Opinion ID: 1987576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: contacts between judge and jurors.

Text: Some of the juror affidavits alleged that the trial judge met with the alternate jurors after they had been dismissed to learn their feelings about the case; and that he met with the trial jurors after they had been discharged from their duties, at the conclusion, of the penalty phase, and that he had told these jurors that they had done, the right thing. To further convince them, he divulged evidence that had been excluded at trial, i.e., that Ora Lee Isaacs, Appellant's former wife, [5] would have testified that Appellant returned home after one of the robberies with money and a gun, and that Appellant had physically abused her. Appellant claims that the prosecutor, despite the no-contact order, was present at those meetings, and that all of these circumstances resulted in a denial of due process and fair sentencing. We first dispense with Appellant's arguments concerning the three alternate jurors. The meeting, took place in the judge's chambers after the remaining jurors had begun their deliberations. One alternate juror's affidavit stated that she could not remember the substance of the conversation but did remember asking the judge why she had been removed from the jury. Another stated that she told the judge that she thought the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. The third stated that she had doubts about the case because there was no eyewitness testimony. Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to be present at critical stages of the trial. RCr 8.28(1). However, this meeting between the judge and the alternate jurors was not any stage of the trial, much less a critical stage. Because the alternate jurors had already been dismissed, they no longer had the power to influence the outcome of the proceedings. And based on their affidavits, it is clear that none of these jurors told the trial judge anything that would have influenced his decision to impose a harsher penalty. Thus, the ex parte meeting did not result in prejudice to Appellant. Washington v. United States, 291 F.Supp.2d 418, 44041 (W.D.Va.2003). The same result obtains with respect to the trial judge's post-trial meeting with the jurors who had participated in deliberations. Since the jurors had been discharged from jury service when the meeting occurred, the trial judge's comments could not have prejudiced the jurors against Appellant. Rather, Appellant argues that (1) the trial judge's statement that the jurors did the right thing, which he made before final sentencing, indicates that he had prejudged Appellant's sentencing and thereby deprived Appellant of a fair sentencing hearing; (2) at sentencing, the trial court improperly considered suppressed evidence proffered by Isaacs, which was never subject to cross-examination; and (3) the prosecutor gained an unfair litigation advantage over Appellant because of his presence at these ex parte meetings. With respect to the first argument, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). This Court has previously considered a juror's testimony that a trial judge told a jury that it did the right thing by returning a recommendation for death, and we concluded that this purported evidence of the trial judge's bias was woefully insufficient to set aside the defendant's sentence. Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 151, 166 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1371, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). See also United States v. Beard, 960 F.2d 965, 970 (11th Cir.1992) (trial judge's negative personal opinion of the defendant, stated to the jury after the verdict was returned, did not stray from neutrality); United States v. Battle, 235 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1348 (N.D.Ga.2001) (alleged post-trial contact between judge and jury in which judge told jury that it had made the right decision was unwise, but not reflective of bias against the Defendant). In the case sub judice, where there is no other evidence of personal bias on the part of the trial judge, his mere comment to several jurors that they had done the right thing did not reflect bias such to per se deny Appellant a fair sentencing. The essence of Appellant's second argument is that by citing the excluded evidence in his conversation with the trial jurors, the trial judge revealed that he credited it as reliable and thus considered it in sentencing Appellant to death. Citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), Appellant contends that he was denied due process of law because the trial judge imposed the death sentence based in part on evidence that Appellant had no opportunity to cross-examine or explain. See id. at 362, 97 S.Ct. at 1207. We disagree. The judge in Gardner explicitly disclosed that he relied on information not revealed to the defendant in reaching his sentencing decision. Id. at 351, 97 S.Ct. at 1201. In contrast, before sentencing Appellant, the trial judge in this case stated that he would just rely upon [his] recollections of the evidence in the case .... In sentencing Appellant for the non-capital offenses, the trial judge considered no additional information except for the presentence report prepared by Appellant's probation officer. Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3057, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). This presumption applies as well to the evidence relied upon by a trial judge in reaching his sentencing determination. As there was no indication in the record that the trial judge considered any evidence that Appellant did not have the opportunity to confront or explain, there was no due process violation. Paradis v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950, 956-57 (9th Cir.1994). Finally, Appellant argues that the prosecutor's presence at the trial judge's meeting with the excused jurors gave the Commonwealth an unfair litigation advantage, by exposing the prosecutor to the judge's opinion of both the jury's verdict and the reliability of Isaacs's excluded testimony. This claim is also meritless. Cf. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (Appellant has no constitutional right to be present at every interaction between a judge and ... juror). There is a due process right to be present at a proceeding `whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness [sic] of his opportunity to defend against the charge .... [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.' Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332-33, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)). While such post-trial meetings between judge, juror, and prosecutor should be avoided to minimize any appearance of impropriety, Appellant has failed to show that his absence from this meeting thwarted a fair and just sentencing. If the trial judge had indeed formed a preliminary opinion as to the merits of the jury's sentence recommendation before the formal sentencing proceedings occurred, Appellant has not demonstrated, that the prosecutor's knowledge of the judge's supposed opinion would have changed the arguments presented at formal sentencing. Additionally, since the trial judge did not consider Isaacs's evidence in setting the sentence, his opinion of the testimony was of no benefit to the prosecutor or consequence to Appellant. Thus, the prosecutor's presence during the trial judge's meeting with the former jurors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Laurel Circuit Court's order denying Appellant's motion for a new trial is AFFIRMED.