Opinion ID: 1041860
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Solicitor’s Opinion

Text: In contrast to McMaster’s interpretation of “valid existing rights,” the Solicitor’s Opinion concluded that the term refers to a claimant who had actually “filed a patent application, and established a right to a patent before the land in question was designated as wilderness” by “complying with all the requirements for obtaining a patent.” Solicitor’s Opinion at 3, 21. Under this reading, the Wilderness Act does not preserve a right to a surface estate for those who “located a mining claim and made a discovery of a valuable mineral claim 16 MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES deposit before the land in question was designated as wilderness, but . . . had not established a right to a patent before the land was designated as wilderness.” Id. at 3–4. Since the Solicitor’s Opinion is contrary to McMaster’s interpretation of the statute, we must determine whether it is owed deference.
Under Chevron, we conduct a two-step inquiry to determine whether an agency interpretation warrants deference. At step one, we ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; [and we] . . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–43. If, however, “the statute is silent or ambiguous,” id. at 843, prior to step two, “we must decide how much weight to accord an agency’s interpretation,” Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 2008); see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–28 (2001); N. Cal. River Watch v. Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766, 772–73 (9th Cir. 2010). If we determine that Chevron deference applies, then we move to step two, where we will defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. First, we hold that the meaning of “valid existing rights” in § 1133(d)(3) is ambiguous under Chevron step one. Section 1133(d)(3) clearly excepts “valid existing rights” from its mandate that patents should be issued to only the mineral estate; but what constitutes a “valid existing right[]” MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES 17 is not clear from the text; the term is undefined. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. The contrasting interpretations that McMaster and the government offer for “valid existing rights” demonstrate the ambiguity inherent in the term. As explained, McMaster argues that “valid existing rights” preserves the right to the surface estate for all those who had properly located a mining claim prior to the relevant wilderness designation because they had a legitimate expectation that they would receive title. In contrast, the government argues that “valid existing rights” are akin to “vested rights,” and Congress retains the authority to limit and regulate a preexisting mining claimant’s opportunity to obtain a patent. Courts that have interpreted the term “valid existing rights” within the context of other statutes have sometimes defined the term in accordance with the government’s definition, see, e.g., Alaska Miners v. Andrus, 662 F.2d 577, 579–80 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a plaintiff with valid claim did not have a “valid existing right” to a patent “prior to the payment of any money for the granting of the patent for the land”); Freese v. United States, 639 F.2d 754, 758 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (holding that claimant who was denied a patent had his “valid existing rights” preserved and that “[t]he law is well-settled that [a] vested right [to a] patent does not arise until there has been full compliance with the extensive procedures . . . for the obtaining of a patent”). Other times courts have arguably interpreted the term in a manner consistent with McMaster’s definition, see, e.g., Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v. United States, 806 F.2d 924, 926–27 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that “‘valid existing rights’ does not necessarily mean vested rights[;] . . . legitimate expectations may be recognized as valid existing rights, especially where the expectancy is created by the government in the first instance”); Seldovia Native Ass’n, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Aleknagik); cf. 18 MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES E. Cent. Eureka Mining Co. v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 204 U.S. 266, 269–70, (1907) (holding that the phrase “rights or interests . . . under existing laws” included “inchoate rights”). In addition, the District of Columbia Circuit has specifically held that the phrase “subject to valid existing rights,” as contained in a different statute, is ambiguous under Chevron step one. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702, 707–08 (D.C. Cir. 2008).1 Moreover, with regard to the Wilderness Act in particular, the fact that the Department of the Interior has changed its practice—and as McMaster argues, also its written policies and regulations2— with regard to what constitutes a “valid existing right” also supports our conclusion that the term is ambiguous. See Solicitor’s Opinion at 19–20. Since we conclude that the meaning of “valid existing rights” in § 1133(d)(3) is ambiguous under Chevron step one, we must determine how much weight to afford the agency interpretation before moving to step two. See Tualatin Valley 1 The statute at issue in Nat’l Mining Ass’n was the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (“SMCRA”). The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (“OSM”) has stated that “valid existing rights” under SMCRA “is not analogous to [‘valid existing rights’] under other Federal statutes,” Valid Existing Rights, 64 Fed. Reg. 70766-01 (Dec 17, 1999), including our interpretation of “valid existing” rights in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. See Aleknagik, 806 F.2d at 926–27. This further illustrates the ambiguity in the term. 2 As explained, although the BLM had a practice of issuing fee-simple patents to claimants who had located their claims prior to the wilderness designation, see Solicitor’s Opinion at 19–20, its written policies and regulation were arguably not clear as to whether a fee-simple patent must always issue to a claimant in McMaster’s position. MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES 19 Builders, 522 F.3d at 940; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 227–28; Wilcox, 633 F.3d at 772–73. Chevron deference applies only when (1) “it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,” and (2) “the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. Although it seems clear that Congress has explicitly delegated authority to the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe regulations relating to the operation of the Mining Law and the issuance of patents, see 30 U.S.C. § 22; 43 U.S.C. § 2,3 the Solicitor’s Opinion was not “promulgated in the exercise of [the Department’s] authority” to issue regulations regarding public lands. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. The Supreme Court has stated that “[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters which lack the force of law[] do not warrant Chevron-style deference,” Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000), and we have relied on Christensen to broadly conclude that “Solicitor’s opinions . . . cannot properly be viewed as an administrative agency interpretation of statute that has the force of law.” The 3 Congress has specified that citizens seeking to acquire title to mining claims must follow “regulations prescribed by law,” 30 U.S.C. § 22, and has made clear that the “Secretary of the Interior . . . shall perform all executive duties appertaining to the . . . sale of the public lands of the United States, or in anywise respecting such public lands, and, also, such as relate to private claims of land, and the issuing of patents for all grants of land under the authority of the Government.” 43 U.S.C. § 2. The Supreme Court has confirmed that these statutes make clear that “the Department [of the Interior] has been granted plenary authority over the administration of public lands, including mineral lands; and it has been given broad authority to issue regulations concerning them.” Best, 371 U.S. at 336–37. 20 MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1068 n. 16 (9th Cir. 2003), amended on reh’g en banc by 360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2004).4 Thus, the Solicitor’s Opinion does not warrant Chevron deference.
4 Wilderness Soc’y declares that Solicitor’s Opinions, as a class, are not entitled to Chevron deference because “[s]uch opinions . . . normally are the product of individual lawyers advising their client agencies . . . [and] do not . . . involve procedural protections comparable to an agency’s rulemaking procedures.” Id. at 1068 n.16. But see Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31. If we were deciding the issue on a blank slate we might come out somewhat differently. The Solicitor Opinion at issue in Wilderness Soc’y addressed a specific project in Alaska, “d[id] not attempt to draw broader conclusions regarding the permissibility of th[e] type of enterprise [at issue],” and “was not a document intended to have the general force of law.” Id. at 1068. In contrast, here, the Solicitor’s Opinion was arguably issued with a “lawmaking pretense.” Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). The Opinion’s interpretation of “valid existing rights” applies to an entire class of claims, and the Opinion itself specifically requires the BLM to “amend its regulations . . . and its Manual . . . to comport with th[e] Opinion,” and to apply the Opinion to “all new and currently pending patent applications.” Solicitor’s Opinion at 21–22. Moreover, Solicitor Opinions, generally, have “precedential value”—they “bind future parties.” MarmolejoCampos, 558 F.3d at 909. Solicitor’s Opinions are binding on the Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”), an appellate body that hears appeals from BLM decisions. See Solicitor’s Opinion M-37003, Binding Nature of Solicitor’s Opinions on the Office of Hearings and Appeals (Jan. 18, 2001); United States v. Rannells, 175 IBLA 363, 377 n.3 (IBLA 2008). Indeed, it seems to be somewhat of an anomaly that we have concluded that IBLA opinions are entitled to Chevron deference, see Brandt-Erichsen v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., 999 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1993), but Solicitor Opinions, which are binding on the IBLA and can overrule IBLA decisions are not, see 43 C.F.R. 4.5(a). But, since we ultimately conclude that the Solicitor’s Opinion is entitled to Skidmore deference, the question of whether Chevron applies is not determinative in this case. MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES 21 An agency action that does not warrant Chevron deference may still warrant “respect proportional to its ‘power to persuade.’” Mead, 533 U.S. at 235 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). Under Skidmore, “[t]he weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and [any other] factors which give it power to persuade.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. We conclude that the Solicitor’s Opinion is entitled to respect under Skidmore. It is a well-reasoned, formal, signed, twenty-two page opinion, see Solicitor’s Opinion at 1–22, that is “thorough[] . . . in its consideration,” and ultimately persuasive. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. McMaster argues that the Solicitor’s opinion is inconsistent “with earlier . . . pronouncements.” For the reasons explained earlier, the Solicitor’s Opinion was not clearly contrary to the regulation or, arguably, the Manual, although it does appear to be in tension with the prior BLM policy (though the policy still left the agency room for discretion). To the extent there is any inconsistency, however, this is just one factor under Skidmore. The Solicitor’s Opinion also carefully analyzes the text, purpose, and legislative history of the Wilderness Act, as well as the “modern judicial treatment of valid existing rights with respect to legislation affecting mining claims and patents.” Solicitor’s Opinion at 1–16. In sum, the Solicitor’s Opinion is a “persuasive interpretation of the law,” Tualatin Valley Builders, 522 F.3d 22 MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES at 942, despite the fact that it arguably represents a change in the agency’s view.5 First, the Solicitor’s Opinion’s reading of “valid existing rights” is consistent with the text of § 1133(d)(3). Section 1133(d)(3) states that “hereafter, subject to valid existing rights, all patents issued under the mining laws of the United States affecting national forest lands designated by this chapter as wilderness areas shall convey title to the mineral deposits within the claim.” Because the phrase “subject to valid existing rights” clearly refers to the issuance of a limited patent to the mineral estate, “valid existing rights” must refer to a claimant’s valid existing right to a patent—not merely a valid claim. See Solicitor’s Opinion at 5 (“[T]he phrase ‘valid existing rights’ must refer only to a claimant’s valid existing rights to a patent.”). Moreover, as the Solicitor’s Opinion points out, see Solicitor’s Opinion at 6, § 1133(d)(3) references both “valid existing rights” and “valid claims.” By virtue of the fact that Congress used both of these phrases in the same section of a statute, we infer that Congress intended different meanings. SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is a well-established 5 To the extent that McMaster argues that the Solicitor’s Opinion is arbitrary and capricious because it represented a “reversal of agency policy” or a “change from agency practice,” McMaster’s argument fails. Agency inconsistency is “at most” a reason for concluding that an action is arbitrary and capricious only when the change in position is inadequately explained. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005); cf. id. at 981 (explaining that Chevron still applied to an inconsistent policy because “[a]n initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone[;] . . . the agency . . . must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis”). Here, the change in the agency’s practice was not unexplained. The Solicitor Opinion clearly, and rather extensively, stated the reasons supporting its interpretation. MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES 23 canon of statutory interpretation that the use of different words or terms within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different meaning for those words.”). Thus, the exception of “valid existing rights” from § 1133(d)’s requirement that the surface estate be reserved to the government cannot mean that any “valid claim” is excepted from the requirement that the surface estate be reserved. “Valid existing rights” must mean something different. The Solicitor Opinion’s reading is also consistent with the purpose of the Wilderness Act. The Wilderness Act was enacted to “secure for the American people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness” by creating and administering wilderness areas “for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these areas, [and] the preservation of their wilderness character.” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a). As the Solicitor’s Opinion explains, reading “valid existing rights” narrowly, so as to require more than a mere “valid claim,” helps to “maximize protection of the wilderness” and is consistent with the Act’s “protective thrust.” Solicitor’s Opinion at 7. Although, to some extent, § 1133(d)(3) also represented a compromise between mining and preservation interests, see Hubbard, 76 Denv. U. L. Rev. at 597, construing “valid existing rights” in this manner does not interfere with mining interests. A fee-simple patent is not necessary for mining to continue. See Independence Min. Co, 105 F.3d at 509 (stating that a miner “need not obtain patents to continue its mining operation”). The holder of a valid, located claim is entitled to the “exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the . . . location[],” 30 U.S.C. § 26; 24 MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES see id. § 28; see also Best, 371 U.S. at 335, and has “the right to extract all minerals from the claim without paying royalties to the United States,” Independence Min. Co., 105 F.3d at 506 (internal citation omitted). In addition to being consistent with the text and purpose of the Wilderness Act, the Solicitor’s Opinion is also in harmony with precedent. For example, in Alaska Miners v. Andrus, claimants challenged a provision of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., which limited the issuance of patents to those with valid claims who complied with the mining laws and applied for a patent within a five year period. See Alaska Miners, 662 F.2d at 579–80; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1621(c). ANCSA provided that “[a]ll conveyances . . . shall be subject to valid existing rights,” 43 U.S.C. § 1613(g) (emphasis added); see also Alaska Miners, 662 F.2d at 579–80. The claimants argued that miners with valid claims “have a valid existing right to require the government to hold open indefinitely the option to apply for a patent,” Alaska Miners, 662 F.2d at 579, essentially the same argument McMaster makes here. We held that: Appellants ha[d] no such right to a patent or to the opportunity to apply for a patent outside of the time restriction [mandated by the Act]. Appellants may well have an existing right to prevent third parties from interfering with their possessory interest. However, they have no right to prevent the government from conveying the legal title to the native corporations. MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES 25 Id. Moreover, we reasoned that “the interest of a claimant in a mining claim, prior to the payment of any money for the granting of the patent for the land, is nothing more than a right to the exclusive possession of the land based upon conditions subsequent, a failure to fulfill which forfeits the locator’s interest in the claim.” Id. (emphasis added).6 The U.S. Court of Claims has similarly held that the owner of a valid but unpatented mining claim had no right to receive a patent because he “had not yet taken the first step towards obtaining patents.” Freese, 639 F.2d at 758. In response to the claimant’s argument that “his right to the issuance of a patent upon each of his mining claims vested as soon as he completed the discovery and location of each claim,” the court explained that “[t]he law is well-settled that [a] vested right [to a patent] does not arise until there has been full compliance with the extensive procedures set forth in the federal mining laws for the obtaining of a patent.” Id.; see also Cook v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 435, 445–46 (Fed. Cl. 1997) (holding that plaintiffs were “entitle[d] to a patent” and had a vested property interest once they did “all that [was] required . . . under existing law to receive title to public 6 East Central Eureka Mining Co. v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 204 U.S. 266, 269–71, (1907), is not to the contrary. In East Central, the statutory language at issue was broader than “valid existing rights”—the savings clause referred to “rights or interests in mining property acquired under existing laws.” Id. at 270. The Court also concluded that “rights”meant rights in the “popular” sense, rather than “technical[] legal sense.” Id. at 271. In contrast, here, “valid existing rights” has been treated as a technical, legal term that has been subjected to precise interpretations by courts and agencies. See, e.g., Valid Existing Rights, 64 Fed. Reg. 70766-01 (Dec 17, 1999); Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 512 F.3d at 707–08; Aleknagik, 806 F.2d at 926–27; Alaska Miners, 662 F.2d at 579–80; Freese, 639 F.2d at 758. 26 MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES land, including the filing of all papers and, where applicable, the payment to the United States of the purchase price for a patent”). The court also explained that the claimant’s “‘valid existing rights’ in his mining claims [were] . . . preserved,” despite the fact that the claimant was completely denied a patent, because the claimant’s “rights of use, enjoyment and disposition in his unpatented mining claims remain[ed] undiminished.” Freese, 639 at 758. Although we previously held in Aleknagik, with regard to a different statute, that it was reasonable for an agency to interpret “valid existing rights” “to mean something other than ‘vested’” where plaintiffs had a “legitimate claim” and the government represented that claimants had a right to that claim, 806 F.2d at 926–27,7 no such representation has been made to individuals in McMaster’s situation. We reasoned in Aleknagik that “legitimate expectations may be recognized as valid existing rights, especially where the expectancy is created by the government in the first instance.” Id. at 927. Here, however, individuals with valid claims who have not even filed a patent application do not have a “legitimate expectation” of receiving fee-simple title. They have not yet completed even the “first step” of the process of applying for a patent—in contrast to the claimants in Aleknagik. Id. at 926; see 30 U.S.C. § 29. Nor has McMaster claimed that the government has somehow represented to individuals with 7 We applied Aleknagik to the ANCSA in Seldovia Native Ass’n, 904 F.2d at 1343. There we held that conditional purchase options granted under the Alaska Statehood Act “satisfy the requirements of a valid existing right. Because they are granted by the State of Alaska pursuant to an Act of Congress, they create legitimate expectations of property interests. In addition, they are rights leading to the acquisition of title.” Id. Seldovia is also distinguishable from this case because the claimant had a legitimate expectation that was clearly created by an Act of Congress. MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES 27 valid claims that they have a right to fee-simple title.8 Rather, the Mining Act indicates that an individual with a valid claim will have an opportunity to apply for a patent and may receive one if he can meet the statute’s requirements. See 30 U.S.C. § 29. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that “[a]lthough owners of unpatented mining claims hold fully recognized possessory interests in their claims, . . . these interests are a ‘unique form of property.’ The United States, as owner of the underlying fee title to the public domain, maintains broad powers over the terms and conditions upon which the public lands can be used, leased, and acquired.” Locke, 471 U.S. at 104 (citations omitted).9 Indeed, we held in Swanson v. Babbitt that “[u]ntil a patent is issued, the government has broad authority to manage public lands” and “to remove those public lands from mining claims and patents,” 3 F.3d at 1352. Thus, individuals such as McMaster, who have only a valid 8 By contrast, the government’s conduct in Aleknagik suggested that the claimants—occupants of a townsite—had a right to fee-simple title. At the Aleknagik claimants’ request, BLM had already completed a preliminary process for forming a townsite, called “segregation.” 806 F.2d at 925. Here, the government has not undertaken any steps to patent the claims because McMaster has not filed the initial application. Nor has the government explicitly represented through its policies that all valid claims established before the effective date will receive fee-simple title. As explained, neither the regulation, nor the Manual, nor the BLM policy clearly require all valid claims to be patented. 9 Contrary to McMaster’s contentions, the Solicitor’s interpretation is also consistent with Stockley v. United States, 260 U.S. 532 (1923). In Stockley, the Court said that “‘existing valid claims’ [o]bviously means something less than a vested right.” Id. at 544. Similarly, the Solicitor interpreted “valid existing rights” to mean something more than an “existing valid claim.” See Solicitor’s Opinion at 6. 28 MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES claim, do not have a legitimate expectation of receiving a patent. Finally, the Solicitor’s Opinion also addressed the legislative history to the Wilderness Act. The Opinion discusses a letter to the House of Representatives from Assistant Secretary of the Interior, John A. Carver, Jr.,which suggested adding the language “subject to valid existing rights.” H. Rep. No. 88-1538 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3615. The letter explained: The requirement of the bill that all patents issued after the effective date of this act shall convey title to mineral deposits with a reservation to the United States of all title to the surface of the lands must be subject to ‘valid existing rights.” The owner of a valid mining claim perfected under the mining laws prior to the effective date of this act has already acquired a possessory title to the surface of the land and any patent issued on such a claim after the effective date of this act must convey title to both the land and mineral deposits therein, unless provision is made for just compensation. Id. at 3625. Although the letter states that a patent conveying fee-simple title “must” issue to the “owner of a valid mining claim perfected under the mining laws prior to the effective date of th[e] act” because the owner has “already acquired a possessory title to the surface of the land,” Carver does not provide a legal basis for this assertion. See Solicitor Opinion at 9–10. Carver’s reference to “just compensation,” however, implies that his rationale for the amendment is based, at least MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES 29 in part, on avoiding compensable takings. See H. Rep. No. 88-1538 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3615, 3625. Viewed in that context, Carver’s interpretation is an incorrect statement of the law. We have held that just compensation is required only when the claimant has a vested property right, see Acton v. United States, 401 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1968), which requires more than a valid claim and a possessory interest, see Swanson, 3 F.3d at 1348 (holding that a “vested right does not arise until there has been full compliance with the extensive procedures set forth in the federal mining laws for the obtaining of a patent” (citation omitted)); see also Alaska Miners, 662 F.2d at 579–80. In addition to the Carver letter, the Solicitor’s Opinion also discusses the House Committee Report, which was apparently based on the Carver letter. Solicitor’s Opinion at 8. The House Report states that § 1133(d)(3)’s limitation of surface rights would apply to “locators of claims staked after the effective date of the act.” H. Rep. No. 88-1538 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3615, 3618. (emphasis added). As the Solicitor’s Opinion pointed out, this statement is somewhat inconsistent with Carver’s interpretation of the savings clause—those who have merely staked a claim do not yet have a valid claim with a present possessory interest. Solicitor’s Opinion at 10. We agree with the Solicitor’s Opinion that to the extent that the Carver letter or House Report implied that “owners of valid mining claims[, or staked claims,] have, without more, vested rights to a patent including the surface as well as the mineral deposits, [that] viewpoint is less persuasive,” see Solicitor’s Opinion at 9, particularly since the Carver letter and House Report are somewhat inconsistent in their interpretation of “valid existing rights.” Moreover, the Carver 30 MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES and House Report interpretations are also inconsistent with the text and purpose of the Wilderness Act, as well as relevant case law, as has been explained. We find the Solicitor Opinion’s conclusion with regard to the legislative history convincing: The “valid existing rights” provision is “best viewed as responsive to the general constitutional concern the Assistant Secretary raised, rather than as legislating any precise understanding of the scope of those rights.” Id. at 10. “[T]he suggestions offered in both the Carver letter and the House Committee Report . . . should not . . . be regarded as enacting into law a particular view of valid existing rights. Instead, by using such a general, common phrase, Congress was leaving it ultimately up to the courts to determine what ‘valid existing rights’ meant in the patenting context.” Id. In sum, because the Solicitor’s Opinion is consistent with the text of the statute, purpose, and our prior precedent, and because it adequately discussed and explained legislative history that could be perceived contrary to its interpretation, we find the Solicitor’s Opinion to be persuasive. We therefore conclude that the Solicitor Opinion’s interpretation of “valid existing rights” is entitled to Skidmore deference.
Applying the rule set forth in the Solicitor’s Opinion to the facts of this case,10 it is undisputed that as of the effective 10 McMaster argues that the rule set forth in the Solicitor’s Opinion has an impermissible retroactive effect as applied to its case. See Solicitor’s Opinion at 21 (stating that the Opinion should be applied to all “currently pending patent applications”). Although “retroactivity is not favored in the law,” and an agency does not have “power to promulgate retroactive rules MCMASTER V. UNITED STATES 31 date of the California Wilderness Act—September 28, 1984—McMaster had nothing more than a valid claim in the Oro Grande. McMaster did not fulfill the requirements for procuring a patent until at least August 14, 1992. Therefore, McMaster did not have a “valid existing right” to a feesimple patent under the Wilderness Act at the time that he submitted its patent application, and was properly granted a patent with reservation of the surface estates. McMaster’s only “valid existing right” was to a claim, not a patent. The district court did not err in dismissing McMaster’s first QTA claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).