Opinion ID: 1935115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Prior Inconsistent Statements of Lesando and Merlo

Text: Defendant challenges the introduction of statements made to the prosecution by Peter Lesando and Michael Merlo. Those statements related conversations that they had had with defendant while in prison in which defendant admitted his involvement in the murders and that he had been the shooter. Both Lesando and Merlo informed the prosecutor before trial that they would not testify to those conversations or the statements because they could not remember the events having occurred. The State sought to have Lesando's and Merlo's statements introduced as prior inconsistent statements pursuant to Evidence Rule 63(1)(a) (now N.J.R.E. 803(a)). Based on findings in separate evidentiary hearings, the court determined that both Lesando and Merlo were feigning their lack of recollection, and concluded that the prosecution could introduce their prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. New Jersey Rule of Evidence 803(a)(1) states in part: The following statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule: (a) Prior statements of witnesses. A statement previously made by a person who is a witness at a trial or hearing, provided it would have been admissible if made by the declarant while testifying and the statement: (1) is inconsistent with the witness' testimony at the trial or hearing   . However, when the statement is offered by the party calling the witness, it is admissible only if, in addition to the foregoing requirements, it (A) is contained in a sound recording or in a writing made or signed by the witness in circumstances establishing its reliability   . ( N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1) restates almost verbatim the text of former Evidence Rule 63(1)(a).) In State v. Mancine, 124 N.J. 232, 246-47, 590 A. 2d 1107 (1991), and State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1, 7-9, 577 A. 2d 806 (1990), we explained that amendments to Evidence Rule 63(1)(a) represented New Jersey's movement away from the orthodox view, under which such evidence was admissible only for impeachment purposes, and toward the more accepted, modern approach that the prior inconsistent statement of the proponent's witness could be admitted as substantive evidence. In Gross, we expressed our agreement with fifteen factors that the Appellate Division had enumerated for proper evaluation of the reliability of a prior inconsistent statement. 121 N.J. at 10, 577 A. 2d 806 (quoting State v. Gross, 216 N.J. Super. 98, 109-10, 523 A. 2d 215 (1987)). We held that in determining the admissibility of such statements, the court should be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence is sufficiently reliable for presentation to the jury, noting that the required availability for cross-examination provided additional safeguards for reliability. Id. at 10-17, 523 A. 2d 215. The issue presented by defendant's appeal is whether the State in a criminal prosecution can introduce the prior inconsistent statement of its witness when the witness testifies that he cannot recall either making the statement or the events described in the statement, and the court determines that the witness is feigning that lack of recollection. Defendant claims that the prior statements were inadmissible under Evidence Rule 63(1)(a) because the witness's failure to recall the statements or the events they related did not constitute testimony that was inconsistent with the prior statements. Furthermore, defendant claims that even if the statements were inconsistent, admitting them as substantive evidence in such circumstances violates defendant's state constitutional right to confront witnesses, because the lack of recollection, even if feigned, makes effective cross-examination impossible. In State v. Bryant, 217 N.J. Super. 72, 524 A. 2d 1291, certif. denied, 108 N.J. 202, 528 A. 2d 24, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 978, 108 S.Ct. 490, 98 L.Ed. 2d 488 (1987), the Appellate Division squarely addressed the issue and, although acknowledging that courts were divided on the question, determined that the witness's prior inconsistent statement was admissible under the hearsay exception and did not violate the defendant's federal and state constitutional right to confront witnesses. Id. at 77-79, 524 A. 2d 1291. The court reached that same conclusion in State v. Burgos, 200 N.J. Super. 6, 10-12, 490 A. 2d 316 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 304, 501 A. 2d 961 (1985). We begin by observing that the federal courts generally agree that a feigned lack of recollection regarding the facts contained in a prior statement constitutes inconsistent testimony and is not excluded as hearsay. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 563, 108 S.Ct. 838, 844-45, 98 L.Ed. 2d 951, 960 (1988) (It would seem strange    to assert that a witness can avoid introduction of testimony from a prior proceeding that is inconsistent with his trial testimony by simply asserting lack of memory of the facts to which the prior testimony related.); United States v. Bigham, 812 F. 2d 943, 946-47 (5th Cir.1987) (discussing advisory committee note to federal rule that exception for prior inconsistent statements would protect against turncoat witnesses); United States v. DiCaro, 772 F. 2d 1314, 1321-22 (7th Cir.1985) (noting accepted view that inconsistent within meaning of hearsay exclusion does not mean diametrically opposed), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081, 106 S.Ct. 1458, 89 L.Ed. 2d 716 (1986); United States v. Murphy, 696 F. 2d 282, 283-84 (4th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945, 103 S.Ct. 2124, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1303 (1983), and cert. denied sub nom. Waddell v. United States, 461 U.S. 945, 103 S.Ct. 2123, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1303 (1983); United States v. Rogers, 549 F. 2d 490, 496 (8th Cir.1976) (A claimed inability to recall, when disbelieved by the trial judge, may be viewed as inconsistent with previous statements when the witness does not deny that the previous statements were in fact made.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918, 97 S.Ct. 2182, 53 L.Ed. 2d 229 (1977); United States v. Insana, 423 F. 2d 1165, 1170 (2d Cir.1970) (distinguishing between genuine lack of recollection, which may justify exclusion of prior statements, and admissibility where a witness does not deny making the statements nor the truth thereof but merely falsifies a lack of memory); see also United States v. Distler, 671 F. 2d 954, 958 (6th Cir.) (observing in context of actual lack of recollection that partial or vague recollection is inconsistent with total or definite recollection), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827, 102 S.Ct. 118, 70 L.Ed. 2d 102 (1981). That position is shared by many state courts. See, e.g., Van Hatten v. State, 666 P. 2d 1047, 1050-52 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); People v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 4th 1183, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702, 719, 842 P. 2d 1, 18 (1992) (When a witness's claim of lack of memory amounts to deliberate evasion, inconsistency is implied.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 114, 126 L.Ed. 2d 80 (1993); United States v. Hsu, 439 A. 2d 469, 470-71 (D.C. 1981); Traver v. State, 568 N.E. 2d 1009, 1011-12 (Ind. 1991); State v. Marco, 220 Neb. 96, 368 N.W. 2d 470, 473 (1985) (noting that inconsistency does not require diametric opposition and can arise from failure to recall); State v. Sanchez, 112 N.M. 59, 811 P. 2d 92, 97 (Ct.App. 1991); State v. Whiting, 136 Wis. 2d 400, 402 N.W. 2d 723, 731 (Ct.App.), review denied, 138 Wis. 2d 531, 412 N.W. 2d 893 (1987); cf. Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E. 2d 717, 721-22 (1982) (holding witness's prior statement admissible as substantive evidence when witness denied that statement or that conversations related therein had been made). In addition, commentators agree that a feigned lack of recollection at trial amounts to inconsistency for the purposes of determining whether a prior inconsistent statement is admissible under hearsay exceptions: When is a prior statement inconsistent? On the face of it, a prior statement describing an event would not be inconsistent with testimony by the witness that he no longer remembers the event. Yet the tendency of unwilling or untruthful witnesses to seek refuge in forgetfulness is well recognized. Hence the judge may be warranted in concluding under the circumstances the claimed lack of memory of the event is untrue and in effect an implied denial of the prior statement, thus qualifying it as inconsistent and nonhearsay. [2 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 251 (4th ed. 1992) (footnotes omitted).] In 3A Wigmore on Evidence § 1043 (Chadbourne rev. 1970), the observation was made that where a witness now claims to be unable to recollect a matter, a former affirmation of it should be admitted as a contradiction. However, the orthodox rule that limited the use of prior statements to impeachment, rather than as substantive evidence, resulted in a reluctance of courts to admit prior statements based on lack of recollection for fear that juries would necessarily view the uncontradicted prior statement as evidence of the facts contained therein. Ibid. See also 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 801-132 (1988) (observing that when witness lacks recollection of both prior statement and events in statement, if prior statement is introduced, limited cross-examination effectively makes prior statement single version of events). Nonetheless, because the unwilling witness often takes refuge in a failure to remember,    [a]n absolute rule of prohibition would do more harm than good, and the trial court should have discretion. Wigmore on Evidence, supra, § 1043. As noted, New Jersey has abandoned the orthodox rule, and expressly permits a party to introduce its witness's prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence. That approach allows the jury to believe the version of events contained in the prior statement over the version presented by the witness at trial  even when the witness's lack of recollection suggests that the events and statement never occurred. Thus, we agree that a feigned lack of recollection is an inconsistency on which the admission of a witness's prior inconsistent statement may be based. Furthermore, although we recognize that a witness's feigned lack of recollection may sharply limit or nullify the value of cross-examination, we agree with the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Owens, supra, 484 U.S. at 557-61, 108 S.Ct. at 841-43, 98 L.Ed. 2d at 956-59, and conclude that those limitations do not rise to the level of denying a defendant's federal and state constitutional right to confront witnesses. See, U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10. In Owens, supra, the victim of a severe beating that resulted in a fractured skull had given a statement to police in the hospital shortly after the beating in which he identified the defendant as his assailant. At trial, the victim testified that he remembered identifying defendant to the police while in the hospital. However, on cross-examination, the victim admitted that he no longer could recall the attack sufficiently to identify his assailants and, except for when he made his statement to police, could not remember who had visited him during his subsequent hospital stay. That lack of recollection frustrated the defendant's efforts to cross-examine the victim on statements in which he allegedly had implicated someone other than the defendant for the assault. The Court upheld defendant's conviction against claims that evidence of the prior identification violated the federal hearsay rule, permitting admission of a witness's prior identifications if the witness testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(C), and the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. The Court determined that the case squarely presented an issue that the Court had reserved in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed. 2d 489 (1970): whether a witness's loss of memory concerning events described in a prior statement that is admitted into evidence so affect[s] the petitioner's right to cross-examine as to violate the Confrontation Clause. 484 U.S. at 558, 108 S.Ct. at 841, 98 L.Ed. 2d at 957 (citing Green, supra, 399 U.S. at 168-69, 90 S.Ct. at 1940-41, 26 L.Ed. 2d at 502-03). The Court's conclusion was that the Confrontation Clause guaranteed only `an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.' Id. at 559, 108 S.Ct. at 842, 98 L.Ed. 2d at 957 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2664, 96 L.Ed. 2d 631, 643 (1987) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed. 2d 15, 19 (1985))). The Court explained that the opportunity to cross-examine a defendant on issues such as the witness's perception, bias, and physical infirmities was all that the Sixth Amendment provided. Although that opportunity did not insure success, the Court observed, successful cross-examination is not the constitutional guarantee. Id. at 560, 108 S.Ct. at 843, 98 L.Ed. 2d at 958. Furthermore, we observe that in Owens the Court cited with approval Justice Harlan's concurrence in Green, supra, in which he stated that he would have reached the issue of the out-of-court statement, and would have held that a witness's inability to recall either the underlying events that are the subject of an extra-judicial statement or previous testimony or recollect the circumstances under which the statement was given, does not have Sixth Amendment consequence. [ Id. at 558, 108 S.Ct. at 842, 98 L.Ed. 2d at 957 (quoting Green, supra, 399 U.S. at 188, 90 S.Ct. at 1951, 26 L.Ed. 2d at 514) (emphasis added).] We also conclude that the constitutional confrontation guarantees are not violated by a witness's lack of recollection regarding an introduced prior statement or the events described in such a statement. The finding of feigned recollection is essentially a finding by the court that the witness is lying about the statement and about the contents of the statement. That the lie is in the form of a loss of memory rather than an outright denial that the events occurred is not of constitutional significance for the purpose of cross-examination. One objective of the New Jersey exception to the hearsay rule for prior inconsistent statements is to expose to the jury the possibility that the witness is lying, and to give the jury an alternative account of the events that it may choose to use as substantive evidence rather than the account offered by the witness. The jury, however, must observe the witness and make a decision about which account is true. We question whether defendant would have had a significantly-enhanced opportunity to cross-examine Lesando and Merlo if they had simply denied that they had made the statements or had spoken to defendant about the murders. In that event, defendant would have been left to the same means of discrediting the statements that he used at trial: suggesting that Lesando and Merlo had spoken with others about the murder, had had contact with Coleen Alexander, had read the accounts in the newspaper, or had made up the statements to benefit them in the disposition of their own criminal cases. That Lesando's and Merlo's statements were admitted on the basis of feigned lack of recollection did not necessarily cause a less effective cross-examination. Defendant elicited testimony concerning Lesando's erratic state of mind and his drug use at the time he gave the statement to police. Lesando testified that the officials from the prosecutor's office had not inquired about his state of mind on the day he gave the statements. He expressed doubt that he would have been placed back in a cell with defendant had he in fact given such a statement. Defense counsel also was able to explore whether Lesando had read newspaper accounts of the crime; whether he had had contact with Coleen Alexander in prison; and whether Lesando knew Robert Lohman, the person that defendant had originally claimed to be the killer. Defense counsel also elicited testimony from Lesando about his mental state at the time of the alleged statement, and suggested that in other conversations with Lesando defendant had implicated Alexander as the killer. Finally, defense counsel elicited testimony about Lesando's exposure to prosecution for recently-committed crimes. Admittedly, Merlo's cross-examination was less revealing. He essentially stated he had no recollection regarding the events at that time. Nonetheless, defense counsel established that Merlo had received a favorable plea bargain and favorable sentencing shortly after having given his statement to police. We conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the prior inconsistent statements of Merlo and Lesando. The court correctly concluded that under the circumstances, the prior statements made by both witnesses to police concerning conversations that they had had with defendant were inconsistent with the witnesses' feigned lack of recall regarding those statements and conversations. Thus, the decision to admit those statements, in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Gross, supra, 121 N.J. at 10, 577 A. 2d 806, was proper. Finally, we hold that the admission of those statements, in the context of the witnesses' unwillingness to testify truthfully about them, did not deprive defendant of his constitutional right to be confronted by the witnesses against him.