Opinion ID: 2803096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absence of Results of Blood Test

Text: 15 West Virginia Code § 17C-5-9 (1983)7 provided as follows: Any person lawfully arrested for driving a motor vehicle in this State while under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or drugs shall have the right to demand that a sample or specimen of his blood, breath or urine be taken within two hours from and after the time of arrest, and that a chemical test thereof be made. The analysis disclosed by such chemical test shall be made available to such arrested person forthwith upon demand. This Court addressed that statute in Moczek and unequivocally held that a driver’s license will be revoked on the basis of the driver’s refusal to submit to a breath test, whether a blood test is taken or not. 178 W. Va. at 554, 363 S.E.2d at 239. Specifically, this Court observed: It is clear that even though Mr. Moczek had a right to a blood test in addition to the secondary chemical test designated by the state police under W. Va. Code, 17C-5-4 [1983], in this case the breathalyzer, the fact that he refused to take the designated breathalyzer automatically subjected him to administrative suspension of his driver’s license. Id.; see also Chapman v. W. Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 188 W. Va. 216, 423 S.E.2d 619 (1992) (holding license could be suspended for refusal to submit to breath test following arrest for DUI, despite driver’s willingness to undergo blood test). This Court in Moczek further explained: W. Va. Code, 17C-5-9 [1983] does not require that an alternative test be offered; it merely accords an additional right to individuals to have another test to supplement the designated secondary test if that designated secondary test is either a breath 7 West Virginia Code § 17C-5-9 (1983) applies in this case. The statute was amended in 2013, but those amendments do not affect the substantive issues evaluated in this opinion. 16 or urine test. It is clear now that a person who refuses to take the designated breathalyzer or urine test will have his license revoked, even if he takes an alternative blood test that conclusively proves that he was not intoxicated. Id. at 555, 363 S.E.2d at 240 (emphasis supplied).8 Applying that logic to the present case, it is clear that Mr. Hall’s administrative license revocation is properly premised upon his refusal of the breathalyzer test. As this Court observed in Moczek, “the results of the blood test would have been irrelevant to the 8 As the Supreme Court of Utah aptly explained in Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736 (Utah 1984), a statute permitting a driver to request a blood test “does not supersede or negate” an implied consent statute. Id. at 739. “If the driver refuses to take the test requested by the officer, his driver's license must be revoked.” Id. A blood test simply “provides the defendant with additional means . . . to muster a defense to a charge of driving under the influence.” Id. Moreover, we note that a court addressing only the administrative license revocation based upon refusal to submit to the breathalyzer under the implied consent statute would not be obligated to address the driver’s concerns about the absence of a requested blood test. As the California Court of Appeal concisely noted in Webb v. Miller, 187 Cal.App.3d 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), those two issues are entirely separate. Id. at 629. While deprivation of a blood test prevents the accused from obtaining evidence for his defense of the DUI claim, it does not affect the issue of refusal to submit to the testing required by the police through the implied consent law. Any contention regarding the absence of a blood test “is a red herring” in a case dealing exclusively with the implied consent issue. Id. “The issue here is not whether Webb was driving while under the influence of alcohol, but rather, his refusal to submit to chemical testing. Consequently, even a test result favorable to Webb would have no bearing on whether he violated [the implied consent law].” Id. In the instant case, this Court addresses both the implied consent and the blood test components of this case only because the DMV revocation order dealt with the two infractions separately and imposed individual penalties for each, revoking Mr. Hall’s regular driver’s license for one year for the refusal and six months for the DUI, to run concurrently. His commercial driver’s license was revoked for a combined one year. 17 outcome of the narrow issue of whether Mr. Moczek’s license should be suspended because appellant’s refusal to take the designated breathalyzer test immediately after his arrest made the present case one of administrative revocation.” Id. The Court in Moczek was careful to emphasize, however, that Mr. Moczek’s license was “suspended because he refused to take the breathalyzer test, and not because he was driving while under the influence of alcohol.” Id. In that manner, Moczek differs from the present case; here, the DMV identified two separate bases for revocation and specified that Mr. Hall’s licenses were being revoked for one year for “refusing the secondary chemical test” and six months for “driving under the influence.” By statute, those revocation periods were ordered to run concurrently. Consequently, having already concluded that the revocation for “refusing the secondary chemical test” was appropriate, this Court must also analyze the second basis for the DMV’s order and determine whether the six-month revocation for “driving under the influence” was appropriate in this situation. Although a blood sample was taken, a “chemical test thereof,” as required by West Virginia Code § 17C-5-9, was never performed. Moreover, the sample was retained under the control of the police department and was placed in an evidence locker when Officer Harden returned to the police station on February 3, 2011. Officer Harden’s intention at that time was to have the blood sample tested by the 18 West Virginia State Police Laboratory.9 When he testified during a June 2012 hearing, however, Officer Harden explained: A few months ago I had talked to our evidence technician in [sic] whether or not we had gotten anything back from the state police lab in reference to the blood sample, and he said that during that time the West Virginia State Police was not accepting blood, so it was not submitted. We still have it in our department. No additional explanation for the failure to test the blood sample was provided. On appeal to this Court, the DMV contends that the circuit court and OAH erred in finding that it was the investigating officer’s obligation to have the blood sample tested. The DMV argues that Mr. Hall could have made an attempt to secure the blood sample for testing. The DMV directs this Court’s attention to In re Burks, 206 W.Va. 429, 525 S.E.2d 310 (1999). In Burks, however, the essential requirements of the statute were satisfied; the question was whether the failure of the officer to supply the results of the test was a substantial denial of due process. Id. at 432, 525 S.E.2d at 313. The Court held as follows in syllabus point two: A person who is arrested for driving under the influence who requests and is entitled to a blood test, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 17C-5-9 [1983], must be given the opportunity, with the assistance and if necessary the direction of the arresting law enforcement entity, to have a blood test that insofar as possible 9 Officer Harden indicated on the West Virginia DUI Information Sheet that an analysis of [Mr. Hall’s] blood would be performed by the West Virginia State Police Laboratory. 19 meets the evidentiary standards of 17C-5-6 [1981]. That test having been performed in Burks, however, the officer did not have the obligation to obtain and furnish the results. The Court explained at syllabus point three: “The requirement that a driver arrested for DUI must be given a blood test on request does not include a requirement that the arresting officer obtain and furnish the results of that requested blood test.” The Court in Burks further explained that “[p]lacing such a requirement on the arresting officer can only be fairly read into the statutory scheme, if the blood test is the officer’s ‘designated’ test - and not a test that is requested by the driver.” Id. at 433, 525 S.E.2d at 314. “Of course, the arresting officer cannot pose an impediment to the driver’s obtaining the results of and information about the test.” Id.10 In State v. York, 175 W. Va. 740, 338 S.E.2d 219 (1985), this Court discussed the evidentiary implications of a denial of a blood test and reasoned as follows: To deny this right would be to deny due process of law because such a denial would bar the accused from obtaining evidence necessary to his defense. . . . The defendant’s right to request and receive a blood test is an important procedural right that goes directly to a court’s truth-finding function. Id. at 741, 338 S.E.2d at 221 (citations omitted and emphasis supplied); see also Koontz v. State, 617 S.E.2d 207, 207-10 (Ga. 2005) (holding, in criminal context, that police officer 10 While the precise statutory standards vary by state, other jurisdictions have also adhered to the central theme that an officer may not unreasonably impede the right to the blood test requested by the driver. See, e.g., State v. Smerker, 136 P.3d 543 (Mont. 2006). 20 failed to reasonably accommodate driver’s request for independent blood subsequent to required breath test where blood drawn but not tested, with no further inquiry by police officer); Cole v. State, 587 S.E.2d 314 (Ga. App. 2003) (holding that officer took no steps to help overcome obstacle created by hospital’s inability to test blood sample); State v. Button, 426 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (finding officer’s innocent mistake in failure to test blood sample not relevant); O'Dell v. State, 409 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (holding officer unjustifiably refused driver’s repeated requests to call other hospitals to have blood sample tested). In the case sub judice, the investigative personnel complied with only one portion of West Virginia Code § 17C-5-9. They transported Mr. Hall to Thomas Memorial Hospital, and a blood sample was taken. The subsequent statutory requirement, however, was not satisfied because a blood test on that blood sample was never conducted. The DMV contends that the burden of proceeding from blood sample to blood test is upon Mr. Hall because he requested the blood test. On the contrary, Mr. Hall argues that the statute creates a due process right to both demand and receive a blood test and that the act of retaining the blood sample in an evidence locker rather than ascertaining that a blood test be performed on the blood sample constitutes denial of due process. Although the circumstances in Burks were similar to the present case, the 21 statutory right of the driver in Burks to demand and receive a blood test was satisfied. This Court’s holding in Burks was simply that the police officer did not have the obligation to “obtain the results” of the blood test. 206 W.Va. at 433, 525 S.E.2d at 314. In other words, those results of the completed blood test were available to the driver, and the failure of the driver to obtain those results was not attributable to police inaction. The present case, however, involves somewhat more culpable conduct by investigative personnel. The police actually retained dominion and control over the blood sample, in evidence locker number five of the South Charleston Police Department. Although they may have intended to cause that sample to be tested by the West Virginia State Police Laboratory, no such test was ever conducted. This Court consequently affirms the conclusion of the hearing examiner and circuit court that Mr. Hall was denied the statutory and due process rights, under West Virginia Code § 17C-5-9, to have his blood tested independently. We therefore affirm the portion of the circuit court order that rescinds the DMV’s six-month license revocation for DUI.