Opinion ID: 1214235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Effect of Short on the Green analysis

Text: In State v. Short , we held no showing of actual prejudice is required to establish reversible error from the denial of a peremptory challenge. Petitioner relies on Short to argue that under the present state of the law, we would no longer apply the three-step analysis used in his direct appeal. We recently reiterated this three-step analysis in a decision issued after the decision in Short. See State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999). [3] In Council, we found no error in the juror's qualification and never reached the prejudice analysis. In citing Green, however, we implicitly acknowledged the continued viability of the three-step analysis. We now confirm that our Green analysis remains valid. We begin by noting that other states with precedent similar to Short have reached the opposite result suggested by petitioner on the question whether a defendant need only show he used all his peremptory strikes to obtain reversal for the erroneous qualification of a juror who did not sit. These decisions follow the United States Supreme Court's recent opinion in United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000), which distinguishes the forced use of a peremptory strike from the denial of one. The Martinez-Salazar case arose in the Ninth Circuit. That circuit has a well-settled rule that a party need not show prejudice from the denial of a peremptory strike. United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir.1996). [4] Relying on this precedent in Martinez-Salazar, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant's Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated because he had to use a peremptory strike to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 146 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir.1998). On appeal, however, the Supreme Court rejected this analysis, distinguishing the forced use of a peremptory strike from the denial of such a strike. It held: [I]f the defendant elects to cure such an error [in juror qualification] by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rulebased or constitutional right. 528 U.S. at 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792. Thus, the Supreme Court has definitively rejected a federal due process claim based on the forced use of a peremptory strike. Since Martinez-Salazar was decided, a majority of state courts considering the issue have interpreted their state constitutions to conform to its holding. See, e.g., In re: Evans v. State, 794 So.2d 411 (Ala.2000); State v. Manning, 270 Kan. 674, 19 P.3d 84 (2001); State v. Entzi, 615 N.W.2d 145 (N.D.2000); State v. Verhoef, 627 N.W.2d 437 (S.D.2001); State v. Fire, 145 Wash.2d 152, 34 P.3d 1218 (2001); State v. Lindell, 245 Wis.2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (2001). [5] Although we may afford more expansive rights under our state constitutional provisions than those conferred under the federal constitution, State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 541 S.E.2d 837 (2001), we decline to do so here. We have repeatedly stated that peremptory strikes implicate no constitutional right. State v. Potts, 347 S.C. 126, 554 S.E.2d 38 (2001); State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357 (1995); State v. Bailey, 273 S.C. 467, 257 S.E.2d 231 (1979). We adopt the Martinez-Salazar analysis and interpret our state constitution to find no due process violation from the forced use of a peremptory strike. Thus, we confirm the continued viability of the three-step analysis used in petitioner's direct appeal. [6] Petitioner's argument that our decision in his direct appeal was a legal fluke is without merit.