Opinion ID: 48990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Garcia-Esparza's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: 102 Garcia-Esparza contends that his trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance of counsel because (1) he failed to move for a mistrial after Adame's testimony, and (2) he failed to argue effectively against the district court's decision to sentence Garcia-Esparza to 720 months, as recommended in his Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSR).
103 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that (1) his counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance was prejudicial. 10 To satisfy the first prong, the defendant must demonstrate that the alleged errors were so serious that the assistance was below the constitutional minimum guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, as measured under an objective standard of reasonableness. 11 To satisfy the second prong, the defendant must show that his counsel's performance prejudiced him to such an extent that the trial or sentencing was fundamentally unfair or unreliable and that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. 12 104 Our review is highly deferential to counsel and presumes that counsel's assistance was adequate. 13 Moreover, we will not resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal when the defendant fails to raise the issue in the district court, except when a well developed record exists. 14
105 Our review of the record convinces us that the performance of Garcia-Esparza's trial counsel was not deficient. As to Adame's testimony, immediately after Valles' counsel orally moved for a mistrial, the district court considered the mistrial motion as having been made by each defendant and then denied it as to each defendant. It would have been redundant and pointless—and not conceivably a constitutional violation—for Garcia-Esparza's trial counsel to move personally for a mistrial. 106 As for sentencing, it is entirely unclear what Garcia-Esparza contends was deficient. In his appellate brief, the totality of his argument consists of the following: Appellant's counsel failed to argue effectively the judge's adherence to the PSR. The PSR called for 720 months instead of the range above noted, 352 to 425 months. This claim simply lacks the requisite specificity needed for appellate review, as it is unknown what Garcia-Esparza claims to be error. 107 The most that we can decipher is that Garcia-Esparza takes issue with the district court's factual finding that he was responsible for the distribution of over 150 kilograms of heroin and 30 kilograms of cocaine. To the extent that this is Garcia-Esparza's argument, we note that his trial counsel objected in-depth to the factual findings in the PSR, both to the probation officer—who relayed the objections to the district court prior to the sentencing hearing—and to the district court during the sentencing hearing. One of his objections asserted that the PSR incorrectly calculated the Guidelines range, claiming that it should have been 352 to 425 months, because the district court incorrectly found that Garcia-Esparza was responsible for the distribution of over 150 kilograms of heroin and 30 kilograms of cocaine, rather than the 1.6 kilograms of heroin and 2.3 kilograms of cocaine advocated by Garcia-Esparza. The district court considered Garcia-Esparza's objections prior to the sentencing hearing, afforded trial counsel an opportunity to argue the objections orally at the sentencing hearing, and then denied the objections. We cannot see how the actions of Garcia-Esparza's trial counsel were deficient in any way. 108 If perchance this is not Garcia-Esparza's argument of ineffective assistance at sentencing, we rule that his argument was waived for inadequate briefing. 15