Opinion ID: 1059581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Commercial Vehicles

Text: This brings us to the merits of the Wolfes' Assignment of Error No. 3 and the question whether their vehicles were commercial vehicles within the meaning of Fairfax County's zoning ordinances. The Wolfes began parking vehicles on their property in mid-1969 in connection with their business of installing underground storage tanks, lifts, lubrication equipment, air compressors, and other types of equipment for gasoline service stations. At that time, a zoning ordinance adopted in 1959 provided that Where may be kept as an accessory use on any lot in [a residential] district not to exceed one commercial vehicle (other than a tractor trailer) operated by the occupant of the lot. A new zoning ordinance adopted in August 1978 allowed the parking of one commercial vehicle on a residential lot but barred any tractor trailer or vehicle exceeding one and one-half (11) ton capacity. A further change in October 1978 added garbage trucks, dump trucks, construction equipment, and cement-mixer trucks to the list of commercial vehicles prohibited from parking in residential districts. The amendment also defined a commercial vehicle as [a]ny vehicle with a rated carrying capacity of 1,500 pounds (3/4 ton) or more, and any vehicle, regardless of capacity, which displays advertising lettered thereon or which is licensed as a Tor hire' vehicle. The trial court held that, because the Wolfes' vehicles were used for commercial purposes, they then and now are commercial vehicles, meaning they were commercial vehicles under both the 1959 and the 1978 versions of the zoning ordinance. The Wolfes say this holding was incorrect. Citing Sellers v. Bles, 198 Va. 49, 53, 92 S.E.2d 486, 489 (1956), the Wolfes submit that, since the provisions of the zoning ordinances restrict the common law right of an owner to use his property in his own way, the provisions must be strictly construed in favor of the individual claiming the right. Continuing, and stressing a lack of definition of the term commercial vehicle in the 1959 zoning ordinance, the Wolfes say that while, in its broadest sense, 'commercial' simply indicates a relationship to business or commerce, ... in its more narrow and restricted sense the term is limited to the purchase, sale, or trade of goods, commodities, and services. (Citing Hendricks v. American Employers Ins. Co., 176 So.2d 827, 832 (La. Ct.App.1965) (emphasis added)). The Wolfes also say that, construing the term most favorably to the landowner, [the] term 'commercial purpose' in [a] zoning ordinance [is] limited to businesses for the purchase, sale, exchange of goods and commodities, or the rendering of services. (Citing Reiser v. Meyer, 323 S.W.2d 514, 521 (Mo.Ct.App.1959) (emphasis added)). We fail to perceive how these definitions benefit the Wolfes. In their contracting business, they are obviously involved in the rendering of services, and their vehicles are used directly in the performance of those services. Nor can we perceive any difference between a meaning of the term commercial based upon the element of rendering services, on the one hand, and the meaning assigned by the trial court based upon the element of use, on the other hand. To hold there is a difference would be to say that rendering services with a vehicle is not a use of the vehicle, and that would involve an unacceptable exercise in hairsplitting. The meaning adopted by the trial court, viz., a commercial vehicle is one used for commercial purposes, provides a simple, straightforward, and common sense test, fair to both sides of a zoning contest. Accordingly, we will apply the test here. There can be no question that the Wolfes used their vehicles for commercial purposes. Indeed, they have admitted as much. [10] They also admitted before the BZA that the vehicles were commercial vehicles under the 1978 version of the zoning ordinance. [11] We think the vehicles were just as clearly commercial vehicles under the 1959 ordinance. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's ruling that the vehicles were commercial vehicles then and now.