Opinion ID: 454769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Termination Claim

Text: 36 On March 21, 1978, pursuant to Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 120.69 (West 1982), Casines petitioned a state circuit court for enforcement of the CSC reinstatement order. 11 37 Wainwright asserts that the state action will resolve Casines's post-termination claim and afford Casines complete relief. 12 Therefore, Wainwright argues, the district court should have abstained from entertaining Casines's section 1983 claim for reinstatement. In the alternative, Wainwright argues that section 120.69 provides Casines with an adequate state remedy for redress of the alleged post-termination due process violation; therefore, this issue is controlled by Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). Wainwright contends that under Parratt, Casines has failed to state a section 1983 claim. 38 Casines argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to abstain from addressing her post-termination claim. She asserts that the state enforcement proceedings involve only issues of state law, the resolution of which will not eliminate the need for the federal court to address her federal constitutional claim. Casines also argues that Wainwright's conduct constitutes a substantive due process violation and that Parratt is not controlling because it applies only to procedural due process violations. 39 The district court found, and Wainwright does not dispute, that Casines had a property interest in her employment. Wainwright could not continue to deprive Casines of that federally protected right without according her due process of law. Casines's post-termination claim involved an issue of federal constitutional law. The issue pending in the state circuit court enforcement proceeding is whether Wainwright is bound by the CSC reinstatement order, even though the order was addressed to the FPPC. Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to abstain from hearing the action is controlled by Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). Pullman holds that where a case presents an important federal constitutional issue and an unsettled question of state law which, when answered, may make final resolution of the constitutional question unnecessary, federal courts should abstain from deciding the constitutional issue until the state law issue is resolved. 40 In this case, a ruling by the state court that Wainwright was bound by the CSC order would leave the federal due process and damages issues ripe for federal resolution. On the other hand, if the state court rules that Wainwright was not bound by the CSC order, all federal issues are resolved. The abstention issue is a serious one in this case. We remand this issue to the district court for further consideration under Pullman and in light of events that have or have not occurred in the state circuit court action. 41 If the district court does not find abstention proper, it must address the due process claim. In Parratt the Supreme Court held that where the state has an adequate post-deprivation remedy for redress of random and unauthorized acts by state employees, the complaint fails to state a cause of action under section 1983 for a violation of due process. Where, however, the claimant is deprived of due process regardless of the state's post-deprivation procedures, then the claimant has suffered a substantive violation of due process. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, a plaintiff states a claim for a substantive due process violation by alleging that the state has violated an independent substantive right and it is clear that rights are violated no matter what process precedes, accompanies, or follows the unconstitutional action. Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir.1984) (footnote omitted). 42 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982), illustrates such a substantive due process violation. The plaintiff in Logan filed an administrative complaint of employment discrimination with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (Commission). Under the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, the Commission had 120 days within which to convene a fact-finding conference designed to obtain evidence, ascertain the position of the parties, and explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement. The Commission failed to convene a fact-finding conference within the 120 days. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's complaint was barred and that the plaintiff could not file a second charge before the Commission based upon the same act of alleged discrimination, because to do so would circumvent the purpose of the act and frustrate the public interest in expeditious resolution of disputes. 43 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a post-deprivation procedure which permitted the state to terminate a claimant's cause of action because a state official, for reasons beyond the complainant's control, failed to comply with a statutorily mandated procedure, was constitutionally inadequate. The Supreme Court distinguished Logan from Parratt on the ground that in Logan, the state system itself destroyed the plaintiff's property interest, whereas in Parratt, it was the random and unauthorized act of a state employee which had resulted in the deprivation of the plaintiff's due process rights. The plaintiff in Logan was not challenging the Commission's error in failing to timely convene a fact-finding conference. Rather, the plaintiff was challenging the established state procedure that destroyed his entitlement without according him proper procedural safeguards. Logan, 455 U.S. at 436, 102 S.Ct. at 1158. 44 Casines acknowledges that Hudson v. Palmer, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), extended Parratt to apply to intentional deprivations of property. Casines contends, however, that Parratt does not apply in this case for two reasons. First, Casines argues that Wainwright's action cannot be characterized as random and unauthorized. She argues that, as the director of a state agency, Wainwright's actions in refusing to reinstate her constitute state policy and are more akin to an established state procedure. Second, Casines contends that section 120.69 does not provide her an adequate post-deprivation remedy because, although it provides for declaratory and injunctive relief, it does not provide for damages. Monetary relief is limited to a mere maximum fine of $1,000. See Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 120.69(2). 45 Parratt was decided on May 18, 1981, four months after the district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Casines on the issue of liability. Thus, the district court did not have the benefit of Parratt, Hudson, or the Logan explanation of Parratt when it addressed the issue of Wainwright's liability for refusing to reinstate Casines. Therefore, if the district court does not abstain, it should reconsider Casines's post-termination claim in light of these intervening decisions. Broussard v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 665 F.2d 1387, 1390 (5th Cir.1982) (case remanded for reconsideration in light of intervening decision).