Opinion ID: 1383576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Circuit Court's Declaratory Judgment Order

Text: This case presents a conflict between two powers that are assigned by the Legislature through statutes: the power of local governments to enact and enforce zoning and planning regulations, and the power of privately-owned public utilities to acquire land by eminent domain for public uses. Local governments such as the Jefferson County Commission are empowered by the Legislature to create planning commissions and to enact and enforce land use regulations pursuant to W.Va.Code, 8-24-1 to -78. Specifically, W.Va.Code, 8-24-39 [1988] allows local governments to enact planning regulations: ... so that adequate light, air, convenience of access, and safety from fire, flood and other danger may be secured; that congestion in the public streets may be lessened or avoided; that the public health, safety, comfort, morals, convenience and general public welfare may be promoted; [and] that the preservation of historic landmarks, sites, districts and buildings be promoted[.] The Legislature has statutorily conferred upon certain private corporations the power to take private property through eminent domain in W.Va.Code, 54-1-1 to -12. This article specifically allows privately-owned power companies to take or damage private property for specified public uses, including: For the construction and maintenance of... electric light, heat and power plants, systems, lines, transmission lines, conduits, stations (including branch, spur and service lines), when for public use[.] W.Va.Code, 54-1-2(b) [1979]. The circuit court ruled that the power of public utilities to take property through eminent domain is superior to the authority of local governments to enforce land use regulations, because to hold otherwise would preclude and frustrate the meaning and purpose of the statutorily-conferred power of eminent domain. Potomac Edison argues that the circuit court's decision is correct because the statutes conferring upon local governments the power to enact land use regulations specifically exempt State agencies from those regulations. W.Va.Code, 8-24-69 states: The planning and zoning provisions of this article are supplemental to and do not abrogate the powers and authority extended to agencies, bureaus, departments, commissions, divisions and officials of the state government by other state statute and these powers and authority shall remain in full force and effect.... Potomac Edison argues that this statute applies to Potomac Edison because it is a quasi-state agency. In support of this position, Potomac Edison cites to two cases. First, it refers to Handley v. Cook, 162 W.Va. 629, 632, 252 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1979), where we stated that The Legislature in order to make power available has conferred upon electric power companies the right of eminent domain, and has thereby necessarily imposed upon them, as public service corporations, the right and duty of performing public service. Second, in Baldwin v. Appalachian Power Co., 556 F.2d 241 (4th Cir. 1977) ( per curiam ), the appellee points out that the defendant power company was, [b]y exercising the delegated power of eminent domain ... act[ing] as an agent of the state. By availing itself of a state-granted right of entry the Baldwin court held that the power company was acting under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Potomac Edison, in sum, argues that the Legislature has directed that public utilities, when exercising the power of eminent domain, are in essence state agencies and therefore exempt from the Planning Commission's authority. The appellant Planning Commission's argument is that county land use ordinances are on the same level as State law, unless they conflict with or are preempted by State law. The Planning Commission argues that Potomac Edison is a private corporation, and not an arm of the government or a political subdivision. The appellant agrees that while W.Va.Code, 54-1-1 to -12 confers upon public utility companies the power of eminent domain, those statutes do not exempt those companies from local land use ordinances. We agree with the Planning Commission's position. It is well established that through W.Va. Code, 54-1-1 to -12, the Legislature has seen fit to statutorily delegate the power of eminent domain to certain internal improvement companies such as Potomac Edison. Board of Education of Kanawha Co. v. Campbells Creek R. Co., 138 W.Va. 473, 476, 76 S.E.2d 271, 274 (1953). We have explicitly recognized that there is a substantial difference between the degree of deference that is to be given to private entities such as utilities and public governmental bodies, in their exercise of the power of eminent domain. Charleston Urban Renewal Authority v. The Courtland Co., 203 W.Va. 528, 537 n. 6, 509 S.E.2d 569, 578 n. 6 (1998). For example, in West Virginia Board of Regents v. Fairmont, Morgantown & Pittsburgh Railroad Co., 155 W.Va. 863, 189 S.E.2d 40 (1972), a governmental subdivision, the West Virginia Board of Regents, sought to condemn land and easements owned by a privately-owned railroad to which the State had granted the power of eminent domain. We recognized the Board of Regents' authority to take land from the privately-owned railroad by eminent domain for the construction of a personal rapid transit system, where the land was to be dedicated to public use by West Virginia University. We held that the eminent domain rights of the private corporation were subordinate to the rights of the government subdivision, stating: The right of the state to condemn is an attribute of sovereignty, while the power of utilities to condemn is granted by legislative act and may be revoked by legislative act. The right of the state is therefore superior to that of the utility. 155 W.Va. at 867, 189 S.E.2d at 43. Furthermore, there is no statutory language excluding private corporations exercising eminent domain from the application of land use ordinances. (For example, W.Va. Code, 8-24-50 [1984] exempts timber and mineral extraction from the application of certain zoning ordinances.) We therefore reject the notion, absent specific statutory authorization, that the taking of land by eminent domain for public use raises a private corporation to the level of being a state agency for purposes of avoiding the ambit of laws regulating land use. Numerous other jurisdictions have concluded that privately-owned power utilities should be subject to local zoning restrictions. While statutory schemes vary from state-to-state, in the absence of a specific statutory exemption, courts generally hold that local zoning ordinances are binding upon a public utility. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. County of Lake, 183 Ill.App.3d 1060, 132 Ill.Dec. 590, 540 N.E.2d 6 (1989) (public utility attempted to subdivide parcel of land on which a transmission distribution center was built; court held statute exempting poles, towers, wires, cables, conduits from zoning restrictions did not exempt public utility from county zoning ordinance concerning the subdivision of property); Union Agricultural Society at Palmyra, Inc. v. Sheldon, 79 Misc.2d 818, 361 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1974) (although agricultural society possessed power of condemnation, its construction of an exhibit and storage building could be restricted by local zoning ordinances); Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Co., 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.Civ.App.1972) (landowners sued public utility to force compliance with zoning ordinance in construction of power substation; court held that public utility must comply with zoning restrictions because [t]he city, to which the state has specifically entrusted the police powers, has the power to inquire into the reasonableness of the manner by which eminent domain is to be exercised within its corporate limits.); State ex rel. Kearns v. Ohio Power Co., 163 Ohio St. 451, 127 N.E.2d 394 (1955) (power company attempted to build power lines on property taken by eminent domain in territory controlled by planning commission; court held that the privately-owned power company was amenable to the planning commission's zoning restrictions); New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. Statler, 204 Misc. 7, 122 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (1953) (a public utility has the right, where it establishes the necessity therefor, and complies with the local ordinances, to condemn property but these rights do not exempt it from complying with the local zoning ordinances. Local zoning ordinances were binding on the public utility.) See generally, A. Manley, Applicability of Zoning Regulations to Projects of Nongovernmental Public Utility as Affected by Utility's Having Power of Eminent Domain, 87 A.L.R.3d 1265 (1978). After reviewing the circuit court's August 8, 1997 final order, we conclude that the court erred by declaring that the Planning Commission could not enforce the Jefferson County zoning ordinances against Potomac Edison. We hold that a privately-owned public utility, which may exercise the power of eminent domain under W.Va.Code, 54-1-1 to -12, is subject to land use regulations enacted by a local unit of government pursuant to W.Va.Code, 8-24-1 to -78. B.