Opinion ID: 1940704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is the County entitled to a New Trial on its Counterclaim?

Text: When the jury returned its verdict the verdict stated: We, the jury, find [Universal] . . . and [Crane] defendants, and [the County], Additional Defendant, Guilty of Negligence, and furthermore we, the jury, award [Topelski] the sum of $50,000. The court below then moulded the verdict to read: A verdict in favor of [Topelski] in the sum of $50,000 against Universal and [Crane], defendants, and [the County] additional defendant; and in the counterclaim, a verdict in favor of [Universal] and [Crane] against [the County]. By reason of the provisions of the Second Class County Code, [2] the County became obligated to pay Topelski, its police officer, injured through the performance of his duties, his full rate of salary (until his disability ceased), together with all medical and hospital bills incurred in connection with his injuries. In accordance therewith, the County in the case at bar has paid in full Topelski's salary and all his medical and hospital bills. There can be no question of the right of the County to recover by way of subrogation from the third party tortfeasor all the salary, medical and hospital expenses paid to or for Topelski: [3] Philadelphia v. P.R.T., 337 Pa. 1, 10 A. 2d 434; Potoczny v. Vallejo, 170 Pa. Superior Ct. 377, 380, 85 A. 2d 675; Furia v. Philadelphia, 180 Pa. Superior Ct. 50, 118 A. 2d 236. The real question is how must the County proceed to enforce its right of subrogation and was the method adopted in the case at bar a proper method. The County could have instituted an action in the name of Topelski individually and in the name of the County use-plaintiff against Crane and Universal ( Meehan v. Philadelphia, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 659, 661, 136 A. 2d 178) or when Topelski instituted his action against Crane and Universal the County could have intervened to protect its subrogation rights ( Philadelphia v. P.R.T., supra, p. 4; Potoczny v. Vallejo, supra). Instead, the County sought to enforce its right to subrogation by a counterclaim filed against Crane when Crane brought the County upon the record as an additional defendant. When the matter came for trial, the County, seeking to prove its counterclaim, produced testimony that it had paid up to that time hospital and medical bills of Topelski totalling $6,082.31. This testimony was later stricken from the record on the objection of Topelski's counsel; such action of the court was entirely proper. In Philadelphia v. P.R.T., supra (p. 4), this Court stated: The sums here paid by the city to the firemen were not strictly speaking wages. They were in the nature of disability compensation, similar to workmen's compensation payments and payments under an accident insurance policy and should be treated in the same manner. Such payments have always been disregarded in determining the amount of damages to which an injured plaintiff is entitled: [citing cases]. The admission of such evidence would have been prejudicial to the claim of Topelski: Blatt v. Davis Construction Co., 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 30, 133 A. 2d 576. Even though he had not paid these bills, Topelski could have offered them in evidence and recovered the amount thereof: Philadelphia v. P.R.T., supra, p. 4. At the time of closing arguments, counsel for the County was permitted to discuss before the jury the County's right to subrogation. This was done without objection by other counsel motivated no doubt by a desire to eliminate the possibility of any error in this respect. We believe such argument should not have been permitted under the circumstances. In Penna. Co. for Ins. On Lives, etc. v. Lynch, 308 Pa. 23, 162 A. 157, we stated (p. 26): A counterclaim is `in effect a declaration by defendant against plaintiff in the nature of an independent action deferred until the defendant is brought into court': 23 Standard Enc. of Proc., page 582. (Emphasis supplied) Whether a counterclaim is filed by an original defendant against the plaintiff or by an additional defendant against an original defendant is immaterial; each such counterclaim constitutes an independent action against the party against whom the subrogation rights are sought to be enforced. In the case at bar, the County sought to enforce its subrogation rights against Crane, one of the alleged tortfeasors, and the procedure it adopted was improper. Under our practice the right of subrogation can only be enforced in the original action and not in a separate suit in the name of the city: Philadelphia v. P.R.T., supra, p. 4; Potoczny, supra, p. 380; Furia, supra, p. 54. In proceeding by counterclaim, the County was clearly in error. In view of such conclusion, we need not consider the propriety of the moulding the verdict by the court nor whether the County is entitled to a new trial on the counterclaim. In Potoczny, supra, p. 380, 381, Judge (later Justice) ARNOLD stated: The doctrine of subrogation is based `on considerations of equity and good conscience. . . to promote justice . . . [and] is granted as a means of placing the ultimate burden of the debt upon the person who should bear it.' . . . `It is a device adopted by equity to compel the ultimate discharge of an obligation by him who in good conscience ought to pay it.' Under the instant circumstances, the County has a clear right to recover by way of subrogation all the salary paid to and all the medical and hospital expenses paid for Topelski. By relieving the County of the charge of negligent conduct on its part we have removed the only bar to such right of recovery. The inherent difficulty in the instant situation is that the County adopted an improper and inappropriate procedure to enforce its subrogation rights. It would, indeed, be odd if the County must be denied that which in equity and good conscience it is entitled to simply because it adopted an inappropriate method of enforcing its rights. The equitable consideration which gives rise in the first instance to a recognition of the existence of the right to subrogation dictate that the County be given an opportunity to enforce such right by an appropriate procedure. To that end the court below is directed to entertain a petition on the part of the County to intervene nunc pro tunc in the principal action instituted by Topelski against Crane and Universal. Judgments against Crane and Universal affirmed. Judgment against the County reversed and a judgment n.o.v. entered in favor of the County. Mr. Justice O'BRIEN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.