Opinion ID: 2977399
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction to Review the Asylum Claim

Text: The BIA upheld the IJ’s finding that Win had not shown that his application for asylum was timely. The IJ found that Win had failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that his asylum 9 application was filed within one year of his arrival in the United States as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). The IJ also observed that Win did not argue or present evidence that there were changed or extraordinary circumstances that would have justified the IJ’s consideration of his untimely application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). Likewise, Win did not raise any constitutional claims or matters of statutory construction, a factor that would have allowed this Court to exercise jurisdiction over his asylum claim. See Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 2006). Appellate review of asylum claims is statutorily limited. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3).2 This Court recently observed that “§ 1158(a)(3) ‘bar[s] our review of asylum applications denied for untimeliness . . . when the appeal seeks review of discretionary or factual questions, but not when the appeal seeks review of constitutional claims or matters of statutory construction.’” Huang v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Almuhtaseb, 453 F.3d at 748). Because Win’s appeal does not seek review of constitutional claims or matters of statutory construction, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the IJ’s factual finding that Win’s application was untimely. B. Claim for Withholding of Removal Under the INA and the CAT Although this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Win’s asylum claim, it does have jurisdiction over Win’s appeal of the BIA’s denial of his requests for withholding of removal under the INA and for protection under the CAT. See Sall v. Gonzales, 251 F. App’x 337, 339 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 544-52). “Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision, we review 2 The statute provides that: No court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2). 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). Paragraph (2)(B) addresses the one-year time bar for asylum applications. 10 the IJ’s decision directly.” Sall, 251 F. App’x at 339 (citing Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2004)).
An alien can request the relief of a withholding of removal under both the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and the CAT. Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2006). The alien’s burden of proof under the INA and the CAT is different. “To qualify for withholding of removal under the INA, an applicant must establish that there is a ‘clear probability’ that if [he] were removed, [his] life or freedom would be threatened on account of political opinion or the other protected grounds listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).” Xiao Ji Chen v. United States DOJ, 434 F.3d 144, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2006). To show that there is a “clear probability,” the applicant must show that “‘it is more likely than not,’ that [he] would be subject to persecution” on account of a statutorily protected ground if he was removed. Almuhtaseb, 453 F.3d at 749 (quoting Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631, 640-41 (6th Cir. 2005)). “Evidence of past persecution creates ‘a rebuttable presumption . . . that there is a clear probability of a future threat should the applicant be returned.” Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 156 (citing Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2003) and 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)). “By contrast, to be eligible for withholding of removal under the CAT,” the applicant must show that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” Almuhtaseb, 453 F.3d at 749 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“We review the BIA’s decision on a request for withholding of removal under the same standard regardless of whether the request was made pursuant to the INA or the CAT. . . . We will 11 reverse the BIA’s determination against withholding of removal if it is ‘manifestly contrary to law.’” Id. at 749 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(C)). “To reverse the BIA’s determination, we must find that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but indeed compels it.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As to factual findings, “[w]e defer to the administrative findings of fact except when ‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
The IJ denied Win’s claims for withholding of removal under the INA and the CAT based on a finding that his testimony about past persecution and fear of future persecution lacked credibility, thus precluding him from satisfying his burden of proof. This is the same reason the IJ determined that Win’s claim for asylum would be denied even if it had been timely. The BIA held that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was not clearly erroneous because of the major discrepancies between Win’s testimony, his written application, and his corroborating evidence. Win argues that the BIA erred when it affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. Credibility determinations are findings of fact reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. Sylla v. INS, 388 F.3d 924, 925 (6th Cir. 2004). This is a highly deferential standard of review, requiring that “findings of fact are ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Although highly deferential, “the determination must be supported by specific reasons, must not be based on irrelevant inconsistencies, and must be based on issues that ‘go to the heart of’ the applicant’s claim.” Xhamxhi v. Gonzales, 188 F. App’x 472, 475 (6th Cir. 12 2006) (quoting Sylla, 388 F.3d at 926). “If discrepancies ‘cannot be viewed as attempts by the applicant to enhance his claims of persecution, they have no bearing on credibility.’” Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 623 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000)).3 Because the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, we review the IJ’s finding directly. Yu, 364 F.3d at 702. Despite Win’s arguments to the contrary, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Win was not credible about his past persecution or his fear of future persecution. In this case, although a few of the inconsistencies identified by the IJ were irrelevant,4 we conclude that a review of the record as a whole would not compel a reasonable adjudicator to conclude that Win was credible. See Yu, 364 F.3d at 702. Other inconsistencies that the IJ relied upon for her adverse credibility finding go to the heart of Win’s claims of past persecution and fear of future persecution in Burma and can be viewed as attempts by him to enhance his claims of persecution. First, Win testified that, after his August 1989 arrest, he was placed on a watch list, was required to report to the government authorities bi-weekly, and noticed military intelligence people 3 “The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, changed the standard governing credibility determinations, stating that those determinations may be made without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim. This provision, however, applies only to those aliens who applied for asylum, withholding of removal, or other relief on or after May 11, 2005, the effective date of this provision of the Act. Sall, 251 F. App’x at 340, n.1 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because Win applied for relief earlier than May 11, 2005, this provision of the REAL ID Act does not apply to this Court’s review of his claims. Id. 4 For example, the inconsistency between Win’s testimony that he had no brothers and the statement about his “brothers” in his application for asylum does not go to the heart of Win’s claims and thus cannot form a basis for the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. “[M]inor and irrelevant inconsistencies cannot constitute the basis of an adverse credibility determination.” Sylla, 388 F.3d at 926. 13 coming around his home. As the IJ noted, Win’s application for asylum states otherwise, i.e., that after this August 1989 arrest, he was free to be involved in politics again. Additional record facts corroborate Win’s written admission and undermine the credibility of his testimony about past persecution and fears of future persecution or torture in Burma. Despite his continued political activity, Win remained unharmed in Burma for almost seven years, the period between his alleged August 1989 and May 6, 1996 arrests. Win also testified that, although he continued his political activity in pro-democracy efforts in Burma, albeit more secretly than in the past, he remained unharmed in Burma from May 1997 until September 1998, when he left for Thailand. We have observed that this type of evidence indicates that the applicant’s situation “was not sufficiently grave to constitute persecution.” Almuhtaseb, 453 F.3d at 750 (citing cases). The IJ’s adverse credibility finding is further supported by omissions in the corroborating evidence Win presented and the lack of corroborating evidence reasonably available to Win. Although Win testified that NLD representative Aung Soe Myint was aware of his past three arrests, the letter from Myint that Win presented as corroborating evidence failed to mention any of those arrests. Similarly, although Win testified that his mother was aware of his three arrests and mistreatment and had let him know that the Burmese government authorities were still asking about his whereabouts, Win failed to obtain either an affidavit or statement from his mother acknowledging any of these facts despite her ability to provide him with other documents like his birth certificate and family certificates. His mother could have also corroborated Win’s testimony about the circumstances of his father’s death in 1995. IJ determinations regarding the availability of corroborating evidence are not to be reversed “unless the court finds . . . that a reasonable trier of fact 14 is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).5 There is nothing in the record that would compel a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that this corroborating evidence was unavailable. Accordingly, the IJ’s determination cannot be reversed. The above inconsistencies go to the heart of Win’s claims for withholding of removal and are sufficient to support the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. Thus, there is no need to address Win’s additional arguments about other inconsistencies. See Xhamxhi, 188 F. App’x at 476 (observing that “[o]ther circuits hold that a single inconsistency may support an adverse credibility finding.”). Here, the IJ determined that, even if Win’s asylum application had been timely, his request for asylum would be denied on the merits because he was found not to be credible and thus could not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Because we conclude that the IJ’s adverse credibility findings were sufficient “under the less stringent standards for petition of asylum, the IJ’s findings were also sufficient to reject [Win]’s petition based on the more exacting standards used for withholding of removal and CAT.” Sall, 251 F. App’x at 341 (citing Hamida v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 734, 741-42 (6th Cir. 2007) and Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 1998)). C. “Asylum only” claim. 5 The REAL ID Act of 2005 amended 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). This amended provision took effect on May 11, 2005, and, pursuant to § 101(h)(3) of the REAL ID Act, Pub. L. 109-13, Div. B, Title I, 119 Stat. at 305, applies to all cases where the final administrative order of removal is issued before, on, or after May 11, 2005. Accordingly, Win’s appeal is governed by this standard. 15 The BIA determined that Win had waived the argument that he should have been in “Asylum Only” proceedings. Despite Win’s arguments to the contrary, the BIA did not err. Win was charged, under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or as an alien who has arrived in the United States at a time or place other than designated by the Attorney General. The record reflects that Win conceded this charge of removability. Moreover, Win never complained to the IJ about this charge or the nature of his removal proceedings. Rather, he raised this challenge for the first time in his administrative appeal. Because Win failed to raise this argument before the IJ, the BIA correctly concluded that the argument was waived. See Shehu v. Gonzales, 151 F. App’x 437, 44142 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that, because the petitioner failed to complain about a translator’s deficiencies during his removal proceedings, “the BIA properly held that he waived any objection to the quality of the translation.”).