Opinion ID: 3010257
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: e., to identify and group counts involving

Text: substantially the same harm. Thus our task is to determine the primary victim that Congress had in mind when it enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(4)(B). Only if we can find no identifiable victim will we deem the primary victim to be society. Our review of the legislative history leads us to conclude that the primary victims that Congress had in mind when it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) were the children depicted in pornographic materials.0 The bill grew out of a deep and abiding concern for the health and welfare of the children and youth of the United States. S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 41. The Act itself was called the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 (the Act). The Senate Report focuses on preventing the harms suffered by children depicted in pornographic films and pictures. See S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-11, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 45-48 (referring to exploited children, child victims, and boy victims). The report concluded that the use of children as . . . the subjects of pornographic materials is very harmful to both the children and the society as a whole. Id. at 43. While this conclusion refers to the harm to society in addition to the harm to the children depicted, it is clear from the report as a whole that the primary concern of Congress was protecting children from pornography. This is not a statute where there is no identifiable victim. The fact that a criminal statute in a general sense protects society as a whole cannot suffice to make society the primary victim. Were this the case, society would be the primary victim of nearly every criminal statute. Ketcham acknowledges that the victims of § 2251, which makes it a crime to produce pornographic material featuring 0 The Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1992). We are not persuaded by the Fourth Circuit's contrary conclusion in United States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1990). children, are the children depicted. According to Ketcham, however, the same cannot be said for § 2252 which makes it illegal to transport, distribute or possess such materials. We disagree. The victims Congress was seeking to protect with all of the criminal offenses found in the Act are the same. Section 2252, by proscribing the subsequent transportation, distribution, and possession of child pornography discourages its production by depriving would-be producers of a market. The primary objective of both § 2251 and § 2252 is thus the same -- to protect children from exploitation by producers of child pornography -- and the victims of both sections are, accordingly, the same. Since the primary victims of offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1), (a)(2), & (a)(4)(B) are the children depicted in the pornographic materials and because Ketcham's four counts of conviction involved materials depicting different children, the district court correctly concluded that grouping Ketcham's offenses pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b) is inappropriate.