Opinion ID: 2039545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: deputy fryer

Text: Frank Fryer began working as a deputy in the Brown County Sheriff's office on July 1, 1975. On September 9, 1975, at 4:30 p. m., the Sheriff called a meeting of all of his deputies and announced that Fryer's employment would be terminated at 5:00 p. m. that day because of unexplained mileage on his assigned vehicle. The following analysis is an application of the relevant evidence in the record to the guidelines listed above: 1) The record indicates that the only criticism Fryer ever received from the Sheriff pertained to an incident which occurred during Fryer's first week of employment. Fryer had allegedly threatened a member of the fire department that he might use his authority against the department. Fryer denied the allegation, and he heard nothing more about the incident until the administrative hearing on October 10, 1975, subsequent to his discharge. 2) Fryer was given no advance notice of his discharge. He was notified one-half hour prior to termination. 3) Prior to August 21, the Sheriff met with deputies Fryer, Jark, and Grass about joining the Union. The deputies wanted higher salaries and said they thought union representation would help them negotiate with the County Commissioners. The Sheriff told them that if they would wait until they got deputies in the outlying towns, he knew they could get more money. On August 25, the Sheriff had a letter prepared to the County Commissioners, which the deputies signed, stating they agreed to forestall any further action with Union negotiations until we can meet with the Board of Brown County Commissioners for the purpose of discussing salary proposals, etc. It is desired to meet at the very earliest date possible. The Sheriff testified that he thought they would just drop things and let us work with the Commission, and that he knew this could be done. See N. L. R. B. v. Nabors, 196 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1952). 4) On August 21, Fryer invited the Sheriff to a meeting sponsored by the Union at the Aberdeen Holiday Inn. The Union's business manager explained to the Sheriff that a number of the deputies had signed Union cards. At the administrative hearing the Union's business manager and Deputy Jark testified that the Sheriff left the meeting in an agitated state. Deputy Robert Grass also testified that at quitting time that afternoon he was called to meet with the Sheriff, Chief Deputy Kahl, and deputies Phyllis Biegler and Carroll Burckhard in the Sheriff's office. They inquired about the Union, and It came up that if we were to go union we would probably not expect to find another job in the State of South Dakota with law enforcement. From this evidence it is logical to infer that the Sheriff was opposed to unionization. 5) At the time of his discharge Fryer had been a public servant for seventeen years, seven of those years as a firefighter and seven years as a deputy. 6) Fryer was one of the three deputies who met with the Sheriff in the summer about joining the Union. Fryer testified that he was the principal speaker at the meeting on August 21, which the Sheriff attended, and Fryer spoke in favor of joining the Union. At that meeting the Sheriff was informed that a number of his deputies had signed union cards. Also, the Sheriff testified that on August 25, when the letter was written to the County Commissioners, he had already been advised by the deputies that they had signed union cards. From this evidence it is logical to infer that Fryer was a known leader of the unionization drive and the Sheriff knew of Fryer's union activity at the time of Fryer's discharge. See N. L. R. B. v. Melrose Processing Co., supra. 7) On August 22, the day after the union meeting, all of the outlying deputy sheriffs were laid off, allegedly because of lack of funds. The Sheriff testified that he had informed the County Commissioners of the union activity in process. All of the laid-off deputies were reinstated on August 23. The Sheriff testified that he had absolutely no knowledge of the lay-offs until he read about them in the local newspaper on August 23. Deputy Phyllis Biegler testified that a survey of county mileage was done on September 9. That afternoon at 4:30 Fryer was told his employment would be terminated at 5:00. Thus, the discharge plan was promulgated with speed. See McGraw-Edison Company v. N. L. R. B., supra. 8) The only reason given for Fryer's discharge at the 4:30 p. m. meeting on September 9, was that he had 2,800 unexplained miles on his car. When the Sheriff had instructed Fryer on the use of the car, he simply said that he wanted honest miles reported and cards filled out on every trip. Fryer was allowed to use the car for personal use, to drive it to and from work in the morning, for coffee breaks, at noon, after work, and for night duty. Fryer testified that he always asked before he used the car for anything other than duty. Fryer was never asked or given an opportunity to explain how he had acquired the additional miles, either before or after he was discharged. 9) In this case two deputies were discharged. Both of those deputies had actively promoted unionization. Although Deputy Grass had met with the Sheriff, Jark, and Fryer in the summer about union representation, he did not attend the August 21 organizational meeting. Grass was not discharged, but he testified that he was afraid of losing his job, and that he believed that the firing of the other two deputies was an object lesson. Grass testified that the meeting on September 9 was the first time the Sheriff had called all of the deputies together and fired someone in front of them all. From this evidence it is reasonable to infer that Fryer was singled out for special treatment at variance from the normal routine in the Sheriff's office. See N. L. R. B. v. Nabors, supra. 10) Although the only reason given for Fryer's discharge on September 9 was the unexplained mileage on his car, at the hearing on October 10, the Sheriff also listed the threat made to a member of the fire department. Fryer had heard nothing about that threat since his first week of employment with the Sheriff's office. If, upon review of the evidence analyzed above, we conclude that there was substantial evidence indicating that Fryer's union activity . . . weighed more heavily in the decision . . . to fire [him] than did [the Sheriff's] dissatisfaction with [his] performance, Marshfield Steel Company v. N. L. R. B., 324 F.2d 333, 337 (8th Cir. 1963), the ruling of the trial court must be reversed. Substantial evidence is defined by statute in South Dakota to mean such relevant and competent evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as being sufficiently adequate to support a conclusion. SDCL 1-26-1(8). We conclude that pursuant to the analysis above, there was substantial evidence from which reasonable inferences could be drawn that Fryer's union activity weighed more heavily in the decision to fire him than did dissatisfaction with his job performance. While each of these points is but a single block and alone might not be enough to support the finding of the [Division], when they are placed side by side these blocks form a sufficient foundation to support the finding of discrimination. N. L. R. B. v. Melrose Processing Co., supra, 351 F.2d at 700.