Opinion ID: 2509294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Order Competency Hearing

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by declining to order a competency hearing pursuant to section 1368. When the accused presents substantial evidence of incompetence, due process requires that the trial court conduct a full competency hearing. [Citation.] `Evidence is substantial if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competence to stand trial.' ( People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131, 115 Cal. Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461, quoting People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 726, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729.) Absent substantial evidence of defendant's incompetence, the decision to order such a hearing [is] left to the court's discretion. ( People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 163, 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169.) On November 28, 1994, just before trial began, the trial court learned that Dr. Coburn, defendant's court-appointed psychiatrist, had written defense counsel expressing his doubt that defendant was competent to stand trial. According to the trial court, the letter indicated that defendant was fully aware of the charges against him but he has little understanding of the nature of the plea change and has significant impairment in his ability to rationally cooperate with counsel . . . . The court found that the letter was too vague to raise a doubt about defendant's competence. It asked Dr. Vicary, the defense psychiatric expert, and Dr. Coburn to interview defendant and assess his competence to stand trial. As part of their assessment, the court asked them to examine the November 21 Marsden proceeding transcript, calling it highly probative of whether or not the defendant understands the nature of the proceedings and can assist counsel. Defense counsel Sheahen stated that, although working with defendant had been extremely difficult and at times defendant lack[ed][a] . . . grasp of what [was] going on, he was surprised that Dr. Coburn felt there was a 1368 issue and was uncertain whether defendant's behavior amounted to incompetence. The court also observed that defendant had repeatedly assisted counsel. Shafi-Nia disagreed with Sheahen and the court, stating that he believed defendant was incompetent. After reviewing the transcript and interviewing defendant, both Coburn and Vicary opined that defendant was competent to stand trial. The trial court declined to conduct a competency hearing. Defendant contends that Dr. Coburn's somewhat equivocal statements about his competence and statements by defense counsel constituted substantial evidence of incompetence. They do not. While Coburn testified that defendant was fragile and disturbed, he also repeatedly acknowledged that defendant was not incompetent to stand trial. Moreover, defendant ignores the opinion of the other defense psychiatric expert, Dr. Vicary, who testified without reservation that defendant was competent. Nor did comments by defense counsel constitute substantial evidence of incompetence. First, defense counsel were not in agreement on the issue of defendant's competence. While Shafi-Nia claimed that defendant was incompetent, Sheahen, the more experienced criminal defense attorney, did not share this belief. Second, even if both counsel had agreed that defendant was incompetent, such opinion, standing alone, would not have been dispositive of the issue but only one factor for the trial court to consider in determining whether substantial evidence existed. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1164, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Balanced against the conflicting statements of counsel were the opinions of the experts that defendant was competent and the trial court's own observation that defendant had repeatedly assisted in his defense, including bringing and arguing his first Marsden motion. (See People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1282, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645 [a defendant's participation in his trial demonstrate[s] beyond any doubt that he was fully aware of the nature of the proceedings and able to assist counsel].) We conclude therefore that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a competency hearing. [10]