Opinion ID: 215922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Second IDEM Suit

Text: With subject matter jurisdiction secure, we treat VIM's motion as one to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Our review of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss is de novo. We construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, accepting as true all well-pled facts alleged, taking judicial notice of matters within the public record, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. See General Electric Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (7th Cir.1997) (permitting courts to take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment). Under this standard, we turn to VIM's statutory bar arguments. Because the issue is so straightforward, we address first the effect of the second IDEM suit, which was filed after the plaintiffs filed this RCRA citizen suit. The district court found that the plaintiffs' RCRA violation claim in their earlier citizen suit was barred by that second IDEM lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B). That conclusion is contrary to the plain language of subsection (b)(1)(B). Subsection (b)(1)(B) says that a citizen's violation action may not be commenced if the EPA or state agency has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States or a State.... The statute prohibits only commencement of a citizen suit, not the continued prosecution of such an action that has already been filed. It operates to prohibit commencement of a citizen suit only if the government has commenced and is diligently prosecuting its own action, and not, for example, if the government  commences and begins diligently prosecuting. The verb tenses make clear that subsection (b)(1)(B) bars a RCRA citizen suit for a RCRA violation only if the suit was commenced after the government has commenced a lawsuit, not if the citizen suit was filed first. This conclusion follows our interpretation of the identical statutory language for citizen suits under the Clean Water Act (CWA) in Friends of Milwaukee's Rivers v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743 (7th Cir.2004). Like RCRA, the CWA prohibits a citizen from commencing a citizen suit if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State.... 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). In Friends of Milwaukee's Rivers we held that a state enforcement action filed mere hours after a CWA citizen suit was filed did not bar the citizen action. See 382 F.3d at 754-55. We explained that our holding was dictated by the clear and unambiguous language of the CWA's preemption provision. Id.; see also PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 618-19 (7th Cir.1998) (defendant's argument that Illinois's preliminary and informal administrative acts were sufficient to bar a later-filed citizen suit could not override RCRA's plain statutory text that only an action has the barring effect); Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. American Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 208-09 (4th Cir.1985) (CWA citizen suit filed three hours before state agency suit was entitled to proceed based on plain language used in verb tenses). Given the identical language in RCRA in section § 6972(b)(1)(B) and the CWA in 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B), we see no reason to hold otherwise here. The district court reached its different conclusion based on River Village West, LLC v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co., 618 F.Supp.2d 847 (N.D.Ill.2008). The issue in that case was whether a citizen suit was precluded under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), which expressly limits federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction to bar legal challenges to a removal or remedial action by the EPA. The district court in River Village West relied upon CERCLA section 113(h) to use a later-filed suit to bar an earlier-filed citizen suit under RCRA. See 618 F.Supp.2d at 852-53. CERCLA section 113(h) uses different language that does not include the temporal limits found in the RCRA and CWA on citizen suits. Accordingly, the analysis in River Village West could not extend to this case without some showing that CERCLA section 113(h) also applies here. Neither VIM nor the district court has offered a theory for doing so. Without approving or disapproving the analysis in River Village West on its own merits, its analysis does not support the decision to treat the second IDEM suit as a bar to this RCRA citizen suit. The later-filed second IDEM suit does not restrict the plaintiffs' ability to pursue this citizen suit.