Opinion ID: 1793265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duplication of evidence.

Text: Appellant contends that all of the charges arising from the August 3, 2001, search should be vacated on double jeopardy grounds because the chemicals, equipment, and methamphetamine found during the August 3, 2001, search are the same chemicals, equipment, and methamphetamine found during the July 24, 2001, search, and that the police simply failed to remove those items from his property. Thus, he claims he has been convicted twice for the same offenses. During the July 24, 2001, search, the Kentucky State Police officers found: Two marijuana plants; Two plastic containers containing pill dough; Jar containing coffee filters and liquid that tested positive for methamphetamine and attached by plastic tubing to a plastic ketchup bottle (generator) that was smoking when discovered; Punctured Prestone starting fluid cans; Denatured alcohol; Aluminum foil boat; Two funnels; Mason jar; Liquid Fire; Coleman Fuel; Glass jar containing ether; Used coffee filters; Altered propane tank containing anhydrous ammonia; Bowl of suspected anhydrous ammonia. According to the search warrant, the Prestone starting fluid cans, aluminum foil boat, used coffee filters, funnels, and Mason jar were not removed from the property after the search. The propane tank was also not removed, but the police rendered it inoperable by puncturing it with bullet holes. During the August 3, 2001, search, officers of the Logan County Sheriff's Office found: Two plastic containers with powder in the bottom that were still smoking and two empty plastic liquid dishwasher bottles that had been fitted with tubing that were still emanating gas; Salt; Rubber hose; Bag of lithium strips; Punctured Prestone starting fluid cans; Rolling papers; Burnt aluminum foil; Berez torch; Pipes with burn residue that tested positive for methamphetamine; Syringes with burn residue that tested positive for methamphetamine; Glass jar containing anhydrous ammonia; Glass jar containing liquid that tested positive for methamphetamine; Altered propane tank punctured by bullet holes. Because we have previously determined in Part I of this opinion, supra, that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) (possession of the chemicals and equipment), and because Appellant was not charged with mere possession of methamphetamine, KRS 218A.1415(1), this issue affects only his convictions of possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container for the purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine on August 3, 2001, and of use or possession of drug paraphernalia on August 3, 2001. The instruction on possession of anhydrous ammonia on August 3, 2001, permitted a conviction based on possession not only of the anhydrous ammonia found in the glass jar on that date but also on possession of the altered propane tank, despite the fact that the Kentucky State Police had previously disabled the tank for future use by puncturing it with bullet holes, thus precluding a second conviction for possessing anhydrous ammonia in the tank on August 3, 2001. Thus, the conviction of possession of anhydrous ammonia on August 3, 2001, must be reversed for a new trial at which the jury will be instructed that a conviction of unlawfully possessing anhydrous ammonia must be premised upon the anhydrous ammonia found in the glass jar on that date. (The anhydrous ammonia found in the glass jar could not have been the same anhydrous ammonia found in a bowl in the deep freeze during the July 24th search because the officers who found the anhydrous ammonia on July 24th diluted it and poured it out on the ground.) The statute defining the offense of use or possession of drug paraphernalia provides that [i]t is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia for the purpose of ... manufacturing, ... ingesting, inhaling... a controlled substance in violation of this chapter. KRS 218A.500(2) (emphasis added). Under the to use theory, a defendant could be convicted of either presently and unlawfully using the drug paraphernalia or having unlawfully used it in the past. Under the intent to use theory, a defendant could be convicted of presently possessing the drug paraphernalia with an intent to unlawfully use it in the future. The instruction under which the jury convicted Appellant of use or possession of drug paraphernalia on August 3, 2001, was as follows: You will find the Defendant guilty of possession/use of drug paraphernalia, under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about the 3rd day of August, 2001, the Defendant possessed drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it in the furtherance of illegal drug activity or manufacture. (Emphasis added.) The jury convicted Appellant of use or possession of drug paraphernalia on July 24, 2001, under an identically worded instruction. The trial court did not submit either count of the indictment to the jury under the to use theory, effectively granting a directed verdict of acquittal and thereby precluding retrial on that theory. Kotila, 114 S.W.3d at 236. Drug paraphernalia was defined in a separate instruction that parroted the lengthy definition in KRS 218A.500(1), except that it substituted the word methamphetamine for the words a controlled substance. It is possible, as Appellant asserts, that the liquid that tested positive for methamphetamine on August 3, 2001, was some of the same liquid found in the glass jar that was being cooked on July 24, 2001 (the officers who conducted the search on July 24, 2001, did not claim to have confiscated all of that liquid although one would have expected them to have done so). It is also possible, as Appellant asserts, that the punctured Prestone starting fluid cans found by the sheriff's officers on August 3, 2001, were the same cans found by the state police on July 24, 2001, and that the burnt piece of aluminum foil found by the sheriff's officers was the same aluminum foil boat with burn marks found by the state police. Otherwise, there does not appear to be any duplication of the items found during the separate searches. Appellant's double jeopardy claim with respect to the liquid that tested positive for methamphetamine fails because (1) the indictment did not charge Appellant with the offense of possession of methamphetamine, KRS 218A.1415(1), on either occasion; and (2) the product of the manufacturing process, e.g., the methamphetamine that was actually manufactured, is not within the definition of drug paraphernalia. KRS 218A.500(1). Thus, Appellant could not have been convicted of any crime except manufacturing methamphetamine premised upon his possession of the liquid that tested positive for methamphetamine. And since the trial court did not instruct the jury on the to use theory of KRS 218A.500(2), Appellant could not have been convicted for possessing the empty Prestone starting fluid cans on either occasion. The cans were empty, i.e., did not contain any starting fluid, and thus could not have been possessed with an intent to use them to manufacture methamphetamine in the future. However, Appellant may have been twice convicted of possessing the same aluminum foil boat with the intent to use it to ingest or inhale methamphetamine. Although we have never addressed the issue, other jurisdictions have held that uninterrupted possession of the same contraband over a period of time is but one offense constituting a continuing course of conduct, precluding convictions of multiple offenses for possession of the same contraband on different dates. The most oft-cited case on the issue is United States v. Jones, 533 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir.1976), in which the defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon for possessing the same firearm in October 1970, the date he purchased it, in March 1973, when he was stopped for a traffic violation and the officer recorded the fact that he was carrying the weapon, and in December 1973, when officers discovered it while executing a search warrant for suspected bootlegging. Id. at 1389-90. Analogizing the facts with those in Crepps v. Durden, 98 Eng.Rep. 1283 (K.B.1777) (baker could not be charged with multiple offenses for selling loaves of bread on the Sabbath), and In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 7 S.Ct. 556, 30 L.Ed. 658 (1887) (practicing Mormon could not be charged with three counts of illegal cohabitation for sharing marital felicity with seven wives over three-year period), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in Jones that [p]ossession is a course of conduct, not an act; by prohibiting possession Congress intended to punish as one offense all of the acts of dominion which demonstrate a continuing possessory interest in a firearm. Id., 533 F.2d at 1391. The Court distinguished United States v. Hairrell, 521 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir.1975), where the defendant was charged and acquitted of possessing counterfeit currency, then was properly charged again for possessing the same counterfeit currency after the acquittal because continued possession after acquittal constituted a new and different offense from that with which he was previously charged. Hairrell, 521 F.2d at 1266. Compare KRS 505.020(1)(c), infra. In United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191 (9th Cir.1993), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted this distinction to mean that an uninterrupted possession would constitute only one offense but that an interrupted possession would permit separate convictions for possession both before and after the interruption. Id. at 193. See also United States v. Rivera, 77 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir.1996) (Where there is no proof that possession of the same weapon is interrupted, the Government may not arbitrarily carve a possession into separate offenses.); Johnson v. Morgenthau, 69 N.Y.2d 148, 512 N.Y.S.2d 797, 505 N.E.2d 240, 242-43 (N.Y.1987) (uninterrupted possession of a weapon over a six-day period constituted a continuous offense supporting only one prosecution for criminal possession); State v. Zele, 168 Vt. 154, 716 A.2d 833, 837 (Vt.1998) (possession of marijuana occurring on two separate days was a continuing offense); Wayne R. LaFave & Austin V. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.2(3), at 32 n. 42.1 (Supp.1998) (crime of possession not an act, but a continuing offense, lasting as long as the act of possession does); compare United States v. Conley, 291 F.3d 464, 470-71 (7th Cir.2002) (separate convictions of illegal possession of the same firearm on July 7, 1999, and January 27, 2000, upheld where possession was interrupted during a two-month period in which the weapon was in the possession of another person). KRS 505.020(1)(c) provides: (1) When a single course of conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one (1) offense, he may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not, however, be convicted of more than one (1) offense when: ... (c) The offense is designed to prohibit a continuing course of conduct and the defendant's course of conduct was uninterrupted by legal process, unless the law expressly provides that specific periods of such conduct constitute separate offenses. (Emphasis added.) Under our statute, the continuing course of conduct can only be carved into separate offenses if it has been interrupted by legal process. Legal process would include an arrest warrant, an indictment, or an arraignment. Morales v. Busbee, 972 F.Supp. 254, 266 (D.N.J.1997). We conclude that Appellant's arrest for use or possession of drug paraphernalia on July 24, 2001, was a legal process that interrupted his possession of the aluminum foil boat so that his subsequent possession of the same paraphernalia (if it was the same) would constitute a separate offense. Thus, if he was twice convicted of possessing the same aluminum foil boat, those convictions did not constitute double jeopardy. Appellant also posits that he was convicted of both possession of drug paraphernalia on August 3, 2001, and manufacturing methamphetamine on August 3, 2001, based on his possession of the smoking hydrogen chloride generator. Since those offenses are defined under two separate statutes, this claim must be analyzed under the Burge / Blockburger test of whether each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805, 809 (1996). KRS 218A.1432(1)(a) requires that the defendant knowingly and unlawfully manufacture methamphetamine. KRS 218A.500(2) requires that the defendant use or possess with the intent to use drug paraphernalia for the purpose of, e.g., manufacturing methamphetamine. Because the drug paraphernalia instruction only permitted a conviction of that offense under the intent to use theory, the jury could not have found guilt of use or possession of drug paraphernalia under a theory that Appellant had already used the generator to manufacture methamphetamine. Thus, it must have found that he intended to use it again to manufacture additional methamphetamine in the future. Since one conviction was for the present or past use of the paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine and the other for an intent to use the paraphernalia in the future to manufacture additional methamphetamine, each offense required proof of an element that the other did not and no double jeopardy violation occurred. In conclusion, Appellant's claim of possible multiple convictions for the same offenses requires retrial of the conviction of possessing anhydrous ammonia on August 3, 2001, but does not require retrial of his convictions of use or possession of drug paraphernalia.