Opinion ID: 563774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: exclusion of faneuil's negligent entrustment claim

Text: 12 Faneuil argues that the lower court erred in dismissing a claim, mistakenly denominated by Faneuil in its brief as one for negligent misrepresentation, which charged Western Surety with carelessness in licensing and monitoring Mongillo. The court struck the claim before trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f), which permits the imposition of sanctions upon parties who fail to comply with, or who endeavor to subvert, pretrial orders. The magistrate found Faneuil to have been derelict in preserving the claim for trial. He stated: Nothing in the Pretrial Memoranda filed by any of the parties, and nothing in the requests for instructions submitted by any and all of the plaintiffs [in advance of trial], even remotely suggested that plaintiffs contended they were entitled to recover upon a showing of negligent hiring and/or supervision.... 13 The proper performance of the case-management function requires that the trial court be allowed great latitude in applying Rule 16(f). Accord Matter of Sanction of Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir.1984) (Rule 16(f) give[s] courts very broad discretion to use sanctions where necessary ... to insure the expeditious and sound management of the preparation of cases for trial), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1014, 105 S.Ct. 2016, 85 L.Ed.2d 299 (1985). Thus, we review the magistrate's imposition and choice of sanctions only for abuse of discretion. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2780, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976); Roland M. v. Concord School Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 999 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1122, 113 L.Ed.2d 230 (1991). 14 Faneuil challenges the preclusive order primarily on the basis that the negligent entrustment claim was part of its original complaint. The riposte is misdirected. The issue is not whether the claim was ever raised in the pleadings, but whether it was sufficiently developed and perennialized in the relevant pretrial proceedings. As a case takes shape and the court struggles to narrow and pinpoint the issues, the parties have an unflagging obligation to spell out squarely and distinctly those claims they desire to advance at the trial proper. Good-faith compliance with Civil Rule 16 plays an important role in this process. See Erff v. MarkHon Industries, Inc., 781 F.2d 613, 617 (7th Cir.1986) (Because the parties rely on the pre-trial conference to inform them precisely what is in controversy, the pre-trial order is treated as superseding the pleadings and establishes the issues to be considered at trial.). In these purlieus, a litigant forsakes clarity and forthrightness at its peril. 15 Here, the record confirms that Faneuil failed to advance the negligent entrustment theory in any of its pretrial submissions. To be sure, Faneuil stated in its pretrial memorandum that it would prove the laxity of Western Surety's supervision--but the sole theory of liability to which that proffer related was premised on agency grounds, viz., that Western Surety was bound by and responsible for the actions of its licensed agent, Robert F. Mongillo, and was bound to honor the Bond that its agent had issued, or be liable for all damages sustained as a result of Mr. Mongillo's issuance of an unauthorized Bond. There was no mention of negligent entrustment or any comparable theory. We agree with the magistrate that a single reference to negligent entrustment in a lengthy complaint, casually made and soon forgotten, was not enough. When all is said and done, veiled hints and cryptic allusions will not suffice to preserve claims for trial. 16 In sum, the fair intendment of Faneuil's filings, taken sequentially, conduced to the belief that, as trial neared, negligent entrustment was no longer in the case. Hence, the court could properly find that Rule 16 was flouted and that Western Surety would be unfairly prejudiced if Faneuil's failure appropriately to preserve the issue was overlooked. We conclude, therefore, that dismissing the negligent entrustment claim did not entail an abuse of discretion. See Erff, 781 F.2d at 618 (trial court was not obligated to consider plaintiff's alternative theory of recovery because it was not disclosed at pretrial conference); Allen v. United States Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 696 (5th Cir.1982) (same); see also Roland M., 910 F.2d at 999 (When a litigant tardily seeks to bring a new issue in from the cold, the reasons for changing the syllabus and whether prejudice may result are factors which inform the district court's discretion.).