Opinion ID: 594405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary Judgment on Britt's ADEA Claims and Directed Verdict on Hamilton's ADEA Claims.

Text: 36 Having determined that this Court has jurisdiction over the age discrimination claims, we review both the district court's granting of summary judgment in Grocers' favor on Britt's claims and the district court's directing a verdict in Grocers' favor on Hamilton's claims. After reviewing the merits of the claims, we affirm the respective decisions of the district courts. 37 Summary judgment is appropriate if the record discloses that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In reviewing the summary judgment, we apply the same standard of review as did the district court. Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir.1989); Moore v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 871 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir.1989). The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and answers to interrogatories, together with affidavits, must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact remains. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To that end we must review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir.1986). Finally, as the Supreme Court stated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 256, 106 S.Ct. at 2514 (citations omitted). The Court also held that the standard of review for a directed verdict is the same as that for review of a summary judgment. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. 38 In addition, a reviewing court is not limited to the district court's reasons in affirming a grant of summary judgment. This Court may affirm on grounds other than those relied upon by the district court when the record contains an adequate and independent basis for that result. Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1267, 117 L.Ed.2d 495 (1992); Schuster v. Martin, 861 F.2d 1369, 1371 (5th Cir.1988). 39 When no direct evidence of age discrimination exists, the evidentiary procedure generally adapted to the ADEA context is that announced by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Bienkowski v. American Airlines, 851 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir.1988). Initially, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of age discrimination. The elements of a prima facie case are hotly disputed in these two cases. 11 The elements of a prima facie case may be somewhat flexible in an ADEA case according to the facts in issue. McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.1980). Because we affirm the district courts on an alternative basis, it is unnecessary to resolve the issue of what the proper elements of a prima facie case should be. 40 If the plaintiff proves his prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination is established. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to rebut this presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its disparate treatment of the plaintiff. Id. Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's reasons are pretexts for unlawful discrimination either by showing: (1) that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the defendant or (2) that the defendant's reason is unworthy of credence. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-95, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The plaintiff retains the burden of persuading the fact finder that impermissible discrimination motivated the adverse employment decision. Id. 41 Both Britt and Hamilton contend that Grocers' replacement of employees with others, some of whom were allegedly younger, was motivated by the age of the strikers and violated the ADEA. The district courts in both Britt and Hamilton held that the plaintiffs had failed to make out a prima facie case under the act. 42 As this Court has stated it is relatively easy both for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case and for a defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his decision. Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories Corp., 936 F.2d 805, 811 (5th Cir.1991). Because neither plaintiff can show that the defendant's reasons for disparate treatment of the plaintiffs are pretexts for unlawful discrimination, however, we see no need to rummage through the arguments over whether the plaintiffs have established a prima facie case. In the context of summary judgment or directed verdict, the question is not whether the plaintiff proves pretext, but rather whether the plaintiff raises a genuine issue of fact regarding pretext. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. Both Britt and Hamilton fail to do so. 43 Grocers contends that its decision to convert the temporary employees into permanent employees was motivated by several concerns: (1) its gratitude to these individuals for keeping the company in operation during the strike; (2) that these temporary employees were leaving to take jobs elsewhere; and (3) striker misconduct. In the Britt case, the plaintiffs offered several affidavits in an attempt to establish pretext. The evidence in these affidavits offered to show age-related employment decisions consists of what are at best characterized as stray remarks by three Grocers employees concerning the age of the workers. This Court has ruled that similar statements are insufficiently probative to create a jury issue in an ADEA case. Guthrie v. Tifco, 941 F.2d at 379; Elliott v. Group Medical & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215, 104 S.Ct. 2658, 81 L.Ed.2d 364 (1984); Stendebach v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 691 F.2d 735, 738 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 944, 103 S.Ct. 2122, 77 L.Ed.2d 1302 (1983). These statements are insufficient to show either that (1) a discriminatory reason more than likely motivated Grocers or (2) Grocers' explanation is unworthy of credence. 44 The Hamilton plaintiffs relied on much the same evidence in presenting their case for trial as did the Britt plaintiffs in the summary judgment proceeding. This evidence, even considered with the additional evidence adduced at trial, is insufficient to rebut Grocers' reasons for failing to recall the strikers. As the district court found, Grocers may have been reluctant to rehire these workers, but the evidence is insufficient to establish that the reason for this reluctance was age discrimination. 45 Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, Grocers was under no obligation to notify the plaintiffs that they were being replaced. Nor does this lack of notification imply a bias based on age. Hamilton also challenges Grocers' practice of refusing to recall anyone who resigned to obtain his benefits. The theory is that Grocers coerced older workers into resigning to obtain their pension benefits, thereby discriminating against these workers based on age. Nothing in the record supports this claim. Additionally, we do not see how this practice harms older plaintiffs. 46 Hamilton asserts that the strikers were replaced because of their seniority and higher salaries, and that such an action supports an inference of age discrimination. This Court, however, has stated repeatedly that [s]eniority and age discrimination are unrelated. Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 130 n. 17 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1439, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); see also Amburgey, 936 F.2d at 813. Hamilton relies on Uffelman v. Lone Star Steel Co., 863 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1098, 109 S.Ct. 2448, 104 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1989), to support this contention. Uffelman is distinguishable, however, because, by terminating Uffelman, the employer was able to avoid paying Uffelman's retirement benefits as he was nine months away from vesting. In this case, Grocers actually paid substantial retirement benefits to strikers who resigned. Finally, the comparison of the age of workers at another Grocers' subsidiary with the age of workers at the location where the plaintiffs worked does not bolster this argument. 47 Hamilton offered as support of age discrimination evidence that during the recall, younger workers were hired to take regular positions, while older employees awaiting recall were offered only jobs in the frozen food warehouse. 12 The record does not support this contention. Additionally, this Court held in Hanchey v. Energas Co., 925 F.2d 96, 99 (5th Cir.1990), that offering a different job to the plaintiff did not raise a genuine issue of fact regarding pretext. We find the remainder of Hamilton's evidence equally unconvincing. 48 In sum, the appellants are left with nothing more than their speculation and belief that they were permanently replaced because of age. This type of evidence is insufficient to create a fact issue as to pretext. Little v. Republic Refining Co., 924 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.1991); Laurence v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 885 F.2d 280 (5th Cir.1989). Therefore, we uphold the summary judgment in the Britt case and the directed verdict in the Hamilton case. 49