Opinion ID: 1212322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Meaninglessness of the Adversarial Process

Text: Whatley argues that his defense counsel, Johnny Mostiler, had such a heavy caseload as the contract defender for Spalding County that this Court should presume that Whatley's defense suffered prejudice. In general, an ineffective assistance claim can succeed only where the prisoner can show actual prejudice to his or her defense that in reasonable probability changed the outcome of the trial. [12] However, Whatley correctly notes that an exception to this general rule applies and prejudice will be presumed where, although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial. [13] An example of where such extreme circumstances existed is a case where the entire membership of the state bar had been appointed to defend racially-vilified defendants in a highly emotional public setting, where it `was a matter of speculation only' whether anyone would actually represent the defendants at trial until the last moment, where [n]o attempt was made to investigate ... [and n]o opportunity to do so was given, and where the trial began within a few moments after counsel for the first time charged with any degree of responsibility began to represent [the defendants]. [14] Whatley asserts that, during the two-year period when his case was pending, Mostiler represented 70% of 1,558 felony defendants with the remainder being represented by his associate, opened 70 civil cases, represented one murder defendant outside the county, and represented four death penalty defendants. A review of the record reveals that Whatley's assertion may be somewhat exaggerated; however, more importantly, we find that his assertion regarding Mostiler's general caseload is irrelevant. As was noted by the habeas court, it is the amount of time actually spent by Mostiler on Whatley's case that matters, not the number of other cases he might have had that potentially could have taken his time. The habeas court found that Mostiler was a highly-experienced attorney, was experienced in death penalty cases, was appointed two years before Whatley's trial, and spent over 157 hours on [Whatley's] case in addition to the 96 hours that his investigator logged. The habeas court further noted with approval testimony by the defense investigator stating that it was likely that Mostiler's billing records under-represented the time he actually spent on the case. The Eleventh Circuit recently addressed a similar claim regarding Mostiler's heavy caseload and its bearing on another death penalty case in which he was defense counsel. Although the case was decided on procedural grounds, the Eleventh Circuit stated the following in dictum: As the district court found, Mostiler was an experienced and effective advocate for Osborne. Osborne presented no evidence, other than vague statistics, to support his allegation that trial counsel's caseload impeded his representation. As such, Osborne cannot show that Mostiler's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness such that prejudice is presumed. [15] We agree with the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit that vague statistics that fail to shed light on the amount of work actually done in the particular case at issue are insufficient to show the kind of complete breakdown in representation necessary for prejudice to the defense to be presumed. [16]