Opinion ID: 2623326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to strike improper testimony

Text: Prosecution witness Police Chief Nicholas of the Weed Police Department testified he had investigated an incident on September 26, 1986, in which George Toombs reported that defendant had shot a hole in the tire of Toombs's truck. When asked whether defendant had offered an explanation, the witness responded, As I recall, he made a statement that he didn't have a firearm, he hadn't shot a gun or something of that nature, that it was a firecracker. When the witness answered yes to the prosecutor's next question asking whether defendant had also said something about Toombs, defense counsel objected on relevancy grounds. After an unreported sidebar conference, the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection. The prosecutor asked no further questions of the witness. A short time later, and outside the jury's presence, defense counsel clarified for the record that at the bench he had objected to the testimony about defendant's statements on the ground there was no evidence defendant had been advised of his rights before speaking with the officer, as required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Counsel also noted for the record the trial court had rejected his motion to exclude on that ground. When the court reminded defense counsel it had sustained his objection to a portion of the questioning about what the witness had heard defendant say about Toombs and that the prosecutor had ceased his questioning altogether, defense counsel indicated he had objected to the entire line of questioning and noted that some statements did come in. Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to strike the question and answer about defendant's statements explaining the September 26 incident. He asserts the evidence was irrelevant because it was unrelated to any statutory factor in aggravation under section 190.3. He argues that because the evidence portrayed him as untruthful, it prejudiced the jurors against him and invited them to depart from their impartial fact-finding duty in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to fair trial, due process, reliability of verdicts, and fundamental fairness. Respondent asserts defendant has failed to preserve his claim of error because defense counsel did not object to the challenged testimony on relevancy grounds. We find the record unclear. Although defense counsel initially objected to the prosecution's question as irrelevant, he later clarified for the record that the trial court had overruled his objection at the bench on Miranda grounds and noted that his motion to exclude was denied by the trial court. Counsel's making a record of the Miranda violation claim, however, does not foreclose the possibility he had also argued irrelevancy as a basis for exclusion. Because the trial court sustained the initial objection and the prosecutor ceased questioning, the record strongly suggests defense counsel raised more than one ground for keeping the evidence from the jury. [13] In any event, we find no error. For purposes of section 190.3, relevant evidence is evidence relevant to the specific factors set forth in that provision. ( People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 773-774, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) Section 190.3, factor (b) permits the jury to consider [t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence.... The factor of violent criminal activity encompasses not only the existence of such activity but all the pertinent circumstances surrounding it ( People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 985, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214), and these circumstances may be shown through testimonial evidence. ( People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 201-202, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664.) Here, the prosecution presented evidence that in 1986 defendant approached his former father-in-law George Toombs as he sat in his parked truck, shot the front tire, and then threatened Toombs with a handgun through the driver's side window. Toombs testified about the incident and, as previously noted, Police Chief Nicholas testified about his investigation. Although defendant's statement to the police denying his use of a gun is only marginally relevant to establishing that the crime actually occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, it arguably pertains to the broader circumstances surrounding the incident and was therefore admissible. Even if the statement should have been excluded as irrelevant to any statutory factor in aggravation, however, the prosecutor did not mention it again during summation and the testimony constituted such a minor portion of the case-in-aggravation as to render its admission harmless. (See People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 765-766, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135.) For the same reason, we reject defendant's claim that defense counsel was incompetent for not promptly objecting when the prosecutor first inquired about defendant's statement. ( People v. Medina, supra, at p. 770, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.)