Opinion ID: 1453508
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instruction on Circumstantial Evidence and Reasonable Doubt

Text: (41) The court refused defendant's request to instruct that the jury could not draw any inference based on circumstantial evidence unless the underlying facts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and the inference is the only reasonable one. (See CALJIC No. 2.01.) Defendant contends the court erred. The contention fails for two reasons. First, the prosecution did not substantially rely on circumstantial evidence for proof of guilt. ( People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 406 [276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221].) More fundamentally, the reasonable doubt instruction was inappropriate at the penalty phase. At a penalty phase, unlike the guilt phase, the jury does not engage in factfinding as such, but rather determines the appropriate penalty for the crime or crimes of which the defendant has already been convicted. Although other crimes must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before they can be considered in aggravation ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 280-281 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]), none was offered in this case. Aggravating factors other than criminal activity need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury may consider them. In People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113], we rejected the claim that a valid death penalty law must require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any ... aggravating factors.... ( Id. at p. 777.) As we explained, instructions like those discussed in [ People v.] Brown [, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, and given in this case] are better suited to the normative task of sentencing than are admonitions, such as those urged by appellant, which speak in terms associated with traditional factfinding. (42 Cal.3d at p. 779.)