Opinion ID: 1102227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Risk of Error

Text: Having determined the nature of the private interests involved, we turn now to the risk of error inherent in the chosen procedure. Because a primary function of the legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions, the second stage of the Eldridge inquiry requires consideration of the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest involved as a consequence of the procedures used. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2618, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979). There is virtually overwhelming assurance the deprivation in these cases is not baseless or unwarranted. The statute authorizes impoundment of the motor vehicle when it does not contain the requisite documentary proof of insurance. The occupant of the motor vehicle either will or will not be able to produce this proof. An officer will easily and readily be able to determine whether the operator has produced such proof. A predeprivation hearing on the issue of whether or not the vehicle contains this proof would be redundant and serve no additional purpose for it would be the rare occasion where the vehicle's owner would be able to convince an impartial arbiter that he really did show proof of insurance to the officer. See, e.g., Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir.1982) (observing that a pre-towing hearing was not necessary in cases involving illegal parking because a determination that a vehicle was illegally parked was pretty cut and dried.). Plaintiffs err by concluding the risk of erroneous deprivation is great because motor vehicles which are actually insured will be impounded if they do not contain the statutorily required documentary proof. In fact, plaintiffs averred during argument these people are in compliance with the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law and are being unfairly punished. However, this argument ignores the statutory scheme. Louisiana R.S. 32:863.1(A) requires owners or lessees of motor vehicles to keep certain documentation evidencing the vehicle is insured within the vehicle if it is to be operated on a public road. Sections 32:863.1(B) & (C)(1)(a) require an officer to impound the vehicle if it is not in compliance with the provision requiring evidence of liability insurance be contained in the vehicle. Thus, owners whose vehicles do not contain the documentary proof are not in compliance with the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, and the legislature, in its wisdom, has seen fit to require that these motor vehicles be immediately impounded until such proof can be presented. The owner is being temporarily deprived of the use of his motor vehicle because it does not contain the statutorily required documentary proof are not because it may or may not ultimately, in fact, be shown to have been insured at the time of the inquiry by the officer. Whether the motor vehicle is in fact insured at the time of the issuance of noncompliance does not render the officer's conclusion erroneous because it is the lack of documentary proof which triggers the impoundment procedure. Although the legislature has determined the consequences of the owner's inability to produce this proof are lessened where there was in fact insurance on the motor vehicle at the time it was impounded, this does not change the fact that the violation which triggers impoundment is the lack of documentary proof. Here, the impoundment is supported by the officer's objective finding that the vehicle does not contain the required proof of insurance. Furthermore, to the extent that the officer's determination may possibly be erroneous in that the vehicle actually contained documentary proof, the Due Process Clause has never been construed to require that the procedures used to guard against an erroneous deprivation of a protectible property interest be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of error. The Due Process clause simply does not mandate that all governmental decisionmaking comply with standards that assure perfect, error-free determinations. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 13, 99 S.Ct. at 2618. Additionally, the owner may always obtain his vehicle immediately upon proof of insurance, request a hearing, prove he did show proof to the officer, and obtain a refund of all fees because the tow would have been illegal. This case is very similar to Mackey v. Montrym, supra . Under Massachusetts law, a person who refuses to submit to a breath analysis test upon his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence shall have his license suspended based solely on the officer's report indicating the fact of the arrest, the grounds supporting the arrest, and the fact of the driver's refusal to take the breath analysis test. It is not necessary for the driver to be convicted of D.W.I. nor is it necessary that the driver in fact was operating the vehicle while under the influence for his license to be immediately suspended. The suspension is effective immediately, with the driver being given the opportunity to appeal the suspension or to request an immediate post-suspension hearing. The Supreme Court held the driver was not entitled to a pre-suspension hearing. Although it noted the driver had a substantial property interest in the license which allowed him to operate a motor vehicle, there was little risk of an erroneous deprivation, and additional procedures would serve no purpose, especially in light of the strong state interest in the suspension. Specifically, the Court noted that the predicates for the driver's suspension were the objective facts of probable cause justifying the arrest and the driver's refusal to take the test. It was not relevant, for purposes of the Massachusetts statute, whether the driver was, in fact, operating the vehicle while under the influenceonly that he had been arrested based on probable cause for doing so. In such a case, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles was required to suspend the license. The risk of an erroneous observation or deliberate misrepresentation of the facts by the reporting officer was found insubstantial and a hearing prior to the suspension by the Registrar would be an exercise in futility because the Massachusetts Legislature had already made the determination that the Registrar lacked discretion as to whether or not to suspend the license. Another case involving a similar analysis is Gilbert, supra . Therein, the Supreme Court upheld the temporary suspension without a predeprivation hearing of a state employee who had been arrested on felony charges. A presuspension hearing was not necessary because its only purpose would be to assure that there were reasonable grounds to support the suspension without pay, and this had already been assured by the arrest and the filing of charges. Similarly, in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, supra , the U.S. Supreme Court held a pre-deprivation hearing was not required where a bank official's employment was immediately suspended upon indictment. Likewise, in Barry v. Barchi, supra , the Court held a pre-deprivation hearing was not required where a horse trainer was immediately suspended upon his horse's positive test for drugs. Although it could ultimately be shown at a hearing that the indictment was not warranted or that the drug test was false, the states' interests justifying immediate suspension were paramount where there was an opportunity for a postdeprivation hearing and where there was some assurance, in the form of the indictment and the positive drug test, that the deprivation was not baseless or unwarranted. In the instant case, we are dealing only with the temporary impoundment of a motor vehicle because it did not contain the statutorily required documentary proof of insurance. It is irrelevant at that point whether the vehicle is actually insured, for the legislature has mandated that all vehicles carry proof of insurance. The risk of an erroneous observation or deliberate misrepresentation of the facts surrounding whether the operator, in fact, presented such proof, is insubstantial. [4] A hearing prior to the impoundment would be an exercise in futility because the hearing's only purpose would be to determine whether or not the officer was correct in determining the vehicle, indeed, lacked such proof. The owner is given the opportunity to limit the negative consequences of the noncompliance by presenting proof of insurance within three days. Otherwise, the impoundment will continue until such proof is presented, and the owner has the right to request an administrative hearing under La. R.S. 32:863.1(C)(5)(a). We note that because the owner is able to recover his vehicle with proof of insurance the very next day after the impoundment, thereby limiting the storage fees he incurs as well as the length of time he is deprived of his vehicle, there is no additional harm to him resulting from the fact that the administrative hearing will not be held until some indefinite time in the immediate future. [5] If the owner shows at the hearing that his vehicle was in fact insured at the time of the issuance of the notice of noncompliance and that this proof was in fact presented to the officer, then the owner can be made whole after the hearing with a refund of the towing, storage, and administrative fees since the tow would have been illegal. If the owner shows at the hearing that his vehicle was in fact insured at the time of the issuance of the notice of noncompliance even though this proof was not presented to the officer, then the owner, who was able to obtain his vehicle the very next day after the impoundment, was still properly held accountable for the towing and storage fees because the tow was justified by the vehicle's failure to contain such proof. Finally, an administrative hearing, whether delayed or not, is of no benefit to an owner whose vehicle remains uninsured, and thus impounded, because the State is allowed, as explained earlier, to make it illegal for vehicles to be operated without insurance. Under any of these factual situations, the effect of the delay between the impoundment of the vehicle and the administrative hearing is minute.