Opinion ID: 790216
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court's Qualified Individual Analysis

Text: 24 Hammel next asserts that the court erred in determining that there were no reasonable accommodations that EGC could have implemented that would have allowed him to perform the essential functions of his job at the cheese factory. As noted above, [ u]nder the ADA, the employer avoids all liability if the plaintiff would have been fired because incapable of performing the essential functions of the job, and the burden of proof on the issue of capability is not on the employer but on the plaintiff. Miller v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 483, 484 (7th Cir.1997) (emphasis added). This is because the provisions of the ADA relating to employment protect only a `qualified individual,' 42 U.S.C. § 12112; that is one who with or without a reasonable accommodation by the employer can perform the essential functions of the job. Id. at 485. Thus, it is Hammel's burden to supply evidence sufficient [that would] allow a jury to conclude that reasonable accommodations could or should have been fashioned that would have allowed him to perform the duties of a general laborer in a manner that would meet or exceed EGC's legitimate expectations and satisfy the essential functions of that position. McPhaul, 226 F.3d at 563 (emphasis added). 25
26 At the outset, we note that throughout the course of his employment Hammel displayed a number of most troubling work habits that had nothing to do with his disability. Hammel repeatedly took unauthorized work breaks and engaged in making personal telephone calls on work time. In addition, without permission Hammel would walk outside the factory for cigarette breaks while he was on duty. Hammel also exhibited insubordinate, arrogant and obstinate behavior—unrelated to his vision impairment—when he mocked Smith after being told to get back to work following another unauthorized cigarette break as well as when he refused to cease and desist operating the cheese grinder after he was reprimanded for repeatedly placing his hands on and inside of the dangerous machinery while in operation. The disregard Hammel exhibited for the direct orders he was given and his demonstrated lack of respect for his supervisor's directions evince a troubled, confused and unsuitable employee, not a disabled one. Many of the reckless acts Hammel was guilty of committing in the factory bore no connection to his vision disability, but rather to his insubordinate makeup and nature. For example, Hammel negligently operated an electric pallet jack, which on at least one occasion crashed into a wall, ruining a pallet of cheese wheels (which Hammel shrugged off and laughed about immediately after the incident). In addition, Hammel had a tendency to slam the 30-pound cheese wheels onto the work table, rather than carefully place them as instructed; a practice which distracted and endangered his fellow employees and damaged the cheese product. Hammel cannot reasonably claim that such irresponsible and reckless conduct was the result of his diminished sight. These were serious employment infractions and no employer should be required to accept much less ignore or condone this type of irresponsible conduct simply because the employee acting out also happens to be suffering from a disability within the meaning of the ADA. 27 Due to Hammel's careless attitude and inability to perform the tasks assigned to him, EGC was certainly justified in discharging him based solely on his behavior and attitude, without regard to his disability. However, unfortunately for EGC, the company made Hammel's disability an issue and without doubt spurred this litigation when, in an attempt to protect him from the real truth of his discharge, they informed Hammel that he was being terminated, not because he was an undesirable employee with serious attitudinal problems, but because his vision impairment interfered `to some extent' with his work and caused [EGC] concern for his own safety and the safety of his coworkers, a mistake Buhlman acknowledged in deposition testimony prior to trial. Id. at 2003 WL 21665133, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at . The district court reasoned that these statements were sufficient to demonstrate that EGC had discharged Hammel because of his disability. However, notwithstanding this determination, the judge ruled post-trial that the reasons EGC had given when terminating Hammel were irrelevant because Hammel failed at trial to demonstrate that he was capable of performing the essential functions of the job in manner that met EGC's legitimate business expectations, with or without accommodation. We agree. 28 Hammel has not argued, nor could he argue that the improper motivations of the decision makers at EGC alone entitle him to relief pursuant to the ADA. For it is well established that [u]nder the ADA, the employer avoids all liability if the plaintiff would have been fired because incapable of performing the essential functions of the job. Miller, 107 F.3d at 484 (emphasis added). Employment decisions motivated by an improper or discriminatory animus are violative of the ADA, but however improper, the ADA only protects qualified individuals; those who can perform the essential functions of their job with or without reasonable accommodations. Id. at 485. Thus, it is Hammel's burden to establish either: (a) that he could perform the essential functions of his job without accommodation; or (b) that reasonable accommodations were available and could have been implemented to allow him to perform the essential functions of his job. 29
30 Hammel had significant difficulties while attempting to perform the essential duties of a general laborer at the cheese factory. Further demonstrating Hammel's inability to perform the functions of his job in anywhere near a work-manlike manner was his inability to properly stamp the cheese wheels, and his likewise incapability of correctly forming, stacking, transporting the finished cheese product, and/or flipping the product, all essential to EGC's business. See supra pp. 856-58. This is not to mention the risk of injury that Hammel posed to his co-workers by spilling brine, tripping over hoses, and bumping into presses, walls, and fellow workers, some of which were undoubtedly caused by his patent carelessness. See id. Whether Hammel had problems performing his duties at EGC resulting from his disability or poor attitude is unimportant; however, what is germane, and is apparent from the record, is the fact that Hammel was unable to perform the essential functions of his job and meet the expectations of his employer. 31 We agree with the trial judge's conclusion that it is irrelevant ... whether it was [Hammel's] vision impairment or his refusal to take the proper care that caused him to bump into his co-workers or the equipment, to run pallets into the wall, or fail to turn and stack the cheese properly or to slam the cheese down on the table... [for][w]hatever the cause he has demonstrated his inability to perform the essential tasks of the job ... [and is] not a qualified individual within the meaning of the [ADA]. Hammel, 2003 WL 21665133, at -9, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at -24 (emphasis added). As this court has made clear on a number of occasions, when the evidence demonstrates that an employee is incapable of performing the job, the employer need not isolate the disability-related causes for an employee's inferior performance from problems that stem from a poor attitude, insubordination, carelessness, or outright disregard for the safety of himself and his co-workers. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 484-85 (7th Cir.1999); Palmer v. Circuit Court, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997); Siefken, 65 F.3d at 667. Instead, an employer is entitled to conclude that termination is warranted solely on the basis of the employee's patent inability to perform his job in manner that meets the essential requirements of that position. This is true even if, after further inquiry, an employer determines that the employee's inability to perform the job is due entirely to a disability. Matthews, 128 F.3d at 1195; see also Palmer, 117 F.3d at 352; Miller, 107 F.3d at 484-85. Either way, an employer is only in violation of the ADA if a terminated employee can establish that reasonable accommodations exist that would have enabled that person to perform the essential functions of his or her job. See Miller, 107 F.3d at 485-86. As demonstrated below, Hammel failed to put forth any such accommodations and thus cannot prevail. 32
33 At trial Hammel's vocational expert, Richard Davis, recommended that EGC could have implemented some questionable accommodations that he believed would have enabled Hammel to perform the essential functions of a general laborer. Among these proposed accommodations were four that involved Hammel's use of adaptive techniques that he had previously been trained to utilize during periods of training at Blind Incorporated (a vocational training school) prior to his employment at EGC such as using: 1) a feel technique to help him properly stack the cheese wheels; 2) a flipping technique to ensure that the cheese wheels were flipped and turned correctly; 3) a foot-shuffling technique to avoid tripping; and 4) a technique which had him intentionally bump into and feel objects in order to understand physical space. However, Hammel needed no accommodation from EGC to make use of these adaptive techniques. 34 Reasonable accommodations under the ADA are defined in part as modifications or adjustments to the work environment [by the employer]... that enable a[n] ... individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of a position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( o ) (emphasis added). These adaptive techniques are skills and know-how that Hammel stated that he had been trained to incorporate into his work routine prior to his employment with EGC. They are not modifications or adjustments to the work environment [by the employer]... that enable him to perform the job's essential functions. Instead, Hammel's proposed adaptive techniques were nothing more than modifications or adjustments to his own work performance that he was expected to utilize without prodding or accommodation from his employer. Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) ([I]f a person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures ... must be taken into account when judging [a disability].); Siefken, 65 F.3d at 667. Thus, we agree with the trial judge's determination that these adaptive techniques were not reasonable accommodations within the meaning of the ADA. 35 Davis proposed additional accommodations that, in his opinion, EGC supposedly could have undertaken to facilitate Hammel's performance of some of the job's essential functions. Among these proposed accommodations, 9 Davis suggested that Hammel could learn to stamp the cheese wheels correctly by having a co-worker check on [his] stamping and teach him how to hold the stamp to make sure that it printed. Hammel, 2003 WL 21665133, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at . As the trial judge properly determined, this is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. The courts have been reticent, as they should be, to require employers to provide accommodations that necessitate the enlistment of another employee to assist an ADA claimant in performing the essential functions of his job. Id. at 2003 WL 21665133, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at  (citing Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835, 845-46 (7th Cir.2002)). To be sure, the ADA does not require an employer to accommodate a disabled employee by making special, individualized training or supervision available in order to shepherd that employee through what is an essential and legitimate requirement of the job. Williams, 253 F.3d at 282 (the employer is not required to give the disabled employee preferential treatment, as by giving her a job for which another employee is better qualified, or by waving his normal requirements for the job in question); Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1022 (7th Cir.1997). In this regard, let us make clear that the ADA is not an affirmative action statute in the sense of requiring an employer to give preferential treatment to a disabled employee merely on account of the employee's disability, see Williams, 253 F.3d at 282, although it does provide disabled persons an opportunity to work assuming accommodations exist which allow them to perform a job as would any other employee. Accommodations which require special dispensations and preferential treatment are not reasonable under the ADA, thus Davis's recommendation that Hammel be given special training and provided with a person to check up on him does not qualify as a reasonable accommodation. 36 Davis also proposed that Hammel and his fellow EGC laborers could employ verbal cues to avoid bumping into each other. However, we are of the opinion that it borders on the absurd to even suggest implementing a measure of this nature in a factory setting of this type. The particular work environment at EGC is excessively noisy and many employees, out of necessity, are found to wear ear-plugs while performing their duties. Because he would be unable to hear them due to the excessive noise level, it is antithetical and unreasonable to propose that based on verbal cues Hammel could be prevented from colliding with walls, equipment and other employees near the production line on the busy work floor. 37 What's more, Hammel's proffered accommodations address only a small portion of EGC's legitimate concerns with Hammel's careless, unacceptable work performance, such as his inability to legibly stamp the cheese wheels, avoid collisions with machines and other employees and a myriad of other problems. More importantly, these proposed measures do not address Hammel's inability to perform a significant number of his essential assignments, duties and responsibilities at EGC, such as forming, stacking, and flipping the cheeses. In Miller v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, this court addressed a similar situation in which a woman who had suffered injuries in a car accident, resulting in an almost complete loss of vision, was discharged from her position as a prison guard. Miller, 107 F.3d at 484. Allegedly, she was told by the warden that she was being fired because there was no way a blind person would ever work in his Prison. Id. We upheld the district court's conclusion that the guard was not a qualified person within the meaning of the ADA, regardless of the allegedly distasteful and irrational motivation behind her termination, because there was no way that she could perform the essential duties of a corrections officer. Id. at 485. In coming to this conclusion we found persuasive evidence that, even with accommodations, this woman could fulfill only two out of over ten job requirements of the position. Id. In turn we rejected her contention that she should have been allowed to rotate between the two functions which she could perform because the reason for having multiple able workers who rotate through the different positions is to be able to respond to unexpected surges in the demand for particular abilities. Id. Because Miller was unable to perform the duties of her position as a correctional officer and the prison officials could not offer her reasonable accommodations that would allow her to fulfill those duties, we held that she was not entitled to the protections of the ADA. Id. 38 As was the situation in Miller, Hammel and his vocational expert failed to recommend to this court reasonable accommodations that would allow him to perform the essential duties required for employment as a laborer at EGC. Id. In addition, Hammel was an insubordinate, reckless, and thus undesirable employee, and we agree with the trial judge's conclusion that [n]o accommodation would make a difference for an employee unwilling to exercise care, accept instruction or take responsibility for getting his work done properly. Hammel, 2003 WL 21665133, at -9, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at  (emphasis added). Also, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Hammel is not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, and thus is not entitled to the protections thereof. Basith, 241 F.3d at 927; Bay, 212 F.3d at 973; DePaoli, 140 F.3d at 674. As Judge Crabb noted, perhaps [EGC's] business manager should have told [Hammel] exactly why he was being fired rather than try to sugar coat the news .... [but this] failing [does not] make [EGC] liable to [Hammel] under the ADA. Hammel, 2003 WL 21665133, at -9, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at . The district court did not commit clear error in concluding that EGC did not discriminate against Hammel because of his disability when it terminated him. 10 39