Opinion ID: 169475
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Substantial Factor in Motivating An Adverse Employment Action

Text: Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that their speech on the four remaining matters was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action. See Cragg, 143 F.3d at 1346. First Amendment retaliation claims do not depend on a property interest in continued employment. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (noting that a plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims are not defeated [e]ven though he could have been discharged for no reason whatever, and had no constitutional right to a hearing prior to the decision not to rehire him). Consequently, we have stated that [a]ctions short of an actual or constructive employment decision can in certain circumstances violate the First Amendment. Morfin v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 906 F.2d 1434, 1437 n. 3 (10th Cir.1990). Although we have never established a general rule for determining what adverse employment actions may suffice, we have noted that `promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliation or support are an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment rights of public employees.' Schuler v. City of Boulder, 189 F.3d 1304, 1309 (10th Cir.1999) (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990)). Indeed, in Morfin, we implied that substantial harassment and abuse could be a sufficient adverse employment action for First Amendment purposes. See 906 F.2d at 1437; see also Schuler, 189 F.3d at 1309 (analyzing Morfin ). We have also held that First Amendment retaliation claims can be based on removing job duties from an employee's portfolio or giving an employee a written reprimand or a poor performance rating. Id. at 1310; see also Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1220-21 (10th Cir.2005) (noting that a First Amendment retaliation claim may be based on repercussions that would not be actionable under Title VII). In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of an adverse employment action resulting from Plaintiffs' speech and association. For example, Plaintiffs contend that they received poor performance evaluations (that differed materially from their prior evaluations) during the period in which they exercised their First Amendment rights. See Aplt.App. at 1334-57. They contend that their actual performance did not change and that the decline was due to the result of gossiping. See Aplt. Br. at 14-15 (citing multiple parts of the record). It also appears that Dr. Marlatt imposed increasingly strict prohibitions on speaking outside of school as a result of Plaintiffs' speech. For example, Dr. Marlatt eventually forbade Plaintiffs to speak with parents about school matters. Id. Additionally, Plaintiffs testified that they were ignored by Dr. Marlatt and that Dr. Marlatt treated them with a hostile demeanor, slamming doors and chairs. Id. at 16. Finally, Plaintiffs suggest that they were blacklisted from future employment at the Academy because of their speech. Id. at 54-55. While a supervisor's surly attitude would probably not deter a reasonable person from exercising his or her First Amendment rights, it is clear that poor performance ratings certainly could, especially for non-tenured teachers. Additionally, increased restrictions on protected speech and association and blacklisting are also sufficient to satisfy the standard. Based on the facts before us, there is enough evidence to create a genuine dispute about whether these adverse actions occurred and whether they were motivated by Plaintiffs' speech and association. Accordingly, summary judgment for Defendants on this ground is improper.