Opinion ID: 768847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Summary Judgment for the Defense on the Common Law Claims

Text: 56 Finally, plaintiff cross-appeals the district court's decision to grant summary judgment for the defense on plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The conduct alleged by a plaintiff must satisfy an extremely highburden in order to survive a motion for summary judgment with respect to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Tennessee. The district court in this case correctly quoted the appropriate language from Dunn v. Moto Photo, Inc., 828 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), saying that the conduct must be that which would be deemed utterly intolerable in a civilized society. That case makes it clear that criminal, tortious, intentional, or malicious conduct does not automatically satisfy the standard. We believe, however, that the intentional and malicious conduct found by the district court in this case is unusually egregious and raises a factual issue with respect to the outrageousness of the behavior involved. The sort of daily, consistent harassing behavior which Pollard endured over a period of months and years has been characterized as a type of slow torture. Her work was sabotaged, her personal safety was compromised, she was subjected to juvenile pranks intended to force her to resign from the shift, and she was repeatedly informed of her co-workers' belief in the inferiority of women. We found ourselves, after reviewing the record, proclaiming a sense of moral outrage that DuPont managers allowed the conduct of the men in the peroxide area to persist for years in silence, and therefore silent approval. Inaction by an employer, or another actor in a position to exercise control, in the face of continuous, deliberate, degrading treatment of another may rise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The tort would be unnecessary in our law as a deterrent if assault or physical harm were always made a necessary element. 57 We conclude that material issues of fact are presented by the outrageous nature of the conduct of DuPont employees together with the refusal of its managers to correct the situation and its blanket, continuing official denial in the face of contrary facts that discrimination based on gender occurred or that its managers were aware of the discrimination. A fact finder at the trial level will hear the case on remand and decide whether the plaintiff has met the standard enunciated by the Tennessee courts for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. We therefore REVERSE the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to DuPont on this issue and REMAND for trial. Otherwise we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Plaintiff's motion to strike Pollard's reply brief is denied.