Opinion ID: 202124
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Raised in Pro Se Brief

Text: Montero-Diaz argues that the effect of the Court's Booker decision, which changed the sentencing guidelines from a mandatory to an advisory system, offends the Constitution's ex post facto clause. The ex post facto clause prohibits a legislative increase in punishment after the event. See United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005). In this case, however, Montero-Diaz' sentence did not exceed the guideline maximum (71 months). Moreover, this court has held that the ex post facto clause does not apply of its own force to changes worked by judicial decisions. Id. at 110. And the sentence, at the bottom of the applicable guideline range, -3- does not raise any fair warning concerns under the due process clause. See id. at 112.
Appellant argues that the Sentencing Commission's promulgation of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 violates the nondelegation doctrine barring Congress from delegating its legislative power to another branch. The Supreme Court has held, however, that Congress' delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission [to promulgate sentencing guidelines] is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional requirements. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989). To the extent that appellant is arguing that, in light of the Apprendi, Blakely and Booker line of cases, Mistretta's holding no longer has force, the Supreme Court has rejected such an argument: [T]he Commission's authority to identify the facts relevant to sentencing decisions and to determine the impact of such facts on federal sentences is precisely the same whether one labels such facts sentencing factors or elements of crimes. Our decision in Mistretta, 488 U.S., at 371, upholding the validity of the delegation of that authority, is unaffected by the characterization of such facts, or by the procedures used to find such facts in particular sentencing proceedings. Booker, 543 U.S. at 242. The Court has stated that its holding in Booker does not call into question any aspect of our decision in Mistretta. Booker, 543 U.S. at 242. -4-
Appellant argues that the sentencing court's application of § 2L1.2(b) violated the double jeopardy clause because it imposed an additional punishment for the prior state conviction for which he was previously sentenced. Such challenges to enhanced sentences based on prior offenses have been rejected by the Supreme Court: In repeatedly upholding such recidivism statutes, we have rejected double jeopardy challenges because the enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes, but instead as a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995)(citations omitted). Appellant argues that the Apprendi, Blakely, Booker line of cases calls into question this reasoning because [t]he prior convictions are now recognized to be a full element of the aggravated illegal reentry offense. Pro Se Brief, p. 32. Appellant's argument has no merit because it is based on an erroneous premise that prior convictions are now to be treated as elements of the offense: Apprendi's explicit exemption of sentence enhancements based on prior criminal convictions from the scope of its constitutional holding left intact the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). There, -5- the Court endorsed treating prior convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of federal criminal offenses. See Almendarez- Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27. We have ruled with a regularity bordering on the monotonous that, given the explicit exception and force of Almendarez-Torres, the rationale of Apprendi does not apply to sentence- enhancement provisions based upon prior criminal convictions. United States v. Moore, 286 F.3d 47, 51 (1st Cir. 2002). Nothing in Blakely or Booker alters the continuing vitality of the Almendarez-Torres exception to Apprendi. United States v. Ivery, 427 F.3d 69, 74-75 (1st Cir. 2005)(emphasis added), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2006 WL 236293 (Feb. 27, 2006); see also Jimenez-Beltre, supra, at  5 (noting that court is bound to follow Almendarez-Torres until it is expressly overruled).
Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to argue to the sentencing judge that a downward departure from the guidelines range was warranted to avoid sentencing disparities and equal protection concerns resulting from the absence of a fast track system for prosecuting and sentencing illegally re-entering aliens in Puerto Rico. This court has rejected equal protection challenges to the fast track program on the ground that similarly situated defendants in fast track jurisdictions could receive a four-level departure not available to defendants in non-fast track jurisdictions. See United States v. Melendez-Torres, 420 F.3d 45, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2005). This court has also stated, in dicta, that -6- [i]t is arguable that even post-Booker, it would never be reasonable to depart downward based on disparities between fast-track and non-fast-track jurisdictions given Congress' clear (if implied) statement in the PROTECT Act provision that such disparities are acceptable. United States v. Martinez-Flores, 428 F.3d 22, 30 n. 3 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2006 WL 236308 (Feb. 27, 2006); See also Jimenez-Beltre, supra, (noting that [w]hether it would even be permissible to give a lower sentence on the ground [of fast track disparities] is itself an open question). Defense counsel argued at sentencing for a departure below the advisory guideline range, on the basis of various personal circumstances of the defendant, including no history of violent offenses, and the fact that his last conviction was over ten years' old. In light of our precedents quoted above, the argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to also request a downward departure on fast track grounds is without merit.