Opinion ID: 1720938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Sentencing on the Conspiracy Conviction

Text: The Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant to a consecutive sentence of twenty-five (25) years for the conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The Defendant complains that the trial court inappropriately used the aggravating circumstance that the crime was especially cruel to sentence her to the maximum sentence. She further complains that the trial court erred in determining that she was a dangerous offender and ordering her to serve the sentence consecutively to the death sentence. When an accused challenges the length, range, or the manner of service of a sentence, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo review of the sentence with a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d). This presumption is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances. State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn.1991). In conducting a de novo review of a sentence, this court must consider: (a) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (b) the presentence report; (c) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (d) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) any statutory mitigating or enhancement factors; (f) any statement that the Defendant made on his own behalf; and (g) the potential or lack of potential for rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, 1-103, and -210; see State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tenn.Crim.App.1987). If our review reflects that the trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after having given due consideration and proper weight to the factors and principles set out under the sentencing law, and that the trial court's findings are adequately supported by the record, then we may not modify the sentence even if we would have preferred a different result. State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991). At the sentencing hearing, the State called as its only witness Officer Debbie Wade, a Corrections Officer with the Knox County Sheriff's Department. She testified that on the day the Defendant was sentenced to die, she gave Officer Wade a letter and requested that it be passed to her co-Defendant, Tadaryl Shipp. Officer Wade gave the letter to her lieutenant and was told not to pass it to Mr. Shipp. The letter was introduced into evidence and read as follows: Tadaryl, hey, love, I just wanted you to know how much I love you. I have ten months to live. Imagine that. I would spend every moment with you if I could, baby. I want to tell you to tell them you lied in your statement and go along with mine. Do you have a copy of mine? If not, I'll give you one. Okay? I love you big bunches, baby, and no matter what they do to me they can't change what's in my heart. Please write me. I miss you so much. You see what I get for trying to be nice to that hoe. I went ahead and bashed her brains out so she would die quickly instead of letting her bleed to death and suffer more and they fuckin FRY me. Ain't that some shit. Please write and tell me what you're feeling. Baker said he would give you some paper and shit while you are out there. Also tell your lawyer if he wants me to I'll testify, testify for you, I will. Love you for the rest of my life. Little devil. The trial court classified the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender on the conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court also considered several enhancement and mitigating factors in setting the sentence above the minimum presumptive sentence of fifteen (15) years. First, the trial court applied enhancement factor number (2), that [t]he Defendant was a leader in the commission of an offense involving two (2) or more criminal actors. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(2). The trial judge then stated that factor number (5), that [t]he Defendant treated or allowed a victim to be treated with exceptional cruelty during the commission of the offense, would not be relied upon heavily because it had already been used in sentencing the Defendant to death on the other count. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(5). Factor number (7), that [t]he offense involved a victim and was committed to gratify the Defendant's desire for pleasure and excitement, factor number (9), that [t]he Defendant possessed or employed a firearm, explosive device or other deadly weapon during the commission of the offense, and factor number (10), that [t]he Defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high, were also found to be applicable. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-35-114(7),(9), and (10). The trial court found that no mitigating factors were applicable. We find error with only one of the trial court's applications of enhancement factors. The trial judge held that the Defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(10). We believe that the court improperly applied this enhancement factor. Enhancement factor (10) refers to the defendant having no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life is high. This Court has previously recognized that factors which are inherent in a particular offense, even if not designated as an element, should not be given substantive weight in increasing a sentence. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 735 S.W.2d 825, 830 (Tenn.Crim.App.1987). We conclude that the risk to human life is inherent in the grading of the offense of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. According to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-12-107, conspiracy is an offense one (1) classification lower than the most serious offense that is the object of the conspiracy. First-degree murder is classified as a capital offense, therefore conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is a Class A felony, a class reserved for only the most serious offenses. Moreover, the indictment contains allegations in support of the element of conspiracy that an overt act be taken, that the Defendant and two others left the Job Corps center, took the victim to an isolated location and attacked her with a box cutter. Not only is the risk to human life inherent in the offense, in the case sub judice, high risk acts were included in the indictment as charged in support of an element of the crime. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-12-103(a), (d). Enhancement factors may be applied if not themselves essential elements of the offense as charged in the indictment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114. For both of these reasons, we conclude that enhancement factor should not have been applied. The evidence produced at trial, including the Defendant's own statement, and the letter introduced at the sentencing hearing would certainly support the factor that she was a leader in the commission of the offense. The statement of the Defendant, the testimony concerning her recounting of the incident to others, the fact that she carried a piece of the victim's skull as a souvenir, and her return to the scene were evidence of her desire for excitement and pleasure. Again, by her own statement, the Defendant admitted carrying a deadly weapon. Although we disagree with the trial court's finding that the Defendant's age and lack of a significant history of prior criminal activities were not applicable mitigating factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant to the maximum sentence of twenty-five (25) years. Clearly, when the applicable enhancing factors are weighed against the mitigating factors, the record supports the trial court's sentence. The trial court found that consecutive sentences were warranted because the Defendant is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life and had no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life was high. See State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 937-39 (Tenn.1995). Again, given the circumstances surrounding this offense, especially the heinous nature of the crime and the fact that the Defendant showed no remorse, we conclude that the Defendant met the criteria for consecutive sentencing and the trial court did not abuse her discretion in ordering such. The sentencing issues raised by the Defendant are without merit.