Opinion ID: 198189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Policy Relating to the Possession of Firearms

Text: 22 Congress' intent in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 922 was to keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 112, 103 S.Ct. 986 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980)). In Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 94 S.Ct. 1262, 39 L.Ed.2d 782 (1974), the Supreme Court stated: 23 The principal purpose of the federal gun control legislation ... was to curb crime by keeping 'firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal background, or incompetency.' 24 415 U.S. at 824, 94 S.Ct. 1262 (citation omitted). 25 According to the Supreme Court, Congress in enacting the firearms ban sought to rule broadly. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 112, 103 S.Ct. 986 (quoting Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977)). See also id. at 116, 103 S.Ct. 986 (Congress was reaching far and was doing so intentionally.); Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 824, 94 S.Ct. 1262(stating Congress was concerned with general availability of firearms to those whose possession thereof was contrary to the public interest). Consistent with this broad purpose, Congress did not limit the firearms prohibition only to those who had already committed dangerous or violent acts. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) (prohibiting possession of firearms by any person under indictment for crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, whether crime was violent or not); id., § 922(g)(1) (prohibiting possession of firearms by felons, whether or not convicted of a crime of violence). See also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)(prohibiting possession of firearms by unlawful users of controlled substances); id., § 922(g)(5) (illegal aliens); id., § 922(g)(7)(citizens who have renounced their citizenship). 26 The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to apply the prohibition against the possession or ownership of firearms by mentally unstable or irresponsible individuals. See H.R. 17735, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), 114 Cong. Rec. 21780, 21791, 21832, and 22270 (1968). Congress considered the mere risk or potential for violence or irresponsible use sufficient reason to prohibit certain categories of persons from possessing firearms. See Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 112 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 986 (Congress' intent in enacting § 922(g) ... was to keep firearms out of the hands of presumptively risky people.); Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 220, 96 S.Ct. 498, 46 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) (legislative history reflects a concern with keeping firearms out of the hands of categories of potentially irresponsible persons). As for an individual adjudicated a mental defective or committed to a mental institution, Congress obviously felt that such a person, though unfortunate, was too much of a risk to be allowed firearms privileges. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 116, 103 S.Ct. 986. 27 In enacting the federal firearms ban, Congress had a second purpose in mind--national uniformity in determinations of whether a person is within a category covered by the firearms prohibition. As the Supreme Court has stated, treating the scope of the ban as a matter of federal law makes for desirable national uniformity unaffected by varying state laws, procedures, and definitions ... Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 112, 103 S.Ct. 986. The Dickerson Court noted that giving effect to the intricacies of varying state statutes would seriously hamper effective enforcement of [the firearms ban]. Id. at 121, 103 S.Ct. 986. 7 C. Commitment Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) 28 Chamberlain does not deny that Maine's procedural requirements for an emergency involuntary hospitalization pursuant to 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863 were met in his case. He contends, however, that his preliminary five-day involuntary hospitalization, which was followed by his voluntary admission to the same institution on an informal basis for an additional eight days, did not amount to a commitment sufficient for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). He argues that a person can be deemed committed under Maine law for purposes of the federal firearms ban only after notice and issuance by a state judge of a formal order of commitment following a full hearing at which the person has had the opportunity to be heard. 29 As said, Congress itself has not defined the term commitment. However, in ordinary usage, commitment means to place in or send officially to confinement ... to consign legally to a mental institution.... See Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971). In that sense, Chamberlain's involuntary admission under section 3863 would seem no different from a commitment. In urging us to interpret commitment so as to exclude an initial five-day emergency detention, Chamberlain relies upon the maxim that an ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). The rule of lenity serves important goals, including allowing fair warning as to what conduct is criminal and punishable, and is the product of an awareness that legislators and not the courts should define criminal activity. Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 814, 94 S.Ct. 1262. As the Huddleston Court noted, however, [z]eal in forwarding these laudable policies ... must not be permitted to shadow the understanding that '[s]ound rules of statutory interpretation exist to discover and not to direct the Congressional will.'  Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 542, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943)). Although penal laws are to be construed strictly, they 'ought not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.'  Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 814, 94 S.Ct. 1262 (quoting American Fur Co. v. United States, 27 U.S. 358, 2 Pet. 358, 367, 7 L.Ed. 450 (1829)). We believe that Congress's intent can reasonably be ascertained in this case and that Chamberlain's restrictive interpretation of commitment would defeat the broad prophylactic purpose, Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 118, 103 S.Ct. 986, of the federal firearms ban. 30 Chamberlain focuses first on the fact that section 3863 of the Maine statute uses only the phrase involuntary admission with respect to the five-day emergency detention in issue, whereas section 3864 speaks expressly of commitment in regard to the longer-term detention discussed there. He argues that we owe this difference in terminology great deference. We find no evidence, however, that the Maine Legislature consciously used the involuntary admission language to distinguish between that and a commitment. To the contrary, the legislature has used the terms admission and commitment interchangeably. Section 3864(1)refers to the post-emergency application filed by the chief administrative officer of the hospital under § 3863(5)(B) 8 --filed pursuant to a procedure Chamberlain urges us to interpret as a commitment--as an application to admit a person to a mental hospital. 9 This legislative imprecision undermines Chamberlain's attempt to find an important meaning in the difference in terminology here. Chamberlain's argument likewise finds no support in the opinions of the Maine courts concerning the involuntary hospitalization statutes and their predecessors. The Maine Supreme Court has at times characterized the initial involuntary hospitalization under § 3863 as a commitment, see, e.g., In re Faucher, 558 A.2d 705, 706 (Me.1989), and at other times has characterized the same procedure as one for emergency admittance, Sukeforth v. Thegen, 256 A.2d 162 (Me.1969). 10 31 Moreover, even if the Maine Legislature had been more precise in its use of the two terms, we would be faced with the question of how far to rely upon the language chosen by the state legislature in interpreting commitment for purposes of the federal firearms ban. We would hesitate to convert a question of federal law into one solely of state law, as such an approach could destroy the uniformity Congress sought in enacting section 922(g)(4). State statutes tend to vary widely as to the language chosen to describe the process of involuntary hospitalization. Compare, e.g., Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 123, § 12(e)(referring to a ten-day emergency involuntary hospitalization, similar to section 3863's five-day detention, as a commitment) with 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863(1)(characterizing emergency procedure as admission). Were we to focus solely on whether or not the term commitment is used, a patient in Massachusetts admitted on an emergency basis would be deemed committed for purposes of conviction under the federal firearms ban, while a patient involuntarily hospitalized in Maine in identical circumstances would not. This is precisely the sort of national patchwork, Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 122, 103 S.Ct. 986, Congress sought to avoid in enacting the firearms ban. 32 In support of his narrow interpretation of commitment, Chamberlain relies primarily upon Giardina and Hansel. In those cases, the courts indeed relied upon the words chosen by the respective state legislatures in concluding that no commitment had occurred. In Giardina, petitioner was involuntarily hospitalized for two weeks pursuant to a Louisiana statute allowing detention of persons based upon a Physician's Emergency Certificate stating that the person is mentally ill. The Eighth Circuit carefully examined the language used by the Louisiana Legislature in both the then-existing and superseded versions of the involuntary hospitalization statutes, and concluded that since no commitment--as the process had been characterized by the state legislature--had occurred, no commitment had taken place for purposes of the federal firearms ban. 861 F.2d at 1336. In Hansel, the Fifth Circuit followed a similar course. The court concluded that since the Texas statute at issue did not characterize Hansel's involuntary detention as a commitment, no commitment had occurred pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922. 474 F.2d at 1122-23. 11 33 With all respect, we believe that the proper interpretation of the phrase, committed to a mental institution, should not turn primarily on the label attached by the state legislature to its procedures, but rather on the substance of those procedures. Thus, rather than focus on the nuances of state statutory language in interpreting commitment, we look at the realities of the state procedures and construe them in light of the purposes Congress sought to accomplish by prohibiting firearm possession by someone who has been committed to a mental institution. We ask whether identifying the state's procedures for involuntary hospitalization as a commitment is reasonable and consistent with the federal policy underlying the firearms ban--namely, to keep firearms out of the hands of those who, if permitted to possess them, would pose a risk or potential for harm. See Waters, 23 F.3d at 34. 34 For this reason, we respectfully decline to follow the approach of Giardina and Hansel, the cases on which Chamberlain primarily relies. Our approach is similar to the analysis of the Second Circuit in Waters. In Waters, petitioner was involuntarily hospitalized pursuant to a New York statute similar in many respects to the Maine statute under consideration. The statute allowed for the involuntary admission of an individual for sixty days based upon an application of a relative or other qualified person and a certificate, signed by two physicians, showing that the physicians had examined the individual within ten days of admission and determined that he was mentally ill. Id., at 32. The statute provided that during the sixty-day period, the individual may request a hearing on the question of the need for involuntary treatment. Id. at 30. At the end of the sixty days, the patient could be further detained if he voluntarily admitted himself for an additional period or the director of the mental health facility obtained a court order authorizing the person's continued detention. Id. At the end of the initial sixty-day period, Waters voluntarily admitted himself for an additional seven months. No formal court order of continued detention was ever obtained. 35 The Second Circuit held that these procedures, whether termed an 'admission' or a 'commitment' [by the legislature] ... established 'commitment' procedures under New York state law, and Waters was 'committed' pursuant to those procedures. Id. at 34. The court noted that no formal judicial proceeding was required under the state statute to detain a person beyond the initial sixty days--a person could voluntarily admit himself to the institution for an indefinite period. Id. at 34. The court went on to conclude that deeming the procedures at issue a commitment was consistent with federal gun control policy, which seeks to prohibit the possession of firearms by those with a potential for violence. Id. at 34-35. 36 The procedures followed in this case, whether denominated as an involuntary admission or a commitment by the Maine Legislature, constituted in all functional respects a commitment for purposes of § 922(g)(4). Chamberlain was involuntarily hospitalized based upon an application filed by a clinician at a mental hospital who stated that Chamberlain had put a loaded gun to his head and threatened his wife. Prior to admission, Chamberlain was examined by a physician who certified, as required under Maine law in order to detain Chamberlain involuntarily, that Chamberlain suffered from a mental illness and posed a danger to himself and others. A judicial officer reviewed the application and the certification of the first physician, determined that they were prepared in accordance with law, and ordered that Chamberlain be detained in a mental institution for five days. A second physician examined Chamberlain within twenty-four hours of admission and certified that Chamberlain suffered from a mental illness and posed a danger to himself and others. During the five-day emergency detention, Chamberlain was not free to go as he pleased. In all respects, then, we conclude that Chamberlain was formally committed to a mental institution. See H.R.Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4421 (noting that it would be unlawful to possess a firearm under the statute if one has been formally committed, for example, pursuant to court order). 37 We reject Chamberlain's argument that a person is not committed for purposes of the federal firearms ban unless all of the requirements set forth in section 3864--including provision of counsel, a full-blown adversary hearing, a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the person suffers from a mental illness, and a judicial order of commitment--are satisfied. Persons held under section 3863 are involuntarily detained as surely as are those held for longer periods under the more elaborate procedures of section 3864. Moreover, to treat section 3864 detention as the only real commitment would come close to limiting commitments to cases in which a person has actually been adjudicated a mental defective after an adversary hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) separately bans persons who have been adjudicated a mental defective from owning firearms, in addition to those who have been committed to a mental institution. In denying firearms to those committed to a mental institution, Congress appears to have cast a wider net--to maximize the possibility of keeping firearms out of the hands of [, among others, persons suffering from mental illness]. See 114 Cong. Rec. 21784 (1968) (remarks of Congressman Celler). Requiring an adversary hearing and a judicial finding of mental illness would conflate two of the categories Congress singled out for the firearms prohibition. 38 We repeat that Congress deemed the potential for misuse of firearms or violence sufficient to bring various categories of individuals within the firearms ban. The legislative history nowhere suggests the need for showing clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness with regard to other categories of individuals placed within the firearms ban--including those under indictment, convicted felons, drug abusers, illegal aliens, and those who have renounced their citizenship. To require a full-scale adversary proceeding and a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that a person is mentally ill and poses a likelihood of harm to himself or others before giving effect to the firearms ban would undermine Congress's judgment that risk or potential, not likelihood, probability, or certainty, of violence is all that is required. 39 Nor does it appear that Congress intended that only persons conclusively found to be suffering from mental illnesses or difficulties after having been afforded the fullest possible panoply of due process rights be deemed to have been committed to a mental institution for purposes of the firearms ban. 12 That level of formality is not required for most of the categories Congress identified as within the firearms ban, including those who have merely been indicted for a crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). When Congress has intended that a particular status triggering the firearms ban be conditioned upon notice and the opportunity to be heard, along with other procedural rights, it has stated so explicitly. In 1994, for example, Congress amended the Gun Control Act to include within the firearms prohibition persons 40 subject to a court order that ... restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child ... 41 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), Pub.L. 103-322, § 110401(c). Before the ban can be applied against such persons, however, Congress required that several procedural rights be provided, including a hearing at which the person has the opportunity to participate and a judicial finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child. See §§ 922(g)(8)(A),(C). See also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (imposing the ban against those convicted of felony). Congress imposed no such procedural requirements with respect to determining those committed to a mental institution. 42 A further reason to find that the meaning Congress envisioned for commitment encompasses Maine's five-day involuntary admission procedure is that many patients of the type Congress would not want to possess firearms may have undergone, like Chamberlain, the five-day emergency detention under section 3863 followed by a voluntary stay at the institution, rather than followed by a further involuntary detention there under section 3864. The initial five-day commitment requires, in both situations, medical findings of dangerousness, although Chamberlain's treatment at Acadia Hospital was thereafter prolonged beyond the five days on a voluntary basis, permitting his continued treatment without need for officials to request his additional involuntary commitment. Were we to hold that the initial emergency commitment was an insufficient basis for bringing him under the federal weapons ban, Chamberlain and many like him would be exempted from the ban even though, in many instances, their mental condition and potential for dangerousness might have been no different from those whose additional hospitalization was under section 3864 rather than being voluntary. 43 While we conclude, therefore, that a five-day emergency detention is a commitment, and that it implicates the potential for harm Congress sought to regulate under the firearms ban, we realize the possibility of instances in which an initial commitment of this type may later be shown, in further state proceedings, to have been mistaken. This, however, is not such a case, hence we need not decide to what extent subsequent proceedings before state tribunals may vitiate a five-day emergency detention for purposes of section 922(g)(4). Here, Chamberlain voluntarily elected to remain at Acadia for more than a week after the initial five-day admission period expired. He does not contest the validity of his emergency admission, but only whether that admission constitutes a legally sufficient commitment. 44 We also note that Chamberlain and others similarly situated are provided by Congress with the administrative means to contest and, in appropriate circumstances, to remove the firearms ban Congress has imposed against those committed to a mental institution. Department of Treasury v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556, 559, 106 S.Ct. 2683, 91 L.Ed.2d 459 (1986). See also Waters, 23 F.3d at 35. Under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), such persons may apply to the Secretary of the Treasury for relief from the firearms ban. The Secretary may grant relief 45 if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest. 46 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). See 27 C.F.R. § 178.144 (describing procedures by which one may petition for relief). These procedures allow a formerly committed person to challenge the continuing validity of a determination that he suffers from a mental illness and is a danger to himself or others. Although he could have done so, Chamberlain did not avail himself of this administrative remedy. 47 We conclude that, under the circumstances presented here, Chamberlain was committed to a mental institution for purposes of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).