Opinion ID: 2103368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted into evidence testimony that Defendant had taken the aforementioned television set during the aforementioned earlier burglary. Defendant argues that this evidence of a prior crime was not admissible because the State did not establish that the television was taken during a burglary committed by use of a modus operandi similar to that employed to commit the charged crime. We find no error. As a general rule, evidence of a defendant's other crimes is irrelevant and highly prejudicial and therefore not admissible. However, such evidence may be admissible to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime, to establish his knowledge, intent or motive, or to demonstrate that the charged crime was part of a common scheme or plan of criminal activity. See, e.g., Sizemore v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 215, 217. Defendant's argument focuses upon the `common scheme or plan' exception. He correctly argues that under our cases, the State, in order to demonstrate that the charged crime was part of a common scheme or plan of criminal activity, must establish that the manner of committing each crime in the series was so unusual or distinctive as to be like a signature. This exception recognizes that when the means used to commit the previous crime were nearly identical to the means used to commit the charged crime, evidence of the prior crime tends to establish that the same person committed both and is thus relevant to prove the identity of the perpetrator. See generally, Hobbs v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 729. However, in other cases our courts have upheld the admission of evidence of prior crime to show a defendant's intent or motive without requiring a showing that the means used to commit the prior crime were virtually identical to the means used to commit the charged crime. Cf., Watkins v. State (1983), Ind., 446 N.E.2d 949, 962 (defendant's prior shooting at intended victim admissible to establish defendant's motive for subsequent murder of person defendant mistook for intended victim). This is particularly true where, as here, there is no substantial question that the defendant committed the acts which led to the charge, but rather the issue is the defendant's motive or criminal intent. See, Anderson v. State (1933), 205 Ind. 607, 617-620, 186 N.E. 316, 320-21 (evidence of prior, dissimilar crime admissible to establish defendant's motive for shooting sheriff whom defendant believed was pursuing him for the prior crime). Of course, the exceptions allowing introduction of evidence of prior crimes may overlap somewhat from case to case. Hence, in Feyerchak v. State (1978), 270 Ind. 153, 155-56, 383 N.E.2d 1027, 1028, this Court upheld admission of evidence that a defendant charged with robbery had utilized a very similar modus operandi during a prior robbery in the same area to show the defendant's criminal intent during the second episode. In this case the evidence that Defendant had admitted to the arresting officers that he had taken the television during a prior burglary the same evening was admissible to establish his intent to commit theft when he broke into the victim's home. We find no error in admission of this evidence.