Opinion ID: 775311
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel--Identification Charge

Text: 38 In stark contrast to the double jeopardy claim, Petitioner did raise, in his coram nobis petition to the Appellate Division, the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel for failing to request an eyewitness identification instruction. See supra, at 86 & n.1. However, the Appellate Division did not explicitly address this claim, writing only, appellant has failed to establish that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. Aparicio, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 697. Although the trial counsel claim was not explicitly addressed, it was, as a technical matter, adjudicated; the Appellate Division denied Aparicio's coram nobis application. Id. Thus, this claim is exhausted. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438, 92 S. Ct. 509 (1971). 6 39 Although this claim is admittedly exhausted, it is nonetheless procedurally barred because the state court rejected it on an adequate and independent state procedural ground. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730. In Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989), the Supreme Court announced what became known as the clear statement rule: that federal habeas review will not be precluded unless the state court clearly and expressly stated that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. Id. at 263, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, in Coleman, the Supreme Court backed away from the clear statement principle, holding it was an essential predicate to the Harris presumption that the state court decision on petitioner's claims be grounded in substantive federal law. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735. Coleman thus recast the clear statement rule, holding that when the state court's decision fairly appeared to rest primarily on resolution of [the petitioner's federal] claims or to be interwoven with those claims, and did not clearly and expressly rely on an adequate and independent state ground, a federal court may address the petition. Id. In the absence of such a reliance on federal law, the Harris presumption of reviewability evaporates and federal habeas courts must ascertain for themselves if the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a state court judgment that rests on independent and adequate state grounds.  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 736. 40 Making that determination here is a vexing challenge, given the dearth of information in the state court decision. Not only did the Appellate Division not explicitly discuss Petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, it did not even acknowledge its existence. Explicating Petitioner's claim, the state court wrote, Application by appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this court . . . . Aparicio, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (emphasis added). With regard to Petitioner's trial counsel claim, we are left with, in essence, a one-word decision: denied. 41 Faced with a spate of similar summary denials, this Court, interpreting Coleman, held that the Harris presumption did not apply to such denials without opinion unless there is 'good reason to question whether there is an independent and adequate state ground for the decision.' Quirama v. Michele, 983 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739). 42 Here, there can be no doubt that the state court's decision on Petitioner's trial counsel claim rested on an adequate and independent state bar: Aparicio never raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his direct appeal. As we discussed above, see supra, at 90, New York law prohibits review of a claim on collateral review when the defendant unjustifiably fails to raise the claim on direct appeal. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.10(2)(c). The Appellate Division's conclusion on coram nobis that Aparicio was not denied effective assistance of appellate counsel disposed of Aparicio's only proffered cause for the failure to raise the trial counsel claim on direct appeal. The Appellate Division's decision concerning Aparicio's trial counsel claim thus had to rest on a state procedural bar; under New York law, the decision could not possibly rest on any other ground. 43 Petitioner's trial counsel claim, then, can only be reviewed on federal habeas if he satisfies the cause and prejudice standard of Coleman. And, similar to the double jeopardy claim, our later conclusion that the performance of Petitioner's appellate counsel in this regard was not so deficient as to violate Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights, see infra, at 99-100 & n.11, serves to reject the only cause Petitioner presented for the default. This claim is also thus barred from federal review.