Opinion ID: 8203910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retroactive application of the tribal transfer statute

Text: ¶ 25. The above two-step analysis is prescribed by the statute in all cases involving such transfer requests, but in this particular case, there is an additional issue that requires separate consideration. ¶ 26. In granting the petition for review for this case, this court ordered that the parties address whether the facts that the case was pending in Brown County Circuit Court for nearly two years, and was pending at the time Wis. Stat. § 801.54 became effective, have any bearing on the applicability of § 801.54. Kroner has now argued that Wis. Stat. § 801.54 is not the applicable framework under which to analyze this case because it was not in effect at the time his claim was filed and does not apply retroactively. 9 Of course, the effective date does not control the determination of whether a rule applies to a case. As we have stated, The establishment of effective dates does not determine whether a statute will apply retroactively. All statutes have effective dates. Trinity Petroleum, 302 Wis. 2d 299, ¶ 38 (quoting Salzman v. DNR, 168 Wis. 2d 523, 530, 484 N.W.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1992)). This case, like Trinity Petroleum and Mosing v. Hagen, 10 the case the Trinity Petroleum court relied on, concerns a statute adopted by this court pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Wis. Stat. § 751.12 (authorizing this court to promulgate rules that regulate pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for the purposes of simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits). The question is then whether Wis. Stat. § 801.54 is retroactively applicable to a case such as this, where the case was filed before the rule took effect but where the circuit court ruled on a transfer motion brought after the rule took effect. Trinity Petroleum sets forth the governing rule. It makes clear that even for procedural (and therefore presumed retroactive) rules, there are still exceptions where the new rule diminishes a contract, disturbs vested rights, or imposes an unreasonable burden on the party charged with complying with the new rule. Id. As we stated in that case, citing precedent, This court's analysis in Mosing v. Hagen is particularly instructive in teaching that retroactive application of procedural rules is not absolute. Mosing held that a statute (that was adopted by the court through its rulemaking authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 751.12) applied retroactively unless it affected a vested or contractual right or imposed an unreasonable burden upon the party attempting to comply with the procedural requirements. Trinity Petroleum, 302 Wis. 2d 299, ¶ 54 (citations omitted). ¶ 27. There is little evidence on this record that would be relevant to this determination. An analysis regarding the rule's effect on any vested or contractual right or its imposition of any unreasonable burden is needed. Because there are facts that may be relevant to this determination, we remand for the development of the facts and the arguments on this issue and a determination by the circuit court as to the retroactive applicability of the statute.