Opinion ID: 702560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard for Proving Discrimination

Text: 30 Both the ALJ and the Secretary of Labor utilized the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) for defining the burdens in proving whistleblower discrimination. This circuit has yet to determine the applicable burden allocations in a retaliatory discharge case arising under the Energy Reorganization Act. While the McDonnell Douglas method of proving discrimination, commonly known as the burden-shifting or inferential method, was originally created to address actions arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq., this circuit utilizes the method in discrimination claims arising under other Congressional acts. See Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., Inc., 954 F.2d 424 (7th Cir.1992) (using the method in a case regarding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). We see no reason why the method prescribed by McDonnell Douglas should not be employed in whistleblower retaliation claims as well. 7 31 There are three phases to the burden-shifting method. In the first phase, the burden rests squarely on the employee. The employee can create an inference of discrimination by establishing a prima facie case. A prima facie case is established when the employee shows four elements: (1) the employer is governed by the [Energy Reorganization] Act; (2) the employee engaged in protected activity as defined in the Act, Bechtel Construction Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 933-34 (11th Cir.1995) (citing 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5851); (3) the employee's subsequent discharge; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the discharge. Simon v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 49 F.3d 386, 389 (8th Cir.1995) (citing Couty v. Dole, 886 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir.1989)). Proximity in time is sufficient to raise an inference of causation. Bechtel, 50 F.3d at 934 (citing Couty, 886 F.2d at 148). 32 The employee's burden of satisfying the four elements of a prima facie case is not onerous; rather, a prima facie showing is quite easy to meet. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 127 (1st Cir.1991). The establishment of a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer's decision to terminate the employee was the result of impermissible factors in violation of the ERA. Rand v. CF Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1144-45 (7th Cir.1994). 33 Once an inference of retaliation is created, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, [nondiscriminatory] reason for the discharge. Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 336 (7th Cir.1993). In this second phase, if there is no evidence that dual motives exist, the employer need not persuade the court; the burden is simply one of production. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The burden of proof remains on the employee at all times. Id. However, once the plaintiff has shown that the protected activity 'played a role' in the employer's decision, Mackowiak, 735 F.2d at 1163-64, the employer has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have terminated the employee even if the employee had not engaged in the protected conduct. 8 Passaic Valley Sewerage v. United States Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 481 (3rd Cir.1993) (citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)). 9 Once the employer satisfies his burden, either of persuasion or production, the rebuttable presumption is dissolved. Loyd v. Phillips Bros., Inc., 25 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir.1994). The employee is then required to prove that the employer's proffered reason for the termination is a mere pretext for an unlawful discharge. Fisher v. Transco Serv. Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1243 (7th Cir.1992). 34 In both dual motives and burden-shifting cases, the employee must prove that the lawful justification for the termination was phony. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. 879, 884-85, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995) (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87, 97 S.Ct. 568, 574-76, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)). To meet the burden of persuasion in the third phase, the plaintiff need not produce direct evidence to contradict the employer's purported reason. Bechtel, 50 F.3d at 934. Rather, the employee may simply persuade the trier of fact by establishing either that the unlawful reason, the protected activity, more likely motivated [the employer] or that the employer's proffered reason is not credible and that the employer discriminated against him. Id. It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that a reason given for a job action is not just, or fair, or sensible ... [rather,] he must show that the explanation is a 'phony reason.'  Pignato v. Am. Trans Air, Inc., 14 F.3d 342, 349 (7th Cir.1994). 35 It is clear that Kahn established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. As both the Secretary of Labor and the ALJ noted, there is no dispute as to the first and second elements. ComEd is an employer subject to the ERA, and Kahn is an employee of ComEd. Furthermore, the third and fourth elements exist as well. Kahn was constructively discharged from employment on April 14, 1992. This discharge occurred less than a month after he made internal safety-related complaints to his supervisors pursuant to his job requirements as a Quality Control Auditor, and, therefore, the proximity of time between his protected activities and his discharge creates an inference of unlawful termination. 36 Since Kahn properly established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer, ComEd. Neither the Secretary of Labor nor the ALJ concluded that Kahn effectively proved that his protected activities played a role in his termination. Rather, both held that Kahn simply created an inference. Therefore, the Secretary employed the McDonnell Douglas method, involving a defendant's mere burden of production, as opposed to the Mt. Healthy dual motive method, which places a much greater burden, a burden of persuasion, upon the defendant. The Secretary determined that ComEd met the burden of production by outlining Kahn's abusive and inappropriate behavior toward White, Orsini, Wagner, and Whittier. ComEd asserted Kahn's belligerent and improper conduct towards his coworkers and supervisors as the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his termination. ComEd was not required to substantiate the simple assertion. The mere articulation of a lawful reason for Kahn's firing satisfies the employer's burden. 37 Kahn contends that ComEd's proffered reason is not a lawful reason. According to Kahn, ComEd is in violation of the ERA if it fires any Quality Control Auditor who creates friction in his relation with coworkers and superiors since such friction inherently arises due to the nature of Kahn's job. Since conflicts between such auditors and other employees are common at nuclear facilities, Kahn argues, the termination of a whistleblower employee for such conflicts is an unlawful reason. Thus, Kahn contends that ComEd failed to proffer a legitimate reason for his termination, and the inference of unlawful discrimination remained unrebutted. 38 We find Kahn's argument unpersuasive. Kahn's attempt to hide behind his protected activity as a means to evade termination for non-discriminatory reasons is flawed. The cases to which Kahn cites, Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir.1985), Mackowiak, and Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., Inc., 954 F.2d 424 (7th Cir.1992), do not stand for the proposition that an employer may not discharge an employee for poor behavior or for rude and uncommunicative conduct as Kahn suggests. Rather, these three cases involve a trier of fact's conclusion that the purported behavioral reasons proffered by the employer as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharge were pretextual. Such is not the case here. We have consistently held that an employee's insubordination toward supervisors and coworkers, even when engaged in a protected activity, is justification for termination. Sullair P.T.O., Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 500, 502-04 (7th Cir.1981) (shouting vulgarities towards management warrants discharge); NLRB v. Truck Drivers, Oil Drivers, Etc., 630 F.2d 505, 508-09 (7th Cir.1980) (distributing a letter to the employer's executive board during a political luncheon for Chicago's then mayor to the potential embarrassment of their employer justifies termination). Moreover, communication made in the form of threats of violence or insubordination, during the course of otherwise protected activity, is removed from protection. See Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 1225, 1234 (5th Cir.1976); Corriveau & Routhier Cement Block, Inc. v. NLRB, 410 F.2d 347, 350 (1st Cir.1969). [T]he rights afforded to the employee are a shield against employer retaliation, not a sword with which one may threaten or curse supervisors. Id. 39 Certainly Congress did not intend to tie the hands of employers in the objective selection and control of personnel in enacting various laws proscribing employment discrimination. Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 545 F.2d 222, 231 (1st Cir.1976). It is well-settled in this circuit and other circuits that an employer may terminate an employee for any reason, good or bad, or for no reason at all, as long as the employer's reason is not proscribed by a Congressional statute. NLRB v. Knuth Bros., Inc., 537 F.2d 950, 954 (7th Cir.1976); Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 669, 679 (9th Cir.1981). No such statute proscribes the discharge of an employee who exhibits inappropriate behavior while on the job. As such, ComEd's proffered reason is both legitimate and non-discriminatory. Therefore, the inference of discrimination is dissolved. 40 Yet, this does not end the discussion. We next address whether there was substantial evidence to support the Secretary's determination that ComEd's proffered reason for terminating Kahn was the true reason. In support of his conclusion, the Secretary unequivocally stated that [t]he evidence of record overwhelmingly supports the reason [ComEd] gave for discharging Kahn, his inappropriate behavior and language toward co-workers, which culminated in the shouting and poking incident with his team leader, Whittier. (Decision and Order of Secretary of Labor, at 6). In further support of his conclusion, the Secretary adopted the ALJ's voluminous evidence indicating that [ComEd] constructively discharged Kahn because of his behavior and not for reasons proscribed by the ERA. (Decision and Order of Secretary of Labor, at p. 7). The ALJ and Secretary pointed to the following events, all of which lead to Kahn's termination: (1) Kahn's sarcastic, argumentative, and condescending behavior towards White; (2) Kahn's loud and abusive demeanor towards Orsini; (3) Kahn's nonconsensual and inappropriate touching of Wagner, in addition the various suggestive comments and unwanted sexual advances; (4) Kahn's abrasive and aggressive manner in which he associated with workers whose organizations he was auditing; (5) complaints of less-than-thorough investigations by Kahn; (6) Kahn's use of unauthorized overtime; and (7) Kahn's admitted and witnessed outburst and use of foul language with Whittier, coupled with unconsented and unwarranted touching of Whittier's person. This evidence clearly amounts to substantial evidence. The evidence is much more than a mere scintilla and certainly represents that amount from which a reasonable person could conclude that Kahn was terminated due to his abrasive, belligerent, and antagonistic conduct rather than the protected activities in which he was engaged. 10 41 Kahn further contends that since ComEd condoned Kahn's inappropriate behavior, it waived its reliance on that behavior to justify Kahn's termination. This argument is based on inaccurate facts. Kahn claims that his supervisors never even communicated [to him] that the behavior problems alleged to have occurred during those incidents were a problem. (Brief of Petitioner, at 19.) Not so; both the Secretary and ALJ cite to numerous times when Kahn was counselled for his inappropriate and obnoxious behavior. Moreover, Kahn argues that the October 16, 1991 performance review included a Fully Meets Expectations rating and stated that Kahn's performance and behavior consistently achieve[d] expected levels of performance. (Brief of Petitioner, at 19). Thus, according to Kahn, ComEd cannot terminate him for any incidents that occurred prior to the date of the performance review. This argument is patently irrational and without merit. As already stated, an employer may fire an employee for any reason at all, as long as the reason does not violate a Congressional statute. 11 Even taking this erroneous argument as true, the termination was, for the most part, due to the incident with Whittier which occurred more than five months after the performance review. Therefore, even if we were to adopt the waiver and condonation theory, which we do not, Kahn's argument would still fail. 42 Our role as a court of review is clear. We do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decisions. No matter how medieval a firm's practices, no matter how highhanded its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm's managers, [the Energy Reorganization Act] does not interfere. McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir.1992) (citations omitted). Rather, our inquiry is restricted to whether the Secretary of Labor's finding that ComEd proffered an honest, legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Kahn's termination is supported by substantial evidence. We find that it is. We also find no indication that the Secretary's decision is arbitrary, capricious or that the Secretary abused his discretion in any way. Accordingly, we affirm.