Opinion ID: 77049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Committing Tortious Act in Florida

Text: 15 The Florida Long-Arm statute also provides for the assertion of jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who commits a tortious act in Florida. FLA. STAT. ch. 48.193(1)(b). Florida courts construing this provision have noted that the alleged tortfeasor's physical presence [in Florida] is not required. Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1260 (Fla.2002). Rather, jurisdiction may be found in certain instances where an out-of-state defendant commits a tort that produces an injury in Florida. See id. 7 For example, allegations about an out-of-state defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida are sufficient to trigger jurisdiction under the Long-Arm statute provided, however, that the cause of action arises from those communications. Id.; see Acquadro v. Bergeron, 851 So.2d 665, 671 (Fla.2003) (finding jurisdiction under FLA. STAT. ch. 48.193(1)(b) where an out-of-state defendant allegedly defamed a Florida resident during a phone call made into Florida). Accordingly, there must be some connexity that exists between the out-of-state communications and the cause of action such that the cause of action would depend upon proof of either the existence or the content of any of the communications ... into Florida. Carlyle, 842 So.2d at 1017. 16 Based on this precedent, we find that Horizon made sufficient allegations in its complaint that Kass committed a tortious act in Florida as defined by FLA. STAT. ch. 48.193(1)(b). The district court noted that the general gravamen of the complaint was that Kass allegedly was negligent in failing to perform certain duties, and therefore jurisdiction was lacking under ch. 48.193(1)(b) because the complaint did not allege that any out-of-state communications into Florida were themselves tortious. Our review of the complaint, however, reveals otherwise. After stating that Henley expressed concern about the limitations of Horizon to perform oversight and back office functions, Horizon alleged in its complaint that Wolf, in communications from his California office to Horizon, affirmatively represented that he, and subsequently Kass, would monitor Yu & Company and perform back office services for Horizon. See R1-2 at 21, ¶ 59. In Count III of its complaint, after reincorporating the allegations in paragraph 59, Horizon alleged that these communications were issued with intent to deceive and defraud Horizon, id. at 55, ¶ 148, and therefore constituted constructive fraud, an intentional tort in Florida, see Alex Hofrichter, P.A. v. Zuckerman & Venditti, P.A., 710 So.2d 127, 130 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998). While Kass argues that it made no such representations to Horizon, Horizon met its burden to rebut Kass's denials by offering proof from Wolf's deposition which indicated that Kass had discussed back office services with Henley. See Acquadro, 851 So.2d at 671 (noting that the plaintiff has the burden to offer further evidence to support the allegations in the complaint after the defendant sufficiently challenges by affidavits the allegations supporting jurisdiction in the complaint). Accordingly, regardless of the veracity of Kass's denials on the merits, we conclude that Horizon had satisfied its burden to establish jurisdiction under FLA. STAT. ch. 48.193(1)(b). See Future Tech. Today, Inc., 218 F.3d at 1250 (finding allegations sufficient for jurisdiction but declining to consider the merits of the controversy).