Opinion ID: 202894
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stark's Motion To Suppress His Third Confession

Text: We review a district court's finding of fact for clear error, but give de novo consideration to its legal conclusions. United States v. Campa, 234 F.3d 733, 737 (1st Cir.2000). In determining the outcome [of a motion to suppress] under the attenuation doctrine, the court of appeals does not defer to the district court. United States v. Paradis, 351 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir.2003); accord United States v. Hughes, 279 F.3d 86, 89 (1st Cir.2002). Stark contends that his third confession should have been suppressed as fruit of the unlawful search of his RV. However, it is well-settled that a court need not hold that all evidence is `fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). A confession made after an illegal search may be admitted if it was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Id. at 488, 83 S.Ct. 407 (internal quotations omitted). To determine whether the initial taint has been removed, we must balance the following factors: (1) the voluntariness of the statement; (2) [t]he temporal proximity of the illegal search and the confession; (3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct ( Brown factors). Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). The district court found that the Brown factors counseled against suppressing Stark's third confession because it was made voluntarily two days after the illegal search; Stark was rested, fed, and de-cuffed; the confession was made to a new officer and in a new location; and the initial search and seizure was not an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment. We agree. There are numerous indicators that Stark's third confession was voluntary, thus meeting the first of the Brown factors. The first of these is the fact that Stark received a renewed Miranda warning before making his third confession. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (stating that a confession after proper Miranda warnings may be found `voluntary'). In addition, Stark's proactive role in the planning of the controlled delivery demonstrated that he was not acting from compulsion, but in the spirit of self-interest and cooperation in making his third confession. See United States v. Patino, 862 F.2d 128, 133-34 (7th Cir.1988) (finding that defendant's decision to cooperate with the FBI and actively assist them with their investigation indicated that her second confession was voluntary). The second Brown factor, temporal proximity, also counsels against suppression. Stark gave his third confession two days after the illegal search, which was arguably a sufficient amount of time for him to reflect on his predicament and determine whether he wanted to speak with an attorney before making any further statements. Compare Brown, 422 U.S. at 604-05, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (stating that two hours was insufficient), with United States v. Oliver, 27 Fed.Appx. 927, 928-29 (10th Cir.2001) (concluding that eleven hours was sufficient); United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir.2000) (finding that six days was adequate). Stark counters that two days was insufficient because he was in police custody the entire time. However, this fact is not dispositive in cases where, as here, the conditions of detention were favorable, marked by rest and food. Compare Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982) (concluding that six hours was too temporally proximate because defendant was in police custody the entire time and was subjected to several interrogations, fingerprinting and a lineup); United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 313, 325 (5th Cir.1984) (finding that ten hours was insufficient because, inter alia, defendant was in police custody and was sleep deprived, having spent the previous night in the woods hiding from police), with Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 107-08, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980) (finding that forty-five minutes was sufficient because, inter alia, defendants were detained in their home and able to move around freely); Oliver, 27 Fed.Appx. at -29 (stating that eleven hours was adequate because, although defendant was in police custody, he was apparently left alone by officers during that time). We also find that a significant intervening event took place, satisfying the third Brown factor. Stark gave his third confession to O'Neill, a new DEA agent in a new location, and at a time when he was rested, fed, and de-cuffed. United States v. Ayres, 725 F.2d 806, 810 (1st Cir.1984) (finding that interrogation by a new officer in a new location when defendant was relaxed, composed and uncoerced sufficiently dissipated whatever taint may have infected his prior statements). The final Brown factor, which analyzes the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct, weighs against suppression as well. This is the most important part of the analysis because it is tied directly to the rationale underlying the exclusionary rule, deterrence of police misconduct. United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 464-65 (7th Cir.2003). In analyzing this factor, courts look to see whether: (a) the police used threatening or abusive tactics; (b) the impropriety of the [initial misconduct] was obvious; and (c) the initial search was a mere evidence expedition calculated to elicit a confession. Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254; see also Patino, 862 F.2d at 134. The type of misconduct that the Supreme Court has found to warrant suppression of evidence is readily distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. For example, in Brown, two detectives broke into and searched the defendant's apartment without probable cause and, upon the defendant's arrival at his apartment, pointed a gun at his head and arrested him merely for further investigation and questioning. 422 U.S. at 592, 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254. Similarly, in Wong Sun, six or seven officers went to the business of a man who was thought to be a heroin dealer, forcibly opened his door, followed him into his bedroom, and almost immediately handcuffed and arrested him without probable cause. 371 U.S. at 474, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407. The coercive tactics used by police officials in Brown and Wong Sun were certainly not at play here during the initial traffic stop, continued detention, or search of the RV. Crivello's decision to effectuate the traffic stop was also not an obvious error. Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (suppressing evidence after finding that the impropriety of the [initial misconduct] was obvious). Although the district court found the stop was not justified because a single instance of swerving over the fog line did not violate the statute, this may not have been apparent to Crivello because the statute does not define what it means to drive as nearly as practicable in one lane. See Mo.Rev.Stat. ß 304.015.5. The ambiguity of this statute is further supported by the fact that several federal courts, in analyzing similarly-worded statutes, have found that an isolated instance of crossing over the fog line was sufficient to violate the statute. See United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (8th Cir.2007) (citing several examples of such cases). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's refusal to suppress Stark's third confession.