Opinion ID: 2492624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Johnston's Brother at Penalty Phase

Text: Johnston first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for offering the testimony of Johnston's brother, Max Allen, during the penalty phase. Johnston argues that there could be no rational justification for trial counsel to call Allen as a witness and asserts that counsel failed to investigate the potentially damaging content of Allen's testimony. Johnston claims that these actions by his counsel were unreasonable and resulted in the jury's eleven-to-one vote to recommend a death sentence. We affirm the trial court's denial of this claim. This Court has held that two requirements must be satisfied for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful under the Strickland standard: First, a defendant must show that counsel's actions or omissions were deficient; and second, the deficiency established must further be shown to have so affected the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So.3d 535, 545-46 (Fla.2010). To prove counsel's performance was deficient, a defendant must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reviewing court must then, in light of all the circumstances, determine whether the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Id. However, this Court must strongly presume that defense counsel's actions were reasonable at the time of the counsel's conduct. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Any such strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct. Howell v. State, 877 So.2d 697, 703 (Fla.2004) (quoting Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000)). To establish prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate that because of counsel's deficient performance, he was deprived of a fair trial with a reliable result. Bradley, 33 So.3d at 672 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). The prejudice requirement is satisfied only if there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Mere speculation that counsel's error affected the outcome of the proceeding is insufficient. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. And to establish ineffectiveness, both deficient performance and prejudice must be proven. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on this claim and determined that counsel was not ineffective because the strategic decision to offer Allen's testimony was reasonable. The record shows that calling Allen as a witness was part of the defense strategy to portray Johnston as an individual with an extensive, documented history of mental health disorders. On the stand, Allen testified as an eyewitness to Johnston's mental problems during youth, including his psychiatric hospitalization and extremely disturbed behavior. Defense counsel explained that Allen's testimony was intended to give context to the mental health mitigation and to confirm that Johnston showed signs of frontal lobe issues since childhood, received shock therapy, and was overmedicated. The defense trial team had extensively discussed the strategy behind calling Allen as a witness. Further, when asked whether he desired the jury to recommend a life sentence for his brother, Allen stated, I don't think that it's right for th[e] state to kill him. For all these reasons, counsel's strategic decision to call Allen to testify in the penalty phase was not deficient performance, and we affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this ineffectiveness claim. [4]