Opinion ID: 3010735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reasonableness of SEPTA's Restrictions

Text: Even if the speech in question had fallen outside the limited public forum created by SEPTA, we would nonetheless conclude that SEPTA's removal of the posters violated the First Amendment because the removal was not reasonable. When reviewing a governmental agency's limitation of speech on government property that has not been designated a public forum, the reasonableness of action limiting speech is gauged with reference to the nature of the forum itself. As the Supreme Court explained: Consideration of a forum's special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation since the significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990) (plurality opinion) (quoting Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); see also, Perry, 460 U.S. at 49. The Kokinda plurality went on to hold that a ban on solicitation on postal premises was reasonable, in part because the purpose of the forum was to accomplish the most efficient and effective postal delivery system. Id. at 732. Solicitation, the postal service had decided, was inherently disruptive of its business. Id. Other cases also make clear that the reasonableness of the government's restriction on speech depends on the nature and purpose of the property from which it is barred. In Kreimer, for example, we considered whether regulations governing the behavior of library patrons were reasonable by evaluating to what extent the regulations were consistent with, or promoted, the purposes to which the library had been dedicated. 958 F.2d at 1262. Rules limiting disruptive behavior were deemed reasonable 23 because they constituted perhaps the clearest and most direct way to achieve maximum library use. Id; see also, Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 270, 273 (1988) (content-based restrictions on speech in school newspaper constitutional so long as [they] are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (distinctions in non-public forum based on subject matter and speaker identity are constitutional as long they are reasonable in light of purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral); Lee v. Intern. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 672, 685 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reasonableness inquiry is whether [the restrictions on solicitation and on distribution of literature] are reasonably related to maintaining the multipurpose environment that the Port Authority has created.). Similarly, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974), the Court considered whether the city's refusal to accept political advertising on its rapid transit vehicles violated the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that Revenue earned from long-term commercial advertising could be jeopardized by a requirement that short-term candidacy or issue-oriented advertisements be displayed on car cards. Users would be subjected to the blare of political propaganda. There could be lurking doubts about political favoritism, and sticky administrative problems might arise in parceling out limited space to eager politicians. In these circumstances, the managerial system to limit car card space to innocuous and less controversial advertising does not rise to the dignity of a First Amendment violation. 418 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion). The Court thus reasoned that, in order to maximize commercial revenue and eliminate concerns about political favoritism, the city could restrict the car card space to exclude political advertisement. In this case, the district court concluded that SEPTA acted reasonably in relying on Dr. Lee's letter to remove the 24 CBM posters. However, CBM paid the commercial rate for the advertising space, just like any other advertiser, and submitted an advertisement on abortion and women's health, topics that were already the subject of other permitted advertisements. The subject of the speech, and the manner in which it was presented, were compatible with the purposes of the forum. The plurality opinion in Kokinda warned against accepting the argument that simply because the government permitted other potentially disruptive speech on postal property, it had to permit solicitation as well. The Court reasoned that whether or not the Service permits other forms of speech, which may or may not be disruptive, it is not unreasonable to prohibit solicitation on the ground that it is unquestionably a particular form of speech that is disruptive of business. 497 U.S. at 733.8 See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 831, 838 n.10 (1976). In this case, however, unlike Kokinda and Lehman, the government has offered no basis on which to conclude that the speech in question would interfere with the accepted purposes of the advertising space. See Lee v. Intern. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 672, 691 (1992) (O'Connor, J. concurring) (because I cannot see how peaceful pamphletting is incompatible with the multipurpose environment of the Port Authority airports, I cannot accept that a total ban on that activity is reasonable without an explanation as to why such a restriction `preserves the property' for the several uses to which it has been put. [citation to Perry]); Airline Pilots Assoc. v. Dept. of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1161 (7th Cir. 1995) (Flaum, J. Concurring) (...when the government decides who may speak based on substantive criteria, it acts as a censor. The government should not normally take on the role of deciding who may speak on what matters, regardless of what capacity in which it acts). _________________________________________________________________ 8. Although the four Justice plurality concluded that the restriction was reasonable, three dissenting Justices concluded that even if the forum was nonpublic, the restrictions were not reasonable, in large part because the post office permitted other disruptive speech. This inconsistent treatment, in the eyes of the dissent, renders the prohibition on solicitation unreasonable. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 760-761 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 25 SEPTA argued before the district court that Gambaccini had testified that SEPTA closed the debate to a situation in which there are ads or debated and dubious statements of medical fact.9 Consistent with this statement, SEPTA could have argued that based on Dr. Lee's letter, it viewed CBM's ad as debated and dubious, and accordingly excluded it. A prohibition on debated and dubious ads, put in place before, or because of the concerns about CBM's ad, might qualify as reasonable. We note, however, that SEPTA does not have a policy of protecting riders from debated and dubious speech generally, nor does SEPTA link this purported policy to its use of the forum. In any event, we need not reach that question. Gambaccini did not testify to such a policy, implemented either before or after the removal of CBM's ad. Instead, when questioned if he would post an ad saying women who choose abortion live longer and have less breast cancer, he answered [N]ot unless there was some credible evidence to support it. (Appendix at 354-355). This is a different standard -- a debatable advertisement may well be supported by credible evidence. And if this standard controlled, SEPTA was unreasonable because it failed to give CBM an opportunity to produce such evidence. Moreover, Gambaccini did not explain whether this standard applied generally, or just to ads on the topic of abortion and cancer. Nor did he explain SEPTA's grounds for adopting it. SEPTA has left us to guess why, in terms of the purpose of the forum, it excluded CBM's ad, and why, and to what extent, other ads will also be excluded. This makes it difficult to evaluate the extent of the governmental interest in excluding the speech from SEPTA's property. Finally, as we have noted, SEPTA never asked CBM-- the sponsor of the ad -- to defend its accuracy, to explain the basis for the ad, or to clarify it. Instead, SEPTA removed the ad without contacting CBM -- even though CBM had modified the poster in response to SEPTA's previous requests. _________________________________________________________________ 9. SEPTA argued before us that it determined not to devote its advertising areas to alarming allegations regarding cancer and abortion, given the controverted nature of the public health claim as described in the HHS letter. 26 We conclude, therefore, that under the facts presented SEPTA's actions were not reasonable. SEPTA acted as a censor, limiting speech because it found it to be misleading. SEPTA argues that it cannot investigate the accuracy of medical claims in ads. For that reason, it relied on Dr. Lee's letter. We do not hold that SEPTA must hire its own cadre of experts to evaluate medical claims made in ads. It was SEPTA, however, which accepted advertising on a permitted topic, and then decided that CBM's ad was unacceptably misleading. Having decided to exclude the posters on this basis, SEPTA did not act reasonably when it failed to ask CBM to clarify the basis on which the claim was made. This is all the more true where SEPTA has failed to explain how its content-based distinctions are related to preserving the advertising space for its intended use, and where SEPTA has in place no policy, old or new, written or unwritten, governing the display of ads making contested claims.