Opinion ID: 2458734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue One: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Text: Levy argues his life sentence with a mandatory minimum of 25 years ordered pursuant to Jessica's Law violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. But the substance of Levy's argument may not be analyzed without first determining whether the issue is properly preserved. Generally, claims of constitutional error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but there are some recognized exceptions. See State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 159, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008). Levy argues the issue was preserved, instead of invoking an exception. Levy concedes, and the sentencing hearing record reflects, that no specific objection was made to the district court about Levy's sentence being cruel and unusual. But Levy argues his counsel's characterization of the sentence as excessive in the written departure motion and repeated orally at sentencing properly preserved the issue for appeal. Specifically, in his departure motion, Levy's counsel stated: The defendant is now 21 years of age and was only 20 at the time of the alleged offense. A minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years is excessive on the facts of this case and circumstances in the instant case. And prior to the district court handing down Levy's sentence, while arguing for the downward departure, defense counsel said, The defendant, at the time this offense was committed, was twenty years old; was an adult by two years. And a term of twenty-five years, given this defendant and these facts, we think is excessive in this case. Levy acknowledges he did not use the phrase cruel and unusual punishment or violation of the Eighth Amendment, but urges this court to find that an inquiry into this issue should have been made nevertheless. But the test is not simply whether certain catch phrases were used in making an argument about cruel and unusual punishment. See State v. Mondragon, 289 Kan. 1158, 1164, 220 P.3d 369 (2009) (Because there was no effort before the district court to present the issue of whether a Jessica's Law sentence is cruel or unusual, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.). In State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 574 P.2d 950 (1978), this court listed three relevant factors in determining whether a sentence violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. They are: (1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be examined with particular regard to the degree of danger present to society; relevant to this inquiry are the facts of the crime, the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the extent of culpability for the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the prescribed punishment; (2) A comparison of the punishment with punishment imposed in this jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and if among them are found more serious crimes punished less severely than the offense in question the challenged penalty is to that extent suspect; and (3) A comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the same offense. 223 Kan. at 367, 574 P.2d 950. Freeman did not require that the defendant address these three factors first with the district court, but more recent decisions from this court do. For example, in State v. Garza, 290 Kan. 1021, 1032-34, 236 P.3d 501 (2010), we rejected the defendant's argument for cruel and unusual punishment because it was not preserved. In Garza, the defendant argued he advanced the issue when he stated in his departure motion at the trial level only that the statutory minimum sentence would `amount to cruel and unusual punishment.' 290 Kan. at 1032, 236 P.3d 501. We held the issue was not preserved. 290 Kan. at 1034, 236 P.3d 501 (citing State v. Morningstar, 289 Kan. 488, Syl. ¶ 4, 213 P.3d 1045 [2009]). Previous decisions by this court similarly barred a defendant's cruel and unusual punishment argument for lacking preservation. See State v. Trevino, 290 Kan. 317, 320-22, 227 P.3d 951 (2010); Mondragon, 289 Kan. at 1164, 220 P.3d 369; State v. Easterling, 289 Kan. 470, 485-87, 213 P.3d 418 (2009); State v. Spotts, 288 Kan. 650, 652-54, 206 P.3d 510 (2009); State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 160-61, 199 P.3d 1265 (2009); Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 159-61, 194 P.3d 1195. To date, we have held this issue was preserved in only one appeal, and Levy's trial objections fall far short of the Eighth Amendment objection raised in that case. See State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715, 718-21, 217 P.3d 443 (2009). In Seward, the defendant actually launched a federal and state constitutional challenge during plea negotiations with the State, included the claim in his written downward departure motion, and restated it at his sentencing hearing. But even in that case, we remanded the issue to the district court to make the required factual and legal findings articulated by Freeman, rather than take it up for the first time on appeal, adding: We emphasize that we believe this case to be exceptional. In the future, a defendant who wishes to appeal on the basis of a constitutional challenge to a sentencing statute must ensure the findings and conclusions by the district judge are sufficient to support appellate argument, by filing of a motion invoking the judge's duty under Rule 165, if necessary. 289 Kan. at 721, 217 P.3d 443. See Supreme Court Rule 165 (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 242). At oral argument in this appeal, Levy's counsel acknowledged the effort now to raise this issue was pushing the envelope. The litany of cases holding that this issue should be developed first at the district court level underscore this requirement. Accordingly, we hold that Levy's argument was not preserved.