Opinion ID: 2591946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jury InstructionsChild Endangerment

Text: [¶ 20] Baker's third argument on appeal is that the district court failed to adequately instruct the jury regarding the elements of child endangerment. However, Baker did not object to this at trial and, accordingly, on review when an appellant does not object to a jury instruction, this Court reviews the issue under the plain error standard, which states as follows: First, the record must clearly present the incident alleged to be error. Second, appellant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way. Last, appellant must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice against him. Six v. State, 2008 WY 42, ¶ 12, 180 P.3d 912, 917 (Wyo.2008). [¶ 21] At trial the district court gave the jury two instructions regarding the two counts of child endangerment and the elements of the crime (one instruction for each count, i.e., for each of the two child victims): Instruction No. 31 The elements of the crime of Child Endangering with methamphetamine, as alleged in Count Five of the Information, are: 1. From on or about the 1st day of February, 2006 through on or about the 20th day of December, 2006; 2. In Natrona County, Wyoming, 3. the Defendant, David Dale Baker; 4. Did knowingly and willfully cause or permit a child, to wit: [Victim I], born October 1, 1998; 5. To remain in a room or dwelling where the Defendant knew that methamphetamine was being manufactured. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty. [3] [Emphasis added.] [¶ 22] Baker insists that the instructions were flawed because a change in tense expands the scope of the statute and thus did not require the jury to find that the children were present at the time the methamphetamine was being actively manufactured. The statute reads that children must be present where methamphetamine is being manufactured. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405 (LexisNexis 2009) (emphasis added). Baker argues that the change in tense expands the scope of the statute and did not require the jury to find that the children were present at the time the methamphetamine was being actively manufactured. [¶ 23] Under the plain error standard of review, Baker meets the first prong by showing that the alleged error is clearly on the record. However, the second prong is where Baker fails to meet the standard. He cannot show that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way. The test and rule of law to be used when determining whether or not a jury instruction was proper regarding the necessary elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed. Butz v. State, 2007 WY 152, ¶ 18, 167 P.3d 650, 655 (Wyo.2007). [¶ 24] The Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions track almost exactly to the instruction used at trial in the instant case. The applicable jury instruction reads in pertinent part: ... Caused or permitted the child to remain in a room, dwelling or vehicle where the defendant knew that methamphetamine was being manufactured or sold. W.Cr.P.J.I. 44.05A (2004). The State argues, and we agree, that this is a compelling showing of the appropriateness of the jury instructions used at trial. [¶ 25] Moreover, the jury instruction mirrored the language of the statute. That the word is was changed to was makes sensethe jury was being asked to deliberate as to whether methamphetamine was being manufactured in the home between February 1, 2006, and December 20, 2006, which, at the time of trial, had already happened. Thus, the time in question was effectively past tense. Reasonable jurors, being familiar with the English language, would understand the instruction in accordance with the ordinary meanings and uses of the words. Butz, ¶ 22, 167 P.3d at 656. Because Baker failed to meet the second prong of plain error, we affirm this issue and conclude that the jury instructions used at trial were proper.