Opinion ID: 1678586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The substantial evidence standard

Text: We have consistently held that evidence supporting a conviction is sufficient if it is substantial. Huggins v. State, 322 Ark. 70, 74, 907 S.W.2d 697, 700 (1995). Applying the substantial evidence standard, we will affirm a verdict of guilt if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion one way or the other without having to resort to speculation or conjecture. McGehee v. State 328 Ark. 404, 410, 943 S.W.2d 585, 588 (1997). We consider only the evidence supporting the verdict, and we neither weigh the evidence presented at trial, as that is a matter for the factfinder, nor weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Bell v. State, 334 Ark. 285, 292, 973 S.W.2d 806, 810 (1998). In our death-penalty cases, however, we have been remarkably inconsistent in describing the standard to be applied when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury's finding that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. In Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 341, 354, 605 S.W.2d 430, 438 (1980), we said that a trial court should submit an aggravating circumstance to the jury if the circumstance is supported by any evidence ... however slight. We further indicated that, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an aggravating circumstance, we would not require the same degree of proof to sustain a jury finding that an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists as we would require to sustain a conviction if that circumstance was a separate crime. 269 Ark. at 355, 605 S.W.2d at 439. A fair reading of the Miller case and the cases that have followed it, see Dansby v. State, 319 Ark. 506, 524, 893 S.W.2d 331, 341 (1995); Wainwright v. State, 302 Ark. 371, 385, 790 S.W.2d 420, 427 (1990); Parker v. State, 300 Ark. 360, 368-69, 779 S.W.2d 156, 160 (1989); Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 92, 656 S.W.2d 684, 691 (1983); Miller v. State, 280 Ark. 551, 559, 660 S.W.2d 163, 167 (1983)(Hays, J., concurring), suggests that, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury's aggravated-circumstance finding, we apply a standard different from, and less demanding than, the standard applied when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury's finding of guilt. In the case now before us, the majority, correctly in my view, departs from that precedent and holds, contrary to the Miller decision, that an aggravated-circumstance finding must be supported by substantial evidence, which is the same degree of proof ... require[d] to sustain a conviction.... Miller v. State, 269 Ark. at 355, 605 S.W.2d at 439. In determining whether an accused is guilty of an offense, and in determining whether an aggravating circumstance exists, the jury applies the very same standard i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt. It is only logical that this Court apply the same standard on appeal i.e., substantial evidencewhen reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting those jury determinations. Despite our statements in our 1980 Miller opinion, we have applied, in at least four cases, the substantial evidence standard when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an aggravated-circumstance finding. See Greene v. State, 335 Ark. 1, 977 S.W.2d 192 (1998); Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 988, 936 S.W.2d 509, 546 (1996); Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 30-32, 852 S.W.2d 772, 775-77 (1993); Miller v. State, 280 Ark. 551, 554, 660 S.W.2d 163, 165 (1983). Although I agree with the majority's application of the substantial evidence standard in this case, I find its reference to a second standard of review to be confusing. The majority first states, correctly, that a finding that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt must be supported by substantial evidence. It then states, however, that such a finding will be affirmed if, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the aggravating circumstance to have existed beyond a reasonable doubt. This second standard, known as the rational factfinder standard, is applied in federal court when a habeas corpus petitioner challenges, under the Due Process Clause, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a state court's finding that an aggravating circumstance exists. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990). The same standard applies in federal court when a habeas corpus petitioner challenges on due-process grounds the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a state-court conviction. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Following Lewis v. Jeffers, supra , we applied the rational factfinder standard in at least two cases in which we considered the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an aggravated-circumstance finding. See Kemp v. State, 324 Ark. 178, 200, 919 S.W.2d 943, 953 (1996); Coulter v. State, 304 Ark. 527, 533, 804 S.W.2d 348, 351-52, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829, 112 S.Ct. 102, 116 L.Ed.2d 72 (1991). See also Miller v. Lockhart, 65 F.3d 676 (8th Cir.1995). In cases reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting convictions, however, we have consistently applied the substantial evidence standard rather than the federal standard announced in Jackson. In Jones v. State, 269 Ark. 119, 120, 598 S.W.2d 748, 749 (1980), we said that the language in Jackson v. Virginia did not require[] us to abandon our decisions regarding the test of whether a jury verdict should stand in a criminal case. There must be substantial evidence to support such a decision. See also Ricks v. State, 316 Ark. 601, 604, 873 S.W.2d 808, 810 (1994)(stating the federal test as set forth in Jackson v. Virginia ... is of no particular relevance....). Despite our application of the rational factfinder standard in the Kemp and Coulter cases, we should, for the sake of clarity and consistency, apply only the substantial evidence standard in any case in which we review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting either a conviction or a finding that an aggravated circumstance exists. Our substantial evidence standard is arguably a rough equivalent[] to the Jackson-Lewis standard, see Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 n. 10, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994), and there is no suggestion that our standard affords any less due process to an accused than the standard articulated in the Jackson and Lewis cases. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 45 and n. 21, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) (stating the due process test of Jackson v. Virginia  sets a lower limit on an appellate court's definition of evidentiary sufficiency). The majority opinion, by referring to, and perhaps applying, the substantial evidence and the rational factfinder standards of review, muddies an area of the law that is in need of clarity. There is one final statement in the majority's discussion of this point that I find troublesome. The majority correctly holds that a jury's finding that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt must be supported by substantial evidence. It suggests, however, relying on language in the 1980 Miller case, that a trial court may submit an aggravating circumstance to the jury if the State introduces any evidence, however slight, in support of the aggravating circumstance. The substantial evidence standard clearly requires a greater quantum of proof than the any evidence, however slight standard. The problem with the majority's suggestion, then, is obvious. A rule allowing a trial court to submit an aggravating circumstance to the jury upon a lower evidentiary threshold, such as any evidence, however slight, will always result in a reversal if a jury finds the existence of an aggravating circumstance when the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstance is anything less than substantial. Thus, if this Court is to apply the substantial evidence standard in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury's finding that an aggravated circumstance exists, then that is the standard that a trial court should apply in determining whether to submit an aggravating circumstance to the jury. For the sake of judicial economy, a trial court should not submit an aggravating circumstance to the jury unless there is substantial evidence, not merely slight evidence, in support of it.