Opinion ID: 764743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Sustain Coleman's Conviction

Text: 14 Coleman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to Counts 5 and 10. In doing so, he faces a nearly insurmountable hurdle ... [in that] we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, defer to the credibility determination of the jury, and overturn a verdict only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Szarwark, 168 F.3d 993, 995 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1363 (7th Cir.1997)). 15 Count 5, which charged Coleman with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, arose from the execution of the search warrant at 2420 West Wright Street. Coleman contends that the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 43.5 grams of white powder recovered during the search was actually cocaine. Coleman points out that no crime lab test was ever conducted to confirm the positive results of the field test. He argues that the field test results, without more, were insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was cocaine. 16 We need not decide whether the field test alone would have been sufficient, however, because in this case, the government also presented circumstantial evidence that the white powder was cocaine. In addition to the twelve baggies, the shoebox contained $4,800 in cash, and a loaded gun. Detective DeValkenaere testified that the white powder looked and smelled like cocaine. Just before the search warrant was executed, the police observed Coleman in front of 2420 West Wright Street engaging in what appeared to be two drug transactions. Coleman's co-conspirators testified that Coleman sold cocaine out of 2420 West Wright Street. And finally, a DEA informant bought cocaine from Coleman at that address. 17 As Coleman admits, the identity of a drug may be established solely by circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Murray, 753 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir.1985) (identification of the substance as marijuana by co-conspirators, high price charged for the substance, and covert nature of purchases were sufficient to support a finding that the substance was marijuana). Here, the circumstantial evidence was accompanied by the results of a cobalt thiocyanate test, the reliability of which has not been challenged on appeal. The circumstantial evidence and the field test results were sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that the substance recovered during the search of 2420 West Wright Street was cocaine. 18 Coleman next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to Count 10, which also charged him with possession with intent to distribute cocaine. This count was based on the DEA informant's controlled purchase of cocaine from Walker, Evans, and Coleman on November 14, 1995. Coleman contends that the government proved only that he was present during the November 14, 1995 transaction. The government argues that the evidence showed more than mere presence, and contends that at the very least it presented sufficient evidence to prove that Coleman aided and abetted the transaction. [A]n aider and abettor may be punished with the same severity as a principal. United States v. Corral-Ibarra, 25 F.3d 430, 436 (7th Cir.1994). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). 19 To sustain the conviction under a theory of aiding and abetting, we must find that the government proved that Coleman knowingly participated in the transaction as something he wished to bring about and that he sought by his actions to make it succeed. United States v. Lewis, 117 F.3d 980, 985 (7th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Participation may be established by circumstantial evidence, and the evidence may be of relatively slight moment. United States v. McKneely, 69 F.3d 1067, 1072 (10th Cir.1995). Nonetheless, mere presence is insufficient to support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See United States v. Stewart, 145 F.3d 273, 277 (5th Cir.1998); United States v. Montilla-Rivera, 115 F.3d 1060, 1064 (1st Cir.1997). 20 In this case, Coleman was not simply passively present during the transaction. Rather, he left with Evans to retrieve the cocaine, and returned with Evans to complete the transaction. Furthermore, during the transaction, Coleman and Evans discussed, albeit briefly, the fact that Evans had done a good job cooking the cocaine under Coleman's tutelage. Given this statement, the jury could have concluded that Coleman supervised the preparation of the crack, or that he was talking up the quality of the cocaine in order to facilitate the sale. Although the evidence is not overwhelming, it is not so spare that we will disturb the jury's verdict. 21 Because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Coleman's conviction of Counts 5 and 10, we need not address Coleman's claim that the submission of these counts to the jury prejudiced the jury's deliberations with respect to the conspiracy charge.