Opinion ID: 2626110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Participation in Plea Discussions

Text: Both the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Colorado Revised Statutes provide that the trial judge shall not participate in plea discussions. § 16-7-302(1), C.R.S. (2005) (emphasis added); Crim. P. 11(f)(4) (emphasis added). Both the rule and the statute carve out an exception for the trial judge to participate when the parties arrive at a tentative plea bargain and ask the trial judge to indicate whether he or she will grant concessions contemplated by the plea agreement regarding the charges or the sentence. § 16-7-302(2); Crim. P. 11(f)(5). Colorado's prohibition against judicial participation in plea negotiations is consistent with the American Bar Association's (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pleas of Guilty 127-28 (3d ed. 1999). [4] As part of this prohibition, Standard 14-3.3(c) directs trial judges to refrain from influencing the defendant to accept a particular offer: The judge should not through word or demeanor, either directly or indirectly, communicate to the defendant or defense counsel that a plea agreement should be accepted or that a guilty plea should be entered. Id. at 128 (emphasis added). The rationale supporting this rule is that [it] protects the constitutional presumption of innocence, and avoids placing judicial pressure on the defendant to compromise his or her rights. Id. at 134. The judge plays an essential role to ensure the impartial and objective administration of criminal justice. [5] When a judge becomes involved in plea discussions, the judge is no longer a judicial officer or a neutral arbiter. See United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 203 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 926, 97 S.Ct. 330, 50 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976). Judicial participation transforms the judge from a neutral arbiter to an advocate for the resolution the judge has suggested to the defendant. When the judge does participate, he or she brings to bear the full force of the judicial office. United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F.Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y.1966); People v. Clark, 183 Colo. 201, 203, 515 P.2d 1242, 1243 (1973). Because of the disparity in power between the defendant and the judge, judicial participation in plea negotiations undermines the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Clark, 183 Colo. at 203-04, 515 P.2d at 1243. Hence, numerous jurisdictions have ruled that a judge cannot take certain actions, such as threaten a defendant with a more severe sentence if the defendant refuses to plead guilty, id., 183 Colo. at 203, 515 P.2d at 1242-43; make a tacit offer of leniency, even if that offer is accompanied by caveats, see, e.g., United States v. Baker, 489 F.3d 366, 375 (D.C.Cir.2007); compare the potential consequences of pleading guilty versus going to trial, United States v. Cano-Varela, 497 F.3d 1122, 1133 (10th Cir.2007); or become a legal advisor to the defendant, Cano-Varela, 497 F.3d at 1134; see also United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 462 (4th Cir.2006) (finding error where the trial court, among other comments, advised the defendants they might be better off pleading to the indictment). That being said, so long as the judge remains impartial, the rule against judicial participation must not be applied so rigidly as to interfere with the everyday operations of the courts. See United States v. Frank, 36 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir.1994) (The rule against judicial participation in plea bargaining protects the parties against implicit or explicit pressure to settle criminal cases on terms favored by the judge. It does not establish a series of traps for imperfectly articulated oral remarks.). A judge may make observations about the evolving legal posture of a case and may inquire as to whether parties wish to consummate a plea agreement. People v. Venzor, 121 P.3d 260, 264 (Colo.App.2005). In addition, a judge may make case management decisions without violating the rule against judicial participation in plea negotiations. Cano-Varela, 497 F.3d at 1132-33; United States v. Cannady, 283 F.3d 641, 645 (4th Cir.2002); see also People v. Jasper, 17 P.3d 807, 814 (Colo. 2001) (affirming a trial court's decision to reject a plea agreement because it was outside the plea-cutoff deadline). Consistent with the purposes of the rule, a judge may explain to the defendant that he or she has a decision to make and may impose a deadline for making that decision, but the judge cannot influence the defendant to accept or reject a particular plea bargain.