Opinion ID: 2612406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: miscellaneous ineffective-assistance claims

Text: In his supplemental brief on appeal, defendant summarily cites some 34 alleged errors and omissions by counsel at the pretrial, guilt, and penalty phases. For the most part, defendant supplies no citations to the record, simply directing our attention to all the information in the consolidated proceedings before this Court. Defendant repeats accusations that counsel's investigation of all aspects of the case was inadequate. He claims counsel incompetently failed to seek suppression of damaging evidence, explore weaknesses in the prosecution's case, expose prosecution witness Acker's police agency and motives to lie, proffer instructions pertinent to the theory of defense, and present mitigating penalty evidence. He asserts that counsel's tactical errors at the penalty phase affected the balance of aggravation. He points out that counsel prepared no surrebuttal at the penalty phase and admitted to the jury he had not realized he was entitled to such argument. In the aggregate, defendant asserts, counsel's performance was so shockingly deficient that it entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. This caused a denial of Sixth Amendment rights so fundamental, he urges, as to raise a presumption of reversible prejudice even if specific cognizable harm cannot be identified (citing United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 [80 L.Ed.2d 657, 668, 104 S.Ct. 2039]). We disagree. We have already rejected several of defendant's claims on the merits. Others exaggerate or misstate the record. [49] The remainder fail to support defendant's claim of pervasive incompetence. Though counsel might have done more in several areas, the record indicates he did investigate the facts of the shooting; interpose appropriate motions; subject the prosecution witnesses, Acker in particular, to meaningful cross-examination; and present as strong a defense to guilt as the circumstances warranted. His hesitance to offer mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase was supported by plausible fears of damaging rebuttal. Defendant, of course, was not constitutionally entitled to a perfect trial, or to ideal representation. He utterly fails to demonstrate a breakdown of the adversarial process so severe that reversal is presumptively warranted. Nor does his shotgun attack establish any specific new instance of incompetence that undermines confidence in the outcome. No basis appears for disturbing the judgment.