Opinion ID: 1122767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Detective's Authority

Text: The prosecution argues that the trial court's broad suppression order is, in substance and effect, a grant of witness immunity to Manning. Under the terms of section 13-90-118, C.R.S.1973, however, a police officer is not authorized to apply to the court for a grant of immunity or to promise transactional immunity [7] to a witness. According to the prosecution, the trial court should not have extended the immunity power beyond the express terms of the statute. See State v. Ward, 571 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1977); State v. Hargis, 328 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla.App.1976). Without proper authority, therefore, Bailey's alleged promise should not bind the government in this case. United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1110 (D.C.Cir.1975); Ward, 571 P.2d at 1346. The prosecution concludes by arguing that Fisher, 657 P.2d 922 (Colo.1983), is distinguishable since the promise in that case was not subject to the restrictions of an immunity statute. What the prosecution overlooks is that the alleged promise in this case was not subject to the restrictions of section 13-90-118 either. If the suppression of Manning's statements was incorrect, the reason will be either that Bailey's comments did not rise to the level of a promise, or that the promise he made was excusable. Under these circumstances, we hold that Bailey was an agent of the government when he talked to Manning. In January, he was expressly authorized to promise Manning that she would not be prosecuted if she revealed the location of her son and if he was alive and healthy. In April, Bailey made statements on his own initiative; nevertheless, he possessed the necessary apparent authority [8] to bind his principal, the government. See Gilmore v. Constitution Life Insurance Co., 502 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir.1974); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Green, 384 F.2d 298 (10th Cir.1967); Bowser v. Union Bag Co., 112 Colo. 373, 149 P.2d 800 (1944); White v. Brock, 41 Colo.App. 156, 584 P.2d 1224 (1978); Russell v. First American Mortgage Co., 39 Colo.App. 360, 565 P.2d 972 (1977). As an agent, Bailey was capable of implicating Manning's constitutional rights by any promise or commitment that he made. Fisher, 657 P.2d at 930 n. 11. Any result to the contrary would be unsound from both a legal and a practical standpoint. If police officers were free to make promises to actual or potential defendants, knowing that the government could, without consequence, deny or disaffirm those commitments, the temptation would be great to use unauthorized promises as a device for extracting confessions. See People v. Bookman, 646 P.2d 924 (Colo.1982) (confessions should not be obtained by promises of special consequences); People v. Scott, 198 Colo. 371, 600 P.2d 68 (1979) (confessions obtained by direct or indirect promises, however slight, will be considered involuntary).