Opinion ID: 852796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admitting the Victim's Age

Text: The first aggravator used to enhance Trusley's sentence was the age of the victim. The State argues that this aggravator was proper because Indiana's sentencing scheme declares that it is an aggravating circumstance if the victim is under twelve years of age. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(4)(West 2004). The question for Blakely purposes, however, is not whether a trial court can enhance a sentence based on this aggravator, but whether the fact that Brian Small was under twelve was properly established. The Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey declared that other than the fact of prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). As clarified in Blakely, the statutory maximum of which the Court spoke was the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.  Blakely, 542 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 2537. We recently held that Blakely was applicable to Indiana's sentencing scheme because our presumptive term constituted the statutory maximum as defined in Blakely. Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 683 (Ind.2005). Consequently, we held that to enhance a sentence under Indiana' then existing system the sort of facts envisioned by Blakely as necessitating a jury finding must be found by a jury.... Id. at 686. Blakely is not concerned, primarily, with what facts a judge uses to enhance a sentence, but with how those facts are found. Under Blakely, a trial court in a determinate sentencing system such as Indiana's may enhance a sentence based only on those facts that are established in one of several ways: 1) as a fact of prior conviction; 2) by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; 3) when admitted by a defendant; and 4) in the course of a guilty plea where the defendant has waived Apprendi rights and stipulated to certain facts or consented to judicial factfinding. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 2537, 2541; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The only evidence before the sentencing court was that the victim was just ten months old. Trusley's attorney, in summing up his argument about sentencing, sensibly and professionally acknowledged the existence of that fact by saying: However, the Court has to consider not only aggravating factors, such as the imposition of a suspended sentence would ... depreciate the seriousness of the crime. And also, that the victim [of the] crime was less than twelve years of age, and in her care. (Sent. Tr. at 57.) (emphasis added). [3] We conclude that this statement by counsel is sufficient to constitute an admission by Trusley that Small was under twelve at the time of his death. [4] The recent Supreme Court ruling in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), supports this conclusion. In that case, the Court considered what sources a trial court may properly consult in determining whether a prior conviction contained the necessary elements to serve as a predicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Following the reasoning of a previous decision which had limited the scope of inquiry to statutory elements, charging documents, and jury instructions, the Court concluded that in pleaded cases, the closest analogs to jury instructions... would be the statement of factual basis of the charge ... shown by a transcript of plea colloquy or by written plea agreement presented to the court, or by a record of comparable findings of fact adopted by the defendant upon entering the plea. Id. at 1259-60. Although Shepard was concerned with the appropriate sources of factual information regarding prior convictions, read broadly it establishes the appropriate sources a court may consult in determining whether a fact concerning the commission of a crime has been adequately established during a plea hearing in order to pass Sixth Amendment muster. In this case, defense counsel's statement occurred during such a plea colloquy, and the trial court properly considered the age of the victim as an aggravating circumstance.