Opinion ID: 4123854
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Date of Entry into the Bank-Fraud Conspiracy

Text: Pielsticker raises an additional challenge to the district court’s bank-fraud loss calculation by disputing its finding that he entered the bank-fraud conspiracy from its outset. He asserts that he entered the bank-fraud conspiracy late, and thus was 13 responsible for a portion of the total bank-fraud loss, specifically $7,537,948.25 (as the PSR found), or less. To find that Pielsticker entered the bank-fraud conspiracy from the outset, the district court relied on Moore’s testimony from the sentencing hearing. Moore testified that by May 2009, when the bank-fraud conspiracy began, Pielsticker had decided “[Arrow] just need[ed] to create another invoice like . . . the first time.” Appellant App. vol. 3 at 459. And from that point on, either Mowry or Pielsticker authorized the inflated amounts that Arrow billing clerks sent the Bank. Pielsticker doesn’t dispute that Moore’s testimony supported the district court’s finding. Rather, he argues that the district court erred in finding Moore credible. When the district court bases its findings on determinations regarding the witnesses’ credibility, “Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the trial court’s findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). Unless the witness’s story is internally inconsistent or contradicted by objective evidence or documents, we will “virtually never” reverse for clear error. Id. On three grounds, Pielsticker argues that Moore’s testimony was not credible. First, Pielsticker asserts that Moore gave conflicting testimony about the number of times that Pielsticker authorized the inflated amounts. The record shows that on direct examination, Moore testified that either Mowry or Pielsticker authorized the inflated invoices. On cross-examination, Moore clarified that Pielsticker, as opposed to Mowry, authorized the inflated invoices about 25-30 percent of the time. Despite 14 Pielsticker’s contention, Moore’s apportionment between Mowry and Pielsticker is consistent with his statement that either Mowry or Pielsticker authorized the inflated amounts. Second, Pielsticker contends that an e-mail Moore sent on August 15, 2009 contradicts his testimony. In his August 15 e-mail, referring to the inflated invoices, Moore stated, “I have no guilt about the fluff.” Appellant App. vol. 3 at 509. On direct, he testified that Pielsticker was a “tyrant.” Appellant App. vol. 3 at 433. These statements aren’t inconsistent. Third, Pielsticker contends that statements from other Arrow employees contradicted Moore’s testimony. The district court’s decision to credit one individual’s testimony over another’s is “virtually never . . . clear error.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575. And our review of the record shows that at least one of these Arrow employees lacked personal knowledge of Pielsticker’s involvement in the bank-fraud conspiracy.7 Because Pielsticker has failed to show that Moore’s testimony was “so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face,” id., the district court could find Moore credible. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Pielsticker entered the bank-fraud conspiracy from the outset based on Moore’s testimony. 7 For example, Arrow’s billing clerk, Michelle Bullard, stated in her Bank interview that she never communicated with Pielsticker about the practice of inflating invoices. 15 Therefore, we affirm the district court’s finding that the Bank suffered $11,464,560.08 in bank-fraud loss.