Opinion ID: 2319916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Narrative Statement

Text: I would conclude, however, that the defendant's narrative statement resulted from improper police conduct, in violation of Miranda and Edwards. For this reason, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the defendant's narrative statement must be suppressed. Because I disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion that the initial, improper interrogation never ceased, I reach my conclusion on a different basis. Although the initial, improper interrogation ended when the defendant invoked his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the defendant's narrative statement resulted from further, improper interrogation, and, therefore, it must be suppressed pursuant to Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, which prohibits police from engaging in further interrogation of a suspect after the suspect has invoked his right to counsel. The Edwards rule is implicated when the suspect (1) invokes his right to counsel, and (2) is subjected to further interrogation by the police. Id., at 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880. The defendant's narrative statement in the present case implicates this doctrine. By the time the defendant made his narrative statement, he previously had invoked his right to counsel. After the defendant made his first and second statements, the officers told the defendant that they would like to speak with him and asked whether he wanted to waive his rights and to speak with them without counsel. The police also asked whether the defendant minded if they wrote down what the defendant would say. The record demonstrates that these statements were posed to the defendant in a manner that indicated that the officers desired to question him to obtain a statement about the murder and conveyed their desire that he waive his rights. Because these questions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, I would conclude that the defendant made his narrative statement after further interrogation, which occurred after he had invoked his right to counsel. Therefore, to admit the defendant's narrative statement, the state must demonstrate that there was compliance with Edwards. [7] Applying the requirements of Edwards to the facts of the present case, I am persuaded that the narrative statement should have been suppressed. In accordance with Edwards, if statements that the defendant made in response to further interrogation are to be admissible, the state must prove that the defendant (1) initiated, and did not merely continue, the discussion with police, and (2) knowingly and intelligently revoked his earlier invocation of his right to counsel. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044-45, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (opinion announcing judgment). The state cannot meet its burden of establishing that the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and intelligent because the police never informed the defendant of his Miranda rights. [8] For this reason, I would conclude that the defendant's narrative statement resulted from further interrogation by the police in violation of Edwards and should have been suppressed. Finally, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the admission of the defendant's narrative statement constituted harmful error, and this is not altered by my previous conclusion that the defendant's second statement was properly admitted. Although the defendant admitted in his second statement that he had gone to Stamford, presumably on the day of the murder, to look for work, it did not contain the kind or degree of detailed information that the defendant provided in his narrative statement. Significantly, the second statement did not contain the specific admission by the defendant that he had gone to the victim's home on the day of the murder, as he had admitted in his narrative statement. In view of the fact that the state relied heavily on the admissions that were set forth exclusively in the defendant's narrative statement, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the admission of the defendant's narrative statement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I concur in the majority opinion insofar as the majority reverses the defendant's conviction and remands the case for a new trial, concludes that the defendant's constitutional right against double jeopardy was not violated and concludes that the defendant's narrative statement should have been suppressed. I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as the majority concludes that the officers did not honor the defendant's invocation of his rights, that the improper interrogation never ceased, and that the defendant's first and second statements should have been suppressed.