Opinion ID: 186262
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The FBI files matter

Text: 24 In dispute here is whether the but for requirement has been met, and whether Livingstone was a subject of the IC's investigation. 25 1. The but for requirement. As he did concerning the Foster documents matter, Livingstone argues that he satisfies the but for requirement under several different circumstances previously recognized by the Court. His first claim concerns the Attorney General's conclusion of the preliminary investigation of the matter in just two days. According to Livingstone, the AG cut short the preliminary investigation in order to try to stem the adverse publicity the Clinton White House was suffering after public disclosure of the existence of the files. He claims that if the AG had permitted the preliminary investigation to run its usual course, then the Attorney General might well have concluded that, given the obvious errors in the Secret Service list of persons requiring access to the Clinton White House, no further investigation in fact was warranted. (Emphasis supplied by Livingstone.) 26 Livingstone's second claim is that even if the AG had used the full amount of time for the preliminary investigation, the only basis upon which she would have referred it to the IC would be the requirement in the Act that [t]he Attorney General shall not base a determination ... that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted ... unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the person lacked [the state of mind required for the violation of criminal law involved]. 28 U.S.C. § 592 (a)(2)(B)(ii). Livingstone argues that if that were the case, the `but for' test still would be satisfied, because the Attorney General would by definition be prolonging the investigation solely because of the Independent Counsel statute's requirements. 27 Third, Livingstone contends that absent the Act, the IC's investigation of the FBI files matter would have been disposed of at a much earlier stage of the investigation than the four years the Independent Counsel kept the matter open and that any other investigative body or authority would not have taken nearly as long. Similarly, Livingstone claims that it is doubtful that, given the obvious bureaucratic mistake that had been committed, [he] or Mr. Marceca would have been criminally investigated in these circumstances had they been private citizens rather than employees of the White House. 28 In her evaluation, the IC disputes Livingstone's claim that the AG conducted an exceptionally brief preliminary investigation in order to prevent any further bad publicity to the White House. She notes that this claim is nothing more than Livingstone's conclusion about the AG's motive, and that in any event, it is not a logical claim because the referral of a matter to an IC generates substantial media attention. 29 As for Livingstone's argument that had the AG conducted a full-term preliminary investigation, she would have only referred the case to the IC because of the Act's strict clear and convincing mens rea requirement, the IC notes that Livingstone points to no facts to support this argument. Furthermore, she notes that in any event [t]here would have had to have been convincing evidence that none of those involved had the requisite state of mind before no investigation would have been conducted. The IC goes on to note that, at the time of the preliminary investigation, there was substantial evidence that over 300 FBI reports on staff members of previous administrations had been improperly received at the OPS; that the White House admitted there was no legitimate reason to have the reports; that the Secret Service contradicted OPS's testimony as to how the files came to be requested; and that Marceca, who had requested the files, admitted to utilizing them even after realizing that they had been improperly requested. Such evidence, according to the IC, was clearly sufficient to satisfy the probable cause standard required of prosecutors in conducting further criminal investigation and that no type of investigation substantially shorter than the IC's would have resolved the matter. As such, the IC argues that Livingstone's state of mind argument must fail. 30 In its evaluation, the DOJ argues, as it did concerning the Foster documents matter, that Livingstone invokes an incorrect legal standard when he argues that he fulfils the but for test because he would not have been investigated had he been a private citizen. Rather, asserts the DOJ, the correct standard is whether someone similarly situated would have been investigated in the absence of the Act. Here, the DOJ argues that the answer is in the affirmative, because the FBI was investigating the matter even before the decision was made to refer the matter to the IC, and the allegations concerning the matter were credible claims of serious wrongdoing. 31 With respect to Livingstone's claim that he meets the but for test because the AG did not take the full 90 days to conduct her preliminary investigation, the DOJ argues that in light of the circumstances surrounding the allegations a more extensive preliminary investigation was unnecessary. 32 Although the IC and the DOJ argue otherwise, it appears to us that with respect to the FBI files matter Livingstone has passed the but for test. In our recent opinion concerning the fee application of Marceca, we found the but for requirement fulfilled because a full length preliminary investigation by the DOJ, in contrast to the two-day investigation actually conducted, would in all probability have revealed that the list provided to Marceca by the Secret Service was in fact outdated; and this would have lead to a curtailed investigation. In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan (Marceca Fee Application), 366 F.3d 922, 927 (D.C.Cir., Spec. Div., 2004) (per curiam). Since Livingstone was involved in the same investigation, he fulfills the but for requirement under the same reasoning. 33 2. Subject. While acknowledging that Marceca was the principal focus of the IC's investigation in the FBI files matter, Livingstone argues that he was also a subject because he requested Marceca be detailed to OPS and assigned Marceca to the files project. He buttresses this argument by claiming that he was specifically denominated a subject of the Independent Counsel's investigation in communications between the Office of Independent Counsel and [his] counsel. 34 The IC, however, disputes Livingstone's subject claim. First, the IC contends that Livingstone's assertion that he was denominated a subject by the IC is incorrect, because in fact the IC made no such designation. Furthermore, the IC notes that Livingstone was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury only as a witness, and was questioned by the OIC specifically with respect to who hired him for the position at OPS. Under these circumstances, according to the IC, there is nothing to suggest that there was a realistic possibility that [Livingstone] would become a defendant. 35 Although there is some dispute as to whether or not Livingstone was informed by the IC that he was considered a subject, it appears that the circumstances were such that it was reasonable for him to believe that there was a realistic possibility that he would become a defendant. Dutton, 11 F.3d at 1079. First, Livingstone was Marceca's boss, and it was Marceca who was the named subject of this part of the IC's investigation. Furthermore, as Livingstone's fee application points out, it was he who requested Marceca's detail to the White House and assigned Marceca the task of updating the White House passholder files. Under such conditions, it was reasonable for him to expect that the IC would point the finger of accusation at him. Id. at 1078 (holding fee applicant had subject status because of his involvement in same enterprise as his supervisor who was a defendant in an independent counsel's investigation); In re North (Gadd Fee Application), 12 F.3d 252, 256 (D.C.Cir., Spec. Div., 1994) (per curiam) (same). 36 Consequently, we find that Livingstone is entitled to reimbursement of the attorneys' fees he incurred during the time he defended against the IC's investigation of his involvement in the FBI files matter. From the billings submitted, this appears to be approximately June 25, 1996 to September 25, 1997. He is further entitled to reimbursement of fees incurred for reviewing and replying to the IC's Final Report. His award is subject to certain reductions set forth below. 37