Opinion ID: 168112
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-Trial Proceedings in the District Court

Text: On June 5, 2000, W illiam E. Smith, III, a former Aztec rig worker, filed a complaint in New M exico state court against Aztec, arguing that its policy of refusing to pay wages to drill rig crews for their travel time was a violation of the FLSA. Aztec removed the action to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss. Aztec argued that the plaintiff’s claim for compensation under the FLSA for time spent traveling to and from his w ork site was barred by the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). The district court denied A ztec’s motion to dismiss. After the district court denied Aztec’s motion to dismiss, a number of other current and former Aztec rig workers consented to have M r. Smith’s attorney represent them in a joint action against Aztec for all unpaid wages owed under the FLSA. On October 23, 2001, the district court granted M r. Smith’s m otion to certify his lawsuit as a class action. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 18, 2002, asserting that Aztec owes “unpaid wages and overtime compensation due to [its] employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act.” R. Vol. I at 31. To support their travel time claim, the plaintiffs made the following allegations: (1) “Aztec W ell requires its twenty-four hour rig hands to meet at a designated location within the tri-city area -3- of Farmington - Aztec - Bloomfield prior to the commencement of each work shift”; (2) “The rig hands are further required to travel from this designated location to remote well sites . . . in a vehicle under the supervision and control of agents or employees of Aztec”; and (3) “During this travel to and from the well site, rig hands perform work . . . for which they are not compensated, nor is such travel time counted by Aztec Well towards hours worked by the rig hands, for purposes of calculating overtime pay.” Id. at 34. On February 15, 2002, the district court approved the plaintiffs’ notice of pendency of class action, and the parties distributed the notice to other potential members of the class. The notice stated that “the Plaintiffs claim Aztec Well has failed to lawfully compensate its employees for all hours worked, including overtime, where . . . rig hands are not paid for travel time to and from well sites.” Id. at 39. Subsequently, a number of Aztec employees opted into the law suit with respect to the travel-time claim. In their answers to Aztec’s interrogatories, the plaintiffs raised factual allegations that could support additional FLSA claims against Aztec based on preand post-shift work allegedly performed at the w ell sites. The interrogatory answers— which were not submitted to Aztec until October 11, 2002, several weeks after the close of discovery— contain the follow ing allegations: [O ]n arrival at the w ell site, usually about 30 minutes before commencement of paid time, these plaintiffs w ould change into -4- specialized protective gear required by the employer . . . . The crew would then meet sometimes with the tool pusher to discuss safetyrelated concerns. . . . Each crew member would then meet with his counterpart on the preceding crew . . ., and each would be briefed on the special concerns or considerations relevant to the performance of duties on that shift. At that time the crew members would then commence their paid period. Id. at 170–71. Despite raising these allegations in their interrogatory answers, the plaintiffs made no attempt to include them in their pleadings by formally amending their complaint. On November 4, 2002, Aztec filed a motion to dismiss several of the plaintiffs from the action because they had filed their notice of consent to representation after the statute of limitations on their FLSA claims had run. Actions for unpaid wages under the FLSA are “forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). The district court found that there was still a material question of fact as to the w illfulness issue, and therefore dismissed only those plaintiffs who filed their consent to representation more than three years after leaving Aztec’s employment. -5- At a subsequent hearing, on April 2, 2003, the district court granted A ztec’s motion for partial summary judgment dismissing all travel-time claims that arose after January 27, 2000— the date w hen Aztec distributed a travel policy to its employees. Aztec’s travel policy states “that it does not control or direct the travel or transportation of any 24-hour rig employee to or from the rig location,” that no crew member “is required to travel to or from the 24-hour rig location with the [supervisor of the crew],” and that “24 hour crew members . . . may not be asked or required to perform any service or duty for the company or any company supervisor while traveling to or from the 24 hour location.” R. Vol. I at 70 (emphasis omitted). The district court held that no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiffs on travel-time claims arising after this travel policy was announced, and ordered the plaintiffs to submit a revised list of the remaining class members in light of its ruling. W hen the plaintiffs submitted their “revised” list of class members, they took the position that no one should be dismissed from the class pursuant to the district court’s summary judgment order. The plaintiffs contended that the district court’s order related only to their requests for travel-time compensation based on the nature of the traveling, not their travel-time claims based on “w ork activities performed by Plaintiffs during the travel period.” R. Vol. I at 106, 107. The plaintiffs argued that because all of the class members w ere asserting both types of travel-time claims, they all remain parties to the action. Aztec contended -6- that the district court’s previous order applied to both sets of travel-time claims, and therefore that any plaintiff who did not work for Aztec before January 27, 2000 should be dismissed from the action. Both parties appeared to agree that “[t]he only claim remaining in this litigation is the FLSA travel time claim.” R. Vol. I at 95; see also R. Vol. I at 107–08 & n.1. The district court agreed with Aztec’s interpretation of its previous order, and dismissed thirty-four plaintiffs from the action who did not work for Aztec before January 27, 2000. Fifty-two plaintiffs remained in the action after the district court’s order. On December 10, 2003, the parties filed their pretrial order. Both parties stipulated to a number of facts in pretrial order, including the following: (1) “Aztec W ell employed the Plaintiffs w orking on a ‘24 hour rig’”; (2) “the well sites on which Aztec Well performs its work vary in distance from the Aztec, New M exico yard where Aztec Well’s offices are located”; (3) “Aztec Well’s 24hour crew members are not paid for the time that they travel to and from well sites”; (4) there “is no contract . . . that required Aztec W ell to compensate [plaintiffs] for time spent traveling”; (5) “it is the standard practice of other oilfield companies in the San Juan basin not to compensate 24-hour crew members for the time that they travel to and from a well site”; and (6) “[t]hree or four-person crews generally, but not alw ays, drive together to well sites.” R. Vol. I at 122. -7- The plaintiffs alleged in the pretrial order that they “regularly worked hours for which they were not compensated by Defendant, including required and necessary meetings, drive time, travel and other preliminary and postliminary activities which are an integral part of the Plaintiffs’ principal activities.” Id. at 120. In the section of the pretrial order containing the plaintiffs’ factual contentions, the plaintiffs reasserted their claim from the October 2002 interrogatory answers that they performed work at the well sites before and after their shift. Aztec asserted that the plaintiffs’ claim for relief “is barred in its entirety by the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a).” Id. at 121. At the pretrial conference, ten days after the parties submitted their pretrial order, the district court heard arguments on whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to assert an FLSA claim against Aztec based on time allegedly spent changing into specialized clothing and attending pre-shift safety briefings. Aztec argued that these were “brand new claims” that have “not been in a complaint, an amended complaint, in a pretrial order, . . . [or] in any of the documents filed with the Court,” and should be denied as untimely. Id. at 150-51. The plaintiffs argued that the claims were not new because they had been raised in the October 2002 interrogatory answers. The district court agreed with Aztec, noting that the two additional claims would unduly complicate the case and weaken the commonalities of the class, and that the plaintiffs made no effort to amend their complaint to assert these two new -8- claims despite knowing about them for more than a year. Consequently, the court limited the plaintiffs’ lawsuit against A ztec to the travel time claims asserted in their amended complaint.