Opinion ID: 6560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying the Central Hudson Factors

Text: 20 Central Hudson laid out a four-part test for evaluating a restriction of commercial speech: 21 At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 16 22
23 This issue is not contested. MD II's advertising is related to lawful activity and is not misleading.
24 This part of Central Hudson requires us to identify with care the interests the [City] itself asserts for the restriction on speech; we may not supplant the precise interests put forward by the [City] with other suppositions. 17 7] The chief interest the City asserts to justify its regulation focuses on the deleterious effects topless bars have on the surrounding community. There is a correlation between the presence of topless dancing establishments, depressed property values, and increased crime. The City in formulating its ordinance relied on studies finding these correlations to exist. The district court relied on just these effects in upholding the location restrictions contained in Sec. 14-2.2 of the Class D Dance Halls ordinance. MD II gives us no cause to question the validity and importance of the governmental interest in preserving property values and deterring crime. 25
26 This is the most difficult part of the Central Hudson test for the City. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the substantial burden this requirement places on the proponent of a restriction on commercial speech. 18 The burden is on the City to show that its restrictions on MD II's advertising will in fact alleviate ... to a material degree 19 the harms identified above. [T]he regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose. 20 27 The district court found that the city has failed to show that its regulation of Plaintiff's use of the term 'gentleman's club' in any way furthers its stated interest in preserving property values or reducing crime. [T]he city has made no finding, the district court continued, that advertising that employs the term 'gentleman's club' produces the deleterious effects which the city seeks to curb. The City has not on this appeal persuaded us that the district court's findings were incorrect. In formulating its ordinance, the city relied on no studies showing a link between advertising and property values or crime. 21 We have no doubt that the interests the city seeks to protect merit protection, but like the district court, we are unable to conclude on this record that those interests are served by banning the advertising prohibited by the ordinance. This factor weighs in favor of affirming the district court.
28 Finally, Central Hudson requires that a regulation of commercial speech extend only as far as the interest it serves. 22 In this respect, too, the ordinance is deficient. Section 14-1(5)(B)(v) is particularly broad, forbidding the use of any term calculated to attract patrons with nudity, semi-nudity, or simulated nudity. The City conceded at oral argument that the literal wording of this provision reaches the advertising of events that have never been shown to harm property values or promote crime. 23 The City has put no evidence in the record that forbidding the use of any term calculated to attract patrons with nudity, semi-nudity, or simulated nudity in commercial advertising is narrowly tailored to prevent the erosion of property values or reduce crime rates. Therefore, this factor also supports the district court's judgment. 29 On balance, we conclude that application of the Central Hudson factors supports affirmance of the district court. There has been a failure of proof on this record. 24 Because the burden of justifying its speech regulation is on the City, the district court's summary judgment for the plaintiff was correct. 30 Because we uphold the district court's summary judgment for the plaintiff, we reject the City's challenge to the district court's award of attorneys' fees to MD II.