Opinion ID: 184751
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: WOC's NEPA Claim

Text: 17 NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed EIS for all major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see also Fund for Animals v. Thomas, 127 F.3d 80, 83 (D.C.Cir.1997). Under the statute, [t]he EIS must include, among other things, a 'detailed statement' describing the reasonably foreseeable environmental impact both of the proposed federal action and of any feasible alternative(s) to the proposed federal action, including nonaction. City of Grapevine, Tex. v. DOT, 17 F.3d 1502, 1503 (D.C.Cir.1994) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). Under the regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality, federal agencies are responsible for [d]esignating the major decision points for the agency's principal programs likely to have a significant effect on the human environment and assuring that the NEPA process corresponds with them. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.1(b). An agency need not conduct a comprehensive EIS if an environmental assessment reveals that the proposed action would not have a significant effect on the environment. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.9. Thus, the law does not require an agency to prepare an EIS until it reaches the critical stage of a decision which will result in irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources to an action that will affect the environment. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 170, 173 (2d Cir.1977). As the Second Circuit stated in Mobil Oil Corp., NEPA does not intend that [an agency] may be indefinitely delayed in undertaking its statutory duties by controversy over an EIS concerning events which may never occur. Id. Applying these principles in the context of leasing, we conclude that WOC has not established the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources necessary to establish ripeness, whether or not it has established the element of injury redressable in this litigation necessary to establish standing. However viewed, we do not have jurisdiction. 18 In Sierra Club v. Peterson, we held that when a federal agency charged with administering oil and gas leasing on federal lands has taken such action that it no longer retain[s] the authority to preclude all surface disturbing activities subsequent to issuing an oil and gas lease, an EIS assessing the full environmental consequences of leasing must be prepared before commitment to any actions that might affect the quality of the human environment. 717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C.Cir.1983). Based on this analysis, we concluded that [i]f the [Forest Service] chooses not to retain authority to preclude all surface disturbing activities, an EIS must be prepared when the leases are issued. Id.; see also Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir.1988) ([U]nless surface-disturbing activities may be absolutely precluded, the government must complete an EIS before it makes an irretrievable commitment of resources by selling non-NSO leases.). Concededly, the application of these principles does not necessarily presuppose that an obligation could not occur at an earlier stage. However, consistent with the purpose of NEPA as correctly described by the Second Circuit in Mobil Oil Corp., it is not logical that the Service would be required to delay its undertakings and commit its resources to the preparation of an EIS which might ultimately prove unnecessary. Thus, we hold that the point of irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources and the concomitant obligation to fully comply with NEPA do not mature until leases are issued. 19 In the instant case, WOC brought its NEPA action before any leases had actually been issued by the BLM. Therefore, WOC's NEPA challenge was premature. This does not preclude WOC from obtaining judicial relief should it later become appropriate. See Louisiana Envtl. Action Network, 87 F.3d at 1381. Indeed, once the leases were issued by the BLM, WOC was free to challenge the Forest Service's NEPA compliance. In fact, WOC has raised the NEPA compliance issue before the IBLA in its administrative protest of the BLM's offering of three Shoshone leases. However, that challenge would necessarily be a challenge to the state of the Forest Service's NEPA compliance at the time of lease issuance. The record before us is therefore incomplete since it represents the state of the Forest Service's NEPA compliance at the time the Forest Service rendered its specific lands decision. After that point, the Forest Service was free to undertake additional efforts to comply with its NEPA obligations, including efforts to make its EIS sufficiently site-specific. Until the point of irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources had been reached--i.e., the leases had actually been issued--any challenge to the Forest Service's NEPA compliance by WOC or anyone else remained premature. 20 In addition to the constitutional restraints of the standing and ripeness doctrines, prudential considerations also support our conclusion that WOC's NEPA claim is premature. Prudence ... restrains courts from hastily intervening into matters that may best be reviewed at another time or another setting, especially when the uncertain nature of an issue might affect a court's 'ability to decide intelligently.'  Louisiana Envtl. Action Network, 87 F.3d at 1382 (internal citations omitted) (quoting American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. ICC, 747 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C.Cir.1984)). As the Supreme Court has noted, premature review  'denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise.'  Ohio Forestry, 118 S.Ct. at 1671 (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 242, 101 S.Ct. 488, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980)). The ripeness requirement is designed 21 to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. 22 Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507; see also National Treasury Employees Union, 101 F.3d at 1431 (Prudentially, the ripeness doctrine exists to prevent the courts from wasting our resources by prematurely entangling ourselves in abstract disagreements....); New York State Ophthalmological Soc'y v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379, 1386 (D.C.Cir.1988) (A controversy is ripe if further administrative process will not aid in the development of facts needed by the court to decide the question it is asked to consider.). 23 Review of WOC's NEPA claim based on the record as it existed at the specific lands stage would not only violate the constitutional limitations on this Court's jurisdiction under Article III, but also would affect this Court's ability to decide intelligently whether the Forest Service met its NEPA obligations. WOC's NEPA claim is not fit[ ] ... for judicial decision as contemplated in Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507. As the Supreme Court noted in Ohio Forestry, a claim is not ripe where the possibility that further consideration will actually occur before [implementation] is not theoretical, but real. 118 S.Ct. at 1671. The Forest Service was free to engage in further efforts to fulfill its NEPA obligations before the leases were issued. Indeed, the verification process established by the Forest Service specifically contemplated further action on this front. Therefore, it is clear that WOC's NEPA compliance claim could not possibly be in a concrete and final form, Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 915, until the lease issuance stage, at which time it became ripe for review. 24 Moreover, under the second prong of the Abbott Laboratories test, withholding consideration of the NEPA claim at this stage in the proceedings will not result in any hardship to the parties. See 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507. There is no hardship here since WOC may pursue its NEPA claim based on the Forest Service's compliance as of the date of lease issuance, and, indeed, it appears that it has done so before the IBLA. As a result, we must dismiss WOC's NEPA claim for lack of jurisdiction.