Opinion ID: 848685
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: do amendatory provisions violate the constitution?

Text: Each of the challenged tribal-state compacts contains a provision that purports to empower the Governor to amend it on behalf of the state without seeking legislative approval of any specific amendment. [61] This provision, plaintiffs contend, violates the separation of powers doctrine embodied in art 3, §2 of Michigan's Constitution because it grants broad authority to the Governor to usurp a legislative power. That is, plaintiffs argue that, like the original compacts, any amendment constitutes legislation that is subject anew to the enactment requirement of Const 1963, art 4, §26. Plaintiffs essentially argue that even had the Legislature properly adopted the compacts, the specific amendatory provision would nonetheless violate the separation of powers doctrine because the Legislature may not, even by properly enacted legislation, grant the Governor a general power to amend that legislation. Defendants contend, on the other hand, that the amendments to the compacts, like the compacts themselves, in no way implicate legislation, and, therefore, the Governor does not usurp legislative functions in exercising his power to amend them. The Court of Appeals ruled that this issue was not ripe for review because the Governor had not yet attempted to amend the compacts. However, during the pendency of this suit, Governor Granholm purported to amend the compact with the Odawa Tribe by (1) extending the terms of the compact from twenty to twenty-five years, (2) requiring the eight percent semiannual payment that the tribes must make to the Michigan Strategic Fund to instead be made to the State ... as the governor so directs, (3) increasing the semiannual payment from eight percent of profits to either eight, ten, or twelve percent depending on the profits of the casino, and (4) providing less restrictive limitations on gaming by requiring the tribe to make the semiannual payments to the state only as long as the state does not authorize new gaming in ten specified counties rather than statewide as under the original compact terms. Accordingly, this issue is at present ripe for review. [62] As long ago as 1874, this Court recognized the importance of respecting the proper lines of demarcation between the practices of our three branches of government. In Sutherland, supra at 324-325, Justice Cooley stated: And that there is such a broad general principle seems to us very plain. Our government is one whose powers have been carefully apportioned between three distinct departments, which emanate alike from the people, have their powers alike limited and defined by the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their respective spheres of action equally independent.... This division is accepted as a necessity in all free governments, and the very apportionment of power to one department is understood to be a prohibition of its exercise by either of the others. [Emphasis added.] This broad general principle elaborated upon by Justice Cooley in Sutherland is what is now embodied in the separation of powers doctrine of Michigan's Constitution. Art. 3, §2 of our Constitution provides, The powers of government are divided into three branches; legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution. The legislative power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and a house of representatives. Const. 1963, art. 4, §1. Thus, the Governor may not exercise legislative power unless expressly provided for in the Constitution. Yet, the amendatory provision of the tribal-state compacts purports to grant the Governor a broad and undefined legislative power  the power to amend legislation. The Legislature may not, either by resolution or by bill, delegate to the executive branch a broad and undefined power to amend legislation. Thus, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue and hold that the amendatory provision contained in each compact violates the separation of powers doctrine and is, thus, void insofar as it may be regarded as granting sole amendatory power over legislation to the Governor. [63]