Opinion ID: 2520814
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevant ICWA Provisions

Text: Reacting to a disturbing history of states placing Indian children in non-Indian parental care, Congress passed ICWA with the intention of discouraging this practice. [3] The act is intended to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families. [4] It attempts to achieve this objective by establishing minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture. [5] One way that ICWA promotes these goals is through § 1913's requirement that courts return Indian children to their biological parents if those parents withdraw consent to adopt before issuance of a final adoption decree. While § 1913(a) recognizes that a parent may voluntarily consent to termination of parental rights in favor of foster care placement or adoption, [6] § 1913(c) provides that [i]n any voluntary proceeding for termination of parental rights to, or adoptive placement of, an Indian child, the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for any reason at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or adoption, as the case may be, and the child shall be returned to the parent. [7] ICWA further advances its goals by preferring Indian adoptive parents over non-Indian adoptive parents. In determining the appropriate adoptive placement of an Indian child, ICWA requires that, in the absence of good cause, preference be given to placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families. [8] ICWA does not define good cause, however, leaving it to the states to determine when good cause exists to deviate from the ICWA preferences. [9] The Bureau of Indian Affairs publication Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings lists factors that may convince state courts that good cause does exist to deviate from the ICWA preferences. [10] Although the guidelines are only persuasive and are neither exclusive nor binding, this court has looked to them for guidance. [11] These factors include: (1) the extraordinary physical and emotional needs of the child as established by testimony of a qualified expert witness; (2) the unavailability of suitable families for placement after a diligent search has been completed for families meeting the preferences requirements; and (3) parental preferences in favor of deviation. [12] Accordingly, we have held that courts may consider parental preference when determining whether there is good cause to deviate from ICWA preferences. [13] The superior court found that Andrea's initial desire to deviate from the ICWA placement preferences at the time she signed a document purporting to relinquish her parental rights was the primary factor establishing good cause to deviate from the ICWA preferences. The court did not consider the mother's subsequent changed wishes when ruling that good cause existed to deviate from the ICWA preferences. And once the mother's rights were terminated, it is questionable whether she would have standing to state a parental preference. [14] But the question remains whether there was a valid final decree of parental termination in this case that would prevent Andrea from withdrawing her consent to adoption pursuant to § 1913(c) of ICWA. The answer to this question hinges on the validity of Andrea's relinquishment of parental rights.