Opinion ID: 1302154
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Docherty: Responsibility for 100,000 Ecstacy pills

Text: At Docherty's resentencing, the district court found that she was responsible for at least 100,000 pills. Docherty challenges this finding on the ground that various witnesses said that they had purchased only relatively small quantities of pills from her. She also relies on an affidavit submitted by Jeross prior to Docherty's resentencing in which he estimates that he had provided Docherty with less than 4,000 pills and states that Docherty was largely unaware of the pill shipments coming from Canada; The district court based its drug-quantity determination primarily on testimony from Leto, who was hired by Jeross to transport the Ecstacy pills from Canada to the United States. Leto testified at length and in detail at Docherty's initial sentencing hearing about the conspiracy, specifically addressing Docherty's role and the quantity of drugs involved. He stated that he brought [a]pproximately ten thousand pills per trip to the United States from Canada hidden in his car-door panels, and estimated that one hundred thousand pills is less than the amount that was actually brought over while [his] involvement was going on. Leto further testified that, upon returning to the United States from Canada with the pills, [e]very time, the location I brought [the pills] back to was 1695 West Troy Street, which was Docherty's home. The pills would then be unloaded out of the vehicle and brought into [Docherty's] house where they were split into packages of one hundred. Leto said that he witnessed the pills being repackaged in Docherty's house. He explained that [t]he pills would come from Canada to Kathleen's house. Kathleen would handle the distribution between the four or five smaller distributors . . ., and she would regulate the drugs that the distributors received. Leto's testimony regarding the quantity of drugs was corroborated by Brian Manns, a special agent with the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement who was involved in the investigation. Manns testified that the amounts of money that were seized on [sic] this investigation correlate with over 100,000 pills based on their estimated purchase and sale prices. Furthermore, Docherty's own written records of the drug transactions permitted Manns to easily say that [Docherty and Jeross] sold over 100,000 pills. He also said that the investigation showed that Leto was not the only courier operating in the conspiracy, which suggests that more than the 100,000 pills transported by Leto were involved. In addition, Manns said that he had inspected Leto's car and concluded that the hidden car panels were capable of holding well over 10,000 pills per trip. Leto, Manns said, had made between 10 and 15 trips to Canada. The foregoing evidence supports the district court's finding that Docherty was responsible for at least 100,000 pills. Indeed, the testimony from both Leto and Manns suggests that the conspiracy involved well over 100,000 pills. By sentencing Docherty on the basis of 100,000 pills and not more, the district court appropriately exercised caution to ensure that Docherty was more likely actually responsible for a quantity greater than or equal to the amount used in calculating the sentence. See United States v. Mahaffey, 53 F.3d 128, 132 (6th Cir.1995). Docherty's reliance on Jeross's affidavit, which states that Docherty was involved in distributing a much smaller quantity of pills, and testimony from witnesses who said that they had purchased only small quantities of drugs from her, does not warrant a different conclusion. First of all, the district court explained that it credited Leto's testimony over Jeross's affidavit because it found Leto to be a more truthful and credible individual than Jeross. The court's credibility determination is supported by Leto's detailed testimony, which was consistent with the contents of Docherty's notes, the assets seized, and other evidence uncovered in the course of the investigation. And Jeross's statement that Docherty was largely unaware of the shipments from Canada is contradicted by the evidence that the shipments were taken to her home, where she would handle the distribution of the pills once they were repackaged. Furthermore, statements by other individuals regarding their purchase of small quantities of drugs from Docherty neither contradict Leto's testimony that at least 100,000 pills were involved nor undermine the district court's conclusion to that effect. These statements simply suggest that, in addition to her large-scale distribution activities, Docherty also sold small quantities of pills to other individuals. The foregoing evidence supports the district court's finding that Docherty was responsible for at least 100,000 pills. We therefore conclude that the court did not err in making that determination. 2. Docherty and Jeross: Challenge to the use of the 2002 version of the Guidelines for calculating drug weights Both Docherty and Jeross argue that the district court erred in failing to apply the 2001 Guidelines when determining the weight of the pills attributed to them for purposes of calculating their base offense levels. The 2001 Guidelines specified a typical weight for MDA of 0.100 gram per tablet, whereas all subsequent versions of the Guidelines provided for a typical weight per tablet of 0.250 grams for both MDA and MDMA. USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 11, Table: Typical Weight Per Unit Table. Docherty's and Jeross's base offense levels were determined by establishing the total weight of the pills that contained the controlled substances. See USSG § 2D1.1(c). In cases such as the ones before us, however, the actual total weight of the pills is not known. The general rule in those cases to multiply the number of doses, pills, or capsules by the typical weight per dose in the [Guidelines typical-weight table] to estimate the total weight of the controlled substance. . . . USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 11, Table: Typical Weight Per Unit (Dose, Pill, or Capsule) Table. Note 11 states, however, that the estimates set forth in the Typical Weight Per Unit Table are not to be used if any more reliable estimate of the total weight is available from case-specific information. Id.; see also United States v. Nersesian, 210 Fed.Appx. 495 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming the district court's determination of the total drug weight, which was based on the average per-pill weight of 10,000 Ecstacy pills actually recovered and tested  instead of the typical-weight measurements contained in the Guidelines  because the district court properly relied on this `case-specific information' to conclude that it was more likely than not that the Ecstacy pills tested were representative of the 100,000 pills the defendant admitted to trading (quoting USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 11)); United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting the defendant's argument that the typical-weight measurement from the 2000 Guidelines should apply, instead concluding that the district court, in compliance with Note 11 to USSG § 2D1.1, properly estimated the drug weight based on the actual weight of the Ecstacy tablets recovered from the defendant and a coconspirator). The district court is generally instructed to apply the version of the Guidelines that is in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced. USSG § 1B1.11(a). But where the application of the version of the Guidelines in place at the time of sentencing would constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the court must apply the version of the Guidelines that was in place at the time the defendant committed the offense. USSG § 1B1.11(a), (b)(1), cmt. n. 6. Docherty was originally sentenced on October 23, 2003, when the 2002 Guidelines were in effect. Jeross was first sentenced on July 8, 2004, when the 2003 Guidelines were in effect. According to the indictment against them, the drug conspiracy ended on August 9, 2002, at which time the 2001 Guidelines were in effect. The 2002 and 2003 Guidelines would therefore apply to Docherty and Jeross, respectively, unless the 2001 Guidelines would result in a lower Guidelines range. See USSG § 1B1.11(a), (b)(1). The merits of each defendant's argument on this issue are addressed in turn below.
In preparation for Docherty's resentencing, the parties submitted, at the district court's request, a joint brief reporting the results of laboratory tests that were conducted on the 2,499 pills that Docherty sold to undercover law enforcement officers. The report includes the number of pills tested, the average weight per pill, and the weight of the controlled substance detected in each pill. Docherty's argument challenging her base offense level rests on the assumption that the application of the typical weight per unit of MDA and MDMA (either 0.250 grams from the 2002 Guidelines or 0.100 grams from the 2001 Guidelines) affected her base offense level calculation. It did not. At her resentencing, the district court aptly noted that it did not need to determine which Guidelines version to apply because, instead of using the Guidelines' typical-weight estimates, it used data from the lab report, which it found to be more reliable. (Citing USSG § 2D 1.1, cmt. n. 11) In Docherty's case, as in Nersesian, 210 Fed.Appx. 495, case-specific information was available for determining the weight of the 100,000 pills attributed to her. The pills purchased from her by the undercover agents were tested and weighed in a lab, and the results were set forth with specificity in the lab report as well as in the parties' joint brief. This data was comprised of exact measurements and, like the information used in Neresian, was considered by the district court to be more reliable than the estimates contained in the Guidelines. Note 11 to USSG § 2D1.1 does not, as Docherty suggests, instruct the courts to follow whichever approach leads to the more favorable result for the defendant. To the contrary, it explicitly states that where more reliable, case-specific information is available, such information is to be used. Accordingly, the district court properly used the lab data instead of relying on the Guidelines' typical-weight estimates. The version of the Guidelines that the district court used therefore had no effect on Docherty's base offense level calculations.
Jeross raises the same drug-weight argument that Docherty asserted. But in his case, unlike Docherty's, the district court used the typical-weight estimates from the Guidelines rather than actual lab results. The court erroneously thought that, whether it applied the typical-weight estimates from the 2001 Guidelines or the 2002 Guidelines, Jeross's base offense level would be 36. Having found him responsible for 100,000 pills, the court calculated his base offense level by multiplying 100,000 pills by 0.250 grams (the typical weight per unit of MDA and MDMA under the 2002 Guidelines), for a total of 25,000 grams of MDA/MDMA. It concluded that this drug weight corresponded to a base offense level of 36. Six levels were then added because of Jeross's role in the offense and his obstruction of justice (neither of which he challenges on appeal) for a total offense level of 42 and a Guidelines range of 360 months to life in prison. That range exceeds the 240-month statutory maximum for his drug offenses, however, so the court imposed a sentence of 240 months. But the district court failed to do the last step in the calculation, which is to convert the MDA/MDMA drug weight (i.e., 25,000 grams) into its marijuana equivalent. See USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 10. That step was necessary because the Drug Quantity Table in USSG § 2D1. 1(c) does not list either MDA or MDMA, meaning that an equivalent weight of a listed drug has to be identified in order to obtain a base offense level. See USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 10. After multiplying 100,000 pills by the typical weight per pill, the court should have next multiplied the resulting MDA/MDMA drug weight by the marijuana-equivalency factor, which is 500 grams under either the 2001 or 2002 Guidelines. USSG § 2D1.1, Drug Equivalency Tables, Table: LSD, PCP, and Other Schedule I and II Hallucinogens (and their immediate precursors). The district court realized its mistake when it resentenced Docherty nine months after it resentenced Jeross. It also noted that it had not examined available laboratory data regarding the pills seized in Jeross's case, apparently because it thought that using either the 2001 or the 2002 Guidelines would have made no difference in Jeross's base offense level. The record on appeal contains several references to pills that were recovered in the Jeross investigation and to a chemical analysis that was conducted on those pills. But no lab report for Jeross is included and the number of pills recovered in the investigation is inconsistently reported. Whether the pills referenced in connection with Jeross are the same pills that were purchased from Docherty is also unclear. Nevertheless, the record establishes that pills were obtained and tested in the Jeross investigation, which means that more reliable, case-specific information than the Guidelines' typical-weight estimates was likely available to the district court for the purpose of determining the weight of the pills. The record contains no indications that Jeross challenged the lab results at any time. Two approaches were therefore available to the district court in calculating the weight of the drugs attributed to Jeross and the corresponding base offense level. First, the district court should have used the data in the lab report if that data was more reliable than the Guidelines' typical-weight estimates. See USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 11. Alternatively, if the court had determined that such data was not more reliable, it should have instead used the typical-weight estimates set forth in either the 2001 or 2002 Guidelines, depending on which version led to a more favorable result for Jeross. Id. The question before us is whether the district court's sentencing errors render Jeross's sentence procedurally unreasonable and thus warrant a remand for resentencing, or whether the errors were harmless. As the following discussion explains, the end result under either method of calculating the proper drug weight would have been the same: a Guidelines range that was well above the 240-month statutory maximum prison term that was permitted, and actually imposed, for Jeross's drug offenses. The district court, under either of the two approaches, would have been required to depart downward from the Guidelines range and render a sentence within the statutory maximum, which it in fact did at both of Jeross's sentencing proceedings. The first possible approach would have been for the court to use the actual drug weights obtained from testing the pills attributed to Jeross, provided that such information was reliable. See USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 11. On this point, the government's brief refers to the information contained in the lab report and in the joint brief submitted in Docherty 's case, but is unaccompanied by any explanation as to why that information should be used in calculating Jeross 's base offense level. Jeross's brief is similarly unhelpful, stating only that the average weight of the seized pills containing MDA and/or MDMA was less than 0.250 grams, without providing a specific weight and without identifying the source of that information. And Jeross's reply brief does not challenge the government's suggestion that the Docherty lab results are applicable in his case. If the pills attributed to Jeross are either the same pills recovered from Docherty or have similar characteristics, then Jeross would most likely have been subject to a base offense level of 36. When combined with Jeross's criminal history category of I, this results in a sentencing range of 360 months to life (with the sentencing enhancements for his role in the offense and obstruction of justice) and is the very same base offense level that the district court arrived at both initially and at resentencing post- Booker. Jeross's base offense level would have had to be reduced to at least 32 (before adding six levels of enhancements) to result in a Guidelines range that was within the 240-month statutory maximum for his offense (i.e., 235-293 months). But our discussion in Part II.B.3. below explains why a base offense level of 32 or lower would have been inappropriate in Jeross's case. If, however, lab results for the pills attributed to Jeross were neither available nor reliable, then either the 2001 or 2002 Guidelines' typical-weight estimates for determining. Jeross's sentence were possible alternatives. Under the 2002 Guidelines, which were in fact used at Jeross's resentencing, the typical weight of both MDA and MDMA is listed as 0.250 grams and would have resulted in a marijuana equivalent of 12,500 kilograms (i.e., 100,000 pills × 0.250 grams of MDA or MDMA × 500 grams of marijuana), which corresponds to a base offense level of 36. That is the same base offense level that the district court calculated at both of Jeross's sentencing proceedings and, after adding six levels for the applicable enhancements, would result in the very same Guidelines range of 360 months to life in prison. Finally, the district court could have applied the typical-weight estimates from the 2001 Guidelines, and should have done so if the 2001 Guidelines led to a more favorable result. This is Jeross's argument. Specifically, he contends that the proper course would have been for the district court to apply the 2001 Guidelines' typical MDA weight of 0.100 grams to all 100,000 pills, claiming that of the 2,128 pills purportedly obtained during the investigation against him, 1,650 contained MDA, 478 contained MDMA, and 976 contained no controlled substance (data that is unsupported by either citations to the record or any further explanation of its source). Application of the 2001 Guidelines, however, would be problematic in this case. The 2001 version lists the typical weight for MDA as 0.100 grams, but does not provide a typical weight for MDMA, and therefore does not make clear how to calculate the weight of pills containing MDMA where actual information is unavailable. Adding to the problem is a note to the Typical Weight Per Unit Table in the 2001 Guidelines explaining that the weight of 0.100 grams listed for MDA is in fact the typical weight of the actual controlled substance, or pure MDA, and not the typical weight of the pill containing the MDA. USSG § 2D1.1, Table: Typical Weight Per Unit, cmt. 11 n.  (2001). The same note further explains: Therefore, use of this table provides a very conservative estimate of the total weight. Id. As previously noted, all versions of the Guidelines expressly state that a defendant is to be held responsible for the weight of the entire pill, not just the weight of the controlled substance. USSG § 2D1.1 n.A. This case, however, does not require us to decide what a district court should do when it must determine the weight of pills that contain MDMA using the typical-weight estimates from the 2001 Guidelines, which do not provide an MDMA weight. That is because here, even if the district court had applied the MDA typical-weight estimate to all 100,000 pills, the result would have been a base offense level of 34 (i.e., 100,000 pills × 0.100 grams of MDA × 500 grams of marijuana, which totals 5,000 kilograms of marijuana). That base offense level, plus the six levels of sentencing enhancements, would result in a total offense level of 40 and a Guidelines range of 292-365 months in prison. Such a range, like the sentencing ranges obtained under the other scenarios, well exceeds the 240-month statutory maximum for Jeross's drug-related offenses. Thus the court would once again be required to downwardly depart from the Guidelines range and impose a sentence within the maximum term permitted by the statute, as it did in sentencing Jeross. The foregoing analysis demonstrates that, even if the district court had correctly converted the MDA/MDMA drug weight into its marijuana equivalency, determined whether to use the actual weight information from the lab report, or used the 2001 Guidelines for determining a drug weight, the result would have been no different: a Guidelines range that was well above the 240-month statutory maximum. Based on our review of the record, we see no grounds for finding that these errors affect[ed] the district court's selection of the sentence imposed. See United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992)). Under all scenarios, in other words, the district court would have been required to impose a lesser sentence in order to comply with the statute, the Guidelines range notwithstanding. Nothing in the record, moreover, suggests that the district court would have imposed a sentence of less than 240 months. Accordingly, the district court's errors were harmless and do not warrant a remand for sentencing Jeross a third time. 3. Docherty and Jeross: Challenge to the method of calculating the weight of all 100,000 Ecstacy pills Docherty and Jeross both challenge the district court's determination of the weight of all 100,000 pills for which they were held responsible. As discussed above, the district court may approximate the amount of drugs involved based on competent evidence, so long as a preponderance of the evidence supports the estimate. Furthermore, this court has repeatedly held that a district court may extrapolate the total weight of all of the drugs attributed to a defendant from the actual weight of a smaller amount of drugs actually recovered. United States v. Nersesian, 210 Fed.Appx. 495, 498 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming the district court's base-offense-level calculation, which applied the average per-pill tablet weight of the 4,999 pills tested by the government to all 100,000 pills that the defendant admitted to distributing, and explaining that the district court's extrapolation of the total weight from the sample size is not clearly erroneous and we cannot say that the court erred in using this estimate to determine Nersesian's base offense level); United States v. Gonzalez, 210 F.3d 373 (Table) (6th Cir.2000) (holding that the district court did not err in determining the total quantity of marijuana and cocaine contained in 11 mail parcels based on the actual weight of marijuana and cocaine found in the only two mail parcels that were recovered); United States v. Ventimiglia, 4 F.3d 995 (Table) (6th Cir.1993) (affirming a drug-quantity determination where the district court estimated the amount of drugs contained in two unrecovered packages of meth based on the actual weight of meth found in one intercepted package, and observing that [n]umerous courts have upheld similar drug quantity calculations). a. Docherty Docherty argues that the district court was unreasonable in applying the weight measurements of the 2,499 pills that she sold to undercover agents to all 100,000 pills for which she was held responsible. In addition, she argues that, under the rule of lenity, the district court should instead have based any estimation of the unrecovered pills upon the estimate of the actual amount of MDA per tablet that is most favorable to Ms. Docherty, which she contends would have been 50 milligrams, or 0.05 grams, per pill. This is an amount that is equal to the active-ingredient, or pure, weight of MDA. She essentially asserts a two-part argument, and we will address each part in turn. In the first place, the district court determined Docherty's base offense level by relying on the drug-quantity calculations set forth in the parties' joint brief, which in turn relies on the data contained in the lab report. All nine calculation methods used the same formula, which multiplied 100,000 (the total number of pills) by a specified drug weight per pill by the marijuana-equivalency factor, the total of which resulted in a corresponding base offense level under USSG § 2D1.1(c). The calculations on which the district court relied in determining Docherty's base offense level are analogous to those approved by this court in the cases cited above. Moreover, the calculations utilize data that was contained in the Drug Enforcement Agency lab report and stipulated to in the parties' joint brief. Docherty has failed to provide any basis on which to conclude that the court erred in its calculation method. The second part of Docherty's argument is that, applying the rule of lenity, the district court should instead have calculated her base offense level by using a drug weight that is most favorable to her, which she identifies as 50 milligrams per pill. But, as explained in Part II.B.2. above, the Guidelines in effect at all times relevant to this case provide that a defendant's base offense level is to be determined by the entire weight of the pill containing the controlled substance, and not by the weight of the actual controlled substance alone (i.e., the weight of the pure MDA, MDMA, or meth contained in the pill). See USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.A ([T]he weight of a controlled substance set forth in the [Drug Quantity Table] refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of the controlled substance.). This court has repeatedly rejected the argument that only the pure weight of a controlled substance should be used as the basis for calculating a defendant's base offense level instead of the weight of the entire pill. See, e.g., United States v. Jinadu, 98 F.3d 239, 250 (6th Cir.1996) (concluding that the defendant's argument that the pure weight, instead of the total weight, of the drug should be the standard has no merit); United States v. Landers, 39 F.3d 643, 647 (6th Cir.1994) (noting that the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held under USSG § 2D1.1 that the entire weight of dilaudid tablets, rather than merely the quantity of hydromorphone contained therein, must be taken into account, and therefore the potency of the particular doses at issue was irrelevant for sentencing purposes as long as they contained some amount of active ingredient) (emphasis in original); United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 208, 214-15 (6th Cir. 1990) (calculating the defendants's base offense level under the Guidelines on the basis of the total weight of cocaine involved in the transaction, even though the government chemist reported that only 87% was a pure form of cocaine). Accordingly, Docherty's argument fails. To be sure, this court's decision in United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir.1990), also discussed in Part II. B.2.b. above, instructs that a court must be cautious when choosing between a number of plausible estimates of drug quantity, none of which is more likely than not the correct quantity, thereby protect[ing] defendants from being held responsible for drug quantities in excess of the amounts for which they more likely than not are responsible. But this rule does not, as Docherty argues, require a court to sentence a defendant using the most favorable drug weights available (i.e., active, or pure, ingredient weights instead of total-pill weights) when doing so would directly contradict the Guidelines. Indeed, such a rule would eviscerate the Guidelines' explicit instruction to hold a defendant responsible for the total weight of the pill in question and, moreover, would have required an entirely different result in each of the cases cited above. The district court in the present case therefore properly rejected the four calculations in the joint brief that were based on active-ingredient weights. Those calculations resulted in base offense levels of 32, 34, 36, and 38. Furthermore, the calculations that resulted in the lower base offense levels of 32 and 34 relied not only on using just the active-ingredient weights of the drugs, but assumed that all 100,000 pills contained only MDA and MDMA and did not contain any detectable amounts of meth. Meth, however, was present in 1,479, or 59%, of the pills tested and has a drug equivalency conversion factor of 20 kilograms of marijuana to one gram of meth compared to a 500-gram marijuana-equivalency conversion factor for both MDA and MDMA. The presence of meth would thus result in a significantly higher total drug quantity and base offense level than the presence of only MDA and/or MDMA. In addition, the base offense level of 32  which Docherty urges is correct  also assumes that all 100,000 pills had the lightest active-ingredient weight, 50 milligrams, an amount that appeared in only 7 (or 0.28%) of the 2,499 pills recovered. In contrast, the five calculations that used a total-pill weight (not an active-ingredient weight) resulted in base offense levels of 36 (in four calculations) and of 38 (in one calculation). Of these five calculations, one method used the average tablet weight of all pills recovered and one method used the typical weight estimate from the Guidelines. Both resulted in a base offense level of 36. Moreover, the record indicates that the district court did not consider the calculations that resulted in a base offense level of 38, suggesting that it in fact applied the rule of lenity, if only implicitly. Having reviewed all of this information, the district court concluded that [t]he lab results indicate that the quantity of drugs present supports a base offense level of 36. This conclusion is corroborated by competent evidence in the form of calculations that properly used the average total-pill weight from the lab report (and was consistent with results based on the Guidelines' typical-weight estimate). Accordingly, the district court did not err in calculating Docherty's base offense level at 36. b. Jeross Jeross argues that only 2,128 pills were recovered in his case, and asserts that [t]he number of pills . . . was too small (and, of the pills seized, the weight too varied) from which extrapolation to a total weight should occur. But, as discussed in Part II.B.2.b. above, the district court did not in fact extrapolate the total weight of the 100,000 pills attributed to Jeross from the pills recovered. It instead determined the total weight by using the typical-weight estimate contained in the Guidelines. Jeross's argument on this issue is therefore without merit. 4. Jeross: Apprendi violation Jeross next argues that the district court failed to comply with the ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), by imposing consecutive sentences that were greater than the statutory maximum permitted for his offenses. The district court sentenced Jeross to four concurrent prison terms of 240 months each  the maximum permitted by the statute  for his drug-related offenses. Jeross also received one consecutive term, as permitted by USSG § 5G1.2(d), of 30 months' imprisonment for a related offense of evading cash reporting requirements, a term that is well below the statutory maximum of 60 months for that offense. Such a sentence does not violate Apprendi because it does not exceed the statutory maximum for any of the offenses at issue.