Opinion ID: 901459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Harmless v. prejudicial error

Text: [¶ 25.] Although admission of an involuntary confession violates the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not constitute reversible error if the State can prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1257, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). The United States Supreme Court uses caution in conducting this analysis, noting: A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. . . . [T]he admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct. Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so. Id. (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-140, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1630, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)). [¶ 26.] There was no physical evidence linking Holman to the robbery. Neither the clerk nor her boyfriend could identify Holman. The only significant evidence of guilt besides the confession was the testimony of a claimed accomplice. However, the jury was instructed that it could not base a conviction on the accomplice testimony unless it was corroborated by other evidence. The instructions provided that the confession could be used as evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony. Under these circumstances, the State has not met its burden of proving the involuntary confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶ 27.] Reversed and remanded for trial. [¶ 28.] KONENKAMP and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur. [¶ 29.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER, Justice, concur in result.