Opinion ID: 784716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of evidence of the eight-kilogram theft

Text: 9 Lillard's argument that Fed R. Evid. 404(b) prohibited the admission of evidence of his theft of the eight kilograms of cocaine is unavailing. Rule 404(b) prevents the admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove the character or criminal propensity of a defendant, but permits such evidence to be used for the limited purposes of proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. This rule is inapplicable, however, where the evidence the government seeks to introduce is directly related to, or inextricably intertwined with, the crime charged in the indictment. See United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1061, 1070 (9th Cir.1993) (Evidence should not be considered `other crimes' evidence when the evidence concerning the other act and the evidence concerning the crime charged are inextricably intertwined.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 10 Evidence of Lillard's theft of the cocaine was inextricably intertwined with the conspiracy charge. As we noted in Williams, [t]he policies underlying rule 404(b) are inapplicable when offenses committed as part of a single criminal episode become other acts simply because the defendant is indicted for less than all of his actions. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Lillard stole the cocaine from the very shipment that provided the basis for his involvement in the conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine. See United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1012(9th Cir.1995) (evidence is inextricably intertwined if it constitutes a part of the transaction that serves as the basis for the criminal charge). Telephone conversations among Duenez, Dominguez, and Hooper discussing the missing eight bundles of cocaine all identify Lillard as the driver of the December shipment. Lillard's subsequent admissions to Hooper concerning the theft provide additional evidence of identity, but more importantly serve to establish another element of the conspiracy, namely Lillard's knowledge of the contents of the illegal December shipment. 11 Moreover, the district court's admission of the evidence did not violate Fed.R.Evid. 403, which provides that even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Both parties agree that the trial judge did not engage in an explicit Rule 403 analysis, but note correctly that it is sufficient if a review of the record shows that the court considered the rule's requirements before admitting the evidence. See United States v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the court implicitly found that the disputed evidence's probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect because immediately before the court's initial decision to admit the evidence, [defendant]'s counsel argued repeatedly that it was unduly prejudicial); United States v. Ramirez-Jiminez, 967 F.2d 1321, 1326 (9th Cir.1992) (finding that the district court had implicitly evaluated Rule 403's requirements because the government's trial memorandum reminded the judge of the necessity of weighing probative value and prejudice). 12 In this case, Lillard's counsel specifically and repeatedly argued for the exclusion of the evidence on the grounds that it was highly prejudicial to the defense, and that the evidence ha[d] no probative value and[was] unfairly prejudicial under F.R.E. 403. Given these facts, we conclude that the district court implicitly balanced the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, and therefore did not abuse its discretion in deciding to admit the evidence. 13