Opinion ID: 2971540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trespass claim

Text: When exercising jurisdiction over state claims, this court follows state law standards for granting motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. J. C. Wyckoff & Assoc., Inc. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1483 (6th Cir. 1991). Michigan courts review a trial court’s decision to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict de novo. Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 666 N.W.2d 186, 192 (Mich. 2003). Judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted “only when, viewing the evidence and all legitimate inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there remain no issues of material fact upon which reasonable minds could differ.” Ewing v. City of Detroit, 651 N.W.2d 780, 786 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 661 N.W.2d 235 (Mich. 2003).
In Michigan, the statute of limitations for trespass is three years. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10). The parties dispute whether CERCLA or Michigan law determines when the statute of limitations begins. We conclude that both CERCLA and Michigan law provide the same commencement date, and that this date was more than three years before Milford filed its suit. CERCLA provides that if a state statute of limitations provides a commencement date for a property damages claim that results from a release of hazardous substances into the environment that is earlier than the “federally required commencement date,” then the statute of limitations for the state law claim will commence at the federally required date, rather than the state law date. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1). The federally required commencement date is the date on which “the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the . . . property damages . . . were caused by or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A). Under Michigan’s “discovery rule,” a plaintiff’s claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, (1) an injury and (2) the causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s breach. Moll v. Abbott Laboratories, 506 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich. 1993). Because Michigan courts have not considered whether the discovery rule applies to groundwater contamination cases, this court must decide based on its assumption of how the highest state court would decide the issue if confronted with it. Miles v. Kohli & Kaliher Assoc., Ltd., 917 F.2d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 1990). We assume that the Michigan Supreme Court would apply the discovery rule in this case. The discovery rule generally applies where a plaintiff may remain unaware of an injury for a long time, and the policies behind the statute of limitations are not offended by applying the discovery rule. The policies behind the statute of limitations include the provision of opponents with a fair opportunity to defend, elimination of “stale” claims in which evidence is likely to have been forgotten or destroyed, and protection of defendants from protracted fear of litigation. Moll, 506 N.W.2d at 823. These policies are not offended by applying the discovery rule to cases of groundwater pollution. It may take years for a tortfeasor’s pollutants to reach a victim’s groundwater, to detect the resulting pollution, and for the contaminee to know of contaminants’ harmful effects. Moreover, we reasonably may assume that the Michigan Supreme Court would consider parties who use hazardous substances likely to keep records of the substances they use, and more likely than those they harm to know of the danger posed by those substances. For these reasons, we assume Michigan would apply the discovery rule to groundwater pollution cases. The commencement date established by Michigan’s discovery rule is functionally identical to CERCLA’s federal commencement date. Both rules look to when the plaintiff knew or should have known No. 03-1597 Village of Milford v. K-H Holding Corp., et al. Page 4 of his potential cause of action against the defendant. See, e.g., Presque Isle Harbor Dev. Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 875 F. Supp. 1312, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1995). The parties do not dispute that K-H admitted to Milford in 1993 or 1994 that it had discovered a release of hazardous substances, or that Milford asked MDNR to identify K-H as a PRP in 1994. Milford argues that it was not certain that K-H caused the contamination at this time, in part because K-H denied that it was the source of the wells’ contamination, despite its release of the hazardous substances. But the discovery rule does not permit a party to await certainty. To toll the limitations period because a prospective defendant denies its liability, or because the plaintiff lacks absolute certainty as to the tortfeasor’s identity, would circumvent the purpose of the statute of limitations. Because Milford knew before 1996 that K-H had released specific chemicals, that those chemicals were present in its water supply, and that there were few, if any, realistic alternative sources of contamination, it knew (or should have known) of its potential cause of action against K-H, and its trespass claim is therefore time-barred.
Milford counters by invoking the “continuing trespass” doctrine, insisting that the continuing migration of the contaminants allows recovery. We find the doctrine inapplicable under the circumstances. To be sure, where a wrong is of a continuing nature, a defendant may recover damages resulting from that harm which occurred within the limitations period. Horvath v. Delida, 540 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). “A continuing wrong is established by continuing tortious acts, not by continual harmful effects from an original, completed act.” Id.; see also Sable v. General Motors Corp., 90 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1996). Milford presented no evidence at trial, however, to suggest that K-H continued to release substances after March 1, 1996. Although Milford presented some evidence that pollutants released before the statutory period may have continued to move from K-H’s property to Milford’s wells after this time, no evidence substantiates that this resulted from further acts by K-H. Even if further migration occurred, it was not a new act of trespass. In Horvath, the court held that where water seepage causes property damage, the cause of action accrues when the land is “visibly damaged.” The seepage of more water without further acts by the defendant does not constitute an additional tort. Horvath, 540 N.W.2d at 762. In the absence of further acts by K-H, there was no continuing trespass.