Opinion ID: 828424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: further response to majority

Text: The majority concludes that in this case establishing title is a necessary prerequisite to the alteration of the plat. I agree.15 If the plat had been simply altered without a judicial decree that plaintiffs were the true owners of the property, the LDA would have served as the vehicle to “establish an otherwise nonexistent property right,” which would be contrary to our holding in Tomecek v Bavas, 482 Mich 484, 496; 759 NW2d 178 (2008) (“The LDA was never intended to enable a court to establish an otherwise nonexistent property right.”).16 But that does not mean that plaintiffs should be relieved from filing their cause of action pursuant to the LDA. MCL 560.223 requires the plaintiff in an LDA action to set forth the “reasons for seeking the vacation, correction, or revision” of a plat, which in this case would obviously be that the plaintiff acquired an interest in the platted property by adverse possession.17 The trial court would 15 In supposing that this dissent would hold that “an LDA action [is] a prerequisite to establishing an adverse possession claim,” ante at 12 n 39, the majority misapprehends this dissent. The argument here is not that an LDA action is a prerequisite to the establishment of an adverse-possession claim, but only that, when an adverse-possession claim overlaps an action to “vacate, correct, or revise a plat,” the former must be brought within the LDA in order to ensure that the protections afforded by the LDA inure to the benefit of persons whom the statute was intended to protect. 16 Although I continue to believe that Tomecek was correct that an LDA action seeking to “vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat” does not enable a court to establish an otherwise nonexistent property right, Justice CAVANAGH, who joins this opinion, does not. See Tomecek, 482 Mich at 499 (CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, neither of our positions in Tomecek is inconsistent with the position asserted in this dissent. 17 Contrary to the majority’s position, the doctrine of standing would not bar an adverse possessor from proceeding in this manner, even one who was not already the owner of a 25 then proceed with the case as with any other adverse-possession action, and the plaintiff would be required to show “clear and cogent proof of possession that [has been] actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of 15 years, hostile and under color of claim of right.” Burns v Foster, 348 Mich 8, 14; 81 NW2d 386 (1957). If the plaintiff is able to meet this burden of proof, the trial court would then “vacate, correct, or revise all or a part of a recorded plat,” as provided in sections 222 to 229 of the LDA. MCL 560.221. In this way, persons who purchase property in reliance on the representations made in a plat, as well as future purchasers of platted property, are protected by the requirements of the LDA, and the plat remains accurate because a new plat must then be prepared in whole or part. MCL 560.229(1).18 Indeed, the majority itself sees “no reason why plaintiffs could not have addressed both the adverse possession claim and the LDA claim in bifurcated proceedings . . . in platted lot. MCL 560.222 provides that a complaint may be filed by “the owner of a lot in the subdivision, a person of record claiming under the owner, or the governing body of the municipality in which the subdivision covered by the plat is located.” Because title vests automatically in the adverse possessor upon expiration of the period of limitations, Gardner v Gardner, 257 Mich 172, 176; 241 NW 179 (1932), the adverse possessor would be an “owner of a lot in a subdivision” and thus would have standing to file a complaint under MCL 560.222. 18 Requiring plaintiffs to proceed in this manner does not run afoul of Tomecek because the LDA is not being used here to create substantive property rights. Rather, the doctrine of adverse possession itself created these rights, which passed to plaintiffs upon the expiration of the requisite period of limitations. Gardner, 257 Mich at 176. Thus, the LDA does not serve as a vehicle to create substantive property rights, but only serves as the “tool to validate property rights that already exist[].” Tomecek, 482 Mich at 496 (opinion by KELLY, J.). 26 which the court would have first addressed the quiet title claim and then, if necessary, resolved any issues regarding the plat[.]” Ante at 21. However, it simply believes that “there is nothing in the LDA that requires a litigant to proceed in that manner.” Ante at 21. To me, what compels a litigant to proceed in that manner is, equally simply, that the LDA constitutes the exclusive manner by which to “vacate, correct, or revise” a plat. The township’s easement is a “part of the plat,” and when that interest is altered-- or in this case entirely terminated-- outside the scope of the LDA, the mandate that actions seeking to “vacate, correct, or revise” must be undertaken in a particular manner is disregarded. Although plaintiffs could establish title in a quiet-title action, if the LDA and the quiettitle statutes are to be harmonized, plaintiffs must file such an action under the LDA. If nothing requires a litigant to proceed in that manner, and if a litigant can proceed in a piecemeal fashion by bringing only a quiet-title action, and then-- and only if he so chooses-- a subsequent action to alter the plat under the LDA, then why did this Court reverse in Martin, in which the plaintiffs proceeded in the identical manner now deemed acceptable by the majority? Our analysis in that case answers this question, and it merits reiteration: Allowing this action to proceed as one to quiet title is contrary to the statutes, which not only outline the specific procedures to be followed and what must be pleaded, but also require that an extensive group of parties be served, including everyone owning property located within three hundred feet of the lands described in the petition, the municipality, the State Treasurer, the drain commissioner, the county road commissioners, affected public utilities, and, in certain instances, the directors of the Department of Transportation and the Department of Natural Resources. [Martin, 469 Mich at 550-551 (emphasis added).] 27
The majority errs in its understanding of Martin v Beldean, both factually and legally. As already discussed, Martin held that a plaintiff “seeking to vacate, correct, or revise a dedication in a recorded plat” must file a lawsuit pursuant to the LDA. Martin, 469 Mich at 542-543. This precedent is now made the subject of hypertechnical distinctions that have no grounding in either the LDA or in Martin itself. Given the importance of Martin to this case, the majority’s analysis warrants further response. The majority states that this dissent “incorrectly concludes that Martin requires plaintiffs in the instant case to file under the LDA,” because the Martin plaintiffs had a preexisting substantive property right—reflected in the plat and documented by a deed—in the plat whose language they sought to have declared void. Thus, the issue in Martin concerned whether the plat’s language accurately reflected the parties’ preexisting rights as outlined in the plat itself. Furthermore, the relief sought by the Martin plaintiffs’ quiet title action was to conform the plat at issue to those preexisting property rights. [Ante at 14.] The majority’s points are straightforward, but its asserted distinctions fail. First, the Martin plaintiffs did not have a “preexisting substantive property right . . . reflected in the plat,” because the plat reflected only that the disputed property, outlot A, was “‘reserved for the use of the lot owners.’” Martin, 469 Mich at 545. Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the plat granted absolutely no rights to the plaintiffs in outlot A, but instead, just as the plat in this case, granted use rights to someone other than the plaintiffs.19 In Martin, the plat granted use rights to the other 21 lot owners; in this case, 19 In fact, it was not until the plaintiffs applied for a permit to build on outlot A that they learned that it had been dedicated for the use of the other lot owners. Martin, 469 Mich at 544-545. 28 the plat granted use rights to assorted other persons, including the township. Thus, the Martin plaintiffs had no preexisting substantive property right reflected in the plat. Second, just as in Martin, plaintiffs here “had a preexisting substantive property right”-- the right of title which passed upon the expiration of the statutory period of limitation-- “in the plat whose language they sought to have declared void.” The majority might better explain why the Martin plaintiffs, whose claimed title to the disputed property was established by a deed, were required to bring their quiet-title action pursuant to the LDA while plaintiffs in this case, whose title to the disputed streets was established by adverse possession, are not.20 Any putative distinction based on the method of acquiring title lacks statutory support and suggests, without any apparent basis in the law, that title acquired by deed constitutes a legally superior method of acquiring title for purposes of an LDA action. In any event, plaintiffs here did acquire title to the disputed streets by deed. The trial court found that North and East Streets were included in a deed to General William G. Beach (plaintiffs’ predecessor) in 1853, and that Cross Street was included in a deed to the Beach family in 1897. Accordingly, even under the 20 In this regard, the majority states that “plaintiffs had no recognized, recorded, preexisting property rights in the disputed land,” ante at 14, but I fail to understand the relevance of this distinction for two reasons. First, the majority cites no authority for the suggestion that a plaintiff must have some type of “recognized” and “recorded,” “preexisting” property right in the disputed land. MCL 560.222 contains no such requirement. Second, plaintiffs do have a “recognized” property right. As even the majority acknowledges, expiration of the period of limitations vests title in the party claiming adverse possession, Gardner, 257 Mich at 176, and, further, plaintiffs also have deeds that reflect their property rights in the disputed streets. Thus, plaintiffs do have a “recognized recorded preexisting property right[] in the disputed land,” as now required by the majority for the LDA to be applicable. 29 majority’s interpretation of Martin, because plaintiffs did have a “preexisting substantive property right . . . in the plat whose language they sought to have declared void,” they are required to file their action pursuant to the LDA. Third, the majority repeatedly emphasizes that the Martin plaintiffs’ deed “preexisted” the filing of the plat. This purported distinction is again without merit for two reasons: (1) MCL 560.222 contains no requirement that only claims based on property rights that “predated” or “preexisted” the filing of a plat must be brought under the LDA and (2) Martin itself did not rely on this distinction, or even allude to it, in holding that the plaintiffs’ action had to be filed under the LDA. Presumably, this is because the Martin plaintiffs and their predecessors received a deed to outlot A after the subdivision was platted, not before, as asserted by the majority. See Martin v Redmond, 248 Mich App 59, 61; 638 NW2d 142 (2001). Fourth, the majority states that because the plaintiffs had a preexisting property right reflected in the plat whose language they sought to have declared void, the issue in Martin concerned “whether the plat’s language accurately reflected the parties’ preexisting rights as outlined in the plat itself,” ante at 14. Again, I disagree. The Martin plaintiffs did not claim that the plat’s dedication of outlot A was in error21-- that is, they did not claim that the plat inaccurately dedicated outlot A for the use of all owners in the subdivision because that would have been inconsistent with their deed. Instead, the plaintiffs in Martin only claimed that the dedication had expired pursuant to the terms of 21 Nor could they have, as the owner at the time of the plat’s dedication, specifically signed the dedications and restrictions that depicted outlot A as among those reserved for the use of all lot owners. 30 the plat itself, which limited all restrictions, conditions, covenants, and rights to 25 years; by laches or estoppel, as the trial court had held; or because the dedication was invalid, as the Court of Appeals had held. See Martin, 248 Mich App at 62-63. This Court then addressed only the following issues: (1) the Court of Appeals’ holding that a private dedication in a recorded plat is invalid under Michigan law, and (2) whether the plaintiffs, who ultimately sought to have the plat conveyance of outlot A declared “null and void,” were required to file their claim under the LDA. Martin, 469 Mich at 542543. From all of this, it seems clear that the issue in Martin was not, as the majority claims, whether the plat language “accurately” reflected the “parties preexisting rights as outlined in the plat itself,” but only whether the dedication was valid in the first place and, if it was, whether plaintiffs could alter that dedication outside the confines of the LDA. Nothing in Martin concerned the “accuracy” or “scope” of existing rights under a recorded plat, and thus the majority’s purported distinctions are inapt. Fifth, the majority states that “the relief sought by the Martin plaintiffs’ quiet title action was to conform the plat at issue to those preexisting property rights.” Ante at 14 (emphasis added). I fail to see how the Martin plaintiffs, who filed suit to declare their interest obtained by deed superior to the interests of those who claimed an interest in the property as a result of the plat’s dedication language, sought to “conform the plat at issue,” but plaintiffs here did not. Did not both sets of plaintiffs file suit to quiet title to establish their respective preexisting titles as superior to those who claimed an interest in the property stemming from the plat’s dedication language? Did not both sets of plaintiffs file suit to declare “null and void” that very dedication language? Yet 31 according to the majority, only the Martin plaintiffs sought to “conform” the plat to their preexisting property rights. The distinctions are invisible. Sixth, under the majority’s holding, if a party is only required to file a cause of action pursuant to the LDA “[i]f [his] interest in land is traceable to the plat or the platting process,” ante at 18, then it must follow that Martin, a recent and unanimous decision of this Court, was wrongly decided. As already noted, the Martin plaintiffs’ interest in the platted property arose from a deed conveyed after the property was platted. Their interest was neither “traceable to the plat” nor to “the platting process.” Consequently, under the majority’s holding, our decision in Martin, requiring the plaintiffs’ quiet-title action to proceed under the LDA, was in error because the LDA could not have provided the necessary relief. Yet the majority does not overrule Martin. This leads to the second practical question arising from the majority’s opinion, in addition to how plats are to remain as accurate depictions of the realities of property boundaries in Michigan: If the majority cannot reconcile its holding in this case with the Court’s holding in Martin, how are the bench and bar to comprehend the nuances of difference apparently recognizable to the majority that justify the disparate treatment of these cases? The majority leaves in place alternative, and incompatible, formulations of the law, each of which will be invoked as convenient by different plaintiffs, defendants, and judges. In the final analysis, the majority, in attempting to justify its holding that plaintiffs are not required to file their claims under the LDA, deeply misunderstands Martin, both factually and legally. The Martin plaintiffs had neither a “preexisting substantive property right . . . reflected in the plat” nor a deed that “preexisted” the filing of the plat, 32 and their case did not concern the “accuracy” or “scope” of the plat at issue. In addition, the Martin plaintiffs’ interest in the land was not “traceable to the plat or the platting process,” as now required by the majority in order for the LDA to apply. What the Martin plaintiffs did have was a deed that reflected their interest in the property, and they did seek to “conform the plat at issue” to that deed, but, as discussed, those are similarities rather than differences. Thus, just as in Martin, “plaintiffs, in seeking to vacate, correct, or revise the plat, [are] required to file their lawsuit under the Land Division Act.” Martin, 469 Mich at 552.22
According to the majority, the “basic disagreement” between our respective analyses is that this dissent views LDA and quiet-title actions as sometimes “overlap[ping]” and in tension with each other, and thus concludes that it is necessary to harmonize the relevant statutes, while the majority views those actions as separate and distinct, and thus concludes that it is unnecessary to harmonize. Ante at 20 n 57. However, the disagreement between our opinions is even simpler and more fundamental, in my judgment. The question is simply whether plaintiffs’ quiet-title action seeks to 22 Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, the majority maintains that the “factual and legal differences that distinguish the instant matter from Martin compel the result of this case.” Ante at 17 n 53. Never mind that the supposed “factual differences” are nonexistent-- the Martin plaintiffs did not have a preexisting property right reflected in the plat, they did not have a deed that preexisted the filing of the plat, and their case did not concern the accuracy or scope of the plat-- both bench and bar are now left utterly without guidance as to how supposed “factual and legal differences” in future cases should be understood in characterizing these as either Martin or Beach cases. The majority’s legacy here is to leave property law murkier and increasingly subject to judicial discretion and arbitrariness. 33 “vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat.” If answered in the affirmative, plaintiffs must file this action pursuant to the LDA, and only then would the statutes have to be harmonized. If answered in the negative, plaintiffs may proceed with their action as one to quiet title only, without the need to comply with the LDA. Thus, the critical question once again is whether this particular quiet-title action seeks to “vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat.” On this note, it is worth reflecting again on the majority’s approach to answering this question. According to the majority, plaintiffs only seek to establish a substantive interest in property and are unconcerned with “vacat[ing], correct[ing], or revis[ing] the plat.” This analysis is straightforward, but straightforwardly wrong. A plaintiff’s subjective and self-characterized interest cannot be the determining factor in assessing whether an action seeks to “vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat,” for, as discussed, other persons may also have affected property interests in the plat, and the fundamental premise of the LDA is that each of these is entitled to be heard in actions “vacat[ing], correct[ing], or revis[ing] the plat.” Each is entitled to notice, to participate fully in the lawsuit, and to have his or her interests accurately depicted on the plat. By focusing exclusively upon a plaintiff’s subjective and selfcharacterized interests, the majority: (1) fails to take other persons, and other interests, into account, as required by the LDA, (2) fails to adhere to the express language of the LDA, which requires that an LDA action be undertaken whenever the “vacat[ion], correct[ion], or revis[ion]” of a plat is sought-- not merely when it has been stated that it is sought-- and instead substitutes its own “crucial limitation,” limiting the LDA to cases in which the plaintiff has a property interest “traceable to the plat or the platting process,” 34 and (3) substantially undermines the LDA as a means for ensuring the accuracy of plats in this state.