Opinion ID: 728070
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Limitation of Cross-Examination Regarding Possible Bias

Text: 26 In cross-examining Glenn, Morrison's counsel attempted to impeach her by showing that she was cooperating with the government under threat of a prison sentence which would mean losing custody of her children, and thus she had a strong incentive to say anything the government wanted her to. In pursuit of this objective, Morrison's counsel elicited from Glenn that her two children lived with her, and that she would lose custody of them if [she] were locked up. Tr. 7/1/92 at 232. At this point, Morrison's counsel pressed on, precipitating the following exchange: 27 Q. Okay. So the only way to keep from losing your children is to testify against Mr. Morrison? 28 A. Could you repeat that question? 29 THE COURT: I am afraid I am going to have to sustain an objection to that question that has not been made. Sentencing is the responsibility of the court, and nobody knows now what is going to happen at the sentencing. 30 MS. NORMAN: All right, your honor, but-- 31 THE COURT: And certainly the witness does not. 32 MS. NORMAN: But if she didn't cooperate-- 33 THE COURT: I don't want to hear any more about it. 34 MS. NORMAN: (Continuing)--it would be a mandatory sentence. 35 Id. at 232-33. 36 This limitation on Glenn's cross-examination did not amount to an abuse of discretion, because the question called for a speculative answer on Glenn's part. Glenn had pled guilty to a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856, a crime with no statutorily-mandated minimum sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 856 (1994). Thus, the only floor placed on Glenn's sentencing was that created by the sentencing guidelines, and while the guidelines place significant constraints on the discretion of sentencing judges, they permit judges to depart from guideline sentences when the judges find an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission ... that should result in a sentence different from that described. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). Glenn could only speculate as to what would happen had she [321 U.S.App.D.C. 179] refused to testify against Morrison and the government consequently declined to request a downward departure at sentencing. As the trial judge correctly observed, the sentencing judge might nevertheless have granted her a downward departure under § 3553(b), enabling her to retain custody of her children. 37 Furthermore, even if the premise of the judge's objection had been false, any error would certainly have been harmless in light of the cumulative nature of this portion of the cross-examination. Before the judge intervened, Morrison's counsel had already brought out the facts that Glenn was testifying pursuant to a plea agreement, that she had three children, two of whom lived with her, and that she could lose custody of her children if she went to prison. In fact, before the exchange quoted above occurred, Morrison's counsel had already asked Glenn the same question about the connection between Glenn's testimony and her ability to retain custody of her children and, after some confusion on Glenn's part, elicited the answer she sought. 11 Even in the exchange during which the judge attempted to limit the cross-examination, Morrison's counsel was able to articulate for the jury the precise point she had been trying to elicit from Glenn by saying, over the judge's interruption, [b]ut if she didn't cooperate it would be a mandatory sentence. Therefore, because Morrison's counsel had ample opportunity to impeach Glenn on the issue of Glenn's motivation to help the government in order to avoid losing custody of her children, we hold that the district judge's error, if indeed any error had been committed, would in this instance be harmless. 38