Opinion ID: 2582014
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the State Qualify as an Employer under the IWA prior to 2003?

Text: Employees argue that the IWA has unambiguously defined employer to include the State since the legislature extensively revised the statute in 1973 and expanded coverage to all employees in Washington. [4] They do not concede the possibility that the language of chapter 49.12 RCW and chapter 296-126 WAC is ambiguous. The State responds that the plain language of the statute and the rules does not include the State because the language applies only to private industry. The State also contends that even if the statute and rules are ambiguous, the history of the IWA demonstrates that the statute had always been intended to apply only to private industry. Employees further argue that the definition of employer in the IWA includes persons and that the IWA applies to the State because the definition of person under RCW 1.16.080 includes the State. Employees claim that the purpose of the IWA is to protect all employees in the state of Washington, and if public employees were not protected by the IWA, they would be left unprotected. The State responds that public employees have always been subject to, and protected by, civil service laws and regulations. Therefore, according to the State, the Employees' claim that state employees would be left unprotected if not covered by the IWA is false. As the wide gulf between the parties' positions suggests, the definitions of the terms person and employer may be subject to a variety of interpretations. If the statute's meaning is plain on its face, the court must give effect to that plain meaning. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash.2d 224, 239, 59 P.3d 655 (2002). A statute is ambiguous, however, when it is fairly susceptible to different, reasonable interpretations, either on its face or as applied to particular facts, and must be construed to avoid strained or absurd results. Strain v. W. Travel, Inc., 117 Wash.App. 251, 254, 70 P.3d 158 (2003). Nevertheless, a statute is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable and courts are not obligated to find ambiguity by seeking out alternate interpretations. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash.2d at 239-40, 59 P.3d 655. Prior to 1988, the language used in RCW 49.12.005(3) arguably was subject to the varying interpretations espoused by the parties in this case. In 1988, however, the legislature adopted legislation specifying that the the state, any state institution, any state agency, political subdivisions of the state, and any municipal corporation or quasi-municipal corporations qualified as an employer for purposes of certain new family care leave provisions of the IWA. LAWS OF 1988, ch. 236, § 8(3). Like the 1988 amendment, the legislature explicitly made the IWA section enacted in 1998 specifically applicable to the State. If the IWA already applied to the State, this language would be superfluous. The legislature is presumed not to include unnecessary language when it enacts legislation. See Davis v. State ex rel. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 969, 977 P.2d 554 (1999) (A fundamental canon of construction holds a statute should not be interpreted so as to render one part inoperative.); Judd, 152 Wash.2d at 202, 95 P.3d 337 (no portion of a statute shall be rendered meaningless or superfluous through interpretation). Giving proper effect to the language employed by the legislature in 1988 and 1998, it is clear that at least as of 1988 only those sections of the IWA specified by the legislature applied to the State. We hold, therefore, that the IWA did not apply to the State for the purposes underlying Employees' claims. For this reason, the trial court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed.