Opinion ID: 106864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the policies of the privilege.

Text: The privilege against self-incrimination registers an important advance in the development of our liberty `one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.'  Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 426. [4] It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load, 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev., 1961), 317; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life, United States v. Grunewald, 233 F. 2d 556, 581-582 (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd 353 U. S. 391; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a protection to the innocent. Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 162. Most, if not all, of these policies and purposes are defeated when a witness can be whipsawed into incriminating himself under both state and federal law even though the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to each. Cf. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U. S. 371, 385 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK). This has become especially true in our age of cooperative federalism, where the Federal and State Governments are waging a united front against many types of criminal activity. [5] Respondent contends, however, that we should adhere to the established rule that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not protect a witness in one jurisdiction against being compelled to give testimony which could be used to convict him in another jurisdiction. This rule has three decisional facets: United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, held that the Federal Government could compel a witness to give testimony which might incriminate him under state law; Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U. S. 371, held that a State could compel a witness to give testimony which might incriminate him under federal law; and Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487, held that testimony thus compelled by a State could be introduced into evidence in the federal courts. Our decision today in Malloy v. Hogan, supra , necessitates a reconsideration of this rule. [6] Our review of the pertinent cases in this Court and of their English antecedents reveals that Murdock did not adequately consider the relevant authorities and has been significantly weakened by subsequent decisions of this Court, and, further, that the legal premises underlying Feldman and Knapp have since been rejected.