Opinion ID: 1092881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: were white's constitutional rights to confront the witnesses against him and to due process violated?

Text: ¶ 4. The trial court did not allow White to cross-examine Shedd, the State's primary witness and a non-party, about his prior felony drug conviction, ruling that the prior conviction did not relate to his veracity under M.R.E. 609(a)(1). [1] We find that White should have been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine Shedd on this subject. Under M.R.E. 609(a)(1), the crime which is the basis for impeachment does not have to involve dishonesty or a false statement. Also, White has a constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. See Young v. State, 731 So.2d 1145, 1151 (Miss.1999).
¶ 5. The trial court ruled that White could not impeach Shedd because White failed to demonstrate that the prior conviction related to Shedd's veracity. The trial court reasoned that, because White failed to make this threshold finding, further analysis under Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632, 636 (Miss.1987), [2] was unnecessary. Relying upon a long line of cases, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, before White could impeach Shedd, he must first have shown that the prior conviction related to Shedd's propensity for truthfulness. See Tillman v. State, 606 So.2d 1103, 1107 (Miss.1992); Pugh v. State, 584 So.2d 781, 784 (Miss. 1991); McGee v. State, 569 So.2d 1191 (Miss.1990); Saucier v. State, 562 So.2d 1238, 1245 (Miss.1990); McInnis v. State, 527 So.2d 84, 88 (Miss.1988); Bennett v. State, 738 So.2d 300 (Miss.Ct.App.1999); Johnson v. State, 723 So.2d 1205 (Miss.Ct. App.1998). ¶ 6. These cases are overruled insofar as they require the use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes to relate to dishonesty or a false statement only. Under M.R.E. 609(a)(1), crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year are allowed for impeachment, provided the court determines that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect on a party. M.R.E. 609(a)(2) pertains to crimes which reflect on a witness' propensity for truthfulnesscrimes involving either dishonesty or false statements. Therefore, the plain language of M.R.E. 609(a)(1) provides that, so long as the prejudice/probative test of M.R.E. 609(a)(1) is complied with, convictions resulting in death or imprisonment in excess of one year are admissible for impeachment purposes whether or not the conviction relates to the witness' veracity.
¶ 7. Unlike the federal rule, M.R.E. 609(a)(1) extends the probative/prejudicial analysis to all witnesses, including parties to both civil and criminal cases. F.R.E. 609(a)(1) shields only a criminal defendant from having his credibility attached with evidence of prior crimes. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (F.R.E.609(a)(1) was drafted and intended to authorize a judge to weigh prejudice against no one other than a criminal defendant). [3] The limited applicability of F.R.E. 609(a)(1) is based on the common law edict that a person convicted of a felony was not competent to testify as a witness. Gradually, this absolute bar was eroded to the point that a felon's testimony was competent, but was also subject to impeachment by evidence of his felony or crimen falsi misdemeanor conviction. ¶ 8. By its terms, F.R.E. 609(a)(1) requires a judge to allow the impeachment of any witness with a prior non-dishonesty felony conviction only if the probative value of the evidence is greater than its prejudice to the accused.  Green, 490 U.S. at 509, 109 S.Ct. at 1984 (emphasis added.) However, impeachment evidence detrimental to the prosecution in a criminal case shall be admitted without any such balancing. Id. M.R.E. 609(a)(1) extends protection from the prejudicial effect of impeachment with prior felonies to any party. However, we do not interpret the broader language of M.R.E. 609(a)(1) to extend equal protection to both sides in a criminal case, i.e., to the State and to the accused. ¶ 9. A criminal defendant is afforded greater protection than the prosecution via the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Jordan v. State, 728 So.2d 1088, 1097 (Miss.1999). Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution contains an almost identical provision, and we have relied on the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the confrontation clause, stating the purpose of the confrontation clause is fulfillment of the mission ... to advance the accuracy of the truth determining process ... by assuring that the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of a prior statement. Id. ¶ 10. Given the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to confront those testifying against him, we interpret M.R.E. 609(a)(1) as allowing full impeachment of prosecution witnesses without the requirement of a balancing test, except in extreme situations such as where the prosecution witness has a prior conviction that is both highly inflammatory and completely unrelated to the charges pending against the accused. Such a prior conviction should be analyzed under a M.R.E. 609(a)(1) probative/prejudicial balancing test. However, such is not the case presently before us.
¶ 11. In Young, we determined that the right of confrontation extends to and includes the right to fully cross-examine the witness [testifying against the defendant] on every material point relating to the issue to be determined that would have a bearing on the credibility of the witness and the weight and worth of his testimony. Id. at 1151 (citations omitted). In Young, as well as in the case before us, the accused sought to impeach the State's key witness with evidence of a prior conviction under M.R.E. 609(a)(1). Although the prior conviction in Young, and again in the case, met the basic requirements of M.R.E. 609(a)(1) inasmuch as the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, the impeachment was not allowed. See id. at 1150-51. ¶ 12. To deny the accused the right to explore fully the credibility of a witness testifying against him, is to deny him the Constitutional right of a full confrontation. Id. Finding that the trial judge in Young abused his discretion by excluding evidence of the State's chief witness' prior conviction, we reversed and remanded for a new trial with instructions to allow evidence of the witness's prior conviction for impeachment purposes. Being unable to distinguish the facts in Young from the facts in the case sub judice, we reverse White's conviction and remand for a new trial so that White may introduce evidence of Shedd's prior felony drug conviction for impeachment purposes.