Opinion ID: 2052636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Terry Seizures, Arrests, and the Handcuffing of Suspects.

Text: In Terry, the Supreme Court held that, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the police may briefly detain an individual for investigative purposes, even if they lack probable cause to arrest, so long as the officers have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-81. Terry thus carved out a narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. To come within the purview of the Terry exception, police action must be justified at its inception, and must also be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which initially justified the detention. Id. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1878-79. Thus, when officers subject a detained suspect to a greater restraint on his liberty than is permissible in a legitimate Terry seizure, articulable suspicion is not sufficient, and the Constitution requires a showing of probable cause. See, e.g., In re M.E.B., 638 A.2d 1123, 1126 (D.C.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 221, 130 L.Ed.2d 148 (1994). The question presented in this case is whether the use of handcuffs, which is a familiar feature of arrests, precluded the judge from finding that the seizure was no more than a permissible Terry stop. In M.E.B., which also involved the handcuffing of suspects prior to a show-up identification, we described the difference between a full arrest and a Terry seizure in terms of their distinct purposes: Generally, an arrest is effected when the police have made a determination to charge the suspect with a criminal offense and custody is maintained to permit the arrestee to be formally charged and brought before the court.... A Terry seizure, on the other hand, involves a more temporary detention, designed to last only until a preliminary investigation either generates probable cause or results in the release of the suspect. Id. (citations omitted). The measure of the scope of permissible police action in any investigative stop depends on whether the police conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 1127 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)). [H]andcuffing the detainee, like length of detention, place of detention, and other considerations, is simply one factor, among many, that the trial judge must consider in weighing whether a detention for investigation crossed the line into the realm of arrest. Id. at 1128. In M.E.B., the appellant and another individual were detained by two police officers because they matched a radio description of two men seen at the site of a murder. Id. at 1124-25. The two suspects were handcuffed, placed in the rear of a police vehicle, and transported to other locations for identification. The entire detention lasted between twelve and seventeen minutes. Id. at 1127. The appellant contended that the handcuffing was unnecessary and that it converted the seizure into a full arrest. This court disagreed. We held that, given the seriousness of the crime under investigation, the brevity of the detention, and the fact that the suspects were to be transported in a patrol car for several blocks, handcuffing was a reasonable precaution under the circumstances. Id. at 1128. We reiterated that the protection of the officer making the stop ... is of paramount importance. It has been called the rationale of Terry.  Id. at 1127 (quoting United States v. Mason, 450 A.2d 464, 466 (D.C.1982) (per curiam)). Decisions in other jurisdictions are to the same effect. As we noted in M.E.B., courts generally have approved the use of handcuffs where it was reasonably necessary to protect the officers' safety or to thwart a suspect's attempt to flee. Id. at 1128 (quoting Reynolds v. State, 592 So.2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 1992)); see also United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir.1982) (police conducting on-the-scene investigations involving potentially dangerous suspects may take precautionary measures if they are reasonably necessary), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1206, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983); People v. Weeams, 665 P.2d 619, 622 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (Officers conducting an investigatory stop may use that amount of force which is reasonably related in scope and character to ensuring their safety during the period of detention.). The foregoing standard is an objective one. The question is whether the handcuffing of the suspect was an  objectively reasonable use of force in light of the totality of the circumstances. Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 958 (7th Cir.1992) (emphasis added); see also Graham, supra, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872-73. To determine if the Fourth Amendment was violated, the court must decide whether the officers' actions [were] `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Graham, supra, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. Thus, whether police officers in fact feared for their safety during an encounter with a suspect is not dispositive. [10] The critical question is whether a reasonably prudent officer would have been justified in using handcuffs to neutralize potential threats to his or her safety or to inhibit any attempt by the suspect to escape. Courts have routinely held the use of handcuffs in the Terry context to be reasonable in situations where suspects attempted to resist police, made furtive gestures, ignored police commands, attempted to flee, or otherwise frustrated police inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir.1983); Bautista, supra, 684 F.2d at 1289; United States v. Purry, 178 U.S.App. D.C. 139, 141-42, 545 F.2d 217, 219-20 (1976); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2(d), at 366-67 (2d ed. 1987 & 1995 Supp.). Such conduct on the part of a particular suspect is not, however, a sine qua non. Indeed, there was no evidence in M.E.B. that either suspect did anything untoward after the two young men were detained. We nevertheless concluded in that case that `the handcuffing of [defendant] was reasonable, as a corollary of the lawful [ Terry ] stop,' in order to maintain the status quo while the officer sought more information. 638 A.2d at 1128 (quoting Purry, supra, 178 U.S.App.D.C. at 142, 545 F.2d at 220) (alteration in original). Other courts have likewise held that the use of handcuffs was justified where, as here, the crime of which the defendant was suspected was a violent one and the defendant was reported to have been armed. See, e.g., United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1228 & n. 4 (7th Cir.1994) (handcuffing  once highly problematical  is becoming quite acceptable in the context of a Terry analysis); Weeams, supra, 665 P.2d at 622; People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378, 540 N.Y.S.2d 971, 971-72, 538 N.E.2d 323, 323-24 (1989) (per curiam).