Opinion ID: 1308100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: indiscernible object exception

Text: In affirming the overruling of the Martins' motions for directed verdict, the Court of Appeals determined that the range of vision rule does not apply to the instant case because Roth should not have anticipated the presence of gravel at the intersection. The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the indiscernible object exception applied. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals examined two cases with similar facts, one of which applied the range of vision rule and the other of which applied the exception. In Burkey v. Royle, 233 Neb. 549, 446 N.W.2d 720 (1989), a passenger suffered injuries when the car she was riding in was rearended by a vehicle driven by the defendant. The collision occurred at an icy intersection when the defendant driver unexpectedly hit ice or a clump of snow, id. at 553, 446 N.W.2d at 723, causing her to slide into the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger. The district court overruled the plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability, and the jury found for the defendant. We reversed, holding that the range of vision rule required a directed verdict on the issue of liability and noting that the rule applies notwithstanding that a motorist's ability to maneuver the vehicle is impaired by the presence of ice or snow upon the road surface. Id. at 555, 446 N.W.2d at 724-25. We also disregarded the position that since the patch of ice or snow the defendant slid on was unexpected, the indiscernible object exception applied, because if the presence of ice or snow upon the road surface is known or should have reasonably been anticipated, the snow and ice are considered conditions rather than intervening causes and thus do not exonerate a motorist from the application of the range of vision rule. (Emphasis supplied.) Id at 556, 446 N.W.2d at 725. In light of the inclement weather conditions and the presence of ice and snow on the roads on the day in question, we determined that the defendant was necessarily aware of the slick conditions and that a directed verdict should therefore have been entered. One year after Burkey, we examined a similar factual situation in Edgerton v. Lawry, 235 Neb. 100, 453 N.W.2d 743 (1990). The record in that case showed that the defendant's vehicle slid on a patch of ice into the rear end of the plaintiffs stopped vehicle. The plaintiffs motion for directed verdict on liability was overruled and her case dismissed. Unlike the situation in Burkey, there was no ongoing storm nor were the streets covered with ice or snow at the time the defendant's car slid into the plaintiffs car. Moreover, the plaintiff testified that she had driven 25 miles prior to the collision and had not encountered any ice. Based upon these facts, we concluded that the range of vision rule did not apply, finding that the defendant had no reason to anticipate the presence of ice on the road until she actually slid on it. Roth asserts that the facts in the instant case are analogous to Edgerton insofar as he testified that he did not encounter any gravel prior to the intersection at the site of the collision. Roth therefore argues that he could not reasonably have expected the unusual accumulation of gravel, brief for appellee at 13, that caused him to rearend Martin's vehicle and that the indiscernible object exception to the range of vision rule applies. A review of the record, however, reveals that Roth also testified that he was aware that the city of Omaha routinely places gravel on the roads during times of inclement weather and that such gravel would remain on the streets after the ice or snow had melted. Roth also testified that there had been ice and snow 2 days before the accident and that he had encountered ice at certain locations on the day of the collision. Based upon this testimony, we cannot conclude that Roth was unaware that gravel would be on Omaha roads that day. Gravel, like snow or ice, is a condition of the road during periods of inclement weather and is not an intervening cause such that its presence prevents application of the range of vision rule. As such, we disagree with Roth's contention that he must be placed on specific notice, brief for appellee at 15, of gravel at intersections, for the test is whether Roth knew or should have known that gravel could be on the streets of Omaha, thereby altering driving conditions on the day of the collision. Roth nevertheless argues that the gravel he slid on was an unusual amount, such that a jury must decide whether he was liable for rear-ending Martin's vehicle. However, Roth offered no evidence as to the depth, volume, or specific amount of gravel he encountered, nor did he offer any explanation as to why he considered the amount of gravel at the intersection to be unusual. Regardless, having concluded that Roth should have been put on notice of the presence of gravel on the streets of Omaha on the day in question, we can discern no reason to make application of the range of vision rule dependent upon the amount of gravel Roth opines he encountered. Just as the depth of snow or ice is irrelevant for purposes of applying the rule, so, too, is the amount or depth of gravel. Indeed, as the amount of gravel present increases, so, too, should the driver's awareness of that condition. Accordingly, we disagree with Roth's contention that the indiscernible object exception applies to the facts of this case.