Opinion ID: 777304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appointment of a Technical Advisor

Text: 83 Procedural rulings are reviewed by this court under regional circuit law, the Ninth Circuit in this case, unless the procedural issues are unique to patent law. See Nat'l Presto v. W. Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1188 n. 2, 37 USPQ2d 1685, 1686 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.1996). Further, [w]e apply regional circuit law to procedural issues that are not themselves substantive patent law issues. Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1360, 61 USPQ2d 1216, 1219 (Fed. Cir.2001); Int'l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324, 1328, 59 USPQ2d 1532, 1535 (Fed.Cir.2001). The procedural issue, namely the use of a technical advisor to assist the district court in understanding complex scientific and technical factual issues, is not limited to and unique to patent cases. Technical advisors may be useful for the understanding of scientific evidence generally as well as the science or technology involved in patent cases. Because understanding issues of complex science and technology is not so unique as to clearly implicate the jurisdictional responsibilities of this court in a field within its exclusive jurisdiction, Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359, 50 USPQ2d 1672, 1675 (Fed.Cir.1999) ( en banc in relevant part), we apply regional procedural law. The Ninth Circuit applies the abuse of discretion standard to a district court's appointment of a technical advisor. Ass'n of Mexican Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir.2000) ( en banc ). 84 A technical advisor is helpful in assisting the court in understanding the scientific and technical evidence it must consider. See Id. at 590; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (endorsing the appointment of specialists to assist district courts in understanding scientific or technical evidence); Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir.1988). Such evidence in a patent case includes expert testimony, scientific articles and texts, and patents, upon which the court must rely in understanding the technology so that it can interpret the patent claims and determine whether to grant motions for summary judgment of validity, invalidity, infringement or noninfringement, and to assist the court in articulating appropriate jury instructions. In this case, the court specifically noted that evaluation of the prior art required it to consider and understand complex technical concepts beyond normal technical and scientific facts regularly addressed by the district court. 85 The district court is the gatekeeper of the trial in determining when scientific evidence is properly admissible. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 n. 2, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1168 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.1999). Because this function is critical, the district court must have the authority to appoint a technical advisor in such instances so that the court can better understand scientific and technical evidence in order to properly discharge its gatekeeper role of determining the admissibility of such evidence. See Ass'n of Mexican Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 591. However, the federal courts of appeals must determine, the extent, if any, to which a district court has established safeguards to prevent the technical advisor from introducing new evidence and to assure that the technical advisor does not influence the district court's review of the factual disputes. 86 The law has long recognized that it may effectively use the knowledge of experts to inform and support the judicial process to settle disputes. The Supreme Court noted that: Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties.... This power includes authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause. 87 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312, 40 S.Ct. 543, 64 L.Ed. 919 (1920). 88 The trial court's inherent search for truth is the basic building block by which the judicial process maintains its credibility within the fabric of our society. In this search, it cannot be expected that trial judges will have expertise in biotechnology, microprocessor technology, organic chemistry, or other complex scientific disciplines. Therefore, in those limited cases where the scientific complexity of the technology is such that the district court may require the assistance of a technical advisor to aid in understanding the complex technology underlying the patent, it has the inherent authority to appoint such an advisor. 89 A district court's appointment of a technical advisor, outside of the purview of Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1 falls within the district court's inherent authority, and the Ninth Circuit has held that district courts may use technical advisors when desirable and necessary. Ass'n of Mexican Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 590. It also implicitly recognized that district courts should use this inherent authority sparingly and then only in exceptionally technically complicated cases. Id. at 590-91. Therefore, we apply the law of the Ninth Circuit and review the appointment of the technical advisor, and whether the district court properly followed appropriate procedural safeguards, for abuse of discretion. Id. at 591. 90 Although the Ninth Circuit has recognized the need for district courts to avoid impropriety, it has not held precisely what procedural safeguards district courts should employ. Thus, to establish a basis for our review, if the regional circuit court has not specifically spoken on the issue, we must reasonably predict how that court would decide the issue. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1575, 223 USPQ 465, 472 (Fed.Cir.1984). 91 In Association of Mexican American Educators, the majority noted that Judge Tashima suggested in his dissent a list of procedural safeguards. Id. at 591. The majority did not adopt the specific guidelines delineated by the dissent because such strict compliance would unnecessarily undo [the] entire trial in the case before it. Id. However, it recognized the need for some procedural safeguards and the need for a reviewing court to have a standard against which to judge abuse of discretion. 2 This in the minimum implies the need to establish some definable safeguards for future cases. Conceptually, we can distill from the Association of Mexican American Educators opinion appropriate guidelines from which the Ninth Circuit would delineate desirable procedural mechanisms to safeguard the use of a technical advisor and generate a record for review on appeal. 92 These guidelines propose broad criteria for minimally safeguarding the judicial process and the district court from undue influence by the technical advisor and to ensure that the technical advisor's role is properly limited to a tutoring function and providing technical education and background information in the technology to the court. Id. at 611-14 (Tashima, J. dissenting). In essence, the guidelines propose that the district court in appointing a technical advisor must: use a fair and open procedure for appointing a neutral technical advisor ... addressing any allegations of bias, partiality or lack of qualifications in the candidates; 3 clearly define and limit the technical advisor's duties, presumably in a writing disclosed to all parties; 4 guard against extra-record information; 5 and make explicit, perhaps through a report or record, the nature and content of the technical advisor's tutelage concerning the technology. Id. at 611. The fact that the use of a technical advisor is permissible under such guidelines does not mean that it is invariably desirable or that safeguards are not required. As a practical matter, there is a risk that some of the judicial decision-making function will be delegated to the technical advisor. District court judges need to be extremely sensitive to this risk and minimize the potential for its occurrence. 6 93 In this case, we conclude, based on the record before us, that the district court did not abuse its discretion and established sufficient protective measures to ensure that Dr. Hearn did not unduly influence its decision. The court recognized that such appointments should be reserved for the exceptional case, but deemed it appropriate in this case because it concluded that this infringement determination was a highly technical case far beyond the boundaries of the normal questions of fact and law with which judges routinely grapple. The court acknowledged that technical advisors may not contribute evidence. As such, the court properly concluded that a technical advisor is not subject to the requirements set forth in Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence regulating the appointment of expert witnesses. The district court further recognized that the technical advisor's role is limited to explaining the terminology and theory underlying the evidence offered by the parties. The court determined that its technical expert, Dr. Hearn, was a neutral third party, and explained its reasoning for that determination in its memorandum. The court assured the parties that Dr. Hearn had agreed that he will not engage in any independent investigation of the underlying litigation, provide evidence to the Court, or contact any party or witness in this action. The court further agreed to identify any material relied upon by Dr. Hearn, other than that submitted by the parties or that upon which a person versed in the relevant field of knowledge would be reasonably expected to rely. The court stated that Dr. Hearn would execute an affidavit indicating his understanding of that order before beginning his engagement, and would file an affidavit attesting to his compliance with its terms at the conclusion of his employment. 94 TechSearch complains that the district court abrogated its authority by allowing Dr. Hearn to resolve disputed issues of fact. It asserts that the district court could not have resolved the issues before it without improperly relying on the conclusions of Dr. Hearn, as evidenced by the fact that the district court had to seek the assistance of a technical advisor. TechSearch further alleges that Dr. Hearn undertook independent research and possible experiments. It asserts that the district court likely used such information and that this created reversible error, and that the district court should have allowed the parties to depose Dr. Hearn consistent with Fed.R.Evid. 706 to determine the extent this alleged evidence influenced the court. TechSearch's allegations of independent research and experimentations stem from, inter alia, the fact that Dr. Hearn purchased computer equipment and software while a technical advisor to the court. On that basis alone, TechSearch speculates that Dr. Hearn must have been conducting independent experiments on microprocessor architecture. That Dr. Hearn billed his time to research and charged the court for calls he had placed, is the foundation upon which TechSearch bases its allegation of independent research. Finally, TechSearch alleges that Dr. Hearn's failure to certify his compliance with the order was reversible error. 95 TechSearch's arguments are without merit. As noted, the district court appointed Dr. Hearn as a technical advisor. Rule 706 applies to expert witnesses, but not to technical advisors. Unlike a technical advisor, an expert witness appointed by the court may be relied upon as a source of evidence and may be called upon to testify. Ass'n of Mexican Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 591. Such was not the case here. Accordingly, we reject TechSearch's argument that the district court's failure to subject Dr. Hearn to cross-examination by the parties constitutes reversible error. 96 Upon review of the record before us, we are not convinced that the evidence suggests that Dr. Hearn conducted independent experiments or research. Nor are we persuaded that the evidence establishes that Dr. Hearn's failure to certify his compliance with the order was reversible error. As noted, the court exercised great care to insure that Dr. Hearn's assistance did not unduly influence the court's consideration of the evidence. To the extent the procedures followed by the district court fell somewhat short of those essential to avoiding such influence, we note that the district court appointed the technical advisor prior to the issuance of the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in Association of Mexican American Educators, and the district court at least followed the minimum requirements necessary at that time. Given the extent of the safeguards imposed by the district court as it exercised due care to avoid improper influence by its technical advisor, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the appointment and use of the technical advisor.