Opinion ID: 2264301
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial court's remedial measures

Text: The final factor under Spain requires us to evaluate the trial court's actions addressing the prosecutor's remarks. The first time the court had an opportunity to address these remarks was upon the objection by petitioner to the prosecutor's reference to her own niece and the insinuation to the jury that they should put themselves in the shoes of the victim. The court properly sustained that objection. The court, however, overruled the next objection to the prosecutor's comment implying that petitioner had to prove that Nigha had a motive to lie. The only other action taken by the trial court with regard to the prosecutor's remarks was one paragraph in the jury instructions based upon the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions (MPJI-CR § 3:00) stating: Opening statements and closing arguments of lawyers are not evidence in this case. They are intended only to help you to understand the evidence and to apply the law. Therefore, if your memory of the evidence differs from anything the lawyers or I may say, you must rely on your own memory of the evidence. This instruction was given only generally and then before oral argument when it could not address specifically the objectional remarks because they had not yet been made. After closing arguments the same general written instruction was sent back with the jury without elaboration or without being identified as having any specific relationship with the prosecutor's improper remarks. The trial judge in Spain did use the same instruction and we recognized the presumption that jurors are able to follow the instructions given to them by the trial court. Spain, 386 Md. at 160, 872 A.2d at 34. However, at the specific time the objectionable remarks were made in Spain, the trial court immediately responded in the presence of the jury: Okay, well the jury understand[s] that this of course is closing argument, and that they will [consider the statements to be] lawyers' arguments. Id. at 151, 872 A.2d at 29. Judge Harrell responded for us in Spain: We note also the likely diminution of prejudice from the prosecutor's comments as a result of the trial judge's contemporaneous reminder that they were only an attorney's argument, not evidence,. . . . By emphasizing the argumentative nature of closing arguments contemporaneously with the improper comments, the judge took some effort to eliminate the jury's potential confusion about what it just heard and therefore ameliorated any prejudice to the accused. Spain, 386 Md. at 159-60, 872 A.2d at 33-34 (emphasis added). In the case sub judice there were no contemporaneous efforts by the trial judge to ameliorate the prejudice or any specific effort to cure the effects. Instead, he relied only on the general instructions he had previously given and the fact that written general instructions would go in the jury deliberation room. We look at the trial judge's actions as a whole in reference to the statements. In Spain, for example, upon objection by the defense attorney to the prosecutor's comments, the trial court contemporaneously and specifically addressed the issue that the jury understood the remarks to be only lawyers' arguments and not evidence. See Miller v. State, 380 Md. 1, 35-37, 843 A.2d 803, 823-24 (2004) (holding that the trial court properly denied a motion for a mistrial based upon a prosecutor's comments because it properly sustained the defense's objections, granted the defense motions to strike and immediately instructed the jury to disregard the specific comments); Dunn v. State, 140 Md. 163, 117 A. 329 (1922) (holding that since the trial court promptly admonished the prosecutor and told him to refrain from making improper statements, the trial court did not err when it overruled an objection and denied a motion for a mistrial). In petitioner's case the only time the judge addressed the weight or appropriateness of the prosecutor's remarks was in the general jury instructions, which at no point directly addressed the improper remarks. Thus there was no immediacy or specificity as to any efforts to cure. Recognizing the role of the trial court in ruling upon remarks made during closing arguments this Court has stated: When in the first instance the remarks of the State's Attorney do appear to have been prejudicial, a significant factor in determining whether the jury were actually misled or were likely to have been misled or influenced to the prejudice of the accused is whether or not the trial court took any appropriate action, as the exigencies of the situation may have appeared to require, to overcome the likelihood of prejudice, such as informing the jury that the remark was improper, striking the remark and admonishing the jury to disregard it. Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 423-24, 326 A.2d at 720. And then in Hill: The Court of Special Appeals will also need to take account of the persistency of the prosecutor's conduct  continuing to make these remarks time and again despite the court's rulings that the remarks were improper. A court obviously commits no error when it sustains objections to impermissible comments or gives a proper curative instruction, if that is all that is requested. There is a risk, however, when the prosecutor persistently ignores those rulings and continues in an improper course of conduct, that the jury may come to regard the court's rulings as rote window dressing and thus pay less attention to them. The number of such rulings may actually assume an inverse significance  the more of them, the less weight each or all of them will have  in which event only a mistrial may serve to remedy the error. Hill, 355 Md. at 226, 734 A.2d at 210. In this case, the prosecutor's inappropriate remarks continued and when taken as a whole were highly prejudicial to the petitioner. We hold that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's remarks was likely to have improperly influenced the jury under the circumstances in the case at bar. The weight of the evidence was not overwhelming. The State's case relied heavily upon the credibility of the victim. The trial judge did not take sufficient steps and took no specific steps to ensure that the jury give the appropriate consideration to the statements as only being the prosecutor's arguments and not evidence. As a result, we cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's remarks were harmless. See Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678. The Court of Special Appeals determined that petitioner failed to preserve some of the issues for review because he only objected to two of the statements and did not move for a mistrial as to those issues at the end of closing arguments. Lawson, 160 Md.App. at 629-30, 865 A.2d at 633. The intermediate court then found that when an issue is not preserved, it must find that there was plain error in order to reverse the conviction. The court noted that plain error is invoked only in instances which are compelling, extraordinary, exceptional, or fundamental to a fair trial. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted); see Miller, 380 Md. at 29, 843 A.2d at 820; Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 171, 729 A.2d 910, 930-31 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 910, 528 U.S. 910, 120 S.Ct. 258, 145 L.Ed.2d 216 (1999); Clermont v. State, 348 Md. 419, 455, 704 A.2d 880, 898 (1998); Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 588, 602 A.2d 677, 694 (1992); State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 202, 411 A.2d 1035, 1037 (1980). In the intermediate court's opinion, each statement when considered in isolation, was not so harmful to the petitioner as to amount to plain error. That court erred in limiting a plain error issue to each inappropriate statement separately. Once error is determined during a plain error review, prejudice can only be determined by a consideration of the error in the context of the entire case including the cumulative effect of all errors on the ability of a jury to render a fair and impartial verdict in the context of the case. The Court of Special Appeals points to Clermont and Rubin for the proposition that this Court is reluctant to find plain error in closing arguments. Lawson, 160 Md.App. at 631, 865 A.2d at 635. These cases, however, are very different when compared to the case sub judice. They were both cases where there was ample evidence against the defendants and the arguments did not vitally affect their right to a fair trial. Clermont, 348 Md. at 456, 704 A.2d at 898 (There is no basis for reversal because none of the alleged errors vitally affected Clermont's right to a fair and impartial trial.); Rubin, 325 Md. at 589, 602 A.2d at 695 (noting that the improper argument is not a basis for reversal in view of the overwhelming proof of guilt). In the present case, the primary evidence against the petitioner that the offenses occurred was the testimony of Nigha. Although her testimony alone was legally sufficient for a conviction, it might not have convinced the jury. The prosecutor's comments when taken as a whole, could have prejudiced the jury in such a way as to deny the defendant a fair and impartial trial. See Meno v. State, 117 Md. 435, 441, 83 A. 759, 761 (1912).