Opinion ID: 1846429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Murray was denied due process when the circuit court denied his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial.

Text: ¶ 18. This Court has stated that the: [r]eview of a speedy trial claim encompasses the fact question of whether the trial delay rose from good cause. Under this Court's standard of review, this Court will uphold a decision based on substantial, credible evidence. If no probative evidence supports the trial court's finding of good cause, this Court will ordinarily reverse. DeLoach v. State, 722 So.2d 512, 516 (Miss. 1998) (emphasis added).
¶ 19. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-17-1 states that, [u]nless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned.  Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Rev.2007) (emphasis added). Murray inartfully suggests that this Court should consider the January 31, 2005, arraignment of the nolle prossed case as the applicable arraignment date. Should this Court concede this earlier arraignment date, which we do not, the time between that arraignment and the commencement of the jury trial on August 22, 2006, was 568 days. However, [i]f the defendant is the cause of the delay, he cannot complain thereafter. Simmons v. State, 678 So.2d 683, 685 (Miss.1996) (quoting Reed v. State, 506 So.2d 277, 281 (Miss.1987)). See also Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 955 (Miss. 1997) ([a] defendant should not be allowed to control the justice system to his advantage.). Therefore, any delay attributable to Murray would toll the running of the 270-day statutory period. See id. at 953. On March 4, 2005, Murray was re-indicted, an event which he admittedly expected, and an arrest warrant was issued. Murray was not located until his arrest in Jackson County on March 31, 2006. Like the circuit court, this Court attributes that delay to Murray, as he failed to surrender himself to the State's custody. Therefore, the 270-day period was tolled during that time. See id. Under Murray's suggested timeline, only 176 days elapsed between that arraignment and the trial, which would be attributed to the State. ¶ 20. However, a proper analysis applies the actual date of arraignment after re-indictment. Following Murray's re-indictment on March 4, 2005, he filed a Waiver of Arraignment on April 3, 2006, after being extradited to Lincoln County. Between his Waiver of Arraignment on April 3, 2006, and the commencement of the jury trial on August 22, 2006, only 141 days passed. Therefore, the circuit court's denial of Murray's statutory speedy-trial claim was supported by substantial, credible evidence. DeLoach, 722 So.2d at 516.

¶ 21. The constitutional right to a speedy trial exists separately from the statutory right. See Simmons, 678 So.2d at 686. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part, that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . . . U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held that the right to a speedy trial is `fundamental' and is imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the States. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2184, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 108 (1972) (quoting Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223, 87 S.Ct. 988). ¶ 22. In Barker, the United States Supreme Court created a balancing test which: necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: [l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Regarding this balancing test, Barker states: [w]e regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full recognition that the accused's interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution. Id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (emphasis added). See also Herring, 691 So.2d at 955 ([t]he weighing of the Barker factors is not a mechanistic weighing. We must look at the totality of the circumstances.). ¶ 23. The following timeline summarizes relevant events for purposes of Murray's constitutional speedy trial claim: 4/9/04: Murray initially arrested 4/10/04: Murray released on bond 8/3/04: Indictment 1/31/05: Arraignment 2/22/05: State nolle prosequi's the 8/3/04 indictment as defective 3/4/05: Re-indictment 3/4/05: Arrest warrant issued for Murray 3/31/06: Murray arrested by Jackson County Sheriff's Department 4/3/06: Murray extradited to Lincoln County; files Waiver of Arraignment; and is released on bond 6/26/06: Murray files Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial 6/26/06: Hearing on Murray's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial 8/22/06: Commencement of jury trial For constitutional purposes, the defendant's right to a speedy trial attached at the time of arrest.  Atterberry v. State, 667 So.2d 622, 626 (Miss.1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (emphasis added). This Court has previously stated that any delay of eight (8) months or longer is presumptively prejudicial.  Noe, 616 So.2d at 300 (quoting Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss.1989)) (emphasis added). Following re-indictment, Murray was not arrested until March 31, 2006. Between Murray's arrest on March 31, 2006, and the commencement of the jury trial on August 22, 2006, 144 days passed. As this delay is less than eight months, it is not presumptively prejudicial[,] id., and therefore, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. As such, this Court finds that the circuit court's denial of Murray's constitutional speedy-trial claim was supported by substantial, credible evidence. DeLoach, 722 So.2d at 516.
¶ 24. Murray also asks this Court to analyze his speedy-trial claim using April 9, 2004, as the date of arrest.
¶ 25. Between Murray's arrest on April 9, 2004, and the commencement of the jury trial on August 22, 2006, 865 days passed. As this delay exceeds eight months by more than 600 days, it is deemed presumptively prejudicial, and this factor favors Murray. Noe, 616 So.2d at 300 (quoting Smith, 550 So.2d at 408). Therefore, the remaining Barker factors will be analyzed. See Herring, 691 So.2d at 955-56 (quoting State v. Ferguson, 576 So.2d 1252, 1254 (Miss.1991)) ([o]nce we find the delay presumptively prejudicial, the burden shifts to the [State] to produce evidence justifying the delay and to persuade the trier of fact of the legitimacy of the[se] reasons.).
¶ 26. In Barker, the United States Supreme Court stated: different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (emphasis added). See also Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1137, 1139 (Miss.1992) (citations omitted) ([w]here the defendant has not caused the delay and the State does not show good cause for that delay, this Court weighs this factor against the [State]. . . . [A]ny delay unintentionally caused by the State will not be weighed as heavily against the [State] as where the delay was intended to hurt the defendant's case.). Furthermore, this Court has stated that [d]elays which are attributable to one party count against that party. Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 993 (Miss.2001). Therefore, delays attributable to the defendant tol[l] the running of time. Jenkins, 607 So.2d at 1138. See also Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Miss.1985) (if the defendant causes the delay he will not be allowed to complain.). ¶ 27. Between Murray's arrest on April 9, 2004, and the State's first indictment on August 3, 2004, 116 days passed. As no evidence was presented that this time period could be attributed to either Murray or an intentional delay by the State, this Court will weigh it against the State. See Jenkins, 607 So.2d at 1139. Between Murray's first indictment on August 3, 2004, and the State's decision to nolle prosequi that indictment on February 22, 2005, 203 days passed. Once again, no evidence was presented that this time period could be attributed to either Murray or an intentional delay by the State, therefore, this Court will likewise weigh it against the State. See id. A mere ten days passed between the State's nolle prosequi on February 22, 2005, and its re-indictment of Murray on March 4, 2005. Even though Murray was aware of the State's intention to re-indict, it still weighs against the State, which controls both events. Between issuance of an arrest warrant for Murray on March 4, 2005, and his subsequent arrest in Jackson County on March 31, 2006, 392 days passed. This Court attributes this delay to Murray's absence from the jurisdiction, see Issue II.(A.) supra, and, therefore, does not count this period of delay against the State. See id. at 1138. Finally, between Murray's arrest in Jackson County on March 31, 2006, and commencement of the jury trial on August 22, 2006, 144 days passed. No evidence was presented that this time period could be attributed to either Murray or an intentional delay by the State, therefore, this Court will weigh it against the State. In total, this Court finds that 473 days of the delay are attributable to the State, albeit with limited weight, given the absence of evidence indicating intentional delay. As that 473-day delay exceeds the presumptively prejudicial threshold of eight months, this Court finds this factor to favor Murray. See Noe, 616 So.2d at 300.
¶ 28. Barker provides that: [t]he defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (emphasis added). See also Atterberry, 667 So.2d at 627 (citations omitted) (failure to assert a right to a speedy trial should be given `strong evidentiary weight' in the Barker analysis.). While [a]n accused has no duty to bring himself to trial[,] . . . [s]till he gains far more points under this prong of the Barker test where he has demanded a speedy trial.  Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss.1994) (quoting Jaco v. State, 574 So.2d 625, 632 (Miss.1990)) (emphasis added). This Court previously has distinguished the demand for dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial from the demand for speedy trial. See Guice v. State, 952 So.2d 129, 141 (Miss.2007); Brengettcy, 794 So.2d at 994; Perry, 637 So.2d at 875-76. Specifically, Perry states that: [i]n Adams [v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 169-70 (Miss.1991)] we observed that a demand for dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is not the equivalent of a demand for speedy trial. Such a motion seeks discharge not trial. There we held that a demand for dismissal coupled with a demand for an instant trial was insufficient to weigh this factor in favor of the defendant, where the motion came after the bulk of the entire period of delay had elapsed. Id. Similarly, as the trial court observed, Perry never demanded trial; he demanded dismissal claiming that his speedy trial rights had already been violated. Although his June motion mentioned that trial was set for October, an earlier trial date was not a part of the relief requested, even in the alternative. Perry, 637 So.2d at 875-76 (emphasis added). ¶ 29. This Court finds Murray's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial analogous to the motions filed by the defendants in Adams and Perry. Murray's motion was not filed until the vast majority of the delay period had elapsed. Specifically, 808 days had passed from the time of Murray's April 9, 2004, arrest to the filing of his motion, and the motion preceded the jury trial by only 57 days. Substantively, the June 26, 2006, motion was Murray's first speedy-trial-related motion. In that motion, Murray never sought an instant trial, but solely moved for dismissal. As failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial[,] Murray's failure to make timely demand for a speedy trial leads this Court to find that this factor favors the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. 2182.
¶ 30. The accused is not required to put forth an affirmative showing of prejudice to prove his right to a speedy trial was violated. Nevertheless an absence of prejudice weighs against a finding of a violation.  Atterberry, 667 So.2d at 627 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Under the Barker test, prejudice has two aspects: (1) actual prejudice to the accused in defending his case, and (2) interference with the defendant's liberty. Brengettcy, 794 So.2d at 994 (citing Perry, 637 So.2d at 876). In Barker, the United States Supreme Court determined that: [p]rejudice . . . should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (I) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (II) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (III) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (emphasis added). An evidentiary demonstration of prejudice is necessary as this Court will not infer prejudice to the defense out of the `clear blue.' State v. Magnusen, 646 So.2d 1275, 1285 (Miss. 1994). ¶ 31. Murray argues that he suffered prejudice from the delay because: [h]is initial bond was lost after the bonding company went out of business, so Murray had to pay another bond. As a result of [Murray's] absence from work, Murray was fired from his job. [Finally,] the State admitted [Murray's blood] evidence was destroyed during the delay and did not refute Murray's testimony regarding his employment[. As such,] this factor also weighs against the State. The State responds that Murray's complaints about paying for another bond and losing his job were personal and not prejudicial to his defense. Regarding Murray's blood evidence, the State asserts: [t]he original blood vials were destroyed in keeping with standard laboratory practice. The record reflects that Murray and his counsel were given photocopies of the blood vials as well as the written results of the test. His counsel cross[-]examined the lab technician who testified that Murray's blood alcohol content was .22 per cent. In addition, in his own testimony, Murray admitted that he had been drinking from around 5:00 to around 11:00 to 12:00 P.M. (Citations omitted). ¶ 32. As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that Murray's prejudice argument is limited, as he makes no allegations of oppressive pretrial incarceration or anxiety. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. This Court agrees with the circuit court that Murray's allegations of prejudice in being fired following his March 31, 2006, arrest and being required to pay for another bond because Griffith Bonding went out of business, in no way impaired Murray's defense. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 33. As to disposal of Murray's blood specimens by the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, this Court concludes that the absence of this physical evidence is mitigated by eyewitness testimony [14] and the testimony of expert forensic toxicologist McIntire. Not only did McIntire vouch for the untampered nature of the blood specimens upon receipt, her subsequent examination determined that Murray had a 0.22% blood alcohol level. Additionally, she testified that disposal of the blood specimens was consistent with Mississippi Crime Laboratory policy. As such, this Court concludes that Murray's defense was not impaired by the disposal of the specimens. In total, this Court finds that substantial, credible evidence in the record supports the circuit court's conclusion that Murray failed to establish prejudice. DeLoach, 722 So.2d at 516. As the absence of prejudice weighs against a finding of a violation[,] this Court finds that this factor favors the State. Atterberry, 667 So.2d at 627. Balancing Test ¶ 34. Assuming arguendo that the applicable date of arrest is April 9, 2004, a presumptively prejudicial 473-day period of the delay is attributable to the State. However, Murray's failure to make timely demand for a speedy trial or to establish any prejudice to his defense from the delay leads this Court to the same conclusion as in Issue I(B)(1). Specifically, substantial, credible evidence supported the circuit court's denial of Murray's constitutional speedy-trial claim. DeLoach, 722 So.2d at 516.