Opinion ID: 2070627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony on Defendant's Truthfulness

Text: In his appeal, defendant argued that testimony by several police officers concerning defendant's truthfulness should not have been admitted, and he urged this Court to relax its strict object-or-waive rule. It is a well-established rule of law that [t]he determination of the truthfulness or credibility of a witness lies within the exclusive province of the jury. State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902, 905 (R.I.1995); see also State v. James, 557 A.2d 471, 473 (R.I.1989). Moreover, we have held in Haslam, that a witness is not permitted to offer an opinion concerning the truthfulness of the testimony of another witness, and that when a witness does not literally state an opinion concerning the credibility of another witness but his or her testimony would have the same `substantive import,' such testimony is inadmissible. Haslam, 663 A.2d at 905. In the present case, three police officers offered testimony about defendant's credibility after defendant had first elicited such opinion. The record reveals the following interchange during defense counsel's cross-examination of Detective Thomas Beaulieu, who questioned defendant on the night of the shooting: Q: During the course of your questioning of Mr. Rieger, would it be fair to say that from beginning to end, he insisted that he didn't remember what happened with the shooting? A: Yes. Q: Do you have any reason to believe he wasn't being sincere with you? [Counsel for the State]: Objection. The Court: Are you sure you want to object to that? [Counsel for the State]: I'd be happy to let him answer. The Witness: Could you repeat the question? The Court: Go ahead, Mr. Craven.Q: Do you have any reason to believe that he wasn't telling you the truth? A: Other than a gut feeling, no. I don't believe he was being honest with me about shooting Mr. Chatelle. In the following redirect examination, the state took the opportunity to ask the witness about his opinion of defendant's truthfulness. On this single occasion defendant did raise a general objection that was overruled by the court. Prior testimony by two other investigating police officers concerning the same issue met no objections by defendant, nor was there objection when the state made reference to their testimony in closing argument. We have repeatedly explained that [a]ccording to our well-settled `raise or waive' rule, issues that present themselves at trial and that are not preserved by a specific objection at trial, `sufficiently focused so as to call the trial justice's attention to the basis for said objection, may not be considered on appeal.' State v. Anderson, 752 A.2d 946, 948 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Morris, 744 A.2d 850, 858-59 (R.I.2000)). Consequently, allegations of error committed at trial are considered waived if they were not effectively raised at trial, despite their articulation at the appellate level. Anderson, 752 A.2d at 948 (quoting Morris, 744 A.2d at 858-59). The record here reveals that defense counsel failed to object to any testimony by police officers about defendant's truthfulness, except in one instance. The objection was a general one, however, and therefore we conclude that the issue of opinion testimony on defendant's honesty was not properly preserved for our review. Although we have recognized an exception to the raise-or-waive rule if basic constitutional rights are concerned, State v. Mastracchio, 672 A.2d 438, 446 (R.I.1996), the error asserted must go beyond the level of harmless error, the record must be `sufficient to permit a determination of the issue,' and counsel's failure to raise the issue must be premised upon `a novel rule of law that counsel could not reasonably have known during the trial.' State v. Donato, 592 A.2d 140, 142 (R.I.1991). We are persuaded here that the requirements for an exception have not been met and that the rule on credibility of witnesses was sufficiently established to be known to defense counsel at trial.