Opinion ID: 1494306
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Overly Broad

Text: Petitioner also is incorrect in arguing that  123 is unconstitutionally overbroad. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that [a] clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be `overbroad' if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114, 92 S.Ct. at 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (footnote omitted). The purpose of the over breadth doctrine is designed to protect First Amendment freedom of expression from laws written so broadly that the fear of punishment might discourage people from taking advantage of that freedom. Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 36, 641 A.2d 870, 878 (1994) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915-17, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 167, 638 A.2d 93 (1994)). As we stated in Eanes v. State : The crucial question ... is whether the [statute] sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth amendments. The concern is that an overbroad statute may, by that very fact, have a chilling effect on free expression. That is, if a statute is to be struck down as overbroad, it must appear that the statute's very existence will inhibit free expression. The doctrine is `strong medicine' and should be applied sparingly. It should not be invoked when a limiting construction can be placed on the statute. Because the over breadth doctrine involves a challenge to the facial validity of a statute, a court should not resort to it unless there is a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized first amendment protection of parties not before the court. Eanes, 318 Md. at 464-65, 569 A.2d at 618 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the over breadth doctrine to a wide spectrum of cases ranging from those statutes that regulate only the spoken word to those that involve expressive conduct. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613-16, 93 S.Ct. at 2916-18, 37 L.Ed.2d 830. The Court has applied a higher standardÔÇöthe over breadth must be real, substantial, and judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweepÔÇöto those statutes that involve conduct and not merely speech: [T]he plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial over breadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from `pure speech' toward conduct and that conductÔÇöeven if expressiveÔÇöfalls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effectÔÇöat best a predictionÔÇöcannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16, 93 S.Ct. at 2917-18, 37 L.Ed.2d 830. Explained in another way: [P]articularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2918, 37 L.Ed.2d 830. In contrast, when it comes to statutes that regulate only speech, [34] the Court has decided that the possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpublished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester because of the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612, 93 S.Ct. at 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830. As with the vagueness challenge, the courts of our companion states have divided in their views regarding their respective statutes dealing with harassment as unconstitutionally overbroad or not. We conclude that the reasoning of those states that have determined that their similar harassment statutes do not transgress the confines of the over breadth doctrine are more persuasive, taking into account the mandates of the doctrine and the language of  123. In following these states, we further determine that  123 sanctions conduct that is within the state's power to prohibit and that any overbreadth that the statute arguably may be subject to is not substantial in relation to that conduct which  123 is meant legitimately to prohibit (or protect). Many states have concluded that their harassment statutes are not overbroad because of their statutory requirements for purposeful conduct, such as in the present case, requiring an intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other person. In Connecticut v. Snyder, 49 Conn.App. 617, 717 A.2d 240 (1998) the Appellate Court of Connecticut concluded that that state's harassment statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad as it applied to conduct. The statute states that a person is guilty of harassment when with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he communicates with a person by telegraph or mail, by electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network, by computer network ..., or by any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.... Snyder, 717 A.2d at 241 (second alteration in original) (quoting CONN. GEN.STAT.  53a-183 (a)(2)). Relying upon Connecticut v. Anonymous, 34 Conn.Supp. 689, 389 A.2d 1270 (1978), the Connecticut court stated: The over breadth principle is not violated by the unrestricted scope of the messages which the statute may ban because it is the manner and means employed to communicate them which is the subject of the prohibition rather than their content. The statute is not flawed because a recital on the telephone of the most sublime prayer with the intention and effect of harassing the listener would fall within its ban as readily as the most scurrilous epithet. The prohibition is against purposeful harassment by means of a device readily susceptible to abuse as a constant trespasser upon our privacy. Snyder, 717 A.2d at 243-44 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anonymous, 34 Conn.Supp. 689, 389 A.2d 1270). The Snyder court further acknowledged thusly with respect to mailings, such as in the present case: Since the statute proscribes conduct, rather than content of the mailings, the risk that the statute will chill people from the exercise of free speech is minor compared with the unfortunately prevalent misuse of the postal system to harass others and invade their privacy. Thus, because this statute prohibits intentional harassment by means of the mail and does not seek to regulate the content of such mailings, we hold that first amendment freedoms are not involved and the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Snyder, 717 A.2d at 244. Similarly, in People v. Taravella, 133 Mich.App. 515, 350 N.W.2d 780 (1984), the Court of Appeals of Michigan determined that Michigan's telephone harassment statute prohibited conduct rather than pure speech and, as such, was not unconstitutionally overbroad. The Michigan court stated: Do telephone calls by an angry parent to a student with failing grades, by a dissatisfied consumer or by a disgruntled constituent, if accompanied by language thought to be `offensive' by the recipient of the call, subject the caller to criminal sanctions under the statute? In each case, defendant claims, the caller's exercise of his constitutional right of free speech might `annoy,' `frighten' or be considered `obscene' or `harassing' by the listener. Thus, under defendant's interpretation of the statute, if is the listener's perception or characterization of the nature of the call which would control. We disagree. The statute clearly provides that the focus is on the caller; it is the malicious intent with which the transmission is made that establishes the criminality of the conduct. Taravella, 350 N.W.2d at 784 (emphasis added). On the same note, [35] in Idaho v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 896 P.2d 357 (Ct.App. 1995), the Court of Appeals of Idaho determined that a harassment statute is not overly broad because the statute prohibited only telephone contacts made with a specific and exclusive intent to `annoy, terrify, threaten, intimidate, harass or offend,'  which is not protected speech but conduct, and the statute did not proscribe telephone calls made with a legitimate intent to communicate. Richards, 896 P.2d at 362 (emphasis added). The court, quoting from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, stated: The government has a strong and legitimate interest in preventing the harassment of individuals.... `Prohibiting harassment is not prohibiting speech, because harassment is not a protected speech. Harassment is not communication, although it may take the form of speech. The statute prohibits only telephone calls made with the intent to harass. Phone calls made with the intent to communicate are not prohibited. Harassment in this case, thus is not protected merely because it is accomplished using a telephone.' [36] Id. (quoting Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 242 (4th Cir.1988) (quoting West Virginia v. Thorne, 175 W.Va. 452, 333 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 996, 106 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed.2d 363 (1985))); see also Champagne v. Gintick, 871 F.Supp. 1527 (D.Conn.1994) ([T]he Supreme Court has held that `violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact ... are entitled to no constitutional protection.' (alteration in original) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984))). In the present case, conduct that otherwise qualifies as unlawful harassment is not protected merely because it came to Javin's or her parents' home in the form of letters delivered through the United States Postal Service. Furthermore,  123 expressly eliminates constitutionally protected speech from its ambit. Section 123 does not apply to any peaceable activity intended to express political views or provide information to others and the conduct to be prohibited must have no legal purpose. Other states have concluded that similar restrictive language helps to abate any over breadth. Cf. Boychuk, supra, at 788 (suggesting that employing language in stalking and harassment statutes that specifically except[s] protected activities from the scope of the statute would aid in ensuring that such statutes do not infring[e] on legitimate activities). In People v. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d 529, 634 N.Y.S.2d 660, 658 N.E.2d 706 (1995), the New York Court of Appeals determined that the New York harassment statute's limiting clause `without legitimate purpose of communication'... expressly excludes constitutionally protected speech from its reach [and] plainly distinguishes this statute from those which impose criminal liability for `pure speech.' Shack, 658 N.E.2d at 710. The court concluded that because of the restrictive clause the defendant could not rely successfully on the First Amendment to support a challenge to its facial validity, id., and it is this limitation that distinguishes the statute from those harassment statutes that have been declared unconstitutionally broad. Shack, 658 N.E.2d at 711 (citing People v. Klick, 66 Ill.2d 269, 5 Ill.Dec. 858, 362 N.E.2d 329 (1977)). In McKillop v. Alaska, 857 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct.App.1993), the Court of Appeals of Alaska also determined that a harassment statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad. The court noted that the harassment statute had the potential, in addition to prohibiting conduct, to punish political speech or other legitimate communication upon proof that one of the speaker's subsidiary motives was to annoy the listener. McKillop, 857 P.2d at 365. The court further stated: We agree that a person engaging in advocacy or criticism may legitimately intend to annoy or disturb his or her listeners. Nevertheless, `the right of every person to be left alone must be [weighed] in the scales [against] the right of others to communicate.' McKillop, 857 P.2d at 364 (alterations in original) (quoting Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 1490, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970)). [37] To avoid an overbroad construction, the court interpreted the statute to prohibit telephone calls only when the call has no legitimate communicative purpose, when the caller's speech is devoid of any substantive information and the caller's sole intention is to annoy or harass the recipient. Id. (emphasis added). On the same note and most recently, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in Kansas v. Whitesell, 270 Kan. 259, 13 P.3d 887 (2000), determined that a stalking statute, worded similarly to  123, was not unconstitutionally overbroad. [38] The court reasoned: A criminal statute should not infringe upon the First Amendment. The First Amendment, however, is not an impenetrable shield which protects any speech or conduct, whatsoever, with disregard to its harm and effect. Despite our First Amendment rights, we are not free to harm others under the guise of free speech. As speech strays further from the values of persuasion, dialogue and free exchange of ideas, and moves toward willful threats to perform illegal acts, the State has greater latitude to regulate expression. People v. Borrelli, 77 Cal.App.4th 703, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 (2000) (referring to Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d 935, 938 (5 Cir.1991)). Application of the overbreadth doctrine... is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908. Concerning stalking laws, there must be a balance that is struck between our constitutional right to free speech and our personal right to be left alone. Whitesell, 13 P.3d at 900-01. The Kansas court then favorably repeated the following quote: Many crimes can consist solely of spoken words, such as soliciting a bribe ... or making a terrorist threat.... The state may penalize threats, even those consisting of pure speech, provided the relevant statute singles out for punishment threats falling outside of the scope of the First Amendment protection.... In this context, the goal of the First Amendment is to protect expression that engages in some fashion public dialogue, that is `communication in which the participants seek to or are persuaded; communication which is about changing or maintaining beliefs, or taking or refusing to take action on the basis of one's beliefs.... A statute that is otherwise valid, and is not aimed at protected expression, does not conflict with the First Amendment simply because the statute can be violated by the use of the spoken words. Whitesell, 13 P.3d at 901 (alterations in original) (quoting Borrelli, 77 Cal.App.4th at 714, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462; Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 21 Cal.4th 121, 87 Cal. Rptr.2d 132, 980 P.2d 846 (1999))); see also Parker v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 24 Va.App. 681, 485 S.E.2d 150 (1997). Petitioner cites other out-of-state cases in which a statute was deemed to be unconstitutionally vague despite an intent requirement. These cases, however, do not discuss statutes with the restrictive language of  123ÔÇödoes not apply to any peaceable activity intended to express political view or provide information to othersÔÇöand are worded quite differently from  123. For instance, in Bolles v. People , the Supreme Court of Colorado found that the Colorado harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because the dictionary definitions of intent to alarm and annoy, as used in the statute, would render criminal such acts as forecasting a storm and warning against illnesses. Bolles, 541 P.2d at 81. The court concluded that even reading in restrictive language such as no legitimate purpose would not save the statute from being overbroad, but instead would inject vagueness into the statute. Id. As discussed, supra,  123 does not contain the language legitimate purpose but employs instead legal purpose, which is more restrictive, in addition to the restriction that  123 does not apply to peaceable activity intended to express political views or provide information to others. We conclude that other out-of-state cases, on which Petitioner relies, are distinguishable from the present case. [39]