Opinion ID: 842329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: scoring the ovs to determine the minimum sentence

Text: Despite our Drohan decision, defendant argues that one aspect of Michigan's indeterminate sentencing scheme nonetheless violates the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant claims that because his PRV score alone placed him in an intermediate sanction cell, he was entitled to a maximum sentence that did not include prison time. Defendant contends that the sentencing court violated Blakely by engaging in judicial fact-finding to score the OVs, thereby allegedly increasing his maximum sentence from an intermediate sanction to a term of imprisonment. We again reject defendant's argument and affirm defendant's sentence. Generally, when a defendant is sentenced in Michigan, [t]he maximum penalty provided by law shall be the maximum sentence. . . . MCL 769.8(1). Our sentencing guidelines set a range only for a defendant's minimum sentence. MCL 769.34(2). The sentencing court determines a defendant's minimum sentence range by considering together the OVs, the PRVs, and the offense class. MCL 777.21(1). [10] Generally, once the sentencing court calculates the defendant's guidelines range, it must, absent substantial and compelling reasons, impose a minimum sentence within that range. MCL 769.34(2). There are, however, exceptions to this rule. One exception pertains when the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range is 18 months or less. In such cases, the court, unless it articulates substantial and compelling reasons, must impose an intermediate sanction: If the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range for a defendant determined under the sentencing guidelines set forth in chapter XVII is 18 months or less, the court shall impose an intermediate sanction unless the court states on the record a substantial and compelling reason to sentence the individual to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections. An intermediate sanction may include a jail term that does not exceed the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months, whichever is less. [MCL 769.34(4)(a).] MCL 769.31(b) defines intermediate sanction as probation or any sanction, other than imprisonment in a state prison or state reformatory, that may lawfully be imposed. Intermediate sanction includes, but is not limited to, 1 or more of several options, including up to one year in jail, probation with any conditions authorized by law, probation with jail, and other options such as house arrest and community service. [11] We hold that Cunningham does not require us to modify our previous decision. A sentencing court does not violate Blakely by engaging in judicial fact-finding to score the OVs to calculate a defendant's recommended minimum sentence range, even when the defendant's PRV score alone would have placed him in an intermediate sanction cell. Cunningham involved the Supreme Court's examination of California's determinate sentencing law (DSL). In Harper, we described the facts and holding in Cunningham: In Cunningham, the defendant was tried and convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14. The statute defining the offense prescribed three precise terms of imprisonment  lower, middle, and upper term sentences of 6, 12, and 16 years, respectively. The statute that controlled which term a sentencing judge should impose provided that `the court shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.' Circumstances in aggravation or mitigation were to be determined by the court after considering the trial record, the probation officer's report, statements submitted by the parties, the victim, or the victim's family, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing. The judge in Cunningham sentenced the defendant to the 16-year upper term, on the basis of the judge's findings of aggravating facts including the particular vulnerability of the victim and the defendant's violent conduct, which indicated a serious danger to the community. The Cunningham Court concluded that the sentence violated the defendant's rights because an upper term sentence may be imposed only when the trial judge finds an aggravating circumstance. . . . An element of the charged offense, essential to a jury's determination of guilt, or admitted in a defendant's guilty plea, does not qualify as such a circumstance. . . . Instead, aggravating circumstances depend on facts found discretely and solely by the judge. In accord with Blakely, therefore, the middle term prescribed in California's statutes, not the upper term, is the relevant statutory maximum. 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (`[T]he statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. ' (emphasis in original)). Because circumstances in aggravation are found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . the DSL violates Apprendi's bright-line rule: Except for a prior conviction, `any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' 530 U.S., at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435. [ Harper, supra at 620, 739 N.W.2d 523 quoting Cunningham, supra, 127 S.Ct. at 868.] The Supreme Court reiterated its holding from Blakely that [t]he relevant `statutory maximum,' . . . `is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.' Cunningham, supra, 127 S.Ct. at 860, quoting Blakely, supra at 303-304, 124 S.Ct. 2531. After holding that California's DSL violated Blakely, the Court advised California that [o]ther states have chosen to permit judges genuinely `to exercise broad discretion . . . within a statutory range,' which, `everyone agrees,' encounters no Sixth Amendment shoal. Cunningham, supra, 127 S.Ct. at 871, quoting Booker, supra at 233, 125 S.Ct. 738. The Cunningham decision did not modify Blakely. Although California's DSL contains some language facially similar to MCL 769.34(4)(a), further examination of the two sentencing schemes reveals clear differences. Under California's DSL, the defendant was legally entitled to a maximum sentence of 12 years in prison. The DSL did not attach any conditions to the defendant's entitlement to the 12-year maximum sentence. The DSL violated Blakely by allowing the sentencing court to exceed that 12-year maximum sentence on the basis of facts not submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. By contrast, Michigan's sentencing scheme does not entitle defendant to a maximum sentence of an intermediate sanction in the same way that the defendant in Cunningham was entitled to a 12-year maximum sentence. In Michigan, a defendant does not even qualify for an intermediate sanction until after the OVs are scored. MCL 769.34(4)(a) plainly prescribes that a defendant qualifies for an intermediate sanction only [i]f the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range for a defendant determined under the sentencing guidelines . . . is 18 months or less. . . . (Emphasis added.) To determine a defendant's minimum sentence range under the guidelines, the sentencing court must first score the OVs and the PRVs and consider the offense class. MCL 777.21. Thus, under MCL 769.34(4)(a), a defendant does not even qualify for an intermediate sanction until after the court has scored all the sentencing variables, including the OVs, and those variables indicate that the upper limit of the defendant's minimum sentence range is 18 months or less. In other words, a defendant's qualification for an intermediate sanction is contingent on the sentencing court's calculation of all of the defendant's sentencing variables. A defendant has no legal right to have his minimum sentence calculated using only a portion of the statutorily enumerated factors. [12] Upon conviction, a defendant is legally entitled only to the statutory maximum sentence for the crime involved. A defendant has no legal right to expect any lesser maximum sentence. As the Blakely Court stated, whether a defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence makes all the difference insofar as judicial impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned. Blakely, supra at 309, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Thus, a sentencing court does not violate Blakely principles by engaging in judicial fact-finding to score the OVs to calculate the recommended minimum sentence range, even when the scoring of the OVs places the defendant in a straddle cell or a cell requiring a prison term instead of an intermediate sanction cell. The sentencing court's factual findings do not elevate the defendant's maximum sentence, but merely determine the defendant's recommended minimum sentence range, which may consequently qualify the defendant for an intermediate sanction. In this case, the properly scored guidelines gave defendant a recommended minimum sentence range of 5 to 28 months in prison. This placed defendant in a straddle cell, for which the sentencing court had the discretion to impose a minimum sentence of either a prison term with a minimum term within the guidelines range or an intermediate sanction. MCL 769.34(4)(c). [13] Defendant also faced a statutory maximum sentence of 15 years in prison for his conviction of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 750.84; see MCL 769.10. Even if Michigan's intermediate sanction cells are characterized as setting maximum sentences for Blakely purposes, defendant never gained a legal right to an intermediate sanction. Therefore, the sentencing court did not violate Blakely by scoring the OVs and imposing a prison sentence within the guidelines, rather than imposing an intermediate sanction based on defendant's PRV scores alone. Accordingly, we affirm defendant's sentence.