Opinion ID: 1343062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: post-trial errors

Text: First, the appellant contends the trial judge improperly denied his motion for public proceedings, which motion was filed prior to the sentencing hearing, but after the delinquency hearing. The appellant relies upon W.Va.Code, 49-5-1(d) [1982], which provides, in pertinent part, that the general public shall be excluded except persons whose presence is requested by a child or respondent and other persons the court finds to have a legitimate interest. (emphasis added). The State maintains that the exception in the above code section was not meant to allow the public in the courtroom during the proceeding. Clearly, the purpose behind excluding the public from the hearing of a juvenile proceeding is to protect the juvenile and not to infringe upon the rights of the juvenile. The appellant argues, however, that he is entitled to waive his right to have the public excluded. Furthermore, he asserts that if he does waive such right, it will violate his right to have his criminal proceeding open and public as found in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and in article III, § 14 of the W.Va. Const. if the trial court declines to allow the public to be present. Additionally, the appellant maintains that if this Court construes W.Va.Code, 49-5-1(d) [1982] to mean that the juvenile could never request a public proceeding, then § 49-5-1(d) [1982] would violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Const. We fail to see how the absence of the public at the sentencing hearing infringed upon the rights of the appellant. Indeed, the appellant, himself, failed to provide this Court any authority suggesting that the failure to allow the public to be present during the sentencing hearing infringes upon a juvenile's rights when the juvenile did not request the presence of the public at the delinquency proceeding. Essentially, the appellant seeks to pick and choose at what stages he wanted the public to be present. We acknowledge, however, that had this issue been raised prior to the appellant's delinquency hearing, the ramifications could be very significant. Currently, throughout the country, courts are addressing similar issues. E.g., RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 38 (Alaska 1971) (Children in juvenile delinquency proceedings are guaranteed the right to a public trial); In re McM., 105 Cal. App.3d 187, 164 Cal.Rptr. 199 (1980) (A juvenile has no constitutional right to a public trial in a juvenile court proceeding); Florida Pub. Co. v. Morgan, 253 Ga. 467, 322 S.E.2d 233, 238 (1984) (A state may create a rule that juvenile court proceedings are presumed to be closed to the public, but for constitutional reasons this presumption cannot be conclusive); In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879, 886-87 (1969), cert. granted by 397 U.S. 1036, 90 S.Ct. 1379, 25 L.Ed.2d 647 (1970) and judgment affirmed on other grounds, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971) (A public hearing is not required in a juvenile court proceeding. In McKeiver the Supreme Court of the United States held that a trial by jury in the adjudicative stage of a juvenile proceeding was not constitutionally required) In re N.H., 63 Ohio Misc.2d 285, 626 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio Com.Pl.1992) (The public does have an interest in access to delinquency proceedings which is similar to its interest in criminal matters; however, the public's interest must be weighed against the confidentiality concerns of the juvenile court proceeding.) We decline to further address this issue because the appellant has failed to sufficiently argue how the exclusion of the public from his sentencing proceeding infringed upon his rights considering the appellant failed to seek public access during the delinquency proceeding.
Second, the appellant asserts that the trial judge improperly refused to provide appellant's counsel with a copy of an affidavit of Paul Donato, the principal of appellant's high school. Though the trial judge has stated that the affidavit was not part of this case, a letter written by Mr. Donato to the appellant's counsel indicates otherwise. According to the appellant, Mr. Donato stated that he did not believe that appellant should have been charged as a juvenile delinquent; however, appellant states that Mr. Donato declined to provide an additional statement since the affidavit filed with the circuit court was his statement. Specifically, in a letter dated December 9, 1993, Mr. Donato wrote to appellant's counsel that the affidavit will stand as my statement on this matter. Common sense dictates that a trial judge should not conceal an affidavit which was written for purposes of being made part of a record. Furthermore, a trial judge may not intentionally conceal information which has a bearing on the case. Such behavior by a trial judge will not be condoned. Unfortunately, the record does not reveal the contents of the affidavit. Without a more developed record on this issue, this Court is unable to determine the relevance, if any, of the affidavit to the case before us. The appellant should have requested that the trial judge send the affidavit to this Court under seal, if necessary, for an examination of its contents. Cf. W.Va.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(1) (A party may make a motion to restrict or deny discovery of a statement, and if a Court grants the motion the text of the statement shall be sealed and preserved in the record so that it is available to the appellate court on review) and State v. Tamez, 169 W.Va. 382, 394, 290 S.E.2d 14, 20-21 (1982) (When the State refuses to disclose the identity of an informant, the trial court upon motion, is to conduct an in camera inspection of the written statements prepared by the State explaining why the identity of the informant should not be disclosed, and the in camera inspection shall be sealed and made a part of the record so that it will be available on appellate review). Accordingly, since the appellant failed to request that the affidavit be sent to this Court for review, we are unable to resolve this issue.
Third, the appellant asserts that the trial judge erred in sentencing the appellant to a period of probation rather than dismissing the petition pursuant to W.Va.Code, 49-5-13(b) [1988] which provides seven dispositional alternatives ranging from dismissing the petition to committing a child to a mental health facility. The appellant correctly points out that this Court held in syllabus point 1 of State ex rel. R.S. v. Trent, 169 W.Va. 493, 289 S.E.2d 166 (1982), that W.Va.Code § 49-5-13(b) (1980 Replacement Vol.) requires the juvenile court at the dispositional stage of delinquency proceedings to `give to the least restrictive' of the enumerated dispositional alternatives `consistent with the best interests and welfare of the public and the child.'  The third of the seven alternatives is probation which requires a finding that the child is in need of extra-parental supervision. [7] The appellant maintains that the evidence does not indicate that he was in need of extra-parental supervision. In support of his contention, the appellant states that he had a 3.0 grade point average and was taking college preparatory courses and three honors courses when the incident occurred. The appellant also states that he played football and basketball in school. Additionally, teachers stated that prior to this incident the appellant had never been in a fight at school and was never in any trouble. However, in syllabus point 4 of State v. Goodnight, 169 W.Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982) this Court held: Sentences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits and if not based on some [im]permissible factor, are not subject to appellate review. See also State v. Farr, 193 W.Va. 355, 456 S.E.2d 199 (1995). Nothing in the record indicates that the trial judge was not within the statutory limits nor is there anything within the record which indicates that the trial judge based his decision on some impermissible factor. Accordingly, we hold there is no error on this issue.
The appellant raises four other issues on this appeal. First, the appellant argues that the trial judge improperly incarcerated the appellant in the Industrial Home for Youth for a diagnostic evaluation. As the State points out, this issue has been resolved. After the trial, the trial judge granted the State's motion to require the appellant to undergo diagnostic and psychological evaluation and ordered that the appellant be taken into custody and sent to the Industrial Home for Youth for thirty days of diagnostic testing. The appellant did not object. However, the appellant, who had retained counsel at this stage of the juvenile proceeding, [8] later filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with this Court seeking his release from the custody of the Industrial Home for Youth. This Court issued a rule to show cause to the trial judge. In response, the trial judge explained that he was unaware of the appellant's objection to being sent to the Industrial Home for Youth until the rule to show cause was issued. The trial judge asserted that when he knew of the appellant's objection, he released the appellant from the custody of the Industrial Home for Youth. This Court, therefore, dismissed the writ of prohibition by an order dated February 17, 1994, because it was moot. Therefore, the issue is not properly cognizable by this Court on appeal. As this Court has stated in the syllabus of Standard Hydraulics, Inc. v. Kerns, 182 W.Va. 225, 387 S.E.2d 130 (1989):  `Moot questions or abstract propositions, the decision of which would avail nothing in the determination of controverted rights of persons or of property, are not properly cognizable by a court.' Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Lilly v. Carter, 63 W.Va. 684, 60 S.E. 873 (1908). See also syllabus, State v. Pettrey, 177 W.Va. 723, 356 S.E.2d 477 (1987). Second, the appellant contends that the trial judge improperly ordered the appellant's parents to pay, prior to the final adjudication, Dr. Fremouw's charges for the diagnostic and psychological evaluation of the appellant, which totaled $365.00. Neither the State nor the appellant provides any authority for the trial judge assessing or not being authorized to assess such costs. However, we are concerned about the imposition of such costs on the parents in this case. Given the circumstances of the case, such costs may not be imposed. Third, the appellant argues that the trial court improperly prohibited the appellant and his parents from receiving a copy of the pre-diagnostic investigation and the psychological evaluation. W.Va.Code, 49-5-13(a) [1988], in relevant part, specifically states that [t]he court ... may order a psychological examination of the child [and]... [u]nless waived, copies of the report shall be provided to ... counsel for the child [.] While the above code section does provide that a copy of the report is to be provided to the juvenile's attorney, it does not require that the child or his parents should receive their own copy of the report. [9] Moreover, the State asserts that the trial judge in the case before us clearly indicated in a letter dated January 11, 1994, that the appellant's counsel was given an opportunity to review the pre-diagnostic investigation and the psychological evaluation report. No prejudice has been shown. Thus, we decline to reverse on this ground. Fourth, the appellant maintains the trial judge erred in his interpretation of Trial Court Rules for Trial Courts of Record Rule XVII(a) which states, in relevant part, that if a motion for disqualification of a judge is filed at least 7 days in advance of any date set for a non-trial proceeding in the case, and if the judge does not agree to recuse himself, then the judge must proceed no further in the matter and must transmit a copy of the motion to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of West Virginia along with his response. In the case before us, the appellant filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge on February 18, 1994. On February 25, 1994, a dispositional hearing was scheduled. The appellant argues that he met the seven-day requirement. The trial judge found that the appellant did not. However, the trial judge did inform the appellant that he would provide him with an opportunity to provide a memorandum on the issue of whether the motion should be transmitted to the Chief Justice. The appellant declined the offer and chose to proceed with the hearing. The appellant, thus, waived any error on this issue. As this Court held in syllabus point 3 of In the Interest of S.C., 168 W.Va. 366, 284 S.E.2d 867 (1981):  `An order to which no objection was made and which was actually approved by counsel, will not be reviewed on appeal.' Syl. pt. 1, Loar v. Massey, 164 W.Va. 155, 261 S.E.2d 83 (1979). Cf. Pardee v. Johnston, 70 W.Va. 347, 74 S.E. 721 (1912) (If improper testimony is given to a jury over objection, and if the trial judge offers to strike such testimony, but the party objecting declines to have the trial judge strike the objectionable testimony, then the objecting party may not complain about the objectionable testimony on appeal.)