Opinion ID: 1651085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to Statute.

Text: We first consider Musser's various constitutional challenges to section 709C.1(1)( a ). Our review of these claims is de novo. State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Iowa 2005). We presume a statute is constitutional. Id. To overcome this presumption, a challenger must prove the unconstitutionality of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. This burden can be met only by refuting `every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be found constitutional.' Id. (citation omitted). A. First Amendment. The defendant claims section 709C.1 offends the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it compels speech. Specifically, he argues an HIV-positive person engaging in intimate contact with another person can avoid criminal liability only by telling the potential victim that the person is HIV positive and educating the potential victim about the possible transmission of the virus. An infected person who has sexual relations with another without conveying this information is punished, he contends. The legal principle upon which the defendant bases his argument is valid: the First Amendment safeguards not only the right to speak freely, but also the right to refrain from speaking at all. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1189, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 1641 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring). Moreover, the right to refrain from speaking encompasses not only thoughts and opinions; it applies equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 573, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 2347, 132 L.Ed.2d 487, 503 (1995). The State contends these principles are inapplicable here, however, because section 709C.1 does not compel speech. It points out the Iowa statute, unlike statutes from other states, does not expressly require an infected person to tell a potential victim that the person is HIV positive. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.5210 (2006) (making it a felony for an HIV-infected person to engage[ ] in sexual penetration with another person without having first informed the other person that he or she ... is HIV infected). The State asserts the victim could learn of the HIV status from any source. Even though section 709C.1 does not explicitly require disclosure by the defendant, we think the practical effect of the Iowa statute is the same as those statutes mandating disclosure. To avoid violating section 709C.1, a defendant must rely on the consent defense set out in section 709C.1(5). Realistically, the only way a defendant can be assured the victim knowingly consents to exposure is for the defendant to tell the victim of the defendant's HIV status. The unlikelihood of the victim obtaining this knowledge in any other way is underscored by the confidential nature of this medical information. See Iowa Code § 141A.9(1) (Any information, including reports and records, obtained, submitted, and maintained pursuant to this chapter [Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) ] is strictly confidential medical information.); see also id. § 622.10 (preventing medical professional from disclosing confidential communications). In other words, the only way a potential victim will know the defendant is HIV positive is if the defendant discloses this fact or otherwise waives the privilege protecting this fact from disclosure by his treatment providers. [4] For this reason, we conclude the statute compels speech. [5] Cf. People v. Jensen, 231 Mich.App. 439, 586 N.W.2d 748, 758 (1998) (concluding Michigan statute compelled speech). This conclusion brings us to the critical issue: Does the statute's impact constitute an unconstitutional infringement of the defendant's free speech rights? See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2332, 65 L.Ed.2d 319, 326 (1980) (stating not every limitation on speech violates the Constitution). In testing the constitutionality of section 709C.1 under the First Amendment, we choose the appropriate level of scrutiny based on the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement thereon. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 2677, 101 L.Ed.2d 669, 689 (1988). If the affected speech is commercial speech or if the regulation is content neutral, an intermediate level of scrutiny applies. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2459, 129 L.Ed.2d 497, 517 (1994) (stating regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, 65 L.Ed.2d 341, 351 (1980) (holding regulation of commercial speech is subject to an intermediate level of review). The nature of the speech at issue here is clearly noncommercial. Commercial speech is expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 561, 100 S.Ct. at 2349, 65 L.Ed.2d at 348. The interests at stake in the intimate relationship providing the context for the speech regulated by section 709C.1 are plainly not economic. In deciding whether the statute regulates speech on the basis of content, we find guidance in the following observations of the Supreme Court: [T]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys.. . . But while a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content based, it is not necessary to such a showing in all cases. Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content. As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based. By contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content neutral. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642-43, 114 S.Ct. at 2459, 129 L.Ed.2d at 517-18 (citations omitted). An example of a content-neutral regulation is one that addresses only the time, place, or manner of speech. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 447 U.S. at 536, 100 S.Ct. at 2332, 65 L.Ed.2d at 327. [T]he essence of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recognition that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, may frustrate legitimate governmental goals. Id.; accord Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2754, 105 L.Ed.2d 661, 675 (1989) (Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is `justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' (Citation omitted.)). Applying these principles, we conclude section 709C.1 regulates speech on the basis of content. The focus of section 709C.1 is not on the time, place, or manner of expression, but on the content of the communication. The statute requires transmission of specific informationthe infected person's HIV-positive status. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 795, 108 S.Ct. at 2677, 101 L.Ed.2d at 688 (Mandating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech. We therefore consider the Act as a content-based regulation of speech.). The content-based nature of the statute is no less so because the state's primary intent is to limit the spread of AIDS. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642-43, 114 S.Ct. at 2459, 129 L.Ed.2d at 518 (Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.). In addition, the fact that the public interest undoubtedly supports the required disclosure does not change the nature of the statute as compelling the communication of specific facts the speaker would prefer not to reveal. See Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1252 (6th Cir.1997) (As Turner Broadcasting makes clear, the real issue is whether the law is aimed at the communicative impact of speech.). Because section 709C.1 is a content-based regulation, it is subject to strict scrutiny. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 1886, 146 L.Ed.2d 865, 879 (2000) ([C]ontent-based speech restriction ... can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny.); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642, 114 S.Ct. at 2459, 129 L.Ed.2d at 517 (Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular message are subject to [strict] scrutiny.). If a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813, 120 S.Ct. at 1886, 146 L.Ed.2d at 879 (citation omitted). We believe section 709C.1 withstands strict scrutiny. The obvious purpose of this statute is the protection of public health by discouraging the transmission of the AIDS virus. As one court has explained, Considering the ease of transmitting AIDS and HIV through sexual penetration and the absence of any cure, the state's interest in protecting the public health, safety, and general welfare of its citizenry becomes extremely significant. Although the statute may significantly infringe defendant's individual interests in remaining silent, the state's interest to compel her to disclose that she is HIV infected before engaging in sexual penetration is undeniably overwhelming. Jensen, 586 N.W.2d at 759; accord State v. Gamberella, 633 So.2d 595, 604 (La.Ct. App.1993) (No one can seriously doubt that the state has a compelling interest in discouraging the spread of the HIV virus.). We think section 709C.1 promotes a compelling state interest, and the legislature narrowly tailored the statute to promote this compelling interest. See Gamberella, 633 So.2d at 604 (holding statute [f]orcing an infected person to inform all of his sexual partners so the partner can make an informed decision prior to engaging in sexual activity ... is narrowly drawn to further the state's compelling interest). The statute does not absolutely prohibit an infected person from having sexual relations with another. Moreover, section 709C.1 does not compel public disclosure of an infected person's HIV status; an infected person may privately inform a potential sexual partner of his or her condition. We cannot conceive of a less restrictive way in which the state could accomplish its goal, and the defendant has not suggested such an alternative. We hold, therefore, that section 709C.1 does not unconstitutionally infringe the defendant's First Amendment free-speech rights. B. Vagueness. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits vague statutes. State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Iowa 2006). A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 2498, 147 L.Ed.2d 597, 621 (2000). Musser claims the statutory prohibition of intimate contact between an infected person and another is unconstitutionally vague because the statutory definition of intimate contact lacks clarity. Section 709C.1(2)( b ) defines intimate contact as the intentional exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that could result in the transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus. The defendant argues an ordinary person would not know what type of contactmode of transmissionis prohibited. Consequently, he asserts, the statute is vague not only as applied to him, but facially as well. We discuss each claim separately. 1. Vague as applied. When considering a vague-as-applied challenge, we focus on whether the defendant's conduct clearly falls `within the proscription of the statute under any construction.' State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 465 (Iowa 1996) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306, 312 (Iowa 2000). In the case before us, Musser engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim. The question, therefore, is whether the definition of intimate contact gave the defendant fair warning that sexual intercourse fell within the statutory prohibition, in other words, involved the exposure of the victim to a bodily fluid that could transmit the virus. This question was answered in State v. Keene, 629 N.W.2d 360 (Iowa 2001). This court took judicial notice in Keene of the fact that sexual intercourse is one of the most common methods of passing the [human immunodeficiency] virus. 629 N.W.2d at 365. We concluded based on this common knowledge and related statutes [6] that any reasonably intelligent person is aware it is possible to transmit HIV during sexual intercourse, especially when it is unprotected. Id. This court held, therefore, that the statute was not vague as applied to the defendant in Keene, who had had unprotected sexual intercourse with the victim. Id. at 366. The same conclusion is warranted here. When the statute is read as a whole and considered in the light of common knowledge and related statutes, it clearly gives fair warning that the transfer of semen through sexual intercourse could transmit the virus and is, therefore, prohibited. Consequently, section 709C.1(1) is not vague as applied to Musser, who engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse with the victim. 2. Facial vagueness and overbreadth. [I]mprecise laws can be attacked on their face under two different doctrines. First, the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Second, even if an enactment does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, it may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1857, 144 L.Ed.2d 67, 77-78 (1999) (citation omitted). We conclude section 709C.1 passes constitutional muster under both doctrines. [7] a. Overbreadth. Musser argues section 709C.1 impermissibly chills the exercise of infected persons' freedom of association. He suggests the statute could be interpreted to prohibit an infected person from sweating on another while playing a game of basketball or from kissing another. Assuming such social contact is protected by the First Amendment, we disagree that the statute could be interpreted to apply to such interactions when they are not capable of transmitting HIV. The statute clearly defines the proscribed contact: contact that exposes another to bodily fluid from the infected person  in a manner that could result in the transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus.  See Iowa Code § 709C.1(2)( b ) (emphasis added). We have previously determined the state has a compelling interest in stopping the spread of HIV infections and AIDS, and the statute is clearly limited to contact that can spread these conditions. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3252-53, 82 L.Ed.2d 462, 474-75 (1984) (finding infringement of associational rights constitutional in light of compelling state interest). In view of the state's compelling interest, the proscribed contact is not sheltered by the First Amendment. We conclude, therefore, that the statute simply does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Morales, 527 U.S. at 52, 119 S.Ct. at 1857, 144 L.Ed.2d at 78. For that reason, section 709C.1 does not violate the overbreadth doctrine. b. Facial vagueness. The defendant claims the statute is facially vague because it does not define the modes of transmission that could result in transfer of the virus. We think the desired clarification is provided, however, by reference to common knowledge and related statutes. A statutory term provides fair warning if the meaning of the word `is ... fairly ascertainable by reference to similar statutes, prior judicial determinations, reference to the dictionary, or if the questioned words have a common and generally accepted meaning.' Hunter, 550 N.W.2d at 465 (citation omitted). In addition, a challenged statute should be viewed in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part. State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306, 314-15 (Iowa 2000). We proceed to do that now. Initially, we take judicial notice of the fact, as we also did in Keene, that the HIV may be transmitted through contact with an infected individual's blood, semen or vaginal fluid. 629 N.W.2d at 365. In addition, we note section 709C.1(1) prohibits not only intimate contact by an HIV-positive person, but also the transfer of semen or other potentially infectious bodily fluids for insemination, or other administration to another person. Further clarification of the modes of transmission encompassed in chapter 709C is found in Iowa Code chapter 141A, a related statute dealing with AIDS. See State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 436 (Iowa 2005) (concluding statute gave fair warning when meaning was ascertainable by reference to related statutory definition). Section 141A.1(13) defines infectious bodily fluids as bodily fluids capable of transmitting HIV infection as determined by the centers for disease control and prevention of the United States department of health and human services and adopted by rule of the department. The website of the Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention contains information detailing which bodily fluids transmit HIV, as well as an explanation of the ways in which HIV can be transmitted. See Divs. of HIV/AIDS Prevention, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Fact Sheet: HIV and Its Transmission, available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts/transmission.pdf (July 1999); Divs. of HIV/ AIDS Prevention, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Which Body Fluids Transmit HIV?, http:// www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/faq/faq37.htm (last updated Dec. 15, 2003). When common knowledge and related statutes are considered, section 709C.1 provides standards for the police and public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests. Morales, 527 U.S. at 52, 119 S.Ct. at 1857, 144 L.Ed.2d at 78. Therefore, the statute does not violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Gamberella, 633 So.2d at 603 (holding statute prohibiting sexual contact between infected person and another who has not given knowing and lawful consent was not facially vague).