Opinion ID: 2196501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: identifier denies or forgets making extrajudicial identification

Text: Third-party testimony of an identifier's identification that the identifier has either denied making or failed to recall is devoid of any attributes that would make it reliable. [15] The eyewitness identification itself is unreliable. Furthermore, under this situation there is no one available to testify to the accuracy of the identification. [16] While the alleged identifier can be cross-examined, [17] the cross-examination is, in reality, an exercise in futility. [S]uppose that at the trial the witness not only fails to identify the defendant, but also denies that he ever identified him on a prior occasion. May the prosecutor prove by mere observers that a positive identification actually took place, and obtain a conviction on the basis of that testimony? Clearly the answer would be no.... The plain common sense prohibiting such testimony is obvious. True it is that the person alleged to have made the out-of-court statement ( i.e., the original identification) is present in court and available for cross-examination.... Here, however cross-examination would constitute an exercise in futility. Of what possible value to the defendant is a cross-examination of a witness as to the accuracy of an identification he claims he never made? [4 Weinstein & Berger, ¶ 801(d)(1)(C)[01], p 801-223, n 27, quoting Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases, 161-162 (1965).] The Massachusetts Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion: Prior identifications are admissible as probative evidence notwithstanding their hearsay attributes because of the superior probative worth of an identification made closer in time to the events in question. Where, however, the extrajudicial identification is established not by the identifying witness but by a person who observed the identification, we believe that probative worth is outweighed by the hazard of error or falsity in the reporting. Where there is a dispute not only as to the accuracy of a pretrial identification, but also as to whether the identification was in fact made, the evidential value of the prior identification is almost completely dissipated. Thus, a police officer's attribution to a witness of a positive identification denied by the witness at trial is not admissible to prove the identification. Its effect is limited to impeachment. [ Commonwealth v Daye, 393 Mass 55, 61; 469 NE2d 483 (1984). Citations omitted.] While the majority insists that defense counsel has the ability to attack the extrajudicial identification via cross-examination, it cannot seriously contend that cross-examination can expose the accuracy, trustworthiness or the reliability of the identification. [18] The absence of a scintilla of reliability of this type of testimony, coupled with this Court's pre-MRE position regarding the admissibility of third-party identification testimony, compels the conclusion that MRE 801(d)(1)(C) does not exclude from the definition of hearsay, third-party identification testimony of an identifier's extrajudicial identification when the identifier denies or forgets making the extrajudicial identification. [19] This testimony is repugnant to the truth-seeking function of trial, contrary to the intent and policies surrounding the adoption of MRE 801(d)(1)(C). 3. THE FEDERAL INTERPRETATION While I am aware of the federal interpretation of FRE 801(d)(1)(C), see United States v Jarrad, 754 F2d 1451 (CA 9, 1985); United States v Lewis, 565 F2d 1248 (CA 2, 1977), I cannot espouse its rationale or result. Admittedly, the federal approach provides persuasive authority; this Court, however, is not bound by the federal application. We have in the past interpreted the MREs more stringently than their federal counterparts. See Meeboer (After Remand) at 340, n 1 (BRICKLEY, J., dissenting). When the federal approach is repugnant to this Court's intent in adopting the MREs, it is this Court's duty to reject the federal application. Furthermore, not all commentators embrace the direction the federal rule has taken. See Seidelson, Third-party testimony about prior identifications and federal rule of evidence 801(d)(1)(C): A petition for rehearing, 8 Rev of Litigation 259 (1989). Professor Seidelson suggests that the federal courts have erred in their application of FRE 801(d)(1)(C) because of their erroneous reliance on extraneous statements made during the floor debate. It is established law ... that the statements and opinions of legislators uttered in the debates are not competent aids to the court in ascertaining the meaning of statutes. Id. at 271, n 38 (citations omitted). Professor Seidelson asserts that the federal courts would have properly applied FRE 801(d)(1)(C) had it effectuated the intent of the conference committee: The codification of existing federal law which allowed only the substantive admissibility of an identifying witness's testimony as to his prior identification. Id. at 267. I would not disregard the precedent and policies of this Court to simply mimic the Federal Rules of Evidence and other jurisdictions.