Opinion ID: 3189206
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: F.E.B.’s Arguments

Text: We find F.E.B.’s multifarious arguments to the contrary unpersuasive.
First, F.E.B. argues the exception does not apply because the United States did not build up or fill in the island “for its own use,” 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a). Rather, F.E.B. contends, the United States created Wisteria Island incidentally, for the sole purpose of storing the fill that created it, and never used it for anything else. Of course, in ruling on the statute of limitations question, we do not dispositively rule on the merits of F.E.B.’s SLA claim, including as to whether using the island as a place to store fill constitutes “use” under the relevant SLA exception. See Mottaz, 8 It is also undisputed that Florida, F.E.B.’s predecessor, had actual knowledge of how the island was created. 13 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 14 of 25 476 U.S. at 851 (“The limitations provision of the Quiet Title Act reflects a clear congressional judgment that the national public interest requires barring stale challenges to the United States’ claim to real property, whatever the merits of those challenges.”). For statute of limitations purposes, the crucial issue is whether the SLA clearly and unequivocally abandoned the United States’ interest in the island. It is well-established—and was well-established when the SLA was enacted—that grants of federal property are construed strictly in favor of the United States. See Alaska, 521 U.S. at 34-35; United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957) (applying “the established rule that land grants are construed favorably to the Government, that nothing passes except what is conveyed in clear language, and that if there are doubts they are resolved for the Government, not against it.”) (citing Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20 (1919)). Given that rule of construction, the circumstances of Wisteria Island’s creation hew closely enough to the “for its own use” exception to the SLA to preclude a finding that the SLA clearly and unequivocally abandoned the federal government’s interest in that island. That conclusion comports with the Supreme Court’s only treatment of the exception.9 See California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States 9 In addition, the conclusion is consistent with the SLA’s legislative history, which shows that Congress added the exception in response to the Navy’s concern that the SLA would strip it of 14 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 15 of 25 (California II), 457 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). In California II, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that the SLA exception for land built up by the United States “for its own use” would apply to coastline that had slowly accreted after the United States constructed jetties nearby, even though the accretion was inadvertent, and the resulting coastline had remained barren and unused for the first eighty years of its existence. Id. at 275-76, 287. That result, the Supreme Court reasoned, “follow[ed] from the congressional object to assure each sovereign the continuing benefit of landfill and like work performed by each.” 10 Id. at 287. Wisteria Island surely was both created and used for a more functional purpose than the inadvertent accretions at issue in California II. Although F.E.B.’s predecessors did not have the benefit of California II, as discussed above, even the SLA’s plain language put them on notice that the cloud on the island’s title remained unresolved. The SLA did not abandon the United States’ interest in the island for purposes of the QTA statute of limitations. submerged lands that it had “improved.” See Submerged Lands: Hearings on S.J. Res. 13, S. 294, S. 107, S. 107 Amend. Before the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong. 544-556 (1953) (statement of Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of the Navy). The Navy specifically listed “fill” as one of the “improvements” at Key West Naval Station that it sought to shield from the SLA. Id. at 547, 549-50. 10 Although California II’s discussion of the exception is dicta, “there is dicta . . . and then there is Supreme Court dicta.” Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006). We have consistently recognized that “dicta from the Supreme Court is not something to be lightly cast aside,” id. (quotation marks omitted), but rather is of “considerable persuasive value,” United States v. City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d 968, 974 (11th Cir. 1998). 15 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 16 of 25
Second, F.E.B. points to subsequent actions by various federal employees appearing to affirm Florida’s ownership of Wisteria Island: For instance, a 1956 internal memo by the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks to the Chief of Naval Operations opined, “[i]t would appear that . . . the Navy would have a difficult time in proving that this island was built up for Federal use,” and accordingly recommended condemning the island for subsequent federal use (Doc. 67-1); a 1957 letter by the Navy’s District of Public Works Officer requested condemnation appraisals of the island; and 1961 court documents condemning an adjacent island (which may have been created during the same dredging operations that created Wisteria Island) acknowledged that Florida owned and held legal title to the adjacent island prior to the condemnation. It is, however, well-established that internal agency memos or other informal statements by subordinate government employees are not sufficient evidence of abandonment. See Rio Grande, 599 F.3d at 1187 (“[I]ntra-office memoranda, and similar intra-governmental communications do not bind the government, such that they can . . . stop the QTA’s limitations clock.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kingman, 541 F.3d at 1200-01 (agreeing that documents 16 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 17 of 25 evincing only “confusion and mistake on the part of some government employees, as to whether the United States ultimately possessed an ownership interest,” did not show abandonment); Spirit Lake, 262 F.3d at 740-42, 44 (“[T]he QTA limitations period does not stop when government action simply compounds a preexisting cloud on title.”); Cheyenne Arapaho, 558 F.3d at 598. So, too, here: Nothing in the documents F.E.B. identifies amounts to a “clear and unequivocal” abandonment of the United States’ claim, and, even if something did, there is no indication that the authors possessed the authority to dispose of government property. See California I, 332 U.S. at 40 (“[O]fficers who have no authority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by their conduct cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act.”). Not only that, but there is no indication that F.E.B.’s predecessors-in-interest were aware of, let alone relied on, the internal government documents identified by F.E.B. See Rio Grande, 599 F.3d at 1184-85 (disregarding government statements of which the plaintiffs were not aware because “they certainly could not have led [them] to believe that the United States had abandoned its claim”). Finally, the remainder of the government actions on which F.E.B. relies— such as the 2004-2006 licensing agreements to use the island for Navy training exercises—were undertaken long after the statute of limitations had run, and are 17 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 18 of 25 therefore irrelevant. See id. at 1185 (finding actions taken after the limitations period to be irrelevant). For all of those reasons, the actions of subordinate federal employees did not abandon the United States’ claim to Wisteria Island.
Third, F.E.B. contends the statute of limitations has not run because, in opposing F.E.B.’s SLA claim to the island, the United States now asserts a “different claim” to the island than it asserted in 1951. But the interest in real property that the United States asserted in 1951 is the same interest that it asserts in this suit: ownership of Wisteria Island, going back through the entire chain of title to that island. F.E.B.’s predecessors had actual notice of that asserted interest in 1951. It is that interest—not “the subjective intent of the government to enforce [the interest] in the face of changed conditions”—that constitutes the government’s “claim” for purposes of the QTA’s statute of limitations. Vincent Murphy Chevrolet Co. v. United States, 766 F.2d 449, 451 (10th Cir. 1985). Although the SLA created a new legal claim to the island for F.E.B.’s predecessors, it did not abolish their preexisting notice of the United States’ asserted interest. See id. at 251-52 (finding the QTA statute of limitations had run because, although the plaintiffs’ cause of action was newly available due to recently changed conditions, the plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the challenged government interest for many 18 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 19 of 25 years prior). F.E.B.’s predecessors remained on notice notwithstanding the fact that any government opposition to their newly minted SLA claim could implicate defensive legal arguments different from the affirmative claims raised in the government’s 1951 letter. See id. at 452 (“[F]or purposes of determining when ‘the claim’ accrues under § 2409a[(g)], all that is necessary is a reasonable awareness that the government claims some interest adverse to the plaintiffs.”) (internal alteration, quotation marks omitted); Knapp, 636 F.2d at 283 (“Knowledge of the claim’s full contours is not required.”).11 The QTA’s statute of limitations accrues upon notice of the United States’ claim—not upon the creation of an adverse claimant’s potential cause of action. The United States was not required to reassert its ownership interest after the SLA was enacted in order for the previously triggered limitations period to continue running. See Richmond, 945 F.2d at 770 (“To hold that the limitations period did not begin to run until conditions had changed and the government reasserted its claim would be in effect to extend the limitations period indefinitely, in contravention of Congress’s expressed intent.”). 11 See also Rio Grande, 599 F.3d at 1176 (“[T]he starting of the limitations clock is not dependent on the plaintiff knowing the precise nature of the property interest upon which the United States predicates its claim of title.”); Richmond, 945 F.2d at 770 (“Assuming . . . [the plaintiff] did not know the exact nature of the government’s claim in 1938, it still could not escape the limitations bar, for all that is necessary for accrual is a reasonable awareness that the Government claims some interest adverse to the plaintiff’s.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 20 of 25
Fourth, F.E.B. contends the statute of limitations has not run because the government did not take action adverse to F.E.B.’s predecessors’ interests either before or after the SLA’s 1953 enactment. But the plain language of the QTA is clear: The statute of limitations is triggered as soon as a plaintiff acquires actual or constructive notice of the government’s claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) (“[A QTA] action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States.”). Courts have consistently declined to require affirmative adverse government action to initiate the limitations period—let alone to keep an initiated period running. See Wisconsin Valley Imp. Co. v. United States, 569 F.3d 331, 335-36 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The Company contends that the clock does not start until the United States uses land in a way incompatible with the private claim . . . . This argument is incompatible with the rule . . . that it is the private party’s knowledge (actual or constructive), rather than the United States’ bulldozers or other physical activity, that causes a claim to accrue.”); Long v. Bureau of Reclam., 236 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff’s action for an easement accrued in 1949 because, “[w]hile [the plaintiff’s] use of [the disputed road] to gain access to 20 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 21 of 25 his property was not actually denied until 1988, the government’s right to deny access was reasonably clear to his predecessor-in-interest in 1949”); Richmond, 945 F.2d at 770 (holding that the limitations period started when the plaintiff first learned of the disputed covenant, not when the government later attempted to enforce that covenant for the first time). 12 F.E.B.’s reliance on Werner v. United States to argue otherwise is misplaced. See 9 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993). Werner stands for the common sense proposition that the statute of limitations is not triggered by just any government interest in property, but rather only a claimed interest that is inconsistent with— that is, adverse to— the plaintiff’s asserted interest. See id. at 1516-17 (finding the plaintiff’s QTA action for an easement across government property accrued not when the plaintiff knew the government owned the property in general, but when the plaintiff realized the government claimed title without an access easement). That proposition is most relevant where a plaintiff asserts a nonpossessory interest, such as an easement; after all, in that context “knowledge of a government claim of 12 See also Rosette Inc. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1394, 1398 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[The plaintiff] knew of the United States’ interest in 1978 . . . . The fact that it decided not to contest that interest until a disagreement arose cannot defeat the workings of the statute of limitations.”); Knapp, 636 F.2d at 283 (finding that the plaintiff’s action accrued when it was first aware of the cloud on its title, not when the government later acted on its claim by approving a survey of the disputed land for the first time); Calif. ex rel. State Land Comm’n v. Yuba Goldfields, Inc., 752 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history of the Act requires a showing of adversity.”) (emphasis added). 21 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 22 of 25 ownership may be entirely consistent with a plaintiff’s claim.” Michel v. United States, 65 F.3d 130, 131-32 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiffs’ “claim of access to roads and trails across the refuge did not accrue until [they] knew or should have known the government claimed the exclusive right to deny their historic access to the trails and roads across the refuge”) (citing Werner, 69 F.3d at 1516). A contrary rule “would lead to premature, and often unnecessary, suits,” as citizens currently enjoying access to government land “would be compelled to sue to protect against the possibility, however remote, that the government might someday restrict [their] access.” Id. at 132. Accordingly, courts have widely embraced the proposition that the United States must claim “some interest adverse to the plaintiff’s” before a QTA claim accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations. See Rio Grande, 599 F.3d at 1176; Cheyenne Arapaho, 558 F.3d at 595; Wisconsin Valley, 569 F.3d at 334-35; Kingman, 541 F.3d at 1198; Spirit Lake, 262 F.3d at 738; Bank One Texas, 157 F.3d at 402 n.11; Richmond, 945 F.2d at 770. F.E.B. conflates the requirement for an adverse government interest with a requirement for adverse government action. But the two are distinct: Although adverse government action is sufficient to put a plaintiff on notice of a government’s claim, it is not necessary. See Wisconsin Valley, 569 F.3d at 335- 22 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 23 of 25 36; Long, 236 F.3d at 915; Rosette, 141 F.3d at 1398; Richmond, 945 F.2d at 770; Yuba Goldfields, 752 F.2d at 397; Knapp, 636 F.2d at 283. Therefore, given that F.E.B.’s predecessor had actual knowledge of the government’s claim to ownership of the island, the fact that the government did not affirmatively obstruct its or its successors’ use of the island before or after the SLA’s enactment does not forestall application of the statute of limitations.
Finally, at oral argument, F.E.B. asserted for the first time that a finding of no abandonment by the United States in this case would effectively foreclose the availability of QTA claims for all submerged lands nationwide. F.E.B. arrives at that sweeping conclusion by fashioning a new argument for the government (an argument not asserted by the government itself)—namely, that the Supreme Court’s 1947 decision granting the United States “paramount” rights in submerged coastal lands, see California I, 332 U.S. at 38-39, constituted a “claim” by the United States to all such lands for purposes of the QTA statute of limitations. Starting from that hypothetical premise, F.E.B. contends that, unless the court finds the SLA abandoned all California I “claims,” the QTA limitations period on all submerged coastal lands expired long ago. 23 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 24 of 25 The problem with F.E.B.’s argument is that it is counterfactual. The government does not argue that California I triggered the QTA limitations period for Wisteria Island. Rather, the government asserts that its 1951 letter triggered the limitations period. In that letter, the United States relied not on California I, but instead on its 1819 treaty with Spain, and 1845 and 1924 Executive Orders, to assert ownership over the island. As discussed in Section II.A supra, that letter’s explicit and unambiguous assertion of a property interest in the island more than meets the QTA’s accrual requirements. We therefore have no reason to consider whether California I constituted a “claim” by the United States to Wisteria Island—or submerged lands in general—in order to decide this case. Accordingly, we express no opinion on that issue. Similarly, our holding regarding the SLA’s effect on the QTA statute of limitations is narrowly drawn to the facts of this case. Contrary to F.E.B.’s contention, we need not decide whether the SLA in general abandoned preexisting government claims to submerged lands. Rather, we hold only that, given the undisputed and well-known facts of Wisteria Island’s creation, the plain language of the SLA exception for lands “built up by the United States for its own use,” 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a), gave rise to an open and obvious question as to whether the SLA applied in this case. See supra § II.B. We leave further explication of these issues to future cases. 24 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 25 of 25