Opinion ID: 1939618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: is there sovereign immunity?

Text: The legislature in enacting PA 1943, No 237, as an amendment of the Court of Claims Act (PA 1939, No 135), re-wrote § 24 to impose liability on the state for torts of its officers and employees. In Minty v. Board of State Auditors (1953), 336 Mich 370, a majority of this Court determined the amendment to be a waiver of sovereign immunity from liability, not merely a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit, in those causes of action or claims against the state to which the statute applied. The legislature repealed its 1943 action in 1945 by Act No 87, and thereafter has dealt with waiver of the state's immunity from tort liability by `a pattern of deliberate legislative choices.' McDowell v. State Highway Commissioner (1961), 365 Mich 268, 271. In McDowell, a majority of the Court approved by quotation the following characterization by the Attorney General in his brief: So far as the state itself is concerned, the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it presently exists in Michigan is a creature of the legislature. The doctrine has been modified by the legislature, abolished by the legislature, re-established by the legislature, and further modified by the legislature. (P 271.) The statement of the Attorney General is subject, however, to applicable and overriding provisions of the State Constitution. To that extent, the legislature does not have an unlimited discretion in shaping the pattern of the state's immunity from liability. In this case, at the time of the fire, our Constitution prohibited the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Article 13, § 1, of the Constitution of 1908 provided: Private property shall not be taken by the public nor by any corporation for public use, without the necessity therefor being first determined and just compensation therefor being first made or secured in such manner as shall be prescribed by law. On numerous occasions we have recognized that the taking under the foregoing provision and its counterpart in the Constitution of 1850, was more than land acquisition for public highways and buildings. In Pearsall v. Board of Supervisors of Eaton County (1889), 74 Mich 558, this Court said (pp 561, 562): `The constitutional provision is adopted for the protection of and security to the rights of the individual as against the government,' and the term `taking' should not be used in an unreasonable or narrow sense. It should not be limited to the absolute conversion of property, and applied to land only; but it should include cases where the value is destroyed by the action of the government, or serious injury is inflicted to the property itself, or exclusion of the owner from its enjoyment, or from any of the appurtenances thereto. In either of these cases it is a taking within the meaning of the provision of the constitution. `A partial destruction or diminution in value is a taking.' Mills, Em. Dom. § 30; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company (1871), 80 US (13 Wall) 166, 177 (20 L Ed 557); Cushman v. Smith (1852), 34 Me 247; Grand Rapids Booming Company v. Jarvis (1874), 30 Mich 308. If the public take any action which becomes necessary to subserve public use, and valuable rights of an individual are thereby interfered with, and damaged or destroyed, he is entitled to the compensation which the constitution gives therefor, and such damage or destruction must be regarded as a `taking.' This Court has applied the constitutional restriction to a variety of takings; for example, to situations of trespass from flooding waters escaping from artificial reservoirs, Ashley v. City of Port Huron (1877), 35 Mich 296; Herro v. Chippewa County Road Commissioners (1962), 368 Mich 263; to a violation of building restrictions on private property by a city in undertaking to erect a fire station, Allen v. City of Detroit (1911), 167 Mich 464; and to a city's abortive condemnation proceedings for urban renewal, ultimately abandoned after ten years, In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood Park Project (1965), 376 Mich 311. Courts of other states have applied similar provisions in their state constitutions to factual situations corresponding to those of this case. In Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Highways v. Cochrane (Ky App, 1965), 397 SW2d 155, work was done on a highway in such a manner that the excavation and fill was left unseeded and unsodded leaving an area exposed to the weather for about one year. As a result, mud and silt entered a private lake on land owned by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that this constituted pro tanto a taking for which the Commonwealth was required to respond in damages. In Thornburg v. Port of Portland (1962), 233 Or 178 (376 P2d 100), the supreme court held that a property owner's proffered testimony concerning jet flights near his land was admissible in an action wherein the property owner claimed a taking under the eminent domain section of the state constitution. The supreme court said (p 192): In summary, a taking occurs whenever government acts in such a way as substantially to deprive an owner of the useful possession of that which he owns, either by repeated trespasses or by repeated non-trespassory invasions called `nuisance'. If reparations are to be denied, they should be denied for reasons of policy which are themselves strong enough to counterbalance the constitutional demand that reparations be paid. None has been pointed out to us in this case. The fire hazard which the state permitted to continue was a nuisance which directly interfered with the property of plaintiffs' subrogors and ultimately led to its damage. In Kurtigian v. City of Worcester (1965), 348 Mass 284 (203 NE2d 692), it was said (p 291): This private nuisance was nonetheless one merely because the city had acquired the lot through foreclosure for nonpayment of taxes. Public policy in a civilized community requires that there be someone to be held responsible for a private nuisance on each piece of real estate, and, particularly in an urban area, that there be no oases of nonliability where a private nuisance may be maintained with impunity. In Wilkinson v. The Detroit Steel and Spring Works (1889), 73 Mich 405, this Court said (p 418): The obligation to construct a building that would be safe and secure was primary with the defendant, and could neither be delegated nor excused by employing one person to prepare plans, and another person to do the work, and resigning all control and responsibility into his hands. The exercise of reasonable care in the creation or maintenance of a nuisance can never be an absolute defense to an action for an injury occasioned thereby. There is no sovereign immunity applicable to a situation of nuisance as we have in this case. The judgments in the Court of Claims and the Court of Appeals are reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Claims for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against the state for the amount of their respective claims. For that purpose additional testimony may be taken if deemed necessary. Costs shall be taxed in favor of plaintiffs.