Opinion ID: 774022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board's claim of waiver

Text: 18 We turn first to the issue of waiver. At the outset, we note that Rose objected twice to the court's proposed charge: first, at the charge conference (before closing arguments) and later when the judge denied Rose's request for a burden-shifting instruction (after closing arguments). In her first objection, Rose specifically cited Price Waterhouse for the proposition that the Board should bear the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have demoted her even in the absence of discrimination. As discussed above, the district judge then deferred decision on this question until after closing arguments. At that point, the judge stated (outside the presence of the jury) that he denied plaintiff's request for a Price Waterhouse charge and rejected her objection to the charge as originally drafted. After some colloquy, the judge adhered to his ruling and Rose noted her objection. The judge then gave the instructions to the jury and sent them to deliberate. At this point, however, Rose failed to renew her objection and the Board now argues that this failure waived it. 19 To preserve an objection, Rule 51 requires that a party object after the instruction is read to the jury unless... a further objection to the charge... would have been futile. Fogarty v. Near N. Ins. Brokerage Inc., 162 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1998)(internal quotation marks omitted). Our analysis of the futility of a renewed objection is guided by Thornley v. Penton Publishing, Inc., 104 F.3d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1997), a case involving a similar waiver issue. In Thornley, plaintiff had objected twice to the proposed jury instruction but failed to renew the objection after the jury had been charged. We found there that appellant had argued its position to the district judge, who rejected it, [and] a further exception after delivery of the charge would have been a mere formality, with no reasonable likelihood of convincing the court to change its mind on the issue. Id. Here Rose objected twice to the proposed instruction without success before the jury was charged. We conclude that a renewed objection after the judge had completed his charge would, as in Thornley, have been futile. Rose therefore sufficiently preserved her objection to the jury charge for appellate review. 3 20