Opinion ID: 2631807
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Motion for New Penalty Phase Jury

Text: Defendant next argues the court improperly denied his motion to impanel a new jury to decide the penalty issue, under section 190.4, subdivision (c). He speculates that the prosecutorial misconduct and inflammatory photographs previously discussed may have caused the guilt phase jury to become biased against him, and that a new jury was needed to assure him a fair penalty trial. Defendant also observes that, following the guilt phase, the court relieved his first defense team (Attorneys Pohlson and Hall) of their appointment due to a conflict arising from an apparent plot by defendant to escape by forcing those attorneys to secure weapons for him and then killing them. New counsel (Attorneys Horan and Ospino) sought a new jury for the penalty phase asserting, among other grounds, the substantial delay in proceeding to the penalty phase, and new counsel's nonparticipation in voir dire of the existing jury. The court denied the motion without comment. Section 190.4, subdivision (c), provides the same jury shall try both the guilt and penalty phases unless for good cause shown the court discharges the jury and impanels a new one. In light of this legislative preference for a single jury, we have indicated that good cause to impanel a new jury must appear on the record as a demonstrable reality and show the jury's inability to perform its function. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1354, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; see People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 858, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152.) On appeal, we will overturn the court's ruling denying a new jury only if we find the court abused its discretion in doing so. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1354, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Although defendant urges us to review the record independently on this point, he cites no cases holding that such an independent review of this kind of discretionary ruling under section 190.4, subdivision (c), is either necessary or appropriate. We find no abuse of discretion. As we have seen (pts. 1 and 2, ante ), contrary to defendant's assumption, the guilt phase jury was neither tainted nor prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct, improper victim impact evidence, or inadmissible crime scene photographs. Moreover, trial counsel's desire to participate in jury voir dire was an insufficient ground for impaneling a new jury. (See People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 267-269, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897.) And the delay in commencing the penalty phase, by itself, would be an insufficient ground for impaneling a new jury, as mere delay would not necessarily impair the jury's ability to perform its function in determining the appropriate penalty for defendant. Nothing in the record suggests defendant was actually prejudiced by the delay.