Opinion ID: 2512108
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted Doyle error; attorney-client privilege.

Text: During the direct examination of defendant, counsel asked him to explain why he had not told Sergeants Medsker and Paniagua what he was now telling the jury about what happened at Sarah LaChapelle's house. Defendant responded that he did not feel it would do him any good, because he didn't too much like Medsker. Moreover, he stated, about a week after his arrest, he learned from his initial appointed counsel, James Chaffee, that he faced the death penalty, and Chaffee advised him not to discuss the case with anybody. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited from defendant that, on the Friday and Sunday preceding his trial testimony, defendant had somewhat discussed that testimony with his current counsel. Learning that current counsel was in the same firm as Chaffee, the prosecutor sarcastically repeated, Oh, they were from the same office. A defense objection was sustained, and the prosecutor was directed to proceed by question and answer. The prosecutor then asked whether, when Chaffee first advised him not to discuss the case with anyone, Chaffee had made notes of what defendant told him. When the defense objected that we're getting into attorney-client confidential communication, the court responded, He's just asking if he made notes. That's all. [Defendant] brought this up himself. In answer to the prosecutor's question, defendant then said, I don't know. He probably did. I don't know. The prosecutor next asked if defendant had made notes of his conversation with Chaffee, and defendant said no. At that point, the prosecutor moved on to another topic. Somewhat later, the prosecutor asked when defendant told Chaffee he saw two men coming out of Sarah LaChapelle's house. The court promptly sustained a defense objection, ruling that the prosecutor's question go[es] beyond what he said Chaffee told him and assumes a fact not in evidence. Later still, the prosecutor asked defendant whether you [made] any effort to call the police and tell them that Mrs. LaChapelle was murdered or that you saw two men coming out of her home. Defendant said no. As a matter of fact, the prosecutor continued, you never told that to anyone until this jury heard it for the first time. Defense counsel objected on grounds of attorney-client privilege, and the court sustained the objection. (15) Defendant first argues the prosecutor's questions about defendant's failure to report the crime, or to tell the true story before trial, were misconduct under Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 [49 L.Ed.2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240] ( Doyle ). Doyle forbids impeachment of a defendant's exculpatory trial testimony with cross-examination about his or her postarrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings. ( Doyle, supra, at p. 619.) Defendant did not object on Doyle grounds below, and thus has forfeited this claim. In any event, it largely lacks merit. Insofar as the prosecutor questioned why defendant, upon discovering Sarah LaChapelle's body, did not promptly call the police, the prosecutor was not casting suspicion upon defendant's silence during a period after he had been arrested, and had heard and decided to exercise his Miranda rights. The prosecutor was simply making the point that if, as defendant now claimed, he innocently came upon the horrific murder of his family's neighbor, it would have been natural to summon assistance immediately. Such questions did not violate Doyle, and were not improper. When the prosecutor went further, and asked whether defendant had told anyone the supposed true facts prior to trial, a defense objection on attorney-client privilege grounds was promptly sustained. If incipient Doyle misconduct lurked in this question, it was thus nipped in the bud. Defendant also complains of the prosecutor's efforts to elicit the content of his pretrial conversations with his counsel. He asserts these efforts were invasions of his attorney-client privilege, as well as improper attempts to insinuate that he and his counsel colluded to produce coached and rehearsed testimony. The latter claim was forfeited by failure to raise it below. In any event, no basis for reversal appears. With one exception, each prosecutorial attempt to probe attorney-client conversations was squelched by a successful defense objection before any answer was forthcoming. The single exception, the prosecutor's question about whether defendant's first counsel, Chaffee, took notes of their initial conversation, produced an I don't know answer from defendant. The subject was not pursued. Defendant cannot have suffered prejudice. Finally, defendant urges that the prosecutor exploited his theory of collusion between defendant and counsel, and improperly impugned defense counsel's integrity, by suggesting in his rebuttal that, when preparing for her just completed argument, counsel had created a preposterous defense involving a nonexistent phantom killer, and said that counsel wants you to start guessing about a phantom killer. The claim is forfeited by failure to object below to the remarks now challenged. In any event, we find no misconduct. (16) Personal attacks on opposing counsel, including accusations that counsel fabricated a defense or misstated facts in order to deceive the jury, are forbidden. (E.g., Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 30-31; Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1154.) On the other hand, the prosecutor may vigorously argue his or her case, including the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. ( Friend, supra, at p. 30.) A substantial portion of defense counsel's argument was devoted to the premise that defendant was not guilty of special circumstance murder if, though involved with another person in the burglary and robbery of Sarah LaChapelle's home, he was not Sarah's actual killer and did not intend to kill. In support of this theory, counsel interpreted the forensic evidence to suggest that, even if defendant was a coparticipant in the burglary and robbery, a second burglar and robber was the actual killer. It was in this context that the prosecutor responded by disparaging counsel's use of the evidence to manufacture a phantom killer theory. The prosecutor did not accuse defense counsel of factual fabrication or deceit; he merely argued, as he was allowed to do, that there was no evidence for counsel's theory. The prosecutor's language was strong, but well within bounds we have previously recognized as permissible. (See Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1154-1155, and cases cited.) No misconduct occurred.