Opinion ID: 52675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Corredor’s Challenge to the 22 June 2006 Order

Text: Corredor first challenges the BIA’s 22 June 2006 final order, in which the BIA dismissed her appeal and agreed that she had failed to establish eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal or protection under CAT. Corredor maintains that she did establish her eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal and CAT relief, and that therefore BIA’s 22 June 2006 final order was erroneous. Because Corredor failed to seek judicial review of the 22 June 2006 order within the 30-day window mandated by the INA, however, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider her challenge to the merits of the 22 June 2006 order. Under the plain language of the INA, a petitioner seeking asylum or withholding of removal may seek judicial review of a final order “not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). An order “shall become final . . . upon dismissal of an appeal by the [BIA].” 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a). “Since the statutory limit for filing a petition for 6 review in an immigration proceeding is mandatory and jurisdictional, it is not subject to equitable tolling.” Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1272 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotations omitted). In addition, the finality of a removal order is not affected by the filing of a motion to reconsider. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S. Ct. 1537, 1549 (1995). Here, the BIA dismissed Corredor’s appeal of the IJ’s decision on 22 June 2006, thereby rendering the order of removal a “final order” for purposes of the INA. Corredor was required to seek judicial review of that final order “not later than 30 days after the date [of the order].” INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Corredor, however, did not seek review of the final order until she filed the present petition for review with this court, on 29 September 2006, plainly in excess of the 30-day time period mandated by the INA. Nor did Corredor’s intervening motion to reconsider toll the deadline for filing a petition for review with this court. See Stone, 514 U.S. at 405, 115 S. Ct. at 1549. Accordingly, we conclude that Corredor’s petition for review of the 22 June 2006 final order was untimely, and that we therefore lack jurisdiction to address the merits of the BIA’s decision denying her asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See, e.g., Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1272 n.3 (declining to consider the merits of the BIA’s final decision due to a lack of jurisdiction, where the petitioner 7 filed her petition for review more than 30 days after the BIA’s final order emanated); Narayan v. INS, 105 F.3d 1335 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). To the extent Corredor seeks review of the BIA’s 22 June 2006 order, we dismiss that portion of her petition for lack of jurisdiction. B. Corredor’s Challenge to the 31 August 2006 Order Corredor also challenges the BIA’s order of 31 August 2006 denying her motion to reconsider its earlier order. Although she contends that the order denying her motion to reconsider was erroneous, her petition for review fails to establish how it was erroneous, other than by reiterating her argument that she was persecuted on account of her political opinion, thereby demonstrating her eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. After reiterating her contention that the IJ erred in concluding otherwise, she states simply that “[t]he BIA also erred in denying the motion to reconsider.” Br. of Pet’r at 13. “This court reviews the BIA’s denial of a petitioner’s motion to reopen [a] deportation order for abuse of discretion.” Gbaya v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 342 F.3d 1219, 1220 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citation, quotations, and alteration omitted). See also Assa’ad v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that the decision to grant a motion to reconsider is “within the discretion of the [BIA]”) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a)). We have stated that “[i]n this 8 particular area, the BIA’s decision is quite broad.” Gbaya, 342 F.3d at 1220 (citation and quotations omitted). On appeal, our review is “limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion” and whether the manner in which it was exercised “has been arbitrary or capricious.” Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by “specify[ing] the errors of fact or law in the previous [BIA] order, and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” INA § 240(c)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). In this case, Corredor’s motion to reconsider did not specify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s final order adopting the IJ’s decision. Rather, as the BIA observed, Corredor’s motion to reconsider simply reiterated her argument that she had suffered past persecution on account of a political opinion–an argument that the BIA had already considered and rejected. Because Corredor’s motion to reconsider failed to specify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision, the BIA’s 31 August 2006 denial of her motion to reconsider was neither arbitrary nor capricious.