Opinion ID: 1436706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: My colleagues' jurisdictional analysis appears to be predicated on the assumption that Walton's action against the District and its officials is really a habeas corpus proceeding, in effect though not in name. They conclude, relying upon our recent decision in Abdullah v. Roach, 668 A.2d 801 (D.C.1995), that the case was properly before the Superior Court pursuant to D.C.Code § 11-921(a)(3)(A)(iii) (1995), which expressly confers jurisdiction on that court over habeas corpus proceedings against persons other than federal officers or employees. In my opinion, however, this case is significantly different from Abdullah. Unlike the petitioner in that case, Walton did not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He did not directly challenge the legality of his detention, nor did he seek relief from confinement or from adjustment segregation. Rather, he prayed for declaratory and injunctive relief, and he asked the court to vacate the finding that he violated two prison regulations and to expunge or remove from his file the documents relating to the challenged proceeding. As the majority expressly recognizes, we held in Vaughn v. United States, 598 A.2d 425, 431 (D.C.1991), that habeas corpus is not the exclusive means by which a prisoner may challenge the legality of disciplinary proceedings instituted against him. Under these circumstances, I am reluctant to recast Walton's suit for him. Rather, I would treat the case as being exactly what it appears to be  an action for relief from adverse and allegedly unlawful agency action. We have held that the Superior Court may entertain claims for such relief pursuant to D.C.Code § 11-921(a)(6) (1995), which vests that court with jurisdiction over any civil action or other matter, at law or in equity, brought in the District of Columbia. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354, 358-360 (D.C. Jan. [ ], 1996); Speyer v. Barry, 588 A.2d 1147, 1159-60 (D.C.1991) (citations omitted). In Abdullah, we recognized that Section 11-921(a)(6) served as an alternative jurisdictional basis for a suit by a prisoner who had alleged that his legal rights were violated in disciplinary proceedings instituted against him by correctional authorities. [1] That analysis applies with full force to Walton's case. Contrary to the District's position, there is nothing novel in our recognition of the Superior Court's jurisdiction to consider the legality of agency action alleged to be unlawful. Even where the liberty of the citizen is not at issue, the actions of government agencies are normally presumed to be subject to judicial review unless [the legislature] has precluded review or a court would have no law to apply to test the legality of the agency's actions. Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 398 (D.C.1991) (quoting Carlin v. McKean, 262 U.S.App.D.C. 212, 214, 823 F.2d 620, 622 (1987)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1046, 108 S.Ct. 784, 98 L.Ed.2d 870 (1988). [O]nly upon a showing of `clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review, Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (citations omitted), and as we held in Abdullah, no such evidence exists with respect to the LRAA. The authority of courts to grant relief from unlawful agency action existed at common law, and it was merely reinforced (and not created) by the federal Administrative Procedure Act and similar local enactments. See Abbott Labs., supra, 387 U.S. at 140, 87 S.Ct. at 1511; Sierra Club, supra, 670 A.2d at 358-359. The presumption of reviewability is not the product of enacted law; it is common law. 5 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28:1, at 254 (1984). The Superior Court thus had civil action jurisdiction over Walton's complaint, and there is no need to treat that complaint as a petition for habeas corpus when such a characterization is contrary to the pleader's intent.