Opinion ID: 77026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection

Text: 48 McNair's final claim is that the State's use of peremptory challenges to strike a number of African-American potential jurors violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). McNair raised this claim before the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Supreme Court of Alabama on direct appeal, and both courts denied relief. Ex parte McNair, 653 So.2d 353, 354-58 (Ala.1994); McNair, 653 So.2d at 323. The district court, after reviewing the state court opinions and conducting an independent review of the record, likewise denied relief on this claim. McNair, 307 F.Supp.2d at 1293. We agree that McNair has not made out a claim for relief under Batson. In Batson, the United States Supreme Court established a three-step test for evaluating claims of racial discrimination in jury selection. The defendant must first establish a prima facie case by producing evidence sufficient to support the inference that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Johnson v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005); Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. The burden then shifts to the State to rebut the defendant's prima facie case by offering race-neutral explanations for its challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. The State's proffered explanation at this stage need not be persuasive or even plausible . . . the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (internal quotation omitted). 49 If both sides carry their burdens, it is left to the court to determine whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. At this point, the decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation . . . should be believed. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion). This is a pure issue of fact, subject to review under a deferential standard . . . [and] peculiarly within a trial judge's province. Id. at 364-65, 111 S.Ct. at 1869 (internal quotation omitted). Also, because this claim was decided on the merits by the Alabama courts, McNair is not entitled to habeas relief unless he can demonstrate that [the] state court's finding of the absence of purposeful discrimination was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence. . . and that the corresponding factual determination was `objectively unreasonable' in light of the record. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 348, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1045, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(e); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2325, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). This standard is demanding, but not insurmountable. Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2325. 50 McNair's trial jury was selected from a sixty-four member venire that included eighteen African-Americans. Ex parte McNair, 653 So.2d at 355. The prosecutor used eleven of his twenty-six peremptory challenges to strike African-Americans; the remaining seven African-American members of the venire served on McNair's jury. 20 Id. McNair argues both that the totality of the circumstances of the jury selection process indicates a Batson violation and that three particular strikes constituted violations. We address each of these claims in turn.
51 McNair presents three arguments intended to cast doubt on the jury selection process: (1) that the district attorney's office that handled McNair's prosecution has a history of racial discrimination; (2) that the prosecutor did not question ten of the eleven stricken African-American venire members about the specific area of concern that prompted the use of the peremptory challenge; and (3) that the prosecutor relied on vague and unsubstantiated notes from an assistant district attorney as the basis for challenging five of the venire members. We readily discount the latter two assertions. The prosecutor's failure to question most of the stricken African-American venire members about the specific concern that prompted the use of the challenge is not very persuasive in this case. For example, it is not likely to have been productive to question a juror about age or a prior misdemeanor or a bad reputation. Moreover, the prosecutor also struck white jurors without such specific questioning. With respect to McNair's assertion that the prosecutor relied on vague and unsubstantiated notes from his assistant, McNair fails to explain why a prosecutor's reliance on notes and information furnished by an assistant is any indication at all of racial bias. Furthermore, our review of the notes does not persuade us that they were unduly vague or unsubstantiated. Although McNair's assertion that the district attorney's office had a history of racial discrimination is a matter of some concern, we will consider that as part of our totality of the circumstances analysis after discussing McNair's challenges with respect to individual jurors.
52 A defendant can establish a Batson violation by demonstrating that any single strike was the result of purposeful discrimination. Cochran v. Herring, 43 F.3d 1404, 1412 (11th Cir.1995). In an attempt to do this, McNair argues that his prosecutors peremptorily challenged three specific venire members in violation of Batson. Before discussing the merits of each claim, we note that in no instances does McNair argue that the prosecutor's proffered reasons for the strikes were facially discriminatory. We also note that the state trial court made a finding of fact that the strikes were not racially motivated, and that the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's ruling was not clearly erroneous. McNair, 653 So.2d at 355-56. Thus, the only question facing this court is whether McNair can show by clear and convincing evidence that the state court finding was erroneous. 53 McNair's first claim focuses on James McAllister. The prosecutor's proffered reason for striking McAllister was that the latter was not from Henry County. In response to a question during voir dire, McAllister gave his address as Route 3, Box 605, which is in Henry County, and stated that he worked in Eufala, Alabama, which is not in Henry County. He remained silent when the trial judge asked the entire venire if any of them resided outside of Henry County. Finally, the notes supplied by the prosecutor's assistant suggested that McAllister did not live in Henry County. Presented with this information, the prosecutor reasonably could have believed that McAllister did not live in Henry County. McAllister clearly worked in another county, his address may have implied residence in another county, and his silence in the face of a general question from the trial judge, while informative, is not dispositive. Although the prosecutor's reason for striking McAllister was based on a belief that ultimately proved incorrect, this does not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the state court's finding of fact was erroneous, and McNair presents no additional evidence to support his contention. 54 McNair's next claim focuses on Allen Boatwright. The prosecutor struck Boatwright because the latter had a prior misdemeanor conviction. McNair argues that this reason was pretextual because the prosecutor had earlier, when asking if any venire members or their relatives or close friends had been prosecuted by that particular district attorney's office, stated that he was not interested in misdemeanors. This argument is not persuasive. After narrowing the field somewhat with his initial inquiry, the prosecutor reasonably could have decided that, of the remaining venire members, he would prefer those without prior criminal violations. We also note that the prosecutor struck white venire members who had prior misdemeanor convictions. The prosecutor's proffered reason was plausible and race-neutral, and McNair offers no evidence to support his claim of pretext. 55 The subject of McNair's third claim is David Marsh. The prosecutor struck Marsh on the basis of a recommendation from an assistant district attorney who knew Marsh and his apparently poor reputation in the community. This reason is facially neutral, and McNair offered no evidence that it was pretextual. In the absence of any evidence that the state's proffered facially neutral reason was pretextual, McNair cannot overcome the presumption favoring the state court's determination.
56 After a careful review of the record, we cannot conclude that the totality of the circumstances provides clear and convincing evidence that the state court's finding of the absence of purposeful discrimination was incorrect, nor can we conclude that the court's corresponding factual determination was objectively unreasonable in light of the record before the court. As noted in the preceding discussion, McNair offers virtually no evidence to indicate that the prosecutor's articulated legitimate reasons for the individual strikes were pretextual. McNair's challenges in that regard are mere speculation lacking any persuasive force. 57 The only argument with any force at all is McNair's list of cases in which convictions obtained by this district attorney's office have been reversed or criticized on the basis of Batson. We cannot conclude that this argument can carry McNair's heavy burden. We note initially that McNair himself admits that a prosecutor's history of discrimination, while a relevant consideration, is not dispositive. In addition, McNair has wholly failed to connect any conduct criticized in the cited cases to McNair's own prosecutor, much less his conduct in this case. Such disconnected history cannot carry McNair's burden, especially when the prosecutor's articulated, legitimate reasons for each strike remain virtually unimpeached. 21 58 Having considered the totality of the circumstances, and in light of the presumption enjoyed by the state court findings of fact, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), we cannot conclude that McNair has rebutted the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented to the state court, 24 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); and thus, the district court correctly denied habeas corpus relief with respect to this Batson claim.