Opinion ID: 1947609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Should Appellant Have Been Permitted to Explore the Informant's Previous Cooperation with Law Enforcement?

Text: Appellant argues that his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was violated when he was not allowed to cross-examine Romano about his prior cooperation with law enforcement, and when the court did not permit an avowal. Appellant wanted to cross-examine Romano about any previous experience he had assisting the prosecution as an informant as he did in the case at bar. The trial court ruled that Appellant could only ask whether Romano had been paid money for his assistance in this case. The court held that asking about any other instances of assistance would not be relevant. Appellant argued that such information was relevant to show Romano's motivation and bias in this case based on his expectation of a benefit. Appellant further argued that Romano's testimony at trial that he was scared of being labeled a snitch after testifying in the case at bar opened the door to questioning about whether he truly possessed such a fear or was in fact already accustomed to providing information to the Commonwealth. First, we do not observe that Appellant was precluded by the court from putting on an avowal of Romano's responses to this line of inquiry. After making arguments to the bench on the admissibility of this questioning, defense counsel stated that he would like to put this information in by avowal. The judge responded, All right. Defense counsel stated, Later on. The judge stated, Make sure you do then. Although the judge had earlier stated that counsel could not question Romano in chambers, we do not agree that there was any ruling completely precluding avowal testimony from Romano. Even without knowing what would have been said, we conclude it was error for the court to disallow this line of questioning. Whether an informant was rewarded for cooperation in other cases is relevant to show motivation for producing statements and other evidence to receive benefits or payment, and can call into question the accuracy or veracity of testimony. There is no reason to refrain from giving the jury an accurate picture of why an informant might come forward with information. The Commonwealth cites Caudill v. Commonwealth, [33] for its holding that the mere fact that a witness helped the police in an unrelated case is not evidence of bias in the case at bar. The Commonwealth therefore argues that a witness' history of cooperation is not relevant. We do not agree that Caudill is so broad. In Caudill , we specifically held that the jury should be permitted to get a general picture of the witness' motivation. We held that [s]o long as a reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity, bias and motivation is developed, the judge enjoys the power and discretion to set appropriate boundaries. [34] In Caudill , the court allowed the defense to inquire into her desire that the parole board would know that she had cooperated with the prosecution in the case. However, the court held that the defense could not ask whether the informant had assisted in another case noting that defense counsel did not have information about whether the informant had received or been promised cooperation in that case. [35] In the case at bar, by contrast, defense counsel was precluded from exploring Romano's motivations before the jury. We believe Appellant showed he wanted to explore more than the mere fact that a witness helped the police in another case. The defense was attempting to show, in addition to cooperation, that an expectation of monetary or prosecutorial rewards caused Romano to engage in a months-long interrogation of Appellant. Such information would have been relevant to show motivation and bias, and would have been essential to allow the jury to assess Romano's credibility. In United States v. Leja, [36] the court held that disallowing such cross-examination as to previous cooperation with police was error because it is proper to show bias created by the expectation in the informant based on his experience in getting rewards from the activity. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is `always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.' [37] We have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. [38] Evidence of a witness' bias, hostility, or interest is germane to the question of credibility and should be presented before the jury. To determine whether Appellant was harmed by, not being allowed to ask about these matters, we look, as in Caudill , to see if a reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity, bias and motivation [was] developed. [39] In this case, the jury never learned that Romano had inquired about obtaining a benefit from working with police. Thus it was error not to allow the defense to explore Romano's motivation beyond whether he had received payment. Moreover, it is clear that informants are not only rewarded in monetary terms. We see no reason for the trial court to hold that only monetary benefits could be inquired into regarding bias. Appellant should have been allowed to ask about prior cooperation and the informant's expectation of future benefits.