Opinion ID: 1858055
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Heading: The Public Policy to Protect Juveniles

Text: The final ground cited in Dino was the general policy of Louisiana law to protect juveniles from the possible consequences of their immaturity. The treatment accorded juveniles has undergone a sharp shift in the twenty years since Dino was decided, as evidenced by the Legislature's promulgation of the Children's Code and other changes in our laws. See In re: C.B., R.B., T.C., R.C., S.C., et al., 97-2783 (La.3/11/98); 708 So.2d 391 (discussing changes in the nature of juvenile delinquency adjudications and the blurred distinction between juvenile and adult proceedings). Moreover, the two public policy references cited in Dino as examples of the general policy of protecting minors (the contractual incapacity of juveniles under former La. Civ.Code art. 1785 and the procedural incapacity of juveniles set forth in La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 4501) both are legislative decisions, while the Dino requirements are not. On reconsideration of Dino, we conclude that the prophylactic requirements adopted in Dino, although probably serving the salutory purpose of improving police procedures during the time since their promulgation, were not constitutionally or statutorily required and were improvidently adopted by judicial decision. Under a totality of circumstances standard, the special needs of juveniles can be accommodated in a manner that affords protection not only to juveniles, but also to the interests of society and of justice. See In the Interest of Holifield, 319 So.2d 471, 474 (La. App. 4th Cir.1975)(Lemmon, J., Concurring). Excluding an otherwise valid confession of guilt just because the accused was a few months away from achieving non-juvenile status is simply too high a price to pay for the arguable benefit of more easily administering a per se rule that neither the framers of the Constitution nor the redactors of the Code of Criminal Procedure considered necessary. A confession by a juvenile given without a knowing and voluntary waiver can be, and should be, suppressed under the totality of circumstances standard applicable to adults, supplemented by consideration of other very significant factors relevant to the juvenile status of the accused. While law enforcement officers would do well to continue to follow the Dino procedure in order to insure the validity of a confession by a juvenile, a prophylactic rule imposing these requirements as an absolute standard is not appropriate. We accordingly overrule State in the Interest of Dino, 359 So.2d 586 (La.1978), and reinstate the totality of the circumstance standard that prevailed prior to the Dino decision. Since the trial court's decision in this case to suppress defendant's statement made in response to the officer's question was premised solely on the officer's failure to comply with the Dino requirements and since the trial court never reached the issue of whether defendant's statement was otherwise knowingly and voluntarily given, we remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration of that issue in light of the holding herein.