Opinion ID: 7191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jones act vessels: yea or nay?

Text: 44 Again, as both Pavone and Ketzel depend for recovery on the ability to sustain their claims to having been Jones Act seamen when they were injured, and as the BILOXI BELLE was concededly situated on navigable waters at the times when the subject accidents are alleged to have occurred, thereby meeting the situs test for Jones Act purposes, the core question is whether the status of the BILOXI BELLE was that of Jones Act vessel at the times in question. And in the context of indefinitely moored floating casinos, that question is res nova in this circuit. 22 With the assistance of able counsel, our esteemed colleagues of the Southern District of Mississippi and the Eastern District of Louisiana, respectively, have rendered opinions in the instant cases crafted in classical maritime methodology for determining, on the basis of a watercraft's unique physical and functional attributes, whether such a craft--here the BILOXI BELLE--is a vessel, conventional or nonconventional, for purposes of the Jones Act or the general maritime law. We are not prepared to say that either opinion is flawed; that the analysis in either is erroneous; or that the result reached on the narrow question whether the BILOXI BELLE was a Jones Act vessel vis-a-vis Pavone and Ketzel at the times their accidents occurred is wrong. We have nagging concerns nevertheless that vessel analyses of the kinds performed by the district courts in the instant cases could be overbroad, albeit through inadvertence, and thereby return to haunt us in slightly differing contexts in the future. 23 We conclude that the correct result reached by the district courts in these cases can be achieved in a narrower--and thus a jurisprudentially more principled--way, thereby avoiding the potentiality of undesirable future side effects. 45 The approach to which we refer comprehends the analysis of putative vessels that were either withdrawn from navigation at the time in question or never placed in navigation. In particular, we examine the status of the BILOXI BELLE as of the times pertinent to the alleged injuries in these cases to determine if it was a Jones Act vessel--assuming arguendo that the subject craft was built and used for nonvessel purposes, was moored other than temporarily to the bank, and either had been withdrawn from navigation or was being used as a work platform, or both. 24 46 The concepts of withdrawn from navigation and work platform, both usually eschewing vessel status, are not infrequently intertwined. The withdrawn-from-navigation idea has been recognized for decades, distinguishing craft or structures that meet the general dictionary definition of vessel from those that meet Jones Act or the general maritime law vessel status at a given time, such as when the craft or structure has been  'laid up for the winter.'  25 Both that concept and the work-platform concept are certainly alive and well in this circuit, as perhaps best illustrated by a triumvirate of relatively recent decisions. 47 In the 1984 Jones Act case of Bernard v. Binnings Construction Company, 26 the vessel in question was a small raft or work punt stationed alongside a piling that was being driven near the shore of a canal. We noted first the teachings of our earlier cases establishing that dry docks and analogous structures of which the primary purpose is to provide a work platform--even if the structures are afloat--are not Jones Act vessels, as a matter of law. 27 In Bernard, we recognized that: 48 In a line of cases beginning with Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, 28 we have extended [the rationale that a floating dry dock is not a vessel while moored at the bank and operated as a dry dock], by analogy, to structures that lack the permanency of fixation to shore or the bottom that is common to dry docks, but nonetheless are used primarily as work platforms. 29 49 The Bernard court then laid out what has become the starting point in this circuit for analyzing such work-platform cases: 50 Since Cook we have, despite our reluctance to take Jones Act claims from the trier of fact, affirmed findings that, as a matter of law, other floating work platforms are not vessels. A review of these decisions indicates three factors common to them: (1) The structures involved were constructed and used primarily as work platforms; (2) they were moored or otherwise secured at the time of the accident; and (3) although they were capable of movement and were sometimes moved across navigable waters in the course of normal operations, any transportation function they performed was merely incidental to their primary purpose of serving as work platforms. 30 51 The next case in our trilogy is Ducrepont v. Baton Rouge Enterprises, Incorporated, 31 in which we were called on to classify a structure as a vessel or nonvessel under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) 32 as well as under the Jones Act and the general maritime law. In Ducrepont, we slightly expanded one element of the Bernard test by recognizing that a structure could meet the work-platform definition under the Bernard factors even if it had not originally been constructed for that purpose, as long as it was used primarily as a work platform at the time in question and met the other Bernard factors. 33 52 Then came Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Company, 34 in which we heeded the lesson of our earlier decision in Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Servs., Incorporated, 35 stating that, [a]s a general principle, where the vessel status of an unconventional craft is unsettled, it is necessary to focus upon the 'purpose for which the craft is constructed and the business in which it is engaged.'  36 We then proceeded in Gremillion to reinforce the Bernard analysis as follows: 53 Our decisions in this area instruct, however, that as a matter of law certain dry docks and floating work platforms will not qualify as Jones Act vessels. [citing in a footnote, examples from our prior jurisprudence: floating platform used for cleaning and stripping; repair barge; oil production platform that had not moved for twenty-four years; gulf rig moved only twice in twenty years; small raft-like work platform used to drill pilings; floating work platform used in unloading grain barges.] A survey of the case law demonstrates three common attributes for nonvessels: 54 (1) The structure was constructed to be used primarily as a work platform; 55 (2) the structure is moored or otherwise secured at the time of the accident; and 56 (3) although the platform is capable of movement, and is sometimes moved across navigable waters in the course of normal operations, any transportation function is merely incidental to the platform's primary purpose. 37 57 When the undisputed facts of the instant cases are plugged into (1) the Desper /Hawn withdrawn-from-navigation factors, or (2) the Bernard/ Gremillion work-platform attributes, or both, and are compared to the functional and nautical characteristics and mooring statuses of the various craft that in earlier cases were held as a matter of law to be nonvessels for Jones Act purposes, there can be little doubt that indefinitely moored, shore-side, floating casinos, such as the BILOXI BELLE, must be added to that list. Here, the semi-permanently or indefinitely moored barge supporting the BILOXI BELLE casino was constructed ab initio to be the floating site of a restaurant and bar (not a key factor given Ducrepont 's recognition that original construction as a work platform is not a prerequisite). 38 From its inception the instant barge was used first as a floating restaurant and bar until its conversion to a casino and its renaming as the BILOXI BELLE, after which it has been used only for casino purposes. Upon its arrival in Mississippi from Texas, the BILOXI BELLE was moored to the shore in a semi-permanent or indefinite manner, and continued to be thus moored before, during, and after the accidents in question. The BILOXI BELLE is susceptible of being moved, and in fact was moved across navigable waters one time in the course of normal operations (assuming that movement to avoid the threat of a hurricane on a single occasion can be deemed normal operations), which one-time movement was purely incidental to the barge's primary purpose of physically supporting a dockside casino structure. 58 We hold, therefore, that at the times of the Pavone and Ketzel accidents, the BILOXI BELLE (1) was removed from navigation, and (2) was a work platform. Under either circumstance, it was not then a vessel for purposes of the Jones Act or the general maritime law. 59 For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgments in the cases consolidated for review herein are, in all respects, 60 AFFIRMED.