Opinion ID: 1835988
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: and C. VAGUENESS and DUE PROCESS

Text: Ch. 73-120 states that material is obscene if considered as a whole, applying community standards, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion and utterly without redeeming social value and if, in addition, it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters. The wording of the statute is substantially the same as the Georgia statute in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973). Upon return of Slaton for reconsideration, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973), upheld the constitutionality of Ga. Code Ann. § 26-2101, after which the Florida statute under consideration was fashioned. The Georgia court cited its authoritative constructions in earlier decisions involving the statute to support the requirement for statutory definitions of obscenity. [1] Those earlier interpretations were held to supply the required specificity in the present statutory phraseology under consideration. The prior authoritative constructions were also held to have avoided an unconstitutional retroactive judicial construction of the statute, thereby preventing a violation of the due process clause. Florida does not enjoy such earlier interpretations of this statute upon which to rely but we do find the statutory language sufficient. Ch. 73-120 was patterned after the substantially identical provision found in 26 Ga. Code Ann. § 2101(b). Where this occurs it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction of our own statute. Gay v. Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1952); Denmark v. Ridgell Furniture Co., 117 Fla. 244, 157 So. 489 (1934); Venice East, Inc. v. Manno, 186 So.2d 71 (Fla.App.2d 1966). If a Florida statute is patterned after a statute of a sister state, it is amendable to the same construction that its prototype has been given in the sister state. Flammer v. Patton, 245 So.2d 854 (Fla. 1971); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Beazley, 54 Fla. 311, 45 So. 761 (1907). Statutes adopted from another state may be deemed to have been adopted with the construction given to them by the courts of the state from which they were adopted. State ex rel. Porter v. Atkinson, 108 Fla. 325, 146 So. 581 (1933). A statute adopted from another state is governed by the construction placed upon it, at the time of its enactment, by the highest court of the state from which the statute was adopted. Crane Co. v. Richardson Constr. Co., 312 F.2d 269 (CA 5, 1963). Thus, in construing Ch. 73-120 to determine whether it meets the specificity test set forth in Miller , we may properly resort to interpretations of 26 Ga. Code Ann. § 2101(b) by the Supreme Court of Georgia, which is the highest court of the state from which our statute was adopted, prior to the date on which Ch. 73-120 was enacted. As was noted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973), the provisions of 26 Ga. Code Ann. § 2101(b) have been authoritatively construed in such a manner as to meet the specificity test set forth in Miller . The cases relied upon in Slaton to support such determination are Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 377, 180 S.E.2d 712 (1971) (dealing with acts of sexual intercourse, natural, unnatural, bizzare, and violent); Walter v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 676, 182 S.E.2d 464 (1971) (actual sexual activity, both natural and unnatural, including sexual intercourse, fellatio and cunnilingus); 1024 Peachtree Corp. v. Slaton, 228 Ga. 102, 184 S.E.2d 144 (1971) (similar description of the material involved); and Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 228 Ga. 343, 185 S.E.2d 768 (1971) (simulated sexual activity including portrayal of sexual intercourse and fellatio). All of these authoritative constructions of the Georgia statute, it will be noted, were handed down in 1971, well before the date upon which Ch. 73-120 was enacted. [2] Accordingly, the proper construction of Fla. Stat. Ch. 73-120 should follow the construction placed upon the Georgia statute which was its prototype by the highest court of Georgia. As did the Supreme Court of Georgia in Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973), we hold that the statute meets the requirements set forth in Miller . In addition to the delineation contained in the statute itself, as hereinafter set forth, these authoritative constructions specifically delineate the field of operation of Ch. 73-120 in a manner consistent with the new Miller standards. We do not extend ex post facto application to such Georgia authoritative constructions as binding notice to an offender of what conduct is prohibited; only our own constructions are binding as such notice in Florida. Miller . In this respect we stand on our direct holding which follows that the statutory language is sufficient for such purpose of notice. These Georgia holdings on a like statute, however, are supportive of our present like interpretation and, being before the Legislature in its adoption of such statute, as reflecting the legislative intent thereof. The United States Supreme Court, in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), has set forth the test to be used to separate the unprotected obscene from materials protected under the First Amendment (and, as to the states, under the Fourteenth Amendment). As stated in that opinion: The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether `the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, [cites omitted], (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 413 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2615, 37 L.Ed.2d at 431. The U.S. Supreme Court in explaining in Miller what was intended by specifically defined by state law, gave the following examples: (a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. 413 U.S. at 25, 93 S.Ct. at 2615, 37 L.Ed.2d at 431. As further examples of state laws directed at depiction of defined physical conduct, as opposed to expression, [3] the Court in Miller pointed to specific statutes of Oregon and Hawaii which prohibit specifically designated anatomical areas and specifically designated sexual activities from being depicted in such a manner as to appeal to the prurient interest, etc. Our recent decision in Davison v. State, 288 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1973), held that Fla. Stat. § 847.013, F.S.A., met the specific definition requirements of Miller on its face, in that it specifically defined, in terms of physical condition rather than in terms of expression, the statutory meaning of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, and sadomasochistic abuse. The term harmful to minors is then defined in that statute to mean descriptions or exhibitions of these defined types of sexual conduct when predominantly appealing to the prurient interest, patently offensive to prevailing community standards, and utterly without redeeming social value. As noted above, Miller requires that in order for a state to regulate obscene materials, the state statute must specifically define sexual conduct deemed obscene, as may be bolstered by earlier authoritative constructions thereof which do so and thereby place an offender on prior notice of the conduct proscribed. We must determine here whether or not Ch. 73-120, Laws of Florida, on its face specifically defines sexual conduct. There have been no prior authoritative constructions of this statute upon which to lean. The asserted doubt concerning the validity of the statutory definition lies in its seemingly defining obscene materials in terms of a mere interest as opposed to the depiction or description of sexual conduct. The obscenity is described but as an interest in such sexual conduct. The statutory definition states: Material is obscene if ... its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion... . The conditional or adverbial clause clearly modifies the predicate adjective obscene which is equated to the subject of the sentence material by a copulative verb. At this point, the statute speaks of that which is obscene as that which appeals to prurient interest, and that which appeals to prurient interest is modified by its appositive, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion. While these words literally indicate a type of interest in specific sexual conduct, nevertheless, the intent and purpose is clear, that these constitute the prohibited conduct which is deemed to be obscene. Otherwise, it is of little purpose to view such conduct as a mere interest. It is a fundamental principle that this Court has the duty, if reasonably possible, to resolve all doubts concerning the validity of a statute in favor of its constitutionality. [4] As well, it is our duty when construing a statute to ascertain legislative intention and to effectuate it. [5] The intent of the legislature to regulate the depiction or description of sexual conduct is manifest from the undeniable fact that sexual conduct is the keystone of obscenity. The title of the act reads:  An Act relating to the distribution of obscene materials. It is the fruit of plain common sense that we hold that this statute defines the sexual conduct deemed obscene. We refuse to permit grammatical niceties to frustrate our duty to effectuate legislative intent. We, therefore, conclude that this is the only reasonable construction which is consistent with legislative intent. The information filed against the defendant in this case charges him with showing a film which, ... graphically depicts and shows nude male and female persons actually engaging in sexual conduct including sexual intercourse, sodomy, cunnilingus, and fellatio... . The statutory definition, as we construe it, specifically defines the sexual conduct (interest) which renders materials obscene as shameful or morbid nudity, sex or excretion. The acts which the information charges that the film depicts are those which the definition contemplates. The statute states sex which, in the statutory context, of course means sexual intercourse, or interplay, this being the indisputable basis of this obscenity matter. The statute states shameful or morbid and, as construed, these words modify nudity and sex. We hold these to include cunnilingus, sodomy and fellatio, as charged in the information, for these acts render nudity and sex shameful or morbid. We recognize the ease with which we might dispose of these distasteful cases by merely construing this statute to encompass the definition suggested by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller . However, we feel that such a construction would usurp the power of the Legislature to enact statutes, a power which is vested solely therein by the Constitution of the State of Florida. [6] Our construction is consistent with common sense and legislative intent, and we will not, in effect, rewrite this statute by incorporation of the definition offered by the Supreme Court of the United States. [7] Any amendments we leave to the Legislature. In State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., [8] the Supreme Court of the State of Washington upheld a statute which only prohibited the distribution of that which is obscene. [9] Our statute is clearly more specific than the statute upheld by the Washington Court.