Opinion ID: 2495848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on the mother's emotional-distress claim.

Text: ¶ 45. Federation successfully argued at trial that the mother's claims of the consequences of emotional distress (untreated headaches, stomachaches, and insomnia) did not meet the standard set by caselaw. See Adams, 744 So.2d at 743-44. The Adams Court found that vague testimony about loss of sleep and worry . . . was insufficient to support an instruction or award of damages for emotional distress. Id. at 744. ¶ 46. The mother counters that her claims were sufficient evidence of a physical manifestation of emotional distress. Alternatively, she cites cases stating that no physical injury is required under certain circumstances. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So.2d 898 (Miss.1981) ( implied overruling recognized by Adams, 744 So.2d at 741-42); First Nat'l Bank v. Langley, 314 So.2d 324, 338-39 (Miss.1975) (abandoning the impact rule). She asserts that no physical injury is required, as this was not a case of simple negligence. [6] However, Langley and the other cases cited are inapposite. The plaintiffs in Langley, Devers, and Adams were the persons upon whom the negligent conduct was inflicted, not third persons who only heard about it later. See Adams, 744 So.2d at 737; Devers, 405 So.2d at 899, Langley, 314 So.2d at 325. Here, she testified that she was not present during any of these events. Nothing in the record indicates that she was ever on the premises. She does not qualify as a bystander, thus, she has no bystander claim. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Hawkins, 830 So.2d 1162, 1174 (Miss.2002) (quoting Summers v. St. Andrew's Episcopal Sch., Inc., 759 So.2d 1203, 1210 (Miss.2000)). ¶ 47. This Court has adopted the Dillon factors in determining whether a defendant should reasonably foresee injury to a plaintiff, thereby owing a duty of care. Summers, 759 So.2d at 1210 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968)). The factors are: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920. ¶ 48. This Court in Summers dealt with mental-anguish claims by parents based on an alleged sexual assault on their child at school. Summers, 759 So.2d at 1206. The Summers Court considered a case in which a federal district court granted summary judgment, finding that family members could not recover mental-distress damages after witnessing the mistreatment of their mother. See Campbell v. Beverly Enters., 724 F.Supp. 439, 440 (S.D.Miss.1989). The Campbell court concluded that family members could recover if they had sustained or been threatened with physical injury. See id. Summers also cited Moore v. Kroger Company, 800 F.Supp. 429, 433 (N.D.Miss.1992), in which the plaintiff argued that Campbell allowed for recovery for gross or wanton negligence even when the plaintiff was outside the zone of danger and outside the range of immediate sensory perception. Summers, 759 So.2d at 1210. However, the Moore court held otherwise, reasoning that the emotional distress at issue was that of the immediate victim, and that the range of foreseeable plaintiffs does not include after-the-fact witnesses of the results. Id. (citing Moore, 800 F.Supp. at 433-34). The Summers Court held that the parents did not meet the bystander criteria, as they were not near the scene, nor was their shock caused by `contemporaneous observance of the accident.' Summers, 759 So.2d at 1210. L.R.'s mother, like the Summers plaintiffs, meets only one of these factors, thus, she cannot be considered a bystander to whom the defendant owed a duty of care. In dicta, the Summers Court discussed the plaintiffs' putative claim that they might be due relief if the defendant's alleged conduct had been willful, wanton, malicious, or intentional. See id. at 1210-11. However, the Summers Court concluded there was no evidence to support the claim. Id. at 1211. ¶ 49. Here, the trial court considered the bystander-liability issue but in the end decided that proof of damages to support her claim was lacking. As the trial court's decision was in accord with this Court's precedent and consistent with the testimony offered at trial, we find no error in granting a directed verdict regarding L.R.'s mother's claim of emotional distress.