Opinion ID: 1936059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Filing of the second complaint

Text: Snyder also claims that the Commonwealth's failure to file its second information until eight months after arrest requires quashal or dismissal of the charges stated in the second complaint pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 130(b), (d), 131(b), and 315(a). Rule of criminal procedure 130 states: (b) When a defendant has been arrested without a warrant for driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances, the arresting officer may, when he deems it appropriate, promptly release the defendant from custody rather than taking him before the issuing authority. . . . . (d) When a defendant is released pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), a complaint shall be filed against the defendant within five (5) days of the defendant's release. Thereafter, a summons, not a warrant of arrest, shall be issued and the case shall proceed as provided in Rule 110. Where a party seeks a dismissal for a failure to comply with Rule 130, Pa.R.Crim.P. 150 applies. Commonwealth v. Revtai, 516 Pa. 53, 532 A.2d 1 (1987). Rule 150 states: A defendant shall not be discharged nor shall a case be dismissed because of a defect in the form or content of a complaint, summons, or warrant, or a defect in the procedures of this Chapter, unless the defendant raises the defect before the conclusion of the preliminary hearing and the defect is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. The Commonwealth argues that Snyder has waived his Rule 130 claim by failing specifically to raise it before the conclusion of the preliminary hearing as required by Pa.R. Crim.P. 150. Commonwealth v. Revtai, supra ; Commonwealth v. Schimelfenig, 361 Pa.Super. 325, 522 A.2d 605 (1987) (en banc), appeal denied sub. nom., Commonwealth v. Hall, 518 Pa. 624, 541 A.2d 1136 (1988). Under Rule 150, a defect in procedure in a Chapter 100 rule shall not result in a dismissal unless: (1) the defendant has raised the defect before the conclusion of the preliminary hearing [4] and (2) the party seeking relief can show that the Commonwealth's noncompliance prejudiced his rights. The Comment to Rule 150 explains that [o]rdinarily, if a defendant does not raise a defect before the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the defendant cannot thereafter raise the defect as grounds for dismissal or discharge at a later stage in the proceedings. In the usual case, any defect must be properly raised before the issuing authority who must then specifically describe that defect on the docket to be transmitted to the court of common pleas. Pa.R.Crim.P. 26(a), (b)(9). [5] The transcript of the district judge in this case, who is required by the Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically to record any Rule 150 objections, presents no record of any such objections. We must thus conclude that appellant has failed to preserve his Rule 130 claims for appellate review. We next address Snyder's motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 131(b). Rule 131 states: (b) When more than one offense is alleged to have been committed by one person arising from the same incident, the issuing authority shall accept only one complaint, and shall docket the matter as a single case. (c) Upon application by any interested person and proof that any provision of paragraphs (a) or (b) hereof was violated, a judge of the court may order the forfeiture of all additional costs of the issuing authority accrued by reason of such violation, and thereafter such costs shall not be taxed in the case. A court cannot remedy a violation of rule 131(b) with dismissal. Commonwealth v. Tome, 484 Pa. 261, 398 A.2d 1369 (1979). The only remedy is relief from the additional costs incurred from defending the second action separately. Id. (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 131(c)). Snyder has received relief under Rule 131(c) and we find his efforts to dismiss to be without merit. Snyder also asserts that the second complaint should be dismissed under Pa.R.Crim.P. 315(a) because the Commonwealth failed to file an information in a reasonable time. Rule 315(a) states: Upon motion and a showing that an information has not been filed within a reasonable time or that an indictment has not been found against a defendant within a reasonable time, the court may order dismissal of the prosecution, or in lieu thereof, make such other order as shall be appropriate in the interests of justice. Dismissal under Rule 315(a) lies within the court's discretion. Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 431 Pa. 536, 246 A.2d 430 (1968) (ruling on discretionary aspect of prior version of Rule 315). [6] In considering dismissal, the court will look to what ruling is appropriate in the interests of justice. Id., 431 Pa. at 542, 246 A.2d at 433. A decision made pursuant to Rule 315(a) will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Kirk, 220 Pa.Super. 115, 283 A.2d 712 (1971) (ruling on discretionary aspect of prior version of Rule 315). In addressing Snyder's Rule 315 motion, the court found that the Commonwealth was pushing its luck in filing an information eight months after arrest. However, as there was no real prejudice to Snyder other than delay, the court ruled against dismissal. Though Rule 315 speaks of the interests of justice and not prejudice, under the circumstances of this case we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision and affirm its ruling to deny Snyder's motion. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hailey, 470 Pa. 488, 368 A.2d 1261 (1977) (plurality).