Opinion ID: 219116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Toevs had a right to meaningful periodic review while he was confined to the QLLP.

Text: Because Mr. Toevs has established a liberty interest, we proceed to the next issue, which focuses on the process that was afforded to him. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224, 125 S.Ct. 2384; Kirkland, 464 F.3d at 1189. Mr. Toevs does not contest the adequacy of the process by which he initially was committed to the QLLP or by which he was regressed to Level 1 in September 2005. Rather, he argues that while he was in the QLLP from 2005 to 2009, he was denied his right to a meaningful periodic review of his status. The periodic-review requirement stems from Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483, 115 S.Ct. 2293. In Hewitt, the Supreme Court stated, administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate. Prison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of such inmates. Id. at 477 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 864. The review need not be extensive, as the Court continued: This review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit the submission of any additional evidence or statements. The decision whether a prisoner remains a security risk will be based on facts relating to a particular prisoner which will have been ascertained when determining to confine the inmate to administrative segregationand on the officials' general knowledge of prison conditions and tensions, which are singularly unsuited for proof in any highly structured manner. Id. But the review must be meaningful; it cannot be a sham or a pretext. See id.; Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir.1986); McClary, 87 F.Supp.2d at 214. Mr. Toevs contends that a meaningful review must be one that can result in his immediate release from the QLLP to the general population. In light of the circumstances presented here, we disagree. The cases Mr. Toevs consults to form his definition of a meaningful review did not involve prisoners who were in stratified incentive programs such as the QLLP. See Mackey v. Dyke, 29 F.3d 1086 (6th Cir. 1994); Kelly v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394 (8th Cir.1975). In those cases, there were only two choices; either the prisoner was in administrative segregation or he was in the general population. Naturally, then, when the only alternative to segregation was the general population, the courts referred to a review that was capable of releasing the inmate into the general population. But here there were six levels within the QLLP, and Mr. Toevs had no right to rejoin the general population before he completed all six levels. Therefore, he did not have a right to an interim review capable of prematurely terminating his participation in the QLLP at any time before the completion of the sixth level. Unlike punitive segregation, including punitive isolation which is imposed by way of punishment for past misconduct, administrative segregation is not punitive and it looks to the present and the future rather than to the past. Kelly, 525 F.2d at 399. Thus, a meaningful review is one that evaluates the prisoner's current circumstances and future prospects, and, considering the reason(s) for his confinement to segregation, determines, without preconception, whether that placement remains warranted. As one scholar has put it, Hewitt's requirement of a meaningful periodic review presumes that the reviewing entity considers whether the prisoner's conduct during the period since the most recent security review warrants reclassification. Consideration of behavior is an integral component of a fair and meaningful hearing. Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. Pa. J. of Const. L. 115, 126-27 (2008). In the context of a stratified incentive program such as the QLLP, the review would consider whether the prisoner is eligible to move to the next level or, if the prisoner already is at the highest level, if he or she is eligible to graduate from the program. Further, what would be required for an intelligent and meaningful review of the case of one inmate might not be required in the case of another. Kelly, 525 F.2d at 400. Where, as here, the goal of the placement is behavior modification, the review should provide a guide for future behavior (i.e., it should give the prisoner some idea of the requirements for, and his progress toward, more favorable placement). See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (noting that Ohio's requirement of a statement of reasons serves as a guide for future behavior); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) (noting that prisoners denied parole were told the reason as a guide to the inmate for his future behavior). The statement of reasons must explain what the prisoner must do to work [his] way out of solitary confinement. Otherwise, the statement would not serve the function of providing the prisoner with a `guide for future behavior.' Lobel, 11 U. Pa. J. of Const. L. at 127. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the Supreme Court instructed the lower courts to examine the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards and the fiscal and administrative burdens [on the government] that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. The value of requiring an explicit advisement of progress through the QLLP program is high, in that it promotes the ultimate goal of a behavior-modification program. Moreover, the administrative burden on the government should be relatively low, as the QLLP already requires officials to track prisoners' progress and evaluate their prospects for promotion to the next level. A meaningful review, however, does not require giving the inmate an opportunity to submit additional testimony or evidence. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 864. And if the relevant circumstances truly have not changed, the fact that the review form says nothing different will not preclude a review from being considered meaningful. See Edmonson v. Coughlin, 21 F.Supp.2d 242, 253 (W.D.N.Y.1998). 2. Mr. Toevs did not receive meaningful periodic reviews between 2005 and 2009.