Opinion ID: 4514949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: additional sustaining grounds

Text: Since the court of appeals held the introduction of LaRosa's reply testimony was reversible error, the majority declined to address a number of other issues Prather raised on appeal. Prather has presented five of those issues to this Court as additional sustaining grounds. 1. Prosecutorial Misconduct and Due Process Violation We find unpreserved Prather's argument that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct and violated his right to due process when it sandbagged the defense with LaRosa's rebuttal testimony. Prather never raised prosecutorial misconduct or due process concerns at trial. He had the opportunity to do so during the in camera hearing concerning the admissibility of LaRosa's testimony and at the time LaRosa testified at trial. The first time Prather raised these issues was during his post-trial motion for a new trial. See State v. Holmes, 320 S.C. 259, 266, 464 S.E.2d 334, 338 (1995) (providing new trial motions may not be used to raise evidentiary issues for the first time). 2. Confrontation Clause Violation We find unpreserved Prather's arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to introduce into evidence portions of Phillips' statements to law enforcement because they were inadmissible hearsay, they were unreliable, and they were irrelevant. Phillips did not testify, and during trial, Prather asserted only a Confrontation Clause violation. We will therefore address only that argument. See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) (internal citation omitted) (In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge. . . . A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.). As noted above, the word rapist—correctly spelled—was carved into Victim's low back. The State introduced two one-word cutouts from Phillips' sixpage handwritten statement to law enforcement. The cutouts showed he twice misspelled the word rapist as rapeist. Nothing else from Phillips' statement was introduced into evidence. Captain Mark Jones testified he witnessed Phillips write the statement and neither asked Phillips to write the word nor told Phillips how to spell it. Captain Jones testified he did not inform Phillips of the import of the word, but Jones admitted he did not know if Phillips misspelled the word on purpose. Phillips did not testify during Prather's trial. Prather argues Phillips' statement to law enforcement was testimonial and that the State's use of only the two one-word cutouts of the word rapeist did not diminish the overall testimonial nature of the cutouts. Prather contends the State used the cutouts to show he carved the word rapist on Victim's back. Prather argues a Confrontation Clause analysis does not depend on the character of the evidence, but on its purpose. We hold Prather's confrontation rights were not violated. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, extended against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of a criminal defendant 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him.' Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). This constitutional guarantee includes the right to cross-examine those witnesses. State v. McDonald, 412 S.C. 133, 139, 771 S.E.2d 840, 843 (2015). A defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause are violated, even if a cautionary instruction is given, when a non-testifying codefendant's statement that expressly inculpates a defendant is admitted at trial. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968). The [United States Supreme Court], in Richardson v. Marsh, specifically declined to extend this rule to the situation when a defendant's name or any reference to defendant is redacted, even though the statement's application to him is linked up by other evidence properly admitted against the defendant. State v. Evans, 316 S.C. 303, 307, 450 S.E.2d 47, 50 (1994). However, in Gray v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court found that redaction that replaces a defendant's name with an obvious indication of deletion, such as a blank space, the word 'deleted,' or a similar symbol, still falls within Bruton's protective rule since it refers directly to the 'existence' of the nonconfessing codefendant. 523 U.S. 185, 192 (1998). In State v. Evans, the defendant was convicted of charges arising from a deadly automobile accident. 316 S.C. at 306, 450 S.E.2d at 49. A State's witness testified the only passenger in the defendant's vehicle discussed the accident with him and made the statement, I wasn't driving anyway. Id. The defendant argued the statement implicated him as the driver and, because the passenger did not testify at trial, the admission of this testimony was a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 306-07, 450 S.E.2d at 49-50. We disagreed, holding the admission of the statement was not a Confrontation Clause violation because [t]he statement did not 'on its face' incriminate [the defendant], although its incriminating import was certainly inferable from other evidence that was properly admitted against him. Id. at 307, 450 S.E.2d at 50. Most of our State's recent jurisprudence regarding Confrontation Clause violations focuses on the admissibility of a co-defendant's full-confession implicating another party with insufficient redactions. See McDonald, 412 S.C. at 141, 771 S.E.2d at 844 (finding a nontestifying codefendant's confession insufficiently redacted by replacing a defendant's name with the phrase, another person); State v. Henson, 407 S.C. 154, 158, 166, 754 S.E.2d 508, 510, 514 (2014) (finding the State's use of a nontestifying codefendant's confession that replaced the defendant's name with the guy, he, and him violated the Confrontation Clause because it was inferable without relying on other evidence that the confession referred to and incriminated the defendant). We hold the redaction of Phillips' statement to the point where only the word rapeist remained rendered the evidence nontestimonial. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (providing testimony is generally a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828))). The word rapeist did not infer anything about what specifically transpired that night or who killed Victim. Like the statement in Evans, the word rapeist did not incriminate Prather on its face. Although the incriminating nature of the single misspelled word could be inferred in light of the other evidence presented at trial (specifically that the word was spelled correctly as carved on Victim's back), the word did not facially incriminate Prather. We therefore reject Prather's Confrontation Clause argument. 3. Directed Verdict Prather argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict as to the murder charge because the evidence did not rise above a mere suspicion that Prather caused Victim's death. Prather contends Victim could have died at any time despite Prather's physical assault on Victim; in support of this proposition, Prather cites the presence of drugs and alcohol in Victim's system and Victim's obesity, enlarged heart, and cirrhosis of the liver. When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight. State v. Hernandez, 382 S.C. 620, 624, 677 S.E.2d 603, 605 (2009). In an appeal from the denial of a directed verdict motion, the appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Cope, 405 S.C. 317, 348, 748 S.E.2d 194, 210 (2013). We must affirm the trial court's decision to submit the case to the jury if there is any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the defendant's guilt. Id. However, we must reverse if the evidence only gives rise to a mere suspicion of the defendant's guilt. See Hernandez, 382 S.C. at 625, 677 S.E.2d at 605. 'Suspicion' implies a belief or opinion as to guilt based upon facts or circumstances which do not amount to proof. State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 322, 555 S.E.2d 402, 404-05 (2001). In State v. Burton, 302 S.C. 494, 397 S.E.2d 90 (1990), we discussed the issue of proximate cause in homicide cases. The defendant's act may be regarded as the proximate cause if it is a contributing cause of the death of the deceased. The defendant's act need not be the sole cause of the death provided that it be a proximate cause actually and contributing to the death of the deceased. Id. at 496-97, 397 S.E.2d at 91. A person is deemed to be guilty of the homicide if the injury inflicted contributes immediately to the death of the deceased. Id. at 498, 397 S.E.2d at 92. Here, Victim's numerous injuries included cuts to his lower back, two fractured ribs, a fractured nose, bruising to his face, head, and body, and a burn mark on his finger. The pathologist testified the beating Victim endured caused him to die, though she could not rule out smothering as a contributing factor because of the position of Victim's body on the couch. The evidence as a whole raises the inference that he was left in that position as a result of the beating. ER nurse Sharpe testified Prather told her he beat Victim, that Victim was probably still laying there, and that Victim was alive, maybe barely though. Sergeant Kleckley and Officer Suber both testified they interviewed Prather at the ER and that Prather told them: I beat the shit out of [Victim] with devastating blows. The State presented sufficient evidence to establish Victim's death was caused by a severe beating perpetrated by Prather. The trial court properly denied Prather's motion for a directed verdict as to the murder charge. 4. The State's Supposed Pursuit of Inconsistent Theories Phillips pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and armed robbery one week after Prather was convicted. 1 Prather claims the State presented facts during Phillips' plea hearing that were inconsistent with the State's presentation of evidence and theories during Prather's trial. Prather primarily claims the State advanced inconsistent theories as to who carved rapist on Victim's back. We find this argument unpreserved. We acknowledge Prather could not have raised this issue to the trial court until after Phillips pled. However, Prather also failed to raise this issue in his post-trial motion for a new trial and supporting memorandum, the latter of which was filed over a month after Phillips' guilty plea. See Dunbar, 356 S.C. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 693 (In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge.). 5. Statement from an Unavailable Witness During trial, Prather attempted to introduce into evidence a written statement given to law enforcement by Ralph Jody Webb Becknell, a purported witness who died prior to Prather's trial. The document itself is not in the record, but the colloquy between defense counsel and the trial court indicates Becknell gave a statement to law enforcement on April 22, 2005. Becknell evidently stated he had a phone conversation with Victim between 9:15 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on the night of the killing. The colloquy further indicates Becknell stated Victim told him his ribs were hurting. Prather contends this would establish Victim sustained significant blows to his ribs several hours before Prather struck Victim with his fists. The trial court ruled the statement was inadmissible hearsay. Prather contends the statement was admissible as a present sense impression under Rule 803(1) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence or as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2), SCRE, and would have corroborated his defense that he was not responsible for Victim's death. We hold the trial court properly excluded Becknell's statement. Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rule 801(c), SCRE. Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by [the South Carolina Rules of Evidence] or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of this State or by statute. Rule 802, SCRE. Here, we have hearsay included 1 Phillips pled under the theory of accomplice liability, with Prather as the principal actor. We detect no inconsistency in the core facts presented during Phillips' plea. within hearsay, as Victim's statement to Becknell was hearsay, and Becknell's statement to law enforcement was hearsay. Hearsay included within hearsay is not necessarily inadmissible; such may be admitted if each part of the combined statements satisfies an exception to the hearsay rule. See Rule 805, SCRE. Rule 803, SCRE, contains many exceptions to the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness. Prather argues Victim's statement to Becknell that his ribs were hurting was admissible under Rule 803(1) as a presence sense impression. Rule 803(1) defines a present sense impression as a statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. To qualify as a present sense impression: (1) the statement must describe or explain an event or condition; (2) the statement must be contemporaneous with the event; and (3) the declarant must have personally perceived the event. State v. Hendricks, 408 S.C. 525, 533, 759 S.E.2d 434, 438 (Ct. App. 2014). Prather argues Victim's statement to Becknell was also admissible under Rule 803(2) as an excited utterance, which the rule defines as a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. For a statement to be an excited utterance: (1) the statement must relate to a startling event or condition; (2) the statement must have been made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement; and (3) the stress of excitement must be caused by the startling event or condition. State v. Washington, 379 S.C. 120, 124, 665 S.E.2d 602, 604 (2008). [T]he intrinsic reliability of an excited utterance derives from the statement's spontaneity which is determined by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement when it was uttered. Ladner, 373 S.C. at 119-20, 644 S.E.2d at 693. Even if Victim's statement to Becknell was a present sense impression under Rule 803(1) or an excited utterance under Rule 803(2), Becknell's statement to law enforcement clearly does not fall within either exception. As for Rule 803(1), Becknell, as the declarant to law enforcement, did not personally perceive the event causing Victim's pain and his statement to law enforcement was not contemporaneous with the event. As for Rule 803(2), there is no evidence whatsoever that Becknell gave his statement to law enforcement while he was under stress or excitement of any kind. Therefore, the trial court did not err in excluding Becknell's written statement.