Opinion ID: 4203981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Oil Pollution Act Claims

Text: In 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in the Prince William Sound on the Alaska coast, causing the largest oil spill at that point in U.S. history. Congress enacted the OPA in response.5 See Metlife Capital Corp. v. M/V EMILY S., 132 F.3d 818, 820 (1st Cir. 1997). Before passage of the OPA, the Clean Water Act provided liability limitations for federal pollution removal costs associated with oil spills. Id. The OPA altered the Clean Water Act framework by impos[ing] strict liability for pollution removal costs and damages on the 'responsible party' for 4 In the district court, Ironshore urged the court to exclude the contract from consideration when ruling on the motions to dismiss, noting that the motions included only excerpts of the contract and that Ironshore -- a nonparty -- had never seen the entire document. After the government subsequently provided the full document, Ironshore did not challenge the full document either by seeking leave to file a written objection or at the hearing on the motions to dismiss. In these circumstances, we deem waived any challenge to the contract's authenticity. 5 Although we refer to the OPA's rules regarding oil spills, the statute applies equally to diesel fuel spills, such as the spill occurring on the FISHER. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(23). - 8 - a vessel . . . from which oil is discharged. Id. at 820-21 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)). In turn, the OPA limits the total dollar amount for which a responsible party can be held liable, so long as that party has not committed acts of gross negligence or willful misconduct. Id. at 821. Finally, the statute consolidated previously established oil pollution funds into the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund[,] . . . which pays claims brought under the OPA after they have first been presented to the responsible party, if the responsible party is entitled to a defense, or the liability limit under the statute has been reached. Id. In the context of oil spills occurring from a ship, the OPA defines a responsible party, in part, as any person owning, operating, or demise chartering the vessel. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A). But there is a caveat. The OPA explicitly states that the statute does not apply to any discharge . . . from a public vessel. Id. at § 2702(c)(2). Furthermore, in spelling out which vessels fall under the purview of the OPA, the statute defines the term vessel as every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water, other than a public vessel. Id. at §2701(37) (emphasis added). The statute defines a public vessel as a vessel owned or bareboat chartered and operated by - 9 - the United States[] . . . except when the vessel is engaged in commerce. Id. at § 2701(29). Ironshore seeks to recover costs that it incurred when it reimbursed its insured, BSR, for cleaning up the diesel spill. All parties agree that the OPA applies to diesel spills occurring in graving docks such as the one owned by BSR, and no party argues that the FISHER was engaged in commerce when it discharged its fuel. AMSEA and the United States both assert that the FISHER is exempt from the OPA because it was both owned and operated by the United States at the time of the spill and, hence, qualifies as a public vessel under the act. Ironshore responds that while the United States was the owner of the FISHER at the time of the spill, AMSEA was its sole operator. Because AMSEA crew operated the ship rather than government employees, Ironshore argues, the FISHER does not qualify as a public vessel under the OPA, and Ironshore can recover from both parties under the statute. Although the OPA states that vessels owned and . . . operated by the United States are public vessels, the statute provides no definition of the word operated. Nor are we aware of any federal court, aside from the district court in this case, that has been required to interpret the precise definition of public vessel under the OPA. But the OPA is not the only federal statute that employs the term public vessel. Congress enacted the Public Vessels Act in 1925, waiving the United States' - 10 - sovereign immunity and allowing parties to sue the government for damages arising from the negligent operation of public vessels. See Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 218-19 (1945). Unlike the OPA, the Public Vessels Act has provided a substantial body of case law interpreting the term public vessels. In 1966, the Third Circuit faced an analogous set of facts to those we face here in the case of In re United States, 367 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1966). There, the court had to decide whether a military transport tanker owned by the U.S. Navy's Military Sea Transportation Service and crewed by a private contractor constituted a public vessel under the Public Vessels Act. Id. at 507-08. The Third Circuit did not consider it a difficult question, stating, we would have thought it too clear for serious argument that a ship owned by the United States and used as directed by the Navy for the transportation of military supplies is 'a public vessel of the United States.' Id. at 509. The court flatly rejected claimants' argument that only ships crewed by public employees constitute public vessels under the Public Vessels Act, concluding that government ownership and use as directed by the government exclusively for a public purpose suffice without more to make a ship a public vessel. Id. (citing Smith v. United States, 346 F.2d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1965)). - 11 - Likewise, the Second Circuit held in 1985 that a government-chartered vessel operated by a private contractor constituted a public vessel under the Public Vessels Act because Congress understood the term 'public vessel' in the [Public Vessels Act] to include a vessel . . . used solely in public service. Blanco v. United States, 775 F.2d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1985). Courts have continued to apply the same meaning to public vessels under the Public Vessels Act since the passage of the OPA. See, e.g., Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080, 1083 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005); Favorite v. Marine Pers. & Provisioning, Inc., 955 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1992). It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that [s]tatutes which relate to the same subject matter should be considered together so that they will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general objective scope. United States v. Gray, 780 F.3d 458, 467 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2004)). Moreover, the canon of in pari materia advises that Congress generally intends specific words to carry consistent meaning when used in the same context. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972). When Congress opted to exempt public vessels from OPA liability, it did so against a backdrop of federal law that had consistently interpreted the term public vessels to include government owned ships crewed by private contractors acting on - 12 - behalf of the government. We harbor no doubt that Congress intended the OPA term public vessels to be interpreted in the same manner as public vessels under the Public Vessels Act. In the context of the OPA, we therefore adopt the sound consensus of our sister circuits, holding that if a vessel functioning in a public capacity is owned (or bareboat chartered) by the United States, but crewed by a private contractor, such a vessel constitutes a public vessel so long as the private contractor is acting under the operational control of the United States and except when the vessel is engaged in commerce.6 See In re United States, 775 F.2d at 53 ([G]overnment ownership and use as directed 6 Ironshore insists that the term public vessel should be interpreted more narrowly under the OPA than its interpretation under the Public Vessels Act because the OPA is a strict liability statute, while the Public Vessels Act requires a higher burden of proof associated with standard negligence. Ironshore, however, points to no authority -- and we can find none -- for its alternative interpretation. Instead, relevant legislative history indicates that Congress intended for the term public vessel to sweep quite broadly. In its final report on the OPA, the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries -- the committee with principal jurisdiction over the bill -- noted that a 'Public Vessel' is a subclass of vessel that performs governmental functions for federal, state, or local units of government. H.R. Rep. No. 101-242, pt. 2, at 54 (1989). The only carve-out that the committee report envisioned was for government-owned vessels engaging in commercial service, which the report defined as all types of trade or business involving the transportation of goods or persons but exclud[ing] those vessels performing service as combatant-vessels. Id. This carve-out for government owned vessels engaged in commerce also appears in the enacted statute. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(29). - 13 - by the government exclusively for a public purpose suffice without more to make a ship a public vessel.). Applying this principle to the FISHER gives us little pause. Although AMSEA agreed in its contract with the Military Sealift Command to provide personnel, operational and technical support ashore and afloat, equipment, tools, provisions, and supplies to operate, maintain, and repair the [FISHER], the contract clearly established that at all times the FISHER would be controlled by the U.S. military. A section of the contract titled Operational Control stipulated that the vessel would operate in the worldwide service under the ultimate operational control of one of five military commands.7 Moreover, a separate section stated that the Military Sealift Command Headquarters would exercise Administrative Control of the ship. As part of its day-to-day operations, AMSEA was responsible for performing scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and repairs, as necessary, on a 24 hour a day basis. It held authority to subcontract for certain maintenance and repair work outside its own crew's capabilities, though any subcontract exceeding $100,000 -- and any changes altering a subcontract by 7 These commands, specifically, were the United States Fleet Forces Command, the United States Transportation Command, the Commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, the Commander of the United States Naval Forces Europe-Africa, and the Commander of the United States Naval Forces Central Command. - 14 - more than $50,000 -- had to be approved in advance by the government. Furthermore, AMSEA was required to incorporate specific provisions into any subcontract it executed, including the subcontract to use BSR's graving dock. Finally, at all times AMSEA's civilian Master of the ship was under an obligation to follow both a Navy standard operating manual and any additional definitive instructions from the United States Navy. The strict hierarchical relationship between the Military Sealift Command and AMSEA establishes, as the district court concluded, that AMSEA crewed the FISHER under the operational control of the United States. AMSEA did not lease the FISHER from the United States, nor was it permitted to use the vessel for its private gain. Rather, all of AMSEA's work on the FISHER benefited the Military Sealift Command and the United States directly. Under the OPA, the United States both owned and operated the FISHER. Because the FISHER is a military vessel owned and operated by the United States, it qualifies as a public vessel under the OPA. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(29). As such, it is exempt from OPA liability. Id. at § 2702(c)(2). Hence, the district court properly dismissed Ironshore's OPA claims against the United States and AMSEA. - 15 -