Opinion ID: 400892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: authority to summon interpol to respond in this forum

Text: 8 At the outset, we stress a key feature of this case. The issue posed for decision is not whether the district court here is more or less appropriate than some other forum in the United States for adjudication of the claim in suit. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) (suit against local dealer, although it could not proceed in Oklahoma, could be maintained in New York). The alleged offending Interpol Notification was transmitted to Interpol's liaison, USNCB, in Washington, D. C., and no forum in this country is suggested to be more suitable than the District of Columbia for consideration of the case. Our task, therefore, is to determine whether Leon Steinberg, a citizen and domiciliary of the United States, may call Interpol to account at all in the United States for a publication Interpol sent here and abroad that Steinberg claims is a libel, causing him shame, humiliation, and mental suffering. 9 Steinberg has invoked federal court subject matter competence on the basis of the parties' diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). He asserts no claim arising under federal law. 6 Personal jurisdiction over the defendants, therefore, initially turns on local (state) law, in this case, District of Columbia law. See Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc); Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F.Supp. 407 (D.D.C.1978), aff'd mem., 612 F.2d 587 (D.C.Cir.1980); 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1075, at 309-10 & n.50 (1969). Application of that law, however, is subject to a federal check. In United States jurisprudence, the outer boundaries of a court's authority to proceed against a particular person or entity is set by a due process measure, imposed on action at the national level by the Fifth Amendment, and on state action by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transport Corp., supra, 652 F.2d at 1036 (separate local law, federal check (due process) inquiries are telescoped when state law standard is any basis (of personal jurisdiction) not inconsistent with the Constitution); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 203 (D.C.Cir.1981) (state law may be coextensive with due process, or it may require connections between defendant or episode in suit and forum beyond these due process commands). We examine first the question whether the District of Columbia Long Arm Statute supplies a rule of competence, i.e., a rule authorizing the exercise of personal jurisdiction, that covers this case. We next consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction over Interpol in this action is compatible with the due process measure. 10 Steinberg relies, in the alternative, on two provisions of the District of Columbia Long Arm Statute. First, he invokes D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1), which authorizes the exercise (of) personal jurisdiction over a person ... as to a claim for relief arising from the person's ... transacting any business in the District of Columbia. Second, he cites D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(4), which provides for suit against a nonresident who caus(es) tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District so long as the nonresident regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered in the District of Columbia. Subsection (a) (4), we believe, provides a rule of competence fully appropriate to the claim in suit. We therefore pretermit the question whether the transacting any business provision, subsection (a)(1), also supports the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case. 7 11 Interpol acted abroad (in France) in transmitting the Notification said to defame Steinberg, and allegedly caused injury to Steinberg in the District and elsewhere when it dispatched the Notification to USNCB and other liaisons. 8 But subsection (a)(4) requires something more. The pivotal question with respect to that subsection's application here is whether Interpol engages in (a) persistent course of conduct ... in the District of Columbia. 12 We emphasize that the persistent course of conduct to which the statute refers denotes connections considerably less substantial than those required to establish general, all purpose jurisdiction on the basis of doing business in the forum. Subsection (a)(4) is taken from the Uniform Interstate & International Procedure Act (13 U.L.A.) § 1.03(a)(4). It was the Commissioners' design, in requiring something more than the in-forum impact at issue in the litigation, to exclude cases in which that impact is an isolated event and the defendant otherwise has no, or scant, affiliations with the forum. See 13 U.L.A. at 468-69 (1980) (Commissioners' Comment); Founding Church of Scientology v. Verlag, 536 F.2d 429, 432 (D.C.Cir.1976) (the persistent course of conduct need not be related to the act that caused the injury; all that is required is some other reasonable connection between the defendant and the forum). See also Note, The Virginia Long Arm Statute, 51 Va.L.Rev. 719, 749 (1965). 13 It is undisputed that the United States, pursuant to statutory authorization, 22 U.S.C. § 263a, participates in Interpol, that USNCB, situated in the District, acts as this country's Interpol liaison, and that USNCB regularly sends information to and receives information from Interpol. Even without the further Interpol-Washington, D. C., links indicated in discovery pursued in this action (e.g., dealings between Interpol and United States agencies other than USNCB; meetings here attended by Interpol officers), the subsection (a)(4) persistent course of conduct proviso is met. Interpol has constant liaison with the nation's capital. Its longstanding ties to this forum, while they do not add up to doing business here, 9 suffice to supply the something more subsection (a)(4) requires. 14 Finally, we find no due process infirmity in the application of subsection (a) (4) to this case. Given the mutually beneficial relationship between Interpol and the United States, and the regular contacts Interpol has with this country and District, we perceive no unfairness to the defendants in requiring them to appear and interpose an answer to Steinberg's complaint. 10 Nor is there any suggestion that adjudication in the District would intrude upon the sovereignty of another nation or state of the United States. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, supra, 444 U.S. at 291-92, 297, 100 S.Ct. at 564, 567. 11 Taking into account the nature and quality of the alleged act and tortious injury, the convenient administration of justice in all its aspects, including alternative forums, 12 and Steinberg's interest, as a United States citizen and domiciliary, in vindicating his reputation as an individual without a criminal record, we hold that, whatever defenses Interpol and its Secretary General may have to the claim in suit, the litigation is not barred at the threshold for lack of in personam jurisdiction. 13