Opinion ID: 625170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: False Imprisonment Claim Against Gusman

Text: The jury rejected all claims against Gusman relating to Appellees' conditions of confinement and their inability to make telephone calls. The jury found Gusman liable for false imprisonment, however, which under Louisiana law consists of two elements: (1) detention of the person; and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention. [5] It is undisputed that Gusman detained the Appellees, and thus, the question at issue is whether that detention was unlawful. The only basis urged by Appellees that their detention was unlawful is Gusman's failure to release them when they were not granted a probable cause determination within 48 hours after their arrest. Under Louisiana law, a person who is arrested and in custody is entitled to a determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours of arrest. [6] If such a determination is not timely made, the arrested person shall be released on his own recognizance. [7] This statute tracks the United States Supreme Court's decision in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, [8] in which the Court held that a probable cause determination must generally be made within 48 hours to comply with the Fourth Amendment. [9] As Appellees were arrested at approximately 5:00 a.m. on Saturday, August 27, 2005, this 48-hour period expired at 5:00 a.m. on Monday, August 29just as Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast. Appellees had received no probable cause determination as of that Monday morning, but Gusman continued to detain them. Appellees insist that the 48-hour rule permits no exceptions, but the United States and Louisiana Supreme Courts have indicated otherwise. In Riverside, the United States Supreme Court stated that if a probable cause determination is not made within 48 hours, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. [10] Likewise, interpreting the relevant state statute, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Louisiana v. Wallace : In the absence of a bona fide emergency or other extreme circumstances, all persons arrested without a warrant for whom a probable cause determination is not made within 48 hours must be immediately released from custody on their own recognizance. [11] This statement constitutes dicta, as Wallace did not involve an emergency, but it nonetheless demonstrates that the Louisiana Supreme Court recognizes an emergency exception to the 48-hour rule. [12] Notably, the emergency exception in Wallace is worded almost identically to the same exception in Riverside, the decision that led to the creation of the Louisiana statute in the first place. It is therefore plain that both the federal and the Louisiana 48-hour rules contain an emergency exception. This aligns with common sense, because adopting Appellees' position that the 48-hour rule permits absolutely no exception could lead to any number of absurd consequences. Thus, in determining whether Appellees' detention was unlawful, we apply the emergency exception to the 48-hour requirement. Gusman maintains that his detention of Appellees falls within this emergency exception. He also contends that he is immune from liability for false imprisonment under Louisiana's discretionary immunity statute. [13] Appellees counter the latter point by claiming that Gusman waived his discretionary immunity defense in the trial court and cannot raise it on appeal. In particular, Appellees note that although Gusman raised discretionary immunity in his answer and in his post-verdict Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 motions, he failed to raise the issue in the pre-trial order or in his Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law. [14] Appellees themselves may have waived this waiver argument by failing to raise it in opposition to Gusman's Rule 50(b) motion, [15] but we do not reach that issue, or the discretionary immunity argument at all. Rather, we reverse the jury's verdict on the simpler and more direct ground that Gusman's actions fall within the emergency exception to the 48-hour rule. [16] The undisputed evidence in this case compels the conclusion that Hurricane Katrina was a bona fide emergency within the meaning of the emergency exception to the 48-hour rule. Indeed, if Katrina was not an emergency, it is difficult to imagine any set of facts that would fit that description. As the storm bore down on New Orleans, Gusman and his officers had to provide for the security and safety of approximately 5,800 of their own inmates, plus 130 more inmates who were transferred from St. Bernard Parish. [17] The officers planned to evacuate inmates vertically in the Templeman III building to higher floors, if necessary. They also stockpiled food and water in the Templeman III buildingon the first floor, unfortunately. OPP initially survived the storm without flooding, but this changed rapidly after the levees were breached. The water rising on the first floor of Templeman III quickly reached waist level, the generator went out, and food and water supplies were contaminated. The electronic system for controlling the cell doors ceased to function, and officers had to open the doors manually, whichfor some cells on the first floorrequired the officers to dive into the water to manipulate the locking mechanism. The temperature grew very hot, and the officers allowed the inmates to break windows for purposes of air ventilation. The officers worked for many hours with inadequate food, water, and sleep. After the arduous process of evacuating the inmates was completed, the officers continued working to evacuate other individuals who were stranded in the neighborhood. In light of this clear emergency, we hold that the 48-hour rule was suspended. Consequently, Gusman did not falsely imprison the Appellees by holding them without a probable cause determination rather than releasing them into the teeth of the storm on the morning of August 29, 2005. Appellees contend that they would not have received a probable cause determination within 48 hours of their arrest even in the absence of Hurricane Katrina, because the Municipal Courts did not operate on the weekends at that time. The jury, however, answered No to the following interrogatory: Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Sheriff Marlin Gusman, in his capacity as the Criminal Sheriff of Orleans Parish, had a policy, practice, or custom of deliberate indifference to arrested individuals' right to have a probable cause determination made by an impartial judge or magistrate within 48 hours of an arrest made without a warrant that was the moving force behind a violation of [Appellees'] constitutional rights? If Gusman had a general policy of detaining individuals beyond 48 hours without a probable cause hearing, even in the absence of an emergency, that interrogatory would have to have been answered in the affirmative. In that situation, the municipal policy would certainly have been adopted with `deliberate indifference' to its known or obvious consequences. [18] Further, the municipal policy would be the `moving force' behind the constitutional violation, [19] as there would unquestionably have been a direct causal link [20] between Gusman's policy and the violation of the 48-hour rule. But, as the jury answered No, and Appellees have not appealed that factual finding, they cannot rely on Gusman's purported policy of violating the 48-hour rule even in non-emergency conditions. Gusman's detention of Appellees was not unlawful because his actions fell within the emergency exception to the 48-hour rule. Thus, we must reverse the district court's denial of Gusman's motion for judgment as a matter of law. We thus do not reach Gusman's additional argument that the jury's verdict was internally inconsistent.