Opinion ID: 2973076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidentiary Exclusion

Text: This Court reviews evidentiary rulings by a district court for abuse of discretion. Bowman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 350 F.3d 537, 547 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing GE Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997); United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 564 (6th Cir. 2003)). On August 10, 2004, the district court granted DaimlerChrysler’s motion to exclude the testimony of Ethelbert Slater and the statistical analyses of John Sase, Ph.D. The judge asserted that Mr. Slater’s opinion as set out in his deposition neither bore a connection to the attitudes of the DaimlerChrysler employment decision-maker that affected Hopson, nor stemmed from Mr. Slater’s personal knowledge or observations. J.A. 460. “He in fact knew nothing about the filling of the jobs involved.” J.A. 460. Similarly, the judge found Mr. Sase’s statistical data “wholly inadequate” because they did not “identify the African-American workers qualified for supervisory or managerial jobs” or “identify employees who applied for [the] positions” in question. J.A. 460. By not taking account of nondiscriminatory variables, the data are “not the product of reliable principles and methods[.]” J.A. 460. 6 The Court finds no fault with the district court’s decisions. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, only “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence” may be used in court. FED. R. EVID. 401. Furthermore, what constitutes relevant evidence depends on the nature of the evidence proffered. Opinion testimony by a lay witness, such as Mr. Slater, may only encompass opinions or inferences “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness [and] (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue[.]” FED. R. EVID. 701. Mr. Slater’s testimony does neither. His opinions shed no light upon the attitudes of the relevant DaimlerChrysler decision-makers and, in fact, deal only with his own experience with unrelated employees. Testimony by experts, such as Mr. Sase, must be “based upon sufficient facts or data[,]” and the witness must have “applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702. As the district court explained – and we agree – Mr. Sase’s statistics do not pass this test. Nevertheless, Hopson retorts that this Court’s mandate in Hopson I “ordered that said testimony [by Messrs. Slater and Sase] be placed before the jury.” Final Br. Appellant at 37-38, 4142. While Hopson is correct in that “the trial court is bound to ‘proceed in accordance with the mandate and law of the case as established by the appellate court[,]’” the court must first glean the substance of the mandate in question. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Am. Eng’g Co., 105 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Petition of U.S. Steel Corp., 479 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1973)). This Court reviews the interpretation of mandates de novo. See United States v. Moore, 131 F.3d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1997). 7 Plaintiff-Appellant misconstrues this Court’s opinion. Hopson I was an appeal from summary judgment for the defendant. 306 F.3d at 428. As such, this Court examined the evidence in a light most favorable to Hopson when it determined that the Slater and Sase evidence “give rise to a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 436. At no point did the Court rule on the evidence’s admissibility. On the contrary, this Court expressed that “Hopson will have to demonstrate that Slater’s opinion is connected to the decision-makers’ actual attitudes” to avoid exclusion. Id. at 437. Likewise, Hopson I “recognize[d] that, on remand, Defendant-Appellee may challenge various aspects of Hopson’s statistics.” Id. at 438. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence at trial, and so we AFFIRM its decision. IV. The Judgement as a Matter of Law This Court reviews motions for judgment as a matter of law de novo. See Estate of Riddle v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 421 F.3d 400, 407-08 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Bowman, 350 F.3d at 544). “If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue,” a judgment as a matter of law for the opposing party is appropriate. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). A court may not grant the motion if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions from the evidence. See Bowman, 350 F.3d at 544 (citing McJunkin Corp. v. Mechs., Inc., 888 F.2d 481, 486 (6th Cir. 1989)). After the district court properly granted DaimlerChrysler the summary judgment and evidentiary exclusions above, Hopson’s case-in-chief succeeded only in proving prima facie race discrimination and could not muster proof, apart from Hopson’s personal opinion, that 8 DaimlerChrysler’s stated reasons for its employment decisions were pretexts for discrimination. The court therefore granted DaimlerChrysler judgment as a matter of law. J.A. 791-93. Because Hopson produced no evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found for the Defendant-Appellee, the district court properly granted the motion. Consequently, this Court AFFIRMS the judgment as a matter of law for DaimlerChrysler.2