Opinion ID: 2976177
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Marcusse

Text: The evidence adduced at trial was more than sufficient to sustain the jury’s conviction of Marcusse on all counts. The evidence contained in the voluminous trial record was aptly recounted by the district court in its opinion denying Marcusse’s motion for judgment of acquittal. The following is a highly compressed summary. The evidence introduced during the nearly five weeks of trial in this case overwhelmingly showed that Marcusse created, managed, and directed the activities of Access with the intent to defraud investors out of their money. Marcusse made false representations to investors, both directly and through numerous written publications, regarding the success, safety, and legality of the Access financial investments and the church chapter accounts that investors were told to establish for the receipt of their “profits.” The evidence showed that neither Marcusse nor any of the other defendants ever actually invested the victims’ money. Rather, in keeping with a classic Ponzi 17 scheme, investors were paid “returns” on their principal from money invested by subsequent victims, and monies not so paid were diverted by defendants for their own personal use. See In re Mark Benskin & Co., Inc., Nos. 94-5421, 94-5422, 1995 WL 381741, at  (6th Cir. June 26, 1995) (intent to defraud may be reasonably inferred from nature of Ponzi scheme itself) (citing Conroy v. Shott, 363 F.2d 90, 92 (6th Cir. 1966)). Marcusse’s claim of a good faith belief in the promises made to investors is belied by the evidence. Despite representations that investors’ principal was “guaranteed,” she knew that those monies were not kept in safe accounts and were not invested in legitimate markets. Indeed, the evidence showed that the markets described in Access’s literature did not even exist. When the government’s investigation began, Marcusse threatened investors against cooperating with the authorities and, ironically, accused the government of a conspiracy to take investors’ money. She further invoked the “nondisclosure” agreements which investors were required to sign before learning details of the “investments.” Indeed, the jury could reasonably have inferred that those agreements were a prophylactic attempt by defendants to prevent their fraudulent scheme from coming to the attention of accountants or lawyers who might otherwise have been consulted by would-be investors, and who no doubt would have recognized the true nature of the operation. 18 Further, faced with a grand jury subpoena for Access’s records, Marcusse fled with the records, which were never found. See United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 403 (6th Cir. 2005) (evidence that defendant ordered destruction of files after learning of federal investigation supports finding of knowledge of and participation in conspiracy to defraud). The same evidence supports the finding that Marcusse diverted for her own purposes funds which she knew to be proceeds from this unlawful scheme. Incredibly, in a brief before this court, she states: “The fact that defendants used some of the money invested to reward themselves is also irrelevant to the various charges of mail fraud and money laundering.” Such an affront is consistent with Marcusse’s asserted view that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over her, that the tax laws are invalid, and that she can conduct herself in any manner she pleases. The jury no doubt perceived this attitude from Marcusse’s trial testimony and concluded that, contrary to her assertions of good faith, Marcusse had merely “thumbed her nose” at the law.