Opinion ID: 2753112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eligibility for Extreme Hardship Waiver

Text: An alien may receive a waiver under INA § 212(h) if, among other reasons, removal would result in extreme hardship to family members who are United States citizens or lawful residents. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). “No waiver shall be granted,” however, if the alien “has not lawfully resided continuously in the United States for a period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation of [removal] proceedings.” Id. § 1182(h) (emphasis added). In Yepez-Razo v. Gonzales, we observed that the phrase “lawfully resided continuously” was unclear. 445 F.3d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 2006). There, we chose not to define “lawfully resided continuously” in the first instance because we are prohibited from “‘intrud[ing] upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency.’” Id. at 1219 n.6 (alteration in original) (quoting Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16). A few months later, the BIA agreed that “lawfully resided continuously” is an ambiguous phrase, and it addressed this issue in a precedential opinion, Rotimi, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 571. There, Rotimi entered the United States in 1995 as a nonimmigrant visitor with permission to remain for six months. Id. at 568. Within the six-month time period, he filed an application for asylum, which was denied. Id. He VARGAS CERVANTES V. HOLDER 13 then married a United States citizen, received an immediaterelative visa, and ultimately became a lawful permanent resident in 1997. Id. In 2003, DHS served Rotimi with a notice to appear based on his commission of a CIMT. Id. at 569. He claimed that he qualified for a waiver under § 212(h) because he had lawfully resided in the United States for more than seven years. Although he had been a lawful permanent resident for only five years, he claimed that he began “lawfully residing” in the United States when he entered the country lawfully. The BIA rejected Rotimi’s argument, holding that “‘lawfully resided’ connotes more than simple presence or residence.” Id. at 572. It then explained that residence is not “lawful” unless “authorized or in harmony with the law.” Id. at 574. Because lawful residence is a privilege “that an alien can[not] achieve through self-action alone,” the BIA explained that “lawfully” entering the country is not enough. Id. at 572. Furthermore, it held that being an applicant for an adjustment of status, by itself, does not qualify as continuous lawful residence for purposes of § 212(h). Id. at 577–78. Accordingly, the BIA concluded that Rotimi did not qualify for a waiver under § 212(h) even though he physically resided in the United States, because he did not lawfully reside in the United States until he became a lawful permanent resident. Id. Here, we must consider whether Vargas “lawfully resided” in the United States between June 12, 2001, when his wife filed an application on his behalf for an adjustment of status, and July 10, 2008, when DHS issued the Notice to Appear. In considering this question, we are guided by the two-step analysis set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron, we first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. If the 14 VARGAS CERVANTES V. HOLDER statute is silent or ambiguous, we then consider “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. The agency’s interpretation need not be the best construction of the ambiguous statute. Id. at 843 n.11. The first step of the Chevron analysis is straightforward here because we previously observed that “lawfully resided continuously” is an unclear phrase. Yepez-Razo, 445 F.3d at 1218; see also Rotimi, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 571. Therefore, under the second step of the Chevron analysis, the BIA’s decision is entitled to deference so long as it is reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44; see also Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“The BIA’s precedential decisions interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act are entitled to Chevron deference.”). The BIA concluded that “actual approval, not simply the submission, of the application [for lawful permanent resident status] is required before the alien can claim to have been accorded the privilege of residing permanently in this country.” Rotimi, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 574. That conclusion is reasonable. The BIA’s decision finds support in the text of the statute, in the statute’s legislative history, in a comparison of the statute with other sections of the INA that use similar language, and in case law distinguishing between an alien who has applied for a particular status and one who has been granted such status. See id. at 573–77. Accordingly, we defer to the BIA’s decision, and in doing so, we join the Second and Eleventh Circuits. See Rotimi v. Holder, 577 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Quinchia v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 552 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2008). Vargas’s situation is indistinguishable from Rotimi. Although he applied for lawful permanent resident status in 2001, he did not begin lawfully residing in the United States VARGAS CERVANTES V. HOLDER 15 until February 21, 2002—the day he became a lawful permanent resident. As in Rotimi, the time Vargas resided in the United States while his application for lawful permanent residency was pending does not count as lawful residence because his application did not confer upon him any status or benefit. Since Vargas had not lawfully resided in the United States for seven years when he was served with notice to appear, the IJ and the BIA correctly decided that Vargas does not qualify for a waiver under § 212(h).