Opinion ID: 1663505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the verdicts of the jury were against the weight of the evidence?

Text: ¶ 12. Taylor argues that both the counts on which he was convicted should have resulted in acquittals because there was no evidence of intent. Taylor contends that there is no proof that he had the full awareness of what he was doing and that he calculated, planned and contemplated the consequences of any act or acts he may have committed. ¶ 13. In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the verdict, this Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and accept as true [a]ll evidence supporting or tending to support the verdict, as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.... Harrell v. State, 583 So.2d 963, 964 (Miss. 1991). If the evidence is such that fair-minded jurors might have reached different conclusions, the verdict must be allowed to stand. Ashford v. State, 583 So.2d 1279, 1281 (Miss.1991) (quoting Butler v. State, 544 So.2d 816, 819 (Miss. 1989)). Matters regarding the weight and credibility to be accorded evidence are to be resolved by the jury. Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203, 212 (Miss.1985). ¶ 14. When presented with a challenge to the weight of the evidence, this Court must accept as true the evidence favorable to the state. Van Buren v. State, 498 So.2d 1224, 1229 (Miss.1986). A new trial will not be ordered unless this Court is convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice. Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss.1983). ¶ 15. Count 1 of the indictment charged Taylor with deliberate design murder. Taylor argues that there is no proof in the record that Taylor acted with deliberate design to effect the death of Strachan. This Court has held that the term deliberate design is interchangeable with malice aforethought declaring that [i]t has long been the case law of this state that malice aforethought, premeditated design, and deliberate design all mean the same thing. Tran v. State, 681 So.2d 514, 517 (Miss.1996)(quoting Windham v. State, 602 So.2d 798, 801 (Miss.1992)). Definitionally, we regard `malice aforethought' and `deliberate design' as synonymous. Blanks v. State, 542 So.2d 222, 227 (Miss.1989) (citing Fairman v. State, 513 So.2d 910, 913 (Miss.1987); Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1139 (Miss.1985); Lancaster v. State, 472 So.2d 363, 367 (Miss.1985)). ¶ 16. Taylor argues the record is void of proof that Taylor had the full awareness of what he was doing and that he calculated, planned and contemplated the consequences of any act or acts he may have committed. Taylor cites Windham v. State, 520 So.2d 123, 126 (Miss.1987), in arguing that the word `deliberate' always indicates full awareness of what one is doing, and generally implies careful and unhurried consideration of the consequences. ¶ 17. Taylor also disputes the validity of Jury Instruction 9, which instructed the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor killed Strachan and: that he did so with the premeditated and deliberate design to effect the death of Teresa G. Strachan with malice aforethought or in the commission of an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of Teresa G. Strachan.... ¶ 18. Taylor's reliance on Windham to dispute this instruction is misplaced. The instruction deemed erroneous in Windham included at the moment language that allowed for a deliberateness that developed instantaneously with the killing. Jury Instruction 9 does not include such language. In addition, this Court noted in Windham that deliberate design to kill a person may be formed very quickly, and perhaps only moments before the act of consummating the intent. 520 So.2d at 126; See also Gossett v. State, 660 So.2d 1285, 1293 (Miss.1995). Thus, Jury Instruction 9 is consistent with the precedent of this Court. ¶ 19. Taylor also seeks to find refuge in the Weathersby rule which this Court has enunciated as follows: [W]here the defendant or the defendant's witnesses to the homicide are the only eyewitnesses to the homicide, their version, if reasonable, must be accepted as true, unless substantially contradicted in material particulars by a credible witness or witnesses for the state, or by the physical facts or by the facts of common knowledge. Weathersby v. State, 165 Miss. 207, 147 So. 481, 482 (1933). ¶ 20. The State contends the Weathersby rule is of no benefit to Taylor due to later cases that developed exceptions such as the following: If the defendant's version of the killing is reasonable, it must, as a matter of law, be accepted as true, unless `substantially contradicted in material particulars by a credible witness, ... or by the physical facts or by facts of common knowledge.' Also, Harveston v. State, 493 So.2d 365 (Miss.1986). A defendant who met the Weathersby Rule would be entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. As stated in Weathersby, and many of our subsequent decisions, this rule has no application where the defendant's version is patently unreasonable, or contradicted by physical facts. Where the defendant is the only eyewitness to a slaying, his version must be reasonable and credible before he is entitled to an acquittal under the rule. And, there is still another circumstance which still precludes the application of the Weathersby rule, and that is where the accused, following the slaying, gives conflicting versions of how the killing took place, or initially denies the act. Blanks v. State, 547 So.2d 29, 32 (Miss. 1989) (citations omitted). ¶ 21. Thus, the Weathersby rule is not applicable because Taylor gave conflicting accounts of the shooting. Also, his claim that the shooting was an accident is not credible in light of the physical evidence, in particular the three contact wounds. Because the Weathersby rule does not apply, there is a presumption that the unexplained killing of one person by another is presumed to be malicious, and therefore murder. Blanks, 547 So.2d at 33. ¶ 22. Taylor also argues that the State failed to prove the concluding requirement of Jury Instruction 9 that the defendant had the mental capacity to realize and appreciate the nature and quality of his acts and to distinguish between right and wrong at the time he committed these acts.... This language is a statement of the M'Naghten Rule which is the longstanding test for insanity in Mississippi. Simply stated, the test for insanity is whether the defendant was unable to distinguish right from wrong at the time the act was committed. Tyler v. State, 618 So.2d 1306, 1309 (Miss.1993) (quoting Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173, 1181 (Miss.1990)). ¶ 23. In arguing that he was delusional and could not distinguish between right and wrong, Taylor points to the testimony of Patrolman Shane Ellis who was dispatched to the residence a few hours prior to the shooting. Ellis testified that Taylor had fired a gun inside the home because he thought he saw something that he didn't see. Taylor also told his mother and his sister that he had shot at someone coming down from the attic. There was also testimony from Thomas Smithson and Thomas Hall that Taylor may have been delusional or paranoid. Both the prosecution and the defense rely on the testimony of the State's psychologist, Reb McMichael who stated that Taylor was mentally disturbed but that he was not insane under the M'Naghten test. Taylor argues there was enough doubt raised concerning Taylor's sanity that the burden should have been shifted to the State. The defendant is presumed sane until a reasonable doubt of his sanity is created. When such a doubt arises, the burden is then placed upon the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's sanity. Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 173 (Miss.1989). ¶ 24. However, the question of a defendant's sanity is for the jury, which may accept or reject expert and lay testimony. Tyler v. State, 618 So.2d at 1309. Given the fact that there is testimony on both sides of the issuea jury's verdict on the insanity issue is essentially conclusive and unreviewable. Gerlach v. State, 466 So.2d 75, 79 (Miss.1985). This Court has recognized that institutional and practical considerations mandate that in insanity defense cases, perhaps more than any other, a jury's verdict ought to be given great respect and deference. Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d at 301. In this case, there is not a sufficient basis for disturbing the decision of the jury. ¶ 25. Taylor raises essentially the same issues concerning the conviction under Count Two. Thus, our conclusion is the same. Taylor's first issue is without merit.