Opinion ID: 1292001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eligibility for a Temporary Restricted License

Text: Iowa Code section 321J.12 states: A defendant whose alcohol concentration is more than .10 shall not be eligible for any temporary restricted license for at least thirty days if a test was obtained and ... the defendant's alcohol concentration exceeded .15. Iowa Code § 321J.12(2)( b ) (Supp.2003). In a cross-appeal, Lee contends this bar on a temporary restricted license should not apply because his alcohol concentration was, in fact, less than .15 at the time he was driving. Lee's argument may be broken down into its legal and factual parts. In his legal argument, Lee contends the alcohol concentration referred to in Iowa Code section 321J.12(2)( b ) concerns his condition at the time he was driving, not at the time he took the breath test. In support of this claim, Lee argues the so-called relation-back provision of the drunk driving criminal statute, see Iowa Code section 321J.2(8)( a ), should apply in this administrative proceeding. In his factual argument, Lee points to the opinion of his expert witness, the stipulation of the parties in his criminal case, the margin of error of the breath test machine, and an inadmissible preliminary breath test result taken at the scene of the stop. Lee posits this evidence proves his alcohol concentration was, in fact, less than .15 at the time he was driving.
The agency concluded Iowa Code section 321J.12 does not require IDOT to prove Lee's alcohol concentration at the time he was driving. On appeal, Lee contends it is absurd to think the legislature in devising a driver's license revocation statute would care what his alcohol concentration was at any other time than when he was driving. Lee posits section 321J.2(8), the so-called relation-back provision of the OWI statute, should apply in this administrative proceeding. Although there is a blush of logic in Lee's argument, it once again conflates criminal and administrative proceedings. By its own terms, section 321J.2(8) only applies to any prosecution under this section, i.e., criminal proceedings brought under section 321J.2. Section 321J.12, on the other hand, does not contain any language requiring IDOT to prove the licensee's alcohol concentration at the time of driving. That is, unlike Iowa Code section 321J.2, a criminal statute directed at drunk driving, Iowa Code section 321J.12, an administrative statute directed at chemical-test failure, does not contain a relation-back provision like section 321J.2(8). Legislative intent is expressed by omission as well as by inclusion, and we decline to write such a provision into section 321J.12. Wiebenga v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 1995). Although under the implied consent doctrine the test must be administered within two hours of driving, nothing in the statute requires IDOT to show the driver's alcohol concentration exceeded .15 at the time of vehicle operation. Cf. Saunders, 226 N.W.2d at 22 (The question of whether plaintiff was in fact operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage ... is not an issue in this civil proceeding....). To the contrary, the legislature has expressly indicated these administrative proceedings should be limited to, inter alia, whether the defendant took the test and whether those test results indicated an alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit. See Iowa Code § 321J.13(2)( b ) (2003). In considering Lee's legal claim, the reviewing officer correctly concluded Iowa Code section 321J.12 does not require IDOT to prove Lee's alcohol concentration at the time he was driving.
On appeal, Lee argues there is not substantial evidence to show he had an alcohol concentration greater than .15 at the time he was driving. As indicated, however, the issue in this administrative hearing is whether his alcohol concentration exceeded .15 at the time of the test. Accordingly, we do not reach Lee's factual claim. The agency's finding that Lee's alcohol concentration exceeded .15 at the time of the test stands, and we affirm on the temporary restricted license issue. We have considered all other arguments Lee presents and find them insufficiently preserved, lacking merit, or necessarily resolved in the foregoing analysis. We specifically point out, however, that our decision in Pietig v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 385 N.W.2d 251 (Iowa 1986), which Lee briefs extensively, is inapposite. Pietig is irrelevant to our disposition of this case because it merely judicially defined revocation as the termination of the licensee's authority to drive. 385 N.W.2d at 253. Implicitly premised upon the differences between administrative and criminal proceedings, Pietig held that an administrative revocation that was never implemented did not preclude a later criminal revocation. 385 N.W.2d at 251-54.