Opinion ID: 1822354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the claims against memorial hospital at gulfport.

Text: ¶ 7. The Longs argue the circuit court erred in granting Memorial Hospital's motion to dismiss because (1) it applied a strict rule that the complete failure to attempt service before the expiration of 120 days warranted dismissal, (2) the circuit court's orders forming the basis of the first appeal prohibited the Longs from having the McKinney complaint properly and timely served until after this Court's April 14, 2005, mandate on the first appeal, and (3) the circuit court's order dismissed the entire action, not simply the claims against Memorial Hospital. Memorial Hospital and Vaughan respond that the circuit court correctly applied Rule 4(h) to dismiss Memorial Hospital because good cause cannot be shown where no summons issued and no attempt to serve process occurred before June 6, 2005. They further contest the Longs's arguments that the court's rulings prohibited the Longs from serving process and the circuit court erred in dismissing the entire matter. Finally, Memorial Hospital argues that the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over it due to the fact that McKinney failed to comply with the Mississippi Tort Claims Act before filing the lawsuit against it, and all claims against it are now barred by the one-year statute of limitations found in the Tort Claims Act. ¶ 8. At the outset, it must be observed that the Longs failed to name Memorial Hospital as a defendant to their own lawsuit. In fact, only fictitious parties were named as defendants. The Longs are now attempting to obtain relief by arguing that the McKinney complaint, which named Memorial Hospital as a defendant, should not have been dismissed for failure to serve process. ¶ 9. Rule 4(h) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure requires a summons and a copy of the complaint to be served upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint. If this is not done, the party responsible for service must show good cause why such service was not made within that period, otherwise the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice. Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(h). In applying this rule within its order dismissing Memorial Hospital, the circuit court concluded, As a matter of law, a plaintiff can never demonstrate good cause and diligence where no attempt to serve process was made. In reaching this conclusion, the court quoted and paraphrased Montgomery v. SmithKline Beecham Corp .: `Good cause' can never be demonstrated where the plaintiff has not been diligent in attempting to serve process. Montgomery, 910 So.2d 541, 545 (Miss. 2005) (citing Bang v. Pittman, 749 So.2d 47, 52 (Miss.1999)). ¶ 10. The Longs argue that Mississippi case law allows good cause to be shown in absence of any attempt to serve process, contrary to the absolute rule stated by the trial court, and that good cause existed due to the previous orders of the circuit court granting dismissal of their suit. This Court in Powe v. Byrd examined a situation where a plaintiff made little, if any, effort to serve process on a defendant within the time allowed by Rule 4. Powe, 892 So.2d 223 (Miss.2004). There, a plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action one week before the two-year anniversary of the death of the injured party. The process server was not instructed by plaintiff's counsel to attempt to serve process on the defendant until the final day for service under Rule 4. Service was not accomplished until after the time for service expired. Id. at 225. When the trial court dismissed the original action without prejudice, the plaintiff filed a second complaint. The trial court ruled the action stated by the second complaint to be time-barred and dismissed it with prejudice. Id. This Court considered the plaintiff's claims that she waited for an expert's opinion as to the merits of her action before attempting service. It affirmed the circuit court's judgment, stating We find that waiting until the last day to serve process on a defendant does not constitute good cause. Powe knew that it was of the utmost importance to have the process served on or before that day and did not accomplish same. Id. at 227. ¶ 11. Other, similar cases include Bacou-Dalloz Safety, Inc. v. Hall, 938 So.2d 820 (Miss.2006) (this Court considered and found good cause lacking in plaintiff's two attempts at service: the first attempt at service of original complaint was made by certified mail upon out-of-state corporation at the wrong address and attempted only once within 120-day period; the second attempt at service occurred long after 120-day period expired); Triple C Transport, Inc. v. Dickens, 870 So.2d 1195 (Miss.2004) (this Court affirmed dismissal where the plaintiff's complete failure to attempt service on a defendant due to an identification problem with a co-defendant did not amount to good cause or excusable neglect); and Holmes v. Coast Transit Authority, 815 So.2d 1183 (Miss.2002) (this Court considered whether ongoing settlement negotiations constituted good cause for failure to serve, and ruled in favor of dismissal where plaintiff's first attempt at service was improper and no further attempts to serve within 120 days followed). ¶ 12. We agree with the Longs that there is no concrete rule in Mississippi law that good cause automatically will be found lacking when a plaintiff completely fails to cause a summons to issue for a defendant or does not attempt at all to serve a defendant within 120 days of the filing of her lawsuit. This Court's precedent indicates the reasons offered to demonstrate diligence in light of the failure to serve will be, and should be, reviewed even where the plaintiff's attempts at service are negligible or nonexistent. Even the cases offered by Memorial Hospital and Vaughan for the rule that such a review is unnecessary demonstrate this Court will at least examine the reasons offered before finding them insufficient. ¶ 13. The circuit court's order approximates, but ultimately misstates, the rule in Montgomery and Bang. In Montgomery, this Court stated and applied the rule that it will consider the plaintiff's diligence and, finding it lacking, will never find good cause. Montgomery, 910 So.2d at 545, 547-48. In Bang, this Court applied the same procedure to the same result. Bang, 749 So.2d at 51-52. In both cases, summons issued before the expiration of time to serve, so these cases only suggest the resolution of the issue. On the other hand, in this case, the circuit court simply asked whether the plaintiff attempted service of process and, finding no evidence of an attempt, found no good cause existed. The court's order granting dismissal does not reflect due consideration of the reasons offered by the Longs for their failure. Rather, it appears as if the trial court's analysis simply relied upon its incorrect paraphrase of the rule from Montgomery. Since we agree that the Longs's reasons for their failure to serve process must be examined, they are examined below. Good cause analysis ¶ 14. The Longs offer this matter's winding procedural history and the restrictions to their participation to show good cause why service of process was not completed on Memorial Hospital until almost three years after Huey Long's death. The transcript of the hearing demonstrates the Longs offered to the circuit court many of the same reasons for failing to serve Memorial Hospital as they now offer on appeal. A review of that history, coupled with a discussion of the law, follows. ¶ 15. Lori McKinney filed her lawsuit against Memorial Hospital on October 17, 2002. She gave notice of claim to Memorial Hospital the same day she filed her lawsuit, contrary to Mississippi law. [3] Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Rev.2002); Univ. Med. Center v. Easterling, 928 So.2d 815 (Miss.2006) (requiring a plaintiff to wait the required number of days before filing tort claims suit; if suit is filed too early, this Court requires dismissal); Wright v. Quesnel, 876 So.2d 362 (Miss. 2004). But see City of Pascagoula v. Tomlinson, 741 So.2d 224 (Miss.1999) (suit filed two weeks after notice of claim was not dismissed; prior interpretations of Tort Claims Act found appropriate remedy to early filing of lawsuit was request for stay by defendant, not dismissal). Mississippi law now requires strict compliance with the ninety-day notice requirement in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1); Easterling, 928 So.2d at 819. Even if we were to apply the rule from Tomlinson to the facts before us, McKinney still failed to timely serve Memorial Hospital, and this failure is binding on the Longs. ¶ 16. Applying the holding of the first appeal of this matter, the Long lawsuit, filed the day after the McKinney lawsuit, was of no effect at the moment of its filing. Long, 897 So.2d at 174. This matter proceeded under the McKinney complaint with McKinney acting as fiduciary for the Longs's claims. McKinney was free to effect service on Memorial Hospital during the interval between filing her complaint and the interlocutory appeal. The Mississippi Tort Claims Act gives a governmental entity defendant ninety days from the filing of a notice of claim to consider the claim before a lawsuit can be maintained. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Rev.2002). Assuming, for argument's sake, the circuit court entered a stay in the McKinney suit for ninety days after the date Memorial Hospital received the notice of claim, McKinney had 120 days from January 17, 2003, to effect service upon Memorial Hospital. Applying this assumption, the period for service of process of the original complaint on Memorial Hospital ended May 17, 2003. Throughout this time, both McKinney and the Longs had the benefit of counsel. No court order encumbered McKinney's ability to serve process. ¶ 17. Participation by the Longs's counsel was prohibited by the circuit court's orders, except for a period beginning February 6 and ending March 24, 2003. The Longs offer no reason why McKinney could not have served process on Memorial Hospital between January and May of 2003, or requested more time for service from the circuit court. We find the Longs's arguments concerning their inability to act on the McKinney complaint to be without merit. They failed to sue Memorial Hospital themselves. Since they chose to seek relief from dismissal under the McKinney complaint, they have bound themselves to the choices and inaction of McKinney. As a consequence, they share the same fate with respect to Memorial Hospital. ¶ 18. Another basis for the Longs's claim that good cause exists to justify the failure to serve process on Memorial Hospital is the strained relationships between McKinney and her counsel and the Longs and their own. This court's holding on interlocutory appeal assumes McKinney acted as a fiduciary during this time, therefore, strained relationships between co-plaintiffs and their counsel do not constitute good cause to warrant relief from dismissal. Regardless of whether the co-plaintiffs were on amicable or hostile terms, McKinney, as fiduciary for all interested parties and as the only party with the standing to use the court's powers to prosecute this suit, was responsible for service of process and simply neglected to complete this task within the time allowed. There is nothing in the record before the Court to explain this neglect. ¶ 19. Finally, although the Longs filed their petition for interlocutory appeal on April 21, 2003, the filing of a petition for interlocutory appeal does not stay the proceedings of the circuit court unless this court enters an order to that effect. Miss. R.App. P. 5(f). This Court did not enter such a stay until September 19, 2003, well after the time for service elapsed. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record to show good cause or excusable neglect why McKinney failed to serve process on Memorial Hospital between the time she filed her complaint and when this Court entered the order granting the interlocutory appeal. McKinney acted as fiduciary for the Longs, so they share the penalty for her failure. The circuit court's findings that (1) McKinney did not cause process to issue for Memorial Hospital, (2) McKinney did not ask for an extension of time to serve Memorial Hospital, and (3) Memorial Hospital did not attempt to evade process are supported by substantial evidence. Its judgment finding that good cause did not exist for McKinney's failure to serve process is not an abuse of discretion and is affirmed. ¶ 20. The Longs raise one final argument concerning the dismissal of Memorial Hospital. They contend the dismissal of Memorial Hospital did not dismiss the entire action. This issue does not affect the merits of the dismissal of Memorial Hospital, but it does concern the way the circuit court treated the dismissal of Vaughan. The court's order of dismissal for Memorial Hospital states, the subject complaint is dismissed without prejudice. (Emphasis added). Its order dismissing Vaughan found the amended complaint to be a new cause of action. ¶ 21. The circuit court's order dismissing Memorial Hospital did not properly dismiss the entire action, as two fictitious parties, surgeon John Doe 1 and anesthesiologist John Doe 2, remained as unidentified defendants. One of the benefits of Rule 9(h) is to allow a plaintiff, who is aware of his cause of action against a defendant but ignorant of the defendant's identity, to name a fictitious party as a defendant in order to use the court's resources to discover her true identity. See, e.g., Veal v. J.P. Morgan Trust Co. N.A., 955 So.2d 843, 845-46 (Miss.2007); Rawson v. Jones, 816 So.2d 367, 369 (Miss. 2001). To dismiss the entire action, when only the identified parties are dismissed and the complaint articulates claims against fictitious parties whose identity can be discovered, is to deprive a plaintiff of this benefit. Therefore, the circuit court erred in dismissing the entire action when dismissing Memorial Hospital. ¶ 22. This conclusion does not result in any change in the outcome of the dismissal of Memorial Hospital. We also note that the authority relied upon by the circuit court to treat the amended complaint as a new cause of action, King v. American RV Centers, Inc., 862 So.2d 558 (Miss.Ct.App. 2003), has been criticized and overruled by this court and should be treated on remand with appropriate circumspection. Wilner v. White, 929 So.2d 315 (Miss.2006). ¶ 23. In summary, the circuit court's judgment dismissing Memorial Hospital due to McKinney's failure to timely serve process is supported by substantial evidence and is affirmed. The circuit court's January 9, 2006, order dismissed Memorial Hospital without prejudice. This result was not changed when the circuit court reconsidered dismissal. This is the result anticipated by Rule 4, therefore, the court's analysis ends here with respect to Memorial Hospital. ¶ 24. The circuit court dismissed Vaughan after considering his affidavit and those of the Longs and their counsel. Under the circumstances, the circuit court was presented a question of Mississippi law when examining a motion for summary judgment. Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b); 56. We apply a de novo review to questions of law presented on summary judgment. Veal, 955 So.2d at 845; City of Jackson v. Perry, 764 So.2d 373, 375 (Miss.2000).