Opinion ID: 772427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Standard for Dismissal of Meritless Claims for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Text: 11 A court must dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the alleged basis for exercising federal jurisdiction is so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974). Although the Supreme Court has cautioned against dismissing complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when unstated questions of federal law may underlie a complainant's cause of action, see id. at 536-38, in this case the sole basis for alleging federal preemption, and hence federal jurisdiction, is plainly evident from the complaint. 12 Kroll asserts that the district court had jurisdiction to hear his declaratory judgment complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a), which grants federal district courts jurisdiction to adjudicate any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents. The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to confer jurisdiction upon district courts when a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1988); see also Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1325, 47 USPQ2d 1769, 1773 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 50 USPQ2d 1672 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 13 Kroll's preemption claim rests on 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(2)(D) and 35 U.S.C. §§ 32, which authorize the PTO to regulate the conduct of patent practitioners appearing before it, and to discipline them for related misconduct. The first of these statutes provides that the PTO may establish regulations governing patent practitioners: 14 (b) The [United States Patent and Trademark] office 15 (2) may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which 16 (D) may govern the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before the Office, and may require them, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, to show that they are of good moral character and reputation and are possessed of the necessary qualifications to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, advice, and assistance in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. 17 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(2)(D). 18 The Director of the PTO has authority to discipline malfeasant patent practitioners pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 32, which provides: 19 The Director may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case, from further practice before the Patent and Trademark Office, any person, agent, or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who does not comply with the regulations established under section 2(b)(2)(D) of this title, or who shall, by word, circular, letter, or advertising, with intent to defraud in any manner, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before the Office. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The Director shall have the discretion to designate any attorney who is an office or employee of the United States Patent and Trademark Office to conduct the hearing required by this section. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, under such conditions and upon such proceedings as it by its rules determines, may review the action of the Director upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended or excluded. 20 35 U.S.C. §§ 32. 21 The question for appeal is whether either of these statutes creates a cause of action entitling Kroll to relief, or whether Kroll's preemption argument raises a substantial question of federal patent law. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808-09.