Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: 10, b.12, b.70-73, b.80-83, b.143, b.183, b.195, b.212, b.223)

Text: The fifteen claims in this category concern trial counsel's employment of Russell Kolins as a private investigator on behalf of defendant. Adjudicating the claims on the merits, we conclude that all of them should be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. We recount the circumstances of Kolins's involvement in the case to provide context for our discussion of defendant's claims. Marshall testified on direct examination that Kolins had been retained by defendant's trial counsel, Glenn Zeitz, to conduct an investigation on Marshall's behalf. According to Marshall, [s]ometime after [September] 22nd it was decided that [Kolins] should go down to spend the day [in Louisiana] to, I guess, just investigate or to check around, see what was going on down there. Marshall testified that he had spoken with Kolins by telephone on September 26 and learned during that conversation that Robert Cumber had been arrested and that the person Marshall knew as Jimmy Davis was actually Billy Wayne McKinnon. In response to defense counsel's question whether it [was] ever agreed or suggested by you or anyone that the purpose for [Kolins] being down there was to in any way, shape or form get together with McKinnon or anyone on McKinnon's behalf to create any kind of story, Marshall testified, Absolutely not. The State cross-examined Marshall about his telephone conversation with Kolins. The prosecutor suggested that Kolins had read Marshall a statement prepared by McKinnon that purported to explain McKinnon's activities in New Jersey without implicating either McKinnon or Marshall in Maria Marshall's murder. Marshall denied that Kolins had read McKinnon's statement to him during the September 26 telephone call. Kolins testified on Marshall's behalf. According to Kolins, he had flown to Louisiana on September 26 for the purpose of interviewing the person Marshall had hired to investigate his wife. Kolins testified that he had met Jimmy Davis and had been informed that he was Billy Wayne McKinnon. Kolins spoke with Marshall by telephone at 6:30 p.m. on September 26 to inform him of the developments in the investigation and to request permission to extend his stay in Louisiana. According to Kolins, about an hour or two after he ended his conversation with Marshall, Kolins received from McKinnon's attorney the exculpatory statement prepared by McKinnon. Kolins testified on both direct and cross-examination that he had not discussed the contents of McKinnon's statement with either Marshall or Zeitz on September 26. During the State's cross-examination of Kolins, Kolins read McKinnon's statement into evidence. According to the statement, Marshall hired McKinnon in April or May 1984 to conduct an investigation of his wife, and McKinnon travelled to New Jersey twice, once in June and once in September, to conduct the investigation. The statement related that Marshall had sent McKinnon two money orders totalling $5500 early in the investigation, and paid him $800 in cash at their last meeting, at which time Marshall told McKinnon that things were fine and that Marshall could not afford to pay McKinnon any more money. McKinnon left New Jersey the next day, and later learned that New Jersey law-enforcement authorities were in Louisiana investigating Maria Marshall's death. The final paragraph of McKinnon's prepared statement exculpated both McKinnon and Marshall: Since the night I saw Rob Marshall at [Harrah's] Marina Casino in Atlantic City at approximately 8:30 or 9:00 o'clock p.m., I have not seen or heard from him since. At no time during any conversation that Rob Marshall and I had concerning his or her activities was it ever requested, suggested or intimated that he would like to dispose of his wife. He related to me quite the opposite. He appeared to me to be a well-organized, settled individual who is happy with his lifestyle and family ties but had a suspicion that his wife might have been having an affair which would cause [him] to seek someone outside of the community to conduct an unbiased and impartial investigation of her activities. Following the admission into evidence of McKinnon's statement, counsel for co-defendant Thompson made an application to the court to recall McKinnon for cross-examination on the statement. The prosecutor objected on the ground that the State had not had an opportunity to conduct a direct examination of McKinnon concerning the statement. A lengthy colloquy ensued concerning the failure of Zeitz to produce the statement at an earlier point in the trial. Zeitz explained that he had not had the statement earlier and that from the beginning, [he had] been making every effort to try and get it. The court declined to rule at that time on the application to recall McKinnon and ordered the State to continue its cross-examination of Kolins. The State proceeded to question Kolins about the whereabouts of McKinnon's prepared statement from the time that Kolins had received the document in September 1984 until the time that Kolins testified at trial. Kolins testified that the document was kept in a box that had been misplaced when he moved from one residence to another in February or March 1985, and that he had not found it until a few days prior to his testimony. Kolins also stated that he did not recall giving a copy of McKinnon's statement to Zeitz after returning from Louisiana, although he acknowledged that counsel may have seen the statement. Kolins denied that he had intentionally hidden the statement. At the close of all testimony, the court again heard argument on Thompson's application to recall McKinnon. The State argued that if Thompson were given the opportunity to cross-examine McKinnon on the statement, the State should be permitted to recall Marshall for further cross-examination concerning the similarity between McKinnon's statement and Marshall's suicide tape. Zeitz objected to having either McKinnon or Marshall recalled, contending that whether McKinnon's statement and Marshall's tape were similar was a matter of argument and that the jury, having received both statements in evidence, could draw its own conclusions. Defense counsel also explained that Kolins had shown him McKinnon's prepared statement a long time ago, over a year ago, and I've been asking him to locate the thing since then and I said it over and over again, and I don't think I have to continue defending myself about it. The prosecutor pointed out that even if that were true, Kolins had testified that he located the statement on the Monday prior to his testimony, which would have been when Marshall was testifying. The State therefore contended that Marshall's counsel had effectively withheld the statement until after Marshall was finished testifying. The court ruled that because Thompson's counsel and Thompson were faultless, they should have the opportunity to pursue further cross-examination of McKinnon on the subject of his prepared statement and that, in the interest of justice, the State would be permitted to conduct further cross-examination of Marshall on that subject. Despite that ruling, however, neither Thompson's counsel nor the State recalled McKinnon or Marshall. We address first defendant's claims involving defense counsel's failure to obtain and produce in a timely manner the statement that McKinnon gave to Kolins in September 1984. Defendant argues that counsel's failure to obtain the statement precluded a full and adequate cross-examination of McKinnon, and demonstrates his pervasive lack of preparation for trial. Defendant also argues that counsel's failure to provide the State a copy of the statement in timely fashion compromised counsel's integrity. We conclude that defendant's claims are without merit and do not warrant an evidentiary hearing. In our view, any ineffectiveness of counsel in connection with the misfiling or misplacement of McKinnon's statement could not have had a material effect on the outcome of defendant's trial. The trial record reveals that, although a copy of McKinnon's statement was not produced by Zeitz until after both McKinnon and Marshall had testified, both Marshall's counsel and the State already knew of or had seen the statement. McKinnon had testified that after he learned that New Jersey law-enforcement authorities were in Louisiana investigating the murder, he fabricated an exculpatory statement purporting to explain his presence in New Jersey. He also testified that that statement was given to Kolins. On cross-examination, Zeitz had elicited from McKinnon that the statement was entirely McKinnon's creation and that McKinnon had not collaborated with anyone in creating it. In view of that testimony, and because the statement was ultimately placed in evidence and read into the record, we are satisfied that its late admission into evidence was immaterial. The jury had the benefit of the statement itself, and counsel had the opportunity to present arguments concerning McKinnon's statement to the jury in summation. We also dismiss defendant's claims alleging that the State engaged in a strategy of impugning Kolins's integrity by suggesting that Kolins was involved in a conspiracy to cover up Maria Marshall's murder and that Kolins's receipt of McKinnon's fabricated statement was in furtherance of that conspiracy. Defendant first contends that his counsel should have moved in limine to exclude evidence of McKinnon's statement because the statement was prepared after the dates of the murder conspiracy as charged in the indictment. Defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective in his response to the alleged efforts by the State to impugn Kolins's integrity. One such claim alleges that Zeitz should have requested a mistrial in response to the inference that Kolins travelled to Louisiana to arrange a cover story for Marshall. Another claim alleges that counsel should have called Kolins as a witness prior to calling Marshall and should have elicited from Kolins rather than Marshall the nature of Kolins's instructions and the purpose of Kolins's trip to Louisiana. In a third claim, defendant contends that Zeitz should have removed himself from the case to testify that he personally had directed the scope of Kolins's investigation and that it had not been his or Kolins's intention to secure a cover story for Marshall. A fourth claim concerns a comment by the prosecutor to defense counsel in the presence of the jury regarding whether Zeitz had instructed Kolins to conduct an investigation in Louisiana. And a fifth claim alleges that counsel should have called McKinnon's sister as a witness to establish that she had given McKinnon's statement to Kolins after Kolins spoke by telephone with Marshall. We determine that all of those claims are without merit and that defendant has failed to establish by any of those claims a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial record reveals that, during the State's examination of McKinnon, both Marshall's and Thompson's counsel objected on the ground that McKinnon's statement had been prepared subsequent to the dates of the alleged conspiracy. In addition, both counsel vigorously objected to the inference that McKinnon had given Kolins the fabricated statement in furtherance of a conspiracy to cover up the murder. Zeitz argued that the State's examination of McKinnon could not be used to cast some kind of shadow over the head of the defense investigator. In response, the prosecutor stated that he intended to elicit from McKinnon only that [McKinnon] made up a story. He gave it to [Kolins] and that's it. I am not alleging that [Kolins] told him to make up the story. Following that colloquy, the court ruled that there was no showing that the proffered testimony was inadmissible. We conclude that the court's ruling was unquestionably correct and that defendant has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the proffer of testimony concerning McKinnon's statement. In addition, we decline to second-guess counsel's tactical decisions to call Marshall as a witness prior to calling Kolins, to elicit from Marshall the purpose of Kolins's investigation in Louisiana, and to decline to call McKinnon's sister as a witness. We also reject as wholly without merit the allegation that counsel could somehow have prevented the prosecutor from making an inappropriate remark concerning Kolins's trip to Louisiana, and we note that that remark was both fleeting and insignificant. The allegation that Zeitz should have taken the extreme measure of removing himself as counsel to testify about Kolins's role as defense investigator is equally without merit. We discern nothing in the record to support defendant's suggestion that counsel should have ended his representation in order to testify. We also reject defendant's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel involving counsel's failure to move for a mistrial or seek other relief following a comment by the prosecutor allegedly intended to denigrate Zeitz and Kolins. During defense counsel's cross-examination of the insurance examiner who examined defendant and Maria Marshall on the morning of September 6, 1994, counsel asked whether the witness knew the location of the original medical screening form that he had completed for defendant. Upon learning that the form was in Sioux Falls, South Dakota at the offices of the insurance company, counsel paused to request the Court's assistance in obtaining the document. At that point the prosecutor remarked in the hearing of the jury, Why don't you send Russ Kolins. Defendant contends that counsel's failure to seek relief following the prosecutor's remark constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. The prosecutor's fleeting remark, although inappropriate, could not have materially affected the outcome of the trial. Another allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel involves Zeitz's elicitation during cross-examination of McKinnon that McKinnon had tampered with a car rented by New Jersey State law-enforcement authorities who were in Louisiana to investigate the murder. McKinnon testified that while he was in a restaurant with his wife and Kolins, State Investigators Murphy and Churchill had entered the restaurant. McKinnon then went outside to the parking lot and let the air out of the tires of the car he believed was rented by the State Investigators. Defendant argues that Zeitz's elicitation of that testimony diminished Kolins's credibility and therefore constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. McKinnon did not testify that Kolins was involved in the tampering, and we decline to question counsel's tactical decision to elicit McKinnon's admission that he had tampered with the State's car. We also note that during both direct and cross-examination of Kolins, Kolins emphatically denied any involvement in McKinnon's tampering with the State's car. Defendant also contends that counsel should not have permitted Kolins to perform investigative work on behalf of co-defendant Thompson, because Thompson's interests were adverse to Marshall's. We reject that claim as wholly without merit. Kolins testified that during his investigation on behalf of Marshall he learned information that ultimately would be helpful to Thompson's defense. Kolins explained that at the request of Thompson's counsel and with the permission of Zeitz, he later shared that information, which concerned Thompson's alibi witnesses, with Thompson's counsel. We will not second-guess counsel's decision to share information useful to the impeachment of defendant's chief accuser, McKinnon, and helpful to a co-defendant being jointly tried with defendant. A tactical decision of that nature does not, in our view, constitute deficient performance of counsel. Two of defendant's claims concern a pretrial investigation of Kolins that was conducted by State law-enforcement officers after they learned that Kolins had been retained as a private investigator on behalf of defendant. The claims include an allegation of a discovery violation based on the State's failure to produce the police reports of that investigation, and an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel based on Zeitz's failure to request or obtain prior to trial those police reports. We conclude that both of those contentions are entirely without merit. The State's investigative reports on Kolins disclose no information materially affecting Kolins's credibility, and the mere fact that Kolins was investigated by the State reveals no more than that the State engaged in thorough preparation for trial. Defendant could not have been prejudiced by counsel's failure to request that which had no capacity to affect the trial. Lastly, we address defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to Zeitz's continued reliance on Kolins as an investigator and witness for the defense despite Kolins's misplacement of McKinnon's statement, the State's alleged efforts to impugn Kolins's integrity, and McKinnon's testimony concerning the tampering with the State's car. Even assuming, arguendo, that Zeitz's continued reliance on Kolins was unreasonable in view of those facts and circumstances, we would conclude that defendant has failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant fails to demonstrate either that Zeitz's continued reliance on Kolins had a material detrimental effect on the outcome of the trial or that Zeitz's retention of a different investigator probably would have led to a different result.
Defendant has raised thirty claims concerning the admission into evidence of an audio tape defendant recorded during an apparent suicide attempt and related issues concerning the seizure of items from his motel room. The factual context for those claims has been set forth in a prior opinion of this Court, see Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 39-41, 62-73, 586 A. 2d 85, and need be summarized only briefly here. We address the claims on their merits and determine that they should be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. On September 27, 1984, approximately one week after police had confronted defendant with their knowledge of his connection to McKinnon, police were informed that defendant had checked into the Best Western Motel in Lakewood, New Jersey. Investigators immediately established surveillance at the motel. At 11:30 p.m., defendant left his room and went to the front office of the motel. Investigator Mohel followed defendant and observed him at the front desk. After defendant returned to his room, Mohel spoke to the clerk who said that defendant had deposited letters in the outgoing mail tray. Mohel testified that he looked into the tray and saw two letters there. One was addressed to Joseph Dougherty, Esq. On the outside of the envelope, Mohel observed the writing: To be opened only in the event of my death. Mohel immediately seized the letters and telephoned for assistance. When uniformed officers arrived, they entered defendant's room and found him there asleep. Mohel woke defendant and asked him if he had taken anything. Defendant said that he had put a lethal dose of a sleeping medicine in a cup of soda, but that he had fallen asleep before drinking it. Defendant said that it had been his intention to commit suicide at the exact time his wife had been murdered, but that he had overslept. The State obtained a search warrant to open the envelopes. Inside the envelope addressed to Dougherty, investigators found a letter, a contract to sell some real estate, and an audio tape. The tape was dictated by defendant, and we previously have set forth its substance. The tape discussed Marshall's relationship with Kraushaar, his intention to leave Maria within a month, his spiral of debt that accelerated to almost    two-hundred thousand dollar[s]    that I was determined to pay off, but just couldn't seem to climb out, and his reasons for hiring [McKinnon] to investigate Maria. On the tape Marshall acknowledged that he had sent McKinnon $5,500 in two installments and had given him an additional $800 at Harrah's the night of the homicide. Marshall instructed Dougherty on the tape with respect to how various business, financial, and personal matters should be handled. Marshall expressed his intention to take his own life because he expected to be indicted and convicted for his wife's murder, even though he was innocent. [ Id. at 40-41, 586 A. 2d 85 (first alteration in original.)]