Opinion ID: 2007417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether MRS 17.545 is Punitive in Purpose or Effect

Text: Because we conclude that the General Assembly did not intend KRS 17.545 to be punitive, we must now determine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention to deem it `civil.' Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In making such a determination, courts are guided by seven factors originally discussed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). Smith, 538 U.S. at 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140. As in Smith , the five factors relevant here are, whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme (1) has been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment, (2) promotes the traditional aims of punishment, (3) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, (4) has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, or (5) is excessive with respect to the nonpunitive purpose. Id.
We first address whether the scheme established by KRS 17.545 has been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment. Traditionally, the colonial era practice of banishing an offender from the community has been regarded as a form of punishment. Smith, 538 U.S. at 98, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Banishment has been defined as punishment inflicted upon criminals by compelling them to quit a city, place, or country, for a specified period of time, or for life. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269-70, 25 S.Ct. 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040 (1905). As the district court rioted, courts reviewing sex offender residency restrictions have avoided or sidestepped the issue of whether these restrictions constitute banishment, and dissenting judges have been far more intellectually honest concluding that residency restrictions constitute banishment. While KRS 17.545 is not identical to traditional banishment, [5] it does prevent the registrant from residing in large areas of the community. It also expels registrants from their own homes, even if their residency predated the statute or arrival of the school, daycare, or playground. Such restrictions strike this Court as decidedly similar to banishment. We therefore conclude that the residency restrictions in KRS 17.545 have been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment.
Next, we address whether KRS 17.545 promotes the traditional aims of punishment: retribution and deterrence. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168, 83 S.Ct. 554. KRS 17.545 promotes general deterrence through the threat of negative consequences, i.e. eviction or restriction of where a person may live in the future. More significant, however, is the statute's retributive effect. KRS 17.545 makes no individualized determination of the dangerousness of a particular registrant. Even those registrants whose victims were adults are prohibited from living near an area where children gather. When a restriction is imposed equally upon all offenders, with no consideration given to how dangerous any particular registrant may be to public safety, that restriction begins to look far more like retribution for past offenses than a regulation intended to prevent future ones. In his concurring opinion in Smith , Justice Souter expressed his unease with the absence of individualized risk assessment: Ensuring public safety is, of course, a fundamental regulatory goal ... and this objective should be given serious weight in the analyses. But, at the same time, it would be naive to look no further, given pervasive attitudes toward sex offenders.... The fact that the Act uses past crime as the touchstone, probably sweeping in a significant number of people who pose no real threat to the community, serves to feed suspicion that something more than regulation of safety is going on; when a legislature uses prior convictions to impose burdens that outpace the law's stated civil aims, there is room for serious argument that the ulterior purpose is to revisit past crimes, not prevent future ones. Smith, 538 U.S. at 108-09, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (Souter, J., concurring). By imposing restraints based solely upon prior offenses, KRS 17.545 promotes and furthers retribution against sex offenders for their past crimes. We therefore conclude that KRS 17.545 promotes the traditional aims of punishment.
Next, we address whether KRS 17.545 imposes an affirmative disability or restraint. We find it difficult to imagine that being prohibited from residing within certain areas does not qualify as an affirmative disability or restraint. In Hyatt, this Court upheld registration requirements, noting that registration does not place limitations on the activities of the offender.... 72 S.W.3d at 572 (citing Collie v. State, 710 So.2d 1000 (Fla.Ct.App.1998)). In Smith , the U.S. Supreme Court found it significant that offenders subject to the Alaska [registration] statute are free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision. 538 U.S. at 101, 123 S.Ct. 1140. By contrast, KRS 17.545 places significant limitations on where a registrant may live. With this limitation come significant collateral consequences. As the district court noted, the restrictions could, for example, impact where an offender's children attend school, access to public transportation for employment purposes, access to employment opportunities, access to drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs and even access to medical care and residential nursing home facilities for the aging offender. The registrant also faces a constant threat of eviction because there is no way for him or her to find a permanent home in that there are no guarantees a school or [other facility] ... will not open within 1,000 feet of any given location. State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145 at 1150 (Ind. 2009). As such, a registrant cannot establish a permanent home. KRS 17.545 clearly imposes affirmative disabilities and restraints upon registrants.
We next consider whether KRS 17.545 has a rational connection to a legitimate nonpunitive public purpose. The Commonwealth argues that residency restrictions serve the nonpunitive purpose of public safety, which is undoubtedly a legitimate purpose. The question is therefore whether KRS 17.545 bears a rational connection to public safety. KRS 17.545 prohibits registrants from residing (i.e. sleeping at night, when children are not present) within 1,000 feet of areas where children congregate, but it does not prohibit registrants from spending all day at a school, daycare center, or playground (when children are present). It allows registered sex offenders to sit across the street and watch children, and even to work near children. KRS 17.545 does not even restrict an offender from living with the victim, so long as they live and sleep outside of the prohibited area. All KRS 17.545 prohibits is residing in a home within the prohibited zone. It does not regulate contact with children. It is difficult to see how public safety is enhanced by a registrant not being allowed to sleep near a school at night, when children are not present, but being allowed to stay there during the day, when children are present. [6] KRS 17.545 is connected to public safety. However, the statute's inherent flaws prevent that connection from being rational. Therefore, we conclude that KRS 17.545 does not have a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose.
Finally, we address whether KRS 17.545 is excessive with respect to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety. In making that determination, we note the lack of individualized risk assessment, combined with the statute's fluidity. First, as noted previously, KRS 17.545 does not make any type of individualized assessment as to whether a particular offender is a threat to public safety. KRS 17.545 prohibits all registrantsregardless of whether the registrant's victim was an adult, teenager, or child, and regardless of whether the crime was violent, nonviolent, or statutoryfrom living within 1,000 feet of a school, playground, or daycare facility. There is absolutely no individual determination. The Commonwealth correctly points out that a statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance. Smith, 538 U.S. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140. In Smith , the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that individual assessment was not necessary for sex offender registration requirements, and that [t]he State's determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness, does not make the statute a punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 104, 123 S.Ct. 1140. In Kansas v. Hendricks , the U.S. Supreme Court upheld involuntary civil commitment of sex offenders who had completed their period of incarceration. 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501. The Kansas law at issue required individual assessment of offenders prior to commitment. Id. at 352-53, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The Smith court noted that, while individual assessment is not required for sex offender registration, in Hendricks , [t]he magnitude of the restraint made individual assessment appropriate. Smith, 538 U.S. at 104, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The residency restrictions found in KRS 17.545 are more onerous than the registration requirements at issue in Hyatt and Smith , but less onerous than the involuntary commitment in Hendricks . We believe that the magnitude of the restraint involved in residency restrictions is sufficient for a lack of individual assessment to render the statute punitive. The record before us does not reveal whether or not Respondent might be a threat to children and to public safety. But this is exactly why KRS 17.545 is excessive. [7] Given the drastic consequences of Kentucky's residency restrictions, and the fact that there is no individual determination of the threat a particular registrant poses to public safety, we can only conclude that KRS 17.545 is excessive with respect to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety. Second, as the district court stated, [t]he excessiveness of Kentucky's residency restrictions is further heightened by their fluidity. While a sex offender may be permitted one day to live in a particular home, he may the next day find himself prohibited by the opening of a school, daycare facility, or playground. Perhaps even more troublesome is the fact that a city could easily designate an area a playground, and the statute provides no guidance as to what exactly qualifies as a playground. While such fluidity may provide little problem for registrants in rural areas of Kentucky, it should be easy to see why this becomes a serious burden in areas such as Louisville, Lexington, or Respondent's home of Northern Kentucky, with its dozens of tightly clustered municipalities. Furthermore, the statute places the sole burden on the registrant in determining whether or not he is in compliance. KRS 17.545(2). This fluidity and uncertainty makes KRS 17.545 excessive with respect to the purpose of public safety. Of the five Smith factors, all five weigh in favor of concluding that KRS 17.545 is punitive in effect. Therefore, we conclude that KRS 17.545 is so punitive in effect as to negate the General Assembly's intention to deem it civil.