Opinion ID: 2350429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the human rights act violation

Text: In granting partial summary judgment, Judge Braman found that Georgetown's denial of University Recognition and the attendant tangible benefits violated the Human Rights Act. At trial on the free exercise defense, Judge Bacon therefore proceeded from the premise of an established statutory violation. Without challenging the underlying finding of a Human Rights Act violation, Georgetown asks this court to affirm Judge Bacon's conclusion that the Human Rights Act is unconstitutional as applied. If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoidable. Spector Motor Services, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 154, 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944). Thus, if a case may be decided on either statutory or constitutional grounds, [the courts], for sound jurisprudential reasons, will inquire first into the statutory question. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-07, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2683, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980); see also, e.g., New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582-83, 99 S.Ct. 1355, 1364, 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 297, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932). A constitutional issue is presented in this case only if Judge Braman correctly concluded that the statute was violated. Before considering Judge Bacon's later ruling on the free exercise defense, we must ask ourselves whether the Human Rights Act was properly construed by Judge Braman. The deeply rooted doctrine that a constitutional issue is to be avoided if possible informs our principles of statutory construction. We do not needlessly pit a statute against the Constitution. Insofar as its language permits, the Human Rights Act must be construed in a manner which protects its constitutionality. E.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 92, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1791, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 444, 104 S.Ct. 1883, 1890, 80 L.Ed.2d 428 (1984); International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 1789-90, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961); Moore v. Coates, 40 A.2d 68, 71 (D.C.1944); see generally SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 2.01, 45.11 (4th ed. 1985) (hereinafter SUTHERLAND). Moreover, it should be read, if it can be, so as to avoid difficult and sensitive constitutional questions concerning the scope of the First Amendment. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 1322, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979); see also, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 2902, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985); Nova University v. Educational Institution Licensure Commission, 483 A.2d 1172, 1179-80 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054, 105 S.Ct. 1759, 84 L.Ed.2d 822 (1986); see generally SUTHERLAND, supra, at § 45.11. [13] On the facts of this case, as found by Judge Bacon after trial, the particular scheme of University Recognition operating at Georgetown includes a religiously guided institutional endorsement of recipient student groups. Contrary to Judge Braman's earlier construction, the Human Rights Act does not require one private actor to endorse the ideas or conduct of another. The trial court's interpretation would defeat the plain language of the statute and simultaneously transform the Human Rights Act into a patent invasion of the First Amendment. The statute would be rendered both practically and legally unenforceable. Because the Human Rights Act does not require Georgetown to endorse the student groups, its denial of University Recognition did not violate the statute. While the Human Rights Act does not require any endorsement  and therefore does not require the type of University Recognition offered by Georgetown  it does require equal access to the facilities and services attendant upon that status. D.C.Code § 1-2520 (1987). In this case the student groups have been denied four tangible benefits that also come with a grant of University Recognition: officially approved use of a mailbox, use of the Computer Label Service, mailing services, and the right to apply for (but not necessarily to receive) funding. All of these tangible benefits, unlike an endorsement, are facilities and services within the meaning of the Human Rights Act; the record supports Judge Braman's conclusion that they were denied on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. Tangible benefits having been denied upon an impermissible basis, we affirm, to that extent only, Judge Braman's finding that the Human Rights Act was violated; we reverse his holding that the denial of University Recognition was of itself a statutory violation.
Judge Bacon found as a fact that under the Georgetown scheme University Recognition benefits a student group in two ways. The major purpose of `[U]niversity [R]ecognition' is official endorsement...., an endorsement which Georgetown tenders in accordance with the normative teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. University Recognition also gives a student group access to certain tangible benefits. Unless clearly erroneous, these factual findings are binding upon us for purposes of this appeal. D.C. Code § 17-305(a) (1981); see Chaconas v. Meyers, 465 A.2d 379, 384 (D.C.1983); Blanken & Blanken Investments, Inc. v. Keg, Inc., 383 A.2d 1076, 1078 n. 4 (D.C. 1978); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 154 A.2d 124, 125 (D.C.1959). Specifically, the student groups urge us to disregard as clearly erroneous Judge Bacon's factual finding that University Recognition at Georgetown includes an endorsement. They point out that other groups with University Recognition occupy a broad range of the political, social and philosophical spectrum, and argue that Georgetown cannot claim that all of these organizations are strictly Roman Catholic in outlook. In particular, the student groups refer us to the recognized existence of such diverse bodies as the Jewish Students Association, the Organization of Arab Students, the Young Americans for Freedom, and the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee. At trial, the student groups challenged President Healy with evidence concerning the University's willingness to extend University Recognition to organizations whose members adhere to religions other than Catholicism. President Healy responded: It is the understanding of the Roman Catholic Church that faiths other than the Roman Catholic Church are, to put it in the technical terms, carriers of grace and as such are good. The Roman Catholic Church would feel that they are incomplete, but in the context of a complex university, it is the clear and stated purpose of the Roman Catholic Church that those of other faiths receive the same pastoral and intellectual sustenance in their faith as far as it is possible for the University to grant it, given the multiplicity, as Catholic students receive from a Catholic university. The student groups also sought to undermine Georgetown's claim of endorsement by pointing to views on artificial birth control, abortion, divorce and lesbianism associated with members of the Women's Rights Collective (WRC) and the Women's Political Caucus (WPC). However, one of their witnesses, Sister Mary K. Liston, stated that WPC, another campus group of which she was a member, had not and could not take a pro-abortion position [b]ecause of the stand of the Catholic Church on the issue of abortion. Sona Jean Vandall, a representative of WRC, acknowledged that the only formally stated purpose of that organization is the eradication of policies and practices which alienate and discriminate against women. She further testified that views contrary to Roman Catholic teachings were carried in none of WRC's published information and that no such positions had been voted on by its membership. Referring to an occasion when WRC posted other organizations' notices concerning artificial birth control and abortion, President Healy testified that he referred the matter to a committee to determine whether [these incidents were] an isolated instance or whether [they were] an essential part of the collective activity. After discussion with the various parties, he regarded the incidents in question as such minor instances of activity as not to be of serious concern to the University. He concluded, on that basis, that withdrawal of WRC's University Recognition would not be appropriate. With regard to the plaintiff student groups, President Healy saw the matter differently. He testified that the University does not distinguish between students on the basis of their sexual orientation and said that group activity merely promoting the legal rights of gay people would present no religious conflict. But, according to President Healy and other Georgetown representatives, including its theological expert, the purposes set forth in the GPGU Constitution described an organization for which University Recognition would be inappropriate for a Catholic institution. The statement that stopped me most, said President Healy, was GPGU's stated commitment to the development of responsible sexual ethics consonant with one's personal beliefs. See GPGU Constitution ( quoted supra note 5). Under Roman Catholic doctrine, as expert testimony established, responsible sexual ethics are not a question of personal belief. The University cannot make that statement about any area of front line morality without insisting upon the objectivity of moral fact and that it is not left strictly to individual determination within any context which can reasonably be read as Catholic. Under Roman Catholic doctrine, contrary to GPGU's suggestion, sexual ethics are the subject of an absolute and unyielding moral law, one laid down by God. President Healy also testified that GPGU's expressed intention to establish a program of activities which reflect the above purposes, id., was open-ended enough to involve the University in a host of positions and activities which together or singly it would find inappropriate. He had similar reservations about GRC's stated commitment to the provision of information to gay and lesbian law students concerning Washington's gay community, including educational, cultural, religious, social and medical services. See GRC Constitution ( quoted supra note 6). According to President Healy, GRC's association with the range of activities engaged in by the Washington gay community would involve Georgetown University in positions it would not wish publicly to adopt. Roman Catholic teachings establish moral norms which prevent believers from recognizing homosexual conduct, as distinguished from homosexual orientation, as anything other than sinful. President Healy added that the duty to obey these moral norms would be more binding upon institutions, which have to act publicly and where there is an added moral consideration of leading others astray or giving scandal in the technical sense of the word, so that the binding authority of Roman Catholic teaching on an institution would, at least in that dimension, be greater than it would be on an [individual]. Reverend Richard J. McCormick, S.J., Georgetown's theological expert, testified to the same effect. He said that a Roman Catholic university has a duty to act in a way consistent with those teachings and not to undermine them in its public policies. Thus, in its public policies and public acts, the University ought not to adopt a public policy of explicit endorsement or implicit endorsement of, for example, abortion, premarital intercourse, or homosexual conduct. Georgetown should not in its public actions, policies, decisions, take a position that would equivalently establish another normative lifestyle equally valid with the one that is in a normative position. According to President Healy, a grant of University Recognition to GPGU and GRC would conflict with Georgetown's duty not to undermine the Roman Catholic teaching that human sexuality can be exercised only within marriage.... The trial court did not define precisely what it meant by endorsement. For President Healy, a position that the Church was either neutral or approving of the range of homosexual activities is unacceptable. (Emphasis added.) This statement reveals what we understand to be at stake. An official endorsement, as symbolized by Georgetown's grant of University Recognition, would express religious approval of or neutrality towards the student groups. Under the Georgetown scheme, University Recognition is reserved for groups that do not fundamentally challenge the moral norms. We cannot characterize as clearly erroneous Judge Bacon's finding that the scheme of University Recognition offered by Georgetown includes the type of endorsement just described. Recognition Criteria described it as an endorsement. Georgetown administrators repeatedly testified that they understood it to have that effect. From the outset of its dealings with GPGU and GRC, Georgetown equated University Recognition with an endorsement. Neither Recognition Criteria nor any evidence adduced at trial indicates that University Recognition is an automatic right. That status was granted in the University's discretion and some application of Roman Catholic doctrine was involved in the recognition process. Our required deference to Judge Bacon's factual finding is not undercut by Georgetown's willingness to endorse a wide range of groups with extremely diverse goals and activities. For those whose common interest is a non-Catholic religious belief system, Georgetown's endorsement appears to have been granted in the spirit of ecumenism. For others, including WRC, the evidence permitted Judge Bacon to conclude that no essential part of the collective activity contravened Roman Catholic doctrine, and that the administration would withdraw University Recognition if there were more than isolated instances of unofficial activity inconsistent with those teachings. The trial court was therefore entitled to conclude that the University adopted an approving or at least neutral position towards all of the existing groups because it did not perceive them to be incompatible with its religious obligations. This comports with our understanding of what endorsement means in this case. An appellate court may not usurp the role of the factfinder. We cannot label clearly erroneous Judge Bacon's endorsement finding, i.e., that University Recognition at Georgetown contains an expression of religious approval or neutrality towards a student group obtaining that status. [14]
The distinction between the endorsement and the other benefits contained in Georgetown's scheme of University Recognition is fundamental. It is so from both a statutory and a constitutional perspective. In this case, the separateness of the benefits at issue is obscured by the fact that they are bundled together into a single package known as University Recognition. Because the endorsement and the tangible benefits contained in that package are fundamentally distinct, we must sever the artificial connection between them in order to analyze the true issues. The endorsement contained in University Recognition is an intangible. To a student group, it is no more than an expression of official approval or neutrality, a statement of Georgetown's tolerance towards organizations that pose no fundamental challenge to the moral norms. The endorsement is a symbolic gesture, a form of speech by a private, religiously affiliated educational institution, an entity free to adopt partisan public positions on moral and ethical issues. [15] In speaking out on human sexuality, Georgetown is guided by a religious mission undertaken along with secular educational functions. The endorsement contained in University Recognition assists the student group only by giving it Georgetown's imprimatur or, at least, nihil obstat. Quite different are the tangible benefits associated with University Recognition. Unlike the endorsement, the tangible benefits are facilities and services, D.C. Code § 1-2520 (1987), and not an abstract expression of the University's moral philosophy. Their distinct characteristics are disguised only because both the endorsement and the additional tangible benefits are included in one package known as University Recognition. As amicus The Governor's Council on Lesbian and Gay Issues of the State of Wisconsin points out, such a structure unnecessarily ties the University's religious beliefs to extension of benefits. Brief at 5-6. We agree. While the endorsement and the tangible benefits may be one for Georgetown's administrative purposes, they are not so in the eyes of the Human Rights Act, nor are they so in the eyes of the First Amendment. The constitutionality of the statute, as the District of Columbia remarks, cannot depend on the [U]niversity's internal linkages. Reply Brief at 3. We open up the package of University Recognition and examine its contents separately. [16]
The Human Rights Act does not require one private actor to endorse another. Georgetown's denial of University Recognition to the student groups did not violate the statute. There are two reasons why, as a matter of statutory construction, the Human Rights Act cannot be read to compel a regulated party to express religious approval or neutrality towards any group or individual. First, the statute prohibits only a discriminatory denial of access to facilities and services provided by an educational institution. D.C. Code § 1-2520 (1987). An endorsement is neither. The Human Rights Act provides legal mechanisms to ensure equality of treatment, not equality of attitudes. Although we fervently hope that nondiscriminatory attitudes result from equal access to facilities and services, the Human Rights Act contains nothing to suggest that the legislature intended to make a discriminatory state of mind unlawful in itself. Still less does the statute reveal any desire to force a private actor to express an idea that is not truly held. The Human Rights Act demands action, not words. It was not intended to be an instrument of mind control. Judge Braman's construction of the statute, as requiring an insincere expression of opinion, conflicts with its literal meaning. Second, as we have already pointed out, unless the language of the statute is plainly to the contrary, we must construe it so as to uphold its constitutionality. To read into the Human Rights Act a requirement that one private actor must endorse another would be to render the statute unconstitutional. The First Amendment protects both free speech and the free exercise of religion. [17] Its essence is that government is without power to intrude into the domain of the intellect or the spirit and that only conduct may be regulated. Interpreting the Human Rights Act so as to require Georgetown to endorse the student groups would be to thrust the statute across the constitutional boundaries set by the Free Speech Clause and also, where sincere religious objections are raised, the Free Exercise Clause. Nothing in the statute suggests, let alone requires, such a result. Because similar interests are often implicated, the Supreme Court has relied on both the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause to protect against government intrusion into the inner domain. The Court has made clear that the state is without power to regulate the intellect or the spirit; its rule is over actions and behavior only. In its initial decision interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the Court described the division between opinion and action as the true distinction between what properly belongs to the Church and what to the State. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 163, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878). With the adoption of the Free Exercise Clause, Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order. Id. at 164. The Court quoted with approval a statute drafted by Thomas Jefferson to protect religious freedom in Virginia: [i]t is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order. Id. (quoting 12 Hening's Stat. 84 (1784)). [T]o suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his [or her] powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty. Id. The Court concluded, as a matter of constitutional principle, that [l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Reynolds, supra, 98 U.S. at 166. [18] That principle has been emphatically reaffirmed in a later free exercise case: the Amendment embraces two concepts,  freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 18, 310 U.S. at 303-04, 60 S.Ct. at 903 (citations omitted). The principles embraced within the absolute core of the clause, freedom of conscience, thought and expression of religious belief, as sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165, 64 S.Ct. 438, 441, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), cannot be forced to jostle for position with other values regarded by the state as more deserving. A number of free speech cases have expanded the idea that government cannot force one to embrace a repugnant philosophy. Initially, these decisions implicated religious objections, but the Supreme Court has since made clear that the protection against forced speech also extends to matters of a secular nature. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), children attending public schools were required to salute the United States flag upon pain of expulsion and possible criminal penalties against their parents. This symbolic gesture was an affront to the religious beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses. To sustain the compulsory flag salute, observed the Court, we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his [or her] own mind left it open to public authorities to compel him [or her] to utter what is not in his [or her] mind. Id. at 634, 63 S.Ct. at 1183. The Constitution precludes such a result: the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcend[ed] constitutional limitations on their power and invad[ed] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our constitution to reserve from all official control. Id. at 642, 63 S.Ct. at 1187 (emphasis added). The state has no power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any statement of belief. Id. at 634, 63 S.Ct. at 1183. Only one member of the Court preferred to reach this result by emphasizing the religious nature of the objections: Official compulsion to affirm what is contrary to one's religious beliefs is the antithesis of freedom of worship. Id. at 646, 63 S.Ct. at 1189 (Murphy, J., concurring). In a later free exercise case concerning a Sunday closing statute challenged by Orthodox Jews, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion), the Court carefully distinguished Barnette before upholding the regulation. It stressed that [c]ertain aspects of religious exercise cannot, in any way, be restricted or burdened by either federal or state legislation.... The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute. Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. at 603, 81 S.Ct. at 1146 (emphasis added). A compulsory flag salute requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. Id. at 605-06, 81 S.Ct. at 1147 (quoting Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. at 633, 63 S.Ct. at 1183) (emphasis added in Braunfeld ). In contrast to the flag salute cases, however, the Braunfeld statute did not outlaw the holding of any religious belief or opinion, nor [did] it force anyone to embrace any religious belief or to say or believe anything in conflict with his [or her] religious tenets. Id. at 603, 81 S.Ct. at 1146; accord, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-55, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2486-89, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (the First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself [or herself] in accordance with the dictates of his [or her] own conscience); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1535, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (under the Religion Clauses beliefs are absolutely free from the state's control); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462, 91 S.Ct. 828, 842, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971) (the Free Exercise Clause bars `governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such' ... or interference with the dissemination of religious ideas (emphasis in original; citations omitted)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1793, 10 L.Ed. 2d 965 (1963) (The door of the First Amendment stands tightly closed against any government regulation of religious beliefs as such.... Government may neither compel affirmance of a repugnant belief... nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold views abhorrent to the authorities (emphasis in original; citations omitted)). Similarly, in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961), the Court held that a statute requiring a declaration of belief in God as a test for public office violated the Free Exercise Clause. The state regulation unconstitutionally invade[d] the appellant's freedom of religion and therefore [could not] be enforced against him. Id. at 496, 81 S.Ct. at 1684. The Court relied on broader free speech principles, as it had in Barnette, when it upheld the challenge of Jehovah's Witnesses whose religion forbade them from compliance with a governmentally compelled exhibition of vehicle license plates bearing the state motto Live Free or Die. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). The question there was whether the State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message. Id. at 713, 97 S.Ct. at 1434. The answer was no. Speech may no more be officially prescribed than it may be proscribed. The right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. Id. at 714, 97 S.Ct. at 1435. The Wooley Court explained that freedom from compelled expression is an essential element of a society dedicated to free speech. A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of `individual freedom of mind.' Id. at 714, 97 S.Ct. at 1435 (citing Barnette ). A state measure forcing one to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to a repugnant point of view invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which the First Amendment reserves from all official control. Id. at 715, 97 S.Ct. at 1435. The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the right against compelled expression came in a free speech case without religious overtones. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 903, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (plurality opinion). A public utility company was ordered by the California Public Utilities Commission to include in its billing envelopes the speech of a third party with whom the utility disagreed. The state regulation in Pacific Gas & Electric did not require the utility to voice any endorsement, but merely to serve as a vehicle for the views of a ratepayers' organization. Id. at 906-07, 911 n. 11. Furthermore, the utility's objections were not religiously based, so that only the Free Speech Clause and not the Free Exercise Clause was implicated. Id. at 908-10. Finally, the utility engaged primarily in commercial speech relating to its business interests, although its newsletter also carried recipes, stories about wildlife conservation and other matters of public concern. Id. at 907-08. Despite these limitations, the Court upheld the utility's objection to the challenged regulation. The degree of intrusion upon the utility's First Amendment rights was doubtless considerably less than Judge Braman's construction of the Human Rights Act would impose upon Georgetown. In contrast to a heavily regulated public utility, Georgetown's stock-in-trade is in ideas; as a private, nonprofit, religiously affiliated educational institution seeking to implement its own vision of education, it is entitled to favor particular views on moral, ethical, philosophical, political and social issues. For corporations as for individuals, wrote the Pacific Gas & Electric plurality, the choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say, id. at 912 (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 2840, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974)), because [c]orporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the `discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster, id. at 907 (quoting First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1419, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978)). The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas.... There is necessarily ... a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect. Id. at 909 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 2230, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985) (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 778, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968) (emphasis in original)). The Public Utilities Commission therefore could not compel the public utility to assist in disseminating the speaker's message or to associate with speech with which [the public utility] may disagree. Id. at 911. [19] In Pacific Gas & Electric the Supreme Court clarified the line between compelled expression and mere accommodation of another's speech. It distinguished Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980), in which the owner of a shopping center set up as a public forum was required by state law to admit pamphleteers. Notably absent from Prune Yard,  said the Court, was any concern that access to this area might affect the shopping center owner's own right to speak: the owner did not even allege that he objected to the content of the pamphlets; nor was the right of access content-based. Prune Yard thus does not undercut the proposition that forced associations that burden protected speech are impermissible. Pacific Gas & Electric, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 910. In sharp contrast to the threatened endorsement here, the Prune Yard Court had stressed the unlikelihood that the pamphleteers' views would be identified with those of the shopping center owner and also emphasized that no specific message was being dictated by the government in that case. 447 U.S. at 74, 100 S.Ct. at 2037. But Georgetown's scheme of University Recognition cannot be analogized to a public forum, nor can its campus be equated with a business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please. Id. Far from Prune Yard 's required accommodation of another's speech, this case raises the specter of compelled expression in violation of the First Amendment. A grant of University Recognition by Georgetown includes an endorsement of student groups it considers broadly compatible with Roman Catholic doctrine. To that extent, University Recognition is speech. Government compulsion to grant University Recognition would threaten both the free speech and free exercise guarantees of the First Amendment. Although a compelling state interest may justify regulation of religiously motivated conduct, nothing can penetrate the constitutional shield protecting against official coercion to renounce a religious belief or to endorse a principle opposed to that belief. The very purpose of a Bill of Rights is to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majority and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. at 638, 63 S.Ct. at 1185. Georgetown's right to express opinions based on Roman Catholic teachings includes the right to do so by way of granting University Recognition to groups it regards as consonant with that belief system. Individuals will not always agree with Georgetown's choices as to what groups are deserving of its approval, but its right to freely express its views is nonetheless protected by the First Amendment. Freedom of expression is a right to which we all lay equal claim, irrespective of the content of our message. This is easily illustrated. Suppose that the Gay University of America (GUA) is established as a private educational institution. Part of its mission is to win understanding and acceptance of gay and bisexual persons in an intolerant society. Although open to everyone, regardless of sexual orientation, GUA does expect its faculty, staff and students to maintain a sympathetic attitude towards gay practices and the philosophies that support them. GUA has, as the trial court finds, a system of University Recognition through which it expresses its approval or tolerance of various student groups desiring that status. But the GUA administration refuses to grant University Recognition to the Roman Catholic Sexual Ethics Association (RCSEA). In that situation, the Human Rights Act's ban on discrimination based on religion could not avail the Catholic student group, for the simple reason that the statute does not require GUA to give expressions of approval or tolerance. Insincere statements of opinion are not what the Human Rights Act requires. On the other hand, the statute would require equal distribution of any attendant tangible benefits if GUA's denial of these was based on the religion of RCSEA members. Georgetown's protection against compelled expression is no more and no less. The trial court's construction of the Human Rights Act would transform the statute into a violation of the First Amendment. It would compel Georgetown to endorse the student groups despite the Supreme Court's warning that a religious actor may not be forced to say ... anything in conflict with [its] religious tenets. Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. at 603, 81 S.Ct. at 1146. This construction of the Human Rights Act is required neither by its language nor by its purpose of ensuring equal treatment  treatment concretely measured by access to facilities and services, not by the educational institution's expressed approval of the purposes and activities of recipient student groups. [20] Georgetown's obligation under the statute is not to express a particular point of view. It is to make tangible benefits available to its students without regard to their sexual orientation. The Human Rights Act does not require Georgetown to grant University Recognition and its accompanying intangible endorsement to the student groups.
Although the student groups were not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that Georgetown's denial of University Recognition  including an endorsement  violated the Human Rights Act, the statute does require Georgetown to equally distribute, without regard to sexual orientation, the tangible benefits contained in the same package. If discrimination appears from the record, this court may sustain the statutory ruling on a ground different from that adopted by the trial court. Max Holtzman, Inc. v. K & T Co., 375 A.2d 510, 513 n. 6 (D.C.1977); see also Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. District of Columbia, 316 A.2d 871, 875 (D.C. 1974); Wells v. Wynn, 311 A.2d 829, 829 n. 2 (D.C.1973). Our review of the record reveals no genuine dispute that the tangible benefits were denied on the basis of sexual orientation. The Human Rights Act was violated to that extent. [21] The Human Rights Act cannot depend for its enforcement on a regulated actor's purely subjective, albeit sincere, evaluation of its own motivations. Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize its existence.... Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196, 29 S.Ct. 260, 265, 53 L.Ed. 465 (1909). It is particularly difficult to recognize one's own acts as discriminatory. Apart from organizations that failed to meet purely technical requirements such as a minimum membership, the record shows that Georgetown never denied University Recognition to a student group that was not mainly composed of persons with a homosexual orientation. Where, as here, those possessing characteristics identified by the legislature as irrelevant to individual merit are treated less favorably than others, the Human Rights Act imposes a burden upon the regulated actor to demonstrate that the irrelevant characteristic played no part in its decision. Georgetown failed to present facts that could show it was uninfluenced by sexual orientation in denying the tangible benefits. One nondiscriminatory reason asserted by Georgetown for its denial of the tangible benefits contained in University Recognition was that it could not give its accompanying endorsement to the student groups without violating its religious principles. But as the Human Rights Act, properly construed, requires no direct, intangible endorsement, Georgetown cannot avoid a finding of discrimination on that ground. The remaining nondiscriminatory reasons asserted by Georgetown may be summarized as follows: the purposes and activities of the student groups fell outside the boundaries set by Recognition Criteria, rendering them ineligible for the tangible benefits they sought and not otherwise qualified within the meaning of the statute, D.C. Code § 1-2520 (1987); and, in any event, the denial of tangible benefits was based on the purposes and activities of the student groups, not on the homosexual status of their members, so that the sexual orientation of the students involved played no part in the decisionmaking process, id. In this case, the nondiscriminatory reasons asserted by Georgetown have the effect of fusing together what would normally be two separate inquiries  are the student groups otherwise qualified for the tangible benefits they seek, and, if so, did Georgetown deny those tangible benefits due to the sexual orientation of their members? Here, because the answer to both of those distinct questions is determined by objective reference to the purposes and activities of the student groups, what are normally two separate inquiries collapse into one: did the homosexual orientation of the group members cause them to be treated differently from other applicants? We are not bound by Georgetown's subjective perception of the purposes and activities to which it objected. Georgetown must view the purposes and activities of a student group in a way which is free from impermissible reliance upon factors unrelated to individual merit. Accordingly, if the homosexual status of group members entered into Georgetown's assessment of the purposes and activities of the student groups, albeit unconsciously, the denial of tangible benefits was itself based on sexual orientation. Put differently, it would be irrelevant that Georgetown saw itself as doing nothing more than applying neutral guidelines established by Recognition Criteria if sexual orientation had in fact influenced how those standards were applied. In denying GPGU's application for University Recognition Georgetown adverted to that group's expressed purpose (one of four) to provide a forum for the development of responsible sexual ethics consonant with one's personal beliefs. See GPGU Constitution ( quoted supra note 5). That purpose is at odds with Roman Catholic teachings. But GRC's constitution contained no comparable statement; Georgetown's stated objection was to GRC's much broader intention to [p]rovide lesbians and gay men entering the Law Center with information about Washington's gay community, including educational, cultural, religious, social and medical services. See GRC Constitution ( quoted supra note 6). Because GRC's purposes include an asexual commitment to serving the broad range of needs experienced by homosexual students, but no statement as to the propriety of homosexual conduct, Georgetown's objection to that organization must to some extent have been prompted by the sexual orientation of its members. That Georgetown's treatment of the gay student groups was not exclusively influenced by a specific objection to purposes and activities inconsistent with Roman Catholic dogma was further evidenced by Debbie Gottfried, the University's Director of Student Activities. In clarifying GPGU's status after it had obtained Student Body Endorsement, but had failed to obtain University Recognition, Gottfried wrote that the University would not change its position on what it feels would be interpreted as endorsement and official support of the full range of issues associated with this cause.  Letter from D. Gottfried to GPGU (Jan. 18, 1980) (emphasis added). At no time has Georgetown defined what it meant by the full range of issues associated with the gay student groups, despite its insistence that Roman Catholic doctrine favors the provision of equal civil and political rights to homosexually oriented persons and that its religious objection was directed only to the promotion of homosexual conduct. Gottfried's statement was later repeated by Dean Schuerman, who wrote that the University would not lend its endorsement, support or approval to the positions taken by the gay movement on a full range of issues  or the major activities and issues which, by definition, are associated with a gay organization.  Letter from Dean W. Schuerman to GPGU (Feb. 21, 1980) (emphasis added). Similarly, when Dean McCarthy turned down GRC's application at the Law Center, he wrote that the University would not lend its official subsidy and support to a gay law student organization because that would be interpreted by many as endorsement of the positions taken by the gay movement on a full range of issues.  Letter from Dean D. McCarthy, Jr., to GRC (Feb. 26, 1980) (emphasis added). Georgetown thus ascribed to the student groups not only purposes and activities which they may have had, but also a host of others automatically assumed to be a necessary attribute of their homosexual orientation. Other conclusive evidence that Georgetown took homosexual orientation into account in its recognition procedures is supplied by the fact that on the same day as he denied University Recognition to GRC at the Law Center, President Healy wrote an essentially identical letter to the Chancellor of the Medical Center, despite the fact that no homosexually oriented students there had ever applied for such status. President Healy wrote: I am sure that you are aware that the Gay Students on the Main Campus have appealed Father Freeze's decision to me. That appeal has recently been denied.... Since you may be presented with a similar situation at the Medical Center, I want to point out that this decision applies equally to the Medical Center. Letter from President T. Healy, S.J., to Chancellor M. McNulty (May 8, 1980). This action amounted to an adverse decision without any consideration on the merits, in light of criteria neutral to sexual orientation, of the purposes and activities of whatever group might be formed sometime in the future. It is explicable only if Georgetown considered the predominantly homosexual orientation of some future student group at the Medical Center, and not just its specific purposes and activities, to be a factor of intrinsic relevance to a grant of University Recognition. That a predominantly homosexual orientation would be fatal to a bid for tangible benefits at the Medical Center establishes beyond any doubt that Georgetown was not oblivious to sexual orientation in its application of Recognition Criteria. It is apparent from this correspondence, all of which was before Judge Braman when he granted summary judgment on the discrimination issue, that Georgetown's denial of tangible benefits was not closely tied to specific purposes and activities of the student groups promoting the homosexual conduct condemned by Roman Catholic doctrine. The conclusion is inescapable that the predominantly gay composition of the student groups played at least some role in their treatment by Georgetown. By objecting to the student groups' assumed connection, by definition, to a full range of issues associated with the gay movement, rather than to specific purposes and activities inconsistent with its Roman Catholic tradition, Georgetown engaged in the kind of stereotyping unrelated to individual merit that is forbidden by the Human Rights Act. In short, the record reveals no genuine doubt that Georgetown's asserted nondiscriminatory basis for its action was in fact tainted by preconceptions about gay persons. Georgetown did not apply Recognition Criteria on an equal basis to all groups without regard to the sexual orientation of their members. Judge Braman's finding that Georgetown discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation is further supported by his express reliance on another provision of the Human Rights Act. The effects clause provides that [a]ny practice which has the effect or consequence of violating any of the provisions of this chapter shall be deemed to be an unlawful discriminatory practice. D.C. Code § 1-2532 (1987). Under that section, despite the absence of any intention to discriminate, practices are unlawful if they bear disproportionately on a protected class and are not independently justified for some nondiscriminatory reason. As the legislative history demonstrates, the Council imported into the Human Rights Act, by way of the effects clause, the concept of disparate impact discrimination developed by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). In Griggs, decided shortly before the Human Rights Act was passed in its original form as a municipal regulation, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 as prohibiting not only intentional discrimination, but also practices which prejudice protected groups and are not supported by some independent, nondiscriminatory justification. Griggs was expressly relied upon by the drafters of the Human Rights Act when the original regulation was adopted. Dr. Marjorie Parker, chairwoman of one of the committees that proposed the law to the pre-Home Rule City Council, explained to Council members that because the District regulation parallels the Civil Rights Act, the public could look to the federal model to answer many of their questions concerning the administration and enforcement of the Human Rights Act. District of Columbia City Council, Committee Report on Title 34, The Human Rights Law, 1 (Oct. 15, 1973) (available in the District Building) (hereinafter Parker Report II); see also District of Columbia City Council, Committee Report on Title 34, The Human Rights Law, 2 (Aug. 7, 1973) (available in the District Building) (hereinafter Parker Report I). The Parker Report II specifically cited Griggs and noted that it upheld the applicability of the Civil Rights Act in cases of unintentional discrimination. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). During the passage of the bill, the Council retained the effects clause despite opposition from local employers. A submission from the Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade and the C & P Telephone Company resulted in the preparation of a memo distributed to Council members reaffirming the Parker Report's interpretation: The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power held that unintentional discrimination is just as liable under the Civil Rights Act as intentional discrimination. District of Columbia City Council, Memorandum on Proposed Draft Clarifications: Title 34, at 5 (Oct. 11, 1973) (available in the District Building) (emphasis in original). The memo added that [w]hile unintentional discrimination would be unlawful [under the Human Rights Act], a finding of such would probably prevent any judgment of damages against the perpetrator. Id. The Council made only inconsequential changes to the wording of the effects clause as originally proposed. A Human Rights Act violation was established with regard to Georgetown's denial of the tangible benefits. The evidence before Judge Braman may not permit the conclusion that Georgetown consciously denied benefits due to the sexual orientation of the student groups involved. It is nonetheless evident that the University allowed the homosexual orientation of the individuals involved  not just the purposes and activities of their student organizations  to creep into its decisionmaking. By failing to confine its objections to purposes and activities which it found offensive for reasons independent of the sexual orientation of the students, Georgetown discriminated. The position that a gay organization is by definition associated with a full range of issues reveals that sexual orientation was a factor in Georgetown's denial of tangible benefits. That statement established an intentional violation. D.C. Code § 1-2520 (1987); and, in any event, under the effects clause the Human Rights Act also prohibits unintentional discrimination, id. § 1-2532. Finally, none of the Human Rights Act's narrowly drawn exceptions avails Georgetown here. [22] The Human Rights Act having been violated with respect to the tangible benefits, we proceed to Georgetown's free exercise defense.