Opinion ID: 2615526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Self-Defense [2] and Reckless [3] Conduct

Text: Duran was charged with, and convicted of, aggravated homicide by vehicle. The criminal statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(ii) (LEXIS 1999), provides: (b) A person is guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, if:    (ii) He operates or drives a vehicle in a reckless manner, and his conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another person. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on self-defense, explaining: The reason is that it appears to me that the evidence does not warrant a self-defense instruction because as I understand the Defendant's testimony she intended at no time to inflict any injury and certainly not death on [the victim], rather that she was simply trying to avoid further confrontation with him.    So that she does not claim that she ever acted intentionally to inflict any harm on him, rather any harm to him was incidental and accidental in her point of view. So it's the view of the Court that the self-defense being an affirmative defense and this Defendant, having in her testimony denied any such act on her part, inflict injury on [the victim], self-defense is not an available defense. This Court has not directly considered whether self-defense is an appropriate affirmative defense to a crime involving recklessness rather than an intentional act. Duran argues that Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420 (Wyo.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1224, 105 S.Ct. 1215, 84 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), implied that self-defense is an appropriate defense to criminal recklessness. In Small, the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter. Small, 689 P.2d at 422. Out of an abundance of caution, the trial court gave eight instructions on self-defense. Id. Contrary to Duran's contention, the court did not imply that the self-defense instructions were necessary. Id. The trial court also instructed the jury that one of the necessary elements of involuntary manslaughter was that the defendant acted recklessly. In another instruction the court defined recklessly. The state proved to the satisfaction of the jury that appellant acted recklessly. The same evidence that proved appellant acted recklessly also proved that appellant did not act in self-defense since proof of recklessness under the facts of this case negates self-defense. A finding of recklessness is inconsistent with, and precludes a finding of, self-defense. Id. Small continued its analysis, quoting a case from our sister court in the State of Washington with approval: When recklessness is an element of the crime charged, and the court properly instructs the jury on the elements of recklessness, the jury must determine, before it may convict, that the accused knew of and disregarded a substantial risk that a wrongful act would occur and that such disregard was a gross deviation from the conduct of a reasonable person in the same situation. Such a finding is totally inconsistent with self-defense. A person acting in self-defense cannot be acting recklessly. Thus, if the jury is able to find that a defendant acted recklessly, it has already precluded a finding of self-defense. Id. (quoting State v. Hanton, 94 Wash.2d 129, 614 P.2d 1280, 1282 (1980)). In Small, this Court opined that henceforth, when self-defense is properly raised the jury should be specifically instructed that the state has the burden to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Small, 689 P.2d at 423. However, based on the Hanton analysis, we determined that, although the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the state has the burden to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, the error was not reversible error. Small, 689 P.2d at 423. Small held that the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately informed the jury of the state's burden of proof, including the negation of appellant's assertion of self-defense. Id. at 423-24. Rather than implying that self-defense is a proper defense to criminal recklessness, Small implies that the self-defense instructions were not necessary because a finding of recklessness precludes a finding of self-defense. If Small had determined that the self-defense instructions were necessary, it would have found reversible error for failure to specifically instruct that the state has the burden to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 423. See also Olson v. State, 960 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Wyo.1998) (Instruction failed to assign to the State the burden of negating self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt as Small requires. Court also recognized that Small was critical of self-defense for involuntary manslaughter, but did not decide the appeal on that basis.) While Duran claims that the more persuasive approach finds self-defense is relevant to the reckless element of the offense, this Court is inclined to follow [t]he majority of jurisdictions hold[ing] that self-defense requires intentional conduct. See State v. Blanks, 313 N.J.Super. 55, 712 A.2d 698, 703 (1998) and cases cited therein. A charge of recklessness involves an unintentional act. State v. Miller, 981 S.W.2d 623, 632 (Mo.App.1998). The trial court gave proper instructions to the jury on the elements of the offense and the definitions of recklessness and proximate cause. The jury had the applicable law before it. The trial court did not err in refusing to submit an instruction on self-defense to the jury.