Opinion ID: 2516369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of Defense Challenges to Potential Jurors for Cause

Text: ś 36 Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to strike nine prospective jurors for cause. Defendant used peremptory challenges to remove seven of the nine. Cf. State v. Huerta, 175 Ariz. 262, 264, 855 P.2d 776, 778 (1993). Defendant further asserts that boilerplate voir dire questions about fairness are inadequate in a death penalty case. See State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A.2d 1172 (1988). ś 37 Arizona law provides that cause to excuse a prospective juror exists [w]hen there is reasonable ground to believe that a juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict.... Ariz.R.Crim.P. 18.4(b). The party challenging the juror bears the burden of establishing that the juror could not be fair and impartial. State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 13, 951 P.2d 869, 878 (1997). In assessing a potential juror's fairness and impartiality, the trial court has the best opportunity to observe prospective jurors and thereby judge the credibility of each. See State v. Pawley, 123 Ariz. 387, 389, 599 P.2d 840, 842 (App. 1979). Importantly, a juror's assurances of impartiality need not be couched in absolute terms, Trostle, 191 Ariz. at 13, 951 P.2d at 878, and we will not set aside a trial court's ruling absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. See State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 390, 814 P.2d 333, 347 (1991); see also Trostle, 191 Ariz. at 12, 951 P.2d at 877. ś 38 In this case, defendant challenged nine prospective jurors. The judge conducted voir dire of each and concluded that he or she could be fair and impartial. Defendant first challenged Juror # 2, Collum, because she had a daughter and initially expressed a willingness to risk incarcerating an innocent defendant in order to ensure conviction of all guilty defendants, although she later stated that she believed conviction of innocent defendants was a risk inherent in the justice system because it is never possible to be absolutely certain from evidence and testimony that a person is guilty or innocent. Notwithstanding her expressed viewpoint, Collum responded to the court's voir dire as follows: Court: All right. Ms. Collum, in reference to your general view that it is better that society let-or it's better to have a few innocent people go to jail rather than run the risk of letting a guilty person go free, does that general view affect at all this case and the understanding that this case has to be proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt? Does that affect that at all? Ms. Collum: I do not feel that it would affect it. ś 39 Defendant challenged Juror # 7, Koebensky, because he said initially he had no tolerance for a person who would kill an innocent young girl, a sentiment he clarified as his belief that men should not abuse women. The trial court questioned Koebensky regarding his sentiment: Court: Do you think that you can be a fair and impartial juror based upon everything now that you know about this case? Mr. Koebensky: Yes. ś 40 Defendant challenged Juror # 42, Waiter, because she stated she had once been the victim of armed robbery and expressed a religious conviction in support of capital punishment. During voir dire, the following exchange occurred: Court: What Mr. Storrs' concern is, and all of us are wondering, do you think that you would find yourself, so to speak, in the shoes of the victim, remembering your experiences of the gun being pointed at you and how angry you were, and do you think that you would lose your ability upon hearing facts about a gun being pointed and being shot perhaps, do you think that you would lose your ability to be fair and impartial because of your experience? I think that's the area we are trying to address. Ms. Waiter: I would say right now, no, it would not affect me. ś 41 The trial court also questioned Ms. Waiter regarding her religious conviction in support of capital punishment: Court: In that function as a juror, you cannot allow any thoughts that you have about punishment affect your decisionmaking process in determining guilt or innocence. Do you understand that? Ms. Waiter: Yes. I do. Court: Do you believe that you can do that and put aside your philosophical views about the death penalty and not allow that to affect how you look at Mr. Hoskins' case? Ms. Waiter: Yes. ś 42 Defendant challenged Juror # 60, Thielemann, because he expressed sympathy for the victim. The following voir dire exchange occurred: Court: All right. As you are going along in the trial, if there is some feeling of sympathy for the victim that you find that you are having, is it your best thought that you would be able to put that aside and not allow that to affect your deliberations? Mr. Thielemann: I believe so. ś 43 Defendant challenged Juror # 61, Lavery, because she stated initially she was uncertain whether she could be impartial. During voir dire, the following exchange took place between counsel and Ms. Lavery: Mr. Storrs: So then, you would at this point be able to change your answer to Question 87 when it asked, What is it about yourself that makes you feel you can be an impartial juror? And you said, I can try. Is that still the way you feel? Is there still a question in your mind after our discussion now? Ms. Lavery: I would have to look at both sides. That's all I can say. I don't have going one way or the other. I am not picking either side. Mr. Storrs: And I don't mean to belabor the point, you know, but I need to have your assurance that you will be able to do that and not just try. Do you understand what I mean? Ms. Lavery: Yeah, I would be able to. ś 44 Defendant challenged Juror # 64, Coffin, because she exhibited an initial, fundamental misapprehension of the burden of proof in criminal cases by suggesting the defendant should have to prove his innocence. Despite her initial impression regarding the burden of proof, Ms. Coffin responded to the judge's subsequent questioning as follows: Court: Ms. Coffin, let me follow up on that one issue. Ms. Sanders is correct. To be an appropriate juror, you have to come in with a neutral frame of mind. It is the state's burden of proving Mr. Hoskins guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He is presumed to be innocent at this stage. That doesn't change unless Ms. Sanders proves that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The law is that Mr. Hoskins doesn't have to prove anything at all. He doesn't have to present any evidence. He doesn't have to testify. These are all important constitutional rights. Do you understand these rights? Ms. Coffin: Yes, I do. Court: All right. And even though you, in general, perhaps before you came in today, thought that the defendant should be required to prove his innocence, do you now understand that's not correct? Ms. Coffin: Yes, I do. Court: And do you now agree that you would be able to follow the Court's instructions on the law that the defendant doesn't have to prove anything to anybody? Ms. Coffin: Yes, sir. ś 45 Defendant challenged Juror # 70, Thomas, because she first stated she did not understand why defendant did not have to testify in his own behalf. During voir dire, the following exchange took place: Court: All right. Ms. Thomas, I am a little confused about what some of your thoughts are. The state will go ahead and present its evidence here in the case, and then Mr. Storrs and the defendant will make a decision about whether Mr. Hoskins wants to testify. If Mr. Hoskins doesn't testify in this case, what do you think about that? Ms. Thomas: That's his choice. Court: And do you understand the law is that he does not have to testify? Ms. Thomas: That he does not have to, yes. . . . . Court: The way we normally phrase it is we ask you if you can completely disregard that fact and not use that in your determination of guilt or innocence. How do you think about that? Ms. Thomas: If I amâ I am not going to. Why would I? There would be no reason to. I was just telling you what I felt. I mean, that if he was innocent, then he should want to testify, because that's the way I feel. But I am not doing that in the court, am I? You are asking me my feelings, but what you are going to ask me to do in court is to weigh the evidence. Court: Right. And can you put aside your feelings that you have just described and your thought process and not use that in your decision-making process at all? Ms. Thomas: Yes. ś 46 Defendant challenged Juror # 74, Pizana, because he revealed that a friend was involved in the criminal justice system and that he (Pizana) was angry because his friend had falsely asserted innocence. The record indicates the following exchange: Ms. Sanders: Okay. Would you understand that this is a completely different case? Mr. Pizana: Sure, I understand that. Ms. Sanders: Do you feel that you would be able to base your decision in our case solely on what we present to you in the courtroom? Mr. Pizana: Sure. Because it is a different case. . . . . Court: Let me follow up on that. Do you think that that personal situation in that other situation would affect your ability to be fair and impartial here in this case? Mr. Pizana: No, it shouldn't. ś 47 Finally, defendant challenged Juror # 76, Glow, because she was a practicing attorney. Despite defendant's concern, Ms. Glow stated that she could function as a fair and impartial juror in the present case: Court: Do you think that you could put aside your knowledge of perhaps technically what is going on and just focus and decide this case based upon the evidence that's actually admitted? Ms. Glow: Yes. I would definitely have to focus, but I could do it. ś 48 We observe that juror statements and circumstances normally warrant further exploration by the trial court to assure fairness and impartiality. Here, the trial court questioned each juror on matters of individual concern and was satisfied on the question of fairness. Prejudice will not be presumed but must appear affirmatively from the record. See Trostle, 191 Ariz. at 13, 951 P.2d at 878. The record discloses that, on questioning, the nine jurors each affirmed that he or she could be fair and impartial and would weigh the evidence as instructed by the trial court. The law requires no more. Each challenge was considered, and, in our view, the trial judge did not commit an abuse of discretion in denying challenges for cause as to the nine.