Opinion ID: 618982
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence Offered by Rossiello

Text: Rossiello, as lead counsel, sought $592.50 for each hour that he spent on Pickett's case. In support of this rate, Rossiello presented records from a 2008 Title VII case in which he received fees at an hourly rate of $620 and copies of settlements in similar cases in which he obtained rates between $540 and $585 in 2007. The exhibits attached to plaintiff's fee petition demonstrate a significant range in the size of the recent awards obtained by Rossiello: $260 per hour in 1996; $305 per hour in 1996; $320 per hour in 1997; $350 per hour in 1999; $375 per hour in 1999; $475 per hour in 2002; and $500 in 2003. In addition to his own affidavit, Rossiello produced affidavits from Richard Schnadig, Stephen Erf, and Vicki Lafer Abrahamson, who have each worked in employment law for more than 30 years. They offered their own hourly rates as support for the reasonableness of Rossiello's claimed rate of $580 to $620, and they stated that this rate is reasonable for someone with Rossiello's substantial experience and success in Title VII cases in Chicago. Schnadig and Erf asserted that the market rate for similarly experienced lawyers in their firms is $450 to $500 and $600 to $700, respectively. Abrahamson, a lawyer with less experience than Rossiello, stated her own rate as $550 for non-trial cases and noted that she would charge a higher rate for trial. The district court found little evidence to support Rossiello's claimed rate. The court acknowledged that certain evidence indicates more substantial rates in a handful of circumstances and that these affidavits, and the settlement agreements in 2007 and 2008, arguably support an award in the range Mr. Rossiello seeks, but the court expressed reluctance to approve that high rate here. We remind the district court not to set[] the amount of evidence required at a nearly unattainable level, People Who Care, 90 F.3d at 1311, but we conclude thatwith two exceptionsthe district court acted within its discretion in determining that plaintiff's evidence did not support Rossiello's claimed rate. A district court is entitled to determine the probative value of each [evidentiary] submission. Batt v. Micro Warehouse, Inc., 241 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir.2001). The fact that we might have weighed the evidence differently does not necessarily mean that the district court abused its discretion. Cf. Tomazzoli v. Sheedy, 804 F.2d 93, 97 (7th Cir.1986) (There is no one correct formula for determining a fee award. . . .). The highly deferential standard that we apply to the district court's determination of attorneys' fees counsels against disturbing the district court's determination here. We accord significant deference to the district court out of recognition that these disputes are essentially factual, that they do not need to be resolved in a uniform manner, and that we must avoid a second major litigation over fees. See Spellan, 59 F.3d at 645. Although plaintiff provided some evidence that supports the requested rate, it is undeniable that substantial evidence supports much lower rates. Many of Rossiello's fee awards, even after accounting for inflation, use lower rates. In Uphoff, we stated that, while evidence of fee awards in prior similar cases must be considered by a district court as evidence of an attorney's market rate, such evidence is not the sine qua non of that attorney's market ratefor each case may present its own special set of circumstances and problems. 176 F.3d at 408; see also Spegon, 175 F.3d at 557 ([A] district court abuses its discretion not when it declines to follow another court's determination of an attorney's reasonable hourly rate, but rather, when it dismisses that court's determination as irrelevant.). Here, the district court adequately considered the past fee awards as part of its determination of Rossiello's market rate and properly recognized the vast range of rates awarded. Similarly, the third party affidavits assert that Rossiello's requested rate is reasonable, but we have previously criticized third party affidavits that merely opine on Rossiello's market rate. See Batt, 241 F.3d at 895. We have indicated a preference for affidavits that actually provide evidence as to what the comparable attorneys charge for similar services. See id. The affidavits here do provide some support for a rate in the range requested by Rossiello but also provide support for a lower rate. The district court further acted within its discretion in discounting the probative value of the few hourly billing contracts presented since Rossiello did not submit proof that his clients had paid these amounts. We do note that, in contrast to the substantial evidence presented by plaintiff, defendant offered hardly any evidence in support of a lower hourly rate. Defendant's evidence consists only of citations to previous cases in which the court reduced Rossiello's hourly rate, as well as a comment from defendant's counsel that he charged his client less than $250 per hour for his work in this case. Had defendant submitted no evidence, the district court would have had to award fees at Rossiello's proposed rate. See People Who Care, 90 F.3d at 1313. Yet we have recognized that if a fee applicant can establish that his requested hourly rate is the `market rate' by reference to his prior fee awards, then we see no reason why a defendant cannot point to that attorney's past fee awards to suggest that a lower hourly rate should be awarded. Spegon, 175 F.3d at 556. [7] Thus, defendant's sparse evidence does satisfy its burden. There are, however, two evidentiary determinations that we conclude exceeded the scope of the district court's discretion. First, as noted in the previous section, the fact that the affidavits came from attorneys who do not receive contingent fees does not lessen their persuasive value. Plaintiff is not able to submit the best type of evidenceevidence of Rossiello's own billing ratebecause Rossiello does not typically bill by the hour. But plaintiff did produce what we have labeled the next best evidence, see Spegon, 175 F.3d at 555-56, and thus the court should not have disregarded the rates attested to in the affidavits on the ground that the attorneys do not earn contingent fees. Second, the district court erred to the extent that it reduced the hourly rate based on plaintiff's failure to introduce evidence of fee awards in contested cases that approach the rate requested here. We have expressly stated that [n]othing in the case law requires that a party show that the hourly rate they have requested has previously been disputed and upheld, however. Indeed, a previous attorneys' fee award is useful for establishing a reasonable market rate for similar work whether it is disputed or not. Jeffboat, LLC, v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 553 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2009). We are unable to determine what role the impermissible considerations played in the district court's reduction of Rossiello's hourly rate. Therefore, we remand to give the district court an opportunity to reevaluate the evidence consistent with our conclusions.