Opinion ID: 895202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Accident-Reconstruction Expert

Text: TXI argues the trial court erred by overruling its timely objection to Hughes's reconstruction expert, Dr. Kurt Marshek, whom it contends expressed an unreliable opinion that Rodriguez caused the accident by crossing the center line first.
For an expert's testimony to be admissible, the expert witness must be qualified to testify about scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, TEX.R. EVID. 702, and the testimony must be relevant and based upon a reliable foundation. Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 628 (Tex.2002). An expert's testimony is relevant when it assists the jury in determining an issue or in understanding other evidence. TEX.R. EVID. 702. But, expert testimony based on an unreliable foundation or flawed methodology is unreliable and does not satisfy Rule 702's relevancy requirement. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556-57 (Tex.1995) (discussing TEX. R. EVID. 702). When the reliability of an expert's testimony is challenged, courts `should ensure that the [expert's] opinion comports with the applicable professional standards.' Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex.2001) (quoting Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 725-26 (Tex.1998)). To aid in that determination, we have suggested several factors to consider when assessing the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702. [2] We have emphasized, however, that these factors are non-exclusive, and that they do not fit every scenario. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726. They are particularly difficult to apply in vehicular accident cases involving accident reconstruction testimony. Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32, 39 (Tex.2007) (citing Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Tex.2006)); see also Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 727. Nevertheless, the court, as gatekeeper, must determine how the reliability of particular testimony is to be assessed. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726. Rather than focus entirely on the reliability of the underlying technique used to generate the challenged opinion, as in Robinson, we have found it appropriate in cases like this to analyze whether the expert's opinion actually fits the facts of the case. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 904-05 (Tex.2004). In other words, we determine whether there are any significant analytical gaps in the expert's opinion that undermine its reliability. Id.
Dr. Kurt Marshek, an emeritus professor of mechanical engineering at the University of Texas, testified for Hughes. In preparing for his testimony, Marshek reviewed the police accident report and photographs from the accident scene, visited and took measurements at the accident site, specifically measured the gouge and scrape marks created by the accident, ran skid tests with an exemplar vehicle and measuring device to determine the roadway's coefficient of friction, inspected and photographed the Yukon, collected data on the Yukon's speed and braking during the five seconds before impact from the vehicle's black box, performed a time-distance analysis, and reviewed the accident scene witnesses' statements and depositions. Employing this data, Marshek rendered drawings of the accident site to illustrate his theory of the accident. Marshek's theory was that Rodriguez left his lane of travel, crossed over the center line into the westbound lane, and partially re-entered his eastbound lane before the initial impact with the Yukon. Marshek further concluded Kimberly Hughes steered sharply left into the eastbound lane to avoid Rodriguez's gravel truck, which then at least partially occupied her lane, resulting in the collision in Rodriguez's eastbound lane. [3] Using the physical evidence, Marshek described his version of the initial collision and each vehicle's subsequent movements. The first impact occurred with the gravel truck's second axle, creating downward pressure on the Yukon's tire and forcing the rim to carve a gouge in the eastbound lane six inches from the center line. Reddish paint and rubber marks on the gravel truck's tires revealed where the Yukon made contact with the tires at the second, third, fourth, and fifth axles. Rim and axle damage to the second and fourth axles demonstrated more substantial contact. After the initial collision, the gravel truck's significant mass dictated the Yukon's direction, forcing the Yukon's rear end to move clockwise and adopt the gravel truck's trailer's angle. While following this angle, the Yukon's front left rim first gouged and then scraped the concrete at an angle to the center line. After hitting the fourth axle, the Yukon's left rear rim moved back toward the centerline creating a scrape mark. As it cleared the trailer's end, the Yukon was fully in its westbound lane, moving slightly sideways before it re-entered the eastbound lane, colliding with the Ford pickup. Meanwhile, the gravel truck applied its brakes 128 feet after the point of impact, leaving tire marks on the road until the truck rested 486 feet away.
TXI complains Marshek's testimony is no evidence that Rodriguez proximately caused the collision. Marshek was the only witness to suggest the gravel truck crossed the center line, but TXI assails his testimony, arguing that (1) Marshek incorrectly assumed that the gouge mark pinpointed the place on the road where the Yukon collided with the gravel truck's second axle; (2) Marshek incorrectly assumed the gouge mark indicated the angle of the gravel truck at the moment the Yukon struck it; (3) Marshek calculated the gravel truck's position based on an imprecise witness time estimate contrary to proper protocol; and (4) Marshek selectively relied on eyewitness line-of-sight testimony. TXI claims Marshek's theorythat the Yukon's collision with the second axle created the gouge marklacks any factual foundation. [4] However, some facts do support Marshek's theory. The gravel truck's second and fourth axles were the most heavily damaged, and thus may signify the most likely collision points capable of creating the gouge. Marshek acknowledged that the severe damage to the fourth axle could indicate where the Yukon gouged the road, but rejected the possibility based on the additional scrape marks present in the eastbound lane after the gouge. Marshek matched these scrapes with subsequent impacts at the third and fourth axles. While disputing other points, all experts agreed the Yukon began moving counterclockwise back into the westbound lane after colliding with the fourth axle. As Marshek testified, had the fourth axle collision caused the gouge, there would have been no further event in the eastbound lane to create the additional scrape marks before the Yukon re-entered the westbound lane. TXI also claims Marshek admitted during cross-examination that the gouge mark did not signify the initial collision with the second axle. Marshek testified that the Yukon would have traveled eleven feet after colliding with the second axle, assuming it took one-eighth of a second for its wheel damage to create the gouge mark. However, Marshek estimated that the actual time from initial impact to the rim gouging the pavement would normally be one-tenth to one-twentieth of a second, and that here the impact between the Yukon and second axle created extra drag with the larger truck tire applying a downward force on the Yukon's wheel, inhibiting its lateral movement. Thus, contrary to TXI's claim, Marshek did not concede that the gouge mark would have been made eleven feet from the point of initial impact with the second axle. TXI next argues Marshek's conclusion that the gouge mark reflects the gravel truck's angle during the collision with its second axle is unreliable because Marshek did not rule out the possibility the gouge mark might have been created during subsequent impacts with the gravel truck's tires and axles. An expert's failure to rule out alternative causes of an incident may render his opinion unreliable. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 720 (Tex.1997). However, that is not the case here. Marshek pointed to scrape marks and other physical evidence to conclude the gouge mark occurred during the collision with the gravel truck's second axle, which effectively eliminated other causes of the gouge mark. He also testified the additional scrapes were created by the Yukon and angled in roughly the same direction as the gouge mark. Marshek's gouge-mark-angle theory finds support in the physical evidence. As Marshek explained, the Yukon weighs one-sixteenth of the gravel truck, making the collision analogous to a fly hitting a boulder. The gravel truck's weight was distributed along the trailer, so when the Yukon impacted the gravel truck's tires and axles it conformed to the trailer's angle, gouging and scraping the road at an angle to the center line. Further, Marshek found additional support in the angle of the gravel truck's brake marks. He testified the direction and length were consistent with the gouge mark angle and consistent with the gravel truck re-entering its eastbound lane. Moreover, Marshek tried to line up the gouge mark and the brake marks using the assumption that the gravel truck remained in its eastbound lane. He concluded the brake marks would not line up unless Rodriguez executed a dangerous steering maneuver likely resulting in a rollover or spillage that did not occur. TXI also contends Marshek incorrectly estimated the gravel truck's position by distorting Rodriguez's testimony and ignoring accepted accident reconstruction protocol. Rodriguez testified that he turned the gravel truck to the right in an attempt to avoid the collision, but his estimates of how long he turned varied from probably one second or less to two or three seconds, I think. TXI argues Marshek distorts Rodriguez's testimony by relying on these statements, yet rejecting Rodriguez's assertion that he never crossed the center line. Further, it contends Marshek violated accident reconstruction protocol by relying primarily on Rodriguez's time estimates instead of physical data. Marshek's reliance on Rodriguez's statements does not distort Rodriguez's testimony. In City of Keller v. Wilson, we said that evidence cannot be taken out of context in a way that makes it seem to support a verdict when in fact it never did. 168 S.W.3d 802, 812 (Tex.2005) (citing Bostrom Seating, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 140 S.W.3d 681, 684-85 (Tex.2004)). We provided an example: If a witness's statement `I did not do that' is contrary to the jury's verdict, a reviewing court may need to disregard the whole statement, but cannot rewrite it by disregarding the middle word alone. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 812. Rodriguez made two statements: (1) he did not move out of his lane, and (2) he turned right immediately before the collision. Rather than cherry-picking parts of Rodriguez's testimony or twisting its meaning, Marshek simply illustrated a possible inconsistency in Rodriguez's testimony based on his review of the physical evidence. Marshek's use of Rodriguez's testimony also did not violate accepted accident reconstruction protocol. According to TXI's testifying expert, John Painter, an accident reconstruction specialist uses witness statements to help fill gaps after the specialist analyzes the physical data. Painter acknowledged eyewitness statements assist in reconstructing an accident, but implied such statements cannot be an expert's primary data source. As discussed above, Marshek based the gravel truck's position on the physical evidence the gouge mark angle, the subsequent scrapes' angles, and the gravel truck's brake marksusing Rodriguez's testimony solely to bolster his theory. Although his time estimates changed, Rodriguez consistently maintained that he turned to the right before the collision. Given the gravel truck's speed, Marshek concluded that even with only one second of movement (Rodriguez's lowest estimate), Rodriguez would have started the turn from the Yukon's lane. TXI similarly complains Marshek distorts another witness's testimony by crediting the witness's statement that he did not see the Yukon until it passed the gravel truck's trailer while ignoring the same witness's assertion that he never saw the gravel truck cross the center line. [5] However, Marshek discussed the witness's testimony only in response to questions regarding Painter's line-of-sight analysis. [6] When asked whether the possibility that the gravel truck re-entering the eastbound lane blocked the witness's view of the Yukon until it cleared the truck's trailer supported Marshek's theory, he responded, Yes, it would. However, Marshek did not ground his theory upon the witness's testimony, but instead based it on other evidence. Lastly, TXI asserts that Marshek conceded his theory to be speculation when he admitted that nobody knows what the steering was ... it's all total speculation. Read in context, however, this comment was directed at Painter's use of a computer simulation, and its inability to consider the vehicles' specific steering angles. Rodriguez testified that he turned to the right immediately before the collision, and Marshek confirmed that angle from the physical evidence and Rodriguez's testimony.
Expert testimony is unreliable when `there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.' Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 39 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997)). Expert testimony is also unreliable if it is not grounded in scientific methods and procedures, but is rather based upon subjective belief or unsupported speculation. Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petrol. Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex.2004). Expert testimony lacking a proper foundation is incompetent, City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 813, and its admission is an abuse of discretion. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 800. The court's ultimate task, however, is not to determine whether the expert's conclusions are correct, but rather whether the analysis the expert used to reach those conclusions is reliable and therefore admissible. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d at 629 (citing Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 728). Reliability may be demonstrated by the connection of the expert's theory to the underlying facts and data in the case. Two recent cases illustrate the point. Compare Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 40-41 (concluding that a complaint about expert's testimony went to its weight, not its admissibility) with Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d at 906 (concluding an expert's testimony was unreliable because it was based on a subjective interpretation of the facts rather than scientific analysis). Both cases involved auto accidents allegedly caused by the failure of a defective mechanical part. The question in both cases was whether the failure of the part caused the accident or resulted from it. In Ledesma, a metallurgical and mechanical engineer testified extensively about his theory of how a u-bolt came to be under-torqued on the rear leaf spring and axle assembly of a Ford truck. 242 S.W.3d at 37-38. He further explained how this defect caused the axle assembly to come apart which, in turn, caused the drive shaft to separate from the transmission. Id. at 37. The expert supported his theory with observations and measurements from the physical evidence and the manufacturer's own specifications. Id. at 37-38. Although there was some question as to when the part failed, the expert pointed to other physical evidence to support his theory regarding the u-bolt's failure as the triggering event for the accident. Id. at 38. We concluded that the manufacturer's complaints about the expert testimony ultimately went to its weight and not its admissibility. Id. at 40-41. In Ramirez, the expert's theory was that a bearing defect in the left rear wheel assembly of a Volkswagen Passat caused a loss of control when that wheel became detached from its axle. 159 S.W.3d at 904. Although detached from the stub axle, the wheel was found under the rear wheel well after the accident. Id. at 902. Critical to the expert's theory was the assumption that the detached wheel remained pocketed in the wheel well throughout a turbulent and high-speed accident sequence, involving a grass and concrete median and another vehicle. Id. at 904. The expert proposed the laws of physics explained his assumption, but did not connect his theory to any physical evidence in the case or to any tests or calculations prepared to substantiate his theory. Id. at 904-06. We concluded the expert's testimony was unreliable because it was not supported by objective scientific analysis but rather rested upon the expert's subjective interpretation of the facts. Id. at 906. As we have repeatedly said, `a claim will not stand or fall on the mere ipse dixit of a credentialed witness.' City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex.1999)). Marshek's testimony here, however, was neither conclusory nor subjective. His observations, measurements, and calculations were, as in Ledesma, tied to the physical evidence in the case which likewise provided support for his conclusions and theory. Marshek's expert testimony thus meets our standard for reliability, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony.