Opinion ID: 378214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: grounds for dismissal

Text: 14 The first ground presented to the district court on which it may have relied 9 in dismissing the suit against Dominicana is the immunity accorded foreign sovereigns by the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1604. Section 1604 which, of course, has no bearing on the ultimate disposition of the claims against the defendants other than Dominicana provides a general grant of immunity to foreign states, subject only to the exceptions delineated elsewhere in the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-07. The burden of establishing the applicability of this immunity naturally lay with the one claiming it, Dominicana. H.R.Rep. at 17; Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F.Supp. 396, 405 & n. 9 (D.N.J.1979). Since Dominicana, wholly owned by the Dominican government, undisputedly is a foreign state as defined for purposes of the FSIA in § 1603(a), supra note 1, the only question is whether it demonstrated that the Arangos' claims did not lie within any exception specified in §§ 1605-07. H.R.Rep. at 17 (burden of proving non-applicability of specified exceptions lies with foreign state). We do not believe Dominicana shouldered this aspect of its burden with respect to the entirety of the Arangos' actions against it. 15 Section 1605(a)(2) provides an exception to the blanket grant of immunity in § 1604 for actions based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere . . . . Dominicana has admitted before the district court, in its Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, that its airline operations, including sales of tickets and tourist cards, carried on in the United States constitute such acts and commercial activity as would trigger § 1605(a) (2). R. at 99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d), (e) (defining relevant commercial activity). 10 It argues, however, that § 1605(a)(2) is inapplicable because the Arangos' claims arise not from this commercial activity, but from the acts of Dominican immigration officials in expelling the Arangos from the Dominican Republic and from the events of the non-commercial, involuntary re-routing of the Arangos in which Dominicana was compelled by those authorities to participate. With respect to certain of the Arangos' claims, this is true, but as to others it is not. 16 Two counts of the Arangos' complaint allege false imprisonment and battery stemming from the Arangos' being forcibly placed on board the Dominicana flight from Santo Domingo to San Juan, Puerto Rico by Dominican immigration officers, with the aid of Dominicana employees, in connection with the Arangos' involuntary re-routing, and from their allegedly being man-handled during this procedure. In accordance with its argument, above, Dominicana is not answerable to these tort claims. The focus of the exception to immunity recognized in § 1605(a)(2) is not on whether the defendant generally engages in a commercial enterprise or activity, as an airline such as Dominicana unquestionably does; rather, it is on whether the particular conduct giving rise to the claim in question actually constitutes or is in connection with commercial activity, regardless of the defendant's generally commercial or governmental character. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F.Supp. 849, 855-56 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (holding generally commercial Soviet news agencies immune for allegedly libellous story produced for official Soviet state publications); see International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F.Supp. 553, 568-69 n. 14 (C.D.Cal.1979). 17 Dominicana's actions in connection with the involuntary re-routing were not commercial. Dominicana was impressed into service to perform these functions, for which it apparently was not compensated, by Dominican immigration officials pursuant to that country's laws. Dominicana acted merely as an arm or agent of the Dominican government in carrying out this assigned role, and, as such, is entitled to the same immunity from any liability arising from that governmental function as would inure to the government, itself. See Papagianakis v. SAMOS, 186 F.2d 257, 261-62 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921, 71 S.Ct. 741, 95 L.Ed. 1354 (1951) (similarly recognizing derivative sovereign immunity for private vessel owners and crew against false imprisonment claim stemming from their incarceration of plaintiffs on board the vessel pursuant to orders from United States immigration officials). See also Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 51-52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830, 96 S.Ct. 50, 46 L.Ed.2d 47 (1975) (one who acts as Medicare agent for HEW is cloaked in HEW's governmental immunity). 18 Arangos' complaint also, however, stated claims for breach of warranty and contract based on the miscarriage and non-performance of the vacation tour and the apparent failure of defendants to refund the price paid for the tour. It further alleged that, because Dominicana knew of the official list of undesired foreigners forbidden to enter the Dominican Republic and because of its high duty of care as a common carrier, Dominicana was negligent in arranging the Arangos' vacation air transportation without ascertaining whether they would even be allowed to enter the Dominican Republic for the purpose of that vacation, or without at least warning them of the potential danger of exclusion based on that list and its attendant costs and consequences. Each of these claims, and the duties alleged therein to have been breached, arose directly from or in connection with the marketing and execution of contracts i.e., the sale of airline tickets and tourist cards necessary to enter Dominican Republic by Dominicana, along with the other defendants, in the normal course of its airline business in the United States. Consequently, while these claims may eventually fail for other reasons, they plainly stem from Dominicana's commercial activity in the United States and are, therefore, not barred by foreign sovereign immunity. See United Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R., 461 F.Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (holding no immunity for breach of contract for sale of service); National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F.Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
19 The second theory proffered to the district court as grounds for dismissal was the act of state doctrine. The act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity (or legality) of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power (has) committed within its own territory. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401, 84 S.Ct. 923, 926, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964). Relegating grievances from acts of this sort to executive channels of international diplomacy, the rule is an embodiment of the deference to be accorded the sovereignty of other nations; it averts potential diplomatic embarrassment from the courts of one sovereign sitting in judgment over the public acts of another. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 1862, 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1975); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252, 18 S.Ct. 83, 85, 42 L.Ed. 456 (1897). 20 Unlike foreign sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine affects the viability of the Arangos' claims against all the defendants. It does not simply relieve the foreign government of liability for its acts, but operates as an issue preclusion device, foreclosing judicial inquiry into the validity or propriety of such acts in litigation between any set of parties. National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F.Supp. at 640; see, e. g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 608, 54 L.Ed.2d 477 (1977) (foreclosing antitrust conspiracy suit against private oil companies that would have required inquiry into alleged untoward motives behind Libya's nationalization of its oil industry). Consequently, the Arangos' battery and false imprisonment claims would be foreclosed under this doctrine, as well as under the FSIA, since they would, by definition, require an adjudication of the propriety and legality of the acts of the Dominican immigration authorities and, more specifically, of Dominicana employees while effectively deployed as agents of that government under the orders of these authorities in the performance of their official governmental duties in denying the Arangos' entry into the Dominican Republic and effecting their removal. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 18 S.Ct. 83, 42 L.Ed. 456 (1897) (foreclosing suit under act of state doctrine against foreign agent who detained American citizen); United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1979) (characterizing exclusion of aliens as a sovereign governmental act). 21 Dominicana urges that, beyond this, since the Arangos' expulsion by Dominican authorities was the precipitating factor for all plaintiffs' claims, all should be foreclosed by the act of state doctrine. This contention accords that doctrine too great a breadth. The act of state doctrine only precludes judicial inquiry into the legality, validity, and propriety of the acts and motivations of foreign sovereigns acting in their governmental roles within their own boundaries; 11 it does not preclude judicial resolution of all commercial consequences stemming from the occurrence of such public acts. See National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F.Supp. at 639-40. The Arangos' contract and negligence claims require only a determination of the respective rights and duties of the parties in the wake of the sovereign acts of the Dominican immigration authorities. The claims raise the questions of who bears the risk of loss following such an incident and whether there existed a duty on the part of any defendant to protect the Arangos from, or to warn of, the possibility of its occurrence. They do not necessitate a consideration or evaluation of the legitimacy of those acts of state, themselves. Consequently, the act of state doctrine, like the FSIA, should not have required dismissal with respect to the Arangos' contract and negligence claims.
22 Finally, though they did not present the question to the district court, the parties have alluded on appeal to whether, independent of the preclusive effects of foreign sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine, the Arangos have alleged facts presenting a legally cognizable claim. Keeping in mind that a complaint is to be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Voter Information Project, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 1980), we believe that a claim has been stated. 23 Under the law of Florida, the state in which the contract for air transportation was executed and in which performance commenced, a common carrier such as Dominicana is required to exercise the highest degree of care, foresight, prudence, and diligence toward its passengers. Edwards v. Jacksonville Coach Co., 88 So.2d 543, 544 (Fla.1956) (emphasis added). This has been specifically construed to include a duty to warn a passenger, upon the purchase of a ticket, of potential dangers from third parties at the point of arrival. Werndli v. Greyhound Corp., 365 So.2d 177, 178 (Fla.App.1978) (failure to warn that bus terminal at destination was in high crime area and would be locked upon arrival stated cause of action against carrier for injuries received at destination at hands of third parties). 24 In a case closely analogous to this one, the First Circuit in Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Castano, 358 F.2d 203, 208-09 (1st Cir. 1966), ruled that where an international air carrier failed to warn a passenger, upon his purchase of a ticket, that he would be prevented by immigration officials from entering the country of his destination unless he had a proper visa, that carrier would be liable for all damages and injuries proximately flowing from the passenger's exclusion from that country due to his failure to secure a visa. 25 Dominicana has admitted that it was aware of the list of undesired foreigners and, in fact, had previously transported individuals who had been denied entry into the Dominican Republic on the basis of that list. R. at 76-77. Without attempting to define all possible grounds of recovery by the Arangos, we can see now that if they can demonstrate either (1) that Dominicana, with the foregoing knowledge, sold them tourist cards upon the false assertion that these cards, alone, would assure their entry into the country, or (2) that Dominicana had access to the list, knew or should have known the Arangos' names were on it, and therefore, that the object of their vacation contract was impossible, yet proceeded to arrange for their vacation air transportation, a cognizable claim will have been proved. See Dumas v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir. 1980), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief on his claim). Therefore, while there may be flaws in the Arangos' particular theories of recovery that may even be assailed subsequently on summary judgment, the complaint appears adequate to withstand a motion to dismiss. 26 For the reasons set forth in Section I of this opinion, the appeal is DISMISSED and the cause is REMANDED.