Opinion ID: 1237924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Computer Simulation Inputs

Text: Lahr challenges several of the district court's rulings regarding the computer simulations run by the agencies. We begin with some background to facilitate an understanding of what is and what is not at issue with regard to those simulations. The agencies used several computer simulation programs in their investigation of the crash. The CIA used a program created by the National Security Agency (NSA). An NTSB employee, Dennis Crider, wrote his own software program. The NTSB also used two programs called BREAKUP and BALLISTIC. The agencies' use of these programs resulted in two types of potentially discoverable information: the software programs themselves and the inputs entered into the programs by the agencies. As to the first categorythe programs themselvesthere is no dispute on appeal between the parties. The district court held that the NSA's computer program fell under an exemption, and Lahr does not challenge that conclusion, at least with respect to the software itself. The district court ordered the NTSB to disclose the Crider program, and the agency does not appeal this ruling. Finally, the agency does not contest the district court's order directing the NTSB to search for the BALLISTIC and BREAKUP programs and disclose them, if found, subject to any applicable FOIA exemptions. The only dispute about the computer simulation programs arises from the nondisclosure of certain of the inputs into these software programs. We discuss below the relevant inputs with respect to each program.
The CIA withheld the NSA program, citing FOIA Exemption 3, which exempts from disclosure matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), and pointing to the National Security Agency Act of 1959. [18] Lahr concedes that the NSA program itself falls within this exemption, but argues on appeal that the data inputs are segregable and should be disclosed. The district court concluded that Exemption 3 was applicable to the software in its entirety. It is not entirely clear, however, whether this pronouncement included what Lahr refers to as the programs inputs, but the government has not released any of these inputs. Under Exemption 3 and the NSA statute, information is properly withheld if the agency describe[s] the intelligence activity involved, and ... show[s] why disclosure of requested materials could reveal the nature of that activity. Hayden v. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 608 F.2d 1381, 1391 (D.C.Cir.1979). The agency need not make a specific showing of potential harm to national security because Congress has already, in enacting the statute, decided that disclosure of NSA activities is potentially harmful. Id. at 1390. The CIA submitted an initial affidavit from a senior NSA official stating that release of the computer program could expose how the U.S. Government analyzes the performance characteristics of foreign weapons systems that are aerodynamic or ballistic. The district court found this description wanting and ordered an in camera affidavit. After reviewing that in camera submission, the district court concluded that the affidavit sufficiently described how the program, a unique tool for foreign weapons system analysis, could harm the nation if disclosed. The district court then concluded that Exemption 3 is applicable. After reviewing the NSA's affidavit in camera, we agree with the district court. The affidavit states that the program is used to analyze foreign weapons, and outlines specific reasons why release of the program, including the data inputs, would put the agency's sources and methods at risk. We hold that the affidavit offers a sufficient explanation. The program and the inputs therefore fall within Exemption 3 and were properly withheld.
As noted, the district court ordered disclosure of the software for the Crider program, finding that the program itself was not deliberative and therefore did not properly fall within Exemption 5. Lahr contests the district court's conclusion that the simulation inputs did fall within Exemption 5. [19] On appeal, Lahr's sole argument is that a government misconduct exception bars the applicability of Exemption 5. As with the other documents withheld under the deliberative process privilege, we hold that Lahr waived the argument by not raising it before the district court. We therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that the inputs properly fell within Exemption 5.
Lahr made two kinds of requests relating to the BALLISTIC and BREAKUP programs. First, he sought the programs themselves. Second, he requested [a]ll records of the formulas and data entered into the computer simulations regarding the NTSB's zoom-climb conclusion. The district court ordered the government to search for and disclose, if found, the BALLISTIC and BREAKUP programs, subject to any applicable exemptions. The district court also ordered the government to review its records to locate data inputs for the BREAKUP program and disclose that information, if found. The government appeals none of these orders. The district court also found, however, that the BALLISTIC program, unlike BREAKUP, was not used in any manner in connection with the `zoom-climb conclusion,' and thus held that the data inputs for that program did not fall within the scope of Lahr's request. Lahr appeals this ruling, arguing that the flight-path of the debris descendingwhich he contends the BALLISTIC program modeledis inextricably a part of the government's theory that two-thirds of the aircraft ascended. The government's declarant stated that the BREAKUP and BALLISTIC programs were not a part of the simulation program for the main wreckage of the aircraft, which modeled the ascent of the aircraft after the separation of the nose section. Instead, these programs were used for determination of the trajectory of certain pieces of the aircraft other than the main section. The declaration provides additional detail for the BREAKUP program, indicating that it was used to determine the timing of the nose separating from the aircraft. On that basis, the district court concluded that the BREAKUP program was in fact relevant to the zoom-climb conclusion. Importantly, it was the timing of the nose separation, not the trajectory of certain pieces of the aircraft, that the district court found related to the zoom-climb theory. This conclusion makes sense, given that the zoom-climb thesis centers on the upward trajectory of the main body of the aircraft following the nose separation and has little to do with other pieces of the plane. The district court also determined, on the other hand, that the government had demonstrated that the BALLISTIC program was not used in connection with the zoom-climb conclusion. The government's declaration supports this conclusion. It states that the only way in which these programs were relevant to the flight-path simulation was by providing the timing point at which the nose separation occurred. According to the declaration, this timing information was obtained solely from the BREAKUP program. In light of this evidence, we cannot conclude that the district court's finding that the BALLISTIC program did not contribute to the zoom-climb theory was clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that the data inputs to the BALLISTIC program were not responsive to Lahr's request.