Opinion ID: 2157042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: limiting the scope of moore's examination of officer dimiduk

Text: Moore also argues on appeal that the trial judge violated his Sixth Amendment rights by improperly curtailing his direct examination of Officer Dimiduk, and limiting his cross-examination of Officer Dimiduk after the trial court reopened cross-examination of the witness. The trial court is entrusted with a large measure of discretion to control the introduction of evidence[.] Baker v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 7, 36, 401 F.2d 958, 987 (1968). Although the opportunity to cross-examine a witness is a fundamental right, which is guaranteed in a criminal trial through the [C]onfrontation [C]lause of the Sixth Amendment[ ], Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064, 1073 (D.C.1978) (citations omitted), the extent and scope of cross-examination of a witness ... is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Morris v. United States, 389 A.2d 1346, 1352 (D.C. 1978). [T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defendant might wish. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, once a party has had an opportunity substantially to exercise the right of cross-examination, the extent of further interrogation is within the sound discretion of the trial court and reversal by an appeals court is warranted only where an abuse of discretion leads to prejudice. Singletary, 383 A.2d at 1073 (citations omitted). The record reflects that Officer Dimiduk was originally called as a witness during the government's case in chief. He testified on direct examination that he was responsible for filling out the PD-163 on the night of Moore's arrest, and that he had included all crucial information in the report. He also testified that he observed Officer Bryant remove some papers from behind the armrest in the rear of the car, along with the film canister containing crack cocaine. After the government's direct examination of Officer Dimiduk, Moore fully exercised his right to cross-examine Officer Dimiduk. During Moore's cross-examination of Officer Dimiduk, however, he chose not to question the officer with respect to why the personal medical papers linking him to the crack cocaine were not recorded on the PD-163. Instead, once the government rested its case, Moore called Officer Dimiduk as his first witness and attempted to ask him why the PD-163 did not reflect that Moore's personal papers were found in the hiding place with the crack cocaine. Because the trial court disallowed Moore's questioning with respect to the PD-163 on direct examination in the defense's case in chief, Moore attempted but was prohibited from questioning the officer about the absence of the personal medical papers from the PD-163 again when the trial court reopened cross-examination of Officer Dimiduk for another limited purpose. In this case, there is no question that Moore had a copy of the PD-163 in his possession and could have elicited this very information during his cross-examination of Officer Dimiduk. Moore either made a tactical decision not to pursue this line of questioning, or mistakenly forgot to question the officer before he was excused as a witness. In any event, after a thorough and exhaustive examination of the officer, Moore offered no explanation as to why he could not confront Officer Dimiduk with the omission of the personal medical papers from the PD-163 on cross-examination. Thus, having had the opportunity to cross-examine Officer Dimiduk on this issue, it was within the trial court's discretion to disallow Moore any further examination of this witness. See Green v. United States, 718 A.2d 1042, 1061 (D.C.1998); United States v. Gaviria, 325 U.S.App. D.C. 322, 348, 116 F.3d 1498, 1524 (1997). Finally, the trial court reopened Moore's cross-examination of Officer Dimiduk for the specific purpose of inquiring about his grand jury testimony which was not provided to Moore until after the government's direct examination of the officer. The trial court reopened cross-examination of the officer upon Moore's request for this limited purpose only, and again it was within the trial court's discretion at this time to afford Moore a second chance to inquire about the omission of the papers from the PD-163. See Green, 718 A.2d at 1061. Moore had the opportunity and did effectively cross-examine Officer Dimiduk in this case. Moore was able to present to the jury during cross-examination and during his closing statement the inconsistencies between Officer Dimiduk's trial testimony and his grand jury testimony, as well as the inconsistencies between Officer Dimiduk's testimony and the trial testimony of Officers Bryant and Ruiz. In addition, we cannot discern any prejudice to Moore because he was not precluded from arguing in his closing statement to the jury that his personal medical papers allegedly found with the crack cocaine were never recorded on the PD-163. Moreover, the record does not reveal that the trial court's ruling kept the jury from relevant and important facts. See Lawrence v. United States, 482 A.2d 374, 376 (D.C. 1984). Moore proffers no reason why he could not have questioned the officer about the PD-163 on cross-examination. Therefore, in this case, Moore's contention that the trial court abused its discretion by not permitting him to further question Officer Dimiduk must fail. Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is hereby Affirmed.