Opinion ID: 621564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Decision to Reopen the Suppression Hearing

Text: Much of Stennis’ complaint on appeal is that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in reopening the suppression hearing after the late filed DVD was discovered. Stennis contends that the magistrate judge promised the defense that the proceedings would not be reopened as a result of the late filed DVD and that any further examination requested by the defense would be strictly limited 11 No. 10-5835 to the DVD’s contents. Stennis argues that, after the late filed DVD revealed facts in his favor, the magistrate judge prejudiced the defense when he reneged on his ruling and expanded the scope of the second proceeding in the government’s favor. Stennis further argues that the magistrate judge’s decision was substantially informed by an unsworn statement filed by the government along with the late filed DVD. Stennis contends that, despite succeeding on his motion to strike the statement, it was an impermissible and prejudicial ex parte communication. Because the late filed DVD arguably benefits Stennis’ case, Stennis obviously does not seek to exclude the late filed exhibit in its entirety, nor does he press a challenge to Officer Roncska’s explanation for failing to bring the DVD to the first suppression hearing. Instead, Stennis urges that his motion to suppress should be reevaluated strictly in light of the discrepancies between Officer Roncska’s testimony at the original suppression hearing and the late filed exhibit. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to reopen a suppression hearing for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lawrence, 308 F.3d 623, 627 (6th Cir. 2002). Reopening a suppression proceeding is permitted, but a court should be “extremely reluctant” to do so. See United States v. Carter, 374 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1111 (2005) (quoting United States v. Kithcark, 218 F.3d 213, 219–20 (3d Cir. 2000)). The trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances involved, but the court should insist at least that the moving party provide a reasonable and adequate explanation for failing to put forth its evidence in the original proceeding. See Kithcark, 218 F.3d at 220 (citations omitted). The court’s “primary focus” should center on whether the opposing party would suffer prejudice from reopening the proceeding. Id. 12 No. 10-5835 Stennis’ complaints on this issue are unavailing because he cannot show how he was prejudiced by the reopened hearing. The magistrate judge had already arrived at an unfavorable decision and the proceeding was reopened to Stennis’ benefit, in conjunction with his motion for reconsideration. Although Stennis believes that the magistrate judge expanded the scope of the second hearing beyond what was originally promised him, we disagree. The magistrate judge promised he would be allowed to cross-examine the officers about the contents of the late filed DVD, should the DVD provide exculpatory information. Essentially, this is what happened at the second hearing. Both parties were allowed to examine the police officers in light of the late filed exhibit and the other records discovered in the archives and used by the officers to refresh their recollections. The magistrate judge’s procedure was fair under the circumstances, and we cannot find an abuse of discretion in his actions. Finally, even if we were to limit our consideration in the manner Stennis requests, we would still uphold the district court’s decision. Taking into account the discrepancies between Officer Roncska’s testimony and the late filed exhibit, it remains clear and uncontested that Officer Roncska had encountered Stennis on a prior occasion. As explained above, that prior encounter provided Officer Roncska with a specific articulable basis for believing that Stennis might be armed and dangerous and carrying drugs. Coupled with noticing a bulge in Stennis’ pants, a reasonable officer in Officer Roncska’s position would be justified in performing a Terry frisk. Finally, because the unsworn statement is such a source of consternation to the defense, we briefly address and reject the contention that this statement was an improper ex parte communication between the government and the magistrate judge. The allegedly unsworn statement is a one page 13 No. 10-5835 document, signed by Officers Roncska and Jinnett, which describes the events on the tape. The statement also contains one line that briefly alludes to a second prior encounter with Aaron and Joyce, in which the couple alleged that Stennis set their car on fire in retaliation for speaking to police. An ex parte communication occurs when one party initiates direct or indirect communication on the substance of a pending case without the knowledge, presence, or consent of all parties involved in the matter. That did not occur in this case. The statement was filed, on open record, with the court. The defense had notice and opportunity to challenge its contents. Accordingly, our doctrine on ex parte communication does not squarely apply. Stennis’ substantive challenge is that the statement violated Crawford v. Washington’s rule against the admission of testimonial evidence in a criminal trial without the opportunity for crossexamination. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 50–56 (2004). The means for addressing this challenge is through a motion to strike—an action which defense counsel successfully pursued. Under these circumstances, any prejudice was cured by granting the motion to strike and allowing the defense to cross-examine the officers.