Opinion ID: 4469018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Children’s Out-of-Court Statements

Text: [¶15] The mother next argues that, because her counsel did not have access to audio recordings of the children’s interviews with Department caseworkers, her counsel could not properly prepare to cross-examine or inattention of counsel amounting to performance . . . below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney,” and demonstrate that “(2) the parent was prejudiced by the attorney’s deficient performance in that counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” In re Child of Kimberlee C., 2018 ME 134, ¶ 6, 194 A.3d 925 (quotation marks omitted). 8 witnesses.5 She asserts that, if the court had granted the motion in limine and excluded the children’s statements regarding the March 8, 2019, incident, there would not have been competent evidence in the record to support a finding of jeopardy. “We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for clear error and an abuse of discretion.” In re Kayla S., 2001 ME 79, ¶ 9, 722 A.2d 858. [¶16] Generally, hearsay is inadmissible under Maine Rule of Evidence 802. A court, however, “may admit and consider oral or written evidence of out-of-court statements made by a child, and may rely on that evidence to the extent of its probative value.” 22 M.R.S. § 4007(2) (2018). Contrary to the mother’s contentions, although we recognize her “fundamental liberty interest to direct the care, custody, and control of their children, [w]e have held that the introduction of evidence pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4007(2) . . . does not violate due process.” In re Children of Danielle H., 2019 ME 134, ¶ 6, 215 A.3d 217 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). [¶17] The mother’s primary objection to the admission of evidence of the children’s statements through others was based on her lack of timely access to 5Significantly, no counsel participating in the hearing had obtained the audio recordings of the children’s statements before the hearing. At hearing, the counsel for the Department and the guardian ad litem stated that neither had heard, nor received, any recordings of the children’s statements. The record is not clear as to why the recordings were not provided, but it is clear that counsel took steps to attempt to limit the detriment that her client might experience as a result of the missing recordings. 9 the recordings and the assertion that the mother would be at a disadvantage if the statements were admitted without counsel having had access to the recordings. The trial court was unpersuaded by the mother’s objection and reasonably “balanced the interest of the State in protecting the [children] with the interest of the parents in maintaining custody” when it allowed the children’s statements into evidence. In re Destiny T., 2009 ME 26, ¶ 12, 965 A.2d 872; see 22 M.R.S. § 4007(2). Thus, the court recognized the statutory abrogation of the hearsay rule concerning statements made by children. Indeed, when it addressed the issue of hearsay as it relates to the children’s statements, the court recognized the general statutory policy that children’s statements be allowed and directed the mother’s counsel to make appropriate objections during examinations, objections which counsel presented. A court has “broad discretion in determining the weight to accord [a child’s] statement.” In re Serena C., 650 A.2d 1343, 1345 (Me. 1994); In re Children of Danielle H., 2019 ME 134, ¶ 7, 215 A.3d 217 (explaining that “whether to admit a child’s out-of-court statement lies within the trial court’s discretion”). [¶18] We discern no abuse of that discretion on this record, where the mother had opportunity to examine witnesses concerning the children’s statements and corroborating evidence, in addition to testifying herself 10 concerning the events at issue. This is all the more true given that the evidence of the actual treatment of the children and the chaos surrounding their lives was more critical to the court’s analysis than the children’s statements about those events. [¶19] Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the children would be in circumstances of jeopardy in the mother’s care. See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4035, 4036 (2018); In re Children of Christine A., 2019 ME 57, ¶ 9, 207 A.3d 186; In re Destiny T., 2009 ME 26, ¶ 14, 965 A.2d 872. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. Brittany M.R. Sawyer, Esq., Holmes Legal Group, LLC, Wells, for appellant mother Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services Springvale District Court docket number PC-2019-18 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY