Opinion ID: 2617087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Petition for Review in Direct Appeal

Text: There is no basis under Washington law for Ms. Shumway to now raise the severance issue as part of her direct appeal. It has been three years since this court denied Ms. Shumway's petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision on her direct appeal. Ms. Shumway does not seriously argue, nor could she, that this court should (1) order the Court of Appeals to recall its mandate in this case; (2) vacate our order denying the petition for review; or (3) grant Ms. Shumway a three-year extension of time in which to file an amended petition for review so that she might correct the tactical or inadvertent omission of the severance issue in her original petition. RAP 13.4 requires a party seeking discretionary review of a Court of Appeals decision on direct appeal to file a petition for review within 30 days of the entry of the decision or order terminating review. A petition for review will be granted only in certain circumscribed cases, RAP 13.4(b), and, if this court accepts review, the court will review only the questions raised in the petition and in the answer to the petition, unless the court orders otherwise. RAP 13.7(b). Ms. Shumway did not raise the severance issue in her petition for review, and we denied review of the petition which she filed in this court. The Court of Appeals then issued its mandate, relieving the appellate courts in this state of jurisdiction to revisit and act on the merits of the case. See Reeploeg v. Jensen, 81 Wash.2d 541, 547, 503 P.2d 99 (1972). RAP 12.9(b) provides that an appellate court may recall a mandate issued by it to correct an inadvertent mistake or to modify a decision obtained by the fraud of a party or counsel in the appellate court. (Emphasis added.) We have been cited no authority to support an interpretation of this rule that would authorize this court to order the Court of Appeals to recall its mandate in order to provide a party the opportunity to add an issue to a petition that has already been denied. See Reeploeg, 81 Wash.2d at 546, 503 P.2d 99 (to require courts to consider and reconsider cases at the will of litigants would deprive the courts of that stability which is necessary in the administration of justice) (citing Kosten v. Fleming, 17 Wash.2d 500, 505, 136 P.2d 449 (1943)); 3 LEWIS H. ORLAND & KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: RULES PRACTICE 348 (4th ed.1991) (the rule should not be considered as authorizing a recall of the mandate for the purpose of reexamining the case on its merits). Additionally, RAP 12.9(c) requires a motion to recall a mandate to be made within a reasonable time. The mandate in this case was issued by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 1995. More than 1,000 days have passed since the mandate was issued. There is no argument on behalf of Ms. Shumway attempting to explain why allowing this passage of time before seeking relief should be deemed reasonable. Even if Ms. Shumway were able to demonstrate that the mandate issued by the Court of Appeals shouldand couldbe recalled, there is no procedure under our appellate rules to amend a petition for review after review has been denied by this court. Ms. Shumway no longer has an opportunity to seek discretionary review in this court of the Court of Appeals decision, on direct appeal, that the trial court properly denied her motion to sever.