Opinion ID: 2313191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admitting the Complaining Witness's Pretrial Out-of-Court Statement.

Text: Dailey first contends that the trial judge improperly admitted S.D.'s videotaped statement because her testimony at trial did not establish the requisite foundational elements described in Keys v. State. [2] We review admission of an out-of-court statement for abuse of discretion. [3] The State introduced, and the trial judge admitted, S.D.'s videotaped statement under 11 Del. C. § 3507. On appeal, Dailey argues that S.D.'s testimony did not touch upon the events perceived or heard and the out-of-court statement itself [4]  a necessary colloquy before admission under our case law. Although the parties contend that 11 Del. C. § 3507 applies, we review the admission of this statement under 11 Del. C. § 3513, [5] which specifically applies in this case. 11 Del. C. § 3513 pertinently provides that: An out-of-court statement made by a child victim or witness who is under 11 years of age at the time of the proceeding concerning an act that is a material element of the offense relating to sexual abuse, physical injury, serious physical injury, death, abuse or neglect ... is admissible if ... (b)(1) [t]he child is present and the child's testimony touches upon the event and is subject to cross-examination rendering such prior statement admissible under § 3507 of this title.... At the time of trial, S.D. was 6 years old and first degree rape falls within the enumerated acts listed in § 3513. In order to admit her out-of-court pretrial statement, S.D. must be present and subject to crossexamination, an issue not in dispute, and her testimony must touch [] upon the event. [6] We note that this last requirement arguably differs from § 3507 and Keys' foundational requirement that the testimony must touch both on the events perceived and the out-of-court statement itself. [7] We are unsure what to make of the phrase: rendering such prior statement admissible under § 3507 of this title.... As we interpret the facts in this case, however, the trial judge correctly concluded that the statement would be admissible under § 3507 as well as § 3513 allowing us to avoid the difficulty of parsing § 3513 to determine whether the General Assembly intended to lessen the State's foundational burden for admitting out of court statements by complaining witnesses younger than eleven years old. Here, S.D.'s testimony did touch on the event and she was available for crossexamination, thereby meeting § 3513(b)(1)'s explicitly enumerated requirements. Moreover, the videotape allayed any concern that it was not her statement and enabled the trial judge to asses the voluntariness of the statement and the jury to assess S.D.'s credibility as she made her taped statement. Because the parties and the jury could observe S.D.'s videotaped statement and see and hear her testify to the same events she discussed in part in her live testimony at trial, the concerns are met that in other circumstances require the declarant to touch on the statement itself. Therefore, we conclude under both 11 Del. C. § 3513(b)(1) and 11 Del. C. § 3507 that the trial judge properly admitted the videotaped statement.