Opinion ID: 673206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: charles onuorah's batson objection

Text: 10 Charles Onuorah argues on appeal through new counsel that his trial counsel's waiver of his rights under Batson was ineffective, because Charles Onuorah did not participate personally in the waiver. This alleged error was not brought to the attention of the trial court. We therefore review for plain error. Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 52. This requires us to determine whether: (1) there was a clear violation of a legal rule, (2) that was not effectively waived, and (3) that prejudiced the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Olano, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-78 (1993). For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Charles Onuorah effectively waived his remedy under Batson. 11 [T]he State denies a black defendant equal protection of the laws when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been purposefully excluded. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 85. This principle applies to federal defendants via the due process clause of the fifth amendment. United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 823 n. 4 (9th Cir.1992). 12 To invoke Batson, the defendant must initially establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the prosecutor has peremptorily challenged members of his race under circumstances that raise an inference of discrimination. United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415 (9th Cir.1988). To defeat such a showing the prosecutor must articulate a [race] neutral explanation [for the challenge] related to the particular case to be tried. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. If the court finds, as it did here, that the explanation is not race neutral, then the Batson remedy is mandated. Id. at 100 n. 24. We give great deference to the district court's findings, and will not disturb them unless they are clearly erroneous. See Hernandez v. New York, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991). 13 In the case at bar, the district court found that Charles Onuorah made a prima facie case with respect to both African-American jurors peremptorily challenged by the government. Therefore, the government was required to enunciate race-neutral grounds for each challenge. The district court found that the government did not meet this requirement with respect to one of the jurors, Ms. Rogers. 1/23/92 R.T. at 24 (I can't accept the reason as a race neutral reason). 14 All that remained, then, was to determine the appropriate remedy for the violation of Charles Onuorah's fifth amendment rights. 1 The district court's remedy was to offer Charles Onuorah a choice of selecting a jury from a new panel or accepting two additional peremptory challenges. We review de novo whether a particular remedy is sufficient to cure a Batson violation. See Bishop, 959 F.2d at 827 (question of law whether remaining representative jury cured discrimination). 15 The Supreme Court, in dicta in Batson, suggested that the appropriate remedy upon a finding of discrimination is either to select a jury from a new panel not previously associated with the case, or else to disallow the discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 n. 24 (we express no view on which of these two remedies is more appropriate). By the time the district court found that the government improperly exercised a peremptory challenge against juror Rogers, only the first of these two remedies was available because Ms. Rogers had been excused and left the courtroom. The court, hoping to avoid dismissing the panel and starting over again, offered Charles Onuorah a choice. The court would grant the defense two additional peremptory challenges, one for, essentially, Mrs. Rogers, and one for Mr. Bagley, or else it would dismiss the jury panel and start the selection process anew. 16 The former arrangement, if forced on Charles Onuorah, would not have satisfied Batson 's mandate, because it would not have honored the fundamental principle that 'under Batson, the striking of one black juror for a racial reason violates the Equal Protection Clause.'  Bishop, 959 F.2d at 827 (quoting United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir.1986) (emphasis added in Bishop )). 17 The district court understood that a remedy of two additional peremptory challenges could not be imposed on Charles Onuorah involuntarily. The judge said, it would take your consent. If you're not willing to do this, then I will dismiss the panel, and we will begin again. And as a practical matter--there is no assurance that you will be any better off with another panel than you are with this panel. 1/23/92 R.T. at 25. Therefore, the question is whether the court properly concluded that it effectively received Charles Onuorah's consent to an alternative arrangement. 18 Waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'  Olano, 113 S.Ct. at 1777 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). Given the specific facts of this case, it is clear that Charles Onuorah's counsel effectively waived Onuorah's right to have a new jury empaneled as a remedy for the Batson violation when counsel selected an alternative that he deemed preferable. Such waiver precludes Onuorah from raising this issue on appeal. See Olano 113 U.S. at 1777 (an effective waiver extinguishes the error). 2