Opinion ID: 1060398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: application of the standard in this case

Text: Applying this standard to the present case, the threshold issue is whether there has been a material change in circumstances occurring subsequent to the initial custody determination. See Placencia v. Placencia, 48 S.W.3d 732, 736 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). As the Court of Appeals has acknowledged, [t]here are no hard and fast rules for determining when a child's circumstances have changed sufficiently to warrant a change of his or her custody. Solima v. Solima, 7 S.W.3d 30, 32 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998). Nevertheless, the following factors have formed a sound basis to determine whether such a change has occurred: the change has occurred after the entry of the order sought to be modified and the change is not one that was known or reasonably anticipated when the order was entered, see Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Tenn.1975), and the change of circumstances is one that affects the child's well-being in a meaningful way, Hoalcraft v. Smithson, 19 S.W.3d 822, 829 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999). In this case, Mr. Blair asserts that material changes in circumstances are present due to his growing relationship with his daughter and to his purchase of a new home since 1995. As the Court of Appeals held in an earlier appeal in this very case, the development of a closer bond between parent and child is not typically deemed a material change in circumstances warranting a change in custody, because such a development is one that is hoped for in granting regular visitation, not an unexpected circumstance. See Blair v. Badenhope, 940 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996), perm. to appeal denied, Mar. 17, 1997. In addition, the non-custodial parent's purchase of a new home in a suitable neighborhood since 1995 cannot constitute a material change in circumstances because [c]ustody is not changed because one parent is able to furnish a more commodious or pleasant environment than the other.... Id. (citation omitted). Importantly, we do not foreclose the possibility that the development of a stronger relationship between a child and the non-custodial parent could, in combination with other factors, support a finding of a material change in circumstances. However, the record here fully supports the trial court's finding that Joy's maternal grandmother has provided her with a loving, stable home and a caring environment. Indeed, no doubt because of these encouraging circumstances, Joy has excelled academically and has become involved in a variety of school and church programs. Because Joy's present environment with Ms. Badenhope is not one that adversely affects her well-being in any way, the interest in maintaining a stable and successful relationship between Joy and her grandmother weighs against any custodial change at this point. Cf. Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 328 (Tenn.1993). Consequently, after carefully reviewing the record in this case, we are unable to say that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that Mr. Blair has failed to show the existence of a material change in circumstances warranting a change in Joy's custody arrangement. See Hass v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tenn.1984) (stating that the standard of review of factual findings in child custody cases is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. (citing Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d)). Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the lower courts not to grant Mr. Blair's petition to modify the previous custody order awarding custody of Joy to Ms. Badenhope.