Opinion ID: 1192452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plain Meaning of the Actual Words

Text: (1a) Observing that section 969a explicitly requires that as a condition of amendment the information be pending, defendant argues the plain meaning of this requirement prohibits postverdict amendments, because an information is no longer pending when the jury has finished its deliberations and returned a verdict. At that time, he argues, the information is no longer pending because the function of the information has been fulfilled. Accordingly, the People's statutory right to amend the information ceased when the jury returned a verdict. In contrast, respondent relies on definitions found in two standard law dictionaries to conclude that the word pending means that period of time beginning at the inception of a legal proceeding until the rendition of a final judgment.  (Black's Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 1134, col. 2, italics added; see also Ballentine's Law Dict. (3d ed. 1969) p. 930, col. 1 [a pending action is one that has not been terminated by a final judgment or order].) Because a verdict is not a final judgment (§ 1237, subd. (a) [sentence is a final judgment that may be appealed]; cf. People v. Gardner (1960) 177 Cal. App.2d 43, 45 [1 Cal. Rptr. 830] [verdict of guilty not appealable]; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Appeal, § 3164, p. 3919 [[t]he judgment is the oral pronouncement under [§ 1202] ..., not the jury's verdict]), respondent argues the information remains pending for section 969a purposes until pronouncement of sentence. In sum, defendant claims the information ceases to be pending upon the rendering of the verdict, whereas respondent argues the information continues to be pending until pronouncement of sentence. (2a) To determine the meaning of section 969a, we must ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. ( DynaMed, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386 [241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323] (hereafter Dyna-Med ).) Our first step is to scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. ( Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 763 [280 Cal. Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404]; Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].) The critical language at issue here is the following passage in section 969a:  Whenever it shall be discovered that a pending ... information does not charge all prior felonies of which the defendant has been convicted ..., said ... information may be forthwith amended to charge such prior conviction or convictions.... (Italics added.) Certainly the word whenever suggests the amendment may be made at any time. (See People v. Superior Court ( Mendella ) (1983) 33 Cal.3d 754, 764, fn. 9 [191 Cal. Rptr. 1, 661 P.2d 1081] [emphasizing the word whenever in § 969a in observing that because the People can add prior felony allegations later, priors need not be pleaded and proven at the preliminary examination], superseded by statute on another point, as discussed in People v. Baries (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 313, 321 [256 Cal. Rptr. 920].) This potentially open-ended period for amendment, however, is then limited by the description of the information as pending, which suggests some temporal limit on amendments. Whether an information is still pending following receipt of the verdict, or whether it remains pending until sentencing, is not clear. Defendant contends the question of the plain meaning of the word pending in section 969a has been settled by prior case law. In People v. Houston (1937) 24 Cal. App.2d 170 [74 P.2d 517] (hereafter Houston ), the People filed a supplemental information alleging prior conviction allegations [a]fter defendant had been found guilty. ( Ibid. ) When the defendant appealed and claimed the supplemental information (and the subsequent finding he was an habitual criminal) was improper, the Attorney General conceded the filing was error under section 969a, and the appellate court accordingly reversed the judgment of habitual criminality. ( Houston, supra, 24 Cal. App.2d at p. 171.) Two years later in People v. Louviere (1939) 34 Cal. App.2d 62 [93 P.2d 179] (hereafter Louviere ), the People, following the jury's verdict, filed an amended information to charge a prior conviction. The allegation was apparently found true. On appeal, the appellate court held the trial court erred in permitting the postverdict amendment of the information and deleted reference to the prior conviction, citing Houston, supra, 24 Cal. App.2d 170. ( Louviere, supra, at p. 64.) Finally, in People v. Morton (1953) 41 Cal.2d 536 [261 P.2d 523] (hereafter Morton ), this court cited both Houston and Louviere in observing section 969a relates only to the amendment of a pending indictment or information to add new prior conviction charges before verdict.  ( Morton, supra, at p. 543, italics added.) We continued: The legislative purpose expressed in the section ... was to fix a time after which no further charges could be made. ( Ibid. ) Defendant contends this trio of cases establishes an information is no longer pending for section 969a purposes following receipt of the verdict. Although these three opinions suggest a postverdict amendment of the information to charge prior convictions is impermissible, none is dispositive of the issue now before us. In Houston, supra, 24 Cal. App.2d 170, the court engaged in no analysis of the issue, the Attorney General having conceded error. In Louviere, supra, 34 Cal. App.2d 62, the appellate court simply cited Houston, again providing no analysis of the question of the proper interpretation of section 969a. Defendant's claim that Morton controls this case fares no better. In Morton, the primary issue was whether the evidence was sufficient that a crime for which the defendant had spent time in the Tennessee State Penitentiary qualified under California law as a prior felony conviction. To prove the prior conviction, the People presented a card from the Tennessee prison bearing the defendant's name, fingerprints, and the letters HBL. No Tennessee prison official testified as to the meaning of these initials, although a local California law enforcement officer testified that, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Bulletin of Standardized Abbreviations, he believed HB stood for housebreaking and L denoted larceny. We concluded this evidence was insufficient to prove the prior conviction. ( Morton, supra, 41 Cal.2d at pp. 539-540.) The next question in Morton was whether the entire matter (including the substantive offenses) had to be retried, or whether a limited remand for retrial on just the prior felony enhancement was permissible. ( Morton, supra, 41 Cal.2d at pp. 541-542.) In the course of this discussion, this court cited Houston and Louviere, and briefly suggested that the interpretation of section 969a in those cases was necessary to ensure the prior conviction allegations are tried by the same jury. ( Morton, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 543.) This passage in Morton was dictum, however, because the case did not concern the proper interpretation of section 969a, but instead involved whether the evidence was sufficient to prove a certain prior conviction and, if not, what the proper procedure would be on remand. (41 Cal.2d at pp. 540-541.) In sum, neither Houston, Louviere, nor Morton, persuades us the plain meaning of the actual words in section 969a prohibits postverdict amendments of the information to allege prior felony convictions.