Opinion ID: 2622018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether the Act is void for vagueness under the due process clauses of the Washington Constitution and the United States Constitution

Text: ś 64 The Post's final argument is the Act violates the void-for-vagueness doctrine embodied in the due process clause. Under this doctrine, `a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.' [34] U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 629, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (alteration in original) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). ś 65 The first step in analyzing a vagueness challenge is to determine whether the challenge to the statute in question is to the face of the statute or as applied in a particular case. City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171, 181-82, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). A vagueness challenge to a statute that does not implicate First Amendment rights must be considered in light of the facts of the specific case before the court. Vill. of Hofman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 182, 795 P.2d 693. Thus, a statute must be tested for unconstitutional vagueness by inspecting the actual conduct of the party who challenges the ordinance and not by examining hypothetical situations at the periphery of the [statute's] scope. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 182-83, 795 P.2d 693. ś 66 Due process does not require impossible standards of specificity or absolute agreement. Id. at 179, 795 P.2d 693. Vagueness is not simply uncertainty as to the meaning of a statute. Id. In determining whether a statute is sufficiently definite, the provision in question must be considered within the context of the entire enactment and the language used must be afforded a sensible, meaningful, and practical interpretation. Id. at 180, 795 P.2d 693. A court should not invalidate a statute simply because it could have been drafted with greater precision. Id. at 179, 795 P.2d 693. ś 67 The Post argues the Act is void for vagueness because an ordinary person cannot understand whether smoking is proscribed in private, nonprofit fraternal clubs. The Act specifically exempts private . . . workplace[s], within a public place under RCW 70.160.060. The Post argues an ordinary person would not understand, in light of RCW 70.160.060, that smoking is banned in places of employment within private facilities. Furthermore, the Post argues, the definition of place of employment is vague as to which private facilities are exempt. The Post relies on a case where part of a smoking ban was struck down as being void for vagueness because it failed to adequately define smoking paraphernalia. Lexington Fayette County Food & Beverage Ass'n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 131 S.W.3d 745, 756 (Ky.2004). But cf. Roark & Hardee, 394 F.Supp.2d at 916-18 (determining the terms smoking and smoking accessory are not unconstitutionally vague); Taverns for Tots, 341 F.Supp.2d at 849-53 (finding a smoking ban exemption for a private social function was not unconstitutionally vague); Coal. for Equal Rights, 458 F.Supp.2d at 1262 (finding a smoking ban exception for small employers was not unconstitutionally vague). ś 68 The Act clearly prohibits smoking in a public place or in any place of employment. RCW 70.160.030. An ordinary person would understand that if an area constitutes a place of employment, smoking is prohibited. The phrase place of employment clearly applies to the Post because it is an area under the control of a private employer which employees are required to pass through during the course of employment. RCW 70.160.020(3). The Post concedes it is an employer, it has employees, and the employees are required to work in the lounge. Thus, an ordinary person would believe smoking is prohibited at the Post. The Post's argument centers on the exceptions for private facilities and privately enclosed workplaces within public places. Although the interplay between these exceptions and their application in other situations (such as hotel rooms) may not be entirely clear, these matters are not before the court because the Post is asserting only an as-applied vagueness challenge. The Act is sufficiently definite to overcome the Post's void-for-vagueness challenge.