Opinion ID: 2325691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definition of Deadly Force

Text: [¶ 7] Preston argues that the definitions of deadly force and defense of premises are unconstitutionally vague, because the in the direction of another person element of the definition of deadly force is impermissibly ambiguous. [7] Preston did not raise this issue at trial, so we review it for obvious error. See M.R.Crim. P. 52(b); State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶¶ 29, 30, 782 A.2d 319, 328. [¶ 8] A statute should define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. State v. McLaughlin, 2002 ME 55, ¶ 9, 794 A.2d 69, 72 (quotation marks omitted). When confronted with a vagueness challenge to a statute, we will test the statute in the circumstances of the particular case, and we will consider whether the statutory language was sufficiently clear to give the defendant adequate notice that his conduct was proscribed. State v. Aboda, 2010 ME 125, ¶ 15, 8 A.3d 719, 724. [N]ot every ambiguity, uncertainty or imprecision of language in a statutory pattern rises to the level of being unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Id. ¶ 9, 8 A.3d at 722 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 9] Deadly force is physical force that a person uses with the intent of causing, or that a person knows to create a substantial risk of causing, death or serious bodily injury. 17-A M.R.S. § 2(8) (2010). Further, intentionally, knowingly or recklessly discharging a firearm in the direction of another person ... constitutes deadly force. Id. The court instructed the jury that discharging a firearm in the direction of another person constitutes deadly force and instructed the jury on defense of premises using language nearly identical to the statutory language. See State v. Martin, 2007 ME 23, ¶ 6, 916 A.2d 961, 964 (stating that a court does not need to confine its instructions to the exact language of the criminal code (quotation marks omitted)). [¶ 10] Preston told a detective that he fired into a woodpile in the direction of the power line where he had seen the victim walking. The deadly force definition is not vague or unclear when applied to the facts in this case. See State v. Witham, 2005 ME 79, ¶ 11, 876 A.2d 40, 43 (stating that a court considers a challenged statutory definition in the factual context of the particular case). [¶ 11] Preston also argues that the jury verdictsnot guilty on the charge of reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon and guilty on the charge of criminal threatening with a dangerous weaponare inconsistent and illustrate the problem with the definitions and the resulting injustice to him. We do not agree that the verdicts cannot be logically reconciled; we thus reject Preston's assertions that they are inconsistent. [8] State v. Finnemore, 1997 ME 44, ¶ 6, 7, 690 A.2d 979, 980-81.