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Text: The Tenth Circuit's decision issued on July 24, 2002. Less than a month later, on August 22, petitioner Brent Taylor_x0097_a friend of Herrick's and an antique aircraft enthusiast in his own right_x0097_submitted a FOIA request seeking the same documents Herrick had unsuccessfully sued to obtain. When the FAA failed to respond, Taylor filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Like Herrick, Taylor argued that FEAC's 1955 letter had stripped the records of their trade-secret status. But Taylor also sought to litigate the two issues concerning recapture of protected status that Herrick had failed to raise in his appeal to the Tenth Circuit.

After Fairchild intervened as a defendant,[1] the District Court in D.C. concluded that Taylor's suit was barred by claim preclusion; accordingly, it granted summary judgment to Fairchild and the FAA. The court acknowledged that Taylor was not a party to Herrick's suit. Relying on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449 (1996), however, it held that a nonparty may be bound by a judgment if she was "virtually represented" by a party. App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a-31a.

The Eighth Circuit's seven-factor test for virtual representation, adopted by the District Court in Taylor's case, requires an "identity of interests" between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment. See id., at 31a. See also Tyus, 93 F.3d, at 455. Six additional factors counsel in favor of virtual representation under the Eighth Circuit's test, but are not prerequisites: (1) a "close relationship" between the present party and a party to the judgment alleged to be preclusive; (2) "participation in the prior litigation" by the present party; (3) the present party's "apparent acquiescence" to the preclusive effect of the judgment; (4) "deliberat[e] maneuver[ing]" to avoid the effect of the judgment; (5) adequate representation of the present party by a party to the prior adjudication; and (6) a suit raising a "public law" rather than a "private law" issue. App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a (citing Tyus, 93 F.3d, at 454-456). These factors, the D.C. District Court observed, "constitute a fluid test with imprecise boundaries" and call for "a broad, case-by-case inquiry." App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a.

The record before the District Court in Taylor's suit revealed the following facts about the relationship between Taylor and Herrick: Taylor is the president of the Antique Aircraft Association, an organization to which Herrick belongs; the two men are "close associate[s]," App. 54; Herrick asked Taylor to help restore Herrick's F-45, though they had no contract or agreement for Taylor's participation in the restoration; Taylor was represented by the lawyer who represented Herrick in the earlier litigation; and Herrick apparently gave Taylor documents that Herrick had obtained from the FAA during discovery in his suit.

Fairchild and the FAA conceded that Taylor had not participated in Herrick's suit. App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a. The D.C. District Court determined, however, that Herrick ranked as Taylor's virtual representative because the facts fit each of the other six indicators on the Eighth Circuit's list. See id., at 32a-35a. Accordingly, the District Court held Taylor's suit, seeking the same documents Herrick had requested, barred by the judgment against Herrick. See id., at 35a.

The D.C. Circuit affirmed. It observed, first, that other Circuits "vary widely" in their approaches to virtual representation. Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965, 971 (2007). In this regard, the D.C. Circuit contrasted the multifactor balancing test applied by the Eighth Circuit and the D.C. District Court with the Fourth Circuit's narrower approach, which "treats a party as a virtual representative only if the party is `accountable to the nonparties who file a subsequent suit' and has `the tacit approval of the court' to act on the nonpart[ies'] behalf." Ibid. (quoting Klugh v. United States, 818 F.2d 294, 300 (C.A.4 1987)).

Rejecting both of these approaches, the D.C. Circuit announced its own five-factor test. The first two factors_x0097_"identity of interests" and "adequate representation"_x0097_ are necessary but not sufficient for virtual representation. 490 F.3d, at 971-972. In addition, at least one of three other factors must be established: "a close relationship between the present party and his putative representative," "substantial participation by the present party in the first case," or "tactical maneuvering on the part of the present party to avoid preclusion by the prior judgment." Id., at 972.

Applying this test to the record in Taylor's case, the D.C. Circuit found both of the necessary conditions for virtual representation well met. As to identity of interests, the court emphasized that Taylor and Herrick sought the same result_x0097_release of the F-45 documents. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit observed, Herrick owned an F-45 airplane, and therefore had "if anything, a stronger incentive to litigate" than Taylor, who had only a "general interest in public disclosure and the preservation of antique aircraft heritage." Id., at 973 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Turning to adequacy of representation, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that some other Circuits regard notice of a prior suit as essential to a determination that a nonparty was adequately represented in that suit. See id., at 973-974 (citing Perez v. Volvo Car Corp., 247 F.3d 303, 312 (C.A.1 2001), and Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 973 (C.A.7 1998)). Disagreeing with these courts, the D.C. Circuit deemed notice an "important" but not an indispensable element in the adequacy inquiry. The court then concluded that Herrick had adequately represented Taylor even though Taylor had received no notice of Herrick's suit. For this conclusion, the appeals court relied on Herrick's "strong incentive to litigate" and Taylor's later engagement of the same attorney, which indicated to the court Taylor's satisfaction with that attorney's performance in Herrick's case. See 490 F.3d, at 974-975.

The D.C. Circuit also found its "close relationship" criterion met, for Herrick had "asked Taylor to assist him in restoring his F-45" and "provided information to Taylor that Herrick had obtained through discovery"; furthermore, Taylor "did not oppose Fairchild's characterization of Herrick as his `close associate.'" Id., at 975. Because the three above-described factors sufficed to establish virtual representation under the D.C. Circuit's five-factor test, the appeals court left open the question whether Taylor had engaged in "tactical maneuvering." See id., at 976 (calling the facts bearing on tactical maneuvering "ambigu[ous]").[2]

We granted certiorari, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 977, 169 L. Ed. 2d 800 (2008), to resolve the disagreement among the Circuits over the permissibility and scope of preclusion based on "virtual representation."[3]