Opinion ID: 1595136
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Automobile Searches

Text: [4] ¶ 22. The contents of automobiles generally receive reduced Fourth Amendment protection for two reasons. First, the ready mobility of an automobile makes it more likely that contraband or evidence of a crime will vanish during the time needed to comply with the warrant requirement. Pallone, 2000 WI 77 at ¶ 60 (citing Houghton, 526 U.S. at 304). Second, because traveling in an automobile exposes passengers and items in the vehicle to public view, there is a reduced expectation of privacy in the automobile and its contents. Id. ¶ 23. The Supreme Court first recognized the automobile exception in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-56 (1925), and concluded that law enforcement officers may search an entire motor vehicle without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. The Court clarified Carroll in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982), and recognized that the scope of such a probable cause search extends to every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search, including closed containers. ¶ 24. The Supreme Court recently applied the Ross holding to a search of passengers' property in Houghton, 526 U.S. at 295-96. Sandra Houghton was a passenger in a car stopped for speeding by the Wyoming Highway Patrol. Id. at 297-98. During the stop, the officer noticed a syringe in the driver's pocket. Id. at 298. When asked about the syringe, the driver admitted he used it to take illegal drugs. Id. Based on the driver's admission, the officer conducted a probable cause search of the car for contraband. Id. During the search, the officer found Houghton's purse on the back seat and searched it, discovering drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine. Id. ¶ 25. Houghton challenged the search. The Court held that police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers' belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search. Id. at 307. The Court's opinion was a logical extension of the Ross doctrine. ¶ 26. In reaching its conclusion, the Court weighed the degree of intrusiveness of the search against the governmental interests at stake. Id. at 303-04. The Court noted that although searches of the person, like the Terry [4] weapons frisk, constitute a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, the same traumatic consequences are not to be expected during a search of personal property in a vehicle. Id. at 303. The Court also observed that [p]assengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they transport in cars, because cars traveling on public roads are exposed to public scrutiny and pervasive governmental controls. Id. at 303. ¶ 27. On the other side of the scale, the Court considered the government's interest in effective law enforcement: (1) the ready mobility of the automobile creates a risk that contraband will be permanently lost while authorities obtain a warrant; (2) automobile passengers will often be engaged in common enterprise with the driver and thus will have the same interests in concealing their wrongdoing; and (3) a criminal might hide contraband in a passenger's belongings as readily as in other containers in the vehicle. Id. at 304-05. The Court concluded that a probable cause automobile search encompasses any items of passenger property within the automobile that may contain or conceal the object of the search. Id. at 303, 307. ¶ 28. As we have already noted, this case is not directly governed by the automobile exception because it does not involve a search based upon probable cause. However, these cases reflect the Supreme Court's judgments about the expectation of privacy that attaches to property in an automobile, the level of intrusiveness of a personal property search, and the individual's interests as against the government's in this context. As such, they are highly relevant to our evaluation of the reasonableness of the consent-based automobile search in this case. And the cases establish that the Supreme Court considers the expectation of privacy to be much diminished, the level of intrusiveness to be slight, and the governmental interests to outweigh the individual's under circumstances such as these. [5]