Opinion ID: 700436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tax returns

Text: 27 Valenti argues that the district court should not have admitted his tax returns for 1991 and 1992 because, under Fed.R.Evid. 403, the probative value of the returns was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice from the obvious inference that he was a tax cheat. This Court reviews for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1120 (2d Cir.1992). 28 The government offered the tax returns, which did not list as income any of the money Valenti took from the Association, to rebut Valenti's defense that the money was legitimate compensation. The tax returns were obviously probative to refute Valenti's defense that the contested funds were legitimate compensation for work he performed for the Association. As the district court observed, by taking the money and not declaring it on his income tax it implies rather strongly that the conversation he alleges took place with Mr. Shamos didn't exist. Any arguable prejudice to Valenti was de minimis: it strains credulity to think that the jury might have believed Valenti innocent of transporting stolen goods, but voted to convict him anyway just because he failed to report income on his tax returns. 29 Valenti also argues, for the first time, that there was an innocent explanation for his failure to report as income the funds he took: the money was earned off-shore in St. Maarten, and thus was not subject to United States tax. We decline to address this argument, which Valenti did not raise below, although he had ample opportunity to do so. See, e.g., Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 663 (2d Cir.1995) (As a general rule, appellate courts do not consider issues that were not raised at the district court.).