Opinion ID: 460188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Geyen's Challenge to the ABCMR's Decision

Text: 24 Geyen alleges that the ABCMR's 1982 decision denying him an upgraded discharge was arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and erroneous in law. We have no doubt that this cause of action is distinct from the first, in which Geyen challenges his activation and the Army's denials of his hardship applications. Neither action depends upon the other for its vitality. See Oppenheim v. Campbell, 571 F.2d 660, 663 (D.C.Cir.1978). The two actions seek review of different final administrative orders. 6 Moreover, the issue in an action challenging denial of a hardship discharge is whether the service acted in accordance with regulations in effect at the time of the denial. On review, however, the ADRB must consider subsequent policies and procedures more favorable to the serviceman. See 32 C.F.R. Sec. 70.9(c)(1) (1984). The ABCMR, in determining whether error or ... injustice has been committed, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1552(a) (1982), must determine whether the ADRB has properly applied the new standards. Thus, the court's task in reviewing the two orders may be quite different. 25 Other courts considering suits such as Geyen's have treated the two causes of action as distinct. See Bittner v. Secretary of Defense, Civ. No. 84-1730 (D.D.C. June 13, 1985); Schmidt v. United States, No. C-83-3834 JPV (N.D.Cal. Apr. 25, 1984); cf. Walters, 725 F.2d at 115 (leaving issue open); Nichols, 721 F.2d at 660 (where plaintiff does not challenge Board's decision as arbitrary or capricious, no new cause of action accrues); see also Oppenheim, 571 F.2d at 663 (finding APA review to be distinct cause of action in nonmilitary context). 26 As we have noted, the six-year statute of limitations in Sec. 2401(a) applies to suits seeking nonmonetary relief through nonstatutory review of agency action. The issue, therefore, is when Geyen's second cause of action accrued. We hold that it accrued at the time of the ABCMR's decision in 1982. See Impro Products, 722 F.2d at 850. Consequently, the action is not time barred. 27 Appellees contend that Geyen's action for review of the ABCMR's decision accrued not in 1982, as we hold, but at the time of his discharge in 1972. The case upon which they principally rely, however--Walters--dealt solely with an action directly challenging a discharge. The Walters court expressly declined to address the limitations applicable to actions for review of ABCMR decisions. 725 F.2d at 115. 28 Moreover, the problems that would arise if we were to find that Geyen's first cause of action accrued when the ABCMR rendered its decision in 1982--missing or destroyed documents and records--are not present here. Review of agency action under Sec. 706(2)'s arbitrary or capricious standard is limited to the record before the agency at the time of its decision. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 1607, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985); 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706 (1982). The year that elapsed between the ABCMR's decision and the filing of Geyen's suit did not offer a significant opportunity for the record before the Board to disappear or be lost. 29 Finally, establishing the date of discharge as the point of accrual for review of an ABCMR decision denying an upgrade would leave some Board decisions immune from judicial review. Any time a former serviceman waited more than six years to seek an upgraded discharge from the ADRB and the ABCMR, the decisions of those bodies could not be reviewed. This would be so even though the serviceman had sought relief well within the 15 years permitted for petitioning the ADRB and the three years for a further petition to the ABCMR. 30 The Supreme Court has held that agency action should be subject to judicial review unless there is clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended otherwise. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567, 95 S.Ct. 1851, 1857-58, 44 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 820, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). We do not find evidence in either the language or the legislative history 7 of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1552 that Congress intended to immunize ABCMR decisions rendered on petitions presented more than six years after the underlying events occurred. 31 We hold that Geyen's second cause of action was not barred by Sec. 2401(a)'s six-year limitation.