Opinion ID: 9514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: Giraldi challenges the sufficiency of evidence to sustain the convictions on all counts. This Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and affirm if a rational trier of fact could find that the government proved all essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Mackay, 33 F.3d 489 (5th Cir.1994). If the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, the conviction should be reversed. Id. at 493. In reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the countervailing evidence as well as the evidence that supports the verdict. United States v. Wright, 24 F.3d 732 (5th Cir.1994). B. Proof of Giraldi's knowledge of illegal nature of funds Each count of conviction required the government to prove that Giraldi knew that Aguirre's funds were the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. The money laundering conspiracy alleged in Count 1 and the substantive money laundering offenses in Counts 2 through 11, under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, require proof that, Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity ... Section 1956 also requires proof that the defendant knew the transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. Absent sufficient proof of these elements, the convictions on Counts 1 through 11 are invalid. The bank fraud allegations charged in Counts 13 and 14 require proof that Giraldi: ... knowingly executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice 1) to defraud a financial institution; or 2) to obtain any of the monies, funds, credits, assets, securities or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises ... The scheme or artifice alleged in the bank fraud counts of the indictment describes the introduction of drug proceeds into the banking system in a manner designed to provide drug dealers access to loans, which is the same illegal activity alleged in each of the money laundering counts. Therefore, in order to sustain the bank fraud convictions, there must be sufficient evidence that Giraldi knowingly and willfully introduced the drug proceeds into the banks. Counts 15 through 18 alleged violation of 12 U.S.C. § 630, by misapplying bank funds knowingly and willfully, with the intent to injure and defraud the bank, based on false and fraudulent pretenses and representations. The bank's money was allegedly misapplied by loaning it to the drug dealers, who used their drug proceeds on deposit as collateral for the loans. The alleged false and fraudulent pretenses and representations were Giraldi's statements concerning the source of Aguirre's wealth. It is well established that the government must prove that Giraldi knowingly participated in the deceptive or fraudulent transaction. See United States v. Shaid, 916 F.2d 984 (5th Cir.1990) cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1076, 112 S.Ct. 978, 117 L.Ed.2d 141 (1992). Giraldi contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knew Aguirre's funds were t he proceeds of unlawful activity. There is no direct evidence of Giraldi's knowledge that Aguirre's funds were derived from illegal drug sales. Giraldi contends that he made a mistake by not discovering the illegal source of Aguirre's funds, and t hat the government's proof that he was negligent or that he should have known is not sufficient for conviction. The government answers that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Giraldi did in fact know or was willfully blind to the source of Aguirre's funds. This argument is supported by the evidence that Giraldi was specifically charged with investigating and knowing his client, was dishonest about the fact that he had not followed the prescribed procedures prior to taking the initial deposit, failed to properly paper various transactions during his relationship with Aguirre and took several actions to control the damage once the authorities began to investigate Aguirre's holdings. After a careful review of the record, we have concluded that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Giraldi's conviction. In addition to the falsehoods contained in the Benet memo, Giraldi either personally made or approved false statements in banking records concerning the source of funds coming into and the use of funds flowing out of the Aguirre account. The evidence revealed that Giraldi stated that Aguirre was invested 100 percent in deposits with Texas banks prior to opening his BT accounts. The evidence of wire transfers that tracked the source of the money Aguirre deposited showed that it came from cash deposits into and temporary placement with currency exchange houses rather than deposits with Texas banks. Likewise, the statements concerning the use to which funds from Aguirre's loans and letters of credit were put were false. In addition to the false statements in the bank records, Giraldi made false statements to a government agent named Iglio who was investigating irregularities in one of Aguirre's accounts shortly after Aguirre's reported death. At that time, the government had seized Green Mountain, an AEBI account for which Giraldi served as account representative, pursuant to a criminal investigation of Rogelio Rodriguez. Aguirre, Aguirre's wife and daughter each owned an interest in Green Mountain and Rodriguez was listed as the fourth owner. This conversation was recorded without Giraldi's knowledge and the recording and transcript were admitted into evidence at trial. During that conversation, Iglio asked Giraldi how he got hooked up with Aguirre. Giraldi lied to Iglio, saying that Aguirre was a client of Banker's Trust where he worked earlier, and had been referred by Banker's Trust. Iglio also asked Giraldi about the relationship between Rogelio Rodriguez and Aguirre. Giraldi claimed that Aguirre had only recently met Rodriguez, who had never had anything to do with Green Mountain, except that Aguirre had guaranteed a $1.5 million letter of credit for him with Green Mountain's assets, because Aguirre was a generous, naive person. In fact, Giraldi's records, admitted into evidence at trial, showed that Aguirre and Rodriguez were partners in various enterprises and that overlapping ownership by Green Mountain, Aguirre, Rodriguez and seven other trust accounts and businesses formed a complex web of financial relationships that Giraldi's taped statements omitted or denied. In addition to the false statements in bank records and on the Iglio tape, evidence was introduced concerning Giraldi's extensive background and experience in international banking. He had attended banker training seminars that outlined typical money laundering schemes that were very similar to the banking practices that Giraldi used on behalf of Aguirre. He had been trained and even served as a trainer in know-your-client practices that, had they been employed, would have exposed Aguirre's wealth as illegitimate. Further evidence showed that the wife of the drug lord Abrego was named on the original Aguirre Swiss bank account without proper documentation. When proper documentation was requested, she withdrew from ownership rather than provide it. The government offered t his as circumstantial evidence that Giraldi knew that the money in the Aguirre accounts was not legitimate. Although there is no requirement that the Government provide a motive for the charged offense, there was evidence that the motive for Giraldi's crime was the pressure on international bankers to recruit new clients and the concomitant professional and monetary success that comes to those who are able to produce. Giraldi offers alternate explanations for the evidence at trial. He claims that the Benet memo was partly true, in that the referral came through Benet's colleague Laura Machuca, and that there was no proof that Giraldi believed anything in the memo was false when he made out the memo. The problem with this explanation is that even if the jury were willing to assume Giraldi made a mistake about the original referral, he did not correct it once he talked to Benet and discovered the mistake and even repeated the information in subsequent banking documents. Further, inaccurate information about the size of Benet's deposits and the length of his relationship with Citibank was clearly within Giraldi's knowledge at the time the memo was written and was never corrected. Giraldi variously describes away the evidence as memory lapses, misstatements, sloppiness, carelessness, failure of Giraldi to be aware of the falsity of statements, both oral and written, and that certain practices, such as vague purpose statements on loan applications, were standard procedure in international banking. This is a close case. However, it is not especially remarkable given that mental state is almost always proved by circumstantial evidence from which the jury must infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewed in the light most favorable t o the prosecution, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Giraldi's convictions. A rational jury could have found it incredible that carelessness and honest mistakes could account for the complexity of financial gerrymandering required to give Aguirre's transactions the appearance of legitimacy. Giraldi's additional challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bank fraud and misapplication counts are without merit. GIRALDI'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL A. Standard of review The standard of review for the denial of a new trial is abuse of discretion. United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.1991). This Court must affirm the conviction if a rational jury could have found the elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Dula, 989 F.2d 772, 778 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 172, 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993). Review does not encompass weighing the evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses. Id.