Opinion ID: 1202382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Death as the Appropriate Penalty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Text: (29) In his next issue defendant argues that the jury should have been instructed that it could impose a sentence of death only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating and death was the appropriate penalty. We have previously rejected this argument and need not discuss it again here. (See Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 107; Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 777-778.) Defendant also complains of the mandatory aspect of the 1978 death penalty law. This jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.84.2 that: After having heard all of the evidence, and after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed. [ถ] If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole. (30) As we explained in People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440] and elaborated upon in subsequent cases, such instructions have the potential of confusing the jury as to the nature of the weighing process it must perform and the scope of its power and responsibility for making the ultimate penalty decision. (See People v. Myers, supra, 43 Cal.3d 250, 273-276 ; Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1277-1280; Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 538-541.) In light of various special instructions given by this trial court and the arguments of counsel, however, there is no possibility that the jury was actually misled in this case. This jury was instructed, for example, that it was the sole judge of whether facts constituted aggravating factors, and ... if you find any aggravating factors present you are the sole judges of what weight, if any, that factor should be given. As noted above, the jury was told it could consider any other circumstances relating to the case or to the defendant as reasons for not imposing the death sentence. They were told: It is the combined weight of the factors not their number, which is determinative; you are not merely to count the number of factors on either side. Further, Any mitigating circumstance, standing alone, may be sufficient to outweigh any number of aggravating circumstances, and any aggravating circumstance, standing alone, may be sufficient to outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The weight to which any or all specific mitigating or aggravating factors are entirely a matter for your determination. The arguments of counsel similarly emphasized the qualitative rather than mechanical nature of the weighing process. The prosecutor, for example, told the jury, immediately after reading them the portion of CALJIC No. 8.84.2 noted above, that ... as far as this weighing procedure โ and I caution you โ I want to remind you, this is not a counting of factors. This is a weighing, a qualitative weighing of factors โ you will be instructed that the weight of the factors, not their number, that is determinative. [ถ] You are not merely to count the numbers on either side. While he asked the jury to consider whether the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, this was never described as a mechanical process. Defense counsel certainly stressed the individual power of each juror, stating, You are allowed in these proceedings when you go back there to take your personal beliefs, your philosophy of life, the Christianity if that's where you are, and to apply those principles that guide you that you think are right from your own personal view which may be different from somebody else's who may also be a Christian and to say I'm going to do this, this is my vote because of those principles. He even urged, without prosecutorial objection: And if you don't think that you have the courage that you could go up there and could pull that switch that drops those pellets, and watch his eyes bulge out and turn purple, when he throws up on himself, then you don't have the right to vote to take his life. He concluded: And you better [ sic ] everyone of you, have the courage that you told us that you had to take the responsibility, because each one of you, each of you has absolutely now the absolute divine right and control over the death of that man because he can't die without you. Under these circumstances, while the objectionable portion of CALJIC No. 8.84.2 presented the potential for misleading the jury, there is no possibility the jury was actually misled in this case.