Opinion ID: 1969263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue of improper vouching was rejected in first appeal.

Text: Prior to trial, State granted Fenstermaker immunity from prosecution for any involvement with the death of Sjong. Jenner asserts that the prosecutor improperly bolstered Fenstermaker's credibility by emphasizing the immunity agreement. First, we review the purpose of habeas corpus. The remedy of post-conviction habeas corpus is restricted by the provisions of SDCL 21-27-16 and the prior decisions of this Court. As we noted in McCafferty, 449 N.W.2d at 591, this remedy can be used only to review (1) whether the court had jurisdiction of the crime and the person of the defendant; (2) whether the sentence was authorized by law; and (3) in certain cases, whether an incarcerated defendant has been deprived of basic constitutional rights. Habeas corpus is not a proper remedy to correct irregular procedures, rather, it reaches only jurisdictional error. McCafferty, 449 N.W.2d at 591; Goodroad v. Solem, 406 N.W.2d 141, 143 (S.D.1987). In fact, the very issue of improper bolstering was raised by Jenner's pro se brief on direct appeal and was summarily rejected by this Court. Jenner, 434 N.W.2d at 80. Hence, it shall not be considered again. Acknowledging this possibility, Jenner alleges Baumann's failure to object to the bolstering at trial equates to ineffective assistance of counsel. This failure is based upon State v. Goodroad, 455 N.W.2d 591 (S.D.1990), a decision handed down three years after Jenner's trial. Baumann's effectiveness cannot be weighed against a standard that was not in existence or recognized in this jurisdiction. Counsel cannot be presumed to know the rulings of this court prior to their release. State v. Iron Shell, 336 N.W.2d 372, 375 (S.D.1983). Nor did the trial court have South Dakota precedent to rely on concerning the claim of bolstering. Nevertheless, we feel that it is important to revisit State v. Goodroad where this Court first analyzed the subject of improper bolstering/improper vouching of a witness. 455 N.W.2d at 594-95. Vouching is not strictly taboo, rather it is the prejudicial effect which must be avoided. In Goodroad, an agent for the Department of Criminal Investigation testified that another witness, who had yet to testify, received a plea bargain and promised to testify truthfully. According to the agent, if the witness lied, the witness would face prosecution for all of the drug deals he's admitted. Thus, the jury was informed that the witness had confessed to committing a crime and would now testify truthfully to avoid punishment. During his closing argument, the prosecutor stated the witness was staking his freedom on the truth with the plea agreement. We held that this was beyond prosecutorial bounds and quoted the following from United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 536 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942, 101 S.Ct. 3088, 69 L.Ed.2d 957 (1981): The witness, who would otherwise seem untrustworthy, may appear to have been compelled by the prosecutor's threats and promises to come forward and be truthful. The suggestion is that the prosecution is forcing the truth from his witness and the unspoken message is that the prosecutor knows what the truth is and is assuring its revelation. Conveying this message explicitly is improper vouching. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359-60 n. 15, 78 S.Ct. 311, 323 n. 15, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958)[.] We conclude that conveying it by implication is equally improper.... The prosecutor may not tell the jury that the government has confirmed a witness' credibility before using him. [Citation omitted.] He should be no more able to indicate that the government has taken steps to compel the witness to be truthful. Both of these arguments involve improper vouching because they invite the jury to rely on the government's assessment that the witness is testifying truthfully. Goodroad, 455 N.W.2d at 594. However, the mere statement in such agreement that a witness promises to speak truthfully does not by itself constitute improper vouching. Id. A witness makes the same promise to speak truthfully by taking the oath at trial. State v. McCord, 505 N.W.2d 388, 394 (S.D.1993). Most jurors, even without instruction by the court, know that perjury charges will be brought if a witness makes a false statement under oath. Goodroad, 455 N.W.2d at 595 (citing State v. Chakouian, 537 A.2d 409, 412 (R.I.1988)). Thus, the State may elicit testimony on direct examination regarding a witness' immunity agreement. United States v. Keskey, 863 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir.1988). Prejudicial error does not result simply because the State uses the witness' immunity agreement to be truthful. Goodroad, 455 N.W.2d at 594. Rather, prejudice can result from the prosecution placing the prestige of the government behind the witness and implying that the prosecutor knows what the truth is and thereby assures its revelation. Id.; Roberts, 618 F.2d at 536; United States v. Carter, 953 F.2d 1449, 1460 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2980, 119 L.Ed.2d 598 (1992). With these parameters in mind, we review the following exchange between the prosecutor and Fenstermaker concerning the immunity agreement: Q And in the last week, I have told you that I was going to give you immunity from prosecution in the State of South Dakota for any involvement you would have in regard to the death of Jackie Sjong. Is that correct? A Yes. Q I have also told you that anything that you would say here could not be used against you in any other states and other courts. Is that correct? A Yes, it is. Q Now, other than that offer and acceptance of immunity by yourself, are there any other deals or agreements between you and me or the State of South Dakota? A No, there isn't. Q All right. Now, let's get one thing on the record right off the bat. Mr. Fenstermaker, you have pled guiltyand correct me if I'm wrongto manslaughter in regard to the death of Eric Presswood [the hitchhiker]? A Yes. Voluntary Manslaughter. Q All right and have you been sentenced in regard to that case? A Yes, I have. Q And what was your sentence? A 12 years. Q All right. When you entered into that agreement, was I or anybody from South Dakota a party to that agreement in any way? A No. Q When you entered into that agreement with the State of California, was there any discussion about leniency toward you or any offer of any deal in regard to your testimony in this case regarding Jackie Sjong? A No there wasn't. Q I have advised you, have I not, Mr. Fenstermaker, that the only way that you could get in trouble testifying here in this case because of the immunity that I have given you would be if you would come in and not tell the truth. Is that correct? A Yes, it is. Q And have I not advised you that if you lie in the courtroom that not only could you be charged with perjury, but the immunity which I have extended to you would no longer apply? A Yes.  (Emphasis added.) We repeat: It is not error for the State to elicit testimony on direct examination regarding a witness' plea or immunity agreement. Keskey, 863 F.2d at 479. This testimony does not insinuate the State possesses information not heard by the jury, nor can it be taken that the prosecutor has expressed his personal opinion on a witness' veracity. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1165 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3184, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974). There was no insinuation that the prosecutor knew better than the jury what the truth was. Rather, this exchange established the pressures under which Fenstermaker testified by putting his understanding of the immunity agreement, and what would happen if he breached his end of the bargain, before the jury. Such does not constitute improper vouching. United States v. Creamer, 555 F.2d 612, 617 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833, 98 S.Ct. 118, 54 L.Ed.2d 93 (1977). The abuse to be guarded against is a prosecutor invoking considerations from outside the record which prejudice the defendant and deprive him of a fair trial. State's examination of Fenstermaker was permissible, Creamer, 555 F.2d at 617, and did not rise to the prejudicial vouching of Goodroad. During closing arguments, the prosecutor discussed Fenstermaker's testimony, stating that Fenstermaker had no motive to lie, and if he did, the immunity was canceled. Although Jenner has compared these comments to the prosecutorial overkill in Goodroad, we remind that the State is permitted to make fair comments on the credibility of witnesses during final argument. State v. Howard, 323 N.W.2d 872, 874 (S.D.1982). Inappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone, would not justify a reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding. Instead, as Lawn teaches, the remarks must be examined within the context of the trial to determine whether the prosecutor's behavior amounted to prejudicial error. In other words, the Court must consider the probable effect the prosecutor's response would have on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1044, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). We do not agree that the jury, in its role of judging the credibility of witnesses, was prejudicially swayed by the prosecutor's comments. As this questioning was not improper and Goodroad had yet to be handed down, failure to make the objection did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 1064-65.