Opinion ID: 4153008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: district court’s omnibus order

Text: Following the jury’s verdict, the Plaintiffs filed numerous post-trial motions, which the district court resolved in an omnibus order. district court’s omnibus order pointed out that, “In that [earlier partial summary judgment] order, the Court held that only a trier of fact could determine whether Defendants’ Report Card Requirement and Proper Attire Rule violated the Fair Housing Act.” As to the Loitering and Curfew Rules, the district court’s omnibus order explained that the district court’s earlier order had found the text of the Rules violated the Act but had “left the ultimate determination of liability and damages” to the jury, stating: The Court did find, however, that the text of the Curfew Rule and the Loitering Rule violated the Fair Housing Act. Notwithstanding the Court’s conclusion that the text of those rules violated the Fair Housing Act, the Court left the ultimate determination of liability and damages to the trier of fact. 36 Case: 16-11248 Date Filed: 03/15/2017 Page: 37 of 73 The district court’s omnibus order recapped how the Plaintiffs argued at trial that the district court’s earlier ruling meant that the jury had to determine only damages as to the Loitering and Curfew Rules. This, according to the district court, was a mistake: “While the Court had previously held that the text of [those two Rules] did violate the FHA, this violation is not equivalent to a finding of liability under the FHA.” The district court’s omnibus order further explained that the sentence from its earlier order that the Defendants’ evidence of enforcement went to “damages and not to liability” “did not signal that Defendants were liable—as reiterated by the Court at trial. Instead, this sentence (when properly viewed in context) merely disregarded Defendants’ arguments as inapplicable in the context of whether or not the Loitering Rule and Curfew Rule—in the abstract—violated the FHA. The Court’s ruling was very narrow and was limited to the text of the rules and not to a finding of liability.” The district court’s omnibus order also explained why its earlier order did not directly entitle the Plaintiffs to relief: The Center’s position and apparent confusion in this matter stems from a certain disconnect in its motion for partial summary judgment. While the argument in the Center’s motion focused on whether the text of Defendants’ rules violated the FHA, the Center’s prayer for relief sought a determination of liability. The disconnect, then, was causation. Implicit in the Center’s reasoning was (i) if a rule violates the FHA, and (ii) the rule was published by the Defendant, then (iii) the publishing Defendant is liable to a fair 37 Case: 16-11248 Date Filed: 03/15/2017 Page: 38 of 73 housing center. Not so. The statute governing remedies under the FHA merely states that certain remedies “may” flow from a violation and, moreover, case law establishes . . . that the existence of a rule that violates the FHA is not, by itself and without more, sufficient to impose liability. While there were no disputed material facts at summary judgment as to whether Defendants’ rules were published, there was a dispute of material fact as to what impact those rules had on Plaintiffs and on the community as a whole. Indeed, Defendants’ enforcement of the rules was a hotly and vigorously contested issue that resulted in extensive testimony at trial. The impact of Defendants’ rules on the community was a hotly contested issue also. To the extent the Center takes the position that, independent of any dispute of material fact pertaining to causation, the existence of certain rules caused it damages as a matter of law at summary judgment, or, alternatively, that the Center was not required to prove causation at summary judgment, these positions contravene the law. (Emphasis added). In support, the district court pointed to Martin v. Palm Beach Atlantic Ass’n, Inc., 696 So. 2d 919, 922-23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that a condominium association’s rule facially violated the FHA but stating that the association’s contention that it did not intend to discriminate “may be considered by the jury as to the issues of damages and their causation”) and Blomgren v. Ogle, 850 F. Supp. 1427, 1440 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (holding that, while an apartment’s rule discriminated on its face, damages “may be imposed only where there is credible proof of harm proximately caused by the violation”). Thus, the district court’s omnibus order explained: While the text of the Loitering Rule and the Curfew Rule in the instant case patently discriminated against children, the application and enforcement of those rules were left to the jury to determine 38 Case: 16-11248 Date Filed: 03/15/2017 Page: 39 of 73 causation and damages and, as a result, the jury—not the Court— determined Defendants’ liability. (Emphasis added) Because evidence was introduced that the Rules applied to all residents, the district court’s omnibus order rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that the trial evidence proved that the Rules were enforced in a discriminatory manner, stating: It was within the jury’s purview to conclude that there were no discriminatory acts sufficient to cause the Center any damages or, at a minimum, to conclude that the Center did not meet its burden to establish such. The Defendants in this case were accused of discrimination against children. Notwithstanding this serious allegation, approximately eighty percent of the families residing in Defendants’ complexes had children. The Center emphasizes that this evidence means many families experienced discrimination. That is one interpretation. Another plausible inference from this evidence is that many families chose to live there, chose to stay. Families renewed their leases. An extremely small percentage of families residing at the Defendant communities chose to join this lawsuit. Evidence was introduced that the controversial rules were intended to benefit children. Evidence was introduced that the rules were applied uniformly to all residents—not just children[.] (Emphasis added). The district court’s omnibus order thus denied the Plaintiffs’ post-trial motions, including their motion for a new trial. The Plaintiffs timely filed this appeal. On appeal, the Plaintiffs do not challenge the jury’s verdict as to the Report Card Requirement or Proper Attire Rule. Rather, the Plaintiffs seek a new trial on their claims about the Loitering and Curfew Rules. The Plaintiffs argue that the district court should have told the jury that the Defendants’ Loitering and Curfew Rules made them liable to the Plaintiffs as a matter of law and that the only issue for the jury was the amount of damages. 39 Case: 16-11248 Date Filed: 03/15/2017 Page: 40 of 73 The Plaintiffs argue the district court erred by not telling the jury this in the jury charge or at least in the verdict forms.