Opinion ID: 1788387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Atkins v. Virginia and Ring v. Arizona

Text: ¶ 72. On June 19, 2003, Jordan filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. Jordan's amended petition is based on Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). ¶ 73. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), the United States Supreme Court held that the execution of mentally retarded inmates amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and was therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. In his first supplement to the petition for post-conviction relief, Jordan alleges that he has suffered from mental retardation and its attendant adaptive deficits since early childhood. The only indications of mental retardation he provides are that his childhood development was slow, that he did not learn to walk until he was two years old, that he suffered from meningitis as a child which might have caused brain injury; and, that he was placed in special education classes in school. None of those allegations are supported by any affidavits of mental health professionals or by any documentary or medical evidence. Based on these allegations alone, Jordan seeks a hearing on whether he is mentally retarded. ¶ 74. On May 20, 2004, we announced the requirements for obtaining a hearing to determine whether a capital defendant is mentally retarded in Chase v. State, 873 So.2d 1013 (Miss.2004). This Court held: With the sole exception discussed below, no defendant may be granted a hearing on the issue of Eighth Amendment protection from execution, due to alleged mental retardation unless, prior to the expiration of the deadline set by the trial court for filing motions, the defendant shall have filed with the trial court a motion, seeking such hearing. The defendant must attach to the motion an affidavit from at least one expert, qualified as described above, who opines, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that: (1) the defendant has a combined Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of 75 or below, and; (2) in the opinion of the expert, there is a reasonable basis to believe that, upon further testing, the defendant will be found to be mentally retarded, as defined herein. Upon receiving such motion with attached affidavit, and any response filed by the State, the trial court shall provide a reasonable amount of time for testing the defendant for mental retardation. Thereafter, the trial court shall set a hearing on the motion, and the matter shall proceed. Id. at 1029. We further held: We hold that no defendant may be adjudged mentally retarded for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, unless such defendant produces, at a minimum, an expert who expresses an opinion, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that: 1. The defendant is mentally retarded, as that term is defined by the American Association on Mental Retardation and/or The American Psychiatric Association; 2. The defendant has completed the Minnesota Multi phasic Personality Inventory-II (MMPI-II) and/or other similar tests, and the defendant is not malingering. Such expert must be a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist, qualified as an expert in the field of assessing mental retardation, and further qualified as an expert in the administration and interpretation of tests, and in the evaluation of persons, for purposes of determining mental retardation. Upon meeting this initial requirement to go forward, the defendant may present such other opinions and evidence as the trial court may allow pursuant to the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Id. On August 26, 2004, this Court further addressed the question of what is required in order to obtain a hearing under Atkins in Wiley v. State, 890 So.2d 892 (Miss. 2004). This Court in Wiley held: This Court spoke of evolving standards in Chase, 873 So.2d at 1024. We now find it necessary to expand on the procedure to be used in reaching a determination of mental retardation by holding that this Court will consider the entire record before it in deciding whether to grant an Atkins hearing. The standard set out by this Court in Chase, 873 So.2d at 1028, and cited herein establishes the minimum requirements for a person to be adjudged mentally retarded. This Court said [n]o defendant may be adjudged mentally retarded... unless that defendant produces an expert opinion that the defendant is retarded and has completed the MMPI-II. That does not mean that every defendant who submits an expert opinion to this Court and has completed the MMPI-II will be adjudged mentally retarded for the purposes of Atkins. Further, Wiley does not even assert that he has completed the MMPI-II or some similar test to show that he is not malingering. There is a mention of the MMPI-II in the 1987 affidavit of Dr. Fox, but nothing in this most recent motion. 890 So.2d at 897-98. ¶ 75. Jordan's Atkins claim is unsupported by any affidavits or records indicating that he has an I.Q. of less than 76. Further, there is no indication that he has completed the MMPI-II. Jordan's petition has failed to support his claim of retardation under the precedent announced in Chase; therefore, Jordan is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of mental retardation. ¶ 76. Jordan also claims that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), requires that the jury be allowed to determine whether he is mentally retarded. On the same day that the petitioner filed the amended petition raising the Ring claim, this Court decided this same issue in Russell v. State, 849 So.2d 95 (Miss.2003). There, the Court stated that [w]e find that not being mentally retarded is not an aggravating factor necessary for imposition of the death penalty, and Ring has no application to an Atkins determination. Id. at 148. This precise issue has previously been decided by this Court adversely to Jordan's position, and we rely on the previous holding. ¶ 77. Jordan also claims that the Ring decision and its predecessor Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), require a new trial because the aggravating factors were not included in the indictment. As with the prior issue, this Court has addressed these identical claims in a previous decision. In Berry v. State, 882 So.2d 157 (Miss.2004), this Court determined that Ring and Apprendi have no applicability to Mississippi's capital murder sentencing scheme. Id. at 172. This issue is thus without merit.