Opinion ID: 39988
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Napue/Giglio Claim

Text: For Summers to prevail under Napue/Giglio, he must prove that Dr. Grigson’s testimony was (1) false, (2) known to be so by the state, and (3) material. See United States v. Mason, 293 F.3d 826, 828 (5th Cir. 2002) (“To prove a due process violation, the appellants must establish that (1) [the witness] testified falsely; (2) the government knew the testimony was false; and (3) the testimony was material.”). In the context of an application for the COA, Summers must show that the district court’s disposition of the claim is debatable. We find it is not. The district court found that Summers had rebutted the state habeas court’s presumption of correctness with respect to the first two of three elements of Napue/Giglio. However, the district court denied relief when it determined t hat Dr. Grigson’s testimony was immaterial as to the final outcome in the penalty phase. Summers, in his application for an additional COA, contends that “the District Court’s holdings and the evidence presented by Mr. Summers indicate that the issue of materiality in this instance is debatable.” Leaving aside the correctness of the district court’s - 12 - resolution of the first two elements of Napue/Giglio,5 Summers fails to appreciate that an affirmative answer on those first two elements has no effect on the materiality inquiry. Where a state habeas court has made express findings on the issue o f materiality, we are precluded from affording habeas relief under AEDPA unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Here, the state habeas court made express findings, unchallenged by Summers, that foreclose relief under AEDPA: “The evidence to support [Summers]’s future dangerousness was overwhelming even without the testimony of Dr. Grigson. Dr. Clay Griffith testified in a manner that virtually echoed Dr. Grigson’s testimony. Dr. Griffith’s testimony is not attacked.” In response, Summers cites, inter alia, Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2001), and argues that psychiatric testimony is especially prejudicial. Summers overlooks the fact that, contrary to Gardner, where the psychiatric testimony “was the centerpiece of the evidence presented by the State during the punishment phase,” id. at 562, the testimony in question here was mirrored by another psychiatrist whose testimony remains unchallenged. In addition to the psychiatric testimony, the state presented numerous witnesses in support of its future dangerousness claim. Summers also relies on an affidavit from a juror, in which the juror states that Dr. Grigson’s testimony made up part of the “most influential testimony” from the penalty phase. Leaving aside 5 The state habeas court made express factual findings on this issue. Summers produced evidence which, in the opinion of the district court, contradicted those findings. Because it does not alter the outcome of this appeal, we make no comment on the district court’s rejection of a portion of the state court’s findings, except to note that the clear and convincing standard is a high one. See Crowe v. Smith, 261 F.3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 2001). - 13 - the point that the juror identifies Dr. Grigson’s testimony as only a part of the influential testimony,6 this portion of the affidavit is inadmissible and cannot be considered. Under Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, jurors’ affidavits are inadmissible “regarding the following four topics: (1) the method or arguments of the jury’s deliberations, (2) the effect of any particular thing upon an outcome in the deliberations, (3) the mindset or emotions of any juror during deliberation, and (4) the testifying juror’s own mental process during the deliberations.” Pyles v. Johnson, 136 F.3d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Ortiz, 942 F.2d 903, 913 (5th Cir. 1991)). Indeed, in matters involving a death sentence, this circuit has noted that “we are convinced that Rule 606(b) does not harm but helps guarantee the reliability of jury determinations in death penalty cases.” United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 246 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)). As to the materiality prong, Summers’s argument is unavailing. The state habeas court, the district court, and this court all agree that Dr. Grigson’s testimony contributed little in light of the wealth of future dangerousness evidence presented by the state. Summers has failed to show that reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court’s resolution of this Napue/Giglio claim.