Opinion ID: 810883
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ronnanita

Text: Over Ronnanita’s objection, the district court accepted the PSR’s findings, which included several sentencing enhancements. After the application of these enhancements, the district court determined Ronnanita’s final offense level to be 36 and her criminal history category to be II, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The district court went below the advisory range and sentenced Ronnanita to 96 months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised release on each count to be served concurrently. Ronnanita challenges her sentence, contending it would have been less had her guideline range been lower.
Ronnanita first argues that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), which calls for a threelevel enhancement if “the defendant was a manager or supervisor . . . and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive[.]” (emphasis added). The Sentencing Guidelines define “participant” as “a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.” § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1. We have explained that this means a participant “could have been charged,” even if only Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 25 as an accessory; but “mere knowledge of a conspiracy” is insufficient to establish that a person was “criminally responsible.” United States v. Pabey, 664 F.3d 1084, 1097 (7th Cir. 2011). Ronnanita claims five people were not “criminally responsible” for the scheme, so the three-level enhancement was inappropriate. The parties agree that the Appellants were each “participants” in the scheme; that makes three. The dispute between them focuses on whether other individu- als—Jacqueline Hawkins and Jennifer Washington (MTE employees) and Phillip Rowe, Eric Blount, and Clarence Jones (mortgage company employees)—qualify as participants under Section 3B.1(b). We decline to decide whether these other individuals qualify as participants because we believe the entire scheme easily satisfies the “otherwise extensive” provision, so the number of “participants” does not matter. See United States v. Hussein, 664 F.3d 155, 162 (7th Cir. 2011). Section 3B1.1, commentary note 3 states, “In assessing whether an organization is ‘otherwise extensive,’ all persons involved during the course of the entire offense are to be considered. Thus, a fraud that involved only three participants but used the unknowing services of many outsiders could be considered extensive.” In determining whether a scheme is otherwise extensive, we have considered: (1) the monetary benefits obtained during the scheme; (2) the length of time the scheme continued; (3) the number of people utilized to operate the scheme; and (4) the scheme’s geographic scope. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 682 F.3d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 26 Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 2012); Pabey, 664 F.3d at 1097; Hussein, 664 F.3d at 162; United States v. Knox, 624 F.3d 865, 874 (7th Cir. 2010). We have also held that a scheme is otherwise extensive if the number of participants plus outsiders who unwittingly advance a conspiracy is greater than five. See, e.g., United States v. Tai, 41 F.3d 1170, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1994). At the bare minimum, the participation of the Appellants, plus at least Hawkins, Washington, and one other MTE Board Member, satisfies this “greater than five” standard, regardless of whether Hawkins and Washington were “criminally responsible.” See Pabey, 664 F.3d at 1097 (citing Tai, 41 F.3d at 1174-75). This number does not even include the additional MTE Board Members, the other MTE employees who helped organize venue meetings in numerous states, the mortgage company employees, or the numerous A-Buyers used to further the Housing Program. We believe the scheme was also extensive with respect to the amount of money obtained (over $18 million), the intended geographic scope (at least six states), the number of people affected (over 3,000), and the overall complexity (using straw buyers to facilitate Housing Program transactions). Thus, the scheme qualifies as “otherwise extensive” under U.S.S.G. § 3B.1(b), and the three-level enhancement was correct.
Ronnanita next contests the district court’s calculation of her criminal history category. The PSR assessed one criminal history point to Ronnanita pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c) for a conviction of larceny by conversion Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 27 on July 18, 2005. Ronnanita received a twelve-month probation sentence, plus a fine, for that conviction. Section 4A1.1(d) states that two points should be added “if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation[.]” Accordingly, the PSR applied two additional criminal history points because Ronnanita’s criminal charges were committed while Ronnanita was still on probation for the larceny conviction, which she was not discharged from until May 15, 2006. A criminal history category II was thus designated, which corresponds to the three criminal history points assigned to Ronnanita. Ronnanita claims this criminal history category was incorrect because four of the eight counts on which she was convicted occurred after she was discharged from probation on May 15, 2006. We first note Ronnanita’s failure to object to her criminal history calculation in the district court, so we only review for plain error. See United States v. Vasquez, 673 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2012). But regardless of the standard applied, Ronnanita’s argument easily fails because all that is required under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) is for “any relevant conduct” of the offense to have been committed while the defendant was on probation, see § 4A1.1 cmt. n.4, not the instant offense “in its entirety” as Ronnanita claims. Therefore, because the evidence at trial established that Ronnanita’s participation in the overall scheme began in early 2005 and continued at least into 2007, Ronnanita engaged in conduct related to her convictions while on probation, and the district court did not err in calculating her criminal history category. 28 Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082
Ronnanita also contests the district court’s calculation of the loss attributable to her offenses. The PSR calculated the loss suffered by the individuals involved in the Spend and Redeem Program and the Housing Program to be between $8,579,052 and $10,783,961. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a loss in excess of $7,000,000 but less than $20,000,000 corresponds to a twenty-level increase in the defendant’s offense level, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K); Ronnanita’s offense level was, therefore, increased by twenty levels. Ronnanita did not provide the Probation Office or the district court with any information regarding a loss figure. Her challenge to the calculation is nonetheless two-fold: (1) her participation and responsibilities were almost entirely related to the Housing Program, so she should only be attributed losses related to the Housing Program (roughly $2,600,000); and (2) the losses attributed to Roy III at his sentencing hearing on August 16, 2011, eight months after she was sentenced, were only $7,336,957.49, so the amount attributed to her was approximately $3,400,000 too high. We address each argument in turn. From the outset, Ronnanita’s argument that the evidence demonstrated she only had “tangential conduct with the Spend and Redeem Program” is completely without merit. As discussed above, Ronnanita actively facilitated participation in both the Spend and Redeem Program and the Housing Program. She was “second in command” and the person to go to with problems. She Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 29 also transferred money between numerous accounts, and that money was connected to both programs. The evidence presented at trial established that Ronnanita was fully involved with both the Spend and Redeem Program and the Housing Program; the district court properly attributed the losses of both programs to her. Generally, because Ronnanita did not raise her second contention—that the losses attributed to Roy III for the same programs were $3,400,000 less—until her reply brief, her argument would be waived. See Griffin v. Bell, No-11-3389, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18599, at  (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2012) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are deemed waived.”). However, we have stated that “exceptional circumstances” may allow us to consider arguments that would otherwise be waived. See In re Busson-Sokolik, 635 F.3d 261, 268-69 (7th Cir. 2011). This issue is one of those rare situations. Ronnanita filed her amended brief with this Court on June 1, 2011; Roy III was not sentenced until August 16, 2011. It would have been impossible for Ronnanita to know what the loss amount attributed to Roy III would be two months into the future, so we will reach the merits of Ronnanita’s second contention. Ronnanita correctly points out that the loss amounts attributed to her and Roy III were inconsistent, but she fails to explain why this difference is consequential. Even if we assume that Ronnanita had been sentenced on the same day as Roy III and the district court accepted the same loss calculation given to Roy III ($7,336,957.49), that amount is still greater than the $7,000,000 threshold of 30 Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K). Ronnanita’s loss calculation would still result in a twenty-level increase of her offense level. “To find clear error we must be persuaded that the sentencing court made a fundamental error which resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Schaefer, 384 F.3d 326, 332 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Hatchett, 31 F.3d 1411, 1423-24 (7th Cir. 1994)). Ronnanita has not put forth any support for the proposition, and we perceive no reason to believe, that this difference had any effect on the administration of justice, so we find that no clear error occurred.
The PSR concluded that approximately 3,000 indi- viduals participated in the programs and approximately 1,900 individuals lost money in the scheme. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C), the PSR applied a six-level increase because the offense involved more than 250 victims. Ronnanita again claims the number of victims apportioned to her is erroneous because she was only actively involved in the Housing Program. For the same reasons we believe the losses allocated to her were correct, we believe the calculation of victims was also appropriate.