Opinion ID: 2080915
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Windsperger

Text: The facts, as succinctly stated by the appeals tribunal and affirmed by the commissioner, are these: (2) On the morning of May 28, 1982 the claimant left a anote for her employer to the effect that she wanted to leave early on the following day (Saturday, May 29, 1982). The claimant was scheduled to work that Saturday until 3:00 PM. (3) The employer answered the claimant by writing on the backside of her note to the effect that she could leave at 2:30 PM but not at 1:00 PM. This was the Memorial Day weekend and the employer anticipated a busy day on Saturday. (4) Throughout the day on May 28, 1982 the claimant attempted to talk with her employer about her leaving early. About 8:00 PM that day, the claimant and the employer discussed the matter. In the course of the conversation, the claimant became quite loud and violently upset when not allowed to leave early. The Claimant continued her arguing at which time the employer indicated to the claimant that he had enough and was warning her. The employer warned the claimant to stop three times, and finally told the claimant, You're fired. This all took place within a period of fifteen to twenty minutes. There were customers in the store during this time but these customers were unaware of any arguing or commotion. (emphasis supplied). The appeals tribunal concluded: Based upon a review of the evidence and testimony of record, the tribunal concludes that the claimant, while her discharge was fully justified from the point of view of the employer, is not guilty of willful misconduct within the meaning of [Minn.Stat. § 268.09, subd. 1] and [ Tilseth v. Midwest Lumber Co., 295 Minn. 372, 204 N.W.2d 644 (1973)]. (emphasis supplied). The commissioner, reversing the decision of the appeals tribunal, concluded in these words: In the present case, the claimant was clearly advised that she would not be given the two hours off on what the employer termed one of the busiest days in a retail liquor store. The employer had allowed the claimant to leave one-half hour. The claimant had not set out at the hearing or on review any compelling reason for her early departure. Her persistence in arguing the point after being warned three times by the employer to discontinue clearly indicates a lack of concern for her employment. This representative does not concur with the Appeal Tribunal that this was merely a single instance of poor judgment. (emphasis supplied). The majority opinion does not hold that the action of the employee was not misconduct but holds that one incident should not constitute statutory misconduct. While we cannot condone Windsperger's irrational outburst at her manager, the majority acknowledges, it nonetheless holds that her tantrum does not evince such a willful disregard for her employer's interests as to justify denying her unemployment benefits. As a matter of fact, it was not entirely an isolated incident because, as the majority opinion acknowledges, Windsperger had once, over a year before, thrown a three-minute temper tantrum when told she would not be getting a raise. In Auger v. Gillette Co., 303 N.W.2d 255, 257 (1981), we noted, although in a different episode of misconduct, that a warning given to employees would have strengthened employer's proof. In this case, as the findings of the appeals tribunal make clear, [t]he employer warned the claimant to stop three times. Two elements in the majority's statement of the rule of law are disturbing. First, the majority seems to say that insubordination is permissible if it occurs only once. I cannot accept the notion that any act of insubordination, however deliberate and inexcusable, is permissible if it happens only once. Second, the majority would hold that insubordination is not disqualifying misconduct if other employees or customers do not observe it. The adverse effect of insubordination is not that it is observed by others but, rather, that insubordination, in disregard of proper standards of behavior, interferes with the efficient and cooperative conduct of business. The employee here was attempting to work her will against her employer without regard for the necessities of the business in which she was employed. In Tilseth v. Midwest Lumber Co., 295 Minn. 372, 204 N.W.2d 644, we adopted the construction of misconduct as formulated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941). The Boynton case involved an employee who had 3 minor traffic accidents during 2 months of employment but failed to report them, one accident involving a minor personal injury of which he was not actually aware. It was in that context that the Wisconsin court articulated the exception that mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed `misconduct.' 237 Wis. at 259, 296 N.W. at 640. But for that exception, the general rule of Boynton is that misconduct is such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to his employer. Id. (emphasis supplied.) A lower court of Wisconsin, in Lathrop v. DILHR & Presto Products, Inc., No. 163-489 (Wis.Cir.Ct., Dane Cty., March 12, 1979), reads the formulation of Boynton differently from this court's decisions today. There, during a meeting to discuss some reports of unsatisfactory work, the employee became angry and, in a vulgarity, told his supervisor where he could stick it. The court there expressed the opinion that merely one act of insubordination to a supervisor in the nature of that committed by the employee    may properly be found to constitute misconduct. I view the circumstances of the case here as a deliberate and insubordinate attempt by the employee to work her will notwithstanding a reasonable order of the employer. No place of employment, large or small, can operate effectively for the benefit of the employer and other employees where an employee for 15 or 20 minutes evinces defiance or a disaffected attitude toward the reasonable exercise of managerial authority. I am not unaware of the decisions in other states that may be read to support the result reached by the majority of this court. Those decisions might be more persuasive, however, were it not for the distinguishing fact that the insubordinate conduct in this case was in the face of repeated warnings to desist. I observe, too, that similar authorities are not followed by the court in the companion case of Hamilton v. International Dairy Queen .