Opinion ID: 744751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: fclaa

Text: 48 Because the Disclosure Act does not require a statement relating to smoking and health ... on any cigarette package, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (emphasis added), we are concerned only with § 1334(b), which provides: 49 No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter. 50 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b). 51
52 We begin with Cipollone, which concerned the viability of state common-law damages actions against cigarette manufacturers for injuries stemming from the lung-cancer death of Rose Cipollone. See 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). The Court analyzed the statutory preemption language of both the 1965 and 1969 Acts, but because the plaintiffs' claims arose before 1984, the Court did not consider the CSEA's potential effect on those claims. See id. at 508, 112 S.Ct. at 2613. In the Court's mixed ruling, Justice Stevens' opinion spoke for a majority of the Court in certain sections, but largely represented the views of only a plurality of the Court. The ruling also produced two separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Principally, the Justices disagreed over whether or not state common-law damages actions, as opposed to positive enactments by state legislatures or administrative bodies, fell within the scope of the express preemption provisions in the 1965 and 1969 Acts. While a majority of the Court held that the 1965 Act did not preempt state common-law damages actions, see Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518-19, 112 S.Ct. at 2618-19, a plurality found that the 1969 Act's broader preemption language did encompass some common law claims, see id. at 520-21, 112 S.Ct. at 2619-20. 53 To determine whether or not a particular common law claim fell within the express preemption clause, the plurality formulated the following central inquiry: we ask whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health ... imposed under State law with respect to ... advertising and promotion,' giving that clause a fair but narrow reading. Id. at 524, 112 S.Ct. at 2621. 20 According to the plurality, each phrase within that clause limits the universe of common-law claims pre-empted by the statute. Id. In Lohr, a Court majority approved a similar approach. See Lohr, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2257 (parsing language in express preemption clause to determine federal statute's preemptive scope); id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2258 (looking to [t]he legal duty that is the predicate for [plaintiff's common-law state damages claim] to determine whether or not it was preempted by federal requirements). 54 On this basis, we apply a modified version of the test in this case and ask whether or not the predicate legal duty created by the Disclosure Act constitutes a(1) a requirement or prohibition ... imposed under State law, (2) based on smoking and health, (3) with respect to the advertising or promotion of any [properly labeled] cigarettes. § 1334(b). 21 55
56
57 Although members of the Cipollone Court disagreed over whether a state common-law damages action could constitute a requirement under § 1334(b), the Court unanimously agreed that positive enactments are state-imposed requirement[s] or prohibition[s] within the meaning of that clause. See 505 U.S. at 521, 112 S.Ct. at 2620 (plurality opinion); 505 U.S. at 525, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); 505 U.S. at 548, 112 S.Ct. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The Disclosure Act, being a positive enactment by the Massachusetts state legislature, therefore constitutes a state-imposed requirement that falls within the universe of state action potentially preempted by the § 1334(b). 22 58
59 We think it clear that the obligations imposed by the Disclosure Act are based on smoking and health, and the Commonwealth does not dispute this position. The law's stated purpose, [f]or the purpose of protecting the public health, and the accompanying text strongly imply that its anticipated effect will be greater public awareness about the additives and nicotine in tobacco products and the potential health effects of those ingredients. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 307B. The Disclosure Act, therefore, bears the requisite relationship to smoking and health within the meaning of § 1334(b). See Vango Media, 34 F.3d at 73 (finding city ordinance requiring display of public health messages about health risks of smoking was based on smoking and health because both its purpose and effect centered on such risks); Lacey v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 956 F.Supp. 956, 962 (N.D.Ala.1997) (stating that a list of ingredients in cigarettes would most likely be material only as it related to the health of a plaintiff); Cf. Griesenbeck v. American Tobacco Co., 897 F.Supp. 815, 823 (D.N.J.1995) (finding that threat of self-immolation arising from the negligent care of one's cigarette is a 'health risk'  bearing the requisite relationship to smoking and health). 60 Courts have found the requisite link to smoking and health lacking where the predicate duty was a more general obligation, for example, the duty not to deceive, Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528-29, 112 S.Ct. at 2623-24 (plurality), the duty not to conspire to commit fraud, id. at 530, 112 S.Ct. at 2624 (plurality), and the duty to not engage in unfair competition by advertising illegal conduct or encouraging others to violate the law, Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 7 Cal.4th 1057, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 358, 875 P.2d 73, 80 (1994) (involving claim that cigarette manufacturer's Old Joe Camel advertising campaign targets minors for the purpose of inducing and increasing their illegal purchases of cigarettes). Cf. Lohr, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2258 (finding that plaintiffs' negligent manufacturing claim was predicated on the general duty of every manufacturer to use due care to avoid foreseeable dangers in its products and thus, the state common-law requirements were not with respect to medical devices). 61 Here, the Commonwealth does not argue that the Disclosure Act imposes an obligation so general as to take it out of the smoking-and-health nexus of § 1334(b). While the argument could be made that the Disclosure Act predicates its obligations upon the general duty to follow state statutory reporting requirements rather than state-considerations that are based on smoking and health, we think such an argument impermissibly raises the level of generality of the inquiry. The logical extension of this argument would be that all obligations stemming from state positive-enactments are predicated on the general duty to abide by state law, thus bringing every such requirement outside the scope of the preemption clause even if it squarely involved otherwise preempted matters. Cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 543, 112 S.Ct. at 2631 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (criticizing plurality's frequent shift in the level of generality at which it examines the individual claims). 62
63 Having found that the Disclosure Act is a requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health ... imposed under State law, we turn to the main dispute underlying our express preemption analysis: whether or not the obligations imposed under the Disclosure Act are with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes within the meaning of § 1334(b). At first glance, the Disclosure Act's reporting duties seem entirely unrelated to tobacco industry advertising and promotion. Certainly, as the district court found, the compelled furnishing of additive and nicotine-yield lists to state authorities does not itself constitute advertising or promotion. 23 Although the cigarette manufacturers do not seriously dispute this conclusion, they submit that the Disclosure Act's requirements are with respect to advertising and promotion within the meaning of § 1334(b). 64 The cigarette manufacturers theorize that the FCLAA, through its mandated warning labels and express preemption language, exclusively delineates the necessary and sufficient health information that cigarette manufacturers may be compelled to communicate to the public. They contend that section 1334(b), therefore, in addition to preempting requirements to change cigarette labels or advertisements, prohibits any additional requirement to communicate to the public about smoking and health. The manufacturers reason that the Disclosure Act, although styled as an agency reporting requirement, essentially compels them to communicate additional smoking and health information to the public because the health department will make the information publicly available. They assert that § 1334(b) would be rendered meaningless if the Commonwealth may accomplish indirectly what it may not accomplish directly by using the state agency as a conduit for the manufacturers' compelled communication. In short, they claim that the Disclosure Act impermissibly requires them to participate in what amounts to a public service advertising campaign intended to supplement the federally mandated warnings. 65 In Cipollone, two of the Court's opinions specifically analyzed the phrase with respect to ... advertising and promotion: Justice Stevens' four-vote plurality opinion, which interpreted the phrase narrowly, and Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Thomas joined, which interpreted the phrase more broadly. 24 We note initially that the six Justices represented by these two opinions apparently agreed that the preemption clause reached plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims, at least insofar as they required proof that the manufacturers' post-1969 advertising or promotions should have included additional, or more clearly stated, warnings. 505 U.S. at 524, 112 S.Ct. at 2621 (plurality); see id. at 554, 112 S.Ct. at 2637 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627 (explaining that successful failure-to-warn claim effectively compels manufacturers to alter warning labels). 66 The four-member plurality further found, however, that the preemption clause did not bar [failure-to-warn] claims that rely solely on [the cigarette manufacturers'] testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion. Cipollone 505 U.S. at 524-25, 112 S.Ct. at 2621-22 (emphasis added). Moreover, under the plurality's reasoning, fraudulent misrepresentation claims survived insofar as those claims rely on a state-law duty to disclose such facts through channels of communication other than advertising or promotion. Id. at 528, 112 S.Ct. at 2623 (emphasis added). Significantly, the plurality offered the following by way of illustration: Thus, for example, if state law obliged respondents to disclose material facts about smoking and health to an administrative agency, [sec. 1334(b) ] would not pre-empt a state-law claim based on a failure to fulfill that obligation. Id. (emphasis added). 67 Under the plurality's reasoning, there appears to be little doubt that the Disclosure Act is not with respect to advertising or promotion because the manufacturers do not satisfy their obligation to file annual reports to the state health department through an advertising or promotion channel. See 505 U.S. at 528, 112 S.Ct. at 2623 (plurality). The agency's potential release of the information to the public would seem to raise no concern with the plurality, which was not otherwise troubled about compelled communication to the public through alternative, non-advertising, non-promotional channels (i.e., in duties underlying certain surviving failure to warn and fraudulent misrepresentation claims), for the purposes of the language at issue. Thus, we believe that the plurality's reasoning militates towards the Commonwealth's position. 68 Justice Scalia's opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that a state law claim based on the failure to warn consumers  'through channels of communication other than advertising or promotion'  would not come within § 1334(b)'s preemptive scope. Id. at 554, 112 S.Ct. at 2637 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting plurality opinion, id. at 528, 112 S.Ct. at 2623). While acknowledging that the FCLAA clearly does not preempt claims unrelated to industry advertising and promotion, Justice Scalia reasoned that it preempts claims based on duties that can be complied with by taking action either within the advertising and promotional realm or elsewhere. Id. at 554, 112 S.Ct. at 2637. Thus, according to Justice Scalia, although a product warning could be communicated in many ways, § 1334(b) would preempt the duty as a whole because it could be satisfied through advertising or promotion. See id. at 554-55, 112 S.Ct. at 2637-38. 25 69 Justice Scalia's opinion also intimated, however, that a hypothetical law requiring disclosure of product health-hazards to a state public-health agency would bear no relation to industry advertising and promotion. Id. at 554, 112 S.Ct. at 2637. He further speculated that such a law would seem to survive a proposed practical compulsion test to determine the viability of a state law, which he phrased as: whether the law practically compels the manufacturers to engage in behavior that Congress has barred the States from prescribing directly. Id. at 555, 112 S.Ct. at 2637 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Scalia's opinion suggests that because the hypothetical law's requirements could not possibly be satisfied through advertising and promotional efforts, the law would not practically compel the manufacturers to relinquish the advertising and promotion immunity accorded them by the Act. Id. at 555, 112 S.Ct. at 2637. 70 In this case, of course, we are presented with an agency reporting requirement coupled with the probability that the information provided will be made public. Although the health department will likely publicize the required reports, the Disclosure Act does not practically compel the manufacturers to communicate smoking and health information to the public within Justice Scalia's explication because, while the communicative action to consumers could alternatively be achieved through advertising and promotional efforts, the Disclosure Act itself admits of no such alternative to compliance. There is no suggestion that the manufacturers could somehow comply with the Disclosure Act simply by changing their advertising or promotional materials. Moreover, direct communication of the additive and nicotine-yield information to the public through some other means would not excuse the manufacturers' duties under the law. Thus viewed, the Disclosure Act would survive even Justice Scalia's more expansive, but distinct minority view of the preemption clause. 71 While our Cipollone-based analysis necessarily draws upon the dicta of six Justices who were not presented with an actual agency-reporting scheme, much less a scheme that contemplates the public release of the information reported, we believe that the Justices' observations suggest a qualitative difference, for § 1334(b) purposes, between direct communication with the public and disclosure to a state agency. The fact that public health agencies exist to serve the public, and the absence of any secrecy mandates in the Cipollone opinions discussing state agency reporting requirements, further suggest that the agency's ultimate use of the information does not bear on the question whether such a reporting scheme relates to advertising and promotion. In the end, we believe that Cipollone weighs strongly in favor of the Commonwealth's position. 72 In the wake of Cipollone, several courts have dealt specifically with the question whether a state statute or common-law damages action, in various contexts, implicates the phrase, with respect to ... advertising or promotion. § 1334(b). In general, the cases yield a broad interpretation of the language at issue. Not surprisingly, therefore, the manufacturers rely heavily on select language from them. Although none of the cases involves a state-agency reporting scheme, we review them to contextualize the manufacturers' arguments and to indicate how the cases differ from the instant dispute. 73 In Vango Media, Inc. v. City of New York, 34 F.3d 68, 70 (2d Cir.1994), the Second Circuit held that the FCLAA expressly preempted a city ordinance requiring an advertising business to display a minimum of one public health message about the dangers of smoking (or the benefits of not smoking) for every four tobacco advertisements. The court reasoned that the phrase with respect to in § 1334(b) is essentially synonymous with relating to, which, in turn, the Supreme Court has interpreted broadly. Id. at 74 (citing definitions such as referring to or having a connection with). Although the city ordinance did not require changes in the content of tobacco advertisements, the court found that it impermissibly impacted advertisers and promoters by impos[ing] conditions on their display of cigarette advertisements. Id. at 75. The court concluded that the city ordinance directly contravened the FCLAA's purpose of avoiding diverse advertising regulations and tread[ed] on the area of tobacco advertising, even if ... only at the edges. Id. at 74. 74 In this case, the cigarette manufacturers argue that Vango Media establishes that the FCLAA preempts any attempt to require anyone to provide smoking and health messages to the public through any media, even media other than industry advertisements. They argue that the Disclosure Act surely comes within this vast preempted realm. We do not read Vango Media so expansively. In Vango Media, the very display of tobacco advertisements invoked the city ordinance requirements, thus evincing a direct and substantial connection between the ordinance and industry advertising. See id. at 74-75. The Disclosure Act, on the other hand, does not impose conditions upon tobacco advertising or promotional decisions, which are irrelevant to the Disclosure Act's obligations. 75 Moreover, even assuming (without deciding) that with respect to is synonymous with relate to, the Disclosure Act does not relate to advertising or promotion because it lacks the requisite reference to or connection with the preempted realm. See California Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 117 S.Ct. 832, 837-41, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (analyzing relate to phrase in express preemption language in Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)); Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Servs. Fund, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 117 S.Ct. 1747, 1751-52, 138 L.Ed.2d 21 (1997) (same). The Disclosure Act does not make reference to advertising and promotion because it does not act[ ] immediately and exclusively upon advertising and promotion, and, unlike the ordinance in Vango Media, the existence of such advertising is not essential to the [state] law's operation. Dillingham Constr., --- U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 838. The Disclosure Act does not have a connection with advertising and promotion because it does not mandate the structure and content of advertising, see id. at ---, 117 S.Ct. at 839, and, while it may somehow alter[ ] the incentives in advertising decision-making, it does not dictate the choices, id. at ---, 117 S.Ct. at 842. Thus, while the ordinance in Vango Media ran afoul of § 1334(b)'s with respect to language by analogy to the Court's relate to jurisprudence, the Disclosure Act does not. 76 Several other cases have involved state claims that sought to impose liability on tobacco product manufacturers for failing to disclose information to consumers through channels other than traditional advertising or promotion. A few courts have found general allegations in this regard insufficient to escape § 1334(b)'s preemptive reach. See Cantley v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 681 So.2d 1057, 1061 (Ala.1996) (finding bare allegation that cigarette manufacturers concealed material facts was inevitably based upon a state law duty to disclose facts through advertising or promotion because communication with consumers normally occurs only through those channels (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Griesenbeck v. American Tobacco Co., 897 F.Supp. 815, 823 (D.N.J.1995) (finding that a claim that cigarette manufacturers should have warned [of health risk] ... somehow, presumably through some variety of mass-notification was preempted because [a] company's attempt to notify its mass market of anything ... is considered 'advertising or promotion' under the general usage of those terms); cf. Grenier, 96 F.3d at 564 (finding failure-to-warn claims preempted under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act because plaintiff failed to set forth a coherent specific claim that was not based on the preempted realm of labeling or packaging). 77 In another case, a plaintiff creatively premised her failure-to-warn claim on the failure to employ specific non-promotional communications, such as public service messages, seminars on smoking cessation and harmful smoking habits, direct mail-outs ..., public advocacy, and lobbying. Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris Inc., 929 F.Supp. 416, 418 (S.D.Fla.1996). The court rejected the proffered alternatives, reasoning that they employ the same techniques as a traditional advertising or promotional campaign .... [and] are all undertaken with the effect of promoting and fostering a product or an ideology. Id. at 419. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's theory would render the FCLAA meaningless because it suggest[ed] that at the same time [the tobacco manufacturers] were providing the Congressionally-mandated warnings, they were exposing themselves to state law tort liability by failing to use 'non-promotional communications' to disseminate material essentially duplicative of the Surgeon General's warning. Id. at 418. 78 In yet another case more closely analogous to this one, a plaintiff sought an injunction to compel cigarette manufacturers to disclose to consumers the nature, type, extent and identity of all cigarette additives. Lacey v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 956 F.Supp. 956, 958 (N.D.Ala.1997). After reviewing the FCLAA's scheme and obligations, the court found the claim preempted because it was based upon an alleged duty ... to provide to consumers more information regarding smoking and health than is required by the [FCLAA], id. at 963, and because its additional disclosure obligations unavoidably attack[ed] the manufacturers' advertising and promotion, id. at 962. 26 79 Here, we are presented with more than a vague tell-the-consumers-any-way-you-wish claim. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 555, 112 S.Ct. at 2637 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Specifically, the Disclosure Act requires that ingredient reports be filed with a state agency; the reports themselves are plainly outside the realm of advertising or promotion. Unlike plaintiff's theory in Sonnenreich, the Disclosure Act does not require the manufacturers to produce materials and disseminate information to consumers through techniques, such as seminars or direct mailings, that resemble promotional efforts and impel the fostering of a product ideology. Unlike the plaintiff's claim in Lacey, the Disclosure Act does not impose a duty upon manufacturers to provide additional smoking and health information directly to the public. 80 There would arguably appear to be little difference between requiring manufacturers to disseminate ingredient information directly to the public and requiring them to file such information with a state agency, which, in turn, will make the information publicly available. Nevertheless, there is a difference, and we are unpersuaded by the manufacturers' argument that the difference is not substantively important. Moreover, we find doubtful their expansive interpretation of the with-respect-to-advertising-and-promotion condition. 81 While we need not decide the issue now, we are skeptical of the manufacturers' sweeping proposition that the FCLAA prescribes the exclusive means by which they may be compelled to communicate health information directly to the public. On this point, we find informative the Cipollone plurality's preservation of some claims that were based, in part, on the duty to communicate smoking-and-health information to the public. See 505 U.S. at 524-25, 112 S.Ct. at 2621-22 (failure-to-warn claims); id. at 528, 112 S.Ct. at 2623 (fraudulent misrepresentation claims). The survival of such claims undermines the premise that the FCLAA delineates the exclusive scope of consumer-communication duties, and furthermore suggests the very existence of a subset of such requirements that are wholly unrelated to advertising and promotion. We also find informative the legislative history's repeated reference to the narrow and limited nature of the preemption provision and declaration that the provision is limited entirely to State or local requirements or prohibitions in the advertising of cigarettes. S. Rep. 91-566, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2663. 82 Our skepticism aside, significantly, the Disclosure Act does not require the manufacturers to communicate directly with consumers. Of course, a quintessential state requirement with respect to ... advertising and promotion would be a law mandating changes or additions to the content of cigarette advertisements. One step removed from such a law would be a requirement that manufacturers mass-communicate additional warnings or other smoking-and-health information directly to consumers through channels other than advertising or promotion. At this point, the argument in favor of preemption begins to weaken given the Cipollone plurality's seemingly narrow concern with requirements specifically involving advertising and promotional channels. See 505 U.S. at 524-25, 528, 112 S.Ct. at 2621-22, 2623. Further removed yet would be a requirement to disclose such information to some entity other than the consuming public. While one can imagine subsequent intermediate steps, at some point we reach the agency reporting scheme before us. 83 We think that the agency-reporting scheme prescribed under the Disclosure Act is insufficiently related to the advertising and promotion realm to bring the state law within § 1334(b)'s preemptive scope. As noted above, the reports required under the Disclosure Act do not themselves constitute or resemble promotional material. Once the manufacturers file the reports with the state public health agency, their communicative obligation ceases. They will not be required to disseminate further the reported information, which becomes public (if at all), solely through agency action. Thus, unlike an obligation to advise consumers directly of any information, which may compel the manufacturers to engage in activity resembling advertising and promotional efforts, the Disclosure Act requires no such exertion. In fact, the law separates the normal source of product advertising and promotion, the tobacco industry, from any direct communicative action to the public. That the information contained in the report may eventually become widely disseminated does not transform the manufacturer's initial reporting obligation into an advertising or promotional activity. In our view, an implied transformation of this sort would distort the language of § 1334(b) beyond Congress' intent. In short, the line between with respect to and no relation to advertising and promotion must be crossed at some point, and although we need not pinpoint that exact location now, we think it has been crossed here. 84 Moreover, we disagree with the manufacturers' argument that the Disclosure Act meets this condition because it reflects the Commonwealth's impermissible judgment that the federally-mandated health warnings are inadequate and thus constitutes an attack upon those warnings. The Cipollone plurality specifically rejected the proposition that § 1334(b) broadly preempts any claim that inevitably questions the suitability of the manufacturers' advertising and promotion activities. See 505 U.S. at 525, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (discussing breach-of-express-warranty claim). As the plurality stated: The appropriate inquiry is not whether a claim challenges the 'propriety' of advertising and promotion, but whether the claim would require the imposition under state law of a requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health with respect to advertising or promotion. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 525, 112 S.Ct. at 2622. 27 This observation indicates that the relevant inquiry focuses not upon any relation between advertising and the motivation behind a state law, but upon the law itself and any connection it might have with advertising activities. See Associated Indus. v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274, 279 (1st. Cir.1990) (Rather than attempt to divine the Massachusetts Legislature's intent in enacting its ... legislation, we look instead to the effect of the regulatory scheme. (footnote omitted)) (involving express preemption analysis). Thus, the mere suggestion that state lawmakers sought passage of the Disclosure Act in part because of their discontent with federal regulatory efforts does not affect our preemption analysis. 85 We find, therefore, that the reach of the FCLAA's express preemption clause, § 1334(b), does not preclude enforcement of the Disclosure Act. We reach this conclusion even assuming that underlying the state law is discontent with the federally mandated warnings and the desire to communicate the additive and nicotine-yield information to the public. Looking to the actual effect of the state law, the Disclosure Act does not require alterations in the industry's advertising and promotional activities, or impose any duty to disclose information through those channels. The state law's obligations are neither triggered by advertising decisions, nor could they be fulfilled by altering cigarette labels or advertisements. The law does not direct the manufacturers to employ any mass-marketing or other techniques even remotely resembling advertising and promotion. In the end, we think that had Congress intended to prohibit the public disclosure of smoking and health information that, at some point, the tobacco-product manufacturers had disgorged under state law, the limited phrase with respect to advertising and promotion would be an odd vehicle to reach this end. Thus, we find the explicit preemption language and legislative history insufficient to clear[ly] and manifest[ly] overcome the presumption against preemption of a state's traditional powers to legislate for the health and safety of its citizens. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 606, 111 S.Ct. at 2482; see Dillingham Constr., --- U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 842 (We could not hold pre-empted a state law in an area of traditional state regulation based on so tenuous a relation without doing grave violence to our presumption that Congress intended nothing of the sort.) (construing express preemption language). 28