Opinion ID: 1292293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Government's Firearms Identification Expert

Text: Spent bullets, cartridge casings, and bullet fragments were recovered from the scene of the triple homicide and the victims' bodies. A subsequent search of Michael's apartment in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania turned up two handguns, one of which was a 9mm Bryco semiautomatic pistol. Shortly thereafter, this and other ballistics evidence was turned over to Michelle Kuehner, a firearms examiner in the Forensic Laboratory Division of the Allegheny County Coroner's Office (the Forensic Lab). Upon comparing the ballistics evidence recovered from the crime scene and the victims' bodies with bullets and cartridge casings produced from a test firing of the 9mm Bryco, Kuehner concluded there was a match. [1] Before trial, the government placed Bobby and Michael on notice that it intended to call Kuehner as an expert witness. Michael moved for a pretrial Daubert hearing to challenge Kuehner's testimony, [2] contending that the government had yet to establish its admissibility under Fed.R.Evid. 702. In an order dated December 22, 2004, the district court denied the motion without a hearing. It reasoned: Judge Marrero of this Court has recently upheld the use of ballistics as reliable under Rule 702. See United States v. Santiago, 199 F.Supp.2d 101, 111-12 (S.D.N.Y.2002). The Supreme Court has likewise cited ballistics as a proper subject of expert testimony because it aids the jury in understanding the evidence. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-313 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413] (1998) (unlike expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the juror's knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth); see also United States v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375, 376 n. 1 (D.Md.2004) (stating that, [i]n the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification, and collecting cases); [ United States v. O'Driscoll, No. 4:CR-10-277, 2003 WL 1402040, at  (M.D.Pa. Feb.10, 2003)] (the field of ballistics is a proper subject for expert testimony and meets the requirements of Rule 702.). . . . Defendants have not offered any reason for us to depart from the reasoning of these cases. Accordingly, the request for a Daubert hearing to challenge the government's proposed ballistics . . . evidence is denied. Williams, 2004 WL 2980027, at . At trial, the government called Kuehner as an expert. She testified first about her background. Kuehner stated that she had served as a firearms examiner within the firearms section of the Forensic Lab for approximately twelve years. She testified that, in addition to the hands-on training she received from her section supervisor, Dr. Robert Levine, she attended seminars on firearms identification, including annual workshops put on by the Association of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners (the AFTE) where firearms examiners from the United States and the international community gather to present papers on current topics within the field. Kuehner also explained that she and Dr. Levine published a paper in the AFTE Journal matching a bullet to the cartridge case from which it was discharged. Kuehner further stated that she has given presentations on the subject of firearms analysis at several AFTE meetings and for Duquesne University's forensic science and law programs. In addition, Kuehner testified that she had examined approximately 2,800 different types of firearms and provided expert testimony on between 20 and 30 occasions. After establishing her background, training, and experience, Kuehner went on to testify that she uses a firearms identification methodology that is a subset of a broader forensic discipline referred to as toolmark identification. Toolmark examiners are trained to examine the marks left by tools on a variety of surfaces in an attempt to match a toolmark to the particular tool that made it. Firearms, she explained, are simply the tools that impart marks on bullets and cartridge cases. [3] Kuehner then testified as to how the methodology enables her to determine whether a given sample of ballistics component [4] was fired from the same gun. She starts by examining the components' class characteristics. A spent bullet's class characteristics include its caliber, the number of its land and groove impressions, [5] the twist of its land and groove impressions, and the width of its land and groove impressions. Class characteristics, Kuehner explained, allow her to narrow the universe of firearm possibilities to certain types of guns made by certain manufacturers. For example, a spent 9mm bullet exhibiting six land and groove impressions could only have been expelled from a firearm with a 9mm gun barrel that has six lands and grooves. Once Kuehner narrows the firearms possibilities by class, she looks for specific random, microscopic imperfections in the barrel caused by changes in the manufacturing tool as it makes each barrel on the production line. These imperfections in turn leave unique striations on each bullet as it moves through the barrel. It is her examination of these unique marks, Kuehner testified, that allows her to determine whether two bullets were fired from the same gun. Using a comparison microscope to view the two bullets side-by-side, she compares the height, depth, width, length and spatial relations of their striations. Significant similarity between striations signals an identification or a match  that is, the bullets were fired from the same firearm. The striations need not be identical; they need only be in sufficient agreement based on Kuehner's training and experience. She explained: So I am looking at the number of striations, . . . their physical characteristics, their height, [and] their depth. And when the pattern of agreement exceeds the amount of agreement that I know exists in two bullets that have not been fired from the same firearm, then that is sufficient agreement.    You can't really put numbers to it. It's more, more coming from experience, so, which is why . . . you test bullets. So sufficient agreement meaning that you have enough agreement [between the striations on the bullets] than those that you know do not match. Kuehner testified that, based on comparison of striations, there are two conclusions she may reach other than a match. She can make an eliminat[ion], concluding that the two bullets were not fired from the same gun. Or, she can make an inconclusive determination, meaning that, although the bullets exhibit similar class characteristics, there is not enough agreement or disagreement between their striations to conclude whether they were or were not fired from the same gun. Kuehner further explained that after she performs her examination, she documents her conclusions in a report, which Dr. Levine reviews. Based on her analysis in this case, Kuehner concluded that certain bullets and cartridge casings recovered from the crime scene and the victims' bodies matched those she produced by test firing the 9mm Bryco. Bobby now challenges the district court's decision to permit Kuehner to testify as an expert. We understand his argument to be that the district court abused its discretion by (1) denying him a Daubert hearing and (2) failing to undertake an adequate inquiry into the reliability of Kuehner's firearms identification methodology. The government counters that the district court acted within its discretion under the circumstances and that any error was harmless. [6] We review the district court's decision to admit expert testimony under Rule 702 for abuse of discretion. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). A decision to admit scientific evidence is not an abuse of discretion unless it is manifestly erroneous. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 129 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). A. Gatekeeping under Daubert While the proponent of expert testimony has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the admissibility requirements of Rule 702 are satisfied, see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 n. 10, 113 S.Ct. 2786, the district court is the ultimate gatekeeper. See Fed.R.Evid. 104(a); United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir.2004); see also Brooks v. Outboard Marine Corp., 234 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir.2000) (rejecting argument that opposing expert testimony is necessary to trigger the district court's obligation to analyze admissibility of expert testimony). The Federal Rules of Evidence assign to it the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786. In assessing reliability, the district court should consider the indicia of reliability identified in Rule 702, namely, (1) that the testimony is grounded on sufficient facts or data; (2) that the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) that the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). But these criteria are not exhaustive. See Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir.2004). Daubert enumerated a list of additional factors bearing on reliability that district courts may consider: (1) whether a theory or technique has been or can be tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the technique's known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and (4) whether a particular technique or theory has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786.  Daubert 's list of specific factors, however, neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167. Rather, the district court's inquiry into the reliability of expert testimony under Rule 702 is a flexible one. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Accordingly, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142, 119 S.Ct. 1167. Yet while the district court's discretion is considerable, it is not unfettered: It does not permit the district court to perform the [gatekeeping] function inadequately. Id. at 158-59, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the majority opinion makes clear that the discretion it endorses  trial-court discretion in choosing the manner of testing expert reliability  is not discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function). As an initial matter, we reject Bobby's contention that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for a hearing. While the gatekeeping function requires the district court to ascertain the reliability of Kuehner's methodology, it does not necessarily require that a separate hearing be held in order to do so. See id. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (district courts possess latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability); see also United States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir.2000) (Nowhere . . . does the Supreme Court mandate the form that the inquiry into . . . reliability must take. . . .). This is particularly true if, at the time the expert testimony is presented to the jury, a sufficient basis for allowing the testimony is on the record. See 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.02[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.2006). The remaining question, then, is whether there was a sufficient foundational basis in the record to support the trial court's decision to admit Kuehner as an expert? First, the district court noted with approval the decision in Santiago rejecting a challenge to the reliability of the government expert's firearms identification methodology as pseudo-science. 199 F.Supp.2d at 111. The Santiago court stated that the government had submitted a letter describing, among other things, the method that the expert used to match particular guns to the bullets in question. Id. Moreover, the preliminary ruling below in Santiago had accepted that much of the reliability inquiry would occur when the government laid the foundation preliminary to the district court's admitting the expert's testimony. See 199 F.Supp.2d at 112 (noting that in addition to expecting the government to ask about the expert's training, experience, qualifications, and the methods he used to match the bullets with the guns in question, the court was interested to learn how often [the expert's] identifications have been wrong in the past and the degree to which his methodology has been accepted in the community of forensics experts). We think that Daubert was satisfied here. When the district court denied a separate hearing it went through the exercise of considering the use of ballistic expert testimony in other cases. Then, before the expert's testimony was presented to the jury, the government provided an exhaustive foundation for Kuehner's expertise including: her service as a firearms examiner for approximately twelve years; her receipt of hands-on training from her section supervisor; attendance at seminars on firearms identification, where firearms examiners from the United States and the international community gather to present papers on current topics within the field; publication of her writings in a peer review journal; her obvious expertise with toolmark identification; her experience examining approximately 2,800 different types of firearms; and her prior expert testimony on between 20 and 30 occasions. Under the circumstances, we are satisfied that the district court effectively fulfilled its gatekeeping function under Daubert. The trial court's admission of Kuehner's testimony constituted an implicit determination that there was a sufficient basis for doing so. The formality of a separate hearing was not required and we find no abuse of discretion. We do not wish this opinion to be taken as saying that any proffered ballistic expert should be routinely admitted. Daubert did make plain that Rule 702 embodies a more liberal standard of admissibility for expert opinions than did Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923). See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (holding that the Frye test of general acceptance in the scientific community was superceded by the Federal Rules); see also Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 265 (observing departure, under Federal Rule, from the Frye standard). But this shift to a more permissive approach to expert testimony did not abrogate the district court's gatekeeping function. Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396 (2d Cir.2005). Nor did it grandfather or protect from Daubert scrutiny evidence that had previously been admitted under Frye. See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir.2003) (Michael, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Saelee, 162 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1105 (D.Alaska 2001) ([T]he fact that [expert] evidence has been generally accepted in the past by courts does not mean that it should be generally accepted now, after Daubert and Kumho [Tire]. ). Thus, expert testimony long assumed reliable before Rule 702 must nonetheless be subject to the careful examination that Daubert and Kumho Tire require. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (explaining that Rule 702 requires district courts to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable); id. at 592 n, 11, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on `novel' scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence. Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended.); see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (explaining that whether a witness's area of expertise is technical, scientific, or more generally experience-based, Rule 702 requires the district court to fulfill the gatekeeping function of ensuring that his or her testimony is reliable). Because the district court's inquiry here did not stop when the separate hearing was denied, but went on with an extensive consideration of the expert's credentials and methods, the jury could, if it chose to do so, rely on her testimony which was relevant to the issues in the case. We find that the gatekeeping function of Daubert was satisfied and that there was no abuse of discretion.