Opinion ID: 2611058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Answer to (B)

Text: As mentioned, defendant's second complaint under his first assignment of error is that the district attorney's refusal to engage in plea negotiations with [defendant] constituted `unequal treatment' and unfair selective prosecution. The threshold question is whether plea negotiations fall within the ambit of privileges and immunities for purpose of an Article I, section 20 analysis. [2] Although defendant cites no authority for the proposition that plea bargaining, standing alone, is a privilege, immunity, or benefit of state or federal constitutional significance, we assume that standardless or irrational plea bargaining or a refusal to plea bargain for an improper purpose would be a governmental act within Article I, section 20. See Bienen, The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L Rev 27, ___ (1988). Whether it is or not, the district attorney's refusal to negotiate or plea bargain in this case did not violate defendant's rights protected by Article I, section 20. The district attorney's decision not to pursue plea negotiations with defendant did not deny him equal privileges and immunities. Defendant's total argument on this issue is as follows: In all cases except defendant's case, the prosecutor entered into plea negotiations.    Penn attempted to justify his rationale on only three cases. Because of Williamson's young age (20) and lack of prior record, and mitigating circumstances about the crime (Williamson responded to a homosexual attack), Penn conceded that he was over-charged and claimed guilty pleas to unaggravated murder were justified.    Penn noted that Moen, age 50, suffered from medical problems and probably would not physically survive 20 years in prison.         Penn based his decision on the facts that Farrar was age 29, had a prior record, and an antisocial personality; the state had sufficient evidence to prosecute defendant for aggravated murder with a death penalty sanction; and Penn knew of no mitigating evidence. From the above, defendant argued that: Age is not a determinative factor. Compared to Farrar, Williamson was younger (age 20) and Moen was older (age 50). Life sentences were offered in both of those cases. There was no evidence of the ages of the other murderers. The criminal record was not the key factor. Presumably, Moen and some (if not all) of the other murderers had criminal records. All of the others were offered plea negotiations. Penn opined that he could prove aggravated murder and the death penalty sanction in Farrar's case. Presumably, he could do so in Moen's case; he did not indicate that he could not do so.3 Penn did not justify why he could not prove aggravated murder in the other cases. Finally, Penn stated he did not yet know of any mitigating evidence in Farrar's case. This position occurred at the early stages of defendant's case. Penn relied upon the homosexual attack in Williamson as mitigation. In contrast, there was no mitigation cited in Moen's case. Penn merely relied upon administrative convenience. The Marion County District Attorney did not establish a consistent standard for plea negotiations. His refusal to negotiate with Farrar constituted unequal treatment under Article I, section 20 and the Fourteenth Amendment. [3]     Moen was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. See State v. Ronald Howard Moen, SC No. S33952 [309 Or. 45, 786 P.2d 111] (review pending). Assuming the privilege or immunity clause involves plea bargaining or the prosecution's willingness to enter into a plea agreement, the appropriate persons for the analysis of disparate treatment are those who have been charged in Marion County with aggravated murder: Moen, Williamson and defendant. The district attorney concededly treated Moen and Williamson differently. The district attorney negotiated with Moen and offered him an agreement not to seek the death penalty if he would plead guilty to aggravated murder, and he negotiated with and offered Williamson the opportunity to plead guilty to two lesser-included charges of simple murder. That defendant was treated differently from Moen and Williamson does not establish ipso facto a violation under either Article I, section 20, or the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether the difference in treatment was merely haphazard, i.e., without any attempt to strive for consistency among similar cases. The district attorney's actions were not based on class discrimination, animus to defendant or his attorney, or on concerns collateral to fair prosecution of defendant for aggravated murder. The district attorney did offer a clear, rational, consistent, and consequently sufficient justification for treating defendant differently from Moen and Williamson. The district attorney offered Moen a life sentence in exchange for a guilty plea to aggravated murder because Moen is 50 years old with severe medical problems which insure that a 20-year mandatory sentence [on an aggravated murder conviction] will be the equivalent of incarceration until death. Both aspects of the offer had a rational relation to the prosecution decision  a guilty plea to the principal offense has obvious advantages to the state, and the offer to waive the death sentence in return for the plea was reasonable under the circumstances. Given that rationale for the offer to Moen, the district attorney's refusal to offer the same agreement to defendant is both rational and consistent. Defendant, who was 29 years old and apparently in good health at the time of trial, was not similarly situated to Moen for the purpose of the criteria employed by the district attorney in offering a plea bargain to Moen. The Williamson case presents a distinct but related concern. Williamson was allowed to plead guilty to two lesser-included charges of simple murder because he was only twenty years old, there was evidence of provocation by the victims, and the facts of the case would have created sympathy for the defendant because the killing took place in response to a homosexual sexual attack by the victims, according to the defendant's version of the crime. Furthermore, the district attorney testified that given the three statutory questions he did not have sufficient evidence to really justify seeking the death sentence in Williamson's case. As with the offer to Moen, both aspects of the offer to Williamson had a rational relation to the prosecutorial decision  a guilty plea to two counts of the lesser included charge of simple murder had obvious advantages to the state, and the offer to dismiss the aggravated murder charge was reasonable under the circumstances. Defendant failed to establish that the district attorney's refusal to engage in plea negotiations with him constituted a violation of Article I, section 20, or of the Equal Protection Clause.