Opinion ID: 1269651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instruction on Mendez's Emotional Damages

Text: Mendez first contends that the district court erred when it issued a sua sponte instruction to the jury limiting its consideration of her emotional damages. The jury initially received an instruction that Mendez's damages should be the amount of money which would reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any injury you find was caused by the defendant. The district court later recalled the jury in the midst of deliberations and  over Mendez's objections  instructed it that the evidence does not support an award of damages for any period after July 3, 2002, the day Mendez was released from the police station. It is well established that [a] party is entitled to an instruction about his or her theory of the case if it is supported by law and has foundation in the evidence. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.2002). We review a district court's formulation of jury instructions for abuse of discretion. Id. Mendez contends that the district court abused its discretion by limiting the jury's consideration of her damages to only the two days of events at issue, contrary to Mendez's theory of her case. We disagree and affirm the district court.
Mendez presented fairly minimal evidence of any actual damages she suffered as a result of her illegal arrest and the illegal search of her home. During trial, she testified that she felt [l]ike a prisoner while she was at the police station, and that she was desperate and was afraid they might kill her son, Angel. She also recounted beating on the windows of the police car she was placed in after the shooting. A detective who interviewed Mendez on the night of July 2 agreed that she was upset during some points of the interview and that at times it was difficult for her to talk, although he believed that her anguish was related to Ignacio's shooting. Mendez's husband similarly testified that his wife was crying uncontrollably and unable to speak when she returned home from the police station. As to the ill effects of the illegal search, Mendez testified only that she noted upon her return that the closets were all out of order, and there were clothes thrown around and papers thrown around. Although this evidence arguably showed that Mendez had suffered emotionally during the false arrest and illegal search, she did not present any expert witnesses, medical evidence or even testify herself that she had suffered any ongoing ill effects from the illegal arrest and search. The only evidence she presented of any possible ongoing emotional damages at all occurred during the following exchange at trial: Counsel : Are you taking medication for depression now? Mendez : Yes. Counsel : And when was that prescribed? Mendez : After they killed my son. Counsel did not, however, ask Mendez any follow-up questions to link her depression specifically to her emotional distress from the illegal arrest and search as opposed to any distress she felt from Ignacio's death. The only other evidence that Mendez now suggests could support a jury's finding of ongoing emotional damages was that she cried on the witness stand while recounting some of the events. The district court first expressed concerns about the scope of the emotional damages instruction before closing arguments, when the County requested an instruction that neither Mendez nor Angel had suffered any damages other than nominal damages. The court was not persuaded that plaintiffs had failed to show any emotional damages from the events, but did flag its concern as to whether they had put forward any evidence of ongoing emotional damages. The court did not immediately rule on the issue, however, and counsel proceeded to make their closing arguments the next day. During a break between the defendant's closing argument and the plaintiff's rebuttal, the court raised the issue again, stating that it was aware of Mendez's testimony about depression, but I would like to see the testimony indicating  pointing to specifically, the detention and the search as being the cause of that depression. Mendez's counsel willingly agreed to defer argument on the issue until after he had delivered his rebuttal; the district court then ordered both sides to prepare a record of transcript excerpts supporting ongoing emotional damages. The case was then submitted to the jury. After reviewing the parties' submissions, the court ruled the next morning that limitation is appropriate, especially in light of the lack of specific evidence as to damages and their time frames. The court recalled the jury and issued a new instruction limiting its consideration of damages to the two days Mendez was in custody. The jury ultimately returned an award of nominal damages for the false arrest and illegal search claims.
Mendez raises two principal arguments against the district court's revised jury instruction. First, she contends that the court abused its discretion because there was a sufficient foundation in the evidence for the jury to have found that she incurred ongoing emotional damages, beyond the damages she suffered during the false arrest and illegal search itself. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. We disagree. As Mendez essentially admits, the only evidence that she suffered any ongoing emotional distress was her testimony that she had been on anti-depressants since the day of the shooting. She never testified, however, that this depression was related to the illegal search and arrest, as opposed to any depression she may have felt at the traumatic death of her son, an event for which the County was not liable. She was never asked, nor did she testify, that she suffered any ongoing distress, ill feelings or delayed trauma as a result of the illegal arrest or search, nor did she put forth any medical evidence about the cause of her depression. Although we agree that emotional damages may be based on humiliation and emotional distress established by testimony or inferred from the circumstances, whether or not plaintiffs submit evidence of economic loss or mental or physical symptoms, see Johnson v. Hale, 13 F.3d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir.1994), this does not mean that emotional damages can be inferred entirely from circumstances, without any supporting testimony from witnesses. To the contrary, in Johnson the plaintiffs provided detailed and substantial testimony to support their emotional damages claim. See id. at 1353. In that case we were merely clarifying that they did not also need to present evidence of actual mental or physical symptoms. See id. Mendez also points to Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 186-87 (9th Cir. 1990), where we held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial, when the trial court had concluded that it was erroneous to instruct a jury that a plaintiff's emotional distress was necessarily attributable to one of two possibly traumatizing events, only one of which was illegally caused by defendants. Murphy offers no support to Mendez, however, because in that case we did not consider what evidence the plaintiffs presented  or would need to present  to establish that they suffered ongoing emotional distress from the defendants' act. We agree that it is possible that Mendez suffered ongoing damages from both the illegal search and arrest as well as the death of her son. The district court did not abuse its discretion, however, because she presented no evidence to support that possibility. Second, Mendez argues that the timing of the jury instruction  coming after closing arguments, in the midst of jury deliberations  denied her due process. She relies on United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 256 (2d Cir.1992), which held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 requires a trial court to rule on jury instructions prior to summation, to afford the parties an opportunity to frame their closing remarks in light of the court's subsequent legal instructions. Even assuming the dubious proposition that this rule of federal criminal procedure is also a principle of constitutional due process applicable to civil trials, Mendez can neither show that she was substantially misled in formulating [her] arguments nor otherwise prejudiced. Cf. id. Mendez was on notice that the court had concerns about the scope of her damages instruction, but she agreed to defer the court's ruling on the matter until after her counsel had given his rebuttal argument. Further, her closing argument for damages was couched in very broad terms, telling the jury that there is no magical formula to assess damages and that they should just be reasonable and fair to Mrs. Mendez. Her counsel's reference to the ongoing depression during closing arguments was brief and cannot show that she was substantially misled in formulating her arguments. Id. We affirm.