Opinion ID: 2326373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Obvious Error Standard

Text: [¶ 18] Where no party objects to an alleged error at trial, [o]bvious errors or defects affecting substantial rights may still be addressed on appeal. M.R.Crim. P. 52(b). We have characterized obvious error as a seriously prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice. State v. Perry, 2006 ME 76, ¶ 15, 899 A.2d 806 (citations omitted). By its very nature, obvious error does not lend itself to a precise definition. In our earliest decision applying the obvious error standard to a faulty criminal jury instruction, State v. Wright, we adopted the civil standard for reviewing unpreserved errors: whether a manifest error in law has occurred in the trial . . . and injustice would otherwise inevitably result. 128 Me. 404, 406, 148 A. 141 (1929). [¶ 19] Thus, the obvious error standard (1) calls for an evaluation of the error in the context of the entire trial record to determine (2) whether the error was so seriously prejudicial that it is likely that an injustice has occurred: The obvious error standard requires the reviewing court to make a penetrating inspection of all the circumstances of the trial to determine whether there exists a seriously prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice. What is obvious error defies precise articulation, and only the particular circumstances, weighed with careful judgment, will determine whether the obviousness of the error and the seriousness of the injustice done to the defendant thereby are so great the Law Court cannot in good conscience let the conviction stand. State v. Daley, 440 A.2d 1053, 1055 (Me. 1982) (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 20] Although our opinions are largely in agreement that before an instructional error can be deemed obvious, the prejudice resulting from the error must be manifest, they have not been consistent in articulating the test to be employed in making that determination. For example, in State v. Peterson, we asked whether the verdict would be inexplicable but for instructions that disclose errors so highly prejudicial to the rights of the respondent as to cause, or contribute to, [an unjust result]. 145 Me. 279, 288, 75 A.2d 368 (1950). A less demanding test was employed in State v. Greenlaw, which concluded that in as much as [the erroneous instruction] may have misled the jury . . . we deem this manifest error in law an efficient cause for setting aside the verdicts below. 159 Me. 141, 150, 189 A.2d 370 (1963), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gordon, 321 A.2d 352, 359 (Me. 1974). [¶ 21] Beginning with State v. McKeough, 300 A.2d 755, 761 (Me.1973), we have generally framed the obvious error test in terms of a reasonable possibility that, but for the trial court's error, the jury would have reached a different verdict. However, the McKeough opinion did not portray the reasonable possibility standard as a test for identifying obvious error. Rather, the absence of a reasonable possibility was the conclusion of the Court's analysis as to whether the Justice's instruction contained seriously prejudicial errors tending to produce manifest injustice. [3] Id. at 757. [¶ 22] Adopting the reasonable possibility language of McKeough as the standard, many of our subsequent decisions have reviewed for obvious error, both instructional and otherwise, by assessing whether there was a reasonable possibility that, absent the unpreserved error, the jury would have reached a different verdict. See State v. Nelson, 2010 ME 40, ¶ 14, 994 A.2d 808; Perry, 2006 ME 76, ¶ 15, 899 A.2d 806; State v. Walker, 512 A.2d 354, 356 (Me.1986); State v. Michaud, 473 A.2d 399, 404 (Me.1984); State v. Bahre, 456 A.2d 860, 865 (Me.1983); State v. Childs, 388 A.2d 76, 81-82 (Me. 1978); State v. Deveau, 354 A.2d 389, 392 (Me.1976); State v. McDonough, 350 A.2d 556, 564 (Me.1976). [¶ 23] However, the obvious error standard that we employ should recognize that where the trial court has concluded that there is sufficient evidence to instruct the jury on a defense, as was the case here, it necessarily follows that it was reasonably possible that the jury could have acquitted the defendant on that basis. See 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1), (2) (2010). A possibility refers to an occurrence that may or may not happen. Webster's New World Compact Desk Dictionary and Style Guide 377 (2nd ed. 2002). A mere possibility that an instructional error affected the verdict is quantitatively and qualitatively less substantial than a seriously prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice, or a serious[] . . . injustice done to the defendant. . . so great the Law Court cannot in good conscience let the conviction stand. Daley, 440 A.2d at 1055 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 24] The judicial deference owed jury decisions demands an appellate standard of review more rigorous than one narrowly focused on whether it was reasonably possible that the jury would have returned a different verdict. [¶ 25] The case for a more demanding obvious error test is also supported by the principles underlying Rule 52(b), which are identical to the principles underlying the federal rule for reviewing plain error. Compare M.R.Crim. P. 52(b), with Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). The federal rule provides: A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Obvious error and plain error are substantively alike. State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶ 13 n. 9, 782 A.2d 319. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that the language of Federal Rule 52(b) is permissive, but that courts should exercise their remedial discretion under the rule only where an unpreserved error affects substantive rights and seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 26] In 2001, we quoted and applied the Supreme Court's formulation of the obvious error standard in Burdick : Our review pursuant to the obvious error standard of M.R.Crim. P. 52(b) is similar to the plain error review announced by the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b): Under that test, before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error []seriously affects the fairness and integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.[] 2001 ME 143, ¶ 13 n. 9, 782 A.2d 319 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (citations omitted)). [¶ 27] This analysis focuses on the degree to which the error prejudiced the jury's deliberations or the defendant's rights, measured in the broader context of the entire trial record. We also noted in Burdick that if the claimed error is of constitutional dimension, the appellate discretion afforded by the fourth criterion is considerably reduced and we must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect [the defendant's] substantial rights. 2001 ME 143, ¶ 29, 782 A.2d 319. [¶ 28] As with most human endeavors, trials are inherently imperfect and unintended errors inevitably occur. Thus, absent a constitutional error, a jury's verdict should be upset based on an unpreserved error only where the injustice resulting from the error is truly manifestthat is, it is direct, obvious, and observable. Black's Law Dictionary 1048 (9th ed. 2009). The four required criteria identified in Burdick are in keeping with the high threshold of proof necessary for an unpreserved trial error to be fairly described as having produced manifest injustice. [¶ 29] We thus clarify that we will henceforth apply the four-part Burdick test when conducting obvious error review, and that we will no longer rely on the less deferential McKeough reasonable possibility standard. For an error or defect to be obvious for purposes of Rule 52(b), there must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If these conditions are met, we will exercise our discretion to notice an unpreserved error only if we also conclude that (4) the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.