Opinion ID: 1421847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing to Seek Suppression of Unlawfully Seized Evidence

Text: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 13, of the California Constitution extend similar protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. (1) The federal exclusionary rule, pursuant to which both federal and state courts must exclude evidence seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, although once described as an essential part of the constitutional guarantee ( Mapp v. Ohio (1960) 367 U.S. 643, 657 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1091, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 84 A.L.R.2d 933]), has more recently been described by the United States Supreme Court as `a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the person aggrieved.' ( United States v. Leon (1984) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [82 L.Ed.2d 677, 687, 104 S.Ct. 3405], quoting United States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338, 348 [38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571, 94 S.Ct. 613].) Therefore, although state application of the exclusionary rule in criminal trials is essential to ensure that the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment is not an empty promise ( Mapp v. Ohio, supra, 367 U.S. 643, 660 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1093]), the circumstances to which the federal exclusionary rule must be applied as a sanction in order to deter future unlawful conduct by police or other state agents are defined by the United States Supreme Court. (2) The Supreme Court has held that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not require its application when unlawfully seized evidence is offered against a defendant whose own rights have not been compromised by the unlawful seizure. Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The balancing process implicit in this approach is expressed in the contours of the standing requirement. Thus, standing to invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations where the government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of the unlawful search. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) [36 L.Ed.2d 208, 93 S.Ct. 1565]; Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) [22 L.Ed.2d 176, 89 S.Ct. 961]; Wong Sun v. United States, supra [371 U.S. 471 (9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407)]; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) [4 L.Ed.2d 697, 80 S.Ct. 725, 78 A.L.R.2d 233]. This standing rule is premised on a recognition that the need for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are strongest where the Government's unlawful conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of the search. ( United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 [38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571-572].) Reaffirming its belief that invasion of the defendant's personal right is necessary to accord standing to invoke the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the court explained in Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 137 [58 L.Ed.2d 387, 397, 99 S.Ct. 421]: Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected. In Rakas the court also emphasized that the issue is not really one of standing, but, because rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are personal, whether the defendant's rights have been invaded. [T]he question is whether the challenged search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it. That inquiry in turn requires a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.... [T]his aspect of the analysis belongs more properly under the heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing.... (439 U.S. at p. 140 [58 L.Ed.2d at p. 399]; see also, United States v. Salvucci (1980) 448 U.S. 83 [65 L.Ed.2d 619, 100 S.Ct. 2547]; Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 448 U.S. 98 [65 L.Ed.2d 633, 100 S.Ct. 2556]; United States v. Payner (1980) 447 U.S. 727 [65 L.Ed.2d 468, 100 S.Ct. 2439].) Although the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule was adequately served through a limited application to searches which invaded the defendant's personal right, a broader application of the rule has been thought necessary in this state both to deter unlawful police conduct and to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. Even before Mapp made the exclusionary rule mandatory in state courts, this court reasoned that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of state and federal constitutional guarantees was a necessary, judicially declared, rule of evidence because other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with the attendant result that the courts under the old rule have been constantly required to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers. ( People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 445 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513].) We noted in Cahan that because we were adopting the exclusionary rule as a rule of evidence, we were not bound in its application by decisions applying the federal rule ( id., at p. 450), and later in the same year held that because the California exclusionary rule served a broader purpose than the rule then applied in the federal courts it was applicable whenever evidence is obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees, ... whether or not it was obtained in violation of the particular defendant's constitutional rights. ( People v. Martin (1955) 45 Cal.2d 755, 761 [290 P.2d 855].) In adopting this vicarious exclusionary rule in Martin, we explained again that exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was necessary both because other remedies had been ineffective in deterring unlawful police conduct, and because admission of the evidence involved the court in an implied condonation of that conduct. This result occurs whenever the government is allowed to profit by its own wrong by basing a conviction on illegally obtained evidence, and if law enforcement officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary rule by obtaining evidence in violation of the rights of third parties, its deterrent effect is to that extent nullified. Moreover, such a limitation virtually invites law enforcement officers to violate the rights of third parties and to trade the escape of a criminal whose rights are violated for the conviction of others by the use of the evidence illegally obtained against them. ( Id., at p. 760.) Thereafter, this judicially created rule of evidence was applied by this court to evidence seized in violation of either the Fourth Amendment or article I, section 13 (formerly § 19) of the California Constitution. (See Kaplan v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.3d 150, 157; People v. Brisendine, supra, 13 Cal.3d 528, 549 [Our vicarious exclusionary rule has never been required under the Fourth Amendment (see Alderman v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 165, 171-176 [22 L.Ed.2d 176, 185-188, 89 S.Ct. 961]) but has been a continuing feature of California law under our ability to impose higher standards for searches and seizures than compelled by the federal Constitution].)