Opinion ID: 1698030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Willie Dean Ware and Adrienne Baker

Text: Clerks of court and magistrates like Ware and Baker are afforded judicial immunity for their discretionary judicial acts. City of Bayou La Batre v. Robinson, 785 So.2d 1128, 1133 (Ala.2000) (citing Almon v. Gibbs, 545 So.2d 18, 20 (Ala.1989)). Judicial-immunity cases decided both before and after the Cranman restatement was adopted provide guidance in this case. Before the adoption of the Cranman restatement, this Court determined whether clerks and magistrates were entitled to judicial immunity by first analyzing whether the clerk or magistrate was acting within his or her official capacity, and secondly, whether the act was discretionary or administrative in nature. Almon, 545 So.2d at 20. In Almon, a district court clerk was sued for failing to issue a warrant. The clerk decided not to issue the warrant after determining that there was a lack of probable cause for arrest. This Court has held that where a clerk of court is performing a duty that requires the exercise of judgment and discretion in its performance, it is considered a judicial act entitling the clerk to judicial immunity. This absolute immunity for acts within the jurisdiction of the judicial officer is extended even where the officer acts in error, maliciously, or in excess of his authority. 545 So.2d at 20. We held that the court clerk was entitled to immunity because the determination whether probable cause to issue a warrant existed involved an exercise of discretion. Almon, 545 So.2d at 20. Since the adoption of the Cranman restatement, this Court analyzes whether a magistrate or court clerk is entitled to judicial immunity for official acts by determining whether the magistrate or clerk was required to `exercise judgment' in the execution of the task. Bayou La Batre, 785 So.2d at 1133 (quoting Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405). In Bayou La Batre, a city court magistrate attempted to fax a warrant-recall order to the city police department. The magistrate placed the recall order upside down in the fax machine so that she in fact transmitted the back of the ordera blank pagerather than the recall order itself. Bayou La Batre, 785 So.2d at 1130. The police never received the recall order, and the plaintiff was arrested because the police believed that there was an outstanding warrant for the plaintiff's arrest. The plaintiff sued the City of Bayou La Batre, alleging false arrest and false imprisonment. The city argued that because the magistrate enjoyed judicial immunity the city was also immune from liability as to claims based on the magistrate's conduct. This Court held that magistrates and clerks are officials with a blend of judicial and administrative duties and that, under Cranman, they are entitled to judicial immunity when they are required to `exercise judgment' in the execution of a task. Bayou La Batre, 785 So.2d at 1133 (citing Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405). We held that, under the Cranman restatement, the magistrate was not entitled to judicial immunity because she was performing an administrative duty that did not involve the exercise of judgment when she faxed the warrant-recall order to the police department. Bayou La Batre, 785 So.2d at 1133. In addition, this Court distinguished the acts of the court magistrate in faxing the warrant-recall order upside down from the acts of the court clerk in Almon. We stated: This Court held [in Almon ] that the determination of whether probable cause existed to issue a warrant is a judicial act, an act that properly affords judicial immunity. [545 So.2d at 20.] The situation with which we are confronted today is whether a magistrate should be protected by judicial immunity for failure to recall a warrant. Bayou La Batre, 785 So.2d at 1133. The petitioners argue that their petition is due to be granted because, they say, Ware and Baker have judicial immunity. [7] Baker, in her affidavit, stated that Ware instructed her to clean up any pending or unresolved files. In doing so, Baker apparently made an error in issuing the capias warrant for Arnold's arrest for failure to appear. Under the holding in Bayou La Batre, the Cranman test is applied to determine whether Baker and Ware are entitled to judicial immunity. 785 So.2d at 1133. The petitioners state that Baker and Ware's decision to issue the warrant for Arnold's arrest required the exercise of judgment and discretion in issuing a warrant to resolve a pending file. Despite this argument, the evidence before us does not indicate what steps Baker and Ware took before issuing the warrant for Arnold's arrest. Baker's and Ware's affidavits do not describe how they made the decisions to clean up the court files and to issue the warrant for Arnold's arrest. At this point in the proceeding, it is unclear whether Ware's instruction to clean up the files and Baker's actions in cleaning up the files were discretionary-type actions that involved the exercise of judgment required for immunity under Cranman. [8] We are unable to determine whether Baker's and Ware's actions are like the administrative act of the magistrate in Bayou La Batre, 785 So.2d at 1129 (faxing the warrant-recall order upside down) or the discretionary-type action of the court clerk in Almon, 545 So.2d at 20 (determining whether probable cause existed to issue a warrant). Therefore, at this point in the proceeding, Baker and Ware have not established a clear legal right to an order directing the trial court to stay discovery and conduct a hearing on the summary-judgment motion on the basis of judicial immunity.