Opinion ID: 1423514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Facilities Within the Taussig Road Right-of-way

Text: Missouri-American, through its predecessors, originally obtained franchise rights from St. Louis County to lay and maintain mains and pipes, along and across the public highways as they now exist, or may hereafter be laid out, of the County of St. Louis. When that franchise was granted, Taussig Road was a public highway of St. Louis County. However, before any mains or pipes were laid along Taussig Road, it was annexed by Bridgeton. Under sections 71.520 and 393.010, RSMo 2000, municipal authorities of the state are vested with the prerogative to grant or refuse permission, in their discretion, to [utility companies] to place their appliances in the public ways, either above or below ground. Holland Realty & Power Co. v. City of St. Louis, 282 Mo. 180, 221 S.W. 51, 54 (1920). For the purposes of this dispute, the power to grant franchise rights in Taussig Road was transferred from St. Louis County to Bridgeton upon the city's annexation. Missouri-American's rights in the Taussig Road right-of-way thus hinge upon the franchise granted to it by Bridgeton. [1] See Mo. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Platte-Clay Elec. Coop., Inc., 407 S.W.2d 883, 889-94 (Mo. 1966); Dixie Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Baton Rouge, 440 F.2d 819, 822 (5th Cir.1971). The Bridgeton Franchise was granted in 1951 and was limited to twenty years. [W]hen the city limits the life of the franchise granted to twenty years, as it must, and that period expires, the privilege of so using the city's public places comes to an end. The continued use is illegal. The corporation acts outside of its granted powers. State ex inf. McKittrick ex rel. City of California v. Missouri Utilities Co., 339 Mo. 385, 96 S.W.2d 607, 613 (1936); accord 12 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations sec. 34:69 (3d ed. 2006) (Generally, upon the expiration of a municipal franchise granted to a public utility, there is no longer any contractual relationship between the municipality and the utility.). Under this general rule, the relationship between Bridgeton and Missouri-American ended in 1971, when the Bridgeton Franchise expired, because it was not renewed and no new franchise has been granted. Missouri-American could have removed its facilities from Bridgeton, and Bridgeton could have demanded that it do so. See Bowers v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 328 Mo. 770, 41 S.W.2d 810, 812 (1931). An exception to the general rule occurs, however: when the parties to a franchise continue to perform after the expiration of the franchise in the same manner they did when the franchise was formally in effect. If a company continues to operate after its franchise has expired, it does so under an implied contract, cancelable upon reasonable notice, under the same terms and conditions as the franchise ordinance. 12 McQuillin, supra, sec. 34:69. In Bowers v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 328 Mo. 770, 41 S.W.2d 810 (1931), a railway company operated street cars pursuant to a municipal franchise. After the franchise expired, the company continued to operate its street cars on the public streets and bridges, repair the tracks and bridges, pay the street railway tracks tax, and pay the annual park tax. In other words, they acted as though the franchise was still in existence, and for that reason they should not be heard to say they were not exercising it. Since [the company] treated the franchise as a live instrument, acted thereunder, and received its benefits, they should not be permitted to avoid the obligations it created. Id. at 812. Courts in other states have similarly held that when a utility company continues to furnish service that the town accepts after the franchise expires, an implied contract arises, with the same terms and conditions as the franchise, that may be terminated upon reasonable notice. See Vill. of Lapwai v. Alligier, 69 Idaho 397, 207 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1949); Vill. of Orland Hills v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Ill., 347 Ill.App.3d 504, 282 Ill.Dec. 966, 807 N.E.2d 590, 595-96 (2004); Baker v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 328, 644 P.2d 441, 444-45 (1982); City of Richmond v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 205 Va. 919, 140 S.E.2d 683, 686 (1965). Both Bridgeton and Missouri-American have behaved as though the Bridgeton Franchise were still in force, despite its expiration. Although Bridgeton has demanded that Missouri-American relocate certain facilities along Taussig Road, it has not given notice of termination of the entire franchise relationship. Under the exception to the general rule, the parties are operating under an implied contract, with the same terms and conditions of the Bridgeton Franchise, cancelable upon reasonable notice. The franchise allows Missouri-American to use the streets, avenues, alleys, parks and other public places within the Town . . . for the purpose of putting down, laying, maintaining or using water mains, water pipes, fire hydrants and other appliances. Missouri-American has present authority to lay and maintain facilities within the Taussig Road right-of-way. [2]
The Bridgeton Franchise does not explicitly address the issue of who must pay for the water facilities relocation requested by the city. Accordingly, this question is governed by the common-law rule stated in Union Electric Co. v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of St. Louis, 555 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. banc 1977). In that case, the city of St. Louis had vacated the 600 block of Martin Luther King Drive for its use in an urban redevelopment project. 555 S.W.2d at 31. The land clearance for redevelopment authority requested Union Electric Company to move its facilities in that block. Id. Union Electric sought a declaratory judgment that the city was obligated to reimburse it for the costs of relocating its facilities. Id. at 30. The Court stated: The fundamental common-law right applicable to franchises in streets is that the utility company must relocate its facilities in public streets when changes are required by public necessity, or public convenience and security require it, at its own expense. Id. at 32. Union Electric was required to relocate its facilities, at its expense, because the relocation was made necessary by the urban renewal project. Id. at 33. The primary purpose of the project, the redevelopment or renewal of what is implicitly a blighted area of the city, has been declared legislatively to be a public purpose. The vacation of this block of the city thoroughfare and the requirement that Union Electric remove its facilities therefrom to make the thoroughfare available for use as a part of this project were acts of the City and the Authority in the exercise of a governmental rather than a proprietary function. Id. The same situation exists here. The primary purpose of the Taussig Road project was declared legislatively, by a resolution of the mayor and city council of Bridgeton, to be a public purpose. The resolution stated that Bridgeton's actions to improve Taussig Road were public governmental acts in the public interest and safety to serve the traveling public [and] encourage business and industrial activity and growth, and that the improvements were necessary to increase its size, capacity to handle vehicles of all sizes, speed of travel, and the safety of motorists using Taussig Road. Missouri-American argues that the resolution cannot be considered a valid legislative declaration of public purpose under Union Electric because the resolution was passed almost four years after Bridgeton and TRiSTAR executed their agreement concerning the Taussig Road project. However, the timing is irrelevant. The purpose of the Taussig Road project was for the legislative body to determine. The Court respects that authority and normally does not look behind such legislative determinations. See Union Elec., 555 S.W.2d at 32; accord Tierney v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of Kansas City, 742 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Mo. banc 1987) (the legislative body's authority controls unless its decision is shown to be so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to an abuse of the legislative process); State ex inf. Danforth ex rel. Farmers' Elec. Coop., Inc. v. State Envtl. Improvement Auth., 518 S.W.2d 68, 74-75 (Mo. banc 1975). There is no evidence in the record that could establish any arbitrary and unreasonable acts on the part of Bridgeton sufficient to constitute abuse of the legislative process. The resolution establishes that the changes requiring relocation of certain Missouri-American facilities in the Taussig Road right-of-way are required by public necessity, or public convenience and security require it. Union Elec., 555 S.W.2d at 32. Missouri-American is responsible for relocating its facilities there at its own expense. It is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the facilities located within the Taussig Road right-of-way. [3]