Opinion ID: 1931528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 2The Conduct of the Employer IssueWaiver and Estoppel.

Text: In its approach to petitioner's undertaking to avoid the bar which would ordinarily arise from his failure to file a timely petition for award of compensation the Commission subdivided petitioner's contention into the two separate concepts of waiver and estoppel. The only findings of fact made by the Commission bearing on waiver and estoppel were: (1) Mrs. Farris told Dr. Pino more than once, that she thought his case was `covered' because an employer's first report had been submitted; (2)  ... [Nurse Farris] was aware that ... [Dr. Pino] was obtaining medical treatment for his injured shoulder from different doctors; (3) [b]efore November 1974, Mrs. Farris was not aware that a Petition for Award of Compensation had to be filed within two years; and (4) ... [Nurse Farris] never had anything to do with filing ... petitions [for award of compensation]. As to waiver, properly conceived by the Commission as the intentional relinquishment of a known right, the Commission ruled, correctly, that Mrs. Farris' actions, as imputable to Maplewood, could not constitute a waiver by Maplewood of its right to assert Dr. Pino's late filing of a petition for award as a bar to his claim because Mrs. Farris didn't know of this requirement and, therefor[e], could not voluntarily set it aside. The Commission disposed of the estoppel contention with no more than the summary conclusory statement: We do not believe that the actions or statements of Mrs. Farris, or of anyone else who participated for Maplewood, are grounds for ruling that Maplewood is estopped from asserting that Dr. Pino's rights are barred by the two year filing limitation of Paragraph 95 of the Act. We find it highly significant, however, that the Commission stated this ultimate conclusion immediately after it had ruled, concerning waiver, that Mrs. Farris lacked knowledge of the two-year filing requirement. Moreover, we must take the Commission's generalized mention of the actions or statements of Mrs. Farris .. as a reference only to those activities of Mrs. Farris concerning which the Commission had made the particularized findings of fact above-described. With the Commission's estoppel decision thus postured, we must conclude that the record discloses affirmative indication that the Commission's evaluation of the estoppel question may have proceeded on the conception that it was essential to an estoppel in pais against Maplewood that Nurse Farris actually knew about the two-year filing requirement and, hence, her representations to Dr. Pinothat the submission of the employer's first report had sufficiently covered his claimwere knowingly, not inadvertently, misleading representations. This is an erroneous view of the necessary elements of estoppel in pais. Unlike waiver, which, taken as the voluntary relinquishment of a known right, concentrates on fundamentally subjective considerations, estoppel in pais is concerned with essentially objective factors. Estoppel flows from the actual consequences produced by the conduct of A upon B regardless of whether A subjectively intended the consequences, and which resulted because, objectively evaluated, B has justifiably relied upon A's conduct. It is, therefore, not an essential element of estoppel in pais that the party subjected to it shall have knowingly or intentionally misled the other person. As this Court explained in Stubbs v. Franklin & Megantic Railway Company, 101 Me. 355, 362, 64 A. 625, 627 (1906): The doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied with great care. It is not necessary, however, that there should be intentional moral wrong. There may be such negligence as is the equivalent of fraud. (emphasis supplied) See also: Holt v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Company, 110 Me. 10, 12, 85 A. 159 (1912); Smith v. Phillips National Bank, 114 Me. 297, 302-303, 96 A. 217 (1915); Milliken v. Buswell, Me., 313 A.2d 111, 119 (1973). Estoppel in pais rests on the principle `... if ... [one] actually misleads ... [another] by his own representations, though innocently, the maxim is justly applied to him, that where one of two innocent persons must suffer, he shall suffer, who, by his own acts, occasioned the confidence and the loss.' Colby v. Norton, 19 Me. 412, 418 (1841). [3] (emphasis supplied) Hence, to assure that petitioner's estoppel contentions are decided under a correct legal conception of the estoppel in pais principle, as a doctrine of fair dealing having applicability in workmen's compensation cases, Norton v. Penobscot Frozen Food Lockers, Inc., supra, at p. 33, we must remand this case to the Commission for its reconsideration of the estoppel question in light of this opinion. For the further guidance of the Commission in this regard, we think it advisable to make mention, also, of the legal principles under which the conduct of Nurse Farris, or others, becomes legally chargeable to Maplewood. We do this in specific relation to the Commission's particular finding of fact that Nurse Farris ... never had anything to do with [the] filing [of] ... petitions for award of compensation. Regardless of Nurse Farris' actual authority, Maplewood can become legally bound by virtue of what ... [petitioner], dealing with the agent, [Nurse Farris] believe[d] and ... [had] a right to believe as to the agent's authority from the acts of the principal.  Frye v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 129 Me. 289, 297, 151 A. 537, 541 (1930) (emphasis supplied) See also: Berman v. Griggs, 145 Me. 258, 75 A.2d 365 (1950). As bearing on such apparent authority, the record contains evidencein the form of the testimony of Nurse Farris herself, of her superiors and of an insurance company sales managerthat Maplewood had allowed Nurse Farris for a considerable period of time to handle all compensation matters, with the exception of procurement and maintenance of the insurance coverage. In light of this evidence the Commission should evaluate whether, by such conduct, Maplewood had made it a reasonable appearance to persons like the petitioner that Nurse Farris had authority to represent Maplewood in all those matters. Frye v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., supra. By thus concentrating on the respects in which the conduct of Nurse Farris may bind Maplewood, we do not suggest that hers is the only conduct appearing of record which could be imputable to Maplewood and constitute a basis for the assertion of an estoppel against Maplewood. On the contrary the Commission itself acknowledged that others may have acted for Maplewood when it referred in its conclusory statement regarding estoppel to anyone else who participated for Maplewood. This could reasonably be taken as a reference to the evidence that certain notices to employees had been posted pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 26 [4] which announced in part: If you receive a work-related injury, no matter how slight, NOTIFY YOUR EMPLOYER AT ONCE. You may lose your right to compensation unless your employer has knowledge of the injury within 30 days and you file your Petition within two years from the date of injury. (emphasis in original) As the fact-finder, the Commission would have warrant to conclude that by the emphasis on reporting to the employer, rather than on filing a petition with the Commission, these notices reinforced the misrepresentations inadvertently made by Nurse Farris as the grounds for the assertion of an estoppel against Maplewood. The entry is: Appeal sustained. Pro forma decree of the Superior Court vacated. Case remanded to the Industrial Accident Commission for further proceedings. It is further ordered that the Appellees Maplewood Packing Company and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company pay to the appellant Stefano Pino an allowance of $550.00 for his counsel fees, plus his reasonable out-of-pocket expenses for this appeal.