Opinion ID: 2509294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mental State Issues

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by declining to order a competency hearing pursuant to section 1368. When the accused presents substantial evidence of incompetence, due process requires that the trial court conduct a full competency hearing. [Citation.] `Evidence is substantial if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competence to stand trial.' ( People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131, 115 Cal. Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461, quoting People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 726, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729.) Absent substantial evidence of defendant's incompetence, the decision to order such a hearing [is] left to the court's discretion. ( People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 163, 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169.) On November 28, 1994, just before trial began, the trial court learned that Dr. Coburn, defendant's court-appointed psychiatrist, had written defense counsel expressing his doubt that defendant was competent to stand trial. According to the trial court, the letter indicated that defendant was fully aware of the charges against him but he has little understanding of the nature of the plea change and has significant impairment in his ability to rationally cooperate with counsel . . . . The court found that the letter was too vague to raise a doubt about defendant's competence. It asked Dr. Vicary, the defense psychiatric expert, and Dr. Coburn to interview defendant and assess his competence to stand trial. As part of their assessment, the court asked them to examine the November 21 Marsden proceeding transcript, calling it highly probative of whether or not the defendant understands the nature of the proceedings and can assist counsel. Defense counsel Sheahen stated that, although working with defendant had been extremely difficult and at times defendant lack[ed][a] . . . grasp of what [was] going on, he was surprised that Dr. Coburn felt there was a 1368 issue and was uncertain whether defendant's behavior amounted to incompetence. The court also observed that defendant had repeatedly assisted counsel. Shafi-Nia disagreed with Sheahen and the court, stating that he believed defendant was incompetent. After reviewing the transcript and interviewing defendant, both Coburn and Vicary opined that defendant was competent to stand trial. The trial court declined to conduct a competency hearing. Defendant contends that Dr. Coburn's somewhat equivocal statements about his competence and statements by defense counsel constituted substantial evidence of incompetence. They do not. While Coburn testified that defendant was fragile and disturbed, he also repeatedly acknowledged that defendant was not incompetent to stand trial. Moreover, defendant ignores the opinion of the other defense psychiatric expert, Dr. Vicary, who testified without reservation that defendant was competent. Nor did comments by defense counsel constitute substantial evidence of incompetence. First, defense counsel were not in agreement on the issue of defendant's competence. While Shafi-Nia claimed that defendant was incompetent, Sheahen, the more experienced criminal defense attorney, did not share this belief. Second, even if both counsel had agreed that defendant was incompetent, such opinion, standing alone, would not have been dispositive of the issue but only one factor for the trial court to consider in determining whether substantial evidence existed. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1164, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Balanced against the conflicting statements of counsel were the opinions of the experts that defendant was competent and the trial court's own observation that defendant had repeatedly assisted in his defense, including bringing and arguing his first Marsden motion. (See People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1282, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645 [a defendant's participation in his trial demonstrate[s] beyond any doubt that he was fully aware of the nature of the proceedings and able to assist counsel].) We conclude therefore that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a competency hearing. [10]
Defendant entered dual pleas of guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). Where such dual pleas are entered, section 1026, subdivision (a) (section 1026) provides for a bifurcated trial. [11] The trial court told counsel it would inform prospective jurors that defendant had entered an NGI plea. Defense counsel objected that it would be prejudicial to do so. The trial court responded: I think the jury needs to be advised of the plea and just what they're facing in this case. In the voir dire proceedings that followed, two prospective jurors were excused for cause, one because he told the court that, if the prosecution proved the defendant guilty, he could not accept an insanity defense, and the other because she did not understand the burden of proof would shift during a sanity phase. Defendant contends that informing prospective jurors about his NGI plea violated the spirit of section 1026, and various constitutional protections including the privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence. Nothing in the statute, either expressly or by implication, bars the trial court from informing prospective jurors about a defendant's NGI plea, and defendant fails to articulate a basis for his claim of statutory violation. His constitutional claims are based on the premise that the jury would have been so prejudiced by having learned of his NGI plea it would have been unable to impartially determine his guilt. A similar claim was made and rejected in People v. Guillebeau (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 531, 166 Cal.Rptr. 45. There, the court remarked: As to the contention that once the jury learns of the double plea it cannot approach the question of guilt in an impartial way, it is sufficient to cite the following passage from People v. Leong Fook [(1928)] 206 Cal. 64 at page 78, 273 P. 779: `We must assume that a fair and impartial jury of intelligent men and women would obey . . . instructions and would therefore hold in reserve their ultimate finding upon the issue of the defendant's sanity until that separate issue and the evidence supporting it had, in the prescribed order of the trial, been committed to it for determination. We are not to assume that such a jury will cease to be fair and impartial as the cause progresses upon its successive issues, but, on the contrary, we must assume, in the absence of any other showing, that the jury has retained its attitude of fairness and impartiality under the changed procedure as before until the whole cause . . . has been determined.' ( Id. at p. 543, 166 Cal.Rptr. 45.) We agree with this analysis. Defendant's claim that the jury was prejudiced by learning about his double plea at the outset of trial is wholly speculative. There was no error and, necessarily, no constitutional violations.
After defendant entered his NGI plea, the trial court, pursuant to section 1027, appointed two psychiatrists to examine him, Dr. Vicary for the defense and Dr. Sharma for the prosecution. At the conclusion of the guilt phase, defense counsel informed the court that defendant was requesting appointment of a psychologist to examine him for the sanity phase. Counsel told the court defendant had declined to cooperate with Vicary or Sharma. The trial court refused to appoint a psychologist but without prejudice to renewal of the request. [12] Defendant did not renew his request. Ultimately he withdrew his NGI plea. Defendant contends the trial court's refusal to appoint a third mental health expert violated his federal and state constitutional rights, including the right to ancillary defense services as part of the right to effective assistance to counsel. ( Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319-320, 204 Cal.Rptr. 165, 682 P.2d 360.) His claim is without merit. As a procedural matter, defendant failed to argue in the trial court that the denial of a third mental health expert amounted to a violation of his federal constitutional rights. His constitutional claim is, therefore, forfeited. ( People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.) His claim is also substantively without merit. Defendant contends that under California law, he has a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of a mental health expert. Not so. Neither Ake [ v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53] . . . nor the broader rule guaranteeing court-appointed experts necessary for the preparation of a defense [citation], gives rise to a federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of a mental health expert. ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 838, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) In any event, defendant received reasonable ancillary services, and there was no showing that the appointed psychiatrists were unqualified or incapable of administering the psychologist tests defendant now argues were crucial to his defense. The issue, rather, is whether a defendant's unjustified refusal to cooperate with qualified, court-appointed mental health experts required the trial court to appoint another expert. We think not. (See, e.g., People v. Messerly (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 718, 722, 116 P.2d 781 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint a third mental health expert where two experts had been appointed pursuant to section 1027, had examined the defendant, were cross-examined and (n)o objections were made at the trial as to their qualifications].)
Prior to the commencement of the sanity phase, defendant sought an advance ruling from the trial court to limit the scope of cross-examination if he testified. He wanted to testify only to matters regarding his childhood and his upbringing and to preclude the prosecution from cross-examining him about the murder. The trial court declined to issue an advisory opinion regarding the scope of cross-examination in advance of hearing defendant's direct testimony. Defendant claimed the court left him no choice but to withdraw his plea, but the court refused to accept the withdrawal. Defendant began to withdraw his plea a second time, but then again equivocated, and the trial court again declined to proceed unless defendant's withdrawal was unequivocal. The prosecutor, citing People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698, argued that defendant should be allowed to withdraw his NGI plea if there was no doubt as to his sanity and the examining psychiatrists unanimously agreed he was sane. Without objection, the trial court unsealed the reports of Drs. Vicary and Sharma, and read portions of the reports into the record. The court noted that both Vicary and Sharma concluded that defendant was legally sane at the time of the commission of the offenses. Defendant was then allowed to withdraw his NGI plea. The court stated it was satisfied that defendant understood the nature of his plea and that he furthermore understood his right to a sanity phase trial, and that he has effectively and knowingly and intelligently given up that right and personally withdrawn his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Defendant argues that the trial court's refusal to give him an advance ruling on the scope of cross-examination coerced him into withdrawing his NGI plea. He also suggests the withdrawal was involuntary because there were doubts as to his sanity. Neither claim has merit. Defendant's withdrawal of his plea was not coerced by the trial court's adverse ruling on his motion to limit the scope of cross-examination because there was no such ruling. Rather, the trial court properly declined to provide a ruling in advance of defendant's testimony. Defendant had no inherent right to a binding advance ruling which would spare him the necessity of raising specific objections before the jury. ( People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 513, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081; People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 178-179, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) Regarding his second claim, unlike People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 553, 297 P.2d 999, upon which defendant relies, there was no conflict among the experts regarding defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. (See People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1214, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698 [where there is no doubt in the trial court's mind of defendant's sanity, and the reports of the examining psychiatrists agree he was sane, defendant should be allowed to withdraw his NGI plea].) Accordingly, the withdrawal of his NGI plea was not involuntary.