Opinion ID: 3052173
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the district court erred in awarding andrew

Text: $15,000 IN STATUTORY DAMAGES UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT. Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) and (c), a copyright owner may elect to recover statutory damages instead of actual damages and any additional profits. Ordinarily, we review an award of statutory damages for abuse of discretion. See Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 520 (9th Cir. 1985). [1] Title 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) leaves no room for discretion, however. Section 412(2) mandates that, in order to recover statutory damages, the copyrighted work must have been registered prior to commencement of the infringement, unless the registration is made within three months after first publication of the work. See id. (precluding an award of attorneys’ fees as well);3 Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 707 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the district court awarded Andrew $15,000 in statutory damages because Poof distributed garments bearing the infringing hang-tag after June 15, 2005, the copyright’s registration date. Thus, as a matter of law, the court must have determined that § 412 does not preclude an award of statutory 3 Title 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) provides that “no award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees, as provided by sections 504 and 505, shall be made for any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is made within three months after the first publication of the work.” 6666 DEREK ANDREW v. POOF APPAREL CORP. damages because these post-June 15, 2005, shipments were separate and distinct infringements from the pre-registration infringement. We review de novo the court’s legal conclusion that the post-June 15, 2005, infringements did not “commence” before the copyright was registered. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007). [2] In this case, it is undisputed that Andrew’s hang-tag was first published on August 11, 2003, and that its copyright registration became effective on June 15, 2005. It is also undisputed that the initial act of infringement occurred on May 9, 2005, when Andrew first came into possession of a Poof garment bearing an infringing hang-tag. Thus, Andrew’s copyright in its Twisted Heart hang-tag was registered more than three months after its first publication, and Poof’s infringement first occurred before the effective date of registration. Citing this sequence of events, Poof argues that Andrew is precluded from recovering statutory damages under § 412 because any subsequent, post-registration distributions of garments bearing the infringing hang-tag are continuous and ongoing acts of the initial infringement. Andrew, on the other hand, contends that these post-registration distributions constitute new infringements under the Copyright Act, thereby justifying the court’s award of statutory damages. [3] Until now, we have not expressly addressed the issue presented; namely, whether § 412 bars an award of statutory damages for post-registration infringements when the initial act of infringement occurred prior to the effective copyright registration date. Resolution of this issue necessarily depends upon our interpretation of the term “commenced” as it is used in § 412. In that regard, we examine the text of § 412 and consider the purposes behind its enactment. [4] With respect to the text, we are guided by the courts that have interpreted § 412 in similar factual contexts. As one court has concluded, while DEREK ANDREW v. POOF APPAREL CORP. 6667 [e]ach separate act of infringement is, of course, an “infringement” within the meaning of the stat- ute, and in a literal sense perhaps such an act might be said to have “commenced ” (and ended) on the day of its perpetration[,] . . . it would be peculiar if not inaccurate to use the word “com- menced ” to describe a single act. That verb gener- ally presupposes as a subject some kind of activity that begins at one time and continues or reoccurs thereafter. Singh v. Famous Overseas, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 533, 535 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); accord Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C&C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1394 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (quoting Singh, 680 F. Supp. at 535); Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (“The plain language of the statute does not reveal that Congress intended to distinguish between pre- and post-registration infringements.”). We discern no reason to depart from such a reading. [5] We also recognize that § 412 is designed to implement two fundamental purposes. First, by denying an award of statutory damages and attorney’s fees where infringement takes place before registration, Congress sought to provide copyright owners with an incentive to register their copyrights promptly. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 158 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5774 (“Copyright registration . . . is useful and important to users and the public at large . . . and should therefore be induced in some practical way.”). Second, § 412 encourages potential infringers to check the Copyright Office’s database. See Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 505 (6th Cir. 1998). To allow statutory damages and attorneys’ fees where an infringing act occurs before registration and then reoccurs thereafter clearly would defeat the dual incentives of § 412. See Johnson, 149 F.3d at 505 (“These purposes would be thwarted by holding that infringement is ‘commenced’ for the purposes of § 412 each time an 6668 DEREK ANDREW v. POOF APPAREL CORP. infringer commits another in an ongoing series of infringing acts.”). Every court to consider the issue has held that “infringement ‘commences’ for the purposes of § 412 when the first act in a series of acts constituting continuing infringement occurs.” Johnson, 149 F.3d at 506; accord Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“Interpreting ‘commencement of infringement’ as the time when the first act of infringement in a series of on-going discrete infringements occurs . . . would best promote the early registration of a copyright.”). Indeed, if the incentive structure of § 412 is to be properly applied, Andrew, having waited nearly two years from the date of first publication to register its copyright, should not receive the reward of statutory damages. See Johnson, 149 F.3d at 505-06. [6] Accordingly, we join those circuits that addressed the issue before us4 and hold that the first act of infringement in a series of ongoing infringements of the same kind marks the commencement of one continuing infringement under § 412. This interpretation, we believe, furthers Congress’ intent to promote the early registration of copyrights. [7] Given our interpretation of § 412, we must now determine whether Poof’s post-registration distributions were an ongoing continuation of its initial pre-registration infringement. In this case, there is no legally significant difference between Poof’s pre- and post-registration infringement. Poof first distributed garments bearing the infringing hang-tag on May 9, 2005, if not earlier, and continued to do so—albeit with the hang-tag attached to different garments—after the 4 See Bouchat v. Bon-Ton Dep’t Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d 315, 330 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 2008 WL 436937 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2008) (No. 07-1053); Troll Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., 483 F.3d 150, 158 (2d Cir. 2007); Johnson, 149 F.3d at 506; Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 142-44 (5th Cir. 1992). DEREK ANDREW v. POOF APPAREL CORP. 6669 June 15, 2005, copyright registration. Thus, Poof began its infringing activity before the effective registration date, and it repeated the same act after that date each time it used the same copyrighted material. [8] The mere fact that the hang-tag was attached to new garments made and distributed after June 15 does not transform those distributions into many separate and distinct infringements. See e.g. Mason, 967 F.2d at 144 (concluding that a plaintiff may not recover statutory damages for infringements that commenced after registration if the same defendant commenced an infringement of the same work prior to registration); Ez-Tixz, Inc. v. Hit-Tix, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 728, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting argument that each sale of an infringing ticket was a separate act of infringement that commenced after the copyright’s registration date); Parfums Givenchy, 832 F. Supp. at 1393-95 (rejecting argument that, because the defendant had imported and distributed the infringing product on several distinct occasions, each act of importing the product constituted a separate and distinct act of infringement); Johnson v. Univ. of Va., 606 F. Supp. 321, 325 (W.D. Va. 1985) (rejecting argument that each time a photograph was copied, a separate copyright infringement was commenced). Poof simply engaged in an ongoing series of infringements that commenced with the first distribution in May 2005. Therefore, Andrew is not entitled to statutory damages under the Copyright Act, and the court’s award of $15,000 is REVERSED.