Opinion ID: 2588382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: S.A. 60-308(b)(2)Tortious Act Within the State

Text: The Court of Appeals assumed that K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) would apply because antitrust violations are generally recognized to be torts. Merriman, slip op. at 7. The defendants argue that K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) cannot provide the basis for specific jurisdiction for two reasons: (1) because the alleged tortious act did not occur in Kansas and (2) because price fixing is not a tortious act. The defendants recognize this court has held that when an injury occurs in this state as a result of a negligent act outside the state, the tortious act provision of the long arm statute will support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Ling, 237 Kan. at 632-33, 703 P.2d 731. The Ling court reasoned: [T]he `tortious act' is not complete until the injury has occurred. In other words, the `tortious act' is deemed to have occurred in the state where the injury occurs. 237 Kan. at 633, 703 P.2d 731. Contrary to the holding of Ling, the defendants contend that, under the facts of this case, any tortious act was necessarily completed, not when plaintiff sustained economic injury, but when the defendants sold price-fixed chemicals to the manufacturer (outside Kansas) who made the plaintiff's tires. The defendants contend that a contrary conclusion would mean that any tort which has economic ramifications in Kansas is subject to the jurisdiction of the Kansas courts. The defendants argue that Ling's holding should be limited to situations where physical injury occurs in this state as the result of a tortious act occurring outside the state. The defendants point out that the tortious act provision of the Kansas long arm statute was based upon the tortious act provision of the Illinois long arm statute (see Woodring v. Hall, 200 Kan. 597, 600, 438 P.2d 135 [1968]) and that the Illinois Supreme Court has refused to extend long arm jurisdiction based on a tortious act outside the state which causes only economic injury within the state. See R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs, 111 Ill.2d 304, 312, 95 Ill.Dec. 496, 489 N.E.2d 1360 (1986); Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp., 86 Ill.2d 431, 437-39, 56 Ill.Dec. 657, 427 N.E.2d 1203 (1981). However, several cases applying Kansas law have not made any distinction between physical and economic injury. See Dazey Corp. v. Wolfman, 948 F.Supp. 969, 973 (D.Kan.1996) (exercise of personal jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-308[b][2] proper where plaintiff's financial loss, allegedly caused by defendant's fraudulent conduct, occurred in Kansas); National Gypsum Co. v. Dalemark Industries, Inc., 779 F.Supp. 147 (D.Kan. 1991); Loeffelbein v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP, 33 Kan.App.2d 593, 598, 106 P.3d 74, rev. denied 280 Kan. ___ (2005). There is no persuasive reason not to adopt the view of these cases. The legislature did not make application of K.S.A. 60-308(b) dependent upon the nature of the injury. Jurisdiction can be obtained under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) if either physical or economic injury occurs in the state as a result of a negligent act outside the state. The defendants also argue that price fixing is not a tortious act because, at common law, while some antitrust violations were recognized as torts, other antitrust violations such as price fixing were not. In support, the defendants cite a law review Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Suits, 63 Cornell L.Rev. 682, 692-97 (1978), which opines that whether a particular antitrust suit sounds in tort depends on the nature of the violation and argues that price-fixing actions more closely resemble quasi-contract than tort. The defendants also cite several cases which have refused to recognize price-fixing as a tort. See, e.g., Free v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 164 F.3d 270, 273-74 (5th Cir.1999) (declining to recognize tort cause of action for price fixing in violation of Louisiana antitrust laws where neither Louisiana Supreme Court nor legislature had done so); Four B Corp. v. Ueno Fine Chemicals Industry, Ltd., 241 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1262 (D.Kan.2003) (in price-fixing case, finding plaintiffs had provided no legal support for their contention that a violation of Kansas antitrust laws constitutes tortious behavior); Indiana Grocery Co. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 684 F.Supp. 561, 584 (S.D.Ind.1988) (no Indiana precedent establishes price fixing or predatory pricing as a tort); see also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311 (1940) (prior to Sherman Act, agreements to fix prices gave rise to no actionable wrong). According to the defendants, the cases cited by the plaintiff stand only for the premise that antitrust actions in general are tort actions, or that certain kinds of antitrust violations or other wrongs, other than price fixing, constitute torts. See, e.g., Williams Elec. Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 854 F.2d 389, 394 (11th Cir.1988) (antitrust violations do encompass some business torts including negotiation and execution of contracts that violated antitrust laws); Bangor Punta Operations v. Universal Marine Co., 543 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir.1976) (violation of Lanham Acttrademark infringementconstitutes federal tort of unfair competition); Albert Levine Associates v. Bertoni & Cotti, 314 F.Supp. 169, 171 (S.D.N.Y.1970) (violation of Clayton Actgroup boycottis a tort); McDonald v. Amtel, Inc., 633 P.2d 743 (Okla. 1981) (cause of action under state antitrust statute is tortious rather than contractual in nature). However, the Illinois courts have held that the term tortious act as used in their long arm statute is not limited to those acts which constituted torts at common law. Rather, it encompasses any act that constitutes a breach of duty to another imposed by law. Florendo v. Pan Hemisphere Transport, Inc., 419 F.Supp. 16, 17 (N.D.Ill.1976). Furthermore, there are a few cases, not cited by either party, which have held that price-fixing actions involve the infliction of tortious injury and that injury occurs at the place of sale because the consumer is injured when he or she pays the artificially inflated price. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 105 F.Supp.2d 618, 675 n. 29 (E.D.Mich.2000) (plaintiffs alleged conspiracy to restrain trade, reduce competition and fix prices; court accepted argument that antitrust injuries, by their nature, involve infliction of tortious injury, . . . and that . . . `the place of injury from a price-fixing conspiracy is the place of sale, since the consumer is injured at the time he pays the artificially inflated price'); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Anti-trust Litigation, 525 F.Supp. 1265, 1274 (D.Md.1981). Another such case, Hitt v. Nissan Motor Company, Ltd., 399 F.Supp. 838, 847-48 (S.D.Fla.1975), explained the policy reasons in favor of applying the tortious act provisions of state long arm statutes to a price-fixing conspiracy: [L]ike a defective product, the injury within the forums which could result from a price fixing conspiracy by a manufacturer, its distributor and franchised dealers, is certainly foreseeable even though such injury is only of a pecuniary nature. It is a distinction without merit that a products liability injury arises out of the use of the product because injury as a result of a price fixing conspiracy is incident to the transaction of sale itself. The buyer who pays higher prices due to such a conspiracy is injured at the time such sale is consummated. The analogy is obvious. From a policy point of view an even greater reason can be envisioned for reaching a manufacturer in a case such as the present oneevery buyer of such a `tainted' product is injured and thus the injury is widespread whereas injuries due to defective products are generally relatively rare in proportion to the total number of a given product sold. This reasoning is persuasive. We hold that a price-fixing conspiracy may be a tortious act under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2). Additionally, we must consider the plaintiff's contention that, under a conspiracy theory of jurisdiction, if personal jurisdiction exists over one defendant pursuant to K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2), jurisdiction exists over all of the defendants. K.S.A. 60-308(b) provides jurisdiction over any person who in person or through an agent or instrumentality does any act falling under the provisions of the long arm statute. Thus, if one conspirator commits acts in Kansas in furtherance of the conspiracy and that conspirator falls under the act, jurisdiction can be obtained as to all conspirators. See Professional Investors Life Ins. Co., 445 F.Supp. 687. This method of acquiring personal jurisdiction pursuant to long arm statutes has been adopted by a majority of courts. Courts have used the civil conspiracy theory to assert jurisdiction over [those] whom jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking. In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litigation, 92 F.R.D. 398, 411 (E.D.Pa.1981). See generally Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish In Personam Jurisdiction: A Due Process Analysis, 52 Fordham L.Rev. 234 (1983). Because we conclude that the provisions of K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) may apply as alleged by the plaintiff, we need not consider the other provisions of 60-308 under which the plaintiff asserts jurisdiction. ISSUE 4: Does the Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the Defendants Pursuant to K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) Comport With Due Process? Having determined that K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) may apply, the next consideration is whether application of the provision in this case would comport with due process. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), established the analytical scheme which gave rise to long arm statutes such as K.S.A. 60-308(b), stating due process was not offended when jurisdiction is exercised over a defendant that, although not present within the territory of the forum, has certain minimum contacts with the forum. In considering whether the corporation's minimum contacts meet this standard, courts should consider the quality and nature of the defendant's activity in determining whether it is reasonable and fair to require defense in that state (326 U.S. at 317, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154), rendering jurisdiction consistent with `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. [Citation omitted.].' 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154; see In re Marriage of Brown, 247 Kan. 152, 161, 795 P.2d 375 (1990). Due process requires a demonstration that the nonresident defendant purposely established minimum contacts with the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. (Emphasis added.) In re Hesston Corp., 254 Kan. 941, Syl. ¶ 3, 870 P.2d 17 (1994); see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). The requirement of purposeful availment ensures that an out-of-state defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction as a result of the unilateral acts of another party. Loeffelbein, 33 Kan.App.2d at 600, 106 P.3d 74. In this case, the plaintiff's claim arose from the sale of tires which were manufactured in another state. Therefore, the defendants' sales of rubber-processing chemicals to Goodyear in Kansas are not the basis for the claim. Nor are Bayer's agricultural activities. Rather, the plaintiff argues that the defendants purposefully established contacts with Kansas by selling price-fixed chemicals to national tire manufacturers known to sell tires in Kansas. In other words, according to the plaintiff, the defendants placed their products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the chemicals would be utilized in products which would be purchased by consumers in Kansas. The United States Supreme Court recognized the stream of commerce theory as being sufficient to establish minimum contacts in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs were involved in a car accident in Oklahoma and brought a products liability action in Oklahoma against the New York wholesaler and dealer who sold them their car. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had placed the car into the stream of commerce, that it was foreseeable that the car would be driven in Oklahoma, and that the assertion of personal jurisdiction in that state was therefore proper. The Court rejected that argument. It held that amenability to suit does not blindly travel with the chattel through the stream of commerce, but is limited by foreseeability. 444 U.S. at 296, 100 S.Ct. 580. [T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he [or she] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 580. A corporation can reasonably anticipate being haled into court in a state if it delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State, 444 U.S. at 298, 100 S.Ct. 580, and if the sale of [its] product . . . is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States. 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 580. Four years later, the Court again considered the stream of commerce theory in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987). In Asahi, a Japanese company had manufactured a valve that was incorporated into a tire by a Taiwanese tire manufacturer that was placed on a Honda motorcycle that was sold at retail in California. After an accident in California, the motorcycle purchaser sued Honda and the Taiwanese tire manufacturer in a products liability action. The tire manufacturer impleaded the valve manufacturer and settled its claim with the plaintiff. That left only the question of indemnification between the Taiwanese tire manufacturer and the Japanese valve manufacturer to be determined by the California court. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the valve manufacturer could not be constitutionally required to defend in California; however, four justices, in a plurality opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, also believed the fact that the valve manufacturer introduced its products into the stream of commerce with awareness that a significant portion of them would be sold in California was not sufficient to establish purposeful availment. Some additional evidence, such as evidence that the manufacturer advertised its products in California showing an intent to serve that market, was required. 480 U.S. at 112-13, 107 S.Ct. 1026. The Court of Appeals in this case relied upon this decision in ruling that due process was not met because the defendants had not purposefully directed its sales to Kansas. See Merriman, slip op. at 8-9. The plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals' reliance on the opinion was erroneous because Asahi was a plurality decision. Relying upon the stream of commerce theory, the plaintiff contends the court can infer from the defendants' sales of chemicals to major national tire manufacturers that the defendants knew their product would be used to manufacture tires that would be sold in all 50 states, including Kansas. This argument garners some support in the concurring opinion in Asahi, in which four justices, led by Justice Brennan, disagreed with the idea that additional conduct was needed for the application of the stream of commerce theory. Justice Brennan stated: The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. . . . A defendant who has placed goods in the stream of commerce benefits economically from the retail sale of the final product in the forum State, and indirectly benefits from the State's laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity. 480 U.S. at 117, 107 S.Ct. 1026 (Brennan, J., concurring). In the aftermath of Asahi, some courts have adopted the approach taken by Justice Brennan, designating it as the broad approach, while others have followed the approach taken by Justice O'Connor, designating it as the restrictive approach. Compare Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 415 (5th Cir.1993), and Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1992), with Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir.1994), and Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir.1992). As applied in this case, there are several considerations to be weighed in considering the conflicting views regarding the application of Asahi and World-Wide Volkswagen. First, both Asahi and World-Wide Volkswagen are products liability cases, raising the question of whether the theory should be applied in a price-fixing case. Other courts have expanded the application of the stream of commerce theory to provide a basis for personal jurisdiction in cases involving patent, copyright, and trademark infringement and violations of federal antitrust, tax, and environmental laws. See Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce, 7 Rev. Litig. 239, 261 n. 73 (1988) (digesting cases). And, at least one court has used the theory to find jurisdiction over an antitrust claim involving a price-fixing conspiracy. See Hitt, 399 F.Supp. 838 (upholding jurisdiction under tortious act provisions of various state long arm statutes where foreign defendant caused its products to be shipped and sold in U.S.). We see no basis to depart from this generally accepted view and, therefore, conclude that the stream of commerce theory can be applied to provide a basis for personal jurisdiction in a case involving a price-fixing conspiracy. Next, we must consider the statements in the plurality opinions in Asahi in the context of World-Wide Volkswagen and other decisions of the Supreme Court. See 4 Gard & Casad, Kansas Law and Practice, Kan. C. Civ. Proc. Annot. § 60-308, p. 427 (4th ed.2003) (because Asahi did not overrule World-Wide Volkswagen stream of commerce theory still valid without considering stream of commerce plus). When other cases are considered, it becomes apparent that even the broad view of the stream of commerce theory is not as broad as the plaintiff would suggest. World-Wide Volkswagen requires something more than the mere placing of goods into the stream of commerce and the ability to foresee that the product would eventually make its way into goods sold in Kansas. The decision requires that the sale of a product arise from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States. 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 559. In an earlier decision, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), the Court stated it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. In yet another case, the Court explained: The `purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be hailed into a jurisdiction solely as a result of `random,' `fortuitous,' or `attenuated' contacts. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Rather, to satisfy due process foreseeability, a defendant's contacts must proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a `substantial connection' with the forum State. [Citation omitted.]. 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Our reading of World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi is that the Supreme Court has not abandoned the International Shoe test as further articulated in Burger King. Notwithstanding the breadth of the stream of commerce language in World-Wide Volkswagen, the entire opinion indicated that jurisdiction must rest on a person's activity deliberately directed toward the forum state. This remains the touchstone of the minimum contacts analysis. Furthermore, the decisions of this court have consistently required a purposeful availment. See In re Hesston Corp., 254 Kan. at 959, 870 P.2d 17. As the defendants in this case point out, the burden of making even a prima facie case of purposeful availment is more difficult when the defendant is the supplier of raw materials or component parts used in a manufacturing process. Some courts have upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over suppliers of component parts and raw materials where knowledge that the product would be used in other states could be inferred from the suppliers' business dealings with manufacturers of the completed product. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Lit., 742 F.Supp. 717 (D.P.R.1990); Louis Winer v. San Francisco Mercantile, 501 So.2d 171 (Fla.Dist.App.1987); Dahmes v. Champagne Elevators, Inc., 869 So.2d 904 (La.App.2004); State ex rel. CSR Ltd. v. MacQueen, 190 W.Va. 695, 441 S.E.2d 658 (1994). However, many other courts have rejected this view. In suits similar to this case, at least two courts have determined it would violate due process to exercise jurisdiction over Crompton, Flexsys, and Bayer when faced with price-fixing allegations similar to those raised in this case and under similar jurisdictional facts (these cases did not involve general jurisdiction issues and did not allege any chemical sales in the state such as alleged in this case with the sales to the Topeka Goodyear plant): Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 680 N.W.2d 574 (Minn.App.2004), and Frankenfeld v. Crompton Corp., 697 N.W.2d 378 (S.D.2005). Other courts have reached the same conclusions in cases involving other component parts or raw materials. E.g., In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation, 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn.1996); CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.1996). One such case has many factual similarities to the present case and applied the Kansas long arm statute. Four B Corp. v. Ueno Fine Chemicals Industry, Ltd., 241 F.Supp.2d 1258 (D.Kan.2003), involved a class action arising out of an alleged international conspiracy to fix the prices of sorbates, including potassium sorbate and sorbic acid, which are chemical preservatives used in food products. Plaintiffs allegedly purchased products containing sorbates that were manufactured and sold by defendants. The defendants did not manufacture the products in Kansas and did not sell their products directly to consumers. The court applied the restrictive view of Justice O'Connor's opinion and determined that due process did not allow asserting jurisdiction over the defendants. 241 F.Supp.2d at 1268-70. Citing OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 149 F.3d 1086, 1095-96 (10th Cir.1998), the court applied a test similar to that adopted in Kansas in White v. Goldthwaite, 204 Kan. 83, Syl. ¶ 3, 460 P.2d 578 (1969). The first prong of each test embodies the concept of purposeful availment; the second requires the nexus between that action and the harm. When the analysis in this case is limited to the product stream resulting in the plaintiff's purchase of two tires not manufactured in Kansas, the nexus is lacking in this case. All that connects the defendants' actions and the plaintiff's injury arising from the purchase of tires is the fortuitousness of the plaintiff's residence. There is no indication that the defendants have any control over or collaboration with the tire manufacturers as to where they market their tires. Thus, as it relates to the sales of chemicals to a manufacturer in another state that made the tires which the plaintiff purchased, there is no showing that a defendant's contacts with Kansas proximately result[ed] from actions by the defendant himself that create a `substantial connection' with the forum State. [Citations omitted.]. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174. The plaintiff urges us to look more broadly than at the tire purchase which injured the plaintiff and to consider the nexus established with Kansas because of the defendants' sales to Goodyear in Topeka. This argument blurs the distinction, at least somewhat, between general and specific jurisdiction. The stream of commerce theory does not apply to a general jurisdiction analysis. See Huffy Corp. v. Overlord Industries, 246 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1099 (D.Nev.2003) (holding that defendant's placement of products into the stream of commerce does not support this Court's exercise of general jurisdiction); see also Purdue Research v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 788 (7th Cir.2003) (stream of commerce theory is relevant only to the exercise of specific jurisdiction; it provides no basis for exercising general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant); Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 216 (5th Cir.2000) (We have specifically rejected a party's reliance on the stream-of-commerce theory to support asserting general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.). However, as the plaintiff argues, the sales to Goodyear are in furtherance of the same conspiracy that led to his paying an inflated price and, thus, to his damages. Thus, plaintiff argues there is a nexus and a purposeful availment of the protection of Kansas laws when the defendants entered into business transactions in the State of Kansas where those transactions were a part of the conspiracy at issue. Some courts have concluded that knowledge of and voluntary participation in a conspiracy with other individuals who have physical, in-state presence does not offend due process and allows the court to extend personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who may lack specific, individualized contacts with the forum state. See Istituto Bancario Italiano v. Hunter Eng. Co., 449 A.2d 210, 225 (Del.1982) ([A] defendant who has so voluntarily participated in a conspiracy with knowledge of its acts in or effects in the forum state can be said to have purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby fairly invoking the benefits and burdens of its laws.); Rudo v. Stubbs, 221 Ga.App. 702, 703-04, 472 S.E.2d 515 (1996) (recognizing that coconspirators are agents of each other for purposes of personal jurisdiction when acting in furtherance of conspiracy but requiring specific facts of activity purposefully directed toward Georgia residents). In Execu-Tech Bus. Sys. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So.2d 582 (Fla.2000), the plaintiff alleged the manufacturers of thermal facsimile paper conspired to fix the wholesale price of jumbo rolls of paper in violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade and Practices Act. The Florida Supreme Court held the Japanese manufacturer was subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida. First, the court concluded that the statutory prong of the analysis was satisfied, observing that New Oji and the other conspirators committed a tortious act on Florida soil. The Florida long arm statute was remarkably similar to the Kansas long arm statute. Second, the court determined that the plaintiff's complaint satisfied the constitutional prong of the test because it alleged sufficient minimum contacts between Florida and New Oji to satisfy due process concerns. The court focused on the nexus between the (1) forum state, (2) the foreign corporation, and (3) the price ( i.e., the inflated price paid by Florida consumers for the conspirators' price-fixed paper). 752 So.2d at 585. The court further pointed out the plaintiff alleged the paper produced and distributed by the conspirators was sold at a correspondingly inflated retail price in every state, including Florida. Likewise, in Mackey v. Compass, 391 Md. 117, 892 A.2d 479 (2006), the Maryland Supreme Court found the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction to be consistent with due process. The court observed that, under the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction, a coconspirator to whom the acts of another coconspirator are attributed must have agreed to participate in a conspiracy that he or she could reasonably have expected at the time of the agreement to involve forum-related actions, and, therefore, the acts attributed are not simply unilateral acts of the coconspirator who literally performed them. The jurisdiction is based on the coconspirator's deliberate choice to enter into the coconspiracy. The Mackey court succinctly stated: Because the conspiracy theory gives one subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum the ability to avoid in advance being subject to suit in the forum, it satisfies the fundamental due process requirement that a defendant can be involuntarily subjected to the personal jurisdiction of a forum only if the defendant `purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state.' [Citations omitted.]. 391 Md. at 135, 892 A.2d 479. Further, it has been observed that asymmetry would result if coconspirators are allowed to enjoy the benefits and protections of the forum state's laws without being subject to personal jurisdiction in that forum. See Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 111-12, 172 N.W.2d 292 (1969). For other cases recognizing conspiracy theory jurisdiction, see, e.g., Remmes v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 435 F.Supp.2d 936 (N.D.Iowa 2006); Jung v. Association of American Medical Colleges, 300 F.Supp.2d 119 (D.D.C.2004); Kohler Co. v. Kohler Intern., Ltd., 196 F.Supp.2d 690 (N.D.Ill.2002); Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d 95 (E.D.N.Y.2000); Santa Fe Technologies v. Argus Networks, 131 N.M. 772, 42 P.3d 1221 (Ct.App.2001); Chenault v. Walker, 36 S.W.3d 45 (Tenn.2001). With regard to cases which have not recognized the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction, some criticism appears to focus on whether the Due Process Clause permits a state to assert extra-territorial jurisdiction over a person or entity that did not foresee that the conspirators would commit acts within that state. See, e.g., In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export., 307 F.Supp.2d 145, 157-58 (D.Me.2004); Steinke v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 270 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1200 (D.Mont. 2003); Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 660, 672 (W.D.Wis.1998); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. United States Golf Ass'n, 728 F.Supp. 1429, 1434 (D.Ariz.1990). This concern does not apply in this case, at least under the allegations made by the plaintiff. Each defendant, as an alleged coconspirator to which the acts of another coconspirator are attributed, agreed to participate in a conspiracy that, at the time of the agreement, could reasonably have been expected to reach Kansas consumers. Indeed the conspiracy was aimed at wide-spread price fixing. Furthermore, acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were committed in Kansas through the sales to Goodyear. These acts are not simply unilateral acts of one or two of the coconspirators but of all the conspirators. At least one of the affiliated companies in each of the three affiliated groups of companiesCrompton/Uniroyal, Flexsys, Bayersold products in Kansas pursuant to the alleged conspiracy. The alleged conspiracy resulted in alleged economic harm to the plaintiff in Kansas. Jurisdiction over this tortious action can be based on the coconspirators' deliberate choice to enter into the coconspiracy. Another strong factor in the plaintiff's favor is the consideration of what benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state are afforded to the respective parties. Kansas has a strong interest in protecting the rights of its citizens and providing a forum convenient for the redress of wrongs done to Kansans. Moreover, the plaintiff is seeking application of the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act, K.S.A. 50-101 et seq. The interpretation of this Act is better left to Kansas courts than those of a foreign forum where the plaintiff would otherwise be forced to seek redress. Therefore, considering the allegations of the plaintiff's petition and in balancing the general equities of the situation, we conclude the exercise of specific jurisdiction pursuant to K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) against price-fixing coconspirators under the facts alleged in the plaintiff's petition would not violate due process. Reversed and remanded.