Opinion ID: 1995845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Missing Codicil

Text: As we have mentioned, D.C.Code § 18-109(a)(2) allows a will or codicil to be revoked by burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating ... with the intention of revoking it. The District of Columbia therefore recognizes an evidentiary presumption that applies if the original of a will or codicil cannot be found at the time of its maker's death: If a will or codicil, known to have been in existence during testator's lifetime, and in his custody, or where he had ready access to it, can not be found at his death, a presumption arises that such will was destroyed by testator in his lifetime with the intention of revoking it; and in the absence of rebutting evidence this presumption is sufficient to justify a finding that the will was revoked. Webb v. Lohnes, 69 App. D.C. 318, 321, 101 F.2d 242, 245 (1938) (quoting 1 PAGE ON WILLS, § 773 (2d ed.1926)). [3] The presumption is not rebutted merely by producing a copy of the executed original. In re McKeever, 361 A.2d 166, 171 (D.C.1976) (We hold that the decedent's revocation of the original will in her possession also revoked the carbon copy of the same will in her safe deposit box.). On the other hand, it is generally agreed that the presumption [of revocation] is rebuttable[,] Gilbert v. Gaybrick, 195 Md. 297, 306, 73 A.2d 482, 485 (1950); [4] it is not absolutely necessary that the original be produced or that its absence be satisfactorily explained. Once the presumption of revocation is triggered, the party seeking to probate a copy of the will or codicil must show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the testator did not destroy the lost will or codicil with the intent of revoking it. Webb, 69 App. D.C. at 321, 101 F.2d at 245. A variety of evidence may be offered in an attempt to meet this burden. See In re Barfield, 736 A.2d 991, 998 (D.C.1999) (to prevail, proponent of will that could not be found at decedent's death must offer[] facts to rebut the presumption of revocation); Clark v. Turner, 87 U.S.App. D.C. 54, 55, 183 F.2d 141, 142 (1950) ([Proponent of lost will] must show either that the will was in existence at the time of decedent's death or ... he must be able to show that the testatrix intended that the will remain in force, thus rebutting the presumption of revocation.); Webb, 69 App. D.C. at 322, 101 F.2d at 245 (considering that decedent had access to the will and daily opportunity to destroy it, whether any witness claim[ed] to have seen the will or heard any statement from [decedent] that it was still in existence, and whether evidence [demonstrated] continuing interest and friendly relationship between the [decedent and beneficiary].); New York State Library School Ass'n v. Atwater, 227 Md. 155, 158, 175 A.2d 592, 594 (1961) (considering testator's statements, within two years of her death, referring to the existence of the missing will, but intimating that she might revoke or change [it]); Plummer v. Waskey, 34 Md.App. 470, 481-84, 368 A.2d 478, 485-86 (1977) (citing 95 C.J.S. WILLS § 385, at 285-87) (listing types of evidence that can overcome the presumption) (considering the state of relations between the testator and beneficiary, as well as evidence that testator had been contemplating making a new will shortly before her death). In this case, appellant Ward-Allen testified that she sent the original copy of the codicil to Mr. Mitchell, in North Carolina, because she knew that Ms. Creech had nominated him to be her personal representative and that he would need the document. When Ms. Ward-Allen ultimately filed a petition for standard probate, she had not recovered the original, and she filed a copy of the codicil. Appellant contends she testified that she had possession of the original of that codicil after Anna Creech died. ... This may well have been what she intended to say, but the record is less than clear. The questions and answers did not always follow a logical progression, and Ms. Ward-Allen made confusing statements about whether she mailed the original before or after Ms. Creech died. [5] To add to the uncertainty, Ms. Ward-Allen's two witnesses, Ms. Garner and Special Allen, remembered seeing the original codicil right before she sent [it to Mr. Mitchell], but thought that occurred in 1995. Unfortunately, we do not know if, or when, Mr. Mitchell received the original codicil because he did not appear at the hearing, nor did Ms. Ward-Allen's attorney depose him. Moreover, although the court said, I believe Ms. Ward-Allen's testimony about her sending it to Mr. Mitchell, it did not make any findings regarding when that occurred. It is crucial that this uncertainty be resolved. If Ms. Ward-Allen had the original codicil after Ms. Creech's death, then Ms. Creech obviously had not destroyed it. See Tilghman v. Bounds, 214 Md. 533, 538, 136 A.2d 226, 228 (1957) (There was evidence tending to show that the will was in existence at and after the time of the death of the testatrix ... [and none demonstrating] that she executed any later will, or that the [will, when last seen by witness,] had been altered or mutilated in any way.; allowing copy of will to be probated). If Ms. Ward-Allen sent the original to Mr. Mitchell before Ms. Creech's death, then Ms. Creech would have lost the opportunity to revoke the codicil by destroying the original. D.C.Code § 18-109(a)(2) (revocation of a will or codicil by destroying it may only be accomplished by the testator himself, or by a person in his presence and by his express direction.). The presumption of revocation would not apply unless she somehow regained access to it. [6] These factual questions should be resolved on remand. As we have said, only portions of the 1992 will may be admitted to probate. If the court concludes on remand that Ms. Creech revoked the codicil, she will have made no valid provision disposing of the residue of her estate (including her real property and the china closet) and those items will pass under the laws governing intestacy. See 4 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 30.14, at 140 (rev.3d ed. 2004) (Where a devise is revoked by codicil and no disposition is made of it, it descends as intestate property.); see also Warner v. Warner, 99 U.S.App. D.C. 80, 86, 237 F.2d 561, 567 (1956) (remanding for consideration of whether portion of trust's residuum passed in intestacy); Howard v. Evans, 24 App. D.C. 127, 135 (1904) (Bearing these rules in mind, we are of the opinion that the will did not pass the title to lot 8 in block 594. ... As to lot 8, Bolden Evans died intestate, and the title thereto passed to the plaintiff as his heir at law.). In remanding, we reiterate that [t]he primary function of a court in construing the terms of a will is to determine the intent of the testator and to give that intention full effect unless it is contrary to law. O'Connell v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 475 A.2d 405, 407 (D.C.1984); see also Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. Convention of Protestant Episcopal Church, 54 App.D.C. 14, 19-20, 293 F. 833, 838-39 (1923) (If [the testator's] intention does not conflict with any rule of law or public policy, ... it is the court's duty to be diligent in seeing that it is obeyed. Nice distinctions by which the clearly stated will of a testator would be defeated should not be resorted to or encouraged.).