Opinion ID: 1583910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: A-1's Cross-Appeal: Judgment for the Treasurer on 1998-2001 Taxes.

Text: We next consider A-1's argument on cross-appeal that the Treasurer was precluded from suing again for the 1997-2001 taxes, after obtaining the tax sale certificates found lacking in the original action brought by the Treasurer to collect the taxes. A-1 argues the operation of IRCP 1.444 and IRCP 1.946, in conjunction with the doctrine of res judicata, prohibits the Treasurer from bringing the second action. A-1 raised these arguments previously in its motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. The district court, however, denied the motions, holding IRCP 1.444 did not apply, the summary judgment in Fennelly I was not an adjudication on the merits under IRCP 1.946, and, therefore, res judicata did not apply. A-1 challenges these conclusions on cross-appeal. We need not resolve these arguments on their merits. On appeal in Fennelly I, we reversed the judgment A-1 now claims as the basis for claim preclusion. In such circumstances, A-1's arguments in support of claim preclusion are inapplicable. Even if the district court had agreed with A-1 and granted summary judgment based on claim preclusion (or we did so here on appeal), [r]eversal and remand for further proceedings on the entire case [in Fennelly I ] defeats preclusion entirely until a new final judgment is entered by the trial court or the initial judgment is restored by further appellate proceedings. 18A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4432, at 66-67 (2d ed.2002); see Lulirama Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 876 n. 2 (5th Cir.1997) (noting plaintiff's claims cannot be barred by res judicata because state court's decision that formed the basis for res judicata was reversed, and that reversal defeated preclusion entirely); Tavery v. United States, 897 F.2d 1032, 1033 (10th Cir.1990) (reversing district court's judgment that was based on preclusion because the court vacated the decision of the tax court that formed the basis of the district court judgment); Amalgamated Cotton Garment & Allied Indus. Fund v. J.B.C. Co. of Madera, Inc., 608 F.Supp. 158, 163 (W.D.Pa.1984) (A judgment that has been reversed on appeal is thereby deprived of all conclusive effect for purposes of both res judicata and collateral estoppel.). Therefore, we need not address A-1's arguments regarding claim preclusion. [1] Nevertheless, a judgment was entered by the district court on the Treasurer's claims for taxes from 1998-2001. Therefore, we proceed to address A-1's remaining arguments to determine whether the district court's entry of summary judgment was otherwise valid. A-1 essentially raises two claims of trial court error in entering summary judgment for the 1998-2001 taxes. First, it claims its resistance to the summary judgment motion set forth several items of evidence to show the Treasurer was estopped to collect the taxes. This evidence included claims by A-1 that the property taxed was no longer in existence by 1998, A-1 was never contacted by the assessor to update the tax list, the valuations of the property were increased by the assessor, A-1 only kept its records for five to seven years, and it was otherwise at a disadvantage in defending the lawsuit. Second, A-1 claims its resistance to the summary judgment presented a factual dispute over the question of whether the Treasurer gave A-1 the required statutory notices to enable the Treasurer to collect the taxes. We recognize equitable estoppel may be a viable defense to a property tax collection action under exceptional circumstances. See Fennelly I, 728 N.W.2d at 174; see also Williams v. Van Sickel 659 N.W.2d 572, 580 (Iowa 2003) (listing the elements of equitable estoppel). We rejected this defense by A-1 in Fennelly I, and we again reject it under the circumstances alleged in this case. The evidence alleged by A-1 falls far short of the type of evidence necessary to establish equitable estoppel. We agree with the district court that A-1 failed to present material facts to support its claim as a matter of law. A-1 also failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to withstand summary judgment by claiming it never received the statutory notice of tax sale pertaining to the tax claims in dispute. See Iowa Code §§ 445.2, 446.2, 446.9 (2005). This claim is insufficient because the failure to receive the required notices is not a defense. See id. §§ 446.2, 446.9(4). The statute only requires the treasurer to properly mail notice. Id. The Treasurer submitted evidence showing the notices were properly mailed. Thus, A-1's claim it never received the notices is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Accordingly, we conclude the district court properly entered summary judgment for the Treasurer on the 1998-2001 taxes.