Opinion ID: 2621639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor's Argument About Lack of Remorse

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it permitted the prosecutor to argue to the jurors at the penalty phase that they could consider defendant's lack of remorse as a circumstance in aggravation, and again when it refused to admonish the jury that lack of remorse was not a circumstance in aggravation, and that these trial court errors violated defendant's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the state Constitution. At the penalty phase, the defense moved to prohibit the prosecutor from arguing to the jury that defendant had not expressed remorse. The trial court denied the motion. During his argument to the jury, the prosecutor made these statements about defendant's lack of remorse: An important consideration for you in determining whether or not he deserves your sympathy or your mercy may be whether or not he's expressed any remorse for what he's done. What did he do at the scene after he's just done this to these two people? Does he say, I feel bad? Does he say, God, what have I done? No. He's worried about himself, as he always is, first and foremost. He tells his brother Ted, I may go to prison for this if I'm caught. You can consider his lack of remorse as he is fleeing the scene as aggravation. You can consider his lack of remorse later on as just tending to show there isn't any mitigation or the mitigation is not worthy of your consideration. Does he have a breakdown when his mom asks him, gee, son, what happened, your hands are cut? I got jumped by some Mexicans at McDonald's. He is able to say that with a straight face. Does he seem like he is feeling any remorse at that time, knowing the scene that he just left? Does he make an anonymous call to the authorities, hey, you might want to run out to the residence and take a look, so that maybe they don't have to be discovered by a member of their own family or a neighbor? He is content to just let them rot there. Concerned about himself? What is the first thing he does when he gets to the crack house? He sends James or somebody at the crack house for some bandages and some tape for his hands. He won't go the hospital at that point because he knows that if the crime has been discovered, the county hospital is one of the first places they will look for someone who might have been injured. But the first thing he does is see to himself, bandages and tape for Mr. Pollock.... The prosecutor also argued that defendant's jailhouse conversation with his mother in which he discussed a plan to kill a police officer during an escape attempt demonstrated that defendant had not changed for the better since his incarceration and was not deserving of the jury's mercy. Later, out of the jury's presence, the defense objected to the prosecution's argument that the jury could view lack of remorse as a circumstance in aggravation. The prosecutor replied that he had argued only that lack of remorse at the scene of the crime was a circumstances of the offense that the jury could consider in aggravation. The trial court overruled the objection, noting for the record that it was treating the objection as timely. Conduct or statements at the scene of the crime demonstrating lack of remorse may be considering in aggravation as a circumstance of the capital crime under section 190.3, factor (a). ( People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1231-1232, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159.) On the other hand, postcrime evidence of remorselessness does not fit within any statutory sentencing factor, and thus should not be urged as aggravating. ( Id. at p. 1232, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159.) When evidence of postcrime remorselessness has been presented, however, the prosecutor may stress that remorse is not available as a mitigating factor. ( Ibid.; accord, People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 187, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 149, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 465, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992.) We find no impropriety in the prosecutor's argument. In urging the jury to consider [defendant's] lack of remorse as he is fleeing the scene as aggravation, the prosecutor was properly urging the jury to view defendant's remorselessness during his flight from the murder scene as an aggravating circumstance of the capital crime under section 190.3, factor (a). ( People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1231-1232, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159.) In urging the jury to consider [defendant's] lack of remorse later on as just tending to show there isn't any mitigation or the mitigation is not worthy of your consideration, the prosecutor was properly arguing that remorse was not available as a mitigating factor. (See id. at p. 1232, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159.) Defendant argues that the statements he made to his brother immediately after returning to the car from the victims' house cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance of the crime because they do not unequivocally show a lack of remorse. But that was a factual issue for the jury to decide. The jury could reasonably conclude, as the prosecutor argued, that defendant's remarks demonstrated that he was concerned only about himself and not at all about the two people he had just brutally killed. Similarly, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant's false statements to his mother about how his hands became injured and his conduct in bandaging his hands at the crack house demonstrated a preoccupation with his own welfare that was inconsistent with genuine feelings of remorse. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's argument was improper because the defense did not present any evidence of remorse or attempt to rely on remorse as a mitigating factor. We disagree. Defendant's mother testified that while incarcerated pending trial in this case, defendant had sent her letters just to tell me how much he loves me and cares for other people and how sorry he is for what he's done.  (Italics added.) This was evidence of remorse to which the prosecutor was entitled to respond. Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor misled the jury in suggesting that evidence of postcrime remorselessness could negate the entire case in mitigation rather than merely demonstrating the absence of remorse as a mitigating factor. Although the prosecutor's argument was somewhat ambiguous in stating that lack of remorse could establish that there isn't any mitigation or the mitigation is not worthy of your consideration, we think a reasonable juror likely would have understood it to mean that the evidence of defendant's remorselessness could show that remorse was not available as a mitigating factor and also that defendant was not entitled to the jury's sympathy. We have not found impropriety in similarly expansive argument. (See, e.g., People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 146, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887 [prosecutor argued that jurors should `ask to see at least some evidence of remorse' by the defendant for his capital crimes before considering a sentence of life without parole].) When objecting to the prosecutor's argument, defense counsel made a fleeting and ambiguous reference to an admonition. Even if we assume, as defendant urges, that this was a request for an admonition, the trial court properly refused the request after concluding, correctly, that the prosecutor's argument on the topic of remorse was not improper.