Opinion ID: 2243264
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Seal the First Verdict

Text: In People v Ricardo B. (73 N.Y.2d 228, supra ), we held that use of the dual jury was not inherently prejudicial, and endorsed its use, with reservations. We cautioned that the procedure should be used sparingly and that, when it is, thorough precautions be taken to protect the defendant's due process rights ( id. , at 235). While taking note of the procedures employed by the trial court in Ricardo B. , and finding them sufficient to protect the defendant's due process rights, we did not indicate whether less stringent safeguards would render the procedure inherently prejudicial. We now answer that question in the negative. Trial by dual juries is, at root, a modified form of severance, and we have previously held that their use is to be evaluated under standards for reviewing severance motions generally ( Ricardo B. , 73 NY2d, at 233), which require a showing of prejudice to entitle a defendant to relief ( People v Mahboubian , 74 N.Y.2d 174, 183). Recognizing that no prejudice was alleged or established below, [2] defendant urges us to hold that the safeguards described in Ricardo B. constitute a mode of proceedings prescribed by law ( People v Mehmedi , 69 N.Y.2d 759). The suggested approach would require us to construe Ricardo B. as articulating the minimum constitutional standards for a dual-jury trial, such that any departure deprives a defendant of a fair trial and requires reversal without regard to actual prejudice ( People v Crimmins , 36 N.Y.2d 230, 238). Defendant's position is incompatible with our prior considerations of the particular error urged here: a postverdict allegation of improper influence on juror deliberations. Such a claim is generally asserted through a motion to set aside the verdict (CPL 330.30 [2]), and a defendant is entitled to a hearing on the issue upon assertion of facts indicating misconduct ( People v Durling , 303 N.Y. 382). Absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right, however, proof of juror misconduct does not entitle a defendant to a new trial ( People v Ciaccio , 47 N.Y.2d 431). As we reiterated in People v Clark (81 N.Y.2d 913, 914), `not every misstep by a juror rises to the inherently prejudicial level at which reversal is required automatically'   . Each case must be examined on its unique facts to determine the nature of the misconduct and the likelihood that prejudice was engendered (citing People v Brown , 48 N.Y.2d 388, 394). In Clark , therefore, we concluded that absent a specific showing of improper influence, a jury verdict could not be impeached. Where dual juries are employed, the same standards control. Alleged errors during the course of a dual-jury trial need not be scrutinized pursuant to a higher standard than would be applicable in a single-jury trial. Reversal is not required simply because the court failed to implement the most restrictive procedures applicable to dual juries. Although trial courts retain discretion to adopt more restrictive procedures, the measures employed in Ricardo B. remain guidelines rather than minimum constitutional requirements. The particular error alleged in defendant's case would not require reversal were this a single-jury case. Where complete severance has been granted, one codefendant generally is convicted prior to the other. That a jury may be aware another person has been convicted of participating in the alleged crime is not deemed inherently prejudicial in that context. Just as sealing of a verdict or a gag order is not constitutionally required when severed codefendants are successively tried, such protections are not invariably necessary to preserve the integrity of a dual-jury trial. A trial court may want to impose more restrictive procedures when circumstances, such as extensive publicity, suggest that a failure to seal the first verdict might lead to prejudice, and reversible error. Where the unwieldiness of the procedure ( see, e.g. , Hedlund v Sheldon , 173 Ariz 143, 840 P2d 1008) would out-weigh its prophylactic effect, however, a trial court may properly decline to follow such procedures. While defendant here requested that the court seal the first jury's verdict, he never contended that its failure to do so resulted in any prejudice to him. His present assertions of prejudice are merely speculative. Defendant does not assert that his jury was aware of the fact of the Rosario verdict, let alone that it knew Rosario had been convicted. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. Order affirmed.