Opinion ID: 874018
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I.R.C.P. 37(c).

Text: This Court reviews a trial court's response to a request for Rule 37 sanctions for a manifest abuse of discretion. Ashby v. W. Council, Lumber Prod'n & Indus. Workers, 117 Idaho 684, 686, 791 P.2d 434, 436 (1990). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) states: Expenses on Failure to Admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, the requesting party may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that the party might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit. The trial court here appears to have concluded that sanctions were inappropriate because the admissions sought were not of substantial importance. At the hearing on Boise Tire's motion to reconsider, the trial court stated that I certainly do think that there were some of the requests for admission that were denied that should have been admitted. These included the fact that Marisela was Nayeli's mother and that Jose and Marisela were common law spouses. [7] However, the court concluded that: I think some of these request for admission should have been admitted, but I do notbut I don't think that thisin this particular case that the admission or failure to admit necessitated any proof that was other than the proof that you would have had to have put on, had the admissions been made. Had it been admitted that she was the wife, say, of Jose Manuela Carrillo, the common-law wife, you would still have to put on evidence relating to some issues, and certainly as to whether she waslet me get specificthe mother of Nayeli Carrillo, well, yes, that should have been admitted, but you are still going to put on proof of that, . . . The court also stated that ... while maybe it should have been admitted that [Marisela] was Nayeli's mother, it absolutely doesn't change anything in the proof of the trial that that wasn't admitted, because you are still because the nature and quality of that relationship was something that would have to be addressed at trial in order to establish the damages. Since the trial court recognized the determination as discretionary, acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with I.R.C.P. 37(c)(2), and reached its determination by an exercise of reason, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Carrillos' request for fees under I.R.C.P. 37(c).