Opinion ID: 2451203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Is the recommended sanction of disbarment appropriate?

Text: ¶ 43 The Disciplinary Board recommended disbarment as the presumptive sanction for counts 4 and 5, those related to the fee. [10] The hearing officer recommended two years' suspension. We give more weight to the Disciplinary Board's recommendation based on its unique experience and perspective in the administration of sanctions. Preszler, 169 Wash.2d at 19, 232 P.3d 1118 (citing In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen, 150 Wash.2d 744, 754, 82 P.3d 224 (2004)). We affirm the Disciplinary Board's recommendation unless we can articulate a specific reason to reject it. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, 167 Wash.2d 51, 90, 217 P.3d 291 (2009). We use a three step process when reviewing the recommended sanction. We first consider the ethical duties violated, the lawyer's mental state, and the actual or potential injury caused by the conduct, using the ABA Standards. Second, we determine whether aggravating and mitigating circumstances call for a departure from the presumptive sanction. Third, if raised by the attorney being disciplined, we evaluate the proportionality of the sanction to the misconduct and the extent of agreement among the Disciplinary Board. ¶ 44 The total of Van Camp's ethical violations here is extremely serious. While we have already analyzed these violations, a few points merit further mention. First, Van Camp utilized a confusing fee agreement that he knew to be ambiguous. [11] The form used the phrase earned retainer when Van Camp argues he meant flat fee. The agreement should have expressly established the basis for the fee. While retainer and flat fee agreements are ethically acceptable, RPC 1.5(f), [12] the terms must be clear, in language the client can readily understand, and must be contained in a writing signed by the client. The client must know and understand the agreement. Any ambiguities will most often be construed against the lawyer as the drafter. In this case, adding to the confusion on this form, Van Camp's fee agreement contains both the earned retainer phrase and listed hourly rates, which suggests that hourly rates may be charged against the earned retainer amount. Further, the agreement did not define the scope of the representation. It should have. And, taking us to our next point, the services agreed upon should actually be performed. ¶ 45 The only specification in the fee agreement was that Van Camp would represent and defend Honkala in a suit. But Van Camp's various ethical violations demonstrate he fell far short of this and his general responsibility to represent his client. A lawyer must advise his client, advocate for his client's interest, and provide representation consistent with his client's needs. In this case, Van Camp did not communicate or explain a settlement offer to his client, despite numerous indications that his client wished to settle. He did not provide his client with diligent representation, for example, by failing to follow up with opposing counsel regarding settlement offers. He did not keep his client informed about his case. And Van Camp misled his client, telling Honkala there was no permanent injunction offer. This emerging pattern of dishonesty is very troubling. ¶ 46 Van Camp's reconstructed time sheets are further significant evidence of his ethical lapses. He does not dispute that this was an attempt to justify his fee. But it was not an honest justification. The entirety of the reconstruction is questionable. For example, it lists 9.5 attorney hours for the first day of the representation, when Honkala initially met Van Camp. This is in addition to listing 27 attorney hours for e-mails from and to Honkala. (Worth noting, we disbarred a lawyer largely based on her misrepresentations and falsification of documents to the WSBA during the investigation process. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Whitt, 149 Wash.2d 707, 72 P.3d 173 (2003).) This falsification of the time sheets indicates that Van Camp knew he was violating the RPCs. ¶ 47 This brings us to an examination of the lawyer's mental state and the injury caused by the misconduct. Under the ABA Standards, suspension is appropriate if the lawyer knowingly engages in violative conduct and causes injury or potential injury to the client, the public, or the legal system. ABA Standards, std. 7.2. Disbarment, however, is appropriate when the lawyer knowingly engages in violative conduct with the intent to benefit himself or herself that causes serious or potentially serious injury to the client, the public, or the legal system. ABA Standards, std. 7.1 (differences emphasized). ¶ 48 The facts before us are sufficient to find the requisite mental state warranting disbarment. We give great weight to the hearing officer's factual findings regarding the lawyer's state of mind. Cramer, 165 Wash.2d at 332, 198 P.3d 485. The hearing officer found that Van Camp knowingly deceived his client with the ambiguous fee agreement and that the fee arrangement was drafted expressly and knowingly by Van Camp for his own benefit, so the knowledge and intent requirements were met. This is further evidenced by Van Camp's prior discipline, which put him on notice that his fee agreement was problematic, and by his dishonest time reconstruction. ¶ 49 The Disciplinary Board increased the sanction from the hearing officer's recommendation because it thought the injury to Honkala and the legal system was, in fact, serious. We agree. Importantly, the Disciplinary Board noted Van Camp withheld an early settlement offer that could have settled the litigation early and at minimal expense, and he refused to voluntarily refund any portion of the fee. [13] The WSBA argues the injury to Honkala was serious due to Honkala's financial situation. Honkala was unemployed because of a disability, had to get a loan to come up with the $25,000, and his family, which includes three children, supported itself mainly on his wife's incomeso $25,000 was a substantial amount of money to him. Additionally, Van Camp's failure to diligently represent his client likely cost Honkala any chance he had in prevailing against Wendle on his lost contract expectancy claim, as his counterclaim was included in the litigation that was dismissed with prejudice. Together, these warrant a finding of serious injury. ¶ 50 The extensive aggravating factors present give further support for disbarment. The hearing officer listed (1) prior discipline, (2) dishonest or selfish motive, (3) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process, (4) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct, and (5) substantial experience in the practice of law as aggravators. [14] Additionally, the Disciplinary Board added a sixth factor: indifference to making restitution, after three years passed without Van Camp making any refund of fees. We consider these aggravators to be very serious. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cramer, 168 Wash.2d 220, 237-38, 225 P.3d 881 (2010) (aggravating factors of prior discipline, bad faith obstruction of disciplinary process, substantial experience, and indifference to making restitution would justify disbarment even if not the presumptive sanction). ¶ 51 Of these aggravators, we are concerned with Van Camp's record of similar prior discipline. He has been disciplined three times in the last 25 years for violations similar to those here. ¶ 52 In 1985, Van Camp was censured for charging an excessive fee, engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, making misrepresentations to the court and the WSBA, engaging in potential conflicts of interest by making loans to a client, and by having an ex parte hearing without notice to the other party. Restitution for the excessive fee was $29,000. Here, the hearing officer thought this violation too remote to have much bearing upon the present proceeding. The Disciplinary Board correctly disagreed, listing the excessive fee as an aggravator within its discussion of disbarment as a more appropriate sanction than suspension. We agree. We routinely consider misconduct dating back many years as an aggravating factor where the misconduct is similar. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against VanDerbeek, 153 Wash.2d 64, 92, 101 P.3d 88, (2004). ¶ 53 In 2002, Van Camp was suspended for six months for making false statements, under penalty of perjury, in his bankruptcy proceeding. The hearing officer found this to be a poor reflection of Van Camp's record for truthfulness and honesty, and indicative of a serious disregard for upholding the integrity of the legal system and the profession. Findings of Fact at 000027. We agree. This violation is somewhat similar to the current misrepresentations to his client, and one of Van Camp's current aggravating factors, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process, which involved false statements as well. ¶ 54 In 2005, Van Camp was reprimanded for violating former RPC 1.4(b) (1985) by using the term earned retainer fee on intake of a potential medical malpractice case. In that case, the agreement was unclear how $1,000 paid by the client would be used, whether for costs, fees, or both, and whether any of it was refundable should Van Camp not pursue the case. There was actual injury to the client because she was denied sufficient information to allow her to make an informed decision regarding Van Camp's representation, similar to the current situation. Finding the evidence close, the hearing officer gave him the benefit of the doubt as to mental state and selfish motive and concluded he was merely negligent. Ultimately, Van Camp was reprimanded and placed on a two year probation, but a review of the hearing officer's recommendation reveals she chose not to recommend suspension because Van Camp was then currently suspended, and she assumed it would run concurrently. There were two terms of the probation: a. Respondent may not accept earned retainer fees as defined in Formal Opinion 186[ [15] ] in cases where he undertakes representation of personal injury victims, regardless of the cause of that injury, be it medical malpractice or otherwise. Respondent must treat all advance fee and/or cost payments as advance fee and/or costs payments, including maintaining them in his trust account until withdrawal is appropriate under [former] RPC 1.14 (i.e., the fee is earned and due to the lawyer, or the cost is incurred). b. Respondent must purchase a stamp, which must be used on all documents, pleadings or correspondence received or produced by his office and sent to clients, to evidence the fact that the document has been sent or mailed to the client.... Board Ex. 71. [16] The terms of the probation put Van Camp on notice to more adequately explain his fees and to provide clients with copies. Yet, the conduct in this case is largely the same. ¶ 55 The only aggravating factor Van Camp contests is the similarity of the 2005 discipline, attempting to distinguish his prior misconduct from the present. However, the language of the fee agreement that was found to be ambiguous was the same as used here. While some facts may differ in the present proceeding, what remains is that Van Camp did not learn from his prior discipline and correct the problem. We have disbarred attorneys for repeated behavior indicating the attorney did not learn from the previous disciplinary action. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Yates, 110 Wash.2d 444, 453, 755 P.2d 770 (1988) (citing In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Allper, 94 Wash.2d 456, 617 P.2d 982 (1980); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Vetter, 104 Wash.2d 779, 711 P.2d 284 (1985); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Selden, 107 Wash.2d 246, 728 P.2d 1036 (1986)). ¶ 56 Next, we consider the extent of agreement among the Disciplinary Board. We give deference to the sanction decisions of a unanimous Disciplinary Board. Cramer, 165 Wash.2d at 331, 198 P.3d 485 (citing In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Day, 162 Wash.2d 527, 538, 173 P.3d 915 (2007)). But here the Disciplinary Board was split: seven favored disbarment while three preferred a three year suspension. Van Camp argues a split Disciplinary Board decision vitiates the deference we give, but he cites no authority that supports this proposition. The consideration of a divided Disciplinary Board is merely one aspect of our analysis. One thing is clear: the Disciplinary Board was unanimous in imposing a serious sanction of at least a three year suspension. With this in mind, we consider proportionality. ¶ 57 In conducting this proportionality analysis, we focus on the misconduct, aggravating factors, prior discipline, and the lawyer's culpability to determine whether the sanction here is appropriate. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Christopher, 153 Wash.2d 669, 686-87, 105 P.3d 976 (2005). The lawyer must show the recommended sanction disproportionate, Marshall, 160 Wash.2d at 349, 157 P.3d 859, and that the recommended `sanction departs significantly from sanctions imposed in other cases.' In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Hicks, 166 Wash.2d 774, 790, 214 P.3d 897 (2009) (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Haley, 156 Wash.2d 324, 339, 126 P.3d 1262 (2006)). ¶ 58 None of the cases provided by Van Camp establish that disbarment would be disproportionate. [17] What they do suggest is that had Van Camp's misconduct been less serious, or not involved six counts, or not involved such extensive aggravating factors, or not been coupled with prior discipline, then disbarment might be disproportionate. But the misconduct before us, when considered together in its entirety, does warrant disbarment, and disbarment is not disproportionate.