Opinion ID: 2975163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Treating Physicians

Text: Morris contends that the ALJ did not accord proper weight to the reports of his treating physicians. Specifically, he contends that the ALJ inappropriately rejected the opinions of Dr. 3 Angulo, whom he saw for his leg pain; Dr. Dela Cruz, his primary physician; and Dr. Dolansky, whom he saw for depression. He also provides conclusory allegations that evidence submitted by Dr. Kite was rejected inappropriately. The Agency’s regulations require the Agency to “give good reasons” for discounting evidence of disability submitted by the claimant’s treating physicians because “these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide detailed, longitudinal picture of [the claimant’s] medical impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Morris argues that the ALJ did not provide good reasons for discounting his physicians’ conclusions. We do not agree. Our review reveals that the ALJ provided a lengthy and thorough discussion of these doctors’ reports and findings. Unlike in Wilson v. Comm’r, 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004), on which Morris heavily relies, the ALJ did not summarily dismiss the treating physicians’ opinions. Rather, he detailed, at substantial length, why he found them to be lacking, compared them with other evidence, and ultimately included some of their conclusions in his hypothetical regarding Morris’ residual functional capacity. Wilson, in contrast, held that an “important procedural safeguard,” Bowen, 478 F.3d at 747 (citing Wilson, 378 F.3d at 547), was violated when the ALJ summarily dismissed the evidence submitted by the treating physician. This safeguard is important because it informs claimants of the reasons for the disposition of their cases and also facilitates appellate review. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. After this procedural safeguard has been satisfied, the case is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. Further, Morris does not point to any specific conclusion that the ALJ disregarded, except for the conclusion that Morris was disabled. “The determination of disability is [ultimately] the prerogative of the [Commissioner], not the treating physician.” Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 4 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). The ALJ evaluated the opinions of Morris’ physicians (treating and otherwise), adopted those medical opinions it found appropriate, and then presented those opinions in the form of a hypothetical to the vocational expert. There was no error.