Opinion ID: 2636693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Data on False Reporting

Text: For Wells' last claim of error, he contends Nichols should have been allowed to testify that scientific data shows that the `incident of false reporting is approximately 68% in cases in which families are being separated.' He points to evidence in the record and argues that [i]t is fair to say from that evidence that the family was in turmoil and separation was a definite possibility. Consequently, the cited statistical relationship had potential relevance to the allegation which arose under such circumstances. (Emphasis added). Wells argues that this data is important because, again, it is necessary that the expert be able to comment to some extent about what can happen, in general, if improper methods of interviewing are used. Frankly, the threshold premise for the admission of this particular evidence the family's separationis speculative. Wells himself describes the separation, at best, as merely a definite possibility. Moreover, his characterization of the evidence as having potential, as opposed to actual, relevance further dilutes his argument. Finally, relevance is a determination obviously within the trial court's discretion. State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 507, 186 P.3d 713 (2008). We cannot hold that the decision to exclude speculative evidence was an abuse of discretion. In addition to the State's specific responses to Wells' four categories of purported evidentiary error, it also argues that Wells was nevertheless able to present evidence of his defense through other means. Without reviewing its specific examples, we simply note that Wells essentially admits as much. As mentioned, his brief acknowledges that the adverse effects on the reliability and accuracy of a child's statement of employing improper interviewing procedures and techniquesas used in this caseare implied. He asks merely that the adverse consequences be clearly stated or explained, i.e., as part of Nichols' testimony. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that there was neither an abuse of discretion nor a constitutional violation, i.e., a trial court's interference with Wells' constitutional right to present a defense by excluding evidence that was an integral part of it. See State v. Carter, 284 Kan. 312, 320, 160 P.3d 457 (2007); Cooperwood, 282 Kan. at 578-80, 147 P.3d 125. More particularly, the trial court allowed expert testimony on two of the three categories identified in State v. Criqui, 77 P.3d 1008, 2003 WL 22119226 at -5 (Kan.App.2003) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 277 Kan. 925 (2003):(1) proper and improper interviewing procedures and techniques to be used in child sexual abuse cases and (2) the problems perceived by the expert with the interviewing techniques used in this case. As previously mentioned, the third area addressed in Criqui expert testimony on how certain procedures and techniques could adversely affect the reliability and accuracy of a child's statementis not a mandatory ingredient in a required recipe. Accordingly, its exclusion from evidence does not necessarily constitute error. Rather, as here, it is subject to the trial court's balancing of the rule prohibiting testimony about a witness's credibility against other evidentiary rules, e.g., the helpfulness of expert testimony to a jury. In conducting this balancing, the trial court in the instant case did allow some evidence from Criqui's third area. More specifically, Nichols was allowed to testify that the use of leading questions by Runyanand through implication, by C.B.'s mothercontaminates their interviews of children by providing information that the children did not know. Moreover, after hearing related evidence, the jury was left to determine if other purported improper, or improperly used, procedures and techniques similarly could adversely affect the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses and their statements. The jury was capable of connecting these particular dots; expert testimony was not required to help them. Reversed and remanded for a new trial. McFARLAND, C.J., not participating. MARQUARDT, J., assigned.