Opinion ID: 3022894
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unreasonableness in Light of Booker

Text: As mentioned above, the District Court sentenced Dair after Booker. Dair claims that in light of that case, his sentence of 325 months was unreasonable. We recently established our test for the reasonableness of a post-Booker sentence in United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2006). To determine the reasonableness of a sentence, “we must first be satisfied the court exercised its discretion by considering the relevant factors.” Id. at 329. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the relevant factors are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed-- (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for . . . the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . . . Id. In addition to the factors listed in Cooper, § 3553(a) also requires that courts consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Though the 5 “record must demonstrate the trial court gave meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors,” it need not “discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing.” Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329. Guided by our holding in Cooper and in light of the deference we owe the District Court, we are satisfied that Dair’s sentence was not unreasonable. In its analysis of the § 3553(a) factors, the District Court conducted an extensive colloquy during which it addressed specifically the justice of the sentence, its deterrent effect and protection of society. The District Court also factored in the characteristics of the defendant, noting Dair’s remorsefulness and family responsibilities before sentencing him. Finally, as discussed above, the District Court calculated Dair’s Guidelines range, pursuant to its statutory obligation. In short, the District Court fulfilled its duty under Cooper to give due consideration to the relevant § 3553(a) factors. Our inquiry does not end there, however. In addition to ensuring that the District Court considered the § 3553(a) factors, “we must also ascertain whether those factors were reasonably applied to the circumstances of the case. In doing so, we apply a deferential standard, the trial court being in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence in light of the particular circumstances of the case.” Id. at 330. We are particularly satisfied that the trial judge here is in the best position to determine Dair’s sentence, as he is the judge most familiar with the intricacies of the Courtney Carter Narcotics Organization. Based on these additional considerations, we remain satisfied with the reasonableness of Dair’s sentence. 6