Opinion ID: 2460345
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Witness in Jail Clothing

Text: What this research has revealed is that the law is less settled regarding whether witnesses should be permitted to testify in jail clothing, but a majority of jurisdictions have concluded that requiring a witness who is called by the State to testify in jail clothing may affect the defendant's right to a fair trial. See Annot., 16 A.L.R.4th 1356. The results are not the same if the witness is called by the defense. We addressed this situation in State v. Bradford, 254 Kan. 133, 864 P.2d 680 (1993). In Bradford, the defendant moved for a mistrial after a defense witness testified while in chains and jail clothing. The defendant argued the use of chains could have caused jurors to base their evaluation of the witness' credibility on unacceptable factors. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Bradford court observed that the defendant called this witness to testify concerning events that allegedly occurred while he and the witness were incarcerated. The defendant did not request that either the jail clothing or chains be removed. The Bradford court stated that the witness' courtroom appearance was controlled by Bradford, not by the State. Bradford, 254 Kan. at 143, 864 P.2d 680. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we further noted that the court offered to have the chains removed when the witness' appearance was first brought to its attention. Bradford, 254 Kan. at 143, 864 P.2d 680. The facts of Bradford are so distinguishable the decision is not particularly helpful. Here, we do not have a witness being called by the defense; rather the State controlled West's and Jackson's appearance in the courtroom. Further, the individuals wearing jail clothing in our case were not witnesses and had not been listed as potential witnesses, so there was no advance notice to Ward. Despite these distinctions, it is noteworthy that Bradford 's rationale implies that a witness ordinarily should not testify in a jury trial while wearing jail clothing. To emphasize the appropriateness of that conclusion and to suggest that the conclusion's doctrinal basis is the presumption of innocence, Ward points us to the rationale used by appellate courts in other jurisdictions that have disapproved of the practice of having witnesses testify in jail clothing. These cases Gibson v. State, 233 S.W.3d 447 (Tex.App.2007), and State v. Kuchera, 198 N.J. 482, 969 A.2d 1052 (2009) do not fully support her argument, however. In the first of these cases, Gibson, the Texas Court of Appeals found it was within the trial court's discretion to require witnesses to appear in jail clothing if the circumstances warranted it. There, the defendant knew the witness was in jail and would likely be called to testify, but the defendant did not make a timely request that the witness be permitted to testify in street clothing. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the witness' jail clothing and handcuffs. Although the Texas Court of Appeals believed it is better to require that no witness testify in jail clothing, it held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. Gibson, 233 S.W.3d at 453. In the second case cited by Ward, Kuchera, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that as a general rule, witnesses for either the State or defense should not testify in jail clothing. The general rule, however, was tempered by the court's recognition that such attire may be affirmatively permitted by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion. Kuchera, 198 N.J. at 486, 969 A.2d 1052. Still, the court narrowed that discretion by indicating that requiring a witness to testify in jail clothing `further[s] no vital State interest,' Kuchera, 198 N.J. at 499, 969 A.2d 1052 (quoting State v. Artwell, 177 N.J. 526, 539 832 A.2d 295 [2003]), and it similarly prejudices the defendant in terms of his witness' credibility and the suggestion of `guilt by association.' Kuchera, 198 N.J. at 499, 969 A.2d 1052 (quoting Artwell, 177 N.J. at 539, 832 A.2d 295). Ward points out that unlike the situations in Gibson and Kuchera, Ward, through her counsel, did voice an objection to the presence of the jail-clothed individuals. She also acknowledges, however, that these cases do not directly address the issue before this court where it is the appearance of a nonwitness that raises a question of prejudice. Furthermore, several other cases regarding witnesses do not support Ward's arguments. While these courts have recognized the risk of unfair prejudice to a defendant when witnesses are forced to testify in jail clothing or restraints, many have concluded that the practice does not adversely affect the defendant's presumption of innocence or imply that the defendant is disposed to commit crimes. Rather, the potential prejudice has been seen as arising because of the impact on the witness' credibility. See, e.g., Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632, 635 (7th Cir.1982) (Although the shackling of defense witnesses may be less prejudicial to the accused because it does not directly affect the presumption of innocence, . . . nevertheless it may harm his defense by detracting from his witness' credibility.); People v. Froehlig, 1 Cal.App.4th 260, 264, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 858 (1991) (The appearance of a defense witness attired in prison clothes does not, of course, adversely affect the presumption of innocence or carry with it the inference that the defendant is a person disposed to commit crimes. . . . The credibility of a defense witness observed by the jury in prison attire may be suspect, but the prejudicial impact upon the defense is considered `less consequential.'); Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471, 475, 305 N.E.2d 830 (1974) (The shackling of a witness . . . may influence a jury's judgment of credibility and further hurt the defendant in so far as the witness is conceived to be associated with him.); Hightower v. State, 123 Nev. 55, 58, 154 P.3d 639 (2007) ([R]equiring an incarcerated defense witness to appear in prison clothing may prejudice the accused by undermining the witness's credibility in an impermissible manner.); State v. Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d 383, 399, 635 P.2d 694 (1981) (While a shackled witness may not directly affect the [defendant's] presumption of innocence, it seems plain that there may be some inherent prejudice to defendant, as the jury may doubt the witness' credibility.). In this case, we are not concerned about the credibility of West or Jackson, who did not testify, and these cases do not support a conclusion that their presence in the courtroom while in jail clothing infringed on Ward's right to be presumed innocent.