Opinion ID: 1780026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Recommendations by the Guardian Ad Litem

Text: ¶ 31. The Fosters contend the chancellor did not properly consider the recommendations of Ms. Perrealt, the guardian ad litem, when deciding not to terminate Harris' parental rights and permit their adoption of Elizabeth. Ms. Perrealt found that Harris had abandoned Elizabeth because he knew, or should have known, he was the father. Ms. Perrealt based her conclusion on the following evidence: (1) Harris had sex with Rogers. (2) Harris contacted an attorney about stopping an abortion. (3) Harris bought prenatal vitamins for Rogers. (4) Harris had Elizabeth's birth announcement and could have counted back nine months to discover the date of conception. (5) Rogers told Ms. Perrealt that Harris knew he was the father. (6) Harris allowed nearly a year after Elizabeth's birth to go by before attempting to be a part of her life. (7) Because Elizabeth had bonded with the Fosters, it was in her best interest to allow the adoption and to terminate Harris' parental rights. ¶ 32. As this Court stated in S.N.C., 755 So.2d at 1082, there is no requirement that the chancellor defer to the findings of the guardian ad litem, as proposed by the petitioners. Such a rule would intrude on the authority of the chancellor to make findings of fact and to apply the law to those facts. Accordingly, [t]he guardian ad litem's presence . . . in no way detracts from the chancellor's duty to hear the evidence and make a decision on all of the evidence, not just on the testimony of the guardian ad litem. Id. The chancellor properly included a summary of Ms. Perrealt's recommendations in his opinion, and explained his reasons for not adopting her position. See S.N.C., 755 So.2d at 1082; Gunter v. Gray, 876 So.2d 315, 323 (Miss. 2004). ¶ 33. After considering all the evidence, the chancellor was free to, and indeed obligated to, come to his own conclusions on the issues. As this Court noted in Hensarling: We may not always agree with a chancellor's decision as to whether the best interests of a child have been met, especially when we must review that decision by reading volumes of documents rather than through personal interaction with the parties before us. However, in custody cases, we are bound by the limits of our standard of review and may reverse only when the decision of the trial court was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was employed. Hensarling, 824 So.2d at 586-87; see also Wright v. Stanley, 700 So.2d 274, 280 (Miss.1997); Williams v. Williams, 656 So.2d 325, 330 (Miss.1995). The chancellor's decision was supported by credible evidence. It was neither manifestly wrong nor clearly erroneous, and the chancellor employed the proper legal standards in arriving at his decision. As such, we affirm the chancellor's denial of the Fosters' Petition for Adoption and for Termination of Parental Rights.