Opinion ID: 2736728
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Zamora

Text: Zamora’s primary argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is that the testimony was uncorroborated. He claims that the Government tried to corroborate the witness testimony with the ATV and night-vision goggles that were used to smuggle drugs and were seized from Zamora’s home. But Zamora claims he did not own or control the ATV and that he did not use the night-vision goggles. Further, he argues that coconspirator testimony was incredible as a matter of law because the witnesses gave conflicting dates, ranging from 2005 to 2009, when testifying about when Zamora joined the conspiracy. The Government responds that Zamora’s arguments completely ignore the appropriate standard of review; applying the correct standard of review, the Government argues, the evidence is not plainly insufficient. We agree with the Government that the evidence supporting Zamora’s conviction was not plainly insufficient. First, Zamora’s arguments that the uncorroborated witness testimony is insufficient as a matter of law are unavailing. As discussed above, see supra subpart III(B)(2), this Court has previously held that the Government is entitled to prove its case based on uncorroborated testimony from cooperating witnesses unless the testimony is incredible as a matter of law. See Villegas–Rodriguez, 171 F.3d at 228. Zamora does not otherwise attempt to argue that the testimony was incredible. Second, a review of the record shows that there was evidence to support the jury’s conviction. Zamora worked at Baluarte Ranch, and he secured jobs for Carbajal and other coconspirators to further the smuggling operation. Several witnesses testified that Zamora let them into Baluarte Ranch when they arrived with shipments. The jury also heard testimony that Zamora allowed other smugglers to store marijuana on the ranch or at his home. There was also testimony that Zamora was a law enforcement lookout and that Zamora personally transported loads off of Baluarte Ranch. Further, Zamora 12 Case: 13-40203 Document: 00512780393 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 No. 13-40203 was paid $1,000 per load, earning $30,000 to $40,000 for his work with Carbajal. Considering all of this testimony, we cannot say that the record is devoid of evidence to support the jury’s verdict. See Delgado, 672 F.3d at 330–31. Thus, under plain-error review, the jury had sufficient evidence to find Zamora guilty. C. Variance Between the Indictment and Evidence at Trial (Garza) At the outset, we note that Garza’s brief is somewhat inconsistent in how it frames this issue. Garza labels it a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in the headings of his brief. But, in the body of his brief, he discusses the factors this Court uses to determine whether there has been a variance between the indictment and proof at trial, and he then applies those factors to his case. Thus, despite the headings in his briefing, we will construe this as a variance argument. 1. Standard of Review “The question whether the evidence establishes the existence of one conspiracy (as alleged in the indictment) or multiple conspiracies is a fact question within the jury’s province.” United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 2007). This Court affirms the jury’s finding of a single conspiracy “unless the evidence and all reasonable inferences, examined in the light most favorable to the government, would preclude reasonable jurors from finding a single conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even when the Court finds a variance, the Court will “reverse only if the variance prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. The defendant’s substantial rights are not affected “as long as the government establishes the defendant’s involvement in at least one of the proved conspiracies.” Id. at 770. 13 Case: 13-40203 Document: 00512780393 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 No. 13-40203 2. Analysis “A material variance occurs ‘when the proof at trial depicts a scenario that differs materially from the scenario charged in the indictment but does not modify an essential element of the charged offense.’” Id. at 769 (quoting United States v. Delgado, 401 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 2005)). Determining whether there is a variance between the indictment, which charged a single conspiracy, and the proof at trial, which Garza alleges proved multiple conspiracies, requires counting the conspiracies. “The principal considerations in counting the number of conspiracies are (1) the existence of a common goal; (2) the nature of the scheme; and (3) the overlapping of the participants in the various dealings.” United States v. Morrow, 177 F.3d 272, 291 (5th Cir. 1999)