Opinion ID: 2633244
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Landscaping Easement

Text: In this appeal, Pothier does not argue there was insufficient evidence to support finding a prescriptive easement for landscaping; rather, Pothier contends the district court erroneously granted Fisher's motion to amend, adding the prescriptive easement claim because that issue was not tried by the implied consent of the parties. According to I.R.C.P. 15(b), [w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. The purpose of Rule 15(b) is to allow cases to be decided on the merits, rather than upon technical pleading requirements. Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd., 135 Idaho 495, 500, 20 P.3d 679, 684 (2000). Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue is not established merely because evidence relevant to that issue was introduced without objection. At least it must appear that the parties understood the evidence to be aimed at the unpleaded issue. M.K. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980) (quoting MBI Motor Co., Inc. v. Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709, 711 (6th Cir. 1974)). For example, it has been held as error for a district court to find the parties mutually rescinded a contract based on evidence supporting the parties' breach of contract claims where, [h]ad the parties considered the issue of rescission to be before the court, they may have been able to present other evidence, not relevant to the breach of contract claims, which might have tended to rebut any inferences that the parties had rescinded the agreement. M.K. Transport, 101 Idaho at 349-50, 612 P.2d at 1196-97 (emphasis added). Upholding a district court's grant of a divorce based on willful desertion when such a claim was never alleged in the complaint, this Court offered the following guidance on determining prejudice: A party cannot complain of variance between pleading and proof in the absence of a showing that he was misled thereby to his prejudice. There is no showing by appellant that he was misled in this regard, or that he was unaware of the facts upon which the finding was based. Thus, there was no error committed by the trial court in granting the divorce on a ground not initially plead, when the evidence fully sustained the finding. Losee v. Losee, 91 Idaho 77, 79, 415 P.2d 720, 722 (1966) (quoting Frost v. Mead, 86 Idaho 155, 166, 383 P.2d 834, 840 (1963)). If a party can show prejudice by pointing to evidence it would have otherwise introduced or arguments it would have otherwise made, then that party may complain about a district court's finding based on an unpled theory. The determination whether an issue has been tried with the consent of the parties is within the trial court's discretion, and such determination will only be reversed when that discretion has been abused. Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 226, 46 P.3d 518, 522 (2002). In reviewing an exercise of discretion, this Court must consider (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. In granting Fisher's motion, the district court correctly noted granting a motion to amend was within its discretion. It also appears the district court acted within the bounds of its discretion and exercised reason in reaching its decision: Pothier failed to show any real prejudice and the evidence to which Pothier did not object supported a finding of a prescriptive easement. On these facts, where a prescriptive easement can be thought of as a lesser included cause of action of adverse possession, it is difficult to see how Pothier could be prejudiced by the post-judgment amendment of the pleadings. The pleaded theory of adverse possession is virtually identical to the unpleaded but awarded claim of a prescriptive easement; the only real difference between the two is that adverse possession grants possession of the property, while a prescriptive easement merely allows the claimant use of the property. Thus, the grant of a prescriptive easement to Fisher is actually less of an encumbrance on Pothier's title than would be an award of title by adverse possession. Where an unpleaded theory relies on less evidence than a pleaded theory and results in less relief to the moving party, it is difficult to see how the grant of a Rule 15(b) motion will prejudice the nonmoving party. Because Pothier could show no prejudice here, the district court's grant of Fisher's motion to amend his complaint was not an abuse of discretion.