Opinion ID: 1801571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the chancery court err when it denied the parties a dissolution of their marriage on the grounds of irreconcilable differences?

Text: In her initial pleading, Rita Gardner alleged irreconcilable differences as an alternative ground for divorce. In answer to the complaint, Craig Gardner admitted this allegation. In his counterclaim for divorce, Craig also alleged irreconcilable differences as an alternative ground for divorce. In answer to the counterclaim, Rita admitted that there are irreconcilable differences between the parties. At trial neither party raised the issue of irreconcilable differences but rather relied on his or her proof of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. At the close of Rita's proof, Craig's attorney moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to meet the burden of proof as to habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The chancellor agreed that Rita had not met her burden of proof and sustained the motion. At the close of Craig's proof, Rita's motion to dismiss was confessed and the chancellor dismissed Craig's complaint as to the habitual cruel and inhuman treatment grounds. Craig denies Rita's contention that the Chancellor erred in not granting her a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The recent case of Massingill v. Massingill, 594 So.2d 1173 (Miss. 1992) is cited by Rita in support of her argument. In Massingill, the lower court granted a divorce on the alternative grounds of irreconcilable differences. This Court reversed, finding that the Chancellor had exceeded his authority. Rita contends that the present case can be distinguished based on the pleadings entered in the present case and because neither party denied the other party's request for an irreconcilable differences dissolution. In Massingill, the Court noted: Divorce in Mississippi is a creature of statute. Original jurisdiction to grant divorces in this State was vested in the legislature and the subsequent jurisdiction of the chancery court over divorce is derived from the assignment of that authority to the chancery court by the legislature. 594 So.2d at 1175. Miss.Code Annotated § 93-5-2 states as follows: (1) Divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences, but only upon the joint complaint of the husband and wife or a complaint where the defendant has been personally served with process or where the defendant has entered an appearance by written waiver of process. (2) If the parties provide by written agreement for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage and for the settlement of any property rights between the parties and the court finds that such provisions are adequate and sufficient, the agreement may be incorporated in the judgment, and such judgment may be modified as other judgments for divorce. (3) If the parties are unable to agree upon adequate and sufficient provisions for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage or any property rights between them, they may consent to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences and permit the court to decide the issues upon which they cannot agree. Such consent must be in writing, signed by both parties personally, must state that the parties voluntarily consent to permit the court to decide such issues, which shall be specifically set forth in such consent, and that the parties understand that the decision of the court shall be binding and lawful judgment. Such consent may not be withdrawn by a party without leave of the court after the court has commenced any proceeding, including the hearing of any motion or other matter pertaining thereto. The failure or refusal of either party to agree as to adequate and sufficient provisions for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage or any property rights between the parties, or any portion of such issues, or the failure or refusal of any party to consent to permit the court to decide such issues, shall not be used as evidence, or in any manner, against such party. No divorce shall be granted pursuant to this subsection until all matters involving custody and maintenance of any child of that marriage and property rights between the parties raised by the pleading have been either adjudicated by the court or agreed upon by the parties and found to be adequate and sufficient by the court and included in the judgment of divorce. Appeals from any orders and judgments rendered pursuant to this subsection may be had as in other cases in chancery court only insofar as such orders and judgments relate to issues that the parties consented to have decided by the court.    (5) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, no divorce shall be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial; provided, however, that a divorce may be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial, if the contest or denial has been withdrawn or cancelled by the party filing same by leave and order of the court. (6) Irreconcilable differences may be asserted as a sole ground for divorce or as an alternate ground for divorce with any other cause for divorce set out in Section 93-5-1. (Emphasis added). In Massingill, this Court reserved judgment on whether the pleadings signed by the parties, standing alone, could satisfy the statutory provisions requiring that mutual consent must be in writing, signed by both parties personally. 594 So.2d at 1177. As in the present case, there were other areas which made this determination unnecessary. The holding of Massingill applies to this present case; the difference is in the answers to the initial complaints. In Massingill, both parties denied that the other was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. As this Court noted the facts negate any conclusion there was mutual consent to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Id. at 1178. In the present case, Craig fully admitted Rita's contention that she was entitled to a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences, and Rita admitted that there are irreconcilable differences between the parties, which falls short of an unequivocal admission that Craig was entitled to a divorce on this ground. Even if the pleadings met the requirement of a writing, signed by both parties, personally, the other statutory requirements of § 93-5-2(3) were not met. Specifically, there was no valid writing stating that the parties voluntarily consented to permit the court to decide the issues upon which the parties could not agree; there was no writing specifically setting forth the issues upon which the parties were unable to agree; there was no statement that the parties understood that the decision of the court would be a binding and lawful judgment. These elements are required by statute. It must be emphasized that the language of the statute is framed in mandatory rather than permissive terms. As noted by the Court in Massingill, it is conceivable the required `mutual consent in writing' could have been accomplished by written stipulation, written agreement, or by some other viable means either prior to or during the last appearance before the chancellor. Id. In the present case, no effort was made to obtain such a stipulation, agreement or other means at the conclusion of the cases on the primary grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or at any other juncture prior to appeal. After the August 22, 1991, divorce trial, Rita Holloway filed a Motion for Reconsideration and an Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Rita was concerned over who would get the 1985 Dodge Diplomat and the 1983 Dodge Diplomat. The judgment of the court was entered on September 25, 1991. On the same day, Craig filed a Motion to Correct Judgment in which he asked for additional visitation and also for reconsideration of which automobile should be awarded to each party. None of the motions mentioned or apparently even contemplated an irreconcilable differences divorce. The fact that Craig has disputed this assignment of error on appeal is further indication that no consent within the meaning of the statute existed. The record of the proceedings, including all motions filed and hearings held, fails to clearly indicate that any of the participants were considering irreconcilable differences grounds as a viable basis for divorce. The record lacks the clarity and specificity that the statute requires, in addition to the specific writings required by the statute. The statutory requirements for granting a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences were not met, and the chancellor did not err in not granting a divorce to the parties on this ground.