Opinion ID: 600741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Denial of the Suppression Motion

Text: 19 Perea and Ortiz, who was arrested shortly after the events involving Perea, were indicted on one count of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and more than 500 grams of cocaine, one count of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, and one count of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. Perea, in support of his motion to suppress the contents of the duffel bag, the money found in the back seat of the cab, and his statements to the agents, argued, inter alia, that the degree of force used to effectuate the stop was so great that the stop should be treated as an arrest, and that since the information possessed by the agents did not rise to the level of probable cause, the arrest was unlawful. In response to the government's challenge to his standing to challenge the search of the duffel bag, Perea argued that he had standing as a bailee. The government contended that Perea had abandoned the bag by telling the agents it was not his. With respect to this contention, which Perea disputed, the district court stated during the hearing, I don't decide this on the question of abandonment. My view of abandonment may be somewhat different than the higher court's view of it, but I don't find that he abandoned. (Hearing Transcript, June 21, 1991, at 7.) 20 Without mentioning the abandonment contention again, the district court denied the suppression motion on other grounds. First, in a Memorandum and Order dated June 24, 1991 (June Memorandum), it ruled that though Perea, as a passenger, had standing to challenge the stop of the cab, the testimony at the suppression hearing plainly demonstrate[d] that there was present the reasonable suspicion necessary to effect a forcible stop. June Memorandum at 1. The court declined, however, to decide whether the force used in the stop was so great as to constitute an arrest, for which probable cause would have been required, stating that 21 the critical fact is that nothing followed from the alleged excessive use of force. The subsequent search of the trunk of the taxi resulted from the stop the law enforcement officers had every right to make and not from the manner in which the stop was effected. The result might be otherwise if the validity of the search depended on the consent of the driver or the defendant.... Because the validity of the subsequent search does not depend on such consent, there is no need to question the judgment of the law enforcement officers as to the degree of force appropriate in stopping a car that they had reason to suspect was engaged in crime of which violence is often an integral part. 22 Id. at 2. 23 The court ruled that Perea had no standing to challenge the search of the cab's trunk because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trunk. Noting that the cab did not belong to Perea and that the trunk was simply a temporary storage place for a duffel bag during a brief taxi ride, the court ruled that Perea had no more of an expectation of privacy in the trunk of the taxi than the defendant in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98[, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633] (1980), had in the pocketbook of his friend in which he placed narcotics. June Memorandum at 2-3. 24 The court ruled that Perea also had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the duffel bag itself, stating that 25 I do not credit his testimony regarding either the length of time the bag had been in his custody or what he was doing with it at the time of its seizure. Even under his version of the events, however, it is conceded that the bag and its contents did not belong to him and that he was a temporary custodian of the duffel bag. At best, the record suggests that Mr. Perea was simply hired to transport the bag from one location to another. Because he does not assert any facts remotely suggesting that he had any expectation of privacy in the contents of the bag, the search did not violate any expectation of privacy that the defendant had in the duffel bag or its contents. 26 Id. at 3. 27 Finally, in a one-page order dated July 26, 1991, the court denied Perea's motion to suppress the money seized from the back seat of the cab and his statements to the agents, stating as follows: 28 At the time defendant told the arresting officers that the money was hidden in the back of the livery, there was probable cause for his arrest. Even if the initial seizure of the defendant on the basis of reasonable suspicion is characterized as an arrest without probable cause, the subsequent statements made after probable cause was established (and the fruits of those statements) need not be suppressed. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365[, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1626, 32 L.Ed.2d 152] (1972).