Opinion ID: 1222695
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: An Uninvited Judicial Excursion

Text: Equally troubling is the majority's insistence on rewriting a perfectly legitimate, clear, and unambiguous statute. Basic tenets of judicial restraint instruct us to refrain from interpreting that which is unambiguous. As we stated in syllabus point one of Sowa v. Huffman, 191 W.Va. 105, 443 S.E.2d 262 (1994), `[a] statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.' Syl. pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951). We also emphasized in Sowa that [i]t is not the province of the courts to make or supervise legislation, and a statute may not, under the guise of interpretation, be modified, revised, amended, distorted, remodeled, or rewritten, or given a construction of which its words are not susceptible, or which is repugnant to its terms which may not be disregarded. 191 W.Va. at 111, 443 S.E.2d at 268 (citing State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W.Va. 137, 145, 107 S.E.2d 353, 358 (1959)). Unambiguous statutes simply do not call for our interpretation. For the majority to have intervened to essentially redraft the legislative pronouncement is improper. We have employed the procedures set forth in the statute for circuit court review quite effectively, as illustrated by our decision in Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 189 W.Va. 519, 432 S.E.2d 789 (1993). Furthermore, we indicated in Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990), and again in Higginbotham, that a circuit court which changes a family law master's recommendation must make known its factual findings and conclusions of law. See Whiting, 183 W.Va. at 456, 396 S.E.2d at 418, and Higginbotham, 189 W.Va. at 522, 432 S.E.2d at 792. With no indication of difficulty in application or interpretation, the majority steps in, uninvited, [10] and reformulates the standard of review. Judicial interpretation can be justified under Sowa where the statute is not clear, is ambiguous, or fails to express legislative intent. 191 W.Va. at 106, 443 S.E.2d at 263, Syl. Pt. 1. The statute in question does not fall into any of those categories. Without justifying its intrusion into the legislative realm, the majority voraciously cites authority for the proposition that by borrowing terms of art from the legal tradition, the legislature is presumed to know the cluster of ideas attached to each word. What the majority appears painfully unaware of, however, is the fact that prior to seizing upon a method of interpretation, a court must reckon with the issue of whether the interpretation is justified. Thus, without justification for intrusion as a prerequisite, the manner of interpretation is irrelevant. Indeed, when judicial construction is necessary, such concepts as presumption of legislative knowledge of meaning or connotation of certain words would be appropriate. But where judicial construction or interpretation is uncalled for, as in the present case, launching into such discussion is meaningless and superfluous. The majority's decision in this matter is an example of highly imprudent judicial reconstruction of legislative action. Furthermore, if the legislature had wanted to impose a clearly erroneous standard in the FLM statute, it certainly could have done so. It has demonstrated its ability to employ those terms intelligently in the statutes on many other occasions, [11] and if such had been its intention in the family law master statute, it most certainly did not need the assistance of this Court to incorporate that concept of review.