Opinion ID: 1961817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the Act of May 10, 1927, as amended, pertaining to the division of entireties property after divorce, applicable to a partial interest in real estate?

Text: The act in question, 68 P.S. § 501, [2] in pertinent part reads: Whenever any husband and wife, hereafter acquiring property as tenants by entireties, shall be divorced, they shall thereafter hold such property as tenants in common of equal one-half shares in value and either of them may bring suit in the Court of Common Pleas, sitting in equity, of the county where the property is situate, against the other to have the property sold and the proceeds divided between them. Appellant contends that the act was to apply only to fee simple interests in real estate and not to an undivided interest of 40%. She goes on to argue that if applied to a partial interest then the statute is unconstitutional as it treats divorced parties differently than other tenants in common. The Act provides that a tenancy by the entireties is converted, upon divorce, into a tenancy in common. Either party may then seek to partition the property. In this respect, the Act is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. Lykiardopoulos v. Lykiardopoulos, 453 Pa. 290, 294, 309 A.2d 548 (1973); Barale v. Barale, 282 Pa.Superior Ct. 213, 422 A.2d 1082 (1980). We must first define property within the meaning of the Act. We are assisted by the Supreme Court's decision in Blumner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 362 Pa. 7, 66 A.2d 245 (1949). There the court held that partition under the Act pertained to all property, whether real, personal or a chose in action. In reaching such conclusion the court held that the appellant's contention, that the Act only applies when the spouses have taken the entire title would be adding the word real to the word property in the statute. 362 Pa. at 11, 66 A.2d 245. To quote the court: The thing to be partitioned is the thing acquired by the spouses . . . . Id. Applying such reasoning to the facts at hand, the thing to be partitioned under the Act was the property acquired, which was a 40% undivided interest in the tract, not the entire tract. In Blumner, the parties had acquired an agreement to purchase realty vesting them with the equitable title but not the legal title to the realty. Such interest was held partitionable. Relying on the above reasoning, we hold that an undivided 40% interest is likewise subject to partition. We find support for this proposition from other cases dealing with the Act. The Act of May 10, 1927 provides a complete procedure to be followed (except for claims preserved under the Divorce Code of 1980) when parties who have been divorced, partition property formerly held as tenants by the entireties. Lykiardopoulos, 453 Pa. at 293, 309 A.2d 548. Looking at the Act, it provides only for a husband or wife to bring an action against his or her spouse; and not against third parties. In Reeping v. Reeping, 277 Pa.Superior Ct. 269, 419 A.2d 766 (1980), this court in a Per Curiam Opinion (Judge Spaeth filed a Concurring Opinion) found that a third party could not be joined in such action under Rule 1031 Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. [3] Judge Spaeth, concurring, wrote that whether governed by the Act or as a result of one party's appropriation, a third party could not be a proper party to such partition action. In the context of the present case, we agree. Appellant then contends the Act is unconstitutional since it treats divorce tenants in common differently from other tenants in common. When the Act was first enacted in 1925, it was applicable to estates by the entireties then existing, including estates formed prior to the enactment. This retrospective portion of the Act was found to be constitutionally invalid. In 1927, the Legislature re-enacted the Act of 1925 omitting such provision. The Act of 1925 was however held to be valid as to real estate acquired after the date of enactment, by husband and wife, as tenants by the entireties. See Christner v. Christner, 366 Pa. 41, 76 A.2d 361 (1950). While appellant's constitutional attack differs from that in Christner, it nonetheless must fail, as it is without a logical and legal foundation. The Act is, as previously noted, in derogation of the common law, Lykiardopoulos. Without the Act, there is no right to partition; upon divorce the parties interests but for the Act would remain unchanged, as tenants by the entireties. Mertz v. Mertz, 139 Pa.Superior Ct. 299, 302, 11 A.2d 514 (1939). Nonetheless, appellant argues that the distinction between tenancies in common resulting from divorce and those that are created otherwise is improper. The Legislature may accord to persons placed into different classes, different treatment so long as the basis for the different treatment is related to the objective of the statute. Such classification must be reasonable and rest on a distinction having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374-75, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1169, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974). The Act's purpose is to provide for a ready, uncomplicated method for achieving some sense of economic justice upon dissolution of a marriage. We find the Act is a reasonable method for achieving such purpose.