Opinion ID: 682155
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Availability of Federal Habeas Review

Text: 11 Whether a state trial court correctly applied its own rules of evidence is not a matter cognizable on federal habeas corpus. Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1991); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir.1991). However, if the admission of evidence so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair, habeas corpus relief is available. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919. Lambert claims that admission of evidence that he engaged in prior acts of sexual misconduct with Denise Foster compromised his due process right to a fair trial by permitting [the jury] to find him guilty merely because they felt it was his character to commit sexual assault. 12 As a preliminary matter, the government argues Lambert's due process claim is not appropriate for federal habeas corpus review because it was not adequately raised and litigated in state court. Although Lambert relied partly on the Due Process Clause in his state trial court motion to exclude evidence of his prior acts, he appealed the denial of that motion to the Oregon appellate court based only on state evidence law. 13 Federal habeas corpus is available only after all state avenues of relief have been exhausted. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b) (1988). However, exhaustion of state remedies requires only that a petitioner fairly present[ ] the substance of his federal claim to the state courts. Henry v. Estelle, 993 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir.1993). See also McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir.1991). [A] federal claim is fairly presented if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theory upon which his claim is based. Henry, 993 F.2d at 1425 (quoting Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir.1986)). Thus, to state a federal due process claim it is not necessary to invoke 'the talismanic phrase due process of law' or cite 'book and verse on the federal constitution.'  Id. at 1426 (quoting Tamapua, 796 F.2d at 263). So long as a petitioner makes essentially the same arguments before the state and federal courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied. Id. 14 In his direct appeal, Lambert asserted that the government introduced evidence of his prior sexual acts with Denise Foster, in violation of Oregon Evidence Code Sec. 404(3), to prove his predisposition to commit the charged crime. He presently claims that introduction of this evidence violated his right to a fair trial by permitting the jury to convict him based on his sordid character and prior bad acts, rather than on a reasoned determination that the prosecution had established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under either theory, the threshold question is whether the other acts evidence was in fact offered to prove Lambert's propensity to commit sexual assault. Thus, we conclude that Lambert presented essentially the same argument to the Oregon Court of Appeals and we are free to address the merits of his habeas claim.