Opinion ID: 1816599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of sec. 62.03 (2), Stats.

Text: Ch. 62 of the Wisconsin statutes sets forth a comprehensive series of regulations which govern the operations of municipal governments in Wisconsin. The provisions of the chapter are automatically applicable to cities of the second, third and fourth classes, but not applicable to cities of the first class ( i.e., cities with population in excess of 150,000 residents). In this case the pertinent portion of ch. 62 is found in sec. 62.13 (5), Stats., which deals with suspension and removal procedures for employees of fire and police departments. (5) DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST SUBORDINATES. (a) A subordinate may be suspended as hereinafter provided as a penalty. He may also be suspended by the commission pending the disposition of charges filed against him. (b) Charges may be filed against a subordinate by the chief, by a member of the board, by the board as a body, or by an elector of the city. Such charges shall be in writing and shall be filed with the president of the board. Pending disposition of such charges, the board or chief may suspend such subordinate. (c) A subordinate may be suspended for cause by the chief or the board as a penalty. The chief shall file a report of such suspension with the commission immediately  upon issuing the suspension. No hearing on such suspension shall be held unless requested by the suspended subordinate. If the subordinate suspended by the chief requests a hearing before the board, the chief shall be required to file charges with the board upon which such suspension was based. (d) Following the filing of charges in any case, a copy thereof shall be served upon the person charged. The board shall set date for hearing not less than 10 days nor more than 30 days following service of such charges. The hearing on the charges shall be public, and both the accused and the complainant may be represented by an attorney and may compel the attendance of witnesses by subpoenas which shall be issued by the president of the board on request and be served as are subpoenas in justice court. (e) If the board determines that the charges are not sustained, the accused, if he has been suspended, shall be immediately reinstated and all lost pay restored. If the board determines that the charges are sustained, the accused, by order of the board, may be suspended or reduced in rank, or suspended and reduced in rank, or removed, as the good of the service may require. (f) Findings and determinations hereunder and orders of suspension, reduction, suspension and reduction, or removal, shall be in writing and, if they follow a hearing, shall be filed within 3 days thereof with the secretary of the board. (g) Further rules for the administration of this subsection may be made by the board. (Emphasis supplied.) When this statute was first enacted, it did not apply to Milwaukee because Milwaukee was a city of the first class and the same were excepted from mandatory compliance with the provisions of ch. 62, Stats. Consequently, prior to the enactment of the ordinance by which Milwaukee adopted sec. 62.13 (5) (b), the filing of complaints with the board in Milwaukee was governed by sec. 29.18, Milwaukee City Charter, Annotated, 1934. This older ordinance provided that a citizen could not file a complaint unless he was a reputable freeholder.  Thus, in cities of the second, third and fourth classes in Wisconsin, a citizen could file a complaint if he was an elector, but a resident in the city of Milwaukee could not file a complaint unless he was a reputable freeholder. Milwaukee sought to correct this rather obvious denial of equal protection by adopting sec. 62.13 (5) (b), Stats. Cities of the first class are entitled to adopt those portions of ch. 62 which they deem desirable by virtue of sec. 62.03, which provides that: First class cities excepted. (1) The provisions of chapter 62 of the statutes shall not apply to cities of the first class under special charter. (2) Any such city may adopt by ordinance the provisions of chapter 62 of the statutes or any section or sections thereof, which when so adopted shall apply to such city. (Emphasis supplied.) Appellant's contention is that Charter Ordinance No. 341, by which Milwaukee adopted sec. 62.13 (5) (b), Stats., does not comply with sec. 62.03 (2), because sec. 62.03 (2) refers to section or sections, and that what Milwaukee did was to adopt less than a section. That is, if the council had adopted all of sec. 62.13, there would be no dispute. But since the council adopted only sub. (5) (b) of sec. 62.13, it did not comply with the requirement of sec. 62.03 (2) (section or sections). The trial court found the appellant's argument overly technical, and we think properly so. As pointed out by the trial court, the word section is nowhere defined in the statutes and the interpretation sought by appellant would frustrate the legislative intent of sec. 62.03 (2), Stats., which was to allow Milwaukee to adopt whatever portion of ch. 62 it deemed advisable. Sec. 62.04, Stats., entitled Intent and construction, expresses the purpose and intent of the legislature in enacting secs. 62.01 through 62.26. Sec. 62.04 provides, in part:  . . . For the purpose of giving to cities the largest measure of self-government compatible with the constitution and general law, it is hereby declared that sections 62.01 to 62.26, inclusive, shall be liberally construed in favor of the rights, powers and privileges of cities to promote the general welfare, peace, good order and prosperity of such cities and the inhabitants thereof. (Emphasis supplied.) In view of this admonition to construe sec. 62.03 (2), Stats., liberally in favor of the rights . . . of cities, it seems very dubious that the legislature in using the word section was consciously contemplating the fine gradations between sections, subsections and paragraphs. Moreover, the proposition that the words section or sections should not be technically construed is bolstered by sec. 990.01 (1), Stats.: (1) GENERAL RULE. All words and phrases shall be construed according to common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed according to such meaning. (Emphasis supplied.) It is common and approved usage to refer to statutes and their component parts as sections. For example, Webster's New International Dictionary (3d), at page 2052, defines section as: . . . a division of a law, statute, or legislative act. . .  Black's Law Dictionary (4th), at page 1521, defines section as follows: In text-books, codes, statutes, and other juridical writings, the smallest distinct and numbered subdivisions are commonly called `sections,' sometimes `articles,' and occasionally `paragraphs.' . . . In addition, this court has previously recognized that the use of the word section by the legislature does not invariably mean the entire section. In State ex rel.  Ekern v. Zimmerman (1925), 187 Wis. 180, 194, 204 N. W. 803, this court noted that: . . . When the word `section,' therefore, was used, the legislature clearly intended not the entire section, but that portion of the provision which included the forestry amendment. The word `section' has also been interpreted as meaning a subdivision or subsection. . . . More recently, and with specific reference to sec. 62.03, Stats., this court held that sec. 62.03 allowed cities to adopt any part of ch. 62. In Wauwatosa v. Milwaukee (1954), 266 Wis. 59, 67, 62 N. W. 2d 718, the court said: Sec. 62.03, Stats., expressly gave cities of the first class the right to adopt any part of the general charter law contained in ch. 62, Stats., by ordinance. . . . Since ch. 62, Stats., is to be liberally construed in favor of the rights of cities and since common words are to be given their common meaning and since this court has previously held that section in sec. 62.03, means any part of ch. 62, it is obvious that Charter Ordinance No. 341 is valid and in compliance with sec. 62.03. In addition to the technicality raised, appellant also argues that sec. 62.13 (5) (d), (e), and (f), Stats., which Milwaukee did not adopt contain important procedural safeguards without which the appellant may be denied a fair trial. The safeguards referred to include inter alia that the accused shall have the right: 1. To be represented by an attorney; 2. To compel attendance of witnesses by subpoena; and 3. To be informed in advance of the charges against him. These rights are so fundamental that if the board proceeded without affording them to the appellant, obviously he would be denied a fair trial. But the council's  failure to adopt these portions of sec. 62.13 (5), Stats., is not proof of their intent to deny the appellant the rights contained therein. On the contrary, Rule 13 (8) through (14) of the rules and regulations of the board clearly provides that all three of the rights listed above, as well as other procedural guarantees, shall be secured to the appellant. Therefore, since it is clear that the appellant will enjoy the rights in question, the source of those rights is immaterial, and consequently the council's failure to adopt (d), (e) and (f) of sec. 62.13 (5), in no way prejudices the appellant. Our determination that the ordinance is a valid enactment pursuant to sec. 62.03 (2), Stats., makes it unnecessary to pass upon the issue of whether or not the ordinance deals with a matter of statewide concern.