Opinion ID: 149023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Restitution is Limited to the Loss Sustained by the Government as a Result of the Offense of Conviction

Text: Batson further argues that the district court erred by ordering restitution in an amount beyond the loss caused by the conduct underlying the offense of convictionin this case, aiding and assisting in the preparation of a particular fraudulent tax return. She contends that the VWPA and MVRA limit restitution to the offense of conviction unless the offense of conviction involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity. [6] 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)-(2); id. § 3663A(a)(1)-(2). Although this issue was fully briefed on both sides, the Government conceded Batson's point in a letter to this court filed just prior to oral argument. We nevertheless briefly address the question presented, as it is one of first impression in this circuit. The statutory language supports the limitation of restitution to the offense of conviction. Although restitution as a condition of probation (and by extension, supervised release) is not limited to the offenses specified in the VWPA and MVRA, restitution otherwise is to be ordered under section 3556. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(2). Section 3556 provides for orders of restitution in accordance with the VWPA and MVRA. The VWPA provides that [t]he court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense [under listed titles or statutes] may order . . . restitution to any victim of such offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The language of the MVRA is equally singular: when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the court shall order . . . that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense.  18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (emphasis added). The natural reading of these provisions is that restitution is authorized for the offense of conviction and not for other related offenses of which the defendant was not convicted. It is no surprise, therefore, that in Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990), the Supreme Court held that federal courts may order restitution under the VWPA only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction. Id. at 413, 110 S.Ct. 1979. Subsequent amendments to the VWPA created an exception to Hughey when the crime of conviction includes as an element a scheme, conspiracy or pattern of criminal activity (which the parties agree is not the case here), but otherwise Hughey's limitation remains in effect. United States v. Lawrence, 189 F.3d 838, 846 (9th Cir.1999). Although we have not yet applied the rule of Hughey to awards of restitution ordered as a condition of supervised release, there is no reason why it does not apply. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently observed, every other circuit that has considered this question has applied Hughey to awards of restitution.. . under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3563(b)(2). United States v. Varrone, 554 F.3d 327, 334 (2d Cir.2009) (citing United States v. Frith, 461 F.3d 914, 920 (7th Cir.2006); United States v. Romines, 204 F.3d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.2000); Gall v. United States, 21 F.3d 107, 110 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rosser, 963 F.2d 368, 1992 WL 113384 (4th Cir.1992) (unpublished per curiam)). We now join our sister circuits in holding that an award of restitution ordered as a condition of supervised release can compensate only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction, Hughey, 495 U.S. at 413, 110 S.Ct. 1979, so long as that offense does not involve an element of scheme, conspiracy or pattern of criminal activity. The district court, therefore, erred in ordering restitution in an amount beyond the loss sustained by the Government as a result of the offense of conviction.