Opinion ID: 203905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eligibility for Career Offender Status

Text: The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a defendant be classified as a career offender if he meets the following criteria: (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time he or she committed the offense of conviction; (2) the offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has been previously convicted of two prior felonies of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a); see also Almenas, 553 F.3d at 31.
The government bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a prior conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes. United States v. McKenzie, 539 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir.2008). The Government may satisfy its burden by producing a certified copy of the conviction or an equivalent proffer. Id. at 19 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, for the proposition that an equivalent proffer includes official court documents). Once the government's threshold burden has been met, the conviction is presumed valid for purposes of applying the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Unger, 915 F.2d 759, 761 (1st Cir.1990).
The government was unable to provide a judicial record of the fact of Bryant's New York conviction. The PSR noted that the New York Supreme Court Clerk's office was unable to locate the file for the case. To prove the fact of this conviction, the PSR and the government relied upon the criminal history record maintained by the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the New York State Police Information Network (NYSPIN) as well as the incarceration record from the New York Department of Correctional Services. Bryant argues that the government is constrained as to what it can rely on to prove the fact of a conviction, contending that the Supreme Court in Shepard required that the existence of a prior conviction be proved by judicial records. [2] We decline the invitation to read Shepard as broadly as Bryant does. As we have stated previously,  Shepard and its progenitor, Taylor ..., address the appropriate sources for ascertaining the elements of a putative predicate offense when the statute of conviction encompasses both conduct that would constitute a predicate offense and conduct that would not. [3] United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 202 (1st Cir.2006). Specifically, Shepard concerned itself with the sources upon which a sentencing court can rely to determine the character of an offense. See 544 U.S. at 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254. This is a different question than what we are presented with in the instant case. More precisely, we agree with our sister courts that Shepard does not control here because the Shepard Court did not address what documents can be used to prove the fact of a prior conviction.  United States v. Zuniga-Chavez, 464 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir.2006) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Neri-Hernandes, 504 F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir.2007) (ruling that  Shepard does not apply when determining whether the government has satisfied its burden of proof as to the existence of a prior conviction); United States v. Sanders, 470 F.3d 616, 623-24 (6th Cir.2006) (noting that Shepard does not control the inquiry as to whether the government has provided sufficient evidence to establish a fact of the conviction). While Bryant argues that it would make little sense to permit courts to consider a broader array of less reliable, less certain, non-judicial records to determine whether such a conviction even existed, in the first place, it does not logically follow that we should extend Shepard 's rule governing judicial records to the instant facts when the concerns that animated the Supreme Court in Shepard and Taylor are not readily applicable. There is little danger that a sentencing court's inquiry into the existence of a prior conviction would engender the same kind of practical difficulties and potential unfairness that could be present in a determination of whether a defendant's convictions were violent felonies, which was at issue in Shepard and Taylor. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601, 110 S.Ct. 2143). Establishing the fact of a prior crime is a more discrete inquiry that is not as susceptible to the lengthy and cumbersome collateral trials of the kind the Shepard and Taylor Courts hoped to avoid. Although Shepard does not control here, the district court must nevertheless determine whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable. When a defendant objects to the fact of a conviction as Bryant does here, [4] we have held that: [T]he Government may not simply rely on assertions in a presentence report if those assertions are contested by the defendant. Thus, when the defendant calls into dispute a presentence report's description of an alleged prior conviction, the Government must demonstrate that the description in the report is based on a sufficiently reliable source to establish the accuracy of that description. United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 75 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Price, 409 F.3d 436, 444 (D.C.Cir.2005)). [5] We conclude that the district court, by failing to heed this language from Brown, committed clear error. Here, to prove the fact of this conviction, the PSR and the government relied upon the criminal history record maintained by the NCIC, the NYSPIN, and the incarceration record from the New York Department of Correctional Services. Responding to Bryant's objections to this evidence, the district court stated that based upon the preponderance of the evidence standard... there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that this defendant was, in fact, convicted in the so-called New York conviction of a crime that forms a predicate to his being considered to be a career offender. The district court added: I do acknowledge that there are some close questions that had to be determined in making this finding, but the Court does find that the government has sufficiently offered proof to a preponderance of the evidence that both of these crimes were committed and the defendant was convicted of them and, together, they establish that he is, by virtue of this third conviction that he's about to be sentenced for, a career offender. We hold that it was simply not enough for the district court to have relied on the government's recitation of the sources cited in the PSR without any additional inquiry into the reliability of these sources. Unlike certified convictions or other comparable judicial records that detail the fact of a conviction and carry a presumption of reliability sufficient to allow the government to meet its burden, see McKenzie, 539 F.3d at 19 (noting that government may satisfy its burden by producing a certified copy of a conviction or another official court document); Unger, 915 F.2d at 761 (same), we believe that non-judicial records, such as those provided by the government here, should not be afforded the same presumption. The district court clearly erred by not requiring the government to show that the PSR's description of the offense was `based on a sufficiently reliable source to establish the accuracy of that description.' See Brown, 510 F.3d at 75 (quoting Price, 409 F.3d at 444). In the absence of such an inquiry, the district court could not have properly concluded that the government met its burden. [6]
Bryant additionally challenges whether the government met its burden to prove the fact of the Suffolk Superior Court conviction. Here, it is notable that Bryant does not challenge the authenticity of the certified copy of the judicial record detailing the Suffolk Superior Court conviction. Rather, Bryant, challenges the fact of the conviction on grounds that a hand-written docket sheet from the Boston Municipal Court, the court where the case originated, puts into question the validity of the Suffolk Superior Court conviction. The notation states, SUCR9310760: Previous record vacated. Superior Court Case is dismissed. Bryant contends that this notation, though not from the court of conviction, is nevertheless a judicial record of the originating case that undermines the reliability of the Suffolk Superior Court conviction for purposes of a sentencing enhancement. The government defended the reliability of the judicial record from the Suffolk Superior Court during the sentencing hearing. The government noted that the official court record from the court of conviction is a more dependable source than a hand-written notation from another court. In any event, the government contends that the district court did not clearly err in crediting the government's argument. We agree. Unlike its evidence supporting the fact of the New York conviction, the government submitted a certified copy of a judicial record to prove the fact of the Suffolk Superior Court conviction from the court in which Bryant was convicted. As stated above, the government can satisfy its burden through this type of judicial record because it is presumptively reliable. See McKenzie, 539 F.3d at 19. Moreover, the record shows that the district court carefully considered Bryant's argument, but nevertheless decided in favor of the government. Thus, despite the existence of the handwritten notation which admittedly added some confusion, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that the certified copy of the record from the Suffolk Superior Court was sufficiently reliable to support the fact of Bryant's Suffolk Superior Court conviction. [A] district court's choice between two plausible, but conflicting, interpretations of a factual scenario cannot amount to clear error. United States v. Carrasco, 540 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir.2008) (alterations in original) (quoting Valentín v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 367 (1st Cir.2001)).

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a controlled substance offense is an offense ... punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance... or the possession of a controlled substance ... with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute or dispense.  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the definition of controlled substance offense requires that the statute under which the defendant was charged involves an intent to distribute or other indicia of trafficking. [7] Bryant argues in the alternative that if the government has met its burden to prove the fact of the New York conviction, it nevertheless failed to prove that the New York conviction for attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance necessarily qualifies as a career offender predicate. [8] Bryant bases his argument on the Second Circuit's decision in Savage. See 542 F.3d at 965-66. In Savage, the Second Circuit reviewed a district court's decision to apply a sentencing enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). [9] Id. at 960. The district court in that case based its decision, in relevant part, on its determination that one of the defendant's prior felony convictions under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 21a-277(b) was for a controlled substance offense, as the term is defined in U.S.S.G § 4B1.2(b). [10] Id. In reversing the district court decision, the Savage court expressed its concern that an offer to sell under Connecticut law could include a fraudulent offer which would mean that the person making the fraudulent offer would not have the intent to distribute or sell an item. Id. at 965. Thus, it reasoned that the Connecticut statute, by criminalizing a mere offer to sell, criminalizes more conduct than falls within the federal definition of a controlled substance offense. Id. at 966. The Savage court further concluded that the defendant's sentence should be vacated [b]ecause nothing in the statute of conviction, the charging document, the plea colloquy or other comparable judicial record established with certainty that [the defendant] necessarily pleaded guilty to the elements of a controlled substance offense.... Id. at 960. Bryant argues that the statute upon which the New York conviction is based, like the Connecticut statute, criminalizes conduct that falls outside the federal definition of a controlled substance offense. Bryant argues that because the New York statute defines sale of a controlled substance to include offer, it criminalizes both predicate and non-predicate conduct. See N.Y. Penal Law § 220.00(1) (`Sell' means to sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another, or to offer or agree to do the same.). Bryant claims that because the government failed to show the New York conviction was for conduct that would constitute a predicate offense, it cannot be used for career offender purposes. Bryant's argument fails because it is well-established under New York law that `in order to support a conviction under an offering for sale theory, there must be evidence of a bona fide offer to selli.e., that defendant had both the intent and ability to proceed with the sale.' People v. Samuels, 99 N.Y.2d 20, 750 N.Y.S.2d 828, 780 N.E.2d 513, 515 (2002) (quoting People v. Mike, 92 N.Y.2d 996, 684 N.Y.S.2d 165, 706 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (N.Y.1998)); see also People v. Gondolfo, 94 Misc.2d 696, 405 N.Y.S.2d 890, 894-95 (1978). Thus, the instant case is distinguishable from Savage because concerns that Bryant could have been convicted for making a fraudulent offer, a non-predicate offense, do not exist here. At the time Bryant was allegedly convicted of the offense, he would have been found to have intent to proceed with a sale. It follows then that the New York conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which requires an intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).
Bryant also challenges the Suffolk Superior Court conviction on the grounds that the government has failed to prove that he pleaded guilty to acts that would constitute a career offender predicate. In 1992, Bryant was initially charged with one count of trafficking in cocaine in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32E(b)(1), and one count of conspiracy to violate the drug laws of the Commonwealth (specifically, to traffic in cocaine) in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 40. The trafficking charge was dismissed and Bryant pleaded guilty only to the conspiracy charge. Where the predicate offense involves a conspiracy, the sentencing court must determine whether the object of the conspiracy falls within the scope of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). See Piper, 35 F.3d at 619 (To determine the status of a conspiracy conviction vis-a-vis the career offender rubric, the key question is `conspiracy to do what?'). Bryant correctly argues that the statute of conviction encompasses both conduct that would constitute a predicate offense and conduct that would not. [11] Therefore, the sentencing court is required to determine whether the guilty plea, defined by a more expansive statute, necessarily admitted the elements of a controlled substances offense for career offender purposes. See Shepard 544 U.S. at 20-21, 125 S.Ct. 1254. As noted above, to make this determination in a case involving a guilty plea, the sentencing court may review the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Id. at 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254. In this case the indictment underlying the Suffolk Superior Court conviction demonstrated that the object of the conspiracy fell within the scope of a controlled substances offense under U.S.S.G § 4B1.2(b). It stated that Bryant did conspire ... to unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute a net weight of fourteen grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine .... (emphasis added). Reliance upon the indictment is also consistent with our precedent. See Santos, 363 F.3d at 24 (Where the charging instruments are instructive on the issue of whether a predicate offense [falls within the scope of § 4B1.2], we need not look further.) (citation omitted); United States v. Leavitt, 925 F.2d 516, 517-18 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing to the Sentencing Guidelines commentary to justify looking to the indictment to decide whether conduct can be a predicate offense for career offender purposes if it falls under a statute broad enough to encompass other conduct that would not be a predicate offense for career offender purposes). We conclude that since the indictment clearly narrowed the charge to a crime that qualifies as a controlled substances offense for career offender purposes and Bryant pleaded guilty to the same, the Suffolk Superior Court conviction qualifies as a career offender predicate offense.