Opinion ID: 1395864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: We begin by acknowledging an intra-circuit conflict regarding the standard of review for Confrontation Clause challenges to a trial court's limitations on cross-examination. [5] See United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 393 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir.) (recognizing the conflict), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1041, 125 S.Ct. 2280, 161 L.Ed.2d 1074 (2005). One line of Ninth Circuit cases has applied de novo review. See, e.g., United States v. Holler, 411 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir.) (We review de novo whether a limitation on cross-examination violated the defendant's right of confrontation.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 996, 126 S.Ct. 597, 163 L.Ed.2d 496 (2005); United States v. Wilmore, 381 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 2004) (Whether a limitation on cross-examination is so restrictive that it constitutes a violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right is reviewed de novo. ); United States v. Adamson, 291 F.3d 606, 612 (9th Cir.2002) (We review de novo whether limitations on cross-examination are so severe as to violate the Confrontation Clause.); United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir.2000) (Whether limitations on cross-examination are so severe as to violate the Confrontation Clause is a question of law reviewed de novo.). A second line of cases has applied an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., United States v. Lo, 231 F.3d 471, 482 (9th Cir.2000) ([W]e review a trial court's decision to limit the scope of cross-examination for abuse of discretion, and will find a Confrontation Clause violation only if the trial court's ruling limits relevant testimony[,] . . . prejudices the defendant . . . and denies the jury sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original); United States v. Shabani, 48 F.3d 401, 403 (9th Cir.1995) (reviewing limits on cross-examination for abuse of discretion); Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1550 (9th Cir.1992) (Because trial judges have broad discretion both to determine relevance and to determine whether prejudicial effect or other concerns outweigh the probative value of the evidence, we will find a Sixth Amendment violation only if we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.). A third line of cases combines these two approaches. See, e.g., United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 979-80 (9th Cir. 2003) (Whether limitations on cross-examination are so severe as to violate the Confrontation Clause is a question of law we review de novo. . . . We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's limitation of cross-examination.); United States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir.1999) (This court reviews de novo whether the limitation on cross-examination violated [the defendant's] right of confrontation. The district court, however, has considerable discretion in restricting cross-examination, and this court will find error only when that discretion has been abused.) (citations omitted); United States v. James, 139 F.3d 709, 713 (9th Cir.1998) (The district court may impose reasonable limits on cross-examination, which we will review for an abuse of discretion. Whether limitations on cross-examination are so severe as to amount to a violation of the confrontation clause is a question of law we review de novo. ) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Vargas, 933 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir.1991) (The trial judge has discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination, and this court finds error only when that discretion has been abused. . . . Whether limitations on cross-examination are so severe as to amount to a violation of the confrontation clause is a question of law reviewed de novo.). We resolve this conflict by concluding that the third approach is most appropriate. We hold that the following approach should be used to review whether a trial court improperly restricted a defendant from cross-examining a prosecution witness: If the defendant raises a Confrontation Clause challenge based on the exclusion of an area of inquiry, we review de novo. In reviewing a limitation on the scope of questioning within a given area, we recognize that trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). A challenge to a trial court's restrictions on the manner or scope of cross-examination on nonconstitutional grounds is thus reviewed for abuse of discretion. This approach is in harmony with the Supreme Court's decision in Van Arsdall. [6] In Van Arsdall, the Court recognized that trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination. Id. The Court held, however, that where the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility of a witness' bias, the defendant's Confrontational Clause rights were violated. Id. This standard also recognizes that whether there has been a Confrontation Clause violation is ultimately a question of law that must be reviewed de novo. See Shryock, 342 F.3d at 979; cf. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-99, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (holding that courts of appeal are to review de novo district court determinations regarding reasonable suspicion and probable cause, reasoning that de novo review prevents divergent interpretations of similar facts, enables appellate courts to maintain control of legal rules, and unifies precedent). At the same time, this standard allows the trial court discretion to manage the presentation of evidence and restrict examination based on relevant considerations. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. Applying this approach here, Defendants' Confrontation Clause claims challenge the district court's limitation on the scope of cross-examination within an area of inquiry: the biases and motivations to lie of the Government's cooperating witnesses, Poitra and Lamere. We therefore review Defendants' claims for abuse of discretion.