Opinion ID: 1177070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: shorelines master program

Text: The DuPont Shorelines Master Program was approved by DOE in 1975, pursuant to WAC XXX-XX-XXXX; RCW 90.58.080, .090. The DSMP permits ports and water related industry within its urban designation, but subjects them to conditional use requirements. The DSMP and the DOE (WAC 173-16-070(1)) conditional use guidelines are similar. The DOE guidelines provide, in pertinent part: Conditional use permits will be granted only after the applicant can demonstrate all of the following: (a) The use will cause no unreasonably adverse effects on the environment or other uses. (b) The use will not interfere with public use of public shorelines. (c) Design of the site will be compatible with the surroundings and the Master Program. (d) The proposed use will not be contrary to the general intent of the master program. The DSMP changes are as follows: In subsection (a), the word unreasonably has been omitted from the DSMP to read no adverse effects on the environment or other uses. In subsection (b), the word not has been replaced with in no way and the word public has been replaced by the to read will in no way interfere with public use of the shorelines. In subsection (c), the words and the Master Program have been eliminated. Adverse effect is nowhere defined. Plaintiffs contend these changes in language show that DuPont intended to make its conditional use criteria more restrictive than the DOE guidelines. They argue that the SHB erred in applying a reasonableness standard to the DSMP requirements. In approving the permit, the SHB found adverse effects, but not unreasonably so. Plaintiffs argue this violates the legislative intent behind DuPont's omission of the word unreasonably and creates an ad hoc amendment. In short, plaintiffs propose a literal interpretation of the no adverse effects language. Defendants, on the other hand, assert the SHB correctly interpreted DSMP conditional use criteria. They maintain their export facility not only complies with, but furthers, the DSMP. Moreover, defendants contend a literal interpretation of no adverse effects would prohibit construction of any port facility and is inconsistent with the area's urban designation. [4, 5] The question, then, is whether a literal interpretation of the conditional use requirements (no adverse effects) is consistent with the city council's intent as expressed in the DSMP as a whole. We view the locally adopted plan as we would a statute. In interpreting a statute, it is the duty of the court to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent and purpose, as expressed in the act. The act must be construed as a whole and, if possible, the provisions of the act should be harmonized to insure proper construction. Tommy P. v. Board of Cy. Comm'rs, 97 Wn.2d 385, 391, 645 P.2d 697 (1982). The introductory comments to the DSMP express the following intent: T]his program is directed to long range planning in the order of 20 - 30 years into the future. During this period we envision significant development of the property for industrial, commercial, residential and recreational uses. (Italics ours.) The general goal of the DSMP is: [T]o develop the full potential of DuPont's shoreline in accord with the unusual opportunity presented by its relation to the City and surrounding area, its natural resources values, and its unique aesthetic qualities offered by water, topography, views, and its maritime character. Any such development would be ordered and diversified with the goal of preserving and enhancing the environment to the end that it shall return to the community, state, private property owners, and public-at-large the greatest good compatible with the least possible disturbance to the environment. To achieve this goal, nine policies are stated: 1. To maximize efforts to control and eliminate shoreline pollution  air, water, and land. 2. To restrict mineral extraction or exploration on or adjacent to DuPont's shoreline and the waters of Puget Sound in general. 3. To be concerned with and to seek ways to satisfy the growing need for adequate recreational facilities. 4. To be concerned with and to seek ways to provide modern competitive marine terminal facilities for world trade with due concern for the environment. 5. To encourage preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife in this area for future generations in cooperation with State and Federal agencies. 6. To define all appropriate shoreline uses and to assure that all such uses are compatible with the site, the surrounding area and the environment. 7. To establish and maintain reasonable structural standards for maintenance and development of Du Pont's shoreline. 8. To require that all shoreline uses conform to all applicable federal, state and local laws and regulations relating to environmental quality and resource protection. 9. For that portion of the shoreline that is designated as Shorelines of Statewide Significance, the following specific policies apply: a. Recognize and protect the state-wide interest over local interest. b. Preserve the natural character of the shoreline. c. Result in long-term over short-term benefit. d. Protect the resources and ecology of shorelines. e. Increase public access to publicly owned areas of the shorelines. f. Increase recreational opportunities for the public on the shorelines. (Italics ours.) Reading the general purpose and policies of the DSMP as a whole we are convinced the slight language differences in the DSMP and the DOE conditional use provisions do not support plaintiffs' position. While the DSMP stresses the vital importance of preserving the environment, it recognizes that some commercial and industrial use of the shoreline is necessary and desirable. A literal interpretation of no adverse effects would end any development of the DuPont shoreline. The DSMP is an extensive, carefully worded document of 95 pages. It would be wholly unreasonable to read the DSMP language of no adverse effects or any other isolated word or phrase in the document so literally as to defeat the overall purpose of the program. We will not do so. Plaintiffs' counsel at oral argument suggested the City of DuPont in 1975 took out the word unreasonable and deliberately took it out for reasons of enhanced shoreline protection along these shorelines of the Nisqually Delta. Counsel for DOE, however, more persuasively argued the average person on the street, who's not a lawyer, is not used to SEPA litigation, commonly puts a balancing or a judgmental feeling within their description of what they conclude is adverse. They balance the pros and the cons.... [T]hat's what the average citizen's advisory person who drafted this language would have meant. Moreover, a balanced reading of the DSMP is consistent with the SMA, from which DuPont received its authority. The SMA declares it to be the policy of the State to foster reasonable uses. While the SMA is concerned with protecting against adverse effects to the public health, the land and its vegetation and wildlife, and the waters of the state and their aquatic life, it does not say there can be no adverse effects. One final observation: Plaintiffs choose to emphasize the phrase no adverse effects on the environment. The DSMP guideline in question, however, reads [t]he use will cause no adverse effects on the environment or other uses.  (Italics ours.) A moment of reflection will make it evident even the position of the plaintiffs, carried to its logical conclusion, violates the guidelines. Any use would be an adverse effect on the environment but to ban any use would have an adverse effect on other uses. We choose to avoid a literal reading of no adverse effects as it would lead to an inconsistent and absurd result. Surely those who drafted the guidelines did not contemplate such nonsensical consequences from their work. The spirit or purpose of an enactment should prevail over the express but inept wording. State v. Day, 96 Wn.2d 646, 648, 638 P.2d 546 (1981).