Opinion ID: 1940334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conclusion

Text: For the reasons expressed above, we approve the decision of the Second District in Milks and reverse the decision of the Third District in Espindola. It is so ordered. WELLS, LEWIS, and CANTERO, JJ., concur. ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur. ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I cannot agree with the majority that the Third District in Espindola has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Florida's Sexual Predator Act in distinguishing Florida's Act from the Connecticut Sexual Offender Registration Act approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003). What the majority fails to confront are not only the express legislative findings contained in Florida's Act concerning future dangerousness, but more importantly, the Act's explicit adoption of the term sexual predator rather than sexual offender in its registration scheme. It is one thing to provide the public with public information about sexual offenders, but quite another to tell the public that the State has determined that certain persons are sexual predators. It is pure sophistry to suggest that these actions are the same. [7] Obviously, no one's popularity is going to be enhanced by having his or her name appear on a list of sexual offenders. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court has noted in Doe, that listing simply comes with having been convicted of a sexual offense. While it is true that many will conclude that any person convicted of a sexual offense will always be dangerous, that will be an individual determination based on accurate information. For that reason, I agree with the majority and the U.S. Supreme Court in Doe that states have broad authority to provide this information to the public. That is what Connecticut did, and the U.S. Supreme Court correctly approved that action. However, it is a far different matter when the State decides to classify certain individuals as sexual predators and to disseminate information about those predators to the public. Under such a scheme, no individual determination of dangerousness need be made because the State has already done that for us. And, of course, no one would challenge the State's determination of predator status. The public has a right to rely on the accuracy of that determination and will do so. No reasonable person would take the chance not to rely on such determination. It is in making this irrefutable conclusion that someone is a sexual predator without affording that someone an opportunity to object that Florida's Act runs afoul of constitutional due process protections. As noted above, unlike the sex offender registration laws in some other states, Florida's Act designates offenders not merely as sex offenders, but as sexual predators. Common sense tells us that there is a clear difference between an offender and a predator. For example, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 917 (10th ed.1994), defines predator as one that preys, destroys, or devours. Other reliable authorities contain similar definitions. Accordingly, by notifying the public as to the presence of sexual predators, Florida's Act goes well beyond merely listing persons who have previously been convicted of a sex offense. In actual effect, by designating these offenders as sexual predators, the State is clearly stating that the predator is dangerous and the public should beware.