Opinion ID: 853033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Gun Owner's Duty of Care

Text: Heck's Estate argues that the owner or possessor of a loaded handgun owes a duty to the public to exercise ordinary care in the storage and safekeeping of the handgun. The trial court ruled that absent negligent entrustment, when an instrumentality passes from a person's control, responsibility for injuries inflicted by it cease. The Court of Appeals agreed, basing its finding primarily on Article I, § 32 of the Indiana Constitution establishing a right to bear arms and the absence of a relevant statutory duty regarding storage of guns in the home. Estate of Heck, 752 N.E.2d at 200-01. To recover on a theory of negligence, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) defendant's duty to conform his conduct to a standard of care arising from his relationship with the plaintiff, (2) a failure of the defendant to conform his conduct to that standard of care, and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach. Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind. 604, 611, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706 (1974). Whether the defendant must conform his conduct to a certain standard for the plaintiff's benefit is a question of law for the court to decide. See Neal v. Home Builders, Inc., 232 Ind. 160, 111 N.E.2d 280 (1953). Courts will generally find a duty where reasonable persons would recognize and agree that it exists. Gariup Const. Co. v. Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Ind.1988). This analysis involves a balancing of three factors: (1) the relationship between the parties, (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and (3) public policy concerns. Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 996 (Ind.1991). We analyze these factors to determine if the Stoffers had a duty to store their firearm safely. A. Relationship Between the Parties. The relationship between Officer Heck and the Stoffers was tenuous at best. Prior to the deaths of Officer Heck and Timothy, the parties did not know each other. ( See R. at 572-73.) Their relationship was formed only because of Timothy's acts. The Stoffers were gun owners and parents of a drug-addicted felon fleeing from police, to whom they gave unrestricted access to their home where they kept a handgun. Officer Heck was the policeman attempting to apprehend Timothy. This factor weighs in the Stoffers' favor. B. Reasonable Foreseeability of Harm. On the other hand, given the facts of this case, the foreseeability of the harm weighs in the Estate's favor. By his own admission, Ray Stoffer indicated his awareness of Timothy's frame of mind. He told police: [Timothy] had all this pressure, there was nothing left, there was no other way to go. For him to take a gun, he had [to] know. . . . [H]e knew the situation with the police, he knew they wanted him and for him to have a gun on him, he knew what was going to happen, I know he did. I told [my wife], he had to almost have a death wish . . . (R. at 754.) Several additional facts, taken as a whole, lead us to conclude that the events of this case were foreseeable. Timothy had stolen from his family several times. On three separate occasions, he was charged with resisting law enforcement officers. He actively sought to evade police detection by hiding at his parents' lake cottage. Ray Stoffer believed Timothy would flee rather than face his August 14th sentencing hearing. (R. at 837.) The Stoffers' knew of Timothy's lengthy criminal history. Finally and most important, Timothy retained free and unfettered access to his parents' home. Other actions by the Stoffers' lend further credence to the foreseeability of these tragic events. When their grandchildren visited, the Stoffers hid the handgun in the attic. (R. at 387, 395.) Moreover, upon Timothy's release from prison, they took extra precautions to secure their cash, checks and other valuables based upon Timothy's track record of stealing from family members. (R. at 605.) The Stoffers exercised due care to protect their grandchildren and valuables, but failed to safeguard the gun from a mentally disturbed, habitual and violent offender [with] free access to the premises. Estate of Heck, 752 N.E.2d at 207 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). We decline to take a narrow view of Webb's foreseeability of harm prong and determine that this factor weighs in favor of the establishment of a duty. C. Public Policy Concerns. As to the public policy concerns implicated in this case, our review of current scholarship reveals that Timothy's theft and usage of the gun to kill Officer Heck is depressingly common. Over a quarter million firearms are stolen each year, and this arsenal is used in thirty-five percent of the crimes involving guns. Andrew J. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent Storage of Firearms, 32 Conn. L.Rev. 1189, 1227 (2000). In Indiana alone, over 4,000 people were killed and an additional 8,800 were injured by gun violence over the most recent five years for which data was available. (Amicus Brady Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence et al. Br. at 3.) Preserving human life and reducing criminal acts are the most important public policy goals. [2] These statistics take on greater significance when juxtaposed with the relatively slight burden of reducing the risk of gun theft. Safe firearm storage, depending on the particular circumstances, can be accomplished by numerous non-burdensome means. Simply locking the front door, thereby preventing the public's access, may be sufficient in some circumstances. Where the risk of theft is greater, more safety measures might be requiredsuch as placing the gun in a safe, locking the trigger, storing the gun and ammunition separately, taking back house keys, or changing locks. Different factual situations call for different methods of safeguarding, but most are relatively non-burdensome to gun owners. Basing its decision on what it called the Indiana Constitution's longstanding and largely unfettered right to bear arms, the Court of Appeals found that public policy did not support a duty to store and keep guns safely. Estate of Heck, 752 N.E.2d at 201. [3] Of course, the Court of Appeals was focusing on the dearth of legislation about storage of firearms. There is a good deal of legislation on the topic of firearm safetylegislation that rests on the constitutional notion that the right to bear arms is not absolute. See Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 694 (Ind. 1990). The legislature's actions persuade us that public policy supports recognition of a duty in this case. A significant number of statutes govern the sale, use and possession of firearms. See, e.g., Ind.Code Ann. § 35-47-2.5 (West 2000) (regulating the sale and license of handguns). Indiana Code § 35-47-2-7 is a particularly relevant statute. It prohibits the sale or transfer of ownership of a handgun to a minor, felon, drug abuser, alcohol abuser or mentally incompetent person. See id. The legislature has deemed the safety risk associated with the possession of handguns by these individuals as too high. Implicit in this prohibition is the recognition that a degree of responsibility is associated with handgun ownership. The Stoffers argue that recognition of a duty of reasonable and ordinary care in this case will create a new and never before recognized cause of action. (Appellee Stoffer Construction Br. at 12.) Not so. The cause of action is negligence, and the duty of care is well established that care which is reasonable under the circumstances. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 298 explains: The care required is always reasonable care. This standard never varies, but the care which it is reasonable to require of the actor varies with the danger involved in his act, and is proportionate to it. The greater the danger, the greater the care which must be exercised. Based upon the significant number of gun-related crimes and the ease of securing a firearm in the home, we find that public policy favors the safe storage of firearms. D. Conclusion About Duty. Our review of this case's facts reveals that the balance of factors supports our conclusion that the Stoffers had a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in the storage and safekeeping of their handgun. E. Role of Right to Bear Arms. Professor Vandercoy has supplied us with a thoughtful brief analyzing the propriety of the question of common law duty we have discussed above. He also asserts that a legal regime permitting the sort of civil liability sought by Heck would dampen, if not stifle, the right of Indiana citizens to keep a firearm in their dwellings for self-defense purposes. Amicus N.R.A. Br. at 11. A constitutional guarantee does not shield parties from negligence claims tangentially related to the exercise thereof. Several constitutional provisions guarantee the free exercise of religion, but nothing precludes a person from suing for slip-and-fall injuries that occur on a church's premises. See, e.g., Hanson v. St. Luke's United Methodist Church, 682 N.E.2d 1314 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 704 N.E.2d 1020 (Ind.1998). In the same vein, the press has the right to free exchange of thought and opinion, but newspaper distributors are not shielded from negligence suits for injuries caused by their delivery drivers. Similarly, Indiana gun owners are guaranteed the right to bear arms, but this right does not entitle owners to impose on their fellow citizens all the external human and economic costs associated with their ownership. Article I, § 32 does not preclude this action from going forward. The trial court's dismissal of the Estate's complaint was therefore error.