Opinion ID: 1772284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: claim 5 (ineffectiveness of penalty phase counsel)

Text: Trepal claims that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase in two ways: (a) in failing to present humanizing mitigating evidence; and (b) in failing to argue lingering doubt as a mitigating circumstance. Specifically, as to subclaim (a), Trepal argues as follows: The mitigating evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing consisted of numerous friends and family who provided heartfelt testimony regarding Mr. Trepal's caring and generous reputation, as well as his distressed youth and the effects of being a gifted intellectual but social outcast. Mr. Trepal also presented numerous friends and fellow Mensa members who testified that Mensa was an innocuous social club with amiable members (including doctors, lawyers, and even a Polk County judge), who enjoyed each other's company and participated in harmless, intellectually stimulating activities. Simply put, Mensa was a social group like many others in most communities. This evidence was not presented to the jury, which instead was left with the impression that Mensa was a group of weird misfits that are dangerous and suspect. Finally, Mr. Trepal presented the testimony of Dr. Francis Smith, an expert in speech pathology, who explained that Mr. Trepal suffers from a neurologically-based speech impairment, as well as Dr. Hilda Rosselli Kostoryz, an expert in special education, giftedness, and higher learning, who explained the nature of Mr. Trepal's giftedness, how it affected him as both a child and adult in terms of social and professional interactions, and that among gifted people, Mr. Trepal is a normal individual. As to subclaim (b), Trepal asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective based on the following reasoning: Defense counsel had the unusual benefit of a stipulation by the State that lingering doubt evidence could be presented at the penalty phase, and the court permitted its introduction. Without any reasonable tactical strategy, and to Mr. Trepal's detriment, no lingering doubt evidence was presented. All of the information discussed in [claim (1) ] also affects the issue of penalty, and constitutes valid mitigation, particularly in light of the State's stipulation at trial. The circuit court addressed both subclaims in its order denying relief on Trepal's first rule 3.850 motion. As for subclaim (a), the circuit court ruled as follows: (2) Claim # 5 concerned the lack of mitigation evidence presented at the sentencing phase of the trial. This claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and the records did not refute the claim. See, Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So.2d 635 (Fla.1994). Trial counsel claimed that the failure to produce mitigation evidence was strategic (R. 4369-70 and 4397-98), but the court could not reach this conclusion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. After hearing the testimony at the hearing, the court finds that the decision not to present mitigation evidence was tactical and reasonable under the circumstances. There is no reasonable probability that the jury's recommendation would have been different had the proposed evidence been presented. The specific examples of evidence that the defendant alleged should have been introduced in the penalty phase are listed below. (a) CHARACTER EVIDENCE FROM MENSA FRIENDS At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant called several MENSA members to testify on behalf of Mr. Trepal. All the witnesses basically testified that the defendant was a nice, caring, intelligent, thoughtful, generous and non-violent individual. In cross-examination, the state attorney asked all of the witnesses if they knew that the defendant had been convicted of a felony in the 1970's, that he spent time in federal prison, that he and his wife engaged in sado-masochistic practices, that he had physically battered his wife, that his wife had to flee to a neighbor's house because Mr. Trepal was being violent, and that he had in his house a pornographic video depicting an actual murder. Most of these bad acts were referred to in a pre-trial motion in limine filed by the defendant. (R. 4905) Many of the witnesses did not know of these facts, and although all stated that their opinion of Mr. Trepal would not change, the impact on the jury would have been potentially devastating to the defense. The trial attorneys testified that they were aware of the state's `bad character' evidence and that it affected their decision not to call any of the defendant's MENSA friends. The decision was obviously tactical, and after hearing the testimony and the state's cross-examination, the court finds that the decision was reasonable. (b) ABILITY TO FORM CLOSE, LOVING RELATIONSHIPS This mitigator would appear to rely upon much of the evidence from the defendant's family and MENSA friends. Once again, the potential that negative evidence would reach the jury affected counsel's decision not to introduce the evidence. The strategy was reasonable and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. (c) THE DEFENDANT WAS A MODEL PRISONER No evidence was presented on this ground. Therefore, the court does not know if the defendant was a model prisoner. In any event, the court finds that the decision not to present this type of mitigation evidence, if it existed, was harmless. (d) THE DEFENDANT HAS STRONG RELIGIOUS BELIEFS No evidence was presented on this ground. Therefore, the court does not know if the defendant has strong religious beliefs. In any event, the court finds that the decision not to present this type of mitigation evidence, if it existed, was harmless. Further, it is conceivable that the state could have presented negative character evidence to rebut the potential mitigation evidence, so the decision appears to be tactical. (e) FAMILY HISTORY WAS NOT PRESENTED TO JURY Several of the defendant's family testified at the evidentiary hearing. The court finds that the decision not to present the family history and character evidence from family members was harmless. Further, it is conceivable that the state could have presented negative character evidence in rebuttal, so the decision appears to be tactical. A portion of this claim related to the defendant being an intellectually gifted child. An expert in gifted children testified at the evidentiary hearing. The state asked the expert numerous questions about some of the defendant's letters and journal entries, which detailed criminal experiences and other bad acts, that the expert had relied upon in formulating her opinion. The material was extremely damaging to the defendant. To open the door to such evidence during the penalty phase would have been a tremendous tactical mistake. Further, the court doubts that a jury who has convicted a man of one count of first degree premeditated murder and six counts of attempted first degree murder would find that the defendant's giftedness mitigated the crime. Another part of the claim related to the defendant's speech impediment. An expert speech pathologist testified to the effects of stuttering on a child. The court finds that the decision not to present this type of mitigation evidence was harmless. As for Trepal's claim that trial counsel should have argued lingering doubt to the penalty phase jury, the circuit court ruled as follows: Prior to the start of the penalty phase closing arguments, the court announced under Florida case law that to argue residual doubt to the jury is improper at this stage. The state attorney told the court that my opinion disagrees with the court's. I think residual doubt is something that the defense can argue if they want to. (R. 4370-72). The rule 3.850 motion alleged that even though counsel was given permission to argue lingering doubt, counsel failed to do so and therefore was ineffective. A portion of the lingering doubt argument would have to focus upon other suspects. As noted previously, the defendant told his lawyers not to argue Diana Carr committed the crime. There has been no evidence presented to suggest that the defendant had changed his position on this issue. The other potential suspect was Pye Carr. Trial counsel testified that they did not have any evidence that Pye Carr was involved in the poisonings. Trial counsel had numerous problems with blaming Pye Carr. Some of the reasons were that it was his wife who died; his son was the sickest of the two boys poisoned; there was no evidence to suggest a motive; there is no evidence that Pye had the knowledge and ability to use thallium; and Pye had ingested thallium as well. Trial counsel testified that during the guilt phase the decision was made that counsel would not continue to point the finger at Pye Carr because counsel believed that their credibility with the jury would ultimately be lost if they continued. The same concerns would have been present at the penalty phase. The defendant lists other potential areas of lingering doubt that trial counsel should have argued, but the court finds that the decision not to argue lingering doubt was ultimately harmless and that there is no reasonable probability that the jury's recommendation would have been different had the arguments been made. In all candor, prior to the evidentiary hearing, the court was very concerned with the failure to present any mitigation evidence, other than the stipulation. At first glance, it appears that the decision not to put on evidence constituted per se ineffectiveness. Once the court heard the testimony of the trial attorneys and could begin to understand the legal strategy, the initial presumption of ineffectiveness was overcome by evidence of sound legal tactics and competent counsel. As to all of the arguments concerning the penalty phase proceedings, the court finds that there is no reasonable probability that the sentence would have been different even if what was presented to this court had been presented during the penalty phase of the defendant's trial. Stewart v. State, 481 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Fla.1985). Collateral counsel argued that trial counsel must have been ineffective at the penalty phase, because even with minimal mitigation evidence, the jury returned a 9 to 3 recommendation. However, after hearing what mitigation was available and the reasons for not introducing a majority of the evidence, the court believes that the jury returned a 9 to 3 vote, not in spite of, but because of, the strategy of trial counsel. Applying the Stephens standard of review, set forth above, to the circuit court's ruling on this claim, we conclude that the court's factual findings are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record, and the court properly concludedbased on those findingsthat counsel was not ineffective under the Sixth Amendment. We find no error. We reject the remaining claims raised by Trepal pursuant to his first and second rule 3.850 motions. [16] We also reject Trepal's habeas claims. [17]