Opinion ID: 433508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the consequences of ferc's failure to give ncwcd the

Text: REQUIRED NOTICE 57 Having established FERC's statutory obligation to NCWCD, we still need to determine the consequences of FERC's breach of that obligation. In its rejection of NCWCD's petition for reconsideration, and more emphatically in its arguments to this court, FERC emphasized two points. First, the Commission argues that on June 9, 1981, prior to the close of proceedings, NCWCD received actual notice when one of its Directors saw the last of the newspaper notices. In FERC's view this was sufficient to negate NCWCD's challenge. Second, and more important, FERC argues that NCWCD admits having received all relevant information by September 29, 1981, and yet it waited until December 10 to seek reopening. FERC argues that that delay alone would merit rejection of the reopening petition.A. The Assertion That NCWCD Received Actual Notice Through the June 9 Newspaper Notice 58 We reject the argument that the observation by one member of NCWCD's Board of Directors of the June 9 newspaper notice gave NCWCD sufficient actual notice of Energenics' application. It is undisputed that that notice did not contain the precise location of the proposed project and that NCWCD called the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior to find that information. It is also undisputed that the Bureau gave NCWCD incorrect information and that as a result NCWCD chose not to pursue the matter. FERC, however, argues that it certainly had no statutory obligation to give in its municipal notices more information than it actually gave in its published notice, and thus any statutory violation was harmless. Moreover, FERC argues that the published notices directed that inquiries be made either to the Commission or to Energenics--and not to the Bureau--and thus it cannot be held responsible for NCWCD's receipt of incorrect information. 59 We need not decide whether the notice published in the newspaper and the Federal Register would have been sufficient to fulfill FERC's Section 4(f) municipal notice obligation had it been sent out as a direct municipal notice. The fact is that FERC did mail a notice to some government entities pursuant to the municipal notice provision and that that notice, unlike the published version, did specify the exact location of the project. FERC implicitly made a determination that that information was appropriate for government entities, and NCWCD was statutorily entitled to that same information. 60 We also need not go into great detail analyzing the degree of clarity of the published notice or the degree of reasonableness of FERC's response. It is enough to note that the notice did not unequivocally direct inquiries to either FERC or Energenics. At various points the notice stated: first, that Energenics' application was on file and available for public inspection with the Commission; second, that [c]orrespondence with the [a]pplicant should be directed to Energenics' president, whose address was listed; third, that [a] copy of the application may be obtained directly from the [a]pplicant; and fourth, that any filings should be sent, in the required form, to the Commission and to the applicant. NCWCD responded by contacting the Bureau of Reclamation, which owned the relevant land and with whom NCWCD had an established relationship. Its goal was not to obtain a copy of the application, but only a very basic and simple piece of information. On its face, it does not seem unreasonable to have expected Bureau to have known it. We can thus conclude that the reading of the June 9 notice did not make harmless FERC's failure to fulfill its statutory obligation. 61 A legislature, in order to take into account the particular circumstances and protect the particular interests of certain potential parties, may surely mandate that an administrative agency give them notices in a specific manner. That legislative power would be made meaningless if an agency could freely ignore the mandated manner to the recipient's harm. Because here NCWCD did not receive the same actual knowledge from the published notice that it would have received from the direct municipal notice, and because that deficiency may have made a difference in its failure to participate in the proceedings, FERC's failure to comply with the statute was not clearly made harmless by any actual notice received by NCWCD before the permit was issued. 62 B. FERC's Contention That NCWCD's 72-Day Delay Made the Petition Untimely 63 All parties agree that on September 29, 1981 NCWCD learned the actual location of Energenics' proposed project from Energenics itself. This knowledge prompted NCWCD to begin the process of, first, evaluating that location to decide if it had the interest and capacity to compete with Energenics for the right to construct and operate a project there; second, determining its legal rights and strategies concerning such competition; and third, preparing the legal papers for its petition to reconsider and reopen. At its monthly meeting on November 13, 1981 the NCWCD Board of Directors authorized NCWCD to file a competing application, and on December 10, 1981 (72 days after learning of the location) NCWCD petitioned for reconsideration of the permit issuance and for reopening to permit filing of a competing application. Without a hearing, FERC rejected the petition as untimely. 64 Because this case comes to us lacking any factual findings, we cannot decide the issue of whether the 72-day delay was reasonably excusable, but for a number of reasons we must reverse FERC's decision that, assuming the truth of all facts alleged by NCWCD, the petition was still inexcusably untimely. In reaching this conclusion we are not holding that waiting such a long period of time is generally acceptable in efforts to reopen an administrative proceeding. That is clearly not the case. But this case involves a number of special circumstances. We are influenced by the time limits contained in FERC's own practice, by the legislative history of the Federal Power Act's notice provision, and by the particular facts of this case. 65 The significance of NCWCD's 72-day time period should in part be evaluated in light of the time periods given to parties in FERC's own proceedings. We assume that those periods reflect FERC's views of how long various tasks and decisions should reasonably take. In this case FERC first issued notices of Energenics' application on May 6, 1981 and listed July 9, 1981 (64 days later) as the last date for comments, protests, or petitions to intervene. The notices also explained that anyone interested in filing a competing application could, under 18 C.F.R. Sec. 4.33(b) & (c) (1983), protect that interest by filing, on July 9, a relatively simple notice of intent. 13 The Commission would then give them until September 8, 1981 (126 days after the initial notice) to prepare and file the application. 66 In evaluating the significance of the 72-day time period, it is relevant to ask what sort of behavior Congress deemed foreseeable in the absence of proper notice. Thus it is relevant that Congress' passage of the municipal notice provision seems to have been motivated by the belief that it was needed because the types of entities within the statute's definition of municipality would be unable to easily recognize their interests and quickly act on them. This seems to have been the point of the provision's sponsor as he explained its purpose to the House of Representatives: 67 It is well known    that municipalities and public officials are often very dilatory and that they sleep upon their rights. It seems to me it is wise to provide that as soon as an application is filed by any person or corporation that notice shall be at once given to the various municipalities, which mean the county, city, irrigation district, drainage district, or other political division of the State   . This will bring knowledge directly home to the    officials and give them an opportunity to present their application if they desire public or municipal ownership, where otherwise the matter would be entirely overlooked and snap judgment would be taken against them   . 68 56 Cong.Rec. 9762 (August 30, 1918) (statement by Representative Sinnott). Of course, this recognition by Congress cannot mean that once notice is deficient a municipality can learn the relevant information and then freely sleep on its rights. But it should influence the evaluation of a municipality's behavior, since a municipality should not lose its rights if its response was within congressional expectations. Congress seems not to have expected municipalities to be able to file competing applications with exemplary promptness after casually or informally coming upon the necessary information, and this factor should at least lead us to look at the issue with some flexibility. 69 Given these factors, we must conclude that the decision to reject NCWCD's petition for reopening, reached as it was without a hearing or any fact-finding, was an abuse of discretion. For a number of reasons the passage of 72 days, in and of itself, cannot sustain FERC's conclusion. FERC's own procedures allow a municipality which receives proper notice to take more than 60 days to reach a decision on whether it wants to compete. At that point it need only file a simple notice of intent to gain approximately 60 more days for preparing its application. Most important, the notice sets out the exact procedure to follow, the exact due dates, the option of protecting interests with a notice of intent, etc. Thus potential parties need not expend time and effort determining what is expected of them. The facts here, in contrast, presented NCWCD with the information in a piecemeal fashion and placed it in the situation of having to argue a theory of reopening that appeared never to have publicly arisen before. FERC's regulations did not explain what constituted proper notice, nor did they explain what a municipality in NCWCD's position was expected to do. Although FERC here argues that all NCWCD would have had to do was file the simple notice of intent, no public statement by the Commission stated that this would have been appropriate. Given the fact that the petition was less than two weeks late, as compared with FERC's normal period for requiring the short notice of intent, given that this sort of delay and confusion was what Congress expected and thus sought to avoid by requiring direct, unambiguous, written notice, and given that FERC placed NCWCD in a position in which neither FERC's stated procedures nor its precedents gave NCWCD any clear guidance, we find it an abuse of discretion to have denied the petition on the facts alleged. 70 We reverse FERC's conclusion that 72 days was so untimely that, even if the explanation offered was true and complete, it would not be reasonable. FERC may of course hold hearings at which NCWCD may be required to prove the facts in its allegations. And, of course, at such hearings NCWCD's allegations may be examined, impeached, or cast in a different light by new facts, and as a result NCWCD's behavior may be found to have been unreasonable. But such a finding would have to be based on NCWCD's failure to prove its factual contentions or on the presentation of significant new facts not currently before us. On the facts contained in the record before us, FERC could not have validly reached that determination. 14 71 Reversed and remanded. 72