Opinion ID: 1703227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: claimants for nica benefits

Text: Section 766.302(3) defines the class of claimants who can seek NICA benefits on behalf of injured infants: Claimant means any person who files a claim pursuant to s. 766.305 for compensation for a birth-related neurological injury to an infant. Such a claim may be filed by any legal representative on behalf of an injured infant.... And section 766.305(1) provides in pertinent part: All claims filed for compensation under the plan shall commence by the claimant filing with the division a petition seeking compensation. Petitioners assert that they can seek NICA benefits for Michael McKaughan because the legislature's use of the phrase Such a claim may be filed, and, specifically, use of the word may, does not restrict the class of claimants solely to legal representatives of injured infants. We agree with the district court that petitioners' assertion is inconsistent with the plain language and meaning of the statute. See McKaughan, 652 So.2d at 859-60. Common sense dictates that claims for NICA benefits would be filed only by a legal representative of the injured infant who is affirmatively seeking such benefits. If petitioners' argument were accepted, then petitioners would be able to assert the McKaughans' rights in a manner wholly contrary to their wishes. Nothing in the legislative findings and intent or the terms of the statute suggests the legislature envisioned that the claims provisions of the NICA statute could be invoked in such a manner. Further, we see nothing in the legislative scheme that indicates the legislature did not intend to create a straightforward administrative system to handle claims for compensation filed by persons who assert they are entitled to NICA benefits. Petitioners also assert that the language of section 766.304, which mandates that the administrative officer shall hear and determine all claims, reflects the legislature's intent that the administrative officer have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the nature of an infant's injury. This argument is also inconsistent with the plain language of the NICA statute. First, section 766.301(2) expressly states that the NICA plan shall apply only to birth-related neurological injuries. As is already apparent in this case, the McKaughans assert that their son has not suffered a birth-related neurological injury, and is not entitled to NICA benefits. Second, section 766.304 provides: The hearing officer shall hear and determine all claims filed pursuant to ss. 766.301-766.316 and shall exercise the full power and authority granted to him in chapter 120, as necessary, to carry out the purposes of such sections. The statutory language clearly limits the jurisdiction of the hearing officer to determining the nature of an infant's injury only when a claim for benefits under section 766.305(1) is filed alleging that the infant has suffered a NICA injury. The McKaughans have not filed such a claim. Consequently, we agree with the district court that the administrative hearing officer correctly determined that he did not have jurisdiction under these circumstances to determine the nature of Michael McKaughan's injury. See McKaughan, 652 So.2d at 859. While there may be persons who erroneously assert that their claims fall outside this compensation plan, there is no clear indication that the legislature intended to prevent those persons from litigating their positions in court.