Opinion ID: 1356054
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tape-recorded Conversation Involving Defendant

Text: While defendant was incarcerated awaiting trial, jail officials surreptitiously tape-recorded a conversation among defendant and his mother and sister in the jail visiting room. Over defense objection, the court admitted the recording. Defendant argues the recording was an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and that it violated title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520). Both contentions lack merit. ( Lanza v. New York (1962) 370 U.S. 139, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1043, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388; Donaldson v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 28-30, 196 Cal.Rptr. 704, 672 P.2d 110; People v. Von Villas (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 223-225, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112.) As we summarized in Donaldson, under settled federal precedent ..., the secret monitoring and recording of unprivileged conversations in prisons, jails, and police stations did not constitute an unlawful search. ( Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 27, 196 Cal. Rptr. 704, 672 P.2d 110.) Defendant argues the purpose of the recording was to gather evidence, not to protect institutional security. Whether he is correct makes no difference. Although we found recordings of this kind unlawful under state law unless done to protect institutional security ( DeLancie v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 865, 183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142), federal law does not make that distinction. (E.g., Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 27-30, 196 Cal.Rptr. 704, 672 P.2d 110.) In general, relevant evidence that is illegally obtained under California law is nonetheless admissible, so long as federal law does not bar its admission. ( People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1043, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388, citing Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d).) Accordingly, the trial court correctly refused to suppress the recording. ( Hines, supra, at pp. 1043-1044, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Defendant also contends the evidence was irrelevant and should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial. He did not object on these grounds at trial, so he may not raise them on appeal. ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 918, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93.) Indeed, when the trial court ruled on the search and seizure question, it specifically asked whether defendant was objecting on any other basis. Defense counsel responded that he might make other objections later, but at the moment he objected solely on privacy grounds. The court then said, Well, having heard no specific objections other than privacy grounds, I'll hold any ruling on that. You're not suggesting any further editing as far as I can tell?  Defense counsel answered, Not at the moment. (Italics added.) Defendant made no other objection to the recording. Much of the conversation was, indeed, irrelevant or at least unhelpful to the prosecution. Defendant never admitted guilt. As the trial court noted, much of it is self-serving. It estimated the tape contained only about thirty seconds that it would offer if it were the prosecution. Some of the tape was clearly relevant. Defendant made statements regarding where he was the night of the crime. He also claimed not to know whether he was in the car when Edwards and Osborne drove the victim away, contrary to his trial testimony that he was in the car. Defense counsel clearly made the tactical decision that if the jury heard any part of the conversation, it should hear it all. That decision appears reasonable because, as the court noted, much of the conversation was self-serving.