Opinion ID: 865509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether dismissal is warranted for failure to

Text: COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENT. ¶29. Forest Hill and Long Term Care argue that no notice was given to any defendant before filing suit and that Brister admitted this to the trial court. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-36(15) (Rev. 2003) states: No action based upon the health care provider's professional negligence may be begun unless the defendant has been given at least sixty (60) days' prior written notice of the intention to begin the action. No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered. If the notice is served within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration 11 A third issue was presented (whether Rhonda Bounds was improperly substituted as a defendant); however, Bounds’s post-appeal settlement with the plaintiff now renders this issue moot. 15 of the applicable statute of limitations, the time for the commencement of the action shall be extended sixty (60) days from the service of the notice for said health care providers and others. This subsection shall not be applicable with respect to any defendant whose name is unknown to the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint and who is identified therein by a fictitious name. This amendment was passed by a special session of the Legislature in 2002, and was effective from and after January 1, 2003. Brister argues that she was not required to give sixty days notice because Henry passed away on July 31, 2001, and her cause of action thus accrued before January 1, 2003. However, we have clearly held that the statutory notice is required for claims filed on or after January 1, 2003, regardless of when the claim accrued. Arceo v. Tolliver, 949 So. 2d 691, 694-95 (Miss. 2007) (citing Pitalo v. GPCHP-GP, Inc., 933 So. 2d 927, 928-29 (Miss. 2006)). ¶30. Brister admits that she did not give the statutory notice to any party. Previously, this Court was “squarely confronted with a situation where the plaintiff, in filing an original complaint, a first amended complaint, and a second amended complaint, wholly failed to submit any notice required by the statute.” Arceo, 949 So. 2d at 697 n.5 (emphasis in original). We further stated in Arceo: On June 4, 2004, Myrtis Tolliver filed a complaint for medical malpractice and negligence against Dr. Arceo and John and Jane Doe defendants. On June 25, 2004, the plaintiff filed a first amended complaint; and, on July 23, 2004, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. Prior to the filing of these complaints, the plaintiff failed to submit the notice required by Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(15) (Rev. 2003). Id. at 692-93 (footnotes omitted). We held in Arceo that the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, because 16 Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-36(15) clearly states that no action may be begun without prior notice. Id. at 694-95 (citing Pitalo, 933 So. 2d at 928-29). Here, as in Arceo, “the plaintiff wholly failed to provide any written notice to any medical provider concerning her intention to commence suit.” Id. at 694. Thus, clearly, as a named party, Forest Hill was entitled to sixty days notice before the filing of the suit, failing which, Forest Hill was entitled to dismissal. ¶31. As to Long Term Care, Brister also argues that she was not required to give notice to the defendants, specifically Long Term Care, who were substituted as John Does, because Section 15-1-36(15) specifically provides that “[t]his subsection shall not be applicable with respect to any defendant whose name is unknown to the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint and who is identified therein by a fictitious name.” We agree with this assertion as to Long Term Care concerning this first issue and find that; therefore, we proceed to Issue