Opinion ID: 853928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jury's Exposure to Extraneous Influences

Text: Coleman claims the jury in his trial was subjected to extraneous influences. (Appellant's Br. at 97.) He complains that the jury saw a woman in the hallway of the courthouse, whom the bailiff identified to them as Debra Brown, after the trial court ruled that they should not view Brown in person. The post-conviction court determined that Coleman's evidence did not establish that the jurors saw Brown in the hallway: We are not persuaded that the jurors did see the petitioner's codefendant in the hallway outside the courtroom during the trial. They apparently saw a woman that some of the jurors think, or think they were told by the bailiff, was the codefendant. (P-C.R. at 1740.) Our review of the evidence from the post-conviction hearing, particularly the affidavits of five of the jurors in Coleman's trial, shows there was conflicting evidence. [12] The evidence supports the post-conviction court's judgment on this issue. Moreover, even if the jury had viewed Brown, the State would have been able to overcome the presumption of prejudice that would have arisen. A presumption of prejudice arises when the jury is exposed to out-of-court communications with unauthorized persons. Conrad v. Tomlinson, 258 Ind. 115, 279 N.E.2d 546 (1972). The State sought to bring Brown into the courtroom and have her stand near Coleman for the purpose of comparing their relative heights and complexions to show how they match A.H.'s descriptions, which were partially comparative in nature. The defense objected on the grounds of relevance and possible prejudicial effect. [13] The parties debated whether the potential prejudice could be avoided by various methods, but the record reflects that the court actually sustained the objection to the showing of Brown on grounds of relevance. (T.R. at 1519 (I don't see the probative value of her appearance here at all.).) The court's primary reason for refusing to allow the State to show Brown was relevance, suggesting that it would not tend to prove or disprove any fact at issue. We conclude that, minimally, Coleman needs to demonstrate that the jury concluded something on the basis of a hallway view to warrant relief. He has not done so.