Opinion ID: 1255112
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutor's Prejudicial Comments Disseminated During Trial

Text: On April 16, 1984, several weeks into the appellant's lengthy trial, the appellant moved for a mistrial based on statements made by the prosecuting attorney during a radio interview broadcast on a day that the court was in recess. The prosecutor's statements included the remark: No doubt in my mind that he in fact is the murderer of Vanessa Reggettz and her two children. Contemporaneously with his motion for a mistrial, the appellant moved that the trial court poll the jurors about their exposure to the prosecutor's prejudicial remark. The judge denied both of the appellant's motions, stating that he had confidence that the jurors had complied with his admonition to avoid radio, newspaper, and television accounts of the case while the court was in recess. We agree with the appellant that the trial judge committed reversible error when he refused to poll the jurors. In Syllabus Point 3 of State v. Critzer, 167 W.Va. 655, 280 S.E.2d 288 (1981), this Court made it clear that [i]t is improper for a prosecutor in this State to `[a]ssert his personal opinion ... as to the guilt or innocence of the accused....' ABA Code DR7-106(C)(4) in part. This rule is applicable in and out of the courtroom. Standard 8-1.1(a) of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justidce (2d ed. 1980) limits extrajudicial statements by attorneys, specifically providing that: A lawyer shall not release or authorize the release of information or opinion for dissemination by any means of public communication if such dissemination would pose a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial. (emphasis added). Here, possible prejudice resulted from the prosecuting attorney's extrajudicial statement expressing his personal opinion as to the appellant's guilt. By refusing to poll the jurors the trial court left unanswered the critical question of whether any or all of the jurors were exposed to this inherently prejudicial statement. In Syllabus Point 5 of State v. Williams, ___ W.Va. ___, 305 S.E.2d 251 (1983), this Court held that: If it is determined that publicity disseminated by the media during trial raises serious questions of possible prejudice, the court may on its own motion or shall on motion of either party question each juror, out of the presence of the others, about his exposure to that material. (emphasis added). See also Syl.Pt. 2, State v. Nixon, ___ W.Va. ___, 359 S.E.2d 566 (1987). Thus, where publicity has been disseminated which raises a serious question of possible prejudice and either party has made a motion to poll the jurors about their exposure to the publicity, a trial court's refusal to undertake such questioning constitutes reversible error. In the case now before us, timely motions were made for a mistrial and to poll the jurors concerning their exposure to the prosecuting attorney's extrajudicial statement. Although corrective measures, such as giving a cautionary instruction, may have justified not declaring a mistrial even if it were determined that the jurors had been exposed to the radio interview, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to poll the jurors to determine whether a manifest necessity existed to discharge the jury and to declare a mistrial. See W.Va.Code § 62-3-7 (1984 Replacement Vol.). [2]