Opinion ID: 2508503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Circuit Court Plainly Erred In Sentencing Vellina To Consecutive Prison Terms Based Upon Uncharged Alleged Misconduct.

Text: Vellina argues that the circuit court plainly erred in sentencing him to consecutive terms of imprisonment based upon uncharged misconduct alleged by the prosecution at the sentencing hearing. We agree. In determining the particular sentence to be imposed, the court must consider a variety of factors [citing HRS § 706-606 [(1993) [8] ]] in exercising its discretion in fitting the punishment to the crime `as well as the needs of the individual defendant and the community.' State v. Nunes, 72 Haw. 521, 524-25, 824 P.2d 837, 839 (1992) (quoting State v. Kumukau, 71 Haw. 218, 225, 787 P.2d 682, 687 (1990)) (footnote omitted) (some brackets added and some in original). Within the range of discretion that the Hawai'i Penal Code affords courts in imposing sentences, HRS § 706-668.5 (1993) [9] authorizes sentencing courts to impose sentences consecutively under certain circumstances. HRS § 706-668.5 (1993) permits consecutive sentencing if multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a criminal defendant at the same time. The legislative purpose of the statute is to give the sentencing court discretion to sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment to run either concurrently or consecutively. Discretionary use of consecutive sentences is properly imposed in order to deter future criminal behavior of the defendant, to insure public safety, and to assure just punishment for the crimes committed. Absent clear evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a sentencing court will have considered all factors before imposing concurrent or consecutive terms of imprisonment under HRS § 706-606 (1993). State v. Tauiliili, 96 Hawai'i 195, 199-200, 29 P.3d 914, 918-19 (2001) (footnotes and citations omitted). At Vellina's sentencing hearing, the deputy prosecuting attorney (DPA) argued for the imposition of consecutive sentences based upon the DPA's claim that Vellina had sold those firearms to a drug dealer for drugs. The DPA offered no proof to substantiate his allegation that Vellina had sold the semi-automatic rifle that he stole to a drug dealer. The circuit court likewise did not question the DPA regarding the basis for his belief that Vellina had sold the firearm to a drug dealer. In sentencing Vellina, the circuit court stated, Now, when I hear that . . . some drug dealer now has . . . an illegal semi-automatic weapon that you stole and transferred to him, I mean, that's pretty damaging to the community. The circuit court proceeded to sentence Vellina, taking into consideration . . ., particularly, the need to make an example of this kind of behavior to the community and to promote community safety, to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling twenty years. In Nunes, this court held that the trial court unconstitutionally punished the defendant for an uncharged crime by sentencing him to thirty days in prison upon determining that the victim in a family court abuse case had lied for the defendant. Because this court could find no evidence that the victim had lied for the defendant except that her testimony conflicted with the statement that she had previously given to the police, we stated that [i]n essence, the judge imposed a sentence for uncharged crimes  either intimidating a witness or tampering with a witness. Id. at 525, 824 P.2d at 840. In the present matter, the circuit court unquestionably determined that Vellina had transferred the semi-automatic firearm to a drug dealer and sentenced him with that in mind. Similar to Nunes, the circuit court imposed punishment for uncharged crimes  possibly either transfer and possession of firearms, pursuant to HRS § 134-4 (1993), or the prohibited transfer of firearms, pursuant to HRS § 134-8 (1993). Id. at 526, 824 P.2d at 840. We see nothing in the record to support the circuit court's conclusion that Vellina transferred a semi-automatic firearm to a drug dealer. Indeed, a presentence investigation report was not even prepared for the present matter. While a court has broad discretion in imposing a sentence, and can consider the candor, conduct, remorse and background of the defendant as well as the circumstances of the crime and many other factors, a judge cannot punish a defendant for an uncharged crime in the belief that it too deserves punishment. Nunes, 72 Haw. at 526, 824 P.2d at 840. As such, it appears that the circuit court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason in sentencing Vellina. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i at 7, 72 P.3d at 479 (citations omitted). Furthermore, because Vellina's rights were substantially affected, we hold that the circuit court plainly erred in sentencing Vellina to consecutive terms of imprisonment based on the unsubstantiated allegation that he had transferred the semi-automatic firearm to a drug dealer.