Opinion ID: 2236288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Reconfiguration of Districts Two through Five

Text: Generally, once this court holds a provision of an act unconstitutional, as we have just done, our inquiry would next focus on whether the invalid portion may be severed from the remainder of the challenged legislationif severance is not possible, the entire legislation must fall. See, e.g., State Board of Elections, 136 Ill.2d at 532-33, 146 Ill.Dec. 126, 558 N.E.2d 89; City of Chicago Heights v. Public Service Co., 408 Ill. 604, 610, 97 N.E.2d 807 (1951). Relying on this precedent, defendants argue that if the Cook County provisions of the Act are deemed invalid, the Act's severability clause renders the remaining provisions in full force and effect. In this respect, defendants correctly identify section 55 of the Act as a specific severability clause. Section 55 provides the following: To the extent that any provision of this Act is found to be unconstitutional, that provision alone shall be deemed of no force and effect and all other provisions of this Act shall remain in full force and effect. Pub. Act 89-719, § 55, eff. March 7, 1998. We need not, however, address defendants' contentions regarding the severability of the Cook County provisions because even if we were to agree that those provisions are capable of severance, the Act contains a second constitutional infirmity which nevertheless renders it unconstitutional in its entirety. Specifically, the provisions of the Act that redistrict judicial districts two through five are unconstitutional in that they improperly split several judicial circuits amongst multiple judicial districts. Moreover, as we explain in greater detail in the last section of our analysis, the residue of the Act cannot be severed from all of the invalid provisions without doing violence to the General Assembly's overall intent in passing the Act. As noted elsewhere in this opinion, the Act repeals the Judicial Districts Act and redraws the geographic boundaries for judicial districts two through five. Although the legislature, in the Act, again divided the four districts by county, seven judicial circuits are divided amongst two or more judicial districts. For example, under the previously existing law, all four of the counties which comprise the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit were within the Third Judicial District. Under the Act, two of the counties remain in the Third Judicial District, one county is in the Fourth Judicial District, and one county is in the Second Judicial District. Plaintiffs view such redistricting as unconstitutional because a circuit must be contained entirely within a single judicial district. They argue that the plain language of the Constitution clearly establishes that the judicial circuits are the building blocks of our state court system. According to plaintiffs, a group of circuits are combined to create an appellate district, and the districts, when combined, encompass the entire state. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that neither the Constitution nor the debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1970 require such a result. They counter that the applicable language in the Constitution is not as clear an indication of the intent as plaintiffs suggest. Rather, defendants view the issue as one shrouded in ambiguity and that this court must, therefore, resolve any doubts in favor of the constitutionality of the statute. This court has long recognized that the meaning of any given constitutional provision depends on the common understanding of the citizens who, by ratifying the Constitution, gave it life. Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill.2d 483, 492, 83 Ill.Dec. 308, 470 N.E.2d 266 (1984) (and cases cited therein). We therefore begin our analysis, as we must, by giving effect to the plain language of the Constitution, for it is the language itself which provides the best evidence of what the drafters intended to convey to the citizens for ratification. Sayles v. Thompson, 99 Ill.2d 122, 125, 75 Ill.Dec. 446, 457 N.E.2d 440 (1983). The following constitutional provisions are particularly relevant to our discussion: The State is divided into five Judicial Districts for the selection of Supreme and Appellate Court Judges. The First Judicial District consists of Cook County. The remainder of the State shall be divided by law into four Judicial Districts of substantially equal population, each of which shall be compact and composed of contiguous counties. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 2. Appeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court in the Judicial District in which the Circuit Court is located. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 6. The State shall be divided into Judicial Circuits consisting of one or more counties. The First Judicial District shall constitute a Judicial Circuit. The Judicial Circuits within the other Judicial Districts shall be as provided by law. Circuits composed of more than one county shall be compact and of contiguous counties. The General Assembly by law may provide for the division of a circuit for the purpose of selection of Circuit Judges and for the selection of Circuit Judges from the circuit at large. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 7(a). Each Judicial Circuit shall have one Circuit Court with such number of Circuit Judges as provided by law. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 7(b). We regard the language in the Constitution as a limitation upon the legislature's authority and not as a grant of power. As a result, the General Assembly is free to enact any legislation not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. See State Board of Elections, 136 Ill.2d at 525, 146 Ill.Dec. 126, 558 N.E.2d 89. Section 6 of the Constitution provides that appeals from final judgments of a circuit court are a matter of right to the appellate court in the judicial district in which the circuit court is located. Section 7 of the Constitution concerns both circuit courts and judicial circuits. Section 7(a) begins by first dividing the state into judicial circuits, which may be comprised of more than one county. The next two sentences set forth how the judicial circuits shall be composed. The first of these two sentences refers back to the judicial districts established earlier in section 2 and requires that the First Judicial District constitute one judicial circuit. The next sentence permits the legislature to provide by law for the other judicial circuits within the judicial districts. Finally, section 7(b) requires each judicial circuit to have one Circuit Court. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 7(b). Section 7, therefore, establishes a unified circuit court structure in this state, comprised of judicial circuits resting within the judicial districts. It is the combination of sections 6 and 7 which renders unconstitutional the splitting of a judicial circuit amongst different districts. Section 6 requires that appeals from judgments of the circuit court be heard in the Judicial District in which the Circuit Court is located. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 6. However, the Constitution limits each judicial circuit to only one circuit court, even though a circuit may be comprised of multiple counties, throughout which various circuit courthouses may be situated. In order to comply with the constitutional requirement that appeals from a circuit court must be heard by the appellate court in the judicial district in which the circuit court is located, the entire judicial circuit from which the single circuit court is created must likewise be contained wholly within a single judicial district. Our interpretation of the foregoing constitutional language is buttressed by comments made during the Constitutional Convention of 1970. Although several members of the Judiciary Committee disagreed with the concept of granting the General Assembly the authority to divide circuits for the purpose of the selection of circuit judges (see, e.g., 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1078 (hereinafter Proceedings)), not one member of the Committee dissented from the majority's proposal that [t]he present basic constitutional pattern of judicial circuits remains unchanged. This means that Cook County is defined as a permanent judicial circuit, with the remainder of the state being divided by law    [and] the judicial circuits being encompassed wholly within each of the four Appellate Court Districts outside of Cook County.  (Emphasis added.) 6 Proceedings 978. In fact, the intent to keep intact circuits encompassed within a judicial district is evinced by the verbatim transcript of the debate of July 2, 1970. The chairman of the Judiciary Committee, William Fay, stated that the present basic constitutional pattern of judicial circuits remains unchanged. Cook County continues to be defined as a separate permanent judicial circuit, the remainder of the state being divided by law and the judicial circuits consisting of one or more counties and the judicial circuits being encompassed wholly within each of the four appellate court districts outside of Cook County.  (Emphasis added.) 3 Proceedings 2278. Thus, the constitutional debates reinforce the notion that judicial circuits were not to be split amongst various judicial districts. The insight provided by these comments is critical to our task of discerning the intent of the drafters. As this court has stated in the past, [t]he meaning which the delegates to the convention attached to a provision in the Constitution    is relevant in resolving ambiguities which may remain after consulting the language of the provision. [Citations.] The reason is that it is only with the consent of the convention that such provisions are submitted to the voters in the first place. Kalodimos, 103 Ill.2d at 493, 83 Ill. Dec. 308, 470 N.E.2d 266. Defendants themselves acknowledge the above-cited statements, but dismiss their relevance by characterizing them as mere fleeting references to the question at hand. Given defendants' contentions that the issue of whether judicial circuits may be split and put into different judicial districts is one shrouded in ambiguity, we find this characterization inexplicable. The statements serve as a clear indication that the language utilized in sections 6 and 7 was intended to prohibit the legislature from splitting the circuits amongst several judicial districts. Sections 25, 30, 35, and 40 of the Act, however, contravene this intent by dividing several judicial circuits. For this reason, therefore, the sections are unconstitutional.