Opinion ID: 4582595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantial Threat of Future Enforcement

Text: The last element of injury in fact, in this context, is whether it is clearly likely that “the future threat of enforcement of the [challenged policy] is substantial.” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 164, 134 S. Ct. at 2345. At this point, “[t]he distinction between facial and as-applied challenges bears legal significance.” See Schlissel, 939 F.3d at 766. Whereas “[t]here must be some evidence that [a] rule would be applied to the plaintiff in order for that plaintiff to bring an as-applied challenge,” that is not the case for facial challenges. Id.; accord Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Google Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 227–28 (5th Cir. 2016) (involving no facial challenge). Instead, “when dealing with pre-enforcement challenges to recently enacted (or, at least, non-moribund) statutes that facially restrict expressive activity by the class to which the plaintiff belongs, courts will assume a credible threat of prosecution in the absence of compelling contrary evidence.” N.H. Right to Life PAC v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1996); accord Carmouche, 449 F.3d at 660; McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 237–39 (3d Cir. 2010) (determining standing based on policies alone); Ariz. Right to Life PAC v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 2003); Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2003); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1999). The University of Texas members of Speech First plainly belong to a class arguably facially restricted by the University policies. Not only this, Speech First has also shown, by producing the University’s public log of bias incidents, that the Hate and Bias Incidents Policy has been resorted to 24 Case: 19-50529 Document: 00515621737 Page: 25 Date Filed: 10/30/2020 No. 19-50529 countless times regarding hundreds of events since 2012. Significantly, the largest numbers of reported complaints have related to Israel and affirmative action, two topics on which Speech First member Student A, for example, intends to speak. Such evidence establishes a threat of enforcement, not only of the Hate and Bias Incidents Policy, but also of the University’s other intertwined policies. The Hate and Bias Incidents Policy, after all, specifically refers to the Institutional Rules, as do the CCRT webpage and the Residence Hall Manual regarding the same issues. In addition, the Institutional Rules on speech specifically refer to the Acceptable Use Policy for “[r]ules protecting and regulating speech on University computer networks.” These overlapping policies strongly suggest that enforcement of one produces a credible threat of enforcement of the others. Speech First has clearly shown a credible threat of enforcement of those policies upon its members. Fenves disagrees with the sufficiency of this showing based on case law and on “compelling contrary evidence” that belies a credible threat of prosecution. The district court focused on the proffered declarations of University officials that no sanctions had been imposed for violating the challenged policies. On the case law, Fenves notes, Laird holds that “a complainant who alleges that the exercise of his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere existence, without more, of a governmental investigative and datagathering activity” faces no substantial threat of future harm. 408 U.S. at 10, 14, 92 S. Ct. at 2324. This holding was necessitated by the facts of the case. But Laird also contrasted the facts before it with a number of cases where “this Court has found . . . that constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id. 25 Case: 19-50529 Document: 00515621737 Page: 26 Date Filed: 10/30/2020 No. 19-50529 (citations omitted). Standing existed in the Court’s prior cases because “the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions he was challenging.” Id. at 11, 2325. Thus, according to Laird, a plaintiff who belongs in a class subject to the challenged policies has standing, while one who only resides in a country that maintains policies with which he disagrees, but who fails to allege himself personally subject to the policies, does not. Id. at 13, 2326. Laird does not prevent these plaintiffs, who are arguably covered by the allegedly unconstitutional policies, from having standing. In a second thrust at Speech First’s invocation of Gardner, Fenves quotes Carmouche, in which this court required more than “the mere existence of an allegedly vague or overbroad statute.” 449 F.3d at 660. This is in harmony with Laird. That Carmouche relied on a history of past enforcement to show a substantial threat of future enforcement does not contradict Laird’s acknowledgement that a plaintiff who is subject to a regulation or proscription has standing to sue. Either type of evidence may establish “a fear of prosecution that is not ‘imaginary or wholly speculative.’” Id. (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 302, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 2311 (1979)). As the Seventh Circuit explained, a plaintiff who mounts a preenforcement statutory challenge on First Amendment grounds “need not show that the authorities have threatened to prosecute him . . . ; the threat is latent in the existence of the statute.” Majors, 317 F.3d at 721. Finally, Clapper v. Amnesty International USA imposes no obstacle to finding a threat in this case that is likely substantial. In Clapper, the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs were in a class that, under the challenged statute, could not be targeted. 568 U.S. 398, 411, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013). Having established this, the Court looked for a history of enforcement or 26 Case: 19-50529 Document: 00515621737 Page: 27 Date Filed: 10/30/2020 No. 19-50529 specific facts 13 about the government’s targeting practices that might yet give rise to a substantial threat of enforcement. Id. The Court did not suggest, however, that if the plaintiffs had been the subject of the challenged policies, such evidence would have been necessary. Unsurprisingly, in Blum v. Holder, the First Circuit determined that “Clapper does not call into question the assumption that the state will enforce its own non-moribund criminal laws, absent evidence to the contrary.” 744 F.3d 790, 798 n.11 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Gardner, 99 F.3d at 15). The standard articulated in Gardner remains sound. Turning to the argument that the University offered “compelling contrary evidence” to the presumption of enforcement, Fenves alleges an absence of relevant past enforcement of the University’s policies. He reiterates the speech-protecting language of the policies in question and points to declarations by University officials to support that the University lacks any intention to penalize the intended conduct of Speech First’s members. This evidence is not compelling. First, both Fenves and a former Dean of Students assert that they know of no instance in which the University speech policies have been enforced against the speech topics described by Speech First. 14 Past enforcement of speech-related policies can assure standing, but as the foregoing discussion shows, a lack of past enforcement does not alone doom a claim of standing. See, e.g., Carmouche, 449 F.3d at 660 (“Controlling precedent . . . establishes that a chilling of speech because of the mere existence of an allegedly vague or overbroad [law] can be sufficient injury 13 Unlike this case, Clapper reviewed dismissal for lack of standing at the summary judgment stage, at which a plaintiff “can no longer rest on . . . ‘mere allegations,’ but must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts.’” Id. at 412, 1148–49. 14There is no reason to doubt their statements, which are based only on their personal experience; but on the other hand, the University’s student disciplinary records were unavailable to Speech First at this stage of litigation. 27 Case: 19-50529 Document: 00515621737 Page: 28 Date Filed: 10/30/2020 No. 19-50529 to support standing.”). Where the policy remains non-moribund, the claim is that the policy causes self-censorship among those who are subject to it, and the students’ speech is arguably regulated by the policy, there is standing. See, e.g., Schlissel, 939 F.3d at 766 (fact that “there is no evidence in the record” of past enforcement “misses the point”). Second, as was discussed above, the policies’ protection for student free speech “rights” is qualified and limited by required adherence to “university rules.” And third, University officials’ disavowals of any future intention to enforce the policies contrary to the First Amendment are compatible with, and simply reinforce, the open-ended language in those policies. The difficulty with such disavowals is that regulations governing “rude,” “uncivil,” “harassing,” or “offensive” speech can in fact cover speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011); Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ill. 1978). 15 Moreover, the University continues to defend the use of these terms. Even more to the point, if there is no history of inappropriate or unconstitutional past enforcement, and no intention to pursue discipline against students under these policies for speech that is protected by the First Amendment, then why maintain the policies at all? At least, why maintain the plethora of potential sanctions? After all, the University regulatory policy for speech, including the Acceptable Use Policy, could have stated succinctly that students will be disciplined, up to and including academic punishment 15This difficulty is not avoided by the University’s reliance on Blum. The Blum court construed a federal statute and, in doing so, exercised special “rigor[ ]” due to separation of powers concerns. 744 F.3d at 797. The statute in that case specifically targeted conduct, violent threats, and economic damage, but specifically excluded criminal liability for protected First Amendment conduct. 744 F.3d at 794. The government’s disavowal of prosecutions for protected speech thus had a secure statutory basis, unlike the disavowals here. 28 Case: 19-50529 Document: 00515621737 Page: 29 Date Filed: 10/30/2020 No. 19-50529 and criminal referral, for speech that is outside the protection of the First Amendment and, perhaps, Title IX, which covers sexual harassment in institutions receiving federal funds. 16 A reasonable observer must deduce that the University meant to expand its regulatory authority beyond the First Amendment; consequently, a reasonable student must act on the same assumption and self-censor her speech in accord with the perceived policies. Adding to the credible threat that the policies pose to the exercise of protected speech are two other circumstances: the University’s awareness that verbal harassment policies must be applied “narrowly” and the operation of the Hate and Bias Incidents Policy, through the CCRT, to deter those who would express controversial views. The Institutional Rules’ definition of verbal harassment consumes nearly a full page of small type. This alone might raise questions about vagueness, but the uncertainty is magnified by the University’s caveat that: Verbal harassment has been interpreted very narrowly by the federal courts. Policies on verbal harassment or hate speech at many universities have been held unconstitutional . . . . This policy should be interpreted as narrowly as need be to preserve its constitutionality. Put in terms of prospective enforcement, what does this mean? Surely it reasonably implies that the University will protect and enforce its verbal harassment policy as far as possible, but the distance to that horizon is unknown by the University and unknowable to those regulated by it. Likewise, insofar as the CCRT’s evaluations of bias incident reports is based on the same definition of verbal harassment, the entire University community has been encouraged to and has funneled into the CCRT hundreds 16 Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999). Whether Davis may constitutionally support purely verbal harassment claims, much less speechrelated proscriptions outside Title IX protected categories has not been decided by the Supreme Court or this court and seems self-evidently dubious. 29 Case: 19-50529 Document: 00515621737 Page: 30 Date Filed: 10/30/2020 No. 19-50529 of wide-ranging complaints. Moreover, the CCRT has “referred” a large number of reporting individuals “to appropriate sources of support and/or coordinate[d] with a university entity as appropriate.” The CCRT describes its work, judgmentally, in terms of “targets” and “initiators” of incidents. Further, examples of CCRT responses to reported incidents have included “facilitating conversation between those who were targeted by and those who initiated an incident; and making referrals to campus resources such as the UT Austin Police Department, the Office of the Dean of Students, and the Office for Inclusion and Equity (OIE).” The CCRT, in some measure, represents the clenched fist in the velvet glove of student speech regulation. That the CCRT invites anonymous reports carries particular overtones of intimidation to students whose views are “outside the mainstream.” As one expert explains, “[i]n both concept and design, such efforts [by “bias response teams”] to encourage students to anonymously initiate disciplinary proceedings for perceived acts of bias or to shelter themselves from disagreeable ideas are likely to subvert free and open inquiry and invite fears of political favoritism.” Keith Whittington, Free Speech and the Diverse University, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 2453, 2466 (2019); see also Hon. Jose Cabranes, For Freedom of Expression, For Due Process, and For Yale: The Emerging Threat to Academic Freedom at a Great University, 35 Yale L. & Pol. Rev. 345, 360 (2017) (lamenting potential dangers of anonymous reports and recordkeeping by campus bias “police”). For these reasons, the existence of the University’s policies, which the University plans to maintain as far as a federal court will allow it, suffices to establish that the threat of future enforcement, against those in a class whose speech is arguably restricted, is likely substantial. And such likelihood is all that is necessary to establish the final prong of injury-in-fact for standing to 30 Case: 19-50529 Document: 00515621737 Page: 31 Date Filed: 10/30/2020 No. 19-50529 seek a preliminary injunction in this kind of case. Speech First has established an injury in fact.