Opinion ID: 199000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Puerto Rico's One-Year Statute of Limitations

Text: 22 This is a diversity suit governed by the law of Puerto Rico. The parties agree that the relevant statute of limitations is provided by article 1868 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, which is controlling for civil tort actions filed pursuant to article 1802. See 31 L.P.R.A. § 5298. Article 1868 bars any action for recovery of non-contractual damages brought more than one year from the time the aggrieved person has knowledge of the injury. See id. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held that a plaintiff has knowledge of an injury when he has (1) notice of the injury and (2) notice of the person who caused it. Colon Prieto v. Geigel, 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. 313, 330, 115 P.R. Dec. 232, 246 (P.R. 1984). 23 We first consider the notice of the injury requirement. Notice of theinjury occurs when there 'exist some outward or physical signs through which the aggrieved party may become aware and realize that he has suffered an injurious aftereffect, which when known becomes a damage even if at the time its full scope and extent cannot be weighed.' Kaiser v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Delgado Rodrguez v. Nazario de Ferrer, 21 P.R. Offic. Trans. 342, 356, 121 P.R. Dec. 347, 360, (P.R. 1988)). Once a plaintiff is on notice of the injury, the plaintiff may not wait for his injury to reach its final degree of development and postpone the running of the period of limitation according to his subjective appraisal and judgment. Ortiz v. Municipio De Orocovis, 13 P.R. Offic. Trans. 619, 622, 113 P.R. Dec. 484, 487 (P.R. 1982). 24 The second prong of the Colon Prieto test needs little explanation: 'Notice of the person who caused the injury' is required . . . so that the injured person 'may know who to sue.' Kaiser, 872 F.2d at 516 (quoting Colon Prieto, 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 330). As we have previously indicated, [t]he key inquiry under this prong of the knowledge requirement is whether plaintiff knew or with the degree of diligence required by law would have known whom to sue. Id. (citations and internal quotation omitted); see also Rodrguez-Surs v. Montesinos, 123 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997). 25 The case law indicates that under the Colon Prieto test a plaintiff is held accountable for both true knowledge and deemed knowledge. In Rodrguez-Surs, this Court explained: 26 First, the concept of true knowledge applies where a plaintiff is actually aware of all the necessary facts and the existence of a likelihood of a legal cause of action. Second, concepts of notice and deemed knowledge apply. Under these concepts a plaintiff's subjective awareness is measured against the level of awareness that the plaintiff, having been put on notice as to certain facts and having exercised reasonable care regarding a potential claim, should have acquired. 27 123 F.3d at 14. Consequently, actual knowledge is not required where, by due diligence, such knowledge would likely have been acquired. Villarini-Garca v. Hospital Del Maestro, Inc., 8 F.3d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Rodrguez-Surs, 123 F.3d at 16 (Once a plaintiff is made aware of facts sufficient to put her on notice that she has a potential tort claim, she must pursue that claim with reasonable diligence, or risk being held to have relinquished her right to pursue it later, after the limitation period has run.). 28 Finally, [i]f a plaintiff brings an action more than a year after the injury took place, she bears the burden of proving that she lacked the requisite 'knowledge' at the relevant times. Hidge v. Parke Davis & Co., 833 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Iluminada Rivera Encarnacion v. Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 13 Offic. Trans. 498, 501, 113 P.R. Dec. 383, 385 (P.R. 1982)); see also Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 887 (1st Cir. 1993); Kaiser, 872 F.2d at 516. 29 In this case, there is no dispute that the damages alleged by appellants occurred in 1988, more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the only question is whether appellants have demonstrated that they lacked the requisite legal knowledge of who caused their injury prior to the running of the statutory period. See, e.g., Hidge, 833 F.2d at 7. In their opposition to DuPont's motion for summary judgment, appellants did not dispute that by 1988 they had notice of their injury, the alleged damage to their papaya crops. Appellants argued, however, that they did not know that Benlate was responsible for their injury until sometime in 1992, when their chemical supplier, Angel Rivera, advised them that Benlate was beingrecalled. 2 In addition, appellants argued that (1) the first Benlate-related claim initiated in Puerto Rico against DuPont was filed on April 23, 1991, and (2) they could not have reasonably foreseen in 1988 that their damages were caused by Benlate. 30 Appellants' contention that they lacked the requisite knowledge of who caused their injury prior to 1992 is contradicted by the deposition testimony of Miguel A. Colon-Capeles, which indicates that by December 20, 1989 appellants were preparing a claim against DuPont. As outlined above, Colon-Capeles testified that Armando Torres requested a certification of the papayas he had purchased from appellants in 1986, 1987, and 1988 because they had a claim against the DuPont company concerning a chemical which had apparently affected the sowing and the farms and the lands in which they had their 'papaya' farms. In response to a follow-up question, Colon-Capeles reiterated that Armando Torres requested that he needed a certification what he had sold to me during the year so as to be able to support his case. 31 After DuPont moved for summary judgment, appellants attempted to rebut Colon-Capeles's deposition testimony by filing an affidavit from him dated July 10, 1998. In that affidavit, Colon-Capeles states [a]fter careful reflection, I am unable to recall the reason for which Mr. Torres requested that I provide him with invoices in 1989. Appellants also filed an affidavit from Armando Torres dated July 8, 1998, stating that he had requested the invoices in order to submit a claim for federal assistance (FEMA) relating to Hurricane Hugo. 32 The district court struck both affidavits on the basis that appellants failed to justify the suggested changes in testimony and have likewise failed to create a genuine issue of credibility. Torres II, slip op. at 11. The court reasoned: 33 The contested affidavits were presented after DuPont moved for summary judgment. No satisfactory explanation is provided in either of the affidavits as to why the prior testimonies given by Colon Capeles and Armando Torres changed . . . . Without an appropriate explanation as to why the testimony changed, there are no facts suggesting why a credibility question exists and the nonmoving party should not be allowed to manufacture a question of fact to delay resolution of the suit. 34 Id. (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2726 (3d ed. 1998)). The district court's determination is amply supported by the law and the record. 35 It is settled that [w]hen an interested witness has given clear answers to unambiguous questions, he cannot create a conflict and resist summary judgment with an affidavit that is clearly contradictory, but does not give a satisfactory explanation of why the testimony is changed. Colantuoni v. Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Slowiak v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993); Trans-Orient Marine v. Star Trading & Marine, 925 F.2d 566, 572 (2d Cir. 1991); Davidson & Jones Dev. v. Elmore Dev., 921 F.2d 1343, 1352 (6th Cir. 1991). 36 Here, as in Colantuoni, appellants offered the affidavits of Miguel Colon-Capeles and Armando Torres only after defendants had filed motions for summary judgment. 44 F.3d at 5. Notably, the post-summary judgment affidavit of Colon-Capeles does not indicate that there was any confusion at the time of his deposition testimony, see, e.g., Colantuoni, 44 F.3d at 5,nor does it allege that the prior testimony was in error. In fact, Colon-Capeles's affidavit makes no reference to the contrary statements in his deposition at all. As the district court indicated, there is simply nothing in the record that provides any explanation for why Colon-Capeles changed his testimony. See Torres II, slip op. at 10. 37 Armando Torres's July 8, 1998 affidavit fares no better. It states: 38 On or about December 20, 1989, I asked Miguel Colon [Capeles] of Cheche Tropical Products to provide me with certifications of the amount of papaya that he purchased from Agro Industrias from 1986 to 1988 in order to submit a claim for federal assistance (FEMA) relating to Hurricane Hugo. I did not ask Mr. Colon [Capeles] to prepare the certification for a claim against DuPont since I did not become aware, until the summer of 1992, that my use of Benlate 50 DF was responsible for the loss of my papaya plantations. 39 However, at his January 23, 1998 deposition, Armando Torres testified that he either never made a claim to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or, at the very least, he did not recall whether he had made a claim to FEMA. In addition, appellants' responses to DuPont's interrogatories contain two admissions that flatly contradict Armando Torres's July 8, 1998 affidavit. First, appellants stated that Hurricane Hugo damaged plantains. The certifications prepared by Colon-Capeles refer to papaya, not plantains. Second, appellants stated that as of 1989, the year Hurricane Hugo struck Puerto Rico, they were no longer planting papaya. Again, Armando Torres's affidavit provides no explanation for these contradictions. 40 This Court review[s] the district court's decision as to 'the evidentiary materials it will consider in deciding a motion for summary judgment' only for 'a clear abuse of discretion.' Lennon v. Rubin, 166 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting EEOC v. Green, 76 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1996)). In this case, we see no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision to strike the affidavits of Miguel Colon-Capeles and Armando Torres. See Colantuoni, 44 F.3d at 4-5. 41 Consequently, as the district court correctly determined, Colon-Capeles's deposition testimony is uncontradicted and clearly indicates that appellants possessed the requisite legal knowledge of their injury and who caused it prior to the statutory period. While we believe that this evidence is sufficient to dispose of this case, we note that there is ample additional evidence in the record to support the district court's ruling. This evidence includes: (1) Armando Torres's testimony that, in April 1988, appellants fumigated their entire papaya plantations with Benlate; (2) Armando Torres's testimony that the injury to the papaya crops was evident during the one (1) week following this spraying and, within a month thereafter, we already became aware that something more deep rooted had occurred to the crops; (3) the testimony of Angel Rivera, appellants' chemical supplier, stating that after the application of Benlate to appellants' papaya the plants looked unnourished, yellowish, the fruit falling to the ground without reaching ripeness; (4) Rivera's further testimony that Armando Torres told him that appellants' crops had become unwell after they were sprayed with Benlate; (5) the testimony of Eugenio Toro, an expert from the Agricultural Extension Service, stating that by late 1988 or early 1989 he had determined that something was happening physiologically in the [papaya] plant[s], possibly an intoxication, and that he had ruled out disease, lack-of-nutrient problems, and excessive rainfall as potential causes of the damage; and (6) the testimony of Ventura Cruz-Sanchez, a farm worker employed by appellants, stating that after the plants were sprayed with Benlate the following day we had to pull a machete and start cutting them up. Based on this evidence, in addition to the testimony of Colon-Capeles, the district court held that appellants possessed the necessary information of whom to sue or that with the degree of diligence required by law they should have known who to sue by 1988. See Torres II, slip op. at 12. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's ruling that the statute of limitations was triggered in 1988 and that therefore appellants' claims are time-barred under Article 1868. See 31 L.P.R.A. § 5298. 42 In reaching this determination, we are in agreement with the district court that whether or not appellants received notice that Benlate was being recalled in 1992 or that the first Benlate claim was filed in 1991 is irrelevant. Once appellants were put on notice of a potential legal cause of action, the statute of limitations began to run. Additional information that appellants may or may not have later acquired is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.