Opinion ID: 2336350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Campbell

Text: One who aids and abets another person in committing an offense shares the liability of the principal for all acts committed in furtherance of the common purpose, if the act done either is within the scope of that purpose, or is the natural or probable consequence of the act intended. West v. United States, 499 A.2d 860, 865 (D.C.1985); see D.C.Code § 22-105 (1996) (aiders and abettors shall be charged as principals). The aider and abettor, however, need not have the same criminal intent as the principal. See ( Charles) Johnson v. United States, 671 A.2d 428, 435-436 (D.C.1995); Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 1001 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1017, 112 S.Ct. 667, 116 L.Ed.2d 757 (1991); Hackney v. United States, 389 A.2d 1336, 1342 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132, 99 S.Ct. 1054, 59 L.Ed.2d 95 (1979). Campbell contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction as an aider and abettor. His conviction must be affirmed, however, if there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that he intentionally engaged in conduct from which death was likely to occur as a probable consequence. Matthews v. United States, 629 A.2d 1185, 1197 (D.C.1993). [P]roof of presence at the scene of a crime plus conduct which designedly encourages or facilitates a crime will support an inference of guilty participation in the crime as an aider and abettor. Jefferson v. United States, 463 A.2d 681, 683 (D.C.1983) (emphasis added). We hold that Campbell's involvement in the crime, even though his role was limited to that of a getaway driver who never even got out of the car, was sufficient under controlling case law to support the jury's verdict. According to the government's evidence, Daniels and Davis got into Campbell's car, openly agreed to wet the Bama, and instructed Campbell to take [them] around the corner so [they could] do something. Daniels, sitting in the front seat next to Campbell, was carrying a large firearm, which was visible beneath his arm when he ran around the front of the car. Campbell kept the car parked in the same location while they were gone. When gunshots were heard, Campbell told Terry to just chill and ordered him into the front seat. He then waited for Davis and Daniels to return. When they climbed back into his car, Campbell started laughing and drove off. From this evidence, a reasonable juror could infer that death was a natural and probable consequence of Campbell's driving two armed men to a particular place so that they could wet someone, waiting for their return after hearing gunshots, ensuring that the back seat was clear to facilitate their getaway, and then driving them away from the murder scene to complete their escape. See Byrd v. United States, 364 A.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C.1976) (affirming conviction of aider and abettor who drove the principal to the scene of the crime, waited in the car while he committed the crime, and then drove the principal away from the scene); Bailey v. United States, 128 U.S.App. D.C. 354, 359, 389 F.2d 305, 310 (1967) (same); Long v. United States, 124 U.S.App. D.C. 14, 20-21, 360 F.2d 829, 835-836 (1966) (same). We see no material difference between the present case and any of these three cases, and thus we find no merit in Campbell's sufficiency argument.