Opinion ID: 1489278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rulings Relating to Coulter's Allegations of Sexual Misconduct

Text: After the filing of her initial complaint on January 23, 2004, Coulter filed her first amended complaint on February 5, 2004. The first amended complaint contains no allegations of sexual misconduct. During June 2004, defendants took Coulter's deposition, in which she testified that, during the course of her visits to Dr. Fullum, Dr. Fullum committed various acts of sexual misconduct against her. A flurry of motions followed. Dr. Fullum moved for a protective order that would preclude Coulter from publicizing her allegations of sexual misconduct. In October 2004, Coulter moved to amend her complaint to add allegations of sexual misconduct as a form of medical malpractice. Defendants filed motions in limine to preclude Coulter from presenting evidence of sexual misconduct during the trial. The trial court denied Coulter's motion to amend but granted defendants' motions. Coulter challenges these rulings. This court reviews a trial court's decision to permit or deny an amendment of pleadings for abuse of discretion. Taylor v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 957 A.2d 45, 51 n. 15 (D.C.2008). We will uphold a refusal to allow an amendment if predicated on valid grounds. Id. at 53 n. 20 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Stated differently, absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial court's grant or denial of leave to amend a complaint. See Eagle Wine & Liquor Co. v. Silverberg Elec. Co., 402 A.2d 31, 34 (D.C.1979). Judge Combs Greene denied Coulter's motion to amend in an order dated December 7, 2004, explaining that she was persuaded by defendants' arguments that to allow the eleventh hour filing would result in great prejudice to [the] defendants. Coulter argues that this ruling amounted to an abuse of discretion since the court thereafter extended the discovery deadline (to afford the parties time to complete depositions of experts) and since, as events unfolded, trial did not begin until more than sixteen months later. We have recognized that [t]he lateness of a motion for leave to amend ... may justify its denial if the moving party fails to state satisfactory reasons for the tardy filing and if the granting of the motion would require new or additional discovery. Pannell v. District of Columbia, 829 A.2d 474, 477 (D.C.2003) (citation omitted); see also Eagle Wine, supra, 402 A.2d at 35 (noting that the determination may rest on findings that the moving party has not put forth any satisfactory reason for the delay (e.g., new information which could not have been uncovered earlier) and that an `unduly delayed' amendment would mean a large additional expenditure of effort and money by the opposing party in discovery on a new aspect of the case after substantial discovery already has taken place). Here, the record shows that Coulter could have set forth her claim of sexual misconduct  which allegedly occurred during the January to June 2003 period  in either her initial or first amended complaint. Moreover, by the time Coulter sought to amend her complaint in October 2004, defendants had already deposed all but one of Coulter's witnesses. Although defendants learned of Coulter's sexual misconduct allegations during her June 2004 deposition, they argued that they would have prepared for and conducted her deposition and the expert depositions differently had they been apprised that Coulter intended to pursue these claims as a basis for a medical malpractice recovery. [9] As defendants explained to the trial court, to establish that Dr. Fullum committed medical malpractice by the alleged sexual misconduct, Coulter would have had to prove that in the course of Dr. [Fullum's] ... treatment of [her], a relationship similar to a psychologist-patient relationship developed between the two; that it was a breach of the applicable standard of care for Dr. [Fullum] to engage in sexual acts with [her] during the course of or attendant to that relationship; and that the breach of the standard of care by Dr. [Fullum] proximately caused [her] claimed injuries. McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman, 717 A.2d 346, 353 (D.C.1998). These are matters that must be established through expert testimony, id., and that therefore, presumably, would have necessitated additional questioning of Coulter, the designation of additional defense experts (or an expansion of the scope of testimony by the experts that defendants had already designated), and a new round of depositions of those experts. [10] In addition, as Dr. Fullum argued to the trial court, trying Coulter's claims of sexual misconduct along with her claims of negligent diagnosis and treatment of her breast cancer may have impeded Dr. Fullum's ability to receive a fair trial on the latter claims. Taken together, these factors provided an ample reasonable basis for the court's denial of the motion to amend. While Judge Combs Greene did not explicitly refer to each of these factors, she stated, in denying the motion [a]fter a review of the record and on consideration of the pleadings, that she had considered the relevant factors, including the absence of any reason why [Coulter] could not have included the amendment ... in the original Complaint or in the First Amended Complaint and the element of prejudice. Similar considerations of prejudice justify the court's granting of defendants' motion in limine to preclude evidence and argument regarding Coulter's allegations of sexual misconduct [11]  evidence that was rendered irrelevant in light of the order denying the motion to amend. Coulter is correct that the court's ruling on the motion in limine did not articulate the grounds and rationale upon which the ruling was based. But that was not required. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 636 n. 17 (D.C.1979) (This is not to suggest that a trial court must articulate reasons, let alone correct reasons, for every evidentiary ruling. In most instances, the appellate court will be able to infer the reasoning upon which the trial court made its determination) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). During the discovery period, Coulter's counsel, in a letter to Dr. Fullum's counsel, said that Coulter was considering a website to determine what is under the tip of [the] iceberg concerning Coulter's allegations of sexual misconduct by Dr. Fullum. This led Dr. Fullum's counsel to move for a protective order pursuant to Super Ct. Civ. R. 26(c). On September 22, 2004, Judge Combs Greene issued an order  which Coulter refers to as a gag order  stating that all parties to this matter, including their counsel, agents, and expert witnesses retained on their behalf, are strictly prohibited from disseminating, disclosing, publicizing, distributing, or otherwise making available any information appearing in the court record, witness statements and deposition transcripts in this matter to persons or entities not parties to this case [during] its pendency. [12] The order also requires the parties to take all necessary precautions to prevent the disclosure of the allegations being made in this litigation (without limiting its scope to the allegations of sexual misconduct). Coulter contends that this protective order was excessively broad and infringed upon her First Amendment rights. [13] There can be no doubt that the trial judge had discretion, pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 26(c), to issue a protective order that would prevent abuse of the discovery process. [14] To prevent such abuse, the court was authorized to impose specific terms and conditions for discovery and ... require that confidential information [obtained through discovery] ... not be disclosed at all, Mampe v. Ayerst Lab., 548 A.2d 798, 803 (D.C.1988), upon the moving party's showing with some specificity how it may be harmed by the disclosure of a particular document or piece of information. Id. at 804. [15] However, the protective order that the court entered went far beyond what could be justified under the discovery rules because it precludes the dissemination of any information contained in the case record, without regard to whether the information is confidential, and without regard to whether the information was obtained through discovery. [16] For similar reasons, we also agree with Coulter that the scope of the protective order exceeds what the First Amendment permits. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984) (where ... a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment). In seeking the order, Dr. Fullum cited, inter alia, the potential impact of unrestrained speech by Coulter about her allegations of sexual misconduct on Dr. Fullum's professional career. But a prior restraint on speech that is premised merely on protecting business interests fails first amendment scrutiny. Bailey v. Systems Innovation, Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 99 (3d Cir.1988). Even if the court had fashioned the broad protective order to protect the impartiality of potential jurors  a rationale the court did not suggest  at a minimum some narrowing of the order would have been required to avoid violating the parties' First Amendment rights. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 396, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962) (when the right to speak conflicts with the right to an impartial judicial proceeding, an accommodation must be made to preserve the essence of both); see also Bailey, supra, 852 F.2d at 100 (vacating order that prohibited extrajudicial statements by attorneys in a civil case because the court did not consider other methods to ensure a fair trial, such as careful voir dire of prospective jurors, or emphatic jury instructions); Pfahler v. Swimm, 2008 WL 323244, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12064 (D.Colo. Feb. 4, 2008) (vacating restraining order where court failed to consider whether other measures would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pre-trial publicity) (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 550, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976)). Accordingly, on remand, the trial court should consider whether a protective order is necessary to ensure a fair trial, Bailey, supra, 852 F.2d at 99, or to prevent abuse of the discovery process. Mampe, supra, 548 A.2d at 805. If the court determines that a prior-restraint order is warranted, any order it issues must be carefully drawn order [so as to] limit[ ] speech as little as possible. In re Ti B., 762 A.2d 20, 30 (D.C.2000) (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981)). [17]