Opinion ID: 702336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lack of a Defense

Text: 61 Rodriguez's next argument is that Telander improperly commented on his decision not to testify, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination, when he remarked to the jury, What was the defense? The defense was the Defendant's investigator ... and a Chicago police officer would testify that he surrendered himself. When Telander made these statements, Rodriguez's attorney promptly said objection. However, after his objection was properly overruled, he gave no specific reasons for his objection nor did he make an offer of proof as to why the objection should be sustained. 62 The remarks of the prosecutor fall far short of a statement that could reasonably be considered as referring to Rodriguez's failure to testify. We first note that the law is clear that an attorney, when making an objection, must make a clear statement of the specific grounds for objection[s]. O.K. Sand & Gravel v. Martin Marietta Technologies, 36 F.3d 565, 568 (7th Cir.1994). [G]eneral objections [at trial] do not preserve an issue for appellate review because they do not alert the court or [the] opposing party as to the specific grounds for the objections. Doe, 52 F.3d at 1457 (citation omitted); cf., Prymer v. Ogden, 29 F.3d 1208, 1214 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 665, 130 L.Ed.2d 599 (1994) (general objections to evidence do not preserve an issue for review). Thus, defense counsel has procedurally defaulted on this issue and we are barred from reviewing the propriety of this comment unless Rodriguez can meet the cause and prejudice test. Jones, 15 F.3d at 675; see also Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1256 (7th Cir.1992) (citing Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89, 97 S.Ct. at 2507-08). 63 Rodriguez's counsel has offered no explanation for his failure to make a specific objection and we refuse to search and comb the record in search of an explanation for the defendant's cause for waiving this issue on direct review. United States v. Adamo, 882 F.2d 1218, 1230 (7th Cir.1989) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Brown, 899 F.2d 677, 679 (7th Cir.1990) (it is not the obligation of this court to research and construct the legal arguments open to parties, especially when they are represented by counsel). 64 The right against self-incrimination is violated only when 1) it was the prosecutor's manifest intention to refer to the defendant's silence, or 2) the remark was of such a character that the jury would 'naturally and necessarily' take it to be a comment on the defendant's silence. United States v. Donovan, 24 F.3d 908, 916 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 269, 130 L.Ed.2d 187 (1994); see also United States v. Tipton, 964 F.2d 650, 657 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. DiCaro, 852 F.2d 259, 263 (7th Cir.1988) (quotation omitted). In DiCaro, we held that because the essence of the defendant's theory was that the government's witnesses were not reliable, the prosecutor was entitled to 'imply that the failure of the defense to present available evidence (other than the defendant's testimony) in opposition to the government's witnesses supports a conclusion that the government's witnesses are reliable.'  Id. State's Attorney Telander merely commented on the less than compelling nature of the defense by pointing out that it consisted of the investigator's report of his conversation with Santana and that a police officer would have testified that Rodriguez surrendered himself. 65 The overwhelming evidence as to the guilt of Rodriguez, see, supra, Section A, and the judge's explicit instruction to the jury in this case that [t]he fact that the defendant did not testify should not be considered by you in any way in arriving at your verdict, are further proof that the jury would have no reason to interpret the prosecutor's statements, in the normal course of his argument, regarding the weakness of the defense as a comment on Rodriguez's failure to testify on his own behalf because jurors are presumed to follow ... instructions. Doe, 52 F.3d at 1458; see also Davis, 15 F.3d at 1402 ([w]e rely on our belief that juries heed the instructions). Therefore, we hold that Rodriguez suffered no prejudice, nor did State's Attorney Telander engage in any misconduct, when he merely commented in passing on the sparse defense Rodriguez presented at trial.