Opinion ID: 78632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Elicit Objections

Text: In United States v. Jones, the Eleventh Circuit held that after imposing sentence, a district court must give the parties the opportunity to object to the ... court's ultimate findings of fact and conclusions of law and to the manner in which the sentence is pronounced. 899 F.2d 1097, 1102 (11th Cir.1990), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.1993). It reasoned such a procedure would serve the dual purpose of permitting the district court to correct on the spot any error it may have made and of guiding appellate review. Id. In applying the Jones rule, [the Eleventh Circuit] has held that when the district court merely asks if there is `anything further?' or `anything else?' and neither party responds with objections, then the court has failed to elicit fully articulated objections and has therefore violated Jones.  United States v. Campbell, 473 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir.2007). Under this rule, when a district court fails to elicit objections after imposing a sentence, [the appellate court] normally vacate[s] the sentence and remand[s] to the district court to give the parties an opportunity to present their objections. Id. at 1347. But a remand is not necessary when the record on appeal is sufficient to enable adequate review. Id. In the Eleventh Circuit Jones applies to supervised release revocation proceedings. Id. at 1348. Not all circuits agree. United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 219 n. 12 (3d Cir.2009) (rejecting Jones rule, stating, inter alia, we have never adopted such a supervisory rule and, in light of our precedents, we doubt the propriety of doing so); United States v. Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir.2009) (rejecting imposition of a requirement that district courts elicit objections after announcing sentence). Relying on Jones and Campbell, [2] Steele argues the district court erred in failing to elicit objections from the parties after imposing sentence, thereby preventing him from determining the reasons behind the court's deviation from the guidelines' recommended sentencing range. Even though the court asked both parties whether there was [a]nything further and neither party responded with an objection, Steele claims the court did not fulfill its obligation of eliciting objections. (R. Vol. II at 28.) This issue has not previously been presented in this Circuit. We side with the Third and Ninth Circuits in concluding a trial judge is not required to specifically elicit objections after announcing a sentence. Competent professionals do not require such gratuitous superintendence; as long as there is a fair opportunity to register an objection, ask for an explanation or request factual findings, counsel must take the initiative thereby insuring that silence is not mistaken for acceptance. If a proper record is not made in the district court, we will only review for plain error. [3] In this case a sufficient opportunity was made available. If Steele had objections to the sentence imposed or, more particularly, to the decision-making process, he could and should have raised them at a time and in such a way as to afford the trial judge an opportunity to correct any error, clarify any ambiguity or elaborate as necessary. In any event, this judge clearly articulated his (self evident) reasons for imposing a sentence outside the recommended rangeSteele's serial violations of the law and supervised release terms, the failure of a shorter sentence to deter such violations and the apparent futility of substance abuse treatment.