Opinion ID: 1247623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The State Bar, for the Purpose of Expenditure of Dues, Is Analogous to a Governmental Agency.

Text: The issue we face today came before the United States Supreme Court in Lathrop v. Donohue (1961) 367 U.S. 820 [6 L.Ed.2d 1191, 81 S.Ct. 1826]. Plaintiffs in that case challenged the constitutionality of the Wisconsin integrated bar. Relying on case upholding the constitutionality of legislation authorizing the union shop ( Machinists v. Street (1961) 367 U.S. 740 [6 L.Ed.2d 1141, 1165, 81 S.Ct. 1784]; Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson (1956) 351 U.S. 225 [100 L.Ed. 1112, 76 S.Ct. 714]), all justices agreed that compulsory membership in the bar was constitutional. (See Levine v. Heffernan (7th Cir.1988) 864 F.2d 457.) Justice Brennan, writing for four justices, declined to reach questions concerning the use of mandatory dues because the plaintiffs had not objected to any specific expenditure. The remaining five justices agreed that the issue of use of dues was properly before the court, but disagreed on the result. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Frankfurter, treated the bar association as analogous to a governmental agency and dues as analogous to license fees, and found no constitutional infirmity in the use of dues for authorized purposes. (See Lathrop, supra, 367 U.S. at pp. 864-865 [6 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1217-1218].) The member, he points out, is not required affirmatively to profess or assent to any belief, and the bar, in its lobbying activities, did not claim to present the views of all of its members. (See id. at pp. 860-861 [6 L.Ed.2d at p. 1215].) Justice Whittaker asserted briefly that practicing law was a special privilege, which could be conditioned on payment of bar dues. Justices Douglas and Black dissented, referring to their opinions in Machinists v. Street, supra, 367 U.S. 740, where they said that the use of union dues to finance political activities violated the members' First Amendment rights. Thus as pointed out in a subsequent case, all Lathrop decided was that the constitutional issues concerning use of bar dues should be decided; it did not decide those issues. ( Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) 431 U.S. 209, 233, fn. 29 [52 L.Ed.2d 261, 233, 97 S.Ct. 1782].) Consequently the treatment of bar dues remains an unsettled question. We recognize certain similarities between the bar and a labor union which would support imposing upon the bar those restrictions which limit union expenditures. The bar is an association composed of members of a particular profession. It is governed by a board, the majority of whom are elected by the members. It holds annual meetings. Although much of its activity is done to promote the public interest, it also regularly acts on behalf of the special interest of its members. The California Constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions, however, appear to envision the bar as a governmental agency. The State Bar Act of 1927, codified in sections 6000-6087, provides in section 6001 that [t]he State Bar of California is a public corporation. This declaration attained constitutional status with the enactment in 1966 of article VI, section 9 of the state Constitution, which asserts that [t]he State Bar of California is a public corporation. Every person admitted and licensed to practice law in this State is and shall be a member of the State Bar except while holding office as a judge of a court of record. (3) What is a public corporation? When the State Bar Act was enacted in 1927, this term was defined by a statute, since repealed: a public corporation is one formed or organized for the government of a portion of the state. (Former Civ. Code, § 284.) Construing that statute, a 1917 decision said that [p]ublic corporations ... are those corporations formed for political and governmental purposes and vested with political and governmental powers. ( Bettencourt v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1917) 175 Cal. 559, 561 [166 P. 323].) In State Bar of California v. Superior Court (1929) 207 Cal. 323 [278 P. 432], it was contended that the State Bar could not be a public corporation because it was not created to govern a portion of the state, and that the State Bar Act was thus an unconstitutional attempt to create a private corporation. [7] The court responded that the statute defining a public corporation could not limit the Legislature from enacting subsequent statutes creating public corporations for purposes other than the government of a portion of the state. It added that the Legislature has frequently created public corporations which did not have the function of governing a portion of the state, citing examples of reclamation districts, levee districts, and irrigation districts. [8] It was further argued in State Bar of California v. Superior Court, supra, 207 Cal. 323 that the State Bar must be considered a private corporation in view of its membership, functions, purpose, and its independence from public regulation and control. The court responded that the regulation of the practice of law is within the police power of the state  a close issue in 1929, but not today  and referred to legislative and judicial regulation as sufficient to classify the bar as a public corporation. (1b) This decision does not answer the question whether a public corporation is necessarily a governmental agency. But it is significant that all other public corporations in California  water districts, school districts, reclamation districts, etc.  are clearly considered governmental entities. Conversely, no labor union or professional association is classified as a public corporation. Apart from its denomination as a public corporation, other aspects of the bar show its governmental nature. The Board of Governors includes six public members appointed by the Governor, who are not members of the bar. (§ 6013.5.) The presence of consumer representatives on state regulatory boards is a common phenomenon, but no law permits the Governor to appoint nonmembers as officers of a labor union or private association. Section 6008 declares that [a]ll property of the State Bar is hereby declared to be held for essential public and governmental purposes and is exempt from taxation. Section 6026.5 requires public meetings; a similar requirement applies to governmental regulatory boards but not to unions or private associations. Section 6001, subdivision (g) states that [n]o law of this State restricting, or prescribing a mode of procedure for the exercise of powers of state public bodies or state agencies ... shall be applicable to the State Bar, unless the Legislature expressly so declares  an unnecessary enactment unless laws governing the exercise of powers of state public bodies or state agencies would otherwise apply to the bar. In Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Superior Court (1960) 54 Cal.2d 548 [7 Cal. Rptr. 109, 354 P.2d 637] we said that this last provision demonstrates [t]hat the Legislature considered the State Bar as at least akin to a state public body or agency (p. 565), and held that officers of the bar could claim the confidential communication privilege given public officers under former Code of Civil Procedure section 1881. [9] A later decision, Engel v. McClosky (1979) 92 Cal. App.3d 870 [155 Cal. Rptr. 284], applied the tort claims act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) to the State Bar. [10] A recent amendment to section 6031 further indicates that the Legislature views the bar as a governmental agency. Subdivision (b), added by the amendment, provides that the board [of governors] shall not conduct or participate in, or authorize any committee, agency, employee, or commission of the State Bar to conduct or participate in any evaluation, review, or report on the qualifications, integrity, diligence, or judicial ability of any specific justice [of an appellate court] ... without prior review and statutory authorization by the Legislature. If the State Bar is considered a private association, the constitutionality of this statute is suspect. It is a content-defined prohibition of a particular form of political speech by a named organization, imposed, apparently, because the Legislature objected to bar attempts to influence the voters. It would be difficult to justify a prohibition on political speech by a private association, especially one enacted because the speaker is thought too knowledgeable and influential with the voters. If the bar is thought of as a governmental agency, on the other hand, section 6031, subdivision (b), merely defines the scope of authority of the agency, and raises no constitutional question. (4a) As we noted earlier, the Court of Appeal divided the State Bar's function into two parts. It held that in regulating the admission of members to the bar, and disciplining current members, the bar performed a governmental function, but in all other activities it was analogous to a private association. We reject this holding on two grounds. The first is simply that the reason we view the bar as analogous to a governmental agency is not only that it performs a governmental function, but that the state Constitution, statutes, and court decisions treat it as a governmental agency. Those enactments and decisions do not differentiate according to the specific activity performed by the bar. Thus the bar is a public corporation, whether it is disciplining members or filing amicus curiae briefs; it is exempt from taxation and immune from tort liability both when examining applicants for admission and when lobbying the Legislature. Its statute under the California Constitution, its structure, and its government are the same for all its functions. We conclude that however classified, it must be regarded as a single entity. Second, the Court of Appeal's dichotomy, viewing lobbying and amicus curiae activity as that of a private association, would frustrate the legislative purpose underlying the bar's authority to promote the administration of justice. Under the Court of Appeal's view, whenever the bar proposed to advise the Legislature or the courts of its views on a matter, it would first have to engage in the three-step analysis set out in Ellis v. Railway Clerks (1984) 466 U.S. 435 [80 L.Ed.2d 428, 104 S.Ct. 1883]. The bar must first determine whether the activity is germane to the purpose for which the bar has compulsory membership. Next, if the activity is germane, it must decide whether it inflicts an infringement of the dissenters' First Amendment rights beyond that inflicted by compulsory membership alone. Finally, if there is an infringement of First Amendment rights, it must determine whether there is a state interest sufficient to justify that infringement. [11] Such a procedure would be an extraordinary burden. Hundreds of bills come before each legislative session; cases affecting the administration of justice arise frequently. Bar action, to be effective, must take place before the legislative session ends or the case is submitted. (5) (See fn. 12.), (4b) The bar has neither time nor money to undertake a bill-by-bill, case-by-case Ellis analysis, nor can it accept the risk of litigation every time it decides to lobby a bill or brief a case. [12] Thus the likely result of the Court of Appeal's approach would be to deter the bar from conducting any lobbying or filing any amicus curiae briefs. If those activities promote the administration of justice by providing the Legislature and the courts with expert legal assistance, as we believe, an approach which would deter all lobbying and amicus curiae activity would frustrate the state interest underlying the establishment of an integrated bar. (1c) Furthermore, the one area where the Legislature has indicated displeasure with the bar's activity concerns election campaigning. Yet if the bar is viewed as a private association, it would have a constitutional right to participate fully in political campaigns. (See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, supra, 431 U.S. 209, 235-236 [52 L.Ed.2d 261, 284-285]; cf. Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 424 U.S. 1 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, 96 S.Ct. 612].) No explicit authorization would be necessary; any prohibition on such activity, such as section 6031, subdivision (b), would be unconstitutional. [13] Again, such a result would seem inconsistent with legislative intent. We recognize that most of the cases from other jurisdictions which have addressed the subject of integrated bar dues have applied the labor union analogy to the bar. ( Gibson v. The Florida Bar (11th Cir.1986) 798 F.2d 1564; Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico (D.P.R. 1983) 565 F. Supp. 963, revd. in part in Romany v. Cologio de Abogados de P.R. (1st Cir.1984) 742 F.2d 32, on remand Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico (D.P.R. 1988) 682 F. Supp. 674; Arrow v. Dow (D.N.M. 1982) 544 F. Supp. 458 [N.M. Bar]; The Florida Bar v. Kennedy (Fla. 1983) 439 So.2d 213; Falk I, supra, 305 N.W.2d 201; Falk II, supra, 342 N.W.2d 504; Reynolds v. State Bar of Montana (Mont. 1983) 660 P.2d 581 [40 A.L.R.4th 669].) [14] None of the bar associations involved in those cases, however, rest upon a constitutional and statutory structure comparable to that of the California State Bar. None involves an extensive degree of legislative involvement and regulation. Consequently, while we are uncertain whether the courts have correctly described the bar associations at issue in the cited cases [15] we remain confident that the California State Bar is best described as analogous to a governmental agency. [16]