Opinion ID: 390302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Factors Favoring Release

Text: 15 Chief among the factors favoring release is the common law right of the public to inspect and copy judicial records. The existence of such a right was recognized by the Supreme Court in Warner Communications, where the Court stated: 16 It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents. 17 435 U.S. at 597, 98 S.Ct. at 1312. 18 The right to inspect and copy, sometimes termed the right to access, antedates the Constitution. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1260. It has been justified on the ground of the public's right to know, which encompasses public documents generally, and the public's right to open courts, which has particular applicability to judicial records. Crystal Grower's Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980); Cohen v. Everett City Council, 85 Wash.2d 385, 535 P.2d 801 (1975); United States v. Burka, 289 A.2d 376, 379-80 (D.C.App.1972). 5 See Comment, All Courts Shall Be Open: The Public's Right to View Judicial Proceedings and Records, 52 Temp.L.Q. 311, 337-40 (1979). 19 The Second Circuit, in discussing the nature of the interest which favored disclosure of the Abscam videotapes, stated: 20 Though the transcripts of the videotapes have already provided the public with an opportunity to know what words were spoken, there remains a legitimate and important interest in affording members of the public their own opportunity to see and hear evidence that records the activities of a Member of Congress and local elected officials, as well as agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. And there is a significant public interest in affording that opportunity contemporaneously with the introduction of the tapes into evidence in the courtroom, when public attention is alerted to the ongoing trial. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra closed courtroom not justified despite prompt release of tapes of the trial after its conclusion, -- U.S. -- at -- n.3, 100 S.Ct. 2814, at 2820 n.3, 65 L.Ed.2d 973; Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S. (539) at 560-61, (96 S.Ct. 2791 at 2803-04, 49 L.Ed.2d 683). 21 In Re Application of National Broadcasting Co. (Myers), 635 F.2d at 952. 22 In Warner Communications, the Supreme Court considered an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ordering the release to the media of audiotapes of conversations of President Nixon which had been subpoenaed in connection with the Watergate proceedings. In reaffirming the existence of the right to inspect and copy judicial records, the Court did not attempt to rationalize its underlying basis. However, in contrasting the English decisions which require showing of a particular interest with the American decisions which generally do not condition enforcement of this right on a proprietary interest in the document or upon a need for it as evidence in a lawsuit, the Court stated: 23 The interest necessary to support the issuance of a writ compelling access has been found, for example, in the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies, see, e. g., State ex rel. Colscott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 621-627, 57 N.E. 535, 536-538 (1900); State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336-339 (1879), and in a newspaper publisher's intention to publish information concerning the operation of government, see, e. g., State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis.2d 672, 677, 137 N.W.2d 470, 472 (1965), modified on other grounds, 28 Wis.2d 685a, 139 N.W.2d 241 (1966). But see Burton v. Reynolds, 110 Mich. 354, 68 N.W. 217 (1896). 24 435 U.S. at 597-98, 98 S.Ct. at 1311-12. 25 Because Congress had enacted a statute governing the procedure for release and access of the Nixon papers, including the tapes in question, the Court in Warner Communications did not undertake to balance the strength of the common law right to view judicial records against the interests pressed by defendants, which it viewed as the procedure to be followed in ruling on a request for access. The Court also rejected the broadcasters' claim that release of the Watergate tapes was required by either the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press or the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial, id. at 608-10, 98 S.Ct. at 1317-18, an issue the broadcasters do not raise here. Nonetheless, the interests identified by the Court in Warner Communications as supporting the right to access, the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies and publication of information concerning the operations of government, are identical to the interests identified in the subsequent decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, -- U.S. --, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), where the Court held for the first time that the public's access to criminal trials is guaranteed by First Amendment. Although we do not consider the applicability of the First Amendment here, we believe that some of the same policy considerations identified as supporting open trials may be considered when the issue involves the common law right of access to trial materials. 26 In Richmond Newspapers, the plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Burger for three members of the Court traced the criminal trial from the days before the Norman Conquest, when attendance at trials was compulsory for freemen who were required to render judgment, through its evolution in England and the American colonies to contemporary times. The characteristic which remained constant in this development was the openness at the proceedings to those who wished to attend a criminal trial. Id. at 2821-23. 27 Chief Justice Burger found that the importance of openness lay not only in the interests of the defendant but also in the interests of the public. He stated that (t)he early history of open trials in part reflects the widespread acknowledgment, long before there were behavioral scientists, that public trials had significant community therapeutic value  (emphasis added) and that especially in the administration of justice, the means used to achieve justice must have the support derived from public acceptance of both the process and its results. Id. at 2824. In stressing the important prophylactic purpose served by the open processes of justice in providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion, the Chief Justice continued: 28 Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante the enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot erase from people's consciousness the fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done or even the urge for retribution. The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is done in a corner (or) in any covert manner. It is not enough to say that results alone will satiate the natural community desire for satisfaction. A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice, Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954), and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it. 29 Id. 100 S.Ct. at 2824-25. 30 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote separately, stressing the structural role played by the First Amendment in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government. He explained that: 31 Implicit in this structural role is not only the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), but the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate as well as other civic behavior must be informed. The structural model links the First Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication. 32 Id. 100 S.Ct. at 2833 (footnotes omitted). 33 Turning next to the importance of public access to the trial process itself, Justice Brennan, like Chief Justice Burger, found that open trials play a fundamental role beyond that of assuring the criminal defendant a fair and accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence. Among other, broadly political, interests advanced by the trial process is the need to demonstrate to the citizenry the fairness of the law. Id. at 2837. Open trials assure the public that procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded equally Public access is essential, therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve the objective of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. Id. Furthermore, for Justice Brennan, a trial implicates one of the branches of government, and therefore the conduct of the trial is preeminently a matter of public interest because the knowledge that it  'is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power,'  id. at 2838, quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270, 68 S.Ct. 499, 506, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). See generally The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 149-59 (1980). 34 The factors emphasized by both opinions, which jointly commanded a majority of the votes of the Court, are equally significant to the issue before us. We need not speculate on whether the Richmond Newspapers case betokens a more expansive view of the First Amendment's application to the right to copy evidence introduced at trial than was followed by the Court in Warner Communications two years before, 6 but we believe the analyses in Richmond Newspapers of the public's right to an open trial provide strong support for reliance on the common law right of access to trial materials in this case. 35 We recognize that an application to copy evidence for the purpose of dissemination, such as that made by the broadcasters here, does not present the precise issue raised in cases where the issue was the public's right to attend open trials or to inspect judicial records. In the proceedings below, the trial was open, the audio and videotapes were publicly played, and the broadcasters as well as other representatives of the news media were provided with a transcript which they were free to disseminate without limitation. The issue before us focuses instead on the right to rebroadcast evidence already publicly available in the same form as that viewed by those present at the trial. Nonetheless, broader dissemination would serve the same values of community catharsis, observation of the criminal trial process, and public awareness served by the open trial guarantee. 36 In exploring the news media's fair report privilege in an action for libel, we recently commented on the value of public supervision and inspection of courtroom proceedings, and the public's interest in learning of important matters. See Medico v. Time, Inc., No. 79-00597, 643 F.2d 134 at 140-142 (3d Cir. 1981). These same interests favor broad dissemination of the actual evidence introduced in judicial proceedings. 37 Finally, we note that the criminal trial at which the tapes were played was not an ordinary criminal trial. The two defendants tried were elected public officials accused of receiving money for acts to be performed by them because of their official positions. The Abscam indictments have provoked public concern and comment about the morality of public officers. The government's involvement in the conduct for which defendants were prosecuted has raised sensitive issues of public policy, since the integrity of the methods used in federal law enforcement has been called into question. Subsequent to the trial and the ruling on the tapes, Judge Fullam held that the conduct of the undercover agents established entrapment which entitled defendants to judgments of acquittal. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F.Supp. 1182, 1200 (E.D.Pa.1980). The actions of the indicted elected officials, the conduct of the law enforcement agencies, and the court's decision to set aside the convictions combine to create legitimate public interest in the proceedings far beyond the usual criminal case. 38 The public's opportunity to observe the trial proceeding, secured by Richmond Newspapers, is subject to certain practical limitations, and can be taken advantage of only by those persons who have the available time and means to be present. Thus, the public forum values emphasized in that case can be fully vindicated only if the opportunity for personal observation is extended to persons other than those few who can manage to attend the trial in person. All of the foregoing factors favor permitting rebroadcast of the evidence produced at the trial for wider dissemination. 39 The district court indicated a great reluctance to find a presumption that evidence produced at trial should be made available to the broadcasters in a form that will permit its observation by the public at large. The court saw no justification for a very strong presumption in favor of permitting copying and re-dissemination by the broadcasters, 7 stating it was quite impossible to derive from the Supreme Court's (Warner Communications ) decision any support for the expansive view of the common law right of access espoused by the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals  501 F.Supp. at 859. The district court believed that existence of a presumption was refuted by references in Warner Communications to the crucial fact that (the broadcasters) require a court's cooperation in furthering their commercial plans and the need for a sensitive appreciation of the circumstances that led to (the) production of the tapes. 435 U.S. at 602-03, 98 S.Ct. at 1314-15. We view this language in Warner Communications as addressed to the circumstances that led to the production of the Watergate tapes in court, a third party subpoena vigorously contested by the President of the United States. Unlike the district court, we read the Warner Communications decision as supportive of a presumption of release of the tapes, because the only circumstances referred to there which would militate against production were use of subpoenaed material as a vehicle for improper purposes. 435 U.S. at 598, 98 S.Ct. at 1312. In any event, when the common law right of access is buttressed by the significant interest of the public in observation, participation, and comment on the trial events, we believe that the existence of a presumption of release is undeniable. Obviously, the strength of the presumption can be effectively considered only in relationship to the factors which would justify denial of the application. However, in order to avoid ambiguity, we hold that there is a strong presumption that material introduced into evidence at trial should be made reasonably accessible in a manner suitable for copying and broader dissemination.