Opinion ID: 1652318
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State's Challenges for Cause

Text: Johnson argues that the trial court erred in granting five of the State's challenges for cause. He claims that although the veniremembers in question may have appeared uncomfortable or hesitant during death-qualification, their responses fell short of manifesting irrevocable commitment to voting against the death penalty. A prospective juror's qualifications are not conclusively determined by any single response, but from the entire voir dire examination. [17] As the trial court has the benefit of evaluating firsthand the demeanor and responses of each veniremember as the voir dire progresses, the trial court's ruling as to whether a veniremember is committed to follow the law will not be disturbed absent a finding of abuse of discretion. [18] A general aversion to the death penalty does not by itself disqualify a veniremember. [19] Cause for removal exists if a prospective juror's views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of [that person's] duties as a juror in accordance with [the jury] instructions and [the juror's] oath. [20]
In response to the question of whether the veniremembers could seriously consider imposing the death penalty, Peggy Edwards responded, I'm having quite a bit of stress about thinking that I would be the one to say that someone else wouldn't live. When asked if she could sign a death verdict as foreperson, she stated, It would be a very difficult thing to do. I'm just under a lot of stress about it. I'm not real sure whether I could or not. Edwards also stated that there was a possibility that she would hold the State to a higher burden than beyond a reasonable doubtthat of complete proof. When the State asked her directly whether her views on the death penalty would substantially impair serious consideration of it, Edwards replied, It's possible it could, yes, and I'm one of those people that has always thought I believed in the death penalty until it comes down to me actually saying, yes, I should go ahead and do it, followed by I'm not real sure on that until it actually would come down to the moment of, yeah, you've got to make the decision now. I'm just not real sure. Edwards later stated that she did believe she could follow the court's instructions and could stand up in court and say Yes, this is my verdict in the event of a unanimous recommendation of death. Viewed within the context of the entirety of Edwards's responses, however, these two statements do not prove that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that her commitment to follow the law was substantially impaired with respect to the State's burden of proof or the serious consideration of both life imprisonment and the death penalty. [21]
Angela Leap confessed that she had mixed emotions about the death penalty, but that depending on the facts of the case, she could consider it as an option. When asked if her views would substantially impair the serious consideration of the death penalty, she responded, It might make it difficult, yes, and I would have trouble sentencing someone to death, yes. She stated that she would [p]robably yes hold the State to a higher burden of proof in the penalty phase than the guilt phase. Although the court found that Johnson later rehabilitated Leap as to the burden of proof, the court went on to sustain the State's challenge, noting for the record that Leap was very emphatic in answering the prosecutor's question that her feeling about the death penalty would substantially impair her ability to serve as a juror. There is no evidence in the record of abuse of discretion.
Philip Moore initially stated that it would be difficult for him to be fair and impartial in the guilt phase with the knowledge that the State would seek the death penalty for a first-degree murder conviction. He added that once guilt had been determined, however, he could follow the law in the penalty phase, and that in some cases, he felt the death penalty was appropriate. Later in the voir dire, however, he admitted that he could not sign a verdict recommending death. It is reasonable for a trial court to conclude that a veniremember's unequivocal statement of his inability to sign a death warrant amounts to a substantial impairment to performing the duties of a juror, specifically the serious consideration of the full range of punishment at law, including the death penalty. [22] There is no evidence of abuse of discretion.
Debra Tapp initially stated that although she had problems with the death penalty, she could seriously consider it. Later in the voir dire, however, she stated twice that she would have difficulty imposing the death penalty and twice more that her views would substantially impair her ability to even seriously consider it. She did eventually state that on certain facts, she could sign a death verdict, but it would be a little hard. She also stated that she probably would be able to deal with life in prison a little easier. The record does not reflect that the trial court abused its discretion in finding Tapp's ability to seriously consider the death penalty to be substantially impaired.
Although Valerie Twenter originally stated that she could follow the court's instructions, she later answered that could not consider the death penalty. Then later still, she replied that she could seriously consider both punishments if the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, no single answer is dispositive of a veniremember's commitment to follow the law. [23] Absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that a veniremember's ability to consider the full range of punishment at law is substantially impaired, the ruling will not be disturbed. [24] There is no evidence of abuse of discretion.