Opinion ID: 4556443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Dissent’s Analytical Path Is Unavailable

Text: The dissent, understandably, seeks to avoid this result, but we cannot endorse the legal reasoning it uses along the way. Our dissenting colleague seeks to retroactively reframe the Salmoran line of cases as applying only when there is a “clear difference between the statute of conviction and the federal generic offense[.]” (Dissenting Op. at 3.) Thus, in his view, the realistic probability inquiry is foreclosed only when the petitioner “definitively demonstrate[s] a difference” between them. (Dissenting Op. at 5.) In close cases, then, and only in close cases, will the inquiry apply. But nowhere in Salmoran is there any indication that we were laying down a mere tie-breaking rule. Instead, as already noted, what we said was that “where the elements of the crime of conviction are not the same as the elements of the generic federal offense … the realistic probability inquiry … is simply not meant to apply.” Salmoran, 909 F.3d at 81; see also Zhi Fei Liao, 910 24 F.3d at 723 (holding that “the BIA erred in conducting a ‘realistic probability’ inquiry where the elements of petitioner’s controlled substance conviction under Pennsylvania state law did not match the elements of the generic federal offense”). In line with that holding, we engage in an ordinary statutory interpretation analysis of the statute of conviction. And once we complete that analysis, we compare our result to the federal generic offense. We do not then take into account how difficult the statutory interpretation question was in determining whether the realistic-probability inquiry applies.11 Tempting as it is, then, we cannot accept our dissenting colleague’s reading of Salmoran. But even if the dissent were correct that Salmoran requires a “clear difference” between the elements of the state statute and the federal generic offense, such a difference is present here. Our dissenting colleague believes that Pennsylvania’s Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse statute requires “a mens rea of knowledge, if not intent.” (Dissenting Op. at 6.) He bases that conclusion on two premises: first, that a mens rea of recklessness would produce absurd results which the legislature could not possibly have intended; and second, that it is a mistake to rely on the default culpability requirements of § 302(c). 11 Nor are we persuaded by the dissent’s approach of first looking for prosecutions and then concluding, after finding none, that the realistic-probability inquiry does not apply. That is precisely backwards. We only look through judicial records for prosecutions after we determine whether the realistic-probability analysis applies. 25 As to the first premise, it is putting the cart before the horse to start with the absurdity doctrine and then work backwards from there to interpret the text so as to avoid a preconceived absurd result. Instead, we first interpret the statute according to its text and only then analyze whether that text leads to an absurd result. To do otherwise leads to a distortion in statutory interpretation as we strain to avoid the pre-identified absurd result. That risk is amply demonstrated by the free-form and purposive approach the dissent takes to arrive at a preferred statutory interpretation. Regardless of any intuitions we may have about whether Pennsylvania’s involuntary deviate sexual intercourse statute ought to be viewed as a sufficient match with the provisions of federal law defining the generic offense, our discomfort with the outcome in this case doesn’t allow us to rewrite our own precedent or Pennsylvania law.12 12 The dissent’s purposive analysis fails even on its own terms. The dissent claims that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has articulated one possible purpose of § 3123(a)(7) as “to protect minors younger than 16 years of age from older teenage and adult sexual aggressors.” Commonwealth v. Albert, 758 A.2d 1149, 1154 (Pa. 2000). But the language relied up on by our dissenting colleague is from the court’s analysis of hypothetical reasons offered by the government in response to a rational-basis challenge to the statute. The court’s recognition of a legitimate state interest sufficient to withstand rational-basis scrutiny says nothing about what mens rea would suffice to accomplish the statute’s purpose. In fact, the court specifically noted that there was no statutory purpose defined anywhere. See id. at 1152 (“At the outset, we note that neither the legislative provision[] at issue here nor the accompanying legislative 26 As to the second premise – that § 302(c) is inapplicable in this context – our dissenting colleague cites no authority for that proposition, save a couple of opinions declining to apply it in an unrelated context.13 And, as history … disclose any official statement by the legislature regarding the rationale or policy motivating [its] enactment.”). Moreover, it is not for us to make Pennsylvania’s policy choice in setting the level of culpable mens rea for sexual offenses. As already noted, it seems strange to imagine how the deviate sexual intercourse statute could be violated recklessly (see supra n.10 and accompanying text), but suppose an adult were to aggressively and inappropriately touch a child, and that conduct resulted in the penetration “however slight” required for a violation of §§ 302(c), 3101, and 3123(a)(7). In such a situation, penalizing reckless conduct is not on its face absurd. The dissent’s example of a parent feeding her child is plainly inapposite. Such an innocent action carries no culpable mens rea whatsoever and thus is not subject to criminal penalty. 13 Our dissenting colleague cites Commonwealth v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898 (Pa. 2011), as an example of a Pennsylvania court engaging in broader statutory interpretation “rather than merely applying § 302(c).” But at issue in Hart was an interpretive dispute over actus reus, not mens rea – specifically, over “whether the mere offer of an automobile ride to a child constitutes an attempt to ‘lure’ the child.” Id. at 900. In concluding that an offer for a ride must be accompanied by “other enticement or inducement,” id. at 27 900, 909, the court unsurprisingly saw little need to engage with section 302(c). No one argues that section 302(c) will answer every relevant question a criminal statute might raise. What matters for our purposes is whether it answers the relevant question we must answer – namely, the minimum mens rea for which a defendant could be convicted. It does. And the answer it gives is different from – and broader than – the mens rea for the federal generic offense. Nor is the dissent’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623 (Pa. 2005), persuasive. There, the state supreme court recognized that where a criminal statute “does not explicitly provide for an applicable mens rea, the General Assembly has provided a default culpability provision in Section 302(c) . . . that is to be applied.” Id. at 630 (emphasis added). True, in applying section 302, the court stated that the mens rea default does not apply where a contrary mens rea “is . . . prescribed by law.” Id. (quoting 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 302(c)). But it did so only because the relevant offense, third-degree murder, had a “consistent[]” and “wellsettled” mens rea (malice) at common law. Id. at 630–31. There is no such common-law tradition for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a minor. Finally, the dissent cites to a lone concurrence by one justice that was joined by none of the other six justices on the bench. See Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d 1136, 115152 (Pa. 2014) (Todd, J., concurring). The justices in the majority reiterated their “repeated[] h[o]ld[ing] [that] § 302 provides the default level of culpability where a criminal statute does not include an express mens rea.” Id. at 1149 (majority op.) (citing Gallagher, 924 A.2d at 639; Ludwig, 874 A.2d at 630; and Mayfield, 832 A.2d at 427). Even the 28 already discussed, Pennsylvania courts have applied § 302(c) to closely related statutory language.14 So while it is true that the text of Pennsylvania’s Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse statute does not itself contain a mens rea, the clear guidance from the courts is that we should apply the gapfilling provisions of § 302(c).15 There is nothing unusual two justices in dissent were in full agreement on that point. See id. at 1154 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting). 14 See supra pp. 17-18. 15 Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly emphasized the broad applicability of § 302(c) to the Commonwealth’s criminal laws. The state supreme court has relied on it, for instance, in explaining that even for a criminal statute that lacks any mention of mens rea, the legislature’s intent as to mens rea is not unclear. See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418, 427 (Pa. 2003) (assessing 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3124.2 – a provision neighboring § 3123(a)(7) – that criminalizes institutional sexual assault and importing a mens rea of recklessness). Indeed, once an interpreting court determines that the relevant offense was not intended “to be a strict liability crime” the court “need . . . do[] nothing more than advert to § 302(c) and require the Commonwealth to prove at least recklessness.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 924 A.2d 636, 638 (Pa. 2007) (“As a rule, in . . . instances [where the statute does not express a mens rea requirement], Section 302(c) of the Crimes Code prescribes the default culpability requirement . . . .” (emphasis added)); Commonwealth v. Parmar, 710 A.2d 1083, 1088–89 (Pa. 1998) (“The bribery statute does not have an explicit 29 about supplementing the text of a specific provision with a cross-reference to a generally applicable statutory provision despite the unfortunate result it leads to when made a component of the categorical approach to analyzing Cabeda’s conviction. So, while we are in complete accord with our colleague’s desire to mitigate the workings of the categorical approach, we cannot take the analytical path he suggests. In the end, we are left to shake our heads at the path we are on. But, having followed that path as required, we conclude that there is not a categorical match between Cabeda’s statute of conviction and the corresponding generic federal crime. mens rea requirement on its face, but it is subject to the culpability requirements of Section 302 . . . . Th[ose] culpability requirements . . . apply to all crimes in the Crimes Code, like bribery, [as well as] those outside the Crimes Code . . . .”). The Pennsylvania code itself bears out § 302(c)’s broad application. As the state supreme court explained in Parmar, see 710 A.2d at 1089, although the legislature crafted exceptions to section 302(c)'s general rule, those exceptions apply only to summary offenses and those for which a legislative purpose to impose absolute ability . . . plainly appears[.] 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 305(a)(1)–(2). Neither of those exceptions, however, applies here. We are thus bound to apply § 302(c). 30