Opinion ID: 874783
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: To ultimately convict Howard of the felony DUI enhancement would require retrying him in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy.

Text: The State argues that even if double jeopardy has been triggered, Howard can still be convicted of the felony DUI without being retried. The State argues, in effect, that the district court already found Howard guilty of the enhancement; therefore, the district court's finding of guilt can be reinstated if we find that the California Judgment was properly admitted and proved by complying with I.R.E. 902(4). The State's argument relies on the opening sentence of the analysis section of the district court's order: If admissibility under the Idaho Rules of Evidence were the end of the inquiry, Howard would be guilty of [the felony DUI enhancement], due to the admission of [the two judgments of conviction]. It is established that double jeopardy does not bar the appeal of an acquittal in cases where a jury first returned a guilty verdict. In Smith v. Massachusetts , the United States Supreme Court explained: When a jury returns a verdict of guilty and a trial judge (or an appellate court) sets aside that verdict and enters a judgment of acquittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a prosecution appeal to reinstate the jury verdict of guilty. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-353 [95 S.Ct. 1013, 1026, 43 L.Ed.2d 232, 246-247] (1975). But if the prosecution has not yet obtained a conviction, further proceedings to secure one are impermissible: [S]ubjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 [106 S.Ct. 1745, 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 116, 122] (1986). 543 U.S. 462, 467, 125 S.Ct. 1129, 1134, 160 L.Ed.2d 914, 922-23 (2005). In a bench trial, there is an analogous situation wherein double jeopardy does not bar the appeal of an acquittal. In United States v. Jenkins, the Court explained: A general finding of guilt by a judge may be analogized to a verdict of `guilty' returned by a jury. Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 584 (1st Cir.1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 658 [56 S.Ct. 383, 80 L.Ed. 468] (1936). In a case tried to a jury, the distinction between the jury's verdict of guilty and the court's ruling on questions of law is easily perceived. In a bench trial, both functions are combined in the judge, and a general finding of `not guilty' may rest either on the determination of facts in favor of a defendant or on the resolution of a legal question favorably to him. If the court prepares special findings of fact, either because the Government or the defendant requested them or because the judge has elected to make them sua sponte, it may be possible upon sifting those findings to determine that the court's finding of `not guilty' is attributable to an erroneous conception of the law whereas the court has resolved against the defendant all of the factual issues necessary to support a finding of guilt under the correct legal standard. 420 U.S. 358, 366-67, 95 S.Ct. 1006, 1011-12, 43 L.Ed.2d 250, 257-58 (1975), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (emphases added). While the district court's statement strongly suggests that it would have found Howard guilty, this statement is not enough. It is not a general finding of guilt analogous to a jury verdict of guilty, nor is it a formal finding of guilt. Rather, it is dicta. The district court did not prepare special findings of fact on the elements of the felony DUI enhancement. Thus, even though the district court's statements strongly suggest that it would have done so, we are not able to determine that the district court actually resolved all facts necessary to support a finding of guilt against the defendant, and are not able to determine that the court's finding of not guilty is solely attributable to an erroneous interpretation of law. In Jenkins, the United States Supreme Court held that the district court did not reach a general finding of guilt that could be reinstated if the government prevailed on appeal, noting that [e]ven if the District Court were to receive no additional evidence, it would still be necessary for it to make supplemental findings. 420 U.S. at 370, 95 S.Ct. at 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d at 259. Since Jenkins, the Court has continued to require a general finding of guilt by the trial court in order for this type of appeal to avoid the double jeopardy bar. In Lee v. United States, the Court found that strong statements of guilt made by the trial court did not amount to a general finding of guilt. 432 U.S. 23, 28 n. 4, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 2144 n. 4, 53 L.Ed.2d 80, 86 n. 4 (1977). The Court stated: Both sides assume that the District Court's statements, made to justify denial of Lee's motion for judgment of acquittal, that he had been proven (sic) beyond any reasonable doubt in the world and that there was no question about his guilt; none whatsoever, ... do not amount to a general finding of guilt. We agree that the court's comments, in the context in which they were made, cannot be viewed fairly as a general finding of guilt analogous to a jury verdict. Id. (emphasis added). In Finch v. United States, the Court held that double jeopardy barred appealing the district court's dismissal for failure to state an offense even where the parties stipulated to the facts, because no formal finding of guilt or innocence had been entered. 433 U.S. 676, 677, 97 S.Ct. 2909, 2910, 53 L.Ed.2d 1048, 1050 (1977). The Court explained that, [a]bsent a plea of guilty or nolo contendere ..., a verdict or general finding of guilt by the trial court is a necessary predicate to conviction. Id. We hold that double jeopardy bars Howard from being convicted of the felony DUI enhancement. The district court's order does not contain special findings of fact that enable this Court to determine that the district court entered a general finding of guilt on the felony DUI charge that could be reinstated on remand. If we were to remand to the district court with instructions that the California Judgment need not comply with either I.C. § 9-312 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 in order to be admitted and proved, the district court may not need additional evidence, but because there were no specific findings of guilt as to the factual elements of the offense, the district court would have to make such findings in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy.