Opinion ID: 794242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Oppression Count

Text: 36 Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that the District Court erred in granting a judgment of acquittal following the jury verdict of guilty on Count One of the Indictment. Count One charges a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7214, which provides in pertinent part as follows: 37 Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States — (1) who is guilty of . . . willful oppression under color of law . . . shall be dismissed from office or discharged from employment and, upon conviction thereof, shall be. . . imprisoned not more than five years. . . . 38 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(1). 39 The District Court properly determined that there was evidentiary support for a jury finding that the first two elements of the offense were satisfied, viz. that Temple was an employee of the United States and that she was acting in connection with the revenue laws by threatening the detectives with an IRS audit. The District Court erred, however, in concluding that there was a lack of evidentiary support for the third element — willful oppression of the detectives under color of law. Since this is a case of first impression in regard to the interpretation of willful oppression under color of law in the context of a criminal prosecution under § 7214(a)(1), we turn to some commonly held concepts to illuminate the phrase. 40 Willful repeatedly has been defined in the criminal context as intentional, purposeful, and voluntary, as distinguished from accidental or negligent. See Black's Law Dictionary 1630 (8th ed.2004). Evil intent or bad purpose are not implicit in this definition. Id. Oppression includes the unjust or cruel exercise of authority or power. Merriam-Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 1584 (1993). In criminal law, it is [a]n abuse of office committed by a public official. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://dictionary. oed.com/ entrance.dtl (search for oppression) (definition from the June 2004 Draft Revision to the 1989 Second Edition) (last visited February 27, 2006). For a definition of the phrase under color of law, we turn to the cases interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the criminal and civil statutes prohibiting the deprivation under color of law of rights protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States. While color of law under these statutes refers to actions taken under color of state law, we think that the tests established in the cases pertinent to these statutes are helpful in determining whether an action is taken under color of federal law for purposes of § 7214(a)(1). We therefore substitute [federal] for state when quoting from the cases. We have noted that 41 [t]he Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the color of law requirement, concluding that [m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of [federal] law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of [federal] law, is action taken `under color of [federal] law.' 42 United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 50 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941)). Color of law and pretense of law are synonymous, and acts of officers engaged in personal pursuits are not included. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945). Although no bright line separates actions taken under color of law from personal pursuits, Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548 (2d Cir.1994), the relevant question in determining whether an action was taken under color of law is not whether the [action] was part of the defendant's official duties but, rather, whether the [action] was `made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of [federal] law,' Walsh, 194 F.3d at 51 (quoting Classic, 313 U.S. at 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031). One who abuses a position given to him or her by the government is said to act under color of law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). Such is the case, for example, where a police officer, albeit off-duty, nonetheless invokes the real or apparent power of the police department. Pitchell, 13 F.3d at 548. 43 In determining that the color of law requirement had not been met, the District Court relied on Hughes v. Halifax County Sch. Bd., 855 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.1988). In Hughes, the plaintiff claimed that he was assaulted, battered, and subjected to intentional emotional distress under color of state law because he was accosted by county employees. Id. at 186. The county employees were co-workers employed by the maintenance department of the school district. In rejecting a claim that the co-workers were acting under color of law, the Court in Hughes distinguished cases involving judges and police officers: The judges were figuratively and literally clothed in state power, and the officers were acting behind badges. [The co-workers] were wearing, at best, county coveralls. The indicia of state authority just isn't the same. Id. at 187. 44 Hughes is not analogous to the case at bar. Temple's employment by the IRS clothed her with the indicia of authority while the co-workers' employment in positions of equal rank with the plaintiff in Hughes did not. The District Court also found that Temple had no power or authority because she was arrested and handcuffed when she threatened the detectives. Temple, 342 F.Supp.2d at 240. But this fact does not establish that the threats were not made under color of law. The District Court also found it significant that, some time after the threat was made, some personnel at the police precinct laughed while Temple was responding to pedigree questions, and that she was at one point treated as an emotionally disturbed person. Id. These events perhaps indicate in retrospect that the detectives should not have taken Temple's threats seriously. Yet, they testified that they did in fact take the threats quite seriously. Moreover, these later events do not gainsay the fact that the detectives knew of Temple's employment with the IRS and had no reason to doubt that she would carry out her threats as she made them in the police car on the way to the precinct. Recently, in United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30 (2d Cir.2006), a case involving sexual abuse of minors by a mayor, we held that the mayor acted under color of law by actively and deliberately us[ing] his apparent authority as mayor to ensure that the victims did not resist or report the ongoing abuse. Id. at 47. The evidence here, insofar as it pertains to color of law, is even more compelling than it was in Giordano. Here, there was a specific and direct threat under the guise of apparent authority, while in Giordano it appears that no specific and direct threat to invoke official authority ever was made. 45 In this regard, the District Court's observations — that Temple was on notice that the IRS had proposed to remove her from service, that she had been disciplined several times, that her employment was precarious when she was arrested, and that there was no basis in the record to conclude that Temple had authority to initiate an audit of the detectives' returns, Temple, 342 F.Supp.2d at 240 — do not support the conclusion that Temple was not clothed with the authority of federal law. The detectives were unaware of any of these matters as they transported Temple and as she made her threats. They knew only that she was an employee of the IRS. To them, she was authorized to speak as a representative of her agency. Her oppressive conduct was indeed made possible by her perceived ability to invoke the real or apparent authority of her department. 46 We have said, in another context, that Section 7214 imposes sanctions on revenue agents for departures from the high standards of conduct demanded by those holding that office. United States v. Stern, 418 F.2d 198, 199 (2d Cir.1969) (per curiam). Temple's egregious, obnoxious, unprofessional, and, indeed, oppressive behavior represent a significant departure from those standards. In any event, we are unwilling, under the circumstances revealed, to agree with the District Court that no rational jury could find that Temple acted under color of law. See United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir.1991) (holding that, in case involving an assault by an off-duty police officer on his wife's boyfriend, a rational jury could find that the officer acted under color of law).