Opinion ID: 1960299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 29

Heading: -iv- race as an impermissible factor

Text: Finally, defendant contends that prosecutors and juries impermissibly consider the race of defendants and of victims when imposing the death sentence. His point is that if he were not an African-American, the prosecutor would not have sought and the jury would not have imposed the death penalty. The statistics do not support his contention. Our abiding problem with analyzing the effect of race is that the case universe still contains too few cases to prove that the race of a defendant improperly influences death sentencing. That fundamental point distinguishes our opinion from the dissent. The inescapable fact is that we lack enough cases to conclude with any degree of statistical reliability whether race is working impermissibly in death sentencing. For the dissent, however, the under-sized data pools and consequently large margins for error, post at 425, 645 A. 2d at 730, merely mean that the Court has not met its burden to ensure that the imposition of the death penalty is proportionate. As we have explained above, however, we believe that the burden remains that of the defendant to prove disproportionality. Supra at 348-349, 645 A. 2d at 692-693. In Marshall, we reaffirmed our commitment to equality in the administration of justice, stating that were we to believe that the race of the victim and race of the defendant played a significant part in capital-sentencing decisions in New Jersey, we would seek corrective measures, and if that failed we could not, consistent with our State's policy, tolerate discrimination that threatened the foundation of our system of law. [130 N.J. at 209, 613 A. 2d 1059.] We remain committed to that belief. Consequently, we will continue to monitor any correlation between race and the imposition of the death penalty. Also in Marshall, we indicated that we would find the race-based disparities described in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 326-27, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1785-86, 95 L.Ed. 2d 262 (1987), to be constitutionally significant. Id. at 210, 613 A. 2d 1059. In McCleskey, the United States Supreme Court sustained the imposition of the death penalty notwithstanding certain disparities in death sentencing according to the race of the defendant and of the victim. 481 U.S. at 291, 107 S.Ct. at 1766, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 277. Those disparities were that white-victim cases received capital sentences at a rate eleven times that of cases involving black victims; black defendants who killed white victims were sentenced to death at nearly twenty-two times the rate of black defendants who killed black victims and seven times the rate that pertained to white defendants who killed black victims. Id. at 326-27, 107 S.Ct. at 1785, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 300-01. The McCleskey data further indicated that prosecutors sought the death penalty for seventy percent of black defendants who killed white victims, but for only fifteen percent of black defendants who killed black victims and nineteen percent for white defendants who killed black victims. Id. at 327, 107 S.Ct. at 1785, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 301. Although the United States Supreme Court found these data not to be significant under the Federal Constitution, we believe that these disparities could be significant under the New Jersey Constitution. Marshall, supra, 130 N.J. at 210, 613 A. 2d 1059. Unlike the data in McCleskey, the Marshall data did not demonstrate that race played a constitutionally-significant role in death sentencing. Ibid. In Marshall, the Special Master presented two tables: Table 18, which treats the race of defendants; and Table 18A, which treats the race of victims. Table 18 illustrated that at culpability level four, black defendants are sentenced to death sixty-four percent more often than non-black defendants. Ibid. According to Table 18A, white-victim cases are 1.4 times more likely to advance to the penalty trial than cases involving other victims. Id. at 211, 613 A. 2d 1059. Although these tables demonstrate a degree of disparity that troubled us in our analysis of McCleskey, we ultimately found in Marshall no substantial discrimination in the application of the Act. One reason was that the tables did not provide an extensive set of relationships between the statistical variables. Id. at 210, 613 A. 2d 1059. Table 18 and Table 18A showed the rate of death sentencing for defendants and victims individually, but they did not show, as the McCleskey data showed, the death-sentencing rate for race-of-victim and race-of-defendant combinations. Another reason we rejected Marshall's arguments was that the number of cases involving defendants, black or non-black, with comparable culpability factors was too few to support any reliable conclusion. Id. at 211, 613 A. 2d 1059. Finally, and most importantly, the data showed no race-of-victim effects in penalty-trial decisions. Id. at 212-13, 613 A. 2d 1059. For these reasons, we concluded that the data showed no `substantial discriminatory effect in the application of the [Act].' Id. at 211, 613 A. 2d 1059 (quoting Final Report, supra, at 103). Here, amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey and New Jersey State Conference of NAACP Branches have attempted to correct the deficiencies we identified in Marshall. Amici developed a more extensive set of relationships by evaluating the interaction between race-of-victim and race-of-defendant combinations and by assessing the influence of statutory and non-statutory factors such as socio-economic status and the gender of the defendant. Also, amici updated the Marshall universe by adding forty additional cases. It recently supplemented this larger universe with the data from the Martini Report. The Martini data add eight more penalty-trial cases to Table 18 and twenty-eight more penalty-trial cases to Table 18A. Using these amended tables, Bey argues that an overall racial disparity exists at a statistically-significant level, particularly at the middle ranges of culpability where the choice between life and death is less certain. As in Marshall, Bey's Table 18 displays race-of-defendant disparities in death-penalty-sentencing decisions among penalty-trial cases after adjusting the standard-culpability levels. As stated above, only seven cases fall within culpability level four, Bey's level. The Martini data add only one case. Bey, to include enough cases for a statistically-reliable comparison, redefined level four from .60-.80 to .145-.89. His new level four now contains twenty-three cases, ten of which resulted in the death penalty. Thus, forty-three percent (10/23) of the cases at culpability level four resulted in the death penalty. The Martini data include twenty-seven cases, thirteen of which resulted in the death penalty, thereby increasing the death-sentencing rate at level four to forty-eight percent (13/27). Bey argues that a disproportionate number of these death sentences were imposed on black defendants. Of the ten cases included in the Bey data that resulted in death sentences, eight involved black defendants, but only one defendant was white and one was Hispanic. Therefore, the death sentence was imposed on black defendants in culpability level four, Bey's level, at a rate of eighty percent (8/10); for non-black defendants, the rate was only fifteen percent (2/13). The results are produced below: Culpability Level Black Defendant Non-Black Defendant % Disparity 1 0 ( 0/21) 0 ( 0/12) 0 2 0 ( 0/8 ) 0 ( 0/11) 0 3 .17 ( 1/6 ) 0 ( 0/15) 17 4 .80 ( 8/10) .15 ( 2/13) 65 5 1.0 (12/12) .94 (16/17) 6 The Martini data reflect a similar, although slightly decreasing disparity between black and non-black defendants. Of the thirteen cases that received a death sentence, ten involved black defendants and only three involved white or Hispanic defendants. Therefore, Bey's data show that at culpability level four, the death sentence was imposed on black defendants at a rate of eighty-three percent (10/12), and on non-black defendants at a rate of twenty percent (3/15). The results are: Culpability Level Black Defendant Non-Black Defendant % Disparity 1 0 ( 0/16) 0 ( 0/10) 0 2 0 ( 0/12) 0 ( 0/15) 0 3 .2 ( 2/10) .13 ( 2/16) 7 4 .83 (10/12) .20 ( 3/15) 63 5 1.0 (11/11) .94 (15/16) 6 Despite amici 's best efforts, defendant's analysis remains flawed. Defendant's redefinition of the culpability levels distorts culpability level four, the level that evidences the highest percentage of disparity and that includes Bey. The basic problem is that level four includes too much. To create middle ranges that contain a sufficient number of cases, defendant extended culpability level four from a range of .20 to .75. This extended range fails to achieve the underlying purpose of creating culpability levels consisting of similar cases. Supra at 364-365, 645 A. 2d at 700. In Marshall, the Special Master chose the original twenty-percent ranges so that each range would contain sufficiently similar cases in terms of blameworthiness. Admittedly, he also stated that culpability level four would need to be expanded to include a sufficient number of cases for a valid statistical analysis. Marshall Report, supra, Technical Appendix 9 at 5. The Special Master, however, never stated that any range so expanded would be statistically reliable. As expanded, culpability level four includes cases that are dissimilar. Thus, the level is unreliable. The dissent's attempt to develop a reliable statistical base fails for the same reason. Although the dissent's culpability level four is smaller than defendant's, it still includes cases that are dissimilar. The dissent's level four includes cases with a predicted probability of a death sentence ranging from .19 to.85, a sixty-six percentage-point differential. A culpability range that spans sixty-six percentage points, although narrower than defendant's range, is still too broad to ensure the inclusion only of comparable cases. Furthermore, the dissent's perceived true mid-range cases, post at 424, 645 A. 2d at 730, with a predicted probability of .30 to .70, includes only fifteen cases at level four. So meager a number of cases is too small to support the dissent's conclusion that an obvious disparity between races is visible. Post at 424, 645 A. 2d at 730. We note, moreover, that the dissent's compilation of cases, unlike defendant's Table 18, is not limited to penalty-trial cases and includes cases that are not even death eligible. Post at 423, 645 A. 2d at 729 n. 4. Implicit in the extensions of level four as proposed by defendant and by the dissent is the admission that without extending the range to include additional cases, level four would contain too few cases to support a reliable statistical conclusion. The lack of sufficient cases becomes clear if we confine our analysis to the standard twenty-percent levels contained in the Bey and Martini Reports. Of the cases included in level four in the Bey Report, only seven proceeded to the penalty phase, three of which resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. The comparable data in the Martini Report show only eight cases, four of which resulted in the death sentence. Neither table contains a sufficient number of cases to determine whether a significant statistical disparity exists between death-sentencing black and non-black defendants. In the Martini Report, moreover, Bey's predicted probability of receiving a death sentence increases to .81, which places him in culpability level five, the highest culpability level. Without a sufficient number of similar cases, we cannot hold that race impermissibly influences the imposition of the death penalty. As vexing as waiting for more data may be, we have no alternative but to wait. To force the analysis by adding dissimilar cases, as defendant and the dissent propose, would disserve the ends of justice. We do not foreclose all attempts to modify the culpability ranges to produce a sufficient number of cases for a valid statistical analysis. Any such modification, however, must consist of ranges containing similar cases. Defendant's Table 18 also addresses other impermissible factors, such as socio-economic status. Defendant argues that socio-economic status aggravates racial disparity at Bey's culpability level. The flaw in defendant's analysis is that he subjectively defines socio-economic status. The problem is not that we should never consider socio-economic status. In Marshall, we stated that such data might be relevant. 130 N.J. at 135, 203, 214, 613 A. 2d 1059. The data, however, must be objective and rooted in traditional sentencing guidelines. Supra at 366, 645 A. 2d at 700-701. In Marshall, we also accepted the defendant's argument that we should not undertake subjective, moralistic judgments when considering non-statutory factors. Id. at 155, 613 A. 2d 1059. Socioeconomic status, as defined by Bey, invites precisely that kind of subjective judgment. Defendant appears to have defined socio-economic status according to general job descriptions without considering other relevant facts about the defendants' or the victims' lifestyles. For example, defendant identifies high socio-economic status as including victims or defendants who are employed as secretaries, government workers, and store managers. Consequently, he identifies Carol Peniston as having a high socio-economic status simply because she was a secretary. From the record, however, we cannot glean sufficient information to justify that conclusion. Bey contends that defendants of low socio-economic status include those who have never worked, have worked sporadically, or are engaged in organized crime. According to this classification, defendant deemed William Todd Lewis to be of low socio-economic status, although Lewis had worked as a truck driver consistently since 1971, had earned $400 per week, and was married to a woman who owned her own house and car. Similarly, defendant classifies Samuel Mincey as being of low socio-economic status, although Mincey had owned his landscaping business for five years, worked in construction, and had been a maintenance worker. Defendant's Table 18A illustrates the race-of-victim disparities in penalty-trial death-sentencing decisions after adjusting the culpability levels to the same extent that we find unacceptable in Table 18. Unlike in Marshall, this table demonstrates a more extensive set of relationships that are similar to the McCleskey comparisons; defendant evaluated the interaction between race-of-victim and race-of-defendant combinations, and assessed the influence of statutory and non-statutory factors such as socio-economic status and gender of defendant. Defendant argues that the results definitively show that at the penalty-trial phase, defendants who kill white victims are more likely than defendants who kill non-white victims to receive the death sentence. He presses the point although both his victims were African-American women. We produce the results below. Culpability Level White Victims Non-white Victims % Disparity 1 .19 ( 6/32) .06 ( 3/50) 13 2 .35 ( 8/23) .24 ( 9/37) 11 3 .65 (15/23) .29 ( 4/14) 36 4 .72 (13/18) .71 (12/17) 1 5 .90 (27/30) .91 (20/22) -1 As with the race-of-defendant data in defendant's Table 18, the data in his Table 18A continues to reflect a disparity that generally decreases with additional cases. The Martini data add twenty-eight cases, four of which fall within culpability level four. The results are: Culpability Level White Victim Non-white Victim % Disparity 1 .18 ( 7/38) .03 ( 2/59) 15 2 .42 (10/24) .29 (14/48) 13 3 .57 (13/23) .27 ( 3/11) 30 4 .74 (17/23) .75 (12/16) -1 5 .93 (27/29) .87 (20/23) 6 On examination, however, the tables do not show any disparity at Bey's level of culpability in the imposition of the death penalty because of the race of the victim. Moreover, Table 18A suffers from the same flaws as Table 18: the modified culpability ranges include cases that are dissimilar and that are based on inadequate measures of socio-economic status. In sum, we do not find from the data presented that the race of either the defendant or the victim plays an impermissible role in death sentencing. Likewise, we do not find that the socio-economic status of the defendant or the victim plays any such role. Defendant also argues that his sentence violates the United States Constitution because juries do not generally impose death sentences and because geographic disparities impermissibly affect death sentencing. We rejected those arguments in Marshall, supra, 130 N.J. at 188-206, 613 A. 2d 1059, and continue to find them unpersuasive.