Opinion ID: 1966373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Award of Alimony and Counsel Fees

Text: The defendant next contends that the trial justice erred in awarding plaintiff alimony and counsel fees without considering defendant's ability to pay. Furthermore, defendant avers that the trial justice erred by determining the amount of plaintiff's counsel fees on a record devoid of an affidavit supporting such fees, and by failing to conduct a hearing on whether the fees were fair and reasonable. Section 15-5-16(a) provides that the [F]amily [C]ourt may order either of the parties to pay alimony or counsel fees, or both, to the other. Concerning alimony, § 15-5-16.1(c) provides that [t]he assignment of property, if any, to be made shall precede the award of alimony, since the needs of each party will be affected by the assignment. Similarly, although the trial justice has the authority to order one spouse to pay the counsel fees of the other, he or she first must determine that the party from whom payment is sought has sufficient financial ability to pay such fees and that the spouse seeking payment is without property available for that purpose. Hogan v. Hogan, 822 A.2d 925, 929 (R.I.2003) (quoting Becker v. Perkins-Becker, 669 A.2d 524, 529 (R.I.1996)). Obviously, the parties' financial resources and needs are affected by the distribution of marital assets. Thus, a trial justice may reach the question of alimony and counsel fees only after assigning the marital property. Here, the trial justice considered the factors that he was required to consider under § 15-5-16 in determining alimony. He weighed defendant's reported earnings of $55,364 against plaintiff's lack of citizenship, language barrier, and little, if any, training and formal education. He also considered plaintiff's responsibility to provide primary care for the minor children, the five- and two-year-old. The trial justice determined, nevertheless, that it was reasonable to believe that plaintiff could obtain citizenship, become more fluent in English and gain marketable skills, if she applies herself during [the] period of time before her youngest child is of school age. He awarded her, therefore, alimony of $200 per week for three years. We detect no abuse of his discretion. Moreover, in awarding counsel fees the trial justice specifically considered his earlier award of equitable distribution. He was well aware of the nature and value of the assets assigned to each party. He found, however, that plaintiff needs the award of equitable distribution to help sustain herself and the children and to assist her in the rehabilitation period. She is therefore without means to pay counsel fees. It is within the trial court's discretion to determine the need and amount of counsel fees to be awarded. Thompson v. Thompson, 642 A.2d 1160, 1165 (R.I.1994). [A] trial justice presiding in a divorce proceeding acts within the limits of judicial discretion in fixing the amount of attorney's fees and, absent judicial abuse, this court will not review the exercise of such discretion. Becker, 669 A.2d at 529 (citing Gartner v. Gartner, 79 R.I. 399, 408, 89 A.2d 368, 374 (1952)). In fixing the amount of the award, the trial justice is not bound by the opinions of attorneys in regard to the value of the services rendered but should exercise his or her own independent judgment since he or she has the requisite skill and knowledge to form a reasonably correct idea of what is fair and reasonable compensation. Id. Here, the record clearly indicates that the divorce action had been assigned to the trial justice for more than sixteen months, and that he had presided over the case management conference, pretrial hearing and several motions. We are satisfied, therefore, that he was very familiar with the complexity of the case and the efforts that counsel expended to protect the interests of their respective clients. In his decision the trial justice said: Throughout this marriage, the plaintiff was kept in the dark as to all of the financial matters. She had little knowledge of the holdings or the value of any assets of the parties. Counsel for the plaintiff was required to go to great lengths to discover the various assets of the parties and to determine the values of same. The trial justice specifically found that based on this case and its complexity,    a counsel fee in the amount of $10,000 is reasonable, and then ordered the defendant to pay said amount as a contribution towards counsel fees incurred by [the] plaintiff, which at the time totaled $20,000. We are satisfied that the trial justice engaged in a sufficient analysis of the appropriate factors and that, in the circumstances of this case, the award of counsel fees was a sustainable exercise of his discretion.