Opinion ID: 2572527
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Wrongful Death Statute

Text: [¶ 4] The argument presented conjures up a statutory hurricane from which we are asked to pluck a wind-borne feather. We are unable to spot a hurricane in that argument and are thus unwilling to grasp for the feather. As a beginning point, it is asserted that McMackin may not maintain a wrongful death claim in these circumstances. The relevant statute provides: § 1-38-101. Actions for wrongful death which survive; proceedings against executor or administrator of person liable. Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued is liable in an action for damages, even though the death was caused under circumstances as amount in law to murder in the first or second degree or manslaughter. If the person liable dies, the action may be brought against the executor or administrator of his estate. If he left no estate within the state of Wyoming, the court may appoint an administrator upon application. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-101 (LexisNexis 2003). [¶ 5] In the original opinion we have adequately explained the foundations of, as well as the wide acceptance of, the loss of chance doctrine and we will not iterate that material here. Those same materials make clear that loss of chance resists precise definition and is subject to varying interpretations and different applications. In some jurisdictions it is allowed as a wrongful death action where the consequences of the negligent act(s) is, in fact, death. Where the result of the negligence is not death, traditional negligence/medical malpractice principles apply. In some jurisdictions, loss of chance claims are allowed as a survivorship claim. In some jurisdictions it is treated as a common law cause of action or a stand-alone theory of recovery. We are comfortable that the loss of chance claim asserted in this matter fits within Wyoming's wrongful death statute, although it may expand to some limited extent our previous pronouncements in this area of the law. We might retreat to a recognition of loss of chance as a stand-alone theory or as a common law claim, but we are unable to detect an erosion of the legislature's intent or an intractable conflict with our existing precedents in ruling as we do. We are exhorted that the only injury that may be vindicated by the wrongful death statute is death. The recognition of Mrs. Brown's loss of a chance to live, as being actionable within the context of the wrongful death statute, does not strain the bounds of reason, logic, or the law. [¶ 6] The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recognized that loss of chance has its roots in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(a): ... The majority of jurisdictions, however, have interpreted sec. 323(a) as lessening the plaintiff's burden of proof on causation.... Once the plaintiff shows that the defendant's negligence increased the risk that the plaintiff's injury would occur, sec. 323(a) allows the trier of fact to determine whether the negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury.... This court has previously approved of sec. 323(a).... We conclude that the evidence in this case was sufficient under current Wisconsin law to present the causation to the trier of fact. To establish causation in Wisconsin, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm. The phrase `substantial factor' denotes that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead the trier of fact, as a reasonable person, to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense.... `All that is required in negligence cases is for the plaintiff to present probable facts from which negligence and causal relations may be reasonably inferred.' ... One who negligently creates a dangerous condition may be held liable even though another cause is also a substantial factor in contributing to the result.... There may be more than one substantial causative factor in any given case.... The defendant's negligent conduct need not be the sole or primary factor in causing the plaintiff's harm.... ... We disagree that to establish causation the Ehlingers must show that proper diagnosis and treatment would have been successful. We conclude that in a case of this nature, where the causal relationship between the defendant's alleged negligence and the plaintiff's harm can only be inferred by surmising as to what the plaintiff's condition would have been had the defendant exercised ordinary care, to satisfy his or her burden of production on causation, the plaintiff need only show that the omitted treatment was intended to prevent the very type of harm which resulted, that the plaintiff would have submitted to the treatment, and that it is more probable than not the treatment could have lessened or avoided the plaintiff's injury had it been rendered. It then is for the trier of fact to determine whether the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm. [Emphasis in original. Internal citations omitted.] Ehlinger v.Sipes, 155 Wis.2d 1, 454 N.W.2d 754, 758-59 (1990); also see Jorgenson v. Vener, 2000 SD 87, ¶¶ 10-20, 616 N.W.2d 366 ¶¶ 10-20 (S.D.2000). [¶ 7] The statutory conflicts proposed to us do not require us to modify our original opinion. However, to further clarify our holding, we will note two further significant points. First, WCPJIC 3.04, at 18 (Revised April 1994) provides: CAUSEDEFINED An injury or damage is caused by an act, or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about the injury or damage. This instruction will work well with the concepts that inhere in the loss of chance doctrine. Some additional guidance in fashioning appropriate instructions can be found in Ronald W. Eades, Jury Instructions on Medical Issues, §§ 10-9 and 10-10 at 575-80 (1997 and Supp.2001): 10-9. Loss of a chance. If you believe from the evidence the [state nature of defendant's act or omission] increased the risk of [death] [the harm sustained] by significantly decreasing the patient's chances of [survival] [recovery], you should find the defendant to be liable. 10-10. Loss of ChanceDamages based upon percentage amount of loss of chance of better result. If you find from the evidence that [Defendant] was negligent in the treatment of [Plaintiff] and that this negligence was a substantial factor in reducing [Plaintiff's] chances of obtaining a better result, then you will award such damages as will fairly compensate [Plaintiff] for this loss of chance of a better result. [¶ 8] A plaintiff is not required to establish the lost chance of recovery or survival in an exact percentage for the matter to be submitted to the jury. The jury is to consider evidence of percentages of the lost chance in the assessment and apportionment of damages. The damages recoverable by the plaintiff equals the total sum of the damages for the underlying injury or death multiplied by the percentage of the lost chance. Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Medical Group, 76 Ohio St.3d 483, 668 N.E.2d 480, 484-85 (1996). [¶ 9] Finally, we take note that there is often a special need for expert testimony in loss of chance cases. As set out in J.D. Lee and Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law Litigation and Liability, § 25:92 at XX-XXX-XX, (2002): It is the general rule that expert testimony is required to establish the connection between the alleged negligence of the defendant and the illness, injury, or death of which the plaintiff complains. However, where the matter is within common knowledge, the basis for the requirement of expert testimony is dissipated. The classic example of this exception is where a foreign object is left in the patient's body. Thus, where a suture needle had been left in the patient's body, expert testimony was held to be unnecessary to establish causation between the alleged negligence of the defendant doctor and the pain of which the plaintiff complained. In another case, expert medical testimony was held unnecessary to establish that a surgical error in one operation, a severed ureter, was the proximate cause for the plaintiff being hospitalized and undergoing a second operation. Other illustrations of the exception to the rule requiring expert testimony include a case where the defendant physician was charged with having left the decedent, wounded by gunshot, unattended at a critical time; where the plaintiff was given the wrong injection and upon discovery was then given a second, or offsetting injection, a tranquilizer, and after being left unattended, tried to go to the washroom, fainted and fell, sustaining injuries; and where a delirious expectant mother fell from a bed in the obstetrical department labor room while the nurse assigned to the room was absent. It is readily apparent that this case does not fit into one of the exceptions to the requirement for foundational expert testimony.