Opinion ID: 794148
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prospective Relief for State-Law Claims

Text: 27 Section 802 of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), provides that [p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The City defendants argue that the PLRA thus limits the district court's power to order prospective relief for violations solely of state law. Appellants' Br. at 52. We agree. 28 Congress defined the term civil action with respect to prison conditions as any civil proceeding arising under Federal law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison except for habeas corpus proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2). The instant civil proceeding, having been brought in part (and relief having been granted in part) under the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA, arises under Federal law, even if some of the claims prosecuted in the course of the proceedings are state-law claims. This action also addresses the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2), because it challenges the adequacy of the defendants' provision of educational services and related ancillary services to inmates. Thus, under the language of section 3626(a)(1), any prospective relief ordered in this case must extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of [these] particular . . . plaintiffs. (emphasis added). 29 In 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), Congress provided federal district courts with so-called supplemental jurisdiction to decide certain state-law claims. It reads: 30 Except as provided in [other] subsections [of section 1367] . . . or as expressly provided by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 31 Id. The plaintiffs argue that under these provisions, the district court had jurisdiction over any state-law claims related to the federal claims being adjudicated and, therefore, that the court had the power to vindicate fully those state-law rights. For us to read 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) to prohibit prospective relief on such state-law claims, they contend, would be for us to read it to impliedly repeal 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) in part. Such implied repeals, they point out, are not favored by courts, which assume that Congress generally does not intend to enact laws in conflict with its own earlier statutes without saying so. [A]bsent a clearly established congressional intention, repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will only be found where provisions in two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute. Lockhart v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 699, 704, 163 L.Ed.2d 557 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 32 Here, though, Congress explicitly contemplated that other statutes would limit the supplemental jurisdiction granted in section 1367, which provides that such jurisdiction may be limited as expressly provided by Federal statute. By its terms, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) appears to be such a Federal statute. 33 True, on occasion, when Congress has limited section 1367, it has referred explicitly to jurisdiction. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4) (providing that section 1367 shall not be construed, by reason of a claim arising under such subsection, to confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property or child custody decree). It hardly follows, however, that Congress must make specific reference to section 1367 in order to limit its reach. Indeed, Congress likely did not do so here because section 3626(a) limits not jurisdiction, but rather the types of remedies available once jurisdiction has been properly invoked. 34 The only provisions of section 3626 that refer explicitly to state law claims further support this reading of the statute. Section 18 U.S.C. § 3626(d) reads, State law remedies. — The limitations on remedies in this section shall not apply to relief entered by a State court based solely upon claims arising under State law. This provision appears to clarify the scope of section 3626(a)'s remedial limitations. Since section 3626(a)(1) states that in any civil action (emphasis added) related to prison conditions prospective relief shall be narrowly drawn, section 3626(a) would appear to operate to limit the remedial powers of both federal and State courts in such cases. This limitation includes two elements: First, it limits the extent of such relief to that which is no further than necessary to correct the violation; second, it narrows the permissible grounds for prospective relief by requiring that it be issued only to remedy violations of the Federal right in the case. Therefore, if a State court were hearing a civil action involving both state and federal claims, section 3626(a) would not only require that any prospective relief for a federal claim extend no further than necessary to correct its violation, but would also seem to prevent that court from ordering any prospective relief at all for violations of the state law claims. But such a result would clearly infringe upon a state's traditional power to grant its courts a full range of remedial powers. Thus, subsection (d) was included to foreclose this result. 35 Subsection (d) explicitly carves out an exception for State courts from the requirement that prospective relief go no further than necessary to correct the violation and remedy only the Federal right in the case, so the blanket restriction on prospective relief must apply to all civil actions related to prison conditions in federal courts. But since, under this view, the restriction both limits the extent of the relief and requires that it remedy a federal right, we think section 3626 clearly prohibits a federal court from issuing preventive relief based entirely upon state-law claims. 4 36 It follows from the foregoing analysis that the district court was not permitted to order prospective relief to remedy an asserted violation of state law only. We thus agree with the City defendants that the district court erred in ordering such relief, and we vacate those portions of the injunction — paragraphs three through five, seven, nine through eighteen, thirty-nine through forty-three, and forty-five — that appear to be based solely on asserted violations of state law. 37