Opinion ID: 1769131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: guilt analysis

Text: The Bar challenges several of the referee's recommendations as to guilt. In order to successfully challenge a referee's recommendation of not guilty as to a particular rule violation, the Bar must demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record to support the recommendation, or that the referee's recommendation is clearly contradicted by the evidence. See Florida Bar v. Spann, 682 So.2d 1070, 1073 (Fla.1996). Although we give deference to a referee's recommendations as to guilt, we find that several of the referee's recommendations are clearly contradicted by the evidence.
The Bar argues that Varner knowingly made a false statement of material fact by submitting the fictitious notice of voluntary dismissal to Welch, and therefore the referee erred in recommending that Varner be found not guilty of violating rule 4-4.1(a) (knowingly making false statement of material fact). We agree, because the referee's recommendation of not guilty as to rule 4-4.1(a) is contradicted by the evidence. Rule 4-4.1(a) provides that in the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person. Although the referee found that Varner believed a suit had been filed at the time he made the verbal representation to Welch that a suit had been filed, the referee also found that Varner knew a suit had not been filed when he mailed Welch the notice of voluntary dismissal with a fictitious case number. A document has been held to constitute a statement for the purposes of rule 4-4.1(a). See Florida Bar v. Adams, 641 So.2d 399 (Fla.1994) (letter from attorney accusing another attorney of suborning perjury basis for violation of rule 4-4.1(a)). This document contained a false statement of fact in that the case number was nonexistent, and also implied other falsehoods: that a lawsuit had been filed and that the lawsuit was now being voluntarily dismissed. The false statements in the document were material in that they were in furtherance of a falsehood that State Farm relied upon in settling the matter. By sending the notice to Welch, Varner knowingly made a false statement of material fact, and we therefore disapprove the referee's recommendation and find Varner guilty of violating rule 4-4.1(a).
The Bar also contends that the referee erred in recommending that Varner be found not guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(b). Rule 4-8.4(b) provides that a lawyer shall not commit a criminal act [1] that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. The Bar argues that Varner's submission of the fictitious notice violated section 817.234(1)(a)1-2, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). [2] This section provides: Any person who, with the intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurer: 1. Presents or causes to be presented any written or oral statement as part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim 2. Prepares or makes any written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to any insurer in connection with, or in support of, any claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim... commits a felony of the third degree.... § 817.234(1)(a)1-2, Fla. Stat. (Supp 1998). Although it is arguable whether Varner violated subsection one, in that at the time the fictitious notice was sent the claim had already been paid, see § 817.234(1)(a)1 (prohibiting presenting any false statement  as part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy) (emphasis added), we find it unnecessary to resolve this question because we agree with the Bar that a violation of subsection two of the statute is clear. Section 817.234(1)(a)2 provides that any person who, with the intent to deceive an insurer, [p]repares or makes any written... statement that is intended to be presented to any insurer in connection with, or in support of, any claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy is guilty of violating the statute. Under the facts as found by the referee, it is clear that the fictitious notice was sent with an intent to deceive an insurer in connection with a claim for payment, and that such act constitutes a violation of section 817.234(1)(a)2. [3] We therefore disapprove the referee's recommendation and find Varner guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(b).
The Bar contends that Varner should have been found guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), because the fictitious notice invoked the power and prestige of the court in order to further the deception. We agree. One need not be involved in a judicial proceeding to engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. See Florida Bar v. Machin, 635 So.2d 938, 939-40 (Fla.1994) (While conduct that actually affects a given proceeding may be prejudicial to the administration of justice, conduct that prejudices our system of justice as a whole also is encompassed in rule 4-8.4(d).). Varner attempted to conceal his initial mistake in representing to State Farm that a lawsuit had been filed by creating a fictitious court document that was cloaked with the aura of authenticity. Such misuse of official documents is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, see, e.g., Florida Bar v. Cox, 718 So.2d 788, 793 (Fla.1998) (lawyer violated rule 4-8.4(d) by creating, signing, and mailing various false documents), as it diminishes the public trust in the reliability of such documents. Since it is not disputed that Varner did indeed execute and mail the fictitious notice, we disapprove the referee's recommendation and find Varner guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(d). [4]