Opinion ID: 764699
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The procedural bar

Text: 24 In the absence of cause and prejudice, federal courts are barred from undertaking a habeas corpus review of state-court decisions that rest on independent and adequate state grounds. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 82, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (holding that a Florida rule requiring that the petitioner's confession be challenged at trial or not at all was an adequate state ground for barring a claim on habeas corpus that the petitioner's confession should not have been admitted into evidence). State procedural rules, such as Kentucky's requirement that all claims of fatal variance be addressed on direct appeal, constitute such independent and adequate state grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 744, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (holding that counsel's failure to file a timely notice of appeal in state court was an adequate state ground for denying a petitioner's habeas corpus claims). If a petitioner procedurally defaults on a claim in state court, federal courts will deny review of that claim on habeas corpus unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional error. See id. at 750. 25 When Lucas collaterally attacked his conviction in the Kentucky courts, the Kentucky Court of Appeals declined to address the issue of the fatal variance because the issue could and should have been raised on direct appeal. Lucas's failure to raise the fatal variance on direct appeal thus constituted a procedural default. Unless Lucas can demonstrate that there was a justifiable reason for his default and that the jury instruction had a prejudicial effect on the effectiveness of his defense, he is not entitled to a review of the constructive amendment claim in federal court. See id. at 754 (stating that habeas petitioners carry the burden of demonstrating cause and prejudice in order to overcome procedural default).