Opinion ID: 1955771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the jury award.

Text: The jury returned a verdict against Clinical Lab and awarded lump-sum damages of $3.7 million. Clinical Lab then moved for a remittitur to not more than $438,000, which motion was denied. Clinical Lab asserts it is entitled to a new trial or, in the alternative, a new trial as to damages alone or an order or remittitur to a reasonable sum [10] as the jury's verdict was the result of passion, partiality and prejudice. [T]he amount of damages to be awarded is a factual issue to be determined by the trier of fact, [and] we review the issue on appeal under the clearly erroneous standard. Flagtwet v. Smith, 393 N.W.2d 452, 455 (S.D.1986) ( Flagtwet II ). We will not let stand a verdict if it is so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being beyond all measure, unreasonable, and outrageous and such as manifestly shows the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption. The fact that a verdict is extremely liberal is not grounds for a new trial. Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194, 203-04 (S.D.1989); Weidner v. Lineback, 82 S.D. 8, 20, 140 N.W.2d 597, 603 (1966). Kim initiated this action to recover damages for personal injuries. When she died, the complaint was amended by the co-executors of her estate to include a wrongful death cause of action. It is, therefore, appropriate to recall that [i]n every action for wrongful death the jury may give such damages as they may think proportionate to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death to the persons respectively for whose benefit such action shall be brought. SDCL 21-5-7; Flagtwet v. Smith, 367 N.W.2d 188, 189 (S.D.1985) ( Flagtwet I ). A pecuniary injury encompasses more than strictly economic losses in that it includes the loss of decedent's companionship and society as expressed by, but not limited to, the words `advice,' `assistance,' and `protection,' but without consideration for the grief and mental anguish suffered by the beneficiaries because of the wrongful death. Flagtwet I, 367 N.W.2d at 191. The monetary value of the loss of consortium cannot be determined according to a definite rule. Flagtwet II, 393 N.W.2d at 455; Morey v. Keller, 77 S.D. 49, 54, 85 N.W.2d 57, 60 (1957). And, as with a jury award for personal injuries, we have allowed the trier of fact `wide latitude' in making its award. Flagtwet II, 393 N.W.2d at 455. Kim was thirty-four years old at the time of her death. At trial, there was testimony that the monetary value of Kim's loss to the family was $388,000. Funeral, medical and other expenses of $51,000 were also proved. In closing argument to the jury, the monetary value of Kim's pain and suffering was asserted to be $1,000,000. Kim greatly suffered many faces of pain during the year following the realization that she would die from the very disease which the pap smear was designed to detect. The enormity of Kim's knowledge of her impending, unalterable doom, her confusion, fear, misery, depression, helplessness, physical pain and mental terror, her sure knowledge that she would never live to witness the adulthood of her children or old age with her husband, all were proper considerations for the jury and surely had a powerful influence upon it. The jury was informed, in Instruction 23, of numerous other elements of damage which it could bear in mind in this combined personal injury and wrongful death action. These included the instruction, moral training and superintendence of education [Kim] might reasonably have given her children had she lived; [the] counsel, guidance and aid [Kim] would reasonably have given [her husband] had she lived; [and] the loss of advice, assistance, companionship, society and protection [Kim] would presumably have given [her husband] and children had she lived. Sander's counsel argued to the jury in closing that the monetary value of Kim's advice, companionship, moral training, education and aid as mother to her children, who were 15, 12 and 8 years old at the time of her death, amounted to $480,000 per child and the monetary value of those losses to her husband was $890,000. The total damages awarded by the jury were approximately $69,000 less than argued by counsel. Clinical Lab did not argue damages in closing arguments to the jury. Even so, Clinical Lab asserts the jury's award cannot stand as the jury's passion is so evident. It argues that Bethel v. Janis, 597 F.Supp. 56 (D.S.D.1984), clearly demonstrates these damages were excessive. We have examined Bethel, keeping in mind that only applications of South Dakota law by this Court are binding on us. We are struck that any similarity between the instant case and Bethel ends with the observation that both are wrongful death and personal injury actions. Though both parents there died, and injuries were sustained by two of their children, the deaths were quick, if not instantaneous, and the injuries sustained were comparatively minor and short-lived. Further, evidence submitted in that trial to the court on the majority of the damages alleged, was often perfunctory at best or nonexistent. Clinical Lab also argues this case is indistinguishable from Zaninovich v. American Airlines, 26 A.D.2d 155, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1966). Zaninovich was a wrongful death action brought on behalf of minor children whose parents had both died instantly in an airplane crash. Zaninovich did not include a cause of action for personal injuries, pain or suffering sustained by the deceased parents. That court found the damages awarded were excessive and explained: The gross excessiveness of the principal awards is easily demonstrated [because it puts the surviving children] far above the standard of living to which they were accustomed[.] Id. at 872. Further, that court concluded, as Clinical Lab argues we should conclude, that this change in the standard of living was alone sufficient to show the jury award was unreasonable. Id. We are not persuaded by that lower New York court's focus on placing survivors in a standard of living equal to that to which they were accustomed prior to the death of the father, the only wage-earning parent. We have not been cited to, nor has our research uncovered, any instance where any court, including the courts of New York, have adopted this philosophy. We decline to adopt what the Zaninovich court itself called a crude analysis. Significantly, we note the trial court specifically found the jury did not act out of an excess of emotion and that their reactions to the testimony wasn't an unmeasured or inappropriate response[.] Just as we defer to [t]he trier of fact [as] the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses, unless clearly erroneous, Wolff v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 472 N.W.2d 233, 236 (S.D. 1991), so too do we defer to the determination of the trial judge as to the total effect of trial testimony on a jury panel. Finally, we bear in mind that we have not found any prejudicial errors by the trial judge in the course of the trial which would lend support to a finding of excessive damages. E.g., Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 283 (5th Cir.1975). A review of the record does not leave us with the opinion that, under all the facts of this case, this award was beyond all measure, unreasonable, and outrageous and such as manifestly shows the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption. Small, 437 N.W.2d at 203-04; Weidner, 82 S.D. at 20, 140 N.W.2d at 603.