Opinion ID: 2166394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: denial of request for continuance of trial

Text: At the conclusion of the hearing on March 29, 1985, the Superior Court not only denied Bailey's request to dismiss the charges against him and declined to issue Bailey's petition for a Rule to Show Cause but also denied Bailey's request that his case should be continued. The request for a continuance by Bailey was raised orally, for the first time, at an office conference to discuss Bailey's written motions. The Superior Court reserved decision on all of the defense motions until the hearing on March 29, 1985 had been completed. At the conclusion of the March 29, 1985 hearing, the trial court asked Bailey's defense attorneys if the request for the continuance was still viable. The following exchange took place: MR. RAMBO: Yes, your Honor. I would suggest they're viable. I would particularly suggest that the request for a continuance is viable and in view of the fact that Mr. Bailey has alleged that there's been the kind of interference that would preclude his adequate defense. He's had significant notes that have taken him hours and hours to put together for counsel and those notes, particularly in view of the fact that back up counsel, if you will, most recently into the case, which would be of assistance to me, I should say particularly. There's a lot of material early involved in preparation for trial and it was probably three or four weeks ago that I was made aware of the fact that I would be attending trial. So with regard to the references he made to the Sponaugle testimony, I would say that the defendant feels that testimony is more relevant than I thought they were, so I would suggest that his request for a continuance would certainly be reasonable for that reason alone, if not for the other stated, and I will not get into the sketch pad because that speaks for itself. I would also advise the Court that we thought after our conference down state that we will have access now to certain pictures that could be presented to Mr. Bailey for his use in doing those drawings that we've asked him to do, and I don't think the pictures are done today yet. MISS BRADY: They're done. It's my understanding they weren't done when I left Dover for me to bring up with me. Defense counsel met with the chief investigating officer, who happens to be the head of SBI, the State Bureau of Identification and in charge of the Photographic Unit. They met Wednesday and selected photos for eight-by-ten copies to be made and they were worked on yesterday and this morning, and I believe are probably done now, but not in time for me to bring to Wilmington with me. THE COURT: When you ask for a continuance, Mr. Rambo, how long are you talking about? MR. RAMBO: Well, I think what Mr. Bailey has indicated, your Honor, is that these things are things you can't do within a couple of hours. THE COURT: Name your price. Are you talking about one day, two days, a week, a month? MR. RAMBO: I think he's talking about a week, your Honor. THE COURT: Miss Brady, what's your position? The prosecutor objected to the request for a continuance. The State's objection was based primarily upon problems in scheduling witnesses. Bailey's attorney indicated a willingness to permit the State to call witnesses out of turn and even to permit the State to call witnesses during the course of the defendant's case. The prosecution declined to accept the latter offer. After considering the respective positions [27] with respect to the request for a continuance, the Court issued the following ruling: THE COURT: My understanding is that the State's case will take, at a minimum, four days, which probably will use up our first week by the time we pick the jury and all. I would propose to start on Monday and proceed forthwith. If, in the course of the proceedings, it becomes evident that the defense needs additional time because of what we've been hearing about, the Court will consider it. I say that, having in mind that even assuming there's some disappearance of material, it is not unknown material and it can be presumably resurrected or reassembled in useable form by next week, so I am not persuaded that we're in a position where it just would unduly prejudice the defendant to put the case off for a week. To put it off at this juncture, not only inconveniences the State, it may cause all kinds of problems on witnesses and it may mean the defendant may not get around to figuring out the witnesses for the defense, but last, perhaps not least, it certainly would inconvenience the Court. We're in a schedule crisis from day to day and when you put aside cases like this, even for a week, it causes a lot of turmoil. I am not persuaded there should be a dismissal of the action based on what I heard or there should be a Rule to Show Cause issued or that the case should be continued. This Court has held that applications for continuances are left to the discretion of a trial judge whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling is clearly unreasonable or capricious. Riley v. State, Del.Supr. 496 A.2d 997, 1018 (1985), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 3339, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986). In Riley, we also concurred with the observation of the United States Supreme Court that there are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 850, 11 L.Ed.2d 921, reh. den. 377 U.S. 925, 84 S.Ct. 1218, 12 L.Ed.2d 217 (1964). In Riley this Court held that in reaching a decision on whether to grant a continuance, the trial court should consider the reasons advanced by the defendant as well as the circumstances of the case. The circumstances of the present case and the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time Bailey's continuance request was denied demonstrate that the trial judge properly exercised his broad discretion in this area. In support of the request for a continuance, Bailey's attorney alleged that State interference with Bailey's right to counsel by the State resulting in the disappearance or damage of certain legal materials would preclude Bailey from properly presenting an adequate defense. In support of this position, Bailey relies upon our decision in Merritt v. State, Del.Supr., 219 A.2d 258 (1966). In Merritt we held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a request for a continuance when new counsel was appointed on the day of trial and only given thirty minutes to consult with the defendant before the trial commenced. Bailey's situation is quite different. The attorneys representing him at his fourth trial were appointed several months before trial on December 6, 1984. Their original request for a continuance was granted and Bailey's trial date was continued from January 21, 1985 to March 11, 1985. The ultimate date set for that trial was April 1, 1985. Not only did Bailey's attorneys have several months to prepare for trial but their motion to hire a private investigator was granted on March 18, 1985 and their motion to permit the defendant to visit the crime scene was granted on March 21, 1985. The only issue before the Superior Court on March 29, 1985 vis-a-vis a continuance related to the missing trial materials. After a full and complete hearing, the court concluded that even if there had been some disappearance of material, it is not unknown material and it can be presumably resurrected or reassembled in reuseable form by next week, so I am not persuaded we are in a position where it just would unduly prejudice the defendant to put the case off for a week. Assuming that the defendant's request for a continuance was not directed solely at the problem caused by the missing legal materials and assuming that it also encompassed all possible problems, the defense request for a continuance was limited to a postponement of the trial for one week. The trial court found that a great deal of turmoil would be created even if the case was only put off for one week. However, in concluding that the request for a continuance should be denied and that the trial should commence as scheduled, the Court also ruled that if in the course of the proceedings, it becomes evident the defense need additional time because of what we've been hearing about, the Court will consider it. There is no indication in the record that the request for a further continuance or additional time was renewed during trial. In reaching its decision to deny Bailey's request for a continuance of one week, the trial court clearly considered the reasons advanced by the defendant for the continuance as well as the circumstances of the case. Cf. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997. In weighing the relevant factors, the trial court did not preclude a subsequent request for a continuance  during the course of the trial  by Bailey, but, in fact, invited such a request if Bailey's attorneys found it necessary. Broad discretion must necessarily be given to trial courts on matters concerning the grant or the denial of a continuance. Given the circumstances under which the request for a continuance was made, the court's handling of the request was entirely reasonable and appropriate. Cf. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997. See also Raymond Heartless, Inc. v. State, Del.Supr. 401 A.2d 921 (1979) and Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct. 841.