Opinion ID: 1090851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: Failure to Exclude Jurors Who Were Biased Against Russell

Text: ¶ 154. Finally, Russell argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to identify and exclude jurors whose bias would have prevented them from being impartial in this case, but Russell does not specify any witnesses or how counsel should have extracted this particular information. Russell also states that counsel failed to ensure that jurors who were closely related to law enforcement were struck either for cause or peremptorily, but mentions no jurors by name. Absent some specific allegation as to any specific juror we find that this issue is without merit. K. INADEQUATE BATSON CHALLENGES. ¶ 155. Russell argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failure to raise a timely objection to the 1990 jury based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Second, Russell states that defense counsel failed even to point out the power of the prima facie case, or the history of the abuse of peremptory challenges in this jurisdiction. Third, defense counsel failed to demand either that the prosecution ask the questions that would have revealed the pretextual nature of their questions, or ask the questions themselves. Fourth, defense counsel made no effort to prove that the State's challenges were entirely pretextual. ¶ 156. Defense counsel raised the Batson issue on direct appeal. We provided the following analysis: Russell, a black man, was tried by a jury consisting of nine whites, two blacks, and one Oriental. In selecting the jury, the State used 11 of its challenges: 9 challenges against blacks, 2 challenges against whites; the defense used 10 of its challenges: 9 against whites and 1 against a black. Russell challenged the State's use of nine peremptory challenges against members of the black race, alleging its challenges constituted an impermissible practice under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The State articulated reasons for all its challenges. The trial court found the State's reasons to be racially neutral and overruled the Batson Motion. In examining this assignment of error [w]e give great deference to the trial court's findings of fact on this issue. [citation omitted]. As long as the trial court was within its authority when it determined that the State articulated a neutral, non-race based explanation, we will not reverse. We have carefully examined each of the reasons given by the State and find that the trial court was within its authority in declaring each reason to be racially neutral. This assignment is without merit. Russell, 607 So.2d at 1110-11 (citations omitted). ¶ 157. Russell's argument is apparently that while defense counsel raised the issue, it could have been done better. Russell states that defense counsel did not timely raise the issue in the circuit court. While this is true, a record of the State's reasons for its strikes was eventually made, and the issue was raised on direct appeal and reviewed by this Court. Russell states that the race neutral reasons given by the State were false, and attaches unsworn statements from five persons who were struck from the venire, stating that the State's reasons were not accurate. Russell states that Mississippi has refrained from mandating a particular procedure for trial courts to follow. Nevertheless, Mississippi requires that defense attorneys be afforded a meaningful opportunity to dispute the race-neutrality of the prosecutor's stated reasons for employing peremptory strikes. We find that defense counsel was given a meaningful opportunity to respond to the State on this issue. This issue is without merit. L. FAILURE TO MAKE AN OPENING STATEMENT. ¶ 158. Russell argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make an opening statement. Russell cites two cases from other jurisdictions where counsel was found to be ineffective for a multitude of shortcomings, one of which was a failure to make an opening statement. The State cites Manning v. State, 726 So.2d 1152, 1169 (Miss.1998), where we stated that the decision to make an opening statement is a strategic one. In short, failure to make an opening statement certainly would be one factor to consider in making a determination of ineffectiveness, but by itself is not determinative. M. FAILURE DEVELOP A MEANINGFUL AND CONSISTENT DEFENSE THEME. ¶ 159. Russell argues that defense counsel should have developed a theme for the defense at trial, primarily, the theme that Russell acted in self-defense. Defense counsel was able to raise this defense partially, but not to the extent desired by Russell, primarily because of Russell's failure to support it with his testimony. Russell next argues that if defense counsel was going to argue that the whole dispute between Russell and Officer Cotton was over the yeast and money, then at least counsel should have introduced substantial evidence on why this was so much larger an issue in the context of a prison setting than it would be in the free world. While such a strategy might have been helpful, it would also have emphasized to the jury that Russell was in prison and needed to stay there. We find that this issue is without merit. N. FAILURE TO PREVENT THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS. ¶ 160. Russell argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failure to prevent comments on the prior record of the accused. Russell points to the testimony of Officer Rayford Jones who approached Russell immediately after he stabbed Officer Cotton. Officer Jones was called as a witness by the State, and testified on direct examination that he told other MDOC officers also approaching Russell to let me try and talk him out of his knife cause this wasn't the first time that I had had an occasion to run into Russell and get something from him like that. Defense counsel objected based on relevance and the testimony amounting to evidence of another crime. The circuit court never said sustained, but clearly felt the testimony was improper, as it directed the State not to pursue this line of questioning, and instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. Officer Jones then stated that he told Russell that if he gave him the knife he would not hurt Russell and he would not let anyone else hurt him. Russell stated that this second bit of testimony re-emphasized the past encounter. We disagree and find that defense counsel was not ineffective here. O. INADEQUATE IMPEACHMENT. ¶ 161. Russell next argues that defense counsel failed to impeach various witnesses for the state. He specifically mentions Smith. As stated earlier, two problems with impeaching Smith's testimony is that (1) Smith's testimony is not that much different in key areas from Russell's own testimony and (2) Russell now asks that Smith's recantation of his previous testimony be taken seriously. ¶ 162. Womber was the next witness that defense counsel should have impeached. Russell argues that Womber's testimony was prepped; that he did not know how many times Russell had stabbed Officer Cotton; that Womber could not have seen Russell come out of his cell door; that Womber was wrong when he said Russell tried to stab Officer Lee; that Womber's statement that he had spoken to Russell about another inmate, Bobby Caldwell, selling knives was not true; and that Womber was lying when he said he did not know what inmates were yelling about during the stabbing. ¶ 163. We have no idea as to whether Womber's testimony was prepped; it appears of little consequence that Womber did not know the exact number of times Russell's knife actually hit Officer Cotton; that since Russell admitted how he got out of his cell, it is of little consequence as to whether Womber saw it or not; that Officer Lee testified that Russell turned towards me and came towards me swinging the knife; that there is nothing here from Caldwell as to whether the alleged conversation with Russell occurred or not; and we are not sure how defense counsel should have proved that Womber really did know what other inmates were yelling. Now that Womber has recanted his trial testimony, he is a reliable witness, according to Russell. ¶ 164. Russell next states that Officer Lee could have been impeached because of his misstatement of the time of the incident on one report and his identification of a unit register for the days prior to the date of the stabbing. Russell states that a cursory glance at the copy of the register so identified reveals that it cannot be that same log, but is a substitute. Russell cites nothing further in support of this allegation. As for the wrong time on the report, this would have shown that Officer Lee was not perfect, but little else. ¶ 165. Officer James Bovan never testified in any of Russell's trials. It would have difficult to impeach him with his incident report. ¶ 166. Richard O. Williams, a criminal investigator for the Mississippi Highway Patrol, first testified that he became involved in the investigation of the stabbing in June 1989. He then corrected himself and stated July 1989. Russell says defense counsel should have capitalized on this. Trying to develop meaningful impeachment based on such a peripheral matter would have been a waste of time. We find that this issue is without merit. P. FAILURE TO PRESENT IMPORTANT EVIDENCE. ¶ 167. Russell states that there was substantial favorable evidence that defense counsel should have presented, as well as witnesses who should have been called by the defense. Russell states that this evidence was discussed in detail under other issues, so we will not attempt to discuss it in further detail here. Q. WHETHER RUSSELL WAS ADEQUATELY ADVISED OF HIS RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY. ¶ 168. Russell states that this issue, like the previous one, has been discussed in greater detail under other issues. Russell does say that to the extent that counsel did not create a situation where there was a presumption of prejudice from the manner in which counsel effectively placed Russell in the position of having to tell something other than the whole truth, counsel prepared ineffectively to present their client on the witness stand. Russell next argues that defense counsel did not believe that Russell could be impeached with his prior statement to MHP Officer Rogers, but does not give any authority for this statement. The circuit court's order of May 10, 1990, which suppressed the statement, specifically stated that the statement was not suppressed as to rebuttal or impeachment testimony. Russell states that defense counsel did not prepare him for the impeachment he faced with his own statement, but does not say how defense counsel should have prepared him to deal with a statement he made. R. INADEQUATE GUILT PHASE CLOSING ARGUMENT. ¶ 169. Russell next argues that defense counsel made a brief and ineffective closing argument at the guilt phase of the 1990 trial, citing three specific deficiencies: counsel referred to Russell as a dog, counsel did not argue self defense, and counsel did state that Russell was guilty of manslaughter. ¶ 170. A review of the record shows that defense counsel's closing argument spans eight pages. Defense counsel did state, in trying to explain Russell's way of life in prison of being under constant control of guards as far as sleeping, meals and showers, as being like a caged animal. Defense counsel stated that Officer Cotton, in taking Russell's money and not delivering the yeast, was in effect poking a caged dog or a caged animal, and this is what caused the rage and helplessness in Russell which eventually caused him to kill Officer Cotton. ¶ 171. Russell is also correct that defense counsel only briefly mentioned self-defense during closing argument, and that was in the context of a manslaughter instruction. Russell states that defense counsel should have been arguing self defense, but there was no evidentiary support for the self defense theory Russell raises now. The jury was instructed on self-defense, based apparently on Russell's belief that Officer Cotton was armed and about to use a knife, but defense did not argue this, probably because there was little testimony to support it. If defense counsel made a strategic decision to argue manslaughter as the strongest defense, we find that he was not wrong. ¶ 172. We dispute that defense counsel conceded on closing argument that Russell was guilty. Defense counsel argued that the jury should consider manslaughter in an attempt to keep Russell from getting the death penalty. We find that defense counsel was not ineffective here. S. FAILURE TO ADVISE RUSSELL OF HIS RIGHT TO TAKE PART IN CLOSING ARGUMENT. ¶ 173. Russell states that defense counsel was ineffective for not advising him of his right to take part in closing argument, because if he had, Petitioner clearly would have taken the opportunity to speak on his behalf in closing argument. This is the same Willie Russell described by his attorneys in this petition as semi-literate and mentally retarded. Russell cites no authority for this speculative argument, which we find to be without merit. T. INADEQUATE JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GUILT PHASE. ¶ 174. Russell argues first that defense counsel was ineffective for submitting an instruction, D-17, which states that if you find that the State has failed to prove any one of the essential elements of the crime of capital murder, you must find the Defendant not guilty of capital murder and you will proceed with your deliberations to decide whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of a lesser crime of manslaughter. Russell points out that counsel actually argued the matter the other way around to the jury, urging them to consider manslaughter first. The State points out that we have found that this type of instruction, an acquit-first instruction, is not prohibited by the law of this State. Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 75 (Miss.1998). ¶ 175. Russell next argues that defense counsel did not request a proper instruction on self-defense, and the State's instruction was also improper. As stated before, the State's self-defense instruction which was given was proper under the law at the time of Russell's trial. This issue is without merit.
¶ 176. Russell alleges that, in the three years between the 1990 trial and the second sentencing trial, counsel had not developed any other meaningful evidence for the penalty phase, made catastrophic and unjustifiable decisions in terms of what should be presented, and did not even seek to present evidence that the Supreme Court of Mississippi had suggested to be admissible. Since very little of what current post-conviction counsel has developed is meaningful, we do not fault trial counsel for failing to develop or present it earlier. Russell does not specify defense counsel's catastrophic and unjustifiable decisions, and so we will not address these here. As to our suggesting that certain evidence was admissible, we assume that Russell refers to Officer Cotton and his alleged illegal dealings with other inmates. We did state, in Russell, 607 So.2d at 1116, that the evidence discussed herein may well have been admissible during sentencing had Russell re-offered it. Russell did offer evidence during the first sentencing trial of his own dealings with gangs and how they had threatened him for interfering in an attack on a third inmate but did not offer evidence of Officer Cotton and his dealings with gangs. Defense counsel may have felt that introducing evidence which could be viewed as an attempt to smear the victim at this point would have done more harm than good. At the second sentencing trial, defense counsel could have attempted to introduce the evidence about Officer Cotton, but considering that there was still no connection between Officer Cotton, the gangs and the threat on Russell's life, this does not appear to have prejudiced Russell. ¶ 177. Russell alleges that counsel spent 1 3/4 hours with him in preparation for the second sentencing hearing. Russell cites nothing in support of this assertion. Russell again complains about the failure to introduce the gang material, along with evidence of C.O. Cotton's misconduct. Once again we find that this evidence was not particularly relevant.
¶ 178. Russell's counsel filed a motion for change of venue for the second sentencing hearing. Venue was changed to Montgomery County. Russell apparently argues that his counsel should have objected, because the jury was likely to almost as closely linked to Parchman as the Sunflower County jury. This is an argument with no support, and it presupposes that counsel could have prevented the change to Montgomery County.