Opinion ID: 4509465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Minimum Qualifications for DMV Position

Text: ¶ 19. The central question in this appeal is not, as VSEA suggests, the meaning of “minimum qualifications” in the CBA; it is whether grievant met the minimum qualifications for 7 the DMV position. Consistent with the above, we owe the Board deference with respect to its findings of fact concerning grievant’s relevant education and experience. But regarding the “minimum qualifications” for the DMV position, the Board owes deference to, and is not free to stray from, the definition established by the DMV. We will not defer to “factual” findings that effectively rewrite the minimum qualifications for the job. ¶ 20. We conclude that the Board overstepped its authority here by essentially redefining the minimum qualifications for the DMV position. Rather than applying the clear meaning of the term, the Board applied a skills-based analysis, reinterpreting the minimum qualifications to include the equivalent of office clerical work, for the equivalent of two years. In so doing, the Board departed from the minimum qualifications as defined by the DMV. Our conclusion is consistent with both the CBA and DHR policy. Neither our case law calling for a functional analysis of job duties in other contexts nor the fact that some individuals who do not meet the minimum requirements have been hired through the competitive hiring process persuades us otherwise. We discuss these considerations in more detail below. ¶ 21. As noted above, the minimum qualifications for the DMV position include, in relevant part, “two (2) years or more of office clerical experience, that included significant public contact.” Consistent with a straightforward understanding of this requirement, a recruitment services supervisor at DHR testified at the Board hearing that the meaning of “office clerical experience” was “office clerical as an occupation.” In other words, “that’s the primary focus of the position, . . . that’s the reason for the job to exist, is to perform those—to be an office clerk.” The main function of a correctional officer, in her view, was to “provide safety and security within the . . . facility,” and that clerical duties, important as they may be, are “incidental to the main activities of that position.” She testified, “I don’t have the latitude to say, I don’t think they meet the minimum qualifications but I could tell that they could do it, so I’m going to make the referral.” And she rejected the notion that she could conclude that someone has two years of office clerical 8 experience by adding up all the time a person performs clerical tasks in the course of their otherwise non-clerical job. ¶ 22. In concluding that grievant had more than two years of office clerical experience because the time he spent performing clerical tasks in the course of his work as a corrections officer added up to more than nine months, the Board described the State’s understanding of clerical work to be “an outdated application of clerical work in our technological age.” It did not, however, find as a matter of fact that correctional officers are clerical workers or that their primary occupation was administrative—and the record does not appear to support such a finding. Instead, it found that “grievant had experience as a correctional officer performing most of the clerical tasks credited as important by the State,” and that this experience furthered his ability to meet the requirements of the DMV position. It also found that “the frequency with which he performed such tasks was equivalent to at least nine months of the five plus years he was a correctional officer.” ¶ 23. The Board first overstepped its authority when it evaluated grievant’s qualifications by “weighing whether the applicable experience furthers an applicant’s ability to meet the competencies of the position.” It did not ask whether grievant’s job as a correctional officer was an “office clerical” position, but instead reasoned that it provided him the same skills that office clerical experience would. It admonished the State for emphasizing the “setting in which clerical work occurs rather than the tasks performed.” In doing so, the Board essentially disregarded the word “office” in “office clerical experience,” suggesting that any work involving clerical tasks qualifies as “office clerical” work. It also implicitly rejected the notion that clerical and administrative professionals develop distinct or more robust skills relative to workers in other settings whose jobs require them to complete reports, use office equipment, or use a computer for administrative purposes. The Board is not authorized to reinterpret the minimum qualifications in this way. The Board may well believe that the minimum qualifications set by the State are outdated, but it is not the Board’s role to modernize the State’s job descriptions. It may not “substitut[e] its own judgment for that of the State.” Jewett, 2009 VT 67, ¶ 25. 9 ¶ 24. Second, the Board overstepped when it credited grievant with nine months of clerical work based on the amount of time he spent performing clerical tasks. It stated that “the frequency with which he performed such tasks was equivalent to at least nine months of the five plus years he was a correctional officer.” This unorthodox method of calculating work experience is not called for by the job descriptions set by the State. The State did not include the words “or equivalent,” or any similar language, in its job description. Thus, the Board was not empowered to ask whether grievant had the cumulative equivalent of two years of office clerical experience, but was only empowered to decide whether he had two years of office clerical experience. It must apply the minimum requirements as established by the State. ¶ 25. The CBA reinforces this conclusion. The CBA defines minimum qualifications as “the lowest level of skills, experience and educational qualifications necessary for admittance to the examination process.” The CBA itself recognizes that “skills,” “experience,” and “educational qualifications” are distinct aspects of “minimum qualifications”—people who can demonstrate the requisite skills but lack the required experience and education do not meet “minimum qualifications” as defined by the CBA even though they may well be able to perform a particular job. Moreover, the CBA extends RIF rights to employees who meet “the minimum qualifications for the position”—not “the minimum qualifications for the position or the functional equivalent.” The Board’s approach effectively expands the rights of bargaining-unit members beyond those bargained for in the CBA. Milton Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Milton Staff Ass’n, Local 130 VEA/NEA, 163 Vt. 240, 244, 656 A.2d 993, 995 (1995) (“We will not supply terms or embrace a construction that would alter the rights of the parties as expressed in the original agreement.”). ¶ 26. State personnel policies likewise support our analysis. DHR defines minimum qualifications as being “set at a level that provides a reasonable likelihood that a candidate for the job possesses the most important minimum required knowledge, skills, and abilities to adequately perform entry level work in the job.” Personnel Policy 4.0. This policy recognizes that the “minimum qualifications” screen identifies candidates who are most likely to have the requisite 10 competencies. Pursuant to DHR policy, the “education” and “experience” requirements in particular serve this purpose. See id. (“Minimum qualifications are usually expressed in terms of the nature and amount of formal education, training, work experience, as well as any special requirements such as licenses, certifications, or physical standards.”). Nothing in these policies authorizes DHR, or the Board, to override the plain meaning of a minimum qualification, or to substitute a skills-based analysis for the minimum work-experience requirements. ¶ 27. We conclude that the cases relied upon by VSEA in support of the Board’s tally of the clerical tasks performed by grievant in his capacity as a corrections officer are inapposite. The cases involve different contexts that call for a functional analysis of an employee’s job responsibilities rather than the categorical application of “minimum qualification” requirements as required by the CBA in this case. See, e.g., Harwood Union High Sch. Dist. v. Harwood Educ. Ass’n, 172 Vt. 167, 175, 773 A.2d 277, 284 (2001) (stating that to determine whether employees are confidential employees and thus excluded from bargaining unit, “the relevant consideration is the employees’ actual powers, rather than their theoretical authority” (quotation omitted)); Fighterfighters of Brattleboro, Vt., Local #2628 v. Brattleboro Fire Dep’t, 138 Vt. 347, 351, 1415 A.2d 243, 245 (1980) (stating that in determining whether individual is supervisor and thus statutorily excluded from bargaining unit, “theoretical or paper power will not make one a supervisor”). In this context, the CBA does not provide mandatory reemployment rights to every applicant whose transferable skills from past employment render them competent to perform a given job. Nor does it allow substitution of work experience involving similar transferable skills for the work experience required to meet the minimum qualifications of a particular job. Instead, it guarantees mandatory reemployment rights to every applicant who meets the minimum qualifications for the job. ¶ 28. Finally, the fact that hiring managers have made exceptions to the minimum qualifications in the competitive hiring process does not change our conclusion. In support of its interpretation of the minimum qualifications, the Board pointed to evidence that, in its competitive 11 hiring process (as opposed to the RIF process), DMV has hired at least one applicant with “significantly less office clerical experience listed on the employment application than Grievant.” Minimum qualifications cannot be used selectively to screen out candidates with reemployment rights. For this reason, the Board was correct to disregard the skills listed in the job specifications for the DMV position, such as “considerable knowledge of motor vehicle financing,” which are not treated as minimum qualifications for any applicant. However, we cannot conclude that a minimum qualification may not be applied by DHR simply because in the distinct competitive hiring process the department hiring manager has sometimes made exceptions to the department’s own minimum qualifications. This does not appear to be a case where minimum qualifications are being used as an “end-run” around the State’s contractual obligations.3 Vt. State Emps.’ Ass’n, 30 VLRB 296, 331, 2009 WL 4808835, . ¶ 29. In sum, it is not the Board’s role to rewrite job descriptions or to require a different analysis than was anticipated in the CBA. Because we conclude that the Board departed from a straightforward application of the DMV’s established minimum qualifications in this case, we reverse. Reversed. FOR THE COURT: