Opinion ID: 2775226
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the evidence was sufficient to support

Text: MR. JONES’S CONVICTIONS FOR MURDER AND AGGRAVATED ROBBERY ¶ 65 Mr. Jones argues that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to sustain his convictions for murder and aggravated robbery, 89 and he therefore asks this court to reverse the convictions. After reviewing the record, we hold that Mr. Jones has not demonstrated there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We therefore affirm. A. Mr. Jones’s Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting His Murder Conviction Was Preserved ¶ 66 We first address the State’s contention that Mr. Jones’s argument regarding the murder charge was unpreserved. At the close of the State’s evidence, Mr. Jones moved to dismiss the case on the basis that the State failed to establish the elements of the crimes. Regarding the motion to dismiss for the charges of 88 See Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ¶ 38, 267 P.3d 232 (holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate “that counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 89 Mr. Jones does not challenge his unlawful distribution conviction for insufficient evidence. 34 Cite as: 2015 UT 19 Opinion of the Court murder (count one) and unlawful distribution (count three), defense counsel stated, “I’m not going to address those rather extensively” because from “the evidence the Court has heard, . . . [the court] can make a ruling on [its] own.” Defense counsel then extensively argued a sufficiency of the evidence claim regarding the aggravated robbery charge (count two), and the State responded only as to that charge. The trial court denied “the motion to dismiss count two.” Defense counsel then requested the court rule on the murder and unlawful distribution charges, even though counsel admittedly “didn’t argue it but our motion would include” those counts. Without further argument, the court denied the motion for all three counts. 90 ¶ 67 We hold that Mr. Jones preserved his challenge to the murder conviction. “An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it].” 91 Mr. Jones moved for a directed verdict both after the State rested and at the close of all evidence, and his motion specifically addressed all three charges against him. Though counsel was brief, under the circumstances of this case, it is clear that Mr. Jones challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that identified him as the murderer because there were no other contested issues related to the murder charge. Thus, we determine that the court had notice of the claim and an opportunity to rule on it; therefore, the claim was preserved. We now turn to the merits of Mr. Jones’s arguments challenging his murder and aggravated robbery charges. 90 After the defense rested, Mr. Jones moved for directed verdict “with regard to all three[] counts.” Again, defense counsel stated, “I don’t think I will spend a great deal of time with regard to count one or count three.” Defense counsel argued extensively regarding count two, the aggravated robbery charge. The court denied the motion as to count two. Defense counsel again asked for a ruling on counts one and three, noting that “I didn’t argue them but I did make the motion.” The court denied the motion for directed verdict as to counts one and three as well. 91 Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 12, 266 P.3d 828 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 35 STATE v. JONES Opinion of the Court B. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Sustain Mr. Jones’s Murder Conviction ¶ 68 To succeed in overturning the verdict, Mr. Jones has the burden to “marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” 92 The standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence is “highly deferential” 93: “we will reverse a jury verdict only when the evidence . . . is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he or she was convicted.” 94 ¶ 69 The State charged Mr. Jones with murder under three alternative theories: “intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] the death of another,” “depraved indifference to human life,” and felony murder. 95 Drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, we determine that the State provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find Mr. Jones guilty of murder. Detective Knighton testified that Mr. Jones admitted to being with Ms. Brennan in her car on the night of her death and to buying and smoking crack cocaine with her. The autopsy report revealed that Ms. Brennan had ingested cocaine shortly before her death. DNA testing on cigarettes found inside the vehicle confirmed that Mr. Jones had been in the car. The director of the homeless shelter testified that the shelter records indicated that Mr. Jones checked into the shelter every night from February 1 to February 22, that he did not check in on February 23—the night of Ms. Brennan’s 92State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ¶ 22, 69 P.3d 1278 (internal quotation marks omitted). 93 State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 30, 326 P.3d 645. 94 State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 302, 299 P.3d 892 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Walker, 765 P.2d 874, 874 (Utah 1988) (“So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 95 UTAH CODE § 76-5-203(2). The predicate offense charged in this case for felony murder was robbery under Utah Code section 76-5-203(1)(s). 36 Cite as: 2015 UT 19 Opinion of the Court murder—and that he checked in again on February 24. Detective Knighton testified that he was never able to locate the coat that Mr. Jones claimed to have been wearing on the night he met with Ms. Brennan. Ms. Brennan’s mother testified that Ms. Brennan had left the house with approximately $200 in cash, but Ms. Brennan’s wallet was never recovered. Experts from the state crime lab and Sorenson Forensics testified that Y-STR DNA testing from samples underneath Ms. Brennan’s fingernails and the belt used to strangle her excluded 99.6 percent of the male population but could not exclude Mr. Jones. ¶ 70 Given the deferential standard on review, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to reasonably find all required elements for the crime of murder. C. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Sustain Mr. Jones’s Aggravated Robbery Conviction ¶ 71 We also conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict on the charge of aggravated robbery. “A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon . . . ; [or] (b) causes serious bodily injury upon another[.]” 96 ¶ 72 At trial, Ms. Brennan’s mother testified that Ms. Brennan often carried a wallet and that Ms. Brennan likely had about $200 when she left home on the night of her death. Detective Knighton testified that Mr. Jones stated that Ms. Brennan purchased the cocaine, but only used about $30 to make the purchase. Officer Van Wagoner testified that, in his experience, drug crimes are responsible for a substantial portion of crimes in the Salt Lake area and that robberies were commonly associated with drug crimes. ¶ 73 Mr. Jones argues that there are plausible alternatives to explain why the wallet was never found. However, in reviewing a jury verdict, we do not consider possible alternatives. Instead, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. We conclude that reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence presented support the jury’s conviction for aggravated robbery. 96 UTAH CODE § 76-6-302(1). 37 STATE v. JONES Opinion of the Court