Opinion ID: 3064166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Henry

Text: Henry raises two issues on appeal: (1) the district court abused its discretion by disqualifying one of his attorneys; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by excluding photocopies of forms from casinos, retained by his “tax preparer,” which reflected his gambling winnings, and refusing to permit his tax preparer to testify regarding the amount of money recorded on the excluded forms. Henry also has filed a motion to supplement his reply brief.
Before the Defendants’ case went to trial, Dell’s counsel filed a motion for a continuance and a hearing in order to resolve a possible conflict of interest issue. 3 Dell’s counsel had learned from his client that one of Henry’s attorney’s, Ty Trayner, had represented Dell during the prosecution of state charges against him related to actions for which he and Henry were charged in the third count of the instant indictment. Finding that Trayner had an “intractable conflict of interest,” the district court disqualified him, after particularly noting that: (1) Dell had considered acting as a government witness and might still have chosen to do so; and (2) Dell might have chosen to testify in his own defense. On appeal, Henry argues that the district court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to his choice of counsel. He specifically notes that no evidence was taken at the hearing where Trayner was disqualified, and the government never filed a motion or response, only orally joining Dell’s motion. Henry argues that the district court never inquired into the “essential issue” of whether any confidential information was shared by Dell and Trayner. He stresses that he was willing to waive any conflict of interest, even if it would have prevented his counsel from cross-examining Dell at trial. He also argues that the court disqualified Trayner on the “remote chance” that a conflict would arise. While we have recognized a defendant’s presumptive right under the Sixth Amendment to counsel of his choice, we have held that this right is not absolute, but is qualified by the judiciary’s “independent interest in ensuring that the 4 integrity of the judicial system is preserved and that trials are conducted within ethical standards.” United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1523 (11th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we have held that in light of the limited nature of a defendant’s right to choose his own counsel, the trial court’s refusal to hear the defendant through his chosen counsel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 22. We have held that an attorney’s actual or potential conflict of interest overcomes the presumption in favor of a defendant’s counsel of choice and warrants disqualification. Ross, 33 F.3d at 1523 (11th Cir. 1994); see United States v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “the Sixth Amendment right to have the effective assistance of counsel encompasses the right to have counsel untainted by conflicts of interest”). “In deciding whether the actual or potential conflict warrants disqualification, we examine whether the subject matter of the first representation is substantially related to that of the second,” in order to determine whether the potential defense counsel has “divided loyalties that prevent him from effectively representing the defendant.” Ross, 33 F.3d at 1523. “If the conflict could cause the defense attorney improperly to use privileged communications in cross-examination, then disqualification is appropriate.” Id. When a witness at trial was defended by an attorney representing the defendant against charges related to an identical crime, the attorney has an 5 “actual” conflict of interest. United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007). “The rule of law in this circuit is (and will continue to be) that once the former client . . . proves that the subject matters of the present and prior representations are ‘substantially related,’ the court will irrebutably presume that relevant confidential information was disclosed during the former period of representation.” Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 859 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted). Although a client may knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to conflict-free representation, the court may refuse to accept the waiver where necessary to “ensure the adequacy of representation, to the protect the integrity of the court, and to preserve trial judge’s interest to be free from future attacks over adequacy of waiver and fairness of trial.” Almeida, 341 F.3d at 1323 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Where a court justifiably finds an actual conflict of interest, there can be no doubt that it may decline a proffer of waiver. . . . [I]n the murkier pretrial context when relationships between parties are seen through a glass, darkly . . . [t]he likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials[.] . . . [Thus,] the district court must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses. 6 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162-63, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1698-99, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Because one of Henry’s attorneys had several potential conflicts of interest relating to his representation of both Henry and a codefendant, and Henry was able to receive his choice of representation with respect to one of his attorneys, the district court did not abuse its discretion by disqualifying his attorney.
At trial, Henry called his mother, Karen Simmons, to the stand, and she testified that she was Henry’s “tax preparer.” Henry sought to introduce into evidence, through Simmons, documents that she stated were photocopies of “W- 2G” forms received from casinos reflecting Henry’s gambling winnings for several years. She stated that they were used to prepare Henry’s income tax returns. The district court found that they were hearsay and not covered by the “business records” exception, as argued by Henry. Henry then questioned Simmons regarding whether she knew, from preparing Henry’s tax returns, what amounts of money had been recorded on the forms. The court found that, to the extent that Henry was asking Simmons about his tax returns, her testimony would be excluded by the best evidence rule. The court also refused to allow Henry to use 7 the excluded forms to refresh Simmons’s recollection regarding the amount of Henry’s gambling winnings. Henry argues that the district court erred by excluding Simmons’s photocopies of the W-2G forms provided by casinos regarding his gambling earnings, because they were admissible as business records. Acknowledging that Simmons did not prepare the forms herself, he stresses that Simmons kept the forms in her capacity as a licensed tax-preparer. He contends, further, that the court denied him a chance to provide proof of a legitimate source of income from his gambling winnings by refusing to allow Simmons to testify regarding her recollections of Henry’s gambling winnings as his tax-preparer, or to allow him to use the inadmissable forms to refresh her recollection regarding Henry’s winnings. Determinations of the admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial judge, and we will not reverse unless we find an abuse of discretion. United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002). We will reverse an erroneous evidentiary ruling, however, “only if the resulting error was not harmless.” United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999), corrected by 194 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) (noting that errors that do not affect substantial rights must be disregarded). An error is harmless unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that [it] affected the defendant’s 8 substantial rights.” United States v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 1489, 1493 (11th Cir. 1990). The business records exception to the hearsay rule provides that a record “if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the . . . record . . ., all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness,” is admissible unless the circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). The trustworthiness prong is not met when the party authenticating the records can provide no testimony regarding “the origination and compilation of the documents” or “about the initial link in the chain producing the record.” United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002). The best evidence rule, in Federal Rule of Evidence 1002, provides that: [T]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in [the Federal Rules of Evidence]. The purpose of the best evidence rule is to prevent inaccuracy and fraud when attempting to prove the contents of a writing. However, where the original of a [document] has been lost or destroyed, the original is not required and other evidence of its content is admissible, unless the proponent lost or destroyed the original in bad faith. United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1513-14 (11th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotations omitted). Federal Rule of Evidence 612 provides that a witness may 9 use a writing to refresh her memory for the purpose of testifying. Fed.R.Evid. 612. The district court properly excluded documents and testimony from evidence because: (1) the forms that Henry’s witness presented were hearsay and were not business records under the hearsay exception; and (2) the witness’ testimony regarding her memories of Henry’s tax returns was barred by the best evidence rule. Accordingly, we affirm.