Opinion ID: 2349621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Drew Evidence

Text: Prior to trial, before Judge Rankin, the government sought court approval to use three incidents of prior bad acts evidence at trial. Only the third incident is at issue. The government sought to show that in the summer of 2000, several months prior to the indicted altercation, Ms. Butler arrived home in a vehicle with another man. Appellant, in a fit of jealously, stabbed the man, smashed the windows of the car, and attempted to attack another passenger. Finding the incident to be relevant to rebutting appellant's claim of self-defense, both Judge Rankin and Judge Bush ruled pretrial that evidence of the incident could be admitted. [2] No evidence of the incident was introduced in the government's case in chief; however, the government did cross-examine appellant regarding the incident, to which appellant made no objection. [3] On appeal, appellant contests the adequacy of the government's pretrial proffer regarding its Drew evidence, asserting that the government failed to establish the crime by clear and convincing evidence. Appellant also challenges the government's cross-examination of the appellant regarding the incident and the government's reference to the incident in its closing remarks.
While evidence of a crime for which the accused is not on trial is `inadmissible to prove disposition to commit crime, from which the jury may infer that the defendant committed the crime charged,' [o]ther crimes evidence is admissible ... when it is `relevant and important' to the issue of intent (among other issues). Riley v. United States, 790 A.2d 538, 539-540 (D.C.2002) (citing Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App. D.C. 11, 15-16, 331 F.2d 85, 89-90 (1964)) (other citation, footnote, and emphasis omitted). To warrant admission of Drew evidence, our cases have held that the defendant's commission of the other crime must be established preliminarily by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 540 n. 2 (citation omitted). A trial court's admission of Drew evidence based upon a proffer is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In Daniels v. United States , we held that a `trial court may act within its discretion to conduct its pretrial inquiry on the admissibility of the other crimes evidence by means of a `detailed proffer from the government' instead of holding, in effect, a bench trial of the other crime, which presumably will be fully replicated before the jury if admitted.' Crutchfield v. United States, 779 A.2d 307, 330 (D.C.2001) (quoting Daniels v. United States, 613 A.2d 342, 347 (D.C.1992)). In its proffer, the government must show the trial court that the evidence that it proposes to present during the trial would, if believed, clearly and convincingly establish that the uncharged crime occurred and the defendants were connected to it. [4] Daniels, supra, 613 A.2d at 347 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In this case, the government made several proffers regarding the incident: in writing, before Judge Rankin, and before Judge Bush. In its filed Notice of Intent to Introduce Other Crimes Evidence, the government proffered, [i]n or about late Summer or early Fall, 2000, the defendant stabbed a young man in the vicinity of 1209 30th Street, S.E., after the young man drove up in the car in which Ms. Butler was riding. The defendant also smashed some of the windows of the vehicle in an attempt to attack another passenger. Prior to the stabbing and destruction of property, the defendant indicated that he was angry at the young man because defendant thought the young man was romantically involved with Ms. Butler. Before Judge Rankin, the government averred that in the summer or early fall of 2000, the victim [Ms. Butler] was in the car, as were two other men. The defendant believed that the victim was romantically involved with one of the men. The victim saw the defendant go after that man, beat him, and also smashed some of the windows in the car. Before Judge Bush, the government stated, With regard to the summer incident she [the prosecutor before Judge Rankin] proffered to the Court that there was an eyewitness that saw that incident. Moreover, defense counsel acknowledged to Judge Bush that [t]he summer of 2000 incident ... is an allegation that Mr. Anderson stabbed somebody because he was jealous of the person who was with the complaining witness. The government proffered that they have testimony of the complaining witness [Ms. Butler] as to that and testimony of another witness who's a relative-a live-in relative of the complaining witness. Later the government reiterated that, the government's proffer was that we had Ms. Butler and an eyewitness to this... Appellant challenged the admission on the basis of the proffer contending, but for those two individuals there's no corroboration in the sense that no 911 call was made, the police were never contacted, the alleged victim of that assault isn't-you know, the government doesn't have that person. Judge Bush ruled, The court finds that the complaining witness's testimony-I mean, the Government's-the jurors will hear from the complaining witness on the instant offenses as well as the prior incident-prior incidents and that's the core of proof here and so the court finds that that would be clear and convincing. (Emphasis added). [5] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the other crime evidence based upon the fulfillment of the government's proffers. The government furnished both the general time and the specific location of the incident. Specific details of the incident were asserted to the trial court: that the defendant was upset because he believed Ms. Butler was involved with another man in the car, he broke the windows of the car, and he stabbed the person with whom he believed Ms. Butler was involved. Finally, the government indicated that both Ms. Butler and another eyewitness would testify to the events. This information  if believed, [would] clearly and convincingly establish that the uncharged crime occurred and the defendant[][was] connected to it. Daniels, 613 A.2d at 344-47 (emphasis added) (government proffered that an eyewitness would testify as to the specifics of a drug association and the reason for the murder in question, while other witnesses would corroborate that account); cf. Bolanos v. United States, 718 A.2d 532, 535, 539, 545 n. 8 (D.C.1998) (Reid, J., concurring with alternative holding and Ruiz, J., concurring) (government's proffer that the victim and another unnamed eyewitness would testify regarding a prior beating of the victim by the defendant was sufficient). Given the detail of the proffer here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that, if presented and believed, the government's proffered evidence would be clear and convincing. [6]
To the extent that appellant contends that the cross-examination was impermissible because the government failed to fulfill its proffer and demonstrate the commission of the crime by clear and convincing evidence, we review for plain error. See Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976) (errors not objected to at trial are unreachable on review unless they fall within the purview of the plain error rule). Appellant argues that the pretrial motion in limine and discourse regarding the admission of the Drew evidence preserved any challenge to the cross-examination regarding that evidence for appeal. See Wilkins v. United States, 582 A.2d 939, 942 n. 7 (D.C.1990). The continuing objection doctrine only applies where the trial court has already had an opportunity to decide the point at issue while the purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to give the trial court an opportunity to correct any potential errors at the time they are made. McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 45 n. 14 (D.C.1991) (appellant's objection that the government lacked a good faith basis for asking a question on cross-examination did not preserve for appeal appellant's challenge to the government's discussion of such questioning in its closing argument) (citations omitted). Here, appellant's pretrial objection argued that the government had not demonstrated the existence of the other crime by clear and convincing evidence. After the trial court permissibly ruled that the government's proffer, once fulfilled, would be clear and convincing, appellant was required to alert the court if such proffer, in fact, had not been satisfied in order to request that the trial court prohibit the government from questioning the appellant regarding the other crime. Where a trial court permits the admission of evidence subject to the fulfillment of a condition, an opposing party must object if it believes that condition has not been fulfilled when the disputed evidence is presented. See, e.g., United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir.2000) (Absent a thorough examination of the objection raised in the motion in limine and an explicit and definitive ruling by the district court that the evidence is admissible, a party does not preserve the issue of admissibility for appeal absent a contemporaneous objection) (emphasis added); Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 565-66 (7th Cir.1999) (conditional rulings require further action at trial ... for example, the judge says that certain evidence will be admitted unless it would be unduly prejudicial given the way the trial develops  then later events may lead to reconsideration, and the litigant adversely affected by the ruling must raise the subject later so that the judge may decide whether intervening events affect the ruling. An appeal in such a case without an objection at trial would bushwhack both the judge and the opponent) (citations omitted); United States v. Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1551 (5th Cir.1993) (and cases cited therein), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1081, 114 S.Ct. 1829, 128 L.Ed.2d 459 (1994); cf. McGrier, supra, 597 A.2d at 45 n. 14. In order to establish the existence of plain error, appellant must show that the allowance of the cross-examination constituted error that was (1) obvious or readily apparent, and clear under current law; and (2) so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial. Johnson v. United States, 840 A.2d 1277, 1280 (D.C.2004) (citations omitted); Clayborne v. United States, 751 A.2d 956, 966 (D.C.2000) (citations omitted). Plain error is found only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done. Bates v. United States, 834 A.2d 85, 92 (D.C.2003). The error, if any, was not obvious. To begin with, it is far from clear why it should be obvious to the trial judge that the government had not produced substantive evidence in accordance with its proffer when that fact did not occur to defense counsel. Moreover, in general, the cross-examination of a witness regarding a crime that has not resulted in a conviction is permissible upon a showing (1) of a factual basis for the question and (2) that the crime bears directly upon the veracity of the witness in respect to the issues involved in the trial. Murphy v. Bonanno, 663 A.2d 505, 509 (D.C.1995) (citation omitted); Sherer v. United States, 470 A.2d 732, 738 (D.C.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984). We have said that the impeachment rules should not be confused with the analytically distinct doctrine that restricts the introduction, as substantive evidence, of an accused's prior crimes or bad acts [under] ... Drew.  Sherer, supra, 470 A.2d at 738 n. 5 (emphasis added). Our cases have not made clear whether the standard elicited under Sherer or the standard under Drew should apply to questioning of the defendant himself or herself regarding other crimes. Compare Portillo v. United States, 609 A.2d 687, 690-91 (D.C.1992) (holding that the cross-examination of the defendant was improper where the questioning did not fulfill the strictures of Sherer ), and Jamison v. United States, 600 A.2d 65, 68-69 (D.C.1991), with Galindo v. United States, 630 A.2d 202, 207 (D.C.1993) (stating Sherer applies to cross-examination of a non-defendant witness). Nor have our cases elucidated whether such questioning, in light of appellant's claim of self-defense, would be considered substantive evidence or impeachment. [7] See, e.g., Wesley v. United States, 547 A.2d 1022, 1025 (D.C.1988) (when a defendant testifies to certain facts or issues during his direct examination, he `opens the door' to further inquiry into those matters on cross-examination. The extent and scope of that cross-examination are subject to the broad discretion of the trial judge.) and Howard v. United States, 663 A.2d 524, 528 n. 6 (D.C.1995) (noting the Drew exception for intent applies when the defendant's state of mind is at issue, including a claim of self-defense, but addressing extrinsic evidence not cross-examination of the defendant). Thus, any error in the allowance of the cross-examination could not be deemed clear under current law. [8] Johnson, supra, 840 A.2d at 1280.
Appellant further argues that the trial court improperly permitted the government, over appellant's objection, to refer to the other stabbing incident in its closing argument because there was no evidence on the record that such an event occurred. We review for abuse of discretion and find none. See Gordon v. United States, 783 A.2d 575, 589 (D.C.2001). At least where the appellant's testimony was already before the jury without objection, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the closing argument on the grounds that appellant's answers that he did not recall the other stabbing were relevant to his credibility. As the trier of fact, the jury was entitled to disbelieve [a defendant's] testimony... And if the jury did disbelieve [him], it was further entitled to consider whatever it concluded to be perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992); cf. Earle v. United States, 612 A.2d 1258, 1268-69 (D.C.1992). Here, where the appellant answered that he did not recall stabbing someone rather than stating that he did not commit the stabbing, the jury was permitted to find such answers incredible and apply its credibility determination to the appellant's claim of self-defense. See WIGMORE, supra note 7. The trial court, thus, did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to refer to the testimony regarding that incident in closing for the purpose of attacking the appellant's credibility. [9]