Opinion ID: 2092803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The applicability of Kersey.

Text: Since our decision in Kersey, we have extended the mitigation principles enunciated in that case to an attorney who was addicted to lawfully obtained prescription drugs, see In re Temple, 596 A.2d 585, 586 (D.C.1991); to a lawyer who was suffering from clinical depression, see In re Peek, 565 A.2d 627, 631-32 (D.C.1989); and to a practitioner afflicted with bipolar disorder, see In re Larsen, 589 A.2d 400, 400-01 (D.C.1991); but see In re Appler, 669 A.2d 731, 741 (D.C.1995) (refusing to apply Kersey in disciplinary proceeding against attorney with bipolar disorder who stole more than a million dollars). These cases differ from Marshall's, however, in that the attorney's disability in each of them did not result from criminal conduct on his part. Marshall's addiction, on the other hand, stems from his unlawful possession, use, and abuse of cocaine over a period of several years. A cocaine habit, once acquired, is not easily cast off: Cocaine is a seductive and intensely coercive drug, one of the most powerful pharmacological reinforcers known. Once it has been experienced, the tendency to reuse it is nearly irresistible.... Coke is the only drug laboratory animals prefer to food, water and sex. They will self-administer the drug until they overdose and die, if given free access to it. LISKA, DRUGS AND THE HUMAN BODY 145 (2d ed.1985); see also In re Rentel, supra note 13, 729 P.2d at 619 ([c]ocaine appears to be the most addicting substance yet known to medical science) (quoting respondent Rentel's psychiatrist). Any humane person would surely feel compassion for those who have become ensnared by the drug to their detriment and, often, to their ruin. See Hein, supra, 516 A.2d at 1108. But notwithstanding cocaine's often all-but-irresistible attraction for those who have allowed themselves to become involved with it, the intentional possession of the drug is unlawful in the District of Columbia, see D.C.Code § 33-541(a) (1998), and, indeed, throughout the United States. See 21 U.S.C. § 844. Marshall now asks us to mitigate the sanction, for conduct otherwise warranting disbarment, on the basis of a condition which was brought about, at least initially, by his own intentional violation of the law. This would represent a giant step beyond Kersey a step which would tend, in our view, to create perverse incentives and to undermine the rule of law. We begin with the obvious. There are valid and rational differences between addiction to [cocaine] and alcohol.... Alcohol is legal, although regulated, while [cocaine] is prohibited. Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 409 (D.C.1975) (en banc) (holding that heroin addict may properly be convicted of possession of a controlled substance). Each time [Marshall] used cocaine during [a period of several years], he engaged in [criminal conduct punishable by] ... imprisonment and a ... fine. In re Rentel, supra, 729 P.2d at 620. To apply a mitigation principle previously used only in connection with lawful conduct to a situation involving criminal behavior distorts that principle beyond recognition. In In re Terner, supra note 14, an attorney who was facing discipline for neglect of numerous matters entrusted to him and for other unprofessional conduct asked the court to consider his cocaine addiction in mitigation. The attorney had sought professional help, but he did not do so until after his misconduct had been discovered. The Supreme Court of New Jersey emphatically rejected the attorney's claim: [W]e remain committed to the proposition that such addiction is neither a defense to nor a mitigating factor in attorney discipline. Nor can we ignore the different legal consequences attendant on the abuse of cocaine as distinguished from alcohol. Attorneys who use cocaine or other controlled dangerous substances necessarily violate the law. We would be remiss in condoning such activity, even to the extent of allowing it to ameliorate the penalty in a disciplinary proceeding. 577 A.2d at 519. The court added that an attorney who becomes involved in the abuse of unlawful drugs does serious harm to his clients and brings disgrace upon all members of the legal profession. Such conduct evinces a disrespect for the very laws he is sworn to uphold. Id. (quoting Special Master's Report). In In re Demergian, supra , the Supreme Court of California disbarred the respondent for misappropriation, rejecting his request for mitigation based on addiction to cocaine and alcohol: [C]ocaine use is hardly a mitigating factor. Petitioner became addicted through voluntary use of an illicit drug. (Compare In re Nadrich (1988) [citation omitted], [44 Cal.3d 271, 243 Cal.Rptr. 218,] 747 P.2d 1146 (drug addiction resulted from legitimate medical treatment)). Apart from petitioner's subsequent rehabilitative efforts, his use of cocaine increases the danger he presents to the public, the courts, and the reputation of the legal profession. Logically, therefore, it is a factor in aggravation. 768 P.2d at 1074 (emphasis in original). In In re Rivkind, supra note 12, the Supreme Court of Arizona, in suspending an attorney for two years for abuse of cocaine where the abuse had not affected his clients, stated that [w]e will deal very sternly with any lawyer who neglects his clients while abusing drugs. 791 P.2d at 1041. Here, Marshall not only neglected Mr. Warrick's interests but misappropriated money and fabricated evidence in order to try to cover up the conversion. As the Board has correctly pointed out, see p.[534], supra, adoption of Marshall's position would place an attorney who has misappropriated client funds and who has also violated the criminal law by abusing cocaine, in a more favorable position, for purposes of professional discipline, than the lawyer who commits a like misappropriation but who has scrupulously complied with the drug laws. We agree with Bar Counsel that [t]o permit mitigation on grounds of illegal drug use effectively would reward the attorney for illegal conduct occurring after he assumes his professional responsibilities. Such a result would adversely affect the perception of the Bar. Simply stated, people go to jail for conduct that Respondent offers as a mitigating factor. An informed public would find it intolerable that such a lawyer be granted special grace. Marshall's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. According to Marshall, [t]he Board is arguing that Respondent be punished for his misconduct, use of cocaine, rather than to fulfill its duty to recommend [a lesser sanction]. The Board has made it plain, however, that it is recommending discipline because Marshall misappropriated client funds and fabricated documents, and not because he abused an unlawful drug. If Marshall had never used cocaine, the Board's recommendation would have been exactly the same. The Lawyer Counseling Committee of the District of Columbia Bar (LCC) has filed an amicus brief in which it argues that the illegality of cocaine possession should not be dispositive. [19] The LCC relies in part on Bar Counsel's statement, quoted in In re Reynolds, 649 A.2d 818, 819 (D.C.1994) (Farrell, J., concurring), that simple possession of cocaine is not illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, and also on the dismissal in Reynolds of disciplinary charges against an attorney who had violated the terms of his probation in a criminal case by using a controlled substance. According to the LCC, Reynolds stands for the proposition that use of an unlawful controlled substance, standing alone, does not warrant sanctions. The LCC has, however, misapprehended the import of the Reynolds decision. As Judge Farrell stated in his concurring opinion in Reynolds, which was joined by Judge Terry and which thus represented the views of a majority of the court, [b]efore us is no question whether respondent's admitted illegal drug use during probation (which resulted in revocation) is independent grounds for discipline. Id. at 819. Moreover, Judges Farrell and Terry were of the opinion that [i]n future cases, such repeated illegal use of drugs affecting a lawyer's fitness to practice law may well result in discipline without regard to whether it involved `moral turpitude.' Id. at 820. Relying on the dissenting opinion in In re Rentel, 729 P.2d at 624, [20] the LCC urges that [w]e should encourage those members of our profession with alcohol and chemical dependencies to overcome their addictions and, accordingly, we should take rehabilitation into consideration when determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction. We do not disagree with the proposition that addicted attorneys should be encouraged to deal with their affliction, and nothing in this opinion suggests that a lawyer with a drug problem who asks for assistance and treatment should be disciplined for his past possession of unlawful drugs alone. We agree with the Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, that an attorney who commits disciplinary offenses warranting disbarment, and then seeks assistance only after he has been apprehended, comes too late with his rehabilitation defense to merit the consideration of the court. See Terner, supra, 577 A.2d at 519. Like the respondent in Terner, Marshall sought treatment after having engaged in the misconduct that brought him down and after Bar Counsel initiated an investigation of it. In sum, we reject Marshall's attempt to invoke the Kersey principle, and we hold that, at least where an attorney's misconduct warrants disbarment, addiction to cocaine attributable to the intentional use of that drug does not warrant the imposition of a lesser sanction. [21]