Opinion ID: 1387032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: alternative disposition

Text: The Board also argues that the Court of Appeals should have canvassed the record for an alternative basis upon which to affirm the district court under Lancaster v. Utah Board of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994). In Lancaster, we affirmed the dismissal of a Rule 65B(c) petition, even though the trial court had failed to articulate its reasons for denying the petition as required by that rule, because on an independent review of the pleadings we concluded that the petition was properly dismissed. The determination was based on the nature of the claims brought by the petitioner. Because due process protections apply to original parole grant hearings, Labrum, 870 P.2d at 911, the fairness of the process by which the Board undertakes its sentencing function is reviewable by an extraordinary writ. [4] Lancaster, 869 P.2d at 947 (citing Labrum, 870 P.2d at 910); see Preece, 886 P.2d at 512; Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). However, because we do not sit as a panel of review on the result, absent some other constitutional claim, the substance of the Board's decision is not reviewable by an extraordinary writ except perhaps in an extreme case. Lancaster, 869 P.2d at 947 (citing Labrum, 870 P.2d at 910); Preece, 886 P.2d at 512; see Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3). None of the claims brought by the petitioner in Lancaster described a due process violation reviewable under Foote and Labrum. Accordingly, we held that the petition was properly dismissed as frivolous on its face. Lancaster, 869 P.2d at 947. The Board argues that Renn's petition is likewise frivolous and improper. The Board asserts that Renn challenges only its substantive decision to modify his rehearing date and thus fails to state a valid claim for relief. Therefore, the Board argues, the Court of Appeals erred by not affirming the district court on that alternative ground. We disagree. The Court of Appeals reviewed the record and declined to affirm the dismissal of Renn's petition on an alternative ground. The court stated: [D]espite the fact that we agree with the State's general premise that an appellate court may affirm a district court's dismissal of a habeas corpus petition on alternative grounds, we cannot apply that premise here. Our review of this record reveals no discussion relevant to the nature of Renn's challenges.... The district court ... dismissed the case solely on the basis of the statute of limitations, having had no occasion to determine whether these claims involved procedural due process or substantive discretionary issues. The record, therefore, provides us no reasonable alternative basis by which to uphold the district court's dismissal of Renn's petition. 862 P.2d at 1381-82. Our own review of the record convinces us of the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision. The record is insufficient to provide a basis upon which to determine the nature of Renn's claims. Renn's petition could fairly be interpreted as involving issues of procedural due process that may be subject to judicial review or substantive issues exclusively within the Board's discretion. To the extent Renn challenges the fairness of the procedure followed by the Board in setting his parole rehearing date, Renn states a claim reviewable under Rule 65B(e). See Labrum, 870 P.2d at 911; Preece, 886 P.2d at 511-12 (Rule 65B(e) petition alleging that board of pardons failed to comply with its own rules requiring that an `explanation of the reasons for [a] decision [be] given and supported in writing' (quoting Utah Admin.Code R671-305-2 (1992)). Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals' reversal and remand to the district court for an evaluation of the issues raised in Renn's petition. Affirmed. HOWE, DURHAM and RUSSON, JJ., concur in Associate Chief Justice STEWART's opinion. ZIMMERMAN, C.J., concurs in the result.