Opinion ID: 2538890
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: consequences of guilty plea

Text: ¶ 31 A defendant must be informed of all the direct consequences of his plea prior to acceptance of a guilty plea. State v. Barton, 93 Wash.2d 301, 305, 609 P.2d 1353 (1980). Again, A.N.J. largely bases his claim on ineffective assistance of counsel. While a defendant cannot be positively misinformed about the collateral consequences, those collateral consequences can be undisclosed without rendering the plea involuntary. The distinction between direct and collateral consequences of a plea `turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment.' Id. (quoting Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir.1973)). A.N.J. argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because, he contends, his counsel misled him about the consequences of his plea. ¶ 32 The trial judge made no relevant findings, perhaps because he believed that A.N.J.'s challenge went to the registration requirement and that the registration requirement was merely a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. This court has never held that a preexisting automatic statutory requirement of sex offender registration is not a direct consequence of a plea, though we decided a related but different issue in State v. Ward, 123 Wash.2d 488, 513-14, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994). Ward challenged the sex offender registration statute itself, which imposed a registration obligation on people convicted long before it was enacted. See id. Several offenders who had either pleaded guilty or had been convicted of sex offenses before the registration statute was enacted challenged the registration obligation on constitutional grounds. The State argued, among other things, that the registration requirement was not ex post facto and need not be in place at the time the plea (or conviction) was entered. We agreed that the postconviction registration requirement did not violate the constitution: [W]e conclude there was no constitutional requirement to advise Doe of his duty to register as a sexual offender at the time of his guilty plea. Although the duty to register flows from Doe's conviction for a felony sex offense, it does not enhance Doe's sentence or punishment. A defendant must understand the sentencing consequences for a guilty plea to be valid. (Italics ours.) State v. Miller, 110 Wash.2d 528, 531, 756 P.2d 122 (1988). As we concluded under our ex post facto analysis, registration as a sex offender does not alter the standard of punishment. Because registration as a sex offender does not alter the standard of punishment, we hold the duty to register is collateral, and not a direct, consequence of a guilty plea. Id. at 513-14, 869 P.2d 1062. Ward considered a statutory consequence that came into existence only after the conviction, not an existing, automatic statutory consequence. Under existing statutes, the obligation to register follows directly from the conviction. E.g., RCW 9A.44.130. While the registration obligation does not affect the immediate sentence, its impact is significant, certain, and known before a guilty plea is entered. A.N.J. argues that he was misled as to both the direct and collateral consequences of his plea, but since he was correctly informed that he had an obligation to register as a sex offender, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether a current statutory duty to register as a sex offender is a direct consequences of a plea for the purposes of establishing whether a plea was involuntarily made. ¶ 33 A person convicted of a sex crime can petition to be relieved of the obligation to register. RCW 9A.44.140. Anderson says he told A.N.J. and his parents that up to the discretion of the court ... he could have the requirements to register as a sex offender removed when he was 18 or 21. CP at 29, 164. Broadly speaking, that is the case; but the process is conditional and discretionary. [15] However, under current law, the record of juvenile sex offenses never goes away. RCW 9.94A.525(2); cf. In re Pers. Restraint of LaChapelle, 153 Wash.2d 1, 4, 100 P.3d 805 (2004) (discussing prior times when juvenile offenses did wash out). The record of A.N.J.'s conviction of a juvenile sex offense will remain with him the rest of his life. ¶ 34 The failure to advise A.N.J. that the juvenile sex conviction would remain on his record forever, in and of itself, would not rise to a manifest injustice. See, e.g., State v. Oseguera Acevedo, 137 Wash.2d 179, 195, 970 P.2d 299 (1999). But if A.N.J. was misinformed that his conviction could be removed from his record, then he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. State v. Stowe, 71 Wash.App. 182, 188, 858 P.2d 267 (1993) (When there are additional consequences of an unquestionable serious nature ..., it may be manifestly unjust to hold the defendant to his earlier bargain.); State v. McCollum, 88 Wash.App. 977, 982, 947 P.2d 1235 (1997). ¶ 35 The record establishes that Anderson allowed A.N.J. and his parents to have an erroneous understanding that his juvenile conviction as a sex offender could be removed from his record and failed to adequately distinguish between the registration requirement and A.N.J.'s criminal record. See Ex. 3, at 3. Earlier, Anderson remembered some confusion when A.N.J.'s parents asked when the charge could be removed from A.N.J.'s record. CP at 35. Anderson's original signed declaration said he told the parents he believed the conviction would be removed from A.N.J.'s record when he was 18 or 21, and A.N.J.'s parents testified consistently. CP at 29, 32 (parents' declarations). [16] Anderson further declared he never ... advise[d] [A.N.J. and his parents] further regarding their question and never ... fully explained it to them. CP at 35. Anderson's subsequent testimony that sex offenses could not be sealed up, but that he could have the requirements to register as a sex offender removed hardly added clarity to the issue. CP at 164. Importantly, the record reflects that A.N.J. and his parents simply did not understand the difference between registration as a sex offender and the record of a conviction. ¶ 36 Anderson spent precious little time with his client considering the gravity of the charges against A.N.J. A conviction as a juvenile sex offender will have a significant impact on his life. Taken together, the contractual constraints under which Anderson was working, the limited time he spent with his client before the plea, the fact he did not return A.N.J.'s parents' phone calls, the limited time he spent with A.N.J. to go over the statement on plea, A.N.J.'s prompt motion to withdraw his plea upon discovering the consequences of the plea, Anderson's declaration that there was some confusion about when the charge could be removed, and that Anderson believed the conviction could be removed from A.N.J. record when he turned 18 or 21, we have no difficulty concluding A.N.J. was misinformed as to the consequences of his plea. He is entitled to withdraw it.