Opinion ID: 2598537
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Purpose of Avoiding or Preventing a Lawful Arrest Aggravating Circumstance

Text: [ś 124] Olsen was charged with committing the murders for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. In applying this aggravating circumstance to Olsen, the State contended the evidence showed that after the bartender told him that he would not get away with his crime, Olsen realized the witnesses in the bar could identify him and he then executed them. Olsen contends that application of the aggravator under these circumstances permits it to be valid in any homicide case, because in virtually every homicide there is a witness silenced, and an arrest thus potentially prevented. He points out that such application would call into question the constitutional validity of the aggravator because [t]here [would be] no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty is imposed, from the many cases in which it was not, citing Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433, 100 S.Ct. at 1767. He urges that no evidence establishes and this court cannot find that the dominant motive for the murder was the elimination of witnesses. He contends that the aggravating circumstance is properly limited to those cases where it is the dominant motive, as illustrated by those situations involving an imminent arrest or those cases where the victim of the murder is a witness to an earlier independent crime. [ś 125] Hopkinson II and Hopkinson III considered the application of this factor. This court found the evidence established that the victim was an accomplice murdered because he was to testify before a grand jury about Hopkinson's role in an earlier multiple murder. Hopkinson v. State, 696 P.2d 54, 70 (Wyo.1985) ( Hopkinson III ); Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d at 58-59. The State contends that limiting this factor to witnesses in an ongoing investigation as in Hopkinson would make this aggravating circumstance practically indistinguishable from the aggravating circumstance in § 6-2-102(h)(viii). [9] [ś 126] Again, our task is to strictly construe the plain language of this aggravating circumstance, giving it a constitutional construction if possible, and giving effect to legislative intent. We have already determined that it is the legislative intent to limit application of the death penalty to the most culpable of crimes. Plainly, the legislature intended that the death penalty apply to those murders motivated to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or effect an escape from custody although the murders also occurred during commission of a robbery, the aggravating circumstance articulated in § 6-2-102(h)(xii). [10] [ś 127] The evidence supports finding that the only motive for the execution-type killings after the victims had cooperated and the robbery was accomplished was as Olsen admitted, namely, to eliminate identification witnesses. The statutory language is exactly similar to Florida's statutory language which has been held to encompass application of this provision to the murder of a witness to a crime. Riley v. State, 366 So.2d 19, 22 n. 4 (Fla.1978). Riley established that the mere fact of a death is not enough to invoke this factor when the victim is not a law enforcement official. Id. at 22. In a later decision, when confronted with evidence that use of a silencer on a gun suggested a motivation to avoid arrest and detection, Florida rejected that argument, holding that motive would not be assumed and requiring that the evidence must clearly show that the dominant or only motive for the murder was the elimination of witnesses. Menendez v. State, 368 So.2d 1278, 1282 (Fla.1979). Florida has consistently found that [s]tanding alone, the fact that the victim could identify the murderer does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the elimination of a witness was a dominant motive for the killing. Bruno v. State, 574 So.2d 76, 81-82 (Fla.1991); see also Floyd v. State, 497 So.2d 1211, 1214-15 (Fla.1986); Bates v. State, 465 So.2d 490, 492 (Fla.1985). We hold that these rules should apply for this aggravating circumstance under Wyoming's statute. Olsen's concern that in virtually every homicide there is a witness silenced, and an arrest thus potentially prevented, does not arise when the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the dominant motive is to eliminate witnesses to a crime. [ś 128] In this case, sufficient evidence supports finding that this aggravating circumstance existed. Olsen stated that none of the victims resisted him during the robbery and the robbery was accomplished before he shot them. Olsen stated that he shot the victims because they could identify him. This evidence established that Olsen's dominant motive for the murders was to eliminate the witnesses to his crime of robbery and established for the jury beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance of murder to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest.