Opinion ID: 1171321
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: conditions and requirements for the approval of transfers of preferences

Text: 5. Failure to comply with the following requirements, without prior approval of the Forest Supervisor, may result in cancellation of the preference:    (d) Base property purchased in connection with transfer of preference must be the land actually used by the vendor as base property and must be used as base property by the purchaser one season immediately following the purchase. Casey's own acts made transfer of the grazing permit impossible. Thus, he cannot shift the blame onto the shoulders of others and disclaim responsibility for failure of the transfer. Appellants further contend that there is insufficient evidence to support the award of $120,000 damages. The gist of their argument is that evidence on damages is speculative and will not support any award. The evidence on damages in this case is primarily that of John Dooling, one of the landowners, and Joe Helle, an expert witness. The owner of property can testify in a reasonable way as to its value for the use to which he is putting it. Alexander v. State Highway Comm., 147 Mont. 367, 412 P.2d 414; State Highway Comm. v. Biastoch Meats, Inc., 145 Mont. 261, 400 P.2d 274; Alexander v. State Highway Comm., 142 Mont. 93, 381 P.2d 780. This is particularly true where he is shown to have some peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct judgment as to the value of the property in question beyond what is presumed to be possessed by men generally. State v. Peterson, 134 Mont. 52, 328 P.2d 617. Suffice it to say that John Dooling qualified under either test, his testimony was reasonable, and it supported an award in excess of the $120,000 damage award by the jury. Joe Helle was eminently qualified as an expert appraiser of the land in question. He held a college degree in range management with a subsequent master's degree. He had been associated with ranches most of his life and had worked for the Forest Service for six years. He had been a range conservationist in the Beaverhead National Forest and an assistant ranger in the Big Hole. He had extensive experience in land and range classification. He was a private range consultant; had done appraisal work; and has served as a commissioner in land condemnation cases. Helle examined the land, the county classification records, determined the market value of the entire acreage by classification, examined 60 sales in the area including 20 sales in the Big Hole on which he based his valuation. He valued the hay land at $486,750, the pasture land at $238,160, the timberland at $14,400, and the state lease at $11,200, for a total of $750,510. To this he added an annual loss because of having to use hayland as pasture, due to lack of the grazing permit, capitalized this loss at 5%, and came up with a figure of $200,000. He further established a value on the land and the grazing permit at the time of contracting of $950,000 and the value of the land without the permit at $750,000. He also used a third approach to estimating damages. His overall testimony supported an award of approximately $200,000, considerably in excess of the $120,000 awarded by the jury. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was substantial credible evidence supporting both the breach of the contract and the $120,000 awarded as damages. The next issue assigned for review concerns the giving or refusal of 9 jury instructions, 5 of which were given over objection of appellants and 4 of which were instructions offered by appellants and refused by the court. We have examined the instructions given by the court over objection of appellants and find them to correctly state the law under plaintiffs' theory of the case as established by their evidence. As to the 4 instructions prepared by appellants and refused by the court, all were either covered by other instructions given or were incorrect or misleading statements of the law. Appellants' fourth issue for review is whether an attorney's fees should have been allowed on the $50,000 promissory note. Appellants contend that the note was past due and unpaid, that it specifically provided for a reasonable attorney's fee for collection, and that the court should have fixed such fee and allowed it as part of the setoff against the damages awarded to plaintiffs. In the instant case the buyers and Dorothea Dooling admitted liability on the note, claimed that a greater amount was owing them as damages by the payees on the note, and sought to credit the amounts owned by them on the note against the damages they suffered. The jury verdict did just that. Under such circumstances, the trial court was correct in refusing any award of an attorney's fee on the note. Gilliland v. Rodriquez, 77 Ariz. 163, 268 P.2d 334; Oklahoma State Union of F.E. & C. Union of America v. Keathley, (Okl. 1955), 291 P.2d 1031; Wagner & Chisholm v. Dunham, (Tex.Civ.App. 1923), 246 S.W. 1044; 41 A.L.R.2d 677. The following language of the Utah Supreme Court in Nalder v. Kellogg Sales Company, 6 Utah 2d 367, 314 P.2d 350, expresses our thoughts: As to the allowance of attorney fees, we hold the better rule to be that where the makers of a past-due note providing for attorney fees on the amount found due sue the payee for damages and recover a judgment for a sum greater than the amount awarded to the payee on a counterclaim in the action, that no attorney fees should be allowed on the counterclaim. We have examined all other arguments raised by appellants and find them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. JAMES T. HARRISON, C.J., and ADAIR, CASTLES and JOHN C. HARRISON, JJ., concur.