Opinion ID: 4536769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The “realistic probability” test

Text: The categorical match inquiry is modified by the so-called “realistic probability” test when the state statute of conviction is of “indeterminate” scope in its application and so leaves open the possibility that it does not in practice match the federal statute; otherwise said, that the federal and state statutes appear from their texts alone to be a categorical match, but their enforcement may diverge in practice. See Hylton, 897 F.3d at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate such a mismatch “requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.” Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193. 15 In Duenas-Alvarez, the Supreme Court confronted an apparent categorical match between a California theft statute and the INA’s generic federal definition of theft. Id. at 189–90. Petitioner Duenas-Alvarez argued that, despite the apparent match, the scope of criminal liability for aiding-and-abetting was broader as applied by California than tolerated by federal law, and therefore the state statute could not be treated as a categorical match to the federal statute and his state conviction could not serve as a ground for his removal. Id. at 190–94. The Supreme Court rejected his argument. It explained that, notwithstanding some suggestions that state law and federal law might lack absolute equivalence in their treatment of such liability, Duenas-Alvarez had failed to demonstrate a “realistic probability” that the state in fact applied its law more broadly than the federal. To make such a demonstration, the Court said, he had “at least [to] point to his own case or other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which he argues.” Id. at 193. “[T]o find that a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute requires more than the application of legal imagination to a state statute’s language,” it explained. Id. The “realistic probability” test articulated in Duenas-Alvarez has no role to play in the categorical analysis, however, when the state statute of conviction on its face reaches beyond the generic federal definition. As we recently explained in Hylton v. Sessions, the “realistic probability” test simply does not apply “when the statutory language itself, rather than the application of legal imagination to that language, creates the realistic probability that a state would apply the statute to conduct beyond the generic definition.” Hylton, 897 F.3d at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, as we have shown, because the plain language of the Connecticut statute allows prosecution for “carrying” an antique pistol or revolver or for “transporting” a loaded antique pistol or revolver, the mismatch with the federal statute is not created by “legal imagination” 16 applied in the context of an apparent match, but by the state’s statutory language itself. As we wrote in Hylton, “When the state law is facially overbroad, we look no further.” Id. at 65 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 4 The BIA further wrote, in defense of its alternative holding, that “[t]his is not a case where the text of the statute of conviction plainly criminalizes the carrying of antique pistols and revolvers” and for that reason lies outside the federal statute’s reach. CAR at 4 n.1. But as we have explained above, that conclusion was in error, making its alternative holding misguided as well.