Opinion ID: 26083
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary Framework

Text: 15 The well-known McDonnell Douglass framework applies to Title VII retaliation cases in which a plaintiff has presented only circumstantial evidence of retaliatory animus. Portis v. First Nat'l Bank, 34 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1994). Here, there is no direct evidence that Chief Ojeda terminated Montemayor from the Department for retaliatory reasons. Therefore, we apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to this case. 16 To prove a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Montemayor must demonstrate: (1) that she engaged in a protected activity; (2) experienced an adverse employment action following the protected activity; and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Mota v. University of Texas Houston Health Science Center, 261 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir. 2001). Because the causation showing at the prima facie stage is much less stringent than a but for standard, Montemayor arguably made out a prima facie case. 17 The City subsequently satisfied its burden of production by contending that Montemayor was terminated because she was a substandard cadet. At that point, any inference of discrimination disappeared and Montemayor had the burden of proving that her termination from the Fire Department would not have occurred but for her protected conduct. See Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001); Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 305 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996)([t]he ultimate determination in an unlawful retaliation case is whether the conduct protected by Title VII was a 'but for' cause of the adverse employment decision). 18