Opinion ID: 307739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: failure to report for physical examination

Text: 17 Appellant argues that as a conscientious objector he was not under a legal duty to obey an order to report for a physical examination and thus is entitled to reversal of his conviction for failing to report for such an examination. The law is settled that the order to report for a physical examination sent to a registrant classified I-O does not impose a duty required of him under the Selective Service Act and he cannot be prosecuted for failure to report for the examination. United States v. Walsh, 279 F.Supp. 115 (D.Mass. 1968). However, this court has held that a registrant who is not classified I-O may not assert, as a defense to a charge of failing to appear to be physically examined, that his right to a I-O classification has been abridged. United States v. Dombrouski, 445 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1971). 4 18 Additionally, appellant argues that he should have been charged and convicted only of the failure to report for induction, on the ground that the order to report for induction cancelled the previous order to report for a physical examination. Under the authority of 32 C.F.R. Sec. 1631.6 (1972), the Selective Service may, instead of prosecuting a registrant who has failed to report for a physical examination, presume that the registrant is physically acceptable and order his induction; in such an instance, a physical must be performed when he reports for induction. However, this does not mean that the order to report for physical examination is cancelled by a subsequent order to report for induction. Under Selective Service regulations the physical examination order is not cancelled in this manner and a registrant who does not report for such an examination is under a continuing duty to do so. 5 Nor is it impermissible for a defendant to be convicted both for failure to report for a physical examination and for failure to report for induction. 50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 462 (1970); cf. Moorman v. United States, 389 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1968). Therefore, reversible error did not occur when the trial judge entered judgments of conviction on both counts.