Opinion ID: 350606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admissibility of the Murder Confession

Text: 16 The appellant contends that his murder confession should have been suppressed because it was illegally obtained. He contends that 18 U.S.C. § 5033 required police officials to immediately produce him before a magistrate after arrest. The statute reads: 17 Whenever a juvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, the arresting officer shall immediately advise such juvenile of his legal rights, in language comprehensive to a juvenile, and shall immediately notify the Attorney General and the juvenile's parents, guardian, or custodian of such custody. The arresting officer shall also notify the parents, guardian, or custodian of the rights of the juvenile and of the nature of the alleged offense. 18 The juvenile shall be taken before a magistrate forthwith. In no event shall the juvenile be detained for longer than a reasonable period of time before being brought before a magistrate. 19 There is no case law as yet reported on this statute, although there are a few reported cases on its predecessor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 5035. The predecessor statute reads, as relevant: 20 Whenever a juvenile is arrested for an alleged violation of any law of the United States, the arresting officer shall immediately notify the Attorney General. 21 If the juvenile is not forthwith taken before a committing magistrate, he may be detained in such juvenile home . . . to insure his safety or that of others. 22 In no case shall such detention be for a longer period than is necessary to produce the juvenile before a committing magistrate. 23 Comparison of the language of the two statutes reveals that while the first sentence of the second paragraph of the statute as amended in 1974 appears to repeat the old standard of arraignment forthwith, the next sentence now appears to say the forthwith requirement bars only unreasonable, not unnecessary, delays. 24 The appellant contends that, properly read, 18 U.S.C. § 5033 precludes detention for the purpose of interrogation, regardless of how benign the questioning may be. He adds that the statute requires an arrested juvenile to be brought before the nearest magistrate with no more delay than necessary for transportation. Such prompt action to protect the rights of a juvenile imposes a burden on law enforcement authorities and upon the magistrate greater than that imposed where the defendant is an adult, according to the appellant's reading of the statute and case law. 25 Although nothing in the legislative history of the 1974 Juvenile Delinquency Act addresses the purpose of section 5033, 11 appellant argues that by examining the Act as a whole, one can see an apparent Congressional intent to increase post-arrest protection of juveniles. The Senate report on the 1974 amendment says only that the bill was intended to provide basic procedural rights for juveniles and to bring Federal procedures up to the standards set by the various model acts, many state codes and court decisions. S.Rep.No.93-1011, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in (1974) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 5284. Its commentary on the specific section merely noted that the section was implementing the due process protections such as advisement of right to counsel and right to remain silent provided for in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), and progeny, as well as incorporating the rehabilitative concept of a juvenile proceeding as promulgated in model juvenile court acts. Id. at 5312. 26 The appellant argues that these benevolent intentions, which were coupled with other procedural innovations such as the sealing of records (§ 5038), are good evidence that Congress could not possibly have intended to prune the rights of juveniles. 27 This court has never interpreted § 5033 or its predecessor, § 5035. Appellant, however, brings to our attention decisions from other circuits. In United States v. Glover, 372 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1967), a juvenile was detained for about fifteen hours and then questioned before being arraigned. The court suppressed the damaging statement made during that questioning, finding in the necessity requirement of § 5035 no hint of any purpose to allow detention for any other objective than prompt arraignment before a judicial officer, so that the magistrate may explain and protect the juvenile's rights among others, the right against compulsory self-incrimination and the right to the assistance of counsel. United States v. Glover, 372 F.2d at 46. The court interpreted the statute as evincing Congressional concern for the greater need of the young and inexperienced for independent, unbiased advice as to the right to counsel and the right to refrain from self-incrimination when interrogated by the police authorities. Id. at 47. 28 Glover was followed by United States v. Binet, 442 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971). In Binet, there was only a four-hour delay before the incriminating statements were extracted. The court was careful to point out that under the circumstances of that case, there was no possible investigatory motive for the questioning, and that the delay and prearraignment questioning were solely for the purpose of obtaining a confession. United States v. Binet, 442 F.2d at 299-300. In the instant case law enforcement authorities were investigating two crimes committed practically contemporaneously, with the initial assault confession being of doubtful truth. 29 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals followed Glover and Binet in United States v. DeMarce, 513 F.2d 755 (8th Cir. 1975). A juvenile was arrested during the early morning hours of July 6, 1974, a Saturday. Bureau of Indian Affairs police lodged the juvenile at a detention center. He did not appear before a magistrate until Tuesday, July 9, after an eighty-hour pre-arraignment delay. At some unspecified time during that period of delay, admissions were made to law enforcement authorities. The district court ordered the statements suppressed and the Court of Appeals affirmed, although the delay was apparently unintentional. 30 Appellant argues that in light of the predecessor statute having been construed in this manner by the cases aforementioned, it remains to be seen whether Congress in the 1974 Act intended to alter the state of the law or reduce the protection it afforded juveniles. 31 We are not persuaded by the appellant's argument. This judgment is made in light of the strong policy this court has in following the rule that the waiver of legal rights following Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), warnings also constitutes a waiver of those rights enunciated in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957). This rule was pronounced in Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 419 F.2d 651 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058, 90 S.Ct. 1383, 25 L.Ed.2d 676 (1970), expressly adopted by this court in United States v. Lopez, 450 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1971), and has been followed consistently in the past. United States v. Mandley, 502 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974), United States v. Woods, 468 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1045, 93 S.Ct. 544, 34 L.Ed.2d 496 (1972); United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1972). 32 The above cases deal with the waiver of rights under F.R.Cr.P. 5(a), 12 of which 18 U.S.C. § 5033 is the direct counterpart. While we are mindful of the rights of juveniles at the adjudicative stage of a proceeding to those essentials of due process and fair treatment afforded adults, 13 we are not aware of any law to the effect that juveniles are entitled to any greater rights than adults, 14 nor do we so interpret 18 U.S.C.A. § 5033. 33 We are of the opinion that there was a valid Miranda waiver by the boy and his father at the F.B.I. office. It is undisputed that at the time of the rendition of Miranda rights and the waivers, the boy's parents were present. 15 The evidence is conclusive that they understood their rights. The examining officers were, we feel, scrupulously fair and deliberate in ascertaining that both X and his parents understood his rights under Miranda. 34 To be valid the waiver must have been voluntary. In DeSouza v. Barber, 263 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1959), this court was confronted with an appellant who contended that as an infant he could not effectively admit or waive his right to counsel. We emphasized in that case: 35 Whether the confession or admission is competent depends not alone upon the infant's age, but also upon his intelligence, education, information, understanding and ability to comprehend. (citations omitted). 36 The same factors should be considered in determining whether an infant is competent to waive counsel. In Williams v. Huff, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 31, 142 F.2d 91, 94 (1944), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had under consideration habeas corpus proceedings where a seventeen year old boy had waived his right to counsel in a criminal case. While the author of the opinion would have held as a matter of law that a boy of seventeen cannot competently waive his right to counsel in a criminal case, the majority of the court took the position that the 'appellant's competence was a question of fact, in the determination of which his youth was entitled to serious consideration but was not necessarily conclusive', and that the 'District Court should take evidence and determine whether, in the light of his age, education, and information, and all other pertinent facts, he has sustained the burden of proving that his waiver was not competent and intelligent'. See also Curtis v. Hiatt, 161 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1947); Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 236 F.2d 666 (1956); McBride v. Jacobs, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 189, 247 F.2d 595 (1957), cf. Dooling v. Overholser, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 247, 243 F.2d 825 (1957). DeSouza v. Barber, 263 F.2d at 476-477. 16 37 In McBride v. Jacob, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 189, 190, 247 F.2d 595, 596 (1957), the court propounded: 38 (O)bviously not all minors are capable of making a waiver. Where the court finds for any reason the minor is not capable of waiver the parent may so waive provided the court also finds there is no conflict of interest between them, and of course the waiver by the parent must be an intelligent, knowing act. 39 We find no evidence in the record to persuade us that either X or his parents lacked capacity to make a knowing waiver of Miranda rights, nor was there evidence of a conflict of interest. We feel that the decision to make a statement to the F.B.I. was an intelligent, knowing one. Since the Miranda waiver was valid, there was a valid waiver of the McNabb-Mallory prompt arraignment right. We find the district court committed no error in admitting the appellant's murder confession into evidence. 40 Even assuming arguendo that error in this area was committed, we are of the opinion it was harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). We find that under the appropriate standard of certainty for nonconstitutional error in this Circuit that any error was more probably than not harmless. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1977). Though one could strain to find language in Glover, supra, perhaps the leading case to the effect that a juvenile speedy arraignment requirement is mandated by Miranda, 17 it is fairly clear that its holding was based solely on the statute. 18 41 We feel that evidence of appellant's guilt, aside from his murder confession, was overwhelming. Blood of appellant's type was found on Miss Brown's blouse and shawl. One of Miss Brown's hairs, crushed as with a blunt instrument, was found on appellant's jacket. The woman was slain by a right-handed person, as is appellant. He was the last person seen with the two victims. Finally, while he was at the juvenile detention facility, he was visited by one of his teachers. She testified that she asked the boy if he committed the crimes of which he was accused. He replied, Yeah, I guess so. Yeah, I did it. (Tr. 678).