Opinion ID: 6984410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rita Romer’s Status as a Responsible Person

Text: Applying these standards, the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Rita Romer was a responsible person within the meaning of section 6672(a). While the government did introduce uncontroverted evidence that Rita Romer was an officer, director, and shareholder of Atlas, she introduced evidence that she held her ownership interest and her titles merely as a convenience to her husband, who exercised effective control over her interest in the company. And although the government introduced evidence that Rita Romer had check-signing authority, she introduced evidence that she had virtually no power to sign a check without the knowledge or consent of either Steven Romer or Uribe. Finally, the government set forth evidence showing that Rita Romer was involved in important decisions regarding Atlas’s operation, but she introduced evidence that she had no deci-sionmaking authority over Atlas’s affairs, financial or otherwise. As noted above, section 6672(a) was not intended to apply to an individual who lacks actual control over an employer’s finances, even though he or she has technical authority by virtue of title or ownership interest. See Fiataruolo, 8 F.3d at 939. Although Rita Romer’s ownership interest, titles, and check-writing authority indicate that she may have been a responsible person, other evidence tends to show that she may have exercised little actual control over Atlas’s purse strings. Thus, indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of Rita Romer, there exists a genuine issue of fact as to whether she exercised “significant control” over Atlas’s finances or merely enjoyed a “titular designation” at the company. See Rem, 38 F.3d at 644 (question of fact existed as to titular designation where party was officer, director, and 20% owner of the company but evidence suggested that another individual effectively controlled his actions). Thus, the district court erred in finding that Rita Romer was a responsible party as a matter of law. See id. at 645. While the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the government, it did not err in denying Rita Romer’s motion. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government, these same genuine issues of fact exist and preclude a finding that Rom-er was not a responsible party as a matter of law.