Opinion ID: 679519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Posture and Standards of Review

Text: 11 We review de novo the grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard used by the district court. Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.1990). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Concrete Works, the party opposing summary judgment. Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241. 12 Denver, as the moving party, has the initial burden to show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter. Id. In so doing, the nonmoving party may not rest solely on the allegations in its pleadings, but must instead, by its own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'  Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). 13 At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Nonetheless, [w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, summary judgment in favor of the moving party is proper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
14 At the outset, we consider Denver's contention that Concrete Works fails to satisfy its burden of establishing standing to challenge the Ordinance's constitutionality. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (setting forth the burden of establishing standing). Although the district court ultimately ruled that Concrete Works does have standing, the court characterized the company's showing as extraordinarily weak because it has not established that it was refused a contract because of the race or gender of its owner. Concrete Works, 823 F.Supp. at 827-28. 15 Just a few months after the district court entered its judgment, however, the Supreme Court clarified that a contractor who challenges a minority preference contract scheme on equal protection grounds need not show that it would have received a contract absent the city ordinance. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 2299, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). The Court explained that, so long as the nonminority contractor can show that it was able and ready to bid on a contract subject to the ordinance, the requisite injury in fact under Article III arises from an inability to compete [with minority contractors] on an equal footing due to that ordinance's discriminatory policy. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2303. 16 Guided by this principle, we conclude that Concrete Works has demonstrated injury in fact because it submitted bids on three projects and the Ordinance prevented it from competing on an equal basis with minority and women-owned prime contractors. 5 Specifically, the unequal nature of the bidding process lies in the Ordinance's requirement that a nonminority prime contractor must meet MBE and WBE participation goals by entering into joint ventures with MBEs and WBEs or hiring them as subcontractors (or satisfying the ten-step good faith requirement). In contrast, minority and women-owned prime contractors may use their own work to satisfy MBE and WBE participation goals. Ordinance Sec. 28-57. Thus, the extra requirements impose costs and burdens on nonminority firms that preclude them from competing with MBEs and WBEs on an equal basis. 6 See Contractors Ass'n v. Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 995-96 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that nonminority contractors had standing to challenge a City of Philadelphia ordinance that closely parallels the Denver scheme--the ordinance requires a city agency to set MBE participation goals and authorizes it to issue waivers for nonminority general contractors who are unable to satisfy the goals after a good faith effort); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 5 F.3d 1397, 1399 (11th Cir.1993) (reversing, in the wake of Northeastern Florida, the district court's dismissal of nonminority contractor's suit because the county's contract program treated minority and nonminority contractors differently). 17 In addition to demonstrating injury in fact, Concrete Works also satisfies the two remaining elements to establish standing: (1) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (2) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable ruling. Northeastern Fla., --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2302 (citations omitted). Thus, we conclude that Concrete Works has standing to challenge the constitutionality of Denver's race- and gender-conscious contract program.
18 The final preliminary matter we must address is the standard of equal protection review that governs our analysis. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 19 We determine the appropriate standard of equal protection review by examining the nature of the classifications embodied in the statute. We apply strict scrutiny to the Ordinance's race-based preference scheme and thus inquire whether the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-95, 109 S.Ct. at 721-23 (plurality) (adopting strict scrutiny test); id. at 520, 109 S.Ct. at 735-36 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (supporting strict scrutiny standard of plurality). Gender-based classifications, in contrast, are evaluated under the intermediate scrutiny rubric, which provides that the law must be substantially related to an important government objective. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 & n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3335-36, n. 9, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982); Rowley v. Board of Educ., 863 F.2d 39, 40 (10th Cir.1988). 20