Opinion ID: 1059198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Malicious Prosecution Claims Against Ring

Text: We have recently restated the following principles: In an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecution was (1) malicious; (2) instituted by, or with the cooperation of, the defendant; (3) without probable cause; and (4) terminated in a manner not unfavorable to the plaintiff . . . In the context of a malicious prosecution action, probable cause is defined as knowledge of such facts and circumstances to raise the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on those facts and circumstances, that the plaintiff is guilty of the crime of which he is suspected. The determination whether a defendant had probable cause to believe that a crime was committed is judged with reference to the time the defendant took the action initiating the criminal charges. When the facts relating to the question of probable cause are in dispute, the issue is one of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. Stanley v. Webber, 260 Va. 90, 95-96, 531 S.E.2d 311, 314-15 (2000) (internal citations omitted). [W]hat constitutes probable cause is a question for the court; but where there is any conflict in the evidence it is for the jury to determine whether in the particular case such probable cause existed. Brodie v. Huck, 187 Va. 485, 488, 47 S.E.2d 310, 312 (1948). Additionally, [w]hen a defendant, in initiating a prosecution, acts in good faith upon the advice of reputable counsel, after a full disclosure of all material facts, he has probable cause to support his action. Probable cause serves as a complete defense to an action for malicious prosecution, even if the advice given by the attorney is wrong. The defendant must prove that he sought advice of counsel with an honest purpose of being informed of the law, that he made a full, correct and honest disclosure of all material facts known to him or which he should reasonably have known, and that he acted in good faith guided by the advice given by counsel. This defense usually presents a jury question unless reasonable minds cannot differ that advice of counsel has been established. Pallas v. Zaharopoulos, 219 Va. 751, 755, 250 S.E.2d 357, 359-60 (1979) (internal citations omitted).
The issuance of a criminal warrant must be supported by probable cause that a crime was committed and probable cause that the person charged committed the crime. Code § 36-106 provides sanctions for violation of the Uniform Statewide Building Code (USBC). Ring's affidavits supporting the issuance of criminal warrants against Andrews and Cox state: Failed to obtain a Building Permit before beginning work on a 10,000 Gallon Storage tank. Concealing work prior to the required inspection by pouring concrete slab. USBC § 107.1 provides that: [a]n application shall be submitted to the code official for the following activities, and these activities shall not commence without a permit being issued in accordance with Section 108.0[:] 1. Construct or alter a structure. 2. Construct an addition. 3. Demolish or move a structure. 4. Make a change of occupancy. 5. Install or alter any equipment which is regulated by this code. 6. Move a lot line which affects an existing structure. USBC § 113,2 provides that: [t]he permit holder shall assure that the following inspections have been conducted and approved by the code official . 1. Inspection of footing excavations and reinforcement material for concrete footings prior to the placement of concrete. 2. Inspection of foundation systems during phases of construction necessary to assure compliance with this code. 3. Inspection of preparatory work prior to the placement of concrete. 4. Inspection of structural members and fasteners prior to concealment. Undisputed facts properly considered for resolution of a motion for summary judgment establish that excavation of the area for the tank occurred before the issuance of the building permit and that a concrete pad was poured without inspection. Cox asserts that the building permit was issued to the School Board and not to him; consequently, he could not be held responsible for violations of the USBC. But the undisputed facts establish that Cox was Director of School Maintenance, he was supervising the construction for the tank, he directed a construction company to excavate the site on the day before the permit was issued, he directed an employee to obtain the permit, and he and persons under his direction poured concrete before obtaining an inspection. When a corporation or other entity acts through individuals and such action involves a violation of the law, the correct rule is that all who participate in it are liable. Crall v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 855, 859, 49 S.E. 638, 640 (1905). Andrews and Cox maintain that there is a factual dispute over whether a building permit was required for the excavation and whether an inspection was required before pouring concrete. The interpretation of the requirements of the USBC is a matter of law, implicitly resolved against them by the trial court's ruling from the bench that there was probable cause for the issuance of [the warrants]. The undisputed facts properly considered upon motion for summary judgment establish that probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant against Cox. But this record does not support a finding upon summary judgment that the warrant against Andrews was issued with probable cause that Andrews participated in any acts in violation of the law. Andrews was the Chairperson of the Grayson County School Board, an unlikely person to be directing on-site construction and pouring concrete. At this stage in the proceeding there is no evidence of any act on her part that provided probable cause that she committed the building code violation in question, and her status as Chairperson of the School Board does not result in vicarious liability for the acts in question.
Reliance upon advice of reputable counsel after full disclosure of all material facts provides a complete defense to an action for malicious prosecution, even if the attorney's advice is wrong. Justified reliance suffices to establish probable cause to support the initial prosecution. Noell v. Angle, 217 Va. 656, 660, 231 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1977). In this case, it is unclear whether an accurate disclosure of all material facts was made. Upon review of this record, we hold that the evidence properly considered for summary judgment purposes does not support a grant of summary judgment on this question.
A voluntary compromise ending a criminal prosecution defeats a subsequent suit for malicious prosecution. Orndorff v. Bond, 185 Va. 497, 502, 39 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1946). Ring alleges that such a compromise was reached in the General District Court of Grayson County when the nolle prosequi was entered in the underlying criminal matters. Andrews and Cox say that no agreement was reached. It is undisputed that a nolle prosequi was entered. Why it was entered and whether it was the result of a compromise cannot be determined by summary judgment on this record.
Ring maintains that he is entitled to the absolute immunity provided by quasi-judicial immunity because he characterizes his actions as those of a prosecutor, involving functions intimately related to the judicial process. As previously addressed, under defined circumstances, a prosecutor may have absolute immunity, in the nature of quasi-judicial immunity, from civil liability. Burns, 500 U.S. at 492, 111 S.Ct. 1934; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984. We have recognized that quasi-judicial immunity may extend to certain non-judicial public officials acting within their jurisdiction, in good faith, and while performing judicial functions. Harlow, 230 Va. at 493, 339 S.E.2d at 184. In conducting this analysis, we apply the `functional comparability' test established by the United States Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). Harlow, 230 Va. at 494, 339 S.E.2d at 184. We must examine whether the act in question shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial process to justify immunity. We conclude that Ring's duties as a building inspector are more akin to those of a police officer in the enforcement of laws, rules and regulations, than a prosecutor in the judicial process. As a matter of law, Ring is not entitled to the absolute immunity afforded by quasi-judicial immunity.
In the alternative, Ring maintains that if he is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, he is, nonetheless, entitled to the same qualified immunity extended to police officers for actions taken in good faith and with probable cause. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). A defendant who asserts the qualified immunity defense, not the plaintiff, must allege and prove the elements comprising this defense. Jordan v. Shands, 255 Va. 492, 499, 500 S.E.2d 215, 219 (1998). Ring argues that Andrews and Cox have not presented any facts that support a claim of actual malice. On this question the burden of proof is on Ring, not Andrews and Cox. Upon review of this record, we hold that the evidence properly considered for summary judgment purposes does not support a grant of summary judgment on this question.