Opinion ID: 493363
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The August 28 Search Warrant

Text: 21 Espinosa argues that the evidence obtained in the August 28 search should have been suppressed because the search warrant was issued without probable cause. We accord great deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause to issue a search warrant and will reverse only if that determination is clearly erroneous. United States v. McQuisten, 795 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir.1986). Our task is to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the supporting affidavit furnished a substantial basis for the magistrate to make a  'practical, common-sense decision'  that there was a  'fair probability'  that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found at the specified locations. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 106 S.Ct. 1610, 1615-16, 89 L.Ed.2d 871 (1986) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332-33, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)); United States v. Kinstler, 812 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir.1987); McQuisten, 795 F.2d at 861-62. 22 Espinosa focuses almost exclusively on the affidavit's report that a confidential tipster stated only a belief that the defendant was engaged in narcotics trafficking. The government emphasizes the subsequent surveillance incidents of brief meetings in shopping centers, parking lots, restaurants, and gas stations with individuals with whom the defendant exchanged plastic and paper bags on two occasions; the defendant's residence in an apartment rented by a person under a false name who was awaiting trial on a cocaine charge; his possession and use of a key to another apartment rented by a female, which he visited briefly to pick up and drop off small packages immediately before meeting with someone to exchange packages in a parking lot; his use of cars not registered or traceable to him, one of which was registered to an individual who had been arrested on a drug charge in 1982; and the absence of any visible means of support. Detective Altieri, an experienced narcotics detective, formed the opinion that the defendant's pattern of activity showed that he was engaged in narcotics transactions and used the Sepulveda apartment as a stash pad for narcotics or cash. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n. 2, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641 n. 2, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) ([A] trained, experienced police officer ... is able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.); United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1985). 23 Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant. See Kinstler, 812 F.2d at 525 (noting significance of pattern of ostensibly innocent activity); McQuisten, 795 F.2d at 862. 3
24 Espinosa next argues that the district court should have suppressed the evidence seized on August 28 because the John Doe warrant did not meet the specificity requirement of the fourth amendment. We review de novo the district court's determination that the warrant was sufficiently particular. See United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir.1986). 25 The fourth amendment provides that a search warrant must particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir.1982). Evidence seized pursuant to illegal general warrants must be suppressed. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325-26, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 2323-24, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979). Courts have invalidated warrants that purported to authorize searches of undescribed, unidentified persons at a particular location. See People v. Tenney, 25 Cal.App.3d 16, 101 Cal.Rptr. 419 (1972); People v. Staes, 92 Ill.App.2d 156, 235 N.E.2d 882 (1968). Other courts have held John Doe warrants invalid when the officers learned the identity of the person in sufficient time to include the name in the warrant before making the search or arrest. See United States v. Doe, 703 F.2d 745, 746-50 (3d Cir.1983); United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494, 496-97 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934, 98 S.Ct. 1511, 55 L.Ed.2d 532 (1978). 26 Reaching the opposite result is United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 402 U.S. 1008, 91 S.Ct. 2188, 29 L.Ed.2d 430 (1971). There, the Third Circuit upheld a warrant that authorized a search of John Doe, a white male with black wavy hair and stocky build observed using the telephone in Apartment 4-C, 1806 Patricia Lane, East McKeesport, Pennsylvania. Id. at 389. The court held that the physical description, coupled with an address where he might be found, satisfied the specificity requirement of the fourth amendment. Id.; see also 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure Sec. 4.5, at 89-90 & n. 90 (1978). 27 The circumstances in Espinosa's case are stronger than those in Ferrone. The search warrant for Espinosa provided a more detailed physical description of the individual to be searched than in Ferrone. Although Espinosa's warrant itself did not specify his residence or other place where he might be found, the accompanying, incorporated affidavit specified his Park Plaza residence and two vehicles (with license plate numbers) where he might be found. The information in the affidavit is properly considered because the record makes clear that (1) the affidavit accompanie[d] the warrant, and (2) the warrant use[d] suitable words of reference which incorporate[d] the affidavit therein. United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir.1982); accord Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 967; United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1289, 94 L.Ed.2d 146 (1987). 28 In addition, unlike in Doe and Jarvis, Detective Altieri and his partner did not know the name of the defendant prior to the search. Indeed, Espinosa had taken great pains to conceal his identity from the authorities and the public: he occupied a Park Plaza room rented by a woman who used an alias; used a Sepulveda apartment rented by another woman; used cars not registered or traceable to him; carried a driver's license in the name of Henry Rodriguez; and had other identification in the name of Roberto Cordero. Under these circumstances, the warrant did not violate the specificity requirement of the fourth amendment. Cf. United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir.) (stating that a general description of the items to be searched may be acceptable if a more precise description is not possible), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 977, 104 S.Ct. 2360, 80 L.Ed.2d 831 (1984); Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963 (stating that one relevant factor in appraising the specificity of warrants is whether the government could have described the items more particularly in light of the information available to it at the time the warrant was issued). The warrant and the accompanying, incorporated affidavit left the officers with no discretion as to whom to search. See Hayes, 794 F.2d at 1354; Hillyard, 677 F.2d at 1339. 29