Opinion ID: 597850
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Clear Entitlement to Relief

Text: 22 Gillette has stated no claims against the Union other than those which relate directly to its representation of her through the five-step grievance process against CCC. Such claims fall within the collective bargaining agreement, and are thus governed by federal law. Consequently, given that Gillette's federal claims have been found to be time-barred, it is clearly erroneous to remand any claim against the Union to the state court. 23 In her amended complaint, Gillette alleges that: 24 (1) The Union had a legal obligation to provide her with representation concerning the grievance filed on her behalf after her employment with the Company was terminated. 25 (2) The Union failed to provide her with appropriate representation as her grievance was processed. 26 (3) The direct and proximate consequence of the Union's negligent failure to provide her with adequate and appropriate representation was that she lost her arbitration hearing. 27 (4) The Union did not afford her further representation after her arbitration hearing. 28 At her deposition, Gillette brought forth more specific charges against the Union: 29 (1) The Union did not properly handle references to old disciplinary records which were raised by CCC during the arbitration hearing. 30 (2) The Union failed to investigate her grievance thoroughly. 31 (3) The Union improperly represented her during her arbitration hearing (by, for example, failing to ask any questions of the person at CCC who discharged Gillette, and failing to present material witnesses). 32 (4) The Union refused to permit her to have her attorney attend the fourth-step grievance meeting and arbitration hearing. 33 (5) The Union failed to appeal the adverse arbitration award. 34 These being Gillette's only claims against the Union in the record, they all clearly relate to the Union's representation of her grievance. 35 Section 301 generally governs suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization. The Supreme Court has read Section 301 expansively to include suits brought by employees. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200-01, 83 S.Ct. 267, 270-71, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962). To ensure uniformity in this area of federal law, Section 301 has been held to preempt state law claims that are substantially dependent upon an analysis of a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795, 799-800 (6th Cir.1990). An action for breach of duty of fair representation that directly implicates the grievance provisions of a collective bargaining agreement clearly falls within the ambit of section 301 preemption. Id. at 802. In Maynard v. Revere Copper Products, Inc., 773 F.2d 733, 735 (6th Cir.1985), this court stated: 36 The duty of fair representation relates to an area of labor law which has been so fully occupied by Congress as to foreclose state regulation. Whether union conduct constitutes a breach of fair representation is a question of federal law.... The fact that an action for failure to fairly represent a member may be brought in a state court ... is beside the point. Regardless of the forum in which the claim is presented, the case is controlled by federal law. 37 (Citations omitted.) In Maynard, this court held that federal law preempted an employee's claim for damages against his union for breach of duty of fair representation, brought pursuant to a provision of Michigan's Handicappers' Act. In doing so, this court agreed with the district court which had held that the Michigan statute created no new rights for an employee and imposed no new duty on the union not already clearly present under existing federal labor law. Id.; see also Welch v. General Motors Corp., 922 F.2d 287, 293-94 (6th Cir.1990). 38 Gillette does not dispute the general preemptive effect of federal law in this area. Rather, she tries to avoid dismissal of her claims against the Union by arguing that she has certain specific state-law claims which do not substantially depend on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement for their resolution. 39 Gillette's amended complaint alleges that the Union did not provide appropriate representation, and committed negligent failures. Construing these claims broadly, she asserts that they encompass state-law claims of negligence/malpractice, fraud/collusion, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship, which may be resolved independently of the collective bargaining agreement. 40 Gillette's argument is unpersuasive. While it is true that pleadings are to be construed as to do substantial justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f), a complaint is supposed to contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Gillette's amended complaint does not allude to collusion between the Union and CCC, nor to any tortious interference with contractual relations, nor to the Union negligently pursuing any specific state-law claims on behalf of Gillette. Fraud must be pled with particularity, Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), and it was not pled. In a similar vein, this court remarked in Fox: 41 While state law causes of action for fraud independent of [collective bargaining agreement] rights and duties unquestionably can evade the preemptive reach of section 301, the allegation in this case is a classic example of the comparatively amorphous [tort] claims in the employment context [that] fall prey to § 301 preemption because they fail to articulate theories clearly independent of collective bargaining agreement rights and obligations. 42 Fox, 914 F.2d at 801-02 (citation omitted). 43 Gillette's amended complaint does not contain any claims against the Union beyond a breach of duty of fair representation. Additionally, review of the record reveals no support for any claim other than a breach of duty of fair representation. It is notable that Gillette, in her response to the summary judgment motion, wrote: Based on the above essential facts, the Plaintiff can prove the assault and retaliatory discharge claims against the Company as well as a malpractice claim against the Union. The district court remanded a malpractice claim to the state court. Gillette's attempt to squeeze a negligence/fraud/collusion/tortious interference claim out of her amended complaint is creative, but unavailing. 44 In summary, Gillette's purported state claims against the Union are clearly related to its duty of fair representation. Thus, federal law clearly preempts them and they are clearly time-barred. Consequently, it is clear error for the district court to have remanded the malpractice or any other pendent state claims against the Union to the state court. This clear error weighs in the Union's favor as this court balances the writ of mandamus factors.