Opinion ID: 161824
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Theoretical Yield

Text: Mr. Walters also objects to the use of a theoretical yield concept used in the Presentence Investigation Report to calculate the amount of methamphetamine attributable to him, calling such calculations “voodoo criminology.” Mr. Walters did not object to the use of a theoretical yield concept until after the completion of the Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report. Mr. Walters first raised his objection to the calculations in a sentencing memorandum when he referred to the calculations as “tortured.” 5 5 The Presentence Investigation Report was completed March 21, 2000. The Addendum to the report was completed June 30, 2000. Mr. Walters did not object to the use of the theoretical yield calculations until August 31, 2000. The district court sentenced Mr. Walters on September 6, 2000. -12- The district court ruled “[a]s to any objection to the theoretical yield calculations used in the [Presentence Investigation Report], the court finds such objections to be untimely pursuant to Rule 32(b)(6)(B) and (D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Rule 32(b)(6)(D) allows the district court to entertain a new objection at any time before sentencing if the objector shows good cause. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(D). However, the district court is not required to hear an objection to the Presentence Investigation Report if the objection is not raised within fourteen days of counsel’s receipt of the report. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(B), (D); United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1500 (10th Cir. 1996). We leave the decision about whether to hear the new objection to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Archuleta, 128 F.3d 1446, 1452 n.12 (10th Cir. 1997). We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to accept Mr. Walters’ objection to the theoretical yield calculation. 3. Prosecutorial Misconduct In addition to challenging his sentence, Mr. Walters also disputes the validity of his conviction. He argues the district court erred by not granting a mistrial or new trial to remedy two instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Mr. Walters first argues the prosecutor violated the district court’s ruling on a motion -13- in limine when he allowed a witness to testify about Mr. Walters’ prior drug activity. Second, Mr. Walters contends the prosecutor made an improper comment during closing arguments. We review the district court’s denial of a motion for mistrial or new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Gabaldon, 91 F.3d 91, 94 (10th Cir. 1996). “We engage in a two-step process in reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct. First, we determine if the conduct was improper. Second, we determine if any improper conduct warrants reversal.” United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 769 (10th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 886 (1999). A. Violation of Motion in Limine Ruling The first instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor was questioning Special Agent Hupp regarding interviews with Mr. Walters. In attempting to elicit testimony that Mr. Walters had contact with a coconspirator’s family members prior to the conspiracy, the prosecutor asked Agent Hupp about Mr. Walters’ statements concerning a co-conspirator’s nephew. Agent Hupp testified Mr. Walters “suspected [the nephew] of ripping off some cultivated marijuana plants on his property.” At the close of testimony on the day -14- Agent Hupp testified, counsel for Mr. Walters made an oral motion requesting a mistrial on the grounds that Agent Hupp’s testimony was prejudicial and violated the district court’s prior ruling on a motion in limine. The ruling on the motion in limine instructed counsel to approach the bench before introducing evidence concerning Mr. Walters’ past dealings with the co-conspirator. In denying Mr. Walters’ oral request for a mistrial, the district court first noted the prosecutor “should have informed the witness not to ... answer in that way as to the marijuana.” However, the district court found the prosecutor’s misconduct was not sufficient to justify granting a mistrial. After the jury returned a verdict, Mr. Walters renewed his objection to the prosecutor’s conduct by filing a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial. The district court denied the motion noting “the transgression was minor and inconsequential in the context of this trial,” and “given the weight of the evidence against the defendant, this evidence, even if it should have been excluded, did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Walters, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1214. We conclude the district court throughly reviewed the motions and did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Walters’ requests for a mistrial and new trial. B. Closing Statement -15- The second instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing statements. Mr. Walters argues “the prosecutor stated words to the effect that ‘since the Grand Jury indicted the Defendant that [the jury] should take that into consideration in reaching their verdict.’” In reality, the prosecutor’s statement was much less egregious. During closing arguments, counsel for Mr. Walters' wife, a co-defendant, argued Mrs. Walters had been victimized twice, the first time by [a co-conspirator] and again by being accused of conspiring with him and harboring him. In response, the prosecutor argued [t]he grand jury did not revictimize these defendants by indicting them on these charges. Mr. Walters did not contemporaneously object to the prosecutor's statement. Mr. Walters’ first mention of the prosecutor’s statement was in the district court's chambers while the jury was deliberating. At that time, counsel for Mr. Walters requested that the district court review the transcript of the closing argument and possibly give an additional jury instruction. The district court denied the request. Mr. Walters again questioned the propriety of the prosecutor's statement in his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial. In denying Mr. Walters’ motion for a new trial, the district court noted -16- “‘[p]rosecutors have considerable latitude to respond to an argument made by opposing counsel.’” Walters, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1214 (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Muniz, 170 F.3d 1007, 1012 (10th Cir. 1999)). The court found, although the prosecutor would arguably have been better served to have eschewed any suggestion that the grand jury's return of a superseding indictment was in some way vindicated by the evidence presented, the comment directly responded to the defendants' arguments and in its context was not improper. Id. at 1215. To mitigate any potential prejudicial effect, the district court “repeatedly instructed the jury that the superseding indictment is merely a charge.” We affirm the district court's well-reasoned decision. 4. Polygraph Evidence Finally, Mr. Walters argues the district court erred in “permitting polygraph evidence to enter into the case.” After conducting a hearing to assess the admissibility of the polygraph evidence, the district court allowed a Kansas Bureau of Investigation polygraph examiner to testify regarding a polygraph test he performed on Mr. Walters. The court also admitted a report the examiner prepared. Mr. Walters contends polygraph evidence is inherently unreliable and, therefore, should not have been admitted. The district court determined Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703, and 403 governed the admissibility of polygraph evidence in this -17- case. Walters, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1209. We conclude the district court properly admitted the polygraph evidence under these rules. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert witness testimony. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1999) (amended 2000). Rule 703 governs the facts or data an expert may rely upon in forming his opinion. Fed. R. Evid. 703 (1999) (amended 2000). Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), outlines the framework a district court should use in determining whether to admit evidence under Rule 702. Under Daubert, courts measure reliability of scientific evidence by considering (1) whether the technique can and has been tested; (2) whether the technique has been subjected to peer review; (3) the known or potential error rate of the technique; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (5) whether the technique has gained general acceptance in the scientific community. United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. at 593-95), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 906 (1988). Rule 703 allows an expert to base his testimony on facts or data “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.” Fed. R. Evid. 703 (1999) (amended 2000). “We review de novo whether the district court properly followed the framework set forth in Daubert.” Call, 129 F.3d at 1405 (citation omitted). If, however, the district court correctly applied the Daubert standards, we may reverse only if we -18- find the district court abused its discretion. Id. In determining whether to allow the polygraph testimony, the district court held a hearing outside of the presence of the jury. Kansas Bureau of Investigation polygraph examiner George Johnson testified at the hearing. The district court found: [Mr. Johnson] was able to articulate with sufficient precision the reasons supporting his opinion that the polygraph examination administered to Jay Dee Walters was reliable. The polygraph examiner was also able to explain in substantial detail the manner in which the polygraph examination worked, the manner in which this examination had been verified by Jay Dee Walters’ post-examination interview, and the peer scrutiny to which that examination had been subjected and deemed reliable. Johnson also explained that polygraph examination similar to the one he performed on Jay Dee Walters have empirically been proved reliable. Walters, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1208-09. Mr. Walters did not present any testimony to refute Mr. Johnson’s testimony. Consequently, the district court was satisfied the polygraph evidence was admissible under Daubert and Rules 702 and 703. Id. at 1209. We conclude the district court properly applied the Daubert framework and affirm the district court’s decision to allow the polygraph evidence under Rules 702 and 703. The district court then determined whether the polygraph evidence would be unduly prejudicial and thus warrant exclusion under Fed. R. Evid. 403. Id. at -19- 1209. Rule 403 gives the district court discretion to exclude any evidence it determines is more prejudicial than probative. Fed. R. Evid. 403; United States v. Espinoza, 244 F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We review for abuse of discretion a [district] court’s ruling under Rule 403.”). The district court concluded the polygraph evidence was not more prejudicial than probative. The court noted Mr. Walters stipulated to admission of the polygraph results before he submitted to the polygraph. Walters, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1209 (citing United States v. Gilliard, 133 F.3d 809, 812 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A] district court can admit polygraph evidence ... when the parties stipulate in advance as to the circumstances of the test and as to the scope of its admissibility.”)). In addition, the district court drafted a lengthy jury instruction designed to prevent the jurors from giving undue weight to the polygraph results. We are satisfied the district court, on the facts of this case, did not abuse its discretion in allowing the polygraph evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403. -20-