Opinion ID: 2612956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: issue fourjury instruction on second degree murder

Text: In his fourth contention, Bankert says that the jury instruction setting forth the elements of second degree murder erroneously included a provocation element which was inherently confusing to the jury. Furthermore, the prosecution's closing argument that a finding of provocation would be illogical in this case was prejudicial. The instruction from SCRA 1986, 14-210, that second degree murder could be found only if [t]he defendant did not act as a result of sufficient provocation, (footnote omitted) is appropriate only in cases where provocation is an issue. Id., Use Note 1. As Bankert admits, this error was not presented below. The parties were ordered by the trial judge to submit a complete set of jury instructions more than a month before the trial began. Bankert never objected to this instruction before the trial. It appears from the transcript that, at the time the judge read this instruction, he called the parties to the bench to discuss the appropriateness of the provocation language. Again, Bankert did not object. Since this issue was not preserved below, the only mode of review open to Bankert is that the instruction constituted fundamental error. SCRA 1986, 12-216(B)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1992); State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510, 515, 760 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1988); State v. Lucero, 70 N.M. 268, 272, 372 P.2d 837, 840 (1962) (Where substantial justice has been done, the parties must have taken and preserved exceptions in the lower court before this court will notice them on appeal.). Because we find the evidence overwhelmingly supports the conviction for intentional killing during the commission of a felony, even if the provocation instruction was inappropriate, elimination of that instruction would not have altered the jury's determination. We find in this jury instruction no miscarriage of justice, no deprivation of any rights essential to Bankert's defense, and nothing to shock the conscience if the conviction were permitted to stand. State v. Jett, 111 N.M. 309, 314, 805 P.2d 78, 83 (1991). Furthermore, the prosecution's closing argument was a fair assessment of the evidence on this issue. See State v. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 730, 819 P.2d 673, 680 (1991). There was no fundamental error and Bankert waived further review of this issue by failing to preserve it below. State v. Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 661, 808 P.2d 624, 631 (1991).