Opinion ID: 2556570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Evidence Established Causation

Text: Dr. Reddy's other argument is that the Superior Court erred in denying his Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law because Harbor Health failed to produce evidence that Ms. Spriggs would have received surgery clearance and authorization for the surgery prior to her death. [39] Dr. Reddy argues that section 6853 of the Medical Malpractice Act requires a plaintiff to present expert testimony as to the consent of a patient to surgery. Section 6853(e) states that: No liability shall be based upon asserted negligence unless expert medical testimony is presented as to the alleged deviation from the applicable standard of care in the specific circumstances of the case and as to the causation of the alleged personal injury of death ... [40] In Duphily v. Del. Elec. Coop. Inc ., this Court stated: Delaware recognizes the traditional but for definition of proximate causation. Our time-honored definition of proximate cause ... is that direct cause without which [an] accident would not have occurred. In other words, a proximate cause is one which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. [41] Proximate cause is to be determined, on the facts, upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent. Implicit in the trial court's conclusion is the finding that the accident would not have occurred if the plaintiff had kept a proper lookout. [42] Dr. Reddy argues that there is no causal connection between his conduct and Ms. Spriggs' deteriorating condition because there is no proof that the proposed surgery would have occurred. Dr. Reddy relies on Ms. Spriggs' factual circumstances in 1998 and that no one from the District of Columbia testified whether the surgery would have been approved. Dr. Dabney stated that he would have recommended surgery when Ms. Spriggs' spine reached a sixty degree curvature, which would have been somewhere around 1995-1996. Consequently, the appropriate time period at issue is 1995-1996. Harbor Health presented expert testimony that Dr. Reddy breached the applicable standard of care by not returning Ms. Spriggs to duPont every six months and by failing to develop a strategy for dealing with the scoliosis that simply would have been of a nature to have at least reminded him that she has an ongoing chronic problem and to have that evaluated periodically to make sure that it was dealt with before it became a much more serious problem. Expert testimony was also presented that these failures proximately caused injury to Ms. Spriggs and that Ms. Spriggs suffered from such failures. There was sufficient expert testimony presented at trial to support a finding that had the correct treatment been recommended, that treatment would have been approved at the appropriate time. This conclusion is supported by the record, which indicates that Ms. Spriggs had a tracheosectomy repair and her hip socket removed in 1997. From this evidence, without any additional expert testimony, the jury could reasonably find that if Dr. Reddy had returned Ms. Spriggs to duPont every six months, the surgery on her spine would have been recommended and approved during the 1995-1996 period. Accordingly, there was sufficient record evidence to support the jury's determination that the failure to have corrective surgery performed was proximately caused by Dr. Reddy's negligent conduct.