Opinion ID: 2561876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Incorporation Interpretation

Text: Notwithstanding canons of statutory construction which counsel us to follow the traditional and plain meaning of a statute's words ( Mercer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 763, 280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404), the majority identifies, and ultimately adopts, a different interpretationthat the Legislature's use of the word person in section 12940, subdivision (h) was intended to incorporate other provisions of the statute that are aimed at actions a person takes. [10] (Maj. opn., ante, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 638, 177 P.3d at p. 236.) While the majority does not specify to; which provisions of section 12940 it is referring, subdivisions (c) and (j) both apply to actions a person takes: subdivision (c) makes it unlawful [f]or any person to discriminate ... in the selection or training of [a] person in any apprenticeship training program ... and subdivision (j)(l) makes it unlawful for an employer, labor organization, employment agency, ... or any other person to harass. (See also id., subd. (i).) Concluding that the word person was added to section 12940, subdivision (h) to incorporate other unlawful employment practices defined in other parts of section 12940 ... (maj. opn., ante, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 628, 177 P.3d at p. 236, italics added), the majority fails to explain the implication of this incorporation. In light of its ultimate conclusion that subdivision (h) does not impose individual liability, the majority could only have two possible implications in mind: either (1) the Legislature's addition of the word person to subdivision (h) provided certain victims of retaliation with a remedy that did not previously exist, because the word person appeared in other subdivisions (e.g., subd. (c)), but did not appear in the retaliation provision, or (2) the word person was added to subdivision (h) for purely cosmetic reasons. Neither is plausible. With regard to the first possible implication, before the Legislature added the word person to the retaliation provision (Stats.1987, ch. 605, § 1, p. 1942), it was unlawful for any employer, labor organization, or employment agency to retaliate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part .... (§ 12940, former subd. (f); italics added; Stats.1985, ch. 1151, § 2, p. 3893.) One could claim that, prior to the addition of the word person to the retaliation provision, an individual who was discriminated against under subdivision (c) (apprenticeship training program), and was subsequently retaliated against for complaining, could not sue for retaliation. Any such claim is demonstrably false. Even if the list of entities at which the retaliation provision were aimed did not include the word person, there could be no doubt that a person retaliated against for opposing a violation of subdivision (c) (a practice[] forbidden under this part [subd. (h)]) could sue the discriminator's employer for retaliation committed by the employer or by any person acting as an agent of the employer (§ 12926, subd. (d); see Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 663, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333). Therefore, it cannot be that the Legislature added the word person to subdivision (h) so that those retaliated against for opposing violations of subdivision (c) (or subdivision (j) [harassment]) would have a remedy. The second possible implication, and the one the majority appears to have endorsed, is that the Legislature added the word person to section 12940, subdivision (h) for no reason at all, or for `purely cosmetic purposes. Under this interpretation, both before and after the word person was added to subdivision (h), a person retaliated against for opposing any practice forbidden under section 12940 could sue. Additionally, according to the majority, both before and after the word was added, subdivision (h) imposed no personal liability on individuals who retaliate. The addition of the word person to subdivision (h), in the majority's estimation, appears to have worked no change at all. Such a conclusion is dubious, particularly because, as previously noted, it renders the word person, and the amendment that added it, surplusage. If these were the only two possible implications of this interpretation, I would conclude that the majority had not identified a reasonable alternative to a plain reading of the statutory language. But there is one other possible implication of this interpretation: the word person might have been added to subdivision (h) to point back to, or incorporate, other provisions aimed at actions a person takes, and in so doing, incorporated the level of liability existing in the underlying provision. This interpretation would impose personal liability on an individual who retaliated against a person who complained of an unlawful employment practice that itself provides for individual liability. Subdivision (c) illustrates this point. In that provision, the Legislature has made it unlawful for a person (and only a person) to discriminate in the selection or training of a person in any apprenticeship training program. (§ 12940, subd. (c).) It would be difficult to interpret subdivision (c) to allow suit against anyone other than the offending personthe subdivision does not identify anyone else the victim can sue other than the person who discriminated. If the offending person then retaliates against the victim for opposing the discrimination, the victim has suffered an independently actionable wrong and may now assert a retaliation claim under subdivision (h). As above, it would be difficult to say that subdivision (h) does not allow suit against that very same person for retaliating against the victim for opposing misconduct under subdivision (c). Accordingly, under the only reasonable implication of the majority's incorporation interpretation, subdivision (h) does impose individual liability, at least against a person who retaliates against someone who opposes a violation of subdivision (c). This reasoning applies with equal force to retaliation against a person who opposed the retaliator's own harassment. As previously set forth, under subdivision (j)(l), it is unlawful for an employer ... or any other person to harass an employee. In response to our decision in Carrisales, the Legislature enacted subdivision (j)(3), making clear that harassers are individually liable. As above with subdivision (c), if a supervisor may be held individually liable for harassment under subdivision (j), it logically follows that the word person in subdivision (h) permits suit against that very same supervisor for retaliating against an employee who opposes the supervisor's own harassment. That is precisely what transpired here. Plaintiff alleged that Weiss harassed him on the basis of his sexual orientation and sexually harassed female employees as well. Plaintiff complained to Weiss, asking him to stop. After Weiss ignored plaintiffs entreaties, plaintiff complained to the human resources director and, ultimately, filed a charge with the DFEH. Plaintiff further alleged that, in response to his efforts to oppose Weiss's harassment of women and of plaintiff, Weiss then retaliated against him. [11] No one disputes that, under subdivision (j)(3), Weiss can be held individually liable for his harassment. [12] Accordingly, while an incorporation interpretation may be a reasonable alternative to a plain reading of the statutory language, the only plausible implication of such an interpretation is that subdivision (h) imposes personal liability on Weiss for retaliating against plaintiff for opposing Weiss's own harassment. [13]