Opinion ID: 171033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Advocating for Sentence in Excess of Thirty Years

Text: Following the testimony of five witnesses, the government summarized its case for sentencing Cudjoe. The AUSA stated: [w]hile 360 months to life may seem extensive, the government certainly believes that given his history, given his character, given his choices, and given his drug dealing, gun carrying and firing personality, that this Court should strongly consider a penalty that will protect society from him in any and all future events. This statement is irreconcilable with the government's promise to refrain from advocating for a sentence in excess of thirty years. The government explicitly proffers a sentence in excess of thirty years and asks the court to protect society in all future events, clearly suggesting a life sentence. This conduct violated both the letter and the spirit of the plea agreement. As the Supreme Court explained in Santobello v. New York, when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). The record suggests this concession from the government  standing mute on Cudjoe's request for a thirty-year sentencewas vital to Cudjoe's willingness to enter into the plea agreement. The government failed to fulfill its promise to Cudjoe, thereby materially breaching the plea agreement. [3] Based on the government's breach, Cudjoe asks this court to reduce his sentence to thirty years. Cudjoe has not, however, offered any precedent indicating such relief is appropriate. Instead, [r]esentencing is the typical remedy for the breach of a plea agreement. United States v. VanDam, 493 F.3d 1194, 1206 (10th Cir.2007). [4] Furthermore, resentencing appears to be the most appropriate remedy in this case. The plea agreement did not ensure Cudjoe that his sentence would be limited to thirty years; only that the government would not advocate for a sentence in excess of thirty years. Thus, we order specific performance on that promise at resentencing. In conformity with Supreme Court precedent, we therefore remand for resentencing by a different judge. United States v. Cachucha, 484 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir.2007); see also Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. 495 (noting that on remand, petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge).