Opinion ID: 167809
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Delegation by Board

Text: M s. Saurini’s first challenge to the jury instructions is that the district court should have given the jury her proposed instruction (which she proffered twice) that the School District is liable under § 1983 “if the Board delegated its decisionmaking authority to a retaliatory administrator.” Aplt. Br. at 50. Her proposed instruction read: -6- A claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment may be shown if (a) the School Board retains its decision-making authority but exercises it with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or (b) the School Board delegates its decisionmaking authority to an Administrator who retaliates against Plaintiff in violation of her constitutional rights. Pursuant to Colorado law, delegation of the School Board’s decision-making authority regarding nonrenew al of probationary employees is not allowed. However, the School Board must be in compliance w ith this law . The School Board is not in compliance of Colorado law if through a custom or usage it creates or gives decision-making authority regarding nonrenewal of school employees to an Administrator and then rubber-stamps the Administrator’s decisions concerning the nonrenewal list. Aplt. App. at 2598 (emphasis added). M s. Saurini’s challenge concerns alternative “(b)” in the first paragraph. She alleges that the Board had a custom of delegating to M r. Hinson the responsibility of choosing which personnel should be nonrenewed and then voting to approve his choices without serious debate. She argues that this custom effectively delegated the authority to renew or not renew to M r. Hinson and “resulted in ‘assembly-line rubber-stamping’ of Hinson’s recommendations, thereby creating a direct causal link between the School Board and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” A plt. Br. at 53. The jury, she concludes, “should have been instructed in this causal link and had the opportunity to determine the facts of this issue.” Aplt. Br. at 53-54. -7- M s. Saurini’s argument is contrary to circuit precedent. In Jantz v. M uci, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), we held that the school board did not delegate authority to a subordinate, and therefore had no liability under § 1983 for the subordinate’s alleged discrimination, when state law invested the school board with “final authority” to review hiring decisions made by a subordinate officer, unless the subordinate’s decision was based on a policy statement expressly approved by the board. Id. at 631 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff in Jantz made a “rubber-stamping” argument similar to M s. Saurini’s; although there was no express policy that guided the subordinate’s hiring decisions, the plaintiff argued that the board delegated its hiring authority to the subordinate by “custom or usage” because its “ultimate hiring decisions rarely conflict[ed] with the decision of the [subordinate].” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). W e disagreed, holding that “[s]imply going along with discretionary decisions made by one’s subordinates” is not a delegation of policymaking authority, as long as the school board retained the authority to review hiring decisions. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants in this case argue that Jantz controls because Colorado law , like the Kansas law applied in Jantz, prevents boards of education from delegating hiring and firing decisions. See Big Sandy Sch. Dist. No. 100-J v. Carroll, 433 P.2d 325, 328 (Colo. 1967), overruled on other grounds by Normandy Estates M etro. Recreation Dist. v. Normandy Estates, Ltd., 553 P.2d -8- 386 (Colo. 1976) (en banc). M s. Saurini does not respond to this argument (indeed, the second paragraph of her proposed instruction states that such a delegation of authority is not allowed under Colorado law), and we agree that Jantz controls. There was no error in failing to instruct the jury that the School District could be liable on the theory that it delegated its authority to M r. H inson. M oreover, because the jury rendered a verdict in favor of M r. Hinson, the School District could not be liable under a delegation theory in any event.