Opinion ID: 3003378
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Before getting to the substance of this case, we address a jurisdictional issue. Rule 23(f) states that “[a] court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed . . . within 10 days after the order is entered.” The Sheriff followed this procedure and we permitted the appeal. However, Harper claims that the district court’s order was not the appealable order contemplated by Rule 23(f) because it did not define the class as required by Rule 23(c)(1)(B), and that, consequently, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the Sheriff’s appeal. Harper is correct that the district court did not define the class as it should have, but that does not deprive us of jurisdiction. There is no doubt that the district court certified the class. Its order states: “Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Case as a Class Action is granted.” This allowed the Sheriff to seek permission to file an interlocutory appeal. Harper argues that the Sheriff was required to wait until a new class definition was submitted. But Harper was charged with that responsibility and the Sheriff had only ten days in which to seek permission to appeal. The Sheriff waited as long as he could and acted properly.1 1 The Sheriff submitted his Rule 23(f) request to file an interlocutory appeal on the same day that Harper’s amended class definition was due. Because Rule 6 directs that weekends are not counted when a time period is less than eleven days, (continued...) 6 No. 08-3413 Furthermore, the propriety of resolving Harper’s proposed class issues through the class action format, which goes to the heart of this appeal, is not dependent on the subtleties of the class definition.