Opinion ID: 2598178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Manifest Constitutional Error

Text: ¶ 52 RAP 2.5(a)(3) does not permit all asserted constitutional claims to be raised for the first time on appeal, but only certain questions of manifest constitutional magnitude. Scott, 110 Wash.2d at 687, 688, 757 P.2d 492. This court has rejected the argument that all trial errors which implicate a constitutional right are reviewable under RAP 2.5(a)(3), noting that [t]he exception actually is a narrow one, affording review only of `certain constitutional questions.' Id. at 687, 757 P.2d 492 (citing Comment (a), RAP 2.5, 86 Wash.2d 1152 (1976)). Exceptions to RAP 2.5(a) must be construed narrowly. WWJ Corp., 138 Wash.2d at 603, 980 P.2d 1257. ¶ 53 Appellate courts will not approve a party's failure to object at trial that could identify error which the trial court might correct (through striking the testimony and/or curative jury instruction). Scott, 110 Wash.2d at 685, 757 P.2d 492. Failure to object deprives the trial court of this opportunity to prevent or cure the error. The decision not to object is often tactical. If raised on appeal only after losing at trial, a retrial may be required with substantial consequences. State v. Madison, 53 Wash.App. 754, 762-63, 770 P.2d 662 (1989). ¶ 54 Manifest in RAP 2.5(a)(3) requires a showing of actual prejudice. Walsh, 143 Wash.2d at 8, 17 P.3d 591; McFarland, 127 Wash.2d at 333-34, 899 P.2d 1251. `Essential to this determination is a plausible showing by the defendant that the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.' WWJ Corp., 138 Wash.2d at 603, 980 P.2d 1257 (quoting Lynn, 67 Wash.App. at 345, 835 P.2d 251). This reading of manifest is consistent with McFarland's holding that exceptions to RAP 2.5(a) are to be construed narrowly. WWJ Corp., 138 Wash.2d at 603, 980 P.2d 1257. If the trial record is insufficient to determine the merits of the constitutional claim, the error is not manifest and review is not warranted. Id. at 602, 980 P.2d 1257; McFarland, 127 Wash.2d at 333, 899 P.2d 1251 (citing State v. Riley, 121 Wash.2d 22, 31, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993)).
¶ 55 No case of this court has held that a manifest error infringing a constitutional right necessarily exists where a witness expresses an opinion on an ultimate issue of fact that is not objected to at trial. Prior decisions in the Court of Appeals have found alleged improper witness opinion testimony not to constitute manifest error. [3] ¶ 56 However, in Kirkman the Court of Appeals relied upon Dolan, 118 Wash.App. at 330, 73 P.3d 1011 and State v. Saunders, 120 Wash.App. 800, 811, 86 P.3d 232 (2004), in concluding that improper witness testimony can be raised for the first time on appeal as a manifest constitutional error. [4] See also State v. Mendoza-Solorio, 108 Wash.App. 823, 834-35, 33 P.3d 411 (2001) (assuming, without deciding, that the facts raised a manifest constitutional error but finding error harmless). ¶ 57 In Carlin, the Court of Appeals did seem to hold that expression of an opinion touching upon a defendant's guilt, not objected to at trial, amounts to a manifest error under RAP 2.5(a)(3). But Carlin's apparent holding in this regard was squarely rejected by the Court of Appeals in Heatley, 70 Wash. App. at 586, 854 P.2d 658. There, the court said it rejected Carlin to the extent it is read as holding that a claim that testimony is an opinion on guilt necessarily alleges a manifest constitutional error that will be considered for the first time on appeal under RAP 2.5(a). Id. (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals noted in Heatley,  Carlin provides no analysis and cites no relevant authority for the proposition that this is the type of `manifest error' contemplated by RAP 2.5(a)(3). Id. at 583, 854 P.2d 658. ¶ 58 In light of the underlying rationale for RAP 2.5(a)(3), Madison and Heatley provide the better approach. Admission of witness opinion testimony on an ultimate fact, without objection, is not automatically reviewable as a manifest constitutional error. Manifest error requires a nearly explicit statement by the witness that the witness believed the accusing victim. Requiring an explicit or almost explicit witness statement on an ultimate issue of fact is consistent with our precedent holding the manifest error exception is narrow. WWJ Corp., 138 Wash.2d at 603, 980 P.2d 1257. ¶ 59 Requiring an explicit or almost explicit statement by a witness is also consistent with this court's precedent that it is improper for any witness to express a personal opinion on the defendant's guilt. State v. Garrison, 71 Wash.2d 312, 315, 427 P.2d 1012 (1967); State v. Trombley, 132 Wash. 514, 518, 232 P. 326 (1925).
¶ 60 It also appears from the respective records that defense counsel for both Kirkman and Candia chose not to object to the testimony for tactical reasons. Kirkman's defense counsel had determined to introduce other testimony of A.D.'s reputation for truthfulness. In Candia, some of the testimony was helpful to defendant, as the Court of Appeals conceded, stating that Dr. Stirling's testimony that it was unlikely the defendant could actually penetrate C.M.D. was favorable to Candia. Candia, 2005 WL 1753622, at , 2005 Wash.App. LEXIS 1871, at . Candia now seeks to appeal the admission of a portion of testimony which [he] obviously wanted to use in challenging his accuser's credibility. Id., 2005 WL 3485971, at , at  (Quinn-Brintnall, C.J., dissenting). ¶ 61 The record in each case also establishes that each jury received specific instructions that they were the sole triers of fact and the sole deciders of the credibility of witnesses. Jury instruction 1 states that jurors are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of what weight is to be given to the testimony of each. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 130. Jury instruction 6 states that jurors are not bound by expert witness opinions, but determin[e] the credibility and weight to be given such opinion evidence. CP at 136. Jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions. See Candia, 2005 WL 1753622, at , 2005 Wash.App. LEXIS 1871, at . This court has even found such instructions relevant (and curative) in claims of judicial comment on the evidence. See Ciskie, 110 Wash.2d at 283, 751 P.2d 1165.
¶ 62 This court's decision respects both the constitutional role and the assumed abilities of juries. The right of jury trial: is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary. State v. Evans, 154 Wash.2d 438, 445, 114 P.3d 627 (2005) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-06, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)). Juries embody the commonsense judgment of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). Only with the greatest reluctance and with clearest cause should judgesparticularly those on appellate courtsconsider second-guessing jury determinations or jury competence. As Judge Learned Hand wrote, Juries are not leaves swayed by every breath. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (D.N.Y. 1923). ¶ 63 There was no explicit statement of opinion on the credibility of the defendants or victims by these witnesses and no objections at trial (for tactical reasons). Thus, there were no manifest constitutional errors in either Kirkman's or Candia's case.