Opinion ID: 1135651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Psychological Impairment

Text: The district court construed NRS 616.605(3) to preclude a permanent partial disability award for psychological impairment resulting from an industrial accident, and we agree. NRS 616.605(3) provides: No factors other than the degree of physical impairment of the whole man may be considered in calculating the entitlement to compensation for a permanent partial disability. (Emphasis added.) The district court found that the word `psychological' is not included within the term `physical' as used in this statute, and it further found that SIIS may not pay an award for psychological impairment. Maxwell contends that the district court gave NRS 616.605(3) an unduly narrow construction in limiting permanent partial disability awards exclusively to physical impairments. Maxwell asserts that, where a physical impairment is coupled with a psychological impairment, both injuries should be compensable. The construction of a statute is a question of law, and independent appellate review of an administrative ruling, rather than a more deferential standard of review, is appropriate. Nyberg v. Nev. Indus. Comm'n, 100 Nev. 322, 324, 683 P.2d 3, 4 (1984); American Int'l Vacations v. MacBride, 99 Nev. 324, 326, 661 P.2d 1301, 1302 (1983). Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, such that the legislative intent is clear, a court should not add to or alter [the language] to accomplish a purpose not on the face of the statute or apparent from permissible extrinsic aids such as legislative history or committee reports. Cirac v. Lander County, 95 Nev. 723, 729, 602 P.2d 1012, 1016 (1979). We are not empowered to go beyond the face of a statute to lend it a construction contrary to its clear meaning. Union Plaza Hotel v. Jackson, 101 Nev. 733, 736, 709 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1985). While worker's compensation statutes must be liberally construed to protect the worker, Southwest Gas v. Woods, 108 Nev. 11, 14-15, 823 P.2d 288, 290 (1992), such a rule cannot justify the inclusion in a statutory scheme of a substantive right that cannot be supported by any fair reading of the statutory scheme. Weaver v. SIIS, 104 Nev. 305, 306, 756 P.2d 1195, 1196 (1988). We conclude the language of NRS 616.605(3) is clear and unambiguous, and we hold that the legislature has specifically precluded permanent partial disability awards for psychological impairment. Maxwell contends, however, that NRS 616.605(3) must be construed in conjunction with NRS 616.605(2), rather than in isolation, and that, when this is done, the meaning of NRS 616.605(3) becomes ambiguous. See Acklin v. McCarthy, 96 Nev. 520, 523, 612 P.2d 219, 220 (1980) (statute should be interpreted according to the entire statutory scheme of the act). NRS 616.605(2) provides, in part: The insurer shall select a physician or chiropractor from a group of rating physicians and chiropractors designated by the administrator, to determine the percentage of disability in accordance with the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. Chapter 12 of the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides), entitled Mental and Behavioral Disorders, provides a system for rating psychological and other non-physical impairments for purposes of making permanent partial disability awards. American Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 215 (2d ed. 1984). However, rules of statutory construction provide that a specific statute takes precedence over a general statute. SIIS v. Surman, 103 Nev. 366, 368, 741 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1987). We conclude that the AMA Guides do not defeat the clear import of NRS 616.605(3). We cannot assume that, by designating the AMA Guides as the standard by which claimants are to be evaluated, the legislature intended a small section of the AMA Guides to take precedence over the express provisions of NRS 616.605(3). The language of NRS 616.605(3) is too clear and explicit to interpret in any manner other than according to its plain meaning. We hold that the language of NRS 616.605(3) limiting permanent partial disability awards to awards for physical impairment precludes the award of compensation for psychological conditions resulting from an industrial accident, including Maxwell's resulting depression. While we realize that psychological impairment can be just as debilitating as any physical malady, NRS 616.605(3) represents a clear legislative mandate restricting permanent partial disability awards to physical injuries. We accept that mandate, and we decline to construe NRS 616.605 in a manner which distorts the legislature's will.