Opinion ID: 1895338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court commit error in overruling johnson's motions for continuance?

Text: Although Johnson's primary argument is that the trial court erred in overruling his motions for continuance, he first complains that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by having no counsel at arraignment or during the first 170 days there after. Johnson was arraigned on October 13, 1989 and was represented by Rufus Ward, one of the public defenders. At the request of the court, Ward was purportedly standing in for William Catledge. The court was under the mistaken impression that Catledge was representing Johnson. Catledge had represented Johnson at a probation revocation hearing held after Johnson's arrest. It is unclear why Catledge did not continue representing Johnson. On December 19, 1989, Circuit Judge Lee Howard conducted a docket setting and determined that Catledge did not represent Johnson and appointed Louis Coleman, a public defender, to represent Johnson. On December 21, 1989, Coleman filed a motion for discovery on Johnson's behalf. Johnson's contention that he was not represented at the arraignment is not supported by the record. It does appear that Johnson was not thereafter represented by counsel until December 19, 1989. Under the Mississippi Constitution, the right to counsel attaches once the proceedings reach the accusatory stage, which is earlier in the day than does the federal right. Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 876 (Miss. 1987). Rule 1.05 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice provides: Counsel shall be appointed no later than the time of initial appearance, and once appointed, counsel shall continue to represent the defendant until permitted to withdraw by proper order of the court. Such appointed counsel shall have free access to the defendant who shall have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his favor. The defendant shall have such representation available at every critical stage of the proceeding against him where a substantial right may be affected. Even so, the arraignment proceeding as practiced in Mississippi does not constitute a critical stage whereby the presence of counsel would be required under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution or the Mississippi Constitution. Williamson, 512 So.2d at 875. Unless Johnson can show some adverse effect upon his ability to conduct a defense, the denial of the right to counsel at this early stage does not constitute reversible error. Id. at 876. As stated in Wright v. State, 512 So.2d 679, 681 (Miss. 1987), the denial of the entitlement to timely appointed counsel will result in reversal of a subsequent conviction, however, only where it is shown that the accused experienced some untoward consequence flowing directly from denial of counsel. Johnson has not made such a showing that he experienced any adverse effect or untoward consequence. During the time Johnson was entitled to but without counsel there is no indication that the State took advantage of the situation or that any further proceedings were conducted. Johnson next raises the issue of his three motions for continuance which were overruled by the lower court. The first motion concerned Johnson's desire to substitute counsel and related matters. On April 2, 1990, Coleman met with Johnson at the Clay County Jail. Johnson had until that date been at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman. Johnson refused to talk to Coleman because Johnson's family was in the process of hiring another attorney, Emanuel Smith. The next day, April 3, Coleman was advised by Smith that, while arrangements had been made for him to represent Johnson, he could only represent Johnson if the case were set for the next week during the same term to allow him time to prepare. On April 4, the original date set for trial, Coleman moved for a preliminary hearing and was granted a continuance until April 11, 1990, the next week during the same term of court. On April 9, Coleman was advised by Smith that he would be unable to represent Johnson due to scheduling conflicts. Smith had prepared a motion for continuance which he sent to Coleman. Smith also sent an affidavit stating that he could only represent Johnson if the case were continued to the next term of court. On April 10, Coleman filed a Motion for Continuance and Relief on Related Matters in which he set out the course of his dealings with Johnson and Smith, including as exhibits to the motion the affidavit and motion sent him by Smith. Coleman also stated in the motion that there was a material witness present at the sale who he was unable to identify and locate because Johnson refused to communicate with him. On April 11, 1990, Coleman filed a second motion for continuance asserting the same grounds raised in the first motion and adding that the problems have been amplified and compounded by actions of the State which prevented Coleman from being able to properly use trial preparation time. Coleman stated to the court that he had a very crowded docket for the week and had been unable to spend as much time preparing for the case due to an unexpected change in another trial. The lower court, in denying the first two motions, found, in part, as follows: The testimony before the court is that the defendant met with Mr. Coleman on April the 2nd and 3rd, and on his own election, decided not to discuss the case with his counsel. So if there's any problem it's because he created the problem and now he wants to take advantage of the problem he created ... The court finds that the  there is no competent evidence before the court by Mr. Smith; that the court feels that the defendant, Mr. Johnson, is seeking a continuance and substitute counsel for purposes of delay; that this is an age-old tactic to want to change lawyers at the last moment to avoid being put to trial, and the court does make that finding. The court further is of the opinion that no motion filed by Mr. Smith to substitute himself for counsel is before the court and the court would feel that the better procedure would be to have, if Mr. Smith had, in fact, received two thousand dollars, that he would, pursuant to the rules of the court, make application to this court to be substituted as counsel of record, and there's no such application. .. . Johnson notes in his brief that the procedure for substitution of counsel is governed by Rule 1.11 of the Uniform Circuit Court Rules, which provides that an attorney will not be allowed to withdraw as counsel without permission of the court. Johnson also cites Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-29 (1972), the statute on continuances, and notes that the trial court in the exercise of sound judicial discretion could properly have denied the requested continuance. Section 99-15-29 states: A denial of the continuance shall not be ground for reversal unless the supreme court shall be satisfied that injustice resulted therefrom. Johnson's third motion for continuance came after the State's direct examination of Bruce Andress. During his testimony Andress stated that when he went into the office to purchase the cocaine from Johnson, there was another man sitting on a couch in the office. Johnson's counsel requested a continuance stating that the identity of the black male who was a witness to the transaction had not been disclosed to the defense. The State noted that the fact that another person was present was in the officer's report which defense counsel had received. When the trial judge suggested that Johnson should know the identity of the man, Coleman responded, My client is not talking to me. It was later stipulated that Andress testified at the preliminary hearing that he did not know the name of the man on the couch. Johnson's counsel then stated that Johnson said he did not know the man's name either. The next witness after Andress, Charles Johnson, an agent with the West Point Narcotics Unit, testified that he was present in the office after the deal was completed and the man on the couch was Bobo Randale. After Charles Johnson's testimony, Coleman renewed his request for a continuance. The court overruled the motion for continuance and allowed Johnson to request a subpoena instanter since the identity of the potential witness was revealed. After the State had rested its case and the court had conducted a hearing advising Johnson of his right to testify, the court announced the following: All right, I want the record to also reflect that the witness, Bobo Randale, has been served and is present, and the defense counsel has interviewed that witness, and that witness is available to be called at the instance of the defendant if it so desires. The court makes that finding. The defense rested without calling any witnesses. In closing arguments, the court sustained the State's objection to Johnson's counsel arguing that the State should have called Randale as a witness. As acknowledged by Johnson, the decision to grant or deny a continuance is one left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Wallace v. State, 607 So.2d 1184, 1190 (Miss. 1992); Morris v. State, 595 So.2d 840, 844 (Miss. 1991); Fisher v. State, 532 So.2d 992, 998 (Miss. 1988). Unless manifest injustice appears to have resulted from the denial of the continuance, this Court should not reverse. Hatcher v. Fleeman, 617 So.2d 634, 639 (Miss. 1993). Based on the findings of the court, there was no error or abuse of discretion in denying the motions for continuance. In particular, attorney Smith's failure to file with the court a motion to be substituted as counsel and to affirmatively state that he would be or was Johnson's attorney supports the court's decision. Smith's affidavit only outlined the conditions under which he would accept the representation of Johnson. The failure to disclose the identity of the witness to the transaction is also no basis for granting a continuance. Although Johnson argues that this was a discovery violation, the portions of Rule 4.06 cited by Johnson relate to the State's continuing duty to disclose exculpatory material. As is apparent, Johnson's decision not to call the witness after interviewing him is clear indication that the testimony would not have been exculpatory. As noted by the State, it is unlikely that Johnson would allow the man to sit in on the drug sale if he were not someone he knew and trusted. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-29 states further: On all applications for a continuance the party shall set forth in his affidavit the facts which he expects to prove by his absent witness or documents that the court may judge of the materiality of such facts, the name and residence of the absent witness, that he has used due diligence to procure the absent documents, or presence of the absent witness, as the case may be, stating in what such diligence consists, and that the continuance is not sought for delay only, but that justice may be done. The court may grant or deny a continuance, in its discretion, and may of its own motion cross-examine the party making the affidavit. The attorneys for the other side may also cross-examine and may introduce evidence of affidavit or otherwise for the purpose of showing to the court that a continuance should be denied. No application for a continuance shall be considered in the absence of the party making the affidavit, unless his absence be accounted for to the satisfaction of the court. A denial of the continuance shall not be ground for reversal unless the supreme court shall be satisfied that injustice resulted therefrom. In the present case, Johnson failed to make the requisite factual showing of what the absent witness would have testified to or his own efforts to identify and find this witness earlier. This Court has consistently held that a trial court will not be held in error in denying a continuance where the defendant fails to follow the procedure outlined by statute and caselaw. See Pinson v. State, 518 So.2d 1220, 1222 (Miss. 1988); Pool v. State, 483 So.2d 331, 336 (Miss. 1986). The record does not show that Johnson was in any way prejudiced by the delay in identifying the witness. In each instance where a problem arose, Johnson, in some way caused or contributed to the cause of the problem. Johnson refused to talk to his appointed counsel even after it was clear that other counsel would not be available to him. This Court has twice quoted favorably the following language from Shaw v. United States, 403 F.2d 528, 529 (8th Cir.1968): A defendant cannot base a claim of inadequate representation upon his refusal to cooperate with appointed counsel. Such a doctrine would lead to absurd results. Corley v. State, 536 So.2d 1314, 1318 (Miss. 1988); Evans v. State, 273 So.2d 495, 498 (Miss. 1973). Johnson has failed to show that the denial of any of his motions for continuance was an abuse of discretion and, more importantly, that any injustice resulted. This assignment of error cannot be the basis of any reversal.