Opinion ID: 1536017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of Own Conduct Evidence

Text: Defendant argues that it was improper for the State to charge both him and Staples with capital murder when it was clear that only one of them killed Sergeant Gonzalez. Because the State was not clear on which one of them was the killer, defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he committed Sergeant Gonzalez's murder by his own conduct. Defendant also points out that guideline two of the Prosecutor's Guideline for Designation of Homicide Cases for Capital Prosecutions, which was adopted by the New Jersey County Prosecutors Association and the Attorney General in 1989, provides that a prosecutor must be satisfied that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, by his own conduct, actively and directly participated in causing the death of the victim. Rule 3:7-3b requires that an indictment for murder specify whether the act is murder as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), (2) or (3), and whether or not it is alleged that the defendant committed the murder by his or her own conduct, paid another to commit the murder, or is the leader of a drug-trafficking network who secured the murder in furtherance of a conspiracy. A grand jury may return an indictment if there is a prima facie showing that the accused has committed a crime. State v. New Jersey Trade Waste Ass'n, 96 N.J. 8, 27, 472 A. 2d 1050 (1984). For the crime of purposeful or knowing murder, the prosecutor was not required to state in the indictment whether the murder was committed by defendant's own conduct. The own conduct requirement is not an element of purposeful or knowing murder; it is merely a triggering device for the death penalty phase of the trial. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 99, 549 A. 2d 792 (1988) (quoting State v. Moore, 207 N.J.Super. 561, 576, 504 A. 2d 804 (Law Div.1985)). The own conduct requirement is analogous to the filing of a notice of aggravating factors that a prosecutor must file before subjecting a defendant to a capital trial. We have stated: Like the indictment, the notice of aggravating factors is the turn-key to a capital prosecution. Implicit in both is the notion that the allegations derive from some verifiable source. The need to ensure that such a source exists compels some preliminary review to satisfy the interest of the public and the defendant that such charges not proceed to trial without a factual mooring. [ State v. McCrary, 97 N.J. 132, 143, 478 A. 2d 339 (1984).] Under McCrary, the prosecutor must show that there was sufficient evidence to allege the aggravating factors. Id. at 140-41, 478 A. 2d 339. That means that when a prosecutor indicts a person for capital murder, he or she must, among other requirements, (1) make a prima facie showing to the grand jury that the person committed the murder, and (2) present some evidence that one of the triggering devices applies to the facts of the case. Defendant's reference to the Prosecutor's Guideline for Designation of Homicide Cases for Capital Prosecution does not weigh into our decision. The standard stating that a prosecutor must be satisfied that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, by his own conduct, actively and directly participated in causing the death of the victim is only a guideline establishing uniformity for prosecutors to follow when determining whether to seek the death penalty. It holds no legal significance. Our examination of the record convinces us that there was a sufficient amount of evidence before the grand jury against both defendants which, if believed, reasonably could lead to a finding that either defendant or Staples murdered Sergeant Gonzalez by his own conduct. Because Simon is the defendant in this appeal, we will focus only on the evidence against him. The grand jury was presented with evidence that Simon was the passenger and that the shot was fired from the passenger side of the vehicle. In addition, Simon exited the passenger side of the vehicle with the murder weapon in his hand after the crash. That evidence satisfies the State's burden of making a prima facie showing that defendant murdered Sergeant Gonzalez by his own conduct. Hence, the indictment was proper. We also reject defendant's contention that the State could not charge him and Staples with capital murder because it was clear that only one of them murdered Sergeant Gonzalez. In State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 580 A. 2d 221 (1990), two defendants were indicted for capital murder. The Court noted that the petit jury found both Clausell and his co-defendant guilty of purposeful and knowing murder, and found that Clausell, but not his codefendant, had committed the homicidal act by his own conduct. Id. at 312, 580 A. 2d 221. This Court neither questioned nor criticized the fact that two defendants, in a single-shooter murder, were charged with capital murder for killing the same victim, and that the petit jury was left to decide, if it could, who was the actual shooter. Similarly, in State v. Brown , Brown and a co-defendant were both indicted for capital murder, although a jury did not have to decide who actually killed the victim by his own conduct because Brown's co-defendant pled guilty. 138 N.J. 481, 651 A. 2d 19 (1994), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 700 A. 2d 306 (1997). In addition, the Legislature specifically discussed situations in which there were more than one participant in a murder when drafting the death penalty statute. The Legislature noted that an accomplice to a murder would not be subjected to the death penalty, but that when the line between principal and accomplice was blurred, it is up to the jury to decide who pulled the trigger. Public Hearing Before Senate Judiciary Committee on Senate Bill No. 112 (Death Penalty) at 18 (Feb. 26, 1982). We conclude that as long as there is sufficient evidence for the State to make a prima facie showing that each defendant committed the murder by his or her own conduct, the State is permitted to charge more than one defendant with capital murder, even where it is clear that only one person actually killed the victim by his own conduct.