Opinion ID: 1086355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reliance on Beeper Cases

Text: The Government posits that law enforcement personnel acted in good faith because they relied on, among other things, the Supreme Court‟s “guidance” from Knotts that using an electronic tracking device does not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Appellant Br. at 55 n.21.) Indeed, the Government observes that the reasoning from Knotts underpins the decision of “every court of appeals to consider” GPS tracking (save the D.C. Circuit). (Id. at 48-49.) We first ask ourselves, therefore, whether the Knotts decision — along with its sibling case, Karo — qualifies as binding precedent under Davis v. United States, wherein the Supreme Court held that the good faith exception covers police officers acting in reliance on later-invalidated binding appellate precedent. 131 S. Ct. 2419. As the forthcoming discussion demonstrates, we find that the explicit holding from Davis is inapposite because Knotts and Karo are both distinguishable given (1) the lack of a physical intrusion in those cases, (2) the placement by police of the beepers inside containers, and (3) the marked technological differences between beepers and GPS trackers. In Davis, the police had executed a search of the defendant‟s car subsequent to his arrest. At the time of the search, prevailing Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent held that the police could lawfully search a suspect‟s car incident to his arrest. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819 (11th Cir. 1996). The defendant unsuccessfully challenged the search. While the defendant‟s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court limited Belton, effectively restricting the areas 38 of the car that the police were allowed to search after a suspect‟s arrest. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). In deciding Davis, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[r]esponsible law-enforcement officers will take care to learn what is required of them under Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform their conduct to these rules.” 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the Court, the police in Davis merely behaved as “reasonable officer[s] would and should act.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the Court found that “[t]he deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case can only be to discourage the officer from do[ing] his duty,” which was not “the kind of deterrence the exclusionary rule seeks to foster.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, therefore, the Court deemed that the police in Davis were covered by the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and evidence recovered pursuant to the search was not suppressed. Id. Of great significance to the instant case is the fact that in Davis the police relied on binding appellate precedent that “specifically authorize[d the] particular police practice.” Id. at 2429 (first emphasis added). Indeed, as Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence, Davis did not “present the markedly different question whether the exclusionary rule applies when the law governing the constitutionality of a particular search is unsettled.” Id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).16 By 16 We also note that the Eleventh Circuit‟s opinion in Davis was explicit on this point: “[We refuse] to apply the exclusionary rule when the police have reasonably relied on clear and well-settled precedent. We stress, however, that our precedent on a given point must be unequivocal before we will suspend the exclusionary rule‟s operation.” United 39 its plain terms, therefore, the express holding in Davis is inapposite to this case because Knotts and Karo do not qualify as appropriate binding appellate precedent: Neither case involved a physical trespass onto the target vehicle; in both cases the police placed the beeper inside of a container which was then loaded into the target vehicle by the driver (all with the container owner‟s permission). See Karo, 468 U.S. at 708; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. Additionally, both Karo and Knotts addressed the use of beepers, which — as we have already explained — are markedly different from GPS trackers. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556-57. Davis extends good faith protection only to acts that are explicitly sanctioned by clear and well-settled precedent, and neither Knotts nor Karo sanction the type of intrusion at issue in this case. Consequently, we hold that law enforcement‟s reliance on the beeper cases, standing on its own, cannot sufficiently insulates the GPS search in this case from the exclusionary rule. States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Buford, 632 F.3d 264, 276 n.9 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Like the Eleventh Circuit, we also „stress, however, that our precedent on a given point must be unequivocal before we will suspend the exclusionary rule‟s operation.‟” (quoting Davis, 598 F.3d at 1266)); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 n.6 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the good faith exception applied because “Tenth Circuit jurisprudence supporting the search was settled. Thus, there was no risk that law enforcement officers would engage in the type of complex legal research and analysis better left to the judiciary and members of the bar”). 40