Opinion ID: 723734
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Challenged Ballot Issues

Text: 15 The Hospital's only other arguments concern the decisions of the Board with respect to two challenged ballots. Because of the one vote margin, these ballots are of course critical to the results of the election but we do not find either decision problematic. 16 The first challenge is to the Board's decision holding Alima Davis a regular employee and accepting her ballot. The Hospital argues that no substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Board's finding that Alima Davis was a regular employee. It notes that Davis, an on-call registered nurse, worked only a total of 56.5 hours during the calendar quarter immediately preceding the eligibility cutoff date, resulting in an average of 4.35 hours per week. It maintains that the Board impermissibly ignored that all of these hours were worked during the first three weeks of that period and that Davis did not regularly average four hours per week. The Hospital also contends that Davis's ballot should not have been counted as there had been de facto termination of her employment prior to the election. 17 We will uphold a Board's exercise of discretion unless its action is unreasonable, arbitrary or unsupported by the evidence. BB & L, Inc. v. NLRB, 52 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C.Cir.1995) (per curiam). We must therefore uphold a Board decision if it is rational and in accord with past precedent. Id. 18 Here, the Hospital and the Association entered into a stipulation regarding eligibility at the pre-election hearing. The stipulation stated that all non-scheduled or on-call registered nurses who averaged at least four hours or more of actual work during the 13-week quarter prior to the March 27, 1993 eligibility date could vote in the election. At the Hospital's request, a provision was added: [An] employee need not work in each of the 13 weeks of the quarter as long as they average four hours per week over that period of time. Desert Hospital, Supplemental Decision at 3 n.2. 19 Although conceding that the four-hour formula contained in the stipulation is consistent with Board policy and precedent, the Hospital argues that the Board's mechanical application of the formula is not. In BB & L, Inc., we recognized that strict application of the four-hour test is inappropriate where special circumstances exist suggesting no community of interest is present. 52 F.3d at 370. The Hospital contends that such special circumstances existed here as Davis's employment was neither continuous nor regular. To support this claim, the Hospital notes that Davis did not work in the latter part of the eligibility quarter; that a staffing secretary had tried without success to contact Davis on several occasions after mid-January 1993, asking her to call back if she could not work; and that Davis either did not return the calls or indicated that she was unavailable or sick. Thus, the Hospital argues she had no real continuing interest in the terms and conditions of employment offered by the employer. Id. at 371 (quoting Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 306 N.L.R.B. 294, 296, 1992 WL 27705 (1992)). 20 We disagree. BB & L, Inc. is inapposite. In that case, the parties did not enter into a stipulation regarding eligibility prior to the election. Here, the parties clearly did. In Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 932 (D.C.Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048, 112 S.Ct. 912, 116 L.Ed.2d 812 (1992), we held: 21 When the parties stipulate the bargaining unit ... the Board has a .... limited role. First it must ensure that the stipulated terms do not conflict with fundamental labor principles. Having done so, its task is simply to enforce the agreement. If the terms of the stipulation are unambiguous, the Board must hold the parties to its text. If the terms are ambiguous, the Board may look to the usual factors governing the definition of an appropriate unit, including the community-of-interest standard. 22 See also Dacas Nursing Support Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 7 F.3d 511 (6th Cir.1993) (finding that NLRB may not rely on worker's casual status or lack of community-of-interest to disregard terms of unambiguous stipulation); NLRB v. Speedway Petroleum, 768 F.2d 151, 156 (7th Cir.1985) (same). 23 The portion of the stipulation at issue provides: [An] employee need not work in each of the 13 weeks of the quarter as long as they average four hours per week over that period of time. There is nothing ambiguous about this provision. That Davis did not work the latter portion of the eligibility quarter thus has no import in our analysis. Davis worked more than four hours per week in the eligibility quarter, averaging 4.35 hours per week. Under the stipulated formula, therefore, she was entitled to vote in the election, and the Board did not err in counting her ballot. 24 The Hospital also contends that Davis's vote should have been excluded as there had been de facto termination of her employment prior to the date of the election. It notes that staffing secretaries ceased calling Davis as of April 23, treating her as ineligible for additional scheduling after that date. Although conceding that Davis's name had not been removed from the on-call list, the Hospital contends that its staffing secretaries had made a conscious decision not to call her again. 25 Taken as a whole, however, the evidence clearly supports the Board's finding that no de facto termination of Davis occurred. Contrary to the Hospital's argument, the staffing secretaries did not cease calling Davis because she was ineligible to work. Rather, they ceased calling her because she did not return their calls and was unavailable for work on the days on which they did reach her. Further, the staffing secretaries failed to follow normal Hospital practice regarding removal of on-call employees from the staffing list as no secretary contacted the Hospital's manager regarding Davis's availability problem nor did any secretary inform Davis of her change in status prior to the election. Thus, nothing had occurred prior to the election to terminate Davis's eligibility to vote. 26 The Hospital also contends that the Board improperly excluded the vote of Mary Madden. It argues that the Board incorrectly concluded that Mary Madden was a statutory supervisor and thus impermissibly sustained the challenge to her ballot. The Hospital contends that the record reveals that Madden exercised no authority over bargaining unit employees and that the level of authority she had over non-unit employees did not involve a sufficient degree of independent judgment and discretion for her to qualify as a supervisor. According to the Hospital, the overwhelming weight of Board precedent also supports this finding. 27 In order to establish that an employee is a supervisor, the evidence must show that an employee has the authority to engage in at least one of the twelve activities that Section 2(11) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11), identifies as indicia of supervisory status; that is, the individual must have the authority to (1) hire, (2) transfer, (3) suspend, (4) lay off, (5) recall, (6) promote, (7) discharge, (8) assign, (9) reward, (10) discipline, (11) responsibly direct or (12) adjust grievances. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1780. Additionally, an employee's exercise of that authority must require independent judgment, id., and cannot be merely routine, clerical, perfunctory, or sporadic. Lakeview Health Ctr., 308 N.L.R.B. 75, 78, 1992 WL 191676 (1992). 28 The Hospital contends that Madden exercised no authority over bargaining unit employees and that any authority she had over non-bargaining unit personnel did not involve the level of independent judgment necessary for her to be deemed supervisory. It notes that all of Madden's decisions were evaluated by her supervisor; she did not have final authority to hire, lay off, or recall employees; and all of her reprimands and warnings were reviewed and investigated independently by her supervisor. Although admitting Madden could interview applicants, the Hospital claims this was used only as a screening mechanism. 29 A Board determination regarding supervisory status is entitled to special weight and is to be accepted if it has warrant in the record and reasonable basis in the law. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173, 179 n. 6, 82 S.Ct. 1237, 1240 n. 6, 8 L.Ed.2d 418 (1962); Davis Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 2 F.3d 1162, 1173 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1368, 128 L.Ed.2d 45 (1994). The Board's determination here was clearly supported by evidence in the record. Madden's position differed from those of the other nurses. She had her own office and performed no direct patient care. Additionally, she oversaw non-unit employees, assigning them to particular cases and granting them overtime. And, although she did not hire employees, she was involved in the initial screening interviews. Such actions show that Madden was aligned with management as her hiring and evaluation work was a regular and frequent portion[ ] of her responsibilities. Detroit College of Business, 296 N.L.R.B. 318, 321, 1989 WL 224348 (1989). Thus, we hold the Board correctly concluded Madden was a supervisor and properly sustained the challenge to her ballot. III. CONCLUSION 30 For the foregoing reasons, the conclusions of the NLRB are affirmed; the petition for review is denied; and the cross-petition for enforcement granted.