Opinion ID: 1111268
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Some Principles of Appellate Review

Text: Finally, the majority fails to follow this Court's precedents of appellate review. Again and again we have articulated the scope of review. Early on we stated: [E]vidence which supports or tends to support the decree, together with all inferences which may be reasonably drawn from it and which support the decree, must be accepted. Blakeney v. Blakeney, 244 So.2d 3, 4 (Miss. 1971). Accord Culbreath v. Johnson, 427 So.2d 705, 707 (Miss. 1983). We have also stated our scope of review in terms of manifest error: It is that where the chancellor was the trier of facts, his findings of fact on conflicting evidence cannot be disturbed by this Court on appeal unless we can say with reasonable certainty that these findings were manifestly wrong and against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Even if this Court disagreed with the findings of fact and might have arrived at a different conclusion, we are still bound by the chancellor's finding unless manifestly wrong as stated above. Richardson v. Riley, 355 So.2d 667, 668 (Miss. 1978). We combined this test into our now familiar substantial evidence/manifest error rule: We have repeatedly refused to reverse a chancery court's finding of fact where there is any substantial credible evidence which supports it.... Put otherwise, the chancery court's findings must be allowed to stand unless manifest error is present and apparent. Dunaway v. Busbin, 498 So.2d 1218, 1220 (Miss. 1986). Today's majority opinion steps outside our scope of review, something the Harris court did not do, to avoid the chancellor's findings of fact as a true ascertainment of the parties' intent at the time the conveyance was signed in 1945. The chancellor below made the following findings: (1) Neither Hardy nor Josephine McLeod could read or write, and, therefore, could not have prepared the deed; (2) The deed was prepared by Thornhill or his agent; (3) The party who carried the deed to the McLeods for execution was familiar with what he wanted to buy and knew the difference between minerals and royalty; (4) The deed was not ambiguous, and (5) The deed conveyed a non-participating royalty interest. The majority obviously overlooks our precedent in connection with disturbing the chancellor's findings and ignores the fact that the chancellor, having heard the testimony of Thornhill, is in the best position to make findings of fact based on the evidence presented in this case. There is substantial credible evidence that Thornhill knew in 1945 that he bought a royalty interest in the McLeod estate, for the conveyance which he prepared states in plain language that he did not receive the rights appurtenant to mineral ownership. Moreover, considering the objective circumstances surrounding the conveyance and the practical construction both parties placed upon the conveyance for some 34 years can only lead to the same credible conclusion the chancellor came to. By stepping outside our scope of review to reverse the chancellor's findings, we render a decision today contrary to our basic principles of oil and gas law and deed construction, principles which the chancellor correctly applied to the facts before him.