Opinion ID: 2092615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Choose v. Byrne

Text: Right to Choose v. Byrne is this Court's seminal case addressing equal protection and abortion rights under the New Jersey Constitution. 91 N.J. 287, 450 A. 2d 925 (1982). The New Jersey Legislature had restricted state Medicaid funding of abortions to only those abortions necessary to preserve the life of the mother. Id. at 294, 450 A. 2d 925. The statute thereby premised funding on the distinction between an abortion necessary to preserve a woman's life and an abortion necessary to protect a woman's health. Id. at 292, 450 A. 2d 925. At the time the Court decided Right to Choose, the Supreme Court of the United States had recently handed down Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2693, 65 L.Ed. 2d 784, 811 (1980), which held that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit Congress from proscribing the use of Medicaid funds for an abortion except when required to save the life of the mother. We held to the contrary under equal protection principles found in our State Constitution. Right to Choose, supra, 91 N.J. at 310, 450 A. 2d 925. Right to Choose, in considering the state equal protection claim, first applied the analytical framework developed by the United States Supreme Court in parallel cases under the Federal Constitutiona tiered equal protection analysis generally using either a rational-basis or strict-scrutiny review. Right to Choose, supra, 91 N.J. at 305-06, 450 A. 2d 925 (citing, e.g., San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1293-94, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 39-41 (1973); Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. at 163-65, 93 S.Ct. at 731-33, 35 L.Ed. 2d at 182-84). We observed, however, that in cases involving a classification that indirectly infringes on a fundamental right, Right to Choose, supra, 91 N.J. at 310, 450 A. 2d 925, the inflexibility of the tiered framework prevents a full understanding of the clash between individual and governmental interests. Id. at 308-09, 450 A. 2d 925. Rather, we adopted a test that weighed the governmental interest in the statutory classification against the interests of the affected class. Subsequently, in Greenberg, we explained: In striking the balance, we have considered the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction. [ Supra, 99 N.J. at 567, 494 A. 2d 294.] In Right to Choose, the Court placed a woman's health and privacy on one side of the scale and weighed those interests against the State's interest in potential life. Supra, 91 N.J. at 310, 450 A. 2d 925. The Court held that the government had unreasonably interfered with a woman's fundamental right to choose an abortion when necessary to protect her life or health. Ibid. The Court declined, however, to hold that all statutory funding restrictions on abortion are unconstitutional. Ibid. Instead, it decided that the State's equal protection guarantee barred discrimination against a particular class of pregnant women because it could not be justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 308, 310, 450 A. 2d 925. In lieu of striking the entire statute, the State was required to fund those abortions medically necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. Id. at 312, 450 A. 2d 925; cf. Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 94, 662 A. 2d 367 (1995) (applying equal protection balancing test enunciated in Right to Choose ); Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 576, 494 A. 2d 294 (same). That holding, consistent with New Jersey's more expansive constitutional provision, gave women seeking to exercise their right to choose greater protection than the protection afforded in Harris v. McRae .