Opinion ID: 500012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: personal jurisdictional over the unexco defendants

Text: 7 Section 13-423(a)(1) of the District of Columbia long arm statute provides that a local court may have personal jurisdiction over a person as to a claim arising from that person's transacting any business in the District of Columbia. This provision of the long-arm statute has been interpreted to be coextensive with the Constitution's due process limit. See Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C.Cir.1987). In the instant case, FCI argues that the District may exercise jurisdiction over the UNEXCO defendants pursuant to Sec. 13-423(a)(1). 2 We disagree. For the reasons that follow, we uphold the district court's conclusion that due process precludes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the UNEXCO defendants. 8 FCI concedes that neither UNEXCO nor its officers maintained a bank account in the District relevant to this lawsuit; the only bank accounts that are implicated in the alleged check-kiting scheme were maintained at PIBC by Petra, JASE and Kattan. See Appellant's Brief at 40 n. 39. Nor does appellant contend that UNEXCO has its place of business in the District. Rather, FCI's position is that the flow of checks and wire transfers into and out of the PIBC account in the District constituted the transaction of business in which [the UNEXCO defendants] actively participated. Appellant's Reply Brief at 10. According to FCI, [t]he continuous transfer of massive sums of money through PIBC accounts in the District was a calculated and intentional projection of UNEXCO's check-kiting business into the District of Columbia. Appellant's Brief at 40. Conclusory statements such as these, however, [do] not constitute the prima facie showing necessary to carry the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction, Naartex, 722 F.2d at 787, and FCI has failed to adduce any concrete evidence establishing that UNEXCO participated in an illegal check-kiting scheme or that it purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privileges of conducting activities within [the District]. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). The evidence in the record shows only that UNEXCO received checks drawn on accounts in the District and that UNEXCO wrote checks on its FCI account in New York that were eventually deposited in the District by third parties. As the district court noted, UNEXCO is not alleged to have sent any checks directly to [PIBC]. Mem.Op. at 14 (emphasis added). Nor is there any indication whatsoever in the record that UNEXCO specifically arranged for the checks to be deposited in, or drawn on, the PIBC accounts in the District. As the Supreme Court has stated, the mere fact that a plaintiff accepts checks drawn on a bank in a particular forum is of neglible significance for determining whether the plaintiff has sufficient contacts with that forum. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). Because FCI has not presented evidence to substantiate its claim that UNEXCO transacted business with Petra or that UNEXCO had any unusual ties with the PIBC accounts in the District, we agree with the trial court that there is no basis on which to hold that [the UNEXCO defendants] 'purposefully directed' their activities in any way towards the District. 3 Mem.Op. at 23. 9 FCI claims in the alternative that Petra and PIBC are co-conspirators of UNEXCO and that the District has jurisdiction over UNEXCO through the agency of Petra and PIBC. As noted, however, the general rule is that a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of the pertinent jurisdictional facts. See, e.g., Chase v. Pan-Pacific Broadcasting, Inc., 617 F.Supp. 1414, 1415 n. 1 (D.D.C.1985); Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 445 F.Supp. 687, 691-92 (D.Kan.1978); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d Sec. 1068, at 345 (1987). Here, FCI has fallen far short of making out a prima facie case of the jurisdictional fact of a check-kiting conspiracy. There is no concrete evidence in the record indicating that there was a common plan--in the District or anywhere else--to defraud FCI and that UNEXCO and Petra and PIBC conspired and acted to further that plan. Nor has appellant brought forth evidence to establish that there was any connection between FCI's $23 million overdraft in New York and the transfer of funds through the PIBC accounts in the District. It is settled a plaintiff must allege specific acts connecting [the] defendant with the forum, Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204, 1208 n. 5 (9th Cir.1980), and that the bare allegation of conspiracy or agency is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. E.g., McLaughlin v. McPhail, 707 F.2d 800, 806 (4th Cir.1983); Lehigh Valley Indus. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 93-94 (2d Cir.1975). 4 10 Because FCI has failed to make a prima facie showing that UNEXCO has purposefully established minimum contacts with the District or that it participated in a conspiracy in the District to defraud FCI, we affirm the district court's ruling that the District does not have personal jurisdiction over the UNEXCO defendants. 5