Opinion ID: 1440925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Resentencing in this Case

Text: In this case, appellant's arguments, as well as the trial court's consideration of appellant's request to be present at resentencing, are based on an understandable misapprehension of the discretion with which the trial court was vested by our remand order. Our opinion remanding the case stated that the trial court should vacate either the two armed robbery convictions [11] or the felony murder conviction and resentence Mr. Mooney accordingly. [12] We did not, as we sometimes do, direct the trial court as to which conviction(s) to vacate; nor did we instruct the trial court, as we sometimes do, to resentence in accordance with its original sentencing plan. See Garris v. United States, 491 A.2d 511, 514 (D.C.1985) (noting that in remand instructions to cure double jeopardy violations, [w]e have consistently approved this practice of permitting trial judges to implement their original sentencing schemes); see, e.g. Brown, supra, 795 A.2d at 60; Green, supra, 718 A.2d at 1063 ([W]e remand [appellant's] case to permit the trial court to determine which counts should merge with others and resentence accordingly to `allow[] the trial court to effectuate its original sentencing plan without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.') (alteration in original) (quoting Garris, 491 A.2d at 514); Bean v. United States, 606 A.2d 770, 772 (D.C. 1992); Catlett v. United States, 545 A.2d 1202, 1219 (D.C.1988); Malloy v. United States, 483 A.2d 678, 681 (D.C.1984); Thorne v. United States, 471 A.2d 247, 249 (D.C.1983). Appellant argued to the trial court that because it had broad discretion to resentence appellant de novo, he had a right to be present and allocute. The government countered that because appellant's § 23-110 motion was functionally equivalent to a Rule 35 motion, his presence was not required, pursuant to Rule 43(c)(4). The government did not contest that the court had a choice as between the armed robberies and the felony murder convictions, but argued that because the remand order instructed that resentencing be according to the original sentencing plan, the trial court's discretion was limited to imposition of the minimum sentence of twenty years to life mandated by statute. The government's latter argument was based on a mistaken premise, as the remand order was not so limited. As a result, the trial court evaluated appellant's request  as it was bound to do  within the context of the non-specific (either/or) terms of our remand order, and (mistakenly) believed it was bound to resentence appellant in accordance with the original sentencing plan. The trial court recognized that the difference in the consequences flowing from the choice as between the armed robbery convictions or the felony murder conviction was great. [13] If the trial court vacated appellant's two armed robbery convictions, as it did, appellant would be left with, at least, a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years to life on the felony murder conviction, reducing his original sentence by five years. On the other hand, if the trial court were to vacate the felony murder conviction, as the remand order purported to permit it to do, appellant could have been sentenced, at the most lenient end of the spectrum, to two concurrent five to fifteen year terms on the armed robbery convictions, to run concurrently with the five to fifteen year sentence for possession of a firearm during a crime of violence or dangerous offense, which would have reduced appellant's sentence by twenty years and made him eligible for immediate release. Even if the trial court were unlikely to so drastically reduce appellant's sentence, the trial court could have sentenced appellant to three consecutive five to fifteen year terms for the two armed robberies and the one firearm possession count, in which case his minimum sentence would have been reduced by ten years. If those options had been available to the court, appellant would have had a right to be present and allocute. But none of these hypothetical sentences was legally available. The purpose of resentencing in a case like this is to correct the illegality [14] of a sentence that violates double jeopardy's bar on the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). [15] There are certain situations where vacating either one of two convictions, say first-degree premeditated murder and felony murder (of the same person), is necessary to cure the double jeopardy problem, for a person may stand convicted only once for a single murder. See Parker v. United States, 692 A.2d 913, 918 n. 9 (D.C.1997). [16] But where the illegality of multiple punishments results from convictions of a greater and a lesser-included offense, the double jeopardy bar is fully addressed, and the illegal sentence corrected, by merging the lesser into the greater offense so that only the latter remains, unless  and this is an important caveat  there is clear legislative intent that punishment should be imposed for both. This is because the touchstone of double jeopardy analysis in determining what is the same offense is legislative intent. See Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874) (imposition of jail sentence and fine constituted double jeopardy where statute provide for either sentence or fine). [T]he Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishment in excess of that authorized by the legislature. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 383, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989) (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980)). In interpreting whether two offenses prescribed by D.C. law constitute the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy, in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, we follow the rule of statutory construction, Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), set down in Blockburger v. United States: where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Cf. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) (where Missouri law intended cumulative punishment under two statutes, even if considered same offense under Blockburger, Double Jeopardy clause does not preclude imposition of cumulative punishments in single trial); see also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980) (holding that D.C.Code § 23-112 prohibits imposition of consecutive sentences for offenses considered the same under Blockburger ). Applying Blockburger, felony murder and the underlying felony, in this case, armed robbery, are not separate offenses, and felony murder is undoubtedly the greater offense. As the Supreme Court has observed, [i]t cannot be suggested seriously that the legislature intended an attempted robbery conviction to suffice as an alternative sanction for murder. Jones, 491 U.S. at 384-85, 109 S.Ct. 2522. We therefore make explicit what has been implied in our remand orders over the years: absent legislative intent otherwise, when resentencing to respect the double jeopardy bar on multiple punishments for the same offense where the defendant has been convicted of a greater and lesser-included offense, the trial court has but one course, to vacate the lesser-included offense. Franklin v. United States, 392 A.2d 516, 519 n. 3 (D.C. 1978) ([W]here an appellant has been convicted of both the crime and a lesser included offense, the appropriate appellate remedy is vacation of the lesser included offense.) [17] (citing Franey v. United States, 382 A.2d 1019, 1021 (D.C.1978)). That is what the trial judge did in this case, vacate the lesser-included offense of armed robbery in favor of the conviction for felony murder. Moreover, the felony-murder offense of which appellant was convicted carries a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years, see D.C.Code §§ 22-2401, -2404 (1991 Supp.), which is the sentence that the trial judge imposed. As the trial judge had no discretion to sentence appellant other than as he did, due process did not require appellant's presence or safeguard his right to allocute. For this reason, the judgment of conviction on remand is Affirmed.