Opinion ID: 1610178
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: employment at will doctrine.

Text: ¶ 37. HeartSouth argues that Boyd is subject to an implied contract which was created by the actions of the parties and for which no terms have been written. HeartSouth argues that Boyd's actions created a contract between the parties and therefore subjects him to the terms of the original employment agreement. ¶ 38. HeartSouth's argument is contrary to the employment at will doctrine. HeartSouth would have this Court hold Boyd subject to an implied contract for which no terms exist. It would be repugnant to precedent to allow HeartSouth to hold Boyd liable under a fictitious employment contract and impose terms upon him for which he never agreed to abide. ¶ 39. Mississippi has followed the employment at will doctrine since 1858. McArn, 626 So.2d at 606 (citing Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So.2d 1086, 1088 (Miss.1987)). The employment at will doctrine provides that an employment contact at will may be terminated by either party with or without justification. Id. at 606 (quoting Kelly v. Miss.Valley Gas Co., 397 So.2d 874, 877 (Miss.1981)). [A]bsent an employment contract expressly providing to the contrary, an employee may be discharged at the employer's will for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, excepting only reasons independently declared legally impermissible. McArn, 626 So.2d at 606 (quoting Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247, 253-54 (Miss. 1985)). See also Miss. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 437 So.2d 388, 397 (Miss.1983). This Court has only recognized two exceptions in tort to the doctrine of employment at will in McArn wherein we stated: We are of the opinion that there should be in at least two circumstances, a narrow public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine and this should be so whether there is a written contract or not: (1) an employee who refuses to participate in an illegal act as in Laws [v. Aetna Finance Co., 667 F.Supp. 342 (N.D.Miss.1987),] shall not be barred by the common law rule of employment at will from bringing an action in tort for damages against his employer; (2) an employee who is discharged for reporting illegal acts of his employer to the employer or anyone else is not barred by the employment at will doctrine from bringing action in tort for damages against his employer. 626 So.2d at 607. ¶ 40. HeartSouth's implied contract is contrary to our holdings concerning employment at will. If this Court found that HeartSouth through the use of parol evidence could prove an implied contract and thereby seek damages for the breach of such contract, then employees could also get around the employment at will doctrine and sue their employers for breach of an implied contract for employment. Under HeartSouth's theory, no assent to be bound is necessary for an implied contract. All that HeartSouth argues that is needed is actions which are consistent with a contractual relationship. HeartSouth's argument is without merit and contrary to established precedent. ¶ 41. In sum, we have stated that `[t]he right to contract is fundamental to our jurisprudence and absent mutual mistake, fraud and/or illegality, the courts do not have the authority to modify, add to, or subtract from the terms of the contract validly executed between two parties.'  Wallace v. United Miss. Bank, 726 So.2d 578, 584 (Miss.1998). (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg v. Caruthers, 443 So.2d 861, 864 (Miss.1983)). `Contracts are solemn obligations and it is not the function of the courts to make contracts for parties, but rather to give effect to them as written.' Miller v. Miss. Stone Co., 379 So.2d 919 (Miss.1980) (quoting Roberts v. Corum, 236 Miss. 809, 815, 112 So.2d 550, 556 (Miss.1959)). For these reasons, we cannot at the request of Heartsouth hold Boyd subject to an employment contract that does not exist.