Opinion ID: 695854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Baxter

Text: 36 We now turn to defendant Baxter. Baxter has claimed that the district court precluded him from cross-examining Duke regarding two previous bank robberies for which he had not been charged and thereby prevented him from showing that Duke, rather than Baxter, masterminded the robbery in the instant case. Baxter has also claimed that he was not allowed effective cross-examination of Duke, because the witness refused to answer questions regarding his involvement in a bad check scheme. In addition, Baxter has raised challenges to the district court's refusal to remove a juror during his trial, an instruction given to the jury regarding false exculpatory statements, and an enhancement given to him at sentencing.
37 During cross-examination of Duke, Baxter's counsel asked him whether there was a charge pending for a bank robbery in which he was involved in Texas. Duke denied the charge. Later, defense counsel again asked about Duke's connection with the bank in Texas, and also about another bank. Duke again denied knowing anything about the subject. The government objected to the questioning and the judge sustained the objection, stating that there was insufficient evidence for the defense to continue the questioning. 38 Contrary to Baxter's claims, the defense was not precluded from pursuing its line of questioning. The question regarding the Texas bank robbery was asked and answered more than once. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide: 39 Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. 40 FRE 608(b). The rule goes on to state that the trial judge may allow inquiry into specific instances of conduct on cross-examination, if they are probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. In the instant case, the defense asked about the alleged bank robbery and received a negative response. Under Rule 608(b), the defense was not allowed to produce extrinsic evidence of the alleged robberies once the witness denied knowledge of them, and the line of questioning thus ended once the questions had been answered. The district judge did not prevent the defense from going into the issue. In addition, it was within the judge's discretion to cut off questioning after the robberies had been inquired into twice. See Caudle, 606 F.2d at 458-59.
41 Baxter has also argued, as has McWilliams, that he was prejudiced by his inability to ask Duke about the charges pending against him regarding worthless checks. In actuality, counsel for Baxter inquired into the bad check charges at least five times during the cross-examination of Duke. Duke explicitly stated that the case was pending, and that he did not wish to talk about it. The district court finally sustained an objection to the line of inquiry. 42 For the same reasons as stated above regarding the identical claim of McWilliams, the district court was correct in ruling that Baxter could not continue questioning Duke about the pending bad check charges. The district judge was within his discretion in limiting cross-examination of the witness.
43 Baxter's counsel contended at trial that a woman in the jury was tapping other jurors on the shoulder and asking them questions during the trial. He asked that she be removed. The district judge stated that he had not noticed any inappropriate activity by the jurors, and that he would watch them more closely. When Baxter objected again, the judge stated: 44 I do not know what to say other than you and I are making different observations. 45 I have been trying to keep more of an eye on the jury since you were up here the last time. All I can say is, again, I have not noticed certainly no untoward activity at all[sic]. I have not noticed any communication of any kind between any of the jurors. If there has been any, it's been so minimal and so inconsequential, I am not about to intervene, to say anything, or to do anything. 46 Baxter has argued that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to refuse to remove the juror. 47 The district judge has the discretion to remove a juror when the judge is convinced that the juror cannot fulfill his or her duties. See, e.g., United States v. Fajardo, 787 F.2d 1523, 1525 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir.1972) (per curiam); see also Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 24(c) (Alternate jurors ... shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties.). The district judge in the instant case clearly was convinced by the situation that there was no juror misconduct. He observed the jurors especially closely and found nothing inappropriate in their behavior. The judge considered the issue and decided, in his discretion, that there was no reason to remove the juror. We see no justification for disturbing this ruling.
48 Baxter's next assertion of error concerns an instruction given by the district court regarding false exculpatory statements: 49 You have heard testimony that the defendant made some statements to law enforcement authorities in which the defendant claimed that his conduct was consistent with innocence, not guilt. The Government claims that these statements in which he exonerated or exculpated himself were false. 50 If you find that the defendant gave a false statement in order to divert suspicion from himself, you may but you are not required to, infer that the defendant believed that he was guilty. You may not, however, infer on this basis alone that the defendant is, in fact, guilty of any of the crimes for which he is charged. 51 Whether or not the evidence as to a defendant's statements shows that the defendant believed that he was guilty, and the significance, if any, to be attached to that, are matters for you and you alone to decide. 52 Baxter has contended that allowing such an instruction was confusing to the jury, since it told the jury that once they found guilt, they could find consciousness of guilt, which in turn is probative of guilt. While Baxter has recognized that we have, in the past, allowed instructions which inform the jury that they may infer consciousness of guilt from false exculpatory statements, see, e.g., United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. McDougald, 650 F.2d 532, 533 (4th Cir.1981) (per curiam), he has urged this court instead to adopt the approach of the First Circuit concerning instructions on false exculpatory statements. 53 Baxter has cited United States v. Littlefield, 840 F.2d 143 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 860 (1988), for the First Circuit's view. In that case, the court stated that an instruction on consciousness of guilt should not be given when, as in this case, the jury could find the exculpatory statement at issue to be false only if it already believed evidence directly establishing the defendant's guilt. Id. at 149. However, the court also pointed out that an instruction on consciousness of guilt is considered appropriate when the evidence shows an action on the part of the defendant that normally could be viewed as an awareness of guilt, such as ... a false statement. Id. at 148 (footnote omitted). We choose to adhere to our previous position regarding the use of false exculpatory statements, and hold that the district judge in the instant case did not abuse his discretion by giving the jury an instruction regarding false exculpatory statements.
54 Baxter was acquitted of the count of his indictment that charged the use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. In the pre-sentence report, however, the probation officer gave Baxter a five-level enhancement for brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm in the course of a robbery, under Sec. 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The defense objected to this enhancement, but the district court determined that the enhancement was appropriate. The appellate standard of review of a district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines is articulated in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e): 55 The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. 56 The district judge's application of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed on appeal under a clearly erroneous standard when the issue depends upon a factual determination. United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1315 (4th Cir.1994); United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir.1989). When the issue is one of the legal interpretation of the Guidelines, our review moves closer to a de novo standard. Jones, 31 F.3d at 1315; Daughtrey, 874 F.2d at 217. On mixed questions of law and fact regarding the Guidelines, we apply a due deference standard in reviewing the district court. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d at 217. The standard of proof used at sentencing is a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Engleman, 916 F.2d 182, 184 (4th Cir.1990). 57 Baxter has argued that when his sentence was enhanced by five levels, he was punished for acquitted conduct, since he had been acquitted of the charge of using a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. In response, the government has pointed out that the sentence enhancement was not based on acquitted conduct, because although Baxter was acquitted of the use of a firearm charge, he was also convicted of armed robbery. 2 The prosecution has thus contended that the jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Baxter was criminally responsible for the handgun used by Duke in the robbery, and it was appropriate to sentence him accordingly. 58 However, even disregarding the fact that Baxter was convicted of armed robbery, the sentencing judge was permitted to consider acquitted conduct in sentencing the defendant. We, along with other circuits, have held that acquitted conduct may be used as a basis upon which to enhance a defendant's offense level under the Guidelines for the counts of which he was found guilty. See United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 738-39 (4th Cir.1989); see also United States v. Welch, 945 F.2d 1378, 1385 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1118 (1992); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 181-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844 (1990); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16-17 (1st Cir.1989). In Isom, we pointed out that the burden of proof at sentencing, a preponderance of the evidence standard, differs greatly from the beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for a conviction. Isom, 886 F.2d at 738 n. 3. The sentencing court may consider facts underlying an acquittal as long as those facts seem reliable. Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 17. 59 In the instant case, there was reliable evidence that Baxter saw the gun used by Duke and that he told the police that the gun was in McWilliams' car. The district judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Baxter knew about the gun and anticipated its use in a robbery by Duke. The judge's finding was clearly supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and his enhancement of Baxter's offense level was proper.