Opinion ID: 2197540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing Under Section 601(b)(2)

Text: Various provisions of the Marriage Act permit interested parties to initiate or intervene in a child custody action, and to obtain a best-interests hearing, without the need to resort to habeas corpus procedure. (750 ILCS 5/601, 602 (West 1992).) However, like the cases decided under habeas corpus procedure, custody cases decided pursuant to section 601 of the Marriage Act require custody determinations to be based on the fundamental best-interests factors, which are codified in section 602. (See, e.g., Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 40, par. 602, Historical & Practice Notes, at 17 (Smith-Hurd 1980); Cohn v. Scott (1907), 231 Ill. 556, 83 N.E. 191; Nye v. Nye (1952), 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300.) Section 603 of the Act involves temporary custody procedures and section 610 governs the modification of custody based on changed circumstances. 750 ILCS 5/603, 610 (West 1992). Section 601(b)(2) of the Marriage Act provides that a child custody proceeding is commenced    by a person other than a parent, by filing a petition for custody of the child in the county in which he is permanently resident or found, but only if he is not in the physical custody of one of his parents. (Emphasis added.) (750 ILCS 5/601(b)(2) (West 1992).) The plain language of section 601(b)(2) reveals that the Does satisfy the literal requirements of the statute. The phrase physical custody, as used in section 601(b)(2), has been defined as requiring a determination of who is providing for the care, custody, and welfare of the child prior to the institution of custody proceedings. ( In re Marriage of Nicholas (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 171, 120 Ill.Dec. 698, 524 N.E.2d 728.) Physical custody requires living with the child for an extended period of time. [Citation.] ( In re Custody of Kulawiak (1993), 256 Ill.App.3d 956, 962, 194 Ill. Dec. 934, 628 N.E.2d 431.) Clearly, Richard has never been in Kirchner's physical custody. Thus, the existence of the Does' standing is premised on the child's day-to-day living in their care and Kirchner's lack of physical custody. Kirchner acknowledges that the Does appear to have standing under the plain terms of section 601(b)(2) because Richard is not in the physical custody of one of his biological parents. However, he argues that the case law requires, as a prerequisite to a nonparent's standing to maintain a custody suit, that the natural parent be shown to have voluntarily relinquished custody or control of the child. Because Kirchner never voluntarily relinquished such custody or control, he argues that the Does cannot establish their standing as a matter of law. The majority adopts Kirchner's argument on this point, and goes further, by reducing the Does' relationship with Richard to mere possession. Such a construction of section 601(b)(2) is insupportable by reasoned analysis. In fact, the majority's view of the Does' standing assumes that the issue of Richard's custody depends on the same issue that was the subject of the fitness hearing in which Kirchner's paternal rights were terminated. However, as the cases discussed in the prior section of this dissent establish, the focus of a custody proceeding, whether brought pursuant to habeas corpus or pursuant to sections 601 and 602 of the Marriage Act, is not whether the natural parents' rights have been legally terminated or voluntarily relinquished. Rather, the sole determination for the court to decide in custody matters is what is best for the child. The key inquiry in the cases which have discussed the specific standing requirement of section 601(b)(2) is whether the child is in the physical custody of one of the natural parents when the suit is filed by the party seeking custody. ( E.g., In re Custody of Peterson (1986), 112 Ill.2d 48, 96 Ill.Dec. 690, 491 N.E.2d 1150.) The question of whether a natural parent has physical custody of his or her child at the time the nonparent files for custody assumes that the natural parent had physical custody to begin with, or had been exercising care and control of the child, or at least enjoyed significant involvement in the minor's life. (See Peterson, 112 Ill.2d 48, 96 Ill.Dec. 690, 491 N.E.2d 1150; In re Custody of Menconi (1983), 117 Ill.App.3d 394, 73 Ill.Dec. 10, 453 N.E.2d 835.) In the case at bar, the majority does not and cannot conclude that Richard is, or ever has been, in the physical custody, control, or possession of Kirchner. Instead, Richard has at all times been in the lawful custody of the Does, and the fact that the adoption was invalidated does not alter that basic fact. When this court ruled that the Does' adoption of Richard had been improvidently granted, the Does' legal status as adoptive parents changed. However, their familial bonds with Richard did not change. Conversely, while the vacation of the adoption restored Kirchner's paternal right to develop a relationship with Richard, such ruling did not automatically vest in Kirchner the right to take immediate control and custody of Richard. In holding that the Does lack standing because Kirchner did not voluntarily relinquish Richard, the majority relies on cases which are inapposite to the case at bar, particularly In re Custody of Peterson (1986), 112 Ill.2d 48, 96 Ill.Dec. 690, 491 N.E.2d 1150. In Peterson, the maternal grandparents sought custody of their grandchild upon the death of the child's mother, who had been living in the grandparents' home with the child. The grandparents' petition for custody asserted that the child was not in the physical custody of the father, who was divorced from the mother at the time of her death. The Peterson court rejected an interpretation of the statutory phrase physical custody that would have equated it with mere possession, noting that the statute was not intended to confer standing on persons who may file for custody based on bare, temporary possession of a child. The Peterson court rejected the maternal grandparents' claim of standing, noting that the child was in the mother's custody, not the grandparents', at the time of the mother's death. Moreover, the child's father, who lived close by, had been regularly exercising his visitation rights during the mother's lifetime. The court noted that under such circumstances, it would not reasonably occur to the father that the maternal grandparents had physical custody of his child and were developing a position of standing, so that upon the death of his wife he could be deprived of his right to custody of his child. ( Peterson, 112 Ill.2d at 54, 96 Ill.Dec. 690, 491 N.E.2d 1150.) There had been no transfer of physical custody from the mother to the grandparents, and the fortuity of the mother's death was the sole reason the grandparents could assert that the child was not in the father's physical custody at the time they filed their petition for custody pursuant to section 601(b)(2) of the Marriage Act. Unlike the case at bar, Peterson involved the rights of a divorced parent who had maintained his relationship with his child during the life of the mother, and who could not be deemed to have lost physical custody of the child, within the intent of section 601(b)(2), upon the custodial parent's death. The instant case involves significantly different facts, and the Does' standing is based on the reality that they have been the sole and legal custodians of Richard since four days after his birth. The majority's holding that the Does lack standing because Kirchner did not voluntarily relinquish his paternal rights requires the majority to redefine the legislature's phrase physical custody and to distort the decisional law interpreting that phrase. Two decisions cited with approval in Peterson illuminate the proper application of the standing requirement of section 601(b)(2): In re Custody of Barokas (1982), 109 Ill.App.3d 536, 65 Ill.Dec. 181, 440 N.E.2d 1036, and In re Custody of Menconi (1983), 117 Ill.App.3d 394, 73 Ill.Dec. 10, 453 N.E.2d 835. In Barokas, the mother had placed her child in the temporary care of a family member, who later turned the child over to a third party who had often baby-sat the child as an overnight guest. This third party filed suit for custody on the basis that the child was not in the natural mother's physical custody at the time the suit for custody was initiated. The appellate court held that the mother had not intended to relinquish actual custody of the child within the meaning of the statute and therefore the third party lacked standing to maintain a custody action. In Menconi, the court held that grandparents who sought custody of their grandchild did have standing to file for custody, notwithstanding the natural father's objections. The mother of the child had died shortly after the baby's birth and the father asked his parents to care for the baby. The grandparents took over the child's care and the father visited only for short intervals. After 6½ years, the father forcibly removed his child from the home of his parents, and refused to return the child. The court in Menconi held that the grandparents had standing to seek custody, even though the natural father, at the time the grandparents filed their custody petition, had physical possession of the child. In In re Marriage of Carey (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 1040, 136 Ill.Dec. 518, 544 N.E.2d 1293, a stepmother was held to have standing to petition for custody of her stepchild upon the death of the father, notwithstanding the rights of the natural mother. The court found that the stepmother and child had developed a mother-son relationship during the years they had lived with the father. The court noted that although the natural mother had exercised her visitation rights, she had not provided for the care, custody, and welfare of the child in such manner that when the father died the court was required to find that physical custody of the child was in the natural mother. See also Montgomery v. Roudez (1987), 156 Ill.App.3d 262, 108 Ill.Dec. 803, 509 N.E.2d 499 (nonparent had standing to counter-sue for custody, pursuant to section 601(b)(2) of Marriage Act, in habeas corpus proceedings brought by unwed, teenaged mother who had signed equivalent of irrevocable consent to adoption). The above cases indicate that the standing requirement of section 601(b)(2) has not been not used as an artificial barrier to prevent genuine claims of custody by persons who have cared for the child on a daily basis in the role of parents. Rather, the statute prevents temporary caretakers, or persons living with the child's custodial parent, from asserting custodial rights in children who have been left in their care for limited periods of time. Therefore, the majority's expressed concern that a headmaster of a boarding school or the director of a children's summer camp might wrest custody from the natural parents under the guise of section 601(b)(2) is totally unfounded. The majority's conclusion that the Does have even less authority to seek standing than headmasters and camp directors is patently absurd. 164 Ill.2d at 492, 208 Ill.Dec. at 279, 649 N.E.2d at 335. The standing requirement has been viewed as intended to protect both the custody rights of the natural parent and the environmental stability of the child, and therefore it has been observed that the determination of whether a nonparent's standing has been established depends on the particular facts involved. (See Kulawiak, 256 Ill.App.3d at 961, 194 Ill.Dec. 934, 628 N.E.2d 431 (there is [n]o single fact or litmus test which controls the finding of physical custody for purposes of standing); In re Marriage of Santa Cruz (1988), 172 Ill.App.3d 775, 783, 122 Ill. Dec. 759, 527 N.E.2d 131 (relevant facts include who has immediate physical possession of the child; how the person took over control; and the nature, manner, and duration of possession).) The Does acted in accordance with the law throughout these proceedings and they were not accused of or found guilty of fraud or collusion in the adoption court. [2] As to the nature, manner, and duration of their possession of Richard, clearly the Does have formed a strong familial relationship with him. The majority acknowledges that the numerous appellate cases that have construed the standing requirement of section 601(b)(2) have not always focused on voluntary relinquishment as the sole factor but concludes that an exhaustive review of such cases discloses that this custody provision has never been invoked to alter parental rights absent some measure of voluntarily relinquishment. (164 Ill.2d at 493, 208 Ill.Dec. at 280, 649 N.E.2d at 336.) Because custody hearings do not, and cannot, terminate all parental rights, the majority's reliance on the voluntary relinquishment concept is misplaced. Although this court previously overturned the circuit court's factual determination and thereby vacated the adoption, it should be remembered that Kirchner's legal status at the time Daniella gave up the baby for adoption was that of an undisclosed sexual partner of the birth mother. The Kirchners were not then married and therefore there was no legal presumption that he was the father. The transcript of the hearing to terminate his paternal rights contains Kirchner's admission that Daniella never told him the baby died and that he did not believe her uncle's statement to that effect. Testimony of the uncle corroborates that Kirchner did not believe the baby had died. Even if he was unable to ascertain the baby's whereabouts initially after its birth on March 16, 1991, he admitted that he knew of the adoption by no later than May 12, 1991, when Daniella moved back into his apartment. His attorney did not file any pleading or legal document regarding Kirchner's paternity when the attorney filed his appearance form on June 6, 1991. The court-appointed guardian ad litem told the court that Kirchner's testimony of having been deceived was not credible. The guardian ad litem also expressed the opinion, based on the evidence, that the real reason Kirchner was seeking to prevent the adoption was because Daniella wanted to get the child back. The trial court ruled that the evidence established that Kirchner did not take sufficient steps to establish the necessary interest in the infant during the statutory 30-day period following the child's birth. As a result, that court terminated Kirchner's rights pursuant to Illinois adoption law. Consent to the adoption was not required by law. Although this court's vacation of the adoption changed Kirchner's legal status, and restored his paternal rights, it does not follow, in law or logic, that he was thereby retroactively vested with physical custody of Richard to defeat the standing of the Does. As noted, the majority's failure to recognize the Does' standing is largely premised upon its inaccurate view of the legal effect of the failed adoption. In this court's prior opinion, we held only that Kirchner's legal right to prevent the adoption, through timely assertion of his rights as an unwed biological father, had been erroneously terminated. We did not hold, in our prior opinion, that custody of the child became legally vested in Kirchner, nunc pro tunc, as a result of the failed adoption. The effect of vacating a legally entered decree of adoption because a parent's rights were improperly terminated is entirely distinct from the issue of what hearing is necessary when the biological parent seeks to take over control and custody of a child who is living in his adoptive family's home at the time the court invalidates the adoption. To blunt the argument that the Does have standing in the eyes of the law the majority implies that the adoption was void ab initio because it was obtained through lies, deceit, and subterfuge imputed to the Does. Thus, the majority attempts to bootstrap its conclusions by this highly unfair and extremely inaccurate characterization of the prior adoption proceedings. By casting the Does and their attorney as lawbreakers, the majority attempts to strip the Does of their legal standing to maintain a best-interests custody determination.