Opinion ID: 1126345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Titania Richardson and Mary Nettles

Text: The defendant also based his motion for new trial on the testimony of allegedly newly discovered witnesses, Titania Richardson and Mary Nettles. Pursuant to a material witness warrant, Titania Richardson, who was serving time in Parish Prison at the time of the hearing, denied witnessing the murder, claiming instead to have been just out there. Yet she was certain that the defendant was not one of the two men involved in the shooting. She was not interviewed by police that night or any other; she did not step forward before because she was frightened, as the men responsible live around her house. She knows them only as Tracey and Mario. Richardson did not mention the murder until a month or so after the defendant's trial, when she bumped into the defendant's sister and later spoke on the telephone to her and the defendant's newly-enrolled counsel. She declined to get involved, and she denied telling the sister or the attorney that she had seen the victim's cousin remove something from the victim's pocket right after the shooting. Mary Nettles, who owned a defunct bar directly across the street from Creola's, testified that she came to her darkened bar that night to pick up something. She came across a drunken man in a pick-up truck parked in front of her bar. When she asked him for a few dollars, he handed her two $10 dollar bills. Nettles testified that the man had been drinking all day and that this man, his cousin, and his friend would go into Creola's for a time, then come outside to drink. The defense made no attempt to establish how Nettles knew the actions of these people or, more importantly, whether she could identify the man in the truck as Freddie Thompson. While inside her bar, Nettles heard two or three shots. When she came outside, she saw two men with hoods running toward Montegut Street, where they turned right and kept going. Nettles says she did not recognize either man, but she ran after them, following them around the corner of Laussat and Montegut. According to Nettles, neither man wore a cast, one had a gun, and one was tall while the other was closer to her size. Nettles was able to discern these details even though she said it was dark and she could see only the backs of the men as they fled. Nettles knows the defendant, and has known his family for twenty or thirty years. She maintained that the defendant was not involved in the killing because, when she reached Laussat and Montegut in time to see the men turn on Law Street, she also saw defendant by a house belonging to Yam, whose real name she believed to be William Thomas. In support of the motion for a new trial, newly-enrolled defense counsel contended that Christina Davis's letters all but name the gunman as her cousin, Tracey Davis. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the letters have effectively identified Tracey Davis as the shooter and Mario as the other male accomplice. Det. Kaufman did testify at trial that Tracey Davis was a suspect; however, Thompson was unable to identify Tracey Davis as one of the perpetrators. According to the defense, the testimony of Richardson and Nettles clears the defendant and points to Tracey Davis as one of the assailants. Though Nettles did not identify the drunken man in the truck outside her bar, defense counsel, who assumed that Nettles had begged money from Thompson, argued that jurors did not learn that Thompson was so intoxicated he was unable to distinguish between one and ten dollar bills. This new evidence, counsel maintained, undermined the already weak single-eyewitness identification case. If nothing else, counsel urged, the ends of justice demanded a new trial. The State responded that no one could identify Tracey Davis and that nothing connected him to the crime. As for Richardson, the State argued, she denied being a witness and, in any event, waited over a year before coming forward, however reluctantly. Nettles, a long-time friend of the defendant's family, also waited for almost two years before giving her testimony. Finally, the State argued, the defense did not call the defendant's first two attorneys to determine whether Richardson and Nettles were known to the defense, but not called at trial for strategic reasons. We do not find that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. Titania Richardson denied witnessing the shooting, admitting only to having been out there without explaining her location in relation to the assault on the victim or the direction the assailants took when they fled the scene. The basis of her information is thus suspect. Additionally, her criminal record and details of her current incarceration are unknown. As for Mary Nettles, her name appears on the co-defendant's witness list of May 24, 1996. Counsel for the defendant, who had adopted all pleadings and motions of counsel for co-defendant Christina Davis, surely had presumptive knowledge of the witness list he had jointly submitted and of Nettles's testimony. Consequently, it is implausible that, given Nettles's appearance on the defense witness list and her longstanding relationship with the defendant's family, trial counsel was unaware of, or that reasonable diligence would not have uncovered, Nettles's exculpatory account of the incident until twenty-two months after the murder and four months after the defendant's trial. Therefore, the defendant's claims of newly-discovered evidence were reasonably rejected by the district court. In summary, the defendant does not demonstrate that the proffered evidence was not known before trial or that reasonable diligence would not have uncovered these witnesses. The defense showing does not undermine confidence in the outcome, hint at a fundamentally unfair trial, or support a view that in combination any perceived errors mandate a new trial. Defendant offers only innuendo and conclusory allegations in support of the consolidated claims; hence, he fails to show that a new trial under Article 851(3) is justified. We find no abuse of the district court's discretion in ruling on the motion for new trial.
On appeal, the defendant alleges the state improperly manipulated the order of trial so as to preclude Christina Davis from testifying at his trial, thereby denying him his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to mount a defense and to present a material witness. The defendant essentially relies on State v. Walland, 555 So.2d 478 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), and Taylor v. Singletary, 122 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir.1997), which are discussed below. Article V, § 26(B) of the Louisiana Constitution provides that the district attorney controls the administration of criminal prosecutions. Further, La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 61 states that subject to the supervision of the attorney general, as provided in Article 62, the district attorney has entire charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in his district, and determines whom, when, and how he shall prosecute. Additionally, La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 704(A) provides: Jointly indicted defendants shall be tried jointly unless: (1) The state elects to try them separately; or (2) The court, on motion of the defendant, and after contradictory hearing with the district attorney, is satisfied that justice requires a severance. In State v. Walland, supra , the court of appeal reversed a trial court ruling denying the defendant's request that his co-defendant be tried first so that the co-defendant could testify on his behalf. The defendant and a co-defendant were jointly charged with possession of a stolen vehicle. The defendant filed a motion for severance, arguing that the co-defendant wished to testify on his behalf, but that self-in-crimination concerns would prevent it if the two were tried together. The motion was supported by an affidavit from the co-defendant stating that he would testify on behalf of the defendant at a separate trial, but that he would not testify at a joint trial due to concern for his own Fifth Amendment rights. The trial court granted the severance based on the affidavit; however, the State proceeded to trial against the defendant first. The defendant objected to the order of trial, arguing that the co-defendant would not testify unless he was tried first. When the trial court denied his objection, the defendant applied for supervisory writs to the court of appeal. Relying primarily on United States v. DiBernardo, 880 F.2d 1216 (11th Cir. 1989), [15] the Walland court held that the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense entitled him to a trial following that of his co-defendant. Walland, 555 So.2d at 482. The court reasoned that, once the trial court granted a severance, only one order of trials was equitably possible and that the District Attorney's statutory authority to control the prosecution could not supersede the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial, to present a defense, and to call his witness. Id. The court ordered that the co-defendant's trial be scheduled prior to the defendant's trial. In Taylor v. Singletary, 122 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir.1997), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the state trial judge, who has discretion to set the order in which co-defendants will be tried, violated the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in denying his pre-trial request that his co-defendant be tried first. The defendant and the co-defendant were charged with first degree murder. After the co-defendant's motion for severance was granted, the defendant moved to be tried after the co-defendant, so that the co-defendant could provide exculpatory testimony on his behalf. The defendant supported his motion with an affidavit from the co-defendant, in which the co-defendant stated that he would assert his Fifth Amendment privilege until his trial was completed and that, whether convicted or acquitted, he would testify at the defendant's trial. The affidavit authorized the co-defendant's attorney to make an in camera proffer as to the details of the co-defendant's proposed testimony. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, the defendant called the co-defendant to the stand, but the latter invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. The defendant was convicted as charged, while the co-defendant was later acquitted at his trial, at which he had testified on his own behalf. On appeal in the state courts, the defendant unsuccessfully argued that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying his motion to be tried after his co-defendant and that his right to present material, exculpatory testimony was denied. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the federal district court's finding that the defendant's constitutional right to present a material witness had been violated, but the appellate court, noting that the district court had applied an incorrect standard, concluded that the error was not harmless. Citing DiBernardo, supra, and Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970), the Taylor court held that judicial economy in determining the order of trial must yield to the defendant's right to a fair trial. Equating the potential constitutional harm of a particular sequence of trial with the denial of a severance, the court reasoned that the same factors the trial court considers before ruling on a motion for severance are relevant when the defendant seeks a certain order of trial. Specifically, the defendant must show: (1) his bona fide need for the co-defendant's testimony; (2) the substance of the testimony; (3) the exculpatory nature and effect of the testimony, and (4) the likelihood that the co-defendant will testify on his behalf. Taylor, 122 F.3d at 1393. By the same token, to show an abuse of the trial court's discretion in scheduling the order of trials, the defendant on appeal must prove that he suffered compelling prejudice. Id. The court found that the defendant had had a bona fide need for the co-defendant's testimony, that the substance, nature, and effect of the testimony favored granting the motion, and that it was very likely the co-defendant would have testified on the defendant's behalf. The court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion, because the exclusion of the co-defendant's testimony had caused the defendant prejudice. The Taylor court, after reviewing the trial testimony in light of the co-defendant's testimony at his trial, went on to conclude that the trial court's error was not harmless, because the defendant had established that the unavailable evidence `could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.' Taylor, 122 F.3d at 1395 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-35, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). The procedural facts in the instant case are distinguishable from Walland, Taylor, and DiBernardo. In Walland and DiBernardo, the defendants prior to trial moved for severance requesting that a co-defendant, who was willing to provide material, exculpatory evidence, be tried first. Furthermore, the defendants in those cases, as did the defendant in Taylor, objected to the order of trial when the trial courts did not agree to try first the co-defendants who were willing to provide exculpatory evidence. Here, the defendant did not move for a severance prior to trial, nor did he object to the State's motion to sever trial and to proceed with trial against the defendant. Instead, the defendant vainly attempted to call Davis to the stand during trial, presumably knowing that she was facing the same first degree murder charge and that she would most likely invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege. Furthermore, the record does not permit us to conclude that the State engaged in misconduct by electing to try the defendant first. The defendant's allegation that the State knew prior to the date of trial that he would attempt to call Davis to testify on his behalf is simply without support in the record. [16] At any rate, absent a written motion to set the order of trial or an objection to the State's decision to proceed against the defendant first, there is nothing for this court to review. La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 841; State v. Taylor, 93-2201, p. 7 (La.2/28/96), 669 So.2d 364, 369. The defendant also claims the district court erred in granting Christina Davis a blanket privilege against self-in-crimination. He argues that he was precluded from asking her questions the answers to which would not have inculpated her but would have exonerated him. We find the district court did not err in ruling that Davis was unavailable as a witness once she and her attorney indicated that, if called, she would invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege and refuse to testify. The availability of a witness under La.Code Evid. art. 804(A)(1) is a matter for the court, and proceedings to assert a privilege should be held outside a jury's hearing. It is improper for either side to call a witness, knowing that the witness will assert a privilege, solely to impress upon jurors the fact that the privilege is being claimed. State v. Berry, 324 So.2d 822, 830 (La.1976); see also State v. Haddad, 99-1272, p. 6 (La.2/29/2000), 767 So.2d 682, 684, 2000 La. LEXIS 507, . [17] When the purpose is other than to draw negative evidentiary inferences from a claim of privilege, courts have allowed jurors to observe the process. See State v. Wille, 559 So.2d 1321, 1336-38 (La.1990) (state allowed to call accomplice so that jury could observe claim of Fifth Amendment privilege after the defense made repeated references to accomplice's absence). In general, a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege is permissible when the witness is charged with participating in the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, and when it is apparent that the inquiry will be devoted to subject matter that would raise in the witness reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer or an explanation as to why one cannot be given. State v. Brown, 514 So.2d 99, 109-11 (La.1987) (citing State v. Darby, 403 So.2d 44, 48-49 (La.1981)); State v. Edwards, 419 So.2d 881, 892 (La. 1982); State v. Coleman, 406 So.2d 563, 566 (La.1981); but see State v. Wilson, 394 So.2d 254, 257-59 (La.1981)(a privilege may be asserted only as to particular questions). The United States Supreme Court has observed that, [t]o sustain the privilege [against self-incrimination,] it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer ... or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 487, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). Here, trial counsel did not seek to ask Davis particular questions. Nor did he offer reasons in support of the district court's sua sponte and pro forma action in not[ing] an objection ... on behalf of [the defense] when it ruled that Davis was unavailable as a witness. Appellate counsel's suggested questions, which he views as non-privileged and reasonable, include queries on whether Davis knew the defendant, whether she saw him the night of the crime, and whether he spoke to her the day or night of the murder. Given Davis's deep involvement in the circumstances surrounding Barnes's death, as evidenced by her statements and letters, we find that requiring Davis to answer these proposed questions directly, or to explain why she could not answer them, would have risked injurious disclosure that could very likely have incriminated her, vitiating the very privilege she sought to exercise. See State v. Brown, 514 So.2d at 109 (rejecting inquiries along similar lines); Hoffman v. United States, supra . The trial court's ruling was proper.
The defendant also alleges that his trial counsel's performance was so defective as to render him without the effective assistance of counsel. A criminal defendant is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel. United States Sixth Amendment; La. Const. art. I, § 13; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Washington, 491 So.2d 1337 (La.1986). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and, that counsel's professional errors resulted in prejudice to the extent that it undermined the functioning of the adversarial process and rendered the verdict suspect. Strickland v. Washington, supra ; Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). This does not mean errorless counsel [or] counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render effective assistance. State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528, 531 (La.1982). A claim of ineffectiveness is generally relegated to post-conviction, unless the record permits definitive resolution on appeal. E.g., State v. Prudholm, 446 So.2d 729 (La.1984). However, when the record is sufficient for review, this Court will reach the merits of complaints about counsel's performance and grant relief when appropriate. E.g., State v. Hamilton, 92-2639 (La.7/1/97), 699 So.2d 29, 32-35. The defendant makes a serious allegation that his counsel's performance was deficient. He asserts that trial counsel, who is now deceased, failed to prepare adequately for trial: counsel visited his client on only one occasion in the six months before trial, and then for only ten minutes; counsel filed only one motion on his owna motion to withdraw following trial; counsel had no discernible trial strategy tailored to the defendant, as counsel relied solely on Christina Davis's counsel to file any and all pre-trial motions; counsel was unaware that his client had never been arraigned; and counsel failed to secure the presence at trial of witnesses apparently known to the defense. He also asserts that his counsel's performance during trial was derelict: counsel failed to object to hearsay evidence; counsel failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct; and counsel failed to rehabilitate the defendant's alibi witnesses. Although the defendant argues otherwise, the record before us is insufficient for us to make definitive findings as to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, that claim is relegated to post-conviction relief, where an evidentiary hearing may be conducted to develop a sufficient record on the issues raised.