Opinion ID: 774701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of the Rumors on the Verdict

Text: 42 All of this said, we do not reach the question of Bibbins' vitality in the wake of AEDPA because, even without considering the jurors' subjective statements (in keeping with Bibbins), we conclude that the Appellate Division did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent in rejecting petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim. 6 We base our conclusion instead solely on the juror's objective statements, see United States v. Calbas, 821 F.2d 887, 896 n.9 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that [t]he district court was entitled to avail itself of... [its] finding[], based on post-verdict juror testimony, that the jury preempted discussion of [extra-record] information in concluding that [petitioner] had not been prejudiced because, [w]hile... the trial court's post-verdict determination of extra-record prejudice must be an objective one,... it may appropriately consider the circumstances surrounding introduction of that information in making such a determination); see also Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the extent to which the jur[y] discussed and considered extra-record information is a factor the court should consider in making prejudice determination). 43 The jurors' objective statements about how they heard... the prejudicial information not admitted into evidence, Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117, and the circumstances surrounding introduction of that information, Calbas, 821 F.2d at 896 n.9, clearly indicate that the extent to which the jur[y] discussed and considered [the rumors], Sassounian, 230 F.3d at 1109, was quite negligible. When questioned by the trial court immediately after he had submitted the note about the rumors, juror Wolford surmised that one or two jurors other than he and juror Kelly had actually heard the rumors. This surmise was corroborated by the jurors' post-verdict objective statements. Juror Holland testified that he had heard that petitioner had been in trouble before, and juror Arciero testified that she had heard that petitioner had had some trouble with the law. None of the remaining eight jurors, however, reported hearing rumors about petitioner's prior bad acts. Furthermore, when questioned by the trial court after the verdict was rendered, Wolford explained that the rumor was voiced at one end of the table and discussions were going on, myself and of course Miss Kelly that did hear it felt very strongly it should be brought forth. At that point somebody said it was just a rumor.... I think we both then basically, in discussing, it was never mentioned again what it was, what was said to start the whole damn business going. And I just said I don't care. I got to bring it forth. This evidence supports the reasonable conclusion that as soon as Wolford and Kelly heard the rumors about petitioner's prior bad acts, they proposed that interjection of the rumors should be reported to the judge. This gave rise to a discussion among the jurors about whether such a report was necessary. This discussion appears to be what Wolford is referring to as the whole damn business. Although discussion of Wolford and Kelly's proposal then ensued and Wolford and Kelly ultimately sent a note about the rumors to the trial court, nothing in the juror's testimony or the note suggests that the actual subject matter of the rumors was a part of that discussion. This appears to be what Wolford meant when he stated that in discussing, it was never mentioned again what it was, what was said to start the whole damn business going. 44 Additional support for the conclusion that the jury did not consider the rumors in any meaningful way is provided by the fact that, following the note in question, the jury requested that the entire jury charge be read again. Hence, the jurors again heard that their verdict was to be based solely on the evidence admitted at trial. Furthermore, there was no rush to judgment following the introduction of the rumors. See Sassounian, 230 F.3d at 1110 (Lengthy deliberations preceding the misconduct and a relatively quick verdict following the misconduct strongly suggest prejudice.). Subsequent to the rumor incident - which occurred on the second of five days of deliberations - the jury deliberated three additional days. During this three-day period, the jury requested readback of the testimony of six different witnesses. 45 Finally, the prosecution introduced a considerable amount of circumstantial evidence tending to show that petitioner had murdered the victim. As the Appellate Division noted, there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt, including his lie to the police that he had not been with the victim on the night of the homicide, his attempt to create a false alibi, his altering of his appearance after the homicide, his vacuuming of his car the day after the homicide, and his spontaneous statement to police that you don't have me good enough. Loliscio, 187 A.D.2d at 176. Furthermore, there was evidence the jury could credit that petitioner was uninjured before the homicide but had deep scratches on his arm thereafter. Id. And most importantly, there was evidence that the victim had been killed sometime between 12:15 A.M. - the time at which the victim called petitioner's home looking for petitioner, according to petitioner's mother - and 2:30 A.M. The Medical Examiner testified that the victim had died no later than 2:30 A.M.. Taken together with petitioner's ultimate admission that he had sexual intercourse with the victim between 12:15 A.M. and 1:00 A.M. - at which latter time petitioner claimed he had dropped off the victim at a 7-11 store - this timing evidence supported petitioner's guilt. Id. Petitioner was left to arguing that some other person (or persons) managed to kill the victim and transport her to the Cove sometime between 1:00 A.M. and 2:30 A.M. The jury can hardly be faulted for not accepting this defense theory. 46 In sum, we hold that the Appellate Division, in rejecting petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim, did not unreasonably apply the federal constitutional law clearly established in Turner and Chapman. 7