Opinion ID: 2166544
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reasonableness of Allen's Failure to Take Advantage of Preventive and Corrective Measures

Text: We now turn to the second prong of the Faragher / Ellerth affirmative defense, which required Allen to exercise reasonable care in avoiding harm by taking advantage of the State's preventive and corrective measures. In Faragher , the Supreme Court said that while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the defense.  Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (emphasis added). Furthermore, federal courts have consistently held an employee's duty to use an employer's complaint procedure promptly is not alleviated by the employee's speculative fear of retaliation or subjective belief in the futility of complaining. Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1307; Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 35-36 (1st Cir.2003); Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267-68 (4th Cir.2001); Shaw, 180 F.3d at 813. Rather, to be reasonable, an employee's failure to use an employer's complaint procedure must be based on a credible fear that any complaint would not be taken seriously or would result in retaliation. Reed, 333 F.3d at 36; Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295-96. The record demonstrates that Allen waited nearly thirteen months after McPhee's first act of harassment to report the harassment. In the absence of proof that Allen's delay in reporting was based on a credible fear that her complaint would not be taken seriously or would result in retaliation, this evidence is sufficient to satisfy the State's burden of proof on the second prong of the Faragher / Ellerth defense. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08, 118 S.Ct. 2275. Allen argues that her delay in reporting McPhee's conduct was reasonable because it stemmed from her concern that McPhee would learn of the allegations and be part of the decision-making process. As previously discussed, the sexual harassment policy required McPhee to be involved in the decision-making process for all sexual harassment complaints, with no exception made for complaints in which McPhee was the alleged harasser. Given the role McPhee would be designated to play in the handling of Allen's sexual harassment complaint, a reasonable jury could conclude that Allen could have credibly believed that complaining would have been futile or counterproductive or would have resulted in retaliation. Accordingly, we hold that there are material issues of fact regarding whether Allen unreasonably failed to take advantage of corrective measures made available to her by the State. In summary, the State has failed to demonstrate that there are no genuine disputes of material fact with regard to the reasonableness of the anti-harassment policy's complaint procedures and the reasonableness of Allen's failure to take advantage of preventive and corrective measures made available by the State. Accordingly, the trial court erred in determining that the State established the Faragher / Ellerth defense.