Opinion ID: 177111
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence

Text: Ramos also argues that the district court erred in refusing to permit him to admit the statement of co-defendant Burk. Ramos contends that the statement should have been admitted under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. He also argues for the first time on appeal that the district court=s decision to exclude the statement 1 The jury convicted Ramos of both aiding and abetting the possession of the drugs and gun, as well as constructive possession, but Ramos addresses only the latter in his brief. ATo establish liability based on an aiding and abetting theory, the government must prove (1) that the substantive crime has been committed, and (2) the defendant knew of the crime and attempted to facilitate it.@ United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1992). The jury could also have reasonably convicted Ramos under an aiding and abetting theory for the same reasons it could have convicted him of constructive possession and actually being involved in the sales. 6 violated his due process rights pursuant to Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). A>Hearsay= is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.@ Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 331 (3d Cir. 1992). A hearsay statement is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. McGlory, 968 F.2d at 333. The present sense impression exception allows a court to admit Aa statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.@ Fed. R. Evid. 803(1). In order to qualify for admission under this exception: A(1) the declarant must have personally perceived the event described; (2) the declaration must be an explanation or description of the event rather than a narration; and (3) the declaration and the event described must be contemporaneous.@ United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir. 1998). Here, the defense did not elicit any foundation to support the admissibility of codefendant Burk=s statement as a present sense impression. Moreover, to its credit, the district court invited defense counsel to seek reconsideration of the ruling while Burk testified. Counsel did not renew the argument that the statement should have been admitted as a present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. Furthermore, the evidence showed that there was a delay of at least twenty minutes between the 7 defendants= arrest and Burk=s statement. In addition, Burk was securely detained inside a police car when he made the statement. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the statement did not satisfy the requirement that Athe declarant had no chance to reflect - that is, no time to fabricate or misrepresent his thoughts.@ See United States v. Macey, 8 F.3d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 1993). Finally, as just noted, Ramos argues for the first time on appeal that precluding Burk=s statement violates his due process rights pursuant to Chambers. It is well established that, absent extraordinary circumstances, we will not address an issue that is raised for the first time on appeal. See Page v. Schweiker 786 F.2d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 1986). Ramos has not shown any such extraordinary circumstances here, and we do not find any.