Opinion ID: 1103049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Albin, 498 So.2d at 173. [17]

Text: Without passing on the propriety of the Albin court's interpretation of the insurance policy involved therein, particularly insofar as the purely emotional injuries it referred to were loss of consortium damages, we expressly decline to extend that interpretation to the type of injuries suffered by Lejeune claimants. We reach this conclusion because the policy's definition of bodily injury is ambiguous and should be construed in favor of coverage [18] and because interpretation of the term bodily injury to include Lejeune damages is reasonable and consistent with the jurisprudence of this court. The definition is ambiguous in at least two respects. First, the definition is circular in that the term being defined is used within its own definition: Bodily injury is bodily injury to a person, and sickness, disease or death which results from it. Secondly, if the definition was intended to cover only external, physical injuries, then bodily injury easily could have been defined in a more restrictive fashion through the use of such words. Moreover, interpretation of the term bodily injury to include Lejeune damages is consistent with the jurisprudence of this court. In Lejeune, 556 So.2d at 570, we made it clear that in order to be compensable, mental pain and anguish suffered because of injury to a third person must be both severe and debilitating. We pointed out that [o]ther states have recognized that `[t]he essence of the tort is the shock caused by the perception of the especially horrendous event.' Id. at 570 n. 11 (quoting Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo.1986)) (emphasis added). Additionally, although not having to do with the interpretation of a policy definition, it is nonetheless instructive to note that in Sparks v. Tulane Medical Center Hospital & Clinic, 546 So.2d 138, 146 (La.1989), we interpreted the phrase physical structure of the body as it is used in the Worker's Compensation Act to include injuries to the mental health of an employee. We observed: An individual's mental health is an essential component to the overall operation of the physical structure of his body.... [T]here is no bright-line distinction between `physical' and `mental' injuries, either in medicine or in law.... Where the language of an insurance policy provision is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, the interpretation which favors coverage must be applied. In this case, it is reasonable to find bodily injury as defined in the policy herein includes severe and debilitating mental pain and anguish such as that suffered by Lejeune claimants. We therefore conclude Mrs. Crabtree's mental anguish constitutes bodily injury as defined in the State Farm policy. (3) Did Mrs. Crabtree suffer her mental anguish in the same accident? For the $50,000 per accident aggregate policy limit to apply, we must find not only that Mrs. Crabtree suffered a bodily injury but also that she suffered that bodily injury in the same accident as that which caused the bodily injury to Mr. Crabtree. State Farm argues Mrs. Crabtree was merely a witness to the accident and not involved in it. We disagree. Mrs. Crabtree saw her husband violently struck and severely injured by an oncoming car. She suffered mental pain and anguish precisely because she witnessed the event which caused the severe injuries to her husband. The same accident which caused Mr. Crabtree's bodily injury also caused Mrs. Crabtree's bodily injury. We conclude Mrs. Crabtree's bodily injury, the mental anguish she suffered when she saw the car strike her husband and when she ran to his side to comfort him, occurred in the same accident as that which caused Mr. Crabtree's bodily injuries. [19]