Opinion ID: 2270644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allowing Evidence of Clark's Prior Sexual Misconduct to be Introduced During the Guilt Phase Was an Abuse of Discretion.

Text: In 1988, Clark pleaded guilty to first-degree sexual abuse and second-degree sodomy. He was sentenced to a total of fifteen years' imprisonment. But the sentence was probated for five years on condition that Clark serve three months in jail. Over Clark's objection, the Commonwealth was permitted to offer the testimony of M.M., one of the sex abuse victims in Clark's 1988 conviction. Clark now argues that the trial court's decision to permit M.M.'s testimony was reversible error. We agree. Since the trial court's unique role as a gatekeeper of evidence requires on-the-spot rulings on the admissibility of evidence, we may reverse a trial court's decision to admit evidence only if that decision represents an abuse of discretion. [10] And for a trial court's decision to be an abuse of discretion, we must find that the decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. [11] In looking at whether the ruling admitting M.M.'s testimony was an abuse of discretion, we are guided by Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b), which provides that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Generally, a defendant's prior bad acts are inadmissible because [u]ltimate fairness mandates that an accused be tried only for the particular crime for which he is charged. An accused is entitled to be tried for one offense at a time, and evidence must be confined to that offense. . . . The rule is based on the fundamental demands of justice and fair play. [12] We have construed KRE 404(b) as being exclusionary in nature since [i]t is a well-known fundamental rule that evidence that a defendant on trial had committed other offenses is never admissible unless it comes within certain exceptions, which are well-defined in the rule [KRE 404(b)] itself. [13] For that reason, any exceptions to the general rule that evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible should be closely watched and strictly enforced because of the dangerous quality and prejudicial consequences of this kind of evidence. [14] KRE 404(b)(1) provides that evidence of prior crimes or wrongs is admissible if offered for proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.] In this case, M.M.'s testimony does not neatly fit into any of the exceptions enumerated in KRE 404(b)(1). But that list of exceptions is illustrative, not exhaustive. [15] Among the non-enumerated exceptions we have recognized to KRE 404(b)'s general prohibition on the introduction of prior bad acts evidence is the exception advanced here by the Commonwealth, and accepted by the trial court and Court of Appeals: modus operandi. [16] So, in order to resolve Clark's case, we must enter yet again the murky waters of determining whether prior sexual misconduct by a defendant is admissible, a difficult, fact-specific inquiry, as evidenced by the fact that we once deemed our own opinions on this topic to have been somewhat scattered. [17] The modus operandi exception requires the facts surrounding the prior misconduct must be so strikingly similar to the charged offense as to create a reasonable probability that (1) the acts were committed by the same person, and/or (2) the acts were accompanied by the same mens rea. If not, then the evidence of prior misconduct proves only a criminal disposition and is inadmissible. [18] In English , we affirmed the trial court's admission of evidence of prior acts of sexual misconduct toward other victims, recognizing that the evidence was offered to show a modus operandi for the purpose of proving motive, intent, knowledge, and the absence of mistake or accident[.] [19] Specifically, the prior bad acts in English demonstrated that contrary to the defendant's statement to the police that he might have inappropriately touched a victim without realizing it, he actually touched the victim on purpose ( i.e., intent, absence of mistake or accident); and he touched the victim for his own sexual gratification ( i.e., motive). Thus, the prior bad acts demonstrated the necessary mens rea or mental state. In the case before us, there is no indication that M.M.'s testimony was offered to prove Clark's mental state, since there is no indication that Clark might have unintentionally committed the alleged sexual acts toward L.H. and E.H. Likewise, there is no indication that another perpetrator abused L.H. and E.H., such that the perpetrator's identity was at issue. [20] Rather, M.M.'s testimony was offered to prove the other fundamental element of the crimes against L.H. and E.H.: [ corpus delicti ]whether the event occurred at all. [21] Nonetheless, the question of corpus delicti is intertwined with that of identity because striking similarities in factual details between the prior bad acts and the current charges could demonstrate that [i]f the act occurred, then the defendant almost certainly was the perpetrator such that it is proper to treat the evidence as if offered to prove identity by similarity, and to require that the details of the charged and uncharged acts be sufficiently similar to demonstrate a modus operandi. [22] We have attempted to clarify and refine our analysis of the modus operandi exception in recent reported decisions of this Court. Toward that end, we held that it is not the commonality of the crimes but the commonality of the facts constituting the crimes that demonstrates a modus operandi. [23] So, as a prerequisite to the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence, we now require the proponent of the evidence to demonstrate that there is a factual commonality between the prior bad act and the charged conduct that is simultaneously similar and so peculiar or distinct that there is a reasonable probability that the two crimes were committed by the same individual. [24] Thus, [a]lthough it is not required that the facts be identical in all respects, `evidence of other acts of sexual deviance . . . must be so similar to the crime on trial as to constitute a so-called signature crime.' [25] With the background of our recent precedent in mind, as the proponent of the prior bad acts evidence, the Commonwealth bore a heavy burden to meet that evidentiary standard. In order to determine whether the Commonwealth met that burden, we must engage in a searching analysis of the similarities and dissimilarities between Clark's admitted misconduct toward M.M. and his alleged misconduct toward E.H. and L.H., bearing in mind that [i]t is inevitable, particularly when the prior act amounts to an earlier violation of the charged offense, that there will be some basic similarities between the prior bad act and the new criminal conduct. [26] As a prefatory matter, we note that the baseline fact that there was sexual contact between Clark and M.M., E.H., and L.H. is, in and of itself, not a distinct pattern sufficient to satisfy the modus operandi exception. Indeed, such sexual contact is a necessary prerequisite for the commission of the offense. In other words, the fact that Clark touched the penis of all three victims is merely an element of the offense of first-degree sexual abuse. [27] Because a person must satisfy all of the elements of the crime in order to commit first-degree sexual abuse, the fact alone that Clark touched the penis of all three victims is a mere element of the crime. Likewise, the fact that all three victims were apparently less than twelve years of age at the time they were subjected to sexual contact by Clark is also an element of the crime and is not strong evidence of a distinct pattern of conduct sufficient to meet the modus operandi exception. So, for the benefit of the bench and bar of this Commonwealth, we stress the fundamental principle that conduct that serves to satisfy the statutory elements of an offense will not suffice to meet the modus operandi exception. Instead, the modus operandi exception is met only if the conduct that meets the statutory elements evidences such a distinctive pattern as to rise to the level of a signature crime. The question is, therefore, what other similarities exist between Clark's abuse of M.M. and his later alleged abuse of E.H. and L.H., such that Clark's abuse of all three falls into the distinct pattern necessary to qualify for the modus operandi exception? The Commonwealth relies upon the following alleged similarities: all three victims were of the same approximate age; Clark put his hands inside each victim's pants and fondled the penis; Clark never asked any of the three victims to reciprocate his sexual contact with them; and Clark was in a position of trust with each victim. We agree with the Commonwealth that the age of all three victims was similar. Although the fact that each victim was under twelve is evidence to satisfy the statutory element, not evidence sufficient to meet the modus operandi exception, the fact that the victims were of fairly similar agesall prepubescent malesis entitled to at least some weight toward meeting the Commonwealth's burden under the modus operandi exception. But we do not agree with the Commonwealth that the fact that Clark fondled each victim's penis is a significant factor to show the distinctive pattern necessary to meet the modus operandi exception. Contact between the abuser and the intimate body parts of the abused appears only to meet the requisite sexual contact necessary to commit first-degree sexual abuse. This conclusion that Clark's fondling of all three victims is not sufficiently distinctive to rise to the level necessary to meet the modus operandi exception is reinforced by the fact that Clark did not only fondle his victims' peniseshe subjected two of the victims to oral-genital contact. The lack of a consistent allegation that Clark placed his mouth on the penis of all of his victims greatly undercuts the purported distinct pattern to Clark's abuse. We agree with the Commonwealth that the fact that Clark never sought reciprocal sexual contact by any of the three victims weighs in favor of a modus operandi exception in this case. Finally, though we accept the Commonwealth's premise that Clark was in a position of trust as to all three victims, we disagree with the Commonwealth's contention that Clark's position of trust relative to each victim has significant weight in meeting the modus operandi exception. Clark's role was vastly different with M.M. than it was with E.H. and L.H. Clark was acting as a counselor or confessor in his role as M.M.'s priest; but he was a long-time family friend to L.H. and E.H., which did not involve his role as a pastor. Thus, it can neither be said that Clark evidenced a distinctive pattern of abusing children he contacted in his role as a pastor, nor can it be said that Clark only abused children he came into contact with in his non-professional life. Since Clark's position and status with M.M. was markedly different than it was with E.H. and L.H., we cannot accept the Commonwealth's contention that Clark was in a position of trust as to all victims in a sufficiently similar manner to meet the modus operandi exception. When all the similarities are considered, what we are left with is Clark reaching his hands down the pants of three victims who were all of the same approximate age without asking the victim to reciprocate the sexual contact. By contrast, there are numerous differences in Clark's conduct toward all three victims. As previously mentioned, not all of the victims accused Clark of orally abusing them. And though we agree with the trial court that it is not necessary that the abuse always occur in the same geographical location, the abuse of all three victims occurred in many different places, such as school, bedrooms, bathrooms, living rooms, and vehicles. Moreover, Clark sometimes abused the children when he was alone with them and sometimes abused them when others were around. Finally, Clark's position with regard to M.M. and E.H. and L.H. is vastly different because he was a counselor and priest to M.M., while he was a longstanding friend of the family of E.H. and L.H. So, it appears that, at most, there were as many differences as similarities between Clark's past and current alleged conduct. This state of relative equipoise is insufficient to meet the demanding modus operandi exception. [28] Even Anastasi v. Commonwealth, [29] which we have acknowledged pressed the limits of admissibility of other uncharged criminal acts on grounds of similarity sufficient to indicate a modus operandi[,] [30] presented a more compelling pattern of similar conduct than does the case before us. Though it predates our recent reiteration that the focus on prior bad acts under the modus operandi exception must be on the common facts, not the commonality of the crimes, Anastasi is entirely reconcilable with that principle, as well as with our conclusion that there is not enough distinctive commonality of facts to meet the modus operandi exception in this case. Anastasi , as in the case before us today, involved charges of first-degree sexual abuse. At trial, the Commonwealth was permitted to have a witness testify that the defendant anally raped him eight years before. Despite the fact that rape is obviously an offense with different elements than the charged crime of first-degree sexual abuse, we affirmed because the defendant's conduct toward all victims, including the rape victim, was strikingly similar. We said that [t]he evidence in this case disclosed that all victims were young boys with whom Anastasi managed to be alone in bedrooms. In each instance he was dressed only in his underwear and all victims, except one, were clothed only in underwear. In each case, prior to the sexual contact, he tickled and wrestled with the children. [31] As previously shown, there simply is not such a distinctive pattern of misconduct by Clark in the case before us. Even if we had determined that the Commonwealth had satisfied a minimal showing of a distinctive pattern of conduct by Clark sufficient to constitute a signature crime, the probative value of M.M.'s testimony as to that pattern would have been destroyed by the fact that Clark's abuse of M.M. occurred over twenty years before the case before us today. [32] Temporal remoteness goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the prior bad acts evidence. [33] The temporal remoteness of the prior bad acts is of less concern when the evidence of the pattern of conduct falls within a clearly defined, distinctive pattern. [34] As previously stated, however, Clark's conduct toward M.M. does not bear the hallmarks of a signature crime, meaning that the vast time lapse between Clark's abuse of M.M. and his trial for abusing L.H. and E.H. is a significant counterweight when balancing the probative value of M.M.'s testimony and the undue prejudice it caused Clark. This is true especially in light of the fact that the Commonwealth has cited no authority in which we deemed a twenty-plus year old sexual bad act to be admissible. In fact, we have condemned the introduction of prior bad acts that were far less remote than the one in the case at hand. [35] Therefore, given the lack of distinctive similarities between Clark's conduct toward M.M. and his conduct toward E.H. and L.H., we find that the probative value of M.M.'s testimony was greatly diminished by the temporal remoteness of Clark's abuse of M.M. In short, we find that the Commonwealth has not met its heavy burden to show that Clark's conduct toward M.M., E.H., and L.H. is so similar and distinctive as to be admissible under the modus operandi exception to KRE 404(b). That conclusion is reinforced by the twenty-year time gap with Clark's prior sexual bad acts toward M.M. Therefore, under the set of facts of this case, we find that ultimate fairness and the fundamental demands of justice and fair play required Clark to be tried for only the crimes for which he was charged; and the trial court abused its discretion by permitting M.M. to testify about the offense committed by Clark. [36]