Opinion ID: 2297393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Southern's Appeal

Text: 1. The principal item of damages asserted by Southern is a claim for $95,447.15 based upon unwarranted delays and interferences with the performance of the work alleged to have been caused by Bowaters or Sirrine. The trial court found that Southern had failed to prove its case, and rejected the claim. Southern in its brief asserts that there is ample evidence to justify a finding in its favor, and that there is no evidence to the contrary. A reading of the testimony and documents supplied in the appendix to Bowaters' brief shows beyond any doubt that the evidence offered by Bowaters tended to show that the delay in the completion of the masonry work was the fault of Southern itself. Plainly, the issue of delay was a question of fact. The trial judge found it against Southern; there was competent evidence to sustain his finding; and it will not be disturbed here. Turner v. Vineyard, 46 Del. 138, 80 A.2d 177; Mulco Products, Inc. v. Black, 50 Del. 246, 127 A.2d 851. Southern does not seem to question this rule; its contention on the point, as we understood it from the oral argument, is this: During the course of the trial Bowaters withdrew that part of its counterclaim alleging damages by reason of delays caused by Southern; such withdrawal, Southern argues, had the effect of removing from the court's consideration the evidence offered by Bowaters in support of its counterclaims for Southern's delay. Therefore, says Southern, the only evidence on the issue of delay was the evidence offered by Southern. The fallacy of this contention is obvious. Bowaters' evidence was offered not only in support of its counterclaim but also in support of its answer, which expressly alleged that the delay in the completion of the masonry work was solely Southern's fault. The judge had all the evidence before him, and resolved the conflict against Southern. That is the end of the matter. A special point is made about the question of access openings as a cause of delay caused by Bowaters. Access openings are openings required to be left in the exterior walls for the admission of heavy machinery, so that such machinery may not have to be disassembled outside of the walls and reassembled inside. The cost of such openings the trial court found to be an extra. Southern argues that this was a finding of unnecessary delay caused by Bowaters which the court should have found to be a compelling illustration of Bowaters' delay and from which the court should have inferred that all delays were the fault of Bowaters. The conclusion does not follow. The court found in Southern's favor that the access openings were not covered by the plans and specifications, but obviously also found that Southern's claim for delay on that account was not proved. 2. The second question raised by Southern on the briefs concerns the legal consequences of delay under the terms of the contract if it be assumed that such delay was caused by Fabroan. How this can be an issue here we do not understand. Southern admits it made no contention below that Fabroan caused the delay. Therefore Southern cannot raise the point here. Stephenson v. Commonwealth & Southern Corporation, 19 Del.Ch. 447, 168 A. 211. It is quite true that the trial court did consider this question. Bowaters expressly pleaded as a defense to the charge of delay an article of the contract providing that if Southern should be delayed in the prosecution of the work by act or neglect of Fabroan, the time for performance by Southern would on request be extended, and that such extension would discharge Fabroan from any liability by reason of the delay. The court below considered the validity of this provision and sustained it, although it was not strictly necessary for it to do so, because, as above stated, the issue of Fabroan's responsibility for delay was not in the case. Certainly that issue is not before us, and the validity of the contract provision referred to is therefore not before us. 3. The third question here concerns a claim of Southern for $6402.18 overhead and profit on premium overtime wages paid by Southern to its workmen. The contract provides as follows: Fabroan, if it deems necessary, may direct the Subcontractor to work overtime and if so instructed the Subcontractor will work said overtime and, provided that the Subcontractor is not in default in any of the provisions herein, Fabroan will pay the Subcontractor for the actual additional wages paid at rates which have been approved by Fabroan, plus taxes imposed by law on such additional wages, plus compensation and liability insurance on said additional wages when required by law to be paid by the Sub-contractor. Bowaters paid Southern in accordance with the contract, but refused to pay overhead or profit. Southern argues that the contractual provision above quoted cannot be availed of by Bowaters (1) because the contract contemplated a normal work-week of forty hours, and in this case, because of Bowaters' delays, overtime became the rule of the job; and (2) because conversations between representatives of Southern and Bowaters prior to the execution of the contract indicated that overtime would be negligible. As to the first reason, it appears to be based largely on the contention, rejected by the trial judge, that Bowaters caused the delay. The normal work-week provision relied on is taken from the Bowaters-Fabroan contract. It provides: The normal working schedule contemplated is a 40-hour work-week, but the Contractor with the approval of the Resident Engineer may exceed this work schedule and pay premium overtime when this seems necessary or desirable. We find nothing in the above quoted provision that weakens the force of the first-quoted provision in the Fabroan-Southern contract. That provision, in our opinion, governs the rights of the parties in respect of payment for overtime work. Overhead and profit are not included. The court below so held, and we agree. As for the second reason  the alleged oral conversations preceding the execution of the contract  it appears that the testimony was in conflict and that the court rejected Southern's version of these conversations. The court said: The plaintiffs have failed to prove, by the necessary preponderance of the evidence, that there was a representation by Fabroan or agreement between the parties, expressed or implied, whereby the amount of overtime work to be performed by the plaintiffs was limited or whereby the defendant undertook to pay to the plaintiffs overhead and profit on overtime wages. Again, that finding will not be disturbed here. Southern's third point is without merit. 4. Southern's last point relates to a claim for $1058.30 for overhead and profit on the difference between the tile specified and the tile actually used. The applicable provision of the contract is found in Addendum C. It reads: In the event Off-Grade Structural Glazed Facing Tile, as manufactured by Mapleton Clay Products Company, Canton, Ohio, is authorized for certain portions of the work, price adjustment of Item 4 of the Bid or Proposal will be made on the basis of material prices quoted in Paragraph 5, Item 4 etc. Some of the Mapleton tile was used. Bowaters paid Southern the difference in price but refused to pay overhead or profit. The above quoted provision contains no clause requiring payment of overhead or profit in addition to the increased cost. Southern points to a subsequent provision of Addendum C, reading as following: Any change in completed work done on basis of work order issued by contractor at direction of Engineer will be performed by Sub-contractor and charged on the basis of actual Labor and Material Cost plus Insurance and Social Security Taxes and 6½% of direct labor cost for tools and equipment, except in special cases adjustment of this item to be mutually satisfactory, plus 10% overhead and 10% profit. In our opinion this clause does not touch the matter, since it deals specifically with changes in completed work. Moreover, it emphasizes the distinction here applicable; in case of change in completed work, overhead and profit are recoverable; in case of substituted tile, only the additional cost is recoverable. Cf. United States for Use and Benefit of Lichter v. Henke Const. Co., 8 Cir., 157 F.2d 13. The trial court so ruled, and we agree. Southern's assertion that change in the material was a change in completed work we cannot follow. A good deal of the argument in Southern's brief is devoted to an attempt to show that upon substitution of materials a contractor incurs expense additional to the difference in cost. Even if this be so, the fact is immaterial. The contract provisions govern. We find no merit in Southern's appeal.