Opinion ID: 2049366
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: THE MacDONALD INDICTMENT.

Text: Norman P. MacDonald (defendant) was found guilty under an indictment charging a violation of G.L.c. 269, § 10, which reads in material part: Whoever ... carries ... under his control in a vehicle, a firearm, ... loaded or unloaded, ... shall be punished by imprisonment.... The defendant has appealed pursuant to G.L.c. 278, §§ 33A-33G, and assigns as error the denials of his motions to suppress, for a directed verdict, and for a severance. Various questions relating to rulings on evidence and the judge's instructions have also been raised. The defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied. The evidence introduced at the pre-trial hearing in its aspect most favorable to the Commonwealth was as follows: The defendant visited an apartment at 47A Tufts Street, Somerville, at about 1 P.M. on May 21, 1963. He was in the company of James F. Meara and Arthur A. Fancy, two of the six defendants at the trial. When he arrived, he parked his car on the right hand side of Tufts Street, outside Meara's house. Officer Gleason arrested MacDonald at the apartment approximately one-half hour later. At about 4 P.M. that same day, Officer Powers saw the defendant's motor vehicle, a Buick, parked on Tufts Street. The car was locked and no attempt to open it was made. Powers at that time did not have a search warrant. On the following day, Officer Powers went to Vitt's Garage on Somerville Avenue, where the car had been taken. The car was opened with the defendant's keys and four police officers searched the interior, including the trunk. A revolver with two cartridges in it was found under the driver's seat. On a motion to suppress the burden of establishing that evidence has been illegally obtained is on the moving party. Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317 (9th Cir.). Addison v. United States, 317 F.2d 808, 812 (5th Cir.), cert. den. 376 U.S. 905. Murray v. United States, 333 F.2d 409 (10th Cir.). See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338. Here the defendant failed to introduce evidence indicating that the search was not made pursuant to a valid warrant. Indeed, it appeared at a voir dire conducted during the subsequent trial that a search warrant had been secured. The judge conducting the pre-trial hearing to suppress seems to have assumed, as he could have, that the search of the automobile was made pursuant to a warrant and he denied the motion on the ground that the defendant had not sustained his burden of proving that the warrant was invalid. There was no error. The defendant contends, however, that there is no authority under our law to search a motor vehicle. He relies on the absence of a specific reference to motor vehicles in G.L.c. 276, § 1 (as amended through St. 1947, c. 93), which refers only to a particular house or place and the fact that a subsequent amendment, St. 1963, c. 96, § 1 (enacted after the search), expressly included motor vehicles. [1b] We disagree. Use of the word place in the statute calls for a broad construction. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 142 Mass. 573, 574-575, where, under a statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor in any building or place ... within four hundred feet of ... a public school the term place was construed to include a tent, booth, excavation in the ground, or something similar. In Commonwealth v. Berwick, 346 Mass. 5, although the point was not singled out for discussion, it was impliedly held that a warrant to search a motor vehicle could be issued under a similar statute. The statute in that case (G.L.c. 271, § 23) authorized the issuance of warrants to search or seize gaming apparatus in a house, building, room or place. It is hardly likely that a legislative policy permitting searches of homes, the citadels of privacy, would not also embrace the search of automobiles. The 1963 amendment which added the words motor vehicle was merely clarifying legislation; it made explicit that which was implied. The defendant also assigns as error the denial of his motion for a directed verdict. We find no error. From the evidence that the revolver with cartridges in its chambers was discovered in the defendant's car, that the locked car was opened with his keys, and his admission that I am the only one that uses that car, the jury could properly infer that he had carried a firearm under his control in a vehicle. There is nothing to the defendant's argument that the Commonwealth never established that the revolver was a firearm. The pistol and cartridges were introduced into evidence. The jury could have found, without the aid of expert testimony, that the gun was capable of discharging a bullet as required by G.L.c. 140, § 121. The instructions to the jury were correct on this point. The judge properly charged ... you may draw your own conclusion from the appearance thereof whether or not it is a firearm, it being an exhibit in the case. The defendant contends that the denial of his motion for a severance with respect to the firearm indictment was reversible error. But the determination in such a case as to whether the defendants' or the Commonwealth's substantial rights will be prejudiced by consolidation or severance for trial rests in the sound discretion of the judge. Commonwealth v. Iannello, 344 Mass. 723, 727. Commonwealth v. Bingham, 158 Mass. 169, 171. Commonwealth v. Seeley, 167 Mass. 163, 166. Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 328. Commonwealth v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441, 459-460, cert. den. sub nom. Millen v. Massachusetts, 295 U.S. 765. The exercise of this discretion is not limited to the situation where a defendant seeks to have a separate trial apart from that of other defendants. It is also within the judge's discretion as to whether a single defendant should be tried for several offences at the same trial. Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 211 Mass. 50, 54. Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 411-412. Commonwealth v. D'Amico, 254 Mass. 512, 514. We cannot say the judge's denial of the defendant's pretrial motion was an abuse of discretion. There were grounds for the conclusion that evidence relevant to the offence of carrying a firearm was related not only to the indictment against MacDonald for receiving stolen property but also to the indictments against the other defendants. The defendant also assigns as error the admission of certain statements made by him while at the police station. [1c] His conduct indicated a consciousness of guilt and an admission that he owned and was in control of the vehicle from which the firearm had been taken. His behavior and replies to questions could hardly, as the defendant argues, be considered unequivocal denials. See Commonwealth v. Gangi, 243 Mass. 341, 345; Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 532. Other grounds have also been advanced for the exclusion of this evidence. One is based on the purported denial of the defendant's rights under the recent case of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478. Another rests on an alleged violation of G.L.c. 276, § 33A, as amended through St. 1960, c. 269. [1d] (See the intimation in Commonwealth v. Bouchard, 347 Mass. 418, 420-421). But there is no basis in the record for these contentions. The fact that the defendant asserted in his motion to strike that ... [the defendant] hadn't been informed of any rights or anything of that nature and has argued these issues does not establish a record upon which these rights, whatever they may be, can be grounded. See People v. Farrara, 46 Cal. (2d) 265, 268-269. There were extended voir dires at the trial as well as at the pre-trial hearings on motions to suppress, at which the defendant was afforded an ample opportunity to lay the foundation for these questions, if he had chosen to do so. Finally, the defendant has argued that the evidence just discussed was tainted by an unreasonable search and seizure. See Commonwealth v. Palladino, 346 Mass. 720, 724. Since, as we have held, the defendant has not sustained his burden of establishing that the search was unlawful, this contention must fail. Judgment affirmed.