Opinion ID: 74557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Breach of the Michigan Plea Agreement

Text: Nyhuis claims that the government orally promised him that he would not be prosecuted for incidents underlying his Michigan conviction and that the Florida prosecution constituted a breach of that agreement. He raised this claim for the first time on motion to dismiss the Florida indictment on double jeopardy and immunity grounds. The district court considered and denied this motion. Nyhuis re-asserted the claim on direct appeal. After careful consideration, we concluded that there was no merit to Nyhuis’ claim that the government violated its plea agreement with him. Nyhuis, 8 F.3d at 742. We said then: The Government “agree[d] not to bring additional criminal charges against the defendant in the Western District of Michigan arising out of his involvement in the distribution of marijuana.” It has not done so. The Government further agreed not to bring additional charges against Nyhuis arising out of “those transactions disclosed by the defendant in the proffer already made to the government.” (Emphasis added.) It has not done so. . . . To permit Nyhuis retroactively to sweep his cocaine involvement within the ambit of the plea agreement would be an endorsement of the strategy of telling a little and hiding a lot. Id. 4 Upon review of the present motion, the district court concluded that, despite Nyhuis’ protestations to the contrary, his Section 2255 due process claim is based upon the same alleged plea agreement violation resolved against him by this court on direct appeal of his conviction. We agree with the district court. We can discern no fact or other evidence underlying the present due process claim which was not raised by Nyhuis and considered by us in his prior immunity claim.2 The district court is not required to reconsider claims of error that were raised and disposed of on direct appeal. United States v. Rowan, 663 F.2d 1034, 1035 (11th Cir. 1981). “[O]nce a matter has been decided adversely to a defendant on direct appeal it cannot be relitigated in a collateral attack under section 2255.” United States v. Natelli, 553 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1977).3 Nyhuis has merely re-characterized his prior immunity claim as a due process claim. A rejected claim does not merit rehearing on a different, but previously available, legal theory. Cook v. Lockhart, 876 F.2d 220, 222 (8th Cir. 2 The district court noted that Nyhuis does not point to one fact that was not and could not have been discovered prior to his appeal and that his present allegations are based almost entirely upon evidence developed at the 1991 evidentiary hearings on his motion to dismiss for violation of the immunity agreement. 3 Furthermore, even if this issue had not already been resolved against Nyhuis, we would agree with the district court that it is procedurally barred. “In general, a defendant must assert an available challenge to a sentence on direct appeal or be barred from raising the challenge in a section 2255 proceeding.” Greene v. United States, 880 F.2d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 1989). 5 1989). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in denying the motion to set aside the verdict as a violation of due process.