Opinion ID: 1719977
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether, alternatively, the trial court erred in refusing to give lovett's jury instruction d-11?

Text: Lovett's final contention is that the following, proposed jury instruction D-11, should have been given: For Roger Bradford to prevail, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, considering that he had had a fire within the last five years, he could have obtained fire insurance from another insurance company. If you find that Roger Bradford has failed to prove that he could have obtained fire insurance from another company, considering that he had had a fire within the last five years, then any negligence on the part of Jimmy Lovett was not proximate cause of any damages allegedly sustained by Roger Bradford; therefore, you must find for Roger Bradford. The standard for reviewing jury instructions is as follows: On appeal, this Court does not review jury instructions in isolation; rather, they are read as a whole to determine if the jury was properly instructed. Accordingly, defects in specific instructions do not require reversal where all instructions taken as a whole fairly  although not perfectly  announce the applicable primary rules of law. However, if those instructions do not fairly or adequately instruct the jury, this Court can and will reverse. Peoples Bank and Trust Company v. Cermack, 658 So.2d 1352, 1356 (Miss. 1995) (citations omitted). The record reflects that the jury was properly instructed with regard to the elements of negligence and with regard to foreseeability in relation to proximate cause. Therefore, this instruction was not required. See Id.