Opinion ID: 3030093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count 1 – First Amendment Claim4

Text: As the District Court found, the Supreme Court has determined that, while expressive conduct is protected under the First Amendment, “we cannot accept the view that an apparent limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1967). Rather, to determine whether a particular action or pattern of conduct constitutes speech protected under the First Amendment, we must ask whether “an attempt to convey a particularized message was present, and whether the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. State of Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)). The District Court opined that, here, “[Montanye’]s conduct in assisting an at-risk student cope with her emotional and psychological problems does not possess sufficient communicative elements to fall within the protection of the First Amendment.” Therefore, the District Court concluded, and we agree, that while Montanye’s conduct in 4 Though Count 1 of Montanye’s Amended Complaint alleged constitutional violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, which the District Court dismissed, she has elected only to pursue her First Amendment claim on appeal. 7 scheduling K’s therapy sessions, transporting her to those sessions and attending those sessions may have involved some “kernel of expression,” there was no intent to convey any message, let alone a particularized message, supporting special education, and no likelihood that her interactions with K could be “understood” as conveying such a message. Accordingly, we will not disturb the District Court’s finding that Montanye failed to allege that she engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment and its resulting dismissal of Count I.