Opinion ID: 692069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the alligator snapping turtles count: the lacey act issues

Text: 21 According to Guthrie, there are two reasons why the district court should have dismissed the part of the indictment that charged him under the Lacey Act for conspiracy to sell and purchase alligator snapping turtles. First, Guthrie contends that the Lacey Act improperly transforms state misdemeanors into federal felonies, because Congress cannot constitutionally delegate to a state the authority to create federal crimes. Second, Guthrie contends that the Lacey Act charges should have been dismissed because the state regulation that protects alligator snapping turtles was promulgated pursuant to a statute adopted in violation of the state constitution. These claims present questions of law for our de novo review. See United States v. Osburn, 955 F.2d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 223, 121 L.Ed.2d 160 & --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 290, 121 L.Ed.2d 215 (1992). Both contentions lack merit.1. The Unconstitutional Delegation Challenge 22 The Lacey Act makes it unlawful to deal in any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law. 16 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3372(a)(2)(A) (West 1985). The Act provides criminal penalties for trade in protected animals whose value exceeds $350, see 16 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3373(d)(1)(B) (West 1985 & Supp.1994); the value of the alligator snapping turtles involved in this case exceeded that amount. Guthrie's prosecution under the Lacey Act was dependent upon an underlying state nongame species regulation, Ala.Admin.Code r. 220-2-.92 (1990), which prohibits the taking, capture, killing, or offering to sell or trade of alligator snapping turtles. See Ala.Admin.Code r. 220-2-.92(1)(c) (1990). 23 Guthrie argues that the Lacey Act prosecution is void because Congress has unconstitutionally delegated to states the legislative authority to create federal felonies. Because Congress has no power over the state agencies, Guthrie claims, it cannot deliver criminal authority to those agencies. This argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299, 302 (11th Cir.1988), which upheld the constitutionality of the Lacey Act provisions insofar as they enforced foreign law. Necessary to that result was the reasoning that the Act's enforcement provisions involve[ ] no delegation of power. Id. Following that reasoning, we conclude that the Lacey Act does not unconstitutionally delegate federal legislative authority to states or their agencies. 24 2. The Constitutionality of the Underlying State Regulation 25 Guthrie contends that his Lacey Act conviction must be reversed because the Alabama regulation listing the alligator snapping turtle as a protected species was adopted pursuant to state statutes that are invalid under the Alabama Constitution. He argues that all of the Alabama statutes authorizing the Commissioner of Conservation and Natural Resources to administer laws protecting wild animals violate Sec. 45 of the Alabama Constitution, which provides: 26 Each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except general appropriation bills, general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or revision of statutes .... 27 Ala. Const. of 1901, art. IV, Sec. 45. According to Guthrie, the titles of the authorizing statutes do not sufficiently reflect the content of those laws, and one of the authorizing acts also violates the single subject requirement. Because the alligator snapping turtle regulation was promulgated in a manner that violates the state constitution, he argues, the regulation cannot form the state law basis for a Lacey Act prosecution. 28 As a threshold matter, Guthrie's position is dependent upon the proposition that a Lacey Act defendant in federal court can defeat the charge against him by demonstrating that the state regulation listing a species as protected is invalid under state law. While the question is an interesting one, we need not reach it because the regulation is plainly constitutional. 29 Regulation 220-2-.90 cites as statutory authority Secs. 9-2-7, 9-2-8, and 9-2-12 of the Alabama Code, and 1982 Alabama Acts 82-424. The three code provisions in turn derive from three different acts. According to Guthrie, the three code provisions violate the Alabama Constitution because their titles as reported in the Michie codification of the Alabama Code do not match the substance of those provisions. However, the Code of Alabama itself clearly states that the headings provided by Michie are not the titles of acts: the descriptive headings or catchlines immediately preceding or within the text of the individual sections of this Code ... do not constitute part of the law .... Ala.Code Sec. 1-1-14(b) (1975). Instead, we must look to the underlying acts to determine whether the titles of the acts comply with Sec. 45 of the Alabama Constitution. 30 We need only determine that one of the acts providing the commissioner with authority to promulgate the regulation is constitutional in order to hold that Regulation 220-2-.92 is valid. For the reasons that follow, we hold that 1943 Alabama Acts 531 (Act No. 531) meets the clear expression requirement of Sec. 45 of the Alabama Constitution and is valid. 3 Under Act No. 531, the Commissioner (then referred to as Director) of Conservation and Natural Resources: 31 is authorized to make and promulgate such reasonable rules and regulations not in conflict with the provisions of the game and fish laws as he may deem for the best interest of the conservation, protection, and propagation of wild game, birds, animals, fish, and sea foods, which rules and regulations shall have the effect of law .... 32 1943 Alabama Acts 531. By its plain language, this act gives the Commissioner the power to promulgate regulations relating to the protection of wild animals, including the alligator snapping turtle. 33 The title of Act No. 531 is: To amend Section 21, Title 8, Code of Alabama 1940. That is precisely what Act No. 531 does--it amends Title 8, Sec. 21, Code of Alabama 1940, which authorized the Commissioner to promulgate certain rules and regulations. The Supreme Court of Alabama has held that a bill that purports to revise or amend a particular code section violates the single subject or clear expression requirements of Sec. 45 of the Alabama Constitution only if the act's subject matter is not germane to the code section it seeks to amend. Opinion of the Justices. No. 121, 256 Ala. 29, 53 So.2d 583, 584 (1951). The same test applies to laws already enacted. See Baggett v. Webb, 248 So.2d 275, 283-84 (Ala.Civ.App.), cert. denied, 287 Ala. 725, 248 So.2d 284 (1971); cf. Holcombe v. Pierce, 253 Ala. 173, 43 So.2d 640, 642 (1949) (holding provisions of act whose title indicates it amends entire code chapter need only be germane to chapter as whole). 34 Applying the holdings of the Alabama Supreme Court, we find that Act No. 531 is plainly valid because its provisions are germane to the section of the code that it amends. Act No. 531 amends only Sec. 21 of Title 8 of the 1940 Alabama Code; it does so by adding a limitation preventing the Commissioner from promulgating regulations that interfere with dams and certain other private water uses. This added limitation is clearly germane to the subject of the Commissioner's powers to promulgate conservation regulations and does not go beyond the scope of the code provision it amends. 35 Act No. 531 therefore does not violate Sec. 45 of the Alabama Constitution. Its provision regarding the promulgation of regulations is codified in Sec. 9-2-8 of the current Alabama Code, which provides that the Commissioner of Conservation and Natural Resources: 36 is authorized to make and promulgate such reasonable rules and regulations not in conflict with the provisions of the game and fish laws as he may deem for the best interest of the conservation, protection and propagation of wild game, birds, animals, fish and seafoods, which rules and regulations shall have the effect of law .... 37 Ala.Code Sec. 9-2-8 (1975). Because Act No. 531 does not violate Sec. 45 of the Alabama Constitution, Alabama Code Sec. 9-2-8 is valid, and Alabama Reg. 220-2-.92, which cites Sec. 9-2-8 as one of its sources, is likewise valid. We need not address the validity of the remaining statutes, since Act No. 531 is itself sufficient authority for the regulation. By rejecting the state law invalidity predicate of Guthrie's claim, we do not reach the issue of whether a viable state law challenge to the underlying regulation would be a defense to a Lacey Act prosecution. Nor do we imply any view on that question. 38