Opinion ID: 2816325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Petitioner’s Brady Rights

Text: Petitioner also raises a constitutional due process claim against the U.S. government under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), arguing that he was entitled to disclosure of U.S. consular records related to the 2009 communications between the United States and Mexican authorities about the Oaxacan arrest warrant in his case. In Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 353 (6th Cir. 1993), this Court expressly extended Brady “to cover denaturalization and extradition cases where the government seeks denaturalization or extradition based on proof of alleged criminal activities of the party proceeded against.” As the Supreme Court has recognized, “Brady claims have ranked within the traditional core of habeas corpus.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2011). The government “violates a defendant’s right to due process if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.” Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012). Evidence is “material” under Brady “when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. The scope of the government’s Brady obligations extends to evidence material to an affirmative defense or the ability of a defendant to assert his constitutional rights. See, e.g., United States v. Gamez-Orduno, 235 F.3d 453, 461 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The suppression of material evidence helpful to the accused, whether at trial or on a motion to suppress, violates due process.”) (holding that Brady obligations included disclosure of a report that was material to defendants’ standing to pursue a Fourth Amendment suppression motion); accord Nuckols v. Gibson, 233 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding a Brady violation where prosecution withheld evidence that was material to whether the defendant’s confession should have been suppressed). The district court’s ruling that the government was not required to disclose the documents related to the 2009 communications between the United States and Mexico rested on its belief that Petitioner could not assert a speedy trial defense to extradition under the treaty. As discussed above, that premise was in error. Petitioner is entitled to receive evidence in the No. 14-5860 Cruz Martinez v. United States Page 25 government’s possession that is material to his Article 7 defense to extradition based on the Speedy Trial Clause. Nor is this outcome anomalous, contrary to the government’s strenuous effort to cast doubt on this Circuit’s binding precedent in Demjanjuk. Courts have unanimously held that the government is bound by principles of due process in its conduct of extradition proceedings. Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he judiciary must ensure that the constitutional rights of individuals subject to extradition are observed.”) (granting habeas on a due process claim arising from the government’s introduction of evidence in violation of a confidentiality agreement); Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 1983) (remanding for consideration of a due process claim based on the government’s violation of immunity agreement); Petition of Geisser, 627 F.2d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 1980) (agreeing that noncompliance with a plea bargain is a valid constitutional claim that may be raised to challenge extradition proceedings and that “a purported treaty obligation of the United States government cannot override an individual constitutional right”). Just as the government does not have the discretion to surrender an individual to a foreign government without express authority granted by law, Valentine, 299 U.S. at 9, the government likewise cannot obtain that authorization in a particular case by withholding material evidence that is within its possession, Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 354. Here, Petitioner seeks only documents already in the possession of the U.S. government. Cf. Drayer, 190 F.3d at 415 (denying a claim under Demjanjuk where “[t]he United States complied with its discovery obligations by turning over the materials in its possession to petitioner” and, naturally, “[i]tems that may be in the possession of Canada must be sought in a Canadian forum”). It seems likely, to say the least, that an inquiry regarding his case from the United States in 2009—three years before Mexico submitted its informal extradition request, and four years before the request was perfected by the delivery of the full extradition packet—will be material to Petitioner’s speedy trial claim. If the documents are in fact material and favorable to the accused, the government must disclose them. On remand, the district court should conduct No. 14-5860 Cruz Martinez v. United States Page 26 appropriate proceedings to ensure that the government’s constitutional obligations in this regard are met.7