Opinion ID: 2611807
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of section 4(e)

Text: Plaintiff asserts the Constitution's authorization for the provision by charter of the powers of county officials cannot broadly apply to any power the county electorate may choose to provide. This is undoubtedly true; there are unquestionably numerous kinds of powers that the charter may not constitutionally grant to the CLERB or to other county officers. (7) The question is whether the power authorized in this case is within the constitutional authority of the charter. Neither party nor their respective amici curiae have brought to our attention any controlling authority on this issue. Yet, general guidance is found in Reuter v. Board of Supervisors (1934) 220 Cal. 314 [30 P.2d 417] (hereafter Reuter ), which concerned a challenge to a charter county's authority to create a new county officer of county engineer, and to vest in him powers and duties of road commissioner that the general statewide law granted to and imposed on the county board of supervisors. In upholding the charter provision, we construed the predecessor to article XI, section 4(e) of the Constitution  former section 7 1/2  which, immediately after specifying that county charters shall provide ... [¶] For the powers and duties of boards of supervisors and all other county officers ..., also stated: [ P ] rovided, that the provisions of such charters relating to the powers and duties of boards of supervisors and all other county officers shall be subject to and controlled by general laws. (Italics added.) We held this proviso void, as being inconsistent with and repugnant to the general provision of that portion of the section of which it is a part ( Reuter, supra, 220 Cal. at p. 320), because, we reasoned, if general laws controlled the charter's provision of powers and duties relating to county officers, then the thrust of the provision for establishment of powers and duties through the county charter would be defeated. We did not think the framers of the amendment, nor the people of the state who ratified it, contemplated any such absurd result. ( Id. at p. 321; see also id. at pp. 322-324.) The powers and duties involved in Reuter included the duty to take charge of the highways in the county and the power to employ all men, teams, watering cars and all help necessary to do the [road] work.... ( Reuter, supra, 220 Cal. at p. 319.) We upheld the charter provision, stating: [A] county charter may provide for powers and duties of county officers although such powers and duties, as fixed by the charter, may differ from and be in conflict with the powers and duties of such officers as provided by the general laws of the state. ( Id. at p. 326.) We concluded by quoting the predecessor to current article XI, section 3(a), and noting that to the extent it is authorized by the Constitution, a county `charter ... shall become the organic law thereof relative to matters therein provided ... and shall supersede all laws inconsistent with such charter relative to the matters provided in such charter.' (220 Cal. at p. 226, quoting Cal. Const., art. XI, former § 7 1/2, par. 17.) Although Reuter, supra, 220 Cal. 314, construed the predecessors to present article XI, sections 4(e) and 3(a), it remains an accurate construction of those provisions. (See Cal. Const., art. XI, § 13, quoted ante, p. 1208.) The import of Reuter, supra, 220 Cal. 314, is twofold. First, it establishes that powers and duties legitimately conferred by charter on county officers supersede general law. Accordingly, even if we were to assume, as plaintiff suggests, that the Legislature intended to preempt or cover the field of entities that may issue subpoenas, Reuter stands for the proposition that, under the state Constitution, the Legislature may not do so if the grant of power to issue subpoenas is the type of power properly conferrable under article XI, section 4(e) of the Constitution (see post, fn. 10). Second, Reuter sheds some light on that latter factor, i.e., the type or kind of power conferrable under section 4(e). As noted above, the powers at issue in Reuter included the power to employ all men, teams, watering cars and all help necessary to do the [road] work.... (220 Cal. at p. 319.) The conferral of power to contract for employment and/or services vested in the county engineer the authority to bind the county by contract  a substantial and important power that might subject the county to liability for its breach, but a power that was nonetheless regular and necessary in order for the engineer to fulfill the duties imposed on him. Viewed in this context, we cannot conclude that the power conferred on the CLERB is outside the legitimate authority of the charter under article XI, section 4(e) of the Constitution. The power to issue subpoenas is one that is often conferred throughout the nation on boards such as the CLERB. (Petterson, Police Accountability and Civilian Oversight of Policing: An American Perspective, in Complaints Against the Police: The Trend to External Review (Goldsmith edit. 1991) pp. 259, 287-289 [11 of 21 civilian review boards in large cities possess power to issue subpoenas]; see also Brown v. City of Berkeley (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 223, 236 [129 Cal. Rptr. 1] [ charter city citizens police review board granted power to issue subpoenas]; [8] Richmond Mun. Code, § 3.54.080(b)(8) [same]; Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 2.41.220(a)( i ) [same].) [9] Moreover, the power to issue subpoenas is reasonably necessary to the full accomplishment of the legitimate goals of the legislation. (See, e.g., City of Newark v. Benjamin (1976) 144 N.J. Super. 58 [364 A.2d 563, 571-572] [Without the power to subpoena witnesses, hearings before a [civilian review board] would be inadequate and ineffective]; cf. Vance v. Ananich, supra, 378 N.W.2d 616, 618-619.) Given this, we reject plaintiff's assertion that the power granted by the charter amendment to issue subpoenas is outside the constitutionally authorized scope of section 4(e). [10]