Opinion ID: 5855233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discovery decisions

Text: The district court limited discovery as to Boeing. We are loath to inject ourselves into such case management decisions absent compelling 9 Case: 18-31158 Document: 00516164985 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 No. 18-31158 reasons. We have examined the record closely on this and are left with uncertainties about the limitations. We explain. Discovery decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., HC Gun & Knife Shows, Inc. v. City of Houston, 201 F.3d 544, 549 (5th Cir. 2000). This court “will reverse a discovery ruling only if it is ‘arbitrary or clearly unreasonable,’ and the complaining party demonstrates that it was prejudiced by the ruling.” Id. (quoting Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1996)) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The Plaintiffs appeal the MDL court’s denial of their request for a six month’s reopening of discovery. At the time the magistrate judge for the MDL court denied the Plaintiffs’ request to reopen discovery, the suit had been docketed in the MDL court for years. The Plaintiffs had only named Boeing as a defendant in the preceding six months and had delayed serving their discovery requests and notice of deposition on Boeing until a little over a month from the close of discovery. Boeing argues that the Plaintiffs were “clearly given the chance to engage in meaningful discovery” and wasted that opportunity “over the course of five years of litigation.” Boeing also states that Plaintiffs’ efforts to reopen discovery are inappropriate because they have not been able to identify any “arbitrary or clearly unreasonable” action by the magistrate judge, that their notice of deposition was deficient, and the motion to compel discovery was filed “six months after the close of discovery.” The Plaintiffs explain their delay in joining Boeing as a defendant by arguing that Boeing’s alleged role at the MAF had only become apparent in documents received shortly before they added Boeing to the suit. Further, even though the Plaintiffs gave no explanation for their initial delay in serving discovery requests on Boeing after naming it as a party, they are correct that Boeing avoided turning over documents by filing various motions that 10 Case: 18-31158 Document: 00516164985 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 No. 18-31158 delayed discovery until dispositive motions had been decided after the scheduled close of discovery. We next summarize the motions. After the Plaintiffs served their discovery request and interrogatories, Boeing first filed a motion to dismiss, and then sought a protective order as well as a stay of discovery while the motion was pending. The MDL court then granted Boeing’s motion to dismiss on June 24. Discovery closed on June 30, 2013. The protective order/stay was then formally granted on July 22, 2013 because, although Boeing was dismissed at that time, the Plaintiffs had filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal on the pleadings. Upon reconsideration, the MDL court reinstated the suit against Boeing. When the Plaintiffs sought to reopen discovery and reconsider the deadlines pertaining to Boeing, though, their request was denied. In ruling on the discovery motion, the magistrate judge for the MDL court found the first set of discovery requests “overly broad and improper,” and based its denial on “the circumstances of the case.” Perhaps the magistrate judge was correct that the discovery that the Plaintiffs sought was overly broad, but at least some of what the Plaintiffs sought may have been outcome determinative. Prior to summary judgment, the Plaintiffs sought considerable written discovery from Boeing and attempted to depose a corporate representative. Included in their written discovery requests was information regarding Boeing’s contracts with NASA, Boeing’s role at the MAF, Boeing’s asbestos policies, documents related to asbestos at the buildings that Williams was alleged to frequent, and the identity of persons and organizations involved in asbestos-related activity at the MAF. At the time, Boeing characterized the requests as “overly broad and improper” and “unrestrained as to scope, time, and location such that they constitute[d] an egregious violation [of the district court’s discovery order.]” 11 Case: 18-31158 Document: 00516164985 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 No. 18-31158 Boeing is correct that the discovery requests are expansive. Some of the information, though, might have advanced the Plaintiffs’ case across two dimensions and may not have been available from other sources. First, evidence showing Boeing’s control of the relevant workspaces could have shown whether Boeing was responsible for installing or maintaining asbestos in the buildings that Williams was known to have frequented. Second, and relatedly, it could have decreased the uncertainty about Williams’s connection to Boeing by way of showing the extent of Boeing’s involvement at the MAF. Without knowing more about what was already available to the Plaintiffs by way of other parties or through discovery sharing tools set up by the MDL court, we do not know if denying the motion to reopen discovery was either “arbitrary or clearly unreasonable” or even if it prejudiced the Plaintiffs. To reverse this discovery decision, both must be true. If the Plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to seek discovery from Boeing and had no other means for acquiring information concerning Boeing’s relationship with the relevant buildings, they would meet this stringent test. In light of our conclusion that summary judgment was improperly granted, the district court will have the benefit of the holding we have already made about the evidence when re-evaluating the need for discovery. We REMAND to the district court to ascertain what responsive information the Plaintiffs could have reasonably accessed as part of the MDL and whether additional discovery is appropriate.