Opinion ID: 1118523
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Substantial Performance Instruction

Text: At trial the Authority requested the following instruction, which the trial court declined to give, regarding BBH's contractual duties: In determining whether Plaintiffs have substantially performed the Architect Agreement you are instructed that among the important and essential benefits Defendant was entitled to receive from Plaintiff under the contract were: (1) Plans, Specifications and Drawings that were complete, definite and specific. (2) Reasonable and substantially accurate costs of the project which estimate the Defendant was entitled to rely upon. (3) All services to be performed by Plaintiffs in a timely manner for approval by the Idaho State Building Authority. (4) Services that met with the approval of the Defendant. Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief, Appendix A. Rule 51(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure recommends that a trial judge use the applicable Idaho Jury Instruction unless she finds that a different instruction would more adequately, accurately or clearly state the law. Also, where the substance of a proposed instruction is adequately covered in another instruction actually given, a trial judge does not err in refusing to give the proposed instruction. Quincy v. Joint School Dist. No. 41, Etc., 102 Idaho 764, 640 P.2d 304 (1981). The trial court gave the following instruction: When I say that plaintiffs must have `substantially performed' the contract or that `substantial performance' of the contract is required, I mean that, although there may have been some deviations or omissions from the performance called for by the language of the Architect Agreement, the Idaho State Building Authority received the important essential benefits for which it contracted for [sic] up until the time of their termination. R. Vol. 12 at 170. This instruction is identical to IDJI 609 with the addition for up until the time of their termination, which does not change its meaning. The given jury instruction accurately stated the law of substantial performance, as well as adequately stating BBH's duty to the Authority. There was no need for an instruction that specifically listed architects' duties under a contract because the Agreement itself specifically delineated each party's contractual obligations, and was admitted into evidence. In many instances, the Agreement established the equivalent duty imposed by section (1) of the requested instruction, that BBH was to provide plans, specifications and drawings that were complete, definite and specific. [2] The Agreement also clearly established that BBH was to prepare and submit a detailed estimate of the construction cost of the Project based upon design documents and existing relevant market conditions, as section (2) of the proposed instruction required. Exhibit 1, p. 1. Sections (3) and (4) of the requested instruction overlap in their requirement that BBH's services meet with the approval of the Authority. This condition also was explicitly included in the Agreement, which required in numerous places that BBH submit their plans to the Authority for approval by the Authority. Section (3)'s requirement that services be completed in a timely manner is an implicit condition of the Agreement. When no time of performance is expressed in a contract, which was so in this case, it will be implied that the contract must be performed within a reasonable time. Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 567 P.2d 1284 (1977); McFarland v. Joint School Dist. No. 365, 108 Idaho 519, 700 P.2d 141 (Ct. App.1985). The jury was so instructed in instruction number 11, further negating the need for the Authority's requested instruction. R. Vol. 12 at 175. The Authority fashioned its requested instruction after language in Nave v. McGrane, 19 Idaho 111, 113 P. 82 (1910), which the Authority claims is directly on point and justifies giving an additional, separate instruction on architects' duties. We disagree. In Nave, the architect failed to deliver the essential benefit of the contract; the plan he provided was entirely unworkable and lacked numerous fundamental provisions. The Nave court found the evidence at trial to demonstrate that the plans themselves clearly show[ed] that they are not definite and certain and are not in conformity with the recognized authorities on engineering, contracts, and specifications and architecture. Id. at 117, 113 P. at 84. To the contrary, in the present case, the plans provided by BBH were accepted by the Authority and ultimately used in constructing the Project, supporting the jury's determination that BBH did substantially perform and that the Authority did in fact receive the essential benefit of the Agreement. The Authority's contention that its requested instruction was necessary because BBH attempted to show that they need not provide complete, definite and specific construction documents is also unfounded. As the sole support for its assertion, the Authority cites to a portion of the testimony of Brian Smith, an architect unrelated to the Project, called as a witness by BBH: Q.: And so in every building you design, you leave out the beam lengths for the contractor, and he has got to figure out what they are? A.: Yes, and there is good reason for that. Tr. Vol. 11 at 1919. Mr. Smith testified that a complete set of construction documents need not, and in fact preferably would not, contain the dimensions of beams and bolts to be mounted onto concrete footings of a building. He further testified that the determination of beam lengths and bolt sizes must be made by a steel fabricator; the fabricator must personally measure the building foundations and find out where things actually ended up in the concrete work before he can size the beams and bolts ... Tr. Vol. 11 at 1917. While the Authority attempts to characterize the absence of specific beam length dimensions as a flaw in the documents, when this passage is placed in the full context of Mr. Smith's testimony, it lends no credence to the Authority's contention. In summation, the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury using the Authority's requested instruction on BBH's contractual duties was not erroneous, as the given instruction IDJI 609 properly stated the applicable law.