Opinion ID: 2319344
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: NTV's Appeal

Text: NTV contends that WCD failed to meet its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence its charge in Count I of its Complaint [`Breach of Contract Substantial Completion'], that NTV failed to follow the procedures set forth in the negotiated definition of `Substantially Complete' included in the [c]ontract. NTV argues that the trial court incorrectly decided in favor of WCD on the substantial completion issue because the trial judge ignored principles of contract interpretation, as well as specific contract provisions, [6] and imposed her own, misguided view of what was equitable under a similarly misguided discussion of the facts of the case. NTV (1) emphasizes its view that [t]he judge's ruling evidences her apparent failure to grasp the distinction between the Kfoury work and the nonKfoury work, the relationship between NTV and Kfoury, and Kfoury and Valentine, and between Valentine and WCD; (2) faults the judge for conclud[ing] that Valentine was also NTV's subcontractor/agent for the nonKfoury work; and (3) in essence maintains that the trial judge misunderstood the Substantially Complete concept as defined in the contract, and hence, improperly relied on Mr. Joch's testimony, as well as that of Ms. Powell, with respect to the meaning of that term. Finally, NTV appears to claim that the trial court failed to recognize that under the contract, WCD had only two optionsterminate the contract or proceed to closing; and that WCD and the trial court could not redefine substantial completion to allow WCD to defer closing until it considered the Unit to be Substantially Complete. WCD primarily supports the trial court's findings and analysis regarding substantial completion, including its determination that NTV's architect, Mr. Thoren, acted unreasonably when he declared that WCD's Unit was Substantially Complete on January 31, 2007. WCD argues that the testimony of Mr. Luce, Mr. Joch and Ms. Powell supports the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Moreover, WCD contends that both Kfoury and nonKfoury work constituted part of the Build-Out Work, and that NTV's `Kfoury Work' theory was invented well after litigation began and was not supported by the [c]ontract or the evidence. WCD further asserts that even if NTV is correct that it could demand closing once the `Kfoury Work' was [s]ubstantially [c]omplete, the Kfoury work was not complete as of January 31, 2007; that the trial judge correctly found that the parties agreed to extend the Closing Date to February 28, 2007; and that under the contract, WCD properly refused to close prematurely. We are persuaded by our review of the entire record, including trial transcripts and exhibits, and the trial court's analysis, that WCD has the better of the arguments regarding substantial completion. We are guided by the following legal principles pertaining to contract interpretation. Since the proper interpretation of a contract is a legal question, `this court exercises de novo review.' Unfoldment, Inc. v. District of Columbia Contract Appeals Bd., 909 A.2d 204, 209 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Independence Mgmt. Co. v. Anderson & Summers, LLC, 874 A.2d 862, 867 (D.C.2005)). `The writing must be interpreted as a whole, giving a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all its terms,' and ascertaining the meaning `in light of all the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the contract was made.' Debnam v. Crane Co., 976 A.2d 193, 197 (D.C.2009) (quoting 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 205-06 n. 7 (D.C.1984)). In construing a contract, the court must determine what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the disputed language meant. Unfoldment, Inc., supra, 909 A.2d at 209 (quoting Independence Mgmt. Co., supra, 874 A.2d at 867) (internal quotation marks and other citation omitted). In this context, a reasonable person is: (1) presumed to know all the circumstances surrounding the contract's making; and (2) bound by usages of the terms which either party knows or has reason to know. Akassy v. William Penn Apartments Ltd. P'ship, 891 A.2d 291, 299 (D.C.2006). We apply the reasonable person standard . . . both to the circumstances surrounding the contract and the course of conduct of the parties under the contract. Id. (quoting Intercounty Constr. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 443 A.2d 29, 32 (D.C.1982)) (internal quotation mark and other citation omitted).