Opinion ID: 778271
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the BIA's Action Grounded in Policy Considerations?

Text: 19 The O'Tooles can still prevail under the second part of the discretionary function exemption if the government's decision was not susceptible to a policy analysis grounded in social, economic, or political concerns. Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 595 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325). As has been noted by numerous courts, reconciling conflicting case law in this area can be difficult. See, e.g., Varig, 467 U.S. at 811-12 (noting that the Court's reading of the [FTCA] has admittedly not followed a straight line); Shansky v. United States, 164 F.3d 688, 693 (1st Cir.1999) (observing that the case-by-case approach of this second prong has led to some disarray, and citing cases whose holdings are in direct conflict). 20 At one extreme of the policy prong of the analysis, where the discretionary function exception provides no defense to liability, are those agency decisions totally divorced from the sphere of policy analysis. For example, a government official who drives negligently, causing an accident, cannot be said to have exercised his judgment in a way related to public policy. Although driving requires the constant exercise of discretion, the official's decisions in exercising that discretion can hardly be said to be grounded in regulatory policy. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325 n. 7; see also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 34, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953). The discretion exercised by the negligent government driver is just not the kind of decisionmaking the discretionary function exception protects. 21 At the other extreme are those agency actions fully grounded in regulatory policy, where the government employee's exercise of judgment is directly related to effectuating agency policy goals. Decisions like these — such as the regulation and oversight of S & Ls by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, see Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 332-34; the release of vaccine lots by the Bureau of Biologics of the Food and Drug Administration, see Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 545-48; and the enforcement and implementation of airline safety standards by the Federal Aeronautics Agency, see Varig, 467 U.S. at 814-20 — are the kinds of decisions Congress empowered agencies to make and which the discretionary function exception shields from liability. 22 The question is, where does this case fall along the spectrum? The government characterizes its decision to forego needed repairs and maintenance as a proper exercise of agency discretion, in which the BIA was forced to make a judgment call to achieve its policy goals. The O'Tooles argue that allowing the irrigation system to fall into disrepair is no more a conscious regulatory choice than failing to maintain the brakes on a car. Is the government's choice not to make needed repairs on its property due to budgetary constraints more like lighthouse maintenance, see Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (discretionary function exception does not apply), or more like regulation of airline safety, see Varig, 467 U.S. at 814-20 (discretionary function exception applies)? While there is unquestionably an element of subjective characterization to the second part of the discretionary function exception analysis, we believe the O'Tooles have the better argument. We hold that an agency's decision to forego, for fiscal reasons, the routine maintenance of its property — maintenance that would be expected of any other landowner — is not the kind of policy decision that the discretionary function exception protects. Because the BIA advances no other reason for its actions or inactions aside from the choice to spend its limited funds in other ways, the discretionary function exception does not apply. 23 We find support for our holding in this Circuit's precedent. In ARA Leisure Servs. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.1987), a tour bus company sued the United States and the National Park Service for negligent design and maintenance of a road. We held that the government's decisions as to design and construction were protected by the discretionary function exception, but the failure to maintain[the road] in a safe condition was not a decision grounded in social, economic, or political policies. Id. at 195. In this context, we considered and rejected the same allocation-of-resources argument put forth by the BIA, noting that the fact that Park Service maintenance personnel were required to work within a budget does not make their failure to maintain[the road] a discretionary function for purposes of the FTCA. Id. We held that [t]he allocation of funds among projects, which lies at the heart of the BIA's justification for its failure to repair, was not a policy decision of the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from tort liability under the second prong of the discretionary function exception analysis. Id. at 196. 24 The Supreme Court has observed that Congress, in adopting the FTCA, sought to prevent the unfairness of allowing the public as a whole to benefit from the services performed by Government employees, while allocating the entire burden of government employee negligence to the individual, leav[ing] him destitute or grievously harmed. Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320, 77 S.Ct. 374, 1 L.Ed.2d 354 (1957). To apply the discretionary function exception to shield the BIA's alleged negligence would unfairly allocate the resulting harm on the O'Tooles. And, in holding the government liable for harm allegedly resulting from negligent maintenance of a lighthouse in Indian Towing, the Court observed: 25 The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate a light..., it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order.... If the Coast Guard failed in its duty and damage was thereby caused ..., the United States is liable under the [FTCA]. 26 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955); see also Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538 n. 3 (citing this passage with approbation). Similarly, the BIA was under no obligation to acquire Bowler Ranch, but, once it did, it also acquired the obligation to keep its irrigation system from causing harm to others to the same extent that a private landowner must. The O'Tooles' lawsuit involves a mundane question of routine ditch maintenance. It is not the sort of public policy issue that the discretionary function exception is designed to protect. Of course, our holding goes only to whether the district court has jurisdiction over the O'Tooles' negligence action. We express no opinion as to the merits of their claim. See Cope, 45 F.3d at 448. 27 The danger that the discretionary function exception will swallow the FTCA is especially great where the government takes on the role of a private landowner. Cf. Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir.1997) ([I]f the word `discretionary' is given a broad construction, it could almost completely nullify the goal of the [FTCA].). Every slip and fall, every failure to warn, every inspection and maintenance decision can be couched in terms of policy choices based on allocation of limited resources. As we have noted before in the discretionary function exception context, [b]udgetary constraints underlie virtually all governmental activity. ARA Leisure Servs., 831 F.2d at 196. Were we to view inadequate funding alone as sufficient to garner the protection of the discretionary function exception, we would read the rule too narrowly and the exception too broadly. Instead, in order to effectuate Congress's intent to compensate individuals harmed by government negligence, the FTCA, as a remedial statute, should be construed liberally, and its exceptions should be read narrowly. See, e.g., Kielwien v. United States, 540 F.2d 676, 681 (4th Cir.1976) (The [FTCA] is remedial and should be liberally construed to grant the relief contemplated by Congress....). 28 The BIA's decision to allow the irrigation system on Bowler Ranch to fall into disrepair to the detriment of neighboring landowners does not fall within the protection of the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. It is less like an FDA decision not to approve a drug for sale, or a National Park Service decision not to put up a guardrail that will block visitors' views, than like a government employee's negligent driving. It was not a decision susceptible to policy analysis, Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325, or grounded in social, economic, and political policy, id. at 323 (quoting Varig, 467 U.S. at 814). We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 29 REVERSED AND REMANDED.