Opinion ID: 2791580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of propensity evidence

Text: Foy argues that introduction of evidence he assaulted another woman after he allegedly assaulted O. runs afoul of the general principle articulated in Alberni v. McDaniel that “denial of due process is demonstrated if the action complained of . . . violates those fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our 7 civil and political institutions.” 458 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 2006). AEDPA “recognizes . . . that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007). But in this case, precedent forecloses the conclusion that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) (expressly reserving the question “whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime”); Alberni , 458 at 866, 875 (“The scant supply of Supreme Court precedent applicable to the propensity evidence issue does not . . . provide sufficient ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’” (McKeown, J., concurring)). The trial court’s decision did not unreasonably apply a “governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision,’” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71–72 (2003), because the Supreme Court had not set forth any applicable legal principles concerning whether the introduction of propensity evidence violates due process. AFFIRMED. 8 FILED APR 06 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK Foy, Jr. v. Gipson, No. 12-15947 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS