Opinion ID: 2352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Mandate

Text: With respect to Crape's first argument, we review the district court's compliance with our mandate in a previous appeal de novo. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir.2007). [2] The law of our circuit concerning the obligations of a district court to follow our mandates is settled. Litman v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.1987). With exceptions that are not relevant here, our rule is that an appellate decision is binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case. Id. at 1510. [3] Nevertheless, our mandates do[ ] not bar consideration of matters that could have been, but were not, resolved in earlier proceedings. Luckey v. Miller, 929 F.2d 618, 621 (11th Cir.1991). On this score, [a] mandate may be vague or precise depending on the issues raised on appeal, and [d]etermining the scope of a mandate can present problems [of] interpretation. Litman, 825 F.2d at 1511. In determining the scope of our previous mandate, we must therefore determine the scope of the issues considered in that appeal. In Crape's first appeal, he unequivocally argued that § 4243(g) required the district court to find he had departed from his prescribed regimen of treatment. But although our decision suggested his point had been concede[d], 314 Fed.Appx. at 200, the Government's brief had not addressed the issue at all. [4] Moreover, our decision framed the issue as whether the district court [had] failed to apply the proper legal standard under § 4243(g), id. at 200, and Crape had correctly argued that the standard applied by the district court was unclear. For example, the court had not made an explicit finding that Crape's continued release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(g). After noting that we ha[d] not had occasion to address the conditional release standard of § 4243(g), [5] we instructed the district court merely by repeating the statute's operative language. 314 Fed.Appx. at 200-01. Consequently, if the statute allowed the district court to revoke Crape's conditional discharge without considering his compliance with his medical regimen, then so did our mandate in his previous appeal.