Opinion ID: 2368128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Recommended Eighteen-Month Suspension

Text: In determining what discipline to impose, this court must consider three issues: whether the Board has supported its determination that there was clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of identical reciprocal discipline; whether the Board's recommended sanction of suspension for eighteen months is consistent with our case law; and whether the Board's recommendation that we not impose a fitness requirement was proper. See In re DeMaio, 893 A.2d 583, 586 (D.C.2006). As we observed in In re Pennington, 921 A.2d 135 (D.C.2007), there is what amounts to a presumption under Maryland law that an attorney who engages in intentional dishonesty will be disbarred. Id. at 140. By contrast, in this jurisdiction, a presumption of disbarment rebuttable only by `compelling extenuating circumstances' has heretofore been reserved for one class of intentionally dishonest conduct, that involving misappropriation of client funds. Id. at 141. [5] Since respondent's conduct did not involve misappropriation, we can begin by agreeing with the Board that had respondent's misconduct occurred in this jurisdiction, it would not have resulted in the same punishment (disbarment) as was imposed in the disciplining jurisdiction. Thus, it was appropriate for the Board to go on to consider what sanction would likely have been imposed as original discipline in this jurisdiction and whether that sanction is substantially different from disbarment. To make that determination, the Board considered a number of disciplinary decisions of this court in which we sanctioned attorneys for conduct involving fabrication of documents or other dishonesty and (in some of the cases) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Board referred specifically to In re Scanio, 919 A.2d 1137 (D.C.2007) (per curiam) (30-day suspension where attorney made false statements to his personal insurer and lied to his law firm to cover up the original false statements); In re Hawn, 917 A.2d 693 (D.C.2007) (30-day suspension where attorney falsified his resume submitted to prospective employers and altered his law school transcript); In re Owens, 806 A.2d 1230 (D.C.2002) (30-day suspension where attorney made false statements under oath to an administrative law judge to cover up her attempt to eavesdrop on testimony in violation of a sequestration order); In re Miller, 553 A.2d 201 (D.C.1989) (30-day suspension where attorney surreptitiously searched locked files of her former employer to find her personnel information); In re Zeiger, 692 A.2d 1351 (D.C.1997) (60-day suspension of attorney who submitted altered client medical records to opposing party's insurer); In re Schneider, 553 A.2d 206 (D.C. 1989) (60-day suspension where attorney submitted falsified documents to his law firm to obtain reimbursement for expenses that he had properly incurred but had failed to document); In re Mendoza, 885 A.2d 317 (D.C.2005) (90-day suspension of attorney who furnished bogus Criminal Justice Act vouchers to a factoring company); In re Kennedy, 542 A.2d 1225 (D.C. 1988) (90-day suspension where attorney diverted client payments that should have gone to his law firm, misrepresented his salary on a personal loan application form, and engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); Pennington, supra, 921 A.2d at 136-38 (two-year suspension with fitness requirement for attorney who falsely told client that case had been settled for $10,000, which she paid to client with personal funds rather than admit that suit had been dismissed because of her error, facts that led to the attorney's disbarment by Maryland); and In re Slaughter, 929 A.2d 433 (D.C.2007) (three-year suspension and fitness requirement where attorney falsely represented to his law firm that the firm had been retained by the State of Arkansas, forged a contingency fee agreement, created phony signature pages and certificates of service, induced the firm to represent certain individual plaintiffs that the firm would not have represented but for the purported representation of the state, and caused the firm to invest over $1.5 million in attorney time and expenses in representing individuals). [6] Report at 11-13. Thus, the Board cited cases evidencing that the sanctions this court has imposed for conduct similar to respondent's conduct in issue here range from a suspension of thirty days to a suspension of three years. [7] On this basis, the Board concluded, and we agree, that there is a substantial difference between disbarment (the sanction imposed by the Maryland Court) and the discipline that this court would have imposed on respondent in an original proceeding. See DeMaio, supra, 893 A.2d at 589 ([I]t is self-evident that there is a substantial difference between [the sanctions imposed in these similar cases] and disbarment. Thus, D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(4) has been satisfied.). Because the presumption in favor of identical reciprocal discipline is overcome, we next consider whether to accept the Board's recommendation that we impose a suspension of eighteen months as non-identical reciprocal discipline. In determining an appropriate sanction within the range described above, the Board identified several relevant factors. The Board observed that respondent's conduct did not involve criminal activity; that [n]othing in the record suggests that the law firm was defrauded, that respondent acted for pecuniary gain or was otherwise self-interested, or that he acted to cover up a mistake; that respondent's misstatements were confined to the law firm; that respondent self-reported his Maryland disbarment (albeit almost four months after the Maryland Court issued its order); [8] that he had no prior disciplinary history; that he had acknowledged that his conduct warrants a suspension; and that the client was not deceived in any way, nor were his legal rights affected because he had instructed Respondent that he did not wish to appeal the award of summary judgment. [9] Report at 11, 13, 14, 15, 16. Counterbalancing these factors (which in the Board's view weighed against recommending a sanction at the high end of the range) are several others that, the Board reasoned, increase[] the seriousness of Respondent's misconduct. Report at 12. The Board found that the duration and scope of [respondent's] dishonesty counsel in favor of a more substantial sanction than would be appropriate if a single matter were involved. Report at 13-14. The Board noted that respondent engaged in a protracted course of dishonesty, which continued for an entire year, which involved multiple affirmative misrepresentations, and into which he invested substantial effort; that he fabricated documents and included on them bogus court file-stamps; and that he deprived the client of the opportunity to decide for himself whether, at reduced fees, he would have chosen to appeal the adverse ruling below, conduct that implicated Rule 1.4 (requiring that an attorney keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation). Report at 13, 14. Taking into account these various factors, the Board arrived at its recommendation of an eighteen-month suspension (which, we think, can fairly be regarded as a mid-range sanction). Bar Counsel asserts that, if [w]e were writing on a clean slate, disbarment would be the appropriate sanction. Bar Counsel's brief acknowledges, however, that this court's decision in Pennington, in which we declined to impose the identical reciprocal discipline of disbarment, appears to undermine that argument. We agree with that assessment. Of particular note, in Pennington, we suspended rather than disbarred the attorney even though she had a prior disciplinary history and even though, in the wake of her dishonesty to the client and third parties (in order to conceal her own negligence) and her falsification of a settlement sheet, she failed to express remorse. See 921 A.2d at 143 n. 3. Bar Counsel emphasizes that here, respondent's position before the Board was that only a brief (30-day) suspension was warranted, demonstrating, in Bar Counsel's view, that respondent likewise has failed utterly to appreciate the seriousness of his misconduct. However, because a 30-day suspension is within the range of sanctions that this court has imposed in cases involving dishonesty, [10] and because respondent states that he is deeply remorseful for and ashamed of his actions, we cannot say that the record clearly and convincingly supports the conclusion that Bar Counsel urges. [11] Nor can we agree with Bar Counsel that the Board's recommended sanction is excessively lenient in light of cases such as In re Goffe, 641 A.2d 458 (D.C.1994), and In re Corizzi, 803 A.2d 438 (D.C.2002). In Goffe, we disbarred the attorney, explaining that [w]hat most markedly distinguishes this case from any that we have previously seen is the repeated resort not only to false testimony but to the actual manufacture and use of false documentary evidence in official matters. 641 A.2d at 464. In Corizzi, we disbarred an attorney who had counseled his clients to commit perjury to the virtual destruction of their causes. 803 A.2d at 439. While respondent's misconduct involved placing bogus file stamps on purported pleadings, there is no evidence that he submitted such false documents in official proceedings, presented false testimony, or suborned perjury. Thus, although undeniably serious, [12] his conduct, we are satisfied, does not warrant a sanction as severe as the one we imposed in those cases. [13] We also deem it important that, unlike the misconduct at issue in Slaughter, Sheehy, Perrin, and In re Berger, 737 A.2d 1033, 1035 (D.C.1999), cases on which Bar Counsel relies, respondent's misconduct did not involve fraud. Respondent Slaughter's dishonesty caused his law firm to invest over $1.5 million in attorney time and expenses that it would otherwise not have incurred. [14] Slaughter, 929 A.2d 433. In Sheehy, the attorney failed to prepare the client's case, allowed the limitations period to expire, falsely told the client that a settlement had been achieved, and then made a payment to client from personal funds to placate her, withholding a purported fee amount. See 454 A.2d 1360. In Perrin, the attorney admitted that he had participated in a scheme [involving misleading private placement memoranda] to obtain money by making `promises and representations as to the future.' 663 A.2d at 519. And in Berger, the respondent engaged in a series of fraudulent transactions with various insurers on behalf of himself and his firm. See 737 A.2d at 1035. Here, by contrast, nothing in the record suggests that the law firm, the client or any third party was defrauded. We are satisfied with the Board's identification of the relevant facts on this record and with its assessment of how they weigh in determining what sanction is appropriate. We therefore adopt the Board's recommendation that we impose an eighteen-month suspension. In doing so, we recognize both that `[t]he imposition of sanction in bar discipline cases is not an exact science,' and that we owe respect to the considered judgment of the members of the Board. In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 17 (D.C.2005) (quoting In re Austin, 858 A.2d 969, 975 (D.C.2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). [15]