Opinion ID: 1944074
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Revocation Case

Text: The Board determined that by omitting Peel from the list of parties to be noticed, White had violated Environmental Board Rule 10(F) [2] and, therefore, revoked his permits under Board Rule 38(A)(2)(b), which provides [t]he board may after hearing revoke a permit if it finds that:... (b) the applicant or successor in interest has violated the terms of the permit or any permit condition, the approved terms of the application, or the rules of the board. White argues on appeal, however, that his failure to list Peel was not a violation of a Board rule and therefore should be analyzed instead under Board Rule 38(A)(2)(a) (providing that the Board may revoke a permit if it determines an applicant willfully or with gross negligence submitted inaccurate, erroneous, or materially incomplete information in connection with [a] permit application). More specifically, he argues that he complied with Board rules by providing a list of parties to be noticed, but that it was inaccurate and incomplete because of the omission of Peel. Therefore, the Board should not have revoked the permits given its finding that White had not done so willfully or with gross negligence. The State, like the Board, relies on our decision in In re Conway, 152 Vt. 526, 567 A.2d 1145 (1989), for the proposition that failure to list an adjoining landowner on a permit application voids a permit, no matter how long the permit has stood. [3] The Board has taken a similar position in other cases. See, e.g., In re Mt. Mansfield Co. d/b/a Stowe Mountain Resort, # 5L0646-3-EB (Revocation) (Apr. 26, 1994) (denying a motion to dismiss a petition for revocation and concluding that allegation that permittee had violated a rule of the Board by failing to provide notice to an adjoining landowner was sufficient despite lack of allegation of willfulness or gross negligence), dismissed, In re Mt. Mansfield Co. d/b/a Stowe Mountain Resort, # 5L0646-3-EB (Revocation) (June 22, 1994) (dismissing matter following adjoining landowner's motion to withdraw his petition for revocation); In re Bickford, # 5W1093-EB (Revocation) (Apr. 22, 1993) (dismissing petition for revocation as moot based on determination that permit was void ab initio for lack of notice to adjoining landowner). This represents an over-extension and misapplication of our holding in In re Conway, however, and is an application of the decision to fact patterns In re Conway was not intended to reach or address. In In re Conway, we affirmed a decision of the Board that voided a permit issued by the district commission and remanded for a new hearing following the appeal of the decision to issue the permit by an adjoining landowner who had not been listed on the permit application and had therefore not received notice in time to participate in the district commission proceedings. 152 Vt. at 527-28, 567 A.2d at 1145-46. In effect, the Board was vacating the decision of the commission to issue the permit and remanding for a new hearing on the permit application. Significantly, the permit application process had not run its course in that case, as the decision to issue the permit itself was being appealed to the Board. More importantly, we agreed with the Board in that case that the district coordinator had acted ultra vires when he had allowed the permit applicants to decide whether to list certain adjoining property owners on their permit application and thereby to decide whether the adjoiners received notice. See id. at 530, 567 A.2d at 1146. We concluded that this was not the exercise of discretion regarding whether to provide personal notice to adjoining landowners contemplated by 10 V.S.A. § 6084 and the Board's own Rule 10(F), but rather was an impermissible delegation of discretion to the applicants themselves. Id. Therefore, the Board's decision to nullify the proceedings at that point in the application process was proper, not because the applicants had violated Rule 10(F) by not listing the adjoining landowners, but because the district coordinator, and the district commission by ratifying his act, had failed to adhere to their own rules by allowing the applicants in effect to decide who received notice. In other words, In re Conway does not stand for the proposition that an applicant's failure to list an adjoining landowner on a permit application somehow renders that permit void or even that it is a violation of a Board rule; rather it simply stands for the proposition that the district coordinator and the district commissions must adhere to their own established procedures for processing permit applications, and failure to do so is reversible error. Given that In re Conway does not require the Board to void or revoke permits merely based on the inadvertent omission of an adjoining landowner from the list required on permit applications no matter when this oversight is discovered, we question the wisdom of the Board's interpretation of Rule 38(A)(2)(b) to allow such a result. [4] This case is instructive in this regard. As the result of the Board's decision to revoke White's permit and its requirement that he initiate an entirely new permit application process as the appropriate corrective action, several perhaps unforseen consequences ensued. The most noteworthy consequence is the participation of several other of White's neighbors who, although they were properly noticed and did participate in the original proceedings, were allowed to submit new, additional evidence regarding the impacts of White's activities on their properties in the context of the new permit proceedings. The neighbors were also granted, via their participation in the new permit proceedings, a hearing in the revocation proceedings for which they were originally denied party status. Lastly, White was faced with the prospect that he would be denied a permit entirely for the activities which he had been carrying on for a number of years and with respect to which he had made considerable investments. All of these consequences stemmed from the inadvertent omission of one adjoining landowner from an otherwise complete list. It is difficult to imagine that the Legislature contemplated such a result flowing from 10 V.S.A. § 6090(c) (providing that Act 250 permits may be revoked for violation of any conditions attached to any permit or the terms of any application, or violation of any rules of the board). Such a result counsels against the interpretation the Board has given to Rule 38(A)(2)(b). Furthermore, if the grant of authority by the Legislature to the Board found in § 6090(c) does allow for such a result, it is unfortunate that an inadvertent omission can serve as such a pitfall to permittees years after they have completed the permitting process. We are confronted with a difficult obstacle, however. White argues on appeal that fact patterns such as the one presented in this case should be analyzed exclusively under Rule 38(A)(2)(a) (requiring a showing that the predicate acts for revocation be done willfully or with gross negligence) and that the inadvertent omission of an adjoining landowner from a permit application does not constitute a violation of a Board rule pursuant to Rule 38(A)(2)(b). White did not raise this argument at any stage before the Board and is presenting it for the first time on appeal. In his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law following the initial hearing on the petition by Peel to revoke his permits, White did argue that his permits should not be revoked under subsection (2)(a) because he did not omit Peel wilfully or with gross negligence. Furthermore, White attempted to distinguish In re Conway and In re Bickford factually from his case. White did so, however, in the context of his argument that the remedy under subsection (2)(b) for the failure to list an adjoiner in his case should not be revocation, based on his contention that Peel had failed to adequately indicate any impact on his property from the activities. He did not raise or address the Board's application of subsection (2)(b) so as to allow for revocation based on a failure to list an adjoiner, or, alternatively, its interpretation of In re Conway that such a failure somehow renders a permit void ab initio. In other words, White never presented the argument that inadvertent omissions of adjoining landowners from the application did not constitute a violation of a Board rule under 38(A)(2)(b). In fact, it does not appear that the issue of White's omission of Peel constituting a violation of Board Rule 10(F) was ever in dispute. At several later stages in both the revocation proceedings and the new permit proceedings, White continued to argue regarding the proper corrective action under Rule 38(A)(2)(b), but the issue of violation was not brought to the Board's attention. We have repeatedly stressed that we will not address arguments not properly preserved for appeal. In re Whitney, 168 Vt. 209, 214-15, 719 A.2d 875, 879 (1998); Passion v. Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 166 Vt. 596, 599, 689 A.2d 459, 463 (1997) (mem.). Furthermore, [t]o properly preserve an issue for appeal a party must present the issue with specificity and clarity in a manner which gives the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on it. State v. Ben-Mont Corp., 163 Vt. 53, 61, 652 A.2d 1004, 1009 (1994). The very purpose of the preservation rule is to ensure that the original forum is given an opportunity to rule on an issue prior to our review. Deyo v. Kinley, 152 Vt. 196, 200, 565 A.2d 1286, 1289 (1989). We have been particularly solicitous regarding this requirement in the context of appeals from the Board, given that preservation is statutorily required as part of the Act 250 scheme. See In re Denio, 158 Vt. 230, 234-36, 608 A.2d 1166, 1168-70 (1992) (holding that even jurisdictional challenges must be raised before the Board as a prerequisite to their consideration on appeal by this Court); 10 V.S.A. § 6089(c) (No objection that has not been urged before the board may be considered by the supreme court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.). The Legislature, through § 6089(c), has restricted our discretion in the matter. We are thus foreclosed from addressing the issue of whether the inadvertent omission of an adjoining landowner from an otherwise complete list of adjoiners constitutes a violation of a Board rule pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 6090(c) and Rule 38(A)(2)(b). Additionally, the argument that an incomplete list does constitute compliance with Board Rule 10(F) and therefore cannot serve as the basis for revocation absent a finding that an omission was willful or grossly negligent under Rule 38(A)(2)(a) is better addressed by the Board in the first instance, where it can bring to bear its experience and expertise in the administration of the Act 250 permit application process. White also argues that he was not accorded due process of law regarding the DPA's request that the Board enforce its September 1996 order requiring him to comply with the conditions in the revoked permits in order to continue operating under them and that the Board erroneously denied his motion for a rehearing on this basis. White contends that he was entitled to the benefit of the procedures outlined in Board Rule 38 with regard to the DPA's request and that the Board failed to strictly adhere to those procedures, thereby depriving him of due process. White's argument rests on the premise that the DPA's filing was in fact a petition for revocation rather than a request for enforcement of the Board's order. A petition for revocation triggers the procedures outlined in Board Rule 38 which include specific requirements regarding the contents of the petition, treatment as an initial pleading in a contested case and the requirement that a permittee be given an opportunity to correct [u]nless there is a clear threat of irreparable harm to public health, safety, or general welfare or to the environment. The DPA's request, however, was not a new petition for revocation, but rather simply sought enforcement of the Board's prior order. [5] Furthermore, the Board possessed the inherent authority, if not an obligation, to determine whether White was complying with its own order. Cf. VSEA (Health Care) v. State, 161 Vt. 600, 601, 643 A.2d 231, 231-32 (1993) (mem.) (observing that Labor Relations Board refusal to order State to bargain in good faith under its statutory authority to issue cease and desist orders was an abrogation of its lawful authority to enforce its orders). There are no rules that explicitly govern the procedure for determining compliance with and seeking enforcement of the Board's orders. Given this absence, we must assess the process afforded to White in light of the factors enumerated by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), to determine whether White was deprived of his constitutional right to due process in this case. Given that the Board provided notice to White that it would be determining his compliance with its September 1996 order, specifically his compliance with certain conditions in his revoked permits; afforded White the opportunity to prefile testimony and objections to the DPA's prefiled testimony; conducted a hearing in which White was able to cross-examine the DPA's witnesses; and permitted White to file a written closing argument post-hearing, we cannot say that White was deprived of due process in the Board's proceeding to determine his compliance with its order. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 (listing factors to be considered when evaluating due process claim); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (listing elements such as adequate notice, the opportunity to present evidence, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, an opportunity to be represented by an attorney and a neutral decision-maker as potential components of constitutionally sound proceedings). Therefore, we will not disturb the decision of the Board making revocation of White's permits final.