Opinion ID: 884035
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the District Court err in granting Alan's motion for partial summary judgment, which excluded from the marital estate Alan's interest in a testamentary trust established by his father?

Text: Alan's father William A. Meeks, Sr. died in 1986, leaving a will which established a testamentary trust for the benefit of his wife (Alan's mother), and which named Alan and his brother as co-trustees. According to the terms of the will, the trustees have the power to invade the corpus only if there are no other sources of funds reasonably available for the maintenance of Alan's mother, and then only to the extent necessary for her care, maintenance and support. Upon the death of Alan's mother, the trust will terminate and will be distributed in equal shares to Alan, his brother, and his sister. The will also contains a spendthrift clause regarding the trust, which provides: No title in the trust or trusts created in and by this will, or in the income therefrom, shall vest in any beneficiary, and neither the principal nor the income of any such trust estate shall be liable for the debts of any beneficiary, and no beneficiary shall have any power to sell, assign, transfer, encumber or in any other manner to anticipate or dispose of his or her interest in any such trust estate created by the terms of this will or the income produced thereby by the Co-Trustees to said beneficiary. Based on the foregoing language, Alan moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that he has only a contingent remainder in the trust, and his interest therefore should not be considered part of the marital estate. The District Court agreed and granted the motion, excluding Alan's remainder interest in the trust from the marital estate. Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.; Vincelette v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1995), 273 Mont. 408, 903 P.2d 1374. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is identical to that of the trial court and, in determining whether summary judgment was appropriate, we will use the same criteria employed by the trial court. Vincelette, 903 P.2d at 1376 (citations omitted). Linda contends the grant of partial summary judgment in this case was in error. While she does not argue that a genuine issue of material fact exists, she contends the District Court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Alan's remainder in the trust is contingent. Linda maintains that Alan has a vested remainder in the testamentary trust which should be considered part of the marital estate and divided accordingly. A contingent remainder is a right to property which may or may not vest in possession at some future date. Generally, a remainder will be considered contingent if the recipient is unknown or if the interest will only vest upon the occurrence of an event which is not certain to happen. A remainder will not be considered contingent if it can fairly be construed to be vested. 23 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Edition (David A. Thomas, ed., 1994), 314 (citations omitted). [A] vested remainder is one which is limited to an ascertained person in being, whose right to the estate is fixed and certain, and does not depend on the happening of any future event, but whose enjoyment and possession is postponed to some future time.... [A] vested remainder is not rendered contingent by the fact that it may never vest in possession. 23 Thompson on Real Property, 325-26 (citations omitted). Alan is an ascertainable person in being whose right to a share of the remainder of the testamentary trust is not dependent upon the occurrence of some future event. Rather, he is sure to inherit so long as two given events do not occur. Alan will lose his remainder interest if he dies before his mother, or if the entire trust corpus is used for his mother's maintenance and care before her death. Only these events will serve to divest him of his remainder interest. It therefore follows that, absent additional conditions, Alan's interest in the testamentary trust would be classified as a vested remainder, subject to divestment. Such classifications, however, are not necessarily controlling regarding how a remainder interest should be treated. When such interests are created by a will, the testator's intent also must be considered. When construing a will, the cardinal rule is that the intent of the testator must be effected if it is not contrary to the law or to public policy. Matter of Estate of Bennett (Colo.App.1989), 789 P.2d 446. See also Allen v. Shea (1983), 105 Idaho 31, 665 P.2d 1041; In re Estate of Larsen (Utah 1982), 649 P.2d 31; In re Question Submitted by U.S.Ct. of App., Tenth Cir. (1976), 191 Colo. 406, 553 P.2d 382; McGinley v. McGinley (1989), 388 Pa.Super. 500, 565 A.2d 1220. The testator's intent, if clearly articulated, can preserve as contingent a remainder which otherwise would be deemed to have vested. McGinley, 565 A.2d at 1225. [W]hether a remainder is vested or contingent depends entirely upon the testator's intention, and where the testator has indicated with reasonable certainty the intention that it shall not vest until a particular time, it will not vest until that time arrives, and then only in those who are in esse and capable of taking at that time. 23 Thompson on Real Property, 341 (citations omitted). Appellant cites several cases in support of her position that an interest in a testamentary trust is vested and should be included in the marital estate. In re Marriage of Kis (1982), 196 Mont. 296, 639 P.2d 1151; In re Marriage of Buxbaum (1984), 214 Mont. 1, 692 P.2d 411; In re Marriage of Hill (1982), 197 Mont. 451, 643 P.2d 582; Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79. These cases are easily distinguished, however. Rolfe and Kis address the valuation of a party's interest in a pension fund, not a testamentary devise. Accordingly, there is no testator in these cases whose intent might contravene the general classifications. While Hill and Buxbaum deal with testamentary devises, in neither case was the intent of the testator inconsistent with a finding that the interest in question was vested and properly included in the marital estate. In the case at bar, Alan's father by his will declared that [n]o title in the trust ... or in the income therefrom shall vest ... prior to actual distribution. In so doing, he unequivocally expressed his intent that his children's interests in the trust remain contingent until such time as the corpus of the trust is in fact distributed. In Montana, a decree of distribution is conclusive upon the rights of devisees under a will, subject only to be reversed, set aside or modified on appeal. A decree of distribution has the same force and effect as does a final judgment. Hill, 643 P.2d at 586. Since Alan's father's will provided that Alan's interest in the testamentary trust remain contingent until actual distribution, the District Court did not err in refusing to classify the interest in a manner contrary to the testator's express intent. Alan has a contingent remainder in his family testamentary trust, which was properly excluded from the marital estate. Therefore, the District Court did not err in granting Alan's motion for partial summary judgment.