Opinion ID: 853069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver as an Affirmative Defense

Text: We agree with the Court of Appeals that the affirmative defense of waiver must be raised at the post-conviction hearing to be properly preserved for appeal. The Court of Appeals relied principally on Langley, 256 Ind. at 199, 267 N.E.2d at 538, for its conclusion that waiver must be raised at the post-conviction hearing to be properly preserved. Langley held that the State must raise the issue at the hearing: [I]t would seem that the state is precluded from asserting waiver on appeal where they made no mention concerning it at the hearing. Id. at 207 n. 2, 267 N.E.2d at 543 n. 2. Although the State was the appellee, the court considered the issue precluded on the same basis that an appellant is normally denied the right to raise an issue for the first time on appeal. Id. Langley also declared, Where, however, the state, as it did in this case, chooses to meet a petitioner's allegations on their merits at the hearing, we must do likewise on appeal. Id. at 207, 267 N.E.2d at 542-43. Relying on Langley, the Court of Appeals in this case concluded that the key factor in preserving waiver for appeal is that the issue be argued to the post-conviction court. Bunch, 760 N.E.2d at 1167. Similarly, Mickens v. State, 596 N.E.2d 1379, 1381 (Ind.1992), interpreted Langley to require that the waiver defense be presented by the State to the post-conviction court before that court can find waiver. See also State v. Eubanks, 729 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied (State must argue waiver as a defense to the post-conviction court or the defense is waived); Nelson v. Gurley, 673 N.E.2d 497, 500 n. 3 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (Waiver must be specifically pleaded in the answer or specifically raised at trial or it is waived.). Langley involved two consolidated cases in which post-conviction relief had been denied. The rules governing post-conviction relief were adopted in 1969 and the current Trial Rules became effective in 1970. Langley was decided by this Court in March 1971. It is not clear whether the Court regarded the Trial Rules as applicable to the post-conviction proceedings before it. In any event, it is now clear that the Trial Rules apply to post-conviction relief proceedings. Ind. Post Conviction Rule 1(5) (All rules and statutes applicable in civil proceedings including pre-trial and discovery procedures are available to the parties, except [in cases involving a change of judge request].); State v. Drysdale, 677 N.E.2d 593, 595 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997), trans. denied (Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the rules and statutes applicable to civil proceedings and the petitioner has the burden of proving his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.). Under current Trial Rule 8(C), the State must raise the issue in its pleading and carry its burden of proof at trial in order to prevail on an affirmative defense. See Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind. 2000). Failure to plead the defense waives it. Having pleaded the defense, as the State did here, it remained the State's burden to establish the necessary facts to support the defense. Here, at the post-conviction hearing, although the State did not abandon the defense, it took no steps to call it to the post-conviction court's attention. More importantly, the State did not present the facts necessary to establish this defense either by evidence or by requesting judicial notice of the issues presented in Bunch's direct appeal. These facts were readily available to the State. Simply offering into evidence Bunch's appellate brief would establish that the sentencing issue was not raised on direct appeal. As a result of this omission, the State failed to establish the facts necessary to carry its burden of proof on this defense. The State therefore is not entitled as a matter of right to a ruling that Bunch has waived his claim of sentencing error.