Opinion ID: 1351576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Granting of the People's Motion to Introduce Evidence in Rebuttal on the Nature of Life Imprisonment Without Possibility of Parole

Text: Outside the presence of the jury, defendant moved for an order allowing him to introduce, and play for the jury, certain evidence referred to in the facts, viz., the videotape of a brief segment of a television series called Two on the Town, which dealt with San Quentin Prison and the infliction of the penalty of death. He argued that the segment was admissible as relevant to ... sentence under section 190.3: it provided information as to the nature of the ultimate sanction. The People opposed the motion. They argued in substance that the segment on San Quentin Prison was inadmissible because the proper focus of the penalty phase was defendant and his crimes, and that the proffered evidence was not pertinent thereto. After viewing the San Quentin segment, the court granted defendant's motion. It reasoned in relevant part as follows. [T]he `San Quentin' film ... basically is simply kind of a news account of what [the] San Quentin death chamber is, the gas chamber, and how it has been used in the past, and how it is continually to be maintained under the assumption that some day in California it will be used again. [¶] And I've thought about that. Does that relate to quote, `sentencing' unquote? Well, that is one of the sentences that  one of the penalties that could be imposed in this case. It seems that, therefore, it could be appropriate to allow the jury to see that tape so that they have clearly in mind the full and complete thrust of what a punishment of death decision could be. And so my ruling would be to allow them to see that tape. Before the San Quentin segment was to be played, the People moved outside the presence of the jury for an order allowing them to introduce in rebuttal the testimony of Mike Madding as to the nature of the penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. As noted in the facts, Madding was the Public Information Officer at San Quentin Prison at the time the San Quentin segment was produced, and was interviewed on camera during the piece. The People argued in substance that Madding's proffered testimony was admissible as relevant ... to sentence under section 190.3: it would provide, inter alia, information as to the nature of the penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The prosecutor stated: It's my intention to call [Madding] in rebuttal ..., since counsel has convinced the Court that they should know exactly what their options are, to inform the jury on what life without possibility of parole means. In other words, what a person serving such a sentence can look forward to as far as his time in prison, what privileges are available, what liberties are not available. [¶] I think that in light of the Court's ruling on the gas chamber, I think that they should also have an informed choice to know exactly what that type of sentence means. Defendant opposed the motion. Counsel argued in substance that the proffered testimony was inadmissible because it was speculative and in any event [in]appropriate. The prosecutor responded: [Y]ou can't say there are two penalties, and we're only going to show them, the jury, what one of them is. [¶] I don't think they should be shown either one. I've made that clear. I've been overruled on that point. And I don't think it's fair for them to see one and not the other. They're going to know what the death penalty is. I think they should equally be informed what life without possibility of parole is. The court declined to rule on the People's motion. It reasoned in pertinent part as follows. First of all, the reason I am allowing this tape to be shown is because I think that it goes, pursuant to 190.3 of the Penal Code, to the area of sentencing. [¶] The suggestion made by the District Attorney is that he should be allowed to present to the jury the other side, that is, the alternate to the possibility of the death penalty. And that also he should be allowed the opportunity to call this person, I guess, who they interviewed on this, who was at that time, I think it was the Public Affairs Officer at San Quentin.... [¶] I'm not going to rule in a vacuum. I have no idea what this man would say. At the same time, I'm certainly not going to dismiss out of hand the District Attorney's request to present a rebuttal witness as it relates to the sentencing factors. [¶] So I suppose what we will end up doing is, if it in fact is still intended by the People to present such evidence, we'll have this person come in and probably outside the presence of the jury make an offer of proof as to what the testimony would be.... [¶] I understand the District Attorney's position, and it doesn't on its face seem totally unreasonable, but I certainly am not going to just give him carte blanche to come in and bring forward information that I don't think is appropriate. So I think it's premature. I'm not going to rule on that now. Defendant proceeded to introduce into evidence, and play for the jury, the videotape of the San Quentin segment. After the defense rested, the People made an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury. The prosecutor stated as relevant here: [I]t is my intention to call [Madding] ... since, as Counsel eloquently observed, that the jury should know what the two alternatives are. Now that they know one, and that is the gas chamber, that they should now be familiar with what the life prisoner without possibility of parole is subject to. Called to the stand by the People in support of the offer of proof, Madding was examined by the prosecutor concerning such matters as the living accommodations and privileges available to persons sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, and also the living accommodations and privileges that defendant might himself obtain if he were sentenced to that penalty. Madding was cross-examined on these issues by defense counsel. The court effectively granted the People's motion. Its ruling was as follows. The matter that is before me is the question of whether or not it's appropriate for the District Attorney to ask questions of Mr. Madding as they relate to what would be the  I guess, the atmosphere or aspects of the sentence if the jury decided upon life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. [¶] ... There are a couple of issues that are really before the Court. [¶] First of all, it seems to me that it is appropriate to allow the District Attorney to show the other side of the coin, as it were, since I have allowed the defense to present briefly the videotape that shows the gas chamber at San Quentin. And so I would allow at least some presentation of what it is that makes up life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, issue number one. [¶] Issue number two, I think it is inappropriate to allow the witness to speculate on various matters, and it's  very much of the testimony that was elicited outside the presence of the jury certainly was speculative in nature. So I guess we'll take it on a question-by-question basis, and if there's objections, I'll rule upon those accordingly. Thereupon, after calling Madding to the stand in the presence of the jury, the People conducted direct examination on, inter alia, the living accommodations and privileges of persons sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. For his part, defendant conducted cross-examination on these issues. Madding's testimony was brief and neutral. (15) Defendant now contends that the court erred by granting the People's motion for permission to introduce in rebuttal the testimony of Madding as to the nature of the penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. He argues that the ruling was improper under, among other provisions, the cruel and unusual punishments and due process clauses of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and also under their counterparts in article I, sections 17 and 7 and 15, of the California Constitution. The point must be rejected. Defendant himself raised the issue of the nature of the penalties available to the jury. He introduced evidence as to one. In response, the People introduced evidence as to the other. It may well be, as defendant now urges, that both were wrong. (See People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 138-139 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37] [holding inadmissible evidence as to the nature of the two possible penalties].) Also, it may well be, in accordance with the adage on which defendant now relies, that two wrongs do not make a right. But on this record, defendant must be held responsible for any error on the court's part and accordingly may not be heard to complain thereof. The basis of the challenged ruling was the broad construction of the phrase, relevant to ... sentence, in section 190.3. That basis was laid by defendant himself. In any event, as noted Madding's testimony was brief and neutral. Prejudice could not have arisen therefrom.