Opinion ID: 4503615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requiring new evidence of conduct by the

Text: respondent to justify extending a protection order puts the petitioner at risk of further harm. The sole issue under consideration is whether the trial court’s decision to extend an order for protection for two years was contrary to law. Under our deferential standard of review, I would hold that it was not. See A.G. v. P.G., 974 N.E.2d 598, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“When considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a decision to issue or modify a protective order, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses.”). In her initial petition for a protection order, D.W. alleged that S.H., a former military special operator and owner of numerous firearms, grabbed her neck, forced her from her car, slammed her face into the car door, prevented her from escaping by grabbing her shoulders, and slammed her down onto the concrete floor. By consenting to the two-year protection order, S.H. agreed that he perpetrated “domestic or family violence” against D.W., that he was a “credible threat” to her safety, and that he should be enjoined from directly or indirectly contacting D.W. for the presumptive two-year period contemplated in the Act.1 See Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(f) (2014). Two years later, D.W. petitioned the trial court for an extension of the original protection order. This extension required evidence of “continuing harm or the threat of continuing harm that necessitated the issuance of the protective order in the first instance.” J.K. v. T.C., 25 N.E.3d 179, 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting A.N. v. K.G., 10 N.E.3d 1270, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). The trial court judge—who presided over the original order and the couple’s divorce proceedings—had only to decide whether S.H. represented a “credible threat to the safety” of D.W. See id. (quoting I.C. § 34-26-5-9(f)). Still, the Court today requires something more. “Evidence that the respondent violated a protective order may alone justify extending the order’s duration,” the majority tentatively concedes. Ante, at 10 (emphasis added). But without evidence of new conduct by the respondent, whether in the form of a “follow-up act” or express threat, the Court ultimately concludes that “the Act does not permit the reissuance, renewal, or extension of the protective order.” Ibid. at 8. Is it really necessary for our trial courts, in issuing an extension, to wait for the respondent to commit an act of violence or to otherwise violate the original order of protection? I think not. And to conclude otherwise, in my opinion, defeats the Act’s purpose of promoting the “protection and safety of all victims of domestic or family violence” and preventing that violence 1 Because S.H. was D.W.’s spouse at the time the original order for protection was entered, and her former spouse at the time it was extended, state and federal law would have precluded S.H. from owning or possessing firearms. See I.C. § 34-26-5-3(c) (2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)). In accordance with these statutes, I would remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to enter an order disqualifying S.H. from owning or possessing firearms for the duration of the protection order. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PO-118 | January 31, 2020 Page 2 of 5 in the future. See I.C. § 34-26-5-1. Indeed, under the heightened evidentiary standard imposed by the Court today, it may be too late for many victims to petition for an extension. After all, the “risks of recidivism and harm are high in the context of domestic and family violence.” Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence § 306, cmt. (Nat’l Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges 1994).2 And to the extent the majority finds “no other reasonable grounds to believe” that S.H. intends to harm D.W., ante, at 8, that conclusion departs from our deferential standard of review and deprives the trial court of deciding whether there’s a “credible threat to the safety” of the petitioner. See J.K., 25 N.E.3d at 181. I agree with the majority that the mere “existence of a prior order does not dictate the outcome of a later dispute between the same parties.” See ante, at 8. Indeed, as our Court of Appeals has instructed, an “extension must be based upon evidence that a protective order currently is ‘necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the threat of violence’ because of a continuing threat of harm.” J.K., 25 N.E.3d at 182 (quoting I.C. § 34-26-5-9(f)). But a petitioner seeking to extend an order for protection need not present evidence of new conduct on the part of the respondent—that is, conduct occurring after entry of the original order. In my opinion, the petitioner’s sworn testimony, so long as the trial court finds it credible, should suffice in meeting this evidentiary requirement. And it’s irrelevant whether the prior domestic-violence incident is “remote in time.” See ante, at 8. Indeed, a “court may not deny a petitioner relief . . . solely because of a lapse of time between an act of domestic or family violence and the filing of a petition” I.C. § 34-26-5-13 (emphasis added). Here, while S.H. may have only perpetrated a “single episode of physical violence” against D.W., see ante, at 8, that single episode proved 2The Act “is based largely on the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence,” among other laws. Protection Order Committee of the Judicial Conference of Indiana, Protection Order Deskbook ch. 1, at 1 (rev. ed. 2015), available at https://www.in.gov/judiciary/iocs/files/centerbb-po-deskbook.pdf. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PO-118 | January 31, 2020 Page 3 of 5 extremely violent. And given the severity of that attack, coupled with her testimony that she remained fearful for her and her family’s lives, D.W.’s continued subjective fear was objectively reasonable in justifying an extension of the protection order. Though the evidence presented by D.W. may have been minimal, the trial court was still in the best position to weigh the parties’ evidence and to judge the credibility of the witnesses.