Opinion ID: 1706473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Existence of Riparian Right

Text: The first question we must decide is whether Koch has a riparian right, inasmuch as a person may not be heard to complain, either in a court of law or before an administrative tribunal, as to the infringement of a right which in fact he does not possess. [31] In Osterman v. Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District , parties claiming riparian rights objected to applications made by an irrigation district for the allowance of water rights in the North Platte and Platte Rivers. In an appeal from an administrative decision granting the applications, the irrigation district argued that the objectors did not in fact possess riparian rights. We noted evidence that the objectors were representatives of titles for lands bordering the Platte River which were initiated by settlement as early as 1857 and for which patents had been issued earlier than 1870. We concluded that the objectors therefore possessed common-law rights of riparian owners of land. In Wasserburger v. Coffee, [32] parties claiming riparian rights sought to enjoin upstream irrigators who held appropriation permits, claiming that the irrigation exhausted streamflow necessary to water cattle. The irrigators denied that the plaintiffs possessed riparian rights. In resolving this issue, we first examined whether the legislative adoption of the prior appropriation doctrine abrogated all riparian rights. We concluded that while the 1895 irrigation act abrogated the common law of riparian rights in favor of the current system of appropriation, it did not abolish existing riparian rights with respect to parcels of land severed from the public domain prior to April 4, 1895, the effective date of the act. Such rights could be established by showing that by common law standards the land was riparian immediately prior to the effective date of the act and that it had not subsequently lost its riparian status as a result of severance. [33] Thus, riparian rights which had vested prior to the effective date of the 1895 act were preserved, but no new riparian rights could be acquired after that date. [34] The 1895 act denied the common law doctrine as to all riparian land not privately owned as of its effective date. [35] There is no evidence in this record establishing when Koch's property was severed from the public domain or whether any predecessor in title held vested riparian rights prior to April 4, 1895. Koch argues that such proof is not required under the reasoning of Brummund v. Vogel. [36] The plaintiff in that case, claiming riparian rights, sought to enjoin an upstream appropriator from damming a creek which provided the main source of water for the plaintiff's cattle. Our opinion specifically stated that the plaintiff neither pled nor proved facts entitling him to vested riparian rights under the common law which might precede April 4, 1895, the effective date of the irrigation act of 1895, which is the cut-off date for the acquisition of riparian rights and the invoking of the law of priority of application giving the better right as between those using the water for the same or different purposes, and preferring domestic use over other uses in cases of insufficient water. [37] Nevertheless, the opinion goes on to recognize that the right of the downstream user to use water from the stream for domestic purposes was superior to the upstream appropriator's rights. [38] However, because the downstream user failed to meet his burden of proof, injunctive relief was denied. Brummund has been criticized as the cause of a good deal of uncertainty to the law of riparian-appropriator disputes. [39] The commentators note: If domestic users are protected against all others by virtue of the preference laws, then the value of an appropriator's right is considerably diminished. The situation becomes more aggravated if anyone watering livestock (even a person having no protected interest under any known Nebraska law) is given a valid claim to water and the right to enjoin appropriators. . . . . . . . Further, expanding livestock watering rights beyond riparians, as Brummund may have done, works a substantial change in Nebraska water law, according to many authorities. Thus, to the extent that Brummund suggests such an extension, it is wrong. [40] We agree. Prior to Brummund, we noted that the dual administration of water resources under the doctrines of riparian rights and of prior appropriation results in a hydra of perplexity and that the two methods are incompatible. [41] Our case law prior to Brummund characterized surface water rights as either appropriative or riparian and required proof of any claimed riparian right. [42] The departure in Brummund from that course was unwise. To the extent Brummund suggests that riparian rights can be asserted without proof of their existence, or that there may be a nonriparian, common-law right to surface water, it is disapproved. The record in this case does not establish that either Koch or the Aupperles held riparian rights. They are simply owners of adjoining tracts of land through which the tributary flows, with Koch's land situated downstream of that of the Aupperles. Koch, as the party seeking injunctive relief, had the burden to show that the proposed Aupperle dam would infringe on his rights. Because he has not even demonstrated the existence of a common-law riparian right, he clearly is not entitled to injunctive relief. Accordingly, we need not analyze the reasonableness of the use by each party of the water flowing in the tributary. [43] However, we note that the record fully supports the finding of the district court that both parties intended to use water in the tributary primarily for aesthetic and recreational purposes with grade stabilization, erosion control, and domestic use (watering cattle) being secondary in nature.