Opinion ID: 1831360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: retroactivity of $500,000 limit on general damages

Text: We find it unnecessary to consider at length the City's contention that the plaintiff's award for damages of over eight million dollars was excessive, for this reason: only the City and its primary liability insurer are being cast in judgment. The City has been released by the plaintiff for all damages in excess of one million dollars as discussed at the beginning of this opinion, and their primary liability carrier, Angelina Casualty Company, has no exposure over one million dollars. The appropriate quantum award is surely substantially in excess of one million dollars. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that a scrutinizing assessment of plaintiff's damages may well reveal that the district judge's award was within the mid rather than upper range of a legally permissible assessment. [10] See Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332, 335 (La.1976). Although the court of appeal did not disturb the quantum awarded by the trial court, it did impose a $500,000 limit on the award for pain, suffering, and mental anguish by retroactively applying LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(1). Socorro, 561 So.2d at 761-62 (citing Mullet v. DOTD, 539 So.2d 897 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 541 So.2d 1390 (La.1989)). Socorro asserts that the court of appeal erred in applying the statute retroactively. He is correct. LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(1) limits the recovery of general damage in personal injury awards against the state, or any of its agencies or political subdivisions, to $500,000.00. See footnote 1, supra. LSA-R.S. 13:5102(B) includes municipalities within its definition of political subdivision, thus placing the City within the purview of the statute at issue. [11] Enacted by Acts 1985, No. 452, § 1, the statute did not become effective until September 6, 1985. Plaintiff was injured on October 19, 1983. Therefore, his cause of action for injuries arose before the act became effective. La.Civ.Code art. 6 provides that [i]n the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretive laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary. Likewise, LSA-R.S. 1:2 provides that no section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so stated. We have explained that this general rule applies only to substantive laws. Lott v. Haley, 370 So.2d 521, 523 (La.1979). Thus, the question of whether LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(1) should be applied retroactively depends on whether the statute is properly deemed substantive or procedural. [12] LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(1) is clearly substantive as opposed to merely procedural because it has the effect of changing the law regarding the amount of damages recoverable in personal injury lawsuits. The very substance of the claim for damages, the amount thereof, is affected by the legislation. The statute here is just as clearly substantive as the one which was held so in Landry v. State, 495 So.2d 1284, 1290 (La. 1986) (LSA-R.S. 9:2800, a statute removing governmental units from the reach of strict liability under Article 2317). And it is even more certainly substantive than the statute held to be so in Graham v. Sequoya Corp., 478 So.2d 1223, 1225-26 (La.1985) (LSA-C.C. art. 1935 (repealed), a statute providing for attorney fees in the collection of promissory notes) and Cambridge Corner Corp. v. Menard, 525 So.2d 527, 530 (La. 1988) (LSA-C.C.P. art. 1732 (amended), a statute revoking the right to jury trial in cases under $10,000). We approve of Dubois v. State Farm Ins. Co., 571 So.2d 201 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1990), writ denied, 575 So.2d 367 (La.1991) and Hellmers v. Dept. of Transp. & Development, 503 So.2d 174 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 505 So.2d 1141 (La.1987), each of which held that the statute under review here (LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(1)) is a substantive law entitled to only prospective application. To the extent that the following Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal cases applied LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(1) retroactively, they are expressly overruled: Bernard v. State, through DOTD, 563 So.2d 282 (La. App. 4th Cir.1990); Mullet v. State, through DOTD, 539 So.2d 897 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 541 So.2d 1390 (La.1989). Likewise, we reverse the court of appeal in this case insofar as it retroactively applied the liability limiting statute. Socorro, 561 So.2d at 761-62.