Opinion ID: 6343413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Step-Three Challenge

Text: On appeal, Anderson argues that the ALJ’s Step-Three analysis failed to consider whether his obesity in combination with his other impairments met a listed disability. At the administrative level, Anderson did not argue that his impairments met any particular listing. That is not fatal to his ability to raise such a challenge in federal court. Although 4 the Supreme Court has described SSA administrative proceedings as “adjudicative,”2 they are not classically so3 because they are “non-adversarial,”4 and at times “inquisitorial.”5 Even so, ALJs must articulate their factual findings as part of an administrative record so that those findings may be judicially reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(1)(A), 405(b)(1) (providing that an administrative decision must explain the facts, the administrative determination, and the reasons upon which that determination is based).6 Despite the administrative record requirement, the other attributes of SSA administrative proceedings inhibit the application of the otherwise bedrock adjudicative principles of party presentation, waiver, and forfeiture. Accordingly, at the administrative level, an applicant’s failure to identify a specific listing at Step Three does not preclude the applicant from later contending that his or her conditions met such a listing. But once an unsuccessful applicant seeks judicial review of SSA’s administrative decision, principles of party presentation, waiver, and forfeiture do apply. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 108–09 (2000) (recognizing that in the context of SSA appeals “appellate courts will not consider arguments not raised before trial courts”); cf. TD Bank 2 Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019). 3 See Carr v. Saul, 141 S. Ct. 1352, 1363 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing SSA proceedings as a “decidedly pro-claimant, inquisitorial process [that] is quite unlike an adversarial suit in which parties are expected to identify, argue, and preserve all issues”). 4 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b). 5 Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000) (plurality op.). 6 See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141 (1973) (explaining that substantial-evidence review is appropriate “when reviewing findings made on a hearing record”); Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119–20 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that substantial evidence review of bare conclusory statements is impossible). 5 N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that appellate courts “may affirm on any basis supported by the record, even if it departs from the District Court’s rationale”). Thus, to preserve Step Three arguments for this Court’s review, an applicant who did not succeed at the administrative level must, in district court, identify the specific listings and provide arguments that his or her conditions meet such a listing. In this appeal, Anderson argues that he meets three specific listings and one group of listings due to the cumulative effect of his physical injuries, ailments, and obesity. The individual listings Anderson identifies are Listings 1.02 (describing major dysfunction of a joint), 1.04 (describing spine disorders), and 11.14 (describing peripheral neuropathies). The group of listings is those contained in Paragraph 5.00 (relating to the digestive system). By making those same arguments in District Court, Anderson preserved them. But none of those contentions are successful: the ALJ considered each of them, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Anderson did not meet any listing. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (explaining that the substantial-evidence threshold is satisfied if the record contains “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Listing 1.02 requires an inability to ambulate effectively. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1 Listing 1.02(A); id. Listing 1.00(B)(2)(b)(1)–(2) (defining ambulation as “an extreme limitation of the ability to walk” such that the individual is unable “to carry out activities of daily living”). But the ALJ determined that Anderson, despite his lower body injuries and obesity, could drive a car, travel on his own and grocery shop weekly, and the record contains adequate evidence to support that conclusion. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. Even if Anderson’s obesity made walking more difficult, 6 substantial evidence still supported the ALJ’s conclusion, especially here, where Anderson did not allege that his obesity affected his ability to work. Also, the ALJ adopted the conclusions of expert medical consultants who were aware of Anderson’s obesity, so the ALJ’s decision at least “constitutes a satisfactory if indirect consideration” of Anderson’s obesity. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005). Listing 1.04 requires nerve root compression, spinal arachnoiditis, or lumbar spinal stenosis that results in an inability to ambulate effectively. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1 Listing 1.04(A)–(C). But in reviewing Anderson’s medical records, the ALJ determined that he does not suffer from nerve root compression or spinal arachnoiditis. Those medical records, reinforced with the ALJ’s other finding that Anderson could ambulate effectively despite his injuries and obesity, constitute substantial evidence that Anderson did not meet or equal Listing 1.04. Listing 11.14 requires significant and persistent disorganization of motor function in two extremities “in spite of prescribed treatment.” See id. Listing 11.14; id. Listing 11.04(B); see also id. Listing 11.00(C) (defining ‘persistent disorganization of motor function’ to require paresis or paralysis, involuntary movements, and sensory disturbances). The ALJ recognized that Anderson once complained of numbness in his right hand but observed that later examination revealed a normal grasp and stable functioning, and relevant evidence in the record supports his observation. See Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing substantial evidence as “sufficient evidence ‘to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict’” (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951))). Although one doctor found sensory loss in Anderson’s foot shortly after he broke it, other medical consultants disagreed with that conclusion. But courts, on substantial-evidence review, 7 “are not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations,” so the differing views of the other medical consultants constitute substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s determination that Anderson failed to meet or equal Listing 11.14. See Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Finally, Paragraph 5.00 contains several listings related to various digestive ailments,7 and Anderson argues that the ALJ did not consider any of them. But the record belies his contention. The ALJ considered Anderson’s treatment for gastritis, gastric ulcers, mild esophagitis, hemorrhoids, and cholecystitis, as well as his gallbladder removal, but determined that his digestive impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment in Paragraph 5.00. As for the listings that could be relevant to Anderson, his doctors found no evidence of gastrointestinal hemorrhaging, see 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1 Listing 5.02, or inflammatory bowel disease, see id. Listing 5.06. That record evidence adequately supports the ALJ’s finding that Anderson did not meet or equal a Listing in Paragraph 5.00. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. Therefore, Anderson’s Step Three challenge fails.