Opinion ID: 204158
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title III Wiretap

Text: Cartagena challenges the sufficiency of the government's showing of necessity pursuant to § 2518(1)(c) of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518. Section 2518(1)(c) sets forth the necessity requirement. It requires that law enforcement officials applying to use electronic surveillance include a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. Id. In reviewing the government's showing of necessity, our role is not to make a de novo determination of sufficiency as if [we] were [the issuing judge], but to decide if the facts set forth in the application were minimally adequate to support the determination that was made. United States v. Ashley, 876 F.2d 1069, 1074 (1st Cir. 1989)(quoting United States v. Scibelli, 549 F.2d 222, 226 (1st Cir. 1977))(internal quotation marks omitted). To establish necessity, the government is not required to show that other investigative methods have been wholly unsuccessful, United States v. Villarman-Oviedo, 325 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003), nor must the government exhaust all other investigative measures before resorting to wiretapping. United -8- States v. Abou-Saada, 785 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1986); see also López, 300 F.3d at 52. The government is only required to show that it has made a reasonable, good faith effort to run the gamut of normal investigative procedures before resorting to means so intrusive as electronic interception of telephone calls. López, 300 F.3d at 52 (citing Hoffman, 832 F.2d at 1306-07). Turning to the affidavit, we are satisfied that the application was minimally adequate to support the determination that was made. Ashley, 876 F.2d 1074. The DEA Special Agent filed a fifty-nine-page affidavit that defined the goals of the government's investigation and supplied a detailed overview of the investigation to date. The affidavit listed specific reasons why traditional investigative methods used up to that point -- including informants, physical and video surveillance, controlled purchases and seizures of heroin, and pen register and toll analysis -– had not yielded sufficient information. It also provided thorough explanations as to why other traditional investigative techniques (e.g., physical surveillance, search warrants, grand jury subpoenas, telephone records and pen register data, trash searches, witness interviews, cooperating individuals, and undercover agents) were unlikely to be fruitful. Cartagena argues that the affidavit in support of the wiretap contained material omissions and misleading and false statements that, if known to the judge, would have prevented a -9- finding of necessity. Cartagena contends that the government omitted material information concerning the extent of Báez's infiltration into the conspiracy, the frequency, nature, and scope of his communications with López, the activities he was authorized to perform, and the quality of information he had provided to the government.2 He also alleges that the government made false statements by creating the impression that Báez had only been able to provide the most general information about the drug enterprise. Lastly, Cartagena argues that the government omitted material information that would have established that traditional investigative procedures were producing some results for the government. Had this information been included, says Cartagena, the issuing court would not have been able to find that a federal wiretap was necessary, requiring the government to continue pursuing less intrusive investigative techniques. Cartagena's arguments are flawed for the following reasons. Section 2518(1)(c)'s full and complete statement requirement does not mandate that officers include every single detail of an investigation, even if relevant to the need for a wiretap. United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2 Cartagena additionally argues, regarding both the state and federal wiretaps, that the government intentionally omitted an unconstitutional search of López's phone from the affidavits. Because we do not believe the information obtained from the search was used in support of the wiretaps, Cartagena's allegation is irrelevant to his necessity claim. -10- 2005). Provided that sufficient facts are included supporting the need for a wiretap over other investigative procedures, the officer need not set forth the minutiae of an investigation. Id. Furthermore, [t]here is no rule on the amount of time investigators must try and fail, using other methods, before turning to a wiretap application, United States v. NelsonRodríguez, 319 F.3d 12, 33 (1st Cir. 2003). Even if traditional investigative procedures produce some results, the partial success of the investigation [does] not mean that there [is] nothing more to be done. United States v. Cao, 471 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2006). The government's affidavit made clear that although DEA agents had secured information through traditional investigative measures, their ability to continue obtaining actionable intelligence from such methods was limited.3 We have never required the government to run outlandish risks or to exhaust every conceivable alternative before seeking a wiretap, Hoffman, 832 F.2d at 1306, and we find no need to create such a requirement today. On deferential review, we are satisfied with the issuing court's determination that the facts provided were sufficient to 3 Specifically, the affidavit provided that traditional law enforcement investigative techniques had failed to identify the smuggling locations to which the narcotics were transported, the exact method by which the conspirators imported the narcotics into the United States, the persons to whom Cartagena supplied the narcotics, the method by which the organization laundered its drug proceeds, or the full nature and scope of Cartagena's drug trafficking activities. -11- rise above the standard of minimal adequacy. See United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) (necessity established where government described previously pursued techniques, stated why they were ineffective, and explained why other methods, including grand jury subpoenas and search warrants, were not viable options). Furthermore, even if the affidavit had contained the information that Cartagena alleges was omitted or misstated, we find no reason to conclude that the inclusion of such information would have prevented the judge from deciding that a wiretap should be issued. In light of the large quantities of evidence from sources other than Báez, if we excise (or otherwise appropriately adjust) all misleading statements from the affidavit, there is still a more than adequate showing of 'probable cause.' Thus any misstatements are immaterial. Nelson-Rodríguez, 319 F.3d at 34 (quoting United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1102 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.)). In this case, the affidavit contained information gathered from several other cooperating informants, video and physical surveillance, analysis of toll and phone records, analysis of pen registers, and seizures of heroin and cocaine. On these facts, we cannot say that the court erred in concluding that the omission or misstatement of information about Báez's informant activities did not provide grounds for -12- suppression. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Cartagena's motion to suppress.4