Opinion ID: 1981956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Testimony of Messrs. Rowland and Hebert

Text: On the tenth day of trial, GMC called as witnesses Edward Rowland (Rowland) and Robert Hebert (Hebert), retired GMC employees. Both men had been extensively involved in the design and placement of the seat belt retractor mechanism at issue. McLain's attorney objected to Rowland and Hebert testifying on the ground that what they would be presenting expert testimony to the jury, and they had not been designated as experts by GMC prior to trial. GMC asserted that Rowland and Hebert were being called to testify as fact witnesses, concerning their first hand knowledge of design work on the seat belt retractor in the 1981 Firebird. The Superior Court ruled that Rowland and Hebert could not testify as experts. However, the Superior Court also ruled that prior to trial, Rowland and Hebert had properly been identified as fact witnesses. Compare Stafford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Del.Supr., 413 A.2d 1238 (1980). Therefore, the Superior Court permitted Rowland and Hebert to testify, based upon their personal knowledge, as to what they did. The issue in this appeal is whether Rowland's and Hebert's testimony was factual or constituted expert testimony. Id. [6] Testimony by a person who has expertise in a certain area is not ipso facto expert testimony. The rules of evidence draw a distinction between testimony by a witness, based upon personal knowledge of the facts in the case and testimony by a witness, who has been qualified as an expert, in the form of an opinion or otherwise about a subject area which is relevant to the case. Compare D.R.E. 602 and D.R.E. 702. When a witness testifies based on their own experience, knowledge and observation about the facts in the case, they are not giving expert testimony, as that term is defined by the rules of evidence. [7] The record reflects that GMC limited its examination of both Hebert and Rowland to questions of their direct personal involvement in the development of the seat belt retractor system at issue, the resources that were available to them at GMC for development of the seat belt system and any alternative designs contemplated at the time of its design by these two men. Neither Rowland nor Hebert were questioned by GMC's attorney regarding their opinions or conclusions as to whether, for example, the seat belt system complied with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, whether the seat belt system was designed in a negligent manner, or whether any alternative system proposed by McLain's expert was better. In contrast to the testimony GMC elicited from Rowland and Hebert, the experts identified by GMC in discovery, including GMC employee Frank Montalvo and former employee Richard Stewart, were asked to make a second-hand [8] evaluation of the seat belt system, to state their ultimate opinions on GMC's negligence or lack thereof in the design and also to opine on the feasibility of and problems with any alternative designs posited by McLain's experts. The Superior Court's conclusion that Rowland's and Hebert's testimony was of a factual, and not an expert nature, is supported by the record. The record reflects that, in the case sub judice, Rowland and Hebert testified, from personal knowledge, as to what they did, understood, and considered when designing the seat belt retractor system for the 1981 Firebird. The questions asked of Rowland and Hebert did not attempt to elicit a response from them in the form of an opinion or otherwise with respect to the ultimate issue of whether GMC was negligent in the design of the seat belt retractor system, or any other aspect of this case. D.R.E. 702-703. Compare Stafford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 413 A.2d at 1245. The Superior Court's decision that the testimony given by Rowland and Hebert was non-expert in nature, is AFFIRMED.