Opinion ID: 2317113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insufficiency of Discovery and Cross-Examination Alone

Text: Although we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, we disagree with one significant aspect of its opinion. The intermediate appellate court agreed with the State's contention that Moore's constitutional rights were satisfied by the State's disclosure of the Cellmark documents and reports during discovery. The court stated as follows: [T]here is nothing to indicate that Cellmark's evaluation of the samples was not impartial, scientific, and objective. Additionally, appellant's counsel was provided with all the DNA documents and reports generated by Cellmark prior to trial in order to prepare a defense. Thus, the State provided expert analysis and any constitutional duty had ended after that point. Moore v. State, 154 Md.App. 578, 598, 841 A.2d 31, 42 (2004). The intermediate appellate court based its holding in part on Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982), in which we held that a defendant found by the trial court to be competent to stand trial following a court-ordered evaluation by psychiatrists at a State hospital was not entitled to a private psychiatrist of his own choosing to assist in his defense at State expense. Id. at 415, 439 A.2d at 549. We stated as follows: Here, Johnson was evaluated by a team of independent psychiatric experts, he was furnished with copies of the resulting reports prepared by the examiners, and he had the opportunity to subpoena and question at trial members of the examining team. Whatever the amount of required State assistance for the appointment of defense experts to enable the indigent to place this issue of insanity before the trial court, we need not determine here, for it is certain that once an accused is evaluated by state funded, impartial and competent psychiatrists, that constitutional duty, if any, ends. `[T]he State has no constitutional obligation to promote a battle between psychiatric experts by supplying defense counsel with funds wherewith to hunt around for other experts who may be willing, as witnesses for the defense, to offer the opinion that the accused is criminally insane.' Id. (Citations omitted). In light of Ake, decided three years after Johnson, it appears to us that our holding in Johnson has been overruled implicitly to the extent it suggests that the report of a State-employed expert who does not assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense would be constitutionally sufficient. We find numerous passages from Ake supportive of the proposition that due process requires the provision of a defense expert. We find the following language particularly revealing: We therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.  Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. at 1096 (emphasis added). [T]he assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense. In this role, psychiatrists ... know the probative questions to ask of the opposing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their answers. Id. at 80, 105 S.Ct. at 1095 (emphasis added); [T]he psychiatrists for each party enable the jury to make its most accurate determination of the truth on the issue before them. Id. at 81, 105 S.Ct. at 1095. [W]ithout the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high. Id. at 82, 105 S.Ct. at 1096 (emphasis added); [E]xperts are often necessary both for prosecution and for defense.... [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of those against him. Id. at 82 n. 8, 105 S.Ct. at 1095 n. 8 (quoting Reilly v. Berry, 250 N.Y. 456, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929) (Cardozo, C.J.)). The weight of authority among courts that have considered the issue suggests that the services of a defense expert are required. See, e.g., Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 392 (6th Cir.2003); Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1291 (8th Cir. 1994); Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640, 644 (11th Cir.1991); Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1156-59 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir.1985); Buttrum v. Black, 721 F.Supp. 1268, 1312-13 (N.D.Ga.1989); Lindsey v. State, 254 Ga. 444, 330 S.E.2d 563, 566-67 (1985); People v. Lawson, 163 Ill.2d 187, 206 Ill.Dec. 119, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1192 (1994); Binion v. Commonwealth, 891 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Ky.1995); Polk v. State, 612 So.2d 381, 394 (Miss. 1992); State v. Gambrell, 318 N.C. 249, 347 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1986); De Freece v. State, 848 S.W.2d 150, 159 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Contra, Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 185, 191 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that a court-appointed psychiatrist, whose opinion and testimony is available to both sides, satisfies the defendant's rights); Commonwealth v. Reid, 537 Pa. 167, 642 A.2d 453, 457 (1994) (finding Ake satisfied when trial court offered indigent defendant the opportunity to be examined by a neutral court-appointed psychiatrist); see also People v. Leonard, 224 Mich.App. 569, 569 N.W.2d 663, 671 (1997) (trial court's refusal to appoint DNA expert did not deny defendant effective assistance of counsel where defense attorneywho had undergraduate degree in chemistryeffectively and comprehensively cross-examined the prosecution's experts after receiving discovery of all documents relating to DNA analysis in the case). In his comprehensive and thoroughly researched law review article, Professor Paul Giannelli addresses this issue as follows: Appellate courts often cite the fact that the cross-examination of the prosecution expert was effective as a reason why a defense expert was not needed.    First, the same reasoning applies when prosecutors seek a psychiatric evaluation of an accused who has raised an insanity defense ... and yet virtually every jurisdiction has procedures recognizing the prosecution's right to have the accused examined by a state psychiatrista prosecution expert. The rationale for this procedure is obvious: the adversary system would be undermined if the prosecution was deprived of its own expert. Second, effective cross-examination of a prosecution expert frequently requires the advice of a defense expert.... Third, there is a significant difference between attacking the opinion of an opponent's expert through cross-examination and attacking that opinion through the testimony of your own expert. In Daubert [ v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2798, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)] the Supreme Court noted that `[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.' In 1983, the Court upheld the admissibility of expert testimony concerning future dangerousness in capital cases. In so ruling, the Court noted that `jurors should not be barred from hearing the views of the State's psychiatrists along with opposing views of the defendant's doctors.' Similarly, the 1992 report of the National Academy of Sciences observed that `[m]ere cross examination by a defense attorney inexperienced in the science of DNA testing will not be sufficient.'... Finally, if this factor is relevant at all, it would only be so on appellate review under a harmless error analysis. After all, a trial court cannot wait to review the defense counsel's cross-examination before appointing a defense expert. Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 Cornell L.Rev. 1305, 1376-78 (2004) (citations omitted). When a defendant has made the threshold showing described supra, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a defense expert who will assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. We reject the holding of the Court of Special Appeals relied upon by the State before this Courtthat Moore's Ake rights were satisfied by discovery and the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Cotton. The State satisfied the Due Process Clause, as interpreted in Ake, by making expert assistance available to Moore through the O.P.D., conditioned on representation by that agency.