Opinion ID: 1662097
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Judge Corrigan's Character Witnesses

Text: Smulls objected to the relevancy of the state's presentation of five prominent criminal defense attorneys who know Judge Corrigan and testified to his reputation as being free of bias when judging cases involving African-Americans. Smulls concedes that character evidence is relevant when put in issue by the nature of the proceeding, and his real complaint seems to be that character evidence has no bearing on racial bias. However, an inquiry into a judge's alleged racial bias cannot be conducted without an inquiry into the judge's character because the presence or absence of racial bias is part of a judge's character. Where, as here, a party has opened the door by introducing evidence of bad character as manifested by racial bias, the other party may introduce evidence of good character as manifested by the lack of racial bias. Citing Clemmons v. State, 785 S.W.2d 524, 531 (Mo. banc 1990), Smulls also argues that the character and reputation witnesses were not competent to testify because their testimony relates solely to issues the motion court must decide. It is clear from their testimony, however, that the witnesses were testifying not as experts on a matter of law, but as persons familiar with Judge Corrigan's judicial temperament. In Clemmons , the attorneys were impermissibly testifying regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, an issue of law. Id. In contrast, the witnesses here testified regarding bias, a factual determination. See State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d at 334 (Mo. banc 1996); State v. Thomas, 596 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Mo. banc 1980).