Opinion ID: 167423
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The officers were reasonably mistaken when they initially entered 44½ West 2700 South.

Text: 56 Having held that the warrant's over-broad verbiage did not, standing alone, render the warrant invalid, we consider the much closer legal question of whether the officer's initial entry into the separate residence at 44½ West 2700 South was reasonable. Plaintiffs contend that the agents' actions were unreasonable given the information known to them. The district court concluded that the Defendants' mistake was objectively reasonable. Id. vol. IV, at 1320. Agent Pollock reasonably relied on the investigation of Mr. Gomez. His reliance was strengthened by the information given him by the members of the scout team. Id. 57 In so finding, the district court summarized the factors it considered in support of the plaintiffs and the defendants. As to the entry into 44 ½West 2700 South, the district court found the following evidence supported the plaintiffs: 58 1. The main residence had two mailboxes on the front. 59 2. Agent Pollock never saw suspects go in or out of the garage apartment. 60 3. The Salt Lake County records indicated that in addition to the single family residence, there was a outbuilding consisting of a garage and a finished main floor. 61 4. A deed of trust showed two addresses given for the property: 44 West 2700 South and 44 ½ West 2700 South. 62 5. 44 ½ West 2700 had a Questar Gas account. 63 6. The United States Postal Service had the 44 ½ West 2700 South address listed in its database. 64 7. The phone company sent bills to the 44 ½ West 2700 South address. 65 8. The plat indicated two lots. 66 9. The plaintiffs' vehicles parked on the property were not those seen being used by Pawoo and Isabel. 67 10. The outbuilding had pipes from the roof, a door and a window that looked residential, and a light and mailbox situated near the door. 68 11. Members of the scout team told Agent Pollock that they were concerned that the officers knew the outbuilding might be used as a residence, or as something other than a garage, because there were reports of lights and voices and people coming and going. 69 12. The Operations Order listed the residence as Single Family Dwelling with detached Garage/Residence and often referred to residence # 1 and residence # 2. 70 Aplts' App. vol. IV, at 1317-18. 71 As to factors supporting the defendants, the district court listed: 72 1. Agent Pollock thought one of the two mailboxes on the front of 44 West 2700 South was for a newspaper. 73 2. No evidence shows that any of the officers noticed the pipes coming out of the back of the roof, or thought the door and window on 44½ West 2700 South were signs of a residence. 74 3. Mr. Gomez's investigation did not reveal the 44½ West address; he checked the Salt Lake County Recorder's Officer's records, which showed that 44 West 2700 South as a single family dwelling with one detached structure: a garage with a finished main floor. 75 4. Because Mr. Gomez did not know about the 44½ West address, he did not check the Questar records for that address. 76 5. Mr. Gomez believed, after his review of all the records, that there was nothing to indicate that the outbuilding was being used as a residence. Mr. Gomez testified: My research, there's no indication other than one single family dwelling. 77 6. Mr. Gomez told Agent Pollock: The information that I would have relayed to him (Agent Pollock) is the owner of the property and that it shows a single family dwelling.... I identified to him single family dwelling. 78 7. After Agent Pollock encouraged members of the scout team to do their own investigation to verify whether there was a second residence, they went to the South Salt Lake City planner and reviewed the city plan, a map of the area, and received information on the address. All of [their] research indicated this was a single occupied residence with one address. The garage was not a separate residence, but a part of the property at 44 West 2700 South. 79 8. Agent Pollock testified: I didn't have any suspicions that there was a secondary residence there ever except for the fact that my scout Donavan Lucas advised me that they had gone to the planner's office to see if possible there was a secondary residence on the home. And when I asked him, he said no, and that confirmed the information that Joe Gomez gave me that there was not a secondary residence on the property. 80 Id. at 1318-19 (citations omitted). 81 The plaintiffs insist that, based on the above, [n]o reasonable officer could possibly believe [their] home was merely a garage. Aplts' Br. at 47. In addition to the evidence and testimony weighing in their favor as noted by the district court, they emphasize that the following factors clearly indicate to a reasonably competent officer that the detached structure was a residence: 82 &#x2022; the simultaneous raids of residence # 1 and residence # 2, 83 &#x2022; the three separate mailboxes (two on 44 West 2700 South and one on 44½ West 2700 South), 84 &#x2022; the deed of trust, 85 &#x2022; the U.S. Postal Service records, 86 &#x2022; the gas bill for 44 West 2700 South in Ms. Harman's name, 87 &#x2022; the scout team's inspection of the front door hinges, and presumably, the residential type front door and the porch, porch light, rug etc. on 44½ West 2700 South, 88 &#x2022; the residential windows on 44½ West 2700 South, 89 &#x2022; the New Mexico license plates on Ms. Harman's car, 90 &#x2022; the cement walkway and landscaping, and 91 &#x2022; separate telephone service. 92 The defendants counter that, even had they been able to observe the purported porch, porch lights, cement pad, and steps, their existence would have been inconsequential. Such features are commonly found on garages and similar outbuilding that are not used as dwellings. 93 As to SWAT team member Officer Aiveni Taufa's examination of the garage door's hinges, the defendants maintain that the team was merely determining which way the side door opened, so as to execute the warrant as safely and effectively as possible. Officer Taufa testified he saw the door and the purported porch light, but did not recall seeing the mailbox or the rug. The defendants maintain that Officer Taufa's failure to notice these items does not render the initial entry unreasonable. Similarly, the defendants argue that the number of vehicles on the property was consistent with the suspects' known use of the property: numerous different vehicles frequently came and went from drug houses. 94 Particularly at summary judgment, this matter is close, but after considering all of the above factors, and the arguments supporting and against each of them, we agree with the district court that Sergeant Barnett and Agent Pollock reasonably relied upon the information supplied by Mr. Gomez. Although there was a possibility of a separate residence, the information supplied by Mr. Gomez and the scout team's independent verification that the property contained only one residence confirmed Agent Pollock's information supplied in his affidavit. 95 We therefore reject the plaintiffs' suggestion that Sergeant Barnett and Agent Pollock acted unreasonably based on the information before them. The Garrison court ultimately decided that the officers' conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 480 U.S. at 88-89, 107 S.Ct. 1013. In Garrison, the objective facts available to the officers at the time suggested no distinction between [the] apartment and the third-floor premises. Id. at 88, 107 S.Ct. 1013. The same reasoning applies here to 44 West 2700 South and 44½ West 2700 South. Accordingly, after a thorough review of the record, we agree with the district court that upon the initial entry into 44½ West 2700 South, the SERT/SWAT team had reason to believe that the separate detached garage was not a separate residence. Given the facial validity of the warrant, the officers permissibly entered the separate residence. 96 C. Material factual disputes exist as to the reasonableness of the subsequent search and detention of Ms. Harman and Mr. Overton. 97 Having determined that the initial entry into 44½ West 2700 South was reasonable, we must consider whether the defendants, upon realizing the mistaken execution of the warrant, acted reasonably in their subsequent execution of the search warrant and detention of the plaintiffs, which is required for the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court found that [a]lthough Plaintiffs told [Sergeant] Barnett that theirs was a separate residence and they had no connection with the 44 West address, [he] acted reasonably in investigating further before he accepted their story. Aplts' App. vol. IV, at 1322. Relying on Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir.2004), the district court determined that Sergeant Barnett released the Plaintiffs after he had spoken to the occupants of [44] West 2700 and confirmed that the Plaintiffs had no connection to them. Aplts' App. vol. IV, at 1323. 98 Ms. Harman and Mr. Overton contend that the officers did not terminate the search and detention upon realizing that the SERT/SWAT had raided a separate residence with occupants unrelated to the suspects in the main house. Thus, the search and detention exceeded the scope of the warrant. According to the plaintiffs, the immediate discovery of a separate residence and occupants bearing no resemblance to any of the suspects would have informed any reasonable officer of the mistake. 1 99 The officers argue that: (1) relying on Garrison and Peterson, Sergeant Barnett could not have realized the warrant was overbroad until he interviewed the occupants of the 44 West 2700 South, and Ms. Harman and Mr. Overton; (2) they had authority to detain the plaintiffs merely because they were occupants on the premises; (3) the discovery of contraband provided independent probable cause to detain the plaintiffs; and (4) the officers had probable cause to detain, arrest, and incarcerate the plaintiffs. Because the district court granted summary judgment on the first argument, it did not consider whether the evidence was uncontroverted as to the remaining arguments. 100 1. Realization that the warrant was overbroad. 101 The officers maintain that the district court's application of Peterson was correct and that they acted reasonably in holding the plaintiffs and searching the garage apartment. As noted above, the Supreme Court in Garrison held that police officers do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment when they mistakenly execute a search warrant on the wrong address. [T]he [Supreme] Court has ... recognized the need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and executing search warrants. 480 U.S. at 87, 107 S.Ct. 1013. In this vein, the Court noted that, the officers were required to discontinue the search of respondent's apartment as soon as they ... were put on notice of the risk that they might be in a unit erroneously included within the terms of the warrant. See id. (emphasis added). [T]he validity of the search of [the plaintiff's] apartment... depends on whether the officers' failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable. Id. at 88, 107 S.Ct. 1013. 102 Garrison requires that the officers were obligated to retreat as soon as they knew or reasonably should have known that there was a mistake, i.e., they were in the wrong residence. See id. at 87-88, 107 S.Ct. 1013. The Court emphasized that the officers were required to discontinue the search of respondent's apartment as soon as they discovered that there were two separate units on the third floor and therefore were put on notice of the risk that they might be in a unit erroneously included within the terms of the warrant. Id. (emphasis added). 103 In Peterson, relied upon by the district court, the panel affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant-officers' motion to dismiss. There, the officers entered a residence in search of two suspects. The suspects no longer occupied the residence. The residents of the apartment alleged that they were searched and interrogated even after they identified themselves. 371 F.3d at 1202-03. 104 The panel held that, given the procedural posture of the case, where it must take all well-plead allegations as true, the plaintiffs alleged a constitutional violation. The panel noted, however, that, the search became unconstitutional only if it continued after the defendants realized, or reasonably should have realized, that the people named in the warrant as occupants of the apartment no longer resided there. Id. at 1203 (citing Garrison 480 U.S. at 88, 107 S.Ct. 1013). We agree with the district court that Peterson's instructions in this regard are helpful, but we diverge because material facts still in dispute here preclude summary judgment. 105 The Sixth Circuit's ruling in Pray v. City of Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154 (6th Cir. 1995) is particularly instructive to show why material facts are still in dispute. In Pray, an elderly married couple brought a civil rights suit under § 1983 against various police officers and a municipality alleging an illegal search and seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. There, the police gathered information for a warrant to search the upper apartment of a duplex, and arrived at the residence to execute that warrant. This was the second search warrant for this upper apartment. A first warrant for the upstairs apartment had been executed six weeks earlier. At least one of the officers present at the first raid was also present at the second raid. Id. at 1156. 106 The Prays' home was on the lower level of the duplex containing a common vestibule with one door opening immediately to a flight of ascending stairs where the upper apartment was accessed, and one door opening directly into the lower apartment where the Prays lived. Neither door in the vestibule was identified by number or name. Id. The officers held a pre-raid briefing to review the layout of the building and plan the execution of the second warrant. The officer or officers present at the previous raid knew that the correct apartment would be accessed after climbing a flight of stairs. 107 In executing the warrant, the officers' team knocked on what it considered the `obvious' door and, after receiving no immediate response, forced the door open; the door turned out to be the door leading to the Prays' apartment. Id. at 1157. The officers then swarmed through the apartment; they confronted Mr. Pray at gun-point, and pushed him to the floor; another officer discovered Mrs. Pray and pushed her to the ground; the officers remained for about five minutes securing and searching the residence. After finding nothing, the officers proceeded to the upstairs apartment which was the correct object of the search warrant. Id. at 1157. 108 As to the detention, the Sixth Circuit rejected the defendants' qualified immunity defense, noting the plaintiffs' testimony that despite knowing that they were in the wrong place, the defendants nevertheless `secured' the Pray residence for an additional four to five minutes. Id. at 1160. Given this testimony, the court held that it was for the trier of fact to determine, based on the credibility of the evidence before it, at what point the officers knew or reasonably should have known they were at the wrong residence, and to determine what searches and seizures occurred after that. Id.; see also Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 977 (9th Cir.1997) (finding `triable issues' regarding the reasonableness of the detention, particularly as to whether it continued after the officers knew or a reasonable officer would have known that a serious mistake had been made). 109 The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Simmons v. City of Paris, 378 F.3d 476, 481 (5th Cir.2004). In Simmons, the police officers executed a valid search warrant upon the wrong address: the search warrant was for 400 N.W. 14th Street, and plaintiffs were residents of 410 N.W. 14th Street. 110 When the entry team members assembled into a single file line, two of the plaintiffs, Charlotte and Dustin Handley, were on their front porch. Seeing Ms. Handley and her son on the front porch, Officer McFadden sprinted toward them, and the rest of the entry team followed. Charlotte and Dustin, not realizing who the officers were, quickly retreated back inside their home. Officer McFadden followed Ms. Handley into her house through the still open front door. He immediately detained Ms. Handley and Mr. Simmons in the front room. The other members of the entry team followed Officer McFadden into the house and detained the children, Dustin and Angelica, either in Angelica's bedroom or the kitchen. 111 The officers quickly realized they were in the wrong home. In fact, at least two of the officers behind Officer McFadden knew that they were approaching the wrong house, but they thought perhaps Officer McFadden had seen the suspected drug dealer run into the Handley home and that he was in pursuit. The district court found that there were factual disputes as to how long the officers remained in the Handleys' house and whether the officers continued searching the residence after they knew it was the wrong house. 112 Id. at 478 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment for those defendants who entered the home. Id. at 481-82. 113 Qualified immunity does not provide a safe harbor for police to remain in a residence after they are aware that they have entered the wrong residence by mistake. A decision by law enforcement officers to remain in a residence after they realize they are in the wrong house crosses the line between a reasonable mistake and affirmative misconduct that traditionally sets the boundaries of qualified immunity. 114 Id. at 481. 115 Here, the record indicates that the defendants knew early on, that is, before the SERT/SWAT team entry, there was a possibility that the garage was a separate residence. Agent Pollock met with the district attorney who raised the presence of possible indicia on the garage of a separate residence, such as a separate address or a separate mailbox. He stated that he knew there was something attached to the house—but that he did not know if it was original. He thought maybe it was possibly a little workshop. Aplts' App. vol. II, at 556. Agent Pollock acknowledged that he saw the plaintiffs, and that they did not resemble the suspects, who were of Hispanic descent. 116 Sergeant Barnett acknowledged he was aware of a possibility of a second residence before the execution of the search. Id. vol. III, at 1149. According to Sergeant Barnett, this possibility became a strong suspicion when he entered the garage, and was confirmed after interviewing the plaintiffs and those suspects detained in 44 West 2700 South. Id. From the time he entered the garage, he did not suspect the plaintiffs to be part of the known characters in the investigation. Id. vol. II, at 604. Rather than allay his suspicion, Sergeant Barnett opted to focus on the suspects at 44 West 2700 South. 117 Each of the officers had ample notice that the garage may have been a separate residence. See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87, 107 S.Ct. 1013. Neither plaintiff resembled any target described in the warrant or the underlying affidavit. Therefore, we conclude that there are material facts in dispute as to the reasonableness of the officers' delay in realizing that they were at a separate residence not anticipated in the warrant. In addition, factual disputes exist as to whether the full scale search took place after the officers should have realized they were in the wrong residence. 118 2. Limited authority to detain the plaintiffs 119 Next, the officers argue that, under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), and Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005), they justifiably detained the plaintiffs. Summers states that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (emphasis added). According to the officers, they could potentially hold Plaintiffs in handcuffs for two to three hours without violating the fourth amendment. Aples' Br. at 43. 120 In Summers, the officers were about to execute a search warrant upon the suspect's home. The suspect was descending the front steps at the time. After he assisted the officers in gaining entry, the officers detained him while they conducted the search. The court concluded that the detention of the suspect was reasonable: If the evidence that a citizen's residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of the citizen's privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home. Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05, 101 S.Ct. 2587. Unlike Summers, where it was lawful to require [the defendant] to re-enter and to remain in the house until evidence establishing probable cause to arrest [the defendant] was found, here, the officers detained the plaintiffs during the execution of what had become a questionably valid warrant. Id. at 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587. Also, unlike in Summers, here, the officers removed the plaintiffs, who were unclothed or barely clothed, from their bed, and forced them to sit handcuffed on the couch during the execution of the overbroad warrant. 121 In Muehler, during a SWAT team raid of 1363 Patricia Avenue, officers handcuffed and detained Ms. Mena, who was found asleep in her bed at that location. The Court held Ms. Mena's detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under Summers because a warrant existed to search 1363 Patricia Avenue and she was an occupant of that address at the time of the search. Muehler, 125 S.Ct. at 1470. 122 Neither Summers nor Muehler is applicable to this case. First, in neither Supreme Court case was the validity of the underlying warrant at issue. Here, the officers concede the warrant was overbroad. Second, the officers concede that, [a]s with any authority bestowed by a search warrant, be it categorical or otherwise, that authority terminates when an officers knows or reasonably should know that the warrant is overbroad. Aple's Br. at 43. As established above, we have determined that there are material facts in dispute as to the reasonableness of the lengthy detention of the plaintiffs and when the officers' authority terminated. Accordingly, we reject the officers' argument that under Summers and Muehler, the detention was unquestionably justifiable. 3. Presence of contraband 123 Finally, Sergeant Barnett and Agent Pollock argue that the detention was reasonable because once the officers observed contraband in plain view, they had a lawful right to seize the marijuana without a warrant. They contend that they had probable cause to believe that Plaintiffs were involved in illegal drugs related to the criminal activity for which the warrant had been issued. Aples' Br. at 45. In addition, the plaintiffs admitted the marijuana and pipe belonged to them. 124 The officers have not argued that the plaintiffs' continued detention was supported by independent reasons developed during the initial stages of the detention, e.g., to investigate marijuana possession unrelated to the raid on the main dwelling. They argue that the presence of marijuana suggested the plaintiffs were connected to the criminal activity for which the warrant had been issued. Id. at 45. 125 The officers acknowledge that the small amount of contraband standing alone was insufficient to suggest drug trafficking, and that marijuana was not a drug specified in the affidavit supporting the warrant, which specified cocaine and heroin. Sergeant Barnett agreed that from the time he entered the garage, he did not suspect the plaintiffs to be part of the known characters in the investigation. Aplts' App. vol. II, at 604. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the questioning of the plaintiffs or other suspects somehow related to the discovered marijuana. Further, the officers merely issued a citation at the end of the encounter, which suggests that usual police procedures would not have encompassed the handcuffing and detention of the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding these admissions, the officers contend that the contraband provided independent probable cause of related drug activity, which justified the full scale search and detention of the plaintiffs. 126 The plain view doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and who has probable cause to suspect that the item is connected with criminal activity. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983). It is true that the `plain view' doctrine introduces some play into the joints. Hessel v. O'Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir.1992). Of course, if the police officers' presence in the home itself entailed a violation of the Fourth Amendment, no amount of probable cause to believe that an item in plain view constitutes incriminating evidence will justify its seizure. Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 66 n. 10, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). As the Supreme Court explained: 127 What the `plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification -whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused-and permits the warrantless seizure. 128 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135-36, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). 129 We recognize that [i]t is only after the police begin to execute the warrant and set foot upon the described premises that they will discover the factual mistake and must reasonably limit their search accordingly. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 89 n. 14, 107 S.Ct. 1013. Although the officers were acting under the auspices of what they believed to be a valid warrant, we have determined that material facts remain in dispute as to the reasonableness of the detention of the plaintiffs and search of the garage apartment. The Supreme Court consistently reminds us that [a] generalized interest in expedient law enforcement cannot, without more, justify a warrantless search. Georgia v. Randolph, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 1524 n. 5, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (The warrant requirement ... is not an inconvenience to be somehow `weighed' against the claims of police efficiency). 130 As noted above, the plaintiffs did not resemble the suspects as described in the warrant. The plaintiffs consistently denied any involvement with the residents of 44 West 2700 South. Despite building possibilities of a problem, the plaintiffs were placed in a van with suspects from 44 West 2700 South and questioned about their involvement with those suspects. Sergeant Barnett interviewed Ms. Harman, Mr. Overton, and the suspects from 44 West 2700 South before releasing the plaintiffs. 131 While we acknowledge that some portion of the detention may have been justified based on the presence of a small amount of marijuana, the district court did not reach this, argument, and thus we have no factual findings or credibility determinations on this matter from the district court. In addition, the parties do not address the sizeable difference between seizing a person or property in an open area, and the seizing of property or persons situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The officers at no time considered obtaining a separate warrant. Randolph, ___ U.S. ___, at ___, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 1525, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (underscoring general partiality toward police action taken under a warrant [as against] searches and seizures without one) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor does the record at this point disclose any reason such as officer safety or the well being of the plaintiffs during the course of the raid that would support further detention until the entire premises were secured. We are also mindful that the governmental interest implicated by the particular criminal prohibition at issue in this case appears to be relatively minor, as the officers issued a citation for a misdemeanor. Moreover, the officers point to nothing in the record to justify the officers' full-scale search of plaintiffs' garage apartment. 132 Accordingly, we hold that, based on the record before us, material facts are also in dispute as to the reasonableness of the lengthy detention and the full-scale search of the garage apartment. Cf. Pray, 49 F.3d at 1160 (determining trier of fact must determine reasonableness of officers' action when they secured residence for an additional four to five minutes). The district court may make further findings on this claim. Should the trier of fact decide that the detention was unlawful, it may be necessary for a jury to determine what portion of the plaintiffs' injuries was proximately caused by the unlawful detention and the lawful citation. See e.g. Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400-01 (3d. Cir. 1995) (noting that if jury decides troopers' actions were unlawful, it will be necessary to determine how much of the injury suffered by [plaintiff] was `proximately' or `legally' caused by the illegal entry). 133 We reiterate that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (acknowledging the right of police to respond to emergency situations threatening life or limb and indicating that police may conduct a warrantless search provided that the search is `strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation') (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (The Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home.); Payton, 445 U.S. at 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (emphasizing the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic). Based on the record before us, we must reject the officers' claim the detention of the plaintiffs for at least ninety minutes and the search of the garage apartment were reasonable.