Opinion ID: 2507905
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Juror Renee P.

Text: As to Juror Renee P., defendant alleges two theories of misconduct: (1) that Renee P., a registered nurse, improperly asserted her expertise during deliberations, and (2) that she improperly consulted outside sources. Defendant requested that the court conduct an evidentiary hearing, and in support of the motion, he submitted statements from four jurors: Juror Robert R. declared that a major point of dispute during deliberations was whether April James was dead at the time of the rape. Renee P. disclosed to the jury that she was a nurse, and she explained a number of the medical issues relating to blood pressure and circulation. She also explained shunting, and the manner in which the body would have directed the blood after the stab wounds were inflicted. Her explanations were helpful in determining whether the child was dead before she was sexually assaulted. Juror Randall G. similarly declared that whether April James was dead at the time of the sexual assault was a major issue during the deliberations, that Renee P. was an emergency room nurse familiar with stab wounds, that she explained blood pressure, blood circulation in the pelvic area, and shunting, and provided clarification of [the pathologist's] testimony. Juror Cecile Q. told defense investigator Jerry Kubena that Renee P. had gone home and read a lot of books and brought the facts back to the jury. While Cecile Q. initially wavered on whether April James was alive when she was raped, she changed her mind after further explanation from Renee P. on how long death would come after the stab wounds, and how much blood would flow as a result of the wounds. Juror Pam V. told Kubena that Renee P. had been a great help during deliberations by explaining medical terms and definitions. Renee P. explained to the jury the pumping of the heart, the circulatory system, and some of the medical evidence given during trial. A court may hold an evidentiary hearing when jury misconduct is alleged in a new trial motion, but the court may also, in its discretion, conclude that a hearing is not necessary to resolve material, disputed issues of fact. ( People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 415, 272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260.) Based on the proffered juror statements, the trial court denied defendant's motion to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Renee P. improperly asserted her expertise during deliberations. However, it did conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Renee P. had consulted and introduced outside sources during deliberations, and took testimony from Juror Cecil Q. on this issue. It was stipulated that Renee P. would categorically deny consulting outside medical sources and bringing such information back to the jury. After considering the evidence adduced at the hearing, the trial court ruled that Renee P. had not consulted nor introduced outside sources and denied defendant's motion for a new trial. We will consider in turn defendant's claims that Renee P. rendered an improper opinion during deliberations and that she improperly introduced outside sources.
`It is not improper for a juror, regardless of his or her educational or employment background, to express an opinion on a technical subject, so long as the opinion is based on the evidence at trial. Jurors' views of the evidence, moreover, are necessarily informed by their life experiences, including their education and professional work. A juror, however, should not discuss an opinion explicitly based on specialized information obtained from outside sources. Such injection of external information in the form of a juror's own claim to expertise or specialized knowledge of an issue is misconduct.' ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1265, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225 ( Steele ), quoting In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 963, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 281, 911 P.2d 468.) In Steele, the defendant introduced extensive evidence regarding his military training and Vietnam experience and its effect, if any, on a brain electrical activity mapping (BEAM) test. He alleged that four jurors, two with military and Vietnam experience, and two with medical experience, committed misconduct by offering their expertise to other jurors. It was alleged that two jurors `with medical experience ... told the [other jurors] that the criteria that the Doctor's [ sic ] used to establish the validity of the B.E.A.M. Test' was `inadequate' based on `what they have learned in their own experience in the medical field.' ( Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1260, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) Another juror stated that this input `helped me because I have no experience when it comes to that type of thing.' ( Ibid. ) The trial court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and denied defendant's motion for a new trial. We agreed and first noted: To the extent the declarations stated what effect these jurors had on the deliberations, the statements are inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), which prohibits evidence showing the effect that statements or conduct [have] `upon a juror either in influencing him to assent or to dissent from the verdict.' ( Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1265, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) We continued: A juror may not express opinions based on asserted personal expertise that is different from or contrary to the law as the trial court stated it or to the evidence, but if we allow jurors with specialized knowledge to sit on a jury, and we do, we must allow those jurors to use their experience in evaluating and interpreting that evidence. Moreover, during the give and take of deliberations, it is virtually impossible to divorce completely one's background from one's analysis of the evidence. We cannot demand that jurors, especially lay jurors not versed in the subtle distinctions that attorneys draw, never refer to their background during deliberations.... [¶] ... In this case, the declarations do not so clearly show that the jurors crossed the line into misconduct as to have required the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. ( Id. at p. 1266, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) Similarly, in the present case, the evidence presented in support of defendant's motion for a new trial does not show that Renee P. offered the jurors any basis for deciding the case other than the evidence and testimony presented at trial. No declaration suggests that she made any assertion inconsistent with the properly admitted evidence and testimony. Indeed, the remarks attributed to her in her declaration are consistent with the trial testimony of the pathologist, who expounded at length on the concept of blood flow, circulation, and the meaning of shunting. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Renee P.'s explanation of blood evidence was not misconduct.
It is improper for a juror to receive information outside of court about the pending case, and to discuss the case with nonjurors. ( In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 647, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) When such misconduct is determined to be prejudicial, reversal is required. ( Id. at pp. 650-651, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) Cecile Q., the sole juror called to testify at the hearing, was ambiguous as to whether Juror Renee P. had consulted outside sources. She first stated that Renee P. had done research on the point of whether April had been alive at the time of the rape. She explained what ... research she had done, and we listened.... Then we discussed it. But she conceded that she could not recall when Renee P. had made this statement or when she had done the research. She also hedged her statement: Maybe I just, we just assumed that it was a research thing. In other words, she had, she had access to the books, or ... the medical library. Maybe. I don't know. The defense attorney also questioned Cecile Q., ultimately receiving responses that indicated there was no consultation of outside materials. She stated, I don't remember anybody saying exactly if they were going to a library or if it was mentioned and if they really did. She also equivocated, I'm not really sure, a hundred percent sure. I know that the subject was brought up, but whether they really did it, I don't know. The defense attorney again asked who brought up the subject of consulting other books, to which she stated that Renee P. did discuss it, but did not mention that she had consulted books at home or at a library. Further, she stated that at no point did jurors return from a recess with additional information they had not had previously. The trial court ruled that the defense had not established that outside sources were brought into the room. It therefore reaffirmed its earlier ruling that no misconduct occurred. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.)