Opinion ID: 884961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility as Part of Benjamin's Case

Text: ¶ 19 The District Court concluded that the evidence profered by Benjamin did not meet the first Matt requirement of similarity. Benjamin contends that this was an abuse of discretion, because Torgerson's alleged abuse of Moran was sufficiently similar to his alleged abuse of Benjamin and cites various similarities. He argues that the alleged assault on Larson was also similar by virtue of her age at the time she was allegedly assaulted. ¶ 20 Torgerson contends that the acts to which Moran would have testified were not sufficiently similar to those alleged by Benjamin and lists a number of dissimilarities. He does not address Larson's testimony in his brief to this Court. ¶ 21 The District Court determined that the prior acts were too remote and too dissimilar to be admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid. ¶ 22 The first prong of the Matt test does not require that the prior acts be identical to the crime alleged, but they must be sufficiently similar. See State v. Whitlow (1997), 285 Mont. 430, 438, 949 P.2d 239, 245. We have upheld the admission of other crimes where the prior act was the touching of breasts and genitals with attempted penetration of the defendant's young daughter, and the act complained of was touching and actual penetration of another young girl. See Whitlow, 285 Mont. at 438, 949 P.2d at 245. We have also concluded that the similarity prong was satisfied where the prior act was the touching of the outer and inner thighs in an attempt to touch the vaginal areas of a 13-year-old girl, and the act complained of was actual touching of the vaginal areas of 8-, 9-, and 14-year-old girls. See State v. Crist, 253 Mont. 442, 446, 833 P.2d 1052, 1055. However, the State in Crist, also offered prior act evidence that the defendant showed a minor a pornographic magazine, offered her an alcoholic beverage and joked that he would take advantage of her. We concluded that these acts were innuendos that were too broad to meet the standards of similarity, and could not properly be characterized as sexual abuse. See Crist, 253 Mont. at 446-47, 833 P.2d at 1055. ¶ 23 In State v. Long (1986), 223 Mont. 502, 726 P.2d 1364, this Court held that allegedly rubbing the clothed bottom of a five-year-old was sufficiently similar to the complained of facts that the defendant had rubbed the unclothed vaginas of two, four-year-old children, although the defendant argued that the alleged prior bad act had no sexual connotation and that it took on evil connotations only when coupled with the charges of sexual assault. Long, 223 Mont. at 507, 726 P.2d at 1367. ¶ 24 In this case, both parties presented the District Court with lengthy argument about the admissibility of the prior acts. From our review of the record, we conclude that the Court did not abuse its discretion when it reviewed the authorities and concluded that the proffered evidence should not be admitted at trial. Despite the fact that both the act complained of and the alleged prior acts were instances of sexual assaults of minors, there are nonetheless significant distinguishing characteristics in the conduct complained of, from which the District Court could have concluded that the acts were too dissimilar to warrant their admission. In particular, we note that in each of our prior cases cited here, the prior conduct admitted by the District Court was similar in very specific details to the conduct complained of. While we do not conclude that such detail is a necessity in every case, we conclude that the District Court could properly have distinguished the prior conduct in this case on that basis. Accordingly, we defer to the District Court's broad discretion and conclude that that discretion was not abused when the District Court excluded the prior acts testimony of both women during Benjamin's proof of his case because the acts were not sufficiently similar. ¶ 25 The District Court also concluded that the acts complained of were too remote. We have previously refused to establish an arbitrary time limit for remoteness of prior acts. See Crist, 253 Mont. at 446, 833 P.2d at 1055; State v. Medina (1990), 245 Mont. 25, 30, 798 P.2d 1032, 1036, overruled on other grounds by State v. Olson (1997), 286 Mont. 364, 951 P.2d 571. More recently, we have stated that remoteness of a prior act affects its weight, not its admissibility. See Whitlow, 285 Mont. at 438, 949 P.2d at 245; State v. Ramstead (1990), 243 Mont. 162, 167, 793 P.2d 802, 805 (citing State v. Eiler (1988), 234 Mont. 38, 49, 762 P.2d 210, 217). However, because we affirm the District Court's exclusion of the prior acts evidence on the basis of dissimilarity, we need not address whether it was too remote in time.