Opinion ID: 789056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: 13 We have, on several prior occasions, engaged in extensive reviews of the history and background of the False Claims Act. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 738 (3d Cir.1997); Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1152-54; id. at 1162-68 (Scirica, J., dissenting). And we have expended a fair amount of ink examining various aspects of the Act's jurisdictional bar provision. 6 To resolve the instant appeal, we need not reopen Pandora's box with respect to certain requirements of the Act, such as the contours of the public disclosure requirement. Nor do we choose to resolve the issue that the District Court addressed, namely, whether Paranich's knowledge was direct given the role his attorney played in the investigation. This is because we see the instant matter as turning on an issue we have not previously addressed, namely, the requirement that the source must have provided information to the government voluntarily. 14 In broad strokes, the FCA imposes penalties on persons who knowingly submit fraudulent claims to the government. To encourage the ferreting out of fraud against the government, the FCA incentives private individuals aware of such fraud to bring civil actions as relators against those submitting such claims by allowing relators to collect a percentage of any recovery. Prior to filing such a civil action, known as a qui tam action, the relator must disclose the information regarding the fraud to the government. The government then has sixty days to intervene and take over the action. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). If the government does not do so, the relator may continue with the action unless the FCA's jurisdictional bar provision is triggered. The jurisdictional bar provision operates to exclude qui tam actions based upon allegations of fraud or fraudulent transactions that have been publicly disclosed prior to their filing. The provision was designed to preclude qui tam suits based on information that would have been equally available to strangers to the fraud transaction had they chosen to look for it as it was to the relator. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1155-56. This provision does, however, contain a savings clause, preserving suits brought by an original source of the information even where there have been prior public disclosures. 15 The text of the jurisdictional bar provision reads: 16 (A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government [General] Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information. 17 (B) For purposes of this paragraph, original source means an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information. 18 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). As enumerated elements, this section divests courts of subject matter jurisdiction where: 19 (1) there was a public disclosure; 20 (2) in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government [General] Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media; 21 (3) of allegations or transactions of the fraud; 22 (4) that the relator's action was based upon; and 23 (5) the relator was not an original source of the information. 24 Cf. Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 738. We will employ this catalog of elements to structure our analysis, touching on certain aspects more briefly than others.