Opinion ID: 1830345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether a meeting of the minds took place due to the arbitration clause's ambiguous language.

Text: ¶ 41. Parkerson asserts that the arbitration agreement found in the retail installment contract is ambiguous and that, therefore, no meeting of the minds took place regarding the arbitration clause. ¶ 42. In IP Timberlands, we noted that [w]here a contract is clear and unambiguous, its meaning and effect are matters of law which may be determined by the court. IP Timberlands, 726 So.2d at 106 (citing Pfisterer v. Noble, 320 So.2d 383, 384 (Miss.1975)). We further stated: Ambiguity of a contract, or its terms and a contract's meaning and effect are issues of law that are reviewed de novo by this Court. Whittington, 608 So.2d at 1274. This Court must construe the agreement as made by the parties and give the words of the document their commonly accepted meaning. If no ambiguity exists, this Court will accept the plain meaning of the instrument as the intent of the parties. Contracts are solemn obligations and the Court must give them effect as written. Id. at 108. ¶ 43. In Raesly, the district court considered and rejected the plaintiff's ambiguity argument. Raesly, 105 F.Supp.2d at 567. The arbitration agreement at issue in Raesly was embodied in a document separate from the other documents involved with the sale of the mobile home. Id. at 564-65. The court held that [e]ven assuming for the sake of argument that this language creates ambiguity as to the scope of the arbitration agreement, that does not preclude the court from compelling arbitration. Id. at 571. The court based its decision in part on the United States Supreme Court's holding that any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. A finding that the scope of the arbitration clause is vague does not automatically catapult the entire dispute into arbitration. Rather, such a finding creates a presumption in favor of arbitration. Id. at 571-572 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941-42, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). ¶ 44. In the case sub judice, Parkerson signed a clear and unambiguous agreement which provided for arbitration of any controversy or claim ... arising out of or relating to this contract or any agreements or instruments relating to or delivered in connection with this contract. ... The agreement appears to be a standard arbitration clause very similar to those deemed unambiguous in Raesly and other cases. Therefore, I find no merit to this argument and would affirm the trial court on this issue.