Opinion ID: 475326
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Restrictions on Entry Warrants

Text: 15 Next we must decide whether the specific provisions in the preliminary injunction order were proper and whether the terms of the injunction resulted from a proper application of substantive law.
16 The INS contends that paragraphs two and three of the injunction 4 are invalid. It relies on the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Blackie's House of Beef v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940, 102 S.Ct. 1432, 71 L.Ed.2d 651 (1982), for the proposition that a factory search may be based on a warrant that identifies no illegal aliens by name. 17 Blackie's rejected the contention that the INS open-ended warrant was comparable to the routine administrative inspection warrant upheld in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978). 659 F.2d at 1218. Instead, it defined a hybrid standard of probable cause applicable to INS enforcement. See 659 F.2d at 1222-25. A showing less than that required for criminal warrants was deemed appropriate because (1) Congress contemplated vigorous INS enforcement, including entries onto private premises to question aliens, and (2) INS activities are not analogous to a criminal investigation where the employer faces no sanctions of any kind for employing illegal aliens. 659 F.2d at 1218. 18 The court in Blackie's, while accepting a hybrid probable cause standard for INS entry warrants, 5 emphasized the need for sufficient safeguards to assure that nothing impermissible would be left to the discretion of the INS agents. 659 F.2d at 1226. We have held that an application for a search warrant must have sufficient specificity to enable the judge to make an independent determination of whether probable cause exists and to prevent the agents from having uncontrolled discretion to rummage everywhere in search of seizable items once lawfully within the premises. United States v. Condo, 782 F.2d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir.1986) (emphasis in original). 19 Here, the district court stopped short of requiring the INS to identify all suspected illegal aliens by name to obtain an entry warrant. But, it required the INS, through the warrant and its supporting affidavits, to provide information of sufficient specificity to assure that finding such persons is reasonably likely. (Emphasis added). 20 At oral argument, we pressed plaintiff's counsel to propose a particularity standard for the INS to use in obtaining entry warrants for factory raids targeted at undocumented aliens. Counsel's inability to propose a workable standard reflects the difficulty of enforcing immigration laws where little documentary or descriptive information is available concerning suspected undocumented aliens. 21 The requirement to identify the suspect(s) by name or to provide enough specific identifying information to assure that the search for that person is reasonably likely to result in finding that person imposes an unreasonable and impractical burden on the INS. We agree with the District of Columbia Circuit that warrants and accompanying affidavits [that] narrow down the field of potentially vulnerable persons to those employees whom INS agents might reasonably believe to be aliens, 659 F.2d at 1226, satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment even where the targeted persons are not identified by name. 6 The specificity that paragraphs two and three of the injunction order demand for entry warrants is not required under the Fourth Amendment.
22 Paragraph two also requires that every INS warrant contain a specific description of each suspect to be questioned and be based on probable cause to believe each such person is an [illegal alien]. An arrest requires probable cause to believe that the worker is an illegal alien, see Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 724-25 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982), and a worker may not be detained absent reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, Benitez-Mendez v. INS, 760 F.2d 907, 909 (9th Cir.1983). But, non-detentive questioning is permitted based solely on a reasonable suspicion that the person is an alien. See LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1327. Such consensual encounters do not implicate the employee's Fourth Amendment rights. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 221, 104 S.Ct. at 1765. 23 The Court in Delgado stated that no detention occurs in a factory survey as long as INS agents' conduct has given [workers] no reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to answer. 466 U.S. at 218, 104 S.Ct. at 1764. Where a worker merely refuses to answer, id. at 216, 104 S.Ct. at 1763, but does not attempt to flee or evade the agents, id. at 220, 104 S.Ct. at 1765, any additional steps taken by the agents must be supported by some minimal level of objective justification to validate the detention or seizure. Id. at 216-17, 104 S.Ct. at 1763. 24 We find paragraphs two and three of the injunction order to have been improvidently entered. We strike these paragraphs from the injunction order because they exceed the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment and unduly restrict INS's ability to engage in consensual questioning. 25 Because of our conclusions as to paragraphs two and three of the injunction order, it is necessary also to strike paragraph five. 7 The procedures specified in paragraph five make no sense in the absence of a warrant specifically identifying the targeted workers. Moreover, the restriction on generalized questioning is inconsistent with the holding of Delgado, at least where the INS agents have a reasonable suspicion that those questioned are aliens. See LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1327.
26 INS objects also to the restrictions in paragraph six of the injunction order which provides in part: When agents have no warrant, but intend to obtain consent upon arrival at the worksite rather than ahead of time, they must not arrive or conduct themselves in a manner that would foreseeably provoke flight by workers, or that would leave a reasonable person with the belief that he had no choice but to consent to the raid. (Emphasis added). 27 INS contends that this provision is unreasonable and overbroad since flight by workers is virtually always a foreseeable consequence of INS agents' arrival at a factory. 28 We note that the court used the word deliberately in stating a similar restriction in paragraph seven. That appears to us to be a more understandable and enforceable standard than foreseeable provocation. 29 We direct that paragraph six be modified to substitute deliberately for the word foreseeably.