Opinion ID: 3040864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Quinn Testimony

Text: We will reverse the district court's refusal to exclude the testimony of William Quinn based on the government's alleged late disclosure only if the district court abused its discretion in so ruling. See United States v. Pherigo, 327 F.3d 690, 694 (8th Cir.) (standard of review for alleged discovery deadline violation), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 and 540 U.S. 960 (2003). In our review we consider (1) whether the Government acted in bad faith and the reason(s) for delay . . .; (2) whether there is any prejudice to the defendant; and (3) whether any lesser sanction is appropriate to secure future Government compliance. Id. The government notified Sandoval's counsel on the afternoon of April 29, 2005, the Friday before the Monday, May 2 trial start date, that it intended to call three additional witnesses not previously disclosed, including Mr. Quinn, and it offered to make available government interview reports, criminal records, and plea agreements pertaining to the proposed witnesses. Sandoval's attorney responded that he was not interested in receiving the materials only one business day prior to trial. On May 2, Sandoval moved to exclude the three witnesses based on the government's late disclosure. The district court held a hearing on the motion prior to the start of the trial and granted the motion as to two of the proposed witnesses. The district court concluded that the government was not dilatory in its discovery efforts related to Quinn because he had previously been a target of the same drug investigation, was represented by counsel, and had just entered into a cooperation agreement with the government the week before trial. The court also concluded that Sandoval would not be prejudiced by Quinn's testimony as the government did not intend to call him until the following day, giving Sandoval's counsel sufficient time to review his materials. -6- Sandoval argues that the government violated the district court's February 3, 2005, order requiring disclosure of witnesses two weeks prior to trial. Initially, we note that the February 3 order addressed four specific witnesses who provided information to the government that led to the superceding indictment. Although Sandoval's Motion to Disclose Identity of Witnesses sought an Order requiring the government to immediately disclose the identity and all information regarding all witnesses it intends to call at trial, (Dist. Ct. R. Docket Entry # 56), the order entered by the district court was clearly limited to the disclosure of the four specific witnesses (none of whom was Mr. Quinn) who provided information that led to the superceding indictment. The government's failure to disclose Quinn as a witness at an earlier date did not violate the district court's February 3, 2005, order. Even if the government's late disclosure violated the district court's general discovery and pretrial orders, we still conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Quinn to testify. The government had been investigating Quinn's involvement in the drug conspiracy since December 2004. Although Quinn had been interviewed by the investigators, he did not enter into a cooperation agreement with the government and agree to testify against Sandoval until April 26, 2005, three days before the government identified him as a witness. Given the late date of Quinn's agreement to cooperate, the prosecution did not act in bad faith, and its reason for the late disclosure was justified. See United States v. Askew, 958 F.2d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no prosecutorial misconduct where government disclosed witness four days before trial, the day the witness pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate). Nor was Sandoval prejudiced by the late disclosure. The government offered to provide materials about Quinn to Sandoval's attorney three calendar days prior to the start of the trial. Sandoval's attorney rejected the materials at that time, choosing instead to move to exclude Quinn's testimony. Sandoval did not ask for a continuance to allow him adequate time to review the materials, even after the district court denied -7- his motion to exclude Quinn's testimony. The district court found the one-day time frame sufficient for Sandoval's attorney to review Quinn's material and prepare a defense to his testimony. Sandoval's attorney also cross-examined Quinn at trial. Sandoval does not explain how he was prejudiced other than the lateness of the disclosure itself. In these circumstances, Sandoval has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the government's late disclosure of Quinn as a witness. See United States v. Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 857-58 (8th Cir.) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court's decision to allow government witness to testify who was disclosed two days prior to her testimony where the government provided related information to the defense and the defense was allowed to interview and cross-examine the witness), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 884 & 899 (2003); United States v. DeCoteau, 186 F.3d 1008, 1010-11 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing the district court's order striking the government's witnesses for a discovery deadline violation and noting that the defendant's failure to request a continuance supported a finding that the defendant was not prejudiced). As a general rule, a defendant in a noncapital case has no right to require disclosure of government witnesses. DeCoteau, 186 F.3d 1009 at n.2; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2) (Nor does this rule authorize the discovery or inspection of statements made by prospective government witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500 [Jencks Act].). That being said, due process and notions of fair play require the government to disclose all evidence that is favorable to an accused and material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Sandoval made a Brady claim in his motion for a mistrial following Quinn's testimony. In reviewing a Brady claim, we have held that [t]he government's disclosure pattern in a given case does not offend Brady . . . so long as the evidence in question is disclosed prior to the end of trial. United States v. Holmes, 421 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Almendares, 397 F.3d 653, 664 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1448 (2006); United States v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1368 (8th Cir. 1996)). The government disclosed Quinn as a witness and -8- offered its material related to Quinn's plea agreement three days before trial began, Quinn was not called until the second day of trial, and Sandoval's attorney was allowed to cross-examine him at trial. There was no Brady violation.