Opinion ID: 2761209
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The DOC's security concerns

Text: The subjective prong also recognizes that, in issues of security, [p]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wideranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. Bell, 441 U.S. at 547. Although we cannot abdicate our responsibility to ensure that the limits imposed by the Constitution are not ignored, Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 562 (1st Cir. 1985), we do not sit to substitute our own judgment for that of prison administrators, see Nadeau, 561 F.2d at 417. As long as prison administrators make judgments balancing security and health concerns that are within the realm of reason and made in good faith, their decisions do not amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Battista, 645 F.3d at 454. The DOC officials explained that they believed SRS would create new security issues, the most significant being the provision of safe housing options for Kosilek after her surgery. They further explained the importance of keeping other inmates from -61- believing that they could use threats of suicide to extract concessions from the prison administration. Nonetheless, rather than deferring to the expertise of prison administrators, the district court ignored the DOC's stated security concerns, reasoning both that Kosilek could be housed safely and that the DOC had not acted out of a legitimate concern for Kosilek's safety and the security of the DOC's facilities. As explained below, this was in error.
were reasonable Recognizing that reasonable concerns would arise regarding a post-operative, male-to-female transsexual being housed with male prisoners takes no great stretch of the imagination. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848-49 (summarizing evidence that a prison's refusal to provide segregated housing to a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual could pose significant security concerns). At the same time, as particularly relevant in Kosilek's case, the DOC's security report reflected that significant concerns would also arise from housing a formerly male inmate -- with a criminal history of extreme violence against a female domestic partner -- within a female prison population containing high numbers of domestic violence survivors. Nonetheless, in dismissing the DOC's concerns, the district court relied heavily on the fact that security issues have not yet arisen within MCI-Norfolk's general population. Rejecting the testimony of multiple -62- individuals with decades of penological experience -- all of whom acknowledged the risk of housing a female prisoner at MCI-Norfolk -- the district court reasoned that Kosilek's past safety was indicative of a likelihood that she could reside safely at the prison after her operation. This reasoning wrongly circumvents the deference owed to prison administrators: the appropriate inquiry was not whether the court believed that Kosilek could be housed safely, but whether the DOC has a reasoned basis for its stated concerns. Indeed, that Kosilek had so far been safe within MCI-Norfolk's prison population does not negate the DOC's well-reasoned belief that safety concerns would arise in the future after SRS. Cf. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132-33 & n.9 (1977) (holding, in the First Amendment context, that the rights of prisoners may be abridged based on a reasonable belief that future harm or disruption may occur); cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984) (requiring prison administrators to implement prophylactic solutions to foreseeable security issues reasonably within the scope of their expertise). Moreover, the fact that, preoperatively, Kosilek has not been subject to assault or threats does not vitiate the concern that she would be victimized after receiving SRS.15 15 These concerns were obvious to more than just those individuals within the DOC with significant penological experience. The likelihood that issues surrounding secure housing would arise after -63- The district court also reasoned that the DOC [could] reasonably assure the safety of Kosilek and others after sex reassignment surgery by housing Kosilek in a segregated protective custody unit. It then noted, however, that there existed a strong argument that such isolation would amount to a form of extrajudicial punishment that is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. This warning echoes the very concerns highlighted by the DOC, which expressed disagreement with the use of long-term isolation as a housing solution for Kosilek, based on its potential negative effects on her mental health. See also Battista, 645 F.3d at 454 (explaining that creating a segregated treatment center to house a GID prisoner would pose administrative difficulties and be isolating). The deference awarded to prison administrators cannot be defeated by such circular reasoning, which dismisses the DOC's concern in one breath only to recognize its validity in the next. The prison administrators in this case have decades of combined experience in the management of penological institutions, and it is they, not the court, who are best situated to determine what security concerns will arise. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 548 ([J]udicial deference is accorded [in part] because the administrator ordinarily will . . . have a better grasp of his domain than the reviewing judge . . . .). The DOC's judgment SRS was also acknowledged by Kosilek's treating psychologist, Mark Burrows, and by the Fenway Center doctors in their initial report. -64- regarding post-operative housing is without doubt within the realm of reason, Battista, 645 F.3d at 454, and the district court's alternative belief as to the possibility of safely housing Kosilek does not suffice to undermine this reasonableness. The DOC officials also expressed concern that providing Kosilek SRS would incentivize the use of suicide threats by prisoners as a means of receiving desired benefits. Although the district court determined that, in this case, Kosilek's risk for suicidal ideation was very real, this finding does not invalidate the DOC's reasonable belief that providing SRS might lead to proliferation of false threats among other prisoners. The DOC's concern -- regarding the unacceptable precedent that would be established in dealing with future threats of suicide by inmates to force the prison authorities to comply with the prisoners' particular demands -- cannot be discounted as a minor or invalid claim. Such threats are not uncommon in prison settings and require firm rejection by the authorities, who must be given ample discretion in dealing with such situations. Given the circumstances presented here, we cannot say that the DOC lacks reasonable security concerns.
about safety and security The district court ultimately dismissed the DOC's concerns as pretextual, reasoning that DOC was in fact acting in response to public and political criticism. The primary evidence -65- on record tending to support this theory includes a press interview by Commissioner Dennehy, Dennehy's relationships with a state senator and the lieutenant governor, and the acknowledgment that the DOC was aware of negative news coverage regarding Kosilek's request for surgery. In her testimony, Dennehy denied being influenced by such media and political pressures, and stated that the decision not to provide SRS was founded in bona fide security concerns alone. The district court, however, found this testimony non-credible, and this credibility finding is the sort of determination to which our court gives deference. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). Even accepting that Dennehy's motivations were colored by political and media pressure, however, does not take Kosilek's claim as far as it needs to go. As an initial matter, the fact that Dennehy was motivated in part by concerns unrelated to prison security does not mean that the security concerns articulated by the DOC were irrelevant, wholly pretextual, or -- most importantly -- invalid on the merits. In Battista, our court held that deference to the decisions of prison administrators could be overcome where those administrators admittedly relied on inflated data, identified a security concern only several years after refusing to provide treatment for an acknowledged medical need, and engaged in a pattern of changing positions and arguments before the court. Battista, 645 F.3d at -66- 455. Such gross delays and misstatements were not present here.16 Rather, the DOC testified consistently that it believed the postoperative security concerns surrounding Kosilek's treatment were significant and problematic.17 Even if not entitled to deference, see id., those concerns still matter insofar as they are reasonable and valid, and Kosilek did not put on any evidence showing that they wholly lacked merit.18 16 Great weight was placed on the fact that Dennehy told a reporter that there were significant security concerns about post-operative housing three days before she met with Superintendents Spencer and Bissonnette. The record reveals, however, that discussions about housing had previously occurred at Executive Staff Meetings, and Dennehy testified that she had conducted phone calls with both Superintendents prior to meeting to formalize their security report. This timeline, therefore, is far from sufficient to establish that the DOC's security assessments were unprincipled or invalid. 17 That the DOC may have, in the district court's assessment, engaged in a pattern of prevarication regarding whether they understood that SRS was being recommended by UMass as medically necessary, does not undercut the consistency with which they identified safety and security concerns -- concerns which are within their expert province -- that would arise from the surgery. 18 Kosilek did cross-examine Commissioner Clarke to show that a transgendered prisoner had safely been housed in a Washington State prison under his supervision. Left unexplored, however, were the numerous ways in which MCI-Norfolk's environment, facilities, or population might be distinct from this prison in Washington. Neither was there a comparison between that prisoner's criminal history and the criminal history of Kosilek. That an individual was housed safely by Commissioner Clarke while employed in another state does not rebut Superintendent Bissonnette's testimony that moving her to MCI-Framingham would cause climate problems in that particular prison. See Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 371 (1st Cir. 1978) (rejecting uniform housing conditions for detainees, without regard to their disparate criminal history, because Constitutional rights cannot be defined in terms of literal comparisons of this nature). -67- Second, when determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief, our focus must include current attitudes and conduct. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845 ('[D]eliberate indifference[] should be determined in light of the prison authorities' current attitudes and conduct': their attitudes and conduct at the time suit is brought and persisting thereafter. (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 36)). Dennehy has not served as DOC Commissioner since 2007. Given the age of this litigation and the changes in DOC leadership that have occurred since the suit was filed, the district court's assumption that Dennehy's attitudes necessarily carried over to her successors and governed their actions is unsupported by the record. Although consideration of Dennehy's motivation is surely relevant, it is insufficient to show that the DOC continued to be motivated by public pressure even after her departure, or that this is what motivates the DOC presently. Indeed, it was Commissioner Clarke -- and not Dennehy -- who made the decision here. And the only evidence tending to show that Commissioner Clarke may have considered public and political criticism were two letters received by Clarke -- who did not respond -- from Massachusetts legislators. These letters, however, relate almost in their entirety to concerns about the cost of SRS, and the district court soundly rejected any argument that the DOC, or Clarke specifically, had adopted its safety and security measures as a pretextual means of addressing the cost concerns -68- raised by state legislators. Moreover, Clarke was never found by the court to be noncredible.19 The district court improperly imputed its belief that Commissioner Dennehy had acted out of concern for public and political pressure to its assessment of the motivations of future DOC Commissioners. This error ignores the requirement, in cases of injunctive relief, that a court consider the attitudes and beliefs of prison administrators at the time of its decision. Id. at 84546. The effect of this error is particularly clear given that Clarke has now been replaced by Commissioner Spencer, so that Dennehy is now several administrations and more than seven years removed from the decisionmaking process. Without proof that the DOC remains motivated by pretextual or improper concerns with public pressure, even if it was assumed that Dennehy was improperly motivated, the district court's finding that injunctive relief was required is unsupportable.