Opinion ID: 204051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Zoning Board Decision Was a Final Action under the TCA

Text: Cranston makes a novel argument that the zoning board's decision is not a final action by a State or local government under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) of the TCA. [4] We review the district court's decision de novo because it is an issue of law, Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir.1999), and we affirm. Section 332(c)(7) of the TCA, entitled Preservation of local zoning authority, allows state and local governments to apply their zoning regulations to the construction of wireless facilities, subject to five substantive and procedural limitations. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7); see also Nat'l Tower, LLC v. Plainville Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 297 F.3d 14, 19-20 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2002) (listing these limitations). It creates a federal cause of action: Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with those five limitations may sue in state or federal court within thirty days to enforce the TCA's provisions. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). Cranston implicitly concedes that zoning board decisions often would be final actions under the TCA. But it argues that a Rhode Island law permitting state court review of zoning board decisions creates an exception to that rule precisely because the statute limits the scope of court review and does not provide full court review of zoning board decisions. [5] Cranston argues that such limited review makes state court proceedings part of a comprehensive statutory scheme for state zoning decisions that is not final until after state court review finishes. Omnipoint rejoins that it did not need to sue in state court because the zoning board's decision was a final action by an instrumentality of a local government. The TCA does not define final action. The parties do not dispute the Cranston Zoning Board of Review is a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof. See Black's Law Dictionary 764 (9th ed.2009) (defining local government as [t]he government of a particular locality, such as a city); id. at 870 (defining instrumentality as [a] means or agency through which a function of another entity is accomplished, such as a governing body). When interpreting terms within the TCA, we consider its plain text and design, structure, and purpose. Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm'n, 184 F.3d 88, 101 (1st Cir.1999) (quoting O'Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir.1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Cranston Zoning Board of Review's decision falls within the usual meaning of final action set forth in the language of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The terms final and final action have special meaning in the law, and we assume Congress knew the content of background law when legislating. In re Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.2005). Generally a decision is final if it is concluded; that is, if it does not requir[e] any further judicial action by the court that rendered the judgment to determine the matter litigated and the decision can be appealed. Black's Law Dictionary 705 (9th ed.2009). The well-settled rule in administrative law is that a final agency action is one that mark[s] the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 478, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It means a final determination in a case by an administrative agency; that is, whether the agency rendered its last word on the matter. Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1889, 64 L.Ed.2d 525 (1980) (interpreting what is a final action by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act); accord Whitman, 531 U.S. at 478, 121 S.Ct. 903 (same). Only after an agency's final action may courts review the agency's decision. 5 U.S.C. § 704; Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 659, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007). A final action ... by a ... local government or any instrumentality thereof must be one that marks the consummation of the instrumentality's decisionmaking process. In this case there is no dispute that the zoning board is a discrete instrumentality of Cranston, separate and distinct from the Rhode Island Superior Court. The parties agree Cranston's zoning board had concluded its decisionmaking process before that instrumentality and could take no further action. The zoning board's decision was final. Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. City of Carmel, 361 F.3d 998 (7th Cir.2004), on which Cranston relies, undercuts Cranston's argument and supports our analysis. The court held a carrier's claim was not ripe because the carrier sued in federal court when it still had further recourse before the local zoning board. Id. at 1004-05; accord Nextel Commc'ns of Mid-Atl., Inc. v. City of Margate, 305 F.3d 188, 193-94 (3d Cir.2002). Indeed the Sprint Spectrum court observed that the carrier would not need to exhaust[] all state judicial remedies before bringing suit in federal court. Id. at 1001 n. 2. Cranston's reading would frustrate the TCA's overall statutory scheme and purpose. The Act stresses the need for speedily deploying telecommunications and seeks to get prompt resolution of disputes under the Act. Congress enacted the TCA to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies. 110 Stat. at 56 (emphasis added). Under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v), parties may sue within thirty days of a final action, and courts must hear and decide such action[s] on an expedited basis. To hold Omnipoint nevertheless needed to sue in state court would undermine the TCA's goals by imposing a new regulatory obstacle to providing consumers with wireless service. To the extent § 332(c)(7)(B)(v), read in light of its language, context, and purpose, could be thought to be ambiguous, the legislative history confirms that a zoning board's decision is a final action and Omnipoint did not need to seek judicial review under state law of that board decision. The House Conference Report defined a final action as a final administrative action at the State or local government level so that a party can commence action ... rather than waiting for the exhaustion of any independent state court remedy otherwise required. Telecommunications Act of 1996, H.R.Rep. No. 104-458, at 209 (1996) (Conf.Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223.