Opinion ID: 2428722
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Risk-Utility Instruction

Text: This case was submitted to the jury on both negligence and strict product liability theories. To recover on a strict liability theory in a defective design case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the product, as designed, is unreasonably dangerous and therefore `defective'.... [14] As this Court has previously discussed, the question of what constitutes an unreasonable danger in the product design arena is the subject of vigorous debate. [15] This debate has recently reached new levels of intensity with the adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, section 2(b), which abandons the Second Restatement's consumer expectations test in favor of a riskutility test. Under the Third Restatement's test, a product is defectively designed when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller ..., and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.... [16] As the amicus Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., notes, under this test a plaintiff must prove that: (1) a reasonable, safer, alternative design was available at the time of sale; and (2) omission of the safer alternative rendered the product `not reasonably safe.' Both amicus and Ford argue with great force that this test is superior to the consumer expectations test and should be immediately embraced by this Court as the test for determining whether a product is defectively designed. While this question is surely one of great academic and practical interest, it is one this Court has repeatedly resisted answering before the issue is squarely presented. [17] The only question presented in this appeal is whether a specific, non-MAI instruction requested by Ford was appropriately denied. As required by MAI 25.04, the trial court gave the jury an instruction requiring them to find in favor of plaintiffs on the strict liability theory if, inter alia, the product was, at the time of sale, in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use.... In addition, Ford submitted its proposed instruction H, which read, in its entirety: The phrase `unreasonably dangerous' as used in these instructions means that the utility or usefulness of the product was outweighed by its risks. A party who believes that additional instructions are legally appropriate must request a correct instruction and must develop an evidentiary record in support. [18] While the factual record here demonstrates that the relative costs and benefits of alternative seat designs was a primary issue in the case, we are not persuaded that the instruction proffered is superior to the approved instruction in guiding the jury's consideration of these issues. The new Restatement itself, while endorsing Ford's proposed test as the proper one for determining whether to submit a defective design issue to the jury, is entirely agnostic as to the question of the proper form of jury instructions. [J]ury instructions often are couched in language that asks the jury to determine whether the product is not reasonably safe, is unreasonably dangerous, or fails to meet reasonable consumer expectations. The requirement that proof of a reasonable alternative design be introduced as a necessary predicate for reaching the jury in a design defect case is a rule of law for the court. Once a court finds that sufficient evidence of a reasonable alternative design has been introduced, this Restatement leaves the formulation of the jury instruction to the local law applicable in trial courts in the various states. Many states require proof of a reasonable alternative design as a prerequisite to reaching the jury, yet couch their jury instructions in more general language that often includes consumer expectations. The practice of these jurisdictions is fully compatible with the rule stated in this Section. [19] While Ford directs much of its argument towards demonstrating that a large majority of states have adopted a risk-utility test for submissibility, it does not show that this particular instruction, or a substantively similar one, has been adopted by any other state. Indeed, it is difficult to see how this instruction would serve the goal of the Restatement, since it fails to mention the one concept that Ford and the amicus see as key in design defect cases of this sorta reasonable alternative design. While the terms risk and utility might be adequate shorthand for this concept to those well-versed in the Restatement of Torts, the instruction does not guide the typical juror towards weighing competing alternative designs any more than the approved instruction does. In this regard, the proffered instruction stands in contrast to instructions cited by Ford as adopting the risk-utility test, such as the instruction, adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, which asks the jury to engage in a balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm. [20] While Ford argues that the MAI instruction fails to provide sufficient guidance to jurors in determining what is unreasonably dangerous, this Court has, while recognizing that it is a minority approach, explained the benefits of an instruction that treats unreasonable danger as an ultimate issue and avoids abstract, abstruse external standards. [21] A signal virtue of such a general instruction is that it allows the jury to give the concept of unreasonable danger content by applying their collective intelligence and experience to the broad evidentiary spectrum of facts and circumstances presented by the parties. [22] Nothing prevents the litigants from arguing that the utility of a design outweighs its risks, or that consumer expectations were violated, or any other theory of unreasonable dangerousness supported by the evidence. The Third Restatement itself argues that this manner of instruction is entirely consistent with a risk-utility test for submissibility of design defect claims. Even assuming that this Court were inclined to depart from Nesselrode and adopt a more specific definition of unreasonably dangerous in jury instructions, the instruction at issue here does not achieve that goal. The amicus brief makes the point exactly: If ... Missouri law requires plaintiffs to show how the defendant's design could have been safer, then it makes good sense to instruct the jury, at the close of trial, that a design is `in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous' if a reasonable, feasible, safer, alternative design would have reduced or prevented the plaintiff's injuries, and if the omission from the product of that alternative rendered the product not reasonably safe. Perhaps the amicus is correct. But that question is not before the Court, since no instruction of that sort was offered to the trial court. Even if Ford is correct that the risk-utility test is proper in defective design cases of this sort, Ford's proffered instruction was correctly rejected by the trial court, since the instruction failed to adequately put the issue of reasonable alternative design to the jury.