Opinion ID: 177345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clearly Established Law: Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, and Cunningham

Text: In the seminal case of Apprendi v. New Jersey , the Supreme Court applied the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to a trial by an impartial jury to a state law triggering enhanced sentencing ranges based on judicial factfinding. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. There, a New Jersey hate-crime statute permitted the trial judge to impose an extended term of imprisonment if the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the crime with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group based on certain enumerated characteristics. Id. at 468-69, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Supreme Court struck down the statute as a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 497, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Because the hate-crime statute permitted a sentencing judge to enhance a defendant's term of incarceration beyond the maximum otherwise authorized for the underlying offense, based on facts found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant was effectively being charged, convicted, and sentenced to a more serious crime without the protections of a jury trial. [5] See id. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Court in Apprendi set forth the rule and its exception, both now well settled: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added). The exception for prior convictions preserved the Court's earlier holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States , which affirmed the constitutionality of the use of recidivism as a judicially determined sentencing factor authorizing an enhanced sentence. See 523 U.S. 224, 247, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). There, the Court rejected the argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) violated a defendant's right to a jury trial because it authorized an enhanced penalty for any alien caught reentering the United States after being deported, if the initial deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2); see id. at 226-28, 118 S.Ct. 1219. According to the Court, the sentencing factor at issue hererecidivismis a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243, 118 S.Ct. 1219 (emphasis added). In reaffirming the constitutionality of the use of recidivism as a judicially-found sentencing factor, the Supreme Court has since emphasized that the existence of procedural safeguards embedded in prior criminal proceedings, as well as the lack of dispute or uncertainty as to the fact of a prior conviction, mitigate[] the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a `fact' increasing the punishment beyond the maximum of a statutory range. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348. To be sure, [t]he Court's repeated emphasis on the distinctive significance of recidivism leaves no question that the Court regarded that fact as potentially distinguishable for constitutional purposes from other facts that might extend the range of possible sentencing. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (acknowledging that recidivism has formed the basis for sentencing enhancements dat[ing] back to colonial times, and that recidivist sentencing laws were currently... in effect in all 50 states). The rule of Apprendi was later reinforced in Ring v. Arizona, in which the Supreme Court struck down a capital sentencing scheme that vested the trial judge with the discretion to determine the presence or absence of statutorily enumerated aggravating factors required for the imposition of a death sentence. 536 U.S. 584, 588, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Under the Arizona law, a defendant could not be sentenced to death unless the judge found at least one aggravating circumstance. Id. at 592-93, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Absent that factual finding, the defendant faced a maximum sentence of life in prison. Id. at 597, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The result was therefore presaged by Apprendi : [b]ecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348). That Arizona dubbed those findings aggravating factors altered the analysis no more than New Jersey's use of the term sentencing enhancement, because [t]he dispositive question ... is one not of form, but effect. Ring, 536 U.S. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court expanded [6] on the principle announced in Apprendi when it was presented with a challenge to a sentence imposed pursuant to Washington's Sentencing Reform Act. 542 U.S. at 313-14, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Blakely was convicted of second-degree kidnaping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm, which carried a statutory maximum sentence of ten years. Id. at 298-99, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citing Wash. Rev.Code §§ 9A.40.030(1), 10.99.020(3)(p), 9.94A.125). However, pursuant to other statutory provisions, a sentencing judge was required to impose a standard sentence of between forty-nine and fifty-three months unless the judge found substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. Id. at 299, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.120(2)). An illustrative list of aggravating factors was set forth in the Act, and the sentencing judge was required to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting a so-called exceptional sentence. Id. at 299, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The trial judge decided to give Blakely an exceptional sentence of ninety months, based on the fact that he had acted with deliberate cruelty, one of the enumerated grounds for departure. Id. at 300, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The Supreme Court reversed the sentence. The Court first restated the familiar rule (and exception) of Apprendi: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (emphasis added). But the Blakely court went further, and clarified that the relevant statutory maximum may not necessarily coincide with the maximum penalty prescribed by the penal code. Instead, the `statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. Id. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (emphasis in original). For Blakely, the relevant Apprendi maximum was fifty-three months: Because the judge was powerless to sentence Blakely to anything more than fifty-three months based solely on his conviction and the facts admitted pursuant to his guilty plea, the statutory maximum was no more 10 years ... than it was 20 years in Apprendi (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding a hate crime) or death in Ring (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding an aggravator). Id. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Moreover, Blakely clarified that a sentencing scheme can violate the Sixth Amendment even if those facts that a sentencing judge is required to find are not specifically enumerated by statute. Id. at 305, 124 S.Ct. 2531. That the list of aggravating circumstances in the Washington statute was illustrative rather than exhaustive did not elide the constitutional flaw: Whether the judge's authority to impose an enhanced sentence depends on finding a specified fact (as in Apprendi ), one of several specified facts (as in Ring ), or any aggravating fact (as [in Blakely ]), id., the authority is derivative of an unconstitutional source. Because Blakely's ninety-month sentence could not have been imposed but for the judge's finding of deliberate cruelty, it was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. Thus, Blakely settled that the Apprendi maximum is the sentence that is authorized based solely on those factual predicates that are found within the constraints of the Sixth Amendment. That is, those facts that are: (1) proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) admitted by the defendant; or (3) findings of recidivism. Lastly, in Cunningham v. California, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of California's determinate sentencing law (DSL) in light of Apprendi, Ring and Blakely. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007). Under the DSL, most substantive offenses were assigned three tiers of determinate sentences: a lower-, a middle-, and an upper-term sentence. Id. at 277, 127 S.Ct. 856. But the discretion of the trial judge to select either the upper-term or lower-term sentence was circumscribed: the statute provided that the court shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. Id. (quoting Cal.Penal Code § 1170(b)) (emphasis added). Circumstances in aggravation were defined as facts which justify the imposition of the upper prison term, which were to be established by a preponderance of the evidence and stated orally on the record. Id. at 278, 127 S.Ct. 856 (quoting Cal. Jud. Council Rules 4.405(d), 4.420(b), 4.420(e)) (emphasis in original). Hence, the middle term was the default sentence absent further factual findings. Cunningham was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen, for which the prescribed terms were six, twelve, and sixteen years, respectively. Id. at 275, 127 S.Ct. 856. At a post-trial sentencing hearing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence six aggravating circumstances including, inter alia, the particular vulnerability of his victim. Id. Cunningham was sentenced to the upper term of sixteen years. Id. at 276, 127 S.Ct. 856. The Supreme Court held that the DSL violated the Sixth Amendment. In rejecting the State's argument that the Apprendi maximum was the upper-term sentence for Cunningham, sixteen years the Court reaffirmed the principle announced in Blakely that a sentence must be fully authorized by factual predicates obtained in compliance with the Constitution: If the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence, if, instead, the judge must find an additional fact to impose the longer term, the Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied. Id. at 290, 127 S.Ct. 856. Because the judge was required to make a factual finding in order to impose the upper-term sentence, the Apprendi maximum was not the upper term, but the middle term, and the use of judicial factfinding to impose the upper term violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 292-93, 127 S.Ct. 856. Because Cunningham was decided well after the conviction of each petitioner became final, it is urged by the State that we cannot consider it in our analysis. To the contrary, a Supreme Court holding is generally operative retroactively in a collateral proceeding so long as it does not announce a new rule within the meaning of Teague. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004). [A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or Federal Government. To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). Similarly, under AEDPA, clearly established federal law is law that is dictated by Supreme Court precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. McKinney v. Artuz, 326 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotations and brackets omitted). Thus, if the holding of a case was dictated by extant Supreme Court precedent at a particular time, the constitutional rule embodied in that case was necessarily clearly established at that time. In that light, we have no trouble concluding that the identification of a Sixth Amendment violation in Cunningham was dictated at the time that the petitioners' convictions became final on direct review. [7] Specifically, the decision in Blakely can be said to have compelled the result in Cunningham, because Blakely left no doubt that the Apprendi maximum is the highest sentence authorized by constitutionally-obtained factual predicates alone: those contained in the jury verdict, those admitted by the defendant, and those respecting recidivism. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Thus, it should have been apparent to all reasonable jurists, Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-28, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997), that the demise of California's DSL was portended by the holding of Blakely. The State offers no persuasive analytical distinction between the sentencing schemes in Blakely and Cunningham, nor can we discern any. [8] See Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 636 (9th Cir.2008) (noting that the Court in Cunningham simply applied the rule of Blakely to a distinct but closely analogous sentencing scheme). Because Cunningham did not extend the principle announced in Blakely, but merely applied it to a new set of facts, we hold that Cunningham constitutes clearly established law for the petitioners. Nevertheless, for reasons discussed in the remainder of this opinion, we conclude that neither Cunningham nor any other clearly established Supreme Court precedent supports the petitioners' position.