Opinion ID: 75555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Wastewater Treatment System

Text: 121 Hansen contends that the instructions allowed the jury to convict him under the CERCLA release offenses without a finding that he knew the quantity of the materials released or was meaningfully in charge at the time of the release. Taylor argues that, because the instruction failed to include the definition of tank, it allowed the jury to consider the cellroom as a part of the wastewater treatment system. In his request for a charge as to Counts 35 through 40, Hansen asked that the jury be instructed that it could not convict him unless he was the person in charge at the time of the release and knew that the released hazardous materials exceeded the applicable reportable quantity. R4-98, Request to Charge No. 23. 38 The district judge instructed the jury: 122 Now Counts 35 through 41 charge the Defendants, Mr. Christian Hansen and Mr. Taylor with violations of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, which is known by the acronym CERCLA, which requires the immediate reporting of the release of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance into the environment. 123 . . . 124 To establish a violation of this Act, as alleged in Counts 35 through 41, the Government must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt as to each Defendant: 125 First, that the Defendant was one of the persons in charge of a facility; 126 With respect to Counts 35 to 40, that a reportable quantity of mercury contaminated wastewater-that is, more than one pound of wastewater contaminated with mercury and other hazardous substances-was released into the environment within a 24 hour period; 127 As to count 41, that a reportable quantity of chlorine-that is, in excess of 10 pounds-was released into the environment within a 24 hour period; and 128 That the Defendant under consideration failed to notify immediately the National Response Center of the release of such materials as soon as he had knowledge of the release. 129 CERCLA's reporting requirements are not extended to all employees involved in a release. The reporting requirements apply to any person-even if of relatively low rank-who was in a position to detect, prevent, and abate a release of the hazardous substances. 130 . . . 131 A person in charge's control over a facility need not be sole or exclusive. There may be several persons in charge of the same facility. It is only necessary that the individual have or share such control of the facility where the release occurred. 132 R22-201-02. 133 In clarifying the definition of operator under CERCLA, the Supreme Court instructs that an operator is simply someone who directs the workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility . . . specifically related to pollution, that is operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental regulations. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66-67, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1887 (1998). The district court's instructions required that the jury find that the defendant under consideration knew of the release and knew that the release contained hazardous waste, and failed to report it. 134 There is no indication in the record that Taylor requested an instruction on the definition of tank. Hansen requested an instruction on the existence of the wastewater treatment exemption to the 90-day labeling and disposal period. 39 R22-68-69. The judge subsequently included such an instruction: 135 Tanks which are part of a wastewater treatment system that is subject to regulation under the CWA need not have a RCRA permit so long as they are used for the treatment of wastewater. Therefore, wastewater which is being held temporarily in such tanks is not subject to these RCRA permitting requirements. 136 Id. at 199. 137 A tank is defined by the regulations as a stationary device, designed to contain an accumulation of hazardous waste which is constructed primarily of non-earthen materials (e.g. wood, concrete, steel, plastic) which provide structural support. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10. Although Taylor maintains that the instruction would have helped the jury understand that the cellroom was a tank and part of the wastewater system, the evidence showed that the berms, used in the cellroom to contain the wastewater, were constructed of dirt. R19-256. Taylor neither requested a definition of tank in the instructions nor was prejudiced by the failure to of the court to provide it. E. Sentencing Guidelines 138 We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo. United States v. Quinn, 123 F.3d 1415, 1424 (11th Cir. 1997). 1. Downward Departure 139
140 Hansen argues that the district court erred by concluding that it lacked the authority to depart under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. He maintains that, at a minimum, the district court was ambiguous as to whether it believed that it had the authority to grant a downward departure and that any ambiguity must be resolved in his favor. 40 141 At sentencing, Hansen argued, inter alia, that he should be granted a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 because the factors of the case took it outside of the heartland of cases to which the guidelines apply. R13-5-8. He argued that a departure was warranted because the government agencies monitored and knew of the environmental violations, and that this situation was not where Congress intended to impose the high penalties for environmental violations. Id. at 6. After sentencing Hansen, the district judge stated that he d[id] not really find any actual basis for a departure from the guidelines, even though I might, if I had discretion, found otherwise. Id. at 52. 142 We generally may not review the merits of a district court's refusal to grant a downward departure, [but] may conduct a de novo review of a defendant's claim that the district court mistakenly believed it lacked the authority to grant such a departure. United States v. Mignott, 184 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Where the district court expresses ambivalence about its authority to depart from the guidelines, we review the record to determine the district court's understanding. See United States v. Webb, 139 F.3d 1390, 1394-95 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that our independent review of the sentencing transcript reveals that the sentencing judge, at the very least, was bewildered and ambivalent as to whether the guidelines authorized a downward departure and that on balance, . . . the record more strongly suggests that the court believed that it was not authorized to depart downward.). If there is no indication that the district court misapprehended its authority, we assume that the sentencing court understood it had authority to depart downward. United States v. Chase, 174 F.3d 1193, 1195 (11th Cir. 1999). 143 Hansen was sentenced after Randall. During Randall's sentencing hearing, the district judge acknowledged his authority to depart. R9-9. Hansen's sentencing transcript shows that the district judge permitted extensive discussion of whether the circumstances of Hansen's case were outside the heartland of cases to which the guidelines had been applied, and that neither party argued that the district court lacked the authority to depart downward. There is nothing in the record that shows that the district court misapprehended its authority to depart downward. Therefore, we assume the sentencing court understood its discretionary authority to grant a downward departure but decided not to exercise that authority. Id. at 1195. Because the district court understood that it had the authority to depart, we are unable to review the district court's denial of Hansen's request for a downward departure. 144
145 Randall contends that the district court erred in not granting his requests for a downward departure under §§ 5K2.0 and under 5K2.11. As to a departure under § 5K2.0, he argues that his case fell outside the heartland of other environmental prosecutions and that he was at all times operating under the authority of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and upon the advice of his environmental counsel. As to a departure under § 5K2.11, he maintains that the district court erred in concluding that financial factors were not a perceived greater harm which could trigger a departure and in not understanding that the record supported his belief that a greater environmental, as well as economic, harm would occur at the site and in the community if the plant failed to remain operational. 41 146 At Randall's sentencing, the district judge stated: 147 [T]he Court acknowledges that it does have authority to depart from the guidelines pursuant to [§§ 5K2.0 and 5K.211] if it finds that the circumstances of this case warrant such a departure. 42 148 R9-9. He set forth the requirements for a departure under the guidelines, but found that no departure was warranted under either provision. 149 We may not review a district court's refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure. Mignott, 184 F.3d at 1290. Despite Randall's argument to the contrary, the district judge indicated his understanding that financial factors could be a perceived greater harm by weighing the harms associated with closing the plant and putting 300 employees out of work against keeping the plant open as an unsafe chor-alkali plant and keeping the employees working, but found that the financial factors were not a harm greater than the harms associated with the operation of an unsafe chlor-alkali plant. R14-9-11. Because the district court acknowledged that it had the authority to depart, we lack the jurisdiction to review the decision. 150 b. Taylor 151 Taylor also argues that the district court erred by not granting him a downward departure under §§ 5K2.0 and 5K2.11. As to the request for a departure under § 5K2.0, he maintains that his case fell outside the heartland of environmental cases. As to the request for a departure under § 5K2.11, he contends that he believed that closing the plant would cause a greater environmental harm that continuing operations. 152 Taylor presented each of his issues at sentencing. 43 R12-20-21. The district judge asked the probation officer to comment on Taylor's requests for a departure, and to specifically address Taylor's cooperation during the cleanup efforts. Id. at 21-22. The probation officer responded that there were no grounds for a downward departure. 44 Id. at 41. The district judge commented: 153 I am equally bound by the guidelines and by the law. And I do not have much discretion. 154 . . . 155 And I just cannot find a basis for departure under the guidelines, inasmuch as the facts as found are of the kind contemplated by the Sentencing Commission. 156 Id. at 42-43. 157 Because there is nothing in the record that indicates that the district court misapprehended its authority to depart downward, we assume that the district court understood its authority to depart and decided not to exercise its discretionary authority. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to address the district court's decision not to depart.