Opinion ID: 787816
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Disclose Statements

Text: 42 Hicks claims that, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Ohio Criminal Rule 16(B)(1)(a)(ii), the prosecution failed to provide him with inculpatory statements he made to Cincinnati police officers. During the guilt phase of Hicks's trial, Officer Hennekes testified on cross-examination that during an interview between him, Officer Hoffman, and Hicks, he asked what Hicks thought would happen as a result of the murders. Hicks allegedly responded, They will probably give me the electric chair. Officer Hennekes then asked, Don't you think you should get the electric chair for what you did? Hicks responded, Yeah, I do. This was the first time defense counsel learned of these statements. Upon completion of this testimony, Hicks moved for a mistrial premised upon the prosecution's failure to comply with his pretrial discovery request, which the trial court denied. Hicks's counsel never requested that the testimony be stricken from the record or for an admonition to the jury to disregard the testimony. 43 Officer Hoffman's notes of Hicks's interview do not includes these statements. Both parties agree that this information was not given to the defense prior to trial; however, the prosecution could not recall if it was aware of these statements prior to trial. Officer Hennekes's testimony is the only evidence that Hicks uttered these statements. Hicks insists that these statements were inherently and inordinately prejudicial because they conveyed to the jury Hicks'[s] apparent acquiescence in the correctness of a recommendation of death as the appropriate penalty in his case. 44 To the extent Hicks premises his argument upon Ohio Criminal Rule 16(B)(1)(a)(ii), there is no constitutional violation cognizable on habeas. See Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 441 (6th Cir.2002); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (habeas corpus proceedings may be entertained only if Hicks is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States). To the extent that Hicks states an alleged constitutional violation under Brady, however, he was denied a fair trial only if the prosecutorial misconduct was so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of [his] trial, or so gross as probably to prejudice [him]. United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 577 (6th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). 45 Brady requires that the government turn over evidence in its possession to the defense that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Pursuant to Brady, evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The Brady rule does not assist a defendant who is aware of essential facts that would allow him to take advantage of the exculpatory evidence at issue. Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 438 (6th Cir.2001). 46 There is no Brady violation here since there is no evidence that the prosecution knew of Hicks's statements before trial. These statements were elicited during Hicks's cross-examination of Officer Hennekes, not on direct examination by the prosecution. Moreover, as Hicks allegedly uttered these statements, he knew whether he made them and could have advised his counsel accordingly. See Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir.2000) ([N]o Brady violation if the defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of the information in question....). Although Hicks claims that the statements were material to his punishment, i.e., that he believed the death penalty was the appropriate penalty for his crimes, he was not sentenced to death for both murders. Hicks's belief that he would be sentenced to death is also consistent with his expression of remorse during the penalty phase of his trial. Hicks was not denied a fair trial because the result of the proceeding would not have been different.