Opinion ID: 169163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Special Interrogatory on Modification of Contract

Text: 71 The contract between Hutton and the City called for a commencement date to be determined by the Engineer after notice in writing . . . from [Hutton] that [Hutton] has sufficient materials to warrant commencement and continuation of construction. Aplt.App. Vol. IV at 933. At a preconstruction conference on August 4, 2000, this date was set at August 9, 2000, although Hutton has contended that the date was not set properly. 72 On August 14 Hutton requested that the commencement date be adjusted to October 23, 2000, due to the insufficient material being on hand. Id. at 1066. The October 10 response from the Engineer conveyed the City's acceptance of the request, but subject to a condition: Coffeyville is willing to forgo liquidated damages provided that the project is entirely completed within 45 days as defined in the contract, with construction beginning on October 23, 2000. Id. at 1069. That is, the City proposed to agree to Hutton's request if construction was completed within 45 days from the new date; otherwise, the City reserved the right to seek liquidated damages for delays that occurred before October 23. 73 The jury found that the commencement date was October 23, 2000, and that construction was not complete until May 4, 2001. Because the jury further found that Hutton was entitled to only 20 extra days due to bad weather, construction took far longer than the 45 days allowed. The jury also found that the parties had modified the liquidated-damages provision according to the terms set forth in the October 10 letter. Therefore, the district court, in computing damages, included 75 days of delay from August 9 to October 23, 2002. 74 Hutton challenges the addition of those 75 days. It focuses on Question 1 of the Special Verdict Form, which stated: 75 Do you find that the parties agreed to modify certain provisions of the original contract, specifically the construction commencement date and the liquidated damages clause, as set forth in [the] October 10, 2000 letter to [Hutton]? 76 Aplt.App. Vol. I at 110. Hutton's view appears to be that the commencement date was definitively October 23 and delays preceding that date could not be considered for purposes of liquidated damages even if construction took more than 45 days after October 23. In other words, it is asserting that no effect should be given to the part of the October 10 letter that imposed a condition on agreeing to the October 23 commencement date. It argues that it did not assent to that condition and that the condition was not supported by any consideration. Thus, it concludes, the jury could not properly find that the parties modified their contract to incorporate the condition. 77 Regarding assent, Hutton argues that as a matter of law, the October 10, 2000 letter from Coffeyville to Hutton did not modify the terms of the liquidated damages clause and that Question 1 therefore misstates the law. Aplt. Br. at 31. We agree that the letter itself did not adjust the terms of the parties' contract. Because it imposed a condition on acceptance of Hutton's proposal, it was merely a counteroffer. See Restatement, supra, § 59. But the Special Verdict Form does not presuppose that the letter itself modified the contract; rather, it asks the jury to determine whether there was a modification as set forth in the letter. This modification need not have occurred on October 10 or by virtue of the letter's mailing. All that was required was acceptance of the terms by Hutton at some point in time. 78 Hutton argues that the October 10 letter accepted Hutton's proposed commencement date of October 23 and then, separately, requested the modification of other terms of the contract. But the letter simply cannot be read this way; any purported acceptance in the October 10 letter is made provided that the project is entirely completed within 45 days. Aplt. App. Vol. IV at 1069. There is no freestanding acceptance in the letter, as there would be if the City had expressed a hope or a request instead of a proviso. Cf. Restatement, supra, § 61 cmt. a, illus. 1 (A offers to sell B 100 tons of steel at a certain price. B replies, `I accept your offer. I hope that if you can arrange to deliver the steel in weekly installments of 25 tons you will do so.' There is a contract, but A is not bound to deliver in installments.). 79 The letter thus had no binding effect absent a separate acceptance by Hutton. In Kansas, however, acceptance of a proposed modification of a contract need not be explicit. The intent of the parties to modify a contract can be implied from their conduct if they do not continue to act according to the original terms of the contract. Galindo v. City of Coffeyville, 256 Kan. 455, 885 P.2d 1246, 1253 (1994). In particular, Hutton's silence in this context—making no response to the City's setting this condition in the letter— can be construed as acceptance. See Restatement, supra, § 69(1) (Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his silence and inaction operate as an acceptance . . . [w]here because of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that the offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to accept.). After all, the letter was responding to a request by Hutton that the commencement date be adjusted to a date more than two months after the previously set date. If Hutton would have preferred to keep that earlier commencement date (although perhaps reserving the right to litigate its propriety) rather than to accept the City's reasonable conditions (reasonable in that Hutton would suffer no adverse consequence if it could perform with as much speed as the contract originally called for), one would expect it to express its opposition. Or at least the jury could reasonably have drawn that inference and found that Hutton and the City had agreed to the terms of the October 10 letter. 80 Hutton further argues in its reply brief that the contract could not have been modified as set forth in the October 10 letter because the parties did not use the same City form that the parties had used in July 2000 to modify the contract. But we do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal in a reply brief. See United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d 1295, 1301 n. 1 (10th Cir.2007). In any event, this argument is unconvincing. Although the prior conduct of parties can of course aid courts in interpreting their agreement, Hutton has given us no reason to believe that the parties bound themselves to make all contract amendments using the same form. 81 We also reject Hutton's contention that the modification—or, to be more precise, the condition imposed by the City— was not supported by consideration. If nothing else, the City gave up its right to insist on the commencement date set at the preconstruction conference. Even if it were ultimately determined that the City had improperly set the date at that conference, forbearance from a colorable claim is sufficient consideration. See Schiffelbein v. Sisters of Charity, 190 Kan. 278, 374 P.2d 42, 45 (1962) (Forbearance to sue can be good consideration for a promise, regardless of the actual validity of the claim, if the one who forbears has a reasonable and sincere belief in its validity.); Evco Distrib., Inc. v. Brandau, 6 Kan. App.2d 53, 626 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1981) (The principle that forbearance may constitute consideration to support a contract is established in Kansas.). 82 Hutton also seems to attack Question 1 as a misstatement of contract law, but the instruction does not in fact state any law. And as the City's brief points out, a separate jury instruction fully laid out the law governing the modification of contracts, including the requirement of consideration. We hold that there was no error in asking Question 1 or in the jury's answering it in the affirmative.