Opinion ID: 1122990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: RCW 46.61.502 is unconstitutionally overbroad

Text: A statute is overbroad if it sweeps so broadly that it punishes activity which is otherwise permissible. City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wash.2d 826, 827 P.2d 1374 (1992). Also see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L.J. 853 (1990-1991). The overbreadth doctrine has been termed strong medicine; however, the elixir the majority applies does not cure this disease. O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash.2d 796, 804, 749 P.2d 142 (1988). Strong medicine is sometimes required to protect our constitutional rights. Activity which is not illegal may not be punished. Thus, by opening the door to punishment for being under the influence of alcohol after driving, the sweep of RCW 46.61.502 is overbroad. If the same person tested while driving or shortly after driving blew less than a 0.10, he would not have violated the statute, although if the police wait a sufficient time, the reading could increase and he would have violated the statute. But the facts are the same, only the time of testing has changed. See Barud, 681 A.2d at 166 ([T]he statute sweeps unnecessarily broadly into activity which has not been declared unlawful in this Commonwealth, that is, operating a motor vehicle with a BAC below .10%.).