Opinion ID: 2072945
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Review of Preliminary Injunction

Text: We now come to the issue of central concern on Emerson's appeal: whether the Superior Court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction of December 22, 1988. As we stated in Ingraham v. University of Maine at Orono, the party seeking a preliminary or permanent injunction generally has the burden of demonstrating to the court that the following four criteria are met: (1) that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (2) that such injury outweighs any harm which granting the injunctive relief would inflict on the defendant, (3) that plaintiff has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits (at most, a probability; at least, a substantial possibility), (4) that the public interest will not be adversely affected by granting the injunction. 441 A.2d 691, 693 (Me.1982) (per curiam). In this case the State's burden was even greater. Because the requested preliminary injunction had mandatory aspects, the State had to show a clear likelihood of success on the merits, not just a reasonable likelihood. See Committee of Central Amer. Refugees v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir.1986), reh'g denied, 807 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.1987); Commonwealth v. Coward, 489 Pa. 327, 342, 414 A.2d 91, 99 (1980). The Ingraham criteria are not to be applied woodenly or in isolation from each other; rather, the court of equity should weigh all of these factors together in determining whether injunctive relief is proper in the specific circumstances of each case. See Developments in the LawInjunctions, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 994, 1056 (1965) (Clear evidence of irreparable injury should result in a less stringent requirement of certainty of victory; greater certainty of victory should result in a less stringent requirement of proof of irreparable injury) (footnote omitted). We agree with Emerson that because of the mandatory aspects of the preliminary injunction we should review it with heightened scrutiny; but when the equity court has balanced the relevant factors after hearing all the evidence on both sides, our role on appeal is limited to determining whether the court's grant of the preliminary injunction constituted an abuse of discretion. See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, at 428 (1973). Cf. Crafts v. Quinn, 482 A.2d 825, 830 (Me. 1984) (Superior Court's denial of the mandatory preliminary injunction requested by appellants must stand unless plainly wrong or based on an error of law). Emerson challenges the preliminary injunction on three grounds. A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits The Superior Court found that the tires at Emerson's facility were being handled in violation of the Maine Solid Waste Management Statutes and Rules and the Forest Fire Control Statutes, 12 M.R.S.A. § 9301, and in such a manner as to create a significant fire hazard. Based on the clear nature of these violations, the Superior Court found that the State had demonstrated a high likelihood of success on the merits. The one and only question Emerson raises to challenge this conclusion is a question of law: whether his facility is grandfathered so as to be exempt from the requirements the State seeks to impose on him. The law is plainly against him on that question. The Solid Waste Management Act was enacted effective October 3, 1973. P.L. 1973, ch. 387 (codified at 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 1301-1308 (1978). [6] Section 1308 of the Act provides, in relevant part: Rules and regulations adopted pursuant to this chapter concerning the location, establishment and construction of solid waste disposal facilities, but not concerning alteration or operation, shall not affect such facilities in existence prior to October 3, 1973. 38 M.R.S.A. § 1308 (emphasis added). Although the statute thus exempts solid waste disposal facilities in existence before October 3, 1973, from rules relating to location, establishment and construction, such facilities are not exempted from rules relating to alteration or operation. Emerson does not dispute that he is operating a tire disposal facility. Effective February 24, 1987, DEP adopted chapter 406 of the Solid Waste Management Rules specifically governing storage and disposal of tires. Me.Dept. of Envtl. Protection Rules, ch. 406 (Feb. 24, 1987), reprinted in 06-096 C.M.R. 406 (1986). Section 5 of that chapter contains the specific requirements that the Superior Court imposed on Emerson in the mandatory portion of the preliminary injunction. Section 5 also states that these requirements apply to tire storage and disposal facilities that require Site Location Law approval. Section 2(B)(1) in turn provides that Site Location Law approval is required for [a]ny person who proposes to establish a new waste facility or expand an existing waste facility for the storage of tires, the solid waste boundary of which will enclose an area that is 10,000 square feet or more.... The Basis Statement accompanying chapter 406 further clarifies that this regulation establishes specific siting and operating criteria for all new facilities and expansions of existing facilities ..., as well as operating requirements for those facilities, or portions thereof, which were established prior to October 3, 1973, pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. [§] 1308. Under these rules, we conclude as a matter of law that the section 5 operating requirements apply to Emerson's facility. He has been accepting tires there up until the court appointed a receiver on December 22, 1988. The State presented ample evidence establishing that Emerson was operating his facility with tire piles larger than 10,000 square feet and that the piles were expanding. Emerson's contention that he was accepting tires at his facility before the waste management law was enacted does not exempt him from having to comply with current operating rules laid down by state law. Because Emerson chose to continue to operate his tire facility and has continued to expand that facility after October 3, 1973, his facility is expressly subject to the requirements of the DEP rules contained in chapter 406. Emerson contends that his facility does not need Site Location Law approval and that the relevant provisions of section 5 of chapter 406 therefore do not apply to him. He relies on section 3(A)(1) of chapter 400 of the Solid Waste Management Rules, which provides generally that Site Location Law approval is required when a waste facility is located, established, or constructed, but which provides an exemption for [a]ny land area ..., including dumps, used for disposing of solid waste or sludge prior to October 3, 1973.... What Emerson ignores or overlooks is the provision immediately following section 3(A)(1) that, consistent with section 1308 of the governing statute, states: Note: Exempted waste facilities remain subject to portions of these rules affecting alteration, operation or closing. Furthermore, section 3(B)(1) of chapter 400, the section following the section Emerson relies on, provides that review and approval under the Site Location Law are required even for an exempted facility if that facility expands horizontally onto contiguous or non-contiguous parcels or lots in the same immediate vicinity that are owned, leased or otherwise held by the facility owner or operator. Since Emerson relies exclusively upon his grandfathering argumentan argument we reject as a matter of lawthe Superior Court if anything appears to us to have understated the State's likelihood of success by characterizing it as merely high. In addition to the evidence that Emerson's facility is in clear violation of the waste management laws and rules regulating tire storage and disposal facilities, the Superior Court also found, based on substantial evidence, that Emerson's facility was in violation of the hazard clearance law, 12 M.R.S.A. § 9301. The hazard clearance law, enacted in 1979, requires that any dump containing waste which might facilitate either the origin or spread of forest fires be operated in compliance with that section. The Superior Court's finding that Emerson's facility does not meet the requirements of section 9301 lends further support, if any were needed, to its conclusion that the State had demonstrated a high likelihood of success on the merits. The high likelihood of success justifies not only the issuance of the mandatory injunction but also the Superior Court's exercise of discretion under M.R.Civ.P. 65(c) to waive the requirement that the State post a bond or other security. See 2 Field, McKusick & Wroth § 65.5 (1970). B. Balancing of Harms Emerson next contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion by failing to take into account the harm the injunction would cause him, as required under Ingraham. But in issuing the preliminary injunction later incorporated into the December 22, 1988, order, the court specifically stated: Because of the clear nature of these violations, the fact that the defendant ignored warnings on several occasions about the violations, and the fact that the defendant has not taken steps to bring his facility into compliance with the law, and that the State's likelihood of success on the merits appears high; a balancing of the interests clearly weighs in favor of granting a preliminary injunction. (Emphasis added). The court thus specifically balances the relevant interests, and we reject Emerson's argument that there was insufficient evidence on which to base a finding that the balance of interests weighed in the State's favor. Emerson contends that the Superior Court erred in assessing the harm the preliminary injunction inflicts on him, emphasizing the great expense he will incur in bringing his facility into compliance and criticizing the State's failure to put on evidence of Emerson's ability, financial or otherwise, to comply with the preliminary injunction. But Emerson fundamentally misperceives the nature of the harm that the Superior Court was required to weigh in the balance. The harm to Emerson is not the burden and cost of compliance with applicable law. The harm that granting the preliminary injunction causes Emerson is simply the harm of taking the required steps now rather than later, after the trial on the merits. And the harm is not measured by the expense or difficulty of taking those steps, factors that are likely to increase with time rather than decrease. The Superior Court found that the State had demonstrated a high likelihood of success on the merits, a finding that we have confirmed by rejecting as a matter of law Emerson's only argument in defensethat his tire disposal facility is grandfathered from having to comply with the operating requirements of the DEP rules. Given that finding, it was reasonable for the Superior Court to conclude that the pertinent harm to Emerson from granting the preliminary injunction was relatively small. Balanced against this harm to Emerson is the harm to the State, representing the public interest in this case, of allowing the facility to continue to pose an environmental and fire hazard during the pendency of this litigation. The rationale behind the waste management and fire safety laws is to protect the health and safety of Maine citizens. See 38 M.R.S.A. § 1302. During the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the State put on witnesses who described in detail Emerson's tire facility. A DEP representative, a representative of the Maine Forest Service's Division of Fire Control, and the Durham fire chief, all of whom had personally inspected Emerson's facility, described, with the aid of photographs, the location, size, and general condition of the tire piles and the hazards those piles represented. One of those witnesses described the special hazard posed by a fire in a tire pile, noting that these fires generate a lot of heat and heavy black smoke, and are difficult to put out. From all of this evidence, the Superior Court was well justified in finding that the environmental and fire hazard posed by Emerson's facility required immediate action. C. Mandatory Aspects of the Preliminary Injunction Finally, Emerson makes a general challenge to the preliminary injunction, arguing that it goes too far in requiring Emerson to take affirmative steps to come into compliance with applicable law. It is true as a general matter that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final judgment, and that courts do not readily enter mandatory injunctions that grant part of the requested permanent relief. See, e.g., Stanton v. Brunswick School Dept., 577 F.Supp. 1560, 1567 (D.Me.1984). However, the mere fact that a preliminary injunction has mandatory aspects does not ipso facto render the injunction invalid, especially when the status quo is causing irreparable harm to one of the parties. See Crowley v. Local No. 82, 679 F.2d 978, 995 (1st Cir.1982). As discussed above, a preliminary injunction that requires the defendant to take affirmative steps requires that the plaintiff show a clear likelihood of success on the merits. See Commonwealth v. Coward, 489 Pa. at 342, 414 A.2d at 99. Here the State made that showing very amply, and the Superior Court was well justified in these circumstances in requiring immediate steps to reduce the environmental and fire hazard during the pendency of this litigation, which might take months or years to complete. See id. at 329, 343, 414 A.2d at 92, 99 (upholding grant of mandatory preliminary injunction enjoining operation of landfill and requiring the defendants to remedy the pollution discharged where likelihood of success was clear and safeguarding the public interest required affirmative steps). See also Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Food Corn, Inc., 729 F.2d 589, 593 (8th Cir.1984) (upholding grant of mandatory preliminary injunction where merely maintaining the status quo would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff). We reject Emerson's related argument that the preliminary injunction in this case effectively grants final relief before trial on the merits. Although the trial in this case has been delayed, [7] we note that throughout the proceedings Emerson has had fair notice of the claims against him and has participated in several hearings at which he has had the opportunity to contest the facts put forward by the State. Cf. Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Org., 446 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir.1971) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction where the defendant had inadequate notice and opportunity to present effective response). Moreover, the fact that some of the relief granted in the preliminary injunction tracks the permanent relief requested in the complaint does not alone make the preliminary relief granted improper. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Coward, 489 Pa. at 339, 343, 414 A.2d at 98, 99 (upholding grant of mandatory preliminary injunction that paralleled the relief requested in the complaint). See also Developments, supra, at 1058. The affirmative steps required by the original preliminary injunction were not imposed with a blind eye to the difficulties of immediate compliance. The injunction only required Emerson to make a good faith effort to comply with applicable law. The actions taken by the court after the original preliminary injunction are all justified by Emerson's nearly complete failure to heed any of the requirements of that order. The factual history of this proceeding demonstrates that Emerson ignored the court's express order not to accept any tires from outside Durham. There was abundant evidence that Emerson did not make any substantial effort to reduce the fire hazard created by the tires at his facility. We find no error in the Superior Court's actions in response to this evolving situation. The entry is: Orders of December 22, 1988, affirmed. All concurring.