Opinion ID: 2567114
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Heading: Interpretation of section 366.21, subdivision (e)

Text: California has a comprehensive statutory scheme establishing procedures for the juvenile court to follow when and after a child is removed from the home for the child's welfare. (§ 300 et seq.; [citation].) `The objective of the dependency scheme is to protect abused or neglected children and those at substantial risk thereof and to provide permanent, stable homes if those children cannot be returned home within a prescribed period of time.' [Citation.] When the child is removed from the home, the court first attempts, for a specified period of time, to reunify the family. ( In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 71 P.3d 787.) If, after the specified time period has expired, the efforts to reunify the family have failed, `the court must terminate reunification efforts and set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. (§ 366.21, subd. (g).)' ( Ibid. ) The hearing under section 366.26 is called a permanency planning hearing. ( In re Celine R., supra, at p. 52, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 71 P.3d 787.) In this case, the court terminated reunification efforts and scheduled a permanency planning hearing. The permanency planning hearing does not necessarily result in a loss of parental rights, but it very often does. ( In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 52-53, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 71 P.3d 787.) Accordingly, terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing has potentially serious consequences for a parent. The issue here is whether the specified period of time in which the court must provide reunification services had expired before the court set the permanency planning hearing. Mother contends she was entitled to an additional six months of services. This is a question of statutory interpretation. Generally, subject to certain exceptions not relevant here that can extend the time period, if, as here, the child is over three years of age when removed from the home, the reunification period shall not exceed 12 months. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1).) [4] The court is also required to review the status of the child at least once every six months after the initial dispositional hearing until the matter is finally resolved. (§ 366, subd. (a)(1).) The initial six-month review hearing in this case was the one begun on June 22, then continued to July 13 and finally to July 15. Section 366.21, subdivision (e), governs this initial six-month review hearing. The fifth paragraph of that subdivision is critical here and gives rise to the present legal dispute. It provides: If the child was removed initially under subdivision (g) of Section 300 and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the whereabouts of the parent are still unknown, or the parent has failed to contact and visit the child, the court may schedule a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 within 120 days. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has been convicted of a felony indicating parental unfitness, the court may schedule a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 within 120 days. This paragraph was interpreted in In re Monique S. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 677, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 863 ( Monique S. ). In that case, the child was initially removed from the mother under subdivision (b), but not subdivision (g), of section 300. The mother, like mother here, argued that section 366.21, subdivision (e), permitted the court to terminate reunification services after six months of no parental contact only for those children initially removed under subdivision (g) (the parent's whereabouts are unknown). ( Monique S., supra, at p. 682, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 863.) The court disagreed: We interpret the Legislature's placement of the comma after the word `unknown' to create an additional ground for setting the section 366.26 hearing, where `the parent has failed to contact and visit the child,' regardless of the initial grounds for removal. ( Monique S., supra, at p. 682, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 863.) The court found support for its interpretation in former rule 1460(f)(2)(A). ( Monique S., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 682, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 863.) The relevant subdivision of the rule has been renumbered, but it is still substantially identical to the rule cited in Monique S. Today, as relevant, it provides that the court may set the permanency planning hearing at the initial six-month review hearing if: (A) the child was removed under section 300(g) and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's whereabouts are still unknown; or [¶] (B) the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has not had contact with the child for six months; or [¶] (C) the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has been convicted of a felony indicating parental unfitness.... (Rule 1460(f)(1).) The Monique S. court noted that the [r]ules relating to the juvenile court are `designed to implement the purposes of the juvenile court law by promoting uniformity in practice and procedure and by providing guidance to judges, referees, attorneys ... and others participating in the juvenile court.' (Rule 1400(b).) `Insofar as these rules are substantially the same as existing statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter, these rules shall be construed as restatements of those statutes.... [¶] Insofar as these rules may add to existing statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter, these rules shall be construed so as to implement the purposes of the juvenile court law.' (Rule 1400(c)(1) & (2).) We conclude rule 1460(f)(2)(A) restates section 366.21, subdivision (e), providing three discrete grounds for setting a selection and implementation hearing after six months. ( Monique S., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 682, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 863.) The court found its interpretation allowing the selection and implementation hearing to be set after six months of a parent's failure to contact and visit a child is consistent with the intent of the dependency scheme to provide stability for abused, neglected and exploited minors. There is no purpose served in continuing to offer services where a parent, absent extenuating circumstances, makes no effort to reach out to his or her child for six months in the dependency process. ( Id. at pp. 682-683, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 863.) The Monique S. opinion was followed, albeit without independent analysis, in In re Tameka M. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1747, 1754, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, and cited with approval in dicta in In re David H. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 368, 386, footnote 11, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 313. The Court of Appeal in this case disagreed with Monique S. It concluded that the Legislature tied parental failure to visit or contact the child with a prior adjudication of abandonment. We believe our interpretation is sound both structurally and logically. For example, if we read the phrase `or the parent has failed to contact and visit the child' as standing apart from a previous adjudication under section 300, subdivision (g), it would then also stand apart from the requirement of a finding under clear and convincing evidence, a result which makes no sense. Furthermore, it is not reasonable to assume the Legislature meant that a failure to contact and visit the child alone is an independent ground for advancing directly to the section 366.26 hearing when it carefully enumerated a second ground, conviction of a felony indicating parental unfitness, in a separate sentence and indicated that finding must be made by clear and convincing evidence. [¶] Therefore, we interpret section 366.21, subdivision (e) as establishing only two situations where the court can schedule a section 366.26 hearing at the six-month review: (1) when the child has been removed under section 300, subdivision (g) and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence the whereabouts of the parent is still unknown or the parent has failed to contact and visit the child; or (2) when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence the parent been convicted of a felony indicating parental unfitness. Either of these circumstances reasonably justifies accelerating the section 366.26 hearing. Although the statute can be read as the Court of Appeal did here, over 15 years have passed since rule 1460 was promulgated, and 12 years have passed since Monique S. interpreted the statute. For several reasons, we conclude that we should not abruptly change the rule and this interpretation. Rule 1460(f)(1) is unambiguous. The Judicial Council adopted the rule pursuant to its constitutional and statutory authority to adopt rules for court administration, practice, and procedure, not inconsistent with statute. (Rule 1400(b).) The Legislature has specifically directed the Judicial Council to establish rules governing practice and procedure in the juvenile court not inconsistent with law. (§ 265.) The rules have the force of statute to the extent that they are not inconsistent with legislative enactments and constitutional provisions. ( In re Richard S. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 857, 863, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 819 P.2d 843.) Ultimately, the interpretation of a statute is a legal question for the courts to decide, and an administrative agency's interpretation is not binding. ( Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 660, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) Certainly the Judicial Council's interpretation of a statute, as reflected in the Rules of Court, is not binding on the courts, and we will invalidate a rule if it is contrary to statute. ( People v. Hall (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 960-961, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 883 P.2d 974.) But we have also said that when a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, we will consider an administrative interpretation of the statute that is reasonably contemporaneous with its adoption. ( Robinson v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 226, 234, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 825 P.2d 767.) `Consistent administrative construction of a statute over many years, particularly when it originated with those charged with putting the statutory machinery into effect, is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.' ( Ibid.; see also Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557, 568, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296.) Courts have given similar deference to rules of court that the Judicial Council has promulgated. In Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1994) 8 Cal.4th 630, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 641, 882 P.2d 358, we considered a constitutional provision that was construed in a rule of court. We said that past or contemporaneous interpretation by an administrative entity ... of a constitutional provision it is charged with implementing, is accorded considerable weight [citation], and courts generally will not depart from such construction unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized. [Citations.] The Judicial Council, as an independent agency charged with a specialized and focused task of promulgating rules ..., is the entity `presumably equipped or informed by experience' to perform such task, and whose findings warrant deferential treatment by the court. ( Id. at pp. 657-658, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 641, 882 P.2d 358; see also Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1, 4, 260 Cal.Rptr. 253; Zenker-Felt Imports v. Malloy (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 713, 720, 171 Cal.Rptr. 482 [Judicial Council's interpretation of the statutory term `the time of the trial' is consequently to be accorded the benefit of the familiar rule that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to `great weight' unless it is `clearly erroneous or unauthorized'].) In Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031 ( Yamaha ), we considered in detail how much weight courts should give to administrative rules. We recognized the existence of two distinct categories of rules: quasi-legislative and interpretive. Quasi-legislative rules are those that the agency promulgates as part of the lawmaking power the Legislature has delegated to it. Judicial review of these rules is very limited. ( Id. at pp. 10-11, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031.) Rules that interpret a statute receive less judicial deference. Unlike quasi-legislative rules, an agency's interpretation does not implicate the exercise of a delegated lawmaking power; instead, it represents the agency's view of the statute's legal meaning and effect, questions lying within the constitutional domain of the courts. But because the agency will often be interpreting a statute within its administrative jurisdiction, it may possess special familiarity with satellite legal and regulatory issues. It is this `expertise,' expressed as an interpretation ..., that is the source of the presumptive value of the agency's views. An important corollary of agency interpretations, however, is their diminished power to bind. Because an interpretation is an agency's legal opinion, however `expert,' rather than the exercise of a delegated legislative power to make law, it commands a commensurably lesser degree of judicial deference. ( Id. at p. 11, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031.) The rules of court that the Judicial Council adopts can fall into either category; some rules are genuine lawmaking and some are interpretive. The rule at issue here (rule 1460(f)(1)) falls within the second category; it effectively interprets section 366.21, subdivision (e). So this rule is entitled to a lesser degree of judicial deference than a rule that comes within the agency's delegated legislative power to make law. But it is still entitled to some deference. In such a case, `the judiciary, although taking ultimate responsibility for the construction of the statute, accords great weight and respect to the administrative construction.' ( Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 12, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031.) How much weight to give such a rule is  situational  and depends on a number of factors. ( Ibid. ) Factors to consider are whether the administrative interpretation is `contained in a regulation adopted after public notice and comment [rather than one] contained in an advice letter prepared by a single staff member'; whether the interpretation is long-standing and has been consistently maintained; and whether the interpretation was contemporaneous with the legislative enactment of the statute being interpreted. ( Id. at p. 13, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031.) If an agency has adopted an interpretative rule in accordance with Administrative Procedure Act provisions  which include procedures (e.g., notice to the public of the proposed rule and opportunity for public comment) that enhance the accuracy and reliability of the resulting administrative `product'  that circumstance weighs in favor of judicial deference. ( Ibid. ) The Judicial Council's membership consists of appellate and trial judges, as well as others (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6, subd. (a)), so it is uniquely situated to implement the legislative policy. ( People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 713, 180 Cal.Rptr. 196, 639 P.2d 267.) It is charged, by both constitution and statute, with adopting rules of court. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6, subd. (d); § 265; see People v. Hall, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 956, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 883 P.2d 974.) Moreover, although the Judicial Council is not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it is an agency in the judicial branch of state government (Gov.Code, § 11340.9, subd. (a)), its process for promulgating rules includes procedures similar to those of the APA that enhance the final product's reliability. These procedures include internal review as well as notice to the public and an opportunity for public comment whenever the proposed rule is other than a minor or technical change. (See Cal. Rules of Court, tit. 6, Jud. Admin. Rules, rules 6.13(c), 6.20, 6.22.) The Judicial Counsel also has standing advisory committees that advise it in areas of each committee's expertise. These standing committees are directed to act in the best interests of the public and the entire court system. ( Id., rule 6.31(a).) Among the standing advisory committees is one on family and juvenile law, which is required to have members with a wide variety of experience and perspectives. ( Id., rule 6.43.) Rule 1460 was adopted contemporaneously with section 366.21, subdivision (e), and its interpretation has never changed. It was subjected to public comment and internal review. (See Judicial Council of Cal., Admin. Off. of Cts., mem. to Superior Court Com. of Jud. Council re Proposed Revisions to Juvenile Court Rules (May 2, 1989) pp. 2, 71-73.) The Judicial Council's Advisory Committee on Juvenile Court Law considered these comments and the proposed juvenile court rules, and ultimately recommended adoption of the rules, including rule 1460. That advisory committee had 21 members, including appellate and juvenile court judges, a wide variety of public and private attorneys practicing juvenile court law and representing varying constituencies, and others involved in the juvenile court system. (Judicial Council of Cal., Ann. Rep. (1990) pp. 11, 20-21.) All of these circumstances support the conclusion that the formal rules the Judicial Council adopts that interpret a statute, including rule 1460, are entitled to a measure of judicial deference. Accordingly, rule 1460's interpretation of section 366.21, subdivision (e), although not binding on the courts and invalid if contrary to statute, is entitled to great weight and will be overturned only if it is clearly erroneous. ( Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 657-658, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 641, 882 P.2d 358; Robinson v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 234, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 825 P.2d 767.) We emphasize that this is merely deference, not abdication. Statutory construction remains ultimately a matter for the courts. [5] Another circumstance weighing against overturning rule 1460(f)(1) and Monique S., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th 677, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 863, is legislative acquiescence. The Legislature has amended section 366.21, as well as other closely related dependency statutes, at least once, sometimes more than once, sometimes in response to judicial rulings, virtually every year since the Judicial Council adopted rule 1460 and the Court of Appeal decided Monique S. (See Historical and Statutory Notes, 73 West's Ann. Welf. & Inst.Code (1998 ed.) foll. § 366.21, pp. 401-403, and id. (2005 supp.) pp. 188-194; Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457-1458, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 118; Maribel M. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1469, 1471-1472, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 536.) The Legislature has been very active in this area of the law and has carefully watched judicial interpretations of these statutes. But during all this time, it has left untouched rule 1460 and Monique S. It has not substantially changed the paragraph from section 366.21, subdivision (e), that is at issue since its original enactment. (See Stats.1987, ch. 1485, § 43, p. 5631.) This is not just a matter of legislative inattention, which is often of little significance. In Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 973 P.2d 527, we refused to overrule previous Court of Appeal interpretations of a statute for similar reasons. During that time [in the course of judicial interpretation], the Legislature has amended California's statutes regulating competition numerous times, sometimes to overrule judicial interpretations. [Citation.] But it has left this rule intact. Legislative inaction is often not a convincing reason to refuse to change a statutory interpretation. [Citation.] Under the circumstances here, however, including the longevity of the rule and the unanimity of the decisions stating it, we believe it is up to the Legislature to change it if it is to be changed. ( Id. at p. 178, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 973 P.2d 527.) Here, not only has the Legislature failed to overturn a judicial interpretation, it has failed to overturn a rule of court (rule 1460) that the Judicial Council promulgated at the Legislature's direction. (See § 265.) Because the Legislature has specifically directed the Judicial Council to promulgate these rules, we can presume it was aware of the administrative interpretation, which makes its acquiescence all the more significant. (See Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 21-22, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.), and cases cited; Robinson v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 235, fn. 7, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 825 P.2d 767 [Because the Legislature authorized the FEHC to establish the system of publication in which precedential decisions are printed [citations] the Legislature now is presumed to be aware of the two administrative decisions on which the Court of Appeal relied, and thus has reason to be aware of the construction the agency placed on its own regulation.].) Moreover, we agree with the court in Monique S., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pages 682-682, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 863, that its interpretation of the statute is consistent with the overall legislative intent behind the statutory scheme  to balance efforts to reunify the family with the child's need for stability. The parent's interest in having an opportunity to reunify with the child is balanced against the child's need for a stable, permanent home. The parent is given a reasonable period of time to reunify and, if unsuccessful, the child's interest in permanency and stability takes priority. ( In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 851 P.2d 826.) It makes sense for the Legislature to permit the court to set the permanency planning hearing if the parent has not contacted or visited the child for six months. Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate. ( Id. at p. 310, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 851 P.2d 826.) Mother and the Court of Appeal claim the legislative history supports their interpretation of the statute. The Court of Appeal stated that any doubt that remains is readily clarified by express Legislative intent. Section 366.21, subdivision (e) was enacted in 1987 as part of Senate Bill No. 243 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.), a bill intended to establish a new structure for making permanency decisions. With respect to the six-month review, the Senate Committee on Judiciary stated `the new structure would allow a case to go directly from the 6 month review to a permanency planning hearing if the child had been abandoned or the parent was convicted of a felony which indicated parental unfitness.' (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 243, as amended Apr. 27, 1998.) We do not believe that this legislative analysis supports mother's position. The report is fully consistent with rule 1460(f)(1) and Monique S. Contrary to mother's argument, the report does not show that the Legislature intended to require that additional technical requirements for abandonment stated in different statutes be met. (Cf. Civ.Code, former § 232, subd. (a)(1), now Fam.Code, § 7822.) The author of the report may simply have considered allowing six months to pass without contacting or visiting a child to constitute a form of abandonment. A commentary noted that rule 1460(f)(1) and Monique S. do not require that the original jurisdictional finding be made under section 300, subdivision (g), before the court may terminate services due to the parent's failure to contact and visit the child. As explained, this rule recognizes that a parent can abandon a child whether that parent's whereabouts is known or unknown. Either way, the effect on the child is the same. (Seiser et al., Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2005 ed.) § 2.152[4][c], p. 2-293; see also Cal. Judges Benchguides, Juvenile and Family Court Procedures, Benchguide 103, Juvenile Dependency Review Hearings (CJER 2004 rev.) § 103.35, p. 103-47 [A court may set a [section 366.26] hearing at this stage [the six-month review hearing] when the parent has failed to contact and visit the child; there is nothing to be gained in continuing to offer services when a parent makes no effort to reunify with the child for six months and there are no extenuating circumstances], citing In re Monique S., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th 677, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 863.) Mother also argues the statute would violate due process if it were interpreted to permit the finding that the parent had failed to contact and visit the child to be based on some lesser showing than clear and convincing evidence. However, rule 1460(f)(1)(B) indicates that the court must make this finding by clear and convincing evidence. For these reasons, we reaffirm the long-standing administrative and judicial construction of section 366.21, subdivision (e), as permitting the court to terminate reunification services and set the matter for a permanency planning hearing whenever it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed to contact and visit the child for six months after reunification services have begun, whether or not jurisdiction was originally asserted under section 300, subdivision (g).