Opinion ID: 1439775
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expert Testimony Improperly Invaded Province of Jury

Text: Mindombe argued to the trial court that Dr. Davis' testimony was inadmissible because information regarding a child's reactions to sexual abuse was not outside the ken of an average lay juror. In response, the government argued that Dr. Davis' testimony regarding the behavior of abused children was information that is not readily within the realm of understanding of a lay person, and therefore, the expert testimony was properly admitted by the trial court. [6] To be sure, this court has previously recognized that expert testimony involving `the behavioral characteristics of child molestation victims,' . . . [and] the psychological dynamics of a victim of child sexual abuse' are beyond the ken of the average juror. Oliver v. United States, 711 A.2d 70, 73 (D.C.1998) (citations omitted). Because Oliver was a case of first impression to this court, we relied on two cases from other jurisdictions in reaching our decision. See Condon v. Delaware, 597 A.2d 7 (Del.1991); State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 864 P.2d 149 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1181, 114 S.Ct. 1227, 127 L.Ed.2d 571 (1994). In Condon, the Delaware Supreme Court espoused that: It is well within the knowledge of an average juror that any child who has not disclosed the whole truth of a story may in fact be fabricating part of the story. Yet the psychological dynamics of a victim of child sexual abuse . . . are generally not within the knowledge of the average juror. 597 A.2d at 14. Similarly, in Ransom, the Idaho Supreme Court deemed this type of expert testimony helpful because knowledge of common characteristics of sexually abused children gained from behavioral research very well may aid a jury in weighing the testimony and determining the credibility of the alleged victim. 124 Idaho at 710, 864 P.2d at 157. This court has likewise acknowledged the admissibility and usefulness of expert testimony with respect to the battered women's syndrome in Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 584 (D.C.1999), to explain the conduct of the complaining witness in response to the alleged battering. In Nixon, Judge Schwelb poignantly articulated the following as to the helpfulness of this type of expert testimony: Actions sometimes speak louder than words, and a lay juror might well wonder whether [the victim's] actions (and inaction) at the time of the alleged abuse were consistent with the narrative which she provided in the courtroom long after the events occurred. [Expert] testimony was designed to apprise the jurors of certain repeated patterns of behavior on the part of many battered women. With that information, the jurors were in a better position to determine whether these patterns of behavior might explain any perceived discrepancy between [the victim's] words and her deeds. 728 A.2d at 590. Certainly, testimony discussing the patterns and behavior of molested children by experts who have researched and worked with victims in this area serves the same useful purpose. Victims should be allowed the `opportunity to explain to a jury, through a qualified expert, the reasons for conduct which would otherwise be beyond the average juror's understanding.' Id. at 591 (quoting State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash.2d 263, 751 P.2d 1165, 1166 (1988)) (other citation omitted). [7] Although this court and others have approved of the admission of this type of expert testimony, it has not been without limits. Indeed, courts have allowed experts to testify regarding their observations of victims of abuse and the general behavior and conduct of persons belonging to such groups; however, courts have prohibited the introduction of ultimate conclusions by an expert witness as to the truthfulness of a witness, whether the person was in fact abused, and the guilt of the defendant. See id. at 592. In Condon, the court cautioned that: Experts in psychological dynamics . . . of victims of child sexual abuse are allowed to testify as to general tendencies. . . . However, while such experts are allowed to explain seemingly inconsistent behavior by victims in general, they are not allowed to provide statistical probabilities of truthfulness nor are they allowed to opine on the truthfulness of a particular complainant. 597 A.2d at 10. Likewise, in Ransom, the court expressed that allowing experts to state opinions as to the witness's credibility, or to vouchsafe for the accuracy of a victim's spontaneous recollection, or inaccuracy thereof, . . . might indeed usurp the jury's task of determining witness credibility. 124 Idaho at 710, 864 P.2d 149. In this case, Dr. Davis' testimony generally discussed the ability of children to sequence events, her observation that child victims of incest do not always promptly report such abuse, and that children, unlike adults, display a range of responses to abuse, including not visibly reacting. Clearly, Dr. Davis' testimony as to her observations of abused children was in line with the type of evidence deemed admissible by this court in Oliver and Nixon. In addition, the trial court properly limited Dr. Davis' testimony from making any ultimate conclusions as to whether J.M. was truthful or whether Mindombe had actually committed the crimes with which he was charged, consistent with our prior case law.