Opinion ID: 1692363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Price Markup.

Text: One element of the crime of theft in the second degree is that the stolen property have a value in excess of five hundred dollars. Iowa Code §§ 714.1(1), 714.2(2) (1985). To prove this element of the charged offense the State produced a witness who testified that some of the stolen jewelry was insured for $1200, while the uninsured jewelry was worth right around $400. When asked on direct examination her basis for the $400 figure, the witness responded Well, how much I paid for them, plus I worked in a jewelry store and I bought most of them myself while I worked there, so I doI know how much they were worth at the time. In the course of defendant's cross-examination probe into the witness's jewelry store employment, the following exchange occurred: Q. Can you tell the jury what the normal markup is to retail on jewelry items: [Counsel for the prosecution]: Judge, I believe I'll object. This is irrelevant how much a jeweler makes on a sale of a product. [Counsel for defendant]: I think it's relevant as to the value of these items, Your Honor, and if this witness is able to tell me what the normal markup is, I believe the jury will be able to infer a value of the items THE COURT: Objection is sustained because the issue is market value, it's not wholesale value. Defense counsel in an offer of proof informed the court that had the witness been permitted to reply, she would have testified that the normal range of markup on jewelry is between 50 and 750%. Defendant contends that the percentage markup from wholesale to retail would have provided the jury a means of determining an alternative cost standard of value if it rejected the prosecution's evidence of insured value and retail value. He contends that the legislature has recently liberalized the measure of value of stolen property for purposes of Iowa's theft statute, allowing the fact finder greater leeway in determining the worth of stolen property. Compare Iowa Code § 714.3 (1985) (Property value is its highest value by any reasonable standard at the time that it is stolen.), with Iowa Code § 714.3 (1983) (Property value is its normal market or exchange value within the community at the time that it is stolen.). When the legislature amended that statute it also added a sentence explaining the new phrase reasonable standard: Reasonable standard includes but is not limited to market value within the community, actual value, or replacement value. Iowa Code § 714.3 (1985), as amended by 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1162, § 1. We disagree with the defendant's theory that the legislature changed the language of section 714.3 to give finders of fact more leeway in determining the value of stolen property as an element of the crime of theft. The changed language reflects instead a legislative intent to restrict the fact finder by instructing that the appropriate measure of value is the highest value by any reasonable standard. Before the statute was amended, we had held that the finder of fact could consider wholesale as well as resale values of property in determining the market value of stolen goods. State v. Boyken, 217 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Iowa 1974). We have said that testimony concerning value of stolen property is to be liberally received. See State v. Savage, 288 N.W.2d 502, 504 (Iowa 1980). We read the 1984 amendments to section 714.3 as a clear statement that the finder of fact, in this case the jury, is to focus on that standard which produces the higher of several possible values. In sustaining the relevancy objection to the proffered evidence, the trial court pointed out that the prosecution was relying on a market value standard rather than a wholesale value standard in proving the value element of the charged offense. Section 714.3 as amended gave the prosecution that option. It is apparent the trial court was pointing out how slight would be the probative value of the proffered cross-examination response to the question about markups of jewelry in general. Defendant did not explain to the trial court and has not demonstrated in this appeal what probative value that answer would have on the specific facts of this case. See Iowa R.Evid. 701. Moreover, the admissibility of relevant evidence is always subject to the trial court's application of the balancing test of Iowa Rule of Evidence 403. Even relevant testimony, evidence tending to prove some fact in issue, may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. We routinely give trial courts wide discretion in their application of rule 403, recognizing that the attention of a jury should not be diverted unduly from the substantive questions it must answer. Blakely v. Bates, 394 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Iowa 1986); see State v. Martin, 385 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Iowa 1986); Carter v. MacMillan Oil Co., Inc., 355 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Iowa 1984). The trial court certainly did not abuse its discretion in upholding the prosecution's relevancy objection to the proffered testimony concerning the general, wide fluctuation in markup of the wholesale cost of jewelry. Neither of defendant's two assignments of error has merit. Defendant received a fair trial. AFFIRMED.