Opinion ID: 4545965
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The majority conflates the two inquiries

Text: The majority correctly notes that the trial court must conduct both a waiver inquiry and a relevancy inquiry. Majority at 19-20. But the majority fails to keep separate those two distinct inquiries. Instead, the majority describes a waiver inquiry that is exactly the same as the relevancy inquiry. As to the waiver inquiry, the majority instructs the trial court to examine the Magneys’ marital counseling records to determine “the extent of any mental anguish discussed within the Magneys’ marital counseling or whether that particular mental anguish has any bearing on or connection to the mental anguish as pleaded in the complaint.” Majority at 19. Basically, the majority instructs the trial court to determine whether the marital counseling records are relevant to the current lawsuit. And if they are, then the Magneys waived privilege. But if the waiver inquiry is essentially a relevancy inquiry, then what purpose does the separate relevancy inquiry serve? The majority is both conflating 3 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) waiver with relevancy and instructing the trial court to conduct redundant analyses. And by making waiver contingent on relevancy, the majority writes privilege out of existence. See Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 157 (Colo. 1999) (“‘[R]elevance alone cannot be the test, because such a test would ignore the fundamental purpose of evidentiary privileges, which is to preclude discovery and admission of relevant evidence under prescribed circumstances.’” (quoting R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 842 (Tex. 1994)). All records are discoverable only if they’re potentially relevant, not just privileged records. CR 26(b)(1). In sum, before the court analyzes relevancy for purposes of discovery, it must first determine whether the records are privileged and, if so, whether that privilege has been waived. The waiver inquiry is distinct from the relevancy inquiry. Whether privilege has been waived is a difficult question because courts across the country have debated the proper test for making that decision and we have never chosen sides in that debate. We have to do that now to decide this case. I therefore describe the different sides in that debate and the pros and cons of each approach. I conclude that the “narrow” approach is the only one that is consistent with our privilege statute and with United States Supreme Court law on the clarity required to make this privilege work. I would therefore hold that for reasons entirely unrelated to relevance, the Magneys have not waived privilege. 4 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) II. The federal courts have developed three approaches to waiver Respondents seek records that are generally protected by privilege. RCW 5.60.060(9). 2 The primary issue before our court is whether the Magneys waived the privilege that the legislature afforded to them. I agree with the majority that the Magneys did not waive privilege simply by seeking damages for mental anguish. This holding finds support in our precedent regarding the statutory physician-patient privilege. Before that statutory privilege was amended to include waiver “[n]inety days . . . after filing an action for personal injuries or wrongful death,” see LAWS OF 1987, ch. 212, § 1501(4)(b), we had held that the mere filing of an action for personal injuries did not waive the privilege, Bond v. Indep. Order of Foresters, 69 Wn.2d 879, 880, 421 P.2d 351 (1966). Thus, we have already rejected the sort of broad waiver that respondents advocate for here. But determining exactly when a party waives privilege is a tougher question. In Phipps v. Sasser, a personal injury case, we addressed when the privilege is waived, if not at filing. 74 Wn.2d 439, 445-46, 445 P.2d 624 (1968). We 2 The “marital counseling” privilege protects “information acquired from persons consulting the [counselor] in a professional capacity when the information was necessary to enable the [counselor] to render professional services to those persons.” RCW 5.60.060(9). That is, the privilege protects the substance of the conversations. It does not protect the fact that the conversations occurred or when they occurred. 5 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) acknowledged that the privilege holder could certainly impliedly waive privilege prior to trial, and we held that whether the privilege holder has done so is left to the trial court’s discretion on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 446 (“Absent legislative action, the trial court should proceed on a case-by-case basis rather than having this court attempt to fix a precise event in the pretrial proceedings which, under all conditions, would constitute an implied waiver.”). But we didn’t provide guidance beyond that, much to the dissent’s chagrin. Id. at 451-52 (Finley, C.J., dissenting). Underscoring the difficulty of this issue, the federal courts have been unable to reach a consensus on when the similar federal psychotherapist-patient privilege is impliedly waived. 3 See Helen A. Anderson, The Psychotherapist Privilege: Privacy and “Garden Variety” Emotional Distress, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 117, 134 (2013) (explaining that the federal appellate courts “have not set binding 3 In Jaffee v. Redmond, the United States Supreme Court recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 518 U.S. 1, 9-10, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996). The Supreme Court broadly defined the privilege to include “confidential communications made to licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy.” Id. at 15. It stands to reason that the privilege would also include confidential communications made to licensed marital counselors. In contrast to this all-in-one federal privilege, Washington has one statute that creates a psychologist-client privilege, RCW 18.83.110, and an entirely separate statute that creates several seemingly related privileges, including a social worker-patient privilege and the marital counseling privilege at issue here, RCW 5.60.060(9). Given the breadth of the federal privilege, federal case law on the psychotherapist-patient privilege may inform our decisions about how to handle cases involving either our psychologist-client privilege or the privileges contained in RCW 5.60.060(9), including the marital counseling privilege at issue here. 6 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) rules” and the district courts have taken various approaches). The federal courts have taken three different approaches: the broad approach, the narrow approach, and the middle ground approach. Koch v. Cox, 376 U.S. App. D.C. 376, 489 F.3d 384, 390 (2007). These three approaches, adopted by courts around the country, reflect a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the issue, and they more or less cover the gamut of possibilities. Thus, I believe that they are worth considering in detail. 4
Under the broad approach, a patient who places his or her mental condition at issue—for example, by “mak[ing] a claim for emotional distress”—waives privilege. Koch, 489 F.3d at 381 (quoting Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000)). This is the approach taken by the Court of Appeals in Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 172 Wn. App. 835, 854-55, 292 P.3d 779 (2013). I agree with the majority’s analysis and rejection of Lodis. In addition, as I noted above, 4 The majority seems to suggest that it is not worth this court’s time to examine cases from other state courts and from federal courts, pointing out that I “devote[] almost the entirety of [my] opinion to the discussion of out-of-state and federal authority.” Majority at 17 n.8. I, however, believe that it is this court’s duty to examine the law in full detail in order to reach the best decision possible. I am well aware that we are not bound by out-of-jurisdiction cases, but the fact that a case is not binding does not mean that it is not helpful. That is particularly true here, where our court has a dearth of case law (recent case law, at least) on the issue at hand, and where the out-of-jurisdiction cases neatly summarize the three different approaches we might take. 7 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) our court has already rejected the broad approach to waiver, albeit in a different context. See Bond, 69 Wn.2d at 880 (holding that the mere filing of a lawsuit for personal injuries does not waive the physician-patient privilege). Aside from the problems with Lodis identified by the majority, there’s another problem with adopting the reasoning from that case: our legislature has since rejected it. The privilege holder in Lodis filed his claim under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), ch. 49.60 RCW, and sought emotional damages. 172 Wn. App. at 842. The court adopted the broad approach and held that “when a plaintiff puts his mental health at issue by alleging emotional distress, he waives his psychologist-patient privilege for relevant mental health records.” Id. at 855. But the legislature has now passed a law that effectively overrules Lodis. See RCW 49.60.510. Under that new law,5 a privilege holder who brings a WLAD claim does not waive privilege simply by requesting noneconomic damages such as emotional distress. RCW 49.60.510(1). Instead, a privilege holder waives privilege when he or she “[a]lleges a specific diagnosable physical or psychiatric injury as a proximate result of the respondents’ conduct” or “[r]elies on the records or testimony of a health care provider or expert witness to seek general damages.” 5 The legislature recently amended this statute, but the changes have not yet gone into effect. S.B. 6236, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). 8 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) RCW 49.60.510(1)(a), (b). Thus, not only was Lodis incorrectly decided for the reasons stated in the majority opinion, but it also has since been abrogated by our legislature. Other courts have rejected the broad approach for the same reason I disagree with the majority’s opinion: it largely overrides the privilege. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the broad approach in a case with facts that mirror those before us now. Johnson, 977 P.2d 152. There, Johnson brought a personal injury action in which she sought damages “for mental anguish, emotional distress, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life.” Id. at 153. One of the defendants sought “records from her marriage counseling sessions with her ex-husband.” Id. at 154. Like Washington, Colorado has a statutorily created marital counseling privilege. Id. at 155 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1)(g) (1998)). The defendant claimed that the plaintiff had impliedly waived privilege by “inject[ing] her mental condition into the case.” Id. at 154. The defendant argued that “[i]t would be unfair . . . if she were precluded from discovering potential causes of Johnson’s mental and emotional suffering that are not related to the accident.” Id. at 156. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected that argument. Id. at 157. The court noted that the defendant’s “most compelling argument for why we should find an 9 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) implied waiver is that the information sought may be relevant to a determination of the extent to which Johnson’s mental suffering is properly attributable to the accident as opposed to some other cause.” Id. But the court held “that ‘relevance alone cannot be the test, because such a test would ignore the fundamental purpose of evidentiary privileges, which is to preclude discovery and admission of relevant evidence under prescribed circumstances.’” Id. (quoting R.K., 887 S.W.2d at 842). Indeed, if relevance were the test, then privilege may as well not even exist, because even unprivileged material must be relevant to be discoverable. CR 26(b)(1) (allowing parties to discovery only material that “is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action”). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has rejected any approach that takes relevancy into consideration: “Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.” Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996). I would reject the broad approach to waiver.
Under the narrow approach, a patient waives privilege by “‘affirmatively placing the substance of the advice or communication directly in issue.’” Koch, 10 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) 489 F.3d at 390 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 638 (N.D. Cal. 2003)). For example, in Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, the plaintiff alleged violations of various antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws; for most of those violations, she sought damages for emotional distress. 174 F.R.D. 225, 226 (D. Mass. 1997). Courts applying the broad approach would have held that the plaintiff waived privilege simply by seeking damages for emotional distress. See, e.g., Schoffstall, 223 F.3d at 823. But the court in Vanderbilt rejected the broad approach and instead opted for the narrow approach. 174 F.R.D. at 228. The court held that a plaintiff waives privilege only if he or she “puts the privileged communication itself at issue,” by “us[ing] the substance of her communication, by calling her psychotherapist as a witness, for example, or by testifying to the substance of the communication herself.” Id. at 230. Courts that adopt the narrow approach treat waiver of the psychotherapistpatient privilege similarly to how they treat waiver of the attorney-client privilege. “A client waives [attorney-client] privilege when he puts the attorney-client relationship in issue—for example, by suing the attorney for malpractice or by claiming he relied upon the attorney’s advice.” Koch, 489 F.3d at 389 (citing United States v. Moody, 923 F.2d 341, 352-53 (5th Cir. 1991); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.30 (3d ed. 2003); 11 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 80 (AM. LAW INST. 2000)). “By analogy, a patient would waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege when he sues the therapist for malpractice, or relies upon the therapist’s diagnoses or treatment in making or defending a case.” Id. (citing Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229).6 To be sure, courts that adopt the broad approach also claim that they are attempting to treat waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege the same way they treat waiver of the attorney-client privilege—but that claim falls flat. For example, in Schoffstall, a case often cited as an example of the broad approach, the court reasoned “that, similar to attorney-client privilege that can be waived when the client places the attorney’s representation at issue, a plaintiff waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing his or her medical condition at issue.” 223 F.3d at 823 (relying on several federal district court opinions). But that 6 In Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wn.2d 198, 787 P.2d 30 (1990), we examined when a client impliedly waives attorney-client privilege. We held that the client does so when he or she sues an attorney for malpractice. Id. at 208-09. In doing so, we applied a threeprong test that we borrowed from a federal court. Id. at 207-08 (applying test from Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975)). Under one of those prongs, we examined the opposing party’s need for the evidence. Id. But as explained above, the United States Supreme Court has since rejected any sort of analysis that balances the importance of a privilege with the opposing party’s need for the privileged evidence. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17 (“Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.”). 12 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) comparison is imperfect. It equates placing one’s medical condition at issue with placing an attorney’s representation at issue, id., and the two do not equate: “Asking whether the patient’s mental condition is at issue is a very different question from that asked in the context of determining waiver of the attorney-client privilege: whether the client has put the representation—not the topic of representation—at issue.” Anderson, supra, at 124. Simply put, the Schoffstall court’s conclusion that “making a claim for emotional distress necessarily waives the privilege . . . does not follow from the . . . analogy to the attorney-client privilege.” Koch, 489 F.3d at 389 (citing Schoffstall, 223 F.3d at 823). At bottom, the narrow approach is tailored to protect privilege while at the same time barring a party from wielding the privilege as a sword. Id. “‘In other words, a party cannot partially disclose privileged communications or affirmatively rely on privileged communications to support its claim or defense and then shield the underlying communications from scrutiny by the opposing party.’” In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000)). As I discuss below, our court has already gone a long way toward adopting the narrow approach, and I would explicitly do so here. 13 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part)
The middle ground approach reflects a compromise position adopted by those courts that believe that the broad approach protects privilege too little and the narrow approach protects it too much. Under this approach, a patient waives the privilege by alleging more than “‘“garden variety” emotional distress.’” Koch, 489 F.3d at 390 (quoting Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 225 n.8 (D.N.J. 2000)). But what is meant by “garden variety” is not entirely clear. See Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 225 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“The problem in these cases is definitional and stems from the imprecision and elasticity of the phrase ‘garden variety.’”). One court has identified five scenarios in which the claimed emotional distress is more than “garden variety.” St. John v. Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12, 1920 (D.D.C. 2011). According to that court, a party alleges more than “garden variety” emotional distress, and thus waives privileges, if he or she (1) asserts “‘a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress,’” (2) makes “‘an allegation of a specific mental or psychiatric injury or disorder,’” (3) asserts “‘a claim of unusually severe emotional distress,’” (4) makes an “‘offer of expert testimony to support a claim of emotional distress,’” or (5) concedes “‘that his or her mental condition is “in controversy.”’” Id. at 19 (quoting Turner v. 14 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1995)); see also Johnson, 977 P.2d at 157 (applying similar analysis). The absence of an obvious definition of “garden variety” emotional distress, along with the required in-depth analysis that goes with it, has led some courts to reject the middle ground approach. As one court explained, “the use of a test for waiver that hinges on an after-the-fact judicial assessment of numerous qualitative factors introduces a risk of uncertainty that the Supreme Court in Jaffee sought to avoid.” Fitzgerald, 216 F.R.D. at 639. This is correct: remember that in Jaffee, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that “if the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.’” 518 U.S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1981)). Others have criticized the middle ground approach as fundamentally unfair because “[i]t depends on the individual judge’s view of what is ‘ordinary’” and is thus subject to a judge’s biases. Anderson, supra, at 119. Through this lens, the approach is seen as “a kind of discrimination in itself that tells the plaintiff that 15 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) something is wrong with her if she claims to have suffered more than what is reasonable according to the dominant group.” Id. at 141. I agree with these criticisms. This approach is impossible to apply in a principled and consistent manner, provides little to no guidance to future courts, and undermines Jaffee’s directive that privileges be clear and predictable.
As discussed in detail above, we have already rejected the broad approach, and I would reject the middle ground approach, too. This leaves the narrow approach. To some extent, our court has already adopted what amounts to the narrow approach. In McUne v. Fuqua, McUne sued over injuries he suffered in an automobile accident. 42 Wn.2d 65, 68, 253 P.2d 632 (1953). The parties disputed whether McUne had impliedly waived the physician-patient privilege. Id. at 74. We explained, first, that “[w]hen a patient permits his physician to testify without objection, he of course waives the privilege as to that physician.” Id. (citing Williams v. Spokane Falls & N. Ry. Co., 42 Wash. 597, 84 P. 1129 (1906)). In that situation, the patient “also waives the privilege as to other physicians who attended the patient at the same time and in consultation with the first physician.” Id. 16 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) We also held that at least in some circumstances, a patient may voluntarily open the door and waive “the privilege as to any medical testimony which tends to contradict or impeach medical testimony which he has himself offered.” Id. at 76. We held that McUne voluntarily opened the door by having three doctors testify on his behalf and by personally testifying “that he was able to do heavy work before the accident but not afterwards, that his health was good prior to the accident, and that he had not consulted a doctor ‘for years.’” Id. at 75-76. We subsequently limited this holding to some extent, clarifying that “we did not there adopt the minority rule that waiver, by permitting one treating physician to testify without objection, is a waiver as to all.” Phipps, 74 Wn.2d at 448 n.9. We have also explained that a patient does not waive the privilege by testifying as an adverse witness, as that testimony does “not constitute a ‘voluntary opening of the door.’” Randa v. Bear, 50 Wn.2d 415, 421, 312 P.2d 640 (1957) (quoting Packard v. Coberly, 147 Wash. 345, 265 P. 1082 (1928)). So the holding of McUne can be summarized as follows. A patient waives the physician-patient privilege as to those physicians who testify on the patient’s behalf, as well as to those physicians who attended the patient at the same time and in consultation with the testifying physician. And when a patient testifies about his or her condition as it existed in the past, prior to the incident at issue, the patient 17 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) waives the privilege as to those physicians who had treated the patient at that time. This holding, limiting waiver to the topics on which the party affirmatively offers evidence, contains the seeds of the narrow approach. In accord with our case law, I would explicitly adopt the narrow approach now. I would hold that the Magneys have not impliedly waived privilege simply by seeking damages for mental anguish. As this case proceeds, it’s possible that they may waive privilege at some point by, for example, affirmatively claiming no preexisting mental health issues or placing the substance of their communications with their marital counselor directly at issue, see, e.g., Koch, 489 F.3d at 389-90. But they have not done so here. If the Magneys call their counselor as a witness, or if they testify to the substance of their counseling sessions, or if they otherwise rely on their prior treatment in making their case, then they will have waived privilege. McUne, 42 Wn.2d at 74. The Magneys might also waive privilege if they choose to rely on the status of their mental health prior to the events that led to this lawsuit. McUne, 42 Wn.2d at 75-76 (finding implied waiver in part because plaintiff voluntarily took the witness stand and claimed that “his health was good prior to the accident”). But all the Magneys have done at this stage is file a lawsuit in which they seek damages for mental anguish. Because I would adopt the narrow approach to 18 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) waiver, I would hold that this is insufficient to waive privilege. Thus, the Magneys’ marital counseling records are protected by privilege and not subject to discovery, regardless of their relevancy. CR 26(b)(1). The majority suggests that the Magneys may have impliedly waived privilege through some action other than filing this lawsuit. Majority at 3 (reasoning that the trial court should determine “whether the Magneys have impliedly waived privilege through any of their actions thus far”). According to the majority, the Magneys may have “impliedly waived privilege by providing the defendants with evidence of mental anguish akin to that which was discussed during the marital counseling.” Id. at 19-20. But that is a hypothetical situation not before us. The respondents are arguing that the Magneys impliedly waived privilege by filing this lawsuit. See Br. of Resp’ts at 2-3. For purposes of this appeal, the only relevant action that the Magneys have taken is to file the lawsuit. And the majority itself concludes that filing a lawsuit is not enough to waive privilege. Majority at 18 (“we hold that the Magneys did not automatically waive privilege by filing the lawsuit”). I agree, and the potential relevancy of the marital 19 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) counseling records does not change this. There is no reason to remand this case for in camera review of those records. 7