Opinion ID: 3161556
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Access to Privileged Material

Text: Orme next argues that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise the issue of the State being noticed of and allowed to participate in allegedly privileged discussions and communications because the trial court’s refusal to hear his motions ex parte was erroneous.10 Orme asserts that there was no justification for allowing the State to be involved in the preparation of Orme’s defense and that the disclosure of these motions prejudiced him by revealing to the State information it 10. The State cites Jones v. State, 928 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 2006), to argue that Orme’s claim is procedurally barred because it should have been raised on appeal. Id. at 1182 n.5. However, that case involved a defendant using a postconviction motion to argue claims of trial court error that should have been raised on appeal. In contrast, Orme’s claim is being raised in a habeas petition where the very act of failing to raise an issue on appeal is the basis for the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Thus, Orme’s claim is not procedurally barred. - 24 - was not entitled to receive and from which it could deduce the defense strategy. However, Orme has not indicated any specific information within his motions that would have revealed any defense strategy, nor has he set forth any basis on which the trial court should have heard his motions ex parte.11 In addition, Orme has not specifically stated what information the State learned to which it would not have already been entitled under Florida’s liberal discovery rules. In a habeas petition, “[t]he defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.” Wyatt, 71 So. 3d at 112-13 (quoting Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 520 (Fla. 2009)). This requirement is especially significant here, where the motions in question appear to be mostly innocuous: requesting DNA testing of items previously tested by the State and requesting that the court order payment of expert witness invoices by the JAC. Such vague, conclusory allegations are insufficient to warrant relief on a habeas claim. Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 685. As such, we deny relief as to Orme’s second habeas claim.