Opinion ID: 1143642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the spang evidence

Text: Petitioner performed legal, business, and personal services for an elderly couple, Nick and Frances Spang. He maintained a relationship with Frances after Nick's death in 1973, and she came to depend on him heavily for companionship and assistance in all her affairs. In 1974, Frances formally executed a written will prepared by petitioner. It left the bulk of the estate to Frances' sister, Arnette, and Arnette's daughter Suzann Hubbard Edwards (Suzann), or alternatively to an educational trust for Suzann's minor son Shane Dunn. Petitioner was named trustee for Shane and executor of the will but was not a beneficiary. Frances died on April 8, 1979. Petitioner did not offer the 1974 will for probate. Rather, he presented holographic wills executed by her on February 4, 1976, and March 15, 1977, both of which left Frances' house, the estate's most valuable asset, to petitioner. Arnette and Suzann, represented by Attorney Teal, offered the 1974 will. Will contests ensued, and petitioner obtained appointment as special administrator of the estate. Arnette and Suzann sought his removal on grounds of self-interest. While deposing petitioner in that regard, Teal learned that in 1976, Frances had executed and recorded a deed naming petitioner a joint tenant of her residence. [8] Arnette and Suzann filed a petition requesting that the joint tenancy deed be set aside on grounds of fraud and undue influence, thus returning the residence to the probate estate. (Prob. Code, § 851.5.) In January 1980, Judge Pfotenhauer entered an order which removed petitioner as personal representative for possible conflict of interest, named Arnette special administrator, directed petitioner to file an account, ordered him to deliver to ARNETTE HUBBARD all property ... of the estate forthwith, and restrained him from selling, hypothecating, [or] transferring any interest in the Spang residence. In July 1980, Judge Ertola entered a further order clarifying petitioner's duty to turn over possession of joint tenancy property, including keys and deeds to realty. Petitioner did not comply with either order. On May 17, 1983, Judge Marie-Victoire entered judgment on special jury verdicts in the consolidated probate action. The jury found that the deed and the holographic wills were procured through petitioner's undue influence, and that the 1977 holographic will was also procured by his fraud. The court ruled these documents void and admitted the 1974 will to probate. Petitioner appealed the judgment, and in February 1984, the court set a stay bond of $60,500. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 917.4, 917.9.) Apparently petitioner never posted the bond. In late May 1983, apparently acting with court permission, Teal and Arnette retained a locksmith, Thomas Kokezak, who changed the locks on the house. Subsequently, Arnette found that her key to the new locks did not work and that they had been changed again. In early June 1983, petitioner sent Kokezak a Demand to Surrender Possession Obtained by Forcible Entry. [9] On May 25, 1984, Judge Arata entered a specific order directing petitioner forthwith and immediately, and whether or not he received a written copy of the order, to turn over to ... HUBBARD [as administrator] any and all keys to the locks of the Spang residence, to allow her access and possession to the home, not to enter or change any locks on the property, and to refrain from any acts which would prevent her from entering and using the premises. Notice of entry of the order was mailed to petitioner on July 24, 1984. On December 17, 1984, Arnette noticed a motion to hold petitioner in contempt based on disobedience to the May 25 order. Supporting declarations by Arnette and Teal asserted that petitioner had installed tenants in the house as of August 1984. On February 27, 1985, after a hearing on January 31, Judge Wonder filed an order holding petitioner in contempt. The order again directed petitioner to transfer possession of the premises, and it also commanded him to turn over all rents received. If these requirements were not satisfied by February 4, 1985, petitioner was to pay the estate $100 in sanctions for each day until he was in compliance. On June 20, 1985, Judge Wonder entered a second contempt order against petitioner, based on his continuing disobedience to the orders of May 25, 1984, and February 27, 1985. Specific findings were made that petitioner had personal knowledge of the prior orders, was able to comply with them, and had violated them willfully. Once again, petitioner was commanded to turn over possession, keys, and rents, and the $100-per-day sanction for noncompliance was continued. The court also directed issuance of a writ of possession for the premises to the special administrator. Hubbard regained possession only by rechanging the locks. Petitioner acknowledged he had refused to comply with the 1980 orders insofar as they demanded surrender of the residence because he did not consider them valid and legal to that extent. In petitioner's view, they were directed to him as special administrator, not in his individual capacity as surviving joint tenant, and covered joint tenancy assets not yet determined to be part of the probate estate. According to petitioner, Judge Ertola threatened to hold him in contempt for disobedience to the July 1980 order, but an order to show cause was never served because the attorney that was assigned to prepare those papers informed Judge Ertola that the probate court has no jurisdiction over joint tenancy assets. Similarly, petitioner testified, he ignored Judge Arata's post judgment order of May 25, 1984, on grounds it was directed to him as removed special administrator, not to the individual capacity in which he actually held title. It is a matter of technicality, petitioner observed at the disciplinary hearing, and law is nothing but technicality. However, at the time the estate sought contempt before Judge Wonder for disobedience to the May 1984 order, petitioner defended on grounds he did not then have possession of the premises, and Judge Wonder admitted I could not be in contempt of court if I do not have possession. Petitioner asserts he was denied a trial to present this nonpossession defense fully, but that defense appears to be based merely on his installation of tenants during the intervening period. Petitioner claimed he was again denied a trial at the second contempt hearing before Judge Wonder, but told the court he was attempting to evict the tenants. Finally, petitioner testified at the disciplinary hearing about a third contempt hearing of unspecified date. There, petitioner asserted, an unidentified judge found him not in contempt for failing to deliver possession and allowed him to be purged of contempt for rent arrearages, amounting to some $4,800, if they were paid within three days, which was done. No records of this proceeding were introduced in evidence. [10] The evidence of petitioner's fraud and undue influence upon Frances was highly circumstantial. At the civil trial (hereafter sometimes called trial), several of her relatives  Arnette, Suzann, the decedent's nephew Thomas Spang, and Thomas' mother Marie Page  testified to changes in Frances' behavior from 1975 onward. Though always reclusive, she had formerly relied heavily on these relatives to provide the companionship and attention she craved. She would employ pretexts to get them to call or stop by as often as possible. After a time, however, and particularly from 1977 on, she began to hang up the telephone, refuse admittance when they stopped by, and decline to leave the house for outings or visits with them. When offered assistance in her personal affairs, she would respond that Mr. Maltaman, her lawyer, would take care of everything. On occasion, and sometimes tearfully, she would say that petitioner had control of everything, that she was afraid to speak to them since he was expected, and that she could not leave because he had a key and she feared she could not get back in. While certain of these witnesses described Frances as weak-willed, nervous, fearful, neurotic, and easily manipulated by her loneliness, Page said she was strong-minded and stubborn. [11] Spang and Arnette also testified that Frances was not capable without assistance of using the language found in the holographic wills. [12] Charles Vassallo, a real estate broker and notary public, testified at trial about the preparation and recording of the joint tenancy deed. Vassallo knew petitioner as a schoolmate in wartime Malta, and he agreed that the Maltese community in San Francisco is tight. He further acknowledged that he had occasionally referred legal matters to petitioner when Maltese language ability was needed. However, Vassallo disclaimed any close social or business relationship with petitioner, [13] and he denied any cooperation with petitioner in procuring the deed. Vassallo testified he assumed Frances had simply selected him from among the neighborhood brokers in the telephone book. The deed was typed by Mary Akins, who worked in his office. Akins had previously worked part-time for petitioner and was a witness to the 1974 will; again, Vassallo denied any connection. Vassallo explained to Frances the consequences of joint tenancy. She insisted she understood and was acting according to her wishes. She was in a hurry to record the deed, and she pestered Vassallo to drive her to City Hall for that purpose. She appeared alert and oriented, though she seemed to need the support of others. She did not indicate that petitioner had advised preparation of the deed, but simply gave the impression she was on good terms with him. [14] Specific evidence of petitioner's control over Frances' affairs centered around a $5,000 Bank of America savings account. In 1976, the names of Arnette and Suzann were removed from the account, and petitioner's name was substituted. Petitioner testified at trial that this was done for convenience so that he could write checks for emergencies such as sudden medical expenses. [15] After Frances' death, he initially listed the account as a probate asset, but omitted it in a subsequent accounting, apparently on the premise that as a joint tenancy asset it was not part of the estate. At trial, petitioner testified that it was exhausted to pay death expenses. [16] Petitioner also acknowledged the existence of a $10,000 trust fund for the education of Frances' grandnephews, Shane Dunn and Shad Edwards. (See fn. 12, ante. ) The evidence also discloses that Frances and her relatives had a longstanding dispute about where she should live. Arnette wished Frances to move into an adjacent mobilehome in Sebastopol; Frances desired Arnette to live with her in the San Francisco residence, which Arnette refused to do. From August 1975 through September 1978, Arnette wrote petitioner several letters urging his cooperation in getting Frances to Sebastopol. In September 1977, petitioner visited Arnette and Suzann in Sebastopol, and the three had an angry confrontation over the issue. Petitioner testified at trial that shortly after Nick's death, Frances began calling him for companionship on the pretext of reviewing important papers. He sought to limit his visits. He sometimes cooked for her. Petitioner testified he regarded his actions as charitable and saw Frances as a nuisance, not a friend. [17] Petitioner offered varying versions of his response to Frances' advice in early 1976 that she intended to give him the house. At trial, he said he did not tell Frances what terms to include in the will and advised her to contact another attorney. He gave the names of two neighborhood law firms which he believed he had recommended. He was then confronted with his deposition testimony. There he indicated he told her he did not want her to give him the residence, since any bequest or gift to him was sure to be contested in view of their lawyer-client relationship, and he did not wish to be involved. In the deposition, petitioner said he advised her to contact another attorney; when she asked, Which attorney? he told her to look in the telephone book. I did not recommend any [specific] attorneys. Then she wanted ... to make a deed. I said I would not prepare a deed for that purpose. At the disciplinary hearing (hereafter sometimes called hearing), petitioner testified that he dissuade[d] Mrs. Spang from bequeathing or executing a grant deed naming [him] as a joint tenant. At all times, he denied any participation, direct or indirect, in the drafting, execution, or recording of any of the challenged documents. [18] He claimed the 1977 holographic will was discovered only after Frances' death. At trial, petitioner had mentioned Frances' continuing fear that she would be put out of her house and placed in a home. At the hearing, he testified that Frances was indeed a lonely woman, and she did not forgive her sister for not coming down from Sebastopol to live with her. Finally, Arnette testified at the hearing that on two occasions during the probate litigation, she encountered petitioner in the courthouse corridor. On each occasion, she asked to be allowed into the house to retrieve personal property. Petitioner responded that the house and everything in it was his, he had sold or given everything to the Salvation Army, and Arnette would enter only over his dead body. [19] When she vowed she would not let him get away with it, petitioner said he'd send his Maltese Mafia after me. With respect to the Spang matter, the referee made specific findings, adopted by the review department, (1) that petitioner did not, after acquiring knowledge of the [deed and holographic wills], advise [Frances] to seek independent legal counsel, (2) that a judgment was entered on special verdicts finding fraud and undue influence in the deed and wills (but not that the deed and wills had in fact been procured by fraud or that undue influence actually occurred), (3) that the two contempt orders were entered, (4) that petitioner has consistently over the years 1976 through March 1986 disregarded, failed to comply with, and ignored legal, valid and noticed court orders and proceedings, (5) that petitioner repeatedly refused to cooperate with the State Bar, and (6) that petitioner personally attempted to contact Suzann at home, knowing Arnette was represented by Teal and without Teal's consent. [20]