Opinion ID: 2142434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misjoinder

Text: Appellant next urges that several causes of action have been improperly united. They submit that under sec. 263.04, Stats., this complaint is demurrable. Sec. 263.04 provides: UNITING CAUSES OF ACTION. The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint several causes of action, whether they be such as were formerly denominated legal or equitable or both. But the causes of action so united must affect all the parties to the action and not require different places of trial, and must be stated separately. See also Karass v. Marquardt (1939), 230 Wis. 655, 284 N. W. 514, and Midland Terra Cotta Co. v. Illinois Surety Co. (1916), 163 Wis. 190, 157 N. W. 785. Here the first cause of action is against the city under the safe-place statute. Allegations of gross negligence and nuisance are also made against the city. The second cause is against Miss Higgins, the lifeguard, for gross and ordinary negligence, while the third cause is against Houtz, the director of recreation, for ordinary negligence. Appellant contends that a cause of action against the city for a violation of the safe-place statute does not affect either Houtz or Higgins and further that the gross negligence of Higgins does not affect Houtz. We consider that appellant's contention in this respect is subject to several defects. Its objection to a joinder of causes of action in both gross and ordinary negligence disregards the recent decision in Bielski v. Schulze, ante, p. 1, 114 N. W. (2d) 105. There the court recognized that in the usual negligence case, that which has been termed gross negligence is only a high percentage of ordinary causal negligence and a distinction between them in treatment or effect has no sound basis. Therefore the court abolished the concept of gross negligence in such cases as the one now before us and we need not be concerned now with any difficulties arising from a joinder of the present cause of action pleaded as gross negligence and that pleaded as ordinary negligence. Appellant's submission that a cause of action against the city based upon the safe-place statute is misjoined with a cause of action against the individual defendants for their own negligence fails to convince us. To begin with, the joinder of causes of action has been treated in ProcedureJoinder of Causes of Action in Wisconsin, 1955 Wisconsin Law Review, 458. At page 461 the author notes that the Wisconsin supreme court has relied heavily on Pomeroy's analysis of a cause of action, and that in determining how many causes of action are stated in the complaint, the court has often said: `The test of whether there is more than one cause of action stated or attempted to be stated in a complaint is not whether there are different kinds of relief or objects sought, but whether there is more than one primary right sought to be enforced or one subject of controversy presented for adjudication.' The latest expression of this was made in Cohn v. Zippel (1961), 12 Wis. (2d) 258, 107 N. W. (2d) 184, and in Whaling v. Stone Construction Co. (1958), 5 Wis. (2d) 113, 92 N. W. (2d) 278. In explaining this principle, the court stated in Herman v. Felthousen (1902), 114 Wis. 423, 425, 90 N. W. 432: The test to be applied in order to determine whether a complaint states more than one cause of action, is whether, looking at the whole pleading, there is more than one primary right presented thereby for vindication. There may be many minor subjects, and facts may be stated constituting independent grounds for relief, either as between the plaintiff and all the defendants, or the former and one of the latter, or between defendants, and there be still but a single primary purpose of the suit, with which all the other matters are so connected as to be reasonably considered germane thereto parts of one entire subject, presenting to the court but one primary ground for invoking its jurisdiction. Since there is only one subject of controversy (the accident) in the case at bar and only one primary right of plaintiff, there is only one cause of action. We note that an even more-liberal definition of cause of action has been urged by Judge CHARLES E. CLARK, Code Pleading (hornbook series, 2d ed.), p. 130, sec. 19. He urges that a cause of action be considered as referring to such a group of facts, but limited as a lay onlooker would to a single occurrence or affair, without particular reference to the resulting legal right or rights. Sec. 260.11, Stats., provides: WHO AS DEFENDANTS. (1) Any person may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a necessary party to a complete determination or settlement of the questions involved therein. A plaintiff may join as defendants persons against whom the right to relief is alleged to exist in the alternative, although recovery against one may be inconsistent with recovery against the other; and in all such actions the recovery of costs by any of the parties to the action shall be in the discretion of the court. As employees, agents, or officers of the city the doctrine of respondeat superior may impose on the city liability for their negligence and the cause of action against the city may properly be united with the actions against such individuals. Also, if the two statutes conflict, sec. 260.11 prevails over the limitation of sec. 263.04 which demands that a cause of action united in a complaint must affect all parties to the action. De Groot v. Peoples State Bank (1924), 183 Wis. 594, 198 N. W. 614. See also Larson v. Lester (1951), 259 Wis. 440, 49 N. W. (2d) 414, where causes of action were united against a village and one of its policemen in the alleged shooting of plaintiff. The complaint was sustained against demurrer. We reached the same conclusion in Matczak v. Mathews (1953), 265 Wis. 1, 60 N. W. (2d) 352. Smith v. Jefferson (1959), 8 Wis. (2d) 378, 385, 99 N. W. (2d) 119, also held that, In view of the provision of sec. 260.11 (1) which provides that, `Any person may be made a defendant . . . who is a necessary party to a complete determination or settlement of the questions involved' in the action, the municipality may be joined as a party defendant in an action brought under sec. 270.58 against the officer. Larson v. Lester (1951), 259 Wis. 440, 49 N. W. (2d) 414. In the Larson Case, page 444, we held that under certain conditions (which appear to be present now) a political subdivision is required to protect its policemen against damage claims. We see no valid distinction in the status of Larson, the policeman, and Higgins, the lifeguard nor, for that matter, of the director of recreation in so far as concerns the present demurrer. It follows, then, that the political subdivision, the city of Oconomowoc, has a legitimate interest in the controversy between the plaintiff and the city's lifeguard and its director, and the city may be made a defendant, per sec. 260.11, Stats. This court has also stated that sec. 260.11 (1), Stats., pertaining to persons who may be named as defendants, is to be liberally construed as a remedial measure. Ermis v. Federal Windows Mfg. Co. (1959), 7 Wis. (2d) 549, 97 N. W. (2d) 485. We conclude that the causes of action were not improperly united in the present complaint and, as to this ground, the demurrer was correctly overruled.