Opinion ID: 799010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentencing Enhancement for Possession of a Firearm

Text: All three defendants argue on appeal that the district court erred by imposing a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of the .22-caliber Colt revolver that officers found in the basement of the residence. [4] The defendants deny knowledge of the gun and argue that the enhancement cannot be applied for possession of a gun that they did not know existed. For § 2D1.1(b)(1) to apply, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the gun was possessed and (2) it was not clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the drug offense. United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir.2010). To prove that the firearm was `possessed,' the government need not prove ownership of either the weapon or the premises on which it is found for a § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement to apply. Id. at 879. Actual or constructive possession of either the firearm or the premises on which it is found is sufficient. Id. at 880 (finding constructive possession of a gun that was locked in a safe in a storage unit when defendant admitted placing the gun there and had keys to the unit and safe). We have found constructive possession where police found weapons after a defendant's arrest in a storage facility rented in the name of someone other than the defendant. Id. at 881 (citing United States v. Montanye, 962 F.2d 1332, 1347-48 (8th Cir.1992)). The government need not show that the defendant used or even touched a weapon to prove a connection between the weapon and the offense. United States v. Hernandez, 440 Fed.Appx. 522, 523 (8th Cir.2011) (unpublished per curiam) (affirming district court's finding that it was not clearly improbable that an unloaded gun hidden in attic above defendant's garage and wrapped in bandana and electrical tape was connected with defendant's drug offense when defendant stated that he kept it in the attic so police would not find it); see also United States v. Dunning, No. 97-1802, 1997 WL 415241, at  (8th Cir. Jul. 25, 1997) (unpublished per curiam) (finding no clear error in the district court's determination that it was not clearly improbable the revolver, which was found in a closet with the drugs and cash, was connected with the offense even though defendant professed a lack of knowledge as to the presence of the revolver). In this case, each of the defendants constructively possessed the .22-caliber revolver. Ruiz-Zarate and Guerrero-Ramirez were at the residence where officers found the gun; even though the gun was unloaded and hidden behind a ledge in the basement, Ruiz-Zarate and Guerrero-Ramirez could access the basement. In fact, Guerrero-Ramirez testified that they had been drinking all day, and officers found a number of beer bottles in the basement. Although Benavente-Zubia was not at the residence when officers found the gun, a neighbor testified at trial that someone named Ramon owned the residence. See United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 595 (8th Cir.1993) (stating that constructive possession includes dominion over the premises). Furthermore, [a] defendant convicted of conspiracy is properly held accountable for all reasonably foreseeable acts . . . of any co-conspirator taken in furtherance of that conspiracy. United States v. Brown, 148 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir.1998). The government presented evidence at trial that guns are commonly used in drug conspiracies to protect the drug that the defendants are distributing. Because the defendants were involved in a drug conspiracy, Benavente-Zubia could have reasonably foreseen that his co-conspirators might be armed. See United States v. Turpin, 920 F.2d 1377, 1386 (8th Cir.1990) ([T]he single gun may justify an enhancement of the sentences of both [co-conspirators], since possession of a gun by either would suffice to justify an upward adjustment of the other's offense level if it was reasonably foreseeable that one of them would possess a gun in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.). Nor did the district court clearly err by determining that it was not clearly improbable that the gun was connected to the drug offense. The gun was located in the basement of the residence, along with three plastic containers with marijuana residue, boxes of Ziploc bags, and two scales. Cf. United States v. San-Miguel, 634 F.3d 471, 474 (8th Cir.2011) (affirming the application of the enhancement when a revolver was found in a locked safe with cocaine). The fact that the revolver was unloaded when found by the agents does not weigh heavily against the district court's conclusion. Id. Nor does the fact that the revolver was on a ledge behind a wall covered in dust make it clearly improbable that the revolver was connected to the drug offense. Cf. Hernandez, 440 Fed.Appx. at 523. The gun was operable, and we cannot say that it was clearly improbable that it was connected to the drug offense. Ruiz-Zarate also contends that the district court failed to adequately explain its findings regarding the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. Ruiz-Zarate failed to raise that issue below, so we review only for plain error. United States v. Phelps, 536 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir.2008). There is no evidence that the district court plainly erred in its explanation of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. In explaining the sentence the district court need only set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority. United States v. Gonzalez, 573 F.3d 600, 607 (8th Cir.2009) (quotation and citation omitted). Regarding the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, the district court stated: The basis for that ruling, Paragraph 28 of the presentence says, During a search of the residence the officers located Money Gram receipts in the closet of the second bedroom. In addition, three large plastic containers with marijuana residue, multiple boxes of Ziploc bags, two digital scales, a Colt, Single-Action Frontier Scout, .22-caliber revolver, and a paper trash bag were found in the basement of the residence. Now, everybody understands that there were no bullets found, the gun wasn't loaded, but I'm ruling that it should be counted because it was there. . . . If there had been intruders and you or one of the other defendants or one of the occupants of the house wanted to try to scare or ward off the intruder, they could have pulled that unloaded gun and pointed it at them. So it was usable by whatever strange means, whatever strange purpose. It could have been used to protect the marijuana operation, so I'm going to allow the two points to stand. I might further observewell, . . . when a gun is pointed at someone, they don't have the luxury of deciding whether it's loaded or unloaded, and probably you could anticipate if you pointed it at a police officer, you might get shot. So it was usable in the drug trade, although marginal, but it still could have been exhibited in a threatening manner. I'm going to allow the two points to stand. The district court had a reasoned basis for its decision and thus did not plainly err in imposing the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement.