Opinion ID: 2630027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The County's Zoning Enforcement Authority

Text: {7} Counties possess those powers expressly granted by the Legislature, as well as those necessarily implied to implement express powers. El Dorado at Santa Fe, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 89 N.M. 313, 317, 551 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1976). A county's authority to zone can only be exercised pursuant to statutory authority and in conformity with a lawfully adopted ordinance. State ex rel. Vaughn v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 113 N.M. 347, 349, 825 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Ct.App.1991). {8} The parties do not dispute that the Legislature delegated to counties the statutory authority to zone. The Zoning Act (Act) affords counties a comprehensive scheme to regulate land use as a way to protect public health, safety, and welfare. See NMSA 1978, §§ 3-21-1 to -14 (1965, as amended through 1995). Pursuant to the Act, counties may adopt zoning ordinances. See § 3-21-2(A). Santa Fe County did so by enacting several land use ordinances now compiled as a unified land development code. See Santa Fe, N.M., Santa Fe County Land Dev.Code, Ordinance 1996-10 (Sept. 10, 1996) (Land Development Code or Code). The Code includes Article XI, Zoning for Extraction of Construction Materials, which was originally adopted in 1992 to regulate sand and gravel mining. Against this backdrop of general zoning authority, we now examine the statutes and ordinances that address the County's power to enforce that zoning authority. {9} Three sections of the Zoning Act are relevant to our inquiry. First, Section 3-21-6(A)(1) provides that [t]he zoning authority within its jurisdiction shall provide by ordinance for the manner in which zoning regulations, restrictions and the boundaries of the district are ... enforced. Next, Section 3-21-10(A) provides that any ordinance adopted pursuant to [Sections 3-21-1 through 3-21-14] shall be enforced ... as municipal ordinances are enforced. As part of that statute, Section 3-21-10(B) provides: In addition, if any building or structure is erected, constructed, reconstructed, altered, repaired, converted or maintained, or any building, structure or land is used in violation of Sections 3-21-1 through 3-21-14 NMSA 1978, or any ordinance adopted pursuant to these sections, the zoning authority may institute any appropriate action or proceedings to: (1) prevent such unlawful erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, conversion, maintenance or use; (2) restrain, correct or abate the violation; (3) prevent the occupancy of such building, structure or land; or (4) prevent any illegal act, conduct, business or use in or about such the premises. Last, Section 3-21-13(A) provides that counties may enact ordinances to carry out the authority granted to them to regulate building and zoning the same as a municipality. Section 3-21-13(B) provides that county ordinances  may be enforced by prosecution in the district court of the county. Penalties for violations of these ordinances shall not exceed a fine of three hundred dollars ($300) or imprisonment for ninety days, or both. (Emphasis added.) Section 3-21-13© provides that [t]he district attorney and sheriff shall enforce these ordinances. (Emphasis added.) {10} Cerrillos Gravel relies heavily on the latter section of the Act, Section 3-21-13, to support its argument that the district court is the exclusive venue in which the County may enforce zoning violations. Despite the word may first used in Section 3-21-13(B), Cerrillos Gravel argues that the use of shall in Sections 31-21-13(B) and -©, with respect to fines and prosecution by the district attorney and sheriff, mandates enforcement by direct action in court and not by suspension or revocation of a permit. As Cerrillos Gravel notes, Section 3-21-13(B) is similar to NMSA 1978, § 4-37-3(A) (1993), which addresses the general authority of counties to enforce county ordinances by taking a direct action in court. Section 4-37-3(A) provides that [c]ounty ordinances may be enforced by prosecution for violations of those ordinances in any court of competent jurisdiction, and that penalties may not exceed three hundred dollars ($300) or ninety days imprisonment or both. In addition, Section 3-21-10(A) directs that the Zoning Act, and any ordinances adopted pursuant to the Act, shall be enforced as municipal ordinances are enforced. Cerrillos Gravel points out that municipal ordinances are enforced by direct action in municipal court. See NMSA 1978, § 3-17-1© (1993). Thus, Cerrillos Gravel contends, the only statutory remedy available to the County to address zoning violations requires a sheriff or district attorney to bring an action in court, and the only possible penalties are a nominal monetary fine and up to ninety days in jail. {11} We do not agree with Cerrillos Gravel that the County's enforcement authority is dictated exclusively by Section 3-21-13. In addition to Section 3-21-13, Sections 3-21-6 and 3-21-10(B) address the County's power to enforce its zoning regulations. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, these two sections grant counties broad power to enact ordinances to determine how their ordinances are enforced, and to `institute any appropriate action or proceedings' to prevent and abate violations. Cerrillos Gravel, 2004-NMCA-096, ¶ 8, 136 N.M. 247, 96 P.3d 1167 (quoting Section 3-21-10(B)). Rather than interpret Section 3-21-13 as a specific statute that prevails over a general statute, as Cerrillos Gravel urges us to do, we agree with the Court of Appeals that it is possible to harmonize all the statutes concerning the County's enforcement powers. See Cerrillos Gravel, 2004-NMCA-096, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 247, 96 P.3d 1167. {12} As the Court of Appeals observed, the Legislature specifically provided that violations of ordinances  may be enforced by prosecution in court. Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis added); see § 3-21-13(B); § 4-37-3(A). By using the word may, instead of shall, the Legislature indicated it was being permissive, granting the County discretionary authority to enforce violations of ordinances by quasi-criminal prosecution subject to fines and imprisonment. Cerrillos Gravel, 2004-NMCA-096, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 247, 96 P.3d 1167. Thus, under those specific statutes allowing for a quasi-criminal prosecution, it would be proper for a sheriff or district attorney to enforce violations in court. {13} However, Sections 3-21-13 and 4-37-3 do not provide the sole remedy for violations of county ordinances. Rather, we ascribe greater importance to the County's broad authority to provide by ordinance for the manner in which zoning regulations shall be enforced. Section 3-21-6(A). We agree with the County that Section 3-21-6 suggests legislative intent to allow counties to prescribe their own means of enforcing zoning ordinances, including at the administrative level. In Section 3-21-6, the Legislature granted counties the express authority to enact ordinances to provide for enforcement of zoning regulations and restrictions. Pursuant to this broad statutory authority, the County passed a comprehensive zoning ordinance that expressly allows the Board to issue and suspend mining permits, and further provides that such actions may occur administratively. See Santa Fe, N.M., Santa Fe County Land Dev.Code art. XI, § 1.11(A), (B) (1996) (providing that failure to comply with the Code shall subject the mining operation to penalties, which may include suspension or revocation of the mining land use permit, and which will be imposed only after a hearing before the board). Thus, the County had the specific statutory authority to choose how it would enforce its land use ordinances, and the County chose an ordinance prescribing the very administrative course of action it pursued in this case. {14} It is clearly within the scope of the County's statutory authority to provide that suspension and revocation may occur administratively, after a hearing before the Board. The broad enabling legislation need not expressly authorize suspension or revocation as long as those actions are consistent with the statutory authority to enforce zoning regulations. See City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 412-15, 389 P.2d 13, 16-18 (1964) (holding that an ordinance creating an historical district and requiring new buildings to harmonize with old ones was within the scope of the enabling statute allowing municipalities to zone consistently with a comprehensive plan to promote the general health and welfare). {15} In addition to Section 3-21-6, Section 3-21-10 indicates that the Legislature intended to delegate broad authority to counties to enforce their zoning ordinances. While Section 3-21-10(A) speaks of enforcing the Zoning Act as municipal ordinances are enforced, which includes direct action in court, that method is not exclusive. In addition, as Section 3-21-10(B) provides, counties may institute any appropriate action or proceedings to prevent unlawful land use and zoning violations. The language of this section indicates that the Legislature did not intend to limit enforcement to criminal proceedings, but rather that Section 3-21-13 simply provides one alternative for enforcement. Cerrillos Gravel argues that the Legislature only intended Section 3-21-10(B) to provide for injunction or abatement actions in court, as opposed to administrative action, but we are not persuaded. The language of the section does not support such a narrow construction. {16} Further, the County argues its right to impose conditions upon permit approval necessarily implies the right to revoke approval when those conditions are not satisfied. We agree. Statutes may confer authority either expressly or by necessary implication. See El Dorado, 89 N.M. at 317, 551 P.2d at 1364 (stating counties possess those powers expressly granted by statute as well as those necessary to implement those express powers). We agree that the power to revoke a permit is necessarily implied from the power to approve a permit. {17} As our analysis of the relevant statutes and ordinances indicates, we are persuaded that the Legislature delegated broad power to the County to enforce the zoning ordinance, which the County exercised in conformity with a lawfully adopted ordinance. Cerrillos Gravel argues that this holding is inconsistent with Vaughn, which Cerrillos Gravel contends stands for the proposition that revocation of a zoning permit is beyond the scope of the Board's authority in all instances. Although the Court of Appeals correctly rejected this interpretation, we find it necessary to clarify the distinction. {18} In Vaughn, the Court of Appeals examined whether the Bernalillo County Board of County Commissioners had authority to revoke a special use permit that was granted for life. 113 N.M. at 348, 825 P.2d at 1258. In Bernalillo County, a specific ordinance provided for cancellation of a special use permit only in the event the use was discontinued. Id. at 349-50, 825 P.2d at 1259-60. Because the revocation was not based on discontinuance, the Court of Appeals found no authority to revoke the special use permit based on other reasons. Id. at 350, 825 P.2d at 1260. Thus, the Vaughn court held that nothing in the applicable statute or ordinance specifically allows for the cancellation of a special use permit that was granted for life. Id. {19} Cerrillos Gravel argues that Vaughn establishes an absolute prohibition on permit revocations by counties. Disagreeing with that argument, the Court of Appeals interpreted Vaughn as standing for the proposition that a county could revoke a land use permit but only under certain circumstances. See Cerrillos Gravel, 2004-NMCA-096, ¶ 18, 136 N.M. 247, 96 P.3d 1167. The Court of Appeals distinguished Vaughn from this case on grounds that Santa Fe County has an ordinance that specifically provides for suspension or cancellation of a mining permit, and further provides that such an action may occur administratively. Id. ¶ 13, 825 P.2d 1257. {20} We agree that Vaughn did not establish a broad rule that a county may never revoke a land use permit. We add to this analysis, however, by emphasizing that Bernalillo County clearly went beyond its limited authority in Vaughn, while Santa Fe County has broad authority in the case before us. The Vaughn court never determined that Bernalillo County lacked authority to enact an ordinance with a revocation provision, only that the county did not act in conformance with the specific provisions of the existing ordinance. Unlike the situation in Vaughn, the ordinance at issue in this case does not contain an express statement denying enforcement power to the County. Thus, unlike Vaughn, Santa Fe County suspended the permit pursuant to statutory authority and in conformance with a lawfully adopted ordinance. {21} In conclusion, we hold that the County's ordinance providing for suspension or revocation of a mining permit is consistent with the statutory authority granted by the Legislature to pass ordinances defining how land use ordinances will be enforced. See § 3-21-6. The ordinance is also consistent with the statutory authority vested in the County to institute any appropriate action or proceedings to confront violations of land use ordinances. See § 3-21-10(B). As a result, the County had the authority to enforce its ordinance administratively and suspend Cerrillos Gravel's mining permit.