Opinion ID: 1146584
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Heading: Constitutional and Statutory Framework for Criminal Prosecutions in Alabama.

Text: Ala. Constitution (1901), art. I, ง 8, as amended by Amendment No. 37 (1939), provides in pertinent part: No person shall for any indictable offense be proceeded against criminally by information except ... by leave of the court, for misfeasance, misdemeanor, extortion and oppression in office, otherwise than is provided in the Constitution; provided, that in cases of misdemeanor, the legislature may by law dispense with a grand jury and authorize such prosecutions and proceedings before justices of the peace or such other inferior courts as may be by law established. Provided further that in all felony cases, except those punishable by capital punishment, the legislature may by law dispense with a grand jury and authorize such prosecutions and proceedings in such manner as may be provided by law if the defendant, after having had the advice of counsel of his choice or in the event he is unable to employ counsel, the advice of counsel which must be appointed by the court, makes known in open court to a judge of a court having jurisdiction of the offense that he desires to plead guilty, provided, however, the defendant cannot plead guilty within fifteen days after his arrest. (Emphasis added.) In Kennedy v. State, 39 Ala.App. 676, 107 So.2d 913 (1958), the Court of Appeals, following the reasoning in the landmark case of Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. Ill, 61 A.L.R. 793 (1928), held that the defendant in a felony case cannot waive the absence of an indictment except under the express terms of the amendment. The Court of Appeals in Kennedy explained: According to the opinion in People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. Ill, 61 A.L.R. 793, the constitutional requisition of indictments generally in all cases of felony is not one conferring a mere personal privilege upon an accused person, but is so imbued with the public concern for due and proper administration of the law that no individual may waive it. [Emphasis added.] In De Golyer v. Commonwealth, 314 Mass. 626, 51 N.E.2d 251, it was pointed out that the Massachusetts bill of rights has consistently denied the power of the Legislature to permit trial which could lead to imprisonment in the State prison save there be an indictment. The court went on to approve there a statute (somewhat like our งง 260-266 [Tit. 15, Code 1940], supra) which permitted the written waiver of an indictment with consequent prompt arraignment. The opinion points out that the Christian case, as to nonwaiver, does not apply in all states, citing also Edwards v. State, 45 N.J.L. 419. However, a reference to the annotation on the right to waive the lack of an indictment at 61 A.L.R. 798-802, shows a majority of the cases there, including Kyser v. State, [22 Ala.App. 431, 117 So. 157 (1928)], are in accord with the Christian case. See also Annotation, 56 A.L. R.2d 837. For the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the opinion of able Commissioner Clay in Singleton v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 454, 208 S.W.2d 325, is a reaffirmation of the nonwaiver doctrine where jurisdiction would be conferred only by indictment. [The court in Singleton, supra, stated: `Our statutes do not give the Circuit Court jurisdiction to try the offense committed by Whitaker on a warrant of arrest. The only authority of the court to proceed is based on an indictment. This is an essential element of the subject matter. Such jurisdictional requirement cannot be waived by the defendant. It is our conclusion that the conviction of Whitaker was void....' 208 S.W.2d at 317.] It is well to remember the wording of our own Constitution on this point: `No person shall for any indictable offense be proceeded against criminally by information, except   ' Amend. 37. [Emphasis added in Kennedy. ] ... Historically, in Alabama the Christian case deserves more than the usual deference and weight which is due an opinion from a respected sister court of the Anglo-American common law tradition. In the Attorney General's opinion (Vol. 14, p. 150), supra, that decision was relied upon along with the Kyser case as authority for requiring a revision of ง 8 of the Constitution. The opinion was addressed to the Hon. W. G. Hardwick, then a member of the House Judiciary Committee. Thus, its persuasive force has etiological as well as rational foundations. (Footnotes omitted.) 39 Ala.App. at 690-91, 107 So.2d at 926-27. Furthermore, a defective indictment cannot be amended, even as to an immaterial matter, without the consent of the defendant. Code of 1975, ง 15-8-90; White v. State, 448 So.2d 421 (Ala.Crim.App.1983). Additionally, if a defendant desires to plead guilty pursuant to Amendment 37, the court shall direct the district attorney of such court to prefer and file an information against such defendant, under the oath of such district attorney or some witness, which information shall accuse the defendant, with the same certainty as an indictment, of the criminal offense for which he is being held. (Emphasis added.) Code of 1975, ง 15-15-21. The defendant in the present case, Betty Ruth Holloway, and the defendant in Dison, Elmore N. Dison, were convicted of driving under the influence in violation of Code of 1975, ง 32-5A-191, which is a misdemeanor offense under ง 32-5A-3. In Alabama,  all misdemeanors originally prosecuted in the district or circuit court are indictable offenses.  Code of 1975, ง 15-8-2. However, pursuant to the authority granted it by the people of Alabama through Amendment 37, supra, the legislature has, through a variety of statutes, dispensed with grand juries in misdemeanor cases and authorized such prosecutions to be by information, complaint, or uniform traffic ticket and complaint (UTTC) before a district court. See Ala. Const. (1901), Art. VI, as amended by Amendment No. 328, 6.05 (1973); Code of 1975, ง 12-12-32, -50, -51, -53; Temp. Rule 15.1(b) and (c), A.R.Crim.P. Of course, particularly at issue in Dison, as well in the present case is the UTTC. Section 12-12-53(b), supra, provides that the UTTC shall be used in traffic cases where a complaint is made by a law enforcement officer or by any other person or an information is filed by the district attorney.  (Emphasis added.) In defining information and complaint, Temp. Rule 15.1(b) and (c), A.R.Crim.P., provide that both are written statements made upon oath: (b) Information. An information is a written statement charging the defendant or defendants named therein with the commission of an indictable offense, made on oath, signed, and presented to the court by the district attorney without action by the grand jury. (c) Complaint. A complaint is a written statement made upon oath before a judge or other official authorized by law to issue warrants of arrest, setting forth essential facts constituting an offense and alleging that the defendant committed the offense. (Emphasis added.) And, in fact, the UTTC form contains a space for verification. See also Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 19(A)(1) and (2), which provide: (1) Traffic Complaint and Summons. The complaint and summons used in all traffic cases shall be the `Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint.' (2) Use of Ticket. The uniform traffic ticket and complaint shall be used in all traffic cases in all courts of the state. Any ticket properly issued by a law enforcement officer shall be accepted for filing and disposition in any court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense. (Emphasis added.) As discussed above, in Alabama (as well as in other jurisdictions), the presence of a proper grand jury indictment, and other procedural safeguards attendant thereto, have been held to be non-waivable jurisdictional prerequisites in felony prosecutions; in Alabama this is because of constitutional Amendment No. 37. The question then becomes whether, by virtue of the fact that the people of Alabama have specifically empowered the legislature (through Amendment 37) to provide for other procedural prerequisites to the institution of misdemeanor prosecutions, these procedural prerequisites (informations and complaints made under oath) as outlined above, should be deemed to be any less prerequisite constitutionally and jurisdictionally than grand jury indictments in felony cases. The answer is a definite and resounding NO. In Gunn v. City of Birmingham, 402 So.2d 1122 (Ala.Crim.App.1981), the defendant was charged by five separate complaints with violation of ง 28-2 of the General Code of the City of Birmingham. Over defendant's objection, she was put to trial on these multiple complaints. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, noting the substantive and procedural similarities between complaints (or informations) and indictments: A defendant in this state may not be put to trial on multiple indictments without his express agreement and consent, unless he fails to object. Hopkins v. State, 54 Ala.App. 75, 304 So.2d 629 (1974). The complaints by which appellant was brought to trial in the instant case were in the nature of indictments, differing only in that they were presented by a public officer (a City Attorney) upon his oath of office, rather than by a grand jury on their oath. See Code of Alabama 1975 ง 15-7-1, ง 15-8-1. The term complaint, used in this sense, is synonymous with the term information, and is an economical, convenient, and speedy aid to the administration of justice which omits the necessity of a grand jury indictment. Ex parte State, 71 Ala. 371 (1882); see Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition Revised, 1968, Complaint, Information defined. The Constitution of Alabama of 1901 Art. I ง 8, (amendment # 37), makes specific provisions for the omission of grand jury indictments in the prosecution and proceedings in certain well defined situations. Accordingly, Alabama cases have treated complaints of this nature much the same as if they were indictments and have applied the substantive laws of each interchangeably. See, Mitchell v. State, 41 Ala.App. 254, 130 So.2d 198, cert. denied, 272 Ala. 707, 130 So.2d 205 (1961); Anderton v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 390 So.2d 1083, cert. denied, 390 So.2d 1087 (Ala.1980); Hembree v. City of Birmingham, Ala.Cr. App., 381 So.2d 664 (1980). We are of the opinion that the rule of law applied to consolidation of multiple indictments over a defendant's objection is applicable to the multiple complaints in the instant case. ... We are constrained to hold that the appellant was entitled to a separate trial on each complaint, such being necessitated by the form and substance of the complaints brought before the trial court. These complaints are to be distinguished from one indictment charging multiple misdemeanors. Boatner v. State, 8 Ala.App. 361, 63 So. 33 (1913). The rights of the defendant, who upon conviction may be sentenced to fines or hard labor, cannot be sacrificed merely to promote a more rapid and economic dispensation of trial court dockets. Ex parte Beard, 246 Ala. 338, 20 So.2d 721 (1945). (Emphasis added.) 402 So.2d at 1123-24. Nevertheless, the majority opinion does not purport to dispense with the requirement that the UTTC be made out under the oath of the charging officer. The majority simply concludes that this defect (the absence of verification) was merely a defect in the court's jurisdiction of the person, which was waived by the defendant's failure to object to the unverified complaint in the district court.