Opinion ID: 2295912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Countess

Text: Countess, before trial, elected a jury trial by a writing which was in the form designated by § b, signed by him and witnessed by an assistant public defender. Thereafter the appearance of a private attorney was filed. When the case came on for trial on 8 May 1978, the transcript of the proceedings shows that when asked by the clerk how he pleaded, his counsel responded by stating: The plea is not guilty to all Counts in both indictments, Your Honor. The transcript then reads: THE CLERK: How do you elect to be tried? THE DEFENDANT: Judge. THE COURT: Okay. You understand you have a right to a Jury Trial, Mr. Countess? (Whereupon, the Defendant indicated affirmatively by nodding his head.) THE COURT: You understand that, sir? THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I understand. THE COURT: Has your lawyer fully explained that to you? THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. THE COURT: And you have elected to be tried by the Court instead of a Jury? THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. THE COURT: I didn't hear you. THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. THE COURT: All right, yeah, okay. The trial proceeded. Countess was convicted of assault with intent to murder and carrying concealed a deadly weapon and was sentenced in due course. The Court of Special Appeals was convinced that the mandatory requirements of Rule 735 [had] been satisfied. Countess v. State, 41 Md. App. at 657. The court reasoned: Both the appellant and his attorney signed the form which is part of the record, and it contains all of the information required by Section b. On the day of trial, the appellant indicated, in response to questioning, that he understood that he had a right to a jury trial and that his lawyer had fully explained his right to him. The signed form and the in-court responses to questioning, show that the appellant made his election of a court trial with full knowledge of his right to a jury trial and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived the right. [ Id. at 657-658.] In open court, on the record, Countess elected a court trial. Neither the court nor his trial counsel mentioned the prior written election for a jury trial, and the lawyer who had witnessed the execution of the form was not counsel at trial. The circumstances under which it had been signed were not adduced. Although the election of a jury trial designated by the written form had been changed on the day the case was called to a court trial, no attempt was made to ascertain what had prompted the change. There was an inquiry by the judge of the defendant on the record, but the inquiry elicited no more than the barest affirmations by Countess that he understood that he had a right to a jury trial and that his lawyer had fully explained that to [him]. Even if it be deemed to be implicit in the court's permitting the trial to proceed without a jury that it had determined that Countess made his election for a court trial with full knowledge of his right to a jury trial and that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived the right, we do not see in the record sufficient information for us to ascertain whether the court had properly made such a determination. There may be circumstances under which a written election in substantially the form designated by the Rule would be enough to show an effective election of a court trial within the contemplation of § d, but such circumstances are not apparent here. The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals as to Countess is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to reverse the judgments of the Criminal Court of Baltimore and to remand to that court for a new trial.