Opinion ID: 734228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Review for Authority to Consent

Text: 8
9 In the past decade, this Circuit has consistently declined to decide the appropriate standard of review for a district court's ruling on authority to consent to a search. See, e.g., United States v. Dearing, 9 F.3d 1428, 1429 n. 1 (9th Cir.1993) (We have not decided the standard of review for apparent authority determinations.); United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 764 n. 4 (9th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Sealey, 830 F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir.1986) (same). 10 In lieu of providing a standard, we have repeatedly held that the standard of review did not effect our determination of the case at issue. Dearing, 9 F.3d at 1429 (Whether we review de novo ... or for clear error, our conclusion is the same.). As we have uniformly affirmed decisions regarding authority to consent, the result has been to uphold the district court without delineating an appropriate standard. See, e.g., Dearing, 9 F.3d at 1429 n. 1; United States v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir.1992); Sealey, 830 F.2d at 1031; Hamilton, 792 F.2d at 841. We now hold explicitly that district court authority determinations are reviewed de novo. 11 United States v. McConney delineates this Circuit's approach to deciding the appropriate standard of review for the type of mixed questions of law and fact presented by authority determinations. 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). In McConney we stated: 12 If application of the rule of law to the facts requires an inquiry that is essentially factual--one that is founded on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct,--the concerns of judicial administration will favor the district court, and the district court's determination should be classified as one of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. If, on the other hand, the question requires us to consider legal concepts in the mix of fact and law and to exercise judgment about the values that animate legal principles, then the concerns of judicial administration will favor the appellate court, and the question should be classified as one of law and reviewed de novo. 13 728 F.2d at 1202 (citations omitted). 14 McConney identified three distinct steps to deciding such a mixed question: (1) establishment of facts; (2) selection of the applicable rule of law; and (3) application of the law to the facts. Id. at 1200. The district court's determination of the facts is reviewed for clear error and its selection of the applicable rule of law is reviewed de novo. Id. at 1200-01. The standard of review for the district court's application of law to facts is based on a functional analysis. Id. at 1202. 15 Under the McConney approach, we must first ascertain if determination of authority to consent is essentially factual or instead requires a studied analysis of mixed facts and law. Judge Hall's dissent in Hamilton provides a persuasive argument for the latter characterization. 792 F.2d at 844-45 (affirming district court ruling that third party had apparent authority to consent to a motor home search) (Hall, J., dissenting). In response to the majority's decision not to determine the standard of review for authority decisions, Judge Hall argued that the Court should apply a de novo standard: While a trial court may be in the best position to determine the actual extent of mutual use, the question of whether these facts constitute a 'sufficient relationship' for the purposes of the fourth amendment is an inherently legal one. Hamilton, 792 F.2d at 844. 1 As Judge Hall noted, this analysis requires us to consider abstract legal doctrines, to weigh underlying policy considerations, and to balance competing legal interests. Id. at 844 (quoting McConney, 728 F.2d at 1205). We agree that this balancing presents a mixed question of law and fact that should be examined under a de novo standard. 16 Our decision is also guided by the constitutional implications of consent analysis. As McConney noted, de novo review is favored when courts apply the law to facts in constitutional cases. This process requires consideration of the abstract principles that inform constitutional jurisprudence. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1203. Applying this test, McConney held that the exigent circumstances justifying a police search conducted without following standard procedures is reviewable de novo because it is rooted in constitutional principles and policies. Id. at 1204-05. The same type of concerns are presented when reviewing the existence of authority to consent to a search: balancing society's interest in effective law enforcement with the expectations of privacy contained in the Fourth Amendment. Thus, applying de novo review in the present context is appropriate and consistent with our application of a de novo standard in exigent circumstances cases. See United States v. Von Willie, 59 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir.1995) (applying de novo review to exigent circumstances decision). 17 Analysis illustrates that review of a trial court's determination of authority to consent to a search requires a considered judgment of both factual circumstances and legal issues. Thus, we review the district court's authority decisions de novo.
18 Utilizing the de novo standard, we focus on Kim's argument that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence found in the PSM storage locker. Kim claims that Wee had neither actual nor apparent authority to consent to a search of the containers, as he was a mere employee operating at Kim's direction. Kim analogizes their relationship to sub-lessor and sub-lessee, arguing that Kim was essentially sub-leasing the units from Wee, and that consequently, Wee had no authority to consent to the search. We do not find this argument persuasive. 19 The Supreme Court has ruled that consent to a search must be made by an individual with common authority over the property. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). The Court defined common authority as joint access or control for most purposes. Id. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7. Cases subsequent to Matlock have emphasized that a consent-giver with limited access to the searched property lacks actual authority to consent to a search. For example, in United States v. Warner, 843 F.2d 401, 405, (9th Cir.1988), we held that a landlord's consent was insufficient even when the tenant gave permission to the landlord to enter the premises in his absence. In United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir.1984), we suggested that a consent-giver whose right of access is narrowly prescribed would lack sufficient authority to consent to a search. The cases upholding searches generally rely on the consent-giver's unlimited access to property to sustain the search. See United States v. Guzman, 852 F.2d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that authority to consent was present when consent-giver had full access to property); Sealey, 830 F.2d at 1031 (same). 20 Here, the Government argues that Wee's name was on the lease and that he supervised loading of the tools into the storage units. The difficulty with this argument is that Kim had the only key to the lock and had general control over the unit. Wee did not have independent access and, without Kim's permission, Wee did not have the authority to open the unit (and never did open it for his own purposes). These factors put the case outside the joint access or control for most purposes test. 21 However, we have noted that Matlock also establishes an assumption of risk analysis. See United States v. Sledge, 650 F.2d 1075, 1080 n. 10 (9th Cir.1981) ([A] defendant may assume the risk that the third party will at times exceed the scope of authorized access, as that is defined in precise and narrow terms....). Here, Kim dispatched Wee to rent the storage units. By instructing Wee to lease the units in Wee's name, Kim assumed the risk that Wee could exercise his rights as lessee to have the storage company open the unit. In addition, Kim allowed Wee to keep possession of the leases, supervise unloading of the goods and retain the keys on occasion. At any time, Wee could have accessed the storage locker without Kim's knowledge or permission. Because Kim ceded partial control of the PSM lockers to Wee at all times, and allowed him total control on occasion, he assumed the risk that Wee would allow a search of the units. Thus, we find that Wee possessed common authority to consent to the search. 22 Because we find that actual authority existed we do not reach the alternative argument that Wee possessed apparent authority to consent to the search.