Opinion ID: 2813057
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Magistrate’s Rulings

Text: A month after discovery closed, Flint—alleging that Dammon and Berry lied throughout discovery—moved for an extension of the discovery deadline and the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate those allegations. The magistrate judge did not err in denying the motions. A decision to deny reopening discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Winters v. Fru-Con, Inc., 498 F.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2007). That discretion is considerable: case management depends on enforceable deadlines, and discovery “must have an end point.” Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Lock Realty Corp. IX v. U.S Health, LP, 707 F.3d 764, 772 (7th Cir. 2013). In managing their caseloads, district courts are entitled to—“indeed they must—enforce deadlines.” Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Only if a party has failed to act “because of excusable neglect” do the Federal Rules permit a post-deadline extension. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B); Brosted v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 421 F.3d 459, 463–64 (7th Cir. 2005). The reasons for the delay—including whether it was within the reasonable control No. 14-2568 7 of the movant—must be considered. Raymond, 442 F.3d at 606 (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). Neglect is generally not excusable when a party should have acted before the deadline, see Murphy v. Eddie Murphy Prods., Inc., 611 F.3d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 2010), or when a party’s lack of diligence is to blame for its failure to secure discoverable information, see Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 816 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, Flint claims Defendants Dammon and Berry engaged in discovery gamesmanship but cedes she knew they would resort to those dilatory tactics (including lying) as early as the filing of their Rule 26(a) disclosures. Those disclosures were due in May 2012, and Flint did not docket her tardy motion—premised entirely on Defendants’ malfeasance—until April 2013. Waiting almost a year to request extra time in the face of an opponent’s sandbagging is certainly neglect, but not of the excusable variety. See Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 157 (7th Cir. 1996) (“When parties wait until the last minute to comply with a deadline, they are playing with fire.”). As to the magistrate’s refusal to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate Dammon and Berry, Flint’s motion was premised on a grave misunderstanding of the scope of judicial authority. To maintain the separation of powers, judges are generally forbidden from undertaking tasks more properly accomplished by the executive branch. United States v. Courtland, 642 F.3d 545, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680–81 (1988)). And “[g]overnmental and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706. See Watts 8 No. 14-2568 v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (“Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system.”). In the rare case where a federal court initiates criminal contempt proceedings to vindicate its authority, that court “request[s]” the U.S. Attorney to prosecute the charge. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 697 n. 3 (1988) (citing Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987)). If the U.S. Attorney declines (whether due to a conflict of interest or obstructionist behavior), the Supreme Court has instructed district courts to “appoint” a disinterested private attorney as special prosecutor. Id.; Young, 481 U.S. at 800–01. But this is not a contempt case, so neither requesting U.S. Attorney involvement nor appointing a special prosecutor was in play. Insofar as she sought a courtappointed prosecutor, Flint’s motion was a non-starter. In any event, a thorough review of the record reveals Flint never raised the magistrate judge’s rulings with the dis- trict judge, though she had ample time to do so: Flint’s four- teen-day period to object, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), expired well before her summary judgment response came due (twenty-six days later). Subject to exceptions inapplicable here, failure to challenge a magistrate’s pretrial ruling in the district court forfeits the right to attack it on appeal. United States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1499, 1504–05 (7th Cir. 1996). Whether via that forfeiture or on the merits, Flint’s appeal fails insofar as she targets the magistrate’s rulings on extending discovery and appointing a special prosecutor. No. 14-2568 9