Opinion ID: 901663
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Effects of Hanks's Violation of SDCL 7-16-18

Text: [¶ 5.] As previously mentioned, the Board does not appeal the circuit court's conclusions that it had no jurisdiction to remove Hanks from his judgeship and that the tribal judgeship did not affect the legality of the contract. Hanks's judicial position could not have affected the legality of the contract under the facts of this case because the parties stipulated that Hanks [had] not been disqualified as Corson County States [ sic ] Attorney, nor [had] the County requested Curtis W. Hanks be judicially disqualified from representing Corson County, South Dakota on civil matters. Further, at oral argument, the Board completely removed this issue from consideration by indicating they were not defending the contract based on Hanks's apparent statutory violation: Court: You're not defending the contract based on the violation; you simply want a declaration of a violation as we had . . . mentioned in our last opinion? Counsel: Yes. Therefore, under the particular facts of this case, we affirm the circuit court's first two conclusions concerning the legal effects of Hanks's judicial office. [¶ 6.] The third possible effect of Hanks's judicial office concerned his right to hold the office of state's attorney. [3] On this issue, the Board conceded at oral argument that it could not challenge Hanks's right to hold that office in these proceedings: Court: What you're asking for then is a declaration that he's violating the statute, no more no less, is that what you're asking? Counsel: That's right . . . Court: You're not challenging his office? Counsel: We are not and we can't . . . The Board acknowledged that it could not challenge Hanks's status as state's attorney in this county commission appeal because quo warranto is the proper proceeding to determine title to and possession of a public office. Burns v. Kurtenbach, 327 N.W.2d 636, 638 (S.D.1982) (citations omitted). See also State v. Jensen, 2003 SD 55, ¶ 10, 662 N.W.2d 643, 646; McElhaney v. Anderson, 1999 SD 78, ¶ 8, 598 N.W.2d 203, 205. [4] We have departed from this rule only in instances of `exceptional circumstances' of an emergency nature involving the public interest of the entire state or a good portion of it. Weger v. Pennington County, 534 N.W.2d 854, 859 (S.D.1995) (citation omitted). This dispute concerning a county's decision to contract for legal services is not an exceptional circumstance of an emergency nature. [¶ 7.] The Board, however, contends that the circuit court should have entered a declaratory ruling that Hanks was violating SDCL 7-16-18. The Board asserts that the failure to enter a declaratory ruling violated our mandate in Hanks I. However, this case involves an appeal from a county commissioner decision, and no declaratory relief was sought under SDCL ch. 21-24, the Declaratory Judgment Act. That is significant because: [T]he declaratory judgment statutes do not abrogate the ordinary rules of pleading, practice, procedure, and evidence. Even the most liberal construction that can be placed upon such statutes will not warrant the courts in granting affirmative relief by way of a declaratory judgment in the absence of pleading and proof warranting such relief. State Highway Commission v. Sweetman Const. Co., 83 S.D. 27, 32, 153 N.W.2d 682, 684-685 (1967) (quoting Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, § 198, p. 410) (additional citation omitted). [¶ 8.] Here, declaratory relief was not sought in the underlying appeal. Moreover, a declaration of a statutory violation was immaterial considering the procedural posture of this case. It was immaterial because the County did not defend the contract on the allegation that there was no Corson County State's Attorney due to Hanks unlawfully holding a judicial office. Under these circumstances, neither the pleadings nor the proof warranted a declaratory ruling. For these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court followed our mandate to consider the legal effects of this apparent statutory violation. Whether the Contract Exceeded the Permissible Scope of Private Attorney Representation of a County Served by an Elected State's Attorney [¶ 9.] In Hanks I we concluded that the contract was ambiguous concerning the intended extent of the legal services. When there is an ambiguous contract, evidence may be introduced to determine the intention of the parties, which is a question of fact to be resolved by the fact finder. Ford v. Moore, 1996 SD 112, ¶ 10, 552 N.W.2d 850, 855 (citation omitted). A circuit court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Miller v. Jacobsen, 2006 SD 33, ¶ 19, 714 N.W.2d 69, 76 (citation omitted). We will overturn the trial court's findings of fact on appeal only when a complete review of the evidence leaves the Court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. [¶ 10.] The Board first contends that the circuit court erred in relying on contract language to determine the intended scope of the agreement. The Board argues that the court could not look to the contract because we previously ruled that it was ambiguous. However, ambiguity does not foreclose consideration of the written contract: it simply allows the consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of that contract. [I]f the contract `is uncertain or ambiguous,' parol and extrinsic evidence may be used for clarification. Pauley v. Simonson, 2006 SD 73, ¶ 8, 720 N.W.2d 665, 668 (citing Jensen v. Pure Plant Food Intern., Ltd., 274 N.W.2d 261, 263-264 (S.D.1979)). Therefore, the circuit court properly considered the contract language together with extrinsic evidence to determine the intended scope of the agreement. [¶ 11.] This brings us to the central issue: whether this contract contemplated the displacement of Hanks as the elected state's attorney on matters in which only the state's attorney may act. [5] SDCL [ch.] 7-16 does not give the Board authority to hire a lawyer to displace the state's attorney from the duties solely designated to him. Hanks, 2005 SD 38 at ¶ 7, 694 N.W.2d at 700. However, a County does have limited authority to contract for private legal services in three areas: (1) for criminal and civil cases with more than one lawyer in opposition, (2) for representation in counties other than Corson County or in federal and tribal courts, and (3) for legal advice and opinions to the Board. Id. at ¶ 12, 694 N.W.2d at 702. Representation in Cases and Administrative Proceedings [¶ 12.] As we noted in Hanks I, the first two exceptions are limited to representation in certain cases and administrative proceedings. Id. at ¶ 6 (citing SDCL 7-16-6). [6] In this case, the record reflects that Bogue's representation did not qualify under these exceptions because it was not limited to the statutorily authorized cases or administrative proceedings. It is unlikely that such representation could have been a significant component of the contract because, at the time the contract was negotiated, Corson County was not involved in cases outside the County, [7] or cases in Corson County with more than one lawyer in opposition. Indeed, even though similar contracts were negotiated in 2004 and 2005, Bogue testified that she had never undertaken representation of Corson County in state, federal, or tribal court from January of 2003 through the June 2005 hearing. [¶ 13.] Bogue, however, claimed that she was involved in administrative matters. She testified [w]e had administrative matters, and those, I believe, primarily wereI think there were some trust land issues, and I think that there's been some ongoing medical claims that dealt with [the Indian Health Service]. However, as is explained infra, ¶¶ 21-23, the evidence reflects that these administrative matters were not the type of administrative proceedings contemplated by the statute. They simply involved Bogue negotiating with third parties such as the Indian Health Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, or hospital administrators. Therefore, this part of Bogue's representation did not qualify as an administrative proceeding under the first two exceptions. [¶ 14.] Only one part of the contemplated representation qualified under the first two exceptions. Bogue testified that under the contract, had cases developed in federal, tribal or out of county courts, she would have been required to represent the County. Therefore, the contract was valid to the extent that it was for future representation in cases and administrative proceedings allowed under SDCL 7-16-6.