Opinion ID: 75617
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finality of Hagins' Prior Conviction

Text: 14 Hagins also protests the enhancement of his sentence to a mandatory minimum of twenty years due to a prior drug conviction. On 19 February 1996, Hagins pled guilty in Jenkins County, Georgia state court to possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Hagins was sentenced under Georgia's First Offender Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60, et seq., adjudication of guilt was withheld, and he was given five years probation. Because of Hagins's arrest for the federal offense, the state court on 22 January 1997 revoked his first offender status and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison for the state possession with intent to distribute charge. When Hagins was sentenced on the federal charge, Greene did not object to the enhancement of his sentence based on the prior state conviction. 15 A sentence enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) is proper if based on a final prior conviction. Hagins argues that his prior conviction was not final until after the conspiracy terminated, as evidenced by the district court's entry of a judgment and commitment order (J&C) stating that Hagins' participation in the conspiracy ended 13 February 1996. Hagins argues that the judge's later correction of the J&C to alter the date of Hagins' involvement in the conspiracy was improper. Even if the alteration of the J&C was proper, Hagins also argues that his prior conviction was not final until he exhausted his discretionary direct appeal of the revocation of his first offender status. Accordingly, he asks us to find that Greene rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the enhancement. 16
17 Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that [c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time. Fed.R.Crim.P. 36. The district court's original J&C stated that the date Hagins' offense concluded was 13 February, 1996. Ex. Vol.3-165-1. At trial, however, the evidence presented included an audio tape of a conversation between Johnson and Hagins on 28 March, 1996. During that call, Hagins informed Johnson that he did not have an extra two ounces of cocaine, but did have the original amount Johnson had asked him to obtain. Ex. Vol. 4-174-103. At sentencing, the district judge adopted the findings of the PSI, which included a description of the 28 March, 1996 phone call. We find that the district judge properly amended the J&C pursuant to Rule 36. The change was a clerical one. See United States v. Bates, 213 F.3d 1336, 1340 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 666 (2000) (holding that, where a written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncements of the sentencing judge, the oral pronouncement at sentencing controls). 18
19 Hagins also argues that his prior state conviction cannot be used to enhance his sentence because it is still not yet final. Hagins was sentenced as a first offender on 19 February, 1996. According to Georgia law, he had thirty days to appeal that sentence. See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38 (A notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of). The Georgia courts have held that classification as a first offender starts the clock for purposes of filing an appeal. [F]irst-offender status takes the place of a 'sentence' and once imposed upon a criminal defendant, his case assumes the mantle of finality necessary to bring a direct appeal of his conviction. Dean v. State, 338 S.E.2d 711, 712 (Ga.Ct.App. 1985). 20 Hagins argues, however, that the finality of his conviction should run from the direct discretionary appeal of the revocation of his first-offender status. This argument is specious. In United States v. Fernandez, the defendant had received a year of probation after pleading nolo contendere to a state charge of trafficking in cocaine. 58 F.3d 593, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). We held that a sentence may be enhanced based on such a prior state court sentence of probation under a deferral statute. Id. at 599-600. See also United States v. Jones, 910 F.2d 760, 761 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a similar disposition qualified as a prior conviction for purposes of determining career offender status). If such a conviction can be used to enhance a defendant's sentence without a revocation of probation, it follows that we need not wait for revocation of probation and any related appeal to deem the conviction final. Hagins' conviction became final when the thirty days available to him to appeal the original disposition expired. That date was 23 March 1996. Because Hagins' conviction was final he cannot demonstrate prejudice from Greene's failure to object to his sentence enhancement on that basis. 21