Opinion ID: 1561306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: trafficking in a controlled substance

Text: Appellants assert that they were entitled to directed verdicts of acquittal on their respective charges of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, because no cocaine was ever found, thus there was a failure of proof that any controlled substance either was sold or transferred, or was possessed for the purpose of sale or transfer. They rely on those cases which hold that an instruction should not be given on a theory which is unsupported by the evidence. E.g., Butler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 814 (1978); Pilon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 544 S.W.2d 228 (1976); Blaine v. Commonwealth, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 759 (1970). It is unnecessary for a conviction of trafficking in a controlled substance that the controlled substance be seized by the police or that it be introduced at trial. Conviction can be premised on circumstantial evidence of such nature that, based on the whole case, it would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Howard v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 787 S.W.2d 264 (1989). In this case, the jury was instructed that they could find each defendant guilty as either principal or accomplice under alternative theories of criminal liability, i.e., trafficking by sale or transfer, or trafficking by possession with intent to sell or transfer. KRS 218A.1412(1); KRS 218A.010(28). McDuffie testified that Woods told him prior to arriving at Trixie's Lounge that he had the cocaine and that he intended to sell it to Thomas. That testimony alone supports Woods's conviction of trafficking by possession with the intent to sell. Howard v. Commonwealth, supra . There was ample evidence that Thomas gave Woods $27,000.00 for the purpose of promoting a sale of cocaine to him by Woods. That was sufficient evidence to convict Thomas of complicity to first-degree trafficking. KRS 502.020(1). Likewise, Graves was present in the vehicle when Woods told McDuffie that he had the cocaine which he intended to sell to Thomas; Graves participated in directing Thomas and Furman to the parking lot where the transaction would take place; and Graves then positioned himself behind the wheel of Woods's car, a fact from which a jury could infer an intent to aid and abet the commission of the offense by acting as the getaway driver in the event of the need for a hasty departure. That was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict Graves of complicity to first-degree trafficking. See Skinner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 290 (1993). As for the failure of the police to find any cocaine at the scene, the jury could have believed that Woods, McDuffie, Thomas or Furman, all of whom temporarily escaped, did so with the cocaine in his possession.