Opinion ID: 2633010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the district court properly awarded costs pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction over its own process

Text: ¶41 We next consider the district court's order awarding costs to Defendants pursuant to rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Western Water argues that if the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, it likewise lacked authority to award costs. In support of this contention, Western Water cites this court's decisions in Wall v. Dodge, 2 P. 206 (Utah 1881), and State ex rel. B.B., 2004 UT 39, 94 P.3d 252. We acknowledge the complexity of this issue but ultimately affirm the district court's award. [2] ¶42 District courts are courts of general jurisdiction. See Utah Const. art. VIII, §§ 1, 5; Baker v. Dep't of Registration, 3 P.2d 1082, 1089 (Utah 1931). As such, they maintain jurisdiction to consider all matters except as limited by statute or constitution, according to article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution. Under this broad jurisdictional grant, district courts maintain a certain degree of inherent power to properly discharge their duties. See Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) (citing In re Evans, 130 P. 217, 224-25 (Utah 1913)). The inherent power of the district courts allows them to consider and make rulings on matters respecting their own jurisdiction, such as whether the substance of a claim may be reached, whether an issue is ripe for adjudication, or whether a party has standing. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, a district court has inherent power to make, modify, and enforce rules for the regulation of the business before [it], . . . to recall and control its process, [and] to direct and control its officers, including attorneys and such. In re Evans, 130 P. at 224; see Citizens, 230 F.3d at 926 (Courts that lack jurisdiction with respect to one kind of decision may have jurisdiction with respect to another. . . . A court . . . always has jurisdiction to consider its own jurisdiction. (internal quotations omitted)). We accordingly hold that even though the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the merits of Western Water's Revised Plan, it appropriately awarded costs pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction over its own processes. ¶43 This court's constitutional authority to promulgate procedural and evidentiary rules reinforces our view that district courts possess inherent jurisdiction over their internal processes. Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, ¶ 11, 133 P.3d 370; see also Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4 (The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state . . . .). And these procedural rules provide additional support for the award of costs in this case. The award of costs at issue was made under rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for costs as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs, except when express provisions in a statute or rule dictate differently. Admittedly, the concept of a prevailing party generally connotes a party that prevails on the merits of the underlying action. Practically speaking, however, a party's jurisdictional victory may be as significant as a win on the merits because it materially change[s] the legal relationship between the parties and typically comes with all of the attendant costs. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Grynberg v. Praxair, 389 F.3d 1038, 1057 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Citizens, 230 F.3d at 929-30). Furthermore, rule 54(d) does not exclusively limit cost awards to the prevailing party. Rather, the district court maintains discretion to otherwise direct[] the allocation of costs. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). ¶44 Western Water cites both Wall, 2 P. 206, and B.B., 2004 UT 39, for the assertion that cost awards are inappropriate when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying substantive matter. Both cases, however, are distinguishable. ¶45 In Wall, Utah's territorial Supreme Court stated that a want of jurisdiction in the lower court, prevented that court from properly render[ing] judgment for costs, there being no statute authorizing it. 2 P. at 207. The court's concern in Wallthat no statute authorized the award of costswas alleviated by the subsequent adoption of both the Utah Constitution and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, Wall's holding does not apply here. ¶46 The circumstances of B.B. also distinguish it from the present case because the holding in that case relied on the limited jurisdiction of juvenile courts and the lack of any statutory basis on which the parties could invoke jurisdiction. 2004 UT 39, ¶ 19. In that case, the Hardingers had visitation rights under a preadoption order, but those rights were not memorialized in the final adoption decree issued to a second couple, the Scotts. Id. ¶ 3. The Hardingers sought an order to show cause, requiring that the Scotts appear in juvenile court to explain why their violation of the preadoption visitation order did not constitute contempt. Id. The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction and ordered visitation pursuant to the preadoption visitation order. Id. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to hear the claim, and we agreed. Id. ¶¶ 4, 12. Focusing on the fact that juvenile courts have limited jurisdiction because they are creatures of statute, id. ¶ 19, we held that an adoption decree is a final order that alters the legal relationship between the parents, the child, and the court, id. ¶¶ 14-16. [O]nce the legal relationship of parent and child is established, the juvenile court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the adopted child until new requirements for jurisdiction are satisfied. Id. ¶ 17. By operation of statute, the adoption order terminated the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the adopted child, id. ¶ 16; accordingly, the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Hardingers' order to show cause; id. ¶ 13. Consistent with this analysis, we also held that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to award costs. Id. ¶ 19. ¶47 Our holding in B.B. is distinguishable from this case because B.B. relied on the limited jurisdiction of juvenile courts. District courts, in contrast, are courts of general jurisdiction, with inherent authority to oversee their own processes, even when the merits of a claim are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ¶48 In conclusion, as courts of general jurisdiction, district courts have inherent authority to oversee their own processes and to make procedural rules. This authority extends to an award of costs.