Opinion ID: 780062
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 21 When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). In making this determination, we refrain from independently judging the credibility of witnesses or [the] weight of the evidence. United States v. Walls, 293 F.3d 959, 967 (6th Cir.2002). All reasonable inferences are to be drawn in the government's favor. United States v. Kelly, 204 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir.2000). Even circumstantial evidence may sustain a conviction so long as the totality of the evidence was substantial enough to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Walls, 293 F.3d at 967.
22 Randall argues that the government did not present sufficient evidence to establish his guilt with respect to counts two, four, five, nine, and ten. Randall, however, was neither charged with nor convicted on count five, so we will turn our attention to the evidence supporting the remaining challenged counts. 23
24 Count two charged that Randall aided and abetted Terry in attempting to kill Jackson with the intent of preventing her attendance and testimony at Randall's upcoming trial, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1). The government accordingly needed to prove that (1) Jackson was scheduled to be a witness at an upcoming judicial proceeding against Randall, (2) Terry attempted to kill Jackson, (3) Terry did so knowingly and wilfully with the intent to prevent the attendance or testimony of Jackson, (4) Randall helped, commanded, induced, or encouraged Terry to commit the crime, and (5) Randall intended to help Terry commit the crime. 25 Randall's only argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to establish his guilt on count two was that he was not involved in the January 22, 1999 shooting. The evidence belies his contention. Randall solicited numerous individuals, both before and after the shooting, to kill Jackson, who was scheduled to testify against Randall at his upcoming trial on February 1, 1999 regarding the internet harassment and credit card fraud charges. Moreover, Randall's February 12, 1999 letter addressed to his parents mentioned that five warning shots had been fired into Jackson's car from a distance of three to five feet. Although Randall could have found out details about the shooting after it occurred (perhaps from a newspaper article or from family or friends), his knowledge of specific facts about the shooting strongly indicate that he was intimately involved in the plot. 26 Randall wrote a letter to Terry on March 21, 1999, telling Terry that Jackson was likely to testify against Randall because she was fully committed to trying to get me sent to prison. In the same letter, Randall asked Terry to contact the drywall contractor and to handle business for him, their code words for finding a contract killer to murder Jackson. 27 Finally, Jackson was scheduled to testify against Randall only ten days after the shooting incident. This fact, by itself, does not conclusively establish that Randall helped, commanded, induced or encouraged the shooting. But all of the above-mentioned facts, considered together and in a light most favorable to the government, were sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the government proved all of the elements at issue in count two against Randall. 28
29 Count four charged that Randall aided and abetted Terry in knowingly using and carrying a .38 caliber handgun during and in relation to a crime of violence and, in so doing, discharging a firearm, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Under this count, the government was required to establish that (1) Terry committed the crime alleged in count two, (2) Terry knowingly used a firearm during and in relation to Terry's alleged commission of that crime, (3) Randall helped, commanded, induced, or encouraged Terry to commit the crime, and (4) Randall intended to help Terry commit the crime. 30 Randall's only defense to count four again consisted of his argument that he was simply not involved in the January 22, 1999 shooting. For all of the reasons stated above, however, we find his argument to be without merit. 31
32 Count nine charged that Randall knowingly and voluntarily conspired to use the mail with the intent that the murders of the Nimmos be committed, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). The government needed to prove that (1) Randall conspired to use the mail with the intent that the murders of the Nimmos be committed in consideration of money to be paid a contract killer, (2) Randall knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy, and (3) a member of the conspiracy — either Randall or Terry — did one of the overt acts described in paragraphs 31 to 33 of the indictment to advance or help the conspiracy. 33 Randall argues that there was insufficient evidence tying him to the alleged conspiracy. The circumstantial evidence offered by the government, however, which the jury apparently accepted, provided a sufficient link. First, Randall asked Shirley Sheppard in 1998 about the availability of the Hungarian, allegedly to have the Hungarian kill the Nimmos. Second, Randall's March 17, 1999 letter to Terry instructed him to ask their father to meet the Hungarian, also with the intent of having the Nimmos murdered at that time. A third link is found in Randall's Daddy (for your eyes only) letter, which discussed Randall's plans for either Terry or their father to contact the Hungarian for the purpose of killing the Nimmos. Finally, a rational juror could have agreed with the government's contention that Terry's asking Bill whether he did any work down south was a reference to having Bill kill the Nimmos. 34
35 Count ten charged that Randall used the mail with the intent that the murders of the Nimmos be committed in consideration for a payment of money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). Terry contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on this count because there was no evidence that the Copes conspired to kill the Nimmos, and because the Daddy (for your eyes only) letter was not addressed to Terry. As explained above, however, there was ample evidence of such a conspiracy. Furthermore, the fact that the letter was not directly addressed to Terry in no way mitigates the incriminating references to Terry's involvement in the attempt to kill the Nimmos. We therefore conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven against Randall beyond a reasonable doubt.
36 Terry argues that the government did not present sufficient evidence to establish his guilt with respect to counts two, four, five, six, and nine. We will address each of his arguments in turn. 37
38 Count two charged that Terry attempted to kill Jackson by shooting at her with a .38 caliber handgun on January 22, 1999, with the intent of preventing her attendance and testimony at Randall's upcoming trial, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1). The government needed to prove that (1) Jackson was scheduled to be a witness at an upcoming judicial proceeding against Randall, (2) Terry attempted to kill Jackson, and (3) Terry did so knowingly and wilfully with the intent to prevent the attendance or testimony of Jackson. 39 Terry contends that there was insufficient proof regarding the second element, namely that he attempted to kill Jackson. The testimony adduced at trial, however, showed that Terry's unaccounted for time made it possible for him to have been in the vicinity of Jackson's home on the morning of the shooting. Moreover, the gun found in the yard of Terry's house, as well as three guns owned by the Copes' father and to which Terry had access, had general rifling characteristics that matched the bullets fired into Jackson's car. Finally, Terry met with Bill after the January 22, 1999 shooting to arrange for Bill to murder Jackson. He mentioned to Bill that Jackson's car was riddled with bullet holes and laughed that Jackson was gun shy. These facts, together with Terry's contemporaneous involvement with his brother in an effort to rid themselves of problem witnesses, would permit a rational trier of fact to find that Terry attempted to murder Jackson on January 22, 1999. 40
41 Count four charged that Terry knowingly used and carried a .38 caliber handgun during and in relation to a crime of violence and, in so doing, discharging the firearm, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Under this count, the government was required to establish that (1) Terry committed the crime alleged in count two, and (2) Terry knowingly used a firearm during and in relation to his alleged commission of that crime. 42 Terry's only defense to this count consisted of his argument that there was no evidence that he committed the crime alleged in count two. As discussed above, however, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the government had met its burden of proof regarding Terry's involvement in the attempted murder of Jackson. 43
44 Count five charged that Terry, while subject to a domestic violence protection order, knowingly and unlawfully possessed a .38 caliber handgun that was in or affected commerce, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The government accordingly needed to prove that (1) Terry knowingly possessed a firearm (2) at a time when he was subject to a domestic violence protection order, and that (3) the firearm was in or affecting commerce. 45 Terry's only new argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence offered to prove count five is that there was no proof that the firearm used in the January 22, 1999 shooting was in or affecting commerce. This point is relevant because § 922(g)(8) ensures [that] only those activities affecting interstate commerce fall within its scope. United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 218 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that this nexus between the prohibited conduct under § 922(g)(8) and interstate commerce provides the necessary connection to Congress's Commerce Clause authority). 46 Although the government could not identify which particular gun was used in the shooting, its theory was that Terry traveled with a gun from his home in Tennessee to Jackson's home in Kentucky in order to carry out the shooting. The jury accepted the government's argument, which is sufficient to satisfy the in-or-affecting-commerce element. See United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475, 488 (6th Cir.2001) (en banc) (commenting that § 922(g)(8)'s federal jurisdiction element is satisfied when a firearm has traveled interstate). Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Terry committed the crime alleged in count five. 47
48 Count six charged that Terry transported in interstate commerce a .38 caliber handgun while under indictment for a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). The government accordingly needed to prove that (1) Terry knowingly possessed a firearm, (2) the firearm was shipped or otherwise transported in interstate commerce, and (3) Terry was under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year before he possessed the firearm. 49 Terry conceded that he was under indictment for a felony as alleged in the third element, so that his only arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence as to count six are the same as his contentions about the sufficiency of the evidence for count five. For the reasons articulated above, we therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Terry on count six. 50
51 Count nine charged that Terry knowingly and voluntarily conspired to use the mail with the intent that the murders of the Nimmos be committed, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). The government was required to prove that (1) Terry conspired to use the mail with the intent that the murders of the Nimmos be committed in consideration of money to be paid a contract killer, (2) Terry knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy, and (3) a member of the conspiracy — either Randall or Terry — did one of the overt acts described in paragraphs 31 to 33 of the indictment to advance or help the conspiracy. 52 Terry argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on count nine because (1) the mail exchanged between Randall and him did not cross state lines, and (2) there was no evidence that linked Terry to the plot to murder the Nimmos. 1. No interstate mail requirement 53 The murder-for-hire statute requires that the actor use the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent that a murder be committed. Id. (emphasis added). A challenge to the lack of proof regarding the interstate commerce element is deemed to be a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, not a contention about the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 536 (6th Cir.2001). 54 Although Terry maintains that the government's evidence was insufficient because it did not prove that Randall's letters crossed an interstate boundary, § 1958(a) does not require an interstate mailing. The statute speaks of us[ing] the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce. [I]n interstate or foreign commerce modifies facility and not mail. United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 316 (5th Cir.2001) (The key question of statutory construction ... is whether ... the phrase `in interstate or foreign commerce' modifies `use' or modifies `facility.' ... [W]e must conclude that `in interstate or foreign commerce' is an adjective phrase that modifies `facility,' the noun that immediately precedes it- not an adverbial phrase that modifies the syntactically more remote verb, `[to] use.') (emphasis in original). As a matter of statutory construction, we agree with the Fifth Circuit's analysis. 55 The statute also presumes that the mail is a priori federal in nature, an assumption that is buttressed by the fact that the United States Postal Service is a distinctly federal entity ordained by the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (The Congress shall have Power... To establish Post Offices and post Roads.). We therefore conclude that § 1958(a) does not require that the government prove that items mailed through the United States Postal Service cross state boundaries. Although Terry argues that United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir.1999), implies otherwise, we note that Weathers does not interpret the word mail, but rather the phrase facility in interstate or foreign commerce, and is thus inapposite here. 169 F.3d at 339-43 (holding that the defendants' cellular telephone calls utilized facilities in interstate commerce only because their search signals crossed state boundaries). 56 2. The evidence linked Terry to the plot to murder the Nimmos 57 The evidence detailed in Part II.A.1.c. above regarding Randall's involvement in the plot to murder the Nimmos — except for Randall's statement to Shirley Sheppard, which was admitted only as to Randall — sufficiently implicates Terry in the conspiracy. We therefore conclude that a rational juror could have found that the government's proof against Terry regarding all of the elements as to count nine were established beyond a reasonable doubt.