Opinion ID: 1281505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denial of Motion to Sequester the Jury

Text: Prior to commencement of trial, defendant, citing the danger of pretrial publicity, requested that the jury be sequestered for the duration of the trial. This motion was denied, and it further appears the jury was not sequestered during deliberations after the cause had been submitted to them. Instead, during recesses and adjournments they were admonished not to discuss the case, express opinions, deliberate further, or read anything about the case. (See ง 1122.) After the jury had returned its verdict as to guilt, but before commencement of the penalty phase, a news article appeared on the front page of the Independent Press-Telegram discussing an allegation that defendant was to be charged with a new double murder in San Luis Obispo. Concerned that some juror or alternate juror may have seen this article, the court questioned each of the jurors individually as to whether any of them had heard or read anything about defendant after returning the verdict of guilt. The contents of the article were not disclosed during this questioning. Four jurors responded that they had become aware of the article to some degree. One indicated she saw a headline with defendant's name and immediately stopped reading. A second said she saw defendant's picture with a caption, but stopped reading after the caption. A third simply heard there had been something in the news but did not know what it was. A fourth, unfortunately, read the entire article. All other jurors and alternates indicated they had not heard of or read anything about defendant, and they were of course told not to discuss with one another the questions being asked by the court. With defendant's personal waiver, the trial court replaced with alternates the three jurors who had read any part of the article, leaving on the jury only the juror who knew no more than that something had been in the news. (4a) Defendant now claims that the trial court erred in denying his original motion to sequester the jury and that the importance of sequestration was underscored by the incident noted above. He claims error in permitting any of the four jurors who had seen or heard of the article to remain on the jury and in any event claims that the danger of a hidden bias not disclosed on voir dire mandates reversal. Section 1121 provides: The jurors sworn to try an action may, in the discretion of the court, be permitted to separate or be kept in charge of a proper officer. Where the jurors are permitted to separate, the court shall properly admonish them.... (5) Sequestration of the jury even during deliberations is therefore a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 616 [244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854]; see also People v. Ayers (1975) 51 Cal. App.3d 370, 380 [124 Cal. Rptr. 283] [disapproved on other grounds in In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 555, fn. 6 [213 Cal. Rptr. 569, 698 P.2d 637]].) (6) The fact that jurors may be aware that publicity exists in a case does not of itself mean they cannot be fair and impartial. ( People v. Manson (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 1, 28 [139 Cal. Rptr. 275].) (4b) In this case the voir dire of prospective jurors reaffirmed that a fair and impartial trial could be had without sequestration. This jury faced a lengthy trial estimated to be four to six weeks. Clearly the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for sequestration, particularly in its overly broad form. [8] Nor does subsequent exposure of four jurors to the fact that a news article on defendant had appeared mandate reversal of the guilt or penalty portion of this trial. (7) It is misconduct for jurors to read newspaper articles relating to a trial for which they are sitting as jurors. ( People v. Andrews (1983) 149 Cal. App.3d 358, 363-364 [196 Cal. Rptr. 796, 46 A.L.R.4th 1]; People v. Ladd (1982) 129 Cal. App.3d 257, 264 [181 Cal. Rptr. 29]; and see In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391, 397 [220 Cal. Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260].) (4c) The trial court quite properly conducted a hearing into whether and to what extent the jury as a whole may have been affected and whether there was good cause to discharge any of the jurors. (Cf. People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 520 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251].) The results of that hearing rebutted any presumption of prejudice that might have arisen from one juror's misconduct in reading the entire article once it became evident to him that defendant was its subject. The jury had returned its verdict of guilt, had not commenced hearing penalty phase evidence, and had not discussed the contents of the article. While good cause existed to discharge and replace the juror who had read the article (ง 1123), the trial court acted with solicitude for defendant's rights. As noted above, with defendant's personal waiver, the three jurors who had so much as seen the article were replaced with alternates. [9] (8) (See fn. 10.), (4d) Since jurors at the penalty phase were instructed to consider all the evidence in the case received during any part of the trial, there was also no error in failing to instruct the jury to disregard past deliberations and to begin deliberations anew. [10] Deliberations on the guilt phase of the trial were complete and verdicts of guilt had been returned prior to publication of the news article. Deliberations on the penalty phase had not yet begun. In sum, we find defendant's contentions regarding failure to sequester the jury to be without merit.