Opinion ID: 2179752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Private Covenants

Text: The validity of properly created restrictive covenants is well established in Maryland. We stated in Steuart Transportation Company v. Ashe, 269 Md. 74, 304 A.2d 788 (1973): [O]ne owning a tract of land ... may validly impose upon the part granted restrictions upon the use thereof for the benefit of the part retained, and upon the part retained for the benefit of the part granted, or upon both for the benefit of both; that, where the covenants... are not expressly for or on behalf of the grantor, his heirs and assigns, they are personal and will not run with the land, but that, if in such a case it appears that it was the intention of the grantors that the restrictions were part of a uniform general scheme or plan of development and use which should affect the land granted and the land retained alike, they may be enforced in equity.... Id. at 88, 304 A.2d at 796-97, quoting McKenrick v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 174 Md. 118, 128, 197 A. 580, 584-85 (1938). In Jones v. Northwest Real Estate Company, 149 Md. 271, 280-81, 131 A. 446, 450 (1925), we stated: [W]e are here dealing with an original grantor, who still owns a considerable part of the land, and the assignees of an original purchaser, and, as the deed specifically states that the covenants are to bind the grantees, their heirs and assigns, there would seem to be no question, under the authorities, of the grantor's right to enforce the covenants.... The Court of Special Appeals, similarly, stated in Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md.App. 137, 149, 607 A.2d 82, 88 (1992), that: It is, therefore, necessary to construe the meaning of the pertinent provisions of the covenants in order to determine: (1) what, if any, conditions exist affecting the declarant's reservation of plan approval; and (2) whether the facts contained in the respective affidavits of appellants are sufficient to foreclose summary judgment. For a more complete review of the Maryland law with respect to covenants and uniform plans of development, see Steuart Transportation, 269 Md. 74, 304 A.2d 788, and cases therein cited. In Steuart Transportation, 269 Md. at 88-91, 304 A.2d at 797-98, we said, quoting in part from McKenrick v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 174 Md. 118, 126, 197 A. 580, 584 (1938), that recordation of a deed subjecting land to restrictions afforded constructive notice ... sufficient to charge such persons with liability in respect to the restrictive covenants. Quoting from Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 346, 111 A.2d 855, 861 (1955), we commented in Steuart Transportation that [t]he decisions of this Court have long recognized that equity, under appropriate facts, will enforce what variously has been called reciprocal negative easements, implied equitable reciprocal servitudes or merely equities attached to land. Id. at 91, 304 A.2d at 798. In Belleview Construction Company v. Rugby Hall Community Association, 321 Md. 152, 156-58, 582 A.2d 493, 495-96 (1990), we said in relevant part: The original and extended covenants are covenants running with the land.... They are, by their terms, enforceable by the developer, the association, or any lot owner. The covenants were clearly established as part of a general plan of development for this community.... In construing covenants, it is a cardinal principle ... that the court should be governed by the intention of the parties as it appears or is implied from the instrument itself.... This principle is consistent with the general law of contracts.... The courts seem to have generally recognized that there is no public policy against a fair and reasonable construction, in the light of surrounding circumstances, of restrictions designed, in general, to accomplish the same beneficial purposes as zoning. [Alteration in original.] [Citations omitted.] Because the facial validity of the covenant at issue in the case at bar is not challenged, except on Fair Housing Act grounds that have already been addressed, we do not have to construe the reasonableness of the restriction at issue in this case. We have noted the general standard for construing such covenants in our cases, most recently in Belleview, supra . [8] The powers given to, and the functions of, the Committee in the case sub judice, appear to be as intended by the original declarants. Moreover, they appear to be reasonable. In any event, the covenant is not challenged on its face, except as we have heretofore stated.
In respect to whether the Committee actions were reasonable, we said in one of our relatively early cases, Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md. 127, 133, 128 A.2d 430, 434 (1957), in reference to covenants regulating the manner and design of structures, that [t]he language used in the covenants ... makes plain the desire to regulate the construction of the dwellings in such a manner as to create an attractive and desirable neighborhood. We think the parties had a right voluntarily to make this kind of contract between themselves; and the covenant does not create any interference with the fee of the property that would require it to be stricken down as against public policy. It does not prevent the owner from conveying the property or impose any unlawful restraint of trade, but affects only its method of use. We hold that any refusal to approve the external design or location ... would have to be based upon a reason that bears some relation to the other buildings or the general plan of development; and this refusal would have to be a reasonable determination made in good faith, and not high-handed, whimsical or captious in manner. The trial judge in the instant case relied in large part on the testimony of James Meale, a member of the Committee, which we have repeated, supra, in addressing the issue of whether the Committee's decision was reasonable. [9] The court credited Mr. Meale's testimony as we have indicated previously. The trial court noted that Mr. Meale had believed the observations of his neighbors; that Mr. Meale found their information credible. The trial court found Mr. Meale's testimony, that we have heretofore set out, to be particularly persuasive, finding that the decision of the Committee had been based on trash, noise, parking, traffic, sewage and health concerns. It determined that [i]n sum, the decision of the Committee was a reasonable, good faith exercise of discretion, based upon legitimate concerns regarding the impact of the facility upon the surrounding neighborhood. We perceive no error in the trial court's findings as to reasonableness and its issuance of an injunction to enforce the restrictive covenant. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.