Opinion ID: 2636660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court properly granted the motion for directed verdict on the intentional interference claim

Text: ¶ 34 Mr. Ferguson also argues that the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict as to the claim of intentional interference with prospective relations in regards to UMIA. We disagree. ¶ 35 Utah law recognizes a common law cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic relations. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). `[I]n order to recover damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.' Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, ¶ 18, 192 P.3d 858 (alteration in original) (quoting St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 201 (Utah 1991)). The second element offers two alternatives. To establish the first alternative, improper purpose, the plaintiff must prove more than a defendant's motivation of ill will toward the plaintiff; [r]ather, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's `predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff.' Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ¶ 20, 116 P.3d 323 (quoting Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co., 657 P.2d at 307). To establish the second alternative, improper means, a plaintiff must show `that the defendant's means of interference were contrary to statutory, regulatory, or common law or violated an established standard of a trade or profession.' Id. (quoting Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1994)). ¶ 36 At trial, Mr. Ferguson failed to establish the second element. Mr. Ferguson predicated his intentional interference claim on the alleged defamation in this case-that Defendants used an improper means by defaming Mr. Ferguson's professional reputation with UMIA. Defamation would be a means contrary to the common law. However, our holding above, which affirms the trial court's grant of the directed verdict, dictates that no defamation existed, and thus Defendants employed no improper means. And besides Mr. Ferguson's conclusory assertion that the statement to UMIA was motivated out of spite and ill will, we are not directed to and cannot find any evidence to that effect, let alone evidence that injury to Mr. Ferguson was Defendants' predominant purpose. We therefore affirm the trial court's grant of the directed verdict.