Opinion ID: 6348829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: First Direct Appeal and Remand

Text: Westray appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court, arguing, in part, that he had not been properly advised of his appeal rights in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(b). The State conceded Westray was not properly admon‐ ished, and the case was remanded to the trial court in Septem‐ ber 2000. On remand Westray had new legal representation, Brian Lewis. After the trial court gave the instructed admonish‐ ments, Lewis filed a motion to withdraw Westray’s guilty plea. As amended, the motion stated: NOW COMES the Defendant, JAMES L. WESTRAY, by and through his counsel, BRIAN D. LEWIS, and pursuant to Ill. Sup. No. 20‐3260 9 Ct[.] Rule 604(d), hereby respectfully re‐ quests this Court to allow him to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charge of murder, made on November 6, 1998, and in support thereof, hereby states as follows:
not knowingly and voluntarily made, be‐ cause the Defendant was acting on a mis‐ap‐ prehension [sic] of the facts and the law.
WESTRAY, was denied the effective assis‐ tance of trial counsel, because trial counsel failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into mitigation evidence and circumstances of the Defendant. WHEREFORE, Defendant, JAMES L. WESTRAY, respectfully requests this Court to allow him [to] withdraw his plea of guilty, entered in this case, and to set the case for jury trial. At a July 2001 hearing on this amended motion, Lewis called Westray to the stand. Westray testified that when he entered his guilty plea, he did not understand he was “admit‐ ting to being the person who actually committed the murder.” According to Westray, he also did not know the State “would be able to argue that [he] had admitted to being the cause of death of Miss Opatt” afterward. Based on Broeking’s explana‐ tion of “accomplice theory,” Westray believed he was “plead‐ ing to facts that would show that Keith Cook was the actual killer.” Additionally, had he been aware of additional 10 No. 20‐3260 evidence, such as the coroner’s report and a statement made by Cook’s wife implicating Cook, he would not have entered his plea. Both cross‐examination and redirect examination fo‐ cused on Westray’s knowledge and understanding of the guilty plea. Attorney Broeking testified next. Broeking stated he had reviewed the evidence with Westray and informed him of the penalties that could accompany a guilty plea. According to Broeking, “early on” in his representation of Westray, he ex‐ plained that Westray’s claim that he shot Opatt “a fraction of a second” after Cook could be an admission to felony murder that would potentially subject him to the death penalty. He also counseled Westray that “his best chance” of avoiding the death penalty was to plead guilty, but he did not tell him such a result was “probabl[e].” Broeking’s legal theory was that given the “serious aggravating factors,” the “less a jury saw and heard about the crime, the better oﬀ” Westray would be. Broeking testified that Westray ultimately chose to plead guilty. The court denied Westray’s amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although the court provided no explanation for its decision, neither party objected or had anything further to add. D. Second Direct Appeal, Commutation of Sentence, and Postconviction Proceedings Westray appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court for a sec‐ ond time. While his appeal was pending, then‐Governor George Ryan commuted Westray’s death sentence to a sen‐ tence of natural life in prison. The Illinois Supreme Court ini‐ tially dismissed Westray’s appeal but then transferred the No. 20‐3260 11 case to the Illinois Appellate Court. Before that court, Westray argued again that his plea was not knowing or intelligent. But the state appellate court rejected his arguments and aﬃrmed the order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Westray petitioned for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, which was denied in January 2009. Four years later, Westray filed an amended postconviction petition in state court through appointed counsel. Before the state trial court, Westray argued that Broeking was ineffective for failing to investigate and present available evidence in mitigation during sentencing, and that Lewis was ineffective for failing to raise that claim against Broeking on remand. He argued further that the commutation of his death sentence did not render his case moot. The state trial court disagreed and dismissed the postconviction petition. That court concluded that the Governor’s commutation rendered moot Westray’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing. Westray appealed the dismissal of his postconviction peti‐ tion to the Illinois Appellate Court. The court aﬃrmed the state trial court on mootness grounds. In doing so it relied on People v. Lucas, an Illinois Supreme Court case which stated that the commutation of a death sentence renders moot any sentencing challenges resulting from errors at the aggrava‐ tion‐and‐mitigation sentencing stage. See 787 N.E.2d 113, 119 (Ill. 2002). About five months later, the Illinois Supreme Court denied Westray’s petition for leave to appeal. In 2019, Westray filed a pro se federal habeas petition un‐ der 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting the same two ineﬀective assis‐ tance claims. He then requested an evidentiary hearing. After determining that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary, the district court denied the petition. But the court granted a 12 No. 20‐3260 certificate of appealability on the claim that trial counsel Broeking was ineﬀective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his abusive childhood. Although the court was “satisfied that its conclusions [were] correct,” it was “possible that a reasonable jurist could conclude that the state trial court’s denial of the ineﬀective assistance claim … with‐ out stating any reasoning, either should not be entitled to def‐ erential review or amounted to an incorrect or unreasonable application of Strickland.” Westray appealed, and this court appointed counsel.2 Our court then granted appointed counsel’s request to expand the certificate of appealability to include the following issues: “(1) whether we should remand the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on Westray’s theories; and (2) whether the lawyer who filed Westray’s post‐sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea rendered ineﬀective assis‐ tance by not also requesting resentencing on the basis of plea‐ and‐sentencing counsel’s ineﬀectiveness.”