Opinion ID: 2268376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: definition of taxpayer

Text: The 1971 tax act defined a taxpayer as each and every individual resident in this state who has earnings received, credited or accrued in any taxable year from gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets, or from dividends subject to tax, and a resident as an individual: (1) who is domiciled [5] in this state; provided, if an individual maintains no permanent place of abode in this state, and maintains a permanent place of abode elsewhere, and spends in the aggregate not more than thirty days of the taxable year in this state, he shall be deemed not a resident; or (2) who is not domiciled in this state but maintains a permanent place of abode in this state and is in this state for an aggregate of more than one hundred eighty-three days of the taxable year. Public Act No. 8, § 9, Spec. Sess., June, 1971 (General Statutes § 12-505). The plaintiffs contend that since they were not domiciled in Connecticut for the entire year 1971 and did not spend more than 183 days in this state in that year, they fall within neither class of resident as defined in § 12-505, and thus are not within that section's definition of a taxpayer. In support of their contention, they point out that the § 12-505 definition of resident derives from a tax department regulation defining taxpayer under the 1969 act. The regulation covered three classes of persons: those domiciled in Connecticut; those not domiciled in Connecticut but maintaining a permanent place of abode in the state and spending more than 183 days per year there; and those domiciled in Connecticut for a portion of the year. The plaintiffs argue that, since the statute covers only two of the three classes covered by the regulation, the General Assembly must have intended to exclude the third class (those domiciled for a portion of the year). We do not find the plaintiffs' argument persuasive. Section 12-505 clearly and explicitly defines two classes of residents: (1) those who are domiciled in this state, and (2) those who are not. In the stipulation of facts, the plaintiffs concede that they were domiciliaries of Connecticut for several years prior to July 15, 1971. The only domiciliaries of Connecticut who are not classified as residents are those who (1) maintain no permanent place of abode in this state, and (2) maintain a permanent place of abode elsewhere, and (3) spend not more than thirty days of the taxable year in this state. The plaintiffs concededly maintained a permanent place of abode in Connecticut and thus do not come within the exclusion. They were properly classified as residents and thus taxpayers under the statutory definitions. The case of Shell Oil Co. v. Ricciuti, 147 Conn. 277, 285, 160 A.2d 257, relied upon by the plaintiffs, stands for the proposition that the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of administrative regulations which predate legislation. Presuming, as the plaintiffs urge, that the General Assembly knew that the tax commissioner's regulations covered three possible classes of persons, we need not conclude that the General Assembly, in adopting legislation which provided for only two classes of persons, intended to exclude those in the third class from its definition. [6] It is more probable that the General Assembly simply intended to abolish the distinction between those persons domiciled in Connecticut for a portion of the year and those domiciled here for the full year. It is significant that § 12-505 was amended by 1973 Public Act No. 356, § 1, further defining taxable year to mean that portion of such year as either commences when a taxpayer becomes a resident or ends when a taxpayer ceases to be a resident of this state. [A]n amendment which in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the original act. Hartford v. Suffield, 137 Conn. 341, 346, 77 A.2d 760; Atwood v. Regional School District No. 15, 169 Conn. 613, 623, 363 A.2d 1038; see also Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-44, 93 S. Ct. 477, 34 L. Ed.2d 446. The absence in the 1971 enactment of the language later added, specifically mentioning part-year residents, cannot be construed as providing part-year residents with a loophole by which they may entirely escape tax liability. The plaintiffs' second claim, that the statutory definition of resident is so badly drafted as to be void for vagueness under the due process clause, requires little discussion. The 1971 act was drafted with considerable haste, [7] and, as we stated in Kellems v. Brown, supra, 496, [t]he act is not free from ambiguity and certainly lacks the clarity to be desired and expected in revenue raising legislation. The definition of resident is, however, reasonably clear and certain. By its plain language, all persons domiciled in Connecticut during their taxable year are classified as residents; only those domiciliaries falling within the specific exemption escape this classification. While the definition of resident would have been improved by a specific reference to part-year residents, the lack of such a reference does not render the definition excessively ambiguous.