Opinion ID: 2537633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in refusing jury instructions D-14 and D-15.

Text: ¶ 44. Instruction D-14 reads: In your deliberations, you are bound to give Kristi Fulgham the benefit of any reasonable doubt of her guilt that arises out of the evidence or want of evidence in this case. There is always a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt when the evidence simply makes it probable that the defendant is guilty. Mere probability of guilt will never warrant you to convict Kristi Fulgham. It is only when on the whole evidence you are able to say on your oaths, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty that the law will permit you to find her guilty. You might be able to say you believe Kristi Fulgham guilty and yet, if you are not able to say on your oath, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she is guilty, it is your sworn duty to find Kristi Fulgham not guilty. ¶ 45. And instruction D-15 reads: A reasonable doubt may arise not only from the evidence produced but also from a lack of evidence. Reasonable doubt exists when, after weighing and considering all the evidence, using reason and common sense, jurors cannot say that they have a settled conviction of the truth of the charge. ¶ 46. These instructions are attempts to define reasonable doubt. This Court has long held that a definition of reasonable doubt is not a proper instruction for the jury; `[r]easonable doubt defines itself.' [49] We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying these two instructions.