Opinion ID: 2356290
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Speeding

Text: Defendant first assigns error as to his conviction for speeding in violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1252. [1] Defendant contends that the conviction must be reversed because the presiding Justice erroneously instructed the jury, over objection by defendant, that § 1252-2 C fixes a 25-mile per hour speed limit in areas of three separate and distinct kinds: (1) so-called business districts of unspecified density, (2) so-called residential districts of unspecified density, and (3) built-up portions of the special density specified in subsection 3 A. The Justice further charged the jury  in this specific regard without objection by defendant  that an area is built-up within the definition of subsection 3 A if the structure density therein described exists on only one side of a street. The presiding Justice gave this latter instruction because evidence had been presented that along one side of May Street in the vicinity of the Bowdoin-May Streets intersection there were dwelling houses approximately 35 feet apart for a distance of ¼ of a mile. The evidence made plain that the area through which defendant had passed could not reasonably be conceived to be of a business nature. Hence, the effect of the presiding Justice's instructions was to authorize a jury verdict that defendant was guilty of speeding on either of two alternative findings by the jury: (1) the area in question was a residential district, or (2) it was a built-up portion within the definition set forth in § 1252-3 A. Defendant contends on appeal that residential district is not utilized in § 1252-2 C as a self-sufficient concept alternative to built-up portion, but rather the statute prescribes a 25-mile per hour speed limit only in areas which have the special density of structures set forth in subsection 3 A regardless of whether the use of the structures allows for a characterization of the area as residential, business, mixed residential and business, or otherwise. We agree with defendant's position and therefore decide that the conviction of defendant for speeding must be reversed; the presiding Justice's erroneous interpretation of § 1252 could have misled the jury to find defendant guilty of operating in excess of 25 miles per hour merely because they found the area residential in character without also finding that there was the density of structures delineated in subsection 3 A. Based on the face of the statute, its history and the need to avoid constitutional problems arising from other interpretations, we conclude that the compact or built-up definition in § 1252-3 A infuses all aspects of § 1252-2 C, in consequence of which the statute prescribes a 25 miles per hour speed limit only if the structures contiguous to. . . [a] way  whatever the nature of their use as residential, business or otherwise  are situated less than 150 feet apart for a distance of at least ¼ of a mile. On its face subsection 2 C is ambiguous. It permits the interpretation given the jury by the presiding Justice but, equally logically, it may be read to refer to: (1) business districts of a particular density, (2) residential districts of that same density, or (3) districts of that density occupied by varied structures whether characterized as business, residential or otherwise. The punctuation of subsection 2 C tends to favor this latter interpretation. Concentrating on the words, a business or residential district, or buil[t]-up portion, as defined in subsection 3, . . ., we find significant the comma between the words portion and as. With the comma so placed, as defined in subsection 3 is separated from all the language preceding it describing the three areas subject to the 25 miles per hour limit. This indicates that as defined in subsection 3 modifies all three of the concepts preceding the comma after portion. The punctuation thus supports construing subsection 2 C as if it stated in unambiguous terms: a business or residential district, or [other] buil[t]-up portion, [all] as defined in subsection 3, since it is reasonable to conclude that had the Legislature intended the subsection 2 C definition to apply only to the last of the three prior concepts, i. e., compact or built-up portion, the Legislature would have omitted the comma between portion and as. The statutory predecessors of § 1252 confirm this view that § 1252 prescribes a 25 miles per hour speed limit only as to ways meeting the density specification of the subsection 3 definition. The original regulation of speed in thickly settled areas appeared as P.L.1921, Chap. 211 § 62. That statute prohibited speeds in excess of 15 miles per hour within the compact or built-up portions of any city, town or village. Compact or built-up portion was defined as the territory . . . contiguous to any way, which is built up with structures devoted to business, or where the dwelling houses are situated less than one hundred and fifty feet apart for a distance of at least one-quarter of a mile. Thus, the original appearance of a special density-of-structures requirement was uniquely in relation to an area of dwelling houses, i. e., a residential area. In 1929 (by P.L.1929, Chap. 327 § 16) the Legislature undertook to increase from 15 to 20, or 25, miles per hour the speed limit in the compact or built-up portions of any municipality. To this end, the Legislature retained intact the 1921 definition of compact or built-up portion. However, because the Legislature wished to prescribe a 25 mile per hour speed limit for the built-up areas consisting of dwelling houses (residential) as well as some of the ways in the built-up areas in which the structures were devoted to business, but only a 20 miles per hour speed limit as to other ways in such business areas, the Legislature was unable to fix the appropriate speed limit as it had done in the 1921 legislation, by relying upon a single comprehensive reference to compact or built-up portions. Instead, the Legislature was obliged to differentiate that component of the compact or built-up portion definition relating to structures devoted to business from the other concerned with dwelling houses . . . situated less than one hundred fifty feet apart for a distance of at least one-quarter of a mile and to deal with them separately. In the 1929 amendment the Legislature therefore introduced one provision concerning the territory . . . contiguous to any way which is built up with structures devoted to business . . . . The Legislature gave this the shorthand identifying label, business district, and as to any such business district the 1929 statute prescribed two different speed limits: (1) 25 miles per hour as to the ways therein in which the traffic is controlled at intersections by traffic officers or stop-and-go signals, and (2) 20 miles per hour on all other ways therein. [2] In a second separate provision the 1929 statute focused upon the other independent aspect of the compact or built-up portion definition:  the territory . . . contiguous to any way . . . where the dwelling houses are situated less than one hundred fifty feet apart for a distance of at least one-quarter of a mile. [3] This type of area the 1929 legislation designated by the shorthand identifying label residential district [4] and prescribed for it a speed limit of 25 miles per hour. In 1939 the Legislature decided to eliminate the differential between 20 and 25 miles an hour established in the 1929 legislation and to fix a uniform 25 miles an hour speed limit for the two separate business and residential areas dealt with in the compact or built-up portion definition. This it did by retaining that definition as it had been previously worded and by condensing the previously separate speed provisions relating to business and residential areas into a single provision reading: 25 miles an hour in a business or residential district, or built-up portion, as defined herein, . . . . P.L.1939, Chap. 213 § 2 Thus, business district continued to signify after 1939, as it did before, that facet of the compact or built-up portion definition stated to be the territory . . . contiguous to any way, which is built up with structures devoted to business, . . ., the only difference, after 1939, being the elimination of the 20 miles per hour speed limit as to some types of ways in a business district. In 1953, at long last, the Legislature apparently realized that in relation to a built-up area in which the structures are devoted to business  previously identified as a business district,  nothing to clarify understanding is gained by a definition of built-up which merely repeats the word built-up. Hence, by P.L.1953, Chap. 137 § 2, the Legislature amended the compact or built-up portion definition to read, as presently: The compact or built-up portions . . shall be the territory . . . contiguous to any way which is built up with structures which are situated less than 150 feet apart for a distance of at least ¼ of a mile. Thus, commencing with 1953, the Legislature extended to all structures, whatever their use, the density criterion previously specified only for the areas in which the use of the structures was as dwelling houses (the residential). By this elimination of the prior separate components within the compact or built-up portion of a municipality, the Legislature effectively caused the applicability of its 25 miles per hour speed prescription to be determined solely by the density criterion of the compact or built-up portion definition, viz., whether the structures in the area involved, regardless of their use as business, residential or otherwise, which are contiguous to any way are situated less than 150 feet apart for a distance of at least ¼ of a mile. This resulted by virtue of a total developmental process combining the factors that (1) in 1929 the Legislature had made business district and residential district the respective synonyms for the then separately specified components within the compact or built-up portion definition; (2) the Legislature in 1953 substituted for these previously separate components the single generic concept structures  in consequence of which the business district and residential district concepts, previously functioning to identify the differentiated structures then embraced within the compact or built-up portion definition, became after 1953 superfluous vestiges of the statute's prior evolution; and thereby (3) the actually, and comprehensively, functioning determinant became solely the density criterion which had first appeared in 1921 attached only to dwelling houses:  the existence of any structures less than 150 feet apart for a distance of at least ¼ of a mile. We are further persuaded that the foregoing assessment of the legislative history of § 1252, and of the current meaning of the statute, is correct because we discern throughout a consistent legislative purpose. We find logical the legislative emphasis on congestion rather than use. Business establishments and dwelling houses scattered over wide distances do not present the traffic problems caused by numerous pedestrians, frequent turns and parked automobiles. However, an area consisting of structures situated in compact proximity presents all of these hazards whether the use of the structures be business, residential or other. Finally, we note that the interpretation we give § 1252, unlike that of the presiding Justice, avoids the constitutional question precipitated if the vague terms business, residential and district are made the legislative norms determining the criminality of behavior. One court has found constitutional infirmity in like circumstances. Ex Parte Slaughter, 92 Tex. Cr.R. 212, 243 S.W. 478 (1922); but see: People v. Dow, 155 Mich. 115, 118 N.W. 745 (1908). While we need not reach this constitutional issue given our contrary interpretation of § 1252, we note that our interpretation is in accord with the well-settled canon that a statute shall be construed in reasonable manner to avoid jeopardizing its validity on constitutional grounds. State v. Davenport, Me., 326 A.2d 1, 5-6 (1974). In light of the foregoing, the instructions of the presiding Justice were erroneous and necessitate a new trial on the charge of speeding. While we are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of the requisite density described in subsection 3, [5] the instructions of the presiding Justice authorized the jury to ignore density altogether and to find defendant guilty of speeding solely on the basis that the area in question was residential. [6]