Opinion ID: 1401004
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prosecutor's Misstatements of the Law

Text: Mr. Wilson's final complaint alleges that the prosecutor misstated law during voir dire and closing argument. During voir dire, the prosecutor, in front of the jury, objected to defense counsel's line of questioning, stating that [defense counsel's question implied] to the jurors that they personally are going to kill him. They'll be recommending a sentence. If we reach the punishment phase, they'll be recommending a sentence. Tr. Tran. 2/4/97, at 85. Mr. Wilson argues that this statement diminished the gravity of the jury's role in sentencing in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). The OCCA held that this type of comment was not error. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 471. A death sentence is unconstitutional if the jury believes that the responsibility for deciding the appropriateness of the [death penalty] lies elsewhere. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329, 105 S.Ct. 2633. [T]o establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The OCCA has held that state law requires the jury to recommend a death sentence. See Humphreys v. State, 947 P.2d 565, 570 (Okla.Crim.App. 1997); Romano v. State, 847 P.2d 368, 390 (Okla.Crim.App.1993) aff'd, 512 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994). Therefore, the prosecutor's remarks did not improperly describe[ ] the role assigned to the jury by local law. Romano, 512 U.S. at 9, 114 S.Ct. 2004 (internal quotation marks omitted); compare with Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330-33, 335-36, 105 S.Ct. 2633 (prosecutor suggested that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence rested with the appellate court that later reviewed the case; [that] argument ... cannot be said to be either accurate or relevant to a valid state penological interest.). Mr. Wilson next argues that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding who could be considered a principal to a crime. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked whether an individual that's present during the commission of a crime where an individual is killed ... is guilty of murder. Tr. Tran. 2/4/1997, at 54. He later questioned [i]f you have an instance where two people are involved in a crime, and one person is actually the person that hits the victim, let's say in the head, while the other one stands by and watches. Is the person that stands by and watches, in your mind, just as guilty as the person that actually hits the person? Id. at 164-65. The OCCA found that some of these statements were cured when the court sustained defense counsel's objections; the others did not give rise to plain error. The OCCA's decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law. The jury was properly instructed, at the close of trial, as to the requisite involvement a party must have to be responsible for felony murder. R. Vol. II, Box 2, Jury Instruction 25, 26, CR 2-4, CR 2-6, at 350-51 (Merely standing by, even if standing by with knowledge concerning the commission of a crime, does not make a person a principal to a crime.). Assuming, arguendo, that these remarks were erroneous, they did not so infect Mr. Wilson's trial with prejudice as to render it fundamentally unfair.