Opinion ID: 778954
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reliability: Dr. Wicks' Methodology

Text: 39 At the conclusion of the Daubert hearing, the district court made several observations about Dr. Wicks' reasoning and methodology. Initially, it concluded: 40 Dr. Wicks' methodology is itself nothing unusual. The methodology itself is the form that is used by medical doctors uniformly. He considers the history given by the patient, his observations clinically of the patient's behavior, and any psychological testing . . . . I have no doubt that his psychological tests are well established tests that are widely accepted in the medical and psychological community. 41 However after making these general observations, the court went on to identify what it considered to be several problems with the reliability of Dr. Wicks' opinion. The court seemed troubled by the fact that the psychological tests did not reveal a conclusive diagnosis. The court recognized that Dr. Wicks' diagnosis was not inconsistent with the psychological tests, but said, the results are not inconsistent with a lot of other things. The court also asserted that Dr. Wicks based his opinion on his belief that Finley was not faking or being deceptive: 42 When you strip his opinion down to what it really seems to be based on, Mr. McKeon is correct. It's based on the assumption that what he's saying in his history and what he tells to Dr. Wicks is true. It relies upon the assumption that he is being truthful when he says what his views are. 11 43 In its brief, the government extrapolates from the district court's position and argues that Dr. Wicks' opinion is not reliable because it depends entirely on the doctor's subjective assessment of Finley's truthfulness. (Appellee's Br. 12). The government also contends that Dr. Wicks' methodology is deficient under Rule 702 because he based his conclusions on facts that were merely commonsensical 12 or beyond the scope of his expertise. 13 44 It appears from the record before us that Dr. Wicks based his diagnosis on proper psychological methodology and reasoning. He relied on accepted psychological tests, from which he drew sound inferences, and he took a thorough patient history, including meeting with Finley's wife and observing Finley's behavior. Dr. Wicks did not base his conclusions solely on Finley's statements; rather, he used his many years of experience and training to diagnose Finley's mental condition. Finally, Dr. Wicks did not use any experimental techniques in his evaluation of Finley and he did not deviate in any way from his normal practice of conducting psychological evaluations. Thus, we reject the government's argument. 45 The government argues Dr. Wicks' diagnosis is unreliable because it is based on the fact that Dr. Wicks believed that Finley was not deceiving him. The government cites several out-of-circuit cases that it alleges support the argument that Dr. Wicks' opinion is founded on accepting Finley's truthfulness rather than on sound psychological methodology. See United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir.1999); United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 604-05(7th Cir. 1991); and Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.1987). None of these cases is apposite. 46 Neither Charley nor Whitted supports the government's position because both cases involve a medical doctor's testimony about the truth of a child victim's report of sexual abuse. In both cases, the truth of the victim's report was the very substance of the doctor's testimony. The government acknowledges in its brief that Finley's truthfulness is not the substance of Dr. Wicks' opinion. (Appellee's Br. 13). The government instead contends that Dr. Wicks founded his opinion on Finley's truthfulness. Again, however, the facts of this case and the case law offered do not support the government's position. 47 In Charley and Whitted, medical doctors called as experts testified to their opinions that children were abused based primarily on the statements of the children that they were abused. Charley, 189 F.3d at 1267(describing opinions as based largely on witness statements); Whitted, 11 F.3d at 786 (describing opinions as based solely on witness statements). Thus, in each of those cases, the expert was merely reciting the allegation of the alleged victim in the guise of a medical opinion, Whitted, 11 F.3d at 785-86, which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another witness ..., and therefore does not `assist the trier of fact' as required by Rule 702. Charley, 189 F.3d at 1267. In addition, each court noted that the fact of whether the alleged abuse occurred was for the jury to decide and therefore the expert's testimony was usurping the role of the jury as the ultimate fact finder. See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1270; Whitted, 11 F.3d at 787. 48 Unlike the experts in Charley and Whitted, Dr. Wicks did not merely recite Finley's statements to the jury in the guise of a medical opinion. Dr. Wicks did not base his diagnosis of Finley on Finley's own conclusion that he had a mental impairment the way the doctors in Charley and Whitted based their diagnosis of the existence of abuse on the witnesses' statements that they were abused. 49 Nor did Dr. Wicks' diagnosis of Finley usurp the role of the jury with regard to an ultimate issue of fact. The jury needed to decide whether Finley knew the financial instruments were fake, not whether he had a mental impairment that might inhibit him from reaching the conclusion that the instruments were fake. The jury could accept Dr. Wicks' diagnosis and still find that Finley knew the instruments to be fraudulent. Neither Whitted nor Charley stands for the proposition the government would have it support: that a psychologist cannot provide expert testimony about his diagnosis of a mental disorder based on a variety of factors, including the statements made by the defendant to the psychologist in the course of his examination. 50 Likewise, Benson, 941 F.2d 598, and Viterbo, 826 F.2d 420, do not support the government's argument and are inapplicable to the facts of this case. In Benson, the Seventh Circuit found an abuse of discretion where the trial court allowed the government to introduce the testimony of an Internal Revenue Service agent whose purpose was to summarize the government's case and give his expert opinion on whether the defendant was required to file income tax returns. The court concluded that much of the agent's testimony consisted of nothing more than drawing inferences from the evidence that he was no more qualified than the jury to draw and the agent relied on testimony from other witnesses whose credibility was vigorously attacked by the defendant. 941 F.2d at 604. Specifically, the court noted that the agent had no special skill or knowledge that would allow him to credit the truthfulness of the other witnesses. Id. As we have outlined, Dr. Wicks based his psychological analysis of Finley on more than a summary of Finley's statements, and he was eminently more qualified than a layperson on the jury to assess the significance of facts such as Finley's adamant refusal to accept, or even consider, the government's plea offer. 14 51 Viterbo also is distinguishable from the present case. In Viterbo, the Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of the expert opinion of a medical doctor as lacking a reliable foundation because the doctor did not perform a proper medical history of the patient prior to developing his opinion. There, the medical expert sought to attribute the plaintiff's depression and other ailments to his exposure to a chemical based only on the plaintiff's statements that he experienced the symptoms and exposure to the chemical was the only possible cause. 826 F.2d at 424. The Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of that testimony because the doctor was not aware that Viterbo had a family history of depression and hypertension that could have explained the source of the symptoms. Id. at 423(concluding that the failure to take into account this history seriously weakens the reliability of the patient's oral history as a foundation for the doctor's expert opinion). It is not clear that Dr. Wicks made a similar error in diagnosing Finley. The trial record reveals that Dr. Wicks' opinion is based on more than simply crediting Finley's statements. Dr. Wicks administered psychological tests to rule out serious mental disorders, he took a case history and interviewed Finley's spouse to ascertain additional information, and he observed Finley's physical movements and conducted a physical exam to determine if there was a possible physiological problem. The government has not argued that Dr. Wicks' opinion is based on an inaccurate history or is lacking in any specific facts. 52 We also reject the government's argument because Dr. Wicks provided articulable reasons why he believed Finley was not being deceptive or faking. At the Daubert hearing, Dr. Wicks explained that there was no indication that he [Finley] was being deceitful on what probably amounted to four or five hours of testing. Dr. Wicks had previously explained how the psychological tests were specifically designed to detect someone who is trying to fake a mental illness. In addition, Dr. Wicks noted that Finley's responses were internally consistent, and Dr. Wicks had not identified any defensiveness in Finley or any indication that he was over-representing his symptoms. Based on his clinical experience and these facts, Dr. Wicks concluded that Finley was not faking or lying. 15 53 A belief, supported by sound reasoning, that the patient is not faking or lying is sufficient to support the reliability of a mental health diagnosis. In a different factual context, we have stated that the law does not require every expert who testifies to be an expert in detecting deceit. United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir.1997) (reversing a district court's exclusion of defendant's bookkeeping expert who the district court excluded because the defendant may have intentionally deceived the expert about her true knowledge of bookkeeping principles). Analogously, we refuse to require that mental health experts prove themselves infallible lie detectors before accepting their psychological diagnoses. 54 The government next seeks to convince us that Dr. Wicks' diagnosis is unreliable because he based his conclusions on matters beyond his expertise. The doctor was initially hesitant to apply the delusional disorder terminology of the DSM-IV based on his fear that using certain terms would cause the court to question Finley's legal competence. 16 55 In testimony before the jury prior to the government's objection, Dr. Wicks explained that a closed belief system, which distorts or rejects information that does not comport with certain beliefs, is called atypical belief system. This system can also be referred to by the term delusion. 17 Dr. Wicks then explained that there are three major categories of delusions: (1) bizarre delusions held by schizophrenics; (2) atypical delusions held by people who function very normally in everyday life unless you touch their delusions; and (3) shared delusional systems known as folie a deux. Dr. Wicks did not classify Finley in any of these categories. He was interrupted by the government's objection shortly after presenting these three categories. 56 At the Daubert hearing, Dr. Wicks elaborated on how he diagnosed Finley as having an atypical belief system. He admitted that it was an extremely gray diagnosis and he could have easily given him a diagnosis of a delusional disorder [but] that would have raised the question as to his competency in federal court when Dr. Wicks believed that Finley was capable of assisting his attorney and understanding the court proceedings. Dr. Wicks explained his choice of terminology by saying that an atypical belief system is a personality description, not a DSM-IV diagnosis. Nonetheless, Dr. Wicks believed that Finley's mental condition could fit the criteria for a delusional disorder under the DSM-IV. 57 We determine that Dr. Wicks' diagnosis should not be deemed unreliable based on his choice of terminology to describe the diagnosis. Dr. Wicks adequately explained his method of diagnosis to overcome any doubt that he was misdiagnosing Finley or intentionally misleading the government or the court. According to Dr. Wicks' testimony, the symptoms Finley exhibited could be described as either a delusional disorder or atypical belief system. Dr. Wicks simply chose the term, in his view, with the least potential for confusion. We have recognized that concepts of mental disorders are constantly-evolving conception[s] about which the psychological and psychiatric community is far from unanimous and a district court may not exclude proffered expert psychological testimony simply because the defendant's condition does not fit within the expert's — or the district court's own — concept of mental `disorder.' United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1411 (9th Cir.1993) (reversing the district court's exclusion of expert testimony that the defendant had perceptual difficulties making it impossible for her to recognize counterfeit currency). 58 We conclude that the district court erred in assessing the reliability of Dr. Wicks' testimony. Dr. Wicks did not base his opinions solely on the truthfulness of Finley's statement nor does the record before us demonstrate that the diagnosis was reached through unsound methodology or reasoning. It appears from the record that Dr. Wicks' diagnosis incorporates testing, case history, interviews with the patient and family, medical factors and expert experience applying the information contained in the DSM-IV and other mental health publications. Dr. Wicks' experience with evaluating thousands of people should not be undervalued.