Opinion ID: 1130921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First issue of each party) [1]

Text: As appellant recited, we recently repeated the standards for review of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in Wilson v. McMahon, 831 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Wyo.1992) (quoting Inter-Mountain Threading v. Baker Hughes, 812 P.2d 555, 558-59 (Wyo.1991)): `When this appellate court is faced with a JNOV question, we undertake a full review of the record without deference to the views of the trial court. Cody v. Atkins, 658 P.2d 59, 61-62 (Wyo. 1983). In determining whether a JNOV motion should be granted, we consider whether the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence there can be but one conclusion reasonable persons could have reached   . Erickson v. Magill, 713 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo.1986). In our review we consider the evidence favorable to the nonmoving party, giving it all reasonable inferences. Carey v. Jackson, 603 P.2d 868, 877 (Wyo.1979). A court should cautiously and sparingly grant JNOV motions. Erickson, 713 P.2d at 1186.' Appellant argues that one of the principal issues determined by the jury was the intent of the parties. However, the intent of the parties cannot prevail for enforcement of all contracts. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one (1) year from the making thereof is void unless the agreement is in writing and signed by the party to be charged with it. Wyo.Stat. § 1-23-105(a) (1988) (the statute of frauds). In his argument, appellant states that: It is the position of Appellant that the loan commitment or contract was at least an oral agreement upon which the specific terms and parameters are represented by all of the documents generated by the parties, and primarily the bank's records, including the important supplementation of those documents by the primarily unrefuted evidence of the course of dealing and practice standards which the Appellee bankers admitted to be bound. Such did not include any written obligation binding the appellee to finance appellant's business for more than one year in the future. Appellant himself so testified. The written agreements between the parties relating to the terms of the loans consisted only of promissory notes given to appellee by appellant. They were clear and unambiguous. Extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary their terms or determine an intent of the parties not expressed therein (the parole evidence rule). Kerper v. Kerper, 780 P.2d 923 (Wyo.1989); Lawrence v. Farm Credit System Capital Corp., 761 P.2d 640 (Wyo.1988). The district court properly granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the jury verdict was against the weight of properly admissible evidence. If the verdict had been allowed to stand and appeal was taken for error properly reserved on the basis of admission of evidence in violation of the parole evidence rule and of the statute of frauds, we would have to reverse and remand on appeal. The district court corrected the situation as it should. In its opinion letter, it said in part: When Mr. Ames signed the notes and security agreements he may have had an expectation or, more likely, a hope that the bank would continue to finance his ranching operation indefinitely into the future. In spite of his private expectations, that was not the understanding of the bank officers; there was no meeting of the minds on that issue. Such a provision is conspicuously absent from the contract documents. It was error to entertain testimony contrary to the parties written agreementI should not have admitted evidence which sought to vary the terms of the notes and affiliated security agreements. Construction of the contract is for the court, not the jury and only one construction is possible given the plain language of the contract documents. The[re] was no agreement to lend money beyond the term of the notes and by the clear language of the notes advances were subject to bank approval. There was no breach of the lending commitment nor was there a premature liquidation. Regardless of whether a demand to sell the herd was made (a matter hotly disputed by the bank) the fact is that no action was taken by the bank to force payment before the notes were due on December 5, 1989. In fact only partial payment was made on December 4, 1989 and the balance not paid (with the forbearance of the bank) for a considerable time after the due date. Moreover, any agreement to fund Ames' ranching operation for more than one year, as contended by Ames, would necessarily be unenforceable as violative of the Statute of Frauds. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to a judgment N.O.V. on the contract issue. Yet to be considered with reference to this issue is appellant's contention that the doctrine of promissory estoppel favors his position. Again, the district court adequately and properly addressed this contention. It said in its opinion letter: The Statute of Frauds problem is avoided under the plaintiff's theory of promissory estoppel. Reimilong [Remilong] v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461 (Wyo.1989 [1978]). In B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., [829] P.2d [809], (Wyo.1992), Case No. 91-123, decided April 10, 1992, the Wyoming Supreme Court extended the principle to the Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Frauds provision. In doing so it restated the doctrine [at page 5]: `Promissory estoppel is a doctrine incorporated in the law of contracts. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 90 (1981). Judge Posner has provided a considered and succinct description of the doctrine: If an unambiguous promise is made in circumstances calculated to induce reliance, and it does so, the promisee if hurt as a result can recover damages. Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 1986). Promissory estoppel is recognized as both a sword and a shielda cause of action and a defense. Equitable estoppel is a close relative, but it is a tort doctrine that requires proof of misrepresentation. Goldstick. [emphasis supplied]' The underscored language, quoted with approval by our Supreme Court, qualifies and clarifies in important detail the more general language of the Restatements and is of significance in this case. See also, Hayes & Griffith, Inc., v. GE Capital Corporation, ___ F.Supp. ___, 1989 WL 135246 (N.D.Ill.), Memorandum Opinion & Order, Oct. 24, 1989. In this case there is no evidence of an unambiguous promise. The years old statements attributed to a deceased bank officer that he would stick with Ames are too vague to form a basis upon which promissory estoppel could rest. Likewise (considered in a light most favorable to Ames), even if the loan officer made statements that the bank would fund his operation for the 1989 year such a statement does not meet the requirement of an unambiguous promise. In dealing with a similar situation the court in Hayes & Griffith said: `The statement is woefully vague. It was made in the context of ongoing negotiations, and it specified none of the essential terms of the transaction. It was thus not an unambiguous promise, as is necessary to stat[e] a claim for promissory estoppel.' Arguable a promise to `fund his operation' could bind the bank to continue to lend money to Ames indefinitely and regardless of the profitability of his ranch and regardless of the security he would be able to supply and regardless of his ability to repay the loan. It is not unambiguous, nor is it even reasonable. When contrasted with the clarity and precision of the written notes and affiliated documents which emerged as a result of the parties negotiations, it is clearly evident that the alleged statement is simply unenforceable and could not reasonably be relied upon by Ames in the manner he has asserted here. From a common sense standpoint, banks would be reluctant to renew notes even once, (1) if the renewal itself legally obligated them to make further renewals, or (2) if examination of the borrower's finances, budgets, etc., itself so obligated them, or (3) if a combination of both of these actions so obligated them.