Opinion ID: 2585200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instruction regarding accomplice testimony

Text: Two possible accomplices testified in this case: Ricky Black, who told the jury of his role in luring Kenneth Stewart into Brian Seabourn's car, and Treva Coonce, whose testimony was exculpatory, but whoother witnesses testifiedhad made out-of-court statements inculpating defendant. The trial court instructed the jury that Black was an accomplice as a matter of law, but that it was for the jury to determine whether Coonce was an accomplice. The trial court read the jury the standard instructions pertaining to accomplice testimony, including the corroboration rule (CALJIC Nos. 3.11, 3.12, 3.13) and the rule regarding distrust of accomplice testimony (CALJIC No. 3.18). Defendant now contends the trial court erred in failing to modify, sua sponte, the standard instructions (1) to make clear that the corroboration rule applies to both in-court testimony and out-of-court statements of accomplices (CALJIC No. 3.11), (2) to add the word statement to the instruction defining corroboration (CALJIC No. 3.12), and (3) to clarify that only the accomplice's inculpatory statements should be viewed with distrust (CALJIC No. 3.18). The errors, he asserts, violated his Sixth Amendment rights. On defendant's first point, we agree that People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 214, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285 ( Andrews ) supports the application of the corroboration requirement to out-of-court statements as well as testimony. [23] As in Andrews, however, the trial court here was not required to modify the standard instruction absent a request by defendant in view of the circumstance that neither the trial court nor the parties suggested to the jury that, with respect to the corroboration requirement, it should distinguish between Coonce's out-of-court and in-court statements. (See Andrews, supra, at pp. 214-215, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285.) With respect to defendant's second point, addition of the word statement to the standard instruction would have been legally correct, but defendant cites no authority that would have imposed on the trial court the sua sponte duty so to modify CALJIC No. 3.12. ( Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 214-215, 260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285; see also People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142-1143, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1 [the defendant bears the burden of seeking modification or clarification of a legally correct instruction].) Finally, with respect to defendant's third point, in People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 568-569, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928, this court endorsed the type of instruction for which defendant argues, holding that the instruction concerning accomplice testimony should henceforth refer only to testimony that tends to incriminate the defendant. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the jury should be instructed to the following effect whenever an accomplice, or a witness who might be determined by the jury to be an accomplice, testifies: `To the extent an accomplice gives testimony that tends to incriminate the defendant, it should be viewed with caution. This does not mean, however, that you may arbitrarily disregard that testimony. You should give that testimony the weight you think it deserves after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the evidence in the case.' ( Id. at p. 569, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928, italics added, fn. omitted; CALJIC No. 3.18 (1999 rev.) (6th ed.1996).) As indicated, however, we applied the new requirement prospectively only and found no error in the trial court's reading to the jury an instruction consistent with then existing law. ( Guiuan, supra, at p. 570, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928.) Likewise here, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury consistently with then existing law. In any event, the jury was made keenly aware of the inconsistencies among Coonce's various in-court and out-of-court statements, as well as the prosecutor's acknowledgment that Coonce was not always truthful and that it was up to the jury to determine her credibility. Under these circumstances, it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendant had the trial court instructed it along the lines for which defendant argues. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) Cool v. United States (1972) 409 U.S. 100, 104, 93 S.Ct. 354, 34 L.Ed.2d 335, on which defendant relies, is inapposite. There, in a case in which the defense rested almost entirely on accomplice testimony, the high court concluded that an instruction essentially directing the jury that exculpatory testimony of an accomplice had to be proven true beyond a reasonable doubt before it could be considered at all, infringed the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and effectively reversed the burden of proof to require the defendant to establish her innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. No such flaw appears in California's pattern accomplice instructions as given in this case, and the consequent absence of constitutional error refutes defendant's contention that the Chapman standard applies. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 [prejudice resulting from federal constitutional error is assessed under harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard].)