Opinion ID: 1835390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sanctions were properly denied by the trial court under the facts of this case.

Text: By Notice of Review, Siebrecht argues that he was entitled to sanctions under SDCL 15-6-11(a) and (b) or attorney's fees because the present lawsuit was improvidently brought on issues previously raised and adjudicated. The trial court determined that sanctions were not appropriate in this matter. SDCL 15-6-11(a) requires that every pleading, motion and other paper be signed by at least one attorney of record, in his individual name, or, if a party is not represented by an attorney, requires signature of that party. The purpose of such signature is set out within the statute, which states in part: ... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law ... and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation ... Violation of SDCL 15-6-11(a) triggers sanctions under SDCL 15-6-11-(b): If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule [SDCL 15-6-11(a)] the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which shall include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Crowley v. Spearfish Ind. School Dist., 445 N.W.2d 308 (S.D.1989). It appears from the record that Hogg proceeded with this suit in good faith. The advisory committee to Rule 11 noted: The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by inquiring into what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted. 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983). Sanctions are not warranted simply because a summary judgment was awarded. Hogg, through his counsel, vigorously briefed and urged at oral argument before this Court that Vander Vorste v. Northwestern National Bank, 81 S.D. 566, 138 N.W.2d 411, 20 A.L.R.3rd 960 (1965) was controlling and relied upon this lead case in our Court. The argument and theory was artful and creative. We are unwilling, nevertheless, to differ with the trial court's finding that although proceeding with an action such as this appears nonmeritorious based on existing case law, neither sanctions nor attorney's fees are appropriate. For the foregoing reasons, judgment is affirmed in all respects.