Opinion ID: 2173610
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: civil and criminal contempts

Text: The authority of courts in the use of contempt procedures, civil and criminal, are awesome and complete. The most relevant statutory authority is at ch. 295, Stats. 1977, [3] for civil contempts and secs. 757.03 through 757.07, Stats. 1977, [4] for criminal contempts. Ch. 295 was amended and renumbered and is now ch. 785. This court in State v. King, 82 Wis.2d 124, 136, 262 N.W.2d 80 (1978), stated: The courts of this state and those of many other jurisdictions have long held that they possess an inherent contempt power over their branch of the government to maintain decorum and see that their orders are carried out. State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 305-06, 187 N.W. 830 (1922); In re Hon. Chas. E. Kading, 70 Wis.2d 508, 543b, 235 N.W.2d 409, 238 N.W.2d 63, 239 N.W.2d 297 (1975); Ferris v. State ex rel. Maass, 75 Wis.2d 542, 546, 249 N.W.2d 789 (1977); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 226-27 (1821); Doyle v. London Guarantee Co., 204 U.S. 599, 607 (1907). However, this court has just as consistently held that this power is subject to reasonable legislative regulation: `Doubtless, this power may be regulated, and the manner of its exercise prescribed, by statute, but certainly it cannot be entirely taken away, nor can its efficiency be so impaired or abridged as to leave the court without power to compel the due respect and obedience which is essential to preserve its character as a judicial tribunal.' State ex rel. Attorney General v. Circuit Court for Eau Claire County, 97 Wis. 1, 8, 72 N.W. 193 (1897). See also, Upper Lakes Shipping v. Seafarers I. Union, 22 Wis.2d 7, 17, 125 N.W.2d 324 (1963). State v. King, supra, at 136. The definitions and distinctions of the two categories of contempt are found at pages 129-31 of the King case: In some instances the same conduct can constitute civil or criminal contempt. Several general rules have become well accepted. Usually a contempt action which seeks to vindicate the authority and dignity of the court is a criminal contempt, while a contempt which seeks to enforce a private right of one of the parties in an action is a civil contempt. This distinction is often expressed in the results which flow from the particular finding of contempt. If the order is coercive or remedial, the contempt is civil. If the order is purely punitive, the contempt is criminal. . . . . The fact that civil contempts are remedial or coercive, i.e., designed to force one party to accede to another's demand, is demonstrated by the statutory requirement that the sentences be purgeable. Civil contempt looks to the present and future and the civil contemnor holds the key to his jail confinement by compliance with the order. On the other hand, the criminal contemnor is brought to account for a completed past action, his sentences are not purgeable and are determinate. Criminal contempt is punitive. It is not intended to force the contemnor to do anything for the benefit of another party. The distinction between the two forms of contempt is important because most of the constitutionally required bill of rights procedures and due process protections apply only to criminal contempt. With the major exception of contempt committed in the physical presence of the trial court (direct contempt), a criminal contemnor is entitled to, inter alia, an unbiased judge, In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955), Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); a presumption of innocence until found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a right against self-incrimination, State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 317, 187 N.W. 830 (1922). Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911); notice of the charges, the right to call witnesses, time to prepare a defense, Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925); and a right to a jury trial if the sentence is for more than six months, Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210 (1968). (Footnotes omitted.) [5] For a finding of civil contempt, `. . . it is essential in contempt cases that the thing ordered to be done be within the power of the person.' Getka v. Lader, 71 Wis.2d 237, 247, 238 N.W.2d 87 (1976), citing In re Adam's Rib, Inc. (Kaminsky), 39 Wis.2d 741, 746, 159 N.W.2d 643 (1968). Applying these rules to the instant case, it is apparent that Judge McGraw's order of September 22, 1978, found the defendant in contempt, but his application was to establish liens against the jointly held real estate. Judge Wendt's order of June 13, 1979, found the defendant had the financial ability to obey the division of property order but did not make a finding of the defendant's ability to pay the support arrearage and then authorized a capias upon notice in his decision. That in reality only authorized the bringing of another motion, since notice was required. Judge Wendt did not impose any sentence of any kind. Finally, Judge McGraw's order of July 3, 1979, imposed a 60 day sentence but didn't inform the defendant what he had to do to purge himself. Neither judge ever made a finding of the defendant's ability to pay support, past, present or future. It was not sufficient or authorized to order that the defendant may through his counsel submit to the court within ten days, a proposal by which the defendant may purge himself of contempt. [6] The power of contempt does not allow the judge to bargain. The judge has the authority, if the record allows, to impose a sentence of incarceration of not more than six months for civil contempt, but the judge must clearly spell out for the contemnor what he or she must do to be purged. [7] The sentence in a civil contempt is not to punish for not obeying the court's orders, but rather to enforce the private right of one of the parties in the action. Here it is the plaintiff's private rights that the purgeable contempt is to enforce. The rights of this plaintiff which have not been enforced since 1974, the year of the divorce, are: (1) $4,000 due on the estate division; (2) over $7,000 of past support due; (3) payment of medical and dental bills for defendant's children; (4) reimbursement for over $4,725 paid by her in mortgage payments to avoid foreclosure on the jointly owned real estate; (5) to receive dollars when due which had a greater value than current dollars; (6) that she has not had the benefit of the money or interest on the $4,000 as it was due her. [8] We remand this case to the trial court to enter findings and issue an order based on the record stating what the defendant has failed to do with specificity which leads to the civil contempt finding; whether the defendant has been and is financially able to do what he was ordered to do causing his actions to be contumacious; what sentence is imposed and what must the defendant do to purge himself. If additional evidence or testimony is necessary to arrive at appropriate findings on which to base conclusions and resulting orders, then the hearing should be continued and completed. [9] The question of whether or not the act is contumacious is one which the trial court has far better opportunity to determine than this court. Staples v. Staples, 87 Wis. 592, 596, 58 N.W. 1036 (1894). This is old but still valid law. In the Staples case, the court also held: It is true that the remedy is severe and harsh. Imprisonment certainly should not be ordered when it appears that the default is the result of honest inability to pay, on account of business misfortunes, or lack of health or earning ability, or other circumstances which are not the fault of defendant. But where the inability is wilfully brought about by defendant himself, with intent to avoid payment, the refusal to pay becomes contumacious, and the inability so resulting will not purge the defendant of contempt. The script was the same in 1894, only the actors have changed. By the Court.  The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to act consistent with this opinion.