Opinion ID: 1360499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Extension of Qualified Personal Immunity to the State

Text: The proper starting point for a discussion of whether the State is immune for the qualifiedly immune acts of its officers must begin with the legislative abrogation of sovereign immunity. Article II, § 26 of the Washington State Constitution provides: [t]he legislature shall direct by law, in what manner, and in what courts, suits may be brought against the state. In 1961, the Legislature waived the State's sovereign immunity from civil liability. Laws of 1961, ch. 136, § 1 (codified as RCW 4.92.090). As subsequently amended, that section provides: The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation. This provision operates to make the State presumptively liable in all instances in which the Legislature has not indicated otherwise. Quite apart from the legislative mandate abrogating sovereign immunity, the different functions personal and governmental immunity are designed to serve support maintaining state liability in this context, even where the agent enjoys qualified personal immunity. One court has explained the difference as follows: [T]he fundamental reasons for the two immunities differ; for the officer it is to encourage unrestrained execution of responsibility, while for the sovereign it is to prevent judicial scrutiny of basic policies formulated by coordinate branches of government. To insulate the Government from liability for the inevitable mishaps which will occur when its employees perform their functions without fear of liability not only is unjust, but also serves no purpose for which sovereign immunity need exist. Downs v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 713, 750 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (in a Federal Tort Claims Act case it was unnecessary to decide whether government agents were immune, because the government would not be immune even if they were), rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir.1975); see also Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wn.2d at 108. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS recognizes this notion: With respect to some government functions, the threat of individual liability would have a devasting [sic] effect, while the threat of governmental liability would not significantly impair performance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D cmt. j, at 420 (1979). A fact and policy specific inquiry also suggests the rationale underlying the grant of qualified personal immunity to parole officers does not apply with equal force to the State. Parole officers supervising parolees are called upon to make difficult decisions under difficult circumstances. Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195, 215, 822 P.2d 243 (1992). Given these conditions, the prospect of personal liability may reasonably be expected to have an unduly inhibiting effect on the performance of their professional duties. As was the case in Babcock v. State, 116 Wn.2d 596, 616-19, 809 P.2d 143 (1991), the same cannot be said about state liability. On the contrary, maintaining the potential of state liability, as established in RCW 4.92, can be expected to have the salutary effect of providing the State an incentive to ensure that reasonable care is used in fashioning guidelines and procedures for the supervision of parolees. This concern is particularly acute given our recognition that the State has a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect against reasonably foreseeable dangers posed by the dangerous propensities of parolees. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 217. We have also stated that because of the dangers violent parolees present, adequate supervision must be provided. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 215. In this regard, Amicus Washington Defense Trial Lawyers has submitted empirical data establishing that parolees are dangerous and pose a high risk of recidivism. See Br. of Amicus Curiae Washington Defense Trial Lawyers, app. A (Washington State Department of Corrections Recidivism Briefing Paper No. 5 (Feb. 1994)); Criminal Justice Inst., Inc., The Corrections Yearbook (1993), at 14-15. [5] In sum, given the legislative mandate abrogating sovereign immunity, the different purposes personal and government immunity are designed to serve, and the policy concerns just discussed, extending the qualified personal immunity of parole officers to the State would be not only judicially unwarranted but normatively unwise. Government liability, combined with qualified personal immunity for officers, is better suited to accommodate the concerns with which tort law is ultimately concerned. The benefits of maintaining this dichotomy in the liability structure have been identified by one commentator: exclusive governmental liability may have advantages from a deterrence point of view. By encouraging higher standards of care in the selection, training, equipment, and supervision of personnel, such a system can have at least as positive an effect on governmental performance as one based upon liability of the individual official. It would also protect the official from any paralyzing threat of direct personal liability, thus presumably improving morale and effectiveness. (Footnote omitted.) George A. Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (1977). For the reasons just stated, the Court of Appeals' holding that the personal qualified immunity of parole officers runs to the State is reversed.