Opinion ID: 2385408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeal of Robinson Service and Equipment, Inc.

Text: (No. 874 Pittsburgh, 1982) Robinson first argues that it should not have been held liable under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as it was not a seller of dump trucks within the meaning of that term in the Restatement section. Robinson claims that it acted only as an intermediary between George McClymonds and City Welding by installing the dump truck body on the chassis and cab it had sold to McClymonds. Robinson further contends that as the seller of the chassis and cab, it cannot be held liable for an injury which resulted from a defect in the dump body manufactured according to the specification of George McClymonds, which it merely relayed to City Welding on behalf of McClymonds. In Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. That section provides: (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. In Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corporation, 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975), the Court held that to recover against a supplier under a theory of strict liability requires, in substance, only two elements of proof: that the product was defective, and that the defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Robinson does not dispute the fact that the truck's tailgate mechanism was defective when the truck was supplied, or the fact that the defect was the proximate cause of decedent's injury. Rather, as noted above, Robinson urges that it was not a seller as defined in Section 402A. It has been held that the term seller in Section 402A is used generically to include all suppliers of products. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., id . All those engaged in the business of supplying products for use or consumption by the public are subject to strict liability for injuries caused by a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer of his property. Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736 (1977). The record establishes that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury finding that Robinson was liable under § 402A as a supplier of a defective product, which defect caused decedent's injuries. Robinson had been in the business of selling trucks for approximately twenty-five years at the time of trial. George McClymonds needed a dump truck with a chute in the middle of the tailgate and suggested that Robinson obtain the dump body from City Welding, which it did. Robinson then installed the defective dump body on the chassis and sold the completely assembled dump truck to Mr. McClymonds. Such evidence amply supports the conclusion that Robinson could be found liable as a seller under Section 402A. Robinson also contends that the lower court erred by instructing the jury that Robinson was invoking the defense that it was an occasional seller. [1] Robinson claims this was error because it defended on the basis that it was not a seller of dump trucks at all. We find that any arguable error in the jury instructions regarding the occasional seller rule was harmless. In response to a special interrogatory, the jury specifically found Robinson not to have been an occasional seller of dump trucks and the evidence fully supports that conclusion. The lower court's instruction could only have had the effect of permitting the jury to absolve Robinson of liability. Therefore, we can discern no basis for granting relief to Robinson based upon the court's charge on the occasional seller rule. We therefore reject the arguments and appeal of Robinson.