Opinion ID: 2349621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Questioning of Police Officer

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the government to question a police officer to determine whether certain statements were made by Ms. Jeanette Brown, a testifying witness, or someone else. During the cross-examination of Ms. Brown, defense counsel asked her whether she had initially told police that she witnessed the appellant punch, kick and stab Ms. Butler. Ms. Brown denied so telling police, answering, I was not the person that told the police that. Defense counsel then sought to impeach Ms. Brown's testimony as to what she said she had witnessed by calling Officer Latania Nicholson. Officer Nicholson stated that Ms. Brown had told police that she observed Steven Anderson kick and hit the complainant, the victim, and also stab her in the back. After Officer Nicholson testified that she also interviewed a woman named Ms. Wood about the incident, the government requested a side bar during which it stated: It's the government's position that she [Officer Nicholson] is confusing these two witnesses. And I would like to be able to ask her what the person said. Appellant objected to such questioning on the ground that this witness hearsay statement of Ms. Wood is going to come in ... [and] is very prejudicial. The government responded that defense counsel brought this up. What I'm trying to do is not for the truth of the matter asserted... The court permitted limited questioning as to whether the report states that Ms. Brown claims that she observed what happened in the alley or if Ms. Brown agreed with another witness as a rendition of what happened in the alley. The appellant again objected on hearsay, prejudice and confrontation grounds, which were denied. [10] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the questioning of Officer Nicholson regarding Ms. Brown's adoption of another witness's account because the testimony was not hearsay. [11] If a statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it is not hearsay... and [its] admission [is] not an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Burgess v. United States, 786 A.2d 561, 570 (D.C.2001) (citation and footnote omitted). The officer's testimony that Ms. Wood said that was not offered for the truth of what Ms. Wood said  that she saw the appellant stab the victim  but to show that Ms. Brown did not make such statements. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 603 A.2d 451, 461 (D.C.) (holding that accusation that someone was a `snitch' was not hearsay because it was not offered for its truth, but to show that the accusation was in fact made), cert. denied sub nom., Jones v. United States, 506 U.S. 852, 113 S.Ct. 155, 121 L.Ed.2d 105 (1992); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65, 74 n. 21 (D.C.) (grand jury testimony was not hearsay because, it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to establish that an exculpatory lie was told to the grand jury, under oath), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 854, 119 S.Ct. 134, 142 L.Ed.2d 108 (1998). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the testimony as non-hearsay. [12] Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the line of questioning was not more prejudicial than probative  the questioning was to rehabilitate the government's witness, the other witness, Miss Wood, was barely mentioned, the government cut off any additional testimony regarding the other witness, and the government did not refer to the other witness in its subsequent arguments.