Opinion ID: 2994051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Capital-Murder Conviction and Sentence

Text: ¶19. For a criminal defendant to be deemed mentally competent to stand trial, he must have “the sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 8 understanding . . . and . . . a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 788-89, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824, 825 (1960) (per curiam); Coleman v. State, 127 So. 3d 161, 164 (Miss. 2013). This Court further has defined a competent defendant as one: (1) who is able to perceive and understand the nature of the proceedings; (2) who is able to rationally communicate with his attorney about the case; (3) who is able to recall relevant facts; (4) who is able to testify in his own defense if appropriate; and (5) whose ability to satisfy the foregoing criteria is commensurate with the severity of the case. Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 728 (Miss. 2008). ¶20. It is a violation of a criminal defendant’s right to due process to try or convict him while he is incompetent. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966); Smith v. State, 149 So. 3d 1027, 1031 (Miss. 2014). This is because such action fundamentally impinges upon his right to a fair trial. Pate, 383 U.S. at 385. The United States Supreme Court has held that “the prohibition [against trying or convicting an incompetent defendant] is fundamental to an adversary system of justice.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975); Smith, 149 So. 3d at 1031. ¶21. To ensure this constitutional right is properly guarded, this Court has adopted Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 9.06, which provides: If before or during trial the court, of its own motion or upon motion of an attorney, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant to submit to a mental examination by some competent psychiatrist selected by the court . . . . After the examination the court shall conduct a hearing to determine if the defendant is competent to stand trial. After hearing all the evidence, the court shall weigh the evidence and make a determination of whether the defendant 9 is competent to stand trial. If the court finds that the defendant is competent to stand trial, then the court shall make the finding a matter of record and the case will then proceed to trial. If the court finds that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, then the court shall commit the defendant to the Mississippi State Hospital or other appropriate mental health facility. URCCC 9.06 (emphasis added). This rule requires that, once the trial court has reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent, the trial court must order a mental evaluation followed by a competency hearing to determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial. Sanders v. State, 9 So. 3d 1132, 1137 (Miss. 2009). ¶22. In cases like today’s, in which a mental evaluation has been ordered, this Court has held that this is a per se showing that the trial court had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Id. As a result, once a mental evaluation is ordered, a competency hearing is mandatory. Id.; Smith, 149 So. 3d at 1033. ¶23. When a mental evaluation is ordered but no competency hearing is conducted, this Court has held that this is reversible error, unless the purpose of Rule 9.06 has been satisfied under the circumstances. Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 730 (Miss. 2008). In Hearn, the trial court ordered a mental examination, which was conducted, but the judge failed to hold a formal competency hearing. However, at trial, the State’s examining doctor testified as to Hearn’s competence and was subject to cross-examination by Hearn. This Court stated that this satisfied the intent of Rule 9.06 and found no error. Id. ¶24. In another case similar to the current one, a plurality of the Court found that when the trial court judge fails to hold a competency hearing, the purpose of Rule 9.06 cannot be met by a retroactive hearing. Coleman v. State, 127 So. 3d 161, 167 (Miss. 2013). In that case, 10 Coleman was granted a hearing after his conviction to determine his competency. But, at the hearing, Coleman put on almost no evidence suggesting he was incompetent. Id. at 164. Nevertheless, a plurality of this Court, concerned with the inherent dangers and difficulties in holding retrospective competency hearings, found such hearings failed to meet the standard set forth in Hearn. Id. at 167. That is, the purpose of Rule 9.06 is not met by a retrospective hearing. Id. ¶25. More recently, in Smith v. State, this Court recognized the plurality opinion in Coleman as controlling. Smith, 149 So. 3d at 1035. In that case, the trial judge ordered a competency evaluation but failed to hold a hearing on the matter. Smith raised this issue in a motion for post-conviction relief, and the State acknowledged the error. The State, however, argued that the proper remedy was a retrospective hearing. Id. This Court disagreed and provided that “that remedy is unavailable” under Coleman. Id. Instead, the Court found that where the purpose of a court-ordered mental evaluation was to determine competency to stand trial, the defendant “must be either retried or institutionalized following a mental evaluation and competency hearing under Rule 9.06.” Id. ¶26. Here, the State argues Hollie is not entitled to a competency determination or new trial because Hollie waived his right to a competency hearing by pleading guilty. Precedent does not support this position. The United States Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that “it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently ‘waive’ his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial.” Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966); Sanders v. State, 9 So. 3d 11 1132, 1135 (Miss. 2009). The Supreme Court found it unconstitutional to deprive a criminal defendant of a competency hearing where competency is at issue. Pate, 383 U.S. at 385. In that case, the defendant raised the issues of competency to stand trial and insanity, but the trial court determined a hearing on these matters was unnecessary because the State introduced an expert’s report finding Robinson competent to stand trial. Id. at 376, 384. ¶27. On appeal, the prosecution in Pate, like the State and dissent here, argued that because Robinson failed to object before the trial court, the issue was waived. Id. at 384. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, finding “Robinson’s constitutional rights were abridged by his failure to receive an adequate hearing on his competence to stand trial[.]” Id. at 386. The Supreme Court also found that, while Robinson’s demeanor before the trial court was relevant to determining his competency, “it cannot be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on that very issue.” Id. (citing Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 76 S. Ct. 440, 100 L. Ed. 835 (1956)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that, because Robinson raised a legitimate concern regarding his competency to stand trial, it was reversible error not to hold a hearing on the same, despite the lack of a contemporaneous objection. See id. at 384-387. Consequently, the State’s and the dissent’s arguments are without merit. See id. ¶28. Moreover, this Court also has rejected this argument. In Sanders v. State, a case in which the Court cited Pate approvingly, the majority held that, where a competency evaluation is ordered, the trial court “‘shall conduct a hearing to determine if the defendant is competent’ and . . . ‘shall make the finding a matter of record.’” Sanders, 9 So. 3d at. 1136 (quoting URCCC 9.06). Accordingly, the Court found where there is no hearing and the 12 record fails to sufficiently demonstrate competency to stand trial, this is reversible error. Id. The dissent in Sanders, however, made the same argument as the dissent here makes, specifically, that failure to make a contemporaneous objection at trial waives this issue. Id. at 1142. A majority of this Court rejected that view, and as the Court previously has ruled on this very issue, we decline to deviate from the holding in Sanders. ¶29. We also note the dissent relies considerably on Dr. Lott’s report. Here, Hollie argues on appeal that Dr. Lott’s opinion that he was competent to stand trial failed to consider Hollie’s taped confession, and that Dr. Lott did not have Hollie’s full medical record. Dr. Lott’s findings, however, were never introduced into evidence prior to the court accepting Hollie’s guilty plea. Moreover, even if Dr. Lott’s report is considered, the United States Supreme Court has held that such testimony is “some evidence of [a defendant’s] ability to assist in his defense,” but alone it is not dispositive of the issue. Pate, 383 U.S. at 386. ¶30. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we reverse Hollie’s conviction of capital murder and vacate his sentence of death. The trial court judge ordered a mental evaluation but never conducted a hearing on the matter. This is reversible error, and we now remand this case to the trial court to determine Hollie’s competence to stand trial. See Smith, 149 So. 3d at 1035; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105(6) (Supp. 2014) (requiring the Court to review the validity of a death sentence and factual substantiation of the verdict). And, as this Court provided in Smith, Hollie must be “retried or institutionalized following a mental evaluation and competency hearing under Rule 9.06.” Smith, 149 So. 3d at 1035.