Opinion ID: 439951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Uniform Cleaning Allowance

Text: 30 Laffey I affirmed the district court's determination that NWA discriminated on the basis of sex by providing a male-only uniform cleaning allowance. 567 F.2d at 456. Laffey II held a second challenge to the district court's ruling on the cleaning allowance unwarranted by any circumstance capable of generating injustice from adherence to the law of the case. 642 F.2d at 586. Despite the stern law of the case analysis and admonition in Laffey II, id. at 585-86, and the court's further statement that it considered Laffey I 's cleaning allowance holding fully accurate, id. at 586, 13 NWA seeks to continue the fray. It cites General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976), and describes that case as an intervening decision, NWA Brief at 17, although Gilbert issued over two years before Laffey II was argued. 14 31 Gilbert was a Title VII challenge that turned on the Court's conclusion that the disability program in question did not group persons by gender as such. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134-35, 97 S.Ct. at 407-408 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 & n. 20, 94 S.Ct. 2485, 2492 & n. 20, 41 L.Ed.2d 256 (1974)). The issue was an employer's exclusion of women unable to work due to pregnancy or childbirth from disability benefits. The program did not divide potential recipients by gender as such, the Court reasoned, because one of the two groups comprised nonpregnant persons, and thus include[d] members of both sexes. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134-35, 97 S.Ct. at 407-408. In the absence of classification based upon gender as such, the Court inquired whether there was any gender-based discriminatory effect. Id. at 137-39, 97 S.Ct. at 408-410. NWA relies on the discriminatory effect portion of the Gilbert analysis. NWA Brief at 53. 32 Even in Gilbert itself, however, the Court indicated that discriminatory effect analysis should not come into play when the program at issue divides recipients into groups classified by gender as such. 429 U.S. at 136-37 & n. 15, 97 S.Ct. at 408-409 & n. 15. 15 That is the situation here--all male cabin attendants received a uniform benefit package with a cleaning allowance, all female attendants received a different package without a cleaning allowance. 16 33 Congress has overruled Gilbert prospectively to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, 17 and the Supreme Court believes Congress also rejected the test of discrimination [Gilbert ] employed. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, --- U.S. ----, ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 2627, 2631, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983). In its most recent expression in point, the Court left no doubt that, when classification by sex is undisguised, there is no need to consider, as Gilbert did, the average monetary value of the [overall benefit package in question] to male and female employees. Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2632 n. 26. Further, the Court quoted with apparent approval the EEOC's position that it is not a defense under Title VII to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.9(e) (1983)). 34 In Laffey II, the court described the cleaning allowance as simply another supplement to male salaries. 642 F.2d at 589. Gilbert presents no occasion for us to study again that twice-studied issue. See id. at 586. 35