Opinion ID: 1650180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Were the Department's Findings Adequate for Purposes of Judicial Review and Did the Department in Making Its Findings Act Within Its Lawful Authority?

Text: [4] The obligation upon the Department to make findings of facts is imposed by sec. 102.18(1) (b), Stats. 1977, which provides: 102.18. Findings, orders and awards. (1) . . . (b) After final hearing the department shall make and file its findings upon the ultimate facts involved in the controversy, and its order, which shall state its determination as to the rights of the parties. Pending the final determination of any controversy before it, the department may in its discretion after any hearing make interlocutory findings, orders and awards which may be enforced in the same manner as final awards. The statute has been consistently interpreted to require only that the Department make findings of ultimate facts as distinguished from evidentiary facts. Universal Foundry Co. v. ILHR Dept., 82 Wis.2d 479, 483, 263 N.W.2d 172 (1978); Stommel v. Industrial Comm., 15 Wis.2d 368, 372, 112 N.W.2d 904 (1962). [5] An ultimate fact, as that term used in worker's compensation cases in Wisconsin, is one upon which the plaintiff's right of recovery necessarily depends. Gerue v. Industrial Comm., 205 Wis. 68, 70, 236 N.W. 528 (1931). The most important reason for requiring adequate administrative findings is in order to facilitate judicial review. Universal Foundry Co. v. ILHR Dept., 82 Wis.2d at 487. Mr. Goranson argues that the findings and order of the Department demonstrate that his testimony regarding the events leading up to his injury was not accepted. Therefore, it is his contention that the Department was required to explain what exactly constituted the cause solely personal to Mr. Goranson. In order to make this determination, the Department would have to determine what in fact happened in the room. Only by doing so, it is asserted, can it be determined whether the injuries did or did not arise out of employment. This court has reviewed decisions by the Department in previous compensation cases where the circumstances leading up to the accident were unknown or incapable of ascertainment. In Armstrong v. Industrial Comm., 254 Wis. 174, 35 N.W.2d 212 (1948), a travelling salesman was last seen alive when he left a customer and inquired as to the best way to get to a certain location where a relative lived. Nothing was known of his whereabouts until his body was located in a river. He apparently died from an accidental drowning. Depending upon the time of death, which was unknown, he could have been either within or without the course of his employment. This Court upheld the commission's denial of compensation, asserting that even given the presumption in the travelling salesman provision of the statute, the commission had sufficient evidence before it to support its denial of compensation. In commenting upon the evidence it should be kept clearly in mind that the commission was not seeking a complete explanation of decedent's death. Had this been the objective, it is probably true that such an explanation could only be arrived at by guess. The issue is whether there is . . . evidence that at the time of his death . . . [the employee] had deviated from his employment. . . . See also, Hansen v. Industrial Comm., 258 Wis. 623, 46 N.W.2d 754 (1951). Mr. Goranson was the only eyewitness to the entire course of events leading up to his injury. It is apparant that the examiners and the Department discounted his testimony. Absent this testimony, there was very little in the record upon which to predicate a complete explanation of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Goranson's fall. It would have been impossible for the Department to have come up with an accurate factual account of the accident. [6] But this detail is not required. The Department need not make findings as to all of the events occurring prior to the injury. It was sufficient in this case, for purposes of judicial review, for the Department to determine that the applicant broke the window, crawled out, and jumped. The further finding that the injury did not arise out of employment but arose from a cause solely personal to the applicant, is adequate for judicial review. See, generally, Valadzic v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 92 Wis.2d 583, 590, 286 N.W.2d 540 (1979); Reich v. ILHR Dept., 40 Wis.2d 244, 262, 161 N.W.2d 878 (1968). The second question raised concerning the adequacy of the Department's findings is whether the findings made are inconsistent and contrary to law. [7] The Department's findings are fully consistent with the statutory requirements in the worker's compensation law. Sec. 102.03(1), Stats. 1975, [2] enumerates the conditions required for employer liability, and provides a special presumption in favor of travelling employees. In order for liability to accrue, it is necessary both that the employee at the time of the accident be performing services growing out of and incidental to his employment and that the accident causing injury must arise out of his employment. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., 5 Wis.2d 247, 250, 92 N.W.2d 824 (1958). The phrase arising out of refers to the causal origin of the injury and the course of employment phrase refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident in relation to the employment. A. Larson, 1 The Law Of Workmen's Compensation, § 6.10 (1978). [8, 9] The travelling employee statute does not modify these two requirements, it merely provides the employee with a statutory presumption in favor of both of these requirements. [3] It has been noted that even in those cases where the travelling employee presumption applies, the accident or disease must arise out of a hazard of such service. . . . Nielsen v. Industrial Comm., 14 Wis.2d 112, 118, 109 N.W.2d 483 (1961) (emphasis added). The finding that Mr. Goranson was performing services growing out of and incidental to his employment, without deviation for a private or personal purpose, is fully consistent with the finding that the applicant's injury did not arise out of a hazard of his employment.