Opinion ID: 1411993
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of the law of embezzlement to the present case

Text: In the instant case, it is undisputed that Kimberly Weaver had no independent authority to write checks from R & D accounts or to use Shirley Weaver's signature stamp. In fact, both Kimberly and Shirley Weaver testified that direct authorization from Shirley was required before Kimberly wrote each individual check. Although the record is unclear as to the exact location of each check used to misappropriate the company funds, the record indicates that the signature stamp was kept in a desk drawer in Shirley Weaver's office and that Kimberly Weaver could not access this stamp without Shirley Weaver's direct permission. While Kimberly Weaver had access to the checks and signature stamp by virtue of her status as an employee at R & D and International Color, we cannot say, based on these facts, that Kimberly Weaver's possession of this property was lawful nor are we persuaded that this property was under Kimberly Weaver's care and control as required by N.C.G.S. § 14-90. Because Kimberly Weaver never lawfully possessed the misappropriated funds and because the funds were not under [her] care we conclude that Kimberly Weaver did not commit the crime of embezzlement as defined in N.C.G.S. § 14-90. `It is a rule of universal observance in the administration of criminal law that a defendant must be convicted, if convicted at all, of the particular offense charged in the bill of indictment. The allegation and proof must correspond.' State v. Watson, 272 N.C. 526, 527, 158 S.E.2d 334, 335 (1968) (quoting State v. Jackson, 218 N.C. 373, 376, 11 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1940)). Here, defendant was indicted for two counts of aiding and abetting Kimberly Weaver to embezzle funds from International Color, nineteen counts of aiding and abetting Kimberly Weaver to embezzle funds from R & D, and a single count of conspiracy to commit embezzlement from International Color and R & D. Accordingly, the evidence presented by the State at trial must establish that Kimberly Weaver committed the crime of embezzlement to support defendant's convictions on these indictments. However, the State did not prove, and in actuality cannot establish, that Kimberly Weaver embezzled funds from these companies. Kimberly Weaver unlawfully used Shirley Weaver's signature stamp to come into possession of R & D and International Color funds; therefore, the facts appear to support the crime of larceny rather than embezzlement. Accordingly, the appropriate charges against defendant should have been aiding and abetting larceny and conspiracy to commit larceny. Because the State cannot make the allegation[s] and proof correspond, the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed. The State sets forth two main arguments in support of its position on appeal. First, the State argues that Kimberly Weaver was an agent of R & D Plastics and International Color; therefore, she gained access to the misappropriated funds lawfully. Second, the State argues that Kimberly Weaver possessed the currency she later embezzled and that the majority of the Court of Appeals' panel erred in center[ing] on Kimberly Weaver's check writing authority rather than the dominion and control she had over the U.S. currency. We find both arguments unpersuasive for the reasons stated below. The State primarily relies on State v. Johnson, 335 N.C. 509, 438 S.E.2d 722 (1994) to establish that Kimberly Weaver was her employer's agent. However, we find Johnson totally inapposite to the instant case. In Johnson, an attorney was hired for the express purpose of recovering money for damages his client incurred in an automobile accident. 335 N.C. at 510, 438 S.E.2d at 722. Thus, as we stated in Johnson, The defendant was the agent of [his client] with authority to negotiate the settlement of her claim. Id. at 511, 438 S.E.2d at 723. The defendant subsequently negotiated and accepted a payment from the liability carrier on his client's behalf. Although defendant told the adjuster that his client would accept the payment as full compensation for her injuries, defendant never informed his client that he had negotiated a settlement or received the draft transferring the funds. Id. at 510, 438 S.E.2d at 722. Subsequently, defendant or someone in his law office forged the client's signature on the required paperwork, and defendant deposited the money in his personal account. Id. Defendant was later convicted of embezzlement. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, and this Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for reinstatement of the sentence. 335 N.C. at 512, 438 S.E.2d at 723. Johnson has no bearing on the present case. In Johnson there was no dispute that defendant was his client's agent for purposes of negotiating a settlement and obtaining payment in compensation for his client's injuries. In his capacity as an attorney representing his client, defendant acquired the insurance proceeds meant for his client in a lawful manner. Thus, he was properly charged with embezzlement when he later misappropriated those funds. In contrast, Kimberly Weaver does not meet the legal definition of an agent. Two essential elements of an agency relationship are: (1) the authority of the agent to act on behalf of the principal, and (2) the principal's control over the agent. Holcomb v. Colonial Assocs., 358 N.C. 501, 509, 597 S.E.2d 710, 716 (2004). Additionally, both parties must consent that the agent will act on behalf of the principal in a particular capacity. Ellison v. Hunsinger, 237 N.C. 619, 628, 75 S.E.2d 884, 891 (1953). Agency is a relationship which cannot be forced on a person in invitum.  Johnson v. Orrell, 231 N.C. 197, 201, 56 S.E.2d 414, 417 (1949). As stated above, it is undisputed that Kimberly Weaver did not have authority to take the signature stamp or to write any check without specific permission from Shirley Weaver. The State's reliance on Kimberly Weaver's ongoing training to become accounting manager and the fact that Kimberly Weaver was her supervisor's `best friend' is insufficient to overcome this dispositive fact. Unlike the defendant in Johnson, Kimberly Weaver was not her employer's agent and she never lawfully possessed the misappropriated funds, initially or otherwise. Therefore, Johnson does not support the State's argument that Kimberly Weaver embezzled the misappropriated funds. We now address the State's argument to the effect that the Court of Appeals' majority erred in center[ing] on Kimberly Weaver's check-writing authority rather than the dominion and control she had over the U.S. currency. This argument seeks to support the elements of embezzlement which require that the person who misapplied the funds have received, and thus come into possession of, the employer's property by the terms of his employment and in the course of his employment. As possession of property can be actual or constructive, the Court of Appeals' majority considered whether possession could be supported on either theory, noting that: The State correctly cites the rule that possession of property may be actual or constructive. However, [a]lthough defendant's possession of the entrusted property may be actual or constructive, even constructive possession of property requires `an intent and capability to maintain control and dominion' over it.[ ] Weaver, 160 N.C.App. at 619, 586 S.E.2d at 844-45 (quoting State v. Jackson, 57 N.C.App. 71, 76, 291 S.E.2d 190, 194, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 389, 294 S.E.2d 216 (1982)), quoted in State v. Bonner, 91 N.C.App. 424, 426, 371 S.E.2d 773, 775 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). The State's argument fails because it is immaterial whether Kimberly Weaver had actual or constructive possession of the misappropriated funds. Because her possession, if any, was not lawful, the crime of embezzlement has not occurred. See Speckman, 326 N.C. at 578, 391 S.E.2d at 166 (This Court has held that to constitute embezzlement, the property in question initially must be acquired lawfully, pursuant to a trust relationship, and then wrongfully converted.). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial does not support defendant's conviction for the crime of embezzlement. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as to the issue on direct appeal. Defendant's convictions for aiding and abetting embezzlement and conspiracy to embezzle are reversed. Defendant also petitioned this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) for a writ of certiorari to review additional issues which were briefed and argued before the Court of Appeals but were not resolved in its opinion. We allowed certiorari on 5 February 2004; however, we now conclude that certiorari was improvidently allowed. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. AFFIRMED; WRIT OF CERTIORARI IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED. Justice NEWBY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.