Opinion ID: 1855796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Appellant's Prior Attempt to Poison the Victim

Text: Appellant argues that she was denied a fair trial when the court allowed the prosecution to elicit testimony that appellant had once tried to poison the victim. [6] Under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, [e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Minn R.Evid. 404(b). Character evidence which tends to show the strained relationship between the accused and the victim is relevant to establishing motive and intent and is therefore admissible. See State v. Flores, 418 N.W.2d 150, 159 (Minn.1988); State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427, 431 (Minn.1982). For such evidence to be admitted, the trial court must determine that there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the prior bad acts sought to be admitted and, further, that the probative value of the evidence outweighs any potential for unfair prejudice. Flores, 418 N.W.2d at 159 (citations omitted). We generally defer to the trial court's exercise of discretion in evidentiary matters of this nature and will reverse only where there has been a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Kelly, 435 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Minn.1989). While appellant concedes that Krebs' testimony regarding appellant's 1987 attempted poisoning of the victim may have been relevant to showing the relationship between appellant and the victim, she argues that the probative value of the evidence was out-weighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. The jury was aware that the poisoning incident occurred over eight years prior to the murder, that appellant was suffering from a major mental illness at the time of the poisoning attempt, and that there was no evidence that appellant and the victim had a strained relationship in 1995 or that appellant was suffering from a major mental illness at the time of the murder. Therefore, the trial court could well conclude that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger that it would cause the jury to make an unfair inference as to appellant's character. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Krebs' testimony.