Opinion ID: 2106628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: References in the Testimony to the Existence of Other Prosecutions in which the Defendant is Involved

Text: During the State's case in chief, a police officer testified about Mrs. Read's lineup identification of the accused and made the two references to the defendant's involvement in another criminal case. First, the prosecution asked the officer to describe the positions of the men in the lineup, and the witness replied that There were seven men on the stage. A lieutenant gave certain questions to these people and they moved in different directions. They were viewed by the victims of several crimes.  (Emphasis supplied.) Second, in response to a question concerning the custody of the card containing Mrs. Read's identification of the defendant at the lineup, the witness testified It started in the detective bureau, attached to the complaint, and then it went to the district attorney's office and then it was brought into this court on the last case.  (Emphasis supplied.) At the next conference in chambers, defense counsel moved to have all testimony of the witness stricken and an instruction to the jury to disregard it. The court acknowledged that the references in the testimony to other crimes were error, but the court denied the motion to strike all of the witness's testimony. Defense counsel did not move to strike only the objectionable answers on the grounds that to do so would only emphasize that portion of the stricken testimony that was prejudicial. The State offered to elicit testimony from the officer that there were other victims at the lineup to view other men and to have the court instruct the jury that the last case referred to earlier hearings in this case. Defense counsel declined these offers on the theory that such curative efforts do not work. Now on appeal the defendant claims that this other crimes evidence was reversible error. [14, 15] Both sides agree that the witness's reference to other criminal prosecutions involving the accused was error. The only disputed issue is whether the remarks require a new trial. Whether remarks of witnesses or counsel have such a prejudicial effect that a new trial should be granted is a question of fact. Roehl v. State, 77 Wis.2d 398, 412, 253 N.W.2d 210 (1977); Harris v. State, 52 Wis.2d 703, 705, 191 N.W.2d 198 (1971). Where as here the remarks do not go directly to the issue of guilt, they must be considered in the context of the other facts of the case, including the curative effect of striking the remarks and instructing the jury to disregard them. Roehl v. State, supra at 412; Harris v. State, supra at 705; Buckner v. State, 56 Wis.2d 539, 544, 202 N.W.2d 406 (1972). As the State points out on appeal neither of the challenged statements directly reveal the fact of other crimes. [3] The witness's reference to the fact that the lineup was viewed by victims of other crimes and that Mrs. Read's lineup identification card was in court for the last case could give rise to inferences other than the inference that the defendant was being prosecuted for another crime. [16] Even the direct references to other criminal activity have not required a new trial if a sufficient curative instruction was given. The court has held that prejudice to a defendant is presumptively erased from the jury's collective mind when admonitory instructions have been properly given by the court. Roehl v. State, supra at 413. In this case the trial court appeared willing to strike the tainted remarks or give a curative instruction or permit remedial testimony from the officer himself. Yet for strategic reasons the defense rejected these alternatives. We hold that counsel's deliberate election to decline to move to strike the objectionable testimony or for a curative instruction constitutes a strategic waiver of the error. We also point out that the trial judge weighed the prejudicial effect of the witness's remarks. He observed that they came out as an afterthought and were garbled with other parts of the answer. He concluded that in totality, I do not believe the defendant was prejudiced. We agree.