Opinion ID: 773303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Confidential Informant Issue

Text: 11 In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53(1957), the Supreme Court set forth the governing test for disclosure of confidential informants: 12 Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege [to withhold disclosure of the informer's identity] must give way . . . . [However], no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors. 13 Id. 60-62. One of the most relevant factors is whether the evidence is material to the accused's defense. Devose v. Norris, 53 F.3d 201, 206 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Barnes, 486 F.2d 776, 778 (8th Cir. 1973)). Where the witness is an 'active participant' or witness to the offense charged, disclosure will almost always be material to the defense. Id. Thus, where materiality is shown, the court 'owes a duty to make every reasonable effort to have the informant made available to the defendant to interview or use as a witness, if desired.' Id. (quoting Barnes, 486 F.2d at 779-80). 14 Harris relies on Devose v. Norris, 53 F.3d 201 (8th Cir. 1995), to support his argument that the trial court should have required the state to disclose the informant's identity. While Devose bears similar characteristics to the case at bar, particularly in the facts leading up to the arrest, 4 it does not control this case. In Devose, we found that the tenuousness of the informant's testimony presented at two evidentiary hearings, coupled with the informant's active participation in the alleged crime, the inconsistencies in the officer's testimony at trial and the questionable identification of defendant at the time of his arrest required disclosure of the informant's identity. Id. at 206-07. Specifically, we stated: 15 As an eyewitness to the offense, the informant could have shed sorely needed light on the events that took place--specifically, who sold the cocaine to Officer Thomas. Had the informant's identity been disclosed, Devose could have interviewed the informant and either called him as a witness at trial or used the information obtained during the interview to impeach his credibility. 16 Id. at 206. In this case, although the trial court refused to order the state to disclose the identity of the informant, it offered Harris the opportunity to depose the informant for purposes of determining whether he/she would identify him as the perpetrator of the alleged sale. Thus, unlike in Devose, the trial court did not completely deny Harris access to the confidential informant. The record further reveals that Harris failed to take advantage of the trial court's ruling. As the Magistrate Judge states in his Report and Recommendation: 17 It appears that Petitioner and his counsel declined to conduct the deposition, perhaps because of fear that the confidential informant would affirmatively identify Petitioner as the perpetrator . . . . Petitioner and his attorney took a gamble by choosing not to depose the confidential informant. By that choice, he failed to fulfill his duty to fully develop the evidence in the trial court . . . . He cannot now change his mind and seek to overturn his conviction because of a choice he himself made. 18 Appellant's App. at 228-29. On this record, we find this case distinguishable from Devose. 19 Moreover, the trial court's decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. In allowing some disclosure, the trial court appropriately balanced the public interest in protecting confidential informants against the individual's right to prepare his defense as contemplated by the Supreme Court's test in Roviaro.