Opinion ID: 1956367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Madison, Brasher, and City of Winfield Appeal

Text: Defendants Madison, Brasher, and City of Winfield contend that the trial court erred in refusing the following written requested charges: 14. The court charges the jury that speed limitations as provided for under the laws of the State of Alabama do not apply to vehicles operated with due regard for safety and under the direction of police officers of the law in the case of apprehension of violators of the law or of persons charged with or suspected of any such violation. The court further charges the jury that in determining whether the police officers Max Brasher and Frank Madison, or either of them, acted negligently or were guilty of wanton conduct on the occasion complained about, you are to consider that they and each of them were charged with the duty of arresting law violators and if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant Adkins was on the occasion complained about a law violator and was committing violation of the speed laws of the State of Alabama in the presence of the officers, then you are to also consider that the police officers must and often have to exceed the speed limits of the laws of the State of Alabama and exceed precautions normally imposed upon other individuals and further that under such conditions the police officers were not obliged to allow the defendant Adkins to escape, even though pursuit may contribute to defendant Adkins's reckless driving while being pursued. 15. The court charges the jury that if in the presence of the police officers on the occasion complained about the defendant Adkins violated the speed laws of the State of Alabama, it was the police officers' duty to take steps to suppress the offense and apprehend the defendant Adkins. The law imposes upon the City of Winfield and the police officers Brasher and Madison duties which they must perform; in the performance of these duties, the City of Winfield and the police officers must take actions which an individual is not ordinarily called upon to take, such as exposure to the dangers of traffic, and therefore the standard of care exercised by the police officers must be judged more liberally. 17. The court charges the jury that police officers have a duty to pursue and attempt to apprehend speed law violators and in doing so may drive at such speeds and take such steps as may be necessary to apprehend the violator so long as an officer does not exceed proper and rational bounds or act in a negligent or wanton manner and if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that the defendant Adkins was violating the speed laws of the State of Alabama on the occasion complained of, then the court charges the jury the police officers involved had a duty to pursue him and drive at such speeds and take such steps as were necessary to apprehend the defendant Adkins, so long as the officers did not exceed proper and rational bounds nor act in a negligent or wanton manner. If you are further reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the officers did not exceed proper and rational bounds on the occasion complained about, nor acted in a negligent and wanton manner as directed by the court, then you cannot return a verdict for the plaintiffs and against the defendants City of Winfield, Max Brasher and Frank Madison for such actions or conduct on the part of Max Brasher and Frank Madison. The court further charges the jury that the police officers, while in pursuit of the defendant Adkins, were entitled to have any negligent conduct on their part directed by a standard of care different from that normally imposed upon individuals, giving due regard to the type of duty they are required to perform in the public interest in that they should not be held responsible for the action of the defendant Adkins although the pursuit may have contributed to his driving recklessly since the officers were not obliged to allow him to escape. 21. The Court further charges the jury that if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant, Adkins violated the speed laws of the State of Alabama, in Marion County, Alabama, which was the county of the police officers, Brasher and Madison, and that the speeding offense was committed in said officers' presence, then the Court charges the jury that said police Adkins in Walker County, Alabama. As we explain later in this opinion, the trial court was unable to inform defendants of its rulings on their written requested charges prior to their arguments to the jury because defendants submitted to the court a large number of requested charges at a time later than that requested by the court. Defendants objected to the trial court's refusal to rule on the written requested charges, and the court informed the parties that they could object to the oral charge after it had been given to the jury. Following the oral charge, these defendants excepted to the court's failure to submit to the jury the legal principles encompassed in charges 14, 15, 17, 21, supra, and others. Defendants stated these principles in their objection and also referred to the requested charges by number. Therefore, these defendants properly preserved the alleged error for review. See Rule 51, A.R.Civ.P. Defendants submitted the above charges for the purpose of having the court instruct the jury that the officers had the duty and responsibility to enforce the law, and that, accordingly, they should be judged by a more liberal standard of care. Additionally, defendants offered an instruction that the officers were not liable for the conduct of defendant Adkins, even though the pursuit might have contributed to his reckless driving. Because of extensive testimony about the chase being conducted across county lines, defendants also sought to have the court instruct the jury that the officers had the authority to arrest Adkins in Walker County. We hold that the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to charge the jury on the law as reflected in charges 17 and 21 (charge 17 repeats substantially all of the legal principles contained in charges 14 and 15). The trial court correctly, but incompletely, charged the jury: Remember that negligence is doing something that a reasonably prudent person would not have done under the same or similar circumstances, or failing to do something that a reasonably prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances. Now, when applying this measure to these defendants, and in particular, these police officers, we are talking about what a reasonably prudent police officer would have done under the same or similar circumstances. And we are talking about what a reasonably prudent police officer would not have done under the same or similar circumstances. Now, in determining ... what a reasonably prudent police officer would have done under the same or similar circumstances, you may take into consideration the generally accepted standards and practices which you have heard about and which were applicable to police in similar situations at that time. Let me see if I can untangle that. In determining whether or not these defendants, especially the police officers, were wanton or negligent, you must look at what would a reasonably prudent police officer have done under the same or similar circumstances, or what would he not have done? Did he do something that he ought not to have done? And in making this decision, you may use the generally accepted standards, adopted and in practice and used by police officers similarly situated at the time that this transaction took place. The error in this instruction lies in the court's failure to clearly distinguish between the standard of care to be applied for the officers' own personal acts and the standard of care of the officers for their official acts in pursuing a law violator. This Court recognizes that there are no Alabama decisions which directly address this question which was before the trial court. The only prior Alabama decision concerning the duty of care of a police officer performing his duty is Swift & Co. v. Payne, 223 Ala. 25, 134 So. 626 (1931). In Swift, a motorcycle policeman on his way home for dinner collided with another vehicle. In dicta, this Court stated: [T]he rights and duties of the parties to this accidentby parties in this connection we mean plaintiff and the driver of defendant's truckwere just what they would have been had plaintiff not been an officer of the law; that is to say, plaintiff was not performing any official duty requiring unusual speed nor was he relieved of any duty of due care which would have rested upon a private citizen in the same situation. 223 Ala. at 26, 134 So. at 627. Nevertheless, Swift implies that the duty of care for a policeman performing an official duty requiring unusual speed is different from that of a private citizen. A statute in effect at the time of this collision, September 23, 1978, exempted law enforcement officers from statutory speed limitations in certain situations. Code of 1975, § 32-5-96, provides: The speed limitations as set forth in this article shall not apply to vehicles when operated with due regard for safety and under the direction of state troopers, police or road or other officers of the law, as herein provided, in the case of apprehension of violators of the law or of persons charged with or suspected of any such violation, nor to fire departments or fire patrol vehicles when traveling in response to a fire alarm, nor to public or private ambulances when traveling in emergencies. The exemption shall not however protect the driver of any such vehicles or his principal from the consequences of a reckless disregard of the safety of others, as provided by law. (Repealed effective May 19, 1980). Therefore, a police officer could exceed the speed limit so long as he did not drive in reckless disregard of the safety of others. Neither the statute nor Swift addresses the question of the police officer's responsibility for the behavior of the pursued, however, because both focus on the officer as driver. Cases from other jurisdictions, however, are persuasive on that point. The question presented in Wrubel v. State, 11 Misc.2d 878, 879, 174 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (N.Y.Ct.Cl. 1958), was almost identical to the one at issue in the case at bar: Is the State liable for damage occasioned by a fleeing lawbreaker while being pursued by a state trooper who was performing his duty? The Wrubel court held that the State was not liable under the circumstances of that case. The facts themselves in Wrubel and those in the present case are quite similar. The state trooper in Wrubel observed a speeding automobile and gave chase with siren blowing and red lights flashing. Five times the officer pulled abreast of the automobile to signal the motorist over, but each time the driver swerved toward the trooper's car to force him back. The automobile, while being pursued, collided with another automobile, causing injuries to the driver and passenger. The Court found that the State was not liable, because the proximate cause of the wreck was the speed of the pursued automobile and not the conduct of the trooper. The Court expressed concern that if it held the State liable in such circumstances police officers might be reluctant to act in an emergency, with the consequences that the community could be stripped of proper and adequate protection against malefactors. The following analysis in Wrubel is especially significant: In the presence of a violation of law it is the officer's duty to take steps to suppress the offense and apprehend the offender. At its inception the offense being committed was only a traffic infraction. However, it developed, in the opinion of the Court, into reckless driving, a misdemeanor, also into resisting an officer, and other crimes which could be made out of the incident as it developed. Claimants' predication of liability on the State is founded on the novel position that the trooper, in attempting to halt one increasing the danger on the highway, did by his attempt alone increase the danger himself. To extend this position to the ultimate would require a police officer to pursue, at an otherwise lawful rate of speed, a lawbreaker traveling at an unlawful rate of speed, or to ignore him in the first place. An operator who is speeding, or who is a reckless driver on the highway, would know that all he had to do was to go fasterand under claimants' theory escape would be possiblethere would be no chase. A burglar, bank robber or any other felon could threaten to shoot and under claimants' theory escape would be possible and arrest avoided. It is fantastic to further expand claimants' theorysuch thinking would place a police officer in the same category as the Marquis of Queensbury in a pier six brawl. In so holding we do not say that it is impossible for an officer to be negligent or reckless in the performance of his duties. That it is possible is amply pointed out by some of the cases cited by claimants. However, we do not feel those cases to be applicable or controlling in the present instance. A police officer has a right to use whatever means necessary to make an arrest and unless he exceeds proper and rational bounds or acts in a negligent, careless or wanton manner, he is not liable for damages sustained, even by innocent parties, under the circumstances that arose herein. We think the action of the trooper was proper. The contention of claimants is unsound. 11 Misc.2d at 879-80, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 689. Florida has followed the Wrubel analysis in finding that a city is not liable for the wrongful death of a third person killed by one attempting to escape the police in the absence of evidence of lack of due care in operation of the police officer's automobile, City of Miami v. Horne, 198 So.2d 10 (Fla.1967). In Horne, at 13, the court, citing Wrubel, set out the following standard of care: The rule governing the conduct of [a] police [officer] in pursuit of an escaping offender is that he must operate his car with due care and, in doing so, he is not responsible for the acts of the offender. Although pursuit may contribute to the reckless driving of the pursued, the officer is not obliged to allow him to escape. Based upon the preceding authorities, it was error for the trial court to refuse to give requested charge 17. Additionally, under the authority of Raughley v. State, 398 So.2d 414 (Ala.Cr.App.1981), the jury should have been instructed that the officers had the authority to arrest Adkins in Walker County. Therefore, it was also error to refuse to give requested charge 21. Because the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury, these defendants were prejudiced and, therefore, their motions for a new trial should have been granted.