Opinion ID: 159991
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Walt Carroll and William Logan

Text: Mr. Allerheiligen argues the court also erred in excluding expert witnesses Mr. Carroll and Mr. Logan. Neither Mr. Carroll nor Mr. Logan appeared at the hearing on the government’s motion to exclude both witnesses’ testimony. -25- Instead, Mr. Allerheiligen submitted their respective resumes and submitted a proffer of their testimonies. Mr. Carroll has been a law enforcement officer for over twenty-five years and has served as an expert witness and training instructor in the area of drug detection, inderdiction and prosecution of drug cases. Mr. Allerheiligen submitted that Mr. Carroll would “testify as to the presence of wild marijuana on the Allerheiligen property; evidence of spraying in the marijuana field; his observations during his inspection of the Allerheiligen property in 1997; pictures taken by him of the Allerheiligen property; [and] all other issues addressed in [Mr. Carroll’s] report and affidavit.” App. vol. II, at 108. Mr. Allerheiligen asserts Mr. Carroll’s testimony was significant because he inspected Mr. Allerheiligen’s property two weeks after the search and found no evidence of cultivation. Mr. Logan is a criminal defense lawyer. He has called Mr. Rosenthal to testify on behalf of his clients in various cases. Mr. Allerheiligen sought to call Mr. Logan to “testify to [the] defining elements which constitute personal use of marijuana” and “the expected yield of the marijuana seized.” App. vol. II, at 109. After reviewing the proffered evidence, the court concluded “that the purported testimonies of [Mssrs.] Logan and Carroll extend[ed] beyond their respective demonstrated areas of specialized knowledge.” App. vol. III, at 151. -26- As with Mr. Rosenthal, the court found that “the information provided to [it] by the defendant t[old] the court nothing about the scientific reliability of the opinions proffered by [Mssrs.] Logan and Carroll.” Id. With respect to Mr. Carroll, the court found that his “credentials evidence no training, experience or schooling in matters specifically related to marijuana identification, marijuana eradication, marijuana processing, [and] marijuana use.” Id. Moreover, the court found nothing in the record to justify relying on “Mr. Carroll’s perusal of [Mr. Allerheiligen’s] property after [the marijuana seizure] . . . as evidence of the yield of the plants seized.” Id. at 152. As to Mr. Logan, the court stated, “[t]here is nothing of record that would lead this court to believe that it should rely on Mr. Logan’s former clients, members of the California criminal defense bar, California marijuana users or the readers of his articles as a valid indicator of reliability.” Id. The court carefully and meticulously reviewed the proffer of evidence submitted by Mr. Allerheiligen in support of Mssrs. Carroll and Logan, ultimately finding their proffered testimonies were not scientifically reliable. Our review of the record supports that finding. As stated previously, “the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine” what are “reasonable measures of reliability.” Kumho Tire , 526 U.S. at 123. Accordingly, we conclude the court’s decision to -27- exclude the testimony of Mr. Carroll and Mr. Logan was not an improper exercise of its discretion. D. Exclusion of Expert Testimony Regarding Defendant’s Mental and Physical Condition On the defense witness list, Mr. Allerheiligen listed Dr. Stuart Twemlow as an expert witness who would have testified as to Mr. Allerheiligen’s “physical, medical and psychological condition.” App. vol. II, at 110. Dr. Twemlow examined Mr. Allerheiligen pursuant to a court ordered evaluation as a condition of his pre-trial release. The defense also listed Dr. Matthew Schlotterback, who would have testified as to his knowledge of Mr. Allerheiligen’s “medical history.” Id. The government’s motion in limine sought to exclude the testimony of both witnesses. The district court granted the government’s motion, finding that the “[Mr. Allerheiligen’s] true intent [was] to offer a ‘justification’ defense through the use of this testimony.” App. vol. III, doc. 101, at 122. Mr. Allerheiligen had represented on the Omnibus Hearing Report that his sole defense was “general denial; put the government to proof,” and did not list “justification as a defense.” Thus, the court found that allowing the testimony would violate the Omnibus Hearing Report. Additionally, the court found the proffered testimony was akin to a medical necessity defense, which is not a proper defense to possession of -28- marijuana with intent to distribute, the charge at issue in this case. Finally, the court found the testimony was irrelevant and collateral to the issues at trial and therefore would confuse and distract the jury. Upon this finding, the court excluded the testimony pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403. On appeal, Mr. Allerheiligen asserts the court’s finding that the testimony was offered as a justification or medical necessity defense was in error. He maintains the testimony was not offered to prove justification or to negate intent, but rather solely to prove he only grew a few marijuana plants for personal use, not distribution. Moreover, the testimony was relevant because it was offered to bolster the credibility of Mr. Allerheiligen’s statements to KBI agents during the search of his property that he only grew a few marijuana plants for personal use. As explained in the previous section, we review the exclusion of expert testimony for abuse of discretion and we will not overturn the court’s decision unless it is manifestly erroneous. See General Elec. Co. , 522 U.S. at 142; Diaz , 189 F.3d at 1246. Without deciding whether all of the court’s reasons for excluding the proffered testimony were proper, we affirm the court’s decision to exclude the testimony pursuant to Rule 403. Under Rule 403, “relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by -29- considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. At the hearing on the government’s motion to exclude testimony on Mr. Allerheiligen’s psychiatric condition and medical history, defense counsel proffered the following testimony: [Mr. Allerheiligen] has a medical condition that causes chronic pain since the late 60s. [He] tried various prescription medications. [He] has a psychiatric/psychological problem that does not amount to the size of a problem as a bipolar disorder, but it causes extreme hyperactivity and periods of depression similar to what we would call manic depression . . . . He’s had it since birth. . . . And only recently [Dr. Twemlow] has confirmed through his treatment and care of [Mr. Allerheiligen] that that disorder exists. [Mr. Allerheiligen] is currently on enough medication to shock almost anybody. . . . It maintains him at a level of functioning that allows him to participate on a day-to-day basis with his wife and his family and society. That is the type of testimony we anticipate out of [Dr. Schlotterback] and [Dr. Twemlow]. This is not a new problem. It’s a longstanding problem. It’s a problem, which for almost 30 years he monitored and treated himself with marijuana. He has readily admitted that. That’s never been an issue in this case. App. vol. V, at 54-55. The probative value of the proffered testimony on Mr. Allerheiligen’s psychiatric condition and medical history was minimal at best. Establishing Mr. Allerheiligen is a chronic user of marijuana is only marginally relevant to -30- whether he intended to distribute the large quantity of marijuana found on his property. Further, the minimal probative value of this testimony is substantially outweighed by the likelihood it would inject collateral issues at trial that would confuse and mislead the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Regardless of Mr. Allerheiligen’s true purpose for this testimony, psychiatric evidence (1) will only rarely negate specific intent, (2) presents an inherent danger that it will distract the jury from focusing on the actual presence or absence of mens rea, and (3) may easily slide into wider usage that opens up the jury to theories of defense more akin to justification, [therefore,] district courts must examine such psychiatric evidence carefully to ascertain whether it would, if believed, support a legally acceptable theory of lack of mens rea. United States v. Cameron , 907 F.2d 1051, 1067 (11th Cir.1990) (internal quotations and citations omitted) . Moreover, Mr. Allerheiligen had acknowledged throughout that he is a chronic marijuana user and had already admitted to growing at least some of the marijuana on his property for personal use. As defense counsel conceded, Mr. Allerheiligen’s personal use of marijuana has “never been an issue in this case.” App. vol. V, at 55. Thus, the proffered testimony was also partly cumulative. Accordingly, the district court’s exclusion of the proffered psychiatric and medical history testimony under Rule 403 was not an abuse of discretion. -31- E. Evidence the Government Seized but Allegedly Failed to Preserve The presentence report attributed 1,346 marijuana plants to Mr. Allerheiligen. See App. vol. VIII, at 14, ¶ 44. Mr. Allerheiligen alleges the government only seized a representative sample of these plants and failed to seize, preserve, or record any of the peat pots on the plants. Although Mr. Allerheiligen has framed the issue on appeal as whether “the district court abused its discretion in denying [his] motion to exclude testimony about evidence the government had seized but not preserved,” his entire argument is evidently dedicated to the legal proposition that the government’s alleged failure to preserve exculpatory evidence, i.e., the marijuana plants and the peat pots, denied him due process. After reviewing the record, we conclude Mr. Allerheiligen never presented this argument to the district court. The motion Mr. Allerheiligen submitted to the district court was entitled “Motion In Limine To Exclude Testimony About Evidence Which Has Not Been Preserved And To Prohibit Any Testimony Regarding Opinions Based On Scientific, Technical, Or Other Specialized Knowledge.” App. vol. III, at 1. Within this motion, Mr. Allerheiligen argued that because the government did not designate any witnesses as experts on its witness list, the witnesses should be prohibited from testimony based on scientific, technical or specialized knowledge under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. He asserted that, as a result of the -32- government’s failure to designate any of the witnesses as experts, the proposed witnesses should be limited to testimony based on perception only, as opposed to opinion, as required under Rule 701. Accordingly, he argued, no witnesses should be allowed to speculate as to the number of cultivated marijuana plants or peat pots present on Mr. Allerheiligen’s property during the seizure that were not videotaped, photographed, recorded or otherwise preserved. Although the motion contains a citation to California v. Trombetta , 467 U.S. 479 (1984), which outlines the standard for determining when the government’s failure to preserve, or destruction of, evidence violates due process, it is cited for the more general proposition that “[t]he government has a duty to preserve all evidence that is expected to play a significant role in a suspect’s defense.” App. vol III, at 3. The motion makes no allegation of a due process violation, nor does it attempt to argue the elements of the Trombetta test. More importantly, Mr. Allerheiligen never alleged in his motion that the government failed to preserve or destroyed exculpatory evidence, which is the sole focus of Mr. Allerheiligen’s argument on appeal. The district court’s order lends support to our construction of Mr. Allerheiligen’s motion. In denying the motion, the court explained: After establishing to the court’s satisfaction that a witness can offer an opinion as a lay witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, witnesses may testify to their relevant observations, upon proper foundation, whether contained -33- in a report or not. If an agent offers testimony not contained in a report, this may be inquired into on crossexamination to challenge the credibility of the statement. This goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. App. vol. III at 147 (Order, Nov. 19, 1998). The court made no mention of Mr. Allerheiligen’s current due process argument and did not discuss or cite to any cases regarding such. Because Mr. Allerheiligen failed to raise his due process argument to the district court, our review is limited to plain error. See United States v. Orr , 864 F.2d 1505, 1508 (10th Cir. 1988) (“On appeal we will only consider the specific ground of the evidentiary objection in the trial court, unless the ground not raised constitutes plain error resulting in manifest injustice.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Goulah v. Ford Motor Company , 118 F.3d 1478, 1483 (11th Cir. 1997) (“An objection on one ground will not preserve an error for appeal on other grounds.”). Plain error is that which affects substantial rights and undermines the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997). The plain error doctrine is to be “‘used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.’” United States v. Oberle , 136 F.3d 1414, 1422 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Frady , 456 U.S. 152, 163 n. 14 (1982)). Mr. Allerheiligen cannot establish plain error occurred here. -34- Specifically, Mr. Allerheiligen takes issue with the government’s failure to preserve the peat pots. He argues, “[h]ad [the government] seized all of the marijuana plants with peat pots, it would have either supported [his] claim that he only planted 12-15 plants, or disproved such a claim.” Aplt’s Br. at 27. However, to establish a violation of § 841(a)(1), the government did not need to prove Mr. Allerheiligen actually planted the marijuana, only that he possessed it with the intent to distribute. See United States v. Silver , 84 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (10th Cir. 1996); App. vol. V, at 41 (defense attorney acknowledging Mr. Allerheiligen “[didn’t] have to grow [the marijuana] in order to possess it with the intent to distribute”). Moreover, the existence or lack of peat pots was not necessary to attribute the marijuana plants to Mr. Allerheiligen for purposes of sentencing. As stated previously, the presentence report concluded Mr. Allerheiligen “had adopted [the wild] marihuana plants as his own and cared for them as he did the plants that he personally planted,” and, therefore, considered those plants in determining his base offense level. App. vol. VIII, at 13, ¶ 37. Thus, the peat pot evidence was only potentially exculpatory. When potentially exculpatory evidence has not been preserved, in order to establish a due process violation, the defendant must show the government acted in bad faith. See United States v. Gomez , 191 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Arizona v. Youngblood , 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)). Here, Mr. Allerheiligen -35- alleges “the Kansas and federal authorities were well aware of the importance of the number of plants seized,” and “the methodology used to count the plants . . . was unclear and uncertain.” Aplt. Br. at 29. He further argues the government’s explanation for failing to preserve all of the marijuana plants including the peat pots, namely, lack of storage space and difficulty in pulling each plant, evinces bad faith. We are not convinced that this evidence alone is sufficient to establish the government acted in bad faith. See United States v. Deaner , 1 F.3d 192, 201 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that even though the government destroyed seized marijuana because of limited storage space instead of retaining a representative sample as required by statute, the defendant could not establish bad faith); United States v. Beldon , 957 F.2d 671, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding the government did not act in bad faith where officers pulled marijuana plants from their pots or cut them above the roots, and failed to preserve the root systems because it was routine police practice and there was a lack of storage space); see, e.g. , Gomez , 191 F.3d at 1219 (no due process violation where the defendant could not show the police destroyed marijuana in bad faith). Because Mr. Allerheiligen cannot establish the KBI acted in bad faith in failing to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, his due process claim fails. Accordingly, he cannot establish plain error. -36- F. Plea Agreement Mr. Allerheiligen challenges his sentence, alleging the government breached the plea agreement. “Whether government conduct has violated a plea agreement is a question of law . . . we review de novo.” United States v. Hawley , 93 F.3d 682, 690 (10th Cir. 1996). Plea bargains are governed by contract principles, and if any ambiguities are present, they will be resolved against the drafter. See id. The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying facts establishing the prosecution’s breach of the plea agreement. See Cunningham v. Diesslin , 92 F.3d 1054, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996). Because Mr. Allerheiligen asserts the government breached the plea agreement for the first time on appeal, however, our review is limited to plain error. See United States v. Peterson , No. 99-2042, 2000 WL 725478,  (10th Cir. June 6, 2000). Pursuant to the plea agreement the government agreed not to oppose a contested sentencing, thereby allowing Mr. Allerheiligen to rebut the number of marijuana plants the presentence report attributed to him for purposes of calculating his offense level. The government also agreed not to oppose application of the safety valve provisions. Mr. Allerheiligen contends that during a chambers meeting prior to sentencing, the government “sided with the court” when the court announced to -37- both parties’ counsel that it would not be inclined to apply the safety valve if Mr. Allerheiligen contested the number of marijuana plants at sentencing. Aplt. Br. at 30. Mr. Allerheiligen asserts this constituted a breach of the government’s agreement not to oppose a contested sentencing on the number of plants attributable to him. Following the in-chambers meeting, Mr. Allerheiligen filed a “Motion To Reconsider Rulings Made In Chambers With Regard To Sentencing Issues.” App. vol. 3 at 156. Although Mr. Allerheiligen did not argue within this motion that the government breached the plea agreement, the motion did present the district court with the factual issue of what occurred during the in chambers meeting. In its order denying Mr. Allerheiligen’s motion to reconsider, the district court made the following findings with respect to what occurred during the inchambers meeting: The conversation in chambers prior to sentencing was held primarily for the defendant’s benefit. The court made no rulings in chambers, but merely indicated to counsel for both sides that the court was inclined to apply the safety valve provision to this case. The court further indicated to counsel that the court did not believe defendant would be eligible for the safety valve provision if defendant continued to argue his objections with regard to the number of marijuana plants because he would no longer meet the fifth requirement for application of the safety valve by truthfully providing to the government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense. See USSG §5C1.2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). This belief was based not only upon the court’s review of the KBI videotape of the counting of -38- the marijuana plants, but also on the court’s review of [inconsistent] statements provided by the defendant prior to sentencing. App. vol. III, at 185-86 (Order, dated May 6, 1999). The court then concluded: Upon review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing, the court finds that defense counsel never argued to the court that defendant should be allowed to contest the number of plants and still be eligible for the safety valve. Defendant’s counsel also did not voice any objection, either in chambers or during the sentencing hearing, with respect to the court’s view of the applicability of the safety valve. Therefore, the defendant did not make any kind of record regarding the applicability of the safety valve if he contested the number of plants. If the defendant believed that he should be allowed to contest the number of plants and still remain eligible for the safety valve, then he should have raised that argument with the court so that it could be addressed on the record. Id. at 186-87. There is nothing in the record that would permit us to review the court’s findings with respect to what occurred during the in chambers meeting, or Mr. Allerheiligen’s contention that the government breached its agreement through statements made therein. Mr. Allerheiligen did not request that the conversation in chambers be placed on the record, nor did counsel attempt to make any sort of record once the court was in session for the sentencing hearing. Where the evidentiary record is insufficient to permit assessment of an appellant’s claims of error we must affirm. See Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co. , 969 F.2d 977, 979-80 (10th Cir. 1992); see also 10th Cir. R. 10.3(B) (“When the party asserting an -39- issue fails to provide a record sufficient for considering that issue, the court may decline to consider it.”).