Opinion ID: 2270032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: as to conti

Text: The motion for judgment which the Appellate Division granted in favor of Conti requires us to assume that all of plaintiff's evidence together with all reasonable inferences therefrom is true. Melone v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 18 N.J. 163 (1955). Therefore, if any evidence in the case is sufficient to show that Conti was negligent, the motion for judgment cannot be granted. Our review of the record indicates numerous inconsistencies by plaintiff's expert as to the customs of inspection in the roofing trade. However, as noted in the facts, some of his testimony tended to show an industry custom putting a duty of making an inspection of the ceiling and interior conditions on the subcontractor when this person is the man who is actually doing the job. This shows a duty to inspect by Conti, and the evidence in the case considered together with this duty presents a fact controversy sufficient to defeat a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Further, proof of an industry custom is not dispositive of the question of duty. The standard of conduct is reasonable care, that care which a prudent man would take in the circumstances. The customs of an industry are not conclusive on the issue of the proper standard of care; they are at most evidential of this standard. Shafer v. H.B. Thomas Co., 53 N.J. Super. 19, 22-25 ( App. Div. 1958); and see Adams v. Atlantic City Electric Co., 120 N.J.L. 357, 363 ( E. & A. 1938). Dean Prosser puts the principle as follows: Even an entire industry, by adopting such careless methods to save time, effort or money, cannot be permitted to set its own uncontrolled standard   . And if the only test is to be what has been done before, no industry or group will ever have any great incentive to make progress in the direction of safety   . Much the better view, therefore, is that of the great majority of the cases, that every custom is not conclusive merely because it is a custom, and that it must meet the challenge of `learned reason,' and be given only the evidentiary weight which the situation deserves. It follows that where common knowledge and ordinary judgment will recognize unreasonable danger, what everyone does may be found to be negligent; and that there will be extreme cases where it is so clearly negligent in itself that it may even be excluded from evidence. Prosser, Torts § 33, 170 (3 d ed. 1964). And see Texas & P.R. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 23 S.Ct. 622, 47 L.Ed. 905 (1903) (Justice Holmes); The T.J. Hooper, 60 F. 2 d 737 (2 Cir. 1932) (Judge Learned Hand), cert. denied sub nom. Eastern Transp. Co. v. Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662, 53 S.Ct. 220, 77 L.Ed. 571 (1932). In the present case plaintiff provided expert testimony that a reasonable inspection by a roofer would have disclosed that the disc was not fastened to the ceiling securely enough to withstand the vibrations caused by a normal roofing job. The jury, by using its own common knowledge and ordinary judgment to evaluate the circumstances, could have concluded that regardless of industry custom the exercise of reasonable care required the subcontractor Conti, which was to do the work, to make its own inspection for conditions dangerous to persons inside the building. The jury was so charged, and we think this part of the charge was proper. We therefore hold that there was sufficient evidence of negligence by Conti to take this issue to the jury.