Opinion ID: 1142536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: statutorily imposed liability

Text: The majority opinion contends that the legislature intended the provisions of §§ 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a) to operate for the protection of the general public and not only for the protection of the minor or intoxicated person to whom the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was sold. Thus, the majority opinion finds a duty to appellants. This contention is completely refuted by the exception placed in § 12-6-101(a) by the legislature. The general public is not protected at all if the minor can legally receive the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage from his guardian or from a member of his immediate family. The minor is protected from that which could result to him if someone gives him alcoholic liquor or malt beverages, but the ability is legislated for a guardian, etc., to forego the protection for his ward, etc. If the protection were intended to be for the general public, a child's guardian, etc., could not logically forego such protection on behalf of the general public. In other words, the duty to not furnish alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to a minor is legislatively imposed upon all but legal guardians, medical doctors and members of the minor's immediate family. Because certain classes of persons do not have a duty to refrain from furnishing such alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to minors, it cannot be said that the duty imposed on those not in such classes is one owed to the public. It would be discriminatory and irrational to impose a duty owed to the public by John Doe not to furnish alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to a minor but to exempt Richard Roe from the same duty. If the duty is imposed for the benefit of the minor, the exempt classification is rational inasmuch as the guardian or member of the immediate family responsible for the minor  or the medical doctor in treatment beneficial to the minor  is in a position to waive the benefit on behalf of the minor. None of the cases cited in the majority opinion as establishing a duty to the general public refer to a legislative exemption similar to that contained in § 12-6-101(a). The Annotation: Common-law right of action for damage sustained by plaintiff in consequence of sale or gift of intoxicating liquor or habit-forming drug to another, 97 A.L.R.3d 528, collects cases in which liability has, and has not, been established both (1) based on violation of liquor laws, and (2) based on tort apart from violation of liquor laws. None of the cases there referred to concern attachment of liability for violations of liquor laws where the legislative intention was manifest, as here, to impose the duty for the benefit of the minor and not for the benefit of the general public. [3] The Wyoming legislature has addressed the issue of liability for sale of alcoholic liquor and malt beverages to minors, setting forth the scope of duty with reference thereto. In doing so, the liability of the seller was not extended to that here contended for by appellants. This court interpreted the antecedents of §§ 12-5-301 and 12-6-101 in Parsons v. Jow, Wyo., 480 P.2d 396 (1971), and denied recovery in favor of third party against one who furnished alcoholic liquor and malt beverages to a minor who subsequently injured the third party. Subsequent to the date of that opinion, the statutes there involved were amended and re-enacted by the legislature more than once without material change in the provisions thereof which are here involved. Accordingly, the legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the construction placed thereon by the court in Parsons v. Jow, supra, and to have adopted it as part of the law. Such is true unless a contrary intent clearly appears. Harvey v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 53 Wyo. 495, 84 P.2d 755 (1938), reh. denied 53 Wyo. 495, 86 P.2d 735 (1939); Carpenter & Carpenter v. Kingham, 56 Wyo. 314, 109 P.2d 463, reh. denied 56 Wyo. 314, 110 P.2d 824 (1941); and In Re Contas, 42 Wyo. 94, 291 P. 314 (1930). There is no statutory liability imposed upon appellees in favor of appellants. The majority opinion refers to Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 (1981) as authority for the court to establish the requirements of a legislative enactment as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man. The majority opinion neglects to note that, in Distad, we adopted the language of the Restatement, Torts 2d, to this end. Following is part of that quoted from the Restatement (§ 286) in Distad at page 175: `The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part `(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and `(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and `(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and `(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.' (Emphasis added.) As demonstrated, supra, these conditions cannot exist for the purposes of this case in light of the exception contained in § 12-6-101(a). The statutes cannot be said to set a standard for evidence of negligence (including the element of duty).