Opinion ID: 1499847
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Christian

Text: Although the government's evidence against Christian was by no means overwhelming, it was nonetheless sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. First, Ms. Sarah Robinson, an employee at the Downtown Motel identified Christian as the man in room 27 to whom she had given towels at around noon on January 18, 1973. [76] Ms. Robinson identified Christian on three different occasions. The first time was on March 16, 1973, when she went to Metropolitan Police Headquarters and was shown an array of twelve photographs. From this array she indicated that six of the men pictured resembled the man to whom she had given the towels because they had similar facial features. [77] From the six, Ms. Robinson selected one photograph, depicting appellant Christian, which most looked like the fellow [she] had seen at the door. On May 3, 1973, Ms. Robinson attended two lineups where she again pointed to several people who she said resembled Christian because they had similar facial features. On this occasion, Ms. Robinson did not, however, positively identify anyone. Indeed, Christian was not present in this lineup. [78] On February 12, 1974, during the pretrial identification suppression hearing, Ms. Robinson again had the opportunity to view some photographs. After taking the witness stand, she was shown a book of pictures that she had never seen before, and positively identified appellant Christian's photograph. [79] Her third and final identification of Christian came in court at trial. Christian's presence at the Downtown Motel was further corroborated by the introduction of telephone records showing that a call was made from a pay telephone at the motel to Christian's Philadelphia telephone on the evening of January 17, 1973, between the hours of 5 p. m. and 11 p. m. The records showed that this call was made from the same telephone that was used by James Price to call his home in Philadelphia and by William Hawkins to call John Clark's home in Philadelphia on the same date during the same period of time. [80] There was additional evidence showing Christian's close association with the other conspirators. The government showed that the stolen Exxon credit card belonging to Lorrene Goode, the same card used by appellant Clark on the day of the murders, was used on five subsequent occasions by appellant Christian. [81] Furthermore, evidence was introduced showing that Christian used Thomas Clinton's Cadillac and a second car which was rented by Clinton. Christian also was a member of Philadelphia's Mosque Number Twelve, the Black Muslim Mosque attended by some of the codefendants. The case against Christian was not based solely upon evidence of association. Significantly, he fled from Philadelphia to Jacksonville, Florida, soon after receiving a subpoena to appear in a lineup in the District of Columbia. Once in Florida, Christian made efforts to completely conceal his identity. On April 26, 1973, Detective Jandorf of the Metropolitan Police Department went to Philadelphia for the purpose of serving William Christian with a subpoena which required that he appear in the May 3 lineup. Detective Jandorf testified that when he explained to Christian the purpose of the subpoena, Christian appeared to be quite nervous, and asked, What if I'm picked? On May 7, 1973, Christian and another codefendant, John Griffin, who had also been subpoenaed to appear in the May 3 lineup, fled and arrived in Jacksonville, Florida, where they lived together until July 29, 1973. On that date, Christian registered at the Ambassador Hotel, in Jacksonville, under the name of William Cotton. He resided there until August 17, 1973, when he signed a lease for residence at the Lake Park Apartments in Jacksonville. [82] Christian's wife and children lived with him there until October 2, 1973, when he was arrested by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [83] It is generally accepted that the flight of an accused is a fact which tends to prove his consciousness of guilt and thus guilt itself. See, e. g., Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 499, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896); Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 240 A.2d 131, 132 (1968); Green v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 23, 25, 259 F.2d 180, 182 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 917, 79 S.Ct. 594, 3 L.Ed.2d 578 (1959). See also 2 Wigmore on Evidence § 276 (3d ed. 1940). Although evidence of flight does not give rise to a legal presumption of guilt, Hunt v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 3, 316 F.2d 652, 654 (1963), flight is a circumstance from which a court . . . may infer what everyone in daily life inevitably would infer. United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.). [84] In addition to flight, the government introduced evidence of Christian's concealment. The inferences which a jury may properly draw from such concealment are almost identical to those of flight. Thus Christian's concealment further corroborates his consciousness of guilt and therefore guilt itself. See, e. g., Marcoux v. United States, 405 F.2d 719, 721 (9th Cir. 1968); Snell v. State, 302 So.2d 487, 488 (Fla.1974); Rogers v. State, 262 Ind. 315, 315 N.E.2d 707, 712 (1974); People v. Maldonado, 3 Ill.App.2d 216, 278 N.E.2d 225, 230 (1971); State v. Callihan, 11 Ohio App.2d 23, 227 N.E.2d 654, 658 (1967).