Opinion ID: 32129
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Mitigating Evidence Instruction

Text: 16 Miniel argues that the state court denied a jury instruction with respect to the following mitigating evidence in violation of the Eighth Amendment: his drug and alcohol use at the time of the offense; his youth (age 23); his good behavior while incarcerated; and his religious conversion. 1 Finding Miniel's claim precluded by precedent, we deny a COA. 17 In Penry I, the Supreme Court reversed a death sentence on the ground that, although the evidence regarding the defendant's mental retardation and childhood abuse was presented to the jury at the penalty phase of the trial, the special issues prescribed by Texas statute prevented the jury from giving mitigating effect to that evidence. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2952, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). Since the holding in Penry, federal courts have had the opportunity to determine whether the special issues provided a vehicle for considering numerous types of mitigating evidence. 18 As in the instant case, the petitioner in Tucker v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 276, 281 (5th Cir.1997), argued that the jury was prevented from considering the mitigating evidence of her intoxication at the time of the offense and her age, twenty-three. We rejected that claim and found that the petitioner had failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right. Id. at 281-82. More specifically, a jury can give full effect to evidence of voluntary intoxication in its determination whether the defendant acted deliberately, which is contained in the first special issue. Lackey v. Scott, 28 F.3d 486, 489 (5th Cir.1994). The second special issue with respect to future dangerousness affords the jury an adequate vehicle to consider the defendant's youth. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 370, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 2670, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993). 19 With respect to the evidence of Miniel's good behavior while incarcerated, the Supreme Court has explained that no special instruction is necessary to enable the jury to consider the mitigating effect of the petitioner's evidence regarding his good prison disciplinary record. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2329-30, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988). Finally, with respect to Miniel's religious conversion, this Court has held that the second special issue would allow the jury to give effect to mitigating evidence that a petitioner had rededicated his life to God. Jernigan v. Collins, 980 F.2d 292, 295 (5th Cir.1992). 20 Accordingly, Miniel's claim that he was entitled to an instruction to allow the jury to give effect to his mitigating evidence is precluded by precedent. The Supreme Court's decision in Penry II does not indicate otherwise. Penry v. Johnson 532 U.S. 782, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001). In Penry II, the Supreme Court found a supplemental jury instruction with respect to mitigating evidence to be ineffective and illogical. Id. at 1924. Thus, the Court reached the same conclusion it had reached in Penry I: [A] reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence. Id. The Court did not indicate that we have misinterpreted what constitutes Penry evidence. 21 We are therefore satisfied no reasonable jurist would find debatable the district court's resolution of Miniel's Penry II claim. Accordingly, we deny COA as to this claim.