Opinion ID: 1173449
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Heading: Summary Judgment as a Favored Remedy in Defamation Actions.

Text: Before addressing the merits of the ruling below, we first examine whether summary judgment is a favored or disfavored remedy in defamation cases. In 1978, this court in Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 672 [150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 586 P.2d 572], said that because unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights, speedy resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable. [Citing Dombrowski v. Pfister (1965) 380 U.S. 479, 486-487 [14 L.Ed. 22, 28-29, 85 S.Ct. 1116].] Therefore, summary judgment is a favored remedy, and upon such a motion the trial court must determine whether there is a sufficient showing of malice to warrant submission of that issue to the jury. (P. 685.) Court of Appeal decisions echo this approving view of summary judgment, though cautioning that summary disposition is not appropriate if a triable issue of fact exists. (See Kaufman v. Fidelity Fed. S. & L. Assn. (1983) 140 Cal. App.3d 913, 920 [189 Cal. Rptr. 818]; Bill v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal. App.3d 1002, 1015 [187 Cal. Rptr. 625]; Desert Sun Publishing Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 97 Cal. App.3d 49, 53 [158 Cal. Rptr. 519]; Fuhrman v. Risner (1979) 92 Cal. App.3d 725, 730-731 [155 Cal. Rptr. 122].) The United States Supreme Court, and in particular Chief Justice Burger, however, has implied that summary judgment may be unsuited for deciding issues of actual malice. In Hutchison v. Proxmire (1979) 443 U.S. 111 [61 L.Ed.2d 411, 99 S.Ct. 2675], the district court had granted summary judgment for defendant, noting that in deciding issues of actual malice summary judgment might well be the rule rather than the exception. (P. 120 [61 L.Ed.2d at p. 422].) While reversing the district court on other grounds (the high court held that plaintiff was not a public figure and thus the New York Times standard did not apply), the opinion commented in a footnote: Considering the nuances of the issues raised here, we are constrained to express some doubt about the so-called `rule'. The proof of `actual malice' calls a defendant's state of mind into question, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition. [Citations.] In the present posture of the case, however, the propriety of dealing with such complex issues by summary judgment is not before us. (443 U.S. at p. 120, fn. 9 [61 L.Ed.2d at p. 422].) [3] It is pointless to declare in the abstract that summary judgment is a favored or disfavored remedy. A more subtle analysis is required  one that explains how a motion for summary judgment should be decided in a defamation case under the New York Times test. (2) The Fifth Circuit in Rebozo v. Washington Post Co. (1981) 637 F.2d 375, undertook such an analysis and reached the following conclusion: [T]he standard of review of First Amendment defamation actions, as in all summary judgment cases, is whether the record, construed in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment has been entered, demonstrates there are genuine issues of fact which, if proven, would support a jury verdict for that party. Since, however, a jury verdict in a defamation case can only be supported when the actual malice is shown by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of evidence as in most other cases, Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1258 (5th Cir.1980), the evidence and all the inferences which can reasonably be drawn from it must meet the higher standard. (P. 381.) We recognize a potential chilling effect from protracted litigation as well as a public interest in resolving defamation cases promptly. That does not mean, however, that a court should grant summary judgment when there is a triable issue of fact as to actual malice. Instead, courts may give effect to these concerns regarding a potential chilling effect by finding no triable issues unless it appears that actual malice may be proved at trial by clear and convincing evidence  i.e., evidence sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find for the plaintiff and for an appellate court to determine that the resulting judgment `does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression' ( Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, supra, 466 U.S. 485 at p.  [80 L.Ed.2d 502 at p. 515]). To this extent, therefore, summary judgment remains a favored remedy in defamation cases involving the issue of actual malice under the New York Times standard.