Opinion ID: 2363426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Understanding of Miranda Rights

Text: When the defendant was apprehended by Sergeant Bennett, he was given his Miranda rights, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and was then asked by the arresting officer if he had anything to say. Without affirmatively acknowledging that he understood his rights, defendant responded by asking how the police knew he was inside the building and if someone had called the station. This statement was introduced at trial through the testimony of the arresting officer. He was then taken to the police station where he was again read his Miranda rights and asked to sign a written waiver form, which he did in fact sign. Another statement was given. This statement, however, was suppressed because the trial court found that too much time had elapsed between the giving of the rights and the making of the statement. This lapse, the trial court concluded, required that the Miranda warnings be given again. The only statement in issue before this court is the statement made at the scene of the arrest before the defendant signed the waiver form. There is no dispute concerning the accuracy of the Miranda warnings as verbally recited by the arresting officer. Rather, the controversy concerns whether the accused was capable of understanding his rights against self-incrimination and the right to have counsel present during any questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). [1] Before the State can introduce a defendant's statement into evidence it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant understood his Miranda rights. State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 396 A.2d 554 (1978); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 370 A.2d 1153 (1977). Unless an accused understands his rights, there can be no voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver. See United States v. Brown, 535 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1976). The defendant argues that the State has not satisfied this burden because he made no affirmative acknowledgment that he actually understood his rights. State v. Vargus, 373 A.2d 150, 154 (R.I. 1977), and that his drug intoxication made it impossible for him to understand his rights. Pierce v. Cardwell, 572 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir. 1978). [2] One's mental and physical condition are crucial in determining whether a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver occurred. Pierce v. Cardwell, 572 F.2d at 1342. At the suppression hearing there was conflicting testimony concerning the defendant's sobriety. The defendant testified that he repeatedly consumed drugs and alcohol on the day of the arrest. Because of the effect of drugs, he stated that he could not remember talking to the police at the scene of the arrest. The arresting officer testified that the defendant appeared to be sober, despite smelling of a trace of alcohol. The officer also testified that even though he didn't remember whether defendant had actually acknowledged an understanding of the rights, the officer, nevertheless, received the clear impression that defendant understood his rights. In addition, other officers testified that when the defendant was brought to the station house he appeared to be intelligent and aware of the circumstances of his arrest. [3, 4] An express written or oral statement of a waiver of the Miranda rights is not invariably required under the United States Constitution. North Carolina v. Butler, 99 S. Ct. 1755 (1979). Since an express waiver is not always constitutionally required, neither should an explicit statement that an accused actually understands the Miranda rights be required. Whether a person in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the Miranda rights is to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. North Carolina v. Butler, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 1757 (1979). See generally State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 396 A.2d 554 (1978). Therefore the arresting officer's failure to recall whether defendant affirmatively acknowledged an understanding of the Miranda rights is not determinative. The crucial issue is whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that defendant was mentally capable of actually comprehending his rights and voluntarily waived them. [5] The suppression hearing was heard and decided before our decision in State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 396 A.2d 554 (1978), in which we required a trial court at a suppression hearing on the issue of voluntariness to make an express finding of waiver. Nevertheless, the trial court applying the reasonable doubt standard made an express finding and ruling that the defendant understood those [ Miranda ] warnings given by the arresting officer. Accordingly, the court refused to suppress the statement. In the present case the witnesses' testimony was conflicting. Therefore, the trial judge had the responsibility of assessing their credibility. From our review of the record of the suppression hearing, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to allow the judge to determine that the State sustained its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was capable of understanding, and did understand, his rights and thus voluntarily waived them. See United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Cooper v. Warden Illinois State Penitentiary, 566 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977). Consequently, the superior court finding on this matter will not be overturned.