Opinion ID: 771493
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Supervision of Criminally Responsible Participant

Text: 23 Syrax contends that the district court erred in imposing a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 for his role in the offense, arguing that the evidence failed to show that he supervised a participant in the money laundering scheme. Section 3B1.1(c) provides that a defendant's offense level may be increased by two levels [i]f the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than described in (a) or (b). 4 The district court stated that it was very clear that the enhancement should be applied to Syrax's money laundering count, and so applied it, against the recommendation of the probation office. 24 In order for 3B1.1(c) to apply, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants. U.S.S.G. 3B1.1, cmt. n.2. A `participant' is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted. Id. at cmt. n.1; see United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 615-16 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the person supervised must have been criminally responsible for the commission of the offense), abrogated on other grounds by Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993). The enhancement may be applied if the government shows by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant exercised some control over others involved in the commission of the offense or[was] responsible for organizing others for the purpose of carrying out the crime. United States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Hoac , 990 F.2d 1099, 1110 (9th Cir. 1993)) (alteration in original). The preponderance of the evidence standard is met by a showing that the relevant fact is more likely true than not. United States v. Collins, 109 F.3d 1413, 1420 (9th Cir. 1997). 25 Because there is no doubt that Syrax was the leader of the criminal activity, the question is whether the person he supervised (his office manager, Gretchen Wilson) was criminally responsible for the commission of the money laundering. The probation officer recommended against the role enhancement, reasoning that, although there was a blending of criminal conduct and legitimate employee/employer activity, there is nothing to indicate that the defendant and Wilson agreed to or discussed the activity of laundering money. The officer thus concluded that Wilson was not a criminally responsible participant in the money laundering scheme. The district court noted the probation officer's conclusion, but stated that the officer had limited information, and that the court had other information . . . that comes from various different sources and [from] observing different things going on at the trial. The court thus concluded that the enhancement should be applied because [a]ll of the evidence in this case to me indicates . . . that the defendant was the organizer and the leader in this situation and that Wilson `knew what was going on and she was in it up to her ears.'  26 The district court's finding that Wilson was a criminally responsible participant is a finding of fact reviewed for clear error. See Alonso, 48 F.3d at 1545; see also United States v. Lopez-Sandoval, 146 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1998). Clearly erroneous review is significantly deferential,  requiring that the appellate court accept the district court's findings absent a  `definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'  McMillan v. United States, 112 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993)). 27 Whether or not Wilson was criminally responsible for the money laundering is admittedly a close question. The government argues that Wilson and Sandra Coronado, Syrax's wife, were both knowing participants in the money laundering activity, detailing Wilson's responsibilities, for example, to pay bills, order and pay for telemarketing leads, determine commissions for salespersons, and keep Syrax informed of the company's financial situation, all the while aware of the fact that the bills were paid with investor funds. As the probation office noted, Wilson's activities could be seen as a blend[ ] of criminal conduct and legitimate employee/ employer activity. Unlike United States v. Cyphers, 130 F.3d 1361 (9th Cir. 1997), in which there was specific testimony by the employees that they were aware that the activities were unlawful, Wilson's conduct might be interpreted as merely fulfilling her responsibility as an office manager. See id. at 1363. 28 On the other hand, the fact that Wilson pled guilty to one count each of mail fraud and wire fraud supports the inference that, because she was aware of the fraudulent activity, she was aware of the money laundering as well. The district court did not specify what evidence indicated Wilson's knowledge of the money laundering; however, the court did not need to make specific findings of fact in support of an upward role adjustment. See Lopez-Sandoval, 146 F.3d at 716. Wilson's knowledge of the fraudulent activity and numerous responsibilities as office manager make it difficult to characterize her as a mere unknowing facilitator[ ] of the money laundering. Cyphers, 130 F.3d at 1363. A review of the evidence does not leave us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. We therefore conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Syrax supervised a participant in the money laundering scheme. McMillan, 112 F.3d at 1044 (internal quotation marks omitted).