Opinion ID: 2521459
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Our Decision in In re Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d 857

Text: In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243 and footnote 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, the United States Supreme Court explained that a defendant seeking to plead guilty is denied due process under the federal Constitution unless the plea is voluntary and knowing. Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.... [Citations.] Second, is the right to trial by jury. [Citation.] Third, is the right to confront one's accusers. ( Id. at p. 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709.) In Boykin, the defendant pled guilty to five counts at a proceeding in which the judge asked no questions of petitioner concerning his plea, and petitioner did not address the court. ( Id. at p. 239, 89 S.Ct. 1709.) Given that truly silent record, the high court refused to presume a knowing and voluntary waiver of these constitutional rights. ( Ibid. ) In the wake of Boykin, we held in In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449, that each of the three rights mentioned  self-incrimination, confrontation, and jury trial  must be specifically and expressly enumerated for the benefit of and waived by the accused prior to acceptance of his guilty plea.  ( Id. at p. 132, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449, italics added.) Some five years later, in In re Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d 857, 112 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 561, we adopted as a judicial rule of criminal procedure the requirement that the three Boykin-Tahl admonitions must also be given before a court accepts an accused's admission that he has suffered prior felony convictions.  ( Id. at p. 863, 112 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 561, italics added.) Of note here is a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court that the federal Constitution's right to a jury trial does not extend to the factual determination of whether a defendant has suffered a prior conviction. ( Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435.) Nor does our state Constitution afford such a right. ( People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 23, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 18 P.3d 2; see also People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739.) That right is purely statutory in origin. (Pen.Code, §§ 1025 [same jury that tried criminal charge must try prior conviction allegation], 1158; People v. Epps, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 23, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 18 P.3d 2.) When trial is required by statute, we shall assume for the purpose of this discussion that a defendant's due process trial rights, at least under our state Constitution, encompass the rights to remain silent and to confront witnesses. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Here, defendant was advised only of his right to trial, which he waived before admitting the prior conviction. Thus, we must decide whether, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's admission was voluntary and intelligent despite the trial court's failure to advise defendant of the rights to remain silent and to confront witnesses.