Opinion ID: 2995520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Issue and Standard of Review

Text: After granting Officer Coffey’s writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated our prior opinion and remanded this case for further consideration in light of Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). 121 S.Ct. 2545 (2001). Saucier, in turn, states as follows: In a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, the requisites of a qualified immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence. . . . Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. . . . A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry. In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary to set forth principles which will become the basis for holding that a right is clearly established. This is the process for the law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon turning to the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first inquiry. The law might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question of whether the law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case. 121 S.Ct. at 2155-56 (internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied). Thus, Saucier directs us to ask whether Coffey’s conduct, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, rises to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation as a matter of constitutional law. Only if this initial question is answered in the affirmative are we to consider whether a law enforcement officer in Coffey’s position on December 20, 1997 would, nevertheless, have reasonably believed that his conduct was lawful./8 Id. at 2156. Yet the majority opinion fails to answer the first question that Saucier requires us to ask. The majority contends that Coffey did not take issue with the jury’s verdict and, therefore, concedes that his conduct was unconstitutional. Ante at 3. This statement is confusing. I wish to emphasize that on three separate occasions prior to the verdict--(1) in a motion for summary judgment; (2) in a motion for directed verdict following the plaintiffs’ case; and (3) in a motion for directed verdict following the close of all evidence--Coffey did argue that his display of force was protected by the Fourth Amendment, even if all of the McNairs’ evidence was accepted as true. Thus, because I am: (1) mindful of the fact that Coffey has adequately preserved his right to challenge the legal sufficiency of the jury verdict against him; (2) cognizant of our discretionary authority to review the entire record; (3) obligated by Saucier to clarify the boundaries of the law by considering in every instance whether the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, 121 S.Ct. at 2156; and (4) instructed by the Court to review this case in light of Saucier, I am prepared to answer the question head on of whether the McNair brothers were the subject of an unreasonable seizure. Conducting such an analysis complies with the Saucier Court’s ultimate goal of establishing legal principles that remove uncertainty in the case law, guiding public officials in their daily conduct, and protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly break the law from future nettlesome lawsuits. Indeed, although the district court dismissed this case on the basis of qualified immunity, I believe the more proper course in this instance is to set aside the verdict on the independent, clear, and more compelling basis of the insufficiency of the evidence. Qualified immunity is an appropriate and accepted method for disposing of cases prior to trial, rather than after trial, because the denial of a qualified immunity defense is the only procedural vehicle a defendant can use to bring to us at the pretrial stage, instead of after final judgment, any question relating to the merits. Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). Conversely, because the advantage of qualified immunity is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial, Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, qualified immunity in the context of a trial is indistinguishable from other affirmative defenses that come into play only if the plaintiff establishes that the defendant has violated his rights. Thus, it is a non-sequitur for us at the late stage of this litigation to cloak our decision in the language of immunity. When considering Coffey’s post-verdict motion, I am convinced that we should use the same legal analysis as other cases, with the initial inquiry being whether there were sufficient facts to support the verdict rendered, in light of the applicable law. I agree that if the facts substantiated the view that Coffey violated the Constitution, then the proper recourse would be through the doctrine of immunity. But because his actions were reasonable in the first instance, he is entitled to a ruling that affirmatively characterizes his conduct as lawful and prudent, without any discussion of a defense that implies the existence of a valid antecedent claim against him. See Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1273-74 (Hoeveler, J., concurring). Based on the law of the land and my review of the evidence adduced at trial, I agree with the law enforcement officer that this case should never have gone to trial and, furthermore, should never have been submitted to the jury. See Egebergh, 272 F.3d at 926-27. Our inquiry is whether the record contains a legally sufficient evidentiary basis from which a jury could have reasonably derived its verdict. In doing so, we must consider the entire record, without reweighing the evidence or judging the credibility of the witnesses. Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1985). Sitting as an appellate tribunal, we assume that the jury resolved all genuine factual disputes in favor of the McNairs, id., but at the same time, as I read the law, we cannot ignore the court record containing unequivocal, undisputed, andunimpeached evidence that is favorable to Officer Coffey and relevant to the legal sufficiency of the McNairs’ case. See McGee v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1992) (reversing jury award; dismissing case on the basis of undisputed facts and the court’s independent determination of the scope of the Procedural Due Process Clause); see also Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 216 (1931) (jury is not at liberty, under the guise of passing upon the credibility of a witness, to disregard his testimony, when from no reasonable point of view is it open to doubt.); Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271, 1274 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc). Even after drawing inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, I am convinced, as a matter of law, that Officer Coffey’s conduct did not violate the Constitution.