Opinion ID: 3179273
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subsection (F) – “Issuing or Denying Permit”

Text: Evaluation of the second claimed basis for direct circuit court review proceeds in like manner. Movants argue that § 1369(b)(1)(F) does not justify jurisdiction in the circuit court because the Clean Water Rule is not an action of the EPA Administrator “in issuing or denying a permit.” Yet, in relation to subsection (F), too, the Supreme Court has opened the door to Yet, the Rule purports to be adopted under authority, inter alia, of section 311 (33 U.S.C. § 1311). 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,055. And subsection (E) prescribes direct circuit court review of any “other limitation,” in addition to any effluent limitation. It follows that the Rule, representing an “other limitation” as defined in E.I. du Pont and its progeny, and adopted pursuant to § 1311, comes within the scope of circuit court review under § 1369(b)(1)(E). Nos. 15-3751, et al. In re: U.S. Dep’t of Defense & U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Final Page 12 Rule: Clean Water Rule constructions other than a strict literal application. In Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193, 196–97 (1980), the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that an action of the Administrator “functionally similar” to denial of a permit is encompassed within subsection (F). If the “precise effect” of the action would be to deny a permit, the Court reasoned, it would be irrational to conclude, based on a strictly literal application of subsection (F), that the action would be subject to review in district court rather than circuit court. The Court recognized that direct review in the circuit court “would best comport with the congressional goal of ensuring prompt resolution of challenges to EPA’s actions.” Id. at 196. Addition of another level of judicial review, the Court observed, “would likely cause delays in resolving disputes under the Act.” Id. at 197. In conclusion, the Court remarked: “Absent a far clearer expression of congressional intent, we are unwilling to read the Act as creating such a seemingly irrational bifurcated review system.” Id. Here, similarly, the Agencies contend that the effect of the Clean Water Rule, operating in the extant regulatory scheme, is to impact permitting requirements, thereby affecting the granting and denying of permits. This is enough, the Agencies argue, to bring the Clean Water Rule within the ambit of subsection (F), because it too impacts permitting requirements. In support they cite a Sixth Circuit case, Nat’l Cotton Council v. U.S. E.P.A., 553 F.3d 927, 933 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. Crop Life v. Baykeeper, 130 S.Ct. 1505 (2010), and Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Baykeeper, 130 S.Ct. 1505 (2010). In National Cotton, this court held that subsection (F) authorizes direct circuit court review not only of actions issuing or denying particular permits, but also of regulations governing the issuance of permits. The court relied on authorities from the Ninth Circuit and D.C. Circuit stemming from E.I. du Pont and Crown Simpson. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 966 F.2d 1292, 1296–97 (9th Cir. 1992); Am. Mining Cong. v. U.S. E.P.A., 965 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1992); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 656 F.2d 768, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In fact, the National Cotton court noted that this more expansive reading of subsection (F) encompassed even regulations that exempted certain discharges from permitting requirements. Nat’l Cotton, 553 F.3d at 933. That Nos. 15-3751, et al. In re: U.S. Dep’t of Defense & U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Final Page 13 Rule: Clean Water Rule is, under subsection (F), a regulation that imposes no restriction or limitation is reviewable in circuit court, so long as it affects permitting requirements.5 Movants maintain that a mere impact on permitting requirements is not enough to bring the Rule within subsection (F). They contend the holding of Crown Simpson’s expansion of the plain language of the provision is really quite narrow and that National Cotton’s reading of subsection (F) is overly broad and even inconsistent with Crown Simpson. They contend the “precise effect” of the Clean Water Rule is not to deny any permit and that it is therefore not “functionally similar.” Movants attack National Cotton on several fronts. First, they contend the decision is not entitled to precedential weight because its determination of jurisdiction was summary in nature and devoid of substantive analysis. In support they cite Emswiler v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 691 F.3d 782, 788–90 (6th Cir. 2012), for the proposition that “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” based on “less than meticulous” reasoning should be accorded no precedential effect. Emswiler is inapposite. The Emswiler court used these characterizations in relation to an opinion’s careless characterization of a party’s failure to meet a threshold exhaustion requirement as depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. While the failure to exhaust impacted the plaintiff’s ability to win relief on the merits, the Emswiler court called it “less than meticulous” to say the failure to exhaust deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 789. The National Cotton jurisdictional ruling was not the product of carelessness. It is succinct because it efficiently follows the holdings of several other rulings—one by the Supreme Court—whose reasoning it implicitly incorporated by citing them. Granted, the Eleventh Circuit expressly declined to follow National Cotton in Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1288, rejecting the position that Crown Simpson legitimized direct circuit court review of any “regulations relating to permitting itself.” The court noted that, although the Sixth Circuit adopted that interpretation in National Cotton, it did so in reliance on two Ninth Circuit cases that had since been distinguished by the Ninth Circuit in Northwest Environmental, 537 F.3d at 1016–18. In Northwest Environmental, 537 F.3d at 1018, as in 5 National Cotton was followed in this litigation in Murray Energy, 2015 WL 5062506 at –6, the court noting there was no dispute that the Clean Water Rule will have an impact on permitting requirements. Nos. 15-3751, et al. In re: U.S. Dep’t of Defense & U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Final Page 14 Rule: Clean Water Rule Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1288, the court ruled that a regulation creating a permanent exemption from the permitting process could not have the effect of granting or denying a permit reviewable under § 1369(b)(1)(F) precisely because the regulation excluded certain discharges from the permitting process altogether. Yet, even if it be conceded that National Cotton said too much when it noted in dicta that the Ninth Circuit had construed subsection (F) broadly enough to include an exemption from regulation, the fact remains that the action here under review is not an exemption. Rather, both petitioners and the Agencies operate on the understanding that the effect of the Clean Water Rule is not solely to exclude waters from protection, but to extend protection to some additional waters. This extension indisputably expands regulatory authority and impacts the granting and denying of permits in fundamental ways. The later clarification of Ninth Circuit law noted in Friends of the Everglades does not, therefore, in any way undermine the authority of National Cotton as applied to the Clean Water Rule. Finally, movants contend National Cotton is wrongly decided. They contend that Crown Simpson’s expanded construction of subsection (F) was narrow and circumscribed; whereas National Cotton’s holding that subsection (F) authorizes circuit court review of “regulations governing the issuance of permits” is unduly broad. Perhaps. Yet, if we believed National Cotton was not distinguishable and was wrongly decided, we would still not be free to reject its holding. Generally, in a multi-circuit case where a question of federal law is at issue, the transferee court is obliged to follow its own interpretation of the relevant law. See Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959, 964–65 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing In re Korean Airlines Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175–76 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and observing that other circuits have uniformly agreed with the D.C. Circuit). Moreover, no other court has held that National Cotton was wrongly decided. National Cotton, as well as the Ninth Circuit and D.C. Circuit authorities on which it relied, are still good law. Movants have not identified any materially contrary authority. Furthermore, National Cotton’s construction is consistent with congressional purpose, which appears to have been the guiding light in both E.I. du Pont and Crown Simpson. In Florida Power, 470 U.S. at 744–45, in relation to the Atomic Energy Act, the Court recognized that “one crucial purpose” of statutes providing for direct circuit court review of agency action is Nos. 15-3751, et al. In re: U.S. Dep’t of Defense & U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Final Page 15 Rule: Clean Water Rule judicial economy. Id. at 744. The Court noted that the district court’s superior factfinding capacity is typically unnecessary to judicial review of agency action. On the other hand, providing for initial review in the district court has the negative effect of “requiring duplication of the identical task in the district court and in the court of appeals; both courts are to decide, on the basis of the record the agency provides, whether the action passes muster under the appropriate APA standard of review.” Id. The Court acknowledged that the intent of Congress, not the Court’s concept of sound policy, is ultimately determinative, but concluded: Absent a firm indication that Congress intended to locate initial APA review of agency action in the district courts, we will not presume that Congress intended to depart from the sound policy of placing initial APA review in the courts of appeals. Id. at 746. See also Tennessee v. Herrington, 806 F.2d 642, 650 (6th Cir. 1986) (following Florida Power and noting that where Congress has provided for direct circuit court review but its intent is ambiguous in a specific case, policy considerations are relevant); Natural Resources Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 193 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing cases from Second, Seventh, Tenth and D.C. Circuits for the proposition that “when there is a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to the court of appeals, it should be construed in favor of review by the court of appeals.”). National Cotton’s broader reading of subsection (F) is thus consistent with the preference in favor of circuit court review recognized in Florida Power and implicitly at work in both E.I. du Pont, see 430 U.S. at 128 (characterizing it as “almost inconceivable that Congress would have required duplicate review in the first instance by different courts”), and Crown Simpson, see 445 U.S. at 196–97 (noting unwillingness to conclude Congress intended to cause delays that would result from duplicative review process). In Florida Power, the Court overruled Justice Stevens’ objection that proper deference to Congress required enforcement of “the plain and simple construction of the statutory language.” Id. at 750. Justice Stevens’ plain-language position, like that of movants in this case, is not devoid of logic. Yet, as Justice Stevens protested, the Court rejected it as a matter of mere “semantic quibbles.” Id. We do not view movants’ plain-language arguments as semantic quibbles, but, in my view, they have clearly failed to identify any substantial reason to conclude Nos. 15-3751, et al. In re: U.S. Dep’t of Defense & U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Final Page 16 Rule: Clean Water Rule the preference favoring direct circuit court review—created by Congress in § 1369(b)(1) and honored by the Supreme Court—does not, in this case, ultimately serve all parties’ interests in efficiency, judicial economy, clarity, uniformity and finality. Florida Power, like E.I. du Pont and Crown Simpson, demonstrates a strong preference for construing Congress’s provision for direct circuit court review of agency action by a practical, functional approach rather than a technical approach. A holding that we have jurisdiction to hear the instant petitions for review of the Clean Water Rule is consistent with this understanding. On the other hand, a contrary ruling, though facially consonant with the plain language of § 1369(b)(1), finds practically no solid support in the case law. Accordingly, I conclude that we have jurisdiction under subsection (F) as well.