Opinion ID: 2773131
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brown’s Guilty Plea And Motion To Withdraw

Text: Brown was arrested in October 2011 on multiple criminal charges after Wilmington police obtained a search warrant for his home and discovered, among other things, more than 900 bags of heroin in his bedroom. His trial was scheduled for April 24, 2012. On that date, the Superior Court judge engaged in an extensive colloquy with Brown about his decision to waive his right to a jury trial, his frustration with his counsel’s refusal to file two pretrial motions (which his counsel deemed frivolous), and—ultimately—his decision to plead guilty to a single charge of Drug Dealing.4 The transcript of the plea hearing reflects that the Superior Court judge questioned Brown carefully about the factual basis for his plea. Brown freely acknowledged that he was guilty of dealing in heroin as charged in the indictment.5 He stated “on October 26, I possessed heroin and today in Court I’m pleading guilty to drug dealing,” and answered affirmatively when the court asked him if he knew he had heroin, if he intended to deal drugs, and if he knew that doing so was against the law.6 The colloquy therefore reflects Brown’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights. Brown understood the plea and its consequences, including 4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752(1) (Supp. 2014). 5 App. to State’s Ans. Br. at B8. 6 Id. 4 the potential sentence, and Brown stated that nobody had promised him anything or threatened him or forced him to take the plea.7 Brown answered affirmatively when he was asked whether he had enough time to talk with his lawyer about the charges, the facts, the possible defenses to the charges, and the consequences of taking the guilty plea.8 He agreed to be the sentenced the next day by a different Superior Court judge in conjunction with his sentencing on other unrelated drug convictions following a jury trial.9 At the end of the colloquy, the judge asked Brown whether he was satisfied with his defense attorney’s representation. Brown expressed concerns initially about his attorney10 but then twice answered affirmatively when asked if he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation.11 The Superior Court accepted the plea, finding that there was a factual basis for the plea and that Brown had entered the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.12 The next day, at his April 25, 2012 sentencing hearing before the other Superior Court judge, Brown made an oral, pro se motion to withdraw his plea, which the Superior Court denied without prejudice. In denying Brown’s request, the Superior Court stated, “you had a chance yesterday to finish the trial that you 7 Id.. 8 Id. at B8-9. 9 Id. at B8. 10 “I just feel personally that me and my counsel didn’t see, a lot of times on different occasions, eye to eye and I wasn’t treated fairly.” B9. 11 Id. 12 Id. 5 started. You stopped that trial when you told the Court that you wanted to plead guilty, and but for that, you would have gone to trial, you would have faced possible conviction on everything and the sentence that would have been imposed as a result of that.”13 The court ruled that Brown could present a formal motion to withdraw to the judge who took his plea on the previous day. The Superior Court sentenced Brown on his Drug Dealing conviction to 25 years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended after serving 12 years in prison for decreasing levels of supervision.14 On April 27, 2012, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw Brown’s guilty plea, asserting Brown’s contention that he “felt pressured and threatened because my counsel said that I would be convicted at trial” and “[m]y counsel refused to file motions on my behalf.”15 Counsel simultaneously filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on Brown’s behalf, which the Superior Court granted. The Superior Court denied Brown’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea in an order dated May 17, 2012, noting that that a motion filed after sentencing “constitutes a collateral attack on the conviction” and is “subject to the procedural requirements of Rule 61.”16 The Superior Court determined that Brown’s claims of a coerced plea were contradicted by the extensive plea colloquy and Brown’s 13 App. to Brown’s Open. Br. at A7. 14 Id. at A10. 15 Id. at A61. 16 Id. at A62. 6 own statements that he had not been threatened or forced to take the plea, that he understood the consequences of the plea, and that he was satisfied with his attorney’s professional representation.17 Brown did not file a direct appeal of his conviction to this Court. Nor did Brown appeal the Superior Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Instead, on April 24, 2013, Brown retained private counsel, who filed a Rule 61 motion on his behalf. The only issue raised in that motion was a claim that Brown’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a pretrial suppression motion challenging the validity of the search warrant in Brown’s case. The Superior Court denied Brown’s motion, and this appeal followed. New counsel was appointed to represent Brown on appeal. New counsel presented the two arguments pending before the Court for decision; neither argument was raised below.