Opinion ID: 444550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kawasaki

Text: 16 Kawasaki argues that the finding that it is liable should be set aside because (1) the court admitted irrelevant testimony into evidence, (2) plaintiff failed to prove his case against Kawasaki, (3) plaintiff's summation deprived it of a fair trial, and (4) the verdict against Kawasaki cannot stand in light of the verdict in favor of Cutro. We disagree.
17 Over Kawasaki's objection, plaintiff's experts were permitted to testify as to the instability of the Jet Ski and the difficulties in its operation. The evidence included testimony that a Jet Ski was unstable at slow speeds or when stopped; that neither the range of planing speeds nor the turning radius was disclosed; that a Jet Ski was noisy; that it was difficult to get back on; that a Jet Ski was not suitable for use in towing and rescue operation; and that it was not crashworthy. Kawasaki contends that because Brent was proceeding straight ahead and in a planing position when the accident occurred, the evidence as to the behavior of the craft in any other manner of operation was irrelevant and prejudicial, and hence was improperly admitted. With the obvious exception of the evidence that the Jet Ski could not be used for towing and rescue, all of the items challenged by Kawasaki were properly admitted. 18 Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states in part that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether proffered evidence should be admitted, see United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 513-15 (2d Cir.1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905, 98 S.Ct. 1451, 55 L.Ed.2d 496 (1978), and in general in the absence of a significant showing of unfair prejudice, evidence with substantial probative value should not be excluded, United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 644 (2d Cir.1983). The district court did not abuse its discretion in this case. 19 First, Kawasaki has an unduly narrow conception of relevance. The defendants opposed plaintiff's claims in part on the ground that the accident had been caused by Brent's own negligence. Thus, while the Jet Ski may not have been unstable at the moment of the accident, design flaws and undisclosed parameters for optimal operation were pertinent to the difficulties a beginner such as Brent might have with the Jet Ski, causing him not to notice an approaching boat. If, for example, Brent was forced to concentrate exclusively on staying on the Jet Ski, and in order to maintain his balance was required to forgo turning his head, it is unlikely that he could adequately be alert to imminent dangers. The evidence had substantial probative value, and we see no abuse of discretion in the court's determination that that value outweighed any unfair prejudice to Kawasaki from its admission. In any event, even if one or more of the items complained of should have been excluded, we conclude that it is unlikely that Kawasaki was prejudiced, a conclusion that is supported by the jury's finding that the design defects in the Jet Ski were not a substantial factor in bringing about Brent's injury.
20 The jury found that Kawasaki was negligent in failing to provide adequate warnings of potential dangers associated with foreseeable uses of the Jet Ski and that this failure to warn was a proximate cause of Brent's injury. Because the jury also found that the design defects in the Jet Ski were not a substantial factor in causing Brent's injury, Kawasaki contends that it was entitled to judgment n.o.v. on the ground that the latter determination meant that the design defects were irrelevant and that the failure to warn as to the defects thus could not have been a substantial factor in causing the injury. 21 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, e.g., Fortunato v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 962, 965 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1038, 93 S.Ct. 517, 34 L.Ed.2d 487 (1972), we conclude that there was adequate evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude that Kawasaki breached a duty to warn of potential dangers associated with foreseeable uses of the Jet Ski. There was proof as to the Jet Ski's lack of visibility because of its color and size, its lack of stability, and its unusual handling characteristics. There was testimony that rough water conditions made the craft even more difficult to handle and even less visible to others. Given this evidence and the testimony that the handling characteristics of the Jet Ski forced many novice riders to forgo looking anywhere but straight ahead, the jury was entitled to find both that warnings were required and that the general warnings on the Jet Ski were inadequate.
22 Kawasaki argues that plaintiff's counsel's summation deprived it of a fair trial by repeatedly referring to a letter from Brent to his psychiatrist listing activities that Brent could no longer perform, which letter was not in evidence; by offering counsel's personal opinions; and by making improper attacks on opposing counsel. Kawasaki made no objections to any of these statements during the summation, however, and as it has failed to show any flagrant abuse, its present arguments have been waived. See United States v. Perry, 643 F.2d 38, 51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835, 102 S.Ct. 138, 70 L.Ed.2d 115 (1981); cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 238-39, 60 S.Ct. 811, 851, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940). 23 Even were we to consider Kawasaki's arguments, however, we would find them to be without merit. For example, although Brent's letter to his psychiatrist was not physically admitted into evidence, the list of acts Brent could not perform was before the jury because the psychiatrist had read the list to the jury--without objection from Kawasaki. Much of the material in the letter was also testified to by other witnesses. 24 Nor would the other statements of plaintiff's counsel to which Kawasaki now objects require reversal. We agree that counsel's references to his own hard work were out of place and that counsel could more properly have suggested that certain evidence did not present a complete picture without repeatedly referring to opposing counsel in such disparaging terms as masters of the half-truth. There is no indication in this case, however, that the minds of the jurors [were] so influenced by such incidental statements ... that they would not appraise the evidence [as to Kawasaki's negligence] objectively and dispassionately. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 239, 60 S.Ct. at 851.
25 Finally, we find no merit in Kawasaki's argument that it is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the jury's finding that Cutro was not negligent in renting the Jet Ski to Brent was logically irreconcilable with the jury's finding that Kawasaki was negligent in failing to provide adequate warnings. When a claim is made that a jury's answers to special interrogatories are inconsistent, our responsibility as a reviewing court is to adopt a view of the case, if there is one, that resolves any seeming inconsistency. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 786, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) (Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way.). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the verdicts as to Kawasaki and Cutro are not necessarily inconsistent. 26 It is clear that a manufacturer has a duty to warn of the potential hazards in the use of its products, e.g., Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 65, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1015 (4th Dep't 1980), and the jury was so instructed. The jury was not, however, instructed that Cutro as a vendor of the product also had a duty to warn. The court merely instructed the jury that it was to determine whether Cutro was negligent in renting the Jet Ski--or the motorboat--and if it determined that he was, whether that negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. So far as appears, no party requested an instruction that explained to the jury any duty on the part of Cutro to warn of defects in the Jet Ski manufactured by Kawasaki. And the pertinent interrogatory to the jury asked simply, Was defendant Cutro negligent in renting the Jetski [sic ] to Brent Martell? As the jury was not informed of Cutro's duty to warn, its finding that Cutro was not negligent in renting the Jet Ski has no logical bearing whatever on its finding that Kawasaki was negligent in failing to give warnings. 27 Further, even had the jury been instructed that Cutro had a duty to give warnings, we would not view the jury's findings as necessarily inconsistent. Under New York law, the duty of a manufacturer to warn of potential hazards in its products is sometimes greater than the duty of a mere vendor to warn. See Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 275, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 386, 461 N.E.2d 864 (1984) (The manufacturer and the vendor do not necessarily have the same obligation to warn concerning dangers learned of after delivery of the product ....). The differing duty to warn is grounded in the different information that the manufacturer and the vendor may possess as to the hazards of a product. Id. at 275, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 385, 461 N.E.2d 864. There was evidence in the present case from which the jury could infer that Kawasaki had received reports of accidents involving the Jet Ski and calling into question the safety of its design, and that Kawasaki thereby had knowledge of flaws, defects, or hazards that were not known to Cutro. 28 In sum, the jury was entitled to conclude that Cutro's and Kawasaki's respective duties differed, and to find that Cutro as vendor had satisfied his duty while Kawasaki as manufacturer had not satisfied its duty. Accordingly, there was no inconsistency in the verdicts.