Opinion ID: 1343594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Role of Prosecuting Attorney

Text: The duties of the prosecuting attorney in regard to prosecution of abuse and neglect proceedings are set forth in West Virginia Code § 49-6-10 (1996): It shall be the duty of every prosecuting attorney to fully and promptly cooperate with persons seeking to apply for relief under the provisions of this article in all cases of suspected child abuse and neglect, to promptly prepare applications and petitions for relief requested by such persons, to investigate reported cases of suspected child abuse and neglect for possible criminal activity and to report at least annually to the grand jury regarding the discharge of his or her duties with respect thereto. In the amicus brief submitted in this case by Jane Moran, she states that [t]he relationship between the DHHR and the Prosecuting Attorney ... appears to have been mutually supportive from the original taking of Jonathan in December, 1990 through July 1992. Ms. Moran suggests that the problem began when the prosecutor sought a continuance on the grounds that `there are services that might have been provided to hearing impaired parents of hearing children which were not provided due to two opposing expert philosophies.' Apparently, there was a meeting between the prosecutor and the foster care workers and assigned supervisor on January 25, 1993, during which it became apparent that the prosecutor did not support DHHR's decision to seek a termination of parental rights. The record, as well as the oral arguments presented in this case, evidence that vitriolic discord existed between DHHR and the prosecuting attorney, all of which stemmed from a difference in views regarding the resolution of this matter. The prosecutor apparently believed that reunification was possible, whereas DHHR fervently believed that termination of parental rights was in Jonathan G.'s best interests. [33] Herein lies the problem. Should the role of the prosecutor be comparable to her role in criminal proceedings, requiring her to independently weigh the evidence before proceeding on a complaint, or should it be that of a traditional lawyer/client relationship, requiring her to present evidence in accord with the client's wishes within the confines of the law? Guidance on this issue is provided by West Virginia Code § 49-7-26 (1996), which states that [t]he prosecuting attorney shall render to the state department of welfare [division of human services], without additional compensation, such legal services as the department may require. This statutory provision supports the view that the prosecuting attorney stands in the traditional role of a lawyer when representing DHHR in connection with abuse and neglect proceedings. Indeed, the prosecuting attorney cites no authority to the contrary. In the analogous decision of Manchin v. Browning, 170 W.Va. 779, 296 S.E.2d 909 (1982), this Court held that [t]he Legislature has thus created a traditional attorney-client relationship between the Attorney General and the state officers he is required to represent. Id. at 790, 296 S.E.2d at 920. Based on our conclusion that the prosecuting attorney's role as related to DHHR in an abuse and neglect proceeding is that of a traditional attorney-client, we further determine that a prosecuting attorney has no independent right to formulate and advocate positions separate from its client in these cases. [34] This case presents a difficult and confusing scenario regarding the prosecuting attorney's role. [35] According to the amicus brief, the prosecutor advised the circuit court following the filing of the contempt petition by the natural parents against DHHR that she had a conflict in representing her client in the contempt proceedings, but would not withdraw from any other part of this case. The Attorney General was brought into the case at the prosecutor's request [36] and upon the circuit court's direction. [37] Although the prosecuting attorney had a questionable role in these proceedings, the representations in her brief illustrate the difficulties encountered by the prosecutor in connection with her representation of DHHR. [38] Jane Moran, as amicus curiae, suggests that DHHR was prevented by the actions of the prosecutor from presenting its point of view to the circuit court. We do not find that to be the case. While DHHR has a right to determine and advocate a position that comports with its statutory responsibilities, it must nonetheless follow the court's directives even if such directives conflict with its position. All the orders clearly reflect the circuit court's awareness of DHHR's view towards termination rather than reunification. In addition, DHHR had the benefit of the Attorney General's counsel. Upon review, we find the Department was not restricted from full participation in the proceedings, but only in its management of the case. Although the prosecutor's role in this case appears to have exceeded the boundaries of a traditional lawyer/client relationship, we find no reversible error with regard to the prosecutor's involvement in these proceedings under the facts of this case. See infra note 38.