Opinion ID: 1794679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mitigating Effect of Mental Retardation

Text: Ferguson argues that the trial court erred by not considering evidence that he was mentally retarded as a mitigating circumstance and that the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in violation of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-29, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), and Ex parte Henderson, 616 So.2d 348, 350 (Ala.1992). In addressing this issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: Initially, we note that the trial court did refer to the evidence of Ferguson's low intelligence in several parts of its sentencing orderin its findings of fact from the sentencing phase of the trial, in reference to the statutory mitigating circumstances argued by Ferguson, and in reference to the nonstatutory mitigation offered by Ferguson. As stated above, although the trial court did not list this circumstance in its specific findings of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, `the trial court is not required to specify in its sentencing order each item of proposed nonstatutory mitigating evidence offered that it considered and found not to be mitigating.' Wilson v. State, 777 So.2d 856, 892 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), quoting Williams v. State, 710 So.2d 1276, 1347 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), aff'd, 710 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 929, 118 S.Ct. 2325, 141 L.Ed.2d 699 (1998). Moreover, contrary to Ferguson's contention, we find no evidence in the record indicating that Ferguson was mentally retarded. In fact, both Ferguson's expert, Dr. Chudy, and the State's expert, Dr. Rosen, stated unequivocally that Ferguson was not mentally retarded. Although there was evidence that Ferguson had an IQ of 69 and was in the borderline range of intelligence, Dr. Rosen testified that the results of Ferguson's IQ test were deceptive because, Dr. Rosen said, Ferguson had purposefully not put an effort into the test in order to appear more troubled than he really was. Dr. Rosen stated that it was his belief that had Ferguson made an effort when taking the test, his IQ would have been in the middle to upper 70s. Clearly, the trial court did not err in not finding, as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance, that Ferguson was mentally retarded. Ferguson, 814 So.2d at 965. (Emphasis in original.) In Penry, the United States Supreme Court stated: If the sentencer is to make an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty, `evidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.' 492 U.S. at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987)(O'Connor, J., concurring)). As the Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out, the trial court's sentencing order contains several references to Ferguson's mental condition. These references are evidence that the trial court did consider Ferguson's mental condition as both a possible statutory, and a nonstatutory, mitigating factor. Because the trial court properly considered this evidence, no conflict exists between the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion and this Court's opinion in Henderson. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined this issue on settled caselaw that does not conflict with Penry or Henderson.