Opinion ID: 6335188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: negligent entrustment by mr. jesurum

Text: The circuit court granted summary judgment to Mr. Jesurum on Petitioners’ claim of negligent entrustment applying Kentucky and Tennessee law. But as we concluded above, the West Virginia law of negligent entrustment applies to the claim, so we consider Petitioners’ argument in view of the standard established in Syllabus Points 11 and 12 of Payne. 49 Robertson v. LeMaster, 171 W. Va. 607, 611, 301 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1983) (quoting T. Cooley, LAW OF TORTS § 478 (4th ed. 1932)) (holding that an employer violated a duty of care by allowing an exhausted employee to drive himself home when it was foreseeable that employee would injure others due to his exhaustion; employer had required employee to work over twentyseven hours without rest, employee had asked to be relieved from duty due to exhaustion, and employee had been observed falling asleep after shift). 50 Syl. Pt. 11, Payne, 147 W. Va. at 352, 127 S.E.2d at 729. 51 Citing the Restatement of Torts (2d.) § 324A, Petitioners suggest that it is the practice of employees at EAN Tennessee to check the criminal records of prospective drivers, so that EAN has assumed a duty to check criminal records and Mr. Bradshaw violated that duty by not doing so before entrusting the Explorer to Mr. Herrera. Petitioners argue that had Mr. Bradshaw done so, then he would have discovered Mr. Herrera’s criminal background and, presumably, not entrusted the car to him. As Petitioners concede, this Court has not adopted that section of the Restatement. Even if the Court were to do that, the single page cited by Petitioners to establish that EAN has assumed a duty to check prospective renters’ criminal backgrounds does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. On its face, the page shows that any inquiry into a prospective renter’s background is predicated on a computer-generated “warning prompt” and a “Risk Management related message[] (DX claims, Conversion, thefts, arrests, impounds, etc. . . . .).” Petitioners have not identified a portion of the record to support the inference that Mr. Herrera’s particular criminal history would have generated a “warning prompt” and “Risk Management related message.” 16 The court approached Petitioners’ claim in two steps. It first examined the entrustment of the Town & Country to Mr. Herrera on March 13, then the entrustment of the Explorer to him on March 21. The court’s decision rested largely on its finding that Petitioners failed to offer sufficient material evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as whether Mr. Jesurum knew or should have known of Mr. Herrera’s incompetence to operate a vehicle safely on either day. On appeal, Petitioners argue that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Mr. Jesurum knew or should have known about Mr. Herrera’s competency to operate a vehicle. That is so, they contend, because Mr. Jesurum entrusted the Town & Country and the Explorer to Mr. Herrera to further a criminal enterprise, dictated Mr. Herrera’s driving schedule, and—on the night before or morning of the collision—encouraged Mr. Herrera to continue driving although Mr. Herrera had expressed to Mr. Jesurum that he was tired. Petitioners also argue that when Mr. Jesurum entrusted the Town & Country to Mr. Herrera in Tennessee, he was aware that Mr. Herrera would drive long distances in a short period for an allegedly criminal purpose. 52 Petitioners again raise the question of whether Mr. Herrera was an additional authorized driver of the Town & Country or Explorer and the alleged breach of the rental agreement. Mr. Jesurum responds that Petitioners’ evidence regarding a criminal enterprise is specious and immaterial to the claim of negligent entrustment. Mr. Jesurum argues that Petitioners’ speculation that he controlled Mr. Herrera after entrusting the Town & Country is immaterial to the claim of negligent entrustment. Finally, Mr. Jesurum argues that Petitioners have offered no evidence that he knew or should have known that Mr. Herrera was incompetent or unable to drive a vehicle. We concur with Mr. Jesurum that Petitioners have not offered evidence sufficient to a raise a genuine issue of material fact to prevent summary judgment of their claim for negligent entrustment. Mr. Jesurum had met Mr. Herrera shortly before renting the Town & Country in Cleveland, Tennessee. He viewed Mr. Herrera’s Florida driver’s license (identifying Mr. Herrera as a “safe driver”) before entrusting the Town & Country to him. So, when Mr. Jesurum entrusted the Town & Country to Mr. Herrera, he knew that Mr. Herrera was a licensed driver and, based on their brief acquaintance, had no actual knowledge that would indicate that Mr. Herrera was likely to not operate a vehicle safely. Petitioners do not appear to suggest that Mr. Jesurum should have undertaken an additional investigation of Mr. Herrera’s licensure, so we turn to their arguments that in the circumstances Mr. Jesurum was chargeable with knowledge that Mr. Herrera was unfit to drive. It is already determined that Mr. Herrera’s inability to rent a vehicle from EAN or to qualify as an additional authorized driver of a rental vehicle does not reflect on his competency to operate a vehicle—only 52 Petitioners also argue that the circuit court erred by failing to give due weight to their experts’ opinions regarding the probability that a person who has driven approximately 7,700 miles in eight days will be extremely exhausted. These opinions do not establish that Mr. Herrera appeared so fatigued that a reasonable person would know him to be incompetent to operate a vehicle, safely, when Mr. Jesurum entrusted the vehicle to him on March 8 or that Mr. Jesurum should have known that Mr. Herrera, particularly, was exhausted to the point of impairment when the Explorer was entrusted to him on March 21. 17 on his lack of credit and proof of permanent address. 53 Similarly, and as discussed above, the alleged violation of the rental agreement does not demonstrate that Mr. Herrera was incompetent to operate a vehicle safely. Petitioners offer the transcript of a statement given by Mr. Herrera to authorities following the collision to demonstrate that Mr. Herrera was entrusted with the Town & Country to transport undocumented immigrants across the country in exchange for payment. As troubling as the contents of that transcript may be, it is not material evidence 54 sufficient to establish a genuine issue of disputed fact as to Petitioners’ negligent entrustment claim against Mr. Jesurum under Payne. Under that standard, owner liability “rests upon the combined negligence of the owner and the driver—negligence of the owner in entrusting the vehicle to an incompetent driver, and negligence of the driver in its operation.” 55 Taking all inferences in Petitioners’ favor, a reasonable juror might conclude that Mr. Jesurum increased the risk posed to others on the road by sending Mr. Herrera out on a criminal errand. But that conclusion does not support liability for negligent entrustment because it rests on the alleged purpose of Mr. Herrera’s trip to Mesa, Arizona, and not his competency to operate a vehicle safely as known to Mr. Jesurum at the time of entrustment. We briefly address Petitioners’ arguments regarding Mr. Jesurum’s liability for the alleged negligent entrustment of the Explorer to Mr. Herrera on March 21, 2015. Mr. Jesurum was not present when Mr. Bradshaw entrusted the Explorer to Mr. Herrera and so could not assess Mr. Herrera’s appearance. In view of Mr. Jesurum’s absence, Petitioners look to Mr. Herrera’s statement to authorities. There, Mr. Herrera reported that sometime after he picked up the Explorer and before the collision, he told a man (presumably Mr. Jesurum) that he was tired. The man reportedly responded no, “[g]et up, let’s go.” This reported interaction occurred after the entrustment of the Explorer to Mr. Herrera on March 21, 2015. “[T]he critical element of a negligent entrustment cause of action is the initial improper loaning of the vehicle[,]” 56 so this interaction does not bear on what Mr. Jesurum knew or should have known at the time the Explorer 53 See Bakali v. Jones, No. CV 17-1162, 2018 WL 3375164, at  (W.D. Pa. July 11, 2018) (dismissing negligent entrustment claim against rental car company even though drivers were not named as “permitted drivers under the rental agreement” because that did “not indicate that they were ‘incompetent’ as drivers, nor does the fact that the men were under the age of 25 and would not have been authorized drivers under the rental agreement”). 54 Respondents assert that the statement is inadmissible, but do not include any argument or legal authority to support that assertion. Therefore, the issue of admissibility of the statement is not sufficiently developed to allow this Court to consider the issue. See State v. Lilly, 194 W. Va. 595, 605 n.16, 461 S.E.2d 101, 111 n.16 (1995) (“appellate courts frequently refuse to address issues that appellants, or in this case the appellee, fail to develop in their brief”). 55 Payne, 147 W. Va. at 370, 127 S.E.2d at 738 (quoting 5A Am.Jur., AUTOMOBILES AND HIGHWAY TRAFFIC, § 580) (Emphasis added). 56 Huggins, 175 W. Va. at 649, 337 S.E.2d at 17 (Emphasis added). 18 was entrusted to Mr. Herrera. For those reasons, Petitioners have not shown that a genuine issue of material fact remains on their claim of negligent entrustment against Mr. Herrera. 57 C. CONSPIRACY AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BY EAN, RIS, & EMPIRE In June 2017, Petitioners amended their complaint to add claims for IIED and conspiracy against EAN, RIS, and EMPIRE. As explained in their brief on appeal, Petitioners contend that “EAN, RIS and Empire conspired to defeat both insurance coverage [under the SLP] for the collision in this case and a direct recovery against EAN.” Petitioners continue: Specifically, the insurance policy sold by EAN to Jesurum has a one million dollar ($1,000,000) self-insured retention, RIS is a captive third-party administrator for the insurance policy, and Empire is the underwriter. Documentary evidence shows that RIS, working together with Empire, originally denied and disclaimed coverage under the policy on the grounds that Herrera was not an authorized driver of the rental vehicle. RIS and Empire went on to revise the denial by “questioning” coverage due to information that Herrera might have been intoxicated at the time of the collision. By reversing their reasoning for the original denial of coverage and asserting the possibility of a coverage denial based on intoxication, EAN, RIS and Empire effectively foreclosed Petitioners from any meaningful recovery.[58] Petitioners conclude that a reasonably jury “could conclude that those actions satisfy the elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . .” We disagree. The elements of a claim for IIED are well-settled: In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the defendant’s conduct was atrocious, intolerable, and so extreme and outrageous as to exceed the bounds of decency; (2) that the defendant acted with the intent to inflict emotional distress, or acted recklessly when it was certain or substantially certain emotional distress would result from his conduct; (3) that the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress; and, (4) that the emotional distress 57 As EAN observes, Petitioners have not sought to hold Mr. Jesurum liable for their injuries under other theories. 58 Emphasis in original. 19 suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.[59] We agree with EAN, RIS, and Empire that Petitioners have not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to their claim for IIED. Petitioners broadly contend that they have “produced sufficient evidence to show that EAN, RIS, and Empire conspired to defeat both insurance coverage for the collision at issue in this case and a direct recovery against EAN.” Practically, the record reflects that coverage-limits offers have been made to Petitioners, but that they have not accepted those offers because they object to certain provisions or condition included in those offers. Petitioners cannot succeed on a civil conspiracy theory, alone. “A civil conspiracy is not a per se, stand-alone cause of action; it is instead a legal doctrine under which liability for a tort may be imposed on people who did not actually commit a tort themselves but who shared a common plan for its commission with the actual perpetrator(s).” 60 In other words, a civil conspiracy is not actionable unless there is a tort at its center—here, IIED, per the allegations in Petitioners’ amended complaint. Petitioners’ evidence in support of their IIED claim includes three coverage letters sent by Empire to Mr. Jesurum and Mr. Herrera on March 13, 2015; April 6, 2015; and February 15, 2016. While Petitioners may have been distressed by the information conveyed to Mr. Jesurum and Mr. Herrera in those letters, the act of sending a coverage letter to Mr. Jesurum and Mr. Herrera is not, standing alone, extreme, outrageous, or indecent. Petitioners also offer evidence of interactions between the RIS claims investigator and an Empire claims supervisor during the investigation of coverage for Mr. Herrera under the SLP purchased by Mr. Jesurum. Petitioners assert that the initial declination of coverage based on Mr. Herrera’s status as an unauthorized driver accords with relevant training materials but that the later rescission of that declination was improper and out of the ordinary. Petitioners make no argument as to how that series of events is extreme, outrageous, or beyond the bounds of decency as to them—third parties to the SLP insurance contract. Petitioners make the vague argument that “[t]here is a strong factual inference that if Herrera was not an authorized driver under the Rental Agreement, EAN could be held directly liable for the collision at issue in the underlying action,” but they do not ground that inference in the elements of a claim for IIED. Ultimately, Petitioners have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact to preserve their IIED claim against EAN, RIS, or Empire. They have not identified an action so extreme and outrageous as to exceed the bounds of decency. While Petitioners assert that the claims investigator and supervisor’s actions went against their company training, they offer no evidence of either person’s intent to cause them emotional distress or that either disregarded the certainty (or substantial certainty) that emotional distress to Petitioners would result from their conduct. Furthermore, Petitioners have not directed this Court to any portion of the record regarding causation; that is, if outrageous conduct had occurred, that it “was actually caused by the 59 Syl. Pt. 3, Travis v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 202 W. Va. 369, 504 S.E.2d 419 (1998). 60 Syl. Pt. 9, Dunn v. Rockwell, 225 W. Va. 43, 689 S.E.2d 255 (2009). 20 perpetrator’s misconduct rather than by another source.” 61 Finally, Petitioners have not pointed to evidence in the record to substantiate that any emotional distress they suffered due to the determination of coverage under the SLP was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to EAN, RIS, and Empire on Count X of Petitioners’ amended complaint.