Opinion ID: 1264458
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cramer Established Minimum Contacts with Alaska to Satisfy Due Process Requirements for Personal Jurisdiction.

Text: Civil Rule 60(b)(4) allows courts to grant relief from any judgment that is void. A judgment is void if the court that rendered it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. [2] Cramer contends that Alaska lacked personal jurisdiction over him because Wade's claim falls outside the scope of AS 09.05.015, Alaska's long-arm statute. Wade responds that the court had personal jurisdiction under subsections (a)(3), (a)(4)(A), and (a)(5)(D) of the long-arm statute. Alaska Statute 09.05.015(a)(3) gives Alaska courts personal jurisdiction in an action claiming injury to person or property in or out of this state arising out of an act or omission in this state by the defendant. Construing this provision in Kennecorp Mortgage & Equities, Inc. v. First National Bank of Fairbanks, [3] we recognized that failing to pay monetary obligations owed to an Alaska creditor is an omission in this state causing injury to property. [4] Moreover, AS 09.05.015(a)(4)(A) applies in an action claiming injury to person or property in this state arising out of an act or omission out of this state when the defendant carried on solicitation or service activities in this state. Here, Cramer's active solicitation of a loan from Wade by calling him in Valdez and his alleged acts of misrepresentation during the course of their interactions arguably would place Wade's claim within subsection (a)(4)(A) even if the injury to Wade were viewed as resulting from Cramer's acts or omissions outside Alaska. [5] Finally, subparagraph (a)(5)(D) of the long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction in an action that relates to goods . . . or other things of value shipped from this state ... on the order or direction of the defendant. In Kennecorp Mortgage we indicated that this provision would allow jurisdiction over an out-of-state party receiving funds from an Alaska resident. [6] Cramer nevertheless raises specific challenges to each of Wade's long-arm theories, insisting that subsections (a)(3), (a)(4)(A), and (a)(5)(D) are inapplicable. But even if they had merit, Cramer's specific long-arm challenges would not be determinative. In Glover v. Western Air Lines, Inc., [7] we expressly construed Alaska's long-arm statute to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by due process under the federal constitution. [8] And more recently, in Alaska Telecom, Inc. v. Schafer, [9] we reinforced Glover by recognizing that in allowing personal jurisdiction on any other grounds provided by common law, our long-arm statute's catch-all subsection (c) extends to any case falling outside the statute's other subsections in which the exercise of jurisdiction is permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. [10] Thus, reduced to its essence, Cramer's argument requires us to decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids an Alaska court to maintain personal jurisdiction over him. To answer this question we must consider the extent of Cramer's contacts with Alaska and the basic fairness of requiring him to appear in its courts: [D]ue process analysis asks two questions: first, whether minimum contacts exist; second, whether maintenance of the suit is consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. [11] Here, Cramer had no ongoing ties to Alaska. But his limited contacts with Wade will nonetheless satisfy due process requirements if they are substantial enough that [he] could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in [Alaska]. [12] Under the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, [13] Cramer could reasonably anticipate being sued in Alaska if he `purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries `that arise out of or relate to' those activities. [14] Cramer's contacts are sufficient for personal jurisdiction under this test. Cramer's argument that his telephone calls alone could not establish personal jurisdiction is unpersuasive, for it overlooks the totality of the conduct that Cramer engaged in. [15] Cramer purposefully directed his activities at a resident of Alaska by telephoning and transmitting documents to Wade in Valdez, actively encouraging Wade's participation in the truck stop loan, pledging Kokua's assets to guarantee the loan's repayment, signing the promissory note of March 3, 1992, and sending Wade written confirmation that he had arranged direct repayment to Wade by Kokua's escrow officer. And Wade's suit against Cramer relates to and arises directly out of these contacts. Under analogous circumstances, we commented in American National Bank v. International Seafoods : This is not a case of [a nonresident defendant] passively standing by .... Rather, this is a case where the [defendant], knowing that its direct assurance to an Alaskan [resident] would be necessary in order to effectuate a commercial inter-state transaction, directly contacted the Alaskan [resident]; . . . and [made assurances of payment].[ [16] ] Our comment in American National applies here.