Opinion ID: 1896884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable Medical Certainty Claim

Text: Perkins' first claim on appeal is that, because the State failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court erroneously denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. Specifically, Perkins argues that the trial court should have granted his motion, because the medical examiner testified to a reasonable medical probability rather than to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the gunshot wound was the cause of Hawkins' death. This Court reviews de novo a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. The test is whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [1] In prior decisions this Court has found the terms reasonable medical certainty and reasonable medical probability to be legally interchangeable and indistinguishable. In Dutton v. State, [2] which also involved a first degree murder conviction, this Court addressed an argument identical to Perkins' and upheld the trial court's ruling that the use of the words `degree of medical probability,' . . . is sufficient under the circumstances. . . . [3] In Dutton we stated: In homicide cases, where the cause of death is not susceptible of explanation based upon common observation or experience, qualified medical experts after proper and sufficient examination of the body or remains of the deceased may give opinion testimony based upon such examination as to the probable cause of death, provided there are sufficient facts in evidence upon which to base the conclusion. [4] In Floray v. State, [5] we cited Dutton for that principle, and held: when an expert offers a medical opinion it should be stated in terms of `a reasonable medical probability' or `a reasonable medical certainty.' [6] The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also recognized that [m]any courts have held that for all practicable purposes the two phrases [i.e. reasonable medical certainty and reasonable medical probability] are synonymous. [7] In this case, Dr. Michael Caplan, the Assistant Medical Examiner, testified as to the cause and manner of Hawkins' death. He described the entrance and exit wounds of the single gunshot as well as the bullet's fatal trajectory, i.e., entering through the left back side of the skull and brain and exiting through the right side of the nose. [8] Dr. Caplan concluded that Hawkins had been shot from behind with a downward trajectory path from an indeterminate range. [9] The prosecutor asked the witness if he was able to determine the cause and manner of [Hawkins'] death to a reasonable medical probability. Dr. Caplan replied: My conclusion was that the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head with perforation of the skull and the brain and that the manner of death was homicide. [10] Dr. Caplan's testimony conformed to the Dutton standard. Because reasonable medical certainty and reasonable medical probability are interchangeable terms, no error could result by eliciting medical expert testimony couched in either term. Alternatively, Perkins contends that 29 Del. C. § 4707 [11] required the medical examiner to testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty in order for the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. That argument is unpersuasive. 29 Del. C. § 4707, which is titled Postmortem examination; autopsy reports, does not impose any such requirement with respect to a medical examiner's in-court testimony, nor has this Court so held. No part of the statute purports to establish a standard for a medical examiner's in court testimony concerning the cause of death. Testimony as to the ` probable cause of death' has been explicitly established as the standard for medical examiners in Delaware, but `certainty' has never been required. [12] For these reasons, Perkins' first claim fails.