Opinion ID: 715669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sauley's Settlement.

Text: 11 Prior to the start of the contempt trial, by letter dated July 11, 1994, Sauley made an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 Sauley offered to pay $15,000 as the monetary portion of judgment, and to accept (1) a $2,000 suspended coercive fine and (2) injunctive relief in accordance with the 1992 Injunction except for provisions thereof no longer relevant. Sauley's letter declared that he would seek to vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the event that a court invalidated the 1992 Injunction. By letter dated July 20, 1994, New York rejected Sauley's offer, asserting that Sauley's reservation of his right to seek relief pursuant to Rule 60 rendered his offer of judgment a nullity. 12 On July 26, 1994, Sauley made a second offer in open court, this time accepting liability for up to $15,000 in compensatory damages and submitting to a $10,000 suspended coercive fine and injunctive relief. New York accepted Sauley's offer, and the district court subsequently entered judgment against him. The judgment paralleled that entered against the other Respondents, except that Sauley's share of the joint and several liability was limited to $15,000 and Sauley was assessed a fine in the agreed amount. The district court stayed the fine, and provided that it would be vacated and expunged in its entirety if Sauley complied with the injunctive portion of the judgment for three years or until the 1992 Injunction or any successor injunction expired, whichever first occurred. 7 13 In assessing fees and costs against Respondents, the district court found Sauley responsible for his pro rata share of fees and costs incurred up until July 26, 1994, the date of Sauley's second offer of judgment. The district court rejected Sauley's argument that Sauley's liability should be limited to the fees and costs incurred up until July 11, 1994, the date of his first offer, holding that because the terms of the July 26 settlement were more favorable to New York than those offered on July 11, Rule 68's fee-shifting provision was facially inapplicable. See Koppell I, 1994 WL 517457 at  1. 14