Opinion ID: 863298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to quash venire

Text: ¶12. Smith and Conwill were scheduled to be tried jointly for the aggravated assault of Randy Forrester. They had separate counsel. After voir dire had proceeded for some period, it was announced to the jury that Conwill was pleading guilty. The jury was instructed to disregard the plea and to decide the case against Smith based solely on the evidence presented. Smith moved to quash the venire, but that was denied. Smith now contends that he was denied a fair trial by an impartial jury due to his codefendant's guilty plea. ¶13. The State contends that the issue is waived because defense counsel failed to strike any of the jurors on the basis that they knew of Conwill's guilty plea. Smith's counsel moved to quash the venire as soon as it was announced to the jury that Conwill would plead guilty. The trial court refused to quash the venire, but granted Smith a continuing objection for the record. The motion to quash the venire was renewed prior to the start of trial and again at the close of the State's case in chief. Since the argument was that the entire venire was tainted, we find no procedural bar in the defendant's failure to strike some of the prospective jurors, since whoever was left would also suffer from the same taint. ¶14. The substance of the issue can first be viewed by noting that a guilty plea of a co-conspirator while incompetent as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt, may be admissible for other purposes. White v. State, 616 So. 2d 304, 307 (Miss. 1993). Among those purposes is that the guilty plea may be a prior consistent statement with the testimony that the person is giving at the trial of his codefendant. Id. Here, Conwill testified. Of course, the State was not introducing the guilty plea for this evidentiary purpose; explaining to this jury why Conwill was no longer being tried became a necessity because of the timing of the plea. However, had a new venire been summoned, the fact of Conwill's guilty plea could have become known to those jurors when Conwill testified. We find no prejudice from jurors' learning of the plea earlier than they otherwise might. ¶15. To be distinguished from knowledge given a jury about a codefendant's guilty plea is the need to keep undisclosed the fact that another jury convicted the codefendant. In that situation, the possible prejudice is that one jury would rely upon the judgment of a prior jury in reaching its decision. White, 616 So.2d at 307. That is not our situation. ¶16. Even if there were some prejudice, it is presumed that the jurors followed the court's admonition . . . and decided the case solely upon the evidence presented; to presume otherwise would be to render the jury system inoperable. Bell v. State, 631 So. 2d 817, 820 (Miss. 1994). The trial judge admonished the jury to disregard Conwill's guilty plea and to decide the case based solely on the evidence presented. The jury was then asked if there was anyone who could not disregard the guilty plea. No juror responded. That is sufficient.