Opinion ID: 42363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Spence’s Evidentiary Challenges

Text: On appeal, Spence argues that the district court erred by admitting the following hearsay testimony at his supervised release revocation hearing: (1) the allegations of Marcia Buford, Spence’s former wife, relating to the aggravated stalking charge; (2) documents relating to his transfer from Paulding County, Georgia, to a nursing home in Macon, Georgia; and (3) an arrest warrant issued against him for escape. Spence maintains that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by admitting this hearsay testimony. Spence notes that in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed. 2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court held that, under the Confrontation Clause, out-ofcourt testimonial statements by a witness may not be admitted unless the declarant is unavailable, and the defendant previously had an opportunity to cross-examine him. Spence argues that we should hold that Crawford applies to a supervised release revocation hearing. Alternatively, Spence argues that we should determine whether the district court erred by applying the balancing test outlined in United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994) and Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1(b)(2)(C).1 1 Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1(b)(2)(C), a judge must give a defendant at a parole revocation hearing “an opportunity to appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear . . . 3 The applicability of evidentiary rules in supervised release revocation proceedings is a question of law subject to de novo review. United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 112 (11th Cir. 1994). In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that prior testimonial statements may be admitted only if the declarant is unavailable, and the defendant had an earlier opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1374. We have not addressed the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford applies to a supervised release revocation hearing. However, [a]lthough the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in supervised release revocation hearings, the admissibility of hearsay is not automatic. Defendants involved in revocation proceedings are entitled to certain minimal due process requirements. Among these minimal requirements is the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1, which applies to supervised release revocation, incorporates these same minimal due process requirements. Indeed, “[t]he same protections granted those facing revocation of parole are required for those facing the revocation of supervised release.” Thus, in deciding whether or not to admit hearsay testimony, the court must balance the defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses against the grounds asserted by the government for denying confrontation. In addition, the hearsay statement must be reliable. Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. In Frazier, we found that although the district court had erred by failing to .” 4 determine the reliability of the hearsay testimony or conduct the required balancing test, the error was harmless because other properly considered evidence demonstrated that Frazier had breached the terms of his supervised release. Id. We need not determine whether Crawford applies to revocation hearings, nor whether admission of the challenged evidence violated the balancing test set forth in Frazier. As in Frazier, any error was harmless. Even assuming that the evidence challenged by Spence should not have been admitted, the error was harmless because other, uncontested evidence satisfied the elements of aggravated stalking and established that Spence left the jurisdiction without permission.2 Under O.C.G.A. 16-5-91(a): A person commits the offense of aggravated stalking when such person, in violation of a bond to keep the peace posted pursuant to Code Section 17-6-110, temporary restraining order, temporary protective order, permanent restraining order, permanent protective order, preliminary injunction, good behavior bond, or permanent injunction or condition of pretrial release, condition of probation, or condition of parole in effect prohibiting the behavior described in this subsection, follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person. The uncontested evidence related to stalking included the following: (1) Detective Lafay Streetman, who was working with Spence’s parole officer, 2 We note that elsewhere in his brief, Spence’s counsel concedes that “Mr. Spence violated a protective order repeatedly.” Blue Brief at 25. 5 testified that Buford delivered various documents to Streetman that Buford had received through the mail, including legal documents that Spence had filed with the Superior Court of Paulding County and personal letters that either contained Spence’s signature or were signed “your husband.”3 Several of those documents involved Spence’s attempt to divorce his ex-wife, notwithstanding the fact that the two were already divorced. (2) Buford’s permanent protective order was admitted without objection. That protective order stated that Spence was “enjoined and restrained from doing or attempting to do or threatening to do any act of injuring, molesting, maltreating, harassing, harming or abusing the petitioner in any manner and from approaching within 200 yards of the petitioner and from approaching within 200 yards of petitioner’s residence or place of employment.” Revocation Hearing at 47. (3) Spence admitted that he had served Buford with legal documents. (4) The detective testified that Spence had told her he was trying to “resolve” his marriage with Buford. (5) The detective testified that she believed that Buford viewed the mailings as a form of harassment , and that Buford was “taking all this in” and appeared to be “excessively afraid.”4 Even assuming that 3 Streetman testified that she is the lead domestic violence investigator at the Paulding County Sheriff’s Department. 4 Detective Streetman also testified that Buford told her that Buford was so afraid that she had missed work, stayed with her parents, and had begun seeing a doctor who could prescribe medication for her anxiety. 6 all the evidence whose admissibility Spence challenges is inadmissable in a parole revocation hearing, the unchallenged evidence is sufficient to justify the district court’s finding that Spence had committed the felony of aggravated stalking. The court was also justified in finding that Spence had violated the terms of his release by leaving the Northern District of Georgia without authorization from the court or his probation officer. Although Spence challenges the admissibility of certain documents relating to Spence’s transfer from Paulding County custody to a nursing home in Georgia, and to the arrest warrant issued after Spence left the nursing home, Spence does not dispute that he left the nursing home without authorization.5 The probation officer’s petition for revocation of supervised release alleged that Spence was guilty of the crime of escape. As the district court pointed out, regardless of whether Spence is guilty of the crime of escape, the evidence above is sufficient to justify the finding that Spence left the jurisdiction without permission of the court or his parole officer.