Opinion ID: 785539
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 1996 AFDC limits.

Text: 55 Based on Section 1396u-1(c)(2), Wilson-Coker argues that plaintiffs are not eligible for TMA because they are not eligible for AFDC using 1996 income eligibility levels. Section 1396u-1(c)(2) provides: For continued medical assistance in the case of individuals (and families composed of individuals) described in subsection (b)(1)(A) of this section who would otherwise become ineligible because of hours or income from employment, see sections 1396r-6 and 1396a(e)(1) of this title. Subsection (b)(1)(A) specifically references only the 1996 AFDC limits. Wilson-Coker's argument has merit only if we ignore the introduction to subsection (b)(1), which states that the entire section is subject to paragraphs (2) and (3). Paragraph (2) allows the state to use eligibility requirements less restrictive than those in effect in 1996. As the Eighth Circuit recently held, the introductory language of (b)(1) incorporates the alternative methodologies by reference. See Kai v. Ross, 336 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir.2003). When a state decides to use less restrictive requirements, those requirements are deemed to be the requirements of subsection (b)(1)(A). 56