Opinion ID: 2210480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Slander Claim.

Text: Reliance contends that Kiner's claim for slander should not have been submitted to the jury because (1) the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, (2) the statement was a privileged communication, and (3) the statement was not published to third parties. A. Statute of limitations. Reliance argues that Kiner's claim for slander is barred by the two-year limitation of Iowa Code section 614.1(2), which begins to run on the date of publication. Kiner's claim of slander relates to three separate publications. In the first, which occurred on May 28, 1982, Reliance's claims supervisor informed a claims processor at Reliance's local agency that Kiner was addicted to drugs and that Reliance was no longer going to make payments to him. On March 9, 1983, the claims supervisor misrepresented to the claims processor that Kiner had refused to go through a drug dependency evaluation. The final publication was on August 25, 1983. On that date, Reliance's claims supervisor told the local agent that Reliance's status had not changed, that Reliance would continue to refuse payment for the medications, and that Kiner would be required to go to a chemical abuse center for an evaluation. The slander case was first raised when Kiner filed an amendment to his bad-faith petition. This amendment was on January 6, 1988, well beyond two years from the last publication of August 25, 1983. The trial court allowed the amendment to be filed and ruled that, under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 89, the amendment would relate back to the original filing date of the bad-faith claim, which was June 11, 1985. These rulings have not been challenged by Reliance. Every publication or repetition of defamatory matter constitutes a claim which is separate and independent from any claims arising out of the original publication. Bond v. Lotz, 214 Iowa 683, 687, 243 N.W. 586, 587 (1932). The threshold issue is, therefore, whether the August 25 publication was a republication or repetition of earlier defamatory matters. For Kiner's slander action to be timely under section 614.1(2), it must be based on the August 25 publication because, as already noted, that is the only publication within the two-year limitation period. Whether the slander action may be based on the August 25 publication, in turn, depends on whether statements by Reliance on that date were slanderous. Kiner says they were. Reliance argues they were not and, in fact, argues that they should be held to be nonslanderous as a matter of law. Whether a publication is understood as defamatory must be determined by giving to the subject-matter thereof, as a whole, that meaning which naturally belongs to the language used. Sheibley v. Ashton, 130 Iowa 195, 198, 106 N.W. 618, 619 (1906). It is for the court to determine whether the words are capable of a defamatory meaning, and for the jury to determine whether they were so understood. Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 N.W.2d 547, 552 (Iowa 1972). See Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 116 (Iowa 1984). The jury is to determine what the hearer understood from the words themselves and the facts and circumstances attending the speaking of them. Hess v. Fockler, 25 Iowa 9, 11-12 (1868). It is not, however,  necessary for plaintiff to introduce as witnesses those who heard the words spoken, and prove by them the sense in which they understood them.... Id. at 12. A memo relating to the August 25 conversation between Judy Sajka, the Reliance claims manager, and Joetta Deustch, a claims handler for the local Reliance agency, stated: Talked to Judy S[ajka] at Reliance. Status hasn't changed as far as payments go. He is to go to a Chemical Abuse Center for evaluation before they make any commitment to pay or not. Said to send bill up anyway. JD The trial court determined that this publication could be considered slanderous, and the jury found that it was. In view of the parties' previous conversations regarding Kiner's drug problem, the statement of August 25 that Reliance's status hasn't changed, and its reference to a chemical dependency evaluation, could be found to be defamatory. The question of whether it was defamatory in fact was for the jury. B. Privileged communication. Reliance contends that the slander action should have been dismissed on the ground of qualified privilege because the statements were made only to persons having an interest in the subject matter and to whom they had a right or duty to communicate them. Kiner responds that the court correctly instructed the jury on qualified privilege, and in any event, Reliance waived any error in the instructions by failing to object to them. The jury rejected the qualified privilege defense as set out in the court's instructions which, without objection, must be considered to be the correct law. State v. Taggart, 430 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Iowa 1988) (failure to make timely objection to instruction waives right to assert error on appeal; instruction, right or wrong, becomes law of the case). The jury found against Reliance on this issue, and a contrary finding is not compelled under the record. We find no basis for overturning the jury's rejection of this defense. C. Publication to third parties. Reliance contends that the trial court erred in submitting the slander claim because the statement was not published to third parties. It argues that Deustch, who heard the statements, was an agent of either Kiner or Reliance. (She was an employee of the local insurance agency which wrote the workers' compensation policy for Kiner's employer.) Therefore, no communication or publication to a third party existed. Kiner responds that Sajka's communication to Deustch meets the requirement of publication and also that Reliance waived this argument by failing to raise it in the district court. We agree that the issue was not raised, and we therefore decline to consider it on appeal. D. Remittitur or new trial on slander claim. In response to Reliance's motion for a new trial on the slander claim, the trial judge found that the compensatory damages of $75,000 were excessive, but the punitive damages of $150,000 were not. The court stated that the jury's compensatory award was not the result of passion and prejudice, but merely excessive in nature. It ordered a new trial unless Kiner would consent to a reduction of the judgment for actual damages to $50,000. A remittitur of $25,000 is difficult to uphold in view of the court's finding that the larger verdict was not the result of passion or prejudice. Furthermore, the court did not find a lack of evidentiary support for the verdict. The fact that the judgment was reduced by only $25,000 and the statement of the court that the verdict was merely excessive suggests that the court supplanted its verdict of $50,000 for that of the jury for $75,000. Under the principles discussed in Division I, we conclude that the court's order for remittitur was untenable and therefore an abuse of discretion. We accordingly reverse on that issue.