Opinion ID: 1275734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Review of denial of preliminary injunction

Text: The standard of review for grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is abuse of discretion. Washington Fed'n of State Employees, Council 28 v. State, 99 Wash.2d 878, 887, 665 P.2d 1337 (1983). Discretion is abused if the decision is based upon untenable grounds, or the decision is manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary. Id. A party seeking relief through a temporary injunction must show a clear legal or equitable right, that there is a well-grounded fear of immediate invasion of that right, and that the acts complained of have or will result in actual and substantial injury. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 96 Wash.2d 785, 792, 638 P.2d 1213 (1982). Also, since injunctions are within the equitable powers of the court, these criteria must be examined in light of equity, including the balancing of the relative interests of the parties and the interests of the public, if appropriate. Id. There is no dispute that the second and third criteria are met here; the issue is whether petitioner has a clear legal or equitable right at stake. In deciding whether a party has a clear legal or equitable right, the court examines the likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the merits. Washington Fed'n, 99 Wash.2d at 888, 665 P.2d 1337; Tyler Pipe, 96 Wash.2d at 793, 638 P.2d 1213. An injunction will not be issued in a doubtful case. Washington Fed'n, 99 Wash.2d at 888, 665 P.2d 1337; Tyler Pipe, 96 Wash.2d at 793, 638 P.2d 1213. We have frequently noted that a court is not to adjudicate the ultimate rights in the case when addressing the propriety of a preliminary injunction. E.g., Washington Fed'n, 99 Wash.2d at 888, 665 P.2d 1337; Tyler Pipe, 96 Wash.2d at 793, 638 P.2d 1213; Marion Richards Hair Design, Inc. v. Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers, Cosmetologists & Proprietors Int'l Union of Am., 59 Wash.2d 395, 396, 367 P.2d 806 (1962). [2] The Court of Appeals said, however, that while the reviewing court does not ordinarily adjudicate the ultimate rights in the lawsuit, the trial court necessarily decides the merits of the case where the essential facts are not in dispute and the only issue is the likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits. Rabon, 84 Wash.App. at 300-01, 932 P.2d 646. The Court of Appeals accordingly held that the trial court did not err by essentially adjudicating the ultimate merits of the suit, and held that it, too, had to reach the ultimate issues of law. Rabon, 84 Wash.App. at 301, 932 P.2d 646. Petitioner contends the Court of Appeals erred in this analysis and argues that reaching the ultimate merits of the suit is improper where the harm is irreversible and the issues are of serious public concern. Some courts have held that when reviewing an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction, the reviewing court may reach the merits of any purely legal question provided that the interim harm factor is undisputed, because in such a situation the reviewing court is in as good a position to resolve the matter as the trial court would be after determination of the appeal from the preliminary injunction ruling. E.g., Ortiz v. Woods, 129 Cal.App.3d 672, 181 Cal.Rptr. 209, 211 (1982); see also Callaway v. Block, 763 F.2d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir.1985) (holding that it would address on the merits statutory construction and due process claims since the parties' arguments went to the merits, no factual disputes existed, and the questions raised were purely legal questions); Dixon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Thompson, 91 Ill.2d 518, 64 Ill.Dec. 565, 568, 440 N.E.2d 117, 120 (1982) (traditional scope of review of order issuing preliminary injunction need not be followed where trial court decision is in effect a decision on the merits). As a practical matter, it is difficult to see how a reviewing court can assess the likelihood of prevailing on the merits where a purely legal issue is involved without examining the merits of the legal issue. Petitioner does not explain how the trial court or the Court of Appeals should have analyzed the legal issues here any differently. We hold that in ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction the trial court must reach the merits of purely legal issues for purposes of deciding whether to grant or deny the preliminary injunction, and a reviewing court must similarly evaluate purely legal issues in assessing the propriety of a decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction. However, in accord with well-settled principles, a court is not to adjudicate the ultimate merits of the case. Petitioner also argues that where the harm will be severe and irreversible a preliminary injunction should not be denied without clear legal precedent on the legal issues presented. Lack of precedent on an important question is not the test. In Tyler Pipe, the trial court had entered a conclusion of law stating that the case presented a `substantial constitutional question not definitely resolved by prior authorities[,]' and the movant argued that this conclusion met the requirement of demonstrating a clear right. Tyler Pipe, 96 Wash.2d at 787, 793, 638 P.2d 1213. We held that this is not the proper standard; instead, the party must show the likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Id. at 793, 638 P.2d 1213. We reject petitioner's contention that lack of precedent combined with severity of harm requires that a preliminary injunction be granted.