Opinion ID: 1219567
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is the Commission's Justification for Rejecting Total Exclusion Supported by Substantial Evidence?

Text: The attorney general asserts that the Commission: determined without ample evidence in the record that total exclusion would not provide sufficient generating capacity over a reasonable planning period to maintain an acceptable reserve margin of twenty percent; changed its definition of the reasonable planning period of ten years by adding an extra year to the period; ignored evidence of the availability of alternative sources to be purchased, and relied on a PNM forecast that it has previously characterized as unreliable. These issues ask us to apply substantial evidence review when the Commission has not yet finished taking evidence on these questions. What these contentions ignore is that the Commission has not yet determined how capacity will be phased into rates. The timing of inclusion has not yet been finally determined. Thus, the argument that the Commission changed its definition of the relevant time period to determine sufficient capacity fails as premature  it is not yet apparent to what purpose this alleged extension was used. Because this hearing was in essence a threshold determination, binding over certain capacity for further examination to determine if it was necessary to protect New Mexico's energy future, the Commission acted only to protect its options by considering future possibilities. At this time, however, it has not taken any final action that implicates the alleged extra year, and we cannot determine whether it acted improperly. This conclusion is bolstered by the lack of evidence showing that the Commission relied in any way on evidence regarding the extra year. The same concerns, namely the lack of final Commission action regarding phasing in of capacity and the narrow scope of the final order as a threshold determination pending the outcome of the prudence and rate hearings, dispose of the other two arguments. The attorney general claims that reliance on PNM's August 1988 load forecast was misplaced in light of the Commission's skepticism regarding the forecast's reliability. See Final Order, 101 Pub.Util.Rep. (PUR) 4th at 165. First, it is not clear that the Commission abused its discretion in considering a forecast that was submitted on the record and subject to examination by the parties. See, e.g., Attorney General v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 101 N.M. 549, 553, 685 P.2d 957, 961 (1984) (Commission has discretion in considering conflicting evidence). More importantly, no final action in reliance on the forecast has been made, and any decision we would make on this issue at this point would be premature and would subject us to potentially duplicative or unnecessary decision making. Similarly, any argument that more contract purchases, rather than use of PNM's own available resources, should be used can be presented at the subsequent hearings.
The Commission stated, as a further reason militating against total exclusion, that if it had determined that total exclusion of PVNGS was appropriate, in fairness to PNM it would have had to decertify the units, thus forever losing jurisdiction. The attorney general contends that the determination is wrong  that the Commission would not be required to decertify the PVNGS units. The attorney general has not shown, however, how it would be beyond the Commission's discretion to decide that decertification would be appropriate in these circumstances. Moreover, the Commission has not made any decision in this regard. It only stated, as one factor, that decertification would have been fair. It has not determined that decertification should be done, in which case we would be able to evaluate the reasonableness of its decision, and it has not decided that total exclusion was inappropriate because of decertification. Accordingly, we find no reviewable decision before us.