Opinion ID: 1436760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Venue or Venire Change

Text: Appellant notes that there was extensive coverage in the newspapers concerning the murder, his arrest and the 2 trials. Appellant alleges that the coverage was so sustained, pervasive, and inflammatory as to require a change of venue without the need to show any actual prejudice. Appellant acknowledges that the general rule is that a change of venue or venire is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 392 Pa.Super. 331, 572 A.2d 1258 (1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 631, 592 A.2d 1299 (1991). Appellant also acknowledges that generally a defendant must demonstrate that pre-trial publicity resulted in actual prejudice preventing the impaneling of an impartial jury. Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 528 Pa. 57, 595 A.2d 28 (1991). We note that in order for pre-trial publicity to be presumptively prejudicial, a defendant must prove two points: first, either that a) the publicity is sensational, inflammatory, and slanted towards conviction rather than factual or objective; b) the publicity reveals the accused's prior criminal record, if any, or if it refers to confessions, admissions, or reenactments of the crime by the accused; or c) the publicity is derived from police and prosecuting officer reports; and, secondly, that the publicity must be so extensive, sustained, and pervasive without sufficient time between publication and trial for the prejudice to dissipate, that the community must be deemed to have been saturated. Commonwealth v. Pursell, 508 Pa. 212, 495 A.2d 183 (1985). Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 392 A.2d 287 (1978). Although some of the articles to which Appellant points us do refer to Appellant's alleged admissions and allude to Appellant's prior criminal history, we cannot conclude that the publicity was so extensive, sustained and pervasive that the community must be deemed to have been saturated. Indeed, quite the contrary was proven at the individual voir dire of the 121 prospective jurors. As the trial court noted, 11 of the principal jurors selected had no knowledge of the facts of the case and the 12th juror had a small amount of knowledge but no fixed opinion as to guilt or innocence. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961) (It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.) Furthermore, the trial court noted that of the 121 prospective jurors who were individually voir dired over 4 days, only 7 had any detailed knowledge of the case. This leads us to the conclusion that the community was not saturated and as such, Appellant had failed to meet his burden of showing that the pre-trial publicity was prejudicial per se. Compare this present situation with Casper, supra, (where despite the fact that roughly 1/3 of the venirepersons had some knowledge of the facts of that case, the court nevertheless held that no presumptive prejudice was proven) and Commonwealth v. Gorby, 527 Pa. 98, 588 A.2d 902 (1991) (where despite the fact that 34 of the 70 potential jurors knew something about the case, the court held that there was no proof of presumptive prejudice). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motions for change of venue or of venire. Thus, this issue does not afford Appellant relief.