Opinion ID: 1181110
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction on Presumption of Consciousness.

Text: One of the defense theories presented at trial was that of unconsciousness based on psychomotor epilepsy. Dr. Blunt, testifying for the defense, described a psychomotor epileptic condition as one that results from problems in one or both of the temporal lobes of the brain where a person loses control or essentially is unconscious, but they are able to motivate and do things. And what actually occurs is that the outer cortex of the brain is essentially not functioning during those episodes.... They don't reason, they don't think, but ... they can act, they can perform well-learned kinds of things like walking and eating and those kinds of things ... things that we have so thoroughly learned ... that they are almost automatic. Dr. Blunt arrived at her diagnosis of psychomotor epilepsy after reading a transcript of Theresa Babbitt's testimony, where [Theresa] described the starry [ sic ], glassy-eyed effect [ sic ] that [defendant] had during the episodes of violence that he had displayed with her, and also her understanding โ her memory of him having no memory [of the events]. This testimony, Dr. Blunt stated, together with the previously described psychological testing of defendant, was very consistent with a diagnosis of psychomotor epilepsy. Dr. Lee Coleman, testifying for the prosecution in rebuttal, stated that Theresa Babbitt's description of defendant's glassy-eyed look during violent episodes with her was insufficient to support a diagnosis of psychomotor epilepsy, in that in each instance defendant had been drinking, which could account for his behavior, and, moreover, he would become violent, and a person who's having these temporal lobe seizures, ... is not capable of a coordinated, purposeful, directed violent attack because ... the nature of the seizure itself would prevent such a thing. Defendant's claim of having no memory of the incidents was not in and of itself evidence of a seizure because he may or may not have been speaking the truth. Persons experiencing a psychomotor seizure, Dr. Coleman stated, may appear to be awake, but in fact, they are in a true altered state of consciousness because they cannot relate to you in any kind of normal way, they could not talk to you, ... and what you see are ... repetitive stereotype movements.... If what they are doing involved a coordinated thing ... engaging in an activity that involves coordinated muscular complicated movement, they would not be able to continue that. They would be incapable, the doctor testified, of using or continuing to use a cutting instrument to cut a hole in a screen door, or of repeatedly inflicting purposeful traumatic injuries on another, or of removing drawers from dressers, dumping the contents out on a surface, and looking for things of value. Dr. Globus, testifying in surrebuttal, indicated that defendant's conduct on the nights in question was not inconsistent with a theory of unconsciousness based on psychomotor epilepsy. (10a) Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court instructed the jury in terms of CALJIC No. 4.30 [8] and No. 4.31. [9] Relying on Sandstrom v. Montana (1979) 442 U.S. 510 [61 L.Ed.2d 39, 99 S.Ct. 2450], Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307 [85 L.Ed.2d 344, 105 S.Ct. 1965], People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491 [189 Cal. Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302], and related cases, defendant contends that it was constitutional error for the court to instruct the jury on the CALJIC No. 4.31 so-called presumption of consciousness in that the instruction creates a mandatory, rebuttable presumption that the jury would have understood as shifting to defendant the burden of proving unconsciousness. (11) Sandstrom, Franklin, and Roder, supra, stand for the principle that it is a violation of due process to reduce the prosecution's burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In Sandstrom and Franklin, both murder cases, the challenged instructions lightened the prosecution's burden of proving the element of intent. [10] ( Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, 442 U.S. at pp. 523-524 [61 L.Ed.2d at p. 39]; Francis v. Franklin, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 307 [85 L.Ed.2d at p. 360].) In Roder, which involved the charge of a secondhand dealer receiving stolen property (ง 496, subds. 1, 2), the challenged instruction lightened the prosecution's burden of proving the element of knowledge. [11] (33 Cal.3d at p. 504.) (10b) Defendant argues that because unconsciousness completely negates the intent element of the charged crimes, proof of consciousness is a fact necessary to proof of intent. CALJIC No. 4.31, in creating a presumption of consciousness, therefore impermissibly lightened the prosecutor's burden of proving intent or, stated conversely, impermissibly shifted to defendant the burden of negating an element of the charged offenses. The Attorney General responds that consciousness is not an element of the offenses, but rather, is an affirmative defense, and that placing on the defendant the burden of proving an affirmative defense does not violate due process. Section 26, he observes, provides that all persons are capable of committing crimes, except for certain specific classes including those who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof. [12] The statute, he maintains, thus defines unconsciousness as an affirmative defense. Only when there is evidence tending to show that the defendant was unconscious is the prosecution required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he was conscious. In these circumstances, the Attorney General concludes, to permit the prosecution to rely on the rebuttable presumption of consciousness is not a denial of due process. In support of their respective arguments, both parties cite Patterson v. New York (1977) 432 U.S. 197 [53 L.Ed.2d 281, 97 S.Ct. 2319]. In Patterson the defendant was charged with second degree murder. Under New York law extreme emotional distress is a defense to the charge, but the burden is on the defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Rejecting the contention that this scheme impermissibly shifts the burden of persuasion from the prosecutor to defendant in violation of due process, the high court noted that the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict of murder. It constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion; and unless we are to overturn Leland [ [13] ] and Rivera, [ [14] ] New York has not violated the Due Process Clause, and Patterson's conviction must be sustained. [ถ] We are unwilling, the court stated, to reconsider Leland and Rivera. But even if we were to hold that a State must prove sanity to convict once that fact is put in issue, it would not necessarily follow that a State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment. ( Id. at pp. 206-207 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 290].) Concluding, the court stated: We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused. Traditionally, due process has required that only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the accused have been left to the legislative branch. We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged. Proof of the non-existence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required; ... (432 U.S. at p. 210 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 292].) Relying on the United States Supreme Court's statement that the defense of extreme emotional disturbance does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict (432 U.S. at p. 207 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 290]), defendant asserts that where, as here, the defense negatives an element of the offense โ to wit, intent โ Sandstrom, supra, 442 U.S. 510, Franklin, supra, 471 U.S. 307, and Roder, supra, 33 Cal.3d 491 require the prosecution to prove the absence of the asserted defense beyond a reasonable doubt and without the assistance of a presumption. The Attorney General, by contrast, cites Patterson, supra, 432 U.S. 197, for the proposition that due process does not require the state to prove the nonexistence of an affirmative defense. In Engle v. Isaac (1982) 456 U.S. 107 [71 L.Ed.2d 783, 102 S.Ct. 1558], the United States Supreme Court recognized that the prosecution's constitutional duty to negate affirmative defenses may depend, at least in part, on the manner in which the State defines the charged crime.... A State may want to assume the burden of disproving an affirmative defense without also designating absence of the defense an element of the crime. [Fn. omitted.] The Due Process Clause does not mandate that when a State treats absence of an affirmative defense as an `element' of the crime for one purpose, it must do so for all purposes. ( Id. at p. 120 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 797-796].) Pursuant to our statutory scheme, murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. (งง 187-189.) The death, the causation, and the malice are the facts the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt if the defendant is to be convicted of murder. (งง 1096, 1105, subd. (a).) Unconsciousness is a defense. (ง 26.) (12) Although the state, once the defendant raises the issue, has assumed the burden of disproving unconsciousness, this fact of itself does not transform absence of the defense โ consciousness โ into an element of murder for purposes of due process analysis. This is true even though unconsciousness negates the elements of voluntariness and intent, and when not voluntarily induced is a complete defense to a criminal charge (ง 26, subd. Four; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12 [160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]). (See Engle v. Isaac, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 120 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 795-796].) (10c) In sum, because consciousness is not an element of the offense of murder (nor of any offense), CALJIC No. 4.31 does not impermissibly shift to the defendant the burden of negating an element, nor does the instruction violate due process by impermissibly lightening the prosecution's burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, there is no constitutional impediment to the state's use of a rebuttable presumption in meeting its assumed burden โ once the issue has been raised โ to prove consciousness beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Engle v. Isaac, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 120 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 795-796]; Patterson v. New York, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 210 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 292]; cf. People v. Boyes (1983) 149 Cal. App.3d 812 [197 Cal. Rptr. 105] [upholding former version of CALJIC No. 4.31].) Defendant's effort to distinguish this case from Patterson on grounds that the unconsciousness defense negatives an element of the crime is unavailing. The United States Supreme Court's concern in Patterson that the defense of extreme emotional disturbance did not negative any facts of the crime that the state was required to prove related not to whether absence of the defense was an element (which the state would then be required to prove), but rather, to the nature of the defendant's burden of proof. (13) The rule is that when there is placed upon an accused the burden of interjecting a factual contention which, if established would tend to overcome or negate proof of any element of the crime charged as otherwise established by the People, the accused need only raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence or nonexistence of the fact in issue. ( People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963 [127 Cal. Rptr. 135, 544 P.2d 1335].) When, however, the defense raises factual issues collateral to the question of the accused's guilt or innocence [which] do not bear directly on any link in the chain of proof of any element of the crime ( id. at p. 964), there is no constitutional impediment to requiring the accused to prove the collateral facts by a preponderance of the evidence ( id. at pp. 964-965). (See generally Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law (1979) 88 Yale L.J. 1325.) In Patterson, because the emotional-distress defense raised factual issues collateral to the question of guilt and did not serve to negative any element of the crime charged, the state could constitutionally require the defendant to carry the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. (432 U.S. at pp. 200, 206-207 [53 L.Ed.2d at pp. 286, 289-290]; see also Martin v. Ohio (1987) 480 U.S. 228 [94 L.Ed.2d 267, 107 S.Ct. 1098].) (10d) In the instant case, by contrast, defendant's burden was only to raise a reasonable doubt that he was conscious, and then only if the prosecution's proof did not of itself raise such a doubt. (Cf. Martin v. Ohio, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 233 [94 L.Ed.2d at p. 274] [to convict, jury had to be convinced that none of the evidence, whether offered by state or defendant, raised a reasonable doubt]; People v. Loggins (1972) 23 Cal. App.3d 597, 601-602 [100 Cal. Rptr. 528] [construing ง 1105 concerning defendant's duty to come forward with evidence].) (14) (See fn. 15.), (10e) Hence, it is immaterial for present purposes that the unconsciousness defense served to negative an element of the crime. [15] CALJIC No. 4.31, moreover, cannot be read in a vacuum. (15) As the United States Supreme Court has stated: Analysis must focus initially on the specific language challenged, but the inquiry does not end there. If a specific portion of the jury charge, considered in isolation, could reasonably have been understood as creating a presumption that relieves the State of its burden of persuasion on an element of an offense, the potentially offending words must be considered in the context of the charge as a whole. Other instructions might explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption. [Citation.] This analysis `requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury ..., for whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction.' [Citation.] ( Francis v. Franklin, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 315 [85 L.Ed.2d at p. 354]; see also People v. Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 538-539.) (10f) Here, in addition to standard instructions on the presumption of innocence, the prosecution's burden to prove every element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, and the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove intent or mental state, [16] the jury was instructed that unconsciousness was a complete defense, that evidence had been received which tended to show that defendant was unconscious, and that if it had a reasonable doubt that defendant was conscious, it must find him not guilty. (CALJIC No. 4.30, supra, fn. 8.) Placed in context, therefore, CALJIC No. 4.31 did little more than guide the jury as to how to evaluate evidence bearing on the defendant's consciousness and apply it to the issue, an issue that is capable of proof only by circumstantial evidence of the defendant's conduct. (Cf. Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 [92 L.Ed.2d 460, 106 S.Ct. 3101].) We conclude, therefore, that given the entirety of the charge a reasonable juror could not have believed that defendant was required to persuade it that he was unconscious. Rather, the instructions taken as a whole clearly indicate the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt not only that defendant appeared to be conscious, but also that he in fact was conscious. (See People v. Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 540; compare Francis v. Franklin, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 319-320 [85 L.Ed.2d at p. 357] with Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 160-161 [60 L.Ed.2d 777, 794-795, 99 S.Ct. 2213].) We note, finally, that even were we to assume, contrary to our determination, that CALJIC No. 4.31 implicates due process concerns, any error in giving the instruction would be harmless under the Chapman standard of review ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711]). (See Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 582-583 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 473-474].) The defense and prosecution experts both testified that an individual experiencing a psychomotor epileptic seizure could perform well-learned or automatic preprogrammed kinds of activity, like walking or eating, but would be incapable of reasoned or coordinated complicated kinds of movement. Defendant's acts in the Schendel case clearly were purposeful, motivated behavior: Cutting open Ms. Schendel's screen door; ransacking her apartment and removing items of value; pulling her nightclothing above her breasts; placing a mattress on the trunk of her body and a teapot on her pubic area; tying a leather strap to her ankle; and inflicting repeated severe blows on her person. In the W. case the same is true: Demanding her car; beating her into unconsciousness; removing her lower clothing; and taking her cash and jewelry. The record thus establishes defendant's consciousness beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 580-581 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 472-473]; Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497, 502-503 [95 L.Ed.2d 439, 446, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1922].)