Opinion ID: 729699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sagendorf-Teal's Cross-Appeal

Text: 29 The District Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment because it believed that the County was immune from liability under a provision of the New York Constitution stating that [t]he County shall never be made responsible for the acts of the sheriff. N.Y. Const. Art. XIII § 13(a). Sagendorf-Teal correctly contends on cross-appeal that because section 1983 is a federal law, it preempts this state provision. See Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802-03 & n. 8 (2d Cir.1986). Under section 1983, however, the County would still not be liable unless the action in question was taken pursuant to its official policy. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Since the trial court was not presented with any evidence or allegation of an official policy, it was appropriate for the Court to grant summary judgment in favor of the County.
30 New York Civil Service Law § 75-b (McKinney Supp.1996) provides for specific remedies that may be awarded to an employee who has suffered a retaliatory dismissal. The District Court's dismissal of the state claims was appropriate in this case because the jury awarded back-pay through the date of the verdict, and also made the factual determination that reinstatement was inappropriate. By this verdict, the jury fully compensated the plaintiff for her injuries. Since state law provides no theory for additional damages, no other state law remedy remained for consideration. 31
32 The plaintiff contends that the District Court violated the law of the case in dismissing the action against defendants McGreevey and Walker. The law of the case doctrine posits that if a court decides a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern in subsequent stages of the same case. DiLaura v. Power Authority of State of New York, 982 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir.1992). The plaintiff asserts that the District Court denied summary judgment to McGreevey and Walker because there were genuine issues of material fact going to their involvement in the termination of the plaintiff. She further maintains that at trial the plaintiff made the exact showing that the Court stated would be sufficient to send the case to a jury in its denial of summary judgment. The plaintiff therefore concludes that the trial court violated the law of the case in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. 33 Even assuming for the sake of argument that all of the plaintiff's contention are true, the trial court did not err. Application of the law of the case doctrine is discretionary and does not limit a court's power to reconsider its own decisions prior to final judgment. Id. at 76 (citations omitted). Among the major grounds justifying such a reconsideration is the availability of new evidence. Id. (citations omitted). In this case, the trial that intervened between the District Court's denial of summary judgment to McGreevey and Walker and its subsequent grant of their motion to dismiss provided new evidence about their lack of involvement. The District Court therefore was not constrained by the law of the case doctrine from reconsidering its prior determination.
34 The plaintiff's cross-appeal also challenges the District Court's exercise of discretion to deny her claim for front-pay. A front-pay award is a proper method for making a discharged employee whole when the factfinder can reasonably predict that the plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of obtaining comparable alternative employment. Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 92 F.3d 117, 125-26 (2d Cir.1996) (citation omitted). The District Court denied the motion for front-pay on the ground that the proposed methods for calculating the award were too speculative. This determination was well within the discretion of the District Court. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir.1984).