Opinion ID: 1865781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: assignment of error number fifteen

Text: The granting by the trial court of the Motion by State for Independent Mental Examination of Defendant. The trial court ordered a mental examination of defendant by state experts in the middle of trial, but that order was vacated. It is argued that the prospect of the examination adversely affected defense counsel, his client, and the jury. Since the examination never took place, the trial court's error in ordering it is moot. There is no evidence that the threat of the examination affected defense counsel or his client. There is no indication that the jury had knowledge of the proposed examination. This assignment of error lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWENTY-EIGHT The repeated sua sponte interruptions, objections, remarks and comments, both express and implied, made by the trial court, in the presence of the jury, during the direct examination of defense witnesses, and the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, by defense counsel, which were, no doubt, inferred by the trial jurors to be expressions of judicial opinion concerning relevant issues of facts, law and credibility bearing on the question of guilt, thereby affecting the jury in its role as ultimate trier of fact, and causing unfair prejudice to the accused. This assignment contends that the trial court made prejudicial comments on the evidence. Once the trial court ordered counsel to ... please, let's get back to the subject matter of this case, (Tr. 1079) a proper admonition. Maria Krebsbach said I guess I'm lost during the course of her testimony: the trial court commented [t]he observation is correct (Tr. 1553). There was no objection to the remark, which did not prejudice the defense. When the court recessed for lunch, Ms. Krebsbach was on the stand and asked if she could leave. The reply was: [Y]es ma'm. She said Oh well, I ... and was told: [D]on't sit there for an hour and a half. (Tr. 1564) There was no objection to this comment. It was impatient but harmless. When the prosecutor attempted to question Ms. Krebsbach about the effect of World War II on her father, the trial court, after a long dialogue, commented You know we could get to calling everybody in World War II, maybe we should ... (Tr. 1571). The trial court was indicating that the line of questioning was irrelevant. During the examination of Dr. John Wilson, the trial court commented that the witness was creating a problem with his commentary and editorializing on every question. On occasion the trial court also attempted to limit irrelevant and unnecessary examination of various witnesses. LSA-R.S. 15:275. However, the trial court's few remarks do not establish that any impression of the accused's guilt or innocence was conveyed to the jury. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 772; State v. Williams, 375 So.2d 1379 (La., 1979). This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWENTY-NINE The highly improper and inflammatory manner in which the prosecutor utilized and displayed photographic evidence during his impassioned argument to the jury, for the purpose of prejudicing the minds of the jurors against the defendant, deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial in that it caused the jury to return a verdict which was based on prosecutorial passion and prejudice rather than on the actual evidence properly introduced at trial. Defendant contends that the state deprived defendant of a fair trial by the manner in which certain photographic evidence was used in the prosecutor's closing argument. Displaying photographs, the state argued: Does this look like a foxhole or a cave, or does that look like the ride back at the penitentiary? Does this look like a war scene at night or does that look like a police car with sirens on top on a four lane highway in Shreveport, Louisiana? That's a ride back to the penitentiary. Does this look like anything you see in Vietnam. Or does that look like a ride back to the penitentiary.       You show me something that looks like Vietnam in this picture. You decide whether this looks like Vietnam or this looks like a ride back to the penitentiary and you decide if that man did not intend to kill. (Tr. pp. 2344-2346) The use of the evidence and the prosecutor's remarks were within the scope of proper closing argument. Moreover, there was no objection and defense counsel did not ask for an admonition or mistrial. LSA-C.Cr.P. arts. 770, 775. This assignment of error lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THIRTY The prosecutor improperly influenced the jury to unreasonably reject the insanity defense by overemphasizing, and making repeated prejudicial prosecutorial references to, the consequences of the return by the jury of a verdict of `Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity'. It is contended that the prosecutor's argument aroused the passions, prejudice and fears of the jurors and convinced them that an insanity verdict would result in Felde escaping or being released to the detriment of the general public. The following argument was made: If you find him not guilty by reason of insanity, he is not going up to Michigan, or wherever his experts came from, and sit around with a bunch of Viet Nam veterans and talk about things. The Judge will tell you, he is going to a State Hospital until the doctors recommend he be released, and then a judge will decide when that will be six months or a year, five years, whenever a judge decides in the future, upon recommendation of doctors at a State hospital, he must be released, and the judge's decision is reviewable by the Supreme Court as to the merits of that decision. And if he lines up two or three, I mean, goes around, patting them on the back, I'm doing fine, acts real nice, just like he did in the pen, do it two, three, four years, take his medication, act great, recommend his release. And, you know, you can't keep him in jail because he is not going to be in jail. He's going to be in a hospital. He's escaped from the penitentiary. He wants to go to a hospital. He doesn't want to go to the pen for life or possibly face the death sentence. He wants to go to the hospital where he can get out. And, just like he testified, when they didn't give him parole, he got out. And what will he do when they don't turn him loose the first time he wants out? (Tr. 2271-2272) The jury was charged: If a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is returned in a case of this nature, the Court must commit the Defendant to a proper State mental institution or to a private mental institution approved by the Court for custody, care and treatment. The defendant shall not be released until and unless the court determines that he can be released without danger to himself or to others. (Tr. 2366) The prosecutor told the jury that Felde, if found not guilty by reason of insanity, would easily escape. There was no objection. Compare State v. Sharp, 418 So.2d 1344 (La., 1982). Because of the evidence that defendant was an escapee and intended to avoid further jail time, there was a factual basis for the argument. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 774. Although such `... predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict' are improper, it is unlikely, in the context of the entire argument and the court's instructions, that the error contributed to the verdict. State v. Hayes, supra, 364 So.2d at 926. This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THIRTY-ONE The prosecution argument to the trial jury contained comments by the prosecutor to matters not in evidence, thereby adding to the actual evidence in the record through the influence of the prosecutor's official position and causing the jury to arrive at a determination of guilt by giving greater weight to the assertions of the prosecutor than to the actual legal evidence introduced at trial. In rebuttal, the prosecutor referred to things not in evidence when he referred to the automobile seat with the bullet holes from the police car. He implied that the seat was available, but the defense did not want the jury to see it. The bullet holes in the seat, and I believe that we stated in the presence of the Jury the seat was present in the courthouse if anyone wanted it.... (Tr. 2333) It is argued that there was no evidence the seat was available. However, Lieutenant J.O. Blankenship testified that the car seat was present in the courthouse and several photographs of it were admitted in evidence. The brief reference to the car seat was harmless. In his closing argument the prosecutor referred to information in Dr. Marceau's report which was not in evidence. In rebuttal the prosecution referred to statements made by Felde to Dr. Marceau and said that what Felde had said at that time was the truth. The closing references to Dr. Marceau's report were as follows: He examined the Defendant on January 31st, 1979, approximately four months after the incident, and we submit approximately four months after the incident, because it is before the Defendant learned of the possibility of asserting a delayed stress defense. Dr. Marceau examined the Defendant, discussed the fact that the Defendant had been in Viet Nam, discussed the Defendant's drinking problems, the Defendant indicated extreme intoxication, and, thus, under some circumstances, not responsible for his actions, gave certain details of the offense that are not consistent with an alcohol blackout or consistent with a psychotic break or a break from reality, claimed he did not know for sure what he remembered as opposed to what he was told; but told him some things that only the persons in that car would be aware of, like, `Pull the car over, I have a gun.'... (Tr. 2250) In rebuttal, the prosecutor said: And either the doctor made it up or someone made it up and it does not fit in any way as an incriminating piece of evidence in this case that he pulled the gun and told the policeman to pull over, back in January of 1979, when Dr. Marceau spoke with the Defendant. It doesn't fit in any way at that time as incriminating evidence. In fact, it would have been more incriminating for somebody to tell him he pulled the gun and started executing the policeman. But, see, the truth is, obviously, the Defendant told Dr. Marceau what he recalled at the time, four months after the incident. (Tr. 2343-2344) The prosecution erred in quoting from Dr. Marceau's report in his final arguments to the jury. This report was not in evidence. Compare McKenna v. State, 639 P.2d 557 (Nev., 1982) where the conviction was reversed because a court appointed psychiatrist testified about admissions made by the defendant during his psychiatric examination. There was no contemporaneous objection to the comments here and defendant did not request an admonition or move for a mistrial. The argument violated LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 774: The argument shall be confined to evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that the state or defendant may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case. The argument shall not appeal to prejudice. The state's rebuttal shall be confined to answering the argument of the defendant. The prosecution emphasized the fact that Felde apparently told Marceau that he had pulled a gun and told Thompkins to move over, but this does not necessarily negate the defense of insanity at the time of the crime. Felde testified that it was only after the first accidental shot was fired that he did not know what he was doing. The error in quoting from Dr. Marceau's report was not so prejudicial that it requires a new trial. State v. Sharp, supra. The jury was charged that the prosecutor's arguments did not constitute evidence. This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THIRTY-TWO The sua sponte judicial decision to declare a lengthy court recess following the defense closing argument and prior to the rebuttal by the prosecutor resulted in severe prejudice to the defendant, particularly in light of the failure of the trial court to declare such a recess following the closing argument of the prosecution and before the closing argument of the defense. The jury was offered a break at the conclusion of the state's closing argument, and defense counsel neither agreed nor objected. The court said: I am talking to the jury. Are ready to go? No one needs a break, then? Okay. (Tr. 2279) Defense counsel also did not object at the time to the recess he now finds objectionable. Since there was no earlier recess, the twenty minute break for the jury after lengthy arguments was not an abuse of discretion. State v. Gordy, 380 So.2d 1347 (La., 1980); State v. Telford, 384 So.2d 347 (La., 1980); State v. Jones, 412 So.2d 1051 (La., 1982). This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THIRTY-THREE The rebuttal argument of the prosecutor to the trial jurors exceeded the scope of the defense closing argument. Defendant complains again about the mention in rebuttal of information in Dr. Marceau's sanity commission report, cited as an example of calculated prosecutorial overreaching. Since defense counsel alluded to material in Dr. Marceau's report in closing argument, the rebuttal did not exceed the scope of the defense's closing argument. There was no contemporaneous objection, and it is unlikely that the argument had an undue influence on the jury. Defendant also objects to the overruling of his objection to the prosecution reviewing the law on manslaughter, contending this was not proper rebuttal. Defense counsel had referred to the manslaughter statute in his closing argument so the rebuttal argument was proper. This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THIRTY-FOUR The judicial refusal to permit, and the unconstitutional failure of Louisiana codal provisions to provide for, defense rebuttal argument to the trial jury on the affirmative defense of insanity. The state has the right to make the last argument to the jury. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 765; State v. Wiggins, 337 So.2d 1172 (La., 1976). This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THIRTY-FIVE The Louisiana statutory presumption of sanity and the Louisiana codal provisions placing upon the defense the burden of establishing insanity at the time of the offense, are unconstitutional. Defendant's burden of proof on the affirmative defense of insanity is constitutional. State v. Lee, 395 So.2d 700 (La., 1981); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THIRTY-SIX The jury sequestration procedures employed by the trial court failed to properly insulate the jurors from extraneous influences, or the possibility thereof, and throughout the trial there occurred a continuing and substantial failure by the trial court to adhere to the sequestration mandated in a capital case, as repeated contacts, communications and conversations which took place between the jurors and non-juror third parties may well have resulted in the jury verdicts being based upon, and affected by, influences extraneous of the legal evidence introduced at trial. Defendant contends that the jury was not properly insulated from outside influences because the jury room was the most convenient and, at times, the only place where hot coffee could be found. These allegations are unfounded and there is no real basis for the argument. This assignment of error lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THIRTY-SEVEN The prejudicial professional relationship between a trial juror and a prosecution witness whose identity as a member of the sanity commission appointed by the court on motion of the prosecution did not become known by defense counsel until subsequent to the return of the jury verdict. There was apparently a relationship between juror Martha Dominguez, a psychiatric social worker, and a state witness. The record does not reveal with which witness Martha Dominguez was acquainted. It is contended that defense counsel thought defense rebuttal witness, Dr. Joe Ben Hayes, was the witness whom Martha Dominguez knew because the matter was brought up immediately after Dr. Hayes' rebuttal evidence in the following manner: BY THE COURT: Okay. I had one question here by Mrs. Dominguez. She was inquiring about any relationship that a Juror may have to a witness; and I will explain to her and to the Jury on that, if that is agreeable with you. It is almost impossible to pick a Jury that one or the other of the twelve may not have some relationship with some person to appear as a witness. My only inquiry to you, Mrs. Dominguez, is would this relationship at all affect you in rendering a fair and impartial verdict in the case? That is, can you.... BY MRS. DOMINGUEZ: (Juror) A. Not under the circumstances given.... BY THE COURT: That is what I want to know.... BY MRS. DOMINGUEZ: (Juror) A. Not under the circumstances.... BY THE COURT: Whatever relationship you may have to any of the witnesses, you must put it aside and disregard it and weigh the testimony of all witnesses alike, under all of the circumstances, and I will give you some brief explanation of how to evaluate testimony of witnesses, so you will not let that enter.... BY MRS. DOMINGUEZ: A. Not under the circumstances. BY THE COURT: Into your deliberation any more so than the consideration given to other witnesses.... BY MRS. DOMINGUEZ: (Juror) A. No, sir. BY THE COURT: Would not influence you because of your, perhaps, professional or personal relationship with the witness in your deliberation and rendition of verdict? BY MRS. DOMINGUEZ: A. Correct, sir. BY THE COURT: All right. Fine. That's, I didn't think it would but it had to be said. All right.... (Tr. 2241-2243) Defendant alleges in brief that, after the jury commenced deliberations, the judge told him the acquaintance was with Dr. Mauroner, the state witness who testified in rebuttal as a member of the sanity commission and a specialist in psychiatry that Felde was able to distinguish right from wrong. Disclosure during trial that a juror is acquainted with a witness does not necessarily prevent a fair trial. State v. Langendorfer, 389 So.2d 1271 (La., 1980); State v. Daniel, 378 So.2d 1361 (La., 1979). Defense counsel did not attempt at the time to determine the identity of the witness with whom the juror was acquainted and did not move for a mistrial or object in any manner. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 841. The juror's responses indicate that her acquaintance did not affect her verdict. This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBER THIRTY-EIGHT, THIRTY-NINE, FORTY, FORTY-ONE, FORTY-TWO, AND FORTY-THREE A preponderance of the evidence properly introduced at trial clearly established that the defendant was legally insane at the time of the offense charged. (No. 38) The trial jury unreasonably rejected the affirmative defense of insanity as the record of evidence did not reasonably support the finding by the jury that the defendant was both sane and guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (No. 39) The circumstantial evidence relied upon in this case by the prosecution to prove the essential element of `specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm' was not legally sufficient for any rational trier of fact to conclude tha the requisite specific intent had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (No. 40) The evidence properly introduced at trial was insufficient for any rational trial jury to reasonably conclude that the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the requisite presence of the essential element of specific criminal intent was not precluded by the intoxicated or mental condition of the defendant at the time of the offense charged. (No. 41) The legal and competent evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient for any rational trial jury to find that every essential element of the offense of First Degree Murder had been proven beyond all reasonable doubt. (No. 42) The conviction in this case constitutes a deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law as it is based upon alleged conduct of the defendant which is totally attributable to combat infantry training, actual wartime combat experiences, and prolonged dioxin exposure, to which the defendant was subjectedbut for which he was not subsequently treatedby the United States Government. (No. 43) It is contended that the jury erred in finding Felde guilty of first degree murder and rejecting his defense of insanity at the time of the crime on the basis of the evidence presented. Defendant is correct in his contention that the expert testimony about Felde's post-traumatic stress syndrome by Dr. Wilson, Dr. Figley and Dr. Hayes, as well as the lay testimony about the affect of the Vietnam combat on Felde, is very persuasive. However, Dr. Marceau, Dr. Braswell and Dr. Mauroner, the three members of the sanity commission, all testified that defendant was sane at the time of the offense. Both Dr. Marceau and Dr. Mauroner are psychiatrists and a rational jury could have adopted their testimony over that of the defense witnesses. It is also argued that there was no evidence of specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and that, in his intoxicated state and mental condition, defendant was unable to have such an intent. There was evidence that indicated Felde deliberately killed officer Thompkins in order to escape. Felde's intoxication was apparently not total because he was able to get out of the police car, cross the median, negotiate the automobile lot, travel some additional distance and reload his gun while handcuffed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could have found that defendant failed to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence and that he had the specific intent to inflict great bodily harm or kill officer Thompkins. State v. Claibon, 395 So.2d 770 (La., 1981); State v. Lee, 395 So.2d 700 (La., 1981). These assignments lack merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FORTY-FOUR The defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial due to adherence by defense counsel to an employment condition set by the defendant that defense counsel not attempt to obtain any jury verdicts other than `Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity' or `Guilty of First Degree Murder' with Capital Punishment. It is contended that defense counsel's agreement with Felde that he would not attempt to obtain any verdict other than not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty of first degree murder with capital punishment denied Felde his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. LSA-Const. Art. 1, § 13; U.S. Constitution, Amend. 5. Felde required this of his counsel as a condition of employment. To establish ineffective representation, it must be shown that counsel did not meet the level of competency normally demanded in criminal cases. An adequate defense must be based on informed professional deliberation. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Marzullo v. State of Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied 433 U.S. 1011 (1978); Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 4:2 George Mason University Law Review at 241. Here, counsel, by agreement with his client, made an informed and deliberate decision not to ask for life imprisonment. In his closing argument defense counsel said, first degree murder, the best thing you can do for him, if you don't go with insanity, is first degree murder with the death penalty. (Tr. 2325) This could have been a calculated ploy, an all or nothing gamble. Compare Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642 (6 Cir.1981). Under our adversary system, once a defendant has the assistance of counsel the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during trial rests with the accused and his attorney. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 at 512, 96 S.Ct. 1691 at 1697, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 at 135 (1976). The fact that a particular strategy is unsuccessful does not establish ineffective assistance. Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086 (5 Cir.1982). After the jury determined that Felde was guilty of first degree murder, the sentencing hearing was held immediately by agreement of counsel without objection by any of the jurors. The state presented no further evidence. The jury, during the guilt phase of trial, had heard extensive evidence about mitigating circumstances and had been exposed to a tremendous amount of sympathetic testimony about Felde. Compare Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879 (5 Cir.1982). The factual synopsis does not fully reflect the defense effort. Defense counsel argued at the sentencing hearing as follows: I think we all.... No, I can't say that. I feel that he has gone through hell for a long time and I can't see him going down to Angola in his condition and being subjected to what he would be subjected to there. So I am not going to ask you to do what I think would probably be the merciful thing to do. I am not going to ask you to do that myself. He is going to have to do that because I don't think I can, but I believe when you all were elected as Jurors you'd said you could apply the death penalty and I think it would be pretty.... I think if you return the verdict that was returned you probably have to impose the death penalty, I would think. (Tr. 2383) Wayne Robert Felde testified and advised the jury to return the death penalty and stated in response to counsel's question that he would be unable to control his future actions if the death penalty was not returned: BY MR. FELDE: A. All I can say to you all is.... I would advise you to return the death penalty in this case.... Keith Oliver, I know your cousin Joe Oliver. We were cell partners for about eight (8) months.... Mr. Coker, I know one of your good friends, too, Tommy Strange. We picked this Jury and we picked them on intelligence. I consider all of you people intelligent so I hope you will take my advice, return the death penalty. Thank you. BY MR. THOMAS: Q. What if .... the death penalty is not returned, Wayne, do you think you will be able to control your actions in the future? Can you guarantee them that you could control your actions if you would(Interrupted) A. I think other deaths will result. Yes, Mr. Thomas, I do. And that's why I suggested it, to prevent it from happening. They would be on your conscience if you can't return it. Now, I'm not trying to put you all in a bad position but you all are taking other people's lives in your hands, along with mine, so I think you should return it. I don't think no more needs to be said, Mr. Thomas. They're upset. Thank you. (Tr. 2385-2386) Defense counsel later made a closing argument in which he said in part: ... And at this point, I believe there is only one kind of help you can give him because I am not going to stand up here and tell you that you are doing him a favor by giving him life, because Angola is hell and for a crippled man it's hell twice over, and I think that's where he is going to go, first degree murder of a Shreveport policeman. (Tr. 2390)       ... I'm waiting for something to come in here and tell me, you know, there's some reason I should ask you to spare this man but there's not. There, honestly, is not. There's not one reason that I can think of for him to continue to experience what he has been experiencing. I cannot think of one reason... (Tr. 2391-2392) Felde then made a closing argument as co-counsel: I'm not coming out and threatening anybody because that's not what it is. A walking time bomb, that's what it is. Somebody else will die as a result of it if I'm not put to death, I am sure. It's happened twice in eight years. There's been ten years of proof shown to you. I don't known where it went so, please, return that. I think, as countrymen, you owe me that much. I did my part. Please do yours. Okay? (Tr. 2393) There was no evidence other than Felde's testimony at the sentencing hearing. In State v. Clark, 387 So.2d 1124 (La., 1980) defendant Clark told the jury he wanted to be sentenced to death but his counsel argued mitigating circumstances to the jury. Here, even after the guilty verdict, both Felde and his counsel pressed for the death penalty at the penalty phase of trial. After the jury rejected the claim of not guilty by reason of insanity, there is a grave question whether counsel could honor the agreement with his client and maintain a plea for the death penalty. In Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511, 597 P.2d 273 (1979) defendant was allowed to represent himself, but the court appointed standby counsel. At the sentencing hearing, the state presented evidence of five aggravating circumstances: defendant refused to present any evidence of mitigating circumstances. Standby counsel informed the court that there were mitigating circumstances Bishop refused to allow them to present. Subsequently, on appeal, it was claimed that the court panel erred in not hearing evidence of mitigating circumstances. The court stated: In the case at hand, Bishop had ample opportunity to present evidence of mitigating circumstances; however, he made it clear that he did not want to present or have standby counsel present such evidence. He had a Sixth Amendment right not to have counsel forced upon him. Faretta [v. California ], [422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562] supra. When a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel, as here, his refusal to present a defense does not negate his pro per election. People v. Teron, supra [23 Cal.3d 131, 151 Cal.Rptr. 653, 588 P.2d 773 (Cal., 1979)]. `Under Faretta, the state may not constitutionally prevent a defendant charged with a commission of a criminal offense from controlling his own fate by forcing on him counsel who may present a case which is not consistent with the actual wishes of the defendant.' Curry v. Superior Court, 75 Cal.App.3d 221, 141 Cal. Rptr. 884, 887 (1977). For this reason, the sentencing tribunal did not err when it did not delve into the mitigating evidence referred to by the standby counsels. 597 P.2d 276. In the Bishop case an application for stay of execution was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 100 S.Ct. 29, 62 L.Ed.2d 20 (1979). The dissent claimed that the death penalty was being triggered by the arbitrary factor of the defendant's decision to acquiesce in his own death. However, that was not the view of the majority of the court. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 97 S.Ct. 436, 50 L.Ed.2d 632 (1976). [18] Bishop controls this issue. Felde, mentally competent to stand trial and enrolled as cocounsel, had a constitutional right to impose a condition of employment on his counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Thus, a defendant can limit his defense consistent with his wishes at the penalty phase of trial. Bishop, supra. A defendant can also waive post-conviction habeas corpus remedies. Gilmore, supra. A defendant cannot waive his right to appeal a death sentence. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.9; People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal.2d 820, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889 (1969); Goode v. State, 365 So.2d 381 (Fla., 1978). Felde has had an excellent presentation of his appeal. Counsel's agreement not to ask the jury for life imprisonment does not invalidate his conviction or sentence. This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FORTY-FIVE The defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel by the failure of defense counsel to voice timely contemporaneous objections, to request appropriate jury admonitions, and to move for mistrials, in numerous trial situations where the circumstances presented clearly required that such action be undertaken in order to protect and preserve the rights of defendant. Defense counsel claims that he denied Wayne Felde effective assistance of counsel. On the contrary, the record reveals that he made an unusually vigorous and spirited defense. The representation here was within the upper range of competence. This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FORTY-SIX Newly discovered evidence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, which was not discoverable before or during the trial despite the exercise of reasonable diligence, would probably have changed the jury verdict of `guilty' to a verdict of `not guilty by reason of insanity', had that evidence been available for introduction at trial. Defendant contends that, after the verdicts were rendered, counsel first received addresses for three of the eight members of Wayne Felde's unit in Vietnam. It is argued that a new trial should have been granted, because this testimony, not previously available, would have substantiated the defense of post-traumatic stress disorder. The expert and lay testimony on this point was quite comprehensive and the desired testimony would merely have been cumulative. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 854 [19] provides that the newly discovered whereabouts or residence of a witness does not constitute newly discovered evidence. Further there was no statement of the facts which would be established by this new evidence. The new trial was properly denied. This assignment of error lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FORTY-SEVEN The unreasonable and arbitrary ex parte action of the trial court in summarily quashing defense process which had properly issued for the hearing on the Defense Motion for New Trial. Defense counsel subpoenaed the prosecutor for the hearing on the motion for new trial but the trial court excused the prosecutor from the subpoena. Since the subpoena was served late and the prosecutor was unable to appear, the trial court was within its discretion in quashing the subpoena on the ground that it was oppressive. This assignment of error lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FORTY-EIGHT The denial by the trial court of the Defense Motion for New Trial. Defendant contends that a new trial should have been granted because DSM-III, the Diagnostic and Statistic Manuel III of the American Psychiatric Association first recognized post-traumatic stress disorder in 1980, only months prior to trial. However, there was trial testimony that the American Psychiatric Association recognizes this disorder. Although the DSM-III has been adopted in Louisiana hospitals since the trial, this factor is not so material that it would be likely to produce a different result. State v. Talbot, 408 So.2d 861 (La., 1981). This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FORTY-NINE The failure of the trial court to grant the Defense Motion for Payment of Trial Expenses. This assignment of error is irrelevant to defendant's appeal. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FIFTY The Uniform Capital Sentence Report of the trial judge. Defense counsel contends that the uniform capital sentencing report submitted by the trial judge reflects a negative attitude toward the defendant because it contains erroneous information and that this attitude toward the defendant was conveyed to the jury during trial. The report is inaccurate in two particulars. It states that defendant completed the eleventh grade, whereas he graduated from high school. It states that Felde was sentenced to fifteen years for second degree murder and five years concurrently for four counts of assault, but the second degree murder conviction was reversed. Defendant received a total of twelve years when he pled guilty to manslaughter and four counts of assault. This erroneous information could not have had any bearing on the jury's decision because the correct information was introduced in testimony at trial. The trial transcript does not establish a negative attitude by the trial court; the errors in the sentencing report were apparently inadvertent. Defendant also contends that he did not receive a copy of the capital sentence report as required by LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.9.1, § 3. [20] However, this technical omission did not harm the defendant. This assignment lacks merit.