Opinion ID: 6105178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Kentucky Whistleblower Act

Text: The KWA protects disclosures made by “a person acting on his own behalf, or on behalf of another, who reported or is about to report, either verbally or in writing, any matter set forth in KRS 61.102.” KRS 61.103(1)(a). Along with describing the matter to which a report must relate in order to qualify as a disclosure, KRS 61.102(1) identifies who must receive the disclosure in order for the disclosure to be considered protected whistleblowing activity. Under KRS 61.102(1), 18 No [governmental13] employer shall subject to reprisal, or directly or indirectly use, or threaten to use, any official authority or influence, in any manner whatsoever, which tends to discourage, restrain, depress, dissuade, deter, prevent, interfere with, coerce, or discriminate against any [governmental14] employee who in good faith reports, discloses, divulges, or otherwise brings to the attention of the Kentucky Legislative Ethics Commission, the Attorney General, the Auditor of Public Accounts, the Executive Branch Ethics Commission, the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky or any of its members or employees, the Legislative Research Commission or any of its committees, members or employees, the judiciary or any member or employee of the judiciary, any law enforcement agency or its employees, or any other appropriate body or authority, any facts or information relative to an actual or suspected violation of any law, statute, executive order, administrative regulation, mandate, rule, or ordinance of the United States, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any of its political subdivisions, or any facts or information relative to actual or suspected mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. No employer shall require any employee to give notice prior to making such a report, disclosure, or divulgence. In short, the KWA protects governmental “employees who possess knowledge of wrongdoing that is concealed or not publicly known, and who step forward to help uncover and disclose that information.” Davidson v. Commonwealth, Dep’t. of Military Affs., 152 S.W.3d 247, 255 (Ky. App. 2004) (quoting Meuwissen v. Dep’t. of Interior, 234 F.3d 9, 13 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Because no party to this case disputes that UK is an employer and Dr. Kearney is an employee within this statutory framework, in order for Dr. Kearney to prevail on a KWA claim, it remains for him to prove that 1) he made or attempted to make a good faith report or disclosure of a) facts or information 13 See KRS 61.101(2). 14 See KRS 61.101(1). 19 relative to an actual or suspected violation of any law, statute, executive order, administrative regulation, mandate, rule, or ordinance, or b) any facts or information relative to actual or suspected mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse of authority; 2) to an appropriate body or authority; and 3) UK acted to punish him for making the disclosure or acted in a manner to discourage the making of the disclosure. See Woodward v. Commonwealth, 984 S.W.2d 477, 480–81 (Ky. 1998). Harper v. University of Louisville, 559 S.W.3d 796 (Ky. 2018), decided three months after the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of UK, is this Court’s most recent whistleblower decision analyzing disclosure content. Harper, addressing directed verdict issues, summarizes several principles also useful for determining whether Dr. Kearney’s communications are protected whistleblower disclosures which may survive summary judgment. See id. at 802-03. First, “[t]he statute protects the whistleblower who exposes information not generally known.” Id. at 802 (citing Moss v. Ky. State Univ., 465 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Ky. App. 2014)). Second, when the disclosure is not made to one of the entities listed within KRS 61.102(1), it must be made to an “appropriate body or authority” which has the power to remedy or report the perceived misconduct. Id. at 802-03 (citing Gaines, 276 S.W.3d at 793). Third, an employee’s direct complaint to his supervisor concerning the supervisor’s own wrongful conduct generally cannot qualify as a whistleblower disclosure. Id. at 802 (citing Pennyrile, 459 S.W.3d at 345). And fourth, “the nature of the information disclosed cannot simply be an expression of a policy disagreement 20 based upon the whistleblower’s subjective opinion; it must objectively meet the criteria for the kinds of misconduct described in the KWA, such as actual or suspected conduct . . . that objectively viewed constitutes waste or fraud.” Id. at 803 (citing Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). B. Claim Alleging Violation of Administrative Regulation Dr. Kearney views his report of UK’s noncompliance with AR 3:14 as a KRS 61.102(1) report of a “violation of any . . . administrative regulation.” UK, however, argues that the University’s internal administrative regulation is not the same kind or the substantive equivalent of an administrative regulation that KRS 61.102(1) contemplates. Specifically, UK states that AR 3:14 is part of internal university policy, setting rules and requirements within the employment setting. Because KRS 61.102(1) does not define what exactly qualifies as an administrative regulation, UK suggests, citing Bell v. Bell, 423 S.W.3d 219, 223 n.12 (Ky. 2014), that the ejusdem generis doctrine is the statutory construction rule to resolve any ambiguity in the statute’s text. Dr. Kearney agrees that the doctrine is the most appropriate statutory construction rule to apply here but argues that no matter how one may categorize AR 3:14, KRS 61.102(1) also makes “mandates” and “rules” subject to disclosure of actual or suspected violations. He contends that because UK’s governing Board of Trustees enacted this provision to mandate how the University must be run, the University’s internal regulations carry the full weight of a mandate or rule which can only be altered by the Board of Trustees. 21 When dealing with issues of statutory construction, we begin with the plain text. “The cardinal rule in construing statutes is, if possible, to ascertain the meaning of the Legislature from the language used, and if that be plain, clear, and unambiguous, resort to collateral rules of construction is unnecessary.” Mills v. City of Barbourville, 117 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Ky. 1938). KRS 446.080(1) provides that “[a]ll statutes of this state shall be liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legislature . . . .” KRS 446.080(4) further provides: “All words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of language, but technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed according to such meaning.” When a statute is plain and unambiguous on its face, we are not at liberty to construe the language otherwise. Whittaker v. McClure, 891 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ky. 1995). “Our ultimate goal when reviewing and applying statutes is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. We derive that intent from the language the General Assembly chose, either as defined by the General Assembly or as generally understood in the context of the matter under consideration.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 415 S.W.3d 606, 609 (Ky. 2013). We are mindful that “statutes [like the KWA] which are remedial in nature should be liberally construed in favor of their remedial purpose.” Gaines, 276 S.W.3d at 792 (citing Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass’n. v. Jeffers ex rel. Jeffers, 13 S.W.3d 606, 611 (Ky. 2000)). 22 With its full text presented above, a reminder of KRS 61.102(1)’s particularly pertinent content is sufficient here: No employer shall subject to reprisal . . . any employee who in good faith reports, discloses, divulges, or otherwise brings to the attention of . . . [an] appropriate body or authority, any facts or information relative to an actual or suspected violation of any law, statute, executive order, administrative regulation, mandate, rule, or ordinance of the United States, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any of its political subdivisions . . . . Unlike UK and Dr. Kearney, we do not find the ejusdem generis doctrine applicable to the text at issue. Recently decided Harper provides an example of the type of circumstance in which the doctrine does apply. Harper relied upon the ejusdem generis doctrine to address whether the news media qualified as a recipient of whistleblower information under the generic provision “or any other appropriate body or authority.” 559 S.W.3d at 811. Harper, relying on McCarty v. Covol Fuels No. 2, LLC, 476 S.W.3d 224, 235 (Ky. 2015), stated: Our interpretation of the meaning of that phrase is guided by the traditional rules of statutory construction, including the ejusdem generis doctrine. Ejusdem generis is a rule providing that where a generalization within a statute follows a list of specifically designated subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general words will be presumed to be restricted by the particular designation and to include only things or persons of the same kind, class, or nature as those specifically enumerated, unless there is a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose. 559 S.W.3d at 811. Because KRS 61.102(1) identifies specific bodies to whom a whistleblower report may be given but then provides that a report may be made to “any other appropriate body or authority,” the application of the doctrine was clear in that case. Harper explained: 23 The statute plainly lists governmental units and employees within each of the three branches of state government. As desirable as it may be to include newspapers or journalists as repositories of whistleblower reports, the private news media and media outlets bear no resemblance to the class of entities stated in the statute so as to constitute an “appropriate body or authority.” 559 S.W.3d at 811. Because the statute plainly and specifically states that it is applicable to Kentucky’s or any of its political subdivisions’ administrative regulations, we do not find the ejusdem generis doctrine particularly helpful. Rather, the issue presented here is whether UK’s “administrative regulation,” AR 3:14, is an “administrative regulation” to which KRS 61.102(1) applies. UK asserts that because KRS 61.102(1) refers to a “law, statute, executive order, administrative regulation, mandate, rule, or ordinance,” of the United States, Kentucky or a Kentucky political subdivision, the KWA applies to requirements that are implemented by lawmaking authorities in their lawmaking capacities and have the force of law. UK argues that KRS 61.102(1) does not list, and is clearly not applicable to, internal policies, even those that are labeled an “administrative regulation,” like UK’s AR 3:14. While we have generally described KRS 61.102(1)’s underlying dual purpose as “to discourage wrongdoing in government, and protect those who make [such wrongdoing] public,” see e.g., Gaines, 276 S.W.3d at 792, and as dealing with “violations of law,” see e.g., Knott Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Patton, 415 S.W.3d 51, 55 (Ky. 2013), we have never dealt with the specific scope of an “administrative regulation” within KRS 61.102(1). 24 Although it is clear that proper KWA violation reporting goes beyond legislative branch enactments because KRS 61.102(1) also applies to formally created legal directives issued by the executive branch, i.e., executive orders, it is safe to say that some terms used in the statute, i.e., “law,” “statute,”—and perhaps “ordinance”—are also commonly recognized by the general public as legislative enactments. Although that may not be so for an “administrative regulation,” the term “administrative regulation” likewise has a “peculiar” meaning in law, being used within the branch of law often referred to as administrative law. Administrative law is understood as the “law governing the organization and operation of administrative agencies . . . and the relations of administrative agencies with the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and the public.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Simply described, administrative law consists of: “(1) the statutes endowing agencies with powers and establishing rules of substantive law relating to those powers; [and] (2) the body of agency-made law, consisting of administrative rules, regulations, reports, or opinions . . . .” Id.15 An officially promulgated administrative regulation is generally recognized as having the force of law and as typically elaborating the requirements of a law or policy. Id. (see “administrative rule”). KRS Chapter 13A contains Kentucky’s statutes regarding the creation of administrative regulations. Given “administrative regulation” has special meaning in the law as codified in KRS Chapter 13A, we must conclude that 15 Black’s Law Dictionary describes the third part of “administrative law” as “the legal principles governing the acts of public agents when those acts conflict with private rights.” Id. 25 KRS 61.102(1) refers to an administrative regulation duly promulgated under KRS Chapter 13A, rather than merely an internal administrative rule. We turn to KRS Chapter 13A, KRS Chapter 164A, and the Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR) to determine if UK’s AR 3:14 is an administrative regulation recognized by KRS 61.102(1). KRS Chapter 13A, governing the Commonwealth’s creation of administrative regulations, defines a) who may promulgate an administrative regulation and b) what a regulation is and is not. KRS Chapter 164A contains statutes related to higher education finance. Finally, the KAR is the compilation of regulations which have been authorized by statute and which follow the rule-making process. KRS 13A.010(1) defines an “administrative body” as meaning “each state board, bureau, cabinet, commission, department, authority, officer, or other entity, except the General Assembly and the Court of Justice, authorized by law to promulgate administrative regulations.” KRS 13A.010(2) then defines “administrative regulation” as meaning “each statement of general applicability promulgated by an administrative body that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any administrative body.” After explaining that “the term includes an existing administrative regulation, a new administrative regulation, an emergency administrative regulation, an administrative regulation in contemplation of a statute, and the amendment or repeal of an existing administrative regulation,” it pertinently describes things which are not administrative regulations. An administrative regulation does not include 26 “[s]tatements concerning only the internal management of an administrative body and not affecting private rights or procedures available to the public,” KRS 131.010(2)(a), or the “[r]ules, regulations, and policies of the governing boards of institutions that make up the postsecondary education system defined in KRS 164.001[16] pertaining to students attending or applicants to the institutions, to faculty and staff of the respective institutions, or to the control and maintenance of land and buildings occupied by the respective institutions,” KRS 131.010(2)(e). KRS 13A.120(1)(a) provides that “[a]n administrative body may promulgate administrative regulations to implement a statute only when the act of the General Assembly creating or amending the statute specifically authorizes the promulgation of administrative regulations or administrative regulations are required by federal law.” Within KRS Chapter 164A there is a section related to the financial management of institutions of higher education, KRS 164A.555 to 164A.630. KRS 164A.560 states: (1) The governing boards of the postsecondary educational institutions electing to perform in accordance with KRS 164A.555 to 164A.630 regarding the acquisition of funds, accounting, purchasing, capital construction, and affiliated corporations[17,18] 16 This includes the University of Kentucky Board of Trustees. 17 KRS 164A.550(3) defines an “affiliated corporation” as a corporate entity which is not a public agency and which is organized pursuant to the provisions of KRS Chapter 273 over which an institution exercises effective control, by means of appointments to its board of directors, and which could not exist or effectively operate in the absence of substantial assistance from an institution. 18 KRS 164A.610, detailing the organization and operation of affiliated corporations, states: 27 shall do so by regulation. The responsibility for this election is vested with the governing boards, any other statute to the contrary notwithstanding. The governing board may delegate these responsibilities by regulation to appropriate officials of the institution. . . . (2) The governing boards of institutions may elect to receive, deposit, collect, retain, invest, disburse, and account for all funds received or due from any source including, but not limited to, state and federal appropriations for the support or maintenance of the general operations or special purpose activities of such institutions. In the event of such election by the governing board: (1) An institution may organize and operate one (1) or more affiliated corporations to assist it in carrying out its programs, missions or other functions. A qualified firm of certified public accountants experienced in the auditing of colleges and universities and their affiliated corporations shall be engaged to conduct an annual examination of the corporation’s financial statements in accord with generally accepted auditing standards for the purpose of rendering an independent opinion thereon and preparing a report of findings and recommendations concerning appropriate accounting controls and compliance with applicable statutes. The affiliated corporation shall adhere to the principles of accounting and purchasing used by the institution with which it is affiliated. (2) The affiliated corporation shall provide the institution with an accounting at least quarterly, of all income and expenditures of said corporation in connection with contracts or grants with entities external to the institution and the corporation, for the conduct of research or other projects carried out, in whole or in part, through the use of institutional facilities or personnel. (3) The affiliated corporation shall pay to, or for the benefit of, the institution any and all funds received by it from any person, corporation, association or governmental agency external to the institution and the affiliated corporation as reimbursement for indirect expenses incurred by the institution in carrying out research or furnishing other goods or services, deducting from such payments only the expenses attributable to the procurement and performance of research grants and contracts and other contracts for the provision of such goods and services and such sums as may be essential to meet contractual obligations incurred at the request of the institution’s governing board. As reflected in 765 KAR 1:070, UK has elected to organize and operate one or more affiliated corporations in accordance with KRS 162A.610. See n.20 below. 28 (a) The treasurer of the institution shall deposit on a timely basis all tuition fees, fees for room and board, incidental fees, contributions, gifts, donations, devises, state and federal appropriations, moneys received from sales and services, admittance fees, and all other moneys received from any source, in a depository bank or banks designated by the governing board. (b) The governing board shall promulgate rules and regulations limiting disbursements to the amounts and for the purposes for which state appropriations have been made, or for which other moneys have been received. All disbursements shall be recorded in a system of accounts as set forth in KRS 164A.555 to 164A.630. The treasurer of each institution shall prescribe forms to be used with the system of accounts, and no treasurer shall approve any disbursement document unless he determines that the disbursement is to satisfy a liability of the institution incurred for authorized purposes and that the disbursement is to be made from the unexpended balance of a proper allotment. (Emphasis added.) Under this statute it is clear that the General Assembly recognized UK as an administrative body authorized to promulgate its own particular administrative regulations. Title 765 of the KAR contains promulgated regulations for UK. The seven regulations within Chapter 1, Board of Trustees, are respectively entitled 765 KAR 1:010. Acquisition and disbursement of funds, accounting system – records and annual report;19 765 KAR 1:020. 19 765 KAR 1:010 states: RELATES TO: KRS 164A.560, 164A.565 STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 164A.560 NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: The governing boards of the public institutions of higher education may elect to perform the financial management functions of KRS 164A.555 to 164A.630 by issuing administrative regulations to do so. This administrative 29 Delegation of financial management responsibility; 765 KAR 1:030. Annual audit; 765 KAR 1:040. Purchase – inventories – sales of surplus property – capital construction procedures; 765 KAR 1:050. Issuance of bonds; 765 KAR 1:060. Fund for excellence; and 765 KAR 1:070. Affiliated corporations.20 Thus regulation implements the provisions of KRS 164A.560 and 164A.565 at the University of Kentucky. Section 1. The University of Kentucky Board of Trustees elects to perform the financial management functions set forth in KRS 164A.560, Section (2), related to the receipt, deposit, collection, retention, investment, disbursement, and accounting of all funds; and KRS 164A.565 related to the installation of and accrual basis accounting system, other records and annual reports. Section 2. The University of Kentucky Board of Trustees elects to comply with KRS 164A.560, Section (2)(b) to limit disbursements to the accounts and for the purposes for which the state appropriations, or other monies have been received for through the enacting resolution of the institution’s annual operating budget. Section 3. The University of Kentucky Board of Trustees shall use an accrual basis accounting system and fund structure that conforms with generally accepted accounting principles and procedures established for colleges and universities by the National Association of College and University Business Officers and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and shall act to ensure further compliance with Sections (2), (3), (6), (7), and (8) of KRS 164A.565. 20 765 KAR 1:070 states: RELATES TO: KRS 164A.610 STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 164A.560 NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: The governing boards of the public institutions of higher education may elect to perform the financial management functions of KRS 164A.555 to 164A.630 by issuing administrative regulations to do so. This administrative regulation implements the provision of KRS 164A.610 at the University of Kentucky. Section 1. The University of Kentucky Board of Trustees, under the provisions of KRS 164A.560, elects to organize and operate one (1) or more affiliated corporations in accordance with KRS 164A.610. 30 under the KWA, Dr. Kearney’s “administrative regulation” claim must be premised on these promulgated regulations.21 Because it is not evident that any of these Kentucky Administrative Regulations were violated by UK’s alleged failure to adhere to AR 3.14, we must conclude that Dr. Kearney’s “administrative regulation” communication is not a covered disclosure under KRS 61.102(1). As to Dr. Kearney’s cursory argument22 that AR 3:14 is a mandate or rule under KRS 61.102(1), because the General Assembly limits administrative regulations which UK may implement through enabling statutes, we believe similar restrictions must exist for instruments referred to as “mandates” or “rules.”23 Although a university is not commonly recognized as issuing “mandates,” currently, a UK “mandate” or “rule” subject to KRS 61.102(1) is in the form of an “administrative regulation,” i.e., a KAR. Given our interpretation of KRS 61.102(1), as a matter of law, we must conclude summary judgment in favor of UK on Dr. Kearney’s AR 3:14 communication is proper. C. Claim Alleging Fund Mismanagement: April 2014 Meeting Turning to the April 2014 communication regarding KMSF, the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed that Dr. Kearney communicated vaguely the “thought” that KMSF needed an audit and did not convey any intent to 21 Because an administrative regulation originates from an enabling statute, a claim may also properly arise from that statute. 22 The argument consists of three sentences in the reply brief describing AR 3:14 as a mandate or rule. 23 An “administrative regulation” may be referred to as a “rule” written by an agency. Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (see “administrative rule”). 31 expose wrongdoing otherwise concealed. Both courts cite Pennyrile as authority for their respective decisions. In Pennyrile, we explained, Each of the words used in the statute to denote the protected conduct of the employee, “reports, discloses, divulges, or otherwise brings to the attention of . . .” describes behavior that brings to light facts not otherwise known to the recipient. . . . The phrases “in good faith” and “brings to the attention of” clearly denote[] an intent on the part of the employee to reveal or impart what is known to the employee to someone else who lacks that knowledge and, as further discussed below, is in a position to do something about it. 459 S.W.3d at 345. Dr. Kearney cites Harper for the premise that opinion disclosures of suspected waste, mismanagement or abuse of authority are protected under the KWA and cannot be recast as “personal opinions” so as to defeat the Act’s protection. Dr. Kearney contends that likewise, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to him, it was erroneous for the trial court to recast his disclosure as a thought when Dr. Karpf’s threat reflected that he, then-UK EVPHA, got the message that Dr. Kearney suspected waste and mismanagement of KMSF funds, amounting to a disclosure of that suspicion. Dr. Kearney also argues that Dr. Karpf’s threat shut down Dr. Kearney’s attempted disclosure, one that would later be fleshed out in the November 2014 email to UK Associate General Counsel Iler, which listed the unlawful reprisals taken against Dr. Kearney up to that point. Harper states the rule that “the nature of the information disclosed . . . must objectively meet the criteria for the kinds of misconduct described in the 32 KWA, such as actual or suspected conduct that violates a law or administrative regulation or conduct that objectively viewed constitutes waste or fraud.” 559 S.W.3d at 803. In Harper, a jury agreed that Harper’s job was eliminated in retaliation for her numerous complaints to University of Louisville (UofL) officials about suspected wasteful spending. Id. at 800. One disclosure at issue involved UofL’s spending on a commercial. Id. at 805. In keeping with her knowledge and experience, Harper reported a concern that an advertising agency’s quote of $100,000 for the commercial was too high and out of line with industry norms for that type of project and provided a recent comparison of $50,000 being spent on a similar commercial. Id. Harper expressed concern that an overpayment of that magnitude would waste taxpayer dollars, especially when UofL’s programs were being cut back because of budget constraints. Id. This Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and concluded that Harper’s disclosure, while perhaps an opinion, was objectively based and that information was relayed to an appropriate UofL official; consequently KRS 61.102’s disclosure requirements were met. Id. at 806-07. Harper’s disclosure stands in stark contrast to Dr. Kearney’s statements made at the April 2014 meeting about the need to audit KMSF. Although not discussing the text of KRS 61.102 which conveys that the disclosure must be objectively based, that is, based upon “facts or information relative to actual or suspected mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse of authority,” the rule expressed in Harper aligns with the statutory text. Here, unlike in Harper, Dr. Kearney relayed no objective fact or information supporting the suggestion of 33 misconduct, instead simply saying he thought “we need an independent audit of KMSF.” Stated differently, Dr. Kearney did not identify or report certain University actions upon which it was clear he was blowing the whistle. Dr. Kearney, to a certain extent, recognizes this in his argument that he was cut off by Dr. Karpf in that attempted disclosure, but insists he completed the disclosure in the November 2014 email. We conclude that Dr. Kearney’s requests for an audit of KMSF, viewed individually or collectively, are not protected disclosures under KRS 61.102. D. Claim Alleging Fund Mismanagement: November 2014 Email The trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the November 3, 2014 email was not a report to an appropriate body who could remedy the alleged violation because it was sent to UK’s General Counsel office and General Counsel is “alleged to have been involved in the retaliation of which [Dr. Kearney] initially complained from the beginning.” As such, Dr. Kearney was not reporting to an entity that lacked the knowledge of the suspected violation.24 Because we have already determined that the contents of the April 2014 communications do not qualify as protected disclosures, we turn to UK’s summary judgment argument that the email is a reiteration of previously reported allegations. Having concluded that Dr. Kearney’s communication 24 In its summary judgment reply, UK disagreed with Dr. Kearney labeling his email as a report because the email was not sent to anyone unaware of Dr. Kearney’s April 2014 comments; that is, the email was sent to the University’s General Counsel office and General Counsel was present at the April 2014 meeting. 34 concerning AR 3:14 and the unspecified need for an audit of KMSF do not qualify as protected disclosures, we likewise do not view the content of the email to the General Counsel’s office as meeting the disclosure requirement. Although Dr. Kearney views the email as publicly disclosing “Dr. Karpf’s impropriety i.e., attempting [to] gain control of KMSF practice plan funding contrary to University regulations,” the email refers only to violation of UK’s internal administrative regulation, not a KAR, and perhaps generally (and vaguely), KMSF fund mismanagement. In sum, the email content is not a protected statement under KRS 61.102(1). E. Claim Alleging Violation of Administrative Regulation and Fund Mismanagement: Pleadings and Griffith Affidavit The trial court and Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint allegation is a bare-bone reiteration of the April 15, 2014 Faculty Council meeting report and as a reiteration of an earlier report fails to be the initial report as required by Moss. In regard to the Griffith affidavit, the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed with UK that chronologically the affidavit filed February 2016 cannot be a report because it came after the alleged retaliation occurred; Dr. Kearney’s disciplinary appeals concluded in August 2015. In the face of the April 2014 and November 2014 communications being rejected as protected disclosures by the lower courts under Moss and Pennyrile because they were not initial disclosures25 and were not made to an 25 The trial court and the Court of Appeals, going beyond UK’s summary judgment arguments, found that the Faculty Council’s January 2014 discussion was a disclosure. In particular, the trial court gleaned that Professor Jones was the person at the January meeting reporting that the PPC had not met since its creation in 2009, 35 appropriate authority, Dr. Kearney cites Davidson and pivots to argue that his complaint and Griffith’s affidavit, also part of the court record, are disclosures to an appropriate person, i.e., the judiciary, and there is no evidence the judiciary had prior knowledge of the misconduct reported by Dr. Kearney. Dr. Kearney contends that his reporting behavior followed Pennyrile’s guidance and he made the effort to bring his claim to the attention of someone with the power to remedy the mismanagement reported in his pleading. He contends that the lower courts erroneously applied Pennyrile when rejecting the disclosures made in the case record as protected because they were not an “initial report.” Notably, UK’s discussion of Pennyrile and Moss in its brief agrees with Dr. Kearney’s overall point as to the lower court’s interpretation of despite the fact that conditions had occurred requiring the PPC to meet. The trial court then, assuming the Faculty Council is a valid authority under the circumstances of this case to whom a disclosure could be made (although it was not in dispute that the Faculty Council did not have such authority), considered that it was Professor Jones, not Dr. Kearney, who made the initial report. Relying on Moss, the trial court then concluded that the PPC disclosure was not a protected disclosure. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, concluded there were other reasons that the statements made during the January 2014 meeting were not protected disclosures. First, relying on Pennyrile, the Court of Appeals reasoned that since Dr. Kearney and Professor Jones’ statements were recorded in the meeting minutes, they were available and known to Dean de Beer, General Counsel Thro, and Dr. Wilson. Second, since the PPC was not required to meet at any set date or regularity, the statement that it had not met since 2009 was not an accusation of wrongdoing. In response to the trial court’s analysis, Dr. Kearney argued in his Court of Appeals’ brief that Moss does not hold that the first in-time disclosure trumps subsequent disclosure but stands for the proposition that a disclosure of that which is widely or publicly known does not fall within the Whistleblower Act. But, Dr. Kearney argued, if Professor Jones’s January disclosure falls within the Act as the trial court suggests, so does Dr. Kearney’s January disclosure under KRS 61.102(2) since Dr. Kearney aided and supported Professor Jones. Unsurprisingly, Dr. Kearney continues to cite KRS 61.102(2)’s “supports, aids, or substantiates” provision to this Court. 36 these cases.26 Although we do not rely on Pennyrile and Moss in our analysis of Dr. Kearney’s complaint and the Griffith affidavit as disclosures, we take this opportunity to clarify any confusion arising from the Court of Appeals’ opinion. As described earlier, Moss holds that the KWA protects the whistleblower who exposes information not generally known, and Pennyrile holds that an employee’s direct complaint to his supervisor concerning the supervisor’s own wrongful conduct generally cannot qualify as a whistleblower disclosure. In Moss, Moss was employed in an accounting position with Kentucky State University (KSU). 465 S.W.3d at 458. Her claims of alleged waste and mismanagement stemmed from a job assignment; Napier, Moss’s supervisor, assigned Moss the job of reconciling accounts receivable, a task Moss claimed was impossible because the accounts had been unbalanced for many years. Id. Moss claimed that her taxpayer-funded salary was wasted when she was tasked with solving the unsolvable problem of reconciling KSU’s accounts 26 UK states: Again, the rationale underlying Pennyrile presumes the reported misconduct is unknown to others beside the wrongdoer. An employee whose initial report discloses the misconduct to the wrongdoer can still expose the information by making subsequent report to someone else with authority to remedy the issue. The subsequent report in that instance, since it exposes information that had continued to be unknown, qualifies for whistleblower protection, even though it was not the employee’s initial report. The same analysis, however, does not extend to subsequent reports addressing “generally known” information as in Moss . . . . Reports regarding generally known information— regardless whether the information was reported once, twice, or more— are not exposing any misconduct to further the law’s purpose and do not qualify for whistleblower protection for that reason. UK, however, goes on to state that Dr. Kearney’s focus on Pennyrile was misplaced because the rulings below in denying whistleblower protection to Dr. Kearney’s civil complaint were based on Moss, not Pennyrile. 37 receivable. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that Moss’s complaint did not fall under the Whistleblower Act because KSU “was already aware of the problems with reconciling their accounts receivable and financial statements when Moss reported these issues. [KSU] was attempting to address this accounting problem, and thus Moss’s complaints were hardly an initial report.” Id. at 460. In Pennyrile, Rogers was employed by Pennyrile Allied Community Services, Inc. (PACS), a government program focused on rural development. 459 S.W.3d at 341. As part of her job, Rogers went to schools and made presentations. Id. Gibbs, Rogers’ supervisor, went to Rogers’ home to verify that Rogers was working, rather than spending the day at home. Id. This Court concluded that Rogers’ subsequent visit to a deputy sheriff during which she asked questions concerning property and privacy rights, and during which she did not mention her supervisor, was not a disclosure under KRS 61.102. Id. at 344-45. Then, when considering whether Rogers’ complaint to Gibbs during a PACS meeting about his visit to her home constituted an “internal disclosure,” we again reached the conclusion that Rogers did not make a disclosure under KRS 61.102. Id. at 345. First, because Gibbs was well aware of Rogers’ complaint, Rogers was not bringing to light facts not otherwise known to the recipient, and second, because there was no one at the meeting with supervisory authority over Gibbs, Rogers could not have been addressing the comments to someone in a position to bring corrective action. Id. We noted that “Rogers made no effort to bring her claim to the attention of anyone 38 with the power to remedy or report Gibbs’s behavior” and concluded that “[a]n otherwise at-will employee cannot gain whistleblower status, and the protections that come with that status, by simply complaining to her boss about what she perceives as his misconduct.” Id. at 346. In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals stated: In order to be protected under KRS 61.102, an alleged disclosure must be an initial report, not repeated or subsequent reports. See Moss v. Kentucky State University, 465 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Ky. App. 2014); Pennyrile, 459 S.W.3d at 345 (tacitly recognizing that repeated disclosures are not protected under the Whistleblower Act since KRS 61.103(1)(a) requires a disclosure “bring[] to light facts not otherwise known to the recipient”). Simply put, we do not read Moss or Pennyrile as foreclosing a repeated or subsequent report from ever being a disclosure under the KWA. Depending on the circumstances, a repeated report up the chain of command or to another appropriate authority who could remedy the complaint may qualify as a disclosure. Returning to the content of the complaint, Dr. Kearney alleges he disclosed to UK officials in attendance at the April 2014 meeting, along with other Faculty Council members, that UK officials violated University AR 3:14, by failing to create a functioning PPC for a period of four years. He also alleges that he requested an independent audit of KMSF as well as an outside investigation by an independent law firm. He further alleges that university administrators, particularly Dr. Karpf, were mismanaging KMSF funds in violation of university regulations, in an abuse of their authority and in violation of law. Because we found in the preceding analysis that the April 39 2014 meeting statements, and similarly the November 2014 email statements, do not meet KRS 61.102(1) disclosure requirements, we likewise conclude that Dr. Kearney’s complaint, its allegations relying on the April and November statements, does not meet KRS 61.102(1) disclosure requirements. Hence, without Dr. Kearney making protected disclosures, Dr. Kearney’s loss of clinical privileges cannot be viewed as retaliation under the KWA. Consequently, the only question remaining is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact under the KWA related to the Griffith affidavit. The Griffith affidavit filed in the court record is different from Dr. Kearney’s complaint allegations. Griffith provided detailed spending information as to KMSF funds, such as the financing of the Child Development Center’s new building and its annual operating expenses in excess of $100,000 and loaning the Center a sum in excess of $5 million; loaning a pharmaceutical company in excess of $400,000; and as mentioned earlier, leasing a plane and contracting for a pilot’s services. While the affidavit may be considered objective support of alleged misconduct, here, we conclude that even if Dr. Kearney made a report to an appropriate authority through the placement of Griffith’s affidavit into the court record, a genuine issue of material fact does not exist as to the affidavit disclosure being a contributing factor in Dr. Kearney’s salary reduction.27 27 Although Dr. Kearney maintains his amended complaint was a part of the disclosure leading to UK’s retaliation, Dr. Kearney experienced the pay cut before the amended complaint was filed in September 2016. 40 Under the KWA, any covered disclosure must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to be a contributing factor in the personnel action. KRS 61.103(3). KRS 61.103(1)(b) defines “contributing factor” as “any factor which, alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of a decision.” KRS 61.103(1)(b) further provides that “[i]t shall be presumed there existed a ‘contributing factor’ if the official taking the action knew or had constructive knowledge of the disclosure and acted within a limited period of time so that a reasonable person would conclude the disclosure was a factor in the personnel action.” Once a prima facie case of reprisal has been established and disclosure determined to be a contributing factor to the personnel action, the burden of proof shall be on the agency to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the disclosure was not a material fact in the personnel action. KRS 61.103(3). Dr. Kearney points out that three months after he filed the Griffith affidavit, UK reduced his salary substantially, which he views as evidence that reprisals continued against him. Dr. Kearney states that because Dean de Beer and General Counsel Thro had either actual or constructive knowledge of the Griffith affidavit disclosure, and his pay was cut a short time after he placed the affidavit in the court record, he enjoys the presumption under KRS 61.103(1)(b) that the filing of the affidavit was a “contributing factor” in the pay cut, an adverse job action. UK, on the other hand, responds that Dr. Kearney improperly fails to account for all the facts leading up to the pay cut, facts which undercut any potential whistleblower claim. UK details that when the 41 affidavit was filed in February 2016, a review of Dr. Kearney’s compensation in light of his reduced duties was “in the works.” The disciplinary proceeding against Dr. Kearney concluded August 24, 2015. General Counsel Thro communicated with Dr. Kearney in writing August 28, 2015, and among other things, advised that his compensation was under review. UK sent additional letters on October 24, 2015;28 November 11, 2015;29 and December 23, 2015,30 all before Dr. Kearney filed Griffith’s affidavit in the court record on February 10, 2016. UK then sent other letters 28 The October 24, 2015 letter, discussing employment options, stated that Dr. Kearney would have to undertake research and service activities as a full-time tenured faculty member sufficient to justify his then annual salary of $350,000. UK stated to that end, the College of Medicine Dean was prepared to work with Dr. Kearney so that he would be positioned to do so, including facilitating his ability to generate external research dollars. The letter continued, stating, that because Dr. Kearney’s duties no longer included teaching or generating clinical income for the University, his base salary likely would have to be adjusted to reflect his existing and potential contributions to the University’s missions and the University would keep him informed as any decisions were made. 29 The November 11, 2015 letter stated that because Dr. Kearney no longer had clinical privileges, it was necessary to redefine Dr. Kearney’s “Distribution of Effort.” Reiterating the University’s willingness to work with Dr. Kearney to position him for success as a funded researcher, the letter informed Dr. Kearney that in advance of a meeting with Dean de Beer he should submit to the Dean by December 1 a detailed plan for making future contributions to the University in general and for becoming a productive researcher in particular. The letter then stated, “Of course, Dr. Kearney’s salary in both the short- and long-term will reflect his research and service contributions.” 30 The December 23, 2015 letter stated that when Dean de Beer met with Dr. Kearney on December 10, Dr. Kearney informed the Dean he would not comply with the request to submit a detailed plan and his lawyer would be responding. The University explained that tenured faculty members are expected to make significant contributions to the University and to work with their Dean to develop a distribution of effort. The University stated its expectation for Dr. Kearney to submit to the Dean by January 18, 2016 a detailed plan for making future contributions to the University in general and for becoming a productive researcher in particular. The University stated that if Dr. Kearney failed to do so, it would immediately review his salary and his status as a tenured faculty member. 42 on February 17, 201631 and March 24, 2016,32 to establish Dr. Kearney’s new role at UK. Dr. Kearney contends that he submitted research and service plans that were rebuffed by Dean de Beer. UK on the other hand, states that Dr. Kearney did not engage in these efforts and failed to provide a sufficient plan, and UK sent notice of his salary reduction on April 20, 2016.33 We agree with UK that its consistent communications to Dr. Kearney about salary adjustment and research funding expectations before and after the filing of the affidavit totally undermine KRS 61.103(1)(b)’s “contributing factor” presumption. Cf. Harper, 559 S.W.3d at 804 (holding that Harper 31 The February 17, 2016 letter was limited to a discussion of Dr. Kearney’s salary. It stated that because Dr. Kearney no longer generates clinical income for the University, Dr. Kearney’s salary should reflect his expected contributions as a M.D. who holds an appointment as a regular title series tenured professor in a basic science department of the College of Medicine and advised that the Provost had accepted the $133,713 salary recommended by the Dean for Dr. Kearney, and that Dr. Kearney’s reduced salary would begin March 1. The letter also stated that Dr. Kearney had yet to submit a plan that meets the Dean’s expectations of detail and clarity, and that should Dr. Kearney be unwilling or unable to develop a significant research agenda with appropriate external funding, the University would further adjust his salary to reflect his contributions. 32 The March 24, 2016 letter stated that despite repeated requests, Dr. Kearney had yet to submit a plan that met the Dean’s expectations of detail and clarity. The University informed Dr. Kearney that he must submit a plan, meeting the specifications contained in the letter, by April 8, and if he did not do so, the University would regard the failure as a reason to further evaluate Dr. Kearney’s salary. The letter ended stating, “If the University is to continue to pay Dr. Kearney a salary consistent with his peers, then Dr. Kearney must perform at a level consistent with his peers.” 33 The April 20, 2016 letter stated that to date, Dr. Kearney had failed to submit a plan that met the Dean’s expectations of detail and clarity, and that he had made no effort to contribute to the University during the 2015-16 academic year. The University stated that as part of its consideration of whether to commence tenure revocation proceedings, one step it was taking was reducing Dr. Kearney’s salary appropriately (to $43,500), it being fundamentally unfair to pay Dr. Kearney more than his peers who were actually contributing. The salary reduction was effective May 1, 2016. 43 enjoyed the benefit of the statutory presumption, given the elimination of Harper’s position was announced immediately upon the heels of her last wasteful spending disclosure). Consequently, as Dr. Kearney acknowledges, the question becomes whether he has put forth some evidence which reasonably supports his contention that filing the Griffith affidavit in the court record was a contributing factor to the ultimate reduction in his salary three months afterward, allowing him to survive summary judgment. Because Dr. Kearney cannot simply rely on the fact that the affidavit was filed and three months afterward his pay was cut (again), and he points to no other evidence upon which a reasonable person could conclude that his pay cut was retaliation for filing the Griffith affidavit in the court record, we conclude that Dr. Kearney has not met his burden to survive summary judgment. Simply put, Dr. Kearney fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact that disclosing the alleged KMSF fund mismanagement through the filing of the affidavit was a contributing factor in his salary reduction. Summary judgment is also appropriate on this claim. II. Discovery Issue The remaining issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Dr. Kearney from deposing Dr. Wendy Hanson, a member of the Fair Hearing Panel. Dr. Kearney sought to depose her to determine how and from whom the Panel secured information that Dr. Kearney had multiple remediation actions, reprimands, leaves of absences and warnings during his twenty-seven years at the University. UK responded 44 claiming the deliberative process privilege prevented the discovery and the trial court agreed. Dr. Kearney continues to argue the privilege is not recognized in Kentucky. Like the Court of Appeals, we decline to address the issue further because Dr. Kearney does not suggest, much less explain, how his substantive rights were prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his motion to depose a member of the Fair Hearing Panel. As noted, we are affirming the trial court and Court of Appeals on the summary judgment decision based upon the content and timing of Dr. Kearney’s communications, resulting in a dismissal of his case. We decline to issue an advisory opinion on this issue which has no bearing on the disposition of this case. Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 770, 774 (Ky. 2016).