Opinion ID: 40802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: consideration of sentencing disparity with codefendant

Text: 45 In imposing its non-Guideline sentence of sixty months probation, the district court took into account that Duhon's codefendant Berne Life had received a Guideline sentence of sixty months probation. The court acknowledged that Life had obtained the benefit of a downward departure for substantial assistance to the Government under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Because disparity between Duhon's and Life's sentences was not unwarranted within the meaning of section 3553(a)(6), the court erred in considering it. See Long Soldier, 431 F.3d at 1123 (stating that a proper or relevant factor is one listed under § 3553(a)). 46 We agree with the First and Eighth Circuits that a sentencing disparity intended by Congress is not unwarranted. See United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 64-65 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Sebastian, 436 F.3d 915-17 (8th Cir.2006) (holding that it is the province of the policymaking branches of government to determine that certain disparities are warranted, and thus need not be avoided). In other words, what counts is the uniformity in sentencing sought by Congress.  Pho, 433 F.3d at 64-65 (emphasis in original). 47 Several statutory provisions convince us that Congress believes that defendants who provide substantial assistance should generally receive lower sentences than otherwise similarly-situated defendants. Congress has required that the Sentencing Commission assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed . . . to take into account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n). Additionally, Congress provides judges the authority to sentence below the statutory minimum where the Government moves for a substantial assistance departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Similarly, under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(d)(2), if a defendant renders substantial assistance, a judge may give a sentence less than the otherwise mandatory sentence of life imprisonment or death. Lastly, substantial assistance departures are provided for by the Sentencing Guidelines, and Congress has specified those Guidelines as a factor that must be taken into account in imposing a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)-(5). 48 Accordingly, we hold that sentencing disparity produced by substantial assistance departures was intended by Congress and is thus not a proper sentencing consideration under section 3553(a)(6). We note that this conclusion is consistent both with our pre- Booker jurisprudence and with the Seventh and Second Circuits' interpretation of section 3553(a)(6). See United States v. Nichols, 376 F.3d 440, 443 (5th Cir.2004) (holding that disparities resulting from departures for substantial assistance are justified); United States v. Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir.2006) (holding that a sentencing difference based on one culprit's assistance to the prosecution is legally appropriate); United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454, 460-61 (2d Cir.1991) (explaining that Congress intended disparities caused by application of the Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Toohey, 132 Fed.Appx. 883 (2d Cir.2005) (unpublished) (holding that Joyner 's construction of the role the Guidelines play in § 3553(a)(6) consideration remains essentially unchanged in the wake of Booker ). Because Life rendered substantial assistance, he was differently situated from Duhon in a way that Congress has deemed material. The district court should have considered the need to avoid disparity among similarly-situated defendants nationwide rather than disparity with Duhon's differently-situated codefendant. 49 We emphasize the limits of this holding. We hold only that the disparity at issue here-that between a codefendant who rendered substantial assistance and a defendant who did not-is warranted. A judge may still properly reduce a defendant's sentence for appropriate mitigating circumstances particular to that defendant.