Opinion ID: 1157213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Virginia Gray Sutton.

Text: Virginia Sutton was convicted of rape as a principal in the second degree. Principals in the second degree and accessories before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished as principals in the first degree. Code § 18.2-18; Riddick v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 244, 248, 308 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1983). To sustain Virginia's conviction as a principal in the second degree, it must be established that the offense was committed by Raymond as principal in the first degree. See Sult v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 915, 918, 275 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1981). But the fact that she is incapable of committing the offense as a principal in the first degree does not absolve her of criminal liability for aiding and abetting Raymond in commission of the offense. See Adkins v. Commonwealth, 175 Va. 590, 600-01, 9 S.E.2d 349, 353 (1940). To establish Virginia as a principal in the second degree, the Commonwealth was required to prove that she was present, either actually or constructively, when the rape was committed. [2] See Spradlin v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 523, 526, 79 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1954); Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 96, 99, 18 S.E.2d 314, 315 (1942). Presence alone, however, is not sufficient to make Virginia a principal in the second degree. It must also be established that she procured, encouraged, countenanced, or approved Raymond's commission of the crime; she must have shared his criminal intent or have committed some overt act in furtherance of the offense. See Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 124, 306 S.E.2d 886, 888-89 (1983); Hall v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 533, 536, 303 S.E.2d 903, 904 (1983). Virginia Sutton's actions meet these requirements for a principal in the second degree to rape as that crime is now defined by Code § 18.2-61. The trial judge found, from undisputed evidence, that Virginia solicited Beverly to have sexual intercourse with Raymond. The judge also found that both Virginia and Raymond knew that Beverly was afraid to go back to her father. By preying on that fear, Virginia applied relentless pressure on Beverly to submit to Raymond. Shortly before July 23, Virginia reproached Beverly for refusing to submit to Raymond and threatened to return her to her father if she maintained the attitude that she was too good to go to bed with [her] uncle. On July 22, Virginia and Raymond took Beverly to get birth control pills and paid for the purchase. When Raymond and Beverly had intercourse the following night, Beverly testified, she was afraid that Virginia would send her back to North Carolina. During the rape, Virginia was not physically present but was in bed in another room. Nevertheless, her malevolent, intimidating influence on her niece was present and continued unabated. This evidence is sufficient to establish Virginia's constructive presence during the commission of the crime. Long ago, this Court said in Dull's Case, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 965, 977 (1875), of constructive presence: the presence need not be a strict, actual, immediate presence, such a presence as would make [the defendant] an eye or ear witness of what passes, but may be a constructive presence. So that if several persons set out together ... upon one common design, be it murder or other felony, or for any other purpose unlawful in itself, and each takes the part assigned him; ... they are all, provided the fact be committed, in the eyes of the law, present at it. ... (quoting 1 Russell on Crimes 27 (3d ed. 1845)). In this case, Virginia and Raymond discussed Raymond's desire to have intercourse with Beverly and Beverly's resistance. They embarked on a common purpose of inducing Beverly by intimidation to submit to Raymond's advances. Virginia's part in the scheme was to so overcome Beverly with the prospect of returning to North Carolina and a life of physical abuse that she would no longer refuse Raymond's demands. By her reprimands of Beverly and her warning about the consequences of continued resistance, Virginia executed her part in the crime and helped ensure the success of their common enterprise. The evidence also adequately establishes that Virginia shared Raymond's criminal intent and committed overt acts in furtherance of the crime. She and Raymond were determined to have Beverly submit. They knew her fear of her father and could have intended no less than to coerce her submission by their threat to return her to him. Virginia contends that she did no more than encourage Beverly to consent, but the very nature of the inducements she used contradicts this argument. She did more than urge consent when, by stating the alternative, she placed Beverly in the untenable position of submitting against her will or risking physical injury at her father's hand. Coerced submission is not consent, and Virginia's purpose was to achieve such submission. Her motive, showing the depths of her depravity, is revealed in her determination to see her husband and her niece engage in sexual intercourse so that she could help Beverly improve her technique. Nor can Virginia argue that statements she made several days prior to the rape incident were too removed to constitute intimidation during the crime. The threat of being sent home was an ongoing force in a series of repeated confrontations with Raymond. The warning was not limited to one specific encounter but was intended to, and in fact did, induce submission to a continuing sexual relationship. As such it was sufficiently close to the events of July 23 to instill fear in Beverly and induce her submission. Because she procured, encouraged, countenanced, and approved Raymond's having sexual intercourse with Beverly against her will by intimidation, the trial court properly found her guilty of rape as a principal in the second degree. Accordingly, we will affirm both convictions. Affirmed as to Record No. 831787. Affirmed as to Record No. 831788. POFF, J., concurring. STEPHENSON, J., dissenting in Record No. 831788. COMPTON, J., joins in dissent.