Opinion ID: 811856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Hinge

Text: The Commission properly found that the only difference between the claimed invention and the prior art was the “pivotally mounted” (hinged) side. The parties dispute whether it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the old-style SMC connector with a hinged side. The Commission found that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the prior art to achieve the patented invention “to avoid loose parts and for ease of use,” citing expert testimony and the problems with the prior art described in the ’392 Patent. Commission Op. at 26-27. The Commission also found that the solution of adding a hinge to the old-style SMC connector was obvious. First, the Commission found that the prior art U.S. Patent No. 4,915,418 (“Palatchy Patent”) taught that adding a hinge to a pipe coupling eliminated loose parts and made the connector easier to use. Commission Op. at 28; see also Palatchy Patent col. 1 ll. 33-54 (describing the claimed pipe coupling with “hingedly connected” segments that allow the coupling to be “more easily positioned and held in place by the plumber” by allowing the positioning of one segment while “permitting the remaining segments to freely dangle beneath the positioned segment ready for application”). The invention of the ’392 Patent solved similar problems in a similar way. This art is relevant to the invention in the ’392 Patent because the ’392 Patent is also directed to water pipes and cites the Palatchy Patent. ’392 Patent, at [56], col. 4 ll. 34-38. While Norgren argues that Palatchy and the oldstyle SMC connector teach away from the clamp claimed in the ’392 Patent, nothing indicates that they “criticize, 14 NORGREN v. ITC discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed” as required for teaching away. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the Commission found that the addition of the hinge was a common sense solution. Hinges are a common mechanical component that would have been known to those of ordinary skill in the art to solve a loose parts problem. Commission Op. at 29-30 & n.18 (citing Adams v. Bellaire Stamping Co., 141 U.S. 539 (1891)). Even Norgren’s expert in the remand proceedings, John Wolfe (“Wolfe”), indicated that a hinge was a common component that one of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have understood to solve the loose parts problem. Wolfe also testified that there were a finite number of solutions to the loose parts problem. While Norgren argues that the evidence did not show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have expected the addition of the hinge to succeed, the Commission’s conclusion that it did is supported by substantial evidence. Trumper testified that the addition of the hinge did not affect the clamping function. Similarly, Wolfe suggested that the addition of the hinge would not require testing. Also, the Commission correctly rejected Norgren’s argument that the addition of a hinge was nonobvious because Wolfe had not considered it. The correct analysis is whether it would have been obvious to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, not whether it was obvious to Wolfe personally. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Norgren cites Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Laboratories, 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008), to support its argument that there was insufficient evidence of a motivation to combine the elements and argues specifically that the problem listed in the patent was insufficient motivation. NORGREN v. ITC 15 However, KSR expressly stated that “[o]ne of the ways in which a patent’s subject matter can be proved obvious is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the patent’s claims.” 550 U.S. at 419-20. In this case, the Commission properly found the claims obvious based on evidence of known problems and an obvious solution. Nothing presented by Norgren relating to secondary considerations undercuts this conclusion. Contrary to Norgren’s arguments, the evidence presented on secondary considerations does not merit a finding of nonobviousness. The Commission agreed with the ALJ that Wiskamp’s testimony on surprise and skepticism following the release of Norgren’s clamp was lacking in detail and lacking support in the record. The Commission also found the evidence insufficient to show long-felt need, and the testimony Norgren cites does not necessitate the opposite conclusion. While Norgren argued that the expert testimony indicating ways to modify the prior art showed failure by others, the Commission found that the testimony did not show that others tried and failed and that Wolfe conceded that the clamp claimed in the ’392 Patent could have been made at the time of the invention. The Commission found that Norgren failed to establish commercial success and failed to show a nexus between any success and the features claimed in the ’392 Patent. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Finally, the Commission rejected Norgren’s assertion of copying because the clamp accused of being a copy was excluded from the remand proceeding because Norgren failed to provide a foundation. The Commission’s determination of obviousness, including its assessment of secondary considerations, is supported by substantial evidence and is consistent with the law. The invention in the ’392 Patent 16 NORGREN v. ITC was a combination of known elements with no more than expected results. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416-17.