Opinion ID: 2994628
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impeachment of Griffith: Evidentiary

Text: rulings Griffith, as we have already noted, was the linchpin of the government’s case at the trial. Naturally, this meant that Campbell and Montague had a strong interest in undermining him in front of the jury, and the government had an equally strong interest in demonstrating his credibility. Toward the latter end, on direct examination Griffith was asked about his drug use before he left Chicago for Rockford and joined the conspiracy. He insisted that he had neither used nor sold any drugs during that time period: Q: [Government’s attorney]: And when you were in Chicago did you sell drugs? A: No. Q: Never? A: No. Q: Did you use drugs? A: No. On cross examination, he stuck to that story and added that he had not dealt in drugs while he was living in Chicago, in the following exchange: Q: [Montague’s attorney]: Bennie, you testified earlier you lived in Chicago, right? A: That is correct. Q: But in Chicago you didn’t deal any drugs, right? A: That is correct. At least with respect to Griffith’s testimony on direct examination about use (rather than dealing), it is almost certain that he was lying. In fact, Griffith had been convicted of a felony in Chicago in 1994 for possession of a controlled substance. After the exchange we have just noted, Montague’s attorney attempted to impeach Griffith by introducing evidence of that 1994 Chicago drug possession conviction. The district court sustained the government’s objection to the evidence, and it was excluded from the trial. Both Montague and Campbell objected. On appeal, Campbell and Montague argue that this ruling was in error. Montague argued that it violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, and both claim that it misapplied Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a) and 403. Normally, we review a restriction on cross-examination only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Graffia, 120 F.3d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1997). The exception arises when the restriction implicates the criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against her, in which case the standard of review is de novo. See United States v. Sasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995). Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against her. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The exposure of a witness’s motivations to lie is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. See Sasson, 62 F.3d at 882. The right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, however, is not absolute. See id. The Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity to conduct a thorough and effective cross-examination during which the defense has a chance to discredit the witness, not cross- examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)