Opinion ID: 182133
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Heck

Text: The question before us is the basic Heck questionwhether success in Hooper's § 1983 claim that excessive force was used during her arrest would `necessarily imply' or `demonstrate' the invalidity of her conviction under § 148(a)(1). Smith, 394 F.3d at 695. Given California law, as clarified by Yount, we hold that it would not. The chain of events constituting Hooper's arrest was, in the words of the Court in Yount, one continuous transaction. A holding in Hooper's § 1983 case that the use of the dog was excessive force would not negate the lawfulness of the initial arrest attempt, or negate the unlawfulness of [Hooper's] attempt to resist it [when she jerked her hand away from Deputy Terrell]. Yount, 43 Cal.4th at 899, 76 Cal. Rptr.3d 787, 183 P.3d 471 (quoting Jones, 197 F.Supp.2d at 1005 n. 9). The California Supreme Court in Yount did not reach the question how it would apply Heck to a § 148(a)(1) case where non-deadly force was used. Yount, 43 Cal.4th at 899 n. 1, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 787, 183 P.3d 471. But the Court's failure to reach that question does not matter here. While we are bound by that Court's interpretation of § 148(a)(1), the application of the Heck bar in an excessive force case under the Fourth Amendment is a question of federal law that we decide for ourselves. The line between excessive and reasonable force under the Fourth Amendment is not the line between deadly and non-deadly force. The United States Supreme Court held in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), that the test for whether force is reasonable or excessive is whether the officers' actions are `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. The Court did not create a separate test for deadly force in Graham. Rather,  all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive forcedeadly or notin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard[.] Id. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (emphasis in original). In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007), the Court reiterated the point that deadly force cases do not constitute a special category. [There is no] magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer's actions constitute `deadly force.' . . . Whether or not Scott's actions constituted application of `deadly force,' all that matters is whether Scott's actions were reasonable. Id. at 382-83, 127 S.Ct. 1769. In so holding, we agree with many of our sister circuits in similar cases. For example, in VanGilder v. Baker, 435 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir.2006), the Seventh Circuit noted that a plaintiff alleging excessive force does not collaterally attack his conviction [or] deny that he resisted. . . . Rather, [plaintiff] claims that he suffered unnecessary injuries because[the] response to his resistance . . . was not . . . objectively reasonable. See also Martinez v. City of Alburquerque, 184 F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 1999) (The state court's finding that Martinez resisted a lawful arrest . . . may coexist with a finding that the police officers used excessive force to subdue him.); Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2008); Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir.2008); Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876 (11th Cir.2007); Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173(1st Cir.2006); Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir.1997) (permitting an excessive force claim when plaintiff alleged that the officer effectuated a lawful arrest in an unlawful manner). But see Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 682-83 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that excessive force claims are Heck barred by a conviction for misdemeanor assault on an officer during the arrest incident). To the extent the state law under which a conviction is obtained differs, the answer to the Heck question could also differ. Nonetheless, the decisions of our sister circuits are instructive, for many state statutes that criminalize resisting lawful arrest and other lawful police conduct are very similar. It is thus not surprising that most of the circuit courts that have addressed the Heck bar in cases involving such statutes should have given the same answer, and that we, in turn, agree with that answer. In sum, we conclude that a conviction under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) does not bar a § 1983 claim for excessive force under Heck when the conviction and the § 1983 claim are based on different actions during one continuous transaction. In the case now before us, we hold that Hooper's § 1983 excessive force claim is not Heck -barred based on her conviction under § 148(a)(1).