Opinion ID: 2136353
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The statute is constitutional.

Text: Since 1858 the statute in question has made it illegal for females to have or make an offer to have nonmarital sexual intercourse for a thing of value. This classification has been considered by the Indiana Supreme Court to be a natural and reasonable one in the recent case of Wilson v. State, [7] upholding a similar Indiana statute proscribing prostitution by females. The Indiana court found that the Indiana statute rests upon an inherent and substantial basis of classification. [8] This court has previously held that sex can be a proper classification. [9] The defendant did not meet her burden of showing this classification established by sec. 944.30, Stats., to be unreasonable and the record is completely devoid of any showing to that effect. Neither has defendant demonstrated any discriminatory enforcement as between the citation of females for the violation of sec. 944.30 (1) and the enforcement of similar offenses by male prostitutes under secs. 939.30 and 939.31. By the Court. Orders affirmed. ROBERT W. HANSEN, J. (concurring). In construing Wisconsin laws the applicable statute requires that as to references to gender: Words importing one gender extend and may be applied to any gender. (Sec. 990.001 (2), Stats.) Applying this legislatively mandated rule of construction, the writer would hold the reference in sec. 944.30 to Any female who intentionally does any of the following . . . to extend and to be applied to persons of the male gender as well as to persons of the female gender. It follows that any person, male or female, who . . . [h] as or offers to have nonmarital sexual intercourse for any thing of value . . . commits a crime under sec. 944.30 (1). The challenge to the statute, based on an assumed failure to criminalize male, as well as female, prostitution, fails, ab initio, because both male and female prostitutes are included, not excluded in the reach of the statute. Under sec. 944.30 what is wrong for the goose is also wrong for the gander. For this reason and under this construction of the statute, the writer would concur that the judgment appealed from be affirmed.