Opinion ID: 169281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Policies or Practices of General Applicability

Text: 35 Romer also stated in dictum that there may be an exception to the exhaustion requirement when `an agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to the law.' Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 99-296, at 7 (1985)); see Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 724 (10th Cir.1996). 1 We explained that exhaustion may not be required in that circumstance if a plaintiff's challenge to a policy of general applicability raise[s] only questions of law, thereby rendering agency expertise and the factual development of an administrative record less important. Romer, 992 F.2d at 1044. By the same token, however, exhaustion is still required unless the underlying purposes of exhaustion would not be served. Id. 36 In Romer we held that both of plaintiffs' claims needed to be exhausted. Determining whether the CDE's policies have denied children with disabilities appropriately individualized IEPs, we explained, is a factually intensive inquiry into the circumstances of each individual child's case and is precisely the kind of issue the IDEA's administrative process was designed to address. Id. As to the plaintiffs' contention that the CDE's guidelines arbitrarily predetermined the duration of extended-school-day and ESY services, we acknowledged that such an argument arguably asserts a facial violation of the IDEA's individualization requirement. Id. at 1045. Nevertheless, the contention still ultimately requires a determination as to whether any individual child was denied a [FAPE]. Such a determination is enhanced by the factual details of a particular child's case. Id.; cf. Urban, 89 F.3d at 725 (general-applicability exception does not apply when party challenges particulars of a child's IEP). 37 The same analysis applies here. To be sure, Joshua contends that the CDE guidelines and the District's policy facially violate the IDEA because they allegedly prohibit teaching new skills in ESY programs. But the ultimate issue in the case — and the decisive consideration for the reimbursement claim in district court — is whether Joshua received an appropriately individualized IEP and whether he was denied a FAPE. We therefore conclude that the general-applicability exception to exhaustion does not apply.