Opinion ID: 4425913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: History of the POAA

Text: In 1993, 76 percent of the voters in Washington State approved the passage of the POAA. Under the POAA,persistent offenders must be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. ROW 9.94A.570. A persistent offender is a person who commits a third most serious offense after having been convicted on two separate prior occasions of most serious offenses or their out-of-state equivalents. ROW 9.94A.030(38).Most serious offense means any class A felony or certain class B felonies that are violent, sexual, or dangerous.^ See RCW 9.94A.030(33). The age of majority in Washington State is 18 years old, RCW 26.28.010, and juvenile adjudications are not included as strikes under the POAA. Thome, 129 Wn.2d at 748; RCW 9.94A.030(35). We have continually upheld sentences imposed under the POAA as constitutional and not cruel under article I, section 14. See, e.g., State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875, 889, 329 P.3d 888 (2014); State v. Magers, 164 Wn.2d 174, 193, At the time these defendants committed the instant offenses, most serious offenses included, among other crimes, all class A felonies; assault in the second degree; robbery in the second degree; vehicular assault, when caused by the operation or driving of a vehicle by a person while under the influence ofintoxicating liquor or any drug; and any felony with a deadly weapon verdict. RCW 9.94A.030(33). The legislature recently removed robbery in the second degree from the list of most serious offenses. Engrossed Substitute S.B. 5288,66th Leg., Reg. Sess.(Wash. 2019). Languagej making this change retroactive was removed by amendment. Amend. 5288-S AMS PADD S2657.1 to Engrossed Substitute S.B. 5288. ' State V. Moretti, No. 95263-9 i i ^ j 189 P.3d 126 (2008)(plurality opinion); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d ^52, 667, 921 P.2d 473 (1996); State v. Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 715, 921 P.2d 495 (1996); Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 772-73;see also State v. Davis, 133 Wn.2d 187, 190,943 P.2d 283 (1997) (agreeing that the offenders' crimes are not distinguishable from Manussier, Rivers, and Thorne and, therefore, that a challenge arguing that the sentences were cruel would be frivolous). B. Sentencing an older adult recidivist who committed a prior crime as a young adult to life in prison without parole is not categorically unconstitutional Moretti, Nguyen,and Orr each challenge their POAA sentences, claiming that imposing a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole on a person who committed at least one, but not all, of their strike offenses as a young adult categorically violates article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We have previously held that article I, section 14 is more protective than the Eighth Amendment when evaluating both the proportionality ofthe POAA, Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d at 887, and juvenile sentencing. State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 82,428 P.3d 343 (2018). Therefore, if it is not cruel under article I, section 14 to apply the POAA to offenders who committed a prior strike offense as a young adult, then it is necessarily not cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.We review a statute's constitutionality, like questions oflaw, de novo. Id. at 77. 10 State V. Moretti, No. 95263-9 j i I 1. There is no evidence of a national consensus against using a crime committed as a young adult to enhance the sentence of an adult who continues to offend The first step in the categorical bar analysis is to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.Id. at 85. To determine this, we consider 'objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice.' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010)). 'It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.' Id. at 86 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002)). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the burden is on the offender to show that a national consensus exists. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 106 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005); cf. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 86 (explaining that the offender was correct that the direction of change was in his favor). None of the petitioners have provided information about whether other states [ allow the use of a crime committed as a young adult to enhance a sentence imposed on an offender who commits a third strike as an older adult. In his amended i ^ ( supplemental brief, Nguyen argues that states overwhelmingly prohibit the use of i i i ! 11 i State V. Moretti, No. 95263-9 :