Opinion ID: 4543067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims against the Jail Supervisors

Text: As to the Jail Supervisors, Plaintiffs identify two conditions, which, they argue pose a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates at the Jail. First, they argue that the Jail’s classification process does not adequately identify inmates with violent or assaultive tendencies, which leads to nonviolent inmates being double-celled with violent inmates. Second, they argue that the Jail’s practice 4 Plaintiffs urge us to dispense with the subjective component, as the Supreme Court did in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) for excessive force claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment. We decline to apply Kingsley because Grochowski’s death occurred in 2012 and Kingsley was decided in 2015. We are not aware of any court that has ruled that Kingsley has retroactive effect. We therefore do not consider whether Kingsley would otherwise be applicable. 13 Case: 18-14567 Date Filed: 06/22/2020 Page: 14 of 23 of performing hourly rounds is insufficient to ensure the safety of inmates while they are inside their cells. 5 The Jail Supervisors argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims. In order to show that an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the officer must show that he or she was acting within the scope of his or her discretionary authority at the time of the alleged wrongful acts. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). There is no dispute in this case that the Jail Supervisors were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority at all relevant times. The burden therefore shifts to the Plaintiffs, who must show, first, that the officers “violated a constitutionally protected right,” and second, “that the right was clearly established at the time of the misconduct.” Melton, 841 F.3d at 1221. We may address those elements in any order. Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). Here, we begin and end our 5 Plaintiffs also raise arguments about the Jail’s physical design and its funding levels within their claims against the Jail Supervisors. In Georgia, the Office of the Sheriff (which, in this case, includes the Jail Supervisors) is responsible for the administration and daily operations of the Jail. Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cty., 400 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005). The design of the Jail and the Jail’s funding levels, however, are not matters of Jail administration. The record shows that the County worked with an architectural firm to design and construct the Jail in 1999; the Jail Supervisors were not involved in the design process. The record also shows that the Sheriff submits budget proposals to the County, but the County is ultimately responsible for making funding decisions. We therefore restrict our consideration of the Jail’s design and its funding to our discussion of the County’s liability below. 14 Case: 18-14567 Date Filed: 06/22/2020 Page: 15 of 23 analysis by concluding that Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Jail Supervisors violated a constitutionally protected right. 6
Plaintiffs argue that the Jail’s classification process poses a substantial risk of serious harm because corrections officers do not perform the security screening in face-to-face interviews with inmates and because the Initial Classification Form does not account for violent misdemeanors. As a result, they argue, violent inmates can be double-celled with non-violent inmates, which can lead to in-cell assaults. Plaintiffs argue that if the security screening had been conducted in person and if it had accounted for violent misdemeanors, the Jail Supervisors would have identified Brooks as being potentially violent, particularly in light of his 2009 conviction for misdemeanor fighting. Plaintiffs have failed to show, however, that the Constitution requires in-person security screenings or consideration of violent misdemeanors. 6 We assume that the Jail Supervisors are officers with some supervisory authority at the Jail. Had Plaintiffs shown that Grochowski’s constitutional rights were violated, which they have not done, they would also have needed to show that the Jail Supervisors either “personally participate[d] in the alleged constitutional violation or [that] there is a causal connection between actions of the [Jail Supervisors] and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). Because we conclude that no constitutional violation occurred, we do not reach that issue. See Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1264 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We need not address the Appellant’s claims of municipal or supervisory liability since we conclude no constitutional violation occurred.”). 15 Case: 18-14567 Date Filed: 06/22/2020 Page: 16 of 23 Plaintiffs cite case law for the proposition that jail classification systems must consider an inmate’s capacity for violence. See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1308–09 (5th Cir. 1974). 7 However, the Jail’s classification process does consider an inmate’s capacity for violence. The classification process begins with a health screening, which is conducted according to best practices issued by the National Commission on Correctional Healthcare. The healthcare screening takes place in a face-to-face interview, during which a healthcare provider asks the inmate if he has any history of violent behavior or victimization. The healthcare provider also assesses the inmate’s appearance, attitude, mood, and affect. Those measures assist the healthcare provider in determining, in the first instance, whether it is appropriate to place inmates in the general population. A corrections officer then conducts a security screening based on objective criteria, such as the inmate’s current charges, history of violent felony convictions, and any disciplinary records from previous detentions at the Jail. Those objective criteria are collected on an Initial Classification Form, which is endorsed by the National Institute of Corrections. The Initial Classification Form functions as a decision tree based on those objective criteria, and it 7 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981. Id. at 1209. 16 Case: 18-14567 Date Filed: 06/22/2020 Page: 17 of 23 adequately considers an inmate’s capacity for violence in determining whether the inmate should be placed in minimum-, medium-, or maximum-security housing. Plaintiffs have simply failed to show that the Jail’s classification system does not adequately consider an inmate’s capacity for violence.
Plaintiffs next argue that the Jail’s practice of performing hourly rounds is insufficient to supervise double-celled inmates and therefore poses a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates at the Jail. Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Constitution requires jail officials to conduct rounds more frequently than once per hour. To the contrary, the Jail Supervisors cite cases to demonstrate that hourly rounds are constitutionally adequate. In Cagle v. Sutherland, a jail official violated a consent decree from previous litigation that required hourly cell checks. 334 F.3d 980, 985 (11th Cir. 2003). That official let one hour and forty minutes elapse between cell checks and during that time an inmate died. Id. at 989. The court observed that the consent decree “did not establish a constitutional right to hourly jail checks.” Id. Cagle, then, suggests that even hourly cell checks are not constitutionally required. See also Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that jail officials were entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff “cite[d] no cases for 17 Case: 18-14567 Date Filed: 06/22/2020 Page: 18 of 23 the proposition that deliberate indifference is demonstrated if prisoners are not seen by jailers at all times”). We recognize that Cagle and Popham addressed the subjective component of deliberate indifference rather than the objective component of a substantial risk of serious harm. Still, we think these cases support our conclusion here that the Jail’s practice of conducting hourly rounds is constitutionally adequate. Plaintiffs have failed to show that either the Jail’s classification process or its practice of hourly rounds pose a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates at the Jail. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to show that those conditions violated Grochowski’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Absent any constitutional violation, the Jail Supervisors are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. 9