Opinion ID: 2614001
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doyle claim

Text: (30) Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed error under Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 618 [49 L.Ed.2d 91, 98, 96 S.Ct. 2240] [holding the prosecution is not permitted to impeach a defendant's exculpatory statements by referring to his having remained silent after receiving Miranda warnings], in emphasizing in cross-examination and closing argument the circumstance that defendant had not expressed remorse, thereby drawing attention to his failure to confess upon interrogation and, accordingly, violating his privilege against self-incrimination. We repeatedly have commented that the presence or absence of remorse is a factor universally deemed relevant to the jury's penalty determination. (See, e.g., People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 86, 209-210; People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 197 [276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169]; see also People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 313 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585].) We have rejected the contention that such comment violated the Doyle rule when that contention was raised with reference to the 1977 death penalty law (see People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 580 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776]), and our conclusion is the same under the present law. In the case before us, the prosecutor's generalized references to defendant's lack of remorse contained no allusion to the circumstance that defendant had not confessed after receiving Miranda warnings prior to questioning.