Opinion ID: 1830951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the lower court erred when it dismissed based upon the prior trespass doctrine because it is inapplicable to the causes of action stated.

Text: ¶ 21. Despite trespass to land being removed as a cause of action in the Amended Complaint, the lower court held any alleged cause of action for trespass or diminution in value did not pass with the land to the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff may not recover for such a trespass. Donald contends that this ground for a Rule 12(b)6 dismissal was error. ¶ 22. The Defendants argue that not only did the original Complaint contain an allegation of trespass to land, but the entirety of Donald's claims stem from a former trespass claim. They assert that Donald's Amended Complaint is an obvious ploy and his remaining allegations are essentially allegations of trespass. They cite Keppner v. Gulf Shores, Inc., 462 So.2d 719, 725 (Miss.1985)(defining trespass as an offense or infringement to property of another), and City of Jackson v. Filtrol Corp., 624 F.2d 1384, 1389 (5th Cir.1980)(where the Fifth Circuit said Mississippi allows a plaintiff damaged by a physical invasion to its land to recover upon a simple showing that the defendant was responsible whether it be labeled nuisance or trespass or strict liability). In essence, the Defendants argue that all of the alleged wrongful acts and omissions occurred before Donald acquired the property. Thus, under the prior trespass doctrine, any cause of action for the condition of the property would not have passed when he purchased it. [1] ¶ 23. Under Rule 15 it is wholly irrelevant that a proposed amendment changes the cause of action or the theory of the case, or that it states a claim arising out of a transaction different from that originally sued on or that it caused a change in parties. Miss.R.Civ.P. 15-Comment (1998); See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 121 F.2d 561, 563 (8th Cir.1941); contra, Bank of Forest v. Capital Nat. Bank, 176 Miss. 163, 169 So. 193 (1936) ( citing V. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice § 389 (2d ed.1950)). In his Amended Complaint, Donald dropped his trespass to land claim but kept his nuisance and strict liability claims. ¶ 24. However, Defendants correctly assert that under the facts of the instant case labels are unimportant. Applying Mississippi law, the Fifth Circuit has held: Our examination of Mississippi law indicates that ... nuisance, trespass, and strict liability are not separate theories of liability. Mississippi allows a plaintiff damaged by a physical invasion to its land to recover upon a simple showing that the defendant was responsible for the physical invasion. Filtrol, 624 F.2d at 1389 (favorably cited by this Court in Phillips v. Davis Timber Co., 468 So.2d 72 (Miss.1985), and Shutes v. Platte Chem. Co., 564 So.2d 1382 (Miss. 1990)). Thus, the lower court did not err in addressing the cause of action of trespass to land although it had been deleted from the Amended Complaint. However, that being said, the proper application of prior trespass doctrine must still be addressed. ¶ 25. In Filtrol, the prior trespass doctrine was also raised as a defense. 624 F.2d at 1391. There, Filtrol Corp. argued that when the City acquired the right-of-way at issue the alleged contamination was already there. The Fifth Circuit then examined the rationale for the prior trespass doctrine and determined, as follows: The rationale for the prior trespass doctrine is that a purchaser of land to which permanent damage has been done by trespass or nuisance pays less for the land because of that damage. The purchaser therefore cannot recover for the diminution in the value of the property caused by the nuisance or trespass. 58 Am.Jur.2d Nuisances § 105 (1971). (The Mississippi Supreme Court has frequently looked to American Jurisprudence Second for general principles of nuisance law. See e. g., Vicksburg Chemical Co. v. Thornell, 355 So.2d 299 (Miss.1978); Blue v. Charles F. Hayes & Associates, Inc. [sic]) Here, the city is not suing for a diminution in the value of the right-of-way it purchased from Ridgeway; it is suing for special damages caused by Filtrol's invasion of the property it purchased. ... Assuming that the Ridgeway land became permanently contaminated with acid before the City bought it, the City cannot recover from Filtrol the decrease in the value of the land caused by the contamination. The City can nonetheless recover the special damages it has suffered because of the contamination. This application of the prior trespass doctrine accords with the doctrine's purpose. The City cannot recover for the diminution in the value of the land because the price it paid, theoretically at least, for the land reflected the damage to the land by the contamination. The City can recover special damages caused by the contamination because the price it paid for the land did not reflect those damages.[FN6] FN6. The application of the prior trespass doctrine would be especially tenuous in this case when no one knew of the permanent contamination to the subsurface soil on the Ridgeway land at the time the City purchased that land. Since no one knew of the contamination, the contamination could not have influenced the price the City paid for its easement. Filtrol, 624 F.2d at 1391. Prophetically, in footnote 6, the Fifth Circuit described the instant case. If the same rationale is applied here, then Donald's purchase price did not reflect the contamination's effect on the property's value, and application of the prior trespass doctrine would rest on a tenuous base. Thus, this Court finds that the prior trespass doctrine should not have been applied here. The Wayne County Circuit Court judgment of dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is reversed.