Opinion ID: 2590193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Retroactive Application of the 2002 Amendments to RCW 9.94A.525(12)

Text: Legrone argues that the 2002 amendments to RCW 9.94A.525(12) should retroactively apply to the calculation of his offender score. In 2002, the legislature enacted the following underscored amendments to RCW 9.94A.525(12): If the present conviction is for ... manufacture of methamphetamine count three points for each adult prior ... manufacture of methamphetamine conviction and two points for each juvenile ... manufacture of methamphetamine offense. If the present conviction is for a drug offense and the offender has a criminal history that includes a sex offense or serious violent offense, count three points for each adult prior felony drug offense conviction and two points for each juvenile drug offense. All other adult and juvenile felonies are scored in subsection (8) of this section if the current drug offense is violent, or as in subsection (7) of this section if the current drug offense is nonviolent. Laws of 2002, ch. 290, § 3(12) (emphasis added). The language in subsection (7) states: If the present conviction is for a nonviolent offense and not covered by subsection (11) or (12) of this section, count one point for each adult prior felony conviction and one point for each juvenile prior violent felony conviction and 1/2 point for each juvenile prior nonviolent felony conviction. Laws of 2002, ch. 290, § 3(7) (emphasis added); RCW 9.94A.525(7). The legislature also provided that [s]ections 2 and 3 of this act take effect July 1, 2002, and apply to crimes committed on or after July 1, 2002.  Laws of 2002, ch. 290, § 29 (emphasis added). Prior to these amendments, former RCW 9.94A.360(12) (2000) provided that if a defendant was convicted of a drug offense, a sentencing court must: [ C ] ount three points for each adult prior felony drug offense conviction and two points for each juvenile drug offense. All other adult and juvenile felonies are scored as in subsection (8) of this section if the current drug offense is violent, or as in subsection (7) of this section if the current drug offense is nonviolent. (Emphasis added.) Since Legrone committed his drug offense before the effective date of the 2002 amendments, July 1, 2002, the sentencing court applied former RCW 9.94A.360(12), and counted three offender score points for each of Legrone's prior drug convictions. Legrone asserts that the sentencing court should have counted only one point for each of his prior drug convictions pursuant to our decisions in Wiley, 124 Wash.2d 679, 880 P.2d 983, State v. Grant, 89 Wash.2d 678, 575 P.2d 210 (1978), and State v. Heath, 85 Wash.2d 196, 532 P.2d 621 (1975), where, as he contends, we stated that sentencing amendments which reduce punishment for certain offenses must be applied retroactively to pending prosecutions for crimes committed before the amendments' effective date. The State, however, argues that Legrone's claim is moot because along with his drug conviction, Legrone was also sentenced for kidnapping in the first degree, a serious violent offense. [4] Consequently, the State reasons that both the current and former versions of RCW 9.94A.525(12) require the sentencing court to count three points for each of Legrone's prior drug convictions. [5] As noted, we have held that this court will not consider a question that is purely academic. A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 616, 888 P.2d 1105 (footnote omitted) (citing Grays Harbor Paper Co., 74 Wash.2d at 73, 442 P.2d 967; Washam, 69 Wash.App. at 457, 849 P.2d 1229). See also Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wash.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984). If we decided in Legrone's favor, the remedy would be to remand his case to the sentencing court for resentencing; however, even if the court sentenced Legrone under the current version of RCW 9.94A.525(12), Legrone's offender score would remain the same. See Ford, 137 Wash.2d at 485, 973 P.2d 452 (holding that the remedy for a miscalculated offender score is resentencing using a correct offender score). Our consideration of Legrone's case is purely academic, and therefore moot. Nonetheless, we may still reach a determination on the merits of a moot case if it presents an issue of continuing and substantial public interest, and that issue will likely reoccur. Blilie, 132 Wash.2d at 488, 939 P.2d 691; Grays Harbor Paper Co., 74 Wash.2d at 73, 442 P.2d 967. This issue has generated a substantial number of lower court opinions, and implicates the length of sentences for defendants convicted of drug offenses, an issue that is of sufficient continuing and substantial public interest to justify an exception to the mootness doctrine in this instance. [6] Thus, we reach the merits of Legrone's claim. Relying primarily on its decisions in State v. McCarthy, 112 Wash.App. 231, 48 P.3d 1014 (2002), review denied, 148 Wash.2d 1011, 62 P.3d 889 (2003) and State v. Kane, 101 Wash.App. 607, 5 P.3d 741 (2000), the Court of Appeals rejected Legrone's claim on its merits. Legrone, 117 Wash.App. 1044, 2003 WL 21500733, at . In McCarthy, the Court of Appeals held that the 2002 amendments to RCW 9.94A.525(12) lacked any language evidencing that the legislature intended these amendments to apply retroactively, and thus, pursuant to the savings clause, RCW 10.01.040, courts must sentence a defendant in accordance with the law in effect on the date he or she committed the crime. [7] 112 Wash.App. at 237, 48 P.3d 1014. Further, as in Kane, 101 Wash.App. at 614-17, 5 P.3d 741, the Court of Appeals reasoned that this court's decisions in Heath, 85 Wash.2d at 197-98, 532 P.2d 621 (holding that amendments to the section of the Washington Habitual Traffic Offenders Act, chapter 46.65 RCW, governing civil drivers license revocations applied retroactively to pending cases) and Grant, 89 Wash.2d at 684, 575 P.2d 210 (holding that the savings clause did not apply since the legislature had included language evidencing its intent that former RCW 70.96A.010 (1972) be applied retroactively to pending cases), do not require retroactive application of the 2002 amendments when calculating Legrone's offender score. [8] Legrone, 117 Wash.App. 1044, 2003 WL 21500733, at . We agree with the Court of Appeals. We have stated that [the]... savings clause is deemed a part of every repealing statute as if expressly inserted therein, and hence renders unnecessary the incorporation of an individual saving clause in each statute which amends or repeals an existing penal statute. State v. Hanlen, 193 Wash. 494, 497, 76 P.2d 316 (1938). See also State v. Fenter, 89 Wash.2d 57, 61, 569 P.2d 67 (1977) (holding that the savings clause applied to former criminal statutory provisions later repealed by the legislature; pursuant to the savings clause, the defendant should be charged under the former provisions in effect when he committed his crime); State v. Toney, 103 Wash.App. 862, 864, 14 P.3d 826 (2000) (unless the legislature evidences contrary intent, a statute's preamendment version applies to an offense committed before the amendment's effective date). To avoid application of the savings clause, we have not required that the legislature explicitly state its intent that amendments repealing portions of criminal and penal statutes apply retroactively to pending prosecutions for crimes committed before the amendments' effective date. Instead, such intent need only be expressed in `words that fairly convey that intention.' Kane, 101 Wash.App. at 612, 5 P.3d 741 (quoting State v. Zornes, 78 Wash.2d 9, 13, 475 P.2d 109 (1970)). [9] In both Zornes and Grant, we held that the legislature included language which conveyed its intent that amendments to the criminal code be applied retroactively to pending cases. In Zornes, we reasoned that the language the provisions of this chapter shall not ever be applicable to any form of cannabis evidenced the intent that [i]f the provisions of the uniform narcotics acts are not ` ever ' to be applied to cannabis, then they are not to be applied in any case, whether pending or arising in the future. 78 Wash.2d at 13-14, 475 P.2d 109 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Grant, we held that: intoxicated persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution solely because of their consumption of alcoholic beverages [was] an express declaration of a legislative intention that no person shall go to trial on such a charge after the effective date of the act, and [was] sufficient to overcome the presumption of [the savings clause]. 89 Wash.2d at 684, 575 P.2d 210 (quoting RCW 70.96A.010) (emphasis added). Here, however, the legislature has failed to express any intent that the 2002 amendments to RCW 9.94A.525(12) apply retroactively to pending prosecutions for crimes committed before the amendments' effective date. To the contrary, in Laws of 2002, ch. 290 § 3(12), the legislature refers to an offenders present conviction. This is markedly different from the amendments at issue in Zornes and Grant where the legislature included language that clearly indicated that the amendments were intended to apply to all pending prosecutions regardless of the fact that defendants may have committed the crime before the amendments' effective date. In fact, the legislature has expressed the opposite intent here by explicitly providing that the 2002 amendments to RCW 9.94A.525(12) apply to crimes committed on or after July 1, 2002. [10] Laws of 2002, ch. 290, § 29. Our decisions in Heath and Wiley do not require us to reach a contrary result. Heath did not directly implicate the savings clause since it pertained to amendments governing civil driver license revocations under the Washington Habitual Traffic Offenders Act. [11] 85 Wash.2d at 197-98, 532 P.2d 621. Similarly, the Wiley court did not address the effect of the savings clause, nor did it discuss instances where, as here, the legislature merely directs sentencing courts to count certain prior felony convictions differently when calculating offender scores. 124 Wash.2d at 687-88, 880 P.2d 983. Rather, the Wiley court addressed the effect of SRA amendments that downgrade crimes from a felony to a misdemeanor. Id. As the Court of Appeals aptly reasoned, Legrone's reliance on Wiley is misplaced because the amendments in this case do not reflect a legislative determination that the offenses are less culpable. Legrone, 117 Wash.App. 1044, 2003 WL 21500733, at .