Opinion ID: 2321064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Title 9 Provisions are Subject to Waiver

Text: The Unions and City Board contend that the State Board has contravened the State statute by granting waivers of Section 9-108(a). Both the City Board and the Unions contend that any provision found in Title 9 of the Education Article, which governs public charter schools, cannot be waived because Section 9-106(b) only permits waivers of provisions governing other public schools. The Circuit Court, however, disagreed with the Unions and the City Board, concluding that public charter schools are public schools which are not governed solely by Title 9 of the Education Article, but are governed by all of the laws traditional public schools are governed by. In short, because Section 9-108(a) provisions are not enumerated among those provisions exempt from waiver in Section 9-106(c), they are subject to waiver. We disagree with the conclusion of the Circuit Court. Whether the provisions of Title 9 of the Education Article are subject to Section 9-106(c) waivers is a question of statutory interpretation. In conducting statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always to to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp. v. Yanni, 397 Md. 474, 919 A.2d 1 (2007) (No. 67, September Term, 2006) (filed March 15, 2007); In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 468, 906 A.2d 915, 936 (2006); General Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 352, 879 A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005). We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that `no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.' Yanni, 397 Md. at 481, 919 A.2d at 5; In re Kaela C., 394 Md. at 467, 906 A.2d at 936; Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George's County, 390 Md. 145, 162, 887 A.2d 1060, 1070 (2005); Giant Food, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 356 Md. 180, 194, 738 A.2d 856, 860-61, 863 (1999). Further, whenever possible, an interpretation should be given to the statutory provisions which does not lead to absurd consequences. E.g., Roskelly v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 53, 912 A.2d 658, 673 (2006); So. Easton Neighborhood Assoc. v. Town of Easton, 387 Md. 468, 495, 876 A.2d 58, 74 (2005). See also Smack v. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 305, 835 A.2d 1175, 1179 (2003) ([T]he statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense.). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute's provisions and our analysis ends. City of Frederick v. Pickett, 392 Md. 411, 427, 897 A.2d 228, 237 (2006), quoting Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604-05, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004). If however, the language is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute's legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose. Mayor & Town Council of Oakland v. Mayor & Town Council of Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006); Canaj, Inc. v. Baker and Div. Phase III, 391 Md. 374, 403, 893 A.2d 1067, 1084 (2006); Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 591, 865 A.2d 590, 594 (2005). Section 9-106 of the Maryland Public Charter School Act provides that: (a) In general.  Subject to subsection (b) of this section, a public charter school shall comply with the provisions of law and regulation governing other public schools. (b) Waiver.  Subject to subsection (c) of this section, a waiver of the requirements under subsection (a) of this section may be sought through an appeal to the State Board. (c) Same Exceptions.  A waiver may not be granted from provisions of law or regulation relating to: (1) Audit requirements; (2) The measurement of student academic achievement, including all assessments required for other public schools and other assessments mutually agreed upon by the public chartering authority and the school; or (3) The health, safety, or civil rights of a student or an employee of the charter school. The clear implication of this section is that any provision applying to all public schools, and not those specific to just public charter schools, or those listed in subsection (c), may be waived. Title 9 does not govern all public schools, Title 9 governs only public charter schools. Thus, Title 9's provisions are not subject to waiver under Section 9-106(b). The language of Section 9-102 of the Education Article, [16] Definitions, further supports this interpretation. Section 9-102 provides that a public charter school is a public school that [i]s created in accordance with [Title 9], [i]s in compliance with § 9-107 of this title, and [o]perates. . . in accordance with its charter and, except as provided in § 9-106 of this title, the provisions of law and regulation governing other public schools.  Section 9-102(10), (11), and (13) (emphasis added). Thus, Title 9 contains the defining elements of public charter schools, such as nonsectarian, tuition-free, and open to all students on a space-available basis. Section 9-102(1), (3), and (7). Further, public charter schools must be created and operated in accordance with the provisions of Title 9. Section 9-102(13). Section 9-102 does not provide any exception to these requirements; they form the very essence of the public charter school program. By comparison, however, Section 9-102 also requires that public charter schools [o]perate[]. . . in accordance with . . . the provisions of law and regulation governing other public schools,  except as provided in § 9-106 of this title. Section 9-102(11) (emphasis added). Clearly, therefore, when a defining element or requirement of public charter schools was subject to waiver, Section 9-102 so stated. We, therefore, hold that the provisions of Title 9 of the Education Article are not subject to waiver. To conclude otherwise would lead to the absurd result that all of Title 9's provisions could be waived, rendering the entire Title nugatory, a result which conflicts with the canons of statutory interpretation. See Reier v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 397 Md. 2, 33-34, 915 A.2d 970, 988-89 (2007) (rejecting a specific statutory interpretation because it would lead to an absurd result); Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 89, 912 A.2d 674, 695 (2006) (adopting the Circuit Court's analysis because to hold otherwise would lead to absurd results); McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 326, 869 A.2d 751, 754 (2005) (stating that its holding is based, in part, on the potential for absurd results if the Court were to hold otherwise).