Opinion ID: 2657600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application Of AS 47.10.011(7)

Text: Because we are remanding this case to give Rowan an opportunity to present evidence previously unavailable to him, we do not consider whether the trial court’s finding that Junior and Saul are at substantial risk of sexual abuse is clearly erroneous. But we clarify the legal standard to be applied when a parent is found to have sexually abused one child in the household. Rowan argues that the trial court erroneously found Junior and Saul to be children in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(7) (risk of sexual abuse) by relying on In re 14 See Alaska R. Crim. P. 16(b) (setting out discovery available to accused in criminal case). 15 See In re Mendel, 897 P.2d 68, 75 (Alaska 1995) (setting out procedure for in camera review when work-product privilege is claimed); see also Honda Motor Co. v. Salzman, 751 P.2d 489, 492-93 (Alaska 1988) (discussing protection for trade secret). -9- 6881 P.N.,16 which he claims no longer is applicable because of statutory changes; he contends that the court’s finding that he sexually abused the girls does not make the boys children in need of aid under subsection (7). OCS responds that this court “still accepts the foundational principles of” In re P.N. and that the trial court’s findings about Rowan’s sexual abuse of the girls is adequate support for its finding that the boys are at substantial risk of being sexually abused. In In re P.N. the trial court had found all of the children, including three boys, to be in need of aid because the father admitted having sexually abused his ten­ year-old daughter.17 We decided there was support for the finding of dependency in that the [father’s] treatment of the girl could be considered to have evidenced such a serious disregard of parental responsibilities and lack of social and moral values on [the father’s] part as to pose a substantial risk to the physical and emotional well-being of the boys as well as the girl.[18] The statutory basis for our decision was former AS 47.10.010(a)(5),19 which provided that a child was in need of aid when the child “lack[ed] proper parental care by reason of faults, habit or neglect of his parent, guardian or custodian.”20 This statutory basis for CINA status was later repealed.21 16 533 P.2d 13 (Alaska 1975). 17 Id. at 16. 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 In re S.D., 549 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Alaska 1976) (quoting former AS 47.10.010(a)(5) (1975)). 21 See In re J.M., 573 P.2d 1376, 1377 n.1 (Alaska 1978) (noting repeal of (continued...) -10- 6881 Alaska Statute 47.10.011(7), on the other hand, allows a court to find a child to be a child in need of aid when “there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer sexual abuse, as a result of conduct by or conditions created by the child’s parent.” Under AS 47.10.011(7), a parent’s allowing a child to be left with a person having a history as a sex offender or who is under investigation for a sex offense against a minor establishes a prima facie case that the child is at substantial risk of sexual abuse. But the statute does not specify that parental conduct toward a child’s siblings would constitute prima facie evidence of a substantial risk of sexual abuse, nor does it define what constitutes substantial risk of sexual abuse.22 Noting that the legislature included parental conduct toward siblings in the definition of neglect,23 Rowan asks us to apply the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius to decide that the legislature did not intend the sexual abuse of one sibling to be a basis for a finding that other children in the same household are at risk of sexual abuse. We decline to do so. We also reject Rowan’s argument that the legislature intended to overrule In re P.N. when it revised the CINA statutes. The legislature did not list In re P.N. as a case it intended to overrule,24 and 21 (...continued) former AS 47.10.010(a)(5)). 22 Cf. AS 47.10.015 (setting out when court may find physical harm or substantial risk of physical harm). AS 47.10.990(31) defines “sexual abuse” for purposes of AS 47.10.011. 23 AS 47.10.011(9) permits a court to find a child to be in need of aid when “conduct by or conditions created by the parent . . . have subjected the child or another child in the same household to neglect.” 24 The legislature listed several cases it intended to overrule when it revised the statute in 1998 to change the bases on which a child could be found in need of aid, (continued...) -11- 6881 Rowan points to no affirmative statement in the statute or the legislative history indicating any disagreement with the reasoning of that case. As one court has observed, courts “overwhelmingly” have decided that a parent’s sexual abuse of one child in the household is substantial evidence that the other children are at risk of sexual abuse.25 Similar to our reasoning in In re P.N., the California Court of Appeal has held that a father’s “conduct [was] ‘so sexually aberrant’ to support the common sense conclusion that most every person in the family home was at risk of sexual abuse.”26 Although the statutory basis for CINA status now may be different than it was in In re P.N., we continue to adhere to the principles underlying that case, and consequently we hold that when a trial court finds a parent has sexually abused one child in the household, the court may presume that other children in the household are at substantial risk of sexual abuse. The statutory language supports our construction of the statute. Alaska Statute 47.10.011(7) provides that a parent’s leaving a child in the care of someone who the parent knows is under investigation for child sexual abuse is “prima facie evidence that the child is at substantial risk of being sexually abused.” It would not make sense 24 (...continued) including In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996) and R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997). See ch. 99, §§ 1, 18, SLA 1998. 25 Los Angeles Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cnty., 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 502, 506 (Cal. App. 2013) (reversing trial court’s denial of dependency petition); see also In re I.J., 299 P.3d 1254, 1262 (Cal. 2013) (construing California statute as not requiring scientific or empirical evidence for finding that male children are at risk of sexual abuse when their sister has been sexually abused by father). 26 In re Ana C., 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 686, 698 (Cal. App. 2012) (quoting In re Karen R., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18, 22 (Cal. App. 2001)). -12- 6881 for a child to be considered at risk of sexual abuse when left in the care of someone who has been convicted of a sex offense or is under investigation for sexual abuse, but the same child not to be considered at risk of sexual abuse when it is the parent under investigation for sexual abuse or found to have sexually abused another child in the household. If on remand Rowan still is under investigation or subject to criminal charges for sexual abuse of a minor, the trial court may apply the statutory presumption that Junior and Saul are at substantial risk of being sexually abused.27 And if the trial court again finds that Rowan sexually abused Agnes, it can conclude that Junior and Saul are at substantial risk of being sexually abused.28