Opinion ID: 47351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Second Lawsuit Transferred to Florida

Text: On December 10, 2004, the district court for the Northern District of Texas transferred the action to the district court for the Southern District of Florida, where the case was assigned to the same judge who had presided over the previous lawsuit between the parties. On March 10, 2005, the Florida district court issued an order requiring the Defendants, Gismondi and Marlin Yacht, to brief why they failed to abide by the Agreement and why they should not be held in contempt for failing to perform the Agreement.1 1 The order also required Tonnesen to brief why he had failed to proceed with an application for contempt of court until almost five years after the Agreement was signed. Tonnesen’s brief responded, inter alia, that he did not believe the Agreement was enforceable through contempt because the district court’s order in the previous action had not ordered the Defendants to perform their obligations. 4 Upon receipt of the order, Gismondi, acting on behalf of himself and Marlin, wrote a letter to the district court arguing that they had substantially complied with the Agreement. Gismondi asserted that there was a typographical error in the Agreement that made compliance impossible; that is, the 120-pound engine compression, required by the Agreement, was higher than the engines on the yacht were designed to produce. Gismondi attached to his letter a copy of the engine specifications showing a compression of 90 to 110 pounds. The Defendants also submitted through counsel a brief asserting that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether they had complied with the Agreement, which would make a holding of contempt improper.2 The Defendants attached the following documents to their brief, inter alia,(1) an affidavit from Gismondi asserting that they had complied with the Agreement inasmuch as was possible, that the Defendants had attempted to get Tonnesen to reclaim the vessel, and that Tonnesen neither picked up the vessel, sent an individual to check on the repairs to the vessel, nor provided his agent with identification to prove that he could pick up the vessel on Tonnesen’s behalf; and (2) an affidavit from a technician who stated that the engines on the vessel could not be made to perform at the level specified in the Agreement. 2 The Defendants noted the Texas district court’s prior determination that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment as to all claims. 5 Tonnesen asserted in his brief that the only reason he could see for the Defendants’ non-performance was that they had never intended to perform their obligations. Tonnesen argued that a defense of impossibility was inapplicable because the Agreement stipulated that, if the engines on the boat did not meet specified standards, they would be replaced.