Opinion ID: 184117
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lamb:

Text: At the summary judgment stage, Cleary had two claims remaining against Lamb: (1) a Fourth Amendment claim alleging continued detention without probable cause, and (2) a Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging a Brady violation that prevented Cleary from receiving a fair trial, both due to Lamb’s failure to disclose evidence. In the motion for summary judgment, Lamb again argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity. As noted, a government official is immune from civil liability unless, in the course of performing his discretionary functions, he violates the plaintiff’s constitutional right and that right was clearly established. See Aldini, 609 F.3d at 863. Accordingly, if Cleary cannot demonstrate that Lamb violated his constitutional rights, Lamb is immune from liability. In finding that Cleary failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim for continued detention without probable cause as a result of withholding evidence, the district court stated that while it “share[d] in Plaintiff’s concerns regarding the credibility of Rachael’s allegations in light of all the facts and circumstances,” Lamb was entitled to discretion in analyzing Rachael’s allegations and that - 22 - No. 09-1441 Cleary v. County of Macomb, et al. he had probable cause to pursue the charges against Cleary. Cleary II, at 11–12. The court stated that, “at worst . . . the finding of probable cause could have gone either way,” but that because Lamb did not know nor should have known that Cleary was innocent, Cleary failed to demonstrate that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Id. at 12. Although the court correctly concluded that Cleary’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, the issue is not whether there was probable cause based on the information presented to the prosecutor and ultimately to the court, but whether evidence withheld by Lamb that otherwise should have been disclosed would have “dissolved” probable cause.7 See Gregory, 444 F.3d at 750. For there to be probable cause for an arrest, “the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge must be sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense had been, was being, or was about to be committed.” Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 2007). However, “[a] finding of probable cause does not require evidence that is completely convincing or even evidence that would be admissible at trial; all that is required is that the evidence be sufficient to lead a reasonable officer to conclude that the arrestee has committed or is committing a crime.” Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 511 (6th Cir. 2008). In other words, there must be more than “[a] mere suspicion of criminality.” Id. With regard to his Fourteenth Amendment claim, the district court held that all of the evidence allegedly withheld by Lamb was “either not withheld by Lamb, not within Lamb’s actual knowledge, or not favorable or materially exculpatory” for Cleary. Cleary II, at 12–18. The district 7 We may nevertheless affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. See Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 677 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that, although the district court did not separately analyze the issue relied upon by this court to affirm, this court “of course may affirm on a ground not relied upon by the district court”). - 23 - No. 09-1441 Cleary v. County of Macomb, et al. court properly explained that, when bringing a Brady claim alleging that exculpatory evidence was withheld, the plaintiff bears “the burden of establishing that the prosecutor suppressed evidence,” that the evidence was favorable to the defense, and that it was material, meaning that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Warshak, No. 08-3997, –F.3d–, 2010 WL 5071766, at  (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2010); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995). Because Cleary asserts that withholding of the same pieces of evidence violated both his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, our analysis will address both claims together. On appeal, although Cleary asserts that Lamb “never reported over twenty-one (21) essential pieces of the puzzle to the prosecutor,” he ultimately argues that only five specific pieces of evidence were improperly withheld or misstated by Lamb, resulting in a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. First, Cleary argues that Lamb improperly withheld allegations that Kristi had been sexually abused as noted in two specific documents: an intake sheet from protective services and a CSATT Request for Services form. However, Cleary does not argue that this information would have dissolved probable cause. And, in fact, there is nothing in the record to suggest this would be the case. Although the protective services intake sheet states that the information contained therein (including that Kristi had been abused) was told by the “oldest girl” to “the mother,” Schwartz, the intake form was filled out on the basis of a phone call to protective services made by Simon, Schwartz’s mother, and not either of the two individuals who allegedly exchanged this information. Cleary also references the CSATT Request for Services form, which states that “Kristi told mom that Mark also touched her.” Yet, as Cleary’s own complaint recognizes, Kristi - 24 - No. 09-1441 Cleary v. County of Macomb, et al. herself never stated that she had been subject to abuse. The existence of a note made on the basis of a phone call that conveyed information from a third party (not the victim herself, or even the individual that the victim allegedly conveyed the information to), and another similar note that has no identified source beyond the individual who wrote it down, are simply insufficient to dissolve probable cause because neither would have undermined Rachael’s credibility at the time the arrest warrant was requested. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that this evidence would have been material or would have called Rachael’s credibility or reliability into question for the purposes of Cleary’s Brady claim. Cleary asserts that the information about Kristi, specifically the note on the CPS intake sheet, “could have persuaded a jury to render a not guilty verdict; Kristi would have been a child witness testifying to the exact opposite of Rachael during trial.” Cleary explains that this fact was of “critical importance because when Kristi denied being sexually abused by Cleary, consistently, these facts, in union with Rachael’s inconsistency and other factors, were potentially exculpatory and impeaching to Cleary.” However, Cleary’s argument is flawed. Cleary himself stated that Kristi consistently denied that she was abused so, had she testified, she would not have testified to the exact opposite of Rachael. Rather, their testimony would have been consistent because Rachael testified at the trial that only she had been abused. Cleary next argues that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when Lamb stated in his report that Rachael brought in her own doll and demonstrated penetration with it during her interview with Lamb. Cleary argues that “[t]his material misrepresentation would tend to cast more doubt on the credibility of not only Rachael, but Wolf as well.” Cleary asserts that - 25 - No. 09-1441 Cleary v. County of Macomb, et al. Lamb’s misrepresentation about the fact that Rachael brought in and used her own dolls to demonstrate abuse gave the jury “two consecutive separate interviews with Rachael demonstrating thorough sexual penetration with dolls,” but that “[h]ad Lamb been honest . . . a jury would have had two separate interviews where Rachael did not use the dolls in any way . . . .” Cleary argues that her refusal to use the dolls brought by Lamb to his interview with Rachael would have “made her allegations even more suspicious and her inconsistencies greater.” Although Cleary asserts rather pointedly that “Lamb lied” about Rachael bringing her own dolls to her interview with Lamb, Cleary grossly misstates the information in Lamb’s report to support this allegation. In fact, the report does not explicitly state that Rachael brought her own dolls to the interview; rather, Lamb writes in the report that when she was asked to explain what “down there” was referring to, Rachael “indicated on her doll the area of the crotch.” Whether this doll actually belonged to Rachael, or whether Lamb was referring to a doll that he brought and gave to Rachael to use (thus making it “her doll” during the course of the interview), is simply unclear from the report, despite Cleary’s allegations. To the extent Rachael’s use of the dolls was inconsistent, in that she initially refused to use the dolls in her interview with Szlezyngier but later demonstrated the abuse in her meeting with both Wolf and Lamb, this information was disclosed in Szlezyngier’s March 23, 1987 letter to Lamb and turned over to the prosecutor when Lamb sought the arrest warrant. Accordingly, Cleary failed to demonstrate that there was any misstatement or failure to disclose this piece of information by Lamb that resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights.8 8 As discussed below, Cleary did submit an affidavit from Schwartz indicating that Rachael did not play with dolls as toys, would not have brought her own doll to the meeting with Lamb, and - 26 - No. 09-1441 Cleary v. County of Macomb, et al. Cleary also alleges that Lamb withheld the fact that Rachael “played court” with Schwartz. Again, Cleary does not argue that disclosing this evidence would have dissolved probable cause, and the record does not demonstrate that it would have. Although the fact that Schwartz and Simon “played court” with Rachael may be problematic, it is also not entirely surprising given the fact that Rachael, a seven-year-old child, had previously expressed fear about going to court. Moreover, prior to seeking the arrest warrant, Rachael consistently relayed to all individuals who interviewed her that she had been abused by Cleary and had provided significant details about these assaults, all of which was presented to the prosecutor and the court in order to demonstrate probable cause. The fact that Rachael may have played court is simply not enough to dissolve probable cause as it existed at the time of the arrest warrant. With regard to his Fourteenth Amendment Brady claim, Cleary argues that although the district court asserted that this information would have been cumulative for impeachment purposes, “the government cannot satisfy its Brady obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence by making some evidence available and claiming the rest would be cumulative.” Instead, Cleary argues that the government was obligated to disclose all material relating to the credibility of a government witness, did not want to play with or use the anatomically correct dolls during that meeting. However, the affidavit does not state that Lamb falsified the information that Rachael actually demonstrated abuse on the dolls, regardless of whether or not she wanted to use them. Thus, this affidavit does not create a genuine issue of material fact, nor does it alter the conclusion that Lamb did not violate Cleary’s constitutional rights. Moreover, even assuming that Lamb did misrepresent the information in his report and that Rachael did not use the doll, this would not have dissolved probable cause or been material to Cleary’s guilt for the purpose of a Brady violation. The fact that Rachael may not have used the doll during her interview with Lamb was merely cumulative of the evidence that already established that Rachael’s use of the anatomically correct dolls was inconsistent, as she had not used the dolls when she met with Szlezyngier but did use them when she met with Wolf. - 27 - No. 09-1441 Cleary v. County of Macomb, et al. and that the district court was required to view this evidence “in the more sinister slant.” Ultimately, Cleary’s claim seems to argue primarily that this information could have been used to impeach Rachael. However, Rachael’s credibility already was significantly undermined at both the preliminary hearing and the trial, as Cleary himself acknowledges in his complaint, because she would not identify where she was touched by Cleary, did not use the word “potty” consistently as she had previously, the facts of her story changed at various times, and she denied admitting to Wolf that she was nervous about coming to court because she saw someone lying on television. Additionally, Rachael testified at both the preliminary hearing and at trial that she talked to Schwartz almost every day about the incident, opening up the possibility that Schwartz may have influenced Rachael’s development of the story of the abuse. Cleary, as a party to the custody dispute, was aware of Schwartz’s possible motive to get Rachael to lie, he was aware of the evolving and increasingly strange accusations made by Rachael, and he was aware from Lamb’s report that Rachael had become “shy” and had started to have difficulty talking about the abuse allegations. The fact that Rachael specifically “played court,” on top of all of this information, was not material for the purpose of impeaching Rachael’s credibility or arguing the “sinister slant” that Rachael could be lying. Ultimately, this piece of information “is not so clearly favorable or materially exculpatory to support a constitutional claim.” Cleary II, at 16. Cleary next argues that Lamb violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to disclose that Rachael had written a note to Wolf that used the words “penis” and “semen.” Cleary claims that “it is of no moment that Lamb never saw or had possession of the note,” because Wolf had seen the note, therefore “without a doubt, Lamb had knowledge of the note content through - 28 - No. 09-1441 Cleary v. County of Macomb, et al. his several conversations with Wolf and Szlezyngier.” First, Cleary’s complaint indicates that the note given to Wolf only used the word “semen,” and stated that Cleary squirted “semen” onto her candy. In fact, Cleary was aware of Rachael’s use of the word “penis,” because it was revealed in Lamb’s report, which was submitted for the purpose of obtaining the arrest warrant. More importantly, Cleary does not deny in his brief that Lamb never saw or had possession of the note given to Wolf by Rachael. In fact, Cleary argues that Lamb had knowledge of the contents of the note through his conversations with Wolf and Szlezyngier. To the extent the note reflected Rachael’s allegations that Cleary gave her a candy bar with his semen on it, Lamb had already indicated this in his report (that was disclosed when seeking Cleary’s arrest warrant), because Rachael had conveyed that information to him during their meeting. All that remains to Cleary’s allegations then is the fact that Rachael wrote and used the word “semen.” However, because there is no proof that Lamb ever had possession of the note, he cannot now be said to have violated Cleary’s rights for withholding it.9 Finally, Cleary argues that Lamb should have disclosed that Rachael made allegations in 1988 that Schwartz and Gary Schwartz physically and emotionally abused her, and his failure to do so resulted in a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights under Brady.10 Cleary claims that 9 Cleary also asserts that the district court failed to address other descriptive statements made by Rachael, specifically that she told Wolf that what came out of Cleary’s penis was “bumpy like cream of mushroom soup.” While he presented this factually in his response to the motion to dismiss, he never challenged Lamb’s alleged withholding of this statement. Accordingly, we need not address it on appeal. 10 As the arrest warrant was obtained in 1987, Cleary cannot and does not claim that it resulted in his detention without probable cause. - 29 - No. 09-1441 Cleary v. County of Macomb, et al. Wolf had knowledge of this information, which was not disclosed to the prosecutor. He also argues that, contrary to Lamb’s testimony, Lamb was involved in the Cleary case after the arrest warrant issued, and that this is when Beard would have talked to Lamb and should have been given this information. Cleary asserts that Szlezyngier would have had a duty to report any abuse, and that Lamb “clearly did not document all communications he had and Szlezyngier testified that she does not remember if she would document all communications she had with law enforcement.” Thus, Cleary claims that “Szlezyngier more likely than not notified Lamb about the abuse allegations as well,” and Lamb therefore was responsible for a failure to disclose the abuse allegations to Beard. Regardless of Lamb’s continued involvement in the Cleary case, Cleary has failed to demonstrate that Lamb had any actual knowledge regarding the allegations of physical abuse. Even though a protective services employee may have been required to report violations of the penal code to law enforcement, as Cleary asserts, and even assuming that the allegations of abuse rose to the level of penal code violations, Cleary presents nothing to support his claim that this information was given specifically to Lamb. Any law enforcement officer could have received this information, and there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Lamb knew of and then failed to disclose these allegations of abuse. As a result, Cleary has failed to demonstrate that any of the allegedly withheld information resulted in his continued detention without probable cause or a violation of his right to a fair trial under Brady and the Fourteenth Amendment. Although Cleary asserts that the district court did not examine the materiality of the evidence collectively for the purpose of his Brady claim, as it was required to do, a full review of the evidence demonstrates that the court did not err in granting - 30 - No. 09-1441 Cleary v. County of Macomb, et al. summary judgment in favor of Lamb. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436. Viewing the evidence cumulatively, there is nothing to indicate that the result of his trial would have been different. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Lamb.