Opinion ID: 2293877
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims of Error Raised in Forest Ecology Network's and NRCM's Cross-Appeals

Text: [¶ 42] Forest Ecology Network and NRCM assert, separately or together, that LURC erred by (a) not conducting an up or down vote on Plum Creek's petition at the close of the hearing; (b) approving Plum Creek's receipt of compensation in exchange for conveying conservation easements to achieve land conservation requirements; (c) subjecting the concept plan to future amendment only upon the mutual agreement of LURC and the landowner; (d) treating the concept plan as equivalent to prospective zoning for the Moosehead Lake region; and (e) finding that the concept plan satisfied the demonstrated need criterion of 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(8-A)(B). NRCM also contends that the court erred by (f) denying its motion pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C(e) to permit the development of additional evidence regarding the possible bias of certain witnesses. [9]
[¶ 43] Neither the governing statute nor LURC's procedural rules explicitly require LURC to immediately vote up or down on a petition as submitted at the close of a hearing. Section 4.05 of LURC's rules requires that LURC must act upon a petition for proposed changes to district boundaries within 90 days after the final closure of the public hearing, if a public hearing is held, but the section also provides that LURC may elect to reopen the public hearing record and extend the time period for public comment to such date as it may designate. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 004-7 § 4.05(10)(b), (c). This ability to reopen the record and consider additional comments provides LURC with discretion regarding how to proceed at the close of a public hearing, if one is held. [¶ 44] Furthermore, both the governing statute and LURC's procedural rules indicate that LURC may take an active role in the adoption or amendment of land use district boundaries because both permit LURC to initiate such a process. Title 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(7-A)(A) provides: The commission or its staff may initiate and any state or federal agency, any county or municipal governing body or any property owner or lessee may petition for adoption or amendment of land use district standards, district boundaries or land use maps. LURC's rules provide that the Commission or its staff may initiate the adoption or amendment of a land use district boundary. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 004-6 § 4.05(2). LURC's ability to modify a redistricting petition by proposing its own amendments is consistent with LURC's independent authority to initiate such redistricting on its own. Forcing LURC to do no more than accept or reject a petition as drafted and submitted by a private party risks wasting agency resources in situations when LURC finds merit in some aspects of the plan proposed in the petition but not others. [¶ 45] Finally, a requirement that LURC immediately vote up or down on a petition at the end of a hearing would be contrary to general principles of administrative law. The procedure for amending land use district standards, district boundaries, and land use maps is clearly defined by statute as a rulemaking procedure. 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(7-A)(B). Although LURC's written decision repeatedly referred to the hearing as an adjudicatory hearing, when read in context, this reference mischaracterizes both what actually occurred and the nature of LURC's authority when it engages in rulemaking. [10] Under the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, a rule is a judicially enforceable standard adopted by an agency: Rule means the whole or any part of every regulation, standard, code, statement of policy, or other agency guideline or statement of general applicability, including the amendment, suspension or repeal of any prior rule, that is or is intended to be judicially enforceable and implements, interprets or makes specific the law administered by the agency, or describes the procedures or practices of the agency. 5 M.R.S. § 8002(9)(A) (2011). In contrast, an adjudicatory proceeding is defined as any proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of specific persons are required by constitutional law or statute to be determined after an opportunity for hearing. 5 M.R.S. § 8002(1). Although the rulemaking process in this case was not initiated by LURC itself, the ensuing process, the standards employed, and the approved plan were all steeped in LURC's statutory authority to engage in rulemaking. [11] [¶ 46] Unlike adjudications, which are quasi-judicial determinations of individual rights, rulemaking is focused on policy matters of general applicability. The outcome of the procedure outlined in 12 M.R.S. § 685-A is LURC's adoption of new land use standards for an area within the unorganized and deorganized areas of the state. This is not a situation in which LURC's decision adjudicates Plum Creek's rights, or the rights of other specified parties, as would occur with the approval or denial of a building permit or other land use authorization. Those processes will come later, when and if Plum Creek or others apply for permits to develop particular parcels within the bounds of the newly rezoned area. See 12 M.R.S. § 685-B. In this case, LURC performed a quasi-legislative act that has as its outcome the amendment of zoning boundaries and standards governing the use of land within those boundaries. See id. § 685-A(7-A). [¶ 47] LURC's ability to exercise its planning and zoning functions would be greatly diminished if it were compelled to simply accept or reject a proposed concept plan as originally submitted. Such a constricted view of LURC's authority is contrary to the scheme set forth in section 685-A(7-A) because the statute implicitly recognizes that, regardless of whether a petition to adopt or amend land use district boundaries is initiated by LURC, its staff, another agency, county or municipal government, or a property owner or lessee, the rulemaking process that ensues is the same. See id. § 685-A(7-A). As already noted, the statute, like LURC's own rules, specifically provides that LURC can reopen the public hearing record and extend the time for public comment at any time before adopting land use district standards or boundaries. Id. § 685-A(7-A)(B)(3). This dynamic process is critical to ensuring an effective rulemaking process. It would be stymied if we were to adopt NRCM and Forest Ecology Network's position that once a property owner submits a proposed concept plan, LURC ultimately may do no more than take an up or down vote on the plan as originally proposed. [¶ 48] Because LURC was acting in its rulemaking capacity, it was both reasonable and within LURC's authority to develop amendments to Plum Creek's original concept plan.
[¶ 49] Plum Creek will receive compensation from third parties for the conservation land included in the Moosehead Legacy Conservation Easement and the Roaches Ponds Tract Conservation Easement, two areas within the concept plan that total nearly 400,000 acres. NRCM and Forest Ecology Network do not assert that the easements are inadequate, but they do contend that LURC should not have permitted Plum Creek to meet mandatory conservation requirements through its sale, rather than donation, of these conservation easements. [¶ 50] LURC addressed these concerns explicitly in its decision, concluding that current law does not give it authority to declare that a landowner does not, per se, meet these regulatory standards if, as a way to meet them, the landowner is able to arrange financial assistance from a private third party. The court agreed, concluding that under the applicable statutory and regulatory structure, there is nothing to prevent Plum Creek from receiving compensation for the conservation easements. [¶ 51] The position adopted by LURC and the court accurately reflects the current state of the law regarding this issue. Section 10.23(H) of LURC's rules, which addresses Resource Plan Protection Subdistricts, requires plans associated with redistricting to satisfy several criteria, including: The plan, taken as a whole, is at least as protective of the natural environment as the subdistricts which it replaces. In the case of concept plans, this means that any development gained through any waiver of the adjacency criteria is matched by comparable conservation measures. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 010-78 § 10.23(H)(6)(d) (2011). The plan must also strike a reasonable and publicly beneficial balance between appropriate development and long-term conservation of lake resources. Id. § 10.23(H)(6)(f). Nowhere in LURC's rules or statutory authority is there any requirement that these comparable conservation measures be donated. Indeed, as the court noted, NRCM's and Forest Ecology Network's arguments regarding this issue are largely based on policy considerations untethered to any administrative, statutory, or common law authority. LURC's conclusion that compensation by a third party is immaterial when considering the adequacy of conservation measures is a reasonable interpretation of its rules.
[¶ 52] Forest Ecology Network argues that the concept plan provision that provides for the plan's amendment during its thirty-year term only by mutual agreement between LURC and Plum Creek, or its successor, is a thirty-year exemption from future rezoning and a form of contract zoning that is inconsistent with LURC's statutory authority. [¶ 53] When reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute, we apply the analysis developed by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). As we discussed in Cobb v. Board of Counseling Professionals Licensure: If the statute is unambiguous, we do not defer to the agency's construction, but we interpret the statute according to its plain language. If the statute is ambiguous, we defer to the agency's interpretation, and we affirm the agency's interpretation unless it is unreasonable. 2006 ME 48, ¶ 13, 896 A.2d 271 (citations omitted) (noting that this standard is the same as the Chevron analysis). [¶ 54] Forest Ecology Network primarily contends that the concept plan conflicts with 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(9), which provides for review of district boundaries and land use standards every five years. This argument relies on an interpretation of LURC's statutory authority that is at odds with the unambiguous language of 12 M.R.S. § 685-A and 12 M.R.S. § 685-C (2011). Section 685-A(8-A)(A) provides that the amendment of a land use district boundary requires substantial evidence that the proposed land use district is consistent with ... the comprehensive land use plan, among other requirements. Section 685-C(1) directs LURC to create a comprehensive land use plan. [¶ 55] LURC's Comprehensive Land Use Plan not only provides for lake concept plans, but also specifically references the long-range and binding nature of those plans. Comprehensive Land Use Plan app. C, at C-7. The Comprehensive Land Use Plan notes that the goals of concept planning include the encouragement of long-range planning, the long-term protection of resources, and the increased predictability of the development review process. Id. at C-8. The Comprehensive Land Use Plan further provides that a time span for each plan will be established and that [t]en years will be the minimum period, but concept plans of less than twenty years duration will be discouraged if such plans propose significant deviations from existing standards. Id. It is thus clear from the plain language of section 685-A(8-A), which incorporates the Comprehensive Land Use Plan by reference, that LURC has the authority to create long-term, binding concept plans, as was done here. [¶ 56] Forest Ecology Network also contends that the concept plan is in conflict with section 685-A(9) because the concept plan does not permit LURC to unilaterally amend the land use district boundaries if, after the required review, LURC determines that an amendment is necessary. However, turning again to the plain meaning of the statutory language, nothing in section 685-A(9) indicates that LURC must be permitted to unilaterally amend a standard or district after a periodic review. The concept plan permits LURC to amend the plan with Plum Creek's consent, and the plan itself recognizes that it do[es] not purport to constrain future legislative activity. Reading section 685-A(9) as imposing a per se bar on concept plans with a duration of more than five years is in conflict with both the language and purpose of section 685-A(8-A)(A), as well as the Comprehensive Land Use Plan.
[¶ 57] Forest Ecology Network asserts that the concept plan is inconsistent with the Comprehensive Land Use Plan because the latter calls for prospective zoning for the Moosehead Lake region, but LURC has not created a special prospective zoning plan for the region and the concept plan cannot serve as a substitute. However, the Comprehensive Land Use Plan merely lists the Moosehead Lake region as a candidate for future prospective zoning without requiring that it be prospectively zoned. [12] Comprehensive Land Use Plan at 136. Furthermore, as previously noted, the Comprehensive Land Use Plan specifically provides for lake concept plans, and its description of the purpose of the lake concept plan [13] is similar to its description of the purpose of prospective zoning. [14] Because the Comprehensive Land Use Plan does not mandate prospective zoning for the Moosehead Lake region, the decision whether to engage in prospective zoning for the region was within LURC's discretion. Given the similarities between the goals of prospective zoning and concept plans, and the extensive public participation in the review of the concept plan, it was not unreasonable for LURC to conclude that the concept plan was consistent with the Comprehensive Land Use Plan. Under these circumstances, LURC did not abuse its discretion by not engaging in prospective zoning. See Sager, 2004 ME 40, ¶ 11, 845 A.2d 567.
[¶ 58] NRCM challenges LURC's finding that the concept plan, as finally amended, satisfies the demonstrated need criterion of section 685-A(8-A)(B), which requires, for the adoption of a land use district boundary, substantial evidence that [t]he proposed land use district satisfies a demonstrated need in the community or area and has no undue adverse impact on existing uses or resources or a new district designation is more appropriate for the protection and management of existing uses and resources within the affected area. LURC concluded that the demonstrated need criterion of this provision was satisfied, reasoning that because the Moosehead Lake region is designated in the Comprehensive Land Use Plan as an area with special planning needs that cannot be met through reactive zoning, there is demonstrated need in the region ... for long-term zoning that ... (i) [is] prospective (i.e. forward-looking); (ii) avoids haphazard, incremental development; (iii) [is] based on appropriate locations of development, and (iv) strikes a balance between development and conservation. LURC also determined that the new district designation in Plum Creek's concept plan was more appropriate for the protection and management of existing uses and resources within the affected area and that, therefore, the more appropriate requirement of section 685-A(8-A)(B) was met as well. [¶ 59] NRCM contends that LURC engaged in a tautology by relying on the Comprehensive Land Use Plan's statement of the need for a prospective zoning approach that is responsive to demonstrated need as the basis for finding a demonstrated need for the rezoning realized through the concept plan. LURC responds that it reasonably interpreted the statute by considering the demonstrated need criterion relative to the concept plan in its entirety as opposed to its various details viewed in isolation. Further, LURC asserts that because demonstrated need is only one of two alternative criteria in section 685-A(8-A)(B), and its decision concluded that the concept plan met both criteria, the issue of whether the plan met the demonstrated need criterion is moot. [¶ 60] When it considered this issue in the Rule 80C appeal, the court was not convinced that LURC properly analyzed the no adverse impact portion of the demonstrated need criterion of section 685-A(8-A)(B) because the court determined that LURC did not consider the impact on the entire Moosehead region. However, the court ultimately concluded that this did not amount to error because the record amply supports LURC's conclusion that the concept plan satisfied the second prong of section 685-A(8-A)(B)'s criteria, which requires that the plan is more appropriate for the protection and management of existing uses and resources within the affected area. 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(8-A)(B). [¶ 61] The court and LURC's construction of section 685-A(8-A)(B) as providing two ways in which it may be satisfied is consistent with the plain meaning of that section's language. [15] The use of the word or establishes two alternative criteria. LURC concluded that both criteria were satisfied by the concept plan, and NRCM challenges LURC's findings regarding only one of the two. Thus, the issue of whether LURC correctly decided the demonstrated need criterion is moot because there will be no practical consequences flowing from our decision. See Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 2011 ME 48, ¶ 5, 18 A.3d 824 (stating that when we evaluate an issue for mootness, we examine whether there remain sufficient practical effects flowing from the resolution of [the] litigation to justify the application of limited judicial resources (quotation marks omitted)).
[¶ 62] NRCM contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied its motion, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C(e), to develop additional evidence of undisclosed bias among certain intervenors. NRCM contends that it did not become aware of  the depth of Plum Creek's financial association with other intervenors until after the filing of the Rule 80C appeal. We review the court's ruling for an abuse of discretion. Hale-Rice v. Me. State Ret. Sys., 1997 ME 64, ¶ 16, 691 A.2d 1232. [¶ 63] The Maine Administrative Procedure Act permits a reviewing court to order the taking of additional evidence in certain situations: The reviewing court may order the taking of additional evidence before the agency if it finds that additional evidence... is necessary to deciding the petition for review; or if application is made to the reviewing court for leave to present additional evidence, and it is shown that the additional evidence is material to the issues presented in the review, and could not have been presented or was erroneously disallowed in proceedings before the agency. 5 M.R.S. § 11006(1)(B) (2011). In its motion, Forest Ecology Network requested the opportunity to develop additional evidence about payments Plum Creek made to supporters that allowed the supporters to intervene in the proceedings and consequently prejudiced Forest Ecology Network by stack[ing] the deck with intervenors friendly to Plum Creek. NRCM joined in Forest Ecology Network's motion, asserting that [i]f there were party-intervenors in this case whose participation in the proceedings were made possible by virtue of Plum Creek's financing those entities, and paying for their witnesses' time, the record must reflect that financial support. [¶ 64] In its decision, the court correctly noted that these issues were raised during the proceedings before LURC, and LURC was aware of the allegiances at issue. Parties on both sides of the issue raised concerns about funding several times during the administrative proceedings. Most importantly, Forest Ecology Network and NRCM did not assert that LURC denied them the opportunity to pursue this issue as part of the administrative process. As such, Rule 80C(e) does not afford them a fresh opportunity to present evidence on this issue. As we have stated: Rule 80C(e) applies when evidence that is not part of the record, and could not have been made a part of the record by the propounding party, is relevant to a determination before the court. It is not available to present evidence that the applicant should have presented to the agency.... York Hosp. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 2005 ME 41, ¶ 20, 869 A.2d 729. [¶ 65] The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to develop additional evidence. The entry is: The judgment's determination that Land Use Regulation Commission disregarded its procedural rules and engaged in an unauthorized, ad hoc procedure is vacated. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Remanded to the Business and Consumer Docket for entry of judgment affirming the September 23, 2009 decision of the Land Use Regulation Commission.