Opinion ID: 197507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Supplementary Jury Instruction.

Text: 36 Due process requires that the government prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 309, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1968, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522-24, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2458-59, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). In Anderson v. Butler, 23 F.3d 593 (1st Cir.1994), we described a three-pronged framework to be used in analyzing burden-shifting claims: 37 [A] reviewing court must first determine whether a reasonable juror would have interpreted the challenged portion of the instruction as creating a mandatory presumption. If so, the court must then consider whether other parts of the charge clarified the ill-advised language with the result that a reasonable factfinder would not have understood the instruction to create an unconstitutional presumption. Finally, if the court determines that the charge as a whole left the jurors with an impermissible impression, the court must proceed to evaluate the harmlessness vel non of the error. 38 Id. at 595 (citing Hill v. Maloney, 927 F.2d 646 (1st Cir.1990)). 39 We will assume here that Lenny Curtis' testimony that Robinson initiated the fracas by swinging a bottle at the petitioner provided a basis for a claim of self-defense. Under Massachusetts law,once the issue of self-defense has been fairly raised, the jury should [be] instructed on the legal consequences of using manifestly disproportionate violence in the supposed exercise of the right of self-defense. If the jury [conclude] that [the defendant] had the right to use force to defend himself but that the force used was excessive ... they would [be] warranted in finding [the defendant] guilty only of manslaughter. 40 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 412 Mass. 368, 589 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). 41 The petitioner posits that the court's supplemental jury instruction, quoted supra note 1, unconstitutionally shifted the burden to him to prove self-defense by telling the jurors in effect that they must believe Lenny Curtis' testimony in order to return a manslaughter verdict. We disagree with this assessment. 42 We start with the first prong of the three-pronged test. Although this supplementary instruction is not artfully phrased, we believe that no reasonable juror would interpret it as creating a mandatory presumption. To the contrary, we agree with the district court that a reasonable juror probably would have understood this instruction as clarifying the circumstances which would, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution, warrant a manslaughter conviction. 43 The second prong of the test also favors the Commonwealth. On whole-record review, it seems highly likely that any prospect of confusion vis-a-vis the supplementary instruction vanishes when the instruction is considered in conjunction with the main charge. During the main charge the superior court judge explicated Massachusetts law clearly, accurately, and succinctly, telling the jury, inter alia, that the defendant does not have to convince you that he acted in self-defense. The Commonwealth has to convince you that he did not, or that he used excessive force. In addition, the judge cautioned the jury that: 44 [I]f I refer to any of the evidence, it will be by way of example only in order to make the law a little easier for you to understand and to apply, and I in no way intend or infer that you are to give any more weight, place any more importance, and more credibility on a particular piece of evidence that I may mention in the course of the charge than on all the other evidence in the case. 45 In light of these instructions, we believe that a reasonable juror would have understood that, through the supplementary instruction, the trial court sought merely to facilitate the jury's understanding of the applicable law. 3 46 The petitioner also objects to another portion of the supplementary charge: a portion which linked a manslaughter verdict for him to one for his codefendant, Giglio (another East Boston youth convicted of second-degree murder). In particular, he complains about the statement: If there is any manslaughter verdict in the Giglio case there has to be two of them. 4 47 The vice in this statement, the petitioner says, is that it led the jury to believe that, in order to be found guilty of the lesser included offense, Curtis had the burden to prove that Giglio too was guilty only of manslaughter. 48 The petitioner's contention tortures the trial court's statement and distorts its meaning. This portion of the supplementary charge states that in order to find Giglio guilty of manslaughter, the jury must first find Curtis guilty of manslaughter. See Curtis II, 632 N.E.2d at 829. It neither states nor implies the converse: that in order to find Curtis guilty of manslaughter, the jury must first find Giglio guilty of manslaughter. The latter statement would have been incorrect, but the former statement merely fleshed out a specific theory of manslaughter in coming to the aid of another, touched upon in the main charge. 49 To say more would be supererogatory. Because we discern no constitutional error in the trial court's supplementary jury instruction, we reject the petitioner's second claim. 50