Opinion ID: 423614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of the NEPA Claims on the Preliminary Injunction Decision

Text: 11 We recognize two sets of standards for evaluating claims to injunctive relief, which we have termed the traditional and the alternative tests. See Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v. Andrus, 648 F.2d 496, 501 (9th Cir.1980). The traditional equitable criteria for determining whether an injunction should issue are 12 (1) Have the movants established a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) does the balance of irreparable harm favor the movants; (3) does the public interest favor granting the injunction? 13 Id. The alternative test permits the moving party to meet its burden by demonstrating either a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. Benda v. Grand Lodge of IAM, 584 F.2d 308, 314-15 (9th Cir.1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 937, 99 S.Ct. 2065, 60 L.Ed.2d 667 (1979); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir.1975). The district court here expressly applied both tests, and held that plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction under either. We reverse an order issuing or denying a preliminary injunction only if the lower court abused its discretion, or based its decision upon erroneous legal premises. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.1980). 14 The plaintiffs identify as legal error the district court's holding that they lacked standing to raise NEPA claims. That holding is in serious doubt at least as to Inyo, in light of our intervening decision in California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.1982). We there held that a governmental entity in geographical proximity to the site of proposed action, and which must under NEPA be consulted in the EIS process, has standing to challenge the EIS. Id. at 776. 15 Assuming NEPA standing exists, however, it would not affect all of the factors which the district court considered. Because the NEPA claims are essentially similar to the FLPMA claims which the district court recognized plaintiffs had standing to raise, the injury to the plaintiffs is the same under both statutes. In addition, neither side contends that adding NEPA claims would materially affect the district court's analysis of the plaintiffs' likely success on the merits. 16 The only question then is whether plaintiffs are correct in their position that the existence of a probable NEPA violation affects the district court's assessment of the public interest. Plaintiffs contend that recognizing their NEPA claims would require us to hold that a preliminary injunction must issue in this case. For the purpose of considering this argument we assume not only that plaintiffs have standing to pursue the NEPA claims but also that they have made a strong showing on the merits. 17 The presence of strong NEPA claims gives rise to more liberal standards for granting an injunction. See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549, 552 n. 2 (9th Cir.1977); Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937, 96 S.Ct. 299, 46 L.Ed.2d 271 (1975); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1184 (6th Cir.1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir.1972). The premise for relaxing the equitable tests in NEPA cases is that irreparable damage may be implied from the failure of responsible authorities to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a proposed federal action. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 330 (9th Cir.1975). In many instances those charging NEPA violations are able to make a compelling showing of imminent and irreversible harm unless the governmental action is stayed. See, e.g., Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1116-17 (9th Cir.1971). 18 There are nevertheless cases where public concerns other than failure to comply with NEPA must be weighed in determining whether to grant an injunction. In Alpine Lakes Protection Society v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir.1975), we held that unusual circumstances required the court to determine whether the equities in fact favored an injunction. Id. at 1090. The plaintiffs there sought, on NEPA grounds, to enjoin a grant of access which permitted the logging of infested trees. The court held that the balance of equities weighed against the injunction. It looked both to the risk that the timber would be worthless if not promptly removed, and to the risk that the tree infestation would spread to adjacent national forestlands. In denying the injunction it stated that defendants had shown a more tangible and immediate harm, as well as a stronger public interest. Id. 19 Alpine thus authorizes the court not only to weigh the relative hardship and harms to the parties, but to examine how the greater public interest may be affected in the unusual case where enjoining government action allegedly in violation of NEPA might actually jeopardize natural resources. Cf. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 407-08, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 2729, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976) (no grounds for NEPA injunction where party seeking one would suffer no harm and opposing party showed irreparable harm and injury to the public interest). 20 As in Alpine, it is clear in this case that strong environmental considerations militated against enjoining the Plan. The district court found there was a danger of harm to the fragile desert resources of the CDCA if the Plan's restrictions were lifted and plaintiffs were allowed to pursue increased motor vehicle use. 534 F.Supp. at 937. This danger of harm is the kind of unusual circumstance which we said in Alpine calls for the individual weighing of the equities. 518 F.2d at 1090. 21 Our decision in Alpine does not stand in isolation. Other circuits have also held that a showing of NEPA violation should not automatically lead to an injunction where other public interests may be adversely affected. Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 457 (D.C.Cir.1977); New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 550 F.2d 745, 753-55 (2d Cir.1977). 22 The district court in this case did engage in the required weighing, and it concluded that the balance favored the government because enjoining the Plan would leave fragile desert resources vulnerable to permanent damage from increased recreational use, a harm which Congress expressly intended to prevent. 534 F.Supp. at 937. Plaintiffs assert, though not strenuously, that they demonstrated that the Plan would cause environmental harm. Many of the allegations in the district court primarily concerned reduced recreation and development opportunities, which the district court properly viewed as posing no danger of irreparable injury to the environment or to the public interest. 23 More serious allegations of injury concerned inconsistencies between the Plan and Inyo's county plan; but we conclude, however, that the district court properly determined that the harm to Inyo's planning processes was not comparable to the harm enjoining the Plan would cause to the CDCA and the public interest. We agree with the district court's observation that while the claimed procedural deficiencies in the Plan's adoption have caused uncertainty in Inyo's planning process, issuance of a preliminary injunction would do little to redress that injury, since the Plan's validity will remain uncertain until judgment has been entered on the merits in this action. 534 F.Supp. at 937. The district court's analysis is supported by the record and its decision must therefore be affirmed. 24 One aspect of the district court's analysis deserves some clarification, however. The court stated that it was adopting a special injunction requirement for environmental cases so that, under either of our two preliminary injunction tests, it would consider whether the public interest is advanced by issuance of an injunction. 534 F.Supp. at 929. This was no doubt because the alternative test does not expressly recite the public interest as a factor to be considered. A Supreme Court decision issued since the district court decided this case clarifies the matter, however, by holding that the public interest is a factor which courts must consider in any injunctive action in which the public interest is affected. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1803, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982); see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440-41, 64 S.Ct. 660, 674-75, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944). This recognition of the obligation to protect the public interest in injunction cases does not detract from the correctness of the district court's analysis; the court was indeed required to consider the public interest. It simply needed no special rule in order to do so. 25 Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that enjoining the plan would not be in the public interest. Congress expressly found that the CDCA is a total eco-system that is extremely fragile, easily scarred, and slowly healed. 43 U.S.C. § 1781(a)(2). Congress' overriding concern was to provide for the immediate and future protection and administration of the public lands in the California desert. 43 U.S.C. § 1781(b). The Plan seeks to accommodate economic, educational, scientific and recreational uses in the unique setting created by the fragility of desert lands, and by the stress that human use places upon arid eco-systems. Plan at 5-6. There is ample support for the district court's conclusion that the public interest in protecting and managing the CDCA would be severely disserved by enjoining the Plan. 26 We conclude that the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction was not an abuse of its discretion, and was based on correct legal premises. 27 Affirmed.