Opinion ID: 1785226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Second Degree Murder or Manslaughter

Text: Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in failing to modify the verdict of second degree murder and render a judgment of conviction for manslaughter. [7] He argues that the evidence viewed in light most favorable to the state supports only the conviction of the lesser offense. Manslaughter is a homicide which would be either first or second degree murder, but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self control and cool reflection. La.R.S. 14:31(1). [8] Thus, the presence of sudden passion or heat of blood distinguishes manslaughter from murder. The court has stated on several occasions, however, that sudden passion and heat of blood are not elements of the offense of manslaughter; rather, they are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense which exhibit a degree of culpability less than that present when the homicide is committed without them. State v. Tompkins, 403 So.2d 644 (La.1981); State v. Temple, 394 So.2d 259 (La.1981); State v. Peterson, 290 So.2d 307 (La.1974). [9] Since they are mitigatory factors, a defendant who establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in a sudden passion or heat of blood is entitled to a manslaughter verdict. [10] Where such proof has been introduced, a second degree murder verdict is inappropriate. Defendant contends that he met this burdenthat he proved the presence of the mitigatory factors by a preponderance of the evidence. In reviewing defendant's claim, this court must determine whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found that the mitigatory factors were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Bryan, 454 So.2d 1297 (La.App.3d Cir.), cert. denied, 458 So.2d 128 (1984); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Moore v. Duckworth, 443 U.S. 713, 99 S.Ct. 3088, 61 L.Ed.2d 865 (1979); State v. Roy, 395 So.2d 664 (La.1981). The evidence established that St. Pierre threatened to kill defendant. Defendant told his friends that if St. Pierre returned, he had a knife which he would use. The state argues that defendant's statements indicated a plan to provoke an altercation so that he could stab St. Pierre. The evidence, however, refutes the state's contention: as St. Pierre and Jeandron were leaving the game, defendant let them pass unscathed; also when St. Pierre invited him to meet in the parking lot for a fight, defendant refused; and, finally, when St. Pierre announced that's your ass and marched up the ramp, defendant did not rush down to meet his opponent, nor did he unsheath his knife in preparation for the impending fight. Defendant did not unsheath his knife until after he had been punched, thrown against a metal rail, knocked onto the cement ground, and put into a stranglehold with his left arm wrenched behind his back. After being placed in this position, in a panic, he lashed out with his knife. However, as he testified, he did not want to kill St. Pierre; he just wanted to get free. A preponderance of the evidence clearly shows that defendant committed the offense in a sudden passion or heat of blood caused by a provocation which would have deprived an average person of his self control and cool reflection. No rational trier of fact could have concluded otherwise. Thus, the jury erred when it found defendant guilty of second degree murder. It should have returned a verdict of manslaughter. Hence, the trial judge erred in failing to modify the verdict and render a judgment for the lesser offense. La.Code Crim.P. art. 821(C). If the appellate court finds that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the state, supports only a conviction of a lesser included responsive offense, the court may modify the verdict and render a judgment of conviction on the lesser included responsive offense. La.Code Crim.P. art. 821(E). Manslaughter is a lesser included responsive offense to second degree murder. La.Code Crim.P. art. 814(A)(3). Accordingly, in the instant case, the verdict of second degree murder should be reduced to manslaughter.