Opinion ID: 770975
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reference To Jury's Sentencing Decision As a Recommendation

Text: 219 Gall next argues that both the prosecutor and the trial judge violated his constitutional rights by repeatedly referring to the jury's role in sentencing as a recommendation, which lessened the jurors' sentencing responsibility and thus violated Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 220 This issue is clearly controlled by Kordenbrock. In that case, petitioner made the same argument Gall makes today: that both the prosecutor and the judge improperly referred to the jury's task as a recommendation in violation of Caldwell. See 919 F.2d at 1101. This Court plainly rejected the argument. First, it explained that the description of the jury's role as a recommendation accurately and technically reflected Kentucky law of the time. See id. Second, the Court concluded that the prosecutor or judge had not gone so far as to improperly describe[] the jury's role under state law in order to water down their responsibility. Id. Finally, the Court rejected Kordenbrock's reliance on more recent state cases (the same cases cited by Gall here) that altered the instructions to be read to juries; it concluded that those cases were not applicable because the Kentucky Supreme Court had declined to apply the new rule retroactively which means the prosecutor and the judge did not misadvise the jury concerning the division of sentencing authority. Id. 221 Gall has not successfully distinguished the facts of Kordenbrock from this case. He argues that in Kordenbrock, the jurors were informed that the judge would give great weight to their recommendation, while they were not so advised in the Gall trial. In actuality, the references made in the two cases are almost identical. Both prosecutors downplayed the jurors' role during voir dire. Compare Kordenbrock, 919 F.2d at 1101 (informing the jury that it would make a recommendation, that is all and that that recommendation would not be binding on the court) with J.A. at 1097-98 (stating that the jury's recommendation of punishment is not necessarily binding upon the Court). In closing, Gall's prosecutors were more circumspect, referring several times to the jury's impending recommendation but not describing it as a diminished role. See J.A. at 1630, 1632, 1636, 1637. Similarly, the trial court's instructions to Gall's jury used the word recommend largely without elaboration. (The judge instructed the jury that it was their duty to determine what punishment must be imposed upon Gall.) J.A. at 1622-24. With no distinguishing facts, Kordenbrock controls this case. The prosecutor's statements therefore did not violate Caldwell.