Opinion ID: 1286835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Viable underlying claim issue

Text: Day also contends that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the viability of his underlying claims against the state and county public defenders' offices. Day conceded that no viable claim existed against the police department for false arrest or against the prosecutor for misconduct, but he maintained that he still had claims akin to malicious prosecution against the state and county public defenders' offices pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a case like this, Day must satisfy two elements. First, Day must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. This element was satisfied when the district judge dismissed with prejudice all criminal charges pending against Day. Second, Day must prove that the defendants' representation of him during his unlawful imprisonment violated Day's constitutional rights and that defendants were acting under color of state law. The determination of whether a public defender acts under color of state law depends on the nature and context of the function he is performing. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 54, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2356, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992). [A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981). However, a public defender may act under color of state law while performing certain administrative, and possibly investigative, functions. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 54, 112 S.Ct. at 2356 (citing Polk, 454 U.S. at 325, 102 S.Ct. at 453-54); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 & n. 33, 96 S.Ct. 984, 994-96 & n. 33, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1975) (discussing line that separates administrative and investigative functions from those of an advocate); see, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980) (public defender acted under color of state law when making hiring and firing decision on behalf of the state). Zubel does not dispute that the state and county public defenders' offices violated Day's constitutional rights; however, he argues that the state and county public defenders' offices were not acting under color of state law when the violations occurred and therefore no viable cause of action under § 1983 existed. Our analysis is therefore restricted to determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the state and county public defenders' offices acted under color of state law when the alleged violations occurred. In support of his contention that the state and county public defenders' actions were traditional lawyer functions and therefore not conducted under color of state law, Zubel cites Franklin v. Oregon, State Welfare Division, 662 F.2d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir.1981), a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision that concluded that a delay in filing an appeal was not an action under color of state law. In further support, Zubel states that a public defender's decision not to file a frivolous suit is within the scope of traditional lawyer functions. See Polk, 454 U.S. at 312, 102 S.Ct. at 446-47. Zubel argued that Polk is directly on point because the allegation raised in that casethat the public defender injured the appellant while acting pursuant to administrative rules and procedures for handling criminal appealsis identical to the allegation raised in Day's underlying claim. We conclude that these cases cited by Zubel are not dispositive because in both cases the individual attorney made a unilateral decision either to delay or to not file an appeal on behalf of his/her client after the case had been assigned to the attorney, whereas in the instant case, no attorney was apparently even assigned to the habeas corpus proceedings. The district judge said that there was no question in his mind that the actions of the public defender, and any actions of a prosecutor, were traditional lawyer functions. We disagree. We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the state and county public defenders' actions of (1) failing to assign personnel to handle Day's writ petition and (2) losing the writ petition were administrative functions or traditional lawyer functions. Therefore, summary judgment was improperly granted on this issue, and we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.