Opinion ID: 3032252
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: CERCLA’s Application to Clark and Subic

Text: To determine whether the disputed provisions of CERCLA apply to Clark and Subic, we look first to the plain language of the statute. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002); Wilderness Soc’y v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Section 105(d) is silent as to the locations it covers and who may petition for a preliminary assessment. It generally refers to releases without providing any geographic boundaries, and its identification of who may petition for a preliminary assessment is equally vague: “[a]ny person who is, or may be, affected by a release.” 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d). The appellants contend that the district court erred in its determination that section 105(d) of CERCLA does not apply to the alleged pollution of Clark and Subic. They claim that Congress clearly expressed its intent to have CERCLA apply to former military bases located outside the United States. To support their argument, they point to CERCLA’s definition of the “United States,” which includes “the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, Amercian Samoa, the [U.S.] Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and any other territory or possession over which the United States has jurisdiction.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(27) (emphasis added). The appellants also argue that Congress’s extraterritorial intent appears in the plain language of DERP, which provides that “[t]he Secretary shall carry out (in accordance with the provisions of this chapter . . . and CERCLA . . .) all response actions with respect to releases from . . . [e]ach facility or site which was under the jurisdiction of the Secretary and . . . posARC ECOLOGY v. USAF 7077 sessed by the United States at the time of actions leading to contamination[.]” 10 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1)(A)-(B). Based on these provisions, reasonable minds could conclude that, when it was enacted, CERCLA applied to Clark and Subic because they were possessed by the U.S. Id. The government states, however, that the most reasonable construction of “possession” would be U.S. property that does not rest within the territory of another sovereign nation. We need not decide this point, however, because, as we explain below, even if CERCLA did apply to these former military installations when enacted, the appellants would still have to show that they could state a claim when they filed their action. This they cannot do. 2. No Evidence of Congress’s Intent to Provide Relief to Foreign Claimants Like the Appellants [1] The appellants cannot state a claim under CERCLA due to the statutory presumption against extraterritoriality. The Supreme Court and this court have adhered to the longstanding principle of American law that legislation is presumed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless the contrary affirmative intention of Congress is clearly expressed. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Fliardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994). Courts must assume that Congress legislates with knowledge of the presumption that a statute “is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.” Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quotations omitted); see also Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1755 (2005) (“In determining the scope of [a] statutory phrase we find help in the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.” (quotation omitted)). In essence, then, courts must resolve restrictively any doubts concerning the extraterritorial application of a statute. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993). 7078 ARC ECOLOGY v. USAF [2] In Aramco, the Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not provide a claim to anyone living outside the territory of the United States even though the statute contained broad provisions extending its prohibitions to “ ‘any activity, business, or industry in commerce.’ ” Aramco, 499 U.S. at 249 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h)). Despite administrative interpretations of both the EEOC and the Justice Department allowing individuals employed abroad by U.S. companies to seek relief under Title VII’s protections, the Court viewed the statute’s language to be an insufficient indication to override the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at 251-53, 258. The Court ruled that a statute could overcome the presumption only through a “clear statement” in the statute itself indicating congressional intent to provide relief to such foreign claimants.2 Id. at 258. [3] Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to the case at bar, we can find no evidence that Congress expressly (or implicitly) intended to authorize suits under CERCLA by foreign claimants allegedly affected by contamination occurring on a U.S. military base located in a foreign country.3 Accord Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1756 (finding “no con- 2 In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court relaxed the requirement of a “clear statement” of congressional intent within the statute. Smith, 507 U.S. at 204. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that there must only be “clear evidence” of congressional intent to apply the statute extraterritorially. Id. This slight modification of the direct statement requirement is significant because it allows the courts greater leeway in determining whether Congress intended to override the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at 201-03. In discerning Congress’s intent, Chief Justice Rehnquist considered sources other than the language of the statute itself, including the structure of the act, legislative history, and other non-textual sources. Id. Here, sources other than CERCLA’s express language do not provide any evidence that Congress intended for the statute to apply extraterritorially. 3 The appellants’ contention that DERP (10 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1)(A)-(B)) requires the Secretary to apply CERCLA to foreign claimants affected by contamination occurring on any foreign military base also fails to rebut the ARC ECOLOGY v. USAF 7079 vincing indication to the contrary” where a “statute’s language does not suggest any intent to reach beyond domestic” conditions). Even if we were to accept that the language in CERCLA cited by the appellants may be interpreted as bringing such sites within the geographic reach of the statute, this would not overcome the statutory presumption against extraterritoriality, which applies with force and counsels against interpreting CERCLA to provide a cause of action to foreign claimants such as the appellants. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258. B. No Statutory Coverage of Clark and Subic When the Appellants Filed Suit [4] We also conclude that the appellants did not state a claim when they filed their case because, at that time, Clark and Subic had already been under the exclusive control of a foreign sovereign, the Philippines, for ten years. Even if at its inception CERCLA covered Clark and Subic, the relevant inquiry is whether the appellants had a cause of action at the time they commenced this litigation in 2002. It is uncontested that the United States no longer has any control or possession of Clark and Subic. We agree with the appellees’ concerns that the United States has no “authority to conduct a preliminary assessment or a cleanup at Clark and Subic, which were closed as military bases and returned to Philippine control in 1992.” We also agree with the appellees that without an intergovernmental agreement between the United States and the Philippine government, the United States no longer has presumption against extraterritoriality. The appellants do not cite anything in DERP, other than the previously noted language concerning geographic scope, that in any way suggests that Congress intended to provide preliminary-assessment and cleanup claims to foreign claimants. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (reasoning that the “presumption [against extraterritoriality] has special force when . . . construing . . . statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility”). 7080 ARC ECOLOGY v. USAF authority to address any alleged contamination present on or around Clark and Subic. It would be unreasonable for this court to find that, in enacting CERCLA, Congress intended for the President to undertake preliminary assessments or cleanups on foreign soil absent some agreement with the foreign government. Such a holding would impermissibly encroach on the Executive’s foreign affairs authority. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (observing that the Constitution allocates the foreign relations power to the federal executive); see also Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) (noting the President’s role as the “[n]ation’s organ in foreign affairs”). Certainly, nothing in CERCLA requires such action.4 C. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius [5] The appellants’ attempt to state a claim under CERCLA is further defeated by the fact that CERCLA expressly authorizes some actions by a narrow class of foreign claimants, which does not include the appellants: Foreign Claimants. To the extent that the provi- sions of this chapter permit, a foreign claimant may assert a claim to the same extent that a United States claimant may assert a claim if — (1) the release . . . occurred (A) in the navigable waters or (B) in or on the territorial sea or adjacent shoreline of a foreign country of which the claimant is a resident; (2) the claimant is not otherwise compensated for his loss; 4 The provision in CERCLA concerning foreign claimants, 42 U.S.C. § 9611(l), recognizes these limitations as it restricts recovery by foreign claimants to instances where such relief is authorized by treaty, executive agreement, or where the Secretary of State certifies that the foreign claimant’s country provides a reciprocal remedy to U.S. citizens. See Part II.C, supra. ARC ECOLOGY v. USAF 7081 (3) the hazardous substance was released from a facility or from a vessel located adjacent to or within the navigable waters or was discharged in connec- tion with activities conducted under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act . . . or the Deepwater Port Act . . . ; and (4) recovery is authorized by a treaty or an executive agreement between the United States and foreign country involved, or if the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and other appropriate officials, certifies that such country provides a comparable remedy for United States claimants. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(l). The appellants do not meet the requirements of this passage.5 Indeed, they allege releases of hazardous substances or pollutants occurring on the Clark and Subic facilities and not, as the statute requires, in the navigable waters, territorial sea, or adjacent shoreline of a foreign country. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(l)(1). More importantly, the appellants do not allege that their suit is authorized by a “treaty or an executive agreement” between the United States and the Philippines or that the Secretary of State has certified that the government of the Philippines provides a comparable remedy for American claimants. Id. § 9611(l)(4). [6] Reinforcing this barrier to asserting a claim is the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which teaches that omissions are the equivalent of exclusions when a statute affirmatively designates certain persons, things, or manners of operation. Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1990); In re McLinn, 744 F.2d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 1984). 5 We recognize that the appellants seek equitable relief and that section 9611(l) applies only to actions looking to recover money from the Superfund. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(5) (defining “claimant” as “any person who presents a claim for compensation under this chapter”). We discuss section 9611(l), however, not because it directly controls the appellants’ case, but because it shows that Congress specifically provided for relief for certain claims by foreign claimants, which do not include the appellants. 7082 ARC ECOLOGY v. USAF Applying this doctrine to CERCLA bolsters the conclusion that only foreign claimants satisfying section 9611(l)’s express requirements may proceed to court under CERCLA. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 9611(l). This conclusion is further supported by the fact that Congress has provided other avenues for foreign claimants to seek relief, which the appellants have not explored. For example, Congress has established the Foreign Claims Act for compensating any “inhabitant of a foreign country” for property loss, personal injury, or death incident to noncombat activities of U.S. armed forces occurring outside the United States. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a). This statute illustrates the principle that when Congress seeks to legislate with extraterritorial effect, it does so with unmistakable intent. D. Other Provisions Demonstrate That the Appellants Have No Claim Under CERCLA [7] When considering other provisions of CERCLA, we find that the statute’s general approach, concerns, and procedures are inimical to judicial challenges to contamination alleged from sites outside the territorial boundaries of the United States. See United States v. Bonilla-Montenegro, 331 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (avoiding “a statutory construction that would render another part of the same statute superfluous”); see also Hughes Air Corp. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 644 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1981) (adhering to the “basic rule of statutory construction [ ] that one provision should not be interpreted in a way which is internally contradictory or that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent or meaningless”). For instance, CERCLA requires the President to “consult with the affected State or States” before determining appropriate remedial action. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(2). No analogous provision requires consultation with foreign authorities. Similarly, the President cannot provide remedial actions “unless the State in which the release occurs first enters into a contract or cooperative agreeARC ECOLOGY v. USAF 7083 ment” with the United States. Id. § 9604(c)(3). The statute does not contemplate like arrangements with foreign countries. In addition, CERCLA’s citizen-suit provision states that a case “shall be brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred.” Id. § 9659(b)(1). The statute, however, does not prescribe venue for citizen suits involving alleged violations in foreign countries.6 See Smith, 507 U.S. at 202-03 (noting that Congress does not intentionally “create venue gaps” that “take away with one hand what Congress has given by way of jurisdictional grant with the other”); see also Aramco, 499 U.S. at 256 (reasoning that a statute’s venue provisions are “ill-suited for extraterritorial application” when they provide for venue only in the “judicial district in the State where certain matters . . . occurred or were located”). [8] Similarly, there is no provision in CERCLA that provides authority to place any foreign site on the National Priorities List, and, consequently, no foreign site appears on that list.7 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B); 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b). Because the statute authorizes the President to rank the subjects of a preliminary assessment in a system that applies exclusively to releases in the United States, the necessary conclusion is that Congress did not intend for CERCLA to 6 On a related note, no citizen suit may be commenced under CERCLA until 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation to, among others, “[t]he State in which the alleged violation occurs.” 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(1) (emphasis added). Had Congress intended CERCLA’s citizen-suit provision to extend to foreign lands, it would have provided a pre-filing notice for cases that allege releases occurring abroad. 7 Placement of a site on the list makes the site eligible for remedial action through the expenditure of money from the Superfund, a fund established by CERLCA and financed through a combination of appropriations, EPA fees, and industry taxes. 42 U.S.C. § 9605; United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 715 (8th Cir. 2001). 7084 ARC ECOLOGY v. USAF encompass the appellants’ claims. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A), (d). E. Legislative History and Academic Commentary [9] We have not been cited to any aspect of CERCLA’s legislative history that supports the recognition of a claim for alleged contamination of a site outside of the United States. The legislative history recited by the district court indicates that Congress intended for CERCLA to have a domestic focus. For example, a House committee report noted, just prior to CERCLA’s re-authorization, that “there may be as many as 10,000 [ ] sites across the Nation,” and that the federal government’s allocation of resources was inadequate to “fulfill promises that were made to clean up abandoned hazardous wastes in this country.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 55, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837 (emphasis added). Because the congressional record is silent as to any extraterritorial application of CERCLA, it is unlikely that Congress intended for CERCLA to provide relief to the appellants. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1757 (“[T]hose who use legislative history to help discern congressional intent will see the history here as silent, hence a neutral factor, that simply confirms the obvious, namely, that Congress did not consider the issue.”); see also Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979) (“This silence is most eloquent, for such reticence while contemplating an important and controversial change in existing law is unlikely.”). [10] We also note that the available academic commentary on the scope of CERCLA’s application unanimously agrees that Congress did not intend for CERCLA to apply in the manner sought by the appellants. For example, one commentator observes, “citizen suits by aliens rest on a slim foundation. Even if allowed, such lawsuits would be limited to conduct occurring within the U.S. . . .” Lisa T. Belenky, Cradle to Border: U.S. Hazardous Waste Export Regulations and International Law, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 95, 135 (1999); ARC ECOLOGY v. USAF 7085 accord Peggy Rodgers Kalas, International Environmental Dispute Resolution and the Need for Access by Non-state Entities, 12 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 191, 194 (2001); Jack I. Garvey, a New Evolution for Fast-tracking Trade Agreements: Managing Environmental and Labor Standards Through Extraterritorial Regulation, 5 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 1, 39-40 (2000); Richard A. Wegman & Harold G. Bailey, The Challenge of Cleaning Up Military Wastes When U.S. Bases are Closed, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 865, 924-25 (1994).