Opinion ID: 1651278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defense Witness Marjorie Sawyer

Text: In his third postconviction appellate issue, Stewart contends that the postconviction court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to statements made by defense witness Marjorie Sawyer during cross-examination. Stewart asserts that counsel should have objected to the underlined portions of the following exchange between the prosecutor and Sawyer. Q Was Mr. Stewart ever violent with you? A Yes.... Q Um, what did he do to you? A He hit me quite a few times and he beat me up a couple of times, choked me more than once in his drunken rages. And this would all happen when he kept trying for me to, umdon't know what happened to his daddy; and I didn't know. Q Did you ever have to go to the hospital? A Yes. Q Due to these beatings? A Yes, ma'am. Q Did Mr. Stewart ever tell you about any of his crimes that he committed in 1984 and 1985? A His crimes that he had Q Yes, ma'am? Adone? Well, I know he did a few B & E's or whatever while we were on the streets so, um, we could survive. Q Did he ever talk to you about the murder of Rueben Diaz or the murder, of, um, Mark Harris or any of the, um, of those violent crimes? A Um, I believe right after I came back home, he had mentioned to me that he thought he had killed someone; and he broke down. Andbut I don't know for sure, I don't know what happened and, um, he mentioned that; but then I don't quite know for sure, because he was totally mixed up half the time. Q And you didn't know what to believe? A Well, II did believe the way that hebelieved that he did hurt someone; and then after he was talking to, um, a person named Terry the street man that we know, um, they would talk a lot about this. But all I know isall I know is he says, Well, at one time hehe killed somebody and he says, I might do it again, I don't know. And I'm trying to get him calmed down about this; so I didn't really talk about killing anyone. During penalty-phase closing argument, the State mentioned that Sawyer testified that Stewart abused her, but the State did not refer to the uncharged burglaries or the comment that Stewart had claimed to have killed. During the evidentiary hearing, the State called Stewart's trial counsel, Robert Fraser. Attorney Fraser explained that he called Sawyer to testify because he believed she knew more about Stewart's life right before the murders than anyone else. Sawyer was able to testify about their employment and living situation, Stewart's use of alcohol, and Stewart's continuing fixation with and grief over his mother's death. Attorney Fraser testified that he thought Sawyer's testimony would help the jury understand the picture of a man whose childhood virtually destroyed his adulthood and would fit in well with Dr. Maher's diagnosis of PTSD. Attorney Fraser explained that he thought Sawyer's testimony that Stewart had a temper and was violent when drunk was consistent with his defense that Stewart was a dysfunctional human being due to his childhood. Similarly, attorney Fraser testified that he did not object to Sawyer's testimony about Stewart committing burglaries while homeless because the jury was already aware of other more serious collateral crimes and because the evidence fit the theme of the defense. Attorney Fraser testified that he could not remember making a conscious decision about whether to object to the comment that Stewart might kill again. The postconviction court denied the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because it concluded that Stewart did not prove prejudice. Because we agree that Stewart did not establish that he was prejudiced by the testimony, we do not decide whether reasonable defense counsel should have objected to the challenged portions of the cross-examination. The testimony elicited from Sawyer does not undermine confidence in Stewart's sentence. In the instant case, Stewart's violent and criminal nature was well known to the jury independently of Sawyer's testimony. In reference to the prior violent felony aggravating factor, the State informed the jury that besides the Diaz murder, Stewart had been convicted of another murder, two attempted murders, armed robbery, attempted robbery, and aggravated assault. Sawyer did not specify when Stewart commented that he thought he killed someone and might kill again. Thus, as the postconviction court notes in its order, the jury could have assumed that the comment occurred between the murders or attempted murders about which the State presented other evidence. The evidence of the prior convictions also informed the jury that Stewart was violent and willing to steal, regardless of whether Sawyer had testified about the domestic abuse and the burglaries. Given this context, the jury would not necessarily have been influenced by any improper aspects of Sawyer's testimony. Furthermore, during closing arguments, the State mentioned that Stewart was violent to Sawyer, but the State did not mention the other uncharged crimes or argue that the jury should consider Stewart's propensity for dangerousness. As a result, the jury was reminded of little of the now challenged testimony before its deliberations. Instead, the jury was expressly told that it should consider only three aggravating circumstances: whether the crime was committed while Stewart was under a sentence of imprisonment; whether Stewart had been previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; and whether the crime was committed for financial gain. These instructions channeled the jury's deliberations and mitigated the effect of any improper evidence. Cf. Anderson v. State, 18 So.3d 501, 517-18 (Fla.2009) (concluding defendant was not prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to object to prosecutor's inaccurate description of weighing process where trial court properly instructed jury on how to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors). In addition, Stewart does not explain how Sawyer's comments impacted the jury's recommendation of death, the sentencing court's weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, or this Court's conclusion that the death penalty was proportionate. In Owen, 986 So.2d at 553, a detective testified that the defendant had stated that he took advantage of [the victim's] shit because she wasn't that bad looking. On appeal, this Court determined that Owen could not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the testimony about an uncharged sexual battery because all four aggravating factors were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, independent of Owen's statements about the Manley sexual battery, and the trial judge found both statutory mental health mitigating factors and two nonstatutory mental health mitigating factors to be established despite Owen's account. Id. at 554. Similarly, in Stewart's case, the sentencing court's order does not reference any improper aggravation and found all of the mitigating factors proposed by the defense. And again, the sentencing court found that the circumstances properly underlying the prior violent felony aggravating factor were so egregious and so horrific that that factor alone far outweighed all of the mitigation presented. Given the sentencing court's conclusion regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors, trial counsel's failure to object to the evidence of other criminal acts does not undermine confidence in Stewart's sentence.