Opinion ID: 1443358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether bainbridge's statements should have been excluded at trial

Text: Evidence or information acquired as a result of a constitutionally impermissible seizure will be excluded unless the causal connection between the seizure and the acquisition has been broken. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417 (1963). In further explanation of this rule, the Wong Sun court stated: We need not hold that all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to light but for illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Id. In explaining why a voluntary waiver of Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights does not cure an illegal seizure, the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois stated: If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 1397, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969). Arrests made without warrant or without probable cause, for questioning or investigation would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well be made admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings. Any incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment violations would be eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect, a cure-all, and the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures could be said to be reduced to a form of words. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. [643] at 648, 81 S.Ct. [1684] at 1687 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)]. It is entirely possible, of course, as the State here argues, that persons arrested illegally frequently may decide to confess, as an act of free will unaffected by the initial illegality. But the Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make the act sufficiently a product of free will to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession. They cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited. See Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 496-97, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1639, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Brown, 95 S.Ct. at 2261 (footnotes omitted). The Court went on to state: The question of whether a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn on such a talismanic test. [Referring to a test in which a voluntary waiver of Miranda rights, alone, would be sufficient to break the causal connection following an impermissible seizure, thereby making any statements pursuant to the Miranda waiver admissible.] The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1626, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972), and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct[ [2] ] are all relevant. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 491, 83 S.Ct. at 419. The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement, cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3501. And the burden of showing the admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution. 95 S.Ct. at 2261, 2262 (footnotes omitted). In the recently released opinion, United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir.1989), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the policy reasons behind the three considerations laid out in Brown. The court explained that the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession and the presence of intervening circumstances assist in determining whether the defendant's response to police questioning is sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion. Determining the purposes and flagrancy of the official misconduct satisfies the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule and has been decisive most often in cases where police officers did not have probable cause to arrest, but instead took a suspect into custody hoping that an interrogation would yield incriminating statements. The State bears the burden of showing that the causal connection between an impermissible seizure and statements made by the detainee, has been sufficiently broken so as to render those statements admissible at trial. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262. However, the Brown court also noted that even where the lower courts have failed to undertake the inquiry mandated by Wong Sun, the trial may result in a record of amply sufficient detail and depth for the reviewing court to make the determination. As in Brown, the record of the trial is amply sufficient for us to determine whether Bainbridge's statements should have been excluded. I. THE TEMPORAL PROXIMITY OF THE ARREST SEIZURE AND THE CONFESSION The temporal proximity of the seizure and the confession, in this case, is analogous to the situation in Brown. In Brown, the defendant was seized at approximately 5:00 p.m. During the twenty minute drive to the police station the officers asked Brown questions which he alternately evaded or answered falsely. Upon arrival at the station house, Brown was placed in the second floor interrogation room. He was left alone for some twenty minutes. Upon returning to the interrogation room the officers warned Brown of his Miranda rights. There was no assertion that he did not understand these rights. Brown's first statement pertaining to the murder in question was separated from his illegal arrest by less than two hours. Later, at approximately 8:45 p.m., three hours and forty-five minutes after his apprehension, Brown specifically said that he wanted to talk about the homicide. Like Brown, Bainbridge was seized from his home, asked questions in the squad car on the way to the police station and immediately taken to an interrogation room after arriving at the station. Upon entering the interrogation room, Bainbridge signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights. The officers then engaged him in a discussion pertaining to his activities on the day in question. Bainbridge made no incriminating statements. The officers then left him alone with his parole officer. Following this private consultation, Bainbridge admitted his presence at the time Dixie Wilson was murdered.