Opinion ID: 1700206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach of Contract Liability

Text: Wright argues that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and accordingly should be vacated. From a study of Wright's brief it is not clear whether Wright is arguing that judgment should have been rendered in his favor, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury or merely that because the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence the case should be remanded for a new trial. We do not hold that Wright was guilty of substantial breach of contract, subjecting him to liability in damages, for failure to complete the contract within sixty (60) days. The contract did not provide that time was of the essence. Under such circumstances the mere fact that there has been a delay in completion will not justify the project owner in terminating a construction contract or in rescinding it. Bevis Construction Co. v. Kittrell, 243 Miss. 549, 560, 139 So.2d 375 (1962). Of the essence of Wright's contractual undertaking was that he would perform with reasonable dispatch, commencing June 1, 1980. Stevens' termination of the contract occurred on October 6, 1980, the day Stevens filed suit. The question before the jury was whether Wright's failure to complete the job with the 127 days between June 1 and October 6 constituted a breach of Wright's contractual obligation to perform his contract within a reasonable time. There was substantial testimony before the jury that under no circumstances should it take more than 30 days to construct such a swimming pool. The pool in fact was completed in less than 20 working days  the time Wright spent on the job added to the number of days Boyd spent completing the work. Contrary to Wright's claim of excessive rainfall and heat is Stevens' wholly credible proof that there were only two days during June and July when inclement weather would have prevented work. The jury was well within its prerogatives in rejecting as unreasonable Wright's claims of shipping delays and commitments to other jobs. At trial, Wright charged that Stevens had been guilty of breach of contract. In addition to his inclement weather, shipping delay and other commitments defenses, Wright sought to prove that Stevens had been guilty of a material breach of contract by posting the property on August 1 and by failure to pay timely $600 of the amounts due upon completion of excavation and delivery of materials to the job site. These issues were presented to the jury on minimally adequate instructions. Our review of the record makes it clear that the question of who breached the contract was fairly presented to the jury on conflicting evidence. The jury found that Wright had breached the contract and that Stevens had not. No legally viable reason for disturbing that verdict has been presented. Suffice it to say that under our system, it is the jury that resolves such issues, not this Court.
At trial, Wright requested jury instruction No. D-8 which reads as follows: The Court instructs the jury that in determining what your verdict shall be in this case, you must go into the jury room and first discuss and resolve the question of breach of contract before you have any other or further deliberations; and, if you (sic) decide from the evidence and other instructions given by the Court that the Defendant is not guilty of a breach of contract caused by his own fault, that caused actual monetary damages, if any, complained of by the Plaintiffs, then under your oaths, you must return a verdict for the Defendant, Robert B. Wright, Jr., dba Snapco Pools, without ever discussing or considering the question of damages, if any, sustained by the Plaintiffs. The trial court refused the requested instruction. Wright assigns this refusal as error. Wright charges that the denial of this instruction denied the jury consideration of whether there was a breach of contract or not by the appellant/defendant. Wright further argues that the denial of this instruction precluded the jury's considering that Wright's delay in completing the contract may have been caused by inclement weather, or by homeowners' act in posting the premises or making an alleged late payment. Upon our review of the matter, we hold that the refusal of jury Instruction No. D-8 was correct on at least two grounds. First, we do not consider rejected jury instructions in a vacuum. That the rejected instruction may state a sound principle of law  which this one does not  does not mean its refusal was error. Rather, we look at all the instructions given. We consider the court's total charge to the jury. If the point encompassed by the rejected instruction was fairly included in other instructions given the jury, reversal is not required. Hickombottom v. State, 409 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Miss. 1982); Knight v. State, 57 So.2d 161 (Miss. 1952); Norman v. State, 385 So.2d 1298 (Miss. 1980). Jury Instruction No. 5 required that the jury find that Wright breached the contract by failing to construct a swimming pool according to the written contract before a jury verdict for Stevens could be returned. Jury Instruction No. P-6 required, as a predicate for a verdict for Stevens, that the jury find that Wright breached the contract by failure to complete the swimming pool. Jury Instruction No. D-11A then advised the jury that there would be no breach by Wright if the jury found that Wright's non-performance. was caused directly or indirectly by the action or inaction on the part of the plaintiffs which interfered with the performance of the defendant for fulfillment of the contract... . Taken as a whole, these instructions present the question of breach of contract to the jury, although to be candid, we cannot say that they are more than minimally adequate. What is clear, however, is that the rejected instruction, Jury Instruction No. D-8 would have added nothing. Relatively speaking, Instruction No. D-11A was more adequate in presenting Wright's defense than was the rejected instruction D-8. If Wright had before us an artfully drawn instruction setting forth his theory on the breach issue, we might have a different matter. Instruction No. D-8 contains an erroneous statement of law. It would have advised the jury that it could only find against Wright if it found that Snapco was guilty of a breach of contract caused by its own fault, ... [Emphasis added]. If by the word fault the instruction intended to articulate a standard of conduct, failure of compliance with which plus causation would yield liability, the instruction contains a redundancy. In contract law breach is legal fault, the only legal fault. On the other hand, if by fault Wright intended an additional standard, it is superfluous and therefore irrelevant. The only thing the jury had to find to return a verdict against Wright was that Wright was guilty of a breach of contract, and quite clearly the jury did so find.