Opinion ID: 4561577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Patterson’s Testimony

Text: Plaintiffs assert that the district court committed harmful error when it limited Patterson’s testimony under either the work-product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege. Because any error was harmless, we disagree. 1
We review the district court’s application of both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine for clear error. 2 We review questions of controlling law de novo. Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm P.L.L.C. v. United States, 957 F.3d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 2020); Ecuadorian Plaintiffs, 619 F.3d at 377. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed under a “deferential abuse of discretion standard,” Williams v. Manitowoc Cranes, L.L.C., 898 F.3d 607, 615 (5th Cir. 2018), and are subject to the harmless-error doctrine, Heinsohn v. Carabin & Shaw, P.C., 832 F.3d 224, 233 (5th Cir. 2016). Therefore, even if the district court has abused its discretion, “the ruling will be reversed only if it affected the substantial rights of the complaining party.” Nunez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 840, 844 (5th Cir. 2010). 1 Defendants assert that plaintiffs failed to preserve this issue by making a sufficient offer of proof under Rule 103(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. To the contrary, plaintiffs adequately informed the court of the “substance of the evidence,” comporting with the requirements of Rule 103. United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 455 (5th Cir. 2007); Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). Regardless, because we find no harmful error, we need not address this issue. 2 United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Because the application of the attorney-client privilege is a fact question to be determined in light of the purpose of the privilege and guided by judicial precedents, we review the district court’s finding for clear error only.”); Ecuadorian Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 619 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying the same standard of review to the work-product doctrine). 5 Case: 19-20651 Document: 00515545895 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/31/2020 No. 19-20651
Claims of privilege in federal courts are governed by the “common law—as interpreted by United States courts in light of reason and experience.” Fed. R. Evid. 501. “The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). It protects both “the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it” and “the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice.” Id. at 390. “[T]he attorney-client privilege attaches to corporations as well as to individuals.” CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985). Communication between employees and the corporation’s attorney is privileged if it is made “at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel” concerning “matters within the scope of the employees’ corporate duties.” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394. Even still, the attorney-client privilege “only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts.” Id. at 395. Thus, a fact is not privileged “merely because [a client] incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.” Id. at 396.
Established in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), “the workproduct doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege.” United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975). The workproduct doctrine “insulates a lawyer’s research, analysis of legal theories, mental impressions, notes, and memoranda of witnesses’ statements from an opposing counsel’s inquiries.” Dunn v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 927 F.2d 869, 875 (5th Cir. 1991). It protects materials prepared in anticipation of litigation, whether those materials were prepared by the attorney or by agents 6 Case: 19-20651 Document: 00515545895 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/31/2020 No. 19-20651 of the attorney. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 171 (5th Cir. 1979). The doctrine articulated in Hickman was later partially codified as Rule 26(b)(3) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative.” 3 Despite the language of Rule 26, the work-product doctrine protects both “tangible and intangible” work product. 4 Like the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine “protects only the [attorney’s work product] and not the underlying facts.” In re Int’l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1240 (5th Cir. 1982).
As the parties’ divergent briefing illustrates, the district court was less than clear as to whether it based its evidentiary ruling on the work-product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege. Its initial order stated that “any testimony concerning Patterson’s conversation with Defendants’ lawyers will not be permitted at trial.” That seems to invoke attorney-client privilege. At 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). The rule has an exception for “otherwise discoverable” materials in cases of “substantial need,” which neither party asserts is relevant here. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii). 4 Nobles, 422 U.S. at 237; see also 8 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2024, at 494– 95 (3d ed. 2010) (“Rule 26(b)(3) itself provides protection only for documents and tangible things . . . . Nonetheless, Hickman v. Taylor continues to furnish protection for work product within its definition that is not embodied in tangible form . . . .”); United States v. Deloitte, LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Thus Hickman provides work-product protection for intangible work product independent of Rule 26(b)(3).”); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. One Tract of Real Prop., 95 F.3d 422, 427 (6th Cir. 1996). 7 Case: 19-20651 Document: 00515545895 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/31/2020 No. 19-20651 trial, however, the court expanded that ruling. It determined that Patterson could not “testify as to conversations she had with lawyers or things she did at the direction of the lawyers” (emphasis added). That seems to invoke both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. Regardless, we need not discern the particular doctrine on which the court rested its conclusion (nor whether that conclusion was correct). That is so because any error was harmless. An error is “harmless” if it does not “affect[] the substantial rights of the complaining party.” Nunez, 604 F.3d at 844. Plaintiffs sought to establish that the performance evaluations were “shams.” Patterson was allowed ample testimony on that theory, and the jury rejected it. It is unlikely that this additional fact would have swayed the jury. Specifically, Patterson was allowed to state (1) that she had never seen the documents; (2) that until trial—when she was shown the alleged “sham” evaluations—she had never seen any performance evaluations on which the names were hand-written; (3) that performance evaluations were supposed to include a location, which was absent from those offered into evidence; and (4) that during her employment she had never seen a performance evaluation that lacked a designated location. The jury, therefore, had ample opportunity to adopt plaintiffs’ theory that the performance evaluations were “shams.” Moreover, the evaluations were but one piece of evidence bearing on the overall legitimacy of the employment decisions. The jury’s decision to reject plaintiffs’ theory is supported by Memorial Hermann’s additional evidence that the employment decisions were legitimate. For example, the jury heard witness testimony regarding the qualifications and exemplary performance of the employees who were selected for the open positions. In contrast, it heard testimony describing plaintiffs’ disciplinary actions and their 8 Case: 19-20651 Document: 00515545895 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/31/2020 No. 19-20651 general lackluster workplace performance. In short, the jury had sufficient information to determine that the employment decisions were legitimate. Limiting Patterson’s testimony did not, therefore, affect plaintiffs’ substantial rights. Nunez, 604 F.3d at 844. Because any mistake was harmless, the district court did not commit reversible error when it limited Patterson’s testimony under either the work-product doctrine or the attorneyclient privilege.