Opinion ID: 1241755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The majority opinion misunderstands W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(k)

Text: The majority opinion, as did the Court in Syllabus Point 3 of Deel v. Sweeney, 181 W.Va. 460, 383 S.E.2d 92 (1989), misunderstands W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(k). This subsection states: Nothing contained herein shall prevent any insurer from also offering benefits and limits other than those prescribed herein, nor shall this section be construed as preventing any insurer from incorporating in such terms, conditions and exclusions as may be consistent with the premium charged. The first clause of subsection (k) permits insurance companies to offer[ ] benefits and limits other than those prescribed [in W.Va. Code, 33-6-31]. This language obviously permits an automobile insurer to offer any type of coverage (together with particular limits to that coverage) that it chooses. Under this statute, an insurance company can offerin addition to the un- and underinsured coverage required by subsection (b) of the statuteother forms of coverage ( e.g., towing coverage, comprehensive and collision coverage, travel insurance, etc. ). As Justice W. McGraw once deftly noted, the more crucial question in interpreting subsection (k) is how the second clause of subsection (k) should be construed. Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208 W.Va. 36, 61, 537 S.E.2d 882, 907 (2000) (McGraw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Subsection (k) has been relied upon by insurance companiesincluding State Farm in the instant casefor the proposition in the second clause that an insurance company can incorporat[e] in such terms, conditions and exclusions as may be consistent with the premium charged. (Emphasis added.) Justice McGraw examined the language chosen by the Legislature, and concluded that the Deel Court had misquoted the second clauseand by dropping one word from the statute, the word in, had given the statute a flawed interpretation. [3] He argued for the following interpretation: Although not a model of textual clarity, the word in was plainly intended to be synonymous with therein, which in effect limits the second clause to the subject of the first. Subsection (k) therefore merely permits an insurer to impose terms, conditions and exclusions upon benefits and limits other than those prescribed herein. In other words, the statute allows an insurer to impose limitations or exclusions on offerings that are otherwise not specified in the statute. There is simply nothing in this language that could, by any stretch of the imagination, be construed to permit an insurance company to corrupt or curtail the coverages specifically prescribed in subsection (b), regardless of whether those coverages are mandatory or optional to the policyholder. The construction of subsection (k) that I put forward here is certainly no less plausible than that placed upon it by Deel and its progeny. As the Court stated in syllabus point 7 of Perkins v. Doe, 177 W.Va. 84, 350 S.E.2d 711 (1986), [t]he uninsured motorist statute, West Virginia Code Sec. 33-6-31 (Supp.1986), is remedial in nature and, therefore, must be construed liberally in order to effect its purpose. Consequently, to the extent there is any ambiguity in subsection (k), the statute must be construed in favor of securing for automobile insurance consumers the opportunity to obtain the optional coverages specified in subsection (b) without the inclusion of terms, conditions and exclusions that otherwise conflict with the statute. 208 W.Va. at 61, 537 S.E.2d at 907. I agree with Justice McGraw's interpretation of W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(k). I therefore believe that W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(k) should be interpreted to mean that an insurance company may offer coverages other than those prescribed by W.Va.Code, 33-6-31, and may incorporate thereinmeaning incorporate into coverages other than those prescribedsuch terms, conditions and exclusions as may be consistent with the premium charged. Accordingly, Syllabus Point 3 of Deel v. Sweeney and its progeny should be overruled. IV