Opinion ID: 2570629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction on Voluntary Manslaughter Based on Imperfect Self-Defense

Text: Moore argues that the district judge's refusal to give the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter instruction based on imperfect self-defense is reversible. This error, he asserts, prevented the jury from accepting his theory of the case, i.e., that he had an honest but unreasonable belief that he would be shot to death by police if they entered his home or he emerged from it. A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to present his or her theory of defense. See State v. Baker, 281 Kan. 997, Syl. ¶¶ 2, 4, 7, 135 P.3d 1098 (2006). And a district judge has a duty to instruct the jury on any lesser included offense established by the evidence, regardless if that evidence is weak or inconclusive. There is, however, no duty to instruct on a lesser included offense if the jury could not reasonably convict the defendant of the lesser included offense based on the evidence presented. See State v. White, 284 Kan. 333, 347, 161 P.3d 208 (2007) (quoting State v. Boyd, 281 Kan. 70, 93, 127 P.3d 998 [2006]; State v. Drennan, 278 Kan. 704, 712-13, 101 P.3d 1218 [2004]); State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 646, 740 P.2d 559 (1987). When reviewing a district judge's refusal to give a requested instruction, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the requesting party. State v. Saleem, 267 Kan. 100, 113, 977 P.2d 921 (1999). Defendant was charged with capital murder and attempted capital murder under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(5), which prohibits the intentional and premeditated killing of a law enforcement officer, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3110 and amendments thereto. The parties stipulated to the victims' status as law enforcement officers. K.S.A. 21-3403 defines voluntary manslaughter as the intentional killing of a human being committed: ... (b) upon an unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances existed that justified deadly force under K.S.A. 21-3211.... In turn, K.S.A. 21-3211 provides: A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent it appears to such person and such person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to defend such person or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. See White, 284 Kan. at 347-48, 161 P.3d 208; compare K.S.A. 21-3211(Furse 1995). Thus voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense is not a defense to criminal liability; it is a lesser degree of homicide. State v. Carter, 284 Kan. 312, 326, 160 P.3d 457 (2007). Moore did not testify, but he asserts that adequate evidence of his honest belief in the necessity of exerting deadly force came in through the testimony of Walton, who admitted Moore told him repeatedly that he was defending himself, and through Taylor, who testified Moore believed he was going to be shot by police. Sparks also testified that Moore stated he believed he would die. We are not persuaded by Moore's argument. In order for him to be convicted of voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense, the jury would have had to conclude the circumstances could warrant an honest belief that the uniformed officers who entered Moore's home were aggressors threatening imminent use of unlawful force. See White, 284 Kan. at 347-48, 161 P.3d 208; K.S.A. 21-3211 (Furse 1995). Moore's jury could not reasonably do so on the record before us. Two analogous decisions on the necessity of ordinary self-defense instructions are instructive. In the first, State v. Tyler, 251 Kan. 616, 840 P.2d 413 (1992), defendant St. John Tyler requested a self-defense instruction; Tyler was prosecuted for shooting a uniformed police detective who assisted in a warrant-supported raid on Tyler's alleged crack house. The district judge ruled that a law enforcement officer executing a validly issued search warrant could not, as a matter of law, be an `aggressor' within the meaning of K.S.A. 21-3211. 251 Kan. at 626, 840 P.2d 413; see K.S.A. 21-3211 (Furse 1995). On appeal, this court upheld the outcome in the district court but held that its legal ruling was overbroad. We held that a self-defense instruction could be appropriate when an unidentifiable law enforcement officer used force to execute a warrant, if a reasonable person believed the force was justified to repel an unlawful aggressor. Tyler, 251 Kan. at 626, 840 P.2d 413. However, Tyler's circumstances fell outside this rule. Although the detective involved had raised his gun, there was no indication that he was about to use unlawful force. Rather, the detective was dressed in clothing identifying him as deputy sheriff and several occupants of the house heard the officers involved in the raid identify themselves as they entered. Tyler had not attempted to ascertain the detective's identity, and Tyler admitted that he knew his drug operation might be raided and that officers might enter quickly in such an event. With this evidence before the jury, Tyler's testimony that he did not know the detective was a police officer and certain occupants' testimonies that they had not heard the officers identify themselves did not justify a self-defense instruction. 251 Kan. at 626-27, 840 P.2d 413. In State v. Lutter, 27 Kan.App.2d 858, 860, 10 P.3d 16, rev. denied 270 Kan. 902 (2000), a panel of our Court of Appeals applied Tyler to hold that the district judge did not err by refusing to give a self-defense instruction. In Lutter, the only evidence arguably supporting the instruction was the defendant's testimony that he thought the officer, Butler County Sheriff's Deputy Jeremy Train, was going to kill him. The defendant, Michael Lutter, had run away after officers responded to a report of a stranded vehicle in a cemetery. The Court of Appeals panel wrote: Although Train had his gun out, no evidence was presented that indicates that he was about to use unlawful force. Lutter knew that Train was a uniformed sheriff's deputy. He was running away when Train gave chase and told him that he was under arrest. Though Lutter claims he feared for his life and shot first to defend himself against perceived imminent, unlawful aggression, his testimony discloses otherwise. Lutter admits he shot to scare the deputy so that he could escape. In addition, under these circumstances, no reasonable person in Lutter's circumstances would believe it necessary to shoot Deputy Train to defend himself from imminent use of unlawful force. Lutter, 27 Kan.App.2d at 861, 10 P.3d 16. As in Tyler and Lutter, the evidence in this case did not merit the giving of any kind of self-defense instruction. There is no question that Moore appreciated that the persons at his door were law enforcement officers, that he appreciated the reasons they had gathered outside his home and desired to enter it, and that Sparks was a hostage until virtually the same moment that the police came through the door. Moore fired at the officers in spite of his undeniable knowledge of their identity and purpose. Under these circumstances, Moore simply could not have harbored an honest but unreasonable belief that the deadly force was necessary; and we have no hesitation in upholding the district judge's decision to deny a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on imperfect self-defense. This decision eliminates any need to address an alternative argument made by the State, i.e., that the skip rule should apply to excuse any error in refusing the voluntary manslaughter instruction. See State v. Horn, 278 Kan. 24, 43, 91 P.3d 517 (2004).