Opinion ID: 221940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no -3- No. 10-3292 Valente v. Univ. of Dayton genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmovant “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 n.3 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). But in making our determination, we may not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of [any disputed] matter,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); we must instead view the facts in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88. Because this action involves an Honor Code dispute between a university and its student, contractual theories underlie our analysis. See Behrend v. State, 379 N.E.2d 617, 620 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (“Generally . . . when a student enrolls in a college or university, pays his or her tuition and fees, and attends such school, the resulting relationship may reasonably be construed as being contractual in nature.”) Yet, at the same time, “[c]ontracts for private education have unique qualities and must be construed to allow the institution’s governing body to meet its educational and doctrinal responsibilities.” Ray v. Wilmington Coll., 667 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). Courts therefore will not interfere with a private university’s right to make regulations, establish requirements, set scholastic standards, and enforce disciplinary rules absent “a clear abuse of discretion.” Schoppelrei v. Franklin Univ., 228 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967) (emphasis -4- No. 10-3292 Valente v. Univ. of Dayton added); accord Wilmington Coll., 667 N.E.2d at 42; see also State v. Adams, 404 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ohio 1980) (“The term ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies that the [adjudicating body’s] attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary[,] or unconscionable.”).