Opinion ID: 2132735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: What is the proper scope of review?

Text: Both parties concede the Department has authority to review the school district's decision. However, they disagree over the appropriate standard of review the Department must apply in its review. We begin by briefly explaining the powers of the school district in transportation matters. Iowa Code chapter 285 gives the board of directors of a school district certain duties and powers over the provision of transportation. The school district argues its decision to not provide transportation in this case was a discretionary decision subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. The school district relies upon Iowa Code section 285.1 which provides the board of directors of every school district, shall provide transportation ... for all resident pupils attending public school, kindergarten through twelfth grade, except that: (a) Elementary pupils shall be entitled to transportation only if they live more than two miles from the school designated for attendance.... (d) Boards in their discretion may provide transportation for some or all resident pupils attending public school ... who are not entitled to transportation.... Iowa Code § 285.1(1) (1999). The code creates only one mandate for the school district. The school district must provide transportation to students who live more than two miles from school. Id. § 285.1(1)(a). Apart from this requirement, the school district is vested with discretionary authority to decide whether to provide transportation under other circumstances. Iowa Code section 274.1 supports this conclusion stating, [e]ach school district ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all school matters.... Id. § 274.1. The school district's decision to not provide transportation was discretionary in nature because the statute states the provision of transportation is discretionary for students living less than two miles from school. The parents properly challenged the school district's discretionary decision pursuant to section 285.12 which directs the agency boards to hear and decide appeals in a transportation disagreement between a school patron and the board of a local district. Id. § 285.12. Section 285.12 provides, in part, In the event of a disagreement between a school patron and the board of the school district, the patron if dissatisfied with the decision of the district board, may appeal the same to the area education agency board.... Either party may appeal the decision of the agency board to the director of the department of education.... The decision of the director shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with the terms of the Iowa administrative procedure Act. Id. We begin our discussion by determining the extent to which the Department may review the school district's action. At first glance, our decision in Howell School Board District No. 9 v. Hubbartt appears to have addressed the issue of the proper scope of review of a school district's discretionary decision. See 246 Iowa 1265, 70 N.W.2d 531 (1955). In Howell , although the case may have been litigated under Iowa Code chapter 285, the central dispute was not the provision of transportation to students within two miles of a school. Rather, it focused on the school district's exclusive authority to assign a student to one school when the parent sought enrollment in another school in a different district. We emphasized there was no statute either giving or denying the state superintendent the authority to determine which school a pupil should attend. Id. at 1274, 70 N.W.2d at 535-36. Because the legislature had not directed otherwise, we held the school board's decision in this regard concerned a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction and discretion of the local school board. Consequently, we found the state superintendent did not have authority to determine matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the local board. Id. at 1274, 70 N.W.2d at 536. Our decision in Howell must not be construed to mean discretionary decisions of the school district are immune from any type of review. Rather, in Howell , we addressed whether, when reviewing the school district's action, it was proper for the state superintendent to examine the record, make his own independent determination, and substitute his judgment for the school district's. Id. at 1267, 70 N.W.2d at 532. Because no statute conferred upon the state superintendent this broad scope of review, we found he exceeded his authority. That is, in Howell we stated an agency's authority to review the school district's decision is only as broad as that vested in it by statute or regulation. Our holding in Howell was reinforced by our later decision in Board of Education in and for Franklin County v. Board of Education in and for Hardin County , where we briefly discussed Howell as it applies to discretionary actions. See 250 Iowa 672, 95 N.W.2d 709 (1959). The case dealt with the reorganization of a proposed school district. A statute applied to the facts of the case stating, The state department shall have the authority to affirm the action of the joint boards, to vacate, to dismiss all proceedings or to make such modification of the action of the joint boards as in their judgment would serve in the best interests of all the counties. This decision may be appealed to a court of record in one of the counties by any aggrieved party to the controversy.... Iowa Code § 275.8 (1958). Based upon this statute, we found the legislature delegated authority to the state Department of Public Instruction to review the substance of a decision made by the county board or boards or any school district. Bd. of Educ. in and for Franklin County, 250 Iowa at 676, 95 N.W.2d at 712-13 (stating Howell is not applicable in view of the statutory amendment to section 275.8 of the 1958 Code). That is, the aggrieved party had a legal right to appeal to the Department of Public Instruction from the decision of the joint county boards. Because a specific statute in that instance gave authority to the state department to affirm, vacate, dismiss, or modify the actions of the school district, we found the state department did not exceed its authority in modifying the decision and order of the joint boards of education. Id. at 675, 95 N.W.2d at 711. Howell and Board of Education in and for Franklin County compel us in the present case to determine what statutory powers have been conferred upon the Department in reviewing the Sioux City Community School District's decision. In the case before us, the statute giving the school district discretion in the matter of transportation controls the standard we will use to review the school district's decision. Administrative boards, commissions, and officers have no common-law powers. The powers and duties of public office are measured by the terms and necessary implication of the grant of constitutional or statutory authority; in this regard, it has sometimes been stated that public officers have only those powers expressly granted or necessarily implied by statute.... 63C Am.Jur.2d Public Officers and Employees § 231, at 670 (1997); 67 C.J.S. Officers § 107, at 378 (2002). If broader powers are desirable, they must be conferred by the proper authority. 63C Am. Jur.2d Public Officers § 231, at 671. Nothing in Iowa Code section 285.12 suggests the scope of the Department's review of the school district's decision is de novo, allowing the Department to reverse the school district and substitute its own judgment. No statute gives the Department authority to override the school district's ultimate decision because it determines the decision was wrong. Rather, where a statute provides for a review of a school district's discretionary action, the review, by necessary implication, is limited to determining whether the school district abused its discretion. See 63C Am.Jur.2d Public Officers and Employees § 231, at 670; 67 C.J.S. Officers § 107, at 378. Because the school district has discretion in the provision of transportation and the Department has authority to review decisions made pursuant to such discretion, its review is necessarily limited to the abuse of discretion standard. See id. We can find no statute in the Code of Iowa or in the Iowa Administrative Code which gives the Department more authority upon review than that necessary to determine whether the school district abused its discretion. In applying abuse of discretion standards, we look only to whether a reasonable person could have found sufficient evidence to come to the same conclusion as reached by the school district. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1). In so doing, we will find a decision was unreasonable if it was not based upon substantial evidence or was based upon an erroneous application of the law. Spanos, 572 N.W.2d at 592. Neither we nor the Department may substitute our judgment for that of the school district.