Opinion ID: 1832864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: collateral estoppel is inapplicable under these circumstances

Text: [5] We turn now to Stevenson's appeal, which presents a similar, but analytically distinct issuewhether operating his vehicle in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner collaterally estops him from denying his liability in the instant case. Although implicating some similar policy concerns, the rules of evidence with respect to the admissibility of a conviction as evidence for the trier of fact do not determine the collateral estoppel or res judicata effect to which such a judgment may be entitled. [16] [6-8] Collateral estoppel means that when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties or their privies in any future lawsuit. [17] Collateral estoppel may be applied where an identical issue was decided in a prior action, there was a judgment on the merits which was final, the party against whom the doctrine is to be applied is a party or is in privity with a party to the prior action, and there was an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue in the prior litigation. [18] Prior criminal proceedings can work an estoppel in a subsequent civil proceeding, so long as the question involved was distinctly put in issue and directly determined in the criminal action. [19] [9] But for application of the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata, the party relying on either of those principles in a present proceeding has the burden to show that a particular issue was involved and necessarily determined in a prior proceeding. [20] Here, we agree with the district court that the issues presented in the present case were not determined in the traffic infraction proceedings. While the contributory acts of a victim are usually immaterial to the issue of criminal guilt, the contributory negligence of an injured or damaged party in a civil action is vital to the ultimate issue of a defendant's liability. [21] And the proximate relation of the traffic infraction to the accident is not involved in the criminal proceeding, whereas it is an important issue in the civil case. [22] Stevenson argues that the county court judge, in the traffic infraction proceeding, was required to decide that Stevenson was not negligent or a cause of the collision. Stevenson claims that the court affirmatively rejected Wright's testimony and contention that the sole cause of the accident was . . . Stevenson's conduct. [23] We disagree. In order to convict Wright of the offense with which he was charged, the court was required to conclude only that Wright operated his vehicle in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner. [24] The court was not required to consider whether Stevenson was also negligent, nor was the court required to consider whose negligence was the cause (or greater cause) of the accident. The court could well have believed Wright's testimony about the accident, but still concluded that Wright's inability to stop his vehicle before the collision was evidence of negligence. And in point of fact, collateral estoppel is not based on what the trier of fact in the prior proceeding may have believed, but what findings were necessary to the judgment rendered. [25] [10] Stevenson also contends that his own negligence, if any, was not at issue in this proceeding, because Wright completely failed to affirmatively set forth the defense of contributory negligence in his answer. [26] Again, we disagree. The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the defense. [27] In this case, Wright's answer denied his own negligence, but alleged as an affirmative defense that Stevenson's negligence was the cause of the accident, and specified the ways in which Stevenson was allegedly negligent. That was sufficient to give fair notice to Stevenson that his own negligence was at issue and plead the defense of contributory negligence. [28] The district court correctly concluded that on the facts of this case, collateral estoppel was not applicable. We are aware that some jurisdictions have concluded that even where identical issues were decided in a prior criminal proceeding, a conviction for a minor offense is insufficient to support collateral estoppel, because the defendant may lack incentive to vigorously defend, and the conviction may not derive from full and fair litigation. [29] We do not find it necessary to decide that question in this case. Stevenson also contends that the district court erred in concluding that collateral estoppel was not applicable because Stevenson was not a party to the traffic infraction proceedings. But, given our disposition of this appeal, we have no need to consider that question.