Opinion ID: 217494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: The individual defendants argue that they were never properly served with process under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(e) and (m) and, as a result, the judgment should be reversed. The district court's decision regarding dismissal for insufficient service of process is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Perez-Sanchez v. Pub. Bldg. Auth., 531 F.3d 104, 106 (1st Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), which governs the timing of service, provides, If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the court--on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff--must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 allows a party to file a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process. This motion must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). 1 The jury did not assess damages against Haddock, Carmona, and Rivera-Suárez. -10- [A] party that makes a motion under [Rule 12] must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2). Omitting a defense under these circumstances results in waiver. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)(A); Chute v. Walker, 281 F.3d 314, 319-20 (1st Cir. 2002). Moyeno filed a motion to dismiss for improper service under Rule 4(m) on April 3, 2008, and Cruz, Díaz, and Peraza filed a motion to join Moyeno’s motion on April 14, 2008. These motions were filed before their responsive pleadings and thus were timely. In their motions, the individual defendants challenged the timing of the service of process. Crispin's complaint was filed on October 25, 2007, and therefore service of process was due on or before February 22, 2008. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The individual defendants were not served until February 28 and 29, 2008. Thus, the individual defendants were served over 120 days after the filing of the complaint in violation of Rule 4(m). The problem for the individual defendants is that, when they filed these initial motions, they admitted that they were served and challenged only the timing of the service.2 (DE 8 2 Had the individual defendants not admitted they were served, they might have prevailed because the service was improper. Crispin attempted to serve the individual defendants by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an attorney in the Municipality’s legal department. This method of service was effective only as to the official-capacity claims, but it was not effective as to the individual-capacity claims. See Perez-Sanchez, -11- (Ruben Mo[y]eno Cintron . . . w[as] served with summons on February 29, 2008.)); (DE 9 (On February 28, 2008, the appearing defendants, [Cruz, Díaz, and Peraza], were served with summons and a copy of the Amended Complaint . . ..)). A district court is not required to dismiss a defendant when service is not made within the 120-day deadline. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The district court also has the option to order that service be made within a specified time. Id. Given that the individual defendants admitted in their motion to dismiss that they were served on February 28 and 29, 2008, the district court's denial of the motion was effectively a ruling that service could be performed by February 29, 2008. This decision was within the district court’s discretion under Rule 4(m). The individual defendants' later motion challenging the method of service does not help them. This motion was filed on February 19, 2009, almost a year after the alleged service of process. By this time, it was too late. The individual defendants had already sought dismissal for improper service in April 2008. They could have objected to the method of service at that time. Their failure to do so means their objection to the method of service was waived. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)(A); SEC v. Beisinger Indus. Corp., 552 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that insufficient service defense was waived 531 F.3d at 106. -12- where the defendants' initial motion to dismiss alleged only that service was impossible, not that service was improperly effectuated under Rule 4).
Appellants argue the record does not support the district court's imposition of a default judgment. The district court's imposition of a default judgment as a sanction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Remexcel Managerial Consultants, Inc. v. Arlequin, 583 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) gives the district court a veritable arsenal of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders, including designating facts as established, striking pleadings, or rendering a default judgment. Malot v. Dorado Beach Cottages Assocs., 478 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2007). Although a drastic sanction, [t]he entry of a default judgment provides a useful remedy when a litigant is confronted by an obstructionist adversary and plays a constructive role in maintaining the orderly and efficient administration of justice. Remexcel Managerial Consultants, 583 F.3d at 51 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When faced with a motion for sanctions, the non-moving party must file an opposition. District of Puerto Rico Local Rule 7(b) states, Unless within fourteen (14) days after the service of a motion the opposing party files a written objection to the -13- motion, incorporating a memorandum of law, the opposing party shall be deemed to have waived objection. A party’s failure, on account of ignorance or neglect, to timely oppose a motion in the district court constitutes forfeiture. See Rivera-Torres v. Ortiz Velez, 341 F.3d 86, 102 (1st Cir. 2003). The Municipality, Cruz, Díaz, and Peraza never filed a response to Crispin's June 11, 2009 motion for sanctions. The district court gave them until June 29, 2009, to file a response to the motion. Although the district court held the motion in abeyance on June 24, 2009, this did not relieve the parties of their obligation to respond. Indeed, after the motion was held in abeyance, Crispin continued to file motions alleging the defendants were not complying with discovery obligations. When the district court defaulted the Municipality, Cruz, Díaz, and Peraza on July 8, 2009, they had still not responded. It was not until their motion for reconsideration that the defendants disputed Crispin’s allegations. A motion for reconsideration of a sanction order, however, cannot revive claims that were forfeited by failing to timely oppose the original motion. See Marks 3 Zet-Ernst Marks GmBh & Co. KG v. Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the Municipality, Cruz, Díaz, and Peraza forfeited any objection to Crispin’s motion for sanctions.3 See id. 3 There was at least a forfeiture here and therefore we will proceed under a forfeiture analysis. Given the local rule and the knowledge the parties had, they may have actually waived their -14- Similarly, Moyeno never responded to Crispin’s July 16, 2009 motion for sanctions and therefore forfeited any objection to the motion. The district court gave Moyeno until August 3, 2009, to file a response. When the district court sanctioned Moyeno with default on August 11, 2009, Moyeno had not filed an opposition. Because appellants forfeited their argument by failing to raise it in a timely manner, we review only for plain error. See Rivera-Torres, 341 F.3d at 102. We apply the plain error doctrine 'stringently' in civil cases, Gaydar v. Sociedad Instituto Gineco-Quirurgico y Planificacion Familiar, 345 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 320 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002)), and we are not persuaded that this is one of those rare occasions when the standard is met, Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 36 (1st Cir. 2006). By not filing responses, the defendants never informed the district court how they complied with their discovery obligations. Without any opposition, Crispin's assertions regarding the inadequacy of the defendants' responses could be credited by the district court. While default was a harsh sanction, it was brought on by appellants' persistent failure to comply with the court's discovery orders and was preceded by the court's clear advance warning. Goya Foods, Inc. v. Unanue, 233 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2000). There was no abuse of discretion—let objection. -15- alone plain error—in the district court’s decision to sanction appellants in this manner. See Remexcel Managerial Consultants, 583 F.3d at 51.
Appellants argue that the district court should have excluded testimony of Crispin's psychological treatment because Crispin failed to provide all of his medical records during discovery. We review the district court's decisions to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2010). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) states, If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. Crispin identified his treating physicians in his discovery materials, and therefore Rule 37(c)(1) does not preclude the admission of their testimony. Although Crispin did not provide all of his medical records during discovery, the admission of the evidence was harmless to the Municipality because it was able to obtain the records on its own using a subpoena and the district court did not allow Crispin to use any records that he failed to provide to it. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in -16- the admission of evidence regarding Crispin's psychological treatment.
Appellants argue that the district court's failure to give the Municipality's proposed jury instruction on causation was reversible error. “The trial court's refusal to give a particular instruction constitutes reversible error only if the requested instruction was (1) correct as a matter of substantive law, (2) not substantially incorporated into the charge as rendered, and (3) integral to an important point in the case.” White v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 221 F.3d 254, 263-64 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. DeStefano, 59 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1995)). The Municipality's argument fails at prong two because the jury was adequately instructed on causation. See id. The district court explained, Any award you may enter in this case must be based on the evidence and must be based on your dispassionate analysis of the extent of the injuries, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a result of any defendant's wrongs, if any. (emphasis added). The district court also instructed that damages must be found by a preponderance of the evidence and that the mere fact that I am discussing the issue of damages doesn't mean that you have to find damages. These instructions adequately informed the jury that Crispin must prove the -17- defendants' actions caused the damages and that damages should not be presumed. Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to give the Municipality's requested instruction. AFFIRMED. -18-