Opinion ID: 2565993
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: standard of review

Text: [¶ 17] Mr. Lopez focuses on two particular instances of Ms. Huylar's direct examination testimony: (1) when characterizing her very specific and very scientific interview methodology, she said she is testing things because I want to make sure that the information we get is true and accurate; and (2) when the prosecutor in essence asked whether she found elements of a false allegation in CS's disclosure during her interview, she answered, I didn't find those elements that would concern me saying it was a false allegation. [¶ 18] Mr. Lopez urges us to forego the abuse-of-discretion standard of review ordinarily applicable to the trial court's evidentiary rulings and, instead, to use an error per se standard as is used when testimony offers an opinion that the accused is guilty of the charge being tried. Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo.1989); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo.1990). [¶ 19] The State contends, however, that the proper standard of review to apply to these two particular instances of Ms. Huylar's testimony is not entirely clear because Mr. Lopez's trial counsel did not make specific contemporaneous objections to them. Arguably, the State asserts, plain error is that proper standard of review in such a case, and, the State points out, Mr. Lopez's principal brief does not present a plain error analysis. Concluding, the State maintains that the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies. [¶ 20] A study of Mr. Lopez's principal brief reveals, however, that his trial counsel had, in effect, preemptively objected to Ms. Huylar's improper vouching testimony four times before the two particular instances occurred. Mr. Lopez's appellate counsel lists the four objections: the pre-trial motion in limine, the objection during the prosecutor's opening statement to the jury, the objection immediately before Ms. Huylar's direct examination, and the continuing objection lodged early in Ms. Huylar's direct examination. With respect to this continuing objection, the State notes that the Wyoming Rules of Evidence apparently do not specifically address it; further, the State argues, it would appear incongruous for the trial court to permit such an anticipatory objection to an entire class of evidence. It is true, however, that the trial court has broad discretion in exercising reasonable control over the mode of witness examination and evidence presentation in order to avoid needless consumption of time. W.R.E. 611(a). Indeed, our review of the record reveals that, before Ms. Huylar's direct examination, the trial court recognized Mr. Lopez's trial counsel's use of a continuing hearsay objection during the prosecutor's direct examination of CS's day-care provider. Given that practice by the trial court with that witness, we believe that Mr. Lopez's trial counsel reasonably relied on that practice when making the continuing improper vouching objection to Ms. Huylar's testimony. [¶ 21] Having carefully considered the parties' standard-of-review skirmish, we cannot conclude that Mr. Lopez's trial counsel failed to preserve the improper vouching issue for appeal. Counsel alerted the trial court before trial and at every appropriate point as the trial unfolded and Ms. Huylar's testimony was offered that she objected to any attempt by the prosecution to bolster the testimony of the alleged victim with any form of testimony concerning her credibility. [A] defense attorney does not have to walk over any more legal coals to protect the record after first stating the grounds for objection. State v. Milbradt, 305 Or. 621, 756 P.2d 620, 624 (1988). Consequently, we shall apply the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. In Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶ 13, 76 P.3d 805, ¶ 13 (Wyo.2003), we set forth the steps of such review: Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the district court and are not subject to appellate second guessing absent an abuse of discretion. Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 373 (Wyo.1995). We have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice. Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001). Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination. Id. The burden is on the defendant to establish such abuse. Trujillo [ v. State ], 2 P.3d [567] at 571 [(Wyo.2000)]. If the trial court erred by admitting evidence, we then must ascertain whether the error affects any substantial rights of the accused, providing grounds for reversal, or whether it is harmless. The harmless error standard is set out in W.R.A.P. 9.04: Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the reviewing court. See also W.R.Cr.P. 52. An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred. To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under `circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.' Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo.1990). Solis [ v. State ], 981 P.2d [34] at 36 [(Wyo.1999)] (some citations omitted); see also Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 52-53 (Wyo.1999). Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766-67 (Wyo.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 994, 122 S.Ct. 1554, 152 L.Ed.2d 477 (2002).