Opinion ID: 2068552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioners' Exceptions to Ordinance 04-855 Rendering Their Challenge Moot

Text: Petitioners advance three considerations which, they allege, spare their present challenge from being moot: (1) the parking lot may not be accessory; (2) the parking lot cannot be an accessory use to an unlawful or non-permitted structure; and (3) two other sections of the Zoning Code act as a prohibition against nonpermitted or unauthorized uses of land or erection of structures from becoming permitted or made lawful due to subsequent text amendments to the Zoning Code. We reject Petitioners' considerations for the reasons that follow.
Petitioners assert that [i]t is a fallacy to assume or presume that the parking for... Cresmont [Loft] is `accessory,' and that  [such a] determination cannot be made based on the record of this matter.  (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Petitioners' apparent position is that no determination has been made previously on this record as to whether the parking lot at issue falls under the Zoning Code's definition of accessory. [20] Presumably, Petitioners want us to remand the case for that determination. We decline the invitation. Although Petitioners' argument that the City has not decided this question is not wholly untenable, it is in stark contrast to the intent and wording of Bill 03-1228, as well as the 4 December 2003 staff report of the Baltimore City Planning Commission. The Recitals section of Bill 03-1228 provides: Recitals The applicant, Cresmont Properties LLC, is the owner of 2807 Cresmont Avenue, which is located in the Parking Lot District. The owner has obtained a building permit to construct a 26-unit apartment building on the property that includes a 33-space accessory parking lot, and construction has commenced. By long-standing administrative practice by the City, required accessory parking uses do not require a Parking Lot Ordinance. Certain individuals are, however, contesting the practice in court. To expedite the development of the apartment building, the applicant requests that this Ordinance be granted. (emphasis added). Similarly, the Commission's 4 December staff report stated: The applicants are requesting this conditional use [B]ill because several community residents have taken this project to court regarding the use of an alley, and because they are concerned about this same group challenging them regarding the Parking Lot District provisions in the Zoning Code. The City would not normally require this conditional use ordinance because the parking to be provided is accessory to the apartment building. The applicants simply wish to ensure that they may proceed with their project and are willing to provide the higher level of scrutiny afforded the community in the ordinance process, if that would speed the project's implementation. (emphasis added). The obvious intent of Bill 03-1228, as embodied in the Recitals section of the Bill, was to authorize Cresmont to proceed with its proposed development in accordance with the requirements of the Zoning Code, in particular § 10-201, which required accessory off-street parking to be provided for all newly-erected structures. [21] Before enactment of the change to the definition of parking lot in § 10-501 of the Zoning Code, the City was required by § 10-504 to issue an ordinance approving the use of land as a parking lot in the Parking Lot District  the District in which Cresmont's development is situated. See discussion supra Part I.B. Therefore, implicit in the City Council's understanding of the reason for enacting Bill 03-1228, as declared in the Commission's staff report, was the Council's finding that the parking lot being approved and authenticated by the Bill was accessory to the apartment building being constructed. Nothing in the record presented to this Court suggests that Petitioners challenged Bill 03-1228's applicability to the parking lot at issue here on the ground that the City Council's finding that the parking lot is accessory to the apartment building was erroneous, other than the bald assertions noted here.
Petitioners next assert that Apart from any and all other considerations, in order to constitute a permitted accessory use under § 1-102 of the Zoning [Code] ..., a parking lot must serve a permitted structure or use. There is no such thing as lawful or permitted accessory parking to an unlawful or non-permitted structure or use. Therefore, a threshold question to any determination of whether the parking lot at 2807 Cresmont Avenue is accessory or non-accessory, for purposes of any current or retrospective application of the 2005 text amendment, is the legal status of the structure or use allegedly served by the parking lot. The City has conveniently ignored this threshold question, which is the subject of a separate case. Even if the development at 2807 Cresmont Avenue were to survive the [Petitioners'] Open Meetings Act and Judicial Review challenges to the March 2004 conditional use authorization which facilitated its construction, the legal status of the principal structure and its use has been raised in the [Petitioners'] separate action for judicial review relating to permits issued in 2004. That case is presently before this Court as September 2008, No. 106. In that case, the [Petitioners] rely principally on a provision of the Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance expressly prohibiting the construction and use of a building far more than the number of families permitted under the bulk regulations. The [Petitioners] have diligently and consistently pursued this issue since May of 2004. Now that the separate action has reached this Court, should the permits for the principal structure at 2807 Cresmont Avenue and/or its use be deemed unlawful in that case, the already-constructed parking lot and related structures (fencing, light poles, etc.) would unquestionably constitute a non-accessory parking lot and could not escape the prerequisite of a lawfully granted conditional use authorization. If the parties hereto can agree on nothing else, they should at least agree that non-accessory parking lots in the Parking Lot District require conditional use authorization. (emphasis in original) (citation and footnotes omitted). Petitioners do not offer any authority, in the Zoning Code or other source, in support of this assertion. The short answer to Petitioners' contention is that we ruled against them today in their related, but separate, challenge to the apartment building as violating the Code's prohibition against the construction and use of a building for more than the number of families permitted under the bulk regulations. Armstrong v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 409 Md. 648, 674-681, 976 A.2d 349, 365-69 (2009). The disposition of that case settles before us the only contention pending that attacks the legality of the apartment building on zoning grounds.
Petitioners assert that two sections of the Zoning Code prohibit expressly retrospective application to the Cresmont development of the text amendment enacted under Ordinance 04-855. As this argument proceeds, application of the Baltimore City zoning scheme as it exists does not moot the validity of the authorization to construct the parking lot granted by the City Council through Ordinance 04-659 in March of 2004. The first section of the Zoning Code upon which Petitioners rely is § 1-202. Section 1-202 provides: Nothing in this article may be taken to be a consent, license, or permit to: (1) use any property; (2) locate, erect, or maintain any structure or facility; or (3) carry on any trade, industry, occupation, or activity. Petitioners maintain that under § 1-202, no text amendment to the Zoning [Code] may be judicially determined to serve as, substitute for, or convey any construction or use permit. Second, Petitioners pin their hopes on § 3-306(a). That section [22] provides: (a) Unlawful preexisting uses and structures. Any structure or use that is unlawfully existing: (1) does not become lawful solely by the adoption of this article or any amendment to it; and (2) to any extent or manner that the unlawful structure or use is in conflict with the requirements of this article, that structure or use remains unlawful. Petitioners argue that, by enacting §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a), [23] the City Council made a legislative choice to restrain itself from being able (1) to approve unlawfully a developer's application for a conditional use authorization  here the parking lot ordinance, Ordinance 04-659  to allow construction to commence, and then (2) later amend the zoning text so as to relieve the need for its prior action. This application should be an exception to the Yorkdale rule, so it goes, because the operative effect of these sections is to prevent subsequent text amendments to the Zoning Code from legitimating previously enacted, but unlawful, authorizations to construct developments. [24] The City retorts that Petitioners misinterpret the intention of §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a) of the Zoning Code. With regard to § 1-202, the City contends that its plain meaning is simply that the existence of the Zoning Code, wherein lists of various uses of land are authorized (either as of right or by way of application to the Board or the City Council) does not eliminate the need for the use or structure to be in compliance with all other applicable laws and regulations, including obtaining the proper permits, or, in certain cases, obtaining a license or any other approval made necessary by some other pertinent part of the Baltimore City Code. The City describes that every decision by the Board recites similar language to inform applicants that even if an instant application is approved, the applicant, at a minimum, yet must obtain a permit from the pertinent authority. With regard to § 3-306(a), the City imagines the logical extension of Petitioners' interpretation to mean that any structure or use unlawful at the time of the 1971 recodification of the Zoning Code [25] (or any amendment thereafter) remains unlawful even if the Zoning Code is changed subsequently to permit such a structure or use. Petitioners' interpretation, thus stated, is inconsistent with the legislative choice of the word solely in § 3-306(a)(1), or with § 3-306(a)(2)'s provision that to any extent or manner that the unlawful structure or use is in conflict with the requirements of this article, that structure or use remains unlawful. A more logical reading of solely in subsection (a)(1) and the language of subsection (a)(2), according to the City, is that if a structure or use once prohibited is then made a permitted use, pursuant to a text amendment, the amendment does not otherwise free the structure or use from compliance with other requirements of the Zoning Code. The City illustrates its interpretation of these sections: A hypothetical example of how this might work follows. Assume for the moment that in 1971 retail uses were prohibited in certain districts of the City but that the owner of a property in such a district was nonetheless using the property for retail. Assume also that in 1971 the City Council, as part of its comprehensive rezoning of the City in that year, made retail a permitted use in the hypothetical property's zoning district. Under [Petitioners'] theory of the meaning of § 3-306, the use of the property at issue would remain unlawful notwithstanding the change and the property would be forever locked into the prior zoning scheme. This was surely not the intention of the drafters of the 1971 Zoning Code. After all, when they comprehensively rezoned the City in 1971, they specifically intended that their changes would eliminate the prior zoning scheme. [Petitioners'] theory would contravene that intention. The City's theory of the meaning of [§ 3-306(a)] is that if the hypothetical use independently violated some other provision of the Zoning Code that had not been changed-e.g., setback requirements, floor area ratio, etc.-the use or structure would remain unlawful and would still have to adhere to this other requirement. Viewed in such manner, the City's theory gives specific meaning to the use of the word solely in § 3-306(a)(1) as well as the inclusion of the language in § 3-306(a)(2) as part of the provision. (emphasis in original). We agree with the City's interpretation of §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a) of the Zoning Code. Although we are sympathetic to the Petitioners' position here because Ordinance 04-659, the ordinance pursuant to which the parking lot was constructed actually, later correctly was found to have been enacted in violation of the Maryland Open Meetings Act, Petitioners' interpretation of §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a) is misguided. Use of the word solely in subsection (a)(1) of § 3-306 indicates an intention on the part of the City Council that any change to the Zoning Code that authorizes a structure or use that was not authorized properly under the Code prior to the text change does not otherwise free that use or structure from compliance with any other pertinent requirements of the Code. Subsection (a)(2) affirms this intention by advising expressly that regardless of whether a change in the text of the Code authorizes the use or structure, that use or structure remains unlawful so long as it is in conflict with the other requirements of the Code. Also, § 1-202 simply provides that the text of the Zoning Code does not eliminate the need for the applicant to comply with the other requirements of the Baltimore City Code, including obtaining the proper permits, and any other approvals from the appropriate authorities, as provided in the City Code. [26] Were we to agree with Petitioners' interpretation, any change in the zoning text would not apply to any unlawful preexisting uses or structures to which the change in the text would be applicable. For obvious practical reasons, illustrated in the City's hypothetical, this is a result with which we cannot agree in the face of Yorkdale and Layton. [27]