Opinion ID: 2581912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eligibility for a Conditional Driver's Permit

Text: The prosecution argues that the district court erred in concluding, implicitly, that Rodgers was misinformed as to the statutory requirements for obtaining a conditional driver's permit. To determine whether the HPD 386B forms misstated the applicable law, we must examine the statutes relevant to the issuance of conditional driver's permits. This court has stated: The starting point in statutory construction is to determine the legislative intent from the language of the statute itself. Our foremost obligation when interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. We read statutory language in the context of the entire statute, and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose. A rational, sensible and practicable interpretation of a statute is preferred to one which is unreasonable or impracticable. The legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality. State v. Bautista, 86 Hawai`i 207, 209-10, 948 P.2d 1048, 1050-51 (1997) (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). The criteria for obtaining a conditional driver's permit is set forth in HRS § 286-264(a) (Supp.2000), [7] which states in pertinent part: At the administrative hearing, the director, at the request of an arrestee who is subject to an administrative revocation period as provided in section 286-261(b)(1), may issue a conditional driver's permit that will allow the arrestee, after a minimum period of absolute license revocation of thirty days, to drive for the remainder of the revocation period, provided that one or more of the following conditions are met: (1) The arrestee is gainfully employed in a position that requires driving and will be discharged if the arrestee's driving privileges are administratively revoked; or (2) The arrestee has no access to alternative transportation and therefore must drive to work or to a substance abuse treatment facility or counselor for treatment ordered by the director under section 286-261. (Emphasis added.) HRS § 286-264(a) does not expressly indicate that submitting to an alcohol concentration test is a condition of receiving a conditional driver's permit. Therefore, we must examine which persons are subject to the administrative revocation period specified under HRS § 286-261(b)(1) to determine if an alcohol concentration test is required to obtain a conditional driver's permit. HRS § 286-261 (Supp.2000) states in pertinent part: (b) The periods of administrative revocation with respect to a driver's license and motor vehicle registration, if applicable, that shall be imposed under this part are as follows: (1) A minimum of three months up to a maximum of one year revocation of driver's license, if the arrestee's driving record shows no prior alcohol enforcement contacts during the five years preceding the date of arrest; (2) A minimum of one year up to a maximum of two years revocation of driver's license and all registrations of motor vehicles registered to the arrestee if the arrestee's driving record shows one prior alcohol enforcement contact during the five years preceding the date of arrest; (3) A minimum of two years up to a maximum of four years revocation of driver's license and all registrations of motor vehicles registered to the arrestee if the arrestee's driving record shows two prior alcohol enforcement contacts during the seven years preceding the date of arrest; (4) Lifetime revocation of driver's license and prohibition on all subsequent motor vehicles registrations by the arrestee if the arrestee's driving record shows three or more prior alcohol enforcement contacts during the ten years preceding the date of arrest; or (5) For arrestees under the age of eighteen years, the revocation of the driver's license for the period remaining until the arrestee's eighteenth birthday, or for the appropriate revocation period provided in paragraphs (1) to (4) or in subsection (d), whichever is longer. .... (d) The driver's license of an arrestee who refuses to be tested after being informed of the sanctions of this part shall be revoked under subsection (b)(1), (2), (3), and (4) for a period of one year, two years, four years, and a lifetime, respectively. Subsection (b) above designates the administrative revocation periods applicable to arrestees who submit to an alcohol concentration test while subsection (d) sets out the administrative revocation periods for arrestees who refuse testing for alcohol concentration. See State v. Wilson, 92 Hawai`i 45, 49, 987 P.2d 268, 272 (1999). Focusing on the language of subsection (d), Rodgers argues that, because the driver's license of an arrestee who refuses testing for alcohol concentration is revoked pursuant to subsection (b), he or she is eligible for a conditional driver's permit. We disagree. As previously indicated, HRS § 286-264(a) sets forth the criteria for the issuance of a conditional driver's permit. Under HRS § 286-264(a), a conditional driver's permit is available to an arrestee who is subject to an administrative revocation period as provided in section 286-261(b)(1). Thus, the period, or term, of administrative revocation determines who is eligible for a conditional permit. Subsection (b)(1) specifies an indeterminate period of administrative revocation between three months and one year. Although subsection (d) incorporates the scheme of escalating penalties from subsection (b) based upon the number of prior alcohol enforcement contacts, subsection (d) designates a fixed, one-year period of administrative revocation for an arrestee who refuses testing for alcohol concentration and who has no prior alcohol enforcement contacts during the five years preceding the date of arrest. Thus, under the plain language of HRS § 286-261, subsection (d) clearly designates a different administrative revocation period from that prescribed in subsection (b)(1). Additionally, we note that the effect of Rodgers's interpretation of HRS § 286-261(d) leads to a result that is inconsistent with the intent of the legislature. Under Rodgers's interpretation, the Administrative Director [Director] has the discretion to issue conditional permits regardless of whether the arrestee had submitted to an alcohol concentration test. However, we have noted, because the legislature has manifested a clear intent that refusing arrestees receive enhanced periods of administrative revocation, as compared to their non-refusing counterparts, it follows that the Director's discretionary authority to increase the periods of administrative revocation pursuant to HRS § 286-261(b) is capped by the mandatory and nondiscretionary periods enumerated in [HRS § 286-261(d)]. Were this not so, the Director could effect an anomaly, namely, that a non-refusing arrestee could be subject to a period of administrative revocation greater than his or her refusing counterpart, a result clearly inconsistent with [the administrative license revocation scheme's] purposes. Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court, 84 Hawai`i 138, 160-61, 931 P.2d 580, 602-03 (1997). Rodgers's interpretation would grant the Director discretion to, in effect, shorten the mandatory and nondiscretionary periods of administrative revocation enumerated in HRS § 286-261(d). Moreover, HRS § 286-264(a) places no limits on the Director's discretion to extend the thirty-day minimum period of absolute administrative revocation before awarding a conditional driver's permit. Thus, under Rodgers's interpretation, the Director could subject a non-refusing arrestee to a longer period of absolute administrative revocation than his or her refusing counterpart, a result that is inconsistent with the legislature's intent. Based on the foregoing, we hold that arrestees who refuse to take a test for alcohol concentration are not subject to the administrative revocation period provided under HRS § 286-261(b)(1) and, therefore, are not eligible for conditional driver's permits. Accordingly, the HPD 386B forms did not misinform Rodgers about the eligibility criteria for a conditional driver's permit.