Opinion ID: 1446555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: McCoy's Title VII Claims

Text: Assuming a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies, [5] he may prove a claim of intentional discrimination or retaliation either by direct or circumstantial evidence. We analyze cases built on the latter, like this one, under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. [6] Under that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which requires a showing that the plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside his protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group. [7] To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) he participated in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) his employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. [8] If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for its employment action. [9] The employer's burden is only one of production, not persuasion, and involves no credibility assessment. [10] If the employer meets its burden of production, the plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of proving that the employer's proffered reason is not true but instead is a pretext for the real discriminatory or retaliatory purpose. [11] To carry this burden, the plaintiff must rebut each nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason articulated by the employer. [12]
The district court based its summary judgment dismissal of McCoy's race and sex discrimination and retaliation claims on her inability to demonstrate that she suffered a legally actionable adverse employment action. Without proving such an action, McCoy cannot make the necessary prima facie cases of discrimination or retaliation. [13] McCoy argues on appeal that the court erroneously failed to recognize that the City took adverse employment actions both by (1) creating a hostile work environment that caused her constructive discharge and (2) taking her gun and badge and placing her on administrative leave.
A constructive discharge occurs when the employer makes working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign. [14] In determining whether an employer's actions constitute a constructive discharge, we examine the following relevant factors: (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee's resignation; or (6) offers of early retirement that would make the employee worse off whether the offer were accepted or not. [15] This inquiry is an objective, reasonable employee, test under which we ask whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's shoes would have felt compelled to resign. [16] Even considering the summary judgment evidence here in the light most favorable to McCoy, we are satisfied that a reasonable employee in her position would not have felt compelled to resign. McCoy was not demoted, suffered no reduction in salary, and was paid in full for the entirety of her leave. She was relieved of her job responsibilities, but only at her own request, and SPD never indicated that she would not be reinstated to her previous position when cleared medically to return to work. She was not reassigned to menial or degrading work, and she never received an offer of early retirement. The only actions taken by the SPD in connection with this matter were (1) counseling McCoy against workplace horseplay and (2) retrieving her badge and gun and placing her on administrative leave. These actions, when viewed in the context of the circumstances surrounding them, were not calculated [by SPD] to encourage [McCoy's] resignation [17] and do not meet the established standard for a constructive discharge. [18] McCoy does allege that she suffered badgering and harassment by Sergeant Jackson and that SPD and the City permitted it to go unchecked. Such unremediated harassment may create a hostile work environment and cause a constructive discharge, but only if it is severe or pervasive and create[s] an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. [19] Whether an environment is hostile or abusive depends on the totality of the circumstances, including factors such as the frequency of the conduct, its severity, the degree to which the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, and the degree to which the conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. [20] Sergeant Jackson's conduct, even though undoubtedly offensive to McCoy, consisted of little more than occasional boorish remarks and childish horseplay. The district court correctly held that such conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment. [21] Moreover, at the time McCoy chose to retire, Sergeant Jackson had already left the SPD and posed no continuing threat to McCoy's mental well-being or work-place level of comfort. McCoy also acknowledged in her retirement letter that she respected and admired the Chief of Police and that, but for her health concerns, she would look favorably on the prospect of returning to work for the SPD. Based on the summary judgment record before us, we are convinced that McCoy retired voluntarily, not as the result of a constructive discharge. As no reasonable employee in McCoy's position would have felt compelled to resign, she was not constructively discharged.
McCoy also contends that the SPD took an adverse employment action against her when Captain Walker retrieved her gun and badge and placed her on administrative leave. We have historically held that, for all Title VII claims, [a]dverse employment actions include only ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating. [22] Under this standard, the district court properly held that placing McCoy on paid leavewhether administrative or sickwas not an adverse employment action. [23] In the recent case of Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White, [24] however, the Supreme Court abrogated our approach in the retaliation context in favor of the standard used in the Seventh and D.C. Circuits, which defines an adverse employment action as any action that might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. We must therefore analyze the effect of Burlington Northern on this case.
In Burlington Northern, the Court expressly limited its holding to Title VII retaliation claims: The underscored words in the substantive [anti-discrimination] provisionhire, discharge, compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, employment opportunities, and status as an employee explicitly limit the scope of that provision to actions that affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace. No such limiting words appear in the anti-retaliation provision. Given these linguistic differences, the question here is not whether identical or similar words should be read in pari materia to mean the same thing. Rather, the question is whether Congress intended its different words to make a legal difference. We normally presume that, where words differ as they differ here, `Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' There is strong reason to believe that Congress intended the differences that its language suggests, for the two provisions differ not only in language but in purpose as well. The anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees. The substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct. . . . . Thus, purpose reinforces what language already indicates, namely, that the anti-retaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment. [25] Even though our precedent recognizing only ultimate employment decisions as actionable adverse employment actions remains controlling for Title VII discrimination claims and therefore continues to justify summary judgment dismissal of McCoy's discrimination claims, [26] her retaliation claims requires a closer look post- Burlington Northern.
McCoy contends that, by retrieving her gun and badge and placing her on administrative leave, SPD took actions that might well dissuade a reasonable officer from filing a charge of discrimination. McCoy characterizes those actions as the functional equivalent of a discharge, because they remove the essence of being a Police Officer. The City, on the other hand, contends that SPD's actions, when viewed in context, do not meet the standard set forth in Burlington Northern. Specifically, the City points out that McCoy (1) voluntarily requested leave, (2) made troubling statements that raised legitimate safety concerns, and (3) was paid throughout her leave. As such, insists the City, actions like SPD's should not dissuade a reasonable police officer in McCoy's situation from making a discrimination complaint. In Burlington Northern, the Court recognized that arguably adverse employment actions must be viewed in context. [27] In this case, the record makes clear that McCoy did ask to leave work to see her doctor andpresumably acting on her doctor's advicenever attempted to return to work. There is no evidence that SPD would have placed her on administrative leave had she been able to continue working, or that SPD would have refused to reinstate her had she sought to return to work after her leave. The record also makes clear, however, that McCoy did not volunteer to surrender her gun and badge and did not designate her own leave as administrative: SPD made those decisions and took those actions on its own. As McCoy contends that those actions (and not her leave generally) constitute the adverse employment action in this case, we do not regard her initial voluntary request for leave as foreclosing her retaliation claim. We are satisfied that McCoy's troubling statements have no bearing on whether SPD's actions constitute an adverse employment action. In the next step of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, such statements could affect our assessment of SPD's motive for its actions, but they are irrelevant to our consideration whether McCoy's being placed on administrative leave meets the Burlington Northern standard for an adverse employment action. Similarly, the mere fact that McCoy was placed on paid administrative leave does not necessarily mean that she did not suffer an adverse employment action. Police officers are typically placed on administrative leave, frequently with pay, when they are under investigation or as discipline for wrongdoing. In such cases, the officers are indefinitely relieved of all duties and have little, if any, control over their reinstatement. Consequently, placement on administrative leave may carry with it both the stigma of the suspicion of wrongdoing and possibly significant emotional distress. Instances of administrative leave can also negatively affect an officer's chances for future advancement. Accordingly, we recognize that it is at least a close question whether SPD's placing McCoy on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse employment action under the Burlington Northern standard. We need not answer this question today, however, because even if McCoy could make the necessary prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation under Title VII, she cannot prove that the City's proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for collecting her gun and badge and placing her on administrative leave are pretextual. [28]
The adverse employment action allegedly taken against McCoy involved three separate acts. First, Captain Walker retrieved McCoy's gun before allowing her to leave work. Next, Assistant Chief Owens instructed Captain Walker to designate McCoy's leave as administrative, and Walker did so. Finally, Captain Walker took McCoy's badge. The City contends that Captain Walker took McCoy's gun because her comments about workplace violence and taking care of the problem herself raised legitimate concerns about her safety and that of others. The City further maintains that, because McCoy presented no evidence of any racially insensitive conduct by Captain Walker or Assistant Chief Owens, she has not raised a material fact issue whether the decision to classify her leave as administrative had a retaliatory motive vis a vis her allegations of racism in the SPD. The City does not proffer a motive for confiscating McCoy's badge other than that such action was necessary to satisfy SPD rules regarding administrative leave. McCoy contends that she has offered sufficient evidence that the reasons given by the City for SPD's actions are mere pretext for racially retaliatory animus against her railings about the treatments of blacks in the SPD. She primarily points to her testimony that Captain Walker was standing nearby when she complained to another officer about the SPD's mistreatment of its black officers. She also notes that Captain Walker informed Assistant Chief Owens of McCoy's comments when the two men spoke later that day. And, insists McCoy, even if Captain Walker legitimately confiscated her gun for safety reasons, such reasons do not justify his taking her badge. Essentially, McCoy contends that, because Captain Walker and Assistant Chief Owens (1) were aware of her complaints about SPD's treatment of black officers, and (2) took her gun and badge and placed her on administrative leave shortly after she made those complaints, a material fact issue exists as to whether the City's proffered legitimate reasons for SPD's actions are pretextual. We disagree. Close timing between an employee's protected activity and an adverse action against him may provide the `causal connection' required to make out a prima facie case of retaliation. [29] However, once the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason that explains both the adverse action and the timing, the plaintiff must offer some evidence from which the jury may infer that retaliation was the real motive. [30] McCoy has offered no such evidence. She had not alleged that either Captain Walker or Assistant Chief Owens ever engaged in any racially discriminatory conduct towards McCoy or any other black employee; neither does she present any evidence indicating that, under similar circumstances, white officers were treated differently than was she. McCoy's attempt to prove pretext simply by showing that the SPD decisionmakers knew of her complaints and took an adverse employment action shortly thereafter fails. She offers no evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that the legitimate reasons proffered by the City for confiscating her badge and gun and placing her on administrative leave were pretextual. Consequently, summary judgment dismissal of her Title VII retaliation claims was proper.