Opinion ID: 1996268
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Paul Lemont

Text: The petitioners contend that the trial justice erred when she found that Lemont was biased and when she disqualified him on the basis of his ex parte contacts in connection with the Goulet plan. They contend that the town already had introduced a 100-foot plan into evidence, prior to Lemont's request for the alternate Goulet plan, and thus Lemont had properly formed an opinion on the basis of the proceedings on the record. Additionally, the petitioners argue that the trial justice failed to recognize that, like Lemont, the other subcommittee members also favored a modified expansion that was not independently supported by the record. Although the respondent noted that it is perfectly appropriate for a judicial officer overseeing a contested hearing to urge the parties to compromise, Champlin's argues that Lemont was biased because he became an advocate for the best interests of the Town in trying to reach a compromise that was only acceptable by the town rather than Champlin's. We hold that the trial justice's finding that Lemont was biased is not supported by legally competent evidence. First, the trial justice premised her conclusion as to Lemont's bias on the fact that he directed Fugate to recruit Goulet to formulate the alternate plan and his lobbying for the Goulet plan to other subcommittee members. Additionally, the trial justice found bias in Lemont's effort to infect the workshop and full council with a thinly veiled version of the Goulet plan. She described Lemont as act[ing] in concert with Tikoian. Also, the trial justice based her finding of Lemont's bias on his meeting with the Governor to discuss the status of the case. Finally, the trial justice relied on Lemont's admission during the evidentiary hearing that he was influenced by outside pressures. As discussed, the evidentiary hearing repeatedly and improperly subjected agency members to questioning that revealed the members' mental processes as agency adjudicators. Lemont was no exception. Despite her assurances to the contrary, the trial justice clearly relied on Lemont's testimony as to his mental process when she made her finding that Lemont was biased by virtue of his commitment to a compromise. Indeed, the trial court's decision quotes directly and at length from Lemont's testimony in which he discussed his mental process that led him to decide that a compromise was the only appropriate resolution of the matter after he began reviewing the evidence. The trial justice's decision states: Lemont testified that although he did not favor any expansion initially, he later decided to support a compromise to get the matter resolved.    He testified that he `saw all of the cumulative things that were going on, the editorials, et cetera, et cetera, I came up with the thought that perhaps we could compromise this, that everybody could get something, and the matter would be resolved.' The decision also quoted his testimony that I came up with a compromise that I thought would solve the problem, and that's what I wanted to do. I was chairman of the subcommittee. I had heard the testimony. I had heard the comments of the subcommittee. I was looking for something that would be a compromise. There were many people that I heard on Block Island that wanted no expansion. There were later, some of the letters that I did look at, no expansion. I read the editorial in the Block Island paper, the letters to the editor. I listened to your witnesses. I listened to all of the witnesses. And I came up with a conclusion that perhaps there might be a compromise that would settle this matter. Therefore, in his responses to questions posed to him at the evidentiary hearing, Lemont testified as to the process by which he reached the conclusion[] that he would not join in the subcommittee's recommendation to the CRMC. See Morgan, 313 U.S. at 422, 61 S.Ct. 999. The only proper area of inquiry concerning Lemont was to factual matters, and the trial justice erred when she relied on anything else. See Green, 944 F.2d at 854. The passages of Lemont's testimony quoted in the Superior Court's decision are replete with examples of Lemont's mental process. The trial justice relied on testimony that went beyond factual assertions about what evidence was before Lemont. On the contrary, his testimony discussed his conclusion that a compromise was appropriate and how he reached this conclusion. As Justice Holmes characterized the examination of the operation of [the tax assessment board's] minds in Babcock, [t]his was wholly improper. Babcock, 204 U.S. at 593, 27 S.Ct. 326. When Lemont's testimony of his mental process is removed from consideration, we are of the opinion that the trial justice's finding of bias on the part of Lemont was error because the remaining legally competent evidence is far too flimsy to support such a conclusion. As the trial justice correctly noted, disqualification is a severe sanction. Therefore, Lemont's ex parte communication with Fugate in seeking what became known as the Goulet plan and his communication with the Governor regarding the status of the case, while improper, are insufficient to demonstrate the prejudgment and bias necessitating disqualification. Additionally, Lemont's instruction to Goulet to show the plan to subcommittee members also is insufficient because, as a subcommittee member himself, Lemont's communication with the other members is not an ex parte contact. We share the trial justice's disappointment in the lax approach that the CRMC members took toward insulating themselves from improper ex parte contacts. However, the occurrence of ex parte contacts does not require disqualification in every instance. See, e.g., PATCO, 685 F.2d at 573 (disapproving of clearly improper ex parte dinner between agency member and interested labor leader, but holding that the contact did not preclude a fair decision to the parties or the public interest). Thus, once the record is sanitized of any mental processes, Lemont is more like the other agency members who the trial justice found regrettably engaged in ex parte contacts that did not rise[] to the level that would warrant disqualification and less like Tikoian or Zarrella. We hold that the trial justice's finding of Lemont's bias and her disqualification of him from the workshop and council hearing were not based on legally competent evidence.