Opinion ID: 3012506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Quantity Attributable to Batoon

Text: Batoon also argues that the Government failed to prove that he was responsible for any of the drugs, let alone the one to three kilograms found by the District Court to be the quantity seized from Del Rosario's apartment. We review for clear error the District Court's findings of fact regarding the relevant quantities of drugs attributable to the defendant. United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 214 (3d Cir. 1999). Calculation of the applicable drug amount must be determined on the basis of Batoon's relevant conduct. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual SS 1B1.3, 2D1.1. Relevant conduct includes: (1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense . . . . 51 Id. S 1B1.3(a)(1). The application notes help clarify the definition of relevant conduct. Application note 2 states in part: In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, subsection (a)(1)(B) provides that a defendant is accountable for the conduct (acts and omissions) of others that was both: (i) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; and (ii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity. . . . In determining the scope of the criminal activity that the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant's agreement), the court may consider any explicit agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others. . . . With respect to offenses involving contraband (including controlled substances), the defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook. Id. S 1B1.3, cmt. n.2. Batoon contends that he should not be responsible for the amount of drugs found in Del Rosario's apartment because he did not agree[ ] to jointly undertake in the drug distribution scheme. However, the District Court found Batoon responsible for the full amount of drugs pursuant to S1B1.3(a)(1)(A) because Batoon personally aided and abetted the distribution of methamphetamine by providing security to Del Rosario. Application note 2 explains that a finding of joint undertaking under subsection (a)(1)(B) is not necessary where the defendant 52 personally aids or abets a crime under (a)(1)(A). Id. S 1B1.3, cmt. n.2. In response, Batoon replies that he did not actually agree[ ] to provide such security, and thus, he should not be found responsible under this provision. However, Batoon's argument fails to recognize that the agreement can be explicit or an implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S1B1.3, cmt. n.2. Here, from Batoon's conduct (specifically his remaining in Del Rosario's apartment for a significant amount of time while several others came and went), the District Court found an implied agreement between Del Rosario and Batoon to provide security. I believe it's also a fair inference for the Court to conclude that Mr. Del Rosario did not want to be alone or virtually alone in the apartment with supplies of methamphetamine of this kind while being vested with any number of persons who would be looking for drugs. . . . [T]he presence of confidants in Mr. Del Rosario, such as, Mr. Batoon, . . . certainly had the effect of providing some level of security to Mr. Del Rosario . . . . Furthermore, Batoon can be found responsible for the full amount of drugs pursuant to S1B1.3(a)(1)(B) because the full amount of drugs present in the apartment and Batoon's conduct were (i) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; and (ii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 1B1.3, cmt. n.2. Batoon's conduct was in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity because, as already noted and among other things, evidence exists that he provided security for Del Rosario while distributing the drugs. The full amount was reasonably foreseeable to Batoon because he was in the apartment for an extended period of time while the drugs were being distributed, and there was information circulating that a large shipment had arrived from the Philippines. With the above in mind, it cannot be said that the District Court committed clear error in attributing the 53 entire amount of the drugs to Batoon as he is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook. Id.; see also Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 214-15 (holding that appellant who acted as enforcer was responsible at sentencing for all of the drugs distributed during the time he was an enforcer).