Opinion ID: 1127477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Torture Allegation

Text: (9) Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred in limiting counsel to informing the prospective jurors that defendant had been convicted of first degree murder and that the special circumstance of torture murder had been found true, and prohibiting mention of the specific facts surrounding the torture murder, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. No abuse of discretion is apparent. Counsel was permitted to explore the subject of torture with the prospective jurors in an effort to determine if that issue would cause the jurors to automatically vote for or against the death penalty regardless of the evidence. It was not required that they also question the prospective jurors regarding the precise scenario of torture murder presented in this case. ( People v. DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 1217-1218.) Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertion, it is apparent from the record that the trial court was only discussing limitations on Hovey, not general, voir dire. Thus, defendant was not precluded from attempting to show during general voir dire that a prospective juror harbored any specific bias that would cause him or her to vote for the death penalty without regard to the evidence presented, and thus should be excused for cause. ( People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 597.) 4. Jury Cross-section Claim (10) Defendant contends that exclusion for cause of prospective jurors who oppose the death penalty abridges his right to a jury chosen from a representative cross-section of the community. Defendant did not raise this issue below, and it was therefore waived. (See People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 662-663 [286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84].) On the merits, we have repeatedly held to the contrary. (E.g., People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 662; People v. Hamilton (1988) 46 Cal.3d 123, 136 [249 Cal. Rptr. 320, 756 P.2d 1348]; People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 342-353 [197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680].) The United States Supreme Court has likewise held that the fair cross-section requirement is not violated by death qualification of a jury. ( Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 177 [90 L.Ed.2d 137, 150, 106 S.Ct. 1758]; see also Holland v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 474, 483 [107 L.Ed.2d 905, 918, 110 S.Ct. 803].) Defendant cites no persuasive reason to revisit our conclusions. C. Challenged Evidentiary Rulings Defendant challenges numerous trial court evidentiary rulings. None of these claims have merit. 1. Admission of Certain Exhibits (11) Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly admitted certain exhibits in violation of defendant's right to a fair trial, impartial jury, due process, and heightened capital case due process guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In particular, he challenges the admission of crime scene and autopsy photographs of the victim's dead and naked body, and certain physical evidence, i.e., the victim's clothing retrieved from the crime scene and his motorcycle, that were indescribably inflammatory and utterly devoid of probative value. Defendant has waived this claim by failing to object. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 906 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395]; Evid. Code, § 353.) The claim is also meritless. We have held that because evidence of violent crimes is expressly made admissible by factor (b) of section 190.3, the court has no discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to weigh the prejudicial impact of such evidence against its probative value when it is offered at the penalty phase. ( People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 641 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) Here, the challenged evidence, which illustrated the precise nature of the crime, was not admissible under section 190.3, factor (b), but it was admissible under factor (a). Section 190.3, factor (a), expressly makes admissible evidence of the circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true.... Accordingly, just as the trial court did not have discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude evidence expressly made admissible by section 190.3, factor (b), at the penalty phase on the basis that it was unduly inflammatory or lacking in probative value, it similarly lacked discretion to exclude evidence expressly made admissible under factor (a) on this basis. The trial court does, however, retain its inherent discretion to exclude evidence admissible under factor (a) based on the form of the evidence, i.e., that a particular photograph or piece of clothing was inaccurate or cumulative. ( People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 512 [34 Cal. Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249, 31 A.L.R.5th 888].) 2. Expert Testimony Issues (12a) Defendant challenges the trial court's rulings regarding the testimony of certain expert witnesses. We conclude none of these contentions have merit.