Opinion ID: 1114416
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: claimant's proof was insufficient as a matter of law to justify the chancellor in terminating the alimony payments.

Text: The first error addresses the issue that Bernard's proof was insufficient as a matter of law to justify the Chancellor in terminating the alimony payments. This error is based upon the contention that the facts are distinguishable in the case at bar, from the cases cited by the Chancellor. See Owen v. Gerity, 422 So.2d 284 (Miss. 1982); McHann v. McHann, 383 So.2d 823 (Miss. 1980); McRae v. McRae, 381 So.2d 1052 (Miss. 1980); Rubisoff v. Rubisoff, 242 Miss. 225, 133 So.2d 534 (1961). The standard of review in determining the weight of the evidence has been well established by this Court and it will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Crow v. Crow, 622 So.2d 1226 (Miss. 1993); Bell v. Parker, 563 So.2d 594, 596-97 (Miss. 1990). Therefore, this issue is without merit. However, the recent Hammonds opinions reflect the issue of termination of alimony payments. See Hammonds v. Hammonds, 641 So.2d 1211 (Miss. 1994) and Hammonds v. Hammonds, 597 So.2d 653 (Miss. 1992). These opinions discussed past cases which addressed the issue of whether a wife's post-divorce sexual relations or cohabitation may justify termination of alimony payments from her ex-husband. The Hammonds opinion states that the McRae, McHann and Owen cases clearly reflect a moral judgment that a divorced woman should not engage in sexual relations; the penalty for such activity is forfeiture of her right to support from her ex-husband. Hammonds at 1216. However, the Hammonds court noted that a divorced payee spouse engaging in sex was not a per se basis for modifying or terminating alimony but that additional financial inquiries were needed as well. Hammonds at 1216. In Hammonds, the question was the effect of post-divorce cohabitation by the recipient of alimony on her right to alimony. Id. at 1214-1215. The Hammonds Court applied the test for modification of spousal support: whether there has been a material or substantial change in circumstances since the divorce. Id.; citing Tingle v. Tingle, 573 So.2d 1389, 1391 (Miss. 1990); Morris v. Morris, 541 So.2d 1040, 1043 (Miss. 1989). In a departure from past cases holding that subsequent sexual misconduct may result in forfeiture of support, the Hammonds Court remanded for a determination of whether Linda Hammonds was receiving support from cohabitation with another man and whether her financial needs had changed as a result. Hammonds at 1217. In the case at bar, it is unclear whether Glenda Moore Ellis cohabitated with another man although she had substantial contact with him for a long period of time and he was a frequent overnight guest. [3] Even if one finds that Glenda did cohabit with another man, Hammonds requires remand for a determination of whether she receives support from him. In the case at bar, Smith is unemployed and has been so for some time. But, this raises an issue that this Court has not had the occasion to consider (and one that Bernard has not specifically addressed in his brief): Would Hammonds also require remand to consider the issue of whether Glenda supports Smith? [4] The approach in Hammonds follows the modern trend in most jurisdictions. Therefore, on remand, two factors are to be considered by the Chancellor: (1) whether the third party provides support to the recipient (discussed above); and (2) whether the recipient spouse contributes to the support of a third party. Maclaren v. Maclaren, 616 So.2d 104 (Fla. App. 1 Dist., 1993); DePoorter v. DePoorter, 509 So.2d 1141 (Fla.App. 1 Dist., 1987), (where an ex-wife cohabited with another man after dissolution of a 28 year marriage, the court held that cohabitation raised a presumption of changed circumstances but by itself did not require reduction of alimony); Melletz v. Melletz, 271 N.J. Super. 359, 638 A.2d 898 (1994), (where the separation agreement required suspension of alimony payments if the wife cohabitated with an unrelated male, the court refused to apply the contract language as it conflicted with the public policy of guaranteeing privacy to individuals and did not by itself demonstrate a need for reduction of alimony). Naturally, Bernard did not raise the issue as to whether Glenda supports Smith, as he could not anticipate the direction this Court would follow in this area. In order to properly resolve all the relevant issues, this Court remands for a determination on this issue.