Opinion ID: 1119446
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Procedures Required by Due Process

Text: The Defendant argues that his right to procedural due process was violated. He argues that he should have been formally charged by information with being a persistent offender, that he had a right to a jury trial at sentencing, and that the proof of his prior convictions should have been beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant does not engage in a Gunwall analysis to show the state constitution affords greater protection in these three areas. The Defendant urges this court to find that the same procedures which were required under the habitual criminals act [13] should also be required under the new law. Although there are some similarities between the two laws, there are also significant differences in that the crimes used to determine habitual criminal status under the older habitual criminals act were much less serious than the most serious offenses necessary to find a defendant to be a persistent offender under the new law. The habitual criminals act provided for life imprisonment when one who had previously twice been convicted in this state or elsewhere of a felony was convicted of any crime of which fraud or intent to defraud is an element or of petit larceny or of any felony. That act also provided that one who had been four times convicted of petit larceny, or of any misdemeanor of which fraud or intent to defraud is an element, shall be punished by life imprisonment. RCW 9.92.090. In this case and in another case heard by this court on the same day as the present case, [14] it was argued that the new Persistent Offender Accountability Act is simply a reenactment of the old habitual criminals act. We conclude that the new law is not a reenactment of the older statute; the Persistent Offender Accountability Act is a new sentencing law which amends the SRA. Under the habitual criminals act, this court mandated a number of procedural safeguards, including charging by information, a right to a jury trial on the charge in the supplemental information, and proof of the elements of the status of being a habitual criminal beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., State v. Hennings, 100 Wash.2d 379, 389, 670 P.2d 256 (1983); State v. Murdock, 91 Wash.2d 336, 340, 588 P.2d 1143 (1979); State v. Starrish, 86 Wash.2d 200, 204, 544 P.2d 1 (1975). This court recognized these features as the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence. Hennings, 100 Wash.2d at 385, 670 P.2d 256. There is conflicting language in the cases regarding whether the habitual criminals act contained elements of a charge or was simply a sentencing enhancement statute. Compare Hennings, 100 Wash.2d at 389, 670 P.2d 256; Murdock, 91 Wash.2d at 340, 588 P.2d 1143; State v. Holsworth, 93 Wash.2d 148, 159, 607 P.2d 845 (1980); Starrish, 86 Wash.2d at 203, 544 P.2d 1; with State v. Kelly, 52 Wash.2d 676, 677-78, 328 P.2d 362 (1958); State v. Bryant, 73 Wash.2d 168, 173, 437 P.2d 398 (1968). We conclude that the procedures used under the habitual criminals act do not apply to the new Persistent Offender Accountability Act. The 1909 habitual criminals act contained no procedures, and the ones imposed by this court were originally contained in the former 1903 habitual criminals act. See State v. Gustafson, 87 Wash. 613, 614, 152 P. 335 (1915). In contrast, the new Persistent Offender Accountability Act is a part of the SRA, which does spell out the procedures to be followed during a sentencing proceeding. The procedures contained in the SRA apply to the persistent offender law. Unless these statutory procedures violate constitutional guarantees, they must be applied to the new law. See Western Petroleum, 127 Wash.2d at 427, 899 P.2d 792 (an original act and an amendment to it should be read together and construed as one law). The legislature has the authority to determine sentencing procedures. Ammons, 105 Wash.2d at 180, 713 P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796; State v. Benn, 120 Wash.2d 631, 671, 845 P.2d 289 (legislature's power to set sentence parameters entails the power to prescribe sentencing procedures), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 944, 114 S.Ct. 382, 126 L.Ed.2d 331 (1993). We do not have the right to mandate particular procedures greater than the procedures required by the statute unless the procedures run afoul of a constitutional requirement. We conclude that the Persistent Offender Accountability Act is a sentencing law. It was enacted and codified as a part of the SRA, and the purpose of the law is to change sentencing in Washington for those criminals who persist in committing dangerous crimes. See RCW 9.94A.392. We, therefore, will look first to the statute to determine what procedures are due under that law and then ask if any of those procedures violate the guarantee of due process.