Opinion ID: 2610902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Absence from Conferences and Reading of Testimony

Text: (17) Defendant next asserts he was improperly denied the right to be personally present at various in-chambers conferences and a reading of some guilt phase testimony. (The in-chambers conferences included discussion of defendant's hostile reaction to being photographed, his potential for violence if his shackles were removed, and his self-inflicted injuries. The guilt phase testimony did not involve the three murder charges, but only the assault charge arising from the attempted robbery of victim Yoon.) In the present case, defendant orally waived his right to be present at the various in-chambers or bench conferences, and at the reading of testimony. Defendant now observes that, under section 977, a written waiver is required if the defendant is absent during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact.... Assuming the quoted language applies to the conferences and reading of testimony involved here, any error in failing to obtain a written waiver was not prejudicial. As we stated in People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 782 [254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419], Although defendant's oral waiver does not comply with the writing requirement of [section 977], we find no reversible error. Defendant's absence, even without waiver, may be declared nonprejudicial in situations where his presence does not bear a `reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.' (Quoting from People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 359-360 [233 Cal. Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802] [absence from court conferences and reading of testimony deemed nonprejudicial]; see also People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 517-519 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640] [absence from reading of testimony nonprejudicial]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1025-1028 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627] [absence from jury view of murder scene, from conference regarding jury request for clarification, and from reading of testimony nonprejudicial]; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1080-1081 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659] [absence from various hearings and conferences nonprejudicial]; People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 59-62 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109] [absence from penalty-reduction hearing and sentencing nonprejudicial]; People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 829, 845-846 [248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 755 P.2d 894] [written waiver]; People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 406-407 [247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184] [waiver of right to personal presence at reading of testimony; jury provided with transcript]; People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 585-586 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776] [absence from reading of testimony nonprejudicial].) In Garrison, Hovey, and Bloyd, all supra, we held that the defendant had failed to carry his burden of demonstrating prejudice arising from his absence from the reading of testimony to the jury. As we stated in Hovey, The rereading of testimony ordinarily would not be an event which bears a substantial relation to the defendant's opportunity to defend.... (44 Cal.3d at p. 585.) Under the circumstances here, any error in procedure must be deemed harmless. In addition, defendant fails to explain in what manner his presence at the various in-chambers conferences could have improved his opportunity to defend the charges against him. His suggestion that his mere presence at these hearings might have assisted the trial court in evaluating his competence to stand trial is entirely speculative and fails to carry his burden of proving prejudice. (See Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 585 [rejecting, as speculative, argument that jury could have been favorably influenced by watching defendant's reaction to reading of testimony].) Defendant relies on various federal cases which he claims support a different result, but none of them requires us to adopt his position. Indeed, in several recent cases we have discussed and distinguished each of these federal cases, and we will not repeat that discussion here. (See People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 60-61; People v. Grant, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 845; People v. Odle, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 406-407; People v. Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 585.) As the foregoing cases indicate, although some federal appellate decisions contain language to the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has never squarely held that the defendant's presence at all critical phases of trial is mandatory and unwaivable. Thus, assuming the proceedings at issue here should be deemed critical, no prejudicial error occurred by reason of defendant's voluntary absence therefrom.