Opinion ID: 3011150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rifice

Text: Hurley argues in her cross-appeal that the district court's aiding and abetting charge misstated the law under the LAD by requiring a finding of affirmative sexual harassment before Rifice could be found individually liable. She also argues that the district court erred by striking her punitive damage claim against Rifice. We agree. As noted above, the district court's aiding and abetting charge provided that the individual defendants such as Nicholas Rifice and Henry Madamba . . . may only be held liable for their individual, affirmative wrongful acts. XXII App. at 5284. However, in Failla, we expressly rejected this view and concluded that inaction can form the basis of aiding and abetting liability if it rises to the level of providing substantial assistance or encouragement. Failla, 146 F.3d at 158 n.11. Accordingly, the district court's charge misstated the law under the LAD. The district court noted that the charge might well have determined the jury's verdict. See Hurley, 933 F. Supp. at 417-18. The evidence against Rifice mainly concerned his awareness of and apparent indifference to the harassment. Rifice testified that he did nothing to stop the harassment because the harassers should already have known better _________________________________________________________________ 28. Madamba additionally argues that the jury instructions were flawed because they covered aiding and abetting another person's unlawful acts and then, when the jury inquired further, the court stated that the defendant had to willfully and knowingly associate himself with the unlawful act. Madamba Letter at 8. He argues that this is erroneous because the instruction should have required association with the employer and not the act. This is a misreading of Failla, which rejected a shared intent requirement. Moreover, Madamba was associated with his employer as a matter of course. Finally, the New Jersey Appellate Division case of Baliko v. Stecker, 645 A.2d 1218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), undermines Madamba's position. Baliko held that aiding and abetting liability could exist when one union member aided other union members and the sum total of acts was sufficient to cause the union to be liable. 51 and he did not believe that he could do anything about it. This kind of knowing inaction by a high-level employee with responsibility over Hurley and her harassers could, we think, rise to the level of substantial assistance. We will therefore vacate the judgment in favor of Rifice and the district court's order striking plaintiff's punitive damage claim against Rifice.