Opinion ID: 1303215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: demurrer of defendants shultz and meier

Text: [8] These defendants also demurred on the ground that several causes of action were united but not separately stated. Plaintiff's complaint as heretofore noted, sets forth in numbered, separate paragraphs the allegations as to each defendant, or group thereof, and consists of two causes of action as to each defendant, or group thereof. It has been pointed out that the allegations of the first cause of action are sufficient to state a cause of action for negligence and those of the second to toll the statute of limitations. This ground of demurrer is not well taken. Each cause of action against each defendant or group thereof is stated separately not only as to defendants but as to the period of time during which plaintiff was under the care and treatment of such defendant, or defendants. If the demurrer was meant to be on the ground that causes of action against these defendants were improperly joined, that contention is answered adversely to defendants by reason of the rule set forth in Kraft v. Smith, 24 Cal.2d 124, 129, 130 [148 P.2d 23], a malpractice case. We said there: Although the complaint before us is far from being a model of clarity, conciseness, or consistency, it does fairly appear therefrom that plaintiff Wanda Kraft sustained certain severe physical injuries, that the defendants were severally and successively employed to treat such injuries, that each defendant was negligent in the treatment he administered, and that as a proximate result of the negligence of one or the other or both of the defendants the plaintiff Wanda Kraft sustained further injury.... Certainly neither defendant is liable for any injury caused by the independent tort of his co-defendant, to which he himself did not proximately contribute. If upon the trial it develops that neither defendant was guilty of negligence then no prejudice will have been occasioned by their joinder in the one action. If it develops that only one defendant was negligent in his treatment the assessment of the verdict will be simple. If, on the other hand, it appears that negligence of both defendants contributed proximately to cause an injury for which plaintiff is entitled to recover, it may be a matter entailing great difficulty of proof as to the amount in which each defendant is responsible. And: The facts that defendants are not joint tort feasors but independent wrongdoers, and that their negligence operated successively rather than concurrently in time to produce the injury, are not vetitive of the right of joinder. The salutary procedure afforded by sections 379a, 379b and 379c of the Code of Civil Procedure is clearly intended to be available upon a showing either that the negligence of two or more persons, whether joint, independently concurrent, or successive, contributed proximately to cause the injury for which recovery is sought, or that the injury for which recovery is sought was proximately caused by the negligence of one or another or several of two or more persons and, as to each person who is not charged absolutely, that a reasonable uncertainty, requiring determination of some factual or legal issue, exists in respect to alternative or quantitative liability. (Pp. 130, 131.) It appears then that this ground of demurrer was not well taken and should not have been sustained. These defendants also demurred upon the ground that the complaint was uncertain, unintelligible and ambiguous in that it could not be ascertained whether the negligence on their part consisted of a failure to keep the leg free from infection or negligence in prescribing for and treating the leg; and that it cannot be ascertained whether they are charged with negligence in failing to repair the artery and nerve and in failing to remove accumulated blood and, if so, whether plaintiff is charging that any damage resulted; and that it cannot be ascertained what acts defendants are charged with failure to perform in order to have properly combated an infection. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that defendants neglected properly to care for his leg as a result of which the leg was amputated, to his damage and loss. [9] As was said in Greninger v. Fischer, supra, 81 Cal. App.2d 549, 552, it was not necessary for plaintiff to allege in what respect the treatment given him might have been deficient so long as the allegations of the complaint charged the breach of a legal duty, proximate causation and resulting damage. [10] Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded. (21 Cal.Jur., p. 24, § 11; Brea v. McGlashan, 3 Cal. App.2d 454, 460 [39 P.2d 877]; Kidwell v. General Petroleum Corp., 212 Cal. 720, 723 [300 P. 1, 76 A.L.R. 830]; Morlock v. Fink, 81 Cal. App. 686, 690 [254 P. 578].) It follows, therefore, that the demurrer of defendants Shultz and Meier should have been overruled.