Opinion ID: 164826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of the Motions to Suppress

Text: 14 We first review the district court's denial of Nichols' motions to suppress evidence seized during the St. Louis and Kansas vehicle stops and St. Louis apartment search. In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, accept the district court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, and review the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment de novo. United States v. Marquez, 337 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir.2003). 15 Nichols claims that both the St. Louis and the Kansas stops were unjustified at their outset and that the scope of the detention following each of these stops went beyond what was permissible under the circumstances. Applying the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), we consider an initial traffic stop reasonable `if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.' United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995) (en banc)). In analyzing the permissible scope of the stop, we adhere to the rule that a vehicle must be permitted to proceed after a routine traffic stop if a license and registration check reveal no reason to detain [it] unless the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion of other crimes or the driver voluntarily consents to further questioning. United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir.2000). 16 In regard to the St. Louis stop, the district court found that prior to the stop, police had observed two traffic violations — speeding and a lane change without using a turning signal. United States v. Nichols, 248 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1030 (D.Kan.2003). This finding is not clearly erroneous. The stop was thus justified at its outset. The scope of this stop was then permissibly expanded when police smelled raw marijuana in the vehicle. The odor of marijuana, together with the information police had received from their confidential informant, provided probable cause to arrest the vehicle's occupants. United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 703 (10th Cir.1982). We hold the St. Louis stop was reasonable and thus any evidence discovered as a result of the stop was admissible against Nichols. 3 17 In regard to the Kansas stop, the district court credited Trooper Weigel's testimony that he observed the gold Buick following less than two seconds behind the RV in front of it. Nichols, 248 F.Supp.2d at 1031. Again, this finding is not clearly erroneous. We reject Nichols' argument that Trooper Weigel's use of a two-second rule of thumb to determine the Buick was following the vehicle in front of it too closely was improper. The Kansas statute in question states: 18 The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. 19 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1523(a). Weigel explained it was in accord with his training and common practice in his department to use the two-second rule to determine violations of this statute. The district court found his testimony clear and credible and concluded from it that [t]he government ha[d] met its burden of showing ... reasonable suspicion that a violation had occurred. Nichols, 248 F.Supp.2d at 1031. We believe Weigel's use of a two-second rule of thumb together with his calculation of the interval three separate times provided the minimal level of objective justification required for reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). The stop was thus justified at its outset. See United States v. Vercher, 358 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir.2004) (reasonable suspicion of a section 8-1523 violation existed based on an officer's determination that the space between vehicles was not reasonable and prudent); see also United States v. Lopez-Guzman, 246 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1158 (D.Kan.2003) (referring to another Kansas officer's use of a two-second rule when applying section 8-1523). 20 Further, the scope of the Kansas stop was permissibly expanded when Trooper Weigel discovered Mitchell, the Buick's driver, had no driver's license. On that basis, he was justified, after giving Mitchell a warning and returning his papers, in approaching White — the only vehicle occupant with a driver's license — in order to tell her she would need to drive. Following that, White consented to further questioning, 4 so the stop became a consensual encounter, and the officer's question about drugs and weapons and his request to search the vehicle were permissible. Moreover, this questioning was also justified by reasonable suspicion based on the occupants'having no proof of ownership of the vehicle [and] having no proof of authority to operate the vehicle, United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir.1998), together with Mitchell's and McCauley's criminal records, the unconfirmed identification of Quinndell Johnson, and the occupants' apparent violation of the vehicle rental agreement. 21 We thus conclude the district court properly denied Nichols' motion to suppress the evidence seized in these stops. It also properly denied suppression of the evidence seized from the St. Louis apartment, which, as indicated above, was searched with the consent of its tenant, Sheneice Sanders. Contrary to Nichols' claim, the police did not require probable cause, stemming from the traffic stop, to justify this search.