Opinion ID: 603513
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Involuntary Manslaughter Instruction

Text: 38 Before reaching the propriety of the omission of an involuntary manslaughter charge, we first address the threshold dispute over the proper standard of review. The government asserts that Knight did not object to the absence of an involuntary manslaughter charge. If Knight did not properly object, we review the record only to assure that the district court did not commit plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 39 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 provides that [n]o party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. The specificity requirement imposes a strict standard on defense counsel, but it is not a mere formalism. United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1128-29 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1029, 106 S.Ct. 1233, 89 L.Ed.2d 342 (1986). Without a clearly articulated objection, a trial judge is not apprised sufficiently of the contested issue and the need to cure a potential error to avoid a new trial. Id. at 1129 (citing United States v. Graham, 758 F.2d 879, 883 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 226, 88 L.Ed.2d 226 (1985)). 40 We find that Knight did not preserve an objection to the exclusion of an involuntary manslaughter charge. Knight initially requested that an involuntary manslaughter charge be included in the charge to the jury. The trial judge decided to deliver the charge. At the government's suggestion, the judge announced that the charge would be accompanied by an instruction that assault with a deadly weapon is a felony. Because the involuntary manslaughter charge would be coupled with a definition of a felony that included assault with a deadly weapon, defense counsel withdrew his request for an involuntary manslaughter instruction. Based on the request of counsel, the district court did not give the instruction. 5 Prior to the jury retiring, the district court afforded both parties the opportunity to take exception to the jury instructions on the record. Defense counsel did not object to the absence of an involuntary manslaughter charge. 41 Knight asserts he requested that the district court not give a particular instruction: an involuntary manslaughter instruction in conjunction with the proposed explanation of a felony. Knight's initial objection to the complete omission of the charge, he argues, clearly indicated that he desired an involuntary manslaughter charge without a clarification of what constitutes a felony. The actions of defense counsel failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 30. Defense counsel requested that the involuntary manslaughter charge not be given at all. He did not make known that he maintained an objection to the failure to give the charge in the form he advocated. Moreover, when the court asked if either party had any objections to the jury instructions in their final form, defense counsel was silent. The defendant did not convey to the trial judge that he maintained an objection to the omission of an involuntary manslaughter charge. 42 Since Knight failed to properly preserve an objection to the omission of an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction, we review the exclusion of the charge under the plain error standard of Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). See United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 93, 121 L.Ed.2d 54 (1992). Rule 52(b) provides that [p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. The Supreme Court has admonished courts of appeals to characterize a mistake as plain error sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592 n. 14, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)). Under the plain error doctrine, we reverse only particularly egregious errors, id. 470 U.S. at 15, 105 S.Ct. at 1046 (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 163, 102 S.Ct. at 1592), which seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings, id. (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)). To find plain error, the mistake must be sufficiently obvious that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it. Frady, 456 U.S. at 163, 102 S.Ct. at 1592; United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928, 109 S.Ct. 314, 102 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988). 43 The absence of an involuntary manslaughter instruction was not plain error. A jury instruction must contain a lesser included offense only if the evidence adduced at trial could support a guilty verdict on either charge. See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349-50, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 1009, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965); United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 664, 121 L.Ed.2d 588 (1992). 6 Involuntary manslaughter, in relevant part, is the unlawful killing of a person during the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony. V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, § 924(2) (1964). Therefore, Knight was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter charge only if a jury rationally could find that he was not committing a felony at the time the gun discharged. 44 Assault with a deadly weapon is a felony in the Virgin Islands. V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, § 297(2) (Supp.1990). Knight admitted that he intentionally and repeatedly hit the victim's head with a loaded .357 magnum pistol. It was not plain error, if error at all, for the district court to conclude that a rational jury would have to find that using a loaded gun to beat a person's head rises to the level of assault with a deadly weapon and is not merely a simple assault, see V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, § 291 (1964), or an assault that inflicts disgrace, see V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, § 298(6) (Supp.1990). Although a defendant is entitled to have a jury, not a judge, act as fact finder, a trial court need not instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense unless ... a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and not the greater. Commissiong, 706 F.Supp. at 1188; see 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 515, at 21 (1982).