Opinion ID: 2355627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: attempted burglary

Text: Our review of the record does not permit us to conclude that the Commonwealth offered sufficient evidence that would justify a finding of guilt of attempted burglary. All of the evidence offered tends to establish nothing more than the fact that the arresting officer, who was 12, 13 stores away, observed the appellant walk out of a doorway [1] and then proceed to a pile of sand at a nearby construction site where he bent over as though to place some object. The officer stated that at this point he apprehended the appellant and walked him back to 1253 Point Breeze Avenue where he noticed that a protective screen over a window in the doorway had been pried away. From this testimony, the Commonwealth would have us conclude that the appellant used a screwdriver, which was found by the police officer in the vicinity of the sandpile, to pry back the screen, a screen which had been intact four hours previously. A finding of guilt based upon such tenuous evidence would be purely conjectural. Appellant's mere presence at the scene where screening over a window had been bent is insufficient to prove him guilty of attempted burglary. Even assuming that the Commonwealth could prove that appellant possessed the screwdriver; [2] there is nothing to indicate that he used it to bend back the screen. The record is devoid of any evidence connecting appellant with the screen. There was no showing that anyone saw appellant tampering with the window. Furthermore, the arresting officer gave no indication of hearing any suspicious noises as he approached the store. We also note that there was no evidence to show that the screwdriver was the instrument which caused the bending of the screen. The tool or implement used to pry open the screen could have been a screwdriver but it is as equally possible that a hammer, crowbar or any other similar object was the instrument used. There are many tools and implements which are suitable for bending back a screen and the Commonwealth did not attempt to show that in this instance it was a screwdriver which had been employed. We therefore conclude that the finding of attempted burglary was based solely on suspicion or speculation, which is impermissible. See Commonwealth v. Bailey, supra , and cases cited therein. Commonwealth v. Cimaszewski, 447 Pa. 141, 288 A. 2d 805 (1972), although distinguishable on its facts, is illustrative of the extent of the permissible conclusions that a trier of fact may reasonably draw. As summarized by this Court, the evidence in Cimaszewski was that at approximately 11:00 p.m. two police officers, responding to a burglary in progress report, heard noises coming from within the building, the front door of which had been loosened and a window jimmied. Two men were seen fleeing from the rear of the building one of whom was immediately apprehended and identified as appellant Cimaszewski's brother. At the same time, the second officer proceeded to the rear of the property and while so doing heard noises coming from that area. Investigating the noises, the officer found the appellant standing on top of a nearby shed roof. Under these circumstances, we were satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to find Cimaszewski guilty of attempted burglary. With respect to appellant, however, the evidence is clearly insufficient to sustain his conviction. The crucial factors which distinguish the instant case from Cimaszewski are as follows: There is no indication that the radio call received by the arresting officer reported a burglary in progress; the officer heard no noises coming from the doorway; the officer was unable to specifically place the appellant in the doorway in question; and the appellant was not seen fleeing from the scene  at best, he was observed walking from the general direction of the doorway. Even if we were to accept that the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant did in fact pry the screen open, there is serious question whether this record supports the requisite intent necessary for attempted burglary. The crime of attempted burglary requires that the attempted entry be accompanied with an intent to commit a felony within. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, §§ 901, 1107, 18 P.S. §§ 4901, 5107. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 349 Pa. 402, 37 A. 2d 504 (1944) (conviction of attempted burglary set aside because of no evidence of an intention to commit any felonious act). Here it was apparent prior to the dislodging of the screen that entry could not be gained without removing the boarding from the window. The evidence is uncontradicted that the boarding had not been tampered with and there was a complete absence of any evidence of interruption by any outside circumstances. These facts strongly suggest that there may not have been an intention to enter and commit a felony therein but rather that the intent may have been just the malicious destruction of the screen. From a review of all of the evidence we are satisfied that the testimony offered was insufficient to sustain the verdict of attempted burglary.