Opinion ID: 2004047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the circuit court was acting erroneously within its jurisdiction

Text: DOC argues in the alternative that if the circuit court was acting within its jurisdiction, then it was acting erroneously within its jurisdiction by ordering it to transport Hurt. We agree. We begin our discussion by noting that Hurt's court dates have long since passed, and we are told that DOC conducted the transport pursuant to Judge Engle's order. Thus, in this respect, the specific transport order at issue is moot. Kentucky courts have long held that unless there is an actual case involving a present, ongoing controversy, the issues surrounding it become moot. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hughes, 873 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1994); Philpot v. Patton, 837 S.W.2d 491 (Ky.1992); In Re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 222, 262 Ky. 437, 90 S.W.2d 692 (1936). The exception to this rule is when a dispute is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Whether to apply the exception to the rule that a case will be dismissed when the issues are moot which we have recognized when the issues are capable of repetition, yet evading review, involves more than just an important public question that is difficult to review. Our courts do not function to give advisory opinions, even on important public issues, unless there is an actual case in controversy. The decision whether to apply the exception to the mootness doctrine basically involves two questions: whether (1) the `challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration and [2] there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subject to the same action again.' In re Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291, 293 (6th Cir.1988). Philpot, 837 S.W.2d at 493. Disputes involving the transportation of inmates are too short in duration to litigate prior to their expiration, and there is a reasonable expectation that the DOC will again be subject to a transportation order of this type. Accordingly, we believe the exception applies, and discuss the substantive issue of whether DOC or the sheriff of the requesting county is required to transport a DOC inmate held in a county detention center. KRS 441.510(2) provides as follows: (2) The transportation of any inmate housed in a county detention center whose court appearance is necessary in any other county shall be transported by the sheriff of the county where the trial or court proceedings are to be held. Where no specific definition is provided for terms contained in the statute, Kentucky law instructs that words of a statute shall be construed according to their common and approved usage.... In addition, the courts have a duty to accord statutory language its literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable result. Holbrook v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com'n, 290 S.W.3d 81, 86 (Ky.App.2009) (quoting Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com'n v. Jones, 809 S.W.2d 715, 716 (Ky.App.1991)); KRS 446.080(4). There are no specialized statutory definitions applicable to KRS 441.510(2). [3] As such, we apply the plain meaning of the language. By using the term any inmate, it follows that the statute refers to all inmates. By ordinary definition, Hurt is an inmate; he is an incarcerated convicted felon in custody of DOC. Moreover, he is housed in a county detention-center, that is, the Shelby County Detention Center. Further, his appearance was necessary in another county, Perry County, to answer for an indictment returned there. Under the foregoing circumstances, the statute mandates that the inmate shall be transported by the sheriff of the county where the trial or court proceedings are to be held. KRS 441.510(2) (Emphasis added). In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term `shall' is a word of command and ... must be given a compulsory meaning. Black's Law Dictionary 1233 (5th ed. 1979). Shall means shall. Vandertoll v. Commonwealth, 110 S.W.3d 789, 795-796 (Ky. 2003). It follows that the Perry County Sheriff, and not DOC, was required to conduct the transportation. The Court of Appeals' order is vacated to the extent it otherwise holds. We additionally note that the Perry County Attorney's argument that the statute should be construed to apply to only county prisoners and not DOC inmates because KRS Chapter 441 is entitled Jails and County Prisoners is without merit. KRS 446.140 states, in relevant part, that [t]itle heads, chapter heads, section and subsection heads or titles, and explanatory notes and cross references, in the Kentucky Revised Statutes, do not constitute any part of the law[.] It follows that the title of Chapter 441 is irrelevant to the interpretation of KRS 441.510(2). Similarly, the Court of Appeals' reliance upon KRS 196.030(1)(c) is misplaced. KRS 196.030(1)(c) provides as follows: [t]he department [DOC] shall, unless otherwise provided by law, exercise all functions of the state in relation to:... [t]he giving of assistance to other departments, agencies, and institutions of the state and federal government when requested by performing services in conformity with this section[.] (Emphasis added). Here, KRS 441.510(2) otherwise provide[s] by law that the Sheriff will transport DOC inmates housed in county detention centers to other counties for court appearances, and thus, by its own terms, KRS 196.030(1)(c) is inapplicable. We further note that [w]hen two statutes are in conflict, the more specific statute controls the general. Light v. City of Louisville, 248 S.W.3d 559, 561 (Ky.2008). Here, KRS 441.510(2) is more specific in comparison to KRS 196.030(1)(c), and thus the former prevails over the latter. In summary, the proper party to conduct the present transport, and the transport of similarly situated DOC inmates, is the sheriff of the requesting county, not the Department of Corrections. Thus, in issuing the transportation order to DOC, Judge Engle was acting erroneously, and the Court of Appeals similarly erred in its interpretation of KRS 441.510(2).