Opinion ID: 2405703
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims against the Walkers

Text: Through the passage of Act 46 of 1989, the General Assembly abolished alienation of affection and criminal conversation as causes of action. See also Ark.Code Ann. § 16-118-106 (Cum.Supp.1993). While the Walkers claim that Cherepski's claim is one for alienation of affection disguised under different labels, Cherepski asserts that the legislature's abolishment of this tort does not bar his cause of action. Particularly, Cherepski contends that his complaint presents a question of fact as to whether a fiduciary relationship existed, and that it states causes of action for clergy malpractice and outrage. In defending his claims, Cherepski cites Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988). In that case, a husband sued a Catholic priest and the Diocese of Colorado Springs, alleging that the priest, from whom the husband and his wife had consulted for marriage counseling, had induced his wife into engaging in sexual relations with him. The husband asserted claims for negligence, outrage, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court dismissed the action, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (1) whether the state's heart balm statute barred an action against a person who assumes the role of marriage counselor when the counseling relationship results in consensual sexual relations between a counselor and a counselee; and (2) whether the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits tort liability for conduct which arose in the context of a counseling relationship between a clergyman and members of his congregation. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed that the husband's claims for negligence and outrage were essentially claims for alienation of affection and criminal conversation and were properly dismissed. The Destefano court reversed, however, on the fiduciary duty issue, concluding that the priest, given the nature of the relationship as a marriage counselor to the couple, owed a fiduciary duty; that is, he had a duty not to engage in conduct which might harm the marital relationship. We are not called upon to decide whether a cause of action would be cognizable in Arkansas in instances involving a counseling relationship, and the holding in Destefano was clearly premised on the priest's role as a marriage counselor, not his role as a priest. Thus, Destefano is simply not on point here, as it is undisputed that Father Walker was not acting as the Cherepski's marriage counselor. We will now examine the individual claims against Walker.
In his brief, Cherepski repeatedly maintains that the question of whether a fiduciary duty exists is a question of fact. This is an incorrect statement of the law. The question of what duty is owed is always a question of law. First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g, 321 Ark. 210, 900 S.W.2d 202 (1995); Keck v. American Employment Agency Inc., 279 Ark. 294, 652 S.W.2d 2 (1993). Cherepski asserts that, as a devout Catholic, his trust was imposed in the integrity of Father Walker, and that Walker had a duty to promote his spiritual well-being and refrain from taking any action which would interfere with his spiritual well-being. A person is ordinarily not liable for the acts of another unless a special relationship exists between the two parties. Id. A person standing in a fiduciary relationship with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of the duty imposed by the relationship. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 (1979); see also Destefano v. Grabrian, supra . Cherepski has not alleged that he entrusted any matter to Father Walker while Walker served as Chancellor or as judge of the Diocesan Marriage Tribunal. While Walker was eventually assigned to Cherepski's church, he did not become Cherepski's priest until after Susan had filed for divorce. Cherepski cites Adams v. H.L. Moore, 96 N.C.App. 359, 385 S.E.2d 799 (1989) and Nelson v. Dodge, 76 R.I. 1, 68 A.2d 51 (1969), in support of his position that Walker owed him a duty; however, both of these cases involved disputes over property transactions. We conclude that Cherepski's claim for breach of fiduciary duty is nothing more than a claim for alienation of affection in disguise. Because the legislature abolished this tort in 1989, there can be no violation of a nonexistent right. Other courts faced with claims for breach of fiduciary duty in similar factual settings have reached the same result. See e.g., Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir.1994); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla.1993); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1994).
Cherepski further contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim for clergy malpractice against Father Walker. On appeal, he characterizes this claim as a negligence-based cause of action. Arkansas does not recognize clergy malpractice as a cause of action. Several other courts confronted with this issue have specifically refused to recognize clergy malpractice as a separate, cognizable cause of action. See, e.g. Destefano v. Grabian, supra ; Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 244 Neb. 715, 508 N.W.2d 907 (1993). Other courts have held that clergy malpractice was not available under the particular facts alleged. See, e.g. Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church, supra ; Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo.App. 1987) see also John F. Wagner, Annotation, Cause of Action for Clergy Malpractice, 75 A.L.R.4th 750 (Supp.1995). As clergy malpractice is not cognizable in this state, summary judgment was proper as a matter of law.
We recently set out the elements of the tort of outrage in Perrodin v. Rooker, 322 Ark. 117, 908 S.W.2d 85 (1995). To establish a claim for outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) the plaintiff's emotional distress was so severe in nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Id. at 121, 908 S.W.2d 85. While Cherepski couches his amended complaint in terms of intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is clear that his complaint is in essence an action for alienation of affection. The complaint is replete with references to the accelerating friendship between Father Walker and Susan, their alleged adulterous affair, Cherepski's and Susan's eventual divorce, and Cherepski's resulting emotional pain and suffering. The real character of Cherepski's claim is of an amatory tort. His attempt to label his claim otherwise does not remove it from its true characterization as a claim for alienation of affection, which the legislature has chosen to abolish as a cause of action. Other courts have treated similar claims for outrage as veiled attempts to bring an action for alienation of affection. Destefano v. Grabian, supra ; Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church, supra ; Strock v. Pressnell, supra . We conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that Cherepski's claims against the Walkers left no material factors in dispute.