Opinion ID: 2994727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Downward Departure Requests:

Text: Diminished Capacity and Extraordinary Physical Impairment Albarran further objects to the district court’s decision to deny him a downward departure based upon the ground that at the time he committed the offense he suffered from a diminished capacity and the court’s conclusion that at the time of sentencing he was not suffering from an extraordinary physical impairment. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a downward departure in the case of diminished capacity under sec. 5K2.13 if it is determined that the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity. U.S.S.G. sec. 5K2.13 (Nov. 1998). Similarly, the Sentencing Guidelines have a provision that does allow for a departure when it is determined that an extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range; e.g., in the case of a seriously infirm defendant, home detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment. U.S.S.G. sec. 5H1.4 (Nov. 1998). Albarran can successfully challenge the district court’s departure decisions if he shows that the district court misunderstood or misapplied the law, because when a district court recognizes its authority to depart under the guidelines but in an exercise of its discretion chooses not to do so, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review that decision. United States v. Thomas, 181 F.3d 870, 873 (7th Cir. 1999). Albarran contends that the district court did in fact misunderstand the law with regard to his departure requests. During the sentencing hearing, the district court made mention of Albarran’s heart condition at the time of the offense and talked about how Albarran was not under an extraordinary physical impairment at the time of the offense. These two references are troublesome according to Albarran because U.S.S.G. sec. 5H1.4 does not mention that the defendant must have suffered an extraordinary physical impairment at the time of the offense. The district court addressed the extraordinary physical impairment request and the diminished capacity request at the same time, and Albarran believes that the district court conflated the two issues. Albarran argues that because the district court applied an improper legal standard to his extraordinary physical impairment motion, the court as a result ignored the obvious health problems that he displayed. For instance, during his first trial he collapsed in the courtroom and eventually a mistrial was declared because he was unable to attend court due to his ill health. Thereafter, he was sent to Rochester, Minnesota to be evaluated and the district court had a hearing on the status of Albarran’s health. Dr. Javid testified that Albarran suffered from cardiomyopathy and an enlarged heart. During his trial, the court heard testimony concerning Albarran’s hospitalizations and his medical condition. Albarran during sentencing had difficulty recalling the presentence investigation report and the basic legal evolution of his case. All of this evidence regarding his physical condition, Albarran believes, should have been examined by the district court in relation to his extraordinary physical impairment departure request. Albarran’s position is not persuasive. He provided the district court with a memorandum discussing his diminished capacity at the time of his offense and in a separate part of the submission he addressed his extraordinary physical impairment claim. The government responded to Albarran’s memorandum by pointing out that the district court had previously determined that a jury instruction regarding Albarran’s diminished capacity at the time of offense would be inappropriate because there was insufficient evidence presented to warrant such an instruction. In relation to the physical impairment argument, the government noted that case law requires that the defendant prove that he has certain medical needs that could not be met if he was confined and Albarran never specifically provided evidence that the Bureau of Prisons could not adequately treat his physical impairments. At the sentencing hearing, the court reached the two departure issues and allowed the defendant’s counsel the opportunity to address the diminished capacity and the extraordinary physical impairment departure motions. Albarran’s counsel took this opportunity to discuss Albarran’s diminished capacity and the government responded in kind. At no point during this part of the hearing, did Albarran’s counsel present evidence regarding why his physical condition would preclude him from being incarcerated and cared for properly by the Bureau of Prisons. The district court when considering a departure based upon a physical impairment must ascertain, through competent medical testimony, that the defendant needs constant medical care, or that the care he does need will not be available to him should he be incarcerated. United States v. Sherman, 53 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 1995). There was no independent evidence presented concerning Albarran’s medical condition at the sentencing hearing, therefore it would have been inappropriate for the district court to grant a departure on this basis. Albarran’s contention that the district court did not understand its legal obligations with regard to his departure requests is a failing argument. It may appear as though the district court conflated to some extent Albarran’s diminished capacity and extraordinary physical impairment departure motions, but even if we were to assume that this were true, this type of confusion on the district court’s part does not necessarily indicate that the court did not understand its authority to depart. When the district court judge began to address the issue, he remarked, I don’t believe that’s sufficient to support a downward departure for diminished capacity or extraordinary physical impairment. He clearly had acknowledged the distinct nature of the two departure requests and perhaps began to discuss the two together because they were both based upon Albarran’s heart condition. Most of his commentary centers around the significance of Albarran’s heart condition as seen by the district court’s admonishment that [p]eople have heart conditions across this country and continue to engage in normal conduct and have at least sufficient ability to conduct their affairs in an appropriate manner that comports with the law. I believe that the diminished capacity/extraordinary physical impairment departure downward would be inappropriate. We simply have no indication that the district court did not understand its discretion and we are inclined to presume that the opposite is true: ’[A] claim that a seasoned judge . . . didn’t understand his discretion will rarely, if ever, be successful when built merely on inference. Article III judges are presumed to know the law . . . .’ United States v. Wilson, 134 F.3d 855, 869 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Kezerle, 99 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996)) (alterations in original). This is not one of those rare situations where we would be compelled to determine that the district court did not understand its discretion. Consequently, we lack jurisdiction to review the court’s departure decisions and we reject Albarran’s arguments concerning this aspect of his sentence. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision not to depart downward with regard to the diminished capacity and extraordinary physical impairment motions.