Opinion ID: 695267
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vazquez's Trial Testimony

Text: 33 In addition to inferences drawn from Vazquez's banking activities, the government argues that the jury could have disbelieved Vazquez's trial testimony and regarded his false testimony as evidence of guilt. This Court has established that when a defendant takes the stand in a criminal case and exposes his demeanor to the jury, the jury may make adverse determinations about his credibility and reject his explanation as a complete fabrication. United States v. Goggin, 853 F.2d 843, 846 (11th Cir.1988). The jury may view defendant's false explanatory statement as substantive evidence proving guilt. United States v. Allison, 908 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 904, 111 S.Ct. 1681, 114 L.Ed.2d 77 (1991); accord, United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312 (11th Cir.1995); United States v. Howard, 895 F.2d 722, 724-25 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1030, 110 S.Ct. 3286, 111 L.Ed.2d 794 (1990); United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1139 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Cotton, 770 F.2d 940, 945 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Eley, 723 F.2d 1522, 1525 (11th Cir.1984). We have recently noted that [t]his rule applies with special force where the elements to be proved for a conviction include highly subjective elements: for example, the defendant's intent or knowledge.... Brown, 53 F.3d at 315. 10 34 Although much of Vazquez's testimony consisted of his denials that he structured deposits with the bank to evade the reporting requirements and his alternative explanation for his banking activities, Vazquez did specifically testify at one point during the trial about his knowledge that he was acting illegally. On cross-examination, he testified as follows: 35 Q. Well, during this entire time, you knew you were doing something wrong, didn't you? 36 A. Correct. 37 Q. You knew you were doing something illegal, didn't you? 38 A. Correct. 39 Q. And you didn't want to get caught, did you? 40 A. No. 41 Q. You didn't want anybody to know what you were doing, did you? 42 A. Yes, but I would like to give an explanation regarding this. 43 THE COURT: Very well. 44 THE WITNESS: What I would like to clear up is that I didn't want them to find out. And when I say them, what I mean is the tellers. I didn't want the tellers to find out that I was cashing the checks. And I want to say that this is the only thing, this is exclusively the only thing that I didn't want the bank to know what I was doing. 45 Q. You didn't want the government to know what you were doing because it was illegal; right? 46 A. Correct. 47 Thus, Vazquez testified that he knew he was doing something illegal, but that the only illegal activity he was hiding from the bank was his check-kiting practice. 48 We believe that this testimony is sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Vazquez knew that structuring was illegal. Although the jury could have believed Vazquez's testimony about what he knew was illegal and was trying to hide, it was also entitled to reject his explanation and  'conclude the opposite of his testimony is true.'  Brown, 53 F.3d at 314 (quoting Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 961 n. 7 (11th Cir.1992)); accord United States v. Sharif, 893 F.2d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir.1990). Instead of accepting Vazquez's testimony that he was exclusively trying to conceal his illegal check-kiting, the jury could reject that explanation and infer that Vazquez also knew that structuring his deposits was illegal and that he was trying to hide that conduct from the bank. As we have explained before, when a defendant elects to testify, he subjects himself to an evaluation of his credibility by the trier of fact and runs the risk that he might bolster the government's case rather than help his own cause. Howard, 895 F.2d at 724-25.