Opinion ID: 3062904
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Leading Question

Text: Diaz first challenges the court’s ruling on a leading question. During direct examination of Zapada, the following exchange took place: [PROSECUTOR]: Who is that individual that was going to buy 10 kilos of cocaine? [ZAPADA]: I know him as Carmello. [PROSECUTOR]: Carmello Crespo-Dones? [ZAPADA]: Yes. R11 at 125. Diaz objected to the question as leading, and the court overruled his objection. Id. On appeal, Diaz contends that without this leading question, it is possible Zapada was testifying about someone else. Federal Rule of Evidence 611(c) provides that “[l]eading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness’ testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 611(c). Here, the government’s question was necessary to clarify that Zapada was referring to Carmello CrespoDones in order to avoid the very misidentification that Diaz highlights. The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting this question. 2. Zapada’s Testimony About Crespo-Dones’ Statements 10 Diaz asserts that Zapada’s testimony as to statements made by Crespo-Dones constituted impermissible hearsay. Specifically, Diaz challenges Zapada’s testimony that Crespo-Jones introduced Diaz as a friend and drug dealer. Diaz also objects to Zapada’s testimony that Crespo-Jones called Zapada at the end of August 2007 and said that Diaz was almost ready to execute the drug deal. The district court admitted Zapada’s testimony about Crespo-Dones’ statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). R11 at 128, 145. This rule allows statements of a co-conspirator if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed, the conspiracy included the declarant and the defendant, and the statement was made as part of the conspiracy. See United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2006). We find no abuse of discretion in this matter. The evidence established that Crespo-Dones conspired with Diaz to purchase cocaine from Zapada. CrespoDones introduced Diaz as a friend and a drug dealer in order to reassure Zapada that Diaz was knowledgeable about their intended drug transaction and would be useful for future drug deals. Likewise, Crespo-Dones called Zapada during August 2007 to report on Diaz’s progress in securing the drug purchase money. Both of CrespoDones’ challenged statements were made in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. 11 Accordingly, Crespo-Dones’ statements were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) as statements by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy. See id. Diaz further asserts for the first time on appeal that admission of CrespoDones’ statements violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation because Crespo-Dones did not testify. Our review is limited to plain error as Diaz did not raise a constitutional objection in the district court. See United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Diaz must therefore demonstrate that an error occurred, it was plain, it affected his substantial rights, and it “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). No error, plain or otherwise, has been shown. Although the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of “testimonial” statements unless the witness is unavailable and there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination, the Clause does not bar the admission of non-testimonial statements. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004). The Supreme Court has noted that statements in furtherance of a conspiracy are “by their nature . . . not testimonial.” Id. at 56, 124 S. Ct. at 1367. We have likewise held that a co-conspirator’s statements to a confidential 12 informant, which are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), are not “testimonial” and thus do not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. Underwood, 446 F.3d at 1347-48. We explained in Underwood that a co-conspirator’s recorded conversations “clearly were not made under circumstances which would have led him reasonably to believe that his statement[s] would be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at 1347. Had the coconspirator known the true identity of the confidential informant, he would never have spoken to her in the first place. See id. The same holds true here. When Crespo-Dones referred to Diaz as a drug dealer or discussed the purchase of drugs, Crespo-Dones did not anticipate that his statements would be used at some future trial. Nor would he have made the statements if he knew that Zapada was a confidential informant. As such, CrespoDones’ statements were not “testimonial” in nature and their admission did not violate Diaz’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. See id. 3. Zapada’s Testimony That He Felt Afraid Diaz contends that the district court should have excluded as irrelevant Zapada’s testimony that he felt afraid when Diaz displayed his gun. We disagree. Evidence is relevant if it tends “to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action” more or less probable. Fed. R. 13 Evid. 401. Here, count three charged Diaz with carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Diaz asserted in his opening statement that he carried a firearm for personal safety because of his neighborhood. In anticipation of this defense, Zapada testified that Diaz displayed his gun during their final drug meeting and reiterated his previously-stated intent to “start shooting everybody” if anything went wrong. R11 at 150. Zapada’s testimony that he felt afraid was relevant to show that Diaz was carrying his gun for the purpose of protecting himself during the drug deal, not because he lived in a rough neighborhood. Because Zapada’s testimony was relevant to establish count three and to rebut Diaz’s anticipated defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Diaz’s objection. 4. Zapada’s Testimony About Recorded Conversations Diaz alleges that the district court improperly allowed Zapada to testify about his recorded conversations with Diaz and Crespo-Dones. Because no recordings or transcripts were admitted, Diaz contends that Zapada’s testimony was untrustworthy and prejudicial. We find no abuse of discretion. Diaz objected to Zapada’s testimony about “conversations that are memorialized on these CDs that are all in Spanish,” but he gave no basis for the objection. Id. at 153. On appeal, Diaz cites no legal precedent 14 for the proposition that a witness cannot testify about a recorded conversation if the recording or transcript of the recording is not introduced. The sole case he cites cuts against him, as it explains that Federal Rule of Evidence 602 permits a witness to testify about a matter within his personal knowledge. See United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1454 (11th Cir. 1996). This rule would apply here. No abuse of discretion has been shown. 5. Diaz’s Motives for Trial At trial, Diaz was asked by his attorney why he chose to go to trial. Diaz responded that, “I didn’t really choose to go to trial. I mean, I had a lawyer who really didn’t want to help me in the beginning. He had me – ” R11 at 253-54. The government objected and the court sustained the objection on the grounds that Diaz’s reasons not to go to trial or his communications with a lawyer were not relevant. Id. at 254. On appeal, Diaz submits his testimony was relevant to the truthfulness of his testimony about his confession. Diaz’s argument is without merit. Diaz was permitted to testify that he was coerced into confessing and to explain his reasons for wanting to testify at trial. Id. at 252-53. Diaz does not specify on appeal what further information he would have provided in response to the challenged question that would have been relevant to the veracity of his police interview. Nor does Diaz identify any other material fact 15 that would have been made more or less probable by his testimony regarding his motives for trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Diaz’s reasons for choosing to proceed to trial were irrelevant.