Opinion ID: 1590328
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Affirmative Defenses of Contributory Negligence and Assumption of the Risk

Text: Cardinal argues that [e]ven if [Horn] proved that the machine was unreasonably dangerous, Mitchell was contributorily negligent and assumed the risk.  Cardinal's brief, at 20 (emphasis added). More specifically, it contends that a reasonable machine operator would [have] heed[ed] the warnings posted on the machine and in the manual that explain the purpose of the doors and warn that they should remain closed and that the interlocks should not be bypassed. Cardinal's brief, at 21 (emphasis added). Consequently, it argues, Mitchell acted unreasonably and assumed the risk associated with operating the machine while the doors remained open at such a high rate of speed. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Cardinal addresses the warning issue in the context of its affirmative defenses. See Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 872 So.2d 101, 132 (Ala.2003) (the presence of an adequate warning may be part of a defendant's assumption of the risk defense) (Johnstone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Pitts v. Dow Chem. Co., 859 F.Supp. 543, 551 (M.D.Ala.1994). However, in seeking a summary judgment on the affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence, it advances the wrong legal standard. In order to establish assumption of the risk as a matter of law, the evidence must show that the plaintiff discovered the alleged defect, was aware of the danger, proceeded unreasonably to use the product, and was injured. Sears v. Waste Processing Equip., Inc., 695 So.2d 51, 53 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) (emphasis added). `[T]he plaintiff's state of mind is determined by [a] subjective standard,' not the objective standard of reasonability. H.R.H. Metals, Inc. v. Miller, 833 So.2d 18, 27 (Ala.2002) (emphasis added) (quoting McIsaac v. Monte Carlo Club, Inc., 587 So.2d 320, 324 (Ala.1991)). Assumption of the risk proceeds from the injured person's actual awareness of the risk. 587 So.2d at 324. The plaintiff must know that a risk is present and must understand its nature. Id. To establish contributory negligence as a matter of law, [as Cardinal seeks to do here,] a defendant seeking a summary judgment must show that the plaintiff put [herself] in danger's way and that the plaintiff had a conscious appreciation of the danger at the moment the incident occurred. See H.R.H. Metals, Inc. v. Miller, 833 So.2d 18 (Ala.2002); see also Hicks v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 652 So.2d 211, 219 (Ala.1994). The proof required for establishing contributory negligence as a matter of law should be distinguished from an instruction given to a jury when determining whether a plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence. A jury determining whether a plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence must decide only whether the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care. We protect against the inappropriate use of a summary judgment to establish contributory negligence as a matter of law by requiring the defendant on such a motion to establish by undisputed evidence a plaintiff's conscious appreciation of danger. See H.R.H. Metals, supra. Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So.2d 839, 860-61 (Ala.2002) (emphasis added). Thus, assumption of the risk and contributory negligence as a matter of law are both subjective standards, focusing on the risk as known and appreciated by the plaintiff. Therefore, when Horn insists that a `general awareness of danger' is not sufficient to establish [that] the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury, Horn's brief, at 62 (quoting Bowden ex rel. Bowden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 124 F.Supp.2d 1228, 1235 (M.D.Ala.2000)), she is correct. Instructive in this connection is Campbell v. Robert Bosch Power Tool Corp., 795 F.Supp. 1093, 1099-1100 (M.D.Ala.1992) (applying Alabama law). In that case, William Campbell was injured when a grinder disc sold by defendant Robert Bosch Power Tool Corporation (`Bosch') shattered, sending a piece of the broken disc into his eye. 795 F.Supp. at 1095. Although the disc bore a label instructing operators to `use guards and goggles,' Campbell . . . was not wearing eye protection at the time of his injury. Id. Campbell commenced an AEMLD action against Bosch, which asserted, among other things, the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk. Id. Campbell move[d] for a partial summary judgment, arguing that Bosch [had] failed to generate a triable issue of fact concerning that defense. 795 F.Supp. at 1095-96. Bosch presented evidence in opposition to the motion. In this regard, Bosch . . . offered evidence that Mr. Campbell had extensive experience and training with power tools such as electric drills, bench grinders, sanders, buffing machines, power saws, and lathes. The evidence further indicate[d] that Campbell was aware of the potential of many of these devices to cause eye injury, and he owned a welding hood which he would wear to protect his eyes when he thought it necessary. Mr. Campbell admit[ted] that he was aware that swarf or grit kicked up by many of these tools, including the grinding and sanding tool in question, could cause eye injury, and he admits that he assumed that particular risk by not using a guard or goggles on many occasions, including the occasion of his injury. . . . . . . . Bosch offer[ed] evidence that Campbell ha[d] sustained four eye injuries prior to the date of the accident in question. 795 F.Supp. at 1099-1100 (emphasis added). The court concluded that this evidence was insufficient to raise an issue of material fact concerning assumption of the risk of harm from a shattering grinding disc.  795 F.Supp. at 1100. That evidence, said the court, at most demonstrate[d] that Mr. Campbell was aware of a generalized danger of eye injury when using power tools, or . . . that he assumed the risk of having small particles of wood or metal striking his eye. Id. (emphasis added). According to the court, [t]he danger presented by swarf or grit is different in kind and magnitude from the danger presented by a shattering disc, and Mr. Campbell's assumption of the risk of the former does not evidence his intent to assume the latter.  Id. (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the court ultimately held that Campbell was not entitled to a summary judgment on Bosch's assumption-of-the-risk defense. This holding was based on evidence indicating that Campbell owned a Dremel `Moto-Tool' which serve[d] as a sander and grinder, [and] came with an owner's manual [that] Mr. Campbell admit[ted] to having read. 795 F.Supp. at 1099. The manual contained a number of admonishments for users to wear safety glasses, such as: `The operation of any power tool can result in foreign objects being thrown onto the eyes, which can result in severe eye damage. Always wear safety glasses or eye shields before commencing power tool operation. ' On the same page as two eye protection notices, the manual bore a passage which read: `!WARNING When using the steel saw wheels . . . or cutoff wheels . . . always have the work securely clamped. Never attempt to hold the work with one hand while using either of these accessories. The reason is that these wheels will grab if they become slightly canted in the groove, and can kickback causing loss of control resulting in serious injury. . . . When a cutoff wheel grabs, the wheel itself usually breaks. When the steel saw wheel grabs, it may jump from the groove and you could lose control of the tool.' 795 F.Supp. at 1099-1100 (emphasis added). Because the owner's manual which accompanied the Dremel Moto-Tool warned specifically that cutoff wheels `usually' break when they grab, and because [b]oth [the Dremel Moto-Tool] and the one Mr. Campbell was using when he was injured appear[ed] to utilize high-speed rotating wheels, discs, or cutters to cut, grind, sand, or polish materials such as wood or metal, the court concluded that there was a triable issue as to whether the tools [were] relatively similar, and [whether] knowledge of the specific dangerous propensities of one tool could translate into specific knowledge regarding the other. 795 F.Supp. at 1100 (emphasis added). According to Horn, the best argument defendants can make is that Pam Mitchell might have had a general awareness of danger of a spinning part. Horn's brief, at 61 (emphasis added). Again, we agree. The evidence is not undisputed that Mitchell had a conscious appreciation or actual awareness of the specific danger made the basis of this action. One sticker warned the user to beware of injury from [f]lying objects from [the] machine. The remedies suggested for that danger, however, were the use of safety glasses and closed-door operation of the machine. The other sticker warned that [c]utting tools can seriously injure or kill, but also counseled against operating the machine unless [the] doors [were] closed and [the] interlocks [were] working. These stickers, either by themselves or in combination, do not form the basis for a summary judgment on the affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence, and Cardinal's reliance on them is misplaced for a number of reasons. First, it is clear that the use of safety glasses would have been immaterial in protecting Mitchell in this accident. In that connection, the deposition testimony of Procter, Mitchell's supervisor, is particularly relevant to the potential effect of these warnings. Procter, who stated that he had somewhat trained Mitchell, opined that the primary purpose of the warnings against open-door operation was to protect the machine operator from the discharge of coolant and small chips. More specifically, he stated that one would want [the doors] closed while operating the machine at real high speed rates. At such times, the chips would be flying up high, or the coolant swinging around, or you might cut out something that had a little thing on it, and [you might] not want it to fly out or stuff like that. He later reiterated that opinion, stating that, because the coolant would come [out] and spray out over you [and] you would get soaking wet, the doors were to be closed primarily because of the coolant and chips. Like [t]he danger presented by swarf or grit in Campbell, the danger presented by small chips and coolant spraying from the cutting area in this case is different in kind and magnitude from the danger presented by a shattering [cutting tool], 795 F.Supp. at 1100, and awareness of a generalized danger of eye injury or irritation from small chips and coolant  redressable with safety goggles  does not necessarily translate into specific knowledge, id., of the possibility of a fatal injury from a flying tool. Similarly, although one sticker, indeed, warned of potentially fatal danger from cutting tools, the accompanying picture showed fingers being severed. Winston Hadley, vice-president of operations at SDS, testified by deposition that he interpreted the picture on the sticker as a warning not to reach in there and grab hold of that cutter. Of course, this accident did not involve the intrusion of body parts into the cutting area. Second, both stickers advised against operating the machine with the doors open. The closed-door aspect of these warnings is subject to a latent difficulty. Facially, these warnings purport to cover all operations of the machine. It is undisputed, however, that the machine was designed and manufactured to operate in two modes  automatic and manual  and that the interlock was designed to be operational only in automatic mode. Procter testified that  in his opinion  the closed-door warnings applied only to operation of the machine in automatic mode. During Procter's deposition, the following colloquy occurred: Q. [By Horn's counsel] [D]id you ever take notice also of the part of the sign that said do not operate unless doors are closed? A. [By Procter] You mean, did I see it when I read it? Q. Yes. A. Yes. Q. Had you ever informed your machinists or machine operators to not  before the death of Pam Mitchell  to not operate their [machine] with the doors open? A. Yes. I would tell them they need to close the doors when it was in automatic mode because the chips and stuff would fly out on them. You don't want to do that. Q. When it was in automatic mode? A. Yes. Q. What about when it was in manual mode? A. No. Q. Do you think that sign just made reference strictly to . . . automatic mode as opposed to manual mode? A. That would be my opinion. Q. What do you base that on? A. Just when you when you're in manual mode, there are certain things you perform with the doors open.  (Emphasis added.) Procter further stated that the machinists at SDS, both before and after Mitchell's accident, routinely operated their machines in manual mode with the doors open. Indeed, his testimony suggested that some operations would be difficult, if not impossible, to perform with the doors closed. Hadley also stated that there were functions of the machining process that could not be performed with the doors closed. According to Procter, the difference between operation in manual mode and automatic mode was characterized largely by the speed of the spindle. Operations in manual mode were properly performed at rpm on the lower end of the scale of 150 rpm to 10,000 rpm, while automatic-mode operation involved rpms on the higher end of that scale. However, the warning stickers made no reference to spindle speed. Because the machines were designed to be, and were, operated with the doors open at low speeds, Mitchell may have understood the closed-door warning, as did Procter, as applying only to automatic mode, and further, may have understood that the most relevant feature of the warning was spindle speed. Although Procter testified that 4,000 rpm was a  more appropriate speed for . . . automatic mode (emphasis added), he also stated that during his regular supervision of Mitchell, he never knew her to operate her machine in . . . a manner [he] considered unsafe. Thus, Mitchell may have thought that the closed-door warnings did not apply to an operation at 4,000 rpm, that is, that it was safe to operate the machine at that speed with the doors open. Finally, one sticker, to be sure, specifically warned against operating the machine without a functioning interlock. However, Procter, who had worked for SDS for 10 years at the time of his deposition, testified that the interlocks on the machines had not worked in years, if ever. He and Hadley, who had operated a Fadal machine for a previous employer, each stated that he did not even know what an interlock was, or how it was supposed to work, until after the accident. There was no evidence indicating that Mitchell had ever seen a user's manual for the machine she was operating. There was no evidence, therefore, indicating that Mitchell knew what an interlock was, knew that the interlock on the machine she was operating had been disconnected, or knew how the interlock might have affected her operation of the machine had it been functional. Cardinal, which, in effect, urges us to hold that the warnings were adequate as a matter of law to apprise Mitchell of the danger as bases for its affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence, has failed to present undisputed evidence of Mitchell's actual awareness of the risk, McIsaac, 587 So.2d at 324, or her conscious appreciation of the danger, Hannah, 840 So.2d at 861, of operating the machine at 4,000 rpm with the doors open. Consequently, it is not entitled to a summary judgment based on the affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk or contributory negligence.