Opinion ID: 2322066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Issues Raised By T.W.

Text: T.W. argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in limiting her cross-examination of Mr. Jennings, a CFSA social worker, on October 9, 2007. Counsel for T.W. asked whether M.W. was living happily with the aunt when Mr. Jennings assumed responsibility for M.W.'s case. In response to the Magistrate Judge's inquiry about the relevance of the question, Counsel stated: It is very relevant as to where the mother wanted the child to be during that time[, a]nd whether or not the mother wanted the child to be with this particular petitioner. The judge ruled, how the child was doing with the aunt is not relevant to the proceeding as whether I'm waiving or not waiving the parent's interest. Arguably, the line of questioning T.W. sought to pose to Mr. Jennings was relevant with respect to one of the Rule 39 show cause factors[w]hether the birth parent has abandoned the prospective adoptee.... However, Counsel for T.W. never explicitly stated that her line of questioning was designed to show that T.W. had not abandoned M.W., but that the District had removed her from the aunt's care. In addition, to the extent that T.W., through the cross-examination of Mr. Jennings, sought to show that her choice for the care and custody of M.W. was the aunt, the record is devoid of any indication that T.W. wanted the aunt to continue to care for M.W. As Judge Davis declared, there is absolutely no evidence of record reflecting the mother's choice of anything regarding her daughter. Indeed, the record shows that T.W. did not support the aunt's petition for adoption of M.W., and as Judge Davis observed, T.W. did not take any action in response to Judge Dalton's decision almost seven months earlier to dismiss [the aunt's] adoption petition. In short, [t]he extent of cross-examination [of a witness] with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court, In re L.D.H., 776 A.2d 570, 573 (D.C.2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), and we see no abuse of discretion, and no record evidence to support T.W.'s contention that she was denied her [c]onstitutional right to `make personal choices in matters of family life' because of the limitation on the cross-examination of Mr. Jennings. T.W. complains about the Magistrate Judge's decision to bifurcate the show cause hearing concerning the waiver of the biological parents' consent and the proceeding regarding the fitness of J.T.B. to adopt M.W., asserting that because of her exclusion from the proceeding involving J.T.B.'s fitness, she had no opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Marshall (M.W. and J.T.B.'s) therapist, and was not able to object to the late admission of photographs of M.W. by J.T.B.'s counsel after the formal proceedings had concluded. Super. Ct. Adoption R. 42 allows the trial court to consolidate the adoption proceeding with a proceeding to terminate the biological parents' rights, and further permits the court to bifurcate claims or issues. [11] The record shows that bifurcation did not preclude T.W. from posing questions to J.T.B. Indeed, on cross-examination of J.T.B. on October 9, 2007, T.W.'s counsel was able to establish that when M.W. was placed with in J.T.B.'s home, she had adjustment difficulties, temper tantrums, asked to leave J.T.B.'s home, said she hated J.T.B. and wanted to remain with the aunt. The reviewing judge determined that the evidence relating to two of the TPR factors, discussed in Judge Dalton's written findings and conclusions, emerged during the time T.W. was excluded from the proceedings, but that the oral findings were sufficient as to the waiver of consent, and T.W., through her amended motion for review, had an opportunity to address the written findings. Furthermore, in this case, we are satisfied that the bifurcation had no impact on the parents' opportunity to contest the waiver of their consent and the termination of their parental rights. As a practical matter, the first phase of the proceeding, as conducted, operated as a TPR proceeding and the parents had an opportunity to establish that they had not abandoned M.W. and their parental rights should not be terminated. At the conclusion of the first phase, Judge Dalton correctly recognized that the District had presented clear and convincing evidence showing that the biological parents had abandoned M.W. As Judge Dalton stated, in part: With respect to abandonment it is well established that an adoption will be granted without parental consent on grounds of abandonment only when the parent's conduct manifests an intention to be rid of all parental obligations and to forego all parental rights. Abandonment does not require that a [parent] leave her child at a doorstep, nor does it require that she [ceases] to feel concern for the child. In determining whether there has been an abandonment a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the degree of parental love, care, and attention. In order to show a termination of abandonment the conduct of a parent must demonstrate a desire to care for the child. A mere expression of desire by a delinquent parent will not suffice. In this case there is no intent to be a parent. There has been no contact on behalf of the mother of any kind except for one visit a while ago, quite a while ago, and one missed visit, and a conversation that work hours did not comport with visiting. The father has had no visits and there has been no kind of [remun]eration or emotional support from either parent. There is clear and convincing evidence that both parents ... have abandoned and failed to contribute to M.[W.]'s support for six months preceding the date of the filing of the petition for adoption. [T]he parent's conduct demonstrates that neither [the biological father nor the birth mother is] interested in parenting M.[W.] and haven't taken the necessary steps to develop or maintain a parental relationship. Judge Dalton also took into consideration the parents' failure to appear at th[e] show cause hearing despite having been served with formal notice that failure to appear could result in the Court inferring or concluding that both parents ... had abandoned their interest in the child and waived consent. Judge Dalton's findings and conclusions about the parents' abandonment of M.W. are consistent with our case law. See In re C.E.H., 391 A.2d 1370, 1373 (D.C.1978) (In determining whether there has been an abandonment, a court must consider the totality of circumstances, including the degree of parental love, care and attention; an adoption will be granted without parental consent on grounds of abandonment only when the parent's conduct manifests an intention to be rid of all parental obligations[,] and to forego all parental rights.) (citations omitted). In short, our review of the record convinces us that what we said in In re A.W.K., supra , also a bifurcated proceeding, is applicable here: We are persuaded that the court allowed sufficient inquiry and made adequate findings to comply with the essentials of a TPR proceeding as imported into this adoption case. The court's careful and protracted consideration of [M.W.'s] interaction with all persons with whom [she] had contact, and its searching inquiry into how the birth parents had, or had not, asserted and exercised their parental rights, achieved the purpose of the TPR-type hearing.... In reaching this conclusion we necessarily adopt the related conclusion that the trial court acted permissibly in considering whether the birth parents were withholding consent contrary to the best interests of [M.W.] without a full consideration of the particular adoption which was being sought. In the circumstances of this case, it was permissible for the court, in its discretion, to focus almost entirely on the fitness of the birth parents themselves in considering whether to waive their consent. 778 A.2d at 326-27. The evidence presented by the special education teacher and the social workers-Ms. Alvarez, Ms. Burgos, Ms. Meyers, Mr. Jennings-as well as J.T.B., and Ms. Marshall, the therapist, amounted to clear and convincing evidence supporting the findings and conclusions of the Family Court concerning both the waiver of the biological parents' consent, and the fitness of J.T.B. as an adopting parent. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Family Court. [12] So ordered.