Opinion ID: 1231260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Initial Search.

Text: Because the initial search, which revealed the gun, weighs heavily on the question of voluntariness of the later consent, we will first address the validity of that search. Our court has stated the principles which apply to warrantless searches: While the fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they come within a few jealously and carefully drawn exceptions. The burden is upon those seeking to apply the exceptions to prove their applicability by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Bakker, 262 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Iowa 1978). Courts have generally recognized three exceptions to this rule: No warrant is necessary when the search and seizure, within prescribed limits, are incident to a lawful arrest; the warrant requirement may be waived by an informed and voluntary consent; and, third, existence of exigent circumstances may relieve an officer from the obligation to obtain a warrant if it is impracticable to do so. State v. Shane, 255 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa 1977) (quoting State v. Jackson, 210 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Iowa 1973)); see also Myer, 441 N.W.2d at 765. The State has made no claims of any consent or exigent circumstances as to the search of the car. The legality of the search, therefore, depends upon the first exception, the search incident to arrest. The Supreme Court, in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 775 (1981), held that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. Our court adopted the Belton rule in State v. Sanders, 312 N.W.2d 534, 539 (Iowa 1981). The initial question here, therefore, is whether the arrest was lawful. In State v. Reese, 259 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1977), we stated: In order for the State to establish the officers had reasonable grounds to conduct an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the grounds are questioned, the State must show the officers possessed objective facts that indicate ... the stopping officer has specific and articulable cause to reasonably believe criminal activity is afoot. Circumstances evoking mere suspicion or curiosity will not suffice. Id. at 795 (quoting State v. Dixon, 241 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Iowa 1976)). The court of appeals held that the arrest of Garcia was pretextual. [A] pretextual arrest occurs when the police employ an arrest based on probable cause as a device to investigate or search for evidence of an unrelated offense for which probable cause is lacking. United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir.1989); see also United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir.1988). In such a case, the arrest serves as a means to circumvent the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment. Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1039. Courts have differed in their approach to the problem of pretextual arrests. The traditional response to this police tactic has been to suppress all evidence derived from the search incident to the pretextual arrest. Id. Due to recent Supreme Court cases, however, many courts are examining arrests objectively. In fact, many courts will uphold a search incident to a traffic arrest in the face of clear evidence of an ulterior motive. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.2, at 460 (2d ed. 1987). In a recent decision, the Seventh Circuit reviewed Supreme Court decisions relevant to the issue of pretextual arrests. The court concluded: Given this language in a Supreme Court opinion [ Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973)], we, as an intermediate appellate court, do not feel empowered to evaluate the reasonableness of a particular arrest based on the arrest's conformance to usual police practices. Rather, we believe that the reasonableness of an arrest depends upon the existence of two objective factors. First, did the arresting officer have probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense. Second, was the arresting officer authorized by state and or municipal law to effect a custodial arrest for the particular offense. If these two factors are present, we believe that an arrest is necessarily reasonable under the fourth amendment. This proposition may be stated in another way: so long as the police are doing no more than they are legally permitted and objectively authorized to do, an arrest is constitutional. Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1041; see also United States v. Neu, 879 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir.1989) (subjective intent of the officer is not material); Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515 (Most circuits and commentators agree that an objective analysis of the facts and circumstances of a pretextual stop is appropriate, rather than an inquiry into the officer's subjective intent.); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1185 (5th Cir.1987) (in a case where the officers have taken no action except what the law objectively allows their subjective motives in doing so are not even relevant to the suppression inquiry); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708-09 (11th Cir.1986) (objectively reasonable stop or other seizure is not invalid solely because the officer acted out of improper motivation). The court of appeals relied on State v. Aschenbrenner, 289 N.W.2d 618, 619 (Iowa 1980), to show our court has adopted a subjective test: Officers are bound by their true reason for making the stop. They may not rely on reasons they could have had but did not actually have. See State v. Bailey, 452 N.W.2d 181, 182 (Iowa 1990) (same). Even applying this subjective standard, the arrest was proper because the officers did have a proper, albeit a secondary, reason for the stop. Officers may have multiple reasons for making a stop: The officer is bound by the true reason or reasons for making the stop; that is, the officer may not rely on reasons that he or she could have had but did not actually have. Westendorf v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 400 N.W.2d 553, 556 (Iowa 1987) (quoting State v. Lamp, 322 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Iowa 1982)) (emphasis added). Officer LeMar testified of multiple purposes for making the stop: Q. Officer LeMar, what was your real purpose in having Mr. Garcia stopped for no driver's license? A. The no driver's license is a violation of the law. And I also had a very strong suspicion that he was dealing in narcotics. Because the officers had grounds to stop the car and make the arrest because of Garcia's failure to have a valid driver's license, we believe the search which was incidental to the arrest was also proper. This removes the poison from the tree under Wong Sun and eliminates the basic premise of Garcia's argument that his later consent to search was invalid.