Opinion ID: 555060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Advice to the Jury Regarding Ashman's Immunity

Text: 17 Petitioner contends he was denied a fair trial because the trial judge failed to inform the jury that a key government witness, Ashman, testified under a grant of immunity. 18 During its deliberations, the jury asked the Court whether Ashman and Brownie had been granted immunity from prosecution. The Assistant District Attorney reminded the court that while Brownie's immunity had been stipulated, no evidence had been presented with respect to Ashman: 19 Regarding the ... witness Devon Ashman, there is no evidence in the record as to whether or not he received immunity. However, there is evidence in the record in the way of using his Grand Jury testimony in cross examination that he did testify in the Grand Jury. The law in this state, as your Honor knows, is that if someone testifies before the Grand Jury they grant him immunity unless they sign a waiver of immunity.... However, whether or not the witness signed a waiver is not in evidence, and I don't think that we can have the jury speculating on that particular matter. So I would suggest to the Court instructing them on the law without finally reaching the ultimate conclusion on Devon Ashman. 20 Defense counsel objected to this proposal as misleading but the trial judge advised the jury: 21 There was a stipulation entered into during the course of the trial between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Dudley that the witness, Capel Brownie, was granted immunity from prosecution.... With respect to the witness Devon Ashman, there was testimony during trial that Mr. Ashman had testified before the Grand Jury. The law of this state is that one who testifies before the Grand Jury without having executed a waiver of immunity has immunity from prosecution. 22 Petitioner asserts that, notwithstanding the foregoing instruction, the trial judge erred in not telling the jury directly that Ashman had been granted immunity, and the error was of sufficient magnitude to require the grant of the habeas petition. We disagree. 23 Defense counsel essentially requested that the trial judge reopen the record, after jury deliberations had already begun. The trial court's refusal to grant this request was not an abuse of discretion. Nor did the trial court's decision deprive petitioner of a fundamentally fair trial. 24 Under New York law, a trial court may reopen the record after the commencement of deliberations to permit newly discovered evidence or evidence on an essential point which had been overlooked. People v. Ferrone, 204 N.Y. 551, 553, 98 N.E. 8 (1912); see People v. Washington, 71 N.Y.2d 916, 918, 528 N.Y.S.2d 531, 532, 523 N.E.2d 818, 819 (1988); People v. Olsen, 34 N.Y.2d 349, 355, 357 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490, 313 N.E.2d 782, 785 (1974). New York courts are cautioned, however, against the routine granting of such requests, in order to preserve an orderly trial process and avoid giving undue emphasis to the evidence transmitted to the jury during deliberations. Olsen, 34 N.Y.2d at 355, 357 N.Y.S.2d 487, 313 N.E.2d 782; cf. United States v. Golomb, 754 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir.1985). 25 Even if the trial judge's refusal to directly inform the jury of Ashman's immunity was error, it was clearly not an error of constitutional dimension that would warrant the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Taylor v. Curry, 708 F.2d 886 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1000, 104 S.Ct. 503, 78 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983). The relevant inquiry is whether the error, if there was one, deprived petitioner of a fundamentally fair trial. Collins v. Scully, 755 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir.1985); Taylor v. Curry, 708 F.2d at 891. No such deprivation occurred in the instant matter. Petitioner had vigorously attacked Ashman's credibility and put in evidence that Ashman had cooperated with the police and the District Attorney. The evidence that was excluded was thus largely cumulative and did not create a reasonable doubt that would not otherwise exist. See Rosario v. Kuhlman, 839 F.2d 918, 925 (2d Cir.1988). A trial court must have considerable discretion to admit or reject cumulative impeachment evidence, particularly when admission would entail reopening the trial after jury deliberations have begun. See Washington, 71 N.Y.2d at 918, 528 N.Y.S.2d 531, 523 N.E.2d 818. Finally, where counsel fails to account adequately for the failure to elicit the evidence, as here, there is substantial justification for refusing to reopen the record. See also United States v. Aiken, 373 F.2d 294, 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 833, 88 S.Ct. 32, 19 L.Ed.2d 93 (1967). 26