Opinion ID: 2176374
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Text: In 1985, the Council of the District of Columbia established the CAB in its present form under the District of Columbia Procurement Practices Act, D.C.Code §§ 1-1181.1 to 1-1192.6 (1992 & Supp.1993). [7] D.C.Code § 1-1189.3 (1992) sets forth the CAB's jurisdiction over bid protests as follows: The Board shall be the exclusive hearing tribunal for, and shall have jurisdiction to review and determine de novo: (1) Any protest of a solicitation or award of a contract addressed to the Board by any actual or prospective bidder or offeror, or a contractor who is aggrieved in connection with the solicitation or award of a contract.... (Emphasis added.) The District argues that this statute gives the CAB the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and resolve [bid] protests and that the Superior Court accordingly has jurisdiction to intervene only after the CAB has rendered a decision. GIA responds that, notwithstanding the statutory language, the Superior Court's general equity jurisdiction gave the court authority to hear GIA's claims even though GIA's protest was still pending before the CAB. For reasons that will become evident momentarily, we begin our analysis by considering the nature and sources of the Superior Court's subject matter jurisdiction. In 1970, Congress passed the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act, Pub.L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1971), which conferred upon our local courts ... powers analogous to those of state courts and gave the Superior Court plenary jurisdiction over civil matters brought in the District of Columbia via D.C.Code § 11-921 (1989). Reichman v. Franklin Simon Corp., 392 A.2d 9, 12 (D.C. 1978). Thus, [a]s presently constituted, the Superior Court is no longer a court of limited jurisdiction, but a court of general jurisdiction with the power to adjudicate any civil action at law or in equity involving local law. Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 992 (D.C. 1979) (emphasis in original). Only Congress has the authority to alter this grant of general jurisdiction to the Superior Court. D.C.Code § 1-233(a)(4) (1992) specifically prohibits the Council of the District of Columbia from enacting any act, resolution, or rule ... relating to organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts. Thus, the Council may not expand or reduce the jurisdiction of the local courts. See Jones & Artis Const. Co. v. Contract Appeals Board, 549 A.2d 315, 318 (D.C.1988); Capitol Hill Restoration Soc'y v. Moore, 410 A.2d 184, 188 (D.C.1979); Columbia Realty Venture v. District of Columbia Hous. Rent Comm'n, 350 A.2d 120, 124 (D.C. 1975). The Procurement Practices Act was enacted by the Council, not initiated by Congress. [8] The Act therefore lacked the authority to alter the existing jurisdiction of the Superior Court. Consequently, before examining D.C.Code § 1-1189.3, which governs the CAB's authority over bid protests, we must first consider whether, as part of its general equity jurisdiction and entirely apart from the commands and implications of § 1-1189.3, the Superior Court may hear a suit for injunctive relief in relation to a bid protest, even though the underlying protest is still pending before the appropriate agency review board. This court has held that [D.C.Code] § 11-921(a)(6) permits a party `aggrieved' by a decision of a District of Columbia agency to initiate an appropriate action in the Superior Court for equitable relief, unless this court has jurisdiction under the DCAPA [District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, D.C.Code §§ 1-1501 to 1-1511 (1992)] to consider a direct appeal. Speyer v. Barry, 588 A.2d 1147, 1159-60 (D.C.1991); see also Capitol Hill Restoration Soc'y, 410 A.2d at 188; Columbia Realty, 350 A.2d at 123. D.C.Code § 1-1510(a) allows the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to hear a direct appeal from an agency decision only in a contested case, i.e., a proceeding in which `the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law ..., or by constitutional right,' to be determined after a trial-type hearing. Jones & Artis, 549 A.2d at 318 (quoting D.C.Code § 1-1502(8)). Because a bid protest is not a contested case within the meaning of the DCAPA, a disappointed bidder seeking relief from a decision on a bid protest by the CAB must resort in the first instance to the Superior Court. See id.; Network Technical Servs. v. District of Columbia Data Co., 464 A.2d 133, 136 (D.C. 1983). Citing Jones & Artis, the District concedes in its brief that the Superior Court has the authority to review the CAB's final decision on a bid protest. The District contends, however, that the trial court has no authority to interfere with a pending administrative proceeding other than its authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to preserve its jurisdiction. The qualification in the District's argument is highly significant, for, indeed, the All Writs Act does provide the Superior Court with jurisdictional authority, albeit in rare circumstances, to issue emergency relief pending the resolution of agency proceedings. The All Writs Act provides that all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988). In FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603-05, 86 S.Ct. 1738, 1742, 16 L.Ed.2d 802 (1966), the Supreme Court held that this act empowered a federal court of appeals to issue a preliminary injunction to prevent a merger until the Federal Trade Commission had determined its legality. Exercise of the power to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction, the court said, `is in the nature of appellate jurisdiction' ... and extends to the potential jurisdiction of the appellate court where an appeal is not then pending but may be later perfected. Id. at 603, 86 S.Ct. at 1742 (quoting Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. 190, 193 (5 Pet.), 8 L.Ed. 92 (1832) and citing Ex parte Bradstreet, 32 U.S. 634 (7 Pet.), 8 L.Ed. 810 (1833)). Furthermore, the Court observed, the power to issue preliminary relief also covers cases involving administrative agencies: decisions of this Court have recognized a limited judicial power to preserve the court's jurisdiction or maintain the status quo by injunction pending review of an agency's action through the prescribed statutory channels.... Such power has been deemed merely incidental to the court's jurisdiction to review final agency action.... Id. at 604, 86 S.Ct. at 1742 (quoting Arrow Trans. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 372 U.S. 658, 671 n.22, 83 S.Ct. 984, 991 n. 22, 10 L.Ed.2d 52 (1963)). We recently recognized this doctrine in the context of appellate court review of contested cases in Capitol Hill Hosp. v. District of Columbia State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 600 A.2d 793 (D.C.1991). Citing Dean Foods, we observed that, in a contested case over which we would eventually have direct reviewing authority, we would also have the authority to issue emergency relief to preserve the status quo while administrative review is still pending. See id. at 799. As with federal courts, the source of our authority to issue temporary relief pending administrative review in such a case is the All Writs Act. See id.; cf. Morrow v. District of Columbia, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 167, 417 F.2d 728, 735 (1969) (holding that District of Columbia Court of Appeals, as then constituted, had power to issue extraordinary writs in aid of jurisdiction under All Writs Act). Because the District of Columbia Superior Court, like this court, was created by Congress, it follows that the All Writs Act applies equally to the Superior Court. See Christian v. United States, 394 A.2d 1, 43-44 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2889, 61 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979). Therefore, like this court, the Superior Court must also have the power to issue emergency relief pending the completion of administrative proceedings in cases where, in the first instance, review would lie in the Superior Court. [9] Thus, because the Superior Court has jurisdiction to review the CAB's decisions in bid protests, as the District concedes, the Superior Court also possesses the power under the All Writs Act to issue temporary relief to a disappointed bidder even though the CAB has not yet issued a decision. Nothing in the Procurement Practices Act can affect this power because, as we have already noted, the Council, in adopting the Act, lacked authority to alter the jurisdiction of the Superior Court as Congress defined it. [10] With this said, however, we also note that we see not necessary inconsistency between D.C.Code § 1-1189.3 and the Superior Court's authority to issue emergency relief pending the outcome of CAB proceedings. In concluding as we do that the Superior Court has the power to issue emergency relief by virtue of its jurisdiction to review CAB decisions, we do not question the CAB's role as exclusive hearing tribunal for all bid protests. We recognize that, in so designating the CAB, the Council apparently rejected other procurement schemes that allow a disappointed bidder to resort to the trial court either instead of, or in addition to, seeking administrative review. [11] We also appreciate that CAB members have experience in the areas of procurement and contract law, D.C.Code § 1-1189.2(b) (1992), which gives them particular expertise in compiling and interpreting the voluminous and highly technical factual records that are typically involved in a public procurement dispute. Accordingly, we do not hold that the Superior Court's power to grant emergency relief gives it the authority to function as a competitor of the CAB or to ignore the CAB's findings. Nothing in this opinion is intended to authorize the Superior Court as an alternative hearing tribunal. On the contrary, the Superior Court still owes the CAB deference as the primary fact-finder. See D.C.Code § 1-1189.8(d) (1992) (A determination of an issue of fact by the Board [in a bid protest] shall be final and conclusive unless arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or clearly erroneous.); see also Kegley v. District of Columbia, 440 A.2d 1013, 1018 (D.C. 1982) (where review of administrative proceeding properly lies in Superior Court, Superior Court must apply same standard of review as Court of Appeals would apply to review of contested case under DCAPA). Furthermore, as we set forth in detail in Part IV.A., the circumstances in which the Superior Court is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction to issue temporary relief pending the completion of agency proceedings will be extremely rare.