Opinion ID: 169770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discrimination on the Basis of Disability

Text: To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Mr. Jones must show: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job he holds or desires; and (3) UPS discriminated against him because of his disability. See MacKenzie, 414 F.3d at 1274. The District Court held that Mr. Jones failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the first element, so it did not address the second and third elements. We agree that Mr. Jones failed to introduce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is disabled. The ADA defines disability ... with respect to an individual as (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). In the present case, Mr. Jones does not argue that he is actually disabled or that he has a record of a disability. Rather, he contends that UPS regarded him as disabled. To prevail on a regarded-as claim, a plaintiff must show that an employer has mistaken beliefs about the plaintiff's abilities: the employer must believe either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). Moreover, the employer must mistakenly believe that the impairment substantially limits the employee in one or more major life activities. See id. (stating that the regarded as standard is met when an employer mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities or when an employer mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities). Mr. Jones contends that UPS discriminated against him based on a mistaken belief that his shoulder injury substantially limits him in the major life activity of working. [8] See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (identifying working as a major life activity). He maintains that UPS's belief regarding the extent of his impairment is mistaken because Dr. Poppa and Dr. Legler (at least initially) cleared him to work as a package car driver without any lifting restrictions. The District Court held that UPS did not regard him as disabled because it relied on doctors' evaluations to determine whether Mr. Jones could return to work. The court reasoned that, because UPS relied on these evaluations, it did not mistakenly perceive Mr. Jones as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Although we agree with the District Court's conclusion, we do not entirely agree with its reasoning. Reasonable reliance on a medical opinion may demonstrate that an employer did not act on the myths, fears, and stereotypes associated with disability that the regarded as definition of disability was designed to redress. See Rakity v. Dillon Cos., 302 F.3d 1152, 1162-63 (10th Cir.2002); Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1241-42 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Brunko v. Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir.2001) (noting that employer's perception was not based on myths or archaic attitudes about the disabled because it was based on the treating physician's recommendations regarding the plaintiff's ability to lift). In addition, an employer's disregard for or disinterest in medical judgments regarding an employee's condition may support the opposite inferencethat an employment action was impermissibly based on myths or stereotypes associated with disabilities. See Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1134 (10th Cir. 2003); McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir.2001); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2( l ) (indicating that an employer regards an employee as disabled if it makes an employment decision because of a perception of disability based on `myth, fear or stereotype'). [9] In the case before us, the record contains evidence that UPS not only deliberately ignored medical evidence related to Mr. Jones's current ability to perform the essential functions of his position, but also actively interfered with the process by which he was evaluated. But although this evidence undercuts the District Court's conclusion that UPS's perception was based on medical judgment (and therefore not mistaken), a genuine issue of material fact concerning the basis for UPS's perception of Mr. Jones's abilities is not enough to survive summary judgment. Even if UPS mistakenly believed that Mr. Jones could not perform the essential functions of his particular job, it did not regard him as disabled unless it also mistakenly believed that his impairment substantially limited him in a major life activity (in this case, the major life activity of working). See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139; see also Doebele, 342 F.3d at 1133 (noting that an employee must show both that the employer regarded her as substantially limited in the major life activity of working and that the mistaken belief regarding her limitations was based on myth, fear, or stereotype). Unless UPS mistakenly believed Mr. Jones was substantially limited in a major life activity, it was free to decide that his lifting restrictions (real or perceived) prevented him from returning to his job as a package car driver. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490-91, 119 S.Ct. 2139 ([A]n employer . . . is free to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for a job.). Consequently, we will not reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment unless the record contains evidence that UPS viewed Mr. Jones as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. According to the EEOC regulations, in the context of the major life activity of working, the term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis added); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs.). Mr. Jones must therefore present evidence that UPS mistakenly believed his shoulder injury significantly restricted his ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs as compared to similarly trained persons. EEOC v. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted). As we have previously explained, the determination of whether an employee is regarded as disabled in the major life activity of working has a strong subjective component. Id. at 1163. To show UPS regarded him as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, Mr. Jones must therefore show that UPS  subjectively believed [him] to be significantly restricted as to a class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes. Id. The determination of what constitutes a class or broad range of jobs requires, however, an objective inquiry. Id. Thus, we first determine whether UPS subjectively believed Mr. Jones to be substantially limited in his ability to perform other jobs (in addition to his job as a package car driver). See id. at 1166. If UPS treated Mr. Jones as significantly restricted in jobs other than the one he held at UPS, we then determine whether the jobs from which Mr. Jones was regarded as restricted constitute a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. Id. at 1166-67. A class of jobs includes `the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within [the employee's] geographical area,' id. at 1164 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)), whereas a broad range of jobs includes `the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities within that geographical area,' id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C)). As evidence that UPS regarded him as substantially restricted in a class or broad range of jobs, Mr. Jones emphasizes that UPS did not consider him for any other position at the James Street facility where he worked or another nearby facility. In other words, he argues that UPS's failure to offer him reassignment within the company is evidence of its subjective belief that he is substantially limited in performing other jobs. We find this argument unavailing for a number of reasons. First, we note that Mr. Jones does not argue that UPS viewed him as substantially limited in his ability to perform a class of jobs because UPS believed he could not perform other jobs with similar lifting requirements (e.g., jobs loading and unloading trucks). Instead, he argues that, because UPS is a large company with numerous job openings for a variety of positions, its failure to offer him a position without similar lifting requirements is evidence that UPS viewed him as unable to perform a broad range of jobs. To reach this conclusion, he argues that the objective determination of what constitutes a broad range of jobs depends on the range of jobs offered by UPS, rather than the range of jobs available to him within his geographical area. But, as noted above, we look at the range of jobs within the geographical area. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (noting that, when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working, courts should consider, among other things, the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access). We acknowledge, of course, that, when an employer is hiring for a broad range of jobs in the relevant geographical area, its decision not to offer an employee one of a broad range of company jobs may be relevant evidence of its perception of that employee's abilities. See Doebele, 342 F.3d at 1134 (considering employer's failure to offer plaintiff a job, when it was hiring 200-300 people each week, as evidence employer regarded plaintiff as disabled). Here, however, the record demonstrates that UPS believed Mr. Jones was ineligible for jobs without similar lifting requirements under the collective bargaining agreement. [10] Thus, even if UPS had open positions without similar lifting requirements, it could not consider Mr. Jones for these positions without disregarding its understanding of the collective bargaining agreement. [11] See EEOC v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir.2007) (reasoning that employer did not regard plaintiff as disabled when all available truck-driving jobs at company were subject to safety standard that plaintiff could not meet). Moreover, because UPS did not believe he was eligible for other jobs, Mr. Jones's allegations that UPS applied a 100%-healed policy are of no consequence; even if UPS applied such a policy in refusing to return Mr. Jones to work, it did not use the policy to exclude him from a broad range of company jobs. See Henderson, 247 F.3d at 653 (Where the 100% rule is applied to mildly impaired persons to exclude them from a broad class of jobs, it may be treating them as disabled even if they are not ....); see also id. at 653 n. 6 (explaining that the variability and type of jobs available are relevant in determining whether an employer applying a 100%-healed policy regards an employee as disabled). Furthermore, Mr. Jones offers no evidence that UPS did not consider him for particular jobs because it viewed him as substantially restricted in his ability to do these other jobs. Cf. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d at 1166 (noting that a jury could infer from the evidence that employer believed the plaintiff was restricted in ability to do any kitchen job and any other job where there is a chance of bleeding and thereby transmitting hepatitis); McKenzie, 242 F.3d at 971-72 (noting employer's statements, including statement that plaintiff `would be better off in some other field,' were evidence that plaintiff was regarded as disabled in class of jobs). For example, he has not presented any evidence indicating that UPS would refuse to consider him for another job if it had an opening for a job he could perform with his lifting restrictions without violating the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. See Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.3d at 512 (reasoning that given the absence of [job] openings, a mistaken belief that [plaintiff] was disqualified from all driving jobs cannot be inferred from the fact that the company didn't offer him a driving job). In short, because Mr. Jones has not identified a broad range of jobs that UPS mistakenly believed he was substantially limited in performing, his regarded-as claim may not survive summary judgment.