Opinion ID: 1124174
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The necessary consequence of what is expressed qualification:

Text: In a further attempt to bring Ruth Brown's wrongful death claim within the ambit of the release instrument, Defendants rely on LSA-C.C. Art. 3073's qualification that even claims not intended to be included in a compromise are nonetheless included if they are a necessary consequence of what is expressed. Defendants argue that regardless of whether Ruth Brown intended to compromise her wrongful death claim, the release instrument must cover such claim because death was a necessary consequence of Buel Brown's personal injuries, and thus the clear language of LSA-C.C. Art. 3073 renders Ruth Brown's subjective intent to the contrary inconsequential. Plaintiff counters that death is not a necessary consequence of personal injuries. The jurisprudence interpreting the necessary consequence provision of LSA-C.C. Art. 3073 is scant. Nonetheless, from that jurisprudence emerges the following two principles. First, this provision qualifies the general rule that the parties' actual intent is relevant in determining the scope of a compromise. Ravia v. Istre, 600 So.2d 812, 814 (La.App. 3d Cir.1992); Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1321 (5th Cir.1983). Second, [a]ll necessary consequences of what is expressed in the [a]greement, must be reflected within the four corners of the instrument. Pat O'Brien's Bar, Inc. v. Franco's Cocktail Products, Inc., 615 So.2d 429, 432 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 617 So.2d 909 (La. 1993). Applying those principles to the instant case, we find Defendants' reliance on this qualification misplaced. The release instrument, by its express terms, covers only claims arising out of Buel Brown's personal injuries. The wrongful death claim in question is not a necessary consequence of Buel Brown's personal injurieslogically, legally or factually. Logically, as Plaintiff contends, it cannot be said that a necessary consequence of personal injury is death. Legally, as outlined above, claims arising out of a tort victim's personal injuries are separate and distinct from his beneficiaries' wrongful death claim. And, factually, as discussed above, at the time the release instrument was executed, no one thought that Buel Brown would die as a result of his injuries from the accident in question. A more basic deficiency in Defendants' argument that the wrongful death action is a necessary consequence of what is expressed in the release instrument is that it would require we read into the instrument, which states that it covers all claims arising out of Buel Brown's personal injuries, a statement that it covers all claims arising out of the claimed tort. The latter verbiage, unlike the actual verbiage in the release instrument, has been construed in other states as clearly evidencing an intent to compromise all claims arising from a common tort, including both the tort victim's personal injury action and the beneficiaries' subsequently arising wrongful death action. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Todd, 204 Okla. 532, 231 P.2d 681 (1951). [27] The necessary consequence qualification, however, extends only to matters expressed within the four corners of the instrument. Pat O'Brien's, supra .