Opinion ID: 1587312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutorial Misstatements

Text: Sliney argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct during the closing statement. At trial, Sliney testified that he and the victim got into an altercation, which resulted in both parties falling to the floor. When Sliney realized that the victim was unconscious and bleeding, he left the pawn shop, and thus he claims that he was not responsible for several other fatal wounds that the victim received. Based on this testimony, defense counsel argued that Sliney should not be found guilty of murder but that the jury could conclude that he was guilty of some other lesser included offense: I don't know how you want to interpret the facts and I'm not going to ask you to interpret the facts in any way but to determine whether or not Jack Rilea Sliney is guilty rather of aggravated battery, but of something a little more serious, culpable negligence. Whether his conduct of leaving [the victim] there to the mercy of [an accomplice] is felt inexcusable that, in fact it operates as culpable negligence. Sliney contends that from the context of his trial counsel's argument, it is clear that counsel was inviting the jury to consider the offense of manslaughter by culpable negligence, a felony. However, in response to this comment, the prosecutor noted in closing: While we're talking about the elements I think I need to clear up something rather quickly, and I'm sure that counsel didn't mean to mislead you. Culpable negligence is not a more serious crime than aggravated battery; aggravated battery being a felony and culpable negligence being a misdemeanor. I wanted to clear that up but I'm sure that he did not mean to mislead anybody on that. Sliney contends that the prosecutor's incorrect clarification of the law, coupled with the failure of the trial court to inform the jury of the degree or severity of all lesser-included offenses in relation to each other, effectively derogated defense counsel's credibility and veracity with the jury. Sliney argues that as a result, the jury was left to believe that defense counsel was trying to mislead them into convicting Sliney of a misdemeanor instead of a felony when, in fact, manslaughter by culpable negligence is a second-degree felony. Sliney's argument that there was fundamental error based upon prosecutorial misconduct in the closing statement is without merit. Although the prosecutor made a mistake as to what defense counsel meant in his closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly stated that defense counsel was not attempting to mislead the jury. Thus, we do not conclude that the prosecutor was intending to impugn the jury's view of defense counsel's credibility. We do not find there to be a basis upon which to grant habeas relief.