Opinion ID: 45168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Restrained Victim Enhancement

Text: Garcia and Santiago also challenge the district court’s use of the restrained victim enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3.2 Under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3, the district court may increase a defendant’s offense level by two if a victim was “physically restrained” in the course of the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3. “Physically restrained” means the “forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(K)). The use of the modifier “such as” in this definition indicates that the illustrations of physical restraint are listed by way of example rather than as limitations. See United States v. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that forcibly holding victims at gunpoint constituted physical restraint), overruled on other grounds, United States 2 We review a sentencing court’s findings of fact for clear error and the application of the guidelines to those facts de novo. United States v. Behr, 93 F.3d 764, 765 (11th Cir. 1996). 9 v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 2001). We have construed the definition of “physically restrained” in § 1B1.1 to include a situation in which the victims were held against their will, were left with no alternative but to comply with the defendant and had no effective way of leaving. See United States v. Vallejo, 297 F.3d 1154, 1167 (11th Cir. 2002) (involving victims held while being forced to sign documents even though the victims were permitted to move between a club and a restaurant next door). Here, the district court did not clearly err in applying the § 3A1.3 enhancement. Instead of delivering Olimpia – a 15-year-old illegal alien – to her mother at the gas station as arranged, Garcia drove away with Olimpia in order to extort more money from her mother. Garcia also threatened to throw Olimpia out of the van if her mother did not stop following the van. Garcia’s actions and threats effectively prevented Olimpia from leaving the van and joining her mother. Garcia’s argument that Olimpia was not in danger during these events is irrelevant because whether Olimpia was physically restrained within the meaning of § 3A1.3 does not turn on whether the victim was in danger, but on whether the victim was unable to leave.3 3 We also reject Garcia’s argument that the government represented in the trial court that it would not seek the restrained victim enhancement. The government never represented that it would not seek the § 3A1.3 enhancement. Rather, it stated that it did not think that the statutory penalty for endangerment, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii), applied. In any event, the district court was 10 Furthermore, the district court did not clearly err in attributing Garcia’s conduct to Santiago because such conduct was reasonably foreseeable given the nature of the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), cmt. n.2 (explaining that one defendant in a bank robbery is held accountable for second defendant’s assaulting or injuring a victim because such conduct was reasonably foreseeable “given the nature of the offense”). Garcia and Santiago agreed to transport illegal aliens, a scared and vulnerable group, across the country in exchange for money. As part of this plan, Garcia and Santiago were required to collect money from the aliens upon delivering them to their destination. These circumstances created an environment ripe for extortion.