Opinion ID: 794140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Minimum Deprivation of Liberty

Text: 56 Several times this Court has vacated absolute bans on Internet access because narrower restraints were equally suited to achieving sentencing goals. The district court distinguished those cases on the ground that nothing less will effectively curb Johnson's propensities and protect the community. On this record, that ruling is sound. 57 In the case of an offender who had downloaded and disseminated child pornography through the Internet, an outright ban was held to be more restrictive than needed to serve the sentencing goals of rehabilitation and incapacitation because a combination of monitoring and unannounced inspections would exert the control of an Internet ban while allowing an offender access to the Internet for legitimate purposes. See United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.2002); see also United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 386 (2d Cir.2003) (vacating an Internet ban after the government conceded that it could not stand under Sofsky ); United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 82-84 (2d Cir.2001) (vacating a computer and Internet ban, reasoning that, inter alia, [t]here [was] no indication that Peterson's past incest offense had any connection to computers or to the Internet.). 58 As shown in the thorough record compiled in the district court, Johnson's case differs from those cases on two important grounds: the characteristics of the offender and the nature of his past offenses. 2 59 After a two day evidentiary hearing at which both Johnson and the government called witnesses and presented other evidence, the district court found, inter alia, that Johnson was in denial about his risk of re-offending, had not come to terms with what caused him to commit his crimes, had been less than truthful with his mental heath care providers and with probation, and had acted in a secretive manner concerning his sexual activity. The district court also found credible the testimony of Johnson's treatment provider that these actions suggested that Johnson was at a high risk for re-offending. See United States v. Johnson, No. 97-cr-0206, 98-cr-160, 2005 WL 22680 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2005). These findings are supported by the record. 60 In addition, as Johnson concedes, he is a sophisticated computer user (and an experienced engineer), and the district court found that a person with his skills likely could circumvent the software needed for monitoring. Johnson's employer believes that inappropriate Internet abuse at work would be noticed very rapidly due to the office's public culture, and it may be that co-workers would notice if Johnson were accessing and downloading pornographic images (at least during normal business hours), and that Johnson would strongly prefer to keep such images from the sight of others. However, chatting, emailing and messaging can be conducted without tell-tale screen images, and co-workers may be gone after work hours or on weekends. The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that casual oversight in the workplace would not control a sex offender who is in need of treatment and who has engineering and computer skills that could be used to defeat monitoring by anyone. 61 In determining what condition of release is reasonably necessary to protect the community, a court may of course consider the hazard presented by recidivism. In Sofsky, the likeliest consequence if a less restrictive measure should fail would be that the offender would download and distribute child pornography. Serious as those offenses are, the direct harm to children was inflicted previously, when the pornographic images were made, and the lesser harm caused by trafficking can be largely remedied afterward, by destroying copies of the material and returning the offender to prison. In Johnson's case, the likeliest consequence if a less restrictive measure should fail is that Johnson could use the Internet to locate children and lure them to sexual abuse. The perfectly obvious ground for distinguishing Sofsky from Johnson's case is that here the failure of lesser measures risks direct harm to children that may be devastating and irremediable. 62 As the Seventh Circuit observed in United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir.2003), courts in similar contexts have recognized the importance of considering whether a defendant made outbound use of the Internet to initiate and facilitate victimization of children. Compare United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir.2001) (upholding prohibition where the defendant had used the Internet to provide advice to others on how to find and obtain access to young friends), and United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127-28 (3rd Cir.1999) (upholding prohibition where the defendant had used the Internet to develop an illegal sexual relationship with a young girl over a period of several months), with United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391-92 (3rd Cir. 2003) (vacating prohibition where the defendant was convicted of receipt of child pornography, and noting that the defendant in Crandon [by comparison] had used the Internet to contact young children and solicit inappropriate sexual contact with them. Such use of the Internet is harmful to the victims contacted and more difficult to trace than simply using the Internet to view pornographic web sites), and Holm, 326 F.3d at 874, 879 (vacating prohibition on use of any computer with Internet capability by a defendant convicted of possession of child pornography). 63 We therefore affirm the imposition of the absolute Internet ban as it has been crafted in this case.