Opinion ID: 695144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were the new hires permanent employees?

Text: 13 An employer meets its burden of proving that it permanently replaced its striking employees by show[ing] it had a mutual understanding with the replacements that they were permanent. NLRB v. Augusta Bakery Corp., 957 F.2d 1467, 1473 (7th Cir.1992). We will uphold the Board's finding of permanence vel non if it is supported merely by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole, but not otherwise. NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equip. Co., 626 F.2d 567, 573 (7th Cir.1980); see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491, 71 S.Ct. 456, 466, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). 14 In this case, rather than simply finding that the replacements were temporary, the Board found that the Company failed to meet its burden of proving their permanence. This raises the nice question whether we should reverse the Board only if we determine that there is no substantial evidence that the Company failed to meet its burden of proof concerning permanence or even if we determine merely that there is no substantial evidence that the employees were temporary, i.e., without regard to evidentiary burdens. In light of the compelling evidence in favor of permanence in this case, however, we need not resolve this question; under either approach, the Board's determination is not supported by substantial evidence. 15 There are five pieces of evidence in the present record that potentially bear upon the question of permanence: (1) a statement read to each replacement employee at the time he or she was hired; (2) a June 29 memorandum from the Company to its replacement employees; (3) the testimony of Ms. Wilma Chenault, a replacement worker; (4) the testimony of Mr. Gerald Tudor, a human resources manager at the Company; and (5) an April 29 newspaper advertisement for openings at the Company's Berea plant. The Board considered the first four in reaching its conclusion. 16 A Company representative read the following statement to each employee at the time he or she was hired: 17 You are being hired as full time associates, but understand this--Due to the seasonal nature of our business, it must be understood that as a new Associate your employment may be subject to lay-offs. Each time that you are recalled for work we will only estimate the duration of time work is expected to last as we can never be certain. 18 Each Associate currently on strike has the opportunity to return to work to an available job. Once they do this, their length of service and qualifications will be recognized for new openings and during reductions in the work force. Another possibility could be that if the Co. and the Union should renegotiate an agreement that allowed Union associates to return to work, the possibility exists that new associates may be layed [sic] off depending on the Company's manning requirements. 19 The Board found that this statement is equivocal with regard to whether the replacements are permanent hires, and we accept that assessment as a reasonable one. Although the statement indicates that the new associates could be laid-off in the event of a business slowdown or of a settlement with the Union, such conditions do not render an offer of employment non-permanent. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 503-04 & n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 3172, 3179 & n. 8, 77 L.Ed.2d 798 (1983) (That the offer and promise of permanent employment are conditional does not render the hiring any less permanent if the conditions do not come to pass. All hirings are to some extent conditional.) Hence, the statement does not clearly establish that the new hires are temporary. The Company points out that the new employees were being hired as full time associates but that suggests only that they were not being hired as part-time employees; it does not speak to the question of their permanence. The statement that each employee then on strike had the opportunity to return to an available job is also ambiguous. The quoted phrase might apply to the position being filled by the replacement or only to a position that has not yet been filled by a replacement when the striking employee offers to return--which is why both the Company and the Board invoke the hiring statement as support for their respective positions on permanence. Because the hiring statement provides no evidence in either direction, however, the Board had to look elsewhere, as do we, in order to determine whether the replacements were permanent or temporary hires. 20 In the June 29 memorandum, the Company advised its employees as follows: 21 (1) The Company has refused the Union's demands to replace all of the employees who crossed the picket line with strikers; (2) Every additional replacement hired means one less job for the strikers at the conclusion of the strike; and (3) [T]he Company has no intention to modify its position on ... not discharging or requiring Union membership of those who have been through so much to do the work. (emphasis in original) 22 The Board dismissed the June 29 memorandum in a footnote because it does not clearly state that the Company considered the replacements permanent, and it was not circulated until after replacements had been hired. 310 N.L.R.B. at 1290 n. 19. The latter point is irrelevant because the Board has in the past consistently relied upon such post-hiring statements as evidence of the replacement employees' permanence, see, e.g., Associated Grocers, 253 N.L.R.B. 31, 1980 WL 12561 (1980), enforced sub. nom. Transport and Local Delivery Drivers Local 104 v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 897 (D.C.Cir.1981) (relying solely upon post-hiring statement to change the status of replacement workers who, upon hiring, were told that they were temporary); J.M.A. Holdings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1349, 1993 WL 157817 (1993) (pointing both to hiring statement and to post-hiring statement as evidence that new hires were permanent replacements), and the Board has failed to give a reasoned justification for its apparent departure from the path it has worn. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 652, 655 (D.C.Cir.1992). 23 Worse, however, the Board's other reason for giving the June 29 memorandum short shrift--that it did not clearly state that the replacements were permanent--is unfounded in fact. The NLRB itself has not required an employer to have used the magic word 'permanent'  in order to establish that it indeed hired replacements as permanent employees. See Crown Beer Distributors, Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 541, 549, 1989 WL 224309 (1989). More important, the memorandum makes it abundantly clear that the replacement employees would not be replaced by returning strikers. Indeed, any replacement worker reading the memorandum could not have helped but to conclude that he or she was now a permanent employee. For the purpose of determining whether a striking employee is entitled to reinstatement, the promises made in the June 29 memorandum clearly establish the required mutual understanding that the replacement workers were hired permanently. See Augusta Bakery Corp., 957 F.2d at 1473. Consequently, unless the other evidence in the record undermines or countermands the Company's promise of permanence in the June 29 memorandum, the Board's conclusion that the Company failed to meet its burden of proof on this point is not supported by substantial evidence, at least with regard to any employee to whom the Company made the promises contained in the June 29 memorandum. 24 The only other evidence cited by the Board is the testimony of Mr. Tudor and Ms. Chenault. Mr. Tudor testified that some interviewees asked him what would happen if the strike ended, and that he told those who asked that there was a possibility ... that new hires could be placed on lay-off subject to [the Company's] manning requirements at the time. According to Mr. Tudor, he made this statement only to applicants who specifically asked him what would happen if the strikers returned, and there is no evidence in the record to indicate how many interviewees asked him this question. Nor is there any evidence in the record to suggest that Mr. Tudor made this statement to any employee hired after the circulation of the June 29 memorandum. Mr. Tudor's testimony thus does not undermine the promissory effect of the June 29 memorandum. 25 Ms. Chenault was questioned at the hearing about what Mr. Tudor told her during her hiring interview and what she understood him to mean; she was the only replacement employee so questioned. She testified: We was told, you know--we didn't know how long we was going to be there when we was a replacement. You know, just--till this was all over. In other words, Ms. Chenault understood Mr. Tudor to say that she was not being offered a permanent position. Ms. Chenault, however, was interviewed on May 3, well before the June 29 memorandum was circulated. Even if we were to assume for the moment that her testimony could establish that all of the replacements hired through May 3 were hired as temporary employees, therefore, it still would have no bearing upon the question whether the replacements were made permanent as of June 29. 26 The Board seems to recognize that the testimony of Mr. Tudor and Ms. Chenault is of marginal significance, stating only that [t]his is far from an unequivocal assurance that their employment was permanent. Fair enough, but the June 29 memorandum was such an unequivocal assurance, and the Board erred in discounting it. Moreover, the Board failed to consider further evidence supporting the Company's position: On April 29 the Company ran a newspaper advertisement stating that it was seeking applications for [o]penings for regular employees and informed potential applicants that the company benefits include medical insurance, paid vacations, holidays, and pensions. The clear implication, particularly of the benefits, is that the jobs were being offered not for temporary but for permanent employment, and applicants who responded to this newspaper advertisement would surely have so understood. 27 In sum, although we can overlook the Board's failure to give weight to the April 29 newspaper advertisement because its probativeness is at least debatable and it would be extremely difficult to ascertain which replacements saw it, we cannot do the same with regard to the June 29 memorandum; all employees to whom the company made the promises contained in that document became, without doubt, permanent hires. Accordingly, we reverse the Board's determination finding to the contrary for want of substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. 28