Opinion ID: 2971582
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Upshaw’s Obstruction of Justice Enhancement

Text: 15 Rice also argues that it was erroneous for the district court to find that he possessed a firearm during the robbery of Harrison since Harrison never testified that Rice possessed a gun at that time. A district court’s determination that a defendant possessed a firearm at the time of an offense is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Clay, 346 F.3d 173, 178 (6th Cir. 2003). Harrison testified that Rice was in uniform at the time of the incident. And Upshaw testified that “[y]ou’re supposed to carry a weapon all the time, on or off duty.” Therefore, it was not clear error for the district court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Rice possessed a firearm at the time of the Harrison incident. - 40 - Nos. 02-1409/1428 United States v. Upshaw & Rice Upshaw argues that the district court erroneously applied a two-level enhancement to his combined offense level under § 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines for obstruction of justice. Section 3C1.1 provides that a sentencing court may increase a defendant’s offense level by two levels [i]f (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense . . . . Commentary to § 3C1.1 notes that conduct warranting the two-level enhancement includes “committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury.” Id. cmt. n.4(b). The government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed an obstructionist act under § 3C1.1 for that provision’s two level enhancement to apply to the defendant. United States v. Dunham, 295 F.3d 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2002). A district court’s factual determination that a defendant committed an act warranting enhancement under § 3C1.1 is reviewed for clear error, while a court’s interpretation of the provision is reviewed de novo. United States v. Burke, 345 F.3d 416, 428 (6th Cir. 2003). At trial, Upshaw testified in his own defense that marijuana and drug paraphenalia found in the basement of his home during the execution of a search warrant did not belong to him but to his brother-in-law, who at the time of trial was deceased. (Tr. 3764-68.) The district court determined at Upshaw’s sentencing hearing that this excuse was perjury because its falsity “was so transparent.” The court further explained: “[U]nder a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard . . . there’s no excuse. It was his. His fingerprint was on it. It was in his house, under his nose virtually. . . . [I]t’s - 41 - Nos. 02-1409/1428 United States v. Upshaw & Rice just ludicrous to think that a veteran police officer would permit a brother-in-law to run a marijuana distribution business from . . . the laundry room of his house. . . . It was false testimony. It was intended to mislead the jury. It was absolutely material . . . . It was perjury, undoubtedly.” On the basis of this finding, the district court applied the two-level enhancement provided for by § 3C1.1 to Upshaw’s base offense level. Upshaw asserts that the district court’s determination that he committed perjury is clearly erroneous. But he offers no persuasive argument in support of this assertion. Upshaw’s first argument relates to Count XIII of the first superseding indictment, which charged Upshaw with knowingly, unlawfully, and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute a quantity of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. The jury did not reach a verdict on Count XIII. According to Upshaw, this fact demonstrates that some jurors found his testimony as to the marijuana credible. Upshaw then seems to assert, without supporting authority, that the fact that some jurors may have found his testimony to be credible demonstrates that the court’s contrary finding is clearly erroneous. First, the fact that the jury did not reach a verdict on Count XIII does not demonstrate that some jury members found Upshaw’s testimony to be credible. A myriad of explanations can be offered for why a jury failed to reach a verdict on the count. Second, regardless of whether some jurors who evaluated the evidence under a reasonable doubt standard found that Upshaw did not knowingly possess with intent to distribute the marijuana at issue, Upshaw does not present a persuasive argument for why the court’s finding under a preponderance of the evidence standard that Upshaw’s testimony constituted perjury is clearly erroneous. - 42 - Nos. 02-1409/1428 United States v. Upshaw & Rice Upshaw next argues that the district court failed to take note of § 3C1.1, Application Note 2, which states that, in making determinations about whether defendants made false statements at trial, the court should consider that false testimony can be the product of faulty memory or confusion rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead the court or the jury. In essence, Upshaw asserts that any falsity in his testimony arose from confusion and was not deliberate. Yet, he provides no basis for finding that the district court’s determination to the contrary was clearly erroneous or that his memory actually was faulty or his testimony confused. Upshaw’s third argument is that the district court erroneously considered extraneous testimony. Specifically, Upshaw asserts that the court determined his testimony was false based upon the fact that witnesses at other trials blame other people for offenses with which they are charged. The district court’s determination was based on more than a groundless assumption. Rather, the court noted that Upshaw was a police officer and that it was highly unlikely that he was unaware of the presence of drugs found in his home. Finally, Upshaw notes that some of his codefendants testified at trial and, like him, denied wrongdoing and yet did not have their sentences enhanced under § 3C1.1. This argument has no bearing on whether the district court’s finding with respect to Upshaw was clearly erroneous.