Opinion ID: 2627584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Loss of standing by denial of ownership

Text: [¶ 40] We turn to the second question, that of whether Ms. Yoeuth lost standing to challenge the search of the trunk. After the joint hearing on the motions to suppress, the district court issued separate decision letters. In Ms. Yoeuth's case, the district court did not explicitly address the constitutional validity of her stop, detention, or search. It ruled instead that Ms. Yoeuth lacked standing to challenge the validity of Trooper Green's search of the trunk because she: renounced any interest in the trunk of the rental vehicle by telling Trooper Green that she did not put anything in the trunk. [Ms.] Yoeuth did not take any precautions to maintain privacy in the vehicle's trunk. Instead, her statement disavowed any interest in that area and ownership over its contents. The district court cited Andrews v. State, 2002 WY 28, ¶ 20, 40 P.3d 708, 712-13 (Wyo. 2002), to establish that a person who denies or renounces ownership of property has no standing to challenge the constitutionality of a search of that property. As for the counterpart under the federal constitution, the Andrews opinion stated that The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that a defendant abandons any expectation of privacy when he unequivocally denies ownership of the property. See, e.g., United States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d 1446, 1449-52 (10th Cir. 1997). Id., ¶ 20, 40 P.3d at 713. [¶ 41] On appeal, Ms. Yoeuth claims that the district court's decision was in error. She contends that her comment to Trooper Green  I didn't put anything in the trunk  is not a sufficiently unequivocal denial of ownership to establish that she abandoned her expectations of privacy in the trunk or its contents. We will evaluate Ms. Yoeuth's claim by comparing her circumstances with those in the two cases cited above. [¶ 42] In the Wyoming case, Andrews, a deputy sheriff went to the home of Mr. Andrews' parents. Mr. Andrews was staying there, apparently on a temporary basis. The parents gave the deputy permission to search their home. While searching, the deputy asked Mr. Andrews for permission to search his belongings. Mr. Andrews eventually consented, and handed the deputy two duffle bags. Andrews, ¶ ¶ 6-8, 40 P.3d at 710-11. After looking inside the two bags, the deputy asked Mr. Andrews about a third duffle bag located nearby. Mr. Andrews stated that the bag did not belong to him. The deputy asked Mr. Andrews this question: Do you understand that if it's not yours you have no standing to object to me searching it? Mr. Andrews affirmed his understanding. Id. , ¶ 9, 40 P.3d at 711. Because Mr. Andrews explicitly and repeatedly renounced ownership of the bag, we concluded that he abandoned his reasonable expectation of privacy in the third duffel bag at the time of the search. He did not, therefore, have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search of the third duffel bag. Id. , ¶ 23, 40 P.3d at 713. [¶ 43] The situation was quite different in Garzon, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals case. Mr. Garzon was traveling on a bus that made a layover in Denver. A police officer instructed Mr. Garzon and the rest of the passengers to take all of their carry-on luggage off the bus and present it to a drug-sniffing dog. Mr. Garzon took one of his backpacks, but left two others on the bus. When the officer noticed the two backpacks remaining on the bus, he removed them and took them to the drug-sniffing dog. The dog alerted. The officer searched the backpack and found illegal drugs. Id., 119 F.3d at 1448. [¶ 44] There were no identifying marks on the two backpacks. The officer asked a couple of other passengers if they owned the backpacks, but he never asked that question of Mr. Garzon. The appeals court emphasize[d] that [Mr.] Garzon did nothing to manifest objectively an intent to abandon his backpacks that were left on the bus. [He] never once denied ownership of those backpacks. Indeed, he did not even stand silent when asked if anyone claimed them because no such inquiry was ever directed at [Mr.] Garzon or, so far as this record shows, was any such inquiry ever uttered within [his] hearing. Further, he never objectively evidenced an abandonment intent by clear and unequivocal physical acts, such as throwing them away, giving them to strangers, leaving them unguarded on public property or the like. To the contrary, he left them in a secure overhead internal luggage rack just as he was told he could by the bus driver. Id., 119 F.3d at 1450. The court ruled that Mr. Garzon had not denied ownership of the backpacks, abandoned them, or renounced his expectation of privacy in them. Accordingly, the officer's search without consent violated Mr. Garzon's constitutional rights. [¶ 45] Ms. Yoeuth's circumstances are closer to Mr. Garzon's than to Mr. Andrews'. Mr. Andrews explicitly and repeatedly said he did not own the bag, in response to direct and unambiguous questions from the deputy. Ms. Yoeuth was never asked any question about ownership, and she never denied ownership. Like Mr. Garzon, she did not explicitly disclaim an interest in the trunk or its contents. Ms. Yoeuth's comment that she did not put anything in the trunk was ambiguous about ownership of the trunk's contents. It could have meant, for example, that she owned the property in the trunk, but Mr. Loo had put it there for her. Her comment did not amount to an unequivocal denial of ownership. We therefore disagree with the district court that Ms. Yoeuth abandoned her expectations of privacy in the trunk and its contents, and accordingly, we conclude that she did have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Trooper Green's search of the trunk.