Opinion ID: 37721
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim (9)(c)

Text: Shields advances that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the hypothetical questions on future dangerousness that the State posed to Dr. Gripon at the punishment phase of the trial. The prosecutor posed three such questions to elicit Dr. Gripon’s opinion on Shields’s future dangerousness: I would like to go over a hypothetical question 53 United States v. Sparks, 2 F.3d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 1993). 54 Id. (citing United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 1225, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Dixon, 132 F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Sparks). 35 with you, Doctor: Assume with me that the murder was committed, the murder of Paula Stiner was committed by a 19-year-old male who burglarized her home and who laid in wait for his victim, Paula Stiner, for 5 ½ hours. And during that time he used the phone, he gathered up items that he wanted to steal, he fixed himself some food in a skillet, he selected his weapons which were a hammer and a knife. Assume further with me the victim entered the house who was immediately assaulted with the hammer, then the knife, struck some 27 or more times; and during her horrific struggle to survive, was overcome and died 10 to 15 minutes after the initial assault began. Assume with me further that immediately after the assault on the victim that the Defendant went over to the victim’s purse which was only a very short distance away from her body, rummaged through the purse, taking what he wanted, including credit cards, [and] the keys to her car, which was parked in the garage. Assume that the person drove to a shopping mall in Paula Stiner’s car. Within about an hour and a half of having committed the murder, he was at the mall. He purchased items of clothing. He was described as cool, polite, calm. He said that the card was his mother’s credit card. Tell us, Doctor, what does that behavior tell you as a psychiatrist? Assume further that the man, about two hours or so later, met with some friends of his at a fast food restaurant and again acted normal; was not intoxicated, according to them; claimed that the car he was driving was borrowed from a friend, that it was even for sale. Assume further that later that evening he went out with one of his friends to a nightclub in the Montgomery County area, acted normal, had some beers, just had a good time. What does that behavior tell you, Doctor, about that person? Assume that during the year prior to the murder that the man stole from his parents, he burglarized his 36 parents’ home. What does that tell you? What does that behavior tell you, Doctor? In response to these hypothetical examples, Dr. Gripon testified that the described behavior demonstrates premeditation, viciousness, and a lack of concern for the victim shown by “the going about [of] the normal activities of life as if nothing had actually happened.” He stated that “[a] person who can do that has little concern for their fellow man, if any.” Dr. Gripon also stated that such behavior demonstrates a lack of responsibility and a “rather callous, very hard nature.”55 Shields asserts that the hypothetical scenarios exaggerated and mischaracterized the facts of the crime. Shields also contends that the extraneous offenses —— such as the credit card purchase —— should not have been included in the hypothetical questions. Shields’s arguments are meritless. He does not explain how the hypothetical examples mischaracterize or exaggerate the facts that the State presented at trial. Based on our review of the record, the hypothetical presentations neither mischaracterized 55 Shields relies heavily on this argument because in the affidavit of an investigator who interviewed the jurors after the jury imposed the death penalty —— attached to his state habeas application —— one of the jurors stated that Dr. Gripon made a better presentation on future dangerousness than the defense witnesses and that “[s]he believe[d] that all of the other jurors felt the same way about Dr. Gripon.” 37 nor exaggerated the facts of Paula Stiner’s murder. Rather, they paralleled the evidence that the state introduced at trial. If trial counsel had objected, his objection would have been meritless. The failure to raise meritless, futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.56 As for Shields’s “extraneous offenses” argument, he fails to point to an extraneous offense in the hypothetical examples. Our review of Shields’s state habeas petition does reveal, however, that he referred to Mark Lang’s testimony about the credit card purchase of the suit that occurred two hours after the murder. The record clearly reflects that Lang testified to the facts that the prosecutors included in the hypothetical questions. Further, we reject any possible argument that Shields makes with regard to the admissibility and use of such testimony. Tracy Stiner testified that when he arrived home on the day of the murder, he found his wife’s purse and its contents scattered around on the floor of their breakfast area. He also testified that Mrs. Stiner carried several credit cards in her purse. Lang testified that on that same day, Shields used a credit card to purchase $271.71 in clothing from DeJaiz’s. The name on the card 56 See Clark v. Collins, 19 F.3d 959, 966 (5th Cir. 1994); Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)). 38 was Paula Stiner. Shields, identified by Lang, signed the charge using the name Tracy Stiner, the victim’s husband. Lang’s testimony tied Shields to the scene of the crime —— where he stole the credit card —— and to the attack itself. Such testimony is clearly admissible. Any objection to this testimony under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), as Shields appears to urge, would have been futile. Under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.”57 The prosecution did not use the testimony of Lang —— or any corroborating evidence —— to prove the character of Shields. This evidence had relevance apart from any possible tendency to prove Shields’s character.58 Further, under our and Texas law, “[f]ruits of the same crime are admissible and do not constitute an extraneous offense.”59 Shields’s use of Paula Stiner’s credit card 57 TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). This language tracks that of federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 58 See United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 871 (5th Cir. 1998); Alba v. State, 905 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 59 Skidmore v. State, 530 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); see also United States v. Price, 877 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Where evidence is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense, it is relevant and not extraneous. If the challenged extraneous evidence is inseparable from the evidence of the charged offense, it is unnecessary to consider its 39 constituted fruits of his crime. We are satisfied that jurists of reason would not debate the district court’s ruling in this regard, and we deny a COA on this claim.