Opinion ID: 1908635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: expert testimony of eyewitness identifications.

Text: Appellants contend that the trial court erred in excluding the proffered expert testimony of Dr. Steven Penrod, a university professor who has published extensively on the reliability vel non of eyewitness identifications. This proffer was made chiefly by appellant Green in order to challenge his identification by Givens.
As we have often reiterated in a number of contexts, [t]he admission of expert testimony is committed to the broad discretion of the trial court and a ruling either admitting or excluding such evidence will not be disturbed unless `manifestly erroneous.' Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 831 (D.C.1977) (quoting Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 8 L.Ed.2d 313 (1962)); accord, e.g., Eason v. United States, 687 A.2d 922, 925 (D.C.1996), aff'd in pertinent part, 704 A.2d 284, 285 (D.C.1997) (en banc) (per curiam); In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 897 (D.C.1991) (en banc). In Dyas, we identified three criteria for the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) the subject matter must be so distinctively related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman; (2) the witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth; and (3) expert testimony is inadmissible if the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an expert. 376 A.2d at 832 (quoting McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 29-31 (E. Cleary ed., 2d ed.1972)) (emphasis in original). In Dyas and its progeny, we have consistently upheld decisions to exclude expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness identifications as within the trial court's broad discretion. See Taylor v. United States, 451 A.2d 859, 866-67 (D.C.1982); Brooks v. United States, 448 A.2d 253, 257-58 (D.C.1982); Jackson v. United States, 420 A.2d 1202, 1203 n. 2 (D.C. 1979) (en banc); (Michael) Smith v. United States, 389 A.2d 1356, 1358-59 (D.C.1978) (per curiam); Dyas, supra, 376 A.2d at 832. Appellants agree that abuse of discretion remains the standard, but they suggest that trial courts have come to interpret Dyas as articulating a rule that such testimony is per se inadmissible. [7] To address that concern, we pause to say a few more words about Dyas. It may be useful to recall the facts of Dyas. It involved an outdoor robbery at gunpoint on a clear afternoon in which the witness had no impediments to his observation of [the defendant] during the two or three minutes they were confronting each other at a distance of three feet. 376 A.2d at 830. He gave a detailed and essentially accurate description of the defendant at the crime scene. Id. The witness identified the defendant as the robber in a photo array and subsequent line-up within two weeks of the robbery. [8] See id. The proffered testimony of the expert witness in its specifics would have stated that scientific literature supports the conclusions that (1) one under stress does not make observations as accurately as one not under stress; (2) within hours after a criminal episode the ability to remember details begins to rapidly decline; and (3) once a person publicly announces an opinion he will be motivated to maintain it despite the existence of subsequent, contrary evidence. Id. at 831. Under these circumstances, we were persuaded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered testimony since its subject matter was not beyond the ken of the average layman nor would such testimony aid the trier in a search for the truth, and that counsel through effective cross-examination would be able to sufficiently present to the jury any inconsistencies or deficiencies in the eyewitness testimony. See id. at 832. The Dyas case and its progeny simply upheld discretionary calls by the trial court in the circumstances presented. Dyas does not exclude expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness identification for all purposes and under all circumstances, even where a trial court, in its discretion, believes the jurors might find such testimony truly helpful. Conversely, a determination by the trial court excluding such testimony as not beyond the ken of the average layman is a ruling only that upon the particular proffer made and in the concrete setting of that case, the possible assistance of the expert testimony to the jury is insufficient to outweigh the potential for distracting the jury or supplanting its customary role in evaluating credibility. Under Dyas, as under any case concerning the admissibility of expert testimony, we will review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion, whether the trial court admits or excludes the proffered testimony. See Oliver v. United States, 711 A.2d 70, 73 (D.C.1998) (per curiam) (It is well established that a trial judge has broad discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony, and that a decision either way should be affirmed unless it is manifestly erroneous.) (quoting Spencer v. United States, 688 A.2d 412, 417 (D.C.1997)); cf. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 517, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (A court of appeals applying `abuse of discretion' review to such rulings may not categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings which disallow it.). In other words, Dyas and its progeny do not articulate a per se requirement that all expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness identification must be excluded. [9] Surely it would be unnecessary and undesirable to present expert testimony in each and every case involving eyewitnesses, [10] but there may be cases in which a jury would find such testimony helpful. Under the abuse-of-discretion standard applicable here, however, we cannot say that the trial court's exclusion of Dr. Penrod's testimony was manifestly erroneous.
Before the second trial, appellant Green presented Dr. Penrod to testify about the psychological factors affecting memory and perception that may have influenced the bizarre fluctuations in Rodney Givens' testimony at the first trial. As already recounted above, Givens stated that he did not see any perpetrator in the courtroom during voir dire, even though both appellants were seated at the defense table. On redirect, however, Givens did identify Green as the man who forced McWeay into the back seat of the Oldsmobile, got in the car himself, and ordered Givens to drive away. Givens also had selected two photographs from a police array before trial, one of which was a photograph of Green, but Givens was not able to state with certainty which of the two photos depicted the kidnapper. Under the proffer, Dr. Penrod would have testified about the following psychological concepts: (1) unconscious transference, by which a witness who sees a person in one setting might subliminally, and incorrectly, associate that person with another time or place; (2) photo-biased identifications, in which a witness who sees a photograph of a suspect might be more inclined to make an incorrect identification of that suspect later; (3) the negative effects of stress, fear, and emotion on the accuracy of an eyewitness's memory; (4) similar negative effects of violence or the use of a weapon on an eyewitness's memory; (5) similar negative effects of poor lighting conditions and brief periods of interaction between an eyewitness and a perpetrator on the accuracy of the eyewitness's memory; and (6) the reluctance of an eyewitness who has publicly identified someone to change that identification later, or even to admit doubt. By educating the jury about these concepts, Green hoped to cast doubt on the accuracy of Givens's identification. [11]
The trial court ruled that Dr. Penrod's testimony would not be admitted and explained its ruling orally as follows: The memorandum filed by [counsel for Green] not only contains Professor Penrod's extensive curriculum vitae, but also sets forth a number of citations to other cases and law review articles and other articles written for scientific or professional journals [by] Professor Penrod and others, talking about the, if you will, state of the art within this particular field, and how, within that field, [it] has changed in the last ten years or progressed from their professional point of view. So I am not making this ruling without some cognizance of basically what is out there, but rather I am making this ruling based upon my conclusion that this proffered testimony and evidence does not meet the first prong of the Dyas three-prong test. In this particular situation, I frankly think that the question might be more difficult if I were being asked to rule upon a blank canvas, as it were. That is not the situation. I, along with the parties and Counsel, have lived through about three and a half weeks of trial in this case. I have gone thr[ough] the experience of a number of voir dire examinations held out of [the] presence of the jury, including Mr. Givens, the primary witness against whom this testimony is being offered. I am also dealing with a situation where Counsel [at the first trial] ... thoroughly and exhaustively explored with Mr. Givens, outside the presence of [t]he jury, and even more so in the presence of the jury, all the circumstances of his in-court identification.... [Counsel for Green] left nothing unturned in cross examining that young man. I don't think there was anything else you... could have asked him about his identifications. And I think in some respects you made him out to be silly in front of the jury, through the quality of your cross examination. But the point is, all of those facts were presented to the jury. You've got the transcript from the first trial. I fully expect you will go into this with Mr. Givens again, and ... if he starts to give answers that are different, you obviously not only have the transcript, but you even have exhibits with which to impeach him and make him appear to be changing his testimony.... To propose to bring in an expert now to talk about some scientific studies, professional studies, however you wish to denominate them, done ... in a controlled environment, as opposed to or perhaps in addition to some case studies which are referred to based upon interviews with jurors who served in actual cases, I think is to present information that, number one, is unnecessary to this particular jury that will be hearing this case; and, secondly, [deals] with matters that are not beyond the ken of the average juror. It is one thing to say[,] in a sort of clean canvas upon which has not been painted upon or drawn upon, that this is what the scientific world believes goes on in terms of eyewitness identifications. To then say to the jury[,] here is what the scientific community says, now let's make the transference without the expert making the transference, but I want you, ladies and gentlemen, to make the transference, if you will, from what goes on in the controlled environment to Rodney Givens, who has been, you know, skewered left and right by Defense Counsel on cross examination, are things which I think are not necessary for the jury's evaluation in this case. I think that the jury is perfectly capable of using their own common sense, their own experiences, and the facts which you bring out on cross examination, to make an evaluation as to [first] whether or not Rodney Givens had any perceptual difficulties; number two, whether those perceptual difficulties have impacted positively or negatively on his identification, and finally to use that common sense and experience in determining how reliable is that identification, independent of whether or not there are even any perceptual abilities or abilities to recall things.... [Defense counsel] made it appear that it was absolutely silly for him [Givens] not to have known that the defendants were going to be in the courtroom and where they would be sitting, and how is it that he had to suddenly stick his head around the corner of the jury box in order to see Mr. Green, and why hadn't he done it before. All these facts were brought out to the jury, and the jury was in an absolutely perfect position to make an assessment as to what weight, if any, to give to Mr. Givens' testimony. Given what I have heard in the first trial, and what I have seen, and knowing that there's likely to be a repetition of it which would get even more nasty if he [Givens] tries to change something, I don't see any basis for concluding that this type of proffered expert testimony would deal with the subject matter that is beyond the ken of our average juror and lay person; therefore, the motion is denied. We cannot say that this lengthy oral ruling was manifestly erroneous. The trial court properly exercised its discretion by taking account of the scientific developments identified in the proffer. Then the trial court, similar to its predecessors in Dyas and that case's progeny, concluded that the proffered expert testimony did not deal with subject matter beyond the ken of an average juror and would present information unnecessary to this particular jury that would be hearing this case. See Taylor, supra, 451 A.2d at 866-67 & n. 9 (concerning stress, reluctance of witness to change publicly-declared identification, and perpetrator's use of a weapon); Brooks, supra, 448 A.2d at 258 (concerning the nature of human memory and perception and the mental processes involved in an eyewitness identification); (Michael) Smith, supra, 389 A.2d at 1358-59 (concerning the psychology of memory and perception); Dyas, supra, 376 A.2d at 831-32 (concerning stress, reluctance of witness to change publicly-declared identification, and possibility that authority figures might unduly influence the identification process). See also Commonwealth v. Santoli, 424 Mass. 837, 680 N.E.2d 1116, 1118-20 (Mass. 1997) (affirming, under abuse-of-discretion standard, the exclusion of expert testimony on the effects of, inter alia, stress, the use of a weapon, and postevent suggestions on the accuracy of an eyewitness's identification). Dr. Penrod's testimony was proffered for two reasons upon which this court has not yet ruled in a published opinion: unconscious transference and photo-biased identifications. Courts of other jurisdictions, however, have held that a trial court's exclusion of expert testimony offered for such purposes is not an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-36 (4th Cir.1993) (affirming, under abuse-of-discretion standard, the exclusion of expert testimony on, inter alia, the effects of unconscious transference on the accuracy of an eyewitness identification); Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 122, 455 S.E.2d 724, 726-27 (Va.Ct. App.1995) (affirming, under abuse-of-discretion standard, the exclusion of expert testimony on the effects of, inter alia, photo-bias in subsequent in-person identifications). The point of such proffers is always to undermine the reliability of the identification. As the trial court pointed out, defense counsel in this case had ample opportunity to argue to the jury that Givens's identification was influenced by his prior viewing of the photo array and, perhaps, by encounters with Green in other settings, and otherwise to challenge Givens's identification testimony. Moreover, like the trial court here, we have recognized the importance of cross-examination to emphasize to the jury the eyewitness's equivocations and possible mistakes. See Taylor, supra, 451 A.2d at 867; Brooks, supra, 448 A.2d at 258; (Michael) Smith, supra, 389 A.2d at 1359; Dyas, supra, 376 A.2d at 832. The circumstances under which Givens viewed Green on the night of the offenses, the lapse of two years between that night and Givens's first attempt to identify Green, and Givens's equivocation were all made known to the jury through lengthy cross-examination. We note also that the trial court had personally seen the mishaps involving Givens which formed the basis for the proffered testimony, and was in a particularly good position to determine what benefit, if any, expert testimony might provide to explain them. In short, given the abuse of discretion standard applicable here, we cannot say the trial court erred in excluding Dr. Penrod's testimony for all proffered purposes. We turn now to the appellants' separate contentions.