Opinion ID: 2430934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Public Policy and Exemplary Damages

Text: Finally, even though we have based our decision on the law of this jurisdiction, we must also examine Gladewater's contention that public policy mitigates against the award of exemplary damages. Most of these center around the avowed purposes of exemplary damages: punishment and deterrence. First, as noted before, it can be argued that the punishment aspect of exemplary damages has no real meaning in the context of municipalities in that it is the citizen/taxpayer who ultimately bears the burden of the award. Furthermore, a real question exists as to whether exemplary damages against a municipality will act as an effective deterrence against wrongful conduct any more than actual damages would. Another policy argument commonly made is that it should be assumed that municipal officials will do their duty to discipline the tortfeasor, and that other appropriate measures are available through the electorate. The final major policy argument raised is that because exemplary damages are dependent upon the wealth of the defendant, such an award will open up the unlimited taxing power of the municipality as a measuring device of a proper award. We recognize that these policy reasons are important criticisms of the potential abuses of exemplary damage awards. Thus, any exception to be carved out of the general rule of non-liability must create an exceedingly difficult burden to meet. By requiring a plaintiff to show both wanton, malicious, or grossly negligent behavior and actual imputation to the city leaders, it will limit recovery to only those exceedingly few situations where the actions of persons in authority show utter disdain for the protection of the citizens' rights. We are aware that our decision today is a fairly novel one with reference to results reached in other jurisdictions and will cause some consternation among municipal leaders and those who serve them. In making any decision, we may look to the laws of other states for guidance, but eventually we must always turn to the cases decided by courts of this State. The apparent implication in the decisional history of the question presented today is that if the proper facts exist, a jury should be able to consider awarding punitive damages against a municipality. The proper facts have never arisen in this State, and there is no certainty that they ever will. We would be remiss, however, in denying prospective awards as a matter of law, as such an action would be tantamount to holding that no conduct could ever be sufficiently egregious to meet the standard. Because one can envision proprietary actions by a city which might warrant a jury's punitive award, we will not foreclose on such an option. In addition, we believe that the juries of Texas will be the best arbiter, as they always have been, of whether or not exemplary damages are justified under the facts. The same reasoning applies for the amount of the award given, as the jury is in the best position to determine what will deter the wrongdoer from their conduct, whether that wrongdoer is a private citizen or a municipality. We recognize that there is some authority to treat the municipal corporation in all ways as an ordinary corporation when the municipality is exercising its proprietary functions. We reject such a holding as it would open the cities of this State to potentially devastating judgments arising from the culpable acts of its most minor employees. Such a result would be both unmanageable and undesirable in our modern society where local governments' involvement in day-to-day life is so pervasive. Rather, we believe that each case must stand or fall on its own merits. To reiterate: Unless the plaintiff can show intentional, willful, wanton or grossly negligent acts which show maliciousness or evil intent by a policy-making official of the municipality, no exemplary damages can be awarded. In the present case, while we sympathize with the Pike family due to the trauma it has undergone, Texas precedent demands that their recovery of exemplary damages be disallowed. Thus, while we affirm the holding of the court of appeals that exemplary damages are recoverable in limited instances under Texas law, we reverse the holdings of the trial court and court of appeals which allowed Harold Pike and Mildred Powell such a recovery. KILGARLIN, J., concurs. WALLACE, J., joined by GONZALEZ, J., dissent.