Opinion ID: 589770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of an Arrest Record

Text: 14 During closing argument, defense counsel stated: 15 And what do you find from the evidence and the background of Richard? Fairly normal existence. High school graduate, honorably discharged from the Army, became a policeman, etcetera, etcetera. Violence was not a part of his life. He was not what they call a sociopath ... [W]hat in this man's background and his history, arrest records, convictions, thefts, burglaries, crimes, what in his background would explain what he did? And the evidence is nothing. 16 (emphasis added). The prosecutor made the following comments in response: 17 Now, you know, Mr. Hogan goes on and on about this once so perfect guy who turned whatever and killed somebody. And he says, 'Well what is it in his background? What is it? The prosecution hasn't brought an arrest record. The prosecution hasn't brought in this information.' Mr. Hogan knows I can't do that. I'm not allowed to do that. 18 (emphasis added). 19 Quichocho claims that the prosecutor's comments were improper because they falsely suggested that Quichocho had an arrest record when he did not. In the alternative, Quichocho states that even if Quichocho did have an arrest record, the remarks were still improper because the prosecution may not say anything to the jury implying that evidence exists but has not been admitted into evidence. See United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir.1978). Quichocho further argues that the remarks were prejudicial and require reversal because they suggested involvement in prior crimes, which discredited the thrust of the defense. 20 A prosecutor's remarks in closing argument are reviewed for plain error in the absence of an objection by defense counsel. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 6, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1041, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). This court is authorized to correct only particularly egregious errors that affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982); United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936). Here, Quichocho failed to object to the prosecutor's comments and we must therefore determine whether those comments were particularly egregious under the Frady/ Atkinson plain error standard. 3 We conclude that because the comments were invited by defense counsel, they were not plain error. 21 In Young, the Supreme Court held that a defense counsel's conduct is relevant to the plain error analysis if it invited the prosecutor's response.[T]he issue is not the prosecutor's license to make otherwise improper arguments, but whether the prosecutor's invited response, taken in context, unfairly prejudiced the defendant. In order to make an appropriate assessment, the reviewing court must not only weigh the impact of the prosecutor's remarks, but must also take into account defense counsel's opening salvo. Thus the import of the evaluation has been that if the prosecutor's remarks were invited, and did no more than respond substantially in order to right the scale, such comments would not warrant reversing a conviction. 22 470 U.S. at 12-13, 105 S.Ct. at 1045. See also United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1104, 107 S.Ct. 1337, 94 L.Ed.2d 187 (1987). Here, defense counsel's comments concerning the non-existence of character evidence, including any arrest record, invited the response by the prosecution that he had not been allowed to introduce any such evidence. Taken in context, the comment did not unfairly prejudice Quichocho. Instead of falsely implying to the jury that a specific arrest record existed, the prosecution's comment merely rebutted defense counsel's suggestion that the reason the government failed to introduce negative character evidence is that none existed.