Opinion ID: 1238237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: assumption of the risk instruction

Text: Department argues the trial judge erred in rejecting its motion for a judgment as a matter of law in the case of Michael Nash, the bungee jump master, after the jury determined Nash assumed the risk of his injuries. Department also asserts the judge erred in modifying the assumption of the risk charge in light of a recent Court of Appeals opinion that was not law when Nash's cause of action accrued. The trial judge instructed the jury on the accepted definition of the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk, i.e., that a plaintiff's conduct may constitute implied assumption of the risk where it is shown that he understood and appreciated a known danger created by the defendant, and then freely and voluntarily exposed himself to it. Mayes v. Paxton, 313 S.C. at 116, 437 S.E.2d at 70. The judge also told the jury, over Department's objection, that [e]ven if you find that [Nash] assumed the risk in this case, [Nash] may still recover as long as his assumption of the risk was not greater than the gross negligence of the defendant. The jury had to balance any assumption of the risk by Nash with any gross negligence by Department. The judge drew the balancing instruction from Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 325 S.C. 507, 482 S.E.2d 569 (Ct.App.1997) (deciding for first time in South Carolina that implied assumption of risk is one facet of comparative negligence, not a complete defense to an injured plaintiffs claim), aff'd as modified, 333 S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565 (1998). [5] The Court of Appeals decided Davenport I two months before respondents' trial. The jury awarded Nash's statutory beneficiaries $1 million in actual damages. The judge reduced the award to $900,000 after the jury, in a special verdict form, determined Nash had assumed the risk of his injuries and was ten percent at fault in the accident. In South Carolina, the general rule regarding retroactive application of judicial decisions is that decisions creating new substantive rights have prospective effect only, whereas decisions creating new remedies to vindicate existing rights are applied retrospectively. Prospective application is required when liability is created where formerly none existed. Davenport II, 333 S.C. at 87, 508 S.E.2d at 574. In applying our general rule, this Court and the Court of Appeals have made decisions fully retroactive, [6] fully prospective, [7] and selectively prospective. [8] In Davenport II, we employed the third approach by concluding that the revised view of assumption of the risk applied to the instant case and to all causes of action that arise or accrue after the date of this opinion. Thus, except for this case, if a cause of action arose or accrued prior to our decision today, it will be governed by the common law form of assumption of risk, if applicable, as it existed under South Carolina case law before this opinion. Davenport II, 333 S.C. at 87, 508 S.E.2d at 574. We adhere to the prospectivity rule announced in that case. Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge's instructions drawn from Davenport I improperly allowed the jury to consider Nash's assumption of the risk as part of the comparative negligence analysis. Assumption of the risk constituted a complete bar to recovery when Nash's cause of action accrued in 1993, and the trial judge erred in applying the new principles retroactively. We reverse the judgment for Nash's statutory beneficiaries and grant them a new trial. Although the jury determined Nash had assumed ten percent of the risk, the improper instructions undoubtedly affected the jury's deliberations and its answers to questions posed in the special verdict form. Both parties are entitled to a new trial with proper instructions on the law. [9]