Opinion ID: 1735845
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The first assignment of error reads:

Text: The court erred in permitting complainant to introduce any evidence in the trial of this cause which tended to show possession in complainant of any of the land described in the bill of complaint, i. e., any land north of the northern boundary line of the SE¼ of the SW¼ and the SW¼ of the SE¼ of section 5, Township 20, range 5, Hale County, Alabama. The reason for this assignment of error is that complainant placed in evidence as a source of his title a deed given to him by his mother, brothers and wives and sisters in 1943, which described the land as follows: Seventy-eight acres of land known as the Malone Place, and being the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 5, in Township 20, Range 5 East, less 2 acres off the East side thereof; and also the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 5, Township 20, Range 5 East, and being the identical land conveyed to the said Mamie M. Burton by Richard Taylor and wife Pearl Taylor by deed dated May 13th, 1935, and recorded in the Probate Office of Hale County, Alabama in Book All page 332. Complainant introduced in all five deeds to show his and his predecessor's title, back to 1902. Each deed has the identical description and according to appellant's contention each deed contains two fatal words. The words are and being. In other words, the grantors in each case not only described the land as the Malone Place but then described it with particularity and by government numbers. It is insisted that a general description such as The Malone Place cannot override a particular description where a conveyance described the premises by clear and definite metes and bounds. It is argued that since the government numbers are specific, the lands described by the government numbers are readily ascertained and the government numbers must prevail. Pretermitting the contention by appellee that Assignment One is not in compliance with Supreme Court Rule I, Code 1940, Tit. 7 Appendix, we have reached the conclusion that the court was not in error in permitting the complainant to introduce the evidence complained of in Assignment One. In the case of Spires v. Nix, 256 Ala. 642, 57 So.2d 89, 92, this court reviewed the Alabama decisions with reference to conflicts between general and particular descriptions. This court in that case said: (5). It is true that sometimes a general description will yield to a particular one but, when so, the particular description must itself be accurate and precise and be of such character as that it was evidently intended to take precedence over the general description. That theory is emphasized in the case of Guilmartin v. Wood, 76 Ala. 204. In the case of Sumner v. Hill, 157 Ala. 230, 47 So. 565, the description under consideration was of the Hancock Place, followed by a more particular description by government numbers. The question in that case was whether the general description `The Hancock Place' or the government numbers which followed should prevail. Since the government numbers did not embrace all of the Hancock Place, it was held that the term `Hancock Place' is a sufficiently definite description without the aid of a more particular one by government numbers, and the Court declared the principle to be applicable that where a deed of conveyance contains a general description which is definite and certain in itself and followed by a particular description, the latter will not limit or restrict the grant which is clear and unambiguous in the general description. To the same effect is Pendry [Pendrey] v. Godwin, 188 Ala. 565, 66 So. 43. The description there under consideration in the deed was of the place known as the `Jess Myers Place, described as follows' followed by government numbers. It was there observed that it was the manifest purpose of the grantor to convey to the grantee the Jess Myers Place, and that he did in effect convey the legal title to all that was known as the Jess Myers Place, and the fact that he described it by government numbers did not conclusively establish the description of the land by government numbers. Under those circumstances it was held, as it had been on a previous appeal, that the government numbers would be regarded as a misdescription. The Court thereby gave effect, without so expressing it, to the principle declared in Greenleaf on Evidence, represented by the Latin term `Falsa demonstratio non nocet.' (1 Greenleaf on Evidence (16th Ed.) 301). This principle is illustrated in 25 Corpus Juris 435, 35 C.J.S. Fallido-Falsario, p. 494. The evidence tends to show that the land in question had been known as the Malone Place for many years. The words of the description are substantially identical to those in the case of Sumner v. Hill, 157 Ala. 230, 47 So. 565. As in the Hill case, the government numbers did not embrace all the Malone Place. There are no words in the description which would limit or restrict the grant to less than all of the Malone Place. The description of the Malone Place is a sufficiently definite description without the aid of a more particular one by government numbers and was sufficient to convey to appellee the land known as the Malone Place, including the land involved in this suit. Assignment No. 1 is without merit.