Opinion ID: 879577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The central jurisdictional issue is whether the District Court had the jurisdiction under § 70-30-111, MCA, to determine if the transmission line was a public necessity. The court ruled it had no jurisdiction to determine necessity since that determination had already been made by the Board of Natural Resources pursuant to the Major Facility Siting Act. The court stated that under §§ 75-20-301, -302, and -303, MCA, the Board was charged with determining the necessity of the facility before it could issue a certificate of environmental compatability and public need, such a certificate being required before the facility could be constructed. The court reasoned that the combination of those statutes and § 75-20-103, MCA, (providing that the Siting Act is to supersede all other laws) and § 75-20-407, MCA, (limiting the jurisdiction of courts to hear issues which would stop or delay construction of a facility) restrained it from determining the issue of necessity. The court thereafter issued a preliminary order of condemnation in favor of MPC. A general rule of statutory construction is that when several statutes may apply to a given situation, the construction adopted should be one which will harmonize the several statutes and, if possible, give effect to all. Section 1-2-101, MCA; Schuman v. Bestrom (Mont. 1985), 693 P.2d 536, 538, 42 St.Rep. 54, 57. In construing statutes, the intention of the legislature should be followed, if possible. Section 1-2-102, MCA. Our task here is to reconcile, if possible, the provisions of the Siting Act and the Montana Eminent Domain Act. In issue 6, the landowners contend that actions under the Siting Act and the Eminent Domain Act are separate and exclusive, and that MPC, having elected to file an action in eminent domain, must follow the procedure set forth under the Eminent Domain Act. MPC argues that portions of the Eminent Domain Act have been superseded by the Siting Act, and it need follow eminent domain procedure only to the extent it does not conflict with the Siting Act. The Siting Act and the Eminent Domain Act were enacted at different times, for different purposes. The eminent domain laws were first enacted in 1877 to authorize the taking of private property for public use. Section 70-30-101, MCA. The Siting Act, first enacted in 1973, was essentially an environmental law whose policy was to maintain and improve the environment while allowing controlled development of large energy facilities. Section 75-20-102, MCA. In terms of location and construction of these facilities, the Siting Act transferred the decision of where to route transmission lines from the utilities to the Board of Natural Resources and Conservation. Section 75-20-105, MCA. However, while the Siting Act provides the procedure for obtaining approval to construct a major facility, it does not provide a mechanism for the acquisition of specific tracts of property on which to build the facility. The property must be obtained through condemnation proceedings under the laws of eminent domain. When the right of eminent domain is invoked, the provisions of the law granting the right must be complied with. Madison Co. v. Elford (1983), 203 Mont. 293, 661 P.2d 1266, 1268, 40 St.Rep. 457, 460; Housing Authority v. Bjork (1940), 109 Mont. 552, 556, 98 P.2d 324, 326. MPC does not, as the landowners contend in issue 6, face an election of remedies in having to choose the procedure of either the Siting Act or the Eminent Domain Act. Rather, MPC must follow both laws in order first to gain approval for a transmission line and second to acquire the property upon which to build the facility. Before private property can be taken for a public use, a court must find that the plaintiff (condemnor) has shown the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the use to which the property is to be applied is a use authorized by law; (2) that the taking is necessary to such use; and (3) that an effort to obtain the property sought to be condemned was made by submission of a written offer and that such offer was rejected. Section 70-30-111, MCA. If the court finds and concludes from the evidence presented that the plaintiff has met the burden of proof under § 70-30-111, it must enter a preliminary condemnation order. Section 70-30-206(2), MCA. The primary disagreement between MPC and the landowners is over the interpretation of § 70-30-111(2). MPC contends the District Court has no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the taking of appellants' property is necessary to the public use (here, construction of a 161 kv transmission line), since the necessity for the transmission line and its location had already been determined by the Board in administrative proceedings under the Siting Act. MPC argues that § 75-20-407, which limits the jurisdiction of courts to hear controversies involving major facilities, was enacted to foreclose all court action which would delay construction of the certified facility. The landowners, on the other hand, contend strict compliance with eminent domain procedure is required, and that therefore they are entitled to be heard in District Court on the question of the necessity of taking their particular tract of property. Before turning to the due process issue of whether landowners have been given an opportunity to be heard, we will look at the specific question of whether §§ 75-20-103 and 75-20-407 affect the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear evidence on the necessity of taking a particular tract of property under the Siting Act. Other jurisdictions have had the opportunity to examine this question as it relates to location and construction of power lines across private property. While those jurisdictions do not have the equivalent of a Major Facility Siting Act, they do have specific statutory schemes which provide for location of electric transmission lines. The general rule is that where the legislature has delegated the power of determining the necessity of exercising the power of eminent domain to a private corporation or administrative agency, the corporation's or agency's determination of necessity is a political decision which is not subject to judicial review. In Re Bangor Hydro-Electric Co. (Me. 1974), 314 A.2d 800, 803; Otter Tail Power Co. v. Malme (N.D. 1958), 92 N.W.2d 514, 521; United States v. 277.97 Acres of Land (S.D.Cal. 1953), 112 F. Supp. 159, 162; see generally Annot., 19 A.L.R.4th § 8 at 1032 (1983). The corporation determining the location of the power line route is entitled to much latitude in its determination. Otter Tail Power Co., 92 N.W.2d at 521. Given the expertise and detailed knowledge of considerations involved in choosing a location for the power line, the route chosen by the corporation is given great weight under the law of eminent domain. Montana Power Co. v. Bokma (1969), 153 Mont. 390, 399, 457 P.2d 769, 775. The determination reached by the corporation or agency will not be overturned absent proof of arbitrariness by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; see also Otter Tail Power Co., 92 N.W.2d at 521; In Re Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 314 A.2d at 804; Northern States Power Co. v. Effertz (N.D. 1959), 94 N.W.2d 288, 291. Each of the above cited cases, while granting that the corporation has been legislatively empowered with the initial determination of location for a power line, pre-supposes that the landowner has the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence of abuse of discretion or bad faith on the part of the condemnor. By similar analogy, we find that our legislature has empowered the Board of Natural Resources to make the determination as to the necessity of a facility such as the 161 kv transmission line at issue in this case. Under the statutory scheme of the Siting Act, the Board must make findings as to the environmental compatability of (including land use patterns) and need for the facility before it can issue a certificate to MPC. Sections 75-20-301(2), 75-20-503, MCA. At the time the certificate is issued, an aggrieved party such as the landowners in this action may seek judicial review of the issuance of the certificate, alleging error in the location of the facility or in the procedure by which the choice was made. Section 75-20-406, MCA. The standards of judicial review are the same as those for a contested case under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA). Sections 75-20-406(2) and 2-4-704, MCA. Further, if some aspect of the Siting Act or certain conditions of the certificate are not being complied with by the agency or MPC, any resident of this state may bring an action in mandamus before the District Court of the First Judicial District, County of Lewis and Clark. Section 75-20-404, MCA. The foregoing administrative procedure, subject to judicial review, controls the general placement of the transmission line under the Siting Act. After the certificate is issued and has survived any challenges under judicial review, MPC has the right to construct its power line within a specific two mile wide corridor. The next step is the approval of a final centerline by the Board. When the final centerline is approved, MPC then may begin purchasing the specific property by means of negotiated settlement or condemnation. If MPC proceeds thereafter to acquire an interest in property in a condemnation action, it must file a complaint alleging the facts necessary to be found under § 70-30-111, i.e., that the taking of a specific tract of property is necessary for construction of its transmission line. The question then faced by the District Court is whether it is empowered to determine that the final centerline location adopted by the Board is necessary to the public use authorized by law. MPC's argument, adopted by the District Court, is that the court may not even hear evidence on the question of necessity. Its argument is based on the following three sections of the Siting Act: XX-XX-XXX. Chapter supersedes other laws or rules. This chapter supersedes other laws or regulations except as provided in XX-XX-XXX [not applicable here]. If any provision of this chapter is in conflict with any other law of this state or any rule promulgated thereunder, this chapter shall govern and control and the other law or rule shall be deemed superseded for the purpose of this chapter. Amendments to this chapter shall have the same effect. XX-XX-XXX. Jurisdiction of courts restricted. Except as expressly set forth in XX-XX-XXX, XX-XX-XXX, and XX-XX-XXX [not applicable here], no court of this state has jurisdiction to hear or determine any issue, case, or controversy concerning any matter which was or could have been determined in a proceeding before the board under this chapter or to stop or delay the construction, operation, or maintenance of a facility, except to enforce compliance with this chapter or the provisions of a certificate issued hereunder pursuant to XX-XX-XXX and XX-XX-XXX or XX-XX-XXX. XX-XX-XXX. Centerline location.