Opinion ID: 147526
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suppression of Brooks’ Statements

Text: Lastly, Brooks appeals the denial of her motion to suppress the statements that she made to the DCIS agents. As she did below, Brooks contends that the interviews were custodial in nature and that, because she was not given a Miranda warning, they must be suppressed. On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2006). “A factual finding will only be clearly erroneous when, although there may be evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d 701, 705 (65h Cir. 1999). The district court conducted a hearing on the motion. Only one witness, DCIS special agent Collins, testified. He stated that he and agent Camper conducted the interview in a side room of the ECC. Brooks was asked first if she would consent to the questioning and she agreed. Brooks sat next to the door and the interview lasted between two and a half and three hours. During that time, the agents took several breaks and Brooks took one bathroom break. When asked why he did not 12 United States v. Brooks Nos. 08-5875/5948 read Brooks her Miranda rights, Collins replied, “It wasn’t a custodial interview.” He also stated, “[S]he could have left at any time.” Id. However, Collins conceded that he never explicitly told her so. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court gave its reasons for denying the motion: [C]ounsel have correctly identified the issue as to whether or not this was a custodial setting. The factors that the Court should look at will be the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. The second, given those circumstances, whatever a reasonable person would have felt, that she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. In reviewing all this evidence the Court finds that a reasonable person would have felt that they could have terminated this . . . interrogation and left at any time. The interrogation occurred at . . . work in a . . . room with a window to it adjacent to a work area. No restraints were placed on . . . Ms. Brooks. The testimony has been that she was provided the opportunity for breaks if she wanted them. She did take one break. That they never told her, as the best I could tell, that she could leave, but they never told her she couldn’t. It was subjective intent, as I understood the testimony, was she could have left at any time. When I look at the subjective impression of the defendant, based on her subsequent actions, I think it was relevant that she called and wanted to meet with them again. If she felt that she had been in the custody the first time, I don’t think she would want to meet with them again and felt in custody . . . the second time. And the focus of the investigation was not on . . . Ms. Brooks. The focus of the investigation had to do with Mr. Burke. When I consider all those factors, the Court finds that this is not a custodial investigation, nor custodial statement, and that Miranda rights did not attach. And the Court denies the defendant’s motion to suppress the statement. We affirm the district court on this issue. In reaching this conclusion, we note that the facts of this case closely resemble another decision of this court, United States v. Mahan, 190 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 1999). In Mahan, we outlined the factors that inform a decision of when an interrogation 13 United States v. Brooks Nos. 08-5875/5948 is considered custodial for Miranda purposes: “[T]he issue of whether a suspect is ‘in custody,’ and therefore entitled to Miranda warnings, presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). For an individual to be “in custody,” there must be “a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.” Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112, 116 S.Ct. 457 (citation and internal quotation omitted). In determining whether a suspect is “in custody” for purposes of applying the Miranda doctrine, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). See also Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112, 116 S.Ct. 457 (stating that the custody determination hinges upon whether, “given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”). Id. at 421. As in the case before us, the defendant in Mahan was interviewed at work, he was never told that he was not free to go, the door of the interview room was unlocked, arrest was never threatened, and no show of force was made, such as the use of handcuffs or the brandishing of a firearm. Id. at 422. The circumstances surrounding Brooks’s questioning were similar and we conclude that a reasonable person in her position would have felt free to leave.