Opinion ID: 2626390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Photograph of Carol while Alive

Text: Near the start of the penalty trial, the court and counsel repeatedly discussed the admissibility in the prosecution's case-in-chief of two photographs of Carol while she was alive. One depicted Carol and her husband Delbert together, and the other depicted Carol with several family members. The prosecution offered the pictures as victim impact evidence under Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 ( Payne ), and its progeny. The defense opposed admission of the photographs on these grounds. Counsel argued that the photos were irrelevant and prejudicial because they were taken at unknown times, and because they did not show the kind of harm contemplated by the cases on which the prosecution relied. The trial court excluded the group family photo, but admitted the photo of Carol and Delbert, marking it exhibit No. 85. The prosecution introduced the latter item while Delbert was on the witness stand. In the process, the prosecution asked one substantive question, How did you feel about your wife? As noted, Delbert said she was his whole life. Defendant argues here, much as below, that exhibit No. 85 was irrelevant. Its admission purportedly violated his right to due process under the federal and state Constitutions, and his right to a reliable verdict under the federal Constitution. We disagree. [23] In 1987, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred evidence of a murder victim's personal traits and the effect of the murder on surviving relatives. ( Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 509, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 ( Booth ); see South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805, 811-812, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 [barring prosecutorial argument on the matter].) Four years later, in Payne, supra, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, the high court reversed itself, and held that the states could choose to admit evidence of the specific harm the defendant had caused, to wit, the loss to society and the victim's family of a unique individual. ( Id. at p. 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597.) According to Payne, the federal Constitution bars such evidence only if it is so unduly prejudicial as to render the particular trial fundamentally unfair. ( Ibid. ) Shortly after Payne, this court held that victim impact evidence is generally admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a). ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835-836, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) Payne and Edwards apply even where, as here, the murder occurred while Booth, supra, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, was in effect. ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 394-395, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) The challenged photograph helped illustrate Delbert's expression of love for Caroltestimony that defendant does not contest. As a whole, such evidence implied that Carol's loved ones suffered grief and pain over her loss. Thus, the jury could consider this evidence in determining whether death or LWOP was the appropriate punishment. (E.g., People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 444, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391 [allowing photos of murder victims taken at unspecified times].) Contrary to what defendant implies, the photograph was not irrelevant or unduly prejudicial simply because it did not depict Carol exactly as she appeared to defendant, or because he knew nothing about her marriage. ( People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1183, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353 [rejecting claim that victim impact evidence involves only circumstances known or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the crime].) No error occurred.