Opinion ID: 613518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cullen v. Pinholster provides an alternative bar to the consideration of new evidence

Text: The Supreme Court in Cullen v. Pinholster held for the first time that federal habeas corpus review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Although the majority opinion does briefly mention that Cullen v. Pinholster restricts federal courts to the record considered by the state court in its merits review, I think a more in-depth look at Pinholster would be helpful here. In Pinholster, the defendant had twice adjudicated state habeas corpus petitions based on ineffective assistance of counsel all the way to the state supreme court, and twice the state supreme court denied the petitions on the substantive ground that they lacked merit. Id. at 1396-97. The defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court and was granted an evidentiary hearing; he presented two new medical experts who offered new diagnoses of the defendant's mental state. Id. at 1397. The district court granted habeas relief based on the new evidence and the 9th Circuit affirmed, holding that the new evidence made the state court's application of the Strickland standard objectively unreasonable. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that § 2254(d)(1) is backward-looking and thus review under that provision is limited to the record in existence at that same time i.e., the record before the state court. Id. at 1398. The Court further reasoned that [i]t would be strange to ask federal courts to analyze whether a state court's adjudication resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied federal law to facts not before the state court. Id. at 1399. Pinholster directly controls the resolution of the juror misconduct ground under § 2254(d)(1). The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheppard's argument that Juror Fox's ex parte communications prejudiced Sheppard's trial and rejected it on the merits, holding that under Smith v. Phillips and Ohio law Sheppard had suffered no prejudice from the juror misconduct. Ohio v. Sheppard, 84 Ohio St.3d 230, 703 N.E.2d 286, 290-91 (1998). The Ohio Supreme Court was not presented with evidence that Juror Fox had been influenced by his ex parte communication, which indeed did not come to light until a later federal district court evidentiary hearing. This Court is limited to those same factsthat Juror Fox was not influenced by his ex parte contactbefore the state court in its review on the merits. Since even Sheppard does not appear to argue that the state court's analysis was contrary to or an unreasonable application of established United States Supreme Court precedent based on the facts before it, affirmance of the district court's denial of habeas relief on the juror misconduct ground is clearly warranted.