Opinion ID: 1701978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: counsel's concession of guilt

Text: We need not remand Dillbeck's claim that his counsel was ineffective per se for conceding that he was guilty of first-degree murder without his consent. The record reveals that during voir dire and at trial, Dillbeck's counsel repeatedly conceded that Dillbeck was guilty of felony murder. [11] Dillbeck claims that he was not informed that counsel would make such concessions nor did he consent to counsel making such concessions. He argues that counsel's assistance, therefore, was ineffective per se under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d 618 (Fla.2000) ( Nixon II ), and Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172 (Fla.2003) ( Nixon III ). Dillbeck's claim is without merit. After reviewing the trial record, we conclude, as a matter of law, that neither Cronic nor the Nixon line of cases applies to Dillbeck's claim. We therefore affirm the circuit court's denial of relief.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally are analyzed under the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Nixon II, 758 So.2d at 622 (We emphasize that the Strickland standard normally applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.). Under Strickland, a defendant is entitled to relief if he can show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. However, if the defendant can demonstrate that counsel entirely fail [ed] to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, the law will presume prejudice and deem counsel ineffective per se. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. We applied the presumed prejudice standard of Cronic in Nixon II. Nixon's trial counsel told the jury during his opening statement that there will be no question that [the victim] died a horrible, horrible death and there won't be any question, none whatsoever, that my client, Joe Elton Nixon, caused [the victim's] death.... That fact will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any reasonable doubt. Nixon II, 758 So.2d at 620. During his closing argument, Nixon's counsel told the jury: I think you will find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the crimes charged, first-degree premeditated murder, kidnapping, robbery, and arson. Id. We noted that Nixon's counsel's statements were the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, id. at 624, and we held that Cronic's presumed prejudice standard would apply and counsel would be deemed ineffective per se if Nixon could establish that he did not consent to counsel's strategy of conceding guilt. Id. at 623. Furthermore, we held that Nixon's consent must have been affirmative and explicit; [s]ilent acquiescence is not enough. Id. at 624. We also held that to avoid similar problems in the future ... if a trial judge ever suspects that a similar strategy [of conceding the defendant's guilt] is being attempted by counsel for the defense, the judge should stop the proceedings and question the defendant on the record as to whether or not he or she consents to counsel's strategy. Id. at 625. At the evidentiary hearing conducted by the circuit court on remand, Nixon's trial counsel testified that Nixon provided neither verbal nor nonverbal indication that he did or did not wish to pursue counsel's strategy of conceding guilt. Nixon III, 857 So.2d at 175-76. Testimony at the evidentiary hearing revealed only that Nixon did nothing when asked his opinion regarding this trial strategy. Id. at 175. Based on this testimony, the circuit court denied relief, holding that Nixon's pattern of interactions with counsel demonstrated that Nixon's failure to approve or disapprove verbally was approval of counsel's strategy. Id. at 176. On appeal, we reversed the circuit court's denial of relief. We held that Nixon was entitled to a new trial because there [was] no competent, substantial evidence which establishe[d] that Nixon affirmatively and explicitly agreed to counsel's strategy. Id.
Dillbeck argues that he is entitled to relief under Cronic and the Nixon cases. Dillbeck's argument, however, is without merit. Initially, Dillbeck argues that he is entitled to relief because the trial court did not conduct an on-the-record inquiry to determine whether or not he consented to trial counsel's strategy of conceding guilt. That requirement, however, was articulated by this Court nine years after Dillbeck's trial and, by its own terms, was intended to be prospective only. See Nixon II, 758 So.2d at 625 ([I]n order to avoid similar problems in the future, we hold that if a trial judge ever suspects that a similar strategy is being attempted ... the judge should stop the proceedings and question the defendant on the record....) (emphasis added). [12] Dillbeck also argues that he is entitled to relief under the Nixon line of cases because he did not consent affirmatively and explicitly to counsel's strategy of conceding that he was guilty of felony murder. However, as we noted above, the trial record demonstrates conclusively, as a matter of law, that Dillbeck is not entitled to relief under Nixon. Two factors in the trial record compel this result. The first, and most important, factor is Dillbeck's own trial testimony, which mirrored counsel's strategy of conceding guilt to felony murder but contesting a finding of premeditation. Like Dillbeck's counsel's concessions to the jury, Dillbeck himself admitted at trial that he was guilty of felony murder, but he argued that the killing was not done with premeditation. Tr. at 1981-82. This is precisely the same concession Dillbeck's counsel made and about which Dillbeck now complains. The second factor that removes Dillbeck's case from the scope of the Nixon cases and leads us to conclude that Dillbeck, as a matter of law, is not entitled to relief is that the State twice brought the Nixon issue to the trial court's attention and requested that the judge question Dillbeck to determine if he consented to counsel's concessions of guilt. Id. at 325-26 (during voir dire); id. at 1647 (opening statement). Both times, Dillbeck's trial counsel objected to any such inquiry, arguing that the matter was confidential and subject to the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 326-27 (voir dire); id. at 1648 (opening statement). [13] When the State raised the issue during voir dire, the judge did not question Dillbeck, but he did ask for, and he received, counsel's assurance that [he had] discussed the matter with Mr. Dillbeck. Tr. at 329. The judge then stated for the record: I do find that [Dillbeck's counsel] has assured me that he has discussed the strategy [of conceding guilt] with Mr. Dillbeck.... Mr. Dillbeck has been present throughout the inquiry of the jurors. I find that Mr. Dillbeck appears to be totally aware of the proceedings, that he has responded to each of the jurors that have come into the room, that he is well aware of what is going on. ... I do believe that if he in any way disagreed with the strategy of his lawyer in the handling of this matter, that he could make that known to me, if he chose to do so. And he has not done so and I would also say that from my experience with [Dillbeck's counsel] ... it is inconceivable to me that [he] could be accused of being ineffective counsel.... So, at this point, I do decline to ask Mr. Dillbeck directly with regard to this question. But I would certainly give Mr. Dillbeck an opportunity to be heard on it if he chose to do so. .... And I assume from his lack of response to my statement and the smile on his face at this time, that he does not intend to respond at this point. Id. at 330-32 (emphasis added). The judge explained that he was just trying to be cautious to avoid the problems that had arisen in Nixon and stated that he was satisfied that this is a knowing procedure that both [counsel] and Mr. Dillbeck are proceeding in. Tr. at 333. When the State again raised the issue, this time after Dillbeck's counsel's opening statement, Dillbeck's counsel again objected to any questioning of Dillbeck. However, Dillbeck's counsel assured the court that he had discussed all this with my client. Id. at 1648. The judge agreed with counsel that it would be improper to question Dillbeck, but he told counsel that it would be very comforting to me if Mr. Dillbeck would be willing to say to the Court that he has discussed this matter with you and is aware of the consequences and you have explained it thoroughly to him. Id. at 1650. Dillbeck's counsel replied: Well, he probably would if I asked him to, but I think this is important. Id. The judge then concluded the matter by stating: I think that [Dillbeck's counsel] has given me the assurances that I need to allow this matter to proceed.... I would assure anyone who reads this record that I believe this is the most effective strategy that [Dillbeck's counsel] could implement.... Mr. Dillbeck has been present throughout all these proceedings. He was present throughout the voir dire examination and is obviously alert and intelligent and ... there is no question in my mind but [that] he understands fully what is happening here and would indicate an objection if he did not concur with it. Id. at 1651-52 (emphasis added). The record reveals that Dillbeck was informed by the court of his right to object to his counsel's strategy of conceding guilt, and he chose not to object. For each of these reasons, we hold, as a matter of law, that Dillbeck is not entitled to relief under the Nixon line of cases. We therefore affirm the circuit court's denial of relief.