Opinion ID: 612140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Robert Phibbs

Text: 91 Phibbs argues that the district court violated Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by refusing to submit a questionnaire developed by defendants to prospective jurors, when the court itself conducted the voir dire of the jury venire. 92 Except for Robert Murr, defendants waived their respective interests in examining the jury venire. According to Phibbs, the other defendants entrusted Murr with undertaking the voir dire to attempt to balance their right to an impartial jury with the district court's concern for expediency. Such a strategy appears to have been partially the result of defendants' fears that the court was leaning towards exclusively examining prospective jurors, and was an effort to devise an alternative procedure more desirable to them. If so, their sense of the court's inclination proved to be accurate. 93 Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Trial Jurors--Examination) states: 94 The court may permit the defendant or the defendant's attorney and the attorney for the government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the defendant or the defendant's attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper. 95 Thus, the trial court may resolve to conduct the voir dire on its own. If the court does so, it may also ask the jury venire other appropriate questions suggested by the parties. 96 In reviewing the district court's handling of the voir dire in the case at bar, we must ascertain whether the court abused the broad discretion vested in him by the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States in his impaneling of [the] jury. United States v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815, 822 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099, 104 S.Ct. 1592, 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984). A trial court retains great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire. Mu'Min v. Virginia, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1904, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991). So long as the court ensured that the defendant or defendants had a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors, reversal is not mandated. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1960). 97 In its examination of the jury venire, the district court drew upon the substance of the questions presented by defense counsel. As the voir dire progressed, the court held bench conferences to address areas of concern highlighted by defendants. At its conclusion, the court asked whether there were any other questions from counsel, eliciting no response. 98 The district court examined the panel members as a group concerning the presumption of innocence, the meaning of reasonable doubt, their knowledge of the parties and attorneys, and their knowledge of the case. They were also asked about their impressions of the criminal justice system, any predispositions they might have regarding drug prosecutions, whether any of them had prior experience as a juror, whether any of them had been a victim of crime, and whether they could set aside their personal feelings in rendering a verdict. All of these questions, and others, served to establish that the individuals who were ultimately selected as jurors were unbiased. 2 99 Phibbs suggests that the written questionnaire created by defendants was necessary to ferret out those prospective jurors whose biases would not be revealed through a collective examination. 3 An individualized examination of the jury venire is not, however, required by the United States Constitution. See Mu'Min, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1904. Much of the questionnaire was directed at the personal habits and activities of the panel members (e.g., what books they read, what television shows they watched, etc.). While such information might have aided defendants in identifying sympathetic jurors, it was not needed to compose a fair-minded jury. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its management of the voir dire. 100 Phibbs claims nonetheless that considering the length of the trial was estimated at one month, a one and one-half voir dire examination was so grossly inappropriate that a fair and impartial jury could not have been seated after such questioning. However, he does not cite any instance of prejudice relative to the jury as a body or to any specific juror. Nor does he point out any question that the court failed to ask that harmed defendants. As a result, we find his contention to be without merit. 101
102 Phibbs also asserts that defendants did not receive a fair trial because FBI Special Agent Clyde Merryman and DEA Special Agent Frank Finken, both of whom appeared as witnesses, were allowed to remain in the courtroom throughout the proceedings. 103 Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Exclusion of Witnesses) provides: 104 At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. The rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause. 105 In the instant case, the government sought to designate both Merryman and Finken as its representatives during the trial. After a defense objection, the district court replied: 106 I think the rule provides that anyone that was necessary to assist counsel in the presentation of the case would be--would be permitted to remain in the courtroom. Inasmuch as this is an extended trial, boxes of documents both from the Eastern District of Kentucky and the Eastern District [of] Tennessee, it would be unduly burdensome on the Court and time consuming if we just had one case agent. So the request of the Government is not unreasonable, so the motion is overruled. 107 The court then engaged in a colloquy with one of the counsel for the defense, inviting him to bring contrary authority to its attention before any witnesses were called. Counsel did not do so. 108 Hence, the court initially treated both Merryman and Finken as essential witnesses under Rule 615(3). Later, however, the court requested that the government designate one of the two as its representative pursuant to Rule 615(2); it would then consider whether the other agent was an essential witness. The government responded by selecting Merryman as its representative, and the court found that Finken's presence in the courtroom was also needed for the government to effectively present its case. 109 Phibbs concedes that one of the agents could have stayed in the courtroom, despite the fact that he would later testify. However, he argues that the government had the burden to show that the presence of more than one agent was essential to it laying out its case. See Fed.R.Evid. 615. 110 The district court followed our procedure, as set out in United States v. Pulley, 922 F.2d 1283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, Pulley v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 67, 116 L.Ed.2d 42 (1991), to be used when the government seeks to have two agent-witnesses in the courtroom for assistance. Rule 615(2) affords the government the right to designate only one representative for such a purpose. Id. at 1286. However, certain prosecutions may be complex enough that the aid of more than one law enforcement officer is needed to sort through extensive, technical evidence, and to help map out strategy. See United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir.1990). When the government wants to have two agent-witnesses in attendance throughout a trial, it is always free to designate one agent as its representative under subpart (2) [to Rule 615] and to try to show under subpart (3) that the presence of the second agent is essential to the presentation of its case. Pulley, 922 F.2d at 1286. 111 Demonstrating that an additional agent 4 is, in fact, essential is no easy task. Criminal defendants, as do all persons caught up in the legal process, have a substantial interest in discouraging and exposing fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion related to in-court testimony. Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Evid. 615. This interest was recognized in the text of Rule 615, which made the exclusion of witnesses by the parties a matter of right, subject to exceptions that are narrowly defined. 112 The essential witness exception set out in Rule 615(3) contemplates such persons as an agent who handled the transaction being litigated or an expert needed to advise counsel in the management of the litigation. Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Evid. 615. We are persuaded that Finken fell within this category due to the particular circumstances of the case at bar. This was a trial that was scheduled for approximately one month, involving several defendants and a great deal of evidence, not all of which was readily accessible. After Merryman was designated the government's representative in accordance with Rule 615(2), the court determined that Finken, who was intimately familiar with portions of the evidence, was also needed to advise the government in its handling of the prosecution. As Merryman and Finken were, for the most part, responsible for distinct aspects 5 of a far-flung investigation, this was not an abuse of discretion. 113 We note that the district court took steps to guarantee that Merryman and Finken would not parrot each other's testimony. It directed that, when one of them was on the stand, the other was to be outside the courtroom. Such a measure could be taken, not only on the basis of the court's inherent powers of trial oversight, but also in reliance upon Rule 615 itself. See, e.g., United States v. Womack, 654 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156, 102 S.Ct. 1029, 71 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982) (breach of conditions placed on sequestration constitutes violation of Fed.R.Evid. 615). 114 Phibbs, however, asserts that government counsel really wanted Finken and Merryman in court so that they might be in a position to coach Parks during recesses, or to otherwise guide his testimony. He claims that defendants were prejudiced because Merryman had substantial contact with Parks, and the clear purpose and effect of allowing Agent Merryman to remain in the courtroom was to be able to listen to all of the testimony and to, in fact, cumulatively correct any questionable credibility problems and to bolster the credibility of Mr. Parks[.] As for Finken, he also had the opportunity to sit through this testimony and assist Agent Merryman in the 'correction' of Mr. Parks' testimony. Phibbs offers nothing to support his charges, and we find them to be rank speculation. 115 Despite the possibility of improper influence, Rule 615(2) allows the government to have any law enforcement officer it wants at its counsel table. Similarly, Rule 615(3) does not categorically bar any class of agents from assuming essential witness status. Ordinarily, if there are concerns about coaching by an agent-witness, the court may order him not to discuss the case with any other witness. If the agent fails to adhere to such an order, the court has a variety of remedies at its disposal, ranging from commenting on the transgression to the jury, to holding the agent in contempt, or disqualifying him as a witness, or even declaring a mistrial. 116 In addition, the defense is free to cross-examine both the agent-witness and the alleged object of his coaching efforts, subject to the control of the court. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 89-91, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1335-36, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976). See also M. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6611 at 217-221 (West 1992). Here, defendants engaged in spirited cross-examination of Parks, Merryman, and Finken, touching upon the question of coaching.
117 Phibbs next contends that the evidence underlying his convictions was insufficient, and that the district court erred in denying both his motion for a directed verdict following the government's case-in-chief, and his subsequent motion for judgment of acquittal. 118 Phibbs was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute the drug (21 U.S.C. § 846), as well as on nine counts of possession of cocaine, or aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine, with the intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2). 119 Jerry Parks testified that Phibbs, an employee of Robert Murr's, wrote a letter to the United States Probation Office in Memphis, Tennessee, stating that he would employ Parks if he was transferred to Knoxville. Phibbs sent the letter on behalf of Murr because Murr was under investigation by authorities in Knoxville. Their efforts were successful, and Parks was given permission to work for Automotive Enterprises, one of Murr's companies. After Parks began his tenure there, Phibbs represented to Parks' probation officer that he was on the job. However, according to Parks, his employment was a sham and [he] didn't do anything there at Automotive Enterprises other than carrying on Mr. Murr, the Chief's, cocaine business. Phibbs sometimes paid Parks with sham checks, which he would then cash, returning the money to Phibbs to put back in the account. 120 After Parks began supplying Murr's cocaine customers with the drug, he often gave Phibbs the money he collected from them if Murr was unavailable. This was done on Murr's express instructions, so that Parks would not be carrying large sums on his person. The amount turned over to Phibbs would frequently be in the neighborhood of $10,000 to $15,000. 121 When, after November of 1988, Murr decided to move the location of the cocaine stash from the house he rented for defendant Diane Whited, he told Parks to bury the drugs inside a pipe on a hillside behind Automotive Enterprises. Parks testified that the only other person in the world who knew where the cocaine was subsequently hidden was Phibbs. This was so that, in the event Parks was arrested or injured, somebody in our organization ... would know. 122 Ernie Nicely, a business partner of Murr's, stated that on two occasions when defendant Kenneth Lawson came to see Murr at Anderson County Auto Auction, ostensibly to discuss matters related to the cocaine conspiracy, Phibbs was on the property. This was unusual because [h]e very seldom came out there; it was 20 miles away from Phibbs' job at Automotive Enterprises. On the last day that Nicely saw Lawson, August 17, 1989, Murr called him and asked him to take two suitcases out of the safe at Anderson County Auto Auction and to deliver them to Phibbs at Automotive Enterprises. 123 Later, in September of 1989, Murr told Nicely that defendant Edward Rogers owed him $2,000, and that Phibbs was to deduct that amount from the $10,000 that he was holding for Rogers. According to Nicely, Rogers owed the money for drugs or something. Around that time, Murr instructed Nicely to get rid of  a 1984 Porsche 940 that was on Murr's property until he could get a title for it. Phibbs informed him that Murr had obtained the car in exchange for a kilogram of cocaine. When he titled the Porsche in his own name, Phibbs furnished the money to pay the tax. 124 Rogers' statements at trial corroborated those of Parks and Nicely regarding Phibbs' participation in the drug distribution ring. He confirmed that he owed Murr $2,000 for drugs, and that he went to Phibbs to settle his account. Phibbs claimed that he actually owed $4,000 for four ounces of cocaine. During their conversation, Rogers asked Phibbs if he was still in business, and Phibbs replied in the affirmative. 125 All of this testimony was buttressed by the government's introduction of records demonstrating that calls were made from Murr-related telephones to Phibbs' residence, his beeper, or to Whited's cellular phone, which was listed in his name, during the periods delineated in the distribution counts. 126 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient proof from several sources that Phibbs knew of, intended to join and participated in the charged conspiracy. Pearce, 912 F.2d at 161 (6th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Stanley, 765 F.2d 1224, 1237 (5th Cir.1985)). He received and processed drug money, helped install Parks as a middleman, and was part of the security surrounding the cocaine stash. As for the distribution counts, Parks' testimony, in particular, indicated that Phibbs handled drug money during the relevant time frames. His contention must therefore be rejected. 127
128 Phibbs further argues that, at sentencing the district court should have accorded him a four-point reduction in offense level, attendant to a finding that he was a minimal participant in the drug ring, rather than a two-point reduction for being a minor participant. He also asserts that he was entitled to a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 6 129 A district court's factual decisions, such as those related to a defendant's acceptance of responsibility, or his role in the offense, are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Perry, 908 F.2d 56, 58 (6th Cir.1990). To be clearly erroneous,  'a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must ... strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.'  Id. (quoting Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 847, 110 S.Ct. 141, 107 L.Ed.2d 100 (1989)). 130 Application Note 1 to United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.2 (Mitigating Role) states in part that: Subsection (a) [dealing with minimal participants] applies to a defendant who plays a minimal role in concerted activity. It is intended to cover defendants who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group. With this language in mind, Phibbs latches onto the probation officer's conclusion in his presentence report that Phibbs gives the appearance, amid all of the co-defendants to be least involved in the group to contend that he should have been considered a minimal participant. He further claims, in this regard, that he did not have organizational, managerial or monetary interests in any of the trips to Kentucky to buy cocaine. 131 However, Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 underscores that: 132 It is intended that the downward adjustment for a minimal participant will be used infrequently. It would be appropriate, for example, for someone who played no other role in a very large drug smuggling operation than to offload part of a single marihuana shipment, or in a case where an individual was recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs. 133 The district court, in passing sentence, felt that Phibbs was not merely on the fringes of the drug distribution ring: 134 You knew what the deal was, you knew what the deal was from beginning to end. And I really believe that and I infer you were into it deeper than what the United States was able to prove. The ostrich defense is not applicable in cases like this. 135 In comparing the roles of Whited, whom it considered to be a minimal participant, and Phibbs, the court took Whited's dependence on Murr and the fact that, unlike Phibbs, she was not a repository of drug money to be significant. In its view, these factors placed her below Phibbs for sentencing purposes. 136 Our examination of the record convinces us that Phibbs was not the sort of marginal player that the United States Sentencing Commission and Congress conceived of as a minimal participant. He was involved in the drug distribution ring throughout the bulk of its existence, having been entrusted with drug-related funds, as well as critical knowledge concerning the whereabouts of the cocaine supply. Consequently, the district court's conclusion as to his role in the enterprise was not clearly erroneous. 137 Phibbs further contends that he should have been granted a reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. In a statement furnished to the district court, Phibbs acknowledged that he was aware, or should have been aware, that he was given money that was the product of Murr's cocaine deals. Once Murr was arrested, it became clear to him that the money was, in fact, drug-related. Thus Phibbs avers that he truthfully admitte[d] the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction. Application Note 1(a) to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. 138 However, the district court was not so sure. It told Phibbs' counsel that I have read his statement, and I don't think that the statement even comes close to a contrite heart and acceptance of responsibility. Accordingly, the court denied Phibbs' request for a sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. 139 We approve of the court's decision. Phibbs did not even begin to address the scope of the charges on which he was convicted. To the extent that he did, he did not do so in good faith. There was evidence that he understood all along he was collecting tainted money, and that he was enlightened with respect to the magnitude of the drug distribution ring. Rogers' testimony indicated that he continued his criminal conduct after Murr was arrested. In no way did he assist law enforcement authorities in their probe of the ring's activities. Hence Phibbs could not be said to have accepted responsibility for his offenses in a manner contemplated by the federal sentencing guidelines.