Opinion ID: 1444074
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hilton's Motion for New Trial

Text: We turn to Hilton's contention that the trial court erred in denying, without a hearing, his motion for a new trial [8] claiming that he should be tried again, separate from his co-defendant, so that he could testify free from intimidation. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 33, the trial court may grant a new trial ... if required in the interest of justice. Super Ct.Crim. R. 33. [9] In applying the interest of justice standard where the defendant claims the right to present additional evidence, the trial judge who heard the trial evidence, sits as the thirteenth juror to determine whether a fair trial requires that the [additional evidence] be made available to the jury. Herbin v. United States, 683 A.2d 437, 441 (D.C.1996), citing Godfrey v. United States, 454 A.2d 293, 299 (D.C.1982) (internal citations omitted). [10] When the convicted defendant claims that he was under duress from or intimidated by his co-defendant  and thus prevented from putting on exculpatory evidence at trial  the trial court is presented with a colorable claim for relief. Geddie, 663 A.2d at 534. Where the trial court denies the motion out of hand, without exploring the claims of intimidation or stating any reasons for denying the motion, there is an abuse of discretion. Id. This is not a case like Geddie where the trial court denied the motion out of hand, without giving an explanation. Id. The trial court explained that appellant's claims were not supported by reference to specific instances of intimidation, and had not been raised when severance was sought pre-trial. Although we agree with the trial court that appellant's motion should have been more detailed and included affidavits, cf. id. at 533 (motion recited open and veiled threats against defendant, his family and a witness, and that defendant had reason to believe co-defendant's threats should be taken seriously), we disagree that appellant's motion did not present a colorable claim. The motion clearly set out that Hilton was afraid ... to truthfully testify about his own innocence and it was the co-defendant's influence [that] kept [Hilton] from the stand. The motion explained the pressures on Hilton and proffered what his testimony would have been. We consider the personal representations of defense counsel in the motion as a proffer that at a hearing he would have testified that his client was being intimidated by his co-defendant. [11] Although the trial judge pointed out that Hilton had given different reasons pre-trial and posttrial for wanting to be tried separately from Lyons, [12] we note that defense counsel's representations in the motion are consistent with counsel's statements pre-trial that his client was afraid [to] work[] out the case unless the other co-defendant does. On this record, the inconsistency and delay are insufficient to deny the motion. But see Geddie, 663 A.2d at 535 (noting that delay in presenting claim of intimidation may raise questions about its credibility). Other reasons give us pause. Many considerations can influence a defendant not to take a stand, but an obvious one  impeachment with prior convictions  was not a factor here. We also take into account that counsel expressed that he was gravely concerned that his client was wrongfully convicted, and that Hilton asserts that he is innocent. Hilton's proffered defense is not so implausible that it could not be believed by a jury, or create a reasonable doubt about his guilt as an aider and abetter. Cf. Geddie, 663 A.2d at 533 (defense that undercover officer who bought heroin from defendant was confused in his identification of defendant). Our decision in United States v. Hamid, 531 A.2d 628 (D.C.1987), establishes that a claim of duress or intimidation by a co-defendant may entitle a defendant to some form of relief, and warrant[s] the court's serious consideration. Id. at 534. [13] Based solely on the written motion, we cannot seriously evaluate appellant's claims or his entitlement to relief, nor could the trial court. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in summarily denying Hilton's motion for a new trial without a hearing to determine if appellant's claims of fear and intimidation were credible. A hearing will provide an opportunity to ask Hilton why he was afraid of Lyons to the point that he was intimidated not to testify in his own defense, and for the trial judge to evaluate Hilton's demeanor and credibility. Hilton's trial counsel also may need to be called as a witness. Only then can the trial judge weigh the nature of appellant's fear, appellant's potential testimony in a new trial and, ultimately, whether, sitting as the thirteenth juror, the trial judge believes that in the absence of his testimony, appellant was denied a fair trial. But at this juncture, in light of the circumstantial government case against Hilton, and the lapse of time between the robbery and the chase, his testimony about why Lyons was in the car with him and why he sped away when the police spotted Lyons and gave chase, if believed, could have impacted the verdict in his case. Under Geddie's heightened analysis, it is possible that appellant was denied his right to a fair trial. See Geddie, 663 A.2d at 534. (Because the alleged intimidation presented the possibility that appellant was prejudiced in his right to a fair trial . . . we must remand this case . . . for further consideration.) (quoting Wilson v. United States, 380 A.2d 1001, 1004) (D.C.1977) (Nebeker, J., concurring). For the foregoing reasons, Lyons's conviction is affirmed. Hilton's conviction is reversed and remanded for further consideration by the trial court. So ordered. FARRELL, Associate Judge, concurring. I agree fully with the court's disposition of Lyons' appeal. As to Hilton, I concur reluctantly in the remand for a hearing. The court says that at a hearing the trial judge can evaluate Hilton's demeanor and credibility, ante at 489. But credibility as to what? We presently have no idea what Hilton would say on the stand, since he personally has furnished no affidavit or other statement asserting a basis for the claim of intimidation. His counsel suggests that Hilton is afraid to substantiate the claim ([T]his motion is itself more strongly worded than Mr. Hilton might like.), so we are left to assume that  just perhaps  at the hearing Hilton will have overcome his fear and be ready to recite the objective basis for the coercion Lyons supposedly worked upon him. That, as I see it, is an insufficient showing to require the judge to convene an evidentiary hearing. On the other hand, trial counsel's motion, read very generously, implies that he himself witnessed interactions between the codefendants or was told things by Hilton (which might be admissible as going to the client's state of mind) that could support a claim of duress or intimidation. [1] That is enough to justify a hearing, though barely. Ultimately, however, unless Hilton's own words  not his counsel's  impeached by his failure to utter them at any time earlier, see Geddie v. United States, 663 A.2d 531, 535 (D.C.1995) (discussing means by which defendant can timely bring intimidation to court's attention without danger of retaliation), persuade the trial judge that duress rather than an unsuccessful choice of strategy likely dictated his defense, the hearing will be as predictable in outcome as it may be brief. REID, Associate Judge, concurring. I fully appreciate Judge Farrell's reluctance to remand Mr. Hilton's case for further consideration by the trial judge who ably handled a challenging co-defendant trial. I believe that Judge Ruiz is correct, however, that this disposition is directed by our case law. In the final analysis, the concept of a fair trial compels us to take what, at first blush, appears to be an unnecessary step. But, we are required to ensure that fear and intimidation did not contribute to Mr. Hilton's conviction. Thus, I join Judge Ruiz's disposition of Mr. Hilton's case without hesitation.