Opinion ID: 1938332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the availability of treatment

Text: The first four issues on which leave was granted are considered together because they are each related to the trial court's determination that the treatment mandated by MCL 768.36; MSA 28.1059 would not be provided to defendant. After careful consideration of the proceedings below, as well as the able argument and enlightening brief of defense counsel, we find ourselves in agreement with the Court of Appeals that matters relating to post-sentence treatment, or lack of treatment, are prematurely raised. The reasons asserted by the trial judge for her finding of unconstitutionality are premature in that they all relate to speculation that the Department of Corrections or the Department of Mental Health will not pay heed to the statute. While future events may prove the trial judge was correct in her surmise, to conclude that compliance with the statute is `impossible' is inaccurate. 77 Mich App 327, 330; 258 NW2d 214 (1977). We find, at the outset, that this new statute grants defendant, and other persons who are sentenced pursuant to this new verdict, an unequivocal statutory right to such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness or retardation. MCL 768.36(3); MSA 28.1059(3), upon commitment to the custody of the Department of Corrections, or the right to [t]reatment [which] shall be provided by an agency of the Department of Mental Health, or with the approval of the sentencing courts and at individual expense, by private agencies, private physicians, or other mental health personnel. MCL 768.36(4); MSA 28.1059(4), if defendant is placed on probation with treatment as a condition of the probation. While we recognize that the statute grants a right to such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated, we hold that on this record the sentencing court erred in attempting to determine whether that treatment would in fact be provided. In attempting to do so, the sentencing court failed to afford the departments statutorily charged with the responsibility for providing that treatment a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statutory mandate. Indeed, in exercising its sentencing function, the trial court did not even have before it the parties statutorily charged with the responsibility for administering the statute's mandates. While a knowledgeable representative from each of the departments charged with certain duties under the statute cooperated with the court in its inquiry into the availability of the mandated treatment, that was not enough. In order for the sentencing court to have properly made the findings it purported to make concerning the actual availability and provision of treatment for defendant, it must first have had the responsible departments before it as parties to a legal proceeding, represented by counsel, and afforded a full and fair opportunity to develop a factual record to determine at least the following: 1) Whether treatment was psychiatrically indicated for defendant; 2) If so, the type and length of the treatment that was psychiatrically indicated; 3) Whether that treatment was being provided or would be provided; and 4) If not, the reasons for the failure to provide such treatment. The sentencing proceedings below did not afford these departments an opportunity to develop such a record. [5] The extraordinary procedure followed by the sentencing court in People v McQuillan, 392 Mich 511; 221 NW2d 569 (1974), is inapplicable to this situation. In McQuillan, this Court found that a sentencing court properly assumed jurisdiction pursuant to a Delayed Motion to Vacate Commitment Order to review the constitutionality of the automatic commitment statute by which that court had committed defendant to the Department of Mental Health. In a footnote response to the dissenting opinion in McQuillan, the majority characterized the procedure followed by that sentencing court as a proper exercise of its jurisdiction to review whether it had authority to commit a person to an institution in the first instance. The Court specifically said this was an altogether different thing from the sentencing judge reviewing whether rules or practices of the correctional authorities denied a person's constitutional rights after a proper commitment, which its opinion would not justify. 392 Mich 523, fn 2.5. The procedure followed by the sentencing judge in the instant case was an attempt to conduct a review of the rules and practices of the correctional authorities prior to commitment. Commitment was properly authorized under the statute. An attempt to determine before commitment was effected that the rules and practices of the correctional authorities would violate defendant's constitutional rights after commitment was premature. McQuillan is not authority for the trial court's actions in this case. Moreover, until such time as Mr. McLeod undergo[es] further evaluation in the custody of the Department of Corrections, as provided by the statute in question, no determination can be made of what treatment [in the judgment of that agency] is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness or retardation. Thus, it is logically impossible to conclude that the required care will not be provided. We are constrained to observe that even if a proper determination could have been made by the trial court that Mr. McLeod would not receive the required treatment, it does not follow that the statute is, for that reason, unconstitutional. Department of Corrections noncompliance with the statutory mandate for evaluation and treatment cannot render an otherwise constitutional statute unconstitutional. Therefore, we hold that on the record before us the sentencing court was an inappropriate forum to determine that the sentencing provisions of MCL 768.36; MSA 28.1059 could not and would not be implemented. We find that the trial court's factual finding that the conditions at the Department of Corrections facilities posed a threat of immediate and irreparable injury to the defendant was made on an inadequate factual record and consequently does not impair our holding. Finally, because no full evidentiary record was properly developed below, it has not been established that defendant will not be afforded the treatment to which he has a statutory right nor that the actual operation of MCL 768.36; MSA 28.1059 violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. [6] On this record those challenges to this statute must fail.