Opinion ID: 1770982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: other closing argument errors

Text: In addition to raising the prosecutor's improper use of opinion testimony during closing argument, Martinez also claims on appeal that the prosecution made numerous other improper remarks in closing argument. In particular, Martinez takes issue with an impermissible reference to the term injunction and an attack on the defendant's character during closing argument. As to the prosecutor's use of the term injunction in closing argument, the trial court had ruled prior to trial pursuant to a motion in limine that the prosecutor was prohibited from using that term. [4] Despite the fact that the court specifically instructed the prosecution to inform the State's witnesses not to mention the word injunction during their testimony, Sloane Martinez used the term during her direct examination. The trial court sustained a timely objection by the defense but denied a subsequent motion for mistrial. Later, the prosecutor himself violated the motion in limine when he twice referred to the injunction during closing argument. Although this reference was not contemporaneously objected to, the defense subsequently made a motion for a mistrial, arguing that it created a false impression of spousal abuse. [P]rosecutorial improprieties must be viewed in the context of the record as a whole to determine if a new trial is warranted. Sireci v. State, 587 So.2d 450, 452 (Fla.1991). We do not find that the court abused its discretion when it refused to grant a mistrial solely on the basis of the use of the term injunction by the witness and prosecution. See Cole v. State, 701 So.2d 845, 853 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1051, 118 S.Ct. 1370, 140 L.Ed.2d 519 (1998); Sireci, 587 So.2d at 452. However, it is of concern to this Court that the prosecution violated the trial court's ruling. We find it difficult to understand how the interests of justice are furthered when a prosecutor runs the risk of reversal by twice violating a specific pretrial ruling. Further, during closing argument, the prosecutor also commented on Martinez's character by stating: You see, when you think about the defendant, you've got to realize who you're dealing with here. You think a man who thinks about being, number one, a man who doesn't tell the truth. He doesn't tell the truth to the women he's involved with; he cheats on them; he runs around on them, not just once, not just twice. That's who we're dealing with here. That's who he's looking out for. However, the well-established rule in Florida relating to character evidence is: The character of a person accused of crime is not a fact in issue, and the state cannot, for the purpose of inducing belief in his guilt, introduce evidence tending to show his bad character or reputation, unless the accused, conceiving that his case will be strengthened by proof of good character, opens the door to proof by the prosecution that his character in fact is bad. This salutary rule is not permitted to be violated by the state, even when the defendant offers himself as a witness. Jordan v. State, 107 Fla. 333, 334, 144 So. 669, 669 (1932). Because Martinez did not testify or present witnesses who testified about his good character, the defense did not open the door to enable the prosecution to present evidence of bad character. See id. The type of character attack utilized by the prosecutor has no place in closing argument. Standing alone, these comments would not constitute fundamental error, see Kilgore v. State, 688 So.2d 895, 898 (Fla.1996), nor would they have warranted a mistrial. See Cole, 701 So.2d at 853. Thus, neither the improper references to the injunction nor the attack on Martinez's character in closing argument would alone require reversal. However, it is appropriate to consider both the preserved and unpreserved errors in determining whether the preserved error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gore v. State, 719 So.2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1998); Whitton, 649 So.2d at 865; Jackson v. State, 575 So.2d 181, 189 (Fla.1991). Thus, these additional closing argument errors further support our determination that the error in admitting the properly preserved opinion of guilt testimony was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.