Opinion ID: 2831306
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suit against the governmental unit

Text: If a plaintiff elects to sue a governmental unit for harm that its employee tortiously caused, then subsection (a), which addresses “a suit under this chapter against a governmental unit,” applies. TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 101.106(a). Under subsection (a), the plaintiff who elects to sue the governmental unit cannot later decide to sue the employee: the decision to sue the governmental unit “constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit 6 or recovery by the plaintiff against any individual employee of the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter.”5 Id. B. Suit against both the governmental unit and its employee If a plaintiff elects to sue both a governmental unit and its employee, then subsection (e), which addresses a suit “under this chapter against both a governmental unit and any of its employees,” applies. See TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 101.106(e). Subsection (e) does not necessarily prohibit a suit from proceeding against both defendants, but if the governmental unit files a motion to dismiss the claims against the employee, those claims “shall immediately be dismissed.” Id. Subsection (e) thus “protect[s] governmental employees by favoring their early dismissal when a claim regarding the same subject matter is also made against the governmental employer.” Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 657. Upon the dismissal of the employee, the governmental unit remains as the only defendant. C. Suit against the government employee Finally, as in the present case, a plaintiff may elect to sue only a government employee. Unlike a suit against a governmental unit, a suit against a government employee does not necessarily reflect that the plaintiff has decided whether the employee was acting within or outside the scope of employment. The plaintiff may sue the employee in the employee’s official capacity (thus implicating the governmental unit’s vicariously liability) or in the employee’s individual capacity (thus seeking to hold the employee personally liable) or in both capacities. 5 Similarly, under subsection (c), the settlement of such a claim will “immediately and forever bar the claimant from any suit against or recovery from any employee of the same governmental unit regarding the same subject matter.” Id. § 101.106(c). 7
Regardless of the capacity allegations, when the plaintiff chooses to sue the government employee, then subsection (b), which addresses “a suit against any employee of a governmental unit,” applies. See TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 101.106(b). As a corollary to subsection (a), subsection (b) provides that a plaintiff who chooses to sue a government employee cannot later decide to sue the governmental unit: the decision to sue the employee “constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter.” Id. Unlike subsection (a), however, subsection (b) provides an exception: a plaintiff who sues a government employee cannot sue or recover from the governmental unit “unless the governmental unit consents.” Id. (emphasis added). Because “the manner in which the government conveys its consent to suit is through the Constitution and state laws,” we held in Garcia that the exception applied and subsection (b) did not bar claims against a governmental unit when the Legislature had “consented to suits” by waiving immunity under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. See Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 660. Thus, the “consent” that provides an exception to subsection (b)’s bar includes statutory waivers of immunity, “provided the procedures outlined in the statute have been met.” Id.
When a plaintiff elects to sue a government employee, subsection (f) may also apply. Subsection (f) applies when a suit “is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct within the general scope of that employee’s employment and if it could have been brought 8 under this chapter against the governmental unit.” TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 101.106(f). We have held that “any tort claim against the government is brought ‘under’ the Act for purposes of section 101.106, even if the Act does not waive immunity” for that claim. Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 375 (Tex. 2011). Thus, while subsection (b) applies to all suits against a government employee, subsection (f) applies only when the government employee “acted within the general scope of his employment and suit could have been brought under the Act—that is, his claim is in tort and not under another statute that independently waives immunity.” Id. at 381. As the Court has previously explained, “section 101.106(f)’s two conditions are met in almost every negligence suit against a government employee,” so employee-defendants are usually entitled to dismissal upon the filing of a motion. See Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 381. The parties agree that subsection (f) applies to the present case. Thus, this suit is “considered to be against the employee in the employee’s official capacity only.” TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 101.106(f). If the employee moves to dismiss under subsection (f), the trial court “shall” grant the employee’s motion and dismiss the plaintiff’s suit against the employee “unless the plaintiff files amended pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the governmental unit as defendant on or before the 30th day after the date the motion is filed.” Id. § 101.106(f). If the plaintiff timely files amended pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the governmental unit as defendant, the suit will proceed only against the governmental unit. The plaintiff may, however, decline to amend the pleadings in response to a motion to dismiss under subsection (f). The employee’s assertion that the suit is based on conduct within the scope of the employee’s employment does not make it so. The issue of whether the complained-of 9 conduct occurred within the scope of employment will not have been finally adjudicated when the plaintiff decides whether to dismiss the employee and sue the governmental unit instead. As we noted in Franka, once an employee files a motion to dismiss under subsection (f), the plaintiff has thirty days to decide “whether to acquiesce and sue the government instead,” and the statute does not mandate that the trial court rule on the motion within that time. 332 S.W.3d at 380. There may be fact issues that a jury must resolve to establish whether the conduct at issue was within the scope of employment. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 757 (Tex. 2007) (concluding as a matter of law that employee was not within scope of employment when there was “no conflicting evidence or conflicting set of inferences to raise a genuine issue of material fact”). And even if the trial court rules on a subsection (f) motion within thirty days, the ruling is subject to review on appeal. Cf. Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 380 (observing that “[e]ven if the plaintiff obtained the trial court’s ruling [on waiver of immunity] before having to decide whether to dismiss the employee, there would be no assurance that the ruling would be upheld on appeal, especially after the issue was relitigated with the government.”). This means that, after an employee files a motion to dismiss under subsection (f), a plaintiff is faced with the same choice he otherwise faces under subsections (a) and (b) when he first files suit: he must choose a single avenue of recovery—against the government or the employee—at a time when there may be uncertainty as to which avenue of recovery is the right one under the facts of the case. Subsection (f), like the election-of-remedies provision as a whole, forces a Tort Claims Act plaintiff to decide early whether the government employee acted within the scope of 10 employment, and makes the plaintiff, rather than the governmental unit or its employee, bear the consequences if the decision is wrong.