Opinion ID: 1609293
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Michigan v. Jackson :

Text: Although the general rule is that a defendant can make a valid waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel during direct or overt interrogation, even in the absence of his counsel, the United States Supreme Court later created a prophylactic rule for deciding whether an accused who has asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel could subsequently be found to have waived that right. In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), a consolidated case, the Court first noted defendants had a Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel at their postarraignment interrogations, as they occurred after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings by way of the arraignments, and because the interrogation represented governmental efforts to elicit information from the accused, a critical stage triggering the right to counsel. The Court then turned to whether the defendants had made a valid waiver of the right to counsel. Adopting the reasoning of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), which had announced an identical prophylactic rule in the Fifth Amendment context [10] , the Court held that once a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, if a defendant requests the assistance of counsel or assert[s] his right to counsel, then any subsequent waiver obtained pursuant to police-initiated interrogation will be presumed involuntary, regardless of whether the waiver was actually voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under the traditional analysis used by the Court in Brewer v. Williams . We thus hold that, if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid. Michigan v. Jackson, Id. at 636, 106 S.Ct. at 1411. Thus, a bright-line rule was created as an exception to the traditional rule allowing for the waiver of the right to counsel, such that where defendant has asserted his right to counsel, a later waiver in response to police-initiated interrogation is irrebuttably presumed invalid. The adoption of this prophylactic rule was based on the supposition that suspects who assert their right to counsel are unlikely to waive that right voluntarily in subsequent interrogations. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. at 350, 110 S.Ct. at 1180. Where defendant's right to counsel has attached by the mere fact of the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings against him, but where defendant has not asserted this right, the Court will not presume that a subsequent waiver in response to police-initiated interrogation is invalid. The defendant who has not asserted his right to counsel after it has attached, although he does not get the enhanced protection of the prophylactic rule created in Michigan v. Jackson , still gets protection under the Sixth Amendment in that his waiver of the his right to counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Such was the holding of Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988), wherein the analysis to be used where a defendant whose Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached but has not been asserted was made clear. In Patterson, defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had clearly attached, as he was indicted prior to his questioning by the police. Noting that defendant had not, however, retained, or accepted by appointment, a lawyer to represent him at the time he was questioned by authorities, and that he at no time sought to exercise his right to have counsel present [11] during the questioning, the Court held the prophylactic rule created in Michigan v. Jackson would not apply, and instead, the inquiry would turn simply on whether or not defendant had made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. Had petitioner indicated he wanted the assistance of counsel, the authorities' interview with him would have stopped, and further questioning would have been forbidden (unless petitioner called for such a meeting). This was our holding in Michigan v. Jackson, supra, which applied Edwards to the Sixth Amendment context.... Our decision in Jackson ... turned on the fact that the accused ha[d] asked for the help of a lawyer in dealing with the police.... Preserving the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with police only through counsel is the essence of Edwards and its progenynot barring an accused from making an initial election as to whether he will face the State's officers during questioning with the aid of counsel, or go it alone. If an accused knowingly and intelligently pursues the latter course, we see no reason why the uncounseled statements he then makes must be excluded at his trial. Patterson, Id. at 291, 108 S.Ct. at 2394. The fact of attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not alone preclude the police from thereafter interrogating a defendant. Patterson v. Illinois . Nor does the mere fact of appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant alone preclude subsequent interrogation. Brewer v. Williams , Michigan v. Harvey , 494 U.S. at 352, 110 S.Ct. at 1181 (but nothing in the Sixth Amendment prevents a suspect charged with a crime and represented by counsel from voluntarily choosing, on his own, to speak with police in the absence of an attorney.); Montoya v. Collins . Had the United States Supreme Court intended, as we mistakenly held in Hattaway, for the fact of appointment of counsel alone to be sufficient to preclude the police from thereafter interrogating defendant and obtaining a valid waiver, it could have so stated in Michigan v. Jackson , since in that case the Court noted that one of the two defendants had not only requested counsel but that a notice of appointment had been mailed to a law firm, effectively appointing counsel for that defendant. Instead, the Court declined the opportunity to hinge its rule invalidating waivers obtained pursuant to police-initiated interrogation on the fact of the appointment of counsel itself and instead chose to invalidate only those waivers obtained pursuant to police-initiated interrogation occurring after the defendant has made a request for counsel or an assertion ... of his right to counsel, Michigan, Id. at 635, 106 S.Ct. at 1411. [12]
Having concluded that under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who has appointed counsel but who has not otherwise asserted or invoked his right to counsel can make a waiver of his right to counsel in the absence of his attorney, we turn now to the issue of whether the same conclusion would be reached under La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13. The basic precept of the Hattaway opinionthat the right to counsel under La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13 is similar in scope and operation to the right of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitutionis correct. This conclusion is supported not only by the language of the provision itself but also by the transcripts to the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973, and the history of our state jurisprudence prior to the adoption of the 1974 Constitution. First, the language used in the two provisions shows they are similar in scope, operation and function. The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13 provides that [a]t each stage of the proceedings, every person is entitled to assistance of counsel of his choice or to appointed counsel if indigent. The only obvious difference between the two is that the Sixth Amendment does not directly provide for the appointment of counsel if defendant is indigent. However, we do not believe the addition of this sentence in any way affects the interpretation of when the right to counsel under the article attaches and to which subsequent stages it applies, and under which circumstances it can be waived. Other than this, there is no other meaningful semantic difference in the language used under the two provisions. There is no evidence that the framers of the Louisiana Constitution and the people of this state who ratified it intended to completely abrogate the validity of waivers by defendants of their right to counsel where such waivers are otherwise permissible under the Sixth Amendment. Not only does the facial similarity of the two provisions support the conclusion that the right to counsel under the two constitutions is coextensive, but the transcripts of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 also support such a conclusion. Because Louisiana Const. Art. I, Sec. 13 does not dictate on its face when the right to counsel may attach, to which proceedings it would apply, and under what circumstances it can be waived, the transcripts are a relevant source of guidance in our determination of these issues. The only pertinent discussion of this particular provision of Art. I, Sec. 13 located in the transcripts is the following: Mr. Ginn: Mr. Stinson, it says, at all stages of the proceedings, at all stages of the proceedings he must have a lawyer there. Does that mean that a sheriff or a district attorney could not talk to the man unless there was an attorney there? Is that what this implies? Mr. Stinson: It says, He shall be entitled. And I think that means that if a person says, I'd rather not talk to you until I have the opportunity to see a lawyer, and they should explain to him before he answers any questions, and I believe that's federal and, also, state, that he has a right to an attorney to advise with him before he makes any statement. I think it's just a reenactment of what the present law is. State of Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 Verbatim Transcripts Vol. VI, p. 1132-33 (emphasis added). The above statements, when combined with the fact that not one other comment was made regarding this provision (indicating there was no controversy over the plain meaning of the provision), reveal the framers of our constitution did not intend to give to defendants in this state any greater protection with respect to the right to counsel than was already afforded them under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. More particularly, there is nothing in the language of the provision or the transcripts which indicates any intent to foreclose a defendant's ability to waive his Art. I, Sec. 13 right to counsel after counsel has been appointed to represent him. Additional support for our concluding the provisions are similar in function can be found from the pre-existing state jurisprudence at the time of the framing of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. Prior to the enactment of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, this court consistently resolved arguments asserting a violation of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and the Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting same and rarely even mentioned the applicability of the right to counsel under 1921 La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 9. [13] Even when that provision was mentioned, Sixth Amendment jurisprudence was referred to as guidance in interpretation. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 307 So.2d 582 (La. 1975); State v. James, 305 So.2d 514 (La. 1974); State v. Allen, 251 La. 237, 203 So.2d 705 (1967); City of New Orleans v. Cook, 249 La. 820, 191 So.2d 634 (1966); State v. Rasheed, 248 La. 309, 178 So.2d 261, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1012, 86 S.Ct. 1962, 16 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1965). Thus, if the framers of the 1974 Constitution and the people of this state who ratified it had intended to break from our previous jurisprudence and to create a right to counsel under our state constitution which would be broader in scope and extent than that protected by the Sixth Amendment, it seems to us they would have adopted language which more clearly evinced such an intent. [14] Nor do we any longer agree with the argument implicit in Hattaway that because the Massiah line of cases pre-existed the 1974 Constitution and Brewer was not handed down until 1977, the framers intended for the holdings of the Massiah cases and not the Brewer case to apply to overt interrogations cases. While Brewer v. Williams was decided by the Supreme Court three years after the adoption of our Constitution and several of the opinions in the Massiah line were issued prior to 1974, the Brewer opinion did not create an exception to that line of cases. Later cases by the Court interpreting and applying Brewer made clear that Brewer was not an exception but, rather, merely recognized the prevailing rule that waivers of the right to counsel were permissible even where defendant had appointed counsel. Furthermore, looking only to the Massiah line of cases for an indication of whether or not a waiver of counsel by a represented defendant can be valid in an overt interrogation case simply because those cases may pre-date our constitution, as we did in Hattaway, is improper because waiver was never an issue in any of those cases. Therefore, we conclude the right to counsel under Art. I, Sec. 13 of our constitution and the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment are coextensive in scope, operation, and application. [15] The Sixth Amendment jurisprudence predating our state constitution, as well as later U.S. Supreme Court decisions explaining those cases, make clear that a defendant can validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under certain circumstances. We hold the same principle applies to the right to counsel under La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13. Because our constitution can give no less protection than is afforded by the United States Constitution, we are additionally bound by the Court's holding in Michigan v. Jackson that once defendant's right to counsel has attached, if he makes an assertion or invocation of this right, any waiver he would later make in response to police-initiated interrogation will be considered invalid, regardless of whether the waiver would normally meet the standards of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. Where defendant's right to counsel has attached but he has not made an assertion or invocation of his right to counsel, a waiver in response to police-initiated interrogation can be considered valid provided it is knowing, intelligent and voluntary.