Opinion ID: 484640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Paragraph J Issue

Text: 28 We conclude that the court erred also in summarily dismissing Wakefield's theory that the Danray Plan had been superseded and that Paragraph J therefore no longer was applicable. The court itself noted that the exchanges of communications created confusion and that there were therefore ambiguities in what plan was referred to in the pertinent statements by Cotten. On a motion for summary judgment, the court may not properly resolve such ambiguities in favor of the moving party. E.g., Schwabenbauer v. Board of Education, 667 F.2d at 313 (In determining whether or not there is a genuine factual issue, the court should resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party.) The court did not apply this principle. 29 Nor was the fact that Wakefield may have made concessions at prior moments during this litigation sufficient to warrant the entry of summary judgment against him. The substance of the statements cited by the district court was that Wakefield's amended complaint alleged that Wakefield's right to commissions had been governed by the 1978 Danray agreement. This is precisely what NTI argued to this Court in Wakefield I, urging that Wakefield's contract claim should have been decided and dismissed by the court as a matter of law on the basis of the clear language of the commission contract and should not have been presented to the jury at all. We remanded the contract claim for a new trial. It was not open to the district court on remand to dismiss summarily on the basis of previously known evidence.