Opinion ID: 1791305
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Actual v. Partial Dependency

Text: Having determined that non-resident foreign nationals may qualify as dependents under our workers' compensation statute, we now turn to the primary factual dispute in this case: the relative amount of support received by these parents from their deceased son during the applicable time period.
Before we reach this case's merits, we must consider the evidentiary issues that the Consulate has raised. [9] We reject the Consulate's arguments against the admission of Mr. Perez's testimony under the business records exception to the hearsay rule and affirm the trial court's decision to admit all of the evidence in this record. The business records exception, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(6), provides, in pertinent part, that [a] . . . record[] or data compilation . . . made at or near the time by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge and a business duty to record or transmit if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the . . . record or data compilation is admissible despite it being hearsay. First, the Consulate objects to Mr. Perez's testimony because he was not a person with knowledge and a business duty to record or transmit, or a qualified custodian of, the records under the exception. This argument does not persuade us. Whatever his or her title[,] to qualify as a custodian under the exception, the witness must be able to testify as to the identity of the record, the mode of preparation, and whether the record was made in the regular course of business at or near the time of the recorded event. State v. Baker, 842 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tenn.Crim. App.1992). In addition, [i]t is sufficient if the person laying the foundation for the record testifies that the regular business procedure is for a person with personal knowledge of the recorded event to provide information or make the entry. Neil P. Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence § 8.11[4] (5th ed.2005); see also Witter v. Nesbit, 878 S.W.2d 116, 122 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993). Though Mr. Perez was Intermex's chief compliance officer, with the duties already described above, and not the local Intermex agent who processed Employee's transactions, Mr. Perez nevertheless testified in detail to all of the Baker requirements and to the process by which a local Intermex agent keyed in data to Intermex's database at the time of each transfer. Second, the Consulate argues that Mr. Perez's testimony regarding the compilation of the eleven Intermex transfers does not satisfy the exception because the compilation was made in preparation for litigation years after Employee's transaction, not at or near the time that Employee wired funds via Intermex. This argument also does not persuade us, for two reasons. First, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 1006 permits a trial court to admit a summary of voluminous writings. Such a summary, like the one at issue in this case, would, by necessity, be prepared in anticipation of litigation. See Alexander v. Inman, 903 S.W.2d 686, 702 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). Second, so long as the data included in a compilation otherwise satisfies the business records exception, the fact that a compilation of admissible business records was created during litigation does not disqualify it as a business record under the exception. See, e.g., 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1303 (1995); State v. Robinson, 272 Neb. 582, 724 N.W.2d 35, 65-67 (2006); J.L. v. State, 789 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind.App.2003). Mr. Perez's testimony supports a finding that each piece of data on the compilation complies with the business records exception: (1) as discussed above, Mr. Perez's testimony is, as a matter of law, by a person with knowledge and a business duty to record or transmit the data in question; (2) Mr. Perez stated that an Intermex agent input into their computer system data regarding a transfer when a transaction was initiated, constituting a record . . . made . . . at or near the time of a regularly conducted business activity; and (3) Mr. Perez's testimony showed that it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the . . . record because Mr. Perez indicated that Intermex stored data from each and every transaction it handled in its computer database. Therefore, it was within the discretion of the trial court to admit Mr. Perez's testimony and the compilation under the exception. We affirm the trial court's ruling on this issue.
Having decided, as the trial court did, to admit all of the evidence in this record, we reach this case's merits. We hold that Ms. Pedraza and Mr. Diaz are only partial dependents under the statute because Mr. Diaz earned income at the time of [Employee's] death and for a reasonable period of time immediately prior thereto. To qualify as an actual dependent, Ms. Pedraza and Mr. Diaz must have been [a m]other [or] father . . . who [was] wholly supported by the deceased employee at the time of death and for a reasonable period of time immediately prior thereto. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-210(c) (1999). By contrast, Ms. Pedraza and Mr. Diaz were only partial dependents if they were [a] member of a class named in subsection (c) who regularly derived part of such member's support from the wages of the deceased employee at the time of death and for a reasonable period of time immediately prior thereto. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-210(d) (1999) (emphasis added). [10] Thus, we must focus our inquiry on whether Employee wholly or in part supported his parents and whether that support came at the time of death and for a reasonable period of time immediately prior thereto. [11] Although noted by the trial court only in passing, it is undisputed in the record that, at the time of Employee's death and immediately prior to that time, Mr. Diaz worked and earned money for the benefit of his household. Beginning in September 2002, Mr. Diaz returned to work at a local gas company, earning 90 pesos per day for an unspecified number of days per week. On October 3, 2002, Employee died. Thus, we conclude that Mr. Diaz and Ms. Pedraza were not wholly supported by Employee at the time of [his] death. As a matter of law, we hold that Employee's parents were partial dependents [12] at the time of his death [13] and thus reverse the judgment of the trial court below on this issue. Because we cannot determine from the record the total award due to the parents, we remand this case to the trial court for a determination of the benefit due to the parents as partial dependents under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-210(d).