Opinion ID: 3055301
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miranda Discussion

Text: On appeal, Carson first argues that the statements he made to law enforcement in the September 2010 encounter should have been suppressed as they were made without Carson first being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). Specifically, Carson challenges the admission of: (1) his statements to Sergeant Sims and Sergeant Beedle when he was first stopped, including his statement concerning where he obtained the $1,440 in cash; and (2) his statements to Special Agent Gerhardt and Sergeant Jackson after being escorted to 1239 McDonald Street. Carson maintains he was in custody for the duration of the encounter and was therefore entitled to Miranda warnings prior to any questioning by law enforcement. The Fifth Amendment provides individuals with a right against selfincrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that the government may not use a defendant’s statements elicited during a custodial interrogation against that defendant unless officials provide specific warnings concerning the defendant’s rights against self-incrimination beforehand. United States v. Woods, 684 F.3d 1045, 1055 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). But the trigger for Miranda protections is custody. A person is in custody 24 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 25 of 53 for purposes of Miranda if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe the restraint on his freedom of movement has been curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest. United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1284 (11th Cir. 2010). In assessing whether a reasonable person in Carson’s position would have understood his freedom of movement to have been curtailed in this way, “we consider the totality of the circumstances, including whether the officers brandished weapons, touched the suspect, or used language or a tone that indicated that compliance with the officers could be compelled, as well as the location and length of the detention.” United States v. Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d 876, 881 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For instance, a person temporarily detained pursuant to an ordinary traffic stop is not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984). This Court has further held that a defendant stopped pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), is not “in custody” for Miranda purposes where the restraint used is “the minimal amount necessary for such a stop” and the circumstances of the stop do not involve “the type of ‘highly intrusive’ coercive atmosphere that may require Miranda warnings even before a formal arrest is made.” United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1150 (11th Cir. 2004). Carson alleges that the stop and questioning he was subjected to by law 25 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 26 of 53 enforcement amounted to custodial interrogation because: (1) he was ordered to place his hands on the patrol car; (2) the officers searched him and took away his money and identification; 8 and (3) the officers then took him to another area for further questioning. In response, the government argues that Carson was not in custody for Miranda purposes because: (1) he was standing on a public street in public view; (2) he was questioned only briefly; (3) Carson was never placed in handcuffs or arrested; and (4) the officers never brandished their weapons. Alternatively, the government argues that even if Carson was in custody, any error in the admission of his two statements was harmless. We need not resolve the custody issue because even assuming that Carson was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings, “[t]he admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda is subject to harmless error scrutiny.” United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Under harmless error scrutiny, “[t]he question is whether there is a reasonable probability that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we must decide whether “after we subtract the statements that should not have been admitted at [Carson’s] trial, the remaining evidence is so overwhelming that we are 8 Carson’s assertion here is premised on the fact that at trial, Sgt. Beedle testified that upon taking Carson to Special Agent Gerhardt and Sgt. Jackson, Sgt. Beedle “handed his identification [to the officers and] said, ‘Here’s him. Here’s his money.’” According to Carson, this “prov[es] that they had taken the identification.” 26 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 27 of 53 convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the improperly admitted evidence did not affect the verdict.” United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010); see United States v. Gari, 572 F.3d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir. 2009). The government bears the burden to demonstrate that an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 892 (11th Cir. 2005). The non-Mirandized statements introduced from the September 2010 encounter were essentially that: (1) Carson first said he had obtained the $1,440 in cash found on his person from working at a steel plant but then said it was payment for breaking down boxes at a Shell gas station; and (2) Carson said he did not live on McDonald Street and was in the area because he had been visiting a girl. 9 Subtracting these two statements Carson made to law enforcement in the September 2010 encounter concerning where he obtained the cash and why he was in the area, the remaining evidence of Carson’s guilt is overwhelming. Carson’s testimony alone could support the verdict. First, Carson admitted that he was a drug dealer, and at times he sold drugs, including Oxycontin, on McDonald Street. Carson also acknowledged that he associated with many members of the Riggs organization, particularly Marlon Riggs. On three occasions, Carson conceded he purchased drugs from Riggs organization members when his own supplier ran out, and on one of those occasions he purchased heroin. 9 Carson’s other statements during the encounter, including that Carson had been paid “under the table” and had not paid taxes on those earnings, were not admitted at trial. 27 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 28 of 53 As for the wiretapped phone conversations, Carson admitted it was his voice on the calls, including the three phone calls that served as the bases of the three counts for use of a telephone in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. While Carson testified fervently that these isolated incidents did not mean he was part of the charged drug conspiracy, the jury was free to not only disbelieve Carson’s testimony but also to conclude the exact opposite of what he said was true and to use it as substantive evidence against him. See United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2004). Additionally, Carson’s codefendants testified that Carson sold pills at 1239 McDonald Street, both providing Oxycontin pills to Riggs organization members for resale and purchasing pills to sell himself. When the Riggs organization switched from selling Oxycontin to selling heroin, one of Carson’s codefendants testified that Carson became a major source of heroin. And despite Carson’s assertions that he often purchased the drugs for his own use, a number of Carson’s codefendants testified that they had never seen Carson use Oxycontin or heroin. We must also consider the impact the admission of these two statements had on the other evidence and on Carson’s defense. See Arbolaez, 450 F.3d at 1293 (“[T]he court must inquire into (1) the effect of the erroneously admitted statement upon the other evidence introduced at trial, and (2) upon the conduct of the defense.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The admission of these statements 28 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 29 of 53 showed Carson was inconsistent concerning where he had obtained the cash and about where he lived. But in the absence of these statements, other evidence showed Carson had $2,000 in cash during the November 2009 traffic stop and $5,877 in cash at his home in the January 2011 search. More importantly, the testimony of Carson’s codefendants significantly undermined his credibility on every key point, even without the statements. Furthermore, Carson has never indicated that the admission of these two non-Mirandized statements affected his defense in any way. For example, he has never claimed that he would not have testified had these statements been excluded. Finally, these statements played little if any role in the government’s case against Carson. The two non-Mirandized statements from the September 2010 encounter, while introduced, were not emphasized by the government during trial, during cross-examination of Carson, or in closing argument. Accordingly, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the statements Carson made without the benefit of Miranda warnings in the September 2010 encounter did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of Carson’s motion to suppress the statements.