Opinion ID: 4528343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: History of Detroit’s Schools and State Control

Text: Plaintiffs are students at several Detroit public schools that “serve almost exclusively low-income children of color.” (Compl., R. 1 at PageID #4.) They filed suit in this case against several Michigan state officers, who they say are proper defendants based both on the state’s constitutional and statutory authority to oversee the statewide education program and on the state’s specific interventions into the governance of Detroit’s schools. Michigan’s constitution provides that the state’s legislature “shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools.” Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 2. The constitution also vests “[l]eadership and general supervision over all public education” in the state board of education, which serves “as the general planning and coordinating body for all public education.” Id. art. VIII, § 3. The board also appoints the superintendent of public Nos. 18-1855/1871 Gary B., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 4 instruction, who is responsible for executing the board’s policies and serves as head of the state department of education. Id. According to Plaintiffs, education is a state-level concern and school districts are simply “creations and agents of the State.” (Compl., R. 1 at PageID #48–50.) The Michigan Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that education in this state is not a matter of local concern, but belongs to the state at large.” Bd. of Educ. v. Bacon, 162 N.W. 416, 416 (Mich. 1917) (quoting Collins v. City of Detroit, 161 N.W. 905, 907 (Mich. 1917)). Under Michigan law, the state board of education has oversight authority over school districts and public schools within the state. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 380.1281, 388.1007, 388.1009; see also Council of Orgs. & Others for Educ. About Parochiaid, Inc. v. Engler, 566 N.W.2d 208, 216 (Mich. 1997) (noting that state funding and oversight provisions place public schools “under the ultimate and immediate control of the state and its agents”). But beneath this oversight and supervisory authority, the day-to-day administration of Michigan schools is usually entrusted to the boards of local school districts and their appointees. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1282. But usually is not always. Beyond the state’s general authority with respect to public education, Plaintiffs also allege that the state has repeatedly intervened in the day-to-day management of Detroit’s schools, and that it directly oversaw public education in Detroit from 1999 through the time the complaint was filed in this case. See Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 350–54 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (discussing state interventions in Detroit’s schools). As stated in the complaint, “the State has directly controlled [the Detroit school system] for most of the past fifteen years through variations of an emergency manager system.” (Compl., R. 1 at PageID #16–17.) And while this intervention may have been intended to help address shortcomings in the city’s schools, Plaintiffs say that by “placing the Detroit schools largely in the hands of administrators with no backgrounds in education,” the state only made the problem worse. (Id.) These interventions began in the 1990s, partially in response to “fiscal deficit and failing student achievement outcomes” in Detroit Public Schools (“DPS”), the former Detroit school district. (Id. at #50.) In 1999, the state adopted Public Act 10, which “replac[ed] Detroit’s elected school board and superintendent with a seven member ‘reform board.’” (Id.) The reform board consisted of seven members: six appointed by the mayor, and (at least for five years after Nos. 18-1855/1871 Gary B., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 5 passage) either the state superintendent of public instruction or her designee. 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 10, § 372(2).1 The board required unanimous consent to appoint the school district’s chief executive, id. § 374(1), which Plaintiffs say gave the state an effective “veto power over the selection of the CEO as well as every other decision” (Compl., R. 1 at PageID #50–51). While in 2006, control of DPS was returned “to a locally elected school board . . . as a result of a Detroit voter referendum,” this change was short-lived. (Id. at #51.) In December 2008, the governor declared a fiscal emergency and appointed an “Emergency Fiscal Manager for DPS.” (Id.) This emergency manager shared power with the locally elected school board, but in doing so, the manager “exercised authority not only over financial decision-making, but some educational decision-making as well.” (Id.) In 2011, this power-sharing arrangement ended, as the state significantly expanded the authority of the state’s emergency manager. The manager was effectively given total control over DPS, and was empowered to “[e]xercise solely, for and on behalf of the school district, all . . . authority and responsibilities affecting the school district that are prescribed by law to the school board and superintendent.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 141.1554(f); see also Gary B., 329 F. Supp. 3d at 350–51 (discussing the history and various versions of Michigan’s emergencymanager laws). While a state-appointed transition manager controlled Detroit’s schools at the time the complaint was filed, the state also created a new school district, the Detroit Public Schools Community District (“DPSCD”), to run Detroit’s schools, while keeping DPS in charge of paying down debt. See Ann Zaniewski, New Detroit School Board Takes Reins of District, Det. Free Press, Jan. 11, 2017. The first elections for DPSCD’s board were held in January 2017, and Defendants claim that “the locally elected DPSCD Board of Education and its superintendent now have direct control over the operation of the schools in the district; there is no longer an emergency manager.” (Defs.’ Br. at 27.) That said, the complaint notes that “the State’s Financial Review Commission will remain involved in the oversight of the Detroit schools, and 1 Plaintiffs instead allege that this seventh member was “appointed by the Governor” (Compl., R. 1 at PageID #50), but this makes no difference to their case, since both the governor and the state superintendent are defendants here. Nos. 18-1855/1871 Gary B., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 6 has not yet revealed the scope of authority or direction that will be granted to the elected board.” (Compl., R. 1 at PageID #51.)2 Beyond the emergency managers and other interventions into DPS or DPSCD, “the State also has assumed a special responsibility over what it calls Priority Schools, or the most poorly performing five percent of schools in the State.” (Id. at #52.) At the time the complaint was filed, this included all of Plaintiffs’ schools that remained open. These Priority Schools were managed by a state entity called the State School Reform/Redesign Office (“SRO”). See 2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 204, § 1280c (repealed 2019). According to Defendants, the SRO and Priority Schools were eliminated as of June 30, 2019. Plaintiffs also allege that the state intervened in Detroit schools through an entity called the Education Achievement Authority (“EAA”). The EAA was a statewide school district administered by the state in conjunction with Eastern Michigan University, and included fifteen of the state’s lowest-performing schools. But according to Plaintiffs, “[t]he EAA schools have not improved on the State’s watch. In fact, the most recent Michigan state achievement test results reflect that fewer than 5% of EAA students are proficient in core subject areas.” (Compl., R. 1 at PageID #55.) As a result, the state closed the district and transferred Detroit’s EAA schools back into DPSCD. See Gary B., 329 F. Supp. 3d at 351–52. However, none of Plaintiffs’ individual schools were part of the EAA. Id. at 351 n.3.3 Finally, Plaintiffs point to state-level policy interventions that affect Detroit schools. For example, Plaintiffs claim that in June 2016, the state adopted legislation allowing “noncertificated, nonendorsed teacher[s]” to work in the new Detroit school district. (Compl., R. 1 at PageID #59.) According to Plaintiffs, “[n]owhere else in Michigan may children in 2 This commission includes the state treasurer, the director of the Department of Technology, Management and Budget (who is one of the defendants here) or her designee, and several appointees of the governor, along with certain officers from DPSCD and the City of Detroit. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 141.1635(1)–(2). State officers and appointees constitute a majority of the commission. Id. 3 Plaintiffs also discuss inadequate teachers, decrepit conditions, and a shortage of materials at Marion Law Academy, one of the schools managed by the EAA. While the conditions described at the school seem horrendous (see, e.g., Compl., R. 1 at PageID #58 (“In one fourth-grade classroom, a leaking hole in the ceiling created what students called ‘the lake,’ and the teacher surrounded the area with yellow caution tape after multiple requests for repairs were ignored.”)), none of the named plaintiffs attended Marion Law Academy. Nos. 18-1855/1871 Gary B., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 7 public school be taught by teachers who lack appropriate state-mandated credentials and qualifications.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also allege that the state has threatened to close and then flip-flopped on closing “all of Plaintiffs’ schools that are currently operating and 47 schools in Detroit.” (Id. at #60–62.) They say that these threatened closures exacerbated their problems by sending “students and teachers scrambling, leaving them worried and confused when they should have instead been preparing to start the new school year. Moreover, the State has offered no plan to ensure that any contemplated school closing will not disrupt students’ educations, further entrenching denials of access to literacy.” (Id. at #61.)