Opinion ID: 446443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 21 The Government strongly pursues its contention that the CIT lacked jurisdiction over this case. That issue translates into the question whether a party challenging an import restriction imposed by CITA must attempt to import a textile product, have the Customs Service deny entry, protest the decision within Customs, and then, following denial of the protest, bring an action in the CIT under Sec. 1581(a), supra; or whether a prospective importer (prior to attempting an import) may challenge CITA's actions in the CIT under Sec. 1581(i), supra. 22 Section 1581(i) provides in terms that the CIT shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action ... that arises out of any law of the United States providing for--... (3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions ... or (4) administration and enforcement with respect to matters referred to in [paragraph 3]. (Emphasis added.) On the face of the statute, AAEI-TAG's claim fits squarely. Section 204 is a law providing for quantitative restrictions on textiles. AAEI-TAG objects to CITA's administration and enforcement of the quotas established under the authority of section 204, as described in Part I B., supra. Even if one chooses a restrictive interpretation of the broad terms Congress employed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Sec. 1581(i), this case meets the literal language of that additional jurisdictional provision. 23 The legislative history confirms this conclusion. Prior to promulgation of the present version of Sec. 1581 in the Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1728, the jurisdiction of the Customs Court (now the CIT) was limited to the review of the Customs Service's denial of protests concerning the exclusion, classification, or valuation of imported merchandise. The Customs Court's jurisdiction was exclusive; in fact, the statute providing for federal question jurisdiction over importation matters in the district courts specifically denied the district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Customs Court over international trade matters. 10 This seemingly simple division of jurisdiction soon created a problem: since the Customs Court had jurisdiction only after Customs' denial of a protest, and since the federal question statute denied the district courts jurisdiction only over those matters in which the Customs Service had jurisdiction, could a prospective importer challenge in district court a Customs Service regulation prior to actual importation (and, therefore, prior to a protest)? 24 The cases on this issue in the courts of appeals were not uniform. 11 In Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.1977), the Second Circuit ruled that the district court had jurisdiction over a case in which a prospective importer challenged Customs Service regulations promulgated pursuant to international agreements. The court reasoned that these agreements would be enforced abroad, restricting the opportunity for an importer to attempt to bring in merchandise beyond the agreements' terms. Since in that situation the Customs Service would never have the opportunity to consider a protest, the Customs Court could never obtain jurisdiction, and the district courts had jurisdiction under the federal question statute. 566 F.2d at 399. 25 The District of Columbia Circuit reached an opposite result in Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, 561 F.2d 872 (1977) (per curiam ), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933, 98 S.Ct. 1509, 55 L.Ed.2d 531 (1978). Consumers Union challenged CITA's import restrictions prior to any attempt to import merchandise beyond CITA's ceilings. That court of appeals ruled that the district court lacked jurisdiction: Here ... if anyone wishes to challenge the Committee's actions, he can do so as other challenges of that nature are made, i.e., as an importer ... bringing textiles into the United States. 561 F.2d at 874. Contrary to the Second Circuit's opinion, the court ruled that judicial review of CITA's actions could be had only in the Customs Court following the denial of a protest by the Customs Service. 26 In the Customs Court Act, Congress specifically sought to resolve the confusion between the district courts' and the then Customs Court's jurisdictions. S.Rep. No. 466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5; H.Rep. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3729, 3741. The Senate Report clearly states the intended effect of the new statute, and its reasons: 27 Because the statutes defining the jurisdiction of the Customs Court are so intricate and because international trade problems have become so complex, it has become increasingly more difficult to determine, in advance, whether or not a particular case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court and is therefore excluded from the jurisdiction of the district courts. The result has been demonstrated by the fact that a significant number of civil actions have been initiated in the district courts only to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See, for example, ... Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, [supra ].... 28 ... The amended bill attempts to solve this problem by clarifying the existing jurisdictional statutes relating to the United States Customs Court and by expanding the jurisdiction of the Court to include any civil actions involving imports and a statute, constitutional provision, treaty, executive agreement or executive order which is directly and substantially concerned with international trade. 29 S.Rep. No. 466, supra, at 4-5 (emphasis added). The House Report, though not so direct, is to the same effect: The dismissal of these actions after great expenditures of time and resources, has produced frustration on the part of litigants and the courts. H.R. 7540 will resolve this problem by defining the demarcation between the Court of International Trade and the federal district courts.... H.Rep. No. 1235, supra, at 30, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1980, p. 3741. 30 The main thrust of the Senate Report seems to us to be that Congress intended to put aside the Consumers Union rationale and to expand the jurisdiction of the CIT. The objective of the addition of Sec. 1581(i) was to make it clear that the CIT was to be the forum, and that prospective importers challenging Customs Service regulations imposing import restrictions need not attempt to import merchandise, file a protest and then contest the administrative denial of the protest in the CIT under Sec. 1581(a). See, Sneakers Circus, supra. The decision to clarify and expand the jurisdiction of the CIT--rather than to clarify the jurisdiction of the district courts--as a means for resolving the jurisdictional problem indicates that Congress intended plaintiffs in appellants' shoes to bring their cases in the CIT rather than in the district court. 31 Similarly, the House Report stresses the legislative purpose of clarifying the boundary between the CIT's and district courts' jurisdiction. If those challenging import restrictions must exhaust their remedies with the Customs Service, as the Government urges here, CIT jurisdiction will then arise under Sec. 1581(a). Little scope, if any, would remain for Sec. 1581(i). If anything were left of that new provision, it would be exceedingly narrow and of indeterminate and inconclusive impact. This result is plainly contrary to Congress' purpose in enacting Sec. 1581(i)--to establish clear rules and to center international trade litigation in the CIT. We refuse to create a jurisdictional morass when Congress exerted its efforts to remove one. 32 The decisions relied upon below support this conclusion. In U.S. Cane Sugar, supra, the plaintiff objected to quotas on sugar imports. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals noted that, absent Sec. 1581(i), the case would have gone to the district courts; the court concluded that jurisdiction under Sec. 1581(i) was appropriate and found relief under Sec. 1581(a) to be manifestly inadequate. 683 F.2d at 402 n. 5. In Uniroyal, supra, on the other hand, the importer had already entered the goods in this country, and the goods were subject to redelivery (a situation quite different from the plight of a prospective importer who faces quantitative import restrictions). The court there held only that Sec. 1581(i) could not be used where Sec. 1581(a) was already completely available. The present case falls squarely within the U.S. Cane Sugar rule, and the CIT properly considered the substance of AAEI-TAG's claim. 12 III