Opinion ID: 1145952
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the youth court has original jurisdiction.

Text: ¶ 25. The majority incorrectly finds that circuit courts have original jurisdiction over juveniles charged with statutory rape. This is a case of first impression as this Court has never determined whether circuit courts have original jurisdiction over juveniles charged with sex crimes after the 1989 amendment to the Youth Court Act. The first version of the statute conferring original jurisdiction upon the circuit court read: the circuit court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of such child if he be charged with any crime which, upon conviction, is punishable by life imprisonment or death.  Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-31 (1972) (emphasis supplied). In 1989, the Legislature amended the jurisdictional statute to state that the circuit court has original jurisdiction where any act attempted or committed by a child, which if committed by an adult would be punishable under state or federal law by life imprisonment or death, will be in the original jurisdiction of the circuit court. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-151 (1989) (emphasis supplied). ¶ 26. This amendment came immediately after the United States Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to sentence juveniles under the age of sixteen to death. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988). In light of the Thompson decision, it made sense for the Legislature to amend the jurisdictional statute. In doing so, however, an ambiguity arose with regard to juveniles charged with sex crimes. ¶ 27. Sex crimes are unique in that the Legislature has specifically delineated separate levels of punishment depending on the defendant's age. Miss Code Ann. §§ 97-3-101 and 97-3-65. While adults may receive up to life imprisonment, the Legislature has left it up to the court's discretion to determine the appropriate punishment for juveniles. However, if the circuit court has original jurisdiction over sex crimes involving juveniles, as the majority holds, then this discretion is rendered void. The code provides that where the circuit court has original jurisdiction, and the case is not transferred, then the trial judge shall sentence the youth as though such youth was an adult. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-159. Therefore, with regard to sex crimes, either the jurisdictional statute is valid, or the penal statutes are valid. ¶ 28. Because the jurisdictional statute is ambiguous with regard to sex crimes committed by juveniles, it is necessary to determine legislative intent. Whether the statute is ambiguous, or not, the ultimate goal of this Court in interpreting a statute is to discern and give effect to the legislative intent. City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss.1992) (internal citations omitted). ¶ 29. First, the majority opinion overrules a Court of Appeals case on this very issue, yet it does so in a footnote claiming that the finding is dicta. The finding of the Court of Appeals was not dicta and was critical to the outcome: [T]he circuit court had original jurisdiction over the kidnapping and capital murder charges, while the youth court had exclusive jurisdiction over the burglary and sexual battery charges. Biggs v. State, 741 So.2d 318, 331-32 (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (emphasis supplied). Though not binding on this Court, the Biggs decision certainly constitutes persuasive precedent. ¶ 30. Second, [a]ll doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of a statute. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Robinson, 876 So.2d 337, 339-40 (Miss.2004) (citing Loden v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 279 So.2d 636, 640 (Miss.1973)). It is our duty to support a construction which would purge the legislative purpose of any invalidity, absurdity or unjust inequality. City of Jackson v. Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc., 688 So.2d 742, 747 (Miss.1996) (citing Robertson v. Tex. Oil Co., 141 Miss. 356, 362, 106 So. 449 (1925)). Read in pari materia with the penal statute, the jurisdictional statute should not apply to juveniles charged with sex crimes. Such an interpretation preserves the validity of both statutes as required by our rules of statutory interpretation. ¶ 31. Finally, this interpretation is consistent with this Court's longstanding practice of interpreting criminal statutes in favor of the defendant. Murray v. State, 266 So.2d 139, 141 (Miss.1972) (citing Johns v. State, 255 So.2d 322 (Miss.1971); Berry v. State, 212 Miss. 164, 54 So.2d 222 (1951)). This is particularly important when the interests of juveniles are involved. Quite simply, [T]he youth court is better situated to make decisions regarding the interest of the juvenile, as is reflected by the Legislature's reference to the youth court within Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-157(5); the circuit court does not have the facilities to evaluate juvenile interests. If the circuit court always makes the decision on whether a case should be transferred to the youth court, the role of the youth court is then severely diminished. In effect, the district attorney will be deciding whether a youthful offender will be prosecuted as an adult or a juvenile. State v. U.G., 726 So.2d at 160 (McRae, J. dissenting, joined by Sullivan, P.J., & Banks, J.). ¶ 32. In light of the above, the interests of the child require that we err on the side of caution and interpret the statutes as giving original jurisdiction to youth courts. The legislature intended the court to use its discretion when determining punishment, and the youth court is best suited for this endeavor. The youth court may then make the appropriate determination under Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-157 whether to transfer the case or retain jurisdiction. ¶ 33. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings in the youth court. GRAVES, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.