Opinion ID: 1882296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: exercise of legislative police powers

Text: The State argues that the forfeiture of a vehicle used in the commission of a third offense DWI is a reasonable statutory restriction and a reasonable exercise of police power. We agree. Police power is inherent in the state. Under that power the state may enact laws to protect and preserve social order, to restrict and punish crime, to preserve the public peace, to safeguard and protect the health and morals of the people, even though the effect of such laws is to strike down private contracts, to deprive the citizen of his liberty to contract and to take from him or destroy his property. But the legislature is prohibited from enacting such laws except for adequate reasons. If the reasons are not adequate, such legislation violates the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. See Theriot v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 436 So.2d 515 (La. 1983). The federal and state constitutions provide that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. U.S. Const. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; La. Const. art. 1 § 2. Balanced against this substantive due process right, however, is the police power of governing authorities to protect the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the people: the inherent need of governments to protect the safety and welfare of their citizens from the unrestrained liberty of some individuals. Nowak, Constitutional Law 389 (1978), citing Corwin, Liberty Against Government 72 (1948). La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 4 states that every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power. Professor Hargrave, in The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La.L.Rev. 1 at 12 (1974) notes: The background of [this] provision indicates an understanding that the statutory limitations and police power regulations are to be given a broad ambit. See, e.g. Brown v. State, Through Dept. of Public Safety, Division of Louisiana State Police, 392 So.2d 415 (La.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940, 101 S.Ct. 3085, 69 L.Ed.2d 955, (wherein La. R.S. 15:31 which allowed police to destroy slot machines summarily, was found to accord with the mandate of La. Const. art. 12 § 6 to suppress gambling, and did not violate the due process and right to private property principles contained in La. Const. art. 1 § 2). We have already determined that the right to operate a motor vehicle in Louisiana is a privilege granted by the state and not a constitutional right. Consequently, the state has and can enact numerous conditions on that privilege [6] . Fields v. State, 98-0611, (La.7/8/98), 714 So.2d 1244; Progressive Security Ins. Co. v. Foster, 97-2985, p.4 (La.4/23/98), 711 So.2d 675, 682. Our constitution wisely provides for separation of powers, and authorizes the legislature to make public policy determinations of controversial issues. State v. Smith, 99-0606, (La.07/6/00), 766 So.2d 501. Therefore, under our constitution, the legislature has determined that the public policy of Louisiana is to keep drunk drivers off the state highways. A public policy that should not be determined by this court. Moreover, the state's interests are immediately apparent: (1) the lack of compliance with the law as set forth in La. R.S. 14:98; (2) the high incidence of motor-vehicle accidents involving drunk drivers; (3) the reduction of deaths and injuries that usually result from motor vehicle accidents involving drunk drivers; and (4) the evident risk of the defendant continuing to drive while intoxicated, as this was at least his third offense. The state's interests are significant. These interests justify depriving the defendant of his vehicle. We further note that the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle shall first be used to pay court costs and towing and storage costs; the remainder shall be forwarded to the Council on Automobile Insurance Rates and Enforcement for its use in studying other ways to reduce drunk driving and insurance rates. See La. R.S. 14:98(D)(2)(d). The danger that an innocent owner will be deprived of his property is minimal. The statute also provides that a vehicle shall be exempt from sale if it was stolen, or if the driver of the vehicle at the time of the violation was not the owner and the owner did not know that the driver was operating the vehicle while intoxicated. Additionally, the vehicle shall be exempt from sale if all towing and storage fees are paid by a valid lienholder. La. R.S. 14:98(D)(2)(b)(c). This is adequate protection for owners who are not drunk drivers. Therefore, the sentencing provision of La. R.S. 14:98(D) mandating the forfeiture of the automobile used in the third DWI offense is a reasonable statutory restriction and a reasonable exercise of police power. Accordingly, we find that the statute meets all constitutional mandates.