Opinion ID: 1057814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proper Analysis of Whether Claim is Barred

Text: 1 Under the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, [a]n employee subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act cannot file an independent tort action against his employer or any fellow employee for injuries received in the course of employment. Hudson v. Jarrett, 269 Va. 24, 29, 606 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2005). Contractors, subcontractors, and all workers who are engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of the owner of a project are deemed to be statutory fellow employees. Nichols v. VVKR, Inc., 241 Va. 516, 519, 403 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1991); Code § 65.2-302. The remedy for any injury suffered by any one of them as a result of the alleged negligence of another, while engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of the owner, is limited to that available under the Workers' Compensation Act. Nichols, 241 Va. at 519, 403 S.E.2d at 700. 8 In determining whether a claim is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act, the Court must determine whether the estate alleges an injury that occurred out of and in the course of Gibbs' employment, not whether a claim under the Act would have been subject to a defense rendering it non-compensable. Giordano v. McBar Indus., 284 Va. 259, 264, 729 S.E.2d 130, 133 (2012) When an employee is injured in a work-related accident, the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act provides the sole and exclusive remedy available. Rasnick v. Pittston Co., 237 Va. 658, 660, 379 S.E.2d 353, 354 (1989); Code § 65.2-307(A). An injury is subject to the exclusivity provision of the Act if it is the result of an accident and arises out of and in the course of the employment. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Hazelwood, 249 Va. 369, 372, 457 S.E.2d 56, 58 (1995). Put simply, when an injury falls within the purview of Code § 65.2-300, the exclusivity provision applies. Giordano, 284 Va. at 264, 729 S.E.2d at 133. The analysis of whether the claim made by Gibbs' estate falls within the purview of the Act, therefore, begins with a determination of whether the injury resulting in his death was sustained in the course of employment. Id. This is so because as Code § 65.2-300(A) expressly states, [e]very employer and employee, except as herein stated, shall be conclusively 9 presumed to have accepted the provisions of this title respectively to pay and accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment and shall be bound thereby. Furthermore, [e]xcept as otherwise provided herein, no contract or agreement, written or implied, and no rule, regulation or other device shall in any manner operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by this title. Code § 65.2-300(A). While the majority acknowledges that employers are conclusively presumed to have accepted the provisions of the Act, the majority summarily holds that the Navy could not have accepted the provisions of the Virginia Act because  'the Supremacy Clause immunizes the activities of the Federal Government from state interference.'  (quoting Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 181 n.1 (1988)). 2 If a claim were filed against the Navy under the Virginia Act, the Navy could undoubtedly defend against it on the grounds that the claim is preempted by a conflicting federal act 3 or that the United States 2 The majority states that no party contends that the Navy had accepted the provisions of the Act. To the contrary, the Shipyard asserts that the Act has neither excluded nor exempted the Navy or its employees from the Act. 3 The preemption doctrine, rooted in the Supremacy Clause, requires an examination of congressional intent to supersede state law. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982). The intent to preempt state law may be express, or inferred because [t]he scheme of federal regulation 10 is protected from suit by sovereign immunity. The fact that the claim is subject to a defense, though, does not affect the applicability of the Act to the Navy's employees. [A] successfully asserted defense under the Act may render a particular claim non-compensable; however, there is a significant difference between a claim arising within the purview of the Act that is subject to defenses and a claim that is not within the purview of the Act at all. In the former case, there is no recourse to common law remedies; in the latter case, there is. Adams v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 261 Va. 594, 599, 544 S.E.2d 354, 356 (2001). More specifically, the fact that the United States is shielded from liability arising out of the death of a federal employee in any type of proceeding, may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, because the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject, or because the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The Supremacy Clause does not, in and of itself, grant immunity to the federal government. Nor is the Virginia Act invalidated by the Supremacy Clause. Rather, if the Navy asserted the claim was barred under the Supremacy Clause, the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission would be required to determine whether enforcement of the Act against the Navy would be precluded by a federal act. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic, 486 U.S. at 182-186 (application of state workers' compensation law provision to federal facility not barred by Supremacy Clause where federal law empowered states to apply workers' compensation laws to federal premises); McCotter v. Smithfield Packing Co., 849 F. Supp. 443, 447 (E.D. Va. 1994) (Federal Employees' Compensation Act does not exempt federal employees from the [Virginia Workers' Compensation Act]). 11 including a proceeding brought under a state workers' compensation act . . . has no effect on the liability of a third party who asserts the exclusivity of a state workers' compensation scheme to shield it from liability. McCotter v. Smithfield Packing Co., 849 F. Supp. 443, 447 (E.D. Va. 1994). Thus, the fact that the Navy is entitled to defend against a claim under the Virginia Act on federal law preemption or sovereign immunity grounds does not affect whether the claim falls within the purview of the Act. The majority's sweeping contention that the Act has no application to the federal government, and the Navy in particular, is inconsistent with the position taken by the federal government, including the Navy, in prior cases in which it has sought protection under the Virginia Act's exclusivity provision. See, e.g., Pendley v. United States, 856 F.2d 699, 702 (4th Cir. 1988)(United States Air Force deemed statutory employer under Virginia Act); Hose v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150-52 (D. D.C. 2009) (State Department deemed statutory employer under Virginia Act); Coulter v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 484, 489-90 (E.D. Va. 2003) (United States Marine Corps deemed statutory employer under Virginia Act); Perry v. United States, 882 F. Supp. 537, 539-40 (E.D. Va. 1995) (United States Navy deemed 12 statutory employer under Virginia Act); Hyman v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 905, 906-08 (E.D. Va. 1992) (same). 4