Opinion ID: 2802648
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Part-Time Worker Status

Text: We also reject Darkenwald's argument that her desire to remain a part-timeonly worker provided her with good cause to quit. Our determination of this issue turns on how we construe two statutes: RCW 50.20.050(2)(a), which enumerates what circumstances constitute good cause for voluntarily leaving work, and RCW 50.20.119, which permits a part-time worker to refuse full-time employment and still receive benefits. RCW 50.20.050(2)(a) states that its enumerated list of good causes is exclusive. That list does not include a provision covering employees who wish to limit their work hours, nor does it include a provision covering an employer's demand that an employee work more hours. The absence of part-time worker status from the list thus suffices to defeat Darkenwald's argument that her desire to work only part time provided her with good cause. Our inquiry ordinarily would end there. Darkenwald asserts, however, that a separate statute, RCW 50.20.119, creates an additional category of good cause that protects part-time workers who reject an offer of full-time employment. RCW 50.20.119(1) provides: 10 Darkenwald (Linda) v. Emp't Sec. Dep't, No. 90544-4 [A]n otherwise eligible individual may not be denied benefits for any week because the individual is a part-time worker and is available for, seeks, applies for, or accepts only work of seventeen or fewer hours per week by reason of the application of RCW 50.20.01 0(1 )(c), 50.20.080, or 50.22.020(1) relating to availability for work and active search for work, or failure to apply for or refusal to accept suitable work.[61 Darkenwald's argument incorrectly assumes that the above-quoted statute conflicts with RCW 50.20.050(2)(a)'s statement that the enumerated list of good causes is exclusive. 7 [W]here potentially conflicting acts can be harmonized, we construe each to maintain the integrity of the other. Anderson v. Dep't of Corr., 159 Wn.2d 849, 859, 154 P.3d 220 (2007). Here, the plain language of RCW 50.20.119 does not conflict with the plain language of the exclusivity provision of RCW 50.20.050(2). Rather, RCW 50.20.119 applies only to individuals who are already unemployed and have filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Department; it does not extend to presently employed workers. RCW 50.20.01 0(1 )(c) requires a person who has filed a benefits claim to actively seek and accept any suitable work in order to retain eligibility for unemployment benefits. RCW 50.20.119 sets forth a limited exception to that rule: it excuses a claimant who is a part-time worker from searching for or accepting offers of full-time employment, even if the full-time employment would otherwise be 6 The immediately following subsection (2) defines part-time worker as an individual who: (a) Earned wages in 'employment' in at least forty weeks in the individual's base year; and (b) did not earn wages in 'employment' in more than seventeen hours per week in any weeks in the individual's base year. 7 Darkenwald also asserts that we should defer to RCW 50.20.119 because, she asserts, RCW 50.20.119 was enacted later than RCW 50.20.050. This misconstrues the chronological relationship between the statutes. While RCW 50.20.050 existed prior to the 2003 enactment of RCW 50.20.119, the exclusivity provision was not added until 2009. LAWS OF 2009, ch. 493, § 3. Because the exclusivity provision is actually newer than RCW 50.20.119, giving deference to the later-enacted provision would undercut Darkenwald's argument rather than bolster it. 11 Darkenwald (Linda) v. Emp't Sec. Dep't, No. 90544-4 suitable. RCW 50.20.119(1 ). RCW 50.20.119 thus bars the Department from denying a part-time worker benefits simply because that worker failed to active[ly] search for, apply for, or accept full-time work. /d. Under the Act, a currently employed person need not search for, apply for, or accept employment in order to obtain unemployment benefits. Those obligations do attach, however, to alreadyunemployed individuals who have filed a claim for benefits-as the three statutes cited in RCW 50.20.119's text demonstrate. 8 Consequently, RCW 50.20.119 applies only to workers who are already unemployed and cannot be used as a basis for grafting an additional good cause onto the exclusive list contained in RCW 50.20.050(2)(a). Because the plain meaning of RCW 50.20.050(2) and RCW 50.20.119 are not ambiguous, we need not consider secondary considerations such as legislative history. See Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 12. We note, however, that the legislative history behind RCW 50.20.050's exclusivity provision cuts against Darkenwald's proposed construction. Darkenwald's construction hinges on the assumption that RCW 50.20.050's list of causes is not exclusive and is augmented by RCW 50.20.119. The legislative history demonstrates that the legislature rejected reading such additional causes into the list. As noted supra note 7, the legislature added the exclusivity provision to RCW 50.20.050 in 2009, six years after the enactment of RCW 50.20.119. LAWS OF 2009, ch. 493, § 3. The legislature could have 8 RCW 50.20.119 cites three statutes-RCW 50.20.010(1 )(c), RCW 50.20.080, and RCW 50.22.020(1 )-each of which plainly applies only to individuals who already are unemployed and have filed a claim for benefits. These statutory references thus make clear that RCW 50.20.119, like the cited statutes, can apply only to individuals who are already unemployed. 12 Darkenwald (Linda) v. Emp't Sec. Dep't, No. 90544-4 incorporated part-time worker protections into RCW 50.20.050 at that time, but it chose not to do so. Moreover, the exclusivity provision appears to have been added in response to our 2008 opinion in Spain v. Employment Security Department, in which we held that the statute's list of good causes was not exhaustive. 164 Wn.2d 252, 254-55, 185 P.3d 1188 (2008). The legislature amended RCW 50.20.050 to add the exclusivity provision just eleven months later. See LAWS OF 2009, ch. 493, § 3. The bill report addressing the amendment specifically cited Spain's nonexclusivity holding in its background section. FINAL 8. REP. ON SECOND SUBSTITUTE S.B. 5963, at 2, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009). '[A] change in legislative intent is presumed when a material change is made in a statute.' Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wn.2d 957, 967, 977 P.2d 554 (1999) (quoting Rhoad v. McLean Trucking Co., 102 Wn.2d 422, 427, 686 P.2d 483 (1984)). Our decision in Spain was in keeping with a remedial reading of the statute; had the legislature believed such a construction appropriate for RCW 50.20.050, it could simply have left the statute as it was and allowed Spain to remain controlling law. Its decision to amend the statute less than one year later strongly suggests that the legislature did not believe the usual rules of remedial construction can be used to expand the list of good causes to leave work. 13 Darkenwald (Linda) v. Emp't Sec. Dep't, No. 90544-4