Opinion ID: 1408898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: procedural history, statutory background, and judicial review in general

Text: The Board is mandated by statute to adopt standards of ambient air quality. Two separate proceedings, adopting standards for sulfates and for sulfur dioxide, are at issue here. The Board adopted the challenged sulfates standard, of 25 micrograms of sulfates per cubic meter of air, at the conclusion of a public hearing in February 1976. The Board adopted the sulfur dioxide standard in June 1977 after a public hearing held in April. This standard was modified, in respects not here material, in October 1977. The Board adopted a combination standard of 0.05 parts per million (ppm) sulfur dioxide in the presence of oxidant (ozone) in excess of the state standard for oxidant; or in combination with suspended particulate matter in excess of the state standard for particulates. [3] In February 1978, nine oil companies and two trade associations filed a complaint challenging these standards. As ultimately amended, the complaint sought writs of mandate commanding the Board to rescind its resolutions adopting the standards. By stipulation of the parties, oral argument was held before retired Judge Eugene E. Sax, acting as judge pro tempore of Los Angeles County Superior Court. Judge Sax decided in favor of the oil companies and ordered the issuance of the requested writs of mandate in December 1980. The Board appeals from this judgment. The Board was established by the Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act. (Stats. 1967, ch. 1545, § 5, p. 3680.) In adopting the act, the Legislature manifested its determination to mobilize our state resources to establish an intensive and coordinated effort to combat the problems of air pollution. In the declaration of policy which prefaces the act's substantive provisions, the Legislature asserted the physical environment is being degraded by the waste and refuse of civilization polluting the atmosphere, thereby creating a situation which is detrimental to the health, safety, welfare, and sense of well-being of the people of California. (Former § 39010; present § 39000.) The Legislature further declared: It is necessary to provide a means for an intensive coordinated state, regional, and local effort to combat the problems of air pollution within the various air basins in the state ... and to provide for state authority to establish ambient air quality standards that could vary from basin to basin.... (Former § 39011; cf. present § 39001.) And, [i]t is imperative to provide a single state agency for administration, research, establishment of standards, and the coordination of air conservation activities carried on within the state. (Former § 39013.) At the time of the proceedings at issue in this case, the statute provided for a Board composed of five members, two with training and experience in automotive engineering or closely related fields, two with training and experience in chemistry, meteorology, or related scientific fields, including agriculture, or law, and one member who qualified under the above requirements or had administrative experience in the field of air pollution control. (Former § 39510.) [4] The statutes direct the Board to divide the state into air basins and to [a]dopt standards of ambient air quality for each air basin in consideration of the public health, safety, and welfare, including, but not limited to, health, illness, irritation to the senses, aesthetic value, interference with visibility, and effects on the economy. These standards may vary from one air basin to another. Standards relating to health effects shall be based upon the recommendations of the [health department]. (§ 39606, subd. (b).) It is the duty of local and regional air quality districts to promulgate and implement rules and regulations reasonably assuring achievement and maintenance of the state standards. (§§ 40000-40002; Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Air Resources Board (1982) 128 Cal. App.3d 789, 792-793 [180 Cal. Rptr. 550].) (1) The proceedings of the Board are quasi-legislative in nature, and the courts exercise limited review out of deference to separation of powers between the Legislature and the judiciary, and to the presumed expertise of the agency within the scope of its authority. A reviewing court will determine whether the agency acted within the scope of its delegated authority, whether it employed fair procedures, and whether its action is arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in evidentiary support. ( Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 690, 702 [166 Cal. Rptr. 331, 613 P.2d 579], cert. den., 449 U.S. 1029 [66 L.Ed.2d 492, 101 S.Ct. 602]; California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 212 [157 Cal. Rptr. 840, 599 P.2d 31].) A reviewing court will not substitute its policy judgment for the agency's in the absence of an arbitrary decision ( ibid. ), and in the absence of statutory requirement, the agency need not prepare findings in support of its legislative decision ( Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Air Resources Board, supra, 128 Cal. App.3d 789, 794).