Opinion ID: 778749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scope of Costa Rica's Grant of Extradition

Text: 37 It is also well established that even if the extradition treaty explicitly lists as extraditable crimes the offenses with which a defendant is charged, prosecution on those charges is barred if the extradition request did not list those charges or if the extraditing state declined to grant extradition for those crimes. See Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. at 316-18, 27 S.Ct. 539; United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 159 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d at 944; Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d at 905. This principle is reflected both in the Treaty at issue here, see Extradition Treaty, art. IV, 43 Stat. 1621, 1625 (No person shall be tried for any crime or offense other than that for which he was surrendered.), and in the Costa Rican criminal court's decree granting the extradition request, see Extradition Decree (requiring an assurance from the United States that Campbell would not be tried for crimes different from the ones for which this extradition is granted). 38 Although our courts have authority to determine whether a prosecution in the United States for a given crime is within the scope of the extraditing country's extradition decree, see, e.g., United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d at 944 (United States court may determine whether certain offenses which the government seeks to prosecute fall outside the contemplated scope of the foreign sovereign's extradition decree); Fiocconi v. Attorney General, 462 F.2d 475, 480 (2d Cir.) (essential to determine, as best one can, whether the surrendering state would regard the prosecution at issue as a breach of its agreement to extradite the defendant in question), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059, 93 S.Ct. 552, 34 L.Ed.2d 511 (1972), Campbell's contention that his prosecution on § 924(c) charges went beyond the Costa Rican government's extradition grant is meritless. 39 The United States government's formal extradition request to the Costa Rican government attached a copy of the indictment, which included 11 counts alleging that Campbell violated § 924(c). The supporting affidavit explicitly addressed the § 924(c) counts, inter alia, stating that they charged Campbell with the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; namely, the various armed bank and post office robberies charged in the superseding indictment (AUSA's Affidavit ¶ 17), outlining what the government would be required to prove to establish guilt on those counts, explaining what the § 924(c) penalties were, and attaching copies of the applicable statutory and sentencing provisions. For example, the affidavit stated that 40 [i]n order to convict ROLAND LAVAR CAMPBELL of the offense charged in those counts, the United States must prove at trial that he knowingly and wilfully, during an [ sic ] in relation to a crime of violence (the various robberies charged in the superseding indictment), used and carried a firearm. The penalty for a violation of Section 924(c)(1) of Title 18 United States Code is a mandatory minimum term of five years imprisonment consecutive to the sentence imposed for the crime of violence for an individual[']s first conviction, and a mandatory minimum consecutive twenty years (20) imprisonment for each subsequent conviction for violating the statute. 41 (AUSA's Affidavit ¶ 17.) 42 Presented with this affidavit and copies of the indictment and the statutory provisions, the Costa Rican Criminal Court granted extradition, and its decision was affirmed on appeal. We thus reject Campbell's contention that the Costa Rican government did not knowingly consent to his extradition to face § 924(c) charges carrying cumulative penalties.