Opinion ID: 1903009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Veracity of Moore's Trial Testimony

Text: Appellant's theory in cross-examining Moore was that she fabricated that she had a telephone conversation with appellant during which he confessed to killing Murray in self-defense in order to cover up the fact that she was spreading a lie that Fuller had killed decedent in self-defense throughout the neighborhood. At trial, defense counsel began by cross-examining Moore regarding the tendency of the neighborhood residents to gossip, and that when Moore returned home to the neighborhood from North Carolina, she found the residents were talking about appellant's arrest for the shooting. When defense counsel began to imply in cross-examination that Moore had fabricated the testimony in order to show off her inside knowledge to her neighbors, the government objected. After a bench conference, the trial court, which did not see the relevance of this line of questioning, sustained the objection. [4] On appellate review, [a]n exercise of judicial discretion `will not be reversed unless it appears that it was exercised on grounds, or for reasons, clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.' Clayborne v. United States, 751 A.2d 956, 963 (D.C.2000) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 363 (D.C. 1979)). Although [b]ias or testimonial motivation is always a proper subject of cross-examination, Clayborne, at 962, we have required that the examiner have a reasonable factual foundation or at least a well-reasoned suspicion that the circumstances indicating bias might be true. [5] See id. at 962-63. While this good faith basis requirement, which defense counsel twice referred to in her proffer, is both flexible and lenient, id. at 963, the examiner must proffer a proper foundation consisting of some facts which support a genuine belief that the witness is biased in the manner asserted.... In addition, the attorney must proffer facts sufficient to permit the trial judge to evaluate whether the proposed question is probative of bias. Guzman v. United States, 769 A.2d 785, 790 (D.C.2001) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Brown v. United States, 683 A.2d 118, 124-25 (D.C.1996)). Here, although defense counsel asserted that she had a good faith basis to believe Moore's trial testimony was fabricated, counsel proffered no facts in support of her assertion that Moore had fabricated her trial testimony that appellant had confessed to her during a telephone conversation from jail for the purpose of covering up an earlier lie she had told others in order to participate in the neighborhood gossip. The trial court did not err in limiting the cross-examination of Moore, because [w]here a proper foundation has not been laid for bias cross-examination, the trial court may exercise its discretion to preclude the inquiry. Id. at 790. See Joyner v. United States, 818 A.2d 166, 171-72 (D.C.2003).