Opinion ID: 2353264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Progression Charge

Text: Appellant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's progression charge, which instructed jurors to consider the most serious charge of criminal homicide before moving on to any lesser charges. In providing this progression charge, Appellant argues the trial court required a finding of not guilty on the greatest offense before the jury could consider any lesser degree of murder, thereby leaving jurors who may have a reasonable doubt about his guilt on a higher degree in a naturally coercive position, either having to convince the majority of their position or deadlocking the jury. In response, the Commonwealth argues that the charge was proper because, as the PCRA court found, although we have not specifically approved of the charge, the Superior Court has done so. Commonwealth v. duPont, 730 A.2d 970 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal denied, 561 Pa. 669, 749 A.2d 466 (2000); Commonwealth v. Loach, 421 Pa.Super. 527, 618 A.2d 463 (1992), appeal denied, 535 Pa. 655, 634 A.2d 219 (1993); Commonwealth v. Hart, 388 Pa.Super. 484, 565 A.2d 1212, 1217 (1989), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 642, 581 A.2d 569 (1990) (holding proper a progression charge where the defendant is charged with different forms or degrees of the same crime, because if the jury were first to consider a less serious form of the offense, it might return a verdict of guilty of the lesser charge without determining whether the Commonwealth also proved the additional facts necessary to establish the more serious crime). Appellant cites no Pennsylvania or United States Supreme Court authority for the proposition that a progression charge violates due process, obliging counsel to object. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to advance the change in the law. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 855 A.2d 726, 748-49 (2004); Rollins, 738 A.2d at 451 ([W]e will not deem counsel ineffective for failing to anticipate a change in the law.). Thus, because trial counsel could not have been ineffective for this reason, Appellant's claim of appellate counsel's ineffectiveness necessarily fails. See McGill, at 1023. [15] Having found that Appellant has failed to establish the arguable merit of each of his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we need not remand to review the remaining two prongs of Pierce with respect to that counsel. See Rush, at 657-58; McGill, at 1025.