Opinion ID: 3134248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality Under the Fourth Amendment of the

Text: United States Constitution Presented with the problems caused by chemically impaired drivers in the state, the legislature enacted the statute later declared unconstitutional in King. In response to this court's holding in King, the legislature amended the statute by: (1) deleting the requirement that chemical testing be premised upon a driver's fault in causing an accident; (2) deleting the provision that chemical test results could be used in civil and criminal proceedings; (3) adding a requirement that chemical testing be premised upon the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket for a non- equipment traffic offense; and (4) defining with more particularity the types of personal injury that trigger the chemical testing provision. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95½, par. 11--501.6, with 625 ILCS 5/11--501.6 (West 1994). The legislature did not alter two components in the statute. First, the legislature retained the implied-consent provision of the predecessor statute. Second, the legislature did not require an individualized suspicion of chemical impairment before subjecting a driver to chemical testing. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95½, par. 11--501.6, with 625 ILCS 5/11--501.6 (West 1994). We believe that the changes made by the legislature in response to King reduce the intrusiveness of chemical testing and allow for testing only in those situations in which a driver's expectation of privacy is diminished. Like the railroad industry in Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 109 S. Ct. 1402, and the junkyard business in Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601, 107 S. Ct. 2636, the highways of Illinois are highly regulated. The Vehicle Code comprises 404 pages in the Illinois Compiled Statutes (West 1994) covering a broad range of subjects from ambulances (625 ILCS 5/1--102.01 (West 1994)) to school zones (625 ILCS 5/11--605 (West 1994)). Although a driver does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation (Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1400 (1979)), the regulation of automobiles in Illinois reduces a driver's expectation of privacy. While driving on the road, one reasonably expects less privacy than one expects within the confines of a residence. As the Supreme Court has noted in the context of border checkpoints, one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence. Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1130, 96 S. Ct. at 3084- 85. Further, under the predecessor statute, personal injury included any injury requiring immediate professional attention in either a doctor's office or a medical facility. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95½, par. 11--501.6(g). Under the amended statute, the legislature narrowed the spectrum of drivers subject to chemical testing. Under section 11--501.6(g), personal injuries shall include any type A injury  [which]  shall include severely bleeding wounds, distorted extremities, and injuries that require the injured party to be carried from the scene. 625 ILCS 5/11-- 501.6(g) (West 1994). We believe that the legislature in amending the statute intended to limit the personal injury requirement of section 11--501.6 to type A injuries. We further believe that type A injuries are limited to those listed in section 11--501.6(g) (625 ILCS 5/11--501.6(g) (West 1994)). Accidents involving a fatality still trigger the chemical testing provision. However, personal injury requiring only a visit to a doctor's office or a medical facility no longer can be the basis for testing. Thus, the legislature's more particularized definition of type A injuries subjects a driver to chemical testing in only the more serious accidents. No reasonable driver expects to leave the scene of a serious accident moments after its occurrence. With law enforcement personnel investigating the accident and other personnel attending to the participants' physical conditions, a driver expects less privacy. In addition, any driver subject to chemical testing under the amended statute has a statutory duty to remain at the scene of the accident, render aid to injured parties, and exchange basic information with those involved. See 625 ILCS 5/11--401, 11--403 (West 1994). Given the amount of time required to attend to law enforcement and emergency medical needs, the addition of a chemical test is minimally intrusive. Thus, by the very nature of the circumstances in which drivers find themselves, the legislature has imposed testing only when a driver's expectation of privacy has been diminished and a test is minimally intrusive. Finally, the amended statute premises chemical testing on an arrest[ ] as evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket for a nonequipment violation of the Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.6(a) (West 1994). Drivers issued Uniform Traffic Tickets are released only after posting bail in the form of a current Illinois driver's license, a bond certificate, or cash. 155 Ill. 2d R. 526. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court noted that [a]n arrest  is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual's freedom of movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 909, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1882 (1968). Because the movement of an arrested driver is already subject to restrictions, the administering of a chemical test poses a minimal additional intrusion. In sum, we believe that under the amended statute (625 ILCS 5/11--501.6 (West 1994)), a driver will be subject to chemical testing only in situations in which the intrusiveness of the search has been reduced and a driver's expectation of privacy has been diminished. The intrusion upon an arrested driver is minimal or nonexistent depending upon the length of time required by law enforcement personnel to process the accident scene and emergency medical personnel to attend to the injured parties. Additionally, a driver's expectation of privacy is diminished because a driver is operating a vehicle in a highly regulated environment. Thus, we conclude the legislature has enacted a statute that falls within the special needs exception to the fourth amendment. The State of Illinois has a special need beyond the normal needs of law enforcement to determine whether drivers are chemically impaired and to suspend those drivers' licenses. Under the limitations contained in the amended statute, drivers are subject to chemical testing only when testing will be minimally intrusive and only after a driver's expectations of privacy have been further diminished by the factors set forth in the statute. Fink argues, however, that the special needs exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement is inapplicable because the chemical test results may be used in a criminal proceeding. For several reasons, Fink's claim fails. In support of his argument, Fink points to comments by the King court that the predecessor statute fell outside the special needs exception because one of the stated purposes of the search is to gather evidence for criminal prosecution. King, 153 Ill. 2d at 462. However, as noted elsewhere in King (153 Ill. 2d at 459- 60), the Supreme Court has not yet determined whether evidence obtained under the special needs exception may be routinely used in criminal proceedings. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 662 n.5, 109 S. Ct. at 1415 n.5. King recognized that the Supreme Court has upheld searches under this special exception even though evidence obtained during the search was also used in a criminal trial. King, 153 Ill. 2d at 462. In those instances in which searches were upheld, the evidence was found incidentally during a search which was constitutionally valid under the special needs exception. King, 153 Ill. 2d at 462. If the admission of chemical test results in a criminal proceeding is incidental to a statute's purpose, application of the special needs exception is not precluded. Following King, the legislature chose to delete those provisions contained in the former statute that allowed the use of chemical test results in criminal proceedings. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95½, pars. 11--501.6(e), (f), with 625 ILCS 5/11-- 501.6(e), (f) (West 1994). As we have already noted, the purpose of the statute is to reduce the destruction caused by drunken drivers on Illinois highways. This goal can be accomplished through civil suspension proceedings of those who fail the test, as well as through the provisions suspending the licenses of persons who refuse to submit to chemical testing. By deleting any reference in the amended statute to the use of test results in criminal proceedings, the legislature has made clear that criminal prosecution is only incidental to the primary purpose of the statute. Because the use of test results in other proceedings is incidental to the amended statute's purpose, the special needs exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement remains applicable. King, 153 Ill. 2d at 462.