Opinion ID: 3157592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence Favorable to the Defense

Text: The first Brady prong is whether the evidence of Mr. Weeks’ observation of an injury to Mr. Clemons’ face and his report documenting that observation was favorable to the defense either because it is exculpatory or impeaching. Evidence is exculpatory if it is “material either to guilt or to punishment[.]” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Impeachment evidence is evidence that “affect[s] [the] credibility” of a witness. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). It is favorable to the accused “[w]hen the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). To be favorable, the evidence should “ha[ve] some weight” with a “tendency” to be favorable. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 451. The master determined that Mr. Clemons had presented substantial evidence that the Weeks evidence was favorable to the defense. In reaching this conclusion, the master found especially significant this Court’s findings in its review of Mr. Clemons’ conviction and sentence in his direct appeal and the overruling of his motion for post-conviction relief. During Mr. Clemons’ suppression proceedings, he claimed that the police used physical force to coerce his confession, but his evidence supporting his claims was only the testimony of his family members and attorney and was without the benefit of testimony from an unrelated witness who was employed by the state. Clemons, 946 32 S.W.2d at 218. This Court, in rejecting Mr. Clemons’ assertion, emphasized the significance of the evidence presented and the testimony heard at the hearing on Mr. Clemons’ motion to suppress his confession. Id. Specifically, this Court found that Mr. Clemons’ witnesses could “not demonstrate either when or how [he] incurred any injury” because of: (1) the delayed timing of the witnesses’ observations of Mr. Clemons’ injury and (2) the credibility of the witnesses testifying on Mr. Clemons’ behalf. Id. First, this Court found the fact that the majority of witnesses testifying that they had observed injuries to Mr. Clemons’ face following his interrogation by the police had seen Mr. Clemons “some 48 hours or more” after the interrogation, making it difficult to establish when or how the injury occurred. Id. The only testimony in Mr. Clemons’ favor based on an earlier observation came from his former attorney, Michael Kelly, who had seen Mr. Clemons approximately 14 hours after Mr. Clemons’ interrogation had ended. Id. Mr. Kelly stated that he had observed injuries to the right side of Mr. Clemons’ face at that time. Id. The Court concluded, however, that Mr. Kelly’s testimony was impeached by the testimony of Officer Williams, who had seen Mr. Clemons shortly before Mr. Kelly and who testified that he did not observe any sign of injury. Id. Second, though Mr. Clemons’ family offered corroborating testimony of his injury, this Court noted that “[t]he trial court had the opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses and obviously found the state’s witnesses’ testimony more credible than [Mr. Clemons’].” Id. 33 Based on this Court’s reliance on the witnesses’ testimony and its emphasis on the timing and credibility of those witnesses’ observations of Mr. Clemons, the master determined that “the testimony by [Mr. Weeks] that he saw Mr. Clemons less than three hours after he was booked, and more than eight hours before Williams, could serve to contradict Williams” and impeach Mr. Williams’ credibility. The master reached this conclusion especially “in light of the fact that – unlike the other defense witnesses who testified for Clemons on this issue – Weeks had no ties to Clemons.” The master noted that Mr. Weeks’ testimony would have lent substantial credibility to Mr. Clemons’ claim that his confession was coerced because Mr. Weeks was a witness not related to Mr. Clemons and was without apparent cause to fabricate his observations. This is significant. Much has been made of the fact that Mr. Williams was the ex-husband of a cousin of Mr. Clemons’ mother. Little has been made of the fact that Mr. Williams was employed by the city of St. Louis as a police officer. In contrast, Mr. Weeks was employed by the state as a bond investigator for the board of probation and parole, so he was the only witness regarding Mr. Clemons’ injury who did not have a potential bias either in favor of Mr. Clemons or in favor of the St. Louis police. Mr. Weeks’ testimony was not, therefore, merely cumulative of the testimony of Mr. Clemons’ family members and attorney. Evidence is not cumulative “when it goes to the very root of the matter in controversy or relates to the main issue, the decision of which turns on the weight of the evidence.” Black v. State, 151 S.W.3d 49, 56 (Mo. banc 2004) (internal quotations omitted). Mr. Weeks’ testimony offered an independent corroboration of Mr. Clemons’ 34 allegation that the police beat him in which the credibility of this allegation turned exclusively on the weight of the evidence presented. See id.; see also State v. Perry, 879 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Mo. App. 1994). In light of the deference given to the master’s credibility findings, there is substantial evidence to support the master’s conclusion that the undisclosed evidence from an objective, impartial witness corroborating Mr. Clemons’ testimony was favorable to Mr. Clemons. Mr. Weeks’ testimony would have provided the most immediate account of Mr. Clemons’ physical appearance following his interrogation. The evidentiary value of the most immediate account of Mr. Clemons’ appearance was made evident on direct appeal when this Court ultimately concluded that because Mr. Williams’ observation of Mr. Clemons took place before Mr. Kelly’s, Mr. Williams impeached Mr. Kelly. The credibility of the state’s witnesses is further discredited by the evidence of the misleading description of Mr. Weeks’ pretrial release report in the IAD report, the conduct of Mr. Weeks’ supervisor and the prosecutor in attempting to convince Mr. Weeks to change his report, and the subsequent alteration of Mr. Weeks’ report. Again, the courts must “consider the effect of all of the suppressed evidence along with the totality of the other evidence uncovered following the prior trial.” Woodworth, 396 S.W.3d at 345. This evidence, considered in the totality of the circumstances, supports the master’s conclusion that Mr. Weeks’ observations of Mr. Clemons’ injury, which occurred more than eight hours before Mr. Williams’ observations, and his report would be favorable to corroborate Mr. Clemons’ testimony 35 and impeach Mr. Williams’ testimony. Additionally, this evidence may have led the trial court to sustain Mr. Clemons’ motion to suppress his confession. Mr. Clemons’ confession included the only direct evidence that he was on the platform below the bridge when the sisters were pushed into the water, as well as evidence that the rapes were planned, the Kerry sisters were repeatedly struck on the face during the rapes, Mr. Richardson forced one of the sisters to perform oral sex, and both sisters were conscious and aware of what was happening, all of which likely would have influenced the jury’s decision in sentencing Mr. Clemons to death. Though the state presented circumstantial evidence that Clemons was on the platform, 21 “[a] confession is like no other evidence” because it “is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against [a defendant].” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, a defendant is prejudiced by a coerced confession admitted into evidence “[p]recisely because confessions of guilt, whether coerced or freely given, may be truthful and potent evidence[.]” Lego v. 21 During the habeas hearing, Mr. Clemons asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in answering whether he: raped and/or assisted in raping the Kerry sisters; put one of the sisters and/or Mr. Cummins down the manhole; went down on the platform after the sisters and Mr. Cummins were placed there; forced the sisters and Mr. Cummins to get on the concrete pier; and told Mr. Gray and Mr. Winfrey that he “threw them off the bridge.” The master stated that he drew an adverse inference from Mr. Clemons’ refusal to answer these questions and “infer[red] . . . if he were truthful, Clemons’ answers to every one of those questions would have been damaging to him.” At trial, Mr. Clemons has a constitutional right to choose not to testify, and “the Constitution further guarantees that no adverse inferences are to be drawn from the exercise of this privilege.” Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981). As such, Mr. Clemons’ silence in response to these questions cannot factor into this Court’s determination whether the suppression of the Weeks evidence would have prejudiced Mr. Clemons at trial. See Carter, 450 U.S. at 305. 36 Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483 (1972). In admitting a coerced confession into evidence, a defendant is “compelled to condemn himself by his own utterances” in violation of his constitutional right to due process of law. Id. at 485. Certainly, evidence that may have resulted in the trial court suppressing Mr. Clemons’ damaging confession is evidence favorable to Mr. Clemons because it may have made “the difference between conviction and acquittal,” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985), or a death sentence and a sentence of life without parole. Contrary to the argument in the dissent, the Weeks evidence need not be sufficient to produce this result but need only be such that if used effectively “would have had some weight and its tendency would have been favorable” to Mr. Clemons. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 451. Additionally, even if the trial court were to continue to deny Mr. Clemons’ motion to suppress, the Weeks evidence would be favorable to the defense at trial because it may have led the trial court to overrule the state’s motion in limine to prohibit argument in closing by defense counsel that the police beat Mr. Clemons to coerce his confession. Before closing argument, Mr. Clemons stated he intended to argue “that Clemons’ face was swollen after the interrogation, and he was seen by a number of people, and . . . Cummins said he got hit.” The state objected, arguing that because the officers denied hitting Mr. Clemons and because Mr. Clemons did not take the stand to refute the officers, there was no reasonable inference that the police beat Mr. Clemons during the interrogation. The court agreed, stating “there’s no evidence that the police [beat Mr. Clemons]” because “he could have been hurt anywhere along the line.” 37 But, if Mr. Clemons had called Mr. Weeks to testify at trial regarding his observations and record of Mr. Clemons’ injury on the pretrial release form and the efforts of the supervisor and the prosecutors to convince Mr. Weeks to change his report, the Weeks evidence would have been significant to the court in its ruling. The Weeks evidence included Mr. Weeks’ observations and record of Mr. Clemons’ injury; Mr. Weeks’ testimony that, after a conversation with his boss, Mr. Lukanoff, Mr. Weeks believed the police caused Mr. Clemons’ injury; his conversations with his supervisor and the prosecutor during which they attempted to convince him to change his report; the alteration of the report by the state; and the failure of the IAD report to accurately describe Mr. Weeks’ pretrial release report or include Mr. Lukanoff as a witness to Mr. Clemons’ condition at the time of the pretrial release interview. Together this evidence supports a reasonable inference that Mr. Clemons was beaten by the police during his interrogation. Mr. Weeks’ testimony also would have independently supported Mr. Clemons’ claim that his confession was not voluntary because it was physically coerced. This is significant given that jury instruction 27 instructed the jury to disregard and “give no weight in your deliberation” to the statement if they did not believe it was freely and voluntarily made. The master’s conclusion that the suppressed evidence would have been favorable to Mr. Clemons is supported by substantial evidence, and this Court adopts the master’s findings as to first prong of Brady. 38