Opinion ID: 198585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instructions on Reasonable Doubt

Text: 18 Moore contends that neither the contemporaneous objection rule nor the SJC justice's denial of leave to appeal prevents federal review of his challenge to the jury instructions on reasonable doubt. We disagree because this court's recent decision in Simpson dictates that these rules impose a procedural bar that precludes federal review of this claim. 19 In Simpson, this court held that waiver of a challenge to jury instructions on reasonable doubt and an SJC gatekeeper's denial of leave to appeal impose an adequate and independent procedural bar which precludes federal review. See id. at 205-09. This court explicitly rejected the arguments Moore now makes regarding the Massachusetts courts' supposedly inconsistent application of this procedural bar in these types of challenges. See id. at 206-09. Because Simpson is dispositive of this issue, we now hold that the district court erred in concluding that Moore's challenge to the jury instructions on reasonable doubt was not barred by adequate and independent procedural grounds. 20 Notwithstanding this procedural default, Moore contends that he has shown cause for his default because the law regarding challenges to reasonable doubt jury instructions had not developed until the Supreme Court's seminal opinions in the 1990s. 5 See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam). Moore is correct in recognizing that novel legal theories may provide grounds for finding cause for a procedural default, see Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984), but the Simpson court recognized that claims like the ones raised in Moore's petition were available to counsel before 1975, and thus before Moore's trial and direct appeal. See Simpson, 175 F.3d at 210-15. Therefore, we conclude that Moore cannot show cause for his procedural default and hold that Moore's claim regarding the jury instructions on reasonable doubt may not be reviewed in this petition for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, we affirm the district court dismissal of this claim, albeit on different grounds.