Opinion ID: 1535336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The $3,000 Civil Penalty

Text: Apart from the violation of (i) (11) itself, the employer also attacks the $3,000 civil penalty imposed by the Commissioner. It contends that he failed to observe the necessary criteria prescribed by the statute, and that, in any event, there was insufficient evidence to permit him to do so. We do not agree. Section 40 (f) of Art. 89 states: The Commissioner shall have the authority to assess all civil penalties set forth in this subtitle giving due consideration to the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the business of the employer being charged, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the employer's history of previous violations. We think that there is sufficient evidence to support the imposition of the penalty. Two preliminary observations are in order. First, the violation was found to be both repeated and serious, and there is no contention by the employer that the evidence fails to support this determination, or to come within the statutory definition of those terms. For this purpose, it is sufficient to state that a serious violation essentially is one where there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result. § 40 (b). Secondly, for a repeated violation, a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 may be assessed. § 40 (a). The penalty imposed here, therefore, was well below the maximum limit for such a violation. With respect to the criteria themselves, although, as argued by the employer, there is no evidence of the gross dollar volume of this contract, no such requirement appears in the statute. The evidence showed a range of between 50 and 60 men working on the bridge for this particular employer. This fact, coupled with the evidence that the employer, whose main office was in New Jersey, had handled construction jobs on the same magnitude as the bay bridge in a number of other states, was sufficient to show the size of its business within the contemplation of the statute. In respect to the other statutory criteria, little need be said. That a fatality occurred  for the second time  is testimony to the gravity of the violation. The Commissioner expressly determined in regard to (i)(11) that the employer had not acted in good faith  one of the remaining criteria  ample support for which may be found in its failure to take any remedial action after the prior tragedy. The final consideration to be met under the penalty provision  history of previous violations  speaks for itself in this case. Contrary to the argument advanced by the employer, the statutory criteria were properly recognized by the Commissioner, and were supported by substantial evidence. Hence, we will not disturb the penalty imposed by him. Judgment reversed in part, affirmed in part, as herein set forth; as to that part reversed, remanded to Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County with directions to reverse the decision of the Commissioner of Labor and Industry; costs to be equally divided between the parties. Singley, J., concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority only because the constitutionality of the civil penalty imposed under Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol., 1974 Cum. Supp.), Art. 89, § 40, was not challenged by the appellant. See, Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 8; Constitution, Article IV, § 1. Judge Smith has authorized me to say that he joins in this concurrence.