Opinion ID: 1638061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Lethal Injection Protocol Must Be Promulgated as an Administrative Regulation

Text: The general matters for which an administrative body in the Executive Branch of our government, such as the Department, must adopt administrative regulations are identified in KRS 13A.100 entitled Matters Which Shall Be Prescribed by Administrative Regulations. The part of the statute pertinent to this case provides: Subject to limitations in applicable statutes, any administrative body which is empowered to promulgate administrative regulations shall, by administrative regulation prescribe, consistent with applicable statutes: (1) Each statement of general applicability, policy, procedure, memorandum, or other form of action that implements; interprets; prescribes law or policy; describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any administrative body; or affects private rights or procedures available to the public; KRS 13A.100 (1). Because the semi-colons may cause some confusion, a more helpful reflection of the legislative intent is the definition of administrative regulation. KRS 13A.010(2) provides in relevant part: (2) Administrative regulation means each statement of general applicability promulgated by an administrative body that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any administrative body. The term includes an existing administrative regulation, a new administrative regulation, an emergency administrative regulation, an administrative regulation in contemplation of a statute, the amendment or repeal of an existing administrative regulation, but does not include: (a) Statements concerning only the internal management of an administrative body and not affecting private rights or procedures available to the public; The Department is clearly empowered to promulgate administrative regulations, KRS 13A.100, as reflected in numerous statutes where the Department itself or through its head, the Secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, is specifically directed to adopt administrative regulations. The Department is authorized by KRS 197.020 to adopt regulations regarding the official conduct of Department personnel and the government of the prisoners in their deportment and conduct. The Secretary is given broad authority in KRS 196.035 to promulgate administrative regulations he deems necessary or suitable for the proper administration of the functions of the cabinet or any division in the cabinet. In fact, the current volumes of the Kentucky Administrative Register contain approximately 70 pages of regulations promulgated by the Department addressing such matters as how frequently jail inmates' sheets and pillowcases shall be cleaned, 501 KAR 3:080, and the level of lighting in specific areas of a jail, 501 KAR 3:050, Section 6. In 501 KAR 6:020, Section 1, various Corrections Policies and Procedures are incorporated by reference, including Corrections Policy and Procedure 9.5 (CPP 9.5) discussed above pertaining to Execution as well as policies regarding the Nutritional Adequacy of Inmate Diet; Hair, Grooming and ID Card Standards and Inmate Packages. The preamble to this particular regulation notes that the administrative regulation is to comply with the accreditation standards of the American Correctional Association. Despite the fact that portions of the Department's policy regarding execution have been promulgated as a regulation, the Department maintains and the circuit court concluded that the lethal injection procedures are matters of internal management... not affecting private rights as referenced in KRS 13A.010(2)(a). As for CPP 9.5, which was clearly adopted as an administrative regulation, the Department characterizes it as establishing the public components of the execution process including procedures for attendance by the public and coordination of media activities. The Department's position does not withstand careful scrutiny. First, it is apparent that the lethal injection protocol is solely for the purpose of implementing the death penalty provided for by the General Assembly in KRS 431.220. This alone brings it within the ambit of KRS 13A.100 (1) and supports its promulgation as a regulation. [2] Moreover, the private rights of those individuals being executed by the Commonwealth are invariably affected by the manner in which the lethal injection is administered, again supporting promulgation. KRS 13A.100(1); KRS 13A.010(2)(a). Finally, the Department's own CPP 9.5 belies any suggestion that the execution protocol is a matter of internal management which should not be promulgated as an administrative regulation. CPP 9.5 addresses where the inmate shall be housed in the hours prior to execution; the presence of both an attorney from the Department's legal office and a public information officer to assist the warden with legal and media matters respectively; and the responsibilities of the warden during the death watch and execution including the necessity of designating a deputy warden to oversee the operation of the institution until the warden's execution responsibilities conclude. Contrary to the Department's position, these specific matters extend well-beyond the public components of the execution process and, by adopting this policy as a regulation, the Department certainly claimed no right to prevent its disclosure on grounds of internal management. Maryland's highest court recently addressed whether that state's administrative procedure act required Maryland's lethal injection protocol to be adopted as a regulation. Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 914 A.2d 25 (2006). The Maryland Department of Corrections (DOC) contended the protocol did not have general application, concerned only the DOC's internal management and did not affect the rights of the public. The court rejected all three contentions beginning with the argument that the Execution Operations Manual (EOM) was not a generally applicable policy: (T)here can be no legitimate doubt that the portions of the EOM that govern the method of and procedure for administering the lethal injection have general application and future effect, were adopted to detail or carry out a law that DOC administers, and govern the procedure of DOC. They have general application and future effect because they comprehensively govern the manner in which every death sentence is implemented. Unquestionably, they were adopted, and, indeed, it is their sole purpose and function, to carry out the mandates of CS §§ 3-905 and 3-906 and add details to the procedure that are unaddressed by the statute. They clearly are within the ambit of SG § 10-101(g)(1) [the Maryland code provision defining an administrative regulation.] 914 A.2d at 78. As for the internal management argument, the Maryland court noted that such matters are those that are purely of concern to the agency and its staff. Id. at 79 citing Massey v. Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 389 Md. 496, 520, 886 A.2d 585, 599 (2005). The operative test bears particular attention: The real test of whether a DOC Directive (or other policy statement) is exempt from the APA requirements because it concerns only the internal management of the agency and does not affect public rights is whether, given the nature and impact of the Directive, the Legislature intended that the agency be free to adopt, change, or abrogate the Directive at will, without any public input or legislative review. 914 A.2d at 79. Applying this test, the Evans Court concluded that the Maryland legislature never intended to leave to the DOC, without any oversight, unbridled authority to determine and then change at will, as a matter of internal management, how (the death penalty) statute is to be implemented. Id. at 80. In closing, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that decisions regarding the drugs employed, the manner of their administration and similar issues affect not only the inmates and the correctional personnel, but the witnesses allowed to observe the execution and the public generally, through its perception of the process. Id. Ultimately, the Evans Court declared the challenged execution protocol ineffective and unusable until adopted in accordance with Maryland's administrative procedures act. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reached a contrary conclusion regarding whether that state's corrections department had to adopt its lethal injection protocol as a rule in conformity with Tennessee's Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). In Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292 (Tenn.2005) the Court began by noting the protocol did not fit the definition of a rule. First, the lethal injection protocol is not a rule as defined by the UAPA. Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-102(10). The protocol instead fits squarely within two exceptions to the meaning of rule: statements concerning only the internal management of state government and not affecting private rights privileges or procedures available to the public, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-102(10)(A), and statements concerning inmates of a correctional or detention facility, Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-102(10)(G). 181 S.W.3d at 311-12. Second, the Court concluded that the legislature had granted the corrections department broad discretionary powers and that the public notice, public hearing and other requirements of the UAPA were `simply not realistic requirements for implementing procedures that concern the intricacies and complexities of the prison environment.' Id. at 312 (citation omitted). Finally, and somewhat curiously, even though the Tennessee statute regarding capital punishment generally, and the lethal injection method specifically, authorized the corrections department to promulgate necessary rules and regulations to implement it, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that the statute did not expressly reference the UAPA, thereby supporting the conclusion that the UAPA was inapplicable. Although the issue before this Court is ultimately one of construction of Kentucky statutes, Evans is instructive as to the limitations of the internal management exception. Like Maryland's highest court, this Court finds that the lethal injection protocol is not an issue purely of concern to the Department and its staff. Nor is there any basis for concluding that the Kentucky General Assembly intended for the Department to be able to modify at will, without any oversight, the manner in which the Commonwealth's most serious punishment is meted out. As for the Tennessee Supreme Court's contrary conclusion, Kentucky's Administrative Procedures Act does not have an exception on which that Court relied, i.e. the exception for statements concerning inmates of a correctional or detention facility. Moreover, to the extent the Tennessee Court relied on the internal management exception, which Kentucky law does have, the Court rather summarily cited it without any attempt to explain how implementation of the death penalty qualifies as a matter of internal corrections department management. In short, nothing in Abdur'Rahman persuades us that the Kentucky Administrative Procedures Act dictates a similar conclusion. [3] Finally, the Department maintains that it is prohibited from adopting regulations to implement the lethal injection statute because KRS 13A.120 (1)(a) states an administrative body may promulgate administrative regulations to implement a statute only when the act of the General Assembly creating or amending the statute specifically authorizes the promulgation of administrative regulations or such regulations are required by federal law. This statute is admittedly somewhat perplexing because it appears to contradict KRS 13A.100 which, as noted above, provides that [s]ubject to limitations in applicable statutes, any administrative body which is empowered to promulgate administrative regulations shall, by administrative regulation prescribe, consistent with applicable statutes: (1) Each statement of general applicability, policy, procedure, memorandum, or other form of action that implements; interprets; prescribes law or policy; describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any administrative body; or affects private rights or procedures available to the public. At first glance, this section's broad mandate that authorized agencies shall prescribe regulations for, among other things, policies and procedures affecting private rights, seems at odds with KRS 13A.120's requirement that statutes not be implemented by regulation unless the regulation is specifically authorized by the statute. The conflict, however, is resolvable by application of traditional statutory construction principles. In construing these statutes our goal, of course, is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly, and we derive that intent, if at all possible, from the plain meaning of the language the General Assembly chose. We presume, in a case such as this one of related statutes, that the General Assembly intended for the statutes to be construed together and for both to have meaning. We also presume that the General Assembly did not intend an absurd result or an unconstitutional one. King Drugs, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Revenue Cabinet, 250 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Ky.2008); Mullins v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 210 (Ky.1997). These statutes may be harmonized by noting that KRS 13A.120 provides for when regulation is permitted while KRS 13A.100 provides for when regulation is required. [4] First, KRS 13A.120 limits regulatory authority by requiring every assertion of such authority to be justified by, and to be an implementation of, a statute expressly granting such authority. It does not require, as the Department maintains, that every statute the agency might be called upon to interpret and implement include the regulatory grant. That would be an impossible task for the General Assembly and would render meaningless in part the many statutes establishing agencies and granting general regulatory authority, which is the General Assembly's usual approach to that task. The Department's construction would also render a host of Kentucky regulations promulgated pursuant to such general grants of regulatory authority completely invalid. These results were clearly not the General Assembly's intent and so argue conclusively against the construction urged by the Department. Although KRS 13A.120 does not require that every statute bearing upon an agency's duties and authority include the regulatory grant, it does, as noted, require that every regulation be justified by an express grant of regulatory authority clearly embracing that regulation. That requirement is met here, as the Department's regulatory authority over executions is clearly included within the authority granted by KRS 197.020(1), which provides in pertinent part that [t]he Department of Corrections shall: (a) Promulgate administrative regulations for the government and discipline of the penitentiary, for the government and official conduct of all officials connected with the penitentiary, and for the government of the prisoners in their deportment and conduct. An execution, of course, is one of the most serious official acts carried out by penitentiary officials and the most serious act of governance over a prisoner. This grant of regulatory authority satisfies KRS 13A.120, and thus regulation is permitted. Indeed, KRS 197.020(1) not only permits the promulgation of regulations governing executions, it mandates it. Regulation is also mandated by KRS 13A.100, which requires regulation if, as here, the regulation will prescribe statements of general applicability which implement laws (such as KRS 431.220) or affect private rights. The bottom line, in other words, is that the Department is not prohibited from adopting regulations to implement the death penalty through lethal injection simply because KRS 431.220 contains no express reference to the adoption of regulations. Having concluded that our Administrative Procedures Act mandates that the lethal injection protocol be promulgated as a regulation to the extent it affects private rights, it is nonetheless apparent that there may well be minor issues pertinent to an execution which truly are matters of internal management. The identities of the execution team, the storage location of the drugs and other security-related issues can be classified properly as purely issues of internal management. The drug protocol outlined in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. at ___ _ ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1527-1529, 170 L.Ed.2d at 429-430, however, indisputably affects private rights and must be properly adopted pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A before the Department proceeds with further executions. Finally, while we understand the circuit court's conclusion that the bench trial in Baze/Bowling I was an effective public hearing on the current protocol, there is no legal basis for this Court deeming it a substitute for what the General Assembly has required in our Administrative Procedures Act. When a matter must be prescribed by administrative regulation pursuant to KRS 13A.100, the Act must be complied with in all respects. The Department is obligated to proceed pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A as to all aspects of the lethal injection protocol except matters of mere internal management such as those noted above.