Opinion ID: 586639
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Spears

Text: 2 Spears pleaded guilty to two counts of knowingly distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In determining Spears' base offense level, the district court found that the distribution continued for a period of at least fifty-two weeks and that Spears distributed approximately four ounces per week. The district court based this finding on a special agent's testimony recounting the grand jury testimony of a confidential informant. The informant testified that Spears' father had told him that Spears was selling four ounces per week. The total amount, 208 ounces or approximately 5.9 kilograms, placed Spears at an offense level of 32. The court reduced the offense level by two for acceptance of responsibility. Together with Spears' criminal history category of III, this put Spears' sentencing range at 121 to 151 months. The district court sentenced Spears to concurrent 144 month sentences on each count. 3 Spears challenges the evidentiary basis for the district court's finding that he distributed four ounces of cocaine per week. Spears argues that the court improperly relied on the informant's testimony about his father's statement because there was no objective evidence to indicate that his father was being truthful, and the statement was hearsay and would be inadmissible at trial and was insufficient evidence of the amount he had distributed. 4 The government argues that Spears has waived these arguments on appeal by failing to object to the admissibility or accuracy of the informant's testimony regarding his father's statement before the district court. Although Spears objected to the court considering other statements his father made, he did not object when the informant's statement was introduced at sentencing. Thus, it appears that Spears has not preserved this issue on appeal. 5 Even if Spears had preserved this issue, his various challenges to the district court's use of the statement are without merit. Spears argues that the informant's testimony about his father's statement would be inadmissible at trial. That evidence would be inadmissible at trial does not necessarily mean that it would be inadmissible at sentencing. The rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings, see United States v. Troxell, 887 F.2d 830, 835 (7th Cir.1989), and hearsay is admissible, see United States v. Escobar-Mejia, 915 F.2d 1152, 1154 (7th Cir.1990); USSG § 6A1.3 (court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility at trial). 6 Spears also argues that the testimony is not reliable. In United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.1989), this court stated that  'so long as the information which the sentencing judge considers has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy, the information may properly be taken into account in passing sentence.'  See id. at 1270 (quoting United States v. Marshall, 519 F.Supp. 751, 754 (E.D.Wis.1981), aff'd 719 F.2d 887 (7th Cir.1982)). A sentencing court may properly rely on the statement of a witness made under oath such as the informant's testimony before the grand jury. See United States v. Zuleta-Alvarez, 922 F.2d 33, 37 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2039 (1991). We also note that a co-conspirator's testimony as to the statements of other co-conspirators is within the party admission exception to the hearsay rule. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Although, as we noted, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings, such co-conspirator statements are admissible at trial because they are presumed to be reliable: A co-conspirator is likely to know who the members of the conspiracy are and what they have done or said. We believe such statements bear sufficient indicia of reliability to permit them to be used at sentencing. 7 Although we believe that the evidence was of borderline reliability, Spears has not identified any reason to doubt the truthfulness of the informant or his father. We, like the district court, acknowledge that drug dealers may engage in some puffery in an attempt to make themselves appear to be bigger dealers than they really are; however, we note that Spears' father had no reason to resort to puffery. He did deal substantial amounts of cocaine--there was evidence that he purchased cocaine four kilograms at a time and that he sold approximately one kilogram every three days. In addition, the informant was a long-standing, trusted customer who apparently was familiar with the operation. Spears' father was confiding in a colleague, not recruiting a new customer. The informant was close to Spears' father and had personal knowledge of the workings of the organization. These facts support the reliability of the informant's grand jury testimony. The district court properly relied on this evidence. See United States v. Rodriguez, 897 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir.) (sentencing court may rely upon uncorroborated hearsay testimony and even upon out-of-court statement by unidentified informant at least where there is good cause for not allowing confrontation and some additional corroboration of statement), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 158 (1990); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.) (court may rely on testimony from separate trial of co-conspirators; defendant at sentencing has no absolute right to confront witnesses whose information is made available to sentencing court), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3302 (1990). 8 To the extent that Spears challenges the sufficiency of his father's statement as a basis for the district court's finding, this argument is without merit as well. In sentencing, facts may be established by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Spillman, 924 F.2d 721, 723 (7th Cir.1991). The statement of Spears' father is sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding. 1