Opinion ID: 778774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misinterpretation of Law

Text: 33 I have two serious disagreements with the legal analysis and reasoning of the en banc majority. First of all, the en banc majority states as a matter of established law that in order to qualify as existing, a rule must be dictated by Supreme Court precedent, not Circuit Court precedent. Majority op. at p. 592. In support of this legal principle, the en banc majority cites Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), and, specifically, the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in that case. I note, however, that no other Justice on the Supreme Court joined in Justice Thomas' concurring opinion; and, while Justice Thomas' soliloquy on the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution is academically accurate, the issue that he discusses had absolutely no applicability to the decision making of the majority opinion in Fretwell. Furthermore, Justice Thomas' concurring opinion does not speak at all to the issue for which the en banc majority cites it, i.e. that only Supreme Court precedent (and not Circuit Court precedent) can be used in determining what is existing precedent in applying the Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), anti-retroactivity rule. Even the majority opinion in Lockhart v. Fretwell does not address the issue for which the en banc majority cites it. To the contrary, the majority opinion in Fretwell points out: The new rule principle, therefore, validates reasonable good faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372-73, 113 S.Ct. 838 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990)). Note that the term existing precedents is not qualified as the en banc majority obviously wishes it were by the phrase of the Supreme Court. 34 And this quotation from Fretwell brings up the second major dispute I have with the en banc majority's legal analysis. Towards the end of its opinion, the en banc majority states: Because the rules in Nash, Cherry, and Wainwright prohibiting deceptive clarifying questions have never been dictated by the Supreme Court, we do not believe a state court at the time Soffar's conviction became final would have felt compelled to follow the holding of these cases. 1 Obviously, the en banc majority did not conduct a very thorough survey of the legal landscape at the time Soffar's conviction became final in October 1989. The en banc majority clearly missed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' en banc decision in Russell v. State of Texas, 727 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). In Russell, the Court of Criminal Appeals expressly reviewed and discussed the Fifth Circuit's holdings in Nash and Wainwright and recognized the following rule, which it acknowledged had been applied by several of the courts of appeals in Texas: 35 When an accused's desires are related in an equivocal manner, the interrogating officers are not required to automatically cease the interview. Instead, they are allowed to continue questioning; however, the questions must be specifically aimed at discovering the accused's true desire. Further, any interrogating officer may not use the guise of clarification in order to coerce or intimidate the accused into making a statement. Nor may it be used to elicit further information about the event in question. (Emphasis added.) 36 Russell, 727 S.W.2d at 577. Later, in this same opinion, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated: 37 In the instant case appellant never vocalized a desire to have counsel present. He merely sought opinions as to the necessity of having counsel present. Given the fact that appellant's comments were clearly aimed at the necessity of having counsel present during interrogation, we will give him the benefit of the doubt. Thus, when appellant inquired of the interrogating officers whether they thought it necessary to have counsel present, the officers were under a duty to clarify appellant's desires if they wanted to continue the interrogation. 38 Id. at 578 (citations omitted). Consequently, in my view, there is no need to speculate (as the en banc majority seems want to do) about whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals would have felt compelled to follow the holdings of these cases. Rather, the Texas courts did in fact adopt the holdings in Nash and Wainwright. 39 Finally, the en banc majority asserts the proposition that the holdings of Nash, Wainwright, and Cherry that all questioning following an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel [should] be limited to clarifying questions was overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). 2 The Supreme Court in Davis clearly recognized that in granting certiorari in that case it was doing so in order to decide how law enforcement officers should respond when a suspect makes a reference to counsel that is insufficiently clear to invoke the Edwards prohibition on further questioning; and it recognized that the Court had twice previously noted the varying approaches of the lower courts and that the Court was granting certiorari in order to address the issue on the merits. I agree with the en banc majority that from and after the date of the Davis opinion, i.e. June 24, 1994, the Davis opinion would be deemed to have overruled the portions of Nash, Wainwright, and Cherry which would have required clarifying questions when the suspect makes an ambiguous reference to the need for a lawyer. But Davis really does not speak to the question of what happens if the interrogating officer does get into a dialogue with the suspect (as occurred here in Soffar ) nor whether the interrogating officer can utilize that dialogue to persuade, trick, or cajole the suspect into waiving his Miranda rights (as happened here in Soffar ).