Opinion ID: 2521330
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Verdicts are Inconsistent

Text: Matthew Goins was convicted by general verdict of second degree assault with the intent to commit indecent liberties; however, by subsequent special verdict the jury specifically found Goins was not sexually motivated. The majority acknowledges these verdicts are irreconcilably inconsistent with each other. Majority at 183 ([T]he verdicts are irreconcilably inconsistent.). The concurrence then opines, without misgiving, the verdicts are consistent with each other, reasoning the jury was not required to determine whether the State proved the elements of indecent liberties ... because Matthew Goins was not charged with the crime of indecent liberties. Concurrence at 186. The elements of second degree assault as defined by RCW 9A.36.021(1)(e), the subsection pertinent to Goins' case, are (1) assault and (2) intent to commit a felony. The named felony was indecent liberties. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 16; RCW 9A.44.100(2) (classifying indecent liberties as a felony). Intending to commit indecent liberties requires an intent to have sexual contact with the victim, RCW 9A.44.100(1), which occurs only when the perpetrator touch[es] ... the sexual or other intimate parts of a person ... for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party or a third party, RCW 9A.44.010(2). Intent is statutorily defined as act[ing] with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime. RCW 9A.08.010(1)(a). To intend to commit indecent liberties, therefore, Goins must have acted to achieve the result of touching the sexual or other intimate parts of his alleged victim, Angela Z., to gratify his sexual desire. [2] The concurrence apparently takes the view the jury did not have to find Goins acted to gratify his sexual desire. If such were the case, then a man who punches a woman in the breast [3] would be guilty of assault with intent to commit indecent liberties, regardless of whether he intended to act with a sexual purpose. Certainly the man would be guilty of assault, as he unlawfully touched the woman with criminal intent. See State v. Aumick, 126 Wash.2d 422, 426 n. 12, 894 P.2d 1325 (1995). But one cannot reasonably claim the man acted with the intent to commit indecent liberties. Though the special verdict asked the jury whether Goins commit[ted] the crime with sexual motivation,  CP at 34 (emphasis added), the instructional definition of [s]exual motivation explicitly required a finding that Goins acted for the purpose of his ... sexual gratification, CP at 22. Thus, the jury was asked for the purposes of both verdicts whether Goins acted for the purpose of his ... sexual gratification. Id.; see also CP at 20 (defining sexual contact with the language of RCW 9A.44.010(2)). The jury answered yes in the general verdict but no in the special verdict. Either Goins committed assault with sexual motivation or he did not. It cannot be both. Consequently, the guilty verdict of the crime of second degree assault with intent to commit indecent liberties cannot consistently coexist with a simultaneous finding that Goins acted without sexual motivation.