Opinion ID: 291540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: order denying motion to suppress.

Text: 11 The order of the district court denying appellants' motion to suppress was based upon pretrial evidentiary hearings before the district court, and, by stipulation, upon the transcript of the hearing of a similar motion made by appellants under an earlier and superseded indictment, and upon the transcript of the testimony taken before the Circuit Court of the State of Hawaii on a similar motion made by appellants in that court, in a criminal proceeding against the appellants, on a State charge arising out of the same arrest and search as is involved in the instant case. 12 The following statement relating to the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest and search of appellants is taken entirely from appellants' opening brief, as to which the appellee, in its reply brief, accepts with one exception which we will note later: 13 The firearm in question was found to be in appellants' possession as follows: 14 On November 22, 1966, a motorcycle officer of the Honolulu Police Department on routine patrol at approximately 9:15 at night 'clocked' a motor vehicle containing six men for a speeding violation. After motioning the driver to pull over, the vehicle stopped and the officer 'pulled (his) motorcycle to the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 to 15 feet away.' 15 The officer immediately radioed for another motorcycle which he believed to be in the area because 'it is normal procedure to call for assistance when there are that many people in the car', and because the officer 'had known that (the driver) was what we term an underworld character.' 16 Because the officer did not approach the vehicle, the driver alighted and proceeded toward the officer, who informed him that he had 'committed (a) traffic offense'; that he had been stopped for 'speeding'. 17 Upon asking for and receiving his operator's license, the officer radioed (again) for a 'license check', mentioning the driver's name. Within 'approximately three to five minutes,' while he was 'still writing the citation,' a Lieutenant Howell (accompanied by another police officer) arrived in his private automobile, and was informed of the 'facts of the case.' Soon the other motorcycle and another police vehicle arrived. 18 For reasons which he never expressed at the trial, Officer Howell, who knew 'each and every one' of the appellants, shined a flashlight into the car and 'recognizing the occupants, hailed several of them.' He then asked for the vehicle registration and appellant Kim, who had been standing on the sidewalk area, volunteered that he was the owner. Howell's testimony was that: 19 'He (kim) then walked back around the front of the car to the left hand side and got into the driver's seat, reached into the glove compartment and fumbled with papers and finally produced the registration. At that point, I was standing to his rear. I shined my flashlight into the front of the car along the floorboard and, at that time, noticed a cardboard box on the floorboard on the extreme right, up against the front seat, under (one of the occupant's) legs.' 20 The box, which was taped with masking tape, and which Officer Howell admitted the contents of which he could not see, contained the firearm which was to become the subject of the Indictment. 21 Officer Howell then shined his flashlight into the rear of the car where he 'noticed the butt of a small gun on the floorboard partially under    the front seat', and 'partially covered by newspaper.' He ordered all of the occupants out of the car, 'placed them under arrest for being offensively armed,' and made 'a search of their persons.' 22 Officer Howell asked that 'the wagon' be called. He then retrieved the 'gun butt,' which proved to be attached to a Mauser automatic pistol, 25 caliber. He 'then continued (his) search of the vehicle,' and retrieved from under the front seat a Smith and Wesson revolver, .38 caliber. 23 He then retrieved the cardboard box and upon opening it 'discovered the sawed-off rifle.' 24 Thereafter he found a Colt Cobra revolver, .38 caliber in the pocket of a trunk (trench) coat on the rear seat of the car. 25 Upon searching the appellants again, Lieutenant Howell recovered a .30 caliber 'banana clip' and an Astra revolver, .25 caliber from one of them. 26 In respect to 'STATEMENT OF THE CASE' appearing in appellants' brief, appellee notes in its answer brief that: 27 'On page four of the defendants' brief the defendants refer to the transcript of the trial and say 'for reasons which he (police officer Howell) never expressed at the trial, officer Howell    knew 'each and everyone' of the appellants.   ' Although the reasons were never expressed at the trial, they were expressed in the original motion to suppress and officer Howell testified that he knew the defendants from past experience, from their criminal records and from their reputation.' 28 The record further reveals that officer Howell testified that in the search of the car he found a paper sack containing four wigs. The wigs were never offered or received in evidence. 29 Three of the appellants testified that at the time the car was stopped by the traffic officer, the six occupants of the car were on a pleasure trip to visit the parents of one of the appellants. All of them testified that they were unaware that the sawed-off shotgun was in the car until it was located by officer Howell. Two of them testified that they were without knowledge that there were any other weapons in the car or on the persons of any of the appellants. One of them testified that he owned the weapon which was removed from the pocket of the trench coat. 30 Appellants timely moved to suppress as evidence the items of property described above. 31 The first question presented to us is, whether the warrantless arrest of the appellants by Officer Howell was legal? 32 We examine the circumstances under which this officer acted. Six men were in the automobile. It was night time. The car had been stopped by a traffic officer for exceeding the speed limit. There is nothing in the record to sustain any inference that the car was stopped on some pretext in order to search the car or to make any investigation of the occupants. When there are several persons in a stopped vehicle, it is normal procedure for a traffic officer to radio for assistance. The driver stepped from the car and the traffic officer recognized him as an 'underworld character.' Upon arrival at the scene, Officer Howell, a veteran of twenty-six years on the Honolulu Police Force, after talking to the traffic officer, asked for the registration certificate of the car, which is normal police procedure. At that time, Officer Howell was standing to the rear of the automobile. He recognized the occupants of the car and knew of their past criminal records. He flashed his flashlight into the car, which he had a right to do for his own protection if for no other reason. Bell v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 254 F.2d 82, 84, cert. den. 358 U.S. 885, 79 S.Ct. 126, 3 L.Ed.2d 113 (1958). Such conduct does not constitute a search. State v. Hanawahine et al., 50 Haw. 461, 443 P.2d 149. Seeing the weapon gave Officer Howell probable cause for believing that a crime was being committed in his presence, to wit: a violation of R.L.H.1955, Section 267-25. The arrest of appellants was, therefore, legal. See Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. den. 369 U.S. 876, 82 S.Ct. 1147, 8 L.Ed.2d 278 (1962); Bell v. United States, supra; State v. Hanawahine, et al., supra. 33 The next question is, whether the search following the arrest exceeded the permissible scope under the Fourth Amendment, of a search incidental to a lawful arrest?Appellants contend that the search of the automobile following the arrest, and which disclosed the presence in the automobile of the weapon described in the Indictment, exceeded the permissible scope of such search under the principles announced recently in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). We believe that the search in the instant case did not exceed the constitutional limits announced in Chimel. 34 The instant search occurred on November 22, 1966. Under the standards prevailing at that time, the search clearly met the requirements laid down in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950). 35 The district court properly denied appellants' motion to suppress. 36