Opinion ID: 658280
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel.

Text: 28 4. As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Petitioner meets the exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b) and (c). See generally, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). Exhaustion of a federal claim may be accomplished by either (a) showing the state's appellate court had an opportunity to rule on the same claim presented in federal court, or (b) that at the time he filed his federal petition, he had no available means for pursuing a review of his conviction in state court. White v. Meachum, 838 F.2d 1137, 1138 (10th Cir.1988); see also, Wallace v. Duckworth, 778 F.2d F.2d 1215, 1219 (7th Cir.1985); Davis v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1197 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020 (1986). The question with respect to exhaustion is not merely whether [Petitioner] has in the past presented his federal claim to the state courts, but also whether there is, under the law of the [state], any presently available state procedure for the determination of the merits of the claim. Thomas v. Wyrick, 622 F.2d 411, 413 (8th Cir.1980). Respondent concedes, and this Court finds, that Petitioner exhausted available state remedies and the petition is properly before the Court. 29 5. Petitioner alleges that he was denied an impartial jury. He contends that one of the jurors was not impartial because the juror did not follow the court's directive to avoid outside information concerning the case. The juror in question had become aware of a newspaper article about the case. See Respondent's Answer, filed December 14, 1992, Exhibit M, Affidavit of Kathleen Anderson. 30 6. The right to trial by an impartial jury is a fundamental concept of due process. Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150, 1151 (10th Cir.1991). Usually when an allegation of juror bias is made, the court conducts a hearing to determine the circumstances of the contact and the extent of prejudice which results therefrom. Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1508 (10th Cir.1991). In addition, [s]tate court findings relating to juror bias 'are factual determinations to which the presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C.A. Section apply, although the constitutional standard of jury impartiality is a question of law.'  Burton, 948 F.2d at 1157 (quoting from Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n. 12 (1984)). 31 7. In the instant action, the court held a hearing to address the allegations of juror impartiality and denied Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. The New Mexico Court of Appeals, when considering the issue, again found no juror bias. The court reviewed the newspaper article in question and found that the article was silent as to defendant's guilt or innocence. See Respondent's Answer, Exhibit F. These state court rulings are entitled to deference. Petitioner has not shown a violation of his right to due process. Petitioner's claim that he was denied an impartial jury is without merit. 32 8. Petitioner also claims that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence when it failed to disclose the field notes of Detective Cantwell. The field notes state that the bruises on the child appeared to have occurred between 24 and 30 hours prior to her death. Petitioner asserts that the age of the bruises is relevant because the child was in the custody of her natural father during this time. 33 9. The prosecution has a duty to turn over evidence favorable to the defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Accordingly,  '[t]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' Suppressed evidence is deemed material 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Thornburgh, 962 F.2d 1438, 1444 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 220 (1992) (quoting from United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476, 1479 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987)). 34 10. Applying the materiality test set forth above, the field notes are not exculpatory. The evidence is cumulative. There was testimony by Drs. McFeeley and Krakow about the age of the bruises which supports Petitioner's conviction. The field notes do not raise a probability that had the jury been aware of the notes, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 35 11. Petitioner contends that he was denied the right to confront witnesses because the medical examiner who did the autopsy did not testify at his trial. Another medical examiner interpreted the report. 36 12. This claim is without legal support. Petitioner had the opportunity to confront the witness, albeit not the medical examiner who performed the autopsy. The state has no obligation to call as a witness the doctor who actually performs a particular test as long as the witness called was qualified to offer opinion testimony and relied upon the medical report as part of his opinion. 37 13. Through ground four, Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence from the grand jury and as a result thereof, he was illegally indicted. 38 14. This ground is without merit. [A] prosecutor need not present all conceivably exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, but only that evidence that clearly negates guilt. United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 990 (1991) (quoting United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987)). 39 15. Lastly, Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to present exculpatory evidence; failed to present information about prosecutorial misconduct during the grand jury process to the court; and failed to present evidence about when the injuries took place and who had custody and control of the child at that time. 40 16. The Court evaluates a Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel as follows: 41 To succeed with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel's deficiencies a reasonable probability exists the proceedings would have resulted in a different verdict. Restated [Petitioner] must show his attorney's performance was both sub-standard and prejudicial to his defense, taking into account the strength of the government's case. Trial strategies necessarily evolve without the benefit of hindsight. Accordingly, we afford a high level of deference to the reasonableness of counsel's performance in light of all the circumstances at the time of the alleged error. The ultimate inquiry, of course, focuses  'on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.'  42 United States v. Maxwell, 966 F.2d 545, 547-48 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 826 (1992) (quoting from United States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994, 997 and 997 n. 6 (10th Cir.1990). 43 17. Petitioner has not met his burden under this standard. Petitioner makes conclusory allegations that his attorney failed to present exculpatory evidence. Petitioner does not identify the favorable evidence that his attorney should have presented. Assuming Petitioner's reference was to the field notes, as discussed above, the notes were not exculpatory and counsel was not ineffective in not presenting this evidence. Turning to Petitioner's contention that his lawyer should have vigorously pursued his prosecutorial misconduct claim, this argument is legally without merit. An attorney is not ineffective by not raising meritless claims. Finally, Petitioner alleges his attorney should have spent more time presenting evidence concerning the timing of the injuries. Pursuant to the statute Petitioner was convicted under, N.M.S.A. 1978 Sec. 30-6-1(c)(1) (Repl.Pamp.1984), the identity of the person inflicting the injuries does not matter. What is critical under that statute is whether defendant was aware of any injuries to the child. Petitioner's counsel did not act unreasonably in not presenting evidence that does not refute an element of the crime for which Petitioner was charged. Recommended Disposition 44 That the petition be denied and the case dismissed. 45 /s/ Lorenzo F. Garcia LORENZO F. GARCIA