Opinion ID: 1991137
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The LEOBR and the Instant Case

Text: We next turn our attention to the applicable provisions of the LEOBR to determine whether the Legislature, when it enacted the LEOBR in 1974, intended to provide agencies with the right to judicial review of the not guilty determinations of administrative hearing boards. To determine the intent of the Legislature, we begin with the plain language of the statute. State Dept. of Assessments & Taxation v. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 348 Md. 2, 12, 702 A.2d 690, 695 (1997). Because § 3-109(a) of the LEOBR is entitled Judicial review, we begin our analysis with that provision to determine which decisions the General Assembly contemplated would be entitled to judicial review. [9] Section 3-109(a) provides that [a]n appeal from a decision made under § 3-108 [titled Disposition of administrative action] of this subtitle shall be taken to the circuit court for the county in accordance with Maryland Rule 7-202. Maryland Rule 7-202(a), provides that [a] person seeking judicial review under this chapter shall file a petition for judicial review in a circuit court authorized to provide the review. The General Provisions set forth for the chapter [10] allow for judicial review only where it is authorized by statute. Thus, it appears that an administrative agency may seek judicial review, under § 3-109 of the LEOBR, only in circumstances where it is expressly authorized by statute to do so. As a result, we examine the other provisions of the LEOBR to determine those circumstances in which the General Assembly expressly authorized judicial review of agency decisions. The Commission contends that it is entitled to judicial review of not guilty findings pursuant to § 3-108 of the LEOBR, [11] because a right to such review can be inferred from that provision. Officer Anderson counters that the Legislature did not expressly include in the LEOBR the agency's right to judicial review of a not guilty finding, and, in fact, purposely excluded that right. Officer Anderson further argues that, if the Legislature intended to permit judicial review after a finding of not guilty, all it had to do was say so. Conversely, the Commission observes that the Legislature provided express language to designate the point of finality for a finding of guilt, to discourage officers from appealing the findings of the administrative board before the chief had reviewed and altered them, not in order to exclude review of a not guilty finding. The Commission also argues that, instead, the Legislature made no such express statement about the point at which a finding of not guilty is reviewable, because the ending point is clear from the statute. We reject the Commission's interpretation of the LEOBR. Accordingly, we hold that, under the LEOBR, a party is authorized to seek judicial review only in cases where the decision of the hearing board results in a guilty determination and meets the additional statutory requirements for judicial review. By reading together the provisions of § 3-108 and § 3-109, we are confident that the General Assembly did not intend for a not guilty finding to be considered a decision that is subject to judicial review. The first basis of support for our decision comes from our reading of § 3-108(a)(3), which is the only subsection that makes reference to not guilty findings. Section 3-108(a)(3) expressly states that [a] finding of not guilty terminates the action. The parties in the instant case disagree as to whether terminate means that the proceeding is ended and no longer subject to review, or whether the proceeding is final for the purposes of further review. In our view, the language of that provision, when read in context, clearly and unambiguously elucidates the General Assembly's intent to end the administrative proceedings upon a finding of not guilty. In this regard, a finding of not guilty does constitute a final decision in the context of our previous decisions. With regard to the finality of an administrative agency decision, we have previously stated that: ordinarily[,] the action of an administrative agency, like the order of a court, is final if it determines or concludes the rights of the parties, or if it denies the parties means of further prosecuting or defending their rights and interests in the subject matter in proceedings before the agency, thus leaving nothing further for the agency to do. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 296 Md. at 56, 459 A.2d at 211. Because the General Assembly stated explicitly that a finding of not guilty terminates the action, there is clearly nothing further for the agency to do, and the decision is therefore final within the contemplation of this definition. While the Board's not guilty finding constitutes a final decision, it does not meet the additional requirements set forth by the Legislature, in § 3-108, that would classify the decision as one that is entitled to judicial review under the LEOBR. We observed in Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md. 164, 173-74, 498 A.2d 269, 273 (1985), that [i]f the board finds the officer innocent of the charge, that ends the proceeding. If it finds him guilty, it then makes a recommendation to the chief of police as to an appropriate punishment. The chief is bound by a determination of innocence, but not a proposed punishment in the event of a finding of guilt. As to that, his decision (rather than that of the Board) is final. If the Legislature intended for not guilty findings to be reviewable, it could have included language to express that intention, rather than stating that the action is terminated. Instead, the Legislature spent the remainder of subsection (a) discussing the disposition of administrative actions where the hearing board actually enters a finding of guilty. Specifically, §§ 3-108(a)(4) and (a)(5) state that if the hearing board makes a finding of guilty, it must reconvene the hearing, receive evidence and consider the officer's past job performance and other relevant factors before making a recommendation to the Chief [12] regarding a penalty. [13] Section 3-108 (d)(1), Review by chief and final order, continues by describing one of the two ways in which a decision of the hearing board can fulfill the additional requirements and become subject to judicial review. Section 3-108(d)(1) indicates that within thirty days of receipt of the hearing board's recommendation, the chief must review the hearing board's findings, conclusions and recommendations and issue a final order. Subsection (d)(1) further provides that [t]he final order and decision of the chief is binding and then may be appealed in accordance with § 3-109 of this subtitle. The Legislature's lengthy prescription of all that the Board and police chief must accomplish before a guilty decision becomes subject to judicial review and its failure to include any similar language when addressing findings of not guilty, persuades us that a hearing board's decision must be a finding of guilty to be considered reviewable under the LEOBR. Furthermore, the Legislature's use of the word then signals when an agency can seek judicial review of a hearing board's decision, after all of the requirements are fulfilled. We derive additional support for this interpretation from the language of § 3-108(c)(1), titled Final decision of hearing board, which sets forth additional requirements that a hearing board decision must meet before that decision becomes reviewable. This provision states that the hearing board's decision as to findings of fact and any penalty is final if the chief is an eyewitness to the incident that is under investigation or a law enforcement agency or the agency's superior governmental authority has agreed with an exclusive collective bargaining [14] representative recognized or certified under applicable law that the decision is final. Subsection (c)(2) further provides that [t]he decision of the hearing board then may be appealed in accordance with § 3-109 of this subtitle. Again, we are persuaded that the Legislature intended only for guilty decisions to be reviewable because the Legislature made a finding of guilt a prerequisite for the other requirements needed to render a decision ripe for review. If the Legislature intended otherwise, then it certainly knew how to include the same or similar language when discussing the findings of not guilty, as it did for findings of guilty. To the contrary, the Legislature expressly stated that a not guilty finding terminates the action. When read in context with the other provisions of § 3-108 and § 3-109, the statutory language is clear. Thus, we need not look any further to discern the legislative intent as to when a hearing board decision is reviewable. Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union, 346 Md. at 445, 697 A.2d at 458.