Opinion ID: 2299910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: thomas' invocation of the right to counsel

Text: Thomas also contends that the motions judge should have suppressed the statements that Thomas made after he was advised of his rights. He claims that after he had indicated on the PD-47 card that he was not willing to answer questions without an attorney, the police did not scrupulously honor his invocation of his right to counsel, but instead proceeded to interrogate him, in violation of the prophylactic rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). We do not agree. We recently had occasion in Morris v. United States, 728 A.2d 1210, 1213-22 (D.C. 1999); see also id. at 1226-29 (opinion of Terry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), to discuss Edwards and its progeny in some detail. We reiterated in Morris that where, as in this case, a suspect has refused to answer questions without an attorney being present, any subsequent response by the suspect to custodial interrogation must be suppressed unless the prosecution demonstrates 1. that the suspect has initiated further communications or discussions with the police, and 2. that he has knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Morris, at 1217; see also id. at 1226 (opinion of Terry, J.). In the present case, the motions judge resolved these issues in the government's favor. We discern no error.
Thomas asserts that the police, and not Thomas, initiated the discussions that followed Thomas' original negative response to the fourth question on the PD-47 rights card, relating to his willingness to answer questions without an attorney. The judge found, to the contrary, that the defendant initiated further communication by stating, after being told by Detective Corbett that they had to stop talking because he wrote no to the fourth question, stating that he wanted to talk, he wanted to tell the police what happened. Thomas concedes that the judge's finding is supported by the evidence, but claims that, in context, Corbett's response to Thomas' invocation of rights  specifically, Corbett's statement that there could be no further discussion of the case because Thomas had answered the fourth question on the PD-47 in the negative  amounted to interrogation within the meaning of Rhode Island v. Innis, supra note 12, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682. We believe that the judge's resolution of this issue was right on the mark: Turning to the facts of this case, no common-sense understanding of what Detective Corbett did after Mr. Thomas wrote no to the fourth question can be construed as a question or an interrogation. He simply stated the reality. The questioning had to stop now. They couldn't talk any more because Mr. Thomas wrote no to the fourth question. That's not a question. It's not a declarative sentence that can be construed as an interrogative sentence. We know there are some kinds of conduct that have been found in Supreme Court decisions and the decisions of the lower courts to constitute a question, even though they're not asked as a question. This doesn't fall into that category. This is a simple statement by the detective that questioning has to stop because the defendant had answered no to the fourth question. What happens next, again, in any common-sense understanding of what Mr. Thomas did, has to be considered an initiation by the defendant of further conversation, exchanges, or communications with the police. Very simply: Mr. Thomas wanted to talk. He wanted to talk about this case. That desire came out over and over again in his own testimony at this hearing. He admitted that he wanted to know why the police considered him a suspect, and he understood that the only way he was going to get that question answered was by giving a statement. We recently reiterated in Morris that the motivating factor behind Edwards is to discourage police interference with the exercise of the right to counsel. At 1222 (citation omitted). We noted that in Edwards, officials had extensively badgered the defendant to persuade him to waive his rights, and that the prophylactic rule of that case was designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers in the manner in which the defendant in Edwards was. Id. at 1221 (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (plurality opinion)). We went on to hold that, in the absence of police badgering or interference with the exercise of the right to counsel of the kind that occurred in Edwards, the prophylactic doctrine of that case should not be expansively interpreted to apply, out of context, to situations critically different from the circumstances before the Supreme Court. Id. at 1222 (citation omitted). To treat Detective Corbett's statement that he would, in effect, comply with the Edwards rule (by not questioning Thomas further) as a violation of that rule would expand the decision in Edwards beyond recognition, and it would compel officers to walk a perilous tightrope; almost anything they said or did in response to a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel could lead to suppression of a voluntary confession, even if the suspect fully understood his rights. [21] Edwards' prophylactic rule was intended to serve as a protection of the right to counsel, not as a heads I win, tails you lose trap for the conscientious officer. [22]
The motions judge also found that Thomas waived his right to counsel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. There was ample evidence to support that finding. The testimony established, and the judge found, that on the day of his arrest, Thomas was not quite twenty-four years old. Thomas had completed the eleventh grade. The judge found that Thomas had been arrested and advised of his rights on three or four previous occasions, and had executed PD-47's in connection with some of these arrests. According to the judge, the videotaped confession presents the defendant as a careful, articulate person, capable of expressing himself precisely and in considerable verbal detail. Defense counsel did not contend that Thomas lacked the ability to comprehend fully the Miranda warnings that were given to him, and the judge found that Thomas obviously had that ability. Indeed, Thomas acknowledged during his testimony at the motions hearing that he was familiar with the questions on the rights card, that he understood that he had a choice not to talk to Detective Corbett, that he was not forced to say anything, and that I was treated good. In this case, as in Morris, at 1220, [t]here was thus ample evidence to support the Judge's finding that [Thomas] not only knew what his rights were but had also successfully exercised them in the recent past. [23] The judge also found that Thomas made his videotaped statement freely and voluntarily. This is hardly subject to dispute. Thomas testified that he felt deep remorse for the killing and that he had prayed and cried about it. He explained that it was important to him to have an opportunity to tell his side of the story to the police. As the judge explained, it was clear that the defendant wanted to talk, and it is nowhere more clear than in his immediate initiation of further conversation after the detective said, look, we've got to stop talking, when [Thomas] says, no I want to talk, I want to tell you what happened. We held in Morris that, notwithstanding the defendant's negative response to question 4, the evidence relating to his state of mind supported the judge's finding that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary and intentional. The result must be the same here. There is not the slightest evidence that Thomas' confession was coerced; indeed, his own testimony was to the contrary. As Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), the ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good. If the police did not have that ability, then society would be the loser. Id. Admissions of guilt resulting from valid Miranda waivers are more than merely desirable; they are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law. Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We conclude that the motions judge properly declined to suppress those of Thomas' statements, including his videotaped confession, which were made after Thomas was advised of his rights.