Opinion ID: 1175747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: place restrictions

Text: In my view the majority has engaged in an unlawful abridgment of appellants' exercise of their First Amendment right to picket and demonstrate in a peaceful and orderly manner. The place restrictions contained in the injunction go far beyond measures that are justifiable as reasonably necessary to maintaining access to and from a health care facility or in protecting a woman's privacy right. The majority, instead of proscribing only activity posing a serious threat to those desiring access to the health care facility and searching for less restrictive alternatives, has chosen the easier course of riding roughshod over the demonstrators' exercise of First Amendment rights in the very place where they are entitled to the most protection  our public sidewalks. It is rather ironic and unfortunate that at a time when the abortion issue is at the forefront of public debate this court places a severe impediment upon those most desirous to have their opinions heard. We start with certain indisputable propositions of constitutional law. The first of these is that public places, particularly streets and sidewalks, are the normal and natural locations for our citizens' exercise of their First Amendment right of free speech. Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515, 83 L.Ed. 1423, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939); see also Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303, 41 L.Ed.2d 770, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 2717 (1974); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Coun., 96 Wn.2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981). While the State may reasonably regulate the time, place and manner of the exercise of First Amendment rights as necessary to protection of other compelling public interests, Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98, 33 L.Ed.2d 212, 92 S.Ct. 2286 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 17 L.Ed.2d 149, 87 S.Ct. 242 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55, 13 L.Ed.2d 471, 85 S.Ct. 453 (1965), time and place regulations can enormously hinder the individual's ability to engage in effective advocacy. Access to the `streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places ... for the purpose of exercising [First Amendment rights] cannot constitutionally be denied broadly....' Grayned, at 117 (quoting Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Vly. Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315, 20 L.Ed.2d 603, 88 S.Ct. 1601 (1968)). Even when regulation is justified, it must be narrowly tailored to further the State's legitimate interest. Grayned, at 116-17; Police Dep't, at 98; Cox, at 575-76. Moreover, exercise of First Amendment rights, when logically related to a particular forum, is further protected from regulations which would preclude the use of that place. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 15 L.Ed.2d 637, 86 S.Ct. 719 (1966) (plurality opinion); Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319, 1323-24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974). In balancing the individual's right to demonstrate against the concern for the protection of others, the competing interests must be assessed on an individual basis; blanket bans and absolute prohibitions against picketing in front of or near a site have been universally condemned where a less restrictive and more clearly tailored alternative may be formulated. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Police Dep't v. Mosley, supra at 100-01: Predictions about imminent disruption from picketing involve judgments appropriately made on an individualized basis, not by means of broad classifications, especially those based on subject matter. In short, although limited regulation is permitted, it must be carefully defined and sufficiently circumscribed to minimize the opportunities for abuse of discretion, lest this treasured constitutional right of free speech be subjected to excessive or unnecessary restraints. The proper discharge of this responsibility is difficult. The court's task would be easier if it had broad discretion to squelch free speech and assembly without the necessity of tailoring any restraints to what is absolutely necessary in each individual case. Unfortunately, such discretion has been exercised in the present instance. The result, unsurprisingly, is an excessive restraint. The majority has placed its concern for protection of one constitutional right above another, and paid scant heed to basic time-honored principles of free speech and expression. The resulting injunction, as approved by the majority, prohibits picketers from (1) picketing, demonstrating, or counseling at the Sixth Avenue Medical Building, except along the public sidewalk north of the bus stop on Stevens Avenue; (2) threatening, assaulting, intimidating or coercing anyone entering or leaving the Medical Building; (3) interfering with ingress or egress at the building or parking lots to the south and southeast of the premises; (4) trespassing on the premises; (5) engaging in any unlawful activity directed at respondent physicians or their patients; (6) referring, in oral statements while at the picket site, while young children are present, to physicians or patients, staff or clients as murdering or murderers, killing or killers, or to children or babies as being killed or murdered by anyone in the Medical Building. The trial court's findings, which purportedly justify these restrictions, are that (1) picketers have positioned themselves on the public sidewalks along Sixth Avenue and at the only walkway to the main entrance; (2) picketers have obstructed the passage of visitors and staff at the Medical Building; (3) picketers have caused the physicians and patients emotional distress, created a substantial risk of physical and mental harm, and forced counseling upon persons attempting to enter or leave the premises; (4) picketing has been conducted in an aggressive, disorderly and coercive manner, and in instances has given rise to a clear and present danger to patients; (5) picketing has been conducted in a manner incompatible with the character and function of the Medical Building; and (6) picketers have repeatedly referred to physicians practicing in the Medical Building as killers or murderers in the presence of young children. Although these findings are supported by the record, the record also clearly demonstrates that such incidents have been isolated and infrequent in occurrence. Restrictions less onerous than complete removal of the picketers from the public sidewalk fronting the health care facility are available to protect the State's interest of assuring access to the facility. In Parkmed Co. v. Pro-Life Counselling, Inc., 110 Misc.2d 369, 442 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1981), a New York trial court enjoined antiabortion picketers from demonstrating, picketing and in any way interfering ... on the ... plaza area and its steps. On appeal, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, struck down this portion of the injunction on the ground that it was overly broad and unnecessarily restricted peaceful picketing and demonstrating ... Parkmed Co. v. Pro-Life Counselling, Inc., 91 A.D.2d 551, 552, 457 N.Y.S.2d 27, 29 (1982). Likewise the injunction at issue is broader than necessary, because it prohibits peaceful, controlled picketing that does not impede ingress or egress. The majority in effect concedes that the restrictions are overly broad in regard to effectuating access to the medical facility. With respect to the State's interest in maintaining ingress and egress, the injunction arguably could be narrowed without compromising that interest. The injunction could (1) limit the number of picketers, (2) require them to remain a certain distance from the walkway leading to the entrance, (3) require them to picket in single file, or (4) all of the above. By narrowing the injunction, the State could serve its significant interest in maintaining convenient access to medical care without unduly limiting the picketers' expressive activities. Majority opinion, at 231. The majority nonetheless condones this excessive restraint as necessary to mitigate the harassing effect of antiabortion picketers. In so doing, the majority makes a monumental error in its constitutional analysis. The majority perceives that such picketing invades a woman's privacy rights in effectuating the abortion decision. The privacy interest espoused in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973), however, deals with a woman's right to make a decision concerning abortion without governmental intrusion. See also Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 76 L.Ed.2d 687, 103 S.Ct. 2481 (1983). This does not mean that a woman is entitled to make a decision about abortion in a vacuum, free from public comment including the views expressed by picketers. This privacy interest does not extend to isolate a woman from public debate by silencing others. Moreover, speech does not lose its protected character simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215, 102 S.Ct. 3409 (1982); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 29 L.Ed.2d 1, 91 S.Ct. 1575 (1971). According to the Supreme Court, [t]here is a `profound national commitment' to the principle that `debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' Claiborne, at 913 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 84 S.Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964)). In the words of Justice Rutledge, `Free trade in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, 89 L.Ed. 430, 65 S.Ct. 315 (1945). The majority seemingly acknowledges the overzealousness of its concern for a woman's privacy interest when it states that it is difficult to ascertain what constitutes harassment in the apprehensive mind of a woman coming face-to-face with the picketers. By restraining picketing to Stevens Avenue, the court can avoid conjecture on this point, knowing that the woman's right of privacy is protected to the extent permissible under the First Amendment. Majority opinion, at 231-32. The ultimate strength of our constitutional guaranties lies in their being unhesitatingly applied in time of controversy and tranquility alike. If the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well be abandoned. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 483, 78 L.Ed. 413, 54 S.Ct. 231, 256, 88 A.L.R. 1481 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting). The majority here has affirmed an overly broad injunction which abridges the picketers' First Amendment right of free speech. For these reasons I would remand this case to the trial court with directions to narrow the injunction by eliminating the place restrictions which prohibit picketers from picketing, demonstrating, or counseling on the sidewalk fronting the Medical Building. The remaining restrictions in the injunction are sufficient to assure adequate access to the facility. Because I would hold that the place restrictions are invalid, I would also reverse the contempt orders and fee awards and assessments. These penalties were levied against picketers who violated the place restrictions by picketing along the sidewalk fronting the medical clinic. There was no evidence that these picketers violated any other restrictions in the injunction relating to interfering with ingress or egress to the clinic.