Opinion ID: 2382108
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The order denying Frederick's post-trial motion.

Text: On January 23, 1997, the trial judge issued a thirty-six page Memorandum and Order denying Frederick's § 23-110 motion. With respect to trial counsel's endeavor to secure Winters' testimony at the trial, the judge found as follows: [Trial counsel] described his efforts to locate witness [Eric Winters] for the defendant's second trial. According to [counsel], his investigator (1) had contacted the school [Winters] had attended at the time,[ [16] ] (2) spoken to [Winters]' mother, (3) searched the area where [Winters] was living, (4) examined the social worker file, (5) looked at his previous juvenile file, (6) looked for the social worker file in the courthouse, (7) traced every lead in the area of Georgia and Morton Streets, the location of the 640 Crew of which [Winters] was alleged to be a member, and (8) checked the jail records for the District of Columbia and Maryland.[ [17] ] The judge made no reference in his findings to trial counsel's acknowledgment, on cross-examination, that counsel was totally unaware of Winters' several appearances in the Superior Court in the months preceding Frederick's second trial. The judge likewise made no mention of the Criminal Justice Act voucher, which reflected that Frederick's attorney personally did little or nothing before the trial to attempt to locate and subpoena Winters. The judge addressed the issue further in his Conclusions of Law: Defendant claims that counsel was deficient for failing to call witness [Eric Winters] on the defendant's behalf. The first obstacle to this claim is the testimony of [Frederick's trial] attorney, which this Court credits, that it was the defendant's decision to announce ready for trial even though he was fully aware that [Eric Winters] had not been located and that there was no reason to believe he would be located for trial. See ¶¶ 24, 25, supra. The Court finds, based on this testimony, that the defendant cannot show that he suffered any Strickland prejudice from [trial counsel's] actions because defendant Frederick made the decision to go to trial without [Eric Winters]' testimony, and there is no evidence to suggest that he made that decision other than knowingly and voluntarily. Moreover, the Court has discussed, see supra at ¶ 31, [defense counsel's] efforts to locate witness [Eric Winters]. Those efforts to locate [Winters], albeit unsuccessful, satisfy this Court that [Frederick's] attorney ... was functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687[, 104 S.Ct. 2052]. One may argue that counsel could have done more to locate [Eric Winters]. But the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance, that is, whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88[, 104 S.Ct. 2052]. The Court finds that [trial counsel's] conduct was not deficient within this meaning. Further concluding that the defendant has failed to show prejudice from counsel's alleged unprofessional actions, taken either individually or collectively, the judge denied Frederick's motion. Frederick filed a timely appeal, [18] and the two appeals were consolidated.