Opinion ID: 4534699
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Standard for Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: In Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), the Supreme Court outlined the standard used to assess a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in a petition for habeas corpus. This framework provides the “clearly established Federal law” used to assess a state court’s decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 45 (2012) (per curiam). Under Darden, the first question of course is whether the prosecutor’s comments were improper. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 180 (noting that the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument “undoubtedly were improper”). In other cases, the Supreme Court has discussed whether certain types of statements by prosecutors are improper within the prosecutorial misconduct framework. Relevant here, prosecutors cannot inject their personal opinions into the case, particularly as to what the evidence shows and as to the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7–8, 17 (1985). The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence. Id. at 18–19; see also Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368, 378 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing Young as providing that “[i]t is patently improper for a prosecutor either to comment on the credibility of a witness or to express a personal belief that a particular witness is lying”). 3 3Although a deviation from Hodge (on which the district court substantially relied) cannot itself form the basis for habeas relief, since it is not clearly established Supreme Court case law, e.g., Ross v. Pineda, 549 F. App’x 444, 449 (6th Cir. 2013), our citations to Hodge and other Sixth Circuit cases are only for their helpful discussion of No. 19-1075 Stermer v. Warren Page 23 “Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also id. (“[W]hile [a prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”). The requirement that a prosecutor’s arguments be rooted in the evidence also means that the evidence must be accurately described. “Misrepresenting facts in evidence can amount to substantial error because doing so ‘may profoundly impress a jury and may have a significant impact on the jury’s deliberations.’” Washington v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689, 700 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646 (1974)). “For similar reasons, asserting facts that were never admitted into evidence may mislead a jury in a prejudicial way.” Id. (citing Berger, 295 U.S. at 84). But in assessing whether a defendant’s due process rights were violated, it “is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir. 1983), aff’d in part, 725 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated, 469 U.S. 1202 (1985) (mem.)). If a prosecutor’s comments were improper, the question becomes whether they “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id. (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643); accord, e.g., Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 640–41 (6th Cir. 2005). To decide this question, “the remarks must be examined within the context of the trial to determine whether the prosecutor’s behavior amounted to prejudicial error. In other words, the Court must consider the probable effect the prosecutor’s response would have on the jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly.” Young, 470 U.S. at 12. Though not an exhaustive list, the Supreme Court has discussed several factors to consider in making this assessment. For example, Darden mentioned the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the tactical context of the prosecutor’s statements, and whether the comments were invited by the defense’s own conduct. 477 U.S. at 181–83; accord Young, 470 U.S. at 12–13, 19–20. The nature and frequency of the improper remarks can also determine whether the defendant’s trial was rendered Supreme Court precedent (which can provide the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA), see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003). No. 19-1075 Stermer v. Warren Page 24 unfair. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 89 (“[W]e have not here a case where the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney was slight or confined to a single instance, but one where such misconduct was pronounced and persistent, with a probable cumulative effect upon the jury which cannot be disregarded as inconsequential.”). Again, these are just some of the factors the Supreme Court has considered, and Darden provides a “highly generalized standard for evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct.” Matthews, 567 U.S. at 49. Many decisions of this Court have relied on Darden’s breadth in denying habeas relief. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664. Some panels have gone so far as to say that under AEDPA, a federal court “cannot set aside a state court’s conclusion on a federal prosecutorial-misconduct claim unless a petitioner cites . . . other Supreme Court precedent [meaning other than Darden] that shows the state court’s determination in a particular factual context was unreasonable.” Stewart v. Trierweiler, 867 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2017) (first alteration in original) (quoting Trimble v. Bobby, 804 F.3d 767, 783 (6th Cir. 2015)). That said, cases like Young and Berger can provide this additional context, or else this circuit’s precedent would mean a habeas petitioner essentially could never prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim. See, e.g., id. (using Young to assess a prosecutor’s statements in closing argument); Cauthern v. Colson, 736 F.3d 465, 475–78 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding prosecutorial misconduct under Darden and Young); cf., e.g., Richardson v. Palmer, 941 F.3d 838, 848 (6th Cir. 2019) (assessing a prosecutorial misconduct habeas claim under Darden).
In reviewing prosecutorial misconduct cases on direct appeal, or on habeas claims where AEDPA deference does not apply, this Court has fleshed out the Darden standard by formalizing a two-step framework for assessing prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Bates, 402 F.3d at 641; Macias v. Makowski, 291 F.3d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2001). Under this framework, the reviewing court first determines (much like in Darden) whether the prosecutor’s conduct or statements were improper. Macias, 291 F.3d at 452. Then, the court assesses whether this conduct was “flagrant,” in which case it would violate the defendant’s due process rights. Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, No. 19-1075 Stermer v. Warren Page 25 1385 (6th Cir. 1994) (listing four factors used to decide whether prosecutorial misconduct was flagrant). The district court in this case looked beyond Supreme Court case law and applied the Sixth Circuit’s two-part framework. Stermer v. Warren, 360 F. Supp. 3d at 653–54. As the state argues on appeal, this was error. In Parker v. Matthews, the Supreme Court expressly held that the Sixth Circuit’s two-step “improper and flagrant” inquiry could not be used in cases where AEDPA deference applies. 567 U.S. at 48–49. This is because “circuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’ [and] therefore cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).4 The question under AEDPA is not whether the state court followed Sixth Circuit case law, but whether it reasonably applied binding Supreme Court precedent. Id.; Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 778–79 (2010). By assessing Stermer’s claim in the context of the Sixth Circuit’s framework, the district court applied the wrong test in this case. But in any event, this Court reviews the district court’s grant of habeas relief de novo. Satterlee, 453 F.3d at 365. Thus, we proceed to assess Stermer’s claim by applying AEDPA deference and looking only to whether the state court’s decision comports with Supreme Court case law on prosecutorial misconduct.5