Opinion ID: 4579341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Staying the Injunction

Text: Because the district court denied the legislature’s motion for a stay pending appeal, we may consider that motion now. Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2)(A)(ii). We consider the motion de novo because “we are not reviewing any district court decision or order.” A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted, 907 F.3d 913, 917 (6th Cir. 2018). To grant a stay, we must be satisfied that the balance of four factors—the Michigan Legislature’s likelihood of showing that the voter-transportation law is enforceable, the likelihood and degree of irreparable injury to the legislature if we do not grant a stay, the prospect that the stay would substantially injure other parties interested in the proceedings, and the interest of the public in granting the stay—is sufficient to justify a stay. Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153–54 (6th Cir. 1991). 1. Appellants’ Likelihood of Prevailing on the Merits The district court found the plaintiffs likely to prevail in showing that the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), as amended, preempts the voter-transportation law. We disagree. As first enacted in 1972, 52 U.S.C. § 30143 (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 453) read: (a) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to invalidate or make inapplicable any provision of any State law, except where compliance with such provision of law would result in a violation of a provision of this Act. (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), no provision of State law shall be construed to prohibit any person from taking any action authorized by this Act or from making any expenditure (as such term is defined in section 301(f) of this Act) which he could lawfully make under this Act. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-225, § 403, 86 Stat. 3, 20 (1972). It was amended in 1974 to read, in its entirety: No. 20-1931 Priorities USA, et al. v. Nessel, et al. Page 8 The provisions of this Act, and of rules prescribed under this Act, supersede and preempt any provision of State law with respect to Federal office. Federal Election Campaign Amendments Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443, § 301, 88 Stat. 1263, 1289 (1974). Since then, it has been amended only once, to create an exception for state or local parties’ use of funds for office buildings. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, § 103(b)(2), 116 Stat. 81, 87–88 (2002). On the one hand, the statute, as currently written, contains broad preemption language. If that were all, it might be enough to support the plaintiffs’ argument. It is a bit strange, of course, that in the nearly 50 years since FECA was enacted, no one has tried to use it to challenge Michigan’s statute or many other state statutes related to nonmonetary election expenditures.1 Still, alone, that fact might not move the needle enough to warrant staying the injunction. On the other hand, § 30143 also specifies that the “rules prescribed under” the FECA also preempt state law. The statute contemplates that a court will consider the regulations promulgated under it. If we turn to those regulations—specifically, 11 C.F.R. § 108.7—the scope of FECA’s preemption becomes less clear. Subsection (a) basically restates the statute in equally sweeping language. But immediately afterward, subsection (b) specifies three kinds of state laws that are preempted. Such a clarification would be wholly unnecessary if (a) truly were as sweeping as is claimed. And the three types of laws mentioned there are about campaign finance: the sources of funding and reporting on its collection and distribution. By ejusdem generis, the kind of state regulations contemplated as preempted likely do not include restrictions on selling alcohol on election day, treating voters to coffee, and transporting voters to the polls. Subsection (c) then specifically sets out types of state laws that are not preempted. By expressly allowing many types of election regulations, subsection (c) contradicts a sweeping interpretation of subsection (a). And the kinds of state laws that are not preempted occupy some 1For example, local bans on election-day alcohol sales, see, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 244.480(3)(a); Ga. Code Ann. § 3-3-20(b)(2)(B), or state laws cited by state election officials to threaten companies offering free or discounted coffee to voters, see, e.g., Cal. Elec. Code § 18521; see also Freebies for Voters May Break the Law, Long Beach Press-Telegram (Nov. 2, 2008), https://www.presstelegram.com/2008/11/02/freebies-for-voters-maybreak-the-law. No. 20-1931 Priorities USA, et al. v. Nessel, et al. Page 9 of the broad ground left open by subsection (b). In particular, (c)(4) specifically allows state laws prohibiting “false registration, voting fraud, theft of ballots, and similar offenses” (emphasis added). The Michigan statute, enacted in 1895 and prohibiting hiring carriages to take ambulatory voters to the polls, is assuredly aimed at preventing a kind of voter fraud known as “votehauling.” Vote-hauling can be a classic form of bribery—paying a voter to “haul” himself or herself (and maybe immediate or extended family) to the polls to vote. It is also a usual sink for election-day “street money” or “walking-around money,” as shown in several Kentucky federal vote-buying cases. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Turner, No. CRIM. 05-02, 2005 WL 4001132 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 16, 2005). Tracy Campbell, a professor of history at the University of Kentucky, wrote about vote-hauling in his book about the history of American election fraud. See Tracy Campbell, Deliver the Vote 276 (2005) (“While cast as a way to get voters to the polls, it was often little more than an efficient votebuying operation that provided ‘walking-around money’ to those willing to sell their votes.”); see also id. at 279, 337. Other states have or have had laws forbidding “expenditures” for alcohol on election day for similar reasons. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 244.480(3)(a) (authorizing local governments to ban alcohol sales on election days); Ga. Code Ann. § 3-3-20(b)(2)(B) (same); Act of June 21, 1954, No. 633, § 1, 1954 La. Acts 1145, 1145 (requiring bars to be closed until one hour after polls close); Iowa Liquor Control Act, ch. 24, § 18(d)–(e), 1934 Iowa Acts 38, 46 (banning sales and delivery of alcohol on election days). Saloonkeepers often served as poll officers. Allowing bars to remain open on Election Day created the opportunity for a proprietorelection official to give alcohol to a voter—in exchange for voting a certain way? One would never know. Of course, by raising the potential for fraudulent vote-hauling, we do not cast any aspersions on the appellee organizations or their motives. Not all vote-hauling payments are fraudulent, after all. A campaign might in all innocence pay a volunteer for his or her time and gasoline spent hauling voters to the polls. But a statute can be a prophylactic rule intended to prevent the potential for fraud where enforcement is otherwise difficult. Michigan’s ban on paid No. 20-1931 Priorities USA, et al. v. Nessel, et al. Page 10 voter transportation is one provision among several others in the statute intended to prevent fraud and undue influence. The statute forbids, for example, paying people for votes. MCL § 168.931(1)(a). Or threatening to fire workers for not voting a certain way. MCL § 168.931(1)(d). It also prevents religious leaders from using undue divine influence over their flocks. MCL § 168.931(1)(e). Moreover, the law was enacted in a way and at a time such that we can infer no invidious intent on the legislature’s part. We also make one last point regarding the district court’s analysis of the statute as originally enacted. Act of May 13, 1895, No. 135, § 13, 1895 Mich. Pub. Acts 264, 267.2 The court read the 1895 statute to forbid only a quid pro quo—no hiring transportation in exchange for a vote—and found that the revised, current language was different and therefore had no connection to fraud or election integrity. (R. 79, Order, PageID# 1617–18.) The court read the phrase “for the purpose of securing such voter’s vote, support, or attendance at such primary or convention” to apply to all the types of conduct prohibited by the act: hiring carriages or other conveyances for voters, soliciting persons to cast unlawful votes at primaries, offering voters money or a reward, treating or furnishing entertainment to voters, or promising voters a place or position. But, as the legislature points out, that reading does not make sense: It would be redundant to solicit a person to cast an unlawful vote at a primary “for the purpose of securing such person’s vote, support, or attendance at a primary.” The phrase is better read as modifying only behavior proscribed after the last “who shall,” preserving the grammatical parallelism. So no quid pro quo was required to outlaw the paid provision of transportation in 1895. Nor is it meaningful to this case that the legislature allegedly omitted such a requirement in 1982, when it replaced “carriage” with “motor vehicle” and inserted the vote-hauling ban into a long list of 2The full text of this provision reads: Any person who shall hire any carriage or other conveyance, or cause the same to be done, for conveying voters, other than those physically unable to walk thereto, to any primary conducted hereunder, or who shall solicit any person to cast an unlawful vote at any primary, or who shall offer to any voter any money or reward of any kind, or shall treat any voter or furnish any entertainment to any voter, or shall promise any place or position for the purpose of securing such voter’s vote, support or attendance at such primary or convention, or shall cause the same to be done, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. No. 20-1931 Priorities USA, et al. v. Nessel, et al. Page 11 other antifraud provisions. Act of July 1, 1982, No. 201, § 1, sec. 931(1)(k), 1982 Mich. Pub. Acts 574, 578. 2. Balancing the Equities As described above, the legislature’s likelihood of success on appeal is high. We now consider the remaining factors relevant to granting a stay. The harm to the legislature without a stay would be irreparable: November 3, 2020, will only happen once, and the legislature would lose its ability to regulate paid voter transportation for that election. Although prosecutions for illicit vote-buying would still be possible, enforcement would be far more difficult, requiring proof of a quid pro quo. And any vote-hauling fraud that does occur would still have affected the election itself. On the other side, the harm to the voter-advocacy organizations appears modest. There are other ways, without violating Michigan’s statute, to take voters to the polls. Volunteers can drive voters for free. Generally paid campaign workers—ones who are not specifically paid to take voters to the polls—may also fall outside the statute’s ban, as might using cars that are commercially rented for many different campaign purposes, only some of which are to haul voters. So the organizations’ resources will likely not go to waste. And with the expansion of mailed ballots in Michigan this year, there are likely fewer voters who need to be driven to the polls at all. These injuries also track the public interest, which lies in both fair elections—conducted with a minimum of fraud—as well as free elections—in which as many eligible voters can vote as desire to. A stay benefits the public interest more than harms it.3 3We also consider the potential for confusion coming from a change in election rules on the eve of an election. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam). But we note—as amici urge—that this consideration is only one of many and is neither dispositive nor establishes a presumption against enjoining election rules close to election day. Although the injunction may delight some voters who had hoped to receive paid transportation to their precinct on November 3, it would not likely result in the voter confusion that Purcell cautions against or incentivize the electorate not to vote. So this factor does not weigh heavily in our decision to issue a stay. No. 20-1931 Priorities USA, et al. v. Nessel, et al. Page 12