Opinion ID: 171005
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guilt Transference

Text: A variance can also prejudice a defendant's substantial rights if the evidence adduced against co-conspirators involved in separate conspiracies was more likely than not imputed to the defendant by the jury in its determination of the defendant's guilt. Windrix, 405 F.3d at 1154 (citation and alteration omitted); see also Harrison, 942 F.2d at 758 (noting that a variance is substantially prejudicial if the evidence adduced against the co-conspirators involved was more likely than not imputed to the defendant by the jury in its determination of the defendant's guilt (quotation omitted)). In determining whether there was a prejudicial spillover effect from evidence pertaining to conspiracies not involving the defendant, we generally focus on three questions:  First, whether the proliferation of separate crimes or conspiracies presented in the case impaired the jury's ability to segregate each individual [conspirator's] actions and the evidence associated with [her or] his participation; Second, whether confusion among members of the jury concerning the legal limitations on the use of certain evidence resulted from the variance; and, Third, the strength or weakness of the evidence underlying the jury's conviction. Id. (quoting United States v. Morris, 623 F.2d 145, 149 (10th Cir.1980)) (alterations in original). We address each in turn. In Kotteakos, the Supreme Court emphasized that [n]umbers are vitally important in trial, especially in criminal matters. 328 U.S. at 772, 66 S.Ct. 1239. The defendants argue that here, as in Kotteakos, the number of defendants indicted and tried and number of conspiracies proven increased the probability that prejudice would result. In Kotteakos, thirty-two persons were indicted for conspiracy, nineteen defendants were tried together, thirteen names were submitted to the jury, and at least eight separate conspiracies were proven. Id. at 753, 66 S.Ct. 1239; cf. Berger, 295 U.S. at 80, 84, 55 S.Ct. 629 (holding no prejudice when four defendants were tried for single conspiracy and two separate conspiracies proved). Here, while thirty-four persons were indicted (including eight persons for the conspiracy alleged in Count 1 and six persons for the conspiracy alleged in Count 41), only three defendants charged with conspiracy were tried together, and at most, three conspiracies were proven. [6] While this is more than in Berger, the number of defendants tried and conspiracies proven do not reach the magnitude of Kotteakos, and thus the risk of prejudice is not as great. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 774, 66 S.Ct. 1239 (expressing no opinion on what marks the limit, but making clear that it exists somewhere between Berger and Kotteakos ). Moreover, in addition to the fact that this case involves fewer defendants and conspiracies, several other factors militate against concluding that the evidence impaired the jury's ability to distinguish among separate conspiracies. [7] We note at the outset that the defendants have not identified any specific instances of evidentiary spillover. They merely allege that they were exposed to a general risk of guilt transference from the evidence presented against other coconspirators involved in separate conspiracies. The evidence in this case, however, was not so intricate as to render the jury unable to segregate the evidence associated with each defendant's individual actions. See Edwards, 69 F.3d at 433. First, the evidence offered tended to prove the existence of three separate and distinct conspiracies: Wesson-Carnagie, Williams-Byrd, and Williams-Hilaire. While the jury heard evidence of many fraudulent transactions, the evidence implicating the defendants in their respective conspiracies was relatively simple. It consisted of testimony concerning the defendants' involvement, as well as loan documentation for each transaction. All three defendants worked for different lenders on unrelated transactions involving different home and they did not even know each other. Under these circumstances, the jury could easily have separated the evidence associated with Ms. Carnagie, Mr. Hilaire, and Mr. Byrd. Second, all the transactions not involving Ms. Carnagie and Mr. Hilaire were of the exact same character as the transactions in which they allegedly participated. We have held that such a similarity between different transactions cuts against a finding of substantial prejudice. See Morris, 623 F.2d at 150 (The similarity of the challenged transactions not involving [the defendant] directly militates against our finding significant prejudice.); see also United States v. Levine, 569 F.2d 1175, 1177 (1st Cir.1978) ([T]he prejudice should be minimized by the fact that those transactions not directly involving appellant were of the same character as the ones that did involve him.). In addition, Mr. Byrd, Ms. Carnagie, and Mr. Hilaire were alleged to have played the same rolethat of loan officerand were charged with conduct of approximately equal culpability. See United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 237 (6th Cir.2006). Thus, as in Caver, this was not a case where a defendant with a relatively minor role was forced to endure an extended trial where the bulk of the evidence did not pertain to him. Id. Finally, the jury actually demonstrated that it could compartmentalize the evidence associated with each defendant and not transfer the guilt of some alleged coconspirators to all because it acquitted Mr. Hilaire of the underlying counts and acquitted Mr. Byrd of the conspiracy. See Windrix, 405 F.3d at 1155 (The jury's capacity to distinguish among the codefendants is demonstrated by its acquittal of [a] codefendant . . . on all counts at the very trial at which Defendants were convicted.). Next, we consider whether confusion among members of the jury concerning the legal limitations on the use of certain evidence resulted from the variance. Mr. Hilaire contends that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent and illogical because he was acquitted of the wire fraud counts but found guilty of the conspiracy counts. But the government did not have to prove that he committed an overt act, so long as it proved he conspired with Mr. Williams and other real estate agents and one of them committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Pursley, 474 F.3d 757, 768 (10th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir.1985) (The conspiracy is complete when one or more of the conspirators knowingly commit an act in furtherance of the object of the agreement. (quotation omitted)). Further, even though the government only had to prove that one of the members committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, it presented evidence of overt acts committed by Mr. Hilaire himself; for example, Mr. Williams testified that he witnessed Mr. Hilaire creating false pay stubs. The limiting instruction given by the district court also minimized any possible prejudice. See Edwards, 69 F.3d at 433. The court specifically instructed the jury: You must independently consider whether the Government has proven the guilt of each defendant on each offense charged. This means that you must consider the evidence as to each offense charged against a defendant, without considering the evidence pertaining to the other offenses charged against that defendant. Similarly, you must consider the evidence against each defendant, separately. Your verdict as to one defendant should not influence your verdict as to any other. As we generally assume that jurors follow the judge's instructions, see United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1251 (10th Cir.2000), we conclude that there was no prejudice from jury confusion. Finally, the jury heard ample evidence to convict both Ms. Carnagie and Mr. Hilaire of the smaller, separate conspiracies. Mr. Wesson and Mr. Williams testified extensively concerning Ms. Carnagie's and Mr. Hilaire's involvement and knowledge of the scheme, and their testimony was corroborated by home buyers and real estate agents. [8] In sum, the defendants have failed to demonstrate that the indictment did not give them adequate notice of the crimes charged or that the jury imputed to them evidence of the conspiracies that did not involve them. We conclude that if the variance influenced the jury, it had but very slight effect. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764, 66 S.Ct. 1239. Accordingly, even though a variance occurred, the defendants did not suffer substantial prejudice as a result.