Opinion ID: 3063798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Leave to Designate Medical Expert

Text: Plaintiff Wingster argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for leave to designate a medical expert.5 Wingster claims she was surprised by Dr. Copeland’s affidavit, noting that Dr. Copeland was not listed as an expert in the Defendants’ initial disclosures.6 Wingster asserts that she had no notice that causation was an issue and that she would have designated her own medical expert had Defendants given her notice they would rely on Dr. Copeland. When a summary judgment motion is filed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) allows a district court, before deciding that pending motion, to grant a continuance for additional discovery when the party opposing the motion “shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its 5 We review discovery orders for abuse of discretion. Brooks v. United States, 837 F.2d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 1988). 6 Wingster does not appear to have objected to any part of Dr. Copeland’s affidavit in the district court. 9 opposition.”7 In construing Rule 56(f), this Court has stated that “[b]ecause the burden on a party resisting summary judgment is not a heavy one, one must conclusively justify his entitlement to the shelter of rule 56(f) by presenting specific facts explaining the inability to make a substantive response as required by rule 56(e) and by specifically demonstrating how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1980) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted).8 The party opposing the motion, here Wingster, may not simply rely on vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed facts, “particularly where . . . ample time and opportunities for discovery have already lapsed.” Id. The decision whether to grant a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. Here, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying Wingster’s request for more time to designate a medical expert and to depose Dr. 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) provides: If a party opposing [a summary judgment] motion shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) deny the motion; (2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or (3) issue any other just order. 8 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 10 Copeland. Wingster did not meet her burden to “conclusively justify [her] entitlement to the shelter of Rule 56(f).” Id. At least by the time discovery began in December 2006, Wingster was fully aware that Dr. Copeland was her son’s treating physician at Phoebe Putney Hospital. Wingster’s own initial disclosures indicated that medical personnel at Phoebe Putney Hospital may be called as witnesses. Similarly, Wingster’s own responses to Defendant Head’s interrogatories identified the medical personnel at Phoebe Putney Hospital as possible expert witnesses and repeatedly named Dr. Copeland as an individual likely to have information as to certain issues in the case, including Wingster’s assertion that excessive force proximately caused Haynes’s death. From the start, it was also clear that the cause of Haynes’s aneurysm was a medical causation issue beyond the scope of a layperson’s knowledge that required competent medical testimony. Yet, Wingster did not depose Dr. Copeland and never identified any other medical expert to establish causation. Indeed, as Haynes’s treating physician, Dr. Copeland was a fact witness to the cause of Haynes’s death, as opposed to strictly Defendants’ own, outside expert. And, even if Defendants failed to timely disclose Dr. Copeland as Defendants’ own expert, Wingster has not demonstrated adequately her inability, by the time Defendants’ summary judgment motion was filed, to rebut Defendants’ contention that causation did not exist. 11 Alternatively, even assuming Wingster was somehow wholly unaware that she needed medical testimony in this case, Dr. Copeland’s affidavit, served on Wingster on December 14, 2007, well after fact discovery closed on October 20, 2007, indisputably put her on notice that she needed medical testimony as to causation. After being granted three extensions of time to respond, only on February 14, 2008, did Wingster ask for leave to designate a medical expert witness. And, in her motion for leave, Wingster failed to (1) explain why she still had not identified a medical expert between December 14, 2007, and February 14, 2008, (2) describe how she intended to rebut Dr. Copeland’s affidavit, or (3) explain her inability to make a substantive response in her motion for leave. Instead, on February 14, Wingster requested 30 additional days to designate an expert. In actuality, Wingster had until September 30, 2008, when the district court denied her motion for leave to designate a medical expert, to give the district court some reason to believe she could rebut Dr. Copeland’s medical testimony. However, just like the time from December 2007 to February 2008, the time from February to September 2008 passed and the district court heard nothing from Wingster. For the foregoing reasons, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to designate a medical expert.