Opinion ID: 3066075
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: other cipa claims

Text: Seda raises four other claims related to CIPA: the ex parte nature of many of the CIPA proceedings; the potential withholding of additional classified information that is relevant and helpful to the defense; the exclusion of a classified document in his counsel’s possession; and the claim that classified evidence reveals the search warrant was prompted by prior illegal surveillance.
Seda’s broadside challenge to the in camera and ex parte proceedings is a battle already lost in the federal courts.12 Long ago we underscored that “[e]x parte hearings are generally disfavored,” but held that “[i]n a case involving classified documents, however, ex parte, in camera hearings in which government counsel participates to the exclusion of defense counsel are part of the process that the district court may use in order to decide the relevancy of the information.” Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d at 1261. 12 Seda moved to strike the classified, ex parte appellate briefs and excerpts of record filed by the government or, in the alternative, to request access for his security-cleared counsel and expert to the documents. We denied the motion for the same reasons discussed below with regard to the requirements of CIPA. We reviewed the classified briefs and excerpts of record from both parties. 40 UNITED STATES V. SEDAGHATY Seda especially protests three occasions during trial in which the court held closed hearings with cleared counsel for both parties and then excused defense counsel and met ex parte with the prosecutors.13 These brief ex parte hearings, which directly followed the hearings with defense counsel, were held at the court’s request to clarify issues related to the court’s prior CIPA rulings. CIPA does not limit the court’s discretion to hold an ex parte conference if it is required by some overriding necessity such as the necessity to protect sensitive information related to national security, as it was here. See United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1258 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that “situations where the court acts with the benefit of only one side’s presentation are uneasy compromises with some overriding necessity, such as the need to act quickly or to keep sensitive information from the opposing party”). Apart from his general objections to the ex parte proceedings, Seda claims that he should have received more fulsome notice of the subject of the filings and that his security-cleared counsel should have had access to the classified documents in discovery. The government filed six notices informing Seda that it had filed in camera, ex parte submissions to the court. All of these notices apprised Seda that the submissions were filed pursuant to CIPA § 4, thus notifying him that the government requested authorization from the court to withhold items from discovery that were not relevant and helpful to Seda’s defense. 13 For whatever reason, the docket sheet does not reflect these closed hearings. The hearings should have been docketed but the failure to do so is harmless in light of defense counsel’s knowledge of the hearings and the fact that the transcripts are available for appellate review. UNITED STATES V. SEDAGHATY 41 Seda is of the view that the failure of the notices to describe in unclassified terms the nature of what had been provided to the court makes the filings inadequate. Both Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1) and § 4 of CIPA, however, explicitly provide for ex parte filings and do not require that detailed notice of the content of the filing be provided. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1) (“The court may permit a party to show good cause by a written statement that the court will inspect ex parte.”); 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4 (“The court may permit the United States to make a request for such authorization in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the court alone.”). The notices complied with CIPA and were constitutionally adequate—Seda has no due process right to receive a description of materials in the government’s possession that are not discoverable.14 See United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that, in the context of CIPA, as in other discovery in criminal cases, the defendant is “‘not entitled to access to any of the evidence reviewed by the court . . . to assist in his argument’ that it should be disclosed”) (citation omitted). Similarly, the simple fact that defense counsel held security clearances does not mean that the attorneys were entitled to access the government’s classified filings. See United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 568 (5th Cir. 2011) (approving, in the context of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, denial of discovery to cleared defense counsel because of the government’s substantial interest in maintaining secrecy). 14 For the limited material that was discoverable, CIPA § 4 allows the government to either turn over the original material or create an adequate substitution. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4. An adequate substitution obviates the need for counsel to access the underlying classified material itself (although the government may share it with security-cleared defense counsel to craft an appropriate substitution if the nature and classification of the material permits and the government so chooses). 42 UNITED STATES V. SEDAGHATY In sum, the ex parte proceedings were authorized by CIPA, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1), and the compelling justification and overriding necessity required by common law. The proceedings did not violate Seda’s rights. Our careful review of the classified record confirms that all of the classified filings and transcripts of all of the hearings, including the classified ex parte hearings, have been preserved and made available to us on appeal. The district judge, now retired, was meticulous in his review of the classified material.
The district court did not improperly withhold relevant and helpful information from discovery under CIPA § 4 or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1). See Gurolla, 333 F.3d at 951. We have reviewed the government’s classified submissions in their entirety. The bulk of the information the government sought to withhold was not discoverable. Apart from the classified material underlying the inadequate substitution discussed above, those few items that were discoverable were not relevant and helpful to the defense. The defense provided an analysis by Colonel Lang, former head of Human Intelligence for the Department of Defense. Although we credit Colonel Lang’s experience and expertise, his speculation concerning the documents (to which he did not have access) is just that.
Before trial, Seda’s counsel came into possession of a classified document. Counsel took appropriate steps to safeguard access and negotiated an agreement to turn the material over to a Classified Information Security Officer for UNITED STATES V. SEDAGHATY 43 placement in a secure facility in Washington, D.C. After the district court issued what Seda terms a “gag order”— prohibiting counsel from referencing or disclosing the document—Seda sought reconsideration of that order six times. Seda’s counsel also gave notice under CIPA § 5 of its intent to use the classified information at trial. The district court reviewed the material in camera, determined that the material was not relevant to the charges, and denied reconsideration of the protective order.15 Upon reviewing the document and the district court’s in camera determinations with a fresh eye, we affirm the district court’s determination and conclude that there was no violation of CIPA §§ 5–6. See Rewald, 889 F.2d at 847–48 (“[W]e decline [the defendant’s] invitation to undertake an all-encompassing analysis of this issue, and simply confine our review to the relevancy and admissibility of the classified materials. . . .”). The district court’s limited protective order did not violate Seda’s right to counsel or his right to present a defense. See Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 289 (“The right to communicate with counsel at any point in the proceedings is not absolute.”). The order was justified by compelling national security concerns and the restrictions were limited to a single document that was not relevant to the charges. See Morgan v. Bennett, 204 F.3d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he court should not, absent an important need to protect a 15 Seda also raises a concern that government attorneys or agents participated in the district court’s review of the material that was placed in the secure facility. The records and representations of the Classified Information Security Officers entrusted with the material reflect that no one has accessed the documents except the court and the Classified Information Security Officer on one occasion, and the defense counsel together with the Classified Information Security Officer, on another occasion. 44 UNITED STATES V. SEDAGHATY countervailing interest, restrict the defendant’s ability to consult with his attorney, but . . . when such a need is present and is difficult to fulfill in other ways, a carefully tailored, limited restriction on the defendant’s right to consult counsel is permissible.”).
Seda speculates that the classified materials contain evidence of prior unlawful surveillance that led to the search warrant application. The record does not support a claim of taint. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988). The affidavit attached to the warrant detailed the investigation that established probable cause for the search. The investigative interviews, grand jury subpoenas, and other lawful investigative techniques that made up that investigation were the legitimate basis for the decision to seek the warrant.