Opinion ID: 655057
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ball's Conduct

Text: 76 Ball contends he did not appear at the hearing on January 31, 1992, because he only learned of it that morning. He states further that his inaction was the result of mistake and inadvertence, and not a willful refusal to abide by the processes of the court amounting to culpable conduct. 77 On April 23, 1992, the court filed a Memorandum accompanying its Order denying Ball's motion to set aside the default judgment, stating that even if Ball should not be faulted for failing to appear [on January 31, 1992], his failure to respond to the earlier motions and Orders of this Court cannot be attributed to accident. The court stated further that Ball had notice of every action taken against him and was informed repeatedly by his former counsel that his interests were not being represented in the case. The court concluded that Ball is guilty of a pattern of repeated and unexcused failures to respond to motions filed by the plaintiffs and Orders issued by the Court. 78 In its Memorandum the court cited Smith v. Commissioner, 926 F.2d 1470, 1479 (6th Cir.1991) which held that culpable conduct is to be considered when determining whether to set aside a default judgment. However, Smith leaves open the definition of culpable. 79 The court, citing the Seventh Circuit's definition of culpable in Ellingsworth v. Chrysler, 665 F.2d 180, 185 (7th Cir.1981), as willful misconduct, carelessness or negligence and distinguishable from honest mistake, held that Ball's behavior was culpable and that he was, therefore, not entitled to relief from judgment. 80 This finding is supported by the record and the exhibits. Ball was apprised of each hearing by the court or by letter from law firms which he had retained, and which had withdrawn from his case. We find no honest mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect.