Opinion ID: 1438974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Board's Decision to Terminate Mr. Davis

Text: Through the UAPA, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322 (2005) provides, in pertinent part: (a)(1) A person who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter, which shall be the only available method of judicial review. . . . (h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) Made upon unlawful procedure; (4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (5)(A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in light of the entire record. (B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Applying this standard of review, a reviewing court may reverse the Board's decision only if one or more of the five enumerated grounds for reversal is present. Id. § 4-5-322(h). This scope of review is the same for the trial court, intermediate appellate court, and this Court. Gluck v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 15 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1999). On appeal, Mr. Davis actually attacks the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon by the Board based on his belief that the positive urine specimen test result is inadmissible. As this Court recently stated in City of Memphis, 216 S.W.3d at 316, only the last two [statutory grounds for reversal, Tennessee Code Annotated subsections 4-5-322(h)(4)-(5),] relate to the sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, in order to resolve the issue raised by Mr. Davis, we must determine whether the Board's findings were (4) [a]rbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted excise of discretion[,] or (5)(A) [u]nsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record. Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(4)-(5). In reviewing the Board's findings, we take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence, but we may not substitute our own judgment on questions of fact by re-weighing the evidence. See id. § 4-5-322(h)(5)(B). We may reject the Board's decision only if a reasonable person would necessarily reach a different conclusion based on the evidence. Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249, 276 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). It is not enough that the facts could support a different conclusion. Id. Mr. Davis contends that the positive urine specimen test result was inadmissible evidence for the Board to consider. Without the test result, Mr. Davis believes the Board had no cause to terminate his employment for violating the Program's policies, thus making the Board's decision arbitrary and capricious and [u]nsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material. Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(4)-(5). Before this Court, Mr. Davis' attorney agreed, however, that if the Court finds that the positive urine specimen test result was admissible then the Board's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial and material evidence. Accordingly, if this Court determines that the positive urine specimen test result was admissible, our analysis ends there and the decision of the Board will be affirmed.