Opinion ID: 1671712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Federal Railroad Safety Act

Text: The Supreme Court of the United States wrote in Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 661-62, 113 S.Ct. at 1736: FRSA was enacted in 1970 `to promote safety in all areas of railroad operations and to reduce railroad-related accidents, and to reduce deaths and injuries to persons....' 45 U.S.C. § 421. To aid in the achievement of these goals, the Act specifically directs the Secretary of Transportation to study and develop solutions to safety problems posed by grade crossings. § 433. In addition, the Secretary is given broad powers to `prescribe, as necessary, appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad safety....' § 431(a). The pre-emptive effect of these regulations [adopted by the Secretary] is governed by § 434, which contains express saving and pre-emption clauses. Section 434 states that [t]he Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, orders, and standards relating to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable and that [a] State may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of such State requirement. In my opinion, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue presented here, whether the State tort claim was preempted, in Easterwood, holding that for projects in which federal funds participate in the installation of warning devices, the Secretary has determined the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection, and that in such instances [t]he Secretary's regulation ... cover the subject matter of state law [including tort claims that seek] to impose an independent duty on a railroad to identify and/or repair dangerous crossings. 507 U.S. at 671, 113 S.Ct. at 1741. The pertinent sections of the holding in Easterwood are provided below: The remaining potential sources of pre-emption are the provisions of 23 CFR §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), which, unlike the foregoing provisions, do establish requirements as to the installation of particular warning devices. Examination of these regulations demonstrates that, when they are applicable, state tort law is pre-empted. However, petitioner has failed to establish that the regulations apply to [this case], and hence we find respondent's grade crossing claim is not pre-empted. As discussed above, supra, at 666-667 [113 S.Ct. at 1739], under §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), a project for the improvement of a grade crossing must either include an automatic gate or receive FHWA approval if federal funds `participate in the installation of the [warning] devices.' Thus, unlike the Manual, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) displace state and private decisionmaking authority by establishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or federal approval obtained. Indeed, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) effectively set the terms under which railroads are to participate in the improvement of crossings. The former section envisions railroad involvement in the selection of warning devices through their participation in diagnostic teams which may recommend the use or nonuse of crossing gates. §§ 646.214(b)(3)(i)(F) and (3)(ii). Likewise, § 646.214(b)(4), which covers federally funded installations at crossings that do not feature multiple tracks, heavy traffic, or the like, explicitly notes that railroad participation in the initial determination of `the type of warning device to be installed' at particular crossings is subject to the Secretary's approval. In either case, the Secretary has determined that the railroads shall not be made to pay any portion of installation costs. § 646.210(b)(1) [(1992)]. In short, for projects in which federal funds participate in the installation of warning devices, the Secretary has determined the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection. The Secretary's regulations therefore cover the subject matter of state law which, like the tort law on which respondent relies, seeks to impose an independent duty on a railroad to identify and/or repair dangerous crossings.  507 U.S. at 670-71, 113 S.Ct. at 1740-41 (emphasis added). In view of the holding in Easterwood, I believe that the trial courts properly entered the summary judgment in each of these cases. The majority cites Michael v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 74 F.3d 271 (11th Cir.1996), for the proposition that preemption does not apply in these cases. However, Michael dealt with a situation in which the railroad negligently installed a crossing arm that the plaintiffs alleged was shorter than those authorized by FRSA regulations. In Michael, the Eleventh Circuit held: The provisions of 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), where applicable, preempt state tort law. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 670, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1740-41, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). For railroad crossing projects `in which federal funds participate in the installation of warning devices, the Secretary has determined the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection.' Id. at 670, 113 S.Ct. at 1741. Thus there can be no state law claim against the railroad for defective design. Id. The crossing devices at issue in this case were federally funded, and so the state tort claim for defective design is preempted, so long as the railroad complied with the federal regulations. However, the plaintiffs contend that [Norfolk Southern] violated federal regulations by installing a gate arm shorter than the one called for in the design. Michael, 74 F.3d at 273. I realize that these cases have come to us on appeals from summary judgments: however, the operative facts seem to be admitted. I believe that the plaintiffs' claims are preempted and I agree with the decisions of both trial courts; therefore, I must respectfully dissent. HOUSTON, J., concurs.