Opinion ID: 2623199
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second element of stare decisis: more good than harm requirement

Text: The landlords' failure to convincingly demonstrate Swanner's original or current unsoundness makes the second requirement for overriding the stare decisis rule academic. But it seems worthwhile to emphasize that even if the landlords could establish good reasons to suppose that Swanner was wrongly decided or is currently unsound, we would not override the doctrine of stare decisis unless they also clearly established that more good than harm would result from overruling that decision. [49] In our view, the potential benefits of overruling Swanner have not been clearly established here. The Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in this case sheds useful light on this point. That decision aptly summarized the serious disadvantages of attempting to resolve the difficult constitutional issues raised by the landlords without having a particularized controversy and a solid framework of facts: The manner in which the intersection of marital status discrimination and the First Amendment is presented here, devoid of any specific factual context, renders this case unfit for judicial resolution. The record before us is remarkably thin and sketchy, consisting only of a few conclusory affidavits. A concrete factual situation is necessary to delineate the boundaries of what conduct the government may or may not regulate. And yet, the landlords ask us to declare Alaska laws unconstitutional, in the absence of any identifiable tenants and with no concrete factual scenario that demonstrates how the laws, as applied, infringe their constitutional rights. This case is a classic one for invoking the maxim that we do not decide `constitutional questions in a vacuum.' .... Moreover, by being forced to defend the housing laws in a vacuum and in the absence of any particular victims of discrimination, the State and the City would suffer hardship were we to adjudicate this case now.[ [50] ] Of course we recognize that the federal court discussed these prudential concerns in connection with the threshold issue of ripeness for judicial review  a separate procedural matter that we have resolved in the landlords' favor. Yet the federal court's concerns seem equally relevant to our stare decisis analysis, since they weigh heavily against any hasty assumption that we would do more good than harm by attempting to reconsider Swanner in this case as it currently stands. To the extent that they are relevant to our stare decisis analysis, then, the federal court's well-founded concerns deserve to be heeded, even though Alaska's lenient rule of standing has led us to disagree with the federal court's decision on ripeness. After all, we can see no good reason to hold that the landlords' undeniable right to pursue their claims in Alaska's courts should lighten the usual burden that any litigant must bear to overcome the force of precedent under stare decisis.