Opinion ID: 2629946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: The District Court's Judgment

Text: [¶ 68] Meima contends that, assuming that this Court affirms the district court on the issues previously discussed herein, the district court's judgment was nevertheless erroneous. He first argues that the district court should have credited Meima for the $15,000.00 in earnest money he paid towards the purchase of the Torrington house. In advancing this argument, Meima does not cite to any pertinent legal authority, or any contractual term, indicating that he was entitled to such a credit. [¶ 69] Meima similarly claims that the district court erred in not granting Meima a $70,000.00 credit for the Celina Flat Mine property. According to Meima, he was entitled to that credit because this property has already been conveyed to Broemmel. Meima does not cite to any pertinent legal authority in advancing this argument, nor does he direct us to any evidence in the record indicating that the Celina Flat Mine property actually was ever conveyed to Broemmel. [32] [¶ 70] Meima lastly asserts that the district court erroneously construed the following term of the parties' agreement on the Baltic properties: 8. [Meima] further grants Tom Broemmel, as trustee, total control of the Baltic properties to sell or do [whatever] is necessary to recover any losses incurred as a result of the purchase of said property. The district court found that the term losses was ambiguous, that the parties anticipated that losses would exist before the Baltic properties were resold, and that one such loss was the $140,000.00 Broemmel paid to exercise the Kubich option. Meima claims that the district court's construction was clearly erroneous and not supported by the evidence and offers his own construction of the provision at issue. [33] [¶ 71] It does not appear from Meima's appellate argument that he disagrees with the district court's finding that the term losses was ambiguous. If a contract term is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be considered to determine the intent of the parties. Brown v. Johnston, 2004 WY 17, ¶ 23, 85 P.3d 422, 429 (Wyo.2004). In that instance, `there exists a question of intent which the trier of fact must resolve.' Western Utility Contractors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 731 P.2d 24, 28 (Wyo.1986) ( quoting Goodwin v. Upper Crust of Wyoming, Inc., 624 P.2d 1192, 1195 (Wyo.1981)). Based on our review of the record, we find no reason to disturb the district court's findings on this issue. See Western Utility Contractors, Inc., 731 P.2d at 28. [¶ 72] We affirm.