Opinion ID: 1742046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Express PreemptionDo the Ordinances Constitute Invalid County Zoning of Agricultural Land and Structures?

Text: A. County zoning authority. Iowa Code chapter 335 establishes general zoning authority for counties, the scope of such authority, and the procedures for exercising that authority. See generally Iowa Code ch. 335. One limitation on the county's zoning power is the express preemption of county zoning of agricultural land and structures: [N]o ordinance adopted under this chapter applies to land, farm houses, farm barns, farm outbuildings or other buildings or structures which are primarily adapted, by reason of nature and area, for use for agricultural purposes, while so used. Id. § 335.2. Although the act containing this provision did not state the purpose of the exemption, a predecessor bill having the same exemption asserted that the agricultural exception to county zoning was intended as a protection for the farmer and his investment in his land. H.F. 426, 1947 H.J. 587 (comments and explanation); see Note, County Zoning in Iowa, 45 Iowa L.Rev. 743, 754 (1960); see also Neil D. Hamilton, Freedom to Farm! Understanding the Agricultural Exemption to County Zoning in Iowa, 31 Drake L.Rev. 565, 574 (1981-82) (the exemption of section 358A.2 [now section 335.2] was a significant statement of the `freedom to farm'). The parties agree the ordinances enacted by Humboldt County apply to land and structures used for agricultural purposes. See Kuehl v. Cass County, 555 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa 1996) (holding hog confinement facility was exempt from county zoning regulations under section 335.2). The fighting issue is whether any of the ordinances constitute an ordinance adopted under ... chapter [335]; in other words, are the ordinances zoning regulations? B. Procedure of adoption. The county asserts the ordinances were enacted pursuant to the home rule authority granted in chapter 331 and not pursuant to the zoning power granted in chapter 335. The county points out it did not consult its comprehensive plan prior to enactment of the challenged ordinances nor did it follow the other procedures outlined in chapter 335. See Iowa Code §§ 335.6-.17. But chapter 331 mandates that any zoning power shall be exercised in accordance with chapter 335. Id. § 331.304(6). This provision makes it clear that a county does not have a choice to enact an ordinance under chapter 331 or chapter 335. If the regulation constitutes zoning, the county must follow the procedures and be subject to the limitations of chapter 335. See Thompson v. Hancock County, 539 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Iowa 1995) (holding agricultural exemption is incorporated into zoning regulations enacted under home rule authority of chapter 331). Consequently, a county may not avoid the agricultural exemption simply by labeling a zoning ordinance an exercise of home rule authority and ignoring the procedural requirements of chapter 335. See Land Acquisition Servs., Inc. v. Clarion County Bd. of Comm'rs, 146 Pa.Cmwlth. 293, 605 A.2d 465, 469 (1992) ([T]he stated intent of a municipality is not controlling with respect to the question of whether the substance of an ordinance renders it a zoning ordinance.). C. Purpose of ordinances. That brings us to another argument made by the county to support its position that the challenged ordinances are not zoning regulations. The county points out the purpose of the ordinances is not to regulate land usage, but to create safeguards to protect the integrity of environmental resources in Humboldt County from potential hazards resulting from permitted acts, and to protect the health, safety and welfare of Humboldt County residents. Accordingly, it contends, the ordinances are an exercise of the county's police power. See Gravert v. Nebergall, 539 N.W.2d 184, 186 (Iowa 1995) (stating the police power is the authority to pass laws that promote the public health, safety, and welfare). But the purpose of the regulations does little to assist us in classifying them as the exercise of general police power or the exercise of zoning power. Indeed, any zoning regulation is, by definition, an exercise of the county's police power. See Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Iowa 1980) (Zoning decisions are an exercise of the police power to promote the health, safety, order and morals of society.); see also Iowa Code § 335.5 (stating one objective of zoning is to protect health and the general welfare). Consequently, the county's goal of protecting its natural resources and citizens from the unwanted effects of confinement operations is as consistent with the exercise of zoning power as it is with an exercise of the county's home rule authority. D. What constitutes zoning under chapter 335? If the label placed on these ordinances and the purpose for which they were enacted do not assist us in determining whether they are prohibited zoning regulations, what is the test? We think we must necessarily start with the wording of the statute itself to interpret the scope of chapter 335. See Collins v. King, 545 N.W.2d 310, 312 (Iowa 1996) (In interpreting a statute we necessarily begin with the statute's language.). The zoning power of the county regulated by chapter 335 is described in the statute itself: Subject to section 335.2, the board of supervisors may by ordinance regulate and restrict the height, number of structures, and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes, and may regulate, restrict, and prohibit the use for residential purposes of tents, trailers, and portable or potentially portable structures. Iowa Code § 335.3 (emphasis added). The statute further provides that the board may divide the county ... into districts ... and within such districts it may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings, structures or land. Id. § 335.4 (emphasis added). The statute requires that any regulation adopted pursuant to chapter 335 advance certain enumerated objectives, including to protect health and the general welfare. Id. § 335.5. Based on this statute, the plaintiffs argue any county ordinance that regulates the use of buildings or land to protect the public's health or general welfare is zoning. The county responds that the challenged ordinances do not constitute zoning because they do not regulate land usage by district. It points out the challenged ordinances regulate an activity and apply uniformly across the county, irrespective of district classifications. [9] We think the county's understanding of the distinction between a zoning power and a general police power with respect to the regulation of an activity on land is correct. [10] Historically, zoning regulations took the form of separating geographic areas according to zoning districts and specifying the uses permitted in each district. See 1 Patrick J. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 1.02[1], at 1-6 (1991) [hereinafter Zoning and Land Use Controls ]. Zoning has expanded, however, since its beginnings in the early twentieth century and today's land use regulations are far more flexible and complex. See 6 Zoning and Land Use Controls § 40.01[1][b], at 40-5; see also Plaza Recreational Ctr. v. Sioux City, 253 Iowa 246, 249, 111 N.W.2d 758, 761 (1961) (upholding a city zoning ordinance that restricted the types of bowling alleys allowed in a D-1 district to those which do not permit the consumption of beer or intoxicating liquor on the premises). Zoning regulations may now take the form of performance controls to limit the uses occurring in a particular district. See 6 Zoning and Land Use Controls § 40A.03[1][b], at 40A-21 to 40A-23 (noting the use of standards for traffic, noise, dust, odors, or other like problems to regulate or limit uses). Despite expansion in the type of regulation imposed by zoning ordinances, the fundamental attribute of use regulation by district remains. See, e.g., 83 Am.Jur.2d Zoning § 2, at 36 (1992) (The very essence of zoning is the territorial division of land into use districts according to the character of the land and buildings, the suitability of land and buildings for particular uses, and uniformity of use.) (emphasis added); Black's Law Dictionary 1618 (6th ed.1990) (defining zoning, in part, as [d]ivision of land into zones, and within those zones, regulation of both the nature of land usage and the physical dimension of uses including height[,] setbacks and minimum area) (emphasis added); 8 J. Jeffrey Reinholtz & Timothy P. Bjur, McQuillin Municipal Corporations § 25.07, at 27 (3d ed.1991 rev. vol.) (`Zoning' has been defined as the legislative division of a community into areas in which only certain designated uses of land or structures are permitted. The term ... infers governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or defined areas. ) (emphasis added); id. § 25.53, at 172 (A zoning ordinance is one the nature and purpose of which is to regulate uses of lands and buildings according to districts, areas, or locations. ) (emphasis added); 1 Zoning and Land Use Controls § 1.02[1], at 1-6 (Zoning ordinances are adopted to divide the land into different districts, and to permit only certain uses within each zoning district. ) (emphasis added); 6 Zoning and Land Use Controls § 40.01[1][a], at 40-03 (The central thesis of zoning is that there is a proper place for every use.) (emphasis added). It is this fundamental attribute that is missing in the challenged ordinances; they regulate an activity irrespective of the location of that activity within the county. Thus, although the ordinances may advance the health and general welfare of the community, they do not do so by regulating the usage of land by district. See City of Batavia v. Allen, 218 Ill.App.3d 545, 547, 161 Ill.Dec. 239, 241, 578 N.E.2d 597, 599 (1991) (holding ordinance requiring taverns to close doors and windows during business hours was a licensing restriction and not a zoning provision because it regulates establishments based on the type of business they conduct, not based on their location); Square Lake Hills Condominium Ass'n v. Bloomfield Township, 437 Mich. 310, 471 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1991) (holding ordinance regulating boat docking and launching was not a zoning ordinance because it regulated an activity, and not the use of land and buildings according to districts); Town of Islip v. Zalak, 165 A.D.2d 83, 566 N.Y.S.2d 306, 311 (1991) (holding ordinance regulating recycling stations was not a zoning ordinance because it regulated an activity wherever it was carried out). We note a contrary conclusion would lead to an absurd result. See Hagen v. Texaco Refining & Mktg., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 531, 543 (Iowa 1995) (stating court seeks a reasonable construction of a statute that will avoid absurd results). The plaintiffs argue the county's ordinances substantially restrict the use of land and hence are zoning regulations. But that could be said of any regulation of human activity because human activity customarily occurs on land or in a structure on land. See Town of Islip, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 311 (noting a law is not a zoning ordinance merely because it touches the use of land). Because any regulation of human activity could be characterized as a regulation of the use of one's land, the classification of an ordinance as zoning on the basis that the regulation affects the use of land would make every city or county ordinance a zoning ordinance, subject to the restrictions and procedures of chapter 335. We are confident the legislature did not intend chapter 335 to have such a broad application. For example, section 335.5 requires that any zoning regulation be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan [11] and further that [s]uch regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, as to the character of the area of the district and the peculiar suitability of such area for particular uses. (Emphasis added.) Additionally, section 335.4 requires that any regulation or restriction must be uniform for each class or kind of buildings throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may differ from those in other districts. (Emphasis added.) The statute clearly contemplates that land use regulation under chapter 335 will have the fundamental characteristic of zoningregulation by district. We applied this distinction in Hawkeye Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 356 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 1984), a case interpreting chapter 414, the city zoning statute. In that case, the plaintiff wanted to erect a twenty-six-foot-high billboard, but the city's sign ordinance limited billboards to twenty feet. Hawkeye Outdoor Adver., 356 N.W.2d at 546. The plaintiff sought a variance from the board of adjustment, but the board declined to act on the basis it had no jurisdiction. Id. The question of jurisdiction turned on whether the sign ordinance was a zoning ordinance, subject to variance by the board, or an exercise of the city's general home rule authority. Id. We held the sign ordinance was not a zoning ordinance, in part, because it did not deal with zoning, or restrictions of that sort. Id. We characterized a zoning measure as one which regulates the use of property in designated areas. Id. (emphasis added). Because the ordinances adopted by Humboldt County do not regulate land use by district, they are not an exercise of the county's zoning power under chapter 335. Therefore, the ordinances are not subject to the agricultural exemption of section 335.2. We agree with the district court's conclusion that the challenged ordinances are not invalid under chapter 335.