Opinion ID: 2121934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: (third issue) should this court consider failure to charge sua sponte?

Text: The leading opinion on the subject of sua sponte appellate review is that of Chief Justice THOMAS M. KAVANAGH in People v Dorrikas, 354 Mich 303 (1958). There this Court although the error had not been properly saved, reversed a trial judge who had permitted highly prejudicial but unsubstantiated questions on cross examination, which seriously affected the jury's determination of the very guilt or innocence of the defendant. Chief Justice KAVANAGH spoke as follows: Ordinarily where no timely objection was made to the introduction of such testimony and no request to charge was made, this Court would not examine the points relied upon for reversal, and except under unusual circumstances we have no disposition to relax this rule. Nevertheless, as in a number of previous cases, this Court, in the exercise of supervisory control over all litigation, has often asserted the right to consider manifest and serious errors although objection was not made by the party who appeals. The inherent power of this Court to prevent fundamental injustice is not limited by what appellant is entitled to as a matter of right. People v Steeneck, 247 Mich 583 [1929]; People v Holmes, 292 Mich 212 [1940]; People v Kelsey, 303 Mich 715 [1942]. (354 Mich 303, 316.) My Brother Justice ADAMS in People v Farmer, 380 Mich 198 (1968) has spoken to the same problem where questionably voluntary confession was admitted without objection but later attacked after conviction in the following words: While this Court does have inherent power to review even if error has not been saved  People v Dorrikas (1958), 354 Mich 303  such inherent power is to be exercised only under what appears to be compelling circumstances to avoid a miscarriage of justice or to accord a defendant a fair trial. (380 Mich 198, 208). People v Allie, supra , in affirming the conviction without an unrequested charge on lesser included offenses declined to look at the unpreserved error  thereby not exercising the right to review the merits sua sponte. GCR 1963, 507.5 urged by defendant as authority for this Court to review on the merits sua sponte is not in point. Overlooking that this rule applies to exceptions not objections or failures to request, it is instructive to analyze the text of this rule: Exceptions unnecessary. Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the time of the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objections to the action of the court and his grounds therefore; and, if a party had no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made the absence of the objection does not thereafter prejudice him.  (Emphasis supplied [by defendant p 21 of his brief].) In the face of the above statement by the trial court and silence of defense counsel after the ambiguous dialogue between the trial court and attorney Jones earlier it is stretching the English language to say that the language in the record makes known to the court the action which he desires. The last clause of the rule certainly does not aid the defendant's case, because to say the failure to object is excused because there was no opportunity to object flies in the face of the record. This raises no fundamental injustice requiring sua sponte review. Incidentally, at this point it may be well to note that defendants do not always want instructions on lesser included offenses. Objecting to the inclusion of lesser offenses in the trial court's instructions [2] has come to this Court on appeal. This is presumably on the ground the jury would have more difficulty in convicting the defendant on the major charge and thus be compelled to give the defendant his full freedom. We note that counsel for a codefendant in this case speculated with the judge as to whether there were lesser proper charges in this case without making a request and in any event subsequently seeming to withdraw with an All right. Counsel for defendant Ronald Wynn himself never said anything about an instruction on lesser included offenses, so it is completely impossible to say what was on his mind, whether he read attorney Jones' mind and agreed with him, whether he reluctantly agreed with the trial judge, or whether he had a defense strategy all of his own. In any event, when asked if they wanted additions or corrections, all ended up saying they were satisfied. This Court does not imply the attorney for defendant Ronald Wynn did not want an instruction on lesser included offenses. It just points out that where GCR 1963, 516.1 is not adhered to, the record is too vague for proper appellate action. Finally, the jury verdict convicting defendant of breaking and entering with intention to commit felonious assault was justified. In the colloquy between attorney Jones and the trial judge it is clear that the judge had been persuaded by the testimony of the probability of a breaking (Too much evidence indicates the door was broken into) and of a felonious assault (There is plenty of evidence of that.). The trial judge was on the scene and had ample opportunity to weigh the testimony. Close review of the transcript fails to reveal any reason why the jury verdict should be overturned as a miscarriage of justice. Not only did the complainant Ruth Turner and Ernest Jackson testify that the door was broken in after having been securely locked by slide bolt from within, but the broken door was observed by two police officers and testified to. The testimony of defendants that they dropped in about midnight pursuant to a phoned invitation earlier in the day and that they did nothing but talk until Jackson lunged at White with a knife when White admitted hitting Jackson and disarming him and leaving shortly thereafter loses credibility with the police report of multiple abrasions and lacerations and bleeding mouth and nose of both Ruth Turner and Ernest Jackson and Ruth Turner's swollen eye. The neighbor Cora Brown's testimony of hearing a great commotion and White's calling Ruth Turner Get up bitch before calling the police and later seeing the three defendants running away also tests the credibility of defendant's story in such a way as to justify the jury's verdict. Defendant observes in his brief To avoid manifest injustice the courts have been willing to review charges to a jury absent either a request or an objection, citing People v Jones, supra ; People v Reece, supra ; and People v Lemmons, supra . But as we have already considered, none of these cases are in point as they apply to improper instructions rather than omitted instructions. To sum up, the Allie case and the facts of the instant case make it difficult to justify this Court's reviewing the merits of this case sua sponte.