Opinion ID: 42577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Martinez’s Failure to Testify

Text: With regard to Martinez’s argument regarding his failure to testify, ordinarily “[a] reviewing court will review the trial judge's determination of whether manifest intent was present under the abuse of discretion standard. 13 Moreover, the remark must be examined in the context in which it was made.” United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1338 (11th Cir. 1997). However, where, as here, no timely objection was made to the prosecutor’s allegedly impermissible comment on a defendant’s right not to testify, we will review for plain error only. United States v. Abraham, 386 F.3d 1033, 1036 (11th Cir. 2004). We will only correct plain error if an appellant demonstrates (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects the substantial rights of the defendant, and (4) that, if left uncorrected, would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of a judicial proceeding. Id. n.1. “The test for determining whether a prosecutor’s remark constitutes an impermissible comment on a defendant's failure to testify is whether ‘the statement was manifestly intended or was of such character that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.’” United States v. Carter, 760 F.2d 1568, 1578 (11th Cir. 1985) (quotation omitted). “To prevail on this claim, appellant bears the burden of establishing one of the two criteria set forth in this test.” Id. “The second part of the test requires a determination of whether the jury would naturally and necessarily take the statement to be a comment on [the defendant’s] failure to testify. ‘[T]he question is not whether the jury possibly or even probably would view the remark in this 14 manner, but whether the jury necessarily would have done so.’” Id. Moreover, where no objection was lodged, we can find error only where the comment is so “grossly prejudicial that the harm could not be removed by objections or instructions.” United States v. Griggs, 735 F.2d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 1984). The comment challenged on appeal is as follows: And this thing about, “Well, who’s the friend? Who’s the friend in Lakeland?” We don’t know who the friend is. Angel Martinez doesn’t know who the friend is. There’s only one person who knows who the friend is. As the government concedes, this comment “would have better been left unsaid. However, the comment was an isolated one, made in the context of rebutting the defense’s argument that the government had access to and failed to produce certain evidence, in this comment, the failure to discover the identity of the “Lakeland friend.” Under the plain error standard, and taken in the context of the entire trial, we cannot say that this statement violated Martinez’s substantial rights, nor can it be said that this comment could not have been remedied by an objection or an instruction. In fact, the jury was explicitly instructed that it was not to consider, in any way, the fact that the defendant failed to testify, and was further instructed that the comments of the attorneys were not evidence and that the jury was to make its decision based only on the testimony of the witnesses and exhibits admitted in the record. Accordingly, we conclude that Martinez was not substantially prejudiced 15 by the comment. See Smith, 918 F.2d at 1562 (“[b]ecause statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence, improper statements can be rectified by the district court's instruction to the jury that only the evidence in the case be considered.”). Furthermore, it cannot be said that the jury necessarily would have construed the prosecutor’s statement to be a comment on Martinez’s failure to testify. Compare Griggs, 735 F.2d at 1324 (holding that the prosecutor’s statement, “the defendant has not testified about it,” was an improper comment on the defendant’s failure to testify); but see United States v. LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1991) (discussing Griggs and the failure of Griggs to apply binding Supreme Court precedent requiring the Court to conduct a harmless error analysis). In any event, the context of the comment was in rebuttal of the defense’s questioning of the government’s failure to obtain certain evidence and, notably, the comment was not so alarming as to draw an objection from defense counsel. See United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055, 1061-62 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The defense counsel’s failure to object highlights the innocuous nature of the remark.”). Thus, under plain error review, we conclude that the prosecutor’s comment, though inartful, does not warrant a reversal.