Opinion ID: 1693796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Felony Murder Instructions

Text: We next address defendant's contention that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on felony murder. In considering this issue, we note two critical points. First, defendant failed to object to the court's instructions. Second, an error in omitting an element of the felony murder instructions would be an error of constitutional magnitude. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt). Accordingly, our analysis of the alleged instructional error requires that we first address the standard of review for unpreserved claims of constitutional error.
This state encourages litigants `to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around....' Grant, supra, 445 Mich. at 551, 520 N.W.2d 123. This Court disfavors consideration of unpreserved claims of error. In Grant, this Court discussed the standards for reviewing unpreserved claims of nonconstitutional error. We noted that a rule of automatic reversal would conflict with M.C.L. § 769.26; M.S.A. § 28.1096, which provides that judgments or verdicts shall not be reversed absent a miscarriage of justice. Grant, p. 543, 520 N.W.2d 123. We also observed that Michigan has long recognized the importance of preserving issues for appellate review. Id., pp. 546, 550-551, 520 N.W.2d 123. [6] The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of this policy and the right of the various states to impose preservation requirements. Id., pp. 546-547, 551, 520 N.W.2d 123, citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944). Trial is by far the best time to address a defendant's constitutional and nonconstitutional rights. Grant, supra, 445 Mich. at 551, 520 N.W.2d 123 (emphasis added). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a state's right to develop procedural rules that lead to issue forfeiture[ [7] ] even where the procedural rules implicate constitutional protections if the rules serve a legitimate state interest. Id., pp. 546-547, 520 N.W.2d 123. In Grant, this Court examined federal authority in adopting an issue forfeiture rule for unpreserved, nonconstitutional error. We relied primarily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). In Olano, the Supreme Court explained the plain error rule of F.R. Crim. P. 52(b), which provides: Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. The Olano Court emphasized that a constitutional right may be forfeited by a party's failure to timely assert that right. Id., p. 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770. To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights. Id., pp. 731-734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The third requirement generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Id., p. 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. Id. [8] Finally, once a defendant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate court must exercise its discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error `seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings' independent of the defendant's innocence. Id., pp. 736-737, 113 S.Ct. 1770. In Grant, we found Olano persuasive in distinguishing between Michigan's issue preservation requirement and harmless error rule. Grant, supra, 445 Mich. at 552, 520 N.W.2d 123. [9] Accordingly, we applied the factors set forth in Olano to the question of nonconstitutional error presented in Grant. Id., pp. 552-554, 520 N.W.2d 123. We found that plain error occurred, but that it was not decisive of the outcome. Id.
We hold that the plain error rule discussed in Olano and Grant extends to unpreserved claims of constitutional error. Although Grant `s holding was limited to nonconstitutional error, our reasoning made it clear that extending the doctrine to constitutional error furthers the policy underlying the forfeiture rule. In discussing Olano, we noted in Grant that the specific language of the federal rules themselves, and of the Olano majority's formulation from earlier precedent, make no distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional error. Id., p. 550, 520 N.W.2d 123. Thus, it is the forfeiture aspect and not the actual constitutional status that drives the federal standard. Id. We reaffirm Grant. The policy underlying the issue forfeiture rule provides no basis for distinguishing constitutional from nonconstitutional error. In both instances, requiring a contemporaneous objection provides the trial court an opportunity to correct the error, which could thereby obviate the necessity of further legal proceedings and would be by far the best time to address a defendant's constitutional and nonconstitutional rights. Id., p. 551, 520 N.W.2d 123. Applying the Olano Grant forfeiture rule to unpreserved claims of constitutional error thus serves the important historical and policy reasons underlying the preservation requirement. In applying the plain error rule to claims of unpreserved, constitutional error, we find instructive Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). In Johnson, the trial court had failed to submit the element of materiality to the jury in the petitioner's perjury trial. Id., pp. 463-464, 117 S.Ct. 1544. The petitioner, however, had not preserved the issue at trial. Id., p. 464, 117 S.Ct. 1544. The United States Supreme Court, in a virtually unanimous decision, [10] applied the plain error doctrine to the petitioner's claim of instructional error. Id., pp. 465-470, 117 S.Ct. 1544. The Court concluded that the first two requirements for avoiding forfeiture were met, i.e., plain error occurred. Id., pp. 465-468, 117 S.Ct. 1544. [11] The Court, however, declined to decide whether the petitioner had satisfied the third requirement, i.e., that the error affected substantial rights. Id., pp. 468-469, 117 S.Ct. 1544. Nevertheless, the Court questioned the petitioner's claim that the error was so serious as to defy harmless-error analysis, noting that so-called structural errors are found in a very limited class of cases. Id. [12] The Supreme Court determined in Johnson that, even if the third requirement had been met, it would not correct the error because it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id., pp. 469-470, 117 S.Ct. 1544. In reaching this conclusion, the Court ruled that the evidence of materiality was overwhelming and the issue had been uncontroverted at trial and on appeal. Id., p. 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544. Johnson is persuasive in applying the plain error standard of review to constitutional error, including instances where the alleged error is the failure to instruct the jury on an element of the offense. [13] Because our holding in this case is inconsistent with the plurality opinion in People v. Vaughn, 447 Mich. 217, 524 N.W.2d 217 (1994), we repudiate the Vaughn plurality. In Vaughn, the defendant claimed that the trial court had failed adequately to instruct the jury on the essential element of asportation in his kidnaping trial. Id., p. 224, 524 N.W.2d 217. The plurality declined to apply the Grant plain error rule, stating that it is well established in our jurisprudence that where an erroneous jury instruction pertains to an essential element of an offense, a contemporaneous objection to the instruction is not required to preserve the issue for appeal. Id., p. 228, 524 N.W.2d 217. [14] It therefore concluded that the defendant's failure to object to the instructions did not preclude appellate review. Id., p. 229, 524 N.W.2d 217. Applying a harmless error standard, the plurality concluded that the instructional error was harmless. Id., pp. 235-239, 524 N.W.2d 217. We repudiate the Vaughn plurality's conclusion that litigants have no duty to preserve claims of instructional error. [15] The policy underlying Michigan's preservation requirement governs all issues. Moreover, Vaughn failed to acknowledge that preservation of instructional error is required both by our court rules and by statute. MCR 2.516(C) states: A party may assign as error the giving of or the failure to give an instruction only if the party objects on the record before the jury retires to consider the verdict (or, in the case of instructions given after deliberations have begun, before the jury resumes deliberations), stating specifically the matter to which the party objects and the grounds for the objection. Also, M.C.L. § 768.29; M.S.A. § 28.1052 provides that [t]he failure of the court to instruct on any point of law shall not be ground for setting aside the verdict of the jury unless such instruction is requested by the accused. Although MCR 2.516(C) and M.C.L. § 768.29; M.S.A. § 28.1052, do not control in this case because the alleged error is a constitutional one, they do provide additional support for extending the Olano/Grant forfeiture rule to unpreserved, constitutional error, including claims of instructional error. [16]
Having determined that the plain error rule applies to defendant's claim, we next consider whether defendant may avoid forfeiture of the alleged instructional error. Defendant has met the first requirement, i.e., the existence of an error, because the court's felony murder instructions were erroneous. As noted above, the elements of felony murder are: 1) the killing of a human being, 2) malice, and 3) the commission, attempted commission, or assisting in the commission of one of the felonies enumerated in the statute, among them armed robbery. Turner, supra, 213 Mich.App. at 566, 540 N.W.2d 728. To establish guilt under an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecution must proffer evidence that (1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time he gave aid and encouragement. [ Id., p. 568, 540 N.W.2d 728.] The trial court here instructed the jury on all three elements of felony murder. The court instructed that the prosecution must prove that the victim was killed during an armed robbery by one of the robbers, thus satisfying the first element. The court also clearly instructed the jury regarding malice and defendant's participation in the underlying felony, i.e., robbery. Defendant, however, assigns error to the court's instruction that [t]he prosecution does not have to prove that Mr. Carines, himself, killed him or participated in the killing. To prove [the first] element the prosecution need prove only that one of the robbers killed Mr. Gober. Defendant argues that the instruction allowed the jury to convict him of felony murder without finding that he participated or assisted in killing the victim. The Court of Appeals accepted defendant's argument. It concluded that the trial court blended its felony murder instruction with an aiding and abetting instruction, and in doing so, the court failed to instruct the jury regarding the second element of aiding and abetting, i.e., that defendant must have performed acts or given encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals determined that the error did not affect the verdict because the jury apparently convicted defendant as a principal, given the evidence supporting such a theory. On the specific facts presented here, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the second element of aiding and abetting. We wish to emphasize that we have never held that a defendant must participate in the actual killing to be guilty of felony murder. To the contrary, our case law establishes that, in certain circumstances, a defendant may be held responsible for the actions of a co-felon. See, e.g., Aaron, supra, 409 Mich. at 731, 299 N.W.2d 304 (liability may be established on agency principles where the felons are acting intentionally or recklessly in pursuit of a common plan); Flowers, supra, 191 Mich.App. at 177, 477 N.W.2d 473 (relying, in part, on Aaron `s discussion of vicarious liability in rejecting the defendant's argument that he should not be held responsible for the independent, unauthorized acts [of a co-felon] of breaking and entering and shooting the decedent); Turner, supra, 213 Mich.App. at 566-573, 540 N.W.2d 728 (relying, in part, on the agency principles discussed in Aaron in affirming the defendant's felony murder conviction). Although felony murder may be submitted to the jury on a vicarious liability theory, the trial court in the case at bar chose to instruct the jury under a traditional aiding and abetting theory. The court properly instructed the jury on the first and third elements of aiding and abetting. The court's instructions made clear that the crime charged must have been committed by defendant or some other person, and that defendant must have had the requisite intent, i.e., malice. The court failed, however, to instruct the jury that, to be guilty under a traditional aiding and abetting theory, defendant must have performed acts or given encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime. Once the court began to instruct on such a theory, it should have provided a complete instruction on the aiding and abetting requirements. Defendant has thus established the existence of an error. [17] Moreover, the error was plain. Our case law clearly establishes that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor, a defendant must perform acts or give encouragement that assists the commission of the crime. Defendant has thus satisfied the second criterion of the plain error test. Defendant has failed, however, to meet his burden of persuasion regarding prejudice. The trial court's instructions, when viewed as a whole, adequately protected defendant's rights. Under the instructions given, the jury would not have convicted defendant without concluding that he performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime. The court instructed the jury that it could not find defendant guilty unless he deliberately participated in the robbery in which the victim was killed and unless he acted with malice. The court also instructed that [i]f the killing was purely accidental and totally unexpected, none of the robbers is guilty of First Degree Murder, or if the killing was an act done by one of the robbers which the others had no reason to anticipate, the other robbers are not guilty of First Degree Felony Murder. They are guilty of an armed robbery, but not murder. The court then explained once again the different ways to prove malice, and emphasized that [j]ust because a defendant participated in a robbery during which someone was killed does not itself prove First Degree Felony Murder. The court further instructed that [i]f none of the participants intended for anyone to get killed or hurt and there was no good reason to anticipate given how things were planned and/or how they were carried out, that anyone would get killed or hurt, then any death which occurred during the course of the robbery is not a Felony Murder. If given the circumstances of planning and committing the robbery there was no good reason for participants other than the killer to anticipate a killing or a serious injury, those other participants are not guilty of a Felony Murder. If the way a robbery is planned and/or carried out gives the participants good reason to anticipate that someone might be killed or seriously injured, those participants are guilty of First Degree Felony Murder if someone does get hurt and dies from their injuries even though it was not planned that anyone be killed or injured. These instructions, while imperfect, did not prejudice defendant. [18] The court instructed the jury regarding the element of malice and further made clear that defendant must have participated in the underlying offense. The jury presumably followed the trial court's instructions and found defendant guilty only after concluding that he participated in the robbery and acted with malice. Given the evidence in this case, the jury could not have come to those conclusions without also finding that defendant aided or encouraged the killing. The key evidence tying defendant to the robbery, i.e., the blood on his jacket, tied him even more convincingly to the murder. [19] Defendant has therefore failed to show that the court's error affected the outcome at trial. Accordingly, defendant forfeited the claim of error by not timely objecting to the jury instruction. Grant, p. 553, 520 N.W.2d 123. Alternatively, even if defendant had satisfied the third requirement for avoiding forfeiture we would decline to reverse in this case because the alleged error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-470, 117 S.Ct. 1544. This conclusion is supported by the same reasoning that causes us to conclude that no prejudice occurred. In light of the court's instructions and the evidence presented, the jury could not have reasonably concluded that defendant participated in the robbery and acted with malice without also concluding that he participated in the killing either as the principal or an aider and abettor. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Johnson applies here: On this record there is no basis for concluding that the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Indeed, it would be the reversal of a conviction such as this which would have that effect. Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it. R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 50 (1970). [ Johnson, supra, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544.]