Opinion ID: 1110731
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: denial of motion for disclosure of the names of the arresting officers and disclosure of the criminal histories of johnson and spann

Text: ¶ 71. In reviewing rulings of a trial court regarding matters of evidence, relevancy and discovery violations, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Montgomery v. State, 891 So.2d 179, 181 (Miss.2004). ¶ 72. Flora asserts the trial court denied to him the names and identities of the police officers who were present at his arrest in the early morning hours of September 11, 2001, and also denied him the criminal histories of Roger Johnson and Ray Spann. Flora submits only that this information may have been favorable and possibly could have supported the defense that Flora did not fire the murder weapon. ¶ 73. The law is well-settled on this disclosure issue. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the United States Supreme Court established the principle that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is either material to guilt or to punishment. However, the Supreme Court also recognized that not all failures to disclose exculpatory evidence constitute reversible error, holding that ... the question is whether there is a `reasonable probability' that the verdict would have been different but for governmental evidentiary suppression which `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.' Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). Soon thereafter, we adopted this principle and stated that in order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove the following: (1) that the government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment evidence); (2) that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. King v. State, 656 So.2d 1168, 1174 (Miss. 1995) (emphasis added). ¶ 74. Flora argues the State suppressed favorable evidence; however, Flora fails to show, as required by Brady, either that the evidence was favorable or that the prosecution even possessed the same. In fact, Flora acknowledged this through his motion for discovery that he asked the trial court to order the Jackson Police Department, the Hinds County Sheriff's Office, the Mississippi Department of Public Safety and the Mississippi Department of Corrections to provide him all the records indicating all criminal charges or convictions with regard to five persons who  may be material witnesses in this case and may be called to testify (emphasis added). There is no proof in the record that would allow this Court to decide whether such evidence was favorable or unfavorable. Even if this Court presumes that the evidence was favorable and that the evidence was in the prosecution's possession, Flora still must satisfy the remaining prongs. ¶ 75. Under the second prong of Brady, the defendant must prove that he does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it with any reasonable diligence. King, 656 So.2d at 1174. Presuming Flora did not possess the evidence, no proof exists in the record that Flora could not obtain the evidence with reasonable diligence. Flora argues that state and federal law bar Flora from directly accessing the information via the public entities responsible for maintaining national criminal information databases and access to these databases, but does not cite authority and does not provide any proof that he sought to obtain such information and it was denied. Further, this argument is in direct conflict with a recent decision by the Mississippi Court of Appeals which correctly stated that: [c]onviction records are a matter of public record equally available to the defense as to the State. McNair v. State, 814 So.2d 153, 157 (Miss.App.2001). Moreover, while the names and addresses of the police officers were in the State's possession, Flora failed to demonstrate he could not obtain this information through reasonable diligence. ¶ 76. Even if Flora were to satisfy the first and second prongs, he fails to satisfy the third and fourth prongs of the Brady test. Under the third and fourth prongs of the test, the defendant is required to prove that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence and that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. King, 656 So.2d at 1174 (emphasis added). In 2001, this Court held that in any case, Brady requires a `reasonable probability' of a different outcome, not a mere possibility. Todd v. State, 806 So.2d 1086, 1091 (Miss.2001). Ultimately, Flora cannot prove to a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had this evidence been in his possession. Flora not only admitted to being at the scene of the crime, but he also admitted to being in a struggle with the victim. Evidence also exists which places the weapon used to commit the crime in Flora's possession soon after the crime. Furthermore, gunshot residue was found on Flora soon after the crime, and blood of the victim was found on Flora's clothing. At best, a mere possibility exists that the outcome of trial would have been different, certainly not satisfying Brady or the standard required by this Court's precedent. See id. at 1091. Moreover, there is no evidence of suppression by the State. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to allow Flora to discover potentially favorable evidence.