Opinion ID: 2546552
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is the Restitution Order Entered by the Trial Court Manifestly Unreasonable or Based on Untenable Grounds?

Text: ¶ 69 Hughes challenges the restitution imposed ($145,000) based on ecological and monetary values being arbitrary and an abuse of discretion because the market value of the trees stolen was assessed as $4,465 at trial. The trial court has great power and discretion in issuing restitution. State v. Enstone, 137 Wash.2d 675, 679, 974 P.2d 828 (1999); State v. Fleming, 75 Wash.App. 270, 274, 877 P.2d 243 (1994). A restitution order will only be reversed if Hughes shows an abuse of discretion by the trial court, which exists when the trial court's determination is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Enstone, 137 Wash.2d at 679, 974 P.2d 828 (evaluating appeal of restitution order pursuant to RCW 9.94A.142, and citing State v. Davison, 116 Wash.2d 917, 919, 809 P.2d 1374 (1991); State v. Cunningham, 96 Wash.2d 31, 34, 633 P.2d 886 (1981)). ¶ 70 RCW 9.94A.753(1) [18] directs the trial court to impose restitution at a sentencing hearing. The amount of restitution should be based on easily ascertainable damages. RCW 9.94A.753(3). However, the amount of harm or loss need not be established with specific accuracy. Fleming, 75 Wash.App. at 274, 877 P.2d 243. Evidence supporting restitution `is sufficient if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.' Id. at 274-75, 877 P.2d 243 (quoting State v. Pollard, 66 Wash.App. 779, 785, 834 P.2d 51 (1992) (quoting State v. Mark, 36 Wash.App. 428, 434, 675 P.2d 1250 (1984))). To determine the amount of restitution, the trial court can either rely on a defendant's acknowledgment or it can determine the amount by a preponderance of evidence. State v. Hunsicker, 129 Wash.2d 554, 558-59, 919 P.2d 79 (1996); State v. Ryan, 78 Wash.App. 758, 761, 899 P.2d 825 (1995). Where a defendant disputes facts relevant to the determination of restitution, the State must prove the amount by a preponderance of the evidence at an evidentiary hearing. State v. Dedonado, 99 Wash.App. 251, 256, 991 P.2d 1216 (2000). Case law does not define evidentiary hearing in the restitution context. However, Black's Law Dictionary defines the term as [a] hearing at which evidence is presented, as opposed to a hearing at which only legal argument is presented. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 738 (8th ed.2004). ¶ 71 There is no independent requirement that the amount set in restitution be equal to a calculation determined at trial. And Hughes points to no concrete basis upon which to find that the method of calculating the damages violated the trial court's discretion. Hughes contends that the amount of restitution should be based on the market value, citing RCW 9A.56.010(18)(a), which defines value as the market value. In RCW 9A.56.010, the term value and its definition is relevant to defining the various degrees of theft which are based, in part, on the values of the objects stolen. See RCW 9A.56.010,.030-.050. Because the definition of value he asserts resides in the theft and burglary statute, not in the SRA which governs sentencing, it does not pertain to restitution. ¶ 72 The SRA, chapter 9.94A RCW, governs restitution and the calculation thereof as part of sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Edelman, 97 Wash.App. 161, 166, 984 P.2d 421 (1999) ([U]nder the sentencing reform act, restitution is part of an offender's sentence.). RCW 9.94A.030(34) defines restitution for purposes of the SRA to be a specific sum of money ordered by the sentencing court to be paid by the offender to the court over a specified period of time as payment of damages. The sum may include both public and private costs. It does not require the value to be based on market value. And it considers both private and public costs, which supports considering the real value of the trees and the harm to the environment. ¶ 73 The trial court here conducted a sentencing hearing at which evidence was presented. The State put on two witnesses, both of whom defense counsel chose not to cross examine. RP (May 23, 2003) at 3-21. Defense counsel had the opportunity to put on evidence, and chose only to admit two exhibits. Id. at 22. The trial court relied on testimony from a forest expert on the real value of the trees stolen (including both ecological and monetary components), not the market value. But that value constituted an ascertainable amount, which the State proved beyond mere speculation or conjecture. Hughes has not satisfied his burden of showing that the court's restitution order was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. We affirm the restitution order.