Opinion ID: 2614917
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Judicial Construction

Text: Our construction of the applicable statutory language has been both confusing and contradictory. We first addressed the issue of concurrent employment in Butler v. Industrial Comm'n, 50 Ariz. 516, 73 P.2d 703 (1937). In Butler, the claimant was injured while working for two employers and while travelling from one employer to the other. Id. at 517-19, 73 P.2d at 703-05. The claimant worked as a groundskeepernight watchman and a parking attendant, and both employers were primarily controlled and owned by the same individual. Id. at 517-18, 73 P.2d at 703-04. In light of those unique facts, we held that the average monthly wage determination should be based on the claimant's combined wages from both employers  a holding constituting the reasonable, logical, and just construction of the nature of [claimant's] employment. Id. at 525, 73 P.2d at 706. In Wells v. Industrial Comm'n, 63 Ariz. 264, 161 P.2d 113 (1945), we first squarely addressed the issue presented in this case. The claimant in Wells worked for two unrelated employers as a salesperson and a painter, and the Commission used claimant's wages from both employers to determine his average monthly wage. Id. at 265, 161 P.2d at 114-13. We construed Butler as holding that where a workman is employed by two or more employers, and is injured while in the employ of one, he is entitled to have his wages calculated on the total wages received. Wells, 63 Ariz. at 267, 161 P.2d at 114. We stated that the applicable statutory language and the purposes of the Act indicated that all wages should be combined, id. at 269-70, 161 P.2d at 115-16, and noted that other courts construing similar statutory provisions held that the proper wage is the total received from all employers. Id. at 271, 161 P.2d at 116 (citing cases). Thus, we held that wages from both employers should be combined because that result reasonably represented claimant's monthly earning capacity from all employment at the time of injury. Id. at 269, 161 P.2d at 115. Any other construction of the statute would result in great injustice and lead to absurdities. Id. at 271, 161 P.2d at 116. Wells, however, was short-lived. In Faulkner v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Ariz. 76, 223 P.2d 905 (1950), the court limited Wells and Butler. In Faulkner, the claimant worked primarily for the United States Veterans Administration but had been injured while working at a race track. Faulkner, 71 Ariz. at 77, 223 P.2d at 905. After finding that the Veterans Administration was not covered by the Act, the court affirmed the Commission's decision basing benefits solely on claimant's race track wages. Id. at 78-79, 223 P.2d at 905-06. The court reasoned that any other ruling would prevent the Commission from receiving premiums to the full extent of insurance coverage and would jeopardize the solvency of the compensation fund. Id. at 78, 223 P.2d at 906. Thus, Faulkner limited Wells and Butler to claims, as in the present case, where the Act covers both employers. Faulkner, 71 Ariz. at 78, 223 P.2d at 906. The death knell came for Wells and Butler in a pair of cases decided in the mid-1960s. In Sanchez v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Ariz. 19, 391 P.2d 579 (1964), the claimant, who also worked part-time as a musician, was injured while working as a miner. Id. at 20, 391 P.2d at 580. The specific issue decided in Sanchez was whether the computation of claimant's post-injury loss of earning capacity should have considered his pre-injury earnings as a musician. Id. at 23, 391 P.2d at 582. After discussing Faulkner, the court, in a conclusory manner, stated: Faulkner is consistent with the usual rule, sometimes adopted into statute, that where employments are dissimilar the earnings will not be combined. Any inference to the contrary arising out of Wells v. Industrial Commission, 63 Ariz. 264, 161 P.2d 113, is specifically overruled. The Commission could not, as a basis for compensation, have combined the earnings prior to the injury of the dissimilar employments of miner and musician. Sanchez, 96 Ariz. at 23, 391 P.2d at 582 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The next year, in Wesolowski v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Ariz. 4, 405 P.2d 887 (1965), again without discussion, the court merely cited Sanchez and stated that wages from concurrent dissimilar employment could not be aggregated. Wesolowski, 99 Ariz. at 6, 405 P.2d at 888. The issue was decided. With little discussion and no statutory analysis, Sanchez and Wesolowski explicitly overruled Wells and either implicitly overruled Butler or limited that case to its facts. We have not revisited the concurrent dissimilar employment rule in the nearly thirty years following Sanchez and Wesolowski. During this time, although these two cases have been criticized, see Wiley, mem. dec. at 4-5; Wheeler v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Ariz. App. 488, 490, 528 P.2d 874, 876 (1975), wages from concurrent dissimilar employment have not been combined in determining the applicable average monthly wage, see, e.g., Scott v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 Ariz. App. 20, 23-24, 461 P.2d 499, 502-03 (1969); Riggins v. Industrial Comm'n, 9 Ariz. App. 469, 472, 453 P.2d 980, 983 (1969); Mickelson v. Industrial Comm'n, 7 Ariz. App. 182, 192, 437 P.2d 666, 676 (1968). During this same period, however, wages from concurrent similar employment have been aggregated in determining the pre-injury average monthly wage. See Floyd Hartshorn Plastering Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Ariz. App. 498, 500, 506-08, 494 P.2d 398, 400, 406-08 (1972). Wiley challenges this dichotomy. Wiley argues that we should overrule Sanchez and Wesolowski and combine wages from concurrent dissimilar employment. Wiley makes two arguments: (1) as a matter of statutory construction, the Act does not distinguish between wages received from similar or dissimilar employment and all wages should be combined in determining the applicable average monthly wage, and (2) combining wages when employment is similar but refusing to combine wages when employment is dissimilar deprives Wiley of his rights under the United States and Arizona Constitutions. Because resolution of the first argument may obviate our need to address Wiley's constitutional argument, we begin with the statutory question. See State v. Yslas, 139 Ariz. 60, 63, 676 P.2d 1118, 1121 (1984).