Opinion ID: 821520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Government Claims Statute

Text: Several points are important here. The County does not dispute that the content of the letter is sufficient to serve as a valid claim, nor does it dispute its timeliness. Plaintiff does not dispute that the County was the proper public entity where her claim should have been presented under section 915(a). The case stands or falls on whether presentation of plaintiff‟s letter of intention to someone other than the statute‟s designated recipients or the actual receipt of notice by a proper recipient, satisfies the prefiling claim requirement. It is uncontested that the claim was never delivered or mailed to the “clerk, secretary or auditor” as required by section 915(a). Likewise, the “clerk, secretary, auditor or board” never actually received the claim. (§ 915(e)(1).) Thus, neither section 915(a)‟s specific requirements for compliance, nor section 915(e)(1)‟s provision deeming actual receipt to constitute compliance, were satisfied. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that there was “substantial compliance.” This was error. (footnote continued from previous page) [claimant] . . . to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] [It] also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing board to settle meritorious disputes without incurring the added cost of litigation, and gives it time to engage in appropriate budgetary planning. [Citations.] The notice requirement . . . thus is based on a recognition of the special status of public entities, according them greater protections than nonpublic entity defendants, because . . . public entities . . . will incur costs that must ultimately be borne by the taxpayers.” 8 The proper construction of section 915 is dispositive. “In construing any statute, we first look to its language. [Citation.] „Words used in a statute . . . should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .‟ [Citation.] „If the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, however, the court looks “to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.” [Citation.]‟ [Citation.]” (S. B. Beach Properties v. Berti (2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 379.) Also, a statute “ „must be given a reasonable and common sense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers, practical rather than technical in nature, which upon application will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity.‟ ” (City of Poway v. City of San Diego (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 847, 858, quoting DeYoung v. City of San Diego (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 18.) A court may not, “under the guise of construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.” (California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349.) Further, “ „[w]e must assume that the Legislature knew how to create an exception if it wished to do so . . . . [Citation]‟ ” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal erred by failing to adhere to the plain language of section 915. Instead, it rewrote the statute to read as the court believed it should provide. Section 915(a)(1) reflects the Legislature‟s intent to precisely identify those who may receive claims on behalf of a local public entity. Section 915(e)(1) reflects the Legislature‟s intent that a misdirected claim will satisfy the 9 presentation requirement if the claim is “actually received” by a statutorily designated recipient. Thus, compliance with section 915(e)(1) requires actual receipt of the misdirected claim by one of the designated recipients. If an appropriate public employee or board never receives the claim, an undelivered or misdirected claim fails to comply with the statute. (Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 901.) This straightforward construction honors the statutory language and is consistent with the purpose of the claims statutes.9 While resort to extrinsic sources is unnecessary, our conclusion is consistent with the legislative history. In 1959, the California Law Revision Commission‟s (Commission) report found that there were conflicting claim presentation requirements for public entities throughout the state. The Commission urged that specificity and uniformity were necessary and recommended adoption of uniform procedures for certain claims against public entities. (See Recommendation and Study relating to The Presentation of Claims Against Public Entities (Jan. 1959) 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) pp. A-57 to A-62, A-122 (1959 Study).) The Commission reported, “Much unnecessary litigation has been devoted to resolution of technical issues relating to allegedly improper presentation of claims. . . . [A recurring question is] whether presentation to the wrong official satisfies the statute. Avoidance of these problems can be achieved in part by clear identification of the officer to whom such claims are required to be presented and by express authorization of mailed notice. In order to avoid doubts and to preclude such purely technical issues from interfering with expeditious handling of claims, however, it is recommended that express provision be made to cure minor 9 We need not determine whether section 915‟s use of the term “clerk” refers to the county clerk or the clerk of the board of supervisors. It is undisputed that the claim was not mailed, delivered to, or received by either clerk. 10 defects in the manner of service which do not prejudice the public entity.” (Id. at p. A-122, fns. omitted.) The Commission also referred to a New York law providing that, “ „[I]f service of such notice . . . [is] not in compliance with the provisions of this subdivision, such service shall be deemed valid if such notice is actually received by such person.‟ ” (1959 Study, supra, 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., at p. A- 122, italics added.) In 1959, the Legislature acted on the Commission‟s recommendation and added section 714, the predecessor of section 915.10 (Stats. 1959, ch. 1724, § 1, p. 4136.) “The scheme in effect today was established in 1963, when the Legislature combined the requirements for claims against local entities with those for claims against the state in part 3 of division 3.6 of title 1 of the Government Code. (Stats. 1963, ch. 1715, pp. 3369, 3372 et seq.)” (City of Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 739, fn. 4.) It is logical to provide that actual receipt satisfies the claim presentation requirement. The goals of the claims statutes are to provide entities with sufficient information to investigate and appropriately resolve claims and to plan for potential liabilities. These goals are satisfied when an adequate claim is actually received by an appropriate entity representative. The Legislature retains authority to determine which representatives are appropriate. The Court of Appeal cannot 10 Former section 714 provided, “A claim may be presented to a local public entity (1) by delivering the claim to the clerk, secretary or auditor thereof within the period of time prescribed by Section 715 or (2) by mailing the claim to such clerk, secretary or auditor or to the governing body at its principal office not later than the last day of such period. A claim shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance with this section even though it is not delivered or mailed as provided herein if it is actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or governing body within the time prescribed.” (Stats. 1959, ch. 1724, § 1, p. 4136, italics added.) 11 override that determination simply because it concludes receipt by others should be considered sufficient. The Court of Appeal placed substantial reliance on Jamison v. State of California (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 513 (Jamison). Jamison proves too slender a reed to support the weight of the Court of Appeal‟s expansion. The Jamison holding was later repudiated by its own panel and is in conflict with more recent authority. Jamison was injured in a traffic collision with a truck owned by the California Department of Water Resources. His lawyer filed a claim with the Department of Water Resources before filing suit. (Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 515.) The trial court dismissed the action for failure to comply with the Government Claims Act. (Jamison, at p. 515.) At the time, section 915, subdivision (c), a prior version of section 915(e), required that notice be filed with the State Board of Control and Jamison had failed to do so. (Jamison, at pp. 515-516.) The Court of Appeal concluded Jamison had substantially complied with the existing statute. It noted that most claim statute cases dealt with “substantial compliance” in disputes over whether the contents or form of the claim was adequate, not whether the filing was properly presented. (Id. at p. 516.) It then reviewed the few California cases involving “the question of filing a proper claim with the wrong governmental department or agency.” (Ibid.) The Jamison court drew several conclusions: (1) The statutory requirement is not met when a claim is filed with the wrong entity. (Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.) That principle is reflected in Jackson v. Board of Education (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 856, 858-860, which held that a requirement to serve a local board of education is not satisfied by serving the municipality. (2) If a claim is filed with the proper entity but with the wrong statutory official of that 12 entity, the statute is satisfied if the claim is actually received by the statutory officer. (3) A complete failure to serve any responsible officer of the entity will not constitute substantial compliance. (Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.) As stated in Redwood v. State of California (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 501, 503-504: “It has been repeatedly held that where the claims statute provides for the person upon whom the claim is to be served . . . service upon another is insufficient.” The Jamison court went on to draw a fourth conclusion that it phrased as follows: “Service upon any responsible official of the entity, but not the statutory officer, is sufficient if the party served has the duty to notify the statutory agent.” (Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.) Jamison cited no California authority for this proposition, referring instead to cases from Indiana (Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis (Ind. 1970) 255 N.E.2d 225) and the District of Columbia (Stone v. District of Columbia (D.C. Cir. 1956) 237 F.2d 28 [applying D.C. law]). (Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517.) The Jamison opinion does not reveal whether the statutes at issue in those cases bore any similarity to the California statutory scheme. As justification for importing its fourth conclusion into California law, the Jamison court stated, “Certainly, any responsible officer or employee of a major state agency knows, or should know, that if a substantial claim for damages is presented that it should be forwarded to the Board of Control. In the event the officer or employee actually receiving the claim does not know the proper agency, then a simply [sic] inquiry to the Attorney General‟s office would result in advice as to the proper agency.” (Jamison, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 518.) The court cited no statutory authority supporting the duty it created. Other California appellate courts have refused to follow it. (Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 761; Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 894.) 13 In Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 894, the plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident. He was treated by medical staff at the county medical center that allegedly committed negligence. The plaintiff retained counsel who sent a personal injury claim to the medical center‟s legal department. (Id. at p. 897.) The legal department was not the proper body to receive the plaintiff‟s claim. The plaintiff later retained new counsel who filed a late claim with the county board of supervisors. (Ibid.) After the county denied the claim as untimely and his application for leave to present a late claim was also denied, Life filed a complaint against the county alleging medical negligence. (Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 897.) The county moved for summary judgment on the ground that Life had failed to timely present a claim. (Id. at p. 898.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Life‟s presentation of the claim to the hospital‟s legal department was insufficient. Compliance with section 915 would have occurred only if the misdirected claim was “ „actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public entity. . . .‟ ” (Life, at p. 900.) The Life court found Jamison unpersuasive because it failed to follow the statutory requirement that a misdirected claim be “actually received” by the designated party. (Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 901.) The court also remarked that “Jamison’s reliance on a public entity‟s internal transmittal of a claim conflicts with section 915, which requires the claimant to file with the appropriate official or board.” (Ibid.) The court persuasively concluded that “[b]y focusing on the duty of a public employee in receipt of a claim to forward the claim to the proper agency, Jamison inappropriately shifts responsibility for filing a claim with the proper official or body from the claimant to the public entity.” (Ibid.) 14 In Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at page 764, the claim arose from an automobile accident with a Riverside police officer, Eric Charrette. Del Real‟s attorney wrote to Charrette seeking his account of the accident and requesting that the letter be forwarded to Charrette‟s insurance company. The city attorney responded to the letter, informing counsel that it represented Charrette and that he would not provide a statement. The letter also stated that any further contact with Charrette should be made through the city attorney‟s office. (Ibid.) Del Real later sued Charrette and the City of Riverside. Defendants moved for summary judgment alleging Del Real failed to satisfy the Government Claims statutes. Del Real urged in reply that her letter to Charrette constituted a timely claim. She argued that “even if the letter was not actually received by the appropriate person or body, it should have been,” citing Jamison for the proposition that Charrette had a duty to transmit the letter to the appropriate recipient. (Del Real, at p. 770.) In addition to holding that the letter did not contain the contents of a proper claim, the Court of Appeal held that because the letter was not properly directed it failed to comply with section 915. (Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 770.) In rejecting Del Real‟s argument, the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated, “we have reconsidered our earlier decision in Jamison and, as did the court in Life v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at pages 900-901, we find that it is at odds with section 915, subdivision (c). We therefore decline to follow it.” (Ibid.) We agree with the holdings in Life and Del Real. Their application of the compliance doctrine is consistent with the language of section 915(e)(1) requiring actual receipt by the statutorily designated recipient. Jamison is unpersuasive because it fails to follow the statutory language specifically identifying who must actually receive a claim. Finding compliance when any agency employee is served exponentially expands the scope of the statute. By placing a duty on a public employee who receives a misdirected claim to forward it to the proper 15 agency, Jamison improperly shifted the responsibility for presenting a claim from the claimant to the public entity. (See §§ 910, 915.) Moreover, the County argues persuasively that, in addition to contravening section 915‟s plain language, the Jamison rule creates uncertainty about how and where claims must be delivered. Misdirected claims may be received by various departments or employees and forwarded to multiple people and places, making it difficult to determine whether the claims were actually delivered to, or received by, a department or employee charged with the overall management of claims against the county. The question of when a claim is actually received and whether a specific department or employee managed claims against a public entity would also be fodder for litigation. This result is contrary to the Government Claims Act‟s goal of eliminating uncertainty in the claims-presentation requirements. Accordingly, we disapprove Jamison v. State of California, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 513. The Court of Appeal below further relied on cases decided before the enactment of section 915 or its predecessor, section 714.11 When these cases were decided, claims against the state, local, and municipal governments were governed by numerous state statutes and local ordinances. Recognizing this Byzantine claims system, the Legislature standardized the procedure by enacting the Government Claims Act. In doing so, it replaced more than 150 separate procedures for directing claims against local governmental entities. (Ardon v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 241, 246.) Because of this comprehensive 11 Insolo v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 172; Peters v. City and County of San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 419; and Los Angeles Brick & Clay Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 478, 486. 16 change in the statutory procedures, the early cases cited by the Court of Appeal are inapposite. The Court of Appeal also erred by relying on Elias v. San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 70, 75, and Carlino v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1533. These cases hold that when the governing body of one public entity is also the governing body of another public entity, a claim against the subordinate entity that is delivered to the governing body constitutes substantial compliance with the claims statute. (Elias, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 75-77; Carlino, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 15331534. That is not the case here.12 12 The Court of Appeal additionally relied on out-of-state cases. (Shehyn v. District of Columbia (D.C. 1978) 392 A.2d 1008; Stone v. District of Columbia, supra, 237 F.2d 28, 29-30 [applying D.C. law]; Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, supra, 255 N.E.2d 225; Coghill v. Badger (Ind. Ct.App. 1981) 418 N.E.2d 1201, 1206, fn.3; Hawkeye Bank v. State (Iowa 1994) 515 N.W.2d 348, 350; Webb v. Highway Div. of Oregon State Dept. of Transp. (Or. 1982) 652 P.2d 783, 784.) Plaintiff also cites numerous out-of-state cases. (Finnie v. Jefferson County School District (Colo. 2003) 79 P.3d 1253; Robinson v. Washington County (Me.1987) 529 A.2d 1357; Hansen v. City of Laurel (Md. Ct.Spec.App. 2010) 996 A.2d 882, 891; Kelly v. City of Rochester (Minn. 1975) 231 N.W.2d 275, 276; Kirkpatrick v. City of Glendale (Mo. Ct.App. 2003) 99 S.W.3d 57; Ferrer v. Jackson County Board of Supervisors (Miss. 1999) 741 So.2d 216; Myears v. Charles Mix County (S.D. 1997) 566 N.W.2d 470; Mount v. City of Vermillion (S.D. 1977) 250 N.W.2d 686.) We find these authorities unpersuasive. Neither the Court of Appeal nor plaintiff explain how the claim statutes at issue in these cases were consistent with California‟s Government Claims Act. 17