Opinion ID: 2607459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Unanimity Instructions

Text: As noted, both first degree murder charges were submitted to the jury under premeditation and rape-murder theories. In a special instruction requested by the prosecution, the jury was told that it must unanimously agree on any first degree murder verdict, but that it need not agree on the underlying theory. [16] Defendant objected to this instruction only on grounds the particular language was ambiguous and might mistakenly produce a less-than-unanimous first degree murder conviction. Elsewhere, the instructions stressed the need for jury unanimity as to any verdict in general, and as to any decision to convict defendant of a particular degree of homicide. [17] (27) Defendant does not challenge the propriety of these instructions on appeal. Instead, he claims the court erred in not instructing the jury sua sponte that it must unanimously agree on the particular sexual act underlying any first degree felony-murder verdict as to Catherine. Defendant argues that individual jurors might have based such a verdict on different acts (i.e., that defendant killed Catherine during the course of a rape or attempted rape upon either Catherine or Kimele), and that the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the federal Constitution somehow preclude such a result. As implicitly conceded by defendant at trial and on appeal, the jury was not required to decide which of the two proposed theories (premeditation versus rape-murder) governed the killings in this case. Each juror need only have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the single, statutory offense of first degree murder. ( Schad v. Arizona (1991) 500 U.S. ___, ___, ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 555, 514, 572-573, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 2496, 2503]; People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 92 [279 Cal. Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311]; People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d 207, 243; People v. Guerra (1985) 40 Cal.3d 377, 386 [220 Cal. Rptr. 374, 708 P.2d 1252]; People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 194-195 [107 Cal. Rptr. 68, 507 P.2d 956].) Whatever the basis for this long-standing rule (see Schad v. Arizona, supra, 500 U.S. at p. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d at pp. 572-573, 111 S.Ct. at p. 2503]), it follows that the same jury need not have unanimously agreed on the precise factual details of how a killing under one or the other theory occurred in order to convict defendant of first degree murder. Here, the prosecution's claim that defendant killed Catherine during the course of a rape or attempted rape was relevant only as a possible basis for finding him guilty of first degree murder under a felony-murder theory. Contrary to defendant's claim, he was not entitled to a unanimous verdict as to the particular manner in which any such felony murder occurred. Thus, the court did not err in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte in the terms urged here.