Opinion ID: 1236383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 31

Heading: Consideration of Defendant's Age.

Text: (24) Defendant contends that the jury was improperly allowed by the court and prosecutor to consider his age as a factor in aggravation. Defendant was 26 at the time of the offenses. The court rejected defendant's special instruction stating that if defendant's age were to be considered, it could be considered only as a mitigating factor. The court gave CALJIC No. 8.84.1, which permitted the jury to consider the age of the defendant at the time of the crime in determining the appropriate penalty. During the penalty argument, the prosecutor reviewed the factors listed in CALJIC No. 8.84.1 and argued: The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. He is obviously old enough to know the difference between right and wrong, and that's aggravation. Defendant acknowledges that we have rejected attacks on the instruction given. (See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 301-302 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].) As we noted in People v. Lucky, supra, at page 302, mere chronological age should not of itself be deemed either aggravating or mitigating: In our view, the word `age' in statutory sentencing factor (i) is used as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty. Accordingly, either counsel may argue any such age-related inference in every case. ( Ibid. ) The court did not err in rejecting defendant's proposed special instruction, since it stated that inferences relating to defendant's age could be considered only as a mitigating factor. Nor was there any impropriety in the prosecutor's argument. The prosecutor's argument that defendant was old enough to know better, thus making it aggravating, is an age-related inference that has been found permissible in a number of cases. (See People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 704-705, fn. 6 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217]; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 456-457 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) Defendant urges us to reexamine our construction of the age factor in People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d 259 and succeeding cases, arguing that the unfettered discretion regarding how the factor is to be considered renders it unconstitutional under the principles of Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 96 S.Ct. 2909] and Maynard v. Cartwright (1988) 486 U.S. 356 [100 L.Ed.2d 372, 108 S.Ct. 1853]. We rejected a similar argument in People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 716 [248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253] and are not persuaded that we should reexamine that reasoning. (See also People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 844 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436].)