Opinion ID: 889830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Neighbors' Standing

Text: ¶ 35 As noted, a plaintiff must clearly allege a past, present, or threatened injury to a property or civil right i.e., an invasion of a legally protected interest. Thus, standing often turns on the source of the plaintiff's claim, since the actual or threatened injury required by the Constitution might exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. Such is the case here. Under Sourdough Protective Assn., Inc. v. Bd. of County Commrs., 253 Mont. 325, 833 P.2d 207 (1992), and City of Kalispell v. Flathead County, 260 Mont. 258, 859 P.2d 458 (1993), there is no right to appeal a governing board's approval of a preliminary subdivision plat, except as provided by statute. Responding to these two decisions, the Legislature created the appeal mechanism set forth in § 76-3-625, MCA, which Neighbors invoked in bringing the present action. See Laws of Montana, 1995, ch. 468, § 10. Where the Legislature `has authorized public officials to perform certain functions according to law, and has provided by statute for judicial review of those actions under certain circumstances, the inquiry as to standing must begin with a determination of whether the statute in question authorizes review at the behest of the plaintiff.' Druffel, ¶ 15 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364-65, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)). ¶ 36 Section 76-3-625(2), MCA, provides that certain parties who are aggrieved by a decision of the governing body to approve, conditionally approve, or deny an application and preliminary plat for a proposed subdivision or a final subdivision plat may appeal to the district court in the county in which the property involved is located. The parties who may appeal under this provision are the subdivider, the county commissioners, certain municipalities, and a landowner with a property boundary contiguous to the proposed subdivision or a private landowner with property within the county or municipality where the subdivision is proposed if that landowner can show a likelihood of material injury to the landowner's property or its value. Section 76-3-625(3), MCA. The statute defines aggrieved as a person who can demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest, as distinguished from a general interest, who has been or is likely to be specially and injuriously affected by the decision. Section 76-3-625(4), MCA. ¶ 37 In its motion to dismiss, the City argued that Neighbors had not met these requirementsspecifically, that none of them had alleged or shown a material injury to their property or its value, a specific personal and legal interest, and a special and injurious effect flowing from the subdivision approval. The District Court concluded otherwise, reasoning that the adverse impacts cited by Neighbors (such as increased traffic, noise, and pollution, and disruption of wildlife in the area) could materially injure their properties or the value of their properties. The court observed that it was not necessary for the Plaintiffs to allege specific physical property damage or dollar amounts for injuries to property values in order to bring a suit under § 76-3-625, MCA. On appeal, the City correctly acknowledges that adverse impacts do not have to be monetary. Rather, the City contends that Neighbors' alleged injuries could apply to any new residence and are ambiguous and too general to meet the standard set out in § 76-3-625, MCA. We disagree. ¶ 38 One of the purposes of the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act is to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare by regulating the subdivision of land. Section 76-3-102(1), MCA. Legislation enacted for the promotion of public health, safety, and general welfare, is entitled to liberal construction with a view towards the accomplishment of its highly beneficent objectives. State ex rel. Florence-Carlton Sch. Dist. No. 15-16 v. Bd. of County Commrs., 180 Mont. 285, 291, 590 P.2d 602, 605 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). With this principle in mind, we first consider Heffernan's affidavit filed in response to the City's motion to dismiss. It states that the western boundary of her property shares the northeastern boundary of Sonata Park. In other words, she is a landowner with a property boundary contiguous to the proposed subdivision and, as such, satisfies § 76-3-625(3)(b), MCA. [5] As to whether she is aggrieved, Heffernan states that she and her family have resided on the west side of Rattlesnake Valley for 18 years. She explains that their neighborhood reflects a transition from city to wilderness, and she identifies numerous animals that frequent her property and the surrounding area. She says the presence of this wildlife is an important value to us and one of the reasons that we chose to live here. She also discusses the value of the neighborhood's low density and states that dense development adjacent to our property will diminish this [rural] quality for my family and myself, and diminish the value of our property in the future. She notes that the impact of 37 new homesincluding 259 to 370 additional vehicle trips per day (as estimated by the developer), increased noise, more pets, and less wildlifewill significantly alter the neighborhood for the worse. She states that when she moved to her property, she believed that the recommendations of the Rattlesnake Comprehensive Plan would be considered for any future development. She and her husband expressed their concerns about Sonata Park in letters to the Planning Board and the City Council and at the various public meetings on the subdivision. We hold that these averments are sufficient to establish that Heffernan has a specific personal and legal interest and is likely to be specially and injuriously affected by the subdivision. Section 76-3-625(4), MCA; cf. Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 2010 MT 79, ¶¶ 41-43, 356 Mont. 41, 230 P.3d 808 (contiguous landowner's allegations that the subdivision would affect the enjoyment of his property, adversely impact the quality of his water supply, impact wildlife habitat and wetlands, increase noise, traffic, and light pollution, and decrease the value of his property were sufficient to establish standing); Little v. Bd. of County Commrs., 193 Mont. 334, 355, 631 P.2d 1282, 1294 (1981) (the increased traffic alone was sufficient to show that plaintiffs, as adjacent owners, would be injured in a manner that the general public would not). ¶ 39 Carey and Harmon also filed affidavits on the issue of standing. Carey's property, which he bought in 2001, is located within 150 feet of Sonata Park. It is adjacent to the sole access road to the subdivision and, as a result, will be directly affected by the increased traffic. In fact, Carey avers that the combined noise, dust, and steady intrusion very close to our living space (about 100 feet from living and dining room view windows) will negatively affect our ability to enjoy the natural rural values of our home. Carey states that before he bought his property, he read the Rattlesnake Comprehensive Plan and believed that its goals and guidelines would be the dominant roadmap of development in our neighborhood. He explains that the viewshed, the rural character of the area, and the wildlifeall of which the Rattlesnake Valley plan endorsesare valuable to him and his family. He alleges that Sonata Park will destroy or degrade these aspects of the neighborhood which, in turn, will erode the value of his property. Carey also alleges that the development poses a danger of injury to his family and damage to his property due to soil issues and the potential for a landslide. He notes that he expressed his concerns to city officials but received no meaningful response. ¶ 40 Harmon's property, which he bought in 1991, is within 600 feet of Sonata Park. It too lies along the access road and, thus, will be directly affected by the increased traffic. Harmon cites most of the same adverse impacts alleged by Heffernan and Carey (traffic, noise, detrimental effects on wildlife). In addition, he asserts that allowing Sonata Park's density of development will create light pollution and greatly increase the danger to pedestrians and bicyclists using the neighborhood streets, which do not have sidewalks, curbs, or designated bike lanes. He alleges that the effects of the subdivision will result in a decrease in his property's value. We hold that these allegations by Harmon and Carey are sufficient to establish a likelihood of material injury to each one's property or its value, a specific personal and legal interest, and a likelihood of being specially and injuriously affected by the subdivision. Section 76-3-625(3)(b), (4), MCA. ¶ 41 Heffernan, Carey, and Harmon therefore have statutory standing. However, as noted, [t]he mere fact that a person is entitled to bring an action under a given statute is insufficient to establish standing; the party must allege some past, present or threatened injury which would be alleviated by successfully maintaining the action. Vainio, 284 Mont. at 235, 943 P.2d at 1286; see also e.g. Bennett, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (addressing constitutional standing after determining that standing existed under the statute). Yet, unlike the statute involved in Vainio, which allowed any interested party to bring a paternity action, the statute involved in the present case requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest and that she has been or is likely to be specially and injuriously affected by the decision [of the governing body]. Section 76-3-625(4), MCA. Satisfaction of these criteria, we conclude, is sufficient to establish the existence of a case or controversy. Accordingly, we hold that Heffernan, Carey, and Harmon have constitutional standing as well. ¶ 42 As a final matter, the City contends that North Duncan Drive Neighborhood Association is not pled as a landowner and is therefore not eligible to appeal under § 76-3-625, MCA. If the Association were claiming injuries to itself, we would agree. But that is not the case. An organization may have standing in either of two ways: it may file suit on its own behalf to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy, or it may assert the rights of its members under the doctrine of associational standing. Irish Lesbian and Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 649 (2d Cir.1998). In the latter situation, the association and its members are in every practical sense identical. United Food and Com. Workers v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 552, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 1534, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Association does not seek judicial relief from an injury to itself; rather, it seeks to represent the legal interests of its members. ¶ 43 It is well established that an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members, even without a showing of injury to the association itself, when (a) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his or her own right, (b) the interests the association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the individual participation of each allegedly injured party in the lawsuit. Warth, 422 U.S. at 511, 95 S.Ct. at 2211-12; Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commn., 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). The first two prongs of this test are grounded in the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy, while the third prong focuses on matters of administrative convenience and efficiency, not on elements of a case or controversy, and thus is prudential. United Food, 517 U.S. at 554-57, 116 S.Ct. at 1535-36. ¶ 44 Associational standing is an exception to the general prohibition on a litigant's raising a third party's legal rights. Id. at 557, 116 S.Ct. at 1536; Retired Chicago Police Assn. v. City of Chicago, 76 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir.1996). The doctrine of associational standing recognizes that the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others. United Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290, 106 S.Ct. 2523, 2533, 91 L.Ed.2d 228 (1986). [A]n association suing to vindicate the interests of its members can draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital. Besides financial resources, organizations often have specialized expertise and research resources relating to the subject matter of the lawsuit that individual plaintiffs lack. These resources can assist both courts and plaintiffs. Id. at 289, 106 S.Ct. at 2532 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 45 Consistent with these principles, this Court has recognized standing on the part of organizations that were proceeding on behalf of their members, based on considerations substantially equivalent to those articulated in Hunt. See e.g. Geil v. Missoula Irrigation Dist., 2002 MT 269, ¶¶ 28-32, 312 Mont. 320, 59 P.3d 398 (finding standing where the organization had demonstrated potential economic injury to its members resulting from enforcement of the statutes, the organization was the only entity authorized by the statutes to object to their enforcement, the alleged injury to the organization's members was not shared by the public generally, and denying standing would effectively immunize the statutes from review); Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 1999 MT 248, ¶¶ 4, 41-45, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236 (finding standing based on the injuries allegedly suffered by the organizations' members). ¶ 46 In the present case, therefore, the Association has standing to proceed on behalf of its members if (a) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his or her own right, (b) the interests the Association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the individual participation of each allegedly injured party in the lawsuit. First, Heffernan, Carey, and Harmon are members of the Association, and, as explained above, they have standing to sue in their own right. Second, the Association's purpose (according to Harmon's and Carey's affidavits) is to deal with land use issues and densities in our mostly unzoned neighborhood and to advocate for the Rattlesnake Valley Growth Plan and its underlying principles. The interests the Association seeks to protect in the instant suit (its members' claims that Sonata Park is contrary to the Rattlesnake Valley plan) are germane to this purpose. See Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Downtown Dev., Inc., 448 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir.2006). And nothing in the record suggests a profound conflict of interest among the Association and its members. See Retired Chicago Police, 76 F.3d at 864-65, 867. Third, Neighbors alleged that the City's approval of Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful, and they requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Adjudication of this claim does not require participation by each allegedly injured member of the Association. See Hosp. Council v. City of Pittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83, 89-90 (3d Cir.1991). Likewise, a request for declaratory and injunctive relief does not require participation by individual association members. Id. at 89; cf. United Union of Roofers v. Ins. Corp. of America, 919 F.2d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir.1990) (claims for monetary relief necessarily involve individualized proof and thus the individual participation of association members). And there is no risk that the relief requested would fail to inure to the benefit of the members on whose behalf injury is claimed. See United Food, 517 U.S. at 556, 116 S.Ct. at 1536; Warth, 422 U.S. at 515, 95 S.Ct. at 2213. Accordingly, the Association has standing to assert the rights of its members. ¶ 47 In sum, we hold that Heffernan, Carey, and Harmon have demonstrated statutory and constitutional standing and that the Association has associational standing to proceed on behalf of its members. We reject the City's arguments to the contrary. ¶ 48 Issue 2. Did the District Court err in striking affidavits filed by Muth-Hillberry and the City in connection with their motions for summary judgment? ¶ 49 The City and Muth-Hillberry filed six affidavits in connection with their summary judgment motions. Neighbors then filed two motions to strike these affidavits, which the District Court granted in part and denied in part. The City and Muth-Hillberry now challenge the District Court's rulings. We begin with the City's arguments. ¶ 50 The City filed the affidavits of John Engen (Missoula City Mayor), Jack Reidy (member of the City Council from 1986 through 2007), and Denise Alexander (OPG Principal Planner). These affidavits contain explanations of the City Council's common practice for reviewing and voting on subdivision applications. The evident purpose of the affidavits was to explain why the City believed it had satisfied § 76-3-608(2), MCA, which requires a governing body to issue written findings of fact in conjunction with its decision to approve, conditionally approve, or deny a proposed subdivision. The District Court concluded, however, that this information was irrelevant and had no bearing on the issue before the court. Accordingly, the court struck the affidavits. On appeal, the City offers the blanket assertion that the District Court erred in granting Neighbors' motion to strike. Yet, the City provides no explanation as to why the court's ruling vis-à-vis the Engen, Reidy, and Alexander affidavits was incorrect. ¶ 51 The City also filed the affidavits of Martha Rehbein (Missoula City Clerk) and Mary McCrea (OPG Senior Planner). Rehbein's affidavit and the first part of McCrea's affidavit concern the Rattlesnake Valley Planned District Overlay Zone. Both Rehbein and McCrea state what appears to be an undisputed fact: that the City Council has never applied the Rattlesnake Overlay to the land included in the Sonata Park subdivision. The District Court found this fact to be potentially relevant to its decision on the parties' motions for summary judgment. Thus, the court denied the motion to strike Rehbein's affidavit and denied the motion to strike the first part of McCrea's affidavit. The remainder of McCrea's affidavit, however, summarizes the City Council's process in addressing the issues raised by Neighbors concerning Sonata Park. The District Court struck this part of the affidavit, aptly stating that it would rely on the stipulated record directly rather than on Defendants' summaries. ¶ 52 On appeal, the City argues that it was entitled to prove by affidavit pursuant to [M.R. Civ. P. 56] the Rattlesnake Overlay was never implemented by the City Council. The City contends that Rehbein's and McCrea's affidavits were necessary for this purpose and that the District Court erred in striking the affidavits and in allowing [Neighbors] to continue an erroneous zoning district argument. Yet, as Neighbors point out, they acknowledged during the District Court proceedings that the overlay had never been implemented. Furthermore, as noted, the District Court DENIED the motions to strike Rehbein's affidavit and the first part of McCrea's affidavit, both of which state that the Rattlesnake Overlay has never been applied to Sonata Park land. It is thus a mystery why the City has raised this as an issue on appeal. Accordingly, the District Court's rulings as to the five affidavits filed by the City are affirmed. ¶ 53 Muth-Hillberry filed the affidavit of Frank Muth, who is the managing member of Muth-Hillberry. Muth's affidavit deals exclusively with the Sunlight Agreement, the above-mentioned 1989 agreement between the City and Sunlight Development Company (Muth-Hillberry's predecessor in interest). Relying on Skyline Sportsmen's Assn. v. Bd. of Land Commrs., 286 Mont. 108, 113, 951 P.2d 29, 32 (1997), and Asarco, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir.1980), the District Court struck the affidavit on the ground that it contained extra-record evidence which the court was not allowed to consider in deciding the issue raised by Neighborsnamely, whether the approval of Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful in light of the administrative record the City had at the time of its decision. The court noted that Neighbors had not challenged the Sunlight Agreement or sought any relief related to the agreement. ¶ 54 On appeal, Muth-Hillberry points out that the Muth affidavit was not offered for purposes of determining whether the City's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. In addition to answering Neighbors' First Amended Complaint, Muth-Hillberry counterclaimed for declaratory relief. It asked the court to adjudicate and declare all rights and obligations of the parties with respect to this controversy and the subdivision. More specifically, in its motion for summary judgment, Muth-Hillberry asked the court to determine, as a matter of law, that the Sunlight Agreement overrides the density recommendations in the Rattlesnake Valley plan insofar as they apply to Sonata Park. The Muth affidavit was filed in support of this claim. Muth-Hillberry observes that a ruling in its favor on this issuei.e., that the Sunlight Agreement superseded and rendered irrelevant the 1995 Growth Policywould have mooted Neighbors' claim that the City's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. Thus, Muth-Hillberry argues that [i]n striking the Muth Affidavit, the District Court erred by preventing [Muth-Hillberry] from submitting admissible evidence to support its motion under [M.R. Civ. P. 56]. ¶ 55 This Court reviews evidentiary rulings going directly towards the propriety of summary judgment de novo, in order to determine whether the evidentiary requirements for summary judgment have been satisfied. PPL Mont., LLC v. State, 2010 MT 64, ¶ 85, 355 Mont. 402, 229 P.3d 421. Doing so here, we agree with Muth-Hillberry that the District Court's rationale for striking Muth's affidavit was misplaced. A party is entitled to support its motion for summary judgment with an affidavit, M.R. Civ. P. 56(a), (b), so long as the affidavit is made on personal knowledge, sets forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shows affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein, M.R. Civ. P. 56(e). Muth-Hillberry filed the Muth affidavit in support of its legal theory that the Sunlight Agreement supersedes the Rattlesnake Valley plan. This theory (which Muth-Hillberry asserted in its subdivision application and has maintained ever since) is related to, but distinct from, the question whether the City Council's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. Accordingly, to the extent the Muth affidavit otherwise satisfies Rule 56(e), it should not have been stricken. Nevertheless, because the Sunlight Agreement does not supersede the Rattlesnake Valley plan ( see Issue 3, infra ), the error was harmless. M.R. Civ. P. 61. ¶ 56 Issue 3. Does the Sunlight Agreement supersede the City's growth policy? ¶ 57 The construction and interpretation of a contract is a question of law for the court to decide, and one that we review for correctness. Kruer v. Three Creeks Ranch of Wyoming, LLC, 2008 MT 315, ¶ 37, 346 Mont. 66, 194 P.3d 634. ¶ 58 Muth-Hillberry acquired the property on which Sonata Park is situated in 1992. This property had been part of a larger, 939-acre parcel owned by Sunlight Development Company. In March 1989, the City and Sunlight entered into the Sunlight Agreement, pursuant to which the City agreed to furnish sanitary sewage services to Sunlight's land under § 7-13-4312, MCA. Sunlight contributed $335,000 to the project through a rural special improvement district (RSID), and its property was allocated 2,625 sewer loading units. At the time, the 1975 Urban Area Comprehensive Plan allowed for a base density of 2,500 dwelling units on Sunlight's property, and the 1976 county zoning allowed for a base density of 1,900 dwelling units on the property. These densities are noted in the Sunlight Agreement. ¶ 59 Of relevance to the present case, the Sunlight Agreement gives the City the option to acquire public parklands, restrictive easements, covenants, reservations, sewer density units, land development rights, and other rights as specifically designated in the Option To Purchase attached hereto. The Option To Purchase, in turn, lists the following which the City has the option to purchase from Sunlight:  fee title to 85.7 acres for use as parklands, natural areas, and riparian zone;  fee title or conservation easement rights in 260.7 acres for use as open space;  Sunlight's right, title and interest in and to all density units in excess of 1,432 on its lands in the Rattlesnake Valley; and  transfer of all assessment sewer rights from and under [the RSID] presently existing on the property in excess of 1,432 units. Furthermore, the City is given the additional option to purchase:  Sunlight's right, title and interest in and to an additional 432 density units so as to limit the same to 1,000 on its lands in the Rattlesnake Valley; and  transfer of an additional 432 units of assessment sewer rights from and under [the RSID]. ¶ 60 According to Muth's affidavit, the City exercised its option in 1991 and acquired the 346.4 acres, which it dedicated to public parks and open space. In addition, the City bought down the density units and sewer rights such that Sunlight was left with 1,000 of each for its remaining 592.6 acres. According to Muth, 54 of the density units were ultimately allocated to the area now comprising the Sonata Park property. ¶ 61 Muth-Hillberry asserts that the Sunlight Agreement created vested density rights which may not be impaired by a subsequently adopted Growth Policy. At the outset, it is unclear from Muth-Hillberry's arguments what these density rights guarantee to their holder. Clearly, as Neighbors point out, they cannot include the right to enforce a certain density on Sunlight's lands, as such a promise by the City would be void ab initio. See Davis v. Pima County, 121 Ariz. 343, 590 P.2d 459, 461 (Ariz.App.1978) (The power to regulate land use through zoning ordinances is vested in municipal legislatures and they cannot bargain away this power.); Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning vol. 3, § 44:11 (Thomson Reuters 2010). A contract in which a municipality promises to zone property in a specified manner is illegal because, in making such a promise, a municipality preempts the power of the zoning authority to zone the property according to prescribed legislative procedures. Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 114 N.M. 699, 845 P.2d 793, 797 (1992). ¶ 62 Moreover, the agreement does not appear to guarantee Sunlight a certain density in any event. It grants the City, in conjunction with the right to purchase 346.4 acres for use as public parks and open space, the additional right to fix the maximum density on the remaining 592.6 acres at 1,000 units. The agreement even states that if the City later zones the area at a higher density, Sunlight and its successors shall nevertheless continue to be limited to the density allowances to which [Sunlight] is agreeing in this Option. But nothing in the agreement provides that Sunlight has the right to enforce a minimum density. To the contrary, the agreement states that if the City annexes Sunlight's land but fails to adopt zoning that would permit the development of 1,000 dwelling units, then Sunlight has the right to a prorated refund of its RSID payment. In other words, Sunlight and its successors are given not the right to 1,000 dwelling units, but the right to reimbursement in the event the adopted density is less than this amount. ¶ 63 Beyond its claim to vested density rights, Muth-Hillberry's central argument is that if the densities recognized in the Sunlight Agreement conflict with the densities recommended in the applicable growth policy, then the landowner must resort to the zoning process to resolve the conflict. This view is based on paragraph 9 of the agreement, which states: [I]n the event of conflict between the adopted comprehensive plan's land use designation for a parcel and the adopted zoning designation, the land use designation of the zoning controls subject, however, to other issues addressed in both the comprehensive plan and applicable zoning. Muth-Hillberry interprets this to mean that Sunlight and its successors may utilize[ ] the zoning process to seek greater density than allowed by the Growth Policy, but less than allowed by the 1989 Agreement. Yet, while this interpretation is questionable, the fact remains that the City is statutorily required in the zoning process to be guided by and give consideration to the general policy and pattern of development set out in the growth policy. Section 76-1-605(1)(c), MCA; see also § 76-2-304(1), MCA (municipal zoning regulations must be made in accordance with a growth policy). Thus, under Muth-Hillberry's own construction, the Sunlight Agreement does not supersede the applicable growth policy. The District Court correctly denied Muth-Hillberry's motion for summary judgment on this issue. ¶ 64 Issue 4. Was the City's decision on Sonata Park arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful?