Opinion ID: 2371832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lesser Offenses and Proposed Defenses

Text: Next, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser offenses of reckless manslaughter under RSA 630:2, I(b) (1996), and provocation manslaughter under RSA 630:2, I(a) (1996), and on the defense of a person justification under RSA 627:4 (1996). The defendant also argues that he was improperly denied the right to present the defense of Right to Revolution under the New Hampshire Constitution. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a notice of defense stating that he might raise the defense of physical force in defense of a person under RSA 627:4, and requested that if he did raise the defense, the appropriate jury instruction be given. According to the defendant, he was justified in using physical force to protect his son from being illegally removed from his home. More specifically, the defendant contended that he was justified in using deadly force to protect his son from being kidnapped by DCYF or others working on its behalf. The trial court, ruling on the State's motion to strike following a hearing, found that no evidence or facts were presented to support the defendant's claimed defense and therefore no instruction would be given. Although the scope and wording of jury instructions is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, the court must grant a defendant's requested jury instruction on a specific defense if there is some evidence to support a rational finding in favor of that defense. State v. Haycock, 146 N.H. 5, 9, 766 A.2d 720 (2001) (quotation omitted). By `some evidence,' we mean that there must be more than a minutia or scintilla of evidence. Id. (quotation omitted). Where, however, there is simply no evidentiary basis to support the theory of the requested jury instruction, the party is not entitled to such an instruction, and the trial court may properly deny the party's request. State v. Hast, 133 N.H. 747, 749, 584 A.2d 175 (1990). We will review the trial court's decision not to give a jury instruction for an unsustainable exercise of discretion. State v. Chen, 148 N.H. 565, 569, 813 A.2d 424 (2002). RSA 627:4 provides that a person is justified in using deadly force on another person when he reasonably believes that the other person is committing or about to commit kidnapping. RSA 627:4, II(c). A person is guilty of kidnapping if he knowingly confines another under his control with a purpose to: (a) Hold him for ransom or as a hostage; or (b) Avoid apprehension by a law enforcement official; or (c) Terrorize him or some other person; or (d) Commit an offense against him. RSA 633:1, I (1996). The trial court found that although the defendant had shown frustration and dissatisfaction with state actions relative to his son, the defendant did not present facts that could support his defense. Having reviewed the record, we agree that the defendant failed to present some evidence to support a rational finding in favor of the defense of physical force in defense of a person. While the defendant presented evidence of his alleged mistreatment by DCYF, other agencies, and their representatives, there is simply no evidence that Rowland, DCYF, or any other person or entity had any intent to kidnap the defendant's son or that the defendant reasonably believed they had such intent. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's decision not to give the requested instruction. Regarding the defendant's claim that he was entitled to an instruction regarding provocation manslaughter under RSA 630:2, I(a), the trial court found that the evidence presented did not support it. Under RSA 630:2, I(a), a person is guilty of manslaughter, and not murder, when he causes the death of another while under extreme mental or emotional disturbance caused by extreme provocation. It is generally recognized that provocation is adequate to reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter only if it would cause a reasonable person to kill another out of passion. State v. Smith, 123 N.H. 46, 48, 455 A.2d 1041 (1983). However, a lawful act cannot provide sufficient provocation to support a finding of manslaughter. Id. at 49, 455 A.2d 1041. Here, Rowland had been assigned to the defendant's family's case following a referral from DCYF and had gone to meet with the defendant pursuant to a scheduled visit, which he would not abandon despite the defendant's request. According to the defendant, his long running problems with DCYF, coupled with Rowland's refusal to leave, constituted sufficient provocation to justify a manslaughter instruction. Rowland, however, was engaged in a lawful act when he refused to leave, and a lawful act cannot provide sufficient provocation to support a finding of manslaughter. See id. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in declining to give the requested instruction. Finally, with regard to the defendant's claims that he ought to have been given the opportunity to present defenses of reckless manslaughter under RSA 630:2, I(b) and the Right to Revolution under the New Hampshire Constitution, those claims were not raised before the trial court. Accordingly, we do not address them. See Blackmer, 149 N.H. at 48, 816 A.2d 1014.