Opinion ID: 2039996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statement to Psychiatrist

Text: Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony by Dr. Hann, a psychiatrist, who had treated Dorthy Wyss for smoking, weight loss and anxiety neurosis between January and June of 1981. The defendant contended that Dr. Hann's testimony regarding certain statements made by Dorthy Wyss would result in an unconstitutional denial of Wyss' right of confrontation. Dr. Hann's testimony was that Dorthy Wyss told him that she was living in fear of her husband and that she felt trapped and resentful in her marriage. The trial court denied this motion, finding that the statements to Dr. Hann were so inherently trustworthy and reliable as to overcome the confrontation issue. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr. Hann's testimony. The court of appeals held that the primary purpose of the right to confrontation, to ensure that the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis upon which to evaluate the truthfulness of the prior statement, was satisfied given that reliability inheres in Dorthy Wyss' statements to her doctor. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970), quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970). We agree. In State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 204, 325 N.W.2d 857 (1982), this court detailed the controlling legal standard to be applied in resolving the confrontation issue which is presently before us. We stated: There are two requisites to satisfaction of the confrontation right [when hearsay evidence is admitteed]. First, the witness must be unavailable. Second, the evidence must bear some indicia of reliability. If the evidence fits within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, reliability can be inferred and the evidence is generally admissible. This inference of reliability does not, however, make the evidence admissible per se. The trial court must still examine the case to determine whether there are unusual circumstances which may warrant exclusion of the evidence. If the evidence does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it can be admitted only upon a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. at 215. See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). Obviously the first requisite, unavailability, is satisfied in this case. The defendant argues, however, that the second requisite was not satisfied for two reasons: 1) the statements did not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception; and even if they did, 2) the statements were made under unusual circumstances which undercut their trustworthiness. We find that neither of these arguments has merit. The trial court admitted the statement in question pursuant to sec. 908.03(4), Stats., which codifies the long recognized hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. This section provides: (4) STATEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. The defendant contends, however, that the statements cannot be deemed to fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, as requird by Bauer and Roberts, because they do not come within the traditional scope of that section. According to the defendant, traditionally this section allowed a doctor to relate a patient's report of present or past symptoms only. See J. Weinstein and M. Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence, 803(4) [01] at 803-143 (1984). In support of this argument, the defendant points to the judicial council committee's notes1974, which indicates that sec. 908.03 (4), constitutes a major change in Wisconsin law. . . . W.S.A., Rules of Evidence, p. 467. The committee notes indicate that this statute expanded the traditional hearsay exception to permit a doctor to relate statements of the character or external source of the cause of the symptoms. Thus, according to the defendant this expansion of the hearsay exception is significant because it demonstrates that under the firmly rooted hearsay exception Dr. Hann's testimony would have been limited to recounting what Mrs. Wyss told him of certain fears which brought about her anxiety, not that the defendant was a causal factor in her anxiety. We reject this argument and find that the question of whether a hearsay exception is firmly rooted does not turn upon how long the rule has been accepted but rather how solidly it is grounded on considerations of reliability and trustworthinessthe very reasons for the right to confrontation. The rationale of the hearsay exception at issue here is clearly grounded on considerations of reliability and trustworthiness. Patients go to doctors to receive treatment and are thus strongly motivated to tell the truth. Weinstein and Berger, supra at XXX-XXX-XX (1984). The Federal Advisory Committee's note to Rule 803 (4), Federal Rules of Evidence, which is the federal counterpart of sec. 908.03 (4), Stats., points out that the guarantee of trustworthiness extends to statements as to causation by a patient to a physician. See Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d at R266. We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that a patient's statement to a physician, made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment, as to the cause or source of a symptom, meets the requirement of reliability for confrontation purposes, in the absence of unusual circumstances. Thus, the hearsay exception under which Dr. Hann's testimony was admitted is firmly rooted within the meaning of Bauer and Roberts. Our inquiry does not end here, however, because the defendant argues that Dorthy Wyss' statements to Dr. Hann were made under unusual circumstances which undercut their trustworthiness. Specifically, the defendant contends that Dorthy Wyss' statements were not reliable because: 1) she was being treated for emotional problems; 2) Dr. Hann had used hypnosis as part of his treatment of her and thus the statements may have been produced while under the influence of a hypnotic state; and 3) the evidence was actually evidence of bad character and was therefore unreliable as a matter of law. We reject each of these contentions. First, according to Dr. Hann, Dorthy Wyss was not psychotic or delusional but was suffering from an anxiety disorder. Dr. Hann testified that she was always in touch with reality. Second, there was no evidence that Dorthy Wyss was in a hypnotic state at the time these statements were made. In fact, Dr. Hann testified that Dorthy Wyss had ten sessions with him from January 30, 1981, to June 12, 1981, but that he used a formal procedure to put her in a hypnotic state only once, during her first session on January 30, 1981. The statements at issue were made during the June 12, 1981, session and no hypnosis was used at that time. Accordingly, neither of these circumstances preclude reliability. Finally, we reject the defendant's argument that the unreliability of character evidence has any bearing on the trustworthiness of Dorthy's statements to Dr. Hann. We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the defendant's argument confuses the issue of the reliability of Dorthy Wyss' statement to Dr. Hann with its inadmissibility on other grounds. That evidence of a person's character is excludable under sec. 904.04 (1), Stats., does not make that evidence excludable in this instance, for it was admitted to show that Dorthy Wyss feared and resented her husband, regardless of his character. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dorthy Wyss' statements to Dr. Hann. Accordingly, the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was not violated by the admission of this evidence.