Opinion ID: 886776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Allen Violation

Text: ¶ 25 The instruction at issue in State v. Randall (1960), 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054, was similar to the instruction that the United States Supreme Court approved in Allen v. United States (1896), 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528. The instruction in Randall stated in pertinent part: In conferring together, you ought to pay proper respect to each others opinions and listen with disposition to be convinced of each others arguments ... if the majority are for acquittal, the minority ought seriously to ask themselves whether they may not consider or alter the correctness of their judgment, which is not concurred in by most of those with whom they are associates, and discuss the weight or sufficiency of that evidence which fails to carry conviction in the minds of their fellows. Randall, 137 Mont. at 540-41, 353 P.2d at 1057. ¶ 26 This Court decided to take the opposite view of that of the United States Supreme Court in Allen. Specifically, in holding that it was error to give the above-quoted instruction in Randall, we held: The inevitable effect of the [above-quoted] instruction would be to suggest to the minority members of the jury that they ought to surrender their own convictions and follow the majority. A vibrant pulsating, intelligent minority is a part of our American way of life. The views of the minority often, with the passage of time, become the majority view.... The majority view on any given subject is not always the correct view. It is not in line with our practice to discourage jurors from taking a view contrary to that entertained by a majority of the jurors. Randall, 137 Mont. at 542, 353 P.2d at 1058. ¶ 27 Without addressing Randall we also considered an Allen instruction argument in State v. George (1986), 219 Mont. 377, 711 P.2d 1379. In George, we held that the language used by the judge was not an Allen -type instruction, and, rather, was consistent with another instruction given. Specifically, after receiving the jury's written verdict, the judge noticed that ten jurors had found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle after having been adjudged an habitual traffic offender, while two jurors had found him not guilty. The judge read the verdict into the record and then pointed out to the jury that they were required to reach a unanimous verdict, one way or the other, guilty or not guilty. In addition, the judge noted that if it was possible to get a unanimous verdict, the judge would like to see one. George, 219 Mont. at 380-82, 711 P.2d at 1381-82. ¶ 28 In holding that such an instruction to the jury did not have the inevitable effect of an Allen -type instruction, we noted that the judge clearly indicated to the jurors that no pressure was being put on them to return a unanimous verdict, and that the judge merely asked that they return to the jury room and deliberate `for awhile.' George, 219 Mont. at 382-83, 711 P.2d at 1382-83. ¶ 29 Here again, the bailiff told the jury to find a common ground and to keep working on it, after the foreperson advised him that the jury was deadlocked. Although not given by the judgeand although not condoned by the judgethese instructions, like those in George, did not attempt to pressure the jurors, nor did they assert to the minority jurors that their positions should change, as did the instruction at issue in Randall. Therefore, we conclude that these instructions merely asked the jurors to continue deliberating, and the District Court did not err in denying Steele's motion for a mistrial on that basis. ¶ 30 2. Did the District Court have sufficient evidence before it to support Steele's conviction of assault on a peace officer? ¶ 31 Steele argues that for him to have committed the offense of assault on a peace officer, Officer Baumann must have feared serious bodily injury by use of a weapon. And, at most, Officer Baumann's testimony supports the contention that he feared serious bodily injury by `what reasonably appeared to be a weapon.' As such, Steele argues that Officer Baumann's testimony is not a sufficient basis for a rational trier of fact to have found that Mr. Steele caused a reasonable apprehension of injury `by use of a weapon.' Hence, Steele's conviction of assault on a peace officer should be vacated and the charge dismissed. ¶ 32 That State argues that [w]hile Montana law does not require that Officer Bauman[n] actually perceive the weapon to feel threatened by it, in this case he did perceive the weapon the moment he heard Steel fire it. As such, [a] rationale trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that when Steele fired his concealed weapon as Officer Bauman[n] approached him, at that point Steele violated § 45-5-210(1)(b), MCA. ¶ 33 Section 45-5-210(1)(b), MCA, states that [a] person commits the offense of assault on a peace officer or judicial officer if the person purposely or knowingly causes... reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury in a peace officer or judicial officer by use of a weapon. A weapon is defined as an instrument, article, or substance that, regardless of its primary function, is readily capable of being used to produce death or serious bodily injury. Section 45-2-101(78), MCA. A person need not actually see a weapon to feel threatened by the use of that weapon. State v. Misner (1988), 234 Mont. 215, 763 P.2d 23; State v. Hagberg (1996), 277 Mont. 33, 920 P.2d 86. ¶ 34 In Misner, the defendant left the county welfare office after becoming agitated with the welfare officeran occurrence that had before frequently happenedand walked to his pickup. The welfare officer then watched him get into his pickup, reaching with his right hand to grab his rifle. At that point, the welfare officer stood there in shock for a few seconds, scared that the defendant was going to go off the deep end and do something. Thereafter, the defendant closed the door of his pickup and drove off. Misner was charged with two counts of felony assault. Misner, 234 Mont. at 216-18, 763 P.2d at 24-25. ¶ 35 Misner argued that he could not have committed the offense of assault, as the welfare officer neither saw nor came into close enough physical proximity to the gun. Hence, the State could not establish that the welfare officer was in reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury by use of a weapon. Misner, 234 Mont. at 219, 763 P.2d at 25. ¶ 36 We held that because the welfare officer testified about his previous confrontations with Misner and about his apprehension of serious bodily injury, it was not necessary that ... [the welfare officer] personally observe the gun being waved at him in order to experience reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury. Misner, 234 Mont. at 219, 763 P.2d at 25. ¶ 37 In Hagberg, the officer who pulled over the car in which Hagberg was the passenger, noticed an empty holster on the seat between Hagberg and the driver. The officer also noticed that Hagberg had a glazed look, smelled of alcohol, and was bent over with his arms between his legs and his hands by the floor. Hagberg, 277 Mont. at 37, 920 P.2d at 88. At that point, the officer, in opening the car door, asked Hagberg to step out of the car. Hagberg slammed the car door on the officer's shoulder, after which the officer tackled Hagberg to the ground. In so doing, the officer grabbed a black single-action revolver from Hagberg's hand. Hagberg, 277 Mont. at 37-38, 920 P.2d at 88. ¶ 38 Relying on Misner, we held that the officer had reason to be apprehensive of serious bodily injury, given that: (1) the officer unequivocally testified to his apprehension of serious bodily injury; (2) Hagberg smelled of alcohol; (3) Hagberg sounded belligerent and had a glazed look; (4) there was an empty holster on the seat next to Hagberg; and (5) Hagberg looked as though he was holding a gun. Hagberg, 277 Mont. at 40, 920 P.2d at 90. ¶ 39 Here, Steele had one hand at the back of his waistband and one hand in the front, as he ran from the officers. Based on his prior knowledge of Steele, the officer believed that Steele might have a gun. As the officer approached Steele, he saw Steele turn towards him while at the same time raising his arms from his waistband. The officer thought at this moment that Steele was acquiring him as a target. Officer Baumann then heard a shot, after which he saw Steele drop a pistol that Steele was holding behind his back. During the short interval between hearing the gunshot and seeing Steele drop the pistol, Officer Baumann testified that he was worried about his physical safety and was in fear of his life. Thinking Steele was thereafter unarmed, Officer Bowman tackled him to the ground, and during the fall, another pistol that Steele was clutching in his front waistband dropped to the ground. ¶ 40 Similar to both victims' testimony in Misner and Hagberg, Officer Baumann testified that he was worried about his safety and was in fear of his life. In addition, like the officer's observations in Hagberg, Officer Baumann noticed that Steele was attempting to hold something in his waistband while fleeing, and, upon stopping, rose his hand from his waistband in a motion indicative to Officer Baumann of Steele targeting him. Further, Officer Baumann knew Steele, and from that knowledge was aware that Steele might have a gun on his person. Based on Officer Baumann's knowledge and observations, we hold, as we did in Misner and in Hagberg, that Officer Baumann did not actually have to see the pistol Steele had on his person in order to feel threatened by use of the pistol. Therefore, we hold that sufficient evidence existed to support Steele's conviction of assault on a peace officer. ¶ 41 As Justice Cotter points out in her concurrence, the jury was advised, prior to their deliberations, that they should not surrender to the majority their honest opinions regarding the innocence or guilt of Steele. Hence, the dissent's argument that [t]he bailiff failed to mention that no juror should give up his or her honest opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of Mr. Steele, is misplaced. The jurors had with them in the jury room all of the admitted jury instructions, including Instruction No. 34, as quoted by Justice Cotter in her concurrence. Requiring the bailiff to repeat this instruction as the dissent seemingly propoundsin effect, asks the bailiff to take actions which this Court and the District Court clearly stated they did not condone. Indeed, the dissent first faults the bailiff for advising the jury that we will be here until at least midnight. Yet, the dissent goes on to fault the bailiff for failing to advise the jury further regarding their honest opinions of Steele's innocence or guilt. ¶ 42 As to the problem with the bailiff's here until at least midnight statement, specifically the bailiff testified that the Court has instructed me, or has made mention, that we will be here until at least midnight. Nowhere in this statement did the bailiff indicateas the dissent arguesthat there could not be a hung jury for at least another three and one-half hours and possibly not even then. Ratherand quite simply the bailiff advised the jury of the time frame under which they were operating on that particular day. ¶ 43 Finally, citing George, the dissent claims that [i]n direct contradiction to applicable precedent, the jury was pressured into reaching a verdict. Interestingly, in agreement with George, we held that the jury was not pressured into reaching a verdict, given that, as in George, the jury was aware that they should not surrender their honest opinions to the majority under the pressure of returning a unanimous verdict. See ¶¶ 27-29. ¶ 44 Affirmed. KARLA M. GRAY, C.J., JIM REGNIER and JIM RICE, JJ., concur.