Opinion ID: 4215000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analy'.sis.

Text: An appellate court reviews the trial court's denial of ~1 motion to withdraw a guilty p~ea in a two-step. process. First, a trial court's determination as to th.e voluntariness of a plea is reviewed for clear error. 4 A decision that is supported by substantial.evidence is not clearly erroneous.s Second, once. a court determines a plea to be voluntary, a trial court's refusal to allow a voluntary plea to be withdrawn is review~d for an abuse of discretion. 6 A trial court abuses its discretion when it renders a decision which is ·arbitracy, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. 7 4 Rigdon v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004) (citing Bronk. v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 489 (Ky. 2001) (Cooper, J., concurring)). s Rigdon, i44 S.W.3d at 288 (citing Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W ..3d 532 (Ky. App. 2003)). 6 Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 288 (citing Bronk, 58 S.W,3d at 487). These cases interpret Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.10 to afford abuse. of discretion review of a trial court's decision. RCr a.10 states, At any time before judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty ... to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. (emphasis added). 7 Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 288 (citing Goodyear Tlre & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 58.1 (Ky. 2000)). · 4
A guilty plea is valid only when it is entered intelligently and voluntarily.8 In determining the validity of guilty'pleas in criminal cases, the plea must represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative course of action open to the defendant.9 Whether a guilty plea is voluntarily given is to be determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.10 The trial .court is in the best position to determine the totality. of circumstances surrounding a guilty plea. 11 If the court finds a-guilty plea. to be involuntary, the motion to withdraw . . must be granted; however, if a plea is found to be voluntary, it is then within the trial court's discretion to permit its withdrawaJ.12 A defendant who expressly represents in open court that his guilty plea is voluntary may not ordinarily repudfate his statements to the sentencingjudge.13 Solemn· declarations in open.court carry a strong presumption of verity.14 Because Liggett alleged ineffective assistan_ce of counsel, we in1:J.st consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the guilty plea and j~tapose the presumption of voluntariness inherent. in a proper plea colloquy s Bronk, 58 S.W.3d.at 486. 9 Centers v. Commonweal.th, 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. App. 1990) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) and Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. App. 1986)). 10 Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at ·287-88 (citing Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8 (Ky. 2002)). 11 Id. . . ~K . . 13 Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 568 (Ky. 2006) (quoting U.S. v. Todaro, 982 F.2d 1025, 1030 (6th Cir. 1993)). . · 14 Centers, 799 S.W.~d at 54 (citing Bla,ckledge v. Allison,'431 U.S. 63 (1997)). 5 with a Strickland v. Washington 15 inquiry into the performance of counsel.16 Under this inquiry, Liggett must demonstrate: (1) that counsel made errors so serious that couns~l's performance fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea proce.ss that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that·the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would hav.e insisted on going to trial.17 The fact that counsel consulted .only briefly with his client before his. . client eritered a guilty plea does not, absent more, establish ineffective assistance of counsel; it is only a factor to be considered in the tot8.Iity of .. circumstances.18 While limited communications between an attorney and client are far from ideal, such situations are not uncommnn.19 A ~onclusory . allegation . tO the effect that . absent . the error the. movant would have insisted upo~ a trial is not enough to demonstrate prejudice.20 Liggett must allege facts that, if proven, would ·support a ·conclusion that the decision to reject the plea bargain and go to trial would have been rational under the circumsta,nces.21. C. The Trial Court's Ruling was not ·clearly Erroneous, nor did it Abuse its Discretion. The trial court's finding that Liggett entered his plea voluntarily, ·knowingly, and intelligently finds much support in the record. As stated, the 15 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 16 Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 486. 17 Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 486-87 (citing Sparks, 721 S.W.2d at 727-28). ia Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 290 (citing Jones v. Parke, 734 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (6th Cir. 1984)). i9 Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 291. 20 Stiger v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W. 3d 230, 237 (Ky. 2012). 21 Id. 6 trial court conducted a colloquy in open court with Liggett. During this colloquy, Liggett confirmed that he was intellectually capable of u~derstanding and did .understand the charge against him, his right to contest his guilt on this charge, and the consequences of his decision to plead guilty. And the latermade statements attributed to him in the PSI further supported the validity of the guilty plea he made under oath during the plea colloquy. Liggett's affidavit is the only evidence he submitted to support his effort  aside the guilt:Y, plea. Even viewing Liggett's allegations in the light most to set favorable to him, the totality of the circumstances favors the trial court's finding that Liggett knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his guilty plea. Liggett's statements in open court, his statements in his PSI, and the written motion to enter the plea not only directly refute the conclusory allegations he made in his affidavit~ but also substantially outweigh those allegations, including his ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. Liggett presents no other evidence in support of his allegations, thus failing to meet his burden. Without more than conclusory allegations supported by Liggett's affidavit, we cannot speculate. as to whether Liggett's-allegations amount to such adeficient performance on the part of counsel so as to classify these actions as outside the range of professionally competent. 22 Additionally~ nothing Liggett presented undermines the strength of the tri~l court's factual findings regarding the voluntary, knowin·g, and intelligent nature of the guilty 22 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 7 . plea, nor does· it demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insiste.d on going to trial . .. Liggett's plea bargain resulted in imposition of a sentence of imprisonment that was half the length of the sentepce that he could have received under the law. The bargain included an agreement by the Commonwealth to forego seeking indictment for additional serious charges with substantial ranges of punishment. Liggett thus did not meet his burden of showing that a rat~onal individual would have rather faced this possibility than accept the guilty plea offer. The question is whether the trial court's findings are supported by . - substantial eviqence.; if they. are, the trial court did not commit clear error, and its rulirig must be upheld. Because the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, as state_d :above, the trial court's finding that Liggett's. guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is not clearly erroneous. Lastly, the_ trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Liggett's · motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Nothing about the trial court's decision renders it arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.23 Stated differently, nothing in the record c~ls into question the reasonableness of the trial judge's decision to deny Liggett's motion. The ·judge's decision in this case to deny the motion did not amount to an abuse of 23 Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 288 (citing Goodyear Tire, 11 S.W.3d at 581). 8 ·discretion because it was reasonable.to do so, based on the totality of the record.