Opinion ID: 2242801
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Mitigation Evidence

Text: Defendant next contends that his trial counsel failed to investigate prior to trial several other nonstatutory areas of mitigation. Counsel allegedly failed to assemble mitigation evidence from defendant's family and friends. This testimony would have gone essentially to defendant's disadvantaged and troubled childhood, emotional ties to his sisters and others, and good character. Defendant also attaches to his post-conviction petition mitigation evidence specifically describing his relationship to his street gang. Defendant argues that his membership in the gang, while not praiseworthy, reflected a pathetic need for family. However, such evidence is not inherently mitigating. Stewart v. Gramley, 74 F.3d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1996). The jury might have considered such testimony to be an aggravating factor. The jury could have regarded defendant's troubled life, with his criminal record and gang involvement in prison, as an indicator of defendant's future dangerousness. See Mahaffey, 165 Ill.2d at 467, 209 Ill.Dec. 246, 651 N.E.2d 174. Defendant's trial counsel also allegedly failed to present evidence of defendant's poor academic record. However, such testimony from additional witnesses would have been merely cumulative to the testimony of school psychologist Norma Johnson, which the jury already heard. Further, evidence of educational disabilities is not inherently mitigating. Johnson, 183 Ill.2d at 203-04, 233 Ill.Dec. 288, 700 N.E.2d 996. Defendant next faults his trial counsel for allegedly failing to investigate evidence of defendant's psychological and emotional problems. As with proof of educational disabilities, evidence of mental impairments as described in defendant's evidence is not inherently mitigating. See Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 882-84 (7th Cir.1997). Proof of these mental deficiencies not only could have evoked compassion from the jury, but also could have demonstrated defendant's continued dangerousness. See Johnson, 183 Ill.2d at 203-04, 233 Ill.Dec. 288, 700 N.E.2d 996; Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 406, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063; People v. Madej, 177 Ill.2d 116, 139-40, 226 Ill.Dec. 453, 685 N.E.2d 908 (1997). Defendant next claims that [d]espite his problems and deficits, [he] developed many positive qualities as he became a young adult and moved away from his parents' residence. Defendant faults his trial counsel for failing to present evidence of these positive aspects, specifically including defendant's work history and capacity for rehabilitation. [W]e must assess prejudice in a realistic manner based on the totality of the evidence. Accordingly, it is improper to focus solely on the potential mitigating evidence. As our cases illustrate, the nature and extent of the evidence in aggravation must also be considered. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d at 538, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919 (collecting cases). In this case, we have previously described the merciless and dangerous nature of the aggravation evidence. The failure of defendant's trial counsel to place more information from defendant's past onto the scale probably would not have tipped it in defendant's favor. See Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1322 (7th Cir.1996). Defendant next faults his trial counsel for failing to present additional details pertaining to the Paschal murder and defendant's guilty plea to that crime. This evidence pertains to the dispute between Paschal and defendant's mother, Paschal's provocation of defendant prior to and at the time of the murder, and the police coercion of defendant's sisters to give false statements. Defendant also presents evidence that: his attorney at the plea conference was at that time suspended from the practice of law, his attorney did not confer with him at the conference, and his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. The proffered evidence pertaining to the Paschal murder is largely cumulative to that presented at the sentencing hearing. The evidence pertaining to defendant's guilty plea does not support his allegations. Defendant's exhibits attached to his post-conviction petition show as follows. Two attorneys filed appearances on defendant's behalf; they stood by defendant at, and participated in, the plea conference. Defendant does not now question the credentials of the second attorney. The report of proceedings shows that the circuit court very carefully and thoroughly questioned and admonished defendant to ascertain whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. See 177 Ill.2d R. 402. During the court's questioning, defendant conferred with his counsel twice. His responses, with two attorneys present, show that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and the circuit court so found. To the extent that defendant's proffered evidence presents new information, it probably would not have changed defendant's sentence. See Jackson v. Roth, 24 F.3d 1002, 1005 (7th Cir.1994). Defendant faults his trial counsel also for failing to present mitigating aspects of defendant's prison record. Defendant now points to his many requests for education. He also notes that of his 154 prison disciplinary reports, only six were for assault and, of those six, four were received after he murdered the victim. To defendant, [w]hile that is not commendable, it is hardly the unusual or threatening picture that the prosecution portrayed in aggravation. Defendant also points to an affidavit by Freddie Green, who was a corrections officer at defendant's prison. Green's affidavit included the following. Defendant warned Green of an attack on another guard, thereby preventing it. Also, defendant refused to carry out a gang-ordered hit on another inmate. As punishment, some members of defendant's gang were planning to hit defendant. Green had defendant moved to another cellhouse. Favorable evidence of a defendant's conduct while incarcerated is potentially mitigating. People v. Turner, 156 Ill.2d 354, 360, 189 Ill.Dec. 713, 620 N.E.2d 1030 (1993). In this case, however, [d]efendant's good conduct neither diminished the circumstances of the offense nor lessened his responsibility for its commission. Turner, 156 Ill.2d at 365, 189 Ill.Dec. 713, 620 N.E.2d 1030. While this evidence may be viewed as mitigation, it probably would not have changed defendant's sentence. See Madej, 177 Ill.2d at 140, 226 Ill.Dec. 453, 685 N.E.2d 908. Further, this evidence can support the inference that defendant, following gang orders, murdered the victim to regain favor with the gang. This evidence thereby indicates defendant's future dangerousness. Defendant contends that the evidence submitted in his post-conviction petition is at least as mitigating as the evidence in cases that satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland. Defendant relies on several cases in which trial counsel presented very little to no available mitigation evidence at the death sentencing hearing. E.g., People v. Morgan, 187 Ill.2d 500, 513, 241 Ill.Dec. 552, 719 N.E.2d 681 (1999) (counsel presented two mitigation witnesses whose combined testimony totaled 10 pages of transcript); People v. Orange, 168 Ill.2d 138, 166, 213 Ill.Dec. 589, 659 N.E.2d 935 (1995) (counsel did not present any mitigation witnesses); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill.2d 148, 165, 204 Ill.Dec. 147, 641 N.E.2d 371 (1994) (only mitigation witness was defendant's wife); People v. Perez, 148 Ill.2d 168, 176-77, 185, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984 (1992) (only evidence presented was Department of Corrections psychological report prepared while defendant was imprisoned for prior offense); People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill.2d 1, 21-22, 138 Ill.Dec. 201, 547 N.E.2d 170 (1989) (sole mitigation witness was police officer who testified that defendant expressed remorse when he was questioned about offenses). In this case, however, defendant's trial counsel presented to the jury evidence or argument in several major areas of mitigation. The jury received a sense of defendant's: social history; mental and developmental profile; version of the circumstances surrounding the Paschal murder; gang membership as a substitute for family; and prison record as not being egregious, considering gang control of prisons. True, defendant's trial counsel failed to present additional available evidence in the above-mentioned areas. However, considering the proffered evidence in light of the aggravating circumstances, we conclude that this additional evidence would probably not have precluded defendant's death sentence. See People v. Thomas, 164 Ill.2d 410, 429-30, 207 Ill.Dec. 490, 647 N.E.2d 983 (1995). We hold that the performance of defendant's trial counsel met the constitutional minimum. See Jackson, 24 F.3d at 1005. As this court's opinion on direct review indicates, this was not a perfect trial. See People v. Easley, 148 Ill.2d 281, 170 Ill.Dec. 356, 592 N.E.2d 1036 (1992). However, a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. Likewise, ineffective assistance of counsel refers to competent, not perfect, representation. Recognizing these axioms, Strickland requires only that a defendant receive a fair trial, i.e., a trial free of errors so egregious that they probably caused the conviction or the sentence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692-93; Griffin, 178 Ill.2d at 90-91, 227 Ill.Dec. 338, 687 N.E.2d 820. In this case, defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death based not on any alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, but rather on overwhelming evidence. We uphold the circuit court's dismissal of defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.