Opinion ID: 3010745
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: owbpa

Text: Gilmer was decided on May 13, 1991. Seven months earlier, Congress amended the ADEA by passing the Older 9 Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (OWBPA). Gilmer apparently did not contend that these amendments were applicable to his case. Seus and the EEOC do contend that they are applicable here. Under the OWBPA, an individual may not waive any right or claim under the ADEA unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary. 29 U.S.C. S 626(f)(1). Moreover, a waiver cannot be considered knowing and voluntary if an individual waives rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is executed. Id. at S 626(f)(1)(C). Seus and the EEOC assert that the language any right or claim must encompass the right to a jury trial in district court; thus, the OWBPA prohibits the enforcement of any agreement that requires an individual, in advance of an actual dispute, to forgo her statutory right to trial in a district court. They conclude that the OWBPA precludes enforcement of Seus's agreement to arbitrate. We are unpersuaded for two reasons. First, the legislative history of the OWBPA indicates that it does not apply with respect to waivers that occur before the date of enactment of this Act [Oct. 16, 1990]. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, S 202(a), 104 Stat. 978, 984 (1990) (reprinted in note to 29 U.S.C. S 626 entitled Effective Date of 1990 Amendment (1998)). In common parlance, a waiver occurs when it becomes effective, i.e., when it is executed. For that reason, we conclude that the OWBPA's waiver requirements do not apply to waivers executed before enactment of the statute. Accord Rice v. Brown Bros. Harriman & Co., No. 96 Civ. 6326(MBM), 1997 WL 129396,  (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1997). Because Seus executed her Form U-4 before the OWBPA was enacted, it cannot affect the arbitrability of her claim. Second, assuming arguendo that the OWBPA did apply to Seus's case, its legislative history and the background against which it was enacted provide persuasive evidence that the protection it affords is limited to the waiver of substantive rights under the ADEA. As the Fifth Circuit explained in Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors, Inc., [i]n enacting the OWBPA, Congress' primary concern was with releases and voluntary separation agreements in which employees were forced to waive their rights. . . . [T]he OWBPA protects against the waiver of a right 10 or claim, not against the waiver of a judicial forum. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985), in which it held that [b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. . . . We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history. We recognize that Congress, through the OWBPA, has protected terminated employees who waive their substantive rights under ADEA in exchange for a more favorable severance package; however, we find no clear indication that Congress was likewise concerned with protecting employees who agree to arbitrate claims that may arise during the course of their employment. 56 F.3d 656, 660-61 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court reads OWBPA in the same way. While OWBPA was not urged upon it as controlling authority in Gilmer, the Court did comment upon OWBPA during the course of its analysis there in a way that is highly relevant here. It observed: Gilmer also argues that compulsory arbitration is improper because it deprives claimants of the judicial forum provided for by the ADEA. Congress, however, did not explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution of claims, even in its recent amendments to the ADEA. [I]f Congress intended the substantive protection afforded [by the ADEA] to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history. 500 U.S. at 29 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628) (emphasis added). When referring to Congress's recent amendments to the ADEA, the Supreme Court clearly 11 meant the OWBPA. See id. at 28 n.3. While dicta, the Court's comments provide persuasive evidence contradicting the EEOC's assertion that [b]y its plain terms, the OWBPA prohibits the enforcement of any agreement that requires an individual, in advance of an actual dispute, to forgo her statutory right of action in district court. EEOC's Br. at 14. Clearly, the Supreme Court did not interpret the OWBPA's reference to any right or claim as encompassing procedural rights such as the right to a judicial forum. We thus conclude that the ADEA, as amended by the OWBPA, still reflects no Congressional intent to except from the FAA predispute agreements to arbitrate ADEA claims.