Opinion ID: 6105180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Relevance and undue prejudice.

Text: Lastly, Corbin claims that the testimonies of Michelle Corbin and Trooper Begley fail KRE11 401, 402, 403, and 404’s requirements for relevance and undue prejudice. The core of admissibility resides in KRE 401, 402 and 403. KRE 402 states “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided[.]” Relevant evidence means “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” KRE 401. KRE 403 provides the trial court with latitude to exclude otherwise relevant evidence because the “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice[.]” However, as we stated in Probus v. Commonwealth, “[t]he inclusionary thrust of the law of evidence is powerful, unmistakable, and undeniable, one that strongly tilts outcomes toward admission of evidence rather than exclusion.” 578 S.W.3d 339, 347 (Ky. 2019) (citation omitted). Indeed, “KRE 403 is carefully calculated to leave trial judges with extraordinary discretion in the application and use of [KRE 403].” Id. (citation omitted). When, however, testimony concerns prior bad acts, KRE 404 operates as a limiting principle on admissibility, and, generally speaking, testimony regarding a prior bad act is inadmissible. See KRE 404(b) (“[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible in order to prove the character of a 11 Kentucky Rules of Evidence. 14 person or in order to show action in conformity therewith[]”). For evidence of other bad acts to be admissible under KRE 404(b)(1), it must satisfy the threepart balancing test set forth in Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1994). That test focuses on relevance, probativeness, and prejudice of the evidence: (1) Is the evidence relevant for some other purpose than to prove the criminal disposition of the accused? (2) Does it have probative value, i.e., whether a jury could reasonably infer that the prior bad acts occurred and that the accused committed them? (3) Is its probative value substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect? See id. at 889–91. Because Corbin failed to properly preserve his challenges, we review his claims only for palpable error under RCr 10.26. Therefore, Corbin must show not only that the trial court committed an error, but also that he suffered a “manifest injustice, either through the probability of a different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of law.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Ky. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
At trial, the Commonwealth had the following exchange with Michelle regarding her interaction with Corbin at their home: C: What state of mind was [Corbin] in when he left? M: I assumed him to be wild. I don’t know on what or how much or anything like that I just know he wasn’t himself. C: You said he was wild, what do you mean by that? M: Intoxicated. Intoxicated on something. 15 C: What’s your basis for saying that? You’ve seen him intoxicated before? M: Yes. C: On what? M: Name it, I’ve seen him intoxicated on a lot of things. He’s probably seen me as well, you know. C: What did he appear to you to be under the influence of that day? M: Maybe meth. C: Do you believe that he was under the influence of methamphetamines that day? M: I believe he was under the influence of something. It could have been pills, it could have been anything. Corbin argues Michelle’s testimony was unduly prejudicial because drug use is a felony in the Commonwealth, and any probative value was outweighed by the negative light her testimony cast on his character. The Commonwealth counters by stating that, at the time of Michelle’s testimony, Corbin was charged with fleeing or evading in the first degree while being intoxicated under KRS 520.095(1)(a)2 and his state of mind, as well as whether he was under the influence, was probative and relevant to the charge. We agree with the Commonwealth. Further, Michelle’s testimony was based on considerable personal experience with Corbin, including his erratic behavior during their exchange at the house, and was material to proving the first-degree fleeing or evading charge. Additionally, we note that even if the trial court should have struck the testimony from the record, the jury acquitted Corbin of the relevant charge. Corbin’s ancillary argument that the jury’s decision to recommend the maximum sentence on each of his convictions necessarily dictates a finding that Michelle’s testimony was unduly prejudicial is similarly unpersuasive. 16 The Commonwealth presented a wealth of testimonial and direct evidence to support each of Corbin’s convictions, and this short exchange between Michelle and the Commonwealth does not mar the jury’s decisions or recommendations.
Corbin’s last allegation involves the testimony of Trooper Begley, which outlined the police procedures utilized to arrest him at the motel several days after he escaped from the police chase. Specifically, Corbin alleges that Trooper Begley impermissibly informed the jury that he originally went to arrest Corbin on an unrelated charge, and that, because of the threats Corbin made towards Michelle, the officers staged a trooper armed with a rifle across the parking lot from the motel. Trooper Begley further testified that, after speaking with Corbin through the door of his motel room, Corbin peacefully surrendered to police. While we agree with Corbin that Trooper Begley’s testimony regarding the unrelated warrant was irrelevant, its inclusion in his testimony was not palpable error. Given Corbin’s text messages to Michelle, as well as the ensuing police chase in which he forced the officers off the road, the police had ample reason to take extra precautions in securing Corbin’s capture. Moreover, given the weight of the evidence against Corbin, we do not believe that excluding any of the challenged testimony would have resulted in a different outcome at trial.