Opinion ID: 1125257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: gun and drug evidence

Text: Shortly before opening statements began, the defense realized that the State had several firearms behind its table. Most of the guns had been seized during a search of Brooks' drug house, executed pursuant to a warrant, which occurred 5 days after Marqueta's disappearance. One of the guns had been seized during a search of Lee's rented room when he was arrested for the crimes at issue. The defense objected to the presence of the guns, claiming that they had no real relevance to the case and that the very presence of the guns was prejudicial to Lee. The defense moved that the guns be taken out of the courtroom until the trial court had had an opportunity to rule on the admissibility of the guns. The trial court denied this motion. The trial court found that it would be cumbersome for the State to go outside the courtroom to get a gun each time it wanted to offer one of the guns into evidence. The court allowed the State to keep the firearms in the courtroom. Further, the court ruled that it would allow the State to refer to the guns in its opening statement as long as the State had a goodfaith belief [that the guns could] be admitted into evidence. Upon this ruling, the State presented its opening statement. The prosecution referred to Lee as a drug lord who ran his business from Brooks' drug house and who dominated the others because he had control of the drugs. The prosecution then referred to the guns in its opening statement by stating: Now, while the enforcers, G-Dog and Semaj, would be at the door watching for the police, armedG-Dog usually with a sawed off shotgun and Semaj... armed with weapons that were bought for them by this man; 9 millimeters, Glocks, different kinds of handguns.... In its case in chief, the State also questioned some witnesses about the guns found during the searches. During Steven Alexander's testimony, the State showed him Exhibit 11, a sawed-off shotgun. Alexander testified that the gun looked similar to the one which was pointed at his head on the evening Marqueta disappeared, but that he could not be certain it was the same gun. Roselyn Surratt also testified, and she made a tentative identification of the gun, pointing out that the gun had tape on the handle, as did the one pointed at her on the night Marqueta disappeared. Whistnant, on the other hand, testified that Exhibit 11 was not the same sawed-off shotgun he used on the night in question. Whistnant testified that the gun he carried on the night of Marqueta's disappearance was a two-barrel shotgun, while the Exhibit 11 gun was an over and under shotgun. Vanessa Miller, another member of Lee's drug ring who testified for the State, identified Exhibit 11 as either the gun that was behind her as she sold drugs at Brooks' house or as the gun that Whistnant would carry. During Vanessa Miller's testimony, the State asked her if she recognized anything on a panel of photographs. The photographs were of Brooks' drug house when it was searched. They depicted various evidence seized during the search, including guns and drugs. Lee objected to the pictures and to the line of questioning. The defense pointed out that Lee was not present when the search warrant was served and that there was no evidence tying the guns to Lee. According to Lee, any probative effect the evidence might have was clearly outweighed by the inflammatory nature of the evidence. In response to Lee's objection, the State claimed the evidence was relevant to corroborate its witnesses' testimony that Lee was the head of a drug organization and that Marqueta was killed as a direct result of her involvement with the drug organization. In addition to entering the guns and photographs into evidence, the State called Detective Alan Prince of the Drug Interdiction Unit as a witness. He testified about the specifics of the evidence found at the time of the drug raid. The defense counsel objected to the testimony, stating that the evidence brought in other crimes and wrongs attributed to Lee, thereby creating prejudice that outweighed the probative value of the evidence. Detective Prince testified that the search of the drug house revealed a sawed-off shotgun in the dining room, a rifle in the garage, and a pistol in a coat in Brooks' bedroom. Detective Prince was permitted to testify about contraband and surveillance equipment found during the search. Detective Prince stated that 29 grams of crack cocaine and 10 firearms were seized. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked if there was any evidence that Lee lived at Brooks' drug house. The detective responded that there was not. The State also requested permission to introduce evidence that when Lee was arrested in April 1993, he had drugs in his car and a .22 caliber Ruger pistol under a mattress in his rented room. The prosecution wanted to introduce evidence of the pistol and its seizure because Marqueta was probably shot with a .22 caliber gun. The defense objected, claiming that the gun was irrelevant and that the evidence would be more prejudicial than probative. Finding that the evidence was relevant, the trial court permitted its admission. The defense counsel points out that it is unclear what type of gun Marqueta was shot with or even what type of gun Lee was carrying that night. Sanders testified that Lee owned a .22 caliber pistol. However, Sanders testified that on the night Marqueta was shot, Lee carried a .9 mm Glock 17. Later on, Sanders claimed that the shot fired at Marqueta sounded like a .22. However, he specifically stated that the gun had a blue steel finish and was not nickel plated. The Ruger found under Lee's mattress when he was arrested had a nickel finish, not a blue steel finish. Further, the caliber of the gun that killed Marqueta was never conclusively determined, although the policeman who testified was fairly sure one of the bullets was from a .22. Relevant evidence has been defined as any evidence having any tendency to prove a material fact. K.S.A. 60-401(b). `To be admissible, evidence must be confined to issues but need not bear directly upon them.' [Citation omitted.] State v. Haddock, 257 Kan. 964, 981, 897 P.2d 152 (1995). Based on this definition, the State claims the evidence seized during the search of the drug house and Lee's rented room was relevant to the murder, kidnapping, and assault charges and was properly admitted into evidence. At the search of the drug house, the police found a sawed-off shotgun, two .9 mm pistols, a .22 caliber pistol, and drug paraphernalia. When Lee's rented room was searched, the police found a Ruger .22. The night Marqueta was killed, Whistnant had a .9 mm, Sanders had a sawed-off shotgun, and Lee had a .22. Alexander and Surratt testified that the shotgun found during a search of the drug house looked similar to the weapon pointed at them on the night in question. After Marqueta was kidnapped from her residence, she was taken to and questioned at Brooks' drug house, where the drug paraphernalia and guns were later found. Although there was some evidence indicating that the weapons found at the drug house were not the same weapons used on the night of the murder, there was also sufficient testimony indicating that these weapons were used in the murder and kidnapping. This testimony alone was enough to qualify the gun and drug evidence as relevant. Further, the challenged evidence was properly admitted into trial because it corroborated the testimony of the accomplices. The evidence in question corroborated the accomplices' testimony regarding Lee's drug ring and their testimony that Marqueta owed Lee drug money. The evidence also corroborated certain testimony regarding the events of the evening, including who carried what type of gun. `[A] trial court's decision concerning the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Ryan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 249 Kan. 1, 11, 815 P.2d 528 (1991); see Enlow v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 249 Kan. 732, Syl. ¶ 9, 822 P.2d 617 (1991). `An abuse of discretion exists only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.' Enlow, 249 Kan. 732, Syl. ¶ 9. This general principle applies to rulings on the relevancy of evidence. Tucker v. Lower, 200 Kan. 1, 6, 434 P.2d 320 (1967).' City of Olathe v. Stott, 253 Kan. 687, 700, 861 P.2d 1287 (1993). Shirley v. Smith, 261 Kan. 685, 697, 933 P.2d 651 (1997). `Subject to certain exclusionary rules, the [a]dmissibility of physical evidence is within the sound discretion of the court and is to be determined by the court on the basis of its relevance and its connection with the accused and the crime charged. State v. Beard, 220 Kan. 580, Syl. ¶ 3, 552 P.2d 900 (1976). In State v. Ji, 251 Kan. at 15, we said: [W]hen a physical object is offered into evidence and a question arises as to its connection with either the defendant or the crime charged, unless it is clearly irrelevant, the object should be admitted for such weight and effect as the jury sees fit to give it.' State v. Bornholdt, 261 Kan. 644, 659, 932 P.2d 964 (1997) (quoting State v. Sexton, 256 Kan. 344, 353, 886 P.2d 811 [1994]). It is true the evidence was prejudicial to Lee, but it was not so prejudicial as to outweigh the probative effect of the evidence. See K.S.A. 60-445. The evidence of the guns and drugs seized during a search of the drug house and of Lee's rented room was properly admitted into evidence. Further, K.S.A. 60-447 was not raised in the trial court, and evidence was not admitted pursuant to K.S.A. 60-455. The defendant herein did not request a limiting instruction and raised no objection to the lack of an instruction. Thus, the lack of 60-455 motion or a limiting instruction did not create reversible error. Lee is not entitled to relief on this issue. The relevant evidence was admitted because it corroborated the accomplices' testimony. The defendant herein did not request a limiting instruction and raised no objection to the lack of an instruction. Thus, the lack of a limiting instruction did not create reversible error.