Opinion ID: 1822103
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limitation on Discovery and Denial of Continuance

Text: In Panda's first claim on appeal, it asserts that the PSC denied it due process as an intervenor by limiting its opportunity to participate in discovery and by denying its request for a continuance in FPC's need determination proceeding. Limitations on discovery and denials of continuances are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See MCR Funding v. CMG Funding Corp., 771 So.2d 32, 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Thompson v. Deane, 703 So.2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Manasota-88, Inc. v. Agrico Chem. Co., 576 So.2d 781, 782-83 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (holding no abuse of discretion in denying intervenor a continuance). On August 7, 2000, FPC filed its petition for determination of need for the Hines 2 power plant. The PSC appointed a prehearing officer who, in turn, issued a scheduling order on August 30, 2000. [2] The order set the case for final hearing on October 26-27, 2000. The order further provided that any intervenors had until September 11, 2000, to file their prefiled testimony, the PSC staff had until September 18, 2000, to file their prefiled testimony, and FPC then had until September 25, 2000, to file any rebuttal testimony. The order required all parties to file prehearing statements by October 4, 2000, and the prehearing officer to conduct a prehearing conference on October 11, 2000. The order set October 19, 2000, as the cutoff date for all discovery. Pursuant to this schedule, the PSC staff served interrogatories and document requests upon FPC and conducted depositions. The PSC staff filed prefiled testimony and FPC filed rebuttal testimony. FPC requested and obtained discovery of the PSC staff, including the deposition of an expert sponsored by the PSC staff. The deadline for filing testimony expired without anyone filing a motion to intervene. Moreover, both FPC and the PSC staff filed their prehearing statements without anyone seeking leave to intervene. Although Panda attended the prehearing conference on October 11, 2000, it did so as a spectator because it had not filed a motion for leave to intervene. The following day, Panda sought leave to intervene in the need determination. [3] Panda filed the motion to intervene two weeks before the final hearing. Panda asserted that it delayed intervening in the need proceeding because it was waiting for this Court to decide the pending motions for reconsideration in Tampa Electric, which motions the Court denied in light of a revised opinion on September 28, 2000. Panda claimed that because the Tampa Electric decision potentially affected Panda's ability to sell power in Florida, it made the business decision to wait until the Court denied rehearing in Tampa Electric before intervening. The PSC granted Panda leave to intervene and extended the discovery cutoff through noon of the day before the final hearing in order to permit Panda to take depositions that Panda's counsel stated she wanted. Moreover, FPC allowed Panda to take the deposition of FPC's consultant during the afternoon before the final hearing commenced and provided Panda discovery materials. The prehearing officer also ordered FPC to provide Panda with confidential documents before the hearing, and FPC complied with this order. Under the facts in this case, we conclude that the PSC did not abuse its discretion in limiting Panda's opportunity to participate in discovery. Florida Administrative Code Rule 25-22.039, which provides for intervention in PSC proceedings, states, Intervenors take the case as they find it. [4] As noted above, Panda filed its motion to intervene on October 12, 2000, which was seven days before the discovery cutoff, and two weeks before the final hearing. Although Panda contends that it delayed intervening in the PSC proceeding until after the Court's decision of whether to grant rehearing in Tampa Electric, in fact, Panda waited two weeks until after this Court denied rehearing in Tampa Electric before filing the motion to intervene. Moreover, despite this late-filed motion to intervene, the prehearing officer extended the discovery cutoff date by one day, allowed Panda to take the depositions it requested, and required FPC to provide Panda with immediate access to all confidential information. Therefore, under these circumstances, we conclude that the PSC did not abuse its discretion in limiting Panda's opportunity to participate in discovery. Panda also asserts that the PSC abused its discretion in denying Panda's request for a one-month continuance. We disagree. On October 25, 2000, one day after the PSC granted Panda intervention, Panda moved for a one-month continuance. The PSC denied Panda's motion, finding that Panda did not show good cause for granting the continuance pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.210, which provides: The presiding officer may grant a continuance of a hearing for good cause shown. Except in cases of emergency, requests for continuance must be made at least five days prior to the date noticed for the hearing. (Emphasis supplied.) We conclude that the PSC did not abuse its discretion in denying Panda's motion for a continuance. First, Panda filed its motion for a continuance two days before the hearing, thereby violating the five-day requirement of rule 28-106.210. Second, in order to obtain a continuance, Panda had to procure a waiver from the PSC's rule implementing the statutory deadlines for need proceedings. See § 120.542(2), (5), Fla. Stat. (2000); Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-104.002. Under section 120.542(2), the PSC shall grant a waiver when the person subject to the rule demonstrates that the purpose of the underlying statute will be or has been achieved by other means by the person and when application of a rule would create a substantial hardship or would violate principles of fairness. For purposes of this section substantial hardship means a demonstrated economic, technological, legal, or other type of hardship to the person requesting the variance or waiver. For purposes of this section, principles of fairness are violated when a literal application of a rule affects a particular person in a manner significantly different from the way it affects other similarly situated persons who are subject to the rule. Because the limited amount of time for preparing for this case was a direct result of Panda's decision to delay intervening, Panda has demonstrated neither a substantial hardship nor a violation of principles of fairness. Therefore, we conclude that the PSC did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a continuance.