Opinion ID: 1115434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Disclosure Provisions

Text: Next, WWV challenges the trial court's determination that the ownership disclosure provisions of TMC 5.52.060(b) are constitutional. Relying primarily on Acorn, WWV argues the or other interest language in the ordinance is chilling because it arguably requires disclosure of too much information. The Seattle ordinance at issue in Acorn called for disclosure of the names of all shareholders. The Ninth Circuit held: Because officers and directors, not shareholders, are legally responsible for the management of a corporation's business, ... there is no logical connection between the City's legitimate interest in compliance with the panoram ordinance and the rule requiring disclosure of the names of shareholders. Acorn, 887 F.2d at 226. [8-10] Tukwila's other interest requirement could be construed to include persons with a relatively minor interest in the business, such as shareholders, and if so construed the ordinance would be unconstitutional. However, [w]herever possible, it is the duty of this court to construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality. State v. Browet, Inc., 103 Wn.2d 215, 219, 691 P.2d 571 (1984). The same rules of statutory construction apply to municipal ordinances as to state statutes. Spokane v. Fischer, 110 Wn.2d 541, 542, 754 P.2d 1241 (1988). Therefore, we construe the ownership disclosure provisions of TMC 5.52.060(b) as requiring disclosure of all persons who hold an interest similar to that of an owner or lease-holder  an other significant interest, with significance being based on responsibility for management of the business, as indicated in Acorn. This construction also satisfies WWV's vagueness concerns by eliminating any inappropriate discretion that might have been vested in the licensing official. As so construed, the ordinance meets federal constitutional standards.