Opinion ID: 762046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instructions on the Charge of Murder

Text: 11 Mayabb argues that the jury instruction on the murder charge did not include every element of the offense and was in violation of his due-process right to be convicted on proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the offense and that the erroneous instruction infected the entire trial. 6 12 Under Texas law at the time of the offense, if the evidence raised the issue of sudden passion, the State was required to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of sudden passion. Braudrick v. State, 572 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); see Bradley v. State, 688 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). In such cases, if the State proves all of the elements of murder but fails to prove the absence of sudden passion beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must acquit the defendant of murder and convict the defendant of voluntary manslaughter. 7 Braudrick, 572 S.W.2d at 711. 13 The jury charge on murder was erroneous under Texas law because it did not place the burden on the State to disprove that Mayabb caused the victim's death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause. See Cobarrubio v. State, 675 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), overruled on other grounds by Lawrence v. State, 700 S.W.2d 208, 213 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). However, an improper jury instruction rarely justifies federal habeas relief absent a proper objection in the trial court. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977). A petitioner must show that the erroneous instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. Id. (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)).
14 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) articulates the appropriate standard for determining whether a constitutional error was harmless in a federal habeas challenge to a state conviction or sentence even though no state court ever made any determination whether or not the error was harmless. 8 In Brecht, the Supreme Court held that a federal habeas court may not grant relief on trial errors unless the petitioner demonstrates that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710. This court has interpreted this standard in the following manner: 15 [U]nder Brecht, a constitutional trial error is not so harmful as to entitle a defendant to habeas relief unless there is more than a mere reasonable possibility that it contributed to the verdict. It must have had a substantial effect or influence in determining the verdict. We recognize, however, that if our minds are in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness, under the Brecht standard, of the error, then we must conclude that it was harmful. 16 Woods v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 1017, 1026-27 (5th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). 17 Similarly, in California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 117 S.Ct. 337, 339, 136 L.Ed.2d 266 (1996), the Supreme Court addressed the appropriate standard to review an error in instruction that defined the crime. The Ninth Circuit had crafted a hybrid harmless-error standard. Id. at 338. The Supreme Court held that harmless error enunciated in Brecht and O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995), was the proper standard to review jury instructions. Id. Upon application, when a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about whether trial error of federal constitutional law had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining jury's verdict, that error is not harmless, and petitioner must win. O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 992 (1995).
18 According to Mayabb, the district court erred by: (1) characterizing sudden passion as a defense rather than an element of murder which the State must disprove when raised by the evidence and; (2) failing to credit the state trial court's implicit finding of sufficient evidence of sudden passion to support a voluntary-manslaughter charge. Mayabb finds ample evidence of sudden passion in the record. He contends that he was prejudiced by the jury instruction which did not require the State to prove all of the necessary elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Mayabb contends that the evidence supported a sudden-passion instruction in the murder charge, and that he did not abandon or concede the sudden passion element by pursuing a defensive theory of self-defense. Mayabb asserts that his self-defense theory did not relieve the State of its burden of disproving sudden passion once the trial court found that the evidence raised the issue. 19 We disagree. Our review of the record leads us to affirm the judgment of the district court. The charge did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict and Mayabb cannot demonstrate actual prejudice. Contrary to Mayabb's complaint, the defective jury instruction did not excuse the State from proving an essential element of the offense nor, by extension, did it preclude the jury from finding the same. Instead, the defective jury instruction removed the State's obligation to refute a defense of sudden passion. This was the appropriate course because the record reveals Mayabb's failure to raise the defense at trial. 9 In accord with the district court, we find that the absence of sudden passion must be proved only in response to a defense raised by the evidence. See Cobarrubio v. State, 675 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Braudrick v. State, 572 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) cert. denied, 440 U.S. 923, 99 S.Ct. 1252, 59 L.Ed.2d 477 (1979). 20 We are unable to find that the error in the jury charge had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638, 113 S.Ct. 1710. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.