Opinion ID: 767962
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Law Under Batson

Text: 12 In assessing a challenge under Batson, a trial court must (1) decide whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised a peremptory strike on the basis of race; (2) if so, decide whether the prosecutor has satisfied the burden of coming forward with a race neutral explanation for striking the potential juror; and, if so, then must (3) make a determination whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98. 13 Examining these steps in some detail, we note that at the first step the defendant must show that the circumstances raise an inference of racial discrimination. Such an inference may stem, for example, from a pattern of strikes against minority jurors. See id. at 97. In this case, three black members of the jury panel were challenged peremptorily by the prosecutor. And, as noted, the state trial judge ruled on the Batson application before defense counsel could present any argument regarding such challenges. Although a trial judge may rule on a Batson application even in the absence of a prima facie showing of discrimination, see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991), the trial judge's actions here precluded a full record from being established and prevented a meaningful determination on the question whether the challenges demonstrated discriminatory intent. 14 There is no dispute regarding the trial court's conclusion that the reasons given for the prosecutor's peremptory challenges were race neutral. As such, they satisfy the prosecution's burden at the second Batson step. As the magistrate's report to the district court detailed, the reasons offered for the strikes in this case - negative experience with law enforcement, age, life experience, type of employment, and demeanor - have been found to be acceptable race neutral bases for peremptory challenges. See Jordan, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 271-74 (citing cases). Nevertheless the Batson analysis recognizes that a race neutral reason may be rational and yet be a pretext for discrimination. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363. 15 Jordan now declares that the district court's conclusory statement that the prosecutor's explanations were race neutral did not satisfy Batson's third step. We agree. The Supreme Court made clear in Batson that at the third step in the analysis the trial court has a duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. The Court described this duty of assessing the credibility of the prosecutor's race neutral reasons as embodying the decisive question in the Batson analysis. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. 16 Hence, the third step of the Batson inquiry requires a trial judge to make an ultimate determination on the issue of discriminatory intent based on all the facts and circumstances. United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1991). Although the trial judge's determination of discriminatory intent and credibility is ordinarily entitled to great deference, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, we recently emphasized a trial court's duty at the third stage to determine the credibility of the proffered explanations. See Barnes v. Anderson, 202 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1999). There we held it was error for the trial court to deny a Batson motion without explicitly adjudicating the credibility of the non-moving or challenging party's race neutral explanations for its action in peremptorily striking potential jurors. See id. at 156-57. 17 We also have disapproved a trial court conducting its review of a Batson application with undue haste and ruling in a summary fashion. See United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 696 (2d Cir. 1992). In Stavroulakis we offered defense counsel the opportunity, denied by the trial court, to articulate a prima facie case under Batson. Counsel in that case was unable to do so. In the case at hand, in contrast, Jordan can articulate a prima facie case of a racial basis for the peremptory strikes because he showed a potentially discriminatory pattern in the peremptory strike of three black panelists. On appeal he has argued that one black panelist, Mr. Taylor, was struck on the grounds that he was young and had no supervisory experience, while Ms. Timkin, a white panelist of the same age who had been in her job for only eight months and also had no supervisory experience was not challenged. Support for the notion that there was purposeful discrimination in the peremptory challenge may lie in the similarity between the characteristics of jurors struck and jurors accepted. Where the principal difference between them is race, the credibility of the prosecutor's explanation is much weakened. Although Jordon raised this issue in his state court appeals and in his petition below, neither the magistrate's report nor the district court's opinion addressed his argument. Jordan's challenge alleging discrimination in jury selection is sufficient to warrant a determination whether the prosecutor's proffered reasons were pretextual. 18 The state trial judge presiding at Jordan's trial was not in a position to make the requisite determination as to discriminatory intent. In an effort to save an awful lot of time he ruled summarily on the Batson application after an extremely brief colloquy, and resisted counsel's efforts to make arguments regarding the peremptory strikes so as to create a full record. The trial judge could not properly decide the third Batson step because he granted counsel no time to identify the relevant facts and assess the circumstances necessary to decide whether the race neutral reasons given were credible and nonpretextual. This cursory treatment of Jordan's Batson application was not a meaningful inquiry into the decisive question ... whether counsel's race neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. 19 When there are many factors available upon which a trial court may rely, it may properly make a determination that the prosecutor did not discriminate on the basis of race, even absent a prima facie showing of discrimination. See id. at 369-70. We have upheld a trial court's determination that race neutral reasons were not pretextual where the trial court reconstructed the voir dire at a hearing based only upon the prosecutor's testimony under cross-examination by defense counsel. See Bryant v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 1076, 1078-79 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 907 (1998). But the limited record developed in the present case casts doubt on the trial court's ability to make the required finding regarding the prosecutor's intent, thereby undermining the deference due its conclusion. See Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 1992). 20 The rule in Batson is meant to prevent prosecutors from striking jurors in criminal cases because they happen to be of the same race as the defendant. The letter of Batson requires the trial court to consider all relevant circumstances surrounding a defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. It imposes a duty on the trial court to make a determination whether the defendant established intentional discrimination. See id. at 98. 21 The trial judge in this case made no effort to comply with the letter, much less the spirit, of Batson. Rather, he engaged in a perfunctory exercise designed to speed the proceedings along. Without hearing any argument from defense counsel, the judge declared it was not then necessary that the prosecutor provide a race neutral basis for his challenges, but asked him to provide one in order to save time. This does not constitute a meaningful inquiry into the question of discrimination. Batson requires a trial judge to ensure that a defendant on trial is afforded the equal protection of the law. This is precisely what the trial court failed to do. Because the court did not make the required determination at the third Batson step, we must reverse the portion of the judgment that denied petitioner's habeas application based on a violation of Batson. We therefore direct the district court to, in its discretion, hold a hearing to reconstruct the prosecutor's state of mind at the time of jury selection, or if the passage of nine years since Jordan's trial and other circumstances should have made such a determination impossible or unsatisfactory, to order that the state grant Jordan a new trial. See Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 250 (2d Cir. 1998).