Opinion ID: 148719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the Business Practices Exception

Text: In his second point of error, Coleman asserts that the phrase in § 921(a)(20) excluding as predicate offenses any ... offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offense relating to the regulation of business practices is unconstitutionally vague. Whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. United States v. Rudzavice, 586 F.3d 310, 315 (5th Cir.2009) (citing United States v. Monroe, 178 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir.1999)). The vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of `a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). A principal element of the vagueness doctrine is the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The touchstone of the analysis, however, is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 267, 117 S.Ct. 1219. Addressing § 921(a)(20), the dissent in United States v. Stanko stated that it is a criminal statute that is impermissibly vague. 491 F.3d at 420 (Bright, J., dissenting) (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855). The Stanko dissent explained that to apply the exemption for similar offenses under § 921(a)(20), courts must determine which business offenses are similar to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, and restraints of trade. Id. at 420-21. It reasoned that [t]he complete absence of Congressional guidance and scarcity of federal precedent leaves the meaning of the similar offenses clause unconstitutionally vague, and thus the class of individuals who may possess a firearm without the threat of prosecution is in part undefined. Id. at 421. Rejecting the conclusion that § 921(a)(20) is unconstitutionally vague, the Stanko majority explained that Congress used the comparative term `similar' to modify `offenses,' rather than saying `any other offenses' or simply `other offenses.' Id. at 414. The term `similar' indicates an intent to limit the business practices clause's reach to offenses which are `comparable' or `nearly corresponding' to the enumerated offenses. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2120 (2002)). Because the general phrase `or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices' refers back for its meaning to the three types of offenses Congress specifically enumerated, the court concluded that the plain meaning of the statute indicates Congress's intent to limit the offenses that fall within the § 921(a)(20)(A) exclusion to those pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or offenses similar to them. Id. The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Schultz also rejected a vagueness challenge to the similar offenses clause of § 921(a)(20). 586 F.3d at 531. The Schultz court explained that: According to its terms, § 921(a)(20)(A) excludes those [f]ederal or state offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices. In the final phrase, the word similar limits the term offenses, so that it refers back to the three enumerated offenses, and is further limited by relating to the regulation of business practices. Accordingly, an ordinary individual would have notice that the § 921(a)(20)(A) exception applies only if he or she committed an enumerated or similar offense related to the regulation of business practices. Id. Consistent with the reasoning of Stanko and Schultz, the business practices exception is not unconstitutionally vague because it requires that the excluded offenses be a specific type of business offense or similar to such specific offenses relating to the regulation of business practices. Antitrust law is designed to protect trade and commerce from restraints, monopolies, price fixing, and price discrimination. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 104 (8th ed.2004). While it is almost impossible to formulate an all inclusive definition of `unfair trade practice' ... implicit in the term itself is the requirement that the practice adversely affect either competitors or consumers.... Stanko, 491 F.3d at 416. Likewise, restraint of trade has a definite meaning at common law and includes contracts for the restriction or suppression of competition in the market, agreements to fix prices, divide marketing territories, apportion customers, restrict production and the like practices, which tend to raise prices or otherwise take from buyers or consumers the advantages which accrue to them from free competition in the market. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311 (1940). These exempted offenses demonstrate that Congress intended to exclude under § 921(a)(20)(A) only commercial crimes violating statutes designed to prevent an adverse economic effect on competition or consumers. Dreher, 115 F.3d at 332. The elements test used to determine whether an offense falls within the business practices exclusion is specific and overall gives fair warning as to which offenses meet the definition of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and which are excluded pursuant to the exception in § 921(a)(20)(A). We therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that § 921(a)(20)(A) is not unconstitutionally vague.