Opinion ID: 774813
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficient evidence supported McCoy's convictions.

Text: 79 McCoy argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy and firearms convictions. He contends that the only evidence against him was his presence at Thompkins's arrest and the unreliable account of his statements to LeBouef. 80 McCoy's out-of-court statements, if true, established the elements of his convictions. He admitted to LeBouef the existence of and his membership in a Seventh Ward Soldiers drug conspiracy. He admitted that he shot Walters, establishing his guilt for using a firearm in relation to illegal drug trafficking, because the shooting protected conspiracy members and intimidated the conspiracy's enemies. The admission also established the elements of McCoy's felon in possession of a firearm conviction. Further, independent evidence corroborated McCoy's admissions. His associates were engaged in a drug conspiracy known as the Seventh Ward Soldiers or Seventh Ward Hardheads. McCoy was present when police arrested Thompkins with drugs. Testimony about a bicycle at the scene of Walter's murder corroborates McCoy's statements about that crime. The issue, then, is whether LeBouef's account of McCoy's admissions and the evidence supporting it was credible enough for the jury to convict McCoy. 81 Credibility determinations are within the province of the jury. McCoy's attorney cross-examined LeBouef about his motives for testifying, his access to media accounts about the Seventh Ward Soldiers, and his criminal history. The jury apparently believed that McCoy made most of the admissions, and it was entitled to do so. Meadows v. Delo, 99 F.3d 280, 281 (8th Cir.1996) (finding sufficient evidence based primarily on testimony by alleged junkies offered deals with the State that they overheard incriminating statements). The care with which the jury sifted the evidence is demonstrated, to McCoy's advantage, in their declining to convict him on Counts 14 and 15 involving the murders of two other people, notwithstanding his alleged admission to LeBouef. 82 B. The evidence of the various murders and attempted murders was not extrinsic to the drug conspiracy. 83 The appellants argue that the evidence of uncharged murders and attempted murders was inadmissible under Fed. Rule of Evid. 404(b). Not only did the government not charge them directly with these acts of violence, but it replaced the original counts in the indictment that alleged the use of firearms in relation to crimes of violence. See fn.1. supra. Appellants urge that the evidence of uncharged murders and attempted murders was therefore extrinsic to the drug conspiracy and firearms charges in the final indictment. The district court disagreed, holding that the murders and attempted murders were inextricably intertwined with the firearms charges in the indictment. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 861 (5th Cir.1997). 84 Rule 404(b) excludes extrinsic evidence out of fear that the jury will use evidence that the defendant has, at other times, committed bad acts to convict him of the charged offense. United States v. Aleman, 592 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1979). This fear is not implicated where offenses are uncharged only because the government indicts a defendant for less than all of his actions in a single criminal episode. Id. Evidence of uncharged crimes is not extrinsic if it is inextricably intertwined with the evidence of charged offenses, or if it is necessary to complete the story of the crime. Morgan, 117 F.3d at 861. 85 Both of the grounds for admission of uncharged crimes are present here. Evidence of the murders and attempted murders was relevant to prove that the appellants were trying to protect a drug conspiracy. Moreover, there was no reasonable way to divorce the firearms charges from the murders and attempted murders. The evidence of the uncharged conduct was inextricably intertwined with evidence of the charged crimes and necessary to complete the story surrounding the firearms and conspiracy charges. Rule 404(b) does not apply. See Morgan, 117 F.3d at 861 (evidence that a conspirator held a gun to a police officer's head during a drug deal was not extrinsic to drug conspiracy charges); United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 721 (11th Cir. 1992) (evidence of a double murder was not extrinsic to felon in possession of a firearm charges). 86 The argument for inadmissibility of the murders and attempted murders under Fed. Rule Evid. 403 because of their prejudicial effect is also easily rejected. The panels in Morganand Fortenberry did not consider similar evidence of uncharged conduct unduly prejudicial. Morgan, 117 F.3d at 861; Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at 721. Although the evidence of the murders and attempted murders was prejudicial, it was necessary for the jury to understand the brutal nature of the conspiracy. The court did not err in admitting this evidence. 87 C. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Phillip Enclarde's statements as excited utterances. 88 Baptiste asserts that the district court should not have admitted Phillip Enclarde's statements identifying Baptiste as his murderer. Baptiste argues that Enclarde's statements were inadmissible hearsay. This court's review is for abuse of discretion. 89 Fed. Rule of Evid. 803(2) allows courts to admit hearsay statements if they relate to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. The ultimate question is whether the statements were the product of reflective thought or whether they were the result of the startling event. Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 394 (7th Cir.1991). The amount of time between the startling event and the hearsay statement, though relevant, is not dispositive. Id. 90 In Webb, a defendant tried to exclude statements that a shooting victim made after arriving at an emergency room. The victim, who later died from six gunshot wounds, made statements between one and two hours after the attack. The Seventh Circuit noted that the statements followed an extremely violent experience and that the declarant was still under the stress of the attack. The court held that the fact that the declarant made the statements in response to a police officer's queries, though relevant, did not destroy their spontaneity. The court concluded that the excited utterance exception applied. 91 This case presents stronger circumstances for admissibility than Webb. Enclarde had received multiple gunshot wounds and was lying in a pool of blood at the scene of the attack. Although Baptiste asserts that Enclarde had been lying on the scene for nearly thirty minutes, it is not clear from the trial testimony that even that much time passed. Enclarde died shortly afterward from his injuries. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Enclarde's statements were admissible excited utterances. 92 D. The government's improper closing remarks were harmless error. 93 The appellants challenge the government counsel's prediction during rebuttal argument that they would kill again if the jury failed to convict them. 9 The statements, they assert, prejudiced the jury and led to their conviction. 94 The government concedes that the remarks were improper. It argues, however, that the statements were not unduly prejudicial because they represented a very small part of the closing argument and merely responded to inappropriate closing arguments by McCoy's counsel. 95 Although plain error is probably the appropriate standard of review for each appellant, 10 in an abundance of caution, we will not apply that standard and will determine, since counsel's remarks were improper, whether they substantially affected the defendants' rights. U.S. v. Dorr, 636 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1981). Under this standard, we consider 1) the prejudicial effect of the statements; 2) the effect of any cautionary instructions; and 3) the evidence of each appellant's guilt. United States v. Vaccaro, 115 F.3d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir.1997) (finding no prejudice where the prosecutor called the defendants criminals during a rebuttal argument). Although two wrongs [do] not make a right, we may evaluate prejudice by considering whether the government remarks responded to improper defense arguments. Id. Furthermore, [w]e assume that a jury has the common sense to discount the hyperbole of an advocate, discounting the force of the argument. Id. 96 Here, the improper remarks were not unduly prejudicial. They responded to a series of improper statements by McCoy's attorney. They did not directly threaten the jury by personalizing the defendants' future dangerousness, and no external factors magnified their prejudicial effect. Defense counsel were not sufficiently troubled by the brief comments to object until after the jury had retired for the evening, and none of them requested further curative instructions. That the jury acquitted some of the appellants of individual counts and acquitted one defendant entirely strongly suggests lack of prejudice, since the jury must have carefully considered the evidence against each appellant. 97 The remaining factors confirm that the prosecutor's remarks did not affect the appellants' substantial rights. The district judge warned the jury both before and after closing arguments that the statements of the lawyers were not evidence and did not bind them. There was also enough evidence of each appellant's guilt to dispel any concern that the improper remarks were pivotal to the verdicts. Looking at the trial as a whole, therefore, the improper remarks were harmless error. Compare United States v. Williams, 523 F.2d 1203, 1207-09 (5th Cir. 1975) (conviction reversed for improper closing argument in tandem with prejudicial pretrial publicity), with United States v. Cunningham, 54 F.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1995) (no reversible error), and United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1373, 1376 (10th Cir. 1989) (same). 98 E. Apprendi issues. 99 By hook and crook, 11 all of the appellants contend that their sentences, which, with the exception of Franklin's, call for life imprisonment, exceed the statutory maximum of the drug conspiracy crime of which they were convicted. Their arguments rely on this court's interpretation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), the Supreme Court decision holding that, other than a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. 100 In this court, drug trafficking crimes defined in 18 U.S.C. §a841 are governed by Apprendi analysis on the theory that the dramatically tiered sentences for increasing quantities of illegal drugs enhance the core statutory maximum of §a841(b)(1)(C). United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 163 (5th Cir.2000). Consequently, the quantity of drugs must be alleged in the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt if, as here, the government seeks enhanced penalties under §a841(b)(1)(A) or (b)(1)(B). Id. at 164-65. 101 Because Apprendi reversed this circuit's previous approach to prosecution and sentencing of § 841 offenses, a number of cases posing Apprendi issues have come before us in the year since it was issued. Our approach to those cases has not been fully consistent. An early decision held that, even under the demanding plain error standard, where a defendant never challenged the sufficiency of the indictment or proof of quantity of drugs at trial and thus raised the Apprendi problem for the first time on appeal, he was nevertheless entitled to a revised sentence. United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 578 (5th Cir.2000). A second group of cases held that where the record suggested in any way that the jury implicitly found a quantity of drugs corresponding to an enhanced sentence involved in the crime, plain error review did not allow sentence revision. United States v. Slaughter, 238 F.3d 580, 583-84 (5th Cir.2000); United States v. Green, 246 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir.2001); United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 445 (5th Cir.2001). A third group of cases has ordered revised sentences sua sponte, i.e., where the defendant raised no Apprendi issue at trial or before this court on appeal. United States v. Garcia, 242 F.3d 593, 599 n.5 (5th Cir.2001); United States v. Vasquez-Zamora, 253 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir.2001); United States v. Gonzalez,259 F.3d 355, 359(5th Cir.2001); United States v. Longoria, 259 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir.2001). Finally, a recent decision of this court holds that the implicit rationale for vacating and remanding sentences in light of Apprendi was the fatal omission of the quantity of drugs, now an element of the drug trafficking crime, from the indictment. Gonzalez, supra. If Gonzalez is correct, then all the preceding discussions of plain or harmless error were unnecessary under our precedents, where the indictment omitted the element of drug quantity, for such a situation must invariably result in reversible error in the sentence. 12 102 The instant case reveals problems arising from these holdings. The indictment alleges defendants' involvement in a conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and cocaine base, but it does not allege the quantity of drugs. The other counts of the indictment involve serious federal firearms offenses, but none of them alleges a quantity of drugs involved in the appellants' trafficking. Further, while the evidence at trial abundantly demonstrated that conspiracy members were selling an ounce of crack cocaine or more every week for several years, the jury was never asked to find a particular quantity of drugs. None of the appellants sought jury instructions on drug quantity. Three appellants objected at sentencing that the element of drug quantity had been neither alleged in the indictment nor specifically submitted to the jury in their case. 13 The rest of the appellants did not preserve Apprendierror in the trial court. 103 Having written its brief before many of our above-citedApprendi decisions were issued, the government urged affirmance of the sentences under the harmless or plain error standards, depending upon the stage at which appellants raised the issue. The government points out that several defendants were well aware of their exposure to life sentences, through the government's filing of an information requesting penalty enhancements because of their prior drug convictions. Moreover, Baptiste, Frank and Schexnayder were exposed to life sentences based on their recidivism if only five grams of cocaine base were involved in their transactions. 14 With respect to all of the defendants, the evidence showed that the crack distributed during the period of the conspiracy far exceeded the quantities necessary to justify their sentences. Government witnesses Womack and Thompkins provided evidence of the quantity of the drugs involved. Their testimony was apparently found credible by the jury, because the jury relied on their testimony to convict the appellants for using firearms during and in relation to drug trafficking crimes. Finally, because the appellants chose as their defense strategy to challenge the existence of any conspiracy they did not seriously contest the testimony concerning the quantity of drugs distributed. 104 As in Miranda, Slaughter, and Green, supra, the chances are virtually nil that the jury, confronted with this testimony about appellants' long-lasting conspiracy, would have found that the appellants distributed less than 50 grams of cocaine or cocaine base. Unlike those cases, there is no way to infer from the record that such a determination was reached by the jury. This court's other authorities compel remands for resentencing, albeit on various grounds. 15 Several circuits have, by contrast, applied the plain error standard in similar cases and affirmed enhanced sentences. United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 161 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (opinion of four judges); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 830 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 943-44 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 310-12 (1st Cir. 2000). 105 One cannot help but note the unfortunate consequence here: conspirators who killed or maimed seven people without compunction, three of them in one family and two in another, in order to wipe out their rivals or intimidate witnesses, may be sentenced to a maximum of 20 or 30 years in prison. Yet, had it been forewarned ofApprendi, the government could have restructured its charges to emphasize the murders and attempted murders or add a statement on drug quantities. 16 As it stands, a disproportionately lenient result is compelled by our current precedent. 17 106 F. Other sentencing issues. 107 Because resentencing is required, some of the appellants' other sentencing issues have become moot or should be reconsidered on remand. Schexnayder, for instance, argued that he should not have received a life sentence based on his multiple prior convictions. Jones and Parker expressly challenged, and Baptiste raised the issue by adoption, whether the district court should have sentenced them to consecutive sentences for multiple uses of firearms to advance a single drug conspiracy. These appellants raised this issue for the first time on appeal, citing United States v. Tolliver, 61 F.3d 1189, 1222 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that consecutive §a924(c)(1) sentences based on a single drug conspiracy were improper). Finally, several of the appellants contest the amount of drugs attributed to them during the course of the conspiracy. All of these issues may be reconsidered, if they remain viable, at sentencing. 108 G. Remaining claims. 109 The appellants' remaining arguments do not merit discussion. Suffice to say that 1) the district judge's introduction of closing arguments was not plainly erroneous; 18 2) there was no plainly erroneous variance between the final indictment and the proof at trial; 3) the district court did not plainly err by admitting into evidence six firearms that were seized during the investigation but were not directly connected to the offenses; 4) the district court did not commit plain error by allowing a police officer to testify about the way drug dealers commonly wrapped crack; 19 5) there was no plain error from certain statements and lines of questioning by the prosecutors at trial; 6) there was no plain error from the admission of Frank's correspondence; 20 7) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Franklin's March 1997 arrest for possession of a pistol; and 8) the district court did not clearly err in finding that Baptiste was a leader of the conspiracy for sentencing purposes.