Opinion ID: 1791862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Bottoson

Text: In fact, in this Court's first decision following Ring, Justice Shaw has already expressly done a straightforward retroactivity analysis under Witt and correctly concluded that Ring was of fundamental significance and should be applied retroactively: First, Ring falls within the ambit of Witt, for it emanated from the United States Supreme Court. Second, Ring is constitutional in nature, for its holding goes to the very heart of the constitutional right to trial by jury. And third, Ring is of fundamental significance, for its purpose is to safeguard the basic protections guaranteed by the right to trial by jury. This Court in the past has applied retroactively other significant decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the capital sentencing area. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693, 717 (Fla. 2002) (Shaw, J., concurring in result only) (footnote omitted). Justice Shaw's analysis is clearly sound in its application of our controlling decision in Witt and, importantly, in his observation that we have retroactively applied other significant decisions of the United States Supreme Court on numerous occasions. [20] Notably, like Justice Shaw, the only state court that has examined Ring under a retroactivity test similar to Florida's under Witt has found that Ring should be applied retroactively. See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Mo.2003) (concluding that Ring should apply retroactively under the Stovall/Linkletter test and rejecting the applicability of Teague ). But the majority has ignored Justice Shaw's analysis and his conclusion that Ring's purpose is to safeguard the basic protections guaranteed by the right to trial by jury. Id. Instead, the majority has demeaned the purpose of Ring by asserting it to be a mere technical and inconsequential correction of procedure. It is also apparent on the face of the various opinions in Bottoson that a majority of justices of this Court believed the Ring decision was of fundamental significance and had a significant impact on Florida's capital sentencing law. See Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 705 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result only) (If the holdings of Ring and Apprendi are to be applied as written, it is apparent that Florida's sentencing scheme is at risk because of the scheme's express reliance upon findings of fact made by the trial judge rather than findings of fact made by a jury in determining the existence of aggravating circumstances which must be established and utilized as a basis for imposing the penalty of death.); Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 719 (Pariente, J., concurring in result only) (However, based on the reasoning of the majority of the United States Supreme Court in Ring and Justice Scalia's separate concurrence in Ring, I agree with Chief Justice Anstead that Ring does raise serious concerns as to potential constitutional infirmities in our present capital sentencing scheme.); Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 734 (Lewis, J., concurring in result only) (I am gravely concerned regarding the constitutionality of jury overrides under Ring and I cannot silently afford blind adherence to authorities which are now in apparent irreconcilable conflict with Ring. ); Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 717 (Shaw, J., concurring in result only) ( Ring, however, by treating a `death qualifying' aggravator as an element of the offense, imposes upon that aggravator the same rigors of proof as other elements, including Florida's requirement of a unanimous jury finding. Ring, therefore, has a direct impact on Florida's capital sentencing statute.). [21] In fact, starting with the decisions in Bottoson and King, this Court has applied Ring retroactively in dozens of death penalty cases in the postconviction context. That record too is ignored by the majority.