Opinion ID: 4108524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d at 854. The best we could do was this:

Text: “In general, it may be said that when it appears from the Act itself that revenue is its main objective, and the amount of the tax supports that theory, the enactment is a revenue measure. ‘In general. . . where the fee is imposed for purposes of regulation, and the statute requires compliance with certain conditions in addition to the payment of the prescribed sum, such sum is a license proper, imposed by 6 As a result of Code Revision, the language of that statute has changed slightly, but not in substance, from that in place when Eastern Diversified was decided. 16 virtue of the police power, but where it is exacted solely for revenue purposes and its payment give[s] the right to carry on the business without any further conditions, it is a tax’” (quoting in part from 33 Am. Jur., Licenses, ¶ 19, p.340. Applying those guidelines, the Court concluded that the impact fee was a tax. The revenue objective, we said, was evident in the statute. It was to raise money for county road construction. The fees were not based solely on the service provided to the property owner or to defray the expenses of the regulatory process. As the developer argued, there was no indication that the amount charged had any relevance or relationship to road construction made necessary by the particular development. Our conclusion was that the fee was exacted “solely for revenue purposes . . . to finance road construction which benefit the general public.” This case is far different. As a preface, the application for the CPCN was filed pursuant to both PUA §7-207 and §7-208, which deals with generating stations and associated transmission lines. Section 7-208(f)(1) requires PSC to include in its CPCN the requirements of Federal and State environmental laws and standards identified by the Department of Environment and “the methods and conditions that the Commission determines are appropriate to comply with those environmental laws and standards.” Apart from any general incidental authority PSC may have to attach conditions to approvals, §7-208(f)(1) requires PSC to attach conditions it finds appropriate, which necessarily may include conditions that may call for payments of one kind or another to governmental agencies, at least to the extent that they do not otherwise partake of a tax. 17 Unlike the ordinance in Eastern Diversified, which we concluded on its face was a revenue measure, the authority conferred in PUA §7-208(f)(1) is unambiguously regulatory in nature. The payments required by Conditions J-3 and J-4 are not general exactions on all applicants for a CPCN to construct an electric generating station. They were not for the primary purpose of raising revenue, as there was no evidence that any of the recipients were in need of additional revenue. In determining whether to grant a CPCN, PSC was required by law to consider and weigh any positive economic or environmental impact against any negative impact – a purely regulatory matter. The Conditions were particular to that end – to offset the prospect of an increase in natural gas prices in the future due to the exporting of LNG by Dominion from the Cove Point facility by a contribution to MEAP, to help low-income families who would be specially affected by such an increase, and to offset the impact of the emission of pollutants from the fossil-fueled electric generating station by contributions to the State’s greenhouse gas reduction programs. Accordingly, we hold that the exactions imposed by the two Conditions were primarily regulatory rather than revenue measures and did not constitute taxes. In light of that conclusion, we need not address whether compliance with those exactions was voluntary. Nor need we address Dominion’s argument that, though clearly aware of the two Conditions, AMP never raised the issue of whether they amounted to unlawful taxes before PSC. 18 FAILURE TO IDENTIFY VALUE OF POSITIVE FACTOR PUA §3-113 requires, in relevant part, that a PSC decision and order (1) be based on consideration of the record, (2) be in writing, and (3) state the grounds for the conclusions of the Commission. The Order in this case complied with those requirements. It made extensive references to the record; it based its conclusion on what was in the record; it was in writing; and it stated the basis for the conclusions reached. One of the things PSC was required to consider was whether and to what extent the economic benefit of the electric generating station would offset any negative economic impact from the station. AMP complains that PSC failed to state any finding in that regard – that, although it did assign some value to positive economic benefit, it did not state “what value, or range of values” it assigned to the positive effects. In what would seem, at worst, to be an alleged failure by PSC to make a statutorily-required finding, AMP complains that it was denied due process because, by failing to state the value of the positive economic impact it assigned to the generating station, PSC “made it impossible to effectively challenge how the [statutory] balancing test was implemented.” AMP does not tell us, and we do not understand, how any imprecision in a required finding, if there was one, prevented AMP from challenging the PSC decision, much less how it has been denied due process of law. It is true, as this Court held in Blue Bird Cab v. Dep’t Emp. Sec., 251 Md. 458, 466, 248 A.2d 331, 335(1968) and later in Overpak v. Baltimore, 395 Md. 16, 40, 909 A.2d 235, 249 (2006) that “a fundamental 19 requirement of due process of law in a quasi-judicial proceeding is the right of the parties to be apprised of the facts relied on by the tribunal in its decision,” but we think that occurred here. As we have observed, given the unusual (though not unprecedented) nature of the Project, with the generating station to be used solely to support the exporting phase of the entire LNG facility, it was difficult for the parties (other than AMP, which contended that there was no economic benefit from the generating station because it was not to be connected to the grid) and for PSC to isolate entirely the economic benefit of the generating station from the economic benefit of the Project as a whole. There was evidence of some increased employment, both during the construction of the station and later from its operation and some additional taxes based on the value of the station, once constructed, and PSC, though regarding it as minimal, took that into account. In its Order, PSC recounted the conclusions of the major participants regarding the positive and negative economic impacts, including rough estimates in dollars of the positive economic impact, which is all that it had. It was enough to find that, absent Conditions J-3 and J-4, the positive impact was insufficient to offset the negative impact but that, with those Conditions, totaling $48 million, the positive and negative impacts would be sufficiently in balance. It is a fair inference that, in concluding that, absent those Conditions, the net negative economic impact would not justify the granting of a CPCN, PSC estimated that the positive economic impact, absent those conditions, would be approximately $48 million less than the value of the negative economic impact, which 20 is within the range estimated by the parties in their submissions. We fail to see how AMP was hindered in challenging the PSC Order. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE Finally, AMP complains that the evidence of the separate economic impact of the electric generating station was legally insufficient for PSC to draw any conclusion regarding that factor. AMP acknowledges that there was a good bit of evidence regarding the economic impact of the Project as a whole, but very little regarding the generating station itself. This argument implicates the problem noted above -- the difficulty in isolating and estimating the overall economic impact of just the electric generating station when its sole function was to support the larger Project. There was evidence, which was disputed, regarding the economic benefit that would accrue from the employment of people to build and operate the station and from property taxes that would accrue to Calvert County under the PILOT agreement. It is not clear whether there was any evidence of whether Dominion could have proceeded with the export operation without building the generating station – i.e., draw the needed electricity from the grid – or, if so, what the positive and negative effects of that might have been compared to those arising from building the generating station. There is no reference by any of the parties to any such evidence in the record. 21 PSC was faced with a dilemma. Dominion and PPRP stated that they produced all the evidence they could produce of the positive economic benefit of just the generating station. Neither PSC nor AMP has suggested what further evidence could have been produced. PSC was certainly aware that a decision by FERC was pending, and, in fact, according to its website (https://ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2014/2014-3/09-2914.asp), FERC authorized construction of the Cove Point LNG Export Project (Docket No. CP13-113-000) on September 29, 2014. It is clear from the submissions of PPRP and Dominion that the favorable economic impact of the entire Project would have been far greater in terms of employment and taxes than the impact of just the generating station, and PSC had to consider whether taking the strict view espoused by AMP, as opposed to accepting the evidence that PPRP and Dominion said was all they were able to produce, would have the effect of scuttling a Project that FERC might approve (and did approve) that could produce significant economic benefit to the State and county. AMP insists that PSC should have denied the CPCN, not because of anyone’s failure to produce additional evidence that could have been produced but because of the failure to produce evidence that the parties concluded, and PSC reluctantly accepted, could not have been produced due to the integration of the generating station into the overall Project. We again note PPRP’s statement that, due to that intertwining, “many of the impacts from constructing and operating the electric generating equipment cannot be separated from the larger project and, thus, cannot be evaluated on a stand-alone basis.” . 22 PSC recognized that the evidence regarding just the impact from the generating station alone was less than what it would have liked but dealt with what it had, which was all it was going to get. It did not ignore the statutory requirement to consider economic impact. It concluded that the evidence that it had sufficed to require the imposition of Conditions J-3 and J-4 and, with those Conditions, to warrant the granting of the CPCN. Under the circumstances, that decision was not an unreasonable one. It was one that fell within the discretion of PSC, guided by its expertise, to make, and we shall defer to it. JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; PETITIONER TO PAY THE COSTS. 23