Opinion ID: 2219129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Application to Briggs' Appeal.

Text: Briggs claims the imposition of cash only bail in her case has violated both the sufficient sureties and excessive bail clauses. However, she presented no evidence to show that she was absolutely precluded from accessing a surety of some form. Instead, her allegations appear to center on the denial of access to a commercial bail bond. As we concluded above, there is no absolute right to such access. Briggs has made no claim that she could not otherwise find a sufficient surety. Under other circumstances, we would, perhaps, remand this issue to the district court to determine whether Briggs' access to a surety was completely precluded. However, Briggs' claim is moot, and any further remand on this issue would be an unwarranted and unnecessary waste of judicial resources. We also conclude that Briggs' allegation that her cash only bail was excessive is unavailing. We do not often have the opportunity to consider our excessive bail clause. However, when we do have such an opportunity, the similarity between our clause and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive bail permits us to look to the interpretations by the United States Supreme Court for guidance in interpreting our own clause. State v. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541, 547 (Iowa 2000). The Court's clearest statement on the federal excessive bail clause came in its observation that [t]he only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government's proposed conditions of release or detention not be `excessive' in light of the perceived evil. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2105, 95 L.Ed.2d 697, 713 (1987). A consideration of this limitation requires a comparison between the interest the Government seeks to protect and the method by which it is being protected. Id. Iowa Code section 811.2 vests the determination of the appropriate form of bail in the discretion of the district court. Iowa Code § 811.2. The court's determination is guided by the necessity of reasonably assur[ing] the appearance of the person for trial or deferral of judgment and [guaranteeing] the safety of other persons. Id. § 811.2(1). These purposes are accomplished by considering a number of factors in setting bail, including the nature of the defendant's offense, prior record of criminal activity, and adherence to any other bail requirements imposed by the district court in the past or present. See id. § 811.2(2). Briggs stood accused of prostitution for the fourth time within a single year. The district court at first permitted her to be bailed by commercial bond, but Briggs abused that opportunity by skipping bail and failing to appear for her arraignment. After Briggs appeared for arraignment and the district court set her bail at cash alone Briggs challenged the court's decision by an application for bond review. In reviewing that application and refusing to alter the bail amount and method of satisfaction, it is clear that the district court considered the purpose of bail and the interests the government sought to protect. Moreover, the method by which the state protected that interestbail set at $6500 cashwas reasonably related to those interests. We conclude that Briggs' bail was not excessive.