Opinion ID: 221339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attribution of Loss Amount

Text: Samuels argues that the district court erred when it held him responsible for more than $400,000 in loss, based on the amount fraudulently obtained (or attempted) by all members of the 7 The district court stated that it found “a sentence that’s incrementally greater than Mr. Holloway’s . . . is appropriate and justifiable on the facts and the circumstances of the case” under the same analysis that it “found a four-point enhancement appropriate for Mr. Erwin . . . as compared to the three points for Mr. Holloway.” (Erwin Sent. Tr. at 75.) 14 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 scheme from the time that Samuels joined in July of 2008.8 Because he was “not involved in the planning, execution, or sharing of proceeds from fraud trips led by other defendants,” he contends that “[h]is offense level should therefore be increased only by 10 levels for losses between $120,000 and $200,000 under § 2B1.1(b)(f) from the trips for which he was responsible.” (Samuels Br. at 6.)9 We “review de novo the district court’s method of calculating loss for purposes of sentencing enhancements under the Guidelines.” United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 414 (6th Cir. 2007). “Under the Guidelines, the district court is to determine the amount of loss by a preponderance of the evidence, and the district court’s findings are not to be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Triana, 468 F.3d 308, 321 (6th Cir. 2006). In determining the amount of loss attributable to a defendant, the district court may not “blindly embrace[] the figures set forth in [a defendant’s] PSR . . . . Rather, the district court must actually find facts.” White, 492 F.3d at 416. Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a), offense level and characteristics are determined in relation to certain relevant conduct, including: 8 Samuels does not challenge the mathematical calculation that the district court used in reaching a dollar figure for attempted loss from all co-conspirators post-June 2008. 9 Samuels’ math is somewhat difficult to follow. Samuels’ PSR, as he points out, only reports his having personally traveled on one trip, from October 15-18, 2008. The total attempted loss for that trip was $81,427.79 and the actual loss $73,927.79. (Samuels PSR ¶ 88.) Though the trip that Samuels directly participated in generated an attempted loss of between $70,000 and $120,000—equating to an 8-level increase—Samuels “maintain[s] that he should be held accountable for under $200,000,” (Samuels Br. at 7), because “he personally received no more than $150,000 from the criminal activity he jointly undertook with others.” (Samuels Sent. Memo at 2.) How Samuels could have received $150,000 from the one trip in which he participated, which grossed only $74,000, is inexplicable. 15 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 in the case of jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonable foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). We have held that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) “requires that the district court make particularized findings with respect to both the scope of the defendant’s agreement and the foreseeability of his co-conspirators’ conduct before holding the defendant accountable for the scope of the entire conspiracy.” United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 2002). It is Samuels’ position that the district court did not make particularized findings as to the scope of his agreement with co-conspirators, and that furthermore, the record does not support the finding that Samuels was jointly involved in the trips that he did not personally attend. (Samuels Br. at 9.) Samuels further argues that the conduct of his co-conspirators was not foreseeable, as he “was [not] involved in any way whatsoever in the separate fraud trips conducted by Defendants Holloway and Erwin, the other two leaders in this triple conspiracy.” (Id.) The district court made the following specific factual findings regarding the scope of Samuels’ participation in the criminal enterprise—“that no later than July of 2008 Mr. Samuels has joined this particular conspiracy” and: there’s no question that Mr. Samuels operated at a higher level, at a planning level, at a level that warrants responsibility for the entire operation that occurred on his watch. And I think in Mr. Samuels’ case that includes trips certainly that he went on and also includes trips that he didn’t go on but that other people, in particular Mr. Holloway or Mr. Erwin, were personally supervising. And that’s because in my view Mr. Samuels on this presentence record was somebody who was intimately involved once he got into the conspiracy in the planning, execution, implementation, and then 16 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 ultimately the attempt to clean it up . . . . And I think the evidence on this point is particularly telling and supportive of an inference that, certainly by a preponderance of the evidence, Mr. Samuels’ role is at that high level. (Samuels Sent. Tr. at 59-60, 63.) The district court noted that Samuels had introduced other participants, who went on trips that he did not supervise, to the conspiracy. (See Id. at 64.) The district court found this to be an additional indication that Samuels was intertwined in the entire enterprise, not just the trips that he attended. (See Id.) The district court also credited the proffers offered by many of Samuels co-conspirators, which repeatedly indicated that Samuels was a leader in the conspiracy and performed an “identical” role to Holloway and Erwin, the other supervisors. (See Id. at 59.) This role was greater than that of the walkers, who were only involved in and responsible for the trips that they attended, and extended to the whole of the scheme. (See Id. at 57-58.) Regarding foreseeability, in addition to the foregoing, the district court found that the evidence of co-conspirators’ jailhouse calls to Samuels after the arrest supported to the conclusion that Samuels was aware of the conduct of all of the teams. (See Id. at 60-61.) When arrested, several co-conspirators called Samuels, and during these conversations Samuels discussed not only trips that he personally supervised, but also trips that other supervisors led. (See Id. at 64; Samuels PSR ¶ 50.) He discussed “cleaning” up whatever evidence of the conspiracy might be in California; presumably not just evidence of his own trips (which his co-conspirators would have no reason to tell him to clean up), but evidence of the operation as a whole. (Samuels Sent. Tr. at 64; Samuels PSR ¶ 48.) The co-conspirator also told Samuels that Erwin wanted him to “shut it down,” which again speaks to the conspiracy as a whole and not just to Samuels’ own trips. (Samuels PSR ¶ 49.) 17 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 Samuels replies that the district court’s findings were nonetheless insufficiently particularized, as “the district court failed to distinguish the three conspiracies in this case and determine the separate losses caused by each group.” (Samuels Reply at 1.) This argument fails for two reasons: first, the district court properly found that there was only a single conspiracy, which Samuels joined in 2008; and secondly, because the walkers worked for different supervisors’ teams at different times, and because supervisors sometimes traveled on the teams together, it would be impossible to separate out “three conspiracies” in the way that Samuels seems to envision. (See Samuels PSR ¶ 88.) There is no evidence in the record to undermine the conclusion that Samuels was a supervisor in the single conspiracy from June 2008 forward, and that all activity after that point was jointly undertaken within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The district court made particularized findings regarding both the scope of Samuels participation and the foreseeability of his coconspirators’ actions, and those findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the district court did not err in assessing Samuels a 14-level enhancement.