Opinion ID: 1886897
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Venue/Venire

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for change of venue/venire. He contends that the publicity surrounding the criminal episode at issue was endless, incredibly inflammatory, and referred to [Appellant] as a serial killer and, therefore, it was impossible to select a fair and impartial jury in [Lehigh County]. Brief for Appellant, p. 16. Appellant specifically points out that one month before the trial, the Ladies' Home Journal printed an article, where Appellant was identified by name, which referred to the facts of the case that was not joined for trial and portrayed the details of Appellant's arrest in sensational fashion. Id. at 16-17. [34] Appellant also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) properly ... present and argue the motion for [change of venue]; and (2) make a careful inquiry of the jurors regarding the Ladies' Home Journal article. Brief for Appellant, p. 17. We have previously stated that: The trial court's decision on appellant's motions for change of venue/venire rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling thereon will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. In reviewing the trial court's decision, our inquiry must focus upon whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of the defendant's guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity. A change in venue becomes necessary when the trial court concludes that a fair and impartial jury cannot be selected in the county in which the crime occurred. Normally, one who claims that he has been denied a fair trial because of pretrial publicity must show actual prejudice in the empanelling of the jury. In certain cases, however, pretrial publicity can be so pervasive or inflammatory that the defendant need not prove actual juror prejudice. Pretrial prejudice is presumed if: (1) the publicity is sensational, inflammatory, and slanted toward conviction rather than factual and objective; (2) the publicity reveals the defendant's prior criminal record, or if it refers to confessions, admissions or reenactments of the crime by the accused; and (3) the publicity is derived from police and prosecuting officer reports. Even where pre-trial prejudice is presumed, a change of venue or venire is not warranted unless the defendant also shows that the pre-trial publicity was so extensive, sustained, and pervasive that the community must be deemed to have been saturated with it, and that there was insufficient time between the publicity and the trial for any prejudice to have dissipated. In testing whether there has been a sufficient cooling period, a court must investigate what a panel of prospective jurors has said about its exposure to the publicity in question. This is one indication of whether the cooling period has been sufficient. Thus, in determining the efficacy of the cooling period, a court will consider the direct effects of publicity, something a defendant need not allege or prove. Although it is conceivable that pre-trial publicity could be so extremely damaging that a court might order a change of venue no matter what the prospective jurors said about their ability to hear the case fairly and without bias, that would be a most unusual case. Normally, what prospective jurors tell us about their ability to be impartial will be a reliable guide to whether the publicity is still so fresh in their minds that it has removed their ability to be objective. The discretion of the trial judge is given wide latitude in this area. Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 570 Pa. 117, 808 A.2d 893, 902 (2002) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 919, 123 S.Ct. 2284, 156 L.Ed.2d 137 (2003); also see Hughes, 555 A.2d at 1279; Commonwealth v. Pursell, 508 Pa. 212, 495 A.2d 183, 187-88 (1985). Initially, we note that, despite referring to sensational and highly inculpatory publicity ... in all of the public media, from the day of the discovery of the incidents to the date of the trial, with the exception of the Ladies' Home Journal article, in his brief, Appellant does not specifically refer to any other publication or media outlet. Brief for Appellant, p. 15. Accordingly, because Appellant fails to make any contention relating to any specific item of pre-trial publicity other than the aforementioned Ladies' Home Journal article, even if we assume the existence of such publicity, we find that his argument fails in relation to those items. See Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978) (observing that the mere existence of pre-trial publicity does not warrant a presumption of prejudice). Furthermore, after thoroughly reviewing the record we are not persuaded by the complaints made by Appellant. Any potential bias on the part of the jurors in relation to the media coverage of the case was sufficiently dealt with during the individually-conducted voir dire when the defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court, asked the potential jurors whether they had heard or read anything about the case. Indeed, unless preliminarily excused for other, unrelated reasons, each of the prospective jurors was questioned about their familiarity with the case and their knowledge concerning the incidents from media outlets. Some jurors stated that they knew about the incidents and they were further questioned about whether their ability to decide the case would be affected. The record reveals that of the jurors who were aware of the case, most gained their knowledge through the media reports circulated at the time of Schmoyer's homicide and Appellant's apprehension, which was more than a year before the trial was set to begin. [35] This clearly indicates the presence of a sufficient cooling off period that minimized any potential ill effects of the publicity surrounding the events at issue. [36] Ultimately, the twelve jurors and four alternates selected for trial all stated that they would be fair and impartial when hearing the case. After undertaking an independent review of the entire transcript of the voir dire proceedings, we are convinced that pretrial publicity did not result in the inability to select a fair and impartial jury in Lehigh County. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a change of venue/venire and Appellant is not entitled to any relief on this claim. For this reason, we find that Appellant is similarly not entitled to relief on his allegation of counsel ineffectiveness in relation to the motion to change venue/venire. We also believe that the argument concerning the alleged failure of Appellant's counsel to question the venire persons about the Ladies' Home Journal article is patently unmeritorious. Presently, Appellant specifically argues that, [a]t a minimum, [trial] counsel should have made a careful inquiry of the jurors regarding the Ladies Home Journal article, and the record is devoid of any such questions. Brief for Appellant, p. 17 (emphasis supplied). Contrary to this declaration, on numerous occasions during voir dire, counsel for Appellant asked potential venire persons, two of whom were later accepted as jurors and one as an alternate, whether they subscribed to or read the Ladies' Home Journal. See N.T., 10/11/1994, p. 341, 565; N.T., 10/13/1994, pp. 961, [37] 1171; N.T., 10/18/1994, p. 2100; N.T., 10/20/1994, p. 2788. We believe that this clearly indicates that Appellant's counsel were aware of the article in the Ladies' Home Journal and, in fact, questioned the potential venire persons in relation to that publication. Therefore, we reject this claim without reaching its merits, because the record before us contradicts the allegation made by Appellant.