Opinion ID: 1166413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: case law on the right to an intoxication instruction

Text: The case of People v. Jackson, 14 N.Y.2d 5, 247 N.Y.S.2d 481, 196 N.E.2d 887, where defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, presented a question strikingly similar to the issue before the court here. In People v. Jackson , defense counsel requested an instruction to the jury `that although intoxication is no defense, the defendant may have been so intoxicated as to be unable to form a specific intent to commit the crime charged.' The court refused to so charge `because there is no evidence in this case from which the Court could conceivably come to a finding of the defendant being intoxicated.' The trial court went on to say that while there was evidence that the defendant had consumed a certain amount of liquor, this was not sufficient to warrant the giving of the instruction. The court of appeals observed that it is conceded that if a proper request for instruction on intoxication had been made, it should have been given. The opinion states, at 247 N.Y.S.2d 483, at 196 N.E.2d 888: The request, although imperfectly phrased, was adequate and it is certain that the court understood its import and refused it solely because, so the court thought, there was no evidence of intoxication. The District Attorney on argument here seemed to concede that there was such evidence. We summarize it briefly. Wallace Wood, in whose home defendant met deceased, had testified that he brought home a fifth of whiskey that evening and that Wood and deceased `had been drinking' before defendant arrived at the Wood house. Wood said, describing an argument between deceased and defendant, that `we were drinking whiskey' and after the argument stopped `we start drinking again'. Wood said that he did not know how much defendant drank but that the three consumed all the whiskey although some of it before defendant arrived. The witness did not notice that defendant staggered when he left the house. The People put into evidence oral admissions made by defendant to a police officer including defendant's statements that after dinner he had several drinks in a bar and that he then took a walk during which he met friends on the street and had a few drinks out of a bottle they proffered. A hypothetical question to the prosecution's witness Dr. Winkler had recited the consumption by the three men of the fifth of whiskey. A hypothetical question to defense witness Dr. La Burt had assumed that there actually took place all the drinking described in defendant's statements as well as in Wood's testimony. More important on this issue are the numerous references in the medical testimony to `pathological intoxication' and to the dire effect on a man in defendant's condition of drinking even a little whiskey. Also, the detectives testified to a strong smell of alcohol on defendant's breath, even some hours after the crime. Both counsel summed up to some extent as to intoxication but the court never mentioned it in connection with intent.  We hold that the trial court's refusal to charge as requested was, especially because this is a capital case conviction, grave error. The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered. [Emphasis supplied] The lower court refused to give a requested intoxication instruction and defendant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit rape, the evidence showing the defendant had 10 rum and cokes prior to the entry; the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed in State v. Caldrain, 115 N.H. 390, 342 A.2d 628, 629 (1975). The testimony was that the defendant smelled of alcohol, his speech was slurred and he staggered. The court said: The defendant in this case is charged with a crime of specific intent. Cf. State v. Brough, 112 N.H. 182, 291 A.2d 618 (1972); State v. McMillan, 115 N.H. 268, 339 A.2d 21 (1975). His intent at the time he broke and entered the home of Mrs. Clemons is a separate element of the offense charged. Evidence of his conduct is relevant on the issue of his intent but if there is substantial evidence of intoxication, the jury may consider whether `intoxication could prevent the formation of the requisite intent.' State v. Warren, 114 N.H. 196, 197, 317 A.2d 566, 567 (1974); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236 § 4 (1966). See also RSA 626:4 (effective November 1, 1973), which provides: `Intoxication is not, as such, a defense. The defendant may, however, introduce evidence of intoxication whenever it is relevant to negate an element of the offense charged, and it shall be taken into consideration in determining whether such element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'  It is only when the evidence furnishes no rational basis for jury consideration of the requested instruction that it may be refused. State v. O'Brien, 114 N.H. 233, 317 A.2d 783 (1974); State v. Bacon, 114 N.H. 306, 319 A.2d 636 (1974). There was substantial evidence of intoxication in this case and the defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed that they could consider intoxication in determining whether he had the requisite intent. [Emphasis supplied] In People v. Piranian, 47 A.D.2d 668, 364 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543, the following memorandum opinion was rendered: MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT. Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered March 21, 1974, convicting him of assault in the second degree and disorderly conduct, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, on the law, and new trial ordered. No issues of fact were raised on this appeal and none were considered. In view of defendant's testimony to the effect that on the day of the crimes charged he had consumed nine bottles of beer and was `fairly intoxicated', the jury could have found that at the time in question he was too intoxicated to intend to prevent a peace officer from performing his lawful duty, and, accordingly, the trial court erred in not charging the jury in this regard ( People v. Lee, 35 N.Y.2d 826, 362 N.Y.S.2d 860, 321 N.E.2d 781). In State v. Frankland, 51 N.J. 221, 238 A.2d 680, the defendant was accused and convicted of a specific-intent crime. He testified he was too drunk to remember the events in question because he had consumed 15 drinks of Scotch and water. The intermediate court set the verdict of guilty aside for the reason that the defendant had not urged intoxication as a defense and, therefore, the trial judge was not justified in giving the jury the intoxication instruction. In reversing, the supreme court held that the trial court was warranted in giving an intoxication instruction, even though the defendant had not urged voluntary intoxication as a defense and that his only defense was a denial that he had committed the act. The court said: We reverse and reinstate the conviction. Clearly, the question of defendant's intoxication was raised by the evidence adduced at trial. The defendant testified that he had consumed fifteen drinks of scotch and water and could not remember the events of the evening. Surely under these circumstances the jury was entitled to be instructed on the effect of a finding by them that the defendant committed the act but did not know what he was doing. The trial judge was well within his discretion in charging on a question of law raised by the evidence in the case, even though the instruction was not requested by either party. It was in the interest of justice to give to the jury for their guidance the applicable law on this subject placed before them by the evidence, and the trial court did not err in so doing. State v. Sawyer, 365 S.W.2d 487, 495 (Mo.Sup.Ct. 1963). Indeed, had the trial judge failed to charge on this evidence of intoxication, the defendant well might argue that such failure was reversible error despite the lack of a request to so charge. See People v. Kent, 10 A.D.2d 662, 196 N.Y.S.2d 154 (App.Div., 4th Dept. 1960). Ibid., 238 A.2d p. 682. In determining whether the issue of voluntary intoxication was fairly raised in the instant case, we must take the appellant's testimony as entirely true with respect to the alcohol he consumed  even though his testimony is contradictory in several respects  and we must view all other evidence in a light favorable to him for purposes of these considerations. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1313, supra. Since both the defendant and the State proffered an instruction on intoxication, thus recognizing the defense theory on this issue, and, given the quantities of alcohol involved, the statements made and the actions of the appellant before and after the shooting, the assurance of a fair trial requires an affirmative consideration of the intoxication issue by the jury under proper instructions. It was, therefore, error for the court to have refused to instruct on this theory of appellant's defense.