Opinion ID: 2033121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strict-Scrutiny Analysis

Text: Although marriage undoubtedly is a fundamental right (see Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010, 87 S.Ct. 1817), not every restriction on marriage is subject to strict-scrutiny analysis. [R]easonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may be imposed without rigorous scrutiny by the courts. ( Zablocki v. Redhail (1978), 434 U.S. 374, 386, 54 L.Ed.2d 618, 631, 98 S.Ct. 673, 681; Moran v. Beyer (7th Cir.1984), 734 F.2d 1245, 1246-47.) I do not believe that a State's decision to impose a $40 fee on marriage licenses for the purpose, in part, of funding the Domestic Violence Shelter and Service Fund (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 2403) significantly interferes with a decision to marry, and none of the parties contesting the fee raise that claim. In Califano v. Jobst (1977), 434 U.S. 47, 54 L.Ed.2d 228, 98 S.Ct. 95, the Supreme Court refused to review under the strict-scrutiny test a Federal statute providing that social security beneficiaries permanently lost their benefits if they married nonbeneficiaries. Beneficiaries retained their benefits, however, if they married persons who also received social security benefits. The court unanimously held that strict-scrutiny analysis was inapplicable to review of the Federal provision, even though some persons who might otherwise have married were deterred from marriage by the rule. The court found that the law terminating benefits upon marriage did not interfere with the individual's freedom to make a decision as important as the decision to marry. (434 U.S. 47, 54, 54 L.Ed.2d 228, 235, 98 S.Ct. 95, 99.) For similar reasons, I do not believe that the fee imposed here should subject the statute in question to a strict-scrutiny analysis as a significant interference on the decision to enter into marriage. Plaintiffs here do not allege that their decision to marry, or that of anyone else, was affected by the license fee. Rather, plaintiffs challenge only the use for which the fee was designated by statute. In contemplating marriage, few people consider how the State will appropriate their marriage license fee as a factor in their marriage decision. Certainly, a person's disagreement with how marriage license funds are to be disbursed by the State is not such a significant factor in the marriage decision as to constitute a direct impediment on the right to marry. Although, as the majority points out, the power to tax is the power to destroy ( M'Culloch v. Maryland (1819), 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428, 4 L.Ed. 579, 607), mere possession by the State of the power to tax marriage licenses does not, of itself, constitute an impediment to the right to marry. Rather, it is the exercise of the taxing power in an oppressive manner which could impact upon the marriage decision. The Supreme Court, in Zablocki v. Redhail (1978), 434 U.S. 374, 386, 54 L.Ed.2d 618, 631, 98 S.Ct. 673, 681, stated that strict scrutiny is not required of every regulation which affects marriage; rather, strict scrutiny is required only of those regulations which significantly interfere with the decision to enter into marriage. Strict scrutiny of a statute such as the one before us would be required only if the tax became burdensome to the point that it became a factor worthy of consideration to those deciding upon marriage. That claim has not been raised here.