Opinion ID: 1992370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counsel for the plaintiff:

Text: Q What time that day was it you parked your car in front of the Jewish Home, when do you say it was? A This was Friday, I remember, it pay day, you know. It's 3:00 o'clock, we got paid. I want to go pick up my pay. First, I walk into office and pick up my pay. I want to go with my car downtown to pay my bills, and then happened the accident when I started. Q What time did the accident happen? A 3:00 o'clock, after 3:00 o'clock. Q Did you work that day? A No, this day was my day off, day off. The Court: ... On September 1st, were you doing an errand for the Home? Had you intended to do an errand for the Home on September 1st? You said you were going downtown to pay some bills? The Witness: Yes. The Court: So you were planning to go downtown for your own benefit that afternoon? The Witness: Yes. The plaintiff claims that it was for the jury to determine whether the answer Yes was as to one of the court's questions or to all three questions. It is too speculative to assume that Blankenfeld intended to answer all three questions run together rather than the last of the three, which reasonably appears to supersede the first two. The court's final question and the answer thereto clearly show that Blankenfeld intended that his answer Yes was only to apply to the third question which the trial judge asked him. Nowhere in the record is there any testimony indicating that on September 1, 1961, the Home authorized Blankenfeld to do an errand for it or to use his car in performing any service for the Home. The evidence is reasonably susceptible of but one conclusion, that is, that, at the time of the accident, Blankenfeld was not performing an act for the Home in furtherance of its business. Blankenfeld testified that he did not work on September 1, 1961. The plaintiff claims that a payroll record of the Home indicates that Blankenfeld did work on September 1, 1961. Even if we were to assume that Blankenfeld had worked at his usual employment on the day of the accident, this fact, in the light of the other evidence, would not impose liability on the Home. Nor does the fact that Blankenfeld may have used his car to go on an errand for the Home prior to September 1, 1961, help the plaintiff. Before responsibility can attach to the Home, the relationship of master and servant must have existed at the time the injury was done to the plaintiff and Blankenfeld must have been acting in the course of his employment. In the course of his employment means while engaged in the service of the master, and it is not synonymous with the phrase during the period covered by his employment. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. White, 104 F.2d 923, 926 (9th Cir.). In reviewing the action of the trial judge on the motion to set aside the verdict, we are concerned with whether the judge abused his legal discretion. Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 555, 102 A.2d 352. We are satisfied that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding from the evidence that the jury could not reasonably and logically have found that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by Blankenfeld while he was going on an errand which had been authorized by the Home. There is no error.