Opinion ID: 3063469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motion to Suppress the Evidence

Text: 3 Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the district court properly denied Walton’s motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from his apartment. We will address each argument in turn.
First, Walton argues that the magistrate judge rejected his testimony without making a proper credibility determination. A court cannot reject a defendant’s testimony due merely to the defendant’s status as the accused. See Gallego v. United States, 174 F.3d 1196, 1198-99 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, the magistrate’s report and recommendation reflects that the magistrate considered the conflicting testimony offered by the police officers and the defense witnesses. The report then clearly states that the testimony of the officers was credible. Accordingly, we find that the magistrate judge did make a proper credibility determination.1
Second, Walton argues that the initial entry, detention and protective sweep in the apartment violated the Fourth Amendment. “[T]he Fourth Amendment has 1 On appeal, Walton argues that testimony presented for the first time at trial conflicted with a factual finding upon which the magistrate judge relied in making credibility determinations. Thus, Walton argues that the magistrate judge’s credibility determinations were based on a clearly erroneous fact. We can find no indication in the record that Walton brought this inconsistency to the attention of the district court. As a general rule, we will not consider arguments not fairly presented to the district court. Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006). 4 drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1382 (1980). Walton argues that there were no exigent circumstances because two hours had elapsed from the time of the shooting. According to Walton, the police had secured the apartment complex and could monitor the apartment in question while obtaining a warrant. We disagree. “The term ‘exigent circumstances’ refers to a situation where the inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action. Such is the case when resort to a warrant might endanger the police or the public.” United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520, 1526 (11th Cir. 1983). In Burgos, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search. The opinion concluded: The [ATF] agents had been informed that Mr. Kasha had purchased one hundred and ninety-two guns without the proper license in a seven month period. They had observed Mr. Kasha transfer two large boxes filled with arms to [the defendant]. They had observed [the defendant] enter his home and get help from an unknown man in unloading the boxes. The agents were faced with a house laden with arms and an unknown number of people inside. The officers could reasonably believe that the household was an arsenal. The threat of injury to the neighborhood and arresting officers justified the avoidance of delay involved in obtaining a warrant. Quick action increased the likelihood that no one would be injured. Id. 5 We find the present circumstances analogous. The Miami-Dade police department received an emergency call reporting multiple rounds of gunshots from an assault rifle. The shots were fired in a twelve-building apartment complex directly across the street from an elementary school. At the scene, investigators discovered multiple impact holes from an AK-47 and empty casings on the ground. Approximately two hours after officers arrived on the scene, an individual involved in the shooting identified Walton as the perpetrator and directed police to his apartment. The police were informed that Walton kept weapons in his apartment. As the officers approached the apartment, they positively identified Walton through an open door. The police were faced with an apartment potentially full of an unknown number of armed individuals. Accordingly, we conclude that exigent circumstances justified the officer’s warrantless entry, detention and protective sweep.2
Third, Walton argues that his consent to a search beyond the initial protective sweep was involuntary. Consent to search is effective only if voluntarily given. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at 752. Consent cannot be premised 2 The argument in Walton’s brief is insufficient to preserve the issue of probable cause. Therefore, it has been waived. 6 on “a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Voluntariness is determined in reference to the “totality of the circumstances.” Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at 752 (internal quotations omitted). After the officers conducted a brief protective sweep of the apartment incident to Walton’s lawful arrest, Walton signed a written consent form allowing the officers to search his apartment. The magistrate judge made several findings: only one officer approached Walton to obtain his consent, Walton was not threatened, none of the officers had their guns drawn and the written form specifically advised Walton that he could refuse consent to a search. Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court’s conclusion that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his apartment.
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that the government “may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 7 384 U.S. 436, 444 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In order for a defendant’s incriminatory statements to be admissible, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. United States v. Farris, 77 F.3d 391, 396 (11th Cir. 1996). We determine voluntariness based upon the totality of the circumstances, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Barbour, 70 F.3d 580, 584 (11th Cir. 1995). We have recognized that a statement is not given voluntarily if it is “extracted by any sort of threats or violence, or obtained by any direct or implied promises, or by the exertion of any improper influence.” United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1244 n.14 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the district court properly denied Walton’s motion to suppress his post-arrest inculpatory statements. The magistrate judge made several findings: an officer read Walton his Miranda rights before he was questioned, Walton appeared to understand those rights, Walton signed a form waiving his Miranda rights before he was questioned, Walton was not under the influence of narcotics, and Walton was not coerced or threatened into giving any statement. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that a preponderance of the evidence established 8 that Walton made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver his Miranda rights and that Walton’s statements were voluntary.