Opinion ID: 3170010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: vashti's out-of-court statements

Text: The trial court granted parts of the State's pretrial motion to introduce certain outof-court statements made by Vashti reflecting her fear of Seacat and threats that he allegedly made to her. In admitting certain statements, the trial court explicitly relied on both a statutory exception to the hearsay rule and on K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455 evidence of prior crimes or misconduct. At trial, Seacat renewed his objections based on hearsay but did not bring up admissibility under K.S.A. 60-455, and the trial court accordingly 8 never conducted further analysis under that statute. Seacat maintains on appeal that some of the out-of-court statements were impermissible, prejudicial hearsay. A. Preservation of Certain Out-of-Court Statements for Appellate Review The State initially contends that Seacat waived any challenge to those out-of-court statements that were admitted under theories of both a hearsay exception and K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(b), relating to the admissibility of evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs. In his opening appellate briefing, Seacat did not challenge the 60-455(b) basis for admitting that testimony. The State contends that any error in admitting these statements as exceptions to the statutory rule against hearsay is rendered harmless by the failure to argue against 60-455(b) as an independent basis for admission. This court has held that the failure to brief and argue an issue constitutes abandonment of the issue. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 269 Kan. 594, 602, 7 P.3d 294 (2000). In State v. Godfrey, 301 Kan. 1041, 1043-44, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015), we strictly applied Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 41), requiring that an issue must be briefed in order to be preserved for consideration on appeal. We relied on State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1083, 319 P.3d 528 (2014), which succinctly held: When a litigant fails to adequately brief an issue it is deemed abandoned. The question that the State presents, then, is whether an argument that is limited to the admissibility of hearsay evidence may include a challenge to the admissibility of evidence under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455. In order for Seacat to prevail on this question, he must demonstrate that an out-of-court statement must pass inspection for hearsay admissibility as a threshold requirement for bad-acts admissibility. 9 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(a) and (b) reads: (a) Subject to K.S.A. 60-447, and amendments thereto, evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove such person's disposition to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that the person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion. (b) Subject to K.S.A. 60-445 and 60-448, and amendments thereto, such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. Seacat contends that K.S.A. 2014 Supp.60-455 is a rule of exclusion, citing State v. Wasinger, 220 Kan. 599, 602, 556 P.2d 189 (1976). This is certainly the case with K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(a). See State v. Prine, 297 Kan. 460, 475-76, 303 P.3d 662 (2013). This court has never explicitly held, however, that K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(b) is a rule of exclusion, and more recent analysis of the statute suggests that this subsection is a rule of inclusion. See, e.g., State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 56-57, 144 P.3d 647 (2006) (statutory grounds for admission is inclusive rather than exclusive; other crimes and civil wrongs evidence that passes the relevance and prejudice tests . . . should always have been admissible). The plain language of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(b) supports our holding in Gunby: subject to limited exceptions, evidence of prior crimes or civil wrongs is admissible if it proves some other material fact. Such an inclusive understanding of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(b) is consistent with the interpretation of analogous statutes in other jurisdictions. 10 In Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687-88, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that the text of the federal analog to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455, Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2), contains no indication that any preliminary showing is necessary in order to introduce 404(b) evidence for a proper purpose; if it is offered for a proper purpose, the evidence is subject only to general strictures limiting admissibility, such as relevance and undue prejudice. Various federal circuit courts have held that Rule 404(b)(2) is an inclusionary rule that admits all other act evidence that does not serve the sole purpose of showing the defendant's bad character and that is neither overly prejudicial under Rule 403 nor irrelevant under Rule 402. See, e.g., United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 651 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1204-05 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 739 (9th Cir. 1985). In light of Huddleston, the Tenth Circuit relaxed prior restrictions on the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence and adopted the position that the rule is inclusive, not exclusive. United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1373-76 (10th Cir. 1989). The Tenth Circuit has continued to follow this standard for admissibility: Rule 404(b) is considered to be an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence of other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition. (Emphasis added.) United States v. Watson, 766 F.3d 1219, 1235 (10th Cir. 2014). A majority of other states have reached the same conclusion when analyzing their versions of the federal rule. See, e.g., State v. Messersmith, 238 Neb. 924, 929-30, 473 N.W.2d 83 (1991) (statue allowing evidence of other crimes and wrongs is inclusionary rule); State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48 (1990) (statute is a clear general rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes subject to only one exception—that defendant has propensity to commit offense of nature of crime charged); 11 State v. Pratt, 309 Or. 205, 210, 785 P.2d 350 (1990) (statute is one of inclusion; other crime evidence is admissible under any theory of logical relevance that does not run afoul of prohibition on propensity to commit crimes); cf State v. Nance, 148 N.J. 376, 386-87, 689 A.2d 1351 (1997) (rule is exclusionary, subject to exceptions such as intent, motive, or identity). Although we reaffirm the principle that K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(b) is an inclusionary rule, our analysis does not end here. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-460 is an exclusionary rule; it forbids hearsay evidence, subject to certain enumerated exceptions. See, e.g., State v. Coones, 301 Kan. 64, 81, 339 P.3d 375 (2014); State v. Stafford, 296 Kan. 25, 47, 290 P.3d 562 (2012). If evidence is to be included under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(b) but excluded under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-460, which statute governs the ultimate admissibility of the disputed evidence? This court has not conducted an in-depth analysis of such a conflict. In State v. Carapezza, 286 Kan. 992, 191 P.3d 256 (2008), the State introduced evidence of the defendant's attempts to cash checks against a closed checking account. The trial court admitted the evidence as relevant to establishing motive and plan under K.S.A. 60-455, but the defendant objected based only on hearsay. This court concluded that the defendant's failure to raise the 60-455 issue to the trial court precluded appellate review. 286 Kan. at 1002. While the Carapezza holding supports the State's position in the present case, Carapezza relied on State v. Francis, 282 Kan. 120, 138, 145 P.3d 48 (2006), for authority. See 286 Kan. at 1002. Francis, however, involved a situation in which no objection was made at trial to the introduction of testimony. This court has consistently applied a three-part test for the admissibility of evidence of crimes or civil wrongs under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(b): whether the evidence is material, that is, that it has some real bearing on the decision in the case; 12 whether the material fact is disputed and, if so, whether the evidence is relevant to prove the disputed fact; and whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential for undue prejudice against the defendant. See State v. Longstaff, 296 Kan. 884, 891-92, 299 P.3d 268 (2013). This court has not included in the test a requirement that the evidence also be admissible under other statutory exclusionary restrictions. Courts considering the analog federal rule have also not elected to impose a hearsayadmissibility threshold requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir. 1993) (setting out requirements for admissibility of other bad acts). There is some authority supporting the State's contention that failure to preserve a challenge to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455 admissibility waives a hearsay challenge. In United States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1987), the court considered a defendant's claim that certain out-of-court statements were admitted without objection in violation of the rules against hearsay. The First Circuit concluded that the evidence would have been admissible even in the presence of an objection under the independent grounds of Rule 404(b). 819 F.2d at 342; see also United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 871 (1st Cir. 1983) (defendant objected only on grounds of hearsay; evidence was independently admissible under Rule 404[b]). In Baker, 432 F.3d at 1219, the Eleventh Circuit found a particular out-of-court statement to be inadmissible as hearsay but admissible under Rule 404(b). Similarly, when the objection at trial was based only on hearsay, the trial court's admission of the evidence under the independent grounds of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) was not preserved on appeal and was subject to plain-error analysis. United States v. Harper, 502 Fed. Appx. 447, 451-52 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Baker, 432 F.3d at 1207 (defendant objected only to hearsay, not to Rule 404[b] admissibility, so standard of appellate review is plain error); State v. Taylor, No. COA12-529, 2013 WL 1121333 (N.C. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion) (defendant's failure to object to hearsay was 13 harmless because statement was properly admitted under Rule 404[b]); State v. Thompson, No. COA09-1326, 2010 WL 2816958 (N.C. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (defendant objected to admission of evidence as hearsay; Court of Appeals found admissible under Rule 404[b] allowing evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to show motive, intent, and common plan or scheme); Oliver v. State, Case No. 04-1400261-CR, 2015 WL 505072,  (Tex. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion) (objection made in context of hearsay failed to preserve Rule 404[b] issue for appellate review); State v. Phillips, 194 W. Va. 569, 585 n.25, 461 S.E.2d 75 (1995) (evidence inadmissible under one theory may be admissible under different theory; hearsay statements may therefore be admitted under Rule 404[b] as proof of motive, intent, etc.). Other courts, however, have treated the hearsay exclusion as a threshold barrier to admitting prior crimes and civil wrongs evidence. See, e.g., James v. State, 723 So. 2d 776, 779-81 (Ala. 1998) (inadmissible hearsay threats could not be used to support Rule 404[b] purposes of proving intent, motive, preparation, plan, knowledge, and identity); State v. Charo, 156 Ariz. 561, 563, 754 P.2d 288 (1988) (evidence of prior bad acts may only be admitted if testimony falls within exception to hearsay rules); People v. Nara, 964 P.2d 578, 580 (Colo. App. 1998) (Rule 404[b] evidence may not be admitted when it is based on inadmissible out-of-court statements); People v. Raffaelli, 701 P.2d 881, 885 (Colo. App. 1985) (if evidence is inadmissible hearsay, reliance on Rule 404[b] is misplaced); State v. Mitchell, 169 N.C. App. 417, 421, 610 S.E.2d 260 (2005) (inadmissible hearsay statements may not be used to support grounds for admission under Rule 404[b]); King v. State, 765 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. App. 1989) (Rule 404[b] does not allow introduction of otherwise-inadmissible hearsay to show motive or intent); People v. Fenton, No. SX-10CR-347, 2013 WL 7176406,  (V.I. Super. 2013) (unpublished opinion) (impermissible hearsay precludes application of Rule 404[b]). 14 We are persuaded that the latter approach is the more sensible. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(b) evidence frequently consists of hearsay. It will often be the case that evidence of a prior crime or civil wrong is based on written reports or out-of-court statements. The hearsay statute does not list evidence of prior crimes or civil wrongs as an exception to the rule against hearsay, and admitting such evidence as an implicit exception to the hearsay rule would threaten to swallow up the common law and statutory prohibition without providing defendants protection against unreliable hearsay testimony. We, therefore, conclude that evidence of prior crimes or civil wrongs permitted under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(b) must still pass the K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-460 requirements for admissibility if the evidence also qualifies as hearsay. B. The Admissibility of Vashti's Out-of-Court Statements Seacat contends that the district court improperly admitted hearsay testimony relating to both his intentions and motives for murdering Vashti. A friend and coworker of Vashti, Joy Trotnic, testified that Vashti asked her a couple of weeks before the fire, Do you think Brett would burn the house down with me in it? Another coworker, Scott Hankins, testified that Vashti reported to him that Seacat had made various threats to her: he had threatened to kill himself if she filed for divorce; he had threatened to take the children and disappear; and he had threatened to kill her, burn down the house, and make it look like a suicide, which he could get away with because he was in law enforcement and knew that firefighters were idiots. He also testified that Seacat woke Vashti up one night and told her he was having recurring dreams of killing her. Melissa Beasley also testified about the threats that Seacat would kill Vashti and burn down the house in such a way that it would appear that Vashti had set the fire herself. Beasley substantiated the testimony that Vashti reported Seacat recounting a dream in which he killed her. Connie Suderman, the social worker who 15 counseled both Vashti and Seacat, testified about comments that Vashti made during therapy, including the dream and a threat that if Vashti ever cheated on him, Seacat would kill her. Not every statement to which Seacat objects is subject to hearsay exclusion. As the State correctly points out in its responsive brief, Trotnic's testimony that Vashti asked her whether she thought Seacat would murder her and burn down the house, while inferentially incriminating, was not hearsay. The statement was not offered to prove the truth of a matter stated, because the question did not state a matter. It instead sought an opinion, and it therefore was not hearsay. Other statements, however, were hearsay. The admissibility of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Coones, 301 Kan. 64, 80, 339 P.3d 375 (2014). A trial court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court, when the judicial action is based on an error of law, or when the judicial action is based on an error of fact. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). Subject to certain exceptions, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-460 bars the [e]vidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated . . . . The theory behind the rule excluding hearsay evidence is that the credibility of the declarant is the basis for the reliability of the statement, and the declarant must therefore be available for cross-examination. State v. Cosby, 293 Kan. 121, 127, 262 P.3d 285 (2011). 16 Vashti's out-of-court statements were offered to prove the truth of the matter stated–that she reported threatening statements and behavior by Seacat. The trial court admitted those statements under the statutory exception of necessity: A statement which the judge finds was made . . . if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, by the declarant at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by the declarant and while the declarant's recollection was clear and was made in good faith prior to the commencement of the action and with no incentive to falsify or to distort. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-460(d)(3). Seacat does not dispute that Vashti was unavailable to testify and that the out-ofcourt statements were relevant. Seacat contends that Vashti's statements were not made when his alleged threats were recently perceived and that she had incentive to falsify or distort them. A trial court is necessarily given considerable discretion in admitting statements under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-460(d)(3). State v. Hobson, 234 Kan. 133, 158, 671 P.2d 1365 (1983). [T]he presence or absence of an incentive to falsify or distort is a question of fact to be determined by the trial judge in light of all the circumstances. 234 Kan. at 158. The appellate court is in no better position than the trial court to decide whether the unavailable witness had incentive to distort or falsify statements. State v. Rowe, 252 Kan. 243, 251, 843 P.2d 714 (1992). Seacat argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Vashti had no incentive to distort or falsify statements. He presents several cases from other states and from a federal district court holding that parties in divorce proceedings may attempt to fabricate evidence in order to improve their image when contesting property division or custody of children. See, e.g., Hutchcraft v. Roberts, 809 F. Supp. 846, 850 17 (1992); State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 14, 304 P.3d 276 (2013); Commonwealth v. Sugrue, 34 Mass. App. 172, 175, 607 N.E.2d 1045 (1993). While common sense suggests that a spouse or a child might have incentive to lie in ascribing bad behavior to another party after divorce proceedings have commenced in order to put the other party at a disadvantage, the present case offers a somewhat different scenario. Vashti told other people that her husband was threatening to kill her and set the house on fire to make it appear that she committed suicide. She was subsequently killed, and the house was set on fire. Seacat implies that Vashti was planning her suicide, which she hoped for some reason to make appear to be murder on Seacat's part, a convoluted scheme that she would herself undo by leaving a suicide note. If no death and fire had occurred, and Vashti had only sought to introduce the threats in the course of a divorce proceeding to make her husband appear dangerous and unstable, then Vashti's reliability might have been much more suspect. But the fact that she made the statements and was subsequently found dead in a burning house suggests either that she was telling the truth about the threats or that she was a supremely scheming and vindictive suicide victim who nevertheless chose to leave a suicide note absolving her husband of murder. This court is in no better position than the trial court to decide whether the declarant had incentive to falsify or distort statements. State v. Brown, 220 Kan. 684, 688, 556 P.2d 443 (1976). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Vashti was acting in good faith and without incentive to falsify information when she reported the threats to her friends and therapist. The statutory exception also requires a showing that the statements were made at a time when the matter was recently perceived by the declarant and while the declarant's 18 recollection was clear and prior to the commencement of the action. Although the statements were obviously made prior to the commencement of the action, which is to say, her death and the fire, the precise relationship of the time when Seacat made the threats and when Vashti repeated them to other people is unknown. Both the threats and the repetition of them occurred sometime after Vashti began counseling and preparation for a divorce, a period of 3 or 4 months before her death, and perhaps as little as several weeks before her death. The evaluation of whether the State met the statutory requirements of recent perception and a fresh memory lay within the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Broyles, 272 Kan. 823, 839, 36 P.3d 259 (2001). In State v. Berry, 223 Kan. 566, 568, 575 P.2d 543 (1978), this court found no abuse of discretion in the admission of out-ofcourt statements made 8 days after the declarant witnessed an event. The court noted that the K.S.A. 60-460(d)(3) timeliness requirement differs from the requirement for other hearsay exceptions, in that the statement need not be made contemporaneously with the event or condition it narrates, describes, or explains. 223 Kan. at 568-69. Similarly, in Smith v. Estate of Hall, 215 Kan. 262, 268, 524 P.2d 684 (1974), this court distinguished between the language in K.S.A. 60-460(d)(3) and the language in (d)(1) and (d)(2), which refer to contemporaneous observations and statements. The (d)(3) exception allows for a considerable passage of time, so long as the statement was made at a time when the event could still be reasonably classified as 'recent' and the declarant's memory was still unclouded. 215 Kan. at 268. In State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 270 P.3d 1183 (2012), this court held that a murder victim's statements to her friends in the months preceding her murder concerning her relationship with the defendant were admissible under a hearsay exception for contemporaneous statements and statements admissible on grounds of necessity. The 19 statements were made when the victim had recently perceived the events and while her recollection was clear, and there was no evidence suggesting the victim made the statements in bad faith or with an incentive to lie or distort the facts. 293 Kan. at 1025-26. Although we do not know the exact timing of the threats and of Vashti's reports of those threats, the trial court properly considered the timing issue and relied on evidence before it that it obtained from the preliminary hearing to conclude, without abusing its discretion, that the statements were recent with respect to the reported events. Vashti's sister testified that the dream had just occurred when Vashti recounted that Seacat had awakened from a dream in which he killed her. The social worker's notes mentioned a threat by Seacat, and these notes were taken within weeks of the fatal event. Other witnesses located the reported threats within a couple of months or several weeks before her death. The period of time between the threats and Vashti reporting the threats would have been no more than 4 months and was probably just a matter of days. This was a short enough time period for the trial court to conclude that her memory of the event was fresh and clear and that the event was recently perceived by Vashti.