Opinion ID: 1209614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: ... [other paragraphs]

Text: So Ordered, this 6th day of December, 1963... Then appear the signatures of the seven members who then constituted this court, followed by their titles. This order is inscribed on the Minutes of the Supreme Court at Volume 34, page 107, and is reported at 219 Ga. 873. The foregoing order was necessarily a determination that the action then taken was not, for any reason, considered contrary to the laws and Constitution of this State or the Constitution of the United States, in keeping with the oaths of office taken by those then serving. This order is persuasive here. The constitutional attacks which appellant makes, insofar as necessary to recite, may be summarized as follows: (1) That the legislative Act (Ga. L. 1963, p. 70), authorizing this court to create a unified state bar, is unconstitutional in that it attempts to delegate legislative power to the Supreme Court and the Georgia Bar Association, contrary to Article I, Section I, Paragraph XXIII of the State Constitution; (2) That said Act is unconstitutional in that it attempts to delegate to the Supreme Court and the Georgia Bar Association jurisdiction to legislate into existence the State Bar of Georgia, in violation of Article VI, Section II, Paragraph IV of the State Constitution; (3) That said Act is unconstitutional in that it is a special law relating to a subject for which provision has been made by a general law, in violation of Article I, Section IV, Paragraph I of the State Constitution; (4) That said Act is unconstitutional in that it deprives appellant and others of full enjoyment of their rights, privileges and immunities as lawyers, in violation of Article I, Section I, Paragraph XXV of the State Constitution; (5) That said Act is unconstitutional in that it deprives appellant of the right to have his rights, duties and obligations defined by the General Assembly, in violation of Article III, Section I, Paragraph I of the State Constitution; (6) That said Act is unconstitutional in that it deprives appellant of determination by the General Assembly of matters properly the subject of legislation defining his rights, duties, and obligations as a lawyer, in violation of Article III, Section VII, Paragraph XX of the State Constitution; and (7) That said Act and the Rules of this court for the organization of the State Bar (219 Ga. 878 et seq.) are unconstitutional in that the General Assembly purported to delegate to this court the power to create a private corporation and that this court purported to do so, in violation of Article III, Section VII, Paragraph XVII of the State Constitution. These constitutional attacks upon the creation of the State Bar of Georgia are similar to many which have been made upon the various unified bar organizations throughout the United States. However, the courts have consistently upheld such organizations. (a) The substantial question made by these attacks, as we view them, is whether the authority given the Supreme Court to create the State Bar of Georgia was legislative power. Without doubt, the answer is no. First of all, the very essence and basis of a unified bar is the regulation of the practice of law, which historically has been a judicial, not a legislative, function. And our State Constitution declares that The judicial powers of this state shall be vested in a supreme court ... [and other courts]. Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I ( Code Ann. § 2-3601). In most, if not all, of the jurisdictions of this country, it is recognized that The practice of law is so intimately connected with the exercise of judicial power in the administration of justice that the right to define and regulate the practice naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department of the state government. Indeed, it has been said that the courts have an inherent power to regulate the conduct of attorneys as officers of the court and to control and supervise the practice of law generally, whether in or out of court. While it is in the prerogative of the judicial department to regulate the practice of law, the legislature, under the police power, may act to protect the public interest, but in so doing, it acts in aid of the judiciary and does not supersede or detract from the power of the courts. 7 AmJur2d 44, Attorneys at Law, § 2. The question of a court's inherent power to supervise regulation of the practice of law by creating a unified state bar has been discussed at length by the highest courts of a number of the states, and each of them has held that it had such power. Among those decisions are: Commonwealth ex rel. Ward v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41 (98 SW2d 53); In re Sparks, 267 Ky. 93 (101 SW2d 194); In re Mundy, 202 La. 41 (11 S2d 398); Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8 (11 NW2d 604); State Bar of Michigan v. City of Lansing, 361 Mich. 185 (105 NW2d 131); In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Association, 133 Neb. 283 (275 NW 265, 114 ALR 151); In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okla. 505 (95 P2d 113); Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195 (12 NW2d 515); Petition of Florida State Bar Association, (Fla.) 40 S2d 902; In re Unification of Montana Bar Association, 107 Mont. 559 (87 P2d 172); Application of Montana Bar Association for Unification and Integration of the Bar, 140 Mont. 101 (368 P2d 158); In the Matter of Integration of the Bar of the State of Hawaii (Ha.) 432 P2d 887. See also, Lathrop v. Donohoe, 367 U. S. 820 (81 SC 1826, 6 LE2d 1191); In the Matter of Disbarment of Paul E. Rhodes, 370 F2d 411 (8th Cir.) (cert. den. 386 U. S. 999). Various courts, in recognizing this inherent power to create unified state bar organizations, have defined or explained the nature and extent of inherent power as follows: The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court  appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice. ... In re Sparks, 267 Ky. 93, supra. Inherent power arises from the fact of the court's creation or from the fact that it is a court. It is essential to its being and dignity and does not require an express grant to confer it. Under our form of government it is the right that each department of government has to execute the powers falling naturally within its orbit when not expressly placed or limited by the existence of a similar power in one of the other departments. Petition of Florida State Bar Association, (Fla.) 40 S2d 902, supra. The term `inherent power of the judiciary' means that which is essential to the existence, dignity, and functions of the court from the very fact that it is a court. In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Association, 133 Neb. 283, supra. Also, this court has long recognized the inherent power of the judiciary. That the courts possess certain inherent powers is a proposition which, so far as we know, has never been questioned. Chapman v. Gray, 8 Ga. 337; Bradley v. State, 111 Ga. 168 (36 SE 630, 50 LRA 691, 78 ASR 157); Devereux v. Atlanta Railway & Power Co., 111 Ga. 855 (36 SE 939); Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Alford, 154 Ga. 863 (115 SE 771). This means, then, when the Constitution declares that the legislative, judicial and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct (art. 1, sec. 1, par. 23), it thereby invests those officials charged with the duty of administering justice according to law with all necessary authority to efficiently and completely discharge those duties the performance of which is by the Constitution committed to the judiciary, and to maintain the dignity and independence of the courts. Lovett v. Sandersville R. Co., 199 Ga. 238, 239 (33 SE2d 905). The argument is made that this court had no power, inherent or otherwise, to organize the State Bar since it is limited by Article VI, Section II, Paragraph IV of the State Constitution ( Code Ann. § 2-3704) to appellate jurisdiction for the correction of errors of law, and the proceeding for organization of the State Bar was an original one. This argument confuses power and jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the types of cases the court can hear and decide. Power includes the authority to perform any function reasonably necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, improve the administration of justice, and protect the judiciary as an independent department of the government. See DeKrasner v. Boykin, 54 Ga. App. 29, 34-36 (186 SE 701), for an excellent discussion of this distinction and numerous citations. Nor does the fact that the legislature has in the past enacted statutes concerning the practice of law indicate that such is a legislative function. This court's recognition of such legislative enactments as Georgia Laws 1945, page 155 ( Code Ann. § 81-1601 et seq.), creating the Judicial Council, and Code § 9-105 (as amended by Ga. L. 1952, page 262), relating to appointment of the Board of Bar Examiners, does not mean that this court intended to, or even could relinquish this judicial responsibility to the legislature. On the contrary, this court has stated that the judiciary cannot be circumscribed or restricted in the performance of its power and duty to regulate the practice of law and has made it plain that it considers such legislation to be in aid of the judiciary in the performance of its functions. Ga. Bar Assoc. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 222 Ga. 657, 659 (151 SE2d 718) (one Justice specially concurring, one dissenting  but both recognizing the power of the court to regulate the practice of law). Furthermore, the General Assembly apparently recognized that the creation of a unified state bar was properly a judicial function for the highest court in our judicial department. The Act manifests that body's approval, in the public interest, of the creation of a unified state bar, but leaves the creation, organization and government of it to this court. Creation of a unified state bar being a judicial function, the legislature was not, in Georgia Laws 1963, page 70, attempting to delegate legislative power to the Supreme Court and the Georgia Bar Association, or attempting to delegate to the court and the Bar Association jurisdiction to legislate the State Bar into existence. This holding also controls adversely to appellant as to his attacks asserting that the Act deprives him and others of full enjoyment of their rights, privileges and immunities as lawyers and deprives him of the right to have his rights, duties and obligations defined by the General Assembly. As discussed above, regulation of the practice of law is the function of the judiciary. (b) The contention that Georgia Laws 1963, page 70, is a special law on a subject for which provision has been made by a general law is without merit. The Act clearly is a general law. See Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 592 (110 SE 726, 20 ALR 1105); Talley v. Sun Finance Co., 223 Ga. 419 (2) (156 SE2d 55). Furthermore, the portion of Code § 24-3901 relied upon by the appellant, subsection 1, deals with the jurisdiction of this court, not its power, as discussed in Division 3 (a), supra. (c) The last constitutional attack asserts that the Act and the Rules of this court for the organization and government of the State Bar, violate Article III, Section VII, Paragraph XVII of the State Constitution ( Code Ann. § 2-1917), in that the General Assembly purported to delegate to this court the power to create a private corporation and this court purported to do so. This contention is without merit. The State Bar of Georgia is not a private corporation. No language appears in the order of this court that indicates any intent to create a private corporation. On the contrary, what was created is an administrative arm of the court. It is a governmental body. 7 AmJur2d 47, Attorneys at Law, § 7, supra. Since the creation by this court of the State Bar of Georgia was the valid exercise of a judicial function, the attacks here made are not meritorious. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is