Opinion ID: 865149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: overruling of repeated defense objections to

Text: PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. ¶24. A defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial trial before a jury not exposed to abusive arguments appealing to their passions and prejudices. Although ours 10 is an adversary system, prosecuting attorneys must exercise caution and discretion in making extreme statements in their arguments to the jury, if for no other reason than to save themselves, the defendant, the court and the jury the additional time, expense and effort involved in a retrial. Dunaway v. State, 551 So. 2d 162, 163 (Miss. 1989) (citing Keyes v. State, 312 So. 2d 7, 10 (Miss. 1988)). ¶25. The test to determine if an improper argument by a prosecutor requires reversal is whether the natural and probable effect of the prosecuting attorney’s improper argument created unjust prejudice against the accused resulting in a decision influenced by prejudice. Johnson v. State, 596 So. 2d 865, 869 (Miss. 1992) (quoting Dunaway, 551 So. 2d at 163). Flora alleges several instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and we address each of them in turn. A. Prosecutors questioned witnesses and commented upon matters contrary to the rulings of the trial court ¶26. Flora argues generally that misconduct by the prosecution prejudiced the jury against him, and more specifically that improper comments were made by the prosecution during the examination of witnesses and were pervasive throughout the trial. One such comment was made at the beginning of cross-examination of Flora by the State, when the first phrase spoken by the prosecutor was “[p]oor, poor Milton Flora”. Flora also complains that earlier in the trial, the prosecutor said, “[l]et’s try again,” in response to an objection as to leading, which was sustained by the court during the direct examination of a witness. In both of these instances, timely objections were made by defense counsel, sustained by the trial court, and the jury was instructed to disregard the comments. There were other comments made by the 11 prosecution and pointed out by Flora which were arguably improper, but objections to them were likewise sustained by the trial court. It cannot be said that individually or cumulatively these comments prejudiced Flora to the point of depriving him of a fair trial. “A criminal defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, only a fair trial.” McGilberry v. State, 741 So. 2d 894, 924 (Miss. 1999) (citing Sand v. State, 467 So. 2d 907, 911 (Miss. 1985)). ¶27. Flora also points to instances where the prosecution asked improper questions of witnesses. First, during the cross-examination of Flora, the prosecutor asked him about the results of the gun powder residue test. Defense counsel objected before Flora could answer and the trial court sustained the objection. Later in the cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Flora if he had gun residue on him, and he said he didn’t know, and again an objection by defense was sustained. ¶28. Flora cites Henderson v. State, 403 So. 2d 139 (Miss. 1981), in support of his argument that this duplicate questioning was reversible error. The prosecutor in Henderson was cross examining a defense witness and inquired about past convictions of the witness. An objection and motion for mistrial were made, and the trial court sustained the objection and denied the motion for mistrial. During cross-examination of the very next witness, the prosecutor asked essentially the same question. Again the trial court sustained a defense objection and denied a motion for mistrial. This Court said that the compounding of the improper conduct by the prosecutor, who had just heard the court’s admonishment to the jury 12 on the same subject, created too great a prejudice, and the case was reversed and remanded. Id. at 140-41. ¶29. Flora also complains that during the direct examination of another witness, the defense objected to an improper question, and the prosecutor asked the same question after the objection was sustained. In this instance, however, the record reflects that the prosecutor was simply trying to rephrase the question to make it acceptable to the trial court. The misconduct found in Henderson is clearly distinguishable from the actions of the prosecutor in the present case. ¶30. The trial judge took proper action to ensure Flora received a fair trial. There is no proof any of the comments made by the prosecution were improper enough to meet the Henderson standard, nor is there any proof that the comments resulted in the jury being prejudiced against Flora. B. Denial of motion for mistrial for violation of a suppression order ¶31. During opening statements, the prosecutor told the jury that when the police arrived at Sebrina Johnson’s apartment, they awakened Flora, asked him his name, and he gave them false names. The defense objected and moved for a mistrial, claiming this was a violation of a pretrial order. Following a bench conference, the court overruled the objection and denied the motion for mistrial. ¶32. In a pretrial hearing there had been a lengthy discussion about statements that were made by Flora at the time of his arrest. Flora argued that because he was not given a 13 Miranda warning before the police asked him his name, that he gave false names was not admissible at trial. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Flora now alleges the court granted the pretrial motion to suppress those statements, and thus the prosecution was in violation of the pretrial order. However, the court specifically, and correctly, ruled that despite his not being given Miranda warnings prior to being asked his name, that Flora gave false names to the police was admissible evidence at trial. In Lewis v. State, 445 So. 2d 1387, 1388 (Miss. 1984), Lewis argued the testimony from police officers, that he had given a false name at the time of his arrest, was inadmissible because he had not been given a Miranda warning before being asked his name. This Court held that “Miranda does not preclude an arresting officer from asking the detained individual his name. . . .” Id. Thus, the trial judge correctly denied the Flora’s motion to suppress the false names he gave the police. ¶33. Flora next asserts the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to impeach him on cross-examination with a statement he made prior to being given a Miranda warning. Before Flora was arrested he was asked by the police about the blood on his clothing, and he told them it was from a nosebleed. This statement was ruled inadmissible as substantive evidence by the trial court at a pretrial hearing, and the prosecution did not mention it during the State’s case-in-chief. However, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecution argued they had the right to use the nosebleed statement on cross-examination, to impeach some of 14 Flora’s testimony from direct examination, and the trial court agreed to allow the prosecution its use for that limited purpose. ¶34. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971), the United States Supreme Court said that a criminal defendant’s right to testify in his or her own defense “cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury.” The Supreme Court further held that “[h]ad inconsistent statements been made by the accused to some third person, it could hardly be contended that the conflict could not be laid before the jury by way of cross-examination and impeachment.” Id. at 226. This Court recognized the holding in Harris, stating: “[t]he United States Supreme Court has held that the prosecution may use the statements of a defendant, inadmissible in the state’s case-in-chief because of a defective Miranda warning or procedure, to impeach a defendant’s testimony.” Booker v. State, 326 So. 2d 791, 792 (Miss. 1976). ¶35. During the State’s case-in-chief, investigator Charles Taylor testified that Flora had blood on his clothes when he was arrested, and the clothes were admitted as physical evidence. In his direct testimony, Flora never specifically identified the origin of the blood on his clothes but did talk extensively about the physical altercation with Spann. The trial judge reasoned that “it was implicit in the way [Flora] described the blood appearing on him following the tussle” that Flora said the blood came from the fight. This implied statement was inconsistent with what Flora told the police before he was arrested, and the trial judge properly allowed the prosecution to use it to impeach Flora’s direct testimony. 15 ¶36. Under the holdings in Harris and Booker, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to allow impeachment of Flora with his statement to police, even though he had not been given Miranda warnings prior to making the statement. After this ruling, the prosecution asked Flora if he remembered when the police asked him where the blood on his clothes came from and what he told the police. Flora admitted telling the police the blood was from a nosebleed. C. Denial of motion for mistrial due to improper and prejudicial crossexamination ¶37. Flora next argues it was error for the trial court to overrule his motion for mistrial after the prosecution asked him on cross-examination if he had screamed “where’s the money, where’s the money?” when he entered Subrenda Levy’s apartment on the night of the murder. The defense objected, claiming the State had no proof that Flora had asked this question. The prosecutor responded, saying “there are statements that have been taken by witnesses--” just before being cut off by another defense objection. The trial judge properly excused the jury and discussed he matter outside their presence. ¶38. Flora asserts this Court’s holding in Flowers v. State, 773 So. 2d 309 (Miss. 2000), should apply in this situation. In Flowers, the State questioned a defense witness about the witness purchasing a pair of shoes worn at the murder scene, and the witness denied buying the shoes for the defendant. On rebuttal, the State offered no proof of a basis in fact for asking whether the witness had purchased the shoes for the defendant, and this Court held that it was plain error for the State to leave “an impression in the minds of the jurors that the 16 prosecutor actually had such facts in hand and that the insinuations through questioning contained some truth.” Id. Flora’s reliance on Flowers is misplaced, however, because it is clearly distinguishable. The testimony in Flowers involved key evidence that would help to place the defendant at the scene of the murders, while Flora’s testimony pertained to a collateral matter. There was already evidence, including his own direct testimony, that Flora was at Levy’s apartment when Ray Spann was shot. The question of “where’s the money?” is not key to the ultimate issue in this case, which is whether Milton Flora was guilty of murder. ¶39. This Court has held that “[s]pecific instances of conduct under our rules of evidence may not be proved by extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes; they may only be inquired about on cross-examination.” Pinson v. State, 518 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Miss. 1988); see also Lewis v. State, 580 So. 2d 1279, 1287 (Miss. 1991). This subject arose in Ball v. Sloan, 569 So. 2d 1177 (Miss. 1990), when the defendant sought to impeach the credibility of the plaintiff by asking her if it was true that she had altered a prescription given to her by a doctor. The plaintiff denied having done so, and in its case in chief, the defense called a pharmacist who testified that he refused to fill the prescription for the plaintiff. Id. at 1179. On appeal, this Court held it was error for the trial court to allow, for impeachment purposes, the extrinsic evidence of the pharmacist’s testimony on the collateral matter of the plaintiff altering her prescription. Id. (Citing 608(b), M.R.E.). In the present case, however, Levy had given the police a written statement, of which the prosecution and the defense were both 17 aware, stating that Flora “pointed a gun at me, saying ‘bitch, where is the money’” when he entered her apartment. The defense saying, in the presence of the jury, that “they have no proof” when objecting to the questioning on this matter was in bad faith, and the State had every right to question Flora as to whether he said “where’s the money?” when he entered Subrenda Levy’s apartment, and Flora had the right to admit or deny. When a lawyer seeks to impeach a witness in this risky manner, they must accept the answer given by the witness. ¶40. Flora denied the accusation, and that should have been the end of the matter. When the prosecutor improperly repeated the question several times, the defense objected, and the trial court properly sustained the objection. The attempted impeachment was proper. As to the comment by the prosecutor alluding to the existence of witness statements to corroborate the accusation, the trial judge had wide discretion to determine whether the comment was so prejudicial as to merit a mistrial. Spann, 771 So.2d at 890. There was no abuse of discretion in denying Flora’s motion for mistrial based on this issue. ¶41. Flora also argues it was error for the trial court to allow the State to ask questions alluding to Flora’s having kidnapped and beaten Levy, crimes for which Flora was not on trial. While this issue may have some merit, the defense never objected to the allegedly inflammatory and prejudicial questions, and did not move for a mistrial after this line of questioning. ¶42. If no contemporaneous objection is made at trial, a party must rely on the plain error rule to raise the assignment of error on appeal. Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1289 (Miss. 18 1994) (citing Gray v. State, 487 So. 2d 1304, 1312 (Miss. 1986)). “The plain error doctrine requires that there be an error and that the error must have resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Williams v. State, 794 So. 2d 18, 187 (Miss. 2001) (citing Gray v. State, 549 So. 2d 1316, 1321 (Miss. 1989)). The plain error rule will only be applied when a defendant’s substantive or fundamental rights are affected. Grubb v. State, 584 So. 2d 786, 789 (Miss. 1991). ¶43. The questions asked by the prosecutor on cross-examination of Flora were questions about the events that took place on the night of the murder. Flora was able to answer all of the questions. It is the jury’s job to weigh the credibility of Flora’s testimony. Turner v. State, 726 So. 2d 117, 125 (Miss. 1998). The trial court’s ruling was not error. D. Flora’s objections to prosecutor’s remarks made in closing. ¶44. Flora next argues it was error for the trial court to overrule his objections to improper and prejudicial comments made by the prosecutor on closing rebuttal. The prosecutor reminded the jury of all of the physical evidence against Flora and then said “if you acquit him, you will disregard every piece of physical evidence entered by the State ... and you will only believe Milton Flora.” The prosecutor added “[t]hat’s the only way you let him go.” Flora objected, arguing that the jury should not be told that they “let him go.” ¶45. The standard of review that appellate courts must apply to lawyer misconduct during opening statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Sheppard v. State, 777 So. 2d 659, 661 19 (Miss. 2000). Attorneys are allowed a wide latitude in arguing their cases to the jury. However, prosecutors are not permitted to use tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury. Id. ¶46. Flora argues that Banks v. State, 725 So. 2d 711 (Miss. 1997), should apply in this case. In Banks, this Court addressed a similar issue, where the prosecutor in closing arguments told the jury that if they set Banks free, that he would “walk out of [the] courthouse” was “the most frightening part.” Id. at 718. This Court found that statement to be improper, stating it implied a possibility that Banks would commit crimes in the future if acquitted. Id. However, there were many other errors leading to a reversal in Banks, not the least of which was that there was virtually no evidence linking Banks to the crime. Id. at 713. ¶47. This Court also addressed improper comments during closing arguments in Dancer v. State, 721 So. 2d 583, 589 (Miss. 1998), in which the prosecutor had warned jurors that if they acquitted Dancer, he would walk out of the courtroom and into their neighborhood. Although this statement was made to arouse fear in the jurors, an impermissible tactic, this Court held that, due to the overwhelming evidence against Dancer, the improper comment did not result in a decision made out of prejudice, and therefore, did not constitute reversible error. Id. at 590. ¶48. The comment in the present case simply informed the jury that they were the ones who had the power to convict Flora or to acquit him. It in no way implied that Flora would 20 commit any crimes if acquitted. Unlike Banks, and much like Dancer, there was ample evidence against Flora to conclude the jury’s decision was not improperly influenced by the prosecutor’s comment. ¶49. Flora also complains of another comment made by the prosecutor during closing rebuttal. When discussing the jury instructions, the prosecutor said that a verdict of manslaughter would be a “cop-out” and that this was not a manslaughter case. Flora objected, stating that the comment is “accusing the court of getting them to compromise or cop-out.” The trial judge overruled the objection and said, “[w]ell, that’s her language, her argument. The jury has been instructed on following the jury instructions, and that what the lawyers say is not facts if it goes outside the record. So overruled. It’s argument.” ¶50. Flora also relies on Sheppard, in which this Court held it was improper for the prosecutor to tell the jury that “if the jury voted to acquit, he wanted them to call him and explain their rationale for finding the defense witnesses credible, so he could explain it to the victim’s family.” Sheppard, 777 So. 2d at 661. We held that “[t]he purpose of the remarks was to prejudice the defense, as well as to give the jurors the impression that if they did not convict, the prosecutor was going to subject them to personal ridicule, embarrassment and questioning.” Id. at 662. In the present case, the prosecutor’s statement that a verdict of manslaughter would be a “cop-out,” while possibly riding the line between acceptability and unacceptability, in no way threatened the jury. The added safeguard of the trial court’s admonition to the jury that they were to follow the instructions and that what the prosecutor 21 said that went outside the record was not fact, but “her language,” was sufficient for us to hold that, at most, this was harmless error. E. Allowing presentation in rebuttal of evidence of physical injuries to Levy, an uncharged crime irrelevant to this trial ¶51. “The standard of review of an admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion.” Smith v. State, 839 So. 2d 489, 496 (Miss. 2003) (citing Stallworth v. State, 797 So. 2d 905, 908 (Miss. 2001)). In this assignment of error, Flora contends the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a photograph of Levy, depicting her appearance on the night of Spann’s murder. The trial court allowed the photograph for the limited purpose of impeaching Flora’s credibility as to his testimony that Levy got into his car voluntarily that night and that he did not remember hitting her, especially with a gun. ¶52. Flora argues the holdings of this Court in Flowers v. State, 773 So. 2d 309 (Miss. 2000), Flowers v. State, 842 So. 2d 531 (Miss 2003), and Stringer v. State, 500 So. 2d 928 (Miss. 1986), should apply in this case. Although each of these cases involved multiple murders, the defendants were being tried separately for each victim. In each one of these trials, the prosecutors put in evidence of the murders of the other victims for which the defendants were not then on trial, and this Court held the admission of that evidence constituted reversible error. ¶53. The present case and those cited by Flora are clearly distinguishable. The evidence questioned by Flora is much less severe than that found to be improper in the Flowers and Stringer, in which the prosecution introduced pictures of and testimony about the bodies of 22 the other murder victims. The facts and photographs were particularly gruesome in Stringer, in which the trial court permitted the prosecutor to show the jury pictures of the second victim, a woman who was decapitated by a point-blank shotgun blast. The photograph challenged by Flora is black and white, and the photocopy contained in the record is not clear. It was admitted for a legitimate purpose, and does not rise to the level of gruesomeness or repetitiveness which requires denial of admission into evidence. The trial court did not err in allowing it on rebuttal. V. DENIAL OF INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE OF THE .380 HANDGUN ¶54. Flora argues the trial court erred by prohibiting him from introducing into evidence a chrome .380 handgun that was discovered at the scene of Flora’s arrest. Flora claims that Spann pulled out the chrome .380 handgun when he entered Levy’s apartment, and argues that the exclusion of the gun deprived him of his right to present his theory of the case. Flora alleges that the murder weapon, the .32 pistol, was possessed by his cousin, Roger Johnson, on the night of Spann’s murder. ¶55. As stated supra, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard to the admission or exclusion of evidence by a trial court. Smith, 839 So. 2d at 496. Flora argues that he should have been allowed to put the .380 handgun into evidence because his theory of the case was that he was in possession of the .380, and Roger Johnson had the .32. However, Flora’s own testimony was that Spann had the chrome .380 when Flora and Johnson entered Levy’s apartment, which clearly contradicts Flora’s theory of the case. In addition, Flora 23 apparently wanted to tell the jury that Johnson was in possession of the murder weapon, leading the jury to believe that Johnson was the shooter. However, when the prosecutor asked on cross-examination: “Are you blaming your cousin for shooting Ray Spann?” Flora replied, “No Ma’am.” To say the least, Flora’s “theory” is confusing. ¶56. The trial judge ruled it was never shown that the chrome .380 had any relevance whatsoever in this case. There was never any evidence presented to the trial court that tied the .380 handgun to the murder scene. That it was found underneath Flora at the apartment of Sebrina Johnson does not make it relevant evidence when the murder occurred in another part of the city. ¶57. Flora finally renews his argument that the State opened the door for the admission of the .380 handgun. On direct examination of Investigator Taylor, the State asked him, “Why did you respond to the Lincoln Garden Apartments?” to which Taylor responded “I received a call from the police communications to respond to the apartments in reference to Precinct 3 officers recovering a car and possibly some handguns.” Flora argued, outside the presence of the jury, that the use of the plural “handguns” opened the door for the admission of the .380. The State never asked any questions about multiple handguns found at the scene, and the trial judge correctly ruled that the reference to the “handguns” by Taylor was “very obscure and vague” and that “nothing specific” was said about multiple handguns. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the admission of the .380 handgun into evidence. 24