Opinion ID: 1470383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Family Court

Text: The Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, State v. Day, 911 A.2d 1042, 1049 (R.I.2006); it was created by statute and its authority is restricted to those powers that are conferred by the Legislature. State v. Mastracchio, 546 A.2d 165, 168 (R.I.1988). However, the Family Court's authority over the welfare of children is among the court's core functions, and the Supreme Court consistently, and jealously, has guarded the Family Court's mission as a sanctuary and critical refuge for the state's troubled children. The Family Court's adjudication of a case involving a child accused of conduct that would be criminal, but for the child's age, has wide-ranging effects on the welfare of the child and the well-being of the community. Although this Court consistently has recognized that juveniles have no constitutional right to avoid the adult penal system, we carefully have reviewed any challenge to the Family Court's jurisdictional reach over children. Mastracchio, 546 A.2d at 169. An accused child who comes before the Family Court has the benefit of the ameliorative mission of that court, rather than face the adult criminal justice system, with its dual aim of retribution and deterrence. Knott v. Langlois, 102 R.I. 517, 520-21, 231 A.2d 767, 768 (1967) (citing Comment, Criminal Offenders In The Juvenile Court: More Brickbats And Another Proposal, 114 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1171, 1172 (1966)). When an alleged minor offender is adjudicated in the Family Court rather than the adult system, the case is approached with the possibility of detention in a juvenile institution for rehabilitative rather than retributive purposes for a term which cannot extend beyond his [or her] [19th] birthday[,] as opposed to incarceration in an adult penal institution for a term which depending on the crime may be for as much as life. Knott, 102 R.I. at 521, 231 A.2d at 768-69; see also § 14-1-6. Because of the Family Court's objective of rehabilitation and treatment for troubled youth, this Court has acknowledged the limitations and critical importance of a waiver of jurisdiction by the Family Court. In re Joseph T., 575 A.2d 985, 986 (R.I.1990) (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966)). The Family Court is the last barrier separating the child from the adult criminal justice system, and a decision to waive jurisdiction over a juvenile is not to be undertaken lightly. Waiver of jurisdiction has long-lasting consequences: the child no longer will remain at the Rhode Island Training School, and he or she may face imprisonment in a high-security facility, alongside the state's most hardened felons. For these reasons, the Family Court's waiver of jurisdiction over a child accused of conduct that would be criminal if committed by an adult should be critically examined and cautiously decided. Title 14 of the General Laws is a legislative framework  constructed incrementally and not uniformly  that is designed to deal with children who are accused of acts that would be criminal if committed by an adult. Section 14-1-40(a) provides that a juvenile may not be charged with or convicted of a crime in any court, except as provided in this chapter. This Court has recognized that the Family Court has exclusive personal jurisdiction over juveniles appearing before it on delinquency petitions, and although the Family Court may declare that a child's behavior is delinquent, it has no authority to adjudicate that child as a felon. Day, 911 A.2d at 1049. Only after a judicial determination that a waiver of Family Court jurisdiction is appropriate is that court divested of jurisdiction over the child, who then is subject to criminal prosecution. Id. After careful review of the record in the Greenberg case and examination of settled law with respect to delinquent children, we are satisfied that, whatever the crime charged, the prosecution of a child under the age of eighteen is controlled by title 14 of the General Laws and jurisdiction rests, in the first instance, in the Family Court, subject to a waiver of jurisdiction over the child in accordance with the statute. The Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction authorized to hear criminal cases, but it lacks personal jurisdiction over juveniles accused of criminal conduct unless and until there has been a waiver of jurisdiction over the accused by the Family Court. Day, 911 A.2d at 1049. Waiver of jurisdiction over a child by the Family Court is a decision that is made on a case-by-case basis to protect the best interest of the juvenile and the public. See Mastracchio, 546 A.2d at 169 & n. 5. In crafting a mechanism to balance these sometimes competing interests, we are mindful that [t]he Legislature is `presumed to know the state of existing law when it enacts or amends a statute.' State v. DelBonis, 862 A.2d 760, 768-69 (R.I.2004) (quoting Simeone v. Charron, 762 A.2d 442, 446 (R.I.2000)). The underlying statutory scheme at issue in this case confers jurisdiction on the Family Court over seventeen-year-olds who are accused of offenses that would be criminal if committed by adults. We are of the opinion that the Family Court's original jurisdiction over juveniles who are accused of felony offenses was unchanged by the July Amendment; even after the passage of the amendment, a juvenile could be prosecuted in Superior Court, but only after the Family Court conducted a waiver hearing and waived jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of chapter 1 of title 14. This is so because the amendment did not divest the Family Court of its original and exclusive personal jurisdiction over juvenile offenders. Pursuant to the July Amendment,  [a]ny person who has attained the age of seventeen years or older and is alleged to have committed a felony offense  shall be referred to the court which would have had jurisdiction over the offense if it had been committed by an adult. Section 14-1-6(c), as amended by P.L.2007, ch. 73, art. 22, § 1. (Emphases added.) The state argues that, because the statute required the Family Court to refer the juvenile to adult court, a waiver hearing was not a prerequisite condition. According to the state, the General Assembly did not condition the jurisdictional change upon [a probable-cause] hearing in Family Court. This is so, the state contends, because the amendment to § 14-1-6(c) plainly does not say that the Family Court may only refer an offender to the appropriate adult court upon a finding of probable cause by a Family Court justice, and thus there is no basis to read such a requirement into the statute. This argument is without merit. Section 14-1-6 is completely silent with respect to how the Family Court may waive jurisdiction over a child. The conditions prerequisite to a waiver of jurisdiction and the mandate for a probable-cause hearing are set forth in §§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1. In his decision, the Superior Court justice concluded that the Legislature intended to expand those instances in which the Family Court was mandated to waive its jurisdiction over juvenile offenders, but that waiver of jurisdiction must be in accordance with chapter 1 of title 14. We agree with this conclusion and are satisfied that the Family Court was not divested of jurisdiction over seventeen-year-olds who were accused of conduct that would be criminal if committed by an adult. We hold that juveniles, including defendants before us, should have been presented in the Family Court in the first instance. A juvenile may be referred to adult court only after a probable-cause hearing and a finding by the hearing justice that waiver of jurisdiction is appropriate and consistent with the statute.