Opinion ID: 2677422
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Minnesota Wrongful Death Claim

Text: Ms. Smith also brought a wrongful death action under Minn. Stat. § 573.02. As distinguished from the “qualified immunity” afforded peace officers when addressing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, under Minnesota law a public multiple Taser applications in short succession on a struggling suspect constitute excessive force such that a reasonable officer in Rader’s position would know Rader’s conduct was unlawful.”), aff’d, 371 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished memorandum opinion). 8 In her reply brief, Ms. Smith “point[s] us to a number of other cases . . . that postdate the conduct in question . . . . These decisions, of course, could not have given fair notice to [the officers] and are of no use in the clearly established inquiry.” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 200 n.4. Appellees moved to strike these portions of Ms. Smith’s reply brief that reference cases not cited to the district court in support of her contention that the qualified-immunity prong is satisfied. The motion to strike is denied as moot. -10- official is entitled to official immunity from state law claims when that official is charged by law with duties that require the exercise of judgment or discretion. Generally, police officers are classified as discretionary officers entitled to that immunity. Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41-42 (Minn. 1990) (en banc) (internal citations omitted). “Discretionary conduct is clearly not protected if the official committed a willful or malicious wrong,” but “[t]he doctrine protects honest law enforcement efforts.” Elwood v. Rice Cnty., 423 N.W.2d 671, 679 (Minn. 1988) (en banc). While the issue of malice may raise a question for the jury, Minnesota courts rule in favor of a defendant when “no reasonable jury could find the [officers] acted with bad faith or malicious intent.” Id. “‘In determining whether an official has committed a malicious wrong, we consider whether the official has intentionally committed an act that he or she had reason to believe is prohibited.’” Hassan v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 489 F.3d 914, 920 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571-72 (Minn. 1994) (en banc)). This determination “‘contemplates less of a subjective inquiry into malice, which was traditionally favored at common law, and more of an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of an official’s actions.’” Id. (quoting Beaulieu, 518 N.W.2d at 571). The district court found Ms. Smith “has not put forth evidence sufficient to show that the Defendant Officers intentionally apprehended Smith in a way that they believed was prohibited by law.” Based on the evidence and the reasoning we discussed previously, we agree. We affirm the district court’s grant of official immunity and dismissal of the wrongful death claim against the individual officers. Consequently, we also affirm the district court’s dismissal of the vicarious liability claim against the city. See, e.g., Schroeder v. St. Louis Cnty., 708 N.W.2d 497, 508 (Minn. 2006) (en banc) (“In general, when a public official is found to be immune from suit on a particular issue, his government employer will enjoy vicarious official immunity from a suit arising from the employee’s conduct.”). -11-