Opinion ID: 1918602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the lump sum settlement documents

Text: [¶ 19] Commercial Union also appeals the denial of its summary judgment motion on the issue of whether, by signing the settlement documents, Hawkes released Commercial Union from all liability. Ordinarily the denial of a summary judgment motion on this issue would not be immediately appealable. See, e.g., Chaput v. Unisys Corp., 964 F.2d 1299, 1302 (2d Cir.1992) (holding denial of summary judgment based on defense of release not immediately appealable). However, the case is properly before us on the issue of Commercial Union's immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act, and the parties have fully briefed and argued the issue of the settlement documents. Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy, we may address this issue because if we were to determine that Hawkes released Commercial Union from all liability, the entire case against Commercial Union would be ended. See Struck v. Hackett, 668 A.2d 411, 419 (Me.1995); Ryan v. City of Augusta, 622 A.2d 74, 76-77 (Me.1993). [¶ 20] The Superior Court found that the settlement documents signed by Hawkes are ambiguous. While the interpretation of unambiguous contracts is a matter of law, the interpretation of ambiguous contracts is a matter of fact. Spottiswoode v. Levine, 1999 ME 79, ¶ 16, 730 A.2d 166, 172. For this reason, the Superior Court denied summary judgment. [¶ 21] The three documents signed by Hawkes, which were executed at the time of the lump sum settlement, must be read together. Hilltop Community Sports Ctr., Inc. v. Hoffman, 2000 ME 130, ¶ 16, 755 A.2d 1058, 1062. Principles of contract govern the interpretation of lump sum settlement agreements. Soucy v. Sullivan & Merritt, 1999 ME 1, ¶ 7, 722 A.2d 361, 363. Unless a workers' compensation settlement agreement explicitly waives the right of the claimant to bring another type of claim against the insurer or the employer, such a waiver will not be implied in the absence of evidence of the intent of the parties at the time of contracting to create the waiver. Id. [¶ 22] There is one sentence in Hawkes' affidavit that, when taken by itself, would seem to release Commercial Union from all claims against it. That sentence is that Hawkes fully understands that he will no longer be able to make any claims against Commercial Union if his lump sum petition is granted by the Workers' Compensation Commission. However, the remainder of the two-page affidavit concerns Hawkes' understanding of the meaning of the lump sum settlement and that he is giving up the ability to make any claim under the Workers' Compensation Act arising out of his 1984 injury. Likewise, the other two documents clearly state that Commercial Union is being released only for claims arising out of Hawkes' employment with Giberson BuickPontiac and for claims stemming from the 1984 injury. Thus, most of the affidavit and the other two documents unambiguously indicate that the sole liability under consideration was that of Commercial Union and Giberson Buick for the 1984 injury and compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act. An ambiguity arises, however, because of the one sentence, referred to above, in the affidavit. That ambiguity is whether the three documents taken together release Commercial Union for liability stemming only from the injury sustained by Hawkes at Giberson Buick, or whether they also bar Hawkes' claim for damages caused by Commercial Union's investigation. Because there is an ambiguity and the meaning of the documents is disputed, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Tondreau v. SherwinWilliams Co., 638 A.2d 728, 730-31 (Me. 1994) (holding summary judgment inappropriate when contract is ambiguous and undisputed facts do not determine intent of parties). The entry is: Order denying summary judgment affirmed.