Opinion ID: 199116
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellate Jurisdiction and the Federal Arbitration Act

Text: 17 In turn, two questions of appellate jurisdiction are presented: whether the fact that the order remands for a new arbitral proceeding makes it an interlocutory order and whether the fact that it is only a partial award makes it an unappealable, piecemeal interlocutory order. Each is a question of first impression here. 18 The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., permits appeal from certain orders concerning arbitration which otherwise would not qualify as final judgments under the traditional final judgment rules of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). See Hewlett-Packard Co., Inc. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101, 104 (1st Cir. 1995) (order confirming arbitration award is appealable now because Congress directed in the statute governing arbitration-related appeals that such an 'order'... should be immediately appealable). Under the FAA, immediate appeal may be taken from, inter alia, an order denying confirmation of an award, 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(D), and an order vacating an award, id. § 16(a)(1)(E). Appeal from an interlocutory order directing arbitration to proceed, however, is precluded under § 16(b) in order to further the federal policy promoting arbitration. See Seacoast Motors of Salisbury, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 143 F.3d 626, 628-29 (1st Cir.) (pro-arbitration purposes of the FAA and the institutional goal of avoiding piecemeal appeals and systemic delays served by not permitting appeal from interlocutory orders), cert denied, 525 U.S. 965 (1998). 5 19 Hutson's appeal of the district court's order denying confirmation of the arbitrator's Modified Phase 1 Award falls squarely within § 16(a)(1)(D), which permits an appeal from an order denying confirmation of an award or partial award. Id. (emphasis added). The other part of the district court's order, which vacated the award and remanded the entire matter to a new arbitrator, appears to be covered by § 16, although the statutory language provides for appeal from orders vacating an award. § 16(a)(1)(E). The statute does not expressly mention remands, and so the question arises whether this remand order renders the order a non-appealable interlocutory order. While this court has not yet spoken on this question, other courts of appeals that have done so routinely assume... that an order vacating an arbitrator's decision but remanding for additional arbitration is appealable under § 16(a)(1)(E).... Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Protection Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Jays Foods, L.L.C. v. Chemical & Allied Product Workers Union, Local 20, AFL-CIO, 208 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2000) (observing that the FAA make orders vacating and remanding arbitral awards appealable immediately); Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Texas, 915 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990) (Where the district court has vacated an award and ordered new arbitration by a different panel, its vacatur becomes reviewable pursuant to 9 U.S.C. [§ 16(a)(1)(E)].); Virgin Islands Housing Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Const. Services Corp., 27 F.3d 911, 914 (3rd Cir. 1994) (vacatur and remand order that requires reevaluation of the entire controversy is reviewable). 20 The reasoning of those courts is persuasive, and we hold that an order of the district court which vacates and remands an arbitral award is not thus made an interlocutory order. Allowing the appeal furthers the pro-arbitration policy designed to expedite confirmation of arbitration awards articulated by Congress when it amended the FAA to allow appeal from certain orders concerning arbitration. Hewlett-Packard, 61 F.3d at 104. This is not like an order remanding to the arbitrator merely for clarification. Compare Landy Michaels Realty Corp. v. Local 32B-32J, Serv. Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 954 F.2d 794, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1992) (remand to arbitrator to reconsider calculation of damages not appealable under FAA). A remand for a new arbitration proceeding, unlike an unappealable interlocutory order within the scope of § 16(b), does not offend the policies disfavoring partial resolution by arbitration, see Forsythe Int'l, 915 F.2d at 1020 n.1, but instead encourages finality and completeness. 21 The second question is whether § 16(a)(1)(E), which does not expressly mention partial awards, provides appellate jurisdiction. The arbitrator's Phase 1 Award could be characterized as a partial order because it contemplates further arbitration proceedings in Phase 2. The statute expressly provides an appeal may be taken from orders denying or confirming partial awards. We think that the statute read as a whole contemplates an appeal when there is an order vacating an award, including partial awards.