Opinion ID: 768781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The January 5, 1998 Opinion and Order

Text: 13 The plaintiffs nominally appeal from the district court's January 5, 1998 opinion and order, Margo I, dismissing their complaint. At oral argument, however, plaintiffs' counsel did not discuss any issues related to the dismissal of the complaint, and no significant issues of law with respect to it are raised by the plaintiffs' briefs. We therefore discuss the merits of the plaintiffs' substantive appeal, about which we are in complete agreement with the district court, with some dispatch. 14 The plaintiffs sought to be declared co-authors of the Lion. In Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996), we held that plaintiffs claiming to be co-authors are time-barred three years after accrual of their claim from seeking a declaration of copyright co-ownership rights and any remedies that would flow from such a declaration. Id. at 56. The district court held, and we agree, that Merchant controls this case. Margo I, 1998 WL 2558, at , 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20867, at . 15 The district court found that the plaintiffs knew or should have known about their claim in 1961, but [a]t the very least in 1989. Id., 1998 WL 2558, at , 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20867, at -. The plaintiffs' deposition testimony indicated that they may have discovered their claim as late as 1992. Because of the well-settled rule in this circuit that a party may not, in order to defeat a summary judgment motion, create a material issue of fact by submitting an affidavit disputing his own prior sworn testimony, id., 1998 WL 2558, at , 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20867, at - (quoting Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 572 (2d Cir. 1991)), the district court refused to credit the statements contained in the plaintiffs' affidavits, errata sheets and revised interrogatory answers asserting that they had learned of the Folkways litigation in 1994. If the plaintiffs' claim accrued in 1961, 1989, or even in 1992, it was time-barred under Merchant. 16 The plaintiffs' primary argument on appeal is that Merchant should not be applied retroactively. This argument is meritless. 17 When [a court] applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate [the] announcement of the rule. 18 Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); see also Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995) (reiterating rule stated in Harper). In Harper, the Court found this principle rooted in basic norms of constitutional adjudication, 509 U.S. at 97 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)), and the lack of constitutional authority... to disregard current law or to treat similarly situated litigants differently, 509 U.S. at 97 (quoting American Trucking Assns. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 214 (1990)). As we have said, it is the 'general rule of long standing' that 'judicial precedents normally have retroactive as well as prospective effect.' Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239, 240 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1118, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 19 Merchant held that the plaintiffs were, always would have been, and theretofore would be, time-barred from seeking a declaration of copyright co-ownership rights once the three-year statute of limitations for copyright claims set forth in 17 U.S.C. §507(b) had run. See Merchant, 92 F.3d at 56. In Merchant itself, then, the Merchant rule was applied to facts that occurred, and to a lawsuit that was brought, long before the Merchant opinion was issued. 2 20 Thus, Merchant controls this case. If the plaintiffs' claim accrued before May 22, 1993, three years before the date on which they filed their complaint, then it was barred by the statute of limitations. 21 The plaintiffs' deposition testimony demonstrates that their claim was time-barred. Each plaintiff independently testified to the effect that he knew of the alleged grounds for the group's co-authorship claim prior to May 22, 1993. As the district court correctly held, the plaintiffs cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by responding with affidavits recanting that earlier testimony. See Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969). Nor can they do so by submitting errata sheets long after their depositions were taken, 3 or by filing supplemental answers to interrogatories. There is no reason to distinguish, for purposes of the Perma Research principle, between an attempt to conjure up a triable issue of fact through the proffer of a late affidavit and an attempt to achieve the same end through the submission of delayed errata sheets or supplemental answers to interrogatories. None will defeat a motion for summary judgment. 22 Because the plaintiffs did not file their complaint until 1996 but, according to ineffectively contradicted testimony, knew of the grounds for their claims in 1992, their copyright claims were time-barred. The plaintiffs' remaining claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and trademark were resolved by the district court according to well-established legal principles upon which we need not elaborate further here. We therefore affirm the dismissal of those claims for substantially the reasons stated by the district court.