Opinion ID: 1381126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Charge of Compounding a Felony

Text: The final count set aside by the trial court  count V  charged defendant with compounding a felony. The pertinent part of Penal Code section 153 makes punishable Every person who, having knowledge of the actual commission of a crime, takes money or property of another, or any gratuity or reward, or any engagement, or promise thereof, upon any agreement or understanding to compound or conceal such crime, or to abstain from any prosecution thereof, or to withhold any evidence thereof.... The court justified its dismissal of count V by a two-step evaluation of the evidence. First, as it was Kerhulas rather than defendant who was to abstain from prosecution, Kerhulas would be the compounder and defendant could at most be an aider and abettor. Secondly, because Kerhulas was only pretending to ratify the nonprosecution agreement, there was no crime for defendant to aid and abet. (5) We are persuaded by the People's contention that the court read section 153 in a manner not supported by its text. The statute encompasses conduct by every person who takes money or other reward ... or promise thereof ... upon any agreement or understanding to compound a crime. The court, without discussion, limited the meaning of every person to the victim of a crime who is paid not to prosecute. No dispositive authority in California confirms that restrictive interpretation. Recently, in Hoines v. Barney's Club, Inc. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 603 [170 Cal. Rptr. 42, 620 P.2d 628], we had occasion to discuss the elements of compounding and the policy expressed by section 153. We were called upon to decide the validity of a release of all claims related to an arrest, signed by the accused in return for dismissal of charges by the prosecutor. The issue entailed an examination of section 153 to learn if the prosecutor had violated its provisions in arranging for the release in exchange for nonprosecution. We determined that since the prosecutor was not paid by the complainants in the case to strike the deal, no violation of the statute could have occurred: No claim is made that the prosecutor in the instant case personally received any consideration for moving to dismiss charges pending against plaintiff. So far as research discloses the crime may be committed only by a person  including accomplices  receiving consideration pursuant to agreement to frustrate prosecution for criminal conduct. ( Id. at p. 610.) Our decision left the implication that the presence of consideration received by the prosecutor would have completed the offense. [6] Hoines thus buttresses the conclusion that the Legislature made no misstatement when it declared that every party who profits from inducing the compounding of a crime is within the scope of the statute. There are regrettable similarities between a prosecutor's receipt of consideration to arrange a nonprosecution deal and the conduct of defendant, who is an attorney, in the present case. Both situations involve an officer of the court acting as a paid accomplice of the alleged perpetrators and victims of crime who together propose to frustrate the operation of justice. Here the consideration came from both parties  defendant received a promise of a fee for his services from his client, and the $2,500 and release from Kerhulas. Hoines reiterated the elements of the offense of compounding: (1) knowledge of the crime; (2) an agreement not to prosecute that crime; (3) receipt of consideration. ( Ibid. ; see also Bowyer v. Burgess (1960) 54 Cal.2d 97, 100 [4 Cal. Rptr. 521, 351 P.2d 793].) We have already noted that defendant prepared the nonprosecution agreement and was promised payment for the task; he also obviously had knowledge of the theft and whereabouts of Kerhulas' property. A factfinder could thus conclude that his actions supplied all the elements of compounding, unlike the conduct of the prosecutor in Hoines. It is true that the common law offense of compounding a crime was usually applied only to the victim who accepted something of value in exchange for concealing or not prosecuting the crime. (Perkins on Criminal Law (2d ed. 1969) p. 518.) Since the statutory version of the offense was added to our Penal Code, however, the provision has never been enforced exclusively against a victim, but rather against any person who profits from compounding. (See, e.g., People v. Byron (1894) 103 Cal. 675 [37 P. 754] [witness]; People v. Raymond (1927) 87 Cal. App. 510 [262 P. 442] [killer's friend; victim's physician].) Statutes in a number of other jurisdictions have also been applied to persons other than victims who were paid for their participation in the compounding of the crime or collected illicit payments on behalf of others. (See State v. Fisher (1920) 94 N.J.L. 24 [110 A. 124], revd. on other grounds, (1921) 95 N.J.L. 419 [113 A. 607] [police chief]; State v. Ash (1898) 33 Ore. 86 [54 P. 184] [police officer took money to be forwarded to police chief]; State v. Ruthven (1882) 58 Iowa 121 [12 N.W. 235] [victim's brother]; State v. Henning (1870) 33 Ind. 189 [prosecutor].) Moreover, restrictive reading of compounding statutes has been criticized by the commentators, notably by the drafters of the Model Penal Code: The most outright attempt by a murderer or his relatives to buy off the widow would not make them guilty of compounding.... This result [is] inconsistent with the notion that this law is to prevent obstruction of justice.... (Model Pen. Code (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) com. to § 208.32A, pp. 206-207; see also Perkins, op. cit. supra, at pp. 520-521, fn. 28.) [7] In response to this criticism, at least six states have amended statutes that appeared to cover only victims to now include other parties as well. (See statutes cited in Comment, Compounding Crimes: Time for Enforcement? (1975) 27 Hastings L.J. 175, 189-190, fn. 78.) In light of this trend, we decline to give a needlessly restrictive meaning to the words of section 153 which, on their face, cover a party to the illicit negotiations regardless of whether he is the one who refrains from prosecuting the crime. Indeed, in the case at bar the words of section 153 seem particularly applicable to defendant rather than Kerhulas, as it is difficult to see how Kerhulas' recovery of his own property could be the taking of money or property of another. We therefore hold that any participant in the compounding transaction who fulfills the above-listed elements of section 153 is in violation of the statute. As already shown, the grand jury had ample cause here to suspect defendant of compounding the felony theft of Kerhulas' property. [8] The order is reversed and the trial court is directed to reinstate counts III, IV, and V of the indictment.