Opinion ID: 2599165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of the Motion for Mistrial

Text: Lagat argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial on the ground that the complaining witness cried hysterically throughout the presentation of her testimony. Lagat contends that the sight of Doe's crying so inflamed the jury that his constitutional due process right to a fair trial was compromised. In support of his argument, Lagat cites three Hawai`i cases, none of which are persuasive. In State v. Rulona, 71 Haw. 127, 129, 785 P.2d 615, 616 (1990), this court held that a number of errors committed during trial required that the judgment be vacated and that the case remanded for a new trial. Among these errors was the fact that the trial court had permitted the alleged victim of a sexual assault, an eight-year-old, to testify while seated on the lap of a sexual abuse counselor. Id. at 129-30, 785 P.2d at 616-17. Although HRS § 621-28 (1985) provided that [a] child less than fourteen years of age, involved in a judicial proceeding, ... shall have the right to be accompanied by a ... victim/witness counselor, this court held that it was an abuse of discretion to allow such a prejudicial scenario, where there was no compelling necessity to do so. Id. at 130, 785 P.2d at 617. The record revealed that the child was frightened to be there as a witness[] and would feel better if she sat on the sexual abuse counselor's lap. Id. This court acknowledged that [m]ost witnesses appearing in trial for the first time, even adults, are frightened, but held that such apprehension was insufficient to demonstrate a compelling necessity. Id. In State v. Suka, 70 Haw. 472, 777 P.2d 240 (1989), the fifteen-year-old complaining witness in a sexual assault and kidnapping case was allowed to testify while a representative of the Victim Witness Kokua Program sat next to her and then stood behind her and placed her hands on the complainant's shoulders. Id. at 473, 777 P.2d at 241. This court agreed with the appellant's contention that his due process rights were violated, noting that HRS § 621-28 was inapplicable given the age of the complaining witness. Id. at 477, 777 P.2d at 243. Additionally, this court determined that allowing a victim counselor to take the stand alongside the complaining witness could have had the effect of conveying to the jury [the counselor's] belief that complainant was telling the truth, thereby denying defendant the right to a fair and impartial trial. Id. at 476, 777 P.2d at 242. Again, the record did not support the conclusion that the complainant would have been unable to testify absent the presence of the counselor and indicated only that the complainant was having difficulty testifying without crying[.] Id. at 477, 777 P.2d at 243. Finally, Lagat directs this court to State v. Palabay, 9 Haw.App. 414, 844 P.2d 1 (1992), cert. denied, 74 Haw. 652, 849 P.2d 81 (1993). In Palabay, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) held that it was error for the trial court to allow the complaining witness, a twelve-year-old girl who was the alleged victim of a sexual assault, to testify while holding a teddy bear. See id. at 420-24, 844 P.2d at 5-7. The ICA framed the issue as whether a defendant's right to a fair trial is violated when a child witness is allowed to hold an inanimate object such as a teddy bear while testifying[.] Id. at 422, 844 P.2d at 6. Ultimately, the ICA accepted the appellant's argument that the teddy bear might bolster the complainant's credibility and that the trial court abused its discretion because no compelling necessity required the witness to use a prop. See id. at 424, 844 P.2d at 7. The foregoing cases are inapposite to Lagat's case because, in all three cases, the issue involved the presence of additional people or the use of props at the witness stand, not the presence of tears rolling down the complaining witness's cheeks. There is no indication in any of the above cases that crying, alone, constituted a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. As noted by the Colorado Court of Appeals, other jurisdictions have indicated that outbursts of emotion by witnesses do not automatically prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial. In People v. Ned, 923 P.2d 271 (Colo.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 923 P.2d 271 (Colo.1996), the mother of the victim was asked questions that required her to testify about the actual killing of her child. See id. at 276. The witness began crying, thrashing about in the witness stand, shaking herself back and forth, screeching, screaming, and stamping her feet. Id. The trial court found that, although the display was emotional, it was not `necessarily out of place' or provoked by anything except the circumstances surrounding the death of [the witness's] son. Id. Perceiving no error, the Colorado Court of Appeals stated that other jurisdictions have approved the denial of a mistrial when witnesses have become distraught. See Venable v. State, 260 Ark. 201, 538 S.W.2d 286 (1976) (no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial where victim's stepmother broke down on the witness stand and asked why anyone would want to kill the victim; jury admonished)[;] Duncan v. State, 256 Ga. 391, 349 S.E.2d 699 (1986) (no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial following outburst by victim's mother while she was on the stand; jury instructed to ignore the outburst)[;] Commonwealth v. Andrews, 403 Mass. 441, 530 N.E.2d 1222 (1988) (no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial in murder case based upon spontaneous outburst by victim's mother while identifying photograph of victim; jury immediately instructed to disregard the emotional display). Ned, 923 P.2d at 276. The facts of the case before this court are more akin to Ned than to Rulona, Suka, or Palabay. Lagat's argument that Doe cried hysterically throughout the presentation of her testimony is an overstatement. The record indicates that Doe cried initially when she took the witness stand, that she continued crying after a recess was called, and that the judge felt it necessary to call a second recess when it became obvious that she was not in control of her emotions. During the second recess, the trial court specifically directed the prosecutor to caution the witness, discussed the potential for prejudice, and suggested that counsel draft cautionary instructions in the event they should prove necessary at a later stage of the trial. When Doe returned to the witness stand in the afternoon, she completed a lengthy direct and cross-examination without any further outbursts. The trial court took appropriate and successful steps to minimize any prejudicial effect that may have resulted from Doe's crying. Lagat's counsel expressly elected not to pursue the cautionary instruction to avoid any further attention being drawn to the crying. Moreover, Lagat's bald assertion that he was denied the right to a fair trial, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a prima facie showing of prejudice. Based on our review of the record, we refuse to second-guess the trial court concerning the prejudice, if any, that occurred as a result of Doe's crying during the initial stages of her testimony. The fact that the jury returned guilty verdicts of lesser included offenses in four counts suggests that the jury was not completely swayed in favor of the prosecution by virtue of Doe's outbursts. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lagat's motion for mistrial.