Opinion ID: 3045669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: penalty phase ineffectiveness

Text: The State also challenges the district court’s decision to grant an evidentiary hearing on Reaves’ penalty phase claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 38 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 39 of 42 Although neither party contests our jurisdiction to review that aspect of the district court’s judgment, “we are obligated to address jurisdictional questions sua sponte” whenever jurisdiction may be lacking. Thomas v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n, 594 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). As a general principle, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing “final decisions” of district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, meaning those that “end[] the litigation on the merits and leave[] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983) (quotation marks omitted). In the context of habeas proceedings, however, we have held that a judgment granting a writ of habeas corpus on less than all grounds asserted in a petition is a final, appealable decision within the meaning of § 1291. Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d 621, 622 (11th Cir. 1985). Nonetheless, that does not mean that every action taken by a district court in conjunction with granting a habeas petition constitutes an appealable final decision. Cf. Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 38, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1206 (1995) (holding that there was interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to individual officers, but not the district court’s denial of the county commission’s motion for summary judgment). In and of itself, the district court’s grant of an evidentiary hearing on Reaves’ penalty phase ineffective assistance claim does not constitute a final 39 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 40 of 42 decision on the merits. See Broussard v. Lippman, 643 F.2d 1131, 1133 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981) (“When . . . a district court anticipates that further proceedings on substantive matters may be required, any order it makes to facilitate those further proceedings is necessarily not final.”). 13 Had the district court rejected Reaves’ guilt phase claim on the merits but granted an evidentiary hearing on the penalty phase claim, we would not hesitate to classify the resulting decision as interlocutory. We see no reason to treat the district court’s decision to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the sentence stage claim as final and immediately appealable simply because the court granted Reaves’ habeas petition on a guilt stage claim. Apart from final decisions, we may exercise appellate jurisdiction over certain interlocutory rulings that fall within 28 U.S.C. § 1292 or the collateral order doctrine. The district court’s grant of an evidentiary hearing, however, does not fit under § 1292, see 28. U.S.C. § 1292(a)-(b), nor does it satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine, which applies only to non-final decisions that “conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment,” Wajnstat v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 13 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before the close of business on September 30, 1981. 40 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 41 of 42 684 F.3d 1153, 1156 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). The court’s grant of an evidentiary hearing is not completely separate from the merits of Reaves’ penalty phase claim and, should the district court ultimately grant relief on that claim, the State will have an opportunity to challenge the propriety of the district court’s action in conducting an evidentiary hearing on the claim. If such a challenge occurs and is successful, any evidence admitted at the evidentiary hearing will have to be disregarded; were it otherwise, there would be no way to enforce the restrictions imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction, we may also review an otherwise non-appealable decision that is “inextricably intertwined” with an appealable decision or when “review of the former decision is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). The issue of whether the district court properly granted an evidentiary hearing on Reaves’ penalty phase claim is not “inextricably intertwined” with the merits of its decision on his distinct guilt phase claim, and we have had no difficulty resolving the latter issue without addressing the former. Because the district court’s grant of an evidentiary hearing on the penalty phase claim is interlocutory in nature and no exception to the final judgment rule applies, we lack jurisdiction to review that decision. 41 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 42 of 42