Opinion ID: 3062214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Approaches in Other Circuits

Text: We are mindful of the fact that five other circuit courts have declined to apply Powell in this manner. Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Cook v. United States, 104 F.3d 886, 889-90 (6th Cir. 1997); Sylvestre v. United States, 978 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam); United States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Azis v. U.S. IRS, 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). We are hesitant to create a circuit split, but we have little choice because we are obliged to follow the Supreme Court’s holding in Powell even if other circuit courts have not. Four circuit courts have acknowledged Powell, but have declined to enforce the 23-day requirement as mandatory. These courts have taken two approaches. One approach (taken by the First Circuit) is to acknowledge that Powell requires the government to comply with all of the “required administrative steps,” but then to ignore the fact that the 23-day notice is one of the administrative steps required in the tax code. See Sylvestre v. United States, 978 F.2d at 26, 28. A second approach (taken by the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits) is to assume equitable power to excuse the notice defect if the taxpayer was not prejudiced. See Cook v. United States, 104 F.3d at 889-90; Azis v. U.S. IRS, 522 F. App’x at 777; Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d at 161. 9 None of these courts denied that the 23-day requirement was mandatory or an “administrative step” of the tax code. One other circuit court has declined to apply Powell when the IRS violated a separate notice provision: 26 U.S.C. § 7609(d)(1). Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d at 1065. Though the IRS violated the notice requirement, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed enforcement of the summons to avoid elevating “form over substance.” Id. at 1066-67. Though we do not lightly create a circuit split, we are obliged to follow Supreme Court precedent, even when it might be viewed as “inequitable” or as “form over substance.” In Powell, the Supreme Court expressed itself clearly: If the IRS does not comply with the administrative requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, its summonses are unenforceable. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). The 23-day requirement is mandatory and an administrative requirement of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, under Powell, we conclude that the district courts in the Western and Eastern Districts of Oklahoma were obligated to grant Mr. Jewell’s petitions to quash the summonses.