Opinion ID: 668532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Supportable Interpretation Standard to the Times Review

Text: As we noted in our initial decision, this appeal presents a pure question of law, which we review de novo: whether Moldea can in fact state a claim for defamation. Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1142. In this situation, we must determine as a threshold matter whether a challenged statement is capable of a defamatory meaning; and whether it is verifiable--that is, whether a plaintiff can prove that it is false. See generally, id. at 1142-45. The Times review is, as we previously held, capable of a defamatory meaning insofar as it tends to injure Moldea's reputation as a practitioner of his chosen profession, investigative journalism. The key to this case is the question of verifiability. Although Moldea (I) held that the Times review's statement that Interference contained too much sloppy journalism was a verifiable assessment of the book, we now recognize that, in the context of a book review, it is highly debatable whether this statement is sufficiently verifiable to be actionable in defamation. Arguably, our decision in Moldea (I) failed adequately to heed the counsel of both the Supreme Court and our own precedents that [w]here the question of truth or falsity is a close one, a court should err on the side of nonactionability. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C.Cir.) (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 1564, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 825, 109 S.Ct. 75, 102 L.Ed.2d 51 (1988). The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). The Court has cautioned in several cases that the First Amendment preserves a breathing space essential to the exercise of freedom of the press. To that end [the Supreme] Court has extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood. Id. at 342, 94 S.Ct. at 3008. However, we need not determine whether too much sloppy journalism is verifiable, as the statements that the Times review offers in support of this assessment are supportable interpretations of Interference. Thus, even if the review's assertion that the book contains too much sloppy journalism is verifiable, that assessment is supported by revealed premises that we cannot hold to be false in the context of a book review. As we stated in Moldea (I): Because the reader understands that such supported opinions represent the writer's interpretation of the facts presented, and because the reader is free to draw his or her own conclusions based upon those facts, this type of statement is not actionable in defamation. Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1144-45. As we noted above, Moldea (I) held that only two of the five challenged passages in the Times review could be proven to be false; the other three were held either to be true, or to be supported statements of opinion. In addition, Moldea did not challenge the review's assertion that Interference contains several spelling errors which the reviewer concluded call into question [Moldea's] diligence at simple fact-checking. Thus, only two passages in the Times review are even potentially actionable: the statement that Interference revives the discredited notion that Carroll Rosenbloom was murdered, and the claim that Moldea described a meeting between opposing players just before the 1969 Super Bowl as sinister. Our initial decision in this case erred by basing its holding on a standard that failed to take into account the fact that the challenged statements appeared in the context of a book review, and were solely evaluations of a literary work. Moldea (I) considered whether a reasonable jury could find that the challenged statements were false because they mischaracterized Interference. See Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1146, 1147. Such a standard might be appropriate in the case of an ordinary libel such as that at issue in Milkovich, but it is an inappropriate measure of an interpretation of a book. Applying the supportable interpretation standard, the correct measure of the challenged statements' verifiability as a matter of law is whether no reasonable person could find that the review's characterizations were supportable interpretations of Interference. Applying this standard, we hold that the Times review is not actionable in defamation. First, the Times review stated that: [Moldea] revives the discredited notion that Carroll Rosenbloom, the ornery owner of the Rams, who had a penchant for gambling, met foul play when he drowned in Florida 10 years ago. Moldea discusses Rosenbloom's drowning in pages 319 through 326 of his book, closing his account with quoted observations from several of Rosenbloom's friends, who speculate that he was murdered. Interference later reveals, on page 360, that Moldea has located previously unknown photographs, taken at Rosenbloom's autopsy, which make clear that he died in a tragic accident and was not murdered. As we held in Moldea (I), a reasonable jury could conclude that the Times review's characterization of Interference's portrayal of Rosenbloom's death was false, and that the reviewer's account of the book creates the misleading impression that Moldea inadequately investigated this story. Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1147-48. However, given that Interference does not reveal that Rosenbloom's death was accidental until 35 pages after giving undeniably titillating hints of homicide, we cannot hold that a reviewer could not reasonably suggest that Moldea sought to revive the notion that Rosenbloom was murdered in order to build suspense before disproving that theory. The second potentially actionable review passage states that: Mr. Moldea tells as well of Mr. Namath's 'guaranteeing' a victory in Super Bowl III shortly after a sinister meeting in a bar with a member of the opposition, Lou Michaels, the Baltimore Colts' place-kicker. The truth is that the pair almost came to blows after they both had been drinking; and Mr. Namath's well-publicized 'guarantee' came about quite innocently at a Miami Touchdown Club dinner when a fan asked him if he thought the Jets had a chance. 'We'll win. I guarantee it,' Mr. Namath replied. Moldea (I) concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Moldea did not describe the meeting as a sinister rendezvous, but rather made clear that the meeting was quite accidental and even confrontational. Interference at 197; see Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1146-47. Even applying the supportable interpretation standard, this review passage is close to the line. Interference not only states that the Namath-Michaels meeting was accidental, but on the same page quotes Michaels as saying What we talked about had no relationship to the game, and quotes another player present at the meeting as confirming that  'nothing technical' about the game was discussed. Interference at 197. The Times' petition for rehearing argues only that the review's characterization is supported by the fact that Interference 's description of the Namath-Michaels meeting appears in a chapter of the book largely devoted to probing allegations that there was something suspicious about Super Bowl III. See Petition for Rehearing at 12 (citing Interference at 197). We are troubled by the sinister meeting passage, but are constrained to conclude that it does not give rise to an actionable claim. The review offered at least six observations to support the charge of sloppy journalism: the five challenged passages, plus the unchallenged claim that Moldea made several spelling errors. At least five of these observations could not be proved false at trial, either because they are true, are supported opinion, are reasonable interpretations, or are not challenged in this suit. Moldea is left with only the sinister meeting passage as a possible basis for his defamation claim, and this is a very weak basis indeed. For one thing, the sinister meeting passage is not defamatory on its face, but rather is simply one of the interpretations offered in support of the review's assessment of Moldea's book. Furthermore, even without the support of the sinister meeting passage, the review's assertion that Interference is marred by too much sloppy journalism is (as a legal matter) substantially true, and so is not actionable in defamation. As Moldea (I) noted, substantial truth is a defense to defamation. Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1150. Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true in substance. Liberty Lobby v. Dow Jones, 838 F.2d at 1296 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Sec. 581A cmt. f (1977)); accord Foretich v. CBS, Inc., 619 A.2d 48, 60 (D.C.1993) (citing Liberty Lobby v. Dow Jones ). The Supreme Court explained this defense in Masson by noting that: Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified. 501 U.S. at 517, 111 S.Ct. at 2433 (interpreting California law) (internal quotation omitted); accord Liberty Lobby v. Dow Jones, 838 F.2d at 1296 (a statement is nonactionable if [t]he sting of the charge ... is substantially true.). The difficulty here is that, as Moldea (I) pointed out, this circuit rejected the so-called incremental harm rule in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C.Cir.1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). See Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1149-50. Application of the substantial truth test when incremental harm is not tolerated can be conceptually confusing. However, on reconsidering the instant dispute, we believe Moldea (I) read this court's rejection of the incremental harm rule much too broadly, and that Anderson's proscription is not applicable in this case. Liberty Lobby v. Anderson rejected the defendants' claim that the plaintiffs in that case were libel-proof because unchallenged portions of [defendants'] articles attribute[d] to the [plaintiffs] characteristics so much worse than those attributed in the challenged portions, that the latter could not conceivably do any incremental damage. 746 F.2d at 1568. Then-Judge Scalia observed that: The law, however, proceeds upon the optimistic premise that there is a little bit of good in all of us--or perhaps upon the pessimistic assumption that no matter how bad someone is, he can always be worse. It is shameful that Benedict Arnold was a traitor; but he was not a shoplifter to boot, and one should not be able to make that charge while knowing its falsity with impunity. Id. However, the opinion goes on to note that: There may be validity to the proposition that at some point the erroneous attribution of incremental evidence of a character flaw of a particular type which is in any event amply established by the facts is not derogatory. If, for example, an individual is said to have been convicted of 35 burglaries, when the correct number is 34, it is not likely that the statement is actionable. That is so, however, not because the object of the remarks is libel-proof, but because, since the essentially derogatory implication of the statement (he is an habitual burglar) is correct, he has not been libeled. Id. at 1568-69 n. 6. This latter point is dispositive of the instant case. The disputed sinister meeting passage in the Times review is not inherently defamatory--i.e., it is not like calling Benedict Arnold a traitor and a shoplifter, to cite the example used in Anderson. Rather, the discussion of the sinister meeting is but one of several interpretations of the book offered to support the claim of sloppy journalism. As such, it does not come within the compass of incremental harm. Because the review relies principally on statements that are true, supported opinions or supportable interpretations to justify the sloppy journalism assessment, we are constrained to find that it is substantially true and therefore not actionable.