Opinion ID: 2274302
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Permissible Voir Dire Questions

Text: In State v. Morrow , this Court rejected a defendant's argument that the trial court erred in prohibiting voir dire questions regarding the difference between first and second degree murder because such restrictions prohibited him from intelligently exercising his peremptory and for cause strikes. 968 S.W.2d at 111. This Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in preventing the questions because counsel is not allowed to inform venirepersons as to what law will be applied in the case or what instructions will be given. Id. As in this case, the trial court in Morrow aided defense counsel in developing an appropriate alternative to the prohibited line of questioning. Id. In State v. Hall, the defendant alleged that the trial court erred in preventing his counsel's questions asking venirepersons if they could recommend a sentence of life imprisonment for a defendant who had deliberated and coolly reflected before committing a murder. 955 S.W.2d 198, 203 (Mo. banc 1997). This Court found the trial court properly sustained the State's objections to the questions because it is the role of the court to instruct jurors as to the legal definitions regarding intent. Id. Hall states that [v]oir dire is not the proper arena for the legal definitions that appear in jury instructions as the venirepanel is not the jury, nor does it have evidence before it. Id. The trial court in Hall advised defense counsel to limit questioning to whether the venirepersons could consider the full range of punishment for first-degree murder authorized by law. Id. Johnson cites State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 379 (Mo. banc 1994), for the proposition that [i]n order to discover bias of potential jurors, it is often necessary to reveal some factual or legal detail in voir dire. While it is true that the trial court may permit parties to inquire whether potential jurors have preconceived notions on the law which will impede their ability to follow instructions on issues which will arise in the case, such decisions are properly left to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320, 335-36 (Mo. banc 1993) (emphasis added). In Gray , the trial judge used hypothetical discussions to explain accessory liability and reasonable doubt to venirepersons. 887 S.W.2d at 378-79. While no plain error was found in the judge's comments, this Court cautioned that [d]espite his well-intended purposes, the judge said far more than was necessary in this case and that it would have been best for the remarks to [avoid] the appearance of giving an instruction of law or commenting on the evidence. Id. at 379. This Court noted that the purpose of the Approved Jury Instructions is to avoid confusion among jurors [and][t]hat purpose is undermined when a judge or lawyer, under the guise of voir dire, makes what seem to be comments on the law or facts in the case. Id. Gray warns that [s]uch commentary during voir dire risks incomplete or inaccurate statements and may conceivably lead to confusion. Id. The concerns raised by Gray were avoided when the trial court prevented defense counsel's discussions about the requirements of first-degree murder. The court's proposed solutionasking Can you give life without probation and parole if you find him guilty of first degree murder[?]adequately permitted defense counsel to determine if venirepersons could consider a life sentence in the case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the prosecutor's objections to defense counsel's questions during voir dire. Having found no abuse of discretion, this Court need not consider the issue of prejudice. This point is denied.