Opinion ID: 513191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preclusion of Alibi Testimony

Text: 16 On June 9, 1987, approximately one month before the trial began, the United States Attorney's Office sent to counsel for the defendants certain discovery material enclosed with a letter requesting reciprocal discovery. The letter added: 17 In addition, in the event your client seeks to interpose an alibi defense or a defense based on mental disease, the Government requests written notice pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.1 and 12.2. 18 The letter did not specify the date, time or place of the offense with which the defendants were charged. 19 On Sunday, July 5, 1987, two days before the trial began, the Government turned over to the defense an Assistant United States Attorney's notes of an interview with Tollinchi. The interview notes referred to certain times and places relating to the narcotics transaction, and included mention of certain days of the week. The notes did not mention any dates, however. 20 One week later, on Sunday, July 12, as the prosecution was nearing the end of its case, Andrade's attorney telephoned the Assistant United States Attorney who was prosecuting the case to inform him that Andrade and Vega would call Andrade's father and stepmother as witnesses. According to an offer of proof made by the defendants before Judge Walker the following day, these witnesses would have testified that Andrade and Vega were at Andrade's father's house in Brooklyn in the late afternoon or early evening of April 27. This testimony would have contradicted Tollinchi's testimony placing them at 10 East 67th Street in Manhattan at the same time or shortly before. 21 Judge Walker precluded the alibi witnesses' testimony. He held that the combination of the Government's June 9 letter and the interview notes was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.1(a), and that the Government had been prejudiced by the defense's failure to give earlier notification of its alibi defense. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.1(a) provides: 22 Upon written demand of the attorney for the government stating the time, date, and place at which the alleged offense was committed, the defendant shall serve within ten days, or at such different time as the court may direct, upon the attorney for the government a written notice of the defendant's intention to offer a defense of alibi. Such notice by the defendant shall state the specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the defendant intends to rely to establish such alibi. 23 The Government's June 9 letter did not trigger the notice of alibi requirements of Rule 12.1(a) because it did not specify the time, place and date of the alleged offense. The interview notes in combination with the June 9 letter do not satisfy Rule 12.1(a) because the notes do not specify any dates, and also because the Government did not state in writing that the offense was committed at the times and places referred to in the notes. Furthermore, the Government provided the interview notes only seven days before the defendants informed the Government of their intent to call alibi witnesses, and only eight days before the defendants actually sought to call the witnesses. Rule 12.1(a) gives defendants ten days to comply with a proper Government demand. Therefore the defendants were not in violation of the Rule even if a proper Government demand had been made as of the time the interview notes were provided to the defendants. For this reason we do not consider the Government's argument, raised for the first time on oral argument of this appeal, that the combination of the interview notes and the indictment satisfied Rule 12.1(a). 24 The Government relies on the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 12.1, which states that [t]he initial burden is upon the defendant to raise the defense of alibi, but he need not specify the details of his alibi defense until the government specifies the time, place, and date of alleged offense. (emphasis added) Thus, the Government argues, even if the June 9 letter did not require Andrade and Vega to disclose the details of their alibi defense, it at least obligated them to raise it. 25 The Advisory Committee Note addressed the original text of the proposed Rule as approved by the Supreme Court, which placed the initial burden of raising the defense on the defendant. However, Congress rejected this approach, and changed the language of proposed Rule 12.1 in order to place upon the Government the burden of triggering the duty to disclose an alibi defense. See H.R.Rep. No. 94-247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975, pp. 8-9, reprinted in 1975 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 674, 680-81; C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal Sec. 202, at 743 & n. 1 (2d ed. 1982). The Rule as revised and enacted by Congress clearly provides that a defendant need not disclose her intent to offer an alibi defense unless and until the Government submits a written request specifying the time, date and place of the alleged offense. See United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492, 1499 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Bouye, 688 F.2d 471, 474-75 (7th Cir.1982). It was therefore erroneous for the District Court to preclude the testimony of these two alibi witnesses on the ground that the defendants had failed to comply with Rule 12.1. 1 26 The preclusion of the two alibi witnesses deprived Andrade and Vega of their Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process to present the testimony of witnesses in their own defense. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1001, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Gilmore v. Henderson, 825 F.2d 663, 665 (2d Cir.1987). Cf. Taylor v. Illinois, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (right to compulsory process not violated by exclusion of defense witness where defendant deliberately violates discovery rules). 27