Opinion ID: 1404508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Floyd's pendent state-law claims against the officers

Text: The officers also claim that the district court erred in concluding that they were not entitled to governmental immunity from Floyd's pendent state-law claims. Because the denial of governmental immunity under Michigan law constitutes a final order, we have jurisdiction to review the officers' interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of summary judgment on these grounds. Livermore ex rel. Rohm v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 408 (6th Cir.2007) (explaining that since Michigan's court rules were amended to expand the definition of a final order, we have held repeatedly that, because the denial of governmental immunity is now a `final order' providing defendants with an appeal of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals, this court has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals concerning pendent state law claims of governmental immunity.). The employee provision of Michigan's governmental-immunity act provides in pertinent part as follows: Each . . . employee of a governmental agency . . . shall be immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property caused by the . . . employee . . . while in the course of employment . . . while acting on behalf of a governmental agency if all of the following are met: (a) The . . . employee . . . is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority. (b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. (c) The . . . employee's . . . conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. As used in this subdivision, gross negligence means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results. Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2). The Michigan Supreme Court has explained that, to survive summary disposition of a gross negligence claim against a government employee, the plaintiff must adduce proof of conduct `so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.' Maiden v. Rozwood, 597 N.W.2d 817, 824 (Mich. 1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2)(c)). In the present case, no question has been raised as to whether Officers Quaine and Reynoso were acting within the scope of their authority and engaged in the discharge of a governmental function. We must determine, however, whether Floyd has adduced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers' conduct amounted to gross negligence. See id. at 825-27 (concluding that a staff member at a state mental health facility was entitled to governmental immunity because reasonable minds could not agree that his conduct was grossly negligent and explaining that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden to come forward with specific facts to support her claim). In so doing, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to Floyd and draw all legitimate inferences in his favor. See Jackson v. County of Saginaw, 458 Mich. 141, 580 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Mich.1998) (holding that, even after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, reasonable minds could not differ in concluding that a jail physician's failure to diagnose the plaintiff's throat cancer could not amount to gross negligence as defined in the statute). We believe that Floyd has met his burden under Michigan law. Again, accepting Floyd's version of the facts and drawing all inferences in his favor, both officers used deadly force against him without warning, despite the fact that he was in his own backyard and posed no danger to anyone. Reasonable minds could easily conclude that the officers' conduct was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether Floyd would be injured. This would constitute gross negligence under Michigan law. Summary judgment on Floyd's state-law claims is therefore inappropriate.