Opinion ID: 4534204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Vouching for the Death Penalty

Text: Smiley’s next argument is about certain comments made by the prosecutor during the penalty phase voir dire. Because context is important for evaluating claims of this nature, we present the relevant exchange in some detail. The prosecutor prefaced the comments at issue by observing that there are some people who feel “so strongly about first-degree murder that if someone commits first-degree murder there should be no question” that the death penalty should be imposed. Then, addressing a potential juror who earlier had described - 21 - himself as a strong proponent of the death penalty, the prosecutor asked: “Do you think that just because someone is convicted of first-degree murder it should be an automatic death sentence?” The juror started to answer the question, but the prosecutor interrupted, asking: “[D]o you understand that in Florida not every case meets the qualifications for a death penalty?” The prosecutor continued: We have, you know, 60 death—60 first-degree murder cases pending in our circuit. Okay? Probably nine of them are death eligible. So just because you’re charged with first-degree murder does not mean that your case qualifies as a case that we would seek the death penalty in. Do you understand that? In response, the juror indicated that he understood and answered “yes” when the prosecutor asked if he “agree[d] with that.” The prosecutor then wrapped up by noting that the juror had said that he was a “strong proponent of the death penalty” and by asking: “In this case can you assure us you are going to listen to the law and hold the State to the burden that we have proved at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, you consider the mitigating circumstances before you would make a sentence of death?” Defense counsel did not immediately object. The prosecutor then moved on to question the next potential juror, who also had earlier described herself as a strong death penalty proponent. Once again, the prosecutor began by asking if the juror believed in the automatic imposition of the death penalty as punishment for first-degree murder. The juror answered “no.” Then the prosecutor continued: - 22 - “And do you understand that in the State of Florida that there are certain criteria that must be met before the State can even seek the death penalty?” After the juror answered, “I understand that now,” the prosecutor said: “All right. So like I said, we have lots of cases but we don’t—there are only cases that meet that—” At that point, defense counsel objected and asked to approach the bench. Defense counsel explained that he anticipated that the prosecutor was going to repeat her comments about the number of pending murder cases in the circuit that are eligible for the death penalty. Defense counsel acknowledged: “I fear that I did not make a contemporaneous objection at that time.” But counsel went on to argue that the prosecutor’s comment was “very prejudicial” and counsel ultimately asked the trial court to strike the venire. The trial court sustained the objection to the prosecutor’s comments but denied the request to strike the panel. Smiley now argues that the denial of his motion to strike the venire was reversible error and that a new penalty phase is required. We review a decision of the trial court to deny a motion to strike the jury panel for abuse of discretion. See Guzman v. State, 238 So. 3d 146, 155 (Fla. 2018). To support his argument, Smiley relies on Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1959), Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 2000), and Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 3d 959 (Fla. 2010). We discussed these same decisions in Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 2012). In Braddy, we described the earlier cases as ones where - 23 - prosecutors had violated the principle that “the State may not add legitimacy to its case by vouching for the death penalty during its closing argument.” Id. at 847. We were careful to observe that, in Pait, Brooks, and Ferrell, “the prosecutors clearly appealed to the jurors to give weight to the fact that the State had decided to seek the death penalty.” Id. We emphasized that the prosecutors’ comments in those cases involved “a direct, unambiguous appeal” to the jury to give weight to the State’s decision. Id. Even assuming that precedents involving prosecutors’ closing arguments apply in assessing comments made during voir dire, the comments at issue here do not violate the principle we described in Braddy. Viewing the prosecutor’s statements in context, she was conveying the point that the law does not permit jurors to vote for the death penalty as an “automatic” punishment for first-degree murder. Just after making the disputed comment, the prosecutor in fact asked the juror for assurance that he could hold the State to its burden of proving an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor did not make an argument of any kind, much less a “direct, unambiguous appeal” for the potential jurors to give weight to the State’s decision to seek the death penalty. We do not condone the prosecutor’s comments. The State can and should explain the concepts of death eligibility, aggravation, and mitigation without telling the jury that the government seeks the death penalty only in a subset of first- - 24 - degree murder cases. But the prosecutor’s statements here fall far short of what would be required to justify striking the venire and starting over again, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smiley’s request. (In light of our resolution of this issue, we need not address the State’s argument that Smiley did not lodge a contemporaneous objection and therefore waived this claim.) We deny this claim.