Opinion ID: 1283629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant argues that the State must prove that he operated his vehicle voluntarily. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish voluntary operation. Appellant also contends that there was no evidence at all of the causal connection between his actions and the death of another. We find that there was sufficient evidence on both issues. `The oft-repeated rule by which we test the sufficiency of evidence on appeal of a criminal matter is that we examine and accept as true the evidence of the prosecution, leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence of the defendant in conflict therewith, and we give to the evidence of the prosecution every favorable inference which may reasonably and fairly be drawn therefrom. Stated another way  it is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but rather whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State.   ' Harries v. State, Wyo., 650 P.2d 273, 274 (1982). Cutbirth v. State, Wyo., 663 P.2d 888, 889 (1983). For general-intent crimes it must be found that the prohibited act was done voluntarily. Slaughter v. State, Wyo., 629 P.2d 481 (1981). But it is unnecessary to prove intent by direct, positive and independent evidence. Bryant v. State, 7 Wyo. 311, 51 P. 879 (1898). Intent may be inferred from the conduct of a defendant and from circumstantial evidence upon which reasonable inferences may be based. Stuebgen v. State, Wyo., 548 P.2d 870 (1976). Here appellant stipulated that he was driving the vehicle. At the accident scene, he repeatedly asked an eyewitness not to tell anyone that he was driving the vehicle. The patrolman who investigated testified that the brakes were in good working condition. This evidence, along with the inferences that the trial judge could have drawn therefrom, is sufficient to establish that appellant was voluntarily driving his vehicle. Appellant also contends that there was no evidence of a causal connection between his actions and the death of another. Appellant admits that he drove his vehicle when his blood alcohol level was 0.19%. Section 31-5-233(b)(iii), W.S. 1977, states that if there is more than 0.10% alcohol in the blood, then there is a presumption that the person is incapable of driving safely. The evidence showed that the appellant was traveling approximately 70 miles per hour, that he ran a stop sign, and that he crashed into a vehicle which had the right of way. The evidence also showed that appellant's brakes were working. Appellant stipulated that he was driving and that two people were killed as a result of injuries from the accident. We stated in Hodgins v. State that there must be a causal connection between the doing of the prohibited act and the death of another. Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the State, with all of the inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the State clearly met its burden of establishing that the death of another was caused by appellant driving his vehicle while so intoxicated that he could not safely do so. Because the statute is not constitutionally infirm, and because the State presented evidence, together with the stipulation, from which the trier of fact could find each element of the crime of aggravated vehicular homicide, including an intentional operation of the vehicle, appellant's conviction must be upheld. Affirmed.