Opinion ID: 1320559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: (1) Under Government Code section 835, the state could properly be held liable for failing to erect a median barrier to protect freeway drivers from the serious injuries inherent in cross-median accidents.

Text: In arguing that the trial court erred in leaving the question of its liability to the jury, the state initially contends that it owed no legal duty to plaintiffs which required it to take measures, such as constructing a median barrier, to protect plaintiffs from dangers that allegedly were not of the state's own making. Thus, while the state acknowledges that it would bear responsibility for accidents resulting, for example, from a pothole or crack in a state-maintained roadway, the state takes the position that it is entitled to be absolved of liability as a matter of law whenever an accident occurs merely because of the absence of some protective traffic safeguard and not as a result of a physical aberration or defect of a public highway. Because in the instant case the conduct of the Glass vehicle, rather than any defect in the roadway, was, in the state's view, the precipitating cause of the accident, the state maintains that the trial court should have directed a verdict in its favor. The state's limited view of the circumstances under which it may be held liable for damages for accidents on the public highways is directly refuted both by the explicit language of the controlling statutes and by the holdings of numerous prior decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal. As we shall explain, these authorities clearly demonstrate that when, as in this case, the state has actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition on a public highway, the state bears an affirmative obligation to take reasonable steps to protect the public against the danger. If the state fails to take such reasonable protective measures and its failure promimately causes plaintiff's injuries, the state may be held liable for the resulting damages. In analyzing the question of the state's liability, we begin with the provisions of section 835 of the Government Code, one of the principal sections of the comprehensive California Tort Claims Act dealing with governmental liability for Dangerous Conditions of Public Property. (See generally Gov. Code, § 830 et seq.) (2) Generally speaking, under section 835 [2] a public entity is liable for an injury if the plaintiff establishes: (1) that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury; (2) that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition; (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred; and (4) either (a) that a public employee negligently or wrongfully created the dangerous condition or (b) that [t]he public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section 835.2 [ [3] ] a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. (Italics added.) As the emphasized language indicates, section 835 specifically provides that when a public entity has actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, the entity's liability may be predicated on its failure to take protective measures to safeguard the public from dangers that may not necessarily be of the entity's own creation. This reading of section 835 is confirmed by reference to section 830, subdivision (b), which specifically defines the protect against language of section 835, subdivision (b) to include providing safeguards against a dangerous condition. [4] Thus, the language of the applicable statutes refutes the state's argument that it is under no duty to protect the public against dangers that are not created by physical defects in public property. (See generally Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability (Cont. Ed.Bar 1964) §§ 6.21, 6.26, pp. 204-205, 211.) Moreover, the governing case law similarly rejects the state's initial argument. This court's landmark case of Baldwin v. State of California (1972) 6 Cal.3d 424 [99 Cal. Rptr. 145, 491, P.2d 1121] is directly in point. In Baldwin, the plaintiff was injured while attempting to make a left-hand turn on a heavily traveled four-lane highway; no separate left-hand turn lane had been provided, and while waiting to make the turn the plaintiff was rear-ended and pushed into on-coming traffic. The plaintiff in Baldwin sued both the driver who had rear-ended his car and the state; as in the instant case, in support of the claim against the state plaintiff introduced evidence of numerous similar accidents that had previously occurred at the same site. Plaintiff also adduced the testimony of highway safety experts as to the availability of safety measures, e.g., prohibiting left-hand turns or constructing an overpass or a separate left-hand turn lane, which the state could have implemented to protect against the dangerous condition created by the existing traffic conditions. Despite the fact that plaintiff's injury was not precipitated by a pothole or other physical defect in the public roadway, our court held that plaintiff's evidence would amply support a finding that the intersection represented a dangerous condition ( id., at p. 428) and that the state could be held liable for its failure to take reasonable steps to protect against such danger. In similar fashion, numerous Court of Appeal decisions decided over the past two decades confirm the conclusion that a public entity's liability under section 835 may be predicated upon a failure of the entity to provide adequate safeguards against a dangerous condition of which the entity had actual or constructive notice. (See, e.g., Chavez v. Merced (1964) 229 Cal. App.2d 387, 394-397 [40 Cal. Rptr. 334] (failure to warn of danger from fallen utility line); Bakity v. County of Riverside (1970) 12 Cal. App.3d 24, 30 [90 Cal. Rptr. 541] (failure to protect against obstructed view caused by trees on adjacent private property); Briggs v. State of California (1971) 14 Cal. App.3d 489 [92 Cal. Rptr. 433] (failure to warn of mudslides from adjacent private property); Vedder v. County of Imperial (1974) 36 Cal. App.3d 654, 658-660 [111 Cal. Rptr. 728] (failure to provide protective devices against fire danger); Slapin v. Los Angeles International Airport (1976) 65 Cal. App.3d 484 [135 Cal. Rptr. 296] (failure to provide adequate lighting for safety).) Indeed, several recent Court of Appeal cases are particularly instructive for the present case, confirming the state's potential liability under section 835 for failure to provide an adequate median barrier on a public roadway. (See, e.g., Morris v. State of California (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 962, 965-966 [153 Cal. Rptr. 117]; Harland v. State of California (1977) 75 Cal. App.3d 475, 485-486 [142 Cal. Rptr. 201].) Consequently, we reject the state's contention that liability could not properly be assessed on the basis of its mere failure to protect against cross-median accidents. (3) The state alternatively argues that even if it does bear an affirmative duty under section 835 to protect against the hazards of dangerous conditions which it has not created, the trial court nonetheless erred in submitting the issue of its liability to the jury because, it contends, plaintiff introduced no substantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the absence of a median barrier constituted a dangerous condition within the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions. Although the state concedes that the jury was properly instructed on the issue and implicitly found that a dangerous condition did in fact exist, the state maintains that in light of the evidence presented by the plaintiffs the trial court should not have permitted the issue to go to the jury. We conclude that the issue was properly left to the jury. Section 830, subdivision (a) defines a dangerous condition as a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. (Italics added.) The state recognizes that if the condition of its property creates a substantial risk of injury even when the property is used with due care, the state gains no immunity from liability simply because, in a particular case, the dangerous condition of its property combines with a third party's negligent conduct to inflict injury. (See, e.g., Baldwin v. State of California, supra, 6 Cal.3d 424, 428, fn. 3; Mathews v. State of California (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 116, 121 [145 Cal. Rptr. 443]; Murrell v. State of California ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. (1975) 47 Cal. App.3d 264, 267-270 [120 Cal. Rptr. 812]; Bakity v. County of Riverside, supra, 12 Cal. App.3d 24, 32; Callahan v. City and County of San Francisco (1967) 249 Cal. App.2d 696, 702-704 [57 Cal. Rptr. 639].) The state asserts, however, that cross-median freeway accidents usually result from the negligence of either the victim or a third party, and therefore that the jury could not properly conclude that the absence of a median barrier created a substantial risk of injury when the freeway was used with due care. [5] Although it may well be that many, perhaps even most, cross-median accidents result from the negligence of one or more drivers, the evidence in the instant case was clearly sufficient for the jury to conclude that the lack of a median barrier created a substantial risk of injury even in the absence of negligent conduct. One state highway engineer testified at trial that in cross-median accidents it is not uncommon to have the violating vehicle be an innocent party. In addition, during the course of the trial numerous expert witnesses identified various situations in which cross-median accidents might occur in the absence of negligence, as when accidents result, for example, from mechanical failure, sudden illness, or animals in the road. Moreover, in evaluating the evidence and applying the definition of dangerous condition contained in the judge's instructions, the jurors were free to draw upon their own common driving experiences which might well have suggested to them that many traffic accidents, including cross-median accidents, occur without the negligence of any party. As the Court of Appeal recently noted in Morris v. State of California, supra, 89 Cal. App.3d 962, 965, in rejecting an identical argument of the state: [The median barrier's] obvious function was to protect motorists on the freeway from the intrusion into their lanes of vehicles crossing the median out of control whether by reason of mechanical or tire failures or other causes unrelated to negligence or by reason of the negligence of those drivers and owners. (Italics added.) Accordingly, we conclude that the jury could properly find that the barrierless, heavily traveled freeway constituted a dangerous condition under sections 835 and 830, subdivision (a). Finally, the state argues that as a matter of financial reality it cannot afford to construct median barriers on all freeways on which such barriers are needed and consequently it urges this court, as a matter of policy, to relieve it of liability resulting from its failure to install such barriers. (4) Under section 835.4, subdivision (b), [6] however, the question of the reasonableness of the state's action in light of the practicability and cost of the applicable safeguards is a matter for the jury's determination. (See, e.g., Baldwin v. State of California, supra, 6 Cal.3d 424, 436-438; De La Rosa v. City of San Bernardino (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 739, 749 [94 Cal. Rptr. 175].) In the instant case, the jury was instructed as to the provisions of section 835.4 at the state's request, and the jury's ultimate verdict demonstrates that it concluded that the state had not established that its failure to provide a median barrier in the vicinity of the accident was reasonable in light of the practicability and cost of such a safeguard. The state has not identified anything in the record which would justify disturbing the jury's determination on this point. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs' judgment against the state should be affirmed.