Opinion ID: 2802190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims 15 and 21 Are Obvious in Light of

Text: Voris, Burrell and Whipps Claim 21 depends directly from claim 15. Claim 15 incorporates the resistance exercise machine of claim 6, where “the halting effector mechanism comprises a solenoid and a retractable pin.” ’754 Application at 30, ll. 15–16. Mr. Holness contends the PTAB committed legal and factual error in affirming the Examiner’s determination “that it would be obvious to substitute a solenoid with a retractable pin of Whipps for the Voris brake means.” Appellant’s Br. 61. Specifically, Mr. Holness argues that in the ’754 Application, the solenoid with a retractable pin is a binary device, capable of protruding or retracting. Accordingly, Mr. Holness asserts that “a solenoid with a retractable pin in the place of the Voris ‘brake means’ would not have the capacity to create a variable resistance or any resistance in the Voris device since Voris ‘brake means varies resistance on a shaft.’” Id. at 62. Mr. Holness concludes that “it would be unsatisfactory to combine Whipps and Voris because Whipps teaches away from a solenoid and the use of a solenoid.” Id. The PTAB found that “Whipps discloses the use of solenoid operated pin controllers to adjust the resistance applied by an exercise machine based upon a signal representative of a user’s momentary muscle failure.” PTAB Decision at 14 (citing Whipps, col. 2 ll. 17–22). “’A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in IN RE HOLNESS 16 the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.’” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Mr. Holness has not provided any compelling grounds for his assertion that “Whipps teaches away from a solenoid.” Appellant’s Br. 62. His assertion that substituting a retractable pin in the place of a brake means in Voris teaches away from the use of a solenoid because the combination would fail to create a variable resistance in Voris misses the mark. As this court has established, movement of combined elements is within the technical capabilities of a skilled artisan in the art. In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[W]e do not ignore the modifications that one skilled in the art would make to a device borrowed from the prior art.”) (citing Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications, S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989–90 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Therefore, the appropriate test is not whether replacement of the solenoid pin controllers with a retractable pin for the brake means in Voris would have been appropriate, but whether it would have been obvious for a person of skill in the art to replace one halting effector mechanism with another. See id. Here, as noted by the Examiner and affirmed by the PTAB, Voris disclosed its brake means as its halting effector mechanism and it would have been obvious for a skilled artisan to substitute one type of halting effector mechanism, such as a solenoid with a retractable pin, for another. Therefore, this court sustains the PTAB’s obviousness rejections of claims 15 and 21. D. Mr. Holness Waived Any Right to Claim a New Ground of Rejection Mr. Holness asserts the Examiner issued rejections based on U.S. Patent No. 5,195,746 (“Boyd”) 7 in every 7 Boyd discloses an IN RE HOLNESS 17 office action, and in the Examiner’s final answer, “claimed that Boyd was a ‘typographical error’[8] and then issued a new ground of rejection, not in prior prosecution, based on Burrell, which the [PTAB] affirmed.” Appellant’s Br. 65 Mr. Holness asserts that because “[n]o notice of this ground of rejection was given [to him] during prosecution,” it violates his right to due process. Id. Consequently, he claims the PTAB’s affirmance of the Examiner’s new ground of rejection constitutes “a violation of [his] due process rights.” Id. at 64. The Director argues Mr. Holness has waived his right to assert there was a new ground of rejection. According to the Director, “[a]n Examiner is permitted to include a new ground of rejection in the Examiner’s Answer.” Appellee’s Br. 28 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 41.39). Upon issuing the rejection, the Director argues that the burden then shifts to the applicant to: “(1) request that prosecution be reopened before the primary examiner by filing a reply under 37 C.F.R. § 1.111; or (2) request that the appeal be maintained by filing a reply brief as set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 41.41.” Id. at 28–29. The Director claims that Mr. Holness did not exercise either of these options. [a]pparatus for controlling the movement of an electronic image on a video display [which] includes a base member, a seat for an operator, a support assembly for mounting the seat on the base member in facing relation to the video display, such that the seat can be tilted relative to the base member. Boyd, Abstract, ll. 1–6. 8 The PTAB credited the Examiner’s determination that it made a typographical error and that “Boyd had not been relied upon for rejecting claims 15 and 21.” PTAB Decision at 14. IN RE HOLNESS 18 In this case, the PTAB affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of the ’754 Application over Voris and in light of what Mr. Holness claims to be a new ground––Burrell. However, similar to the regulation related to an Examiner’s decision to reject an application on what constitutes new grounds, § 41.50(b), a subset of the same provision, titled “New ground of rejection,” allows an appellant to challenge the PTAB’s decision to reject an application based on new grounds “within two months from the date of the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). The appellant must either: 1) request a reopening of prosecution; or 2) request rehearing. Id. § 41.50(b)(1)-(2). Here, as noted by the Director, Mr. Holness appealed the PTAB’s decision to this court as opposed to requesting a rehearing of the PTAB’s decision as stipulated by the regulation. Thus, even if we assumed the PTAB based its determination on a new ground of rejection, Mr. Holness cannot now assert that such grounds constitute a violation of his due process rights.