Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Penalty Phase Instructional Error Claims

Text: As described ( ante, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 633, 131 P.3d at p. 1029), the jury heard evidence pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b), that on three occasions defendant was caught with contraband razor blades in jail, in violation of section 4574, subdivision (a). The razor blades had been broken away from a modern form of safety razor. Defendant moved to have the jury instructed to disregard this evidence on the ground that, as a matter of law, the razor blades were not deadly weapons within the meaning of section 4574, subdivision (a) (any person who, while lawfully confined in a jail ... possesses therein any ... deadly weapon ... is guilty of a felony....) The court denied the motion. Following defendant's testimony that he had innocent reasons for possessing the razor blades, the jury was instructed, in pertinent part, that each juror could consider the episodes in aggravation under factor (b) of section 190.3 if he or she found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had violated section 4574. The jury was instructed, To determine whether or not an item is a deadly weapon, you must look to the surrounding circumstances; the capability of its being used to inflict death or great bodily injury; and any inferences that may be drawn as to its intended possession. Defendant argues that the jury should have been instructed that the weapon must not only be capable of producing but also must be likely to produce death or great bodily injury, and that the court's failure to so instruct the jury violated his right to have the jury instructed on every element of the offense. (See People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th 287, 383, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432 [The trial court, having decided to identify the other criminal activity and to instruct on its elements, had a duty to do so accurately and not mislead the jury.].) He discerns violations of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. If error had occurred, however, it would have been invited by defendant. The reporter's transcript makes clear that defendant proposed the instruction and not only acquiesced in, but endorsed, a minor modification to it. The trial court chose defendant's language in place of language the prosecutor preferred. Defendant cannot now complain of error. ( People v. Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th 871, 905, 22 Cal. Rptr.3d 305, 102 P.3d 228.) In any event, there was no error. The instruction the court gave reflects a standard instruction defining a deadly weapon that existed at the time of trial. (Former CALJIC No. 16.291 (5th ed. 1988) [A deadly weapon means any weapon, instrument or object that is capable of being used to inflict death or great bodily injury.].) The standard instruction for section 4574, subdivision (a), defines a  deadly weapon  as any weapon, instrument, or object that has the reasonable potential of being used in a manner that would cause great bodily injury or death. (Judicial Council of Cal.Crim. Instns. (2006) CALCRIM No. 2746; accord, CALJIC No. 7.34.02 (Oct.2005 ed.); see People v. Martinez (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 908-912, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 334.) The standard instruction did not exist at the time of trial, but it is materially indistinguishable from that which defendant requested.
Three miscellaneous claims, regarding burden of proof, lingering doubt, and premeditation and deliberation, require only brief discussion. First, neither Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, nor Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, has changed our prior conclusions regarding burden of proof. The death penalty law is not unconstitutional for failing to impose a burden of proof Б─■ whether beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence Б─■ as to the existence of aggravating circumstances, the greater weight of aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances, or the appropriateness of a death sentence. ( People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th 382, 401, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) Second, notwithstanding defendant's view that the evidence justified requiring the trial court to instruct the jurors that they could consider any lingering doubt they might have had whether defendant intended to kill Lees, the trial court properly denied defendant's request to give the instruction. ( People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 739, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 77, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129 [there is no requirement, under either state or federal law, that the court specifically instruct the jury to consider any residual doubt of defendant's guilt].) Third, defendant unsuccessfully requested that the jury be instructed that it could consider in mitigation any perception it might have that defendant lacked premeditation or deliberation before the murder of Lees. But such a pinpoint instruction is not required (see People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 730, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248), and the instructions given to the jury that it could consider the circumstances of the crime and anything that might extenuate its gravity (ї 190.3, factors (a), (k)) sufficed to permit it to consider the question.