Opinion ID: 1122950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: admission of impeachment evidence

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the state to elicit testimony from defendant's character witnesses concerning the circumstances of their prior early releases from prison, their present parole release dates, and the circumstances of their past escapes and attempted escapes from prison. Defendant argues that this evidence was not relevant under OEC 401 and was unfairly prejudicial, confusing, and misleading under OEC 403. Defendant further asserts that the evidence was calculated to inflame the jurors and to cause them to vote for the death penalty to ensure that defendant would not escape or be paroled in the future. During trial, defendant called a number of his fellow inmates to testify on his behalf as character witnesses. One of those witnesses, death row inmate Langley, testified on direct examination about conditions on death row and about defendant's character and good behavior while in prison. The state cross-examined Langley about his prior convictions and early releases from prison: Q. Mr. Langley, your burglary convictions, how many? A. I would say as an adult, I was convicted of at least three or four. Q. And in any of those burglary convictions, did you receive penitentiary sentences? A. Yes, I did. Q. Do you remember the length of the penitentiary sentence? A. 20 years. Q. And in each of those burglary convictions, were you paroled on those sentences? A. One time. Q. And how long did you serve prior to parole on your 20-year sentence? At that point, defendant's trial counsel objected on the ground that evidence of Langley's prior early releases from prison was not relevant. The trial court overruled the objection. Langley then responded that he had served [a]round 35 or 42 months on his 20-year sentence. Langley also admitted that he had served only 10 years on a 20-year sentence for robbery. We agree with defendant that evidence of Langley's early releases from prison was not relevant. The evidence tended to demonstrate only that convicted persons do not serve their full sentences because they may be released on parole. That fact had no relevance to any issue before the jury in deciding whether defendant should be sentenced to death. Consequently, the trial court erred when it overruled defendant's objection to that testimony. The state argues that any error in admitting Langley's testimony was harmless. In the circumstances of this case, we agree. Before Langley testified, defense counsel called inmate Thompson as a character witness. On direct examination, Thompson testified that he had been convicted of first-degree manslaughter in 1986 and that he was scheduled to be released in 1993. On cross-examination, Thompson testified, without objection, that he had received a 20-year sentence for his manslaughter conviction. The state also elicited from defendant's other character witnesses, without objection, the lengths of their sentences and their scheduled release dates. Under Oregon law, an error is harmless if there is little, if any, likelihood that the error affected the jury's verdict. See State v. Isom, 306 Or. 587, 595-96, 761 P.2d 524 (1988) (explaining standard). Because the state elicited testimony, without objection, from several other witnesses that was substantially similar to Langley's testimony, any prejudice that defendant may have suffered from Langley's testimony was minor. See State v. Pinnell, 311 Or. 98, 109, 806 P.2d 110 (1991) (erroneous admission of evidence deemed harmless, in part, because the jury already had heard substantially similar evidence). We also conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the erroneous failure to sustain defendant's objection to the testimony did not contribute to the jury's verdict. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (stating that, under federal law, error is harmless if the appellate court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury's decision to convict). Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by allowing the state to elicit from two of defendant's character witnesses the circumstances of their escapes and attempted escapes from prison. Defendant argues that evidence of those escapes and attempted escapes was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, because it encouraged the jury to speculate that defendant might escape if sentenced to prison for life. Defendant never objected to the testimony concerning the witnesses' escapes and attempted escapes on the grounds of relevance or undue prejudice. Thus, defendant's claim of error is unpreserved. See State v. Isom, 313 Or. 391, 406, 837 P.2d 491 (1992) (an objection on one ground is not sufficient to preserve some other objection). We decline to consider defendant's unpreserved claim of error.