Opinion ID: 788362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Ex Parte Conversation With Febus

Text: 82 Aspinall also contends that the conversation between the district judge and Febus prior to the probation revocation hearing affected the court's sentencing decision ( see, e.g., Aspinall brief on appeal at 32) and so tainted the proceedings that it violated Ms. Aspinall's due process rights [,] requiring a new hearing ( id. at 35). The record does not support this contention. 83 At the start of the probation revocation hearing, the district judge informed the parties of information he had received from Febus earlier that morning. The court stated that 84 the probation officer visited me this morning. I think probation is technically an arm of the court. I don't know whether it constitutes an ex parte conversation in the usual sense or not. But I'll put on the record exactly what the conversation was. 85 Ms. Febus played for me a recording that is on a cell phone that was seized from Ms. Aspinall's apartment search. It was seized from the defendant as part of the search. And somehow there is recorded what sounds like a beating or a spanking of a child which goes on for a long time with what sounds like repeated slaps and a child crying for a long time. I don't know if the issue is going to come up today. I don't think it bears directly on the particular violations. But I thought that counsel ought to know about it. If defense counsel wants to listen to it at some point, it will be made available. 86 (Rev. Tr. 4; see also id. at 76 (again inviting counsel to listen to the cell phone voicemail recording if he wished).) 87 Aspinall's attorney responded that he would accept the Court's statement that that will not affect any decision that you render on this ( id. at 4), but that he would have a problem if the conversation affected the court's consideration of the allegations against Aspinall because Aspinall was entitled to notice of all the charges against her, and [t]hat is not one of the charges ( id. at 5). Counsel stated, I'm not asking your Honor to recuse yourself unless your Honor tells me that that might have an effect. ( Id. ) The court responded that 88 [i]t's not a charge. I don't think it is—I don't think it bears directly on any of the charges.... 89 The fact is this. I am confident that I can rule on particular charges based on the evidence that's presented.... 90 ( Id. ) 91 The testimony of Febus, the only government witness at the hearing, made no mention of the contents of the cell phone recording. In finding Aspinall guilty on four of the five charges asserted in the revocation petition, the court placed no reliance on the cell phone recording and stated that the contents of that recording did not enter into [its] consideration in terms of guilt or nonguilt. (Rev. Tr. 75.) However, noting that the recording was relevant now as to where we go from here, the court granted the government's request, to which Aspinall did not object, that Aspinall undergo a psychiatric evaluation. ( Id. at 75-76.) The court also remanded Aspinall into custody pending sentencing and ordered that the psychiatric evaluation be expedited at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. The court stated that the reason for the remand was the court's finding of guilt with respect to Aspinall's duplicitous use of her former name after procuring a name change, her effort to defraud the probation department, and as a consequence, an effort to defraud the court as well. ( Id. at 77-78.) When defense counsel brought up the cell phone recording, the court stated that it was concerned about what was on that recording, but [t]hat's not why I'm remanding her. I am remanding her because of the seriousness of the violation. ( Id. at 79.) The court reiterated, I'm not minimizing the recording I heard on the cell phone. It is very troubling. But my reason for remanding her is the seriousness of what's going on here. It's a complete and utter sham. It is submitting fraudulent documents to the probation department. 92 ( Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added).) 93 In sentencing Aspinall following her psychiatric evaluation, the court stated as follows: 94 I am extremely troubled by this case. I gave Ms. Aspinall a break. I sentenced her to probation the first time. Her conduct afterwards was extremely disturbing: Fabricating documents, submitting fabricated documents to the court, trying to commit a fraud on the probation department and the court. 95 I agree there are mental health issues, but they are not an excuse. I think it is a much more serious problem than merely difficulty adhering to the rules. Beyond that, I don't think to this day Ms. Aspinall accepts responsibility or acknowledges wrongdoing. 96 (S. Tr. 7.) At no point did the court mention the cell phone recording during the sentencing hearing or indicate that the information in that recording played any role in its sentencing decision. At no point during either the probation revocation hearing or the sentencing hearing did the defense ask the district judge to recuse himself. 97 Following the sentencing, Aspinall moved for bail pending appeal. In an effort to show some basis for an appeal, Aspinall argued, inter alia, that she had been prejudiced by the prehearing conversation between the court and Febus during which the court heard the cell phone recording. Denying the bail motion, the court stated that neither its findings of guilt nor its sentencing decision had been affected by the recording: 98 I don't know why Miss Febus chose to come see me that morning. I don't think she was trying to taint me. Maybe things came to a head and she was preparing for the hearing, I don't know. But the fact is I was not tainted. I said it then, I'll say it again now, I said it a number of times: I was not tainted. I was troubled. There is no question I was troubled. And that was one of the reasons why I thought there should be some follow-up, including some psychiatric follow-up. 99 .... You know, judges have to look at things all the time to decide whether they come in or not. 100 In a bench trial, for example, evidence is offered, I look at it, and then I might say objection sustained. It doesn't come in. Am I tainted? The answer is no, I am not tainted. This did not bear either on my determination of guilt []or on my sentencing. 101 (Bail Tr. 17-18 (emphases added); see also id. at 22 (With respect to the sentence, I will say it again: The voicemail did not impact on my sentence.).) 102 Given this record, we see no violation of Aspinall's due process rights by reason of the prehearing communication between Febus and the court. A probationer charged with violation of the conditions of her probation is, of course, entitled to ... disclosure of the evidence against her in support of the charges. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1(b)(2)(B). She is also entitled to be sentenced only on the basis of information whose accuracy she has had an opportunity to challenge. See, e.g., United States v. Louis, 814 F.2d 852, 857-58 (2d Cir.1987) (vacating sentence affected by court's ex parte acquisition of expert information on sentencing standards applicable to persons convicted of drug trafficking in Hong Kong). We see no violation of these principles here, where the information provided by Febus ex parte, which was disclosed at the outset of the probation revocation hearing, was neither a basis for nor related to the probation revocation charges. 103 As the district court properly stated ( see Rev. Tr. 4), the Probation Department is an arm of the court. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 455 (2d Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 822, 123 S.Ct. 106, 154 L.Ed.2d 31 (2002). We have noted that the probation officer is a confidential adviser to the court, ... the court's `eyes and ears,' a neutral information gatherer with loyalties to no one but the court. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, the probation officer is often the most appropriate person[] to bring to the attention of the court ... an offender's conduct that is threatening to the public. Id. at 457 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accord United States v. Davis, 151 F.3d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir.1998) (Because of the close working relationship between the probation officer and the sentencing court, the probation officer may communicate ex parte with the district court. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 104 Here, Febus brought to the court's attention her concern that Aspinall might be abusing her nine-year-old daughter. This is precisely the sort of information that one would expect the eyes and ears of the court to bring to the court's attention. On the other hand, the probation officer in this case, rather than acting exclusively in that role, as advisor to the court, was seeking revocation of probation, and thus was acting as Aspinall's adversary. In addition, the officer waited until the very day of the revocation hearing to bring to the court's attention information she had had for some two months. Nevertheless, and crucially for purposes of this appeal, the district court promptly brought this information to Aspinall's attention at the start of the revocation hearing. And though the court found the information sufficiently troubling to warrant an order that Aspinall undergo a psychiatric examination, the court expressly stated that it would not consider that information in its assessment of the probation revocation petition. 105 In sum, the record is clear that the district court repeatedly assured Aspinall that the ex parte information it had received from Febus would not taint the court in deciding the merits of the revocation petition; and thereafter, the court repeatedly stated that the information had not had any effect on either its determination of Aspinall's guilt or its determination of an appropriate sentence. We see nothing in the record to contradict these assurances, and we conclude that the court's receipt of that information caused no violation of Aspinall's right to due process.