Opinion ID: 148908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Majority Opinion's Evisceration Argument

Text: The core of the majority opinion's argument is only that (1) Atkins prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons, (2) a person who meets the preponderance of the evidence standard is more likely than not mentally retarded, and (3) thus Georgia's reasonable-doubt procedural rule substantially burdens and effectively eviscerates the Eighth Amendment substantive right of the mentally retarded not to be executed. As noted earlier, in the 218-year history of our nation's Bill of Rights, no Supreme Court decision has ever held, or even implied, that a burden-of-proof standard on its own can so wholly burden an Eighth Amendment right as to eviscerate or deny that right. Because there is no clearly established federal law supporting Hill's position, AEDPA mandates that we leave alone the Georgia Supreme Court's denial of Hill's constitutional challenge to Georgia's statutory reasonable-doubt standard. [18] See Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 1391-92, 130 S.Ct. 1382; Thaler, 130 S.Ct. at 1173. Even Atkins itself does not support the majority opinion's argument. Atkins did not bestow a substantive Eighth Amendment right on a fixed and rigid definition of mentally retarded persons. The Supreme Court in Atkins stressed that there is serious disagreement in how to determine who is mentally retarded and [n]ot all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. at 2250. Indeed, various states use different definitions of intellectual functioning (some draw the line at an IQ of 75 or below, some at 70 or below, others at 65 or below) [19] and different factors in assessing adaptive functioning. And states use different procedures for determining who is actually mentally retarded. Atkins expressly left to the states the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction regarding mental retardation. Id. Hill's Eighth Amendment right is inextricably bound up in his ability to comply with the state's procedural and substantive requirements for determining mental retardation. Cf. Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 319-20 (4th Cir.2005) (While Walker's claim ultimately derives from his rights under the Eighth Amendment, whether he is mentally retarded is governed by Virginia law.). Atkins 's substantive Eighth Amendment right is bestowed on only an individual who comports with the state processes that determine who is mentally retarded. Given that Hill failed to meet Georgia's reasonable-doubt standard, he failed to demonstrate that he is mentally retarded, and therefore, failed to prove an impending Eighth Amendment violation. Because Hill has not established mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt, a denial of Hill's petition does not result in the execution of a mentally retarded individual under Georgia law. [20] In any event, because Atkins never said, or even hinted at (much less held), what procedures are or are not appropriate for implementing the prohibition Atkins recognized, Atkins a fortiori does not provide clearly established federal law for Hill's claims. To accept the majority opinion's argument would require us to run far afield from Atkins 's actual language and to abandon the deference AEDPA demands. And the United States Supreme Court just this year has twice re-emphasized the constraints AEDPA imposes on federal circuit courts. The majority opinion focuses on Georgia's burden-of-proof procedure and ignores every other procedural protection afforded under Georgia's statute. Looking solely to one aspect of Georgia's procedures, without placing them in context, is inconsistent with Ford, where the Supreme Court evaluated Florida's process as a whole. [21] Georgia's process, when evaluated as a whole, contains substantial procedural protections. Georgia law guarantees Hill the rights: (1) to a full and fair plenary trial on his mental retardation claim, as part of the guilt phase of his capital trial; (2) to present his own experts and all other relevant evidence; (3) to cross-examine and impeach the state's experts; (4) to have a neutral factfinder (the jury, if Hill had elected to have mental retardation decided during the guilt phase, and a judge if otherwise) decide the issue; (5) to orally argue before the factfinder; and (6) to appeal any mental retardation determination. Within the bounds of evidentiary admissibility, there is virtually no limit to the evidence a Georgia defendant can present in support of his mental retardation claim. Thus, the reasonable-doubt standard is but one aspect of a detailed and comprehensive fact-finding process under Georgia law. [22] This is not to say what the ultimate outcome of the constitutional issue in this case should be, but only serves to illustrate further how Atkins did not decide the burden-of-proof question here. As did the Atkins Court, Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Ford made clear its refusal to clearly establish any precise limit on a state's fact-finding procedures for determining the insanity bar to execution aside from a few core due process rights. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 427, 106 S.Ct. at 2610 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (The State should provide an impartial officer or board that can receive evidence and argument from the prisoner's counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence that may differ from the State's own psychiatric examination. Beyond these basic requirements, the States should have substantial leeway to determine what process best balances the various interests at stake.) (emphasis added). Atkins left the states substantial leeway. And Georgia has exercised that leeway by setting the IQ level at 70 (lower than some states, which set it at 75), and by determining that the risk of error due to malingering or other factors is substantial and that there is a need for a robust burden of proof. This is exemplified in Hill's case where Hill's initial expert (clinical psychologist William Dickinson) initially testified Hill had an IQ of 77 and was not mentally retarded, and Hill never claimed mental retardation at trial, on direct appeal, or in his first state habeas petition. The habeas record also documents Hill's (1) extensive work history and ability to function well; (2) disciplined savings plans to purchase cars and motorcycles; (3) military service; and (4) active social life. This is not to diminish the critical importance of the Atkins right not to be executed if mentally retarded. It is only to say that the Georgia Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law. IV. CONCLUSION Even if the Georgia Supreme Court's decision is considered incorrect or unwise by a federal judge, and even if the State of Georgia has inappropriately struck the balance between two competing interests in § 17-7-131(c)(3), AEDPA precludes federal circuit courts from imposing their will, invalidating a state statute, § 17-7-131(c)(3), as unconstitutional, and reversing the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in the absence of clearly established federal law, which the United States Supreme Court admonishes is a holding of that Court. There is no United States Supreme Court case suggesting, much less holding, that a reasonable-doubt burden of proof for claims of mental retardation violates the Eighth Amendment. [23] Atkins did not answer that question. Whether I agree with the Georgia Supreme Court or not, AEDPA requires that this federal court affirm the denial of Hill's § 2254 petition. Indeed, I need not decide the constitutional question as to Georgia's burden of proof statute, but say only that the United States Supreme Court has not decided it either and thus I must sustain the Georgia Supreme Court's decision. Accordingly, I must dissent from the majority's invalidating a state statute as unconstitutional, effectively reversing the Georgia Supreme Court's decision, and refusing to follow AEDPA.