Opinion ID: 1196295
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Proportionality of Defendant's Sentence

Text: Defendant next contends under the state and federal Constitutions that the death penalty in this case is disproportionate considering [his] involvement in the offense and his background and character. He also seeks a review for disparity of sentence compared to similar offenses. (See § 1170, subd. (f).) Alternatively, he asks that this court exercise its discretion to reduce his sentence pursuant to section 1260. In light of settled authority and the facts of this case, we reject each of these contentions. (52) The law is now well established that the Eighth Amendment does not mandate intercase proportionality review. As the United States Supreme Court definitively explained in Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 104 S.Ct. 871], in its prior decisions [p]roportionality review was considered to be an additional safeguard against arbitrarily imposed death sentences, but we certainly did not hold that comparative review was constitutionally required. ( Id., at p. 50 [79 L.Ed.2d at p. 40]; see also People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]; People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 180-182.) (53a) Under the state Constitution (art. I, § 17), we must determine whether the penalty `is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.' [Citations.] ( People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 183; see People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 317.) Notwithstanding his youth at the time, the brutal facts of the crimes and the absence of any other substantial mitigation render it impossible for defendant to show his sentence is disproportionate to his individual culpability. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 462 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135]; see also People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1068.) As the trial court summarized, The defendant deliberately and with premeditation and malice aforethought and in a conspiracy with others murdered the victims in cold blood without any concern, pity, consideration or other compassion for the victims or their families. The record fully substantiates this assessment and justifies the severity of the penalty. (54) As for defendant's statutory claims, in People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, we rejected the notion that equal protection principles mandate that the `disparate sentencing' procedure of section 1170, subdivision (f) must be extended to capital cases. ( Id., at pp. 1287-1288.) Section 1170, subdivision (f), is intended to promote the uniform-sentence goals of the Determinate Sentencing Act and sets forth a process for implementing that goal by which the Board of Prison Terms reviews comparable cases to determine if different punishments are being imposed for substantially similar criminal conduct. (42 Cal.3d at p. 1286.) [P]ersons convicted under the death penalty are manifestly not similarly situated to persons convicted under the Determinate Sentencing Act and accordingly cannot assert a meritorious claim to the `benefits' of the act under the equal protection clause [citations]. ( People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1330.) Defendant offers no factual or legal impetus to reconsider these conclusions. (53b) Defendant's argument for reduction of his sentence based on in-tracase proportionality review under People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pages 477-482, is equally unavailing. In Dillon, an immature 17-year-old, who shot and killed his victim out of fear and panic, received a mandatory life sentence by operation of the felony-murder rule, while his confederates were given petty chastisements. Both the trial judge and the jury were of the view the sentence was excessive in relation to his true culpability. ( Id., at pp. 482-488.) The facts of this case offer no credible point of comparison. In sustaining the jury's guilt and penalty verdicts, the trial court emphasized that the evidence established clearly beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant himself, without question, was the actual killer, who acted deliberately and with premeditation and without moral justification. Codefendant Williams received the death penalty and codefendant Burns was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole for their participation. (See People v. Burns (1987) 196 Cal. App.3d 1440 [242 Cal. Rptr. 573], review den. Mar. 31, 1988.) Thus, defendant's sentence is not disproportionate to either his individual culpability or the punishment of his partners in crime. (See, e.g., People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1068; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 118.) We likewise find no basis for exercising our discretion to reduce defendant's punishment pursuant to section 1260.