Opinion ID: 4198423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the timeliness of the provo complaint

Text: ¶ 10 The Marziales’ complaint in the Provo court was rejected solely on the basis of a credit card error—the type of dishonored payment that both our rules of civil procedure and case law say does not affect the validity of the filing of a complaint. ¶ 11 We begin our analysis with the plain language of the rules at issue. See Aequitas Enters. v. Interstate Inv. Grp., 2011 UT 82, ¶ 17, 267 P.3d 923. Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure details the commencement of an action and states in relevant part that “[d]ishonor of a check or other form of payment does not affect the validity of the filing, but may be grounds for such sanctions as the court deems appropriate,” UTAH R. CIV. P. 3(a), and that “[t]he court shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing of the complaint or service of the summons and a copy of the complaint,” UTAH R. CIV. P. 3(b). Rule 5 states that “[f]iling is complete upon the earliest of acceptance by the electronic filing system, the clerk of court or the judge.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 5(e). Neither rule by its plain language requires valid payment for a complaint to be filed or accepted. In fact, rule 3(a) explicitly states the opposite—that dishonor of payment does not affect whether the filing is valid. ¶ 12 Despite the clear language of rule 3, the City argues that we should read into our procedural rules a requirement that filing fees must be paid at the time a complaint is accepted for the filing to be valid. The City points to Utah’s court fees statute, which 4 Cite as: 2017 UT 51 Opinion of the Court requires that “all fees shall be paid at the time the clerk accepts the pleading for filing,” UTAH CODE § 78A-2-301(1)(dd), and to language added in 2008 to rule 5 tying the completion of filing to the time of “acceptance.” The City argues that the use of “acceptance” in rule 5 and “accepts” in the court fees statute means that we should read the court fees statute’s requirement of payment at the time of filing into rule 5. ¶ 13 We rejected a similar argument in Dipoma v. McPhie, holding that rule 3 does not explicitly incorporate statutes— including the precursor to the court fees statute—that require payment of fees before court employees may perform their services. 2001 UT 61, ¶¶ 10, 13 & n.5, 29 P.3d 1225 (holding that statute providing that “all fees shall be paid at the time the clerk accepts the pleading for filing” was not incorporated in rule 3 for jurisdictional purposes). We reject the City’s argument that the court fees statute is incorporated in rule 5 for similar reasons. The use of “acceptance” in rule 5 and “accepts” in the court fees statute does not mean that those provisions must be read together in the way the City urges, which is to say, in a way that directly conflicts with rule 3’s statement that dishonor of payment does not affect the validity of filing. ¶ 14 Rather than requiring payment at the time of filing as a matter of jurisdiction, rule 3 provides that dishonor of payment “may be grounds for such sanctions as the court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the action and the award of costs and attorney fees.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 3(a). So while a party should pay fees “at the time the clerk accepts the pleading for filing,” UTAH CODE § 78A-2-301(1)(dd), dishonor of payment results not in an invalid filing but in court-determined sanctions, which may vary from case to case, UTAH R. CIV. P. 3(a); see also Dipoma, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 19 (stating that where “a litigant receives notice that his or her original payment has been returned for insufficient funds, the litigant must pay the required filing fee within a reasonable time to avoid dismissal of his or her action”). ¶ 15 Our holding in Dipoma squarely supports this conclusion. In that case, the plaintiff filed a complaint with a personal check for the amount due for the filing fee. 2001 UT 61, ¶ 2. The clerk of court accepted the check for the filing fee and stamped the plaintiff’s complaint “filed.” Id. But a little over a month later—after the statute of limitations had run—the check 5 MARZIALE v. SPANISH FORK CITY Opinion of the Court was returned to the clerk of court for insufficient funds. Id. ¶ 3. The plaintiff eventually paid the filing fee and served the defendant, but the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint was not filed until the plaintiff actually paid the filing fee and therefore was barred under the statute of limitations. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. ¶ 16 We held that “payment of filing fees is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for the commencement of an action under rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,” noting that a contrary rule “could potentially lead to harsh, unintended results, especially in the case of a check returned for insufficient funds.” Id. ¶¶ 15–16. ¶ 17 The City argues that the e-filing system’s status history showing “approved” and “receipt issued” at the same time it was rejected shows that the complaint was not initially approved and stamped “filed,” as was the case in Dipoma. But Dipoma’s holding was not tied to the complaint being stamped “filed” before the payment error was noticed. In Dipoma, the payment error, noticed after filing, did not undo the validity of the filing; here, the error was noticed before (or at the same time as, according to the e-filing status history) the clerk’s rejection and cannot serve as a basis to find the filing untimely. Dipoma’s holding—that payment of filing fees is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid filing— does not depend on when the error is discovered. ¶ 18 We therefore hold that the dishonor of the credit card payment did not affect the validity of the filing for the Provo complaint.2 2 We need not decide at which point in time the Marziales’ complaint was accepted by the court’s e-filing system. The e-filing system indicates that at some point—either before or contemporaneous to the e-filing system’s rejection—the Marziales’ complaint was “approved.” Given that the filing was approved at some point, a dishonor of payment cannot form the basis for a rejection of the filing. We pause to note, however, that we may have reached a different conclusion regarding whether a filing occurred if the City had established that the complaint had never been accepted. But it was the City’s burden to demonstrate (cont.) 6 Cite as: 2017 UT 51 Opinion of the Court