Opinion ID: 2600503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the proper remedy for an officer's failure to inform a detainee about the recording is the dismissal of all evidence related to the traffic stop

Text: ¶ 48 The drivers argue that because their conversations were private and recorded in violation of RCW 9.73.030, all evidence related to the traffic stop should have been excluded under RCW 9.73.050. RCW 9.73.050 provides that: Any information obtained in violation of RCW 9.73.030 . . . shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080, or in a criminal action in which the defendant is charged with a crime, the commission of which would jeopardize national security. In State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wash.2d 828, 836, 791 P.2d 897 (1990), this court interpreted the remedy in RCW 9.73.050 as rendering inadmissible any evidence obtained at the same time as the improper recording of a private conversation, including simultaneous visual observations and assertive gestures. However, this remedy only applies to private conversations under RCW 9.73.030. ¶ 49 In Fjermestad, this court held that undercover officers using body wires without court authorization were knowingly intercepting private conversation in violation of the privacy act. 114 Wash.2d at 829, 836, 791 P.2d 897. In determining what remedy to apply to this violation, the court considered RCW 9.73.050 and noted that the statute applied to `[a]ny information obtained in violation of RCW 9.73.030.' Id. at 836, 791 P.2d 897 (quoting RCW 9.73.050). As we read the statute, it expresses a legislative intent to safeguard the private conversations of citizens from dissemination in any way. The statute reflects a desire to protect individuals from the disclosure of any secret illegally uncovered. . . . Fjermestad, 114 Wash.2d at 836, 791 P.2d 897 (emphasis added). Even though the improper wiretapping in Fjermestad violated RCW 9.73.090(2), it also violated RCW 9.73.030 because it captured private conversations. ¶ 50 Here, the improper recordings did not violate RCW 9.73.030 because they captured traffic stop conversations, which are not private conversations. Thus, the remedy from RCW 9.73.050 and Fjermestad does not apply. We conclude that the violations of RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) in these cases do not require the exclusion of other evidence acquired at the same time as the improper recordings, such as the officer's simultaneous visual observations. ¶ 51 Instead, we look to the remedy we employed in Cunningham, where we determined that recordings that did not strictly conform to former RCW 9.73.090(2) were simply inadmissible. 93 Wash.2d at 831, 613 P.2d 1139. We apply that remedy here and hold that because the officers failed to comply with RCW 9.73.090(1)(c), the recordings in Lewis, Kelly, and DeWaele are inadmissible. We conclude that this remedy applies to both the sound and video tracks of the recordings because RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) prohibits a police officer from turning off the sound recording capabilities of a video recorder. Thus, RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) does not support the admission of the video track without the sound track once a sound recording has been made. ¶ 52 In Lewis, we have a factual situation where Lewis, not the State, offered the recording as an exhibit at his revocation hearing and then moved to suppress the recording and all other evidence acquired at the same time as the recording. While the hearing officer noted that the State did not seek to introduce the recording, the officer also denied Lewis' motion to suppress the recording after admitting the recording as an exhibit. From the hearing officer's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final order, we cannot tell whether the officer relied on the improper recording once admitted. We remand for a new hearing in Lewis without the improper recording. We also remand Kelly and DeWaele for hearings without the improper recordings because the Auburn Municipal Court dismissed those cases prior to hearing.