Opinion ID: 2537581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting certain uncharged misconduct evidence?

Text: [¶ 9] [B]ecause uncharged misconduct evidence carries an inherent danger for prejudice, we have ... adopted a mandatory procedure for testing its admissibility: (1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial court must instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. Vigil [ v. State ], 926 P.2d [351], 357 [(Wyo.1996)] (quoting United States v. Herndon, 982 F.2d 1411, 1414 (10th Cir.1992))[, modified in part by Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, 42 P.3d 483 (Wyo.2002)]. We do not apply this test on appeal; rather, it is intended to be conducted by the trial court. Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Wyo.1997). Our role is to determine whether admission of the evidence was error. Id. ; Spencer v. State, 925 P.2d 994, 997 (Wyo.1996). Generally, the standard for review of rulings under W.R.E. 404(b) is abuse of discretion. Johnson v. State, 936 P.2d 458, 462 (Wyo.1997) (quoting Sturgis v. State, 932 P.2d 199, 201 (Wyo.1997)). Wease, 2007 WY 176, ¶ 51, 170 P.3d at 110 (quoting Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 (Wyo.2002)). [¶ 10] Just prior to the second trial, the State filed a Notice of State's Intent to Introduce 404(b) Evidence. [1] Listed in the notice were five allegations of uncharged misconduct: (1) that the appellant began to abuse the victim when she was in the second grade; (2) that the abuse included fellatio; (3) that the appellant purchased a dildo for the victim for her birthday in 2004 and used it on her in the car after covering the car's windows; (4) that the only time period the victim recalled the appellant did not sexually abuse her was when the family was in Ohio for a week; and (5) that the appellant entered the bedroom the victim shared with her sister, pulled down his pajamas and exposed his penis to them, told them they could touch it or play with it, and told them the victim could be present if her sister wanted to start doing things with him that the victim had been doing. In its Notice, the State presented a detailed analysis of the proffered evidence under Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo.2002) and similar cases. When the motion was heard after voir dire, the State added a sixth allegation, that being that the appellant had showed the victim pornographic movies and books. [¶ 11] The appellant objected to admission of the uncharged misconduct evidence on several grounds. First, he contended that any act that allegedly occurred outside of the time period charged in the Information was not relevant. Second, he argued that the late filing and service of the Notice provided inadequate time for him to investigate and respond. Third, he noted that some of the allegations had not previously been made. And fourth, he complained that the allegations were vague and unspecific in regard to time and place. The State countered primarily with two arguments: one, that some of the testimony was relevant because it refuted contentions the appellant had made in the first trial; and two, that some of the evidence, rather than being uncharged misconduct evidence, was in the nature of an admission by a party opponent, admissible under W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A). [2] [¶ 12] The district court concluded that the uncharged misconduct evidence was relevant and admissible for a proper purpose, because it tended to show the relationship between the appellant and the victim, which is an issue in charges of second-degree sexual assault. To be guilty of the crimes charged, the appellant must have been in a position of authority over the victim, and he must have used that position of authority to cause the victim to submit. The district court then also concluded that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice. In reaching that conclusion, the district court emphasized the fact that the uncharged acts were no more reprehensible than the charged acts, and the fact that the victim of the uncharged acts, being the same person as the victim in the charged acts, was no more sympathetic.