Opinion ID: 2972945
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Credibility of Petitioner and the Witness

Text: “Credibility determinations are considered findings of fact, and are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.” Sylla v. INS, 388 F.3d 924, 925 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 703 (6th Cir. 2004)). This Court will afford substantial deference to an IJ’s adverse credibility determination. However, “the finding must be supported by specific reasons.” Id. (citing Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 623 n.7 (6th Cir. 2004); Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 276 (3d Cir. 2002)). “[M]inor and irrelevant inconsistencies cannot constitute the basis for an adverse credibility determination.” Sylla, 388 F.3d at 926. Rather, “[a]n adverse credibility finding must be based on issues that go to the heart of the applicant's claim.” Id. In sum, this Court may reverse the IJ’s credibility determination only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(4)(B). See also Yu, 364 F.3d 703.
-9- No. 04-3369 As an initial matter, Petitioner’s contention that “[n]either the Immigration Judge nor the Board specifically made an adverse credibility finding”, Pet. Brief at 13, is simply wrong. The IJ stated that “the Court finds the respondent’s testimony and that of his witness not to be credible.” The IJ engaged in an extensive discussion of credibility. The BIA adopted the IJ’s decision in denying Dushi’s petition for review. The IJ’s adverse credibility finding was based on the following omissions and inconsistencies: (1) First, the IJ noted the fact that Lajla Dushi presented no documents to establish her identity, “find[ing] this to be highly suspect since this is a hearing which has been long scheduled . . . .” (2) The IJ noted that while Petitioner’s counsel argued that the Dushi family has a history of anti-communist “sentiment,” no documents to support that claim were submitted. (3) The IJ noted that this statement and other documents submitted were copies, rather than original documents. “When questioned as to where the original documents were, counsel has indicated that they are in possession of respondents, but were not either authenticated or presented to the Court . . . the Court questions why the original documents were not presented so that a careful examination might be made. The only reasonable inference is that the failure to do so would somehow lead to intrinsic questions being raised about them considering the inconsistency and credibility findings in this case.” -10- No. 04-3369 (4) The IJ found Dushi’s testimony to be inconsistent with his prior statements. She noted that he testified that following Hadjari’s funeral, he and two friends were arrested. However, in his statement he named three friends with whom he was arrested. (5) The IJ noted that while Dushi testified that he attended demonstrations as a child, he was unable to offer any specifics. The IJ stated “[w]hile a child of those tender years might be permitted to some vagaries on the dates; nevertheless, these events were apparently not so frequent that he would be unable to articulate at least the number of times he attended.” (6) The IJ found Dushi and his mother to be incredible in their accounts of their travel to the United States. Specifically, the IJ found it “implausible and not credible” that neither Dushi nor his mother had passports when they passed through immigration and customs checks in Macedonia, Switzerland, and Canada, and that they were unable to state the names under which they traveled. The IJ also noted that Dushi was unable to describe with any specificity the truck in which he and his mother allegedly traveled to the United States. These inconsistencies represent substantial evidence to support the IJ’s adverse credibility findings. Petitioner ignores many of these inconsistencies and contends that “the only inconsistency appears to be with the number of people that were with Petitioner at the 1998 demonstration,” and insists that this inconsistency is minor. When viewed alone, this inconsistency may be picayune; however, the Court views this inconsistency in the context of all of the evidence the IJ considered -11- No. 04-3369 in her credibility determination. The Court cannot say that it is compelled to reach a decision contrary to that of the IJ based on the entirety of the evidence.