Opinion ID: 4533006
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The “Invited Error” Doctrine

Text: Morris first claims that the “invited error” doctrine should preclude the government from relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Stitt. Under the invited-error doctrine, a party generally cannot “complain on appeal of errors that he himself invited or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit.” United States v. Howard, 947 F.3d 936, 945 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 996 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1993)). Put differently, you can’t complain about a result you caused. 21 Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Rules of Evidence: Federal Practice & Procedure § 5039.2 (2d ed. Apr. 2020 update). According to Morris, because the government represented to the district court that Tennessee aggravated burglary was not a violent felony under ACCA, it cannot now come to the appellate court and argue the opposite. The problem here is there was no error to invite. When the government said that Tennessee aggravated burglary was not a violent felony under ACCA, it was merely pointing out that binding precedent controlled the outcome of Morris’s case. And at the time, that was true. Our court’s decision in Stitt I did control the case and establish Morris’s right to relief. But there has been an intervening change in the law in the form of Stitt II. Morris cites no authority for the proposition that a party “invites error” when he tells the court to apply then-binding precedent, especially where he nevertheless contends the precedent is wrongly decided and declares his intention to continue litigating the issue. Nor does Morris cite any authority for the proposition that we now have to ignore an intervening change in the law. Thus, his invited-error argument fails. -4- Case Nos. 18-5183/5197, United States v. Morris B. Tennessee Aggravated Burglary and ACCA Generic Burglary Putting Stitt to the side, Morris provides several alternative reasons why Tennessee aggravated burglary is not an ACCA predicate offense. He first argues that Tennessee’s definition of “entry” in its aggravated burglary statute makes the offense broader than generic burglary under ACCA. He then argues that Tennessee burglary is too broad to constitute generic ACCA burglary because it covers merely reckless conduct. Our precedent forecloses both arguments. We begin with the basic framework for these types of challenges. Under ACCA, certain defendants can have their sentences enhanced if they have three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The statute enumerates some offenses that count as violent felonies: “burglary, arson, [and] extortion.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). This is often called the “enumerated offense clause.” To determine whether a prior conviction counts as an ACCA predicate under the enumerated offense clause, we use the “categorical approach.” Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). That means we “compare the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements of the ‘generic’ crime—i.e., the offense as commonly understood.” Id. So, for Tennessee aggravated burglary, we would compare the elements of the Tennessee statute to the elements of “generic” burglary, which the Supreme Court has defined as “unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990). A conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary “qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if the statute’s elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of” generic burglary under Taylor. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. Definition of “Entry.” First, Morris argues that Tennessee aggravated burglary is broader than generic burglary under ACCA because its definition of “entry” is so broad that even some attempted burglaries are criminalized under it. But that exact argument was presented to and -5- Case Nos. 18-5183/5197, United States v. Morris rejected by this court in Brumbach v. United States, 929 F.3d 791, 795 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied 140 S. Ct. 974 (2020). Morris even admits this. Brumbach reaffirmed that Tennessee aggravated burglary qualifies as generic burglary under ACCA. Id. And we as a panel cannot overturn that decision. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, --- F.3d ---, No. 18-5356, 2020 WL 1966845, at  (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2020); Ogle v. Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Ass’n, 951 F.3d 794, 796 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Mens Rea for Tennessee Burglary. Next, Morris argues that Tennessee’s definition of burglary is broader than ACCA generic burglary because it can cover merely reckless conduct. This would be a problem, according to Morris, because the individual would never form the “intent” to commit a crime, as is required under Taylor. The argument refers to Tennessee’s generic burglary statute: (a) A person commits burglary who, without the effective consent of the property owner: (1) Enters a building other than a habitation (or any portion thereof) not open to the public, with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault; (2) Remains concealed, with the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault, in a building; (3) Enters a building and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or assault; or (4) Enters any freight or passenger car, automobile, truck, trailer, boat, airplane or other motor vehicle with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault or commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or assault. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a). Granted, Morris was convicted of aggravated burglary. But Tennessee aggravated burglary incorporates the generic burglary statute: “Aggravated burglary is burglary of a habitation as defined in [Tenn. Code Ann.] §§ 39-14-401 and 39-14-402.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403(a). Morris directs his argument at subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3). Once again, he runs headlong into binding precedent. We have already examined that exact statutory language and -6- Case Nos. 18-5183/5197, United States v. Morris concluded that all three variants count as ACCA burglary under Taylor. United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 684–85 (6th Cir. 2015) (“We find that the first three variants of Tennessee burglary, i.e., Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–14–402(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3), qualify as generic burglary . . . .”). And we have reaffirmed this holding after Stitt II. Brumbach, 929 F.3d at 794–95. So that argument fails, too. C. Different Occasions Morris’s last argument is that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the three convictions forming the basis of his ACCA enhancement occurred on separate occasions. The government argues that this argument is untimely. But even if it were timely, it’s meritless. ACCA requires that the three predicate convictions be “committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Under Sixth Circuit precedent, we can examine certain state court documents, including charging documents, to determine whether ACCA predicate offenses occurred on different occasions. Brown, 2020 WL 1966845, at ; United States v. King, 853 F.3d 267, 273 (6th Cir. 2017); see also Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). And based on the charging documents, Morris did commit the aggravated burglary and two robberies on three different occasions. The aggravated burglary occurred on October 31, 1995. The two robberies occurred on July 2, 2001 and July 14, 2001.1 Morris does not claim the dates on these charging documents are inaccurate. Instead, he argues that we are required to ignore the dates. According to this view, we can examine things like charging documents only to determine “elemental facts”—that is, the facts that the state court necessarily found as elements of the conviction. And because the date of the offense is not an 1 These state court records were not before the district court, but it is proper for us to take judicial notice of them. See United States v. Ferguson, 681 F.3d 826, 834–35 (6th Cir. 2012). -7- Case Nos. 18-5183/5197, United States v. Morris element of aggravated burglary under Tennessee law, according to Morris, the court cannot rely on the dates listed on the documents to enhance his sentence under ACCA. Yet again, binding precedent controls this issue. Confronted with this exact question, we held in United States v. Hennessee that “a district court may consider both elemental and nonelemental facts contained in Shepard-approved documents to determine whether prior felonies were committed on occasions different from one another for purposes of the ACCA.” 932 F.3d 437, 444 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied 140 S. Ct. 896 (2020). Again, Morris recognizes this. Considering the facts in the charging documents, as is allowed under Hennessee, we conclude that Morris’s offenses were committed on different occasions.