Opinion ID: 852830
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Criminal Liability of Governmental Entities

Text: By their terms, the only portions of the Indiana Antitrust Act that contain substantive prohibitions are Sections 1, 2, and 3. These sections are framed similarly to provisions of the Criminal Code and provide that it is a Class A Misdemeanor to engage in the actions prohibited. We think the legislature, when writing this statute in 1907, did not contemplate a governmental entity as a potential violator of its prohibitions. First, on the only occasion where the issue has been addressed by an Indiana appellate court, the Court of Appeals held that the State could not be criminally responsible, even where the statute prohibited acts by persons and defined person to include governmental entities. In State v. Ziliak, 464 N.E.2d 929 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), landowners alleged that state employees committed criminal property offenses when the state employees entered upon the landowners' property and removed certain Indian artifacts without permission. The landowners sought damages under Indiana Code section 34-4-30-1, which provides civil remedies to crime victims. [4] The Court of Appeals held: A criminal offense is an offense against a sovereign state. Id. at 930 (citing Reed v. Carrigan, 190 Ind. 29, 129 N.E. 8 (1920)); 8 I.L.E. Criminal Law § 2 (1971); 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 1 (1981); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1 (1961). A crime is said to be an offense against the sovereignty. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 1 (1981). Because a crime is an offense against the sovereign, it is axiomatic that the sovereign cannot commit a crime. Ziliak, 464 N.E.2d at 930. The court noted that the criminal code, I.C. § 35-41-1-22, defined person as a human being, corporation, partnership, unincorporated association, or governmental entity.  Id. (emphasis in original). Despite this definition, the Court of Appeals concluded that the State was a person as that term is used in the Indiana Criminal Code only for purposes of its status as a victim. Natare argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that Ziliak is inapposite here because it dealt with a claimed crime by the State itself, and did not address whether a subdivision of the State could commit a crime. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Natare Corp., 808 N.E.2d 148 153 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). We find no authority supporting such a distinction. For the reasons expressed below we believe neither the State nor any other governmental entity is subject to criminal provisions of Indiana statutes without the legislation making that result absolutely clear. Indiana law as reflected in Ziliak is consistent with other United States jurisdictions in rejecting the possibility of a crime by the government. Relevant federal cases and statutory authority are sparse. One federal statute carrying criminal penalties (regulating prices and profits for commodities in emergencies) defines person as an individual, corporation, partnership, association, or any other organized group of persons ... and includes the United States or any agency thereof, or any other government, or any of its political subdivisions, or any agency of the foregoing. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, c. 26, Title III, § 302(h), c. 26, 56 Stat. 36. Section 205 of the Act provides for injunctive remedies and criminal fines and imprisonment for convictions. However, the definition of person also explicitly states that: no punishment provided by this Act shall apply to the United States, or to any [federal, state, or local] government, political subdivision, or agency. Id. This definition has been interpreted to mean that governmental agencies are exempt from the act's criminal liabilities, but not necessarily its remedial sanctions. See 1 Working Papers of the Nat'l Comm. on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws 175 (1970), typically known as the Brown Commission. The Brown Commission also noted that though the Emergency Price Control Act specifically extended its prohibitions to governmental entities, no case has been found in which a court has held such an agency subject to the Act. Id. The Brown Commission concluded by recognizing that although there is nothing in the nature of a municipal corporation which would make it inherently incapable of committing a crime, there does not appear to be a Federal case holding a governmental entity as such criminally liable. Id. at 176. State law also finds the concept of a crime by the sovereign to be an alien notion. We have found no criminal code in this country that imposes criminal liability on the sovereign and only one that would permit a fine on an arm of the government. [5] The Model Penal Code specifically excludes from its definition of corporation any entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program. American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 2.07(4)(a) (P.O.D.1962). The commentary to section 207(4)(a) observes that [l]iability in such cases would seem entirely pointless, although of course the liability of individuals involved in criminal activity is preserved. 1 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 207(5)(a), at 345 (1985). At least five states have adopted a version of 2.07(4)(a). [6] Most states, however, like Indiana, contain no express treatment of the issue in their general criminal laws. In the absence of specific legislative direction, we think the Court of Appeals correctly concluded in Ziliak that the legislature did not contemplate a violation of a criminal prohibition by a governmental entity.