Opinion ID: 2118343
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Execution of Will.

Text: While appellant concedes, or at least does not dispute, that when Professor Beale signed the purported 1959 will he had testamentary capacity and was not subject to undue influence, appellant vigorously denies that the 14 pages of the 1959 instrument were legally published and declared to be his will and legally signed and witnessed as such and, in the alternative, that these pages did not constitute his will at the moment of execution. In this record there are a few indisputable facts. From them there are a number of conflicting inferences reasonably to be drawn. It cannot be questioned that on June 16 or 17, 1959, Professor Beale dictated a 14-page document in the form of a last will, revoking all prior wills; that his secretary typed the original will, with three carbon copies, and delivered all of them to him in loose-leaf form the afternoon of June 20th; that Beale was in New York City at the home of a friend, a professor at Columbia University, on the evening of June 21st and on that evening he exhibited a pile of sheets of paper and declared to his three friends that this was his will and desired them to witness his will; that they saw him sign the sheet which was on top of the pile and that immediately thereafter, at his request, they signed as witnesses in his presence and in the presence of each other; that the place where they put their signatures was immediately below the usual testamentary clause declaring this to be Professor Beale's will; that none of the witnesses paid any detailed attention to the number of pages in the pile nor could they identify later any of the pages except the one where they had written their names; that when all four participants had signed, Beale put all papers in his briefcase and the meeting ended. It is uncontradicted that on the next day, or shortly thereafter, Beale and his two sons left by plane for Moscow; that a few days after June 21st, Mrs. Burleigh, Beale's secretary, received a letter from him on Columbia University notepaper, bearing date June 21, 1959, mailed in New York or in London on a day not given; that the letter asked Mrs. Burleigh to make several changes in pages 12 and 13 of the will which she had previously typed, to carry out marginal penciled notes in Beale's handwriting on those pages; that inclosed with the letter were the original pages 12 and 13; that Mrs. Burleigh made the alterations as directed and mailed them back to him in Moscow; that these pages were later found in a sealed envelope addressed to Beale in Beale's handwriting and mailed from London, England, to him at his Madison address. There is nothing legally invalid in the execution of a will because the separate pages of the will have not been fastened together. It is a requirement, though, that all the pages be present at the time of execution. Thompson, Wills (3d ed.), p. 197, sec. 124, states: It is not necessary that they [the witnesses] see or examine all the pages of the will to see that all the sheets of paper were in place when the will was executed. Citing In re Sleeper's Appeal (1930), 129 Me. 194, 151 Atl. 150, 71 A. L. R. 518. In In re Sleeper's Appeal, supra (p. 205), the court stated: ... nor is it essential that the witnesses should see and examine all the pages of a will at the time of execution, if the court is satisfied from other evidence or the circumstances surrounding the execution, that all the sheets of paper offered for probate were present at the time of execution. 2 Page, Wills (Bowe-Parker rev.), p. 277, sec. 19.147, is to the same effect, citing In re Sleeper's Appeal, supra, and 11 Boston University Law Review, 148; 5 Temple Law Quarterly, 152; 17 Virginia Law Review, 69; and 40 Yale Law Journal, 144. In the case at bar the witnesses are unable to say whether or not the 14 pages were on the table before them when, on June 21st, they signed the last page. The determination then, comes down to the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the established facts. Appellant relies on the undisputed fact that two pages of the will were received in Madison within a few days following June 21st, inclosed in a letter dated June 21st. And appellant infers that those two pages had already been sent off to Madison when, late in the evening of June 21st, the testator and witnesses signed the last page. On the other hand, the trial court put weight on the fact that all 14 original pages are clearly identified and legible as they were dictated by Beale before the corrections or amendments. This intact original was handed to Beale by his secretary and was taken by him to New York. The very next day Beale presented a pile of papers to his witnesses and declared that such papers were his will. It is not impossible or improbable that Beale was speaking the truth and the pile of pages were the complete 14-page will, as the trial court found. The fact that Beale sent off two pages to Mrs. Burleigh with a letter dated June 21st may raise an inference that Beale did this before he went to the party and he had there only the remaining pages, which he falsely declared to be his will. Certainly that is not the only permissible inference. When Beale and his friends had signed the will and he had gathered up the pages and departed, June 21st was not over; Beale could still have written the letter, less than 100 words, on that date after the party and inclosed with it pages 12 and 13. There is no evidence at all of when the letter and the pages were mailed and there is some evidence that they were mailed in London. The question is one of inference and when the inferences can reasonably go either way the appellate court must adopt the view taken by the trial court. 1. It is the function of the trial court, in cases tried to the court, to draw such inferences from the established facts as deemed proper, and the supreme court cannot disturb the same unless they are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Hull v. Pfister & Vogel Leather Co. (1940), 235 Wis. 653, 294 N. W. 18 (headnote). As the trial court's function is to determine the facts and to weigh them, Will of Russell (1950), 257 Wis. 510, 44 N. W. (2d) 231, so, too, the inferences to be drawn from established facts are for the trier of the fact, in this case the trial court. Its findings in these respects should not be interfered with unless contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence, ... Estate of Miller (1953), 265 Wis. 420, 424, 61 N. W. (2d) 813. It is well established that findings of a trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal unless they are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Swazee v. Lee (1951), 259 Wis. 136, 137, 47 N. W. (2d) 733. Drott Tractor Co. v. Kehrein (1957), 275 Wis. 320, 323, 81 N. W. (2d) 500. The most that can be said is that on some of the contested issues of fact, the proof might have sustained a finding contrary to that made by the court. Upon such a state of the record this court may not disturb the findings of the trial court. Drott Tractor Co. v. Kehrein, supra, page 328. While the present facts permit the inference urged by appellant they do not compel that inference in opposition to the one drawn by the trial court, and the evidence and reasonable inferences sustain the trial court's conclusion that the entire original will, as dictated by Professor Beale to his secretary, was before the witnesses and the execution of that will complied with the requirements of law.