Opinion ID: 425960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hopi Appeal

Text: 19 The Hopi appeal concerns that part of the district court's order dealing with a particular structure, structure 75, which had been built prior to 1979, but which had not been included in the Hopi Tribe's September 1979 motion. That motion resulted in the 1980 injunction requiring removal of old-new (i.e. pre-September 14, 1979) construction. The district court, in this proceeding, held that since the Hopi had fair opportunity to contest the structure in the prior proceeding and failed to do so, the Hopi Tribe was precluded from now raising the matter. 20 While the district court used the phrase collateral estoppel, which describes the doctrine applying to preclusion of issues actually litigated, see Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970-73, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979), the court was actually applying the principle of res judicata, or claim preclusion, which bars litigation of all matters which could have been raised in support of a cause of action previously litigated. Nevada v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 2906, 2918, 77 L.Ed.2d 509 (1983); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S.Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948); Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 570, 74 L.Ed.2d 932 (1983). See Restatement (Second) of Judgments Secs. 18, 19, 24, 25 (1982). 21 In holding that the Hopi Tribe was precluded from raising matters which could have been raised in the previous action, the district court necessarily viewed the Hopi claim for removal of old-new construction as one cause of action. This clearly was appropriate, since the record reflects that both the Hopi Tribe in its presentation of the matter, and the court in its disposition, sought to resolve in one proceeding the scope of the injunctive relief available with respect to structures erected in the narrow time span between February 10, 1977 and September 14, 1979. The issues to be resolved were closely related in time, space and origin; they were treated as a single trial unit which all parties at the time expected, thus fully satisfying the pragmatic standard adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments Sec. 24 (1982), and recently discussed with approval by the United States Supreme Court in Nevada v. United States, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 2918-19 & n. 12. The issues with respect to structure 75 also arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts, the criteria most stressed in our decisions. Costantini, supra, 681 F.2d at 1201-02; Harris v. Jacobs, 621 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir.1980); accord Hatchitt v. United States, 158 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.1946). See generally 1B J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice p 0.410 at 1152-63 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp.1982-1983). 22 We therefore agree with the district court that the additional relief the Hopi Tribe seeks in connection with structure 75 is part of the same cause of action litigated in the 1980 injunction proceeding, and barred by the general rule prohibiting the splitting of a cause of action. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments Secs. 24 and 26. 23 While the Hopi argue that we should make an exception on grounds of fairness, such exceptions to claim preclusion are narrow. Restatement (Second) of Judgments Sec. 26 (1982); 1B Moore's Federal Practice, supra, p 0.410 at 1167-70; 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 4415 (1982). The record in this case contains testimony of the Director of the Office of Hopi Partition Land that as an employee of the Hopi Tribe he discovered structure 75 before the Hopis filed their motion for an injunction on September 14, 1979, and that as part of his duties he monitored all construction on Hopi partition land. The Hopi therefore cannot even successfully maintain that they were unable to know about the claim in time to present it in their 1979 motion. They fall far short of meeting any of the exceptions to the general rule against claim splitting recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments Sec. 26. 24 The judgment of the district court is affirmed.