Opinion ID: 1951916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutor's Characterization of Mitigating Evidence

Text: During the State's penalty-phase opening and closing, the prosecutor stressed to the jury that defendant be required to accept personal responsibility for his acts. The prosecutor urged the jurors to view defendant's mitigating evidence skeptically: Use your common sense. Ask yourselves what they present, is that based on a real fact? Is that based on something or is it an exaggeration? Do they have in mind a specific diagnosis they want to reach and then pick and choose the facts that fit that diagnosis, and then ask yourselves what does that have to do with this man[`s] coldly, calculated, preplanned murder of Keith Donaghy. What it really comes down to is requiring [defendant] to accept personal responsibility, personal responsibility for his acts. [Defendant] is personally responsible for the ultimate act, the killing of the innocent Keith Donaghy. That's the ultimate act and he should be required to accept the ultimate responsibility for that act and that's the death penalty. Defense counsel immediately objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that [t]his is not about the acceptance of responsibility.... [The State is] making it appear like the presentation of mitigating factors is a denial of responsibility, where, in fact, it is a legal right. The prosecutor denied that he implied that the presentation of mitigating evidence was a denial of responsibility. The court denied the motion for a mistrial and declined to provide a curative instruction. Defense counsel directly responded to the prosecutor's contentions about personal responsibility several times during his opening: [T]his phase of this case has nothing to do with acceptance or rejection of responsibility. It has to do with what is an appropriate punishment under all of the circumstances as the law allows. Later on in the opening, defense counsel stressed that [t]hese [mitigating factors] are not excuses. If they were excuses they would be excuses of responsibility and would have been offered as to issues of guilt and innocence. They are not. In closing, defense counsel again reminded the jury that [w]e are not talking about avoiding punishment here. We're merely talking about the measure of punishment. Defense counsel also added that [t]his is no excuse. [It] gets [defendant] no walk in the park. If you spare his life, he would not be eligible, that is, even considered to be released from jail, for 30 real years.... There is no escaping responsibility. During the State's closing, the prosecutor again said the case comes down to personal responsibility. He stated that the aggravating factor outweighed any mitigating factors, and added that the law gives you guidance that the death penalty makes him responsible for his ultimate act. Defendant did not object to the summation comments. During its penalty-phase charge, the court instructed the jury that it is important to remember that evidence of the presence of mitigating factors is not offered to justify or excuse the defendant's conduct. Rather, it is intended to present extenuating facts about the defendant's life or character or the circumstances surrounding the murder that would justify a sentence less than death. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comments improperly distracted the jury from performing their duty to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors by impermissibly characterizing the mitigating evidence as an effort to avoid responsibility. Mitigating evidence is not aimed at excusing or justifying a defendant's conduct; rather, its purpose its to present extenuating facts regarding the defendant's life or character or the circumstances surrounding the murder that would justify a sentence less than death. State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 620, 610 A. 2d 814 (1992)( Bey III )(quoting Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 170, 548 A. 2d 887). For a prosecutor to characterize a mitigating factor as an excuse is improper. Ibid. In Bey III, supra, we determined that because the court sufficiently instructed the jury regarding the purpose of mitigating evidence, the prosecutor's mischaracterization did not have the capacity to cause an unjust result. Id. at 620-21, 610 A. 2d 814. In this case, the prosecutor did not employ the term excuse. Nevertheless, the implication of the prosecutor's reference to personal responsibility is abundantly clear, and is tantamount to labeling mitigating evidence as an excuse. Defense counsel did register a timely objection, unlike in Bey III, id. at 620, 610 A. 2d 814, at least with regard to the State's opening statement. However, also unlike Bey III, defense counsel repeatedly countered the erroneous comments, vigorously arguing on several occasions that the mitigating evidence was not an attempt to excuse defendant's conduct or avoid personal responsibility for the murder. The court's unequivocal instructions also made clear to the jury that the presence of mitigating factors is not offered to justify or excuse the defendant's conduct. Indeed, the instruction tracked the language this Court used in Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 170, 548 A. 2d 887. An immediate curative instruction would have been the preferred remedy. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that defense counsel's effective counter-arguments, along with the court's clear instructions to the jury regarding the purpose of mitigating evidence, combined to render any prosecutorial misconduct harmless. This jury was made well aware of their responsibility and the proper role mitigating evidence was to play in the discharge of that responsibility.