Opinion ID: 68143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Crime-of-Violence Issue

Text: Relying on Chambers, Young argues that the district court erred by treating his March 4, 2002 escape conviction as a “crime of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) and setting his base offense level at 24. As we note above, the Supreme Court in Chambers held that the failure to report to a penal institution crime is not a “violent felony” within the meaning of the ACCA. 129 S. Ct at 693. Because the ACCA defines a “violent felony” the same way as the guidelines define a “crime of violence,” Young argues that Chambers means that 7 his escape conviction is not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the guidelines.4 On appeal, the government concedes that Young was improperly sentenced in light of Chambers. The government’s brief states: “[T]he government is unable to meaningfully distinguish Young’s escape conviction from that at issue in Chambers. Thus, Young’s conviction for failing to report back to a work release center should not have been deemed a ‘crime of violence’ under the Sentencing Guidelines.” Appellee’s Br. at 9. In addition, no party claims on appeal that the district court improperly looked to the facts in the PSI that showed the conduct in Young’s March 4, 2002 escape conviction was a failure to report back to a work release center.5 In fact, the government did not introduce a judgment of conviction or tell the district court which Alabama escape statute Young violated. It is thus not surprising that the government now concedes that it cannot show that Young’s March 4, 2002 escape conviction is a “crime of violence.” 4 See supra note 2. 5 In other words, neither party raises an issue under Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005). Thus, nothing we say here expresses any opinion on whether information contained in the PSI implicates our precedents with respect to Shepard-approved documents. See United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306, 1323 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that even though “[w]e have yet to specifically address whether reliance on a PSI is permissible under Shepard, . . . it is not necessary [where defendant] does not contend that the district court’s reliance on the PSI was erroneous . . . [and] does [not] dispute in any significant way the facts set forth in the PSI”); see also United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 844 (11th Cir. 2009). 8 Therefore, given the undisputed facts in the PSI, the government’s concession, and the defendant’s explicit stipulation and reliance on the facts of the PSI,6 we conclude that Young’s March 4, 2002 offense consisted only of his failure to report back to his work release center while he was incarcerated and does not constitute a “crime of violence.” We vacate his sentence on this ground alone.7