Opinion ID: 795598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: insufficient evidence: conspiracy

Text: 38 The jury found Ross guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. In cases of conspiracy, deference to the jury's findings `is especially important . . . because a conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation, and it is a rare case where all aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in court with the precision of a surgeon's scalpel.' Morgan, 385 F.3d at 204 (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 109 (2d Cir.2001) (We must be especially deferential when reviewing a conspiracy conviction for legal sufficiency). 39 To be guilty of conspiracy, `there must be some evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that the person charged with conspiracy knew of the existence of the scheme alleged in the indictment and knowingly joined and participated in it.' Morgan, 385 F.3d at 206 (quoting United States v. Gaviria, 740 F.2d 174, 183 (2d Cir.1984)); Jones, 393 F.3d at 111. Ross argues that the evidence was insufficient because the government proved no more than his periodic presence during several drug sales, and this falls short of proving his knowledge of the conspiracy and his intent to participate in it. It is axiomatic that mere presence at the scene of a criminal act or association with conspirators does not constitute intentional participation in [a] conspiracy, United States v. Samaria, 239 F.3d 228, 235 (2d Cir.2001), nor is evidence of suspicious circumstances, standing alone, sufficient. See Jones, 393 F.3d at 111. However, where the government presents evidence tending to show that the defendant was present at a crime scene under circumstances that logically support an inference of association with the criminal venture, a reasonable juror could conclude the defendant was a knowing and intentional criminal conspirator. United States v. Eltayib, 88 F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir.1996). 40 To be sure, while Sherman Green, Ron Keitt, and Donnie Brown testified that Ross accompanied Marcus Snow during numerous multi-ounce crack cocaine transactions from late 1998 until 2001 in and around the apartments on Sixth Street, none claimed that they actually purchased any drugs from Ross. Thus, Ross is correct that, standing alone, this evidence of mere presence at the scene of a drug transaction or mere association with a drug dealer, is insufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross knowingly and intentionally participated in the charged conspiracy. See Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111-12; Samaria, 239 F.3d at 235-36. 41 However, this evidence was not standing alone; there was also evidence that Ross personally participated in several of the drug sales occurring during the period of the charged conspiracy. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding Ross and Marcus Snow's joint rental of the 183 Sixth Street apartment, where the bulk of the paraphernalia and narcotics involved in the conspiracy were discovered, further supports the jury's conclusion that Ross was a knowing and intentional conspirator. Finally, Ross's presence at the apartment during the raid was under circumstances that logically support an inference of association with the criminal venture, as he was caught fleeing, shoeless and coatless in the middle of January, from an apartment in which officers found drug paraphernalia, loaded firearms, $6,000 in cash, and approximately 474 grams of cocaine base packaged and stored in saleable quantities stashed in the basement. Eltayib, 88 F.3d at 171; see also United States v. Benitez, 920 F.2d 1080, 1089 (2d Cir.1990) (rejecting insufficiency claim where defendant jumped out of the window of an apartment where narcotics, weapons, and other evidence of ongoing narcotics operation were found). 42 The combination of this evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the government, supported submitting the conspiracy charge to the jury. See United States v. Nusraty, 867 F.2d 759, 764 (2d Cir.1989) (pattern of acts ... reflecting the defendant's participation in a criminal scheme could support submissibility). Although, as Ross argues, a reasonable juror may have reached a contrary conclusion, such matters are appropriately argued to the jury and are not grounds for reversal on appeal. Benitez, 920 F.2d at 1089-90. Accordingly, we affirm Ross's conspiracy conviction.