Opinion ID: 2264301
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impropriety of the prosecutor's statements

Text: First, we must determine what statements, if any, were improper. The petitioner argues that the prosecutor improperly addressed the jury on four different occasions. The prosecutor used a golden rule argument, [11] she then insinuated that the burden was upon the petitioner to prove that the child was lying, she also appealed to the jury's prejudices and fears, and finally, she alluded to the fact that petitioner's conviction might prevent harm to another specific child in the future.
Petitioner points out that [b]y asking the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of Nigha's mother . . . the State improperly appealed to the passions of the jury in order to persuade them to believe Nigha's version of events. When a jury is asked to place themselves in the shoes of the victim, the attorney improperly appeals to their prejudices and asks them to abandon their neutral fact finding role. The Court of Special Appeals recognized petitioner's argument that such `arguments are impermissible because they encourage the jurors to abdicate their position of neutrality and decide cases on the basis of personal interest rather than the evidence.' Lawson, 160 Md.App. at 627, 865 A.2d at 632. The intermediate court found that the remark was improper, but that the general instructions to the jury before oral argument were sufficient to cure any prejudice engendered by it. Id. Albeit in a civil case, the Court has addressed this specific issue in Leach v. Metzger, 241 Md. 533, 217 A.2d 302 (1966), a personal injury case where a husband and wife sued the driver who had collided with them. The wife was injured as a result of the crash. During closing arguments the plaintiff's attorney asked the jury to put themselves in the place of the husband. The defense attorney promptly objected to the statement and moved for a mistrial. The judge denied the motion, but instructed the jury about the impropriety of the remarks and of their duty to be fair and reasonable. Id. at 536, 217 A.2d at 303. The Court recognized the problem arising from such statements and said: The vice inherent in such argument is that it invites the jurors to disregard their oaths and to become non-objective viewers of the evidence which has been presented to them, or to go outside that evidence to bring to bear on the issue of damages purely subjective considerations, and resultingly courts in many other jurisdictions have deemed such `golden rule' arguments to be improper. Id. at 536-37, 217 A.2d at 304. See also Hill v. State, 355 Md. 206, 214, 734 A.2d 199, 204 (1999) (recognizing that golden rule arguments appealing to the jury's own interests are inappropriate). The Court nevertheless upheld the judgment stating that the judge had promptly and properly corrected the error by instructing the jury. Leach, 241 Md. at 536-37, 217 A.2d at 304. That case, however, involved only one improper statement by the plaintiff. In the case sub judice, the improper comments continued unabated. Moreover, there was no contemporaneous or specific curative instruction given in the present case; the trial court relied on a general instruction.
Petitioner argues that the State improperly attempted to place a burden upon him to present evidence that Nigha had a motive to lie. The Court of Special Appeals determined that the prosecutor's statements clearly asserted that petitioner had failed to present evidence rebutting the State's case. Lawson, 160 Md.App. at 628, 865 A.2d at 633. That court, however, found that the statements did not deny petitioner a fair trial, even if improper, because the jury instructions clearly stated that the burden was upon the State. We stated in Eley, 288 Md. at 555 n. 2, 419 A.2d at 388 n. 2, that the prosecution was not free to comment upon the defendant's failure to produce evidence to refute the State's evidence because it could amount to an impermissible shift of the burden of proof. Later, in Degren, 352 Md. at 429, 722 A.2d at 901, a prosecutor during rebuttal stated: ` nobody in this country has more reason to lie than a defendant in a criminal trial. ' We determined that such a remark was improper, unprofessional and injudicious. We found, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the comments and denying the defendant's motions for curative instructions. We reasoned that, although improper, the comment did not bear directly on the defendant's guilt or innocence. Furthermore, the comments were made in response to the defendants closing arguments stating that the State's witnesses had various reasons to lie. In Shoemaker v. State, 228 Md. 462, 468, 180 A.2d 682, 685 (1962), the prosecutor alluded to the fact that the defendant would be eligible for parole if convicted. The Court concluded that such statements tend to shift the responsibility for finding guilt or innocence onto another body after conviction. It found that it was clear that the argument . . . was improper, and that the jurors `were likely to have been [improperly] influenced to the prejudice of the accused'. . . . Id. at 473, 180 A.2d at 688 (citations omitted); see also Brown v. State, 339 Md. 385, 663 A.2d 583 (1995) (holding that a prosecutor's statement insinuating that the jury could take mercy into account during deliberations was improper, that the effect of injecting such a proposition into the deliberations created the possibility that it would influence the verdict and was not harmless error). The primary evidence in this case was provided directly or indirectly by the victim's statements. Thus, her credibility was a major issue. The prosecutor's statements tended to shift the State's burden to prove all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by requiring the defendant to prove that Nigha was lying. The State's statements were, therefore, inappropriate and under all of the circumstances of this case, as hereafter explained, the jurors `were likely to have been [improperly] influenced to the prejudice of the accused'. . . . Shoemaker, 228 Md. at 473, 180 A.2d at 688.
Petitioner points to the prosecutor's appeal to the juror's prejudices and fears when she made the following remarks: What does a monster look like? Looks like different things to different people. What does a sexual molester look like? He looks like someone you know. He looks like your uncle, your brother, your sister, your cousin. It's possible. But there is no certain way that someone who molests children looks. But they do ingratiate themselves. They make themselves indispensable. They are friendly, always there to watch. Not everyone is like that, but please don't misunderstand me because the important point here is that a child molester looks like anybody else. That's why they are able to do what they do, because they look like all of us, and we trust. Petitioner declares that such statements are designed to inflame the jurors' prejudices against a hated class of individuals and are therefore improper. The Court of Special Appeals disagreed stating that [t]he State never directly characterized appellant as a `monster' or `sexual molester.' Lawson, 160 Md.App. at 630, 865 A.2d at 634. The intermediate court found that the comments were isolated and that they did not affect the petitioner's right to a fair and impartial trial. In the context of this case, we disagree. Prosecutors should not appeal to the prejudices of the jury. Contee, 223 Md. at 584, 165 A.2d at 894; Hill, 355 Md. at 211, 734 A.2d at 202. In Hill, the prosecution's improper remarks extended throughout the duration of the trial. The prosecutor, during opening arguments, told the jury that they were  chosen to send a message to protect [the] community  and to keep[ the] community safe. Hill, 355 Md. at 211, 734 A.2d at 202. The defense's prompt objection to that remark was sustained. Id. Later, during closing arguments the prosecution again asked the jury to send a message to the community and to the defendant's cronies. The objection to that statement was overruled. After the jury commenced deliberations, a motion for a new trial based on the improper remarks was denied. The Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court's decision based primarily upon the fact that the defense attorney failed to raise the objection before the jury was sent out for deliberations. Id. at 215, 734 A.2d at 204. This Court reversed stating that the objection was not overruled due to its untimeliness but on the merits. As a result, the motion did preserve the issue for review even though it was raised after the jury retired for deliberation. The Court also found that the prosecutors statements were wholly improper and presumptively prejudicial. . . . Id. at 216, 734 A.2d at 205. We recognized that the defense's motion for a new trial asked for more than just another curative instruction. . . . The point made was that the jury had been contaminated [] by the prosecutor's improper [remarks, including] . . . references to the need for the jurors to convict petitioner in order to preserve the quality of their own communities. Id. at 219-20, 734 A.2d at 206. As a result, the prosecutor's statements prejudiced the defendant. The Court of Special Appeals in Walker v. State, 121 Md.App. 364, 709 A.2d 177 (1998), addressed the impropriety of a prosecutor's closing argument calling the defendant an animal and a pervert. The court, in addressing these statements stated: Indeed, the nature of the evidence presented certainly gives rise to the conclusion that the actions of appellant  assuming them to be true as we must  were perverse, to say the least. When viewed, however, in the context of the totality of the prosecutor's closing argument, given such odious offenses, it is ironic that resort to excessive appeals to passion are needed to secure a conviction when the nature of the charges and the evidence adduced, without embellishment, is inherently inflammatory, albeit properly so. The right to a fair trial and the search for the truth, however, should not be hampered or obfuscated by extreme appeals to passion calculated to inflame the jury. When the reference to the silent screams and `pervert' are considered in conjunction with the characterization of appellant as `an animal,' we believe the prosecutor, in her zeal, exceeded the bounds of proper comment. Not only is it inappropriate to refer to a defendant in a criminal case as `an animal,' it may be argued that such strategy, in some instances, could be counterproductive should the jury view the State as engaging in a personal contest with the defendant. It is incumbent upon the People's representative to maintain an air of dignity and stay above the frey. Id. at 380-81, 709 A.2d at 185 (emphasis added). In the present case, although the prosecutor did not say this defendant is a monster and a child molester, it is clear that she intended to imply to the jury that he was that monster and child molester. Under circumstances such as those present here, it is not necessary for the prosecutor to specifically name the defendant, in order for the jury to understand that a defendant is the person the prosecutor is describing. Such statements are therefore inappropriate.
Petitioner contends that the State improperly argued that petitioner would, if allowed to roam free, sexually abuse his cousin's eleven-year-old child implying that he was already setting the child up by allowing the mother and child to live in his apartment. The Court of Special Appeals recognized that we have not addressed the issue of the allegation of future criminality in a prosecutor's closing argument. Lawson, 160 Md.App. at 631, 865 A.2d at 634. That court then looked at other state court opinions to guide them in their analysis. State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 951 P.2d 1288, 1297 (1998); State v. Williams, 145 S.W.3d 874 (Mo.Ct.App.2004); Williams v. State, 261 Ga.App. 511, 583 S.E.2d 172, 177 (2003); People v. McNeal, 175 Ill.2d 335, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841, 855 (1997). The court found that such arguments are improper because they are based upon facts not in evidence at trial. Lawson, 160 Md.App. at 631, 865 A.2d at 634. We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that such statements are improper, furthermore we find that such statements, under the circumstances here present, were highly prejudicial to the defendant.
The Court of Special Appeals evaluated each of the statements standing alone and determined that each statement, independent of the others, did not merit reversal of all of the convictions, stating that [t]he remarks at issue were unquestionably improper but, in each instance, they were short, isolated, and vague comments and thus did not vitally affect appellant's right to a fair and impartial trial. Lawson, 160 Md.App. at 632, 865 A.2d at 635. Because the Court of Special Appeals did not consider the separate statements in the context of the prejudice that each of the statements, and all of them together, created in the minds of the jurors, we disagree. As petitioner argues, taken alone the statements may not affect the appellant's right to a fair and impartial trial, but their cumulative effect leads to a different conclusion. This becomes clearer as one applies the two remaining factors under Spain: the strength of the case and the trial court's actions.