Opinion ID: 2045025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of Section 401(a)(6.5)(D)

Text: Having concluded that, for purposes of section 401(a)(6.5)(D), substance containing methamphetamine includes the by-product produced during the manufacture of methamphetamine, we examine the constitutionality of section 401(a)(6.5)(D). Defendants argue that section 401(a)(6.5)(D), as interpreted above, violates both the proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11) and the due process clause (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2) of the Illinois Constitution. Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Guevara, 216 Ill.2d 533, 541, 297 Ill.Dec. 450, 837 N.E.2d 901 (2005). In general, statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and a party challenging a statute has the burden of rebutting that presumption. People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 189, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004). In addition, a court has a duty to uphold the constitutionality of a statute if it is reasonably possible to do so. People v. Dinelli, 217 Ill.2d 387, 397, 299 Ill.Dec. 236, 841 N.E.2d 968 (2005). At the outset, we observe that defendants' proportionate penalties and due process challenges overlap considerably with one another, as well as with their contention that interpreting substance containing methamphetamine to include the by-product of the methamphetamine manufacturing process produces absurd results. Defendants argue that section 401(a)(6.5)(D) violates the proportionate penalties clause because it is cruelly harsh to penalize an individual who manufactures a substance that contains no usable methamphetamine with the same term of imprisonment as an individual who manufactures an identical quantity of pure methamphetamine. Similarly, defendants argue that section 401(a)(6.5)(D) violates the due process clause because, given that they produced no usable methamphetamine, their 15-year minimum sentences are not reasonably designed to remedy the harm the legislature sought to address in establishing that penalty. Defendants assert that it is unfair to punish a methamphetamine manufacturer who has not produced usable methamphetamine as severely as one who has by basing the penalty for manufacturing methamphetamine on the gross weight of any substance produced that contains the drug. In response, the State argues that defendants' proportionate penalties challenge relies on cross-comparison analysis, which this court rejected in People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005). Alternatively, the State argues that, to the extent defendants claim their sentences are cruel and degrading, they fail to acknowledge the dangers unique to manufacturing methamphetamine that justify their 15-year terms of imprisonment. Similarly, with respect to defendants' due process challenge, the State argues that by imposing a sentence based on the weight of the entire mixture in which methamphetamine is being manufactured, the legislature targeted both the threat to public safety that arises from making an addictive, harmful drug and the threat that arises from doing so using a highly dangerous method.
We first address defendants' proportionate penalties challenge. The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution requires the legislature to determine a penalty according to the seriousness of the offense, and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11. Prior to our decision in Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492, a defendant could challenge a penalty pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause by (1) comparing it to the penalty for a similar offense with different elements, (2) comparing it to the penalty for an offense with identical elements, or (3) arguing that the penalty was cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. See, e.g., People v. Moss, 206 Ill.2d 503, 522, 276 Ill.Dec. 855, 795 N.E.2d 208 (2003). In Sharpe, we abandoned cross-comparison analysis as part of our proportionate penalties jurisprudence. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d at 519-21, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492. Thus, a defendant may no longer premise a proportionate penalties challenge on the comparison of similar offenses with different elements. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d at 521, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492. A defendant may, however, still argue that a penalty for a particular offense violates the cruel or degrading standard or is harsher than the penalty for an offense with identical elements. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d at 521, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492. As mentioned, the State suggests that defendants' proportionate penalties challenge is based on a comparison of two offenses with different elements: manufacturing methamphetamine and distributing methamphetamine. Defendants did partially rely on a cross-comparison analysis of these two offenses before the appellate court ( McCarty, 356 Ill.App.3d at 563, 292 Ill.Dec. 521, 826 N.E.2d 957; Reynolds, 358 Ill.App.3d at 296, 294 Ill.Dec. 778, 831 N.E.2d 1103), but their appeals were decided prior to Sharpe. While they could have stated the precise basis for their present proportionate penalties challenge more clearly, we do not understand them to renew their cross-comparison argument, but rather to assert that the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence set forth in section 401(a)(6.5)(D) violates the cruel or degrading standard i.e., that it is cruelly harsh to penalize an individual who manufactures a substance that contains only traces of unusable methamphetamine as severely as one who manufactures an identical quantity of usable methamphetamine. We find defendants' argument unavailing. In general, the legislature has the authority to set the nature and extent of criminal penalties, and courts may not interfere with such legislation unless the challenged penalty is clearly in excess of the very broad and general constitutional limitations applicable. People v. Morgan, 203 Ill.2d 470, 488, 272 Ill.Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d at 519, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492. As we noted in rejecting defendants' assertion that our interpretation of section 401(a)(6.5)(D) produces absurd results, manufacturing methamphetamine is a dangerous process involving toxic and combustible chemicals, and regardless of whether an individual successfully completes the methamphetamine manufacturing process, merely engaging in it poses a serious threat to public safety. Accordingly, we cannot say that the sentencing category established by section 401(a)(6.5)(D) is cruel or degrading or a shock to the moral sense of the community just because the legislature has chosen not to condition an individual's eligibility for it on the level of refinement the individual achieves during the methamphetamine manufacturing process. We therefore conclude that section 401(a)(6.5)(D) does not violate the proportionate penalties clause.
Turning to defendants' due process challenge, we note that to satisfy the requirements of the due process clause, a penalty must be reasonably designed to remedy the particular evil that the legislature was targeting. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d at 531, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492, citing People v. Steppan, 105 Ill.2d 310, 319, 85 Ill.Dec. 495, 473 N.E.2d 1300 (1985). In arguing that section 401(a)(6.5)(D)'s failure to account for the difference between pure methamphetamine and manufacturing by-product violates this standard, defendants rely heavily on the Controlled Substance Act's statement of legislative intent, which provides in part that: It is not the intent of the General Assembly to treat the unlawful user or occasional petty distributor of controlled substances with the same severity as the large-scale, unlawful purveyors and traffickers of controlled substances. 720 ILCS 570/100 (West 2000). Defendants interpret this provision to indicate that the legislature did not intend to treat minor players in the drug trade as harshly as kingpins, and they style themselves the former. In addition, defendants suggest that because the legislature has enacted other statutes that prohibit the dangerous conduct associated with manufacturing methamphetamine (see 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.6) (West 2000) (prohibiting possession of methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals with intent to manufacture methamphetamine); 415 ILCS 5/12(a) (West 2000) (prohibiting water pollution); 415 ILCS 5/21(a) (West 2000) (prohibiting land pollution); 720 ILCS 5/20-1.4 (West 2004) (criminalizing controlled substance manufacturing arson); 720 ILCS 5/20-1.5 (West 2004) (criminalizing aggravated controlled substance manufacturing arson)), it follows that section 401(a)(6.5)(D)'s coverage of that conduct is irrational. With respect to defendants' reference to the Act's statement of legislative intent, we initially observe that the provision they cite focuses on punishment for users and distributors of controlled substances. See 720 ILCS 570/100 (West 2000) (contrasting unlawful user[s] and occasional petty distributor[s] with large-scale, unlawful purveyors and traffickers). Defendants were not simply user[s] or occasional petty distributor[s] of methamphetamine. They were manufacturers of the drug, albeit unsuccessful ones. Therefore, the provision on which they rely is inapposite. More importantly, the Act's statement of legislative intent indicates that the legislature had multiple purposes in mind in promulgating the Act. For instance, the legislature indicated its intent to (1) limit access of [controlled] substances only to those persons who have demonstrated an appropriate sense of responsibility and have a lawful and legitimate reason to possess them [and] (2) deter the unlawful and destructive abuse of controlled substances. 720 ILCS 570/100 (West 2000). The legislature could reasonably have concluded that punishing manufacturers of methamphetamine with a strict penalty, regardless of the ultimate success of their enterprise, discourages even casual experimentation with producing the drug, thereby reducing the quantity of the drug available to individuals with no legitimate reason to possess it (720 ILCS 570/100(1) (West 2000)), and preventing its unlawful and destructive abuse (720 ILCS 570/100(2) (West 2000)). Furthermore, given the unique dangers associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine, the legislature could reasonably have determined that punishing the manufacturing process is equally as important as punishing its result. As for defendants' argument that, insofar as section 401(a)(6.5)(D) targets the dangers of the methamphetamine manufacturing process, it is duplicative, and thus irrational, we simply note that we see no irrationality in an attempt by the legislature to target a threat to the welfare of the public from as many angles as it deems necessary. As we have noted in the past, the legislature has broad discretion to determine not only what the public interest and welfare require, but to determine the measures needed to secure such interest. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill.2d 357, 364, 91 Ill.Dec. 610, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (1985). Unquestionably, then, section 401(a)(6.5)(D) is reasonably designed to remedy the particular evils the legislature was targeting in enacting it. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d at 531, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492, citing Steppan, 105 Ill.2d at 319, 85 Ill.Dec. 495, 473 N.E.2d 1300. We find no due process violation in the legislature's determination that manufacturing greater than 900 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine, regardless of whether the methamphetamine is usable, merits a penalty of 15 to 60 years' imprisonment.