Opinion ID: 2510407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of Mistrial Declaration

Text: While the double jeopardy clause protects against repeated convictions and prosecutions for the same crime, it does not mean that a criminal defendant is entitled to go free every time a trial fails to end in a final judgment. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 L.Ed. 974, 977 (1949), reh'g denied, 337 U.S. 921, 69 S.Ct. 1152, 93 L.Ed. 1730 (1949). A criminal defendant may be retried if the first trial was prematurely terminated by the district court, without the defendant's consent, due to manifest necessity. United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 22 U.S. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). This is so because the defendant's valued right to have the trial completed by a particular jury must in some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments. Wade, 336 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. at 837, 93 L.Ed. at 978. In State v. Stevens , this Court quoted the following summary of the manifest necessity standard: The basic rule is that criminal actions may be terminated by a mistrial without double jeopardy consequences if there is a sufficiently compelling reason to do so, some procedural error or other problem obstructing a full and fair adjudication of the case which is serious enough to outweigh the interest of the defendant in obtaining a final resolution of the charges against himwhat is commonly termed a manifest necessity or legal necessity. The courts have generally declined to lay out any bright-line rule as to what constitutes manifest necessity, but have based their decisions on the facts of each case, looking to such factors as whether the problem could be adequately resolved by any less drastic alternative action; whether it would necessarily have led to a reversal on appeal if the trial had continued and the defendant had been convicted; whether it reflected bad faith or oppressive conduct on the part of the prosecution; whether or not it had been declared in the interest of the defendant; and whether and to what extent the defendant would be prejudiced by a second trial. Since the trial judge is ordinarily in the best position to observe the circumstances which allegedly call for a mistrial, his or her judgment as to the necessity for a mistrial is commonly deferred to; but that judgment may be set aside if the reviewing court finds that the judge has abused this discretionary power, particularly where it appears that the judge has not scrupulously exercised his or her discretion by making a full inquiry into all the pertinent circumstances and deliberately considering the options available .... State v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 826, 892 P.2d 889, 893 (1995) (quoting John E. Theuman, Annotation, Former Jeopardy as Bar to Retrial of Criminal Defendant After Original Court's Sua Sponte Declaration of a MistrialState Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 741 (1985)). In this case, the district court based its finding of manifest necessity for a mistrial on various grounds. First, the district judge announced in court that the mistrial was due to alleged physical and mental deficiencies of Manley's attorney. One month later, the district court identified its determination that Manley had not received effective assistance of counsel as an additional basis for the mistrial declaration.
Due to the defendant's valued right to have his or her case decided by the seated jury, appellate courts have an obligation to satisfy themselves that a trial judge exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial; thus, if a trial judge acts irrationally or irresponsibly, the mistrial declaration cannot be condoned. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514, 98 S.Ct. 824, 835, 54 L.Ed.2d 717, 733 (1978). We review the district court's decision to declare a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. In this case, the district court properly determined the issue was one of discretion, as this Court has held that the decision whether to declare a mistrial and whether there is manifest necessity is within the district court's discretion. State v. Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho 536, 976 P.2d 462 (1999); Stevens, 126 Idaho at 826, 892 P.2d at 893. The district court did not, however, act within the outer boundaries of its discretion or consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it. In making the manifest necessity determination, a district court ought to obtain sufficient information to enable it to consider alternatives to a mistrial and give counsel a timely and meaningful opportunity to be heard on the subject. Stevens, 126 Idaho at 827, 892 P.2d at 894; State v. Nab, 113 Idaho 168, 171, 742 P.2d 423, 426 (Ct.App.1987); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 487, 91 S.Ct. 547, 558, 27 L.Ed.2d 543, 557 (1971). The district court surely could have taken steps to inform itself about defense counsel's mental and/or physical health; a continuance to allow time for such an investigation would be an appropriate alternative to a mistrial. Likewise, the district court could have considered a corrective jury instruction or appointing another attorney to assist defense counsel, as alternatives to a mistrial. But even if the district court had adequately considered and then rejected alternatives, it clearly failed to give defense counsel an opportunity to be heard on the subject. The district court excused its failure to conduct a hearing by stating, During the recess, I determined to announce the mistrial without discussing it with counsel or inviting arguments because of the volatile nature of the situation.... In the interest of maintaining civility and decorum I determined that a mistrial was to be declared sue sponte. . . . We find this justification unpersuasive. There is no indication the situation during the recess was so volatile that the court could not have invited input from defense counsel regarding his emotional and physical health. Given that defense counsel's accusation of bias  the event which seems to have precipitated the mistrial declaration  was made outside the presence of the jury, the district court's claim that the situation was too volatile to allow for a hearing makes no sense. While the district court's interest in civility and decorum is certainly important, it cannot take priority over Manley's prerogative to at least have input regarding the right he was about to lose  the valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. Wade, 336 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. at 837, 93 L.Ed. at 978. In failing to give Manley a chance to be heard on the matter, the district court did not act consistently with the legal standards applicable to its sua sponte declaration of a mistrial. Finally, we turn to the third prong of the abuse of discretion test: whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. With regards to the physical and emotional health of Manley's attorney as a basis for the mistrial, we have already determined the district court abused its discretion by not sufficiently considering its alternatives or affording Manley an opportunity to be heard on the issue. Our focus now is on the alternate grounds for the mistrial, which is the district court's conclusion Manley's attorney was ineffective. There is a strong presumption defense counsel's representation was within the wide range of professionally competent assistance. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 510, 988 P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999) (citations omitted). In assessing the reasonableness of attorney performance, this Court has cautioned, judicial scrutiny must be highly deferential and every effort must `be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.' State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694 (1984)). Indeed, defense counsel's strategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60, 106 P.3d 376, 386 (2004) (quoting Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002)). Thus, while this Court gives deference to the district court's ultimate decision to declare a mistrial, we must at the same time, like the district court, resist the temptation of second-guessing counsel's tactical decisions when the mistrial was based, in part, on a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. In this case, many of the twenty-two Findings of Fact identified by the district court as demonstrating ineffective counsel illustrate the prohibited second-guessing of defense counsel's trial strategy or tactical decisions. For example, the district court found fault with Manley's attorney for failing to file a motion to suppress the incriminating statement made by Manley to the police. As already noted, this was a sound trial tactic, which resulted in the prosecutor acknowledging in front of the jury that a key witness' statement was wrong. Also, the district court was critical of defense counsel's failure to file formal discovery requests, which was of no moment, as the prosecutor had provided all the information needed to Manley's attorney. During oral argument, the State could point to no information Manley's attorney could have timely received, but did not, due to the lack of a formal discovery request. The district court censures Manley's attorney for not hiring a DNA expert, even though there was no question the blood found on Manley had come from his brother, so DNA was not at issue. The Finding that Manley's attorney failed to timely object when one of the State's experts testified the blood spatters on Manley's pant cuffs showed Manley was present at the shooting also does not demonstrate ineffective representation. In fact, Manley's attorney was prepared to rebut that testimony with evidence of similar blood spatter patterns made on certain objects after the shooting took place, but this evidence was excluded by the district court (arguably erroneously). In sum, there is simply no justification for finding ineffective assistance based on these facts. Even giving due regard to the district court's unique ability to evaluate the trial proceedings unfolding before it, and deferring to conclusions drawn from those proceedings, we are compelled to conclude, in this instance, there was no basis for declaring a mistrial based on ineffective assistance of Manley's attorney.