Opinion ID: 684388
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Patrick Gleason

Text: 24 The third and final allegedly improper interrogation occurred when Judge Banks interrupted the petitioner's allocution during sentencing and asked him where he got the .44 magnum he used in the assaults. The judge also asked petitioner if he was aware that the .44 magnum was one of the most powerful handguns available. Petitioner's knowledge of the power of his chosen weapon suggests that the severe injuries suffered by his victims were clearly foreseeable by the petitioner, a consideration obviously relevant to the sentencing judge. The court's questioning of petitioner on this matter was therefore neither inappropriate nor evidence of bias. B. Evidentiary rulings 25 Petitioner further contends that the trial court's evidentiary rulings show bias against the petitioner. 26 1. Exclusion of Michael Griffin's probationary status 27 The trial judge refused to admit evidence that the State's witness, Michael Griffin, was on probation for a misdemeanor charge of driving under the influence (DUI) at the time of trial. Petitioner now argues that Griffin's probationary status may have evidenced an illicit motive for his testifying on behalf of the state. Petitioner, however, made no such argument at trial, arguing instead that Griffin's DUI conviction implied that Griffin's testimony was suspect for want of sobriety. Griffin, however, had already testified to his propensity for drunkenness. Furthermore, when the issue was raised the prosecution stipulated to Griffin's probationary status for the DUI conviction. The trial judge's exclusion of further evidence on the issue was neither an abuse of discretion nor evidence of bias. 28 2. Admission of evidence of the severity of the victims' injuries 29 Petitioner next argues that evidence of the severity of the victims' injuries was irrelevant and prejudicial and its admission further demonstrates [the trial court's] bias. Br. 35. However, as Judge Williams pointed out below, evidence of the severity of the wounds was relevant to Gleason's crimes because: A person who intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement commits aggravated battery under Illinois law. Pet.App. 16-17. C. Imposition of the extended term sentence 30 Petitioner's final alleged evidence of bias was the trial court's imposition of a 40-year extended term sentence. The Appellate Court of Illinois, finding that Gleason had not acted in an exceptionally brutal or heinous manner, reduced the sentence from 40 years to the maximum term of 30 years for attempted murder. Gleason, 240 Ill.App.3d at 257, 181 Ill.Dec. 271, 608 N.E.2d 344. That a majority of the Appellate Court disagreed with the trial judge's determination of heinousness does not imply that the trial judge was biased. Indeed, one of the three justices of the Illinois appellate court agreed with the trial judge that Gleason's conduct was exceptionally brutal and heinous. Id. at 259, 181 Ill.Dec. 271, 608 N.E.2d 344 (Justice Campbell dissenting).