Opinion ID: 196268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lawfulness of Arrests

Text: 17 Nine appellants--Maldonado, Rodriguez-Resto, Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 5 Feliciano, Maysonet, Velez, Noble, Travieso, and Pagan--argue that they were arrested without probable cause, and that therefore the items seized during their arrest should have been suppressed.
18 With respect to a motion to suppress, we review a district court's findings of fact only for clear error. Sealey, 30 F.3d at 9; United States v. Maguire, 918 F.2d 254, 257 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 950, 111 S.Ct. 1421, 113 L.Ed.2d 474 (1991). This deferential standard is appropriate because the district court has a superior sense of what actually transpired during an incident by virtue of its ability to see and hear the witnesses who have firsthand knowledge of the events. United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 975 (1st Cir.1994). Questions of law, however, are subject to de novo review. Id.
19 Law enforcement officers may effect warrantless arrests provided that they have probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416-18, 96 S.Ct. 820, 824-25, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14, 95 S.Ct. 854, 862-63, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). [P]robable cause is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and as such must be evaluated in light of the totality of circumstances. United States v. Torres-Maldonado, 14 F.3d 95, 105 (1st Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Uricoechea-Casallas, 946 F.2d 162, 165 (1st Cir.1991)). Moreover, in order to establish probable cause, the government need not present the quantum of proof necessary to convict. Id. at 105 (quoting Uricoechea-Casallas, 946 F.2d at 165). See also United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 677, 684 (1st Cir.1992) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1588, 123 L.Ed.2d 155 (1993); United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1023 (1st Cir.1987) (same). Rather, it need only show that at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officers were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense. Torres-Maldonado, 14 F.3d at 105; see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). 20 Of course, probable cause must exist with respect to each person arrested, and a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1902-03, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968)); see also United States v. Diallo, 29 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir.1994). Rather, some additional circumstances from which it is reasonable to infer participation in criminal enterprise must be shown. United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 986 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 357, 121 L.Ed.2d 270 (1992) (quoting United States v. Hillison, 733 F.2d 692, 697 (9th Cir.1984)). 21 In assessing the significance of a defendant's association to others independently suspected of criminal activity, the Hillison court looked to whether the known criminal activity was contemporaneous with the association and whether the circumstances suggest that the criminal activity could have been carried on without the knowledge of all persons present. See Hillison, 733 F.2d at 697 (citations omitted). Other courts have focused on the nature of the place in which the arrest occurred and whether the individual himself was behaving suspiciously or was merely tainted by another. See United States v. Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir.1995). 22 A survey of the relevant caselaw makes clear, however, that it is often difficult to determine precisely what additional factors are sufficient to create the requisite inference of participatory involvement. In Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 90-91, 100 S.Ct. at 341-42, officers had a warrant to search a bar and its bartender for heroin. They conducted a patdown search of Ybarra, a bar patron, despite the fact he had made no gestures suggesting criminal conduct, no attempts to conceal contraband, and no suspicious statements. In declaring the search invalid, the Court noted that the officers knew nothing more about Ybarra except that he was present, along with several other customers, in a public tavern at a time when the police had reason to believe that the bartender would have heroin for sale. Id. at 91, 100 S.Ct. at 342. See also Swint v. City of Wadley, Alabama, 51 F.3d 988 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that the legitimate search and seizure of one suspect in a public place cannot be bootstrapped into probable cause for a broadbase search of the business establishment and its patrons). 23 Similarly, in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1902, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), the Court held that probable cause was not established by the mere fact that the defendant spoke to a number of known narcotics addicts over a period of eight hours where the arresting officer was completely ignorant regarding the content of the conversation and saw nothing pass between the defendant and the addicts. See also United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773, 784 (1st Cir.1976), aff'd on other grounds 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (mere act of picking up suspected drug traffickers at the train station and helping them load a contraband-laden footlocker into car does not, without more, constitute probable cause); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593, 68 S.Ct. 222, 228, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (holding that [t]he argument that one who 'accompanies a criminal to a crime rendezvous' cannot be assumed to be a bystander, forceful enough in some circumstances, is farfetched when the meeting is not secretive or in a suspicious hide-out ... and where the alleged substantive crime is one which does not necessarily involve any act visibly criminal). 24 In contrast, the cases in which courts find that probable cause exists generally involve substantially more than a momentary, random, or apparently innocent association between the defendant and the known criminal activity. For instance, in United States v. Patrick, 899 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.1990), the court upheld the search of a male defendant (Patrick) who crossed the border from Canada into New York at about the same time as a woman (Taylor) who was found to be carrying narcotics. Id. at 170. When the two entered the Immigration Office, there were no other travellers present, and both defendants told the same unusual story: they had accidentally crossed the border by bus and were simply returning to the United States. Id. at 171. When cocaine base was found in the woman's purse, the man was also arrested. Id. at 172. Distinguishing Ybarra, the court found that the fact that the man and woman had simultaneously entered the Immigration Office at a time when no others were present and that both told the same unusual story provided an adequate basis for the officials to reasonably believe that Patrick was not just a mere innocent traveling companion but was travelling and acting in concert with Taylor in transporting the cocaine. Id. 25 Similarly, in United States v. Halliman, 923 F.2d 873, 881-82 (D.C.Cir.1991), police officers suspected that a group of narcotics traffickers was living at and operating out of several rooms at the Holiday Inn. Id. at 875. Pursuant to a valid search, the officers seized a substantial amount of cocaine and arrested defendant Halliman. Id. at 876-77. Subsequently, two men entered the hotel lobby and headed for the rooms that had just been searched. The night manager informed police that the two men were in the group of narcotics traffickers who had been frequenting the hotel for the past month. The men stopped in front of one of the rooms in which the cocaine had been seized and contemplated the broken lock. The police then arrested them and seized the cocaine they were carrying. Id. at 877. In upholding the arrest, the court distinguished Ybarra by noting that the police here were aware of more than a momentary, casual, or random association among the defendants, the location, and Halliman. Id. at 882. 26 In Hillison, 733 F.2d at 697, the defendant registered at a hotel under an alias and occupied a room adjacent to two men known to be engaged in narcotics trafficking. The three men visited back and forth between the two rooms and used their automobiles interchangeably. The court found probable cause to arrest the defendant based on his close association with the drug traffickers over the course of three days, noting that it taxes credulity to assert that [the defendant] spent as much time in [the drug-traffickers'] company ... without knowing about their drug dealing activity. Id. 27 In United States v. Holder, 990 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C.Cir.1993), the court found probable cause to arrest a defendant found at the scene of a narcotics transaction. The court's analysis focused on the fact that the transaction occurred in a private apartment where the drugs were openly on display. The court distinguished Ybarra, stating that while Ybarra's presence in a public tavern was ostensibly innocent, [the defendant's] presence in a private apartment just a few feet from a table full of cocaine can hardly be so described.... The logical inference ... was that [he] was either a party to the distribution of drugs or a customer. Id. 28 With these principles in mind, we turn to the claims of each appellant.

29 We first consider the claims of appellants Travieso, Maldonado, and Feliciano. The record indicates that although the men were in a park near a basketball court, they were neither dressed to play nor visibly equipped for a social gathering. Agent Rivera also witnessed Maldonado talking on a cellular phone, which we have previously noted to be a known tool[ ] of the drug trade. United States v. De La Cruz, 996 F.2d 1307, 1311 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 356, 126 L.Ed.2d 320 (1993). While these facts might not be enough alone to constitute probable cause, they do weigh in our evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. More significant, however, are Agent Rivera's subsequent observations. He testified that after the black Pathfinder arrived, the Passenger removed two handbags from the vehicle and placed them between the white van and gray Cougar. Agent Rivera testified further that Travieso, Maldonado, and Feliciano all gathered around as the Passenger handled what appeared to be packages of cocaine. 6 We think that these facts would lead a prudent person to believe that a large-scale cocaine transaction was transpiring and that Travieso, Maldonado, and Feliciano were involved. We accordingly hold that their arrests were supported by probable cause. 30
31 We now consider whether the arrests of appellants Rodriguez-Resto, Maysonet, Velez, and Noble were supported by the requisite probable cause. All four argue that they were improperly arrested for their mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91, 100 S.Ct. at 342. Although a close call, we disagree. 32 While we acknowledge that the facts here are not clearly analogous to any of the cases discussed above, they are completely distinguishable from Ybarra and its progeny in that they indicate more than a momentary, casual, or random association between these four defendants, the location of the arrest, and those independently suspected of criminal activity. Applying the first factor enunciated by the Hillison court, we note that the connection between Rodriguez-Resto, Maysonet, Velez, and Noble and the suspected criminal activity was contemporaneous: all four were among the original group of men that initially attracted Agent Rivera's attention by using a cellular telephone and gathering in street clothes in a public park. See Hillison, 733 F.2d at 697. 33 With regard to the second Hillison factor, we think it strains credulity to suggest that the cocaine transaction was being carried on without the knowledge of all persons present. Id. Admittedly, Rodriguez-Resto, Maysonet, Velez, and Noble were not among the group that gathered around as the Passenger allegedly handled the packages of cocaine. Nevertheless, Agent Rivera's testimony clearly indicates that they were part of the group suspected of narcotics violations. Agent Rivera testified that the group was bunched tightly and moved towards the Pathfinder when it arrived, suggesting that they knew or were expecting its occupants. Furthermore, their lack of either athletic gear or picnic accoutrements made it less likely that they were at the park for an unrelated and innocent activity, and therefore suggested that they were not ignorant of the criminal activity transpiring around them. Although these facts do not conclusively rule out the innocent bystander explanation, we think that they reasonably imply participatory involvement. As the Supreme Court has explained, the evidence must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S.Ct. at 2317 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). We do not think officers in the field are required to divorce themselves from reality or to ignore the fact that criminals rarely welcome innocent persons as witnesses to serious crimes and rarely seek to perpetrate felonies before larger-than-necessary audiences. United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 712 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1005, 122 L.Ed.2d 154 (1993). 7 Accordingly, we find that the arrests of Rodriguez-Resto, Maysonet, Velez, and Noble were supported by probable cause. 8 3. Pagan 34 Appellant Pagan also claims that he was arrested for his mere propinquity to the others. We disagree. Although Pagan arrived after the black Pathfinder had left, his interaction with Travieso was sufficient for the officers to infer his participatory involvement in a drug transaction. Travieso was among the four who had gathered around when the Passenger handled the suspicious packages taken from the handbags retrieved from the back of the black Pathfinder. From this, Agent Rivera could reasonably have concluded that Travieso was intimately involved with the suspected drug transaction. Agent Rivera testified that when Pagan arrived in the red Mustang, Travieso immediately came over and inserted his entire torso into the car as if he were searching for something inside the vehicle. Agent Rivera testified that Travieso then removed an object which he could not identify from the red Mustang. Travieso then extracted a green handbag and brought it to the rear of the red Mustang. Agent Rivera testified that Pagan then exited the vehicle, headed to the rear, and opened the trunk. A few seconds later, the trunk was closed and Agent Rivera could no longer see the green handbag. Pagan then accompanied Travieso, and they joined the group near the bench. We think that these events fairly imply participatory involvement. When Pagan arrived, Agent Rivera already had good reason to suspect that Travieso was in possession of handbags containing cocaine. When Travieso immediately retrieved two objects from Pagan's vehicle, one of which was a handbag which he apparently transferred to the trunk, Agent Rivera reasonably could have concluded that Pagan was also a knowing participant in the drug transaction. 9 We accordingly find that Pagan's arrest was supported by probable cause.