Opinion ID: 2278376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Charge

Text: Finally, Nooner also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's decision not to elicit testimony in the penalty phase that Nooner had a prior charge of aggravated robbery which was reduced to robbery because he had prevented his co-defendant from raping the robbery victim. The prosecution introduced the prior robbery as one of the aggravators in the penalty phase. At the Rule 37 hearing, both defense counsel testified that they did not recall the reduction in charge being due to saving the victim from rape. They did recall a prior conviction as an aggravator. Nooner alleges he told his counsel of the reduction in charge based on his protection of a victim he and his co-defendant were robbing. Even assuming counsel were told, Nooner cannot prevail on the issue. To prevail, he must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsels' errors, the decision reached would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Dillard, supra . As a mitigating circumstance, Nooner's alleged rescue is dubious at best. We hold that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had trial counsel sought to introduce the evidence. Affirmed.