Opinion ID: 1370501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: implied preemption of the county ordinance

Text: 4. A review of the relevant state laws demonstrates that general law does not give local governments broad authority to regulate the application of sludge to land. Preemption may be inferred generally from the comprehensive nature of OCGA § 12-5-30.3 and its implementing regulations. [21] In its policy statement, the Georgia Water Quality Control Act grants the state the responsibility for both water quality and water supplies without mentioning the role of local governments, unlike the statutes in some states. [22] OCGA § 12-5-30.3 specifically directs the Board of Natural Resources to adopt technical and procedural regulations and requires the state EPD director to approve permits to apply sludge to land. As part of its responsibilities, the board has adopted extensive regulations dealing with land disposal and permit requirements under the Georgia Water Quality Control Act. [23] In addition, the General Assembly expressly granted local governments limited authority to act in the field of applying sludge to land. Subsection (d) of OCGA § 12-5-30.3 provides authority for local governing authorities to assess reasonable monitoring fees and to seek an injunction if the fees are not paid. By explicitly granting this narrow power to local governments, the statute by implication precludes counties from exercising broader powers. [24] Moreover, by assigning the task of developing permit requirements directly to the state, the statute implies that the General Assembly did not intend to give counties concurrent jurisdiction to regulate through a permit system. The legislative history of § 12-5-30.3 also supports implied preemption. [25] As originally introduced in the General Assembly, House Bill 228 gave counties authority to approve the land application site. [26] Specifically, subsection (f) would have prevented the state from approving any permit unless the county receiving the sludge gave its written approval or failed to object in writing with 90 days. [27] This veto power provision was deleted in the house committee, [28] and an attempt to reinstate the provision on the Senate floor failed by three votes. [29] As enacted into law, the bill limited the regulatory authority of counties to assessing fees and monitoring sites after the director had approved the permit. [30] Based on the language and legislative history of the state statute, we conclude that the General Assembly has failed to authorize local governments to regulate the application of sludge to land, except in the specific area of monitoring. Because Franklin County has sought to establish a duplicate permit system that is not authorized by general law, we hold that OCGA § 12-5-30.3 preempts the county's ordinance by implication. Judgment affirmed.