Opinion ID: 1666085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alternative Perpetrator Evidence and Alleged Violation of Brady v. Maryland.

Text: In his first assignment of error, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth failed to provide him certain exculpatory evidence as required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and in so doing, undermined his capacity to present a defense. We disagree, as the evidence did not impact Appellant's fundamental rights since it was not material to his guilt. Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to reveal evidence of an alternative perpetrator before trial, thus violating his due process rights. At trial, Detective Morrison testified that upon learning of Michelle Benjamin's death, he initially thought that Tim Brown may have had something to do with the murder. Tim Brown was a known drug dealer in the area and Michelle, who had been working with the Mayfield Police Department as an informant, had made some allegations against Brown. Appellant alleges that he and counsel were unaware that police had considered an alternative perpetrator until hearing Morrison's testimony at trial. Appellant's counsel moved for a mistrial upon grounds of a Brady violation. In Brady , the United States Supreme Court ruled that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of good or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-1197. Implicit in Brady 's requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence affected the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). However, in Agurs , the Supreme Court indicated that an item of undisclosed information is not rendered material by the mere possibility that it may have helped the defense or might have affected the trial. Id. at 109-110, 96 S.Ct. at 2400. Thereafter, in United States v. Bagley, the Supreme Court further revised the materiality requirement, stating that irrespective of the request, evidence is considered material only if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the trial would have been different. 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The Court then indicated that in the context of this different result consideration, a reasonable probability was one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Admittedly, reasonable probability and materiality are nebulous concepts at best. However, the notion was perhaps best clarified in Kyles v. Whitley, wherein the Supreme Court articulated Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a reasonable probability of a different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ( quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 3381). Here, Appellant argues that by not disclosing, before trial, that police had initially considered Tim Brown as an alternative perpetrator, the prosecution suppressed evidence that was both favorable to his defense and material to his guilt. Moreover, Appellant claims that without this disclosure, he did not receive a fair trial or a verdict worthy of confidence, thus violating his due process rights.
Although we are unpersuaded by Appellant's argument, even assuming arguendo that information concerning Brown should have been disclosed, it cannot be credibly argued that information concerning an alternative perpetrator was in any way material, as Appellant confessed  at least twice  to the crime in question prior to Brown ever being developed as a suspect. Significant in the materiality analysis is the chronology and flow of incoming information during the early stages of investigation into Michelle's murder. On Thursday September 3rd, Michelle's body was found in the closet of her apartment. Detective Morrison testified that when he learned of Michelle's death he immediately thought that Tim Brown might be implicated in some manner. However, on Friday September 4th, Appellant turned himself in. On Monday September 7th, Appellant confessed to Detective Jackson, disclosing key details about the murder which led authorities to reasonably conclude that he was the killer. Appellant then asked Jackson to take him to the funeral home where Michelle's body was located so that he could view it. While at the funeral home, Appellant then made his second taped confession and once again provided significant details concerning the murder. Additionally, there was also testimony to the effect that Appellant had confessed to the murder to various family members before being charged. Detective Morrison testified that when he learned Appellant had confessed to the murder, Brown ceased to be a suspect in the investigation. Therefore, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that given the very brief period of time wherein Brown was in any way considered in the investigation, and the fact that Appellant confessed on multiple occasions, providing substantial details regarding the murder that only the killer could know, the prosecution's failure to provide information on Brown in no way impacted Appellant's capacity to present a defense. Although Appellant waxes hyperbolic as to how failure to disclose this information in discovery undermined confidence in the trial court's verdict, we are disinclined to agree, as we find no reasonable probability that possession of the evidence would have led to a different result or that its absence undermines confidence in the verdict. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. at 1566. Thus, there was no Brady violation, as the evidence was not material under Agurs or Kyles.
Here, the record does not indicate that the suppression of the alternative perpetrator evidence provided a manifest necessity for granting a mistrial because no Brady violation occurred. See Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc., 929 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Ky.1996) (It is universally agreed that a mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings which will result in a manifest injustice. The occurrence complained of must be of such character and magnitude that a litigant will be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way.). As such, the trial court properly denied Appellant's request for a mistrial. See Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Ky.2004) (holding that the decision to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion).