Opinion ID: 2552536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant Stewart's Instructional Challenge

Text: Mr. Stewart next argues that, because the trial court failed to expressly inform the jury that an aider and abetter must possess the same mens rea as the principal, the court's aiding and abetting instruction constituted reversible error under Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 826, 836, 843 (D.C.2006) (en banc) (an instruction that told the jury that it need not find that the aider and abettor shared the principal's intent and permitted the jury to find aiding and abetting liability for any acts that are the natural and probable consequences of the crime was constitutional error). Because it was not raised below, we review this issue only for plain error. Kidd v. United States, 940 A.2d 118, 126 (D.C.2007). Mr. Stewart has not shouldered this heavy burden. In this case the jury instruction did not contain the natural and probable consequences language disapproved of in Wilson-Bey. Moreover, the jury was told that, to convict Mr. Stewart, it had to find that he knowingly associated himself with the commission of a crime, participated in the crime as something that he wished to bring about, and intended by his actions to make it succeed. We examined virtually the same instruction in Appleton v. United States, 983 A.2d 970, 978 (D.C.2009), andunpersuaded that such language raise[d] similar concerns to those stated in Wilson-Bey we held that the instruction was not erroneous. Mr. Stewart's claim fails for the same reason. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the aiding and abetting instruction could have confused the jury with respect to mens rea. The jury necessarily found that Mr. Stewart shared the intent of the other robbers when it found him guilty of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Contrary to appellant Stewart's suggestion, Wilson-Bey did not overrule the principle, well-established in our case-law, that an individual is guilty of aiding and abetting an armed robbery if he aids and abets a robbery and he knows or has reason to know that the principal will be armed. See, e.g., Guishard, 669 A.2d at 1314 (aider and abettor must reasonably foresee that the principal will be armed); Hordge, 545 A.2d at 1256 ([I]t is sufficient if there is evidence to support a reasonable inference that the accomplice was aware the crime would be committed `while armed.') (citations omitted). We find no error, and certainly no plain error, here. [5]