Opinion ID: 174796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Threshold Elements of a PAA Claim

Text: Turning to the merits of the appeal, Defendants argue the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that in order for Plaintiffs to prevail on their PAA claims, they must establish a nuclear incident occurred by showing loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property. As an initial matter, we note that an issue was raised at oral argument as to whether or not Defendants forfeited this argument. It is arguable Defendants failed to preserve the issue of whether a nuclear incident must be established as a threshold element of a plaintiff's PAA claim. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs themselves failed to adequately present any such forfeiture argument in their appellate brief. At oral argument, Plaintiffs admitted they did not expressly raise a forfeiture argument, but instead asserted that their brief sufficiently presented the argument by generic references to Defendants' novel Price-Anderson argument and Defendants' failure to identify with clarity the specific rulings of which [they] seek review, or the locations in the record where [their] points were raised. We disagree. Plaintiffs' brief only makes reference to Defendants' lack of citations to rulings below in explaining the difficulty they had in responding to certain arguments. The brief does not raise a forfeiture challenge. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have themselves forfeited any forfeiture argument they may have on this issue, and this court will consider the merits of Defendants' argument. See United States v. Heckenliable, 446 F.3d 1048, 1049 n. 3 (10th Cir.2006) (explaining the government waived the waiver by failing to argue defendant forfeited his challenge on appeal); see also Soo Line R. Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 n. 2 (7th Cir.1997) (holding plaintiff waived any waiver defense it might have had by failing to argue defendant forfeited its appellate argument due to a judicial admission). This court review[s] de novo whether, as a whole, the district court's jury instructions correctly stated the governing law and provided the jury with an ample understanding of the issues and applicable standards. Martinez v. Caterpillar, Inc., 572 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). As we previously mentioned, the 1988 Amendments to the PAA created a federal cause of action known as a public liability action. A public liability action ... means any suit asserting public liability. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). In turn, public liability is defined as any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w). In keeping with these definitions, Defendants argue Plaintiffs must establish that any liability does in fact arise out of or result from a nuclear incident. A nuclear incident is defined as any occurrence ... causing ... bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). Consequently, Defendants argue Plaintiffs must prove as a threshold element of their PAA claims that they suffered one of the injuries enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). This court analyzed a similar question in June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir.2009). There, defendants' uranium mining and milling operations exposed nearby residents to radiation to such an extent that the community had to be evacuated and all structures were razed as part of the remediation effort. Id. at 1236-37. One-hundred-fifty-two plaintiffs claimed the mining and milling operations increased their risk of developing radiation-related illnesses and pursued medical monitoring claims to help detect the onset of disease. Id. at 1237. This court affirmed the dismissal of the medical monitoring claims because they did not implicate bodily injury, which was the only potentially applicable injury under § 2014(q). Id. at 1248-52. Though June did not expressly determine the circumstances in which a plaintiff must establish injury, [9] we now confirm that the occurrence of a nuclear incident, and thus a sufficient injury under § 2014(q), constitutes a threshold element of any PAA claim. Consequently, we reject Plaintiffs' suggestion that they need only assert liability arising out of a nuclear incident. The presence of a nuclear incident is the hallmark of a public liability action. Were a plaintiff only required to plead the presence of a nuclear incident, but never establish one, a public liability action would be completely indistinguishable from whichever state tort claim a particular PAA action incorporates. In creating a federal cause of action under the PAA, however, Congress made clear its intention to limit recovery to the discrete group of injuries enumerated in § 2014(q) while simultaneously utilizing state law to frame the substantive rules for decision. [10] 42 U.S.C. § 2210(hh). Plaintiffs provide no reason why we should render the statute's nuclear incident requirement superfluous outside of the pleading stage. See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w). Accordingly, we conclude a plaintiff must establish an injury sufficient to constitute a nuclear incident as a threshold, substantive element of any PAA claim. The only injuries listed in § 2014(q) which can establish a nuclear incident in the case at hand are loss of or damage to property and loss of use of property. [11] This court has never defined these terms either individually or in a manner that would differentiate one from the other. Our recent decision in June, however, provides significant guidance. As we previously noted, the plaintiffs in June claimed the defendants' uranium operations increased their risk of developing health problems and thus pursued medical monitoring claims. 577 F.3d at 1237. The district court determined medical monitoring claims do not involve a bodily injury and dismissed the action. Id. at 1248. This court affirmed and held DNA damage and cell death do not constitute a bodily injury in the absence of the manifestation of an actual disease or injury, despite the increased risk of developing disease in the future. Id. at 1248-49. In short, June makes clear that only an existing physical injury constitutes bodily injury under the PAA; the mere subclinical effects of radiation exposure are insufficient. Id. at 1249. Our characterization of damage to property is informed by the analysis in June, as the logic applies equally to the issue before us in this appeal. Just as an existing physical injury to one's body is necessary to establish bodily injury, so too is an existing physical injury to property necessary to establish damage to property. Without a demonstrable manifestation of injury, the presence of plutonium can, at best, only establish a risk of future damage to property. As this court indicated in June, however, mere risk of future damage is insufficient. Id. at 1249. Rather, the physical damage must actually be manifest at the time the PAA claim is asserted. This requirement does not heighten a plaintiff's burden of proof, but simply provides that a plaintiff wishing to sue under the PAA for a nuclear-related property injury involving damage to property must first establish actual damage to the property in question. Here, Plaintiffs argue the mere presence of radioactive plutonium particles on their property establishes the requisite damage. In their supplemental brief, Plaintiffs point out a nuclear incident is defined as any enumerated injury arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of ... special nuclear ... material. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). Without question, special nuclear material includes plutonium. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa). According to Plaintiffs, this compels the conclusion that plutonium contamination itself is enough to establish damage to property. This argument misses the point. The statute does not indicate that the mere presence of plutonium is per se injurious to property. If mere contamination without actual damage were enough, Congress could have easily listed contamination as an injury falling within 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q)'s definition of nuclear incident. Instead, Congress required a showing of damage to property. In order to prove plutonium-related damage to property, Plaintiffs must necessarily establish that plutonium particles released from Rocky Flats caused a detectable level of actual damage to the class properties. [12] Jury Instruction No. 3.3 confirmed that Plaintiffs must prove the presence of plutonium on class properties to prevail on their trespass claim. The language of Instruction No. 3.3, however, underscored the limited nature of that proof: Plaintiffs are not required to show that plutonium is present on the Class Properties at any particular level or concentration, that they suffered any bodily harm because of the plutonium or that the presence of plutonium on the Class Properties damaged these properties in some other way. Accordingly, Plaintiffs were never required to, and did not, present evidence of actual physical damage to the property. Damage to property is not, however, the only property injury that a plaintiff can prove to establish the PAA threshold element of a nuclear incident; a plaintiff who establishes a loss of use of property may also recover under the PAA. The express statutory language indicates that more than a mere interference with an owner's use is necessary; a particular use of the property must actually be lost. Plaintiffs did present evidence relevant to a loss of use. Specifically, they tried their nuisance claims under the theory that the presence of plutonium particles on their properties places them at an increased risk of health problems. We agree that when the presence of radioactive materials creates a sufficiently high risk to health, a loss of use may in fact occur. For instance, a residential or business use may be lost due to an increased risk to health so high that no reasonable person would freely choose to live on or work at the property. Similarly, agricultural use may be lost where the soil can no longer produce crops that are safe for consumption due to the presence of the radioactive substance. In short, where the evidence indicates the property has been affected by the radioactive material to such an extent that an otherwise appropriate use of the property is lost, a plaintiff has established the threshold injury element of his PAA claim. [13] Here, Plaintiffs were never required to establish a loss of use of property. Instead, Jury Instruction No. 3.6 only required the jury to find that Defendants interfered with Class members' use and enjoyment of their properties in one of two ways: (1) [b]y causing Class members to be exposed to plutonium and placing them at some increased risk of health problems or (2) [b]y causing objective conditions that pose a demonstrable risk of future harm to the Class Area. Plaintiffs' experts merely testified that any exposure to plutonium whatsoever increases the risk of health problems to some degree. Without an accompanying estimate or calculation of the increased risk, however, this evidence is insufficient to establish a loss of use under 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). Plaintiffs must instead prove that the particular level of risk created by Defendants' conduct had the effect of actually depriving them of a specific use. During supplemental briefing, this court directed Plaintiffs to identify any evidence presented at trial that could establish a loss of use of property. [14] Plaintiffs' supplemental brief confirms they attempted to make out their PAA claims solely by establishing an increased health risk. Plaintiffs' submissions, however, do not reveal evidence of an increased health risk that would be sufficient to permit a reasonable fact-finder to find a loss of use. Indeed, Plaintiffs' experts testified only that the actual dosage of radiation to which Plaintiffs have been exposed creates a small and unquantifiable increased risk of health problems. Nonetheless, we need not review the sufficiency of the evidence, as the jury was never properly instructed on the threshold elements of Plaintiffs' PAA claims. On remand, Plaintiffs will be tasked with producing additional evidence that could support a jury's finding that a nuclear incident occurred, in the form of loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property under 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). Because the jury was not properly instructed on an essential element of Plaintiffs' PAA claims, the verdict must be set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.