Opinion ID: 223146
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Arrest

Text: [Rothermich] first contends that the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Agent [Kriete] pursuant to Rule 404(b). United States v. Hill, 638 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2011). This court reviews for an abuse of discretion a district court's admission of evidence under Rule 404(b). Id. Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of other bad acts that are offered to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence is admissible for certain limited purposes [when] it (1) is relevant to a material issue, (2) is similar in kind and close in time to the crime charged, (3) is proven by -6- a preponderance of the evidence, and (4) does not have a prejudicial effect that substantially outweighs the probative value. United States v. Ali, 616 F.3d 745, 752–53 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Turner, 583 F.3d 1062, 1065–66 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, ___U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1928, 176 L.Ed.2d 396 (2010)) (alteration added). Id. Evidence of prior drug possession, regardless of the amount, is admissible to show knowledge and intent when intent is an element of the offense charged. United States v. Hawthorne, 235 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 2000). Here, Rothermich's intent was an element that the government had to prove. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(1) and 846. We have previously held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior methamphetamine use under Rule 404(b) where the defendant was charged with, inter alia, possessing pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. United States v. Taylor, No. 05-3384, 2006 WL 1069545, at  (8th Cir. Apr. 24, 2006) (unpublished per curiam). Just as in Taylor, Rothermich's offense required the Government to prove knowledge and intent. Id. at . Furthermore, Rothermich concedes that prior possession of methamphetamine is logically relevant [to whether a conspiracy existed or whether he possessed pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine] in that it tends to connect [him] with the final substance mentioned in the indictment. (Emphasis added.) When prior bad acts are admitted to show intent, the prior acts need not be duplicates, but must be sufficiently similar to support an inference of criminal intent. United States v. Ironi, 525 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, as we concluded in Taylor, possessing pseudoephedrine with intent -7- to manufacture and possession of methamphetamine are similar in kind. Taylor, 2006 WL 1069545, at .2 Agent Kriete's uncontroverted testimony established by a preponderance of the evidence Rothermich's prior arrest for possession of methamphetamine. The district court's admission of this evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, as the district court gave a limiting instruction to the jury. United States v. Halk, 634 F.3d 482, 488 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining this court's reluctance to find that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial when the district court gave an appropriate limiting instruction (quotation and citation omitted)). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Rothermich's prior arrest for possession of methamphetamine.