Opinion ID: 1729099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: antisocial personality disorder

Text: Morton contends that the trial court erred in failing to find and weigh Morton's antisocial personality disorder as a mitigating circumstance. Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have determined that a defendant's antisocial personality disorder is a valid mitigating circumstance for trial courts to consider and weigh. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 107, 115, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Robinson v. State, 761 So.2d 269, 273 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1057, 120 S.Ct. 1563, 146 L.Ed.2d 466 (2000); Snipes v. State, 733 So.2d 1000, 1003 (Fla.1999); Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 224 (Fla.1998); Wuornos v. State, 676 So.2d 966, 968, 971 (Fla.1995). We have repeatedly stated that [w]henever a reasonable quantum of competent, uncontroverted evidence of mitigation has been presented, the trial court must find that the mitigating circumstance has been proved. Mahn v. State, 714 So.2d 391, 400-01 (Fla.1998) (quoting Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377, 385 (Fla. 1994)); see Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15, 102 S.Ct. 869 (stating that trial courts may determine the weight to be given to relevant mitigating evidence, [b]ut they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration). In the present case, three expert witnesses testified about Morton's mental health and concluded that Morton suffered from an antisocial personality disorder. Doctor Donald Delbeato, a clinical and forensic psychologist, diagnosed Morton as suffering from a mixed personality disorder, including antisocial personality disorder. Doctor Delbeato observed that Morton had a history of acting cruelly towards animals, setting fires, having disciplinary problems in school, and wetting the bed, all which Dr. Delbeato opined were significant signs that a person would develop antisocial behavior. Mimi Pisters, a mental health counselor, also concluded that Morton suffered from an antisocial personality disorder and opined that the disorder was a result of Morton's early childhood experiences, including: (1) Morton's lack of contact with his mother when he was hospitalized for several weeks following a premature birth; (2) the absence of religion in the home; (3) growing up in a family environment filled with fear and violence; (4) frequent moves by the family; (5) difficulties in school; (6) poor overall health; (7) lack of friendships; (8) his mother's failure to enforce house rules and provide discipline; and (9) his mother's guilt-driven need to give her children everything. Doctor Arturo Gonzalez, the State's expert psychologist, agreed with the other experts that the roots of Morton's antisocial personality disorder were in his childhood. During the penalty phase closing argument, defense counsel argued to the jury that Morton's antisocial personality disorder was the most important mitigating circumstance to be considered. As we recently stated in Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 646 (Fla.2000), [a] trial court may reject a claim that a mitigating circumstance has been proven provided that the record contains competent substantial evidence to support the rejection. We have also explained that uncontroverted expert opinion testimony may be rejected where it is difficult to square with the other evidence in the case. See Foster v. State, 679 So.2d 747, 755 (Fla.1996); Wuornos v. State, 644 So.2d 1000, 1010 (Fla.1994) (citing Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381, 390-91 & n. 8 (Fla.1994)). However, the trial court is required to discuss in its sentencing order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by the evidence. See Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla.1990). In this case, despite the expert testimony and defense counsel's closing argument, the trial court did not discuss this evidence or provide any reasoning in its sentencing order as to why it had rejected the experts' findings and conclusions. Having reviewed the record, we do not find a basis for the trial court's rejection, without discussion, of this mitigating circumstance. Thus, we hold that the failure to consider this proposed mitigator of Morton's personality disorder was error. The State, however, contends that the trial court's failure to find or mention Morton's antisocial personality disorder in its sentencing order is harmless error, especially after considering the substantial aggravating circumstances present in this case. See Wuornos, 644 So.2d at 1011 (holding trial court's failure to find and weigh defendant's alcoholism, difficult childhood, and some degree of nonstatutory impaired capacity and mental disturbances to be harmless error given the aggravating circumstances in the record); Wickham v. State, 593 So.2d 191, 194 (Fla. 1991) (holding that the trial court's failure to find and weigh the defendant's abusive childhood, alcoholism, and extensive history of hospitalization for mental disorders constituted harmless error due to the strong aggravating circumstances). We agree that in this case the failure to separately consider Morton's antisocial personality disorder amounts to harmless error. We base our conclusion on two separate factors. First, the trial court in this double murder case found five aggravating circumstances with respect to the murder of Madeline Weisser and three aggravating circumstances with respect to the murder of John Bowers. Among the aggravating circumstances present in this case were CCP and HAC, which as we stated in Larkins v. State, 739 So.2d 90, 95 (Fla.1999), are two of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme. In addition, this is a double murder. Thus, one of the additional aggravating circumstances in imposing the death sentence for the murder of seventy-five-year-old Madeline Weisser was the great weight afforded to the previous conviction of another capital felony; that is, the murder of her fifty-five-year-old son, which occurred immediately before Weisser's murder. Second, although the trial court did not find and weigh Morton's antisocial personality disorder as a mitigating circumstance, the trial court did consider and weigh several factors from Morton's childhood that likely contributed to Morton's antisocial behavior, including the facts that Morton had minimal physical contact with his mother following birth, Morton's family moved frequently, Morton did not have a stable home and social life, and Morton had a history of physical and mental abuse by his parents. We have reviewed the entire record in this case, including the evidence of the antisocial personality disorder, mindful that the death penalty may be imposed only where specified aggravating circumstances outweigh all mitigating circumstances. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 318, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991). In light of the aggravating factors found in this double murder case, the jury's eleven-to-one death recommendation as to each murder and the fact that the trial judge found and weighed related mitigating evidence, we conclude that any omission from consideration in the sentencing order of the antisocial personality disorder as a separate mitigating circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.