Opinion ID: 2631902
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: attorney work product immunity

Text: ¶ 31 Atkin next challenges the trial court's July 9, 1997, order requiring him to pay $1500 to defendants and compelling discovery in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) and the court's determination that Atkin violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b) by withholding the transcript of his conversation with Johnson despite defendants' requests that he produce the document. Upon finding that Atkin violated rule 34(b) by improperly with-holding the transcript, the court ordered Atkin to pay costs and legal fees incurred pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4), which states that a court shall . . . require the party[, deponent, or attorney] whose conduct necessitated the motion [to compel] . . . to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order [compelling production], including attorney fees, unless the opposition to the motion was substantially justified . . . or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) (1993). [8] Atkin argues on appeal that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay costs and legal fees incurred, as he did not violate rule 34(b) because the transcript of his conversation with Johnson was prepared in anticipation of litigation and to assist in trial preparation, and thus, was protected from production . . . by the work-product doctrine. We review a court's award of costs and attorney fees under rule 37(a)(4) for an abuse of discretion. See Garrand v. Garrand, 581 P.2d 1012, 1014 (Utah 1978); see also Affleck v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 655 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah 1982) (per curiam). [9] ¶ 32 Atkin correctly notes that certain materials otherwise subject to discovery are, upon appropriate objection, protected from disclosure and introduction into evidence because of their creation by an attorney in preparation for litigation. Specifically, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) immunizes from production otherwise discoverable evidence that qualifies as attorney work productmaterials that qualify as (1) documents and tangible things, (2) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, (3) by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (1993). ¶ 33 However, attorney work product immunity is not absolute. Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n v. Uno, 932 P.2d 589, 590 (Utah 1997). The work product privilege derives from dual policy goals aimed at preserving the adversary system and providing attorneys with a zone of privacy permitting effective client advocacy, id., and it thus follows that to the extent these goals are trampled on, the scope of the attorney work product privilege may be eroded. See id. (recognizing exceptions to the privilege for malpractice suits and advice of counsel defenses because enforcing work product immunity in such cases would run contrary to the policy objectives of the doctrine). ¶ 34 Although this court has not been presented with the opportunity to exhaustively address the precise circumstances and exigencies requiring such erosion, numerous courts in other jurisdictions have recognized one set of conditions under which the privilege becomes limited: when attorneys engage in unethical behavior to obtain the evidence at issue. See, e.g., Parrott v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 1262, 1271-72 (11th Cir.1983); Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d 795, 800-01 (D.C.Cir.1981); Anderson v. Hale, 202 F.R.D. 548, 554-55, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4994, at  (N.D.Ill.2001); Wilson v. Lamb, 125 F.R.D. 142, 143 (E.D.Ky.1989); Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 676 F.Supp. 1332, 1357-58 (E.D.Va.1987). As the D.C. Circuit held in Moody v. IRS , [A] lawyer's unprofessional behavior may vitiate the work product privilege. 654 F.2d at 800. The court reasoned that this exception to the privilege is necessary because perverse results would be rendered if lawyers could claim an evidentiary privilege to prevent disclosure of work product generated by those very activities the privilege was meant to prevent. Id. In such cases, Non-disclosure would then provide an incentive for, rather than against, the disfavored practices. The integrity of the adversary process is not furthered by protecting a lawyer who steps outside his role as an officer of the court . . . work[ing] for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. An attorney should not be able to exploit the privilege for ends outside of and antithetical to the adversary system any more than a client who attempts to use the privilege to advance criminal or fraudulent ends. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947)). Indeed, we have repeatedly admonished that, as officers of the court, attorneys must stand as vanguards for the integrity of the judicial process and the dignity of the profession. See, e.g., In re Utah State Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991, 993 (Utah 1982); In re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 558, 95 P.2d 13, 24 (1939); In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 300, 130 P. 217, 225 (1913); McWhirter v. Donaldson, 36 Utah 293, 304, 104 P. 731, 735 (1909); In re Snow, 27 Utah 265, 272, 75 P. 741, 744 (1904); see also Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, ¶ 13, 985 P.2d 255; Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993); Utah R. Prof'l Conduct (preamble) (2001). In view of this roleand in line with our recognition of the need to preserv[e] the adversary system as a primary rationale for allowing work product immunity in the first place, Uno, 932 P.2d at 590we find the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit's decision in Moody persuasive and adopt it here. ¶ 35 Accordingly, in situations where a court has determined that an attorney asserting work product immunity committed an ethical violation in obtaining the evidence at issue, the court must determine any applicable work product privilege vitiated and thus order disclosure of the evidence so long as the disclosure would not traumatize the adversary process more than the underlying legal misbehavior. Moody, 654 F.2d at 801; see also Parrott, 707 F.2d at 1272 (ordering disclosure of clandestinely recorded conversations with witnesses because the only effect of such disclosure would be the playing of the taped conversations at the beginning of the witnesses' depositions); Hale, at 554-55, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4994, at  (following Parrott ); Lamb, 125 F.R.D. at 143 (same); Haigh, 676 F.Supp. at 1357-58 (same). ¶ 36 In this case, we have already determined that the trial court appropriately found Atkin to have violated Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 by engaging in an ex parte conversation with a represented party concerning the dispute underlying this appeal. See supra ¶¶ 19-30. Indeed, it was only through this unethical conduct that Atkin was able to obtain, record, and transcribe his illicit conversation with Johnson at all; had Atkin properly deposed Johnson rather than inappropriately communicating with him about the matter in dispute before first contacting his attorney, then Johnson would have been entitled to receive a transcript of the proceeding as mandated by Utah procedure and law. Utah R. Civ. P. 30(f)(3) (2001). As a result, no legitimate argument can be made that Atkin's unethical behavior did not vitiate whatever work product privilege may have been applicable to the transcript of Atkin's May 10, 1993, conversation with Johnson. Not only was it Atkin's unethical behavior that allowed him to obtain the transcript, but disclosure of the transcript could not possibly have traumatize[d] the adversary process more than the underlying legal misbehavior. Moody, 654 F.2d at 801. In fact, the trial court ordered that the transcript not be referred to or used in th[e] litigation. Consequently, disclosure could only protect the adversary process by restoring the playing field to its position prior to Atkin's actions. In other words, by ordering disclosure of the transcript, the trial court merely corrected the harm done to the adversary system when Atkin took an unfair advantage by unethically dealing with his client's opponent before seekingor receivingpermission from the opponent's counsel to do so. See 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2027, at 411 & n. 11 (1994) (noting that the objectives of work product immunity are not advanced when one party uses unfair practices to gain an advantage in the proceedings). ¶ 37 Therefore, we hold that whatever work product privilege might have existed [as to the transcript] was vitiated by Atkin's unethical methods used to engage in the conversation with Johnson. Parrott, 707 F.2d at 1272. As a consequence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Atkin violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b) when he failed to produce the transcript, and thus, in ordering Atkin to pay costs and attorney fees associated with defendants' motion to compel pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a). Those expenses, in addition to the court's unchallenged [10] award for the reasonable expenses defendants incurred in defending against Atkin's motion to compel Johnson's deposition, see Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) (1993) (If [a] motion [to compel] is denied, the court shall. . . require the moving party or the attorney. . . or both of them to pay to the [prevailing] party or deponent . . . the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees . . . .), shall be paid to defendants by Atkin following remand.