Opinion ID: 779188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The investigating officers' testimony.

Text: 75 Lam first challenges testimony that focused on Agent Troutmann's and Trooper Stanalonis's investigative techniques and how they ascertained whether Yeung was telling the truth. To be sure, their testimony has the effect of assuring the jury that Yeung is a credible witness. It is not clear, however, that all of the reasons for these assurances were not before the jury or that they were based only on the personal knowledge of the government officers. Rather, the officers told the jury about the techniques that led them to credit Yeung's statements during their investigation. The First Circuit has described this distinction as follows: An agent could properly have testified as to the actions he took to corroborate ... testimony, but he could not testify that certain statements were lies, or that interrogation techniques had established the veracity of other statements. United States v. Rosario-Diaz, 202 F.3d 54, 65 (1st Cir.2000). The state court applied a similar legal framework, and we find that it was reasonable in concluding that statements made by Agent Troutmann are not vouching. 76 A statement by Trooper Stanalonis, however, presents a clearer instance of vouching. On cross-examination, Stanalonis testified as to his personal belief that Yeung was telling him a correct story corroborating my investigation. Stanalonis made this statement when he was asked whether he knew if Yeung's story was true during their first meeting, at a point when they were going over photos of suspects and Yeung identified Lam. Stanalonis also stated that Yeung's responses heightened my thoughts on how truthful he was being with me. His statements have the impermissible effect of putting the prestige of Trooper Stanalonis's professional knowledge behind Yeung's testimony, a conclusion with which the Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed, noting that it might have been more prudent to excise the reference to truthfulness. 77 Despite its concern about Trooper Stanalonis's testimony, however, the Pennsylvania Superior Court dismissed this issue on the ground that Stanalonis's vouching did not create unfair prejudice depriving Lam of a fair trial. It reasoned that Stanalonis's testimony was not even harmful because his testimony concerning Yeung's truthfulness was substantially similar to that of Agent Troutmann's, it was a single, unsolicited remark made in passing, and his vouching was not related to a contested issue in the case, as it merely involved Yeung's identification of Lam. Likewise, the Supreme Court has previously denied habeas relief where it found an ambiguous, isolated comment by a prosecutor insufficient to render an entire trial unfair. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). Under this precedent, we see no reason to find the Pennsylvania Superior Court's determination objectively unreasonable. 17 78