Opinion ID: 3151680
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hands-On Participation

Text: The district court concluded that there was a fact issue as to the constitutionality of Lieutenant Conner’s hands-on participation. It did not make a separate state-of-the-law analysis but instead addressed the state of the law as to him and Officers Coleman and Gasca together. Thus, as discussed above, the district court relied solely on Weigel to hold that the law was clearly established. We need not address the constitutionality of Lieutenant Conner’s hands-on participation, because the law was not clearly established. The district court found sufficient evidence to support the following facts with regard to Lieutenant Conner’s hands-on participation. After Lieutenant Conner got to the zoo, but before he reached the struggle, he heard the sound of a Taser being deployed. When he arrived on the scene he saw Mr. Ashley lying on his side with binding his ankles together, securing his ankles to his wrists, and then placing him face down on the ground.” Id. at 1188. This conduct is not analogous to the force employed by Officer Coleman or Lieutenant Conner. Cruz is more analogous to Officer Gasca’s post-handcuffing conduct. But as discussed below, we lack jurisdiction to consider the denial of qualified immunity for post-handcuffing conduct, and so we need not discuss Cruz. 16 Officers Jones and Coleman and two zoo employees holding him down. He joined the struggle by applying his OPN to Mr. Ashley’s legs, but was unsuccessful; Mr. Ashley showed no reaction to the pain-compliance technique. Lieutenant Conner then assisted a zoo employee with handcuffing Mr. Ashley’s right wrist and helped control Mr. Ashley’s left arm so the left wrist could be handcuffed. During the struggle he noticed that Mr. Ashley had “super human strength” and he believed Mr. Ashley “was under some type of intoxication or maybe excited delirium.” Aplt. App., Vol. IV at 540 (internal quotation marks omitted). The question then is whether case law existing as of July 2011 would alert any reasonable officer that it would be excessive force to join in a struggle between two officers and civilians on the one hand and a detainee on the other hand, to apply an OPN, and to hold the detainee’s arms and assist in handcuffing, where the detainee appears to be resisting but may be intoxicated or suffering from excited delirium. Again, the key fact is that the struggle was ongoing when Lieutenant Conner applied the complained-of force. Lieutenant Conner perceived that Mr. Ashley exhibited no reaction to pain-compliance measures and had superhuman strength given his size. Therefore, the body of case law cited above with regard to Officers Jones and Coleman again supports granting qualified immunity to Lieutenant Conner for his hands-on participation in the struggle. Further, for the reasons discussed above with regard to Officer Coleman, Weigel does not clearly establish the law with regard to this stage of the incident. 17 For these reasons, we conclude that in July 2011 it was not clearly established that Lieutenant Conner’s hands-on conduct could be considered excessive in these circumstances. Lieutenant Conner is entitled to qualified immunity for his hands-on participation in the struggle.