Opinion ID: 1463482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Leave To Endorse Additional Witnesses

Text: The final claim made by Moss in his Rule 29.15 motion is that his appellate counsel was ineffective. Trial counsel requested the State's witness list under Rule 25.03 in December. Five days before trial in May, the State notified Moss of two additional witnesses, and it was the first Moss learned that these people had knowledge of the case. On the first day of trial, the State filed and the trial court sustained a motion for leave to endorse these witnesses. Trial counsel objected and preserved the claim for appeal. Appellate counsel, however, did not raise it on appeal. Moss argues the trial court erred by sustaining this motion and claims appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue on appeal. We disagree. The standard for deciding claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is explained in Reuscher v. State, as follows: To support a [Rule 29.15] motion due to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, strong grounds must exist showing that counsel failed to assert a claim of error which would have required reversal had it been asserted and which was so obvious from the record that a competent and effective lawyer would have recognized it and asserted it. The right to relief ... due to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel inevitably tracks the plain error rule; i.e., the error that was not raised on appeal was so substantial as to amount to a manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. [22] We reject Moss's claim because we conclude the trial court did not err by sustaining the State's motion for leave to endorse these additional witnesses. The trial court has broad discretion to permit the late endorsement of additional witnesses. [23] To determine whether the trial court erred by abusing its discretion, the following factors are among those we consider: (1) Whether the defendant waived the objection; (2) Whether the state intended surprise or acted deceptively or in bad faith, with the intention to disadvantage the defendant; (3) Whether in fact defendant was surprised and suffered any disadvantage; and (4) Whether the type of testimony given might readily have been contemplated. [24] Although Moss admits he received notice five days before trial of the State's intent to call both witnesses, he offers no reason why he was unable to interview them and prepare. Moss also did not request a continuance for additional time in which to prepare for these witnesses. Therefore, we find neither that the State intended surprise, nor that defendant, in fact, was surprised or disadvantaged by the decision of the trial court to endorse both witnesses. Consequently, appellate counsel was not ineffective for not raising this claim on appeal.