Opinion ID: 4682736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admissibility of Prior Act Evidence.

Text: 1. Positions of the parties. Goodson claims the district court erred in allowing admission of evidence related to the December 8 altercation, the mention of the arrest warrant related to it, and Miller’s testimony about Goodson punching A.T. in the face several months prior to December 23. Although there was no contemporaneous objection at trial, Goodson now objects to testimony from A.T. outlining the history of their stormy relationship.1 Goodson claims that the evidence was used by the State to show that Goodson was generally a bad person and would act in conformity with that bad character during the December 23 incident. Goodson recognizes that under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b)(2), other act evidence might be relevant on a significant issue such as intent. State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Iowa 2004). Goodson argues, however, that intent was not really an issue in the case as he admitted he was “pissed” and that his actions were not accidental. Goodson also claims that the prior acts evidence was not supported by “clear proof.” Although Goodson concedes that under our caselaw, 1Goodson invites us to address the unpreserved issue on this direct appeal under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under S.F. 589, however, ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims cannot be decided on direct appeal. 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 31 (codified at Iowa Code § 814.7). In State v. Macke, we determined that S.F. 589 did not retroactively apply prior to its effective date of July 1, 2019. 933 N.W.2d 226, 231, 236 (Iowa 2019). Since the district court’s judgment occurred on October 4, 2018, prior to the effective date of S.F. 589, S.F. 589 does not apply and we may address the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issue on direct appeal. 10 direct testimony from one witness may amount to clear proof, State v. Richards, 879 N.W.2d 140, 152 (Iowa 2016), he argues that in this case the evidence was heavily disputed and thus should have been excluded. Even if the evidence was arguably relevant, Goodson argues that the probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. He cites Richards for the proposition that propensity evidence may encourage juries to punish the defendant because of his past conduct rather than on evidence related to the crime. Id. In pressing his argument, Goodson notes that juries are far more susceptible than judges in bench trials to deciding a case based on an improper basis. State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 130 (Iowa 2004). Goodson further asserts that the district court did not properly limit the scope of the prior act evidence. In particular, Goodson argues that the evidence regarding the December 8 incident included a video that was played, in whole or in part, several times for the jury. Goodson notes that the district court did not provide the jury with a cautionary instruction regarding the use of the evidence. Finally, Goodson claims he was prejudiced by the introduction of the prior acts evidence. He asserts that in light of the conflicting testimony at trial, confidence in the jury verdict is undermined because of the improper admission of the prior acts evidence. The State recognizes that the evidence it offered regarding prior acts cannot be used solely to show propensity. Id. at 123 (citing State v. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Iowa 2001) (en banc)). But the State insists the use of the prior acts evidence was not to demonstrate general propensity. According to the State, the evidence was relevant to show Goodson had specific intent to assault A.T. Further, according to the State, the evidence was relevant to show motive. In particular, the State 11 observes that “domestic violence is a pattern of behavior, with each episode connected to the others.” State v. Richards, 809 N.W.2d 80, 93 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 129 n.6). The evidence, according to the State, was not used to show that Goodson “was a violent man generally” but only that he was violent toward A.T. specifically. Richards, 809 N.W.2d at 93–94. The State also argues the evidence was relevant on the question of whether the sex between Goodson and A.T. on December 23 was consensual or coerced. On the issue of “clear proof,” the State observes that the mere fact that the matters are disputed does not prevent admission of the prior acts evidence. The State emphasizes that on the issue of clear proof, there is no “require[ment] that the prior act be established beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is corroboration necessary” when a witness directly testifies about prior events. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 130. 2. Framework for admission of prior acts evidence. The admission of the evidence is governed by Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b)(1). Under the rule, “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” The rule further provides, however, that prior acts “evidence may be admissible for another purpose such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. r. 5.404(b)(2). We have analyzed the admissibility of prior acts evidence using a three-step approach. In Richards, we summarized the three-step approach: (1) “the evidence must be relevant and material to a legitimate issue in the case other than a general propensity to commit wrongful acts”; (2) “there must be clear proof the individual 12 against whom the evidence is offered committed the bad act or crime”; and (3) if the first two prongs are satisfied, “the court must then decide if [the evidence’s] probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” Richards, 879 N.W.2d at 145 (alteration in original) (quoting Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 25). We considered the question of the admission of prior act evidence in a case involving domestic disputes in State v. Taylor. 689 N.W.2d at 120– 30. In Taylor, we determined that in order for the evidence of prior domestic abuse to be admissible, the evidence “must be probative of ‘some fact or element in issue other than the defendant’s criminal disposition.’ ” Id. at 123 (quoting Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d at 440). The Taylor court held that evidence of prior conduct by a defendant against the same victim as the alleged crime may demonstrate motive and intent. Id. at 125 (“[P]rior conduct directed to the victim of a crime, whether loving or violent, reveals the emotional relationship between the defendant and the victim and is highly probative of the defendant’s probable motivation and intent in subsequent situations.”). Similarly, in State v. Rodriquez, we concluded that evidence of prior abuse by a defendant against the victim was admissible when the defendant was charged with murder, kidnaping and assault against his girlfriend (the same victim as the prior abuse) because “prior intentional, violent acts towards the victim . . . [made] it more probable that [the defendant] intended to cause [the victim] serious injury” on the specific day of the crimes for which he was being charged. 636 N.W.2d 234, 242 (Iowa 2001). If there is no dispute such as intent or motive, then the primary “relevancy of [prior acts] is to show the defendant’s criminal disposition or propensity to commit the very crime for which the defendant is on trial.” 13 Richards, 879 N.W.2d at 147 (quoting State v. Henderson, 696 N.W.2d 5, 16 (Iowa 2005) (Lavorato, C.J., concurring specially)). When confronting the possibility of propensity inferences from evidence of violent acts, we look to whether the evidence establishes “not that [a defendant is] a violent man generally, but rather [whether a defendant is] explosive toward [the victim] specifically.” Richards, 809 N.W.2d at 94. Taylor also provides guidance on the second step for determining whether clear proof exists that the individual committed the prior act. “[I]t is not required that the prior act be established beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is corroboration necessary”; instead, all that is required is “sufficient proof to ‘prevent the jury from engaging in speculation or drawing inferences based on mere suspicion.’ ” Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 130 (quoting State v. Brown, 569 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Iowa 1997)). “[A] victim’s testimony, standing alone, satisfies the requirement of clear proof.” State v. Jones, 464 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Iowa 1990). Finally, Taylor provides guidance on the third step for whether the unfair prejudice of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value. To analyze the balancing, Taylor provides, [T]he court should consider the need for the evidence in light of the issues and the other evidence available to the prosecution, whether there is clear proof the defendant committed the prior bad acts, the strength or weakness of the evidence on the relevant issue, and the degree to which the fact finder will be prompted to decide the case on an improper basis. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 124. In Richards, the court acknowledged that “juries would probably not like someone whom they conclude has repeatedly assaulted a significant other and therefore might develop a desire to punish.” 879 N.W.2d at 152. And that a jury trial means that “the fact finder is more susceptible to 14 deciding the case on an improper basis.” Id.; see also Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 130 (“Clearly the likelihood of an improper use of the evidence is reduced by the fact that the present case was tried to the court.”). Yet the caselaw clearly permits the admission of prior acts if relevant to a noncharacter issue and if the relevancy of the evidence is substantially outweighed by prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g., Richards, 879 N.W.2d at 145; State v. Mitchell, 633 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Iowa 2001). 3. Application of prior acts framework. The battle over the narrative in this case was whether Goodson and A.T. were parents and former lovers who had their struggles but generally got along, or whether Goodson had turned so bitter against A.T. in light of their failed relationship that he broke into her home without her permission and physically and sexually assaulted her. The nature of the relationship between A.T. and Goodson was critical in determining the motive for Goodson entering A.T.’s home, whether he entered without permission, and whether he entered the house with intent to assault A.T. Importantly, the prior act evidence did not simply show that Goodson had bad character traits. Instead, the evidence specifically focused on the nature of the relationship between A.T. and Goodson and was clearly connected to factual issues to be determined by the jury at trial. While Goodson may have “stipulated” to being “pissed off,” the issue at trial was not simply whether he was upset or angry. Instead, the jury was asked to determine whether he intentionally broke into A.T.’s house with intent to assault her. Goodson certainly did not concede he intended to commit the acts with which he was criminally charged. See Richards, 809 N.W.2d at 94–95. Goodson and A.T. offered the jury highly conflicting versions of the events on December 23. The prior acts evidence was relevant to show what 15 motivated Goodson on that day. The district court properly admitted the evidence because it helped to “adequately frame the nature of the parties’ relationship.” Goodson claimed to be in the home with A.T.’s permission and that they engaged in consensual sex. A.T. told a much different story. Surely the evidence showing the contentious nature of the relationship between A.T. and Goodson was relevant on the question of whose story to believe. We thus reject Goodson’s argument that the admission of the prior acts evidence was an impermissible effort designed generally to show bad character. It was specific evidence designed to show the nature of the relationship between A.T. and Goodson that had direct relevance to determining what happened on December 23 at A.T.’s home. We next consider the issue of clear proof. A.T. testified about the various pieces of evidence regarding the December 8 incident and said Goodson committed the acts. The content of the video is self-proving in regard to some interaction taking place between A.T. and Goodson on December 8. As for Miller’s testimony about observing Goodson punch A.T. several months before December, the fact that Miller, a third-party witness with nothing to gain, testified under oath about a concrete and particular event is enough to provide sufficient proof to the jury that Goodson actually punched A.T. To add further proof, A.T. testified to remembering the specific event described by Miller. Goodson argues that even if the evidence was otherwise admissible, it should have been excluded by the district court because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the prejudice to Goodson. We do not agree. As noted above, the evidence helps to set the stage for the antagonistic relationship between Goodson and A.T., and eliminates the necessity of the jury to conduct a pure “he said, she said test” of credibility. In cases with conflicting direct testimony, it is crucial to have triangulating 16 evidence to resolve the issue. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the relevance of the testimony was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Last, Goodson claims the district court should have limited the scope of the prior acts evidence. The evidence that was admitted focused on the combative relationship between A.T. and Goodson. The December 8 incident was described in detail and included a video from a security camera. But aside from the detail, Goodson does not identify any prejudicial collateral matters that improperly came in through the back door. We see no reversible error here. For all the above reasons, we reject Goodson’s claim that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior acts in this case.