Opinion ID: 1577692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 54

Heading: Wording of Intoxication Instruction

Text: Appellant argues that he was denied due process of law by the wording of the guilt phase instructions. With respect to the homicide, the trial court instructed the jury on murder, wanton murder, and second-degree manslaughter. It also delivered a separate intoxication instruction, which read: Even though the Defendant might otherwise be guilty of Intentional Murder and/or First Degree Burglary, you shall not find him guilty under those Instructions if at the time he committed the offenses, if he did so, he was so intoxicated that he did not form the intention to commit the offenses. An identical intoxication instruction was approved by this Court in Mabe, 884 S.W.2d at 672. See also Brown v. Commonwealth, 575 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Ky.1978). Appellant, however, argues that the trial court should have included the following additional language: If you believe from all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he did act wantonly as defined under Instruction No. ___ then you shall find him guilty of Second-Degree Manslaughter under Instruction No. ___. According to Appellant, the intoxication instruction as delivered gave the jury the erroneous impression that, if it believed he was voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the crimes, he would be fully acquitted. Appellant recognizes the well-settled principle that voluntary intoxication is not an absolute defense, but rather reduces an intentional crime to one requiring a culpable mental state of wantonness. Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845, 856-57 (Ky.1997). In determining how to convey this premise to the jury, this Court has explained that a separate instruction on intoxication explains to the jury how that defense affects the element of intent. It is unnecessary to repeat that explanation in the instruction on the primary offense. Slaven, 962 S.W.2d at 857 (internal citations omitted). Here, Appellant is requesting the inverse of the instruction requested in Slaven . Instead of the effect of the voluntary intoxication instruction being incorporated into the instruction on the primary offense, Appellant would like that effect explained within the voluntary intoxication instruction itself. As in Slaven , when read in their entirety, the instructions delivered in this case accurately state the law and the effect that voluntary intoxication has on a finding of intentional murder. See Bills v. Commonwealth, 851 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Ky.1993) ([J]ury instructions must be read as a whole.). There was no error.