Opinion ID: 2830739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kentucky Whistleblower Act Claim

Text: Cope argues that the district court erred in dismissing his whistleblower claim because he adequately pleaded facts in support of his claim that his 2009 IRS disclosure and subsequent lawsuit and GADD’s 2013 actions were linked. To state a claim under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act, Cope must plausibly allege four elements: (1) the employer is an officer of the state; (2) the employee is employed by the state; (3) the employee made or attempted to make a good faith report or disclosure of a suspected violation of state or local law to an appropriate body or -6- No. 15-5104, Cope v. Gateway Area Dev. Dist., Inc. authority; and (4) the employer took action or threatened to take action to discourage the employee from making such a disclosure or to punish the employee for making such a disclosure. Davidson v. Ky. Dep’t of Military Affairs, 152 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); see also Ky. Rev. Stat. § 61.102(1). The district court determined that Cope failed to allege facts plausibly supporting the fourth element of causation because Cope’s only allegation regarding causation was that he was “‘subjected to additional retaliatory acts, up to and including termination,’ after his first whistleblower action was concluded,” which was “not a factual allegation, but, rather, a conclusory assertion.” PID 317. However, at the very least, the timeline of events Cope sets forth in his pleadings, and which is detailed in the letters attached as exhibits,2 suggests that it is plausible that his employment was terminated as a result of his disclosure and subsequent litigation. DAIL first began investigating Cope in 2009, after his initial disclosure to the IRS. Then, DAIL began its audit of GADD, and of Cope, just weeks after the jury ruled in his favor. Finally, Anderson’s letter explaining that DAIL would cease funding for Cope was dated the day after the Kentucky trial court entered a judgment for more than $65,000 in Cope’s favor. Although the audit claimed to find systemic issues within the development districts, Cope was the only employee singled out during the audit. The district court dismissed the claim on the pleadings. The extent of GADD’s involvement in the investigation, DAIL’s interest in the IRS’s treatment of Cope’s employment status as the funder, and the validity of the investigation’s conclusions regarding Cope’s job 2 When a document attached to a complaint “is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff’s claims,” it may be considered part of the pleadings and will not convert a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999). -7- No. 15-5104, Cope v. Gateway Area Dev. Dist., Inc. performance are all issues properly addressed in a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment focused on whether there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact. There may be other problems with Cope’s whistleblower claim, particularly in light of the state-court appellate ruling. The district court is free to address any such issues on remand, but based on the pleadings and attached exhibits alone, we conclude that the complaint adequately alleges facts supporting the requisite causation and we cannot say that Cope can prove no set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Cope’s whistleblower claim.