Opinion ID: 173414
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements of Intervention as of Right

Text: Rule 24(a)(2) entitles a movant to intervene as of right if: (1) the movant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) the disposition of the litigation may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the movant's interest; and (3) the existing parties do not adequately represent the movant's interest. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2); Coalition, 100 F.3d at 840. We follow a somewhat liberal line in allowing intervention. WildEarth Guardians v. USFS, 573 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). The factors of Rule 24(a)(2) are intended to capture the circumstances in which the practical effect on the prospective intervenor justifies its participation in the litigation, and [t]hose factors are not rigid, technical requirements. San Juan County v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1195 (10th Cir.2007) ( en banc ). The interest element is a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process. Id. at 1195 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The movant's claimed interest is measured in terms of its relationship to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, not in terms of the particular issue before the district court. See Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir.2001). With respect to Rule 24(a)(2), we have declared it indisputable that a prospective intervenor's environmental concern is a legally protectable interest. San Juan, 503 F.3d at 1199 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-563, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ([T]he desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely [a]esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.)). For example, in San Juan, we found the prospective intervenors had a legally protectable interest in defending a National Park Service rule. We concluded their concern that the plaintiff's success could lead to environmental damage to the area in question from vehicular traffic justified party status. See 503 F.3d at 1167-70, 1199. Similarly, in Clinton, we held that the prospective intervenors, who wished to intervene as defendants in a suit challenging the establishment of a national monument, had a cognizable interest in the continued existence of the monument and its restrictions on public entry. Among other things, their interests arose from a desire to advance conservation goals by preserving the undeveloped quality of the lands encompassing the monument. In crediting these interests, we considered persuasive those opinions holding that organizations whose purpose is the protection and conservation of wildlife and its habitat have a protectable interest in litigation that threatens those goals. Clinton, 255 F.3d at 1252. In both San Juan and Clinton, the prospective intervenors advocated setting aside the land at issue, participated in the government's decision-making process at the administrative level, and visited the contested sites for aesthetic and recreational purposes. See San Juan, 503 F.3d at 1199; Clinton, 255 F.3d at 1251. The second element impairment presents a minimal burden. See WildEarth Guardians, 573 F.3d at 995. [A] would-be intervenor must show only that impairment of its substantial legal interest is possible if intervention is denied. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our cases recognize that the interest of a prospective defendant-intervenor may be impaired where a decision in the plaintiff's favor would return the issue to the administrative decision-making process, notwithstanding the prospective intervenor's ability to participate in formulating any revised rule or plan. See Clinton, 255 F.3d at 1254. [T]he mere availability of alternative forums is not sufficient to justify denial of a motion to intervene because at most, participating in a new proceeding would not provide the level of protection to the intervenors' interests that the current plan offers. Id. In fact, for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2), sufficient impairment may result even from the  stare decisis effect of a district court's judgment. Utahns For Better Transp. v. DOT, 295 F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir.2002); Coalition, 100 F.3d at 844. We may consider any significant legal effect in the applicant's interest and we are not restricted to a rigid res judicata test. Coalition, 100 F.3d at 844 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Clinton provides a useful example of the impairment element. There, the prospective intervenors argued that the land management plan associated with the national monument, which they aided in developing, would be set aside if the plaintiffs succeeded in their case. See Clinton, 255 F.3d at 1253. They pointed out that removing the plan would open up much of the land comprising the monument to unrestricted off-road travel, allowing the wilderness character of the land to be degraded. See id. We held that such an outcome would impair their environmental and conservationist interests. See id. Notwithstanding the prospective intervenors' ability to participate in any renewed land use decision-making process that would result if the plaintiffs won, we recognized that it was not speculative to conclude that the protection accorded the [prospective] intervenors' interest in preserving the wilderness nature of the monument land would be diminished if the land were to lose its designation as a national monument. Id. at 1254. In Coalition, we likewise held that the impairment element was satisfied, at least in part, based on environmental concerns. In that case, the prospective intervenor had a cognizable interest in the protection of the Mexican Spotted Owl. See Coalition, 100 F.3d at 838-39, 844. We found that interest would be impaired if the plaintiff was granted the relief it requested in its complainta declaration that the government failed to conduct a sufficient assessment of the owl's condition and an injunction removing the owl from the endangered species list. See id. at 844. In so concluding, we explained: The appellant could submit a new petition to [] protect the [o]wl; however, he would, as a practical matter, be impaired by the stare decisis effect of the district court's decision, not to mention the direct effect of a possible permanent injunction. Furthermore, the [o]wl and its habitat would not be protected . . . while [the appellant] tried to lift such a permanent injunction and [the government] considered [his] new petition. Id. Finally, the inadequate representation element of Rule 24(a)(2) also presents a minimal burden. The movant must show only the possibility that representation may be inadequate. See Utahns, 295 F.3d at 1117. The possibility that the interests of the applicant and the parties may diverge need not be great in order to satisfy this minimal burden. Id. We have repeatedly recognized that it is on its face impossible for a government agency to carry the task of protecting the public's interests and the private interests of a prospective intervenor. Id.; see also WildEarth Guardians, 573 F.3d at 996; Clinton, 255 F.3d at 1255. Where a government agency may be placed in the position of defending both public and private interests, the burden of showing inadequacy of representation is satisfied. See Utahns, 295 F.3d at 1117. With this legal framework in mind, we consider whether Safari Club has satisfied the elements of intervention as of right.