Opinion ID: 1961094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Respondent's Factual Exceptions:

Text: In discussing respondent's factual exceptions, this Court has combined several of respondent's points in the interest of judicial economy and because many of respondent's exceptions are muddled, thus some can better be incorporated into other exceptions. Respondent makes three discernable exceptions in regard to the hearing court's assessment of the facts. First, respondent excepts to petitioner's investigatory methods, as he claims that they failed to properly investigate Mr. Lobo. Next, respondent's main factual exception pertains to the hearing court's assessment of the credibility of the complainant, Mr. Lobo. Respondent claims that several factors supposedly affect Mr. Lobo's credibility and that the hearing court did not properly evaluate any of these factors. Finally, respondent excepts to the hearing court's finding that an escrow agreement between respondent and Mr. Lobo existed. Each of respondent's factual exceptions are refuted by sufficient factual bases and strong evidentiary support, as found by the hearing judge. Thus, these exceptions are overruled. Respondent's claims that Mr. Lobo's credibility was not investigated by petitioner and assessed properly by the hearing judge find no support in the record. Petitioner undertook an exhaustive, fouryear investigation that included depositions, interrogatories, requests for admissions, an extensive financial investigation, which subsequently unveiled a violation unrelated to Mr. Lobo's complaint, and culminated in the presentation of sufficient evidence of respondent's multiple violations of the Maryland Rules. Respondent's main contention with petitioner's investigation was that petitioner did not conduct an investigation of Mr. Phillip A. Lobo, the Complainant, and his credibility. Respondent requested that petitioner provide financial documents, and the like, so that respondent could impeach the answers Mr. Lobo provided to respondent's questions during Mr. Lobo's deposition. In other words, respondent requested that petitioner, after it satisfied its own burden of proof, should have additionally explored every lead that could possibly assist respondent's defense. That is the purpose of defense counsel. Petitioner is not responsible for respondent's inability to investigate possible defenses. Despite respondent's exception and the fact that respondent's conduct, not Mr. Lobo's, is the focus of this disciplinary proceeding, the record shows that Judge Stevenson did take Mr. Lobo's credibility into account when making her assessment of the evidence before her. In a preliminary motion heard directly prior to the start of the March 26, 2002 hearing, Judge Stevenson heard arguments on respondent's request for petitioner to produce documents of a non-party witness, namely Mr. Lobo's financial records and other documents purported to be relevant to Mr. Lobo's credibility and the possible commission of fraud in India. In ruling on respondent's motion, Judge Stevenson said: I'm going to deny the request for production of documents. I do note, however, the deposition has already been taken. I'm accepting the representation that these issues regarding this documentation and the status were raised and certainly do raise credibility issues for the Court to assess in determining the truthfulness of the testimony that is being presented before this Court. During the hearing, petitioner presented expert testimony refuting respondent's contention that the United States Consulate's denial of Mr. Lobo's L-1 Visa petition was due to credibility issues. In fact, Mr. Johnson stated that the Consulate denied the petition due to administrative processing and did not note any fraud, as is the usual practice. The hearing judge also viewed the videotaped deposition of Mr. Lobo and was able to assess his answers, demeanor and credibility in answering both the petitioner's and respondent's questions. It is apparent that the hearing court had before it sufficient facts, including respondent's claims of fraud and denial of the visa, to assess Mr. Lobo's credibility. We have held that: The hearing judge is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to decide which one to believe and, as we have said, to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon. The judge was free to disregard the testimony of respondent if the judge believed the evidence was not credible. Monfried, 368 Md. at 390, 794 A.2d at 101. Given this settled law and absent clear error, we see no reason to disturb the hearing judge's finding in that regard. Lastly, respondent's exception to the hearing court's finding that there was an agreement between respondent and Mr. Lobo to secure Mr. Lobo's $30,000 in an attorney escrow account, is contrary to all the evidence except respondent's own, uncorroborated, testimony. Petitioner presented an escrow agreement between respondent, Mr. Suri and Mr. Lobo, which was signed and dated by respondent and Mr. Suri. [10] It is of little consequence that the document was unsigned by Mr. Lobo. It was a document prepared by respondent to memorialize the agreement between the parties as to the escrow status of the $30,000 wired to respondent by Mr. Lobo. It was transmitted to Mr. Lobo after Lobo's money had been received by respondent. Petitioner sought to utilize the document as evidence against respondent, not against Mr. Lobo. In addition, as we have indicated, Mr. Lobo had already forwarded the $30,000 to respondent with a request to put the money into such an escrow account, thus respondent's reply to Mr. Lobo, including the escrow agreement signed by respondent and Mr. Suri, established the mutuality of intent for respondent to create an escrow account by respondent on behalf of Mr. Lobo. Respondent's subsequent creation of the account, named Edward Patrick Gallagher, Esquire, Escrow for Phillip Lobo, is additional evidence that an escrow agreement existed. See Porter v. General Boiler Casing Co., Inc., 284 Md. 402, 396 A.2d 1090 (1979) (holding that a signature is not required in order to bring a contract into existence). Respondent did not produce any evidence to corroborate his contention that Mr. Lobo orally altered the escrow agreement after the money was wired to respondent. In fact, as previously mentioned, petitioner produced several pieces of evidence to the contrary. There were no writings supporting this alleged alteration, Mr. Lobo denied such an oral alteration and respondent continued to drain Mr. Lobo's account even after Mr. Lobo formally requested the return of the entire $30,000. Additionally, Mr. Suri's accounting does not correspond to that of respondent's, and a letter written by Mr. Suri shows that he did not know the method of dispersal of the funds, which specifically refutes respondent's claim that Mr. Suri was directing respondent on how to disburse the funds. With this evidence before it, the hearing court's finding of the existence of an escrow agreement was supported by sufficient evidence and was not clearly erroneous. This Court overrules this exception and accepts the hearing court's findings.