Opinion ID: 2594735
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense Counsel's Failure to Object to Prosecutor's Argument

Text: Defendant complains about his counsel's failure to object to allegedly improper statements in the prosecutor's guilt phase closing argument to the jury. We reject defendant's claim. A prosecutor's argument may properly be based on evidence, including reasonable inferences or deductions drawn from the evidence, and on matters that are common knowledge. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 221, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) A defense attorney's failure to object at trial rarely establishes ineffectiveness. ( Ibid.; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 540, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385.) Here, defendant faults trial counsel for not objecting on the ground that in closing argument the prosecutor improperly testified to facts not in evidence. Defendant initially cites the prosecutor's comment to the jury that robbery victim Jung Wang had described defendant's hair as combed back like Cholo style, gang style. As defendant notes, Wang never testified that defendant wore his hair gang style, only that he wore it Cholo style. The prosecutor's gang style remark, however, was fleeting and was made in the context of noting the identification of defendant by several witnesses. Nor can trial counsel be faulted for not objecting to the prosecutor's comments that defendant was not intoxicated on the day of the murder, as shown by his ability to concoct a lie, and that defendant could not have found Litovich's jewelry or received it from someone else because [w]e know the defendant is a loner. These comments by the prosecutor were within the scope of the evidence presented. Equally without merit is defendant's assertion that his counsel should have objected when the prosecutor used the word we in her remark, [w]e know the defendant is a loner. The word we obviously included the jury, and the comment referred to the evidence presented to the jury. Defendant also contends his trial counsel should have objected to what defendant describes as prosecutorial misrepresentations of the law. He accuses the prosecutor of improperly arguing to the jury that defendant failed to present expert testimony showing that defendant could not have formed the requisite specific intent to commit the felonies involved in his case. Defendant argues that because the defense of diminished capacity was abolished before his trial, evidence that he could not have formed the requisite intent was inadmissible and the prosecutor therefore misrepresented the law to the jury. The prosecutor, however, made the statement in question while discussing the instruction about intoxication as negating specific intent. Evidence of intoxication is admissible to show that a defendant lacked the requisite specific intent. (§ 22, subd. (b).) In context, the prosecutor's comment referred to the possible effect of intoxication on defendant's actual formation of the requisite specific intent, not on his capacity to form such intent. We also reject defendant's contention that his counsel was incompetent for not objecting to the prosecutor's argument on the definition of reasonable doubt. After describing reasonable doubt as like being in love, the prosecutor told the jury: You can't really describe it but you know it when you see it. It's that feeling that you have, that you feel comfortable with and it's not something mystical, magical at all. The trial court gave the jury the standard instruction on reasonable doubt. (CALJIC No. 2.90 (1979 rev.).) We have previously held that the court's instructions, not the prosecution's argument, are determinative, for `[w]e presume that jurors treat the court's instructions as a statement of the law by a judge, and the prosecutor's comments as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade.' ( People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 179, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331, quoting People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, fn. 8, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) Defendant here has failed to demonstrate that counsel's failure to object was prejudicial. (See People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 366, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) Defendant asserts trial counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's description of Ann DiPrima's testimony on the ground it misstated the evidence. The prosecutor mentioned to the jury DiPrima's testimony that defendant had brought to her house cartons of cigarettes, firecrackers, speakers with Chinese lettering on them, and a coffee can with coins in it, telling her that he had obtained them from Chinatown. Defendant correctly notes DiPrima did not testify that defendant told her the speakers or the can of coins were from Chinatown. DiPrima, however, did testify that when she saw defendant the morning after the commercial burglaries he had a coffee can with change in it and that several days later she discovered speakers with Chinese lettering on them in her backyard. Defendant fails to show that trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's slight mischaracterization of DiPrima's testimony was prejudicial.