Opinion ID: 2070572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standard for Determining When a Juror Should be Excluded Pursuant to CPL 270.20 (1) (f): Preclude vs Prevent or Substantially Impair

Text: Defendant complains that the trial court applied the wrong standard in determining for-cause challenges during CPL 270.20 (1) (f) life/death qualification. We disagree. Our analysis begins with the federal standard for juror disqualification in capital cases. In Witherspoon v Illinois (391 US 510, 512), the Supreme Court confronted whether an Illinois statute could exclude prospective venirepersons who possessed conscientious scruples against capital punishment. The statutory exclusion eliminated nearly half the venire. The Supreme Court noted that the statute produced a jury that fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner was entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments ( id. at 518). While the State had the right to exclude jurors who, despite their oaths, would not be able to impose the death penalty, it crossed the line of neutrality when it removed from the jury all who expressed conscientious objections against the death penalty ( id. at 520). The most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings ( id. at 522 n 21 [emphasis in original]). Twelve years later, the Court faced a similar conundrum involving a Texas statute that disqualified prospective capital jurors unless they affirmed under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life would not affect their deliberations on any issue of fact. Looking back to Witherspoon and several subsequent cases, the Supreme Court noted a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath ( Adams v Texas, 448 US 38, 45). The Court recognized that Witherspoon did not express a ground for challenging any prospective juror. It limited the State's power to exclude: if prospective jurors are barred from jury service because of their views about capital punishment on `any broader basis' than inability to follow the law or abide by their oaths, the death sentence cannot be carried out ( id. at 48). The Texas statute fell directly within the sweep of Witherspoon; unlike exclusion based on noncapital categories (i.e., personal bias), the oath requirement in Adams focused on the prospective juror's beliefs about the death penalty. Moreover, instead of testing the prospective juror's ability to follow the law or abide by an oath, the statute allowed the exclusion of jurors who were merely affected by the death penalty. [N]either nervousness, emotional involvement, nor inability to deny or confirm any effect whatsoever is equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability on the part of the jurors to follow the court's instructions and obey their oaths, regardless of their feelings about the death penalty ( id. at 50). In Wainwright v Witt (469 US 412), the Supreme Court noted that Witherspoon recognized that there are individuals so opposed to the death penalty that their presence on a capital jury might frustrate the State's legitimate interest in administering constitutional capital sentencing schemes by not following their oaths ( id. at 423). There was nothing talismanic about juror exclusion under Witherspoon merely because it involves capital sentencing juries. Witherspoon is not grounded in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, but in the Sixth Amendment ( id. ). The quest is for jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts ( id. ). Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the proper standard for determining when prospective jurors may be excluded for cause because of their views on capital punishment is whether a juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath' ( id. at 424). This standard applies both to jurors who may be in favor of the death penalty and to those jurors who may be opposed to it ( see Morgan v Illinois, 504 US 719, 735). Under CPL 270.20 (1) (f) venire members are excluded for cause when they entertain views either for or against the death penalty that preclude them from performing their duties. The term preclude is generally defined as to close or to make impossible by necessary consequence: rule out in advance (Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 915 [10th ed]). Defendant contends that the People should be held to this higher standard, which for him differs markedly from the constitutional standard of prevent or substantially impair. [10] CPL 270.20 (1) (f) expressly mandates that a single standard be used to challenge prospective jurors who entertain such conscientious opinions either against or in favor of  capital punishment (CPL 270.20 [1] [f] [emphasis added]). We understand the word preclude to relate to the ability of a prospective juror to perform his or her duty to act impartially and to follow a court's instructions in accordance with the law and not as a measurement of the strength or sincerity of an individual's feelings on the death penalty. As the Supreme Court cases tell us, the focus is on the jurors' ability to serve impartially and not on how the death penalty affects them generally ( see Wainwright, 469 US 412; Adams, 448 US 38). Thus, the word preclude must be understood as an embodiment of the Wainwright prevent or substantially impair standard. Where jurors express conscientious views concerning the death penalty yet still make clear that they are able to follow their oaths to act impartially, they cannot be excluded for cause from participating on the jury. But where jurors express an inability to set aside their personal views on the death penalty in deference to the court's instructions, their judgment is substantially impaired to a degree that it preclude[s] [them] from rendering an impartial verdict or from properly exercising [their] discretion under CPL 400.27 (CPL 270.20 [1] [f]). The trial court applied the appropriate standard for both the prosecution's and defendant's for-cause challenges under CPL 270.20 (1) (f). [11]