Opinion ID: 1283881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: apprendi/blakely argument

Text: [5, 6] Alternatively, Payan argues that any factual finding of an aggravated offense must be made by a jury. This issue was neither raised nor addressed in Hamilton. Payan's argument relies upon the principle established by Apprendi that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [14] This principle is based upon the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment and the jury trial guarantees of the 6th Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the 14th Amendment. [15] Apprendi involved a state statute which permitted a judge to impose an extended term of imprisonment if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that in committing the crime, the defendant acted with the purpose of intimidation based upon race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. Concluding that such a finding would be constitutionally impermissible, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that the legislature could not `remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' [16] Subsequently, in Blakely v. Washington, [17] the Court held that the `statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In applying the Apprendi/Blakely principle to the issues in this case, we must consider whether the aggravated offense finding made by the sentencing judge subjected Payan to punishment which could be imposed on the basis of the jury verdict alone. [18] Because Payan's sentence of imprisonment for the sexual assault conviction is within the 1- to 50-year statutory range for a Class II felony, [19] the narrower question is whether the lifetime registration requirement under SORA and the lifetime community supervision requirement under § 83-174.03 constitute punishment.