Opinion ID: 1138617
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Heading: architects and builders statute of repose

Text: The Utah architects and builders statute of repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5, was enacted in 1967. It provides that actions for personal injury, property damage, and wrongful death against construction professionals must be brought within seven years after the completion of construction, irrespective of when the cause of action arises. Section 78-12-25.5 (1977) provides in pertinent part: Injury due to defective design or construction of improvement to real property within seven years.  No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for an injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to real property more than seven years after the completion of construction. ... . The limitation imposed by this provision shall not apply to any person in actual possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring an action. Historically, the liability of architects, engineers, and other members of the building industry for injuries arising from building defects was limited. English courts required privity of contract to impose liability on a contractor. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng.Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). See generally 3 F. Harper, F. James, O. Gray, The Law of Torts § 18.5 (2d ed. 1986); Heller, The District of Columbia's Architects' and Builders' Statute of Repose: Its Application and Need For Amendment, 34 Cath.U.L.Rev. 919, 923 (1985) [hereinafter Heller]. Early American courts followed the English precedent. See 3 F. Harper, F. James, O. Gray, supra, at 706-07; Heller at 923. Thus, an architect's or builder's liability for defective or negligent design was limited to persons who built a building or caused work to be done on a structure; third persons injured as a result of an architect's or builder's negligent acts had no cause of action against the architect or builder. Under the completed and accepted doctrine, a builder was not liable for negligence once the building was completed and accepted by the owner. See, e.g., Ford v. Sturgis, 56 App.D.C. 361, 14 F.2d 253 (1926). See generally Heller at 924. In 1916, the landmark decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), struck down many years of precedent and abolished the privity requirement in products liability cases. The ripple effect of the MacPherson rule was not applied immediately to actions against builders and architects; however, in 1956, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Hanna v. Fletcher, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 310, 231 F.2d 469, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989, 76 S.Ct. 1051, 100 L.Ed. 1501 (1956), relying upon MacPherson, abandoned the privity requirement in an action against a building contractor. One year later, the New York Court of Appeals in Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957), applied the MacPherson rule and eliminated the privity requirement in actions against architects, even though the court held that the architect in that case was not liable because the defect was not latent. Other courts followed. See, e.g., Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App.2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133, 134-35 (1963); Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 Ill. App.2d 153, 161-63, 222 N.E.2d 584, 588-89 (1966). In response to these and subsequent cases abolishing the privity requirement for architects, engineers, and builders, the construction industry, through the American Institute of Architects, the National Society of Professional Engineers, and the Associated General Contractors, responded with an extensive lobbying campaign to enact legislation limiting the duration of liability of construction professionals. [2] See Comment, Recent Statutory Developments Concerning the Limitations of Actions Against Architects, Engineers, and Builders, 60 Ky.L.J. 462, 464 (1972). Within approximately two years, 1965-1967, thirty jurisdictions enacted similar statutes or amended existing statutes to limit the duration of liability of architects, engineers, and builders. Id. at 464 n. 10. Eventually, forty-six states adopted some sort of limitation. Comment, Oklahoma's Statute of Repose Limiting The Liability of Architects and Engineers for Negligence: A Potential Nightmare, 22 Tulsa L.J. 85, 88 & n. 26 (1986). Although these statutes differ in various respects, including the time within which actions must be commenced, they are similar in that the time within which an action must be filed begins from some date associated with the completion of construction, id. at 88-90, not from the time of an injury. Thus, the Utah statute is a statute of repose, and not a statute of limitations, because it bars all actions against planners, designers, and builders of improvements to real property for injuries occurring after seven years from the date of construction, as well as actions based on injuries occurring within the seven-year period if no action is filed within that period. See Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985).