Opinion ID: 2651362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whistleblower Retaliation

Text: Pierce further contends that the Board's instigation of an ethics investigation against him and its ultimate termination of his employment violated the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act (MWA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 185 et seq. Pierce suggests that the Board retaliated against him for his October 2, 2009 letter objecting to Olsen's harassment or for his June 24, 2010 letter to the Ethics Commission objecting to the Board's refusal to grant him an exemption. -15- Pierce's challenge may sound under either section 185(b)(1) or section 185(b)(3) of the MWA.1 Section 185(b)(1) prohibits a state employer from retaliating against an employee who [d]iscloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer . . . that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 185(b)(1). Section 185(b)(3) of the statute prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who [o]bjects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law. Id. § 185(b)(3). To qualify for protection under section 185(b)(1), but not under section 185(b)(3), an employee must first br[ing] the activity, policy or practice . . . to the attention of a supervisor of the employee by written notice and . . . afford[] the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the activity, policy or practice. Id. § 185(c)(1). While the two causes of action are quite distinct, a plaintiff's burden of proof under the MWA closely parallels his burden for First Amendment discrimination under Mt. Healthy. To prevail on an MWA claim, an employee must show that he engaged in protected activity and that his participation in that activity played a substantial or motivating part in the retaliatory action. 1 Because Pierce did not identify which provision of the MWA underwrites his claim, we follow the district court in analyzing both sections as the most plausible options. -16- Welch, 542 F.3d at 943; see also Larch v. Mansfield Mun. Elec. Dep't, 272 F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 2001). The employer may subsequently avoid liability by proffering a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the [adverse action]. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 262 (1st Cir. 1999). The burden then shifts back to the employee to adduce some significantly probative evidence showing both that the proffered reason is pretextual and that a retaliatory animus sparked his dismissal. Id. The parties spend some time debating whether Chief Olsen qualifies as an employer or merely a supervisor under the MWA, and subsequently whether Pierce's October 2, 2009 letter to the Board disclosed an unlawful practice of the employer under section 185(b)(1).2 The parties also debate whether Pierce's June 24, 2010 letter to the Ethics Commission, directly accusing the Board of retaliation for an unrelated legal dispute, satisfied section 185(c)(1)'s notification requirement. 2 The Massachusetts statute defines the Employer subject to its provisions as the commonwealth, and its agencies or political subdivisions, including, but not limited to, cities, towns, counties and regional school districts, or any authority, commission, board or instrumentality thereof. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 185(a)(2). The statute defines a Supervisor separately, as any individual to whom an employer has given the authority to direct and control the work performance of the affected employee, [or] who has authority to take corrective action regarding the violation of the law, rule or regulation of which the employee complains. Id. § 185(a)(4). -17- We do not reach these issues, because, as with his First Amendment challenge, Pierce's claim under the MWA fails at the second step of the burden-shifting framework. Even assuming that Pierce could establish a prima facie case of retaliation by the Board based on either his October 2, 2009 or his June 24, 2010 letter, the Board has offered an independent and legitimate motive for its adverse employment actions: its objections to Pierce's potential violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268A, § 19. Pierce emphasizes the suspicious proximity between his October 2, 2009 complaint to the Board against Olsen and the Board's prompt instigation of an ethics investigation against him. Yet the Board does not suggest the timing was purely coincidental: by simultaneously protesting both his and Jayne's treatment in the same professional communication, Pierce's letter brought his potential ethics violation back to the Board's attention. The record corroborates that the months before Pierce's letter had witnessed revitalized efforts to combat intra-departmental nepotism at the Cotuit Fire Department, not least through Olsen's release of an updated Familial Relations Policy that March--well before Pierce's support of Wool during the spring election. Pierce's letter also followed soon on the heels of Olsen's August 2009 investigation of a hostile environment at the Department, which yielded complaints against the Pierces by nearly half of the Department's employees. The record fully supports the Board's -18- claim that its ethics investigation, and its subsequent termination of Pierce, responded to genuine and timely concerns about Pierce's professional conduct as Captain. The district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Pierce's MWA challenge. C. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations Finally, in a pendent state claim, Pierce claims that Chief Olsen and Commissioners Campbell, Mycock, and Field tortiously interfered with his employment contract with the Cotuit Fire Department. To support a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he had a contract with a third party; (2) the defendant knowingly interfered with that contract . . . ; (3) the defendant's interference, in addition to being intentional, was improper in motive or means; and (4) the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's actions. O'Donnell v. Boggs, 611 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Harrison v. NetCentric Corp., 744 N.E.2d 622, 632 (Mass. 2001)). Because a defendant may tortiously interfere only with a plaintiff's contract with a third party, an employee cannot bring a claim of tortious interference with an employment contract against his own employer. Harrison, 744 N.E.2d at 632. However, an employee may bring a claim against a supervisor if he demonstrates that the supervisor acted out of malevolence, that -19- is, with actual malice. Blackstone v. Cashman, 860 N.E.2d 7, 13 (Mass. 2007) (quoting Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Mass. 1981)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also O'Donnell, 611 F.3d at 54 n.3. A showing of actual malice requires more than a showing of mere hostility. Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must show that malice was the controlling factor in the supervisor's interference; that the inference of malice is probab[le] rather than possib[le]; and that the evidence affirmatively suggests the supervisor's actions were not derived from a desire to advance the employer's legitimate business interests. Id. at 76-77. In this case, Commissioners Campbell, Mycock, and Field were all signatories to Pierce's employment contract with the Cotuit Fire Department. It is thus questionable whether they can be viewed as supervisors so as to create liability under the common law. Even assuming that all four defendants are supervisors liable for tortious interference, however, Pierce has failed to establish that any of them acted with actual malice. As discussed above, all of the named defendants had legitimate business reasons for their adverse actions against Pierce--most notably, their genuine concerns about the Department's violation of the Massachusetts ethics laws. Pierce has not demonstrated that -20- probable malice was the controlling factor behind the Commissioners' or Olsen's employment decisions. The district court properly entered summary judgments in favor of the defendants on Pierce's tortious interference claim.