Opinion ID: 714051
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy to Distribute Narcotics

Text: 24 The defendant argues that the evidence at trial demonstrated that he only had a buyer-seller relationship with the drug suppliers Robert Burrell and Robert Matthews, and thus the evidence fell short of supporting a conviction for conspiring to distribute the drugs. See United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir.1991). 25 As stated above, [w]e will reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence only if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we determine that no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Vega, 72 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Humphrey, 34 F.3d 551, 555 (7th Cir.1994)). As with his conviction for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, Edwards failed to move for a judgment of acquittal at trial, thus we review his conviction only for a manifest miscarriage of justice. Archambault, 62 F.3d at 998, and we will not reweigh the evidence or re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1065 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1077, 127 L.Ed.2d 394 (1994). 26 The elements of a conspiracy are well established:A conspiracy is a confederation of two or more persons formed for the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, a criminal act. To prove that a defendant was a member of a conspiracy, the Government must demonstrate a participatory link between the conspiracy and the defendant. To establish that participatory link, the Government must offer sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendant knew of the conspiracy and that he intended to join and associate himself with its criminal design and purpose. When reviewing conspiracy convictions, we must be certain that the Government presented substantial evidence that the defendant was a conspirator. The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 27 United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 206 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Campbell, 985 F.2d 341, 344-45 (7th Cir.1993) (citations omitted)). 28 The government may prove each element of a conspiracy entirely by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Yusufu, 63 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 578, 133 L.Ed.2d 501 (1995); United States v. Sasson, 62 F.3d 874, 886 (7th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Vega, 860 F.2d 779, 793 (7th Cir.1988) ([i]t is perfectly legitimate to prove a conspiracy by circumstantial evidence because [b]y its very nature, a conspiracy is conceived and carried out clandestinely, and direct evidence of the crime is rarely available.)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 953, 133 L.Ed.2d 876 (1996). 29 In Edwards's case, count one charged him with conspiring to distribute drugs with Robert Burrell. At trial, FBI Agent Karen Pertuso testified that she interviewed the defendant Edwards shortly after his arrest. According to Agent Pertuso, Edwards stated that he had been dealing heroin and cocaine for some eight years and that one of his sources for heroin was Robert Burrell, also known as Cuz. FBI Agent Robert Pertuso testified that during an FBI surveillance operation on September 2, 1990 he observed Robert Burrell meet Jimmie Edwards in the parking lot of a Denny's restaurant in Gary, Indiana. The FBI learned of this meeting through wiretaps placed on the telephone line at his residence at 1522 Taft Street in Gary; the Agent observed Burrell and Jimmie Edwards exchange packages. 30 Jimmie Edwards (who became a cooperating individual with the FBI) testified that Robert Burrell, or Cuz, was defendant Edwards's source for brown heroin and that he supplied the drug in packages valued at $275 (known as dips). Defendant Edwards's wife, Lorri Edwards, corroborated Jimmie Edwards's testimony that the defendant Edwards received dips of heroin from an individual named Cuz. According to Lorri Edwards, defendant Edwards would beep Cuz whenever he needed heroin to sell and arrange a meeting at an agreed location. 31 At trial, the testimony revealed that Edwards and Burrell had an ongoing cooperative relationship to sell heroin. Both the number of transactions and the mutual trust between Edwards and Burrell (Edwards had Burrell's beeper number) reflect more than a straightforward buyer-seller interaction. When taking into consideration the size of Edwards's drug trafficking operation (at least twenty employees were named at trial and over forty-seven kilograms of sold narcotics were identified) and the length of time involved (Edwards admitted that he had been dealing drugs for at least eight years), it was not a manifest miscarriage of justice for the jury to find that Edwards had a cooperative agreement with his heroin supplier, Robert Burrell. See Berchiolly, 67 F.3d at 639 (we very rarely disturb a jury's credibility determination unless it is irrational and unreasonable.). 32 In count two, Edwards was charged with conspiring with Robert Matthews to distribute drugs. At trial, FBI Agent Karen Pertuso testified that Edwards admitted to her that Robert Matthews was his cocaine source. Jimmy Edwards testified that Robert Matthews was the source for black tar heroin. Testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the government, Robert Matthews stated that he met the defendant Edwards in 1990 when Edwards was looking for an additional source of cocaine and agreed to supply drugs to Edwards. According to Matthews, everything was prearranged and thus a short telephone conversation, spoken in code, 8 was all that was needed, for Edwards to receive a delivery of narcotics. 33 The overwhelming evidence was more than sufficient to support Edwards's conviction for conspiring with Robert Matthews to distribute drugs. Edwards admitted that Matthews was one of his narcotics suppliers, and Matthews testified that the terms of sale and delivery were pre-arranged to avoid suspicion and increase efficiency. As in the Burrell conviction, given the extensive scope of Edwards's drug ring and Matthews's testimony that he had a prearranged agreement to supply Edwards with heroin, there was more than sufficient evidence to conclude that there was no manifest miscarriage of justice in the jury's conviction of Edwards for conspiring with Matthews to distribute narcotics. See United States v. Monroe, 73 F.3d 129, 132 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for participating in a conspiracy, and not merely being involved in a buyer-seller interaction, where the relationship between the alleged co-conspirators was ongoing, and defendant had arranged a series of drug transactions for a drug dealer).