Opinion ID: 6986365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Substantive IDEA Claim

Text: We begin with the substantive IDEA claim because its resolution will facilitate our decision as to the procedural IDEA claim. The substantive claim presents a matter of first impression: whether an academically gifted child with an emotional-behavioral disability is eligible for special education under the IDEA and the corresponding Vermont regulations. We agree with the district court that he is not.
The IDEA was enacted, in part, “ ‘to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.’ ” Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 68, 119 S.Ct. 992, 143 L.Ed.2d 154 (1999) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)); see Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). The instruction must “meet the State’s educational standards, approximate the grade levels used in the State’s regular education, and comport with the child’s IEP [individualized education program 2 ].” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 102 S.Ct. 3034. Recognizing that educational policy and practice are traditional State and local functions, in enacting the IDEA, Congress did not prescribe any substantive standard of education, instead seeking only “to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms.” Id. at 192, 102 S.Ct. 3034; see Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir.1989) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034). Accordingly, implementation responsibilities are delegated to the State educational service agencies — in this case, the Vermont Department of Education— by means of financial incentives. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (defining “State educational agency”) & § 1412 (“Eligibility requirements”). A local educational agency, such as the School District, also qualifies to receive federal funds if it provides a free appropriate public education consistent with the IDEA. See id. § 1414(a). Under the IDEA, the term “children with disabilities” means, among others, children with a “serious emotional disturbance ... who, by reason thereof, need special education and related services.” Id. § 1401(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(1). The federal regulations promulgated under the statute further define “serious emotional disturbance” as: a condition exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics over a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely affects a child’s educational performance— (B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers; (C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances; (D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; or (E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems. Id. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(9)(i) (emphasis added). However, neither the IDEA nor the federal regulations define the terms “need special education” or “adverse effect on educational performance,” leaving it to each State to give substance to these terms.
The VSER, promulgated by the Vermont Department of Education, have been approved by the U.S. Department of Education. Rule 2362(1) establishes three eligibility criteria for special education that are consistent with the IDEA: To be determined eligible for special education, an elementary or secondary student must receive a comprehensive evaluation ... under the auspices of a Basic Staffing Team 3 ...; and based on the results of the comprehensive evaluation, the Basic Staffing Team must determine that the student: (a) meets one or more disability categories (Rule 2362:1); (b) exhibits the adverse effect of the disability on educational performance; and (c) is in need of special education. VSER 2362(1) (emphasis added). Rule 2362(2)(b) defines “adverse effect of the disability on educational performance” as follows: To establish that a disability has an adverse effect on the student’s educational performance, the Basic Staffing Team shall determine and document that the student is functioning significantly below expected age or grade norms, in one or more of the basic skills. ■This determination of adverse effect, usually defined as 1.0 standard deviation or its equivalent, shall be documented and supported by two or more measures of school performance. These measures may include but-are not limited to:' — parent or teacher observation — grades —, curriculum-based measures — work or language samples — other test results. VSER 2362(2)(b) (emphasis added). Rule 2362(3) further provides: ■ [U]nless otherwise stated in an individual category of disability (Rule 2362.1), basic skill areas are defined as: (a) oral expression; (b) listening comprehension; (c) written expression; (d) basic reading skills; (e) reading comprehension; (f) mathematics calculation; (g) mathematics reasoning; and (h) motor skills. VSER 2362(3).

The defendants contend that J.D. did not meet the “adverse effect” eligibility criterion under Rule 2362(1). Relying on the list of basic skills in Rule 2362(3), the defendants argue that J.D.’s emotional disability had no adverse effect on his educational performance because he consistently performed at or above the level of his age cohorts in each of the enumerated areas. J.D., on the other hand, points out that Rule 2362(3) states that the list of basic skills is used to determine eligibility for special education, “unless otherwise stated in an individual category of disability (Rule 2362.1).” J.D. interprets Rule 2362(3) to mean that the basic skills enumerated therein do not apply to a student, such as himself, who has a disability enumerated in Rule 2362.1. In lieu of the 2362(3) factors, J.D. argues that we should look to Rule 2362.1 for indicators of adverse effect. Rule 2362.1, entitled “Categories of Disability,” states that “[t]he existence of one or more of the following categories of disability shall be established according to the criteria set forth below.” Included among the categories is “emotional-behavioral disability”: An emotional-behavioral disability shall be identified by the occurrence of one or more of the following conditions exhibited over a long period of time and to a marked degree: 2. An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers; 3. Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances; 4. A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression!.] VSER 2362.1(l)(h). J.D. argues that the 2362.1(l)(h) list, not the 2362(3) list, must be used to discern whether his emotional-behavioral disability has caused an adverse effect. Based on the language and structure of the VSER, we have no choice but to reject J.D.’s interpretation. First, Rule 2362.1(l)(h) provides that the criteria set forth therein shall be used to establish “the existence of’ a covered disability (ie., the first eligibility criterion under Rule 2362(1)), not the presence of an adverse effect on educational performance (ie., the second eligibility criterion under Rule 2362(1)). This is confirmed by Rule 2362(l)(a) (existence of a disability), which specifically cross-references Rule 2362.1. In contrast, Rule 2362(l)(b) (adverse effect) does not cross-reference Rule 2362.1. Second, Rule 2362.1(l)(c), which defines the disability of visual impairment, expressly states: “For the purposes of this disability, mobility and orientation skills shall also be considered to be basic skills.” Such modification of the 2362(3) list of basic skills is what is meant by the phrase “unless otherwise stated in an individual category of disability” in Rule 2362(3). Thus, the district court correctly evaluated the effect of J.D.’s emotional-behavioral disability on his educational performance by reference to the basic skills in Rule 2362(3).
J.D. also argues that his educational performance cannot be measured by his grades and achievement test results alone, which were indisputably at or above the norm for his age group. Rule 2362(2)(b) provides that the determination of adverse effect “shall be documented and supported by two or more measures of school performance,” including, among others, grades and “other test results.” Conversely, if a plaintiff is unable to identify at least two school performance measures that point to an adverse effect, the plaintiff would not qualify for special education under the IDEA. In this case, the district court highlighted J.D.’s grades and norm-referenced achievement test results as well as the psychologist’s comments. See J.D. II, slip op., at 6, 12-13. These measures showed that J.D. consistently performed above the mean in math and other basic skills. Although not discussed in the district court’s opinion, the record also contains reports and comments from teachers and various personality evaluations. For example, four teachers commented in J.D.’s 1995-1996 academic year report card that he exhibited “excellent application.” One of these teachers also characterized his academic ability as “outstanding” compared to other applicants for college preparatory schools. Based on the overwhelming evidence in the record, the district court did not err in concluding that J.D.’s basic skills, and hence his educational performance, were not adversely affected by his disability within the meaning of the Vermont Rule. J.D., on the other hand, emphasizes his emotional condition, including his difficulty with interpersonal relationships and negative feelings. However, while these are signs of an emotional disability, under the statutory and administrative schemes, they are not measures of an adverse effect on basic skills by which educational performance must be assessed. For this reason, this case is distinguishable from Barnard Sch. Dist. v. R.M., 1983-84 EHLR Dec. 555:263 (D.Vt. Nov. 3, 1983), which J.D. cites. Although the student in that case performed well on certain standardized intelligence tests, the evidence also showed that, unlike J.D., his “school performance ha[d] ... been dismal” and that “he ha[d] obtained failing grades a number of times ... and his overall academic record [was] extremely poor.” Id. at 264. J.D. also relies on a Washington State administrative decision, In re Kristopher H., 1985-86 EHLR Dec. 507:183 (Wash. Sept. 4, 1985), for the proposition that education “connotes all those processes cultivated by a given society as a means for the realization in the individual of the ideals of the community as a whole,” not only proficiency in basic skills. Id. However, as the defendants correctly point out, the administrative law judge in that case applied a dictionary definition of “education” to evaluate Kristopher H.’s “educational performance,” whereas here, we must apply Vermont’s regulatory definition, which directs us to eight basic skills. Because J.D. has not established an adverse effect on any of these skills, we affirm the district court’s holding that he is not eligible for special education under the IDEA.