Opinion ID: 2537242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Allegations Regarding Relationship with Miami-Dade Police Department

Text: In his final subclaim, Rodriguez alleges that the State failed to disclose that a business partner and family member of Isidoro (Lieutenant Villanueva) was a detective with the Miami-Dade Police Department. The postconviction court denied this claim, finding that no impeachment evidence existed because Lieutenant Villanueva did not know about Isidoro's involvement in the case until after the fact, he did not have contact with the officers who investigated the case, and he was not involved with the investigation. The record supports these findings. Lieutenant Villanueva testified at the relinquishment hearing, acknowledging that he knew Isidoro because Isidoro had married his cousin and that he and Isidoro had previously bought two houses, which they sold for a profit. Lieutenant Villanueva explicitly denied that the officers who were investigating the case talked to him about the investigation and further testified that he was not involved in any way, shape, or form in anything having to do with this investigation. None of the witnesses testified about any involvement that Lieutenant Villanueva had in the case. Further, defense counsel acknowledged that he would not have brought this information before the jury if this was all the information he had uncovered because it would have diminished his credibility. The postconviction court's factual findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Moreover, the evidence is insufficient to support a Brady violation. Rodriguez has not demonstrated that the relationship between Isidoro and Lieutenant Villanueva was favorable evidence, and thus he cannot meet the first prong of Brady. Further, Rodriguez cannot establish prejudice because this type of attenuated impeachment evidence could not reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Smith, 931 So.2d at 796 (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936). In reviewing all of the subclaims regarding Isidoro, we find that Rodriguez has failed to show that the State suppressed any favorable evidence, that the State presented false testimony at trial, or that trial counsel was ineffective during the impeachment of Isidoro. Accordingly, we deny relief.
Rodriguez asserts his counsel was ineffective in failing to present testimony from Luis's girlfriend that would have implicated Isidoro and failing to present evidence alleging that Isidoro or Luis's family had sold the jewelry belonging to the crime victims. As to the first aspect of this claim, Rodriguez alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present available evidence from Luis's girlfriend (Cathy Sundin) that Luis and Isidoro drove together from Orlando to Miami to commit the crimes. Contrary to Rodriguez's allegations regarding this claim, he failed to present any testimony to establish that such available evidence existed. At the trial, Luis testified that he flew to Miami in order to participate in the crime. Although Luis did testify at the evidentiary hearing, counsel did not inquire as to this matter. The only evidence upon which Rodriguez relies to support this claim is the pretrial deposition of Cathy Sundin, who was Luis's girlfriend at the time of the crimes. The postconviction court refused to consider this pretrial deposition, holding that the deposition constituted hearsay. However, even if this deposition had been considered, it would not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, in her pretrial deposition, Sundin surmised that Isidoro drove Luis to Miami because Isidoro was the only one around with a car. She had no distinct memory of Isidoro picking up Luis. Further, she had no knowledge that Isidoro helped in committing the crime. However, Sundin mentioned on numerous occasions throughout her deposition that Rodriguez was the person who had planned the crime and that Luis believed he would obtain a significant amount of money if he helped Rodriguez. Because Rodriguez has failed to establish that favorable evidence existed as to this issue, we deny this subclaim. As to the second aspect of this subclaim, Rodriguez also asserts that his counsel should have presented available evidence that members of Isidoro's or Luis's family had and sold jewelry belonging to the victims. Although Rodriguez was permitted an evidentiary hearing on this claim, no evidence was presented that any specific person kept or sold the jewelry. Rodriguez has failed to demonstrate any available evidence that his trial counsel failed to present. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly denied this claim.
In the next claim we address, Rodriguez asserts that his counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase because he failed to present the testimony of Edgar Baez, a witness who saw a man taking a woman into the Josephs' apartment around the time of the murders. Rodriguez asserts that Baez's testimony could demonstrate that the person Baez saw at the time of the crime did not match Luis or Rodriguez but could have been Isidoro. Specifically, Baez was across the street on the day of the murder and saw a man let an older woman (presumably Abraham) into the apartment. Baez had described the man he saw very briefly in a 1984 sworn statement, and a composite sketch was prepared. Baez remembered that a sketch was made but did not recall if he was shown the final picture. Nor could Baez attest that the sketch he helped make, and which he was shown at the hearing, resembled the person he saw in 1984. In reviewing the entire record as it relates to this claim, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief because, based on the evidence presented, Rodriguez is unable to establish either deficiency or prejudice in failing to present Baez as a witness.
We next address Rodriguez's allegations that the State violated Brady because trial counsel was never provided with letters that contained information that could have been used to attack the credibility of Alejandro Lago. [12] According to Rodriguez, the State possessed letters showing that Lago received consideration in exchange for his assistance and that the results of a polygraph test that he took were considered suspect [13] and that if the jury had been made aware of this information, the jury might have rejected the statements of Lago that were presented through the testimony of a law enforcement officer. Specifically, Lago was an inmate who shared a cell with Rodriguez during their confinement. Lago told Detective Crawford that Rodriguez admitted he was not crazy but knew that he had to act insane or the police would connect him to other crimes. The prosecutor initially considered calling Lago to be a penalty phase witness, but instead called Detective Crawford to testify as to Lago's statements. On direct appeal, this Court held that permitting Detective Crawford to testify to the double hearsay statements from Lago was error, but determined that the admission of the testimony was harmless. Rodriguez, 753 So.2d at 44-45. During postconviction proceedings, the circuit court rejected this claim, first questioning whether this information could have impeached Lago because he was never called to testify. Moreover, even if impeachment was possible, the court found that the claim lacked merit because, on direct appeal, any error regarding Lago was found to be harmless. Further, the circuit court thoroughly reviewed the original sentencing order, noting that the original trial judge provided an in-depth analysis as to whether Rodriguez was mentally ill and concluded that Rodriguez consciously exaggerated his symptoms and manipulated the doctors after he learned that he could avoid going to prison for his criminal behavior if he was mentally ill. The postconviction court concluded that based on the testimony of the mental health experts and Rodriguez's prior seventy-one felony convictions, the judge and jury could have easily concluded death was the appropriate sentence. We affirm the trial court's conclusion. As addressed above, in order to prevail on a Brady claim, Rodriguez must show: (1) that favorable evidenceeither exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced. Riechmann, 966 So.2d at 307. Here, there are substantial questions as to whether Lago had been promised any benefits for his assistance before the trial and whether the polygraph would have led to any favorable evidence. Even if Rodriguez could meet the first prong of Brady, however, he cannot show prejudice. On direct appeal, this Court held the trial court erred in permitting Lago's statements to be admitted through Detective Crawford. However, the Court explicitly determined that the admission of the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the number of strong aggravators in this case and the conflicting testimony as to Manuel Rodriguez's mental health, including some testimony that he was a malingerer. Rodriguez, 753 So.2d at 45. Turning to the Brady claim, the challenged documents would only have presented potential additional bases to impeach Lago's statements, assuming they were admissible at all. This additional evidence would not change our harmless error analysis as set forth on direct appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court's ruling on this claim.