Opinion ID: 3161446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fourteenth Amendment Brady Claim

Text: Snow first claims that Nelson and Rankin violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to disclose to prosecutors and the grand jury that on July 15, 2013, the confidential informant identified a man who was not Snow as “the dope dealer,” but on the following day identified 5 No. 15-3320, Snow v. Nelson, et al. Snow as “Emmitt,” the suspected drug dealer and target of the investigation. While there is some argument about whether Snow raises his Brady claim for the first time on appeal, assuming that this claim is properly before us, it lacks merit because the alleged exculpatory evidence was disclosed, and Snow never stood trial. Defendants first argue that Snow’s Brady claim is not properly before this court because it does not appear on the face of his complaint. As a general rule, this court does not consider new arguments presented for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2006). Moreover, we have held that “[t]he appropriate method for adding new factual allegations to a complaint is not via an appellate brief, but by filing an amended complaint.” Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 2006). Defendants are correct that Snow’s complaint does not allege a Brady violation. It does allege a deprivation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but it only states a single cause of action, which nearly mirrors the elements of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. Notably absent is any mention of Brady or the elements of a Brady claim. However, Snow’s Brady and malicious prosecution claims are premised on the same underlying facts. See Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 750–51 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that Brady and malicious prosecution claims can share a factual premise and that plaintiffs are free to pursue claims under both theories). The factual premise of Snow’s Brady claim appears on the face of his complaint and, thus, Snow’s appeal does not seek to augment the factual allegations of his complaint. What is more, Snow’s Brady claim was raised in his Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and it was briefed by both parties before the district court. We assume, therefore, that Snow’s Brady claim is properly before us. However, we find the merits of that claim lacking. 6 No. 15-3320, Snow v. Nelson, et al. When exculpatory material is disclosed, even belatedly, there is generally no Brady violation. See United States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658, 665 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987) (“In general, the principles announced in Brady do not apply to a tardy disclosure of exculpatory information, but to a complete failure to disclose.”). If a criminal defendant can show that he was materially prejudiced by a delay in disclosure, it may be grounds for a Brady claim. Id. However, when exculpatory information is disclosed “‘in time for use at trial’” there is no constitutional violation. United States v. Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 569 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988)). This follows logically from our understanding that material prejudice occurs only when it is likely that the disclosure of the evidence would have altered the result of the proceeding. See United States v. Garner, 507 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2007). Here, the information was disclosed before a trial date was set. And immediately after Snow’s attorney first learned of the alleged misidentification, his client was released, and the charges were dropped. Despite never standing trial and ultimately being released, Snow maintains that he has stated a proper Brady claim because the alleged failure to disclose resulted in his detention for fifty-two days. This argument, however, misperceives the harm Brady claims are designed to redress. Brady’s “ultimate concern [is] ensuring that criminal defendants receive a fundamentally fair trial.” Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of this concern, we have held that liability for a Brady violation only exists when evidence sufficient to “‘put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict’” is improperly withheld. Johnson v. Mitchell, 585 F.3d 923, 933 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)) (emphasis added). Furthermore, a Brady claim requires “a 7 No. 15-3320, Snow v. Nelson, et al. showing that there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that had the evidence been timely disclosed to the defense the outcome would have been different.” Garner, 507 F.3d at 405 (emphasis added). Here, the State did not secure a criminal conviction by improperly withholding exculpatory evidence. On the contrary, the record is clear that the State was complying with discovery requests. Moreover, there is no question that before a plea was discussed or trial dates set, Snow’s attorney learned of the allegedly exculpatory information. Perhaps Snow would have been released earlier had the alleged misidentification come to light sooner, but he can have no complaints about the ultimate outcome of his case. The fifty-two days Snow spent in jail awaiting a plea or a trial is simply not the type of deprivation Brady claims are intended to remedy. Even were we to recognize a Brady claim in this context, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. As we held in Robertson v. Lucas, our precedent does not support any clearly established right of criminal defendants to receive exculpatory Brady material before plea bargaining. 753 F.3d 606, 621 (6th Cir. 2014). There, the court found that while every reasonable officer “would know that they were under an obligation to present Brady material to the prosecutors in time for its effective use at trial,” the officers were under “no clearly established obligation to disclose exculpatory Brady material to the prosecutors in time to be put to effective use in plea bargaining.” Id. at 621–22 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Here, Snow’s attorney was aware of the alleged misidentification prior to any plea bargaining. Thus, defendants are well within the ambit of qualified immunity.