Opinion ID: 1349371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Filppula-McArthur v. Halloin

Text: ¶ 3. Plaintiffs, Noah Filppula-McArthur, a minor, and his mother, Lori McArthur, brought this medical malpractice action against several health care providers and insurers, including Thomas Halloin, M.D., the obstetrician-gynecologist who delivered Noah. The plaintiffs alleged that Noah suffered brain damage as a consequence of Dr. Halloin's negligence at the time of Noah's delivery. ¶ 4. The complaint was filed in Brown County Circuit Court in June 1997, and the case was assigned to Judge John D. McKay. Noah's interests were represented by his guardian ad litem, Wisconsin attorney Janet Angus. Soon after filing the complaint, Attorney Angus moved to have Attorney Ball appear pro hac vice. Upon an affidavit of Attorney Ball, in which he stated that he was in good standing with the Illinois bar and desirous of representing the plaintiffs, Judge McKay admitted him to appear pro hac vice in September 1997. Thereafter Ball assumed the role of plaintiffs' lead counsel in the case. [4] ¶ 5. The record demonstrates several instances of Attorney Ball's failure to comply with Judge McKay's orders during the discovery and pre-trial phases of the litigation. In these instances Ball's compliance was achieved only by court orders issued after defense motions to compel. ¶ 6. Of relevance here is Judge McKay's scheduling order which required plaintiffs' expert witnesses to be identified by April 1, 1998 and deposed by June 1. The order also required discovery to be complete by October 1, with the start of trial scheduled for November 2. However, Ball noticed the deposition of Christopher Inglese, M.D., one of Noah's treating physicians, to be conducted six days before the scheduled start of trial. Dr. Inglese was retained as a treating physician and not as an expert witness. ¶ 7. The defendants moved to quash the notice of deposition of Dr. Inglese arguing that the scheduling order did not allow for depositions to be conducted after October 1. The circuit court agreed and issued an order that reiterated that the scheduling order was still in force and disallowed the Inglese deposition. [5] ¶ 8. In addition to reinforcing the scheduling order, the court ordered Ball's compliance with an August 1998 order to provide defense counsel with a contemplated order of witnesses to be presented at trial. Ball had failed to comply with that order as late as October, explaining to defendants' counsel that because the defendants knew when their case-in-chief would begin there is no need for you to know the order of my witnesses. Upon a defense motion to compel, the court ordered Ball to promptly provide opposing counsel with specificity, and in good faith, the contemplated order of presentation of witnesses. ¶ 9. The ensuing trial began as scheduled on November 2. On the first day of trial, Attorney Ball's conduct led the court, in Judge McKay's words, to admonish Ball on several occasions. During Ball's opening statement to the jury, Judge McKay sustained numerous defense objections relating to the argumentative nature of Ball's statement and also admonished Ball sua sponte at several points. The court denied a motion for mistrial brought by the defendants following Ball's opening statement, but expressed its concern that the statement was almost pure argument in contravention of the court's orders. ¶ 10. Although Attorney Ball and his clients avoided a mistrial on day one, his conduct on the third day of trial brought what was expected to be a three-week trial to an end through a mistrial. The mistrial arose from Attorney Ball's questioning of Dr. Christopher Inglese. ¶ 11. During his opening statement, Ball stated that Dr. Inglese would testify that Noah's problems are due to hypoxic ishchemic encephalopathy. Concerned that Attorney Ball would attempt to elicit expert testimony regarding the ultimate issues in the case from Dr. Inglese, defense counsel brought the matter to the court's attention outside of the presence of the jury before the witness took the stand. Statements by the court and counsel reveal that Dr. Inglese's testimony was the subject of at least one pretrial discussion. ¶ 12. Attorney Ball explained to the court that Dr. Inglese was not testifying as an expert. Rather, he was testifying as a treating physician: ATTY. BALL: I can say that we have not retained Dr. Inglese as an expert. We haven't provided him with anything. He's going to testify as to his treatment and his conclusions and his diagnosis now. The court clarified the allowable bounds of such a witness's testimony: THE COURT: All right. And to that extent then, he's not entitled to express an opinion regarding the liability issues, the causation issues or the damage issues. He's here to offer testimony regarding his treatment, and his treatment obviously would include his diagnosis. ¶ 13. After Attorney Ball made it clear that Dr. Inglese might testify to the cause of Noah's condition while explaining his diagnoses, the court allowed defense counsel to voir dire the witness. Dr. Inglese explained that he had two diagnoses: an anatomic diagnosis and an etiological diagnosis. The witness understood that testimony relating to the etiology, i.e., cause, of Noah's condition was to be avoided: DR. INGLESE: If what you'd like me to do is I can avoid talking about etiology. DEFENSE COUNSEL: That would be fine, and you would be comfortable in doing that and sticking to whatever treatment you rendered and the diagnoses that you had. ATTY. BALL: I'm not comfortable in doing that, Your Honor. I want to ask him his etiologic diagnosis. THE COURT: Well, his etiological diagnosis, Mr. Ball, goes to the very question that is being objected to here. ATTY. BALL: That doesn't THE COURT: He's not been disclosed as an expert who's going to establish liability, cause or damages. ¶ 14. After several rounds of questioning of the witness and argument by counsel, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: Mr. Ball, I've seen this. We have visited this in detail regarding the pretrial of this matter and the motions that were made. This doctor can testify as to his diagnosis, his prognosis. He cannot testify as to the ultimate issues in this case being liability, cause, or damages. It's that simple. ATTY. BALL: So he can testify as to his etiologic diagnosis only? DEFENSE COUNSEL: No. ATTY. BALL: That's what he just said. THE COURT: He cannot testify as to the ultimate issues in this case; that being liability, cause and damages. ATTY. BALL: Understood. THE COURT: To the extent that his etiological diagnosis does not address any of those three issues, he can testify, but based on what he has indicated in voir dire, his etiological diagnosis directly affects one ofat least one of those issues, and he can't testify to that. ¶ 15. In subsequent argument Attorney Ball attempted to persuade the court to allow him to treat Dr. Inglese as an expert, even suggesting postponement of his testimony so as to provide defense counsel with opportunity to depose the witness. The court maintained its original position on the permissible scope of Dr. Inglese's testimony. ¶ 16. Dr. Inglese then took the stand before the jury. During the course of direct examination, Attorney Ball proceeded to ask a number of prohibited questions relating to the cause of Noah's injuries. The first two questions regarding cause faced objections that were sustained. Near the end of his direct examination, Ball asked the following series of questions: ATTY. BALL: I think you indicated that you ruled out genetics as a cause for his problems, is that correct? DR. INGLESE: Correct. ATTY. BALL: Were you also able to rule out the metabolic cause? DR. INGLESE: We investigated that thoroughly. We found no explanation. ATTY. BALL: Were you also able to rule out infection? ¶ 17. At this point defense counsel objected and a sidebar was held. Ball withdrew the last question. At the conclusion of Dr. Inglese's testimony, the defense moved for a mistrial. ¶ 18. The following day, after hearing arguments of counsel recounting the events of the Inglese testimony, the court granted a mistrial. The court explained that the questions eliciting testimony from Dr. Inglese relating to cause were in violation of the court's order. The court noted that Attorney Ball's questions as to cause came after at least three sidebars and the two occasions on which the court defined the parameters of Dr. Inglese's testimony. In the court's opinion, Ball's questioning rendered the case beyond salvaging. ¶ 19. Two months later the court heard the many post-mistrial motions brought by both sides. Attorney Ball sought reconsideration of substantially every ruling made by the court during the course of the trial. The defendants moved for revocation of Attorney Ball's pro hac vice status and for an assessment of costs and fees against him for his conduct leading to the mistrial. In response, the court assessed against Attorney Ball, personally, costs and reasonable attorney's fees, incurred as a result of the mistrial. ¶ 20. The circuit court then revoked Attorney Ball's pro hac vice status. In doing so Judge McKay explained that Ball's pro hac vice standing was a privilege extended by authority of the supreme court and that the circuit court bears the responsibility to ensure professional conduct and compliance with the rules of this courtroom. Judge McKay explained the grounds for revocation as follows: What concerns me is your unwillingness to abide by the rules of this Court, your insistence on revisiting ad nauseaum virtually every decision that this Court renders, your apparent unfamiliarity or disregard for the procedural rules of this jurisdiction, and your continued failure to heed the admonitions from this Court regarding your conduct. All of that, sir, has resulted in a mistrial. It has placed your client's cause in...potential jeopardy. I cannot-more importantly, I will notpermit that to continue, nor will I permit it to reoccur. You have abused your privilege before this Court. I therefore revoke that privilege. ¶ 21. Attorney Ball and his clients subsequently appealed the revocation of his pro hac vice status and the assessment of costs. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in revoking Ball's pro hac vice admission and in assessing costs against him. Filppula-McArthur v. Halloin, 2000 WI App 79, ¶¶ 13, 17, 234 Wis. 2d 245, 610 N.W.2d 201. The court of appeals found that the circuit court reasonably concluded that Ball's blatant failure to follow the court's orders evinced an unwillingness to abide by the rules of professional conduct for attorneys, and thus was a valid basis for revocation of pro hac vice under SCR 10.03(4). Id. at ¶ 13.