Opinion ID: 590214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis of the equal protection claim

Text: 9 In the case at hand, appellant claims that, by terminating her employment solely on the basis of alienage, the defendants violated a clearly established right which should have been apparent to reasonable school officials in September of 1986. She points to the federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause as the principal source of the claimed right. Whatever one may think of the local statute in question, which is no longer in force, we believe appellant's view of the Equal Protection Clause has been largely discredited by Supreme Court case law that we are bound to respect.
10 Although it has long been held that resident aliens fall within the purview of the Equal Protection Clause, see Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2124, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2281, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1851, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39, 36 S.Ct. 7, 9, 60 L.Ed. 131 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1070, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886), the rule is not without its recognized exceptions. A State--and Puerto Rico, for purposes of the exception discussed in this opinion, is to be treated at least as generously as a State--can, in an appropriately defined class of positions, require citizenship as a qualification for office without departing from the constitutional restraints of the Equal Protection Clause. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2850, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973). States are permitted to define these classes so as to preserve the basic conception of a political community. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1004, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). Exempt classes may, therefore, include persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative government. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647, 93 S.Ct. at 2850. The key is whether a plausible nexus exists between citizenship and the demands of a particular position in the public sector. Phrased another way, a State may justify its exclusion of aliens by a showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296, 98 S.Ct. 1067, 1070, 55 L.Ed.2d 287 (1978). To find if this governmental function exception applies in a given instance, a reviewing court must ask whether the position in question ... involves discretionary decisionmaking, or execution of policy, which substantially affects members of the political community. Id.; accord Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440-41, 102 S.Ct. 735, 740, 70 L.Ed.2d 677 (1982).
11 In respect to teachers, the case of Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 99 S.Ct. 1589, 60 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979), provides luminous authority. There, the Court examined a New York law allowing exclusion of aliens from employment as public school teachers. In determining whether teaching in public schools constitutes a governmental function within the sweep of the Sugarman doctrine, the Court first acknowledged the importance of public schools in our democracy:  'Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.... It is the very foundation of good citizenship.'  Id. at 76, 99 S.Ct. at 1594 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954)). The Court then focused on the nature of public education and the degree of responsibility thrust upon teachers in the due performance of their mission. See id. at 78-80, 99 S.Ct. at 1595-96. Teachers, Justice Powell wrote, play a critical part in developing students' attitude toward government and [their] understanding of the role of citizens in our society. Id. at 78, 99 S.Ct. at 1595. He also observed that a teacher possesses wide discretion as to how course material is communicated to students; that he or she inevitably serves as a role model; and that, through both the presentation of course materials and the example he [or she] sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities. Id. at 79, 99 S.Ct. at 1595. 12 On this basis, the court concluded that public school teachers, as a class, come within the governmental function exception and, therefore, the Constitution requires only that a citizenship requirement applicable to teaching in public schools bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 80, 99 S.Ct. at 1596. The Court concluded that the New York statute was narrowly tailored to serve its purpose because it excluded only those aliens who refused to obtain United States citizenship. Id. at 80-81, 99 S.Ct. at 1596.
13 In light of Ambach, we think that, in September of 1986, it did not violate any clearly established federal constitutional right for an education official to terminate a teacher's employment in conformity with a statute barring aliens from holding teaching positions. While it is at least arguable that the Puerto Rico statute has a somewhat broader reach than its New York counterpart, approved in Ambach, 2 the Court has not hesitated to uphold statutes that barred aliens totally from serving in certain government positions. See, e.g., Cabell, 454 U.S. at 441-42, 102 S.Ct. at 741 (deputy probation officers); Foley, 435 U.S. at 299-300, 98 S.Ct. at 1072-73 (state troopers); see also Cervantes v. Guerra, 651 F.2d 974, 981-82 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that a community action agency's bylaws excluding aliens from service on the board of directors did not deny equal protection); cf. Campos v. FCC, 650 F.2d 890, 893-94 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that a statute prohibiting the Federal Communications Commission from granting commercial radio operators' licenses to aliens did not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause). Moreover, the Ambach Court itself suggested that a State may exclude from its political functions all persons who have not become part of the process of self-government. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 74, 99 S.Ct. at 1593 (emphasis supplied). We conclude, therefore, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.