Opinion ID: 1629429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other prospective jurors

Text: Because the court of appeal ordered a remand for a third trial of this matter, the appellate court also discussed the peremptory strikes of three other prospective jurors, Melanie Auzenne, Ivory Jordan, and Virgie Stevenson. At the outset, the court of appeal acknowledged that these strikes do not rise to the level of a racial taint that could not be purged. However, the appellate court found the strikes illustrate[d] the need for the trial judge to perform his pivotal role in evaluating the claims as required by Snyder. Jacobs, 2007-887 p. 21, 13 So.3d at 693. Our review finds the court of appeal, in its analysis of the claims under Snyder, improperly imposed a requirement on the trial judge to articulate on the record whether the trial judge both observed and remembered the demeanor-based explanations given by the prosecutor as race-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges. As previously discussed, Thaler v. Haynes rejected such a requirement. The court of appeal found the prosecutor offered three reasons for striking Ms. Auzenne: (1) she avoided eye contact with the prosecutor and appeared to be unfriendly to the prosecutor or amenable to the prosecutor's discussion; (2) she was formerly employed at the New Orleans District Attorney's office, which has been plagued with problems; and (3) the prosecutor was puzzled when Ms. Auzenne spontaneously volunteered she had never been accused of anything. The trial judge stated he also observed Ms. Auzenne's disinterest, but could not tell whether she responded differently to either party. The court of appeal found the trial judge failed to give his opinion on the prosecutor's credibility regarding Ms. Auzenne's body language and failed to comment on Ms. Auzenne's puzzling remark, thus, abandoning his pivotal role mandated by Snyder. Finally, the court of appeal noted the prosecutor did not ask follow-up questions of this prospective juror regarding her former employment, which the court of appeal found to be suspicious and evidence that the explanation was a sham and a pretext for discrimination. Jacobs, 2007-887 p. 21, 13 So.3d at 693-694. However, the court of appeal also noted a prospective juror's inattentiveness and body language have been held to be valid race-neutral reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge. Jacobs, 2007-887 p. 21 n. 75, 13 So.3d at 693 n. 75, citing State v. Coleman, 2006-518 (La.11/2/07), 970 So.2d 511, 515. Since Thaler v. Haynes instructs that a trial judge is not required to articulate whether or not the judge observed or remembers the demeanor-based explanation proffered by the prosecutor, as long as the trial judge accepts the prosecutor's explanation, the court of appeal's conclusion that this failure automatically invalidates the trial court's ruling is erroneous. Moreover, the trial judge was present when Ms. Auzenne made her strange comment, basically a non-sequitor, which supplies yet another race-neutral reason for the prosecutor's strike. As for the prosecutor's comment about the prospective juror's previous employment at the New Orleans District Attorney's office, and in the absence of knowing when the prospective juror worked at that office, which the attorneys and judge would have known, the response was facially race-neutral. Moreover, as found by the court of appeal, nothing in the totality of the voir dire of this prospective juror rose to the level of a Batson violation. The state proffered four race-neutral reasons for striking Mr. Jordan: (1) he was the only juror wearing shorts on the first day of voir dire; (2) he was employed at a casino and the prosecutor did not believe law-abiding citizens should be involved in some of the things that occur in a casino; (3) he gave the prosecutor a disgusted look when he related he had been a crime victim and there had been a 2-hour delay in the police response; and (4) he had difficulties speaking, which the prosecutor believed could hinder communications with other jurors during deliberations. Jacobs, 2007-887 p. 21-22, 13 So.3d at 694. The trial judge indicated on the record he had observed the disgusted look and the hesitation in speech. The court of appeal found these race-neutral reasons were worthy of credence. Id., 2007-887 p. 22, 13 So.3d at 694. However, because the trial judge did not indicate if he believed the prosecutor's remark on Mr. Jordan's attire, [9] the court of appeal found, under its flawed interpretation of Snyder, that the trial judge abandoned his pivotal role regarding this explanation. The Supreme Court's recent ruling shows the court of appeal's conclusion as to this demeanor-based reason was incorrect. In addition, the court of appeal found the failure of the prosecutor to question Mr. Jordan further about his employment was suspicious and was evidence the explanation was a sham and a pretext for discrimination. Id. When examined, however, the comment, which indicates a prejudice, is still a race-neutral one. No amount of questioning would have elicited the response that Mr. Jordan did not work at a casino. And the appellate court does not point to any other prospective juror with a similar job who was white whom the prosecutor failed to strike. Prosecutors often have prejudices against having persons with certain jobs on the jury, i.e. teachers, ministers, accountants, etc. Unless the trial judge found the prosecutor's race-neutral reason masked a racially-discriminatory intent to remove Mr. Jordan from the jury, the trial judge was entitled to find there was no prohibited motive in the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of this prospective juror. The court of appeal has previously noted that the trial judge expressly stated he accepted the state's race-neutral explanation as to Mr. Jordan, and additionally indicated there was nothing in the voir dire of this prospective juror as a whole which uncovered a valid Batson violation. The state proffered the following race-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenge of Ms. Stevenson: (1) she was asleep while sitting in the general venire audience while the first jury panel was questioned, (2) she taught Sunday School, (3) she had two nephews in jail, and (4) she found in favor of a plaintiff in a civil case. As noted by the court of appeal, Louisiana courts have found that having relatives in jail is a valid race-neutral reason, as well as a prospective juror's involvement in church activities. Jacobs, 2007-887 p. 22-23, 13 So.3d at 694-695. The court of appeal expressed two concerns with regard to these reasons; i.e. that a white prospective juror active in her church was accepted by the state and the trial judge failed to articulate whether he saw Ms. Stevenson sleeping. As previously discussed, Snyder does not require an articulation by the trial judge that he observed the demeanor-based explanation proffered by the state. If the trial judge accepts the prosecutor's explanation, based on the prosecutor's demeanor, the trial judge may find no discriminatory intent. Moreover, the court of appeal also related that the state distinguished the white churchgoer as someone who had also voted guilty in a criminal case, as contrasted with Ms. Stevenson, who, as a juror in a civil trial, voted to award money to the plaintiff. Even more compelling as a distinction, however, is that Ms. Stevenson was observed sleeping during voir dire and the white prospective juror was not. Finally, even with its concerns, the court of appeal found the trial judge expressly accepted the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons and did not find the questioning of this prospective juror constituted a valid Batson violation.