Opinion ID: 402385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: 5 On appeal, Entrekin argues that: (1) the district court lacked the statutory authority to impose the split imprisonment/probation term on the three mail fraud counts to run concurrently with the remaining concurrent one year terms of imprisonment; and (2) the probationary term of his sentence is illegal because there is no custodial sanction available to impose on Entrekin should he violate his probation. According to Entrekin, his entire sentence expired when he served one year in custody on the two unsuspended sentences, because the one-year's imprisonment likewise satisfied the other three concurrent one-year split sentences. 2 We will consider each of these contentions in turn.1. Statutory Authority 6 Entrekin's first argument is that the district court exceeded its statutory authority in imposing the sentence because under 18 U.S.C. § 3651, second paragraph-upon which the district court relied in imposing the split sentence on the three mail fraud counts-imposition of part imprisonment-part probation sentences is permissible only on one-count convictions, and only when the term of imprisonment does not exceed six months. In the present case, Entrekin argues, his split sentence was imposed on a multi-count conviction, and in connection with a term of imprisonment that exceeds six months. 3 7 Entrekin relies on the legislative history surrounding the second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 3651. See S.Rep.No.2135, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3841. Before section 3651 was amended to include its present second paragraph, combined imprisonment-probation sentences could be imposed only on multi-count convictions by virtue of the present first and third paragraphs of section 3651. In single-count indictments, the sentencing judge was faced with choosing either imprisonment or probation, but no combination of the two. The second paragraph of section 3651 was added to inject the same flexibility into one-count situations as existed in multi-count situations. 4 8 Nevertheless, although the intent was to expand sentencing flexibility as to a conviction on a one-count indictment, we cannot find, as Entrekin suggests, any Congressional intent to prevent the imposition of mixed imprisonment-probation sentences in multi-count convictions. Rather, the amendment was meant to expand the sentencing prerogative to permit imprisonment and probation to be imposed on both single-count and multi-count convictions. In a multi-count context, the usual method of combining imprisonment and probation is to impose consecutive sentences, with the imprisonment counts to be followed by the suspended-sentence (probation) counts, see, e.g., Smith v. United States, 505 F.2d 893, 894 (5th Cir. 1974), but section 3651 does not compel such an arrangement. Cf., United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1322 (5th Cir. 1975) (split sentences imposed on multi-count conviction). 9 Entrekin argues that the first and third paragraphs of section 3651 permit mixed imprisonment-probation sentences in multi-count convictions, but that split sentences may not be imposed on the same count. The plain language of the statute belies Entrekin's contention in that the third paragraph of section 3651 provides: Probation may be limited to one or more counts or indictments, but in the absence of express limitation, shall extend to the entire sentence and judgment. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (2d paragraph) (emphasis supplied). In the present case, the district court explicitly limited the probation term of the sentence to begin after Entrekin served six months in custody. 2. The Absence of a Sanction 10 Entrekin next argues that because the district court imposed five concurrent one-year sentences, with three of those sentences split into six months' imprisonment and three years' probation, the time served in custody under the two concurrent terms of one-year of imprisonment must be credited toward Entrekin's split sentences. If he does not receive credit and violates the terms of his probation, Entrekin argues, he will have to serve an additional six months' imprisonment. This would mean that Entrekin could suffer a total of eighteen months' imprisonment, which would (he argues) effectively convert Entrekin's total sentence from one involving concurrent terms to one involving consecutive terms. Entrekin relies primarily on Gaddis v. United States, 280 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1960). 11 Gaddis involved concurrent sentences, one of which was wholly suspended and one of which was not. 5 The court held that Gaddis should receive credit on the concurrent suspended term for the time served on the unsuspended term. Unlike the ambiguous sentencing in Gaddis (see: (T)his case has arisen under a most peculiar factual background, and its decision hinges thereon. 280 F.2d at 337), here the district court expressly provided that the concurrent sentences imposed would be concurrent insofar as imprisonment for the first six months only, but that the remainder of the partially suspended one-year sentences would be on probationary terms-just as the court could without question have provided had the five convictions resulted from five separate single-count convictions. We can find in this sentence no violation of the statutory discriminatory sentencing power of the trial judge. 12 Entrekin thus ignores the fact that he was convicted of five separate counts of a seven-count indictment. Each sentence is predicated on the commission of a separate offense. Even though Entrekin will complete serving his sentences on the conspiracy and false declaration charges after one year, this does not affect the suspended, but unexecuted, portion of the split sentences imposed on the three counts of mail fraud. These sentences are separate and distinct from the two custodial sentences that Entrekin will have to serve in full. Further, our analysis does not violate Gaddis even in spirit, in that under the explicit terms of the district court sentence, Entrekin will be credited one day toward completion of his probation term for every day that he spends in custody pursuant to his unsuspended sentences.