Opinion ID: 2556570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Medical Negligence Act

Text: Dr. Reddy argues that Harbor Health's claim for contribution is subject to the two-year statute of limitations found in the Delaware medical negligence statute. [6] The statute defines medical negligence as any tort or breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider to a patient. [7] Section 6856 states that [n]o action for the recovery of damages upon a claim against a health care provider for personal injury, including personal injury which results in death, arising out of medical negligence shall be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date upon which such injury occurred.... [8] In addition, section 8128 of title 10 states: No action for the recovery of damages upon a claim based upon alleged health care malpractice, whether in the nature of a tort action or breach of contract action, shall be brought after the expiration of the time period for bringing such an action set forth in § 6856 of Title 18. [9] The unambiguous language of the medical malpractice statute indicates that the General Assembly intended for its statute of limitations to apply to claims brought by the consumer of health services against a health care provider. [10] The statute defines medical negligence as any tort or breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider to a patient. [11] The two exceptions to the statute of limitations found in section 6856 both relate to the ability of the injured person to bring suit against a health care provider. The contribution claim brought against Dr. Reddy by Harbor Health is neither an action for tort nor an action for breach of contract by a consumer of health care services against a health care provider. Nevertheless, Dr. Reddy argues, Harbor Health's contribution claim is really a medical negligence claim, since it arose from the original medical negligence claim that was brought in the District of Columbia. Dr. Reddy's argument disregards the fact that a claim for contribution by a joint tort-feasor must by definition arise from some underlying tort. [12] That fact, however, does not alter the independent nature of a joint tort-feasor's cause of action for contribution. [13] Dr. Reddy relies on several of this Court's prior decisions, including Dambro v. Meyer , [14] Taylor v. Pontell , [15] and Christiana Hospital v. Fattori , [16] for the proposition that the General Assembly intended to limit all medical negligence claims to two years from the date of injury. Those cases are distinguishable from this one in that all three barred a suit outside of the two-year statute of limitations period for a claim of medical negligence that was brought by the patient against the health care provider. [17] None of those cases involved a contribution claim by one tort-feasor against another. Accordingly, the application of the general three-year statute of limitations to Harbor Health's claim for contribution does nothing to undermine the holdings in those cases or the General Assembly's intent. [18] An action for contribution is independent of the underlying tort and originates with the establishment of a joint obligation on a liability shared by the tort-feasors. [19]