Opinion ID: 765928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Immunity and Privilege

Text: 16 Donnelley raised absolute defenses to liability based on S 820.2 of the California Government Code andS 47(a) of the California Civil Code. The district court granted summary judgment pursuant to S 820.2. We conclude that neither statute applies.
17 Section 820.2 of the California Government Code states: [e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused. Cal. Gov't Code S 820.2 (West 1999). McQuirk contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this basis because Donnelley's conduct was not discretionary, but rather was ministerial. We agree. 18 The California Supreme Court still applies the analysis it set forth over thirty years ago in Johnson v. California, 447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968), the first case in which it construed S 820.2. See Caldwell v. Montoya, 897 P.2d 1320, 1325 (Cal. 1995). In Johnson, the court was confronted with the issue of whether a parole officer was immune from liability arising from his failure to warn foster parents of the dangerous propensities of a youth placed in their care. See 447 P.2d at 354. The court found the parole officer's decision not to warn the foster parents to be ministerial and therefore concluded that there was no immunity. 19 See id. at 361-63. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected a literal interpretation of the term discretion in S 820.2. The California Supreme Court has since remarked, [o]ur opinion [in Johnson] reasoned as 20 follows: Almost all acts involve some choice among alternatives, and the statutory immunity thus cannot depend upon a literal or semantic parsing of the word `discretion.'  Caldwell, 897 P.2d at 1325. Instead, the Johnson court distinguished between the `planning' and `operational' levels of decision-making. Johnson, 447 P.2d at 360. Only the former are immune from liability. The Johnson court limited planning level judgments to those judgments that have been delegated to a particular branch of government: 21 The [Johnson] court concluded that section 820.2 confers immunity only with respect to those basic policy decisions which have been committed to coordinate branches of government, and does not immunize government entities from liability for sub sequent ministerial actions taken in the implementa tion of those basic policy decisions. This distinction is sometimes characterized as that between the planning and the operational levels of decision making. 22 Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 710 P.2d 907, 915 (Cal. 1985) (citations omitted); see Caldwell , 897 P.2d at 1326 (noting that [i]mmunity is reserved for those `basic policy decisions [which have] . . . been[expressly] committed to coordinate branches of government,' and as to which judicial interference would thus be `unseemly' ) (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Johnson, 447 P.2d at 360). 23 For example, the Johnson court found the parole officer's decision to parole the youth to be a planning level decision warranting immunity because the state legislature had granted the Youth Authority the power to make parole decisions. See Johnson, 447 P.2d at 361. The decision not to warn the foster parents of the youth's violent propensities, however, was a judgment as to how to implement the policy. As an operational judgment, there was no immunity under S 820.2. See id. at 362. The California Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Lopez, in which bus passengers who had been injured by other passengers sued a public transportation agency because, they contended, the driver failed to protect them. See 710 P.2d at 908, 915. The court found the bus driver's decision as to how to intervene to be an operational one because the bus driver was merely implementing the legislature's policy decision that bus drivers must protect their passengers. See id. at 915-16. Therefore, the transportation agency was not immune. 24 Applying this analytical framework, we conclude that the California Supreme Court would find Donnelley's state- ments to be an operational judgment rather than a planning judgment; therefore, Donnelley is not immune from liability. Donnelley's decision to provide references to other law enforcement agencies about past employees arguably resembles a policy decision entitled to immunity underS 820.2. The decision as to what to include in the reference, however, is merely an implementation of that larger policy. Providing a particular reference is analogous to the parole officer's decision whether to warn foster parents of the danger posed by a parolee and what information to provide. 25 Sanborn v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 556 P.2d 764 (Cal. 1976), is similar. In Sanborn, the Clerk of the City and County of San Francisco released certain attached funds to the plaintiff, and was later reprimanded for releasing the funds without a court order. See id. at 765-66. Subsequently, the Clerk made derogatory statements to a reporter about how the plaintiff had tricked him into releasing the funds, and the plaintiff sued for defamation. See id. 26 at 766. The court found that S 820.2 did not apply because [a ] governmental officer's discussions with the public or press regarding the functioning of his office would seem . . . to fall within the category of those routine, ministerial duties incident to the normal operations of that office. Id. at 769. The Clerk's statements were not the sort that result in policies affecting the way in which a public entity governs. Like the Clerk's statements, Donnelley's statements to Smith about McQuirk's reputation and work habits constituted a low-level decision that did not concern the way in which the sheriff's office conducted its busi- ness. Donnelley exercised no discretion, as defined under the Johnson regime. 27 Further, there is nothing to indicate that there has been an express commitment of authority to law enforcement agencies to decide what to provide in an employment reference. In Caldwell, the California Supreme Court held that members of a school board were immune from liability for their decision not to renew the school superintendent's contract in part because a state statute gave the school board authority over the superintendent's employment. Caldwell, 897 P.2d at 1327. The court found that [t]he matter is therefore `expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government' at its highest level. Id. (quoting Johnson, 447 P.2d at 360). We have found no comparable delegation of authority here, nor have the parties indicated any. 28 We are mindful of the importance of an effective law enforcement system, and the concomitant need to hire capable, responsible individuals. However, [i]n the absence of a legislative declaration, we cannot say that [law enforcement] performs a function so much more important than that of other state agencies as to warrant total immunity.  Johnson, 447 P.2d at 363-64. Therefore, we must conclude that Donnelley was not immune pursuant to S 820.2, and that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this basis. 9
29 Donnelley argues that his statements were privileged under S 47(a) of the California Civil Code. Section 47(a) provides that [a] privileged publication or broadcast is one made . . . (a) In the proper discharge of an official duty. Cal. Civ. Code S 47(a) (West 1999). This privilege is absolute. See Saroyan v. Burkett, 371 P.2d 293, 295-96 (Cal. 1962). We conclude, however, that Donnelley's statements were not privileged under S 47(a) for the same reasons that he is not immune pursuant to S 820.2. 30 The statements of local officials may be privileged. See Copp v. Paxton, 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 831, 842 (Ct. App. 1996) (applying privilege to county emergency services officer); Royer, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05 (applying privilege to school board trustees). As Sheriff, Donnelley exercises significant responsibilities. See Cal. Gov't Code SS 26600-03, 26604 (West 1999). Furthermore, sheriffs are constitutionallymandated officials who are supervised directly by the state attorney general. Cal. Const. Art. 5, S 13 (West 1999); id. Art. 11, S 1(b). As such, we conclude that the California Supreme Court would extend S 47(a)'s privilege to statements made by Donnelley in his capacity as sheriff, so long as those statements warranted the privilege. 31 To be privileged, however, Donnelley's statements had to have been made [i]n the proper discharge of an official duty.Cal. Civ. Code S 47(a). The California Supreme Court defines such statements as those made in the discharge of an official duty that are related to a policy-making function. For example, in Saroyan, the California Supreme Court found statements by the state Superintendent of Banks to a reporter to be privileged because the Superintendent had been responding to an attack in the media by his agency's former attorney regarding a policy position the Superintendent had taken. See 371 P.2d at 294, 296. The court concluded that the Superintendent was acting in the exercise of an executive function when he defended the policy of his department, and his statements were related to the defense of that policy. Id. at 296; see also Sanborn, 556 P.2d at 767 (concluding that the defendant was not protected by S 47(a) because he was not exercising a policy-making function). 10 32 This requirement that the statements at issue be related to the exercise of a policy-making function is closely related to the inquiry into whether an official was acting at a planning, as opposed to an operational, level underS 820.2. That is, actions found to be operational for purposes ofS 820.2 cannot constitute statements made in the exercise of a policymaking function for purposes of S 47(a). In Sanborn, the California Supreme Court employed the result of its analysis under S 820.2 to determine whether statements by a city clerk to the news media were made in the exercise of a policymaking function. See 556 P.2d at 767-69. As the court of appeal later recognized: 33 In Sanborn, the California Supreme Court discussed when an official is engaged in exercising his policy making functions by reference to cases construing immunity for discretionary acts under Government Code section 820.2. To be engaged in exercise of his policy-making function the official must reach a basic policy decision, as distinct from an operational decision, after balancing the risks and advantages. 34 Neary v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 230 Cal. Rptr. 281, 285 (Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted). 35 Because we concluded that Donnelley was not immune from liability under S 820.2 because his actions were operational judgments, we also conclude that he was not acting in a policy-making role. Therefore, his statements were not privileged pursuant to S 47(a), and we cannot affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. 11