Opinion ID: 1473997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: alleged consent to the warrantless entry

Text: Because the government, alternatively, has argued that appellant consented to police entry on October 24which, if true, would obviate the need for a warrant (or for any discussion of the emergency exception)I turn to that issue. By justifying the warrantless entry under the emergency exception, my colleagues do not need to address the trial court's finding of a consensual police entry. It is reasonable to infer, however, that by ignoring the trial court's ruling, after remand, on an issue that logically precedes consideration of a nonconsensual, warrantless entry, my colleagues manifest, at the very least, their skepticism about the trial court's ruling. In having to address the issue, I conclude, as a matter of law, that the trial court's crucial findings were clearly erroneous and that there was no consensual entry.
On April 22, 1994, we remanded the record to the trial court for supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the police had received consent to enter appellant's home on October 24, 1989, and, if so, whether this consent extended to permit entry into appellant's bedroom in the basement. Specifically, we asked the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, supported by evidence in the record, clarifying: (1) whether anyone consented to the initial police entry into the house; and, if so, (2) who gave the consent; whether this person had authority to consent to the entry into the house; whether this consent, if given, also extended to entry into appellant's bedroom in the basement; and (3) in any event, whether consent to enter the house and appellant's bedroom could be imputed to appellant, including whether appellant herself consented to police entry into the house or into her bedroom. On May 6, 1994, the trial court made the following supplemental findings of fact and conclusions and incorporated them in the record: At about 11:00 a.m. October 24th, Detective Rufus Jenkins and other police officers visited Defendant's home.... The officers were met at the door by Defendant's brother, Lamard Oliver. The officers stated their desire to speak with Defendant. Mr. Oliver then called Defendant, apparently to inform her of the officers' presence after which Defendant inquired as to whether she should get dressed. Mr. Oliver then, with police officers following, proceeded down a stairwell to the basement of the house which apparently consisted of one large room.       By proceeding to the basement of the house in apparent response to the police officers' expressed desire to speak with Defendant and continuing to the basement with the officers following, Mr. Oliver, thereby expressed his willingness to accommodate the officers by leading them to the basement for the purpose of speaking with his sister. By so doing, Mr. Oliver consented to entry into the house, including the basement area where Defendant was then located. As a resident of the house, Mr. Oliver had apparent authority to admit others to areas not exclusively assigned to someone else. The area of the basement where Defendant was sleeping had apparently not been partitioned nor is there any indication that the basement in its entirety had been designated for Defendant's exclusive use.... Moreover the court finds that Defendant herself, though annoyed with the officers' persistence, nevertheless expressed her willingness to accommodate their desire to enter the basement to converse with her by simply asking if she should get dressed when she was called by her brother. The court concludes that both Defendant and her brother consented to entry into the basement and that both had apparent authority to grant such consent. We then gave the parties twenty days to file, simultaneously, memoranda on the trial court's supplemental findings and conclusions. In appellant's memorandum in response to the trial court's findings, she contends that (1) the trial court's factual findings are not supported by evidence in the record, and that (2) the trial court failed to hold the government to its burden of proving clear and positive testimony of consent that is unequivocal and specific, Judd v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 66, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (1951), because (a) Mr. Oliver's actions cannot justify entry under the doctrine of implied consent, and (b) Mr. Oliver lacked both actual and apparent authority to consent to entry of appellant's bedroom. [7] I agree with appellant that the government failed to meet its burden of proving, with clear and positive testimony, id., that Mr. Oliver and/or appellant volunteered consent to police entry, free from duress or coercion, express or implied. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
I summarize, first, the law applicable when the government contends a person consented to a warrantless entry of the home. It is axiomatic that the `physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' Welsh, 466 U.S. at 748, 104 S.Ct. at 2096 ( quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)). Because the warrant requirement protects the public from needless intrusions into the home, [i]t is a `basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586, 100 S.Ct. at 1380. In sum, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. Id. at 590, 100 S.Ct. at 1382. An individual can waive the warrant requirement by consenting to a search and seizure. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 S.Ct. at 2043; Judd, 89 U.S.App.D.C. at 65-66, 190 F.2d at 650-51. The government, however, must prove consent with clear and positive testimony. Judd, 89 U.S.App.D.C. at 66, 190 F.2d at 651. Furthermore, consent must be voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248, 93 S.Ct. at 2058. Because [i]ntimidation and duress are almost always implicit in such situations where officers display their badges and declare their intentions to search, Judd, 89 U.S.App.D.C. at 66, 190 F.2d at 651, the governmentto establish consentmust show more than the mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); it must clearly establish the absence of intimidation and duress. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248, 93 S.Ct. at 2058; Judd, 89 U.S.App.D.C. at 66, 190 F.2d at 651. [8] This court treats findings of consent as factual determinations, reversible only if clearly erroneous. See In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 500-01 (D.C.1992). A trial court's findings are clearly erroneous `to the extent that they fail to recognize [important] incidents and reject or fail to draw the inferences which we have found inescapable from the record.' Griffin v. City of Omaha, 785 F.2d 620, 628 (8th Cir.1986) (quoting Alexander v. National Farmers Organization, 687 F.2d 1173, 1203 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937, 103 S.Ct. 2108, 77 L.Ed.2d 313 (1983)); see Biggs v. Stewart, 361 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C.1976) (trial court's findings are clearly erroneous when not sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues as to provide a basis for the decision or when not supported by evidence in record). With these principles of law in mind, I turn to the evidence.
As to the initial police entry into the home, I concludeas elaborated belowthat the trial court's finding of consent is clearly erroneous for the following reasons: (1) The trial court failed to make findings as to what precisely occurred at the threshold of the house, despite remand of the record with clear instructions to do so. This omission necessarily reflects the government's failure to prove, with clear and positive testimony, Mr. Oliver's or appellant's consent, free from duress or coercion, express or implied. (2) Even if the trial court had fully credited Detective Jenkins' testimony that Mr. Oliver had admitted the officers to the house (which the court did not), that testimony could not support a finding of implied consent because (a) Mr. Oliver did not know that the police officers were outside before he opened the door, (b) the officers never requested permission to enter the home, and (c) Mr. Oliver's merely walking away from the front door to speak to appellant, his sister, in another part of the houseapparently without any body gesture inviting entrydid not imply permission for the police to enter, rather than wait while Mr. Oliver consulted with appellant. Detective Jenkins was the government's only witness at the suppression hearing who testified regarding the officers' initial entry into appellant's home on October 24. In addition, a defense witness, appellant's brother, Lamard Oliver, testified about the officers' entry. Through the testimony of these two witnesses, therefore, the government had the burden of showing that the officers crossed the threshold of the home with voluntary consent rather than the mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 549, 88 S.Ct. at 1792. I cannot conclude that the government met its burden. Both Detective Jenkins and Mr. Oliver agreed that Mr. Oliver answered the door in response to the officers' knock. After this point, however, their descriptions of what occurred differed significantly. Detective Jenkins described how the officers entered appellant's home as follows: We told him that we were police officers, proper identification was shown and told him that we wanted to talk with Ms. Lisa Oliver.... [Mr. Oliver] admitted us in the house to come in. He stepped back from the door and admitted us into the hallway foyer at the home there. Mr. Oliver described the same event differently: They asked was Lisa home. I said, yes. And I said, `I'll get her for you' and I went to get her. When I turned around, they wasthey came on in the house. When cross-examined, Mr. Oliver denied that he had consented to the officers' entry by admitting them into the foyer: Q: But you let them in, didn't you? A: No, I didn't let them in. I opened the door for them. Q: You opened the door for them? A: Yes. Q: All right. Then they walked in? A: I answered the door, they walked in on their own. Q: They didn'tdid they have to brush by you physically? A: No. I left to go get Lisa and when I came back, they was already in. Q: Well, when you say you opened the door for them, sir, did you open the door, while they were A: No. If you knock on my door and I open the door to see who it is Q: Isn't it a fact that at no time did you tell them to stay outside? A: I didn't tell them to stay outside. Q: Isn't it a fact that you said, Okay, Officers, come in, I'll get my sister, because you didn't think anything was wrong? A: No, I didn't. I don't let the police in my house like that. Nothing. Neither Detective Jenkins' nor Mr. Oliver's account of the initial entry on October 24 addressed who opened the screen door (the existence of which no one disputed). When discussing the entries that occurred on October 23, however, Mr. Oliver explained that, although he had left the front door open, the screen door was closed but unlatched. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to make findings regarding the critical issue: what precisely occurred on October 24 at the threshold of the house. In fact, the trial court did not address how the officers entered the house. Instead, the trial court skipped to the point where the officers followed Mr. Oliver down the basement stairs: The officers stated their desire to speak with Defendant. Mr. Oliver then called Defendant, apparently to inform her of the officers' presence after which Defendant inquired as to whether she should get dressed. Mr. Oliver then, with police officers following, proceeded down a stairwell to the basement which apparently consisted of one room. How the officers happened to enter the house is clearly material to any finding of consent. Although usually a trial court's failure to make findings on a material issue requires remand, see Tauber v. District of Columbia, 511 A.2d 23, 28 (D.C.1986), there comes a point where the failure to make findings reflects the government's inability to prove its case, as opposed to the trial court's mere oversight in addressing the issue. Because the government did not explore the consent issue at the suppression hearing, and because we have already remanded the record specifically for findings of consent, and, further, because the government has not moved the trial court to clarify its findings before this court considers them after the remand, I believe we have reached that failure-of-proof point here. The trial court's failure to address the details of the officers' entry reflects the government's failure to present clear and positive testimony of voluntary consent, Judd, 89 U.S.App.D.C. at 66, 190 F.2d at 651, not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248, 93 S.Ct. at 2058. Indeed, even if the trial court had completely credited Detective Jenkins' testimony regarding the initial entry, I do not believe that this testimony could support a finding of voluntary consent. Detective Jenkins testified that Mr. Oliver admitted us in the house to come in. He stepped back from the door and admitted us into the hallway foyer at the home there. Detective Jenkins never testified that Mr. Oliver opened the screen door or otherwise gestured in a manner that implied he was consenting to the officers' entry. Furthermore, nothing in Detective Jenkins' testimony suggested that the officers ever asked Mr. Oliver to enter the home. Instead, Detective Jenkins' conclusion that Mr. Oliver admitted the officers into the foyer was based solely on the fact that Mr. Oliver had stepped back from the door and had not objected once the officers had come inside. Certainly, consent to enter a house may be implied as well as expressed. Terrell v. United States, 361 A.2d 207, 210 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984, 97 S.Ct. 501, 50 L.Ed.2d 594 (1976) (quoting United States v. Turbyfill, 525 F.2d 57, 59 (8th Cir.1975)). Indeed, several courts, including this court, have concluded that opening a door and stepping back can constitute an implied invitation to enter. See e.g., id. (consent implied where officer knocked on door and identified himself as police officer, and codefendant opened door and walked back into room without saying anything); United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.1976) (consent implied where defendant slammed door on officers after first time they knocked but then opened door and stepped back in response to second time they knocked); Turbyfill, 525 F.2d at 57 (consent implied where officers identified themselves, occupant opened door a few feet and stepped back, and officers opened unlocked screen door and entered house); Robbins v. MacKenzie, 364 F.2d 45, 48 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 913, 87 S.Ct. 215, 17 L.Ed.2d 140 (1966) (consent implied where officer identified himself and his desire to talk with defendant, and defendant responded, Just a minute, unlocked and opened door, and then walked back inside room). Unlike this case, however, these decisions concerned situations where the person opening the door already knew that police officers were outside. Thus, the action of opening the door and stepping back clearly showed an intent to admit (as opposed to merely a desire to see) the person on the other side. As the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has explained: When a householder, knowing the identity and purpose of his [or her] caller, opens his [or her] door and turns back inside, he [or she] expresses by his [or her] actions as adequate a consent to entry as he [or she] would by a verbal invitation. To be distinguished are cases where a householder opens a door not knowing who is there and finds himself faced with armed authority. In such cases the act of opening the door may merely be to see who is there, and turning back may only be retreating. But a police[ officer] who identifies himself [or herself] and his [or her] purpose from the other side of a closed door has every reason to assume that the act of unlocking and opening the door, without more, is a consent to talk, and that the walking back into the room is an implied invitation to conduct the talking inside. Robbins, 364 F.2d at 48 (emphasis added). Furthermore, nothing in Detective Jenkins' testimony suggested that the officers ever asked Mr. Oliver if they could enter the home. Both Detective Jenkins and Mr. Oliver testified that, when Mr. Oliver answered the door, the police merely told him that they wanted to speak with appellant. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has noted: We do not expect others to walk in to our homes, even if the door is open, without first requesting permission to enter. That the police would so enter, without request, creates an impression of authority to do so. United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir.1990). The facts of appellant's case are quite similar to the facts of Shaibu. In that case, four police officers buzzed Shaibu's apartment from the security gate. Over the intercom, Shaibu asked who was there. Although he received no response, he sounded the gate release, and the officers entered the apartment complex. As the officers were walking down the hall towards Shaibu's apartment, Shaibu opened his apartment door and went out to meet them. One of the officers asked Shaibu whether the suspect for whom they were looking was in his apartment. Shaibu turned and walked into the apartment, leaving the door open, and the officers followed him inside. The Ninth Circuit declined to find that Shaibu had given the officers implied permission to enter the apartment, because the police had never requested permission to enter. The court explained: It is one thing to infer consent from actions responding to a police request. It is quite another to sanction the police walking in to a person's home without stopping at the door to ask permission.       We hold that in the absence of a specific request by police for permission to enter a home, a defendant's failure to object to such entry is not sufficient to establish free and voluntary consent. We will not infer both the request and the consent. Id., at 1427-28; see Howard v. Pung, 862 F.2d 1348, 1352 (8th Cir.1988) (act of stepping back while opening door not sufficient evidence of tacit consent), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920, 109 S.Ct. 3247, 106 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989); State v. Clark, 844 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tenn.1992) (no inference of consent where defendant stepped back after opening door, and officers entered without invitation). But see United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.1993) (inference of consent where trial court found that defendant interpreted officers' request to talk as request to enter, and defendant responded affirmatively to request and stepped back to clear way for officers' entry). Likewise, I believe that when the police do not specifically ask to enter a home, the resident's unequivocal, voluntary consent cannot be inferred merely from failure to object to the entry, at least when no body language indicates an invitation to enter.
The trial court's second major finding, that Mr. Oliver consented to the officers' entry into the basement, is also clearly erroneous. Once the trial court credited appellant's and Mr. Oliver's testimony that appellant inquired as to whether she should get dressed, rather than crediting Detective Jenkins' testimony that appellant had invited the officers to come on down, the court could not reasonably infer, without more, that Mr. Oliver voluntarily had consented to leading the male police officers into his sister's bedroom, knowing that she was not properly dressed. As I concluded with respect to the officer's initial entry into the house, Mr. Oliver's failure to object when the police followed him down the basement steps, without asking his permission to do so, cannot reasonably be the basis for inferring consent, rather than submission to the officers' authority. Consider the record evidence. Once again, the trial court was faced with the conflicting testimony of Detective Jenkins and Mr. Oliver. In addition, appellant testified regarding the entry into her bedroom in the basement. All three witnesses agreed that Mr. Oliver called down to appellant to tell her that the police were there. Their testimony differed as to how appellant responded, however. Detective Jenkins testified that appellant responded, Have them come down. He explained that Mr. Oliver then told the officers, Come on down, and they all went downstairs. Mr. Oliver, on the other hand, testified that appellant responded, Should I put on clothes? Mr. Oliver explained that when he walked down the stairs, two or three officers followed him. Appellant testified that when her brother came to the basement door and told her that the police were three, she told him that she was going to put something on and would come up to talk with them. Although the trial judge did not specify which witness he credited, it is clear from the findings that he credited appellant's and Mr. Oliver's testimony that appellant asked whether she should get dressed; the judge did not credit Detective Jenkins' testimony that appellant and Mr. Oliver invited the officers to come on down. The trial court's findings state: Mr. Oliver then called Defendant, apparently to inform her of the officers' presence after which Defendant inquired as to whether she should get dressed. Mr. Oliver then, with police officers following, proceeded down a stairwell to the basement of the house.... A finding of consent clearly would be warranted if the trial court had credited Detective Jenkins' testimony. Once the trial court credited Mr. Oliver's testimony that appellant inquired as to whether she should get dressed, however, it follows that neither appellant nor her brother could be said to have voluntarily consented to the officers' entry into the basement. And yet the trial court concluded that both appellant and her brother consented to the entry: By proceeding to the basement of the house in apparent response to the police officers' expressed desire to speak with Defendant and continuing to the basement with the officers following, Mr. Oliver thereby expressed his willingness to accommodate the officers by leading them to the basement for the purpose of speaking with his sister. By so doing, Mr. Oliver consented to entry into the house, including the basement area where Defendant was then located.... Moreover the court finds that Defendant herself, though annoyed with the officers' persistence, nevertheless expressed her willingness to accommodate their desire to enter the basement to converse with her by simply asking if she should get dressed when she was called by her brother. Absent a request by the officers to enter, voluntary consent cannot be inferred merely from one's failure to object to the entry or, in this case, from walking away from the front door toward the basement to talk with appellant downstairs. More specifically, one cannot infer on this record that Mr. Oliver voluntarily consented to lead two or three male police officers into his sister's bedroom knowing she was not properly dressed. The only logical inference from these facts is that Mr. Oliver submitted to the officers' authority by failing to object when the officers followed him down the basement steps. Submission to authority cannot support a finding of consent. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233, 93 S.Ct. at 2050; Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49, 88 S.Ct. at 1791-92.
Finally, the trial court's finding that appellant herself consented to the officers' entry into the basement by simply asking if she should get dressed when she was called by her brother is also clearly erroneous. It is, in fact, a virtual non-sequitur; someone who is asked for an interview does not routinely invite the interviewer into her room while undressed. All that can reasonably be inferred from appellant's inquiry is that she was not fully dressed. If anything else were inferable, it would be that appellant either would come upstairs to meet with the officers, after getting dressed, or would not consent to anyone's entry into the basement until she had had an opportunity to dress. See United States v. Wenzel, 485 F.Supp. 481, 483 (D.Minn.1980) (Most persons when not fully clothed do not explicitly or impliedly consent to another person's entry.); Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 639, 347 S.E.2d 175, 179 (1986) (same). [9]