Opinion ID: 1964594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Respondent Loring's Conduct

Text: A common pattern of respondent Loring's conduct is evident in these three incidents  a failure to communicate with and fully explain to his clients all salient facts and circumstances. In Fusco, he concealed the fact that he had permitted the statute of limitations to run and misrepresented the status of the appeal. As part and parcel of this conduct, he frequently ignored the clients' requests for information. The same type of behavior existed in the incident involving Rosenfield when he ignored frequent status requests and waited for months before advising him that no appeal had been taken. In O'Connell he concealed from the client the relationships of the abstractor, the abstract company and himself. It was only after unanswered telephone inquiries and a registered letter demand that he invited Mr. O'Connell to a meeting to explain the omission in the search. Other than factual questions, which we have resolved in the foregoing recitations, the respondent's defense is that this Court may not exercise its authority to discipline an attorney when the county ethics committee has not recommended a presentment and has suggested a private reprimand. This position is unsound. We review the actions of the county ethics committees; if we do not concur in their conclusions or harbor a substantial reservation about them, we may and should exercise our authority to cause the matter to be presented to us. See In re LaDuca, 62 N.J. 133, 136, 141 (1973). In the final analysis, the State Constitution has imposed on this Court the ultimate obligation to determine whether members of the bar have committed infractions of the Disciplinary Rules and, if so, to fix the appropriate discipline. N.J. Const. (1947), Art. VI, § 2, par. 3. In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 225 (1976); In re Thompson, 67 N.J. 26, 32-33 (1975). Respondent also contends that this Court may consider ethics matters only when a county ethics committee has filed a presentment. This Court has the inherent power predicated on its constitutional duty to initiate disciplinary proceedings on its own or, as here, when the Chief of the Central Ethics Unit, Administrative Office of the Courts, has brought to our attention matters which warrant the institution of such proceedings. In re Thompson, supra . The attorney-client relationship embodies the concept of the client's trust in his fiduciary, the attorney. That relationship is described in Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 232, 247, 13 L.Ed. 676 (1850): There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of attorney and client, or, generally speaking, one more honorably or faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it. Inherent in that trust is the duty to advise the client fully, frankly, and truthfully of all material and significant information. The respondent has violated that duty and that trust. We have previously reprimanded him for precisely the same type of conduct. In re Loring, 62 N.J. 336 (1973). We wrote at that time: As to the charge of failing to keep his client informed about the status of the appeal and to respond to the latter's inquiries in relation thereto we concur in the Committee's conclusion of unprofessional conduct by respondent. The facts in the matter, as recited above, speak for themselves. It is as improper for a lawyer to deliberately refuse to inform a client of the status of his matter as it is to affirmatively misrepresent that status. In re Rosenblatt, 60 N.J. 505, 508 (1972). Respondent inexcusably refused to respond to reasonable requests by and on behalf of his client for information and advice about the case. [ Id. at 346] Respondent's conduct impairs the confidence of the public in the bar and constitutes a violation of DR 1-102. He is suspended for a period of six months and until the further order of this Court.