Opinion ID: 1945465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Age Mitigator

Text: At trial, defense counsel asserted entitlement to the statutory age mitigator, arguing that a life sentence without the possibility of parole could be a more severe sentence due to the time Troy would serve, being only thirty-three at the time of his sentencing. Defense counsel went on to argue that there was some testimony about the Defendant's emotional maturity that may be relevant to the consideration of that factor. The trial judge denied defense counsel's request. Troy argues that the trial court erroneously denied his requested instruction to the jury on the statutory mitigating factor of age because the evidence established his emotional immaturity and arrested psychological development at the level of a teenager. In his brief, Troy argues that during the penalty phase, psychologist Dr. Maher testified that the trauma from the sexual molestation and ensuing trial in Troy's teen years arrested his psychological and emotional development, and also that Troy has functioned throughout his life at an adolescent level. These claims are borne out by the record. However, we are not inclined to reverse the trial judge's decision on the age mitigator, given that we do not find a clear demonstration of abuse of discretion or harmful error. In Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514 (Fla. 2003), this Court addressed the applicability of the statutory age mitigator if the defendant is over eighteen years of age. We summarized the applicable law as follows: [W]here the defendant is not a minor, as in the instant case, no per se rule exists which pinpoints a particular age as an automatic factor in mitigation. [ Shellito v. State, 701 So.2d 837, 843 (Fla. 1997)]. The existence and weight to be given to this mitigator depends on the evidence presented at trial and the sentencing hearing. See id. For example, this Court has held that age twenty, in and of itself, does not require a finding of the age mitigator. See Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 367 (Fla.1986). In Gudinas v. State, 693 So.2d 953 (Fla.1997), we held, Although Gudinas is certainly correct that he had a troubling past and had always been small for his age, there was no evidence presented that he was unable to take responsibility for his acts and appreciate the consequences thereof at the time of the murders. Id. at 967. In that case, we found that there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that Gudinas was mentally and emotionally mature enough that his age should not be considered as a mitigator. Id. Nelson, 850 So.2d at 528-29. In Nelson, this Court ultimately supported the trial court's rejection of the age mitigator, as we found there was ample evidence establishing that Nelson functioned as a mature adult. Id. at 529 (finding that Nelson obtained and temporarily held a job; he provided his child's mother with money to buy necessities when she was visiting; Nelson did not have a home of his own, but arranged to stay with [others]; and Nelson did not have a driver's license or a car, yet was able to travel places on his own. See Hurst v. State, 819 So.2d 689, 698 (Fla. 2002) (holding that the evidence did not support a finding that a non-minor suffered from mental and emotional problems sufficient to warrant age as a mitigator and noting that Hurst owned his own car, performed adequately in school, and helped with child care within his family)). However, we have on occasion found error in a trial court's denial of the statutory age mitigator instruction. In Campbell v. State, 679 So.2d 720 (Fla.1996), this Court, remanding for resentencing on other grounds, held that the trial court erred in not giving a requested jury instruction on the age mitigator when the defendant was twenty-one years old at the time of his crime. Id. at 725-26. We held, [E]vidence was presented showing Campbell's relatively young chronological age at the time of the crime . . . and linking this to the defendant's significant emotional immaturity. . . . In light of this evidence, the court should have given the requested instruction. Id. at 726. Applying this case law to the instant facts, we find no clear abuse of discretion in the trial judge's decision to deny Troy's request. First, Troy was thirty-one at the time of his crimes, nearly thirteen years older than the legal age of majority. Furthermore, pursuant to Nelson, there is ample evidence that Troy functioned as a mature adult, including the fact that he was employed and cared for his girlfriend's daughter. Troy also failed to present any additional evidence regarding the applicability of the age mitigator before he was sentenced at his Spencer hearing. However, the record indicates that the judge did find and assign weight to various other mitigators that could have a bearing on Troy's emotional maturity, including the fact that the crime was committed while Troy was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, that Troy's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was impaired, that his family background was dysfunctional, and that he had a long history of severe substance abuse and mental and emotional problems. All of these matters were also presented to the jury. In essence then, Troy was able to assert the substance of the claim he now makes, and thus was not deprived of the opportunity to assert his emotional immaturity. Given the unrestricted opportunity, Troy's counsel took full advantage and pursued the strategy of advancing Troy's emotional maturity as part of nonstatutory mitigation. We find no error by the trial court.