Opinion ID: 463548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: uniform federal standard

Text: 24 The RLA does not contain a statute of limitations for actions such as the present combined claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and breach of the RLA's status quo provisions. Ordinarily, when Congress has not expressly provided a statute of limitations governing actions based upon a federal statute, the courts must apply the most closely analogous state statute. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1562-63, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981) (citing Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1112-13, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966)), overruled on other grounds, DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). 25 In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Supreme Court held that hybrid section 301/duty of fair representation claims under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 141-187 (1982), are to be governed by a uniform federal limitations period. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294. The Court reasoned that state legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind, and noted that the lengthy state limitations periods analagous to duty of fair representation claims (i.e., the three to six year period applicable to legal malpractice claims in most states) would frustrate the relatively rapid final resolution of labor disputes favored by federal law. Id. at 168 & n. 18, 103 S.Ct. at 2292 & n. 18. 26 The Court concluded that a more analogous limitations period was the six-month period specified in section 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b) (1982), which governs the bringing of an unfair labor practice charge before the National Labor Relations Board. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169, 103 S.Ct. at 2293. The Court opined that the need for national uniformity is greater in such a hybrid action than in an action for damages resulting from a breach of the collective bargaining agreement because a hybrid action involves  'those consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote--the formation of the collective agreement and the private settlement of disputes under it.'  Id. at 162-63, 103 S.Ct. at 2289 (quoting Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1111, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966)). The Court found that the six-month limitations period specified in section 10(b) properly accommodated the competing interests. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294. 2 27 Every circuit which has addressed the question has held that the same policies which led the Court to adopt a federal limitations statute for hybrid claims brought under the LMRA apply with equal force to similar actions brought under the RLA, which governs labor-management disputes in common-carrier industries. See, e.g., Dozier v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 760 F.2d 849, 851 (7th Cir.1985); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686, 689 (1st Cir.1984); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358, 363-64 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984); Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239, 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 512 (1984); Sisco v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 732 F.2d 1188, 1192-93 (3d Cir.1984). Although this circuit has not yet addressed the question, see Klemens v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International, 736 F.2d 491, 499 n. 7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 435, 83 L.Ed.2d 362 (1984), we have indicated in dicta that the distinction between actions brought under the RLA and those brought under section 301 of the LMRA is without import. Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation Co., 726 F.2d 560, 563 n. 6 (9th Cir.1984). 28 Although we recognize that the claim in the instant case is one step removed from a hybrid section 301/fair representation claim because it does not involve a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation, we are persuaded that a combined claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and breach of the status quo provisions of the RLA bears a greater similarity to the hybrid claim at issue in DelCostello than it does to the straightforward breach of collective bargaining agreement claim alleged in Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp. Unlike the claim in Hoosier but like the claim in DelCostello, the instant claim involves an agreement to submit disputes to arbitration. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162, 103 S.Ct. at 2289. Further, national uniformity is a more important concern in a case such as this which, like DelCostello, implicates the consensual processes which labor law was designed to promote: it raises questions regarding the appropriate terms and conditions to be maintained under the RLA's status quo provisions during the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 162-63, 103 S.Ct. at 2289. Finally, as discussed in detail infra, section IV C, the present action more closely resembles an action founded upon violation of a federal statute than it does an action for breach of contract. Therefore, we believe that the Court's reasoning in DelCostello governs the case before us, and we conclude that federal law, not state law, is the source of the limitations period applicable to a combined claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and violation of the RLA's status quo provisions. 29 There are two federal statutes of limitations which may apply to the instant case: the six-month period of section 10(b) of the NLRA or the two-year period provided in the RLA for suits challenging the decisions of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 First (r) (1982). Because the IAM's second action was filed more than six months but less than two years after Aloha gave notice that it would continue to implement the terms of the Interim Agreement, we must decide which federal limitations period governs. Cf. Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d at 689 (declining to choose between two-year period and six-month period because action was time-barred under either statute). 30 The IAM's suggestion that the applicable period is the two-year period specified in section 153 First (r) of the RLA is meritless. On its face, the two-year limitations period of section 153 is applicable only to actions to review an award of the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB). Section 153 governs the establishment, composition, powers and duties of the NRAB, which has jurisdiction over disputes between common carriers and their employees. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 First (h). Subsection First (q) provides that employees or carriers aggrieved by the terms of an NRAB award or by the NRAB's failure to make an award in a dispute referred to it, may file an action in federal court for review of the NRAB's order. Subsection First (r) of the statute provides: All actions at law based upon the provisions of this section shall be begun within two years from the time the cause of action accrues under the award of the division of the Adjustment Board, and not after. (emphasis added). 31 Furthermore, the nature of judicial review of an NRAB order is very different from that appropriate to actions for breach of a federal statute. NRAB awards are reviewed under a narrow standard of review. See 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 First (q); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 93, 99 S.Ct. 399, 402, 58 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978) (per curiam). Where an NRAB award exists, the award provides sufficient information for the reviewing court to exercise the requisite narrow scope of review. In contrast, the dispute in the instant case was never referred to the NRAB and no award was made. Indeed, the dispute was a major dispute concerning the formation of a collective bargaining agreement or efforts to secure new rights and incorporate them into future agreements, and binding arbitration was not available. IAM v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 776 F.2d at 815-16; cf. Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 268 F.Supp. 210, 213 (W.D.Va.1967) (two-year limitations period in section 153 of the RLA is applicable to airline industry dispute where dispute was a minor dispute already submitted to and resolved by the System Board of Adjustment). Therefore, the two-year limitations period contained in section 153 of the RLA is not applicable to the instant action. See Sisco v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 732 F.2d at 1193-94 (two-year period in section 153 of the RLA is not applicable to duty of fair representation claim under RLA). 32 We agree with Aloha that the limitations period applicable to a combined claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and breach of the status quo provisions of the RLA is the six-month period contained in section 10(b) of the NLRA. In Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 768 F.2d 914 (7th Cir.1985), the Seventh Circuit held that an action for damages and injunctive relief based upon a combined claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and for breach of RLA Sec. 152 First (duty to bargain in good faith) and RLA Sec. 156 (obligation to provide advance notice of any unilateral change in working conditions), was governed by the sixmonth period in NLRA Sec. 10(b). Id. at 919. The court reasoned that because a refusal to bargain is a classic unfair labor practice, the analogy to section 10(b) is stronger than in a duty of fair representation case. Id. The court stated that although two different sections of the RLA were invoked in the complaint, they covered the same ground because a refusal to bargain consists in unilaterally--that is, without negotiations, without bargaining--altering the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 920. See also Robinson v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 777 F.2d 84, 85-89 (2d Cir.1985) (court found that the same considerations which led the Supreme Court to apply the section 10(b) time limitation to fair representation actions are involved in claim alleging discharge for pro-union activities, brought under RLA Sec. 2, Fourth). 33 The instant case likewise involves a refusal to bargain. Aloha refused to reinstate the terms of the Basic Agreement on the reinstatement date specified in the Interim Agreement without negotiations or bargaining. Therefore, the most analogous federal limitations period is the section 10(b) period applicable to unfair labor practice charges.