Opinion ID: 2266043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Adverse Possession

Text: Rhode Island law, by statute, prescribes what set of circumstances must occur before one is divested of legal title to real property as a consequence of that land's being adversely claimed and possessed by another. The adverse possession statute, G.L.1956 § 34-7-1, provides as follows: Where any person or persons, or others from whom he, she, or they derive their title, either by themselves, tenants or lessees, shall have been for the space of ten (10) years in the uninterrupted, quiet, peaceful and actual seisin and possession of any lands, tenements or hereditaments for and during that time, claiming the same as his, her or their proper, sole and rightful estate in fee simple, the actual seisin and possession shall be allowed to give and make a good and rightful title to the person or persons, their heirs and assigns forever; and any plaintiff suing for the recovery of any such lands may rely upon the possession as conclusive title thereto, and this chapter being pleaded in bar to any action that shall be brought for the lands, tenements and hereditaments, and the actual seisin and possession being duly proved, shall be allowed to be good, valid and effectual in law for barring the action. This Court has further explicated this statute by providing concrete elements that are necessary to prove adverse possession. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that in order to establish adverse possession under § 34-7-1, a claimant's possession must `be actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim of right, continuous, and exclusive.' Locke v. O'Brien, 610 A.2d 552, 555 (R.I.1992) (quoting Sherman v. Goloskie, 95 R.I. 457, 465, 188 A.2d 79, 83 (1963)). Further, [a] claimant must establish the indicia of adverse possession for a period of ten years. Locke, 610 A.2d at 555 (citing § 34-7-1). Evidence of adverse possession must be proved by strict proof, that is, proof by clear and convincing evidence of each of the elements of adverse possession. Locke, 610 A.2d at 555. Cognizant of the fact that we have interpreted the elemental requirements of adverse possession on numerous occasions, see Lee v. Raymond, 456 A.2d 1179, 1182 (R.I. 1983), we shall only briefly readdress them here. The elements of actual and continuous possession are successfully established when the claimant shows that the use to which the land has been put is similar to that which would ordinarily be made of like land by the owners thereof.' Id. at 1183. Additionally, the continuity of the possession must be sufficient to signal the true owner of the land that a claim of title contrary to his own is being asserted. Id. The notorious and openness elements are established by a showing that the claimant goes upon the land openly and uses it adversely to the true owner. The owner then becomes chargeable with knowledge of what is done openly on the land. Gammons v. Caswell, 447 A.2d 361, 367 (R.I.1982). A claimant makes a showing that the possession was hostile if a determination is made that the possession of the occupier is to a visible line in all events, regardless of the location of the true boundary line. LaFreniere v. Sprague, 108 R.I. 43, 50, 271 A.2d 819, 822 (1970). Regarding the elements of claim of right and exclusivity, we discussed in Gammons that in order for a defendant to successfully defend against an adverse possession claim of disputed land, there would have to be evidence indicating that the defendants or others had made improvements to the land or, at the very least, had used the land in a more significant fashion than merely walking across it. Gammons, 447 A.2d at 368. In sum, we have opined that the ultimate fact to be proved in adverse possession is that the claimant has acted toward the land in question `as would an average owner, taking properly into account the geophysical nature of this land.' Id. (quoting 7 Powell, The Law of Real Property § 1018 at 740 (1981)). We further noted in Gammons that [c]ultivating land, planting trees, and making other improvements in such a manner as is usual for comparable land have been successfully relied on as proof of the required possession. Id. See also 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession §§ 58-60 (1986). In this case, the trial justice found that Anthony presented undisputed evidence of his cultivation of the land in controversy by planting trees, maintaining a lawn over the disputed area and making other improvements including the erection of a rabbit hutch and two cold frames. The trial justice also determined that [t]he aforesaid activities were initiated on or before May of 1981 and continued thereafter until the defendants bulldozed various plantings of the plaintiff on or about the end of July, 1991. The trial justice then embarked upon what we view as a meticulous journey through the above-discussed elements of adverse possession, explaining in detail the manner by means of which Anthony's use of the land had satisfied those requirements. The findings of adverse possession by a trial court sitting without a jury are entitled to great weight and will not be overturned unless the factual finding is clearly wrong or unless the trial court overlooked or misconceived material evidence. Walsh v. Cappuccio, 602 A.2d 927, 930 (R.I.1992) (citing Hilley v. Simmler, 463 A.2d 1302, 1304 (R.I.1983); Lee v. Raymond, 456 A.2d at 1184). After our examination of the record, we are of the opinion that the trial justice's findings are supported by the relevant, substantial, and probative evidence therein, and that there was no error in his finding that Anthony had used and cultivated the Searle land for the mandated statutory period, nor did he err in finding that the adverse nature of the possession was actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim of right, continuous, and exclusive.