Opinion ID: 76252
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Regulations of Expressive Conduct

Text: 13 The Supreme Court has identified three categories of laws that regulate conduct with an expressive component. In order to determine what level of scrutiny is due Ordinance 1204, we must first decide into which category it fits. a) Content-neutral Regulations 14 First, there are laws of general application that serve purposes unrelated to the content of expression. These content-neutral laws prohibit an entire class of conduct, and do not define the regulated conduct with reference to any expressive content it may have. Such a law is entitled to a deferential, or intermediate, level of constitutional scrutiny. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). 15 A general prohibition of public nudity is a law of general application. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (plurality opinion). It prohibits an entire class of conduct, and does not define the regulated conduct with reference to any expressive component. Id. at 570-571, 111 S.Ct. 2456. Therefore, it is content-neutral on its face. Id. 16 Nor does the application of the statute to expressive conduct — nude dancing — render the statute content-based. Id. 7 So long as the purpose of the statute is unrelated to the suppression of the expressive conduct, the statute is content-neutral. Id. (The perceived end that [the statute] seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but public nudity); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) ([I]n determining content neutrality, ... [t]he government's purpose is the controlling consideration) (emphasis added). A general prohibition of public nudity, even as applied to nude dancing, therefore, is content-neutral and reviewed under intermediate level of scrutiny. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568, 111 S.Ct. 2456. 8 17 Recently, the Court reaffirmed that a ban on public nudity is a content-neutral law of general application due intermediate scrutiny. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289-290, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000). In Erie, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting public nudity as applied to nude dancing because the ordinance was a law of general application, prohibiting the entire class of nude conduct. Id. The Court rejected the charge that the ordinance was content-based, observing that it was a general prohibition on public nudity, which: 18 [b]y its terms, ... regulates conduct alone. It does not target nudity that contains an erotic message; rather, it bans all public nudity, regardless of whether that nudity is accompanied by expressive activity. Id. at 290, 120 S.Ct. 1382. 9 b) Content-based Regulations 19 On the other hand, a law that proscribes or limits conduct precisely because of its expressive component is content-based. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). These regulations draw strict scrutiny because they are aimed at the suppression of free expression. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403, 109 S.Ct. 2533. Under this test, such an ordinance is presumptively invalid, and, if it suppresses protected speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys, it violates the First Amendment, absent some compelling state interest in its enforcement. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746. A law that prohibits nude dancing because of disapproval of its expressive content is unconstitutional. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570-571, 111 S.Ct. 2456. c) Content-Based Regulations Treated as Content-Neutral 20 The Supreme Court has identified a third category of regulation of expressive conduct. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). These regulations define the regulated conduct by its expressive content, and, to this extent, they are content-based. Id. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 925. Their purpose, however, is not to ban the expressive conduct, but merely to establish restrictions on the time, place, and manner of its presentation. Id. at 46, 106 S.Ct. 925. Although content-based, such a regulation will be treated as if it were content-neutral if it serves a substantial government purpose that is unrelated to the suppression of the expressive conduct. Id. at 47-49, 106 S.Ct. 925. 21 In the context of adult entertainment, the Court held that this purpose can be located in combating the harmful secondary effects of that conduct on the surrounding community. Id. at 49, 106 S.Ct. 925. In Renton, the Court upheld an ordinance that targeted adult theaters. Id. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 925. The Court rejected the argument that such an ordinance is necessarily aimed at the content of the films shown there, holding that [t]he ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally `protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life,' not to suppress the expression of unpopular views. Id. at 48, 106 S.Ct. 925 (quoting unpublished district court's opinion in Renton ). Thus, although discriminatory, the ordinance was entitled to be treated as a content-neutral regulation because it was justified without reference to the content of the regulated conduct. Id. 22 Under Renton, such a content-based, but treated as content-neutral, regulation of expressive conduct is entitled to an intermediate level of scrutiny. Id. at 49, 106 S.Ct. 925. It survives this scrutiny so long as it is designed to serve a substantial government interest and leaves available ample alternative avenues of communication. Id. at 50, 106 S.Ct. 925. 23