Opinion ID: 2979808
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Total-Loss Figure and Criminal History

Text: Rossi first argues that the district court erred in relying on the loss figure and Rossi’s prior criminal history in its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. He argues that such reliance is “duplicative and excessive” when those are factors already taken into account in the Guidelines range.7 Appellant Br. at 15. However, we have rejected the argument that a sentence is substantively unreasonable because the § 3553(a) factors on which the district court relied to sentence the defendant outside the advisory Guidelines range were already reflected in the Guidelines calculation. See Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d at 636 n.1. The loss amount and Rossi’s criminal history are relevant to the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 635. For example, the loss amount informs the district 7 Rossi also argues that the district court failed to make specific findings required to depart upward for the inadequacy of a defendant’s criminal history category under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a). As noted above, the district court did not depart under the Guidelines’ departure provisions but rather applied a variance based on the § 3553(a) factors. The fact that the district court did not depart under § 4A1.3(a) for an underrepresented criminal history does not preclude the district court from considering Rossi’s criminal history in its § 3553(a) analysis. See United States v. Lanning, 633 F.3d 469, 474-75 (6th Cir. 2011); Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d at 635. 20 No. 09-3929 United States v. Rossi court’s analysis of the “nature and circumstances of the offense,” § 3553(a)(1), and the “seriousness of the offense,” § 3553(a)(2)(A). Rossi’s previous criminal conviction is relevant to his “history and characteristics,” § 3553(a)(1), and the need to “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” § 3553(a)(2)(B). See Gunter, 620 F.3d at 647 (noting that criminal history is relevant to a number of the § 3553(a) factors). That factors reflected in the Guidelines will also be relevant to the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis is inherent in the sentencing scheme set forth by Congress. Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to develop Guidelines that embody the § 3553(a) factors. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 348–50 (2007). Thus, “both the sentencing judge and the Commission . . . carry[] out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the other at wholesale.” Id. at 348. The district court “must treat the Guidelines as the starting point and the initial benchmark,” and “the Commission’s recommendation of a sentencing range will reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.” Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–09 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the district court, in its own review of the § 3553(a) factors at the level of the particular defendant, may vary from the advisory Guidelines range. Id. at 109. Accordingly, a factor that is already incorporated into the Guidelines is not necessarily an impermissible factor for varying from the advisory Guidelines range. Concluding otherwise “would have the practical effect of making the Guidelines again mandatory.” TristanMadrigal, 601 F.3d at 636 n.1. Rather, we review the reasonableness of the district court’s 21 No. 09-3929 United States v. Rossi determination that the Guidelines range fails properly to reflect the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Lanning, 633 F.3d 469, 477–78 (6th Cir. 2011).