Opinion ID: 215914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Testimony of Cardinale

Text: Cardinale was allowed to testify at trial that, after Cutolo's disappearance, she told Colombo associate Michael Spataro and others that she believed DeMartino had carried out the order to kill her father. DeRoss argued that this testimony should be excluded both on the ground that it was based solely on hearsay statements by Cardinale herself and on the ground that it would be unduly prejudicial, see Fed. R.Evid. 802, 403. On appeal, he pursues his Rule 403 objection, arguing that the government used Cardinale's belief to argue, in summation, that DeMartino had in fact carried out orders by Persico and DeRoss to kill Cutolo. We see no error in the admission of this testimony. Defendants were charged not only with murder in aid of racketeering, but also with tampering with, and conspiring to tamper with, the testimony of Cardinale, Peggy Cutolo, and Cutolo Jr. The government sought to prove that word of Cardinale's belief reached DeRoss, and that that was part of the impetus for DeRoss's threatening to harm Cardinale's family if she or Peggy or Cutolo Jr. made such statements to law enforcement officials, see Part II.B.2. below. The district court allowed the testimony on the ground that Cardinale's testimony as to her statements was nonhearsay under Fed.R.Evid. 801, as it was offered simply for the fact that she made these accusations and was admissible because [t]he rest of the testimony doesn't make any particular sense unless you have the chronology [of] how it occurred that Mr. DeRoss became aware of it (Tr. 280; see id. at 281). The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice. After Cardinale testified that she had told Spataro she thought DeMartino carried out the order to kill her father, the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction. The court instructed that [t]his evidence may not be considered as truth of the matter asserted. It is being used solely as background evidence, background information, and that the evidence, at th[at] point in time, was being admi[tted] only ... against ... DeRoss, and not Alphonse Persico. The statement can be considered against Alphonse Persico if and when the government establishes that a conspiracy existed. ( Id. at 307.) We see no error in the court's ruling or its handling of this evidence. Nor are we persuaded that undue prejudice was created thereafter through arguments by the government explain[ing] for the first time during summations (DeRoss brief on appeal at 57) the theory that DeMartino had actually performed the killing. There was an evidentiary basis for such a theory, even if it later turned out as learned after trialthat DeMartino was involved only in the planning of the murder and did not himself pull the trigger. There was evidence, discussed in Parts I.A. and C. above, that DeMartino harbored a grudge against Cutolo. And there was testimony from Floridia that DeMartino was inordinately happy that Cutolo was gone, stating that Cutolo had gotten what he deserved (Tr. 2297); documentary evidence that a month after Cutolo was murdered Persico paid DeMartino $50,000 ( see GX 59); and evidence that while DeMartino from the beginning had been feared, it was even more so after Cutolo's disappearance (Tr. 2299). In any event, what was important for the charges against Persico and DeRoss was proof that they had ordered and arranged the murder, not the identification of precisely which of the Colombo family members had carried out their instructions. And, as shown in Parts I.A., B., and C. above and discussed in Parts II.B.1, and II.C. below, evidence as to the former was abundant.
On appeal, defendants pursue arguments made in their Rule 29 motions for acquittal in the district court. DeRoss contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of murder in aid of racketeering. Both Persico and DeRoss contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions on the two witness tampering counts. We find no merit in any of their contentions. Under Rule 29, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a). The test for sufficiency is whether, as to a given count, a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir.2003) ( Jackson ). The district court must make that determination with the evidence against a particular defendant viewed in a light that is most favorable to the government, and with all reasonable inferences resolved in favor of the government. The jury may reach its verdict based upon inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence, and the evidence must be viewed in conjunction, not in isolation. United States v. Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 45 (2d Cir.2008) ( Eppolito ) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1027, 173 L.Ed.2d 313, ___ (2009). Our mandate on appeal reflects the same standard, as we review the grant or denial of a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 de novo,  id., considering the evidence as a whole rather than piecemeal, see, e.g., id.; United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir.1999), and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see, e.g., Eppolito, 543 F.3d at 45; United States v. Pizzonia, 577 F.3d 455, 462 (2d Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1088, 175 L.Ed.2d 889 (2010). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government means `crediting every inference that the jury might have drawn in favor of the government,' United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d [130,] 136-37 [(2006)] (quoting United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 333 (2d Cir.1999)), and recognizing that the government's evidence need not exclude every other possible hypothesis, see, e.g., United States v. Espaillet, 380 F.3d [713,] 718 [(2d Cir.2004)]; United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1043 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1001, 116 S.Ct. 545, 133 L.Ed.2d 448 (1995); United States v. Ragosta, 970 F.2d 1085, 1090 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1002, 113 S.Ct. 608, 121 L.Ed.2d 543 (1992). As it is the task of the jury, not the court, to choose among competing inferences that can be drawn from the evidence, United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d at 180, when there are such competing inferences, we must defer to the jury's choice, United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 49 (2d Cir.1998). Eppolito, 543 F.3d at 45. Where there are conflicts in the testimony, we must defer to the jury's resolution of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Cote, 544 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir.2008) ([t]he court must give full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility); United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d at 49; United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 828 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1162, 106 S.Ct. 2285, 90 L.Ed.2d 726 (1986). The conviction must be upheld if  any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). These standards apply whether the evidence being reviewed is direct or circumstantial. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). With these principles in mind, we turn to defendants' various sufficiency challenges.
Count One charged defendants with murder in aid of racketeering, or aiding and abetting such a murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(1) and 2. Section 2 provides, in pertinent part, that whoever aids, abets, ... commands, induces or procures the commission of a federal offense, or willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him would be a federal offense, is punishable as a principal. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) and (b). Section 1959(a) provides, in pertinent part, that [w]hoever, ... for the purpose of ... maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, murders ... any individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United States, or attempts or conspires so to do, shall be punished (1) for murder, by death or life imprisonment, or a fine under this title, or both.... 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1). To convict a defendant of such a murder, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the organization was a RICO enterprise, (2) that the enterprise was engaged in racketeering activity as defined in RICO, (3) that the defendant in question had a position in the enterprise, (4) that that defendant committed or aided and abetted the murder, and (5) that his general purpose in so doing was to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise. See generally United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 982, 120 S.Ct. 439, 145 L.Ed.2d 344 (1999); United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 856, 114 S.Ct. 163, 126 L.Ed.2d 124 (1993). Liability for aiding and abetting can be established by showing ... that the defendant `consciously assisted the commission of the specific crime in some active way.' United States v. Ogando, 547 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 45 (2d Cir.1994)). DeRoss challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as to the fourth element of the murder-in-aid-of-racketeering count, contending that there was no evidence that he aided, abetted, or committed any voluntary act to bring about the disappearance or murder of Cutolo. ( See DeRoss brief on appeal at 42.) This contention is meritless. As set out in detail in Parts I.A., B., and C. above, the evidence against DeRoss included the following: (1) DeRoss harbored anger at Cutolo resulting from their reversal of positions in the Colombo Family hierarchy, with DeRoss originally having been Cutolo's captain, and Cutolo becoming the family's underboss and superior to DeRoss in 1998; (2) in mid-April 1999, DeRoss asked Campanella, with seriousness, how Campanella would feel about killing Cutolo; (3) in mid-May 1999, DeRoss met with Floridia and, with seriousness, told him not to worry about his troubles with Cutolo because [t]hings are going to change; (4) on the afternoon of May 26, 1999, Cutolo disappeared; (5) at 5 a.m. on May 27, barely eight hours after Cutolo could be considered missing, DeRoss arrived at Cutolo's home demandingin tones implying that he had the right to themthe books and records maintained by Cutolo, who was above him in the Colombo Family hierarchy; (6) one week after Cutolo's disappearance, DeRoss, with Persico standing right behind him, told DiLeonardo, the Gambino Crime Family captain who was the liaison with the Colombo Family, that Cutolo had been missing for a week and that DiLeonardo would be dealing with Persico and DeRoss instead of Cutolo from then on, thereby informing DiLeonardo in Mafia-speak that Cutolo was dead; (7) two weeks after Cutolo's disappearance, DeRoss told Campanella that Cutolo was gone because he was getting too powerful; that if Persico went back to jail as expected, Bill would have took over the family and would have never gave the family back to Allie Boy; that, therefore, Bill had to go; (8) three weeks after Cutolo's disappearance, having unsuccessfully solicited Campanella's help in killing Cutolo, DeRoss, with Persico beside him, said Bill is gone and attempted to buy Campanella's allegiance and silence by canceling Campanella's $300,000 debt; (9) shortly after Cutolo disappeared, DeRoss became the Colombo Family's new underboss; and (10) in 2004, when DeRoss and Floridia were incarcerated and spending their days together in the Metropolitan Detention Center, DeRoss admitted his orchestration of Cutolo's murder, saying he brought Billy into the family.... [A]nd he took him out of the family. In sum, the evidence easily permitted the jury to find that DeRoss attempted to get Campanella to help kill Cutolo; that shortly before Cutolo disappeared, DeRoss reassured Floridia that Cutolo would soon be dead; that DeRoss knew Cutolo was dead on May 26, allowing DeRoss with impunity to invade Cutolo's home at 5 a.m. on May 27 demanding the Colombo Family books and records; that DeRoss told others that Cutolo was dead and said that Persico had needed to have Cutolo killed; and that when DeRoss was in jail with Floridia, DeRoss said he had killed Cutolo. The evidence was ample to permit the jury to find that DeRoss participated in the planning and orchestration of Cutolo's murder.
Counts Six and Five charged Persico and DeRoss with witness tampering and conspiracy to commit witness tampering, respectively, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(1) & (b)(2)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 371, in connection with DeRoss's meeting with Peggy Cutolo, Cardinale, and Cutolo Jr. to dissuade them from testifying to what they really believed had happened to Cutolo. Section 1512, as it read at the time of trial, made it unlawful, in pertinent part, to knowingly use[] intimidation or ... threaten[] ... another person, or attempt [] to do so, ... with intent to (1) influence ... or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding; [or] (2) cause or induce any person to (A) withhold testimony ... from an official proceeding.... 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(1) & (b)(2)(A) (2000). In order to establish a violation of § 1512, the government must prove a nexus between the defendant's conduct and a particular official proceeding. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707-08, 125 S.Ct. 2129, 161 L.Ed.2d 1008 (2005); see, e.g., United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir.2007) (persuader must believe that his actions are likely to affect a particular, existing or foreseeable proceeding); cf. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598-600, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995) (finding nexus element in 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which prohibits, inter alia, obstructing or influencing the due administration of justice, or endeavor[ing] to do so, corruptly or by threats or force). The official proceeding referred to in § 1512 need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e)(1) (2000), and the testimony ... need not be admissible in evidence, id. § 1512(e)(2) (2000). Persico and DeRoss contend that there was no evidence that DeRoss exerted pressure on Cutolo family members to lie or that he intended to interfere with any witness's testimony in an official proceeding. Persico also contends that there was insufficient evidence to show that he was involved in any of the conduct attributed to DeRoss. We are unpersuaded. In October 1999, Persico was arrested for violation of his bail conditions ( see Tr. 3946, 3949), and it is undisputed that [a]s early as October of '99 the government made it clear they were looking at Mr. Persico as a target of its investigation into Cutolo's disappearance ( id. at 3684, 3676-77 (testimony and statement of Persico's attorneys)). Thus, it was plainly foreseeable that there would be a grand jury proceeding at which Peggy Cutolo, Cardinale, and/or Cutolo Jr. might be called to testify. And indeed, it was foreseen, for in March 2000, DeRoss met with the Cutolos for a conversation (which Cutolo Jr. secretly tape-recorded) and told the Cutolos that the government may be trying to build a case against Persico (GX 67B at 7). Cardinale understood that they were talking about a future case against Allie for [her] father's disappearance. (Tr. 327-28.) In that conversation, it was clear that DeRoss was meeting with the Cutolos on behalf of Persico; DeRoss said he had come to tell them that the other fella would like to send an investigator to talk to them (GX 67B at 4), and he stated that the investigator is Allie's investigator ( id. at 6). When Peggy Cutolo expressed her reluctance, and Cutolo Jr. said he did not want his mother to have to reopen the emotional wounds, DeRoss indicated that Persico would not be happy if they refused to talk to the investigator. ( See GX 67B at 4 (if you tell the [investigator] no, people may get bad feelings); id. at 6 (I don't know how personally he'll react.); id. at 8 (I don't want him to get any idea.).) And after having secured a commitment that the Cutolos would speak with Persico's investigator, DeRoss said, I'll get back to him today. And uh, tell him you'll be too happy to help. That's my words to him. ( Id. at 15.) There can be no serious question that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to infer that DeRoss was speaking to the Cutolos on orders from Persico. In his attempts to persuade the Cutolos to speak to Persico's investigator, DeRoss also indicated that the Cutolos should not speak candidly in any government investigation. For example, when Cardinale envisioned to DeRoss the possibility that her mother might be overcome by emotion and let her true feelings come out, DeRoss's response was that there would be no harm if that happened only in the meeting with the investigator: the investigator is Allie's investigator, she's not the law.  (GX 67B at 6 (emphasis added).) Thus, when DeRoss told the Cutolos  Don't show your feelings. What you got in your heart, what you got in your stomach (GX 67B at 5 (emphasis added)), those instructions were easily understood by the Cutolos to mean that if they talk[ed] to the police about what [they] actually thought, that could hurt [Allie] (Tr. 326). In urging them to cooperate with Persico, DeRoss pointed out that he, DeRoss, was in a position to prevent Peggy Cutolo from getting hurt (GX 67B at 6; see Tr. 326-27)a statement that plainly implied to the Cutolos that he was also in a position to do precisely the opposite. And in addition to mentioning the possibility of harm to Peggy, DeRoss also pointed to that prospect for Cutolo Jr. ( see GX 67B at 5; Tr. 324-25), for Cardinale's husband ( see GX 67B at 5-6; Tr. 325-26), and for Cardinale's young daughters ( see GX 67B at 5 (You got little, you got kids here)). Worry about your family, he said ( id. at 8); You understand what I'm telling you babe? You've been, you've been around this life ( id. at 6). The Cutolos did understand. Peggy Cutolo testified that she knew that DeRoss was explicitly threatening her and her children and that he was telling her to [k]eep [her] mouth shut. (Tr. 632.) And Cardinale testified that she believed that if the Cutolos told anyone what we really felt, that it would be taken out on my husband or my brother, even my kids. ( Id. at 331.) In sum, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Persico had been informed by the government that he was the target of an investigation into the disappearance of Cutolo; that a grand jury proceeding on that matter was thus foreseeable to Persico and DeRoss; that Persico sent DeRoss to visit the Cutolos; that DeRoss told the Cutolos that the government might be trying to build a case against Persico; that DeRoss told the Cutolos not to tell anyone acting for the government what they really believed had happened to Cutolo; and that DeRoss threatened harm to Peggy Cutolo, Cutolo Jr., Cardinale, Cardinale's husband, and their young daughters if the Cutolos spoke candidly to anyone conducting an official investigation. While DeRoss did from time to time utter the words [t]ell the truth ( e.g., GX 67B at 11), his other recorded statements and the testimony of Peggy Cutolo and Cardinale provided sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the Cutolos reasonably understood DeRoss to mean that, insofar as any government inquiry was concerned, they should not tell the truth.
Persico and DeRoss pursue their contention that they are entitled to a new trial based on the government's posttrial discovery of Cutolo's buried body, and its new information that DeMartino, while involved in planning Cutolo's murder, was not the actual shooter. Persico argues that the government's case against him was weak, shored up only by the summation theory that Vincent `Chickie' DeMartino had killed Cutolo at Persico's behest and dumped Cutolo's body in the ocean. (Persico brief on appeal at 24; see id. at 25-26.) DeRoss argues that [h]ad the jury been informed that DeMartino was not the shooter and that the evidence demonstrated the involvement of three other individuals from another Colombo crew, the jury would have certainly acquitted DeRoss because the government's entire theory was that DeRoss carried out the order by directing DeMartino to murder Cutolo. (DeRoss brief on appeal at 38.) We reject all of defendants' contentions. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow the district court, upon the defendant's motion, to grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a). Our standard for the grant of such a motion requires that (1) the evidence be newly discovered after trial; (2) facts are alleged from which the court can infer due diligence on the part of the movant to obtain the evidence; (3) the evidence is material; (4) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (5) the evidence would likely result in an acquittal. United States v. Owen, 500 F.3d 83, 87-88 (2d Cir.2007) ( Owen ), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1237, 128 S.Ct. 1459, 170 L.Ed.2d 287 (2008). The `ultimate test' is `whether letting a guilty verdict stand would be a manifest injustice.... There must be a real concern that an innocent person may have been convicted.' United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331, 349 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.2001)). The motion is not favored, United States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946, 102 S.Ct. 2014, 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982), and the denial of such a motion will not be reversed except for abuse of discretion, see, e.g., United States v. Mayo, 14 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Siddiqi, 959 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 872, 111 S.Ct. 196, 112 L.Ed.2d 158 (1990). The district court denied defendants' discovery-of-the-body new-trial motions principally on the ground that they failed to establish the third and fifth requirements of the Owen standard, i.e., that the new evidence be material and that it be likely to result in an acquittal. The court noted that the government had not contended that either Persico or DeRoss actually pulled the trigger or that either was even present at Cutolo's murder, and it saw no contradiction between the government's theory of the murder, i.e., that Persico and DeRoss ordered and arranged for others to execute Cutolo, and the discovery of Cutolo's body, which the coroner had determined evidenced a homicide. See District Court 2008 Order at 25. As the court stated in denying defendants' motions for reconsideration, the shooter's identity and the burial site location are relevant, but neither are exculpatory, nor do they serve to impeach the credibility of any of the government's key witnesses. Memorandum and Order dated February 17, 2009, at 6. We agree. Although Persico and DeRoss argue that the discovery of Cutolo's body undercut the government's entire theory at trial ( e.g., DeRoss brief on appeal at 38), that discovery in fact undercut only the theory advanced in summations as to how Cutolo's dead body had been concealed. Nothing about the discovery of the body undercuts the government's contention that the murder was ordered and arranged by Persico and DeRoss. Persico, although not challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict against him on the murder count, contends that the discovery of Cutolo's body warranted the granting of his motion for a new trial because the government's case against him was unpersuasive without the suggestion that he had called the marina to arrange for Cutolo's burial at sea. Persico argues that the case against him was stitched together and quite thin, prov[ing] little more than that he may have learned that Cutolo was dead and apparently was not saddened by the news. (Persico brief on appeal at 20-21.) Persico's characterizations do not do justice to the record. As described in Parts I.A., B., and C. above, the record included evidence that: (1) in the Colombo Family war centering on whether the new boss would be Orena or Persico, in which a dozen people were killed, Cutolo had supported Orena; (2) Persico was aware in 1999 that Cutolo himself wanted to become the family's bossand might try to kill Persico to achieve that goalgiving Persico motive to kill Cutolo; (3) Persico needed to have Cutolo killed because Persico was about to go to jail on the gun charge and Cutolo had gotten so powerful that he would have taken, and refused to yield, control of the family; (4) Cutolo expected to meet Persico on May 26 at 92nd and Shore, but Persico never showed up; (5) Cutolo disappeared from 92nd and Shore on May and was killed; (6) after May 26, Persico never tried to reach Cutolo again; (7) an underboss cannot be killed without permission from the family's boss; (8) after underboss Cutolo's disappearance, Persico launched no investigation in search of an explanation; (9) Persico was present for and silently endorsed DeRoss's statements to DiLeonardo and Campanella shortly after May 26 indicating that Cutolo had been killed; and (10) Persico himself told the boss and underboss of the Bonanno Crime Family that Cutolo was gone because he had tried to take what [wa]s not his, i.e., control of the Colombo Crime Family. In sum, there was solid evidence, taken as a whole, that Persico had a strong motive to have Cutolo killed; that Persico made or endorsed statements telling important members of other crime families that Cutolo had been killed; and that Persico lured Cutolo to a secluded location from which he could be kidnaped to be killed. In light of this evidence and the evidence against DeRoss discussed in Part II.B.1. above, we see no likelihood that innocent men have been convicted, no injustice in the guilty verdicts, and no error or abuse of discretion in the district court's conclusion that the discovery of Cutolo's body did not warrant the granting of a new trial.
In support of their arguments for a new trial, Persico and DeRoss advance other contentions that do not require extended discussion. Principally, they contend that the government violated its Brady obligations, and that they were denied the right to compulsory process by the high cost of producing a witness they wished to have testify for the defense.
At trial, Cardinale testified on cross-examination that after her father's disappearance, her mother found [a] little over a million dollars hidden in the vents of their home and that that money was not turned over to the government. (Tr. 410.) Peggy Cutolo testified that she had found $1.65 million, that she had disclosed that fact to the government, and that the government had not required her to forfeit the money or to pay taxes on it. ( See id. at 624, 696-98.) Defendants contend that the government violated its Brady obligation to disclose this impeachment evidence because it made no formal disclosure of these facts until after trial. (Persico brief on appeal at 44.) They contend that without a formal disclosure, they had every reason to believe that [Peggy's] testimony was falseand that the corroborative testimony of an FBI agent was also false ( id. )and hence they were deprived of the opportunity to argue to the jury that the government's allowing Peggy to keep $1.65 million made all of her testimony unworthy of belief. It is well established that the government has an obligation under the Due Process Clause to disclose to the defendant evidence that is material. See, e.g., Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Evidence is material, however, only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). These principles apply both to information going to the heart of the defendant's guilt or innocence and to information that might well alter the jury's evaluation of the credibility of a significant prosecution witness. See, e.g., Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763; Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). However, where the undisclosed evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on which to challenge a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable or is subject to extensive attack by reason of other evidence, the undisclosed evidence may properly be viewed as cumulative, and hence not material, and not worthy of a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 257, reh'g denied, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir.1998); United States v. Helmsley, 985 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.1987). In sum, undisclosed impeachment evidence is not material in the Brady sense when, although possibly useful to the defense, it is not likely to have changed the verdict. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court, in rejecting defendants' posttrial motions for a new trial on the ground of the alleged Brady violation, found, inter alia, that, for several reasons, the timing of the disclosure did not cause defendants any prejudice. The court noted that the facts were disclosed on the fourth day of a trial that continued for some six or seven weeks thereafter, and it concluded that the Defendants had more than ample time to assimilate the evidence and to effectively use it at trial. District Court 2008 Order at 40. We agree. Cardinale was the second of the government's 31 trial witnesses (the first being the mechanic who left Cutolo at 92nd and Shore on May 26); Cardinale's revelations as to the large sum of money found and retained came during her cross-examination by the defense. The third witness at trial was Peggy Cutolo, who had actually found and been allowed to keep the money. The government brought out during its direct examination of Peggy that she had found $1.65 million, that she had disclosed that fact to the government, and that she had been allowed to keep the money. ( See Tr. 624.) Thus, the government affirmatively elicited from Peggy the information that defendants wish they had used in arguments attacking her credibility. As the district court noted, the relevant testimony was given early in the trial. After that point, it cannot be said that the Brady material was undisclosed; and the defense had another six weeks to use it. Defendants' complaint that there was no formal disclosure until after the trial provides no basis for a new trial. Later in the trial, FBI Special Agent Gary J. Pontecorvo was called as a witness for the defense; he testified that the Cutolos had advised him in early 2001 that they were in possession of some $1.6 million in cash, which Pontecorvo assumed had been amassed from Cutolo's illegal activities. ( See id. at 5292-94.) Pontecorvo testified that, after being so advised, he promptly informed the United States Attorney's Office (USAO); thereafter Peggy Cutolo or her attorney dealt directly with the USAO with regard to those funds, to determine whether some or all had to be forfeited or whether she would have to pay taxes on it ( see id. at 5294-96). Although defendants argue here that [t]hroughout the trial, the defense labored under the misimpression that Mrs. Cutolo and Agent Pontecorvo were testifying falsely (Persico brief on appeal at 45), they made that assumption at their peril. Nothing in the Constitution gives defendants the right to assume that the government has deliberately elicited or countenanced false testimony and then to seek a new trial on the basis that they did not know the testimony was true. The district court also concluded that the evidence that Peggy Cutolo was allowed to keep the $1.65 million was immaterial, given that defendants possessed and usedother grounds to attack her credibility. Those grounds included Peggy's manifest antipathy toward Persico and DeRoss because she believed they had ordered her husband's death, and her internally inconsistent testimony as to precisely where she found the money. Indeed, while Persico argues that belated disclosure of the information that Peggy found and was allowed to keep $1.65 million significantly impaired defense counsel's ability to impeach the credibility of the key prosecution witness (Persico brief on appeal at 48), he also acknowledges that even without impeachment on the basis of the retained money, Mrs. Cutolo was anything but a credible witness. As the trial court noted, her testimony varied `from one day to the next ... on very critical things' ( id. at 23 (quoting Tr. 5488)). The district court further noted that the testimony of Peggy Cutolo and Cardinale was only a small portion of the evidence that led to Defendants' convictions, and it concluded that the evidence as to the money Peggy found and was allowed to keep most certainly would not have damaged the credibility of the virtual parade of other witnesses that testified against the Defendants, nor invalidated the circumstantial evidence on which the jury most certainly relied. District Court 2008 Order at 40-41. The court concluded that there was virtually no probability that disclosure of this information at an earlier time would have changed the outcome of this case. Id. at 40. Our review of the record persuades us that the conclusions of the district court were correct and that defendants' contentions that they should be granted a new trial on account of the alleged Brady violation were properly rejected.
After Vitale testified that Persico told him and Massino, in discussing Cutolo in the latter part of 1999, that a person can't take what's not his (Tr. 2866), thereby informing them that Cutolo had been killed because of his desire to usurp Persico's position as boss of the Colombo Family, Persico informed the government that he wished to call Massino as a witness. Massino was then in the Witness Security Program, and Persico was informed that the cost of transporting Massinowhich Persico was expected to paywould be some $40,000 ( see Persico brief on appeal at 48). In light of the expense, Persico's counsel suggested that she be allowed to question Massino by video conferencing, a suggestion that the government rejected for reasons of security; after objecting that the expense was prohibitive, Persico decided not to call Massino. ( See Tr. 3739, 3915-16, 4281.) On appeal, Persico, joined by DeRoss, contends that the requirement that Persico pay an exorbitant price to bring a witness to court (a price he declined to pay) unduly burdened his compulsory process rights. (Persico brief on appeal at 48.) Given the present record, we disagree. A defendant in a criminal trial has a Sixth Amendment right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. U.S. Const, amend. VI. To establish a violation of that right, the defendant must demonstrate that he was deprived of the opportunity to present a witness who would have provided testimony that was `both material and favorable to his defense.' Howard v. Walker, 406 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982)). To meet this standard, the defendant need not render a detailed description of [the] lost testimony, Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 873, 102 S.Ct. 3440; but he must make a plausible showing that the testimony would have been material and favorable, id. In addition, he must show that `there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact.' United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 831 (2d Cir.1985) (quoting Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 874, 102 S.Ct. 3440). Generally, financially able criminal defendants must bear the cost of bringing their own witnesses to the trial. United States v. Garmany, 762 F.2d 929, 934 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1062, 106 S.Ct. 811, 88 L.Ed.2d 785 (1986). However, a defendant can have the government bear the cost if he persuades the court that he is unable to pay and shows the necessity of the witness's presence for an adequate defense. Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(b). Nothing in the present case supports the contention that these defendants were deprived of the right to compulsory process. First, the reason the cost of having Massino brought to the trial was so high was that Persico waited until late in the trial to inform the government that he wanted to call Massino as a witness. Defendants had been notified in mid-October 2007weeks before the trial beganthat Vitale would be called as a government witness and would testify to a conversation in which `Persico advised [him] that Persico had killed Cutolo because Cutolo had attempted to take over the crime family from Persico' (Persico brief on appeal at 48-49 (quoting a government memorandum to the district court dated October 19, 2007)). The government, by letter dated October 17, 2007, had asked that Persico inform the government by October 26, 2007 of any cooperating witnesses the defense may call, pointing out that the United States Marshal Service requires significant advance notice for production of such witnesses. Persico did not inform the government of his desire to call Massino until more than six weeks later, on November 30. The district court noted that the high cost of bringing Massino to the trial involved first-class air travel for Massino and four or five marshals because there was no advance notice. (Tr. 3916.) Second, at no point has Persico suggested that he lacked the ability to pay the cost of bringing Massino to the trial. Had Persico been unable to pay, he could have applied to the district court for relief under Rule 17(b); he did not. Finally, Persico has not made any showing that Massino's testimony would have been material or favorable to his defense. He supposes that because the government itself did not call Massino to testify, Massino likely did not recall the Persico conversation, described by Vitale, indicating that Persico had had Cutolo killed; and he argues that Massino's testimony that he had no such recollection would have gone far to demonstrate that no such conversation had occurred (Persico brief on appeal at 54). This argument piles speculation upon supposition and falls far short of providing a basis for a new trial.