Opinion ID: 1224510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: was defendant's right to due process violated by the state's conduct in failing to present to the grand jury devine's statements identifying carlos garcia as the gunman?

Text: {16} Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the first grand jury indictment because the State did not present Devine's statement that Carlos Garcia, rather than Defendant, fired the shots that killed Lynnae and wounded Clifton. Defendant relies on NMSA 1978, § 31-6-11(B) (1981), which requires the prosecuting attorney to present evidence that directly negates the guilt of the target where he [or she] is aware of such evidence. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, finding no reasonable probability of a different outcome following application of the standard articulated in Lay v. State, 110 Nev. 1189, 886 P.2d 448, 453 (1994) (concluding that a defendant shows prejudice only when there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent the misconduct.). {17} Generally, courts have been most cautious in invalidating indictments for alleged grand jury misconduct of the prosecutor. Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 696-97, 634 P.2d 1244, 1248-49 (1981). Dismissal has been limited to those few instances where the prosecutor has clearly abused the grand jury process. Id. In Buzbee, we held that Section 31-6-11(B) means the prosecutor shall present evidence, that would be admissible at trial, which directly negates the guilt of the target. Id. at 699, 634 P.2d at 1255. [S]ubstantial prejudice to the defendant must be demonstrated before the province of the independent grand jury is invaded. Id. at 703, 634 P.2d at 1259. In order to be entitled to a dismissal of an indictment based upon a claim that the state failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury as required by Section 31-6-11(B), a defendant must satisfy a three-pronged test. First, defendant must establish demonstrable prejudice resulting from the acts or omissions of the prosecutor. Second, the evidence which is claimed to be exculpatory must constitute evidence directly negating the guilt of defendant.... Third, the evidence claimed to be exculpatory must be evidence which would be legally admissible at trial. State v. Hewitt, 108 N.M. 179, 182, 769 P.2d 92, 95 (Ct.App.1988) (citations omitted). {18} Defendant argues that the second and third prong of the Hewitt test were obviously satisfied by the omission of an eyewitness account identifying someone else as the shooter. While Defendant agrees that the first prong is properly analyzed by the standard in Lay, he asserts that even if we conclude that the other evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to decide that there was no substantial probability of a different outcome, the flagrancy of the omission required the dismissal of the indictment. {19} The prosecutor is invested with wide discretion as to the selection and presentation of evidence. Hewitt, 108 N.M. at 183, 769 P.2d at 96. The State notes that, among other evidence, it already had Defendant's own statement that he fired shots at Devine, Lynnae, and Clifton. Defendant also admits that there was substantial evidence that, considered in a vacuum, could have supported a grand jury's indictment of Defendant. As the trial court correctly determined, Defendant fails on the first prong of the test, because he has not presented demonstrable prejudice by showing a substantial probability of a different outcome. Thus, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.