Opinion ID: 808082
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 1994 Motion for DNA Evidence

Text: Applicant argues that he is entitled to tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), which states: “The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” He contends that his 1994 state-court motion for DNA testing qualifies as a properly filed application for collateral review and that because no court has ruled on his motion, the one-year limitations period is still being tolled. Applicant may be correct that the motion is still pending. But we agree with the district court that his argument fails because the motion is not an application for collateral review. The Supreme Court recently held that “‘collateral review’ of a judgment or claim means a judicial reexamination of a judgment or claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review process.” Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1285 (2011). Although the 1994 motion appears to have been filed outside of the direct-review process, it did not call for a judicial reexamination of the judgment imposing Applicant’s sentence. The motion asked that DNA testing be done on hair samples preserved in Applicant’s case and that the results be provided to -7- him. 1 According to the motion, Applicant believed that the samples would match another felon who was allegedly involved in the homicide for which Applicant was convicted. Presumably, Applicant hoped that the DNA testing results would undermine the validity of his murder conviction. But even though the motion made a passing reference to Kansas Statutes Annotated Chapter 60, which contains the rules governing habeas corpus proceedings, it contained no request that his conviction or sentence be reexamined. It requested only information—the results of DNA testing. In essence the motion was a request for discovery. 1 The full body of the 1994 motion states: MOTION FOR COMPARISON OF DNA EVIDENCE Pursuant to KSA Chapter 60 and KSA 21-2511 comes now petitioner, David L. Woodward, and for cause setsforth [sic] as follows: 1. Evidence, fingerprints, hair and other materials were found relative to my alleged crime of felony murder. NONE ever matched my materials submitted. 2. Material information has arisen that would compel prudent men to question & ask for the fingerprints and other DNA evidence herein to be compared against one felon known as Doil E. Lane. Statements have come to light that Lane was involved in the homicide in question. WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that genetic markers—DNA—be made of hair samples preserved in evidence concerning case 91-CR-792, and such and all results of testing thereto be provided forthwith. Petitioner also prays that the court appoints petitioner new and different counsel in this matter. R., Vol. 1 at 91. -8- Because it did not call for reexamination of the judgment, 2 the motion did not toll AEDPA’s limitations period. 3 Our conclusion is supported by substantial authority. Kholi itself distinguished the motion to reduce sentence considered in that case (which tolled the limitations period) from a discovery motion, saying: “A motion to reduce sentence is unlike a motion for post-conviction discovery or a motion for appointment of counsel, which generally are not direct requests for judicial review of a judgment and do not provide a state court with authority to order relief from a judgment.” 131 S. Ct. at 1286 n.4. And several sister circuits have ruled that a motion seeking discovery but not requesting relief from a judgment does not toll the AEDPA limitations period. The Eleventh Circuit rejected tolling based on proceedings quite similar to those here—a request under a Florida statute for DNA testing; it said that it is “well-settled that a discovery motion 2 The motion also did not call for “reexamination of a . . . claim.” Kholi, 131 S. Ct. at 1285 (emphasis added). When § 2244(d)(2) grants tolling based on an application for “review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim,” the type of claim to which it refers is one that can be raised in a § 2254 proceeding—that is, a claim that the applicant “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 500 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a challenge to the execution of a sentence could be a claim under § 2254 that is not a challenge to a judgment), abrogated in part on other grounds by Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004). The motion for DNA testing did not raise that type of claim. 3 A few months after the DNA motion, Applicant filed a “Motion to Call Forth and Be Heard.” We need not address it separately, because it appears to be essentially a request for action on the DNA motion and seeks no greater relief than that motion, just DNA testing and disclosure of the results. -9- does not” toll AEDPA’s limitations period. Brown v. Sec. for Dep’t of Corr., 530 F.3d 1335, 1338 (11th Cir. 2008); see Price v. Pierce, 617 F.3d 947, 952–54 (7th Cir. 2010) (following Brown); see also Hodge v. Greiner, 269 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (state-court petition to obtain additional documents concerning the investigation of prisoner’s offense “did not challenge [his] conviction” but instead “sought material he claimed might be of help in developing such a challenge”); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2009) (following Hodge). But cf. Hutson v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 236, 238–39 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (motion under Texas statute tolls limitations period because it requests not only DNA testing but also review of the judgment based on test results). This proposition does not create an impediment to federal review based on new DNA evidence. As Brown observed, “If such motions produce newly discovered exculpatory evidence, AEDPA grants the movant a year from that discovery, subject to tolling while related state collateral attacks are advanced, to challenge their conviction in federal habeas proceedings.” 530 F.3d at 1338.