Opinion ID: 2010520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Schmitz's Testimony Admissible

Text: Schmitz did not testify as a witness at Banther's two prior Superior Court trials in 1998 and 2004. At Banther's third trial, the defense objected when the State informed the trial judge that the next prosecution witness would be Schmitz. Specifically, defense counsel stated: Your Honor, we object to the State presenting that testimony from Mr. Schmitz on grounds of fundamental fairness, due process, issue preclusion, collateral estoppel, Disciplinary Rule 3.3 and claimed forfeiture. Banther's anticipatory evidentiary objection to Schmitz's trial testimony was based on a review of a June 14, 2007, taped statement given by Schmitz to a Delaware State Police detective. Defense counsel argued: The State has provided us with a statement which Mr. Schmitz gave in 2007 which they ... expect is going to be consistent with his testimony, and basically is going to be that Mr. Schmitz did nothing wrong; that he did not participate in the murder of Dennis Ravers, but not surprisingly, that Mr. Banther unilaterally did this. After hearing argument from counsel, the trial judge overruled the defense objection, and Schmitz was permitted to testify. In this appeal, Banther argues that the State violated his due process rights under both the Delaware and United States Constitutions by asserting a new theory of criminal responsibilityi.e., that Banther was criminally liable as a principal at Banther's 2008 retrial. In his opening brief, Banther also states: The entirely new theory of the case was inconsistent with the State's previous position in both earlier Banther trials and Mr. Schmitz's prosecution that there had been [a prior] agreement between John Schmitz and Bruce Banther to murder Dennis Ravers. By asking the trial judge to exclude Schmitz's testimony in its entirety, Banther was relying on the doctrine of judicial estoppel. [25] Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion. [26] The primary concern of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process. [27] The doctrine is narrowly construed and is rarely applied against the government in criminal prosecutions. [28] To invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel, some courts require a preliminary showing of manipulation, fraud or bad faith by the government. [29] The record reflects that there was no basis to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Banther's case because the State did not engage in manipulation, fraud or bad faith in presenting Schmitz's testimony. At trial, the prosecutor responded to each of Banther's arguments, including the accusation of ethical impropriety. The trial judge accepted the State's explanation of the circumstances surrounding Schmitz's willingness to testify at Banther's third trial. In Banther's case, the record reflects no reason for the trial judge to invoke judicial estoppel and prevent the jury from hearing highly relevant eyewitness testimony. [30] Schmitz's willingness to testify at Banther's third trial was evidence the State was entitled to present for the jury's consideration. The trial judge's evidentiary ruling permitting Schmitz's testimony was not an abuse of discretion and Banther has demonstrated no federal Constitutional due process violation. [31]