Opinion ID: 320293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Soto-Pena Conversations

Text: 14 Ledesma and Quiroz-Santi also objected on hearsay grounds to the admission of testimony and transcriptions of telephone conversations between Nancy Pena and Isabelle Soto. The government counters by arguing that Soto's statements were properly admitted as those made by a co-conspirator during the course of the conspiracy. 15 Before out-of-court conversations of a co-conspirator may be used as evidence against a defendant, there must be proof from a source apart from the statement: (1) that a conspiracy existed, and (2) that the member against whom the conversation is introduced had knowledge of and participated in the particular conspiracy alleged. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Spanos, 462 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 949 (2d Cir. 1963). In United States v. Griffin, 434 F.2d 978, 983-984 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. Denied sub nom. Andrews v. United States, 402 U.S. 995, 91 S.Ct. 2170, 29 L.Ed.2d 160 (1971), we quoted with approval from United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925, 88 S.Ct. 860, 19 L.Ed.2d 987 (1968), where Judge Waterman of the Second Circuit wrote: 16 '   Once some conspiracy, agency or concert of action is independently shown   , hearsay statements made in furtherance of such relationship    are admissible. However, the independent evidence need not, as appellant suggests, be so clear and convincing as to compel, absent contradiction, a finding of the fact sought to be proved. 17 'The threshold requirement for admissibility is satisfied by a showing of a likelihood of an illicit association between the declarant and the defendant although it might later eventuate that the independent evidence so admitted proves to be insufficient to justify submitting to the jury the issue of defendant's alleged guilty involvement with declarant   . In determining preliminary questions of fact relating to admissibility of the hearsay the trial judge has wide discretion    and need only be satisfied, if he accepts the independent evidence as credible, that that evidence is sufficient to support a finding of a joint undertaking   . 18 'Moreover, the independent evidence of illicit association may be totally circumstantial   . Nor is it necessary in this circuit that such independent evidence be inconsistent with all reasonable hypotheses of innocence, as appellant suggests,    to legitimate its admissibility   .' 375 F.2d at 476-477. 19 The foundation evidence here meets this standard. First, there was independent proof that a conspiracy existed. We note that the 22 pounds of cocaine contained in the trunk was the equivalent of some 100,000 dosages and had a street value in excess of $900,000. These facts, along with shipment of the trunk from Chile to Los Angeles, where it was claimed first by Pena and then by two strangers, are sufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy of two or more persons to possess and distribute cocaine. 20 There must also be some independent proof of each defendant-conspirator's knowledge of and participation in the conspiracy. Both defendants argue vehemently that this kind of evidence was lacking. They concede that they picked up a trunk at Pena's apartment and shipped it to Ledesma in New York, but they contend that there is no evidence from which it can be inferred that they knew that the trunk contained cocaine. The appellants conclude that, without such knowledge of the principal purpose of the conspiracy, Soto's hearsay statements cannot be admitted against them. 21 We will note briefly some of the evidence on which a finding of requisite knowledge could have been based. Pena's neighbor testified that Ledesma had told her that he had obtained her telephone number by calling Soto in Chile. From this telephone call, an inference could properly be drawn that Ledesma participated in or even knew of Soto's illegal plan. We are not convinced by Ledesma's attempt to deny the appropriateness of an unfavorable inference by invoking the rule that mere association with guilty persons is insufficient to establish intentional participation in a conspiracy. See United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210, 61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128 (1940). In viwe of the inconsistency between Ledesma's telephone call and Ledesma's explanation of his involvement with the trunk, the judge had the right to disbelieve the defendants' story of how they flew from New York to California because Quiroz-Santi had had a fight with his wife and then happened to meet a stranger in a bar who paid them money to pick up a trunk of his and ship it to New York. The court was entitled to infer that Ledesma and Quiroz-Santi did not fly across the country and devote a substantial amount of their time and money on the west coast in locating and shipping a stranger's trunk, about which they knew nothing. It was far more likely that Ledesma and Quiroz-Santi were at least partially-informed members of the conspiracy, whose job it was to forward the trunk from Los Angeles to New York. Also, Ledesma used a false name and carried false identification; Quiroz-Santi used a different address for his residence when renting an automobile than when registering at the motel; Quiroz-Santi followed Ledesma's taxi over to Pena's apartment, parked a block away, and waited in the darkened car with a newspaper in front of his face; Ledesma, when picking up the trunk at Pena's apartment, did not mention that he was sent by a stranger whom he had met the previous night, but said that he himself needed the trunk to send clothes back to New York. 22 There was sufficient independent evidence that Ledesma and Quiroz-Santi had knowledge of and participated in the conspiracy to distribute cocaine to justify admitting the hearsay statements of Soto. 23 Quiroz-Santi also argues that even if Soto's half of the conversation is admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, Pena's half still is not admissible since she was little more than a government agent. A similar problem was met in United States v. King, 472 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1973). What was said there is every bit as applicable here: 24 '   For the Judge to have excised all of    (Pena's) half of the discussions would have rendered the recorded conversations, which were legitimate evidence, unintelligible.' 472 F.2d at 5. 25 Moreover, Pena was present at the trial and was subjected to rigorous cross-examination by both defendants. Under these circumstances we find that most of the justifications normally relied upon for excluding hearsay did not exist here. See C. McCormick, Evidence 581-83 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). 26 Finally, Ledesma contends that because two of the conversations took place on December 5, 1972, and the indictment charges that the conspiracy began 'on or about December 8, 1972,' these conversations were inadmissible as predating the existence of the alleged conspiracy. This court has previously rejected the notion that the beginning of the conspiracy must be specifically proved: 27 '   Speaking generally, the government had no knowledge of the exact time or place of the formation of the conspiracy, and to require it to specify the particular time and place, and limit the proof to that time and place, would defeat almost every prosecution   .' Toliver v. United States, 224 F.2d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 1955). 28 See also Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 145, 33 S.Ct. 226, 57 L.Ed. 450 (1913).