Opinion ID: 687708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas

Text: 31 Finally, appellant claims that his guilty pleas in the four other cases were involuntary and should be overturned. He asserts that the pleas were involuntary because his attorney, Mr. James, was constitutionally ineffective in investigating those cases, and because he felt he had no other choice but to plead guilty given Mr. James's lack of interest in his case. 32 Once a defendant has pled guilty, the only non-jurisdictional avenue for challenging his conviction is to claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-48, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984); Barker v. United States, 579 F.2d 1219, 1225-26 (10th Cir.1978). Performance by defense counsel that is constitutionally inadequate can render a plea involuntary. Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357, 1357 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1869, 123 L.Ed.2d 489 (1993). Again, we analyze claims of ineffective assistance using the Strickland standard; appellant must therefore show that Mr. James's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that appellant was prejudiced thereby. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. Because appellant has pled guilty, the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard requires appellant to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir.1989); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). 33 Appellant contends that Mr. James's performance was ineffective because he failed to investigate adequately the charges to which appellant ultimately pled guilty. But appellant has made no showing of what such an investigation would have discovered and how that would have altered his decision to plead guilty. In other words, appellant has not demonstrated that he would have insisted on going to trial had Mr. James conducted a more thorough investigation. Thus, regardless of whether Mr. James's failure to investigate these charges fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, appellant has not shown that he suffered any resulting prejudice. 34 Appellant finally claims that his plea was involuntary because, given Mr. James's apparent lack of interest in his cases, appellant felt as if he had no other choice but to plead guilty. First, as we have just stated, appellant has failed to demonstrate that Mr. James's performance in these cases was constitutionally inadequate. Second, appellant testified under oath at his plea hearing that his decision to plead guilty was knowing and voluntary. 3 The judge who presided over appellant's plea hearing accepted appellant's testimony and found that appellant understood the nature and consequences of his pleas. 35 It is well-established that a defendant's statements on the record, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977); see also Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1183-84 (10th Cir.1988) (quoting the same). As the Supreme Court stated in Blackledge, a defendant's subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal. 431 U.S. at 74, 97 S.Ct. at 1629. Appellant's contention that he felt he had no choice but to plead guilty because of his attorney's allegedly lackluster performance--where appellant has failed to show that his attorney was constitutionally inadequate--constitutes such a conclusory allegation. Appellant has failed to demonstrate that his plea was involuntary.VI. Conclusion 36 Appellant was not denied due process of law and his guilty pleas were not involuntary. The district court's denial of appellant's petitions with respect to those claims is AFFIRMED. We REMAND the case to the district court for further findings as to whether appellant was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel.