Opinion ID: 889185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Third Trial Setting: May 12, 2003 (175 Days of Delay [3] )

Text: ¶ 157 On October 25, 2002, defense counsel (Sather) filed a Motion for Psychological Examination. At a hearing on October 28, the District Court advised Rose that the trial would have to be rescheduled if an evaluation was conducted. Rose indicated that he understood this. The court then granted the motion. The court stated, however, that a new trial date would not be set until the evaluation was received. ¶ 158 Of the 175 days between November 18, 2002 (second trial setting) and May 12, 2003 (third trial setting), the District Court attributed 86 days to Rose and 89 days to the State. The court reasoned that the time it took to complete the psychological evaluation was Rose's responsibility and the time between completing the evaluation and trial was the State's responsibility. The flaw in this reasoning, however, is that these two time periods could have elapsed simultaneously had the court promptly rescheduled trial upon granting Rose's motion. ¶ 159 The first trial date in this case was set on April 25, 2002, for July 29, 2002 (about three months out); the second trial date was set on July 29, 2002, for November 18, 2002 (nearly four months out); and the third trial date was set on February 19, 2003, for May 12, 2003 (almost three months out). Thus, on October 28, 2002, when the court granted the Motion for Psychological Examination and vacated the existing trial date, had the court then set a new trial date, the new date likely would have been sometime in February 2003. (Actually, the prosecutor pointed out during the October 28 hearing that trial dates are already being scheduled in March.) But that did not occur. Rather, the court stated that I won't set [the trial date] until we get the report in. As a result, there is a significant period of time (October 28, 2002, to February 19, 2003) during which there was no trial date set in this case at all. ¶ 160 Such delay is unacceptable, and it clearly is not attributable to Rose. As explained above, the trial court shares the duty of assuring that a criminal case is brought to trial expeditiously. This includes maintaining a trial date. Having a pending trial date provides an impetus for the parties to prepare their cases diligently for trial, which in turn lessens the chance of a speedy trial violation. It also creates a favorable situation in which docket delay (i.e., delay caused by the reality that trial dates have to be set a number of months in advance) transpires simultaneously with the time required by the parties to prepare their cases. ¶ 161 By waiting until February 19, 2003, to set a trial date, the District Court created needless delay (during which, incidentally, Rose was incarcerated). Had the court, on October 28, 2002, set a trial date for, e.g., March 3, 2003 (about four months out), and had Rose's counsel requested additional time to review the psychological report (which counsel received during the first week of February 2003), then such delay would have been properly attributed to Rose. But Rose was never even given the opportunity to proceed to trial in early March 2003 because the District Court failed to set a new trial date promptly after it vacated the November 18, 2002 trial date. ¶ 162 This Court attributes the entire 175-day period to Rose on the ground that his Motion for Psychological Examination caused the District Court to vacate the November 18 trial date. Opinion, ¶ 54. Yet, for the reasons just discussed, although Rose's motion caused the court to vacate the existing trial date, the motion did not in any way preclude the court from promptly setting a new trial date. Rather, the court of its own accord decided to allow four months to pass by without a pending trial date in Rose's case. Notably, the parties were ready to proceed in mid-February 2003, but they had to wait an additional three months to go to trial due entirely to the District Court's failure to maintain a trial setting for Rose on the court's docket. ¶ 163 For these reasons, I conclude that of the 175 days between the second and third trial settings, the 93 days of avoidable delay during which no trial date was set (November 18, 2002, to February 19, 2003) is attributable to the State and weighs more heavily than institutional delay. The remaining 82 days are attributable to Rose.