Opinion ID: 710028
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Conflict of Interest

Text: 18 In his section 2255 motion Farley argued that his lawyer rendered ineffective assistance regarding the taking of his guilty plea and his attempt to withdraw it. To prevail on his sixth amendment claim Farley must demonstrate two things. First, he must show that his lawyer's performance was deficient, i.e., that his lawyer's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Second, he must show that his defense was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. To show prejudice when challenging a guilty plea on the ground of ineffective assistance, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). We conclude that Farley cannot satisfy the Strickland- Hill standard.
19 Farley first claims his lawyer misadvised him that he had to plead guilty if his codefendants pleaded guilty or at least failed to make sure that Farley did not have that misunderstanding. 6 Second, he complains his lawyer failed to disclose to the court at the rule 11 hearing that the pleas were wired. In short, he claims that as a result of his lawyer's deficiencies he entered his plea with the misunderstanding that he had no right to a jury trial. We disagree. 20 If indeed Farley had such a misunderstanding it should have evaporated during the rule 11 colloquy. Again, Farley expressly acknowledged at the rule 11 hearing that he understood he had a right to a jury trial and that he waived that right by pleading guilty. See supra Part IIB. More to the point, having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude there is a reasonable probability that Farley would have insisted on going to trial but for the alleged misunderstanding and failure to disclose. Farley pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of fewer than five grams of crack. He faced a conspiracy charge (and thus the possibility of an increased sentence based on any coconspirator's drugs) as well as multiple counts charging distribution of crack within 1,000 feet of a school. Farley was informed before his plea that one coconspirator, Tammy Brown, had already agreed as part of her plea agreement to testify against him. And the government evidently had audio tapes of the drug transactions charged in the indictment; the government represented below that Farley, the Loves and their lawyers listened to the tapes while they discussed the plea arrangement. Even if we were to look just at the charge to which he pleaded guilty, it appears the government had a relatively straightforward and compelling case: An informant bought drugs from Farley in the presence of codefendant Brown and the government was prepared to call both the informant and Brown to testify at Farley's trial. Moreover, the district court was troubled by Farley's criminal history which included multiple drug convictions. Farley faced a stiff sentence under the guidelines had he been convicted, not to mention a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Finally, Farley has not proffered even a hint of any defense, much less a suggestion that he could have succeeded had he gone to trial. See United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 836 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 153, 126 L.Ed.2d 115 (1993); see also United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 58 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 942, 111 S.Ct. 352, 112 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990). 21 To sum up, Farley's mere allegation that he would have pleaded not guilty and gone to trial had his lawyer adequately informed him is not sufficient to overcome the prejudice prong of Hill v. Lockhart. Horne, 987 F.2d at 836. Because Farley has not established a reasonable probability that he would have insisted on going to trial, we reject his ineffective assistance claim.B. 22 Farley attempts to repackage the ineffective assistance claim into an actual conflict of interest claim. The argument here is that Farley's lawyer had to hold back in the initial rule 32(d) motion for fear of revealing that he (the lawyer) engaged in malpractice by allegedly misadvising Farley that he could not go to trial if his codefendants did not want to and by failing to disclose at the rule 11 hearing that the pleas were wired. If Farley could show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance, prejudice would be presumed. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718-19, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). But there are problems with his argument. 23 First, Farley never raised a conflict of interest claim below. While his section 2255 motion asserted that his lawyer rendered ineffective assistance by filing a perfunctory [rule 32(d) ] motion, which cited unidentified 'ethical' considerations that prevented more vigorous advocacy on Defendant's behalf, J.A. Sec. D, p 5(d), we have no doubt on this record that the ethical considerations that troubled his lawyer went to the fact that Farley, after already having admitted his guilt to the court and the probation officer and in the face of overwhelming evidence against him, decided to change his mind and claim innocence. Farley's conflict of interest claim, with its talk of malpractice and presumption of prejudice, is a far cry from his claim below about the caliber of the rule 32(d) motion. 24 Second, Farley has not shown that his lawyer should have been concerned about a malpractice claim had the lawyer drafted the rule 32(d) motion along the lines Farley now claims he should have. Both the misadvice and nondisclosure claims are proxies for Farley's central contention that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial. The lawyer, without impugning himself, could have argued that Farley misunderstood what he had heard about the wired plea offer and therefore did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial. Likewise the lawyer, who did inform the court about the wired offer hours before the rule 11 hearing, could have raised an issue about the government's failure to tell the court at the rule 11 hearing that the pleas were wired. In either case, Farley has not shown that a conflict of interest affected his lawyer's representation in preparing and arguing the rule 32(d) motion. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349, 100 S.Ct. at 1718. 25 With Farley's conflict of interest claim out of the picture, we are left with a straightforward Strickland challenge to his lawyer's performance on the rule 32(d) motion. Here Farley loses because he cannot show there is a reasonable probability that a more thorough rule 32(d) motion would have convinced the district court to set aside his plea. Even assuming that the lawyer held back in the rule 32(d) motion to protect himself--and there is nothing in the record to warrant that assumption--the misadvice and nondisclosure issues ultimately were brought to the court's attention (the former via Farley's testimony at the rule 32(d) hearing, the latter via the motion to reconsider filed by Farley's current lawyer) and the court did not think either of them sufficiently compelling to warrant setting aside Farley's plea even under rule 32(d)'s pre-sentencing fair and just standard. 26 For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is 27 Affirmed.