Opinion ID: 1469244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: MRPC 8.4(b)

Text: Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(b) Misconduct. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. The hearing judge, in his Conclusions of Law, opined that Respondent's misconduct in this case did not reflect adversely on his fitness as a lawyer and, therefore, did not violate MRPC 8.4(b). Petitioner excepts to this and maintains the hearing judge erred in concluding Respondent's stalking of [a] teenage boy was not conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness as an attorney. Petitioner contends that [w]here a lawyer's misconduct involves sexual misconduct with children, that misconduct reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness. Respondent, in his Reply, urges us to adopt the reasoning of the hearing judge. [8] It is well settled that this Court has original jurisdiction over all attorney disciplinary proceedings. See Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. 1, 20, 762 A.2d 950, 960 (2000) (citing Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17, 741 A.2d 1143, 1152 (1999); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470, 671 A.2d 463, 473 (1996)). The hearing judge's findings of fact, which are prima facie correct, Zdravkovich, 362 Md. at 21, 762 A.2d at 960 (quoting Glenn, 341 Md. at 470, 671 A.2d at 474), are unexcepted to in this case, as we noted earlier. As to his conclusions of law, however, our consideration is essentially de novo, Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Briscoe, 357 Md. 554, 562, 745 A.2d 1037, 1041 (2000), as [t]he ultimate determination... as to an attorney's alleged misconduct is reserved for this Court. Glenn, 341 Md. at 470, 671 A.2d at 474 (citing Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 402-03, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991)). After thoroughly reviewing the record and discovered case law, we sustain Petitioner's exceptions and overrule the hearing judge's conclusion that Respondent's conviction of the crime of stalking, under section 32-20 of the Montgomery County Code, resulting from his actions involving a thirteen year old boy, does not reflect adversely on his trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer in other respects. The Comment to MRPC 8.4 provides that [m]any kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on [the] fitness to practice law.... As we explained in Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Post, 350 Md. 85, 97, 710 A.2d 935, 941 (1998), Rule 8.4(b) recognizes, by its reference to character traits, rather than enumerating specific crimes, that commission of some crimes evidence or demonstrate a character flaw that, were the person committing them applying for admission to the bar, would constitute a significant impediment, if not outright prohibition, to his or her admission or, having been admitted, could result in his or her disbarment. The rule identifies two such traits. In addition to those traits, however, it includes as a catchall object, fitness as a lawyer in other respects. Since the Rule is specific in the requirement that the criminal act reflect adversely on the character traits or fitness as a lawyer, it follows that what the Rule contemplates is that the criminal act evidence another character trait, which, like honesty and trustworthiness, is relevant or critical to the practice of law. The hearing judge, purportedly applying this explanation, reasoned that Respondent's misconduct was not a violation of MRPC 8.4(b), at least so far as to the types of law which Respondent has practiced in the past and those which he has agreed to practice in the future. [9] We disagree. We acknowledge, as did the hearing judge, that Respondent's proffered areas of practice emphasis tend to minimize the potential for interactions with children directly as clients. Additionally, it must be conceded Respondent's misconduct did not involve or occur during the representation of a client. Under MRPC 8.4(b), however, an attorney's criminal misconduct need not involve the class of persons the attorney typically represents, nor occur within his or her practice of law, to be a violation of the rule. In fact, unlawful acts of violence, sex offenses, and drug and alcohol offenses, wholly unrelated to an attorney's practice of law, have been recognized across the country as categories of criminal conduct violative of the provisions of the analogue to this or a similarly framed rule. [10] See ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, at 101:303-101:304 (citing, for example, In re Kearns, 991 P.2d 824 (Colo.1999) (censuring an attorney for conviction of vehicular assault and driving under the influence); Florida v. Kandekore, 766 So.2d 1004 (Fla.2000) (disbarring an attorney for assaulting law enforcement officer); In re Conn, 715 N.E.2d 379 (Ind.1999) (suspending an attorney for conviction of sexual exploitation of minors); In re Sutton, 265 Kan. 251, 959 P.2d 904 (1998) (censuring an attorney following criminal and civil charges for his disobeying a stop sign at construction site, confronting a construction worker, and throwing a soda bottle at him); In re Robertson, 256 Kan. 505, 886 P.2d 806 (1994) (censuring an attorney for his admitted possession of cocaine); In re McEnaney, 718 A.2d 920 (R.I.1998) (suspending an attorney following plea of nolo contendre to possession of cocaine and marijuana)). The crux of any MRPC 8.4(b) analysis is, as the language of the rule states, whether an attorney's criminal act reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. It does not depend on whether the misconduct occurred while representing a client or, as the hearing judge suggested, whether the misconduct involved an individual from the class of persons the attorney typically represented. We are not suggesting that such factors may never be considered in a MRPC 8.4(b) analysis; indeed, there are many instances in which we may consider their existence or nonexistence to be important factors. In the present case, however, their nonexistence does not direct our decision. According to the hearing judge's findings of fact and Respondent's testimony in this case, Respondent had a number of conversations with the victim (a thirteen year old boy) at a local swim center. In one of those conversations, Respondent made an inappropriate sexual remark to him regarding premature ejaculation. Respondent also spoke to the child at a shopping mall, called him on the telephone once or twice, and, ultimately, appeared uninvited at the child's home. This conduct led to his being charged with, and pleading guilty to, the offense of stalking. As he acknowledged in his testimony before the hearing judge, Respondent's actions caused the child to be very frightened and very scared, feeling that Respondent had pursued him inappropriately. In our opinion, these actions, considered together, do not resemble, by any standard, those of a responsible, mature, and trustworthy adult, and clearly violated the unquestioned limits of appropriate adult-child interaction. It is well established in Maryland that children, by nature of their youth, require different levels of protection and care than most adults (excepting perhaps adults under disabilities). In many areas of the law, we have enumerated the inherent differences between children and adults which necessitate that protection. As we explained in Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 473 A.2d 903 (1984), ... youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly `during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment' expected of adults. Id. at 368, 473 A.2d at 921 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16, 102 S.Ct. 869, 877, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 11-12 (1982)) (citation and footnotes omitted). See also Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679, 692, 697 A.2d 1358, 1364 (1997) (explaining that there is a presumption that unequal bargaining power always exists between the two, with the power, and therefore the potential for overreaching, inuring to the adult.). The General Assembly, presumably in recognition of those differences, has enacted a number of statutes placing the responsibility on adults to protect and promote the welfare of children. [11] We too have acknowledged similarly the importance of protecting children. [12] It naturally follows, considering the inherent vulnerability of children, that interaction between children and adults be viewed with close scrutiny. Because of the disparities of power, intellect, maturity, and judgment between the two, children are often without the resources and capabilities, both mentally and physically, to protect themselves from harm. The burden, therefore, is on the adult to act responsibly in his or her interactions with children to preserve their best interests, not to prey on their innocence. That implicit trust and duty is placed upon all adults, even those outside the home and school, including strangers coming into contact with a child in public. These are values we hold as a society, which are not novel to humanity generally. As stated earlier, Respondent's behavior in pursuing the child/victim in this case grossly overstepped the boundaries of appropriate adult-child relationships. In so doing, Respondent demonstrated, and even acknowledged to himself, that he may not be trusted around children in general. [13] , [14] Although adult-child interactions are not related directly to Respondent's practice of law, the concept of trust is an inseparable element of any attorney's practice. It is inconceivable, therefore, how we presently may authorize and entrust Respondent with the enumerable confidential, fiduciary, and trust-based relationships that attorneys, by their profession, are required to maintain in their dealings with their clients or the public. We acknowledge Respondent's diagnosis and apparent affirmative response to his treatment regimen, but do not find that determinative here. [15] Regardless of his present high level of motivation not to repeat the misconduct that led to the present charges, the fact remains that Respondent stalked a child, and that criminal act undermines our view of his present trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer. Many courts in other jurisdictions have found, as we do here, that sexually-motivated attorney misconduct involving children can be within the purview of the type of misconduct encompassed by MRPC 8.4(b) or its analogue. [16] Respondent suggested in his Reply to Petitioner's Exceptions that such cases involving the sexual exploitation of a minor bear[ ] no factual resemblance to his case involving mere stalking of a child. We do not agree. Admittedly, the offense of stalking contemplates different behavior than the offenses committed against minors in the many MRPC 8.4(b)-type cases enumerated in note 16, supra. The purpose of stalking laws, however, such as the one implicated in this case, is to protect the general public and to prevent harm, such as molestation, from occurring to the stalking victim. [17] Therefore, in determining whether a criminal act constitutes a MRPC 8.4(b) violation, it makes no difference that Respondent merely stalked a thirteen year old boy, without consummating an act of sexual abuse or other misdeed. Any such act violates the implicit trust the public and we expect from adults interacting with children. Respondent's failure to act-out even worse misconduct, under the circumstances, does not remove him from the scope of MRPC 8.4(b). [18]