Opinion ID: 473028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inherently Dangerous Activities

Text: 37 Appellants next contend that the district court erred in not instructing the jury on Phillips' strict liability for inherently dangerous activities, a theory of recovery under Texas law. Texas courts have endorsed the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 414 (1965), and imposed liability on principals who attempt to farm out inherently dangerous activities to independent contractors. See Sun Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 514 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (We readily accept the proposition that the employer of an independent contractor may not escape liability for the acts of the contractor which are 'intrinsically dangerous'....). The district court below failed to submit this issue to the jury, in effect granting Phillips a directed verdict on that theory of recovery. Therefore, we must determine the historical facts most favorable to appellants which the jury could have found from the evidence. See Boeing v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 363, 373 (5th Cir.1969). We must then determine whether such facts constitute substantial evidence supporting recovery on this theory. We determine appellants have failed to make out a case for strict liability on this basis. 38 In Texas, vicarious liability is imposed on an employer for the acts of an independent contractor conducting inherently dangerous activities on behalf of the employer. Here, however, there is no employer-independent contractor relationship. An independent contractor is one who performs an activity for another, yet attains functional autonomy over his actions. Pitchfork Land and Cattle Co. v. King, 346 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex.1961) (listing the recognized test for independent contractors including, inter alia, the independent nature of the contractor's business, his obligation to supply tools and materials, and his right to control the progress of the work); see Living, Inc. v. Redinger, 667 S.W.2d 846, 855 (Tex.Ct.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1984), reversed on other grounds, 689 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.1985); Summerville & Sons, Inc. v. Carter, 571 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex.Ct.App.--Tyler 1978), aff'd, 584 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.1979). The Texas courts have defined an independent contractor as any person who, in the pursuit of an independent business, undertakes to do a specific piece of work for other persons, using his own means and methods, without submitting himself to their control in respect to all its details. Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Velize, 695 S.W.2d 35, 40-41 (Tex.Ct.App.--Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (quoting Pitchfork Land, 346 S.W.2d at 598). 39 Crown Central cannot be labeled an independent contractor because, quite simply, Crown Central did not work for Phillips. It is apparent that Crown Central acted only for itself, and that Crown Central, and only Crown Central, called the shots. The contract between Phillips and Crown Central was for the sale and lease of certain knowledge and technology, including patents. This agreement did not make Phillips the employer of Crown Central, nor did it make Crown Central an independent contractor. 40 Because there is no independent contractor-employer relationship, we hold that the district court's action in not presenting this theory to the jury was correct. Thus, we need not decide whether the activities involved here are intrinsically dangerous or whether appellants, as employees of an independent contractor, can recover. 6