Opinion ID: 174443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kone's Derivative Claim

Text: The BIA rejected Kone's claim for derivative relief based on a threat of FGM to her daughter, relying on our rulings in Oforji and Olowo. [4] In those cases, the petitioners, both Nigerian women who had undergone FGM, sought asylum and withholding of removal based on their fear their daughters would be subjected to FGM as well if brought to that country. In both cases, we rejected the petitioners' claims, holding that the parents could not make a derivative claim for asylum based on a likelihood of persecution not to themselves, but to their children. See Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701; Oforji, 354 F.3d at 618. In Oforji, we noted that in contrast to the cancellation-of-removal provision set forth in INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1), the statutory scheme for asylum does not permit consideration of hardship to a petitioner's children when determining eligibility. 354 F.3d at 616-17. We ruled that an alien parent may not establish a derivative claim for asylum by pointing to potential hardship to the alien's United States citizen child in the event of the alien's deportation. Id. at 618. And a year later in Olowo, we again concluded that both the asylum and withholding of removal standards require an applicant to demonstrate that she herself will be subject to persecution if removed, and do not encompass any consideration of persecution that may be suffered by otherseven family memberswho may be obliged to return with her.... Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701; see also Gumaneh v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir.2008) (an applicant may not establish a derivative claim for withholding of removal based upon the applicant's child's fear of persecution); Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir.2007) (same). There is, however, a distinction between the situations in Oforji and Olowo and Kone's situation here. In both Oforji and Olowo, only one parent was in removal proceedings, meaning there was at least the possibility that the other parent could take care of the child in the United States. Cf. Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701 (father was available); Oforji, 354 F.3d at 618 (father may have been available). Here, both parents are in removal proceedings. The BIA somewhat cursorily rejected Kone's attempt to highlight this distinction, noting that because the whereabouts of the petitioner's husband in Oforji were unknown, it was not clear that the children in that case could have stayed with their father. The BIA did not address Olowo, however. On remand, the BIA should do so, in light of Olowo's implication that there may be a claim for constructive deportation when both, not just one, parent is in proceedings. See Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701 ([W]hen there is a parent who is available to care for the daughters in the United States, they are under no compulsion to leave. Accordingly, the facts here do not support a claim for derivative asylum.); see also Gatimi v. Holder, 606 F.3d 344, 349 (7th Cir.2010) ( Gatimi II ) (noting that in Olowo and Oforji, the children had one parent with legal status and so were not subject to removal.); Benyamin v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir.2009) (remanding to BIA to consider whether father qualified for derivative asylum based on threat of FGM to daughter, in case where both parents were subject to removal).