Opinion ID: 168352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unincorporated association as a Section 1983 plaintiff

Text: 19 In their cross-appeal, defendants claim that OSA, as an unincorporated association, is not a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We agree. 20 As an initial matter, we note that, notwithstanding plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, this is a matter of first impression. None of our cases specifically address whether an unincorporated association is a person for the purposes of Section 1983. Likewise, the cases cited by the district court and plaintiffs simply permit, with little or no analysis, unincorporated associations to bring suit under Section 1983. Consequently, such cases have limited bearing on our analysis. 21 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir.2004), and begin with the language of the statute itself, United States Dept. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500, 113 S.Ct. 2202, 124 L.Ed.2d 449 (1993). In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states: 22 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 23 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). OSA, therefore, can only be a Section 1983 plaintiff if it is a person within the jurisdiction of the United States. 24 While Section 1983 itself is silent as to this issue, the Supreme Court, beginning with Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), has had a number of occasions to consider whether a particular entity is a person under Section 1983. See, e.g, Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (holding that municipalities are subject to suit as persons under Section 1983); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that a State is not a person amenable to suit under Section 1983); Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 192, 110 S.Ct. 1737, 109 L.Ed.2d 163 (1990) (holding that neither the Territory of Guam nor an officer thereof acting in his official capacity is a person under Section 1983); Inyo County, Cal. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701, 711-12, 123 S.Ct. 1887, 155 L.Ed.2d 933 (2003) (holding that a Tribe is not a person who may sue under Section 1983 to vindicate its rights as a sovereign). Consequently, we are not without guidance in this area. 25 To determine whether an entity constitutes a `person' within the meaning of § 1983, we examine the statute's language and purpose, Ngiraingas, 495 U.S. at 186, 110 S.Ct. 1737, while keeping in mind the `legislative environment' in which the word [person] appears, Inyo County Cal., 538 U.S. at 711, 123 S.Ct. 1887 (citations omitted). Essentially, this requires that we seek an indicia of congressional intent at the time the statute was enacted. Ngiraingas, 495 U.S. at 187, 110 S.Ct. 1737. In Monell, the Supreme Court considered three factors in holding that Congress intended that municipalities be considered persons potentially liable under Section 1983:(1) legislative history, (2) the general treatment of corporations in 1871, and (3) the Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (the Dictionary Act of 1871). See Monell, 436 U.S. at 686-89, 98 S.Ct. 2018; see also Ngiraingas, 495 U.S. at 192, 110 S.Ct. 1737 n. 11 (characterizing Monell as turning on the legislative history[,] . . . the general treatment of corporations (including municipal corporations) . . . and on the 1871 version of the Dictionary Act). 26 Although Monell dealt only with municipal liability under Section 1983, we have relied upon it to conclude that a municipality may also bring suit under Section 1983. Rural Water Dist. No. 1, Ellsworth County, Kan. v. City of Wilson, Kan., 243 F.3d 1263, 1274 (10th Cir.2001) ([I]n light of Monell, it would be a strained analysis to hold, as a matter of statutory construction, that a municipal corporation was a `person' within one clause of section 1983, but not a `person' within another clause of the same statute.) (quoting South Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 503 (6th Cir.1986)). While there is no per se rule of statutory interpretation that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning, there is a presumption that this is so. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 214, 121 S.Ct. 1433, 149 L.Ed.2d 401 (2001). As such, Monell also guides our determination of whether an unincorporated association is a person and, thus, a proper claimant under Section 1983. 27 In light of Monell and its progeny, therefore, we consider (1) the legislative history of Section 1983, (2) the general understanding, as of 1871, regarding the legal personality of unincorporated associations, and (3) the Dictionary Act of 1871. First, there is no indication within the legislative history of Section 1983 that Congress considered the term persons to include unincorporated associations. Rather, the history cited in Monell illustrates that municipalities, unlike unincorporated associations, were targeted as entities to whom Section 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, and therefore Section 1983, applied. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 686-87, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ([Representative] Bingham's further remarks clearly indicate his view that . . . takings by cities . . . would be redressable under § 1 of the bill.). In fact, comments made by several members of Congress indicate a restricted view of who could qualify as a proper Section 1983 plaintiff. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 683, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ([Section 1] . . . provides a civil remedy . . . to all people where, under color of State law, they or any of them may be deprived of rights to which they are entitled under the Constitution by reason and virtue of their national citizenship. ) (emphasis added) (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871)) (Rep.Shellabarger); id. at 685, 98 S.Ct. 2018 n. 45 (Representative Bingham, the author of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . declared the bill's purpose to be `the enforcement . . . of the Constitution on behalf of every individual citizen of the Republic . . . to the extent of the rights guarantied to him by the Constitution.') (emphasis added) (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 81 (1871)). 28 Next, there was no general understanding in 1871, when the precursor to Section 1983 was passed, that unincorporated associations should be treated as natural persons. Instead, the common law essentially held that unincorporated associations lacked the capacity to sue or be sued. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385, 42 S.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed. 975 (1922) (Undoubtedly at common law an unincorporated association of persons . . . could only sue or be sued in the names of its members, and their liability had to be enforced against each member.); see also Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U.S. 113, 118, 53 S.Ct. 543, 77 L.Ed. 1069 (1933) (These [unincorporated association plaintiffs] are not corporations, quasi corporations, or organized pursuant to, or recognized by, any law. Neither is a person in law, and, unless authorized by statute, they have no capacity to sue.); cf. Will, 491 U.S. at 67, 109 S.Ct. 2304 ([I]n enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common law. One important assumption underlying the Court's decisions in this area is that members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles . . . and that they likely intended these common-law principles to remain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.) (citations omitted). 29 Thus, unlike corporations, it was not well-established, when Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act was enacted, that unincorporated associations should be treated as natural persons. See, e.g., United States v. Amedy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 392, 412, 6 L.Ed. 502 (1826) (That corporations are, in law, for civil purposes, deemed persons, is unquestionable.); Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558, 11 L.Ed. 353 (1844) ([A] corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes as a person, . . . capable of being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a natural person.); Monell, 436 U.S. at 688 n. 50, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (quoting the statement of a sponsor of Section 1 that counties, cities, and corporations of all sorts . . . have become thoroughly established to be an individual or person or entity of the personal existence, of which . . . the United States Constitution does take note and endow with faculty to sue and be sued in the courts of the United States) (emphasis added). In fact, unincorporated associations lacked the capacity to bring suit when Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act was enacted. 30 Last, the language of the Dictionary Act of 1871 also shows that unincorporated associations were not intended to be persons for Section 1983 purposes. As the Supreme Court has previously noted, the Dictionary Act of 1871, as it read when Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act was enacted, stated that in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word `person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate. Will, 491 U.S. at 69 n. 8, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has further observed that an examination of the authorities of the era suggests that the phrase [`bodies politic and corporate'] was used to mean corporations, both private and public (municipal). Id. at 69, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (emphasis added). Because an unincorporated association is, by definition, not a corporation, it is therefore also not a body politic or corporate. Thus, while the Dictionary Act of 1871 extended the meaning of person to include corporations and municipalities, it did not do the same for unincorporated associations. 31 We do not read the current enactment of the Dictionary Act in 1 U.S.C. § 1 to require a contrary result. That text clearly states, and has since 1948, see Pub.L. No. 80-772, § 6, 62 Stat. 683, 859 (1948), that the word person include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the current text of the Dictionary Act does not control, because, beginning with Monell, in each instance where the Supreme Court has addressed whether a particular entity is a person for the purposes of suing or being sued under Section 1983, it has principally considered the Dictionary Act of 1871. See, e.g, Monell, 436 U.S. at 719, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (noting that the `usual' meaning of the word `person' would extend to municipal corporations is also evidenced by [the Dictionary Act of 1871] which had been passed only months before the Civil Rights Act was passed); Will, 491 U.S. at 66-69, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (noting that the Dictionary Act of 1871 did not counsel a contrary conclusion that a state was not a person amenable to suit under Section 1983 and focusing on deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of § 1983); Ngiraingas, 495 U.S. at 187, 110 S.Ct. 1737 (noting that [w]e seek . . . indicia of congressional intent at the time the statute was enacted and that a review of § 1983's history uncovers no sign that Congress was thinking of Territories when it enacted the statute over a century ago in 1871); Inyo County, Cal., 538 U.S. at 714, 123 S.Ct. 1887 n. 1 (The Dictionary Act [of 1871], which was passed just two months before § 1983 and was designed to supply rules of construction for all legislation, provided that `the word `person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . . . .'). In other words, in attempting to discern the meaning of person as used in Section 1983, we look not to how the words are defined now, but rather at how they were defined at the time the statute was enacted. 32 This approach is also consistent with the Supreme Court's general use of the Dictionary Act as a tool of statutory construction. See, e.g., Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory, 506 U.S. 194, 204, 113 S.Ct. 716, 121 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993) (using expanded definition of person from the 1948 version of the Dictionary Act in addressing whether an association is a person for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, because the former was enacted prior to the latter); cf. United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 123 n. 2, 79 S.Ct. 203, 3 L.Ed.2d 165 (1958) (It is significant that the definition of `whoever' in 1 U.S.C. § 1 was first enacted into law as part of the very same statute which enacted into positive law the revised Criminal Code. The connection between 1 U.S.C. § 1 and the Criminal Code, which includes [the statute at issue], is thus more than a token one, the very same statute which creates the crime admonishing `whoever' is to be liberally interpreted.). Additionally, at least one other circuit has held that the current version of the Dictionary Act only applies prospectively. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 451 F.3d 248, 254 (D.C.Cir.2006) (holding that the current definition of person in the Dictionary Act does not apply to a Rule promulgated before the current version of the Act was passed). As the expanded definition of person in the current text of 1 U.S.C. § 1 was added more than seventy years after the enactment of Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act, it is not an indicia of Congress' intent to deem an unincorporated association a person under Section 1983. In sum, none of the aforementioned factors, legislative history, general understanding, or the Dictionary Act of 1871, suggest Congress' intent to entitle unincorporated associations to seek redress under Section 1983. 33 The district court, in contrast, did not rely on any of these factors in reaching the opposite conclusion. Instead, in addition to case law which did not adequately address the issue, the district court relied heavily upon analogy to other entities permitted to sue under Section 1983, such as corporations, Indian tribes and unions. We conclude that these analogies are ultimately unconvincing, particularly in light of our analysis of the abovementioned Monell factors. Specifically, both non-profit and for-profit corporations clearly fall into the category of bodies corporate within the meaning of the 1871 Dictionary Act and, thus, could properly be considered persons under Section 1983. See Will, 491 U.S. at 69 n. 8, 109 S.Ct. 2304. The analogy between tribes and unincorporated associations is also dubious, having been called into question by the Supreme Court's recent decision holding that a tribe does not qualify as a person who may sue under Section 1983 to vindicate its rights as a sovereign. See Inyo County, Cal., 538 U.S. at 711-12, 123 S.Ct. 1887. As for labor unions, it is true that they have been permitted to bring suit under Section 1983. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 819 n. 13, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974) (noting that [u]nions may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as persons deprived of their rights secured by the Constitution and laws). However, this is likely based on the similarities between unions and corporations, rather than an implicit recognition of the right of unincorporated associations to sue under Section 1983. See United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 386, 42 S.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed. 975 (1922) (holding that labor union could be sued for antitrust violations and describing the affirmative legal recognition of their existence and usefulness and provisions for their protection). 34 We conclude, therefore, that the Dictionary Act of 1871, the common understanding regarding unincorporated associations in 1871, and the legislative history of Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 fail to indicate a congressional intent to include unincorporated associations within the ambit of the term person as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As such, we reverse the district court's ruling that OSA is a person entitled to bring a claim under Section 1983, and we remand with direction to dismiss OSA's claims.