Opinion ID: 2972457
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Excessive Force Claims

Text: The plaintiffs’ argument below was two-fold: (1) that Gee’s decision to make a gundrawn charge towards Wilson when Wilson posed no immediate threat to Gee or anyone else was unreasonable; and (2) that even after Gee charged Wilson, it was unreasonable for Gee to 6 No. 04-5551 Burnette v. Gee shoot Wilson because, they allege, Wilson did not lift up or point his rifle at Gee; instead, he maintained a rather innocent posture. The district court, however, determined that when evaluating the “reasonableness” of an officer’s conduct, it is to look only to the direct moments preceding the attack, not to the fact that Gee charged Wilson. The district court then concluded that it was uncontested that Wilson had reached for his rifle and therefore, that Gee did not use excessive force because he reasonably feared for his own life.
Appellants rely on Gaddis, 364 F.3d 763, in support of the proposition that the district court should have considered Sheriff Gee’s decision to charge at Wilson when evaluating the reasonableness of the shooting. Gaddis, however, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Gaddis, each of the moments preceding the shooting was evaluated as an individual instance of potential excessive force, whereas in this case, Sheriff Gee’s charge towards Wilson cannot itself be construed as excessive force, as it did not involve any physical contact between Gee and Wilson. Cf. Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that a high speed chase itself could not constitute excessive force where there was no physical contact with the suspect being chased). Furthermore, contrary to the Appellants’ argument that even if Wilson did reach for his rifle, it was in response to Sheriff Gee’s gun-drawn charge, Sheriff Gee’s conduct cannot reasonably be construed as that which would or should have provoked Wilson to pick up his weapon. While courts have considered an officer’s prior actions in their analysis of the reasonableness of the officer’s subsequent actions towards a suspect, courts have only done so 7 No. 04-5551 Burnette v. Gee where the prior actions involved excessive force or brutality against the suspect. See, e.g. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that “any fear on the officer’s part was the fear of retaliation against [the officer’s] own unjustified physical abuse”). In this case, however, Sheriff Gee had not beaten or physically mistreated Wilson in any way before attempting to disarm him. Thus, the district court correctly excluded Sheriff Gee’s charging of Wilson from its evaluation of his conduct.
Appellants also argue that issues of material fact exist as to whether Wilson even reached for his rifle in response to Sheriff Gee’s charge. Thus, Appellants argue that a jury could find that Sheriff Gee’s decision to shoot Wilson was unreasonable under the circumstances. Appellants claim that circumstantial evidence and expert testimony show (1) that Wilson did not have physical possession of the rifle when Sheriff Gee began his charge because the rifle was located too far from Wilson’s body as he bent down to tie his boot, (2) that in his disabled and sedated state Wilson could not have reacted quickly or precisely enough to reach for the rifle, and (3) that Wilson was shot before he was able to rise from his bent position. The district court concluded that there was no conflicting testimony on these issues because Gee and Wilson were the only two people to witness the event and because Wilson, now deceased, cannot offer a competing version of facts. Consequently, the district court accepted Gee’s version of the shooting as true and decided that Gee did not violate Wilson’s rights. 8 No. 04-5551 Burnette v. Gee Unfortunately for the appellants, no direct evidence exists to rebut Sheriff Gee’s version of the events. Furthermore, even considering the circumstantial evidence presented by Appellants in a light most favorable to them, there is no reasonable basis for overturning the district court’s finding that Wilson reached for or raised his rifle and struggled with Sheriff Gee over the weapon, and that as a consequence, Sheriff Gee reasonably feared for his life when he shot Wilson. We believe that the district court’s thorough analysis of the facts supports its grant of summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Gee. See Plakas, 19 F.3d at 1146-47. First, Burnette testified that when she left the trailer moments before the shooting, her son held the rifle upright on the outside of the right arm of his chair. J.A. 171-72 (Burnette Depo.). Gee testified that immediately before the charge, Wilson had his rifle between his right hip and the inside arm of the chair with the barrel pointing to the floor. J.A. 238-39 (Gee Depo.). Appellants argue that in light of this conflicting testimony, this Court must view the rifle as Burnette remembers it, and consequently, the rifle was too far away from Wilson (who was bending over to his left shoe) such that he could have grabbed it as Gee claimed. As noted earlier, Gee claimed that after Burnette left the trailer, however, Wilson stood up with his gun, expressed his desire to die, and then sat down again. This testimony is uncontradicted. Given that there was some time, albeit two minutes at most, between when Burnette left the trailer and when Gee charged Wilson, it is certainly possible that Wilson shifted the position of his rifle slightly. Furthermore, even if Gee was incorrect about the position of the rifle prior to his charge, this inconsistency is not material because Appellants have presented no evidence that 9 No. 04-5551 Burnette v. Gee Wilson would have been able to grab the rifle if it had been leaning on the inside arm of the chair, but not if it had been leaning on the outside arm of the chair. Second, the Plaintiffs presented the district court with a “cause of death” report by Dr. George Nichols, who reviewed the autopsy evidence and concluded that the effects of the drugs consumed by Wilson prior to the shooting would result in “sedation rather than agitation and aggressive behavior.” J.A. 92. This evidence is, at best, tenuous. If, for example, Dr. Nichols testified that Wilson would not have been able to react to Gee and reach over and pick up his rifle, then there would be a controverted material fact. In this case, however, the doctor’s conclusion that the drugs taken by Wilson would have made him sedated does not actually conflict with Gee’s statement that Wilson reached for and grabbed his rifle. By all accounts, Wilson was not asleep or unconscious and he was alert enough to talk to the paramedics, his family, and with Gee. Wilson could have been more sedated than usual, but still have managed to grab the rifle. Finally, Appellants presented a report produced by Ronnie Freels, a forensic consultant, that concluded that Wilson was shot at close range (between twenty to ten inches) and that the “arm of victim Wilson was shot through first before the penetrating bullets struck the chest of the victim.” J.A. 101 (including autopsy photo). Dr. Nichols, who is also a forensic pathologist, noted that Wilson’s arm “could not have been significantly extended away from the body at the time of the shooting and the left hand could not have held or grabbed any object significantly away from Mr. Wilson’s frontal abdomen.” J.A. 91. Appellants claim that this evidence creates 10 No. 04-5551 Burnette v. Gee a question as to whether Wilson really had his forty inch rifle pointing directly at Gee at the moment that Gee fired on him. However, Sheriff Gee did not claim that the rifle was pointed directly at him at the moment he fired upon Wilson. Instead, he claimed that he was in a struggle with Wilson and that they were wrestling for possession of the rifle when he fired. Therefore, Appellants’ expert analysis does not contradict Gee’s testimony of how the charge and shooting occurred. In sum, the Appellants have not presented any evidence which disputes a material fact. The district court was correct when it concluded that “the testimony of others involved, including Ms. Burnette, Dr. Nichols . . . does not substantially contradict [Gee’s] statement that Mr. Wilson reached for his rifle.” J.A. 16. Consequently, we cannot find that Gee used or may have used excessive force against Wilson, because Gee could have reasonably feared for his own life. See Brandenburg v. Cureton, 882 F.2d 211, 215 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Young v. City of Killeen, Tex., 775 F.2d 1349, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The use of deadly force is reasonable if an officer believes that there is a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others.”)). Therefore, Sheriff Gee was entitled to summary judgment in his favor. Because this Court finds that Sheriff Gee did not violate Wilson’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of excessive force, it need not address Appellants’ arguments regarding qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”). 11 No. 04-5551 Burnette v. Gee