Opinion ID: 2066094
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Preserve Issue: Individualized Sentencing Hearing

Text: The trial court denied defendant's motion to sever his death sentencing hearing from that of Reginald. Defendant's trial counsel failed to include this issue in his post-trial motion, thereby waiving the issue on direct review. Also, although defendant's appellate counsel raised the issue on direct review, he did not cite to any authority or to any section of the record in support of this argument. ( Mahaffey, 128 Ill.2d at 431, 132 Ill.Dec. 366, 539 N.E.2d 1172.) Defendant contends that his trial and appellate counsel failed to preserve for direct review his claim that he was denied his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing hearing. Defendant claims that the trial court denied his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing hearing by refusing to sever his death sentencing hearing from that of Reginald. Defendant contends that he had the constitutional right to have separate juries determine whether the death penalty was appropriate for him and Reginald. We disagree. Generally, defendants who are jointly indicted are to be jointly tried unless a separate trial is necessary to avoid prejudice to one of the defendants. ( People v. Olinger (1986), 112 Ill.2d 324, 345, 97 Ill.Dec. 772, 493 N.E.2d 579.) This is so for several reasons. A joint trial promotes economy, reliability, and consistency in the judicial process. In a joint trial, the jury obtains a more complete view of all the acts underlying the charges than would be possible in separate trials. From this perspective, the jury may be able to determine more reliably the guilt or innocence of a particular defendant and to assign more fairly the respective responsibilities of each defendant in the sentencing. ( Buchanan v. Kentucky (1987), 483 U.S. 402, 418, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 2915, 97 L.Ed.2d 336, 352.) Specifically under our death penalty statute, at the death sentencing hearing, the same jury can consider the entire trial record, allowing a more perceptive and complete analysis of aggravating and mitigating factors, even in cases where the defendant does not present any evidence at the hearing. People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill.2d 129, 146-47, 58 Ill.Dec. 895, 430 N.E.2d 1346. Of course, the eighth amendment requires individualized sentencing determinations in death penalty cases. ( Stringer v. Black (1992), 503 U.S. 222, 229, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136, 117 L.Ed.2d 367, 378; People v. Thompkins (1994), 161 Ill.2d 148, 166-67, 204 Ill.Dec. 147, 641 N.E.2d 371.) Consistent with this mandate, our death penalty statute requires the jury to consider and weigh any aggravating and mitigating circumstances before deciding whether to impose the death penalty upon a defendant. The statute allows for sufficient consideration of both the circumstances of the particular offense and the character and record of the particular defendant before the death penalty can be imposed. People v. Fields (1990), 135 Ill.2d 18, 51, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791. Defendant argues that the joint death sentencing hearing in his case simply could not allow for this required individualized treatment. We disagree. The record shows that the joint death sentencing hearing did not preclude the jury from rendering an individualized sentencing decision as to defendant. The aggravating evidence that the State presented at the sentencing hearing was similar and in some respects nearly identical as to defendant and Reginald. Also, defendant's trial counsel presented mitigating evidence relevant specifically to defendant's character and record. See Fields, 135 Ill.2d at 52, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791. Lastly, the trial court instructed the jury: to consider each defendant separately, that each defendant was entitled to have his case decided on the evidence and law applicable to him, and that any evidence which was limited to one defendant should not be considered as to the other defendant. We presume that the jury followed these instructions. See Fields, 135 Ill.2d at 52-53, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791. Thus, we conclude that this allegedly deficient performance fails the second prong of the Strickland test. If defendant's trial and appellate counsel had preserved this issue for direct review, his sentence would not have been reversed. We cannot say that the trial court manifestly erred in dismissing these ineffective-assistance claims.