Opinion ID: 1979745
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Income Imputed for Eight Additional Hours of Work

Text: [¶ 18] Pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, income may be imputed when a person is found to be underemployed, subject to conditions specified in section 2001(5)(D). Paragraph D states in pertinent part: Gross income may include the difference between the amount a party is earning and that party's earning capacity when the party voluntarily becomes or remains unemployed or underemployed, if sufficient evidence is introduced concerning a party's current earning capacity. [¶ 19] The determination of whether a party is voluntarily underemployed is a question of fact that we review for clear error. Cf. Wrenn v. Lewis, 2003 ME 29, ¶ 17, 818 A.2d 1005, 1010. If a parent is voluntarily underemployed, the court's decision to impute income or apply the parent's earning capacity, rather than his or her current income, is discretionary. See Koszegi v. Erickson, 2004 ME 113, ¶ 14, 855 A.2d 1168, 1171; Dep't of Human Servs. v. Frye, 2000 ME 128, ¶ 11, 754 A.2d 1000, 1002-03. [¶ 20] In this record, there is no dispute that Carolan's job is what would be considered full-time employment with benefits. Her employment as a dental assistant properly utilizes her education and experience. She works thirty-three to thirty-five hours per week, and works virtually all of the hours that are available from her employer. Her employer's office is closed on Fridays. Like many other employees in today's economy, she does not work a full forty-hour week. However, a person who works such a schedule is not thereby underemployed as a matter of fact or law for purposes of section 2001(5)(D). A parent who has a full-time job consistent with the parent's education and experience, but who works less than a forty-hour week, is not, thereby subject to having his or her income recalculated to a forty-hour per week equivalent for child support calculation purposes. [¶ 21] Carolan's employment, although a few hours less than a forty-hour week, is consistent with her training and experience, and utilizes all available hours provided by her employer. The finding of voluntary underemployment was a clear error. Therefore, the court abused its discretion by imputing an additional eight hours of income to Carolan when calculating her gross income. [7] The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded for recalculation of child support consistent with this opinion. LEVY, J., dissenting. [¶ 22] I respectfully dissent because the trial court's findings regarding Carolan's imputed income were supported by competent evidence in the record and were not clearly erroneous. A. Income Imputed for Value of Rent Reduction [¶ 23] Carolan testified that her parents charged the previous tenant of her house $1300 per month, but that they charge her $1000 per month. When asked whether she was doing certain things for them to get the rent reduction, she testified that she was doing lots of yard work and was in the process of painting some of the rooms. Carolan also testified that she and her parents never discussed the $300 as a rent reduction, and that it was her own choice to perform services for the home because she intended to buy the home. However, when she was asked, Well, they reduced the rent by three hundred dollars for you, correct? she responded, They charge me a thousand dollars a month. Yes. [¶ 24] The trial court's decision to treat the rent reduction as imputed income was not, as the Court suggests, based on mere speculation about prevailing rental rates, but was instead based on Carolan's testimony that indicated that the rent reduction may be in exchange for her services. The trial court had the opportunity to observe Carolan and judge her credibility, and it reasonably could have inferred from her testimony that she received the rent reduction as part of a tacit agreement to provide home services. See Jenkins, Inc. v. Walsh Bros., Inc., 2002 ME 168, ¶ 7, 810 A.2d 929, 933 (The meaning and weight to be given the exhibits and the testimony of the witnesses is for the fact-finder to determine and must be upheld unless clearly erroneous.); Sturtevant v. Town of Winthrop, 1999 ME 84, ¶ 9, 732 A.2d 264, 267 ([T]he function of an appellate court is not to review a cold transcript and draw its own factual inferences) (quotation marks omitted). The trial court did not commit clear error in treating the $300 rent reduction as imputed income. B. Income Imputed for Value of Health Insurance [¶ 25] I agree with the Court's conclusion that the trial court did not err in imputing the value of Carolan's employer-provided health insurance to her as income because it is an in-kind payment[] received by a party in the course of employment . . . [that] reduce[s] personal living expenses. 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(B) (2006). I write separately on this point to note that there is no requirement that a party prove that, in the absence of the health insurance, the employer would have paid the employee compensation in an amount equal to the value of the benefit provided. We should conclude simply that where, as here, an employee receives employer-paid health insurance as a benefit of employment that reduces personal living expenses, a court has the discretion to consider the value of the same when determining that employee's gross income for purposes of section 2001(5)(B). C. Income Imputed for Additional Hours of Work [¶ 26] Carolan testified that she does not work Fridays because her employer does not have hours on Fridays and she chooses not to work so that she can take her son to and from school in Auburn: I want to spend time with my son. And the time that I'm allotted to spend with him is Thursday evening, Friday, Saturday and Sunday. So I will not get another job while I have my son. She also appeared to concede the possibility that she could find employment [on Fridays] between eight-thirty and three o'clock in Auburn. [¶ 27] Based on the majority's review of the written trial record, it concludes that Carolan's decision to not work on Fridays is reasonable, and that it is not unjust to use her existing earnings to calculate the amount of child support Bell should pay. As an appellate court, we do not review cold transcript[s], Sturtevant, 1999 ME 84, ¶ 9, 732 A.2d at 267, and superimpose our collective assessment of the weight to be given to the witnesses' testimony and the exhibits, and the meaning to be drawn from the evidence as a whole. The majority's approach begs the question of whether the trial court committed clear error when it determined that Carolan was underemployed. Carolan's own testimony establishes that she need only work an additional four to eight hours per week to achieve a forty-hour work week, and it is reasonably possible for her to do so on Fridays, albeit with an employer other than her current employer. [8] Because there was competent evidence from which the trial court could infer that Carolan could readily work additional hours without substantially disrupting her and her son's existing schedules, the court did not commit clear error. [¶ 28] Our standard of appellate review requires that we uphold factual findings if there is any competent evidence in the record to support them. See Wrenn v. Lewis, 2003 ME 29, ¶ 13, 818 A.2d 1005, 1009. We should affirm the judgment.