Opinion ID: 801219
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Specific Finding of Facilitation

Text: Defendant contends that even if there was sufficient evidence of facilitation to satisfy § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), we must set aside the enhancement because the district court failed to make a specific finding that the firearms in the truck facilitated his possession of methamphetamine. Because Defendant failed to raise the issue in district court, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 669 F.3d 1148, 1150-1151 (10th Cir.2012). We reverse for plain error only when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects the defendant's substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 1151 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant has the burden of establishing all four elements of plain error. United States v. Hall, 625 F.3d 673, 684 (10th Cir.2010). Defendant has failed to establish both the second and third prongs. Even if the district court committed error, the error was not plain. An error is plain if it is clear or obvious under current, well-settled law. In general, for an error to be contrary to well-settled law, either the Supreme Court or this court must have addressed the issue. United States v. Thornburgh, 645 F.3d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir.2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant offers that a few circuits require the district court to make a specific finding of facilitation before enhancing the defendant's offense level under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). See West, 643 F.3d at 115 ([T]he District Court was required to make a specific finding that the gun at issue facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the possession offense.); Jeffries, 587 F.3d at 694 (same); United States v. Blankenship, 552 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir.2009) (same). But he is unable to point to any authority from this court or the Supreme Court to support this proposition, and we know of none. Moreover, even if Defendant carried his burden on the second prong, his challenge fails under the third prong, which establishes that we reverse only when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Hoskins, 654 F.3d 1086, 1099 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). In our view, the probability of a different result is too slim to justify reversal and remand.