Opinion ID: 2033789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Direct Appeal the Proper Remedy?

Text: We have long recognized that a defendant may forgo a trial and plead guilty. Without question, [a]n accused has the right to elect as to whether he will stand trial or plead guilty. Abraham et al. v. State, 228 Ind. 179, 185, 91 N.E.2d 358, 360 (1950). With that election, of course, a defendant gives up certain rights. Indiana's trial courts are obliged to inform a defendant pleading guilty that he is waiving his right to a public and speedy trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to have witnesses testify in the defendant's favor and to require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-35-1-2 (West 1986). Strict compliance with our statute is demanded of our trial courts in order to determine that any waiver of fundamental constitutional rights is knowingly and intelligently given. Davis v. State, 446 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (Ind.1983). In the course of a guilty plea hearing, two sorts of actions occur. One is a legal act by the defendantgiving up various statutory and constitutional rights and pleading guilty to the State's charge. The other act involves determinations of factual guilt. See, e.g., Ind.Code Ann. § 35-35-1-3(b) (West 1986) (court must determine there is a factual basis for plea); Ind.Code Ann. § 35-4.1-1-3 (Burn's 1985) (repealed and replaced by Ind. Code Ann. § 35-35-1-3 (West's Supp.1995)) (defendant must be informed that guilty plea admits the truth of the facts alleged); Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420 (Ind.1983) (court may not accept plea of defendant who proclaims factual innocence). One consequence of pleading guilty is restriction of the ability to challenge the conviction on direct appeal. In Weyls v. State, 266 Ind. 301, 362 N.E.2d 481 (1977), Justice DeBruler restated the long-standing principle that a conviction based upon a guilty plea may not be challenged by motion to correct errors and direct appeal. Id. at 302, 362 N.E.2d at 482, citing Crain v. State, 261 Ind. 272, 301 N.E.2d 751 (1973). Accord, Snow v. State, 245 Ind. 423, 195 N.E.2d 468 (1964); Meyers v. State, 156 Ind. 388, 59 N.E. 1052 (1901). In the face of this precedent, the Court of Appeals held in this case that a defendant should be permitted to appeal from a plea of guilty whenever the record of the guilty plea is adequate to resolve the issue being appealed. Tumulty v. State, 647 N.E.2d 361, 364 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). Under this approach, the determination of whether the record was adequate would apparently be made after the appeal was fully briefed in the court on appeal, as the Court of Appeals did in Tumulty's case. Id. Though the Court of Appeals did not say so, surely this right would not be one forfeitable due to poverty; counsel would necessarily be offered at public expense. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854). The long-standing judicial precedent limiting the avenue of direct appeal for guilty plea challenges stands on multiple grounds. First, the plea as a legal act brings to a close the dispute between the parties, much as settling civil parties do by submitting an agreed judgment. To permit appeal by settling parties would, of course, make settlements difficult to achieve in any litigation. There is a practical reason for the limit on appeals. Of the 31,973 criminal cases adjudicated by Indiana trial courts in 1994 (the most recent figures available), some 28,867, or ninety percent were disposed of by guilty plea. [1] Allowing the new remedy of direct appeal for those 28,867 guilty pleas has the potential to multiply dramatically the caseload in the appellate courts by offering appeals to thousands of admitted felons. In the same year the state's appellate courts heard 1,116 direct criminal appeals. [2] We have created an avenue for claims such as Tumulty's by adopting Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1. The rationale for this rule was explained in Crain, 261 Ind. 272, 301 N.E.2d 751: [T]he type and extent of evidentiary hearing afforded at a post-conviction proceeding is much broader than a hearing on a motion to correct errors and specifically designed to allow appellant an opportunity to establish the factual assertions he makes concerning his guilty plea. Id. at 273, 301 N.E.2d at 751-752. Indeed, we have recently held that post-conviction relief is exactly the vehicle for pursuing the claims Tumulty seeks to present on direct appeal. Butler v. State, 658 N.E.2d 72 (Ind.1995).