Opinion ID: 1435226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Exclusion of Juror B[8]

Text: Finally, Morales argues that the trial court erred in striking Juror B as not death-qualified [9] and as incompetent to serve on the jury. In denying Morales a writ of habeas corpus on this ground, the district court quoted the state appellate court's resolution of the claim: [Juror B's] failure to comprehend the business of the court would have provided a sufficient basis for excusing him. Furthermore, reading his responses in context, it is evident that [Juror B] clearly indicated to the court that he would not follow the instructions of the trial judge and would not consider fairly the imposition of a sentence of death in this case. Under the circumstances, the record does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court by excusing [Juror B] for cause. Morales, 98 F.Supp.2d at 877 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court then stated simply that Morales fails to show that this Court may grant a writ with respect to this claim. He fails to show that he is entitled to a writ pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2). Id. at 877-78. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a juror may not be excluded for cause on grounds of opposition to the death penalty unless the juror expresses an inability or unwillingness to impose the penalty on the facts of the particular case: A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror. But a jury from which all such men have been excluded cannot perform the task demanded of it. . . . Culled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital punishmentof all who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penaltysuch a jury can speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority [who believe in the death penalty]. Id. at 519-20, 88 S.Ct. 1770 (footnote omitted); see also Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 657, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987) (In Witherspoon, this Court held that a capital defendant's right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to an impartial jury prohibited the exclusion of venire members simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. (internal quotation marks omitted)). In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the Supreme Court clarif[ied] Witherspoon, which, in its words, reaffirm[ed] . . . the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment. That standard is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Witt Court acknowledged the impossibility of making each juror's views on the death penalty unmistakably clear during voir dire. Id. at 424-25, 105 S.Ct. 844 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court suggested that, [d]espite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. . . . [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Id. at 425-26, 105 S.Ct. 844. The Supreme Court has recently characterized Witherspoon, Witt, and their progeny as establish[ing] at least four principles of relevance to the question of a juror's death-qualification. Uttecht v. Brown, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007). First, a criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective prosecutorial challenges for cause. Second, the State has a strong interest in having jurors who are able to apply capital punishment within the framework state law prescribes. Third, to balance these interests, a juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible. Fourth, in determining whether the removal of a potential juror would vindicate the State's interest without violating the defendant's right, the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts. Id. (internal citations omitted). As the Supreme Court observed, [d]eference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors. Id. In this case, Morales contends that Juror B indicated his willingness to consider the death penalty by responding I guess I could when asked whether he could give fair consideration to each and every penalty and its possible effect. J.A. at 826-27 (Trial Tr. at 702-03). Morales further insists that Juror B stated without hesitation or ambiguity that he understood the tasks that he would have to undertake as a juror. Morales Br. at 23-25. The Uttecht opinion, however, makes clear that isolated statements indicating an ability to impose the death penalty do not suffice to preclude the prosecution from striking for cause a juror whose responses, taken together, indicate a lack of such ability or a failure to comprehend the responsibilities of a juror. The prosecution in Uttecht struck for cause a juror to whom the Court referred as Juror Z. 127 S.Ct. at 2222. Juror Z initially indicated that he could impose the death penalty in severe situations. Id. at 2226-27 (internal quotation marks omitted). When asked to give examples of such situations, he said that the death penalty would be appropriate if a defendant affirmatively wanted to die or would inevitably re-offend upon release. After being informed by defense counsel that the defendant would never, under any circumstances, be released from prison, Juror Z expressed uncertainty about his ability to impose a death sentence. Pressed by the prosecution, Juror Z continued to equivocate regarding his willingness to consider the death penalty in the circumstances of the particular case before him, though he generally stated that he could consider the death penalty or follow the law. Id. at 2227. The prosecution challenged Juror Z for cause, citing his confusion about the proper circumstances for the imposition of a death sentence. The defense volunteered that it had no objection, and the trial court excused Juror Z. The Ninth Circuit granted Brown's federal habeas petition, holding that the state courts had not found Juror Z to be substantially impaired and, further, that the transcript unambiguously proved Juror Z was not substantially impaired. Id. at 2227-28. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record established that Juror Z had both serious misunderstandings about his responsibility as a juror and an attitude toward capital punishment that could have prevented him from returning a death sentence under the facts of this case. Id. at 2226. The similarities between Uttecht and the instant case are striking. [10] Juror B, like Juror Z in Uttecht, expressed uncertainty and ambivalence regarding the death penalty many times during his voir dire. J.A. at 811-28 (Trial Tr. at 687-704). Indeed, Juror B repeatedly stated that he was generally opposed to the death penalty. Id. Moreover, the few circumstances under which Juror B indicated that he might be able to impose the death penalty did not include the circumstances of the murder with which Morales was charged. See J.A. at 825-26 (Trial Tr. at 701-02) (indicating that Juror B could consider the death penalty in a case involving mass murder or torture). [11] Furthermore, Juror B's answers to voir dire questions provided ample cause for the trial court's concern regarding his ability to comprehend the proceedings. When the prosecutor asked directly about Juror B's feelings regarding the death penalty, Juror B responded, What penalty would I be thinking about? J.A. at 820 (Trial Tr. at 696). The prosecutor then inquired whether Juror B's feelings in relation to the death penalty would prevent him from imposing it under any circumstances, a question that Juror B apparently interpreted as referring to his relatives, as he answered, Not nothing to do with relations or anything. That's just the way I feel about it. J.A. at 821 (Trial Tr. at 697). Morales's counsel subsequently stated to Juror B that there are no wrong answers to voir dire questions and that [t]he only answer that is wrong is the one that you don't give us. J.A. at 822 (Trial Tr. at 698). Juror B responded, You mean the first one? Id. Given Juror B's seeming inability to understand the questions being posed and the instructions given to him, and in light of the considerable deference owed to the trial court's judgment, we cannot conclude that the district court erred in denying habeas relief on the basis of the trial court's exclusion of Juror B for cause.