Opinion ID: 2092417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: History of the Act and Relevant Cases

Text: First enacted in 1853, [3] the act has been amended numerous times. Although the original language of § 10-7-1 that established the right to bring a wrongful death action for damages has not been changed since 1896, the Legislature proceeded to define pecuniary damages and specify additional damages that may be claimed beyond the original baseline of compensatory damages. Other amendments relating to damages made possible the recovery of medical expenses and lost earning power, G.L.1923 ch. 477, § 1, established a minimum recovery for damages, P.L.1949, ch. 2332, allowed damages for pain and suffering, P.L.1972, ch. 246, permitted unemancipated minors to seek recovery for the loss of consortium, P.L.1982, ch. 217, and allowed spouses recovery for loss of consortium, P.L.1984, ch. 64. Interspersed between the amendments have been court decisions, including early Rhode Island cases and a Federal appellate court case that interpreted the act to provide for compensatory pecuniary damages, but not punitive damages. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir.1970); Read v. Dunn, 48 R.I. 437, 440, 138 A. 210, 212 (1927); Burns v. Brightman, 44 R.I. 316, 117 A. 26 (1922); Dimitri v. Peter Cienci & Son, 41 R.I. 393, 103 A. 1029 (1918); McCabe v. Narragansett Electric Lighting Co., 27 R.I. 272, 61 A. 667 (1905) ( McCabe II ); McCabe v. Narragansett Electric Lighting Co., 26 R.I. 427, 59 A. 112 (1904)( McCabe I ). The most pertinent amendment was enacted in the 1971 session of the General Assembly, after the First Circuit Court of Appeals decided Williams v. United States, ante , a wrongful death case brought by a father after the death of his nine-year-old son. Williams held that the trial court properly ruled that pain and suffering of the decedent, and of his survivors, as well as punitive damages, are excluded in wrongful death actions under the act. Id. at 806 (citing McCabe I and Burns ). (Emphasis added.) A well-established tenet of statutory interpretation posits that the Legislature is `presumed to know the state of existing law when it enacts or amends a statute.' Providence Journal Co., 711 A.2d at 1134; see also Romano v. Duke, 111 R.I. 459, 462, 304 A.2d 47, 49 (1973) (We presume that the Legislature is familiar with the construction we have given the phrase `personal expenses' in suitsbrought under the earlier versions of our wrongful death statute.). Thus, when the Rhode Island Legislature amended the act by adding detailed instructions for calculating pecuniary damages, P.L. 1971, ch. 46, and in a second apparent response to Williams, by providing for recovery for a decedent's conscious pain and suffering, P.L.1972, ch. 246, we must assume that it was aware that the First Circuit Court of Appeals had interpreted the act to preclude punitive damages. Williams was not the first opinion to address the issue of damages available under the act. The early Rhode Island cases construing damages under the wrongful death statute interpreted the act to allow for compensatory pecuniary damages and impliedly excluded punitive damages. In 1904, this Court held in McCabe I that [t]he cause of action is the statutory action given by sec. 14, cap. 233, Gen. Laws, for the recovery of damages for death caused by `the wrongful act, neglect or default of another,' and the measure of damages in this form of action is the pecuniary loss sustained.  McCabe I, 26 R.I. at 434, 59 A. at 115. (Emphasis added.) The next year, the Court affirmed McCabe I's holding on the damages that are available in a wrongful death action. After citing wrongful death statutes in other jurisdictions, McCabe II concluded: We are of the opinion that a similar rule of construction should be adopted in respect of our statute, and that in case of death the action should be considered as though it were brought, in behalf of the estate of the decedent, for the damage to that estate caused by the death in question.  McCabe II, 27 R.I. at 278, 61 A. at 670. (Emphasis added.) Further, McCabe II cited favorably a Pennsylvania rule which should prevail that `the proper measure of damages is the pecuniary loss suffered by the parties entitled to the sum to be recovered.' Id. at 280, 61 A. at 670. It is clear from these statements that in a wrongful death action, the Court contemplated recovery for compensatory damages, but not punitive damages. This conclusion has been affirmed numerous times. See, e.g., Read, 48 R.I. at 440, 138 A. at 212 ([t]he damages are for, and are measured by, the loss to the estate of the deceased resulting from the death); Dimitri, 41 R.I. at 394, 103 A. at 1029 (court agreed with plaintiff's contention that the rule for measuring damages in all cases brought under the statute to recover for the death of a person    is that laid down in McCabe [I] ) (emphasis added). More recently in 1996, in remanding a wrongful death claim to the trial court, this Court concluded, that punitive damages would be inappropriate on the counts remanded for trial, reflecting our understanding that punitive damages are not recoverable in a wrongful death action. Clift v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 815 (R.I.1996). Therefore, it is our conclusion that because these decisions expressly or impliedly precluding punitive damages have not produced a legislative response to the issue, we can surmise that the cases have correctly interpreted the statutory intent to bar such damages. See McFadden, 46 R.I. at 477, 129 A. at 268 (holding that the Court's position that a wrongful death action could not be brought against the wrongdoer's estate was deduced [f]rom the fact that the [L]egislature has since these cases were decided made no change in the statutes referred to, [and thus] it is reasonable to infer that the construction of the statutes was in accordance with the legislative intent). See also E-Con-O-Wash Corp. of R.I. v. Sousa, 91 R.I. 450, 453-54, 164 A.2d 851, 853 (1956) (long legislative acquiescence in court's construction could reasonably be considered to imply legislative approval).