Opinion ID: 816251
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Hearsay at Sentencing

Text: Even though Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) does not apply to the sentencing phase of a revocation proceeding, Ruby challenges the evidence the district court relied on at sentencing. He argues the evidence was unreliable because it consisted of hearsay from a police report of his accident and assault. Ruby did not make a specific hearsay challenge to the evidence below, nor did he attempt to show the evidence was flawed through his own testimony, the testimony of other witnesses, or the police statement itself. We therefore review Ruby’s objection for plain error. 2 District courts are not strictly bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence at sentencing hearings. United States v. Browning, 61 F.3d 752, 755 (10th Cir. 1 Because we conclude that Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) does not apply to the sentencing phase of a revocation proceeding, we decline to address Ruby’s argument that we should jettison the “reliability test” for what constitutes good cause under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) and instead adopt a “balancing test.” See Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 546 (10th Cir. 2010) (declining to address whether the balancing test should prevail over the reliability test because hearsay evidence at revocation proceeding was admissible under either test). 2 During the sentencing phase of the revocation proceeding, Ruby’s counsel stated, “We are very hamstrung coming into this courtroom and having the facts of the case basically decided by a probable cause statement, with no really sort of safeguards against that, no testimony, no things like that.” R., Vol. 2, at 15. This is not a clear enough objection to avoid plain error review on appeal. -13- 1995); see also USSG § 6A1.3, cmt. (“In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges are not restricted to information that would be admissible at trial.” (citations omitted)). As a result, “hearsay statements may be considered at sentencing if they bear some minimal indicia of reliability.” United States v. Damato, 672 F.3d 832, 847 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). This reliability floor is a requirement of due process. See United States v. Cook, 550 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that “the due process clause protects a defendant’s right not to be sentenced on the basis of materially incorrect information”). Corroborating evidence is often key to determining whether a statement is sufficiently reliable. See United States v. Todd, 515 F.3d 1128, 1136 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s reliance on hearsay evidence regarding drug sales by defendant where other evidence corroborated it); United States v. Fennell, 65 F.3d 812, 813–14 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court where sentencing enhancement was based solely on hearsay statement by defendant’s ex-girlfriend with no other corroborating evidence); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming sentencing judge where enhancement based on defendant’s leadership role in drug operation was “corroborated by physical and documentary evidence at the trial and by appellant’s admissions at his sentencing hearing”). Ruby argues the district court erred in relying on the statements contained in the Petition and Violation Report when it refused to grant Ruby a downward -14- variance from the guideline range. On appeal, Ruby contends that the petition contains several layers of hearsay which make the statements particularly unreliable. Yet Ruby exaggerates the extent of the hearsay. In fact, all the documents at the hearing were based on the post-accident police report, and Ruby did not even raise in the district court any hearsay-on-hearsay concerns. 3 Ruby relies largely on two cases, Fennell, 65 F.3d 812, and Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, to argue that the hearsay in this case was unreliable. In Fennell, we reviewed a sentence enhancement for possession of a machine gun based solely on his estranged girlfriend’s unsworn telephone statement to a probation officer that the defendant had fired the machine gun at her. 65 F.3d at 813. The court found her statement insufficiently reliable because the girlfriend did not prepare a sworn affidavit, the interviewing officer was not able to observe her demeanor, and there was no other corroborating evidence. Id. Similarly, in Lloyd, the district court enhanced a defendant’s sentence based on allegations of domestic battery. 566 F.3d at 344. Yet there was no independent corroborating evidence for the battery beyond the victim’s cursory statement. Id. at 345. 3 Ruby implies that the admitted documents might have contained some transcription errors, but if there was any doubt that the statements had been distorted or lost in the transcription from the original police report to the Violation Report, Ruby could have easily pointed it out below. He provided excerpts from the original police report as an attachment to his written objection to the Report, which suggests he had access to the entire report. Because he did not object to multiple levels of hearsay, and did not introduce the full police report below, we will not further discount the reliability of the statements in the Violation Report. -15- The statements here are more reliable. Unlike in those cases, where the sole witness had reasons to lie, here the corroborating statements of three relatively neutral witnesses help establish the reliability of Apodaca’s statement to the police officer. Apodaca’s daughter and the other female passenger contemporaneously confirm Apodaca’s version of the events, while Wojick (the uninvolved witness) saw Ruby throw Apodaca to the ground twice and yell at her, an observation entirely consistent with Apodaca’s version of events. These additional witnesses, who spoke in person to the police officer, dispel the doubt that might otherwise hang over the out-of-court testimony of a witness with an axe to grind. See United States v. Caiba-Antele, No. 11-2140, --- F.3d ---, at  (10th Cir. Jan. 23, 2013) (finding sufficient indicia of reliability in corroborating statements given in person to detectives by multiple victims of sexual abuse). Nor did Ruby testify at the sentencing hearing to a contrary set of facts, or ask the court to consider additional documents—other than his written objection to the Report—or the testimony of other witnesses. The district court also relied on the fact that Ruby pleaded guilty to an assault charge in 2005 for having punched Apodaca in the face in 2004. The incident helps amplify Ruby’s capacity for violence and further supports Apodaca’s statement that she was struck in the face. While prior incidents are not necessarily probative of later conduct, Fed. R. Evid. 404(a), this type of evidence -16- may help establish another piece of the “minimal indicia of reliability” necessary to consider hearsay at sentencing. Damato, 672 F.3d at 847; see also USSG § 6A1.3(a) (“In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” (emphasis added)). Ruby’s prior conduct thus is certainly relevant to the district court’s findings of fact and this court’s overall assessment of the reasonableness of the sentence. Ruby tries to discredit Apodaca’s statements by pointing to the acquittals in his state court trial. The fact that Ruby was only convicted of third-degree assault in his state court trial, and not the other offenses—which relied upon Apodaca’s testimony—bears little on whether the district court was justified in considering the proffered evidence. As the government points out, a jury needs to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a defendant, whereas a court imposing a sentence need only make a finding of fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, little can be inferred from Ruby’s acquittal on the other charges. To be sure, none of the facts surrounding the incident resolve concerns about the level of hearsay between the interviewing officer and the reporting -17- officer (if that level of hearsay even existed), or about the officer’s accuracy in writing down the witnesses’ statements. See, e.g., Lloyd, 566 F.3d at 346 (noting that “police reports are neither ‘inherently reliable [nor] . . . inherently unreliable’” (citations omitted)). Yet because Ruby did not place the full police report in the record, there is nothing to support his claim that someone other than the interviewing officer wrote the report. In the end, Ruby did not object below to the admission of hearsay, let alone multiple levels of hearsay. We review for plain error, and even if the district court erred we cannot say that any error was “plain, . . . affects substantial rights, and . . . seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we must reject Ruby’s challenge to the evidence offered at sentencing.