Opinion ID: 1210963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Additional Evidence

Text: Ms. Miller argues on appeal that both the district court and the administrative officers erred in refusing to hear additional evidence alleging systemic dysfunction in the delivery of books on tape. She asserts that this evidence would show the inadequacy of the remedy provided in the administrative proceedings and affirmed by the district court. We review the district court's decision regarding the refusal to consider additional evidence pursuant to the IDEA for abuse of discretion. [5] See O'Toole ex rel. O'Toole v. Olathe Dist. Sch. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 144 F.3d 692, 708-09 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that denial of a motion for an enlargement of time to submit additional evidence should be reviewed for abuse of discretion); accord Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 850 (6th Cir.2004) (A district court's decision regarding additional evidence in an IDEA case will be reviewed for abuse of discretion.). The district court's discretion to accept additional evidence is limited, however, because such evidence is merely supplemental to the administrative record and federal court proceedings must maintain the character of review and not rise to the level of a de novo trial. L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 974 (10th Cir.2004). Ms. Miller has not given us any basis for concluding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to hear additional evidence that allegedly would have shown a systemic dysfunction in the delivery of books on tape. In determining whether the district court abused its discretion by not allowing additional evidence, we look to whether the proposed evidence was relevant to the issue properly before the district court. See Deal, 392 F.3d at 850-51 (concluding that the district court had not abused its discretion in permitting additional evidence where witness evidence was limited in scope to the extent to which their observations were relevant to the challenged decisions for the [specific] school year and the district court took great care to limit testimony to matters relevant to the [disputed] IEP (emphases added)); Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir.1995) (While a district court appropriately may exclude additional evidence, a court must exercise particularized discretion in its rulings so that it will consider evidence relevant, non-cumulative and useful in determining whether Congress' goal has been reached for the child involved. (emphasis added)); see also A.Y. ex rel. B.Y. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 569 F.Supp.2d 496, 507-08 (M.D.Pa.2008) (applying the Susan N. standard to admit evidence because it may shed light on one of the issues before the court but explaining that the evidence would not be considered in connection with a separate question as to which it was not relevant); A.S. v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 477 F.Supp.2d 969, 972 (W.D.Wis.2007) (rejecting evidence that was not relevant to the situation at the time the District created the IEP for [the student]).
The issue properly before the district court was whether the AAO should have found additional IDEA violations regarding Books on Tape and awarded further relief with respect to such violations. Aplt.App. at 378. Although the AAO partially ruled in Ms. Miller's favor regarding books on tape, Ms. Miller claimed additional violations of IDEA on this issue. See Aplt.App. at 11-12 (The IDEA administrative decisions erred by not concluding that the District's failure to offer Books on Tape ... for all necessary textbook ... reading for all relevant school years constituted a failure to provide access to the general curriculum and failure to provide necessary special education services and a deprivation of FAPE.). The AAO ruled against Ms. Miller regarding her sixth grade claim, concluding that APS had not erred by declining to provide books on tape that year because the school had provided the Kurzweil system, which had the identical purpose of providing auditory access to written text. The AAO ruled in Ms. Miller's favor regarding books on tape in seventh and eighth grades. The seventh grade IEP required books on tape, but APS did not provide them, nor did APS sustain its burden of showing that their absence had a de minimis impact on provision of FAPE. The eighth grade IEP generally required access to the Kurzweil system and, more narrowly than the previous IEP, promised books on tape only for a language arts class. See Admin. R. at 142 (Literature books on tape to be ordered.). However, at the time of the due process hearing, neither Kurzweil nor books on tape had been provided. The AAO affirmed the two remedies that had been provided by the DPHO for these failures: (1) reimbursement of the cost of the WYNN software that the Millers had used to compensate for the lack of auditory access to written material, and (2) requiring APS to conduct S.M.'s IEP in the spring so that books on tape could be obtained in a timely fashion before the following school year. The AAO concluded that no systemic remedy was needed and that rearranging the timing of the IEP was sufficient to address any concerns, [t]o the extent the record shows that [APS] was not able to timely provide textbooks on tape. Admin. R. at 300-01.
The additional evidenceevidence allegedly showing systemic dysfunction in the delivery of books on tapeis not relevant to the issue concerning additional IDEA violations relating to books on tape that was properly before the district court. Ms. Miller does not assert that the additional evidence is relevant to that issue. Instead, she argues that because APS failed to provide what it promised in the seventh and eighth grade IEPs, she should have been allowed to prove with the additional evidence that APS again will fail to perform its obligations, despite the administrative decisions. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 30 ([T]he reasons for [the prior] deprivation of the service are relevant if the remedy is going to be entrusted, once again, to the school system that failed to provide the identified service in the first place.); see also id. at 28 ([C]reation of [an] equitable remedy requires factual understanding of the school district's systemic dysfunction.); id. at 30 ([T]he denial of FAPE is sure to be repeated, because there is no existing infrastructure for provision of [these] necessary special education services.). As an initial matter, even if the evidence showed that APS is not providing Books on Tape to its thousands of students with learning disabilities, Aplt. Opening Br. at 29, that would not prove the inadequacy of the remedy in this case. Contrary to Ms. Miller's argument, the district court agreed with the AAO that the provision of some alternative form of assistive technology, such as the Kurzweil system, in lieu of Books on Tape is not a per se violation of the IDEA in this case and approved the AAO's remedy, which involved further evaluations and meetings by the IEP team with respect to this issue instead of simply binding the student and the school district to a particular kind of aid or technology in future years. Aplt.App. at 376-78. More importantly, the attempt to present such evidence is an effort to resurrect the class action that the district court rejected. The district court's denial of her motion to certify a class action is not before us because Ms. Miller did not appeal it. We will not permit her to proceed as though this were a class action. The only question relevant here is S.M.'s relief. See McQueen ex rel. McQueen v. Colo. Springs Sch. Dist. No. 11, 488 F.3d 868, 874 (10th Cir.2007) (The role of the § 1415 process is to resolve a complaint about the education of a specific child.); Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 42 (1st Cir. 2006) ([T]he evidence at trial did not show... that the failures are systemic. Plaintiffs represent no one but themselves, and they are not entitled to relief that goes beyond the scope of what is necessary to remedy the harms caused to them. (citation omitted)). Essentially, Ms. Miller is requesting an opportunity to convince the court that APS will not or cannot comply with its future obligations. Ms. Miller's case, however, is not unlike many other IDEA cases involving school districts' failures to comply with the applicable IEP. We see no reason to oblige the district court to consider additional evidence of past failures in relation to other students to support the inherently speculative conclusion that APS will not provide the necessary services in the future. We cannot lightly presume that school districts will refuse to comply with the relief ordered. If APS were to fail to conduct the ninth grade IEP and timely acquire any books on tape or other assistive technology required by that IEP, Ms. Miller could return to court to enforce the awarded relief. See Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 116 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2003) (concluding that despite [t]he lack of a clause in IDEA that specifically provides for judicial enforcement of administrative orders, the term parties aggrieved in § 1415(e)(2) includes plaintiffs who are aggrieved by the school system's failure ... to comply with the hearing officer's continuing, valid, and final order); see also Hunter ex rel. Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir.1996) (declining to enforce under § 1415(e)(2) but concluding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides an adequate vehicle for a suit to enforce an IDEA administrative decision). We do not consider Ms. Miller's option to return to court to be an ineffective remedy. We are confident that the overwhelming majority of school districts will meet their obligations under the IDEA once their duties have been crystalized in the administrative process and federal court review. Permitting preemptive challenges to the adequacy of the remedy on a speculative theory of noncompliance would not be appropriate. [6]
Ms. Miller argues that it is wrong to find the evidence irrelevant because the IDEA provides an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to ... the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (emphasis added). However, this language does not provide blanket coverage for any issue a parent wishes to raise. The Supreme Court has warned against judicial encroachment on educational policy. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208, 102 S.Ct. 3034. And in McQueen, we observed that [t]he role of the § 1415 process is to resolve a complaint about the education of a specific child.  488 F.3d at 874 (emphasis added). Ms. Miller has not persuaded us that S.M.'s relief will be inadequate absent alteration in APS's entire system. The Supreme Court's decision in Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 127 S.Ct. 1994, 167 L.Ed.2d 904 (2007), does not support Ms. Miller's unbounded interpretation of any matter. In Winkelman, the Court addressed the question of whether the rights protected by the IDEA belonged to the child alone or to both the parents and the child, concluding that various provisions accord parents independent, enforceable rights [under the IDEA]. 127 S.Ct. at 2002. In reaching its conclusion that parents were also real parties in interest (and thus able to proceed unrepresented by counsel), the Court examined § 1415(b)(6). The Court described § 1415(b)(6) as providing [a] wide range of review and as empower[ing] parents to bring challenges based on a broad range of issues. Id. at 2002, 2004. It also noted more generally that the IDEA contained provisions for expansive review and extensive parental involvement. Id. at 2002. The Court concluded that, because the IDEA does not differentiate... between the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents, a parent may be a `party aggrieved' for purposes of § 1415(i)(2) with regard to `any matter' implicating these rights. Id. at 2004. Our conclusion that the additional evidence was not relevant here is not undercut by the Supreme Court's commentary about the breadth of the any matter language. The Court's analysis was focused on parents' role in the statutory procedures, and its general remarks provides no guidance regarding the outer boundaries of any matter. We agree that parents can bring challenges to a broad range of issues. But where a parent has been awarded relief that would be adequate if complied with, we have no obligation to permit a speculative argument about the school district's inability to comply with that award. Because the evidence was not relevant to the district court's review of whether additional relief was appropriate, we cannot find the exclusion of the evidence to be an abuse of discretion. [7]