Opinion ID: 2766627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory and Decisional History

Text: In 1975, this court decided two cases involving the procedures constitutionally required for commitment under the (since-repealed) Mentally Disordered Sex Offender (MDSO) statutes, Welfare and Institutions Code former sections 6300 to 6332. In People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306 (Burnick), we held that the due process guarantees of both the United States and California Constitutions required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order for ―the state to publicly brand a man as a mentally disordered sex offender and lock him up for an indeterminate period in a maximum security mental hospital.‖ (Burnick, supra, at p. 310.) We relied on the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Specht v. Patterson (1967) 386 U.S. 605, reasoning that ―[i]n light of the fundamental similarity between the sexual psychopath proceedings challenged in Specht and in the case at bar, the question before us is whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the ‗full panoply of the relevant protections which due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings,‘ ‖ a question we then answered affirmatively. (Burnick, supra, at p. 318.) In a companion case, People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, we held an MDSO committee was constitutionally entitled to a unanimous jury verdict (id. at pp. 349–352) and that MDSO‘s committed to state institutions other than hospitals (because they were deemed not amenable to 4 treatment at a state hospital) could not be confined for an indefinite period (id. at pp. 346, 375–376). The Legislature responded in 1976 by providing that the term of an MDSO commitment could not exceed the maximum aggregate penal term to which the defendant could have been sentenced. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1101, § 9, p. 4977, amending Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 6316.) After enactment of the determinate sentencing law (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139), further revisions to the MDSO law were made ―to provide additional safeguards against the premature release of dangerous persons.‖ (Stats. 1977, ch. 164, § 6, p. 638.) Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2, added by the 1977 legislation, created a standard and procedure for annual extended commitments beyond the initial maximum term of commitment set by former section 6316.1. Such an extended commitment could be made if the person suffered from a mental disorder so predisposing him or her to commission of sexual offenses as to present a serious threat of harm to others. (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 6316.2, subd. (a).) Under the new 1977 procedure for an extended MDSO commitment, the rules of criminal discovery applied, the defendant had a right to appointed counsel if indigent, and trial was by jury unless waived. (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 6316.2, subds. (d), (e), added by Stats. 1977, ch. 164, § 3, p. 634.) Moreover, the new section provided: ―The patient shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the Federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings. All proceedings shall be in accordance with applicable constitutional guarantees.‖ (Id., subd. (e), italics added.) The 1977 MDSO revisions were intended to ―establish[] a practical and reasonable system for extending commitments on a year-by-year basis for MDSO‘s who continue to be dangerous‖ while making ―provisions for due process‖ and for ―representation of all concerned parties.‖ 5 (Health & Welf. Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1178 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) June 29, 1977, p. 2.) In In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 467, we held equal protection principles demanded that initial NGI commitments, like those under the MDSO laws, be limited to ―the maximum term of punishment for the underlying offense.‖ Relying on the 1977 amendments to the MDSO scheme, we held initial NGI commitments must be limited as in Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.1 to the maximum term of penal confinement, but that NGI commitments could be extended under standards and procedures conforming ―[t]o the extent practicable, and in the absence of further legislation on the subject,‖ to those in Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2. (Moye, supra, at p. 467.) Further legislation was not long in coming. In 1979, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1026.5, limiting initial NGI commitments and providing for commitment extensions. As in Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2, Penal Code section 1026.5 provides that in commitment extension proceedings the rules of criminal discovery apply, indigent defendants have the right to appointed counsel, and trial is by jury unless waived. (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(3), (4), (7).) And, in language almost identical to that in Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2, subdivision (e), the NGI statute states: ―The person shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings. All proceedings shall be in accordance with applicable constitutional guarantees.‖ (§ 1026.5(b)(7), italics added.) Legislative history confirms section 1026.5 was enacted in response to Moye; as we had held was required by equal protection, the new statute set limits on initial NGI commitments, while allowing extensions using a standard and procedures similar to those for MDSO‘s. (Assem. Off. of Research, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1022 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 11, 1979, p. 1; 6 Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1022 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 3, 1979, pp. 1–2.) In an extension hearing under the new statute, the respondent would have ―full jury trial criminal rights.‖ (Assem. Off. of Research, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1022 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.), Sept. 11, 1979, p. 1.) Describing the commitment extension procedure, another analysis stated: ―All rights that apply in criminal trials apply for these hearings (right to counsel, discovery, unanimous jury verdicts, etc.).‖ (Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1022 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.), as amended July 3, 1979, p. 2.) Despite the facially broad language of Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2, subdivision (e), and Penal Code section 1026.5(b)(7), a series of appellate decisions has read the statutes more narrowly as incorporating not all, but only a subset of the constitutional rights enjoyed by criminal defendants. In People v. Henderson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 740 (Henderson), an MDSO committee claimed the trial court violated his constitutional and statutory rights by admitting, at his extension hearing, his statements to state hospital staff to the effect that he was sexually stimulated by violence. The appellate court first rejected the constitutional self-incrimination claim on the ground that admission of the statements in an extension hearing could not be incriminatory, since the proceeding was limited to the issue of the defendant‘s mental disorder and predisposition to commit sexual offenses and would not result in a penal sanction. (Id. at pp. 746–747.) Turning to the statutory claim founded on Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2, subdivision (e), the court read the statute as not mandating application of the privilege against self-incrimination in the case before it. ―Subdivision (e) of section 6316.2 codifies the application of constitutional protections to MDSO proceedings mandated by judicial decision (see, e.g., People v. Burnick, supra[, 14 Cal.3d 306]; People v. Feagley, supra[, 14 7 Cal.3d 338]). It does not extend the protection of the constitutional privileges against self-incrimination to testimonial communications which are not incriminatory.‖ (Henderson, supra, at p. 748.) People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 477 (Williams) restated Henderson‘s reading and extended it to section 1026.5(b)(7). In holding that double jeopardy guarantees did not preclude retrial of an NGI commitment extension petition after reversal of a nonsuit granted by the trial court, the appellate court rejected the argument that double jeopardy protections were incorporated by statute into the extension proceeding: ―It is clear . . . that although many constitutional protections relating to criminal proceedings are available in extension proceedings, the application of all such protections is not mandated by section 1026.5. The statutory language merely codifies the application of constitutional protections to extension hearings mandated by judicial decision. It does not extend the protection of constitutional provisions which bear no relevant relationship to the proceedings. (People v. Henderson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 740, 748.) . . . [¶] Since, as we have concluded in connection with our discussion of the constitutional principles, double jeopardy provisions can have no meaningful application to extension proceedings which are civil in nature, are for the purpose of treatment not punishment, and are not an adjudication of a criminal act or offense, we hold that double jeopardy provisions are not applicable to extension proceedings by virtue of the language of the statute.‖ (Williams, supra, at p. 488, italics added.) In People v. Powell (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1153 (Powell), the court quoted and relied on Williams‘s conclusion that section 1026.5(b)(7) ― ‗merely codifies the application of constitutional protections to extension hearings mandated by judicial decision.‘ ‖ (Powell, supra, at p. 1158, quoting Williams, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 488.) Based on that reading and its own sense as to how an 8 extension hearing should be conducted, the court held an NGI extension hearing respondent did not have the right to be tried by a jury unless personally waived. ―An insane person who is ‗a substantial danger of physical harm to others‘ (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1)) should not be able to veto the informed tactical decision of counsel. . . . [¶] Appellant has twice been adjudged to be insane and state hospital doctors have never indicated that he has regained his sanity. He seeks release so that he can kill people. . . . [¶] Common sense dictates that appellant should not be able to veto his attorney‘s decision to waive jury.‖ (Powell, supra, at p. 1158; see Angeletakis, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th 963, 969–971 [following Williams to hold respondent under § 1026.5 has no right not to be tried while mentally incompetent].) Haynie, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th 1224, which as here dealt with the right not to be called as a witness, broke the chain of narrow interpretations. Over Haynie‘s objection, the prosecution in his commitment extension hearing was permitted to call him in its case-in-chief; on appeal, he contended he should not have been compelled to testify. The Haynie court agreed under the authority of section 1026.5(b)(7). (Haynie, at pp. 1227–1230.) Haynie relied primarily on the statute‘s plain language, reasoning: ―Here, the Legislature‘s words clearly and unambiguously state the person ‗is entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings.‘ A defendant in a criminal matter has an absolute right not to be called as a witness and not to testify. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Evid. Code, § 930.) Under the plain language of the statute, because Haynie is entitled to the same rights guaranteed to a criminal defendant, he should not have been compelled to testify in the prosecution‘s case at his commitment extension trial.‖ (Haynie, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1228.) 9 Reviewing the narrowing decisions discussed above, Haynie expressed agreement with Williams that ―the statutory language of section 1026.5 does not extend the ‗protection of constitutional provisions which bear no relevant relationship to the proceedings‘ ‖ (Haynie, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229), but disagreed with Williams‘s ―broad statement . . . that the statutory language ‗merely codifies the application of constitutional protections to extension hearings mandated by judicial decision‘ ‖ (Haynie, at p. 1230). That interpretation, Haynie reasoned, renders the statutory grant of rights superfluous and ―supplants the legislative rights-inclusive language with a process whereby judges select which rights will apply.‖ (Ibid.) On the application of section 1026.5(b)(7) to the issue of compelled testimony in an extension hearing, Haynie concluded the right not to testify is ―clearly and relevantly implicated when a person is called by the state to testify in a proceeding to recommit him or her even if what is said on the witness stand is not per se incriminating.‖ (Haynie, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230.) Unable to find the respondent‘s compelled testimony was harmless in the extension hearing, the appellate court reversed the commitment extension order. (Id. at pp. 1230– 1231; cf. In re Luis C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1402–1403 [applying Haynie to extension of a juvenile commitment under Welf. & Inst. Code § 1801.5, which provides that the juvenile ―shall be entitled to all rights guaranteed under the federal and state constitutions in criminal proceedings‖]; accord, Joshua D. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 549, 558–562 (Joshua D.).) This brings us to Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th 1099, on which the People principally rely. In Lopez, the issue of an NGI extension defendant‘s right not to testify arose only indirectly; at issue was not an NGI extension but rather a petition for recommitment under the Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) law. (§§ 2960–2981; see § 2972 [procedure for hearing on recommitment].) The 10 defendant argued that the admission of his testimony at the recommitment hearing denied him equal protection of the law because, under the statutes construed in Haynie and Luis C., respondents in NGI and juvenile commitment extension cases could not be compelled to testify. (Lopez, supra, at pp. 1105–1106.) The Lopez court rejected the equal protection claim by disagreeing with Haynie and Luis C. on their interpretations of the NGI and juvenile commitment statutes. Lopez criticized Haynie for not sufficiently addressing Henderson‘s holding that admission of an MDSO defendant‘s statements did not violate his rights under Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2, subdivision (e). (Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1110–1111.) Haynie, the Lopez court asserted, failed to account for the fact ―that Henderson had concluded identical language to that found in section 1026.5(b)(7) did not grant a committee the selfincrimination privilege enjoyed by a criminal defendant.‖ (Lopez, supra, at p. 1111.) Lopez also faulted Haynie for an assertedly contradictory approach to the plain language of section 1026.5(b)(7). On the one hand, Lopez noted, Haynie relied on the statute‘s clear and unambiguous language providing an NGI extension respondent the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant; on the other hand, Haynie agreed with Williams that that language did not include rights with no ―relevant relationship‖ to commitment proceedings. (Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1115.) ―However, if the [Haynie] court actually meant to apply section 1026.5(b)(7) literally, it should not have engaged in any further analysis‖ beyond applying the statute‘s plain language. (Ibid.) Having accepted Williams‘s ―nonliteral‖ reading of section 1026.5(b)(7), Lopez went on to conclude the right not to testify has no relevant relationship to NGI commitment extension proceedings because, like other civil commitment proceedings, they ―are not criminal proceedings, do not involve adjudication of 11 guilt, and do not result in punishment.‖ (Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1116.) For this aspect of its reasoning, Lopez relied mainly on our decision in Cramer, supra, 23 Cal.3d 131, that intellectually disabled persons facing commitment had no constitutional right to refuse to testify. (Lopez, supra, at p. 1116.)