Opinion ID: 792192
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misrepresentation of Facts in Evidence and Comment on Witness Credibility

Text: 22
23 Throughout closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly commented on the credibility of witnesses, including Hodge, Fenn, Fenn's family, Dr. Steiner, Dr. Omley, Dr. Jackson, and Nurse McAliley. Two of these statements were particularly egregious, as they constituted comment on the veracity of the two key witnesses in the case — the defendant (Hodge) and the complaining witness (Fenn). First, the prosecutor asserted that Hodge is lying to extricate himself from what he's done. J.A. at 189 (final closing argument by prosecution). The prosecutor then compounded the misconduct by claiming that Consuela Fenn is absolutely believable, her family is absolutely believable. J.A. at 189 (final closing argument by prosecution). 24 Without citing, quoting, or discussing any of these statements, the state court found: 25 The comments spoken by the prosecuting attorney here were in the context of contrasting the defense and prosecution witnesses. The prosecutor did not claim to have personal knowledge of any witness's truthfulness. We find the prosecutor's comments on the credibility of witnesses were within the bounds of [ State v. Price, 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943, 100 S.Ct. 2169, 64 L.Ed.2d 798 (1980)]. 26 State v. Hodge, 2000 WL 1533917, at  (Ohio Ct.App. Oct. 18, 2000) (unpublished) ( Hodge I ), leave to appeal denied by 91 Ohio St.3d 1459, 743 N.E.2d 399 (2001). The state court did not explicitly address the effect of this finding on Hodge's ineffective-assistance claim. However, it appears that the state court intended to hold that, as it found that no misconduct occurred, trial counsel's failure to object did not satisfy the performance prong of the Strickland ineffective-assistance test. 27 We disagree with the state court's conclusion that no misconduct occurred. It is patently improper for a prosecutor either to comment on the credibility of a witness or to express a personal belief that a particular witness is lying. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Berger, 295 U.S. at 86-88, 55 S.Ct. 629 (citing prosecutor's statements suggesting that he had personal knowledge that a witness was not being truthful as one example of egregious prosecutorial misconduct); see also Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 646 (6th Cir.2005) (To be certain, prosecutors can argue the record, highlight the inconsistencies or inadequacies of the defense, and forcefully assert reasonable inferences from the evidence. But, they can not put forth their opinions as to credibility of a witness, guilt of a defendant, or appropriateness of capital punishment.); United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1389 (6th Cir.1994) (We cannot overstate the extent to which we disapprove of this sort of improper vouching by prosecutors.); State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 470 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1984) (It is improper for an attorney to express his personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of a witness or as to the guilt of the accused.). The prosecutor did both in this case, explicitly stating that Fenn was absolutely believable, but that Hodge was lying. J.A. at 189 (final closing argument by prosecution). 28 As the Supreme Court explained in Young, there are two separate harms that arise from such misconduct. First, such comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury. Young, 470 U.S. at 18, 105 S.Ct. 1038. Second, the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence. Id. at 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038. Both concerns are implicated in this case. The prosecutor's numerous statements on witness credibility — often unsupported by any rational justification other than an assumption that Hodge was guilty — cannot avoid suggesting to the jury that the prosecutor knows something they do not. 20 Moreover, because these statements by the prosecutor were not coupled with a more detailed analysis of the evidence actually adduced at trial, they convey an impression to the jury that they should simply trust the State's judgment that Fenn was a credible witness and that the defendant's witnesses were non-credible, if not perjurious. 21 This misconduct is especially prejudicial in this case given the extent to which the jury's determination as to Hodge's guilt or innocence hinged almost entirely on the credibility of Hodge and Fenn. 22 29 We note specifically that Hodge is not taking these statements out of context. In fact, the prosecutor attempted to bolster Fenn's credibility both immediately before and immediately after his attack on Hodge's credibility. The relevant passage — near the end of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, when it is most likely to be remembered by the jury — begins with the prosecutor's explanation of why Fenn did not immediately accuse Hodge of raping Jane, despite having allegedly caught Hodge in the act: 30 Albeit, logically, she could have told and her family would have beaten him up right on the spot probably, if she would have told. But she didn't. That is a battered woman, or she would be out. No woman would ever be stuck in a battered relationship if they could see themselves logically. 31 She had waited 40 hours, she told the truth, and what she has to say is supported by medical evidence and all the surrounding family. 32 He has offered you nothing. He has tried to portray himself as a law-abiding, respectful, mild-mannered person. He is anything but that. He is uncontrollable; he's not living with the family who he's supposed to be; he's been kicked out of school for fighting; he has the guts to fight with police officers. He is not what he portrays himself to be, and that is because he is lying to extricate himself from what he's done. 33 Consuela Fenn is absolutely believable, her family is absolutely believable. 34 J.A at 188-89 (final closing argument by prosecution) (emphases added). Such juxtaposition of the prosecutor's comments with regard to Hodge and Fenn can only exacerbate the prejudicial effect of each statement. 35
36 The prosecutor repeatedly — and incorrectly — informed the jury that, in order to acquit Hodge, they would have to conclude affirmatively that Fenn's family members were intentionally lying on the witness stand. This was a blatant misrepresentation. For example, the prosecutor stated early in his initial closing argument: 37 But there are things that support what Consuela has to say, that, you know, document that she is telling the truth, and unless you decide that all of the women from her family, including her grand — great grandmother and great aunt are absolute liars, you know she is telling you the truth, and she is supported in what she said 40 hours later. 38 J.A. at 153-54 (closing argument by prosecution) (emphases added). The prosecutor returned to this point near the end of his initial closing argument: 39 To find him not guilty, you have to find Consuela Fenn and her whole family to be nothing but liars, and to believe in what you heard from the Defense here. What you have to the contrary of that is that of a doctor who — three people have unethically testified today, and I think you will know that's the case. Him denying it, and a family that barely knows him comes in here saying he's not that kind of guy, even though he got kicked out of school for fighting, and he was a horrendous prisoner. 40 J.A. at 159 (closing argument by prosecution) (emphases added). As Fenn had told each of her family members that she saw Hodge rape Jane, these witnesses' belief that a rape had occurred was based almost entirely on their belief that Fenn was telling them the truth when she told them she had witnessed the act. Although Floncia Lovejoy and Barbara Lovejoy found blood in Jane's underwear and observed what they allege was abnormal behavior by Jane on the night in question, the jury was not required to conclude that either Floncia Lovejoy's or Barbara Lovejoy's testimony about these observations was untruthful in order to acquit Hodge. Instead, the jury simply needed to determine that the testimony about blood in Jane's underwear was not sufficient to establish Hodge's guilt. Such misrepresentations are themselves unacceptable prosecutorial conduct. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-82, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (noting that the court did not find it appropriate to overturn Darden's conviction in a habeas proceeding because, despite the prosecutor's other severe misconduct, the prosecutor's argument did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did it implicate other specific rights of the accused) (emphasis added). 41 The prosecutor's comments also extended to the credibility of other witnesses in the case. Most troubling are his statements about Dr. Omley, which also completely misrepresent the doctor's testimony, while at the same time accusing defense counsel of twisting ... the facts: 23 42 He also says — and this is a great twisting of the facts, too. I mean, what's going on here? — Dr. Omley said there were no fingerprints. He [apparently referring at this point to defense counsel, who had just made his closing argument] told you he [apparently referring at this point to Dr. Omley] found there was handprints or fingerprints. That's a lie. You look at his report. Dr. Omley said there was handprints, but I asked him if he found bruises that would be consistent with the tension of fingers, and he said yeah, and he notes bruises throughout the chest, which supports what the family is saying, which destroys the straddle injury theory. And if you read Dr. Steiner's report, you'll find he has wrongfully dealt with these issues as well. 43 J.A. at 184-85 (final closing argument by prosecution) (emphases added). In his testimony, however, Dr. Omley — the physician who examined Jane in the emergency room at St. Joseph's — neither stated that he saw a handprint on Jane nor did he state that he saw bruises consistent with the tension of fingers. J.A. at 185 (final closing argument by prosecution). Instead, he testified that the fact the he saw no handprint would not preclude the possibility that Jane had been grabbed by someone's fingertips — a statement very different than an affirmative finding of bruises consistent with the tension of fingers. The relevant portion of Dr. Omley's testimony begins during defense counsel's cross-examination, when Dr. Omley is asked to read from the record that he (Dr. Omley) prepared after examining Jane on December 23, 1996: 44 A. Scratches noted on the anterior — and that's the front — chest and sides of abdomen of varied shape, no handprint  45 Q. Let me stop you there. What does no hand print mean? 46 A. When we see lacerations or bruising to children, anybody, we look for hand imprints on people, because if it's inflicted severely enough, you can sometimes see a handprint bruise on people. 47 Q. So that would be something you would look for as perhaps indicative of an abusive thing as opposed to a natural type of injury? 48 A. That's correct. 49 Q. And a handprint, if done hard enough, could actually show up where you could see the outline of fingers or thumbs, is that accurate? 50 A. That's accurate, sir. 51 Q. You found none of that on this particular victim? 52 A. That's correct. 53 J.A. at 395 (Omley Test.). The prosecutor returned to the handprint issue on redirect examination: 54 Q. Thank you. 55 Now, Mr. Nagy also pointed out that you did not see a bruise that was consistent with being identified as a handprint, is that correct? 56 A. That's correct. 57 Q. Does that mean, though, that what you saw rules out someone grabbing the child forcefully with fingertips? 58 A. We did not — I mean, I did not record any handprints. 59 Q. But that's a whole hand? 60 A. That's a whole hand. Whether or not at some point somebody physically put ten little spots on the child, I can't say. 61 Q. Okay. So your finding of no handprint does not preclude or would not be the bare basis for an argument saying she was not grabbed by fingertips? 62 A. That's correct. 63 J.A. at 407 (Omley Test.). This testimony shows that the prosecutor's statement that Dr. Omley said there was handprints, but I asked him if he found bruises that would be consistent with the tension of fingers, and he said yeah, and he notes bruises throughout the chest, J.A. at 185 (final closing argument by prosecution), is clearly incorrect. More disturbingly, the prosecutor's specific questioning of Dr. Omley on this point suggests that the prosecutor knew that his own later statements during closing arguments were, at the very least, a set of serious misrepresentations. Such statements would be inexcusable even if the prosecution had not just called defense counsel's (accurate) description of Dr. Omley's testimony a lie. J.A. at 185 (final closing argument by prosecution); see also J.A. at 172 (closing argument by defense). Together, the statements are indefensible. 64 Also disturbing are the prosecutor's statements about Dr. Steiner's credibility. These generally assume the truth of any statement made by the prosecution's expert witnesses, and accuse Dr. Steiner of acting wrongfully or unethically, or even perjuring himself, for any statements he made contradicting the testimony of the prosecution's expert witnesses. For example, in his initial closing argument, the prosecutor devoted substantial time to criticizing Dr. Steiner's (entirely proper) statement that he was not in a position to testify as to Fenn's credibility: 65 Now, even Dr. Steiner, finally, after hours of cross examination, admitted that if you believe Consuela's eyewitness account then you should believe Dr. McDavid and you should rule this a rape, and find this as a rape. He concedes that. 66 To get around that issue, he severely discounts Consuela's history. He tells you he's not in a position to judge, he wouldn't do that, and he tries to distance himself from the fact that he wrongfully discounts her story. But we all know from his testimony and his report he is judging her; he is ruling out her credibility even though out of the other side of his mouth he says he is not. You read that report. He sat up there, I don't know how many times, and claims, based on what Dr. McDavid said, there were five statements, and because there were five statements, you should not believe the sixth. That's what he's saying. That's just not credible. He has conceded he did not have the information you have, he can't make that judgment as good as you, and he is wrong, and you know that. He has not heard everything you have heard. He, I think wrongfully, has told you he's never even heard of a battered woman, he's not in a position to evaluate that, that everyone that comes into his emergency room gives an accurate story, there is never a mistake in the date. This is how he has manipulated the data to appear that he is giving a medical opinion that should not be permissible in court and isn't reliable. He is pretending to act within the confines of his field of practice when he gives this opinion, but what he does is, he chooses to discount whether Consuela says there are (sic), therefore there is no history, therefore it is improper to conclude child abuse. Well, if there were no history, you could not rule out child abuse. You cannot find probably child abuse, but you couldn't rule it out. But look at what he's doing and saying; both he and in his report say it's a straddle injury. But he didn't have a history. Now he doesn't need a history, which is required by his profession to obtain a diagnosis of an accidental straddle injury. But he discounts everybody else's use of a history to find sex abuse. 67 Now, how can he do that ethically? He cannot. And that's what Dr. Jackson just said. And, in the same v[e]in, he came to this courtroom and, despite nurse McAliley saying she has seen — a videotape of a young girl being penetrated, I think even 1000 times — a normal picture of the hymen, he comes in and tells you there can't be an inch and a half penetration of a prepubescent female vaginally without hymenal damage. That's a lie. Dr. Steiner says that is unethical, that is not the knowledge that they have today in this field. But yet he is telling you that. So somebody here has perjured themselves; it's either Nurse McAliley, Dr. McDavid and Dr. Jackson, or it's Dr. Steiner. 68 J.A. at 156-158 (closing argument by prosecution) (emphases added). It was entirely improper for the prosecutor imply that any disagreement between the expert witnesses (who, as professionals, could very well have legitimate professional disagreements) meant that one of those witnesses must be perjuring him or herself. 69
70 In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor also made another clear misrepresentation in his effort to discredit defense counsel's closing argument: 71 Mr. Nagy also said that Consuela was being investigated by Children Services. I didn't hear that in this trial. I don't know where that came from. I don't know why he feels he has to unfairly damage her reputation now, but apparently he does. 72 J.A. at 184 (final closing argument by prosecution). However, Fenn testified that she had in fact been investigated by Children Services: 73 Q. Prior to this particular incident, madam, had you had — had you been investigated by Children Services about your conduct with your children? 74 A. Right. 75 Q. When was that, approximately? 76 A. I don't know exactly, but I know it was after it had happened. 77 Q. After this happened? 78 A. Right. I don't know exactly — 79 J.A. at 363 (Test. Consuela Fenn). The prosecutor's statement to the contrary was plainly inconsistent with the testimony presented at trial. 80