Opinion ID: 2181505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DCFMLA Claim

Text: In her complaint, Ms. Chang alleged that she was terminated in whole or in part for exercising her right to medical leave, thereby violating § 36-1307 of the D.C. Family and Medical Leave Act. The trial court granted IP3's motion for summary judgment on this claim because it found that Ms. Chang had failed to present any evidence that: (1) she suffered from a serious health condition covered by the DCFMLA; (2) IP3 interfered with her right to medical leave; or (3) IP3 terminated her because she took a week of leave. On appeal, Ms. Chang argues that she did, in fact, present both evidence of a serious health condition and evidence that she had been terminated because she took a week of leave. Conversely, IP3 argues that Ms. Chang's hypertension was not a serious health condition entitling her to protection under the DCFMLA. IP3 also argues that Ms. Chang failed to state a valid claim for relief under the DCFMLA. On the basis of the record presented, we conclude that Ms. Chang did have a serious health condition during the week she was absent from work. We also find that Ms. Chang stated a valid claim for relief under the DCFMLA for retaliatory termination. Because Ms. Chang has failed to show that IP3's legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for firing her were pretext, however, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment ruling on her DCFMLA claim.
The DCFMLA was designed to ensure job security and health benefits to an employee during a temporary period of absence resulting from a ... serious health condition[ ]. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1990, BILL 8-82, at 2 (May 30, 1990) (REPORT). In order to accomplish these ends, the DCFMLA provides employees of a covered employer [10] with sixteen weeks of protected medical leave during any twenty-four-month period. D.C.Code § 36-1303(a) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-503(a) (2001). The act guarantees that an employee returning from medical leave will be restored to the same position which that employee held when the leave began, or to an equivalent position. Harrison v. Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr., 678 A.2d 572, 575 (D.C.1996); see also D.C.Code § 36-1305(d) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-505(d) (2001). Moreover, to the extent that employment benefits were provided prior to the temporary leave period, an employer is required to continue providing those benefits after an employee takes protected leave. See D.C.Code § 36-1305(a) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-505(a) (2001). The DCFMLA was intended to address many of the same policy concerns as its federal counterpart, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). Both federal and local legislators recognized that many employers had failed to provide job security to employees who were forced by illness to take time off from work. In response, the DCFMLA and the federal FMLA were crafted to provide this needed job security while accommodating the legitimate interests of the workplace. See REPORT at 2, 5, supra; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(4), (b)(1) (2000). Under both the DCFMLA and the FMLA, an employee of a covered employer is entitled to take protected medical leave when unable to perform his or her job functions because of a serious health condition. D.C.Code § 36-1303(a) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-503(a) (2001); 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (2000). The DCFMLA definition of serious health condition is nearly identical to the FMLA definition of the same term. The D.C. statute defines serious health condition as: a physical or mental illness, injury, or impairment, that involves: (A) Inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential health care facility; or (B) Continuing treatment or supervision at home by a health care provider or other competent individual. D.C.Code § 36-1301(9) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-501(9) (2001). Similarly, the FMLA defines serious health condition as: an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves  (A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (2000). Therefore, under both acts, the existence of a serious health condition depends on the nature of care that is required to treat the illness. In the instant case, we are called upon to decide whether Ms. Chang suffered from a serious health condition entitling her to DCFMLA protection. Ms. Chang's treatment for hypertension did not involve inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential health care facility. Therefore, in order to find that she had a serious health condition within the meaning of the DCFMLA, we must determine whether she received continuing treatment for hypertension. See D.C.Code § 36-1301(9) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-501(9) (2001). Although the DCFMLA does not define continuing treatment, FMLA regulations and case law provide some insight into the meaning of this term. Because both statutes define serious health condition in the context of continuing treatment, we may properly look to FMLA regulations and case law as persuasive authority in interpreting our own statute. See, e.g., Grant, 786 A.2d at 583-84 (stating that we rely on case law construing the ADA as persuasive authority when assessing disability claims under the DCHRA because both acts contain similar definitions of disability); see also Walker v. District of Columbia, 656 A.2d 722, 725 (D.C.1995) ([b]ecause the Superior Court's Rule 11 is virtually identical to its federal counterpart, FED. R. CIV. P. 11, this court looks to federal cases interpreting the federal rule as persuasive authority in interpreting [the local] rule) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Under the FMLA regulations, continuing treatment may include any one or more of the following: (a)(2)(i) a period of incapacity ( i.e., inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition, treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom) of more than three consecutive calendar days, and any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same condition, that also involves: (A) Treatment two or more times by a health care provider, by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct supervision of a health care provider, or by a provider of health care services ( e.g., physical therapist) under orders of, or on referral by, a health care provider; or (B) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care provider. . . . 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2) (2003) (italics in original). Treatment by a health care provider includes examinations to determine if a serious health condition exists and evaluations of the condition, while a regimen of continuing treatment includes, for example, a course of prescription medication. . . . 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b). Courts have interpreted these regulations to mean that an employee who is (1) incapacitated for more than three days, (2) seen once by a doctor, and (3) prescribed a course of medication, such as an antibiotic, [] has a `serious health condition' worthy of FMLA protection. Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 163 (1st Cir.1998) (plaintiff with symptoms of angina and hypertension who took three days leave for purposes of diagnosis had a serious health condition because he had seen a physician at least once and been placed on a treatment regimen of medication); Brannon v. OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 1028, 1037 (M.D.Tenn. 1995) (holding that child's throat and upper respiratory infection constituted serious health condition under FMLA where child had visited health care provider, was given a course of prescription medication, and was advised by doctor to stay home for more than three days). Ms. Chang has presented both medical records and testimony from her physician indicating that during her absence from work, she visited her physician, was diagnosed with hypertension, was given prescription medication to treat her hypertension and was told to stay home from work for more than three consecutive days. As a result, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found that Ms. Chang had a serious medical condition within the meaning of the DCFMLA.
On appeal, IP3 argues that Ms. Chang failed to state a claim under the DCFMLA because her complaint did not allege that IP3 interfered and caused her to forfeit any protected right under the DCFMLA or claim that IP3 had retaliated against her for taking protected leave. We disagree with IP3's reading of Ms. Chang's complaint. Ms. Chang's complaint alleged that she was terminated... in whole or in part for exercising her right to medical leave. Although Ms. Chang has not used the word retaliation, her complaint fairly states such a claim under our liberal rules of pleading. See Carter-Obayuwana v. Howard Univ., 764 A.2d 779, 787-89 (D.C.2001) (holding that plaintiff had stated a claim for retaliation under Title VII and DCHRA in spite of her ambiguous pleading); see also Bible Way Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ v. Beards, 680 A.2d 419, 430 (D.C.1996) (liberal rules of pleading normally protect a plaintiff against dismissal of an ambiguous complaint when it can be said to state a claim if all reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor). Whether the DCFMLA, in fact, permits a cause of action for termination in retaliation for taking protected leave is a question of first impression for this court. Both the FMLA and the DCFMLA make it illegal for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise any right created by the respective statutes. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2000); D.C.Code § 36-1307(a) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-507(a) (2001). Both acts make it unlawful for an employer to discharge or discriminate in any manner against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by the act. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2000); D.C.Code § 36-1307(b) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-507(b) (2001). Although neither statute specifically prohibits retaliation against employees for taking protected leave, the FMLA regulations prohibit employers from discriminating against employees... who have used FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2003). Moreover, under these regulations, employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions. Id. In deference to these regulations, a majority of the circuit courts of appeal that have reviewed this type of claim have held that the FMLA protects employees from retaliation following an employee's use of protected family or medical leave. See, e.g., Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 679-80 (8th Cir.2002); Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798 (11th Cir.2000); Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., 179 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir.1999); King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891-92 (7th Cir.1999); Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 159-60; Williams v. Shenango, Inc., 986 F.Supp. 309, 321 (W.D.Pa.1997); Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1325. Given that the FMLA and the DCFMLA were enacted for the same policy reasons and explicitly prohibit the same conduct, we see no reason to deviate from the regulations applied by the majority of courts that have considered this issue under the FMLA. Moreover, the DCFMLA's guarantee that an employee who takes protected leave will be restored to the same or an equivalent position upon returning to work arguably supports a cause of action for retaliation if an employee is fired for taking medical leave. See D.C.Code § 36-1305(d) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-505(d) (2001). Therefore, we hold that under the DCFMLA it is unlawful to terminate an employee because that employee has taken protected family or medical leave.
At the outset, we note that, like the FMLA, the DCFMLA does not immunize an employee from legitimate disciplinary action by her employer for reasons unrelated to the employee's [protected] leave. Bond v. Sterling, Inc., 77 F.Supp.2d 300, 304 (N.D.N.Y.1999). In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, we address the merits of Ms. Chang's retaliation claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applied by a majority of the circuits in retaliation claims under the FMLA. See, e.g., Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir.2002); Brungart, 231 F.3d at 798; Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 319; King, 166 F.3d at 891-92; Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160; Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323; Williams, 986 F.Supp. at 318. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of producing evidence to sustain a prima facie case. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer must then produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his action. If the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to present evidence that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual. The ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff to show impermissible motive or intent. Blount v. National Ctr. for Tobacco-Free Kids, 775 A.2d 1110, 1115 (D.C.2001); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory termination under the DCFMLA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she was engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the two. See King, 166 F.3d at 892; Smith, 302 F.3d at 832; Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 161; Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1325. In the instant case, Ms. Chang presented evidence that she took protected medical leave and was fired on the day she was to have returned to work. This evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See King, 166 F.3d at 893 (taking FMLA leave constitutes a protected activity, termination constitutes an adverse employment decision, and temporal proximity between the two establishes causal connection). This court has previously held that close temporal proximity between a protected activity and an adverse employment action can establish a causal connection between the two. See Carter-Obayuwana, 764 A.2d at 792-93 (testimony that plaintiff repeatedly complained of retaliatory treatment in the days immediately prior to receiving a reduction in salary was sufficient to establish a causal connection). Because Ms. Chang established a prima facie case, the burden shifted to defendant IP3 to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Blount, 775 A.2d at 1115. Here, IP3 has presented ample evidence that it was dissatisfied with Ms. Chang's behavior at work and was actively contemplating her termination well before she ever took protected leave. The email messages sent during the week before Ms. Chang became ill establish that the friction between Ms. Chang and her co-workers had reached intolerable levels. IP3, therefore, has met its burden of producing a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for its firing of Ms. Chang. The burden, then, shifted back to Ms. Chang to show that IP3's stated reason for firing her was pretext. To establish pretext, Ms. Chang presented evidence that she had received favorable reviews and pay raises from her supervisors at IP3 prior to her termination. See Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir.2002) (continuing offer of bonuses and lack of contemporaneous criticism of performance is evidence of pretext). These favorable reviews appear less-so, however, when viewed in context. For example, the April 7, 2000 letter in which Edward White told her, I want you to know in no uncertain terms how much I need you here and want you to continue the good work you have been doing in managing our Accounting Department also warned her that she was not to confront [other staff members] nor to respond by being either uncooperative or unprofessional. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Chang, this letter suggests that although IP3 may have been satisfied with her accounting work, there were some underlying concerns about her ability to get along with other staff members. With respect to the other letters that Ms. Chang relies upon as evidence that IP3 was satisfied with her performance, these letters merely refer to Ms. Chang's accounting work and do not establish that IP3 was satisfied with her professionalism or behavior on the job. See note 6, supra. In addition, although Ms. Chang did receive an eleven percent pay raise three months prior to her termination, Matthew Hensley's November 13, 2000 e-mail to Ned White and Thomas White explained that the purpose of that raise was not to reward Ms. Chang for good performance, but rather to prevent Ms. Chang from leaving prior to January so that the year-end accounting would be completed more quickly in order to facilitate a merger or acquisition. In this e-mail message, the authenticity of which Ms. Chang does not dispute, Matthew Hensley told Ned White and Thomas White, I have told Teru that she has two months to demonstrate to IP3 that she is more than just loyal and hard-working but that she can modify her behavior now to work more productively with management and staff in the future. If she cannot, she will be terminated and knows why. Id. Although Ms. Chang denies that she was ever told that her job was at risk, Ms. Chang admitted in her deposition that she had difficulty working under Ned White's supervision. She acknowledged that she had wilfully disobeyed Mr. White's request not to yell at her co-workers. She even testified that the day before she took protected leave, Mr. White had told her to watch out because she would soon be having her performance review. These admissions seriously undermine Ms. Chang's unsupported claim that she never knew her job was at risk or that her bosses at IP3 were unhappy with her behavior. Regardless, plaintiff's perception of [her]self, and of [her] work performance is not relevant. It is the perception of the decisionmaker which is relevant. Smith v. Chamber of Commerce, 645 F.Supp. 604, 608 (D.D.C.1986). Ignoring the evidence of IP3's dissatisfaction with her professionalism, Ms. Chang argues that IP3's satisfaction with her accounting work coupled with the temporal proximity between her taking of protected leave and her termination proves that IP3's stated reason for firing her was pretext. In support of this argument, she cites to cases from other jurisdictions where courts have held that temporal proximity in conjunction with evidence of satisfaction with an employee's work performance is sufficient to show pretext. See, e.g., Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 265 F.3d 903, 915 (9th Cir.2001) (proximity and previous positive feedback demonstrates pretext under Title VII's opposition clause); O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001) (close temporal proximity supported jury's finding of pretext in Title VII retaliation case); Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 F.Supp.2d 153, 169 (D.Md.2000) (temporal proximity and ongoing antagonism between plaintiff and decisionmaker evidence of pretext under Title VII opposition clause). These cases, however, are distinguishable from the case at bar. None of the cases cited by Ms. Chang involve retaliation against an employee for taking protected FMLA leave. Rather, these cases arose under Title VII's so-called opposition clause, which provides, in relevant part, that [i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a) (2000). The purpose of this language is to prevent Title VII claims from being deterred by an employer who might otherwise have motive to retaliate against an employee who makes such a claim. Heuer v. Weil-McLain, 203 F.3d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 2000). The very existence of an opposition clause thus presupposes an employer's motive for retaliation in such cases. Although the DCFMLA contains a similar opposition clause which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee for opposing an employer's unlawful practices under the DCFMLA, see D.C.Code § 36-1307(b) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-507(b) (2001), Ms. Chang's retaliation claim is fundamentally different. Ms. Chang alleges that IP3 fired her, not in retaliation for any complaint she had made about their DCFMLA practices, but rather because she took time off from work. Under circumstances where an employee has opposed or challenged the employment policies or practices of an employer, the temporal proximity of those complaints to an adverse employment action may be sufficient to show pretext. In such cases, the adversarial dynamic created when an employee challenges an employer's practices gives rise to an inference that the employer had a motive to retaliate. However, where an employee has merely availed herself of the benefits afforded by the DCFMLA by taking protected leave, the employer's motive to retaliate is less obvious. Therefore, in order to establish pretext when an employee alleges that she has been retaliated against for taking protected leave in violation of the DCFMLA, we require a greater showing than mere temporal proximity between the taking of leave and the adverse employment action. [11] Evidence that an employer had a strict attendance policy, a history of reprimanding employees for taking leave, or evidence that directly discredited the employer's stated reasons for terminating the plaintiff would suffice. If we were to require any less, any employer who granted an employee leave under the [DC]FMLA would thereafter have its hands tied regarding any discipline of that employee. Bond, 77 F.Supp.2d at 305 (citation omitted). Aside from her self-serving statements that she was a model employee at IP3, Ms. Chang simply has not put forward any affirmative evidence that would tend to discredit IP3's stated reason for firing her. She has not alleged that her employer had any general concerns with employees taking family or medical leave, or that she or any other employee had been reprimanded for taking leave in the past. In fact, Ms. Chang admitted in her deposition that she had taken sick leave on a number of prior occasions and was not treated any differently when she returned to work. Accordingly, we find that Ms. Chang has failed to show that IP3's legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating her were pretext. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court to grant summary judgment for IP3. So ordered.