Opinion ID: 2512108
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenges to California death penalty law and instructions.

Text: Defendant raises numerous constitutional challenges to California's death penalty law, and to the adequacy of the standard instructions directing the jury's penalty determination. We affirm the decisions that have rejected similar claims, and decline to reconsider such authorities, as follows: Section 190.3, factor (a), is neither vague nor overbroad, and does not impermissibly allow arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. ( Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 90; Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1165.) The standard penalty instructions are not deficient because they fail to identify which sentencing factors are aggravating and which are mitigating ( Friend, supra, at p. 90; People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1064 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531]), or because they fail to require written findings ( Friend, supra, at p. 90; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 275 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123]) or jury unanimity ( Friend, supra, at p. 89; People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 533 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 161 P.3d 58]) regarding the aggravating factors. The instructions are not constitutionally faulty insofar as they fail to require proof beyond reasonable doubt of each aggravating factor, or findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation and that death is the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1067 [71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675, 175 P.3d 632]; People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 620 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292].) Recent United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee (e.g., Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856]; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428]; Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466) have not altered our conclusions in this regard. ( Brasure, supra, at p. 1067; Bell, supra, at pp. 620-621.) As noted, CALJIC No. 8.88 specifies that the jury may return a sentence of death only if each juror is persuaded the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that death is warranted. Jurors so instructed need not further expressly be told that life without parole is mandatory if aggravation does not outweigh mitigation or if mitigation outweighs aggravation, or that life without parole is permissible even if aggravation outweighs mitigation. ( Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 90; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 124 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30] ( Coffman and Marlow ).) Nor need the jury be instructed that the law presumes life without parole, rather than death, to be the appropriate penalty. ( McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th 318, 379; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 833 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 225, 200 P.3d 847]; Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1137; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 190 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980].) The phrases so substantial and warranted in CALJIC No. 8.88 are not unconstitutionally vague. ( Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 90; People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 117 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 186 P.3d 437]; Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1, 123.) CALJIC No. 8.88 is not defective for failing to inform the jury as to which side bore the burden of persuading it that death was appropriate or inappropriate. ( Friend, supra, at p. 90; Coffman and Marlow, supra, at p. 124.) The jury may properly consider evidence of unadjudicated violent criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b). ( Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 90; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 499 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790].) The 1978 death penalty law is not unconstitutional insofar as it fails to provide for intercase proportionality review. ( Friend, supra, at p. 89; People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1368 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 157 P.3d 950]; Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1, 48; see Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 104 S.Ct. 871].) Nor does the death penalty statute deny equal protection to capital defendants. ( Friend, supra, at p. 90; People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 913 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981].) International law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements. ( Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1, 90; Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1164.)