Opinion ID: 4525578
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Rosandich Affidavit.

Text: Against this backdrop, we turn to the particulars of the case at hand. In moving to dismiss the complaint, USSA attached to its motion an affidavit executed by its president, Thomas J. Rosandich. The affidavit contained a plethora of facts bearing on the jurisdictional inquiry. To begin, Rosandich made clear that USSA is both incorporated and headquartered in Alabama; that it does not have any physical presence (say, an office, a registered agent, or even a telephone number) in Massachusetts; and that it does not pay taxes there. According to the school's records, between 2008 and 2010, [Chen] completed his courses in residence in Alabama, except for the term he spent in Missouri and his mentorship stint in New York. Moreover, as of the date of the affidavit (January 10, 2019), USSA had only two enrolled students who were physically present in Massachusetts.4 Chen did not dispute the contents of Rosandich's affidavit either with a dueling affidavit or with any other evidentiary proffer. Not surprisingly, then, the district court jurisdiction — is ill-suited for the general jurisdiction inquiry. See id. And where, as here, purposeful availment is plainly lacking, see infra Part II(D), the sliding scale adds nothing of consequence to the specific jurisdiction analysis. 4 Neither of these students was enrolled in a program leading to a degree. Instead, each of them was taking only a single online course. - 12 - relied on the affidavit in adjudicating the motion to dismiss. See Cheng, 2019 WL 1207863, at -3. Chen strives to convince us that this reliance was misplaced. We are not persuaded. Chen's fundamental premise is that the affidavit is a document extraneous to the complaint and, thus, should not have been relied upon in evaluating the motion to dismiss. This premise is flawed. USSA moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). It is clear beyond hope of contradiction that a district court confronted with a motion to dismiss under that rule must, when employing the prima facie approach, look beyond the pleadings to examine not only the plaintiff's properly documented evidentiary proffers but also the defendant's undisputed jurisdictional facts. See PREP Tours, Inc. v. Am. Youth Soccer Org., 913 F.3d 11, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2019); Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2002). Such jurisdictional facts may be adduced by means of an affidavit made by a person who — like Rosandich — has adequate knowledge of the situation. See BaskinRobbins, 825 F.3d at 34; Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1385. Next, Chen argues that the district court should not have taken the affidavit into account because its contents were disputed. But for this purpose, facts are not deemed disputed merely because defense counsel, in an unsworn brief or in argument before a court, challenges them. See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, - 13 - Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) (observing that despite the liberality of prima facie approach, courts are not required struthiously to 'credit conclusory allegations' (quoting Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 1994))); cf. Corrada Betances v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 248 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2001) (observing that statements contained in a memorandum or lawyer's brief are manifestly insufficient to create genuine issues of material fact). Here, the record reveals that Chen failed to offer any evidence to counter the contents of the Rosandich affidavit. Indeed, his memorandum in opposition to USSA's motion to dismiss did not even mention the affidavit. Under these circumstances, the district court had every right to treat the factual assertions embedded in the affidavit as undisputed and to rely on those facts when resolving the motion to dismiss. Chen has another arrow in his quiver. He argues that the affidavit's validity was unchecked inasmuch as the parties had not yet commenced discovery. This arrow, too, flies wide of the mark. Chen had ample opportunity to move for jurisdictional discovery but failed to do so. A party who chooses not to avail himself of an opportunity for discovery can scarcely be heard to complain when the lack of such discovery thereafter redounds to his detriment. See Mass. Sch. of Law, 142 F.3d at 37 (rejecting claim based on lack of jurisdictional discovery because plaintiff never requested discovery); cf. Jones v. Secord, 684 F.3d 1, 6 - 14 - (1st Cir. 2012) ([C]ourts, like the deity, tend to help those who help themselves . . . .). To cinch the matter, Chen never moved to strike the Rosandich affidavit. Nor did he object to the district court's consideration of the affidavit in his opposition to USSA's motion to dismiss. These omissions are fatal to his belated attempt to challenge the affidavit on appeal. If any principle is settled in this circuit, it is that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal. Teamsters Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992). There is nothing out of the ordinary about the circumstances here. To say more about the Rosandich affidavit would be to paint the lily. We hold, without serious question, that the Rosandich affidavit formed an appropriate part of the district court's decisional calculus.