Opinion ID: 2156240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Graf and Lawlor

Text: Knabe prevailed for the next thirty years until a subtle modification occurred in Graf v. Taggert, supra, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A. 2d 140, and Lawlor v. Cloverleaf Mem. Park, Inc., supra, 56 N.J. 326, 266 A. 2d 569. The issue in Graf was whether the parents of a stillborn child, who suffered injuries while in the mother's womb, could recover under the Death Act. Graf, supra, 43 N.J. at 304, 204 A. 2d 140. The ultimate holding in Graf, precluding recovery for injuries to the unborn child, is irrelevant to our analysis. We look instead to the Graf discussion of when a wrongful death action can be brought and, also, the Court's scrutiny of the statute. Id. at 305-06, 204 A. 2d 140. The Graf Court observed in dicta that the language in N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1, more particularly, the phrase, such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain an action for damages, was not intended to preclude recovery when an injured party failed to bring a malpractice action. Rather, the statute should be read only to preclude recovery where the injured person could not have recovered because the defendant did not commit a wrongful act or the deceased's own conduct would have barred his right to recover. Ibid. (citations omitted). Lawlor reached the same conclusion. Lawlor, supra, 56 N.J. 326, 266 A. 2d 569. In that case, the decedent, while placing flowers on her mother's grave, fell into a hole and was injured. Id. at 329, 266 A. 2d 569. She filed a complaint against the cemetery charging negligence. Twenty-six months after the accident, she died from the injuries. After she died, the cemetery filed a third-party complaint against the hospital and the doctors who treated her. The plaintiff's representatives subsequently filed an amendment to plaintiff's original complaint to include the doctor and the hospital. Because the Court allowed the amended complaint to relate back to the time of filing, the discussion whether a wrongful-death action could be filed more than two years after the alleged malpractice was dictum . Nonetheless, Justice Jacobs, writing for the Court, examined the language of N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1, which provided: When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default, such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain an action for damages. Id. at 344, 266 A. 2d 569 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1). He then commented favorably on out-of-state authority that adopted the persuasive position that the statutory terminology `relates to the character of the injury, without regard to the question of time of suit or death.' Id. at 344-45, 266 A. 2d 569 (citation omitted). Graf and Lawlor thus shifted the focus from speculation about the Legislature's intent to the language of the Act itself, which Knabe had not explicitly addressed, and noted that many out-of-state decisions had interpreted that language contrary to the holding of Knabe. Graf and Lawlor strongly intimated, but did not determine, that the wrongful death statute does not require a viable personal injury action as a prerequisite to the filing of a wrongful death cause of action