Opinion ID: 2109848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defence of Common Employment.

Text: General Laws c. 152, § 18, provides in effect that an employer who is an insured person under the act must furnish compensation coverage to an independent contractor he hires and to the contractor's employees if the employer would be obligated to pay compensation to his own employees had they performed the same work for him. [1] The corollary to the extended obligation imposed on such a common employer, established by judicial construction of § 18, is an immunity from liability in tort under c. 152, § 15, with respect to any employee who comes within the scope of the common employment. [2] However, both the statutory obligation and the related immunity in tort are expressly limited by the terms of § 18, which provides that [t]his section shall not apply to any contract of an independent or sub-contractor which is merely ancillary and incidental to, and is no part of or process in, the trade or business carried on by the insured ... [person, i.e., the employer]. Thus, if in the present case the window washing work in which the plaintiff was engaged at the time he fell was part of or process in the club's business of operating a club or hotel facility, its obligation to the plaintiff, an employee of an independent contractor, would be governed by § 18, as the parties stipulated that the club was an insured person under G.L.c. 152. Since the plaintiff did not reserve his rights to bring a common law action against Industrial pursuant to G.L.c. 152, § 24, his potential remedies against Industrial and also against the club would be limited to workmen's compensation benefits, and he could not maintain the present action in tort. Cozzo v. Atlantic Ref. Co. 299 Mass. 260, 262-263 (1938). McPadden v. W.J. Halloran Co. 338 Mass. 189, 190 (1958). Stewart v. Roy Bros. Inc. 358 Mass. 446, 454-455 (1970). If, however, the plaintiff's window washing work were considered merely ancillary and incidental to the club's business, then the club would not be protected by G.L.c. 152, § 18, and under § 15 of that chapter the plaintiff would be entitled to bring a common law action for personal injuries. [3] Our cases have clearly established that it is ordinarily a question of fact whether particular work performed by an independent contractor or his employees is or is not part of or process in a principal employer's business. Cozzo v. Atlantic Ref. Co., supra, at 264. Cannon v. Crowley, 318 Mass. 373, 377 (1945). Dubois v. Soule Mill, 323 Mass. 472, 476 (1948). McKay v. Ratner, 353 Mass. 563, 565 (1968). Only where the circumstances of a particular case indicate that such work is plainly a part of the employer's business have we considered this question to be one of law. McPadden v. W.J. Halloran Co., supra, at 192. Tindall v. Denholm & McKay Co., supra, at 101. Cf. Stewart v. Roy Bros. Inc., supra, at 455-456. It is the club's contention that this case falls within the latter category. It argues that the window washing performed by the plaintiff at the time of the accident was part of the routine maintenance and cleaning of its facilities which this court has recognized as matter of law are part of the business of a mercantile enterprise even when regularly performed by the employees of an independent contractor hired by the owner for that purpose, and concludes that the trial judge erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict on this ground and in submitting the issue to the jury in the form of special questions. [4] We disagree. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Carr v. Arthur D. Little, Inc. 348 Mass. 469, 471 (1965). Stewart v. Roy Bros. Inc. 358 Mass. 446, 448 (1970). Industrial washed the club's windows from 1961 through 1966, always as a subcontractor of Consolidated, and was the person responsible for cleaning the windows at the time of the accident in 1966. Industrial had five or six window washers on its payroll, and its president hired only experienced washers who were union men. Industrial furnished its employees with all their window washing tools  safety belts, pails, sponges, squeegees, and ladders  and the plaintiff was using a bucket, squeegee, and belt supplied by Industrial on the day of the accident. There were no window washers on the club's payroll from at least 1963 up to the time of the accident, and the club owned no window washer's safety belts. The club had three shifts of its own employees to conduct the operation of the club at the time of the accident, which included two full time maintenance men for the usual carpentry, plumbing and electrical work, a painter, and maids and housemen. On occasion it was necessary for one of these employees to clean a window when the contract window cleaners were not there, but the club's manager had never seen one of its employees use a window washer's belt, and none of them participated in the window cleaning operation described in the club's contract with Consolidated. The contract between the club and Consolidated in effect at the time of the accident required that all windows on the first and second floors be washed on a monthly basis and all other windows in the building be washed semi-annually. The plaintiff was engaged in one such semi-annual washing at the time he fell. In the opinion of the club's manager, window washing was a very minor part of the overall operation of the club. We believe the jury could find on this evidence that the window washing done by Industrial on the club's premises, particularly during the semi-annual cleanings when the windows above the first and second floors were washed, was a dangerous task requiring specialized training and equipment and not a routine maintenance function as the club contends. They could also find that the club had neither the trained employees nor the necessary equipment but in fact had used Industrial to do the work for a substantial number of years prior to the accident. See Cannon v. Crowley, 318 Mass. 373, 376 (1945). Cf. McPadden v. W.J. Halloran Co. 338 Mass. 189, 192 (1958). There was clearly enough evidence to warrant the judge in submitting to the jury the question whether the window washing services performed by Consolidated and Industrial were part of or process in the club's business or merely ancillary and incidental ... [thereto]. Despite the club's argument to the contrary, we do not understand our cases to hold that as a matter of law maintenance activities such as window washing always constitute part or process of a mercantile enterprise. Indeed, Hill's Case, 268 Mass. 491, 492-493 (1929), and Dubois v. Soule Mill, 323 Mass. 472, 475-476 (1948), relied on by the club, appear to provide support for the contrary principle that the question whether a particular activity is a part of or process in another business is usually one of fact. To the club's contention that the window washing was a necessary and integral part of its operation as a quality organization offering quality services in a gracious atmosphere to a select clientele, we again observe that [i]t is manifest that it cannot properly be said that everything that is reasonably necessary to be done for the purpose of carrying on a trade or business is a part of or process in the trade or business within the meaning of § 18. Caton v. Winslow Bros. & Smith Co. 309 Mass. 150, 155 (1941). Hudyka v. Interstate Tire & Brake Stores, Inc. 360 Mass. 102, 104-105 (1971). We hold that there was no error in the denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict based on the defence of common employment.