Opinion ID: 9279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the factual basis for the plea

Text: Rivas argues that the district court erred in finding that there was a sufficient factual basis for his plea of guilty to the offense of using or carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court's acceptance of a guilty plea is considered a factual finding that there is an adequate basis for the plea. We therefore review this finding for clear error. United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 1992). Section 924(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that: Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years . . . . Relying on the recent Supreme Court decision in Bailey v. United States, __ U.S. __, 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995), Rivas contends that the factual basis for the guilty plea is insufficient to show that he used a firearm during the offense. In Bailey, the Supreme Court held that § 924(c)(1) requires evidence sufficient 3 to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense. 116 S.Ct. at 505 (emphasis in opinion). The Court then set forth examples of activities that constitute active employment of a firearm, including brandishing, displaying, striking with, and of course, firing or attempting to fire the gun. In the instant case, at the rearraignment, while detailing the factual basis for the plea, the Government stated that [a]t the time [Rivas] was arrested he was carrying a 9mm Beretta in the front of his pants, which he had his hand on when the officer convinced him that probably wouldn't be a good idea. The district court subsequently inquired whether the facts recited by the Government were true, and Rivas replied [n]o. Defense counsel explained that [t]he only thing he is saying, Judge, is that the pistol he had was underneath the seat. He is saying it was underneath the seat as opposed to being in the front of his pants. (emphasis added). The district court responded that for the purposes of the guilty plea, it doesn't matter. (emphasis added). It is clear that, because the rearraignment was held prior to Bailey, the district court, at that time, was correct. Our prior cases held that all that was needed to establish use was that the firearm was available to [the defendant] to facilitate the commission of an offense. United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 237 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 934, 111 S.Ct. 2057 4 (1991) (citation omitted).1 We need not determine whether Rivas used his firearm in relation to this offense. In this regard, we note that the Supreme Court in Bailey remanded the case for consideration whether the evidence satisfied the carrying prong of § 924(c). Rivas pleaded guilty to count two of the indictment, which charged him with using or carrying a firearm. Accordingly, we must determine whether the factual basis is sufficient to meet the carrying requirement of § 924(c). If so, the district court's response of it doesn't matter would be correct in this case. As recognized by the Eleventh Circuit, because Bailey did not address the carrying requirement, prior precedent analyzing that prong was not affected. United States v. Farris, 77 F.3d 391, 395 n.4 (11th Cir. 1996). Prior to Bailey, in United States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 104 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 928 (1992), we examined the carrying requirement of § 924(c) and explained that the word `carry' derives from the french carier, which means `to transport in a vehicle. (quoting Webster's Third International Dictionary 353 (1966)). Webster provided the following definitions of carry: `to move while supporting (as in a vehicle or in one's hands or arms): move an appreciable distance without dragging: sustain as a burden or load and bring along to another place.' Id. We observed that the legislative history did not indicate that the word carry should be given any 1 Bailey is applicable to this case because a newly announced rule applies to a criminal case on direct appeal. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708 (1987). 5 meaning but its ordinary or literal meaning. Significantly, we also recognized that carrying on the person is different from carrying in a vehicle because the means of carrying is the vehicle itself. Thus, we held that the carrying requirement of § 924(c) is met if the operator of the vehicle knowingly possesses the firearm in the vehicle during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Id. at 104. Accord United States v. Speer, 30 F.3d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 768 (1995); United States v. Ruiz, 986 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 145 (1993). Although Rivas was a passenger rather than the driver of the vehicle, we do not believe that such a distinction means that he was not carrying the firearm. At his rearraignment, Rivas did not contest the part of the factual basis indicating that he apparently was going for the gun when the officer convinced him that probably wouldn't be a good idea. The only thing Rivas disputed was that the gun was in the waistband of his pants. At sentencing, Rivas admitted that the pistol he had was underneath the seat. (emphasis added). In his written objections, Rivas stated that the pistol he had in his possession was placed underneath the car seat. He therefore admitted to knowingly possessing the firearm in the vehicle. Further, it is undisputed that he had the gun during or in relation to the drug trafficking offense. As such, Rivas's actions were sufficient to constitute carrying under § 924(c).