Opinion ID: 177064
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Comment on Defendant's Failure to Testify

Text: Defendant's first allegation of prosecutorial misconduct is that the prosecutor improperly commented on Defendant's decision not to testify. It is a familiar and well established rule of law that a prosecutor's direct reference to a defendant's decision not to testify at trial is a violation of that defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 610-15, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 975 (6th Cir.1988). Defendant argues that one comment in the prosecutor's closing argument, that the jury was entitled to hear from all of the participants in this scheme, was a direct reference to Defendant's failure to testify. We reject this argument, even if we consider the comment out of context from the rest of the prosecutor's closing argument. The comment did not specifically state that Defendant did not testify or that he had not provided an alternative explanation. See, e.g., Griffin, 380 U.S. at 611, 85 S.Ct. 1229 (These things [the defendant] has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain.... Essie Mae is dead, she can't tell you her side of the story. The defendant won't.). Suggesting that the jury was entitled to hear from all of the participants was not a direct reference to Defendant or his decision not to testify. The prosecutor's argument, viewed in context, is not properly interpreted as even an indirect comment on Defendant's silence. In evaluating a claim of improper indirect comments on a defendant's silence, the court should consider: (1) whether the comments were manifestly intended to reflect on the accused's silence or are of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily construe them as such; (2) whether the comments were isolated or extensive; (3) whether there was otherwise overwhelming evidence of guilt; and (4) whether appropriate curative instructions were given. Gonzalez, 512 F.3d at 292-93. Defendant's assertion that the prosecutor indirectly referred to his silence founders on the first prong. Reversal based on a prosecutor's improper indirect comment on a defendant's silence requires one of two findings: manifest intent to comment on the failure to testify; or the remark was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. United States v. Robinson, 651 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir.1981) (quoting United States v. Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246, 1249 (5th Cir.1977)). We cannot find that the prosecutor manifestly intended to comment on the defendant's failure to testify if some other explanation for his remark is equally plausible. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Determining whether the jury would necessarily construe[ ] a comment as one on a defendant's failure to testify requires a probing analysis of the context of the comment, and the likely effect of the district court's curative instruction, if any. Id. An examination of the prosecutor's comment in context of the trial and the rest of her closing argument is necessary to determine whether there is an explanation for it that is equally plausible with Defendant's assertion that it was a reference to his silence. You might wonder why we enter into plea agreements with the likes of Mr. Gates and Mr. Noce. There is no doubt that these are not the type of people that you would probably want to do business with. But it is our obligation to take the evidence where it leads us, both through the testimony of witnesses and the documents, such as bank records and letters. That's the only way we can identify all participants in a scheme. It's not pleasant to make a recommendation to reduce the sentence of a corrupt public official, such as Jimmy Gates, but sometimes we have to do it to make sure that everyone is brought to justice. Good solid citizens who would never dream of paying bribes or taking bribes generally don't have much evidence to give in a trial like this. And that's because the schemes are secret. They are carried out in secret and the participants do not disclose to law abiding people the details of their scheme because they might get turned in. Keep in mind also that the government does not pick these witnesses. The defendant picked these witnesses. The defendant picked these witnesses. He picked Larry Insana as a witness against him when he said to Larry Insana bring your checkbook to the gas station. He picked Liberator Noce as a witness against him when he said how about an hour for you and an hour for me. And he picked Mr. Gates as a witness against him when he said to Mr. Gates let's split the bribes. You are entitled to hear from all of the participants in this scheme. And your good common sense will determine who is telling the truth in this matter. The Judge will instruct you that you can believe all of what a witness says, some of what a witness says, or none of what a witness says. And you have all been in situations, I'm sure, where you have determined that, whether out of fear or out of stupidity, somebody has initially lied about something. And that as time goes on and they're more emotionally capable of telling the truth, the truth eventually comes out. The testimony of Defendant's coconspirators was an important part of the case against Defendant. Here the government faced a problem that is as old as conspiracy prosecutions (if not older): its chief witnesses were admitted criminals, coconspirators who had bargained for favorable treatment. The question of the credibility of any such witnesses is a hardy perennial and an obvious target for a defendant. Here, the target was attacked almost immediately in Defendant's opening statement: Nobody, the evidence will show,... will come into this courtroom and indicate that they observed [Defendant] accepting cash improperly, or have firsthand knowledge of him doing so ... except for those who cannot avoid their criminal responsibility for being involved in such schemes. Defense counsel then pointed out that the evidence would show that Noce and Gates were biased and that they each had an incentive to lie about Defendant to receive a favorable plea bargain. On cross examination, defense counsel went after Gates's credibility based on his character for truthfulness: And you are telling this jury despite a history of lies to law enforcement about your stealing from your job, that they can trust your word? Defense counsel also attacked Gates based on his motive from the plea bargain: And you have to satisfy the government with your testimony in order to get the benefits under that agreement, don't you? In particular, defense counsel highlighted how Gates had changed his story throughout the investigation. The prosecutor's comment about the jury being entitled to hear from all of the participants in this scheme was simply not a comment on Defendant's silence. Rather, it was an explanation of why the prosecution depended on Gates, whose credibility was so vigorously challenged by defense counsel. The quoted passage begins by explaining that, although the government does not enjoy dealing with witnesses such as Gates, they have no choice but to go where the evidence leads and that honest, law abiding citizens are unlikely to have information about a secretive criminal conspiracy. It is the coconspirators themselves who were chosen by Defendant, and who have the relevant information the jury should hear. An argument that the cooperating witnesses were criminals, not choirboys, is familiar and ageless. The following comment about the jury being entitled to hear from all of the participants is nothing other than an explanation for calling a witness of vulnerable credibility. The three paragraphs that immediately follow the comment bolster this interpretation, because they directly address Gates's credibility. Accordingly, this is an equally plausible explanation for the prosecutor's commentindeed, it seems to us the more probable by a wide margin. We cannot, in any event, find that a jury would necessarily construe the remark to be a comment on Defendant's silence. But even if Defendant could make it past the first prong, the other prongs do not weigh in his favor. The remark is the only one that Defendant claims is a comment on his silence. The evidence against Defendant, consisting largely of testimony of coconspirators and bank records, was substantial. Finally, the remark was not so manifestly improper as to require a cautionary instruction sua sponte. Additionally, an interruption and a sua sponte cautionary instruction could have brought unwanted attention to Defendant's decision not to testify, needlessly doing more harm than good. See United States v. Robinson, 357 Fed.Appx. 677, 683 (6th Cir.2009).