Opinion ID: 3063774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: d isclosing the ci’s identity

Text: Watley argues that once the prior controlled drug buys became an issue in the case, the district court’s refusal to compel the disclosure of the CI’s identity deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. He argues that the CI could have significantly assisted his defense that the drugs and guns belonged to someone else, and that the government did not establish its interest in not disclosing the CI’s identity. “We review the denial of a motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant under an abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490 (11th Cir. 1991). The government has a limited privilege not to disclose the identity of its informants. Id. “If disclosure is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.” Id. (quotation omitted). In determining whether disclosure of an informant’s identity is required, the district court conducts a balancing test, “focus[ing] . . . on three factors: the extent of the informant’s participation in the criminal activity, the directness of the relationship between the defendant’s asserted defense and the probable testimony of the informant.” Id. 5 (quotation omitted). Here, the district court appropriately weighed the three factors. The record shows that the CI was not involved in the events of May 22, when Watley was found to have possessed cocaine with intent to distribute. It further shows that the CI conducted two prior controlled buys that were not charged in the indictment. Those prior buys established that someone was selling cocaine at the house. Thus, the CI was neither a mere tipster nor directly involved in the charged offense. The first factor – the CI’s involvement, then, does not clearly indicate whether the CI’s identity should have been disclosed. Nonetheless, regarding the third factor, the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office had used that particular CI for many years. It intended to continue using the CI, implying that disclosing the CI’s identity would compromise future drug investigations. Thus, the government had a strong interest in not disclosing the CI’s identity. Regarding the second factor, Watley argues that the relationship between the CI’s testimony and his defense favored disclosure because the CI’s testimony was crucial to his misidentification defense. But Watley did not introduce any evidence raising a strong inference of misidentification based on the frequency that other persons visited the house. The government, moreover, indicated that, if called to testify, the CI would identify Watley as the person who sold the drugs on April 30 6 and May 18. Although the court did not question the CI, it appears that the CI’s testimony would have hurt, not helped, Watley’s defense. Thus, Watley did not meet his burden to show that the CI’s testimony would significantly aid his misidentification defense, and his argument that the CI could testify that someone else sold the drugs was “[m]ere conjecture” and “insufficient to compel disclosure.” See id. at 1491. In light of the foregoing, the district court did not abuse its discretion by not compelling the government to disclose the CI’s identity.