Opinion ID: 439958
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pflaumer

Text: 81 i) Duty to disclose 82
83 In determining whether Wille's testimony incriminated Pflaumer we must examine the evidence implicating Pflaumer in the excise tax fraud scheme. That scheme originated when Oxman, a commission salesman for Park Oil, arranged through John McCullough, the late president of a Philadelphia labor union, to meet with Pflaumer in an effort to obtain the fuel oil business of Pflaumer's Philadelphia-based enterprises. Jock, Oxman and McCullough attended the initial meeting, but only Jock testified about it. According to Jock, he explained to Pflaumer that he could not offer better prices than those charged by Arco and Gulf other than if we went with the tax-angle routine. Jock agreed to report as delivery destinations [w]hatever they told us to put on the invoice[s]. App. at 136. Jock also testified that Pflaumer instructed him to explain the tax-angle routine to Gillan. App. at 138-39. Jock's testimony implicated Gillan and indicated that Oxman and McCullough were receiving commissions on WHP sales. While the scheme was in operation, WHP fell behind in payments. Jock called Pflaumer and told him he could not pay commissions to Oxman and McCullough because he was not getting paid for his product. App. at 150. Jock also stated that late in 1979, after the date of the last mailing, Pflaumer engaged in efforts to conceal the tax fraud from state auditors by destroying fuel invoices. 84 During cross-examination, questioning by defense counsel suggested that Jock had inculpated Pflaumer in order to obtain Jock's release from prison. The examination established that the prosecution had orchestrated Jock's transfer to Eglin prison camp, a minimum security prison--characterized by Jock as a country club, App. at 270--obtained a reduction in sentence making Jock eligible for parole immediately, App. at 272, and recommended favorable treatment from the Parole Board, which Jock received. App. at 274. As a consequence, Jock--who had at that time served only five months of a four-year prison term for wire fraud--was released on parole after only three additional months' incarceration, two of which Jock served at a half-way house in Palm Beach. App. at 275. The import of Jock's cross-examination was that the government had paid dearly for his testimony. 85 In order to bolster Jock's testimony against Pflaumer, the government sought to establish that Pflaumer had a daily role in WHP's financial affairs. Wille was one such prosecution witness. Wille testified to Pflaumer's role in WHP as follows: 86 Q. What was Mr. Pflaumer's involvement in Wm. H.P., Inc.? 87 A. He pretty much directed the company. His primary interest was in the operation of the brewery, Schmidt Brewery. He directed it from the financial end. From the part that I saw he directed the accounts payable, what was to be paid and the girl who wrote the checks, checked with him about what was to be paid. 88 Q. What would you say the extent of his involvement was in the financial end of the trucking company? ... Could the check go out of there without Mr. Pflaumer's knowledge? 89 A. No. That was his principal involvement on the financial end. 90 Q. Was there a cash flow problem with the company while you were there? 91 A. Yes. 92 Q. Did it require Mr. Pflaumer's constant vigilance? 93 A. The office manager would check with him with respect to any check that was to be written if she did not think that he was aware that the check was going to be written that day. 94 Q. And did you personally talk to Mr. Pflaumer from time to time about the financial end of the trucking company? 95 A. Yes. 96 Q. On a daily basis? 97 A. Probably not on a daily basis but several times a week. 98 Q. Did you observe the office manager talking to Mr. Pflaumer on a daily basis? 99 A. Oh, yes; usually several times a day. 100 App. at 859-61 (emphasis added). The government knew long before trial that Wille would testify to these matters by virtue of several FBI interviews with him. 101 Through Wille, therefore, the government established that WHP issued no checks without Pflaumer's approval and that Pflaumer conferred several times daily with the WHP office manager. In contrast, Pflaumer's defense was that Gillan and Hill ran WHP, while he spent most of his time at the brewery and had little involvement in the day to day financial affairs of WHP. 102 Thus, Wille's testimony rebutted a principal defense on which Pflaumer relied. A significant portion of the government's case consisted of establishing that Pflaumer had a daily role in WHP's financial affairs. The government argued that Pflaumer's assertion that he had no involvement in the affairs of WHP was false, and that the jury might infer that Pflaumer must have known of the scheme. Certainly, therefore, Wille's testimony incriminated Pflaumer. If believed, it established that Pflaumer was sufficiently involved in the affairs of WHP to have direct control over every check that the company issued. The jury might infer, as the government argued, that Pflaumer must have known of the tax scheme. Consequently, we hold that Wille's testimony incriminated Pflaumer in the tax fraud scheme and that the prosecutor before trial had ample basis for knowing that it would do so. 14 103 In ruling that the Wille immunity agreement was immaterial, the trial court pointed out that the testimony of Jock and Luciano suggested Pflaumer's involvement. The court then concluded: 104 Clearly, therefore, even if the defendants had been able to impeach Wille by virtue of the immunity agreement, there was sufficient other evidence implicating Mr. Pflaumer. 105 App. at 1673. This ruling is legal error. The test is not whether, viewed in retrospect, there was sufficient additional evidence such that, without Wille's testimony, the case could have been submitted to the jury. Under Agurs, when a specific request for evidence is made, the standard is whether the defendant has a substantial basis for claiming materiality. Evidence significantly impeaching the truthfulness of an incriminating witness gives rise to a substantial basis for claiming materiality. United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d at 43; United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d at 206-08. Thus, we turn to whether the Wille immunity agreement was significant impeachment evidence. 106
107 We hold that the Wille immunity agreement was significant impeachment evidence, and that the prosecutor had a sufficient basis for appreciating this fact before and during trial. The government had already conferred immunity on two prosecution witnesses and extended substantial benefits to them. The disclosure of yet a third immunity agreement, and of the extension of additional benefits, gave the prosecutor a sufficient basis for concluding that the Wille immunity agreement was significant impeachment evidence. The prosecutor should have appreciated that the disclosure of the existence of substantial benefits conferred on all of the government's principal incriminatory witnesses might have led the jury to doubt their truthfulness. This gave rise to a substantial basis for claiming materiality. Therefore, the question whether the Wille immunity agreement was Brady material should at least have been submitted to the trial court for a pre-trial Brady ruling. 108 (ii) Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 109 We have held that due process required that the government bring the Wille agreement to the attention of the trial court at least. A new trial is required, however, only if the non-disclosure of the Wille immunity agreement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). This determination requires an overview of the totality of the case against Pflaumer. 110 Aside from Jock's strong testimony about the initial meeting, his testimony about the commissions paid to Oxman and McCullough, and his testimony about Pflaumer's interest in concealment, there is very little direct evidence of Pflaumer's involvement. The testimony of Jock's son Michael corroborated WHP's involvement, but tended to inculpate Pflaumer only in an ambiguous passage referring to a price increase to cover federal excise taxes. 15 Peter Cordua, Michael Jock's accountant, also testified to an ambiguous conversation with Pflaumer concerning an audit of fuel deliveries in Pennsylvania. App. at 567. In closing, the government argued that because Pflaumer expressed no surprise at Cordua's reference to Pennsylvania deliveries, the jury might infer that Pflaumer knew some deliveries had falsely been reported as having occurred outside of Pennsylvania. App. at 1324. 16 111 John Luciano also testified to one conversation with Pflaumer. Luciano stated that he had falsified invoices at the direction of Ray Hill, whom the jury acquitted. Asked about a conversation with Pflaumer, Luciano responded: 112 A. He asked me if I worked everything out with Ray [Hill] and I said I did. 113 He said to make sure the stuff was good because he did not want any crap going into his trucks creating a lot of problems for him. 114 I told him we bought most of it from Exxon. 115 He said, keep your nose clean and don't f--- up. We have a good arrangement. 116 App. at 597. The jury might have inferred from Pflaumer's allusion to Hill and to a good arrangement that Pflaumer was aware of the tax scheme. Luciano testified as well that Oxman once told him he had spoken to Billy--referring to Pflaumer--and [that] everything looked fine. App. at 591. 117 Lastly, a WHP accountant testified that Pflaumer's signature appeared on several falsified tax returns. App. at 875-79. The accountant did not, however, indicate that he was aware of Pflaumer's knowledge of the scheme or his role in preparing the returns. And a Pennsylvania tax auditor testified to conversations with Pflaumer in 1980 in which Pflaumer had stated that the auditor had in his possession all of the available fuel invoices. App. at 951. In fact, many invoices had been destroyed. These conversations could be taken as evidence of concealment by Pflaumer. 118 This evidence, coupled with the foregoing testimony of Frank Jock and Wille, constituted the principal evidence of Pflaumer's involvement. 17 We do not agree that in light of this evidence, the error regarding Wille's immunity agreement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. First, as we noted earlier, had Pflaumer's defense counsel been in possession of the immunity letter, he would have been able to argue that Jock had received valuable benefits in exchange for testimony, that Luciano, who corroborated Jock, had also received benefits, and that Wille, who rebutted Pflaumer's defense, had received benefits as well. Consequently, the jury would have perceived Wille as the third government witness whose testimony the prosecution had obtained in exchange for beneficial treatment. The jury, which in acquitting Hill had apparently discredited Luciano, who most directly incriminated Hill, might well have been influenced by the fact that the principal witnesses who incriminated Pflaumer all were the beneficiaries of prosecutorial largess. 119 Second, Pflaumer's impeachment of Frank Jock invited the jury to seek corroboration from other witnesses. Wille was one such corroborating witness, and--in light of the weakness of the corroborating testimony of Michael Jock, Cordua, and Luciano--an important one. Wille was the only witness who testified that Pflaumer exerted day-to-day control over the financial affairs of WHP, thereby affording a basis for inferring that Pflaumer must have known of the scheme. The government's suggestion that Wille's testimony did not suggest that Pflaumer was aware of the fraudulent scheme, Br. at 21, is simply erroneous. Effective impeachment of Wille might have undermined this impression. 120 Of course, the district court's assessment of the likelihood of the impact of non-disclosure on the outcome of the trial is entitled to great weight. United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 953, 100 S.Ct. 2921, 64 L.Ed.2d 810 (1980). Agurs requires that we give deference to the trial court's firsthand appraisal of the record when that appraisal is thorough and reasonable. 427 U.S. at 114, 96 S.Ct. at 2402. The district court's analysis, however, does not satisfy this standard. The entirety of the court's assessment of the weight of the evidence consists of the following paragraph: 121 Frank Jock testified that he entered into a conspiracy with Mr. Pflaumer. John Luciano also testified as to Mr. Pflaumer's involvement. Indeed, defendants' memorandum in support of motion for judgment of acquittal acknowledges the inculpatory nature of their combined testimony. Defendants' memorandum states Mr. Luciano does not directly inculpate Mr. Pflaumer to the same degree that Mr. Jock does.... (Memorandum of Defendants, In support of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, pp. 7 and 8). Clearly, therefore, even if the defendants had been able to impeach Wille by virtue of the immunity agreement, there was sufficient other evidence implicating Mr. Pflaumer. 122 App. at 1672-73. This analysis is not adequate. First, unlike the trial court in Agurs, the district court did not remain[ ] convinced of [Pflaumer's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 427 U.S. at 114, 96 S.Ct. at 2402 (emphasis added). We cannot ascertain whether the court applied the Chapman standard of constitutionally harmless error. Second, the only testimony of Luciano inculpating Pflaumer was the single oblique suggestion that Pflaumer might have known of Hill's role and believed it a good arrangement, and that Oxman had spoken to Pflaumer and believed that everything looked fine. The court's notation that John Luciano testified to Mr. Pflaumer's involvement is not an informed assessment of the impact of this testimony. Rather than canvassing all of the relevant testimony and examining Wille's role in light of it, the district court relied on an inference from a statement in the defendants' post-trial memorandum. Such an inference does not substitute for an informed appraisal of the evidence in its totality. Because we cannot say that the trial court's firsthand appraisal of the record was thorough and entirely reasonable, Agurs, 427 U.S. at 114, 96 S.Ct. at 2402, we are unable to defer to its assessment in this case. For these reasons, we cannot find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 123 Because the prosecutor withheld specifically requested information that might have been used to impeach significantly a witness who incriminated Pflaumer, and because the non-disclosure is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Pflaumer is entitled to a new trial. 124