Opinion ID: 2106692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Original Subject and Multiple Subjects

Text: Second, Rentschler argues that House Bill 974, the 1990 bill that amended section 558.011, changed the original purpose of that section because it amended a sentencing statute, changing it to a procedural statute in violation of article III, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution (Point III). He also alleges that House Bill 974 contained multiple subjects violating of article III, section 23 because it deals with both sentencing and conditional release (Point IV). The use of these procedural limitations [secs. 21 through 23] to attack the constitutionality of statutes is not favored. Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Mo. banc 1997). This Court will resolve doubts in favor of the procedural and substantive validity of an act of the legislature. Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. banc 1994). As Judge Holstein observed in Hammerschmidt's concurrence, there is necessarily a time limitation for these constitutional challenges to strike a balance between the citizen's right to insist that the legislature comply with constitutional procedural safeguards . . . and the strong presumption of regularity of legislative proceedings that promotes stability and finality of legislative enactments. Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 105 (Holstein, J. concurring). [2] A claim must be raised not later than the adjournment of the next full regular legislative session following any person being aggrieved. Id. In no event could such claims be raised later than ten years after the bill complained of becomes effective. Id. citing sec. 516.110(3), RSMo 1986. [3] Here, Rentschler complains about House Bill 974, a 1990 legislative enactment, well outside any reasonable time to bring these claims. [4] His claim is time-barred equitably. However, even if this Court were to reach the substantive merits of his claims, Rentschler articulates no cognizable claim to relief. Rentschler's argument under article III, section 21 misconstrues the nature of that constitutional provision. That provision provides that no bill shall be so amended in its passage through either house as to change its original purpose. Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 21. A proper claim requires comparison between the purpose of the bill as introduced and the bill as actually passed. Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 31, 38 (Mo. banc 1982). Rentschler makes no such comparison. Instead, he claims that House Bill 974 changed the purpose of the enacted 1978 version of section 568.011. This claim is without merit. Section 23 mandates that no bill shall contain more than one subject. Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 23. The test to determine if a bill contains more than one subject is whether all provisions of the bill fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection therewith or are incidents or means to accomplish its purpose. Stroh Brewery, 954 S.W.2d at 327; Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 102; Akin v. Director of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Mo. banc 1996). To determine the purpose, the Court looks first to the title of the bill. Stroh Brewery, 954 S.W.2d at 327; Carmack v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Agriculture, 945 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Mo. banc 1997). The title gives a sequence of statutes being repealed and replaced, all relating to the department of corrections. 1990 Mo. Laws 749. Rentschler argues that because the bill deals with both sentencing terms and conditional release terms, the bill contains multiple subjects. This is not so. Both conditional release and sentencing are subjects relating to the department of corrections, the overall purpose and subject matter of the bill. H.B. 974 does not violate section 23 of article III. Rentschler fails to timely assert his claim and fails to meet his burden overcoming the presumption that H.B. 974 followed constitutionally proper procedure. Both points are denied.