Opinion ID: 771615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Walton v. Arizona

Text: 88 The Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge to the trial judge's role in a state capital sentencing scheme in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990). 33 In Walton, the Court held constitutional a statutory scheme in Arizona that permitted the trial judge, rather than a jury, to find the presence of aggravating circumstances. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the presence of aggravating circumstances functioned as a necessary element of a death sentence and required a jury trial. See id. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 89 The Supreme Court in Apprendi was divided over whether Walton survives Apprendi. The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, distinguished Walton from Apprendi. See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2366. The majority opinion in Apprendi, referring to Walton, suggested that under the bifurcated Arizona scheme, the defendant was death-eligible once the jury found him guilty of first degree murder. Id. (describing Walton as holding that once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed) (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 257, n.2. (Scalia, J. dissenting)). 90 The concurring opinion of Justice Thomas acknowledged the tension between Walton and Apprendi, but found that it was a question for another day. See id . at 2380. 91 Dissenting Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Breyer argued that Apprendi directly conflicts with Walton: 92 The distinction of Walton offered by the Court today is baffling, to say the least. The key to that distinction is the Court's claim that, in Arizona, the jury makes all of the findings necessary to expose the defendant to a death sentence. As explained above, that claim is demonstrably untrue. A defendant convicted of first-degree murder in Arizona cannot receive a death sentence unless a judge makes the factual determination that a statutory aggravating factor exists. Without that critical finding, the maxi mum sentence to which the defendant is exposed is life imprisonment, and not the death penalty. 93 Id. at 2388 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 94 Thus, it appears that four justices considered Walton to survive Apprendi, 34 one justice deferred the question, and four justices expressed the view that Apprendi overruled Walton. In the absence of a majority position about the continued viability of Walton, I turn for guidance to the Court's reasoning in Apprendi. 95 The reasoning of Apprendi, that any assessment of facts that increases the maximum penalty must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, persuades me that a jury must find the presence of an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before a death sentence can be inflicted upon a defendant convicted of first degree murder under Idaho's bifurcated statutory scheme. 96