Opinion ID: 1717179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Due Process Requires the Appointment of Counsel.

Text: ¶ 25. The mother also argues on appeal that due process required that counsel be appointed to represent her at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. Because the chancellor did not appoint counsel to represent her, she asserts that the chancellor erred. She cites Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) and K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds County Department of Human Services, 771 So.2d 907 (Miss.2000) in support of her argument. Alternatively, she claims that the chancery court should have granted her a continuance so that she could obtain an attorney to represent her. ¶ 26. DHS contends that the mother was not entitled to appointed counsel because the presence of counsel would not have altered the outcome of the hearing. DHS also states that the decision to grant or deny a continuance falls within the discretion of the chancery court. DHS claims that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion by failing to grant a continuance given that it was in the best interest of the children to proceed with the hearing and because the mother had five months in which to obtain an attorney for the hearing. ¶ 27. This Court proceeds de novo if the chancellor has misapprehended the controlling rules of law or has acted pursuant to a substantially erroneous view of the law. S.N.C. v. J.R.D., 755 So.2d 1077, 1080 (Miss.2000); see also Dunbar v. Renfroe, 876 So.2d 308, 312 (Miss.2004) ([T]he chancery court's interpretation and application of the law is reviewed under a de novo standard.); C.T. v. R.D.H., 843 So.2d 690, 706 (Miss.2003) ([W]e apply a de novo standard of review on questions of law). The issue presented here is whether due process, in a particular case, requires that counsel be appointed for an indigent parent in a termination of parental rights hearing. This is a question of law and we review de novo. ¶ 28. In Lassiter, the Supreme Court weighed the Mathews procedural due process factors for the termination of parental rights against the presumption that there is no right to appointed counsel in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of physical liberty. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27-32, 101 S.Ct. 2153 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976)). The Supreme Court concluded that the Constitution and due process do not require the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding, and that the right to counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32, 101 S.Ct. 2153. The Supreme Court indicated that the trial court must make this decision in the first instance and that the trial court's decision is subject to appellate review. Id. at 32, 101 S.Ct. 2153. In Lassiter, the Supreme Court found that the parent was not entitled to the appointment of counsel because the case did not involve 1) allegations of neglect or abuse upon which criminal charges could be based; 2) expert witness testimony; or 3) specially troublesome points of law, either procedural or substantive. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the presence of counsel would not have resulted in a determinative difference and that the trial court did not err by failing to appoint counsel for the parent. Id. at 32-33, 101 S.Ct. 2153. ¶ 29. In K.D.G.L.B.P., this Court found that the parent was not entitled to the appointment of counsel and had received a fair and adequate hearing. K.D.G.L.B.P., 771 So.2d at 911. This Court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Lassiter to the facts of the case and found that the parent had ample notice of the hearing such that she could have obtained counsel, that she never requested a continuance or additional time to obtain counsel, that she never mentioned that she was indigent, and that the presence of counsel would not have made a determinative difference. Id. ¶ 30. In this case, the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights was filed on August 28, 2006. On September 6, 2006, the chancery court issued a Special Order Setting Case for Trial for December 4, 2006 stating that [t]he Clerk of this Court will issue process in the time and manner prescribed by law for the Respondent, [J.C.N.F.], to appear and defend at the above specified date, time and place. The hearing was continued from December 4, 2006 until February 5, 2007 because the first chancellor had to recuse herself. ¶ 31. At the beginning of the termination hearing on February 5, 2007, the chancellor asked the mother, who appeared without counsel, if she was prepared to proceed. She first responded [y]es, sir, but when asked again, she stated I don't know, sir. The chancellor then asked if she planned on representing herself and she said [n]o, sir. She explained that she had intended to obtain an attorney through a free service, but that there had been a problem. She added that she had been unable to hire an attorney on her own because she depends on Social Security benefits and had been babysitting in order to earn money, but did not have enough money to hire an attorney. However, during the hearing, she testified that she took care of other people's children voluntarily without pay, and had taken time off from babysitting during the month prior to the termination hearing. ¶ 32. The DHS attorney responded that the mother had two months from the December 4, 2006 hearing to obtain an attorney. The chancellor then decided to proceed with the hearing because the guardian ad litem claimed that the best interest of the children would be furthered by proceeding with the hearing, rather than delaying a decision regarding parental rights. The chancellor stated that I'm going to proceed this morning, because [sic] if it turns out that things are not fair, I will stop it and continue it to a later date. ¶ 33. This Court now turns to the guideposts provided by the Supreme Court in Lassiter whether the hearing involved potentially criminal allegations of neglect or abuse, expert testimony, or troublesome points of law. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32, 101 S.Ct. 2153. The petition alleges in part that [t]here is a substantial erosion of the relationship between the Minor Petitioners and the Respondent, [J.C.N.F.], which was caused at least in part by said Respondent's serious abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence, unreasonable failure to visit or communicate constituting grounds for termination of her parental rights. (Emphasis added). Based on these allegations, the mother could be prosecuted pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 97-5-39(1). Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-39(1) (Rev.2006) (stating that willful acts or omissions of the accused resulting in the neglect, delinquency, or abuse of a child is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment for up to one year; further stating that if the neglect of the child results in substantial harm to the child's health, the accused may be fined up to $5,000 or imprisoned for up to five years). ¶ 34. On the other hand, the case did not involve expert testimony, nor did it involve specially troublesome points of law. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32, 101 S.Ct. 2153. Also, this Court finds that the presence of counsel would not have made a determinative difference, although it may have greatly changed the hearing transcript now before this Court. See id. at 33, 101 S.Ct. 2153; K.D.G.L.B.P., 771 So.2d at 910-11. An attorney would have been able to present the mother's testimony in a more persuasive manner or object to inadmissible evidence, but one of the bases on which the chancellor terminated parental rights would remain unaffected by the presence of counsel. In other words, this Court cannot say that the presence of an attorney would have precluded the chancellor from finding that parental rights should be terminated based on Mississippi Code Section 93-15-103(3)(h). An attorney could not have refuted the fact that the children had been adjudicated neglected, that they had been placed with DHS pursuant to Section 43-15-13, and that the youth court had recommended that parental rights be terminated. Those occurrences had already taken place prior to the termination hearing, and an attorney could not have changed the factual history of the case. ¶ 35. Moreover, this Court notes that the mother had four or five months in which to find a legal services organization to represent her or to raise funds to hire an attorney. She was fully aware of the pending proceeding, and was certainly aware of the fact that her children had been in DHS custody for more than one year. She appeared at numerous hearings, including the termination hearing at issue, in which she actively participated and attempted to represent herself, to object to the admission of evidence, and to question witnesses. The chancellor also made efforts to assist the mother by examining witnesses when she was unable to do so, as well as directing her own testimony when she was unable to present a persuasive case for the return of her children. ¶ 36. Based on Lassiter and K.D.G.L.B.P., this Court concludes that J.C.N.F. was not unconstitutionally deprived of counsel or of due process. Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153; K.D.G.L.B.P., 771 So.2d 907. ¶ 37. The mother also argues that the chancellor should have granted a continuance so that she could obtain an attorney. [1] This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny a continuance for an abuse of discretion and will only reverse if manifest injustice resulted from the decision. Jacobs v. State, 870 So.2d 1202, 1205 (Miss.2004) (citation omitted). There is nothing in the record to indicate that the mother deserved a continuance or that she would have been able to secure counsel had she been granted a continuance. Again, she had four or five months' notice of the termination proceeding. Furthermore, it appears that she faced a similar situation in youth court in 2005. The Disposition Order from the youth court dated April 14, 2005 states that [J.C.N.F.] was advised of her right to and the need to obtain legal counsel at the Shelter hearing on March 4, 2005, and ... [she] was granted a continuance March 23, 2003, in order to obtain counsel, and ... [she] has not retained counsel after having adequate time and notice to do so. The youth court then proceeded with the disposition hearing. ¶ 38. Based on the best interest of the children, the length of time during which J.C.N.F. could have obtained an attorney, and the fact that she had problems obtaining counsel for youth court hearings, this Court cannot find that the chancellor abused his discretion in deciding to proceed with the termination hearing. We also cannot say that a manifest injustice resulted from the failure to grant a continuance.