Opinion ID: 2724
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction to Hear Appeal

Text: While the district court's denial of the state plaintiffs' claims of sovereign immunity is appealable under the collateral order doctrine, Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993), the denial of a motion to remand is generally not the proper subject of an interlocutory appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 578, 74 S.Ct. 290, 98 L.Ed. 317 (1954); Wilkins v. Am. Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 401 F.2d 151, 151 (2d Cir.1968). Nevertheless, California and New Hampshire ask us to rule that the district court erred in holding that these cases were removable under the federal officer and bankruptcy removal statutes. We conclude that review of this question is required pursuant to our independent obligation to satisfy ourselves of the jurisdiction of this court and the court below. On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it. Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453, 20 S.Ct. 690, 44 L.Ed. 842 (1900); accord Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). This obligation is well-founded. Subject-matter limitations on federal jurisdiction serve institutional interests. They keep the federal courts within the bounds the Constitution and Congress have prescribed. Accordingly, subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999). Indeed, we have often taken it upon ourselves to determine whether removal jurisdiction existed even where that issue was not itself appealed. See, e.g., Barbara v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir.1996) (Although neither party raises this issue on appeal, we are under an obligation to do so sua sponte. ); Mignogna v. Sair Aviation, Inc., 937 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.1991) (The parties have not raised the issue of removal jurisdiction on this appeal, but it is our obligation to do so sua sponte. ); see also Sykes v. Texas Air Corp., 834 F.2d 488, 492 n. 16 (5th Cir.1987) (When the district court decides to retain a case in the face of arguments that it lacks jurisdiction, the decision itself is technically unreviewable; but of course the appellate court reviewing any other aspect of the case must remand for dismissal if the refusal to remand was wrong, i.e., if there is no federal jurisdiction over the case.). This obligation is not extinguished because an appeal is taken on an interlocutory basis and not from a final judgment. See Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 187 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir.1999). Indeed, we relied on Merritt in our order in this case denying Citgo Petroleum Corp.'s motion to limit the scope of the appeal to the issue of sovereign immunity, see Berisha v. BP Amoco Corp., Nos. 04-5974-cv (L), 04-6056-cv (Con) (2d Cir. June 27, 2005), and we do so again today. Because subject matter jurisdiction goes uniquely to the fundamental power of the federal courts to hear a case, there is no reason why an appellate court should potentially compound an error of the district court by assuming it has jurisdiction. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101-02, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires. ). Indeed, there are sound policy reasons for tackling the issue at this stage, as [i]t is surely in the interest of judicial economy to determine now whether the federal courts continue to have subject matter jurisdiction over [a] controversy [subject to an interlocutory appeal]. Lamar Adver. of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365, 372-73 (2d Cir.2004). Moreover, this obligation is not undermined by the Supreme Court's holding in Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995). In that case, the Supreme Court held that, when a federal appellate court reviews a district court decision on an interlocutory basis, it may not at the same time review unrelated questions that are not themselves entitled to expedited consideration. Id. at 51, 115 S.Ct. 1203. Specifically, the Court held that, while an order denying a claim of qualified immunity was the proper subject of an interlocutory appeal, another order denying a motion for summary judgment was not an appealable collateral order under the test announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The Court held open the possibility, however, that pendent appellate jurisdiction would be proper if the two rulings were inextricably intertwined or if review of the former decision was necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter. Swint, 514 U.S. at 51, 115 S.Ct. 1203. While we have previously suggested that those two phrases mean essentially the same thing, Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 758 (2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, J.), we have also left open the possibility that the two phrases are not redundant, see Lamar Adver., 356 F.3d at 371 n. 7. 1 Nevertheless, there are several reasons why Swint is inapposite. Because the district court in Swint had subject matter jurisdiction over the collateral order on appeal, the Supreme Court did not have occasion to address whether its holding applied to the special subset of cases in which the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, the issue decided in that case was whether a litigant had the right to appeal the collateral order, not whether the appellate court had the right to address an issue, such as subject matter jurisdiction, on its own initiative. Under these circumstances, we are not inclined to assume that Swint decided a significant issue that it had no reason to consider. See Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 216, 89 S.Ct. 1677, 23 L.Ed.2d 253 (1969). 2 In any event, the present cases satisfy the exception acknowledged in Swint for those circumstances where the appealed interlocutory order cannot be meaningfully reviewed without consideration of a related ruling not itself appealable or where the two issues are inextricably intertwined. Specifically, in Merritt, we held that the review of a collateral order would be meaningless if the district court was without jurisdiction over that claim in the first instance. 187 F.3d at 269. This broad holding plainly compels the conclusion that the review of the issue of sovereign immunity would be meaningless if the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction over these actions. More than this, however, the appealable order relating to sovereign immunity and the collateral issue of removal jurisdiction are significantly related. Our holding rejecting the sovereign right asserted by California and New Hampshire to prosecute these cases in courts of their own choosing is predicated on the assumption that federal law authorizes the removal of these cases. Under these circumstances, the ultimate resolution of the sovereign immunity claim turns on whether these cases were properly removed to federal court. The relationship between these two issues is analogous to that between the issues presented in interlocutory appeals by public officials from claims of qualified immunity in cases alleging the violation of a constitutional right. In those cases, we routinely exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the issue of whether a constitutional right has been violated, because the merits of a constitutional claim generally are inextricably intertwined with qualified immunity . . . . [W]e must determine whether a constitutional right has been violated before deciding whether the right was clearly established. Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir.2006). Similarly, except as an abstract matter, we cannot resolve the defense of sovereign immunity here without determining whether the removal statutes confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court. 3 The defendants suggest that we may not determine the jurisdiction of the district court because we do not have appellate jurisdiction over the entire case. Defs.' Br. at 31. While it is true that our jurisdiction is limited to the subject matter of the appeal—we may not, for instance, reach the merits of the case—we unquestionably have jurisdiction to decide whether there is any further impediment to our exercise of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and, by extension, the jurisdiction of the court below. The defendants also suggest that we have, on many occasions, been willing to forego inquiry into the district court's jurisdiction where the question was not constitutional or where the merits were foreordained, suggesting that such review is not mandatory. Defs.' Br. at 33 (citing Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 177 (2d Cir.2005); In re Arbitration Between Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 497-98 (2d Cir. 2002); Ctr. for Reprod. Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 194 (2d Cir.2002); United States v. Miller, 263 F.3d 1, 4 n. 2 (2d Cir.2001); Fama v. Comm'r of Corr. Servs., 235 F.3d 804, 817 n. 11 (2d Cir. 2000)). Setting aside the fact that the issue of the propriety of removal cannot so easily be separated from the claims of sovereign immunity, the defendants misstate the import of our decisions. In each of these cases, our holding on the merits directed the dismissal of the complaints— the same result that would have followed had we decided that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking. In the present cases, however, the denial of the plaintiffs' claims of sovereign immunity would not result in the dismissal of the complaints; thus, we have an obligation to determine whether the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to go forward. 4 In sum, while an order denying a motion to remand may normally be reviewed only after entry of a final judgment, our obligation to remain assured of our jurisdiction and that of the court below remains intact. Therefore, in ruling in this interlocutory appeal, we must determine whether there is a proper basis for removal of these cases.