Opinion ID: 2581197
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Superior Court Applied the Appropriate Attorney's Fees Schedule to Gregory's Partial Final Judgment for Specific Performance.

Text: Gregory contends that the superior court erred by calculating the attorney's fees award for the partial final judgment for specific performance under Rule 82(b)(2). [8] He argues that the trial court's reliance on Rule 82(b)(2) was misplaced because the partial final judgment for specific performance was a monetary judgment. He maintains that because the present value of his prospective recovery under the judgment is $2.125 million, [9] Civil Rule 82(b)(1) fees of . . . $212,500 are thus payable. We disagree. In Dillingham Commercial Co. v. Spears, [10] we recognized that the superior court erred in applying the fee schedule applicable to money judgments [11] to a judgment for specific performance of an option contract. [12] We specifically indicated that [r]esort to the schedule of attorney's fees set forth in Civil Rule 82(a)(1) was inappropriate since Dillingham did not receive a money judgment. [13] We have defined money judgment for attorney's fees purposes as a judgment in which money change[s] hands. [14] Gregory's partial judgment for specific performance was an equitable remedy, [15] not a money judgment. The superior court appropriately applied Rule 82(b)(2) to Gregory's motion for attorney's fees under his partial judgment for specific performance.