Opinion ID: 2234232
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inflaming the Passions and Prejudices of the Jury and Disparaging Defense Counsel

Text: McDaniel asserts that the prosecutor inflamed the jury by attempting to make this trial about gangs, rather than whether McDaniel committed the charged offense. Specifically, McDaniel argues that the prosecutor improperly used a theme of arrogance throughout the trial to describe gang behavior, and to discuss an incident that occurred during the trial when Willie Watkins, a close friend of McDaniel's and a member of the One-Nines, entered the courtroom to display a trigger finger while State witness Paris Patton testified. This was not improper conduct by the prosecutor. The prosecutor referred to the incident as an example of gang intimidation only, without deflecting responsibility onto McDaniel, and the court took several measures, including providing the jury with a cautionary instruction, to ensure that no prejudice to the defendant ensued. McDaniel also alleges that the prosecutor repeatedly disparaged defense counsel and his role in the proceedings. In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated: There's a reason why attorneys' arguments, closing arguments, opening statements, questions and so forth are not evidence and cannot be considered by you as evidence. Because the attorneys will, oftentimes like to manipulate the evidence, make it what it isn'thoping hopes that you don't recall the evidence that was presented and then misrepresent the evidence to you and ask you to rely on their representations of the evidence as if that's the truth. There's a reason why arguments aren't evidence and that is because, one of the reasons is because when the evidence that comes from the witness stand if it doesn't fit and an attorney stands up and gives you an explanation when that question waswhen the opportunity for introducing that evidence was offered and passed by, it gives them the advantage by filling in the blanks for you in their own words when their clients can't do it for themselves. In addition, referencing defense counsel's failure to ask a witness a particular question, the prosecutor stated: Do you remember any question like that? Well that's because it's not true and counsel knows it's not true and misrepresents that to you. McDaniel argues that the comments qualified as disparagement because they suggest that the jury can't consider what a defense attorney [says] as evidence. . . because they manipulate and lie on behalf of their clients. A prosecutor has special responsibilities as a representative of the people. Specifically, [i]n final argument to the jury, a prosecutor is governed by a unique set of rules which differ significantly from those governing counsel in civil suits, and even from those governing defense counsel in the very same criminal trial. These special rules follow directly from the prosecutor's inherently unique role in the criminal justice system, which mandates that the prosecutor not act as a zealous advocate for criminal punishment, but as the representative of the people in an effort to seek justice. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d at 606. Prosecutors must avoid inflaming the jury's passions and prejudices against defendants. State v. Bailey, 677 N.W.2d 380, 404 (Minn. 2004). Although a prosecutor can argue that a particular defense has no merit, a prosecutor may not belittle the defense, either in the abstract or by suggesting that the defense was raised because it was the only defense that might succeed. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 108 (citing State v. Griese, 565 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn.1997)). We have generally found prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct only in extreme circumstances, and not when a prosecutor's comments are merely likely to confuse. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 363-64 (Minn.1995) (finding misconduct where the prosecutor told the jury that they would be suckers if they believed a defense witness and would need a sedative if they acquitted the defendant); State v. Montjoy, 366 N.W.2d 103, 108-09 (Minn.1985) (concluding that misconduct occurred when the prosecutor repeatedly asked the jury to teach the defendant a lesson and stated that a defendant's rights end when he commits a crime). The prosecutor's comments here crossed the line between questioning opposing counsel's substantive arguments and questioning his personal credibility. Although the prosecutor initially seemed to have confined his comments to attorneys generally to justify why opening statements and closing arguments are not considered evidence, he transformed the argument into a personal attack when he accused defense counsel of misrepresenting the truth. Although the district court did not find prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct, it concluded that the prosecutor's statements in this regard were overly aggressive and an ad hominem attack. Here, although the prosecutor's closing argument was disparaging and improper, we conclude that the misconduct did not play a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict, even under the more stringent Caron standard for serious, objected-to prosecutorial misconduct. See Caron, 300 Minn. at 128, 218 N.W.2d at 200. There was ample evidence that supported McDaniel's conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder, and the misconduct was sporadic, minimal, and rectified by the court's constant admonition that arguments or statements by the lawyers are not evidence. We conclude that the prosecutor's misconduct did not have sufficient impact on the outcome of the case to require reversal.