Opinion ID: 2104257
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doctrine of Mutual Combat Prior to Criminal Code Revision

Text: Prior to November 1, 1989, the effective date of Tennessee's comprehensive revision of the criminal code, Tennessee law provided that an unlawful killing with malice aforethought, either express or implied, constituted the offense of murder. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-201 (1982) [repealed]. If the murder was perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, or by other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing or was committed during the commission of a felony, the killing constituted first degree murder. Id. § 39-2-202(a) [repealed]. All other murders were deemed second degree murder. Id. § 39-2-211(a) [repealed]. Under the pre 1989 criminal code, manslaughter was defined as the unlawful killing of another without malice, either express or implied, which may be either voluntary upon a sudden heat, or involuntary, but in the commission of some unlawful act. Id. § 39-2-221 [repealed]. In addition, case law stated that voluntary manslaughter was the unlawful and intentional killing by one of another, without malice, but upon a sudden heat or passion produced by provocation adequate to obscure the reason of an ordinary man, and thus negative malice. Smith v. State, 212 Tenn. 510, 370 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1963). In Wilson v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals distinguished second degree murder from voluntary manslaughter. As the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: The degree of homicide in the killing was for the jury to determine as shown by the facts. The essential element required to distinguish second (2nd) degree murder from voluntary manslaughter is the presence or absence of malice at the time of the killing. If the killing be not actuated by malice, then it is manslaughter. 574 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978) (citations omitted). The distinguishing element between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter-the presence or absence of malice at the time of the killing-lies at the heart of the doctrine of mutual combat. In a number of cases decided before the revision of the criminal code, the appellate courts reduced convictions for second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter on the ground that the defendant and the victim had been engaged in mutual combat at the time of the killing. See Hunt, 303 S.W.2d at 742; see also Cooper v. State, 210 Tenn. 63, 356 S.W.2d 405 (1962); Wright v. State, 497 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.Crim.App.1973); Mosley v. State, 477 S.W.2d 246 (Tenn.Crim.App.1971). But see Gann v. State, 214 Tenn. 711, 383 S.W.2d 32 (1964) (concluding that the evidence did not support a finding of mutual combat and therefore affirming the conviction for second degree murder). It has been difficult, however, to determine whether the finding of mutual combat negated the element of malice as a matter of law, or whether mutual combat merely served as evidence of the sudden heat or passion element of manslaughter. Black's Law Dictionary's definition seems to support either interpretation. Under its description of mutual combat as one into which both parties enter willingly, or in which two persons, upon a sudden quarrel, and in hot blood, mutually fight, [3] a finding of either a combat entered into willingly or a combat entered into in hot blood apparently would qualify. Likewise, in Hunt , mutual combat was not clearly defined. First, this Court seemed to treat mutual combat as evidence of provocation, stating, Clearly the authorities support the proposition ... [that] a killing ensuing from a sudden transportation of passion or heat of blood, as in a fight or sudden combat, is manslaughter. 303 S.W.2d at 742 (emphasis added). In the same paragraph, however, the Court quoted with approval language from Corpus Juris Secundum that a homicide resulting from mutual combat or the excitement and heat of passion arising therefrom is voluntary manslaughter. 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 48(b) at 912, quoted in Hunt, 303 S.W.2d at 742 (emphasis added). In Cooper, on the other hand, the Court reviewed the facts of the case and stated that from a most careful reading of this record we cannot believe that the defendant intended to kill the deceased prior to being struck in the mouth [by the victim] and that [o]n the other hand, his act appears to have resulted from a sudden impulse or heat of passion. 356 S.W.2d at 410-11. The Court further noted the general rule that `if a man kills another person, upon sudden heat produced by adequate provocation it is voluntary manslaughter.' There must be sudden heat from such provocation to negative malice Id. at 411. Thus, the Court clearly applied the mutual combat doctrine as evidence of provocation rather than as a substitute for it. In light of that rule, the Court stated, [w]e are convinced from reading this record that the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter and not murder in the second degree. Id. Conversely, in Gann , the Court presented a thorough summary of the facts upon which the defendant based his claim that he was guilty, at most, of voluntary manslaughter. While acknowledging the mutual combat analysis of Hunt , however, the Court distinguished Hunt by concluding that there was sufficient evidence of malice in Gann to support the defendant's conviction for second degree murder. Gann, 383 S.W.2d at 37. Our reading of the mutual combat cases leads us to conclude that the doctrine of mutual combat did not, as a matter of law, reduce second degree murder convictions to voluntary manslaughter. Instead, the doctrine was essentially a factual analysis used to determine whether the killing resulted from provocation sufficient to negate the existence of malice. The common thread in the cases in which the appellate court reduced the conviction from second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter is that the court, implicitly if not explicitly, concluded that evidence of the confrontation between the defendant and the victim sufficiently proved that the killing occurred as a result of provocation or the heat of passion, thus negating the element of malice necessary to support a conviction for second degree murder.