Opinion ID: 4531389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ronald Giallanzo

Text: On appeal, Giallanzo principally argues that: (1) the district court committed procedural error by failing to adequately explain its reasons for imposing its above-Guidelines sentences; (2) 2 the district court committed procedural error by failing to consider certain 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, precluding the defense from presenting mitigating evidence, relying on exaggerated descriptions of Giallanzo’s history and conduct, and considering a prejudicial statement made in a related proceeding; (3) his sentences are substantively unreasonable; (4) the government breached its plea agreement with Giallanzo by inviting the district court to impose an aboveGuidelines sentence; and (5) reassignment of his cases to a different judge on remand is appropriate to maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. We address these arguments in turn. In reviewing Giallanzo’s procedural and substantive challenges to his sentences, “our standard is reasonableness, a particularly deferential form of abuse-of-discretion review that we apply both to the procedures used to arrive at the sentence (procedural reasonableness) and to the length of the sentence (substantive reasonableness).” United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 278 (2d Cir. 2012); see also United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The standard of review on the appeal of a sentence for violation of supervised release is now the same standard as for sentencing generally: whether the sentence imposed is reasonable.”). 1 A district court commits procedural error where it improperly calculates the Sentencing Guidelines range, fails to consider the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, or fails adequately to explain its chosen sentence. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). On a substantive reasonableness challenge, “we take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Douglas, 713 F.3d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 2013). 1 Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, we omit all internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, and alterations. 3 “We set aside a district court’s sentence as substantively unreasonable only if affirming it would damage the administration of justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” Id. We conclude that the district court’s explanations for Giallanzo’s above-Guidelines sentences were adequate. At sentencing, the district court focused on the seriousness of the racketeering activity at issue—particularly the lengthy duration of the conspiracy and multiple victims involved—and it was clear in context that it viewed a Guidelines sentence as inadequate to deter Giallanzo from further criminal activity. It reiterated these concerns in a detailed written statement of reasons. With respect to Giallanzo’s 24-month sentence for violating the conditions of his supervised release, the district court explained that Giallanzo’s repeated violations of the court’s trust to “commit even more egregious violations” justified the imposition of “the maximum statutory sentence allowed by law.” Giallanzo App. 201-02. These considerations adequately support the district court’s above-Guidelines sentences. 2 Nor do we find any merit to Giallanzo’s remaining procedural and substantive challenges. The district court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors at length. It did not preclude Giallanzo from presenting mitigating evidence—it simply did not give that evidence the weight that Giallanzo would have liked. Moreover, the record does not suggest that the court relied upon inappropriate statements in sentencing Giallanzo. Accordingly, we find that, as a substantive matter, the district court’s sentences fall within the range of permissible sentences. 2 The record does not reflect that the district court filed a written statement of reasons in connection with Giallanzo’s 24-month sentence for violating the conditions of his supervised release. We nonetheless affirm the district court’s sentence in light of our recent decision in United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2020), which controls this case under this Court’s protocol on precedence. In Smith, we held that a district court is not required to complete a written statement of reasons form for a sentence upon violation of supervised release. Id. at 65. 4 Giallanzo’s argument that the government breached his plea agreement by inviting the district court to impose an above-Guidelines sentence likewise fails. Giallanzo failed to object to the government’s alleged breach of the plea agreement at sentencing, and we therefore review only for plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 143 (2009). Giallanzo bears the burden of showing: “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected [his] substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010). Under this standard, we cannot say that the government breached Giallanzo’s plea agreement. The record demonstrates that the government’s advocacy at sentencing, while strident, was made in support of a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range, as permitted under the plea agreement. Since we do not find a breach of the plea agreement and Giallanzo’s arguments do not give us concern about the district judge’s impartiality or the appearance of justice, we need not address his argument that his cases should be reassigned to a different judge.