Opinion ID: 1757749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court's unjustified comments and actions througout the course of the trial dnied the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial and constituted prejudicial error.

Text: The court did admonish the appellant's counsel to speed up or shorten the voir dire examination of the jury and on other occasions made a rather curt ruling. Also, several objections by defense counsel were never ruled upon by the court. During this process, at one time, the court refused to allow the appellant to proffer evidence into the record but at a subsequent time stated that proffer could be made later. In any event, no proffer was ever made and it is not clear from the record whether it was understood by appellant's counsel that he would be able to proffer into the record at a later time. We have held that the trial court making reference to counsel's dilatory tactics amounted to prejudicial error. Chapman v. State, 257 Ark. 415, 516 S.W.2d 598 (1974). We recognize that the presiding judge should manifest a very impartial and fair course of conduct in the case. This is so because he exercises great influence with the jury. He should refrain from impatient remarks or unnecessary comments which could lead to prejudice by the jury against the defendant. Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Kranc, 193 Ark. 426, 100 S.W.2d 676 (1937). It is the duty of this Court to consider the totality of the circumstances when such matters are presented. Although it may have been advisable for the court to have refrained from some statements made in this case, we cannot say from a totality of the circumstances that reversible error was committed. The court did not attempt to ridicule the appellant's counsel nor did he attempt to degrade him in the eyes of the jury. Again, this matter is not apt to arise on retrial.