Opinion ID: 3012999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair

Text: Dealing Next, Conneen alleges that MBNA breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Delaware law. Delaware courts have been reluctant to recognize a broad application of this covenant out of concern that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could swallow the doctrine of employment at will. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 442 (Del. 1996). While employment at will remains a strong presumption, the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized the limited application of the covenant to an at-will employment 25 contract. Id. at 440 (citing Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992)). Accordingly, Delaware law recognizes four situations where a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may occur in an at-will employment situation: (I) where the termination violated public policy; (ii) where the employer misrepresented an important fact and the employee relied thereon either to accept a new position or remain in a present one; (iii) where the employer used its superior bargaining power to deprive an employee of clearly identifiable compensation related to the employee’s past service; and (iv) where the employer falsified or manipulated employment records to create fictitious grounds for termination. Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 400 (Del. 2000) (citing Pressman, 679 A.2d at 442-44). Conneen alleges that MBNA breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on grounds (I), (ii), and (iv) above. Appellant’s Br. at 34-6. Given the preceding discussion of Conneen’s responsibility for the breakdown in the interactive process, and MBNA’s good faith, we need not even respond to her attempt to rely upon grounds (I) or (ii), and we need only offer brief discussion of her attempt to establish liability under ground (iv). That latter claim rests upon Conneen’s allegation that “Nurse Peterson falsely stated the opinion of Dr. Seltzer with regard to plaintiff ’s prospective change in her work schedule.” Appellant’s Br. at 36. She insists that Dr. Seltzer never told Nurse Peterson that she could resume her normal work schedule at 8:00 a.m. However, even if we assume that Dr. Seltzer did not specifically tell Nurse Peterson that Conneen could begin reporting to work at 8:00 a.m., it is clear from Dr. Seltzer’s own testimony that Conneen can establish, at best, a misunderstanding on the part of Nurse Peterson regarding the April 7 conversation. Moreover, given Dr. Seltzer’s further testimony that Nurse Peterson’s conclusion was not unreasonable, Conneen 26 cannot elevate that misunderstanding into a deliberate attempt to falsify records even under the deferential summary judgment standard that we must apply to that “dispute.” As noted above, no one from MBNA contacted Dr. Seltzer without Conneen’s prior consent, and the record does not support Conneen’s attempts to impute nefarious motives to Nurse Peterson or anyone else at MBNA.16