Opinion ID: 3030042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the prohibition on “access to any on-line

Text: COMPUTER SERVICE” Antelope’s final argument challenges as overbroad the supervised release term prohibiting him from “possess[ing] or from use and derivative use [provided by 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003] is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination”). Kastigar, of course, does not insulate Antelope from prosecution altogether, just from the “use and derivative use” of compelled admissions in trial against him. Id. UNITED STATES v. ANTELOPE 1175 us[ing] a computer with access to any ‘on-line computer service’ at any location (including employment) without the prior written approval of the probation department.” [10] As Antelope acknowledges, we recently rejected precisely such a challenge in Rearden. See id. at 620-21. He argues, however, that his case should be treated differently because his crime involved less use of the Internet and was less severe than Rearden’s. Although there is some appeal to this nuance, the Internet was nevertheless essential to the commission of Antelope’s crime: He first contacted the federal agents through joining a child pornography-oriented online group. Added to the evidence suggesting that Antelope’s crime was one step on a path towards more serious transgressions, there is enough to justify the imposition of the term “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant” and “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2)(B) & (C). We affirm the imposition of this provision of Antelope’s supervised release.