Opinion ID: 4514756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Storer’s Report

Text: ¶8. Dickerson asserts the trial court should not have relied on Dr. Storer’s report and testimony because Dr. Storer, in reaching his conclusion, (1) erred by finding that Dickerson did not have a severe and persistent mental illness; (2) incorrectly relied on his belief that 3 The State makes a cursory claim that there is no constitutional right to competency in post-conviction proceedings. Dickerson argues to the contrary. We decline to address the issue because it is not necessary to decide the case. “It is well-settled by the decisions of this Court that a constitutional question will be passed on where the issues involved in a particular case are such that the case may be decided on other grounds.” Warner-Lambert Co. v. Potts, 909 So. 2d 1092, 1093 (Miss. 2005) (citing Broadhead v. Monaghan, 117 So. 2d 881, 888 (Miss. 1960)). “This Court has previously stated that when there is no necessity to reach a question, we will not.” Id. “As this Court stated in Kron v. Van Cleave, 339 So. 2d 559, 563 (Miss. 1976), ‘courts will not decide a constitutional question unless it is necessary to do so in order to decide the case.’” Scott ex rel. Scott v. Flynt, 704 So. 2d 998, 1007 (Miss. 1996); see also Johnson v. Mem’l Hosp. of Gulfport, 732 So. 2d 864, 866 (Miss. 1998). 5 marked cognitive deficits in executive functioning are not accepted as mental defects that significantly interfere with competency-related abilities; (3) lacked an understanding of postconviction relief proceedings, including what level of assistance an attorney requires of a petitioner during the proceedings; and (4) failed to administer any standard test for evaluating competency.
¶9. Dickerson argues that schizophrenia is a severe and persistent mental illness and that Dr. Storer’s diagnosis that Dickerson did not have schizophrenia based on the lack of symptoms Dickerson displayed was erroneous. The State argues that Dickerson failed to cite any relevant authority to support this contention. “Failure to cite relevant authority obviates the appellate court’s obligation to review such issues.” Arrington v. State, 267 So. 3d 753, 756 (Miss. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Byrom v. State, 863 So. 2d 836, 853 (Miss. 2018)). ¶10. Regardless of Dickerson’s failure to cite authority to support his contention, this Court has held that a person suffering from schizophrenia may still be competent to stand trial as well as competent to be executed. Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 736, 736 n.19 (Miss. 2008) (citing Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2008)); Billiot v. State, 655 So. 2d 1, 17 (Miss. 1995). ¶11. Dickerson argues that Dr. Storer erred by determining that Dickerson did not suffer from schizophrenia because Dickerson had been previously diagnosed with the illness in 6 1997 by another doctor. Dr. Storer explained that he disagreed with the previous diagnosis because Dickerson’s symptoms at the time Dr. Storer evaluated him were not consistent with schizophrenia. Dickerson argues that his symptoms of schizophrenia were merely in remission when Dr. Storer observed him for this competency hearing. He further argues that according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), a psychologist seeing a patient during remission might fail to detect symptoms of the illness. Dr. Storer, however, testified at the hearing that the DSM-5 states that “[n]egative symptoms are more closely related to prognosis than are positive symptoms and tend to be the most persistent.” Accordingly, Dr. Storer testified that the signs of the remaining, underlying negative symptoms would be fairly obvious to a trained psychologist. In his report, Dr. Storer noted that Dickerson’s emotional functioning was good and that his eye contract was also appropriate. Based on Dickerson’s failure to display any signs of underlying negative symptoms associated with schizophrenia, Dr. Storer concluded that Dickerson did not have schizophrenia. ¶12. Regardless of the procedural bar to this claim for failure to cite relevant authority, we find that Dr. Storer’s conclusion that Dickerson did not suffer from a severe and persistent mental illness was reasonably based on the DSM-5. Therefore the trial court’s finding that Dickerson did not suffer from a severe and persistent mental illness was not manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence
Functioning Related to Competency 7 ¶13. Dickerson argues that Dr. Storer incorrectly stated that cognitive deficits in executive functioning are irrelevant and not accepted as mental defects that significantly interfere with competency-related abilities. The State argues that Dickerson’s claim is barred because he failed to cite relevant legal authority to support it, because he failed to object to Dr. Storer’s being allowed to testify as an expert in the fields of clinical and forensic psychology and because the doctrine of res judicata bars his contention that his cognitive deficits in executive functioning render him incompetent. ¶14. Notwithstanding the procedural bars, Dr. Storer was accepted as an expert in the fields of clinical and forensic psychology and actually refused to testify to what Dickerson claims. At the competency hearing, Dr. Storer refused to testify that cognitive deficits in executive functioning are irrelevant to a court’s finding of competency. Instead, he testified that cognitive deficits in executive functioning, alone, are not recognized as “a sufficient foundation for a finding of [in]competence” in any jurisdiction of which he is aware. Even so, Dr. Storer explained that the severity of the dysfunction should determine whether the deficit in executive functioning alone could support a finding of incompetence and offered an example of severe memory impairment due to head trauma as an instance in which a cognitive deficit in executive functioning could support a determination of incompetency on its own. Those circumstances, however, are not present in Dickerson’s case. ¶15. Dr. Storer noted that executive functioning is one part of many to be considered in a finding of competency. He listed criteria for determining whether a person has a cognitive 8 deficit in executive functioning. He further testified that the mere presence of a deficit in executive functioning in a person does not automatically mean that the person will also have deficits in their competency-related abilities. ¶16. Dr. Storer also pointed out that at the hearing held before Dickerson’s trial to determine his competency to stand trial, Dr. Lott testified that, despite Dickerson’s having cognitive deficits, he was competent to stand trial. According to the standard of competency Dickerson asserts should apply in post-conviction proceedings, coupled with his failure to offer any evidence that his cognitive deficits in executive functioning have changed since his pretrial competency hearing, this contention is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. ¶17. The trial court’s finding that Dickerson did not have deficits in executive functioning severe enough to render him incompetent to proceed in post-conviction proceedings was not manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
Understandings of Post-Conviction Proceedings ¶18. Dickerson argues that neither he nor Dr. Storer has a factual understanding of postconviction proceedings or of what a petitioner must be able to do to assist post-conviction counsel. Dickerson’s counsel argues that post-conviction proceedings, while backward looking, also involve an analysis of new facts and claims that Dickerson does not have a factual understanding of the nature of these proceedings. The State disagrees and argues that Dr. Storer and Dickerson both possess a factual understanding of post-conviction 9 proceedings. ¶19. The purpose of the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act “is to provide prisoners with a procedure, limited in nature, to review those objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues or errors which in practical reality could not be or should not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.” Mississippi Code Section 99-39-3(2) (Rev. 2015). ¶20. Dickerson uses his own statement, as recorded in Dr. Storer’s report, to support his contention that he lacks sufficient understanding of post-conviction proceedings. When Dr. Storer asked him what sorts of questions his post-conviction attorneys were asking him when they met, he replied, “They’re going on what they already know. That’s the way postconviction is. They’re going on everything that’s already been written.” ¶21. Dickerson also claimed that he had sent letters to his post-conviction counsel regarding his post-conviction proceedings but that he had yet to receive a reply. While this act does not necessarily mean that Dickerson has the ability to effectively communicate with his counsel, it at least shows that he possesses a willingness to communicate with his counsel and has made an active and rational effort to do so. ¶22. Dickerson then argues that Dr. Storer does not understand the nature of postconviction proceedings either. He offers Dr. Storer’s testimony at the competency hearing at which Dr. Storer stated, “In my consultations with attorneys . . . I have been advised . . . that post-conviction review is primarily a review of the records to make sure that everything . . . was done correctly and in accordance with the rules and procedures as they stood at the 10 time of the trial,” to support his argument. Dickerson, however, prematurely cuts off Dr. Storer’s statement from his testimony at the competency hearing. In the next sentence of his testimony, Dr. Storer stated, [Post-conviction review] also includes[s] new things. For example, the Atkins ruling by the Supreme court. That ended up being applied retrospective[ly]. Miller v. Alabama rulings have been applied retrospectively. So even though those may not have applied at the time of the trial, . . . in post-conviction proceedings, they may be brought up if they applied and were not brought up [at trial]. My understanding is that all of that is encompassed in postconviction review. ¶23. At the hearing, Dr. Storer also testified that it was his understanding that postconviction attorneys are supposed to engage in investigation of facts that were not presented at trial. Dr. Storer’s statement from his testimony, read in totality, does not support Dickerson’s argument that Dr. Storer lacks an understanding of the nature of post-conviction proceedings. ¶24. Dr. Storer explained that he used his understanding of the nature of post-conviction proceedings in determining that Dickerson possesses a reasonable, factual and rational understanding of the proceedings. Therefore, the trial court’s finding that Dickerson had a rational understanding of the nature of post-conviction relief proceedings was not manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. 11
Evaluate Dickerson’s Competency ¶25. Dickerson argues that because Dr. Storer failed to perform any standard tests for competency, specifically the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool - Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), his report on Dickerson’s competency is inaccurate and should not be relied upon by the trial court. Once again, the State argues that because Dickerson failed to cite any authority to support his argument, the issue is procedurally barred and the Court is under no duty to review it. The State also argues that Dickerson waived review of this issue by failing to object to Dr. Storer’s methods before or during the competency hearing. The State further argues that because Dickerson stipulated his acceptance of Dr. Storer as an expert in the fields of clinical and forensic psychology, he is barred from raising issue with the methods used. Notwithstanding these procedural bars, the methods and test Dr. Storer administered during his evaluation were reliable. ¶26. Dickerson claims that the MacCAT-CA is the best known and most widely used test by practitioners when competency is at issue. Dickerson asserts that the MacCAT-CA is an evaluation procedure used to determine a defendant’s ability to understand the nature of the proceedings. Dr. Storer claims, however, that the MacCAT-CA does not apply here. ¶27. Dr. Storer testified the MacCAT-CA is intended to assess a defendant’s competency to stand trial only and that it is not intended to assess any other types or levels of competency. He also testified that he believes that competency to proceed in post-conviction proceedings is very different from competency to stand trial because of the difference in the required 12 abilities to perform varying types of tasks at each stage. Accordingly, Dr. Storer testified that he would only administer the MacCAT-CA in an evaluation to assess competency to stand trial and not in an assessment of any other level or sort of competency, including competency to proceed in post-conviction proceedings. Instead of the MacCAT-CA, Dr. Storer administered the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) to Dickerson in order to obtain objective information for diagnostic clarification. Dr. Storer’s written report states that “[t]he PAI is a self-administered, objective inventory of adult personality designed to provide information on critical clinical variables.” Dr. Storer noted that he “would have loved to have given a direct measure of competence, but there is no competence assessment measure that directly looks at post-conviction competence.” ¶28. Dr. Storer’s failure to administer a test designed strictly for determining competency to stand trial did not render his opinion regarding Dickerson’s competency to proceed in postconviction proceedings incorrect or unreliable. Therefore, the trial court’s finding was not manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. ¶29. We find each error Dickerson alleges Dr. Storer committed in his evaluation of Dickerson to be without merit. The trial court properly considered Dr. Storer’s report.