Opinion ID: 739296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Carbide's Motion for a New Trial

Text: 55
56 Defendants protest that the jury's verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence. The denial of a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence, however, is not subject to appellate review. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1199 (2d Cir.1995), modified, 85 F.3d 49 (2d Cir.1996). 57 The task of reviewing and weighing all of the evidence presented at trial simply imposes too great a burden on the appellate court. Id. Accordingly, while defendants were entitled to argue to the trial judge that the verdict [was] against the weight of the evidence ... the denial of that challenge is one of those few rulings that is simply unavailable for appellate review. Id. Similarly, defendants may not obtain review of the denial of a new trial on the ground that the jury's damage award was against the weight of the evidence. See Haywood v. Koehler, 78 F.3d 101 (2d Cir.1996) (applying Stonewall to preclude review of denial of a new trial where jury found defendants liable for use of excessive force but awarded no damages).
58 Defendants contend that various evidentiary errors at trial rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair to them. They point to the following: (1) allowing one of Lightfoot's witnesses, Dr. Cellura, to testify as an expert that age was a factor in Lightfoot's termination, that there was age discrimination at Carbide, and that Carbide took a particular interest in young, talented people; (2) permitting Lightfoot's counsel to question a witness about Carbide's profits and emissions problems at Carbide plants in West Virginia and Bhopal; and (3) allowing Lightfoot's counsel to discuss specific dollar figures in his closing argument on damages. 59 A motion for a new trial  'ordinarily should not [be granted] unless [the trial court] is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.'  Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 365 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Smith v. Lightning Bolt Productions, Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir.1988)). A trial judge's decision to grant or deny such a motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Song v. Ives Labs., Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir.1992). 60
61 Dr. Robert P. Cellura, who was employed by Carbide from 1976 to 1992, testified against Carbide. Cellura participated in the forced-ranking meeting that resulted in Lightfoot's termination. On redirect examination, Lightfoot's counsel asked Cellura whether he believed that any factor other than Lightfoot's performance influenced the decision to terminate Lightfoot. Cellura testified that he believed age discrimination had been involved, pointing to three factors: (1) a decline in the average age of Lightfoot's group and of all of Carbide's business directors after the reorganization; (2) the decision to terminate Lightfoot rather than a similarly ranked younger employee; and (3) a decline in the average age of Carbide's highest-paid employees. Defendants contend that this testimony should have been excluded because it lacked probative value, was not based on Cellura's personal knowledge, and went to the ultimate issue in the case. 62 The Federal Rules of Evidence allow a lay witness to testify in the form of an opinion, provided such testimony is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 701. The fact that the lay opinion testimony bears on the ultimate issue in the case does not render the testimony inadmissible. Fed.R.Evid. 704(a); see United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1214-15 (2d Cir.1992) (Since neither Rule 701 nor Rule 704(a) limits the subject matter of lay opinion testimony, there is no theoretical prohibition against allowing lay witnesses to give their opinions as to [the ultimate issue in the case].). The admissibility of Cellura's testimony therefore depends upon whether it satisfies the rational-basis and helpfulness requirements of Rule 701. 63 The rational-basis requirement of Rule 701  'is the familiar requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation.'  Rea, 958 F.2d at 1215 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee's note on 1972 Proposed Rules). When Lightfoot's counsel initially elicited from Cellura his opinion that age was a factor in Lightfoot's termination, the district court sustained defense counsel's objections to the unsupported opinion and told Cellura: 64 You don't have any reason for saying that [age was a factor in Lightfoot's termination]. You have given us a conversation, have you? This isn't gossamer we are working with up here. 65 What do you have that Mr. Shackelford said to support that proposition that he did or that he loved or that he ate or that he smelled? 66 In response to the court's admonition, Cellura described two primary factors upon which he claimed to base his opinion: the declining average age of various categories of Carbide employees and Carbide's retention of young Goebel, who was ranked similarly to Lightfoot in the forced-ranking process. Cellura had previously testified that he was one of five managers working directly under defendant Shackelford and that he was personally involved in the forced-ranking procedure that led to the termination of Lightfoot. Cellura was thus in a position to have acquired personal knowledge of the facts that formed the basis of his opinion. The district court commendably sought to ensure that Cellura's testimony focused on those objective facts. 67 Even when a lay opinion is rationally based upon objective facts, it may still be inadmissible if it does not help the jury to understand the witness' testimony or to decide a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 701(b). This helpfulness requirement is designed to provide 'assurance[ ] against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach.'  Rea, 958 F.2d at 1215 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 704 advisory committee's note on 1972 Proposed Rules). The challenged testimony consisted primarily of Cellura's description of the factual basis of his opinion that age was a factor in Lightfoot's termination. Cellura had established a solid foundation of his intimate involvement with Carbide's operation and his opinion was thus based on observations about Carbide's decisionmaking process. This testimony was sufficiently helpful to be admissible. 68
69 Defendants further contend that the trial court erred in allowing Lightfoot's counsel to cross-examine Shackelford about Carbide's earnings between 1989 and 1993, and to question Glen Kraft about emissions problems at Carbide's plants in West Virginia and Bhopal, India. Defendants regard these questions as an attempt to portray Carbide as a disreputable corporate citizen with ample financial resources to compensate victims like Lightfoot. They add that the trial judge's participation in the Bhopal questions amounted to tacit approval of that line of questioning. 70 As to the questions about Carbide's income and financial status, defendants never objected to this testimony. Having failed to make a timely objection at trial, defendants are limited to plain error review of the issue. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1); Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532, 542 (2d Cir.1965) ([C]hallenge [to defendants' closing argument], raised for the first time on the motion for new trial, came too late.). 71 There was no error here, plain or otherwise, since Carbide's opening statement brought up Bhopal and made an issue of Carbide's financial straits: 72 Union Carbide beginning in the mid-1980's was a company that was having serious financial problems. I'm sure most of you know about Bhopal, which cost the company a lot of money. There was a takeover attempt that cost the company a lot of money, and Union Carbide generally had to start reevaluating its business that resulted in the company selling off a lot of businesses that they owned; it resulted in a lot of cost cutting and it resulted in a lot of reductions in force to a lot of people. 73 The cross-examination of Shackelford simply explored the basis for that opening statement. During plaintiff's cross-examination of defendants' witness, Glen Kraft, the Bhopal tragedy was raised and questions were asked about poisonous emissions and their cause. The court interjected with three or four questions before concluding that the entire subject matter was totally irrelevant in my view, but since I was interested, I asked those questions. 74 The court's comment that the questions were irrelevant was sufficient to alert the jury that it should not take that information into account in deciding the case. There is no error. 75
76 Plaintiff's counsel, in summation, asked for a specific dollar amount as damages. Defendants now urge us to adopt a per se rule prohibiting counsel from suggesting a specific sum as damages. We decline to do so. 77 While at least one circuit has such a rule, see Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723, 744 (3d Cir.1990) ([P]laintiff's counsel may [not] request a specific dollar amount for pain and suffering in his closing remarks.), we favor a more flexible approach. It is best left to the discretion of the trial judge, who may either prohibit counsel from mentioning specific figures or impose reasonable limitations, including cautionary jury instructions. See Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1016 (2d Cir.1995) (encouraging trial judges to prohibit counsel from suggesting specific monetary awards for pain and suffering), vacated on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2576, 135 L.Ed.2d 1091 (1996); Mileski v. Long Island R.R. Co., 499 F.2d 1169, 1174 (2d Cir.1974). Here, counsel reviewed the evidence on damages and asked for an award of $1,500,000. The court instructed the jury that damages should be awarded only upon and only in proportion to a showing as to the nature, duration and severity of his condition. 78 Although the jury's award of $750,000, exactly half of the demand by plaintiff's counsel, suggests that the jurors may have been influenced by counsel's mention of a particular dollar amount, in context, the closing and the charge to the jury do not support defendants' claim that the jury was unfairly influenced. Cf. Consorti, 72 F.3d at 1016 (concluding that plaintiff's counsel's suggestion of a specific amount of damages did not unfairly influence jury that awarded precise amount suggested). 79
80 Finally, defendants challenge the court's inclusion of a mixed-motive instruction to the jury. Age discrimination suits under the NYSHRL get the same analysis as claims under Title VII or the ADEA. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1180 (2d Cir.1992). Under Title VII, a plaintiff is entitled to a mixed-motive instruction, which shifts to the defendant the burden of showing that the plaintiff would have been fired even if there were no discriminatory motivating factor, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 260, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1795-96, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (White, J., concurring in the judgment), when the evidence is sufficient to allow a trier to find both forbidden and permissible motives. Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 181 (2d Cir.1992). 81 In Ostrowski we recognized that a plaintiff may carry his burden of proving that a forbidden factor was a motive in his termination through either direct or circumstantial evidence, see id. at 181-82; but a mixed-motive instruction is not required unless such evidence includes conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude. Id. at 182 ([P]urely statistical evidence would not warrant [a mixed motive charge]; nor would ... 'stray' remarks in the workplace by persons who are not involved in the pertinent decisionmaking process.). 82 The district court properly found that Lightfoot produced sufficient evidence to earn a mixed-motive instruction. Lightfoot testified, for example, that Shackelford expressed surprise and disbelief when Lightfoot said he wanted to work until he was seventy years old. In addition to his opinion that age was a factor in Lightfoot's termination, Dr. Cellura testified that Carbide has a high potential category where they take particular interest in young talented people. While the quantum of Lightfoot's evidence may have been less than that in Ostrowski, it was nevertheless adequate to support the instruction given by the court.