Opinion ID: 2585993
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosing Privileged Communications to a Third Party

Text: The second way in which a client might impliedly waive the attorney-client privilege is to disclose privileged communications to a third party. See, e.g., Wesp, 33 P.3d at 198 (noting that if a communication to which the privilege has previously attached is subsequently disclosed to a third party, then the protection afforded by the privilege is impliedly waived); Lanari, 827 P.2d at 500 (holding that statements made initially in confidence to an attorney lose the shield of the attorney-client privilege if the statements are subsequently disclosed to third parties); Fearnley v. Fearnley, 44 Colo. 417, 430, 98 P. 819, 824 (1908) (citing Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470, 9 S.Ct. 125, 32 L.Ed. 488 (1888)) (finding that a client's disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege waives the privilege); see also People v. Medina, 72 P.3d 405, 408 (Colo.App. 2003), cert. denied (June 30, 2003) (holding that, where a client authorized his attorney to deliver to his victim's family a letter containing inculpatory statements, he waived the privilege with respect to the letter). There was no such disclosure to a third party here. It is true that, as Trujillo argued below, Gomez gave recorded statements to a third partythat is, to the prosecution. Nowhere, however, does Trujillo argue that the statements given by Gomez to the prosecution contained privileged information. Nor does the record before us indicate that Gomez's statements to the prosecution contained any privileged information. [2] Rather, it appears that Gomez's statements consisted of only her factual assertions regarding the alleged robbery at issue. Such statements of fact are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. See Gordon v. Boyles, 9 P.3d 1106, 1123 (Colo.2000) (noting that the privilege protects only the communications to the attorney; it does not protect any underlying and otherwise unprivileged facts that are incorporated into a client's communication to his attorney); see also State v. Dixon, 668 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Mo.Ct. App.1984) (Where a party does not testify as to privileged communications with his attorney, he does not waive the privileged character of the communications.). Here, the record shows that the statements made by Gomez to the prosecution contained only factual assertions regarding the underlying crime charged and contained no privileged communications. Because Gomez did not disclose any privileged information to the prosecution by virtue of giving a statement about the alleged robbery, her statement did not waive the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262, 296 N.Y.S.2d 327, 244 N.E.2d 29, 35 (1968) ([T]estimony about an event, even when the witness is protected by immunity, should not be construed as a waiver of the privilege, merely because the subject matter of the testimony may also have been discussed in the privileged communication.); State v. Hollins, 184 N.W.2d 676, 678-79 (Iowa 1971) (quoting from, and holding in accord with, People v. Lynch ). By issuing the subpoena duces tecum to Pauly, Trujillo hopes to discover whether Gomez made statements to Pauly that do not appear in, or seem to contradict, her statements made to the prosecution. In this manner, Trujillo seeks precisely the kind of information protected by the attorney-client privilege; that is, he seeks to require Pauly to disclose what Gomez told him. Trujillo's attempt to gain access to such information where Gomez has not waived the privilege flies in the face of the traditional notion of the protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege: The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, What did you say or write to the attorney? but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (citation omitted). Just as the client cannot be compelled to testify about what she told her attorney, the attorney cannot be compelled to produce documents from his file that reflect what the client told him. In sum, Gomez neither placed any privileged communications at issue nor disclosed any privileged communications to a third party. We thus conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that Gomez impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege. There having been no waiver of the privilege, the trial court's order for in camera review of Pauly's file was unwarranted. The motions to quash filed by Pauly should have been granted.