Opinion ID: 619929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statements Made In Furtherance of the Conspiracy

Text: Serdar Tatar argues that the District Court improperly admitted under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule two sets of statements made by Dritan and Shain Duka about him. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides, in relevant part, that a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is not hearsay. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Tatar argues that the District Court erred in finding that the relevant statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the first set of statements. Although it abused its discretion in admitting the second set of challenged statements, its error was harmless in light of the other evidence of Tatar's participation in the conspiracy to kill United States military personnel, the only offense of which he was convicted.
The first set of statements comes from an audio recording of a conversation among Dritan Duka, Shain Duka, and confidential informant Besnik Bakalli. Dritan said that Tatar wanted to join the military in America and wanted to kill them from inside. (Joint App. 2789.) He told Bakalli that Tatar was very serious, just to get in and kill them and that he was a maniac, he sees [UI] like we aren't human by watching Muslims get killed everyday [UI]. [13] ( Id. ) Later, he said that, when Tatar sought to join the U.S. military, [t]hat was the only thing on his mind that he kill American soldiers (Joint App. 2791). Shain Duka said, [Tatar]'s not totally all there, like you're supposed to be and that Tatar was very funny but he's not serious. (Joint App. 2789.) The District Court accepted the government's argument that these statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy because the Dukas wanted to show Bakalli that they were serious, to keep Bakalli in the conspiracy, and to buck him up. (Joint App. 950.) After discussing other evidence in the record (including Tatar's own admissions) concerning Tatar's attempts to join the military, the District Court concluded that these statements were akin to a present sense assurance to Mr. Bakalli that this is a serious matter. We've got these people lined up who are going to do serious things and I mean and look at Serdar, he's so serious about this, he wanted to join the military to get on the inside. (Joint App. 951.) The second set of statements occurred later in the same conversation, when Shain Duka was discussing our group. Shain said, our group was this Sayed, that boy, the Turk, Serdani [i.e., Tatar], me, Dritoni [i.e., Dritan], Sulemaini [i.e., Eljvir] ... and that, [b]etween the six of us that hung out together, there was no motherf     that could f   with us. Everybody feared us, We were bad. Heading on the wrong path. (Joint App. 2795-96.) The District Court originally expressed some reluctance to admit these statements, saying, I don't know what the context of that conversation ... is to be honest, but ultimately concluded that the statements were admissible because they were talking about an association that apparently the Government contends continued through the length of the conspiracy. It shows that they've been together as a group for some time. (Joint App. 949.)
`We review a District Court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion, although our review is plenary as to the district court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 337 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 297 (3d Cir.2007)). As a threshold matter, we reject Tatar's argument, made in passing, that the statements do not qualify under the Rule because they were made to a government informant, not ... an alleged coconspirator, Appellants' Joint Opening Br. 92, because no blanket rule forbids the admission of coconspirator statements made to informants. Where coconspirators' statements have been made to government informants and were intended to keep others abreast of developments and allay any fear they might have had, we have held that they satisfy the in furtherance of the conspiracy requirement. United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 840 n. 2 (3d Cir.1984); cf. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 173-74, 184, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) (affirming court of appeals' determination that telephone conversations between defendant's coconspirator and FBI informant were made in furtherance of the conspiracy and admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)). As far as Dritan and Shain Duka were concerned, Bakalli was involved in the conspiracy. Therefore, as long as the statements satisfy the other requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), i.e., they were made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, they are admissible. Tatar's challenge focuses on whether the statements satisfy the in furtherance requirement. We have previously explained that `[s]tatements between conspirators which provide reassurance, serve to maintain trust and cohesiveness among them, or inform each other of the current status of the conspiracy' satisfy that requirement `and are admissible so long as the other requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are met.' United States v. Weaver, 507 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1983)). The threshold for establishing that a statement was made in furtherance of a conspiracy is not high: `[t]he in furtherance requirement is usually given a broad interpretation.' Id. at 183 (quoting Gibbs, 739 F.2d at 845). Applying these standards, we cannot say the District Court abused its discretion in concluding that the first set of challenged statements was made in furtherance of defendants' conspiracy. The District Court found that, in the context of the overall conversation, the first set of statements was intended to reassure Bakalli and maintain trust within the conspiracy by illustrating for Bakalli the seriousness of the conspirators' intent. Its analysis in that regard is reasonable, and Tatar has not pointed to any specific dialogue or evidence that would undermine the District Court's conclusion. The second set of statements is more problematic. The District Court reasoned that the statements were evidence of the Dukas' association with Tatar, but did not make any finding regarding how those statements furthered the conspiracy. The government offers a couple of arguments as to how these statements could be viewed as in furtherance of the conspiracyShain's statements about the long duration and comradely nature of his and his brother's association with Tatar, dating to when they were high school students together, were designed to show Bakalli that ... Dritan and Shain had a well-grounded and reliable understanding of Tatar's proclivities, and thus could be counted on to accurately predict how far Tatar would be willing to go to advance the lethal goals of the conspiracy, and Even if Dritan and Shain were not then actively recruiting Bekalli [ sic ] into the conspiracy, the statements furthered the conspiracy by tacitly warning Bekalli [ sic ] not to expose it. Consol. Br. for Appellee 124-25. We do not find either of those explanations convincing, especially because, as the District Court observed, the transcript provides no broader context for that portion of the conversation. (Joint App. 949.) Moreover, in our view, the relevance of the second set of statements was tenuous at best, and, in all events was clearly outweighed by the potential for prejudice inherent in the suggestion of Tatar's close association with the other defendants. See Fed.R.Evid. 403 (The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice.). We therefore conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in admitting them. Given our deferential standard of review, however, we must conclude that the District Court's abuse of discretion was harmless in the context of this trial. As we discuss below, the admission of the second set of statements does not undermine confidence in the verdict against Tatar. See United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir.1995) (en banc) (An appellate court should not exercise its `supervisory power to reverse a conviction... when the error to which it is addressed is harmless, since, by definition, the conviction would have been obtained notwithstanding the asserted error.' (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983))). We also observe that Tatar has not argued on appeal that those statements were inadmissible under Rule 403.
An error in an evidentiary ruling is harmless ... when `it is highly probable that the error did not affect the result.' United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 352 (3d Cir.2011) (quoting Hill v. Laeisz, 435 F.3d 404, 420 (3d Cir.2006)). High probability means that we have a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendants. United States v. Casseus, 282 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is the case here, where evidence other than the challenged statements amply supports Tatar's sole conviction for conspiracy to murder United States military personnel. More specifically, the government established, through evidence Tatar does not challenge on appeal, that Tatar participated in the conspiracy with the other defendants, i.e., that he knew of the agreement and intended both to join it and to accomplish its illegal objects. United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir.2007). Tatar knew of the agreement. Tatar appeared in the video that the FBI discovered of defendants at the shooting range in the Poconos. He discussed violent jihad with the other defendants and gathered with them to listen to and discuss Anwar al-Awlaki's Constants on the Path of Jihad, a lecture advocating violent jihad. ( See Joint App. 979, 989, 2749-52, 2784-85.) In a recorded conversation with government informant Omar, Tatar agreed to provide Omar with a map of Fort Dix after Omar explained that he needed the map as part of his plan to make this country ... pay the price for something they did to me. (Joint App. 2098-99.) Tatar understood and acknowledged the gravity of what Omar proposed: in a subsequent conversation, Tatar specifically asked Omar, [W]hat are you thinking of doing? (Joint App. 2123.) After Omar responded by describing his surveillance of Fort Dix with Shnewer, Tatar said, This is nothing small. (Joint App. 2124.) In addition to this evidence, the government also introduced the transcript of a recorded conversation between Shnewer and Omar, the admission of which Tatar has not challenged on appeal, in which Omar told Shnewer that Tatar was aware that Omar and Shnewer had made a plan on the basis that, in the future, we'll make an attack on Fort Dix. (Supp.App.88-89.) Tatar intended both to join the conspiracy and to accomplish its illegal objects. Tatar plainly understood the implications of providing Omar and Shnewer with the map of Fort Dix. At one point, he said to Omar, I'm getting involved in it, you understand? I'm getting involved in it by giving you the maps. (Joint App. 2123.) In a conversation discussing the planned attack on Fort Dix, Tatar also told Omar, I'm in, honestly, I'm in. (Joint App. 2114.) Finally, Tatar expressed his decision to join the group in unequivocal terms, saying: I'm gonna do it.... I'm gonna give it to you.... It doesn't matter to me, whether I get locked up, arrested, or they take me away, it doesn't matter. Whether I die, don't matter, I'm doing it in the name of Allah. (Joint App. 2135.) Omar testified at trial that, after all of this discussion, Tatar actually gave him the Fort Dix map, confirming that he intended to help Omar and Shnewer carry out their attack. (Joint App. 477-78.) Given this direct evidence of Tatar's participation in the conspiracy, we do not view the admission of the challenged statements concerning Tatar's attempts to join the military to attack it from the inside, or his long association with the Duka brothers, as significant. We note, further, that the admitted statements were mostly cumulative of other evidence: the video from the Poconos and numerous recorded conversations established that Tatar socialized with the other defendants, and Dritan Duka's challenged statement was not the only evidence that Tatar had tried to attack U.S. institutions from the insidein a recorded conversation, Tatar suggested to Omar that you could do it from the inside and said that he had attempted to become a police officer in California for precisely that reason. (Joint App. 2139.) Therefore, we will not reverse Tatar's conviction based on the District Court's admission of the challenged coconspirator statements.