Opinion ID: 835208
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Who was the former client?

Text: The accused argues that, in the adversary proceeding, he was special counsel for the bankruptcy estate, not Trunnell. He further argues that, even though Trunnell had decided, as trustee of the estate, to settle with Dorsey, the interests of the estate were independent of those of the trustee. The Bar argues that the accused's distinction is too fine, and we agree. When a lawyer represents a corporation, the lawyer represents, for the purpose of conflict of interest analysis, the entity, not the person who manages the entity. See In re Banks, 283 Or. 459, 469, 584 P.2d 284 (1978) ([t]he corporation usually is considered an entity[,] and the attorney's duty of loyalty is to the corporation and not to its officers, directors or any particular group of stockholders). However, the entity may act only through its authorized representatives, and, in representing the entity, the lawyer generally must follow their directives. See RPC 1.13(a) (lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents). A personal representative of a decedent's estate similarly has authority to direct a lawyer who the personal representative hires for advice and counsel in the administration of a decedent's estate. See ORS 114.305(18) (a personal representative, acting reasonably for the benefit of interested persons, is authorized to [e]mploy qualified persons, including attorneys, accountants and investment advisers, to advise and assist the personal representative and to perform acts of administration, whether or not discretionary, on behalf of the personal representative). This court has concluded that, for purposes of conflict of interest analysis, when the personal representative hires a lawyer, the lawyer must treat the personal representative as the lawyer's client. See ORS 113.135 ([i]f the personal representative has employed an attorney to represent the personal representative in the administration of the estate, the personal representative shall file in the estate proceeding the name and post-office address of the attorney unless that information appears in the petition or the order appointing the personal representative (emphasis added)); In re Phelps, 306 Or. 508, 517, 760 P.2d 1331 (1988) ([t]he accused was the lawyer for the personal representative); In re Howard, 304 Or. 193, 204, 743 P.2d 719 (1987) (the accused's client was the personal representative). In this case, the accused understood that it was Trunnell who defined the interests of the estate. In his Application to Employ Attorney, the accused stated, in relevant part, that [t]he trustee seeks to employ Special Counsel, G. Jefferson Campbell, Jr. of the law firm of G. Jefferson Campbell, Jr., P.C., to assist the trustee in the following discrete matters having the following potential benefits to the estate. (Emphasis added.) The accused also verified in that document that he [would] be the trustee's attorney of record. (Emphasis added.) In addition, when the accused objected to the settlement that Trunnell had arranged, the accused referred to himself as former special counsel to the Chapter 7 Trustee.  (Emphasis added.) We conclude that, whether the accused represented Trunnell or the estate, Trunnell's decisions represented the interests of the estate and the accused therefore could not represent new clients who opposed the estate's interests, as she determined them to be, without her consent. It is undisputed that the accused did not obtain that consent.