Opinion ID: 2427524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Evidence Was Sufficient To Support Sabir's Conviction

Text: Sabir contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The rule of constitutional sufficiency, derived from the Due Process Clause, instructs that a conviction cannot be obtained except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime ... charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); accord United States v. Aguilar, 585 F.3d 652, 656 (2d Cir.2009). A defendant raising a sufficiency challenge bears a heavy burden because a reviewing court must consider the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and uphold the conviction if  any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original); accord United States v. Aguilar, 585 F.3d at 656. Applying these principles to Sabir's case, we reject his sufficiency challenge as without merit.
In challenging his conviction for conspiracy to provide material support to a known terrorist organization, Sabir contends principally that the government failed to prove the existence of an agreement to violate § 2339B. We are not persuaded. To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both the existence of the conspiracy alleged and the defendant's membership in it. United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir.2008); see also id. (The essence of any conspiracy is, of course, agreement, and in order to establish a conspiracy, the government must show that two or more persons entered into a joint enterprise with consciousness of its general nature and extent.). The trial evidence in this case easily satisfied these elements. Testimonial evidence established that Shah and Sabir had long voiced interest in supporting jihad and mujahideen. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 193-96 (reporting Shah preaching jihad and support for Osama bin Laden in late 1990s at Poughkeepsie mosque); id. at 287 (recounting Sabir's 2003 conversation with mujahideen fighter inquiring how Sabir could help with jihad ). It is against this background that a jury would listen to the recorded conversation of March 4, 2004, in which Shah proposed to a federal undercover agent that Shah and Sabirclose friends for 25 yearsjoin al Qaeda as a pair, me and a doctor, to support that organization's pursuit of jihad. GX 902T at 23. More significantly, during the May 20, 2005 meeting at which Shah and Sabir formally swore allegiance and promised support to al Qaeda, Shah by providing al Qaeda members with martial arts training and Sabir by treating wounded al Qaeda members in Riyadh, see GX 906T at 106-16, Sabir acknowledged that he and Shah had talked for a long time about supporting jihad, id. at 110. Sabir plainly viewed his and Shah's actions at the May 20 meeting as part of their common agreement. When Agent Soufan observed that neither man was obligated to support al Qaeda, Sabir responded that to fail to do so would be to abandon[ ] my brother (Shah) with respect to the very thing we agreed upon... in the first place. Id. Accordingly, we identify no merit in Sabir's sufficiency challenge to his conviction for conspiracy to provide material support to a known terrorist organization.
Equally meritless is Sabir's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempting to provide material support to a known foreign terrorist organization. A conviction for attempt requires proof that a defendant (a) had the intent to commit the object crime and (b) engaged in conduct amounting to a substantial step towards its commission. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 134 (2d Cir.2003).
Sabir does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his intent to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. Nor could he. [13] In addition to Sabir's statements already quoted in this opinion, see supra at [132, 140, 143-44], which constitute powerful evidence of the requisite intent, the following transcript excerpts from the May 20, 1995 meeting further support this element. After Sabir advised that his work in a Riyadh military hospital would put him in Saudi Arabia for two years, Agent Soufan stated that Sabir could help al Qaeda [a]s a doctor ... as a Mujahid. GX 906T at 19. Sabir not only signaled assent, he emphasized a need to feel sure within myself that if I make a certain move, that move is going to be effective. Id. To provide that assurance, Agent Soufan clarified how a doctor could be helpful to al Qaeda's pursuit of jihad. He stated that Osama bin Laden himself had told Soufan that we need doctors if they are trusted. Id. at 32. Soufan explained that brothers sometimes get hurt with a bullet during training and in operation[s]. Id. at 48-49. Because they cannot go to a hospital, the organization needs doctor brothers ... to protect them ... [to] keep the other brothers healthy. Id. at 49. [14] Sabir readily agreed to provide that support, stating, Let me give you another number, whereupon he supplied his personal mobile telephone number, which, with Soufan's assistance, he rendered into code. Id. at 48-50. [15] Sabir understood that the purpose of the code was to conceal the fact that he was working for al Qaeda: Persons who learn the number may not... understand [its] significance.... They may not even recognize it as a telephone number. Id. at 51. He also understood that the coded number would be provided to a trusted al Qaeda operative, who would identify himself as Mus'ab when contacting Sabir on behalf of a wounded jihadist. Sabir responded to this information,  God willing.  Id. at 87 (italics in transcript reflect translation from Arabic to English). Still later in the conversation, when Agent Soufan emphasized to Sabir that he could decline to treat mujahideen if he was not committed to al Qaeda's goals, Sabir made plain that he had no reservations about using his medical expertise to support al Qaeda: I will [do what]ever I can do for the sake of God.... This is my job ... the best I can do is to benefit those people ... who are striving in the way of Allah.... [T]hese are the ones that are most deserving of the help. Id. at 66. When Soufan further stated that it was difficult to take mujahideen to a hospital for treatment, Sabir emphasized that his military identification allowed him to travel freely around Saudi Arabia, thereby suggesting that he could go to the injured person. [I]t's almost like carte blanche.... It's like you can go where you want to go with this.... And anybody that sees it, they don't touch you. Id. at 67. Later, Soufan sought to confirm this understanding, stating [t]hat ID will be very good for you ... because you can definitely help mujahideen now, to which Sabir responded, Yes, yes. Id. at 69. With evidence of his intent thus clearly established, Sabir focuses his sufficiency challenge on the substantial step element of attempt.
The substantial step requirement for attempt derives from the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which in the early 1960s sought to widen the ambit of attempt liability. United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 66 (2d Cir.1983) (Friendly, J.) (citing Model Penal Code § 5.01(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)), overruled on other grounds by National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 254-55, 262, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994). Previously, at common law, attempt had been limited to conduct close to the completion of the intended crime. See generally People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 69, 148 N.E. 786, 789 (1925) (Cardozo, J.) (holding that, to constitute attempt, suspect's conduct must carry the project forward within dangerous proximity to the criminal end to be attained); Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 272, 59 N.E. 55, 56 (1901) (Holmes, J.) (recognizing that some preparations may amount to an attempt when they come very near to the accomplishment of the act). By requiring proof only of a substantial step in furtherance of the intended crime, the Model Code ushered in a broader view of attempt. This court effectively adopted the Model Code's formulation of attempt in United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (2d Cir.1976). The Stallworth defendants were arrested when their planned armed robbery was in progress and [a]ll that stood between [them] and success was a group of F.B.I. agents and police officers. Id. at 1041. As such evidence would have demonstrated attempt even under the common law, the significance of the case rests not on its facts but on the court's approving citation to the Model Code's identification of a range of conductnot always proximate to the desired criminal endthat might nevertheless constitute a substantial step when strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant's criminal intent. Id. at 1040 & n. 5; see also id. at 1041 (observing that application of Model Code emphasizes the importance of a rule [of attempt] encouraging early police intervention where a suspect is clearly bent on the commission of crime). Accord United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 408 (2d Cir.2003); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 66. Thus, a substantial step must be something more than mere preparation, yet may be less than the last act necessary before the actual commission of the substantive crime. United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 987 (2d Cir.1980). It is conduct `planned to culminate' in the commission of the substantive crime being attempted. United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 66 (quoting Model Penal Code § 5.01(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)). [16]