Opinion ID: 2365094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of New Jersey Death Penalty Statute

Text: Defendant and amici curiae, the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey, the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, and New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium, seek reconsideration of the constitutionality of the New Jersey Death Penalty Statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c, under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution. The asserted bases for reconsideration are that the death penalty is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency, is administered in an inconsistent and unreliable manner, and does not rationally further any legitimate penological objective. We have upheld the constitutionality of New Jersey's death penalty statute in each and every year since we last examined the issue in 1987 in Ramseur. See, e.g., Koskovich, supra, 168 N.J. at 541, 776 A. 2d 144 (citing in 2001 to Ramseur and holding that death penalty statute does not violate either federal or state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment); Simon, supra, 161 N.J. at 483-84, 737 A. 2d 1 (reaffirming in 1999 Ramseur and prior decisions upholding constitutionality of death penalty statute); Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 379, 700 A. 2d 306 (reaffirming in 1997 Ramseur and prior decisions); Harris, supra, 141 N.J. at 574, 662 A. 2d 333 (affirming in 1995 Ramseur ); Martini, supra, 131 N.J. at 221-22, 619 A. 2d 1208 (same in 1993); Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 486, 585 A. 2d 864 (rejecting in 1991 as unjustified defendant's request that Court depart from prior rulings on death penalty); Pitts, supra, 116 N.J. at 597-98, 562 A. 2d 1320 (reaffirming Ramseur in 1989). Nothing submitted in this appeal warrants departure from that uninterrupted chain of decisional law. That said, we add the following. In assessing whether a form of punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, we must consider whether the punishment conforms with contemporary standards of decency. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 169, 524 A. 2d 188. Community standards of decency and morality are not static. However, the constitutional test for cruel and unusual punishment must rest on objective and reliable data reflecting the evolving standards of the community. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2926, 49 L.Ed. 2d 859, 876 (1976). The United States Supreme Court has stated, as have we, that the `clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.' Atkins v. Virginia, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2247, 153 L.Ed. 2d 335, ___ (2002) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2953, 106 L.Ed. 2d 256, 286 (1989)); Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 172, 524 A. 2d 188 (finding legislative action to be strong, objective evidence of contemporary moral standards). We continue to adhere to that view and note the Court's recent reaffirmation in Atkins of legislative action as the most reliable indicator of evolving standards of decency. Atkins, supra, ___ U.S. at ___ - ___, ___, 122 S.Ct. at 2247-48, 2252, 153 L.Ed. 2d at ___ - ___, ___ (cataloguing states with statutes prohibiting imposition of death penalty on mentally retarded defendants to conclude that test for evolving standards of decency would be violated by imposing death penalty on such individuals). Unless rebutted by other similarly reliable evidence of community standards, we give deference to the Legislature's understanding of the moral values of our State's citizens. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 172, 524 A. 2d 188. Since our Legislature's enactment of a death penalty statute, we are unaware of any substantial effort within the Legislature to rescind or retrench from its support for the death penalty. Indeed, at times when the Legislature has disagreed with this Court's decisions, perceiving them as curbing or infringing on the death penalty statute's application, the Legislature has reacted with clarifying legislation and even a constitutional amendment to reassert the Act's vitality. See L. 1993, c. 111 (responding to Gerald, supra, and amending Article I, Section 12 of New Jersey Constitution by popular vote to provide that [i]t shall not be cruel and unusual punishment to impose the death penalty on a person convicted of purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury resulting in death who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct); L. 1992, c. 5 (amending N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e). The Legislature's continued support for the death penalty is strong evidence of the community's moral judgment approving the availability of that penalty. Moreover, thirty-eight other states have death penalty legislation; thirty-seven did when Ramseur was decided. State By State Death Penalty Information: States with the Death Penalty, http:www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/firstpage.html (last visited July 3, 2002); Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 173, 524 A. 2d 188. That, too, supplies objective evidence in support of the view that the death penalty does not offend current standards of decency. The moratoriums imposed by the governor in two of those thirty-eight states because of concern about the reliability of such sentences imposed in those states does not, in our view, affect the conclusion that contemporary community standards are not offended by the availability of a death sentence in appropriate cases. In Ramseur, we acknowledged that the actions of juries also can be a form of reliable evidence of the community's standards of decency. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 173, 524 A. 2d 188 (stating that because actions of jurors constitute a true reflection of society's morality, jury verdicts constitute another form of objective and reliable evidence to assess contemporary standards of decency). Examination of data compiled by our Administrative Office of the Courts concerning capital prosecutions over the last ten years indicates that from 1992 to Fall 2001 there have been sixty-nine capital trials. In those trials, juries have found the necessary aggravating factors that outweighed the mitigating factors and that resulted in twenty-two sentences of death. We recognize that since the time of the Ramseur decision, the number of verdicts imposing the death sentence has declined; nonetheless, it remains the case that juries still are finding that a sentence of death is appropriate for some defendants. As in Ramseur, if we regard the actions of those juries as a reliable reflection of society's moral values, the fact that juries continue to return verdicts imposing the death penalty provides additional reliable support for the conclusion that the death penalty does not violate present standards of decency. Ibid. In this appeal, defendant and the amici have brought to our attention a recent survey conducted by the Eagleton Center for Public Interest Polling. The survey indicates that sixty percent of New Jersey residents polled support the imposition of the death penalty for murder. Eagleton Institute of Politics, New Jerseyans' Opinions on a Death Penalty Moratorium (May 2002). When we considered the constitutionality of the death penalty statute in Ramseur, we observed in a footnote that a public opinion poll at that time indicated that approximately seventy-two percent of New Jersey residents supported the death penalty. Supra, 106 N.J. at 174 n. 10, 524 A. 2d 188. Defendant and the amici maintain that the Eagleton survey evidences a change in public support for the death penalty in New Jersey that warrants our reexamination of the constitutionality of that legislatively decreed sanction. Although the constitutional test for cruel and unusual punishment requires that we consider evolving changes in the community's shared values concerning decency in punishment, we do not regard a change in a public opinion poll from seventy-two percent in 1987 to sixty percent in 2002 to be sufficiently significant for that purpose. Public opinion poll data is not as reliable or objective as legislative enactments or jury verdicts in assessing whether the punishment of death conforms with contemporary standards of decency. We did not rely on public opinion poll data in our holding in Ramseur, and neither did the United States Supreme Court in Atkins. Ibid.; Atkins, supra, ___ U.S. at ___ n. 21, 122 S.Ct. at 2249 n. 21, 153 L.Ed. 2d at ___ n. 21 (noting in footnote simply that polling data supports consensus against executions of mentally retarded persons otherwise reflected in legislative changes enacted in numerous states across nation). We decline to regard the reported percentage change in public opinion poll data as a persuasive basis for departing from our well-established precedent on this subject. We therefore reaffirm Ramseur, and subsequent case law upholding the constitutionality of New Jersey's death penalty statute. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 190, 524 A. 2d 188 (holding death penalty statute constitutional under United States and New Jersey Constitutions).