Opinion ID: 1225924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: pension plan

Text: We begin by noting that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, precludes courts from entertaining state law claims arising from employee benefit plans. Joanou v. Coca-Cola Co., 26 F.3d 96, 99 (9th Cir.1994). ERISA contains one of the broadest preemption clauses ever enacted by Congress. Id. (citations omitted). Since Meisner is neither a participant nor a beneficiary of the pension plan, she has no remedy under ERISA. Meisner attempts to circumvent the ERISA preemption by claiming that the pension plan violates the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating on the basis of marital status. It is well settled that a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment requires state action. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). Citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948), Meisner argues that the state action requirement was met by the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Potlatch. Under Meisner's theory, any party to a private contract could invoke the Fourteenth Amendment simply by filing an action in state court. We decline to give Shelley the broad reading that Meisner urges upon us. Even if Shelley applied, it is clearly distinguishable. Shelley involved the issuance of an injunction to force the parties to abide by the terms of a racially restrictive covenant, not a grant of summary judgment. In addition, Shelley involved a classification based on race not marital status. The pension plan in question was clearly a private contract between Potlatch and Meisner's father acting through his agent, the International Woodworkers of America. The grant of summary judgment by the district court did not constitute state action sufficient to support a claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Potlatch on the pension plan claim.