Opinion ID: 536999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 22 We first evaluate the defendants' arguments that there was insufficient evidence to find LaRouche and Spannaus guilty on any count and to find any of the defendants guilty on several counts. The relevant question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of facts could have found the defendant[s] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir.1982) (emphasis in original).
23 The criminal mail fraud statute proscribes the utilization of the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud or to obtain money by means of false pretenses, representations, or promises. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341 (1982). 24 LaRouche argues that no evidence exists to implicate him in NCLC's fundraising activities, which the jury found to be fraudulent. LaRouche's claim is contradicted by the record. Testimony was introduced to show that LaRouche controlled the fundraising activities of the organization and that he was well aware of its financial difficulties. Testimony also evidenced LaRouche's demands for more aggressive fundraising tactics. The government introduced evidence that, after an inquiry about disgruntled lenders' demands, LaRouche responded, Forgive or forget, thereby creating a policy of the nonpayment of loans. The government also exhibited a letter that LaRouche sent to a lender in which he blamed the nonpayment of her loan on wicked operations by adversaries and claimed that the entity responsible for repaying her loan had no discretion in the matter; other evidence showed that his claims in the letter were false. Sufficient evidence supports the jury's conclusion that LaRouche participated in the organization's fraudulent fundraising practices. 25 The record also fully supports Spannaus' conviction. Through the notes in his notebook, evidence of his involvement in the formulation of the nonpayment policy exists. The government also presented evidence that: Spannaus responded to one lender complaint stating that the lender had no right to get his money back; and Spannaus wrote letters to lenders assuring them that the repayment program had been restored and issued letters of indebtedness stating that loans would be repaid at stated times and rates, even though he knew of the campaign's nonpayment policy. 26 The defendants argue that there was not enough evidence to convict them of defrauding lender Martha Van Sickle, who lent the LaRouche organization $250,000, because none of the representations they made to her were false. While the funds that Van Sickle lent were used for the purpose stated to her, Van Sickle testified that she was also falsely told that she would be paid in the usual manner, over a two-year period at ten percent interest per annum, and that she was not informed of events, which occurred prior to the loan, that would greatly hinder the defendants' ability to repay the loan. The evidence supports the jury's conclusion that representations made to her were false. 27 It is also argued that defendant Small was not adequately involved with the solicitation of a $15,000 loan from lender Goodwill Post to be convicted on Count 10. But testimony demonstrated that Small had met with Post to solicit the loan and that, after Post made the loan, Small was credited with helping to obtain it. The evidence is more than sufficient to implicate Small in soliciting the loan made by Post. 28 The defendants contend that the convictions cannot stand on Count 11 because it charged fraud with respect to a $10,000 loan from lender Max Harrell, who had been informed of the risks. But the record contains sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Harrell was assured falsely that he would be paid back. 29 The defendants argue that no evidence supports Count 12, which charges LaRouche with making false statements in a letter sent to lender Elizabeth Sexton. But evidence shows that, contrary to LaRouche's statements in the letter, the responsible entity did have the discretionary funds to repay the loan.
30 LaRouche maintains that he could not have been convicted of Conspiracy to Defraud the IRS because no evidence was introduced to demonstrate that he had the requisite state of mind--an intent to defraud. Rather, he argues, evidence showed that he relied on the advice of tax experts. In fact, an expert witness testified to the view that he owed no taxes. Thus, LaRouche maintains, although it is arguable whether he did indeed owe taxes, it cannot be inferred that he intended to defraud the IRS. 31 The government introduced the following evidence: 32 (1) LaRouche received compensation in kind from a publishing company, even though he was not an employee; 33 (2) the LaRouche Organization maintained real estate for LaRouche that he and his wife referred to as residences; 34 (3) the LaRouche Organization used a security fund to pay essentially all of LaRouche's personal expenses, including clothing and jewelry; 35 (4) when LaRouche redesigned the accounting system, he did not attempt to compile separate accounting of personal expenses; 36 (5) one of LaRouche's advisers wrote a memo proposing to characterize payments made to LaRouche as gifts, showing how it would affect tax liability; 37 (6) LaRouche and his associates justified certain payments to LaRouche by calling them gifts; 38 (7) LaRouche did not file tax returns, although on two occasions an accountant had prepared returns that were not filed; and 39 (8) the IRS had sent LaRouche a series of notices requesting that he file returns, but no reply was ever received. 40 The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that LaRouche intended to defraud the IRS.