Opinion ID: 1268291
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Kentucky Court of Appeals's Adjudication of Railey's Judicial-Bias Claim and Our Standard of Review

Text: The Kentucky Court of Appeals denied Railey's judicial-bias claim based on the following analysis, quoted in full: Railey argues that there was a relationship between the trial court and the prosecution such that the judge should have recused himself. The record shows that the judge is the nephew of the Commonwealth's Attorney. This relationship was previously known to defense counsel, and was made known to all parties before trial. Railey was notified of the relationship, and waived the disqualification of the judge. The appellant must show bias on the part of the court such that the judge could not be impartial in the case. Brand v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 939 S.W.2d 358, 359 (1997). No evidence of bias is presented by Railey, other than the contention that he was denied bail. The trial court is vested with the discretion to determine whether bail is appropriate. Abraham v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 565 S.W.2d 152, 158 (1977). Railey has made no showing that the trial court abused its discretion. The claim that Railey's constitutional rights were prejudiced is unsupported by the record before this court. We affirm the trial court's ruling. J.A. at 187 (Ky. Ct.App. Op. at 6). The majority notes that Railey has challenged the state court's factual finding that he waived his challenge to Judge Bertram's involvement in this case, but the majority declines to address this point. Maj. Op. at 399. Instead, the majority first declares that the state court must have meant that Railey forfeited his claim and then concludes that, in any event, the dispositive issue is the legal question of whether the state court's decision regarding Railey's claim of judicial bias is contrary to or an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's standard for analyzing judicial-bias claims. Id. at 398-401. I agree that the legal inquiry is the dispositive inquiry in this case, but side-stepping this preliminary factual challenge masks the inadequate and flawed nature of the state court's legal analysis of Railey's constitutional judicial-bias claim. For that reason, I briefly consider Railey's factual challenge and the state court's factual determination of waiver. The record contains no evidence that Railey knew of or acquiesced to the relationship between the judge and prosecutor in this case. The Kentucky Court of Appeals's opinion cites no evidence whatsoever in stating that Railey was notified of the relationship [between the judge and prosecutor] and waived the disqualification of the judge. J.A. at 187 (Ky. Ct.App. Op. at 6). The warden's appellate brief contains a similar unsupported assertion. Resp't Br. at 10. Railey alone cited the record on this issue, noting the following exchange at the close of Railey's arraignment: The Court [Judge Bertram]: You'll go over the judge disqualification with [Railey]? Mr. Hagan: Yes, sir, I will. The Court: Thank you. Mr. Hagan: Thank you, Judge. J.A. at 210 (Arraignment Hr'g Tr. at 6). Railey did not even speak at this brief hearing, and a different prosecutor, Timothy Cocanougher, represented the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The record lacks any other evidence that Railey knew of or consented to the involvement of Prosecutor Bertram in a case over which his nephew, Judge Bertram, was presiding. [1] Further, contrary to the majority's speculation that the state court meant that Railey forfeited rather than waived this claim, [2] a later opinion by the Kentucky Supreme Court, considering a different defendant's appeal and a challenge to Judge Bertram presiding over a prosecution conducted by Prosecutor Bertram, also referred to waiver. See McCrobie v. Commonwealth, No.2005-SC-0886-MR, 2006 WL 2987082 (Ky. Oct. 19, 2006). In McCrobie, the Kentucky Supreme Court observed that the disqualification of a judge may be waived by the parties affected and noted that the defendant in that case did sign a waiver along with his attorney and the assistant Commonwealth Attorney. Id. at . No such signed waiver appears in the record of this case, and the record lacks any clear indication that Railey waived this challenge. Insofar as the state court's finding of waiver addressed Railey's constitutional judicial-bias claim, it appears that the state court's decision was both an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ([W]aiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) (Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.). In light of the Kentucky Supreme Court's subsequent decision in McCrobie, however, I believe that the Kentucky Court of Appeals made the factual determination of waiver in this case as it pertained to Railey's state-law claim of judicial disqualification under Kentucky law, which requires that [a] judge shall disqualify himself from any proceeding when he is related to any party within a third degree of relationship. McCrobie, 2006 WL 2987082, at  (citing K.R.S. 26A.015(2)(d)(2)). The significance of determining that the state court's waiver analysis pertains to a state-law claim is two-fold. First, as the majority observes, we do not consider on habeas review a state court's determination of state law. Maj. Op. at 398 (citing Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S.Ct. 602, 163 L.Ed.2d 407 (2005)). Second, the waiver determination accounts for a large portion of the state court's analysis of Railey's claim that Judge Bertram should not have presided over his case. See J.A. at 187 (Ky. Ct.App. Op. at 6). As I explain below, the remainder of the state court's analysis regarding Railey's constitutional judicial-bias claim is directly contrary to Supreme Court precedentin which case we review Railey's judicial-bias claim de novo. In resolving Railey's constitutional judicial-bias claim, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that the claim that Railey's constitutional rights were prejudiced is unsupported by the record before this court. J.A. at 187 (Ky. Ct.App. Op. at 6) (emphasis added). The majority recognizes that it is beyond dispute that judicial bias is structural error that may not be evaluated for harmlessness or prejudice. Maj. Op. at 399 (citing Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218-19 & n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006)). The majority thus must stretch to characterize the state court's scant analysis of Railey's constitutional judicial-bias claim as essentially finding no structural error, which is the kind of error that would flow from a judicial-bias-based due process violation. Maj. Op. at 414. Unlike the majority, I see nothing in the state court's opinion that shows the court found an absence of structural error. To the contrary, the Kentucky Court of Appeals's opinion appears to have evaluated Railey's judicial-bias claim for prejudice, an analysis that is wholly incompatible with structural error, which requires automatic reversal. After noting Railey's argument that the trial court denied him bail, the Kentucky Court of Appeals cited Kentucky law for the proposition that trial courts have considerable discretion in determining bail and then concluded as follows: Railey has made no showing that the trial court abused its discretion. The claim that Railey's constitutional rights were prejudiced is unsupported by the record before this Court. We affirm the trial court's ruling. J.A. at 187 (Ky. Ct.App. Op. at 6). Although the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in stating that [t]he claim that Railey's constitutional rights were prejudiced is unsupported by the record before this Court, might simply have intended to state the conclusion that no error occurred in this case and that Railey's constitutional rights were not violated, such an interpretation is highly doubtful. The court's reference to Railey's constitutional rights follows directly after a sentence highlighting Railey's inability to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him bailthat is, Railey's inability to show prejudice regarding the trial court's bail determination. The majority attributes the state court's use of the word prejudiced to simple inadvertence, Maj. Op. at 397 n. 1, despite the context of the opinion, which clearly analyzed Railey's claim for prejudice. The majority recognizes that courts often consider whether a party was prejudiced because a constitutional right was violated  and even acknowledges that the use of the word `prejudiced' in this context [of a structural error] is clearly incorrect. Id. Nonetheless, the majority assume[s] that the state court meant that Railey was not prejudiced and his rights were not violated and asserts, without explanation, that such a reading . . . is supported by the entire context of the court's holding. Id. As explained above, however, the context is the state court's analysis that evaluated Railey's claim for prejudice  i.e., its analysis highlighted Railey's inability to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him bail. A court evaluating a defendant's claim of a structural error simply has no occasion to refer to prejudice; the state court's use of the word prejudiced here demonstrates that it did not appreciate the nature of Railey's claim. Because the Kentucky Court of Appeals treated Railey's constitutional claim of judicial bias as susceptible to an analysis evaluating any error for prejudice, its opinion is contrary to clearly established federal law. The Supreme Court has explained that [a] state-court decision will certainly be contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (emphasis added). And in such a circumstance, a federal court will be unconstrained by § 2254(d)(1), id. at 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, and de novo review is appropriate. Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 799 (6th Cir.2006); see also Panetti v. Quarterman, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2858-59, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (stating that § 2254 does not preclude relief if either `the reasoning [or] the result of the state-court decision contradicts [our cases]') (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002)) (alterations in original). In Williams, the Supreme Court used its decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to provide a hypothetical example of a state-court decision that would be contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Court explained that [i]f a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding would have been different, then such a state-court decision would be contrary to the Supreme Court's clearly established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner need only demonstrate a `reasonable probability that. . . the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Given that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that judicial bias is a structural error, an analysis that evaluates judicial bias for prejudice is contrary to clearly established federal law.