Opinion ID: 2357753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the propriety of the dismissal of kathleen's petition for assignment of realty in the family court

Text: Kathleen argues that since the question of alimony and support was left open in the final decree of divorce, the Family Court had jurisdiction to make an equitable assignment of the marital real estate pursuant to § 15-5-16.1. In its original form as enacted by P.L. 1979, ch. 279, § 2, this statute read in part as follows: 15-5-16.1. Assignment of Property.  In addition to or in lieu of an order to pay alimony made pursuant to a petition for divorce, the court may assign to either the husband or wife a portion of the estate of the other. Section 4 of P.L. 1979, ch. 279, read: This act shall take effect upon its passage and shall apply to all petitions pending on the date of passage of this act and to all petitions filed thereafter. The word petition as used in this section must be related back to the phrase petition for divorce as set forth in § 15-5-16.1. It is obvious that the General Assembly intended a prospective application in respect to all of the provisions of chapter 279. This chapter made sweeping changes in respect to alimony and child support. The most significant and sweeping change was the granting of the power of assignment of property in § 15-5-16.1. The Legislature explicitly provided that the act should apply to all petitions pending on the date of passage of this act and to all petitions filed thereafter, thus clearly and explicitly intending prospective rather than retroactive application. Kathleen argues that the term petition should be interpreted to mean petition for support as well as a petition for divorce since her final decree of divorce left open the question of support, and presumably alimony as well. Such interpretation would create the possibility of retroactive application to thousands of divorce cases either wherein the questions of alimony and support were specifically left open or wherein no decision in regard to alimony was made. Since there is no time limit upon an application for alimony, other than such limitation as might be imposed by the doctrine of laches, see Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 105 R.I. 89, 100, 249 A.2d 407, 412-13 (1969); Brown v. Brown, 48 R.I. 420, 424, 138 A. 179, 181 (1927); Wilford v. Wilford, 38 R.I. 55, 57, 94 A. 685, 686 (1915), the number of cases to which such a retroactive application might be applied could only be the subject of the merest speculative approximation. We cannot attribute any such retroactive intent to the language used by the Legislature in P.L. 1979, ch. 279, § 4. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the trial justice of the Family Court was correct in his interpretation of the word petition as being applicable to a petition for divorce that was either pending at the time of the effective date of passage or to be brought thereafter. Since Kathleen's petition for divorce was terminated by final decree prior to the effective date of the statute on May 7, 1979, she is unable to avail herself of the benefit of the assignment statute. For the reasons stated, Kathleen's appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court is sustained, the judgment of the Superior Court is vacated, and the papers in case No. 80-404-Appeal shall be remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Kathleen's appeal from the order of the Family Court is denied and dismissed. Said order of dismissal of her petition for assignment of property is affirmed, and the papers in case No. 80-443-Appeal may be remanded to the Family Court.