Opinion ID: 874367
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Respondents are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.

Text: Both parties request attorney fees on appeal. Gibson requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-117 and 72-804. Gibson is not the prevailing party on appeal and therefore is not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs. See Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Commerce & Labor, 145 Idaho 415, 421, 179 P.3d 1071, 1077 (2008) (citing Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Ada Co., 143 Idaho 899, 903, 155 P.3d 700, 704 (2007)) (pertaining to I.C. § 12-117); Page, 141 Idaho at 348, 109 P.3d at 1090 (citing Hoskins v. Circle A. Constr., Inc., 138 Idaho 336, 343, 63 P.3d 462, 469 (2003)) (pertaining to I.C. § 72-804). Respondents request an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 11.1. Idaho Appellate Rule 11.1 provides in pertinent part: The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. Although this opinion has not addressed the issues advanced by Gibson other than whether Ada County had substantial knowledge of an injury, we have carefully examined Gibson's remaining claims. Rather than devoting pages of dicta to these claims, we observe the following: (1) Gibson's claim of erroneous exclusion of the exhibit from Dr. Heyrend's deposition is without merit; (2) her physical-mental claim woefully failed to meet the requirements of I.C. § 72-451, perhaps most notably in that it was based upon an opinion that was not supported by objective evidence and was inconsistent with the recognized criteria for diagnosis of PTSD as set forth in the DSM-IV-TR; [3] and (3) Gibson's claim that the Commission violated her constitutional rights is nothing more than a bald assertion, unsupported by legal authority or meaningful argument. In short, by this appeal, Gibson has done little more than ask this Court to reweigh the evidence presented to the Commission and, implicitly, to substitute our view of the evidence for that of the Commission. We conclude that the instant appeal was brought for an improper purpose and we award attorney fees to Respondents on appeal against Gibson's attorney, personally, pursuant to I.A.R. 11.1.