Opinion ID: 1711014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Award of Costs and Attorney Fees.

Text: To uphold a forfeiture, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a substantial connection between the property and a criminal offense. Iowa Code § 809.11(1); In re Property Seized from De-Camp, 511 N.W.2d 616, 619-20 (Iowa 1994); State v. Dykes, 471 N.W.2d 846, 847 (Iowa 1991). In the forfeiture ruling, the court stated the following: The State has engaged in conjecture and speculation as to Claimant's activities on or about July 2, 1994. Certainly, the Claimant's failure to account for his presence in Winneshiek County and his explanation as to the source of his cash lend themselves to speculation. However, a forfeiture of property rights cannot be based on conjecture and speculation. The court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of proof in the forfeiture proceeding. The State's failure to support its forfeiture action by a preponderance of the evidence, however, does not automatically entitle McIntyre to recover his costs and attorney fees. Generally, a successful litigant is not entitled to either his costs or attorney fees. Iowa Code section 625.29(1) is an exception to the general rule. This section provides in pertinent part as follows: Unless otherwise provided by law ... the court in a civil action brought by the state... shall award fees and other expenses to the prevailing party unless the prevailing party is the state. However, the court shall not make an award under this section if it finds one of the following: a. The position of the state was supported by substantial evidence. .... c. Special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust. The court denied McIntyre's motion on the grounds that substantial evidence was produced by the State to support its position and that the lack of identification as to the ownership of the property constitutes special circumstances which would make the award unjust. A party seeking relief under section 625.29(1) must establish that the state's case is not supported by substantial evidence. Iowa Code § 625.29(3). If the State's case is supported by substantial evidence, the court shall not make an award. Id. § 625.29(1). The court's attention is only to the evidence supporting the State's case. The substantial evidence test has been criticized as an inadequate standard that does not further the remedial goals of section 625.29. See Samuel A. Thumma and Barbara J. Dawson, The Iowa Equal Access to Justice Act: Is Recovery Available?, 39 Drake L.Rev. 431, 472 (1989-1990). A finding is supported by substantial evidence if it may be reasonably inferred from the evidence. In re Property Seized from Rush, 448 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Iowa 1989) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to reach a conclusion. Nichols v. Schweitzer, 472 N.W.2d 266, 274 (Iowa 1991). A finding may be supported by substantial evidence although two inconsistent conclusions might be inferred from the same evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence, but it need not be a preponderance of evidence. Volkswagen Iowa City, Inc. v. Scott's Incorporated, 165 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 1969); Elliot v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 377 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Iowa App.1985). McIntyre contends that the evidence is not substantially supportive of the State's position because it is factually similar to In re Property Seized from Daniels, 478 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 1991). After stopping and arresting Daniels for speeding, the police found a small amount of marijuana and $5150 in a wallet located in the car. Daniels, 478 N.W.2d at 623. A trained dog indicated that the cash bore the odor of a controlled substance. Id. We concluded that the facts did not provide substantial evidence connecting the money with drug dealing and thereby allowing the money to be forfeited. Id. McIntyre urges that in light of Daniels the State should not have commenced the forfeiture action because it did not have substantial evidence to support the action. We find the present case, however, is distinguishable from Daniels. In addition to the common facts, this case also includes McIntyre's inconsistent and suspicious explanation for his presence in a remote area, the presence of grease markers, the large sum of cash wrapped and stored separately from his personal money, and his explanation of the source of the money. We believe the evidence presented by the State was stronger than the evidence presented in Daniels. The State presented more than a scintilla of evidence connecting the seized property with a drug transaction. We believe a reasonable person could conclude that McIntyre's property was used in or derived from a drug transaction. Because the State's position was supported by substantial evidence, the court was required to not award costs and attorney fees. We need not address whether special circumstances would have rendered an award of attorney's fees unjust. AFFIRMED.