Opinion ID: 2716451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Preserve and Test Evidence with Exculpatory Potential

Text: ¶ 27. Defendant argues that the case should have been dismissed because the State failed to collect, preserve or test four items of potentially exculpatory evidence: blood that was on the complainant’s face the night of the incident; fingernail clippings and scrapings from the complainant from the night of the incident; clothes worn by the complainant; and hairs that were found with the complainant’s clothes. Prior to the March 2012 trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the failure of police to collect and test the above evidence violated Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution and the line of cases beginning with State v. Bailey , 144 Vt. 86, 475 A.2d 1045 (1984). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, but issued a corrective instruction to the jury. [4] ¶ 28. The State is obligated, as a matter of due process, to disclose to the defense any exculpatory material within its possession or control. See Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963); V.R.Cr.P. 16(b)(2). The State may violate this burden of production if it destroys, loses or fails to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence. State v. Gibney , 2003 VT 26, ¶ 35, 175 Vt. 180, 825 A.2d 32; State v. Delisle , 162 Vt. 293, 309, 648 A.2d 632, 642 (1994). To be entitled to sanctions under the Vermont Constitution and our decision in Bailey , the defendant need not prove that the missing evidence would be exculpatory, “but must show only a ‘reasonable possibility’ that it would have been favorable.” [5] Bailey , 144 Vt. at 94, 475 A.2d at 1050. If the defendant makes such a showing, the court must determine whether sanctions are warranted based on “ ‘a pragmatic balancing’ of three factors: (1) the degree of negligence or bad faith on the part of the government; (2) the importance of the evidence lost; and (3) other evidence of guilt adduced at trial.” Id . at 95; 475 A.2d at 1050. ¶ 29. Defendant argues that the failure to collect evidence in the first place is equivalent to destroying, losing, or failing to preserve exculpatory evidence. We disagree. The police do not have a duty to collect all evidence that could potentially favor the defense. See State v. Smith , 145 Vt. 121, 127, 485 A.2d 124, 128 (1984) (“The State’s duty to preserve evidence obviously arises only if the State has possession of it.”); Bailey , 144 Vt. at 94-95, 475 A.2d at 1050 (noting that State’s “duty of disclosure attaches in some form once the [g]overnment has first gathered and taken possession of the evidence in question” (quotation omitted)); see also State v. Ware , 881 P.2d 679, 683 (N.M. 1994) (stating rule that prosecution “generally has no duty to collect particular evidence at the crime scene”). However, as we have previously recognized, “[t]here could arise situations in which negligent conduct of the police is sufficiently prejudicial to the defense to warrant” sanctions. State v. Wheelock , 158 Vt. 302, 312, 609 A.2d 972, 978 (1992). In such situations, the Bailey test is an adequately flexible method to determine the appropriate sanction. We see no reason to adopt a new test for a failure to collect evidence, as the State urges. ¶ 30. In this case, the trial court appropriately applied the Bailey test and determined that the failure to preserve the evidence did not violate Article 10. We need not review the trial court’s conclusion here, as the Bailey test depends on the evidence of guilt produced at trial, which will likely be different in the event that a third trial occurs. Should defendant renew his motion, the court will be obligated to reweigh the various factors in light of the evidence presented.