Opinion ID: 340449
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mail Fraud Counts (One-Four).

Text: 13 Defendant argues that Counts One to Four set forth a grossly divagative and shadowy charge of an illusively asserted 'scheme or artifice,' alleged to have been entered into or begun about January 1, 1966, and ending about January 1, 1975, without mention or reference to date, time, place, act or suggestion of act by defendant in implementation or consummation thereof. The counts are further criticized for failing to allege a connection between the scheme and the mailings. Overall, it is asserted that these counts are so vague that defendant was required to joust with a shadow in his undertaking to defend himself against the indictment returned against him. 14 We disagree. We think that these counts are legally sufficient. Rule 7(c) (1), F.R.Cr.P., requires that an indictment shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. Under this rule, an indictment is sufficient if it provides the defendant with sufficient facts intelligently to plan his defense. 8 Moore's Federal Practice P 7.04; 1 Wright Federal Practice and Procedure § 125 (1969). In alleging a scheme or artifice to defraud, as well as in alleging the connection between the scheme and the mailings, the indictment here satisfied this requirement. The scheme alleged was (a) to bribe Kelly and Rykoskey to put funds in defendant's bank in non-interest-bearing accounts in violation of their statutory duty to act dispassionately in the performance of their duties, the bribes being, in part, the payment of the costs of certain living and vacation expenses of the codefendants and their wives, (b) to misappropriate bank funds to be paid for the personal use and benefit of the codefendants, and (c) for the codefendants to accept funds in violation of law. The mails were allegedly used to make payment of such expenses and to transmit the misappropriated funds. 15 Unlike the indictment in United States v. Curtis, 506 F.2d 985 (10 Cir. 1974), on which defendant relies, much more was pleaded than the statutory language of § 1341. To the end of alleging the crime charged, Counts One-Four meticulously and with particularity set forth defendants' positions, the applicable West Virginia statutes, the nature of the scheme to defraud, the actions taken by each defendant to carry out the scheme and the specific use of the mails, including the date and addressee of each mailing, in furtherance of the scheme. 16 The indictment in the instant case is like the indictments which were upheld in United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3183, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974), and United States v. Faser, 303 F.Supp. 380 (E.D.La.1969). Its theory falls within the rationale of Sushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5 Cir.), cert. denied,313 U.S. 574, 61 S.Ct. 1085, 85 L.Ed. 1531 (1941). Moreover, to the extent that defendant may have considered that he was not fairly apprised of the charges against him, he could have sought a bill of particulars under Rule 7(f), F.R.Cr.P. Having failed to do so, he is largely foreclosed from the present attack by the rule recognized in United States v. Chinn, 5 F.R.D. 226 (S.D.W.Va.), aff'd 157 F.2d 1013 (4 Cir. 1946), that an indictment is to be construed more liberally after judgment than before, so that if the indictment contains allegations which clearly express what was meant to be charged although not technically in the language of the statute, any technical deficiency was cured by the conviction and judgment.