Opinion ID: 550158
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does Sec. 7(o ) apply only to recognized representatives?

Text: 33 The State argues that SNEA was not the representative of the employees for purposes of Sec. 7(o ) because SNEA was not a recognized representative under Nevada law. The State argues that Congress specifically intended that under Sec. 7(o ) the definition of representative be a recognized representative. SNEA does not contest the definition of the term representative as a recognized representative, but argues that SNEA is a recognized representative as a matter of Nevada law and practice. 34 Although Sec. 7(o ) of the FLSA does not specifically mention the term recognized representative, there are three sources from which the court drew this interpretation of Sec. 7(o ): the legislative history concerning Sec. 7(o ), the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement Sec. 7(o ), and a letter written by the sponsors of the 1985 amendments which included Sec. 7(o ). 35 Because the statute is silent as to the definition of representative, this court must examine the Committee Reports to determine the legislative intent of the bill. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76, 105 S.Ct. 479, 483, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984) (cites omitted). However, the House and Senate Reports offer different views of the meaning of Sec. 7(o ). Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132, 135 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 854, 107 L.Ed.2d 848 (1990). The House Report states: Where employees have selected a representative, which need not be a formal or recognized collective bargaining agent as long as it is a representative designated by the employees, the agreement or understanding must be between the representative and the employer.... H.R.Rep. No. 331, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1985), quoted in Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d at 135 (emphasis added). The Senate Report states: Where employees do not have a recognized representative, the agreement or understanding must be between the employer and the individual employee. S.Rep. No. 159, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 651, 658 (emphasis added). 36 The Secretary of Labor has promulgated regulations to implement the FLSA. 29 CFR Part 553 (1988). The pertinent regulations state: In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement applicable to the employees, the representative need not be a formal or recognized bargaining agent as long as the representative is designated by the employees. 29 CFR Sec. 553.23(b)(1). In response to concerns that the statute might conflict with an individual state's law which prohibits collective bargaining with state employees, the Secretary of Labor stated:The Department recognizes that there is a wide variety of State law that may be pertinent in this area. It is the Department's intention that the question of whether employees have a representative for purposes of FLSA section [7(o ) ] shall be determined in accordance with State or local law and practices. Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Employees of State and Local Governments, 52 Fed.Reg. 2012, 2014-15 (1987). 37 The regulations promulgated by the governmental body responsible for interpreting or administering a statute are entitled to considerable respect. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2239, 2241 n. 3, 68 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981). See also, Chemical Mfrs.' Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 1107, 84 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985) (in absence of clear Congressional intent to contrary, court cannot substitute judgment for EPA's where the interpretation of a complex statute is rational). 38 The last source, a letter written by the congressional sponsors of the 1985 amendments to the FLSA, states that the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of Sec. 7(o ) is correct and that the representative mentioned in Sec. 7(o ) need not be a recognized representative. Abbott, 879 F.2d at 136. However, post-enactment letters from Congressmen are afforded little deference. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35, 102 S.Ct. 1510, 1517, 71 L.Ed.2d 715 (1982) ([O]ne isolated remark by a single Senator, ambiguous in meaning when examined in context, is insufficient to establish the kind of affirmative congressional expression necessary to evidence an intent....); Brock v. Writers Guild of America, 762 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir.1985) (post-enactment statement by Congressman opposing legislation given little weight). 39 Aside from these sources, the State offers a policy rationale for rejecting the district court's approach: if there is no requirement for a recognized representative, different employees might choose alternate representatives or the same employee might switch representatives, resulting in chaos. 40 The district court in the case at bar accepted the State's interpretation of the statute regarding the definition of representative, holding: the Court concludes that the term 'representative of such employees' in section 207(o )(2)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. means a representative recognized by the employer. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, at 15, Excerpts of Record. Although the district court accepted the State's definition of representative as a recognized representative, the district court held that SNEA is a recognized representative and thus has been authorized to enter into an agreement with the State on behalf of the State employees. 41