Opinion ID: 555115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions Addressing Admissibility of Evidence Outside the Period of the Conspiracy Alleged

Text: 27 Stephenson and Gohagen contend that the district court erred in admitting into evidence at trial certain drugs, guns, cash and other items which were seized outside the time frame of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Specifically, they assert that the court erred in permitting the government to introduce various drug paraphernalia, weapons and cash seized from one to three months after the close of the period of the conspiracy as alleged in the indictment. Stephenson also contends that he was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of the drugs and cash found on Swaby's person when he was arrested on March 17, 1987 in Kansas City, Kansas. Appellants contend that these items were evidence of other bad acts and, as such, their admissibility was governed by Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Appellants argue that admission of this evidence was improper under Rule 404(b) and that, inasmuch as it was seized outside the period of time alleged, its admission resulted in an improper variance of the charge set out in the indictment. 28 In response, the government notes that the vast majority of the challenged exhibits were obtained between May 27, 1987 and August 23, 1988, the fifteen month period of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. The government also points out that of the evidence seized after August 23, 1988--weapons, ammunition, scales, photographs, identification cards, and scraps of paper--none was per se illegal, and appellants have never articulated how this evidence and accompanying testimony constituted the other crimes, wrongs, or acts addressed by Rule 404(b). Thus, the government argues that Rule 404(b) was inapplicable to these items of evidence because they served as proof of the very charge for which these appellants were on trial, not of some other unrelated crime or act committed either prior or subsequent to the stated period of the conspiracy. 29 The facts relevant to this issue are not really in question. It is undisputed that a relatively small portion of the physical evidence introduced at trial was obtained by law enforcement officers on November 21 and 22, 1988, one week after the return of the indictment and three months subsequent to the end date of the conspiracy period alleged. However, some of that evidence may very well have been, and in all likelihood was, utilized by appellants or their unindicted coconspirators during the conspiracy period. The facts being generally undisputed here, our task is merely to determine whether the district court abused its considerable discretion in permitting the government to introduce this evidence at trial. See United States v. LeAmous, supra. 30 We simply are not convinced that the admission of this evidence was governed by Rule 404(b). Evidence is not subject to the provisions of Rule 404(b) if its possession is not a federal crime. United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir.1986), partially vacated on other ground, cert. denied on remaining grounds, 481 U.S. 1034, 107 S.Ct. 1968, 95 L.Ed.2d 810 (1987). There was no showing made that mere possession of the evidence with which we are concerned here was or is, by itself, illegal under federal law. 31 Similarly, we do not agree that this was evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts. We think this evidence can be more accurately described as evidence plainly relevant to the existence of and appellants' participation in the conspiracy charged, and, thus, was properly admissible. See United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 68 (2nd Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, 104 S.Ct. 134, 78 L.Ed.2d 128 (1983); see also United States v. Westbrook, supra. Evidence of a conspirator's post conspiracy activity is admissible if probative of the existence of a conspiracy or the participation of an alleged conspirator, 'even though they might have occurred after the conspiracy ended.'  United States v. Fields, 871 F.2d 188, 197 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 369, 107 L.Ed.2d 355 (1989), quoting Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974). Because we find that the challenged evidence was indeed probative of the existence of the conspiracy and appellants' participation therein, we agree with the district court that this evidence was properly admissible. 32