Opinion ID: 396887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the owen claim.

Text: 39 Robert Owen was a defendant at the start of the trial. He pled guilty before the trial was over. Ciulla's testimony portrayed him as a willing and eager accomplice who knew to whom bribe money could be successfully paid. On August 25, 1980, Attorney Paul T. Smith, counsel for defendant Price, executed an affidavit based on three telephone conversations with Owen and a personal meeting with him at the Federal Penitentiary in Allentown, Pennsylvania, on July 22, 1980. In essence, the affidavit states that Owen told Attorney Smith that Ciulla had lied about defendants Price and Goldenberg; that they were innocent. According to the affidavit, Owen told FBI Agent Flaherty, his own attorney, Brian J. McMenimen and Neil Jon Firetog, United States Strike Force Attorney assigned to the Eastern District of New York, that Ciulla had lied about Price's involvement in the race fixing scheme. 40 Owen executed an affidavit on September 25, 1980, that denied point-by-point the statements attributed to him by Attorney Smith. Agent Flaherty executed an affidavit on November 6, 1980, in which he denied that Owen had told him that Ciulla had lied about Price. In an affidavit dated October 30, 1980, Attorney Firetog completely refuted the statements in the Smith affidavit that Owen had told him that Ciulla had lied about Price and Goldenberg. Firetog also stated that at no time did Owen say that Price and Goldenberg were innocent. Firetog's statement also contradicted Owen's purported statements to Attorney Smith relative to a jockey by the name of Jose Amy. Statements in the Smith affidavit involving alleged conversations between Owen and FBI Agent Martin Conley were denied in an affidavit executed by Conley in October of 1980. 41 As did the district court, we find it somewhat strange that Owen waited for a year after the trial to try and rescue Price and Goldenberg from Ciulla's alleged perjury. He had two opportunities for baring his breast, when he pleaded guilty and at sentencing. In the light of Owen's affidavit, which is a direct counterpoint to the statements contained in Attorney Smith's affidavit, we see no point in an evidentiary hearing. Under the abuse of discretion test as set forth in United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017, already fully discussed, there is no basis for setting aside the district court's denial of appellants' motions for a new trial.IV. THE MESAROSH CLAIM. 42 This is yet another variation on appellants' main theme; Ciulla was lying and the Government knew it. Appellants' attempt to bring this case within the holding of Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1, 1 L.Ed.2d 1 (1956), falls far short of the mark. In Mesarosh the Solicitor General of the United States moved to remand the case to the trial court because of untruthful testimony given before other tribunals by a Government witness. Id. at 3, 77 S.Ct. at 2. We do not think that the failure of the United States Attorney in the Eastern District of New York to use Ciulla in a race fixing trial amounts to an admission that the Government knew that Ciulla lied in this case. We would so find even if the New York prosecutor had not filed an affidavit stating, inter alia, I considered using Ciulla as a rebuttal witness, but his testimony proved unnecessary. 43 Considering his background and way of life, it can always be argued that Ciulla's testimony, or parts of it, was suspect. Under our system of justice, however, the jury determines the credibility of the witness. As we have already noted, Ciulla was subjected to lengthy, intense and skilled cross-examination. Based on the record, we cannot fault the jury's acceptance of Ciulla's testimony. None of the new evidence, either singly or in combination, is sufficiently material to warrant a new trial. 44 The order of the district court denying appellants' motion for a new trial and an evidentiary hearing thereon is affirmed.