Opinion ID: 177231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Redirect of Hitchcockdrug trial

Text: Kinsella complains about the prosecutor's prompting Hitchcock to say on redirect that Judge Woodcock had sentenced him in the same Bangor courtroomtestimony Kinsella says conveyed to the drug-trial jury that Judge Woodcock had already accepted Hitchcock's allegations as gospel. To back up his claim, Kinsella contends that Judge Woodcock's `once burned, twice shy' commentthat Hitchcock would not perjure himself before the judge who had sentenced himconfirmed that the jury could infer that Hitchcock told the truth because the Judge had already heard his story and would spot any lies. We see no error here, plain or otherwise. At every turn, Kinsella's counsel urged the drug-trial jury to conclude that Hitchcock was a liar who did the government's bidding under the plea agreement to skirt a 20-year sentence. To counteract this implication, the prosecutor used redirect to correct any impression that the government had decided Hitchcock's sentence and rightly so. Contrary to Kinsella's contention, we are not 100% certain that the prosecutor's questionDo you remember who sentenced you?sought to elicit the Judge's name rather than the fact that a judge, not the government, had selected Hitchcock's sentence. Regardless, the prosecutor never so much as hinted that Judge Woodcock had already heard Hitchcock's narrative or had found him credible, and the Judge's later instruction that Hitchcock may have lied to save himself undermines Kinsella's claim. Also, the prosecutor did not follow up on the defense's recross of Hitchcock which again intimated that Hitchcock's light sentence flowed from his cooperation agreementand did not touch on this supposedly improper issue during closing arguments. Finally, we see no problem with Judge Woodcock's `once burned, twice shy' statement: the plea agreement admitted into evidencereserved the prosecutor's right to charge Hitchcock with perjury if he testified falsely, and one can properly conclude that a witness who has already agreed to testify against others would likely not jeopardize the potential benefits of providing such testimonyassuming it is truthfulby testifying untruthfully.. . . United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 229 (2d Cir.2005). Viewed in this light, we believe the prosecutor did not overstep his bounds here. See United States v. Sanchez, 251 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir.2001) (not error for the prosecutor to stress during redirect-examination and closing argument that the trial judge, Judge Young, not the government, would ultimately determine the sentence of each cooperating witness, holding that the prosecutor's actions were invited by defense counsel's characterization of the sentencing process and did not stray beyond the limits of fair advocacy). Consequently, there is no error at all, let alone plain error. [1]