Opinion ID: 1872240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Challenge to Firearms Expert Testimony.

Text: Mason asserts that the court erred in overruling his motion in limine and allowing the testimony of the State's firearms expert, Bohaty. Mason argues that the court specifically erred by (1) putting the burden on Mason to prove the unreliability of the expert's testimony rather than putting the burden on the State to prove reliability and (2) failing in its order to give adequate analysis of its reasons for admitting the evidence. We find no merit to Mason's claims, and we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony. An expert's opinion is ordinarily admissible under Neb. Evid. R. 702, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-702 (Reissue 1995), if the witness (1) qualifies as an expert, (2) has an opinion that will assist the trier of fact, (3) states his or her opinion, and (4) is prepared to disclose the basis of that opinion on cross-examination. State v. King, 269 Neb. 326, 693 N.W.2d 250 (2005). When the opinion involves scientific or specialized knowledge, this court held in Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), that we will apply the principles of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) ( Daubert/Schafersman ). Under our recent Daubert/Schafersman jurisprudence, the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary relevance and reliability of an expert's opinion. This gatekeeping function entails a preliminary assessment whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Schafersman, supra . A trial court's evaluation of the admissibility of expert opinion testimony is essentially a four-step process. State v. Tolliver, 268 Neb. 920, 689 N.W.2d 567 (2004). The court must first determine whether the witness is qualified to testify as an expert. It must examine whether the witness is qualified as an expert by his or her knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education. If it is necessary for the court to conduct a Daubert analysis, then the court must determine whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the expert testimony is scientifically valid and reliable. To aid the court in its evaluation, the court may consider several factors, including but not limited to whether the reasoning or methodology has been tested and has general acceptance within the relevant scientific community. Once the reasoning or methodology has been found to be reliable, the court must determine whether the methodology was properly applied to the facts in issue. In making this determination, the court may examine the evidence to determine whether the methodology was properly applied and whether the protocols were followed to ensure that the tests were performed properly. Finally, the court determines whether the expert evidence and the opinions related thereto are more probative than prejudicial, as required under Neb. Evid. R. 403, Neb.Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 1995). Tolliver, supra . Mason's arguments on appeal with regard to admission of the firearms expert testimony appear to focus mainly on the second step of this process, in which the court conducts a Daubert analysis to determine whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the expert testimony is scientifically valid and reliable. To the extent Mason challenges the court's rulings on the other steps of the process, we conclude that the foundation established by the State supported the court's conclusions that Bohaty was qualified to testify as a firearms expert, that the methodologies used by Bohaty could be applied to the evidence in this case, and that Bohaty's testimony was more probative than prejudicial. Regarding Mason's challenges to the trial court's Daubert analysis, we note that the substance of Bohaty's testimony involved opinions he developed based on his examination of the casings and bullets related to the King shooting and, in particular, his examination of the markings on the bullets. From this examination, Bohaty was able to testify to his opinions regarding the type of gun or guns from which the bullets were likely fired. The Daubert analysis therefore was focused on the reasoning and methodologies Bohaty used to form these opinions. Mason first argues that the court improperly conducted the Daubert analysis by putting the burden on him to prove that Bohaty's methodology was unreliable rather than putting the burden on the State to prove that it was reliable. With regard to the respective burdens of the parties to a Daubert challenge, we have stated that [o]nce a party opposing an expert's testimony has sufficiently called into question `the testimony's factual basis, data, principles, [or] methods, or their application ... the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.' Zimmerman v. Powell, 268 Neb. 422, 429, 684 N.W.2d 1, 8 (2004) (quoting Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001)). It is thus apparent that the initial task falls on the party opposing expert testimony to sufficiently call into question the reliability of some aspect of the anticipated testimony. After the factual basis, data, principles, or methods, or their application has been sufficiently called into question, then the proponent of the expert testimony has the burden of showing that the testimony is reliable. See U.S. v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514 (5th Cir.2004). In the present case, Mason filed an initial motion in limine challenging Bohaty's testimony. The motion in limine was a general challenge which failed to specify the aspects of Bohaty's testimony that Mason asserted to be unreliable. In reaction to the initial motion in limine, the court ordered Bohaty to submit himself for deposition and ordered Mason to specify the inadequacies of the expert's testimony. The court thus aided Mason in sufficiently calling into question aspects of Bohaty's testimony. After the deposition, Mason filed a second motion in limine, in which he asserted, inter alia, that the reliability of Bohaty's theory and methodology had not been established, because he only provided his opinion as to such reliability and did not provide any documentation of testing of such reliability. Although in his original motion in limine, Mason had made general assertions regarding reliability, in his second motion in limine, Mason specified his objections to the reliability of Bohaty's testimony to the extent that he sufficiently called reliability into question. Contrary to Mason's argument on appeal, the court did not place the burden on him to prove that the expert testimony was unreliable. Instead, by giving Mason the opportunity to depose Bohaty and by directing him to specify his objections to Bohaty's testimony, the court was guiding Mason in meeting his initial burden to sufficiently call some aspect of the expert testimony into question. After Mason had done so in the second motion in limine, the State then had the burden of showing that the testimony was reliable. The State undertook to meet this burden by entering into evidence, in addition to Bohaty's deposition taken by Mason, the laboratory report of Bohaty's testing in this case and the bill of exceptions from the trial of Mason's cousin, at which trial, Bohaty testified to the same matters to which he was going to testify in Mason's trial. Bohaty's testimony at the cousin's trial included testimony which provided foundation with regard to Bohaty's qualifications as well as the reliability of the methodology he used to form his opinions. The burden was on the State to establish reliability, and in its order overruling Mason's motion in limine, the court determined that the State had met its burden. With respect to the court's order, Mason argues that the court failed to give adequate analysis of its reasons for admitting the expert testimony of Bohaty. Mason relies on Zimmerman v. Powell, 268 Neb. 422, 684 N.W.2d 1 (2004), in which this court concluded in a jury trial that because the trial court failed to explain its reasoning, the court had abdicated its gatekeeping duty under Daubert/Schafersman. Compare State v. Fernando-Granados, 268 Neb. 290, 682 N.W.2d 266 (2004), (extensive findings in nonjury case demonstrated gatekeeping duty performed). We stated in Zimmerman that a court adequately demonstrates that it has performed its gatekeeping duty when the record shows (1) the court's conclusion whether the expert's opinion is admissible and (2) the reasoning the court used to reach that conclusion, specifically noting the factors bearing on reliability that the court relied on in reaching its determination. 268 Neb. at 430-31, 684 N.W.2d at 9. We concluded in Zimmerman that the record included the court's conclusions, but lacked analysis. We elaborated, stating: The court should have explained why [the expert's] trial testimony was sufficient to show that [the scientific method he used] and the manner in which he used it were reliable. For example, if the court believed that [the method] was reliable because [the expert] suggested that it was widely accepted as quality software within the engineering community, it should have said so. 268 Neb. at 435, 684 N.W.2d at 12. In the present case, the court in its order gave reasons why it found that Bohaty's testimony was reliable. Although the court's analysis was not as extensive as might have been appropriate in a more complicated case, given the subject matter at issue, the court's analysis was adequate. In Zimmerman, we acknowledged that the Daubert model recognizes that a range of reasonable methods exists for distinguishing reliable expert testimony from false expertise. 268 Neb. at 429, 684 N.W.2d at 8. We further noted that the trial court has considerable discretion in deciding what procedures to use in determining if an expert's testimony satisfies Daubert/Schafersman  and that [t]he trial court's discretion further extends to deciding what factors are reasonable measures of reliability in each case. Id. The type of ballistics and firearms testimony that Bohaty presented in this case was not novel and is fairly routine in cases involving the use of firearms. Therefore, the Daubert analysis did not need to be as extensive as it might have been if the testimony involved more complicated, less routine methods of testing. In State v. Leibhart, 266 Neb. 133, 144, 662 N.W.2d 618, 628 (2003), with respect to a Daubert challenge to expert testimony regarding shaken baby syndrome, we stated: We note that the evidence presented at the Daubert hearing in this case was not extensive and consisted mainly of [the expert's] testimony and his reference to the relevant literature. However, the level of inquiry in a Daubert hearing may vary depending on the nature of the expert testimony challenged, and the inquiry in the present case was appropriate and sufficient. As we stated in Schafersman [ v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001)], Daubert does not require that courts reinvent the wheel each time that evidence is adduced. 262 Neb. at 228, 631 N.W.2d at 874. We noted in Leibhart that expert testimony regarding shaken baby syndrome had been previously admitted by courts in this state and that courts in other states had found such testimony reliable. We further stated: General acceptance is one of several factors that may be considered to determine the reliability of expert testimony. In this regard, we note that a reexamination under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), is most appropriate where recent developments raise doubts about the validity of previously relied-upon theories or techniques. Schafersman, 262 Neb. at 228, 631 N.W.2d at 874. Leibhart, 266 Neb. at 144, 662 N.W.2d at 628. Similar to the expert testimony in Leibhart, the type of ballistics and firearms testimony to which Bohaty testified in this trial has commonly been admitted in this state. See, State v. Jacob, 253 Neb. 950, 574 N.W.2d 117 (1998); State v. Kula, 252 Neb. 471, 562 N.W.2d 717 (1997); State v. Perrigo, 244 Neb. 990, 510 N.W.2d 304 (1994); State v. Carter, 241 Neb. 645, 489 N.W.2d 846 (1992); State v. Boppre, 234 Neb. 922, 453 N.W.2d 406 (1990); State v. Trevino, 230 Neb. 494, 432 N.W.2d 503 (1988). Expert testimony similar to that given in this case has been found reliable under a Daubert analysis in other jurisdictions. See U.S. v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir.2004) (stating that [w]e have not been pointed to a single case in this or any other circuit suggesting that the methodology employed by [the government's ballistics expert] is unreliable). See, also, U.S. v. Foster, 300 F.Supp.2d 375 (D.Md.2004), and cases cited therein. In a case involving a more novel methodology or a methodology which had been more significantly called into question, a more extensive inquiry and more extensive analysis and reasoning would have been indicated. Considering the nature of the expert testimony involved in this case, we conclude that the court's inquiry, analysis, and ruling with respect to Mason's challenge were adequate and that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Bohaty's expert testimony. See State v. King, 269 Neb. 326, 693 N.W.2d 250 (2005) (admissibility of expert testimony reviewed for abuse of discretion). We therefore reject Mason's assignments of error with respect to the admission of Bohaty's testimony.