Opinion ID: 1215225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Policy (Smith) Analysis

Text: As already noted, the parties  unlike this court  have approached this case with a Smith -style analysis. Whatever may be said with respect to the premises on which they are based, the arguments require some consideration. We turn now to a brief analysis of the policy arguments advanced in support of retention of the Smith rule.
This argument assumes that abolition of the Smith doctrine would encourage enmity between spouses. Would the abolition of common-law interspousal immunity for negligent torts have that effect? There are no studies or other sources or authorities that provide us with a definitive answer to this question, and its answer is one that this court is ill-equipped to posit on its own. See Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, supra, 293 Or. at 551-53, 652 P.2d 318.
The fear of collusion is entirely a product of the relatively recent phenomenon of widely available insurance. But, as this court already has held, the presence or absence of insurance has nothing to do with the substantive obligations one party may have toward another apart from the contract of insurance itself. Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, supra, 293 Or. at 552, 652 P.2d 318. This factor is not relevant.
Much is made of the fact that husband and wife live in a relationship so close and so intimate that it guarantees that there will be incidents of negligence by the spouses on a scale unparalleled in any other relationship of life. There is precedent suggesting that such considerations are relevant, see, e.g., Winn v. Gilroy, supra , but that precedent stands only for the proposition that the proper inquiry concerns the tortious or privileged nature of a parent's act that causes injury to the child, not a special parental immunity from a child's action for personal torts as distinct from other kinds of claims. Id. at 731, 681 P.2d 776. At the same time, however, we recognized in Winn that, because of the parental duty to discipline, supervise, and care for a child, an act or omission that would be tortious as to a stranger might not be tortious as to the actor's child. Thus, it was suggested that a more stringent test be applied when parental negligence involved the substandard performance of specifically parental duties. 296 Or. at 732, 681 P.2d 776. To that end, we agreed with the Restatement rule regarding parent-child torts. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 895G. As already noted, the Restatement rule regarding interspousal torts parallels the rule adopted by this court in the case of parent-child torts. Restatement (Second) Torts § 895F. Because of the nature of the marital relationship, conduct that would be tortious as against a stranger might not be tortious as against one's spouse; considerations similar to such doctrines as consent and privilege may render conduct between spouses nontortious. We think that resort to these doctrines sufficiently alleviates any practical difficulties.
It also can be argued (although our previous cases did not) that, if the doctrine of interspousal immunity for negligent torts is to be abolished, that action should be taken by the legislature. We reject this argument for the reasons that follow. Of course, the legislature could abolish interspousal immunity, or change it, or reenact it if changed. Common law decisions do not preclude legislative reaction; they often invite it. Moreover, the legislature has entered the field in a significant way  the statutes contain comprehensive laws relating to marriage, divorce, children and related matters. See, e.g., ORS 108.080 (providing for actions between spouses to enforce property rights). But this is not a matter in which the legislature has purported to pre-empt the field. Both the legislative and judicial branches remain competent to act. And, while we have competence, we should not hide from our responsibilities on the ground that someone else shares them. The rule we consider today is judge-made. If it is no longer valid or appropriate, it is our responsibility to say so. It must be remembered that any answer we give has substantive effect  deferring to the legislature leaves the present rule in place just as fully as if we had affirmatively declared it for the first time. Based on essentially the same considerations that motivated this court in Winn v. Gilroy to conclude that the rule of parental immunity for negligent personal injury to children should be abolished, we now conclude that the rule of interspousal immunity for negligent personal injury to a spouse also should be abolished. Restatement (Second) Torts § 895F correctly states the law of Oregon. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed; the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.