Opinion ID: 494227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Disqualification Issue

Text: 26 Appellants argue that the lower court erred in not disqualifying Judge Clemon from deciding this case. Before reaching the substance of this claim, however, we outline the complicated procedural history of this issue. 27 On September 6, 1983, Auburn University moved to disqualify Judge Clemon pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Secs. 144 and 455. Three days later, the State Superintendent of Education Wayne Teague filed a similar motion. These motions were accompanied by affidavits, signed by the respective attorneys for these parties, setting forth various facts in support of the motions. Judge Clemon denied the recusal motions. The judge ruled that the affidavits did not meet the technical requirements of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 since they were not executed by a party and that a reasonable person, viewing the true facts, would not harbor doubts concerning his impartiality. Auburn then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. A panel of this court held that a later affidavit executed by the President of Auburn University met the technical requirements of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 and remanded with directions that another judge be assigned to hear the recusal motion. 18 28 Senior District Judge Hobart Grooms was assigned the recusal proceedings, held a hearing and received evidence in the matter. On December 19, 1983, Judge Grooms issued an order granting the motions to disqualify Judge Clemon. Judge Grooms concluded that Judge Clemon's involvement as a counsel of record in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education gave him personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary fact. Judge Grooms also concluded that Judge Clemon's personal and political relationship with former Senator Stewart, then attorney of record for defendant Alabama A & M, raised the appearance of bias. On January 19, 1984, however, Judge Grooms vacated his order and recused himself. 19 Senior Circuit Judge David Dyer then heard defendants' disqualification motions and denied the motions. Judge Dyer found no evidence that Judge Clemon's association with former Senator Stewart would affect the judge's impartiality and concluded that the affidavits did not connect Judge Clemon's involvement in Lee v. Macon to any aspect of the present case. Judge Dyer also denied Auburn's request to certify the issue for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(b). As a result, Judge Clemon presided over and decided this non-jury case.
29 The guarantee to the defendant of a totally fair and impartial tribunal, and the protection of the integrity and dignity of the judicial process from any hint or appearance of bias is the palladium of our judicial system. 20 To ensure that the courts remain above reproach, the Congress passed statutory provisions governing the disqualification of federal judges. The relevant statutes are 28 U.S.C. Secs. 144 and 455. 21 These two statutes control appellants' claim that the lower court erred in failing to disqualify Judge Clemon from presiding over this case. 22 30 Disqualification under Sec. 144 requires that a party file an affidavit demonstrating the judge's personal bias or prejudice against that party or in favor of an adverse party. The statute mandates that the affidavit be filed within a specified time period and that it be accompanied by a certificate of good faith by a counsel of record. If an affidavit is timely and technically correct, the trial judge may not pass upon the truthfulness of the facts stated in the affidavit even when the court knows these allegations to be false. The statute restricts the trial judge to determining whether the facts alleged are legally sufficient to require recusal. 23 The test for legal sufficiency adopted by this Court requires a party to show: 31 1. The facts are material and stated with particularity; 32 2. The facts are such that, if true they would convince a reasonable person that a bias exists. 33 3. The facts show that the bias is personal, as opposed to judicial, in nature. 24 34 In 1974, Congress rewrote 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455 to correct perceived problems in the disqualification statutes. Prior to 1974, both the technical and legal sufficiency requirements of Sec. 144 had been construed strictly in favor of judges. 25 Courts also operated under the so-called duty to sit doctrine which required a judge to hear a case unless a clear demonstration of extrajudicial bias or prejudice was made. 26 Consequently, disqualification of a judge was difficult under Sec. 144. In passing the amended 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455, Congress broadened the grounds and loosened the procedure for disqualification in the federal courts. Although a party still is permitted to make a motion and submit affidavits to bring about a judge's disqualification, the statute places a judge under a self-enforcing obligation to recuse himself where the proper legal grounds exist. 27 The statute also did away with the duty to sit 28 so the benefit of the doubt is now to be resolved in favor of recusal. Section 455(a) requires a judge to disqualify himself when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Thus, under Sec. 455(a) an actual demonstrated prejudice need not exist in order for a judge to recuse himself: disqualification should follow if the reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. 29 Congress expressly intended the amended Sec. 455 to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the courts by eliminating even the appearance of impropriety. 30 Although the courts retained the requirement that the alleged bias or prejudice stem from an extrajudicial source and now permitted the factual accuracy of affidavits submitted under Sec. 455 to be scrutinized, 31 the general effect of this statute was to liberalize greatly the scope of disqualification in the federal courts. 35 The amended Sec. 455 also established a number of bright line rules for disqualification. Mandatory disqualification is provided for in certain situations where the potential for conflicts of interest are readily apparent. For example, under subsection (b), a judge must disqualify himself when he has a financial interest or when a member of his family within the third degree of relationship is a party or lawyer in the case. The statute also states that the parties cannot waive the per se rules of disqualification set out in Sec. 455(b). 32
36 Defendants assert a number of grounds for the disqualification of Judge Clemon. Defendants first allege in their affidavits that Judge Clemon has two minor children and thus is disqualified because these children are members of the plaintiff class. Judge Clemon proudly admits to having two children who were ages 9 and 16 at the time of appellants' motions. The class certified by the trial judge includes all children who are eligible to attend or who will become eligible to attend the public institutions of higher education in the Montgomery, Alabama, area. Consequently, Judge Clemon's children are technically members of this class and possess an interest in the outcome of this litigation. Section 455 provides for disqualification where the judge knows that a minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest ... or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding 33 or if [h]e or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship ... is a party to the proceeding. 34 Defendants argue that the trial judge should be disqualified under the terms of this provision. 37 We conclude that the interests of Judge Clemon's children are not substantial enough to merit disqualification. Any beneficial effects of this suit upon these children were remote, contingent and speculative. There is no evidence that Judge Clemon's children have any desire or inclination to attend a Montgomery area institution. Any potential interest, moreover, is shared by all young black Alabamians. [A]n interest which a judge has in common with many others in a public matter is not sufficient to disqualify him. 35 In similar circumstances where federal judges have possessed speculative interests as members of large groups, the federal courts have held these interests to be too attenuated to warrant disqualification. The courts also have concluded that no personal bias or reasonable doubt about the judge's impartiality exists in these circumstances. 36 Most significant for our decision here is the Fifth Circuit's holding in In re City of Houston. 37 In that case the Fifth Circuit addressed a challenge to a black judge in a voting rights action in which the judge was a class member. The court denied the motion to disqualify, ruling that the posture of the trial judge--possessing an attenuated non-pecuniary interest no different from that of the general voting public in Houston--was not what Congress intended to proscribe in drafting Secs. 144 and 455. We reach the same conclusion here. 38 To disqualify Judge Clemon on the basis of his children's membership in the plaintiff class also would come dangerously close to holding that minority judges must disqualify themselves from all major civil rights actions. As the In re Houston court noted: 39 Many civil rights suits are brought in the form of class actions. Considering the broad declaratory and injunctive relief that federal courts are called upon to dispense, it is hard to imagine a case in which a minority judge would not have a family member within the class.... 38 40 To disqualify minority judges from major civil rights litigation solely because of their minority status is intolerable. This court cannot and will not countenance such a result. The recusal statutes do not contemplate such a double standard for minority judges. The fact that an individual belongs to a minority does not render one biased or prejudiced, or raise doubts about one's impartiality: that one is black does not mean, ipso facto, that he is anti-white; no more than being Jewish implies being anti-Catholic, or being Catholic implies being anti-Protestant. 39 Defendants' argument cuts too broadly since every Alabama judge with children, whether members of the class or not, has an interest in the future of the state university system. 40 As Judge Higginbotham eloquently wrote: 41 It would be a tragic day for the nation and the judiciary if a myopic vision of the judge's role should prevail, a vision that required judges to refrain from participating in their churches, in their non-political community affairs, in their universities. So long as Jewish judges preside over matters where Jewish and Gentile litigants disagree; so long as Protestant judges preside over matters were Protestant and Catholic litigants disagree; so long as white judges preside over matters where white and black litigants disagree, I will preside over matters where black and white litigants disagree. 41 42 Nor can we countenance defendants' claim that Judge Clemon is prejudiced and no longer impartial by virtue of his background as a civil rights lawyer. Appellants point to Judge Clemon's representation of black plaintiffs in race discrimination actions prior to joining the bench as evidence of personal bias in this action. It is well settled that the facts pleaded ... will not suffice to show the personal bias required by the statute if they go to the background and associations of the judge rather than to his appraisal of a party personally. 42 All judges come to the bench with a background of experiences, associations, and viewpoints. As Justice Rehnquist commented, proof that a judge's mind was a complete tabula rasa would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias. 43 A judge is not required to recuse himself merely because he holds and has expressed certain views on a general subject. 44 We conclude that Judge Clemon's background representing plaintiffs in civil rights actions does not warrant disqualification. 45 43 Similarly, the views expressed by Judge Clemon as a political figure and member of the Alabama State Senate do not mandate disqualification. 46 As judges on this court have recognized, [i]t appears to be an inescapable part of our system of government that judges are drawn primarily from lawyers who have participated in public and political affairs. 47 Since the funding and control of public institutions in the instant case are important issues in the Alabama political arena, it is not surprising that Judge Clemon took public positions concerning these institutions prior to becoming a judge. The fact that prior to joining the bench a judge has stated strong beliefs does not indicate that he has prejudged the legal question before him. As noted above, judges have frequently heard cases concerning subjects about which they have previously expressed some views. 48 44 Judge Clemon's involvement in the issues before this court went beyond the mere making of public statements, however. During his tenure in the state legislature, the trial judge actively participated in the very events and shaped the very facts that are at issue in this suit. 49 As chairman of the Senate Rules Committee, Judge Clemon played a critical role in the confirmation of those individuals nominated for positions on the board of trustees of the defendant institutions. Judge Clemon shaped the composition of these governing boards by acting along with other members of his committee to prevent nominations from reaching the Senate floor. For example, press accounts indicate that Judge Clemon was instrumental in preventing the confirmation of Thomas Radney to the Board of Trustees of ASU and that Judge Clemon opposed the nomination on the explicit grounds that Radney's confirmation would have created a white majority on the ASU board. Regardless of whether the specific allegation concerning the Radney nomination is true, it is clear that Judge Clemon's activities in the Senate were relevant to and plainly affected the ultimate outcome of the nomination and confirmation process for the board of trustees of the defendant institutions. Yet Judge Clemon explicitly found at trial that the composition of defendants' governing boards was a relevant and important factor in his finding of liability. In determining whether the dual system had been disestablished, considerations of the racial identifiability of the ... governing boards are probative. His opinion examines in detail the racial composition of the board of trustees for each institution of public higher educaton in Alabama. In his examination of the composition of these governing boards, Judge Clemon was in part examining his own handiwork. 45 While in the statehouse, Judge Clemon also helped spearhead a bill to appropriate $10,000,000 to Alabama A & M. Judge Clemon cosponsored this bill which was intended to provide capital funds to improve A & M's physical plant. The stated premise of this bill was that the facilities of A & M were inferior to those of the historically white universities. Despite then Senator Clemon's best efforts to gain passage of this bill aiding A & M physical plant, the bill failed in the legislature. At trial, A & M cited the defeat of this bill as evidence of racial animus. Thus Judge Clemon was again forced to make factual findings about events in which he was an active participant. At trial, he found the extent of renovations over the last 30 years at A & M to be wanting. Judge Clemon also detailed the poor physical conditions at A & M and found the Alabama's choice of resource allocation for facilities for the period 1965 to 1983 significantly impaired the ability of Alabama State and A & M to attract white students. Regardless of the accuracy of these findings, Judge Clemon was making factual determinations about bills and legislative fights in which he played an active part. 46 The trial judge's activities as a private lawyer also involved him in the disputed evidentiary facts of this case. Judge Clemon served as an attorney of record for individual plaintiffs in the school desegregation case of Lee v. Macon County Board of Education. 50 Filed in 1970, Lee v. Macon included claims under title VI of the Civil Rights Act against many of the same institutions of higher learning as appear here. These claims took place during periods of time which are relevant to the present case under the vestiges theory utilized by plaintiffs. In denying the recusal motion, Judge Clemon stated that he took no part in the portion of Lee v. Macon involving institutions of higher education. He noted that the caption of Lee v. Macon was used in many smaller actions that grew out of the original suit. According to Judge Clemon, his involvement was restricted to the representation of black high school principals in a race discrimination suit. Even this limited involvement in Lee v. Macon, however, left Judge Clemon with knowledge of facts that were in dispute in the instant case. The State's treatment of black high school principals during the period the trial judge represented their cause became a factual issue at trial. Plaintiff presented testimony about the long, continuous history of racially discriminatory employment practices suffered by black high school principals in Alabama. A study also was offered for the purpose of demonstrating that there was, during the period covered [1966-1970], a decrease, substantial decrease in the number of percentage in black educators in Alabama in general and black principals in particular. Over defendants' objection, the trial judge accepted in evidence the testimony and exhibits about the status of Alabama's black high school principals. Judge Clemon admitted this evidence as relevant to prove that as a vestige of the prior de jure system, the state enforced and pursued racially discriminatory employment practices during the period covered by the study. On this issue--whether black high school principals suffered racial discrimination--Judge Clemon was once again faced with evaluating evidence of which he had special extrajudicial knowledge. 47 The language of Sec. 455(b) is unequivocal: 48 [A judge] shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: 49
50 The Reporter's Notes to the Code of Judicial Conduct are equally clear: The Committee also concluded that a judge cannot be, or cannot appear to be, impartial if he has personal knowledge of evidentiary facts that are in dispute. 52 Judge Clemon's disqualification is thus mandated because of his involvement in the disputed factual issues surrounding the composition of defendants' governing boards, the legislative efforts to improve A & M's physical plant, and the State's treatment of black high school principals. Such personal knowledge vitiates the carefully constructed rules of procedure and evidence that ensure deliberate, unbiased fact finding. Litigants also are entitled to have their case decided by a judge who can approach the facts in a detached, objective fashion. Judge Clemon's partisan efforts in these disputes raise legitimate questions about his impartiality in deciding these factual matters. To permit Judge Clemon to decide a case in which he had extrajudicial, personal knowledge of disputed facts would be contrary to the express language and underlying spirit of the statute, as well as the case law. 53 51 This court is not impervious to the burden that disqualification at this juncture places on the court system, the litigants, and the people of Alabama. We recognize that new proceedings before a new judge will exact a not inconsiderable cost in time, energy, and legal fees. 54 The intensity and complexity of this litigation, however, is a measure of its significance. We consider the future of higher education in Alabama too important to be decided under a cloud. In a decision such as this one, a decision which will affect millions of Alabamians, public confidence in the judicial system demands a judge free from personal knowledge or biases about the issues before the court. For this reason, we disqualify Judge Clemon and remand for a new trial. 55