Opinion ID: 2351193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Expert Testimony and the Mental Examination Requirement

Text: ¶ 20 Section 18-1-504(1)(a) provides that a person may be relieved of criminal liability for conduct he engaged in under a mistaken belief of fact if the mistake negatives the existence of a particular mental state essential to the commission of the offense. [5] § 18-1-504(1)(a). Section 16-8-107(3)(b) provides procedures for admission of expert testimony concerning defendant's mental condition [r]egardless of whether a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Accordingly, when a defendant's mental condition is not so severe as to be included in the statutory definition of insanity, [6] but instead is offered to show that the defendant had a mistaken belief of fact that negates the existence of a culpable mental state, expert testimony concerning the mental condition can be admissible. See § 16-8-107(3)(b); § 18-1-504(1)(a). In those cases, the defendant must nevertheless provide adequate notice to the court and submit to a court-ordered mental examination. § 16-8-103.7(3)(a), C.R.S. (2011); § 16-8-107(3)(b). ¶ 21 In People v. Flippo, 159 P.3d 100, 104-05 (Colo.2007), we ruled that the legislature, in section 16-8-107, had distinguished between expert testimony offered to support a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and expert testimony of a mental condition in support of a defendant's theory that, on the occasion in question, he did not form the mens rea required for conviction. The plain language of section 16-8-107(3) demonstrates legislative intent to distinguish between these two uses of expert testimony concerning a defendant's mental condition. [7] § 16-8-107(3); Flippo, 159 P.3d at 104. ¶ 22 We concluded in Flippo that the term mental condition in section 16-8-107(3)(b) includes a defendant's intellectual disability that is not severely abnormal such that it is included in the statutory definition of insanity. 159 P.3d at 105. Defendant in that case sought to admit expert testimony of an intellectual disability suggesting his confession was involuntary. Id. at 103. Interpreting the language of section 16-8-107(3)(b), we determined the legislature intended to allow a defendant to introduce expert testimony of a mental condition that is not severely abnormalsuch as an intellectual disability without pleading insanity. Id. at 104-06 (reasoning that the broad language of section 16-8-107(3)(b) evinces the General Assembly's desire to address evidence that relates to the condition of a defendant's mind beyond just issues of insanity); see also People v. Vanrees, 125 P.3d 403, 408-09 (Colo.2005) (observing that the legislature did not intend to create an `all or nothing' insanity defense that applies in all cases where the defendant presents evidence challenging the culpable mental state element of the crime charged and holding that defendant may introduce non-expert testimony of mental slowness to challenge mens rea without insanity plea). ¶ 23 Nevertheless, when a defendant seeks to admit expert testimony related to a mental condition, section 16-8-107(3)(b) requires the defendant to undergo[ ] a court-ordered examination pursuant to section 16-8-106. The plain language of section 16-8-106(1) [8] accords a court discretion to specify the place where such examination is to be conducted and the period of time allocated for such examination.