Opinion ID: 1837556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: adjudication hearing

Text: In the context of both adjudication and termination hearings, this court has stated that [p]rocedural due process includes notice to the person whose right is affected by the proceeding; reasonable opportunity to refute or defend against the charge or accusation; reasonable opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and present evidence on the charge or accusation; representation by counsel, when such representation is required by the Constitution or statutes; and a hearing before an impartial decision maker. In re Interest of Ty M. & Devon M., 265 Neb. 150, 158, 655 N.W.2d 672, 681 (2003), quoting In re Interest of Kelley D. & Heather D., 256 Neb. 465, 590 N.W.2d 392 (1999) (analyzing due process claims regarding adjudication hearing). Under § 43-279.01(1)(b), this court has also held that a parent in a juvenile court case has the right to appointed counsel if unable to hire a lawyer. In re Interest of N.M. and J.M., 240 Neb. 690, 697, 484 N.W.2d 77, 82 (1992). Mercedes was not present at the adjudication hearing. Our de novo review of the record indicates that at the time the adjudication proceeding was occurring, Mercedes was incarcerated in the Hall County jail next door to the courthouse where the proceeding was conducted. In the context of a termination hearing, this court has held: [P]arental physical presence is unnecessary for a hearing to terminate parental rights, provided that the parent has been afforded procedural due process for the hearing to terminate parental rights. If a parent has been afforded procedural due process for a hearing to terminate parental rights, allowing a parent who is incarcerated or otherwise confined in custody of a government to attend the termination hearing is within the discretion of the trial court, whose decision on appeal will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion. In deciding whether to allow a parent's attendance at a hearing to terminate parental rights, notwithstanding the parent's incarceration or other confinement, a court may consider the delay resulting from prospective parental attendance, the need for disposition of the proceeding within the immediate future, the elapsed time during which the proceeding has been pending before the juvenile court, the expense to the State if the State will be required to provide transportation for the parent, the inconvenience or detriment to parties or witnesses, the potential danger or security risk which may occur as a result of the parent's release from custody or confinement to attend the hearing, the reasonable availability of the parent's testimony through a means other than parental attendance at the hearing, and the best interests of the parent's child or children in reference to the parent's prospective physical attendance at the termination hearing. (Emphasis supplied.) In re Interest L.V., 240 Neb. 404, 416, 482 N.W.2d 250, 258-59 (1992). For the reason discussed below, we now extend the holding in In re Interest of L.V. to a parent who cannot appear at an adjudication hearing because of the parent's incarceration or confinement. See In re Stephen Tyler R., 213 W.Va. 725, 584 S.E.2d 581 (2003) (extending rule adopted from In re Interest of L.V. to case involving adjudication of incarcerated parent's child). See, also, State ex rel. Jeanette H. v. Pancake, 207 W.Va. 154, 529 S.E.2d 865 (2000) (adopting Nebraska's factors for determining whether to allow incarcerated parent to attend termination hearing). An adjudication hearing is the trial stage of a juvenile proceeding, in which the State must prove its allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. Neb. Rev.Stat. § 43-279(1) (Reissue 1998). [C]ases brought under § 43-247(3)(a) can, and sometimes do, end in drastic measures such as termination of parental rights. In re Interest of Billie B., 8 Neb.App. 791, 796, 601 N.W.2d 799, 803 (1999). Under § 43-279.01(1)(a), adequate notice of the possibility of the termination of parental rights must be given in adjudication hearings. In re Interest of N.M. and J.M., 240 Neb. 690, 696, 484 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1992). Based upon the facts adduced at an adjudication hearing, the State may file a motion for termination of parental rights. See In re Interest of Hollenbeck, 212 Neb. 253, 322 N.W.2d 635 (1982). Similarly, the court may implement a rehabilitation plan as a condition of reunification, deny a parent the opportunity for rehabilitation, or place the children with a permanent guardian based upon the facts adduced at this hearing. See, e.g., Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-1312(2) (Reissue 1998) (requiring DHHS to adopt case plan calling for adoption, guardianship, et cetera, when return of child to parents is unlikely based on investigation); In re Interest of Tabatha R., 255 Neb. 818, 587 N.W.2d 109 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was not in child's best interests to order rehabilitation plan); In re Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S., 227 Neb. 251, 417 N.W.2d 147 (1987) (requiring juvenile courts to inform parents that they may order rehabilitation plan). Thus, adjudication is a crucial step in proceedings possibly leading to the termination of parental rights. Cf. State v. Norwood, 203 Neb. 201, 204, 277 N.W.2d 709, 711 (1979) (noting that hearing on motion to terminate was a continuation of the same proceeding). Furthermore, parents have a fundamental liberty interest at stake, and the State cannot adjudicate a child except by procedures which meet the requisites of the Due Process Clause. In re Interest of Ty M. & Devon M., 265 Neb. 150, 655 N.W.2d 672 (2003). `For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard....' In re Interest of L.V., 240 Neb. 404, 413, 482 N.W.2d 250, 257 (1992), quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). We do not intend by this holding to require juvenile courts to conduct an inquiry as to the whereabouts of every respondent parent who fails to appear for a scheduled hearing in order to ascertain whether their absence is attributable to incarceration. In re Stephen Tyler R., 213 W.Va. at 733, 584 S.E.2d at 589. In most situations, in order to trigger the requirements of In re Interest of L.V., the burden is properly placed on the parent or the parent's attorney to notify the court of the parent's incarceration and to request attendance. See In re Stephen Tyler R., supra . In this case, however, the court acknowledged at the adjudication that Mercedes was in custody somewhere, and our de novo review of the record indicates that somewhere was in the Hall County jail. Under these circumstances, it is superfluous to require Mercedes to notify the court of her incarceration when the court was already aware that she was in custody and the record indicated that such incarceration was in the Hall County jail. See, Purbaugh v. Jurgensmeier, 240 Neb. 679, 483 N.W.2d 757 (1992) (noting general rule that notice of personal representative's status in contract transaction is unnecessary if facts demonstrate that third party was aware of status); Melling v. Mattley, 10 Neb.App. 745, 637 N.W.2d 661 (2002) (concluding that failure of Internal Revenue Service to comply with notice statutes did not void sale where property owners had actual knowledge of seizure and sale and failed to raise lack of notice as defense); Snowdon Farms v. Jones, 8 Neb.App. 445, 595 N.W.2d 270 (1999) (purchaser was not obligated to notify seller of title defects in sale of real property when sellers learned of defects on their own). Cf. State v. Hudson and Maeberry, 208 Neb. 649, 654, 305 N.W.2d 359, 362 (1981) (trial court need not initiate inquiry into defense counsel's possible conflict of interest when defendant fails to raise objection `[u]nless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists'). In addition, expecting Mercedes to have contacted the court to request attendance when the notice of the hearing was provided by a summons in a language she could not read, and when, as discussed below, she was not represented by counsel at the adjudication hearing, would not comport with fundamental fairness. We therefore turn to a determination of whether the juvenile court afforded Mercedes due process and, if so, whether the court abused its discretion in not having Mercedes present during the adjudication proceeding. Although the court transcriber's introductory recitation of the adjudication hearing states that Todd Elsbernd appear[s] as counsel for the natural mother, Elsbernd is not noted as being present when the court stated the appearances for the record prior to commencing the adjudication hearing. No reference is made to Elsbernd during the adjudication hearing, and likewise, no participation is attributable to Elsbernd. Furthermore, neither the court's First Appearance checklist, nor the Adjudication Hearing checklist, both dated April 9, 2001, contain a checkmark affirmatively noting the presence of counsel for Mercedes, or that counsel had been waived. See State v. Orduna, 250 Neb. 602, 610, 550 N.W.2d 356, 362 (1996) (checklist or other such docket entry which is made by one authorized to make it imports verity, and unless contradicted, it stands as a true record of the event). To the contrary, the First Appearance checklist has written upon it, 5-7-01 Elsbernd appt, and there is a separate order signed by the clerk magistrate showing Elsbernd's appointment to have occurred on May 7, 2001, 28 days after the adjudication hearing. We determine from our de novo review of the record that despite Mercedes' statutory right to counsel, she was neither represented by counsel at the adjudication hearing nor had she waived this right. See, § 43-279.01; In re Interest of N.M. and J.M., 240 Neb. 690, 484 N.W.2d 77 (1992). We further determine from our de novo review of the record that the juvenile court otherwise failed to afford Mercedes due process in that (1) no procedure was utilized by the court to provide Mercedes with any opportunity to refute or defend against the allegations of the petition and (2) no procedures were implemented to afford Mercedes an opportunity to participate in the hearing, to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses, or to present evidence on her behalf. See In re Interest of L.V., 240 Neb. 404, 482 N.W.2d 250 (1992). We determine that such lack of procedures denied Mercedes due process. Having so determined, we need not reach the issue of whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in not allowing Mercedes to be physically present.