Opinion ID: 1977492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue of collateral attack.

Text: The city argues this issue was raised below by motion to strike and withdraw all evidence based upon no zoning ordinance being present and by its objection to jury instruction 10, the substance of which is set out, infra. Objection to instruction 10 did not refer to this concept. The testimony moved to be stricken was not objected to when offered on the ground it constituted a collateral attack on the ordinance. The motion made at close of evidence grounded on this theory was made too late and was properly denied. Linge v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 1226, 1232, 150 N.W.2d 642, 646 (1967); Ferris v. Riley, 251 Iowa 400, 407, 101 N.W.2d 176, 180 (1960). In addition to the above procedural questions which must be resolved against the city, we cannot agree with it on the substantive merits. Although courts generally apply the rule that the validity of an existing zoning ordinance is not subject to collateral attack in a trial for determination of damages in eminent domain, see Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 291, 303 (1966), ordinarily it is also true the condemning governmental entity is not the zoning authority. Thus in Reeder v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 166 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Iowa 1969) we held an owner whose tract was being condemned by the Iowa State Highway Commission could not attack a zoning ordinance of Cedar Rapids. In Reeder we approvingly cited Linge v. Iowa State Highway Commission, supra, 260 Iowa at 1236, 150 N.W.2d at 648 where the controlling factor was thus pinpointed: [T]he validity of this [Cedar Rapids] ordinance is not properly an issue in this action to which the city is not a party. It would seem plaintiffs are attempting to make an unallowable collateral attack upon the ordinance. (Emphasis supplied.) While this court has not confronted the situation in which the same entity is both the zoning and condemning authority, other jurisdictions in well reasoned opinions have concluded this circumstance obviates the reason for the collateral attack prohibition: It is practical and logical to require that such invalid zoning be disregarded where the zoning authority is also the condemnor. Permitting recovery in eminent domain disregarding the zoning restriction combines in one action the right to recover compensation for both the inverse condemnation resulting from the disguised taking in the form of zoning and for the actual taking of the property. The process avoids separating the matter into two causes involving the same subject matter and the same parties. Moreover, the condemning authority is also the zoning government so that much of the vice of a collateral attack on zoning in the usual eminent domain proceeding is not present. People, Dept. of Pub. Wks. v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 33 Cal. App.3d 960, 963, 109 Cal.Rptr. 525, 529 (1973). See also 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12.322(3), pp. XX-XXX-XXX (rev. 3d ed. 1974) (Existing zoning may also be disregarded where there is a showing that the zoning ordinance, if literally applied, results in an arbitrary and unreasonable restraint on the use of the property); Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 291 at 304-305 (1966) (Many courts have vigorously condemned as confiscatory the action of a public body in adopting a zoning regulation or denying a petition for rezoning merely for the purpose of decreasing land value or preventing its proper utilization, in order to lower acquisition costs in eminent domain proceedings) and citations; Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 751 (1971); Board of Com'rs of State Inst. v. Tallahassee B. & T. Co., 108 So.2d 74 (Fla. Ct.App.1958); Robyns v. Dearborn, 341 Mich. 495, 67 N.W.2d 718 (1954); Long v. City of Highland Park, 329 Mich. 146, 45 N.W.2d 10 (1950); State v. Gurda, 209 Wis. 63, 243 N.W. 317 (1932); 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 273(2) at 1197-1198 (Evidence of adaptability to a particular use which is proscribed by zoning regulations is admissible as bearing on value where removal of restrictions is reasonably probable or where there is a showing that the regulation, if literally applied, would result in an arbitrary and unreasonable restraint on the use of the property); 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra, § 12.322, p. 12-388 (   a potential condemnor [such as a municipality] may not, through the device of zoning for a use to which the property is not suited, depress its value preliminary to condemning it for a public purpose). Even where the unity of condemning and zoning authority would permit an owner to attack a zoning ordinance, he shoulders a heavy burden. Our principles relating to consideration of zoning ordinances are well articulated with supporting citations in Anderson v. City of Cedar Rapids, 168 N.W.2d 739, 742-743 (Iowa 1969). A strong presumption of validity attends a city or town's exercise of this legislative power, which means if the zoning ordinance is facially valid and its reasonableness is fairly debatable it must be allowed to stand. Id. at 742. The burden to prove the proviso unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory is upon the one asserting the invalidity. Id. at 742. On the other hand, zoning is an exercise of police power by the municipality, which is a power delegated from the state, and such delegated power must be strictly construed. Granger v. Board of Adjustment, 241 Iowa 1356, 1363, 44 N.W.2d 399, 402 (1950). And we also recall that inevitable danger referred to by Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-416, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322, 326 (1922): The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation. A similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment. (Citation) When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United States.    We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change. It is also true that by virtue of changing circumstances a zoning ordinance may operate as an arbitrary and unreasonable restraint. 8 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25.113, p. 307 (3d ed. 1965); see Burritt v. Harris, 172 So.2d 820 (Fla.1965); Board of County Com'rs of Metro. Dade Co. v. Soto, 259 So.2d 196 (Fla.Ct.App.1972); Aspen Hill Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 265 Md. 303, 289 A.2d 303 (1972). Even the city does not suggest that in 1971 farming was a feasible productive use of this 34.6 acre tract. Nor does it suggest why it involuntarily annexed farm ground in 1965 and subsequently taxed a 200 by 250 foot portion at a rate based on the city assessor's actual valuation of $20,407. Neither does the city in any way challenge the owner's uncontroverted evidence that development for single family dwellings was economically impossible because of the enormous cost of greater fill requirements. Where it appears that under existing zoning restrictions property must remain for an unpredictable future period unimproved, unproductive and a source of expense to the owners from heavy taxes, the zoning ordinance is unreasonable as to such property. A zoning of land for residential purposes is unreasonable and confiscatory and therefore illegal where it is practically impossible to use the land in question for residential purposes.8 McQuillin, supra § 25.45, pp. 118-119. See also Anderson v. City of Cedar Rapids, supra, 168 N.W.2d at 743 ([I]t is not only proper but highly essential that our municipal officers periodically review and update zoning regulations. Welfare of people, present and future, will not permit adoption of a passive attitude in these matters); Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, 246 Iowa 202, 210, 66 N.W.2d 113, 118 (1954) (So if the only reasonable use of the property is seriously affected by the zoning ordinance, the owner should be entitled to relief   ) People, Dept. of Pub. Wks. v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., supra; William Murray Bldrs., Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 254 So.2d 364 (Fla.Ct.App.1971); Bassey v. City of Huntington Woods, 344 Mich. 701, 74 N.W.2d 897 (1956); Reibel v. City of Birmingham, 23 Mich.App. 732, 179 N.W.2d 243 (1970); Appeal of Dance Oil Service, Inc., 409 Pa. 392, 187 A.2d 166 (1963); Schere v. Township of Freehold, 119 N.J. Super. 433, 292 A.2d 35 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 1374, 35 L.Ed.2d 593 (1973); Summers v. City of Glen Cove, 17 N.Y.2d 307, 270 N.Y.S.2d 611, 217 N.E.2d 663 (1966). The record made here, coupled with the unusual circumstance of the unity of condemning and zoning authority, justified trial court's permitting an attack on the ordinance, even assuming timely and appropriate objections had been made below. As a preliminary to the issue discussed in division II, a distinction should be drawn between two situations in which the jury's valuation is not strictly bound by existing zoning restrictions. In the first, zoning can be disregarded where there is substantial evidence demonstrating the illegality of a restrictive zoning ordinance and the zoning authority's failure to rezone while considering acquisition of the subject property. See People, Dept. of Pub. Wks. v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., supra; Board of Com'rs of State Inst. v. Tallahassee B. & T. Co., supra. In the second and more frequent situation, the jury in an appropriate case is permitted to consider the probability of change in a restrictive (but not illegal) zoning of the property. See Dolezal v. City of Cedar Rapids, 209 N.W.2d 84, 89-92 (Iowa 1973); Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 625-626, 144 N.W.2d 277, 282-283 (1966). In passing we note trial court in instruction 10 (relating to determination of highest and best use) instructed the jury on the second situation. The city objected on the ground there was no competent evidence in the record to show any reasonable probability the real estate might be rezoned, but does not ask us to review trial court's adverse ruling. In the same instruction trial court also told the jury if it found the owner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the city would not rezone the Englert Tract to permit the same to be used for multi-family and commercial development in the near future for the reason that such a rezoning would increase its market value at such time as the defendant may acquire it for use as a park or for any other public purpose, then the highest and best use to which the property was reasonably adapted may be a use permitted by a zoning classification which would permit multi-family and commercial development. The city's only objection to this part of the instruction was there is no competent evidence in the.record to show any reasonable probability that the defendant would not rezone   as a result of any proposed purchase   for park purposes. Of course, the objection accepted the concept of an attack on the zoning ordinance and related only to the sufficiency of the evidence to submit the issue, a matter on which trial court was vested with considerable discretion. See 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra, § 12.322(2), p. 12-418; Board of County Com'rs v. Vail Associates, Ltd., 171 Colo. 381, 468 P.2d 842 (1970). The city did not object on the ground the instruction failed to require the jury to first find the present zoning was arbitrary and unreasonable, depression of market value was the city's sole motive, or that the city acted in bad faith. Such an objection could have been sustained; in other jurisdictions the burden has been placed consistently on condemnee to prove one of these elements to sustain an attack on a zoning ordinance. See People, Dept. of Pub. Wks. v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., supra; Frederickson v. Hjelle, 149 N.W.2d 733 (N.D.1967); Board of Com'rs of State Inst. v. Tallahassee B. & T. Co., supra; Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 291 (1966). The city now intimates the above instruction gave the owner the best of both worlds by submitting the theory of reasonable probability of rezoning and the theory the city would not rezone because it would increase the value at a time when the city contemplated acquisition of the tract for park purposes. As indicated above, we do not place a stamp of approval on the instruction. It is sufficient to note this objection was not raised below. Had it been, trial court would have been confronted with the question whether the established presumption that public officers will do their duty (and rezone an illegally zoned area) would apply. See Board of Com'rs of State Inst. v. Tallahassee B. & T. Co., supra, 108 So.2d at 83. We find no error with respect to the first proposition raised by the city.