Opinion ID: 1537722
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense Decision Debate

Text: A criminal defendant has authority over certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal. [3] Counsel, however, bears principal responsibility for the conduct of the defense. [4] In particular, counsel has the responsibility for determining what arguments to pursue, [5] and what defenses to develop. [6] According to the State, its petition presents one question: in the event of an irreconcilable disagreement between defense counsel and the defendant about a decision to seek a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, do the defendant's wishes prevail? The State is asking this Court to place the decision to pursue a mental illness defense in the category of issues upon which only the defendant can decide. Although the State has been unable to find any controlling precedent that is exactly on point, it makes an argument based upon Delaware Professional Conduct Rule 1.2, Scope of Representation, which states the following: (a) [A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued . . . In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. Thus, Rule 1.2 expressly provides that the client is the ultimate decision maker as to whether to enter a plea, waive a jury trial or testify at trial. [7] The State argues that pursuit of a GBMI verdict is the functional equivalent of a plea of guilt with a request for mitigation of the nature of his sentence (death) or the manner it is to be served (partially in a mental facility . . . ). In response to that argument, Cooke's attorneys assert the United States Supreme Court held in Florida v. Nixon that a concession of guilt is not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. [8] In Nixon, the Supreme Court distinguished a concession of guilt from a guilty plea as follows: Despite [defense counsel's] concession, Nixon retained the rights accorded a defendant in a criminal trial. CF. Boykin, 395 U.S. [238] at 242-243 and n. 4, 89 S.Ct. 1709[, 23 L.Ed.2d 274] (a guilty plea is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts, it is a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution need be advanced). The State was obliged to present during the guilt phase competent, admissible evidence establishing the essential elements of the crimes with which Nixon was charged. . . . Further, the defense reserved the right to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution and could endeavor, as [defense counsel] did, to exclude prejudicial evidence. See supra, at 558. In addition, in the event of errors in the trial or jury instructions, a concession of guilt would not hinder the defendant's right to appeal. [9] In Nixon, the defense attorney conceded guilt and then presented evidence of mental illness during the penalty phase with the goal of avoiding a death sentence. He consulted several times with his client but never obtained explicit consent to conduct the defense in this manner. [10] Because the prosecution was still required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the United States Supreme Court held that conceding guilt during the guilt phase of a capital murder trial was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. [11] Cooke's defense counsel submit their position is strengthened by the Supreme Court's ruling in Nixon because, unlike the attorney in that case, they will not concede that Cooke is guilty. Moreover, Cooke's attorneys assert that a GBMI verdict is an alternative that will only be reached by the jury if they are persuaded that the State has met its burden of proof. In Wainwright v. Sykes , the United States Supreme Court held that the attorney possesses the right to decide certain strategic and tactical decisions, including what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what trial motions should be made, and what evidence should be introduced. [12] Based on Wainwright, Cooke's counsel assert that the decision to present evidence of mental illness at Cooke's trial is a tactical one solely within their province. Cooke's defense counsel argue that the principle that the attorney is the one who chooses whether to pursue a mental health defense was solidified by the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Nixon . [13]