Opinion ID: 4068524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mental Health Program Special Condition

Text: Second, Gordon argues that the district court committed reversible plain error by imposing a special condition of supervised release requiring him to participate in a mental health program “as deemed necessary and approved by the probation officer.” The Government does not challenge Gordon’s position 4 Gordon argues for the first time in his reply brief that the rule of lenity compels this court’s adoption of his alternative interpretation of the Guidelines. See United States v. Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d 863, 868–69 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Although the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines are not statutes, we apply the rule of lenity to them when we find that they are ambiguous.”). We disagree for two reasons. First, our plain text reading of Section 4B1.1 does not indicate that it is ambiguous. See id. at 868. Second, in light of our aforementioned reasoning, we do not find plausible Gordon’s interpretation that a case only arises under Section 4B1.1(b) when the district court also applies the offense level from the table under that subsection. Moreover, we ordinarily do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal in a reply brief. See Hardman v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 142, 152 (5th Cir. 2016). 5 We also note that these circuit court interpretations of the Guidelines support the congressional directive that career offenders receive a sentence of imprisonment “at or near the maximum term authorized.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 cmt. backg’d (2004); see United States v. Cashaw, 625 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 2010). 9 Case: 15-41510 Document: 00513698144 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/29/2016 No. 15-41510 on this issue and instead requests that this court vacate and strike the special condition as unsupported by the record evidence. This court typically reviews the imposition of a special condition of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rodriguez, 558 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). However, because Gordon failed to object at the district court proceedings, plain error review applies. United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 2007). “Plain error exists if (1) there is an error, (2) the error is plain, . . . (3) the error affect[s] substantial rights and (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Garcia-Carrillo, 749 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We determine whether an alleged error is plain by reference to existing law at the time of appeal.” United States v. Bishop, 603 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2010). The district court has wide discretion to impose upon a defendant a term of supervised release as part of its sentencing decision. United States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). However, “such conditions must be reasonably related to one of the following statutory factors: (i) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (ii) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (iii) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (iv) the need to provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” Salazar, 743 F.3d at 451 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2)). If a condition is reasonably related to any of these four factors, it satisfies the requirements. Id. (citation omitted). “[S]upervised release conditions cannot involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the statutory goals.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A sentencing court is required “to state the reasons for its imposition of the particular 10 Case: 15-41510 Document: 00513698144 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/29/2016 No. 15-41510 sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the district court’s rationale is unclear, however, this court can affirm when its “reasoning can be inferred after an examination of the record.” Id. Here, the Government and Gordon both agree that the district court’s imposition of the special condition requiring Gordon to participate in mental health counseling is unsupported by the record. The parties both direct this court to the part of the district court’s order requiring Gordon to participate in anger management counseling as part of his supervised release conditions. They submit that the anger management counseling requirement addresses any issues apparent in the record involving Gordon’s history of anger and violence, thereby rendering the mental health treatment requirement superfluous given the absence of any record evidence indicating that he has a questionable mental health history or a particular diagnosis requiring mental health treatment. We find these arguments persuasive. The district court stated that it was imposing the special condition “based on the information in the report.” Although there is nothing in the PSR relating to a history of mental health treatment, the CSR stated that it recommended the mental health treatment “based on the violent nature of two of the defendant’s prior convictions and the pending charge.” These reasons, however, only relate to the district court’s imposition of anger management counseling, not mental health treatment. Consequently, we conclude that the district court’s imposition of the mental health condition is not reasonably related to any of the Section 3553 factors, nor can it be inferred from an examination of the record before us. See Salazar, 743 F.3d at 451 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2)). As such, the district court plainly erred in imposing the mental health special condition. See Garcia-Carrillo, 749 F.3d at 378. We further conclude that the error affected Gordon’s substantial rights. See id. 11 Case: 15-41510 Document: 00513698144 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/29/2016 No. 15-41510 The imposition of the mental health treatment at Gordon’s cost will present a significant financial burden, require him to attend multiple sets of treatment, and as Gordon points out, result in an unwarranted perception that he requires mental health treatment. See id. For these reasons, we find the exercise of this court’s discretion to correct the error warranted under these circumstances. Id. at 378–79; see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (“The Court of Appeals should correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”). Accordingly, we vacate the special condition of supervised release imposed by the district court requiring Gordon to participate in mental health treatment as deemed necessary and approved by the probation officer. 6