Opinion ID: 1129438
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lying-in-wait Murder

Text: The jury found true the lying-in-wait special-circumstance allegation (see § 190.2, subd. (a)(15) [[t]he defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait]). Defendant challenges the foregoing finding on several grounds. (12a) The instructions told the jury that the special circumstance required proof of an intentional murder committed while lying in wait, and that [l]ying in wait requires the following elements: waiting, watching, and concealment.... The element of concealment ... may manifest itself either by an ambush or by the creation of a situation where the victim is taken unawares even though he sees his murderer. While concealment is an element ..., it is only a concealment which puts the defendant in a position of advantage from which it can be inferred that lying in wait was part of the defendant's plan to take his victim by surprise. (Italics added.) Finally, the jury was told that if it had a reasonable doubt whether a perceptible interruption separates the period of concealment and watchful waiting from the period during which the killing takes place, you must find that special circumstance is not true. 1. Insufficient Instructions  Defendant argues that the foregoing instructions were inaccurate in failing to require an actual physical concealment. We disagree. Before we discuss the applicable legal principles, however, we briefly summarize the evidence in this case as it pertains to the lying-in-wait issue. Accomplice Ortega asked victim Winchell to accompany him to a shopping mall to find a gift for a friend. After learning from Ortega that the couple would be arriving soon to pick him up, defendant armed himself with a belt, knife and hammer, telling his girlfriend Racquel Cardenas that he was going to do Ortega a favor and hurt a girl by strangling her with his belt. When Ortega and Winchell arrived, defendant climbed in the backseat, directly behind Winchell in the front seat. After Ortega had driven through town to a more isolated location, defendant reached over the seat and attempted to strangle Winchell with the belt. The belt broke, and then he began to beat her head repeatedly with the hammer. Winchell's cries for help from driver Ortega indicated that she was taken by surprise, and was previously unaware of any plan to harm her. Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence of his concealment from victim Winchell; indeed, the record is clear that Winchell was aware that defendant was seated behind her during the ride. Defendant argues that the foregoing lying-in-wait instructions improperly permitted the jury to predicate a lying-in-wait finding upon a mere concealment of defendant's purpose, rather than actual concealment of his person. Contrary to defendant's position, however, the cases have indicated that physical concealment from, or an actual ambush of, the victim is not a necessary element of the offense of lying-in-wait murder. ( People v. Sutic (1953) 41 Cal.2d 483, 492 [261 P.2d 241] [concealment in ambush unnecessary]; People v. Tuthill (1947) 31 Cal.2d 92, 100-101 [187 P.2d 16] [victim aware of defendant's physical presence prior to attack]; People v. Byrd (1954) 42 Cal.2d 200, 208-209 [266 P.2d 505] [defendant waited for four hours in front of his former wife's home, entered it, conversed with her, and shot her]; People v. Sassounian (1986) 182 Cal. App.3d 361, 407 [226 Cal. Rptr. 880] [concealment of defendant's purpose is sufficient]; People v. Hyde (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 463, 475-476 [212 Cal. Rptr. 440] [concealment of identity, defendant being disguised as policeman]; Domino v. Superior Court (1982) 129 Cal. App.3d 1000, 1007 [181 Cal. Rptr. 486] [secret design to take victim by surprise]; People v. Ward (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 218, 230 [103 Cal. Rptr. 671] [same].) As stated in Ward, the concealment element may manifest itself by either an ambush or by the creation of a situation where the victim is taken unawares even though he sees his murderer.  (27 Cal. App.3d at p. 230, italics added.) Thus, in Sassounian, supra, 182 Cal. App.3d 361, also involving the validity of a lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding, defendant was first observed waiting on a street corner a few minutes before the shooting, then was seen standing by the passenger side of the victim's car while the shooting was occurring, and then seen running away with an accomplice while stuffing a gun into his pants. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that instructions on a lying-in-wait special circumstance were inappropriate because there was no evidence of any concealment prior to the shooting. As the Sassounian court explained, concealment, in the sense that the defendant uses the term, is not required in order to justify and support a `lying-in-wait' special circumstance. The concealment which is required, is that which puts the defendant in a position of advantage, from which the factfinder can infer that lying-in-wait was part of the defendant's plan to take the victim by surprise. [Citation.] It is sufficient that a defendant's true intent and purpose were concealed by his actions or conduct. It is not required that he be literally concealed from view before he attacks the victim. [Citations.] (182 Cal. App.3d at pp. 406-407.) (13), (12b) We conclude that the jury in the present case was properly instructed on the concealment element of the lying-in-wait special circumstance, and that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of lying-in-wait murder, based on defendant's watchful waiting, from a position of advantage in the backseat, while the car was driven to a more isolated area, and his sudden surprise attack, from behind and without warning, on victim Winchell. (See also People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 615 [244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854] [defendant, a family member, waited until his victims were asleep before killing them].) Defendant relies primarily on two cases which assertedly conflict with the foregoing authorities. In People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 559-560 [297 P.2d 999], we concluded that lying-in-wait instructions should not have been given under the circumstances in that case. There, the defendant on several prior occasions had been seen sitting in a car parked near the crime scene, but significantly he was not so observed on the day of the murder a few days later. We cited Sutic, supra, 41 Cal.2d 483, and Tuthill, supra, 31 Cal.2d 92, with apparent approval but distinguished those cases on the ground that in Merkouris, The killings were not accomplished through defendant's watchful waiting in his car; there was no attempt at either concealment or secrecy; and the killings did not follow on the heels of the watchful waiting. (46 Cal.2d at p. 560.) Thus, although there was a period of watchful waiting in Merkouris, it occurred several days prior to the murders. Merkouris is thus distinguishable, for in the present case defendant's watchful waiting occurred contemporaneously with the assault, and indeed was part of the means through which that assault could be accomplished. (See Tuthill, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 101.) Next, defendant cites Richards v. Superior Court (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d 306, 314-316 [194 Cal. Rptr. 120], to support his position that some period of physical concealment is required to sustain a lying-in-wait finding. There, the victim was stabbed to death and robbed after being lured to a garage by the defendants on the pretext that they needed to recover some of their tools. Because there was no indication as to precisely how the murder occurred, and thus no evidence that the defendants approached the victim from physical concealment after `watchful waiting,' the Richards court dismissed the lying-in-wait special-circumstance allegation. (Pp. 314-316.) Significantly, Richards rejected the argument that the element of concealment could be satisfied merely by taking the victim unawares from behind; the court observed that such a rule would require that we equate concealment with surprise.... (P. 315.) Richards is factually distinguishable, given the absence of any period of watchful waiting on the defendants' part. They simply lured their victim to a garage and killed him. Nonetheless, the court's insistence on some period of actual physical concealment stands in conflict with the cases, previously cited, which indicate that, if a period of watchful waiting is shown which immediately precedes the assault, a concealment of purpose, coupled with a surprise attack from a position of advantage, will satisfy the concealment element in lying-in-wait murder. We thus disapprove Richards to the extent it would require an actual physical concealment as an element of lying in wait. 2. Constitutional Considerations  (14a) Defendant suggests that our interpretation of the lying-in-wait statute as not requiring an actual physical concealment runs afoul of constitutional principles barring the arbitrary selection of certain murders as justifying the death penalty. In defendant's view, such an interpretation would provide no meaningful basis for distinguishing capital and noncapital cases, and would thereby allow the arbitrary or irrational imposition of the death penalty. (See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 778 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 265-266 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) Defendant assumes that, unless a physical concealment requirement is imposed, a lying-in-wait finding could be routinely made in the case of any intentional murder in which the defendant decides to attack his victim, but waits and watches  without notifying his victim of his intent to attack  before inflicting the fatal injuries. In defendant's view, physical concealment adds an element of plotting far in excess of the level of forethought required for premeditation and deliberation, and additionally suggests a particularly repugnant form of sneaking cowardice. (See Richards v. Superior Court, supra, 146 Cal. App.3d 306, 314, fn. 5 [observing that in earlier times, special scorn was reserved for those whose attack after lying in wait deprived the surprised victim of the opportunity for reflection and contrition].) We reject defendant's constitutional challenge to our interpretation of the lying-in-wait special-circumstance statute. (15a) First of all, we do not mean to suggest that a mere concealment of purpose is sufficient to establish lying in wait  many routine murders are accomplished by such means, and the constitutional considerations raised by defendant might well prevent treating the commission of such murders as a special circumstance justifying the death penalty. (14b), (15b) But we believe that an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage, presents a factual matrix sufficiently distinct from ordinary premeditated murder to justify treating it as a special circumstance. (14c) The question whether a lying-in-wait murder has occurred is often a difficult one which must be made on a case-by-case basis, scrutinizing all of the surrounding circumstances. But contrary to defendant's argument, we conclude that an intentional murder undertaken by lying in wait in the foregoing manner is properly among the kinds of aggravated killing which justify society's most severe penalty. 3. No Cognizable Interruption  (16) Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that the murder was committed while defendant was lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), that is, that the murder occurred without any cognizable interruption following the period of lying in wait. (See Domino v. Superior Court, supra, 129 Cal. App.3d at p. 1011.) Indeed, defendant suggests that only a pure ambush situation would satisfy the Domino rule. The point lacks merit. Section 189 provides that a murder perpetrated by means of lying in wait is first degree murder. Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15), however, describes the lying-in-wait special circumstance as the commission of an intentional murder  while lying in wait. (Italics added.) Domino held that the use of the word while in the latter provision indicated that a closer temporal proximity was required than needed to prove mere lying-in-wait murder. As Domino stated, the killing must take place during the period of concealment and watchful waiting or the lethal acts must begin at and flow continuously from the moment the concealment and watchful waiting ends. If a cognizable interruption separates the period of lying in wait from the period during which the killing takes place, the circumstances calling for the ultimate penalty do not exist. (129 Cal. App.3d at p. 1011, italics added.) We need not consider the validity of Domino 's restrictive interpretation of the special circumstance provision (cf. People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 949-952 [248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917]), because the evidence in this case clearly would support a finding that defendant's lethal acts flowed continuously from the moment he commenced his surprise attack. Defendant, after watching and waiting until the car and its occupants reached the outskirts of town, suddenly and without prior warning attacked his victim from behind with the intent to kill her. Although victim Winchell evidently survived defendant's initial attempt to strangle and beat her to death, no cognizable interruption occurred between the period of watchful waiting and the commencement of the murderous and continuous assault which ultimately caused her death. Defendant speculates that Winchell may have already been aware of his and Ortega's murderous plans, and accordingly she was not taken by surprise. But her screams for assistance from Ortega would support a finding that she was indeed surprised by, and unprepared for, the attack. We conclude that the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding should be sustained. 4. No Corpus Delicti  (17) Defendant next argues that because the evidence of lying in wait was derived primarily from his own extrajudicial statements, the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of the lying-in-wait special circumstance. We have recently rejected the argument that nonfelony-based special circumstances must be supported by independent proof of the corpus delicti ( People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 415 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]; see Newberry v. Superior Court (1985) 167 Cal. App.3d 238 [213 Cal. Rptr. 129], 241; People v. McDermand (1984) 162 Cal. App.3d 770, 798 [211 Cal. Rptr. 773] [no corpus delicti required for lying-in-wait special circumstance]), and we see no reason to reconsider our holding here.