Opinion ID: 196233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Analysis.

Text: B. Standard of Analysis. Congruent with these deferential standards of review, the analytic path to be traversed in a section 10(l) case is narrower than that typically travelled in the course of reviewing the grant or denial of preliminary injunctive relief. Indeed, in a section 10(l) case the judicial inquiry is only, or at least primarily, whether there is reasonable cause to believe a section 10(l) offense has been committed. Maram v. Universidad Interamericana de P.R., Inc., 722 F.2d 953, 958 (1st Cir. 1983). Other factors that ordinarily inform district court actions in respect to temporary injunctions are, at most, of secondary interest. See id. (concluding that the special importance that Congress attaches to section 10(l) offenses indicates . . . a strong presumption of irreparable harm, with the balance in favor of the charging party, and that the public interest favors the injunction). Hence, the method of analysis that governs appellate review of the propriety and scope of a section 10(l) injunction is best described as follows: First, the court must determine whether the Regional Director has reasonable cause to believe that the elements of an unfair labor practice are present. In this regard, the Director need only show the existence of credible evidence, even if disputed, together with reasonable inferences, which support [her] conclusions. . . . Second, the court must conclude that the legal theories relied upon by the Director are not without 10 substance. Finally, it must find that temporary injunctive relief is just and proper in terms of effectuating the purposes of the Act. Union de Tronquistas, 586 F.2d at 876 (citations omitted). Having stated the bareboned test, we next flesh out its three constituent parts. 1. Reasonable Cause. The centerpiece of the required
analysis is the supportability vel non of the Regional Director's determination that there is reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice has been, or is being, committed. The case law reveals two principles, in particular, that demarcate the meaning and the margins of this requirement. First, the Regional Director's evidentiary burden, whether measured quantitatively or qualitatively, is modest. Although courts phrase this principle in different ways, sometimes speaking in terms of the Regional Director's burden of proof, see, e.g., Hirsch v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 530 F.2d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1976) (characterizing burden as relatively insubstantial), sometimes speaking in terms of the quantum of proof, see, e.g., Gottfried v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Etc., 927 F.2d 926, 927 (6th Cir. 1991) (requiring only that the Regional Director bring forth some evidence in support of her petition), and sometimes speaking in terms of the probative value of evidence as opposed to its raw quantity, see, e.g., Union de Tronquistas, 586 F.2d at 876 (requiring that the Regional Director show the existence of credible evidence, . . . together with reasonable inferences, to support her 11 conclusions), the thrust of the decided cases is uniform: the Regional Director need not prove that the respondent has in fact violated the NLRA, but, rather, she need only make a minimal evidentiary showing of good reason to believe that the essential elements of an unfair labor practice are in view. The second principle that is germane to the reasonable cause inquiry is that genuinely disputed issues of material fact should be resolved at this early stage in favor of the Regional Director's exposition. See Maram, 722 F.2d at 958; Union de Tronquistas, 586 F.2d at 876; Kaynard v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1980). Put another way, in proceedings under section 10(l) the Regional Director must be given the benefit of every legitimate fact-based doubt. Thus, a reviewing court need not concern itself with resolving conflicting evidence if facts exist which could support the [Regional Director's] theory of liability. Fleischut v. Nixon Detroit Diesel, Inc., 859 F.2d 26, 29 (6th Cir. 1988). 2. Legal Theory. The next segment of the tripartite
analysis implicates the legal theory on which the Regional Director relies. The requirement is straightforward: the Regional Director's theory need not be irreproachable; it suffices if it is not without merit. Union de Tronquistas, 586 F.2d at 877. In other words, the Regional Director need not persuade the court then and there of her theory's ultimate validity, but she must show that the theory is presentable. See Hirsch, 530 F.2d at 302 (explaining that the legal theory upon 12 which the Regional Director proceeds must be substantial and not frivolous); see also Hoeber, 939 F.2d at 123-24 (quoting Hirsch with approval); see generally 8 Theodore Kheel, Labor Law 38.01[1], at 38-9 (1995).
3. Just and Proper. granted pursuant to section 10(l) must, by the terms of the statute itself, be just and proper. Both the purpose and the contours of this imperative are relatively well-developed. The purpose of the 10(l) injunction is to preserve the status quo in order that the ultimate decision of the Board would not be negated or rendered moot by intervening events. Compton v. National Maritime Union of Am., 533 F.2d 1270, 1276 (1st Cir. 1976). Thus, temporary injunctive relief, if otherwise warranted, passes the just and proper test as long as it comprises a reasonable means of ensuring the efficacy of the Board's final order, or preserving the status quo, or permitting administrative proceedings to go forward without undue hindrance, or preventing unjustified interruption of the free flow of commerce, or forestalling the repetition of unfair labor practices. See, e.g., Hoeber, 939 F.2d at 122; Gottfried, 927 F.2d at 927; Asseo, 900 F.2d at 455; Union de Tronquistas, 586 F.2d at 878. In this sense, the purpose of the section 10(l) injunction is simply a narrower, more specific expression of the purpose underlying preliminary injunctions in general. See, e.g., CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 48 F.3d 13 618, 620 (1st Cir. 1995) (The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, freezing an existing situation so as to permit the [ultimate trier of the issues], upon full adjudication of the case's merits, more effectively to remedy discerned wrongs.). Since a section 10(l) injunction may enjoin only those unlawful labor practices specified in the [NLRA], Hendrix v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 571, 592 F.2d 437, 445 (8th Cir. 1979), the form of the injunction must dovetail with the statutory goals. However, less is often better than more, and the relief granted should be narrowly tailored to that which is reasonably necessary to stop mischief, prevent additional harm, and ensure effective final relief. See Gottfried, 927 F.2d at 928; Potter v. Houston Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council, 482 F.2d 837, 841 (5th Cir. 1973).