Opinion ID: 2518032
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Remand to the Trial Court

Text: Defendant contends the case must be remanded to the trial judge for new review pursuant to section 190.4, subdivision (e). There is no basis for a remand. Judge Leon Kaplan presided over defendant's trial. On several occasions during the trial, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor expressed her dissatisfaction with Judge Kaplan. She noted the court frequently interposed its own objections and repeatedly asked for briefing on issues not raised by defendant. She questioned whether his personal feelings against the death penalty were interfering with his ability to be fair to the prosecution. After Judge Kaplan granted defendant's motion for a new penalty trial, the prosecutor argued that the ruling was erroneous, concluding with this remark: I don't think anyone can doubt that what this court is doing is twisting and torturing out of all shape what has occurred in this case in order to reach this court's decision not to impose the death penalty on this defendant because of this court's personal belief. Judge Kaplan stated that he would not respond to personal attacks on this court which have been ongoing and relentless. After he made additional comments explaining the basis for his ruling granting the new penalty trial, Judge Kaplan stated: I have one last statement to make and that is that in light of the personal attacks against the court, I feel that justice would be best served if I would recuse myself from further hearings in this case. The People may wish to consider reassigning this case but that is something that is entirely and exclusively within their province. As for myself, I am going to recuse myself from presiding over further proceedings, however I do not recuse myself from availability to making any supplemental or additional findings that may be required by any reviewing court. The case was reassigned to the supervising judge of the criminal courts. After the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of the new penalty trial, the matter was remanded and eventually reassigned to Judge Howard Schwab to rule on defendant's automatic motion for modification of the verdict under section 190.4, subdivision (e). At the time of this reassignment and again before Judge Schwab, defense counsel objected to having his motion heard by anyone other than Judge Kaplan. Defendant contends that Judge Kaplan made a limited recusal, retaining his availability to make any supplemental or additional findings that may be required by any reviewing court. Defendant claims that review under section 190.4, subdivision (e), is such a supplemental or additional finding. (28) Section 190.4, subdivision (e), provides that a judge ruling on an application for modification of a verdict of death shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances . . . and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. A motion under section 190.4, subdivision (e), should be considered by the same judge who presided at trial whenever possible. ( People v. Brown (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1247, 1264, fn. 7 [248 Cal.Rptr. 817, 756 P.2d 204].) However, we have recognized that when the trial judge dies or becomes unavailable before the modification motion has been decided, it may be heard and determined by any other judge of the same court. ( Ibid. ) We have reached the same conclusion with regard to cases remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of redetermining the modification motion. ( People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 830 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204]; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 287 [266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892]; People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 963 [258 Cal.Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330].) In disqualifying himself, Judge Kaplan stated that justice would be best served by his recusal from further hearings. At the time of defendant's trial, Code of Civil Procedure former section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A), provided that a judge is disqualified if the judge believes his or her recusal would further the interests of justice . . . . [36] Upon the determination of disqualification, the judge shall not further participate in the proceeding, except as provided in Section 170.4, unless his or her disqualification is waived by the parties as provided in subdivision (b). (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (a)(1).) Defendant acknowledges that none of the exceptions in Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, apply here. [37] Indeed, Judge Kaplan belatedly and correctly recognized that he could not engage in selective recusal. At a subsequent record correction proceeding, Judge Kaplan explained that upon further review he determined that he had no jurisdiction to conduct any activities not expressly authorized in Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4. Judge Kaplan cited Geldermann, Inc. v. Bruner (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 662, 665 [280 Cal.Rptr. 264], in which the Court of Appeal determined that the judicial disqualification statutes (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 170-170.8) do not permit limited, partial or conditional recusal. Defendant nevertheless argues that the statutory limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4 cannot prevail in light of constitutional considerations underlying the requirement that the trial judge conduct the section 190.4, subdivision (e) review. Defendant contends that by depriving Judge Kaplan of this review, he was directly denied his constitutional rights to due process and a fair and reliable penalty trial or deprived of a state-created liberty interest, thus derivatively denying him due process. (See Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346 [65 L.Ed.2d 175, 100 S.Ct. 2227].) Defendant's assertions lack merit. Applicable statutory law disqualified Judge Kaplan from ruling on defendant's modification motion. A judge of the same court was authorized to rule on the motion. Contrary to defendant's assertion, section 190.4, subdivision (e) does not require that the motion be heard by the same judge who presided at trial. The statutory procedure merely creates a preference for the same judge to hear the motion if possible. (See People v. Brown, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1264, fn. 7.) Judge Kaplan's self-recusal precluded his further participation. Thus, defendant cannot claim a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution. Finally, defendant asserts this matter should be treated in similar fashion to a mistrial intentionally caused by the prosecutor. (See Oregon v. Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667, 676 [72 L.Ed.2d 416, 102 S.Ct. 2083] [double jeopardy may apply where the prosecutor's conduct is intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial].) Defendant claims that Judge Kaplan's unavailability was provoked by the deliberate action of the prosecutor. He asserts that because the statutory requirements for the imposition of a death sentence cannot be fulfilled, a sentence of life without possibility of parole should be imposed. Defendant's argument is mere speculation, and we reject it. Judge Kaplan did not elaborate on his decision to disqualify himself beyond noting that because of the personal attacks levied against him, justice would be best served by recusing himself from further hearings in the case. Although the prosecutor at times vociferously disagreed with Judge Kaplan's rulings, advocates are permitted to argue that the court's rulings are erroneous or unfair. The record does not establish that the prosecutor was attempting to goad the judge into disqualifying himself. If the prosecutor sought to preclude Judge Kaplan from presiding over the case, she could have moved at any time to disqualify him for cause pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. Moreover, Judge Kaplan had options short of recusing himself if the prosecutor was as deliberately provocative as defendant asserts. At no time during the trial did Judge Kaplan attempt to impose sanctions on the prosecutor. Nor did he find or threaten to find her in contempt.