Opinion ID: 2600307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Vagueness of Asportation Element of Simple Kidnapping

Text: Defendant contends the asportation element of simple kidnapping under section 207, requiring movement of a substantial distance, was impermissibly vague under the [statutory] construction that existed at the time of his 1994 offense and 1996 trial, in violation of our state and federal Constitutions. (U.S. Const., Amends. 8 & 14; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7 & 15.) [6] We disagree. Section 207, originally enacted in 1872, delineated what is today called simple kidnapping and merely restated the common law, which required that the victim be moved across county or state lines. [Citations.] ( People v. Nguyen (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872, 882, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 997 P.2d 493.) Section 207, subdivision (a), now provides, and at the time of defendant's crimes provided, that [e]very person who forcibly, or by any other means of instilling fear, steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any person in this state, and carries the person into another country, state, or county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping. The language `into another part of the same county' was added in 1905 in response to Ex parte Keil (1890) 85 Cal. 309[, 24 P. 742], in which this court held that the forcible removal of a person 20 miles from San Pedro to Santa Catalina Island, both in Los Angeles County, was not kidnapping within the meaning of the statute as it existed at that time. [Citations.] ( People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 8, fn. 3, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369 ( Rayford ).) The trial court instructed defendant's jury that [e]very person who unlawfully and with physical force or by any other means of instilling fear, steals or takes or holds ... another person, and carries such person without her consent, compels any other person without her consent, and because of a reasonable apprehension of harm, to move for a substantial distance, that is, a distance more than slight or trivial, is guilty of the crime of kidnapping in violation of Penal Code section 207(a). (CALJIC No. 9.50, italics added.) The constitutional interest implicated in questions of statutory vagueness is that no person be deprived of `life, liberty, or property without due process of law,' as assured by both the federal Constitution (U.S. Const., Amends. V, XIV) and the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7). Under both Constitutions, due process of law in this context requires two elements: a criminal statute must `be definite enough to provide (1) a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed and (2) a standard for police enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt.' [Citations.] ( Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 341, 853 P.2d 507.) This court has recognized the strong presumption that legislative enactments 'must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.] A statute ... cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.' ( Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 143, 253 Cal.Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852.) Therefore, a party must do more than identify some instances in which the application of the statute may be uncertain or ambiguous; he must demonstrate that `the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.' [Citation.] ( Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1201, 246 Cal.Rptr. 629, 753 P.2d 585.) Stated differently, `[a] statute is not void simply because there may be difficulty in determining whether some marginal or hypothetical act is covered by its language.' [Citation.] ( People v. Ervin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1329, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 231.) The law is replete with instances in which a person must, at his peril, govern his conduct by such nonmathematical standards as 'reasonable,' `prudent,' `necessary and proper,' `substantial,' and the like. Indeed, a wide spectrum of human activities is regulated by such terms: thus one man may be given a speeding ticket if he overestimates the `reasonable or prudent' speed to drive his car in the circumstances (Veh.Code, § 22350), while another may be incarcerated in state prison on a conviction of wilful homicide if he misjudges the `reasonable' amount of force he may use in repelling an assault [citation]. As the Supreme Court stated in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States (1931) 282 U.S. 344, 357[, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374], `There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness.' Yet standards of this kind are not impermissively vague, provided their meaning can be objectively ascertained by reference to common experiences of mankind. ( People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1128-1129, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225.) A sister state's opinion found substantial distance a constitutionally sufficient requirement when considering a similar asportation statutory requirement. In 1977, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered a constitutional challenge to the use of the word substantial when modifying the noun distance in the context of that state's kidnapping statute. ( State v. Motsko (N.D.1977) 261 N.W.2d 860.) In concluding the word substantial in that context did not render the kidnapping statute unconstitutionally vague, the court concluded that substantial acquires precision according to the term it modifies as an adjective.... As used in [the kidnapping statute], it means `significant,' [or] `important,' ... as distinguished from `insignificant,' `trivial,' [or] `nominal'....' Thus, if a complainant was moved a `significant' or `important'as distinguished from `trivial'distance and her liberty was interfered with in a real, important, or significant way, the [North Dakota kidnapping] statute would be satisfied. ( Id. at p. 865.) We reach a similar conclusion. We are convinced that, in the context of our simple kidnapping statute, where the adjective substantial modifies the noun distance, the word substantial means a significant amount as contrasted with a distance that is trivial, and that the phrase substantial distance meets the constitutional requirement of reasonable certainty. Moreover, case law in effect at the time of defendant's offense provided adequate guidance as to what distances would be considered substantial under the simple kidnapping statute. ( People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 573-574, 146 Cal. Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274 ( Caudillo ), overruled in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 235-238, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512 & fn. 6 ( Martinez) ) In Caudillo, we used an earlier case in which the victim was moved 200 feet as an example of sufficient distance to sustain a conviction for simple kidnapping. ( Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 573-574, 146 Cal. Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274, citing People v. Stender (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 413, 423, 121 Cal.Rptr. 334 ( Stender ).) Our citation to' Stender in Caudillo provided defendant with adequate and fair warning that moving his female victim against her will for a distance of more than 200 feet was prohibited. On the other hand, at the time of defendant's offense, we had stated that forcibly moving someone 90 feet did not amount to a taking `into another part of the same county' and hence would be insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction of simple kidnapping. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 67, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468 ( Green ), overruled in Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th 225, 83 Cal. Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512) In light of our statements in Caudillo and Green, defendant had fair notice of what was and what was not proscribed under our statute for simple kidnapping at the time of his offense. We therefore reject defendant's vagueness challenge to the term substantial distance as set forth in the definition of simple kidnapping at the time of his offenses. In turn, we conclude that the term substantial was not so vague in the context of the kidnapping law at the time of defendant's trial to violate due process or constitute cruel or unusual punishment.