Opinion ID: 2790270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discrimination Charges

Text: [¶11] In alleging that she was subjected to discrimination, the only type of discrimination Ms. Apodaca alleged was age discrimination. This also was the only type of discrimination alleged in her charge filed with the EEOC. The federal law applicable to Ms. Apodaca’s discrimination claim is the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., which prohibits employment discrimination based on age.1 Section 626 of the ADEA provides: (d)(1) No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a charge shall be filed-- (A) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred; or 1 The Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act (WFEPA) also prohibits age discrimination. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-105(a) (LexisNexis 2013). Nothing in the record or Ms. Apodaca’s complaint indicates, however, that Ms. Apodaca filed a charge of discrimination with the Wyoming Department of Employment, which charge was required to have been filed within six months of the alleged discrimination. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-106(a) (LexisNexis 2013). 3 (B) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies, within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). [¶12] The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained the consequences of a failure to meet the section 626 time frames: We start with the first question first, asking whether preexisting law requires dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims. The Age Discrimination Employment Act (“ADEA”) provides that “no civil action may be commenced” in federal court unless the would be plaintiff first files a grievance with the appropriate administrative agency—and does so “within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred” where (as here) a state administrative agency process exists to remedy the alleged discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B). Compliance with this administrative exhaustion requirement and its concomitant limitations period is a condition precedent to bringing suit. Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160, 1167–68 (10th Cir.2007). Almond v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 665 F.3d 1174, 1176 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit has further held that compliance with the ADEA’s administrative exhaustion requirements is not only a condition precedent to suit, but is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Shikles v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304, 1317 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[A] plaintiff’s exhaustion of his or her administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under the ADEA.”). [¶13] In this case, Ms. Apodaca not only failed to allege that she timely complied with the ADEA’s administrative exhaustion requirements, the record establishes that she did not timely comply. Ms. Apodaca had at most 300 days to file with the EEOC her charge of discrimination against Safeway, measured from the last act of discrimination. See Almond, 665 F.3d at 1176 (Under the ADEA, “the clock starts running when the plaintiff first knew or should have known of his injury, whether or not he realized the cause of his injury was unlawful.”). Ms. Apodaca’s last day of employment with Safeway was December 21, 2012, which is the last date on which she could have been subjected to the alleged discrimination, and she filed her charge with the EEOC on November 13, 2013. The elapsed time was 327 days, making her charge clearly untimely. The district court thus properly dismissed Ms. Apodaca’s claims for lack of jurisdiction. 4