Opinion ID: 713017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prejudicial Spillover from Vacated RICO Count.

Text: 74 As previously noted, Judge Amon granted Vebeliunas' posttrial motion to vacate the RICO count at the sentencing hearing. Vebeliunas then argued that spillover prejudice from that count required that his other convictions be vacated. The district court rejected this contention, pointing out that most of the RICO predicate acts constituted separate substantive counts as well, and that the evidence regarding the remaining acts would have been admitted in any event because of their relationship to the overall pattern of conduct charged in the balance of the indictment. Vebeliunas reiterates this claim on appeal, contending that a good deal of the lawyers' arguments and evidence at trial was directed to the RICO counts, and that the racketeering allegations were compelling[ly] prejudic[ial], resulting in retroactive misjoinder. 75 We addressed this issue in United States v. Jones, 16 F.3d 487 (2d Cir.1994), where we said: 76 Retroactive misjoinder arises where joinder of multiple counts was proper initially, but later developments--such as a district court's dismissal of some counts for lack of evidence or an appellate court's reversal of less than all convictions--render the initial joinder improper. See generally, 8 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, p 8.06 (2d ed. 1993). In this Circuit, [t]o invoke retroactive misjoinder, a defendant must show compelling prejudice. United States v. Novod, 927 F.2d 726, 728 (2d Cir.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 919, 111 S.Ct. 2018, 114 L.Ed.2d 104 (1991); see United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 553-54 (6th Cir.1982). Prejudicial spillover from evidence used to obtain a conviction subsequently reversed on appeal may constitute compelling prejudice. See Novod, 927 F.2d at 728. 77 16 F.3d at 493. 78 We have subsequently specified that we consider three factors when a criminal defendant raises a prejudicial spillover argument. See United States v. Wapnick, 60 F.3d 948, 953-54 (2d Cir.1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 2, 1996) (No. 95-1003) and ___ V.S.L.W. ___ (V.S. Mar 21, 1996) (No. 95-8335); United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847, 855-56 (2d Cir.1994). We first examine the evidence introduced in support of the vacated count to see if it was of such an 'inflammatory' nature that it 'would have tended to incite or arouse the jury into convicting the defendant on the remaining counts.'  Wapnick, 60 F.3d at 953 (quoting United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 582 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 1637, 104 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989), and Rooney, 37 F.3d at 855). In the present case, there was little or no evidence pertaining to the RICO count that was not also admissible with respect to the remaining counts of the indictment, and none of it was particularly inflammatory. Further, the fact that it is a RICO count that was subsequently dismissed does not alone suffice to establish prejudice. See United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 65 (2d Cir.1983), overruled on another ground, National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994). We note in this regard that the district court instructed the jury that the term racketeering was only ... used by Congress to define the offense, and should not influence their determination of whether the guilt of the defendant has been proven. 79 Second, we must compare the evidence and facts pertaining to the dismissed count with that pertaining to the remaining counts and examine the degree of overlap and similarity between the two. See Wapnick, 60 F.3d at 954; Rooney, 37 F.3d at 855. In cases where the vacated and remaining counts emanate from similar facts, and the evidence introduced would have been admissible as to both, it is difficult for a defendant to make a showing of prejudicial spillover. Wapnick, 60 F.3d at 954 (collecting cases). As noted above, virtually all of the evidence pertaining to the RICO count was also admissible with respect to the remaining charges. 80 Finally, we must make a general assessment of the strength of the government's case on the remaining counts. Id.; see also Rooney, 37 F.3d at 856. Here, the testimonial and documentary evidence against Vebeliunas as to the remaining counts was very substantial. Thus, all three of the relevant factors weigh against Vebeliunas' prejudicial spillover argument. We conclude that his position lacks merit. 81