Opinion ID: 1984561
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Venue Provisions

Text: As explained by the Court of Appeals majority, venue is controlled by statute in Michigan. The statute regarding appropriate venue for contract claims provides: Except for actions provided for in sections 1605, 1611, 1615, and 1629, venue is determined as follows: (a) The county in which a defendant resides, has a place of business, or conducts business, or in which the registered office of a defendant corporation is located, is a[ [5] ] proper county in which to commence and try an action. (b) If none of the defendants meet 1 or more of the criteria in subdivision (a), the county in which a plaintiff resides or has a place of business, or in which the registered office of a plaintiff corporation is located, is a proper county in which to commence and try an action. (c) An action against a fiduciary appointed by court order shall be commenced in the county in which the fiduciary was appointed. [MCL 600.1621; MSA 27A.1621.] Likewise, the statute regarding appropriate venue for recovery of tangible personal property claims provides: The county in which the subject of action, or any part thereof, is situated, is a proper county in which to commence and try the following actions: (a) the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interests therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or interest; (b) the partition of real property; (c) the foreclosure of all liens or mortgages on real property; and (d) the recovery of tangible personal property. [MCL 600.1605; MSA 27A.1605 (emphasis added).] [6] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, subject to de novo review. Oakland Co. Bd. of Rd. Comm'rs v. Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich. 590, 610, 575 N.W.2d 751 (1998). Its primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. v. Marlette Homes, Inc., 456 Mich. 511, 515, 573 N.W.2d 611 (1998). Courts may not speculate regarding legislative intent beyond the words expressed in a statute. Lansing v. Lansing Twp., 356 Mich. 641, 649, 97 N.W.2d 804 (1959); In re Schnell, 214 Mich.App. 304, 310, 543 N.W.2d 11 (1995). Hence, nothing may be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the act itself. In re SR, 229 Mich.App. 310, 314, 581 N.W.2d 291 (1998); 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 198, pp. 394-395. We believe it is unnecessary to look beyond the language of the statutes to address the question whether parties may contractually agree to venue. [7] Since the Legislature declined to provide that parties may contractually agree to venue in advance, we decline to read into the statute a provision requiring enforcement of such agreements. Ramsey, supra at 314, 581 N.W.2d 291. Otherwise stated, we need not, and consequently will not, speculate regarding legislative intent beyond the plain words expressed in the statute. Schnell, supra at 310, 543 N.W.2d 11. Although it is unnecessary to look beyond the language of the statutory venue provisions, we note that examination of the personal jurisdiction statutes supports our conclusion. Statutes in pari materia are statutes sharing a common purpose or relating to the same subject. They are construed together as one law, regardless of whether they contain any reference to one another. State Treasurer v. Schuster, 456 Mich. 408, 417, 572 N.W.2d 628 (1998). Such construction should effectuate each statute without repugnancy, absurdity, or unreasonableness. People v. Harrison, 194 Mich. 363, 370-371, 160 N.W. 623 (1916). Given that statutes that treat venue and personal jurisdiction share the common purpose of determining a particular forum, we conclude that they are in pari materia. Unlike the statutory provisions regarding venue, personal jurisdiction statutes expressly permit individuals [8] and corporations [9] to consent to personal jurisdiction. In addition, M.C.L. § 600.745(2); MSA 27A.745(2) expressly permits parties to contractually agree, in advance, to personal jurisdiction: If the parties agreed in writing that an action on a controversy may be brought in this state and the agreement provides the only basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, a court of this state shall entertain the action if all the following occur: (a) The court has power under the law of this state to entertain the action. (b) This state is a reasonably convenient place for the trial of the action. (c) The agreement as to the place of the action is not obtained by misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other unconscionable means. (d) The defendant is served with process as provided by court rules. Had the Legislature intended to enforce contractual agreements regarding venue, it would have included such a provision in the statutory venue provisions. Because the Legislature wrote such a provision into the personal jurisdiction statute, we will not assume that it intended to validate contractual venue agreements in the venue statutes. Therefore, we conclude that enforcement of contractual provisions establishing venue for causes of action that may arise after the contract is executed would contradict the manifest intent of the Legislature.