Opinion ID: 2325941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence To Prove Malice Aforethought

Text: In Commonwealth v. Gooslin, 410 Pa. 285, 189 A. 2d 157, the Court reiterated the oft-repeated definition of murder (pages 288-289): `Murder in Pennsylvania was first authoritatively defined in the famous case of Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15. Murder, Mr. Justice STEARNE aptly said, in Commonwealth v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511, 515, 516, 76 A. 2d 394, is defined as an unlawful killing of another with malice aforethought, express or implied. The legislature divided murder into two classifications, murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree; and provided that (1) all murder perpetrated by poison or lying in wait; or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate or premeditated killing, or any murder which shall be committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate certain specified felonies [arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping], is murder in the first degree and (2) every other kind of murder is murder in the second degree: Act of June 24, 1939 [P.L. 872, as amended, § 701, 18 P.S. § 4701]. `Malice express or implied is the criterion and absolutely essential ingredient of murder. Malice in its legal sense exists not only where there is a particular ill will, but also whenever there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, wanton conduct, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty. Legal malice may be inferred and found from the attending circumstances. [Accord: Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 242 A. 2d 237; Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa. 188, 236 A. 2d 768; Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525, 194 A. 2d 911.] `To summarize: If there was an unlawful killing with (legal) malice, express or implied, that will constitute murder even though there was no intent to injure or kill the particular person who was killed and even though his death was unintentional or accidental: [citing thirteen Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cases]; 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 192-193; 40 C.J.S. § 13 p. 857, § 20 p. 866, § 21 p. 868; Wharton, Homicide § 2 p. 2, § 92 p. 112 (3rd ed. 1907); Maurer, Pennsylvania Criminal Law: Murder § 3582 p. 915 et seq., § 3689 p. 953 et seq.; I Warren, Homicide § 74 (Perm. ed. 1938); Clark & Marshall, Crimes § 245 (4th ed. 1940).' Accord: Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa., supra (page 530); Commonwealth v. Finnie, 415 Pa. 166, 170, 202 A. 2d 85; Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 421 Pa. 311, 317, 218 A. 2d 561; Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa., supra (at pages 193-194). The test for the sufficiency of evidence to support a murder conviction is likewise well settled. In Commonwealth v. Frye, 433 Pa. 473, 252 A. 2d 580, the Court affirmed a conviction of murder, and said (page 481): It is hornbook law that the test of the sufficiency of the evidence  irrespective of whether it is direct or circumstantial, or both  is whether, accepting as true all the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which if believed the jury could properly have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime or crimes of which he has been convicted. Commonwealth v. Finnie, 415 Pa. 166, 202 A. 2d 85; Commonwealth v. Burns, 409 Pa. 619, 634, 187 A. 2d 552; Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 161 A. 2d 861; Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A. 2d 301 (1968). See also, Commonwealth v. Terenda, 433 Pa. 519, 252 A. 2d 635; Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa., supra; Commonwealth v. Tabb, 417 Pa. 13, 16, 207 A. 2d 884. In Commonwealth v. Finnie, 415 Pa., supra, we said (pages 171-172): `In Commonwealth v. Tyrrell, 405 Pa. 210, 174 A. 2d 852, the Court said (pages 212-213): The essential difference in a non-felony murder-killing between murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree is that murder in the first degree requires a specific intent to take the life of another human being: Commonwealth v. Ballem, 386 Pa. 20, 123 A. 2d 728; Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa., supra; Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa., supra; Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa. 164, 58 A. 2d 433; Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 50 A. 2d 317; Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823. `The specific intent to kill which is necessary to constitute in a nonfelony murder, murder in the first degree, may be found from a defendant's words or conduct or from the attendant circumstances together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, and may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body of another human being : Commonwealth v. Tyrrell, 405 Pa., supra; Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 157 A. 2d 65; Commonwealth v. Nelson, 398 Pa. 359, 152 A. 2d 913; Commonwealth v. Ballem, 386 Pa. 20, 123 A. 2d 728; Commonwealth v. Heller, 369 Pa. 457, 87 A. 2d 287; Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 50 A. 2d 317.' With these important legal principles and standards to guide and govern us, we turn to defendant's motion (a) in arrest of judgment and (b) for a new trial. Appellant-defendant argues that, because of the conflict in the testimony and the pretrial statements of Carroll and Barcley, there is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he killed Page with malice aforethought. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must, there is abundant evidence to infer malice, and appellant's contention on this point is utterly devoid of merit.