Opinion ID: 6337737
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The documentary evidence was potentially

Text: dispositive. The agency predicated denial of Udo’s CAT claim on the adverse credibility determination: Because Udo’s testimony was not credible, the agency found that he “failed to establish that he is gay or that he was ever harmed in Nigeria for being a gay person.” But this finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Instead, the “excommunication notice” combined with his family’s letters and affidavits leave no doubt that Udo is gay and was subjected to violent attacks in Nigeria on the basis of his sexuality. This documentary evidence is “potentially dispositive” to his CAT claim. Cole, 659 F.3d at 772. The “excommunication notice” clearly states that Udo was “caught practicing” prohibited sexual acts including “homosexuality, bisexual, trans-gender or any other related ' On appeal, Udo does not challenge the adverse credibility finding or the denial of asylum relief. UDO V. GARLAND 9 [] act”; he was “apprehended, detained for execution and he escaped”; and he is now subject to “public execution” as a result. The notice was issued by the “Disciplinary Committee” of the “Council of Traditional Rulers” of the Ukana Community to Udo’s family and signed by the Chairman of the Disciplinary Committee, the Secretary, and the Village Head of Ukana Ikot Otu. A copy of the notice is included here. 10 UDO V. GARLAND BS COUNCIL OF TRADITIONAL RULERS UKANA COMMUNITY. DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE. Traditional rujere aecreterial,Nio 23 Ewot houslng estate icin Alnwa tbo State Nigeria EXCOMMUNICATION NOTICE TO LATE MR DONATUS PETER UDO . FAMILY In accordance to our traditional code of conduct, Your son Peter Donatus Udo has commited an offense und section 2 paragraph ¢ which states: Thal any cliren of the community found practicing homesexuniity, biseoual,trans-gender or any other reloted eexval act ta subjected to public execution, On 18 Apri 2015, Your son was cough! practicing this act and spprohended detained for execution and he escaped. This acl vielaiod our code of conduct bond avery cilzens of this community. The disciplinary committed have retelved to expel and excommunicate your famay morriners os followed: . You ehall cease to be recognize as the citizen of this community effecthe from today being 24th day of April 2075 pending your son PETER DONATUS UDO exrtral for pubic: execution in sccomance bo our ler, Signed ‘Ohuku(Obong) Eifiong Ebm Obong Gathort Limenen a ‘ =. ~~ c Edidam John 0. Asanga Vilage Head Ukana feo! Cte. He UDO V. GARLAND 11 Corroborating this decree, Udo’s family members submitted multiple letters and affidavits that detail the violence that Udo experienced in Nigeria after he was discovered with his boyfriend and support Udo’s claim that he will more likely than not be tortured if he is returned. For example, Udo’s mother submitted an affidavit stating that on April 16, 2015, Udo “was caught by the Ikot Ekpene Police Area command Headquarters, Nigeria for Homosexuality at SINADEE Hotel at No: 53 Aba Road, Ikot Ekpene, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria,” that “local police in Nigeria are on [his] trails,” and that the police “have been raiding [her] house periodically thereby making life unpleasant, unsafe and unsecured.” According to her affidavit, Udo’s mother “was left with no other alternative than to use [her] entire resources to mobilize him to flee Nigeria for safety and protection.” Similarly, Udo’s brother, Anthony Donatus Peter, wrote that Udo “was harmed, mistreated, tortured” by “a local security outfit for his perceived sexual orientation which is against culture and tradition and Nigerian law which prescribed death sentence and 14 years imprisonment” for the offense. Compounding the family’s suffering, their home became “a surveillance point for this Vigilante group who want to kill [his] brother by all means.” Anthony added that Udo’s mother had “spent her last saving [sic] to sponsor [Udo’s] trip to United States of America” because his family “never want him to return to Nigeria for his safety.” Udo’s sister, Agnes Donatus Peter, wrote that on April 23, 2015, “the police came to arrest [Udo] and fortunately he ran away” and “he doesn’t commit any crime except homosexuality.” Had the agency accorded any weight to this evidence, it could have concluded at the very least that Udo is “gay [and] 12 UDO V. GARLAND that he was [] harmed in Nigeria for being a gay person” — the missing factual finding upon which the agency predicated its denial of CAT relief. Thus, the excommunication letter and the letters and affidavits from his family members are “potentially dispositive.” Cole, 659 F.3d at 764. B. The agency failed to give reasoned consideration to potentially dispositive evidence. Confronted with this potentially dispositive evidence, the agency failed to give it reasoned consideration. Cole, 659 F.3d at 773. Remarkably, the BIA did not reference the excommunication notice at all in its five-page order. The BIA mentioned Udo’s mother’s affidavit only once in its asylum frivolousness determination, and did not otherwise mention Udo’s family’s letters and affidavits. The IJ acknowledged the documentary evidence in passing in her decision, but failed to mention it at all in her discussion of Udo’s CAT claim. In the face of persuasive evidence, the agency’s dismissive, fleeting reference to that evidence is insufficient and falls far short of the agency’s obligation to give “reasoned consideration” to the evidence. This deficiency is underscored where, as here, “there is any indication that the BIA did not consider all of the evidence before it.” Cole, 659 F.3d at 771-72. The key factual issues, according to the BIA, related to whether Udo was gay and whether he was detained, threatened with death, and beaten for his perceived sexuality. Udo’s documentary evidence is highly probative of both issues and contradicts the agency’s ultimate conclusion—a strong indication that the agency “did not consider all of the evidence before it.” /d. This is especially true here because there is a “significant and material disconnect” between what the evidence says and the UDO V. GARLAND 13 agency’s “conclusions regarding [Udo’s] CAT claim.” Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Cole, 659 F.3d at 771-72); see also Etemadi v. Garland, 12 F 4th 1013, 1025 (9th Cir. 2021). The cases cited by the Government are not to the contrary. In Manes v. Sessions, unlike here, there was no indication that the BIA had failed to consider all the evidence, not in the least because the objective evidence Manes presented—country conditions reports—had little probative value for his particular CAT claim. 875 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 2017). And in contrast to Udo’s case, in Najmabadi v. Holder, there was “no indication that the Board failed to credit” the truth of an affidavit’s factual allegations. 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010). The Government’s references do not undermine our conclusion in any way. Because there is a strong “indication that the BIA did not consider all of the evidence before it .. . the decision cannot stand.” Etemadi, 12 F.4th at 1026 (quoting Cole, 659 F.3d at 771-72).? If. Udo’s Asylum Claim was not Frivolous. The consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application are severe. Noncitizens found to have knowingly filed such applications are “permanently 2 We do not reach whether the agency’s failure to consider the documentary evidence violated Udo’s Fifth Amendment due process rights in addition to immigration regulations. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (“[Courts] will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”). 14 UDO V. GARLAND ineligible for any benefits under [the Immigration and Nationality Act]” including asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6). To find an asylum application frivolous, the agency must make a specific finding that an alien “deliberately fabricated” a “material element” of the application. 8 C.F.R. § 208.20; see also Inre Y-L-, 241. & N. Dec. 151, 162 n.1 (B.L.A. 2007). Whether a fabrication encompassed material elements of a claim is a mixed question of fact and law that we review de novo. See Khadka v. Holder, 618 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2010). The BIA determined that Udo had deliberately fabricated a “material element” of his asylum application, “namely, the location of where his alleged past persecution occurred.” On this basis, the BIA found Udo’s asylum application to be frivolous. We disagree. The name of the hotel where Udo and his boyfriend were allegedly caught having sex is not a “material element” of Udo’s asylum application. We evaluate whether a given aspect of a petitioner’s asylum application was a “material element” of that application by reference to the meaning of “element,” 1.e.,“[a] constituent part of a claim that must be proved for the claim to succeed.” Jd. at 1004 (quoting Element, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)). For Udo’s asylum claim to succeed, he must prove that he “is unable or unwilling to return to his home country because of a wellfounded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 2000)). Because he predicates his fear of future persecution on allegations of past persecution, Udo “has the burden of establishing that (1) his treatment rises to the level of persecution; (2) the persecution was on account of one or UDO V. GARLAND 15 more protected grounds; and (3) the persecution was committed by the government, or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control.” Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010)). We acknowledge that the location where Udo’s past persecution occurred, be it the Sheraton Hotel or the Sinadee Hotel, could be relevant to the agency’s credibility determination. However, the location is at best ancillary to these “constituent part[s] . . . that must be proved for [Udo’s asylum application] to succeed,” and is certainly not a “material element” of his asylum claim. Khadka, 618 F.3d at 1004. We reverse the agency’s determination that Udo’s asylum application was frivolous. In doing so, we decline the Government’s invitation to import the Supreme Court’s framework for assessing materiality from judicial denaturalization proceedings brought under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), instead of following the Ninth Circuit’s framework in Khadka, which directly addressed a frivolousness finding in the asylum context. Because the Government’s proposed approach stems from a different form of proceeding under a different statutory framework, we follow the Ninth Circuit standard.