Opinion ID: 440199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: coercion of testimony

Text: 51 Smith next contends that Johnson confessed and agreed to testify for the state only because of Johnson's fear of the death penalty. Smith notes that one of the terms of Johnson's plea bargain required him to testify before he received his sentence. Smith argues that he should have received an evidentiary hearing on this issue in the district court. 52 We have little difficulty accepting the validity of the argument that Johnson entered into his plea bargain agreement with the state and testified against Smith because of the possible imposition of the death penalty. Nevertheless, the district court properly held that this claim affords Smith no basis for relief. 53 We have substantial doubt that this claim is one that warrants relief. Cf. United States v. Ballard, 586 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir.1978); Chaney v. Wainwright, 561 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir.1977), 443 U.S. 904, 99 S.Ct. 3095, 61 L.Ed.2d 871 (1979). It is clear that Smith's attorney cross-examined Johnson and revealed the facts underlying Johnson's testimony to the jury, which decided whether or not to believe Johnson. We need not consider this issue on its merits, however, because Smith failed properly to raise it under Florida procedure. The Florida courts have refused to address the issue, see Smith v. State, 400 So.2d 956, 959 (Fla.1981); and, absent a showing of cause for failure properly to preserve the issue and resulting prejudice, the issue is barred from review in the federal courts, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1976). Smith has shown neither cause nor prejudice.