Opinion ID: 766623
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General Applicability of Title VI

Text: 22 Title VI was originally passed as part of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and it contains a prohibition on the use of federal dollars to subsidize racial discrimination: 23 No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination in any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 24 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000d. 25 The purpose of Title VI is clear: Congress wanted to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices and it wanted to provide effective protection against those practices. Cannon v. University of Chicago , 441 U.S. 677, 704 n.36 (1979). 26 In the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Congress amended Title VI to include a definition of program or activity. As amended, Title VI provides that: 27 For the purposes of this subchapter, the terms program or activity and the term program  mean all of the operations of -- 28 (1)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or 29 (B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government; or 30 (2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education; or 31 (B) a local educational agency (as defined in section 8801 of Title 20), system of vocational education, or other school sys tem; or 32 (3)(A) . . . 33 (4) any other entity which is established by two or more of the entities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3); 34 any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance. 35 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000d-4a. 36 In other words, the definition of program or activity provided by Congressmeans that if any part of a listed entity receives federal funds, the entire entity is covered by Title VI. Grimes v. Superior Home Health Care, 929 F. Supp. 1088, 1092 (M.D. Tenn. 1996). 37 2. Application of Title VI to the CTC: Title VI Does Not Apply to the CTC Simply By Virtue of Its Existence as Part of the Public School System in California because the term School System Is Used More Expansively By The California State Constitution Than by 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000d-4a(2)(B) 38 The District Court's Order of August 25, 1993 found that neither the CTC nor its predecessor, the CTPL, had received federal funds after January 1, 1980. AMAE I, 836 F. Supp. at 1538. 3 The District Court went on to observe that -although not a direct recipient of federal funds -the CTC could nevertheless be liable under Title VI if it was a part of a school system and any part of that system received federal funds. Id. at 1544 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000d-4a(2)(B)). Reviewing the structure of public education in California, the District Court held that public education in California was, in fact, a single school system and that as a State agency concerned with education, the CTC was a part of that single school system. Id. at 1544-45. Since public education in California receives federal funds, the District Court held that CTC was therefore part of a `school system' referred to in subsection (2)(B) of S 2000d-4a. Id. at 1544. 39 In concluding that public education in California is part of a single school system, the District Court placed particular emphasis on a provision from the California State Constitution, which refers to public education in California as the Public School System. AMAE I, 836 F. Supp. at 1544 (citing Cal. Const., art. IX, S 6, P 2 4 . Although the Defendants below apparently argued that the CTC was outside of the Public School System, the District Court rejected the argument. Looking both to the Constitutional provision itself and to the state decisions interpreting that provision, the District Court concluded that the California State Constitution establishes an entire, unified school system and that such a system included regulatory bodies like the CTC and the Board of Education. AMAE I, 836 at 1544 (citing Kennedy v. Miller, 97 Cal. 429, 432 (1983) and California Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 82 Cal. App. 3d 249, 253-54 (1978)). 40 We do not disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the CTC falls within the Public School System established by the California Constitution. We do, however, disagree with a critical assumption apparently made by the parties. We do not assume that the Public School System defined by the California Constitution necessarily qualifies as the sort of school system to which Congress referred in S 2000d-4a(2)(B). In other words, we do not assume that the term school system is used in the same manner by Congress and the California StateConstitution. As a result, we must determine whether the whole edifice of public education in the State of California would qualify under the federal definition of school system embodied in S 2000d-4a(2)(B). 41 To begin, we must determine the appropriate definition of school system as used in subsection (2)(B) of S 2000d-4a. For this purpose, we start with the language of the statute. As quoted above, S 2000d-4a(2)(B) applies to the operations of: 42 a local educational agency (as defined in section 8801 of Title 20), system of vocational education, or other school system. 43 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000d-4a(2)(B). 44 Of the three terms included in subsection (2)(B),local educational agency is both the only defined term and the only term to which any substantial jurisprudence has attached. 5 To understand the meaning of subsection (2)(B), then, we naturally begin by looking to the definition and history of the term local educational agency. Pursuant to Section 8801 of Title 20, that term is defined as: 45 a public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary or secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State, or for such combination of school districts or counties as are recognized in a State as an administrative agency for its public elementary or secondary schools. 46 The term includes any other public institution or agency having administrative control and direction of a public elementary or secondary school. 47 20 U.S.C.A. S 8801(18)(A-B). 48 We also observe that 20 U.S.C.A. S 8801 contains a definition for a State educational agency, which it describes as the agency primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary and secondary schools. 20 U.S.C.A. S 8801 (28). 6 49 The distinction between local educational agency  and State educational agency is important in this case. It is true that the definition of local educational agency,  read broadly, could include any agency that had any regulatory control over a public school. However, such an expansive reading would ignore the fact that Congress has drawn a distinction between the State educational agencies that regulate schools and the local educational agencies that administer those schools. Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1983) (observing that an educational agency is either a local educational agency or a State educational agency); United States v. City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600, 619 (2d Cir. 1996) (same). This distinction is well established in the structure of numerous federal educational statutes that place different requirements on State educational agencies and local educational agencies. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. S 1414(a) (providing for local educational agencies to submit applications to State educational agencies under Education of the Handicapped Act); 20 U.S.C.A. S 1103c (same for Teacher Corps); 20 U.S.C.A. S 1415(c) (providing for review by State educational agency of decisions by local educational agency); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 954 (10thCir. 1994) (distinguishing between local educational agencies and State educational agencies). After reviewing the statutory roles of State educational agencies and local educational agencies and the case law relating to those roles, it is apparent that local educational agencies are those which actually administer the local schools. 50 In determining what constitutes an agency which actually administers the local schools, the Court is required to look to state law and practice to determine what entity is recognized in a State as an administrative agency for its public elementary or secondary schools. 20 U.S.C.A. S 8801(18)(A-B). In this case, notwithstanding the State Constitutional provision that public education is a part of the Public School System, we find that public schools in the State of California are administered by school districts. 7 Such school districts are responsible for the receipt and payment of bills and debts, and maintain their own accounting and payroll procedures. School districts purchase their own supplies, equipment, and transportation units. They separately negotiate employment agreements and separately hire, pay, and oversee the employees who teach and administer California's public schools. School districts not only manage the schools on a daily basis, they also plan and execute the acquisition, management, and disposal of facilities. They are responsible for the safety and security conditions in their schools. In short, the school districts -and not the entire edifice of public education in California -constitute the primary agencies which manage schools within the meaning of local educational agency as used in 20 U.S.C.A. S 8801(18). 51 Of course, neither the parties nor the District Court have asserted that the California Public School System is a local educational agency within the meaning of S 8801 and it might seem obvious that it is not. 8 Nevertheless, we think this discussion is important because we think that it sheds light on the proper interpretation of S 2000d-4a(2)(B). 52 Looking at the structure of S 2000d-4a(2)(B), it appears to us that Congress meant to expand program or activity to all activities within administrative units like school districts. Aside from the catch-all phrase, to which we will turn momentarily, S 2000d-4a(2)(B) speaks only of local educational agencies and systems of vocational education. 9 We have just discussedthe limitations inherent in local educational agency and we think that the same limitation is obviously inherent in system of vocational education. By a system of vocational education Congress meant any set of vocational schools or programs that were administered by a central body, with management over supplies, facilities, and personnel. It is naturally possible (particularly in a smaller state) that a system of vocational education could be a statewide system, but such a system would still be a discrete system whose management characteristics are similar to school districts. 53 We think that the catch-all term other school system cannot be interpreted independently, but must be interpreted in the context of the previous two terms. In determining whether something qualifies as an other school system  within the meaning of S 2000d-4a(2)(B), we do not simply ask whether it calls itself a school system. Labels alone are frequently misleading. 10 Instead, we must ask whether its essential characteristics are similar enough to those school systems addressed above that we would consider them a single unit for practical purposes. For example, an educational authority which focused upon adult education might not call itself a school system but might nevertheless operate with the sort of centralized management akin to a school district. Likewise, a private or religious entity might run a group of schools which operate with the sort of centralized management akin to a school district. 11 By contrast, a loosely-affiliated group of private schools might refer to themselves as a school system for the purpose of creating a sports league, but we would think it clear that this alone, without more, would not subject every facet of every school in the league to Title VI if one school alone received Federal funds. Indeed, the Supreme Court has very recently made clear that not even the league itself is subject to Title VI merely because one member of the league received federal funds. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Smith, 119 S.Ct. 924, 926 (1999). The critical issue is whether the schools are managed in relevant respects as a connected unit. 54 The legislative history of S 2000d-4a(2)(B) supports this conclusion. The Congressional Report on the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 cautions that [f]or two or more schools to be considered a `school system', there must be some significant linkage between them. Thus, for example, any group of schools whose only connection to each other is that they belong to some umbrella advocacy or membership group, or that they are accredited by one central accrediting agency, would not constitute a school system. S. Rep. No. 100-64 at 17 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 19 (emphasis added). 12 55 A second comment from the Report deserves attention here. The Report states that [i]f federal financial assistance is extended to one of three secondary schools which comprise a system operated by a Catholic Diocese, all of the operations within all three of the schools in the systemare covered. Id. This follows naturally from the fact that such a system would be similar to a school district. We observe, however, that while Title VI coverage would be extended to the entire school system within that Diocese (which is traditionally a metropolitan area), such coverage would not be extended to all schools in the country under the auspices of the Catholic church, nor even all schools under the auspices of a particular Catholic Metropolitan (the Catholic organizational unit that is territorially equivalent to a State). From this we conclude that Title VI extends to all activities within a school district or its equivalent, regardless of whether the system calls itself a school system or not. 56 In the present case, we find that the State Constitutional requirement of a single Public School System  in California does not mean that public education in California is a school system within the meaning of S 2000d-4a(2)(B). Although California requires that all of its public schools be chartered under State authority, Kennedy v. Miller, 97 Cal. 429, 436 (1893), the fact that they all derive from State power is not enough to make all such schools and school districts together a single system in the sense required for Title VI coverage. Cf. Gonzales v. State, 29 Cal. App. 3d 585, 590 (1972) (holding that while school districts exercise state power, they are each independent entities). As a consequence, we conclude that CTC is not covered by Title VI solely by virtue of its existence as part of the Public School System of the State of California. 57 3. Application of Title VI to the CTC: Title VI Does Not Apply to the CTC Simply by Virtue of Its Existence as Part of the State of California because Receipt of Federal Funds by One State Entity Does Not Automatically Sub ject the Entire State Government to Coverage. 58 Because the District Court found that S 2000d-4a(2)(B) resulted in coverage of the CTC under Title VI, the District Court declined to consider whether the CTC was covered under subsection (4) of S 2000d-4a. AMAE I , 836 F. Supp. at 1545 n.8. As we have reached the opposite conclusion, we must proceed to consider whether S 2000d-4a(4) applies to the CTC. 59 As quoted above, S 2000d-4a(4) extends the definition of program or activity to any other entity which is established by two or more of the entities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3). 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000d-4a(4). In essence, Plaintiffs allege that the State of California is subject to Title VI as a recipient of federal funds and that the CTC is covered under Title VI because the CTC is established by the State of California. 13 60 We disagree. Because the State itself cannot be considered a program or activity under S 2000d-4(a), only subsections of the State and not the State as a whole can be subject to Title VI. 14 TheCTC was not established by any subsection of the State subject to Title VI, 15 and consequently the CTC is not covered under S 2000d-4a(4). 61 As laid out above, S 2000d-4a(1) extends the definition of program or activity to all of the operations of a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or local government and to all of the operations of the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to which the assistance is extended. 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000d-4a(1)(A &B). In other words, S 2000d-4a(1) applies to any department or agency of the State which has received federal funds, whether the State entity receives such funds directly from the government or via another State entity. 62 At the same time, however, nothing in S 2000d-4a would include the State, as such, in the enumeration of entities listed in the definition of program or activity. This omission cannot be accidental. Although we could begin with the interpretive cannon, expressio unius, the structure of the statute is direct and conclusive proof that Congress did not mean to subject an entire State to Title VI. Congress went to great lengths in subsection (1)(B) to detail the fact that each department or agency of a State which received federal funds would be subject to Title VI, even if they received such funds via another agency. Subsection (1)(B) would be superfluous if receipt by one agency of the State subjected the entire State to Title VI, and we strive to avoid any construction that would render some of the statute superfluous. Burrey v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 159 F.3d 388, 393 (9th Cir. 1998). Congress simply could not have meant to extend Title VI to the entire State government because one department or agency received aid (even aid intended for the State). 63 Again, the legislative history supports our conclusion. The Congressional Report explicitly concluded that [f]or State and local governments, only the department or agency which receives the aid is covered. S. Rep. 100-64 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6. Although this is an issue of first impression in our Circuit, other Circuits interpreting the Civil Rights Restoration Act have also come to this conclusion. Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 927 F. 2d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 1991); Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, Texas , 118 F.3d 421, 427 (5th Cir. 1997). In sum, we hold that while Title VI may apply to any subsection of the State which receives federal funds, Title VI will not apply to the State as a whole simply because one subsection receives such funds. 64 The District Court found that the United States has long provided the State,through its Board of Education, financial assistance for use in education. AMAE I, 836 F. Supp. at 1537. The District Court also found that the California Department of Education (DOE) has distributed most of that money to local school boards. Id. These findings indicate that the California Board of Education, the Department of Education, and the local school boards are all subject to Title VI under S 2000d-4a(1)(A)&(B). However, although the money may have been given to the Board of Education on behalf of the State, it is that agency and not the State as a whole which is covered by Title VI as a result. 65 The CTC was not created by the Board of Education, the Department of Education, or the local school boards. As a result, although such agencies are covered by Title VI, the CTC is not covered by virtue of S 2000d-4a(4). 66 In sum, we conclude that the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the CTC is covered by Title VI and we order the District Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' Title VI claim against the CTC. 67 4. Application of Title VI to California's Statutory Requirement that Prospective Teachers Pass the CBEST : As Neither the Legislature Nor the CTC Receives Federal Funding, Title VI Does Not Attach to the State's Requirement For Teacher Certification 68 Our conclusion in the previous section that the State of California is not automatically subject to Title VI compels the conclusion that the State of California is not liable under Title VI for imposing the CBEST as a statutory requirement for a public teacher's credential. The receipt of federal funds by the California Board of Education subjects the Board to Title VI, but it does not extend the coverage of Title VI into all of the operations of the entire State. Likewise, the receipt of federal funds by the California Department of Education subjects that Department to Title VI, but it does not extend coverage of Title VI into all operations of the entire State. In this case, the statutory requirement was imposed by the California Legislature. It is clear that Title VI coverage does not attach directly to the requirement as imposed by the Legislature. 69 As we have found that the CTC is not a covered program or activity, and as there is no evidence that the Legislature is a covered program or activity, no Title VI liability could possibly result from their actions. 16 70 C. Application of Title VII to the State Requirement that School Districts May Only Employ Credentialed Individuals 71 1. Title VII Applies to Relationships Between Government Employers and Government Employees 72 Title VII was also originally passed as part of the 1964 Civil RightsAct, and Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A.S 2000e2(a)(1). It is well established that Title VII applies to governmental and private employers alike. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n. 14 (1977); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir. 1979). 73 2. Title VII Does Not Apply to the State's Requirement of the CBEST for Potential Teachers Because the CBEST is a Licensing Exam 74 Defendants argued below that the CBEST was part of the State's licensing process for public school teachers, relying upon the fact that Title VII does not apply to governmental licensing activities. See Haddock v. Board of Dental Exam'rs, 777 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that Title VII did not apply to licensing activities of California's Board of Dental Examiners). 75 Although the District Court agreed that Title VII does not apply to governmental licensing activities, AMAE I, 836 F. Supp. at 1549, the District Court concluded that the CBEST was not a licensing exam because it only licensed public school teachers. Id. The District Court observed that one could be a teacher in a private school without having passed the CBEST, and that the CBEST only stood as a barrier to employment in the State's own schools.  Id. For that reason, the District Court determined that the CBEST is an examination that tests an individual's qualification for a job with a particular employer (the State), not an examination that tests minimal competence for the job of teaching.  Id. 76 We agree with the District Court that, if the State requires an exam solely for its own employees, such an exam constitutes an employment exam. We also think it evident that Title VII applies even if the purpose of the exam is to improve the quality of the State's service to the public, because virtually any State employment exam could be cast as an attempt to improve the quality of the State's service to the public. 77 a. The CBEST Is Not an Employment Exam Because the State Is Not the Potential Employer 78 Nevertheless, we do not agree with the characterization of the CBEST as testing for a particular employer (the State). We note that, immediately after determining that the CBEST was an employment exam, the District Court then discussed the fact that teachers are not employed by the Defendants. AMAE I, 836 F. Supp. at 1550. The parties and the lower court agree that teachers are employees  of the various school districts, rather than employees of the State or of the CTC. Id. 79 As such, we cannot agree that the State is the employer in this instance. We recognize that school districts in California are instrumentalities of the State, Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 251-54 (9th Cir. 1992); First Interstate Bank of California v. State of California, 197 Cal. App. 3d 627, 633 (1988), but we view the relationship between school districts and the State as analogous to the parent/subsidiary relationship. It is well established that a parent company will not usually be considered the employer under Title VII for the employees of its subsidiary. Watson v. Gulf & Western, 650 F.2d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1981). 17 It is likewise well-established in California that the school districts, although exercising aportion of the state's powers of government, are not the state or a part of the state, Gonzales v. State of California, 29 Cal. App. 3d 585, 590 (1972), and that employees of the school districts are not employees of the State. Id. at 590-91 (observing that employee compensation is fixed by the district and not the state, that the employee is paid by the district and not the state, that the scope of his employment is determined by the district and not by the state, that the right to control and supervise him is vested exclusively in the district by the state without reservation, and that he may be discharged by the district for cause, and not by the state.); see also Norton Sound Health v. Bearing Strait Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that, in applying federal statute, Alaska school districts constitute an arm of the State but not the State itself). As the State is not itself the potential employer for the Plaintiffs in this case, we do not believe that the CBEST should be characterized as an employment exam. 80 b. The CBEST Is A Valid Licensing Exam Because The CBEST Is Required Under the State's Police Power and Not Its Proprietary Power 81 The question still remains whether the CBEST is a valid licensing exam. The District Court was of course cognizant of the fact that the school districts are the direct employers, and not the State. AMAE I, 836 F. Supp. at 1550. Nevertheless, the District Court found that the CBEST was not a licensing exam because it focused solely on public employees and not private employees. Id. at 1550. 82 We agree with the District Court that the limitation of the examination to public school teachers raises a question as to whether it is a true licensing exam. Nevertheless, we do not think that such a limitation is necessarily dispositive. Although previous federal courts to uphold teacher licensing exams have not discussed the consequences of the fact that such exams were restricted to public employees, see, e.g., Fields v. Hallsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1990), 18 we think that the critical issue is whether the State is exercising its police powers or its proprietary powers. 19 The clear principle behind the licensing exception is that a State will not be liable under Title VII for interference with an employment relationship if the alleged interference is an exercise of its regulatory responsibilities. See, e.g., George v. New Jersey Bd. of Veterinary Medical Exam'rs, 794 F.2d 113,114 (3rd Cir. 1986) (holding that Title VII does not reach licensing under police powers of a state). 83 Although a limitation of an examination to public employees will inevitably raise the question of whether the State is exercising its proprietary power, it does not inherently require such a conclusion. For example, imagine that the State were to conclude that criminal courts were frequently convicting indigent citizens because their defense attorneys were insufficiently versed in the law of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, imagine that the California Legislature were to pass a law addressed to this problem, requiring that all attorneys employed by public defender offices of the various cities or counties in California were required to pass an exam on the Fourth Amendment as a condition of employment. 84 We think that such an exam would be an exercise of the State's police power, and would therefore be a valid licensing exam despite the fact that it was not extended to private criminal defense attorneys. At least two factors would support such a conclusion. First, we would consider the fact that the requirements extend beyond State employees to all similar professionals in any public agency to be evidence that the State is employing its police power. Second, we would consider the fact that this requirement was mandated by the Legislature (rather than by an administrator responsible for managing the positions at issue) as providing additional evidence that the State is acting in its sovereign capacity rather than its proprietary capacity. 85 Returning to the CBEST exam, we think this is a very close question. Nevertheless, we think that the State is exercising its police powers and not its proprietary powers when it requires that public school teachers be certificated employees. First, although the public schools are instrumentalities of the State under California law, California law establishes that teachers are not State employees. Gonzales v. State of California, 29 Cal. App. 3d 585, 590-91 (1972). Second, the CBEST was mandated by the Legislature and not an administrator or administrative agency responsible for overseeing the employees at issue. Although these factors are not necessarily dispositive, we find in this case that they tip the balance in favor of the Defendants. See generally Fields v. Hallsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that Texas teacher's exam did not make State of Texas into an employer and rejecting claim that the State of Texas was subject to Title VII liability for any effect of exam). 86 The District Court found that the CBEST was not a valid licensing exam, and that as such it constituted an actionable interference with the employment relationship. AMAE I, 836 F. Supp. at 1551 (citing Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). As we conclude that it is a valid licensing exam, and therefore exempt from liability under Title VII, we need not decide whether Sibley would otherwise apply to this situation. 20 87 In sum, we conclude that Title VII does not apply to either the State of California or the CTC as their actions relate to the licensing of public school teachers in the State of California. 88 D. The District Court's Findings That the Test Was Discriminatory 89 Although our conclusion that Title VI and Title VII do not apply to the CBEST could resolve the case, we have reviewed the District Court's factual findings in response to Plaintiffs' Appeal and we find no reversible error in those factual findings. As such, we approve the District Court's factual findings as an alternativeground on which we affirm the District Court's judgment. 21 90 1. This Court Reviews Determinations on Test Validation Under the Clearly Erroneous Standard 91 As a general matter, this Court reviews a district court's determination of law de novo and determinations of fact for clear error. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Where a determination is a mixed question of fact and law, the Court must decide whether the mixed question is predominately a legal determination or a factual determination. Id. 92 Although this Circuit has never discussed at length the appropriate standard of review for test validation, we have applied the clearly erroneous standard in the past. See, e.g., Clady v. County of Los Angles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding district court where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the [district] court's finding of job relatedness was clearly erroneous). In this respect, we are in accord with all of the circuits which have examined this issue. See, e.g., Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp ., 890 F.2d 735, 743 (5th Cir. 1989); Hamer v. City of Atlanta, 872 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1989); Ensley Branch of N.A.A.C.P. v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing cases for clearly erroneous standard); Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Dept., Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm. Of City of New York, 633 F.2d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 429 (7th Cir. 1977); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. Of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Bayonne , 134 F.3d 113, 120 (3rd Cir. 1998) (citing Bernard for clearly erroneous standard); Melendez v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. , 79 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 1996) (reviewing determination on validity of test under clearly erroneous analysis). 93 The question of whether a test has been appropriately validated is primarily a factual question. Although Plaintiffs argue that validation is a legal concept, the underlying determinations such a job-relatedness are factual determinations. The question of validation also depends upon other factual determinations such as the thoroughness and professionalism of the study. As such, this Court reviews test validity determinations under a clearly erroneous standard. 22