ms. LeClaire were decisionmakers. 28 No. 14-3201 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 2010). When considering whether a remark is discriminatory, we also consider the context in which the remark was made. Oest v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrs., 240 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that comments made outside of work, in social settings, are less likely to constitute evidence of workplace discrimination); see also Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 242 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a comment did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination when it “was made in a casual conversation during a long car trip, a setting unrelated to discussions of…work deficiencies”). Here, both of Ms. LeClaire’s comments were unrelated to work and made in settings outside of the workplace. Her alleged comment about her sister-in-law was made after a lunch outside of the office. Ms. LeClaire identified the ethnicity of her sister-in-law, but the comment is far too ambiguous to raise an inference of racial or ethnic discrimination. Her “old Indian husband” remark was made in a casual conversation in the bar of a hotel, during a business trip to Atlanta. Oest, 240 F.3d at 611. Further, the comment was made over a year before Ms. Bagwe was terminated. Tank, 758 F.3d at 806 (“[I]solated comments made over a year before the adverse action are not evidence of discrimination under the direct method.”). Neither of these alleged comments would allow a juror to reasonably infer discrimination. Ms. Papaioannou’s alleged comment about Ms. Bagwe, however, is a closer call. Ms. Papaioannou did not reference the termination, but she did make a disparaging comment which referenced Ms. Bagwe’s ethnicity, and she made it on the day of Ms. Bagwe’s termination. A single “bit” or “piece” No. 14-3201 29 of evidence, however, is not enough to support a claim of discrimination under the direct method of proof. Hobgood, 731 F.3d at 644. We addressed a similar situation in Dass v. Chicago Board of Education, 675 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 2012). In Dass, a teacher who brought a claim of racial discrimination alleged that a principal told her that she should look for a job “on the North Side where most of the Indian kids go.” Id. at 1063. We held that, “even if the remark had been closer in time” to the adverse action, it could not support a claim of discrimination because “[t]he undisputed facts show[ed] that [the plaintiff] was non-renewed because she could not control her class.” Id. at 1072. Here, the undisputed facts show that Sedgwick terminated Ms. Bagwe because of interpersonal concerns. Ms. Papaioannou’s comment did not reference the termination and was made after the decision already had been made. See Egonmwan, 602 F.3d at 850 (holding that a comment did not raise an inference of discrimination because it did not “specifically refer” to the termination and the timing did not raise suspicion). Moreover, Ms. Papaioannou was one of four decisionmakers. She did not make the ultimate decision to terminate Ms. Bagwe, and the record shows that the other decisionmakers based their decision on Ms. LeClaire’s independent assessment of the situation. Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., L.P., 651 F.3d 664, 675 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a claim that one employer acted in a retaliatory manner had far less merit when three other managers signed off on the decision for independent reasons). Ms. Bagwe cannot survive under the direct method of proof on her discrimination claims.
Under the indirect method, we reach the same result. To 30 No. 14-3201 meet her initial burden, Ms. Bagwe must show that “similarly situated employees” who were not members of the protected class were treated more favorably. Andrews, 743 F.3d at 234. As discussed above, Ms. Bagwe has failed to identify any similarly situated employees. Ms. Bagwe cannot survive summary judgment under the indirect method of proof because she cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Tank, 758 F.3d at 810.