Opinion ID: 2107127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Restriction on Cross-Examination of William Thomas

Text: The defendant further argues that the trial justice impermissibly restricted his attempts to cross-examine William as to his motive and bias for testifying at defendant's trial. The defendant contends that the trial justice should have permitted him to cross-examine William concerning (1) whether or not William had engaged in criminal conduct in other states and (2) whether or not William had discussed with the prosecutor his potential criminal liability in other states. The defendant argues that such questioning would reveal whether William was promised immunity for these crimes or whether William believed he had immunity for those crimes in exchange for his testimony at defendant's trial. Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution guarantee an accused the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testify against the accused at trial. State v. Texter, 594 A.2d 376, 377 (R.I.1991) ([T]he right of the criminal defendant to cross-examine his accusers is a fundamental tenet of both our Federal and our State Constitutions.); see also Tiernan, 941 A.2d at 133 ([T]he right of accused persons to confront the witnesses against them has ancient and venerable roots, and this Court has ardently protected this right.); State v. Olsen, 610 A.2d 1099, 1101 (R.I. 1992) (Included in the right to confront witnesses is the fundamental right of the criminal defendant to cross-examine his or her accusers.); 5 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1367 at 32 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (describing cross-examination as being beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth). In describing the scope of the right of confrontation, we wrote as follows in State v. Freeman, 473 A.2d 1149 (R.I.1984): Such a right may not be given or withheld at the discretion of the trial justice. The discretionary authority to limit cross-examination comes into play only after there has been permitted as a matter of right sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 1153-54 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). While it is true that a defendant must be afforded  sufficient cross-examination as a matter of right, [29] there are limitations relative to the exercise of that right. Parillo, 480 A.2d at 1359; see State v. Wright 817 A.2d 600, 610 (R.I.2003) (The scope of cross-examination is not unlimited and the questioning is subject to the sound discretion of the trial justice.); see also Lopez, 943 A.2d at 1042; State v. DePina, 810 A.2d 768, 776 (R.I.2002). [30] The record does not support defendant's contention that the trial justice precluded him from cross-examining William about (1) whether or not there had been discussions between William and the prosecutor about William's possible criminal activity in other jurisdictions or (2) whether or not William hoped or expected the state to help him with respect to any criminal charges that might arise from such crimes. During the cross-examination of William, defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony from him as to whether or not he had ever been involved in criminal activities with Mr. Sparfven or the man referred to as Kevin. The trial justice sustained the prosecutor's objection, and he did not permit William to testify about these specifics. However, the trial justice did permit defense counsel to pursue a line of questioning on cross-examination as to whether he had ever been in the presence of Kevin and Mr. Sparfven and whether he had ever worked for Mr. Sparfven. It is noteworthy that Elaine had testified earlier at defendant's trial that William had told her that he had been involved in criminal activity in Florida along with Mr. Sparfven and Kevin. See footnote 15, supra. Additionally, on cross-examination, defense counsel was permitted to ask whether any of the work William performed for Mr. Sparfven was of a criminal nature. Although William testified that he had never been involved in any criminal activity with Mr. Sparfven, the jury had already heard Elaine testify as to such criminal activity. Accordingly, any error that the trial justice may have made in limiting the scope of the defense counsel's cross-examination of William was harmless. As discussed in the preceding section of this opinion, the prosecutor interposed no objection to defense counsel's cross-examination of William as to his subjective understanding of the immunity order. The trial justice, on the basis of the prosecution's hearsay objection, did preclude defense counsel from eliciting testimony about what was said by the prosecutor at William's immunity hearing. Defense counsel however never sought to question William as to his subjective understanding of the immunity agreement or the immunity proceedings before the presiding justice. In our judgment, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by limiting, as he did, the scope of the cross-examination of William. C