Opinion ID: 1201769
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Gregory's unavailability as a witness

Text: (13) A person is unavailable as a witness if the person is [e]xempted or precluded on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the matter to which his or her statement is relevant. (Evid. Code, ง 240, subd. (a)(1).) One such privilege, the exercise of which makes a person unavailable as a witness, is the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1251 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) To be found unavailable on this ground, a witness must not only intend to assert the privilege, but also be entitled to assert it. ( People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 440-441 [247 Cal. Rptr. 121, 754 P.2d 168, 76 A.L.R.4th 785].) (14a) Here, Gregory demonstrated his intention to assert the privilege when he was called to testify during a foundational hearing out of the jury's presence. After Gregory was sworn, the prosecutor asked whether Gregory intended to answer any questions about the murder of Amelia P., and whether he had conversed with defendant about a crime defendant had committed near the Cudjo camper on the day of the murder. Gregory refused to answer each question, expressly grounding his refusal on the privilege against self-incrimination. Defense counsel then stipulated that Gregory would assert the privilege as to any testimony he may give in this matter. Defendant argues that even though Gregory intended to assert the privilege, Gregory did not sufficiently establish that he was entitled to do so. We disagree. (15) To invoke the privilege, a witness need not be guilty of any offense; rather, the privilege is properly invoked whenever the witness's answers would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the witness for a criminal offense. ( Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [95 L.Ed. 1118, 1123-1124, 71 S.Ct. 814]; see also People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].) To satisfy this standard, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. ( Hoffman v. United States, supra, at pp. 486-487 [95 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1123-1124].) Consistent with these principles, our Evidence Code provides that when a witness grounds a refusal to testify on the privilege against self-incrimination, a trial court may compel the witness to answer only if it clearly appears to the court that the proposed testimony cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the person claiming the privilege. (Evid. Code, ง 404.) (14b) Here, it did not clearly appear that Gregory's proposed testimony could not have tended to incriminate him for the murder of Amelia P. Gregory had been taken into custody as a suspect in that offense. Indeed, defendant has argued, both at trial and on this appeal, that the evidence is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that Gregory, rather than defendant, killed Amelia P. Answers to the prosecution's questions about Gregory's observations on the day of the murder, and Gregory's conversations with defendant relating to the murder, could have developed evidence tending to establish Gregory's own complicity in the victim's death. (See People v. Sipress (1975) 51 Cal. App.3d 98, 102 [123 Cal. Rptr. 884]; People v. Traylor (1972) 23 Cal. App.3d 323, 330 [100 Cal. Rptr. 116].) Moreover, because Gregory had testified at the preliminary hearing, he could properly invoke the privilege to avoid exposing himself to a charge of perjury in that proceeding. ( People v. Maxwell (1979) 94 Cal. App.3d 562, 570-571 [156 Cal. Rptr. 630].) The trial court did not err in finding Gregory unavailable as a witness on the ground of privilege.