Opinion ID: 1785565
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Comply with Statutory Requirements

Text: As an alternative basis on which to affirm, JBJ argues that even if Tracey had the authority to transfer Gallop's right of redemption to Lary, the action by Pavilion, as Lary's successor, to perfect its right of redemption is defective because, JBJ argues, Lary did not comply with certain statutory requirements in § 6-5-247 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, related to demand, the appointment of a referee, or the deposit into court or tender of lawful charges (the statutory requirements). Although we have stated that an appellate court may affirm a judgment of a trial court for any valid reason, [19] we do not consider JBJ's arguments about the statutory requirements because the record here indicates that the trial court did not make any findings concerning, nor did it intend to base its judgment on, those alternative grounds. The procedural circumstances attendant to the entry of a judgment are important. JBJ filed a brief and supporting materials in support of the second summary-judgment motion. In that brief, JBJ argued to the trial court that summary judgment was proper based on the authority-to-assign or the failure-to-comply-with-statutory-requirements grounds. Pavilion opposed all of JBJ's arguments, and submitted a brief and other materials to the trial court in opposition to JBJ's second summary-judgment motion. After receiving those submissions from the litigants, the trial court requested that JBJ submit a supplemental brief focused solely on the authority-to-assign issue. JBJ complied with that request when, on February 3, 2004, it filed a supplemental brief limited solely to the authority-to-assign issue; that supplemental brief concerning the authority-to-assign issue both expanded and refined the arguments JBJ had made previously on that ground. After receiving JBJ's supplemental brief, the trial court, on November 4, 2004, issued its six-page, written order entering a judgment for JBJ. The findings in that order addressed solely the authority-to-assign question; the order was silent as to JBJ's alternative arguments concerning the failure to comply with statutory requirements. Moreover, that order did not state that it was superseding or overruling nor did it otherwise address the trial court's October 22, 1997, order on JBJ's first summary-judgment motion in which, in pertinent part, the trial court found that the statutory requirements for redemption have been fulfilled. [20] Under these circumstances, we are persuaded that the trial court reached and decided only the authority-to-assign issue when it entered a summary judgment for JBJ on November 4, 2004. That ruling was a threshold finding that pretermitted consideration of the failure-to-comply-with-statutory-requirements argument and all other issues raised by Lary's (now Pavilion's) complaint. Because we hold that the trial court's order was so limited, the affirm for any valid reason principle is inapplicable here because the record indicates that the trial court never intended to address the failure-to-comply-with-statutory-requirements argument JBJ reasserted on appeal. [21]