Opinion ID: 2679032
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Impermissible Sentencing Factors

Text: In assessing procedural reasonableness, a court’s “fail[ure] to consider the § 3553(a) factors” constitutes “significant procedural error.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). “It is only logical that a court’s consideration of an improper § 3553(a) factor is likewise erroneous.” United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 200 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 1506 (2013). Section 3583(e) governs the revocation of supervised release. It states that a district court must consider factors outlined in “section[s] 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6) and (a)(7).” Absent from this list is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which allows a court to impose a sentence that “reflect[s] the seriousness of the offense, . . . promote[s] respect for the law, and . . . provide[s] just punishment for the offense.” The text of § 3583(e) does not, however, explicitly forbid a district court from considering §3553(a)(2)(A). 7 Case: 12-13154 Date Filed: 06/18/2014 Page: 8 of 17 The Supreme Court has not addressed whether it is error to consider a factor listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A) when imposing a sentence after revoking supervised release.3 We have not addressed the issue in a published opinion, 4 and those circuits that have are split. The First, Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have concluded that it is not error to consider §3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release, while the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits concluded that it is error. Compare United States v. Vargas-Dàvila, 649 F.3d 129, 131–32 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding that § 3583(e) “does not forbid consideration of other pertinent section 3553(a) factors”), United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding “that a district court does not commit procedural error in taking into account [§ 3553(a)(2)(A)] when imposing a sentence for the violation of supervised release”), United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 399–400 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “it does not constitute reversible error to consider § 3 Vandergrift argues that “the Supreme Court [in Tapia] has expressly confirmed that [§ 3553(a)(2)(A)] is outside the scope of what a district court can consider in imposing a sentence upon revocation of a defendant’s supervised release.” Vandergrift is mistaken. To be sure, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that courts “may not take account of retribution (the first purpose listed in § 3553(a)(2)) when imposing a term of supervised release” under § 3553(c). Tapia, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2388 (second emphasis added). However, at issue here is revocation of supervised release under § 3583(e). Moreover, post-Tapia courts to address whether §3553(a)(2)(A) may be considered in the context of supervised release revocation have not considered Tapia in their analyses, much less treated it as binding precedent. See United States v. Johnson, 550 F. App’x 766, 772 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Kippers, 685 F.3d 491, 498 n.4 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Chatburn, 505 F. App’x 713, 717 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Vargas-Dàvila, 649 F.3d 129, 131–32 (1st Cir. 2011). 4 See Johnson, 550 F. App’x at 772 (“Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has addressed whether it is error to consider a factor listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A) in imposing a sentence after revoking supervised release.”). 8 Case: 12-13154 Date Filed: 06/18/2014 Page: 9 of 17 3553(a)(2)(A) when imposing a sentence for violation of supervised release, even though this factor is not enumerated in § 3583(e)”), and United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 47–48 (2d Cir. 2006) (same), with United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding “that it is improper for a district court to rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) for the modification or revocation of a supervised release term”), United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438–39 (4th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that a district court is not to consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release), and United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1181–83 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Given that § 3553(a)(2)(A) is a factor that Congress deliberately omitted from the list applicable to revocation sentencing, relying on that factor when imposing a revocation sentence would be improper.”). Because the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue and there is a circuit split, any alleged error cannot be “plain.” See United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (explaining that an error cannot be plain “[w]hen neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has resolved an issue, and other circuits are split on it”). Accordingly, Vandergrift cannot demonstrate plain error as to this issue.