Opinion ID: 186502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pro Se and Unaffiliated Counsel Petitions

Text: 17 Next, the appellants contend the district court abused its discretion in denying relief under its inherent equitable authority to the late filing claimants who were not represented by class counsel and did not, class counsel contends, receive actual notice of the S & O deadlines. 9 In their motion for relief the appellants cited lack of notice as a changed circumstance supporting modification of the S & O under either Rule 60(b)(5) or the court's inherent authority because Track A decision letters issued after July 14, 2000 mistakenly omitted language informing claimants that they had 120 days from the date of the decision to petition the Monitor for review. Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Relief at 13-14. The district court rejected this argument because the S & O did not require the letters to include such notice and therefore its absence was not a changed circumstance. 10 On reconsideration, the appellants took a different tack, arguing that when class members do not receive actual notice of a deadline by which they must take some action to preserve their claims, and therefore miss the deadline, the District Court may `exercise its equitable authority to excuse the late filings.' Pls.' Reply to Def.'s Resp. to Mot. for Recons. at 11-12 (quoting In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liability Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir.2001) (alteration original)). The appellants further urged the court to apply the excusable neglect standard in exercising its inherent authority as well as the four factors the Third Circuit adopted under the standard in Orthopedic, namely: 18 1) the danger of prejudice to the nonmovant; 2) the length of the delay and its potential effect on judicial proceedings; 3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant; and 4) whether the movant acted in good faith. 19 246 F.3d at 322-23 (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). The district court applied the Third Circuit's formulation and under the first and third factors found no excusable neglect warranting equitable relief because of the potential prejudice to the Department and the appellants' role in drafting the S & O. The court concluded (1) that the government `will be prejudiced to the tune of almost one million dollars if the Court permits consideration of the late petitions and if even five percent of them are successful,' 307 F.Supp.2d at 50 (quoting Pigford v. Veneman, 265 F.Supp.2d at 50), and (2) because the deadlines were negotiated and agreed to by plaintiffs, it logically follows that the resulting failure to meet those deadlines had been within the reasonable control of plaintiffs, id. at 50-51. In so concluding the court did not abuse its discretion. As the district court pointed out in the May 27, 2001 order suspending the deadlines: As part of the bargain struck between the parties and approved by the Court in the Order of July 14, 2000, class counsel agreed to meet the 120 day deadline in return for the government's agreement to admit more than 1,100 Track A claimants into the class who otherwise would have been excluded. 144 F.Supp.2d at 19 n. 2. If the district court had granted the requested relief from the deadlines, the government would have lost the benefit of its bargain — certainty and finality as to its maximum liability as of the agreed upon date — while the claimant class would have recovered the bargained-away right to compensation for claimants filing review petitions beyond the stipulated deadlines (as extended by the court). 11 The prejudice to the government distinguishes this case from In re Orthopedic in which the court found the defendant would suffer no prejudice because the addition of claimants would have no effect on the amount [the defendant] would pay to those aggrieved by its products as its liability had been capped by a settlement agreement. 246 F.3d at 323. Here, because there is no cap, the expansion of the number of successful claimants (which would result from extending the deadline) will substantially expand the Department's monetary liability. See id. (noting consideration of prejudice there was a unique inquiry and expansion of plaintiff class in the ordinary class action will be to the detriment of the defendant); cf. Grace v. Detroit, 145 F.R.D. 413, 417 (E.D.Mich.1992) (Unlike the cases cited by Plaintiff,. . . in this case there is no fixed settlement fund. Every tardy claim accepted would be an expansion of Defendant City's liability for a reason not originally ordered. The total sum of Defendant's liability is yet to be determined, and increases with each successive claimant.). 20 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's orders denying the appellants' motions are affirmed. 21 So ordered.