Opinion ID: 492411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standards for sanctions

Text: A. Standards for District Judges 23 The district judge recited four grounds in sanctioning plaintiff and her attorneys: (1) inherent power; (2) 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927; (3) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11; and (4) 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k). An elaborate discussion of the standard for each of these grounds is not necessary. A good discussion of the first three grounds appears in Oliveri v. Thompson, 5 803 F.2d 1265, 1271-75 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom. County of Suffolk v. Graseck, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1373, 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987). See generally Johnson & Cassady, Frivolous Lawsuits and Defensive Responses to Them--What Relief is Available?, 36 Ala.L.Rev. 927 (1985); Comment, Courts Are No Place for Fun and Frivolity: A Warning to Vexatious Litigants and Over-Zealous Attorneys, 20 Willamette L.Rev. 441 (1984). 24 As the Oliveri court noted, the different grounds for awarding sanctions and shifting attorneys' fees are distinct and require a close and careful analysis. Although the district judge mentioned the various grounds, it is just not clear which of the various grounds was the basis of the sanction against Rathbun and Ruben. We therefor consider each of the grounds advanced by the district judge and briefly set forth the differences between them. 25 1. Bad Faith 26 A district judge has inherent equitable power to award attorneys' fees for bad faith or frivolous conduct of a case. See, e.g., Roadway Express, supra, 447 U.S. at 765-67, 100 S.Ct. at 2463-65 (citing Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir.1977)). This power extends to parties as well as attorneys. Oliveri, supra, 803 F.2d at 1272; Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1229 (6th Cir.1986). We have discussed the bad faith rule at length in Shimman v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226, 1228-30 & nn. 5, 6 (6th Cir.1984) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215, 105 S.Ct. 1191, 84 L.Ed.2d 337 (1985). 27 There are only two aspects of the bad faith rule implicated by the district judge's opinion imposing sanctions here--(1) bad faith occurring during the course of the litigation; [and] (2) bad faith in bringing [the] action or causing [the] action to be brought.... Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1230. The district judge did not clearly delineate which of these two grounds supported the sanctions against Rathbun and Ruben, respectively. As we note below, however, the only plausible ground for a bad faith finding under the circumstances of this case must be found in the conduct of the litigation and not in bringing it. 2. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927 28 Section 1927 of Title 28 provides for an award of attorneys' fees where an attorney multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.... As explained in the legislative history of the 1980 amendment to section 1927, the section is designed as a sanction against dilatory litigation practices and is intended to require an attorney to satisfy personally the excess costs attributable to his misconduct. See H.R.Rep. No. 1234, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2716, 2781, 2782. See generally Annotation, What Conduct Constitutes Multiplying Proceedings Unreasonably and Vexatiously so as to Warrant Imposition of Liability on Counsel Under 28 USCS Sec. 1927 for Excess Costs, Expenses, and Attorney Fees, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 36 (1987). 29 In United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346 (6th Cir.1976), we initially defined unreasonably and vexatiously to mean an intentional departure from proper conduct, or, at a minimum, ... a reckless disregard of the duty owed by counsel to the court, Id. at 349. We stated in Ross that unintended, inadvertent, and negligent acts will not support an award under section 1927, id. at 349-50, even if significant costs are incurred by the court and opposing parties as a result thereof. As explained in Colucci v. New York Times Co., 533 F.Supp. 1011, 1013-14 (S.D.N.Y.1982), care must be taken in assessing attorneys' fees under section 1927 lest attorneys be deterred from their duty to represent [a] client zealously.... Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-1 (1980). 30 More recently, we have noted a relaxed standard applicable to section 1927 determinations. In In Re: Jaques, 761 F.2d 302 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1259, 89 L.Ed.2d 570 (1986), the majority opinion suggested that intent is no longer relevant to such determinations, id. at 306, although a majority of the panel could not agree on this rule. However, a similar concept was explicated in Jones, supra, as follows: 31 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927 authorizes a court to assess fees against an attorney for unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of litigation despite the absence of any conscious impropriety. An attorney's ethical obligation of zealous advocacy on behalf of his or her client does not amount to carte blanche to burden the federal courts by pursuing claims that are frivolous on the merits, or by pursuing nonfrivolous claims through the use of multiplicative litigation tactics that are harassing, dilatory, or otherwise unreasonable and vexatious. Accordingly, at least when an attorney knows or reasonably should know that a claim pursued is frivolous, or that his or her litigation tactics will needlessly obstruct the litigation of nonfrivolous claims, a trial court does not err by assessing fees attributable to such actions against the atttorney. 32 789 F.2d at 1230 (emphasis added). Jones makes clear that the standard for section 1927 determinations in this circuit is an objective one, entirely different from determinations under the bad faith rule. See Haynie v. Ross Gear Div. of TRW, Inc., 799 F.2d 237, 243 (6th Cir.1986), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2475, 96 L.Ed.2d 368 (1987). 33 Nevertheless, we do not read these subsequent cases as overruling the thrust of Ross, to wit, that simple inadvertence or negligence that frustrates the trial judge will not support a sanction under section 1927. There must be some conduct on the part of the subject attorney that trial judges, applying the collective wisdom of their experience on the bench, could agree falls short of the obligations owed by a member of the bar to the court and which, as a result, causes additional expense to the opposing party. While this ideal may be difficult to implement, judges faced with motions under section 1927 should be mindful that their individual perturbations will not alone justify a sanction. 34 As we discuss below, section 1927 may support a sanction against Ruben for discrete acts of misconduct. 3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 35 Rule 11 was the basis of the unappealed sanction against Weiner and was again mentioned by the district judge in sanctioning Ruben. Rule 11, however, does not support the sanctions imposed in this case. Rule 11 is concerned with the signing of frivolous pleadings and other papers. Oliveri, supra, 803 F.2d at 1274. Because Ruben did not sign any of the pleadings or papers filed in the district court, Rule 11 simply cannot support the sanction against him. Although the language of Rule 11 also allows a sanction against a party, the district judge did not rely upon it in assessing the sanction against Rathbun. 4. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) 36 In Christiansburg, supra, the Supreme Court described the test for awarding attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case. The Supreme Court stated: In sum, a district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith. 434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700. As will be described, we conclude that this standard does not support an award of attorneys' fees against Rathbun. B. Standard of Review 37 The standard for our review is whether the district judge abused his discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. E.g., Jones, supra, 789 F.2d at 1227, 1233; Smith v. Smythe-Cramer Co., 754 F.2d 180, 185 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3530, 87 L.Ed.2d 654 (1985); Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 986 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051, 105 S.Ct. 1749, 84 L.Ed.2d 814 (1985). We must review the record to determine whether it will support the district judge's factual findings. See Jones, 789 F.2d at 1230-31; Smith, 754 F.2d at 185; Tarter, 742 F.2d at 986. 38 Rathbun accepts the abuse of discretion standard. On the other hand, Ruben conclusorily argues for a de novo review of the district judge's conclusion, relying on Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir.1986). Zaldivar was a Rule 11 case, which, as we have noted, does not apply to Ruben. Further, the Zaldivar court itself noted in a subsequent case that the standard for review of sanctions premised on bad faith and frivolousness is abuse of discretion. Mitchell v. Office of Los Angeles County Sup't of Schools, 805 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir.1986) (citing Jones v. Giles, 741 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir.1984)).