Opinion ID: 2600470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Murder of a Juror

Text: Defendant argues that he was denied his rights to due process and to trial by a fair and impartial jury under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution because the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry and declare a mistrial following the murder of a juror. On August 14, 1989, the jury was unable to begin deliberations because one of the jurors, Phyllis Singletary, failed to appear. Eventually, the court released the jury for the day and instructed them to return the following day, telling them the court was attempting to find out what exactly is going on with juror Singletary. The court admonished the jury, stating: Please do not concern yourself with this. It is something that you simply must not allow to interfere with your deliberations. The court added: And again, please do not expose yourself to any news media representation about this case. Shortly before 10:00 a.m. the following day, the court informed the jury that Juror Singletary had been shot to death for reasons unrelated to the present case. The court stated: Her death is tragic and I think we all grieve for her, but what happened to her does not add or diminish anything to the evidence as to whether or not Mr. Ramirez is guilty or innocent of these charges. And I beg you to remember that in your deliberations. The court then selected an alternate juror to replace Juror Singletary and released the jury for the day, ordering them to return the following day and repeating the admonition to not allow yourself any exposure to any media representation about this case. The jury resumed deliberations the following day, August 16, 1989, but defendant moved to suspend deliberations to allow the jury a period of mourning. The court observed that when the jury arrived all of them seemed, as far as appearances are concerned, able to carry on their tasks. The court asked the jury foreperson, outside the present of the rest of the jury, whether the jury was able to resume deliberations. The foreperson replied, I feel that we can probably continue today, adding that [e]veryone appears to have put it behind them. The court stated that it was reasonably satisfied that the jurors are able to proceed with their deliberations and that upon further admonishment I propose that that is exactly what we do. Defendant objected. The court informed the jury that Juror Singletary had apparently been killed by her boyfriend as a result of a personal matter between the two people and it had nothing to do with this case. When the police approached the boyfriend, he killed himself. The court then again instructed the jury that the juror's death was in no way connected with the case of People versus Richard Ramirez and should in no way be permitted to influence you in the performance of your duties as jurors as you deliberate the evidence in this case. You are admonished in the strongest possible terms that your decision in this case must be based on the evidence that you have seen and heard in this courtroom and from no other source. The court then instructed the jury to begin its deliberations anew. On August 21, 1989, defendant filed a motion to voir dire the jurors regarding their reactions to the death of Juror Singletary. A hearing was held on August 31, 1989. The court denied the motion, remarking: I have been observing the jury, and I did note on the day that I excused them, that they were visibly upset, quite frankly. That is whyone of the reasons I gave them the day off. Since this time they have come back and they have, in my opinion, based on my observations, resumed their usual demeanor and apparent cheerfulness and ability to get about their business, and I think that is important to remember.... This court has had nothing that would put it on notice, either by the jury or by its own observations, that would indicate that this jury is not able to continue on with its deliberations. I believe that the deliberations of the jury are very near sacred in society and to interfere with them by allowing counsel to voir dire them about how they feel about Mrs. Singletary's death, how that has affected their deliberation, or even for the court to make such an inquiry, would probably be a fatal mistake.... On August 23, 1989, defendant filed a motion for a mistrial. The court denied the motion at a hearing on September 5, 1989. The jury reached its verdicts on the guilt phase of the trial on September 20, 1989. Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to conduct an inquiry into the jury's exposure to news coverage of Juror Singletary's death. Defendant did not raise this ground in the trial court and, thus, has forfeited this claim. ( People v. Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th 580, 589, 590, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.) In any event, the record does not support defendant's assertion that the trial court erred in this regard. The court instructed the jury on several occasions, including before the circumstances of the juror's death were made public, to avoid media accounts. We assume that the jury followed the court's instructions ( People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 545, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417), and the record does not contain any indication to the contrary. In any event, defendant does not explain how he would have been prejudiced even had the jurors disregarded the court's instructions and viewed media accounts of the juror's murder. The juror's death had no connection to the present case and it is not apparent from the record that anything in the media accounts of the juror's murder would have affected the jury's deliberations. Defendant argues the trial court did not undertake a meaningful inquiry into the effect on the jury of the juror's death because it failed to inquire, for example, whether any of the jurors discussed the death of Juror Singletary, the manner of her death, or whether her death affected their ability to decide appellant's fate. Defendant objected to the jury's resuming deliberations the day after the jury learned of the juror's death, but defendant did not, at that time, ask the court to conduct a further inquiry of the jurors and, thus, has forfeited any argument that the court should have done so at that time. Defendant later asked the court to question the jurors regarding the effect of the juror's death, but the court was asked to rule on this request more than two weeks after the jury had resumed deliberations. The trial court properly denied the request because it correctly was concerned that interrupting the jury's deliberations at that point to inquire about the effect of the juror's death would undermine the sanctity of deliberations. California courts have recognized the need to protect the sanctity of jury deliberations. [Citations.] ( People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 475, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225.) One reason is to `assure[ ] the privacy of jury deliberations by foreclosing intrusive inquiry into the sanctity of jurors' thought processes. [Citation.]' [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) Jurors may be particularly reluctant to express themselves freely in the jury room if their mental processes are subject to immediate judicial scrutiny. The very act of questioning deliberating jurors about the content of their deliberations could affect those deliberations. ( Id. at p. 476, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225.) We find no fault with the trial court's response to this tragic event. The court appropriately released the jury the day it learned of the juror's murder and resumed deliberations the following day only after observing the jurors' demeanor and inquiring of the jury foreperson whether the jury was ready to resume deliberations. Whether a further inquiry was appropriate is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, which was in the best position to observe the jury. As we have noted regarding allegations regarding individual jurors: The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconductlike the ultimate decision to retain or discharge a jurorrests within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] ... [¶] ... [A] hearing is required only where the court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would constitute `good cause' to doubt a juror's ability to perform his duties .... ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 343, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) Defendant relies upon our decision in People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 986-991, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153, in which the father of one of the jurors died while the jury was deliberating in the penalty phase of a capital trial. Rather than replace the juror with an alternate, the court ordered the jury to resume deliberations that Tuesday morning, telling the jury the court would recess before noon so the juror could fly out of state to attend the funeral and deliberations would resume the following Monday. The jury returned a verdict of death at 11:00 a.m. Although we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the jury to resume deliberations, defendant in the present case relies upon our added observation: We do not suggest that a more detailed inquiry by the court would have served no purpose. ( Id. at p. 989, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) It is not clear how defendant is assisted by our decision in Beeler, but any such assistance is lessened by the fact that the circumstances in Beeler differ greatly from those in the present case. Although the murder of a fellow juror is shocking, defendant's attempt to equate that event with the death of a family member, especially a parent, is unavailing. And we declined to hold in Beeler that even the death of a juror's parent is so debilitating that the juror is presumptively unable to deliberate. ( People v. Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 990, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) Defendant also contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. A trial court should grant a mistrial only when a party's chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged, and we use the deferential abuse of discretion standard to review a trial court ruling denying a mistrial. ( People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 555, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) Nothing in the record before us supports the conclusion that defendant's chances of receiving a fair trial were irreparably damaged. The trial court in the present case did not abuse its discretion in resuming deliberations the day after the jury learned that one of the jurors had been murdered.