Opinion ID: 591489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings

Text: 3 On December 30, 1991, the Customs Service seized appellee Ruby Nnadi's (Nnadi) black Nissan Pulsar (Pulsar) from the parking lot of an apartment complex in Austell, Georgia. The vehicle was seized pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a, which provides for forfeiture of property used to aid in introducing any item into the United States contrary to law. 1 Nnadi was present during the seizure and aware that the Customs Service was confiscating her car. 4 The Customs Service based its seizure on information obtained from Jestine Joyner (Joyner) who had been convicted of attempting to smuggle 5.5 pounds of heroin into the United States from the Philippines. Joyner told Special Agent James R. Wiggins that on June 23 or 24, 1991, Nnadi had used the Pulsar to drive Joyner to the Atlanta airport to catch a flight to the Philippines. Nnadi knew that Joyner's mission entailed obtaining heroin and smuggling it back into the United States. Indeed, Nnadi anticipated splitting the profits from this endeavor with Joyner. In addition to Joyner's testimony, the government found (1) information in Joyner's possession linking Nnadi to the heroin venture, and (2) independent information linking Nnadi to a broader smuggling conspiracy. 5 Following the seizure, the government initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings against the Pulsar pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1607 which requires that notice of forfeiture be sent to any party having an interest in a seized article. Such notice was mailed on January 16, 1992, but was addressed to the wrong apartment number. The notice included an explanation of administrative forfeiture proceedings and information on how to challenge the forfeiture by filing a claim and a cost bond. Nnadi claims she never received this notice. 6 On February 10, 1992, Nnadi filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for return of the Pulsar. Simultaneously, she filed a motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Consolidation of Hearing with Trial on the Merits. Following a hearing on February 19, 1992, the district court ruled that the Pulsar had been seized in violation of due process because (1) the vehicle was seized without probable cause, and (2) at the time of the district court's ruling there had not yet been a post-seizure hearing at which Nnadi could have challenged the seizure (the Order). Consequently, the district court ordered the defendant Customs Service to return the Pulsar and enjoined the defendant from re-seizing the vehicle until and unless the plaintiff is given an opportunity to challenge the defendant's legal basis for forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a and defendant has established probable cause for the seizure. 7 On March 4, the Customs Service filed a notice of appeal of the Order together with a motion for a stay pending disposition on appeal. The district court ordered a stay through April 10, 1992. On April 10, the government filed an emergency motion with this court for stay pending appeal. This court granted the stay. 8 On March 6, Nnadi finally addressed the administrative forfeiture proceeding by filing a Claim and Declaration in Support of Request for Waiver of Bond. In late April 1992, the Customs Service, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1603, asked the United States attorney to institute a judicial action against the Pulsar. In response, the United States attorney filed a complaint for forfeiture with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia claiming that the United States had sufficient probable cause to obtain forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and 19 U.S.C. § 1595a. 2 This action is still pending before the district court.