Opinion ID: 1834341
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: review of the evidence presented

Text: Next, we turn to whether, given the evidence presented with respect to the testamentary capacity of Delphine Wagner, summary judgment was appropriate. A party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and must furnish sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the evidence presented remains uncontroverted. After the moving party has shown facts entitling it to judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party has the burden to present evidence showing an issue of material fact which prevents a judgment as a matter of law for the moving party. Ev. Luth. Soc. v. Buffalo Cty. Bd. of Equal., 243 Neb. 351, 500 N.W.2d 520 (1993); Howard v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 242 Neb. 150, 494 N.W.2d 99 (1993). The burden is on the proponent of a will to prove the testamentary capacity of the testator. In re Estate of Camin, 212 Neb. 490, 323 N.W.2d 827 (1982). However, a self-proved will establishes prima facie proof of testamentary capacity. Id. It is undisputed that the will in question is a self-proved will; therefore, the appellee, the proponent of the will, has established prima facie proof of testamentary capacity and met her burden with respect to the motion for summary judgment. Next, we must consider whether the appellant met her burden to present evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact to prevent judgment as a matter of law. In her brief, the appellant contends that the strongest evidence of Delphine Wagner's lack of testamentary capacity is a handwritten document dated March 26, 1984. In this note, Delphine Wagner expresses thoughts on her will, anger toward those of her children who initiated the conservatorship proceedings, and despair. The appellant suggests that because not all of the property Delphine Wagner owned was specifically mentioned in the note, Delphine Wagner did not know the extent of her property. The appellant's argument presumes that Delphine Wagner's intent in drafting the note was to inventory her property. That she did not mention all of her property in this note is of so little consequence that it cannot even be considered relevant evidence as to whether she knew the extent of her property. The appellant also suggests that the phrase Paul [Tank] has no 1/6 in this place whatsoever, found in the above-mentioned note, tends to prove Delphine Wagner's lack of testamentary capacity by establishing that she did not know the natural objects of her bounty. In her brief, the appellant states: The reference to his [Paul Tank's] one-sixth interest, if equated with the interest of his wife Lois Ann, would indicate a belief or intent by Delphine that the property was passing equally to her six children or the five other than Lois Ann. Brief for appellant at 45. The appellant's strained attempt to find meaning in this statement by means of successive inferences clearly illustrates that rather than evidence, the appellant is relying upon conjecture. The appellant argues that Delphine Wagner obviously lost testamentary capacity at some point before she died. The appellant further argues that Delphine Wagner suffered a stroke on May 8, 1984, a little more than a month after she executed her will. Since the condition causing the stroke was obviously progressive in nature, the appellant argues that there is a sufficient basis to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to Delphine Wagner's testamentary capacity on the date she executed her will. We disagree. Even if we assume that Delphine Wagner lost testamentary capacity at some point before she died, a fact we need not decide, the evidence presented fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to her testamentary capacity on April 2, 1984. The appellant is asking us to infer from the fact that Delphine Wagner suffered a stroke on May 8, 1984, that her capacity was diminished more than a month earlier. However, to make such inferences regarding the effects of the stroke on Delphine Wagner's testamentary capacity a month earlier would require us to ignore clear facts. The record affirmatively shows that Delphine Wagner's mental capacity was unaffected 1 month after the stroke. Dr. Roger W. Dilley, Delphine Wagner's physician, testified during a deposition that notes he made in conjunction with a June 8, 1984, visit from Delphine Wagner reflected that she had no evidence of any confusion or difficulty making decisions. With respect to the medical evidence adduced, the appellant admits in her brief that medical records, including the doctor's notes, show nothing regarding substantial mental difficulty until May 30, 1988. Brief for appellant at 40. This is more than 4 years after the will was executed. Although this seems to support the grant of summary judgment, the appellant's point is that the absence of medical records should not be considered evidence in support of testamentary capacity. However, we are not concerned with the weight of the evidence, but, rather, with whether the appellant has adduced evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. She has not. Lastly, the appellant offers her opinions and those of her siblings on Delphine Wagner's testamentary capacity. It is true that a nonexpert witness who is shown to have had a more or less intimate acquaintance with a person may be permitted to state an opinion as to the mental condition of that person by giving the facts and circumstances upon which the opinion is based. In re Estate of Thompson, 225 Neb. 643, 407 N.W.2d 738 (1987). However, it must appear that the witness has in mind the quality of mental capacity essential to the making of a valid will and that the facts and circumstances attested to are sufficient upon which to base an opinion. In re Estate of Camin, supra . Without detailing all the deposition testimony offered by the disinherited children, it is clear that they did not have in mind the requirements for testamentary capacity at the time they offered their opinions. They also were unable to point to specific facts or circumstances upon which they based their testimony. A review of the remaining evidence contained in the record also fails to establish any genuine issue of material fact concerning Delphine Wagner's testamentary capacity. We, therefore, conclude as did the district court that the appellant failed to offer evidence which would present a genuine issue of material fact such as would prevent the rendering of judgment as a matter of law. Finally, we must review the evidence with respect to the claim of undue influence. Undue influence such as to defeat a will is such manipulation as destroys the free agency of the testator and substitutes another's purpose for that of the testator. In re Estate of Peterson, 232 Neb. 105, 439 N.W.2d 516 (1989). Mere suspicion, surmise, or conjecture does not warrant a finding of undue influence; there must be a solid foundation of established facts on which to rest the inference of its existence. Wagner I. It is well established that both the appellee and Clarinda Foote were intimately involved in virtually all aspects of their mother's life during her declining years. That they possessed the opportunity to exercise undue influence cannot be seriously disputed. However, there is virtually no evidence of the other elements of undue influence. With respect to whether Delphine Wagner was subject to undue influence, the record clearly demonstrates that she was not. The record shows that despite the strenuous efforts of certain of her children and her son-in-law Paul Tank to control her, she was determined to retain control over her own affairs. She appeared to be of a mind clearly not amenable to undue influence. Likewise, the appellant fails to present a genuine issue of fact concerning whether the appellee or Clarinda Foote was disposed to exercise undue influence for an improper purpose. The record shows that they were thoroughly involved in the feud which obviously caused Delphine Wagner great anguish. However, it does not show their disposition to exercise undue influence. Though replete with allegations, the record is devoid of any underlying factual basis for those allegations. With respect to the appellant's claim that Delphine Wagner's will was the product of undue influence, we conclude that the district court's grant of summary judgment was appropriate.