Opinion ID: 1303639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: speculation of motive

Text: Finally, McCullough was asked by the Solicitor what she was thinking when she saw Williams pointing a gun at the vehicle. She responded, He [Victim] had to either have broken Kenno's [Williams'] rocks or gave him bad, fake rocks. Counsel's objection was overruled. McCullough then stated the Victim had done things like that before and that she'd never known Williams to do anything like that. Williams objected on grounds this was impermissible hearsay and that McCullough was a fact witness. Williams contends this was improper speculation concerning his intent. [3] We disagree. A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Rule 602, SCRE. The opinion or inference of a lay witness is admissible if it is a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, b) helpful to the determination of a fact in issue, and c) does not require special knowledge. Rule 701, SCRE. See also 31 A Am.Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 30; 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1050. Conclusions or opinions of laymen should be rejected only when they are superfluous in the sense that they will be of no value to the jury. State v. McClinton, 265 S.C. 171, 217 S.E.2d 584 (1975). The terms fact and opinion denote merely a difference of degree of concreteness of description. McCormick on Evidence, § 12 (3rd Ed.1984). Some statements are not mere opinions but are impressions drawn from collected, observed facts. Lafon v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 411, 438 S.E.2d 279 (1993). A natural inference based on stated facts is not opinion evidence. State v. Revere, 572 So.2d 117 (La.App.1990). Where the distinction between fact and opinion is blurred, it is often best to leave the matter to the discretion of the trial judge. See e.g. 31 A Am. Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 9. Here, McCullough's belief that Victim may have stolen Williams' crack was reasonably based upon her observation of the transaction which had just occurred, and the fact that she had previously known Victim to do such things. Moreover, McCullough also knew that Williams had never done anything like this before. Accordingly, her opinion was rationally based upon the events which had transpired and was helpful to the jury's determination as to why Williams chased and shot at them. We find no abuse of discretion in admission of this testimony. In any event, even if the testimony was speculative, Williams suffered no prejudice. As noted above, Williams' earlier sale of cocaine was properly admitted as part of the res gestae and McCullough positively identified Williams as the man who chased them and shot Victim. The record contains no evidence disputing McCullough's version of events. [4] Accordingly, McCullough's belief Victim may have stolen two rocks of cocaine was in no way prejudicial to Williams. State v. Motley, 251 S.C. 568, 164 S.E.2d 569 (1968) (burden is on defendant to show error in admission of evidence is prejudicial). The judgment below is AFFIRMED. FINNEY, C.J., and TOAL, MOORE and BURNETT, JJ., concur.