Opinion ID: 2195507
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Liability Under BIA

Text: Section 20701 of 49 U.S.C. provides, in relevant part, that a railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a locomotive only when the locomotive and its parts and appurtenances are in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury. That statute, first enacted in 1911, was codified as § 23 of Title 45 of the U.S.Code, dealing with railroads, and was part of a number of boiler inspection and safety appliance laws to which the Federal Employer's Liability Act applied. In 1994, the statute was code-revised and moved to title 49 as part of the Federal code revision effort. See P.L. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745, and House Report (Judiciary Committee) No. 103-180, 7/15/93, accompanying H.R. 1758, 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 916-920 (103rd Cong., 2d. Sess.1994). Standing alone, § 20701 does not purport to confer any rights on persons injured when coming into contact with a locomotive or parts thereof that are not in proper condition and safe to operate. As the Supreme Court made clear in Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 188, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1034, 93 L.Ed. 1282, 1302 (1949) with respect to the predecessor statute (title 45, § 23), however, it has been held consistently that the Boiler Inspection Act supplements the Federal Employers' Liability Act by imposing on interstate railroads `an absolute and continuing duty' to provide safe equipment. That conclusion, it stated, stems, not from any express statutory language, but by implication from §§ 3-4 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 53-54. . . which bar pleadings of, respectively, contributory negligence and assumption of risk `in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.' The Court explained that, although it is § 1 of FELA (45 U.S.C. § 51) that creates the basis of an employee's suit for violation of the BIA and that section refers to defects due to the railroad's negligence, it was the Congressional intent to treat a violation of the Safety Appliance Act as `negligence'what is sometimes called negligence per se.  Id. at 189, 69 S.Ct. at 1034, 93 L.Ed. at 1303, (quoting from San Antonio & A.P.R. Co. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 484, 36 S.Ct. 626, 630, 60 L.Ed. 1110, 1117 (1916)). Thus, the Court concluded that the BIA is substantively an amendment to the FELA and dispense[s], for the purposes of employees' suits, with the necessity of proving that violations of the safety statutes constitute negligence; and making proof of such violations is effective to show negligence as a matter of law. Urie v. Thompson, supra, at 189, 69 S.Ct. at 1034, 93 L.Ed. at 1303. See also Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 485, 63 S.Ct. 347, 351, 87 L.Ed. 411, 415 (1943): (Negligence is not the basis for liability under the [Boiler Inspection] Act.). CSX contends that Haischer failed to present any evidence that the HTD device was not in proper condition or was not safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injurythat it was defective in any way. The railroad suggests three possible reasons for the door coming loosethat Haischer brushed against it, causing it to fall open; that it came open due to continuous vibration from operation of the engine; or that maintenance personnel failed to tighten the screws adequatelyand it maintains that none of those reasons creates liability under BIA. The first two possible reasons, it claims, do not show any defect in the device, which is a necessary element for liability; the third, it argues, constitutes not a defect in the device but negligence on the part of other employees, which may be the basis for liability under FELA but not under BIA. In that regard, it uses the sword of strict liability as a shield: if negligence is not the basis for liability under BIA, the railroad cannot be liable for an injury caused by its negligence. The railroad's position is supported neither by case law interpreting BIA nor by logic. The simple answer is that it really does not matter which of the three suggested reasons actually caused the door to come loose. As was shown from the incident itself, it was at least a jury question of whether, when the door came loose and was left hanging, the device, and, consequently, the locomotive, ceased to be in proper condition and, in fact, became unsafe to operate. It was the railroad's duty under § 20701 to make certain that the screws were sufficiently tightened so that they would not come loose, whether by someone brushing against the door or because of normal vibration from the engine. Even though traditional negligence need not be shown under BIA, both of those prospects were entirely foreseeable, and, to satisfy its statutory duty to provide safe equipment in proper condition, the railroad was obliged to assure, through appropriate maintenance, that the screws would remain securely in place. The failure to do so constitutes the kind of negligence per se that the Urie Court held was imposed by BIA. Compare Zachritz v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 336 Mo. 801, 81 S.W.2d 608 (1935) (plaintiff injured when he fell while attempting to board locomotive by grabbing handrail; no defect shown in handrail); Ford v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 54 F.2d 342 (2nd Cir.1931) (same); Harlan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 335 Mo. 414, 73 S.W.2d 749 (1934) (plaintiff injured when trapdoor was negligently left open; no defect in trapdoor). Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., supra, 317 U.S. 481, 63 S.Ct. 347, 87 L.Ed. 411, illustrates the point. A brakeman, standing on top of a locomotive tender, was attempting to pull a water spout over the tender when he slipped on ice that had formed on the top of the tender. He claimed that the ice had formed because of a small leak at the collar of a manhole on the tender, from which water flowed onto the surface of the tender. The jury, in a special verdict, found that there was no such leak, which raised the question of whether the general verdict for the brakeman could stand. The Supreme Court held that, under BIA, the verdict could standthat BIA imposed an absolute and continuing duty to maintain the locomotive and its appurtenances in safe condition, without unnecessary peril to life or limb and that [t]he use of a tender, upon whose top an employee must go in the course of his duties, which is covered with ice seems to us to involve `unnecessary peril to life or limb'enough so as to permit a jury to find that the Boiler Inspection Act has been violated. 317 U.S. at 486, 63 S.Ct. at 351, 87 L.Ed. at 415. That conclusion was founded on the Court's rejection of the notion that the BIA covers only defects in construction or mechanical operation and its view that [c]onditions other than mechanical imperfections can plainly render equipment unsafe to operate without unnecessary peril to life or limb. Id. at 487-88, 63 S.Ct. at 352, 87 L.Ed. at 416. See also Topping v. CSX Transp., Inc., 1 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1993) (relying on Lilly in upholding liability under BIA for injuries suffered when locomotive engineer slipped on metal object, holding that it was a jury question whether presence of loose object in cab of engine rendered locomotive unsafe to operate).