Opinion ID: 2589798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Admission of Victim and Surrounding Crime Scene Photographs

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude exhibits 2B and 2C, which depict the Gilhousen living room, because they include framed photographs of the victims while alive. Our independent review of the exhibits indicates this is not the case; rather, the frames in the exhibits are empty. Defendant also asserts these exhibits were irrelevant. We disagree. They were relevant to support the prosecution's theory that defendant and Flores were aware of the baseball bat's location in that room, and that the room was arranged in a manner that would have allowed Randi Renken to overhear the conversation between defendant, Flores, and April regarding the pound of marijuana and the amount of drug proceeds April had recently earned. Defendant contends that the trial court also erred in admitting exhibits 1, 8, 13, 16, 18, and 19, which are photographs of the victims' bodies and the surrounding crime scene. He objected below to exhibits 1, 8, 13, and 16 on the ground they were cumulative, and to exhibits 18 and 19 on the grounds they were cumulative and irrelevant. These exhibits contained more than one photograph of each victim or crime scene. Defendant now contends these exhibits were not only cumulative and irrelevant, but also unduly prejudicial. To the extent the last claim is waived, he asserts that counsel was ineffective in failing to object on this basis. We conclude on the merits there was no error. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the photographs were relevant to the prosecution's case. Here, the first degree murder charges were tried under the theory that the killings were premeditated or perpetrated during a robbery and burglary. The photographs were pertinent because they showed the nature and placement of the fatal wounds, and supported the prosecution's theory regarding how the murders occurred. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 243, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; see People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 132-133, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) In addition, the photographs clarified the coroner's and other witnesses' testimony regarding the victims' wounds and the locations in which two of the victims' bodies were found. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 132, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecution was not obligated to accept antiseptic stipulations in lieu of photographic evidence. ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 243, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; see People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 133, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Moreover, the photographs were not cumulative. We often have rejected the contention that photographs of a murder victim must be excluded as cumulative simply because testimony also has been introduced to prove the facts that the photographs are intended to establish. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 134-135, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) The same principle applies to crime scene photographs. While defendant contends the photographs were cumulative of each other, depicting essentially the same view of the victims, our review of the record is otherwise. Indeed, the trial court carefully evaluated defendant's objections, the prosecution's response thereto, and the coroner's voir dire testimony, and excluded several photographs on this basis. Defendant contends the trial court erred in not expressly considering whether the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial impact. Of course, as noted above, defendant did not challenge the photographs on this basis. Moreover, the trial court `need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative valueor even expressly state that [it] has done so....' ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 724, fn. 6, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) `The record as a whole shows the court was well aware of, and consistently performed, its duty ... to balance the probative value of evidence against any prejudicial effect.' ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1187-1188, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) In any event, after independently reviewing the photographs, we conclude they were not unduly gruesome or inherently inflammatory, and are unpersuaded for the reasons above that we should reach a different result based on the graphic nature of the photographs, the number of photographs, or the fact that one of the victims was a child. ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 243, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) Finally, defendant contends admission of the photographs was also unduly prejudicial at the penalty phase. Here, the challenged evidence, which illustrated the precise nature of the crime, was admissible under section 190.3, factor (a) (factor (a)). Factor (a) makes admissible evidence of the `circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true....' ( People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1205-1206, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.) In People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1171, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068, we first noted that defendant had waived any objection to the challenged photographs and physical evidence by failing to object below. ( Id. at p. 1205, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.) Had the claim been preserved, we would have then concluded it lacked merit because the trial court has no discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude such evidence at the penalty phase on the basis that it is unduly inflammatory or lacking in probative value. ( People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1206, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.) In so doing, we relied on People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 641, 250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189. ( People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1205, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.) We further observed that the trial court retains its inherent discretion to exclude evidence admissible under factor (a) based on the form of the evidence, i.e., that a particular piece of evidence is inaccurate or cumulative. ( Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1206, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.) Similarly here, defendant did not object below that the prejudicial impact of the challenged photographs outweighed their probative value at the penalty phase. Nevertheless, defendant makes such a challenge in this court. Reading Davenport as a whole, including its reliance on Karis, it stands for the proposition that the trial court lacks discretion to exclude all factor (a) evidence on the ground it is inflammatory or lacking in probative value. (See People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 641-642, fn. 21, 250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189, italics added [We hold here only that the court does not have discretion to prevent introduction at the penalty phase of all evidence of a capital defendant's commission or attempted commission of a prior violent felony.].) Neither factor (a) nor section 190.3, factor (b) (factor (b)), however, deprives the trial court of its traditional discretion to exclude particular items of evidence by which the prosecution seeks to demonstrate either the circumstances of the crime (factor (a)), or violent criminal activity (factor (b)), in a manner that is misleading, cumulative, or unduly inflammatory. ( People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 641-642, fn. 21, 250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189.) We emphasize, however, that at the penalty phase, the trial court's discretion to exclude circumstances-of-the-crime evidence as unduly prejudicial is more circumscribed than at the guilt phase. During the guilt phase, there is a legitimate concern that crime scene photographs such as are at issue here can produce a visceral response that unfairly tempts jurors to find the defendant guilty of the charged crimes. Such concerns are greatly diminished at the penalty phase because the defendant has been found guilty of the charged crimes, and the jury's discretion is focused on the circumstances of those crimes solely to determine the defendant's sentence. Indeed, the sentencer is expected to subjectively weigh the evidence, and the prosecution is entitled to place the capital offense and the offender in a morally bad light. Moreover, the question of whether evidence is unduly inflammatory is closer under factor (b) than factor (a) to the extent the penalty jury must decide whether the factor (b) crime actually occurred beyond a reasonable doubt as well as assess its moral weight for purposes of sentencing. (See People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-55, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279.) The factor (b) evidence, even if it fairly depicts the moral blameworthiness of the defendant, may nonetheless be excludable under Evidence Code section 352 insofar as it unfairly persuades jurors to find the defendant guilty of the crime's commission. This danger is not present with factor (a) evidence at the penalty phase because the jury has already found the defendant guilty of the capital offense. The trial court's Evidence Code section 352 discretion to exclude relevant factor (a) evidence is reduced accordingly. Here, the prosecution did not introduce any evidence at the penalty phase, but merely relied on its guilt phase evidence. We have already concluded the challenged photographs were not unduly prejudicial at the guilt phase. Thus, for the reasons stated above, defendant was not unduly prejudiced at the penalty phase.