Opinion ID: 3052220
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of the Fourth Amendment

Text: The entry into Plaintiffs’ home commenced when de Roco put his foot in the door opening and, together with Deputy Starr, began pushing against the door in an attempt to open it. This warrantless entry was unconstitutional. [1] “It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006) (quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “physical entry into the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Frunz v. City of Tacoma, 468 F.3d 1141, 1142 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted); see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). [2] The warrantless entry into Plaintiffs’ home cannot be justified as a search for a parolee in what might have been the parolee’s residence. Although the residence of a parolee may be searched even if the police suspect no wrongdoing, see Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 856 (2006), “before conducting a warrantless search . . . law enforcement officers must have probable cause to believe that the parolee is a resident of the house to be searched,” Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). And, absent such probable cause, “[n]othing in the law justifies the entry into and search of a third person’s house to search for the parolee.” Id. at 1079. We consider, therefore, what information the deputies had about Witmore’s residence at the moment they began the entry. 7674 CUEVAS v. DE ROCO The record reveals that de Roco provided the deputies with the Diamond Springs address and informed them that it was an “emergency contact address.” There is no indication that de Roco represented to the deputies that Witmore actually lived at the Diamond Springs address. When asked in his deposition whether de Roco had made such a representation, Deputy Horn responded only that de Roco “had reason to believe that he thought Witmore could possibly be there.” Moreover, the fact that de Roco told the deputies that he wanted to do a “knock and talk” indicates that he was basically trying to learn of Witmore’s whereabouts and, at most, was hoping that he might be fortunate enough to find Witmore there. Indeed, despite the fact that the ACIS database indicated that Witmore had provided the Diamond Springs address in 2001 and 2002, the record indicates that the deputies understood that Witmore was not currently living at the Diamond Springs address. The record supports the inference that de Roco showed the deputies a “face sheet” stating that Witmore lived in Placerville. In their depositions, Deputy Horn testified that he understood the Diamond Springs address to be an “emergency contact address,” and Deputy Starr testified that he merely “assum[ed]” that the Diamond Springs address was Witmore’s residence “at some time.” Even if the “flyer” that de Roco showed the deputies was not the “face sheet,” the deputies made no effort to determine whether Witmore had provided de Roco or any other authorities an address other than the Diamond Springs address after 2002. If they had made such an effort, the deputies would have learned from the August 2003 parole form that Witmore’s last known address was the Ridgeview Manor in Placerville. They might also have learned that, in December 2001, Lori Rodrigues informed Witmore’s parole officer that Witmore did not live at the Diamond Springs address. Further, the deputies conducted no surveillance at the Diamond Springs address to determine whether Witmore lived there, CUEVAS v. DE ROCO 7675 they did not even determine that Rodrigues still lived there (by checking property records, for example), and they did not run a check on the license plates of the cars parked outside the residence on the night of the search. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, we conclude that, based on the limited information in their possession, the deputies lacked probable cause to believe that Witmore resided at the Diamond Springs address. [3] The fact that Cuevas tried to close the door when he was asked whether his name was “Randy” does not change our conclusion. Cuevas explained that he thought de Roco — whose Hawaiian shirt, jeans and hiking boots masked that he was a government officer — was a “bad man” who might harm his family. This explanation is a plausible reason for closing the door when a stranger came to his house at night. Although Deputy Starr’s clothing more clearly identified him as a government officer, the evidence indicates that Deputy Starr was not visible to Cuevas because he was standing behind and to the side of de Roco. That Cuevas subsequently punched de Roco does not affect our analysis, because the punch occurred after de Roco and Deputy Starr had already begun to enter the house. [4] Nor does the fact that de Roco thought Cuevas resembled Witmore change our conclusion. Even if the deputies were permitted to rely on de Roco’s belief that Cuevas resembled Witmore, see United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 705 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that when there has been communication among agents, probable cause can rest upon the investigating agents’ collective knowledge), the deputies would not have had probable cause to believe that Witmore resided at the Diamond Springs address, see Watts v. County of Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Watts II”) (“[T]he mere fact that [plaintiff] answered the door of his girlfriend’s home in his boxer shorts did not establish a reasonable belief that he lived there.”). 7676 CUEVAS v. DE ROCO [5] In sum, the information suggesting that Witmore might have resided at the Diamond Springs address was several years old, uncorroborated by available sources, and contradicted by two more recent pieces of information, both of which indicated that Witmore lived in Placerville. Neither de Roco nor the deputies had contact with Witmore — or anyone who knew Witmore and could reliably provide information concerning his residence — prior to the search. Moreover, de Roco knew, and so informed the deputies, that the Diamond Springs address was merely an emergency contact address at which he sought to perform a “knock and talk.” The contrast with the kind of information that does meet the applicable probable cause standard is stark. For example, in Motley the police searched the apartment of the parolee’s girlfriend, where the parolee also lived at some point, approximately three months after she had moved in. 432 F.3d at 1075-76. While the parolee was, as it turned out, in custody at the time of the search, the police had gathered information about the parolee within a month of the search that indicated the apartment as the parolee’s last known address. Id. at 1076, 1080 & n.6. In addition, a police officer who participated in the search had had contact with the parolee on previous occasions — including once at the apartment — during which the parolee and his grandmother had confirmed that the parolee lived at the apartment. Id. at 1080-81. Although the girlfriend — “a less than disinterested source” — told the officers who came to search the apartment that the parolee did not live there and that he was in custody, we concluded that the officers nonetheless had probable cause to believe that the parolee resided at the apartment. Id. at 1076, 1082. The information available to de Roco and the deputies suggesting that Witmore might have lived at the Diamond Springs address was significantly less reliable than the information available to the officers in Motley. Thus, the information did not meet our “relatively stringent standard [for] determining what constitutes probable cause that a residence CUEVAS v. DE ROCO 7677 belongs to a person on supervised release.” United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2006). More generally, in Howard we surveyed four cases in which a search was proper and identified several patterns:4 First, in each of these cases the parolee did not appear to be residing at any address other than the one searched. In three of these four cases, the parolee had reported a different address, but officers had good reason to believe that he was not actually residing at the reported address. . . . Second, in each of these four cases, the officers had directly observed something that gave them good reason to suspect that the parolee was using his unreported residence as his home base[.] . . . Third, in each of [these cases] the parolee had a key to the residence in question. . . . Lastly, in two of these cases, either the parolee’s co-resident or the parolee himself identified the residence in question as that of the parolee. 447 F.3d at 1265-66. The facts of this case fit into none of the patterns identified in Howard. First, the evidence indicating that Witmore might have lived at the Diamond Springs address stemmed from 2002 or earlier, Department of Corrections records from 2003 and 2004 indicated that Witmore’s last known address was in Placerville, and the deputies did not have good reason to 4 Those four cases are United States v. Conway, 122 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 1997), United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1995), United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1991), and United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1979). 7678 CUEVAS v. DE ROCO believe that Witmore was nonetheless residing in Diamond Springs. Second, the deputies had made no observations that gave them good reason to believe that Witmore lived at the Diamond Springs address. Third, there is no evidence that Witmore had a key to Plaintiffs’ residence. Fourth, there is no evidence that after 2002 Witmore ever indicated that he lived at the Diamond Springs address, nor that Rodrigues, his listed emergency contact, lived there after 2003, nor that Plaintiffs ever indicated that Witmore lived there. [6] Thus, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, we conclude that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that Witmore lived at the Diamond Springs address and that, accordingly, Deputy Starr violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by assisting de Roco in pushing against the door and forcibly entering the residence.5 [7] However, Deputies Horn and Cook did not violate Plaintifffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by entering the residence.6 Deputy Horn briefly entered the residence, and Deputy Cook went to stand in the doorway, only after they heard an altercation and a woman screaming inside the residence. At that point there was an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an immediate need to protect persons inside the 5 Because the warantless entry was unconstitutional regardless of Witmore’s parole status, we need not consider Cuevas and Burlette’s arguments concerning California parole law and policy. 6 Plaintiffs have not alleged in their complaint that Deputies Horn and Cook violated their Fourth Amendment rights by entering their fenced backyard before leaving the backyard and entering the residence through the front door. Nor do they “coherently develop[ ]” such an argument on appeal. United States v. Kimble, 107 F.3d 712, 715 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2007); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9). Accordingly, we do not consider whether Deputies Horn and Cook’s warrantless entry into the backyard constituted an unlawful intrusion into the residence’s curtilage. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1987); United States v. Romero-Bustamente, 337 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003). CUEVAS v. DE ROCO 7679 home from serious harm. See United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2008). [8] Deputy Starr’s protective sweep “to look around for Mr. Witmore” also did not violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. It is clear that at least one of the Plaintiffs consented to such a sweep and neither objected. See United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is well established that a person with common authority over property can consent to a search of that property without the permission of the other persons with whom he shares that authority.”) (citations omitted). However, the record indicates that, as part of the sweep, Deputy Starr opened at least one drawer. Doing so exceeded both the consent given and the limits of a lawful protective sweep incident to an in-house arrest. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (explaining that a permissible protective sweep “is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding”). Accordingly, Deputy Starr also violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights in this regard, although any damages caused are likely minimal.