Opinion ID: 2570259
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Privilege review

Text: Fuller argues that a search fee imposable for access to information should be for time spent searching for records, not reviewing retrieved records for privilege. She argues that there is no indication the State of Alaska interprets 6 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 96.360(b) (2003) or AS 40.25.110 to allow fees for time spent reviewing documents for privilege. The city responds that reviewing records for disclosability is part of a search. It reasons that the terminology of AS 40.25.110(c)  which speaks of production rather than copying or duplication and refers to search and copying tasks  implies that searching is broader than copying. The city argues that an agency is required by law to remove privileged materials before production, [24] and that the removal of confidential information should not be treated as an activity separate from the search. The city contends that cases elsewhere are not helpful because their outcome depends on the underlying statute, and each state's statutes differ. We agree with the city that case law from other jurisdictions is not particularly helpful. Determining whether the holder of information may charge for a privilege review depends largely on the applicable statute or regulation. [25] We therefore rely on our interpretation of the pertinent statute and city regulations. Production is defined as the act or process of producing, bringing forth, or making[,]... the act of exhibiting. [26] As used in AS 40.25.110 and HR 01.03 and 01.05, production does not seem to include anything other than routine ministerial efforts in looking for and making available the requested documents. The statute repeatedly uses the phrase search and copying tasks. Read literally, these words refer to the processes of looking for [27] and duplicating [28] requested documents. A task is a specific piece or amount of work usu[ally] assigned by another and often required or expected to be finished within a certain time. [29] In the statute and regulations, tasks is plural. This suggests that searching and copying are distinct and different processes, and that the entire phrase is not meant to broadly encompass other processes. It also implies a clerical, ministerial function rather than an executive function implicating professional expertise and judgment. This suggests that production is essentially administrative and clerical. It also suggests that a privilege review is not production because it is not part of the search task or the copying task. A privilege review is not an inherent or necessary part of a document search. Indeed, a privilege review would seem conceptually to require that the search already have been conducted and the requested documents identified. [30] Likewise, because it seems likely only unprivileged documents would be copied and produced, a privilege review is not inherently part of the copying task. Homer Regulation 01.03 similarly discusses search[ing] and copy[ing] the records. The references to copying fee for simple inspection of records and production of the records in HR 01.05 imply that this regulation covers copying, and does not cover deciding whether documents are privileged. We therefore conclude that production in AS 40.25.110 and HR 01.03 and 01.05 does not include a privilege review, contrary to the ruling of the superior court. Privilege review time consequently cannot be charged to Fuller. The effect of this error is not clear. The city did not reveal exactly how much time Drathman spent conducting his privilege review, although it claimed that he spent 7.25 hours responding to Fuller's request. If there were some reason to think the privilege review took very little time, perhaps it could be said that the prejudice was de minimis. But the city raises no such contention. Moreover, the five-hour thresholds in the applicable statute and regulations make the time spent on the privilege review particularly relevant. If Drathman spent at least 2.25 hours conducting the privilege review, the actual production time must not have exceeded five hours. If the production time did not exceed five hours in one month, no fees could have been imposed on Fuller. We therefore remand to the superior court the issue of how much time Drathman spent on the privilege review. The city also argues that it is relevant that Drathman conducted his review before we issued our decision in Fuller. But because the regulation did not authorize the city to charge Fuller for the privilege review, it is not relevant when he conducted that review.