Opinion ID: 1125233
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the circuit court committed reversible error in giving conflicting jury instructions.

Text: ¶ 6. The trial judge instructed the jury on the crime of murder, on the lesserincluded offense of manslaughter, and on excusable homicide. Jury Instruction S-8 discussed the time frame required for formulating malice aforethought and premeditated design. Jury Instruction S-8 stated: The Court instructs the jury that while malice aforethought is a necessary ingredient to the crime of Murder, that malice aforethought does not necessarily mean hatred or ill will and need not exist in the mind of the Defendants for any definite time, not for hours, days or even minutes, but if there is malice aforethought and a premeditated design to kill and it exists in the mind of the Defendants but for an instant before the fatal act, this is sufficient premeditation and malice aforethought to constitute the offense of Murder, unless the killing is justifiable. (emphasis added.) ¶ 7. The court also instructed the jury on excusable homicide. Jury Instruction D 9 informed the jury that a killing shall be excusable when committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation. ¶ 8. Fears argues that allowing the jury to find premeditated design to kill at the instant of the shooting negates the possibility of a finding of an excusable killing in the heat of passion. Thus, he maintains that the jury instructions on excusable homicide and on premeditated design are in conflict. ¶ 9. This Court's standard of review in looking at jury instructions is [i]n determining whether error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 782 (Miss.1997) (quoting Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918 (Miss.1997)). ¶ 10. We first address Fears's assignment of error to reiterate the necessity that counsel make specific objections in order to preserve a question for appellate review. The Court of Appeals correctly held that this issue was procedurally barred because Fears did not object to the conflicting instructions and did not assign the issue as error in his motion for new trial. The fact that the defense did not object to the jury instructions is determinative in this case because [w]e accept without hesitation the ordinarily sound principle that this Court sits to review actions of trial courts and that we should undertake consideration of no matter which has not first been presented to and decided by the trial court. Barnes v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 733 So.2d 199, 202 (Miss.1999). This Court has held specifically that errors based on the granting of an instruction will not be considered on appeal unless specific objections stating the grounds are made in the trial court. Oates v. State, 421 So.2d 1025, 1030 (Miss. 1982) (citing Collins v. State, 368 So.2d 212 (Miss.1979)). A trial judge will not be found in error on a matter not presented to him for decision. Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 37 (Miss.1998); Bender v. North Meridian Mobile Home Park, 636 So.2d 385, 389 (Miss.1994). ¶ 11. Fears relies upon Duvall v. State, 634 So.2d 524 (Miss.1994), for the argument that the failure of his attorney in the case at bar to object to the instruction does not prevent this Court from reversing the conviction. In Duvall, we held that the trial court erroneously granted State's Instruction S-2, which provided that deliberate design can originate at the very moment of the act of violence. Id. at 525. We held this to be reversible error, despite the fact that defense counsel failed to object. We stated: There is no reason for the prosecuting attorney and the circuit judge to be unaware of the clear holding in Windham, and S-2 should never have been offered by the State or granted by the circuit judge.... Where, however, the State offers and the circuit judge grants and instruction which we have clearly held is erroneous, we are not going to hold defense counsel to the same degree of diligence he has on instructions this Court has not ruled upon. Id. at 525-26 (citing Windham v. State, 520 So.2d 123 (Miss.1987)). ¶ 12. The instruction held to be erroneous in Windham stated that deliberate design may be formed at the very moment of the fatal act. Windham, 520 So.2d at 125. Thus, the trial court and prosecutor in Duvall had ample notice that an instruction which stated that deliberate design can originate at the very moment of the act of violence was clearly erroneous. The instruction in the case at hand, however, stated that premeditated design may be formed an instant before the fatal act. Windham does not constitute clear notice to a trial judge or prosecutor that the instruction at issue in this case was clearly erroneous. Thus, there is no reason not to hold defense counsel to the same degree of diligence to which this Court has repeatedly held that it will be held. The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that this issue was procedurally barred because Fears did not object to the instructions. Because Fears failed to object to the granting of this particular jury instruction, his claim is procedurally barred. Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 596 (Miss.1995). ¶ 13. Without relaxing the bar, this Court also alternatively looks to the merits of Fears's claim. Fears maintains that the jury instructions on excusable homicide and on premeditated design are in conflict and relies on Windham in support of his position. In Windham, we considered a deliberate design instruction where the jury was instructed on both murder and heat of passion manslaughter. The Court stated: [I]t is a contradiction in terms to state that a deliberate design can be formed at the very moment of the fatal act. Moreover, it is possible for a deliberate design to exist and the slaying nevertheless be no greater than manslaughter.... It can thus be seen that this special murder instruction granted the State rules out manslaughter, and is in hopeless conflict with the manslaughter instruction. Id. at 126 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also Cooley v. State, 346 So.2d 912, 914 (Miss.1977). This Court held that instructing the jury that a deliberate design can arise at the instant of the killing conflicts with a heat of passion excusable homicide instruction and is reversible error. ¶ 14. The present instruction, however, is not the same instruction prohibited by Windham, because Windham merely states that a deliberate design cannot be formed at the very moment of the fatal act. Windham mentions nothing in regard to whether a deliberate design may be formed prior to the fatal act as did the instruction here. ¶ 15. Furthermore, there was no error with the deliberate design instruction the jury was given. It has long been the case law of this state, that malice aforethought, premeditated design, and deliberate design all mean the same thing. Jones v. State, 710 So.2d 870, 876 (Miss. 1998). Moreover, deliberate design may be formed very quickly, and perhaps only moments before the act of consummating the intent. Id. at 877. Consequently, the jury instructions were not in conflict, and the jury was properly instructed.