Opinion ID: 670838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Special Master's Authority to Amend

Text: 11 [I]n a case arising under the 1989 amendments to the Vaccine Act, 5 we review de novo the [Court of Federal Claims'] determination as to whether or not the special master's decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. In effect, then, we review the underlying decision of the special master under the ... standard[s] of Sec. 300aa-12(e)(2)(B). Hines v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1524 (Fed.Cir.1991). See also Edgar v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 989 F.2d 473, 475 (Fed.Cir.1993); Bradley v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 991 F.2d 1570, 1574 (Fed.Cir.1993); Grant v. Secretary of the Dep't Health & Human Servs., 956 F.2d 1144, 1146 (Fed.Cir.1992). Whether the special master has jurisdiction to amend her decision after the Court of Federal Claims has entered judgment thereon is a legal question which we review de novo. See Widdoss v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 989 F.2d 1170, 1174 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 381, 126 L.Ed.2d 331 (1993); Whitecotton v. Secretary of the Dep't Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 374, 376 (Fed.Cir.1994). 12 In granting the government's motion to vacate the special master's Order to Amend, the trial court found that there was no legal basis to support the special master's conclusion that she retained jurisdiction to correct her decision after a judgment was entered by the court. The court identified two events by which the special master is divested of jurisdiction under the Vaccine Act. First, if a motion for review is filed by either party within 30 days of the issuance of a special master's decision, the Court of Federal Claims assumes exclusive jurisdiction over the case. 6 See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(e)(2). Once such a motion is properly filed, jurisdiction passes to the court and the special master's jurisdiction reattaches only if the case is subsequently remanded for further action. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(e)(2)(C). Second, if the parties fail to seek review of the special master's decision within the 30-day period, then jurisdiction is lost once the clerk of the Court of Federal Claims enters judgment in accordance with that decision. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(e)(3). It is the latter situation that exists here. 13 The Pattons maintain that the trial court erred in concluding that the special master did not retain jurisdiction to amend her decision after the court entered final judgment in accordance with that decision. The Pattons assert that authority for the special master's continuing jurisdiction can be found in Rule 60 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, the Vaccine Rules, and the inherent powers of the special master. We will consider each of these alleged bases of authority in turn. 14 First, the Pattons argue that a special master possesses authority equivalent to that of the Court of Federal Claims under Rule 60 to amend or correct her decision after a judgment has been entered. The Pattons argue that although their failure to file a timely motion for review under section 300aa-12(e)(1) prohibits the court from reviewing the merits of the special master's decision, the special master nevertheless retains Rule 60-type authority to amend her decision. 15 In asserting that the power of the Court of Federal Claims to grant relief from judgment under Rule 60 is also available to a special master, the Pattons ignore the distinction between the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims and the Vaccine Rules, which govern practice and procedure for the proceedings of the court and the special masters, respectively. Unlike the court, which has express authority under its Rule 60 to afford relief from a final judgment, a special master is without such power under the Vaccine Rules. 7 16 The RCFC apply to special masters only to the extent referenced in the Vaccine Rules, Vaccine R. 1, and the Pattons concede that the provisions of Rule 60 have not been so referenced. 8 As the tribunal charged with setting out the rules governing proceedings before the special masters, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(d)(2), the Court of Federal Claims apparently chose to reserve the power to grant Rule 60-type relief for itself, withholding such power from the special masters. See Donovan v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 28 Fed.Cl. 459, 461, 462 (1993), aff'd, 17 F.3d 1442 (Fed.Cir.1994) (table). Thus, a special master may not avail herself of the authority conferred by Rule 60. 17 Alternatively, the Pattons argue that the ability of the special master to grant relief from a decision after judgment has been entered is authorized by Vaccine Rule 1, which entitles the special masters to regulate the applicable practice, consistent with these rules and with the purpose of the Vaccine Act, to decide cases promptly and efficiently. We reject the Pattons' overly broad reading of Vaccine Rule 1. The rule expresses the Vaccine Act's underlying objective to provide expeditious and conclusive resolution of vaccine-injury claims. See H.R.Rep. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6358. That general mandate, however, cannot be interpreted as endowing special masters with powers contemplated neither by Congress in enacting the Vaccine Act nor by the Court of Federal Claims in promulgating the Vaccine Rules. The discretion afforded special masters under Vaccine Rule 1 may not be exercised in a manner that would disturb or exceed the framework laid out by the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to its authority under the Act. Cf. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589-90, 61 S.Ct. 767, 771, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941) (An authority conferred upon a court to make rules of procedure for the exercise of its jurisdiction is not an authority to enlarge that jurisdiction[.]). 18 Notwithstanding the absence of any express provision authorizing a special master to amend her decision after a judgment has been entered, the Pattons argue that special masters have inherent power, independent of any statute or rule, to grant relief from their decisions. The Pattons point to the historical authority of federal courts to correct or amend their judgments, now codified at Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a), and insist that special masters possess a similar capability. 9 19 The Pattons fail to recognize that special masters are not provided with the same powers as federal courts. Established under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, federal courts have plenary power ... to modify [a] judgment for error of fact or law or even revoke it altogether. Zimmern v. United States, 298 U.S. 167, 169-70, 56 S.Ct. 706, 706-07, 80 L.Ed. 1118 (1936). The 1938 promulgation of Rule 60(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a federal court to correct clerical mistakes and errors arising from oversight or omission, expressly recognized a power that the courts always have had. 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2854 (1973 & Supp.1993). 20 In contrast, the Office of Special Masters owes its existence to and derives its powers from the Vaccine Act. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(c), (d). As a creature of statute ... [a]ny and all authority pursuant to which [a special master] may act ultimately must be grounded in an express grant from Congress. Killip v. Office of Personnel Management, 991 F.2d 1564, 1569 (Fed.Cir.1993). Thus, any authority held by the special masters to correct decisions must flow from the Vaccine Act or its implementing Vaccine Rules, and not from any inherent source of power. In the absence of any express provision allowing the special master to grant Rule 60-type relief, the special master's involvement in the case ends, as a matter of law, once the period for seeking review of her decision expires and judgment is entered by the Court of Federal Claims. See Grimes v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 988 F.2d 1196, 1198 (Fed.Cir.1993). 21 Finally, the Pattons contend that because the special master did not dispose of their claims for compensation for pain and suffering in her August 28, 1992 decision awarding attorneys' fees and costs, that decision constituted an interlocutory decision on which a final judgment could not be entered. That argument, however, disregards the decisional scheme established under the Vaccine Rules. 22 Under Vaccine Rule 13, a special master's decision on compensation for attorneys' fees and costs is separate from her decision on compensation for vaccine-related injury for purposes of seeking review by the Court of Federal Claims under Vaccine Rule 11. Additionally, for certain retrospective cases, such as the instant case, in which the vaccine recipient is not deceased and the vaccine was administered prior to October 1, 1988, Vaccine Rule 10(b) provides that the special master shall postpone deciding compensation for pain and suffering until she issues her decision on attorneys' fees and costs. Upon expiration of the 30-day time limit or upon notice that the parties waive their review rights, the clerk of the Court of Federal Claims is mandated to enter judgment immediately in accordance with the special master's decision. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(e)(3); Vaccine Rule 11(a). 23 In the instant case, the special master issued two separate decisions: one awarding compensation for injury and one awarding attorneys' fees and costs. That she failed to rule on the claims for pain and suffering when she awarded attorneys' fees and costs does not render that decision interlocutory. The 30-day filing period runs from issuance of the special master's decision, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(e)(1), and the mandate to enter judgment after the filing period expires does not require that the decision must have expressly addressed all the issues. Thus, the special master's decision was properly reduced to a final judgment after the parties failed to seek review within the 30-day time limit.