Opinion ID: 2226823
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the inconsistent jury verdicts

Text: Apart from the collateral estoppel issues, I am also bewildered at the nonchalance with which the majority has trivialized the confused and inconsistent jury verdicts in this case. While it is understandable that a lay jury may be moved by a sympathetic plaintiff, it troubles me greatly to speculate that a majority of this court may have been similarly swayed. In count I of its complaint, plaintiff claimed that it was injured and that it sustained damages when Touche Ross negligently failed to, inter alia: (a) report and describe accurately the market value of the Newell investments; (b) promptly advise [the Congregation] of any material change in the nature and/or balance of such investment   ; (c) physically inspect or confirm by direct correspondence with independent custodians the Newell investments; (d) test the market value of the Newell investments by reference to published market quotations; (e) assure accurate Reports on the nature of the Newell investments;   . With respect to the contract count, count III, plaintiff incorporated verbatim the same allegations alleged in the negligence count. Under these circumstances, if plaintiff proved its case, the amount of recovery under either theory should have been the same. Indeed, plaintiff never claimed that its damages would be different depending on the theory of recovery. Plaintiff claimed the same damages, $3,819,352, for both the negligence malpractice and the contract count. Nonetheless, the jury managed to return two inconsistent verdicts. The jury awarded plaintiff $3.9 million on the malpractice count, and $1.5 million on the contract count. These verdicts should have been set aside. It is true that verdicts are to be liberally construed and may be amended to conform to the evidence. ( Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1978), 73 Ill.2d 127, 148, 23 Ill.Dec. 58, 383 N.E.2d 929.) In order for a court to amend a jury verdict, however, the intent of the jury must be clear. ( Churchill, 73 Ill.2d at 148, 23 Ill.Dec. 58, 383 N.E.2d 929.) In this case, it is impossible to discern the intent of the jury. Taken individually, neither verdict is so far removed from the actual loss claimed as to elicit concern. A court could reasonably interpret the $3.9 million malpractice award as the jury's attempt to fully compensate the plaintiff for its entire claim. On the other hand, a court could conclude that the $1.5 million award logically represents the jury's intent to deduct a given amount from plaintiff's claimed losses due to contributory negligence or failure to mitigate damages. These two verdicts, however, are impossible to justify when taken together. As the majority points out, [b]oth the tort and contract counts were based on the same facts and sought recovery for the same injury. (159 Ill.2d at 172, 201 Ill.Dec. at 86, 636 N.E.2d at 518.) Rather than remanding for a new trial, however, the majority finds that the jury's intent regarding damages on the tort count is clear, thus the conflicting verdicts do not warrant a reversal. The fatal error in the majority's opinion stems from its individualized and faulty analysis of the verdicts. The majority first finds that the $3.9 million award demonstrates that the intent of the jury was to award plaintiff the full amount of its damages on the tort count. (159 Ill.2d at 172, 201 Ill.Dec. at 87, 636 N.E.2d at 519.) Next, without explanation, the majority finds that the $1.5 million verdict returned by the jury on the contract count does not bear any ascertainable relationship to the loss suffered by plaintiff. (159 Ill.2d at 172, 201 Ill.Dec. at 87, 636 N.E.2d at 519.) This latter finding, however, completely overlooks the possibility that the jury may have found the plaintiff partly responsible for its losses. Indeed, the $1.5 million verdict bears no ascertainable relationship to the loss suffered by plaintiff only if the $3.9 million award is viewed as demonstrative of the jury's intent. There is, however, no proof that this is so and the majority does not offer a rationale for its conclusion. It appears that the majority finds that the $3.9 million award bears a truer relationship to the amount lost only because it analyzed that verdict first. Had the majority decided to analyze the $1.5 million award first, perhaps it would have found that the $3.9 million award bears no relationship to the loss. In fact, this would make more sense as the plaintiff asked for $3,819,352, not $3.9 million. Even if we were to ignore the collateral estoppel problem, given the irreconcilable discrepancy in the verdicts arising from the same facts and issues, I would remand this cause for a new trial on that issue alone.