Opinion ID: 2351539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Interrogatories and Deposition

Text: The defendants next argue that because Canavan both answered interrogatories and was deposed in the Prudential litigation, the alleged acts of attorney negligence were either known to him or readily discernable by October 5, 1994, the date of the deposition. Again, we disagree. The mere fact that plaintiff answered interrogatories in the underinsured motorist action against Prudential lends no support to defendants' contention. We have examined plaintiff's answers, and they contain no reference whatsoever to either the late filing of the claim or to the settlement without consent of the insurer. Like his written statement to Prudential, plaintiff's interrogatory answers discuss the circumstances surrounding the motor vehicle accident, his recollection of those events, the injuries sustained as a result of the collision, and the extent of medical treatment received as a result of those injuries. It is the content of that discovery, not the mere fact that it was propounded, which seems critical to us. We likewise discern no merit in defendants' argument that plaintiff was alerted to the potential malpractice simply because he was deposed in the suit against Prudential. The defendants have submitted only the cover page of the deposition transcript, implying that plaintiff's mere attendance at the deposition is enough to suggest that he had acquired the requisite knowledge of malpractice in the case. However, without a transcript of relevant deposition testimony, it is impossible for this Court to accept defendants' arguments. Because the deposition was not produced either to us or to the hearing justice, this Court will not speculate as to its contents. In view of the circumstances of this case, and considering the evidence presented by the parties, we hold that an issue of fact exists as to whether the exercise of reasonable diligence could have discovered the defendants' potential malpractice prior to January 1996, when a partner in the firm informed him of a potential conflict in the case and advised him to seek other counsel. That this meeting was the first time the plaintiff may have heard the word malpractice is of little consequence and merely coincidental in our view of the record. As a result, the fixing of the date of the plaintiff's discovery of the alleged malpractice presents a genuine issue of material fact that requires a trial. Accordingly, we conclude that the motion justice erred in finding that the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's claim began to run in 1991, and therefore, the extraordinary remedy of summary judgment was error. Because we have determined that summary judgment was not proper, we need not address whether the continuing representation doctrine is applicable to this case. See Mittleman, 689 A.2d at 1069.