Opinion ID: 1650788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common Law Jurisdiction

Text: 1  What Constitutes the Common Law of Michigan? Since there is no jurisdiction by statute, if the defendant was properly convicted it must be because the surviving common law rule is that in cases involving different jurisdictions the homicide occurs where the homicidal blow is struck. Although we have recognized the common law as part of our jurisprudence, Const 1963, art 3, § 7, it is the English common law unaffected by statute. English statutes of general operation were in force in the territory at one time, but in 1810 an act was passed putting an end to the effectiveness in Michigan of all the written law of England, France, Canada, and the Northwest and Indiana Territories. 1 Territorial Laws, Act of September 16, 1810, p 900; In the Matter of Lamphere, 61 Mich 105, 108 (1886); Methodist Church of Newark v Clark, 41 Mich 730, 741 (1879); Trask v Green, 9 Mich 357, 365 (1861); 1 Blume, Transactions of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan, 1805-1814, pp xxxi-xl; and see In the Matter of Jackson, 15 Mich 416, 438 (1867); Plaza Investment Co v Abel, 8 Mich App 19, 25 (1967). [3] This case must therefore be governed exclusively upon common law prior to the enactment of the statutes of 2 and 3 Edward VI, c. 24 (1548) [4] and 2 George II, c. 21 (1729) [5] (reenacted 9 George IV, c. 31, § 8 [1828]) which related to striking or poisoning in one place and death ensuing in another. 2  Michigan Cases Construing Common Law Alternate Jurisdiction There are no cases in Michigan which directly construe the common law on this point. Obiter dicta occurs in three cases. In each case the language is that of Justice CAMPBELL. In one case, he stated: Until provided for by statute, death in one county from an attack in another did not make murder in either county. Chapman v People, 39 Mich 357, 360 (1878). [6] In another case, he stated: Where death does not immediately follow the mortal blow, and happens in another jurisdiction within the realm, the place of death was generally, under the views taken by the common law authorities, the proper place of jurisdiction;    People v Tyler, 7 Mich 161, 208-209 (1859) (hereinafter Tyler I ). [7] Justice CAMPBELL dissented in Tyler II, [8] 8 Mich 320 (1860) and rejected the doctrine of constructive presence apparently adopted by the majority. In the course of a lengthy dissent Justice CAMPBELL interprets the common law as providing for trial at the place of the blow. He commented on the common law as follows: The old rule requiring every offense tried in the common law courts to be inquired of in the county where it occurred, originated in the peculiar constitution of the early juries. They were not selected merely to hear evidence and pass upon it. They were witnesses, as well as triers, and were supposed to act on knowledge derived in their own vicinage. Where an inquiry was necessary into matters occurring in different counties, there was no adequate machinery for conducting it. The rule survived its reason, and has been maintained since for convenience rather than necessity, and may, therefore, be modified upon proper occasion. But, formerly, if a fatal blow was given in one county, and death happened in another, the homicide could not be within the knowledge of the jurors of either county; those who could speak as to the blow having no means of ascertaining the death, and vice versa. But it was settled that, by carrying the dead body into the county where the wound was given, so that death could be shown by view, the offense might be tried there: 1 Bish. Cr. L., § 554, and citations. And although it may be regarded as doubtful, there are, nevertheless, very high authorities for saying that, at common law (but probably when jury trials became more improved) a trial might always be had in the county where the mortal blow was given, `for that alone is the act of the party, and the death is but a consequence:' 1 East P.C., 361; 1 Hale P.C., 426; 1 Bish. Cr. L., § 454. And it was also necessary at common law, originally, in a case of this kind, to remove the body to the county where the injury was given, in order to have the coroner's inquest: 1 East P.C., 361; 1 Hale P.C., 426; 2 Hale P.C., 66. Tyler II, 338-339. (Emphasis added except the phrase `for that alone is the act of the party, and the death is but a consequence:' wherein emphasis is in the original.) Justice CAMPBELL in the course of his opinion buttressed his statement as to what the common law was by referring to three common law cases as follows: In Rex v. Hargrave, 5 C. & P., 170, it was expressly decided, in a case tried in 1831, where the stroke was given in one county and the death occurred in another, the felony was in the first county. The indictment stated that J.C. assaulted the deceased at, etc., in the county of Middlesex, etc., of which he languished and died in Kent;    (the court said) `the giving of the blows which caused the death constitutes the felony. The languishing alone, which is not any part of the offense, is laid in Kent;'   . Id, 345. (Emphasis added except which is not any part of the offense where emphasis is in original.)