Opinion ID: 3056546
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rodriguez’s Claims on Appeal

Text: Rodriguez argues that the following comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument were not based on evidence and amounted to prosecutorial misconduct: (1) Rodriguez’s allegations of sexual assault could have ruined the life of the accused correctional officer, and (2) because investigators spent time investigating Rodriguez’s allegations, real cases were neglected. We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct de novo. United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 947 (11th Cir. 2006). To establish prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show both that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, and that those remarks prejudicially affected her substantial rights. Id. While a prosecutor may not exceed the evidence presented at trial during her closing argument, she may state conclusions drawn from the evidence presented at trial. United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1400 (11th Cir. 1997). “Although a prosecutor may not make an argument directed to passions or prejudices of the 4 Case: 11-15465 Date Filed: 11/30/2012 Page: 5 of 12 jurors instead of an understanding of the facts and law, there is no prohibition on colorful and perhaps flamboyant remarks if they relate to the evidence adduced at trial.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A prosecutor may argue the conclusions that the jury should draw from the evidence. United States v. Johns, 734 F.2d 657, 663 (11th Cir. 1984). In addition to showing that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, a defendant must also show that those remarks prejudiced her substantial rights. Eckhard, 466 F.3d at 947. Improper remarks prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for the remarks. Id. If “the record contains sufficient independent evidence of guilt, any error is harmless.” Id. Here, the prosecutor’s remarks were not improper and did not prejudice Rodriguez’s substantial rights. When the prosecutor told the jury that the agents had to spend time investigating Rodriguez’s allegations and thus could not investigate real cases, the prosecutor likely intended to remind the jury of the fact that Rodriguez’s lies were material and had real consequences. Similarly, the prosecutor’s comment that Rodriguez’s lies could have ruined the correctional officer’s life was a common-sense inference as to the likely consequences of Rodriguez’s lies. See e.g. Bailey, 123 F.3d at 1400; Johns, 734 F.2d at 663. 5 Case: 11-15465 Date Filed: 11/30/2012 Page: 6 of 12 The prosecutor’s comments during closing argument were not improper and did not prejudice Rodriguez’s substantial rights.
Next, Rodriguez contends that the district court erred in determining that she substantially interfered with the administration of justice. Specifically, Rodriguez argues that the three-level enhancement cannot apply because the government resources expended were part of the investigation into and the prosecution of her false claims. See United States v. Johnson, 485 F.3d 1264, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that “the government correctly recognized at sentencing that it could not rely on any investigative costs incurred prior to Johnson’s false testimony or the expenses associated with prosecuting Johnson's underlying perjury offense.”). “We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the Guidelines de novo.” United States v. Newman, 614 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 2J1.2(b)(2) of the Guidelines provides a three-level enhancement if the offense resulted in a “substantial interference with the administration of justice.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2). The commentary explains that substantial interference with the administration of justice includes, among other things, “the unnecessary 6 Case: 11-15465 Date Filed: 11/30/2012 Page: 7 of 12 expenditure of substantial governmental or court resources.” § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1. In United States v. Johnson, we interpreted this commentary with regard to a perjury offense. 485 F.3d at 1271. We upheld the district court’s application of a three-level enhancement under § 2J1.3(b)(2) for unnecessary expenditure of substantial government or court resources. As a result of the defendant’s false grand jury testimony, the government was forced to identify and interview several other witnesses, review the defendant’s records, and reconvene the grand jury, which required the government to pay travel expenses for grand jury members, prosecutors, and witnesses. Id. at 1272. We also held that the government need not specify the number of hours expended by government employees to sustain the enhancement. Id. at 1271. In this case, the record shows the expenditure of substantial government resources that were required to investigate Rodriguez’s initial claims of sexual assault. First, Rodriguez was interviewed on multiple occasions by different agents. She was moved to a different jail during the investigation. An Assistant United States Attorney had to prepare a search warrant in order to obtain DNA from the alleged perpetrator. DNA had to be collected from Rodriguez’s boyfriend and her alleged attacker. Lastly, the DNA collected (pants, hair, saliva) had to be tested and analyzed. DNA testing and analysis is a time consuming and 7 Case: 11-15465 Date Filed: 11/30/2012 Page: 8 of 12 expensive process. The record reflects that these resources were spent investigating Rodriguez’s allegations and identifying her alleged assailant, and thus are attributable to her criminal conduct for purposes of the Guidelines. Rodriguez has not shown that the district court clearly erred in determining that she substantially interfered with the administration of justice by causing the unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental resources.
Rodriguez contends that her offense was not extensive in scope, planning, or preparation because it involved her claiming that she had been the victim of sexual assault and because DNA analyses quickly proved that her allegations were not supported in fact. Section § 2J1.2(b)(3)(C) provides for a two-level enhancement where the offense “was otherwise extensive in scope, planning, or preparation.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(3)(C). Rodriguez’s offense was “extensive in scope, planning, [and] preparation” and the district court did not err in so finding. See id. Here, the district court found Rodriguez’s offense extensive in scope and planning “because [it] involve[d] a gathering together of lies and misrepresentations.” This court agrees. It could not have been an easy task for 8 Case: 11-15465 Date Filed: 11/30/2012 Page: 9 of 12 Rodriguez to obtain a semen sample from her boyfriend while he visited her in a guarded visiting room and to then use that semen in such a way that would allow her to have semen-stained pants in her cell. To further corroborate her story, Rodriguez provided her boyfriend with a sample of her hair so he could later produce her hair with a semen sample on it. Rodriguez directed agents to her boyfriend so he could give them the hair sample. Given the constraints of incarceration, Rodriguez’s offense clearly involved extensive planning and preparation and the district court did not err in awarding the two-level enhancement.