Opinion ID: 4555772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Facebook Provides RCS

Text: By the language and conditions established in section 2702(a)(2)(B), it appears Congress was aware that, in connection with rendering storage and computer processing services, an 10 U.S. v. Weaver (C.D.Ill. 2009) 636 F.Supp.2d 769, 772–773, quoting § 2703(b)(2) [relying on the language and legislative history of the SCA to conclude that once a user opened an e-mail message and kept that message on the user’s Hotmail account, Microsoft maintained the message “ ‘solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services to such subscriber or customer,’ ” ceased being a provider of ECS, and transformed into a provider of RCS]; Flagg v. City of Detroit (E.D.Mich. 2008) 252 F.R.D. 346, 362–363 [finding that Skytel, an entity that provided text message services, had initially been a provider of ECS; but after text communications had been accessed and stored, Skytel transformed into a provider of RCS]. See generally the useful discussion of these and related cases in Crispin, supra, 717 F.Supp.2d 965, 984–987. 15 FACEBOOK, INC. v. SUPERIOR COURT Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring entity that provides RCS would be expected to have some authority to access its users’ data and communications for the purpose of affording such storage and computer processing services. As noted, the section bars a provider of RCS from divulging “the content of any electronic transmission that is carried or maintained on its service — . . . solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services to [the] subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized to access the contents of any such communications for purposes of providing any services other than storage or computer processing.” (§ 2702(a)(2)(B).) On the other hand, because the subsection precludes disclosure only if the entity is not authorized to access its users’ communications for purposes “other than storage or computer processing,” the court in Juror Number One v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 854, 862 reasoned in dictum: “[I]f the [entity] is authorized to access the customer’s information for other purposes, such as to provide targeted advertising, SCA protection may be lost.” As observed ante, footnote 6, commentators have suggested or concluded the same, asserting that when social media users authorize an entity to access their data and communications in order to facilitate targeted advertising, the entity may not, or does not, qualify under the SCA as one that provides RCS — and thus the entity is not barred from disclosing such content. Consistent with these views, defendant and the district attorney both assert that in light of Facebook’s business model of mining, analyzing, and sharing information about its users’ communications content, Facebook cannot qualify under section 2702(a)(2)(B) as an entity that provides RCS. They argue that by compelling its users to give it authorization (a broad and transferable worldwide license — see ante, fn. 2) to utilize 16 FACEBOOK, INC. v. SUPERIOR COURT Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring information about its users’ mined and analyzed content for sharing with third party advertisers, Facebook goes substantially beyond the limited authorization that would be necessary for it “solely” to provide “storage and computer processing.” This, they assert, shows that Facebook is “authorized to access the contents of . . . communications for purposes of providing . . . services other than storage or computer processing” — and demonstrates that Facebook is authorized to act in precisely the manner the statute says it must not if it wishes to qualify as a provider of RCS that is prohibited from disclosing its users’ communications content. Accordingly, they argue, Facebook cannot qualify as an entity that provides RCS under the Act and thus cannot raise the SCA as a shield against being forced to comply with a viable state subpoena. Facebook responds that everything it is authorized to do — including all mining, analyzing, and sharing of its licensed information about its users’ communications — constitutes “computer processing services,” and hence is contemplated by and covered under the Act in section 2702(a)(2)(B). In other words, Facebook maintains that the phrase “computer processing services” should be broadly construed, and so interpreted, Facebook’s authority to access information is not for a purpose other than computer processing but instead is for computer processing. Although Facebook cites a federal decision and legislative history, along with Professor Kerr’s article, to support its view that “computer processing services” in section 2702(a)(2)(B) should be broadly construed, it seems questionable whether those sources buttress Facebook’s position. Indeed, they may suggest the opposite — that the term 17 FACEBOOK, INC. v. SUPERIOR COURT Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring was intended to have a narrow, rather than broad, interpretation.11 Finally, Facebook insists, “every court to consider” whether Facebook itself qualifies as an entity that provides RCS (or ECS, or both) has held that it meets at least one if not both tests. Yet, as the majority opinion observes, it appears that no court has ever been asked to address, with regard to Facebook itself (or, for that matter, any analogous entity), the specific claim advanced by defendant and the district attorney here: That by virtue of its business model (under which it mines, analyzes, and shares licensed information about its users’ communications), and because Facebook has motivating purposes beyond facilitating temporary storage during transmission, or backup of its users’ communications, Facebook falls outside Congress’s contemplation of an entity that provides RCS or ECS. Indeed, as the majority opinion observes, ante at page 41 and footnote 18, the issue remains unresolved. 11 See Low v. LinkedIn Corp. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 900 F.Supp.2d 1010, 1024, fn. omitted [rejecting an argument that LinkedIn, by “disclos[ing its users’] IDs and the URLs of viewed [profile] pages to third parties,” acted as an RCS provider, and in the process, appearing to endorse a narrow, rather than broad, view of the term computer “ ‘processing services’ ”]; Senate Report No. 99-541, 2d Session, page 3 (1986) [suggesting that Congress, in focusing on entities that provide data processing “outsourcing functions,” contemplated a narrow understanding of “computer processing” when it established the RCS category]; Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra, 72 Geo.Wash. L.Rev. 1208, 1230–1231 [asserting that the key term “processing services” should be limited and construed narrowly, to “refer to outsourcing functions,” and not broadly, which would essentially include every website].) 18 FACEBOOK, INC. v. SUPERIOR COURT Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring