Opinion ID: 2050844
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Presumption: The Law of the State Where the Injury Occurred

Text: The parties disagree as to the nature and effect of a choice-of-law presumptive rule applicable in this case. The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws does not abandon rules entirely. Separate rules are stated for different torts and for different issues in tort. In other words, the identity of the state of the most significant relationship is said to depend upon the nature of the tort and upon the particular issue. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, ch. 7, Topic 1, Introductory Note 2, at 413 (1971); see Scoles, Conflict of Laws § 2.14, at 62-63 (discussing presumptive rules). The Second Restatement's introduction is an understatement. Once one ventures past section 145, however, the chapter dramatically changes character. Instead of infinitely open-ended sections, the Second Restatement, for the most part, articulates reasonably definite rules. To be sure, these succeeding sections contain escape valves that refer to section 6. Many of the rules echo the First Restatement's preference for choosing the law of the injury state. Others do not refer to the injury state directly, but choose connecting factors very likely, if not certain, to lead to the application of the law of the injury state.    Only a relatively few sections refer solely to the general formula of section 145 without providing some presumptive choice. 56 Md. L.Rev. at 1239-40. Thus, the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws has been described as schizophrenic, in that one portion of its split personality consists of general sections such as sections 6 and 145, while the other portion is a set of reasonably definite rules and a preference for territorial solutions, including the injury-state rule for tort cases, endorsed by its predecessor. The general sections embody a free-form approach to choice of law, while the specific sections are quite close to the territorial system embodied by the First Restatement. 56 Md. L.Rev. at 1240. We agree with the concern that the bench and bar have overemphasized the general sections of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws and have undervalued the specific presumptive rules. The opponents of mechanical rules of conflict of laws may have given too little weight to the virtues of simplicity. The new, flexible standards, such as `interest analysis,' have caused pervasive uncertainty, higher cost of litigation, more forum shopping (a court has a natural inclination to apply the law it is most familiar withthe forum's lawand will find it easier to go with this inclination if the conflict of law rules are uncertain), and an uncritical drift in favor of plaintiffs. Kaczmarek, 836 F.2d at 1057 ( dictum ). Accord 56 Md. L.Rev. at 1246 (observing that, in a tort case, following the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws means more than relying on sections 6 and 145). For example, plaintiffs, in support of the appellate court's judgment, actually contend that this court has never expressly authorized use of legal presumptions in choice-of-law determinations in personal injury actions, observing that the word `presumed' is not found in Ingersoll.  Alternatively, according to plaintiffs: Even if this court meant to utilize a legal presumption in favor of the state of injury, presumptions in Illinois are governed by the `bursting bubble hypothesis.' Therefore, according to plaintiffs, if the presumption exists, it is evanescent and easily overcome by any contact with another state. We emphatically reject this contention. In Ingersoll, adopting the proposed draft of what would become section 145 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, this court held that the local law of the State where the injury occurred should determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless Illinois has a more significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties. (Emphasis added.) Ingersoll, 46 Ill.2d at 45, 262 N.E.2d 593. Thus, a presumption exists, which may be overcome only by showing a more or greater significant relationship to another state. Further, subsequent to Ingersoll, this court has repeatedly declared that we have adopted the choice-of-law analysis of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Morris B. Chapman, 193 Ill.2d at 568, 251 Ill.Dec. 141, 739 N.E.2d 1263; Esser v. McIntyre, 169 Ill.2d 292, 297-98, 214 Ill.Dec. 693, 661 N.E.2d 1138 (1996); Nelson v. Hix, 122 Ill.2d 343, 349, 119 Ill.Dec. 355, 522 N.E.2d 1214 (1988). As we have explained, this analysis includes the application of presumptive rules. Generally speaking, then, the Second Restatement contemplates a two-step process in which the court (1) chooses a presumptively applicable law under the appropriate jurisdiction-selecting rule, and (2) tests this choice against the principles of § 6 in light of relevant contacts identified by general provisions like § 145 (torts) and § 188 (contracts). Crampton, Conflict of Laws: CasesCommentsQuestions, at 120. [M]aking a serious effort to consider the entire Second Restatement would improve the quality of judicial decisionmaking. Courts that are willing to follow the narrow rules of the Second Restatement would derive vastly more guidance than that which can be gleaned from sections 6, 145 [torts], and 188 [contracts]. 56 Md. L.Rev. at 1247. [4] In this personal injury action, the appellate court was correct to cite section 146 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws in holding that, under Illinois choice-of-law rules, the law of the place of injury controls unless another state has a more significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties with respect to the particular issue. 368 Ill.App.3d at 907, 306 Ill.Dec. 755, 858 N.E.2d 552. Section 146 is the starting point for any choice-of-law analysis in personal injury claims. Malena, 264 Neb. at 766, 651 N.W.2d at 856; accord McKinnon v. F.H. Morgan & Co., 170 Vt. 422, 424, 750 A.2d 1026, 1028 (2000) (declaring that, before court applies general tort principle of section 145, court must first ascertain whether specific presumptive rule applies to disputed action or issue); Morgan v. Biro Manufacturing Co., 15 Ohio St.3d 339, 342, 15 OBR 463, 474 N.E.2d 286, 289 (1984) (declaring that when confronted with a choice-of-law issue in a tort action, analysis must begin with Section 146). Section 146 received insufficient consideration in the appellate court. Section 146 provides: In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in section 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146, at 430 (1971). One court has explained this presumption as follows: Often, however, the simple old rules can be glimpsed through modernity's fog, though spectrally thinned to presumptionsin the latest lingo, `default rules.' For in the absence of unusual circumstances, the highest scorer on the `most significant relationship' test is the place where the tort occurred. [Citations.] For that is the place that has the greatest interest in striking a reasonable balance among safety, cost, and other factors pertinent to the design and administration of a system of tort law. Most people affected whether as victims or as injurers by accidents and other injury-causing events are residents of the jurisdiction in which the event takes place. So if law can be assumed to be generally responsive to the values and preferences of the people who live in the community that formulated the law, the law of the place of the accident can be expected to reflect the values and preferences of the people most likely to be involved in accidentscan be expected, in other words, to be responsive and responsible law, law that internalizes the costs and benefits of the people affected by it. Spinozzi, 174 F.3d at 844-45. We now apply section 146 to the record before us. Plaintiffs are domiciled and reside in Michigan, and James works in Michigan. Plaintiffs allege that Sears' tortious conduct occurred in Illinois. Comment e of section 146, entitled When conduct and injury occur in different states, addresses this specific situation. The local law of the state where the personal injury occurred is most likely to be applied when the injured person has a settled relationship to that state, either because he is domiciled or resides there or because he does business there. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146, Comment e, at 432 (1971). In contrast: The state where the conduct occurred is even more likely to be the state of most significant relationship    when, in addition to the injured person's being domiciled or residing or doing business in the state, the injury occurred in the course of an activity or of a relationship which was centered there. (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146, Comment e, at 432 (1971). If this guidance were not enough, the comments to section 146 further advise: The likelihood that some state other than that where the injury occurred is the state of most significant relationship is greater in those relatively rare situations where, with respect to the particular issue, the state of injury bears little relation to the occurrence and the parties. (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146, Comment c, at 430-31 (1971). In this case, Jacob was injured while James was operating the tractor mower in the front yard of their home in Michigan. This activity was centered in plaintiffs' Michigan community. Based on the record before us, a strong presumption exists that the law of the place of injury, Michigan, governs the substantive issues herein, unless plaintiffs can demonstrate that Michigan bears little relation to the occurrence and the parties, or put another way, that Illinois has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties with respect to a particular issue.