Opinion ID: 2279565
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Disputed Clause

Text: At issue here is the meaning of subdivide as used in paragraph (3) of the Easement. That provision reads, [t]he property shall not be subdivided, nor shall it ever be devised or conveyed except as a unit. As they did in the trial court, the Sagalyns argue that the language must be given its plain, ordinary and usual interpretation. They argue that the plain and ordinary meaning of subdivide, according to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, is to divide into building lots. They cite BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.1990) which states that subdivide means to divide a part into smaller parts and that subdivision means a division of a lot, tract or parcel or land into two or more lots, tracts, parcels or other divisions of land for sale or development. Thus, they contend that consolidating their record lots into a single lot designation with no change of boundaries is not a subdivision within the meaning of the Easement's terms. In this jurisdiction, we adhere to an objective law of contracts, which means that the written language will govern the parties' rights, unless it is not susceptible of clear meaning or absent other circumstances not pertinent here. See Minmar Builders, Inc. v. Beltway Excavators, Inc., 246 A.2d 784, 786 (D.C.1968) (quoting Slice v. Carozza Properties, 215 Md. 357, 137 A.2d 687, 693 (1958)).[W]ords [are] given their ordinary and usual meaning. National Symphony Orchestra Ass'n v. Konevsky, 44 A.2d 694, 695 (D.C.1945). As has often been stated, [t]he first step in contract interpretation is determining what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the disputed language meant. Intercounty Const. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 443 A.2d 29, 32 (D.C.1982) (citing District of Columbia Dep't of Hous. and Community Dev. v. Pitts, 370 A.2d 1377, 1380 (D.C.1977) and 1901 Wyoming Ave. Coop. Ass'n v. Lee, 345 A.2d 456, 461 (D.C.1975)). The presumption is that the reasonable person knows all the circumstances before and contemporaneous with the making of the [agreement]. Lee, 345 A.2d at 461-62 (footnote omitted); Intercounty, 443 A.2d at 32. [T]he reasonable person is bound by all usages which either party knows or has reason to know. Intercounty, 443 A.2d at 32; Lee, 345 A.2d at 462. Contrary to the Sagalyns' position, the Foundation argues that there is no plain meaning for the term subdivide as used in the Easement. It contends, consistent with the trial court's ruling, that subdivide as used here is a term of art, with a definite and express meaning, depending on the jurisdiction in which it is being used. We agree that the context in which the word is used may shape the term's meaning. We have recognized that the term may have different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. See, e.g., Acheson v. Sheaffer, 520 A.2d 318, 319-20 (D.C.1987). In Acheson, the issue was whether the division of several property lots and their subsequent combination into two lots of record constitutes a subdivision within the meaning of the Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act, D.C.Code §§ 5-1001 et seq. (1981)[Act]. 520 A.2d at 319 (footnote omitted). At the time, the Act defined subdivision as the division of a lot into 2 or more lots of record, [6] while the Subdivision Regulations, Art. I, § 2(j) (1967), also included assembly of lots within its definition. [7] Id. There, we held that the action of the Surveyor in aggregating the parts of the four lots into two of record did not fall within the Act's definition. Id. at 320. Thus, it is apparent that the term subdivide is susceptible to other meanings beyond its dictionary definition which the Sagalyns advance, and may be informed by the context in which the word is used. Where, as here, the disputed term is reasonably susceptible of different interpretations, the provision is considered to be ambiguous. Lee, supra, 345 A.2d at 461 n. 7. In interpreting the term, we look to the rules of contract construction. [8] See Intercounty, supra, 443 A.2d at 32. In this case, the trial court found that subdivide must be given the same meaning as found in the District of Columbia Planning and Development regulation which defines subdivision as the division or assembly of land into one or more lots of record. 10 DCMR § 2799.3. Here, the Sagalyns filed a plat with the Office of the Surveyor to assemble the lots into one record lot as a prerequisite to obtaining a building permit. Under the definition provided in § 2799.3, this constituted an assembly of land into one ... lot[] of record. Id. As the trial court determined, it is reasonable to conclude that the parties knew or should have known the meaning of subdivide in real estate at the time the Easement was created. Since the parties are bound by [the] usages [of a term] which either party knows or has reason to know, Intercounty, supra, 443 A.2d at 32, it cannot be said that the trial court erred in interpreting subdivided according to the definition set forth in the real estate regulations. The trial court's interpretation of the term is supported by the affidavit of a private surveyor, Langelan, who stated that [c]ommon usage of the term `subdivision' in the District of Columbia includes both the division of lots and the assembly of lots or parts thereof into one or more other lots. The Sagalyns offered no counter-affidavits refuting the claim. [9]