Opinion ID: 786958
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statute's Operative Language

Text: 51 Title III of the ADA, entitled Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities, provides that 52 No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 53 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Title III further provides: 54 The following private entities are considered public accommodations for purposes of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect commerce — 55 ... (C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment[.] 56 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The term private entity is defined as any entity other than a public entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6). A public entity is any State or local government [or] any department, agency, . . . or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). 57 Title III's main operative provision, § 12182(a), provides that private entities that do not own the facilities they lease or operate have responsibilities under Title III. Section 12182(a) expressly so states, placing responsibility to refrain from discrimination not only on owners of places of public accommodation but also on those who lease[ ] or operate[ ] such places. 58 Further, limiting the reach of the statute to owners of the stadiums (and other kinds of public accommodation listed in § 12181(7)) would conflict with 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b), which immediately follows 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Section 12182(b)(1)(A)(i) provides: 59 It shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or class of individuals on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 60 (emphasis added); see also § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii) (making it discriminatory to afford to disabled persons, through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, an opportunity to participate in or benefit from such goods, services, facilities, and accommodations that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals); § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (making it discriminatory to provide to disabled persons, through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, a benefit that is different or separate from that provided to other individuals). 8 These provisions make clear that private entities otherwise covered by Title III may not avoid their obligations through contract, such as by contracting to provide goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations at venues they do not own. 61 Such evasion would contravene the broad inclusionary purposes of Title III, to extend the[ ] general prohibitions against discrimination to privately operated public accommodations and to bring individuals with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life. H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 382 (emphasis added); see also S.Rep. No. 101-116, at 58 (1989) (same). Congress acted out of concern that an overwhelming majority of individuals with disabilities lead isolated lives and do not frequent places of public accommodation. H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 34, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 316; see also Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir.2004) (The [ADA] responds to what Congress described as a `compelling need' for a `clear and comprehensive national mandate' to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals.) (quoting PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904 (2001)). In view of this concern, [i]t is critical to define places of public accommodations to include all places open to the public, not simply restaurants, hotels, and places of entertainment ... because discrimination against people with disabilities is not limited to specific categories of public accommodations. H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 35, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 317 (quoting former Senator Lowell Weicker). Making liable those entities responsible for the presentation of a particular event best serves the aim of the ADA, to provide disabled persons with equal access to the activities and events from which they have in the past been excluded. 62 Consistent with these considerations, the Supreme Court has held that a private entity that stages an event for a limited time period at a facility owned by a third party is covered by Title III. In PGA Tour, the Court considered whether the petitioner's four-day golf tours operated on golf courses owned by third parties fall within the coverage of Title III. See 532 U.S. at 665, 121 S.Ct. 1879. The Court reasoned, [i]t seems apparent, from both the general rule and the comprehensive definition of `public accommodation,' that petitioner's golf tours and their qualifying rounds fit comfortably within the coverage of Title III. . . . Id. at 677, 121 S.Ct. 1879. PGA Tour then elaborated: 63 The events occur on golf course[s], a type of place specifically identified by the Act as a public accommodation. § 12181(7)(L). In addition, at all relevant times, petitioner leases and operates golf courses to conduct its Q-School and tours. § 12182(a). As a lessor and operator of golf courses, then, petitioner must not discriminate against any individual in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of those courses. Ibid. 64 Id. 9 The Court's analysis rests on the general principle that, under the statute, a place of public accommodation may be operated by entities who do not own the facility and use it for a limited time period only. 10 65