Opinion ID: 202454
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Raised by González

Text: González raises two claims: that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of conspiracy to commit drug trafficking under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and that the sentence he received was not issued in accordance with our decisions in United States v. Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 2004), United States v. Vásquez-Molina, 389 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2004), or the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
González argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for a jury to find him guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. We will review de novo a district court's denial of a defendant's motion for acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. United States v. Rivera Ruiz, 244 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir. 2001). The standard is whether the evidence, taken in the light most amicable to the prosecution, together with all reasonable inferences favorable to it, would allow a rational fact-finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty as charged. United States v. Maraj, 947 F.2d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 1991). The Government need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, provided the record as a whole supports a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77, 86-87 (1st Cir. 1990). -16- González was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 846. To prove that González was guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, the Government needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an agreement existed to commit the underlying substantive offense (here, the distribution of drugs), that the defendant knew of the agreement, and that he opted to join in it, intending to commit the substantive offense. United States v. Gómez, 255 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2001). During the trial, the Government offered testimony from an FBI agent, a Police of Puerto Rico officer, two cooperating witnesses, as well as hours of videotape that, taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, shows that Rivera and others agreed to distribute cocaine and other drugs at the Malvinas drug point. A jury could reasonably infer from the testimony of the two cooperating witnesses regarding the sales of cocaine by González to Rivera, the audiotape recordings of González's conversations, and the presence of González's name in the ledger, that González was aware of the conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. See United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 712 (1st Cir. 1992) ([F]actfinders may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence based on shared perceptions and understandings of the habits, practices, and inclinations of human beings.). A jury could further infer from the testimony about González's regular sales of cocaine to Rivera that González joined the agreement for the purpose of and with the -17- intent to distribute cocaine. In light of the substantial amount of evidence presented, the fact that one witness could not explain the difference between an eighth and a half kilogram of cocaine or that another witness described the drugs as stones or bricks does not make irrational the jury's conclusion that González was guilty of conspiracy. See United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2003) ([T]he jury's duty is to assess credibility, and it may accept or reject, in whole or in part, any testimony.). Accordingly, we believe that the court was correct to deny González's motion for acquittal.
González challenges his sentence on the ground that the district court refused to make an individualized finding of the quantity of drugs that could be attributed to his participation in the conspiracy. Since González challenges the sentencing court's conclusion of law that such a finding was unnecessary, we will review it de novo. United States v. Brennick, 337 F.3d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 2003). In Colón-Solís, we held that when a district court determines drug quantity for the purpose of sentencing a defendant convicted of participating in a drug-trafficking conspiracy, the court is required to make an individualized finding as to drug amounts attributable to, or foreseeable by, that defendant. 354 F.3d at 103. A defendant can only be sentenced on the basis of -18- drugs he handled, anticipated handling, or for drugs he could reasonably foresee being used in the conspiracy; all of the drugs in a conspiracy may not be automatically assigned to an individual defendant. United States v. Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1197 (1st Cir. 1993). Both González and the Government agree that the sentencing court failed to make such an individualized finding and that this constitutes error. Their only difference is remedy: González believes that the jury needed to determine drug quantity and thus a new trial is merited, whereas the Government believes that a judge could make the determination without the jury and resentencing would be sufficient. On this subject, we have been quite clear: [O]nce the jury has determined that the conspiracy involved a type and quantity of drugs sufficient to justify a sentence above the default statutory maximum and has found a particular defendant guilty of participation in the conspiracy, the judge lawfully may determine the drug quantity attributable to that defendant and sentence him accordingly. Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2002). The principal enunciated in Derman survives the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Blakely and Booker. See United States v. Malouf, No. 05-2245 (1st Cir. Oct. 13, 2006). Consequently, we remand González's case for resentencing in accordance with our decisions. Because we have remanded González's case for resentencing on this ground, we do not -19- need to decide now the merits of González's other sentencing claims.