Opinion ID: 1791270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alimony in Solido

Text: In making its alimony determination, a trial court must consider the factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(d)(1)(A)-(L) (2001). [3] Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 338 (Tenn.2002). The trial court in this case did not specifically recite the factors it considered in determining its alimony award. We, however, have carefully examined the record in light of the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(d)(1)(A)-(L) (2001) and conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court's judgment. See Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tenn.2000) (stating that when a trial court has made no findings of fact regarding the relevant statutory factors, an appellate court must conduct its own independent review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies). The trial court awarded Ms. Langhi alimony in solido. Alimony in solido consists of a definite sum of money that is paid in a lump sum or in installments over a definite period of time. Burlew v. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465, 471 (Tenn. 2001). It may not be modified. Id. The two most relevant factors in determining the amount of alimony awarded are the economically disadvantaged spouse's need and the obligor spouse's ability to pay. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 342. Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(d)(1)(A) (2001) provides that in making an alimony award a court shall consider all relevant factors, including [t]he relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial resources of each party, including income from pension, profit sharing or retirement plans and all other sources. In addition, in making an award of spousal support, courts should consider the separate assets of each party and the provisions made with regard to the marital property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(G), (H) (2001). The trial court found that at the time the parties married, Ms. Langhi earned $33,000 per year, while Mr. Broadbent earned $72,000 per year. Ms. Langhi has less earning capacity and less ability to accumulate assets and savings than Mr. Broadbent and is therefore economically disadvantaged in comparison to Mr. Broadbent. Furthermore, Ms. Langhi's marriage to Mr. Broadbent adversely affected her financial condition. She began the marriage with separate assets that were rapidly diminished by Mr. Broadbent's stock market trades. [T]he amount of alimony should be determined so `that the party obtaining the divorce [is not] left in a worse financial situation than he or she had before the opposite party's misconduct brought about the divorce.' Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410-11(Tenn.1995) (quoting Shackleford v. Shackleford, 611 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tenn.Ct.App.1980) (citations omitted)). The couple did not acquire any marital property, so the trial court could not adjust the division of marital property to compensate Ms. Langhi for her loss. Another factor a court may consider in determining whether an award of alimony is appropriate is the duration of the marriage. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(C) (2001). Especially in a marriage of short duration, trial courts attempt to place the parties as nearly as possible in the financial positions they occupied before the marriage took place. See Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 859 (Tenn.Ct.App.1988). Given the extremely short duration of the marriage in this case, the primary goal should be to place the parties in approximately the same position they were in before the marriage. The trial court correctly attempted to restore the parties to their pre-marriage financial condition. It is clear that the alimony awarded by the trial court was to compensate Ms. Langhi for the decrease in the value of her separate property during the marriage. Finally, the trial court may consider the relative fault of a spouse and such other factors . . . as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties in making a spousal support award. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(K), (L) (2001). The weight of the evidence shows that Mr. Broadbent is more responsible for the end of the parties' marriage than Ms. Langhi. The trial court awarded the divorce to Ms. Langhi and found that Mr. Broadbent's obsession with the stock market ruined [Ms. Langhi's] savings and left her with virtually nothing. The trial court clearly considered Mr. Broadbent's relative fault when calculating the alimony award. We conclude that it was proper for the trial court to consider Mr. Broadbent's participation in the loss of Ms. Langhi's separate assets in awarding alimony. Moreover, the trial court's allocation of responsibility for this loss, although expressed in percentages of comparative fault rather than relative fault, was not error. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $51,500 in alimony in solido to Ms. Langhi.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals with regard to the award of $51,500 in alimony in solido, reinstate the trial court's judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellee, Robert Kendall Broadbent, and his surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.