Opinion ID: 2353279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prior United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Text: [¶ 16] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a trial by jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right to a jury has been made applicable to state criminal proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); see also ME. CONST. art I, § 6. [¶ 17] The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence was significantly augmented in the wake of Apprendi, which extended a defendant's right to a trial by jury to the fact-finding used to make enhanced sentencing determinations. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court vacated a twelve-year sentence imposed for a firearms violation. 530 U.S. at 471, 491-92, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The maximum sentence for the violation was ten years, but the sentencing court enhanced the sentence pursuant to a hate crime statute, which allowed for an increased sentence of up to twenty years if the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime was committed with a purpose to intimidate . . . because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity. Id. at 468-69, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp.1999-2000)). The Supreme Court found that the twelve-year sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added). [¶ 18] The Court refined the meaning of the term statutory maximum in Blakely, where it reviewed a sentence imposed pursuant to a sentencing scheme that authorized a maximum sentence of ten years, but no more than fifty-three months unless the sentencing court determined that certain aggravating factors warranted a longer term. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299, 124 S.Ct. 2531. If the court imposed an exceptional sentence, it was required to set forth supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law in its judgment. Id. The defendant, Blakely, was sentenced to ninety months in prison because the court, after a three-day bench hearing, made a factual finding that he had acted with deliberate cruelty. Id. at 300-01, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Because Blakely's guilty plea alone was insufficient to justify the ninety-month sentence, the Supreme Court vacated the sentence and made clear that the `statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. Id. at 303, 305, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (emphasis in original). [¶ 19] The Supreme Court reaffirmed this basic principle in Booker, where the Court determined that the federal sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because they imposed mandatory sentencing ranges based on factual findings made by the sentencing court. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233-35, 237-38, 125 S.Ct. 738. In Booker, the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, which carried a base sentence of between 210 and 262 months. Id. at 227, 125 S.Ct. 738. The court in a post-trial hearing, however, determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had been in possession of an additional 566 grams of crack and was guilty of obstruction of justice. Id. Consequently, the court elevated the sentence to thirty years. Id. The Supreme Court held that the sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional because they required the court to impose an enhanced sentence based on factual determinations not made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 243-45, 125 S.Ct. 738. Noting that it had never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range, in which case the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant, id. at 233, 125 S.Ct. 738 the Supreme Court cured the defect in the sentencing guidelines by severing the provisions that made the guidelines mandatory, id. at 245-46, 125 S.Ct. 738. [¶ 20] We applied the holdings of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker in Schofield. Schofield was sentenced to an elevated term of twenty-eight years pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(A), based on the court's determination of the nature and seriousness of the manslaughter she committed. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶¶ 7-9, 895 A.2d at 930. We vacated her sentence and held that, under Apprendi, determining whether a crime was among the most heinous offenses committed against a person was a question that the defendant had a right to have decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. ¶¶ 21, 27, 895 A.2d at 933, 935. [¶ 21] More recently, the United States Supreme Court examined the reach of the Apprendi line of cases in Cunningham v. California, ___ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007), where it held that California's determinate sentencing law violated the Sixth Amendment because it allowed the sentencing court to impose an elevated sentence based on aggravating facts that it found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 860, 870-71, 127 S.Ct. 856. The court was directed under the sentencing law to start with a middle term and then move to an upper term only if it found aggravating factual circumstances beyond the elements of the charged offense. Id. at 862, 127 S.Ct. 856. Concluding that the middle term was the relevant statutory maximum, and noting that aggravating facts were found by a judge and not the jury, the United States Supreme Court held that the California sentencing law violated the rule set out in Apprendi. Id. at 871, 127 S.Ct. 856. Although the sentencing law gave judges broad discretion to identify aggravating factors, this discretion did not make the upper term the statutory maximum because the jury verdict alone did not authorize the sentence and judges did not have the discretion to choose the upper term unless it was justified by additional facts. Id. at 868-69, 127 S.Ct. 856.