Opinion ID: 203757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contrary to, or ... an unreasonable application of ...

Text: John next seeks relief under § 2254(d)(1), arguing that the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. He challenges his state court conviction on constitutional grounds, presenting arguments sounding in due process. To be `contrary to' clearly established Supreme Court law, a state court must `appl[y] a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases' or `confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] [Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.' Dagley v. Russo, 540 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). A state court's decision will constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law if the court either `identifies the correct governing legal rule from th[e] [Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case' or `unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.' Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495). Most of John's arguments proceed on the same premise as his fact-based argument  that the government granted him unrestricted use immunity at some point. Specifically, John claims that Novak promised him unrestricted use immunity, which he alleges is reflected by the grand jury colloquy, and then later made this immunity conditional upon him testifying truthfully at the Beckford trial. Given our resolution of John's challenge to the state court factual findings, none of these arguments are colorable. As we developed above, the state court's finding that Novak never promised John unrestricted use immunity is supported by the record, and John has failed to rebut the presumption of correctness we afford that finding. But one of John's arguments does not hinge on our rejecting the state court factual findings. John argues that Novak's threat to strip him of his Fifth Amendment rights, which came before his confession to the FBI agent, rendered his confession involuntary. The SJC disagreed, ruling that the trial court did not err in concluding that John's confession to the FBI agent was voluntary. John, 812 N.E.2d at 1224-25. Although John does not couch his challenge to this SJC ruling in the language of § 2254(d)(1), we take him to be arguing that the ruling was contrary to Supreme Court precedent or involved an unreasonable application of that precedent. Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), in analyzing John's claim that his confession was involuntary, the SJC considered the totality of the circumstances, recognizing that the voluntariness of a confession turns on whether the defendant's will was overborne to the extent that [his] statements were not the result of a free and voluntary act. John, 812 N.E.2d at 1224 (citations omitted); see also Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285-87, 111 S.Ct. 1246. The SJC concluded that John's confession was voluntary, discussing both John's impression of the relevant meeting with Novak and his possible motivation for confessing to the FBI agent. John, 812 N.E.2d at 1224. [8] After review of the record, we conclude that the SJC did not unreasonably apply, or act contrary to, Supreme Court law when concluding that John's confession was voluntary. Although the SJC did not cite Supreme Court precedent, its voluntariness analysis was consistent with it. See Dagley, 540 F.3d at 16 (recognizing that [a] failure to cite Supreme Court decisions does not itself suggest a state court decision is `contrary to' such precedents.... `so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them') (citations omitted). And the SJC's voluntariness ruling was reasonable and amply supported by the record evidence.