Opinion ID: 1810649
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to prevent evidence of prior bad acts[9]

Text: ¶ 65. Crawford alleges that it was ineffective for counsel not to demand a pre-trial hearing on admissibility regarding prior bad acts. However, Crawford fails to cite any case which states that it is ineffective assistance for counsel to fail to insist on such a pre-trial hearing. Thus, the Court is unable to find that counsel was deficient for such failure and this claim is without merit. See Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7.
¶ 66. Crawford asserts ineffectiveness in failing to object to testimony concerning prior bad acts. The first part of this claim is that counsel failed to object to certain parts of testimony where Crawford alleges that F.B.I. agent Summerlin made inappropriate references to Crawford's prior trials. However, this claim is lacking in merit as a review of the record reflects that the word trial never came out of agent Summerlin's mouth at the points alleged by Crawford. Summerlin use the words upcoming event, instead. This was not evidence of prior bad action as Crawford alleges. ¶ 67. Crawford also asserts that the prosecution elicited inadmissible prior bad act testimony from both Crawford's father and Dr. Russell, the defendant's expert. However, in each instance, the prosecution performed this questioning on the cross examination of a witness that the defendant was using to establish the insanity defense and, as such, prior bad act evidence became admissible for challenging this defense. See McLeod v. State, 317 So.2d at 391. Because all of the above evidence was admissible, Crawford cannot show counsel was deficient and, thus, his claim is without merit. See Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7.
¶ 68. Crawford alleges that counsel was ineffective for not requiring the trial court to conduct an on the record hearing pursuant to the requirements enumerated in Polk v. State, 612 So.2d 381 (Miss.1992). However, it is apparent that counsel did make a motion in limine to prevent the introduction of DNA evidence and that the court denied the motion, but not before hearing arguments by both sides and taking Polk into consideration. Also, the court's denial of the motion was affirmed on direct appeal. Not only does Crawford fail to allege what counsel specifically should have done, but this Court found that the evidence was properly admitted. Because Crawford has failed to show deficient performance or prejudice, this claim is without merit. See Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7.
¶ 69. Crawford asserts that counsels' refusal to cross examine the states' expert witness on hair was ineffective assistance. First, Crawford already admitted to being in the barn with the victim, which is all that Crawford has alleged that this testimony showed. As such, he can not show prejudice in this case. In addition, as we have stated above, it is not necessarily deficient for counsel, when employing an insanity defense, to stipulate to underlying facts. See McLeod v. State, 317 So.2d at 391. Crawford has not provided this Court with any case law that finds it per se ineffective to not cross examine and opposing party's expert witness. Because he can not show deficiency or prejudice, this claim is without merit. See Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7.
¶ 70. Crawford claims ineffective assistance in that counsel failed to secure funds for an independent expert to analyze fingerprints because it is possible that this expert may have discovered exculpatory evidence. Essentially, Crawford is claiming that the outcome of trial might have been different. However, Strickland requires a showing that the verdict would have been different; and therefore, this claim is without merit. Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7; see also Brown v. State, 798 So.2d 481, 506 (Miss.2001) (no ineffective assistance where petitioner does not make showing that verdict would have been different if expert were retained).
¶ 71. Crawford asserts that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to three specific pieces of testimony which, he claims, were designed to and did inflame the jury. He first claims prejudice as a result of F.B.I. agent Jackson's statement that he had a daughter close in age to the victim. When read in context, however, the statement was no more than an indication of his desire to find the victim as soon as possible in hopes that she might still be alive. Failure to object here was certainly not deficient. ¶ 72. Next, Crawford asserts that counsel should have objected to two statements made by F.B.I. Agent Summerlin. One statement referred to Crawford's professed opinion that at one point, it seemed as if the victim was attempting to witness to him. Another statement, actually made by the prosecution asks [a]nd that is when he killed her? While these statements were certainly objectionable, Crawford provides no case law on point or sufficiently analogous to back up his assertions that the failure to object to these individual statements rendered counsels' assistance ineffective. Indeed, the record reflects counsels' vigorous participation during the testimony of Agent Summerlin, making several objections. ¶ 73. In addition, it cannot be shown that Crawford was prejudiced by any of the above statements. Crawford has failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a different verdict had these statements been objected to and stricken from the record as this Court requires. See Mohr, 584 So.2d at 430. Because Crawford has failed to show deficiency or prejudice, this claim fails. See Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7.