Opinion ID: 1773531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: voluntary and informed consents

Text: The crux of this appeal is the validity of the consents executed by Moore and Dorning. And, the consents' validity must be determined by whether Moore and Dorning gave voluntary and informed consents, [50] which means: [T]hat at the time of the execution of the consent the consenting person was fully informed of the legal effect of the consent, that the consenting person was not given or promised anything of value except those expenses allowable under KRS 199.590(6), that the consenting person was not coerced in any way to execute the consent, and that the consent was voluntarily and knowingly given. Moore and Dorning do not contest that they voluntarily signed the consents, and because their own lawyer represented them, their consents are presumed to be voluntary and informed. [51] Additionally, the consents, as drafted, include matters that are required only in cases where a parent is not represented by counsel. [52] Clearly, the consents are facially valid. [53] Furthermore, the following facts are not disputed: (1) the consents clearly state that they will be final and irrevocable twenty (20) days after approval of the placement; (2) Moore and Dorning admitted that they read and understood the consents before signing them; (3) immediately before the birth parents signed the consents, Womack explained to them that the consents were irrevocable after twenty (20) days; [54] (4) Moore called Donnelly within the twenty-day revocation period and asked him about calculating the period; (5) Donnelly explained to Moore how the period was calculated; and (6) Moore and Dorning did not revoke their consents during the twenty-day revocation period. Nevertheless, the trial court, relying upon the testimony of Moore, Dorning, and Donnelly, found that Donnelly unintentionally misinformed Moore and Dorning as to the legal consequences of signing the consents, that Moore and Dorning relied upon Donnelly's advice in signing the consents, and, as a result, that the consents were invalid because they were not voluntary and informed. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the trial court clearly erred in its determination that the consents were not knowingly and voluntarily given and thus held that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that the consents were invalid. The Court of Appeals, however, was entitled to set aside the trial court's findings only if those findings are clearly erroneous. [55] And, the dispositive question that we must answer, therefore, is whether the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, [56] i.e., whether or not those findings are supported by substantial evidence. [57] [S]ubstantial evidence is [e]vidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion [58] and evidence that, when taken alone or in the light of all the evidence, ... has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men. [59] Regardless of conflicting evidence, [60] the weight of the evidence, [61] or the fact that the reviewing court would have reached a contrary finding, [62] due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses [63] because judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the exclusive province of the trial court. [64] Thus, [m]ere doubt as to the correctness of [a] finding [will] not justify [its] reversal, [65] and appellate courts should not disturb trial court findings that are supported by substantial evidence. [66] In the present case, the trial court accepted the testimony of Moore, Dorning and Donnelly to the effect that, on the basis of Donnelly's advice, Moore and Dorning believed that they had until the TPR hearing to revoke their consents and have Justin returned to them. It was within the trial court's discretion to believe these witnesses to the exclusion of other evidence. And, because these witnesses' testimony constituted substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings, the Court of Appeals erred, and improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court, when it disturbed the trial court's findings. As the Court of Appeals's improper factfinding regarding the validity of the consents is inextricably intertwined with its holding reversing and remanding the case with directions to dismiss Moore and Dorning's custody action, we reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals as to the merits of the custody action.