Opinion ID: 164068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of Evidence Obtained Through Wiretaps

Text: 11 Cline argues first that the wiretaps on the phones at his business and his home and on Wright's home were obtained without an adequate showing of necessity. The district court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained by means of those wiretaps, concluding that the government had adequately demonstrated necessity. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court's determination that a wiretap was necessary. United States v. Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir.2002). Further, [a] defendant bears the burden of proving that a wiretap is invalid once it has been authorized. Id. If a defendant succeeds in showing that the necessity requirement was not met, evidence seized pursuant to the wiretap must be suppressed. Id. 12 By statute, an application for a wiretap order must contain a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). The authorizing judge must similarly find that normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous in order to meet the necessity requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c); see also Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d at 1222. 13 Such traditional investigative techniques include (1) standard visual and aural surveillance; (2) questioning and interrogation of witnesses or participants (including the use of grand juries and the grant of immunity if necessary); (3) use of search warrants; and (4) infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or informants. United States v. VanMeter, 278 F.3d 1156, 1163-64 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir.2002) (en banc n.1)). Other traditional techniques include pen registers and trap and trace devices. See Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d at 1222 n. 2. 14 If it has not tried those traditional techniques, the government must explain that failure with particularity. Id. at 1222; see also United States v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir.2001). [G]eneralities, or statements in the conclusory language of the statute, are insufficient to support a wiretap application. The statements must be factual in nature and they must specifically relate to the individuals targeted by the wiretap. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1188. However, we consider all the facts and circumstances ... and read the necessity requirement in a common sense fashion. Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d at 1222 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 15 Cline argues that the language in the applications for the wiretaps on the phones in his home and his business as well as in the Wright home were conclusory and failed to adequately demonstrate necessity as to him. He asserts that [t]he facts set forth in the applications and affidavits showed either that the normal investigative techniques that were undertaken were effective or that they had not been tried prior to seeking the wiretaps. Appellant's Br. at 11. 16 Eight applications were filed in this case, seeking authorization to intercept wire communications on five separate telephone lines. 2 Cline argues he was one of the individuals targeted by the wiretaps on the Wright residence telephone (Line A), the Biker's Dream phone (Line D) and his own home telephone (Line E). Senior Judge Richard Rogers of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas signed the orders authorizing and extending the interception of the wire communications on four of the five lines (Lines A-D), and Judge Sven Holmes of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma signed the order authorizing the interception of the fifth line (Line E). 17 The Wright wiretap was obtained first. Cline argues that the affidavit of DEA agent Robert Ryan in support of the original application for the Wright wiretap only cursorily recites prior efforts to infiltrate the organization and the use of ordinary investigative techniques like telephone records, pen registers, background checks, general questioning, informants, physical surveillance, and search warrants, and only mentions Cline by name once. See R. Vol. 83, doc. 628, tab 4. He argues that subsequent affidavits submitted in support of the government's applications for extensions of the wiretap on Wright's telephone, as well as the application for wiretaps on Cline's own residence and on the Biker's Dream, suffered from the same deficiencies. We disagree with all his arguments. Because all the challenged affidavits are very similar, we will address them collectively, pointing out, where necessary, any differences between them. 18 The affidavits in support of the applications recited the use and exhaustion of normal investigative techniques, including [i]nfiltration by undercover officers, [r]eview of telephone records, including pen register results, [r]eview of general background and police records of suspected traffickers, [g]eneral questioning, with or without grants of immunity, [u]se of informants, [p]hysical surveillance, [s]earch warrants, and [w]ire intercepts. R. Vol. 84, doc. 629, tab 7, ¶ 76 (Biker's Dream Wiretap App.), tab 8, ¶ 81 (Cline Residence Wiretap App.), R. Vol. 83, doc. 628, tab 4, ¶ 73 (Wright Residence Wiretap App.). The affidavits explained how infiltration by undercover agents had been unsuccessful because most members of the organization had lived in the same area for years, had known each other for years, and were suspicious of anyone new. Further, the affidavits stated that the investigation revealed that Wright kept his subordinates separate so that they did not always know each other's identity or know what other members of the organization were doing. The affidavits recited the investigation's limited success with the three cooperating individuals the agents had used thus far and that 19 [t]o date, no successful undercover activity has been mounted directly with Tim CLINE. CLINE is very careful to protect himself from this type of activity by dealing only with trusted members of his organization. From training and experience, this affiant knows that members of organized `outlaw' motorcycle gangs are very paranoid and protective o[f] their organizations and activities. R. Vol. 84, doc. 629, tab 7, ¶ 80. 3 20 The affidavits recounted the use of pen register information in the investigation, but stated that such information was limited in its usefulness because it did not reveal the identities of the parties to the conversation nor the nature or substance of the conversation, nor differentiate between legitimate calls and those for criminal purposes. For example, pen register information has established that Tim CLINE utilizes the target telephones to make contact with other members of the LONERS MOTORCYCLE GANG, but the exact nature of the conversations cannot be known without the use of wire intercept. Id., ¶ 81. 21 The affidavits further detailed that while some cooperating individuals had been interviewed, further questioning of individuals was unlikely to prove fruitful. A number of individuals involved in the drug organization had histories of violence. Several murders were believed by those close to the organization to be related to the organization's drug activity. Several individuals had indicated that, while they had provided some confidential information, they would refuse to testify because of fear for their safety. 22 Similarly, the supporting affidavits recounted that [r]eliable confidential informants and cooperating sources have been identified and developed by your Affiant... in regard to this investigation. Id., ¶ 87; R. Vol. 83, doc. 628, tab 4, ¶ 84. However, the organization revealed itself to be compartmentalized and close-natured. Id. The affidavits revealed the use of three cooperating individuals who had some degree of success in infiltrating the organization but whose future usefulness was virtually nil. The first cooperating individual was, at the time of the application, suspected of being an informant and was not able to make further contact with any members of the drug organization. The second individual was incarcerated on an unrelated charge, and the third individual had apparently ceased to cooperate and had in fact gone back to working with the drug organization. The affidavits adequately established that, due to the close-knit community, as well as the suspicious nature of those involved in the drug organization and the difficulty of introducing anyone new into it, the traditional investigative technique of informants had been tried but was unlikely to meet with further success. 23 The supporting affidavits also explained the agents' use of surveillance on numerous occasions of various places and subjects, primarily the manufacturers and distributors of methamphetamine for this organization. R. Vol. 84, doc. 629 tab 7, ¶ 89. They detailed the difficulties encountered in conducting surveillance in the rural area: the officers and their vehicles stood out among the locals; Wright and Cline used sophisticated counter-surveillance techniques; members of the drug organization were familiar with and used back roads where surveillance was difficult or easily detected; surveillance of Cline's business was hampered by the fact that some suspects in the drug organization were county employees and local business persons. 24 The affidavits detailed the limited success obtained thus far by the use of search warrants. While they had resulted in the seizure of drugs and methamphetamine laboratories and proceeds, they had failed to uncover the scope of the operations, or identify the sources of the precursor chemicals, the methods of distribution, and other members of the conspiracy. 25 In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the government made an adequate showing of necessity for the issuance of the wiretaps in question. Far from being conclusory, the affidavits contain sufficient factual details explaining the traditional investigative techniques used, and why any future use of them would likely be fruitless. They sufficiently explain why the investigative techniques would be futile with respect to Cline, as well as other members of the organization being investigated. Many of the problems the agents encountered investigating the drug organization were not unique to Cline, but applied to the entire organization and its structure, and so the failure to specifically name Cline repeatedly was not fatal to the affidavits.
26 Cline next argues the government failed to timely seal the tapes of the calls intercepted on his home telephone. 4 The statute provides that [i]mmediately upon the expiration of the period of the order [authorizing the wiretap], or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a). The statute further provides that [t]he presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom. Id. 27 The order authorizing the wiretap on Cline's residence was issued on February 24, 2000. Telephone calls were intercepted until March 23, 2000. On that same day, DEA agent Rob Ryan, who was the case agent and the wiretap administrator, contacted Assistant U.S. Attorney Allen Litchfield, who was supervising the Oklahoma wiretap. AUSA Litchfield, in turn, contacted the office of United States District Judge Holmes, who had authorized the wiretap on Cline's residence, and stated that the tapes were available. Agent Ryan was told that, because of the judge's schedule, Agent Ryan should appear before the judge on March 30, 2000. Agent Ryan and another AUSA did so, and, on March 30, the tapes were sealed by Judge Holmes. 5 28 Cline argues the one week delay is too long and the government has failed to adequately explain that delay, other than to assert that the judge was unavailable, and this court has never stated whether the issuing judge's unavailability is a satisfactory explanation for such a delay. 29 By its clear language, Section 2518(8)(a) requires, as a prerequisite to the admissibility of a recording, that one of two criteria be satisfied: either the recording must have been properly placed under seal, or the government must provide a `satisfactory explanation' for its failure to comply with the sealing requirement. United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1523 (10th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257, 263, 110 S.Ct. 1845, 109 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990)). If the government fails to comply with the statute, the recording and all evidence derived therefrom must be suppressed. Id. Thus, we must consider whether the presentation of the recording for sealing was immediate within the meaning of § 2518(8)(a) and, if not, whether the government's explanation of its delay in presentation was satisfactory under the statute. We review those questions of statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d 1389, 1394 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Rodriguez, 786 F.2d 472, 476 (2nd Cir.1986). 30 The government argues the recordings were immediately made available to the judge who issued the wiretap order (Judge Holmes) in the sense that the AUSA immediately contacted the judge and offered to appear at the judge's convenience to present the recordings for sealing. Thus, the government argues, the fact that the recordings were in fact sealed, pursuant to the judge's directions, some seven days later is irrelevant. We do not need to decide whether the statute requires that the government only make the recordings immediately available for sealing, regardless of when they are in fact sealed, or whether it requires immediate actual sealing. Even if the government failed to comply with the sealing requirement, we find that the government's explanation for the seven-day delay before the tapes were sealed is reasonable. 31 As indicated, once the wiretap terminated, the government immediately contacted the issuing judge to present the recordings for sealing. The judge informed Agent Ryan and AUSA Litchfield that, due to the judge's scheduling problems, the next available time for the government to present the recordings would be in a week, and directed the AUSA to come back then. R. Vol. 9, doc. 748, attach. E. 6 While the government could have sought another judge to have the recordings sealed, there is no evidence of bad faith and no indication that the recordings were tampered with or that there was any tactical advantage gained by waiting the week to have Judge Holmes seal the tapes. Other courts have similarly accepted the issuing judge's scheduling problems as an acceptable excuse for a delay. See United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1204 (9th Cir.2002) (As we have noted, `[t]he unavailability of the issuing or supervising judge may constitute a satisfactory explanation for a sealing delay.' (quoting United States v. Pedroni, 958 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir.1992))); Maxwell, 25 F.3d at 1394 (Intervening weekends, holidays, and the unavailability of the issuing judge are satisfactory explanations for slight delays in presenting wiretap recordings for sealing.); United States v. Ardito, 782 F.2d 358, 362-63 (2d Cir.1986) (two-day intervening holiday, unavailability of issuing judge, and need to prepare paperwork provided adequate explanation for five-day delay); United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 533 (2d Cir.1977) (holding that unavailability of issuing judge excused six-day delay in sealing of tapes). But see Rodriguez, 786 F.2d at 477-78 (holding that absence of issuing judge is no longer an acceptable excuse for failing to have recordings sealed); cf. United States v. Quintero, 38 F.3d 1317, 1330 (3d Cir.1994) (declining to decide whether the absence of the supervising judge, in and of itself, is sufficient excuse for any delay in sealing). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the government carried its burden of providing a satisfactory explanation for the seven-day delay before the recordings were sealed. 32