Opinion ID: 4557538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: [2-4] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. 4 In order to have jurisdiction over an appeal, appellate jurisdiction must be specifically provided by the Legislature. 5 For an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, the party must be appealing from a final order or a judgment. 6 [5,6] In a criminal case, the judgment from which the appellant may appeal is the sentence, and every direction of the court made or entered in writing and not included in a judgment is an order. 7 Thus, the order granting Fredrickson’s application to proceed in forma pauperis was an order. [7] When the statutory scheme governing the proceedings does not specifically address the finality of orders issued 3 Fredrickson I, supra note 2. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1911 (Reissue 2016). 7 Fredrickson I, supra note 2. - 87 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports STATE v. FREDRICKSON Cite as 306 Neb. 81 therein, final orders are governed by the general definitions set forth by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Supp. 2019). 8 In order to be a final order which an appellate court may review, the lower court’s order must (1) affect a substantial right and determine the action and prevent a judgment, (2) affect a substantial right and be made during a special proceeding, (3) affect a substantial right and be made on summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered, or (4) deny a motion for summary judgment which was based on the assertion of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a government official. 9 The statutes governing in forma pauperis proceedings 10 specifically provide a defendant whose application is denied the right to appeal. 11 Section 25-2301.02 provides that if an objection to the defendant’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is sustained, the party filing the application shall have 30 days after the ruling or issuance of the statement to proceed with an action or appeal upon payment of fees, costs, or security notwithstanding the subsequent expiration of any statute of limitations or deadline for appeal. Section 25-2301.02 also provides for the means of obtaining a transcript for the appeal and the appellate court’s standard of review: In the event that an application to proceed in forma pauperis is denied and an appeal is taken therefrom, the aggrieved party may make application for a transcript of the hearing on in forma pauperis eligibility. Upon such application, the court shall order the transcript to be prepared and the cost shall be paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid. The appellate court shall review the decision denying in forma pauperis eligibility de novo on the record based on the transcript of the hearing or the written statement of the court. 8 See Priesner v. Starry, 300 Neb. 81, 912 N.W.2d 249 (2018). 9 Fredrickson I, supra note 2. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Supp. 2019). 10 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2301 et seq. (Reissue 2016). 11 See § 25-2301.02. - 88 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports STATE v. FREDRICKSON Cite as 306 Neb. 81 Notably absent from the statutes governing in forma pauperis is any reference to the ability to appeal the approval of such an application. 12 Assuming without deciding here that the Legislature did not intend to deny any opportunity to appeal from an order granting a defendant’s application to proceed in forma pauperis with a criminal appeal, the order appealed from here is not final under § 25-1902. This is because the order granting Fredrickson’s application to proceed in forma pauperis did not affect with finality a substantial right. [8-11] The first step in a final order analysis under § 25-1902 is to determine whether the order affected a substantial right of one or more parties. The inquiry focuses on whether the right at issue is substantial and whether the court’s order has a substantial impact on that right. 13 Whether an order affects a substantial right depends on whether it affects with finality the rights of the parties in the subject matter. 14 It also depends on whether the right could otherwise effectively be vindicated. 15 An order affects a substantial right when the right would be significantly undermined or irrevocably lost by postponing appellate review. 16 In Fredrickson I, we stated that because the county filed a notice of appeal as though it were taking an ordinary appeal under § 25-1902 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2018), we would analyze jurisdiction according to the ordinary principles of appellate jurisdiction just recited. We then explained that the order finding that Fredrickson was indigent and entitled to appellate counsel did not affect a substantial right and thus was not final under § 25-1902. We reasoned that the order did not affect a substantial right because it did not obligate the county to pay any specific 12 § 25-2301 et seq. 13 Fredrickson I, supra note 2. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. - 89 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports STATE v. FREDRICKSON Cite as 306 Neb. 81 amount or set a deadline for payment—matters that would be subject to future proceedings addressing the question of reasonable attorney fees. We also noted that the order was not a final determination obligating the payment of Fredrickson’s appellate attorney fees, because Fredrickson’s indigency can subsequently be challenged through Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3908 (Reissue 2016), which provides: Whenever any court finds subsequent to its appointment of . . . counsel to represent a felony defendant that its initial determination of indigency was incorrect or that during the course of representation by appointed counsel the felony defendant has become no longer indigent, the court may order such felony defendant to reimburse the county for all or part of the reasonable cost of providing such representation. Thus, we explained that “even though the order appointing appellate counsel specified that it is at the [c]ounty’s expense, the State is able to seek reconsideration and can challenge the underlying finding of indigency and recoup any subsequently expended funds from the defendant.” 17 We rejected the county’s argument that such an avenue would not effectively vindicate its rights because it is difficult to recoup money from incarcerated criminal defendants. We said: Although recovery of attorney fees may be, at times, difficult, the Nebraska Legislature has specified the process for determination of the [c]ounty’s rights and recovery of funds when there is a subsequent modification of an indigency finding. This argument is insufficient to show a significant undermining of the State’s right. 18 Similarly, the order granting Fredrickson’s application to proceed in forma pauperis with his appeal was not a final determination of the amount the county must pay in fees and costs for Fredrickson’s appeal. Pursuant to § 25-2301, “[i]n 17 Id. at 173, 939 N.W.2d at 391. 18 Id. at 174, 939 N.W.2d at 391. - 90 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports STATE v. FREDRICKSON Cite as 306 Neb. 81 forma pauperis” simply means “permission given by the court for a party to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs or security.” The mandate setting forth the total amount of such fees or costs due has not yet been issued in Fredrickson’s direct appeal. Until the county is ordered to pay a specific sum, its substantial rights have not been affected. Thus, the order granting Fredrickson’s application to proceed in forma pauperis was not a final order and we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. We also note for completeness that whether the in forma pauperis order was properly granted or not does not affect the perfection of Fredrickson’s criminal appeal. We have explained that an in forma pauperis appeal is perfected when the appellant timely files a notice of appeal and an affidavit of poverty. 19 Thus, the question of whether the application was properly granted may alter who is responsible for some of the fees associated with the appeal, but it cannot divest the court of jurisdiction to consider Fredrickson’s appeal of his sentence. 20 We find that appeals from an order approving an application to proceed in forma pauperis and appeals of awards of attorney fees should be treated similarly in this regard. 21