Opinion ID: 1966373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Determination and Assignment of the Marital Assets

Text: The defendant contends that the trial justice abused his discretion in first determining the value of the marital assets, and then in distributing the marital property between the parties. According to defendant, the trial justice abused his discretion in selecting plaintiff's appraisal of the Blackstone commercial property as establishing the property's value without making findings of fact. The defendant further contends that the trial justice erred in assigning to him the entire credit card debt, while awarding plaintiff the entire investment account. It is well established that the equitable distribution of property is a three-step process. Olivieri v. Olivieri, 760 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I.2000) (citing Lancellotti v. Lancellotti, 481 A.2d 7, 10 (R.I.1984)). The trial justice first must determine which assets are marital property, then must consider the factors set forth in § 15-5-16.1(a), and finally, he or she must distribute the property. Olivieri, 760 A.2d at 1248 (citing Lancellotti, 481 A.2d at 10). We will not disturb findings of fact made by a trial justice or magistrate in a divorce action unless he or she has `misconceived the relevant evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.' Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d 1138, 1141 (R.I.2002) (quoting DiOrio v. DiOrio, 751 A.2d 747, 751 (R.I.2000)). Furthermore, unless it is shown that the trial justice either improperly exercised his or her discretion or that there was an abuse thereof, this Court will not disturb the trial justice's findings. Stephenson, 811 A.2d at 1141 (quoting Gormly v. Gormly, 760 A.2d 1241, 1243 (R.I.2000)). In the matter before us, rather than presenting evidence, the parties submitted an Agreed Statement of Facts. The title of the document is somewhat of a misnomer because it is evident from the document itself that the parties had not in fact agreed upon all of the enumerated facts. One such item was a half interest in the commercial property in Blackstone, Massachusetts, that defendant and his brother had acquired in 2000. Although there was no dispute that the interest was marital, or that the property was secured by a $65,000 mortgage, the parties did not agree on its value. Paragraph 27 of the agreed statement provides: An appraisal of the property at 2 Main Street, Blackstone, Massachusetts, conducted at the request of the Plaintiff, states a fair market value of $225,000.00. An appraisal of the same property conducted by an appraiser at the request of the Defendant indicates a fair market value of $190,000.00. Both appraisals are attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. A review of these appraisals reveals that they are not really appraisals at all. The plaintiff's appraisal is described as a preliminary opinion of value and contains a disclaimer that the full appraisal process was not utilized. The defendant's letter is styled a statement of the final estimate. The appraiser indicated that he had made an exterior inspection of the above-referenced property for the purpose of estimating its market value, and curiously stated that said value has been based upon a complete appraisal; the complete appraisal, although in rough form, has been prepared and retained in my files and is available to you for review should you desire. It was not made available to the trial justice. On appeal, Mr. Tzeremes argues that he had proposed that the [F]amily [C]ourt average the two (2) appraisals and calculate [the] value [of the property] at $200,000.00. However, the [F]amily [C]ourt instead, accepted the plaintiff's appraisal, without making any of the necessary, supporting findings of fact    contrary to R.I.R.Dom. Proc. 52. His argument lacks merit. By submitting an agreed statement of facts, the parties waived their opportunity and right to present independent evidence at a trial. Moreover, they waived their right to cross-examine adversarial witnesses, including the two real estate appraisers. Thus, the only evidence available to the trial justice were the two estimates, neither one of which included any supporting data or documentation. It is of little moment that the trial justice failed to articulate specific findings of fact to undergird his selection of plaintiff's appraisal; the facts all were set forth in the parties' joint statement and are a part of the record. It is well settled that a trial justice is free to accept the opinion of one expert, while rejecting the opinion of another expert. Sun-Lite Partnership v. Town of West Warwick, 838 A.2d 45, 48 (R.I.2003). That is precisely what the trial justice did here. Moreover, this Court has held that even in the event that a trial justice fails to expressly articulate findings of fact we shall not refuse to accord the decision the persuasive force usually accorded such decisions on review, for the reason that implicit in a decision are such findings of fact necessary to support it. Mattera v. Mattera, 669 A.2d 538, 541 (R.I.1996) (quoting Duke v. Duke, 510 A.2d 430, 432 (R.I.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 864, 107 S.Ct. 219, 93 L.Ed.2d 147 (1986)). Turning to defendant's challenge to the trial justice's assignment of the credit card debt and the investment account, we first note that although the trial justice failed to explicitly designate the credit card debt as marital in nature, the parties, in their agreed statement of facts, characterized the debt as marital debt    incurred as a result of various stock transactions, and stipulated that the investment losses were caused by economic factors beyond the parties['] control. Moreover, in applying the statutory factors set forth in § 15-5-16.1(a), the trial justice considered the credit card debt as a wasteful dissipation of assets, and found that the bulk of the $77,000 credit card debt was incurred by defendant as a result of stock transactions handled only by defendant. The trial justice noted that defendant had lost approximately $500,000, and at one point the parties had an investment account valued at $300,000, but this account was liquidated in February 2002 for $7,700. The trial justice also found that [m]ost of these losses, however, were beyond the control of the parties. The trial justice ordered defendant to indemnify and hold plaintiff harmless on the $77,000 debt and, conversely, awarded plaintiff the $7,700 previously held in the investment account. It is well settled that the equitable distribution of marital assets is left to the sound discretion of the trial court which is obligated to consider the factors prescribed by the Legislature in G.L.1956 § 15-5-16.1 and that as long as the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence, and if he [or she] considered all the requisite statutory elements, this [C]ourt will not disturb the trial court's findings. DiOrio, 751 A.2d at 750 (quoting Murphy v. Murphy, 714 A.2d 576, 579-80 (R.I.1998)). Moreover, the division of the marital property need not be equal in order to be equitable. Altieri v. Altieri, 711 A.2d 1145, 1146 (R.I.1998) (mem.) (citing Cloutier v. Cloutier, 567 A.2d 1131, 1133 (R.I.1989)). In the case before us the trial justice identified the marital assets, appropriately applied the various statutory factors, and then proceeded to assign the marital assets. He awarded to each party the personal property, including motor vehicles, currently in their respective possession. The plaintiff was awarded the sum of $7,700, which represented the liquidation proceeds of the investment account, to the exclusion of the defendant. That money previously had been paid to plaintiff. The trial justice also ordered that the defendant shall indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless on the $77,000 debt which is outstanding on various credit cards. Finally, he ordered defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of $90,500, which represents 50% of the marital value of Harry's Pizza; Olympia Pizza; 2 Main Street, Blackstone, Massachusetts; and the $28,000 in cash that the defendant gave to his brother. There is no question that the resulting division of marital assets was not equal. By assuming sole responsibility for the $77,000 debt, defendant received a disproportionately smaller share of the net marital estate than did plaintiff. Nevertheless, in the circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that the trial justice was acting within his discretion when he assigned the entire debt to defendant. We again emphasize that the parties waived their respective right to a trial, thereby depriving the trial justice of an opportunity to assess the credibility of the parties. His award necessarily was predicated upon the facts to which both parties had stipulated. Our review of those facts supports the trial justice's findings. The parties agreed that defendant had pled nolo contendere to a charge of domestic assault and was then serving a three-year probationary sentence. They acknowledged that the bulk of the $77,000 debt was incurred as a result of various stock transactions handled exclusively by the Defendant, and that he lost approximately $500,000 in those transactions. Significantly, they stipulated that defendant took various cash advances against the credit card to acquire certain stock and for certain living expenses of the Plaintiff and children. Moreover, the parties agreed that Ms. Koutroumanos had not obtained United States citizenship, had no formal education, and spoke little, if any, English. She also did not have a Social Security number and was not eligible to work on the payroll for any individual. She was, however, assisting her brother in his pizza parlor in return for a place to live for her and her children. She also had borrowed money from her sister-in-law to pay day-to-day expenses. In light of these agreed facts, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by equally dividing the marital assets, yet assigning the credit card liability to defendant. Neither the parties nor the trial justice faulted defendant for losses in the investment account caused by economic factors beyond the parties['] control. As is evident from the agreed facts, however, the bulk of the $77,000 debt resulted from the reckless investment practices of defendant, primarily by taking cash advances against credit cards to purchase stocks. Clearly, the trial justice considered the debt to be a wasteful dissipation of marital assets. Moreover, it was reasonable from the facts to infer, as the trial justice did, that [t]hroughout this marriage, the plaintiff was kept in the dark as to all of the financial matters. Clearly, she had no present ability of contributing to the continuing payment of the debt, and had virtually no means of earning a meaningful income within the immediate future. Mr. Tzeremes also contends that the Family Court failed to award him a credit for one half of the value (or a credit of any amount) of the parties' investment account. In this respect, we agree that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived relevant evidence. In their agreed statement of facts, the parties stipulated that an investment account with Oftring & Company had been liquidated in February 2002. The liquidation proceeds were paid to plaintiff to offset costs and as partial equitable distribution. The trial justice, however, failed to consider these proceeds in the distribution of the marital property, and simply awarded plaintiff the sum of $7,700 already received by her to the exclusion of the defendant. In light of the trial justice's clear intent to divide the marital estate, excluding the credit card debt, on an equal basis, we believe this to be an oversight. Accordingly, we direct that the Family Court order of November 7, 2002 be amended such that defendant be given credit for one half of the liquidated investment account, or $3,850.