Opinion ID: 2453241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assistance of CounselParticipation by Standby Counsel

Text: The State asserts that even if the trial court's inquiry failed to establish Mr. Bledsoe's knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, there is no reversible error because Mr. Bledsoe effectively relinquished representation to his standby counsel, Mr. Davis. We do not agree. The assistance of standby counsel can rise to a level where the defendant is deemed to have had counsel for his defense, thereby mooting any assertion of involuntary waiver. See Oliver, supra ; Calamese v. State, 276 Ark. 422, 635 S.W.2d 261 (1982). Whether or not such assistance rises to that level is a question that must be answered by looking at the totality of the circumstances. See Oliver, supra ; Wicoff v. State, 321 Ark. 97, 900 S.W.2d 187 (1995). Our cases on this issue demonstrate that the assistance must be substantial, such that counsel was effectively conducting a defense. See Oliver, supra ; Calamese, supra . In Calamese, supra , there was no evidence of any inquiry by the trial court into the appellant's attempted waiver of counsel, but we determined that the appellant had been effectively represented at trial by the attorney appointed to assist her. We noted that the attorney immediately assumed a fully active role as trial attorney, conducting the entire interrogation, cross-examination, making objections to evidence and exhibits, presenting a defense with numerous exhibits and four defense witnesses, including eliciting lengthy testimony from the defendant and making a forceful closing argument, all of which was done with evident familiarity. Id. Under those facts, we held that appellant was not left to represent herself at any stage of the proceedings, and she was not denied her right to counsel. Id. Similarly, in Oliver, supra , no effective waiver was obtained when the defendant elected to proceed pro se and standby counsel was appointed to assist during trial. As in Calamese , we affirmed the conviction where, with the exception of the defendant's cross-examination of the first State witness, standby counsel cross-examined each State witness, made objections during the State's case, and presented a motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of the State's case. Id. Further, standby counsel recalled the State's first witness and examined him as well as the remaining six defense witnesses. Id. Counsel also made the closing argument. Id. Under such circumstances, we held that the defendant was not denied his right to counsel because standby counsel not only advised the defendant but actively represented him during most of the proceeding, and the defendant effectively relinquished representation to his standby counsel early in the trial. Id. (emphasis added). The facts here are distinguishable from those in Calamese and Oliver in that the appointed counsel in this case did not actively participate in Mr. Bledsoe's defense during most of the trial. The record shows that Mr. Bledsoe cross-examined twenty-four of the State's twenty-five witnesses, and examined all of the defense witnesses. Furthermore, Mr. Bledsoe raised and argued the only substantive objections during the trial and presented his own closing argument. In contrast, Mr. Davis cross-examined only one of the State's witnesses, raised no objections to evidence or exhibits, and participated in one bench conference. While Mr. Davis conducted voir dire, and gave the opening statement, he effectively relinquished representation to Mr. Bledsoe once the State began to call its witnesses. Mr. Davis's participation level increased again at the close of the trial when he reviewed the jury instructions and handled the sentencing phase. In short, Mr. Bledsoe was left to represent himself during the State's case-in-chief and during the presentation of his defense. Under these circumstances, we must conclude that Mr. Davis did not actively represent Mr. Bledsoe during most of the proceeding. We therefore hold that Mr. Bledsoe was denied his right to counsel. Because we are reversing on Mr. Bledsoe's first point on appeal, it is unnecessary for us to address the merits of his remaining points. Reversed and remanded. ARNOLD, C.J., and CORBIN, J., dissent.