Opinion ID: 2436501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: introduction of deposition testimony

Text: Before trial, the court allowed the defense to depose one of its out-of-state witnesses on grounds that the witness would be unavailable for trial due to recent surgery. Thereupon, the State sought to depose several of its out-of-state witnesses absent any showing that they would be unavailable at trial. The court granted the State's request as to witnesses Connie Mosier and Don Buckner even though it was conceded that the State could probably secure the presence of these witnesses at trial. Bennett's counsel objected, but the objection, which was renewed before trial and just prior to introduction of the depositions, was overruled. The depositions of Connie Mosier and Don Buckner were admitted pursuant to the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-44-202(d)(2) (1987), which provides: At the trial or upon any hearing, a part or all of a deposition, so far as otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used if it appears ... [t]hat the witness is out of the State of Arkansas unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition. The trial court's conclusion that deposition testimony is permissible any time a witness is out-of-state overlooks the title, purpose, and general provisions of section 16-44-202. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-44-202 is entitled Deposing witnesses upon showing of inability to attend trialUse of depositions. Subsection (a) states: If it appears that a prospective witness may be unable to attend or be prevented from attending a trial or hearing, that his testimony is material, and that it is necessary to take his deposition in order to prevent a failure of justice, the court at any time after the filing of an indictment or information may order ... that his testimony be taken by deposition. [Emphasis ours.] Subsection (a) makes clear that there must be some showing prior to trial as to the inability of the witness to attend before the court can order that the testimony of the witness be taken by deposition. Subsection (a) further requires a showing that taking of the deposition is necessary to prevent a failure of justice. If both requirements are satisfied, the court may, under subsection (d)(2), allow use of the deposition at trial if the party offering it shows that its witness is now dead, is out of the state, cannot attend because of sickness or infirmity, or failed to attend despite issuance of a subpoena. Here, the State not only failed to show that its witnesses could not attend trial and that there would be a failure of justice if the depositions were not permitted, but it was actually conceded that the State could obtain the presence of the witnesses at trial. Bennett also argues that introduction of the deposition testimony of Connie Mosier and Don Buckner violated his constitutional right of confrontation. The State responds that a defendant has two types of protection under the confrontation clausethe right to face the witnesses against him, and the right to cross-examine those witnesses. The State argues both rights were protected because Bennett's counsel was present when the witnesses were deposed, he was able to cross-examine them, and his cross-examination was with knowledge of the pending trial at which the depositions would be used. This position ignores a crucial pointthe inability of the jury responsible for deciding a defendant's fate to judge credibility by observing the demeanor of witnesses who must sit face to face with the accused at trial. In Lackey v. State, 288 Ark. 225, 703 S.W.2d 858 (1986), the State had failed to make a good faith effort to obtain the presence of a witness whose transcribed testimony from a former trial was introduced at a subsequent trial. This court stated: While we do not renege on our conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does not require the confrontation with every witness every time a criminal defendant is retried, we find this witness' testimony to have been so significant as to require that the jury in whose hands the fate of the appellant rested be allowed to observe the confrontation so as to see the witness' demeanor and make its determination with respect to the matters addressed to him. The rationale expressed in Lackey is equally applicable here. The deposition testimony of Connie Mosier and Don Buckner was obviously damaging to Bennett, and it was especially critical that the jury be able to observe these witnesses on the stand. It was error to allow their testimony by deposition without any showing that the witnesses could not attend trial. Because we find that the trial court erred in its interpretation of section 16-44-202 and that it should not have allowed the State to take the depositions, we do not address Bennett's other argument to the effect that section 16-44-202 is unconstitutional as applied.