Opinion ID: 2001804
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conditional Gifts Upon Termination of Engagement.

Text: Iversen argues the trial court erred in quieting title to the Custer County real estate and entering the money judgment. She insists her ownership in that property was not acquired in contemplation of marriage. Iversen further asserts that under SDCL 21-41-1 [1] a quiet title action does not allow adjudication of interests between co-tenants. We do not agree. This court has held that although a quiet title action is statutory, SDCL ch. 21-41, it can essentially be an equitable action. Ahl v. Arnio, 388 N.W.2d 532, 534 (S.D.1986) (citation omitted). When the action seeks to determine adverse claims in the property, it is equitable in nature. Id. (citation omitted). Reviewing the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is obvious the court was properly making an equitable adjudication of the parties' rights and responsibilities in this case. The trial court found that the parties became engaged prior to November 9, 1988. Thus, it concluded that Fanning's financial advancements to Iversen and purported co-ownership of real estate were made in contemplation of marriage. The majority rule is that a gift made in contemplation of marriage is conditional and should be returned if that condition is not fulfilled. In re Marriage of Heinzman, 198 Colo. 36, 596 P.2d 61 (1979); Piccininni v. Hajus, 180 Conn. 369, 429 A.2d 886, 888 (1980); Gill v. Shively, 320 So.2d 415 (Fl.1975); Guffin v. Kelly, 191 Ga. 880, 14 S.E.2d 50 (1941); Harris v. Davis, 139 Ill.App.3d 1046, 94 Ill.Dec. 327, 487 N.E.2d 1204 (1986); Glass v. Wiltz, 551 So.2d 32 (La.Ct.App.1989); In re Estate of Lowe, 146 Mich.App. 325, 379 N.W.2d 485 (1985); Glachman v. Perlen, 159 A.D.2d 553, 552 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1990); Wilson v. Dabo, 10 Ohio App.3d 169, 461 N.E.2d 8 (1983); McLain v. Gilliam, 389 S.W.2d 131 (Tex.Civ.App.1965); Spinnell v. Quigley, 56 Wash.App. 799, 785 P.2d 1149 (1990); Bryan v. Lincoln, 168 W.Va. 556, 285 S.E.2d 152 (1981); Brown v. Thomas, 127 Wis.2d 572, 383 N.W.2d 64 (1986). See generally, Perovich, Rights in Respect of Engagement and Courtship Presents when Marriage Does Not Ensue, 46 A.L.R.3d 578; 38 C.J.S. Gifts § 61. In McLain, the Texas Court of Appeals stated: It is generally held that gifts made in contemplation of marriage are subject to an implied condition that they are to be returned if the donee breaks the engagement, and that the rule applies to real estate as well as personalty; also that in a proper case equity will take jurisdiction to enforce a reconveyance. Id. 389 S.W.2d at 132 (citing Guffin, 14 S.E.2d at 54). In 1991, the South Dakota Legislature abolished SDCL ch. 21-4, providing for actions for breach of promise to marry and seduction. Repealed by 1991 S.D.Sess.L. ch. 181, §§ 1-6 and ch. 155, § 1. Although South Dakota repealed the causes of action altogether, other jurisdictions have passed legislation specifically prohibiting actions for emotional consequences resulting from a broken marital engagement. There exists a distinction, however, between such heart-balm actions and the recovery of conditional gifts. The most common basis for decision in cases permitting the recovery of, or for property transferred to a betrothed, is that where the transfer was made on the condition that a marriage ensue, the transferor is entitled to its return on nonfulfillment of the condition. Bryan, 285 S.E.2d at 154. Fanning is not asking for damages for loss of marriage, or humiliation. Rather, he seeks to assert his equitable common-law right to recover property for which he paid and solely owns because the condition precedent to him gifting an interest to Iversen was not fulfilled. See Piccininni, 429 A.2d at 888. In a similar case, Aronow v. Silver, 223 N.J.Super. 344, 349-51, 538 A.2d 851, 854 (1987), the New Jersey Superior Court held that a conditional gift must be returned if the condition is not fulfilled. The parties in Aronow purchased a condominium together, intending it to be their future home. They assumed title as tenants in common. No facts indicated that the property was a joint investment or that the breaching party contributed to the purchase price of the condominium. Id. 538 A.2d at 855. The implication that the arrangement was conditioned upon marriage is inescapable. Id. The court determined the donor would receive the condominium, along with stocks and stock-proceeds held jointly in anticipation of marriage. Id. 538 A.2d at 856; see also Heinzman, 596 P.2d at 61. Ultimately, the controversy became a credibility issue in which the donor prevailed. Aronow, 538 A.2d at 855. Reviewing the record, we cannot say the trial court erred in its credibility ruling that Fanning conveyed co-ownership in the real estate and advanced money to Iverson solely in contemplation of marriage. Iversen provided no financial assistance for the purchase of the real estate, payment of taxes, insurance payments, or the cost to maintain the real estate. Moreover, Fanning's $10,000 check to Iversen had inscribed with love, for wedding and gifts on the memo line. Iversen does not dispute Fanning additionally loaned her $3,775 to use as she wished. The trial court observed the credibility of each of these parties. It found Iversen totally incredible in her attempts to explain the transfer of this property other than in conjunction with marriage expectations. I find it incredible that an individual would accept a ring as an engagement ring which she has testified [it was] and not have contemplation of marriage involved. That is inconsistent with common knowledge, practice and procedure and normal behavior... It makes absolutely no sense that one would, a month after one's contact with another person, turn over half of a $40,000 cabin one has just bought unless it is done based upon an emotional attachment and commitment. There is not one shred of evidence to suggest there are any financial issues involved or other issues beyond a personal relationship. In contrast, the trial court found Fanning crediblehis generosity was his only downfall in allowing Iversen such prolonged use of the property after the engagement was broken. In assessing a similar situation, the court in Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 136 A.2d 127, 130, 390 Pa. 502, 507 (1957), eloquently concluded: A gift given by [one] to [another] on condition that [they] embark on the sea of matrimony... is no different from a gift based on the condition that the donee sail on any other sea. If, after receiving the provisional gift, the donee refuses to leave the harbor,if the anchor of contractual performance sticks in the sands of irresolution and procrastinationthe gift must be restored to the donor. Based on the record, Iversen failed to leave the harbor and the trial court did not err in awarding Fanning the disputed real estate and money.