Opinion ID: 2263311
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The trial judge allegedly commented on the evidence when he instructed the jury.

Text: Before trial, the trial judge asked the prosecutor to clarify some general assertions in the indictment. Particularly, the trial judge wanted to know how the jury could distinguish between the eight general counts of Rape. In response the prosecutor explained that he planned to link each count of Rape to specific acts about which Alicia would testify. During closing arguments, the prosecutor did exactly what he suggested before trial. He explained six [60] specific acts that Alicia testified about and linked each act to a count in the indictment. After closing arguments, the trial judge instructed the jury using the same format as the prosecutor: So let me turn to the first offenses, which are Rape in the First Degree. Defendant is charged with six counts of Rape First Degree. And the first four counts are identical and read as follows: Sylvester Miller, between on or about the first day of October, 1998 and the 31st day of December, 2002 in the County of New Castle, State of Delaware, did intentionally engage in sexual intercourse with Alicia Miller, a child who had not yet reached her 16th birthday, and the defendant stands in a position of trust, authority or supervision over the child. Now, while these four counts read alike, each count references a particular act which allegedly occurred and which is characterized as follows: Count I relates to the alleged sexual intercourse the night before Christmas. Count II relates to the alleged sexual intercourse the night Alicia Miller's brother observed her and her father. Count III relates to the alleged sexual intercourse on the night she was allegedly dragged into her father's bedroom to have oral sex. And Count IV relates to the first time Alicia Miller was allegedly forced to have anal intercourse. Now, the remaining two counts of Rape First Degree are similar but reference conduct that occurred between January 1, 2003 and July 27, 2004 after Alicia Miller had turned 14 years of age. And these two counts are identical and state. Sylvester Miller, between on or about the 1st day of January, 2003 and the 27th day of July 2004, in the County of New Castle, State of Delaware, did intentionally engage in sexual intercourse with Alicia Miller, a child who had not yet reached her 16th birthday and the defendant stands in a position of trust, authority and supervision over the child. Again, each count, Counts V and VI reference a particular act which is characterized as follows: Count V relates to the first summer after Alicia Miller had turned 14 and allegedly had anal sex. Count VI relates to the most recent allegation of sexual intercourse just before Alicia Miller went to Florida. For the first time on appeal, Miller contends that the trial judge impermissibly commented on the evidence in violation of Article IV, Section 19 of the Delaware Constitution. We review this issue under the plain error standard. Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. [61] Article IV, Section 19 of the Delaware Constitution states that judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the questions of fact in issue and declare the law. We recently discussed Section 19 of the Delaware Constitution in Herring v. State [62] . There, we stated: Section Nineteen was adopted as a new provision in the 1897 Constitution to ensure that judges confined themselves to making determinations of law and leaving juries to determine the facts. The purpose of the provision was to protect the province of the jury on factual issues. It was not, however, the intention of the framers to impose any restraint on the proper province of the trial judge in either passing upon the legal admissibility of evidence or in instructing the jury on the law. [63] Further, we discussed when a trial judge's comment about a fact would violate the Delaware Constitution: Trial judges may properly combine a statement regarding a fact in issue with a declaration of law. Trial judges may not, however, comment on the facts in their charge to the jury since only juries are entitled to judge the facts. An improper comment or charge as to `matters of fact' is an expression by the court, directly or indirectly, that conveys to the jury `the court's estimation of the truth, falsity or weight of testimony in relation to a matter at issue.' [64] Here, the trial judge acted within the bounds of the Delaware Constitution because none of his statements conveyed the court's estimation of the truth or weight of the testimony. In fact, directly contrary to what Miller suggests, every fact that the trial judge commented upon he described as an allegation. Miller contends, however, that despite framing every fact as an allegation, the trial judge's instruction was an improper comment on the evidence because it correlated the events to the vague indictment. We disagree. The trial judge's combination of the factual allegations with the law ensured that the jury understood how the asserted facts, if true, related to each of the indictment counts. Therefore, the trial judge did not impermissibly comment on the evidence in violation of Article IV, Section 19 of the Delaware Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.