Opinion ID: 2688436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contentions Other Than Exceptions

Text: We address (and reject) Zhang’s five contentions that do not constitute exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. First, we reject Zhang’s contention that Bar Counsel inhibited her ability to contact Husband before the hearing. Bar Counsel offered to attempt to facilitate a or Remedial Action on April 15, 2013; thus, at no time during this attorney discipline proceeding was the annulment/divorce matter pending in the Virginia Court. Similarly, we reject the contention that the predominant effect of Zhang’s conduct was in Virginia. See MLRPC 8.5(b)(2) (“[T]he rule of professional conduct to be applied shall be . . . the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct.”). Zhang maintained a law office in Maryland, solicited Metcalf—an attorney who shared office space to assist her in Maryland, engaged in discussions with Metcalf in Maryland, and engaged in conduct involving her representation of Wife in Maryland. In examining Zhang’s contention as to predominant effect of the conduct, we find no grounds on which to alter the determination that the MLRPC applies to the case. 6 The only distinction between the sets of rules charged worth pointing out is that the VRPC does not contain a subsection corresponding to MLRPC 8.4(d), concerning conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. - 12 - telephonic or electronic deposition of Husband. Additionally, Bar Counsel provided Zhang’s counsel with Husband’s address. Thus, Bar Counsel actually facilitated Zhang’s ability to contact Husband before the hearing. Second, we reject Zhang’s contention that her rights were violated because she could not confront the complainant (i.e., Husband), who did not testify at the hearing. The right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of Maryland Declaration of Rights applies to a criminal case, not an attorney discipline proceeding. Cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Marcalus, 414 Md. 501, 521, 996 A.2d 350, 362 (2010) (“An attorney disciplinary proceeding . . . is not governed by the same standard of proof as a criminal trial, and it does not demand the same evidentiary burdens as does a criminal prosecution.” (Citation omitted)). 7 Third, we reject Zhang’s contention that the hearing judge erred in sustaining Bar Counsel’s objections after Zhang’s counsel asked Metcalf: “What provision of the Maryland or Virginia or the District of Columbia rules excuses you from having to 7 We are unpersuaded by Zhang’s reliance on this Court’s dicta in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee, 387 Md. 89, 114, 874 A.2d 897, 912 (2005) (“[A]ny concerns that a respondent . . . has been prejudiced by false statements made during the Peer Review process are ameliorated by the fact that the respondent . . . ultimately will have the opportunity to confront the complainant, under oath, at an evidentiary hearing.” (Citations omitted)). The Peer Review process is a confidential and informal process in which a panel consisting of lawyers and at least one layperson hears from the complainant and the respondent and determines whether the matter can be resolved without formal disciplinary action. Id. at 99 n.7, 874 A.2d at 903. In Lee, id. at 98, 102, 874 A.2d at 902, 904, the complainant filed a complaint against the respondent lawyer, spoke during the panel review process, and testified at the evidentiary hearing. No statute, Maryland Rule, or holding of this Court, however, requires that a complainant testify at a hearing in an attorney discipline proceeding. - 13 - communicate directly with your client?”; “[A]re you aware of any exception to Rule 1.4 in Maryland or Virginia that creates an exception excusing you in communicating directly with your client?”; and “Isn’t the critical inquiry whether or not there is confidential information that is being used in one representation to the next?” Zhang’s counsel asked for Metcalf’s opinion about the MLRPC, VRPC, DCRPC, and conflicts of interest. The hearing judge had not admitted Metcalf as an expert in the fields of the MLRPC, VRPC, DCRPC, or conflicts of interest. Fourth, we reject Zhang’s contention that the hearing judge erred in sustaining Bar Counsel’s objections after Zhang’s counsel asked Zhang: “Going back to your representation in the immigration matter, did you obtain from [Husband] any confidential information during the course of that representation?”; and “In the course of your immigration representation, did you obtain any information from [Husband] aside from his name, address, and that he would be the sponsor for [Wife]’s immigration application?” Zhang’s counsel asked for confidential information. Generally, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client[.]” MLRPC
Fifth, we reject Zhang’s contention that the hearing judge erred in declining to admit into evidence the Commission’s investigator’s report. In so contending, Zhang cites multiple exceptions to the rule against hearsay, but fails to explain why any such exception applies to the Commission’s investigator’s report. - 14 -