Opinion ID: 616881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Brown's Section 1983 Suit

Text: On February 1, 2010, Mr. Brown filed his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court in New Mexico against Officer Montoya in his individual capacity and Secretary Williams in both his individual and official capacities. Mr. Brown also named as defendants Bernalillo County Sheriff Manuel Gonzales, III, Bernalillo County Deputy Sheriff Liz Aguilar, and fifty unnamed state and local officials. Mr. Brown alleged that the defendants, acting under color of law, violated his constitutional rights by wrongly directing him to register as a sex offender and placing him in the sex offender probation unit. Mr. Brown alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights to substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection. He sought damages and injunctive relief. Officer Montoya and Secretary Williams filed a joint answer. They raised, among other defenses, qualified immunity, and they alleged that they acted in good faith. Officer Montoya and Secretary Williams also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [4] Secretary Williams asserted that Mr. Brown had not alleged facts indicating that Secretary Williams personally participated in any constitutional rights violation. Officer Montoya and Secretary Williams claimed they were protected by qualified immunity andbecause they acted in good faiththey were protected by statutory immunity under the Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071. In response to the motion, Mr. Brown argued that Secretary Williams was liable as a supervisor for promulgating the Policy that led to his classification as a sex offender and suggested that the district court could reach this conclusion by taking judicial notice of the Policy. In a reply, Secretary Williams argued he was protected by absolute legislative immunity. On November 16, 2010, the district court issued a memorandum opinion and order denying Officer Montoya's and Secretary Williams's motion to dismiss. As to Secretary Williams, the court held that the Complaint alleged sufficient facts to find that he was liable as a supervisor and rejected his legislative immunity defense. The court also rejected Officer Montoya's and Secretary Williams's qualified immunity defense. It concluded the Complaint had alleged sufficient facts that Officer Montoya and Secretary Williams had violated Mr. Brown's clearly established substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection rights by wrongly classifying him as a sex offender when he had not committed a sex offense. The court also found no reason to dismiss on statutory immunity grounds under the Wetterling Act, which protects government officials who implement sex offender registries in good faith, because the Complaint contained sufficient allegations of bad faith. After the district court denied the motion to dismiss, Officer Montoya and Secretary Williams filed a timely interlocutory appeal for review of the court's denial of their motion to dismiss Mr. Brown's claims against them in their individual capacities. [5]