Opinion ID: 2162559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First: Judged exclusively by the record made by and before Judge Smith, was the respondent contemptuous?

Text: By way of purposeful preamble the indorsers of this opinion approach consideration of the recorded facts exactly as they were developed by and made to appear before Judge Smith between June of 1962 and February of 1966, uncolored by any subsequently written judicial opinion. Declared another way, we consider the record as if this Court stood judicially in Judge Smith's shoes on and prior to February of 1966, with no opinion of Anders v. California and no opinion of Mr. Hoffman's appeal to the Court of Appeals known to us, and with no issue framed and submitted for decision save that which the judge decided per quotation above. As we perceive, this is the sure way to avoid the afterwitted error of applying a respectable yet elective Federal intervenient to a not very difficult question of local law. In June of 1962 one Ernest B. Sandefur was charged in Allegan county with first-degree murder. John B. Nahan, a reputable member of the Allegan county bar, was promptly engaged to represent him. Upon Mr. Nahan's advice the defendant stood mute. A plea of not guilty was entered. Two months later the defendant appeared with counsel before the court. The following record was made: Mr. Andrews [prosecuting attorney]: May it please the court, this is the matter of the People of the State of Michigan v. Ernest B. Sandefur, File No 4068. Mr. Sandefur was before the court on the 20th day of June, 1962, with his counsel, Mr. Nahan, of the city of Allegan, and stood mute on a charge of homicide which had been filed on the 5th day of June. My understanding is Mr. Sandefur has further consulted with his counsel, Mr. Nahan, and wishes to inform the court that there is a change in the plea in this matter. Is that right, Mr. Nahan? Mr. Nahan: Yes, sir. I advised Mr. Sandefur and he has agreed to change his plea from mute to a plea of guilty to the general charge of homicide, with the request that the court allow respondent [3] to offer evidence as to the degree of homicide, and then after hearing such evidence determine the degree. The Court: Is that your wish, Mr. Sandefur? The Respondent: Yes, sir, it is okay with me, sir. The Court: Mr. Nahan has been your attorney for the last 2 months or so? The Respondent: Yes. The Court: His services have been satisfactory? The Respondent: Satisfactory to me, sir, fine. The Court: Plea of not guilty heretofore entered by the court may be withdrawn, plea of guilty to the open charge of homicide will be accepted by the court. There will be no bond. Mr. Nahan and the court has discussed the matter of trial date to determine degree of guilt in this matter and he has suggested a month from today. Is that satisfactory to you, Mr. Andrews? Mr. Andrews: Satisfactory to the people, yes, your Honor. The Court: That is the 20th day of September, 9 o'clock. Mr. Andrews: I would be perfectly willing to make available to counsel my files in the matter so we might expedite this hearing. The Court: That will be appreciated. Mr. Nahan: Thank you, your Honor. A little over a month later the court conducted an unusually thorough hearing to determine the degree of guilt. It is unnecessary that the hearing be rehashed here beyond comment that the court and all counsel left no legal stone unturned, no known witness unsworn, no argument for a reduction of degree left silent. The result, certified to us by Judge Smith, was this: On October 9, 1962, the court found: `The court finds there is an absence of that degree of premeditation which would characterize the act as murder in the first degree and, likewise, an absence of such provocation or justification that would reduce the homicide to manslaughter. `We have here a killing done in anger with sufficient time for a cooling off with no justification for self-defense, and in the opinion of the court, those circumstances dictate a finding of murder in the second degree and the court so finds.' The court then asked the respondent, Ernest Sandefur, if he knew of any reason why the court could not lawfully pass judgment, and the respondent replied: `No, sir. `The Court: And sentence in your matter today? `The Respondent: No, sir. `The Court: Is there anything you would like to say to the court? `The Respondent: I don't know of anything, sir. `The Court: Mr. Nahan? `Mr. Nahan: No, sir. `The Court: It is the sentence and judgment of this court that Ernest B. Sandefur be committed to the jurisdiction of the Michigan corrections department and confined at Michigan Southern Prison at Jackson for a period not less than 20 nor more than 40 years. The court recommends the minimum. `Mr. Nahan: Your Honor, does such sentence take into consideration the time spent in the Allegan county jail? `The Court: Yes. The court always takes that matter in consideration.' It was not claimed then or in the course of postconviction proceedings (mentioned later) that Mr. Nahan did not act faithfully and competently for the defendant. Indeed, the full record of the statutory proceeding (CL 1948, § 750.318 [Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.550]), conducted by the court to determine the degree of Mr. Sandefur's guilt, shows that Mr. Nahan went to uncommon lengths in effort to reduce the charge against Mr. Sandefur to voluntary manslaughter; a goal insurmountable in view of eyewitness proof that Mr. Sandefur, having shot at and wounded his son in the home, pursued the fleeing son down the street, meanwhile firing his Colt .45 three times more with fatal effect. Mr. Nahan's uphill work did at least accomplish for Mr. Sandefur a conviction of second-degree rather than first-degree murder, along with recommendation of the minimal term of sentence as fixed by the court, that is, 20 years. In May of 1965 Mr. Sandefur wrote to the Allegan county circuit court, alleging indigency and requesting: Will you please appoint me an attorney, I want to appeal my case, and furnish all records and transcript at public expense. May 27, 1965 the court appointed the respondent Hoffman appellate counsel for the defendant. The order of appointment concluded: It is further ordered that such portion of the trial transcript as shall be requested by counsel for post-conviction motions and the perfection of an appeal be furnished to said counsel. Having obtained the necessary transcripts and having completed what to him was requisite to performance of his appointive duty, Mr. Hoffman reported to the court under date of September 24, 1965 that he could find no reason or ground to file for new trial or attempt an appeal on behalf of Mr. Sandefur. His report consists of 3 printed pages. Save for deletion by asterisks of a long paragraph which includes the oath required by our July 17, 1964 amendment of section 3 of State Bar Rule 16 (373 Mich cxxviii-cxxxi), [4] the report appears verbatim in Justice T.M. KAVANAGH'S opinion and will not be repeated here. We find that report, supported as it was by Mr. Hoffman's undisputed testimony given in response to Judge Smith's order to show cause, amply sufficient to meet and overcome any thought that Mr. Hoffman's refusal to proceed was either contemptuous or technically indicative of contempt. The report and the testimony exhibit assiduous care on the part of an able and experienced trial and appellate lawyer in undertaking to search a complete record  of arraignment, appointment of counsel, plea, and statutory proceeding which included the taking of the defendant's testimony along with that of others  for some reasonable or even arguable possibility of error. The report was right, factually and legally. It justifies our now declared ruling that Mr. Hoffman, declining to proceed further, relied properly upon the canonically ordered duties of members of the Michigan Bar. As against all this it is not out of order to observe that even one of these brilliantly imaginative law professors moderne  strengthened say like Samson with Dundreary whiskers and curls of Custer  would be hard put to strain out of Mr. Sandefur's 1962 court record something other than plain nonsense for review on his behalf. Of that we own to some knowledge born of experience, to which we come now. The soundness of Mr. Hoffman's reported appraisal of the Sandefur record was confirmed by Judge Smith at the time. [5] It was tested thereafter by the Court of Appeals and then by this Court. A week after having received Mr. Hoffman's report Judge Smith appointed another eminent (and this time obediently willing) member of the Allegan county bar, to act as substituted counsel in the place and stead of Mr. Hoffman. Such new counsel promptly prepared and submitted to the Court of Appeals an application on behalf of Mr. Sandefur for leave to take a delayed appeal. We need not relate the valiant if useless content thereof. It was denied unanimously by order entered March 8, 1966. The order reads: In this cause an application for delayed appeal is filed by defendant, and nothing in opposition thereto having been filed, and due consideration thereof having been had by the Court; It is ordered that the application for delayed appeal be, and the same is hereby denied for the reason that a meritorious basis for an appeal is not established. An application to this Court for leave to review the quoted order of denial was denied by unanimous order entered June 14, 1966. That order reads: On order of the Court, the application for delayed leave to appeal is considered, and the same is denied, for the reasons that defendant-appellant has failed to persuade the Court that he has a meritorious basis for appeal or that the decision of the Court of Appeals was clearly erroneous. A second application by Mr. Sandefur, alleging applicability to his 1962 confession and conviction of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 US 436 (86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694), Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), 384 US 719 (86 S Ct 1772, 16 L Ed 2d 882), and Davis v. North Carolina (1966), 384 US 737 (86 S Ct 1761, 16 L Ed 2d 895), all handed down in 1966, was denied here September 6, 1967 by order reading: On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal is considered, and the same is denied, for the reasons that no sufficient justification or meritorious basis is presented and further because a previous application was denied by order of this Court on June 14, 1966. There is reversible error here, committed successively by the retroaction of backward bent judges. Judge Smith erred in planting his judgment of contempt upon view that new section 20 of article 1 of the Constitution of 1963, granting appeal as of right in every criminal prosecution, became applicable nunc pro tunc to the 1962 judgment of conviction and sentence of Mr. Sandefur. [6] Division 3 erred in backtracking Anders two years to justify a judgment of conviction of contempt for having done that which, when performed, was lawful. And Division 3 erred in failing to perceive that the practice pursued by Judge Smith, when the judge substituted promptly the willing Mr. Tooman for the unwilling Mr. Hoffman, provided Mr. Sandefur with service  appellatewise  surpassing that which the Supreme Court later called down upon California on behalf of Mr. Anders. On petition for certiorari, filed by the indigent and imprisoned Mr. Anders, the Supreme Court (not exactly quiescent or unanimous) criticized California's method of providing appellate service and laid down for California and States providing similar appellate procedure a new rule; in particular one which exacts of appointed appellate counsel a request for permission to withdraw and a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. Then the rule calls upon the court to make a determination that the case is [or is not] wholly frivolous. As against that rule and for the nonce we prefer our eminently superior practice; that of appointing for an indigent appellant willing or disposed counsel as done by Judge Smith. It provides for such an appellant a lawyer more likely to serve better than would the lawyer forced against his will to act for a cause he knows, and the trial judge knows, is frivolous. And, unlike Anders, it certainly assures this in the appellate court; that the indigent appellant is represented there no matter the fatuity of the presented issues and arguments presented thereon.