Opinion ID: 204100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner's Alleged Derivative Citizenship

Text: Petitioner may have waived his claim to derivative U.S. citizenship, as the IJ ruled in his May 1, 2007 decision. However, consistent with our discretionary de novo review, we assert our discretion to relax the raise-or-waive rule and thus decide on the merits, as the BIA did in its October 27, 2008 decision. The CCA provides, in pertinent part: (a) A child born outside of the United States automatically becomes a citizen of the United States when all of the following conditions have been fulfilled: (1) At least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization. (2) The child is under the age of eighteen years. (3) The child is residing in the United States in the legal and physical custody of the citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence. (b) Subsection (a) shall apply to a child adopted by a United States citizen parent if the child satisfies the requirements applicable to adopted children under section 101(b)(1) [of the INA]. 8 U.S.C. § 1431. Furthermore, [t]o be eligible for citizenship under [the CCA], a person must establish that the [statutory] conditions have been met after February 26, 2001 . . . . 8 C.F.R. § 320.2(a)(2001). Section 101(b)(1) of the INA, concerning adoption, is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). This statute provides, in pertinent part: (1) The term child means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is  . . . a child adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the child has been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years . . . Provided, That no natural parent of any such adopted child shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this Act . . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i). Because it is undisputed that Petitioner was born abroad (in Jamaica), he is presumed to be an alien and bears the burden of establishing [his] claim to United States citizenship by a preponderance of credible evidence. Matter of Baires-Larios, 24 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468 (B.I.A. 2008) (citing Matter of Tijerina-Villarreal, 13 I. & N. Dec. 327, 330 (B.I.A. 1969)). Because citizenship confers privileges and benefits, and, once granted, cannot lightly be taken away, any doubts [about Petitioner's citizenship] should be resolved in favor of the United States and against him. Berenyi v. INS, 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967) (citing United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 626 (1931)). The Petitioner fulfills one  the second  of the requirements for derivative U.S. citizenship under the CCA: that requirement is undisputed based on the following four concessions by the government. First, the government acknowledges in its brief that Wynter, Petitioner's biological mother, was naturalized as a U.S. citizen on November 2, 2001. Resp't's Br. at 22. Second, the government also acknowledges that Petitioner was under eighteen years old on February 26, 2001, when the CCA became effective. Id. This fact establishes that Petitioner does satisfy the second prong of the CCA. Third, the government states that Petitioner was living in Wynter's legal and physical custody on February 26, 2001. Id. Fourth, as discussed in the next two sections, the government correctly states that Petitioner has not fulfilled the condition in prong three of the CCA, that he was residing in the United States after the CCA became effective pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence. See id. at 23; INA § 320(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(3).
As used in the INA, [t]he term `lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p) (same, and providing further that [s]uch status terminates upon entry of a final administrative order of exclusion, deportation, or removal). In its October 27, 2008 order, the BIA, in issuing a final administrative order for Petitioner's removal, held that the IJ correctly found that Petitioner was not lawfully admitted to the United States as a permanent resident because his LPR status was acquired through the fraud or misrepresentation of third parties, the Walkers. The BIA noted that its determination was guided by its decision in Matter of Koloamatangi, in which the BIA determined that an alien who had acquired LPR status through fraud was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had never been lawfully admitted. 23 I. & N. Dec. 548 (B.I.A. 2003). But in Koloamatangi, the BIA based its ruling on reasoning beyond mere fraud. In fact, the BIA considered sound observations from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that the term `lawfully admitted for permanent residence' did not apply to aliens who had obtained their permanent resident status by fraud, or had otherwise not been entitled to it. Id. at 550 (emphasis added and citations omitted). In Koloamatangi, the BIA ultimately found that the correct interpretation of the term `lawfully admitted for permanent residence' is that an alien is deemed, ab initio, never to have obtained lawful permanent resident status once his original ineligibility therefor is determined in proceedings. Id. at 551. In that 2008 order, the BIA further noted that the same reasoning must apply in Petitioner's case. The BIA asserted that it does not matter that the [Petitioner] may have played no part in the fraud or misrepresentation which enabled him to acquire LPR status because no finding of fraud on his part is required to determine that the [Petitioner's] admission was not lawful. In re Walker, No. A043-219-583 (B.I.A. Oct. 27, 2008). As noted in Part II(A), we are required to afford some degree of deference to the BIA's interpretation in this matter. Our own precedent supports this outcome. In Mejía-Orellana, we found that the BIA's interpretation of lawfully admitted for permanent residence was reasonable when it concluded that an alien who has acquired his `[LPR] status' by fraud or misrepresentation has not been lawfully admitted and so is ineligible for a cancellation of removal. 502 F.3d at 14, 16. We reasoned that any other reading would encourage fraud and misrepresentation in the process of application for lawful permanent resident status. Id. at 16. We further noted, in citing case law from the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, that [o]ther courts have upheld this interpretation of the same phrase in different sections of the [INA]: The natural reading of `lawful' connotes more than just procedural regularity; it suggests that the substance of an action complied with the governing law. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Petitioner argues in his brief that his lack of intent is crucial to this case. He contends that [i]ntent is what the statute requires. Pet'r's Br. at 8. To support his argument, he cites 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), which states that any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure . . . a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States . . . is inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (emphasis added). [2] Petitioner also cites United States v. Dixon, which states that an act is done willfully if done intentionally and deliberately and if it is not the result of innocent mistake, negligence or inadvertence. 536 F.2d 1388, 1397 (2d Cir. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pet'r's Br. at 8. However, as respondent correctly points out: Walker's argument that intent to deceive or defraud is required under INA § 212(a)(6) (C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) is of no moment because Walker was not charged under this provision . . . . Rather, in addition to being charged as removable as an aggravated felon, he was charged with being inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), because he did not possess a valid unexpired immigrant visa at the time of his entry to the United States, a provision which, by its very language, does not require intent to deceive. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Resp't's Br. at 26-27 n.13. Petitioner also seeks to distinguish his case from Mejía-Orellana on the basis that Petitioner himself did not commit any wrongdoing and was a minor when he entered the United States. However, although Mejía-Orellana involved a party who committed fraud or misrepresentation himself (by failing to disclose his arrest on his application for adjustment of status), 502 F.3d at 14, the underlying policy concern is similar in this case. If Petitioner was considered to have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, then the fraud or misrepresentation of third parties applying on his behalf would be encouraged. We thus conclude, based on our requisite deference to the BIA's interpretation and the rationale supporting our own precedent, that it is not determinative that Petitioner himself intended to commit fraud in obtaining admission to the United States for permanent residence. We are sympathetic to the fact, as Petitioner notes in his brief, that Petitioner was a child when he first entered the United States and had no control over the actions of his grandparents; in addition, he did not intend to break any immigration laws nor obtain admission for permanent residence through fraudulent means. Pet'r's Br. at 8. However, statutory interpretation is, in the first instance, the prerogative of the agency charged with interpreting the statute  in this immigration case, the BIA  and the agency's interpretation in this case is reasonable. Accordingly, there is no error of law and we are compelled to affirm.
Petitioner's claim of derivative citizenship presents a Catch-22 for him. Petitioner cannot pick and choose his status to satisfy the CCA's cumulative requirements. As Respondent rightfully points out, Petitioner claims to be his grandparents' child for one purpose [(being lawfully admitted into the United States as an LPR)], and his mother's child for others [(obtaining derivative U.S. citizenship)] . . . . Resp't's Br. at 32, n.17. Even then, however, Petitioner is inconsistent about whether he was ever actually adopted by his grandparents. On the one hand, Petitioner concedes that his adoption by the Walkers was not a legal process. Pet'r's Br. at 3. Not only does Petitioner make this concession in his brief, but he did so multiple times throughout the administrative proceedings: in testimony before the IJ; in his notice appealing the IJ's May 13, 2008 decision; in his brief in support of his application for derivative citizenship; and in his Form N-600 Application for Certificate of Citizenship. On the other hand, Petitioner claims in his brief that, because Vashtie adopted him or he was otherwise her child, he held a viable LPR status in 1992. Pet'r's Br. at 4-6. Even if Petitioner was indeed lawfully adopted by the Walkers in 1985, then it is unclear how he would qualify for the first of the three requirements of the CCA, that [a]t least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization. INA § 320(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(1). It is undisputed that the Walkers are not U.S. citizens. It has not been established that Petitioner's biological father, Anderson, is a U.S. citizen or, even if he is, that he qualifies as Petitioner's parent for the purposes of section 320(a)(1) of the INA. It has also not been established that Wynter, though incontrovertibly a U.S. citizen, qualifies as Petitioner's parent for the purposes of section 320(a)(1) of the INA. If Petitioner was not lawfully adopted by the Walkers, then, given the analysis above, Petitioner does not qualify for the third of the three requirements of the CCA, that [t]he child is residing in the United States in the legal and physical custody of the citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence. INA § 320(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(1). Petitioner has thus failed to establish his claim to derivative U.S. citizenship by a preponderance of credible evidence and is not entitled to such citizenship.