Opinion ID: 170450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantive Due Process Framework

Text: This case once again requires us to wade into the murky waters of § 1983-based substantive due process claims. Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 913 (10th Cir.2007). Substantive due process arises from the Fourteenth Amendment's protections against governmental deprivations without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Under this framework, due process protections are accorded primarily to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994). And, moreover, in extending these concepts to further bar certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them, the Supreme Court has emphasized that only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840, 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (quotations omitted). Importantly for purposes of this appeal, these constitutional protections apply to transgressions above and beyond those covered by the ordinary civil tort system; the two are not coterminous.
What differentiates a constitutional transgression from an ordinary common law tort is a level of executive abuse of power . . . that . . . shocks the conscience. Id. at 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708. In other words, the executive abuse represents arbitrary action of government and requires a showing of government officials abusing their power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression. Id. at 845-46, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (quotations and brackets omitted). While recognizing no calibrated yard stick, id. at 847, 118 S.Ct. 1708, the Supreme Court instructs that the constitutional concept of conscience shocking duplicates no traditional category of common-law fault, id. at 848, 118 S.Ct. 1708. The Supreme Court has also explained, [r]ules of due process are not . . . subject to mechanical application in unfamiliar territory. Id. at 850, 118 S.Ct. 1708. What shocks [the conscience] in one environment may not be so patently egregious in another, and our concern with preserving the constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact analysis of circumstance before any abuse of power is condemned as conscience shocking. Id. Thus, the cases recognize that common-sense distinctions exist between force in one setting (say, a prison) and force in another (say, a kennel business). The case law also recognizes official conduct may be more egregious in circumstances allowing for deliberation (such as when a person is in custody or under governmental control or supervision) than in circumstances calling for quick decisions (such as police chases or prison disturbances). See id. These distinctions in the application of force are not always facilely drawn. Given the latitude we ordinarily afford government actors operating in their official capacities, we recognize constitutional torts only in the narrowest of circumstances, Becker, 494 F.3d at 922. The tortious conduct alleged must do more than show that the government actor intentionally or recklessly caused injury to the plaintiff by abusing or misusing government power. . . . [It] must demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking. Livsey v. Salt Lake County, 275 F.3d 952, 957-58, (10th Cir.2001) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Not surprisingly, little governmental action is held unconstitutional under th[is] formulation[]. 1 Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation § 3.05[D], at 3-116 (4th ed.2006). [3] Even with these general principles in mind, Plaintiffs' case presents a narrow issue that has generated a surprising dearth of reported authority: whether a § 1983 plaintiff can successfully assert a substantive due process right to be free from intentional use of force by a state actor not authorized to use force.
Plaintiffs argue we should resolve their substantive due process claim through the familiar prism of constitutional cases dealing with police encounters, prison confinement, and school discipline. They point, for example, to the legal standard established in police excessive force cases, where we look to, among other factors, (1) whether the victim was suspected of a crime, (2) the severity of the crime, (3) whether the suspect was armed, (4) the suspect's compliance with police commands, and (5) the danger created by the encounter. See, e.g., Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255, 1259-61 (10th Cir.2008). In prison confinement cases, our framework is slightly different. There, we examine whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Serna v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted) (analyzing injuries occurring during cell lockdown). Lastly, Plaintiffs point to our school discipline cases. In these types of cases, [a]s in the cognate police brutality cases, the substantive due process inquiry . . . must be whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented . . . that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience. Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655 (10th Cir.1987) (quoting Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir.1980)) (discussing excessive corporal punishment in an elementary school). Regardless of the context of these cases, Plaintiffs argue Berney's unprovoked attack violated their substantive due process rights on two grounds common to all of the cases. First, the application of force was severe, given the injuries alleged in the complaint. Second, the application of force was grossly disproportionate to any reasonable purpose. Berney's administrative task in delivering licensing notice to the business can hardly be described as calling for fast or physical action. The confrontation at The Golden Bone was thus not an emergency. In the context of Berney's conduct, however, Plaintiffs' analogies are not particularly helpful. Comparing Berney's unprovoked attack to the use of force by police, prison officials, and school disciplinarians ignores two interrelated characteristics common to the excessive force cases and absent from this one: (1) Police officers, prison officials, and even school authorities are cloaked with the state's imprimatur to use some level of force when necessary. See, e.g., Garcia, 817 F.2d at 654 (explaining that ordinary corporal punishment violates no substantive due process rights of school children) (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977)). (2) In excessive force cases the government official's position is precisely what enables the official to harm the victim. The official has a right to exercise physical control. A reasonable person would not feel at liberty to resist an arresting police officer's necessary force. Nor would prisoners feel free to resist a guard maintaining order. And the same applies to school children who, while not restricted to the same degree as arrestees [and] convicts . . ., are similarly involved in an environment where the state has some lawful control over their liberty. Hilliard v. City and County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1520 (10th Cir.1991). The misuse of power is most obvious, moreover, where the official has the opportunity to deliberate, and still chooses to inflict harm. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (discussing cases where the defendant has the time to deliberate but goes on to harm the victim anyway). Focusing on the two characteristics yields the following analysis: in the typical excessive force cases involving government actors, officials enjoy an express authorization to use some degree of force and, relying on their official positions, misuse that authorization. When a public school teacher, for example, exceeds the permitted level of force and inflicts upon a student what amounts to an arbitrary and severe beating, the substantive due process doctrine condemns the act, labeling it a conscience-shocking abuse of official power. Thus, when the two characteristics show up in a case, we can safely say the abus[e] or misus[e of] government power . . . demonstrate[s] a degree of outrageousness . . . that is truly conscience shocking. Livsey, 275 F.3d at 957-58. But we have never held that an official government position alone (without, for example, the abuse of that position) warrants liability under the rubric of substantive due process. The presence of the two interrelated characteristics(1) authorization to use force and (2) the resultant misuse of power in reliance on the official positionin our excessive force jurisprudence explains why we elevate an official's misconduct above ordinary tort law.
The question remains, then, what exactly are the contours of substantive due process claims premised on physical assault by ordinary government actors? The Supreme Court has suggested, albeit in dictum, that a constitutional right might exist to be free from assault committed by state officials . . . outside of a custodial setting. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). But when we step outside the excessive force paradigm, we still must ask, what is it about the attack that transcends the boundaries of an ordinary tort law? Where do we draw the line? Cases outside the custodial context from several other circuits are helpful in answering these questions. Two cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit, for example, stand for the proposition that an unprovoked attack by a public official does not, by itself, automatically translate into a substantive due process violation. In the first case, Skinner v. City of Miami, 62 F.3d 344, 346 (11th Cir.1995), a firefighter sued his colleagues under § 1983 for violating his substantive due process rights by hazing him in an especially degrading and humiliating fashion. The court held this conduct did not constitute a violation of Skinner's substantive due process rights, although it was enough to state a claim under a state law tort. Id. at 347-48. The court rejected application of the circuit's excessive force cases, finding them unpersuasive because they involved a special relationship between the attacker and the victim. Id. at 348 (The cases [Skinner] relies on arose in the custodial setting and are inapposite.). In the other Eleventh Circuit case, a college instructor physically attacked an adult student. Dacosta v. Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045, 1047 (11th Cir.2002). Several fellow students restrained the attacker until police arrived and arrested him for criminal battery. Relying on Skinner, the court concluded the instructor's conduct, malicious as it may have been, did not violate the student's substantive due process rights, only her state law right to be free from battery. Id. at 1048-49. And again, the court dismissed the excessive force cases as inapplicable. Id. (The cases [plaintiff] cites as authority for her substantive due process claim involve excessive force used by law enforcement officers, and are not applicable to the instant case.). The inquiry is thus in what circumstances will a physical assault transcend ordinary state tort law and rise to the level of a constitutional tort. A Seventh Circuit case involving an assault in the employment setting fleshes out the appropriate shocking the conscience standard. In Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir.1997), a teacher complained that the superintendent for the public school district where she worked abused his authority to extort sexual favors from her: He threatened that he would not assign her a classroom aide to alleviate her workload [she taught special education classes], that he would prevent the District from hiring [her husband], and that he would refuse to approve the renewal of her provisional special education license (without which she would lose her job) if she did not engage in sexual acts with him. Id. The court concluded the teacher's allegations stated a § 1983 substantive due process claim precisely because the superintendent's authority over the teacher enabled his ability to assault her. Id. at 1063. These cases help us draw the line in assault cases outside a custodial or law enforcement setting. An assaultstanding alonedoes not suffice to make out a constitutional substantive due process claim. But an assault under a stated threat, a threat the victim knows an assaulting government official has the authority to carry out, can separate the ordinary common law tort from the substantive due process claim. The combination of serious physical abuse and the assaulting official's use of official authority to force the victim to submit can shock the conscience. The superintendent in Wudtke succeeded in forcing the teacher to cooperate only because he threatened retaliation, retaliation fully within his power to enforce. In cases like Wudtke, we recognize the same two interrelated characteristics that define our excessive force cases. First, government bestowed certain discretionary powers on the superintendent (classroom resources allocation, hiring decisions, and teaching license renewal). Second, relying on these powers, the superintendent sexually assaulted the teacher. We see, in other words, governmental powers employed to facilitate the harm inflicted. And such an abuse of authority can, in an individual case, shock our conscience if sufficiently severe.
Combining these principles, the following legal framework emerges: to state a substantive due process claim against government officials not authorized to use force, litigants must show an abuse of governmental authority as an integral element of the attack. Several non-exhaustive factors flowing from these cases help illustrate the requisite abuse of power in claims of excessive force: (1) the harm results from misconduct by a government official; (2) the official has some authority over the victim but is not authorized to use force as a part of the official's position; (3) the official abuses that authority to further the attack; (4) the abuse exceeds run-of-the-mill negligent conduct, rising to the level of reckless or intentional conduct; [4] and, finally, (5) the injury is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708. We emphasize these factors do not exhaust all possible variations of governmental misconduct. They merely provide a frameworkcertainly not to the exclusion of other factorsfor how we can analyze a case like this one.