Opinion ID: 2671020
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standard for a Single Common Scheme or Plan

Text: As we alluded to above, when deciding whether Martin qualified for career offender status, the district court required that, in order for multiple drug transactions to constitute a single common scheme or plan, the transactions had to have been agreed to (or at least planned, discussed or contemplated) by the defendant at the time of the first transaction. It first noted this court's directive that the phrase common scheme or plan be 7 The Guidelines have been subsequently amended to require that multiple prior sentences be counted separately unless they resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument, or were imposed on the same day. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) (2013). -12- given its ordinary meaning. For this proposition, the court cited United States v. Godin, 489 F.3d 431 (1st Cir. 2007) (vacated on reh'g on other grounds by 522 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2008)) and United States v. Elwell, 984 F.2d 1289 (1st Cir. 1993). Godin, the district court continued, stood for the proposition that a scheme or plan implies the existence of some kind of connective tissue, i.e., an initial plan involving multiple acts or steps taken to a single end. The court expanded on this concept, noting that the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Marrero, 299 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 2002), described the test as being 'whether the second crime was anticipated and planned when the original crime was planned or committed.' Martin argues that the standard employed by the district court for evaluating whether a common scheme or plan exists is more stringent than the standard actually set by this Court for doing so. Specifically -- despite the fact that the district court relied on both cases -- Martin insists the court's standard runs afoul of our directive in Elwell and Godin to give the phrase part of a single common scheme or plan its ordinary meaning. Martin's argument is hard to follow but, as best we can tell, she claims that the phrase's ordinary meaning calls for a focus on both the factual commonalities between the offenses (e.g., temporal and geographical proximity, the common criminal investigation, the modus operandi) and the intentions of all the parties involved in -13- the transactions, including the agents. Martin alleges the district court deviated from this supposed ordinary meaning by focusing too narrowly on Martin's intent8 alone, as well as her character or habits.9 Because we are considering the district court's interpretation of a sentencing guideline's meaning, our review is de novo. See Carrero-Hernández, 643 F.3d at 349. We start by taking a look at the cases cited by Martin, and relied on by the district court. Elwell involved a defendant, Hobart Willis, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 846, as well as distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841. 984 F.2d at 1291.10 8 Martin vacillates in her brief, using the phrases subjective intent and specific intent interchangeably, even though the phrases denote different concepts. It seems clear to us that Martin simply means to refer to her own intent, i.e., Martin claims the court honed in too much on her intentions alone. 9 It is not entirely clear what Martin means by character or habits. We suspect she is referring to the district court's mention of her addiction to illegal drugs. Assuming this is the case, we can readily dispose of this argument. The district court indeed mentioned Martin's addiction to heroin and her daily quest to secure the drug but the court did not focus on these things during its inquiry into whether the two predicate offenses were part of a single common scheme or plan. The court, it appears, was simply commenting on how the common scheme or plan concept can be difficult to apply to habitual drug users who, in some instances, are constantly scheming to obtain more drugs. A whole reading of the court's decision makes clear that Martin's addiction did not play a role in the court's ultimate determination that there was no agreement between Martin and Duquette that a second deal would follow. 10 Elwell discussed the appeals of three defendants: David Elwell, Richard Moretto, and Hobart Willis. All three had been indicted, along with six other persons, for conspiring to -14- The district court sentenced him to 210 months' imprisonment under the career offender guidelines due to five prior felony convictions on his record for five bank robberies committed on different dates during a brief period of time in 1968. Id. at 1292, 1294. At sentencing, Willis had argued unsuccessfully that the prior bank robberies should be treated as a single felony conviction because, among other things, they were part of a common plan to rob banks. Id. at 1294-95. He requested an evidentiary hearing at which fellow bank robbers would testify as to this common plan, if his proffer of the facts was not accepted. Id. at 1295. The district court did not accept Willis's proffer, declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, concluded the bank robbery convictions were separate offenses, and sentenced Willis as a career offender. Id. On appeal, we found that the defendant's proffer that the five bank robberies were part of an overarching conspiracy was not implausible, held the district court could not simply ignore it, and remanded the case with specific instructions for re-sentencing. Id. at 1296. Our discussion of a single common scheme or plan in Elwell was brief, given that the relevant issue on appeal was limited to whether the district court could disregard the defendant's proffer and deny his request for an evidentiary distribute cocaine and other related offenses. See Elwell, 984 F.2d at 1291. Both Willis and Moretto had been sentenced as career offenders, but the issue of a common scheme or plan was only discussed in regards to Willis's appeal. See id. at 1294-97. -15- hearing. However, we did indicate that the 'common scheme or plan' language should be given its ordinary meaning. Id. at 1295. Pertinent to our current discussion, Elwell offers nothing more than an unremarkable reminder of the common adage of statutory construction to give words their ordinary meaning. The second case Martin hangs her hat on is Godin, 489 F.3d at 431. In Godin, defendant Jennifer Godin pleaded guilty to obstructing commerce by robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and to using and carrying a firearm, including brandishing the weapon during and in relation to the robbery, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). 489 F.3d at 433. She was sentenced as a career offender to 262 months in prison because of two prior convictions for the burglaries of two different apartments in the same building. Id. at 434. The burglaries had been committed six days apart and were both motivated by a desire for revenge. Id. at 43435, 436. In both instances, Godin knew the victim, had some grievance, kicked in the apartment door and stole various items. Id. at 435. Godin argued that given these factual commonalities, both burglaries should be considered part of a common scheme or plan. Id. at 436. The district court disagreed. Id. Taking up Godin's claims on appeal, we acknowledged that the concept of a single common scheme or plan is a vague one, which lacked a formal test. Id. But a framework did not -16- completely elude us. We reiterated Elwell's dictate that the 'ordinary meaning' of the phrase 'single common scheme or plan' should be used. Id. (citing Elwell, 984 F.2d at 1295). Doing so, we held that a scheme or plan implies some kind of connective tissue like an initial plan encompassing multiple acts or a sequence of steps to a single end. Godin, 489 F.3d at 436 (citing United States v. Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 1999)). This meant (for Godin) that burglaries of two different apartments committed by one actor several days apart need[ed] something more than resemblance of mode or motive even if that were relevant. Id. We concluded that the district court was correct in determining that, despite the factual commonalities, Godin's two burglaries were not part of a single common scheme or plan. Id. The relevant law sketched, we turn to Martin's contention that the district court employed a standard that did not comport with Elwell and Godin. Simply said, she is wrong. Although Godin does not set a hardline standard to work with, it does provide us guidance. From Godin, we know that factual commonalities between offenses are not enough to support a contention that the offenses were part of a single common scheme or plan. After all, the offenses at issue in Godin -- two prior burglaries of different apartments in the same building -- were riddled with factual commonalities, including the same motive for -17- vengeance, yet we placed little weight on them. Rather, something more is needed. That is precisely what the district court required here. Keeping in mind the ordinary meaning dictate, the district court looked for something over and above tangible similarities between the predicate crimes and it reasonably concluded that, to consider multiple drug transactions as part of a single common scheme or plan, the series of transactions ha[d] to be agreed to at the outset. Accordingly, the district court focused its inquiry on whether the second crime was anticipated and planned when the original crime was planned or committed. Indeed neither Elwell or Godin took precisely this same tack, but that is not dispositive. As we explained, determining what constitutes a common scheme or plan is an imprecise science at best. See Godin, 489 F.3d at 436. What is important is the existence of a so-called connective tissue, such as an initial plan encompassing multiple acts or a sequence of steps to a single end. Id. The district court, honing in on Martin's intent,11 looked for a connective tissue -- that is, whether Martin had laid 11 Perhaps the district court could have been more clear about the fact that its inquiry was directed at whether Martin, as opposed to the MDEA agents, had anticipated or planned the October 2001 offense when the September 2001 offense was planned or committed. That it was not, however, is inconsequential. While not expressed in so many words, the single common scheme or plan the district court was looking for was that of the defendant's. -18- an initial plan to conduct multiple drug deals with Duquette or, at the very least, contemplated just such a thing happening. This approach makes sense and is consistent with both Elwell and Godin. Furthermore, some of our sister circuits have read the phrase single common scheme or plan precisely as the district court did here. See United States v. Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 1999)12 (holding that because the terms 'scheme' and 'plan' are words of intention, . . . crimes are part of a single common scheme or plan only if they were jointly planned or when one crime would normally entail the commission of the other); United States v. Irons, 196 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Robinson, 187 F.3d 516, 520 (5th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Chapnick, 963 F.2d 224, 227 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); see also United States v. Chartier, 970 F.2d 1009, 1016 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that the term 'single common scheme or plan' must have been intended to mean something more than simply a repeated pattern 12 In Joy, the Seventh Circuit considered whether a theft conviction and a deceptive practices conviction were related under § 4A1.2(a)(2) as part of a single common scheme or plan. 192 F.3d at 770-72. The court held that it is for the defendant to show he intended to commit both crimes from the outset or he intended to commit one crime which necessarily involved committing the other. Id. at 771. The fact that two crimes have the same modus operandi, are close in time, or are similar in nature does not mean these crimes are related as part of a single common scheme or plan. See id. According to the Seventh Circuit, the test is one of singularity, not similarity. Id. Of note, Marrero, 299 F.3d at 656, the Seventh Circuit case relied on by the district court, cited Joy favorably. -19- of criminal conduct and that the concept involves subjective as well as objective elements). In the end, Martin's argument that she should not be the spotlight of the district court's scrutiny gets her nowhere. The district court's focus on whether Martin planned or contemplated her second offense at the time of her first was not overly narrow as Martin suggests; rather it was in accord with our case law and law from other circuits as well. It was also appropriate for the court to center in solely on Martin's plans and designs. Indeed a dual focus on the intentions of Martin and the MDEA agents (as advocated for by Martin on appeal) makes little sense. The operative inquiry here is whether Martin's crimes should be counted as one or as two for purposes of her sentencing. The only person whose intentions are relevant to that inquiry is Martin. After employing the requisite de novo review, we conclude the district court applied a proper standard.