Opinion ID: 886713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Does the statute of limitations for filing an action to set aside a settlement of a workers' compensation claim toll during the pendency of a statutorily-mandated mediation?

Text: ¶ 28 Preston argues that the statute of limitations tolled during the pendency of her mediation because the Workers' Compensation Court did not have jurisdiction over her petition to reopen her claim until the mediation was complete. Hence, because the mediation lasted 62 days, the applicable two-year statute of limitations for claims of mutual mistake was extended by 62 days. And, as such, Preston argues that because she filed her petition to reopen her claim on September 19, 2001, and because the two-year statute of limitations had been extended by the 62 days, she was within the two-year time frame. ¶ 29 In the alternative, Preston argues that the statute of limitations was tolled under the doctrine of equitable tolling  as this Court articulated that doctrine in Hash v. U.S. West Communications Services (1994), 268 Mont. 326, 886 P.2d 442. Preston also argues that in the event that this Court holds that by petitioning the Department of Labor for mediation Preston did not commence an action, the statute of limitations was equitably tolled. She maintains that under the doctrine, her time within which to file a petition to reopen her workers' compensation claim was equitably tolled during the pendency of the mediation process. ¶ 30 Transportation first argues that administrative hearings do not toll a statute of limitations unless a statute expressly so provides. Because the Workers' Compensation Act does not contain any statute stating that a mediation tolls any statute of limitations, Transportation argues that Preston's mediation did not toll the statute of limitations to mutual mistake of fact. Second, Transportation argues that Preston abandoned her argument regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations under § 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA, as she cited no authority to or explanation of her argument in her appellate brief. In addition, Transportation argues that Preston's argument concerning § 27-2-102, MCA, leads to an absurd result, which both conflicts with settled case law and has nothing to do with when statutes of limitations are tolled, as the language of § 27-2-102, MCA, is clear. Finally, Transportation argues that this Court should not consider Preston's equitable tolling argument, as Preston raises that argument for the first time on appeal. ¶ 31 As to Preston's equitable tolling argument, we decline to rule on the merits of that argument. Preston did not present her equitable tolling argument to the Workers' Compensation Court, and, accordingly, this theory was not properly preserved for appellate review. We have repeatedly held that we will not consider issues raised for the time on appeal because a district court  here the Workers' Compensation Court  cannot be faulted for not ruling on a theory which was never presented to it. In re Marriage of Gerhart, 2003 MT 292, ¶ 31, 318 Mont. 94, ¶ 31, 78 P.3d 1219, ¶ 31. ¶ 32 However, we still must determine whether the statute of limitations for Preston's mutual mistake of fact claim tolled during the pendency of her statutorily-mandated mediation. ¶ 33 Section 39-71-2408(1), MCA, states that: [I]n a dispute arising under [the Workers' Compensation Act]... the insurer and claimant shall mediate any issue concerning benefits and the mediator shall issue a report following the mediation process recommending a solution to the dispute before either party may file a petition in the workers' compensation court. [Emphasis added.] ¶ 34 In addition, § 39-71-2905(1), MCA, states that: A claimant or an insurer who has a dispute concerning any benefits under [the Workers' Compensation Act] ... may petition the workers' compensation judge for a determination of the dispute after satisfying dispute resolution requirements otherwise provided in ... [the Workers' Compensation Act] .... After parties have satisfied dispute resolution requirements provided elsewhere in ... [the Workers' Compensation Act]... the workers' compensation judge has exclusive jurisdiction to make determinations concerning disputes under ... [the Workers' Compensation Act].... [Emphasis added.] ¶ 35 Here, Preston petitioned for mediation on November 29, 2000. The mediator submitted her report on January 4, 2001, and from that date, Preston had 25 days within which to accept the mediator's recommendations or to petition the Workers' Compensation Court for resolution, § 39-71-2411(6), MCA. Taken together, the statutorily-mandated mediation process that Preston initiated took from November 29, 2000, to January 29, 2001  a total of 62 days. ¶ 36 As § 39-71-2408(1), MCA, states, mediation is mandatory under the Workers' Compensation Act before a party can even petition the Workers' Compensation Court for relief. In addition, the Workers' Compensation Court does not have jurisdiction during the pendency of a statutorily-mandated mediation, given that a claimant may only petition the Workers' Compensation Court after satisfying dispute resolution requirements otherwise provided in the Workers' Compensation Act  such as mandatory mediation. ¶ 37 Given these clear statutory constructs, we hold that the statute of limitations tolled during the pendency of Preston's mediation. Hence, Preston had 62 additional days within which to file her petition to the Workers' Compensation Court regarding the reopening of her previously-settled claim. The Workers' Compensation Court erred in concluding that Preston's claim was time-barred.