Opinion ID: 2623600
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jury instructions/sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶24] Mr. Messer asserts that jury instruction No. 6 and the verdict form improperly allowed for alternative findings and a conviction based upon insufficient evidence. The State responds that the jury instruction correctly stated the law and there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of guilty on both alternatives. Jury instruction No. 6 stated as follows: The elements of the crime of battery, as charged in this case, are: 1. On or about the 31st day of August, 2002 2. In the County of Natrona, and State of Wyoming 3. The Defendant, John Anthony Messer 4. Unlawfully touched another, Jessica Gomez 5. A household member 6. In a rude, insolent or angry manner. OR 3. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 4. Cause bodily injury to another, Jessica Gomez 5. A household member. If you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant not guilty. The verdict form stated as follows: We the jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled cause, do find as follows: 1(A). As to the charge of Battery by unlawfully touching Jessica Gomez in a rude, insolent or angry manner, charged in the Amended Information, we find the Defendant, John Anthony Messer: _______ Guilty _______ Not Guilty 1(B). As to the charge of Battery by intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury to Jessica Gomez, charged in the Amended Information, we find the Defendant, John Anthony Messer: _______ Guilty _______ Not Guilty After deliberating for one hour and twenty minutes, the jury sent the following question out to the district court: on the verdict do we have to find for charge 1(A) or 1(B), or both? After consulting with counsel and obtaining their agreement, the district court answered the question as follows without objection: . . . the answer is both. I would advise you that separate determinations need to be made on both 1(A) and 1(B) for which there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the elements of the respective breakdown of the charges. That is, there needs to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements necessary to support the offense of battery as referred to in 1(A), and there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt to establish all of the elements of proof for the battery as would be determined in question 1(B). Those elements are set forth in Instruction 6 of the packet that's been provided. The jury went back to the jury room to deliberate further and returned a verdict of guilty on both 1(A) and 1(B). Consistent with the jury verdict, and following the sentencing hearing, the district court entered judgment finding Mr. Messer guilty on one count of assault and battery (FVPA), third offense, a felony, in violation of § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii). [¶25] We review Mr. Messer's claim for plain error because he did not object to the instruction or verdict form. [1] Therefore, he must prove that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious way resulting in denial of a substantial right and material prejudice. Urbigkit, ¶ 41. [¶26] We have addressed the propriety of jury instructions and verdict forms presenting alternative grounds for conviction in several recent cases. Id. ; May v. State, 2003 WY 14, 62 P.3d 574 (Wyo. 2003); Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, 57 P.3d 1242 (Wyo. 2002). Prior to those cases, we also addressed the issue in Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 966 (Wyo. 1995), where we held that a verdict must be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground but not on another and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected. As in the present case, all of those prior cases involved jury instructions that quoted language directly from a criminal statute containing alternative grounds for conviction of the crime charged. Urbigkit concerned Wyoming's aggravated assault and battery statute and involved the alternative theories that the defendant knowingly caused or attempted to cause, or threatened to cause, bodily injury with a deadly weapon. We upheld two of the convictions but reversed four others because there was no evidence the defendant caused injury or attempted to cause injury or threatened to cause injury with a deadly weapon to four of the victims. Urbigkit, ¶ 48. Bush and Tanner concerned Wyoming's burglary statute while May involved aggravated burglary. In each case, however, the jury was instructed that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged if the evidence showed he entered a building without authority with the intent to commit larceny or the intent to commit a felony. Because the evidence was not sufficient to show entry with the intent to commit both larceny and a felony, we reversed the burglary convictions in Bush and Tanner and the aggravated burglary conviction in May. [¶27] As in these prior cases, the jury instruction given in Mr. Messer's case quoted language directly from the statute containing alternative grounds for conviction of the crime charged. In the present case, however, the verdict form required the jury to identify the alternative statutory grounds upon which its verdict was based. The jury found Mr. Messer guilty on both alternatives  unlawfully touching a household member in a rude, insolent or angry manner and intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury to a household member. Therefore, the question we must decide is whether sufficient evidence supported the jury determination on both. [¶28] Evidence was presented at trial that the victim was awakened from sleeping on the couch at the residence where she and Mr. Messer were temporarily living by Mr. Messer punching her in the face. We agree with the State that whether such actions are viewed as an unlawful touching of another in a rude, insolent or angry manner, or as intentionally, knowingly and recklessly causing bodily injury to another, they meet the requirement for conviction under § 6-2-502. We hold that substantial evidence supported the jury verdict of guilty under both alternatives and there was no error in this regard. [¶29] Affirmed.