Opinion ID: 222853
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misconduct Claims

Text: The District Court separately addressed whether Verbanik had exhausted administrative remedies through the inmate disciplinary system as to his claims that pertained to misconduct proceedings. The District Court concluded that Verbanik failed to exhaust administrative remedies regarding claims that did not allege due process violations and that he failed to state a due process violation because, in light of Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), he did not demonstrate “that he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest that was offended by the Defendants’ actions in allegedly issuing a false report.” Opinion at 10-11. The District Court did not set forth Verbanik’s claims or clarify which of those claims allege due process violations. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for us “to exercise our appellate function to determine whether the district court committed an error of law” as to either basis for its dismissal of these claims. See Logan v. Moyer, 898 F.2d 356, 357 (3d Cir. 1990). We have not yet decided whether or under what circumstances a prisoner may exhaust administrative remedies in the course of misconduct proceedings under DCADM 801. See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the Inmate Discipline Policy is distinct from the Inmate Grievance Review System and declining to hold that a Pennsylvania inmate may satisfy the exhaustion requirement in misconduct proceedings). We decline to do so on this record. It appears that the District Court dismissed all “non-due-process” claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because such claims could not have been 6 raised in the prison disciplinary system. To the extent that Verbanik was required to exhaust through the Inmate Grievance Review System (DC-ADM 804) any claim that could not have been addressed in the Inmate Discipline System (DC-ADM 801), the District Court erred in failing to consider his argument that remedies were not available because he feared retaliation by defendants.1 As the District Court erred in considering matters outside the pleadings without advising the parties that the defendants’ motion would be treated as a summary judgment motion and providing Verbanik an opportunity to present his own affidavit in response, and as there is a question whether administrative remedies were rendered unavailable as to all of Verbanik’s claims by defendants’ alleged retaliatory actions, we will vacate the District Court’s order and will remand for further proceedings. We deny Verbanik’s motion for appointment of counsel. In light of the complexity of the exhaustion issues, however, the District Court may wish to appoint counsel upon remand. 1 In many (if not all) of his misconduct claims, Verbanik asserts that charges were filed in retaliation for his exercise of a constitutionally protected right. “[G]overnment actions, which standing alone do not violate the Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000). Any such claim would not be foreclosed under Sandin. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2000). 7