Opinion ID: 1401826
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ADTPA Exception

Text: Mercury first argues that the ADTPA is inapplicable under § 4-88-101 of the Act, because the practices at issue are subject to and comply with an order administered by the FTC. It asserts this on grounds that the Federal Trade Commission had already investigated Mercury's identical telemarketing practices in Pennsylvania and had filed suit against one of the Mercury appellants in federal court, obtained a federal court order governing these identical practices, and was administering that order at the time the State initiated the action. It maintains that the circuit court violated the statute by accepting the State's claims and by issuing the preliminary injunction. The question presented by Mercury appears to be this: does the circuit court have jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction pursuant to the ADTPA, and specifically under Ark.Code Ann. § 4-88-104(1) (Repl.2001), where the party being enjoined is currently subject to an order administered by the FTC involving similar, if not the same, practices as contemplated under § 4-88-101. We turn to the language of § 4-88-101, which governs the applicability of the ADTPA: This chapter does not apply to: (1) Advertising or practices which are subject to and which comply with any rule, order, or statute administered by the Federal Trade Commission[.] Ark.Code Ann. § 4-88-101(1) (Repl.2001). This court has previously observed that questions of jurisdiction are not independently appealable in an interlocutory appeal from a preliminary injunction. See Villines v. Harris, supra . In Villines , the court had a distinct basis and specific authority to hear the appeal from an injunction[.] 340 Ark. at 324, 11 S.W.3d at 519. While the parties urged this court to examine whether the circuit court erred in finding it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter at issue, this court said: [w]hen an appeal reaches a court via an order granting a preliminary injunction, the appellate court will not delve into the merits of the case further than is necessary to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting the injunction. Id. at 323, 11 S.W.3d at 519. This court concluded that where there is a distinct basis and specific authority to hear the appeal from an injunction, the extent of our review is dependent on the decision appealed from. Id. at 324, 11 S.W.3d at 519. We specifically declined to review a number of issues, unrelated to the preliminary injunction, including whether the circuit court erred in finding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, because this went beyond the scope of the interlocutory appeal dealing with that injunction. The situation in Villines appears analogous to the situation here, where the statutory exception argued by Mercury concerns the circuit court's authority to enjoin Mercury under the ADTPA. In this regard, we are not persuaded by Mercury's contention that because the statutory exception is inextricably linked to this appeal, we should address it. Furthermore, we fail to see how Mercury is in compliance with an order administered by the FTC, which § 4-88-101 requires for the exception to take effect. We hold that the exception does not prevent the instant appeal.